pareto improving campaign finance policy this paper argues that campaign finance policy in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing can be pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters the optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen the argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions

the cost of road infrastructure in low and middle income countries the connections between transport infrastructure and economic development have been extensively analyzed in previous research but little is known about the cost of infrastructure investments in poor countries this paper examines drivers of unit costs of construction and maintenance of transport infrastructure in low and middle income countries and documents that i there is a large dispersion in unit costs for comparable road work activities ii after accounting for environmental drivers of costs residual unit costs are significantly higher in conflict countries iii there is evidence that costs are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption iv these effects are robust to controlling for a country s public investment capacity and business environment our findings have implications for governments aiming to increase connectivity in poor countries

the performance of pivotal voter models in small scale elections evidence from texas liquor referenda abstract this paper explores the ability of pivotal voter models to explain voter behavior in small scale elections using data from texas liquor referenda the findings provide little support for the view that pivotal voter models are a reasonable theory for understanding small scale elections interestingly this is not because they cannot explain the levels of turnout in the data but rather because they cannot explain the size of the winning margins the logic of pivotal voter models implies that elections must be expected to be close even if there is a significant difference between the sizes of the groups or the intensity of their preferences with even a relatively small number of eligible voters elections that are expected to be close ex ante must end up being close ex post however in the data winning margins are often significant

the impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the french legislative elections of 1993 we use regression analysis to estimate the effect that campaign money had on the votes of challengers and incumbents in the 1993 elections to the french legislative assembly incumbent candidates can at best expect to win 1 01 of the popular vote for each extra franc they spend per registered voter in their district challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as this simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals the regression analysis also suggests that voters react negatively to candidates who rely heavily on their own money for their outlays and reward candidates who rely on contributions from private individuals these results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition and that voters may resist a candidate who relies on narrow sources of funding

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

the role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires abstract we study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of buenos aires argentina during 1996 97 we find a well defined negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption prices paid by hospitals for basic homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown after this period prices increase but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown relative to the precrackdown period higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal during the first phase of the crackdown but have a negative and well defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels the last phase of the crackdown controlling for fixed effects we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20 these results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of gary becker and george stigler

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the united states house of representatives our most robust findings can be summarized as follows u the spatial location of candidates is important in determining the pattern of campaign contributions many pacs and all pac types except agricultural cooperatives contribute in a manner highly consistent with a simple spatial model there is little giving by an individual pac to candidates at opposite ends of the dimension there is no instance of a pac contributing to incumbents located at each end of the dimension and only to challengers of incumbents in the middle or vice versa contributions against incumbents i e to challengers of incumbents are often spatial mirror images of a pac s giving in favor of incumbents though this statement must be tempered by the fact that the large majority of pacs give relatively little money to challengers few pacs give money to both challenger and incumbent in the same race giving in open seat races is if anything even more spatially consistent than in races where an incumbent is running while many individual pacs exhibit patterns of contributions consistent with the ideological dimension the data for 1980 suggest that there was no particular bias toward one end of the spectrum or the other taking all pacs together essentially eliminates the effect of the location variable in the regressions giving in races with an incumbent on the ballot was overall balanced across the dimension there are however ideological distinctions even among groups as broadly defined as the fec categories for the corporate labor and trade membership health groups the incumbent s location on the ideological dimension is an important explanatory variable even when other factors specific to the incumbent are considered of course ideology matters to nonconnected groups too they just tend to balance each other off in positive money though not in negative on average corporate and trade groups favor conservative incumbents and opponents of liberal incumbents labor pacs do the opposite except for labor pacs party is not an important variable in explaining positive contributions once the incumbent s voting record is taken into account for contributions to challengers however party is significant corporate nonconnected and trade pacs gave to opponents of democrats labor pacs did the opposite the expected closeness of the election is always an important variable both positive money and contributions to challengers increase as the probability of a strong challenge increases this suggests that pacs are sensitive to the potential impact of contributions on electoral outcomes although committee assignments have some importance in explaining campaign contributions by pac categories their net effect is never strong except in the case of cooperatives this is almost certainly because of the diversity of interests represented by pacs in every category except coops which are essentially one giant pac of milk producers we would surmise that competitive forces in the house result in most members having a portfolio of committee assignments that provides maximum advantage vis a vis each member s constituency it would therefore be surprising if overall committee assignments by themselves pointed to significant differences in generating campaign resources being chairman or ranking minority member of a committee has no impact on campaign contributions other things equal seniority as measured by number of consecutive years in office has a complicated role for positive contributions seniority has a nonmonotonic effect with contributions being higher for the most junior and most senior members ceteris paribus than for incumbents with average seniority negative contributions however are not significantly related to seniority

academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying abstract in this paper we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities to motivate our empirical work we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a house appropriations committee hac or senate appropriations committee sac member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented in addition using instrumental variables estimations we show that universities without hac or sac representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero however for universities with hac or sac representation a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2 8 percent or 3 5 percent increase in earmarks respectively this suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the hac or sac but little or no return if not

the impact of centralization on pharmaceutical procurement prices the role of institutional quality and corruption abstractthe impact of centralization on pharmaceutical procurement prices the role of institutional quality and corruption regional studies this paper deals with the open issue regarding centralized versus decentralized public procurement strategy using a unique dataset on tender prices of selected drugs for hospital usage provided by a sample of 52 italian local health service providers aziende sanitarie locali asls between 2009 and 2012 the paper tests which procurement system centralized decentralized or hybrid performs better controlling for several covariates including measures of institutional quality and corruption it finds that centralized and hybrid procurers pay lower prices than decentralized units moreover the results show that in areas in which institutional quality is lower or corruption is higher the effect of centralization in terms of negotiating lower prices is much stronger with savings of up to 60 of the price paid by asls that procure independently

management of bureaucrats and public service delivery evidence from the nigerian civil service we study how the management practices bureaucrats operate under relate to the quantity and quality of public services delivered we do so exploiting data from the nigerian civil service for 4700 public sector projects we have hand coded independent engineering assessments of project completion rates and delivered quality we supplement this with a survey eliciting management practices for bureaucrats in the 63 civil service organizations responsible for these projects building on bloom and van reenen 2007 management practices matter a one standard deviation increase in bureaucrat s autonomy signi cantly increases project completion rates by 18 a one standard deviation increase in practices related to incentives monitoring of bureaucrats signi cantly lowers project completion rates by 14 we show the negative impacts of incentive provision monitoring arise because bureaucrats multi task and incentives are poorly targeted and because these management practices capture elements of subjective performance evaluation that leave scope for dysfunctional responses from bureaucrats to support a causal interpretation of our ndings we document the determinants of management practices and examine channels through which organizations might endogenously adjust management practices our results provide novel insights into how changes in how bureaucrats are managed can have potentially large impacts on public service delivery in a developing country context jel classi cation j33 j38 o20

the law of small numbers investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement abstracta commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts however restricted auctions are frequently used among eu member states to procure small contracts in this article we investigate this paradox using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009 we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result to our knowledge this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts

u s multinationals and preferential market access this paper examines the relationship between oshoring activity by u s multinational rms and the structure of u s trade preferences we combine rm level panel data on u s foreign aliate activity from the u s bureau of economic analysis bea with detailed measures of u s trade preferences from the u s international trade commission usitc to create a three way panel that spans 80 industries 184 countries and ten years 1997 2006 consistent with existing theory we nd that o shoring and preferential market access are positively and consistently correlated both in the pooled sample and within countries industries and years using both instru mental variables and simultaneous equations approaches to address the endogeneity of export oriented foreign investment we nd that a 10 increase in u s foreign aliate exports to the u s from a particular industry and country is associated with a 4 per centage point increase in the rate of preferential duty free access restricting attention to the generalized system of preferences gsp among potentially eligible develop ing countries we nd that the inuence of multinational aliate sales on preferential market access more than triples

a bargaining theory of inefficient redistribution policies when two policies are available to achieve the same goal why is the relatively inefficient one often observed we address this question in the context of policies used to redistribute income towards special interest groups sigs in a two stage model in the first stage the set of constraints on policy instruments is chosen in the second stage the government and sigs bargain over the level of the available transfer policies restrictions on the use of efficient policies and the use of inefficient ones reduce the surplus over which sigs and governments can bargain there is however an offsetting effect not generally recognized in models of inefficient redistribution an improvement in the government s bargaining position which allows it to capture a larger share of the surplus we show that this positive effect for the government dominates under plausible conditions inefficient policies are the equilibrium outcome under alternative first stage mechanisms for policy selection such as the election of policymakers or in some cases bargaining between sigs and the government jel classification d7 f13 c70 h23

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

gaining access by doing good the effect of sociopolitical reputation on firm participation in public policy making this paper examines the role of firms sociopolitical reputations as proxied by their perceived engagement in socially responsible practices in public policy makers decisions to grant access in the policy making process i argue that policy makers dependencies motivations and decision making processes lead them to evaluate firms by using sociopolitical reputation as a differentiating heuristic i hypothesize that firms that construct stronger sociopolitical reputations will be granted greater access and that firms existing political activity and policy makers partisanship will moderate this relationship i test these hypotheses using an 11 year panel on congressional testimony reputation and political and financial characteristics for the s p 500 and find support for all three these findings support the existence of a sociopolitical dimension to firms reputations that affects how public policy makers evaluate firms demonstrating that corporate social responsibility pays political benefits this paper was accepted by jesper sorensen organizations

a structural model of government formation in this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies we use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process the type of coalitions that form and their relative stability

revolving door lobbyists we study how ex government ocials benet from the personal connections acquired during public service lobbyists with experience in the oce of a us senator suer a 24 drop in generated revenue when that senator leaves oce the eect is immediate discontinuous around the exit period and long lasting consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians the drop in revenue is increasing in the committee assignments power held by the exiting politician

electoral contributions and the cost of unpopularity when considering electoral campaigns candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding to offset this unpopularity effect politicians may either demand more money for campaign advertising from these industries in order to persuade less informed voters or shy away from unpopular contributors to avoid losing the support of the informed electorate our model predicts that the first effect dominates and electoral contributions are increasing in industry unpopularity by using u s house elections data and different identification strategies we provide robust evidence in favor of our predictions jel d72 p16

active and passive waste in government spending evidence from a policy experiment we propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services active waste entails utility for the public decision maker whereas passive waste does not we analyze purchases of standardized goods by italian public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national procurement agency we find that i some public bodies pay systematically more than others for equivalent goods ii differences are correlated with governance structure iii the variation in prices is principally due to variation in passive rather than active waste and iv passive waste accounts for 83 percent of total estimated waste

some inconvenient truths about climate change policy the distributional impacts of transportation policies abstract climate policy has favored costly measures that implicitly or explicitly subsidize lowcarbon fuels we simulate four transportation sector policies cap and trade cat ethanol subsidies a renewable fuel standard rfs and a lowcarbon fuel standard our simulations confirm that alternatives to cat are 2 5 to 4 times more costly but are amenable to adoption due to right skewed distributions of gains we analyze voting on the waxman markey wm cat bill conditional on a district s cat gains a district s rfs gains are negatively correlated with the likelihood of voting for wm our analysis supports campaign contributions as a partial mechanism

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

corruption and the costs of redistribution micro evidence from indonesia this paper examines the degree to which the corruption in developing countries may impair the ability of governments to redistribute wealth among their citizens specifically i examine a large antipoverty program in indonesia that distributed subsidized rice to poor households i estimate the extent of corruption in the program by comparing administrative data on the amount of rice distributed with survey data on the amount actually received by households the central estimates suggest that on average at least 18 of the rice appears to have disappeared ethnically heterogeneous and sparsely populated areas are more likely to be missing rice using conservative assumptions for the marginal cost of public funds i estimate that the welfare losses from this corruption may have been large enough to offset the potential welfare gains from the redistributive intent of the program these findings suggest that corruption may impose substantial limitations on developing countries redistributive efforts and may help explain the low level of transfer programs in developing countries d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

work environment and individual background explaining regional shirking differentials in a large italian firm the prevalence of shirking within a large italian bank appears to be characterized by significant regional differentials in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are substantially more prevalent in the south we consider a number of potential explanations for this fact different individual backgrounds group interaction effects sorting of workers across regions differences in local attributes different hiring policies and discrimination against southern workers our analysis suggests that individual backgrounds group interaction effects and sorting effects contribute to explaining the north south shirking differential none of the other explanations appears to be of first order importance i introduction whether individual behavior is determined by group interactions or by individual background is undoubtedly a fundamental question for the social sciences this question presented itself forcefully when we stumbled onto the following piece of evidence there appear to be significant regional differentials in the prevalence of shirking among the employees of a large italian bank in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are considerably more frequent in the southern branches of the bank in this paper we examine several potential explanations for this fact first individual preferences for shirking versus working may differ according to one s region of hirth we will refer to this hj othesis as one of different individual hackgrounds the second possibility is one of locational sorting low shirking types may tend to migrate to the north high shirking types may tend to migrate to the south or hoth third the northern and southern

public procurement and rent seeking the case of paraguay summary a model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built providing predictions along two dimensions first corrupt public institutions operate by offering contracts without competition and more corrupt entities channel larger share of their budget in this way second these firms enjoy extra returns so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs a large scale microeconomic database including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in paraguay amounting annually to approximately 6 of the country s gdp is then used to corroborate these predictions

obtaining a driver s license in india an experimental approach to studying corruption we conduct two experiments to understand the process of obtaining a driver s license in india in the first experiment we randomly assign license candidates to one of three groups bonus offered a financial reward if they could obtain their license fast lesson offered free driving lessons upfront and control the control group alone illustrates bureaucratic failures 71 of the license getters in that group avoided the mandated driving test and 62 failed a surprise driving test the system responds to private needs there are more license getters in the bonus group but at a social cost there are more license getters who cannot drive in the bonus group the system however also appears to respond to social considerations as there are more license getters in the lesson group large extra legal payments are made by license getters those in the control group pay 2 5 times the official fee more of these extra legal payments take place in the bonus group surprisingly these extra legal payments are not direct bribes to bureaucrats but instead payments to agents in the second experiment we perform an audit study to better understand the role of agents the audit shows that agents can provide licenses to individuals even if they cannot drive but the audit also shows that agents cannot as easily circumvent all other rules we argue that our findings are most consistent with agents being the channel for corruption in this system we also report some suggestive evidence that bureaucrats create red tape possibly to induce more license candidates to use agents

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

corrupting learning evidence from missing federal education funds in brazil abstract this paper examines if money matters in education by looking at whether missing resources due to corruption affect student outcomes we use data from the auditing of brazil s local governments to construct objective measures of corruption involving educational block grants transferred from the central government to municipalities using variation in the incidence of corruption across municipalities and controlling for student school and municipal characteristics we find a significant negative association between corruption and the school performance of primary school students students residing in municipalities where corruption in education was detected score 0 35 standard deviations less on standardized tests and have significantly higher dropout and failure rates using a rich dataset of school infrastructure and teacher and principal questionnaires we also find that school inputs such as computer labs teaching supplies and teacher training are reduced in the presence of corruption overall our findings suggest that in environments where basic schooling resources are lacking money does matter for student achievement

the dynamics of pretrial negotiation it is shown that many cases proceed to court despite ample opportunity for interaction and much of the settlement takes place on the courthouse steps the deadline effect when fixed costs of bargaining are introduced a u shaped pattern of settlement appears with a greater chance of settlement at the beginning and at the end of negotiations than in the middle these characteristics persist even as the time between offers approaches zero the theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts a large proportion of the lawsuits that are settled out of court are settled very close to the trial date or in the first several days of the trial 3 although the deadline effect appears in many other settings as well it has little theoretical support 4

what do campaign contributions buy deciphering causal effects of money and votes in the 1987 1988 election cycle political action committees pacs spent 176 6 million on candidates who competed for a seat in the house of representatives what do pacs buy when contributing this money if campaign contributions are rational allocations of a contributor s income campaign expenditures could increase both the probability that the contributor s preferred candidate is elected and the likelihood that if elected the candidate will vote in the interest of the contributor most studies do not find that incumbents expenditures have a significant positive effect on the number of votes incumbents receive 11 14 15 17 29 the evidence that contributions influence congressional votes is mixed most studies find weak or no support for this hypothesis for example kau rubin and keenan 17 find that contributions from businesses mattered in only two of the eight votes they analyzed others argue that campaign expenditures play no important role in the voting decision of congressmen 5 9 12 31 the lack of finding of significant effects of money on votes has been explained with the need for better models to explain campaign contributions 5 however the theoretical developments of for example ben zion and eyton 4 bental and ben zion 3 and baron 2 have not been incorporated in the empirical analysis of the effect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of legislators empirical models that test this relationship must allow for the endogeneity of campaign contributions for the dichotomous nature of the dependent vote variable and the nonnegativity constraint of campaign contributions most empirical work in this area utilize models that do not incorporate these restrictions in this study i plan to incorporate these aspects of the data generating process into a more detailed model of the effects of campaign contributions on congressional votes of all the reported empirical studies on this issue only chappell 5 uses a model which can properly assess the impact of money on votes chappell finds that campaign contributions do not affect votes in congress when his more detailed econometric technique is used the best test of the theory results if votes have a clear economic payoff to contributors benefits of the votes are concentrated and costs are

a sequential concession game with asymmetric information the essence of the situation to be studied here is this two players are involved in a conflict that can be resolved in only two possible ways each player favors a different outcome during the bargaining phase which lasts until some finite time to each player has the option to concede if none concedes the game ends at time t in a way that is known to one of the players from the beginning of the game the other player is uncertain about the outcome time is valuable but each player prefers to receive his favored outcome at m than to concede immediately thus the game analyzed here is characterized by the asymmetric information about the outcome at the end point i e at time to whereas one player is perfectly informed about the possible outcome the other is compelled to deduce the information from the actions of his informed opponent the latter in turn can try to exploit his initial advantage by manipulating the flow of information for example the informed player may adopt a tough stance in order to create the impression that he is not afraid of forcing the resolution of the conflict at to and thereby builds his reputation at the same time the uninformed player by not conceding can test the opponent s resolve this brief description suggests that the problem analyzed here is a variant of the game of attrition 2 however our problem differs from the standard game of attrition in two respects first we formulate the game in discrete time which has important analytic consequences these are fully developed in hendricks and wilson 1985 second and more important perhaps we study

campaign contributions and access an important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given in this story access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy relevant information under complete information regarding donors policy preferences i argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups and the recipient legislators preferences are similar however one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive relaxing the informational assumption on donors preferences i reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the informational value of access to any agent is endogenous

the impact of industry consolidation on government procurement evidence from department of defense contracting abstract we study the relationship between market structure and public procurement outcomes in particular we ask whether and to what extent consolidation driven increases in industry concentration affect the way in which the government procures its goods and services we focus on the defense industry by far the largest contributor to federal procurement spending in the u s this industry experienced a sharp increase in the level of concentration during the 1990s driven by a series of large mergers between defense contractors using detailed microdata on department of defense dod contract awards we estimate the causal effect of industry concentration on a series of procurement outcomes leveraging the differential impact of these mergers across product markets we find that market concentration caused the procurement process to become less competitive with an increase in the share of spending awarded without competition or via single bid solicitations increased concentration also induced a shift from the use of fixed price contracts towards cost plus contracts however we find no evidence that consolidation led to a significant increase in acquisition costs we infer that the government s buyer power especially relevant in this context given the government is often the only purchaser constrained firms from exercising any additional market power gained by consolidation

redistributive public employment abstract politicians may use disguised redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax transfer schemes first we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis next we provide evidence consistent with the prediction of the model namely that in u s cities politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device we find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

the countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents electoral incentives we argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining these countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency typical of many young democracies we provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from mali tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies to explore the generalizability of these findings we analyze cross country panel data and show that political competition leads to better worse public goods provision under high low levels of party system institutionalization the paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

campaign spending limits incumbent spending and election outcomes abstract we study the impact of campaign spending limits for candidates in canadian federal elections we first demonstrate that spending limits are binding mostly for incumbent candidates we then use this information to produce endogeneity corrected estimates for the impact of incumbent spending on electoral vote shares furthermore we examine the impact of spending limits on broader measures of electoral outcomes finding that larger limits lead to less close elections fewer candidates and lower voter turnout

litigation and settlement under two sided incomplete information this paper deals with a simple game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information parties are assumed to have the choice between settling their dispute out of court or resorting to costly litigation the set of sequential equilibria is characterized and conditions are given under which an efficient equilibrium does exist efficient equilibria however will be ruled out by various tests of refinement a comparative statics analysis is carried out with respect to the quality of private information which parties are assumed to receive before any moves have to be made

socially optimal districting a theoretical and empirical exploration this paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections in the model districting matters because it determines the seat vote curve which describes the relationship between seats and votes the paperrst characterizes the optimal seat vote curve and shows that under a weak condition there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship the paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting this is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect u s state legislators during the 1990s

corruption in procurement and public purchase abstract the paper studies capture and extortion in public purchase it shows that capture yields a dead weight loss while extortion does not based on the calibration of the model the total cost of capture is between 1 2 and 2 88 times the amount of the bribes the theoretical analysis focuses on capture fight the legal framework that emerges from the normative analysis involves open tender for larger purchases and no monitoring for the smaller ones the rule is independent of a country s characteristics large public purchases should hence be ruled by international legislation for markets of medium range national legislation differs when susceptibility to corruption rises there is a shift from the capture to the extortion regime

renegotiation of public contracts an empirical analysis using a dataset of public contracts awarded in italy between 2000 and 2007 we document two facts i both price and time renegotiations are systematic but nearly uncorrelated to each other ii renegotiations are linked to the project design stage

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

local capture evidence from a central government transfer program in uganda according to official statistics 20 percent of uganda s total public expenditure was spent on education in the mid 1990s most of it on primary education one of the large public programs was a capitation grant to cover schools nonwage expenditures using panel data from a unique survey of primary schools we assess the extent to which the grant actually reached the intended end user schools the survey data reveal that during 1991 1995 the schools on average received only 13 percent of the grants most schools received nothing the bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians the data also reveal considerable variation in grants received across schools suggesting that rather than being passive recipients of flows from the government schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of funding we find that schools in better off communities managed to claim a higher share of their entitlements as a result actual education spending in contrast to budget allocations is regressive similar surveys in other african countries confirm that uganda is not a special case

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

publicity requirements in public procurement evidence from a regression discontinuity design abstract we document whether and how publicizing a public procurement auction causally affects entry and the costs of procurement we run a regression discontinuity design analysis on a large database of italian procurement auctions auctions with a value above the threshold must be publicized in the regional official gazette and two provincial newspapers we find that the increased publicity requirement induces more entry and higher winning rebates which reduces the costs of procurement and rationalizes public spending the evidence suggests that the number of bidders is the channel through which publicity affects rebates increased publicity also selects different winners it increases the likelihood that the winner hails from outside the region of the public administration and that the winner is a large company such companies tend to win repeated auctions gaining market share publicity seems to have no adverse effect on the ex post renegotiations of the works as measured by the percent of works delivered with delay or that are subcontracted estimates are robust to alternative measures of publicity alternative model specifications different sample selections to a falsification analysis at simulated thresholds and to the possibility that firms learn about auctions from a web based for profit information provider

votes or money theory and evidence from the us congress abstract this paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group s campaign contributions to politicians we uncover a robust hump shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator this pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician thereby increasing contributions but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds thereby decreasing contributions the model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and pac donations and local employment by sector this procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes we find that an additional vote costs a politician on average 145

inducing political action by workers a firm aiming to influence a governmental policy may benefit from political action by its stakeholders such as workers this article studies the behavior of such a firm showing that workers will have a greater incentive to engage in costly political activity against the governmental policy the greater their number and the higher the wage the firm may therefore profit from paying above market wages and from hiring what might appear to be an inefficiently large number of workers and because unions may overcome free rider problems of uncoordinated political effort a firm may favor unionization or be less opposed to unionization than it would otherwise be the results of this article can also explain why firms may little reduce wages in a recession and why the higher wages paid by unionized firms do not reduce survival rates of these firms

the violent legacy of conflict evidence on asylum seekers crime and public policy in switzerland we study empirically how past exposure to conflict in origin countries makes migrants more violence prone in their host country focusing on asylum seekers in switzerland we exploit a novel and unique dataset on all crimes reported in switzerland by the nationalities of perpetrators and of victims over 2009 2016 our baseline result is that cohorts exposed to civil conflict mass killing during childhood are 35 percent more prone to violent crime than the average cohort this effect is particularly strong for early childhood exposure and is mostly confined to co nationals consistent with inter group hostility persisting over time we exploit cross region heterogeneity in public policies within switzerland to document which integration policies are best able to mitigate the detrimental effect of past conflict exposure on violent criminality we find that offering labor market access to asylum seekers eliminates two thirds of the effect

is trade policy for sale congressional voting on recent trade bills this paper examines voting by u s representatives onthe north american free trade agreement the uruguayround agreement and most favored nation status forchina using recent political economy models of tradepolicy to formulate an empirical specification ofcongressional voting behavior we find evidence thatcampaign contributions influenced legislators voteson the nafta and uruguay round bills labor groupcontributions were associated with votes against freertrade while business contributions were associatedwith votes in favor of freer trade economicconditions in each member s district as well as thebroad policy views of the legislators also affectedrepresentatives voting decisions

politics and administration this paper develops a theory of the eectiveness of government programs in the model a bureaucrat chooses a mechanism for assigning a good such as a license or a benet payment to a client of uncertain qualications the mechanism uses a means test to verify the client s eligibility a politician who values the payos of a subset of client types exercises oversight by designating the resources available for means testing and the population of clients that can be served the model makes predictions about common administrative pathologies including inecient and politicized distribution of resources program errors and backlogs when the politician favors marginally qualied clients programs will tend to be universal with low per capita spending and high error rates when the politician favors highly qualied clients programs have smaller client populations higher per capita spending and lower error rates notably the bureaucrat can only use discriminatory testing in the latter case and programs with larger budgets do not spend more per client

state and development the need for a reappraisal of the current literature this essay tries to bring out some of the complexities that are overlooked in the usual treatment of the state in the institutional economics literature and supplement the latter with a discussion of some alternative approaches to looking at the possible developmental role of the state it refers to a broader range of development goals including the structural transformation of the economy and focuses on problems like the resolution of coordination failures and collective action problems the conflicting issues of commitment and accountability and the need for balancing the trade offs they generate some ingredients of state capacity and political coalition building usually missed in the literature the possible importance of rent sharing in a political equilibrium the advantages and problems of political centralization and decentralization and the multidimensionality of state functions that may not be addressed by markets or private firms

monitoring corruptible politicians does monitoring politicians corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption we use longitudinal data on publicly released audits of municipal governments in puerto rico to answer this question we find that corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits before an election however these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits in spite of this mayors in municipalities audited preceding the previous election have higher re election rates suggesting that audits enable voters to select more competent politicians we conclude that audit programs must be timely sustained and long term commitments in order to be effective

fighting corruption to improve schooling evidence from a newspaper campaign in uganda what are the most effective ways to increase primary school enrollment and student learning we argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption we illustrate this by using data from an unusual policy experiment a newspaper campaign in uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools parents with information to monitor local officials handling of a large education grant program the campaign was highly successful and the reduction in capture had a positive effect on enrollment and student learning jel d73 i22 o12

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

do better paid politicians perform better disentangling incentives from selection the wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed first if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector an increase in politicians pay may change their mind second if the re election prospects of incumbents depend on their in office deeds a higher wage may foster performance we use data on all italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi experimental setup in italy the wage of mayors depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds we apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase 5 000 inhabitants exploiting the existence of a two term limit we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance our results show that a higher wage attracts more educated candidates and that better paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving efficiency importantly most of this effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians rather than by the incentive to be re elected

decentralization and public procurement performance new evidence from italy we exploit a new dataset based on european union eu procurement award notices to investigate the relationship between the degree of centralization of public procurement and its performance we focus on the case of italy where all levels of government along with a number of other public institutions are involved in procurement and are subject to the same eu regulation we find that a municipalities and utilities which currently award among the largest shares of contracts achieve lower rebates than other institutional categories and b decentralization implies lower rebates only when it comes with weak competences of procurement officials the evidence seems to suggest that a reorganization of the procurement system both in terms of partial centralization and increased professionalization of procurement officials would help improve award stage procurement performance jel h11 h57 h71 h77

is it whom you know or what you know an empirical assessment of the lobbying process abstract do lobbyists provide issue specific information to members of congress or do they provide special interests access to politicians we present evidence to assess the role of issue expertis

determinants of adaptation costs in procurement an empirical estimation on italian public works contracts it is widely agreed that rules governing public procurement should be designed to achieve value for money however in the public works sector the good being procured is usually complex and hard to be exactly specified ex ante and alterations to the original project might be needed after the contract is awarded this may result in considerable discrepancies between the lowest winning bid and the actual costs that are incurred by the buyer bajari et al 2006 there is now a wide body of literature focusing on cost escalation during the execution of contracts and their estimates reveal that it can be often quite large this article is aimed at offering an empirical test of the determinants of adaptation costs in the public works procurement using a detailed data set on italian public works contracts we run an empirical analysis grounded on the main conclusions reached in the literature to test for the main drivers of adaptation costs

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

the scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement cost inefficiencies in public procurement tend to come from two sources corruption moral hazard and incompetence adverse selection in most countries audit authorities are responsible for monitoring costs but do not distinguish both sources of inefficiency in their audits judicial courts typically rely on these cost audits but only sanction corruption in a model of public procurement by politicians we study how the respective quality of the two courts affects corruption as well as cost efficiency we find that while better courts have the direct effect of decreasing corruption they may have a negative indirect effect on the abilities of the pool of politicians so that the net effect on cost efficiency is ambiguous

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

credit market frictions and political failure we study how an excessively favorable regulatory environment for banks could arise even with a perfectly competitive credit market in a median voter world in our occupational choice model with heterogeneous wealth endowments market failure due to unobservability of entrepreneurial talent endogenously creates a misalignment between surplus maximizing reforms and reforms that are preferred by the median voter who is a worker this is in contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favor of surplus maximizing institutional reforms this paper illustrates how market failure could lead to political failure even in the benchmark political system that is free from capture by interest groups

popularity shocks and political selection abstract we observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters behaviors by focusing on brazilian politics we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the mis use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election when the audit finds low levels of corruption the parties supporting the incumbent select less educated candidates on the contrary parties pick more educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption these effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media

the political economy of the us mortgage default crisis we examine the effects of constituents special interests and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in us economic history representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the foreclosure prevention act especially in competitive districts interestingly representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own party constituents special interests in the form ofhigher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the emergency economic stabilization act however ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests jel d72 g21 g28

political rents and voter information in search equilibrium abstract political parties committed to grab rents may run for election and even win if citizens are uninformed but how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search we propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout we show that i the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies i i the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely u shaped in the information search cost i i i turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system

condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency an experimental investigation into voting behavior this article reports results from an economic experiment that investigates the extent to which voters punish corruption and waste in elections while both are responsible for reductions in voters welfare they are not necessarily perceived as equally immoral the empirical literature in political agency has not yet dealt with these two dimensions of voters choice calculus our results suggest that morality and norms are indeed crucial for a superior voting equilibrium in systems with heterogeneous politicians while corruption always is punished self interest alone in the absence of norms leads to the acceptance and perpetuation of waste and social losses

cleaning house the impact of information technology monitoring on employee theft and productivity this paper examines how firm investments in technology based employee monitoring impact both misconduct and productivity we use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology it product we use difference in differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of it monitoring on theft and productivity we find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover we examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result economic and cognitive multitasking fairness based motivation and perceived increases of general oversight the observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip based earnings of workers our results suggest that employee misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and employees this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

court efficiency and procurement performance disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court a simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation therefore inducing sellers to delay contract delivery by using a large dataset on italian public procurement we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance we find that where courts are inefficient i public works are delivered with longer delays ii delays increase for more valuable contracts iii contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers and iv a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery other interpretations receive less support from the data

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero