japan s monetary and economic policy japan has gone from very successful policies that promoted growth without inflation to a long period of slow growth recessions and deflation the bank of japan s policies are a major reason for deflation although the bank has purchased foreign exchange it counteracts the inflationary effects of its purchases via sterilization this forces deflation to continue currently there is a dialogue of the deaf the government wants faster growth but does not reform the banking system the bank makes bank reform a condition for ending deflationary policies

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

the optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents tournaments are widely used in organizations explicitly or implicitly to reward the best performing employees for example by promotion or bonuses and or to penalize the worst performing employees for example by demotion withholding bonuses or unfavorable job assignments these incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees relative performance while the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents we show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity under a wide range of conditions loser prize tournaments that is tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers are optimal for the firm the reason is that low ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments as compared to winner prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints jel m52 j33 j24

tournaments with midterm reviews in many tournaments investments are made over time the question whether to conduct a review once at the end or additionally at points midway through the tournament is a strategic decision if the latter course is chosen then the designer must establish both a rule for aggregating the results of the different reviews and a rule for determining compensations we first study the case of a fixed exogenously given prize and then extend the analysis to the case where the prize is not fixed but may vary with the tournament s outcome it is shown that 1 it is always optimal to assign a higher weight to the final review 2 this weight increases with the dominance of the first stage effort in determining the final review s outcome when the prize is not fixed the optimal design generates an asymmetric tournament in the second stage that favors the winner of the midterm review

capacity constraints and cycles in property casualty insurance markets underwriting cycles are unexpected in a structurally competitive industry where financial capital is the major determinant of output capacity arbitrage theories explain underwriting cycles as largely an artifact of institutional lags and reporting practices capacity constraint theories view insurance markets as characterized by real frictions that cause underwriting cycles by temporarily reducing the industry s capacity to insure risks arbitrage theories imply nofsystematic relationship between capacity and underwriting margins while capacity constraint hypotheses predict a negative relationship this article provides a test of the two theories by examining the empirical relationship between casacity and underwriting margins the results using data on four insurance lines generally support the capacity constraint hypothesis unanticipated decreases in capacity cause higher profitability and prices

some empirical evidence on the effects of shocks to monetary policy on exchange rates this paper investigates the effects of shocks to u s monetary policy on exchange rates we consider three measures of these shocks orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the romer and romer index of monetary policy in sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates specifically according to our results a contractionary shock to u s monetary policy leads to i persistent significant appreciations in u s nominal and real exchange rates and ii significant persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of u s interest rates

exchange rate policy for developing countries according to the imf in the mid 1970 s approximately 85 percent of developing countries had pegged exchange rate arrangements since then the situation has changed drastically today most developing countries have either managed floats or flexible exchange rates argentina hong kong and a few others may persevere with their currency boards additional nations may well imitate them and movements toward common currencies a la the european union may gain strength here and there nonetheless it seems clear that the political and financial prerequisites to adopt such hard pegs are extremely stringent new attempts are the exception not the rule the question for most emerging market economies is no longer to float or not to float but how to float in this note we review some key issues in defining the right answer to this question

two stage group rent seeking with negatively interdependent preferences the purpose of this paper is to compare the rate of rent dissipation in a group rent seeking contest in which rent seeking activities take place in two stages with those of a one stage individual contest specifically the effect of the extension by introducing rent seekers with negatively interdependent preferences is analyzed focusing on the relationship between contest structure and preference type we find that rent dissipation given absolute as opposed to relative payoff maximization is lower in a two stage contest than in a one stage contest given players with negatively interdependent preferences we find the reverse

contest design and optimal endogenous entry this paper derives the effort maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs the organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments he sets the value of the prize purse and arranges a monetary transfer entry subsidy or fee for each participating contestant in other words the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse the results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a positive fixed entry cost and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants the study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low

the mirage of floating exchange rates this note summarizes some of the highlights of my longer paper with guillermo calvo fear of floating many emerging market countries have suffered financial crises one view blames soft pegs for these crises adherents to that view suggest that countries move to corner solutions hard pegs or floating exchange rates we analyze the behavior of exchange rates reserves and interest rates to assess whether there is evidence that country practice is moving toward corner solutions we focus on whether countries that claim they are floating are indeed doing so we find that countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not there seems to be an epidemic case of fear of floating

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly we study the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when there are costs for the follower to observe the leader s behavior in a contest the follower can pay to observe the leader s effort but cannot observe the effectiveness of that effort in a tournament the follower can pay to observe the effectiveness of the leader s effort but not the effort itself we show that this distinction matters significantly when observation is costly the value of commitment vanishes entirely in sequential and endogenous move contests regardless of the size of the observation cost by contrast in tournaments the value of commitment is preserved completely provided that the observation costs are sufficiently small

theoretical analysis regarding a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates this paper explores several issues concerning a possible zero lower bound zlb including its theoretical rationale the magnitude of effects of low sustained inflation on real interest rates the validity of analyzing monetary policy in models with no monetary variables and the dynamic stabilizing properties of taylor rules in a zlb context the most important argument however is that if the short nominal rate is immobilized at zero there nevertheless exists a route for monetary stabilization policy to be effective via the foreign exchange market its quantitative importance is examined in a calibrated optimizing open economy model

efforts in two sided contests the degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two sided contests that in volve two types of efforts while usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize potential recipients of the rent seeking efforts also participate in the con test this is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent seeking efforts by try ing to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize we show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation

rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy rents and political motives are present in many aspects of public policy this article considers the role of rents rent seeking and the political choice of environmental policy rents are introduced into the political choice of price and quantity regulation under conditions of uncertainty the model shows how political economy aspects affect the choice between price and quantity regulation the contesting of rents associated with different policies affects the regulatory structure and influences the political choice of an environmental policy target the primary conclusion is that the political choice of environmental policy depends on the interaction between the efficiency of rent transfer and the size of rent seeking groups within the economy

pricing and capital allocation in catastrophe insurance abstract this paper studies multi line pricing and capital allocation by insurance companies when solvency matters to consumers capital is costly to hold and the average loss is uncertain in this environment product quality concerns lead firms to diversify across markets and charge high prices for risk that threatens company solvency even if the risk is unrelated to other asset risk price differences across markets are traced to differences in capital required at the margin to maintain solvency finally the paper shows that capital costs have significant effects on catastrophe insurance markets because of high marginal capital requirements

how to split the pie optimal rewards in dynamic multi battle competitions abstract multi battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life in this paper we examine the effort maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi battle competitions between two players the organizer has a fixed prize budget and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three battle contest a full spectrum of contest technologies in the tullock family is accommodated we find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology in particular when it is in the low range winner take all is optimal for the intermediate range as discriminatory power increases the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner take all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum discouragement effect for the high range a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum discouragement effect is essential for effort maximizing prize design in dynamic multi battle contests

some results on rent seeking contests with shortlisting we show that rent seeking contests with shortlistinghave comparative static properties which depend on thestage of the contest by generalising the argument inamegashie 1997 we show that well known comparativestatic results in single stage rent seeking contestsdo not necessarily carry over to contests withshortlisting the analysis suggeststhat policy prescriptions for reducing rent seekingexpenditures in contests with shortlisting cannot begiven without taking into account the stage of thecontest we also extend the model in amegashie 1997 to the case of unequal class sizes finally theshortlisting method in amegashie 1997 is comparedwith that in clark and riis 1996

interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts the effects of monetary policy existing theory and evidence on the effects of monetary policy are reviewed substantial room for disagreement among economists remains new evidence based on multivariate time series studies of several countries is presented while certain patterns in the data consistent with effective monetary policy are strikingly similar across countries others particularly the tendency of interest rate increases to predict high inflation are harder to reconcile with effective monetary policy

the liability insurance market t his paper offers an overview of the u s liability insurance market and the link between its performance and developments in tort law over the last few decades the dominant feature of the insurance market has been the intermittent periods of rapidly rising premiums and cutbacks on the availability of coverage the insurance cycle appears to be increasing in amplitude and since the 1960s has been concentrated increasingly in liability lines an episode of rising premiums in the late 1960s was followed by a six year period of declining and eventually negative growth rates in total liability insurance premiums over the 1975 1977 period the annual growth rate jumped to 30 percent then followed another period of declining real premiums until premiums nearly tripled in 1984 1986 accompanied by cancellations of policies and massive withdrawal of insurers from some lines this crisis had an economic impact beyond the insurance market leading to the withdrawal of many goods and services from u s markets in mid 1987 the market began to turn again with premiums falling by as much as 40 percent for some commercial policies since then aggregate revenue from premiums has been relatively stable the liability insurance market is intertwined with the tort system in addition to providing incentives to avoid accidents the tort system allocates the risks of accident costs in providing compensation for accident victims the modern expansion of liability in tort law as described by priest in this issue represents a shift in the burden of supplying insurance from first party insurance markets to liability or third party insurance markets clearly this shift will

optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests theory and experimental evidence abstract this paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic two stage elimination contests theoretical results show that for risk neutral participants a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes a runner up prize and a final prize ensures incentive maintenance across stages in contrast a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner takes all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk averse evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants

evidence of capacity constraints in insurance markets this article provides empirical support for the primary predictions of capacity constraint theories of property casualty insurance cycles the primary implications concern industry capacity and the difference between the price of insurance and noncapital costs referred to here as the price payment margin ppm capacity constraint theories predict that low capacity will lead to higher ppms and that capacity growth will follow ppm increases as insurers rebuild capacity price payment margin and capacity series are constructed using industry time series for 1949 90 the estimation finds that ppm growth varies inversely with capacity at the beginning of the period and also inversely with changes in capacity in addition declines in capacity are associated with ppm growth next period while increases in capacity generally have no significant effect on next period s ppm growth furthermore current capacity growth is positively correlated with last period s ppm growth

capacity constraints and the dynamics of underwriting profits paul d thistle the presence of an underwriting profit cycle in property liability insurance has become a stylized fact models of this underwriting cycle imply that the insurance market is governed by two regimes as capacity is constrained or not we apply the smooth transition regression model to insurance industry data for 1934 1993 to test for a regime shift we find a rapid shift between two distinct regimes with different dynamics when capacity is not restricted we find no evidence of a cycle the cycle is present in periods when capacity is restricted immediately following world war ii and after 1968 the underwriting cycle appears to be a recent phenomenon jel g22 c32 i introduction it is well known that the property liability insurance industry is subject to cycles in premiums and underwriting profits the main features of the underwriting cycle are also well known in a soft market coverage is readily available while premium revenue and underwriting profits are low in a hard market coverage becomes difficult to obtain while premium revenue and profits increase the onset of a hard market is typically quite rapid and is followed by the erosion of premium revenue and profits as market conditions return to a soft market 1 it is also generally accepted that the cycle has a period of approximately six years although there is some variation across lines and among countries this approximate period for the underwriting cycle is based on time series estimates of second order autoregressive models e g venezian 1985 and cummins and outreville 1987 understanding the causes of the property liability underwriting cycle is important for public policy and insurance regulation sof t markets may contribute to insurer insolvencies if firms price and underwrite too aggressively while high prices and restrictive underwriting in hard markets may disrupt the flow of goods and services a number of alternative theories have been proposed to account for the cycles in premiums and profits in the property liability insurance market initially attention focused on aspects of the process for determining insurance rates e g harrington and danzon 1991 1994 simmons and cross 1988 stewart 1981 venezian 1985 and wilson 1981 more recent research has developed equilibrium models of the underwriting cycle financial pricing models based on discounted cash flows imply that insurance prices are equal to policy expenses plus the expected present value of future claims under the policies issued 2 financial pricing models implicitly or explicitly assume perfect capital markets in the absence of capital market imperfections there should be no cycles and prices and profits should vary inversely with interest rates cummins and outreville 1987 and doherty and kang 1988 argue that if insurers have rational expectations then as a result of insurance accounting practices and inst itutional features of insurance markets underwriting profits follow an autoregressive data generating process which gives the appearance of a cycle the capacity constraint hypothesis developed by cummins and danzon 1991 gron 1994a b and winter 1988 1991a b 1994 is based on the fact that an insurer must have sufficient policyholders surplus capacity to support the policies it writes 3 capital market imperfections lead firms to rely on internal capital as the source of underwriting capacity this in turn implies that hard markets must be temporary and that soft markets will persist the capacity constraint hypothesis implies that premiums and profits will depend on interest rates and are negatively correlated with surplus or capacity in the short run in the long run capital enters the industry until the constraint is not binding so profits and surplus are not correlated in the long run cagle and harrington 1995 and cummins and danzon 1997 add the assumption that policyholders are willing to pay more for policies with higher financial quality lower insurer default risk and that insurer default risk is endogenous

economic and monetary union in europe the european council s maastricht agreement maps out a precise route to monetary union and the eventual introduction of a common currency my discussion begins with a look at the general arguments for and against monetary union i shall then discuss the proposed constitution of the european central bank and whether it is likely to be conducive to monetary stability together with some of the problems posed by the transition to the new regime finally i will turn to the issue of rules for the conduct of fiscal policy and the question of fiscal federalism

the selection efficiency of tournaments abstract we discuss tournaments in terms of their efficiency as probabilistic mechanisms that select high quality alternatives players in a noisy environment we characterize the selection efficiency of three such mechanisms contests binary elimination tournaments and round robin tournaments depending on the shape of the distribution of players quality the number of players and noise level the results have implications as to how and under what circumstances the efficiency of tournament based selection can be manipulated

what does the bank of japan do to east asia abstract in recent policy debates some have argued that expansionary monetary policy in japan can increase real output in japan and in japan s neighbors while others have warned that it is a beggar thy neighbor policy in this paper we estimate structural vector autoregressions to assess the effects of japanese monetary policy shocks we find that the effects of japanese monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variation in east asia have been modest and difficult to reconcile with the beggar thy neighbor view we estimate that the asian crisis was preceded by expansionary monetary policy shocks in japan but we fail to find support for the view that these shocks contributed to the crisis

influencing rent seeking contests this paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants effort costs can lead to an increase in total effort in asymmetric settings this levels the playing field and therefore encourages weaker players who otherwise would have stayed out to enter paradoxically a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total effort may thus wish to make rent seeking more difficult these results suggest that the often lamented bureaucratic red tape might in fact be a rational response to the problem of attracting lobbyists to participate in a contest

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

axiomatizing multi prize nested lottery contests a complete and strict ranking perspective abstract multiple prizes are usually awarded in contests e g internal promotions school admissions sports etc and players exert effort to increase their chances for winning a higher prize a multi prize contest model must provide each player s probabilities of winning each prize as functions of all players efforts we find that the key notion of hypothetical subcontests in the contest axiomatization literature initiated by skaperdas 1996 can be appropriately interpreted and precisely defined from a ranking perspective as well as the relevant axioms of subcontest consistency and independence of irrelevant contestants iic when there are less than four contestants exclusive a set of axioms properly adapted from those in skaperdas 1996 and clark and riis 1998a are sufficient and necessary for axiomatizing the widely adopted multi prize nested lottery contest of clark and riis 1996a when there are more than four contestants inclusive including a new axiom of independence of irrelevant ranks iir is necessary and sufficient

the design of rent seeking competitions in the standard tullock model of rent seeking as a noncooperative game aggregate expenditures by seekers can equal exceed or fall short of total rents depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker s investment if the supply of an input into the rent seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious problem he supplies it and designs the rent seeking game to maximize his wealth the author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician s wealth in one input and two input rent seeking processes

contests with multi tasking the standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented multi dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure mitigating one of its main advantages simplicity in this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize the amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player we look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest per dimension and totally and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions the standard tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework

asymmetric two stage group rent seeking comparison of two contest structures two variations of a two stage rent seeking contest areconsidered in the first stage of the between groupmodel groups compete through the expenditure of resources bytheir members based on group expenditures one winning groupis probabilistically determined on the second stage membersof the winning group compete with one another for an exogenousprize in the semi finals model a player is chosen fromeach group and then these players compete for the prize groups differ in size or in their valuation of the prize subgame perfect equilibrium solutions are constructed forthese two contest structures

dynamic multi activity contests in many contests players can influence the outcome through efforts in multiple activities several of which can be chosen before others in this paper we develop a model of dynamic multi activity contests players simultaneously choose efforts in long run activities observe each other s efforts in these activities and then simultaneously choose efforts in short run activities a player s long run and short run efforts complement each other in determining the player s probability of winning we compare the outcomes of this two stage model to those of the corresponding model in which players do not observe each other s first stage efforts before the second stage and thus effectively choose efforts in all activities simultaneously interestingly effort expenditures are always lower in the sequential multi activity contest than in the simultaneous multi activity contest the implications of this result for the organization of military litigation innovation academic and sporting contests are highlighted

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

seeking rents by setting rents the political economy of rent seeking in recent years there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators regulators howeve r may also be expected and indeed have been shown to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are themselves rent se ekers in this paper the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators firms and consumers within a rent s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self motiva ted the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants policy implications are drawn where appropriate copyright 1987 by royal economic society

symmetric two stage contests with budget constraints the impact of a budget constraint on individual expenditures is examined in two models of two stage contests with homogenous and risk neutral players competing to win a single indivisible commonly valued rent the set of players is partitioned into equally sized groups in the first model one contestant from each group survives to compete on the second stage against the other survivors in the second model one group survives the first stage and its members compete against each other on the second stage we derive and discuss the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium solution for each model

the zero interest rate bound and the role of the exchange rate for monetary policy in japan in this paper we study the role of the exchange rate in conducting monetary policy in an economy with near zero nominal interest rates as experienced in japan since the mid 1990s our analysis is based on an estimated model of japan the united states and the euro area with rational expectations and nominal rigidities first we provide a quantitative analysis of the impact of the zero bound on the effectiveness of interest rate policy in japan in terms of stabilizing output and inflation then we evaluate three concrete proposals that focus on depreciation of the currency as a way to ameliorate the effect of the zero bound and evade a potential liquidity trap finally we investigate the international consequences of these proposals

china s growing influence in southeast asia monetary policy and equity markets this study analyses the potential transmission of china s monetary policy shocks to equity markets in southeast asia impulse response functions indicate that the impact of a monetary expansion in china is significant and positive for four of the five southeast asian equity markets one explanation for this result is that monetary policy shocks in china lead to an increase in demand for goods and services in both china and abroad which then shows up in the foreign equity market the results in this paper provide evidence of china s influence in southeast asia and its financial markets the transmission effect is small and very short lived but can be expected to increase if the current trends of a deepening economic integration between china and southeast asia and a maturing chinese central bank continue

crises in medical malpractice insurance evidence of excessive price cutting in the preceding soft market abstract prior work suggests that heterogeneous information or weak incentives for solvency could have caused some general liability insurers to charge low ex ante prices during the early 1980s and mid to late 1990s putting downward pressure on other firms prices and plausibly aggravating subsequent periods of rapid premium growth we analyse whether the 1994 1999 soft market in medical malpractice insurance led some firms to underprice grow rapidly and subsequently experience upward revisions in loss forecasts loss development which could have aggravated subsequent market crises consistent with the underpricing hypothesis the results indicate a positive relation between loss development and premium growth among growing firms underpricing was likely more prevalent among non specialist malpractice insurers

synchronized business cycles in east asia and fluctuations in the yen dollar exchange rate because many authors have proposed stimulating the ailing japanese economy by monetary expansion and yen depreciation we explore the repercussions of depreciating the yen against the dollar on the other east asian economies which largely peg to the dollar since 1980 economic integration among japan s neighbors china hong kong indonesia korea malaysia philippines singapore and thailand has intensified and except for china their business cycles have been highly synchronized these cycles have been closely linked to fluctuations in the yen dollar exchange rate through changes in their export competitiveness and inflows of foreign direct investment we show that a major yen devaluation would have a negative impact on incomes in other east asian economies and that it is not a sensible policy option for japan

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

implicit bands in the yen dollar exchange rate this article attempts to identify implicit exchange rate regimes for the yen dollar exchange rate to that end we apply a sequential procedure that considers both the dynamics of exchange rates and central bank interventions to data covering the period from 1971 to 2003 our results suggest that implicit bands existed in two subperiods april december 1980 and march october 1987 the latter coinciding with the louvre accord furthermore the study of the credibility of such implicit bands indicates the high degree of confidence attributed by economic agents to the evolution of the yen dollar exchange rate within the detected implicit band rate thus lending further support to the relevance of such implicit bands

experimental comparison of multi stage and one stage contests this article experimentally studies a two stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one stage contest contrary to the theory the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest there is significant over dissipation in both stages of the two stage contest and experience diminishes over dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject s utility a simple behavioral model that accounts for a non monetary utility of winning can explain significant over dissipation in both contests it can also explain why the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest

the property liability insurance cycle a comparison of alternative models the objective of this paper is to compare alternative models of insurance pricing as theories of the property liability underwriting cycle the existing literature has focused on comparing two models the financial pricing and capacity constraint models however these are not the only relevant models we show that six alternative models imply the same general form of the pricing equation we apply the model to data on stock property liability insurers for the period 1935 1997 we find that the actuarial model and the capacity constraint hypothesis are the only theoretical models that are consistent with the data

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

target zones and realignments recent contributions emphasize that the presence of exchange rate target zones has important effects on the within band behavior of exchange rates when agents are forward looking the authors find that the implications of available models are inconsistent with european exchange rate data and they suggest that the frequent realignments occurring in the period they consider may be responsible for this they construct a model in which the likelihood of a realignment in the near future increases as the exchange rate approaches the limits of its fluctuation band and show that its implications are broadly consistent with the evidence copyright 1992 by american economic association

the dynamics of majoritarian blotto games abstract we study colonel blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective for a large class of contest success functions the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player s overall budget as a consequence a player s chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player has accumulated in prior battles this result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective we also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget for many contest success functions if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended game resembles an all pay auction without noise

decision by sortition a means to reduce rent seeking this essay gives an overview of how arandomized decision mechanism sortition can be expected to reduce the intensity ofself interested activity by rent seekingfactions within democracies the socialcosts of rent seeking are briefly reviewed i then make the case that randomization ofcollective decision making proceduresattenuates rent seeking expenditures iillustrate the argument by reference to thehighly contested presidential election of2000 finally i buttress that argument bycomparing plurality voting and sortitionwithin the context of tullock s efficient rent seeking model 1980

round robin tournaments with a dominant player we analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round robin tournament with one strong dominant and two weak players and we compare this tournament and the one stage contest with respect to the players expected payoffs expected total effort and their probabilities of winning we find that if the contest designer s goal is to maximize the players expected total effort then if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low the one stage contest should be used however if the asymmetry is relatively high then the round robin tournament should be used

identifying monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible exchange rates abstract previous empirical study on the effects of monetary policy shocks in small open economies has generated puzzling dynamic responses in various macroeconomic variables this paper argues that these puzzles derive from an identification of monetary policy that is inappropriate for such economies to remedy this it is proposed that a structural model be estimated to explicitly account for the features of the small open economy such a model is applied to canada with tightly estimated results overall the dynamic responses to the identified monetary policy shock are consistent with standard theory and highlight the exchange rate as a transmission mechanism

do exchange rate shocks have asymmetric effects on reserve accumulation evidence from emerging markets it is generally argued that central banks in emerging market countries motivated by a desire to defend export competitiveness tend to intervene in foreign exchange markets to limit currency appreciations rather than depreciations using panel data from 13 emerging market countries for the period 1998 m1 to 2016 m12 we find that exchange rate shocks play an important role in determining the accumulation of international reserves moreover we find evidence that central banks in emerging markets tend to follow a leaning against the depreciation wind policy rather than the appreciation wind i e we provide evidence of a fear of depreciation

a tug of war team contest this paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams in each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug of war there exists a unique markov perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player s valuation and the current state of the tug of war we derive rich comparative statics for this equilibrium by using the fact that the state of the tug of war evolves according to a time homogeneous absorbing markov chain

competitive devaluations toward a welfare based approach abstract this paper revisits the international transmission of exchange rate shocks in a multicountry economy providing a choice theoretic framework for the policy analysis of competitive devaluations as opposed to the traditional view a devaluation by one country does not necessarily have an adverse beggar thy neighbor effect on its trading partners because they can benefit from an improvement in their terms of trade furthermore a retaliatory devaluation need not be the optimal strategy for the neighbor countries as the induced terms of trade deterioration can be large enough to offset the gains from defending their export market share the concern over competitive devaluations reflected in the fund s charter and the system wide implications of changes in exchange rates still motivate fund policy recommendations a major fund concern in the asian crisis has been the fear that asian currencies would become so undervalued and current account surpluses so large as to damage the economies of other countries developing countries included this is one reason the fund has stressed the need first to stabilize and then to strengthen exchange rates in the asian countries now in crisis and for this purpose not to cut interest rates until the currency stabilizes and begins to appreciate

optimal lottery design for public financing this article develops a model of optimal lottery design for public financing on the assumption that economic agents view buying lottery tickets as a form of entertainment given that lotteries are optimally designed it offers two findings 1 the fundraising potential of a lottery is independent of its type specifically of whether it is a fixed prize type or a pari mutuel and 2 the ratio of the optimal winning prize amount in each prize class to total lottery sales is equalised to the elasticity of demand for lottery ticket purchases with respect to the winning prize in each prize class

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

the design of rent seeking competitions committees preliminary and final contests the paper examines the common practice in multi contest rent seeking competitions where finalists are selected based on rent seekers efforts in a preliminary contest we find that for any single contest design rent seeking expenditures could be reduced by introducing a preliminary contest if the marginal returns to rent seeking effort in the preliminary contest is sufficiently low in addition to other reasons the paper argues that this may explain why such multi contest designs are common we argue that rent seeking expenditure in the preliminary stage represents the cost of reducing the number of contestants we also find that the practice of setting a higher quality standard in the final contest than the quality standard in the preliminary contest reduces rent seeking waste we derive an expression for the optimal number of finalists under certain conditions we find that the optimal number of finalists is directly proportional or equal to the square root of the number of potential contestants finally we show that whether rent seeking expenditures rise or fall when the rent is awarded by a committee instead of a single administrator depends on the sensitivity of the committee relative to that of the single administrator

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

has monetary policy been so bad that it is better to get rid of it the case of mexico motivated by the dollarization debate in mexico we estimate an identified vector autoregression for the mexican economy using monthly data from 1976 to 1997 taking into account the changes in the monetary policy regime that occurred during this period we find that i exogenous shocks to monetary policy have had no impact on output and prices ii most of the shocks originated in the foreign sector iii disturbances originating in the u s economy have been a more important source of fluctuations for mexico than shocks to oil prices we also study the endogenous response of domestic monetary policy by means of a counterfactual experiment the results indicate that the response of monetary policy to foreign shocks played an important part in the 1994 crisis

common value contests with asymmetric information abstract we consider two player perfectly discriminatory common value contests or all pay auctions in which one player knows the value of the contested object with certainty and the other knows only its prior distribution we show among other things that in equilibrium the players win with equal probability this contrasts with a large class of imperfectly discriminatory contests in which the uninformed player wins with a strictly greater probability than the informed player

optimal prize structures in elimination contests abstract we consider multi stage elimination contests where agents efforts at different stages generate some output for the principal depending on the output function various prize structures can be optimal if the output function depends much more on efforts applied at later stages than on those applied at the earlier ones the optimal prize structure can be non monotone that is at some stages prizes fall and the agents who are more successful may earn less necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of such structures are provided we also show that for any increasing prize shape there exists an output function such that this prize shape is optimal further we consider the case of limited liability where the principal is not allowed to use negative prizes but can choose a contest success function csf there is always an efficient equilibrium under which the principal is able to extract the full surplus from the agents and the corresponding optimal prize structure is always increasing moreover under some plausible assumptions the optimal csf is necessary convex which corresponds to the most frequently used prize schemes in practice

contests with stochastic abilities we consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players abilities are stochastic but become common knowledge before efforts are expended players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest which may explain why they participate we also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player s own ability generally benefits this player it may benefit or harm his rival but cannot benefit the rival more than it benefits himself we also explore the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same opponent multibattle contests and with varying opponents elimination tournaments and show that it reduces the strong discouragement effects and holdup problems that may otherwise emerge in such games high own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests jel d72 d74 i introduction manytournamentsarecharacterizedbymultiple rounds with or without the elimination of some candidates in earlier stages of the process of determining a final winner in the political context electionprocessesthatdetermineparty leadersorpoliticalleadersmoregenerallyconsist ofmultipleconteststages intheracefortheu s presidency severalcompetitionstagesgradually narrowdownthenumberofcompetitors 1 inter

contests a comparison of timing and information structures we study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents we consider four institutional settings contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information we find that an effort maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective moreover the sequential contest pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestants types are sufficiently negatively correlated regarding the information structure the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information

escaping from a liquidity trap and deflation the foolproof way and others existing proposals to escape from a liquidity trap and deflation including my foolproof way are discussed in the light of the optimal way to escape the optimal way involves three elements 1 an explicit central bank commitment to a higher future price level 2 a concrete action that demonstrates the central bank s commitment induces expectations of a higher future price level and jump starts the economy and 3 an exit strategy that specifies when and how to get back to normal a currency depreciation is a direct consequence of expectations of a higher future price level and hence an excellent indicator of those expectations furthermore an intentional currency depreciation and a crawling peg as in the foolproof way can implement the optimal way and in particular induce the desired expectations of a higher future price level i conclude that the foolproof way is likely to work well for japan which is in a liquidity trap now as well as for the euro area and the united states in case either would fall into a liquidity trap in the future

contest design and heterogeneity i show that the effect of heterogeneity on contest investments depends on the structure of the competition which implies that heterogeneity matters for optimal contest design this insight helps to explain empirical evidence on the comparison of different contest structures

bayesian methods for dynamic multivariate models if dynamic multivariate models are to be used to guide decisionmaking it is important that probability assessments of forecasts or policy projections be provided when identified bayesian vector autoregression var models are presented with error bands in the existing literature both conceptual and numerical problems have not been dealt with in an internally consistent way in this paper the authors develop methods to introduce prior information in both reduced form and structural var models without introducing substantial new computational burdens their approach makes it feasible to use a single large dynamic framework for example twenty variable models for tasks of policy projections copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

best of three all pay auctions abstract we study a best of three all pay auction it is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing this auction is less productive the players total expected effort is smaller than the one stage all pay auction however with different values of losing over the contest s stages it may be more productive than the one stage all pay auction

risk aversion in rent seeking and rent augmenting games the effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent seeking contests a rent seeking expenditures which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and b rent augmenting expenditures which increase the size of the rent to be awarded risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type b unambiguously while having an indeterminate effect on those of type a these two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent seeking and rent augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player s position

an endogenous policy model of hierarchical government endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents each enjoying some degree of autonomy in this paper policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy a legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups the combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group s depends on the exchange between the same interest group s and the agent at the other tier our results concerning multi tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one tier lobbying in particular the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies moreover the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier it is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures like federations or firms

incentives versus competitive balance abstract when players compete repeatedly prizes won in earlier contests may improve the players abilities in later contests this paper determines the allocation of prizes within and across contests that maximizes the weighted sum of aggregate efforts

the cost of financial frictions for life insurers during the financial crisis life insurers sold long term policies at deep discounts relative to actuarial value the average markup was as low as 19 percent for annuities and 57 percent for life insurance this extraordinary pricing behavior was due to financial and product market frictions interacting with statutory reserve regulation that allowed life insurers to record far less than a dollar of reserve per dollar of future insurance liability we identify the shadow cost of capital through exogenous variation in required reserves across different types of policies the shadow cost was 0 96 per dollar of statutory capital for the average company in november 2008 jel g01 g22 g28 g32