terrorism and the fate of dictators the authors study the influence of domestic political dissent and violence on incumbent dictators and their regimes they argue that elite with an interest in preserving the regime hold dictators accountable when there is a significant increase in terrorism to pinpoint the accountability of dictators to elite who are strongly invested in the current regime the authors make a novel theoretical distinction between reshuffling coups that change the leader but leave the regime intact and regime change coups that completely change the set of elites atop the regime using a new data set that distinguishes between these two coup types the authors provide robust evidence that terrorism is a consistent predictor of reshuffling coups whereas forms of dissent that require broader public participation and support such as protests and insurgencies are associated with regime change coup attempts this article is the first to show that incumbent dictators are held accountable for terrorist campaigns that occur on their watch

economic origins of electoral support for authoritarian successors a cross national analysis of economic voting in new democracies this study explores how economic performance prior to democratic transitions affects the fate of successors to authoritarian rulers in new democracies it investigates 70 founding election outcomes finding that successful economic performance under an authoritarian regime increases the vote share of successors it also finds that the past economic performance of authoritarian rulers decreases the likelihood of government alternation to democratic oppositions interim governments that initiate democratic transition however are neither blamed nor rewarded for economic conditions during transition periods this study concludes that electorates are not myopic and that economic voting is not a knee jerk reaction to short term economic performance in new democracies

the elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns stable democratic regimes depend heavily on the consensual unity of national elites so long as elites remain disunified political regimes are unstable a condition which makes democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns merely temporary oscillations in the forms unstable regimes take disunity appears to be the generic condition of national elites and disunity strongly tends to persist regardless of socioeconomic development and other changes in mass populations the consensually unified elites that are necessary to stable democracies are created in only a few ways two of the most important of which involve distinctive elite transformations after elaborating this argument we examine the relationship between elites and regimes in western nation states since they began to consolidate after 1500 we show that our approach makes good sense of the western political record that it does much to clarify prospects for stable democracies in developing societies today and that it makes the increasingly elite centered analysis of democratic transitions and breakdowns more systematic

the era of electoral authoritarianism in recent years scholarly attention has shifted from the study of democratization to the phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism in these regimes regular elections are held for national legislatures and chief executives yet they fail to live up to democratic standards of freedom and fairness a range of new research has investigated these regimes and especially the capacity of elections to either dislodge or reinvigorate authoritarian incumbents this article reviews some of the current work on electoral authoritarianism and attempts to find ways to achieve synthesis and better theoretical development it notes the need for greater conceptual consensus attention to context and better evaluation of what electoral competiveness means under authoritarian conditions it argues that the next stage for research should be smaller and contextual comparison that can allow for greater attention to concepts while allowing for strong midrange theory

transfer pricing in a dynamic marketing operations interface abstract a transfer price mechanism is proposed to coordinate the strategies of the marketing and operations functional areas operating in a dynamic interface environment in a decentralized firm marketing and operations are strategic decision makers in a differential game in which marketing has price and advertising and operations has production as control variables and advertising goodwill and production backlog are state variables a constant transfer price is entered into the objective functionals for marketing and operations and subgame perfect feedback strategies are derived for price advertising and production as functions of the state variables the feedback strategies allow a solution for the dynamic system involving goodwill and backlog and the total payoff to the firm the sum of the payoffs to marketing and operations is determined as a function of the transfer price finally for certain parameter conditions an interior maximum of the payoff function is achieved and the optimal transfer price is identified

a framework of economic analysis for tapered technology manufacturing alliances abstract globalization of production has altered the configuration of supply chains in many industries besides outsourcing joint ventures and strategic alliances are increasingly established to create competitive production organizations this paper addresses a case of tapered technology manufacturing alliance between a process technology firm with captive manufacturing capability and an efficient manufacturing firm in an asset heavy industry a framework of economic analysis is first developed for fusing the factors of technology licensing manufacturing efficiency risk sharing and demand uncertainty analysis methods of capacity economics are next described for participation analysis capacity allocation and contract term tradeoffs finally we demonstrate the utility of the methods by numerical examples with stylized industry data and by an analysis of alliance stability when facing potential new entrants

geographic diffusion and the transformation of the postcommunist world since the collapse of communism the states of postcommunist europe and asia have defined for themselves and have had defined for them two primary tasks the construction of viable market economies and the establishment of working institutions of representative democracy the variation in political and economic outcomes in the postcommunist space makes it without question the most diverse region in the world what explains the variation all of the big winners of postcommunism share the trait of being geographically close to the former border of the noncommunist world even controlling for cultural differences historical legacies and paths of extrication the spatial effect remains consistent and strong across the universe of postcommunist cases this suggests the spatially dependent nature of the diffusion of norms resources and institutions that are necessary to the construction of political democracies and market economies in the postcommunist era the authors develop and adduce evidence for the spatial dependence hypothesis test it against rival hypotheses and illustrate the relationships at work through three theoretically important case studies

surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains a biform game analysis abstract in this paper we use a biform game approach for analyzing the impact of surplus division in supply chains on investment incentives in the first stage of the game firms decide non cooperatively on investments in the second stage the surplus is shared according to the shapley value we find that all firms have inefficiently low investment incentives which however depend on their position in the supply chain cross subsidies for investment costs can mitigate but not eliminate the underinvestment problem vertical integration between at least some firms yields efficient investments but may nevertheless reduce the aggregated payoff of the firms we show how the size of our effects depends on the structure of the supply chain and the efficiency of the investment technology various extensions demonstrate that our results are qualitatively robust

strategic transfer pricing most research into cost systems has focused on their motivational implications this paper takes a different approach by developing a model where two oligopolistic firms strategically select their cost based transfer prices duopoly models frequently assume that firms game on their choice of prices product prices however are ultimately based on the firms transfer prices that communicate manufacturing costs to marketing departments it is for this reason that transfer prices will have a strategic component to them we derive implications for cost system choice and transfer pricing including showing that firms may cross subsidize their products a result consistent with the empirical evidence

regime cycles democracy autocracy and revolution in post soviet eurasia research on regime change has often wound up chasing events in the post soviet world because it has frequently assumed that regime change if not simple instability implies a trajectory toward a regime type endpoint like democracy or autocracy a supplemental approach recognizes that regime change can be cyclic not just progressive regressive or random in fact regime cycles are much of what we see in the postcommunist world where some states have oscillated from autocracy toward greater democracy then back toward more autocracy and with recent colored revolutions toward greater democracy again an institutional logic of elite collective action focusing on the effects of patronalpresidentialism is shown to be useful in understanding such cyclic dynamics explaining why revolutions occurred between 2003 and 2005 in ukraine georgia and kyrgyzstan but not in countries like russia azerbaijan and uzbekistan

cost based transfer pricing under r d risk aversion in an integrated supply chain abstract this paper examines the economic role of transfer pricing for a vertically integrated supply chain when a risk averse production division manager faces uncertainty on the outcomes from r d investment in particular we compare two representative cost based transfer pricing methods full cost and variable cost pricing we construct an economic model based on the assumption that r d investment reduces the expected fixed costs of a production factor as well as the variable production costs we show that a firm s profit under full cost transfer pricing is greater than that under variable cost transfer pricing under certainty contrary to this benchmark result variable cost pricing becomes more profitable than full cost pricing when the risk averse manager bears relatively high risk

a game theoretic approach to transfer pricing in a vertically integrated supply chain we study the problem of setting transfer prices in a vertically integrated supply chain in which the divisions share technology and transactions costs we develop a cooperative game that provides transfer prices for the intermediate products in the supply chain this model is applied both when the market prices for these products are known and also when their valuations differ we provide a solution that is fair and acceptable to all divisions in the perfect information case the shapley value generates the transfer prices while in the asymmetric case we obtain transfer prices from the solution to a linear program

authoritarian state building and the sources of regime competitiveness in the fourth wave the cases of belarus moldova russia and ukraine this article explores the sources of regime competitiveness in the post cold war era through a structured comparison of regime trajectories in belarus moldova russia and ukraine for the period 1992 2004 an examination of these cases suggests the need for a fundamental rethinking of the commonly held view of the transition process especially in countries that face relatively weak international democratizing pressures approaching these countries as unconsolidated autocracies rather than as simply emerging democracies draws attention to key sources of political competition that have largely been ignored in the literature on competitive regimes thus competitive politics in belarus moldova russia and ukraine were rooted less in robust civil societies strong democratic institutions or leadership than in the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control by preserving elite unity controlling elections and or using force against opponents such pluralism by default has been the outgrowth of the strength of anti incumbent national identity and incumbent weakness as defined by a lack of know how ineffective incumbent organization and or the weakness of certain dimensions of state power

clientelism and polarized voting empirical evidence one must take country specific institutional features into account when analyzing former communist countries transformation process to new political institutions we do so for post communist albania where the regional and cultural polarization that has existed for centuries has evolved to clientelism in the new democracy we show how clientelistic parties give rise to very particular voting patterns these reveal major differences across regions not only in party choice but also in voters responses to government policies these responses depend on the party in government and on the region concerned this is in sharp contrast with results obtained when applying the same model to a large number of more advanced democracies with similar electoral institutions a proper evaluation of democratization in albania thus requires looking beyond the formal institutions governing elections and taking clientelism and its effect on voter behavior into account

fair transfer price and inventory holding policies in two enterprise supply chains abstract a key issue in supply chain optimisation involving multiple enterprises is the determination of policies that optimise the performance of the supply chain as a whole while ensuring adequate rewards for each participant in this paper we present a mathematical programming formulation for fair optimised profit distribution between echelons in a general multi enterprise supply chain the proposed formulation is based on an approach applying the nash bargaining solution for finding optimal multi partner profit levels subject to given minimum echelon profit requirements the overall problem is first formulated as a mixed integer non linear programming minlp model a spatial and binary variable branch and bound algorithm is then applied to the above problem based on exact and approximate linearisations of the bilinear terms involved in the model while at each node of the search tree a mixed integer linear programming milp problem is solved the solution comprises inter firm transfer prices production and inventory levels flows of products between echelons and sales profiles the applicability of the proposed approach is demonstrated by a number of illustrative examples based on industrial processes

ownership organization and income inequality market transition in rural vietnam in transitional economies the scale of economic enterprise and the allocation of property rights shape social structures and influence income distribution in agrarian economies where labor intensive family enterprises dominate political officials income advantages decline rapidly relative to those of private entrepreneurs larger enterprises however provide greater income opportunities for officials especially when a government retains an ownership stake in the initial phases of reform this article replicates the findings from an earlier study of rural china using comparable survey data from vietnam we find that during the first two decades of rural market reform in vietnam and china the scale and ownership of firms differed radically small family enterprises dominated rural development in vietnam whereas china s development was dominated by larger firms initially established by rural governments consequently while cadre income advantages have kept pace with those of private entrepreneurs

gray market trade with product information service in global supply chains abstract this paper investigates the economic effects of a product information service when potential consumers who are segmented by their taste exist in gray markets specifically we construct an economic model that considers a multinational firm mnf who expands business to a country and chooses whether to provide information service regarding product characteristics if receiving the information consumers in a specific segment whose taste suits the characteristics have positive utility from consuming the product while those in other segments have no utility by contrast consumers in all segments have positive expected utility before consuming the product without information with these settings we demonstrate that there arises the equilibrium that the mnf provides no information service when gray market trade i e parallel trade is allowed in the country leading to lower consumer welfare than when it is prohibited a primary finding in the equilibrium is that such a situation arises especially when potential consumers are less segmented in this situation the regulator in the country should ban the parallel imports so as to enhance consumer welfare the result is counterintuitive and notable because one might intuitively infer that gray market trade is less desirable when customers are more minutely segmented and the product information service is thus more specific and necessary

modeling and design of global logistics systems a review of integrated strategic and tactical models and design algorithms the overall focus of this research is to demonstrate the savings potential generated by the integration of the design of strategic global supply chain networks with the determination of tactical production distribution allocations and transfer prices the logistics systems design problem is defined as follows given a set of potential suppliers potential manufacturing facilities and distribution centers with multiple possible configurations and customers with deterministic demands determine the configuration of the production distribution system and the transfer prices between various subsidiaries of the corporation such that seasonal customer demands and service requirements are met and the after tax profit of the corporation is maximized the after tax profit is the difference between the sales revenue minus the total system cost and taxes the total cost is defined as the sum of supply production transportation inventory and facility costs two models and their associated solution algorithms will be introduced the savings opportunities created by designing the system with a methodology that integrates strategic and tactical decisions rather than in a hierarchical fashion are demonstrated with two case studies the first model focuses on the setting of transfer prices in a global supply chain with the objective of maximizing the after tax profit of an international corporation the constraints mandated by the national taxing authorities create a bilinear programming formulation we will describe a very efficient heuristic iterative solution algorithm which alternates between the optimization of the transfer prices and the material flows performance and bounds for the heuristic algorithms will be discussed the second model focuses on the production and distribution allocation in a single country system when the customers have seasonal demands this model also needs to be solved as a subproblem in the heuristic solution of the global transfer price model the research develops an integrated design methodology based on primal decomposition methods for the mixed integer programming formulation the primal decomposition allows a natural split of the production and transportation decisions and the research identifies the necessary information flows between the subsystems the primal decomposition method also allows a very efficient solution algorithm for this general class of large mixed integer programming models data requirements and solution times will be discussed for a real life case study in the packaging industry 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

fair electricity transfer price and unit capacity selection for microgrids abstract microgrids are defined as an area of electricity distribution network that can operate autonomously from the rest of the network in order to achieve the best economic outcomes the participants in a microgrid can benefit from cooperation in microgrid design and operation in this paper a mathematical programming formulation is presented for fair optimised cost distribution amongst participants in a general microgrid the proposed formulation is based on the game theory nash bargaining solution approach for finding optimal multi partner cost levels subject to given upper bounds on the equivalent annual costs the microgrid planning problem concerning the fair electricity transfer price and unit capacity selection is first formulated as a mixed integer non linear programming model then a separable programming approach is applied to reform the resulting mixed integer non linear programming model to a mixed integer linear programming form the model is applied to a case study with a microgrid involving five participants

intrafirm trade arm s length transfer pricing rule and coordination failure abstract this paper demonstrates that uniform imposition of the arm s length principle on transfer pricing leads to coordination failure among countries in terms of economic welfare if the countries trade products in the form of intrafirm transactions by multinational firms mnfs to highlight this implication we first show that imposition of the arm s length principle on an mnf induces it to transfer a product among subordinate divisions at marginal cost i e the competitive price which is consistent with the purpose of the principle nonetheless if regulators in each country impose the principle on mnfs all of the following economic welfare measures decrease compared with the situation where the principle is not imposed 1 consumer welfare in each of the trading countries 2 profit of each mnf and thus 3 total world economic welfare this result indicates that it is possible that enforcement of the principle has no positive effect at all in the world because economic welfare of all economic agents deteriorates when the principle is imposed a numerical analysis demonstrates that this possibility arises in a broad range of circumstances even including the situation where a giant economic world power and a small underdeveloped country mutually trade products in these circumstances an agreement among trading countries that no country imposes the arm s length principle may encourage pareto improvement of the world economy

toward an economic theory of leadership leading by example this paper explores leadership within organizations leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary rather than coerced activity of the followers this paper considers how a leader induces rational agents to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead them copyright 1998 by american economic association

transfer pricing and ownership structure we study the performance of jointly owned production units where upstream firms sell inputs to a downstream final market producer it is found that compared to integrated firms co ownership leads to overinvoicing of input prices transfer prices resulting in lower aggregate profits tax and tariff policy may lessen the organizational inefficiencies of jointly owned firms the analysis suggests that firms must have other reasons for forming jointly owned production units than those guided by production efficiency and benefits from delegation of decision making jel classification f23 l23

the fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world the transition from communism in europe and the former soviet union has only sometimes produced a transition to democracy since the crumbling of the berlin wall in 1989 and the collapse of the soviet union in 1991 most of the twenty eight new states have abandoned communism but only nine of these have entered the ranks of liberal democracies the remaining majority of new postcommunist states are various shades of dictatorships or unconsolidated transitional regimes this article seeks to explain why some states abandoned communism for democracy while others turned to authoritarian rule in endorsing actorcentric approaches that have dominated analyses of the third wave of democratization this argument nonetheless offers an alternative set of causal paths from ancien regime to new regime that can account for both democracy and dictatorship as outcomes situations of unequal distributions of power produced the quickest and most stable transitions from communist rule in countries with asymmetrical balances of power the regime to emerge depends almost entirely on the ideological orientation of the most powerful in countries where democrats enjoyed a decisive power advantage democracy emerged conversely in countries in which dictators maintained a decisive power advantage dictatorship emerged in between these two extremes were countries in which the distribution of power between the old regime and its challengers was relatively equal rather than producing stalemate compromise and parted transitions to democracy however such situations in the postcommunist world resulted in protracted confrontation between relatively balanced powers the regimes that emerged from these modes of transitions are not the most successful democracies but rather are unconsolidated unstable partial democracies

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

elite opportunity in transitional economies command economies gave communist era elites administrative control and material privilege but severely restricted money income and private wealth markets and privatization have injected new value into public assets and create unprecedented opportunities for elite insiders these opportunities depend on the extent of regime change and barriers to asset appropriation regime change varies from the survival of the entire party hierarchy to its rapid collapse and defeat in competitive elections barriers to asset appropriation vary with the extent pace and form of privatization and the concentration and liquidity of assets different combinations of such circumstances jointly affect the extent to which prior elites obtain ownership or control of privatized assets use political office to extract larger incomes move into salaried elite occupations or fall out of the elite altogether regime change and barriers to asset appropriation affect change at the national level but outcomes vary across economic sectors because of characteristics of organizations elite positions and assets this elementary theory serves to integrate varied findings from recent research on central europe china and russia and yields predictions for other regions

global communications and national power life on the pareto frontier regime analysis has focused on issues of market failure the resolution of which depends upon knowledge and institution building global communications regimes however have been concerned either with issues of pure coordination or with coordination problems with distributional consequences outcomes have been decided by the underlying distribution of national power in those areas where power was asymmetrically distributed and there was no agreement on basic principles and norms radio broadcasting and remote sensing no regime was formed in those areas where distributional issues could not be unilaterally resolved allocation of the radio spectrum and telecommunications regimes were created although both principles and rules changed with alterations in national power capabilities