selecting suitable compensation plans of executive stock options theoretical and empirical works have emphasized that executive stock option plans play an important role in compensation management and corporate governance owing to the incentives to increase firm stock price and volatility levels this study not only proposes models of executive stock options and constructs value matched financial variables for comparing the incentive effects towards these options but also develops an empirical study exploring the characteristics of executive stock options and suitable compensation management for companies this investigation examines the daily value and compares incentive effects of six kinds of executive stock options with the empirical data of tsmc the world s largest dedicated semiconductor foundry which is listed on the tse and nyse empirical results indicate that purchased options would be the best choice for companies that are unsuitable to undertake risky investments while the relative indexed options are appropriate for bear markets and good for companies

stock option repricing and its alternatives an empirical examination in this paper i examine the likelihood of ceo stock option repricing and its alternatives namely option grant stock grant and do nothing multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to volatility moreover repricing firms are younger and more concentrated in industries where human capital is important finally i find no evidence that internal governance or executive conflicts of interest are relevant in explaining repricing my results indicate that repricing is motivated by incentive alignment and retention and not by agency cost considerations

judicial productivity delay and efficiency a directional distance function ddf approach abstract the aim of this paper is twofold on the one hand it provides a contribution to the debate on judicial efficiency by conducting an applied research on the italian tax judiciary thanks to a database covering the activities of the italian tax courts over a 3 year period 2009 2011 on the other hand it also contributes to the methodological debate as it compares results obtained with data envelopment analysis dea and directional distance function ddf two related non parametric techniques which allow evaluating the efficiency of each observation as the radial distance from the efficient frontier defined by the best observations while dea has already been used to assess the mere technical efficiency of judicial systems the ddf offers a valuable additional contribution since it makes it possible to minimize the social cost of production of adjudication in the measurement this feature makes it particularly attractive in those sectors in which production externalities may arise such as judicial delays in the case investigated here additionally the paper first applies the bootstrap to the ddf procedure in order to provide more robust estimates and to compare them with the dea results

asymmetric benchmarking in compensation executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad abstract principal agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm s own performance recently it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests that is they can enjoy pay for luck as well as pay for performance we first show that this argument is incomplete the positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk if executives pay is tied to market movements they can only expect to receive the market determined return for risk bearing this argument however assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck if executives can truly influence the setting of their pay they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest namely when the benchmark has fallen using industry benchmarks we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down in which case pay for luck would reduce compensation than when it is up these empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks and they suggest that the average executive loses 25 45 less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck

the dating game do managers designate option grant dates to increase their compensation we provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date ex post that is after the board s compensation decision is made back dating picking a date before the board decision date and forward dating waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior consistent with back dating we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag in the promptly reported sample we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward dating our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game

efficiency of the medical care industry evidence from the italian regional system abstract what might be the relation between clinical research and efficiency of medical care suppliers is the hypothesis of a positive relation consistent considering efficiency as the supplier s ability to maximize the number of patients hospitalized in a mobility process among regions i e mobility balance this work aims at highlighting the existence of a positive externality of pharmaceutical clinical research on that kind of efficiency in other words an externality is able to affect the patients perception of good bad quality of outputs supplied by the medical care industry leading their mobility process taking italy and the mobility of patients among regions into account an operational research study will be performed in order to support this assumption the goal of this work is to show an alternative way to increase the efficiency of medical care suppliers on the market of health care that is to say through their competitiveness on the market of human experimentation

what fraction of stock option grants to top executives have been backdated or manipulated we estimate that 13 6 of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996 2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at the money of which we estimate that 18 9 were manipulated the fraction is 23 0 before the new two day filing requirement took effect on august 29 2002 and 10 0 afterward for the minority of grants that are not filed within the required two day window the fraction of manipulated grants remains as high as 19 9 we further find a higher frequency of manipulation among tech firms small firms and firms with high stock price volatility in addition firms that use smaller non big five auditing firms are more likely to file their grants late finally at the firm level we estimate that 29 2 of firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996 and 2005

business ethics and the decision to adopt golden parachute contracts empirical evidence of concern for all stakeholders golden parachutes are often viewed as a form of excessive compensation because they provide senior management with substantial payouts following an acquisition while other stakeholders are subjected to layoffs disrupted business relationships and other negative externalities using a sample of s p 500 firms an economic and ethical justification for this type of contract is given golden parachutes ensure effective corporate governance that in turn preserve the firm s value for all stakeholders boards of directors enter into parachute agreements to protect recently hired ceos human capital during periods of financial uncertainty and thus potential takeover activity from an ethics viewpoint golden parachutes are valuable to all stakeholders because they encourage merger or acquisition in lieu of bankruptcy

belief based refinements in signalling games abstract there are many economic problems which when modelled as games of incomplete information give rise to many sequential equilibria severely limiting the usefulness of the model there has recently been a large literature devoted to refining the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs this paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and further proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties we also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c70 d82

union negotiations and corporate policy a study of labor concessions in the domestic steel industry during the 1980s abstract this paper studies managerial compensation financial reporting and dividend policies of the seven major domestic steel producers during requests for union concessions substantial layoffs reported losses and sacrifices by nonunion stakeholders buttressed managers case for union concessions from 1980 to 1988 sample firms reduced their work force by about 300 000 almost two thirds and annual wage payments from 16 1 to 8 6 billion reported income is lower during union negotiations controlling for cash flows as is managerial pay with average ceo salary plus bonus declining 18 dividend reductions and white collar pay cuts are substantial pervasive and clustered during union negotiations

an empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives abstract prior research on the factors influencing the use of debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing is extended by considering management incentives when alternative incentive variables are considered separately we find covenants have a significant negative relation to ceo cash compensation an insignificant relation to the value of ceo equity held and significant positive relations to both the ratio of the value of ceo equity holdings to cash compensation and the fraction of equity held by the ceo in two stage simultaneous equations models only the latter is significant when jointly considered with each of the other incentive variables

the repricing of executive stock options abstract we examine a sample of firms that reset the exercise prices on their executive options these repricings follow a period of about one year of poor firm specific performance in which the average firm loses one fourth of its value no other offsetting changes to option terms or compensation are made and many firms reprice more than once without repricing a majority of the options would have been at the money within two years we find that when faced with circumstances in which repricing might be chosen firms with greater agency problems smaller size and insider dominated boards are more likely to reprice

stock option repricing heads i win tails you lose recent scandals at enron worldcom and global crossing have put the ethical spotlight on corporate malfeasance as never before however these are the situations in which management knew that they made the wrong choice as professor joseph badaracco of harvard business school points out the real ethical dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right where both choices can be justified yet one must be chosen over the other whether or not to reprice stock options represents one such ethical dilemma repricing can help exodus of talented employees and motivate them to improve firm performance however it alienates shareholders and other workers of the company who are left unprotected from the adverse economic consequences of a stock price decline

the effect of bankruptcy protection on investment chapter 11 as a screening device asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between equity and debt holders can force a distressed but efficient firm to liquidate and may enable a distressed inefficient firm to continue in the extreme if it is costless for an inefficient firm to mimic an efficient firm in a debt restructuring efficient and inefficient firms are equally likely to continue or liquidate this article shows that chapter 11 procedures impose costs on ineffilcient firms that would otherwise mimic efficient firms this separation induces voluntary filing for bankruptcy by ineffilcient firms and consequently enables efficient firms to continue when they would otherwise be liquidated

the subjective and objective evaluation of incentive stock options owners of incentive options invariably hold undiversified portfolios this paper derives a model for the subjective and objective values of such options the subjective value the value to the holder is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective the objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values this value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount the model which is the black scholes model with modified parameters is simple to use

valuation of bankrupt firms this study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management s published cash flow projections we estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value we find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value but the dispersion of valuation errors is very widethe sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20 to greater than 250 cross sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders incentives to overstate or understate the firm s value

a general framework for evaluating executive stock options abstract motivated by recent recommendations by both european and american accounting standards boards that executive stock options be expensed in firms statements we provide an analytical and flexible framework for their evaluation our approach takes into account the vesting period american style resetting and reloading provisions that are features of many option programs and also considers the trading restriction on executives we identify a recursive structure in the stream of options that are granted to the executive over the course of her employment by exploiting this we are able to obtain a near explicit formula for the option value this enables us to discuss the joint effects of the different features on the exercising strategies and firms granting cost especially we highlight some significant interactions among these features

incentive compatible trade policies a two country trade model with production uncertainty is considered if complete contingent markets do not exist it is desirable for governments to adopt some trade policies to share the production risk a full information policy involves incomes transfers across countries which can be achieved by equal import tariffs and export subsidies with incomplete information we consider incentive compatible trade policies which are designed to be truth revealing while partially sharing the production risk in this case the tariff in one country may differ from the export subsidy abroad

human capital bankruptcy and capital structure we derive a firm s optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk while equity holders can diversify this risk away in the presence of corporate taxes our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice it also makes a number of predictions for the cross sectional distribution of firm leverage consistent with existing empirical evidence it implies persistent idiosyncratic dierences in leverage across firms an important new empirical prediction of the model is that ceteris paribus firms with more leverage should pay higher wages

underwater options and the dynamics of executive pay to performance sensitivities we empirically analyze the dynamics of executives pay to performance sensitivities option pay to performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay to performance sensitivity in other ways building a detailed data set on executives portfolios of stock and options we find that the responsiveness of pay to performance sensitivities created by all executive holdings of stock and options to changes in stock price is large the elasticity of pay to performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0 7 and is larger for high option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater the dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay to performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines on average these larger grants restore approximately 40 of the stock price induced pay to performance sensitivity declines option repricings are inconsequential in this regard despite the attention they have attracted in looking at positive returns we find the reverse higher returns both directly increase pay to performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants which raise pay to performance sensitivities further thus option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

infant industry protection reconsidered the case of informational barriers to entry in industries with imperfect consumer information the lack of a reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis established firms we consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of experience goods and services our model incorporates both moral hazard in an individual firm s choice of quality and adverse selection among potential entrants into the industry we find that infant industry protection often exacerbates the welfare loss associated with these market imperfections

employment horizon and the choice of performance measures empirical evidence from annual bonus plans of loss making entities we examine the extent to which employment horizon concerns affect the relative emphasis on financial versus nonfinancial performance measures in annual bonus plans we argue that managers of loss making firms are likely to voluntarily or forcibly depart in the near future and consequently have a shorter employment horizon loss making firms then need to increase the emphasis on forward looking nonfinancial performance measures to motivate long term effort of their managers thus we hypothesize that the emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures is greater in loss making than in profitable firms even after controlling for the informativeness of earnings we find consistent support for our hypothesis using different archival survey and field data sources and various proxies for short employment horizon and the emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures

managerial incentives risk aversion and debt we investigate the risk choices of risk averse ceos following recent theoretical work we expect ceo risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability we find that the ceos of these firms reduce firm risk even in the presence of strong risk taking incentives our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of ceo wealth to stock price changes firm risk determinants the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on ceo incentives unobserved firm and market effects and debt governance the impact of ceo risk aversion is economically significant

distribution of cost and profit efficiency evidence from indian banking this paper uses the nonparametric dea methodology to estimate cost and profit efficiency of indian banks during the post reform period the results show considerable variation in average levels of profit efficiency across various ownership categories of banks in general state owned banks are found to be more efficient than their private counter parts further efficiency tends to be low among the small banks assets up to rs 50 billion indicating that at the existing scale of operations these banks are operating far below the efficient frontier we also examine the distribution of efficiency using nonparametric kernel density estimates the analysis reveals a rightward shift of the efficiency distribution over the years a major part of this shift comes from the state owned banks based on the conditional distribution the study finds strong evidence of ownership explaining the efficiency differential of banks additionally bank size and product mix are also found to be important although to a lesser extent

corporate bankruptcy reorganizations estimates from a bargaining model this article uses a novel approach to measure the unobserved liquidation value of a firm that relies on the information contained in the allocations that are agreed upon in chapter 11 negotiations i estimate a game theoretic model that captures the influence of liquidation value on the equilibrium allocations using a newly collected data set i find that the liquidation values are higher when the industry conditions are more favorable and the real interest rates are higher i use the estimated model to conduct a counterfactual experiment to quantitatively assess the impact of a mandatory liquidation on the equilibrium allocations

of age sex and money insights from corporate officer compensation on the wage inequality between genders this paper shows that the gender and age of the wage setter are crucial determinants of the disparity in wages between sexes we document our findings using a data set on compensation of corporate officers that is uniquely suited for this analysis because officer wages are set by chief executive officers ceos we show that ceos pay officers of the opposite gender less than officers of their own gender even when controlling for job characteristics older and male ceos exhibit the greatest propensity to differentiate on the basis of sex female officers receive smaller raises if the firm is headed by a man our results suggest that ceo gender and age are economically more important determinants of officer compensation than are firm stock performance stock volatility or return on assets this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

altering the terms of executive stock options abstract we examine the practice of resetting the terms of previously issued executive stock options we identify properties of reset options develop a model for valuing resettable options and characterize the firms that have reset options we find the vast majority of options are reset at the money resulting on average in the strike price dropping 40 our valuation model suggests that resetting has only a small impact on the ex ante value of an option award but the ex post gain can be substantial finally we find resetting has a strong negative relation with firm performance even after correcting for industry performance

the timing of option repricing we investigate whether executive stock option repricings are systematically timed to coincide with favorable movements in the company s stock price for a sample of 236 repricing events we observe sharp increases in stock price in the 20 day period following the repricing date in addition repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements since information about stock option repricing is not generally released to the public around the repricing date these findings suggest that ceos opportunistically manage the timing of the option repricing date

undesirable outputs in efficiency valuations abstract efficiency measurement is usually based on the assumption that inputs have to be minimized and outputs have to be maximized in a growing number of applications however undesirable outputs are incorporated into the production model which have to be minimized in this paper various approaches for treating such outputs in the framework of data envelopment analysis dea are discussed and the resulting efficient frontiers are compared new radial measures are introduced which assume that any change of the output level will involve both undesirable and desirable outputs

modeling undesirable factors in efficiency evaluation abstract data envelopment analysis dea measures the relative efficiency of decision making units dmus with multiple performance factors which are grouped into outputs and inputs once the efficient frontier is determined inefficient dmus can improve their performance to reach the efficient frontier by either increasing their current output levels or decreasing their current input levels however both desirable good and undesirable bad factors may be present for example if inefficiency exists in production processes where final products are manufactured with a production of wastes and pollutants the outputs of wastes and pollutants are undesirable and should be reduced to improve the performance using the classification invariance property we show that the standard dea model can be used to improve the performance via increasing the desirable outputs and decreasing the undesirable outputs the method can also be applied to situations when some inputs need to be increased to improve the performance the linearity and convexity of dea are preserved through our proposal

an incentive compatible approach to the transfer pricing problem abstract this paper offers an alternative approach to regulating certain types of transfer pricing if the multinational enterprise s transfer price decision is not regulated it will manipulate the transfer price in order to maximize net global profit traditional approaches argue for ad hoc penalty schedules to mitigate manipulative transfer pricing in contrast this paper offers an incentive compatible approach which explicitly incorporates the informational asymmetries that encourage misreports the model has the desirous feature that the optimal regulatory policy has self enforcing properties that is the firm will find it profit maximizing to report true costs

multilateral productivity comparisons when some outputs are undesirable a nonparametric approach multilateral productivity comparisons of firms producing multiple outputs some of which are undesirable are obtained by making two modifications to the standard farrell approach to efficiency measurement the restriction that production technology satisfy strong disposability of outputs is relaxed to allow for the fact that undesirable outputs may be freely disposable and the efficiency measures are modified to allow for an asymmetric treatment of desirable and undesirable outputs performance measures that satisfy these requirements are calculated as solutions to programming problems the methodology is applied to a sample of mills producing paper and pollutants

export subsidies as signals of competitiveness in a cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its firm this signalling effect strengthens the usual profit shifting argument for an export subsidy the optimal export subsidy in the signalling equilibrium may be twice as large as the optimal profit shifting export subsidy under complete information

courts and banks effects of judicial enforcement on credit markets the cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance we document this point with reference to the credit market in a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts according to the model improvements in judicial efficiency should reduce credit constraints and increase lending with an ambiguous effect on interest rates that depends on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform these predictions are supported by panel data on italian provinces in provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials credit is less widely available

tariffs for a foreign monopolist under incomplete information when the domestic government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign monopolist that exports to the domestic market the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about demand in the signalling equilibrium the domestic government uses a tariff which is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information however it is possible that welfare in the signalling equilibrium is lower than welfare when the domestic government is uncertain about demand the domestic government can avoid the cost of signalling by delegating tariff setting to a revenue maximising agent

the consequences of the fasb s 1998 proposal on accounting for stock option repricing abstract we examine repricing activity surrounding the fasb s 1998 announcement regarding accounting for repriced options we find that repricing increases during and decreases after the 12 day window between the announcement and proposed effective dates consistent with firms timing repricings to avoid recording an expense we find that firms experiencing increasing earnings patterns firms with earnings around zero and growth firms are more likely to reprice in the window but having repriced recently decreases the likelihood of doing so the evidence suggests that firms trade off financial reporting benefits against reputation costs in decisions to time repricings to get favorable accounting treatment

optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information abstract when cost is private information in the brander spencer model the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options a menu of policies and a uniform policy the former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors the latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information the main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under cournot competition while the opposite occurs under bertrand competition

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

evolution of bank efficiency in brazil a dea approach abstract this paper investigates cost technical and allocative efficiencies for brazilian banks in the recent period 2000 2007 we use data envelopment analysis dea to compute efficiency scores brazilian banks were found to have low levels of economic cost efficiency compared to banks in europe and in the us for the period with high macroeconomic volatility 2000 2002 the economic inefficiency in brazilian banks can be attributed mainly to technical inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency state owned banks are significantly more cost efficient than foreign private domestic and private with foreign participation there is no evidence of differences in economic efficiency due to type of activity and bank size these results may provide some useful guidance for financial regulators and bank managers

dumping and signaling abstract a model of predatory dumping based upon incomplete and asymmetric information is developed the foreign firm may induce exit by the home firm through acting like a low cost competitor irrespective of its actual costs the home firm must infer the foreign firm s cost through its export price by tying the export price to the price that the foreign firm charges in the foreign market a home county antidumping law raises the cost of signaling low production costs to the home producer the law has signal enhancing or inhibiting effects which may adversely affect the home firm with ambiguous welfare consequences

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research

stock and compensation compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance employees fund a large proportion of their firm s activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company these arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders moreover tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times currently both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements prior to the 1980s however tax rules favored funding in other than company stock implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period copyright 1991 by american finance association

ceo compensation in financially distressed firms an empirical analysis this paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987 almost one third of all ceos are replaced and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions newly appointed ceos with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 less than the ceos they replace in contrast outside replacement ceos are typically paid 36 more than their predecessors and are often compensated with stock options on average ceo wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts however managers compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors claims

on the optimality of resetting executive stock options the practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively affect initial incentives resetting can still be an important value enhancing aspect of compensation contracts even from an ex ante standpoint in fact we find that some resetting is almost always optimal the relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to influence the resetting process greater relative importance of external factors on stock performance and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers

the incentive to give incentives on the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation abstract we show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration there are in reality many cases in which remuneration contracts are de facto senior to debt claims in financially distressed firms and in workouts we theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance related incentives a contract substitution effect in other words the relative degree of seniority of managers claims and creditors claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex ante if managerial compensation is more senior than debt higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes lower bonuses and option grants and a higher base salary in contrast when compensation is junior we expect more emphasis on pay for performance incentives in highly levered firms

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

top management compensation and capital structure the interrelationship between top management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied the optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus we analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are 1 equity and risky debt and 2 equity and convertible debt in addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt the optimal management compensation derived has low pay performance sensitivity with convertible debt instead of straight debt the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay to performance sensitivity a negative relationship between pay performance sensitivity and leverage is derived our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of jensen and murphy 1990 with agency theory other testable implications include 1 a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top management compensation structures and 2 the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices the model yields implications for management compensation in banks and federal deposit insurance reform our results explain the dynamics of top management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization

the resolution of claims in financial distress the case of massey ferguson when a firm s business deteriorates to the point where it cannot meet its financial obligations the firm is said to have entered the state of financial distress the first signals of distress are usually violations of debt covenants coupled with the omission or reduction of dividends some financially distressed firms eventually go bankrupt others recover or manage to settle the claims against them out of court 1 the behavior of firms in financial distress is interesting for two reasons first the costs of financial distress are an important element in capital structure theory in many models 2 these costs are hypothesized to counteract the tax benefits of leverage and lead to an internal optimum for the capital structure of the firm second financial distress has come to be recognized as a state in which contractual claims are incompletely specified standard terms of the debt equity contract are violated when the firm enters financial distress and claimants may then decide not to act according to previously agreed upon rules or legal formulas recent history has provided a number of examples of firms in financial distress including massey ferguson international harvester chrysler and braniff the resolution of claims in these situations often differs from what is predicted by legal rules or standard theoretical models this paper examines the actual resolution of claims in the reorganization of massey ferguson ltd in part i we use time series data on daily stock returns to test different specifications of priority rules for debt and equity claims in part ii we consider whether massey ferguson avoided deadweight costs of financial distress through the restructuring of claims negotiated among creditors during the winter of 1980 81

corporate bankruptcy and insider trading the authors document significant sales by the insiders of firms filing bankruptcy petitions prior to the filing date they also find that selling is more intense for top executives and officers and that insiders in general systematically sell stock before prices fall and buy stock after prices have fallen although this trading pattern may simply reflect an implicit compensation arrangement between insiders and stockholders the significant sell off does raise potential questions regarding managements incentives to maximize shareholder wealth throughout the chapter 11 process copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

the role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options we explore how ceo power affects the repricing of executive options the spread between an option s exercise or strike price and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing

optimal export policy for a new product monopoly a new welfare enhancing role is identified for a policy of export subsidization in a new product industry an export subsidy policy promotes the rational perception that a high quality export can be provided at a relatively low price thus an export subsidy generates a first order benefit to welfare by enabling a high quality export to be sold at a less distorted high price the subsidy will also introduce

are company founders underpaid this article examines the relation between founder status and ceo compensation in publicly listed us firms the results suggest that ceo founders receive lower cash pay and total compensation compared to professional managers in contrast ceos who are relatives of the founders receive similar cash pay and total compensation to that of professional managers different compensation levels also emerge in terms of stock option awards the findings underline the importance of distinguishing among these three ceo types when examining the determinants of executive compensation

tariff policy and entry with cost based informational asymmetries i introduction how does the presence of incomplete information alter the usual effects of trade policy recognition that incomplete information characterizes most decision making processes that take place within an international setting has stimulated an emerging body of literature which addresses this question particularly germane to the present study are those papers which introduce an informational asymmetry into an international model of imperfect competition the majority of this literature examines the sensitivity of optimal strategic trade policies to information failures within a brander spencer 1985 model where the domestic and foreign firm compete for export sales to a third market and either the domestic or foreign government employs export subsidies examples include works by brainard and martimort 1997 collie and hviid 1993 maggi 1995 and qiu 1994 another study collie and hviid 1994 allows for domestic consumption and considers optimal import tariff policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist in general optimal trade policy in the presence of informational failures is found to differ from that under complete information the emphasis of the present study is not on the conduct of optimal trade policy but rather on how the introduction of an informational asymmetry alters the realized impact of trade policy on quantities and welfare 1 specifically we examine the effects of import tariff policy within a standard two period model of entry where the costs of the domestic firm are proprietary information the incumbent domestic firm recognizes the threat of a potential foreign rival entering exporting to the domestic market where the latter is uninformed of the cost structure of the domestic firm as is well known from the industrial organization literature the incumbent domestic firm may have an incentive to change its time period one behavior so as to signal information on costs to the foreign firm in an effort to deter entry see milgrom and roberts 1982 in specifying the degree of knowledge possessed by domestic policymakers we adopt the premise that informational deficiencies on the part of policymakers are likely to be quite acute in trade policy formation indeed as brander 1995 notes it is reasonable to suppose that governments are less informed on market conditions and firm characteristics than firms themselves in contrast to previous studies however we also assume that policymakers either cannot acquire information or if they are able to cannot respond by altering policy here the formation of trade policy does not reflect or incorporate full information and thus cannot provide signals to the other uninformed party the foreign firm moreover because policymakers cannot alter policy the foreign firm perceives the tariff rate as credibly fixed the inability to incorporate information into trade policy is especially relevant for situations where policymakers are subject to previously negotiated trade agreements here even should uninformed policymakers subsequently acquire information on domestic cost structure they will be unable to respond our emphasis on the realized effects of tariff policy reflects this information structure to conduct optimal policy government must hold complete information on markets and firm characteristics at the time policy is set as in collie and hviid 1993 1994 or be able to acquire it through signaling or a screening mechanism as in qiu 1994 and brainard and martimort 1997 2 when policymakers lack the ability to acquire or respond to such information optimal policy is not a consideration what is of interest to policymakers in this situation is the response of domestic output and imports to a given tariff rate at the outset of the game then there is a tariff rate set previously by domestic policymakers who were uninformed of domestic costs since the foreign firm cannot infer domestic cost structure by merely observing the tariff rate set by uninformed policymakers any signaling that takes place is on the part of the domestic firm

an assessment of the efficiency of spanish courts using dea the objective is to provide a measure of technical efficiency of the administrative litigation division of the spanish high courts the concept of efficiency to be measured and the most adequate technique for carrying out the efficiency analysis are selected by considering the specific characteristics of public production the analysis is undertaken by using data envelopment analysis dea and various homogeneity tests returns to scale and restrictions on weights are applied in order to ensure a correct comparison between courts some additional extensions to the analysis such as the calculus of efficient delays and an approximation to the calculus of global efficiency are carried out

management turnover and governance changes following the revelation of fraud abstract fraud scandals can create incentives to change managers in an attempt to improve the firm s performance recover lost reputational capital or limit the firm s exposure to liabilities that arise from the fraud it also is possible that the revelation of fraud creates incentives to change the composition of the firm s board to improve the external monitoring of managers or to rent new directors valuable reputational or political capital despite such claims we find little systematic evidence that firms suspected or charged with fraud have unusually high turnover among senior managers or directors in univariate comparisons there is some evidence that firms committing fraud have higher managerial and director turnover but in multivariate tests that control for other firm attributes such evidence disappears these findings indicate that the revelation of fraud does not in general increase the net benefits to changing managers or the firm s leadership structure

reward for luck in a dynamic agency model this paper studies a continuous time principal agent problem of a rm whose cash ows are determined by the manager s unobserved eort the rm s cash ows are further subject to persistent and publicly observable shocks that are beyond the manager s control while standard contracting models predict that compensation should optimally lter out these shocks empirical evidence suggests otherwise in line with this evidence our model predicts that the manager is rewarded for luck

environmental efficiency and economic growth of china a ray slack based model analysis abstract the chinese economy has been experiencing rapid growth since the implementation of the reform and opening up policy however at the same time it faces issues regarding resource savings and environmental protection which are important aspects of the new industrialization therefore this study conducts data envelopment analysis dea to evaluate the environmental efficiency of chinese regions certain existing dea models account for undesirable outputs and do not elucidate the weak disposable relationship between undesirable and desirable outputs thus polar theory is introduced among the dea modeling in this study first drawing on stochastic frontier analysis ray stochastic frontier analysis and dea we propose a ray slack based model rsbm to evaluate provincial environmental efficiencies in china from 2004 to 2012 subsequently an rsbm malmquist luenberger total factor productivity index is structured finally economic growth environmental efficiency and energy consumption are analyzed using spatial panel econometrics as this study treats industrial waste as undesirable outputs the rsbm results show that the environmental efficiencies in the east are the highest while those in the central regions are the lowest the spatial econometric analysis reveals that the ratios of direct to total elasticity and those of direct to total effect for capital labor and energy input variables are fixed furthermore the study provides policy implications and suggestions for future research