information advantage in cournot oligopoly abstract consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits we find that under cournot competition this is not generally the case it holds when firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale but it does not necessarily hold otherwise journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

a model of trade credit in a capital constrained distribution channel abstract in a product market with uncertain demand we examine a distribution channel consisting of one manufacturer and one capital constrained retailer the retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer provided it is also to the latter s benefit to extend trade credit under bank credit financing we show that the channel behaves as if the retailer is not constrained by capital in a wholesale price contract we find that trade credit makes both channel members better off and is the unique financing equilibrium trade credit better integrates the channel than bank credit by centralizing the financing of distribution at the manufacturer we further compare bank versus trade credit under a classical channel contract revenue sharing contract in addition we present a set of numerical experiments to show how product cost internal capital and demand variability impact on the market equilibrium under both bank and trade credits

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

product risk asymmetric information and trade credit the purpose of this paper is to explain cross sectional variations in trade credit terms across firms and industries this study shows that there is a separating equilibrium in which the size of the cash discount conveys information about product quality the driving forces of this equilibrium outcome are the risk sharing motives of the producer and buyer as well as asymmetric information about product quality the empirical implications of the model are derived and discussed in relation to industry practices

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production

accounts receivable management policy theory and evidence this paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain the choice of accounts receivable management policies the tests focus on both cross sectional explanations of policy choice determinants as well as incentives to establish captives we find size concentration and credit standing of the firm s traded debt and commercial paper are each important in explaining the use of factoring accounts receivable secured debt captive finance subsidiaries and general corporate credit we also offer evidence that captive formation allows more flexible financial contracting however we find no evidence that captive formation expropriates bondholder wealth firms typically sell merchandise on credit rather than requiring immediate cash payment such credit sales generate accounts receivable although credit terms and credit collection procedures have been studied see smith 1980 there has been little systematic analysis of the organizational and financial structures employed to manage the firm s accounts receivable these decisions merit more careful attention for two reasons first receivables are a substantial fraction of corporate assets for example 1986 compustat data indicate that accounts receivable are 21 0 of u s manufacturing corporations total assets second we observe substantial diversity in firms use of specialized contracts and intermediaries in their accounts receivable management policies firms can 1 establish a captive finance subsidiary 2 issue accounts receivable secured debt 3 factor 4 employ a credit reporting firm 5 retain a credit collection agency or 6 purchase a credit insurance policy 1 in this paper we demonstrate that accounts receivable management policy offers opportunities for both the development of a robust theory as well as empirical testing of the theory s implications although the data necessary to

the value of public information in a cournot duopoly we derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale

trade credit and informational asymmetry commonly used trade credit terms implicitly define a high interest rate that operates as an efficient screening device where information about buyer default risk is asymmetrically held by offering trade credit a seller can identify prospective defaults more quickly than if financial institutions were the sole providers of short term financing the information is valuable in cases where the seller has made nonsalvageable investments in buyers since it enables the seller to take actions to protect such investments traditional explanations for the widespread use of trade credit fall into two categories the financing motive holds that capital market imperfections enable sellers to finance buyer purchases at lower cost than financial institutions ferris 4 argues that trade credit provides payment flexibility and thus reduces the overall need for buyers and sellers to maintain precautionary balances emery 3 contends that noncompetitive rents of financial institutions can be circumvented by sellers and buyers through provision of trade credit however the financing motive is not sufficient to explain why small suppliers offer trade credit the wide cross sectional variation in terms or why large buyers often take the prompt payment discount late a second set of explanations is best described as pricing motivations for trade credit provision nadiri 10 argues that availability of alternative payment terms can increase product demand but does not indicate why the offered terms could not be duplicated by financial institutions schwartz and whitcomb 14 argue that trade credit is used to circumvent robinson patman and similar prohibitions on price discrimination the correctness of this position depends on the charge to users of trade credit exceeding the cost of provision by the seller although the explanation is possible in principle an empirical question remains as to why variations in actual credit terms appear to be based on product market rather than buyer characteristics the literature also contains analyses of the impact of changing macroeconomic conditions on trade credit terms and aggregate credit flows schwartz 13 for example employs a financing motive for trade credit to conclude that restrictive monetary policy can be partly mitigated by liberalization of trade credit terms by firms with relatively easy access to capital markets however a microeconomic

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

optimal degree of public information dissemination financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive external ities in these environments transparency may reduce expected welfare public announcements serve as focal points for higher order beliefs and affect agentsbehaviour more than justified by their informational contents some scholars conclude that reducing public signalsprecision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare this article shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision but under certain conditions not to all agents restricting the degree of publicity is a better suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are there is a general presumption that higher central bank transparency in terms of information disclosure to a wider audience improves the effectiveness of monetary policy and is beneficial to markets as it reduces information asymmetries helps to assess risk better and arrive at more informed decisions thus enhancing market efficiency while practitioners in central banks and international institutions agree on the desirability of informative announcements and promote higher transparency on the ground that any information is valuable to markets recent academic literature distin guishes private and public information and argues that public announcements may destabilise markets and reduce efficiency by their effects on higher order beliefs if markets are characterised by positive externalities morris and shin 2002 henceforth m s have shown that noisy public announcements may be detrimental to welfare from an ex ante point of view they conclude that a commitment to withholding relevant information or deliberately reducing its precision may be welfare enhancing in this article we challenge this conclusion by distinguishing two components of transparency precision ofinformationanddegreeofpublicity the degreeof publicity is the proportion of agents who receive a signal using a stylised coordination game introduced by m s we show that information should always be provided to the market

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

on the interaction of real and financial decisions of the firm under uncertainty this study analyzes the interaction between the optimal level of investment and debt financing for this purpose a model is structured in which a firm facing an uncertain price has to decide on its optimal level of investment and debt the amount of investment sets a limit on output whose optimal level is determined after price is realized the debt involved is risky there exists a possibility of bankruptcy the analysis proves that investment and its optimal financing have to be simultaneously determined and that a negative relationship exists between operating and financial leverage we also demonstrate that as the tax rate increases optimal capacity decreases and optimal leverage increases an analysis of the impact of changes in the expected price shows that under some conditions an increase in expected price would lead to an increase in optimal investment firm size and a decrease in optimal debt

the effect of payment schemes on inventory decisions the role of mental accounting does the payment scheme have an effect on inventory decisions in the newsvendor problem keeping the net profit structure constant we examine three payment schemes that can be interpreted as the newsvendor s order being financed by the newsvendor herself scheme o by the supplier through delayed order payment scheme s and by the customer through advanced revenue scheme c in a laboratory study we find that inventory quantities exhibit a consistent decreasing pattern in the order of schemes o s and c with the order quantities of scheme s being close to the expected profit maximizing solution these observations are inconsistent with the expected profit maximizing model contradict what a regular or hyperbolic time discounting model would predict and cannot be explained by the loss aversion model instead they are consistent with a model that underweights the order time payments which can be explained by the prospective accounting theory in the mental accounting literature a second study shows that the results hold even if all physical payments are conducted at the same time suggesting that the framing of the payment scheme is sufficient to induce the prospective accounting behavior we further validate the robustness of our model under different profit conditions our findings contribute to the understanding of the psychological processes involved in newsvendor decisions and have implications for supply chain financing and contract design this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

trade credit and credit rationing asymmetric information between banks and firms can preclude financing of valuable projects trade credit alleviates this problem by incorporating in the lending relation the private information held by suppliers about their customers incentive compatibility conditions prevent collusion between two of the agents e g the buyer and the seller against the third e g the bank consistent with the empirical findings of petersen and rajan 1995 firms without relationships with banks resort more to trade credit and sellers with greater ability to generate cash lows provide more trade credit finally small firms react to monetary contractions by using trade credit consistent with the empirical results of nilsen 1994 article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the new economics of regulation ten years after the new economics of regulation is an application of the principal agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms after a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed a survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules the auctioning of incentive contracts the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment and the hierarchical problems in regulation empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion

optimal research for cournot oligopolists we extend the classical cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function by undertaking research firms can acquire private asymmetric information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision the model is a two stage game in the first stage research levels are chosen and in the second stage conditional on private research outcomes production decisions are made we find that for a linear continuous information structure there is a unique nash equilibrium to the game in the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well the model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

risk hedging in a supply chain option vs price discount abstract in this research two risk hedging strategies the option contract and the advance purchase discount contract are investigated within a manufacturer retailer two echelon supply chain context this study offers three contributions first the optimal decisions under the two contracts from the perspectives of both the manufacturer and the retailer are determined second circumstances under which supply chain coordination can be reached are identified third the scenario of loss averse manufacturer has been explored the results of the analysis provide practical insights to the manufacturer when she plans production quantity and to the retailer when he replenishes inventory

bio diesel initiatives potential and prospects in thailand a review thailand experiences a great economic and industrial development and is the second largest energy consumer in south east asia being a net oil importer thai government has declared a renewable energy development programme in order to secure sustainable development and energy security thailand spends more than 10 of gdp for energy imports and transport sector accounts for 36 of total final energy consumption of which 50 is diesel diesel marks a huge impact on thai economy thai government s bio diesel development strategy is to replace 10 of petro diesel in transport sector by bio diesel by 2012 the plan is to increase the use of bio diesel from 365 million liters in 2007 to 3100 million liters by 2012 this paper reviews the current status and potential of bio diesel in thailand and investigates and discusses the qualities and weaknesses of the proposed road map the proposed road map definitely gives immediate solution for soaring oil prices but the long term economic environmental and social impacts need to be examined

the effect of taxes and depreciation on corporate investment and financial leverage this paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm s optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty it extends the deangelo aad masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm s investment decision the authors results indicate that when investment is allowed to adjust optimally the existing predictions about the relationship between investment related and debt related tax shields must be modified in particular the authors show that increases in investment related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level in cross sectional analysis firms with higher investment related tax shields normalized by expected earnings need not have lower debt related tax shields normalized by expected earnings unless all firms utilize the same production technology differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of deangelo and masulis

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

an optimal financial response to variable demand this paper develops a positive theory of trade credit based on its use as a financial response to deterministic variations in demand the operating alternatives to trade credit which include the use of storage or additional capacity are modeled using results from the peak load pricing literature the paper shows that the extension of credit partitions the buyer s inventory cost and permits specialization at incurring the components of this cost this specialization is economical when the seller has an advantage at incurring the financial cost and does not have an advantage at incurring the operating cost of accommodating variable demand conditions that provide these necessary and sufficient cost relationships are described the paper also shows that a reduction in costs rather than an increase in revenues is the source of both the buyer s and seller s increase in wealth

note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively we focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer s and a manufacturer s profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell an item such a commitment is often necessary for retailers who sell primarily through catalogues

stackelberg solution in a vendor buyer supply chain model with permissible delay in payments abstract in practice vendors or sellers often offer their buyers a fixed credit period to settle the account the benefits of trade credit are not only to attract new buyers but also to avoid lasting price competition on the other hand the policy of granting a permissible delay adds not only an additional cost but also an additional dimension of default risk to vendors in this paper we will incorporate the fact that granting a permissible delay has a positive impact on demand but negative impacts on both costs and default risks to establish vendor buyer supply chain models then we will derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain the optimal solution for both the vendor and the buyer under non cooperative stackelberg equilibrium finally we will use two numerical examples to show that 1 granting a permissible delay may significantly improve profits for both the vendor and the buyer 2 the sensitivity analysis on the optimal solution with respect to each parameter and 3 the comparisons between nash and stackelberg solutions

the value of information in a simple duopoly model abstract this paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty it explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers by comparing the ten possible types of information structures it is shown that information may be detrimental that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and or the consumer and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival s cost rather than its own all of these irregular results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

majoritarian preference utilitarian welfare and public information in cournot oligopoly abstract can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from condorcet cycles in a cournot model where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity decisions we show that the majoritarian preference of consumers for the precision of public information is fairly well behaved so that a condorcet winner always exists under a monotonicity condition on the demand function we characterize the condorcet winning precision in terms of the demand function and the number of firms under which the condorcet winning precision i hurts consumers surplus and profits or ii remains conflict free these results have interesting implications on collective bayesian persuasion by agencies representing consumers showing that when full transparency maximizes expected consumers surplus collective bayesian persuasion can lead to full opacity and vice versa

corporate trade credit and inventories new evidence of a trade off from accounts payable and receivable abstract trade credit is an important source of finance for firms and has been well researched but the focus has been on financial trade offs in this paper we consider the trade offs with inventories and develop a simple model that recognizes the incentives a firm faces to offer and receive trade credit our model identifies the response of accounts payable and accounts receivable to changes in the cost of inventories profitability risk and liquidity and importantly this influence operates through a production channel our results support the model and complement many existing studies focused on explaining the financial terms of trade credit

inventory management with asset based financing most of the traditional models in production and inventory control ignore the financial states of an organization and can lead to infeasible practices in real systems this paper is the first attempt to incorporate asset based financing into production decisions instead of setting a known exogenously determined budgetary constraint as most existing models suggest we model the available cash in each period as a function of assets and liabilities that may be updated periodically according to the dynamics of the production activities furthermore our models allow different interest rates on cash balance and outstanding loans which is an enhancement over most traditional models in that inventory financed by a loan may be more expensive than that by out of pocket cash we demonstrate the importance of joint consideration of production and financing decisions in a start up setting in which the ability to grow the firm is mainly constrained by its limited capital and dependence on bank financing we then explain the motivation for asset based financing by examining the decision making at a bank and a set of retailers in a newsvendor setting

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function