business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms abstract we investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller more informationally opaque riskier and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions the improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability and depends on the sharing of firms payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office the value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office furthermore in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength

salvaging gresham s law the good the bad and the illegal contrary to the claims of arthur rolnick and warren weber gresham s law is not a fallacy nor does it rest on the unrealistic assumption of an operational fixed disequilibrium exchange rate between two economically distinct monies here i interpret gresham s law as a result of coercive legal tender laws aimed at discouraging agents from discriminating among alternative monies such laws can systematically drive good money out of circulation by placing buyers and sellers in a prisoner s dilemma in which the use of bad money represents a unique noncooperative equilibrium i offer some historical examples which are not readily explainable using rolnick and weber s proposed alternative to gresham s law copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

do relationships matter evidence from loan officer turnover we show that the cost of employee turnover in firms that rely on decentralized knowledge and personal relationships depends on the firms planning horizons and the departing employees incentives to transfer information using exogenous shocks to the relationship between borrowers and loan officers we document that borrowers whose loan officers are on leave are less likely to receive new loans from the bank are more likely to apply for credit from other banks and are more likely to miss payments or go into default these costs are smaller when turnover is expected as in the case of maternity leave or when loan officers have incentives to transfer information as in the case of voluntary resignations this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

evidence on whether banks consider carbon risk in their lending decisions banks face a dilemma in choosing between maximising profits and facilitating the sustainable use of resources within a carbon constrained future this study provides empirical evidence on this dilemma investigating whether a bank loan announcement for a firm with high carbon risk conveys information to investors about the firm s carbon risk exposure collected through a bank s pre loan screening and ongoing monitoring we use a sample of 120 bank loan announcements for asx listed firms over the period 2009 2015 we measure high low carbon risk exposure based on whether firms meet do not meet the reporting threshold of the nger scheme we document positive and significant excess loan announcement returns for loan renewals for high carbon risk firms but not for loan initiations further we document a more significant loan announcement return for renewals with favourable term revisions finally we find no evidence that the market differentiates between domestic and foreign lenders taken together our results suggest that investors perceive that banks incorporate carbon risk considerations into their lending decisions our results highlight the value of banks as financial intermediaries given the information asymmetry surrounding firms carbon risk exposure and more generally the need to extend modern banking theory to consider issues such as the impact of banks csr reputation on lending decisions

bad times good credit banks limited knowledge about borrowers creditworthiness constitutes an important friction in credit markets is this friction deeper in recessions thereby contributing to cyclical swings in credit or is the friction reduced as bad times reveal information about firm quality we test these alternative hypotheses using internal ratings data from a large swedish cross border bank and credit scores from a credit bureau the ability to classify corporate borrowers by credit quality is greater during bad times and worse during good times soft and hard information measures both display countercyclical patterns our results suggest that information frictions in corporate credit markets are intrinsically countercyclical and not due to cyclical variation in monitoring effort the presence of countercyclical information frictions provides a rationale for countercyclical provisions or capital in banks to smooth credit cycles

on a tight leash does bank organizational structure matter for macroprudential spillovers abstract this paper examines whether the organizational form of multinational banks foreign affiliates affects cross border spillovers of macroprudential regulation we compare changes in the growth of lending provided by foreign banks branches versus subsidiaries in the united kingdom in response to changes in capital requirements lending standards and reserve requirements in foreign banks home countries our results suggest that a tightening of capital requirements at home reduces uk branches interbank lending growth by 5 7 pp more relative to subsidiaries we link this effect to the higher degree of control which parent banks hold over operations of their foreign branches compared to subsidiaries supporting this hypothesis a set of further tests illustrates that the response of foreign affiliates operating under a branch structure is stronger where parent banks are more likely to delegate more decision making authority to the board of directors of their subsidiaries

income redistribution in a common labor market when households are mobile among jurisdictions income redistribution by individual jurisdictions creates fiscal externalities a model of interjurisdictional migration is used to study the nature of this redistributive externality analysis of optimal redistribution and optimal corrective subsidies from higher level governments shows that benefit levels for the recipients of income transfers and tax rates on mobile taxpayers should be equalized across jurisdictions a system of jurisdictions with a common labor market can achieve welfare improvements through coordination of domestic redistributive policy or through the intervention of a higher level government copyright 1991 by american economic association

beyond the transaction banks and mortgage default of low income homebuyers we evaluate the effects of the lending institution and soft information on mortgage loan performance for low income homebuyers we find that even after controlling for the propensity of a borrower to get a loan from a local bank based on observable characteristics those who receive a loan from a local bank branch are significantly less likely to become delinquent or default than other bank or nonbank borrowers consistent with an unobserved information effect these effects are most pronounced for loans originated to borrowers with marginal credit where soft information may have a stronger effect these findings support previous research on information driven lending and provide additional explanation for observed differences in mortgage loan performance between bank and nonbank lenders

on the economics of private money abstract the application of laissez faire to the monetary system is a key ingredient of important proposals for monetary reform both new and old that seek to discipline government creation of money through competition this paper provides an overview of issues to be encountered in the construction of theoretical models of private monetary economies including consideration of market imperfections that have been hypothesized to arise in these systems further some descriptive history of the less regulated monetary systems of 19th century new york is undertaken with an emphasis on discussing the nature of market generated banking and monetary institutions in light of these critiques

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

the susan b anthony dollar and the theory of coin note substitutions this paper analyzes governments attempts to replace circulating notes with coins it argues that because of network externalities in currency systems a government cannot simply offer a new coin such as the susan b anthony dollar to the public and expect it to circulate even when the coin note substitution would benefit the economy for such a substitution to succeed a government may need to force the adoption of the coin by withdrawing the competing bill from circulation copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

monetary policy and regional availability of debt financing the relative availability of bond and bank financing should affect the firm s external financing and investment decisions we define a measure that proxies for the regional borrowing inflexibility to substitute between bank and bond financing debt inflexibility debt inflexibility tilts the firm s financial structure towards equity and reduces investment the impact is stronger during the period of tight monetary policy particularly for smaller firms and firms without banking relationships debt inflexibility increases the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flows reduces the likelihood of dividend payment and makes the firm more likely to pay equity in mergers and acquisitions

does macro prudential regulation leak evidence from a uk policy experiment the regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro prudential regimes internationally for such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that i changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks and ii unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks this paper examines micro evidence lacking to date on both questions using a unique data set in the uk regulators have imposed time varying bank specific minimum capital requirements since basel i it is found that regulated banks uk owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements but unregulated banks resident foreign branches increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks this leakage is substantial amounting to about one third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change

the evolution of a free banking system the institutional features of models of unregulated monetary systems have often been arbitrarily and implausibly assumed this paper instead provides realistic grounding for important features by constructing a logical evolutionary account of free banking sophisticated and orderly arrangements are shown to emerge from competition and the pursuit of less costly methods of payment the emergence of standardized commodity money is followed by the development in turn of basic money transfer banking easily transferable bank liubilities and clearinghouses the features of an evolved free banking system differ from those assumed in recent models of competitive payments systems

foreign banks financial crises and economic growth in europe abstract using industry data from eurostat and applying the rajan zingales methodology we investigate the short run real growth effects of foreign bank presence in the european union our sample stretches from 2000 until 2012 and includes the phase of rapid financial integration before the global financial crisis as well as the following phase of financial fragmentation and bank deleveraging we find evidence that foreign bank presence had a more than four times stronger growth effect during the crisis than in normal times growth effects are also stronger in times of domestic bank deleveraging in light of these results we conclude that a reintegration of the european banking sector is an important building block of future growth perspectives in the european union

who gets credit after bankruptcy and why an information channel abstract conventional wisdom holds that individuals find it difficult to obtain new credit post bankruptcy using credit bureau data we test this hypothesis and show that more than 90 of bankrupt individuals receive credit shortly after filing individuals with good credit history prior to filing have reduced credit availability after bankruptcy while those with ex ante low credit quality receive more credit we show that credit supplied to low quality individuals is severely curtailed during the financial crisis we also find that the default probability on new debt increases after bankruptcy especially among individuals with high ex ante credit score these findings are consistent with an information channel in which bankruptcy reveals new information about a borrower s credit quality

relationship lending during a financial crisis this paper studies whether relationship lending mitigates the transmission of the lehman default shock to the supply of credit in italy exploiting the presence of multiple banking relationships we control for banks and firms unobserved characteristics results show that the growth of credit itself is higher and its cost lower the shorter the distance between the bank and the firm the longer the relationship and the higher the share of credit held by the bank credit growth by relationship lenders is 4 6 higher than that by transactional lenders the increase in the cost of credit is 50 basis points lower the positive effect of relationship lending on credit supply increased during the crisis compared to a pre crisis period the beneficial effect of relationship lending is weaker if the relationship lender is more exposed to the financial crisis especially when lending to weaker borrowers

asymmetric information and the structure of the banking industry abstract we analyze the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi period model of spatial competition in the process of lending incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients acquiring an advantage over potential entrants we show that these informational asymmetries are important determinants of the industry structure and of banks strategic behavior contrary to traditional models of horizontal differentiation the steady state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of exogenous fixed costs in addition less concentrated industry structures may be associated with higher interest rates

fear anger and credit on bank robberies and loan conditions we study the impact of emotions on real world decisions made by loan officers by analyzing the loan conditions of loans granted immediately after a bank branch robbery we find significant differences in conditions of the loans granted after a robbery compared to changes in loan conditions that occur contemporaneously at unaffected branches in general loan officers seem to adopt so called avoidance behaviour in accordance with the literature on posttraumatic stress their avoidance behavior is halved within two weeks after the robbery and the effect further varies depending on the presence of a firearm during the robbery

cross border banking credit access and the financial crisis abstract we study the sensitivity of credit supply to bank financial conditions in 16 emerging european countries before and during the financial crisis we use survey data on 10 701 applicant and non applicant firms that enable us to disentangle effects driven by positive and negative shocks to the banking system from demand shocks that may vary across lenders we find strong evidence that firms access to credit was affected by changes in the financial conditions of their banks during the crisis firms were more credit constrained if they were dealing with banks that experienced a decline in equity and tier 1 capital as well as losses on financial assets we also find that access to credit reflects the balance sheet conditions of foreign parent banks the effect of positive and negative shocks to a bank is greater for riskier firms and firms with fewer tangible assets

soft or hard information a trade off selection of environmental disclosures by way of peer imitation and geographical distance abstractwith the public pressure increasing increasingly more number of studies explore how managers respond to outer pressures by using the environmental disclosure tool however previous studies ignore systematic research on the condition duplicity and consequences of environmental disclosures this article studies how geographical distance and peer imitation influence managers selection of soft and hard environmental disclosures and their economic consequences based on cost benefit trade off models and empirical data the results indicate that when public pressure increases sharply geographical distance has a negative influence on hard environmental disclosures and peer imitation has a positive influence on soft environmental disclosures under the joint effect of two factors managers tend to disclose soft environmental information more than hard environmental information which cannot only mitigate potential risks but also ensure good economic consequences to restrict managers opportunistic

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

does religion mitigate earnings management evidence from china using a sample of 11 357 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2011 we investigate whether and how religion can mitigate earnings management specifically based on geographic proximity based religion variables we provide strong and robust evidence to show that religion is significantly negatively associated with the extent of earnings management suggesting that religion can serve as a set of social norms to mitigate corporate unethical behavior such as earnings management our findings also reveal that the negative association between religion and earnings management is less pronounced for firms with closer distance to the regulatory centers than for their counterparts implying the substitutive effects between religion and the distance to regulators the proxy for regulatory intensity on mitigating earnings management the above results are robust to different measures of earnings management various religion variables and a variety of sensitivity tests

informational frictions and the credit crunch in this paper i estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected i show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships quantitatively these informational frictions appear to be too small to explain the credit crunch in the u s syndicated corporate loan market

loan collateral corporate investment and business cycle abstract collateral and loan rates are observed to be highly cyclical in their use for bank lending the effects of such cyclicality on corporate investment are analyzed in this paper using a dynamic model we find that more collateral causes firms to select riskier safer projects if the loan rate rises above falls below the expected investment return we show that the incentive effect of loan rates becomes stronger with greater collateral with the two credit terms having larger incentive effects on lower quality firms these results offer a new explanation for why lenient collateral policies are associated with rising loan rates in economic upturns but stricter collateral requirements come with falling loan rates during downturns

benefits of relationship banking evidence from consumer credit markets abstract using a unique panel dataset that contains comprehensive information about the relationships between a large bank and its credit card customers we show that relationship accounts exhibit lower probabilities of default and attrition and have higher utilization rates than non relationship accounts dynamic information about changes in the behavior of a customer s other accounts at the same bank helps predict the behavior of the credit card account over time these results imply that relationship banking offers significant potential benefits to banks information the lender has at its disposal can be used to mitigate credit risk on the credit card account

relationship lending hierarchical distance and credit tightening evidence from the financial crisis abstract this paper examines the firms credit availability during the 2007 2009 financial crisis using a dataset of 5331 bank firm relationships provided by borrowers credit folders of three italian banks it aims to test whether a strong lender borrower relationship can produce less credit rationing for borrowing firms even during a credit crunch period the results show that exclusivity of the relationship can mitigate the firm credit rationing we also verify the influence of lending organizational structure during crisis a new measure of distance in lending technologies has been introduced the hierarchical distance calculated as the distance between the branch that originates the loan and the location of the hierarchical level responsible for financing decision our findings document a negative impact of distance on credit availability consistent with the idea that proximity facilitates the transmission of soft information

screening peers softly inferring the quality of small borrowers this paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers creditworthiness we find that these peer lenders predict an individual s likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45 greater accuracy than the borrower s exact credit score unobserved by the lenders who only see a credit category moreover peer lenders achieve 87 of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borrowers screening through soft or nonstandard information is relatively more important when evaluating lower quality borrowers our results highlight how aggregating over the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance lending efficiency this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

bank branch presence and access to credit in low to moderate income neighborhoods banks specialize in lending to informationally opaque borrowers by collecting soft information about them some researchers claim that this process requires a physical presence in the market to lower information collection costs the author provides evidence in support of this argument in the mortgage market for low income borrowers mortgage originations increase and interest spreads decline when there is a bank branch located in a low to moderate income neighborhood

when arm s length is too far relationship banking over the credit cycle we conduct face to face interviews with bank ceos to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders we then use the geographic coordinates of these banks branches and of 14 100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle we find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom it alleviates such constraints during a downturn this positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn moreover our evidence suggests thatrelationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans

the suppression of state banknotes a reconsideration george selgin it is generally believed that congress in imposing a prohibitive 10 tax on state banknotes in 1865 made the public better off by doing away with inferior brands of currency while simultaneously helping finance the civil war by stimulating bond sales to national banks in truth the tax served neither purpose the true purpose of the 10 tax was not to enhance bond sales or to improve the quality of the currency but to offset the inflationary effects of greenbacks and national banknotes in the long run the public might have been better off had state banks retained their right to issue currency jel g21 n21 let us have a bank currency that will be recognized in the next town a currency that will be recognized in new york philadelphia boston new orleans chicago or any other part of the united states representative john f farnsworth illinois april 28 1864 congressional globe 38th congress 1st session 1934 i f the national banks with the great advantages which they enjoy cannot compete successfully with the state banks it simply shows that the latter subserve better the interests of the business community and should not be destroyed representative francis kernan new york february 16 1865 congressional globe 38th congress 2d session 833 i introduction during the civil war a 10 tax was placed on any issuance of notes of state chartered or incorporated banks deliberately forcing state banks out of the paper currency business and making the regulation and issuance of currency a prerogative of the federal government and of federally chartered national banks this paper reexamines the congressional decision to suppress state banknotes american monetary historians have conventionally viewed the decision as reflecting 1 the public s intolerable disgust with an unregulated currency hammond 1957 11 compare dunbar 1922 220 and 2 the government s desire to boost the demand for national bank charters so as to expand the market for its debt e g hughes and cain 1998 373 74 dowd 1992 230 i plan to argue that neither view accounts adequately for the 10 tax the first view in particular begs important questions that have gone unaddressed if state banknotes were clearly inferior to national banknotes why was a prohibitive tax needed to drive them out of circulation just how were consumers supposed to benefit from having their choices restricted i explore several responses to these questions and ultimately conclude that consumers considered some state banknotes to be just as desirable as their national bank counterparts i argue that the 10 tax served not to overcome any banknote market failure but to force the withdrawal of relatively high quality state banknotes i then proceed to show that the tax was not needed to secure adequate bond sales to national banks proponents of the tax were striving not to increase the number of applications for national bank charters but to limit growth in the aggregate money stock i conclude by suggesting that because state banks of issue could have accommodated market demands that national banks failed to satisfy consumers might have been better served had state banknotes been allowed to survive ii the chase plan when the first shots of the american civil war were fired at fort sumter the paper currency of the united states consisted of over 200 million in banknotes issued by nearly 1 500 state chartered banks the quality of these banknotes varied according to their issuers management and regulatory environment 1 some banknotes circulated at par only near their source and at fluctuating discounts elsewhere so that persons carrying notes from state to state risked incurring currency exchange losses of the sort borne by international travelers today a few were subject to especially heavy discounts or were refused altogether because their issuers solvency was in question

financial frictions and employment during the great depression abstract we provide new evidence that a disruption in credit supply played a quantitatively significant role in the unprecedented contraction of employment during the great depression using a novel hand collected dataset of large industrial firms our identification strategy exploits preexisting variation in the need to raise external funds at a time when public bond markets essentially froze local bank failures inhibited firms ability to substitute public debt for private debt which exacerbated financial constraints we estimate a large and negative causal effect of financing frictions on firm employment we find that the lack of access to credit likely accounted for a substantial fraction of the aggregate decline in employment of large firms between 1928 and 1933

gresham s law or gresham s fallacy gresham s law often takes two forms the rule that bad money drives out good money and a qualified version of that rule that requires a fixed exchange rate between the two monies yet history contr

the role of soft information in a dynamic contract setting evidence from the home equity credit market credit underwriting is a dynamic process involving multiple interactions between borrower and lender during this process lenders have the opportunity to obtain hard and soft information from the borrower we analyze more than 108 000 home equity loans and lines of credit applications to study the role of soft and hard information during underwriting our data set allows us to distinguish lender actions that are based strictly on hard information from decisions that involve the collection of soft information our analysis confirms the importance of soft information and suggests that its use can be effective in reducing overall portfolio credit losses ex post

distance and private information in lending we study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information leading to a trade off in the availability and pricing of credit which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus analyzing loan rates and firms decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks strategic use of private information however distance erodes our lender s ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

is relationship lending still a mixed blessing a review of advantages and disadvantages for lenders and borrowers relationship lending is a common lending technology that is assumed to bring several benefits to small medium enterprises smes and to financial institutions that adopt it notably it could reduce information asymmetries permitting banks to offer better credit terms to the borrower however it also entails some costs for both sides the empirical evidence so far has not been conclusive in determining under what conditions relationship lending can be beneficial or harmful most of the studies suggest that smes that engage in relationship lending benefit from more credit availability especially during a financial crisis and lower interest rates this occurs when they are served by small banks are geographically close to the lender when the bank is adequately decentralized and when it is the dominant creditor of the firm however under certain circumstances banks can extract rents from the borrower or be captured by him in addition the consequences and the future of relationship lending will be remarkably affected by the level of competition among banks their ownership structure the regulatory framework and the business model that banks will have to adopt accordingly

bank capital and lending relationships this paper investigates the mechanisms behind the matching of banks and firms in the loan market and the implications of this matching for lending relationships bank capital and the provision of credit i find that bank dependent firms borrow from well capitalized banks while firms with access to the bond market borrow from banks with less capital this matching of bank dependent firms with stable banks smooths cyclicality in aggregate credit provision and mitigates the effects of bank shocks on the real economy

credit rationing and relationship lending does firm size matter abstract using survey based data we investigate factors influencing credit rationing within a bank based financial system we show that rationing depends on various dimensions of the firm bank relationships and that the effects of relationship lending on rationing are not identical for different firm size groups multiple banking increases the probability of rationing for small and large firms debt concentration with the main bank affects positively smaller firms while the opposite is true for large companies the length of the relationship with the main bank decreases the probability of rationing for both groups but more so for large firms endowed with more bargaining power finally the firm bank spatial proximity measured by the headquarters vicinity does not affect the firm s access to credit

domestic banks as lightning rods home bias and information during the eurozone crisis european banks have been criticized for holding excessive domestic government debt during the recent eurozone crisis which may have intensified the diabolic loop between sovereign and bank credit risks by using a novel bank level data set covering the entire timeline of the eurozone crisis i first reconfirm that the crisis led to the reallocation of sovereign debt from foreign to domestic banks in contrast to the recent literature focusing only on sovereign debt i show that the banks private sector exposures were at least equally affected by the rise in home bias consistent with this pattern i propose a new debt reallocation channel based on informational frictions and show that the informationally closer foreign banks increase their relative exposures when the sovereign risk rises the effect of informational closeness is economically meaningful and robust to the use of different information measures and controls for alternative channels of sovereign debt reallocation

bridging the gap the design of bank loan contracts and distance how do the distance constraints faced by lenders in acquiring borrower information affect the design of bank loan contracts theoretical studies posit that greater information asymmetry leads to the allocation of stronger ex ante decision rights to the lender the uninformed party consistent with this hypothesis we find that upon inception contracts tend to be more restrictive when firms seek loans from remote lenders this finding is robust to potential endogeneity bias and simultaneity of various loan terms overall we establish a strong informational link between distance and loan contract design

foreign bank lending evidence from the global financial crisis abstract we exploit highly disaggregated bank firm data to investigate the dynamics of foreign vs domestic credit supply in italy around the period of the lehman collapse which brought a sudden and unexpected deterioration of economic conditions and a sharp increase in credit risk taking advantage of the presence of multiple lending relationships to control for credit demand and risk at the individual firm level we show that foreign lenders restricted credit supply to the same firm more sharply than their domestic counterparts a number of exercises testing alternative explanations for this result suggest that such more intense restriction also reflects the functional distance between a foreign bank s headquarter and the italian credit market

do banks price discriminate spatially evidence from small business lending in local credit markets abstract in this paper we explore the effects of bank borrower physical proximity on price and non price aspects of small business lending in local credit markets along the price dimension our analysis reveals that interest rates increase with bank borrower distance and decrease with the distance between borrower and other competing banks along the quantity dimension we observe that more distant borrowers are more likely to experience binding credit limits we also show that the quantity effects of bank borrower distance are concentrated among less transparent firms our findings are consistent with pricing based on marginal costs that reflect information based factors and are in contrast to the established paradigm where banks adopt spatial discriminatory pricing rules when lending to small sized enterprises

finance and growth for microenterprises evidence from rural china using a survey dataset of chinese rural households we find that access to external finance is positively associated with the decision to become entrepreneur and the initial investment for microenterprises also we find that use of informal finance especially financing from friends and family is positively associated with sales growth of microenterprises with employees but not of self employed we do not find any significant relationship between the use of formal finance and firm growth our findings underline the importance of finance for entrepreneurship and microenterprise growth and the role of informal finance in the absence of efficient formal financial institutions

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

spatial competition in the banking system localization cross subsidies and the regulation of deposit rates abstract the paper analyses a spatial competition model of the banking sector banks offer two kind of services deposits and credit and can either borrow or lend on the money market we investigate the consequences of the regulation of rates paid on deposits the main conclusions are as follows regulation first increases network size beyond social optimum in the long run it results in lower equilibrium credit rates because of increased competition secondly regulation generates tied sales contracts by which banks propose bundles of credit and deposit services tied sales in turn motivate the introduction of cross subsidies between the two activities the rent levied upon regulated deposits financing lower rates in the credit market finally it is shown that in a regulated environment the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced in the sense that fluctuations of money market rates are less than fully transmitted in credit rates

bank lending technologies and credit availability in europe what can we learn from the crisis abstract using a unique sample of european manufacturing firms we empirically investigate how bank lending technologies nd soft information adoption affected firms credit availability during the 2007 2009 financial crisis estimation results indicate that transactional lending technologies increased firms credit rationing whereas soft information mitigated asymmetric information problems and improved firms access to credit by looking at the combined effect of bank lending technologies and soft information we also provide evidence about the complementarity between transactional lending techniques and soft information adoption when soft information was incorporated in transactional lending technologies firms credit rationing significantly reduced this result is especially strong for small borrowing firms and for companies matching with large financial institutions

financial infrastructure and house prices we argue that banks operating in a local market possess better information about the local housing market than do nonlocal banks possessing this information may influence their willingness to grant loans to house buyers and the specifics of the loan terms which in turn may affect house prices because credit facilitation makes the housing market more efficient using a panel data set covering a period from 1993 to 2007 and involving 274 municipalities in sweden we establish a positive causal influence of local bank presence on local house prices there are significant spatial and spillover effects that is banks in a municipality affect the housing markets in neighbouring municipalities although to a lesser extent than in their own municipality similar results are obtained through a gravity model the results are robust over time and municipality size

bank credit rates across the business cycle evidence from a french cooperative contracts database abstract financial theory indicates that bank firm relationships can induce a hold up problem resulting in higher interest rates yet only weak empirical confirmation of this result exists moreover the potential influence of the business cycle on the bank firm relationship still requires empirical consideration with a unique contracts data set collected from a french cooperative bank between 1996 and 2009 this study shows that the effects of bank firm relationships on the credit rate depend on economic conditions and that the hold up problem is at play only during economic recessions

measuring income tax evasion using bank credit evidence from greece we document that in semiformal economies banks lend to tax evading individuals based on the bank s assessment of the individual s true income this observation leads to a novel approach to estimate tax evasion we use microdata on household credit from a greek bank and replicate the bank underwriting model to infer the banks estimate of individuals true income we estimate that 43 45 of self employed income goes unreported and thus untaxed for 2009 this implies 28 2 billion of unreported income implying forgone tax revenues of over 11 billion or 30 of the deficit our method innovation allows for estimating the industry distribution of tax evasion in settings where uncovering the incidence of hidden cash transactions is difficult using other methods primary tax evading industries are professional services medicine law engineering education and media we conclude with evidence that contemplates the importance of institutions paper trail and political willpower for the persistence of tax evasion jel codes g21 h22 h24 h26 p37

financial exclusion and branch closures in spain after the great recession the paper analyzes the factors behind the changes in spatial accessibility to services due to the closure of bank branches during the great recession it uses data on the geolocations of spanish br

credit counseling and consumer credit trajectories nonprofit credit counseling provides consumers with financial education individualized financial counseling and debt restructuring despite potential benefits relatively little is known about its efficacy this study uses administrative data to assess the relationship between counseling and consumer credit outcomes we estimate difference in difference models to analyze credit outcomes for a counseled group relative to a matched comparison group for six quarters after a baseline period we find evidence of a substantial credit shock around the time of counseling post treatment counseling is associated with a persistent reduction in debt even after accounting for bankruptcies foreclosures debt charge offs or participation in debt consolidation programs jel d12

bank net worth and frustrated monetary policy abstract i present a model in which bank net worth determines both loan market competition and monetary transmission to firm borrowing rates in the model banks are local monopolists for borrowers near them when they are flush with equity banks expand their lending compete for customers at the edges of their markets and pass through changes in the monetary policy rate to their loan rates when they lose substantial equity banks consolidate retreat from rivalry and frustrate monetary transmission the model explains why interest rate pass through weakens after financial crises its predictions are consistent with several facts about bank to firm lending

is financial inclusion good for bank stability international evidence abstract financial inclusion has become an important public policy priority following the recent global financial crisis yet we know very little of how it impacts soundness of the providers of financial services using an international sample of 2635 banks in 86 countries over the period 2004 12 we find that higher level of financial inclusion contributes to greater bank stability the positive association is particularly pronounced with those banks that have higher customer deposit funding share and lower marginal costs of providing banking services and also with those that operate in countries with stronger institutional quality the results are robust to instrumental variables analysis controlling for bank fixed effects alternative measures of financial inclusion among several other robustness tests our results highlight that the importance of ensuring inclusive financial system is not only a development goal but also an issue that should be prioritised by banks as such a policy drive is good for their stability

location matters an examination of trading profits the electronic trading system xetra of the german security exchange provides a unique data source on the equity trades of 756 professional traders located in 23 different cities and eight european countries we explore informational asymmetries across the trader population traders located outside germany in non german speaking cities show lower proprietary trading profit their underperformance is not only statistically significant it is also of economically significant magnitude and occurs for the 11 largest german blue chip stocks we also examine whether a trader location in frankfurt as the financial center or local proximity of the trader to the corporate headquarters of the traded stock or affiliation with a large financial institution results in superior trading performance the data provide no evidence for a financial center advantage or of increasing institutional scale economies in proprietary trading however we find evidence for an information advantage due to corporate headquarters proximity for high frequency intraday trading

multiple versus single banking relationships theory and evidence a theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank firm data according to the theory relationship banks may be unable to continue funding profitable projects owing to internal problems and a firm may thus have to refinance from nonrelationship banks the latter however face an adverse selection problem as they do not know the quality of the project and may refuse to lend in these circumstances multiple banking can reduce the probability of an early liquidation of the project the empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model

the taxation of mobile capital by central cities abstract this paper examines the properties of capital taxation within a metropolitan environment it is demonstrated that when the boundaries of the central city jurisdiction fail to incorporate the entire metropolitan community the central city can redistribute wealth from suburban land owners to its residents in effect the central city can exploit its suburbs it does so through capital tax or subsidy policies which reduce employment opportunities in the metropolis hence central city fiscal policy will have an anti development bias it is also shown that unlike most models of fiscal competition the fear of capital outflight will not necessarily lead to the underprovision of public services under some circumstances public services may actually be overprovided

information from relationship lending evidence from loan defaults in china using a proprietary database from a large chinese state owned bank we examine whether information evolved from banking relationships predicts commercial loan default by industrial firms we find that the bank s relationship information is significantly linked to the incidence of default and that its contribution to prediction accuracy is larger than any hard information furthermore the effect of relationship information is stronger among firms that have a more sustained banking relationship our findings indicate that at least in the emerging markets a bank s relationship information still matters for large firms despite the fact that hard information for such firms is abundant

asymmetric information and optimal bank reserves one traditional argument in favor of bank reserve requirements holds that since a b ank and its depositors are asymmetrically informed as to the bank s reserve position and its portfolio the bank will hold too few reserves and too risky a port folio this being the case presumably a central banking authority is equipped t o impose and to monitor a minimal reserve requirement yielding a pareto superior outcome this paper analyzes this position in the context of a formalmodel and shows that at least for some parameters of the model there is such a case for a minimal reserve requirement copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

how to make the metropolitan area work neither big government nor laissez faire we study how political boundaries and tax competition among jurisdictions interact with the labor and land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas contrary to general belief institutional fragmentation and cross border commuting need not be welfare decreasing but the size of the central city matters for welfare under tax competition the central business district is too small tax competition also prevents public policy enhancing global productivity to produce their full impact although our results support the idea of decentralizing the supply of local public services by independent jurisdictions they also highlight the need of coordinating tax policies

cultural proximity and loan outcomes we present evidence that shared codes religious beliefs ethnicity cultural proximity between lenders and borrowers improves the efficiency of credit allocation we identify in group preferential treatment using dyadic data on the religion and caste of bank officers and borrowers from a bank in india and a rotation policy that induces exogenous matching between officers and borrowers cultural proximity increases lending on both intensive and extensive margins and improves repayment performance even after the in group officer is replaced by an out group one further cultural proximity increases loan dispersion and reduces loan to collateral ratios our results imply that cultural proximity mitigates informational problems that adversely affect lending which in turn relaxes financial constraints and improves access to finance

explaining the demand for free bank notes abstract this paper explains why the risky notes of banks established during the free banking era 1837 1863 were demanded even when relatively safe specie gold and silver coin was an alternative free bank notes were demanded because they were priced to reflect the expected value of their backing the empirical evidence supports this explanation specifically in new york wisconsin and indiana the expected value of backing was sufficient for free bank notes to circulate at par which they did in minnesota the backing for notes was very poor they exchanged well below par being treated as small denomination securities

relationship banking and escalating commitments to bad loans the relationship banking literature suggests that business relationships play an important role in the loan decisions of small banks we test one aspect of this hypothesis using a cross sectional panel dataset of small banks located in texas from 1994 to 2002 our results suggest that small banks located in smaller counties escalate their commitment to bad loans when compared with those located in larger counties even after controlling for psychological and social factors that influence escalation tendencies these results highlight the need for small banks to trade off the positive benefits of adopting a relationship banking strategy against its unintended negative consequence we provide some suggestions on how small banks may lessen their escalation tendencies despite adopting a relationship banking strategy the results of this study also suggest that small and medium sized enterprises smes that develop strong relational bonds with small banks may benefit from continued access to credit facilities especially during periods when they experience financial distress

state banks and the national banking acts measuring the response to increased financial regulation 1860 1870 the national banking acts and their supporting legislation led to 263 state bank closures and 934 charter conversions between 1863 and 1870 this paper measures and analyzes these sudden changes using the period s first complete bank level census the data suggest that the national capital requirements prevented many existing banks from converting to a national charter whereas a tax on state bank notes was responsible for the large number of closures the legislation also prevented new national banks from replacing closed state banks and instead encouraged note and security brokers to open new banks in developing areas along the manufacturing belt

the benefits of relationship lending in a cross country context a meta analysis relationship lending may create benefits for borrowers by reducing information asymmetries however empirical evidence is mixed we conduct a meta analysis to summarize and explain the heterogeneity in the results in the literature using hand collected information from 101 studies in the united states europe asia and latin america from 1970 to 2010 we find that strong relationships are generally beneficial for borrowers but lending outcomes differ across the relationships dimensions long lasting exclusive and synergy creating bank relationships are associated with higher credit volume and lower loan rates these benefits are more likely in the united states and in countries where bank competition is high they are not related to the importance of small and medium sized enterprises in an economy suggesting that prevalence of relationship lending does not necessarily come along with borrower benefits our inferences are robust when we control for observed systematic heterogeneity in the original

the failure of models that predict failure distance incentives and defaults statistical default models widely used to assess default risk fail to account for a change in the relations between different variables resulting from an underlying change in agent behavior we demonstrate this phenomenon using data on securitized subprime mortgages issued in the period 1997 2006 as the level of securitization increases lenders have an incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality consistent with this behavior we find that over time lenders set interest rates only on the basis of variables that are reported to investors ignoring other credit relevant information as a result among borrowers with similar reported characteristics over time the set that receives loans becomes worse along the unreported information dimension this change in lender behavior alters the data generating process by transforming the mapping from observables to loan defaults to illustrate this effect we show that the interest rate on a loan becomes a worse predictor of default as securitization increases moreover a statistical default model estimated in a low securitization period breaks down in a high securitization period in a systematic manner it underpredicts defaults among borrowers for whom soft information is more valuable regulations that rely on such models to assess default risk could therefore be undermined by the actions of market participants

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

the benefits and costs of geographic diversification in banking we estimate the benefits of geographic diversification within states and across states for bank risk and return for all u s bank holding companies over 1994 to 2008 and assess whether such benefits depend on bank size for small banks only intrastate diversification increases risk adjusted returns and reduces default risk while for very large institutions only interstate expansions are beneficial but only in terms of default risk in all cases the relationship ishump shaped indicating that at some point the possible agency costs associated with banks getting wider and more geographically diversified outweigh the benefits our results indicate that small banks and very large banks could still benefit from further geographic diversification email addresses celine meslier unilim fr celine meslier don morgan ny frb org donald p morgan katherine samolyk cfpb gov katherine samolyk tarazi unilim fr amine tarazi the views herein do not necessarily reflect those of the federal reserve system 2