information school choice and academic achievement evidence from two experiments we examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower income families in a public school choice plan receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher performing schools parents with high scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose nonguaranteed schools with higher test scores using random variation from each experiment we find that attending a higher scoring school increases student test scores the results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options from which to choose

outside options and the failure of the coase conjecture a buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option abandoning their search or moving on to another seller we show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price contravening the coase conjecture we then embed the singleseller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual no haggling assumption jel c78 d42 d43 l12 l13 the coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory informing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of commitment the idea is that for any given price high value buyers are more likely to purchase than low value buyers leading to negative selection in the demand pool accordingly the seller cuts its price over time causing high value buyers to delay their purchases the seller s inability to commit thus leads its later selves to exert a negative externality on its former selves reducing its overall profit gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 this idea of negative selection is robust versions of it hold when costs are nonlinear kahn 1986 when goods depreciate over time bond and samuelson 1984 when there is entry of new buyers sobel 1991 and when the buyers face future competition fuchs and skrzypacz 2010 in this article we show that the coase conjecture fails in a natural environment where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise we consider a seller who faces a buyer or a continuum of buyers with unknown value for the good and unknown outside option each period the seller chooses price p t the buyer then chooses to buy wait or exercise his option and terminate the game the outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product for example when waiting for the price of the iphone to fall a customer could instead buy a comparable phone from a competitor similarly when bargaining over the price of a car a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer the outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation has terminated for example after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar a tourist could start seeing local attractions

parent teacher meetings and student outcomes evidence from a developing country abstract we conduct a randomized field experiment involving regularly scheduled face to face meetings between teachers and parents over a period of two academic years at each of these meetings the teacher provided the parents with a report card and discussed the child s academic progress we find that the overall test scores of the students in the treatment schools compared to control schools increased by 0 26 sd in the first year and 0 38 sd by the end of the second year the program also resulted in improvements in both student attitudes and behavior and teachers pedagogical practices the intervention encouraged parents to spend more time assisting their children and monitoring their school work the treatment effects are robust across parental teacher and school level characteristics and the findings indicate that programs for stimulating parent teacher interactions are cost effective easy to implement and easy to scale up

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

bargaining with arrival of new traders we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events which represent arrival of traders or information we char acterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers the possi bility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics there is delay in equilibrium and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations the seller pay off equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival in applications when buyer valuations fall average prices drop and delay increases surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate

sequentially optimal auctions abstract in auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price auctions without commitment results when the time between auctions goes to zero seller expected revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price with many bidders the seller equilibrium reserve price approaches the reserve price in an optimal static auction an auction in which the simple equilibrium reserve price policy of the seller mirrors a policy commonly used by many auctioneers is computed journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d44 d82

remedying education evidence from two randomized experiments in india this paper presents the results of a two year randomized evaluation of a large scale remedial education program conducted in mumbai and vadodara india the remedial education program hires young women from the community to teach basic literacy and numeracy skills to children who reach standard three or four without having mastered these competencies the program implemented by a ngo in collaboration with the government is extremely cheap it cost 5 dollars per child per year and is easily replicable it has been implemented in 20 indian cities and reached tens of thousands of children we find the program to be very effective on average it increased learning by 0 15 standard deviations in the first year and 0 25 in the second year the gains are the largest for children at the bottom of the distribution children in the bottom third gain 0 2 standard deviations in the first year and 0 32 in the second year in math they gain 0 51 standard deviation in the second year the results are similar in the two grade levels and in the two cities at the margin extending this program would be up to 12 16 times more cost effective than hiring new teachers authors

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

mutual fund tournaments the sorting bias and new evidence previous findings regarding the risk shifting behavior of mid year underperforming mutual fund managers are mixed in this article i show that this is due to a sorting bias which is caused by the sorting of first half risk levels when establishing relative mid year performance even without risk shifting behavior mean reversion of these sorted risk levels results in the detection of tournament behavior after correcting for this bias i find evidence supporting the hypothesis that first half underperforming managers increase portfolio risk during the second half of the year and that this tournament behavior is not dependent on first half market conditions the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

children s schooling and parents behavior evidence from the head start impact study abstract parents may have important effects on their children but little work in economics explores whether children s schooling opportunities crowd out or encourage parents investment in children we analyze data from the head start impact study which granted randomly chosen preschool aged children the opportunity to attend head start we find that head start causes a substantial increase in parents involvement with their children such as time spent reading to children math activities or days spent with children by fathers who do not live with their children both during and after the period when their children are potentially enrolled in head start

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

quality and price personalization under customer recognition a dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria abstract we present a model of market hyper segmentation where a monopolist acquires within a short time all information about the preferences of consumers who purchase its vertically differentiated products the firm offers a new price quality schedule after each commitment period lower consumer types may have an incentive to delay their purchases until next period to obtain a better introductory offer the monopolist counters this incentive by offering higher informational rents considering the dynamic game played by the monopolist and its customers we find that there is always a markov perfect equilibrium mpe in which the firm immediately sells the good to all customers offering the mussa rosen static equilibrium schedule to first time customers and getting full commitment profits however if the commitment period between two offers is long enough there is another mpe with gradual market expansion contrary to the coasian result for a durable good monopoly we find that in both equilibria the profit of the monopolist increases and the aggregate consumers surplus decreases as the interval of commitment shrinks the model yields policy implications for regulations on collection and storage of customers information

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

contract negotiation and the coase conjecture a strategic foundation for renegotiation proof contracts what does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible this paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation proof contracts in this environment the model extends the framework of the coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods as frictions become negligible all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating efficient and straightforward to characterize

incomplete information bargaining with outside opportunities we consider two kinds of outside opportunity that a seller of an indivisible good might have selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself in both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer s valuation and becomes more pessimistic over time when the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic she prefers the outside opportunity so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer despite the resulting finite horizon nature of negotiations the link between the buyer s willingness to accept an offer and the seller s eagerness to go outside generates multiple equilibria

true monopolistic competition as a result of imperfect information the paper restates hart s 1985a 1985b definition of large group monopolistic competition distinguishes it from oligopolistic competition and raises the question of whether there are reasonable circumstances that give rise to true monopolistic competition as defined the purpose is to show that consumers imperfect information may create conditions that will turn an otherwise oligopolistic market into a truly monopolistically competitive one

changes to mutual fund risk intentional or mean reverting an empirical issue is whether a mutual fund s change in intertemporal risk is intentional or arises from risk mean reversion our methodology uses actual fund trades to identify funds that actively change risk funds that are statistically identified as trading to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk mean reversion mostly funds trade to reduce risk and in particular tracking error variance this is most evident for funds that previously attained a low tracking error variance we find no evidence of a relation between past performance and intended changes to return variance or tracking error variance

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

disclosure and agency conflict evidence from mutual fund commission bundling abstract this study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management for certain expenditures fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity payments can be expensed relatively transparent or bundled with brokerage commissions relatively opaque we find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments moreover we find a differential flow reaction that confirms the opacity of commission bundling collectively our results demonstrate the importance of transparency in addressing agency costs of delegated investment management

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

report cards the impact of providing school and child test scores on educational markets this paper studies study the impact of providing school and child test scores on subsequent test scores prices and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers a randomly selected half of the sample villages markets received report cards this increased test scores by 0 11 standard deviations decreased private school fees by 17 percent and increased primary enrollment by 4 5 percent heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school quality is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers improves market efficiency and raises child welfare through higher test scores higher enrollment and lower fees

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

a theory of bargaining deadlock abstract i study a dynamic one sided offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information the seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not during bargaining the seller may receive an outside option the value of which depends on the quality of the product if the outside option is sufficiently important there is an equilibrium in which the buyer s belief about the product s quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process as a result the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles a bargaining deadlock and its resolution the equilibrium outcome exhibits bargaining delay that does not vanish even with frequent offers and the limiting delay may exist even without a static adverse selection problem under stronger parametric assumptions the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer s belief

risk taking behavior in mutual fund tournaments abstract we develop a two period model of a brown et al j finance 51 1996 85 mutual fund tournament in which two fund managers with unequal midyear performances compete for new cash inflows when one of the managers is an exogenous benchmark winning managers index and losing managers gamble however when both managers are active the winning manager is more likely to gamble expecially when the midyear performance gap is high or when stocks offer high returns and low volatility empirical evidence that winning managers gamble has been documented by other researchers but it has been interpreted as evidence against the tournament model with a dataset of weekly returns from 1984 to 1996 for 660 mutual funds we text for other tournament effects predicted by the model our results suggest a role for the theory of tournaments in studies of mutual fund behavior

why do fund managers increase risk abstract this paper examines the relationship between the increase in fund risk and subsequent cash flows we attempt to test the hypothesis that an increase in fund risk actually increases the net flows of equity funds which is a basic assumption of risk shifting we find that a change in fund risk has a positive and convex relationship with the fund s net flows the effect of risk changes on net flows is a natural consequence of its effects on inflows and outflows this paper s empirical results are robust to return frequency fund age and fund size our findings create incentives for managers to shift risk as documented in the mutual fund literature

the schooling decision family preferences intergenerational conflict and moral hazard in the brazilian favelas this paper experimentally analyzes the schooling decisions of poor households in urban brazil we elicit parents choices between monthly government transfers conditional on their adolescent child attending school and guaranteed unconditional transfers of varying sizes in the baseline treatment an overwhelming majority of parents prefer conditional transfers to larger unconditional transfers however few parents prefer conditional payments if they are offered text message notifications whenever their child misses school these findings suggest important intergenerational conflicts in these schooling decisions a lack of parental control and observability of school attendance and an additional rationale for conditional cash transfer programs the monitoring they provide

mutual fund trades and the value of contradictory private information abstract we investigate the performance of mutual funds that trade using private information these funds are uniquely identified from a set of 2730 funds with 44 315 fund periods between 1994 and 2005 we compare the alignment of fund trades with brokers recommendations which we regard as public information in the universe of informed and uninformed mutual funds funds that systematically trade counter to the public information form a homogenous subset of the privately informed funds by using private information that contradicts the public information these funds exhibit a superior average performance after we control for serial correlation in fund returns we assess this advantage as being an economically significant 1 7 per annum we also show empirically that smaller funds are better able to capture the benefit of private information

pricing product diversity and search costs a bertrand chamberlin diamond model we study price competition in the presence of search costs and product differentiation the limit cases of the model are the bertrand paradox the diamond paradox and chamberlinian monopolistic competition market prices rise with search costs and decrease with the number of firms prices may initially fall with the degree of product differentiation because more diversity leads to more search and more competition equilibrium diversity rises with search costs while the optimum level falls so entry is excessive the market failure is most pronounced for low preference for variety and high search costs

on the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties the presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining equilibrium strategies and outcomes this paper shows that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy in bargaining when parties have access to stationary outside options we show that when opting out is preferable to accepting the inflexible demand of the other party there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in which each party reveals himself as rational as soon as possible a similar conclusion holds when outside options may only be available at a later date or when only one party has access to an outside option

fighting corruption to improve schooling evidence from a newspaper campaign in uganda what are the most effective ways to increase primary school enrollment and student learning we argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption we illustrate this by using data from an unusual policy experiment a newspaper campaign in uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools parents with information to monitor local officials handling of a large education grant program the campaign was highly successful and the reduction in capture had a positive effect on enrollment and student learning jel d73 i22 o12

the effect of holdings data frequency on conclusions about mutual fund behavior abstract a number of articles in financial economics have used quarterly or semi annual mutual fund holdings data to test hypotheses about investment manager behavior this article reexamines four well known hypotheses in finance to determine whether the results of prior tests of these hypotheses remain valid when higher frequency monthly holdings data are employed the areas examined are momentum trading tax motivated trading window dressing and tournament behavior we find that the use of monthly holdings data rather than quarterly holdings data or in the case of tournament behavior holdings data rather than monthly return data change and in some cases reverse previous results this occurs because monthly holdings data capture a large number of trades missed by quarterly data 18 5 of the trades and permit a more precise estimation of the timing of trades

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

child control in education decisions an evaluation of targeted incentives to learn in india i report the results of a field experiment in gurgaon india that offered cash and noncash incentives to learn either to children or to their parents while i find no evidence that the identity of the recipient or form of the reward mattered in the aggregate noncash incentives targeted to children were more effective for initially low performing children while cash incentives were more effective for high performing children to explore the mechanisms behind this result i present a model of household education production and find additional empirical results consistent with the model

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

sequentially optimal mechanisms this paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment a risk neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line the seller has all the bargaining power she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t 1 we show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism a methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent s type 2006 the review of economic studies limited

peer effects teacher incentives and the impact of tracking evidence from a randomized evaluation in kenya to the extent that students benefit from high achieving peers tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones however all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level lower achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution we propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in kenya while the direct effect of highachieving peers is positive tracking benefited lower achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level jel i21 j45 o15

a bargaining model with incomplete information multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player this paper re examines the bargaining model in rubinstein 1985a b monotonicity restrictions are placed on off the equilibrium path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

training wages and sample selection estimating sharp bounds on treatment effects this paper empirically assesses the wage effects of the job corps program one of the largest federally funded job training programs in the u s even with the aid of a randomized experiment the impact of a training program on wages is difficult to study because of sample selection a pervasive problem in applied microeconometric research wage rates are only observed for those who are employed and employment status itself may be affected by the training program this paper develops an intuitive trimming procedure for bounding average treatment effects in the presence of sample selection in contrast to existing methods the procedure requires neither exclusion restrictions nor a bounded support for the outcome of interest identification results estimators and their asymptotic distribution are presented the bounds suggest that the program raised wages consistent with the notion that the job corps raises earnings by increasing human capital rather than solely through encouraging work the estimator is generally applicable to typical treatment evaluation problems in which there is nonrandom sample selection attrition copyright wiley blackwell