optimal inflation tax under precommitment theory and evidence the authors develop and test the orthogonality conditions implied by a dynamic model of the inflation tax a distinguishing feature of the analysis is that the welfare loss from inflation the money demand function and the time path of inflation are jointly derived from first principles of government and private sector intertemporal optimization quarterly data for argentina brazil and israel are used in implementing the model although the overidentifying restrictions of the model are not rejected in most cases there are several data points characterized by higher rates of inflation than the optimal rates under precommitment copyright 1992 by american economic association

rising residential rents in chinese mega cities the role of monetary policy although there have been a large number of studies carried out on fluctuations in housing prices little is known about what causes changes in residential rents which are inextricably intertwined with urban living standards this is especially noteworthy in chinese cities which are now being challenged by the housing market frenzies shift share analysis is proposed to evaluate all possible triggers of residential rent inflation in three cities during the 2001 2013 period which covers two distinct monetary policy regimes in china it is found that the recent rise in residential rent comes as a result of aggregate inflation associated with an expansionary monetary policy since the 2008 global financial crisis and an all encompassing and stable policy stance should therefore be adopted

theoretical approaches to monetary disinflation abstract during the 1980s many countries adopted tight monetary policies to reduce high inflation rates which were the legacy of the 1970s as inflation threatens to rise at the beginning of this decade this paper provides a survey of the 1980s literature which sought to provide theoretical understandings of how monetary disinflation is achieved four models are presented monetarist neo keynesian new classical and post keynesian each model s explanation of the recession which accompanies the monetary disinflation is outlined as well as possible policy measures to reduce the extent of the recession and to hasten the return to full employment

a cointegration test of the optimal seigniorage model abstract this paper tests mankiw s journal of monetary economy 1987 20 327 341 optimal seigniorage model under quadratic cost functions of taxation and inflation the rates of inflation and taxes have unit roots and they must be cointegrated the hypothesis of optimal policy is rejected in five countries

expenditure taxes income taxes and time inconsistency abstract traditional welfare based comparisons of different tax structures implicitly assume that the government can precommit to its future optimal policy when optimal tax rates are time inconsistent however such comparisons may be misleading this paper uses a two period representative consumer optimal taxation model to study the implications of time consistency for the welfare rankings of expenditure and income taxation i show that the welfare rankings of optimal policies may not be preserved by time consistent ones

rules and discretion with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions thus the issue of how to improve upon the time consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy we present a model with three players the central bark the fiscal authority and wage setters in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled we show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated we also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank

designing monetary policy when unemployment persists this paper investigates how unemployment persistence affects the optimal delegation of monetary policy to an independent central banker cb two opposing forces are shown to be at work with more persistence the government s incentive to stabilize the economy is greater but if the cb is forward looking its incentive to create inflation surprises is also greater we show that owing to the second effect the government may wish not to delegate at all unlike the case where there is no persistence in the event that the government does delegate the paper identifies conditions under which either effect dominates in the government s choice of conservatism of the cb we compare delegation to discretion and precommitment using a diagrammatic approach that may be of independent interest we also present some preliminary empirical evidence on the cross country relationship between unemployment persistence and inflation that appears consistent with the model s predictions

optimal seigniorage the gold standard and central bank financing this paper extends the theory of optimal seigniorage to allow for money production costs an important implication is tha t high money production costs along with a requirement that the monet ary branch of government self finance its operation severs the connecti on between the tax rate on output and the tax rate on money using u s data the authors find that tax rates on output and money move together only during periods when the government controls both tax rates and there is a close correspondence between revenue produced b y the monetary authority and revenue transferred to the treasury copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

debt restructuring with a public good endogenous government expenditure is introduced into lucas and stokey s 1983 model of optimal wage taxation so long as the government can precommit to taxes or to expenditures a debt maturity structure that keeps the value of the debt invariant to interest rate changes will make the optimal policies time consistent in the absence of partial precommitment debt restructuring cannot enforce time consistency but it can still limit the costs of time inconsistency numerical examples show 1 average debt is smaller than under the precommitment solution 2 the debt structure is much longer than under partial precommitment and 3 restricting the government to one period debt overstates the welfare losses from time inconsistency

inflationary finance in an open economy abstract models of inflationary finance that consider trade and capital flows generally conclude that openness curtails the ability of governments to impose the inflation tax due to currency substitution this paper models two channels that allow central banks to increase inflation tax revenue by opening the economy first central banks can open the capital account subject to a reserve requirement on capital inflows revenue maximization produces a smaller reserve requirement on foreign capital inflows that on domestic deposits second central banks can impose prior import deposits to broaden the monetary base in order to use the inflation tax on imports as an alternative to tariff revenue

investment in human and nonhuman capital transfers among siblings and the role of government the implications for efficient allocation of parents inability to force transfers among siblings are explored when there are differences in abilities of children within families such transfers may be necessary to achieve a first best solution in the absence of such transfers a tax on earned income and a subsidy to inheritance are useful second best tools whereas subsidies to investments in human capital or physical capital are not desirable

balanced budget constraints and the time consistency of optimal policy in a non ricardian economy it has become increasingly apparent that some optimally determined monetary and fiscal policies may be time inconsistent if governments are allowed full discretion over time this is to say that at any point in time a government s announced commitment to a time path of its monetary and or fiscal instruments which seems optimal at the initial date may provide the government with the incentive to renege on the pre announced policy commitment upon re evaluation at a future date the often cited example 8 is of a government which inflates initially to minimize the current reliance on distortionary labour income taxes but promises reduced inflation in the future at a later date it finds it optimal to re evaluate the commitment and initiates a surprise inflation acquiring revenue in a relatively nondistortionary manner if the government s optimal policy is time inconsistent it will not likely be credible from the private sector s perspective as rogoff 16 has described some authors have suggested that the time inconsistency problem may be resolved if the private sector is able to impose reputational costs on the government for reneging on pre announced policies if the cost associated with the loss of reputation is sufficiently high the government may adopt consistent but sub optimal policies while consideration of reputational costs may yield a policy which is time consistent it may be a second best among the set of consistent policies for example a number of authors have suggested 2 3 16 optimal discretionary policies derived when the government is bound by a rule may be consistent and preferred to the optimal unconstrained discretionary policy imposition of the rule creates a pareto improvement since it alleviates the government s incentive to cheat and therefore reduces the social cost of the private sector s reputational enforcement the difficulty with this solution is to derive the appropriate rule the trivial solution is to commit the government to its optimal plan derived at the initial date however this type of rule relieves the government of any discretion after the policy is announced and it is unlikely that any government would restrict its discretionary powers to that extent a preferable rule would be one which restricts only

monetary mystique secrecy and central banking abstract the paper contains a discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy it documents the federal reserve s defense of secrecy as argued in a recent freedom of information act suit the federal reserve s arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed the discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central bank secrecy and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

reconciling the wage curve and the phillips curve the wage curve is the negative relationship that links wage levels to the unemployment rate it fits accurately with modern non competitive labour market models but goes against a phillips curve modelling because the latter ties wage growth to the unemployment rate in this article we present a comprehensive review of these non competitive models highlighting recent contributions that try to eliminate the possible gap that exists between the concepts of the wage curve on the one hand and the phillips curve on the other copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2005

sustainable plans and debt abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal fiscal policy similar to that of lucas and stokey j monet econ 12 1983 55 93 except that we let the government default on its debt we consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational we concentrate on trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to the markov equilibrium after deviations by the government and show that such mechanisms cannot support equilibria with positive debt we go on to show by way of examples that there can be more complicated trigger mechanisms which support positive debt journal of economic literature classification numbers e61 e62

the time varying nairu and its implications for economic policy the nairu the unemployment rate consistent with a constant rate of inflation is estimated in this paper as a parameter allowed to vary over time value is determined in an econometric model where the inflation rate depends on its past values demand and supply shocks the nairu estimated for the gdp deflator varies over the past forty years within 5 4 to 6 5 percent its estimated value for the most recent quarter 1996 q2 is 5 6 percent the nairu has declined in recent years in response to global competition immigration other factors weakening labor s bargaining position and the rapidly declining prices of computers and other electronics

bequests and the size of population when population is endogenous the consequences of interfamily bequests and endogenous population size for optimal and competitive population sizes and bequests are explored when individuals utility is a function of own consumption the number of children and the welfare of their children when a bequest benefits each member of a second generation family we show that competition leads to underprovision for future generations under a separability assumption the number of children is also shown to be too large

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

the forgotten history of domestic debt there is a rich scholarly literature on sovereign default on external debt comparatively little is known about sovereign default on domestic debt even today cross country data on domestic public debt remains curiously exotic particularly prior to the 1980s we have filled this gap in the literature by compiling a database on central government public debt external and domestic the data span 1914 to 2010 for most countries reaching back into the nineteenth century and earlier for many our findings here on debt sustainability sovereign defaults the temptation to inflate and the hierarchy of creditors only scratch the surface of what the domestic public debt data can reveal first domestic debt is big for the 64 countries for which we have long time series domestic debt accounts for almost two thirds of total public debt for most of the sample this debt carries a market determined interest rate except for the financial repression era between wwii and financial liberalization second the data go a long way toward explaining the puzzle of why countries so often default on their external debts at seemingly low debt thresholds third domestic debt has largely been ignored in the vast empirical work on inflation in fact domestic debt a significant portion of which is long term and nonindexed is often much larger than the monetary base in the run up to high inflation episodes last the widely held view that domestic residents are strictly junior to external creditors does not find broad support

the nairu and wages in local labor markets unemployment in the united states has been below its presumed nairu nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment of 6 percent for more than four years the doctrine or dogma of the nairu led to the expectation that an unemployment rate below the nairu would make accelerating inflation inevitable but by all measures inflation has if anything declined and shows no signs of increasing the nairu doctrine has had a major role in macroeconomic theory and monetary policy for several decades for example the seven hikes in interest rates by the fed in 1994 1995 seem to have been motivated not by concerns about existing inflation cpi u inflation was steady and below 3 percent but by fears that an unemployment rate falling toward the 6 percent level and then below 6 percent in september 1994 would foster future inflation theoretical and statistical criticisms of the nairu have been growing see e g robert solow 1986 james tobin 1993 eisner 1994 rod cross 1995 essays by cross frank hahn and tobin ray fair 1996 olivier blanchard and lawrence katz 1997

price flexibility and output stability an old keynesian view in this symposium i shall play the role in which i was cast the unreconstructed old keynesian considering the alternatives i do not mind being billed as a keynesian an old keynesian at that but old keynesians come in several varieties and i speak for no one but myself nor do i defend the literal text of the general theory several generations of economists have criticized amended and elaborated that seminal work i shall argue for the validity of the major propositions that distinguish keynesian macroeconomics from old or new classical macroeconomics

importing credibility through exchange rate pegging this paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy making in an open economy since inflation is in part uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances the authority s actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective in contrast pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low inflation currency allows perfect monitoring because the exchange rate is in principle controllable for this reason exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly

inflation and reputation with generic policy preferences this paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium for inflation under the generic assumption that monetary policy reflects proximate preferences for low expected inflation and positive unexpected inflation the paper stresses the qualitative implication that in a reputational equilibrium the policymaker behaves as if he is concerned about controlling inflation even though he does not have a direct preference for a low actual inflation rate the analysis also shows how the equilibrium inflation rate depends on a decision interval that reflects the underlying real objectives of monetary policy and that determines how fast private agents would react to opportunistic behavior by the policymaker copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy a comment in an important recent contribution persson persson and svensson 1987 hereafter pps suggest that through careful restructuring of its nominal and real debt obligations a government may be able to induce future governments to follow the monetary and fiscal policies that it regards as optimal today the pps argument builds on lucas and stokey s 1983 demonstration that in a special nonmonetary setting the time inconsistency of optimal fiscal policy can be avoided through managing the term structure of real government obligations to the public the basic idea of the pps scheme for monetary economies is disarmingly intuitive in addition to continually restructuring nominal and real debt obligations a la lucas stokey each government must ensure that the next government inherits a stream of nominal claims on the public whose present discounted value equals the stock of money this equality pps argue removes the incentive for surprise inflation or deflation because such surprises would not affect the real net worth of the government this note shows that the pps prescription for avoiding time inconsistency appealing as it is is not generally sufficient even under the debt restructuring they recommend optimal policy is likely to be time inconsistent the main reason why their scheme fails is that the restrictions it imposes on government asset stocks satisfy first order but not second order conditions for an optimum because of the complex interactions between the current price level and future interest rates a government can raise its objective function by moving several variables at once away from the levels planned by the previous government even though price level changes alone would not affect government net worth we develop our argument using the model notation and equation numbers of pps to which the reader is referred for details the maximization problem associated with

time inconsistency capital mobility and debt restructuring in a small open economy honest government announcements may not be credible governments may have incentives to change their plans when it is time to carry them out or in technical terms the plans may be time inconsistent a dramatic example is the reaction to a hostage crisis governments should announce they will never negotiate with kidnappers to prevent future abductions after the fact however there are strong incentives to break this promise to save the lives of hostages of course intelligent people understand this so without commitment no one expects time inconsistent policies to be undertaken and in general this represents a welfare loss hostage crises occur as shown by kydland and prescott 1977 and calvo 1978 credibility is a problem in tax policy in general governments have an incentive to change tax rates unexpectedly for example to exploit differences between ex ante and ex post elasticities take the taxation of capital ex ante optimal taxes are low to promote elastically supplied investment ex post the supply of capital is inelastic so optimal taxes are high of course if governments can change tax rates at any time then in order to be credible tax plans should be consistent with future incentives as with a hostage crisis this constraint in general represents a welfare loss in a more subtle way the taxation of labor and consumption is also in general time inconsistent optimal tax rates depend on endowments initial plus acquired for example as a rule tax rates should be high on complements to leisure and other endowments that can be directly consumed in a dynamic economy endowments change when assets are accumulated

on a simple rule for the optimal inflation rate in second best taxation abstract the optimal inflation rate is analyzed in the framework of dynamic second best with endogenous factor prices it is shown that when the marginal excess burden of taxation is relatively small the optimal inflation rate is approximated by a simple rule the paper also analyzes the robustness of this rule to the specification of the model money as an input in utility or production

learning rational expectations in a policy game abstract rational expectations is a maintained assumption in the analysis of economic policy here we examine how two types of learning rational expectations rational and econometric affect the time profile of optimal policy in both cases the government adopts policies which delay convergence to rational expectations there is also a reduction in the inflationary bias in one case permanently in the other temporarily the results also show that reputation effects will be explained by models of learning

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

time consistency of monetary policy in the open economy abstract this paper shows that in an open economy time consistency problems are created not only by nominal government debt but also by nominal private debt to foreigners given any external nominal debt inflation redistributes wealth between domestic residents and foreigners a government that cares about the welfare of its residents will be tempted to inflate whenever it or its residents have issued nominal debt to foreigners an analysis of the u s net investment position shows that these international considerations have become increasingly relevant for the united states because the recent external deficits have largely been financed in nominal terms

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

the phillips curve regime switching and the nairu abstract this paper explores the impact of nonlinearities in the phillips curve and its representation by means of a regime switching model on the meaning and the usefulness of the nairu by implementing a regime switching model that can endogenously generate fluctuations in inflation and in the rate of unemployment we conclude that the nairu is not necessarily a single value is not necessarily reachable and is very difficult to measure the model yields a neutral rate which is more an interval of values than a precise number furthermore by postulating dynamic interdependence between real and monetary aspects the model weakens the theoretical basis of the nairu concept itself

central banks and seigniorage a study of three economies in transition abstract the paper examines the relations between central banks and other macro sectors in the czech republic hungary romania with respect to the creation and distribution of seigniorage taking austria and germany as a reference in economies in transition transfers of seigniorage from the central bank to the government and to the banking sector may appear as a natural way to soften the financial constraints of both sectors we propose a simple framework for the analysis of central bank seigniorage based on the opportunity cost approach and measure both the amount and allocation of seigniorage for the five countries in 1993 we find central bank seigniorage to be approximately four times our benchmark value in hungary and thirty times in romania the latter due to the high level of the inflation tax in hungary and romania most seigniorage is appropriated as an interest rate subsidy by the government in romania a large part also goes as a subsidy to the financial sector in none of the five countries we find that central banks retain an excessive amount of seigniorage for reserve accumulation or for current expenditures in the last part of the paper we discuss the implications of our findings on seigniorage for the evaluation of central bank independence vis a vis the government

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the bond price support program as a change in policy regimes evidence from the term structure of interest rates recently mankiw miron and weil 1987 argued that a change in policy regimes generally affects the public s expectations of future interest rates to illustrate this influence they compare the operation of the gold standard with the post gold standard regime in the united states they find that nominal short term interest rates were mean reverting before 1914 but became nonstationary after the creation of the federal reserve system we extend mankiw miron and weil s analysis by noting that the period from 1914 to the present cannot be characterized as one uninterrupted episode of policy discretion the united states temporarily abandoned discretion for a rule in the 1940s the fed and treasury agreed in april 1942 that the fed would adjust federal reserve credit in a manner that would produce relatively low market rates on longterm securities in particular the fed committed itself to support twenty year government bond prices at a level consistent with a 2 5 percent interest rate ceiling we investigate the possibility that the bond price support program of the 1940s conditioned the behavior of short term interest rates in a predictable way according to the expectation theory of the term structure a binding long term interest rate ceiling implies that an increase in the current short rate must cause the sum of the innovation and the change in future expected rates to be zero otherwise the long rate rises above the ceiling and the public perceives a violation of the bond rate commitment placing a binding ceiling on long term interest rates tends to make short term interest rates mean reverting

why do we have nominal government debt abstract we study the choice between nominal and indexed debt in a stochastic macroeconomic model with discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with distortionary taxes nominal debt provides valuable insurance against the budgetary effects of economic fluctuations we show that a welfare maximizing government always issues some nominal debt even though nominal debt increases inflation along the time consistent path of the economy the result is fairly robust with respect to changes in assumptions about policy constraints and about the macroeconomic setting

on pitfalls in the construction of family based models of population growth a note abstract it is known that there are pitfalls in the way of attempts to construct an economic theory of population and growth based on formal models of the family of the type developed by becker it is shown that these pitfalls can be avoided by going slightly outside becker s model modifying the typical family s budget constraint to allow explicitly for the cost of raising children

the mystery of the printing press monetary policy and self fulfilling debt crises we study the mechanism by which unconventional balance sheet monetary policy can rule out self fulfilling sovereign default in a model with optimizing but discretionary fiscal and monetary policymakers by purchasing sovereign debt the central bank e ectively swaps risky government paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk thus yielding a lower interest rate we characterize a critical threshold for central bank purchases beyond which absent fundamental fiscal stress the government strictly prefers primary surplus adjustment to default since default may still occur for fundamental reasons however the central bank faces the risk of losses on sovereign debt holdings which may generate ine cient inflation this risk does not undermine the credibility of a backstop nor the ability of a central bank to pursue its inflation objectives when the latter enjoys fiscal backing or fiscal authorities are su ciently averse to inflation

endogenous contract structure and monetary policy abstract we analyze the co determination of monetary policy and the labor contracts chosen by members of the public who can either fix or index their nominal wages fixed nominal wages allow the central bank to offset productivity shocks while the public fix nominal wages in response to the central bank offsetting shocks so there is an equilibrium in which realistically nominal wages are fixed and shocks offset a result which holds in single as well as in multi period games in addition there may be equilibria in which agents index their nominal wages and the central bank optimally responds by stabilizing price in contrast to conventional models the ramsey rule may be implemented in a finitely repeated game the central bank does not deviate for fear that agents would change their labor contracts such that the central bank s least favored equilibrium will subsequently be played

characterization of the optimal tax on money when it functions as a medium of exchange abstract this paper compares the relative efficiency of the implicit taxation of money and the explicit taxation of real commodities to finance a given amount of government expenditures in the model used money has the property of reducing transactions costs a sufficient condition for a tax on money to be welfare dominated by a linear tax on consumption expenditures is characterized in terms of a few parameters very familiar in macroeconomics this characterization is especially useful in the cases of heterogeneous consumers and increasing returns to scale in transactions since then the optimal tax on money may in principle be positive

optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information abstract this paper examines the optimal behavior of a policymaker who is able to precommit labelled strong when the public entertains the possibility that he is either strong or weak unable to precommit the main result is that in the presence of doubts about their type it is optimal even for strong policymakers to partially accommodate inflationary expectations this contrasts with vickers 1986 who finds that when strength is conceived in terms of the relative concern for employment the strong policymaker inflates less under incomplete than under full information the paper also provides a theory of endogenous announcements

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

time to ditch the nairu the concept of a natural rate of unemployment or nonacceleratinginflation rate of unemployment nairu has ruled macroeconomics for about 25 years yet it is still controversial a wide range of views exists over how the nairu should be estimated a fact that in itself raises questions about the practical usefulness of the concept this essay presents a brief for no confidence in four parts first the theoretical case for the natural rate is not compelling second the empirical evidence for a vertical phillips curve and the associated hypothesis that lowering unemployment past the nairu leads to unacceptable acceleration of inflation is weak and has become much weaker in the past decade third viewed collectively attempts to estimate the location of the nairu have become a professional embarrassment disagreements remain on too many basic issues fourth adherence to the concept as a guide to policy has major costs and negligible benefits conversely the risks of dropping the natural rate hypothesis are minor while the benefits from a sustained pursuit of full employment could be substantial

seigniorage and tax smoothing in the united states 1914 1986 abstract when monetary and fiscal authorities cooperate to minimize the distortionary costs of financing an exogenous stream of government expenditures barro s tax smoothing model implies a long run relationship between tax revenues and inflation previous empirical tests of this relationship are reinterpreted in light of recent work on cointegration and are shown to hold only when stochastic temporal variation in the excess burden of taxes and seigniorage is transitory in nature a new test that holds in the presence of nonstationary disturbances is developed and applied annual u s data from the period 1914 to 1986 reject the revenue smoothing hypothesis

the optimal inflation tax in the presence of currency substitution abstract an important result in the optimal inflation tax literature is that if money is modeled as reducing transactions costs the optimal nominal interest rate is zero this paper examines this issue in the context of a small open economy where both domestic and foreign currency circulate as media of exchange it is shown that the presence of foreign money enables the government to reduce the distortion introduced into the economy by a positive foreign nominal interest rate by setting a positive domestic nominal interest rate

a policy game approach to the high inflation equilibrium abstract the high inflation equilibrium hie refers to a steady state solution where inflation is higher than the one which maximizes seigniorage i e inflation is on the falling segment of the laffer curve it has been claimed that the hie can be stable when the adjustment of expectation is fast however adjustment is fast because inflation is high so the argument is circular in this paper we rationalize the hie using the policy game approach which distinguishes between discretionary and precommitment regimes we expand and demonstrate rigorously using a technique developed by obstfeld barro s suggestion that a hie may result from a discretionary regime we show that this is not possible under precommitment in addition we demonstrate that a hie may result from non fiscal factors such as the motivation to reduce unemployment in a discretionary regime we conclude with a simple diagrammatic exposition of the difference between our approach and the previous one

unemployment getting the questions right in my opinion the form and conception of this conference exemplifies the right instinct for modern macroeconomics there is a fact a big unmistakable unsubtle fact essentially everywhere in the modern industrial capitalist world unemployment rates are much higher than they used to be two or three decades ago why is that if macroeconomics is good for anything it ought to be able to understand and explain that fact we should be able to produce a fairly convincing analytical account of the occurrence and persistence of unusually high unemployment rates you might think that to be a mere commonplace to what other sort of end would anyone organize a conference my experience however is that most high powered academic conferences are stimulated by purely technical developments or less often by ideological or political promotion rather than by the need to deal with an outstanding fact i do not blame anyone for this state of affairs we may not be blessed with many significant observations too big to be quibbled over and technical innovations do need to be thrashed out by experts anyway it is good to be faced by a brute fact that needs explanation it is what macroeconomics ought to be about i compliment the organizers also on a second aspect of the agenda the country by country organization of the papers we can all hope to learn something from cross country comparisons one of the few good ways we have to test analytical ideas is to see whether they can make sense of international differences in outcomes by appealing to international differences in institutional structure and historical environment the right place to start is within each country separately studied by someone who knows the peculiarities of its history and its data you might think that this too ought to be obvious but in fact the usual approach is just the opposite more often than not we fail to take institutional differences seriously one model is supposed to apply everywhere and always each country is just a point on a cross section regression or one among several essentially identical regressions leaving only grumblers to worry about what is exogenous and what is endogenous and whether simple parametrizations do justice to real differences in the way the economic mechanism functions in one place or another i have no way of knowing whether this organized effort will get anywhere in explaining high unemployment but it seems to be set up to give itself the best chance for better or worse probably for the better theoretical and empirical work are closely intertwined in macroeconomics scratch a macro theorist and you find a casual econometrician scratch a macro econometrician and you find a casual theorist usually you do not have to scratch very hard thus the discussion of the issues central to the conference has already hardened into certain characteristic forms there are questions already lying on the table that the individual country papers will be trying to answer i suspect that some

monetary policy and policy credibility theories and evidence within the past decade there has been a significant shift in attitude by many western industrialized countries toward the objectives and conduct of national economic policy the events of the 1970s accelerating inflation and stagnant economic growth motivated the view that inflation had created its own stubborn self sustaining momentum that either was not amendable to the influences of conventional macroeconomic policy or else would yield to such influences only at unacceptable costs this led to the development of a program aimed at reestablishing control over prices while minimizing any adverse consequences of anti inflationary policies on output and employment seen as a new monetary experiment the essential ingredients included prudent financial management abstinence from discretionary intervention commitment to intermediate targets and above all prior announcement of these policies evidence of this program and its effects can be found oni the continents of europe north america and latin america and provide further important lessons in anti inflationary management this paper is a survey of recent theoretical developments in monetary policy which among other issues attempt to explain one rationale for this program and the likely consequences thereof to the extent that the new program of monetary and fiscal reform was deliberately made public and impressed upon citizens as an overriding commitment of governments in advance of its execution reflects a prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they are credible to private economic agents this view emphasized forcefully by william fellner 1976 1979 may be seen as being mainly due to the assimilation of the rational expectations hypothesis

recent developments in the theory of rules versus discretion policymaker this perspective on rules versus discretion was changed by kydland and prescott 1977 who looked at rules as a form of commitment a commitment amounts to a binding contract which specifies in advance the actions that someone will take possibly contingent on some exogenous variables that everyone can observe in contrast under discretion a person promises only to take those future actions that will best further his objectives later on such promises are easy to keep thus discretion is the special case of a rule or contract in which none of today s provisions restrict a person s future actions in the area of private business dealings it is natural to think about optimal forms of contracts which would not usually be pure discretion similarly for public policy the perspective becomes the optimal form of rules or prior restrictions even the smart benevolent policymaker is likely to desire and use

competitive banks and the inflation tax abstract the purpose of this note is to show that the presence of a competitive banking sector has important quantitative implications for the revenue maximizing rate of inflation

reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information abstract previous models of rules versus discretion are extended to include uncertainty about the policymaker s type when people observe low inflation they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to low inflation type 1 this enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted policymaker type 2 an incentive to masquerade as the committed type in the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delivers surprisingly low inflation with corresponding costs to the economy over an extended interval the type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile but shifts eventually to high inflation this high inflation is surprising initially but subsequently becomes anticipated

transactions technology and the time consistency of optimal policy abstract in a perfect foresight continuous time model of the macro economy turnovsky and brock 1980 have demonstrated that the government s choice of an optimal policy will be time inconsistent only if it is bound by a k rule regarding the growth of nominal monetary balances this result is shown to be invalid when bonds bear a liquidity yield under such circumstances it is shown that all optimal policies are time inconsistent the conclusion is that the liquidity properties of the government s financing instruments play an important role in determining the consistency properties of its optimal policies

the natural rate of unemployment reflections on 25 years of the hypothesis 1 introduction rod cross part i the theoretical framework 2 the origins and further development of the natural rate of unemployment edmund phelps 3 the natural rate as new classical macroeconomics james tobin 4 theoretical reflections on the natural rate of unemployment frank hahn 5 of coconuts decomposition and a jackass the genealogy of the natural rate huw dixon part ii adjustment ranges of equilibria and hysteresis 6 the economics of adjustment andrew caplin and john leahy 7 hysteresis and memory in the labour market g c archibald 8 models of the range of equilibria ian mcdonald 9 hysteresis revisited a methodological approach bruno amable jerome henry frederic lordon and richard topol 10 is the natural rate hypothesis consistent with hysteresis rod cross part iii empirical tests and macro models 11 the natural rate hypothesis and its testable implications hashem pesaran and ron smith 12 non linear dependence in unemployment output and inflation empirical evidence for the uk david peel and alan speight 13 prices wages and unemployment in the us economy a traditional model and tests of some alternatives albert ando and flint brayton 14 the natural rate in empirical macroeconomic models simon wren lewis part iv political economy 15 is the natural rate of unemployment a useful concept for europe maria demertzis and andrew hughes hallett 16 the natural rate of unemployment a fundamentalist keynesian view meghnad desai 17 politics and the natural rate hypothesis a historical perspective bernard corry

exchange rate management and macroeconomic policy a national perspective this paper reviews the literature on alternative exchange rate arrangements for a small economy it discusses exchange rate management for short run stabilization purposes and the choice of exchange rate regimes to foster policy discipline recent research has emphasized that the appropriate degree of exchange rate flexibility depends on the nature of disturbances exchange rate movements provide information about shocks and can serve as a basis for intervention rules empirically operational guidelines have not yet been provided floating rates are said to be desirable because they allow policy makers greater autonomy recent research has questioned the implicit assumption that autonomy is always useful rules that prevent discretionary policy may be preferable what role if any the exchange rate should play in such rules has not yet been resolved

the credibility of monetary reform new evidence the history of monetary policy is characterised by crisis and reform the paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful a cross sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem it is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility as the dependent variable we calculate a post reform inflation rate the exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment the constraining influence of institutions and a new variable for ex ante credibility of the reform the paper allows for the conclusion that monetary commitment the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform

leaving emu a real options perspective we examine the real option implicit in a country s decision of whether to leave an existing monetary union when there is uncertainty over the future benefits of this move our theoretical model is calibrated for the current euro 12 area by proxying policymakers inflation preferences with unemployment rates and debt to gdp ratios we observe a robust group of countries that would choose to remain within emu consisting of belgium finland greece and italy france and spain loosely also belong to this core only luxembourg would robustly want to leave emu ireland and the netherlands however complement that core closely

a duopoly theory of government money production the 1930s and 1940s abstract during the 1930s and 1940s the treasury and fed possessed significant monetary powers to explain the interaction of these agencies during this period i develop a theory of money production which assumes each party is interested in increasing the seigniorage associated with their production the theory implies that the two agencies will engage in specific forms of cooperation an examination of monetary policy procedures in the 1930s and 1940s indicates that the cooperation view of the fed and treasury relationship has more explanatory power than traditional views

monetary financial and fiscal stability in the east african community ready for a monetary union we examine prospects for a monetary union in the east african community eac by developing a stylised model of policymakers decision problem that allows for uncertain benefits derived from monetary financial and fiscal stability and then calibrating the model for the eac for the period 2003 10 when policymakers properly allow for uncertainty none of the countries wants to pursue a monetary union based on either monetary or financial stability grounds and only rwanda might favour it on fiscal stability grounds we argue that robust institutional arrangements assuring substantial improvements in monetary financial and fiscal stability are needed to compensate

three pitfalls in the construction of family based models of population growth abstract the construction of family based models of population growth is subject to several pitfalls which must be avoided if internal consistency and empirical relevance are to be maintained the pitfalls are described it is shown that the pitfalls can be avoided by imposing suitable restrictions on utility and production functions

seigniorage inflation and reputation abstract this paper derives a reputational equilibrium for inflation in a model in which the sovereign obtains valuable seigniorage by issuing fiat money in exchange for real resources with contemporaneous perception of actual sovereign behavior and immediate adjustment of real cash balances to new information the friedman elasticity solution for maximal seigniorage is a reputational equilibrium more generally the objective of maximal seigniorage produces an equilibrium inflation rate equal either to a generalization of the friedman elasticity solution or to the rate at which the sovereign discounts future seigniorage adjusted for the growth rate whichever is larger the model formalizes the conjecture that inflation rates in excess of the friedman solution are attributable to high discount rates for future seigniorage

is new zealand s reserve bank act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract this paper evaluates the reserve bank of new zealand act of 1989 from a principal agent perspective arguing that the act represents a dismissal rule the optimal dismissal rule requires that the central banker be dismissed whenever inflation exceeds a critical level that depends on aggregate supply disturbances and measurement error in the inflation index this is essentially the structure established by the act the scope for renegotiating the target rate however creates an incentive for the government to set the critical rate too high consequently the inflation bias of discretion is reduced but not completely eliminated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

fiscal inconsistencies and high inflation abstract this paper presents a simple model of steady state inflationary financing the discrepancy between the target level of spending and a fixed taxing capacity indicates the degree of fiscal pressures this variable need not be monotonically related to the measured deficit since actual expenditures are endogenous large fiscal inconsistencies generate unique steady states located on the bad side of the inflation tax laffer curve there high inflation may coexist with low observed deficits and the revenue constraint results in repressed spending such situations correspond qualitatively with the loss of control over fiscal policies typical of high inflation economies

credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation abstract in this paper we solve for the optimal stackelberg policy in a model of credibility and monetary policy developed by cukierman and meltzer 1986 unlike the nash solution provided by cukierman and meltzer the dynamic optimization problem facing the monetary authority in this case is not of a linear quadratic form and certainty equivalence does not apply the learning behavior of the private sector regarding the policymaker s preferences becomes intimately linked with the choice of the optimal policy and cannot be separated as in the certainty equivalent case once the dual effect of the optimal stackelberg policy is recognized the monetary authority has an additional channel of influence to consider beyond that taken into account by suboptimal certainty equivalent nash policy rules unlike nash behavior the stackelberg solution implies no inflationary bias while being still weakly time consistent this makes the stackelberg solution credible with only stagewise precommitment of the policymaker in the absence of such a precommitment learning behavior of the private sector does not sufficiently inhibit the incentive of the monetary authority to cheat in this model despite the fact that this learning is explicitly recognized in the stackelberg solution

a positive theory of foreign currency debt abstract this paper makes a case for foreign currency debt as a hedging device in an open economy subject to stochastic shocks to output a government can reduce uncertainty in wealth and in consumption by issuing foreign or domestic currency debt if unexpected domestic and foreign inflation are negatively correlated with domestic output foreign currency debt is desirable in comparison to domestic currency debt if growth rates of output of both countries are closely related and if domestic inflation is relatively uncertain it has an additional advantage if domestic debt creates time consistency problems