bilateral trade and shocks in political relations evidence from china and some of its major trading partners 1990 2013 abstract an extensive number of studies investigate the effects of political relations on trade by estimating a gravity model using annual or quarterly data we argue that the use of low frequency data introduces an aggregation bias because the cycle of moderate political shocks is much shorter measured in weeks using monthly data from 1990 through 2013 for china we estimate a model of political relations and conclude that political shocks are short lived narrative evidence from two case studies illustrates the transitory nature of these shocks a var model shows that although political shocks influence exports to china the effects largely vanish within two months a comparison of the monthly and annual frequency gravity equation regressions illustrates the effects of temporal aggregation

conflict cooperation and commerce the effect of international political interactions on bilateral trade flows the public choice approach to political economy is employed to gain insight into the connection between international politics and trade flows a model is constructed in which importers are assumed to be rational utility maximizers who seek to satisfy international security as well as economic welfare objectives this model of bilateral trade flows reflects contemporary theory in the field of international economics and it explicitly incorporates the general foreign policy orientation of importers among its determinants the model is tested in 16 annual crosssectional estimations 1960 75 for a complete network of 25 countries the findings show considerable support for the hypothesis that trade flows are significantly influenced by broad political relations of amity and enmity between nations the author concludes that nations adjust trade ties to satisfy security as well as economic welfare goals and that a formal political economy of trade should reflect this fact

what separates us sources of resistance to globalization with increasing sophistication economists have been estimating gravity equations for five decades robust evidence shows that borders and distance impede trade by much more than tariffs or transports costs can explain we therefore advocate investigation of other sources of resistance despite the greater difficult involved in measuring and modelling them from our selective review of recent findings a unifying explanation emerges a legacy of historical isolation and conflict forged a world economy in which neither tastes nor information are homogeneously distributed cultural difference and inadequate information manifest themselves most strongly at national borders and over distance

transforming the energy sector the evolution of technological systems in renewable energy technology this paper analyses the development and diffusion of technologies that utilize renewable energy sources in germany sweden and the netherlands the analysis enlarges the life cycle model of industry evolution to one where the focus is on the formation and evolution of new technological systems particular focus is on explaining success and failures in shifting from a formative phase into one characterized by positive feedbacks a set of challenges is identified for policy makers attempting to influence the process of transforming the energy sector

the effects of the international security environment on national military expenditures a multicountry study we consider the influence of countries external security environments on their military spending we first estimate the ex ante probability that a country will become involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute using a model of dyadic conflict that incorporates key elements of liberal and realist theories of international relations we then estimate military spending as a function of the threat of armed interstate conflict and other influences arms races the defense expenditures of friendly countries actual military conflict democracy civil war and national economic output in a panel of 165 countries 1950 to 2000 we find our prospectively generated estimate of the external threat to be a powerful variable in explaining military spending a 1 percentage point increase in the aggregate probability of a fatal militarized dispute as predicted by our liberal realist model leads to a 3 percent increase in a country s military expenditures

power politics and international trade r recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade we argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly doing so leads us to two conclusions 1 free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances and 2 alliances are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 we test these hypotheses the results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar rather than in multipolar systems in the early 1970s students of international relations began what would become a long and heated debate about the political correlates of open international markets recently however an important element of consensus has begun to emerge most contributors to this debate now seem to agree that the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade explains the relative dearth of open international markets here we argue that what has become the standard prisoner s dilemma representation neglects the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in the anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly in order to do so we construct and analyze a simple game theoretic model the results of this analysis demonstrate that tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual or potential adversaries these differences imply that free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances however our analysis also suggests that the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts less credible exit threats and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability explain the advantage of a bipolar system we test this argument using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 the empirical analysis supports our argument it demonstrates that alliances have a direct statistically significant and large effect upon bilateral trade moreover it shows that on average alliances have a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in a multipolar world 2

second order sustainability conditions for the development of sustainable innovations in a dynamic environment abstract in particular radical innovations can be important means to achieving improved sustainability due to the existence of path dependency and lock in however the transition from one technological trajectory to another more sustainable one is often impeded by significant barriers fortunately these barriers are by their nature subject to substantial changes in time so it makes sense to carefully distinguish between periods of stability showing high barriers in which the given trajectory can hardly be left and periods of instability characterized by low barriers where a new trajectory can be reached more easily the latter distinction matters since sustainable innovations often rely on governmental regulation and the economic burden arising from this regulation will be much lower in periods of instability moreover due to the complexity and dynamics of change in their respective environments innovations are generally associated with fundamental uncertainty such that it becomes impossible to predict the degree of sustainability yielded by specific innovations in the longer run under these circumstances it is essential to facilitate the change between trajectories and to allow for the possibility to select between a variety of alternative trajectories within a process of trial and error sustainability as viewed from this evolutionary perspective is therefore better understood as the general capability to adapt that is to readily change from less to more sustainable technological trajectories since the latter kind of sustainability determines the conditions under which the former kind i e sustainability related to a specific technology can be achieved the two kinds are respectively called second order and first order sustainability finally a series of determinants and corresponding indicators from the techno economic political and socio cultural sphere is identified which after proper measurement and weighting allow for making an assessment whether and when the incumbent industry is sufficiently destabilized and the political system rendered sufficiently favorable to the new more sustainable technology such that a transition to the preferred trajectory is possible without too much effort

arming in the global economy the importance of trade with enemies and friends abstract we analyze how trade openness matters for interstate conflict over productive resources our analysis features a terms of trade channel that makes security policies trade regime dependent specifically trade between two adversaries reduces each one s incentive to arm given the opponent s arming if these countries have a sufficiently similar mix of initial resource endowments greater trade openness brings with it a reduction in resources diverted to conflict and thus wasted as well as the familiar gains from trade although a move to trade can otherwise induce greater arming by one country and thus need not be welfare improving for both aggregate arming falls by contrast when the two adversaries do not trade with each other but instead trade with a third friendly country a move from autarky to trade intensifies conflict between the two adversaries inducing greater arming with data from the years surrounding the end of the cold war we exploit the contrasting implications of trade costs between enemies versus trade costs between friends to provide some suggestive evidence in support of the theory

the effects of bilateral attitudes on imports research based on the gravity model has shown that non economic factors affect international trade and recent studies have shown that people s perception affects economic exchange in this study we explore the effects of attitudes on bilateral trade using survey data from the pew research center s global attitudes projects for 68 countries from 2002 to 2015 we find that a more favourable attitude of a country towards another country will increase the former country s imports from the latter the result is robust to an endogeneity check to different measures of attitudes and to different estimation methods however heterogeneity is observed across different types of goods and countries the result holds for trade in intermediate and consumer goods but the effects are not statistically significant for capital goods the effects are statistically significant for bilateral trade between different country groups except for high income countries imports from non high income countries

correction to the political determinants of international trade efforts to replicate our study of the effects of politics on trade flows between the major powers have revealed that the computer program written to calculate the estimates produced errors in both the coefficients and the standard errors furthermore these errors have some consequences for the results in this brief corrigendum we present corrected tables for our research note and a slightly modified interpretation of the results our study examined evidence to assess three arguments about how politics may affect trade the first contends that positive political relations in a dyad result in higher levels of trade this argument leads to two hypotheses states in conflict will have a lower level of trade than those not in conflict and trade will increase with the degree of common interests between a pair of states the second argument concludes that democratic dyads will have a higher level of trade than other dyads the third argument focuses on the security concerns of states and leads to the hypotheses that alliances will increase trade in a bipolar system but will have no effect in a multipolar system we refer readers to the original article for a fuller statement of the logic of these arguments their respective hypotheses and a complete statement of our research design and operationalization of the variables morrow siverson and tabares 1998

violence instability and trade evidence from kenya s cut flower sector summary we examine the implications of the violence and instability following the 2007 kenyan elections and how it affected cut flower trade between kenya and the eu using the rotterdam demand model we find that the post election violence had a negative impact on eu imports from kenya equivalent to 33 million which is significant given the importance of flowers to kenya s economy results show that even a short period of violence can have an effect on trade since instability in an exporting country causes importers to source from other countries perceived as less risky persisting even when order is restored

one money one market the effect of common currencies on trade currency unions their dramatic effect on international trade a gravity model is used to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade the panel data bilateral observations for five years during 1970 90 covering 186 countries includes 300 observations in which both countries use the same currency i find a large positive effect of a currency union on international trade and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility even after controlling for a host of features including the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime these effects statistically significant imply that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies currency unions like the european emu may thus lead to a large increase in international trade with all that that entails andrew rose

episodes of war and peace in an estimated open economy model we analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the u s france germany and the uk by means of an estimated open economy model the model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation sovereign default a military draft household preferences and spillovers on other exogenous processes productivity investment trade policy variables if the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the u s other factors are crucial in other countries we also discuss the size and state dependence of public spending multipliers and a counterfactual welfare exercise

lead markets and regulation a framework for analyzing the international diffusion of environmental innovations abstract environmental regulations are often intended to stimulate the generation and adoption of eco efficient innovations an important argument in the public debate is also the creation of new markets for environmentally benign products processes and services in other countries and the generation as a result of export opportunities for the pioneering country lead markets research on lead markets has not however focused on environmental innovations to date we therefore extend the lead market model to environmental innovations and take particular account of the peculiarities of such innovations in particular the public good character of environmental benefits and the role of regulations this approach is applied to two case studies wind energy and fuel efficient passenger cars in both cases the innovation was initially adopted in one country other countries subsequently adopted the same innovation design favored by the lead market which in turn developed into a large exporter in the wind generation and car industries respectively we discuss the regulations employed and the reasons for the international success of the innovations induced by them our findings demonstrate that when supported by global demand or regulatory trends strict regulation results in the creation of lead markets finally we provide recommendations on how our model could be used for further research and in the development of a coordinated environmental and innovation policy

the political determinants of international trade the major powers 1907 1990 we test three arguments about the effect of international politics on trade flows the first argument states that trade flows are greater between states with similar interests than those with dissimilar interests the second that trade flows are greater in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads and the third that trade flows are greater between allies we examine trade flows between the major powers from 1907 to 1990 this period provides variation on all three independent variables of interest and allows us to separate the three arguments empirically we estimate a gravity model of trade with the above political variables added our results demonstrate that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad but alliances generally do not even when controlling for polarity of the system

once an enemy forever an enemy the long run impact of the japanese invasion of china from 1937 to 1945 on trade and investment abstract in this study we exploit one of the most important conflicts of the 20th century between what are currently the world s second and third largest economies that is the japanese invasion of china from 1937 to 1945 to investigate the long term impact of conflicts between countries on cross border trade and investment we find that japanese multinationals are less likely to invest in chinese regions that suffered greater civilian casualties during the japanese invasion and these regions also trade less with japan our study shows that historical animosity still influences international trade and investment despite the trend toward an increasingly globalized world

political oil import diversification by financial and commercial traders abstract international politics affects the oil trade but do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics we construct a firm level dataset for all u s oil importing companies over 1986 2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in political distance between the u s and her trading partners measured by divergence in their un general assembly voting patterns consistent with previous macro evidence we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity however the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold up risks which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical fdi that is subject to expropriation in particular our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from u s political enemies interestingly while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk

product quality and sustainability the effect of international environmental agreements on bilateral trade this paper addresses the impact of sustainability in production on international trade in particular it examines the effect of the international tropical timber agreement itta on tropical timber trade the empirical analysis is based on a gravity equation in a difference in difference setting which is estimated by a panel heckman s selection model this accounts for the potentially systematic selection of trading partners into timber trade activity we then conduct a comprehensive comparative static analysis solving the structural gravity model with and without the itta this allows us to determine the trade impact of an itta induced increase in sustainability for participating as well as for third countries we find that countries participating in the itta exhibit a significant and substantial increase in trade intensity ranging from 4 to 6 furthermore we observe that this effect is more pronounced for smaller member countries non itta countries are confronted with reduced tropical timber flows

prospects for expanded utilization of biogas in germany the prospects for expanded utilization of biogas systems in german was analysed by identifying the operational and policy factors affecting the complete chain of processes from implementation process for biogas plants through to biogas production and utilization it was found that the renewable energies act eeg and energy tax reliefs provide bases for the support of expanded utilization upgrading of biogas to natural gas quality for utilization in the transportation sector was arguably the most promising technology that could support rapid utilization expansion sustainable deployment of biogas systems in light of the unstable feedstock prices and availability and the need for subsidy free operation in the long term requires enhancement of feedstock flexibility and quality characteristics to maximise gas yield and optimisation of the anaerobic digestion process management assessment of energy balance and potential environmental impacts of the integrated process chain provides a holistic assessment of sustainability the results also support the development and foster of policies and framework for development of biogas as environmentally friendly energy resource among a mix of renewable energy sources hence compete favourably with fossil fuels to enhance the prospects for expanded utilization

exchange rate regimes and international trade evidence from the classical gold standard era in this paper we show that the spread of the classical gold standard in the late nineteenth century increased international trade flows this positive effect was compounded whenever a group of countries formed a monetary union applying the gravity model of trade to more than 1 100 country pairs during the 1870 1910 period we find that two countries on gold would trade 60 percent more with each other than with countries on a different monetary standard moreover a monetary union would more than double bilateral trade flows our findings are relevant for current discussions on alternative monetary arrangements for the twenty first century

alliances preferential trading arrangements and international trade c oncerns about the stability of the international trading system have become widespread in recent years many observers feel that the relatively liberal system forged after world war ii is being undermined by the proliferation of preferential trading arrangements these concerns have spawned a great deal of empirical research much of which has found that such arrangements exert a substantial effect on trade flows yet these studies have neglected the role political military alliances play in shaping patterns of commerce this omission is important because there is ample reason to expect that alliances guide trade flows and preferential trading arrangements often are comprised of allies as a result extant analyses risk confusing the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on commerce and systematically overstating the effects of the latter in this study we analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows both factors are likely to promote trade among members but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce the combination of an alliance which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade and a commercial institution which liberalizes trade among members is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties to both 1

terror networks and trade does the neighbor hurt abstract this paper studies how network related terrorism redistributes trade flows across countries including those countries that are not a direct source of terror we first develop a game theoretical framework with imperfect information on the spatial location of transnational terrorism to show how the resulting security measures produce a non monotonic effect on the distribution of trade across countries neighbors adjacent to terror even when they do not source it have trade reduced through enhanced security measures while countries farther away benefit from those security measures second to empirically assess the distortional effects of terrorism on trade we first estimate the structural gravity equation derived from our theory then armed with the estimates of the partial effect of neighbor terror on bilateral trade we perform a counterfactual experiment and confirm the non monotonic general equilibrium effect of neighbor terror on trade

does trade still follow the flag t he economic ties between any two nations are frequently affected by a warming or cooling of bilateral diplomatic relations but there is little to be found in modern economics or political science that helps us understand the connections between international politics and commerce the notion that international economics could be studied in isolation from its political underpinnings or consequences would have been quite alien to mercantilist thinkers in the eighteenth century or to the critics or advocates of imperialism in the nineteenth that economics and politics were inextricably intertwined was taken as a matter of course indeed trade follows the flag was central to these people s understanding of world politics and international economics intellectual trends over the past century radically changed this worldview the ascendancy of liberalism in economic thought brought with it a compartmentalization of disciplines that may now be eroding but we are left with theories of international politics and economics that are very weakly bridged the objective of this study is to map one of the many connections between international politics and commercial ties specifically i seek to identify and measure the effect of changes in state to state diplomatic relations on trade flows between those nations theoretical underpinnings of my effort are in the tradition of public choice political economy frey 1984 because i treat importers as rational utility maximizers and their behavior as determined by preferences pursued within a context of specified constraints the model i put forward is wholly consistent with contemporary neoclassical trade theory but i extend the economists notion of welfare and contend that importers take account not only of the price and quantity of goods and services but of the place of origin of these products and the political relationship between the importing and the exporting nation they do so essentially for traditional security reasons that is importers are motivated to manage their trade relations in ways that minimize risks of disruption in supply or the possibility of hurting friends or

collateral damage trade disruption and the economic impact of war abstract conventional wisdom in economic history suggests that conflict between countries can be enormously disruptive of economic activity especially international trade we study the effects of war on bilateral trade with available data extending back to 1870 using the gravity model we estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of wars on the trade of belligerent nations and neutrals controlling for other determinants of trade as well as the possible effects of reverse causality we find large and persistent impacts of wars on trade national income and global economic welfare we also conduct a general equilibrium comparative statics exercise that indicates costs associated with lost trade might be at least as large as the conventionally measured direct costs of war such as lost human capital as illustrated by case studies of world wars i and ii

impact of historical conflict on fdi location and performance japanese investment in china historical relations between countries bring important explanatory power for foreign direct investment fdi decisions yet little is known on whether a home host country relation exhibits heterogeneous effects on fdi across the country s subnational regions in this study we examine the long term impact of historical conflict on fdi location choices and performance using a sample of 8 646 japanese fdi in china we show that civilian casualties in different provinces of china during the second sino japanese war exert deterring effects on japanese fdi location choices furthermore we demonstrate that civilian casualties negatively affect japanese fdi performance and political capital accumulation strategies in the forms of excessive tax payment and local employment can reduce this negative effect this study contributes to the discussion on how within country differences of historical factors affect fdi location decisions and performance the findings on firms political capital accumulation strategies also provide important implications for fdi operation in an environment characterized by historical animosity

war signals a theory of trade trust and conflict we construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter ethnic trust and trade the model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups inter ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group since conflict disrupts trade the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time transmitting them to the next generation the theory bears a set of testable predictions first war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs second the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode third accidental conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts a war trap the incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers fostering inter ethnic trade and human capital and shifting beliefs coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects

evolutionary approaches for sustainable innovation policies from niche to paradigm fostering technological innovation is considered as an important element of policies towards sustainable development in the past 10 years evolutionary policy approaches have been increasingly advocated for several reasons they seem well equipped to underpin sustainable innovation policies they focus on dynamics of change and their drivers they allow for a substantive perspective on technologies beyond mere input output relations taking into account trajectories and different characteristics of innovation and they are able to describe circumstances under which established technologies might persist even when they are to some extent inferior to their new competitors lock in however the policy effectiveness of evolutionary approaches in cases in which radical or systemic changes are involved is not yet proven in this paper we assess the theoretical rationale instrumental aspects and the coping with policy constraints of three evolutionary policy approaches which have also been used in empirical studies strategic niche management transition management and time strategies each approach has its strengths and specific problems and all three have to be further developed and tested out but they hold promise for contributing to non incremental change with economic and environmental benefits by shaping processes of variation selection and retention with the outcomes feeding back into policy they may also be used in other areas in which innovation direction is important for instance health care or food

make trade not war this paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and trade we show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is economically beneficial military conflicts reduce trade and leaders are rational when war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains however countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict we test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950 2000 period using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues including instrumental variables we find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness for proximate countries we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military conflict

bilateral trade flows the linder hypothesis and exchange risk bilateral trade flows are used to examine the linder hypothesis and the effect of exchange rate variability in a gra vity type trade model derived from an underlying demand and supply mo del a behavioral model is used to justify examining these issues joi ntly the model performs well empirically using a sample of seventeen countries for the period 1974 82 the authors find overwhelming supp ort for the linder hypothesis and this version of the gravity model moreover they find strong support for the hypothesis that increased exchange rate variability affects bilateral trade flows copyright 1987 by mit press

a new world order explaining the international diffusion of the gold standard 1870 1913 abstract the gold standard gradually became an international monetary regime after 1870 similarly some nations in the european union are waiting to adopt the euro while others have joined immediately what explains the timing of exchange rate regime adoption to find out the international diffusion of the gold standard is analyzed duration analysis shows that network externalities operating through trade channels the desire to decrease borrowing costs on international capital markets and the level of development matter some evidence shows that the level of exchange rate volatility or inflationist agricultural interests did not matter for the timing of adoption

insecure resources bilateral trade and endogenous predation a game theoretic analysis of conflict and trade this article analyzes how interstate conflict over resources affects the incentives to trade and how greater trade openness affects the endogenous decisions of arming by enemy countries we identify conditions under which there is trade between two adversary countries and show that each adversary s arming affects domestic welfare in three different ways the first is an export revenue effect which increases welfare because arming causes export revenue to go up i e there is an arming induced terms of trade improvement the second is a resource predation effect which increases welfare because arming increases the appropriation of a rival country s resource input to produce a consumption good the third is an output distortion effect which reduces welfare because arming lowers the domestic production of civilian goods based on these effects we show circumstances in which greater trade openness reduces the intensity of arming we also discuss the implications of resource security asymmetry for conflict and trade

ex tridenti mercatus sea power and maritime trade in the age of globalization this paper tests an implication of the hypothesis that hegemons provide increased global stability and thus promote international commerce specifically we measure the influence of naval power projections on global trade during the latter 19th and early 20th centuries a time of relative peace and robust commercial activity we use archival data on the navies of britain france the united states and germany capturing longitudinal measures of ship deployment tonnage and ship personnel first we develop an empirical naval arms race model and demonstrate that the navies of britain and france in particular responded rigorously to each other we then use our estimates of naval power projected around the world by britain and france to measure their effects on bilateral trade in a panel data gravity model results indicate that while navies had some positive impact on their own nation s trade other nations trade suffered our results show that rather than bolster globalization the first global arms race damaged commercial interests and lowered trade potential around the world

what are the categories of geopolitical risks that could drive oil prices higher acts or threats abstract this study characterizes the oil market as a nonlinear switching phenomenon and examines its dynamics in response to changes in geopolitical risks over low and high risk scenarios we separate the shocks due to geopolitical acts from those due to geopolitical threats to address whether the serious effects of geopolitical risks are mostly due to increased threats of adverse events or to their realization as acts while we find the acts to generate a positive and strong impact on oil price dynamics the effect of threats appears to be moderate or non significant imperfect information in the oil price determination the history of oil supply disruptions emanating from geopolitical events the continued rise in populism in the world oil market volatility multifractility and the time varying degree of weak form efficiency have been advanced to explain the unforeseen responses of oil prices to geopolitical threats to accommodate recent oil related events we construct a composite geopolitical risk indicator by accounting for contemporaneous sources of geopolitical risks namely global trade tensions us china relation risks us iran tensions saudi arabia s uncertainty and venezuela s crisis the combined effects have an outsized impact on oil prices

clear and clean the fixed effects of the liberal peace in their article in this issue donald p green soo yeon kim and david h yoon claim contrary to liberal theory and extensive evidence that neither joint democracy nor economic interdependence significantly reduces the frequency of militarized interstate disputes in pooled time series analyses when dyadic fixed effects are taken into account similarly their fixed effects analyses contradict theory and previous evidence that democracies have higher levels of trade with one another than do other types of states our reexamination however refutes both claims and reinforces previous findings their fixed effects analyses of disputes produces distorted results because they consider a relatively short time period 1951 92 in which variation in the binary dependent variable and the key independent variables democracy and trade is limited when we analyze a longer period 1886 1992 the results confirm liberal theory the differences between our analyses of bilateral trade and those of green kim and yoon primarily arise from a seemingly minor methodological decision a more reasonable method confirms that democracies do have higher levels of trade than expected on purely economic grounds though we do not advocate a fixed effects model for analyzing these data and have serious reservations about its general usefulness our findings provide additional confirmation of liberal theories of international relations

regional trading arrangements natural or supernatural members of the customs union the potential unfavorable effects arise from the introduction of distortions in the relative price between the goods of members and nonmembers in terms of classic customs union theory the trade off is between trade creation and trade diversion the entire exercise assumes that the firstbest solution of worldwide free trade is not attainable for political reasons thus the choice between a status quo of nondiscriminatory most favored nation mfn tariffs and a move to preferential trading arrangements pta s is an exercise in the theory of the second best this paper summarizes recent research by the authors we make an evaluation of the

sovereign risk credibility and the gold standard 1870 1913 versus 1925 31 author s obstfeld maurice taylor alan m abstract what determines sovereign risk we study the london bond market from the 1870s to the 1930s our findings support conventional wisdom concerning the low credibility of the interwar gold standard before 1914 gold standard adherence effectively signalled credibility and shaved up to 30 basis points from country borrowing spreads in the 1920s however simply resuming prewar gold parities was insufficient to secure benefits countries that devalued before resumption were treated more favorably and markets scrutinized other signals public debt and british empire membership were important determinants of spreads after world war one but not before

international trade and finance complementaries in the united kingdom 1870 1913 and the united states 1920 1930 abstract do international trade and finance flow together in a variety of theoretical models trade and finance can be shown to have the potential to be substitutes or complements so the matter must be resolved empirically we study trade and financial flows from the united kingdom from 1870 to 1913 and the united states in the interwar years these were the two major capital exporters and key financial centers in each era we find that trade and finance were robustly correlated for each case we consider simultaneity issues we also discuss evidence from the british empire which casts doubt on the idea that trade is a punishment device in the event of a default

u s war costs two parts temporary one part permanent military spending fatalities and the destruction of capital all of which are immediately felt and are often large are the most overt costs of war they are also relatively short lived but the costs of war borne by combatants and their caretakers which includes families communities and the modern welfare state tend instead to be lifelong in this paper i show that a significant component of the budgetary costs associated with u s wars is long lived one third to one half of the total present value of historical war costs are benefits distributed over the remaining life spans of veterans and their dependents even thirty years after the end of hostilities typically half of all benefits remain to be paid estimates of the costs of injuries and deaths suggest that the private burden of war borne by survivors namely the uncompensated costs of service related injuries are also large and long lived

elections and political risk new evidence from the 2008 taiwanese presidential election abstract we examine the effects of party platforms on the economic opportunities of firms using a unique data set from a political prediction market in taiwan a country with two dominant parties whose political cleavage derives mainly from a single issue the one china principle we find that during the 2008 presidential campaign the share price of taiwanese firms with investments in the mainland responded strongly and positively to a positive electoral outlook for the kmt the party which advocates lifting caps on cross strait investment in mainland china the response is strongest for those firms who have already hit their caps

trade blocs trade flows and international conflict the relationship between foreign trade and political conflict has been a persistent source of controversy among scholars of international relations existing empirical studies of this topic have focused on the effects of trade flows on conflict but they have largely ignored the institutional context in which trade is conducted in this article we present some initial quantitative results pertaining to the influence on military disputes of preferential trading arrangements ptas a broad class of commercial institutions that includes free trade areas common markets and customs unions we argue that parties to the same pta are less prone to disputes than other states and that hostilities between pta members are less likely to occur as trade flows rise between them moreover we maintain that heightened commerce is more likely to inhibit conflict between states that belong to the same preferential grouping than between states that do not our results accord with this argument based on an analysis of the period since world war ii we find that trade flows have relatively little effect on the likelihood of disputes between states that do not participate in the same pta within ptas however there is a strong inverse relationship between commerce and conflict parties to such an arrangement are less likely to engage in hostilities than other states and the likelihood of a military dispute dips markedly as trade increases between them

institutional differences and the direction of bilateral foreign direct investment flows are south south flows any different than the rest we explore the asymmetric effects of institutional differences on bilateral foreign direct investment fdi flows conditional on countries development levels previous experiences of foreign investors and bilateral trade relations the empirical results using bilateral fdi data from 134 countries during 1990 2009 suggest that institutional differences create entry barriers for foreign investors only in north south and south north directions and more so for the former furthermore southern investors appear to have a comparative advantage in institutionally different developing countries finally we find no evidence that investor experiences in other institutionally different countries or existing trade linkages negate the negative effect of institutional distance

mars or mercury the geopolitics of international currency choice we assess the role of economic and security considerations in the currency composition of international reserves we contrast the mercury hypothesis that currency choice is governed by pecuniary factors familiar to the literature such as economic size and credibility of major reserve currency issuers against the mars hypothesis that this depends on geopolitical factors using data on foreign reserves of 19 countries before world war i for which the currency composition of reserves is known and security alliances proliferated our results lend support to both hypotheses we find that military alliances boost the share of a currency in the partner s foreign reserve holdings by 30 percentage points these findings speak to current discussions about the implications of possible u s disengagement from global geopolitical affairs in a hypothetical scenario where the u s withdraws from the world our estimates suggest that long term u s interest rates could rise by as much as 80 basis points assuming that the composition of global reserves changes but their level does not

fixed exchange rates and trade abstract a classic argument for a fixed exchange rate is its promotion of trade empirical support for this however is mixed while one branch of research consistently shows a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility on trade another more recent branch presents evidence of a large positive impact of currency unions on trade this paper helps resolve this disconnect our results which use a new data based classification of fixed exchange rate regimes show a large significant effect of a fixed exchange rate on bilateral trade between a base country and a country that pegs to it these results suggest an economically relevant role for exchange rate regimes in trade determination since a significant amount of world trade is conducted between countries with fixed exchange rates

international politics and import diversification abstractthis paper examines how international politics affects trade in the absence of empires or wars we first show that deterioration of relations between the united states and another country measured by divergence in their united nations general assembly voting patterns reduced u s imports from that country during 1962 2000 though statistically significant the magnitude of the effect of political distance on trade is small indeed we show that except for petroleum and some chemical products u s imports are not affected by international politics american firms however diversify their oil imports significantly away from political opponents of the united states oil trade is often associated with backward vertical foreign direct investment that is subject to the expropriation risk in contrast to the usual claim that oil is a strategic commodity we provide suggestive evidence that trade in products when rents are appropriable is more likely to be affected by international politics