efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

multiple round timber auction design and simulation this paper presents a multiple round timber auction simulation developed in order to study various configurations of auction design in this study simultaneous sequential timber auctions are modelled and analysed using agent based simulation technology as there are many individual items in the auction to be sold the auction designer defines several rounds that are sequential at pre defined intervals at each round the auction designer announces several simultaneous auctions since bidders are offered different items at each round a mathematical linear programing model for selecting the best set of items to bid for is presented different bidding patterns are simulated and compared in various setup configurations the most advanced of these strategies are adaptive and use agent learning capability the comparisons include the success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3 this study suggests an efficient bidding pattern for bidders to bid in order to achieve to their goal and increase their profit similarly in order to increase profit the auctioneer i e the government needs to control several auction parameters including the number of auctions per year the lot size the auction periodicity and the number of bidders this study also suggests parameters configurations that to maximise revenue for the auctioneer

reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions abstract uniform price auctions frequently admit equilibria which raise zero seller revenue we show that when demand is sufficiently strong when market supply is more than covered by any bidder s opponents the introduction of a reserve price improves revenue not only by directly increasing the market clearing price but also by eliminating low revenue equilibria in which the market clearing price is almost always equal to the reserve the condition on demand is sharp and when it is not satisfied there exist equilibria in which the market clearing price almost always equals the reserve our results therefore fully characterize the existence of low revenue equilibria in terms of bidder demand at a given reserve price this sharp characterization extends directly to the case of stochastic supply and low revenue equilibria also fail to exist when supply is stochastic and elastic

buying votes vs supplying public services political incentives to under invest in pro poor policies this paper uses unique survey data to provide for the first time in the literature direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics ruling out alternate explanations such as for example poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes the data come from the philippines a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections the data reveal a significant robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services in places where households report more vote buying government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children and quite strikingly as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance a higher percentage of children are severely under weight

dynamic processes of social and economic interactions on the persistence of inefficiencies an economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered an exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition at each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability and he chooses a coalition a feasible new state to move the economy to and side payments between the agents in the coalition the setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining coalition formation or exchange economies whenever agents are unable to write long term contracts but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude there can be long run inefficiencies with cycles or inefficient steady states however when agents are sufficiently patient the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run moreover when there exists an efficient state that is free of negat

asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers abstract much of the theoretical auction literature assumes that there are no observable differences between the bidders of an auction in this paper i present an asymmetric auction model where the distribution of a bidder s value depends on some commonly observed characteristics the model is applied to joint bidding and mergers in auction markets the results provide additional evidence that first price auctions are less susceptible to the acquisition and exercise of market power than open auctions

collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects with and without complementarities collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects even with large complementarities in the buyers utility functions the bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves while keeping the prices low in the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized the scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases

worst case optimal redistribution of vcg payments in multi unit auctions abstract for allocation problems with one or more items the well known vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism aka clarke mechanism generalized vickrey auction is efficient strategy proof individually rational and does not incur a deficit however it is not strongly budget balanced generally the agents payments will sum to more than 0 we study mechanisms that redistribute some of the vcg payments back to the agents while maintaining the desirable properties of the vcg mechanism our objective is to come as close to budget balance as possible in the worst case for auctions with multiple indistinguishable units in which marginal values are nonincreasing we derive a mechanism that is optimal in this sense we also derive an optimal mechanism for the case where we drop the non deficit requirement finally we show that if marginal values are not required to be nonincreasing then the original vcg mechanism is worst case optimal

collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values abstract the standard approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed disinterested third party who prior to the auction designs and implements a collusive mechanism in environments where collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties this approach may neglect information leakages from simply a proposal to collude we consider a model of collusion where one informed bidder proposes to another as in es and schummer 2004 we allow for general interdependent values and affiliated signals in contrast to third party modeling approaches collusion is inefficient from both a social perspective except for the case of pure common values and from the perspective of the ring both bidders are better off than without colluding but the surplus extracted from the seller is distributed asymmetrically between the bidders the potential for information leakage from proposing is bad for low types who reveal that they are weak competitors but is advantageous for high types because they are able to signal their strength we identify a so called briber s curse whereby acceptance of a proposal causes the proposer to downgrade her expected value for the object when there is additional competition in the form of bidders outside of the cartel the briber s curse significantly harms cartel profits and raises seller revenues

information and subsidies complements or substitutes abstract does providing information about a product influence the impact of price subsidies on purchases this question is particularly relevant for health products in developing countries where both informational campaigns and price subsidies are common policy instruments we conduct a field experiment in zambia and find that providing information about a new version of a product significantly increases the impact of price subsidies on take up taken alone the information manipulation has no significant impact on demand while the price subsidy substantially increases demand however the evaluation of either intervention in isolation fails to capture the significant complementarity between the two

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

managerial overconfidence and corporate risk management abstract we examine whether managerial overconfidence can help explain the observed discrepancies between the theory and practice of corporate risk management we use a unique dataset of corporate derivatives positions that enables us to directly observe managerial reactions to their speculative gains and losses from market timing when they use derivatives we find that managers increase their speculative activities using derivatives following speculative cash flow gains while they do not reduce their speculative activities following speculative losses this asymmetric response is consistent with the selective self attribution associated with overconfidence our time series approach to measuring overconfidence complements cross sectional approaches currently used in the literature our results show that managerial overconfidence which has been found to influence a number of corporate decisions also affects corporate risk management decisions

selective trials a principal agent approach to randomized controlled experiments we study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes are significantly affected by experimental subjects unobserved effort expenditure while standard randomized controlled trials rcts are internally consistent the unobservability of effort compromises external validity we approach trial design as a principal agent problem and show that natural extensions of rcts which we call selective trials can help improve external validity in particular selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment effort and the interaction of treatment and effort moreover they can help identify when treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort expenditure

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

an application of the shapley value to fair division with money the author considers fair division when monetary compensations are feasible and utilities are quasi linear four axioms are discussed individual rationality resource monotonicity population solidarity and the stand alone test the latter views the utility from consuming all the goods as an upper bound on every coalition s actual joint utility under efficiency the four axioms show little compatibility however when the goods have enough substitutability in everyone s preferences the shapley value of the surplus sharing game satisfies all four axioms an example is the optimal assignment of indivisible goods when every agent consumes only one good copyright 1992 by the econometric society

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

conservation auctions should information about environmental benefits be made public most bid evaluation systems in conservation auctions consider both the proposed payment and the environmental attributes when auctioneers have a more comprehensive understanding of the conservation benefits than bidders do information becomes a central element of the auction design concealing information about conservation benefits may be the optimal strategy when entry decisions are not relevant however disclosing information may motivate landholders whose lands are associated with high environmental benefits to participate in an auction the present study demonstrates that revealing information about conservation benefits can be an optimal strategy if it enhances an auction s participation rate when bid acceptance rates are high copyright 2013 oxford university press

entry by takeover auctions vs bilateral negotiations firms often enter new markets by taking over an incumbent we analyze a potential entrant s choice of target under two exogenously given takeover mechanisms i auctions where other incumbents can bid for the target against the entrant and ii bilateral negotiations between the entrant and the target the entrant s choice of target depends on the mechanism and it may not maximize its ex post profit nor consumer welfare in an auction the entrant pays a higher price to take over a target with higher synergies because these impose stronger negative externalities on incumbents and increase their willingness to pay for preventing entry auctions increase the price obtained by the target but reduce welfare compared to negotiations because they may discourage the entrant from acquiring a target with higher synergies

what matters and what does not in households decision to invest in malaria prevention this paper examines the take up of a new malaria control device by rural households in kenya and tests whether the demand curve for the device varies with the framing of marketing messages and with the gender of the person targeted by the marketing previous research suggests that the demand for malaria prevention is highly price sensitive jessica cohen and dupas 2008 even though the private returns to preventing malaria are very large christian lengeler 2004 in the standard model of investment in human capital individuals invest in a health product if the expected benefits from the product outweigh its costs michael grossman 1972 in this framework the low take up observed at relatively moderate prices by cohen and dupas 2008 could be due to people underestimating the expected benefits of investing in prevention or due to people being credit constrained and unable to pay the cost up front it is also possible that the standard model does not apply because people have time inconsistent preferences or because they are uncertain about their own preferences and rely on external cues to resolve their own uncertainty when they need to make a decision an extensive literature in psychology and marketing suggests that decision making can be affected by frames or cues that do not add information about a product but can be effective at persuading individuals to invest in it for example in a recent field experiment in south africa marianne bertrand et al 2008 found what matters and what does not in households decision to invest in malaria prevention

australian ipo pricing in the short and long run abstract we analyse both initial underpricing and post listing returns for australian ipos our results are consistent with the view that unique institutional characteristics may have overwhelmed previous australian tests of equilibrium models of ipo underpricing the results also show that australian ipos significantly underperform market movements in the three year period subsequent to listing further investigation of these anomalous post listing returns lead us to reject various speculative bubble explanations rather the evidence suggests a curvilinear relationship between initial and subsequent returns although the economic significance of the relationship is low

analysing the determinants of performance of best and worst european banks a mixed logit approach abstract using a dataset of 7635 observations on 1384 commercial banks operating in the eu between 1993 and 2001 we utilise a mixed logit model to identify factors that explain the probability of a bank being a best worst performer the empirical evidence confirms the importance of country level characteristics location and legal tradition and firm level features bank ownership balance sheet structure and size specifically smaller sized banks with higher loan intensity and foreign banks from countries upholding common law traditions have a higher probability of best performance

keeping the doctor away experimental evidence on investment in preventative health products household investment in preventative health products in developing countries is typically low even though the returns to such products are high in this paper we experimentally estimate demand curves for health products and test whether 1 information about health risk 2 cash liquidity 3 peer effects and 4 intra household differences in preferences affect demand in our main experiment in kenya involving children s shoes critical for preventing hookworm infection price is by far the most important predictor of purchase providing liquidity and targeting women also increased demand information had no effect even though we find that genuine learning occurred we find no peer effects even though people discussed the product purchase decision extensively we find similar results for price and information in three smaller studies in guatemala india and uganda in experiments involving soap and multivitamins

shared agents and competition in laboratory english auctions at livestock auctions the same purchasing agent can represent more than one processor repeated multiple unit english auctions are created in a laboratory to measure the impact of shared agents on trade prices under alternative treatments with six and as few as two agents representing six principals treatments are constructed in which the agents either know or do not know quantity for sale and in which there are progressively fewer agents bidding knowledge of quantity for sale can be anticompetitive evolution toward increased market concentration leads to consistent anticompetitive pricing resulting in prices significantly lower than the predicted competitive equilibrium prices

what impedes efficient adoption of products evidence from randomized sales offers for fuel efficient cookstoves in uganda consumers failure to adopt products with health and wellbeing benefits apparently far greater than their costs has consistentlychallenged the widespread use of health improving technologies a sales offer combining free trial time payments and the option of returning the product can overcome barriers such as liquidityconstraints and poor information about benefits and usability we tested this sales offer and alternatives in an experiment with a fuel efficient charcoal stove in urban uganda and a fuel efficient wood stove in rural uganda this offer dramatically increased uptake in urban kampala from 4 to 46 and in rural mbarara from 5 to 57

can higher prices stimulate product use evidence from a field experiment in zambia the controversy over how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests in part on whether higher prices can increase use either by targeting distribution to high use households a screening effect or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk cost effect we develop a methodology for separating these two effects we implement the methodology in a field experiment in zambia using door to door marketing of a home water purification solution we find evidence of economically important screening effects by contrast we find no consistent evidence of sunk cost effects jel c93 d12 i11 m31 o12

rational markets yes or no the affirmative case with the recent flurry of articles declaiming the death of the rational market hypothesis it is well to pause and recall the very sound reasons this hypothesis was once so widely accepted at least in academic circles although academic models often assume that all investors are rational this assumption is clearly an expository device not to be taken seriously what is in contention is whether markets are rational in the sense that prices are set as if all investors are rational even if markets are not rational in this sense abnormal profit opportunities still may not exist in that case markets may be said to be minimally rational i maintain that not only are developed financial markets minimally rational they are with two qualifications rational i contend that realistically market rationality needs to be defined so as to allow investors to be uncertain about the characteristics of other investors in the market i also argue that investor irrationality to the extent that it affects prices is particularly likely to be manifest through overconfidence which in turn is likely to make the market hyper rational to illustrate the article reexamines some of the most serious historical evidence against market rationality

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

private health investments under competing risks evidence from malaria control in senegal this study exploits the introduction of high subsidies for anti malaria products in senegal in 2009 to investigate if malaria prevents parents to invest in child health building upon the seminal paper of dow et al 1999 we develop a simple model of health investments under competing mortality risks in which people allocate expenses to equalize lifetime across all causes of death we predict that private health investments to fight malaria as well as other diseases should increase in response to anti malaria public interventions to test this prediction we use original panel data from a senegalese household survey combined with geographical information on malaria prevalence our strategy is to compare the evolution of child health expenditures before and after anti malaria interventions between malarious and non malarious regions of senegal we find that health expenditures in malarious regions catch up with non malarious regions at the extensive and intensive margins and both in level and in composition the same result holds for parental health seeking behavior in case of other diseases like diarrhea we provide evidence that these patterns cannot be explained by differential trends in total income or access to healthcare or child morbidity between malarious and non malarious regions our results suggest that behavioral responses to anti malaria campaigns magnify their impact on all cause mortality for children

do non monetary prices target the poor evidence from a field experiment in india monetary price subsidies are often used to increase take up of health products but monetary prices may screen out those with the highest returns the poor using willingness to pay wtp data from a field experiment in india this paper determines whether nonmonetary prices better target health products to the poor than monetary prices it is found that monetary wtp is increasing in income and nonmonetary wtp is weakly decreasing in income comparing across price types nonmonetary wtp falls relative to monetary wtp as income rises nonmonetary prices better target the poor than monetary prices a larger fraction of total demand is poor

bidding rings and the winner s curse this article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments we show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments but may not be in common value environments with a binding reserve price in the latter case collusion does more than simply transfer rents from the seller to the buyers it also gives buyers a chance to pool their information prior to trade and make an efficient investment decision however full efficiency may not be compatible with information revelation buyers with high signals may be better off if no one colludes leading to inefficient trade this result provides a possible explanation for the low incidence of joint bidding especially on marginal tracts in u s federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions

unintended consequences of sanctions for human rights conflict minerals and infant mortality abstractare victims of human rights abuses better off with or without economic sanctions targeted at their perpetrators we study this question in the context of a us human rights policy the conflict minerals section of the 2010 dodd frank act by discouraging companies from sourcing tin tungsten and tantalum from the eastern democratic republic of the congo the policy has acted as a de facto boycott on mineral purchases that may finance warlords and armed militias we estimate the policy s impact on the mortality of children born before 2013 and find that it increased the probability of infant deaths in villages near the policy targeted mines by at least 143 percent we find suggestive evidence that the legislation induced boycott did so by reducing mothers consumption of infant health care goods and services

corruption and competition in procurement auctions we investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement our assumption is that the bureaucrat i e the agent that administers the market if corrupt may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe as firms expect to be paying a bribe a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated bribe we show however that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firms and thereby to generate a price increase that goes far beyond the bribe received by the bureaucrat we discuss the effect of other forms of bureaucratic discretion in the procurement process and analyze conditions under which unilateral anticorruption controls restore price competition

how not to raise money we show that standard winner pay auctions are inept fund raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another s high bid revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept this problem does not occur in lotteries and all pay auctions where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win we introduce a general class of all pay auctions rank their revenues and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner pay formats the optimal fund raising mechanism is an all pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price

bribing in first price auctions abstract i study a symmetric 2 bidder ipv first price auction prior to which one bidder can offer his rival a bribe in exchange for the latter s abstention i focus on pure and undominated strategies and on continuous monotonic equilibria equilibria in which the bribing function is continuous and nondecreasing when types are distributed continuously on the unit interval such an equilibrium if it at all exists is necessarily trivial its bribing function is identically zero i provide a sufficient condition for its existence and sufficient conditions for its nonexistence when the minimum type is strictly positive a non trivial equilibrium may exist but it must be pooling i provide a sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium when types are distributed continuously on the unit interval and dominated strategies are allowed a non trivial non pooling equilibrium exists at least under the uniform prior

econometrics of first price auctions a survey of the theoretical and applied literature the analysis of auctions is an active area of research for both theoretical and empirical economists this paper provides an overview of the literature relevant to the econometrics of auctions from a structural approach perspective the structural approach is a framework to analyze auction data in which theory and econometrics are closely related there are three fundamental issues at the heart of the structural analysis i are there any testable restrictions imposed by the theoretic model on the data ii is it possible to identify the structural elements that characterize an auction without a priori parametric information iii what can be said about feasible estimation procedures which do not rely on parametric assumptions this survey shows how the structural approach literature has answered each question

the illusion of sustainability this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled the illusion of sustainability conducted during the time period 1998 to 2001 in kenya the study observed that deworming is a public good since much of its social benefit comes through reduced disease transmission people were less likely to take deworming if their direct first order or indirect second order social contacts were exposed to deworming the introduction of a small fee for deworming drugs led to an 80 percent reduction in treatment rates take up was not sensitive to the exact price level suggesting that it is particularly counter productive to charge small positive prices for the treatment of infectious diseases an intensive school health education had no impact on worm prevention funding for the study derived from world bank nih fogarty international center berkeley center for health research

ex post information in auctions assumptions maskin and riley 1984 show that when the amount a buyer is willing to pay for the auctioned object is not independent of his wealth expected revenue tends to be lower under open bidding in contrast milgrom and weber 1982 relax the assumption that valuations are independent and assume instead that buyers private estimates of the item s value are affiliated a buyer with a high estimate then tends to believe that other buyers will have higher estimates as well maintaining the other assumptions milgrom and weber show that expected revenue is higher in the open ascending bid auction the intuition behind this result is that in sealed high bid auctions a buyer s bid is determined not only by his own beliefs but via their bids by the beliefs of those with lower estimates a buyer with a low estimate believes that others are more likely to have low estimates as well he therefore bids less aggressively it follows that a buyer can beat all opponents who have lower estimates with a bid which is lower than it would be if beliefs were independent 2 milgrom and weber also show that if the seller purchases and then publicly reveals information which is positively linked to buyers valuations this also raises expected gross revenue from an auction the intuition here is that this helps to reduce the difference in bidders willingness to pay 3 that such a reduction should raise expected revenue is easily understood for the limiting case in which the seller s information includes all the buyers private information for then all buyer asymmetry is eliminated and so expected buyer profit is bid away to zero the seller therefore reaps the entire surplus in the following pages the implications of correlated signals are further explored while milgrom and weber emphasized the potential gains to a seller who reveals information ex ante the focus here is on ex post information in section 2 it is shown that under weak assumptions the sealed high bid auction is dominated by any auction

auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication abstract this paper examines the feasibility of collusive mechanisms in single unit auctions a model is constructed with private and common value information asymmetry and continuous type space we show that an incentive compatible bid coordination mechanism bcm does not exist if common value uncertainty is present this result contradicts actual antitrust cases where common effects or resale opportunities created uncertainty about valuations but a price fixing cartel was formed we solve the puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all bidder types truthfully reveal their private information the introduced bayesian bid coordination mechanism bbcm exists if the main source of information asymmetry is private value in that case a designated ring member can signal high valuation and suppress competition our results demonstrate the rationale behind cartel mechanisms with pre auction knockouts

private monitoring and communication in cartels explaining recent collusive practices motivated by recent cartel practices a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms prices and quantities are private information conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports the properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid lysine and vitamins

bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions this paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible it presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme which coordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders payoffs the paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium payoffs in a general environment with affiliated signals and private or interdependent values with ipv it is shown that this dynamic scheme yields a strictly higher payoff to the bidders than any static collusion scheme which coordinates bids based only on the current reported signals

optimal collusion proof auctions abstract we study an optimal collusion proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation despite their ability to collude on participation informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power the second best auction i e the optimal auction in a collusion free environment can be made collusion proof if at least one bidder is not collusive or there are multiple bidding cartels or the second best outcome involves a non trivial probability of the object not being sold regardless optimal collusion proof auction prescribes non trivial exclusion of collusive bidders i e a refusal to sell to any collusive bidder with positive probability

group strategy proofness in private good economies many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof but also group strategy proof in appropriate domains of definition hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency that is so for solutions to matching division cost sharing house allocation and auctions in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases in a general framework encompassing all of them we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds jel c78 d44 d63 d71 d82

bidding rings a bargaining approach we address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi unit vickrey auctions we address this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves in the single unit case we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r ring that includes the winner and the top r 1 losers in the multiple units case we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures which we call single winner ring with free riding where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders surplus and depending on the protocol the remaining winners free ride either by staying alone or by colluding in pairs

coordination in auctions with entry abstract we examine self enforcing bidder coordination in auctions in which bidding is costly conditions on the distribution of valuations are identified that guarantee multiple equilibria under slightly stronger conditions within the set of sunspot payoffs only those that are convex combinations of payoffs of extreme asymmetric equilibria are interim efficient for the bidders if preplay communication is possible every no communication equilibrium payoff is interim pareto dominated for the bidders by some cheap talk equilibrium payoff when the number of auctions is large communication equilibria exist that yield ex post efficient payoffs for the bidders almost surely journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d44 d82

free distribution or cost sharing evidence from a randomized malaria prevention experiment author s cohen jessica dupas pascaline abstract it is often argued that cost sharing charging a subsidized positive price for a health product is necessary to avoid wasting resources on those who will not use or do not need the product we explore this argument through a field experiment in kenya in which we randomized the price at which prenatal clinics could sell long lasting anti malarial insecticide treated nets itns to pregnant women we find no evidence that costsharing reduces wastage on those that will not use the product women who received free itns are not less likely to use them than those who paid subsidized positive prices we also find no evidence that costsharing induces selection of women who need the net more those who pay higher prices appear no sicker than the average prenatal client in the area in terms of measured anemia an important indicator of malaria cost sharing does however considerably dampen demand we find that uptake drops by 75 percent when the price of itns increases from zero to 0 75 i e from 100 to 87 5 percent subsidy the price at which itns are currently sold to pregnant women in kenya we combine our estimates in a cost effectiveness analysis of itn prices on child mortality that incorporates both private and social returns to itn usage overall our results suggest that free distribution of itns could save many more lives than cost sharing programs have achieved so far and given the large positive externality associated with widespread usage of itns it would likely do so at a lesser cost per life saved

the medium term aftermarket in high tech ipos patterns and implications abstract a number of theoretical models loosely characterized under the rubric of behavioral finance suggest that price convergence to value is far from instantaneous and possibly involves interplay between noise and informed traders these models are motivated by documented anomalous patterns in equity markets and assume some form of psychological bias that affects investor behavior with the benefit of hindsight it seems clear that the technology sector went through a bubble like pattern in the late 1990s and that investor biases if indeed they exist and can be inferred may have been even more pronounced accordingly our study focuses on the medium term aftermarket in high tech us ipos during this period using both ordered logit regression and split population hazard modeling approaches we document momentum and reversal patterns that are consistent with the predictions of some behavioral finance models our findings indicate that momentum variables are important while fundamental variables have at best weak explanatory power

why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos one of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings ipos is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first day closing market price and the offer price the average ipo leaves 9 1 million on the table this number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm we present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls this results in an explanation of hot issue markets we also offer a new explanation for why ipos are underpriced copyright 2002 oxford university press

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

short run subsidies and long run adoption of new health products evidence from a field experiment short run subsidies for health products are common in poor countries how do they affect long run adoption a common fear among development practitioners is that one off subsidies may negatively affect long run adoption through reference dependence people might anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay more for the product later but for experience goods one off subsidies could also boost long run adoption through learning this paper uses data from a two stage randomized pricing experiment in kenya to estimate the relative importance of these effects for a new improved antimalarial bed net reduced form estimates show that a one time subsidy has a positive impact on willingness to pay a year later inherit to separately identify the learning and anchoring effects we estimate a parsimonious experience good model estimation results show a large positive learning effect but no anchoring we black then discuss the types of products and the contexts inherit for which these results may apply

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

mediators in position auctions abstract a mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play the mediator acts in a pre specified way based on messages received from the players however a mediator cannot enforce behavior that is players can play in the game directly without the mediator s help a mediator generates a new game for the players the mediated game the outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium monderer and tennenholtz introduced a theory of mediators for games with complete information we extend the theory of mediators to games with incomplete information and apply the new theory to position auctions a central topic in electronic commerce we provide a minimal set of conditions on position auctions which is sufficient to guarantee that the vcg outcome function is a mediated equilibrium in these auctions

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

simultaneous allocation of bundled goods through auctions assessing the case for joint bidding we study the costs and benefits of allowing joint bidding in multiple simultaneous first price sealed bid auctions for bundled goods with private values joint bidding raises the prospect of higher allocative efficiency but also reduces the number of bidders resulting in an ambiguous net impact on seller revenue the research was carried out using laboratory experiments in which groups of up to six buyers competed for eight bundles of two separable goods each the main results show that in our experimental environment allowing joint bidding increases efficiency by 11 3 and revenue by 9 4 the research has immediate applications to the sale of public forest stands that arbor a mixture of species for this reason we explore how the results are affected by excess supply the presence of dominant firms and the removal of an allocation rule requiring multiple bidders under certain circumstances

price quoting strategies of an upstream supplier this paper studies an upstream supplier who quotes prices for a key component to multiple sellers that compete for an end buyer s indivisible contract at most one of the supplier s quotes may result in downstream contracting and hence produce revenue for her we characterize the supplier s optimal price quoting strategies and show that she will use one of two possible types of strategies with her choice depending on the sellers profit potentials relative to their uncertainties secure whereby she will always have business or risky whereby she may not have business addressing potential fairness concerns we also study price quoting strategies in which all sellers receive equal quotes finally we show that the supplier s optimal mechanism resembles auctioning a single quote among the sellers this paper can assist upstream suppliers in their pricing decisions and provides general insights into multitier supply chains pricing dynamics this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

auctions and corruption an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer in many auctions the auctioneer is an agent of the seller this invites corruption we analyze a model in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid whichever is more profitable the interplay between these two types of corruption gives rise to a complex bidding problem that we tackle with numerical methods our results indicate that corruption does not only redistribute surplus away from the seller but also distorts efficiency we furthermore explain why both the auctioneer and bidders have a vested interest in maintaining corruption

first best collusion without communication abstract i study a 2 bidder infinitely repeated ipv first price auction without transfers communication or public randomization where each bidder s valuation can assume in each of the statistically independent stage games one of three possible values under certain distributional assumptions the following holds for every 0 there is a nondegenerate interval 0 1 such that if the bidders discount factor belongs to then there exists a perfect public equilibrium with payoffs close to the first best payoffs

simple collusive agreements in one shot first price auctions abstract the paper demonstrates that collusion in a private value first price auction is likely to occur even in a one shot interaction the strategies of the colluding parties must be mixed since agreeing to submit a bid equal to the reservation price of the seller provides the incentive for that bidder to cheat on the designated winner we deal with a complete information environment with arbitrary number of bidders we characterize the sensible equilibrium outcome where the two bidders with the highest valuations collude we show that the equilibrium outcome is unique and that the probability of collusion exceeds 1 2

collusion via resale the english auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post auction interbidder resale is allowed we show this by constructing equilibria where with positive probability one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders these equilibria interim pareto dominate among bidders the standard value bidding equilibrium without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or postbidding spoil division

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

auction design and favoritism abstract the theory of auctions has ignored the fact that often auction designers not the principal design auctions in a multi attribute auction the auction designer may bias his subjective evaluation of quality or distort the relative weights of the various attributes to favor a specific bidder an ancient concern in the procurement of weapons in the auctioning of government contracts and in the purchase of electricity by regulated power companies the paper analyzes the steps to be taken to reduce the possibility of favoritism it is first shown that in the absence of favoritism quality differentials among firms are more likely to be ignored if the auction designer has imperfect information about the firm s costs second if the auction designer may collude with only one bidder the other bidders should be chosen if they are at least as efficient as the former bidder and no hard information about quality differentials is released by the auction designer that would justify fair discrimination in favor of the former bidder last if the auction designer can collude with any bidder the optimal auction tends to a symmetric auction in which quality differentials are ignored the possibility of favoritism reduces the auction designer s discretion and makes the selection process focus on non manipulable monetary dimensions of bids

bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders values and private signals this poses a challenge when bids are observed from rst price common value auctions i bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure using data from u s municipal bond auctions i nd rst price and second price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing rst price formats the number of bidders has a more signi cant impact on revenues in optimal auctions i also nd invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal sp auctions

bribing in second price auctions an ipv 2 bidder second price auction is preceded by two rounds of bribing prior to the auction each bidder can try to bribe his rival to depart from the auction so that he the briber will become the sole participant bribes are offered sequentially according to an exogenously given order restricting attention to pure strategies and imposing a certain refinement i study the efficient equilibria of this game in any such equilibrium whenever the first mover offers a strictly positive bribe this bribe is given by his surplus his valuation minus the payoff that he would have received in the dominant strategy equilibrium of the auction i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium i also extend this equilibrium s construction to a model with general valuations not necessarily ipv

structural econometric analysis of descending auctions since vickrey s 1961 paper the theory of auctions has considerably expanded particularly over the last decade see e g milgrom 1985 1986 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 for recent surveys in contrast except for some experimental work only a few empirical studies have attempted to validate the new theoretical auction models using field auction data two approaches have emerged the first has concentrated upon testing some implications of the theory of auctions using reduced form econometric models with observed bids as the explained variables explanatory variables might then be the reservation price the number of potential bidders when observed and some characteristics of the auctioned object examples are hansen 1985 1986 hendricks et al 1987 and hendricks and porter 1988 the second approach which is structural has a long tradition in econometrics starting from the work of the cowles commission this approach is followed in this paper the basic idea is simple and relies upon

collusive practices in repeated english auctions experimental evidence on bidding rings the repeated meeting of buyers at english auctions where multiple units are sold is a common occurrence the art auctions at sotheby s christie s and other prestigious auction houses are attended by a regular group of institutional buyers more mundanely the same taxicab buyers meet at vehicle auctions for used police cars jon p nelson 1995 commission order buyers attend the same livestock and agricultural commodity auctions these buyers may be agents for multiple meat processors u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2001 the 1946 american tobacco antitrust case american tobacco co et al v united states 328 u s 781 1946 is a well known account of how buyers of tobacco operated to hold down the price of auctioned leaf tobacco at various sites buyers for the big three cigarette manufacturers had developed facilitating practices that helped them purchase raw tobacco at relatively low prices these buyers voluntarily restricted themselves to attend the same auctions buyers were aware of the amount of leaf and the tobacco grades available at auction sites they had instructions from the cigarette makers on the highest bid prices they could pay and communication among these buyers seemed evident from a coordinated practice of buying low grade tobacco that was not used by the makers in the sale of livestock cattle producers have claimed that packer buyers act to hold down cattle prices at the auction site there are a few large processors who give their agents buy orders these orders along with further communication between the processor and agent instruct the agent on the number of cattle to purchase during a given week and provide a schedule of prices they can pay for varying types of cattle some agents represent more than one processor or packer and therefore have multiple buy orders agents repeatedly meet each other at regional cattle auctions they may not be the only buyers but they are the largest purchasers of slaughter cattle brought to market and at most auction sites have substantial monopsony power this paper documents the impacts of several practices that may facilitate low sale prices when multiple units are sold at repeated english auctions laboratory english auction markets are created the number of symmetric buyers attending the auction is either six or two with total demand in these two environments held constant the six buyer market is intended to represent a relatively competitive environment while auctions with two buyers represent rivalry with substantial monopsony power held by each agent we use these two market environments to study how selected treatments or facilitating influences affect the behavior of buying agents the six buyer market generally is viewed as a control for comparison to the dominant twobuyer environment but very collusive behavior may be observed in the six buyer auctions depending upon market practices phillips department of economics and finance university of wyoming p o box 3985 laramie wy 82071 e mail owenphil uwyo edu menkhaus department of agricultural and applied economics university of wyoming p o box 3354 laramie wy 82071 e mail menkhaus uwyo edu coatney u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration competition branch aurora co 80011 e mail kalyn t coatney usda gov this work has been supported by the u s department of agriculture under grant numbers usdagipsnc5418 and usdag00354009126 the findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency 1 these are regional auctions houses where slaughter cattle primarily cull cows and fed steers and heifers and feeder cattle are sold cull cows are animals taken out of a herd and slaughtered because of age inability to produce calves or reduced milk production concerns regarding slaughter cow possessors sharing common purchasing agents have been raised in assessment of the cattle and hog industries calendar year 2000 u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration june 2001

fighting collusion in auctions an experimental investigation the danger of collusion presents a serious challenge for auctioneers in this paper we compare the collusive properties of two standard auctions the english auction and the first price sealed bid auction and a lesser known format the amsterdam second price auction in the amsterdam auction the highest losing bidder earns a premium for stirring up the price we study two settings in one all bidders can collude and in another only a subset is eligible the experiments show that the amsterdam auction triggers less collusion than the standard auctions we compare experimental results to theoretical predictions and provide an explanation where they differ