does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation abstract if discretionary monetary policy gives rise to an inflation bias monetary unification boosts the accumulation of public debt the additional debt accumulation harms welfare if governments are sufficiently myopic in the presence of myopic governments debt ceilings play a useful role in avoiding excessive debt accumulation in a monetary union and allowing a conservative independent central bank to focus on price stability with supply shocks monetary unification results in excessive variability of public debt a debt target that constrains stabilization policy helps to prevent this

fiscal policy coordination with demand spillovers and unionised labour markets we explore the incentives for governments to cooperate by expanding expenditure we have three countries two are in a monetary union the emu the labour markets of both the emu countries are unionised and there is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium we explore the intra and intercountry effects of changes in bargaining power we then examine optimal government expenditures in each emu country we find that there is a positive spillover and that expenditures are strategic complements the coordinated equilibrium involves higher expenditure than the uncoordinated equilibrium

how should control theory be used to calculate a time consistent government policy we study different solutions to a simple one dimensional linear quadratic game with a large number of private agents and a government a time consistent solution is defined as a solution to the hamilton jacobi bellman equation i e as a policy for which the government has noprecommitment capability this solution is compared to a policy where the government has an instantaneous pre commitment i e an equilibrium in which the government has a period by period leadership in both cases we show how control theory should be applied to calculate the equilibrium and how to relate these equilibria to the differential game literature

is there a tragedy of a common central bank a dynamic analysis a great deal of uncertainty exists about the degree to which a european central bank ecb can be exploited as common property by undisciplined governments in a dynamic game between symmetric national governments and a single monetary authority open loop strategies in the national setting coincide with strategies in the international setting compared to the open loop outcome feed back strategies slow down debt stabilization moreover debt adjustment is quicker with a common ecb than with individual central banks while inflation as well as fiscal deficits are lower these results conflict sharply with the notion of the ecb as common property

catalytic finance when does it work in a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort this model helps us understand a debate about the role of the imf in catalyzing lending to developing countries

rules and discretion with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions thus the issue of how to improve upon the time consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy we present a model with three players the central bark the fiscal authority and wage setters in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled we show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated we also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank

the effect of unions on the structure of wages a longitudinal analysis this paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity the econometric model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a large panel data set formed from the u s current population survey the results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills in addition the patterns of selection bias differ by skill group among workers with lower levels of observed skill unionized workers are positively selected whereas union workers are negatively selected from among those with higher levels of observed skill despite a large and sophisticated literature there is still substantial disagreement over the extent to which differences in the structure of wages between union and nonunion workers represent an effect of trade unions rather than a consequence of the nonrandom selection of unionized workers over the past decade several alternative approaches have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers 2 one method that has been successfully applied in other areas of applied microeconometrics is the use of longitudinal data to measure the wage gains or losses of workers who change union status unfortunately longitudinal estimators are highly sensitive to measurement error even a small fraction of misclassified union status changes can lead to significant biases if the true rate of mobility between union and nonunion jobs is low this sensitivity led lewis 1986 to essentially dismiss the longitudinal evidence in his landmark survey of union wage effects in this paper i present some new evidence on the union wage effect based on a longitudinal estimator that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status the estimator uses external information on union status misclassification rates along with the reduced form coefficients from a multi variate regression of wages on the observed sequence of union status indicators to isolate the causal effect of unions from any selection biases introduced by a correlation between union status and the permanent component of unobserved wage heterogeneity recognizing that unions may raise wages more or less for

the known unknowns and unknown unknowns of european monetary union abstract the early literature on economic and monetary union emu in europe provided insights into the difficulties involved in forming a monetary union among diverse economies several of the problems that emerged in the euro crisis were correctly diagnosed beforehand the fact that they were not addressed is not attributable to the shortcomings of research but to a complacent reading of the literature by the policy community the possibility of balance of payments crises within monetary union and the degree of correlation between the default risks of banks and sovereigns were however underestimated or even ignored in the literature an analytical reassessment of emu helps define options for policy reform

union effects on wage dispersion in canadian industry abstract this paper analyzes the effects that unions have on the dispersion of wages in canada the empirical results indicate that unions have a significant effect in reducing wage dispersion the standard deviation in hourly wages is smaller for unionized workers than it is for non unionized workers this result holds not only for the more general case but also for narrowly defined demographic industrial and occupational categories finally regression estimates indicate that the coefficients on the wage determining variables are smaller in the unionized sector

causal relationship between telecommunications and economic growth in china and its regions shiu a and lam p l causal relationship between telecommunications and economic growth in china and its regions regional studies this paper studies the causal relationship between telecommunications development and economic growth of china its result indicates that there is a unidirectional relationship running from real gross domestic product gdp to telecommunications development at the national level causality running from telecommunications development to real gdp is found only in the provinces in the affluent eastern region but not in the low income central and western provinces the results imply that an improvement in telecommunications infrastructure alone is not sufficient for stimulating growth in the central and western provinces it is equally important for the chinese government to develop and enhance other complementary factors like business environments transportation networks education and manpower training in order to make the best use of the telecommunications systems in the ce

a model of currency depreciation and the debt inflation spiral abstract this paper shows how a government that cannot make credible policy commitments might manage its exchange rate and fiscal stance in a world of rational expectations the dynamic game model developed here potentially can generate diverse patterns of macroeconomic behavior patterns that differ as a result of assumed differences in government objectives under some types of government the ongoing strategic interaction between the public and private sectors leads to a disinflationary outcome other governments may push the economy into a spiral of rising debt and inflation

central bank independence and public debt policy the various proposals for the institutional design of the european monetary union have drawn fresh attention to the link between monetary and public debt policies this paper explores the strategic interaction between fiscal authorities setting public debt and the central bank controlling monetary policy in the absence of political distortions an optimally designed conservative independent central bank is sufficient to establish the second best in the presence of political distortions or with coordination of monetary and fiscal policy however also a debt target is needed

can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem abstract this paper addresses three problems with reputational equilibria in the barro gordon monetary policy game the multiplicity of equilibria the coordination problem and a chisel prone credibility problem a chisel proof credibility condition ensures that in response to a small deviation from the low inflation rate by the central bank it never pays for the private sector to acquiesce if the private sector can coordinate then a low but nonzero inflation outcome can be supported as a subgameperfect and chisel proof credible noncooperative equilibrium for an atomistic private sector the result can still hold in a game between successive monetary administrations

public debt stabilization the relevance of policymakers time horizons policymakers are stuck in time political short termism policy myopia policy short sightedness and similar words have been coined to emphasize the present centric policy thinking politics tends to produce short time horizons and as a result policymakers often fail to use present opportunities to mitigate future harms focusing on fiscal and monetary strategic interactions given different separate decision makers our paper aims to explore the effects of policymakers time horizons on debt stabilization to formalize our ideas we use the novel concept of nonlinear model predictive control feedback nash equilibrium nfne and find that present centric policy thinking and decision horizons matters under several dimensions

monetary fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union abstract we consider monetary fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union if monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets the nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities leadership of either authority is better fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment the optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary fiscal symbiosis yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives for any order of moves without fiscal co ordination and without monetary commitment

housework fixed effects and wages of married workers although the primacy of household responsibilities in determining gender differences in labor market outcomes is universally recognized there has been little investigation of the direct effect of housework on wages using data from the panel study of income dynamics cross sectional wage regressions reveal a substantial negative relation between wages and housework for wives which persists in specifications controlling for individual fixed effects the evidence for husbands is inconclusive married women s housework time is on average three times that of married men s the addition of housework time to the wage equations increases the explained component of the gender wage gap from 27 30 percent to 38 percent

euro area government bonds fragmentation and contagion during the sovereign debt crisis abstract the paper analyzes the integration of euro area sovereign bond markets during the european sovereign debt crisis it tests for contagion i e an intensification in the transmission of shocks across countries fragmentation a reduction in spillovers and flight to quality patterns exploiting the heteroskedasticity of intraday changes in bond yields for identification the paper finds that euro area government bond markets were well integrated prior to the crisis but saw a substantial fragmentation from 2010 onward flight to quality was present at the height of the crisis but has largely dissipated after the european central bank s ecb s announcement of its outright monetary transactions omt program in 2012 at the same time italy and spain became more interdependent after the omt announcement providing our only evidence of contagion this suggests that countries have been effectively ring fenced and italy and spain benefited from the joint reduction in yields following the omt announcement

a macroeconomic model with a financial sector this paper studies a macroeconomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents we pursue four sets of results i the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes as volatility spikes agents precautionary motive increases depressing prices even further log linear approximations fail to capture these non linear effects that can cause economies to be significantly depressed for long periods of time ii endogenous risk during volatile episodes increases asset price correlations iii financial experts impose a negative externality on each other and on the labor sector by not maintaining adequate capital cushion and funding structure iv while risk sharing within the financial sector through securitization and derivatives contracts reduces many inefficiencies it can also amlify systemic risks

inflation forecast targeting implementing and monitoring inflation targets abstract inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting the central bank s inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy the weight on output stabilization determines how quickly the inflation forecast is adjusted towards the inflation target money growth or exchange rate targeting is generally inferior than inflation targeting and leads to higher inflation variability commitment to target rules may be better than commitment to instrument rules

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

business cycle convergence in emu a first look at the second moment we analyse the dynamics of the standard deviation of demand and supply shocks as well as of the demand component of gdp across countries in the european monetary union emu this analysis allows us to evaluate the patterns of cyclical comovement in emu and compare them the cyclical performance of the new members of the eu and other oecd countries we make use of sigma convergence methods to identify synchronization patterns in business cycles the eurozone has converged to a stable lower level of dispersion across business cycles during the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s the new eu members have also experienced a strong pattern of convergence from 1998 to 2005 when a strong divergence trend appears an enlargement of the emu to 22 members would not significantly decrease its optimality as a currency area there is evidence for some europe specific characteristics as compared to global comovements in business cycles authors abstract

the welfare economics of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policy abstract in the absence of ricardian equivalence lump sum transfers between households within a country can alter the pattern of national saving and consumption allowing the government to exploit the country s size in world trade and in international borrowing and lending redistribution across generations through unfunded social security retirement schemes or public sector deficit finance with lump sum taxes and transfers enables a national planner to affect both the static and intertemporal terms of trade when trade restrictions or discriminatory taxation of asset income are unavailable due to international agreements the case for cooperative fiscal policy formation by governments of interdependent economies is examined in an overlapping generations economy with internationally perfectly mobile capital and a single relative price the world interest rate the optimum unfunded social security scheme when no distortionary tax instruments are allowed is derived for a government with nationalistic social preferences this policy targets both intergenerational distribution objectives and interest rate objectives the absence of distortionary taxes implies that no overall loss in world surplus need result from the strategic use of lump sum transfers so that coordination of intergenerational transfers is unnecessary for pareto optimality when internationally enjoyed public goods are introduced allocational efficiency requires cooperative selection of national exhaustive public spending programs but it does not demand that the financing of public expenditures be coordinated

is infrastructure capital productive a dynamic heterogeneous approach this paper offers an empirical evaluation of the output contribution of infrastructure drawing from a large data set on infrastructure stocks covering 88 countries and spanning the years 1960 2000 and using a panel time series approach the paper estimates a long run aggregate production function relating gdp to human capital physical capital and a synthetic measure of infrastructure given by the first principal component of infrastructure endowments in transport power and telecommunications tests of the cointegration rank allowing it to vary across countries reveal a common rank with a single cointegrating vector which is taken to represent the long run production function estimation of its parameters is performed using the pooled mean group estimator which allows for unrestricted short run parameter heterogeneity across countries while imposing the testable restriction of long run parameter homogeneity the long run elasticity of output with respect to the synthetic infrastructure index ranges between 0 07 and 0 10 the estimates are highly significant both statistically and economically and robust to alternative dynamic specifications and infrastructure measures there is little evidence of long run parameter heterogeneity across countries whether heterogeneity is unconditional or conditional on their level of development population size or infrastructure endowments

trends in the male female wage gap the 1980s compared with the 1970s 1 introduction an interesting pattern emerges when contrasting men s and women s wage growth in the 1970s and 1980s from 1979 to 1989 female wages grew 1 7 per annum faster than male wages this wage growth in the 1980s resulted in a 17 narrowing of the gender wage gap on the other hand from 1969 to 1979 female wages grew at a rate only 0 39 per year faster than male wages resulting in very little narrowing of the gender wage gap blau 1998 as noted by smith and ward 1989 these contrasting trends puzzled many because it is well known that female work behavior shot up more dramatically in the 1970s than in the 1980s if female wage growth is related to increasing labor force activity one would have expected the male female wage gap to narrow more in the 1970s than in the 1980s the purpose of this paper is to identify some of the reasons why the male female wage gap narrowed more quickly in the 1980s than in the 1970s despite a deceleration of the growth in female labor force activity in the 1980s what appears to be the case is that predominantly younger and less experienced females entered the labor force in the 1970s the entry of women with relatively little human capital brought down the growth in women s average human capital o neill 1985 so that despite the upsurge of women s labor force participation in the 1970s women s average human capital relative to men s increased more slowly in the 1970s than in the 1980s this relatively slower growth in women s human capital appears to have played itself out in the 1980s both because the number of women joining the labor force slowed and because women s labor force attachment as measured by the proportion of potential work years actually worked increased blau 1998 with these trends average female human capital increased in the 1980s resulting in greater overall wage gains because of the stark differences between the 1970s and 1980s this paper concentrates on distinguishing the factors that contribute to men s and women s wage growth in the two decades despite the substantial literature on the male female wage gap the interdecade difference in the trend has not been adequately examined in what follows this paper uses the panel study of income dynamics psid to illustrate the effects of the demographic changes alluded to above 1 first it presents wage trends for the 1970s and 1980s second it provides direct measures of changes in human capital growth within each decade third to illustrate the importance of these demographic trends especially how new young labor market entrants bring down wages it shows that the higher relative female wage growth in the 1980s is reduced and the relatively slower female wage growth in the 1970s is enhanced when one controls for individual human capital characteristics these effects are illustrated first by including actual experience type variables in a regression whose coefficients measure wage growth and second by eliminating new entrants from 1970s and 1980s regression analysis the paper shows that with these controls increases in female average growth in both the 1970s and 1980s were more comparable than previously thought 2 recent literature on trends in the male female wage gap this is not the first paper to recognize the trend in male female wage convergence o neill 1985 blau and beller 1988 smith and ward 1989 goldin 1990 katz and murphy 1992 wellington 1993 o neill and polachek 1993 blau and kahn 1997 and blau 1998 all note that women s wages have risen relative to men smith and ward 1989 find that female relative wages rose between 1920 and 1980 when adjusting for worker skills goldin 1990 piecing together various data sources finds a similar long term narrowing according to her the ratio of female to male earnings in the economy as a whole rose from 0 46 to 0 56 during the period 1890 to 1930 but was virtually stable from 1950 to around 1980 p

a theory of infrastructure led development abstract this paper proposes a theory of long run development based on public infrastructure as the engine of growth the government in addition to investing in infrastructure spends on health services which in turn raise labor productivity and lower the rate of time preference infrastructure affects the production of both commodities and health services as a result of network effects the degree of efficiency of infrastructure is nonlinearly related to the stock of public capital itself provided that governance is adequate enough to ensure a sufficient degree of efficiency of public investment an increase in the share of spending on infrastructure financed by a cut in unproductive expenditure or foreign grants may facilitate the shift from a low growth equilibrium characterized by low productivity and low savings to a high growth steady state

reputation and time consistency recent work has shown that reputational arguments based on trigger strategies can sometimes be used to deal with the problem of time inconsistency in government policy this idea was exploited by robert barro and david gordon 1983 in a model of inflation and by v v chari and patrick kehoe 1988 in a model of capital taxation here it is shown that reputational arguments of this sort are widely applicable 2 a general policy model is developed based on an economy that is stationary over time contains identical households and has no endogenous state variables it is shown in general that the infinite horizon version of this model has equilibria in trigger strategies that yield outcomes strictly better than those attainable as equilibria in the one period model

permanent budget deficits and inflation abstract the issue of whether permanent primary budget deficits have to be monetized is re examined in a simple monetary model hybrid of the sidrauski and overlapping generations frameworks in which intergenerational effects are generated by the arrival of new infinitely lived cohorts the presence of intergenerational effects enlarges for a given fiscal policy the set of admissible monetary policies and weakens the need to monetize the deficit comparisons between the growth and interest rates are in general insufficient to predict whether increased deficit must be monetized because of the existence of both bond and money seigniorage laffer curves

symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union we consider the interaction between the monetary policy in a monetary union and the separate fiscal policies of the member countries we use a barro gordon type model extended to many countries and fiscal policies each country s fiscal policies inflict externalities on other countries and the common monetary policy has its time consistency problem but if the two types of policymakers agree about the ideal levels of output and inflation then this ideal is attained despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives despite ex post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy without fiscal coordination without monetary commitment and for any order of moves

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

transaction costs telecommunications and the microeconomics of macroeconomic growth the sources of differences in growth rates across nations are unclear this observation constitutes one of the central intellectual challenges of our time why is the whole world not developed consequently a host of scholars offer various explanations for growth or nongrowth including cultural factors politics and economics 2 the objective of this article is to determine whether a link exists between transaction costs telecommunications and economic growth the article builds on recent research on the macroeconomic determinants of growth as well as on research regarding the significant economic effects of telecommunications on transaction costs it is organized as follows section i reviews the theory of transaction costs section ii the link between transaction costs and telecommunications section iii contains the empirical analysis and section iv some conclusions

development a study of the indian manufacturing industry if infrastructure tends to generate spillover externalities as has been the assumption in much of the development literature one may reasonably look for evidence of such indirect effects in the accounts of manufacturing industries empirical support for this assumption has so far been ambiguous this analysis of indian data however reveals substantial externality effects from the states infrastructure to manufacturing productivity the analysis separates the direct effects of roads and electricity as mediated by the infrastructure services purchased by manufacturing industries along with other intermediate inputs from the indirect effects as measured by the impact of infrastructure capacity on the solow productivity residual in the 20 years from 1972 to 1992 growth of road and electricity generating capacity seems to have accounted for nearly half the growth of the productivity residual of india s registered manufacturing

dynamic games and the time inconsistency of optimal policy in open economies it has been argued that the bretton woods system of pegged but adjustable exchange rates set up after world war ii was designed specifically to prevent the manipulation of exchange rates in pursuit of national macroeconomic objectives see r cooper so it is perhaps no coincidence that the ending of pegged rates has led to the re emergence of theories and policies involving such manipulation before the war when inflation was low and unemployment high in the major industrialised nations this involved competitive depreciation as countries tried to gain employment in the late 1970 s and early 1980 s however countries like the uk and the us have embarked on policies of competitive appreciation in order to cut inflation regarded as the first priority sharp movements in exchange rates however constitute a threat to orderly trade and stimulate protectionism as bergsten 1981 argues this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

comparisons of business cycles in the ec idiosyncracies and regularities annual data since 1960 and the real business cycle model as a guidance the evidence suggests that there are remarkable similarities between the business cycle pattern of these countries despite significant differences in the patterns of fiscal and monetary policies and the terms of trade we take this evidence to suggest that the type of shocks and the propagation mechanism is fairly similar across the ec countries hence the process of european integration under a set of uniform institutions and policies should not be a problem as far as the business cycle is concerned

telecommunications infrastructure and economic development a simultaneous approach in diesem beitrag wird untersucht welchen einflus die telekommunikations infrastruktur auf die wirtschaftliche entwicklung ausubt diese wichtige frage hat im zusammenhang mit der diskussion um informationsautobahnen aktualitat erlangt in der vorliegenden studie wird der einflus der telekommunikations infrastruktur fur 21 oecdlander fur die vergangenen 20 jahre analysiert es wird ein strukturgleichungsmodell geschatzt in dem investitionen in die telekommunikations infrastruktur als endogene variable erfast werden und in einem mikromodell angebot und nachfrage nach telekommunikations investitionen spezifiziert werden das mikromodell wird dann zusammen mit der makro wachstumsgleichung geschatzt als ergebnis stellen die autoren dann eine positive kausalbeziehung zwischen telekommunikations investitionen und wirtschaftlicher entwicklung fest wenn eine kritische masse an telekommunikations infrastruktur existiert

cooperative monetary and fiscal policies in the euro area this article discusses the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in the euro area though many observers suggest a fiscal union as the next step of euro area constitutional reform a federal fiscal union does not appear politically feasible in the short run we suggest moving forward with cooperative monetary and fiscal institutions and policies that allow for decentralized fiscal decisions while taking federal stabilization policies into account this approach will increase the probability of survival of the euro area compared with the current fiscal arrangements using a dynamic macro model counterfactual simulation paths of our cooperative solution are contrasted with time series data for the euro area

collective bargaining and union membership effects on the wages of male youths the objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the nonunion wage differential consists of two effects the first represents the differential between the wage of a nonunion worker in a collective bargaining unit and the wage paid to a comparable worker not covered by a bargaining agreement this effect arises from the monopoly power of organized labor the second is the wage differential between union and nonunion workers in collective bargaining units this latter effect is attributed to economic benefits that unionism brings to its members empirical evidence is presented in support of both effects

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy the problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources first as shown by guillermo a calvo 1978 the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation second as discussed by robert e lucas and nancy l stokey 1983 there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government in th is paper it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

strategic interactions of fiscal policies in europe a global var perspective abstract the paper analyses the strategic interactions of fiscal policies in the european union context by modelling the interdependencies arising between public and private sectors saving investment balances in a global vector autoregressive framework we use two empirical specifications to reflect some important differences in the sequencing of the policy decision making process in this setting we draw policy implications with respect to fiscal policy coordination and fiscal policy discretion we highlight the importance of several factors such as global capital flows uncertainty with respect to policy actions and nature of the shocks as key elements defining the dimension of the prevailing policy tradeoffs

bargaining effect and membership effect in public sector unions the vast majority of the literature on public sector unionism focuses on union wage effects and the extent of unionization in this paper we investigate some additional aspects of public sector unionism that have been discussed recently with respect to the private sector the first is an analysis of the wage effects attributable to the legal status of the worker union specifically we investigate the difference between an individual s membership in a union and an individual s employment in a collective bargaining unit second we examine the return to human capital and seniority in unionized versus non unionized public sector employment the two issues under scrutiny here are not unrelated for each measures in its own way the ability of the union to deliver benefits to and elicit the support of its membership in other words both are issues of union security for the most part the literature on union wage effects makes no distinction between union membership and collective bargaining coverage as an exception christensen and maki use a cross section of three digit industries to investigate both an industry coverage variable and an industry membership variable 3 they conclude that membership in the union is the key status in the collective bargaining process in two other papers jones 15 and blakemore hunt and kiker 1 use panel data that allow the worker s union status to be identified according to union membership and collective bargaining coverage both find that nonunion workers employed in a collective bargaining unit receive a wage premium over workers who are not covered and that union members receive an extra bonus

externalities information costs and social benefit cost analysis for economic development an example from telecommunications the analytics of achieving a socially optimal allocation of investment resources has been a continuing problem in the field of economic development early work on this subject focused on externalities and on the need to include in the analysis a project s indirect promotional effects later research in what came to be called social benefit cost analysis sbca has added an emphasis on shadow prices on uncertainty and increasingly on income distribution effects 2 in principle these diverse concerns of social benefit cost analysis are complementary rather than competitive in the conditions of a less developed country ldc an investment project s side effects on income creation can be very significant 3 similarly an investment project s indirect impact on income distribution may also be substantial consequently an analysis incorporating externalities is necessary to take indirect social benefits and costs into account in practice however the more recent concerns of sbca have sometimes been accompanied by diminished interest in externalities 4 this paper presents an example that illustrates the importance of including externalities in considering both the efficiency and the equity consequences of investment choice our example analyzes the welfare effects of investment in telecommunications primarily telephone facilities in developing countries 5 investments that make available additional telephones in ldcs are often viewed as having welfare effects similar to increased availability of consumer durables like color television or air conditioning those goods are primarily an added convenience for the upper classes and their availability enlarges further the

using nonlinear model predictive control for dynamic decision problems in economics abstract this paper presents a new approach to solve dynamic decision models in economics the proposed procedure called nonlinear model predictive control nmpc relies on the iterative solution of optimal control problems on finite time horizons and is well established in engineering applications for stabilization and tracking problems only quite recently extensions to more general optimal control problems including those appearing in economic applications have been investigated like dynamic programming dp nmpc does not rely on linearization techniques but uses the full nonlinear model and in this sense provides a global solution to the problem however unlike dp nmpc only computes one optimal trajectory at a time thus avoids to grid the state space and for this reason the computational demand grows much more moderately with the space dimension than for dp in this paper we explain the basic idea of nmpc give a proof concerning the accuracy of nmpc for discounted optimal control problems present implementational details and demonstrate the ability of nmpc to solve dynamic decision problems in economics by solving low and high dimensional examples including models with multiple equilibria tracking and stochastic problems

fiscal and monetary policy co ordination a differential game approach in this paper the interaction between the treasury and the central bank is examined in the case of both cooperative and non cooperative behaviour differential games are used in the framework of a continuous time econometric model of the italian economy the nash and the stackelberg non cooperative equilibrium solutions are computed and the case for cooperation is analysed by considering the nash and the kalai smorodinsky bargaining models it is shown that in the italian case the government has a stronger bargaining position than the central bank a comparison is then made between the different solutions to show that the drawbacks that emerge from non cooperation are not simply those depending on the players payoffs other features are in fact considered which constitute a further argument for policy co ordination

debt deflation financial market stress and regime change evidence from europe using mrvar the economic meltdown since 2008 9 has created disinflation and even deflation in some countries in the euro area in a period with large debt overhang creating the condition for a continuing financial market stress in the euro area as disinflation and deflation push up the real interest rate while growth and income declines the leveraging problem becomes more severe and the economy risks shifting into a regime with high insolvency risk high financial stress rising credit spreads possibly accompanied by strong adverse macroeconomic feedback loops investigating the consequences of those magnifying feedback loops given the debt deflation we demonstrate the possibility of unstable dynamics and downward spirals in the presence of regime dependent macro feedback loops using a theoretical model with decentralized matching mechanisms on both labor and financial markets to explore the amplifying linkages between deflation output labor and financial markets we employ a new solution procedure called nmpc to solve our models variants for out of steady state dynamics we empirically explore deflationary trends in europe and employ a global var gvar model for a large euro area macro data set to estimate the impact of deflation on output moreover we use a four variable multi regime var mrvar model with regime dependent irs to study deflationary as well as well as the financial risk drivers in a mrvar setting new measures for financial risk drivers are employed and multi regime irs for output inflation rates interest rates and financial stress are explored we also study regime changes in central macro relationships such as regime change in the credit output link the phillips curve and in okun s law

classification error models and labor market dynamics measurement error is often a severe problem in longitudinal data such as labor market flows two correction methods have been used for labor market flows but the methods tend to adjust the data in opposite directions one method shows a rigid labor market with long unemployment spells whereas the other shows the opposite because the methods appear theoretically similar one might interpret the differing results as an indictment of both procedures this article documents and explains the differences between the two methods more important it argues that the differences result from the reliance of one method on assumptions that are theoretically implausible and rejected by the data

threshold externalities and cyclical growth in a stylized model of capital accumulation abstract this paper introduces the threshold externalities into a stylized model of capital accumulation in which the representative agent endowed with perfect foresight has an infinite time horizon it is shown that the threshold externalities may generate not only a multiplicity of equilibria but also a cyclical growth path that never converges to any steady state

classification error in dynamic discrete choice models implications for female labor supply behavior two key issues in the literature on female labor supply are i whether persistence in employment status is due to unobserved heterogeneity or state dependence and ii whether fertility is exogenous to labor supply until recently the consensus was that unobserved heterogeneity is very important and fertility is endogenous hyslop 1999 challenged this using a dynamic panel probit model of female labor supply including heterogeneity and state dependence he found that adding autoregressive errors led to a substantial diminution in the importance of heterogeneity this in turn meant he could not reject that fertility is exogenous here we extend hyslop 1999 to allow classification error in employment status using an estimation procedure developed by keane and wolpin 2001 and keane and sauer 2005 we find that a fairly small amount of classification error is enough to overturn hyslop s conclusions leading to overwhelming rejection of the hypothesis of exogenous fertility

fiscal policy coordination and emu a dynamic game approach abstract this paper examines the case for fiscal policy coordination in a european economic and monetary union emu a two bloc model with two market structures is examined emu producing a single homogeneous good in both blocs emu1 and a two good emu emu2 where each bloc produces a single home good the european central bank sets monetary policy so as to achieve credibly low inflation rates we find that for emu2 as relative prices can change countries have an incentive to improve their terms of trade leading to an inefficient noncooperative outcome which can be avoided by cooperation

monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers abstract with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership monetary unification reduces inflation taxes and public spending these disciplining effects of a monetary union which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases are likely to raise welfare two types of arrangements are considered for the union s common central bank ccb making the ccb more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the ccb in contrast to the results of svensson 1997 svensson l e o 1997 optimal inflation targets conservative central banks and linear inflation contracts american economic review 87 98 114 an optimally designed conservative ccb may outperform inflation targeting finally we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification hence subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare

do we really want an independent central bank the issue of an independent central bank is assessed in the context of experience in the u k economy the historical role of the bank of england is examined revealing that the success of anti inflation policy depends on the exchange rate regime as well as on the institutional arrangements holding between the bank and government inflation targets are discussed but independence is also addressed by seeing how other targets such as nominal gdp might perform the theoretical arguments for and against an independent central bank are discussed in detail it is argued that partial independence where the central bank enjoys autonomy in relatively good states and is overridden in bad states is the preferred form of independence attention is drawn to the costs arising owing to a lack of coordination of policy when the finance ministry may compete against the central bank in the case where the latter is independent copyright 1994 by oxford university press

designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a european monetary union this paper explores the conditions under which aeuropean monetary union emu is an optimum currencyarea the scope for an emu increases with theconvergence of structural and fiscal policies smallmoney holdings a conservative european central bank and dependent national central banks how nationalpolicies affect the rest of the union once the emu hasbeen established is also investigated the case forsurveillance of national structural and fiscalpolicies appears to depend mainly on the monetaryarrangements in the union

cooperative and non cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the emu in this paper we analyze the interaction of fiscal stabilization policies in the economic and monetary union emu the excessive deficits procedure of the maastricht treaty and its elaborations in the recent stability and growth pact introduce a set of fiscal stringency requirements on national fiscal policies situations might arise where the need for fiscal flexibility and the fiscal stringency requirements will create a conflict and suboptimal macroeconomic policies are implemented we analyze macroeconomic adjustment under non cooperative and cooperative fiscal policy design in the emu using a dynamic games approach in particular we consider how fiscal stringency requirements like the stability and growth pact affect fiscal policy design under emu and study the consequences of the introduction of a fiscal transfer mechanism between countries

dynamic strategic monetary policies and coordination in interdependent economies this paper develops strategic monetary policies using a standard two country macro model under flexible exchange rates the equilibria considered include feedback nash and feedback stackelberg both of which are compared to the pareto optimal cooperative equilibrium the optimal policies are obtained as feedback rules in which real money supplies are adjusted to movements in the real exchange rate the properties of these policies and their welfare implications are analyzed using numerical simulations the contrast in the present results with those obtained previously for a short run horizon suggest the importance of both intertemporal and intratemporal tradeoffs in the d etermination of optimal strategic policies copyright 1988 by american economic association

the workweek of capital and its cyclical implications abstract the neoclassical growth model studied in the kydland and prescott time to build paper is modified to permit the capital utilization rate to vary the effect of this modification is to increase the amplitude of the aggregate fluctuations predicted by theory as the equilibrium response to technological shocks if following solow the changes in output not accounted for by changes in the labor and tangible capital inputs are interpreted as being the technology shocks the statistical properties of the fluctuations in the postwar united states economy are close in magnitude and nature to those predicted by theory

infrastructure externalities and regional industrial productivity in china a spatial econometric approach this paper evaluates infrastructure s impact on regional industrial productivity in china and distinguishes between within and cross region effects three infrastructure assets are examined elect

debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia as a result of the recent financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession fiscal deficits have soared in many oecd countries as a consequence government debt has been on the rise again after a period of stable or declining government debt in this paper we analyze debt stabilization in a country that features endogenous risk premia imposed by financial markets that evaluate the probability of debt default by governments endogenous risk premia arise by assuming e g simple linear relations between risk premia and the level of debt as a result the real interest rate on government debt can be written as a constant measuring the risk free real interest rate corrected for real output growth plus an endogenous risk premium that depends on the debt level we bring such an endogenous risk premium into tabellini 1986 model and analyze the impact of it this gives rise to a non linear differential game we solve this game for both a cooperative setting and a non cooperative setting the non cooperative game is solved under an open loop information structure we present a bifurcation analysis w r t the risk premium parameter

understanding the gender pay gap what s competition got to do with it a number of researchers have argued that men and women have different attitudes toward and behavioral responses to competition that is women are more likely to opt out of jobs in which performance pay is the norm and to under perform in some competitive situations laboratory experiments suggest that these gender differences are rather large to check these hypotheses and findings against differences in the field the authors use performance pay as an indicator of competition in the workplace and compare the gender gap not only in incidence of performance pay but also in earnings and work effort under these contracts they find that although women are less likely than men to work under performance pay contracts the gender gap is small furthermore the effect of performance pay on earnings is modest and does not differ markedly by gender consequently the authors argue the ability of these competition hypotheses to explain the gender pay gap seems very limited