the monetary approach to exchange rate determination under rational expectations the dollar deutschmark rate abstract this paper reformulates the monetary approach after ascertaining that a money demand function with a partial adjustment mechanism had more empirical support than a money demand function which assumed instantaneous stock adjustment the resulting exchange rate equation is estimated by two rational expectations techniques the parameter estimates are reasonable and are robust to the estimation technique used to different specifications of the driving processes and to changes in the estimation period the structural model outperforms the random walk model and its own unconstrained equivalent a pure time series equation in outof sample forecasts

bank risk taking securitization supervision and low interest rates evidence from the euro area and the u s lending standards using a unique dataset of the euro area and the u s bank lending standards we find that low monetary policy short term interest rates soften standards for household and corporate loans this softening especially for mortgages is amplified by securitization activity weak supervision for bank capital and low monetary policy rates for an extended period conversely low long term interest rates do not soften lending standards finally countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative taylor rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterward these results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

deviations from purchasing power parity in the long run this paper demonstrates that deviations from purchasing power parity reveal a remarkable and possibly startling consistency with martingale behavior during both fixed and flexible rate periods for a wide variety of countries and in both monthly and annual data since this pattern appears to be much more general than one would expect on the basis of models founded on international commodity arbitrage the paper proposes an alternative explanation which instead relies on financial arbitrage in bonds as the underlying mechanism this paper will demonstrate that deviations from purchasing power parity ppp reveal a remarkable and possibly startling consistency with martingale behavior during both fixed and flexible exchange rate periods for a wide variety of countries and in both monthly and annual data this pattern appears to be much more general than one would expect on the basis of models founded on international commodity arbitrage the paper therefore proposes an alternative explanation which does not presuppose free trade in goods but which instead relies on financial arbitrage in bonds as the underlying mechanism the major implication of the theory and the results is that ppp is as likely to be violated in the long as in the short run as an empirical matter deviations from ppp can be observed for most currencies at any instant see kravis et al 21 stockman 37 and genberg 15 among others these deviations are typically both cumulative and persistent the real exchange rate can remain on either side of parity for lengthy but variable time intervals of a year or more as a consequence the current consensus shared

alternative forms of deposit insurance pricing and bank incentive issues abstract this paper derives formulas for a deposit insuring agency s liability and hence a fair value deposit insurance premium and the equilibrium value of bank equity considering a wide variety of factors affecting individual bank risk both fixed rate and variable rate risk sensitive insurance systems are analyzed consideration is made as to whether the deposit insuring agency makes direct payments to depositors or arranges mergers following bank closings the effect of these various policy choices on banks incentive for risk taking is also analyzed

optimal bank reorganization and the fair pricing of deposit guarantees abstract when should regulators close a financially ailing bank fdic practice in the us has moved in the direction of early closure in contrast banking regulators in japan continue to follow a more patient approach this paper analyses a series of models in which closure rules and bailout policies arise endogenously through the interaction of i regulators attempts to minimize discounted expected bankruptcy costs and ii equity holders incentives to recapitalise banks we characterize subsidy policies for distressed banks that implement socially optimal closure rules at minimum financial cost to regulators and which reduce moral hazard

sovereign stress and smes access to finance evidence from the ecb s safe survey abstract we study the effect of sovereign stress on smes capital structure using restricted access data from the european central bank we find that during the sovereign debt crisis and controlling for borrowers quality firms in stressed countries became more likely to be denied credit to be credit rationed and to face higher loan rates less creditworthy firms were not more likely to become credit constrained suggesting no flight to quality in lending we also find that in order to make up for the decline in bank credit firms in stressed countries began relying considerably more on retained earnings and government subsidies

cross border banking credit access and the financial crisis abstract we study the sensitivity of credit supply to bank financial conditions in 16 emerging european countries before and during the financial crisis we use survey data on 10 701 applicant and non applicant firms that enable us to disentangle effects driven by positive and negative shocks to the banking system from demand shocks that may vary across lenders we find strong evidence that firms access to credit was affected by changes in the financial conditions of their banks during the crisis firms were more credit constrained if they were dealing with banks that experienced a decline in equity and tier 1 capital as well as losses on financial assets we also find that access to credit reflects the balance sheet conditions of foreign parent banks the effect of positive and negative shocks to a bank is greater for riskier firms and firms with fewer tangible assets

deposit insurance and the discount window pricing under asymmetric information the risk sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions the two facilities are managed jointly an incentive compatible policy is designed such that banks choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality the function of the discount window is to be a risk neutral lender of last resort to banks in a market dominated by risk averse depositors the need to regulate banks is commonly linked to the risk independent pricing of deposit insurance in that it provides banks with an incentive to increase their risk taking activities 1 critics of the present system have long advocated risk sensitive deposit insurance premiums and a literature is emerging that examines the variety of such pricing schemes 2 this literature typically assumes that the public insuring agency has the same information as the bank concerning the quality of the bank s assets this is both implausible and potentially misleading the bank normally has superior information concerning its assets a pricing policy that ignores this informational asymmetry is likely to provide banks with similar risk taking incentives that is associated with the current riskinsensitive pricing arrangement kane 6 p 275 for example appreciates this aspect of the problem i t is necessary not only to reprice but also to redesign the existing system the fdic and fslic must develop incentive compatible my emphasis insurance contracts and price them fairly contractual incentives must be established that would allow a low risk institution to lower its premiums by communicating to the insurance agency what its own managers know about the institution s own exposure therefore as kane argues a redesigned insurance system is needed that would provide incentives to the banks to truthfully reveal the necessary information and thereby facilitate the efficient pricing of the risk shifted to the public insurer a variety of pricing policies that involve a bank s choice of capital or asset liability composition

small and medium sized enterprise financing and securitization firm level evidence from the euro area this paper analyzes the impact of securitization on access to finance for small and medium sized enterprises smes in the euro area using firm level survey data on sme financing conditions we show that an increase in securitization issuance reduces the probability of smes facing credit constraints and decreases the costs of bank financing for nonconstrained firms our results reveal that in addition to the volume of securitization its type and quality matter for credit extension to smes the paper thus provides empirical support for recent initiatives to revive securitization in europe and for effective monetary policy transmission in the euro area jel d22 e44 e51 e58 g21

long run income and interest elasticities of money demand in the united states econometric techniques designed to accommodate nonstationary data are used to reexamine the stability of interest and income elasticities of money demand in the united states estimates based on postwar monthly data reveal a stable relationship between m1 velocity and various measures of interest rates that proxy the opportunity cost of holding money balances tests for the existence of cointegration and methods used to estimate the income and interest elasticities are based on procedures prescribed by soren johansen 1988 corresponding error correction estimates offer insight as to the dynamics of the process that maintains the equilibrium relation between velocity and interest rates copyright 1991 by mit press

bankruptcy priority for bank deposits a contract theoretic explanation over the past decade several countries including the us have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits we argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency we first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt in particular we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors we then argue why particularly in banking legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

when arm s length is too far relationship banking over the credit cycle we conduct face to face interviews with bank ceos to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders we then use the geographic coordinates of these banks branches and of 14 100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle we find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom it alleviates such constraints during a downturn this positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn moreover our evidence suggests thatrelationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans

cointegration how short is the long run abstract when testing for cointegration and faced with short sample periods it is common for researchers to turn to more frequently sampled observations that is to move from annual to quarterly or monthly data in order to increase the number of observations we argue that such a gain in the degrees of freedom is more apparent than real essentially cointegration is a long run concept and hence requires long spans of data to give tests for cointegration much power rather than merely large numbers of observations using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate this for four popular tests for cointegration

equilibrium relationships between money and other economic variables central to the quantity theory of money are a number of important propositions about the long run equilibrium effects of changes in the nominal stock of money on other economic variables a standard way of testing these propositions is to use quarterly or annual data explicitly model the lag structure and then derive the long run solution of the model from the empirical estimates an alternative is to use some type of smoothing procedure to approximate positions of equilibrium and then to use these transformed data directly in testing hypotheses the national bureau technique of averaging data over reference cycle phases is one such method robert lucas s application of fourier transforms in two illustrations of the quantity theory of money 1980 is another and john geweke s method 1982 of frequency decomposition is a third an entirely different way of approaching the problem is to use cross country average rather than time series data as the basic units of observation the advantage according to lucas is that since the two quantity theoretic laws that he examines are obtained as characteristics of steady states or limiting distributions of theoretical models the ideal experiment for testing them would be a comparison of long term average behavior across economies with different monetary policies but similar in other respects p 1006 in this paper i conduct such an experiment the data that i use are for 20 oecd countries over the period 1956 80 the specific relationships that i examine are those between money and the price level money and real income money and interest rates and money and exchange rates in the main the data accord well with the quantity theoretic model classical neutrality holds there is evidence of a fisher effect albeit a less than complete effect on interest rates finally the data are consistent with long run purchasing power parity and hence correspondingly with a long run monetary approach to exchange rate determination

on the power of dickey fuller tests against fractional alternatives abstract we examine the properties of dickey fuller unit root tests under fractionally integrated alternatives and find that these tests have quite low power

the search for equilibrium relationships in international finance the case of the monetary model abstract this paper considers some of the main long run equilibrium relationships in international finance we supplement the phillips perron test which has a unit root under the null with the new kps test statistic which is based on a stationary null and apply them to the various exchange rate fundamentals the application of the johansen test for multiple cointegrating factors finds evidence of the existence of stable money demand functions in both the usa and uk with relatively short lived perturbations however there appears to be insufficient information in the data to distinguish whether the real exchange rate has a unit root or is persistent and mean reverting the consequent persistent deviations from purchasing power parity appears the only source of rejection of the equilibrium monetary model

cyclicality of credit supply firm level evidence abstract we quantify fluctuations in bank loan supply in the time series by studying firms substitution between loans and bonds using firm level data any firm that raises new debt must have a positive demand for external funds conditional on the issuance of new debt we interpret firms switching from loans to bonds as a contraction in bank credit supply we find strong evidence of this substitution at times that are characterized by tight lending standards depressed aggregate lending poor bank performance and tight monetary policy we show that this substitution behavior has strong predictive power for bank borrowing and investments by small firms

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

real exchange rates under the gold standard purchasing power parity is one of the most important equilibrium conditions in international macroeconomics empirically it is also one of the most hotly contested numerous recent studies for example have sought to determine the validity of purchasing power parity using data from the post bretton woods float and have reached different conclusions we assert that most such studies are flawed for two reasons first the post 1973 data contain by definition only a very limited amount of the low frequency information relevant for examination of long run parity second the dynamic econometric techniques used to model deviations from parity are typically quite crude with respect to admissible low frequency dynamics both deficiencies are rectified in the present paper with dramatic results we construct a new data set of 16 real exchange rates covering more than a century of the classic gold standard period and we study deviations from parity using long memory models that allow for subtle forms of mean

allocating bank regulatory powers lender of last resort deposit insurance and supervision abstract we examine the optimal institutional allocation of bank regulation we find that centralizing the lending of last resort and deposit insurance functions in a regulator leads to excessive forbearance it also leads the bank to invest suboptimally in loans giving this regulator supervision improves on both problems but it still does not lead to the efficient outcome in the multi regulator arrangement we find that it is beneficial to give supervision to the deposit insurer the choice between the unified regulator arrangement and the multi regulator arrangement involves a trade off the multi regulator arrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquidity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels these results assume the absence of information frictions when banks are better informed than regulators we show that regulators may have an incentive not to share private information suggesting it is important to consider regulators informational advantages when deciding on the allocation of regulation

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

tests of exchange market efficiency fragile evidence from cointegration tests abstract several recent papers have employed engle and granger 1987 cointegration tests to determine whether or not markets are efficient we use a new test for cointegration due to johansen 1988 to examine market efficiency with respect to the us dollar exchange rates for canadian japanese and west german currencies the fragile nature of the test indications suggests that cointegration methodologies cannot be relied upon to provide reliable evidence on market efficiency

common stochastic trends in a system of exchange rates univariate tests reveal strong evidence for the presence of a unit root in the univariate time series representation for seven daily spot and forward exchange rate series furthermore all seven spot and forward rates appear to be cointegrated that is the forward premiums are stationary and one common unit root or stochastic trend is detectable in the multivariate time series models for the seven spot and forward rates respectively this is consistent with the hypothesis that the seven exchange rates possess one longrun relationship and that the disequilibrium error around that relationship partly accounts for subsequent movements in the exchange rates a general consensus has emerged in recent years that many macroeconomic time series such as gnp consumption expenditures disposable income etc can be characterized by a stochastic trend model in particular nelson and plosser 22 described this property as one of being difference stationary so that the first difference of a time series is stationary an alternative trend stationary model where a stationary component is added to a deterministic trend term has generally been found to be less appropriate 1 similarly it has long been recognized that many financial time series such as foreign exchange rates are nonstationary e g in meese and singleton 21 the issue of nonstationary is not merely a statistical curiosity but has several important implications for the modeling of exchange rates for instance many models of exchange rate determination under rational expectations require stationarity assumptions when solving out the expected future values of the fundamentals further there has been some controversy over the appropriate transformations to use when conducting tests of whether the forward rate is an unbiased and efficient predictor of the future spot exchange rate 2 some authors e g frenkel 11 12 have conducted tests in levels while geweke and feige 14