bipolarity multipolarity and free trade recent literature typically attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade i argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system security externalities explicit consideration of these effects suggests that a bipolar international political system has an advantage relative to its multipolar counterpart with respect to the opening of markets among states less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in altruism within its alliances explain the advantage of a two power system the real income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that impede it their ability to internalize these effects makes military alliances the natural basis of agreements to open international markets the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary however ones that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts i argue that less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in alliance altruism explain the advantage of a two power system several important limits of the argument should be made clear immediately i argue at the systemic level i attempt to isolate the political and economic incentives for free trade that occur at the level of the international system i do not therefore consider the impact of unitlevel factors on the pursuit of these incentives for example neither the role of special interest groups nor the organization of domestic exchange via hierarchies instead of markets is considered doyle 1986 frieden 1988 ruggie 1982 the conditions i assume are those of standard international trade theory ethier 1983 and illustrative rather than systematic empirical referents are used these restrictions are appropriate given my purpose to demonstrate analytically the advantage of a bipolar international political system with respect to free trade

could tariffs be pro cyclical abstract conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter cyclical we analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied mfn tariffs using a disaggregated product level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011 strikingly and counter to conventional wisdom we find that tariffs are pro cyclical further investigation reveals that this pro cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries tariffs are acyclical in developed countries we present evidence that pro cyclical market power drives the pro cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy

explaining cooperation under anarchy hypotheses and strategies what circumstances favor the realization of mutual interests in the absence of centralized authority and through what strategies can nations foster the emergence of cooperation by altering the circumstances that they confront elementary game theory suggests three sets of conditions that serve as proximate explanations of the incidence of cooperation and discord i payoff structure mutual and conflicting preferences 2 the shadow of the future single play and iterated games and 3 number of players two person and n person games each of these three attributes of context may be subject to willful modification nations may create the preconditions for cooperation through strategies to alter payoffs lengthen the shadow of the future and reduce the number of actors required to realize limited mutual interests

goal programming data envelopment analysis godea for target based multi level planning allocating central grants to the greek local authorities abstract in this paper we develop an interface between goal programming and data envelopment analysis godea in order to integrate target setting and resource allocation in multi level planning problems data envelopment analysis dea has been traditionally used for assessing the performance of individual decision making units and therefore necessary extensions are needed to apply dea principles to the global organisational level without however losing its attractive features the method was originally developed as an aid to the reorganisation of the allocation of central funds to local authorities in greece

resource allocation based on efficiency analysis the purpose of this paper is to develop an approach to a resource allocation problem that typically appears in organizations with a centralized decision making environment for example supermarket chains banks and universities the central unit is assumed to be interested in maximizing the total amount of outputs produced by the individual units by allocating available resources to them we will develop an interactive formal approach based on data envelopment analysis dea and multiple objective linear programming molp to find the most preferred allocation plan the units are assumed to be able to modify their production in the current production possibility set within certain assumptions various assumptions are considered concerning returns to scale and the ability of each unit to modify its production plan numerical examples are used to illustrate the approach

rational hegemons excludable goods and small groups an epitaph for hegemonic stability theory in defining international free trade as a public good hegemonic stability theory posited early in the 1970s that its reliable supply depended upon a distribution of international power analogous to that within a privileged group more recently however critics have challenged three assumptions fundamental to hegemonic theory its premises of free trade public goods and privileged groups they have concluded that hegemony is not necessary for and indeed may be antithetical to a stable world economy based on market exchange the author argues that the critics overstate their case the assumptions they attack allow hegemonic theory to represent analytically several critically important barriers to free trade among states among these are the existence of strategic interdependence among the actors and the prevalence of informational asymmetries the most significant flaw in hegemonic theory is its neglect of the essence of the domain to which it applies the politics of inter state trade in an anarchic world

evaluating the environmental efficiency of a two stage system with undesired outputs by a dea approach an interest preference perspective abstract in this study we propose a new dea model to evaluate the environmental efficiency of a two stage system with undesired outputs the two stage system consists of two parts a production subsystem and a pollution treatment subsystem different choices for allocating resources to each subsystem represent different interest preferences of decision makers with the production subsystem corresponding to short term interests and the pollution treatment subsystem corresponding to long term interests based on a proposed new dea model three theorems are established to show the relationships between the interest preference parameter and the change of efficiency scores an empirical analysis was conducted using the data of 30 provinces and municipalities eight regions of china the empirical results show the effectiveness of the proposed model and the usefulness of the theorems for the real world data optimal efficiency rankings of the eight regions are provided and the efficiency rankings truly reflect the current environmental situations of these eight regions to examine the economic impacts and facilitate sustainable development we also analyze the shadow prices for undesired outputs corresponding implications of the empirical analysis are also discussed

efficient resource allocation via efficiency bootstraps an application to r d project budgeting resource allocation decisions are crucial for the success of an organization this paper proposes an integrated approach to resource allocation problems in which decision makers have one observation of the multiple input output criteria of candidates we offer important improvements over existing approaches based on the widely used data envelopment analysis dea which has two major limitations in its application to resource allocation first traditional dea models compute efficiency scores by optimizing firm specific shadow prices of inputs and outputs this could be problematic because in practice stakeholders would usually require unanimously agreed upon trade offs among evaluation criteria second previous allocation approaches based on dea do not allow for controlling the risk exposure of allocation portfolios to tackle these problems we propose an efficiency measure based on equilibrium shadow prices of different criteria and we use the bootstrap efficiency distributions to gather information regarding efficiency variations and correlations through our methodology decision makers can obtain the risk minimizing allocation portfolio we illustrate the proposed approach through an empirical r d project budgeting problem in which we allocate funding according to the projects efficiency distributions

the second face of hegemony britain s repeal of the corn laws and the american walker tariff of 1846 one challenge facing hegemonic stability theory is to specify the processes by which hegemonic countries construct and maintain a liberal international economic order earlier studies have focused on direct coercion or ideological manipulation by the hegemon as a principal technique for manipulating the trade policies of other countries this article explores a different face of hegemony specifically we contend that by altering relative prices through the exercise of their international market power hegemonic leaders influence the trade policy preferences of their foreign trading partners we examine this argument in the case of the american walker tariff of 1846 american tariff liberalization was intimately related to britain s repeal of its corn laws in the antebellum united states northern protectionist and southern free trade proclivities were fixed western grain growers held the balance of power by allowing access to its lucrative grain market britain altered the economic and political incentives of western agriculturalists and facilitated the emergence of the free trade coalition essential to the passage of the walker tariff

intergenerational earnings mobility and equality of opportunity in south africa summary the paper estimates the degree of intergenerational earnings persistence in south africa using microdata from the national income dynamics study nids the paper finds that intergenerational earnings mobility in south africa is low moreover a limited set of inherited circumstances explains a significant fraction of earnings inequality among male adults in particular race is shown to play a significant role the evidence provided for south africa is consistent with the hypothesis that low levels of intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity are characteristic of high inequality emerging economies

the theory and reality of urban slums pathways out of poverty or cul de sacs this article explores two contrasting perspectives on the role of informal settlements in urban labour markets one proposes that they help to lift households out of rural poverty and onto a path to prosperity through affordable access to urban opportunities the other suggests that the debilitating conditions confine residents to enduring hardship and insecurity south africa is an important test case because of the extent of social and spatial inequalities and the policy ambivalence towards shack settlements preliminary evidence indicates that employment rates are much closer to formal urban areas than to rural areas but conditions of employment are noticeably worse other forms of data are required to assess the magnitude and timescale of economic progression for households

hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in europe although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime as an example great britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century but britain s behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability i advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a political business cycle

the sterling dollar franc triangle monetary diplomacy 1929 1937 the late interwar years encompass a full spectrum of international monetary conflict and cooperation why did great britain france and the united states cooperate in some periods and not in others first the transience of monetary cooperation and conflict is explained in part by inherent characteristics of gold exchange and floating monetary systems second environmental changes swings between prosperity and depression between peace and the threat of war and between monetary orthodoxy and inflationist heresy altered the strategic setting confronting the central monetary powers third the actions of governments both followed from and shaped the circumstances that they confronted through strategies of composition across issues and decomposition across time and actors nations deliberately fostered the emergence of cooperation by altering the context of monetary diplomacy

housing markets in third world cities research and policy into the 1990s abstract a review of analyses of urban housing markets is timely to suggest directions for research and policy in the next decade the neoclassical approach to housing economics is contrasted with a political economy framework with respect to the production or supply of housing and consumption or demand an argument is advanced for increased attention to the analysis of citywide housing markets using insights from both theoretical approaches and for research into processes of exchange such analyses should form the basis for policies which focus neither on selected income groups or residential areas in isolation from wider housing market processes nor on housing output targets but primarily on ensuring the provision of essential inputs

the concentration of capabilities and international trade over the course of the previous two decades political scientists have become increasingly interested in the relationship between international politics and global trade much of the literature on this topic centers on the effects of a hegemonic distribution of power on commerce hegemonic stability theorists argue that hegemony is a necessary condition for the existence of a liberal economic order and that in the absence of a hegemon a liberal international economy is particularly difficult to establish and maintain however a growing number of theoretical and empirical critiques have been leveled against the gemonic stability theory and the issue of whether hegemony helps shape patterns of global trade continues to be the topic of heated debate

informality and development in developing countries informal firms account for up to half of economic activity they provide livelihood for billions of people yet their role in economic development remains controversial some like hernando de soto 1989 2000 see informal firms as an untapped reservoir of entrepreneurial energy held back by government regulations in this view unleashing this energy by reducing entry regulations or improving property rights would fuel growth and development others like levy 2008 take a more cynical view stressing the advantages enjoyed by informal firms and workers from avoiding taxes and regulations a report from the mckinsey global institute describes informal firms as parasites competing unfairly with law abiding formal firms farrell 2004 in this view informality should be suppressed not unleashed still others follow the development tradition of lewis 1954 harris and todaro 1970 and more recently rauch 1991 and see informality as a byproduct of poverty from this dual perspective formal and informal firms are fundamentally different productive formal entrepreneurs pay taxes and bear the cost of government regulation to reach new customers raise capital and access public goods these entrepreneurs are often educated and find it more profitable to run bigger formal firms rather than the smaller informal ones in contrast informal entrepreneurs are typically uneducated and unproductive and they run small businesses producing low quality products for low income customers using little capital and

fire department demand and supply in large cities the purpose of this study is to estimate demand and production functions for fire fighters provided in major cities several factors including the level of fire losses in the communityper capitaincome relative wages of fire fighters population density city size and poverty are used in the analysis this study differs from earlier ones in two ways first multiple measures of community fire losses instead of the usual one are used in the analysis second in contrast with earlier studies of fire protection which have typically relied on ordinary least squares regression analysis ols to study either demand or production this study employs two stage least squares regression analysis 2sls to simultaneously estimate demand and production relations evidence is found that demand for fire fighting is affected by both fire losses and relative size of per capitaincome to fire fighter wages losses in turn are affected by fire fighting hours by poverty and by density there is some evidence for econo

international human rights a regime analysis after laying out a typology of international regimes eight international and regional human rights regimes are analyzed in order to 1 examine the utility of regime analysis in noneconomic issue areas and 2 assess the nature extent and evolution of international cooperation on human rights there has been a remarkable growth of international action since 1945 when human rights were not even widely accepted as a legitimate issue area this growth can be explained largely by expanding perceptions of moral interdependence and community increased national commitment the growing ideological appeal of human rights and changes in the distributions of international power these same factors however suggest only limited future growth on a broader theoretical plane the case of human rights suggests a significant if limited and principally heuristic utility for regime analysis especially to the extent that international relations is becoming increasingly concerned with specific issues

the free trade epidemic of the 1860s and other outbreaks of economic discrimination why was there an abrupt increase in economic openness in europe in the 1860s this increase may have been the result of a contagion process in which the cobden chevalier treaty between britain and france threatened to displace third party exports to fra nce with british exports as a result most european states signed similar treaties with france which had further ripple effects this article outlines a formal model of this process based on the assumption that an agreement between two states incre ases the desirability of similar treaties to third parties propositions regarding the rate and pattern of spread of treaties are derived from this model this article then discusses the insights these propositions may offer into the rise and fall of the most favored nation network of treaties between 1860 and 1929 at a theoretical level the model aims to link the microlevel processes underlying state preferences to system level phenomena at a substantive level this analysis offers insight into the current explosion of regionalism

growth waves systemic openness and protectionism there is a distinctively repetitive quality about trade policy problems domestic economic growth slows producers seek protection against foreign competitors and national decision makers raise barriers to trade while at the same time criticizing their counterparts in other governments for engaging in similar practices because trade is one of the more important topics in international and comparative political economy and because this scenario has played itself out more than a few times it is not surprising that a number of theorists have sought to model the underlying processes thought to produce movements toward and away from protectionism by now a variety of different types of approaches ranging from the cognitive to the systemic have been tried systemic structure ideas and ideology surplus capacity business cycles and shifts in elite orientation and domestic coalitions in response to external crises have been emphasized as principal theoretical foci our position is that the different levels of analysis and alternative foci all have merit and utility what they lack is an appreciation for the underlying systemic processes that link together these various facets of the political economy we seek to develop a theoretical argument that explicates these underlying processes the argument centers on recurring growth waves characterized in alternating pattern by the ascent of system leaders and the subsequent successful attempt of technological followers to catch up with the leaders the downturns of the growth waves produce conditions favoring protectionism but we contend the form and the intensity of protectionism that are likely to be produced will depend on which of the two types of growth waves is in progress ascent waves are characterized by the emergence of new technological leaders and a consequent increase in the gap between the leaders and the technological followers during the periods of structural transition and intense

cooperation in the liberalization of international trade after hegemony what nations dwell in perpetual anarchy for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests because as states they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises the possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off yet at other times states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy

the new economics of regulation ten years after the new economics of regulation is an application of the principal agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms after a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed a survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules the auctioning of incentive contracts the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment and the hierarchical problems in regulation empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion

the limitations of structural theories of commercial policy if a structural theory is one that purports to explain behavior in terms of environmental conditions and that largely eschews analysis of the internal processes of decision makers then it is difficult to identify a theory of commercial policy which is not structural most microeconomic theory is structural so are most balance of power theories in the realm of theories of commercial policy hegemonic stability theories as well as some recently developed theories of international tariff levels fit this description in the latter category judith goldstein s work which attempts to account for american commercial policy in terms of the ideology of american central decision makers and charles kindleberger s ambitious sketch of a general theory of 19th century tariff changes in terms of the diffusion of liberal ideology constitute lonely examples of nonstructural research strategies

trade gaps analytical gaps regime analysis and international commodity trade regulation studies of international regimes have sought to describe international collaborative arrangements in more systematic terms than in the past and to analyze their development in terms of major schools of international relations theory this article refines the commonly used definition of regimes and elucidates the major hypotheses of one theoretical school structural realism the strength and nature of the international commodity trade regime are systematically described and their development is analyzed in terms of the major hypotheses of structural realism in large part these hypotheses are supported by the analysis of what is a relatively weak international regime

the unraveling of the multi fiber arrangement 1981 an examination of international regime change as competition between newly industrializing and advanced industrialized countries has increased trade protection has become a key issue in textile and apparel trade international regimes to regulate trade intervention have existed since the early 1960s the 1981 renewal of the multi fiber arrangement poses two puzzles first why did countries choose to continue to manage conflict through an international regime rather than through some other arrangement second why did the regime become weaker and more protectionist than in the past an international structure approach suggests that regimes are wanted to prevent arrangements in larger systems from being undermined to control the behavior of other countries and to reduce information costs variation in regime strength can be explained by asymmetry in the distribution of capabilities in various systems the nature of the regime is influenced by changes in international competition and by nesting a domestic structure approach on the other hand focuses on the relationships between state and societal groups the commission and member states in the case of the eec the relative strength of groups affects national policies and the development and characteristics of regimes a processtracing examination of international textile negotiations emphasizing the response of decision makers to structural constraints and incentives allows us to ascertain the relative influence of international and domestic structures on the negotiations and outcomes

equity measurement in facility location analysis a review and framework abstract in selecting sites for facilities especially in the public sector the issue of equity is becoming increasingly important beginning with the work of mumphreys et al 1971 mcallister 1976 and savas 1978 a substantial literature has developed that incorporates equity in facility siting decision models despite this level of interest however there has been little agreement in these models as to how equity should be measured further except for some recent works there has generally been little comparison of alternative measures or assesment of their relative value let alone any consensus on the best measure s to use perhaps even more surprising is the great number and variety of measures employed the motivation for this paper is to address these problems and provide for researchers a base from which issues of equity can be included in facility siting models more specifically we seek to review the equity literature as it pertains to facility location assemble the set of measures that have been developed and introduce a framework and common notation for organizing them we also will discuss approaches that can be used to select an appropriate measure of equity

the march of an economic idea protectionism isn t counter cyclic anymore conventional wisdom holds that protectionism is counter cyclic tariffs quotas and the like grow during recessions while that may have been a valid description of the data before the first world war it is now inaccurate since the second world war protectionism has not been counter cyclic tariffs and non tariff barriers simply do not rise systematically during downturns i document this new stylised fact with a panel of data covering over 180 countries and 40 years using over a dozen measures of protectionism and six of business cycles i test and reject a number of potential reasons why protectionism is no longer counter cyclic a diagnosis of exclusion leads me to believe that modern economics may well be responsible for the decline in protectionism s cyclic behaviour economists are more united in their disdain for protectionism than virtually any other concept this in turn leaves one optimistic that the level of protectionism will continue to decline along with its cyclicality andrew k rose

a theory of trade policy leadership abstract this paper constructs a two country model of bilateral trade negotiations in the presence of political uncertainty to demonstrate that unilateral trade liberalization may be an optimal policy for a large country the political uncertainty is due to producer opposition to trade agreement ratification in the foreign country unilateral liberalization by the home country has a salutary effect on negotiations because it mitigates the pain of potential ratification failure on the foreign country it also promotes foreign ratification because it effectively punishes foreign import competing producers for lobbying against an agreement these benefits are shown to outweigh up to a point the terms of trade cost that the home country must suffer when it actually liberalizes unilaterally in equilibrium therefore we see a pattern in which the home country unilaterally liberalizes for several periods until ratification in the foreign country succeeds at which point foreign country finally reciprocates we also demonstrate that contrary to the standard optimal tariff result there may be an inverse relationship between the home country s monopoly power and its optimal unilateral tariff

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

squatters or tenants the commercialization of unauthorized housing in nairobi abstract the conventional view of squatting suggests that the squatter builds his own house in this paper we shall present fieldwork data from nairobi which is totally at variance with this view we shall present data on a private rental sector albeit illegal that is operating in such squatting areas in particular we shall investigate its growth profitability and ownership together with the characteristics of the landlords and tenants involved we shall suggest that the provision of low income shelter is now a commercial activity

fixed cost and resource allocation based on dea cross efficiency abstract in many managerial applications situations frequently occur when a fixed cost is used in constructing the common platform of an organization and needs to be shared by all related entities or decision making units dmus it is of vital importance to allocate such a cost across dmus where there is competition for resources data envelopment analysis dea has been successfully used in cost and resource allocation problems whether it is a cost or resource allocation issue one needs to consider both the competitive and cooperative situation existing among dmus in addition to maintaining or improving efficiency the current paper uses the cross efficiency concept in dea to approach cost and resource allocation problems because dea cross efficiency uses the concept of peer appraisal it is a very reasonable and appropriate mechanism for allocating a shared resource cost it is shown that our proposed iterative approach is always feasible and ensures that all dmus become efficient after the fixed cost is allocated as an additional input measure the cross efficiency dea based iterative method is further extended into a resource allocation setting to achieve maximization in the aggregated output change by distributing available resources such allocations for fixed costs and resources are more acceptable to the players involved because the allocation results are jointly determined by all dmus rather than a specific one the proposed approaches are demonstrated using an existing data set that has been applied in similar studies

opportunism incentives and the m form hypothesis a laboratory study abstract opportunism is one central premise of the m form hypothesis this premise is investigated in a laboratory experiment using m form and u form organizations under incentives based on corporate profit and divisional profits there was greater opportunism under u form organization than under the m form and under divisional profit than under corporate profit incentives additionally a misguided altruism lead a number of individuals to misrepresent information the m form yields higher performance than the u form also corporate profit incentives yield higher total profit than divisional profit incentives the results partially explain why empirical studies do not strongly support the m form hypothesis

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

incentive efficient production frontiers an agency perspective on dea in this paper we examine how empirical production frontiers may contribute to the incentives of production units we consider a series of data envelopment analysis dea frontiers and we show when these may be incentive efficient in the sense that they contain all the information that are relevant for optimal incentive provision the frontiers considered include the so called constant decreasing and varying return to scale models the free disposability and the free replicability models as well as the increasing and decreasing return to scale models based on a relaxed set of assumptions also we illustrate how to design optimal incentive schemes based on such frontiers contents 1 introduction 2 the incentive problem 3 production frontiers and productivity measures 4 incentive efficient production frontiers 5 extensions 6 an example 7 final remarks mathematical appendix references

the limits of international organization systematic failure in the management of international relations contributors to the literature on international organization io have traditionally been overly optimistic about the ability of multilateral management to stabilize in ternational relations and have tended to ignore the destabilizing effects of io while recent revisionist scholarship has acknowledged both the potential for organizational failure and the conditionality of management it has tended to focus on how io fails within specific issue areas and institutions this article offers a typology of the inherent systematic failures of io across issue areas and institutions and thereby seeks to bridge the gaps in our understanding of why many different institutions and managerial schemes have adverse effects it argues that io is prone to failure 1 when it attempts to manage complex tightly coupled systems of relations and issues 2 when it serves as a substitute either for more substantive and long term resolutions to international problems or for responsible domestic or foreign policy 3 when it intensifies international disputes and 4 when it generates moral hazard in offering a general theoretical approach to understanding the destabilizing effects of io the analysis is intended to serve both as a focal point for understanding critical approaches to the study of io and as an alternative rationale for eliminating the excesses of multilateral management

protectionism and world politics much unwarranted gloom and doom has been written of late about the new protectionism it has been widely held to be a major hindrance to third world development an obstacle in the path of world economic recovery and even a threat to good international relations the facts about trade in recent years suggest a different story and the need to look far more critically at some of the myths propounded by liberal economists for it was not protectionism that was responsible for starting the depression of the 1980s any more than that of the 1930s then as now it was financial uncertainty and the consequent shrinkage of credit that slowed both growth and trade nor is protectionism a serious menace not only has it failed to stop the flood of industrial exports from asian countries there afe good reasons of state and corporate self interest why it need not be feared in the future far from being a threat to the international economic order as imf and gatt ideologues would have us believe bilateral trading agreements between states and corporations are sustaining continued growth in trade despite financial disorder

disciplining trade finance the oecd export credit arrangement the salience of tariffs quotas and other import restrictions in current discussions of trade policy obscures what may well become a more significant form of government intervention subsidized export promotion over the past two decades subsidized trade finance has been one of the most widely used instruments of export promotion this article offers an historical description and a theoretical explanation for the success of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd export credit arrangement an international regime restricting the provision of subsidized trade finance the explanation emphasizes three factors the structure of government institutions the relative power of states and the functional value of information more generally the analysis demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of monocausal explanations of international cooperation and the advantages of explanations based on a conception of international cooperation as a multistage process each stage of which may be explained by a separate theory

parallelism in information production moral hazard and relative performance evaluations we analyse how to design incentive schemes for agents producing information the agents may for example be divisional managers market researchers or consultants financial analysts corporate auditors research scientists or political pollsters we show that an agent should be compensated more for making a correct rather than an incorrect prediction and for agreeing rather than disagreeing with colleagues depending on the environment correctness should be compensated more or less than agreement also compensation should increase with the difficulties of making correct or conforming predictions one consequence of the result is that it may sometimes reduce a principal s total incentive costs to engage with more information producers performing parallel investigations because the possibility to make relative performance evaluations of the agents may substantially reduce the costs of motivating the agents in performing their duties as desired

restricted reallocation of resources abstract this paper investigates restricted reallocation among individual units when the efficiency index is calculated for an aggregated unit in the dea framework moreover we address the question of the optimal reallocation flow the optimal flow of inputs among the individual units subject to given transfer costs restrictions on reallocation can be given by the maximum cost the managers are willing to pay in the framework of full reallocation there is a trade off between the maximum allowed reallocation cost and the highest efficiency the aggregated unit can achieve the final goal is to present a way to generate efficiency gain functions that show this trade off

modeling the forms of international cooperation distribution versus information the problems of distribution and information impede international cooperation they arise when actors select how they will cooperate an exploration of the interaction between these problems using a limited information model of cooperation leads to six conclusions first leadership solutions to coordination problems always exist but leadership here is very different from hegemonic provision of public goods second actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy even without a shadow of the future third diffuse reciprocal strategies arise naturally in coordination problems fourth norms and institutions are intertwined within successful cooperation fifth the form of cooperation on an issue varies with the relative importance of distribution and information finally and most important distributional and informational problems interfere with each other arrangements to cooperate can successfully address one but not both of these problems

the unconditional most favored nation clause and the maintenance of the liberal trade regime in the postwar 1870s international institutions within the past thirty years become the subject of renewed interest as scholars vigorously dispute their utility neorealists draw on the post world war ii era to advance sweeping general claims of institutional inefficacy this study by contrast deploys the same hard test method grieco applied to the 1970s tokyo round negotiations to the crisis rife 1870s to construct a unique methodological objective a rigorous hard test of nineteenth century institutional autonomy three principal findings emerged first the maintenance of a liberal world economy in the turbulent 1870s is explained by an unlikely commercial instrument and the unprecedented regime design of an unexplored international institution respectively the unconditional most favored nation mfn clause and the informal conventional tariff system cts regime it underpinned not british hegemony second the international trade regime was not a public good unilaterally provisioned by hegemonic britain via the 1846 corn laws repeal the regime was instead a private good that was collectively provisioned by all its constituent member states via the unprecedented interstate practices institutionalized in the 1860 cobden chevalier treaty and then autonomously maintained by a negarchical and self enforcing sanctioning mechanism finally the informal cts regime s enforcement mechanism autonomously altered the interests and behaviors of states in directions incongruent with executive preferences solely through the brute force of rational calculations imposed by decentralized international institutional constraints both the french and british executives in the 1870s believed the regime was normatively inappropriate and unsuccessfully attempted to exit amid eight system threatening crises nonetheless the mfn based regime s self enforcing sanctioning mechanism autonomously induced compliance conceptualized as unitary states behavior deviating from executives first order preference the extraordinarily turbulent 1870s therefore provide an unexplored historical vantage point to make strong institutionalist claims in an era issue area and under conditions that they are least likely to be validated

assessing the technical and allocative efficiency of hospital operations in greece and its resource allocation implications abstract in this paper we seek to develop a research framework concerning the assessment of the efficiency of public sector hospital operations public hospitals are increasingly under pressure to improve their operations both in terms of resources they use and also in terms of the quantity and quality of their outcomes the assessment of efficiency entails both the notions of technical and allocative efficiency as they yield complementary information about the management effectiveness of individual hospitals technical efficiency has a diagnostic purpose as it yields comparative information about the effectiveness with which individual units convert their input resources into outputs on the other hand allocative efficiency has a planning orientation since the objective of the assessment is to gauge efficiency improvements by means of resource reallocation a linear programming based model is proposed for assessing allocative efficiency in the light of uncertainty about the prices of input factors the empirical part of the paper is based on data from greek public hospitals results and policy implications are discussed based on data from 98 general hospitals based on information from 1992 it was found that significant inefficiencies are present in the operations of greek hospitals that account approximately for 100 mecu in 1992 prices

decision support for target based resource allocation of public services in multiunit and multilevel systems this paper is concerned with the problem of resource allocationand target setting in the provision of public services the paper develops a network based representation of multilevel resource management with equity efficiency and effectiveness being recognised as the fundamental objectives of the system on the modelling side the proposed method combines data envelopment analysis and goal programming formulations integrated within an interactive planning framework an illustrative application on fire departments is used to show the applicability of the method developed to assist the resource allocation process