productivity in swedish electricity retail distribution this paper examines productivity growth in electricity retail distribution in sweden in a multiple output multiple input framework the approach used is nonparametric data envelopment analysis dea productivity is measured by means of the malmquist index productivity comparisons are made between different types of ownership and between different service areas the study indicates a high rate of productivity growth due to economies of density when measured over a period of 17 years the results show no significant differences in productivity growth between different types of ownership or economic organization

education and income attraction an online dating field experiment abstractprior studies have found a robust correlation in the education of dating and married couples however there is little evidence to suggest that such correlations are causal that is for the sake of relationship public goods such as the pleasures of the enlightened conversations that only a common high level of education might support being empirical studies they cannot rule out couples matching on other characteristics like income height or health which are correlated with education from driving results we contribute to this literature by randomly assigning high and low education and income levels to 388 artificial male and female profiles on a large online dating website in china we then counted thousands of visits clicks on abbreviated profiles which included education and income information from search engine results we found that men s visits to female profiles were unaffected by the profile s assigned education level while women s visits to male profiles increase with the prof

credible commitment and success with public enterprise reform abstract this paper studies why some efforts at public enterprise reform fail and why others succeed economic reforms are intended to increase efficiency and thus help sustain long term growth yet many governments have had difficulty sustaining the reforms they initiated and have reintroduced rigid controls over markets and enterprises this is because either in the process of implementation the government discovers that the costs of carrying the reform further are greater than the expected efficiency gains or the public is skeptical that the new policies can be sustained and does not take the actions necessary for the gains to be realized this paper develops a new institutionalist framework and employs various measures of policy commitment and net gain from continued reform to analyze these issues the paper suggests ways in which the potential success or failure of a reform can be assessed with implications for the steps that reformers might take to increase the chances of success

why haven t developing countries privatized deeper and faster abstract despite a decade of privatization in the developing world the vast majority of state owned enterprise soe assets continue to be in government hands bureaucrats in business world bank 1995 correctly identifies politics as one reason for the slow pace of privatization but it underestimates the role of institutional and economic constraints success stories of privitization are rare in low income countries and the long term promise of privatization in sectors posing regulatory complications remains to be established countries in crisis may reform soes quickly and deeply despite these uncertainties but others may opt for gradual reform which need not be altogether bad if speedy privatization results in poorly conceived schemes the cure can be worse than the illness finally bureaucrats are likely to stay in business for years to come and therefore it is important to improve their effectiveness in the roles they are unlikely to shed in the future a market friendly approach to soe reform need not be government un friendly

a model of efficiency wages as a signal of firm value we consider performance contracts with firm private information the verifiable components of the contract an up front wage and employment may serve both as a signal and a performance incentive job rent may be necessary for signaling and since efficient signaling is multidimensional there is an inextricable link between job rent and underemployment signaling can explain the lack of explicit bonding in actuality though our basic model is static our underemployment result is not a consequence of firm myopia when the firm is farsighted it will not maximize the joint future surplus if it cannot extract the worker s share at present copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

determinants of privatization prices generating government revenue is a common objective in privatization this paper asks what determines privatization prices using firm level data for all 236 mexican companies privatized between 1983 and 1992 there are three main reasons why net prices auction prices net of the cost of prior restructuring measures are low averaging 54 cents per dollar of assets first privatization prices are very sensitive to the level of competition in the auction and restrictions often limited participation second the privatization process took too long and lengthier privatizations are associated with lower premiums third firm prior restructuring measures absorbed an average of 33 percent of the auction price most restructuring measures do not increase price and delay privatization further net prices would have increased by 71 cents per dollar of assets if the government had emphasized speed succeeding in divesting assets in one year less than the average and firing the ceo were the only restructuring step taken

privatization and employment a study of the jute industry in bangladesh this paper analyzes the effect of privatization upon employment in the bangladeshi jute textile industry privatization was partia and the selection of mills which were privatized was not based on current economic performance this provides us with a panel data set which permits reliable estimates of the effects of ownership on employment and output privatization has reduced employment of all categories of permanent workers significantly but the extent of employment reduction has been substantially greater among clerical workers and managers as compared to manual workers this implies that public sector excess employment benefited white collar workers who were both better off and better educated and suggests that public sector behaviour was clientelist rather than welfarist

institutions and government controls abstract this paper develops a model of government policy toward industrial control and regulation that sheds light on the determinants of differential country experiences in terms of organizational arrangement and enterprise performance in contrast to the model developed by shleifer and vishny shleifer a vishny r w 1994 politicians and firms quarterly journal of economics 109 995 1025 shleifer a vishny r w 1998 the grabbing hand government pathologies and their cures harvard univ press cambridge ma which suggests that government controls over firms come about when politicians can use public funds to buyoff the managers and solicit their cooperation in politically motivated redistribution of rents the present shows that it may be the ability to use the government s regulatory powers at discretion that encourages politicians to impose controls on firms and redistribute their rents the model implies that the politicians appetite for intervention tends to be greater when the cost of collecting and using public funds is higher which is the opposite of what the shleifer vishny model predicts the present model helps explain the puzzling observation that countries with poor institutions are more likely to impose extensive controls on production and maintain large and inefficient public sectors the model also sheds light on a variety of other stylized facts and puzzles and offers new hypotheses to be tested

recent experience with commercial bank debt reduction has the menu outdone the market abstract debt reduction at market terms has been criticized as too expensive from the point of view of the debtor the recent reduction agreements following the menu approach are partially concerted but they also possess some elements of voluntariness this raises two issues a what is the conceptual justification for such financial arrangements and b based on recent evidence to what extent have these arrangements reduced the cost of debt reduction in a review of six recent menu driven debt reduction agreements we find that the debtors achieved a far better financial result than would have been feasible with simple market buybacks

privatization in africa an appraisal abstract in spite of spirited efforts over a decade only a few african countries can boast of any appreciable success in the privatization and or reform of state owned enterprises soes this paper argues that previous studies have not paid adequate attention to identifying and addressing the factors that affect the outcome of privatization and or soe reforms in africa after highlighting some flaws in these studies the paper focuses on the absence of the prerequisites for successful soe reform it then suggests policy issues that need to be addressed first and the role of interested parties including the multilateral and bilateral financial institutions in enhancing the success of soe reform efforts in africa

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

public versus regulated private enterprise a comparison of public enterprise with regulated private enterprise shows that the efficiencies of privatization stem from the insulation it brings from arbitrary political and self serving influences the critical insulation springs from the costliness of interventions when there is a regulatory compact in place that protects private property from expropriation while it also corrects for market failures that same insulation means that public enteprise is a better form of organization for activities that call for a response to public interest exigencies which cannot be specified in advance or reliably adjudicated after the fact the analysis emphasizes that an appropriate regulatory compact requires institutional support international organizations that seek to implement privatization should consider promoting credible regulatory commitment by requiring countries to execute explicit regulatory compacts and by bringing to bear the weight of their continuing relationship as a means of motivating the countries to conform to such strictures

property rights versus public spirit ownership and efficiency of u s electric utilities prior to rate of return regulation for over a century american economists have been engaged in a vigorous theoretical and empirical debate over the economic performance of publicly owned versus privately owned electric utilities the authors review the historical debate and use micro data collected by the u s commissioner of labor in 1897 98 to construct efficiency measures based on a nonparametric frontier production function since this is prior to state rate of return regulation regulatory effects do not confound the analysis the authors find that publicly owned electric utilities were significantly more efficient than their privately owned counterparts copyright 1991 by mit press

a theory of privatization or why bureaucrats are still in business abstract privatization is a dynamic phenomenon and changes in ownership arrangements require explanations based upon changes in background variables without movements in these variables bureaucrats are likely to stay in business even if reform would increase efficiency it is argued that changes in one such variable the cost of government finance have played a particularly significant role in trigerring privatizations and related reforms the increasing cost of government finance resulting from higher levels of general public expenditure and taxation also explains the policy sequence observed in many countries in which comprehensive ownership reform is preceded by a period of increased financial stringency for state owned enterprises soes

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

assessing alternative solutions to carbon leakage abstract a modified version of the computable general equilibrium gtap e model is developed in order to assess the economic and carbon emission effects of alternative trade policy measures aimed at reducing carbon leakage we compare several unilateral policy measures implemented by countries subject to an emissions level cap results provide evidence of the scarce effectiveness of these policies in reducing the carbon leakage rate and conversely some of the trade measures that are discussed seem to be more consistent with the goal of protecting market shares of national firms in the domestic markets of abating countries assessing environmental and competitiveness outcomes jointly confirms that a global cooperative solution would be the most effective as well as an efficient policy option for reducing carbon leakage

efficiency losses from tax distortions vs government control abstract given the strong theoretical presumption that state enterprises are less efficient than private enterprises why have countries often chosen state ownership this paper explores the hypothesis that high tax rates can distort the decisions of private enterprises by enough that state ownership becomes preferable on efficiency grounds the forecast is that state ownership should be seen primarily in settings with high explicit or implicit tax distortions to private behavior

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms evidence from developing countries this paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992 we use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures both unadjusted and market adjusted results show significant increases in profitability operating efficiency capital investment spending output employment level and dividends we also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples

the relative efficiency of public and private firms in a regulated environment the case of u s electric utilities abstract the relative efficiency of privately owned and publicly owned electric utilities is investigated using theoretical and econometric models that allow for the effects of both ownership type and regulation the estimation results indicate that the two types of firms are equally cost inefficient in the united states the average effect of inefficiency is to increase the cost of production by 2 4 percent holding output constant inefficiency increases the average quantities demanded of capital and labor and decreases the average quantity demanded of fuel