the dynamic cost and persistence of asset inequality in an agrarian economy abstract a growing literature suggests that asset inequality can be economically costly in the presence of agency costs that constrain labor and capital markets unclear in this literature is whether asset markets and optimal individual accumulation of self finance capacity suffice to eliminate costly inequality over time this paper uses numerical dynamic programming methods to explore this question with a model of an initially inegalitarian agrarian economy while an egalitarian asset distribution emerges over time the process involves sufficiently great productivity losses along the way that a redistributive policy could improve on the market s performance by both equity and efficiency criteria

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

economic determinants of land invasions this study estimates the effect of economic conditions on redistributive conflict we examine land invasions in brazil using a panel data set with over 50 000 municipality year observations adverse eco nomic shocks instrumented by rainfall cause the rural poor to invade and occupy large landholdings this effect exhibits substantial heterogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems but not by other observable variables in highly unequal municipalities negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality cross sectional estimates using fine within region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict i introduction c onflict over land is endemic to many rural econo mies in environments marked by a highly skewed distribution of property incomplete land and credit markets poorly or unevenly enforced property rights and weak political institutions agents often resort to extralegal means to improve their economic positions the poor frequently invade private properties and occupy them until either forcibly expelled or granted official titles land conflict which is prevalent in many countries such as brazil south africa uganda and venezuela may distort the allocation of resources in the agricultural sector away from productive uses and thereby contribute to the persistence of rural poverty how do economic conditions affect this redistrib utive conflict this paper explores this question using a rich municipal level data set of 5 299 land invasions from 1988 to 2004 in brazil we follow miguel satyanath and sergenti 2004 by using rainfall as a source of exogenous variation to study the relationship between income and conflict and we find that adverse economic shocks cause the rural poor to invade large landholdings this effect exhibits considerable het erogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems in highly unequal municipalities negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality the effect of income shocks is even stronger in highly polarized municipalities as measured by the degree of bimodality in the land distribution cross sectional estimates using fine within region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict we also find that income shocks cause significantly more land invasions in municipalities with a greater proportion of land under fixed rent contracts by contrast we find no evidence of heterogeneity on a range of other political and socioeconomic variables including political competition sharecropping police expenditures and social welfare spending recent microeconometric studies have examined two

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

dynamic natural monopoly regulation time inconsistency moral hazard and political environments this paper quantitatively assesses time inconsistency moral hazard and political ideology in monopoly regulation of electricity distribution we specify and estimate a dynamic model of utility regulation featuring investment and moral hazard we find that 1 there is under investment in electricity distribution capital aiming to reduce power outages 2 more conservative political environments have higher regulated returns and 3 more electricity is lost in distribution in more conservative political environments we quantify the value of regulatory commitment in inducing more investment conservative regulators mitigate welfare losses due to time inconsistency but worsen losses from moral hazard

determinants and consequences of land reform implementation in the philippines abstract unlike the experience of other developing countries land reform in the philippines has been successful in converting many of share tenants to land reform beneficiaries this study indicates that the implementation of land reform is positively associated with yield growth made possible by the adoption of modern seed fertilizer technology a major reason underlying such association is considered to be an increased economic interest of tenants in land reform arising from divergence of rental value of land from leasehold rent and amortization fees prescribed by law

economic benefits and costs of land redistribution in zimbabwe in the early 1980s summary evidence on the performance of zimbabwe s early land reform effort is mixed in this paper we use a unique micro data set with information on land reform beneficiaries and a control group of nonbeneficiaries and employ propensity score matching to examine household and per capita benefits associated with land reform combining this information with estimates on the cost of land reform we find that the economic return is positive but modest its magnitude depends on assumptions about the opportunity costs of land and the reasons for the observed increase in the size of resettled households

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

limited liability and the existence of share tenancy abstract the paper considers the problem confronting an absentee landlord who can lease out his land on a fixed rent contract share rent contract or a mixture of the two it is argued that in poor areas it is natural to have each contract underwritten by an implicit limited liability clause which allows a person to forego paying rent under extreme crop failures in the presence of such an implicit clause a certain tension appears between a tenant and a landlord with the former preferring risky projects and the latter preferring safe ones it is shown that in such a case share tenancy turns out to be the dominant system from among the class mentioned above because it minimises the tension between the landlord and the tenant the result is then used to discuss conditions under which share tenancy will tend to wither away

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

new ways of looking at old issues inequality and growth abstract the paper uses new cross country data on income and asset land distribution to show that i there is a strong negative relationship between initial inequality in the asset distribution and long term growth ii inequality reduces income growth for the poor but not for the rich and iii available longitudinal data provide little support for the kuznets hypothesis policies that increase aggregate investment and facilitate acquisition of assets by the poor might thus be doubly beneficial for growth and poverty reduction

property rights and the political organization of agriculture we propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined in particular because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency the model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others we test some implications of the theory using a five decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 indian states

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

contractual structure and wealth accumulation can historical wealth distributions affect long run output and inequality despite rational saving convex technology and no externalities we consider a model of equilibrium short period financial contracts where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability if agents have no bargaining power poor agents have no incentive to save poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes with no interclass mobility if instead agents have all the bargaining power strong saving incentives are generated the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and history does not matter eventually d31 d91 i32 o17 q15

history institutions and economic performance the legacy of colonial land tenure systems in india we analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the british in india and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators these areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices

testing between competing models of sharecropping the marshallian approach assumes a prohibitively high cost of monitoring the sharecropper s activities while the monitoring approach argues that landlords stipulate and effectively monitor sharecroppers activities i present new evidence using detailed data collected from eight indian villages most tenants own some land of their own this provides a controlled environment in studying the impact of contractual arrangements the differences in input and output intensities on owned minus sharecropped land of the same household are found to be sizable and significant suggesting a rejection of the monitoring approach and supporting the notion of the marshallian productive inefficiency of sharecropping

the role of land reform in economic development policies and politics as the extensive literature on the subject attests the issue of land reform has been and remains heatedly debated 1 the latest massive demonstration of interest came with the 1979 world conference on agrarian reform and rural development where representatives of no less than 145 nations and three liberation movements agreed that equitable distribution and efficient use of land are indispensable for rural development for the mobilization of human resources and for increased production for the alleviation of poverty fao at one time or another but especially since 1960 virtually every country in the world has passed land reform laws yet the record is far more modest than the promise a in spite of decades if not centuries tuma of land reform activities landownership remains extremely skewed concentration of landownership is almost universally increasing the mass of landless is growing rapidly and the extent of rural poverty and malnutrition has reached horrendous proportions and b in spite of widespread agreement on the need for land reform there are virtually no significant ongoing land reform programs except under extreme political pressures revolutionary in el salvador and postrevolutionary in nicaragua mozambique and angola in several countries the progressive gains achieved by land reform programs are being either eroded by the forces of economic growth mexico venezuela and south korea or purposefully canceled by public policies chile the question i want to explore in this paper is why this blatant discrepancy between rhetoric and reality or to put it another way why is land reform no longer a significant policy issue even though it remains an important political issue in most countries of the world 2 to answer we need first to explore in a positive sense what has been the nature of different land reforms that occurred in the past what were their purposes achievements and limits this will be done by developing a typology of land reforms in the third world because it is essential to distinguish carefully among a wide variety of reforms following the approach of political economy i will do this in the context of modes of production social class structure and types of land tenure

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

land reform income redistribution and agricultural production in korea jeon yoong deok kim young yong january 2000 land reform income redistribution and agricultural production in korea articles chicago u s university of chicago 18

does sharecropping affect long term investment evidence from west bengal s tenancy reforms in india land reform has been high on the political agenda since independence in 1947 and early efforts at abolishing intermediaries are widely credited with having brought about significant social benefits the most prominent type is tenancy reform as it does not extinguish landlords ownership rights tenants who may have benefited from rent ceilings and cannot be evicted still have to pay annual share rent this weakness of rights may fail to create the incentives for effort supply and long term investment that have underpinned the success of land reforms elsewhere effectively adding a dynamic inefficiency to the disincentives created by the marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping this could imply that despite the high political price of implementing land reform in india the schemes so far have failed to reach their productivity and poverty reduction potential

moral hazard land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the philippines abstract introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a principal agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade off between production and land quality maintenance using data from the philippines a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account

success and failure of reform insights from the transition of agriculture this paper analyzes the linkages between the reform strategies in transition countries and economic performance the authors focus on agriculture because of the sharpness of the policy changes fundamental differences among countries and relative simplicity of agricultural relationships the authors document post reform performance in the transition countries of asia and europe the authors show how a pricing reform and subsidy reductions b land rights reform and policies that affect farm restructuring and c the presence institutions that facilitate exchange either markets or market substitutes affect output and productivity the paper ends with general lessons on reforms and transition

rural organization and land reform in brazil the role of nonagricultural benefits of landholding abstract this article examines the effects of nonagricultural land use on agrarian organization and land reform in an economy characterized by limited credit and land rental markets the nonagricultural demand for land under credit constraint generates a potential mismatch between the distribution of land and the distribution of farming skills this disparity reduces the agricultural output if the land rental market is absent a perfect land rental market is shown to determine the highest possible agricultural output policy implications from the model include in addition to market improvements the fact that small farmers rather than landless people should be the target of redistributive land reform programs

limited liability wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies abstract an explanation is provided for two observations concerning variations in the choice of tenants and their welfare differences in tenants wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible on fixed rental commitments in this context the inability of landlords to specify their tenants effort lead to effort choices that vary with the type of contract offered the selection of tenants and the contract terms they receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving fixed rent contracts these results also predict that wealthier tenants earn higher profits on their leased plots

limited liability contractual choice and the tenancy ladder abstract we re examine the connection between limited liability contractual form and the agricultural tenancy ladder in a model with only labor moral hazard we show that ex post limited liability does not explain sharecropping in this model but that ex ante limited liability can do so we characterize the nature of the tenancy ladder in either case

the relation between farm size and farm productivity the role of family labor supervision and credit constraints abstract the paper shows that if the performance of hired farmhands is affected by supervision from family members and if the availability of credit is dependent on the amount of land owned then a systematic positive or negative relationship between per acre yields and farm size will prevail a model with no supervision effects on labor productivity would predict that yields are unaffected by farm size the paper also investigates the relation between land utilization and owned holding size when land rental possibilities are limited results are shown to be compatible with various observed patterns in ldcs