political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

measuring changes in international production from a disruption case study of the japanese earthquake and tsunami the earthquake and tsunami that struck japan on march 11 2011 caused a tremendous loss of life and property the disaster also disrupted global supply chains which was blamed for anemic growth in the global economy a multiregional input output model can quantify the international impacts on production due to changes in demand from companies reducing their orders because of a disruption by using the input output model to conceptualize a supply chain we present a unique method for calculating indirect production losses caused by disabled production facilities methods for calculating the possible transfer of demand to industries in other countries are also discussed we apply the multiregional input output model to the japanese earthquake and tsunami comparing results generated by japanese consumer sales with those generated by japanese production data reveals that japanese demand was satised by other countries and that inventory in the production pipeline likely allowed consumer sales to remain strong

inflation and elections theory and evidence for six oecd economies i introduction political business cycle pbc models feature the idea that governments stimulate demand prior to elections in order to improve election prospects while the first generation of pbc models developed by nordhaus 1975 and macrae 1977 assume that voters are naive and retrospective rogoff and sibert 1988 and rogoff 1990 have developed a rational pbc rpbc model where voters are rational and forward looking most empirical studies of political business cycles examine whether unemployment falls the growth rate increases or fiscal and monetary policies become more expansive prior to elections 1 to my knowledge only alesina and roubini 1992 and alesina cohen and roubini 1992 have studied election cycles on inflation based on a large number of elections in 18 oecd countries the authors find evidence of a post election surge in the inflation rate lasting for 3 5 quarters this paper examines whether the existence of election cycles on inflation can be interpreted as supportive evidence of the rpbc theory by focusing on the theory s implications for the relation between post election inflation and the government s re election chances prior to the election in the theoretical part of the paper it is shown that the rpbc theory does not produce unambiguous predictions the functional form of the relation depends on the government s preferences and the election date if electoral terms are fixed or the election takes place close to the mandatory election date average post election inflation will be higher the closer is the election race provided the government always cares about the social costs of election cycles in the empirical part of the paper i generate estimates of the incumbent s election win probability for a sample of 50 elections in six oecd countries three alternative probability series are generated the probability estimates are interacted with dummies turned on after each election and included as regressors in panel data regressions on inflation the three probability series produce the same conclusion the relation between post election inflation and the incumbent s election win probability is hump shaped if the election race is close the inflation rate increases by 0 014 0 018 during the first year after an election i find no indication of an upward jump in inflation after elections when the incumbent s win probability is close to zero or one as noted in the theoretical part of the paper these results are consistent with the rpbc theory the paper is organized as follows the theoretical model is developed in section ii section iii presents the data sample election win probabilities are computed in section iv section v presents the panel data regressions section vi concludes ii theoretical model the theoretical framework is the signalling game developed by persson and tabellini 1990 extended to accommodate the fact that governments always face some uncertainty about the election outcome i first examine a two period game with fixed electoral terms where the election takes place at the end of period one i then consider a three period game where the incumbent chooses whether to call an election in the first or in the second period the output level and the inflation rate in each period t are denoted x sub t and pi sub t respectively pi sub t is determined by the policymaker output is given by the following supply function 1 mathematical expression omitted where mathematical expression omitted are inflation expectations and mu sub t is the policymaker s competence mu sub t is private information for the policymaker and follows a ma 1 process mu sub t eta sub t eta sub t 1 mathematical expression omitted theta with probability 0 5 eta sub t theta with probability 0

dividend stripping risk exposure and the effect of the 1984 tax reform act on the ex dividend day behavior this article investigates the importance of risk exposure and the effects of the 1984 tax reform act on the ex dividend day behavior the tax reform appears to have inhibited short term trading activities by increasing the risk exposure of incorporated traders moreover stocks for which existing listed options permitted the reduction of risk through hedged dividend stripping strategies were affected much less from the new tax code than their nonoptionable counterparts this implies that risk affects investors dividend yield choice and that the ex dividend day behavior may be caused in part by the existence of risk premia copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

home bias and cross border taxation abstract the relationship between cross border taxation and free float home bias is examined this explicitly recognizes that insider shares are unavailable to foreigners other important explanations for home bias information asymmetry behavioural and governance issues are controlled when examining the impact of cross border tax variables in our sample of countries about sixty percent eighty percent withhold taxes on realized capital gains dividends of foreign investors and about thirty percent of the mature economies provide imputation of taxes paid on dividend income by domestic corporations dividend imputation is a statistically significant impediment to cross border equity flows a tax credit variable for foreign taxes paid on dividends is constructed and found to be statistically significant in reducing home bias a relatively high foreign tax rate that cannot be offset by tax credits is found to significantly increase home bias these results hold for float adjusted home bias and traditional international portfolio home bias

presidents and the u s economy an econometric exploration the us economy has performed better when the president of the united states is a democrat rather than a republican almost regardless of how one measures performance for many measures including real gdp growth our focus the performance gap is large and significant this paper asks why the answer is not found in technical time series matters nor in systematically more expansionary monetary or fiscal policy under democrats rather it appears that the democratic edge stems mainly from more benign oil shocks superior total factor productivity tfp performance a more favorable international environment and perhaps more optimistic consumer expectations about the near term future jel d72 e23 e32 e65 n12 n42 an extensive and well known literature of scholarly research documents and explores the fact that macroeconomic performance is a strong predictor of us presidential election outcomes scores of papers find that better performance boosts the vote of the incumbent s party 1 in stark contrast economists have paid scant attention to predictive power running in the opposite direction from election outcomes to subsequent macroeconomic performance the answer while hardly a secret is not nearly as widely known as it should be 2 the us economy performs much better when a democrat is president than when a republican is

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

electoral uncertainty fiscal policy and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract in this paper we study the link between elections fiscal policy and aggregate fluctuations the setup is a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating both technology and political re election shocks the latter are incorporated via a two party model with elections the main theoretical prediction is that forward looking incumbents with uncertain prospects of re election find it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal policies and that this hurts capital accumulation our econometric estimation using u s data finds a statistically significant link between electoral uncertainty and policy instruments and in turn macroeconomic outcomes

electoral and partisan cycles between us economic performance and presidential popularity a comment on stephen e haynes in this paper we discuss a recent paper by stephen e haynes in which he relates electoral cycles in political support to electoral cycles in economic variables haynes finds that the cycle in support for republican presidents is explained by the cycle in economic variables whereas the cycle in support for democratic presidents is not in our opinion this shortcoming is due to his specification of the popularity function haynes estimates a popularity function which incorporates the notion that voters reward the incumbent for favourable outcomes score hypothesis our popularity function combines the score hypothesis and the notion that voters cast their ballots for the party that best fits the current economic situation issue hypothesis we show that the electoral cycle in popularity of both republican and democratic presidents is explained very well by the cycle in economic variables

money politics and the post war business cycle abstract the political economy literature has enshrined as stylized fact the view that lower inflation and temporarily lower growth follow the election of republican presidents and has emphasized political manipulation of monetary policy as an explanation support for the monetary explanation comes in econometric work that largely ignores identification issues that dominate the literature on measuring the effects of monetary policy we generalize a standard vector autoregression framework to accommodate discrete political party variables we find almost no support for the view that political effects on the macroeconomy operate through monetary policy and only weak evidence that political effects are significant at all

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

fed behavior in periods of price and wage controls there is a literature which addresses the bureaucratic behavior and incentives of the federal reserve system some of the papers along these lines include acheson and chant 1973 kane 1980 levy 1981 toma 1981 friedman 1982 shughart and tollison 1983 and allen 1986 this paper brings to bear some additional evidence on the behavior and the incentives of the fed in particular we examine the behavior of the fed during periods of price and wage controls the public interest approach to fed behavior suggests that the fed should pursue a monetary policy that is consistent with price and wage controls in order to control inflationary forces the private interest approach suggests that price and wage controls make seigniorage operations more profitable for the fed and make it more difficult for fed overseers to monitor fed performance in both cases leading the fed to pursue monetary expansion in its own self interest during a period of price and wage controls the setting of price and wage controls therefore provides a test of public versus private interest hypotheses about fed behavior the paper proceeds as follows section 2 develops the competing explanations of federal reserve behavior section 3 presents the estimates of a structural money supply reaction function and an arima transfer function model of fed behavior in each case controlling for ceteris paribus conditions and periods of wage and price controls the results of both models indicate a falsification of the public interest explanation of fed policy section 4 offers some concluding remarks

electoral cycles and budgetary growth in veterans benefit programs while many studies have generated negative findings regarding the general existence of electoral cycles in economic phenomena we have found an apparently robust electoral cycle in veterans benefits this pattern was found between 1961 and 1978 but has disappeared since then we use this case to investigate the possibility that electoral cycles might contribute to the growth of government spending using two different methods of inference we find no strong basis to conclude that such cycles cause increasing public sector growth

voters information heterogeneity and the dynamics of aggregate economic expectations theory it is argued here that previous studies analyzing the formation of voters economic expectations overlook important subtleties found in a differentiated heterogeneous electorate since different segments of the electorate possess varying information capabilities it is asserted that they will form their prospective economic evaluations differently from one another hypotheses the impact of expectational electoral cycles news coverage of the economy reported by voters retrospective economic evaluations and personal financial expectations are hypothesized to have a differential impact on their economic expectations based on varying levels of information education among subsets of the electorate methods time series multiple regression analysis is conducted for the monthly period between january 1978 and december 1990 the empirical analysis involves testing for the properties of the statistical time series i e integration and cointegration as well as specification of an error correction mechanism ecm that captures long run statistical relationships in appropriate circumstances results these findings uncover electoral heterogeneity based on information education differences with respect to voters prospective economic evaluations specifically the information capabilities of voters is inversely related to their reliance on past retrospective sources of information when forming both egocentric and sociotropic economic expectations the main implication of this research is that the assumption of electoral homogeneity contained in previous longitudinal analyses of aggregate economic opinion formation provides misleading results that either overlook intra electoral variations introduce aggregation bias or possibly both

the applicability of the traditional theory of economic policy abstract the traditional theory of economic policy requires targets instruments an empirical economic model and a social welfare or criterion function to be specified in order to derive the optimal economic policy empirical studies of reaction functions suggest that economic policy is carried out in some systematic manner subject to interference from political factors this survey addresses the problems of specifying estimating and applying an economic model when economic policy is following a path specified by a reaction function attention is paid to rational expectations the lucas critique and the policy neutrality proposition lack of knowledge of the policy maker s objective function poses the most serious difficulty when applying the theory of economic policy various methods of determining this function are reviewed and the possibility that policy makers might be satisficing is discussed the role played by political factors is considered in the light of the public choice literature

ex dividend day stock price behavior the case of the 1986 tax reform act this paper analyzes the behavior of stock prices around ex dividend days after the implementation of the 1986 tax reform act that dramatically reduced the difference between the tax treatment of realized long term capital gains and dividend income in 1987 and completely eliminated the differential in 1988 we show that this tax change had no effect on the ex dividend stock price behavior which is consistent with the hypothesis that long term individual investors have no significant effect on ex day stock prices during this time period the results indicate that the activity of short term traders and corporate traders dominates the price determination on the ex day

the politics of finance how capital sways african central banks abstractwhile there is a large literature on the politics of central banking its insights are difficult to translate to sub saharan africa this article addresses gaps in this literature by considering how the interests of those who control financial resources sway african central banks case studies of kenya nigeria and uganda demonstrate that variation in the sources of capital on which countries rely to finance investment helps to account for the pattern of variation in central bank policy stances the analysis further develops and probes arguments about power derived from the control of capital in the context of developing countries

new evidence that taxes affect the valuation of dividends this paper uses british data to examine the effects of dividend taxes on investors relative valuation of dividends and capital gains british data offer great potential to illuminate the dividends and taxes question since there have been two radical changes and several minor reforms in british dividend tax policy during the last 30 years studying the relationship between dividends and stock price movements during different tax regimes offers an ideal controlled experiment for assessing the effects of taxes on investors valuation of dividends using daily data on a small sample of firms and monthly data on a much broader sample we find clear evidence that taxes affect the equilibrium relationship between dividend yields and market returns these findings suggest that taxes are important determinants of security market equilibrium and deepen the puzzle of why firms pay dividends financial economists have long been puzzled by corporate dividend behavior many individual investors should value a dollar of corporate dividends less than a dollar of corporate retentions because the former gives rise to greater tax liabilities corporations however face equal costs of paying out dividends and retaining earnings miller and modigliani 31 demonstrated that in the absence of taxes dividend policy should have no effect on share valuation if dividends are tax penalized however a value maximizing firm should pay no dividends widespread dividend payments to taxable investors are therefore surprising in 1981 dividend tax revenues in the united states were estimated to exceed 20 billion dollars indeed some have interpreted the large volume of dividends paid as evidence against the rational behavior postulates typically used by economists the dividend question has stimulated a large theoretical and empirical literature concerned with the qluestion of investors valuation of dividends in particular the question of how taxes affect the market valuation of dividends has generated considerable controversy numerous studies including auerbach 2 litzenberger and ramaswamy 24 26 morgan 34 and rosenberg and marathe

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

searching for political business cycles in germany one reslt of the revitalised literature on political business cycles is that there are signs in german data that elections and ideology have an impact however using monthly data for the period 1950 1989 and standard methods of time series analysis we reject both the nordhaus hypothesis of opportunistic cycles and the partisan approaches by hibbs ans alesina we show that some results are sensitive to the assumption of stationarity there are signs of policy cycles in m1 it is hard though to bring this in line with the rogoff hypothesis of rational opportunistic cycles because of the german institutional setting

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

financial system development in transition economies this paper provides an overview of the major issues with respect to financial system development in transition economies which were discussed at a conference in groningen the netherlands december 1997 after a brief remark on the role of financial system design during economic transition the paper focuses on the role of stock markets in the process of financial intermediation with emphasis on the role of regulations in these markets the role of deposit insurance to improve bank system stability and the importance of an independent central bank measurement issues relating to central bank independence and its impact on inflation and growth 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the value of dividend imputation tax credits in australia abstract a dividend imputation tax system provides shareholders with a credit for corporate tax paid that can be used to offset personal tax on dividend income this paper shows how to infer the value of imputation tax credits from the prices of derivative securities that are unique to australian retail markets we also test whether a tax law amendment that was designed to prevent the trading of imputation credits affected their economic value before the amendment tax credits were worth up to 50 of face value in large high yielding companies but subsequently it is difficult to detect any value at all

the ex dividend day behavior of stock prices a re examination of the clientele effect a comment in a recent article in this journal kalay 5 has written an extensive comment on our 1970 article 2 concerning marginal stockholder tax rates and the clientele effect while we are flattered that our article is viewed of sufficient importance to gain this attention 12 years after it was written we do have reservations about kalay s comments we are principally concerned with his interpretations of relevant transaction costs and the role they play in setting equilibrium

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

counterfiscal policies and partisan politics evidence from industrialized countries according to partisan theories of macroeconomic policy left wing parties are more concerned with unemployment while right wing parties tend to weigh the costs of inflation higher an implication of partisan theories is that partisan policy differences should depend on the state of the economy with left wing governments conducting relatively more expansive policies during recessions we test whether left wing governments are more favourably inclined towards countercyclical fiscal policies than their right wing counterparts using a panel data set of 18 oecd countries from 1980 to 1992 the results are supportive of partisan theories the structural deficit is significantly higher under left wing governments when unemployment is high or rising while the ideology of the government party parties has no significant impact on the structural deficit when unemployment is low or falling

the electoral dynamics of human development this paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980 2013 the incidence of partisan and political support effects is also taken into account a gmm estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development majority governments also influence it but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects the electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non oecd countries in countries with less frequent elections with lower levels of income and human development in presidential and non plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes they have also become more intense in this millennium

us presidential elections and implied volatility the role of political uncertainty abstract this paper focuses on the effects of political uncertainty and the political process on implied stock market volatility during us presidential election cycles using monthly iowa electronic markets data over five elections we document that stock market uncertainty as measured by the vix volatility index increases along with positive changes in the probability of success of the eventual winner the association between implied volatility and the election probability of the eventual winner is positive even after controlling for changes in overall election uncertainty these findings indicate that the presidential election process engenders market anxiety as investors form and revise their expectations regarding future macroeconomic policy

the valuation of american call options and the expected ex dividend stock price decline abstract this study focuses on the ex dividend stock price decline implicit within the valuation of american call options on dividend paying stocks the roll 1977 american call option pricing formula and the observed structure of cboe call option transaction prices are used to infer the expected ex dividend stock price decline as a proportion of the amount of the dividend the relative decline is shown to be not meaningfully different from one confirming some recent evidence from studies which examined stock prices in the days surrounding ex dividend

why do stock prices drop by less than the value of the dividend evidence from a country without taxes abstract it is well documented that stock prices on ex dividend days drop by less than the value of the dividend on average this has commonly been attributed to the effect of tax clienteles we examine data from the hong kong stock market where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed as in the u s the average stock price drop is less than the value of the dividend specifically the average dividend for the period 1980 1993 is hk 0 12 and the average price drop is hk 0 06 we are able to account for this both theoretically and empirically through market microstructure arguments

the politics of public aid to private industry the role of policy networks firms lobby for subsidies along geographic sector or factor lines and as a result receive subsidies with a local sectoral or factorwide scope this article investigates what determines the line of cleavage and thereby the scope of the subsidy the factor mobility hypothesis according to which an economic prior the degree of factor mobility determines the geometry of lobbying coalitions misses the fact that factor mobility is as much the product of policy and policymaking as it is its determinant this article argues instead that politicians maximize their chances of staying in power through the deliberate use of subsidies to structure the political debate and embed factor owners into stable policy networks individual factor owners in turn join these policy networks to lobby for monopoly rents capable of insuring them against adverse economic competition the model yields two testable hypotheses first right governments favor subsidies to capital whereas left governments favor subsidies to lab

forward contracts and futures contracts abstract this paper provides a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences between forward contracts and futures contracts under frictionless markets and continuous trading simple arbitrage arguments are invoked to value forward contracts to relate forward prices and spot prices and to relate forward prices and futures prices we also argue that forward prices need not equal futures prices unless default free interest rates are deterministic

political and economic determinants of interest rate behavior are central banks different i introduction do politicians manipulate the instruments of macroeconomic policy to improve their electoral prospects or in response to the preferences of their own party these questions are addressed but not yet resolved by the literature on political business cycles 1 to generate a political business cycle politicians must control the instruments of macroeconomic policy monetary policy plays an important role in the determination of inflation output and employment the objects of concern to politicians and voters yet politicians do not directly control the instruments of monetary policy in industrialized countries instead these instruments are controlled by the central banks which vary widely across countries in their degree of statutory independence we wish to examine empirically whether monetary policy is influenced by the timing of elections or a change in the party in power after controlling for unexpected changes in economic fundamentals our paper assesses therefore one aspect of independence namely whether a central bank makes monetary policy decisions without measurable political influence 2 in this study we attempt to look at what central banks actually do as opposed to what they are legislated to do to distinguish between the form and substance in discussions of central bank independence as in mayer 1976 3 our paper enlarges and improves on cowart 1978 and woolley 1983 both of whom studied the role of political factors in monetary policy for a sample of industrialized countries our methodology is to compare the responsiveness of interest rate changes to economic and political factors in seventeen countries as we discuss below there are differences in opinion about whether an interest rate variable or a monetary aggregate is a better representation of monetary policy actions we compare the results of qualitative measures of differences in central bank design e g rankings of banks in order of independence as determined by legislative criteria with the results of a quantitative comparison of differences in central bank behavior this exercise should help identify the important qualitative features in the reform of existing central banks or in the design of new central banks 4 in our empirical work the relevant relationships are estimated with a recursive vector autoregression technique to control for temporal instability in the economy between 1960 and 1990 and the endogeneity of the variables in question this methodological innovation has important consequences for the understanding of reaction functions and more generally for measuring the impact of macroeconomic shocks on monetary policy we also stress results for separate subsamples of fixed and flexible exchange rates as well as for the full sample our methodology measures the influence of politics on monetary policy relative to the choices and information actually available to the central bank when the monetary policy decision was made our study does not measure the influence of politics on the instruments of fiscal policy as in alesina et al 1991 our study also does not measure the direct influence of fiscal variables on the instruments of monetary policy although there is some evidence on this issue in for example parkin 1986 and burdekin and wohar 1990 burdekin and wohar estimate the relationships between deficits money base growth and inflation for a sample of countries and time period comparable to ours all these studies find some evidence that central banks do accommodate fiscal policy by financing deficits via money growth especially since the end of bretton woods we return to the issue of fiscal policy in considering the interpretation of our results but stress that the effects of fiscal policy are partly captured in our specifications because we measure monetary policy relative to the state of the economy 5 a brief review of the literature which measures statutory central bank independence is given in section ii

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

the determinants of tenure on the federal reserve board of governors should i stay or should i go this paper examines the quit behaviour of members of the federal reserve board of governors we find that the probability of a member continuing is lower when the member is an economist when the member comes to the board from the private sector and when their policy views differ from the board as a whole in addition we find evidence that the president can exert influence on the fed by the power of appointment and in contrast with what one might expect we find that salaries on the board relative to the private sector do not seem to be an important factor in determining the decision to continue service on the board

political business cycles democratization and economic reform the case of africa abstract this paper presents cross country evidence that political business cycles are alive and well in the nascent democracies of the developing world africa provides fertile ground for the study of political business cycles this paper uncovers systematic electorally timed interventions in five monetary and four fiscal policy variables in a panel of african countries these findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory if africa s increasingly frequent elections are associated with reversals of fiscal and monetary policy reform there is a potential conflict between political and economic reform

deficits and money growth in the united states a comment joines 1985 argues that the federal reserve accommodates war induced deficit spending but not non war induced deficit spending using a first difference form of a reaction function to obtain a stationary time series of the monetary base we find that the federal reserve has accommodated federal government deficit spending in the post world war ii period

the influence of elections on federal reserve behavior a political business cycle is tested in a monetary reaction function positive evidence is a result of the 1930s and 1940s and not post war elections in addition there is no evidence of such a cycle in a rational expectations model

the political manipulation of macroeconomic policy conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political as well as economic forces using vector autoregression analysis i test three models of monetary policy determination for the united states 1953 1984 the electoral cycle model that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle the party differences model that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations and the referendum model that changes in presidential approval create in effect a continuing referendum allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary analysis shows that monetary policies as measured by the monetary base and short term interest rates respond to the election cycle and presidential approval although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables

electoral and partisan cycles between us economic performance and presidential popularity empirical voting popularity research examines parameters that relate economic performance to voting and popularity not the interaction of these parameters with movements in economic performance which is what actually influences voting and popularity this paper examines that interaction for the usa from 1953 1 1990 4 by decomposing the response of popularity to economic performance by both political party and the quarter of the electoral term averaged over the electoral term economic performance increases the popularity of democrats but decreases it for republicans whereas near the election the opposite occurs overall the results appear consitent with a mix of partisan and electoral influences so that no single approach seems fully adequate

ex dividend day stock price behavior discreteness or tax induced clienteles abstract since prices are constrained to discrete tick multiples while dividends are essentially continuous ex day price changes will not equal dividends we argue that the expected price drop is strictly less than the dividend but within one tick of the dividend the price drop to dividend ratio will i be less than one ii increase with dividends generally and iii decline between tick multiples giving a sawtooth pattern in the data since dividends and dividend yields are highly correlated discreteness will give the impression of tax induced dividend clienteles even if there are none taxable cash dividends and nontaxable stock dividends exhibit similar ex day behavior

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

another look at the evidence for rational partisan cycles in presenting evidence in favor of rational partisan cycles where electoral victories by leftist parties are expected to create temporary expansions and electoral victories by rightist parties are expected to create temporary recessions alesina cohen and roubini 1999 rely upon autoregressive time series intervention regressions these regressions however are not consistent with their model in this paper a model is derived which is consistent with the intervention approach in its reduced form the differences between the models are highlighted and new empirical estimates are presented on a panel of seven oecd nations which generally does not support the rational partisan cycle implications

the use of inputs by the federal reserve system an extended model recently it has been argued that bureaucratic incentives play an important role in the formulation of policy and the inflationary bias of the federal reserve system shughart and tollison 1983 hereafter s t 1 in particular s t maintain that the fed can retain profits denominated in amenities but not in dollars as a result of the congressional constraint that excess profits be returned to the treasury this constraint provides bureaucratic incentives for the fed to purchase more amenities than a for profit organization and ex plains s t 1983 291 in part the fed s apparent inflationary bias expansionary monetary policy then enlarges the fed s profit amenities choices and allows it to pursue its goal of bureaucratic enhancement s t assume that the dollar value of these amenities is a monotonic transformation of fed employment using this public choice framework they develop a model in which the monetary base is a function of a number of variables including employment in the federal reserve system sysemp

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

partisan monetary policies presidential influence through the power of appointment we investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a presidential administration could affect monetary policy making influence could be a result of direct presidential pressure exerted on members of the federal open market committee fomc or it could be a result of partisan considerations in presidential appointments to the board of governors to investigate these two channels of influence we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the fomc our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise

is there a dead spot new evidence on fomc decisions before elections using new data that chronicle the fed s internal forecast of the output gap from 1973 to 1998 this paper tests for an electoral cycle in the decisions of the federal open market committee fomc the paper provides evidence of a dead spot in the committee s decisions before presidential elections for given values of these internal forecasts the fomc is less likely to decide to tighten monetary policy in the year preceding a presidential election than at other times

analytical assumptions and causal ordering in interindustry modeling since the publication of leontief s path breaking work the overwhelming majority of applications of inter industry models have relied on the standard model of demand driven production functions even when the exogenous perturbation originated on the supply side 13 for some time now in fact some economists have been suggesting an alternative to the standard model in situations of supply constraints 8 58 64 9 1 249 69 10 5 447 54 6 281 89 however this alternative model relying on supply constrained allocation functions is not based on the precepts of standard microeconomic theory rather than assuming that input shares are constant as in the standard model the alternative model assumes that output shares are constant an assumption which is not tied to any demonstrated optimizing behavior on the part of firms both models would seem to be somewhat limited the standard model due to its demand only orientation the alternative model due to its untested analytical underpinnings 1 in fact as this paper demonstrates there is an inherent symmetry underlying interindustry analysis the standard leontief interindustry model can be formulated to directly analyze supply constrained perturbations just as the ghoshian allocation model can be formulated to directly handle demand induced perturbations that is there actually exist four frameworks for employing interindustry models that are differentiated by the analytical assumptions i e production or allocation function and the causal ordering i e demand driven or supply contrained employed this paper demonstrates the four frameworks discusses the rationales for their use and provides illustrative results based on their application to the 1967 u s interindustry table section ii of this paper develops the four theoretical frameworks and demonstrates their symmetry simple empirical results are presented in section iii together with some recommended potential applications conclusions are offered in the final section

ex dividend price behavior of common stocks this study examines common stock prices around ex dividend dates such price data usually contain a mixture of observations some with and some without arbitrageurs and or dividend capturers active our theory predicts that such mixing will result in a nonlinear relation between percentage price drop and dividend yield not the commonly assumed linear relation this prediction and another important prediction of theory are supported empirically in a variety of tests marginal price drop is not significantly different from the dividend amount thus over the last several decades one for one marginal price drop has been an excellent average rule of thumb article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

governments trade unions and the macroeconomy an expository analysis of the political business cycle we have briefly reviewed the state of the art of research on the political business cycle in the context of a simple textbook model of the macroeconomy it has been demonstrated that the government generated political business cycle vanishes as expectations turn rational even then however non inflationary policies apparently are time inconsistent hence democracies seem to be stuck with some sort of inflationary bias

monetary policy and presidential elections a nonpartisan political cycle this paper develops a federal reserve reaction function which relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives pre and postpresidential election estimates of this reaction function for the post accord period of 1953 1984 suggest two conclusions

partisan alignment effects on total factor productivity aray h partisan alignment effects on total factor productivity regional studies unlike the literature on political effects on real economy that suggests that partisan effects accrue through aggregate demand it is hypothesized that such effects could also accrue through aggregate supply using panel data for the spanish regions over the 1986 2010 period the main results are 1 partisan alignment effects only arise when central government enjoys a majority 2 there exist a positive contemporaneous effect and negative lagged effects and 3 in absolute value such effects vanish over time results are robust to different specifications and measures of total factor productivity tfp and methods of estimation

a political explanation of variations in central bank independence although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies their institutional structures their levels of independence differ greatly my explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and in a multiparty government coalition partners an independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts politicians will choose an independent bank 1 if government ministers party legislators and coalition partners have different monetary policy incentives and 2 if government ministers fear that party legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy dispute i statistically test the argument against the cross national variation of central bank institutions i also use the theoretical framework to examine episodes of institutional choice and reform in germany britain and italy

the relation between forward prices and futures prices abstract this paper consolidates the results of some recent work on the relation between forward prices and futures prices it develops a number of propositions characterizing the two prices these propositions contain several testable implications about the difference between forward and futures prices many of the propositions show that equilibrium forward and futures prices are equal to the values of particular assets even though they are not in themselves asset prices the paper then illustrates these results in the context of two valuation models and discusses the effects of taxes and other institutional factors

surprise party estimating the consequences of unexpected presidential election results alesina s quarterly journal of economics 102 651 678 1987 influential model of presidential elections with ideologically motivated parties attributes higher growth and lower unemployment under democratic presidents to the surprise inflation a democratic victory entails in contrast to the published literature we test this hypothesis using calcula tions of presidential election surprises consistent with the assumption of rational economic actors we confront the econometric complications attending a time series approach tak ing into account economic growth dynamics we ultimately fail to confirm the hypothesis that the level of uncertainty associated with presidential election results has an effect on economic outcomes

the bias towards zero in aggregate perceptions an explanation based on rationally calculating individuals i introduction a central theme in the study of economic behavior is individual rationality or utility maximizing behavior contrary to the accusations of many outside critics the economics assumption of rationality neither denies that information is costly nor implies that decisions are error free rational expectations allows for ignorance but insists on the absence of systematic errors in the aggregate even if some individuals make large underestimates their errors are offset by large overestimates made by others alternatively even if people on average underestimate the effect of some variable during one period they may overestimate its effect at a later date these assumptions form the basis for the standard conclusion that the government cannot systematically outsmart the public the theory and application of rational expectations has generated a vast literature over the last couple of decades it is now well known that the application of rational expectations theory to actual cases may for instance be unsuitable when there are systematic errors in the observed variables when loss functions are not quadratic or when variables are constrained to take only positive values while such limitations may well be problematic these objections have in our view not been very damaging in the sense that rational expectations still provides a natural starting point for much economic analysis like rational expectations this paper takes individual rationality as its central theme yet we reach a radically different conclusion from rational expectations regarding aggregate behavior we demonstrate that individual errors in identifying the relationships among variables cause a downward bias in the aggregate that would be equivalent to the public underestimating the strengths of the true relationships rational expectations has considered the misestimation type of error which can cancel out in the aggregate but with errors in identifying relationships there exists no similar cancelling out effect and thus the public appears to irrationally underestimate the strengths of relationships the paper is organized as follows first we set up a simple formal model to examine the misestimation problem and then contrast it to the identification problem section iii explains why the identification problem can be so important even when a relatively small number of variables are involved section iv reviews empirical evidence of bias in the expectations formation literature as shown in section v our hypothesis can be used to explain political business cycles in a standard aggregate supply and demand framework ii theory in our model individuals acquire knowledge in two steps they first identify the causal relationship between two or more variables and then estimate the strength of that relationship as with herbert a simon s satisficing approach 1959 1979 and the analysis in ronald a heiner 1988 we assume finite intellectual capabilities however our model neither assumes nor implies anything about simon s satisficing approach and the often related concept of bounded rationality instead our inquiry is strictly limited to the consequences of omitting variables and will not address the more ambitious question of what strategies individuals might adopt to improve learning like heiner we distinguish between the reliability of making decisions and the issue of obtaining information heiner shows that while decision making itself might be flawless when individuals face only a very limited amount of information it is optimal for them to choose a larger information set and enter into the imperfect decision zone he provides several different reasons finite channel capacity information complexity and nonlocal information for why the advantage of having much information also translates into more decision error while heiner s model deals with individuals making correct or incorrect decisions his underlying reasoning could equally well be used to motivate our analysis of why a portion of the population fails to appreciate certain economic relationships

opinion polls and political business cycles theory and evidence for the united states the paper shows that the frey schneider schultz hypothesis that there is a negative relation between the government s popularity and the government s incentives to engineer political business cycles is consistent with rational forward looking voting provided one makes appropriate assumptions about the incumbent s preferences the empirical part of the paper presents evidence favourable to the hypothesis using quarterly data on us money growth

cross border investing with tax arbitrage the case of german dividend tax credits german dividends typically carry a tax credit which makes the dividend worth 42 86 more to a taxable german shareholder than to a tax exempt or foreign shareholder this results in a penalty for foreign investors who buy and hold german dividend paying stocks i document that as a result of the credit the ex day drop exceeds the dividend by more than one half of the tax credit and show that futures and option prices embed more than one half of the tax credit the existence of the credit creates opportunities for cross border tax arbitrage in which foreign holders of german stock transfer the dividend to german shareholders and implies that it is tax efficient for foreign investors to hold derivatives rather than investing directly in german stocks the empirical findings are consistent with costly tax arbitrage activity by german investors who face tax risk due to antiarbitrage rules since dividend tax credits exist in many other countries the findings are potentially of broad interest

leontief versus ghoshian price and quantity models the classical demand driven input output model dates back to leontief 24 25 its economically complete opposite the so called supply driven input output model was developed almost forty years ago by ghosh 16 whereas its first application came more than ten years later by augustinovics 1 followed by giarratani 18 the first theoretical reservations were formulated another ten years later by giarratani 19 and oosterhaven 31 140 1 despite these reservations the model came more or less en vogue in the 1980s several applications appeared at best paying only lip service to this earlier critique 10 5 moreover without much reservations the model also entered the major input output textbook 28 317 22 while uncritical generalizations and reiterations appeared in the theoretical literature 8 3 9 then a heavy discussion about the economic underpinning of the supply driven quantity model was initiated by oosterhaven 33 36 21 34 with that debate the enthusiasm to perform downright applications of the supply driven model seems to have diminished literally in the footnotes of that debate the non existence the mathematics and the possible economic interpretation of the dual price version of the supply driven model was discussed 33 34 independently of this discussion davar 9 presented the dual model in extension but did not discuss the economic plausibility of the underlying economic assumptions nor their implications in view of the misinterpretations and misuse of the quantity version of the supply driven model this contribution aims at an early evaluation of its price version that is as complete and as balanced as possible it is well known that the dual version of the regular input output model is used to simulate cost push inflationary processes 26 188 201 7 246 other applications relate to for instance the price effects of pollution abatement 17 effects of rising energy cost 29 and energy price effects in multiregional or in extended interregional models 35 32 of course this dual price version of the leontief model is based on the same stringent standard assumptions of the quantity version and on some heavy additional assumptions that are made for the price version 37 naturally the potential use of the dual of the supply driven model lies in the simulation of demand pull inflationary processes as opposed to the cost push applications of the dual leontief model hence part of our evaluation will be directed toward the question whether such applications are justified from an economic point of view or not our discussion will start in the next section with a brief summary of the leontief quantity and

appointment procedures and fomc voting behavior an important issue for the conduct of monetary policy in the united states is whether the various appointment procedures of members of the federal open market committee help determine their voting behavior it is usually asserted that the method by which district bank presidents are appointed leads to more independence and or more conservative behavior increased independence is generally believed to reduce suboptimal short run manipulation of monetary policy but at the cost of reducing the central bank s accountability to the country s short run and longrun objectives the social desirability of any potential differences in monetary policy resulting from these appointment procedures and the optimality of discretionary policy in general are not addressed in this paper however instead the effect on monetary policy of the different appointment procedures currently in place within the federal reserve system is examined does the increased independence that the district bank presidents supposedly possess produce significantly different monetary policy from that of the politically appointed board governors many studies have examined the effects various appointment procedures may have on voting at the fomc and the results have been somewhat mixed belden 2 chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 3 havrilesky and gildea 6 and puckett 8 find that bank presidents tend to vote for tighter policy than board governors while tootell 10 finds no differences between the two groups most of the literature has concluded that in some unclearly defined way and for no clear theoretical reason the more independent district presidents are more conservative than the board governors in this paper conservative is defined over several clear dimensions in order to test whether district presidents vote more conservatively than board governors some slight variation in the voting behavior of bank presidents and board governors is found but the causes of any dissimilarities are shown to be much different from those asserted in the earlier literature

interaction between central bank behaviour and fiscal policy the us case federal reserve behaviour is analysed using a model which incorporates an effect an effect of iscal pressure on monetary policy formulation incentive structures are hypothesized to be such that the central bank plans over a longer horizan than that relevant to the administration with the cyclically adjusted deficit proxying for fiscal pressure from the administration the response to the deficit then plays an interactive role in affecting the trade off weights applied to the competing goals of monetary policy the model performs well for the usa and provides a pattern of policy that is stable over the full 1961ndash 83 period

the federal reserve s response to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks evidence of a partisan political cycle the orthodox approach to modeling the fed s response to economic conditions is to employ a monetary policy reaction function most reaction functions are estimated by regressing a policy indicator possibly the federal funds rate or a monetary aggregate on variables that describe the state of the economy such as unemployment inflation and growth in output under certain conditions which we discuss below estimated coefficients from a reaction function provide information about the fed s monetary policy priorities moreover extending the model to include election and partisan dummy variables may provide information about the fed s response to political pressures there are two problems with interpreting the coefficients in a standard reaction function as the weights that the fed attaches to its policy objectives first the monetary policy decision may not be represented accurately by an aggregate reaction function one that models the fed as a whole because there are twelve voting members on the fomc chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 10 have recently addressed this issue by employing a disaggregated set of reaction functions the second problem with interpreting reaction function coefficients as the weights the fed places on its policy objectives is that this interpretation implicitly assumes structural stability of the underlying macroeconomy abrams froyen and waud 1 31 acknowledge this shortcoming when they state coefficients from estimated reaction functions do not provide direct information on policymaker utility functions rather than being the solution to an unconstrained optimization dependent only on policymaker preferences reaction functions are the output of a constrained maximization where the constraints are the reduced form equations that characterize