maintaining low inflation money interest rates and policy stance abstract this paper presents a systematic empirical relationship between money and subsequent prices and output using us euro area and swiss data since the 1960 1970s monetary developments unlike interest rate stance measures are shown to provide qualitative and quantitative information on subsequent inflation the usefulness of monetary analysis is contrasted to weaknesses in modeling monetary policy and inflation with respectively short term interest rates and real activity measures the analysis sheds light on the recent change in inflation volatility and persistence as well as on the phillips curve flattening and reveals drawbacks in pursuing a low inflation target without considering monetary aggregates

multiple solution indeterminacies in monetary policy analysis abstract a sizeable fraction of recent research on monetary policy has been concerned with issues relating to analytical indeterminacies i e multiple solutions in rational expectations re models most of the literature features sophisticated re analysis conducted within dynamic models that reflect optimizing behavior by individual agents and incorporate taylor style policy rules a few papers have suggested that some of the particular indeterminacy arguments are misleading or irrelevant for the most part however there has been little dissent from the position that these indeterminacies present a genuine problem for monetary policy makers the purpose of the present paper by contrast is to argue that conclusions based on multiple solution indeterminacy findings are of dubious merit rather generally

eductive stability in real business cycle models we reexamine issues of coordination in the standard rbc model is the unique rational expectations equilibrium attainable by rational agents who contemplate the possibility of small deviations from equilibrium surprisingly we nd that coordination cannot be expected even with strong common knowledge assumptions rational agents anticipating small but persistent deviations are led to take actions that eventually contradict the common knowledge assumption this impossibility theorem for eductive learning is not fully overcome when adaptive learning is incorporated into the framework

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

agricultural export subsidies as a tool of trade strategy before and after the federal agricultural improvement and reform act of 1996 if the main justification for agricultural export subsidies is that they reduce government costs of deficiency payments then the 1996 farm legislation would make u s export subsidies largely unnecessary an additional argument advanced in favor of export subsidies is that their aggressive use by one country will cause competing countries to reduce or discontinue their own subsidies this argument is explored by means of a nash equilibrium in which countries choose both a base subsidy level and a response to competitors and by a consistent conjectures equilibrium little support is found for the argument during the period of the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s export subsidies became an increasingly important part of u s farm policy in fact expenditures on the export enhancement program eep exceeded 1 billion in fy 1993 the enduring popularity of export subsidies has been a source of puzzlement to economists see r paarlberg for example economists argue that governments could provide more assistance to farmers at the same cost to consumers if the money spent on export subsidies were spent instead on direct subsidies to farmers anania bohman and carter present a strong argument along these lines several papers have found circumstances under which export subsidies might be justified abbott paarlberg and sharples show that export subsidies can improve welfare in the exporting country if they are implemented in a discriminatory way reducing prices in countries with relatively elastic demands abbott and kallio show how export subsidies may complement other policies intended to support producers when the exporting country has market power in the world market another possible explanation for the popularity of export subsidies is advanced by alston carter and smith 1993 1995 they show that export subsidies may be justified because they reduce the budgetary costs of the price support program there is an additional argument which is frequently heard in debates about agricultural export subsidies but which has not been fully analyzed by economists supporters of the eep program argue that to discontinue its use would be tantamount to unilateral disarmament in the war for international market share in agricultural trade in other words export subsidies are a useful tool of

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

election campaigns agenda setting and electoral outcomes framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes this paper uses a two party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties campaign decisions alternations of power emerge naturally even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant

does money matter in shaping domestic business cycles an international investigation we study the contribution of money to business cycle uctuations in the us the uk japan and the euro area using a small scale structural monetary business cycle model constrained likelihood based estimates of the parameters are provided and time instabilities analyzed real balances are statistically important for output and in ation uctuations their contribution changes over time models giving money no role provide a distorted representation of the sources of cyclical uctuations of the transmission of shocks and of the events of the last 40 years

supply side strategic unemployment in small business in this paper the model which will be analysed is characterized by a labour market with a profitable vacancies b unemployment c excess labour supply d limited mobility and divisibility of labour and e competition on the job the analysed setting is typical for a small business economy the analysis suggests that unemployment will be greater than equilibrium unemployment if present employees and potential entrants consider job assignments for this market under strategic perspectives

perfection the infinite horizon and dominance abstract consideration of time and independence brought into focus by the example of perfection in the infinite horizon leads the author to a modified contraction by dominance solution for game theory

thinking ahead the decision problem we propose a model of costly decision making based on time costs of deliberating current and future decisions we model an individual decision maker s thinking process as a thought experiment that takes time and let the decision maker think ahead about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature by formulating an intertemporal state contingent planning problem which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature and by letting the decision maker deliberate ahead of the realization of a state we attempt to capture the basic observation that individuals generally do not think through a complete action plan instead individuals prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event when they arise

fighting pollution when decisions are strategic in this paper we analyse anti pollution policies in a 2 by 2 game played between a polluter and the police in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the policy maker we show that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2 by 2 game choose nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin

rational behaviour in extensive form games it is argued that subgame perfect equilibrium behavior is not an inevitable consequence of common belief of rationality among players in noncooperative extensive form games the argument centers around a particular extensive form game with perfect information in the context of this game it is argued that if rationality is not common belief throughout play of the game then it can be perfectly rational to play contrary to subgame perfection even if rationality is common belief at the beginning of the game it is then shown that it is impossible for rationality to be common belief throughout every play of the game

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

money supply and capital accumulation on the transition path revisited fischer 1979 and asako 1983 analyze the sign of the correlation between the growth rate of money and the rate of capital accumulation on the transition path both plug a constant relative risk aversion utility based on a cobb douglas and a leontief function respectively into sidrauski s model yet return contrasting results the present analysis by using a more general ces utility presents both of those settings and conclusions as limiting cases and generates economic figures more consistent with reality e g the interest rate elasticity of the money demands derived from those previous works is necessarily 1 and 0 respectively

interest rates and inflation a consensus has emerged among practitioners that the instrument of monetary policy ought to be the short term interest rate that policy should be focused on the control of inflation and that inflation can be reduced by increasing short term interest rates at the center of this consensus is a rejection of the quantity theory such a rejection is a difficult step to take given the mass of evidence linking money growth inflation and interest rates increases in average rates of money growth are associated with equal increases in average inflation rates and interest rates these observations need not rule out a constructive role for the use of short term interest rates as a monetary instrument one possibility is that increasing short term rates in the face of increases in inflation is just an indirect way of reducing money growth sell bonds and take money out of the system another possibility is that while control of monetary aggregates is the key to low long run average inflation rates an interest rate policy can improve the short run behavior of interest rates and prices the shortrun connections among money growth inflation and interest rates are very unreliable so there is much room for improvement these possibilities are surely worth exploring but doing so requires new theory the analysis needed to reconcile interest rate policies with the evidence on which the quantity theory of money is grounded cannot be found in old textbook diagrams

bounded rationality and market fluctuations abstract in a model of a competitive market each firm in each period faces a planning problem caused by random changes in circumstances due to bounded rationality a firm is unable to compute costlessly and exactly its optimal output instead the firm approximates optimal output through a decision making process called a deliberation technology this technology involves a rule of thumb a costly deliberation mechanism and a random deliberation error the issue addressed by the model is how bounded rationality affects market fluctuations the first glance intuition is that fluctuations will increase since deliberation error is an added disturbance to the market however the actual effect is much more complicated and might go either way

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games abstract this paper extends the eductive learning approach in settings with non atomistic agents it shows the connection between the characterization of rationalizable sets by basu 1991 and the seminal result by guesnerie 1992 in the context of cournot oligopoly models

imperfectly rational choice rationality as the result of a costly activity abstract in identifying characteristics of people and of their choices that determine their degree of rationality the nature and incidence of imperfect rationality this paper suggests that there are often observable criteria by which to judge the applicability of the rational choice model to a particular market or choice situation clearer understanding will cut both ways bringing more of non economic behavior into the productive domain of rational choice analysis while at the same time showing economic and non economic behavior that is badly modeled by the assumption of rational decision makers

the cost of ruling cabinet duration and the median gap model in a recent article paldam and skott 1995 provide atheoretical explanation for an important empirical phenomenonin democratic countries incumbent governments tend to losevotes in this paper i show that paldam and skott stheoretical explanation for this cost of ruling ispotentially much stronger than they recognize specifically when generalized in a straightforward way their modelexplains not only the cost of ruling itself but also a secondwell established empirical fact that the longer an incumbentgovernment has been in power the more votes it loses further this generalization of the model produces twoadditional empirical hypotheses that have not yet been testedin the empirical literature

auctions with variable supply uniform price versus discriminatory abstract we examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids we compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty where uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors the seller s private information about marginal cost and the seller s incentive to sell the profit maximizing quantity given the received bids in every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction in the two bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies as a consequence we find that the uniform price auction generates a higher expected revenue for the seller and a higher trade volume

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

a rational voter explanation of the cost of ruling it is well known that the average government loses votes the so called cost of ruling we show that the loss can be explained as a perfectly rational demand for change in a median voter model once the model is amended to let the two parties be visibly different

how cynical can an incumbent be strategic policy in a model of government spending abstract when parties with different preferences compete for election strategic manipulation of state variables for electoral purposes can occur even with rational voters this paper presents a model in which government resources can be used productivity for the benefit of everybody or unproductively for the benefit of the ruling party s constituency a government more inclined to unproductive spending may choose to collect public resources inefficiently in order to produce the importance of spending decisions in the election the model highlights the strategic role of policy decisions that affect incentives and constraints faced by future governments and their impact on election results

testable implications of subjective expected utility theory abstract i show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces when the analyst does not know anything about the agent s payoffs or beliefs and can only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization problem under uncertainty

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

a theory of divided government this paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature s impact on policy depends upon relative plurality to analyze equilibrium in this game between voters we apply coalition proof type refinements the model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the united states for instance the model predicts a split tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress b for some parameter values a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature and c the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections

equilibrium without independence abstract because players whose preferences violate the von neumann morgenstern independence axiom may be unwilling to randomize as mixed strategy nash equilibrium would require a nash equilibrium may not exist without independence this paper generalizes nash s definition of equilibrium retaining its rational expectations spirit but relaxing its requirement that a player must bear as much uncertainty about his own strategy choice as other players do the resulting notion equilibrium in beliefs is equivalent to nash equilibrium when independence is satisfied but exists without independence this makes it possible to study the robustness of equilibrium comparative statics results to violations of independence

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

money s role in the monetary business cycle a small structural model of the monetary business cycle implies that real money balances enter into a correctly specified forward looking is curve if and only if they enter into a correctly specified forward looking phillips curve the model also implies that empirical measures of real balances must be adjusted for shifts in money demand to accurately isolate and quantify the dynamic effects of money on output and inflation maximum likelihood estimates of the modelos parameters take both these considerations into account but still suggest that money plays a minimal role in the monetary business cycle

inter country differences in voter satisfaction with the democratic process a study of world elections using data from the comparative study of electoral systems this paper examines differences between west and east european countries in their levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works compared to east european countries satisfaction levels were considerably higher in western countries west europe north america and oceania moreover there was considerably greater inequality in the distribution of satisfaction in east european compared to western countries when these facts were combined to construct equity sensitive satisfaction averages the gap between western countries and east european countries was even greater than suggested by a comparison of average satisfaction levels this raised the question of why satisfaction levels varied so markedly between these two sets of countries a logit model suggested that a number of factors were important for determining whether people were satisfied with the way democracy worked in their countries while there was a difference between western countries and east european countries in their endowments of these satisfaction inducing factors income gender participation education among others when the equations were estimated separately for the western countries and east european countries the coefficient responses associated with several of these factors also differed markedly between the two groups

the unprofitability of mixed strategy equilibria in two person games abstract in this paper it is demonstrated that the payoffs of mixed strategy equilibria are equal to the maximin values for all 2x2 matrix games if maximim implies completely mixed strategies this characterizes a subclass of unprofitable games maximin instead of nash equilibrium has been suggested as an appropriate solution concept for these games

the future of monetary aggregates in monetary policy analysis this paper considers the role of monetary aggregates in modern macroeconomic models of the new keynesian type the focus is on possible developments of these models that are suggested by the monetarist literature and that in addition seem justified empirically both the relation between money and inflation and between money and aggregate demand are considered regarding the first relation it is argued that both the mean and the dynamics of inflation in present day models are governed by money growth this relationship arises from a conventional aggregate demand channel claims that an emphasis on the link between monetary aggregates and inflation requires a direct channel connecting money and inflation are wide of the mark the relevance of money for aggregate demand in turn lies not via real balance effects or any other justification for money in the is equation but on money s ability to serve as a proxy for the various substitution effects of monetary policy that exist when many asset prices matter for aggregate demand this role for monetary aggregates which is supported by empirical evidence enhances the value of money to monetary policy

optimal investment choice for developing countries rational theory and rational decision making abstract this paper analyzes a key feature of the conceptual process that governments use for making major investment choices in the developing countries both through their direct investment activities and through the special incentives e g credit foreign exchanage and tax subsidies they provide governments typically play a large role in the allocation of investment resources in ldc s consequently the public investment choice process has significant effects on the efficiency of capital formation and on economic growth in developing countries although the feature of the investment choice process on which we focus has important theoretical and practical implications it has so far received little analytical attention

de stabilizing speculation on futures markets an alternative view point abstract this paper offers a new interpretation for possible destabilizing effects of opening futures markets in our model adapted from stein 1987 speculation on futures markets reduces the likelihood of occurrence of a rational expectations equilibrium although the equilibrium price is less volatile after the futures market is opened which is usually viewed as a stabilizing effect traders may find it more difficult or even impossible to coordinate their expectations in order to implement this equilibrium

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

stability with one sided incomplete information two notions of stability ex ante stability and bayesian stability are investigated in a matching model with non transferrable utility interdependent preferences and one sided incomplete information ex ante stable matching outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner s type while bayesian stable matching outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs ex ante stability is a minimal requirement bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties

stationarity rationalizability and bargaining strategies for the seller and the buyer which are weakly stationary we demonstrate that any initial offer from the seller induced by a strategy rationalized by a weakly stationary acceptance rule for the buyer must entail the coase property our result does not presume the selection of a particular equilibrium and follows directly from the weak stationarity assumption of the buyer s acceptance rule and the rational behaviour of the players

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

policy mis representation and the cost of ruling u s presidential elections in comparative perspective the cost of ruling effect on electoral support is well established that is governing parties tend to lose vote share the longer they are in power although we know this to be true we do not know why it happens this research examines whether the cost of ruling results at least in part from the tendency for governing parties to shift policy further away from the average voter it first considers differences in political institutions and how they might influence cost of ruling owing to policy drift and then tests the hypothesis focusing on u s presidential elections which is an unfavorable case to find such an effect results confirm a clear cost of ruling effect in these elections and demonstrate that policy misrepresentation is an important mechanism that is the policy liberalism of presidents from different parties diverges over time as their tenure in the white house increases and the degree to which it does matters for the presidential vote policy is not the only thing that matters and other

activity choice a new approach to economic behavior abstract an individual s work and consumption behavior is modeled as the outcome of an optimal choice among activities at each moment within a day the model describes the time shapes of his demand for goods and services labor supply and activities within the day and it allows the analysis of choices in which unusually complex motivations are incorporated it is applicable to questions of job satisfaction peak demands shift working and capital utilization estimation of the value of time goal and process utilities intrinsic and extrinsic satisfactions labor versus labor power and to the issues of compulsive consumption and self control