sticky prices and monetary policy evidence from disaggregated us data this paper disentangles fluctuations in disaggregated prices due to macroeconomic and sectoral conditions using a factor augmented vector autoregression estimated on a large data set on the basis of this estimation we establish eight facts 1 macroeconomic shocks explain only about 15 of sectoral inflation fluctuations 2 the persistence of sectoral inflation is driven by macroeconomic factors 3 while disaggregated prices respond quickly to sector specific shocks their responses to aggregate shocks are small on impact and larger thereafter 4 most prices respond with a significant delay to identified monetary policy shocks and show little evidence of a price puzzle contrary to existing studies based on traditional vars 5 categories in which consumer prices fall the most following a monetary policy shock tend to be those in which quantities consumed fall the least 6 the observed dispersion in the reaction of producer prices is relatively well explained by the degree of market power 7 prices in sectors with volatile idiosyncratic shocks react rapidly to aggregate monetary policy shocks 8 the sector specific components of prices and quantities move in opposite directions

political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance abstract it is often claimed that politically induced economic flucturations are harmful for the society in this paper we show that this conjecture is not necessarily correct and such fluctuations can actually improve society s macroeconomic performance

price setting during low and high inflation evidence from mexico this paper provides new insight into the relationship between inflation and the setting of individual prices by examining a large data set of mexican consumer prices covering episodes of both low and high inflation when the annual rate of inflation is low below 10 15 the frequency of price changes comoves weakly with inflation because movements in the frequency of price decreases and increases partly offset each other in contrast the average magnitude of price changes correlates strongly with inflation because it is sensitive to movements in the relative shares of price increases and decreases when inflation rises beyond 10 15 few price decreases are observed and both the frequency and average magnitude are important determinants of inflation i show that a menu cost model with idiosyncratic technology shocks predicts the average frequency and magnitude of price changes well over a range of inflation similar to that experienced by mexico

state dependent pricing and the dynamics of money and output standard macroeconomic models of price stickiness assume that each firm leaves its price unchanged for a fixed amount of time we present an alternative model in which the pricing decision depends on the state of the economy we find a method of aggregating individual price changes that allows a simple characterization of macroeconomic variables the model produces a positive money output correlation and an empirical phillips curve in addition the impact of monetary shocks depends crucially on the current level of output which points to a natural connection between state dependent microeconomics and state dependent macroeconomics i introduction there is a long tradition in macroeconomics of attributing the real effects of nominal demand shocks to nominal price stickiness in this view if there is no change in prices when nominal demand rises then quantities must bear the burden of adjustment hence nominal price rigidity provides the friction needed for nominal demand shocks to be transmitted to the real economy standard models of this transmission mechanism such as fischer 1977 and taylor 1980 are based on the assumption that each firm leaves its price unchanged for a fixed amount of time the main reason for considering such time dependent pricing rules is their analytic tractability constraining firms to adjust their prices at prespecified times both simplifies the derivation of equilibrium strategies and allows the use of powerful time series techniques to analyze aggregate dynamics the main disadvantage of the timedependent approach is that between price adjustments firms are not allowed to respond even to extreme changes of circumstance this makes it difficult to know whether the qualitative effects of money in these models are the result of nominal rigidities per se or of the exogenously imposed pattern of price changes an alternative approach to modeling price stickiness is to allow the price setting decision to depend on the actual state of the

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

optimal inattention to the stock market with information costs and transactions costs recurrent intervals of inattention to the stock market are optimal if consumers incur a utility cost to observe asset values when consumers observe the value of their wealth they decide whether to transfer funds between a transactions account from which consumption must be financed and an investment portfolio of equity and riskless bonds transfers of funds are subject to a transactions cost that reduces wealth and consists of two components one is proportional to the amount of assets transferred and the other is a fixed resource cost because it is costly to transfer funds the consumer may choose not to transfer any funds on a particular observation date in general the optimal adjustment rule including the size and direction of transfers and the time of the next observation is state dependent surprisingly unless the fixed resource cost of transferring funds is large the consumer s optimal behavior eventually evolves to a situation with a purely time dependent rule with a constant interval of time between observations this interval of time can be substantial even for tiny observation costs when this situation is attained the standard consumption euler equation holds between observation dates if the consumer is sufficiently risk averse

how much should central banks talk a new argument abstract more openness in central bank decision procedures may increase inflation uncertainty for players on financial markets when it leads to less wage discipline and higher average inflation

analytical approximations in models of hysteresis decisions made under ongoing uncertainty and costly reversibility entail a range of the state variable where inaction is optimal which in turn produces hysteresis permanent effects of temporary shifts the range is usually defined by non linear equations that need numerical solutions in this paper a technique of analytical approximations is developed and applied to two models menu costs and investment the resulting explicit solutions help clarify why hysteresis is important even for small irreversibility in the menu cost model hysteresis is two orders of magnitude larger than under the akerlof yellen or mankiw assumptions when decisions that are costly to reverse are made under conditions of ongoing uncertainty the optimum policy usually entails a range of inertia the action should be taken only when the value of the underlying state variable becomes especially favourable and reversed only when it becomes especially unfavourable there is an intermediate range over which inaction is optimal this in turn gives rise to hysteresis starting from a value in the range of inertia if the state variable crosses the action trigger point and then returns to its original level the action will be taken but not reversed thus a temporary change will leave a permanent effect numerical solutions for models of irreversible investment show that the range of inaction is remarkably large even when the cost of reversal is small see brennan and schwartz 1985 constantinides 1986 and dixit 1989a b for examples of this unfortunately the equations tlhat determine the optimum policy are highly non linear they do not have analytical solutions therefore we lack a clearer and more general understanding of why hysteresis is numerically so important in this paper i derive analytical approximations for the solutions of more general problems of this kind when the costs of change are small the idea that small costs of change induce large amounts of inertia has been popularized in the model of akerlof and yellen 1985 mankiw 1985 and others in these models second order small costs of making price changes yield price stickiness in response to first order changes in the money supply this is a simple application of the envelope theorem but these models are static and their application to a dynamic reality must assume either permanent shocks or static expectations when there is ongoing uncertainty which is rationally expected by the decision maker the option value of the status quo enlarges the zone where inaction is optimal adding these features to the mankiw akerlof yellen may model i show that fourth order small costs of change generate first order inertia

why money talks and wealth whispers monetary uncertainty and mystique this paper analyzes the effect of monetary uncertainty on the inflationary bias and the variance of output and inflation monetary policy uncertainty is modeled as a shock to the central banker s preference for inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization that cannot be observed by the public we find that the mean and variance of inflation increase with the variance of this preference shock however unlike other studies we find that monetary uncertainty may very well have a positive effect on output stabilization and therefore also on society s welfare

rigid prices evidence from u s scanner data this paper uses over two years of weekly scanner data from two small us cities to characterize time and state dependence of grocers pricing decisions in these data the probability of a nominal adjustment declines with the time since the last price change even after controlling for heterogeneity across store product cells and replacing sale prices with regular prices we also detect state dependence the probability of a nominal adjustment is highest when a store s price substantially diers from the average of other stores prices however extreme prices typically reflect the selling store s recent nominal adjustments rather than changes in other stores prices

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

sticky information in general equilibrium this paper develops and analyzes a general equilibrium model with sticky information the only rigidity in goods labor and financial markets is that agents are inattentive sporadically updating their information sets when setting prices wages and consumption after presenting the ingredients of such a model the paper develops an algorithm to solve this class of models and uses it to study the model s dynamic properties it then estimates the parameters of the model using u s data on five key macroeconomic time series it finds that information stickiness is present in all markets and is especially pronounced for consumers and workers variance decompositions show that monetary policy and aggregate demand shocks account for most of the variance of inflation output and hours jel e30 e10

menu costs and phillips curves this paper develops a model of a monetary economy in which individual firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as general inflation sellers can change price only by incurring a real menu cost we calibrate this cost and the variance and autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic shock using a new u s data set of individual prices due to klenow and kryvtsov the prediction of the calibrated model for the effects of high inflation on the frequency of price changes accords well with international evidence from various studies the model is also used to conduct numerical experiments on the economy s response to various shocks in none of the simulations we conducted did monetary shocks induce large or persistent real responses

inflation and output dynamics with state dependent pricing decisions this paper studies a state dependent pricing model in which firms face a fixed cost of changing their pricing plans a pricing plan specifies an entire sequence of time varying future prices allowing firms to choose a pricing plan rather than a single price generates inflation inertia in the response of the economy to small changes in the growth rate of money allowing firms to choose when to change their pricing plan generates a non linear response of inflation and output to small and large changes in the money growth rate the non linear solution method also reveals that the model generates an asymmetric response of output and inflation to monetary expansions and contractions

menu costs and the neutrality of money a model of endogenous price adjustment under money growth is presented firms follow s s pricing policies and price revisions are imperfectly synchronized in the aggregate price stickiness disappears and money is neutral the connection between firm price adjustment and relative price variability in the presence of monetary growth is also investigated the results contrast with those obtained in models with exogenous fixed timing of price adjustment

optimal inattention to the stock market inattentive agents update their information sporadically and thus respond belatedly to news we generate optimally inattentive behavior by assuming that to observe the value of his investment portfolio the consumer must pay a cost that is proportional to the portfolio s contempo raneous value it is optimal for the consumer to check his investment portfolio at equally spaced points in time consuming from a riskless trans actions account in the interim the riskless transactions account that finances consump tion guarantees that funds are never unwittingly exhausted we show that the optimal interval of time between consecutive observations of the value of the portfolio is the unique positive solution to a nonlinear equation quantitatively even a small observation cost one basis point of wealth implies a substantial eight month decision interval under conventional parameter values

are local agreements on equalization grants possible a bargaining model with quasi linear local preferences on local public goods abstract the art 13 of the italian law n 42 2009 theoretically allows for local negotiations between municipalities on the allocation of equalization funds however in the subsequent practice and legislation such form of local negotiation has never been adopted a question arises from the italian experience in the presence of a predetermined equalization scheme decided by the central government are local agreements on equalization transfers possible in this paper we show that in the presence of quasi linear local preferences on public goods there is no space for alternative local agreements on the allocation of equalizing transfers in the presence of predetermined schemes decided by the central government our results suggest that similar practices when allowed are destined to have scarce success we also show that if the central government does not provide a predetermined scheme local agreement on equalization funds are viable

designing monetary policy committees we integrate monetary policy making by committee into a new keynesian model to assess the consequences of the committee s institutional characteristics for inflation output and welfare our analysis delivers the following results first we demonstrate that transparency about the committee s future composition is typically harmful second we show that short terms for central bankers lead to effective inflation stabilization at the expense of comparably high output variability third larger committees generally allow for more efficient stabilization of inflation but possibly for less efficient output stabilization fourth large committees and short terms are therefore socially desirable if the weight on output stabilization in the social loss function is low fifth we show that a central banker with random preferences may be preferable to a central banker who shares the preferences of society

transactions costs and portfolio choice in a discrete continuous time setting abstract this paper makes the following observation concerning a new formulation of the consumption and portfolio choice model of merton 1971 with transaction costs suppose an investor observes his or her current wealth only when making a transaction that transactions are costly and that decisions to transact can be made at any time based on all current information if at each transaction the agent is charged a fixed fraction of current portfolio value an optimal policy exists and the optimal interval of time between transactions is fixed independent of time and current wealth

from hyperination to stable prices argentina s evidence on menu cost models we review and extend several comparative statics results of xed menu cost models of price setting rms facing real idiosyncratic shocks such as the type studied by golosov and lucas 2007 as well as by many others these results are confronted with their empirical counterparts using the micro data underlying argentina s consumer price index for a time period where ination rates vary from almost 5000 per year

limited information capacity as a source of inertia abstract we derive optimal time dependent adjustment rules from shannon s 1948 information theory in a continuous time lq prediction problem with a costly rate of information acquisition processing the optimal prediction evolves smoothly but jumps at an optimally chosen frequency when fresh information accrues a more volatile and persistent target raises the information rate required to maintain a sampling frequency this cost effect moderates and may even reverse the benefit effect on the value of information so optimal inertia is unresponsive to and nonmonotonic in the predictability of the environment conventional models with a fixed cost per observation imply no such cost effect so inertia rises quickly in the predictability of the environment

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

incomplete information higher order beliefs and price inertia the question that motivates this paper is how incomplete information impacts the response of prices to nominal shocks our baseline model is a variant of the calvo model in which firms observe the underlying nominal shocks with noise in this model the response of prices is pinned down by three parameters the precision of available information about the nominal shock the frequency of price adjustment and the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions this result synthesizes the broader lessons of the pertinent literature however this synthesis provides only a partial view of the role of incomplete information once one allows for more general information structures than those used in previous work one cannot quantify the degree of price inertia without data on the dynamics of higher order beliefs or of the agents forecasts of inflation we highlight this with three extensions of our baseline model all of which break the tight connection between the precision of information and higher order beliefs featured in previous work

coordination in heterogeneous federal systems abstract we compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization this type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws regulations standards or diplomatic policies contrary to the common wisdom decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important when coordination costs are symmetric decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences in the case of discontinuous network effects standardization never pareto dominates decentralization

central bank communication in the financial crisis evidence from a survey of financial market participants in this paper we investigate the relationship between market participants perception of central bank communication and their evaluation of central banks i credibility ii unorthodox measures and iii independence we utilise a survey of more than 550 financial market participants from around the world who answered questions in reference to the bank of england boe the bank of japan boj the european central bank ecb and the federal reserve fed we find that market participants believe that the fed communicates best followed by the boe ecb and boj similar rankings are found on the issues of credibility satisfaction with unconventional monetary policy and level of independence using ordered probit models we show that perception of central bank communication is positively related to i evaluation of central bank credibility ii satisfaction with unorthodox measures and iii perceived level of central bank independence

policy rules inflationary bias and cyclical stability statutory policy rules such as a k percent rule for money growth can restrain officials from pursuing their own welfare at the expense of the public good toma 1982 and barro and gordon 1983 among others have presented theoretical models showing how macroeconomic policymakers who pursue their own interests can produce policies that are biased toward too much inflation strict rules are a possible remedy to this problem yet while strict policy rules may reduce inflationary bias they also limit the flexibility of officials to respond to random shocks researchers such as canzoneri 1985 have shown that this can be an important limitation if officials possess information advantages that permit policy to modify economic disturbances effectively if the public dislikes variations in real output this loss of flexible stabilization may offset any gain from a reduction in inflationary bias there is then a potential trade off between reducing inflationary bias and cyclical stability yet to date none of the dimensions of this trade off has been documented evidence of an inflationary bias has been scarce in part because it requires identification of the socially preferred inflation rate similarly the extensive research on electorate concerns with real output has focused on the income level rather than its variance moreover since this research has not been cast in a framework that permits voters to recognize the potential inflationary cost of stabilizing output the validity of these findings is open to question indeed recent work by lucas 1987 suggests that citizens would willingly pay very little to reduce cyclical fluctuations

why money talks and wealth whispers monetary uncertainty and mystique we demonstrate that in important cases propositions 3 and 4 in eijffinger hoeberichts and schaling journal of money credit and banking may 2000 may fail moreover their monetary policy delegation arrangement which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable is dominated by other arrangements without any such uncertainty finally their way of modelling preference uncertainty leads to arbitrary effects on average monetary policy without these preference uncertainty is never desirable

state dependent or time dependent pricing does it matter for recent u s inflation in the 1988 2004 micro data collected by the u s bureau of labor statistics for the cpi price changes are frequent every 4 7 months depending on the treatment of sale prices and large in absolute value on the order of 10 the size and timing of price changes varies considerably for a given item but the size and probability of a price change are unrelated to the time since the last price change movements in aggregate inflation reflect movements in the size of price changes rather than the fraction of items changing price due to offsetting movements in the fraction of price increases and decreases neither leading time dependent models taylor or calvo nor 1 st generation state dependent models match all of these facts some 2 nd generation state dependent models however appear broadly consistent with the empirical patterns

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

a dynamic economy with costly price adjustments this paper studies a general equilibrium model of a dynamic economy with menu costs each firm s productivity is exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks around a trend and the money supply to monetary shocks around a trend all consumption pricing and production decisions are based on optimizing behavior there exists a staggered markov perfect equilibrium with prices determined by a two sided s s markup strategy the paper analyzes the optimal markup strategy and investigates the dynamics of the price index and the aggregate output the welfare consequences of the uncertain aggregate productivity and money supply are also examined

inertia of forward looking expectations macroeconomic variables exhibit inertia on the face of it such inertia sits uncomfortably with the behavior of rational forward looking agents who form expectations on the basis of the best information available at the time christopher sims 2003 sect 8 offers a three fold taxonomy of attempts to rationalize inertia the first is the idea of robert lucas 1973 and edmund phelps 1970 that agents face a signal extraction problem so that their actions react only partially to shifts in fundamentals due to the residual uncertainty the second is the sticky expectations approach of n gregory mankiw and ricardo reis 2002 where otherwise rational and forward looking agents receive information with some delay the third is the rational inattention approach favored by sims himself where agents with informationprocessing constraints choose the optimal coarsening of their information sims 2003 our approach is a variation on the signalextraction theme but has implications for the sticky expectations and rational inattention approaches as explained recently by michael woodford 2003 the original contribution of lucas 1973 had limited success in explaining the persistence of macroeconomic aggregates due to the feature that the underlying fundamentals are fully revealed after a delay of one period without this simplifying feature however the complexity of the problem increases rapidly as expectations of others expectations become relevant in one s calculations robert townsend 1983 phelps 1983 tractability aside the approach holds much promise when agents are differentially informed events in the distant past are more common knowledge than events in the recent past not only has enough time elapsed for the agents to ascertain the facts in the distant past but more importantly enough time has elapsed for each agent to be more confident that other agents have ascertained the facts when common knowledge is important as in coordination problems for example events in the distant past take on significance paradoxically the farther the agents peer into the future the farther they must look into the past to establish the informational platform for their actions to an outside observer the aggregate action betrays all the outward signs of adaptive expectations in order to demonstrate this principle in a transparent way we employ other drastic simplifications but do not assume that realizations are revealed after a delay of one period we thereby preserve the nontrivial nature of dynamic higher order beliefs and show how persistence arises as a natural consequence of the original lucas and phelps insight

multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias abstract this paper shows that an increase in the degree of multiplicative uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy will reduce social loss when policymaker s preferences are highly uncertain this result is still valid even when there is no distortion in the market

endogenous time dependent rules and inflation inertia in this paper we endogenize fixed price time dependent rules to examine the output effects of monetary disinflation we derive the optimal rules in and out of inflationary steady states and develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through time because of strategic complementarities we have to solve both problems simultaneously this allows us to reassess the output costs of monetary disinflations including aspects such as the roles of the initial level of inflation and of the degree of strategic complementarity in price finally we relax the strict assumption of pure time dependent rules by allowing price setters to re evaluate their rules at the time disinflation is announced

rent seeking spillovers and the benefits of decentralization abstract in the presence of spillovers decentralized provision of local public goods may lead to a higher surplus than centralized provision even though localities have identical preferences indeed free riding costs associated to decentralization can be lower than the costs of rent seeking and influence activities under centralization actually centralization yields a higher level of regional surplus only if both the spillover effect from local public spending is sufficiently large and the elasticity of the influence function is sufficiently small

optimal price setting with observation and menu costs we study the price setting problem of a firm in the presence of both observation and menu costs in this problem the firm optimally decides when to collect costly information on the adequacy of its price an activity which we refer to as a price review upon each review the firm chooses whether to adjust its price subject to a menu cost and when to conduct the next price review this behavior is consistent with recent survey evidence documenting that firms revise prices infrequently and that only a few price revisions yield a price adjustment the goal of the paper is to study how the firm s choices map into several observable statistics depending on the level and relative magnitude of the observation vs the menu cost the observable statistics are the frequency of price reviews the frequency of price adjustments the size distribution of price adjustments and the shape of the hazard rate of price adjustments we provide an analytical characterization of the firm s decisions and a mapping from the structural parameters to the observable statistics we compare these statistics with the ones obtained for the models with only one type of cost the predictions of the model can with suitable data be used to quantify the importance of the menu cost vs the information cost we also consider a version of the model where several price adjustment are allowed between observations a form of price plans or indexation we find that no indexation is optimal for small inflation rates

aggregation and optimization with state dependent pricing the literature on the aggregation of s s policies has ignored the impact of aggregate behavior on the individual s optimization problem in the case of pricing the feedback effects are clear not only do pricing strategies determine the evolution of the price level but the evolution of the price level also influences the optimal pricing strategies in this paper we provide a consistent treatment of aggregation and optimization we use this model to analyze three issues in the menu cost pricing literature the relationship between strategic complementarity and the real effects of money the relationship between the variance of the money supply and the correlation between money and output and the relationship between the cost of price adjustment and the size of price adjustment questions concerning the dynamics of aggregate variables such as prices employment investment and consumption represent the core of business cycle analysis one striking feature of these variables is the radical difference between properties of these aggregates and the nature of the individual behavior that underlies them the behavior of a firm s prices investment and employment and the behavior of an individual s consumption all involve frictional elements that lead to discrete adjustment at the microeconomic level heterogeneity among individuals however tends to smooth the behavior of the corresponding aggregates in recent years a large body of research has developed to examine the manner in which microeconomic frictions influence aggregate dynamics one of the centerpieces of this research has been the s s model developed by arrow harris and marschak 1951 the key element of this model is the state dependence of individual decisions agents act when a state variable crosses some critical threshold which balances the cost and benefits of adjustment the aggregate implications of this form of microeconomic behavior have been analyzed by blinder 1981 caplin 1985 and mosser 1991 in the context of inventory dynamics by caplin and spulber 1987 caballero and engel 1991 1993 and caplin and leahy 1991 in the context of prices and by bertola and caballero 1990 caballero 1993 and eberly 1994 in the context of con sumer durables one of the most limiting aspects of these models is that they focus exclusively on the impact that microeconomic inertia has on aggregate dynamics they 1we would like to thank michael harrison loannis karatzas john leahy sr andreu mas colell a co editor and four anonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments and the national science foundation and the sloan foundation for financial support

asymmetric yardstick competition and municipal cooperation this paper addresses the issue of inter jurisdictional cooperation when incumbents are pure rent seekers asymmetric fiscal needs bias yardstick competition as in allers 2012 while incumbents gain control over the political yardstick competition by cooperating this bias leads to asymmetric rent share cooperation is also intrinsically unstable furthermore incentives such as matching grants or economies of scale may enhance cooperation but will not increase political accountability

monetary accommodation and unemployment why central bank transparency matters abstract this note qualifies previous results on the beneficial effects of a non accommodating monetary rule on employment by considering the case where the central bank is not fully transparent about its reaction to wages

dynamic pricing and imperfect common knowledge abstract introducing private information into the dynamic pricing decision of firms by adding an idiosyncratic component to marginal cost can help explain two stylised facts about price changes aggregate inflation responds gradually and with inertia to shocks at the same time as individual price changes can be large the inertial behaviour of inflation is driven by privately informed firms strategically herding on the public information contained in the observations of lagged aggregate variables the model also matches the average duration between price changes found in the data and it nests the standard new keynesian phillips curve as a special case to solve the model the paper derives an algorithm for solving a class of dynamic models with higher order expectations

optimum pricing policy under stochastic inflation we describe aggregate inflation as a stochastic process in which the rate of change of the price level can be positive or zero where the times spent in each state are of random duration this class of processes includes two state markov chains and renewal processes as special cases it is shown that the optimal pricing policy of a monopolistic firm with non convex costs of price adjustment is s s in its real price i e its nominal price relative to the price level a basic certainty equivalence result is proved i e the firm behaves as if it faces a certain and fixed rate of inflation higher than the actual expected rate the difference between the two rates being a risk premium which depends on the real interest rate and the parameters of the stochastic process one can thus apply previous results from the case of certainty sheshinski and weiss review of economic studies 1977 to obtain comparative static results in particular one finds that an increase in the variance of expected inflation leads firms to choose a pricing policy with larger amplitude in real price the paper also addresses the question of consistency in firms expectations when the price level is determined by the firms actions in this paper we consider pricing policies of individual firms in an inflationary environment each firm expects the general price level to increase and must determine the rate of increase of its own price it is assumed that the firm incurs an adjustment cost when it changes its nominal price consequently firms choose to change prices occasionally rather than continuously

integrating sticky prices and sticky information abstract understanding the relationship between nominal and real variables most notably inflation and cyclical output is one of the fundamental questions of economics toward this understanding we develop a model that integrates sticky prices and sticky information a dual stickiness model we find that both rigidities are present in u s data we also show that the dual stickiness model s closest competitor is the hybrid new keynesian model for both models current inflation depends in part on last period s inflation the former model achieves this dependence endogenously through the interaction of the two rigidities rather than through backward looking behavior u s data support the dual stickiness model over the hybrid model because lagged expectations terms appear in the former s inflation euler equation finally we show that it is quantitatively important to distinguish between the two by simulating a dynamic equilibrium model under each of the two inflation equations

inflation uncertainty and unemployment uncertainty why transparency about monetary policy targets matters abstract disclosure of monetary policy targets reduces unemployment uncertainty at the expense of higher inflation uncertainty thereby posing a dilemma for monetary policymakers

presidential address asset price dynamics with slow moving capital i describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries i discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions which subsided afterward after presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings i offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors i address the implications for asset price dynamics of the apparent slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the arrival of new capital to an investment opportunity can be delayed by fractions of a second in some markets for example an electronic limit order book market for equities or by months in other markets such as that for catastrophe risk insurance accordingly prices respond to supply or demand shocks with a sharp reaction because of the relatively small subset of capital and thus risk bearing capacity that is immediately available to absorb a shock on short notice such a price impact is substantially reversed over time as additional capital becomes available the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect many sorts of attention costs to trade as well as institutional impediments to capital movement such as search costs for trading

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

state dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output economists have long suggested that nominal product prices are changed infrequently because of fixed costs in such a setting optimal price adjustment should depend on the state of the economy yet while widely discussed statedependent pricing has proved difficult to incorporate into macroeconomic models this paper develops a new tractable theoretical state dependent pricing framework we use it to study how optimal pricing depends on the persistence of monetary shocks the elasticities of labor supply and goods demand and the interest sensitivity of money demand

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting