factor substitution and discrimination in labor markets the object of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the absence of substitution of non discriminated factors for discriminated factors as a consequence of legislation designed to reduce or eliminate their pay differentials an example of such types of regulations or laws is equal pay legislation this absence of substitution has been noted in the empirical literature typical examples in this area are for example hiring of whites vis a vis blacks males vis a vis females migrants versus non migrants and hiring by castes the discriminated factors are usually paid less than their non discriminated counterparts two interesting and related questions arise in this context first why do profit maximizing but discriminating firms hire both types of factors the theory of discrimination fails to provide a satisfactory answer to this question second does an increase in payment to a discriminated factor via legislation necessarily result in a decrease in its usage given a neoclassical production function that allows for substitution two models are presented to show that such an outcome may not result and in fact the relationship may be the exact opposite that is an increase in the payment to a discriminated factor may increase its usage one can distinguish at least two approaches for incorporating the exploitation of a factor of production first one may like to treat the discriminated and non discriminated workers as identical factors of production and argue that the discriminated workers are paid less than the non discriminated workers second both factors may be treated as separate and indispensable factors of production but for institutional or other non economic reasons the discriminated factor is paid less than the value of its marginal product in this latter case the factor is exploited in the robinsonian sense the second approach has some advantages over the first economic rationality in the first approach would suggest that the firms should only hire the cheaper or the dearer factor but not both as a result of discrimination tastes however in the real world it is commonly observed that both types of factors are hired simultaneously in this approach there is the possibility of firms re switching between both types of factors therefore this paper extends the discrimination literature to show how firms may hire both factors using the second approach one can logically raise the question of substitution of non discriminated for discriminated factors as a consequence of higher rewards we show in a robinsonian type exploitation model that there is no substitution theorem

reference dependent ambiguity abstract motivated by experimental and empirical evidence i study a framework where reference points such as a status quo endowment or default option can distort the way an individual responds to ambiguity i characterize a model of reference dependent maxmin expected utility and provide behavioral foundations for comparing reference dependent ambiguity attitudes i also illustrate some implications of reference dependent ambiguity for trade in an asset market including underdiversification no trade and the potential for a market collapse

indecisiveness in behavioral welfare economics abstract when an individual s preferences depend on the time or frame at which decisions are made the preferences that appear at different frames must be aggregated in order to make social decisions suppose we aggregate each individual i s frame based preferences with a behavioral welfare relation that ranks x above y if when both x and y are available i sometimes choose x and not y and never chooses y and not x the set of pareto optima can then be large in fact a small amount of preference diversity across frames can cause every allocation to be pareto optimal more generally the set of pareto optima will have the same dimension as the set of allocations the pareto criterion then will not be able to discriminate locally among policy options a small distortion for example will call for no policy response

on the indifference relation in bewley preferences abstract bewley s 2002 influential model of preferences over uncertain prospects features an incomplete preference relation and a set of priors over the states of the world such that one act is preferred to another if and only if its expected utility is higher under every prior in that set this note shows that under general conditions on preferences the decision maker in the bewley model cannot be indifferent between distinct monetary acts whenever the set of priors is fully dimensional in the special case of two states in particular such objectively rational preferences are incomplete if and only if the indifference relation is trivial in the above sense

speculation under unawareness no trade theorems establish that in various trading environments investors who share a common prior will not engage in speculation as long as expected utility bayesian updating and full awareness are imposed we relax the last assumption by allowing for asymmetric unawareness and examine under which conditions speculative behaviour emerges we find that if common knowledge is assumed as in the settings of aumann 1976 and milgrom and stokey 1982 unawareness cannot generate speculation this is not true however in settings where no common knowledge is assumed such as speculation in equilibrium geanakoplos 1989 and betting that is always beneficial morris 1994 unless stronger conditions on awareness are imposed

adjustment to labor productivity an application to the economics of discrimination although issues of uncertainty and insurance often have been applied to the labor market few researchers have employed these approaches to the economics of discrimination the discrimination literature is essentially concerned with quantification of wage or employment differences that can be ascribed to either employer or employee distaste for minority or female workers generally wage or employment differences are dichotomized so as to represent respectively productivity and discrimination components following mincer 21 studies usually estimate personal and labor force determined hedonic earnings functions in order to apply chow tests to the separate sets of black white or malefemale coefficients significant differences in the coefficients are a priori evidence of discrimination

randomization vs selection how to choose in the absence of preference decision makers sometimes have to choose between alternative options about which they have no preference either they judge the options equally valuable indifference or they have no judgment about their relative value noncomparability choosing randomly is generally considered a natural way to deal with such situations this paper shows however that systematic randomization between noncomparable options may lead to a chain of decisions resulting in monetary losses a money pump furthermore these losses can be avoided by deliberately selecting one of the noncomparable options instead of randomizing thus randomization among noncomparable options is costly relative to deliberate selection on the other hand randomization among indifferent options is costless relative to deliberate selection

inside the family firm the role of families in succession decisions and performance this paper uses a unique dataset from denmark to investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance we focus on the decision to appoint either a family or an external chief executive officer ceo the paper uses variation in ceo succession decisions that result from the gender of a departing ceo s first born child this is a plausible instrumental variable iv as male firstchild firms are more likely to pass on control to a family ceo relative to female first child firms but the gender of a first child is unlikely to affect firms outcomes we find that family successions have a large negative causal impact on firm performance operating profitability on assets falls by at least four percentage points around ceo transitions our iv estimates are significantly larger than those obtained using ordinary least squares furthermore we show that family ceo underperformance is particularly large for firms in high growth industries and for relatively large firms overall the empirical results demonstrate that professional non family ceos provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they head

exploratory analysis of prospects for renewable energy private investment in the u s opportunities for private investments in renewable energies were explored using a stated preference investment allocation instrument allocation alternatives included conventional and renewable energy investments among renewable energy investments solar and wind energy were ranked the highest while grass and wood based technologies were at the bottom of the renewable energy list this ranking mirrors the allocation of investments in sustainable energy technologies in global markets results were analyzed using a two limit tobit model which suggests that certainty of investments a diversified portfolio and expectation on financial returns were the primary drivers behind funds allocated to renewable energy investments using cluster analysis twenty three percent of our sample of current and future investors was identified as individuals most willing to invest in renewable energies

robust social decisions we propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs in addition to conflicting tastes or interests to do so we adapt the standard pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle we also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle the former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied when it cannot the latter always provides minimal guidance

uncertainty and risk in financial markets this paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the distinction between uncertainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents have incomplete preferences over statecontingent consumption bundles as in bewley 1986 without completeness individual decision making depends on a set of probability distributions over the state space a bundle is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all probabilities in this set when preferences are complete this set is a singleton and the model reduces to standard expected utility in this setting we characterize pareto optima and equilibria and show that the presence of uncertainty generates robust indeterminacies in equilibrium prices and allocations for any specification of initial endowments we derive comparative statics results linking the degree of uncertainty with changes in equilibria despite the presence of robust indeterminacies we show that equilibrium prices and allocations vary continuously with underlying fundamentals equilibria in a standard risk economy are thus robust to adding small degrees of uncertainty finally we give conditions under which some assets are not traded due to uncertainty aversion

labor earnings discrimination and the racial composition of jobs this paper examines the effect of the racial composition of labor markets on wage rates and the racial wage gap the wage rates of white as well as black workers are significantly lower in industry occupationregional groups with high densities of black workers while the racial wage gap does not vary systematically with respect to racial density interpretation of racial gap estimates can be sensitive to inclusion of a racial density variable particularly in sparse specifications an explanation for the wage density relationship cannot be established but results are most consistent with a quality sorting explanation and to a lesser extent the crowding hypothesis

ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance decisions under uncertainty depend not only on the degree of uncertainty but also on its source as illustrated by ellsberg s observation of ambiguity aversion in this article we propose the comparative ignorance hypothesis according to which ambiguity aversion is produced by a comparison with less ambiguous events or with more knowledgeable individuals this hypothesis is supported in a series of studies showing that ambiguity aversion present in a comparative context in which a person evaluates both clear and vague prospects seems to disappear in a noncomparative context in which a person evaluates only one of these prospects in isolation

search bargaining and employer discrimination this article analyzes becker s 1957 1971 theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage bargaining setting discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less and apply stricter hiring criteria to these workers the highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient moreover once ownership and management are separated both highest profits and highest utility can be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient thus market forces like entry or takeovers do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination disappear

the brother in law effect ordinarily labor market equilibrium implies that the marginal worker is indifferent to employment and that the employer is indifferent between equally productive employees when the marginal worker is indifferent to employment employer preferences do not matter if however the marginal worker strictly prefers to be employed the employer can give favors and may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production not only may inefficient workers be employed but the employer may also choose to employ too many workers we refer to this as the brother in law effect when the brother in law effect is due to unionization employment of brothers in law leads to increased employment under some circumstances leading even to over employment relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization if the employment effect is strong because brothers in law are relatively good workers nepotism improves efficiency if the employment effect is weak including in principal agent models where there are informational rents nepotism is inefficient

a decomposition method on employment and wage discrimination and its application in urban china 2002 2013 abstract labor market discrimination is an important issue in developing countries where path dependent institutions have been dominant while effective institutional arrangements and policies have been hidden by local customs and culture however the existing applications of classical blinder oaxaca decomposition face criticism for their imprecise understanding of the factors affecting institutional discrimination in labor markets as well as for their lack of power in formulating well targeted anti discrimination policies following oaxaca 1973 we propose a new method to decompose the total discrimination index tdi to analyze employment and wage discrimination in the labor markets of developing countries the tdi is decomposed into the employment discrimination index edi and the wage discrimination index wdi then into the underpayment index to majorities upi and the overpayment index to minorities opi we apply this method to the institutional discrimination against rural migrants in china s urban areas using national representative data from 2002 to 2013 we have found that 1 the tdi increased quickly after china entered the wto then dropped after anti discrimination policies were implemented 2 the tdi is mainly determined by the upi while the tdi s fluctuation is mainly determined by the wdi our method provides insights into the changing composition of employment and wage discrimination and their respective labor market outcomes in developing countries as a result appropriate policy measures may be developed accordingly

knightian uncertainty and moral hazard abstract this paper presents a principal agent model in which the agent has imprecise beliefs we model this situation formally by assuming the agent s preferences are incomplete as in bewley 1986 2 in this setting incentives must be robust to knightian uncertainty we study the implications of robustness for the form of the resulting optimal contracts we give conditions under which there is a unique optimal contract and show that it must have a simple flat payment plus bonus structure that is output levels are divided into two sets and the optimal contract pays the same wage for all output levels in each set we derive this result for the case in which the agent s utility function is linear and then show it also holds if this utility function has some limited curvature

nepotism discrimination and the persistence of utility maximizing owner operated firms comment a recent thoughtful paper by singell and thornton thereafter st in the southern economic journal deviates in definitions modeling and a result from the traditional literature on tastes for discrimination and nepotism that originates with becker and arrow this comment provides a critique of these three aspects of the st analysis in particular it shows that st s astonishing result that discrimination will persist in a competitive labor market is unjustified st s unconventional definitions of owners with unbiased and biased preferences are wrong and st s unique modeling of discrimination and nepotism is unsupported

ambiguity aversion and incompleteness of financial markets it is widely thought that incomes risks can be shared by trading in financial assets but financial assets typically carry some risk idiosyncratic to them hence disposing incomes risk using financial assets will involve buying into the inherent idiosyncratic risk however standard theory argues that diversification would reduce the inconvenience of idiosyncratic risk to arbitrarily low levels this argument is less robust than what standard theory leads us to believe ambiguity aversion can exacerbate the tension between the two kinds of risks to the point that classes of agents may not want to trade some financial assets thus theoretically the effect of ambiguity aversion on financial markets is to make the risk sharing opportunities offered by financial markets less complete than it would be otherwise

financial complexity and trade what are the implications on trading activity if investors are not sophisticated enough to understand and evaluate trades that have a complex payoff structure can frictions generated by this type of financial complexity be so severe that they lead to a complete market freeze like that of the recent financial crisis starting from an allocation that is not pareto optimal we find that whether complexity impedes trade depends on how investors perceive risk and uncertainty for smooth convex preferences such as subjective expected utility complexity cannot halt trade even in the extreme case where each investor is so unsophisticated that he can only trade up to one arrow debreu security without being able to combine two or more in order to construct a complex trade however for non smooth preferences which allow for kinked indifference curves such as maxmin expected utility complexity can completely shut down trade

first order and second order ambiguity aversion different models of uncertainty aversion imply strikingly different economic behavior the key to understanding these differences lies in the dichotomy between first order and second order ambiguity aversion which i define here my definition and its characterization are independent of specific representations of decisions under uncertainty i show that with second order ambiguity aversion a positive exposure to ambiguity is optimal if and only if there is a subjective belief such that the act s expected outcome is positive with first order ambiguity aversion zero exposure to ambiguity can be optimal examples in finance insurance and contracting demonstrate the economic relevance of this dichotomy this paper was accepted by han bleichrodt decision analysis

knightian analysis of the vickrey mechanism we analyze the vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences in this model the vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant strategy and we prove that all dominant strategy mechanisms are inadequate however we also prove that in undominated strategies the social welfare produced by the vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good but also essentially optimal

pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known an exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions

intertemporal equilibria with knightian uncertainty we study a dynamic and infinite dimensional model with incomplete multiple prior preferences in interior efficient allocations agents share a common risk adjusted prior and subjective interest rate interior efficient allocations and equilibria coincide with those of economies with subjective expected utility and priors from the agents multiple prior sets a specific model with neither risk nor uncertainty at the aggregate level is considered risk is always fully insured for small levels of ambiguity there exists an equilibrium with inertia where agents also insure fully against knightian uncertainty when the level of ambiguity exceeds a critical threshold full insurance no longer prevails and there exist equilibria with inertia where agents do not insure against uncertainty at all we also show that equilibria with inertia are indeterminate

strategic gains from discrimination abstract according to a classical argument an employer handicaps herself if basing hiring decisions on factors unrelated to productivity therefore discrimination is undermined by competition this paper in contrast argues that being discriminatory can be a commitment device that helps an employer and its rivals to partially segment the labor market which leads to lower wages and higher profits discrimination can thus be an endogenous response to competition indeed the relationship between discrimination and competition can be non monotone moreover the logic suggests that a ban on wage discrimination may instead lead to discrimination in hiring

interim efficient allocations under uncertainty abstract this paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either bewley s incomplete preferences or gilboa schmeidler s maximin expected utility preferences the main results characterize interim efficient allocations under uncertainty that is they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors for non existence of a trade which makes all agents better off at any realization of private information for agents with the incomplete preferences the condition is necessary and sufficient but for agents with the maximin expected utility preferences the condition is sufficient only a couple of necessary conditions for the latter case are provided

ambiguity and uncertainty in ellsberg and shackle this paper argues that the similarities between ellsberg s and shackle s frameworks for discussing the limits of the probabilistic approach to decision theory are more important than usually admitted the paper discusses the grounds on which the ambiguity surrounding the decision maker in ellsberg s urn experiments can be deemed analogous to the uncertainty faced by shackle s entrepreneur taking crucial decisions the two authors insights are assessed and special attention is paid to the criteria for decision under uncertainty they put forward the paper establishes a link between ellsberg s and shackle s perspectives and the non additive probability approach of gilboa and schmeidler an approach that offers an alternative to standard probability calculus which can be of use to analyse both ambiguity and uncertainty the comparison between ellsberg and shackle draws on an interpretation of keynes s treatise on probability emphasising keynes s rejection of both well defined probability functions and maximisation as a guide to human conduct it is shown that keynes s viewpoint implies a reconsideration of the boundaries of probability theory that is in the same vein of ellsberg s and shackle s concern in the years of the consolidation of savage s new probabilistic mainstream copyright the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

prejudice and wages an empirical assessment of becker s the economics of discrimination we test the predictions from becker s 1957 seminal work on employer prejudice and find that relative black wages a vary negatively with the prejudice of the marginal white in a state b vary negatively with the prejudice in the lower tail of the prejudice distribution but are unaffected by the prejudice of the most prejudiced persons in a state and c vary negatively with the fraction of a state that is black our estimates suggest that one quarter of the racial wage gap is due to prejudice with nontrivial consequences for black lifetime earnings

nepotism discrimination and the persistence of utility maximizing owner operated firms reply much debate in the discrimination literature surrounds whether employers with biased preferences can persist in the market 7 10 this issue is a natural extension of the broader literature on owner operated firms which focuses on the consistency of utility and profit maximization 12 13 14 18 26 27 theories of owner operated firms which have a long history in economics model the entrepreneur as both a producer and consumer of goods that determines the level of production and consumption jointly through utility maximization 2 9 16 22 31 this approach is applied in this paper to examine employer discrimination and nepotism our analysis provides necessary conditions for utility maximizing firms to persist in the market and shows how biased preferences can yield seemingly uneconomic input and output choices that are in fact rationally inefficient empirical results using data on family farms support the prediction that utility maximizing entrepreneurs trade profit for nonmarket goods and do not hire inputs to maximize profits competitive neoclassical theories of the labor market do not provide a clear theoretical resolution to the issue of persistence of employer nepotism and discrimination the employer discrimination model proposed by becker 4 5 and extended by arrow 1 postulates that entrepreneurs maximize utility that increases with profit but decreases with a nonmarket attribute of some workers e g race ethnicity or gender these models predict that white male workers may initially have better market opportunities than comparable minority or female workers however entrepreneurs who hire based on nonproductive attributes are also predicted to earn less than a normal rate of return and because they derive disutility from an aspect of owning and operating a firm can improve their welfare by leaving the industry and converting firm assets to those that do not require employment decisions e g stocks and bonds this result has the important policy implication that market intervention may not be necessary to improve the relative pay and employment of disadvantaged groups when employers are the source of the discrimination alternatively goldberg 15 uses the arrow 1 framework but postulates that employers

the uncertain foundations of the welfare state abstract the welfare state is often portrayed as provider of insurance against uncertainties in knight s 1921 sense of the term which would be refused or underinsured on private markets this image conflicts with the standard economic model of risk exchange founded on the subjective interpretation of probability which predicts that all individual uncertainties will be insured by private markets our aim in this paper is to explain why this prediction fails and building on contributions to decision theory that take seriously the idea of knightian uncertainty to show why social insurance may be justified

sharing risk and ambiguity we study the market implications of ambiguity in common models we show that generic determinacy is a robust feature in general equilibrium models that allow a distinction between ambiguity and risk

the existence and efficiency of general equilibrium with incomplete markets under knightian uncertainty abstract this paper first establishes the existence of equilibrium for an economy with knightian uncertainty and incomplete markets and then demonstrates the constrained pareto efficiency of the equilibrium when there is one commodity only in each state of nature

the effects of competition and equal treatment laws on gender wage differentials discrimination if it is inefficient can be eliminated by competition in most countries it is also forbidden by law this paper evaluates the influence of economic and legal factors on the portion of male female wage differentials that is not explained by other worker characteristics and may be due to discrimination we use a new international data set of suitable gender wage gap measures constructed from the results of existing studies meta analysis of the data shows that increased competition and adoption of international conventions concerning equal treatment laws both reduce gender wage gaps while legislation that prevents women from performing strenuous or dangerous jobs tends to increase it doris weichselbaumer and rudolf winter ebmer

gender differences in bargaining outcomes a field experiment on discrimination abstract relying on a commonly used fixed offer bargaining script we examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive and frequently used market the taxi market in lima peru our bargaining script secures that only the seller can change prices and terminate negotiations thus we are able to examine differences in the seller s entire path of negotiation and in the reservation price at which they are willing to trade we find that male and female passengers who use the same bargaining script are not treated equally men face higher initial prices final prices and rejection rates these differences are consistent with male drivers being more reluctant to give in to demanding negotiations by male passengers and with male passengers being perceived as having high valuations to identify whether taste based or statistical discrimination drives the inferior treatment of men we conduct an experiment where passengers send a signal on valuation before negotiating the signal eliminates gender differences and the response is shown only to be consistent with statistical discrimination thus in the limiting case of a highly competitive market with experienced traders we do not find evidence of taste based discrimination the differential observed is however consistent with statistical discrimination

household adjustment to gasoline price change an analysis using 9 years of us survey data this paper examines the dynamics and composition of household adjustment to changes in the real price of gasoline using a panel of us households by decomposing the demand for gasoline into the demand for vehicle miles traveled and the demand for household composite miles per gallon we are able to add rich detail to the description of how households respond to gasoline price changes while obtaining total price elasticity estimates well within the range found in the literature we find that consumers initially respond to a price rise with a much larger decrease in consumption than would be indicated by the total elasticity in addition households respond to price changes by adjusting vehicle miles traveled more than composite miles per gallon in the year after a price change

integrating sustainability into city level co2 accounting social consumption pattern and income distribution abstract from a sustainability perspective city level co2 emissions require reconsiderations correspondingly the economy environment society nexus should be incorporated into city scale co2 accounting therefore in this study the semi closed io model is integrated with a hem to calculate co2 emissions arising from the social consumption pattern and income distribution and to explore economic drivers behind co2 variations this method is applied to a case study of beijing result demonstrate that beijing in 2012 witnessed something different from that in 2005 1 co2 emissions centred in the internal linkages of a broader class of consumption terms with high economic output mainly driven by interprovincial exports 2 imports increasingly helped decarbonize the mixed net forward and backward co2 linkages of consumption items and 3 income driven co2 emissions excluding demand side parts persisted which were more obvious on the supply side where households have more economy wide effects besides urban households played an essential role in household wide co2 reductions this paper ended with corresponding conclusions policy implications and directions for future work

overlapping risk adjusted sets of priors and the existence of efficient allocations and equilibria with short selling the theory of existence of equilibrium with short selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences no arbitrage conditions are given in terms of risk adjusted priors a sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is the overlapping of the interiors of the risk adjusted sets of priors or the inexistence of mutually compatible trades with non negative expectation with respect to any risk adjusted prior these conditions are necessary when agents are not risk neutral at extreme levels of wealths it is shown that the more uncertainty averse or risk averse the agents the more likely are efficient allocations and equilibria to exist

a multinomial logit nondiscriminatory approach to estimating racial wage and occupational discrimination this paper combines a technique to measure nondiscriminatory wage structures with a multinomial logit model to estimate both occupational racial discrimination and within occupation racial wage underpayment and overpayment using a recent south african october household survey it is found that racial discrimination against blacks and in favour of whites still persists in the south african labour market implying the persistence of white employer nepotism and or white employee discrimination

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

an equilibrium search model with coworker discrimination this article analyzes the effect of coworker discrimination on wage and unemployment differentials between males and females using a search model an increase in female participation drives up the wage offer to female workers and raises female employment moreover an increase in the degree of discrimination by males results in gains to them in terms of higher wages and lower unemployment but results in losses to females in terms of lower wages and higher unemployment the benefit to males provides an explanation for the persistence of discrimination

discrimination nepotism and long run wage differentials the wage discrimination model developed by becker has been criticized for predicting that competitive forces will lead to the disappearance of racial discrimination in the long run we have reformulated the model in terms of nepotism toward white workers rather than discrimination against black workers in this new framework both nepotistic and taste neutral firms are expected to survive the competitive struggle in the long run therefore the new framework is consistent with long run as well as short run racial wage differentials

incomplete preferences and equilibrium in contingent markets this paper shows that betting or speculative trading between agents with incomplete preferences is likely to occur if agents have access to convex choice sets this contrasts sharply with endowment economy models where preference incompleteness often hinders betting speculative trading or mutually beneficial insurance arrangements our results imply that decision makers with identical tastes and identical feasible sets will potentially gain from speculative trade for generic status quo allocations we also develop a framework for endogenizing the status quo allocations of decision makers that are treated exogenously in the existing literature finally we provide a tractable differential representation of status quo allocations equilibria and conditions where speculative trade may or may not emerge

asset demands without the independence axiom an important application of the theory of choice under uncertainty is to asset markets and an important property in these markets is a preference for portfolio diversification if an investor is an expected utility maximizer then s he is risk averse if and only if s he exhibits a preference for diversification this paper examines the relationship between risk aversion and portfolio diversification when preferences over probability distributions of wealth do not have an expected utility representation

the influence of non pecuniary factors on labor supply the case of navy enlisted personnel this paper expresses the elasticity of labor supply to an occupation in terms of the variances and covariances of the distributions of non pecuniary factors across the alternative occupations we then apply our results to an analysis of reenlistment rates among navy enlisted personnel we argue that those navy skills experiencing a higher incidence of sea duty will have lower pay elasticities this prediction is confirmed empirically using probit analysis

risk management strategies via minimax portfolio optimization recent extreme economic developments nearing a worst case scenario motivate further examination of minimax linear programming approaches for portfolio optimization risk measured as the worst case return is employed and a portfolio from maximizing returns subject to a risk threshold is constructed minimax model properties are developed and parametric analysis of the risk threshold connects this model to expected value along a continuum revealing an efficient frontier segmenting investors by risk preference divergence of minimax model results from expected value is quantified and a set of possible prior distributions expressing a degree of knightian uncertainty corresponding to risk preference determined the minimax model will maximize return with respect to one of these prior distributions providing valuable insight regarding an investor s risk attitude and decision behavior linear programming models for financial firms to assist individual investors to hedge against losses by buying insurance and a model for designing variable annuities are proposed

survival with ambiguity we analyze a market populated by expected utility maximizers and smooth ambiguity averse consumers we study conditions under which ambiguity averse consumers survive and affect prices in the limit if ambiguity vanishes with time or if the economy exhibits no aggregate risk ambiguity averse consumers survive but have no long run impact on prices in both scenarios ambiguity averse consumers are fully insured against ambiguity in equilibrium and thus behave as expected utility maximizers with correct beliefs if ambiguity averse consumers are not fully insured against ambiguity their behavior mimics expected utility maximizers with wrong beliefs and a stochastic discount factor which might be consistently higher or lower than their actual discount factor we use this insight to analyze a markov economy with large persistent ambiguity consumers with decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion whose prudence with respect to ambiguity exceeds twice their absolute ambiguity aversion a s survive in the presence of expected utility maximizers with correct beliefs if the economy further exhibits aggregate risk they drive the expected utility maximizers out of the market and determine prices in the limit in contrast consumers with increasing or constant absolute ambiguity aversion only survive in the absence of aggregate risk and have no impact on limit prices

a more robust definition of subjective probability the goal of choice theoretic derivations of subjective probability is to separate a decisionmaker s underlying beliefs subjective probabilities of events from their preferences attitudes toward risk classical derivations have all relied upon some form of the marschak samuelson independence axiom or the savage sure thing principle which imply that preferences over lotteries conform to the expected utility hypothesis this paper presents a choice theoretic derivation of subjective probability in a savage type setting of purely subjective uncertainty which neither assumes nor implies that the decisionmaker s preferences over lotteries necessarily conform to the expected utility hypothesis copyright 1992 by the econometric society

ambiguity aversion decreases the impact of partial insurance evidence from african farmers indemnifying smallholder farmers against crop loss is thought to play an important role in encouraging the adoption of new technologies and facilitating productivity growth but to be infeasible due to information problems consequently there is interest in developing alternative partial insurance products examples include rainfall insurance and the limited liability inherent in credit contracts i argue that although these products may reduce information asymmetry ambiguity averse farmers struggle to assess whether the contracts reduce risk this problem is most pronounced when the production technology is ambiguous as is likely the case for new technologies i formalize this argument and test the theory using data from two rcts conducted in malawi and kenya comparative statics from the theory are consistent with both sets of data and i argue that income losses from ambiguity aversion may be substantial

interim efficiency with meu preferences abstract recently kajii and ui 2009 17 proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors when agents have bewley s incomplete preferences kajii and ui 2009 17 proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors however when agents have gilboa schmeidler s maxmin expected utility preferences they only propose a sufficient condition the objective of this paper is to complete kajii and ui s work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular maxmin expected utility our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by rigotti shannon and stralecki 2008 24

climate change mitigation potential of norwegian households and the rebound effect abstract an increasing number of studies show that efficiency improvements alone will not be sufficient to attain the substantial emission reductions needed to mitigate global warming to a target of 2 c consumption side changes are likely to be needed to achieve sufficient emission reductions the united nations emphasize the importance of developed countries taking the lead in lowering emissions to achieve the sustainable development goals this paper assess to what extent norwegian households can lower their carbon footprint consistent with territorial emission reductions towards the 2 c target of global warming through implementing a set of behavioral actions we evaluate the efficacy of the set of actions both initially and after considering rebound effects a multiregional environmentally extended input output database is linked with the norwegian consumer expenditure survey to analyze both average and marginal expenditure per unit of increased income further linear programming is applied to examine the changes needed by households to reach different emission reduction targets we find that households implementing the full set of actions without re spending can obtain a 58 decrease in their carbon footprint when accounting for the effect of re spending this reduction drops to 24 35 which is not within the requirements of the 2 c target the optimization analysis suggests households can achieve reductions up to 45 by restricting re spending to specific goods and services this indicates that curbing the rebound effect is key to achieving real reductions in household carbon footprints we show that changing consumption patterns can significantly contribute to lowering anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions without compromising the level of economic activity

customer discrimination and affirmative action i introduction beginning with the work of becker 1957 economists have been concerned with the relationship between competitive market forces and the persistence of labor market discrimination 1 a major insight of becker and the literature that followed is that competition could tend to eliminate discriminatory pay differentials if competitive forces do eliminate discrimination then empirical findings of persistent discrimination are either a result of faulty testing or market imperfections economic analysis of the link between competition and discrimination depends on the origins of prejudice becker identified at least three possible sources employers co workers and consumers 2 in each of these instances the group against which prejudice is directed e g women or minorities which will be termed minorities in this paper may be able to escape discrimination first minorities can work for nondiscriminatory employers if there are any moreover stiglitz 1973 shows that with constant returns to scale such employers will take over markets from the discriminators eliminating any pay gap based on prejudice 3 second if there is co worker prejudice then minorities can work in segregated firms which under constant returns to scale may have a cost advantage over integrated or all majority firms again discrimination will be driven away 4 third minorities can theoretically escape customer discrimination by specializing in the production of goods for which there is no contact between producers and consumers a case discussed by cain 1986 while competitive forces may in some cases erode discriminatory wage differentials the rate of decline of race and sex wage differentials has evidently not been rapid enough in the eyes of policymakers u s anti discrimination policy has been guided by two major vehicles title vii of the 1964 civil rights act and the office of federal contract compliance programs ofccp 5 the equal employment opportunity commission eeoc was created to enforce title vii and is empowered to aid plaintiffs or bring suit itself against employers the commission monitors the employment practices of federal contractors not only are contractors barred from discrimination against protected groups these firms are also required to take affirmative action not to discriminate the purpose of this paper is twofold first it demonstrates that in a general equilibrium framework the case of customer discrimination is theoretically distinct from employer or co worker prejudice in particular while constant returns to scale and the existence of nondiscriminatory firms can eliminate the latter two forms of discrimination customer discrimination may persist even under such conditions the persistence of discriminatory wage differentials is shown to depend on consumer demand technology and the relative size of the minority labor force 6 second the general equilibrium framework is then used to evaluate the impact of government anti discrimination policy where customers are the source of discrimination it is shown that if the government requires equal pay and proportional representation for minorities then the resulting allocation of resources will under particular assumptions be the same as if customers did not discriminate i then contrast these theoretical results with the predicted general equilibrium impact of affirmative action when there is employer or co worker prejudice among previous general equilibrium models of affirmative action welch 1976 assumed no discrimination while freeman 1978 did not specify the source of discrimination it is shown here that the source of prejudice markedly affects one s conclusions about affirmative action further even in some cases where segregation has eliminated discriminatory wage differentials the introduction of affirmative action has allocative effects finally evidence from studies evaluating the impact of affirmative action is used to distinguish among the various equilibrium models

uncertainty efficiency and incentive compatibility ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility abstract a fundamental result of modern economics is the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility that is the fact that some pareto optimal efficient allocations are not incentive compatible this conflict has generated a huge literature which almost always assumes that individuals are expected utility maximizers what happens if they have other kind of preferences is there any preference where this conflict does not exist can we characterize those preferences we show that in an economy where individuals have complete transitive continuous and monotonic preferences every efficient allocation is incentive compatible if and only if individuals have maximin preferences

wage discrimination and population composition in the long run we derive the conditions that sign the effects of changing population composition on wage levels and ratios when labor supply and discrimination preferences vary the overall effect depends on an aggregate market a relative market and a preference distribution effect

the role of consumption and consumers in zero emission strategies abstract this article contributes to the theoretical and empirical discussions on how it could be possible to transform technical eco efficiency into reduced environmental impact of consumption the rebound effect is an important concept in this context the relevance of consumer behaviour is addressed within three important sectors for the zero emissions techniques and systems shopping of paper products energy use in household and waste management it is not only important how much the consumers buy but also what kinds of products they buy and how they use and dispose of them however the responsibility for a sustainable development should not entirely be put on the shoulders of the individual consumer

liquidity and valuation in an uncertain world abstract during the 2007 2009 financial crisis there was little or no trading in a variety of financial assets even though bid and ask prices existed for many of these assets we develop a model in which this illiquidity arises from uncertainty and we argue that this new form of illiquidity makes bid and ask prices unsuitable as metrics for establishing fair value for these assets we show how the extreme uncertainty that traders face can be characterized by incomplete preferences over portfolios and we use bewley s 2002 model of decision making under uncertainty to derive equilibrium quotes and the nonexistence of trading at these quotes we then suggest alternatives for valuing assets in illiquid markets

preference reversals for ambiguity aversion this paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant the reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context dependent weightings of attributes we offer an explanation based on sugden s random reference theory with different elicitation methods generating different random reference points then measurements of ambiguity aversion that use willingness to pay are confounded by loss aversion and hence overestimate ambiguity aversion this paper was accepted by teck ho decision analysis

risk sharing in the small and in the large abstract this paper analyzes risk sharing in economies with no aggregate uncertainty when agents have non convex preferences in particular agents need not be globally risk averse or uncertainty averse in the sense of schmeidler 1989 we identify a behavioral condition under which betting is inefficient i e every pareto efficient allocation provides full insurance and conversely if and only if agents supporting probabilities defined as in rigotti et al 2008 have a non empty intersection our condition is consistent with empirical and experimental evidence documenting violations of convexity in either outcomes or utilities our results show that the connection between speculative betting and inconsistent beliefs does not depend upon global notions of risk or ambiguity aversion

decision theory under ambiguity we review recent advances in the field of decision making under uncertainty or ambiguity we start with a presentation of the general approach to a decision problem under uncertainty as well as the standard bayesian treatment and issues with this treatment we present more general approaches choquet expected utility maximin expected utility smooth ambiguity and so forth that have been developed in the literature under the name of models of ambiguity sensitive preferences we draw a distinction between fully subjective models and models incorporating explicitly some information we review definitions and characterizations of ambiguity aversion in these models we mention the challenges posed by some of the models presented we end with a review of part of the experimental literature and applications of these models to economic settings

subjective beliefs and ex ante trade we study a definition of subjective beliefs applicable to preferences that allow for the perception of ambiguity and provide a characterization of such beliefs in terms of market behavior using this definition we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of ex ante trade and show that these conditions follow from the fundamental welfare theorems when aggregate uncertainty is absent our results show that full insurance is efficient if and only if agents share some common subjective beliefs our results hold for a general class of convex preferences which contains many functional forms used in applications involving ambiguity and ambiguity aversion we show how our results can be articulated in the language of these functional forms confirming results existing in the literature generating new results and providing a useful tool for applications

robust permanent income and pricing i suppose there exists an extremely powerful and if i may so speak malignant being whose whole endeavours are directed toward deceiving me rene descartes meditations ii 1

asymmetric information nonadditive expected utility and the information revealed by prices an example i develop a simple example of a model in which agents have asymmetric information and preferences that are represented by a nonadditive expected utility function the a priori uninformed agent after observing the equilibrium price has conditional beliefs that remain nonadditive then even when the equilibrium price function is fully revealing i e one to one it may be worth while for an a priori uninformed agent to buy redundant private information if he is more confident in that information than in that revealed by the price system

a definition of uncertainty aversion a definition of uncertainty or ambiguity aversion is proposed it is argued that the definition is well suited to modelling within the savage as opposed to anscombe and aumann domain of acts the defined property of uncertainty aversion has intuitive empirical content behaves well in specific models of preference multiple priors and choquet expected utility and is tractable tractability is established through use of a novel notion of differentiability for utility functions called eventwise differentiability

when does aggregation reduce risk aversion we study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate a household shares risky prospects using a social welfare functional we characterize the social welfare functionals such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member and satisfies the pareto principle and an invariance axiom we single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique member of this family which is quasiconcave over riskless allocations

endophilia or exophobia beyond discrimination the discrimination literature treats outcomes as relative but does a differential arise because agents discriminate against others exophobia or because they favour their own kind endophilia using a field experiment that assigned graders randomly to students examinations that did did not contain names we find favouritism but no discrimination by nationality nor by gender we are able to identify these preferences under a wide range of behavioural scenarios regarding the graders that endophilia dominates exophobia alters how we should measure discriminatory wage differentials and should inform the formulation of anti discrimination policy

ambiguity made precise a comparative foundation the theory of subjective expected utility has been recently extended to allow ambiguity to matter for choice we propose a notion of absolute ambiguity aversion by building on a notion of comparative ambiguity aversion we characterize it for a preference model which encompasses some of the most popular models in the literature we next build on these ideas to provide a definition of unambiguous act and event and show the characterization of the latter as an illustration we consider the classical ellsberg 3 color urn problem and find that the notions developed in the paper provide intuitive answers journal of economic literature classification number d81

financial market structures revealed by pricing rules efficient complete markets are prevalent abstract it is well known that when an arbitrage free financial market is incomplete or has tradable financial assets with frictions there must be multiple risk neutral probability measures the main motivation for the present study is to elucidate what type of market structure usually emerges from pricing rules first we obtain that finitely generated pricing rules characterized by polytopes of probabilities capture the class of all finite arbitrage free financial markets that are potentially incomplete or subject to frictions affecting tradable assets next we provide a novel characterization of efficient securities and introduce related notions of market completeness that underlies pricing rules our main result shows that the class of efficient complete markets with bid ask spreads is the prevalent case revealed by finitely generated pricing rules

efficient allocations under ambiguity abstract important implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that if agents have the same probability belief then consumption plans in every efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment and if their beliefs are concordant then the consumption plans are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment we study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept of conditional beliefs which we introduce in this paper we provide characterizations of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications

ambiguity aversion in the long run to disagree we must also agree abstract we consider an economy populated by smooth ambiguity averse agents with complete markets of securities contingent to economic scenarios where bankruptcy is permitted but there is a penalty for it we show that if agents posterior belief reductions given by their average probabilistic beliefs do not become homogeneous then an equilibrium does not exist it is worth noting that our main result does not imply any convergence of ambiguity perception or even the attitudes towards it in this way complete markets with default and punishment allow for ambiguity aversion in the long run and the agents can disagree on their ambiguity perception but they must agree on their expected beliefs

product differentiation decisions under ambiguous consumer demand and pessimistic expectations abstract this paper studies product differentiation decisions in a spatial duopoly with limited information on consumer demand in particular a situation is discussed in which the firms do not know the exact distribution of the random location of consumer demand and its responsiveness to price changes measured by the scale of transport costs but resolve the resulting ambiguity using the maxmin or minimax regret criteria when the firms are sufficiently pessimistic is high enough results are in contrast with the existing literature in particular an increase of demand location uncertainty decreases the equilibrium product differentiation intensifying the second stage competition in prices although the effect is dampened by uncertainty about transport costs endogenizing the choice of objective function leads to the dominance of an extreme form of pessimism which turns out to be socially optimal

competition small business financing and discrimination evidence from a new survey we analyze credit applications loan denials and interest rates paid by small businesses across owner gender race and ethnicity in addition we examine data from owners who said they did not apply for credit because they believed that their applications would have been turned down after controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables including personal and business credit histories substantial differences in denial rates between firms owned by african americans and white males remain moreover consistent with becker s classic theories 1957 we find evidence that increases in competition in the firm s local banking market reduces these differences

energy efficiency fallacies revisited abstract a number of governments including that of the uk subscribe to the belief that a national program devoted to raising energy efficiency throughout the economy provides a costless indeed profitable route to meeting international environmental obligations this is a seductive policy it constitutes the proverbial free lunch not only avoiding politically unpopular measures like outlawing taxing or rationing offending fuels or expanding non carboniferous sources of energy like nuclear power but doing so with economic benefit the author of this contribution came to doubt the validity of this solution when it was offered as a way of mitigating the effect of the opec price hikes of the 1970 maintaining that economically justified improvement in energy efficiency led to higher levels of energy consumption at the economy wide level than in the absence of any efficiency response more fundamentally he argues that there is no case for preferentially singling out energy from among all the resources available to us for efficiency maximization the least damaging policy is to determine targets enact the restrictive measures needed to curb consumption and then leave it to consumers intermediate and final to reallocate all the resources available to them to best effect subject to the new enacted constraints and any others they might be experiencing there is no reason to suppose that it is right for all the economic adjustment following a new resource constraint to take the form of improvements in the productivity of that resource alone as many others have argued any action to impose resource constraint entails an inevitable economic cost in the shape of a reduction in production and consumption possibilities there would be no free lunch in the last few years debate about the validity of these contentions has blossomed especially under the influence of writers on the western side of the atlantic in this contribution the author outlines the original arguments for questioning whether raised efficiency leads to lower consumption reports more recent developments and offers some insights as food for further thought