implications of economic interdependence for endogenous wage indexation decisions this paper shows how economic interdependence affects the indexation decisions of atomistic wage setters in an environment in which monetary authorities do not observe stochastic disturbances before making their policy choices if stochastic disturbances are common across countries interdependence has no effect on equilibrium indexation choices in identical countries however if disturbances are country specific numerical simulations show that interdependence is likely to reduce equilibrium indexation choices relative to a small open economy we also show that indexation choices may be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes but that strategic complementarity becomes more likely as the degree of interdependence rises

history dependence in concave economies abstract this paper investigates concave intertemporal optimization problems and derives two mechanisms either growth or control state interactions e g due to endogenous preferences that allow for multiple steady states including an unstable one therefore history dependence is possible in a perfectly governed economy subject to the law of diminishing returns if one of these two mechanisms is present this result complements a large amount of literature that attributes history dependence to convexities as a consequence lock ins into undesired evolutions are possible beyond the familiar case of increasing returns

competition and social influence the diffusion of the sixth generation processor in the global computer industry1 when is a social actor most strongly influenced by its peers this article addresses this question by clarifying when computer firms were most strongly affected by the choices of their structurally equivalent rivals to adopt a well known technology intel s sixth generation processor the core hypothesis is that the effect of adoptions by structurally equivalent firms increases with the competitive pressure that a focal firm faces in its market position the results show that a chosen firm is most strongly influenced by comparable others when it faces scale based competition and is diversified the implications of this study are twofold a social actor s sensitivity to the conduct of others may depend not only on its place in a hierarchy but also on the nature of its ties to an external audience and a contingent theory of social influence may be necessary to characterize diffusion processes correctly particularly when external and time varying nonnetwork factors have significant effects

some issues concerning interest rate pegging price level determinacy and the real bills doctrine abstract in a recent paper canzoneri henderson and rogoff have shown that it is possible for the monetary authority to peg the nominal interest rate without creating price level indeterminacy in a simplified version of the 1975 sargent wallace model the present paper begins by reviewing that result which involves a limiting case of a money supply rule that depicts the authority as responding to current values of the interest rate then it shows that there exists an alternative rule that will peg the nominal rate without creating indeterminacy but that this rule induces a different pattern of price level fluctuations next the paper considers whether indeterminacy will prevail if the authority tries to effect a peg in a third way by simply standing ready to buy and sell securities at the desired rate finally the implications of the foregoing results are drawn for arguments concerning the real bills doctrine and some critical comments are directed at the recent attempted rehabilitation of that doctrine by sargent and wallace

has the averch johnson effect been theoretically justified abstract in this paper we show that the averch johnson effect of overcapitalization by a regulated monopoly does not obtain when the firm operates in the decreasing cost range of output we develop a dynamic adjustment cost model of the firm and apply a recent result by brock and dechert for non concave hamiltonians to solve for the optimal investment policy for the firm with a phase diagram analysis we are able to make sharp comparisons between the regulated and unregulated cases in particular we show that investment by a regulated firm is lower than that of an unregulated firm even when the rate of return constraint is not binding

wage stickiness and the non neutrality of money a cross industry analysis abstract the paper provides an empirical test of sticky wage models of business fluctuations by focusing on industry level cross sectional implications that emerge this breaks the observational equivalence existing at the aggregate level between rational expectations long term contracting and imperfect information models the specific implication tested is whether output responses to nominal disturbances industry phillips curve slopes are inversely related to wage indexation elasticities the phillips curve slopes are found to vary across industries for the canadian economy but bear no relationship to indexation elasticities casting doubt on the role of nominal wage rigidity in generating the observed non neutrality of money

monetary information and monetary neutrality abstract the monetary theory of business fluctuations in market clearing models constructed under the rational expectations assumption as advanced by lucas and others involves the idea that suppliers and demanders will typically misinterpret movements in the general level of prices as representing more or less favorable relative opportunities for real activities the present paper examines the consequences of agents possessing contemporaneous monetary information of a potentially noisy variety for the non neutrality of unanticipated monetary events within such an equilibrium business cycle model this modification of the information structure has the strong testable implication that real activity will be uncorrelated with contemporaneous monetary data

islands indexation and monetary policy this paper develops a synthesized macroeconomic model that incorporates the local global informational asymmetries of an islands economy into a setting characterized by endogenous wage indexation in such an economy agents are unable both to filter out the separate influences of demand and supply shocks on observed output prices and to distinguish between the separate price effects of local and aggregate disturbances so that optimal wage indexation depends upon both the variances of supply and demand disturbances and the information conditioned forecasts of agents as a result optimal monetary policy generally depends upon the variances of local and aggregate supply and demand

on the optimality of activist policies with a less informed government abstract i investigate whether a government should lead an activist policy in a rigorous utility maximizing framework under rational expectations the economy is one with preset wages and is subject to both demand and supply shocks it is assumed that the government can never act on the basis of information superior to that of the private sector moreover wages are set after government policy has been carried out we find that the optimal policy is nevertheless an activist countercyclical one it has the remarkable property that although the economy is hit each period by stochastic shocks after wages have been preset this optimal policy will nevertheless succeed in keeping the economy on a full employment track

the equilibrium distribution of wage settlements and economic stability several authors recently have attempted to extend the fischer contract model by allowing agents to endogenize the contract pattern see e g gray 1978 and blanchard 1979 aside from the early literature on the pattern bargaining ross 1948 rees and hamilton 1963 and mcguire and rapping 1968 however the only literature that endogenizes the pattern of negotiation is fethke and policano 1982 1984 adopting a game theoretic framework in which each sector selects the contract length and the timing of its negotiation date so as to minimize the expected resource cost of contracting they investigate the determinants and aggregate implications of alternative negotiation patterns in a twosector model with relative and aggregate disturbances in this paper contract length is assumed to be fixed and indexing provisions are ignored our attention is concentrated on the determinants of the timing of bargaining and the macroeconomic consequences of the resulting year to year distributions of wage settlements these questions will be analyzed in a game theoretic framework where bargaining units choose the timing of bargaining and the authority chooses the money supply rules suppose that the distribution of wage settlements is uniform and that the monetary authority chooses optimum monetary policy such as that given by fischer 1977 then the behaviors of the price level output and the real wage are symmetric between odd and even periods and hence bargaining units are indifferent to the timing of bargaining at the same time the authority minimizes the loss function given the distribution of wage settlements consequently no player has an incentive to change his current strategy and the economy is in nash equilibrium in effect fischer 1977 examines the properties of this equilibrium without providing a game theoretic treatment of the problem we require answers to three questions 1 is uniform distribution the only equilibrium of this labor contract economy 2 if not what is the optimal pattern of negotiation from the

nominal wage flexibility wage indexation and monetary union membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non membership this counteracts the stabilisation policy cost of giving up monetary independence but more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an individual monetary policy it is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability the interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full indexation equilibrium

interest rate smoothing and price level trend stationarity abstract this paper discusses the definition and mechanics of central bank interest rate smoothing under rational expectations a tension arising between interest rate smoothing and macroeconomic stabilization objectives induces non trend stationary price level and money stock behavior the paper thereby helps explain why such nominal non stationarities are widely observed further implications are drawn for base drift distribution of real returns on long term fixed rate nominal debt and operating characteristics of interest rate pegs and policy instruments

fixed versus flexible exchange rates in an equilibrium business cycle model abstract this essay re examines the question of which exchange rate regime is preferable using a rational expectations model that explicitly incorporates wealth and emphasizing the information signalling role of prices previous authors have stressed the argument that floating rates provide agents with an additional source of information which improves forecasting accuracy leading to more efficient allocations this paper adds the counterweighing argument that they also have the effect in contrast to fixed rates of introducing an additional source of monetary disturbances in the determination of real variables another issue addressed is the nature of exchange rate adjustments to monetary disturbances

individual firm and market dynamics of csr activities this paper investigates how firms should plan corporate social responsibility short csr this dynamic analysis starts with a firm s intertemporal optimization problem and proceeds to analyze interactions with other firms which are crucial if csr is profitable for firm a then it is most likely also profitable for competitors b and c and these simultaneous decisions affect the gain each would achieve from trying to advance its own position we find that multiple equilibria exist irrespective of whether interactions with other firms are taken into account interactions can eliminate or create additional steady states and can lead to a situation in which history is insufficient to determine the long run outcome among multiple steady states so that coordination is beneficial

activist monetary policy under rational expectations the purpose of this paper is to argue that the pursuit of an activist monetary policy may make economic sense even when people s expectations are formed rationally the paper presents a simple model in which 1 prices are costly to adjust 2 there is uncertainty concerning the parameters affecting aggregate demand and 3 there are positive costs of gathering and processing information by reference to this model it can be shown that an activist monetary policy may or may not be useful in offsetting aggregate disturbances depending upon the extent of information costs and of parameter uncertainty

the stability of money supply policies that peg the rate of interest this paper examines monetary policies that peg the rate of interest without relying on an interestelastic money supply in one case the money supply is completely predetermined in the sense that it only depends on past disturbances that is current disturbances do not affect the current money supply as is the case with an interest elastic money supply interest elastic money supply rules are shown to be untenable because such interest elasticity if large enough results in dynamic instability economists have long debated the relative desirability and the viability of two alternate monetary policies a fixed money supply and a pegged rate of interest one familiar theme which runs from wicksell through patinkin 6 and finally to sargent and wallace 7 is the possible incompatibility between a pegged rate of interest and a determinate nominal price level using different models and quite different analytical techniques both patinkin 6 and sargent and wallace 7 demonstrate this incompatibility more recently sargent and wallace 8 do not treat a pegged rate of interest and a fixed money supply as mutually exclusive alternatives rather their version of the real bills doctrine is a policy that fixes both the money supply and the rate of interest through the use of one period currency loans while preserving dynamic stability and establishing a determinate equilibrium price level the money supply rules derived below which peg the rate of interest are similar to the policy considered by sargent and wallace 8 since the analytic framework employed below is similar to that used by mccallum 5 canzoneri henderson and rogoff 1 and goodfriend 3 this paper bridges the gap between the sargent wallace treatment of a pegged rate of interest and discussions that employ a more conventional analytic framework section ii derives two interest rate pegging policies by employing the notion of a permanent future rate of money growth defined analogously to permanent income this concept is used to show that policies that peg the rate of interest while preserving dynamic stability are equivalent to policies that fine tune the public s perception of future rates of money growth it is this fine tuning of the public s perception of future rates of money growth rather than a perfectly interest

the ecology of organizational mortality american labor unions 1836 1985 this research analyzes the disbanding rates of the full population of american national labor unions for the period 1836 1985 it tests the hypothesis drawn from population ecology theory that di

a complete characterization of optimal growth paths in an aggregated model with a non concave production function the convexity of technology has played a crucial role in economic analyses of optimal one sector growth problems for example two of the key results on the traditional model of ramsey 1928 that have relied on the convexity of the technology are that optimal intertemporal growth involves moving monotonically towards a unique steady state as in cass 1965 koopmans 1965 and that the value function is a concave differentiable function of the initial capital stock as in benveniste and scheinkman 1979

information incentives and contract timing patterns a prominent feature of wage contracting in the united states is the bunched timing pattern that is often associated with the process of pattern bargaining the model describes the bunching of wage contracts as the equilibrium outcome of decentralized decisions in an economy composed of both competitive and monopolistically competitive product markets agents time their wage adjustment to take advantage of the information associated with the timing decisions of others this information based motive leads to staggered contracting a bunching equilibrium requires the presence of heterogeneous product markets and occurs because the information transmitted by contracting agents differs across the market structures copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

sticky prices as coordination failure this paper links the coordination failure and menu cost approaches to the microeconomic foundations of keynesian macroeconomics if a firm s desired price is increasing in others prices then the gain from price adjustment after a nominal shock is greater if others adjust this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity thus nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes jel e12 e30 keynesian macroeconomics waned in the 1970 s because economists grew disenchanted with its weak microeconomic foundations the central difficulty was that keynesian models were based on ad hoc rigidities in nominal wages and prices the 1980 s produced two approaches to reviving keynesian theory the menu cost literature n gregory mankiw 1985 george akerlof and janet yellen 1985 seeks to provide rigorous explanations for nominal rigidities these papers argue that small frictions in price setting are enough to produce large nominal rigidities in contrast the coordination failure literature russell cooper and andrew john 1988 abandons nominal rigidities and seeks alternative foundations for keynesian models the central idea is that many economic activities such as production e g john bryant 1983 trade e g peter diamond 1982 and investment e g nobuhiro kiyotaki 1988 exhibit synergism or strategic complementarity one agent s optimal level of activity depends positively on others activity strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria with high activity equilibria superior to low activity equilibria thus an economy may be stuck in an underemployment equilibrium even though a superior equilibrium exists models with nominal rigidities and models with coordination failures are often presented as competing paradigms 1 this paper shows that this view is incorrect we take a step toward unifying the foundations of keynesian economics by showing that the two sets of ideas are highly complementary nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes this failure has the essential features of coordination failures in previous models flexibility in one firm s price increases the incentives for other firms to make their prices flexible this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity equilibria with less rigidity more active price adjustment are often pareto superior to equilibria with more rigidity these results contribute to our understanding both of coordination failure and of nominal rigidity the range of keynesian phenomena explained by coordination failures is greatly expanded previous coordination failure models contain only real variables and thus ascribe no role to monetary policy or other determinants of nominal spending our results suggest that coordination failure is at the root of inefficient nonneutralities of money theories of nominal rigidities gain new empirical and policy im

coordination failure multiple equilibria and economic institutions models of coordination failure have equilibria that are not first best because of externalities usually these models display multiple equilibria we provide an example of how the existence of some economic institutions and government policies can be explained as mechanisms for internalizing externalities and selecting the best equilibrium in these settings the example we analyse is that of nominal wage and debt contracts nominal contracts can improve on the underinvestment equilibrium by implementing pareto improving transfers between agents if there are multiple underinvestment equilibria then monetary policy can have real effects because the monetary authority can choose a money supply rule to coordinate beliefs and thereby select the best equilibrium

in search of excellence fads success stories and adaptive emulation1 the faddishness of the business community is often noted and lamented but not well understood by standard models of innovation and diffusion we combine arguments about organizational cognition and institutional mimicry to develop a model of adaptive emulation where firms respond to perceived failure by imitating their most successful peers computational experiments show that this process generates empirically plausible cascades of adoption even if innovations are entirely worthless faddish cycles are most robust across alternative treatments of managerial decision making where innovations have modest positive effects on outcomes these results have broad implications for the faddishness of a business community increasingly marked by media driven accounts of success and for the properties of organizational practices that are hot one day and cold the next

the success of a policy model irrigation management transfer in mexico abstract the mexican policy of irrigation management transfer has been widely propagated as a success and has become a model for other countries seeking to improve the performance of their irrigation systems while also cutting public expenditures this article analyses the process of policy making that has generated the policy model and follows the practices means and events through which it has achieved increasing transnational circulation popularity and support the main argument of this article is that the success of a policy model is only a success within the cultural and ideological understandings of a policy network and given the means practices and events that generate and disseminate it this particular case further suggests that success in policy making rather than being based on straightforward evidence of improved management performance is often part of a cultural performance

price and output responsiveness to nominal changes under differential information abstract the paper considers how changes in nominal income are transmitted into price and output changes within a setting where the traditional assumption of instantaneous market clearing costless coordination is given up in favour of a more realistic setting where price decisions are made by numerous agents firms acting independently on their private decentralized information the responsiveness of firm specific prices is considered and it is shown how absolute or nominal price rigidity can be explained building this into a theory of the general price level it is proved that heterogenously perceived nominal changes affect the price level less than proportionally moreover it is shown how a phillips curve relation between inflation and output can be rationalized within the model finally the issue of relative price variability is considered and related to misallocation of economic resources under differential information

refraining from imitation professional resistance and limited diffusion in a financial market why do some practices not spread although this is an important question for both diffusion theorists and those interested in institutional change we know surprisingly little about the limitations on diffusion because most diffusion studies sample on successful diffusion i address the question of why some practices fail to spread by introducing the concept of a deviance discount a deviance discount is a systematic downgrading of the observed adoption performance of controversial practices which limits the contagion of such practices i test and find qualitative and quantitative support for my thesis in the product introduction behavior of swedish mutual fund firms my findings hold implications for diffusion theory and theories of endogenous institutional change

the interaction between indexation contract duration and non contingent wage adjustment a model of the elasticity of indexation contract duration and non contingent wage adjustment is estimated using canadian wage agreements results suggest that the degree of indexation and contract duration are interdependent and are affected by their past values labour market conditions and inflation uncertainty the correlation between the industry product prices and the cpi affects the degree of indexation non contingent wage adjustment depends on expected inflation uncompensated past inflation duration and indexation values past and present and labour market conditions this model explains total wage adjustment as well as more aggregative models designed solely for that purpose

on non uniqueness in rational expectations models an attempt at perspective abstract many macroeconomic models involving rational expectations give rise to an infinity of solution paths even when the models are linear in all variables some writers have suggested that this non uniqueness constitutes a serious weakness for the rational expectations hypothesis one purpose of the present paper is to argue that the non uniqueness in question is not properly attributable to the rationality hypothesis but instead is a general feature of dynamic models involving expectations it is also argued that there typically exists in a very wide class of linear rational expectations models a single solution that excludes bubble or bootstrap effects one that occur only because they are arbitrarily expected to occur a systematic procedure for obtaining solutions free from such effects is introduced and discussed in addition this procedure is used to interpret and reconsider several prominent examples with solution multiplicities including ones developed by fischer black and john b taylor

price level determinacy with an interest rate policy rule and rational expectations abstract this paper reconsiders a result obtained by sargent and wallace namely that price level indeterminacy obtains in their model if the monetary authorities adopt a feedback rule for the interest rate rather than the money stock it is shown that the indeterminacy vanishes if the interest rate rule is chosen so as to have a desired effect on the expected quantity of money demanded this holds even if considerable weight is given in the choice of a rule to the aim of smoothing interest rate fluctuations

information heterogeneity and market incompleteness information is market consistent if agents only use market prices to infer the underlying states of the economy this paper applies this concept to a stochastic growth model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents the economy with market consistent information can never replicate the full information equilibrium and there are substantial differences in impulse responses to aggregate productivity shocks these results are robust to the introduction of a noisy public signal and aggregate financial markets we argue that the principle of market consistent information should be applied to any model with incomplete markets

persistency in sticky price models abstract nominal rigidities imply that nominal shocks have an impact effect which may be propagated by standard mechanisms however the nominal adjustment process may in itself be a propagation mechanism causing persistent effects of nominal shocks this may be caused by inertia in nominal wage and price adjustment arising due to input output networks or multiperiod nominal contracting as captured in models with staggered price wage decisions it has recently been contested whether staggering can account for persistency of any quantitative importance this paper reviews the theory and empirical evidence on this issue and it is concluded that staggering may be a quantitative important propagation mechanism

inflationary finance of budget deficits as an automatic stabilizer abstract a rational expectations model is presented to generalize mccallum and whitaker s 1979 model the model demonstrates the effectiveness and stability of the full employment budget deficit and of inflationary finance used to finance this deficit as automatic stabilizers in the determination of current income under rational expectations within the same model the problem of optimal dynamic stochastic monetary policy is also briefly explored

the drivers of climate change innovations evidence from the australian wine industry this study examined the drivers of climate change innovations and the effects of these innovations on firm outcomes in a sample of 203 firms in the south australian wine cluster the results of structural equation modeling analysis suggest that absorptive capacity has a direct effect on climate change innovations and stimulates knowledge exchanges kes between firms in the cluster kes between firms in the cluster in turn directly affect the climate change innovations the findings suggest a perhaps counterintuitive interrelationship between firm and cluster level impacts in which kes between firms in the cluster play a partial mediating role in the innovation process the study further finds that climate change innovations are related to firm performance fp and reductions in greenhouse gases ghgs mitigative innovations lead to greater ghg reductions while adaptive innovations impact on fp contributions of the findings are discussed as are future research directions

is there a role for commodity prices in the design of monetary policy some empirical the consumer price index in the united states follows a non trend stationary stochastic process that describes the index as drifting randomly upward without bound monetarists have long pointed to similar properties in the time series of monetary aggregates as the source of this incipient inflation their solution to this problem is close adherence by the central bank to targets for a monetary or reserve aggregate that correspond to slow and steady monetary growth with any periods of excessive monetary growth subsequently offset this would produce monetary series that are trend stationary if the demand for money is reasonably stable price series would also become trend stationary and for properly chosen targets the price level would be bounded with a mean inflation rate of zero

conditional relative price variance and its determinants open economy evidence from germany the authors present empirical tests of two hypothesis derived from an open economy version of the multimarket equilibrium model the first hypothesis holds that the conditional relative price variance is positively related to the variance of domestic monetary and foreign nominal and real shocks the second hypothesis claims a negative impact of an increase in conditional relative price variance on normal output in contrast to earlier studies the authors use direct measures of conditional relative price variance based on arch estimates the authors results show that both hypotheses are consistent with german data copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

are reserve requirements relevant for economic stabilization abstract the level of the required reserve ratio and the payment of interest on required reserves are irrelevant for economic stability 1 when the central bank appropriately adjusts its interest elasticity of supply of reserves or currency to offset changes in the required reserve ratio or in the interest rate paid on required reserves or 2 when economic agents form their price level expectations rationally conditional on the current interest rate

discretion wage indexation and inflation it is now well understood that discretionary policy making frequently leads to socially sub optimal outcomes this point was first made by kydland and prescott 12 using an example of a monetary policy game they argued that in the presence of output distortions in the economy the monetary authority has an incentive to renege on earlier promises to maintain price stability by expanding the money supply in order to create unexpected inflation thereby increasing output and employment since private wage setters form expectations rationally this policy action is anticipated and in equilibrium leads to excessive inflation without any resulting change in output or employment consequently in the absence of enforceable policy rules the time consistent discretionary monetary path produces a socially sub optimal inflation rate this form of policy behavior has important implications for the decisions of private agents such as their choice of the degree of wage indexation however most work in the literature on endogenous wage indexation stemming from the seminal paper by gray 10 has analyzed the equilibrium indexation choice assuming either a constant money growth rule 1 or a monetary rule involving lagged or contemporaneous feedback 8 17 only the recent papers by devereux 5 6 have attempted to examine the implications of time consistent discretionary monetary policy for endogenous wage indexation the informational structure he considers has the monetary authority setting the money stock prior to the realization of shocks so that the authority has no information regarding current period disturbances when determining its course of action this assumption precludes any contemporaneous attempt by the monetary authority to stabilize output or the price level devereux reaches the conclusion that wage setters who are aware of the authority s policy decision will find it optimal to index positively to unanticipated price level surprises since none of the aggregate shocks are offset directly by the monetary authority thus the informational environment confronting the authority influences the degree of indexation and subsequently the manner in which aggregate demand and supply variability impinge upon social welfare

how golden parachutes unfolded diffusion and variation of a controversial practice we contribute to a growing focus on variation in diffusion processes by examining the ways in which contested practices are modified as they spread among adopters expanding on prior diffusion accounts we argue that the extensiveness and similarity of a practice will vary in response to both population and organization level mechanisms to examine these issues we study variation in golden parachute contracts a controversial corporate governance practice that emerged and spread widely during the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s using a concept network approach to analyze the composition of parachute plans we find evidence of mechanisms that both increase and decrease extensiveness and variation of golden parachutes our findings hold implications for accounts of practice diffusion over contested terrain by revealing substantial variation in the course of diffusion

trigger price regulation we consider the difficulty of achieving efficient prices and investments when returns on a public utility s projects are vulnerable to opportunistic ratemaking we model the long term relationship between a firm and its regulator as a time dependent supergame in which the regulator sets price ceilings to maximize surplus and the firm invests to maximize profit we find history dependent strategies that support self enforcing mutually beneficial equilibria equilibrium payoffs are close to the planning solution provided interest rates are small enough and capital depreciates fast enough we concentrate on trigger price regulation where in response to inefficient behavior the regulator cuts price down to operating cost and the firm curtails investment this mechanism performs well even with production economies and with restrictions on players threats

interdependences in the intrafirm diffusion of technological innovations confronting the rational and social accounts of diffusion this article investigates the intrafirm diffusion of technological innovations and the interdependences that exist among rival firms in this process previous research has offered two potential explanations for these interdependences social accounts in which they result from institutional pressures and rational accounts in which firms are interdependent as a result of how adoption by rivals affects expectations about the profitability of the technology the article offers two contributions first we propose a competitive interaction mechanism that is consistent with the fundamentals of rational accounts of diffusion second the empirical analysis shows the dominance of the proposed rational mechanism over social accounts of innovation diffusion in the generation of interdependences in the process of intrafirm diffusion

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules i a game theoretic analysis of staggered versus synchronised wage setting this paper studies the benefits of staggered wage setting in reducing strategic conflicts it is shown that when wage setters interact strategically and dynamically they prefer moving alternatingly because by doing so they are able to commit temporarily not to offset the effects of each other s action it is also shown that synchronization represents a better arrangement when agents are able to coordinate these results are consistent with the presence of nonsynchronous and decentralized wage decisions in the united states and the united kingdom and the presence of synchronous bargaining in shunto and coordination in wage determination in japan copyright 1996 by royal economic society

promoting clean energy technology entrepreneurship the role of external context abstract this study examines how political social and economic factors influence clean energy technology entrepreneurship cete government policies supporting clean energy technology development and the development of markets for clean energy create opportunities for cete however the extent to which such opportunities lead to the emergence of new clean energy businesses depends on a favorable external context promoting cete this study employs a novel dataset combining indicators of the policy and social context of cete with information on clean energy technology startup firms in the usa to provide empirical evidence that technological and market conditions supporting clean energy induce more extensive cete under contexts where local attention to clean energy issues and successful firms commercializing clean energy technologies are more prominent by establishing that cete is contingent upon a supportive local environment as well as technology and market opportunities the study holds relevance for policy makers and clean energy technology firms

informational implications of money interest rate and price rules the information available to private agents determines the effectiveness of various types of monetary policy in an economy in which private agents have differential information sets the ranking of three classes of monetary policy rules critically depends on the specification of agents information sets a price rule for example minimizes the variance of output around its full information level when agents observe both the interest rate and money stock more generally if all three monetary policy variables the money stock the price level and the interest rate are contemporaneously observed the policy ranking is indeterminate

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

interest rates aggregate information and monetary policy abstract interest rates set on economy wide markets represent an important source of information to economic agents within the class of business cycle models advanced by lucas and barro this paper explores the information conveyed by such aggregate signals and the types of monetary policies that can influence economic activity by changing the information content of interest rates

wealth effects of open market operations and optimal monetary policy abstract equilibrium models of the business cycle such as those developed by lucas 1973 and barro 1976 barro 1980 are often used to analyze the effects of monetary disturbances on the economy these models typically view monetary injections as arising through lump sum transfer payments that are independent of an agent s holdings of money this paper examines the effects caused by misperceptions about money for the more realistic case when money is injected through open market operations the major result is that unperceived open market operations have a negative wealth effect

externalities from contract length an increase in the length of a firm s labor contract contributes to rigidity in the aggregate price level this increases the variance of aggregate demand but decreases the variance of other firms real wages under certain conditions the net effect is to increase the variance of other firms employment this negative externality implies that the equilibrium contract length in a decentralized economy is greater than the social optimum in other words wages are too rigid copyright 1987 by american economic association

intermediate monetary targets and macroeconomic fluctuations it is investigated whether the choice of intermediate target has altered macroeconomic fluctuations and whether the observed changes are consistent with predictions from economic theory since implications from the theoretical literature focus on the effects of structural disturbances an empirical analysis must identify these effects the structural vector autoregressive var technique estimates structural disturbances using restrictions from standard macroeconomic theory based on descriptions of actual targeting procedures by insiders to federal reserve policy decisions the intermediate target for the united states is identified as the interest rate from 1951 to 1969 and money from 1970 to 1986 var models are estimated over each subsample to assess whether the estimated structural disturbances cause endogenous variables to behave as economic theory predicts tests are also performed to assess whether or not the targeting rule affects the variance of endogenous variables attributable to structural sh

will wage setters ever stagger decisions models featuring the implications of long term contracts typically impose the pattern of negotiation and then develop the implications of this particular structure with no analysis of whether the structure is optimal or stable recent work however focuses on the choice of the timing of wage negotiations across sectors 1 in fethke and policano 1984 we develop a two sector model in which each sector is subject to both aggregate and relative disturbances the main result is that whenever the variability of relative disturbances exceeds the weighted variability of aggregate disturbances a uniformly staggered pattern of negotiation represents a symmetric noncooperative nash solution the twosector case has special properties first the benefit associated with staggered negotiation apparently depends on the existence of large negotiating sectors in the economy second symmetry of relative disturbances in the two sector case leads to the unusual equivalence of the noncooperative and the joint optimization solutions to the problem of determining the optimal negotiation pattern one natural question concerns whether the incentive to stagger negotiation dates will diminish as the number of sectors increases in this paper we develop the three sector case in detail and then generalize the analysis to any number of sectors the results indicate that the more significant are relative disturbances the larger is the number of sectors that will be supported by a stable nash equilibrium with uniformly staggered negotiation dates in an economy characterized by atomistic sectors the incentive to stagger negotiation dates disappears we also compare the joint optimization solution with the nash solution and find that when there are more than two sectors the requirement for uniform staggering to be optimal is more difficult to satisfy under joint optimization than under the nash strategy this di

the neutrality and optimality of counter cyclical monetary policy in equilibrium models with a wealth effect a condition is offered which is both necessary and sufficient for the counter cyclical neutrality of all linear monetary feedback rules with respect to deviations in real market output in that class of stochastic macro economic models with rational expectations additive disturbances multiple markets and a wealth effect on excess commodity demand studied by barro 1976 barro and fischer 1976 king 1982 asako 1982 waldo 1982 and marini 1985 the condition has the form of a constraint on the values of the control parameters of a general monetary feedback rule that includes all other linear feedback rules in this class of models as special cases when the selection of parameters violates this constraint prospective monetary feedback can completely stabilize deviations in real market output around its natural rate without sustained inflation la neutralite et loptimalite de la politique monetaire dans des modcles d equilibre quand un effet de richesse existe on propose une condition necessaire et suffisante pour assurer la neutralite contre cyclique de toutes les regles de retroaction mon6taires lin6aires pour ce qui est des deviations dans le niveau de produit r6el dans cette classe de modeles macro economiques stochastiques avec anticipations rationnelles chocs additifs marches multiples et un effet de richesse sur la demande exc6dentaire de biens tels qu etudies par barro 1976 barro fischer 1976 king 1982 asako 1982 waldo 1982 et marini 1985 cette condition prend la forme d une contrainte sur les valeurs des parametres de controle d une regle mon6taire generale de retroaction dont toutes les autres regles mon6taires lineaires dans cette classe de modele ne sont que des cas particuliers quand la s6lection des parametres ne satisfait pas cette contrainte la retroaction mon6taire prospective peut stabiliser completement les deviations du produit reel autour de son taux naturel sans engendrer une inflation soutenue i would like to thank jim brander ed burmeister john b carlson marsha courchane mike devereux ian domowitz jim glassman craig hakkio stephen r g jones woo sik jung doug mctaggart keizo nagatani doug pearce steve poloz neil raymon stan reynolds john seater shinichi watanabe de mmn wu two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the 1986 canadian economic association meetings the 1986 north american summer meetings of the econometric society the system committee on financial canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xx no 3 august aouit 1987 printed in canada imprime au canada 0008 4085 87 612 624 1 50 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 52 on fri 21 oct 2016 05 54 00 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms neutrality and optimality 613

monetary policy and the timing of wage negotiations abstract in a model of long term labor contracts the simultaneous determination of the pattern of contract negotiation and the pattern of monetary policy intervention yields a nash equilibrium in which agents allow a discretionary role for policy the resulting pattern of negotiation depends on the stochastic nature of the system when all disturbances are aggregate in nature a synchronized pattern of negotiation is optimal regardless of the frequency of monetary policy intervention when both aggregate and relative disturbances affect the system a pattern of bunched negotiations can result with the authority intervening at dates away from the negotiation dates

coming forward the effects of social and regulatory forces on the voluntary restatement of earnings subsequent to wrongdoing we investigate the effects of social and regulatory forces on a firm s decision to disclose past wrongdoing by voluntarily restating its earnings with an eight year sample of more than 2 500 public firms including 170 voluntary restaters we find that firms are more likely to voluntarily restate their earnings in response to informal social pressures from other firms in their industry and less likely to do so in response to formal regulatory sanctions we also show that the impact of these forces varies with firm status we contribute to corporate governance and public policy research that examines the effectiveness of hard versus soft deterrence measures on firm compliance

wage contingencies the pattern of negotiation and aggregate implications of alternative contract structures abstract a model of long term contracts is developed in which the choice of the negotiation pattern is endogenized when disturbances to the economy derive primarily from relative shocks staggered negotiation is optimal because adjustments made by negotiating agents transmit desirable employment effects into sectors that are looked into previously negotiated contracts the price level acts as the transmission mechanism indexation of wages to the price level enhances the benefits of staggered negotiation because the sector specific information revealed by the price level acts as a substitute for explicit inclusion in the contract of sector specific information the degree of persistence and the level of variation in aggregate output and employment measures which are commonly used in comparing the merits of synchronized versus staggered regimes are shown to be inappropriate criteria upon which to judge the optimality of the negotiation pattern

the equilibrium and optimal timing of price changes this paper studies the welfare properties of the equilibrium timing of price changes staggered price setting has the advantage that it permits rapid adjustment to firm specific shocks but the disadvantages that it causes unwanted fluctuations in relative prices and that by creating price level inertia it can increase aggregate fluctuations because each firm ignores its contribution to these problems staggering can be a stable equilibrium even if it is highly inefficient in addition there can be multiple equilibria in the timing of prices changes indeed whenever there is an inefficient staggered equilibrium there is also an efficient equilibrium with synchronized price setting

the macroeconomic implications of financial deregulation abstract this paper explores the possible macroeconomic consequences of financial deregulation in an institutional environment where deregulation raises risks in banking the central bank is supposed to maximize an objective function in which the probability of bank failure is an argument it is then shown that the usual tradeoffs between policy objectives imply that financial deregulation will lead to more interest rate smoothing than would otherwise take place and further that because of restricted entry into banking deregulation will call for some inflation the transition toward deregulation raises special problems which are likely to require a more gradual approach toward the stationary equilibrium

is there an operational interest rate rule in his 1983 paper jeremy siegel derives a seemingly implementable policy rule involving optimal responses to interest rates the existence of such a rule would be of tremendous interest to central banks whose monetary policies place heavy weight on responses to interest rates the siegel rule is especially appealing because it is i an optimal combination policy in the sense of william poole 1970 and ii the proposed implementation of the rule does not require detailed knowledge of the structure of the economy all that is required is a calculation of the covariance between innovations in prices and interest rates within the confines of a rational expectations equilibrium model in which siegel assumes agents do not make use of information embodied in the current nominal interest rate he is able to design an optimal combination policy that does not require detailed information about the economy that such an optimal policy exists is not new but that it can be easily implemented is novel the policy rule depends solely on the covariance between innovations in the aggregate price level and innovations in the nominal rate of interest normalized by the variance of innovations in the interest rate when this index is zero policy has been set optimally when the index is positive the feedback term on interest rates in the money supply rule is too large and when the index is negative the feedback term is too small given that one can obtain reduced form expressions for prices and interest rates the index is easily computed unfortunately siegel s proposal violates robert lucas s 1976 critique that is he implicitly treats as invariant certain aspects of economic behavior that will generally change when one moves to an operational interest rate rule this note shows in detail that in a model where prices are flexible and agents observe local market prices i e the model at least employed verbally by siegel that the coefficients in the aggregate supply and demand functions are not invariant to the form of the money supply rule this lack of invariance will cause siegel s rule to be nonoperational the sensitivity of parameters in aggregate supply functions to policy is not restricted to equilibrium models with flexible prices this property also extends to contracting models with endogenous indexing see for example jo anna gray 1976 therefore siegel s rule will not be implementable in a wide variety of commonly used macro models

monetary policy and the information content of prices rational expectations and cleared markets lead to the proposition that feedback monetary policy is irrelevant to real activity as in the analyses of sargent and wallace however if agents are differentially informed and have access to a common price then prospective monetary policy actions future feedback to imperfectly known current circumstances can alter real activity by changing the information content of prices

union wage settlements during a disinflation this paper examines the role of union wage contracts in the persistence of inflation and the implication of these contracts for the problem of disinflation in the united states a quantitative model of overlapping con tracts explicitly oriented toward the major union sector is developed the model takes account of expectations of future wage price and employment conditions as in more aggregated models that have been used in macroeconomic research in addition the distribution of workers according to contract length as well as deferred wage increases and escalator clauses are explicitly used in the model the main aim of the model is to determine the constraints which these contracts impose on disinflation paths the model indicates that the maximum speed of disinflation is extremely slow in the early phases if a rise in unemployment is to be avoided but increases considerably before the new lower rate of inflation is reached the disinflation path is considerably slower than that observed after hyperinflation periods however the existence of a path of inflation reduction raises questions about whether the institution of union wage con tracts is really the direct cause of costly disinflations or whether their influence works indirectly by raising credibility problems about a monetary disinflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the information content of the interest rate and optimal monetary policy optimal monetary policy rules are derived in a rational expectations cum contracting framework monetary policy is redundant if wage setters exploit the incomplete current information embodied in today s nominal interest rate however the monetary authorities can save wage setters the costs of indexing to the interest rate a contemporaneous money supply feedback rule is as effective as wage indexation a lagged rule relevant under a regime of money supply targeting is also as effective if investors use the interest rate both rules have the same implications for the real interest rate as poole s combination policy however the two rules have strikingly different implications for the nominal interest rate

wage interdependence through decentralized bargaining abstract the idea that sector specific unions are influenced by the wages obtained by other unions has mainly been used to support the empirical observation that wages are highly correlated among industries the sources of wage interdependence can mainly be found in unions preferences in the nature of technology and in price and demand determination the presence of externalities and of strategic complementarity among unions leads to suboptimal equilibria which generates non desired inflation unemployment and possibly also trade balance deficit this enforces the idea that part of current unemployment can be eliminated by improving the cooperation between social actors

alternative time patterns of decisions and dynamic strategic interactions this paper offers a simple approach to study steady state markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players are obliged to commit their actions for several periods it highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in such games the obtained results are then applied to various either micro or macroeconomic issues where time patterns of decisions matter

tests of equilibrium macroeconomics using contemporaneous monetary data abstract this paper uses contemporaneous monetary data to carry out econometric tests of the equilibrium approach to modelling the relation between monetary disturbances and macroeconomic fluctuations the theoretical analysis introduces into an equilibrium macroeconomic model the availability of preliminary data on current monetary aggregates and the process of accumulation of revised monetary data the econometric analysis tests two hypothesis derived from this extended model one hypothesis concerns the neutrality of perceived monetary policy the econometric results imply rejection of this hypothesis the other hypothesis concerns the non neutrality of errors in preliminary monetary data the econometric results fail to reject the contrary of this hypothesis these tests provide strong evidence against the reality of the equilibrium approach

when fashion is fleeting transitory collective beliefs and the dynamics of tqm consulting we analyze changes over time in the types of consulting firms offering total quality management services when tqm was a booming management fashion consultants tended to be generalists with weak links to the technical foundations of the practice after the fashion went bust tqm consulting was increasingly populated by specialists with quality control expertise these results suggest that fashionable practices can return to their technical roots after the hype is over reversing the usual institutional trajectory they also help explain why fashion booms are so fragile and how management practices can be sustained once a boom is over

optimal monetary policy endogenous supply and rational expectations abstract in this paper we demonstrate that the choice of monetary policy regime will affect the variability of output when private agents in forming their supply decisions take into account the authority s selection of a policy rule a striking feature of the analysis is that the choice between policy rules in sargent wallace 1975 framework but with endogenous aggregate supply depends only on the variability of aggregate demand under each rule and not on the variability of aggregate supply it follows that the choice of monetary policy rules reduces to the problem analyzed by poole 1970 in the stochastic keynesian structure

monetary instruments and policy rules in a rational expectations environment abstract this paper explores the implications of rational expectations and the aggregate supply theory advanced by lucas 1973 and barro 1976 for analysis of optimal monetary policy under uncertainty along the lines of poole 1970 returning to a topic initially treated by sargent and wallace 1975 not surprisingly these two classical concepts alter both the menu of feasible policy choice and the desirability of certain policy actions in our setup unlike that of sargent and wallace 1975 the systematic component of monetary policy is a relevant determinant of the magnitude of business fluctuations that arise from shocks to the system central bank behavior both the selection of monetary instruments and the framing of overall policy response to economic conditions can work to diminish or increase the magnitude of business fluctuations however the activist policies stressed by the present discussion bear little if any relationship to the policy options rationalized by the conventional analysis of monetary policy under uncertainty in particular in contrast to poole s analysis money supply responses to the nominal interest rate are not important determinants of real economic activity rather the central bank should focus on policies that make movements in the general price level readily identifiable by economic agents

coevolution in management fashion an agent based model of consultant driven innovation the rise of management consultancy has been accompanied by increasingly marked faddish cycles in management techniques but the mechanisms that underlie this relationship are not well understood the authors develop a simple agent based framework that models innovation adoption and abandonment on both the supply and demand sides in opposition to conceptions of consultants as rhetorical wizards who engineer waves of management fashion firms and consultants are treated as boundedly rational actors who chase the secrets of success by mimicking their highest performing peers computational experiments demonstrate that consultant driven versions of this dynamic in which the outcomes of firms are strongly conditioned by their choice of consultant are robustly faddish the invasion of boom markets by low quality consultants undercuts popular innovations while simultaneously restarting the fashion cycle by prompting the flight of high quality consultants into less densely occupied niches computational experiments also indicate conditions involving consultant mobility aspiration levels mimic probabilities and client provider matching that attenuate faddishness

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

the international diffusion of public sector downsizing network emulation and theory driven learning we examine change in the size of the public sector between 1980 and 1997 across twenty six organization for economic cooperation and development oecd member nations with particular attention to diffusion dynamics general method of moments gmm analyses demonstrate imitation of shifts in government employment within the united states and mutual influence among nations that are geographically proximate and that trade extensively disaggregated analyses show that downsizing is contagious while upsizing is not proximate downsizers but not upsizers are imitated and states act on evidence that downsizing is economically beneficial while ignoring evidence that it is harmful we argue that these asymme tries in emulation and learning are a product of the dominance of neoliberal and managerialist discourses that legitimate and theorize shrinking the public sector the twentieth century as a whole and particularly the three decades after world war ii witnessed steady growth in government size and responsibility states devel oped extensive social safety nets actively managed aggregate demand and regu lated a widening swath of economic and social life this trajectory of expansion was linked to powerful forces of economic development and demographic change and anchored in a broad political consensus 1 the 1980s and 1990s saw a sea change in the rate of public sector growth brit ish prime minister margaret thatcher and u s president ronald reagan led the way with privatization outsourcing and load shedding of public responsibilities but the shift in direction was not limited to radicals on the right country reports

on endogenously staggered prices taylor s model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks however in standard imperfect competition models if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions they will typically choose to synchronize this paper provides a simple model of imperfect competition which produces stable staggering our argument relies on strategic interaction at two levels between firms within an industries and across industries and produces a continuum of staggered price equilibria these equilibria are strict and hence stable under a simple adaptive learning process an enduring problem for business cycle theory is an explanation for the persistent effects of nominal shocks explaining persistence is particularly problematic for theories based on nominal shocks as opposed to real shocks this is because rational expectations implies that nominal shocks themselves cannot be serially correlated since nominal shocks are the deviation of realized nominal magnitudes from expected values in two important papers taylor 1979 1980 provided an argument as to why a nominal shock can have persistent effects taylor s argument required two important assumptions first he assumed that firms could adjust prices only in alternate periods an assumption which may be justified by menu or information costs taylor s second assumption was that price setting was staggered half the firms were constrained to adjust prices in odd periods while the other half were allowed to adjust prices in even periods these two assumptions combined to provide dramatic results on nominal inertia the adjustment of prices to a nominal shock is slow and hence output effects are long lasting taylor s results on persistence arise due to strategic complementarity between price setting decisions this implies that each firm s optimal price is an increasing function of the aggregate price level if a shock arrives in an even period firms in the even cohort will not adjust fully to the nominal shock since firms in the odd cohort have fixed prices in the current period furthermore with rational expectations the even cohort also takes into account the fact that its own failure to adjust fully will also make for partial adjustment in future periods this elegant story has made taylor s model possibly the most influential of new keynesian models by providing a dynamic setting within which small nominal rigidities may result in persistent nominal inertia