drexel burnham lambert s bankruptcy and the subsequent decline in underwriter fees abstract in the 1980s drexel burnham lambert dominated the underwriting of junk bonds with close to a 50 market share in 1990 drexel went bankrupt and was liquidated and the percentage underwriting fees for junk bonds subsequently dropped dramatically we present strong evidence that the exit of drexel burnham lambert and the resulting increase in competition for market share were major contributing factors to the decline in junk bond underwriter fees

allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity abstract there is a general perception that the large trading volume in initial public offerings is mostly due to flippers that are allocated shares in the offering and immediately resell them on average however flipping accounts for only 19 of trading volume and 15 of shares offered during the first two days of trading institutions do more flipping than retail customers and hot ipos are flipped much more than cold ipos institutions do not quickly flip cold ipos to take advantage of price support activities by the underwriter explicit penalty bids are rarely assessed against flippers

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues abstract underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value we show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization destroying the underwriter s incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

reputation and discretion in financial contracting the authors explain the use of legally unenforceable discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible a discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract it is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states in addition discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation this explains discretion among highly confident letters holding company relationships mutual fund contracts bank loan commitments and other financial and nonfinancial contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

on the coexistence of banks and markets we examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets by studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible standard banks can alleviate moral hazard problems while financial markets operated by investment banks can alleviate adverse selection problems in competition standard banks are forced to increase repayments since financial markets can attract the highest quality borrowers this in turn increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unprofitable for standard banks the coexistence of financial markets and standard banks is socially inefficient the same inefficiency may occur with the entrance of sophisticated banks operating with a combination of rating and ongoing monitoring technologies

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

market response to bank relationships evidence from korean bank reform abstract this paper examines how the forced closure of failing banks and the transfer of their loans to surviving banks affect the market value of firms that borrow from the closed banks pre existing relationships between firms and the banks that acquire their loans are detrimental to the positive valuation effects of the event banks may have an incentive to favor pre existing relationships to increase the value of previously extended loans therefore loan renewals to firms with prior relationships do not signal borrower quality to the market which is aware of the banks conflicts of interest this study highlights the importance of the specific mechanisms employed to replace failed banks without decreasing the value of their client firms

explaining voter turnout patterns an information theory voting research is rich in empirical regularities yet a parsimonious theory of voter turnout that can match the facts has proven to be elusive this paper argues that voter turnout patterns can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to include limited information a model is presented in which utility maximizing consumers receive higher payoffs from voting the more confident they are of their vote choice the model provides an explanation for the most important cross sectional voter turnout patterns in addition it suggests a novel explanation for the post 1960 decline in u s participation

commercial bank underwriting of credit enhanced bonds are there certification benefits to the issuer recent studies have expanded the commercial bank certification hypothesis to include banks acting in an underwriting capacity this paper further develops that research by focusing on the industrial revenue bond market in which banks have the unique opportunity to simultaneously act as both credit guarantor and underwriter when explicitly allowing for bank issued standby letters of credit guarantees we find significantly greater yield spreads for those bonds underwritten by commercial banks compared to bonds underwritten by investment banks overall no net benefit appears to accrue to the bond issuer when attempting to achieve joint or double certification benefits by employing commercial banks as both credit guarantor and underwriters except in the special case where the same bank acts as both guarantor and underwriter this limited certification effect is further validated when the credit quality of participating banks is accounted for this result is consistent with an economy of scope in monitoring and reusing information

extreme event risk management a review of lee b preston f 2012 preparing for high impact low probability events lessons from eyjafjallajőkull london chatham house abstract this paper provides a short communication based on a review of bernice lee and felix preston with gemma green 2012 this white paper received 36 survey responses from businesses related to the impact of the eyjafjallaj kull volcano most reported negative profit impacts although 47 reported that it took less than a week to return to normal operations this volcanic incident represents events that have significant impact on supply chains that have low enough rates of occurrence that they cannot be expected to be forecast therefore there is a great deal of value to put the organization in a position to adapt to whatever might occur and to have contingency plans in effect

a theory of the transition to secondary market trading of ipos abstract we develop a model in which investment banks and institutional investors collaborate in smoothing an initial public offering s ipos transition to secondary market trading their intervention promotes welfare under the assumption that significant new information arrives in the market in the immediate aftermath of the ipo under this assumption it is optimal to stage the offering and suboptimal to commit to selling shares at a uniform price the optimal strategy yields an economic rationale for secondary market price stabilization for ipos carried out via a well coordinated network of repeat institutional investors

borrowing relationships intermediation and the cost of issuing public securities abstract this paper investigates how an established borrowing relationship affects the costs associated with initial public offerings of equity our model illustrates how the existence of a borrowing relationship reduces the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the issuing firm s equity in the secondary market if underpricing is related to uncertainty a borrowing relationship can reduce underpricing empirically we find that other things equal ipos of firms with previously established borrowing relationships are underpriced substantially less than other ipos

a model of forum shopping owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea e g authors security issuers sponsors of standards resort to more or less independent certifiers to persuade potential users buyers or adopters of the worth of their property or idea we analyze the sponsor s choices ofcertifier and design social preferences regarding these choices and the impacts thereon of multiple categories of users of a downstream presence of the sponsor and of certifier market power finally we study strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing ideas

underwriting by commercial banks incentive conflicts scope economies and project quality the authors study the issue of commercial bank underwriting of securities their analysis examines the incentive conflict faced by intermediaries that both lend and underwrite securities thereby imposing a cost on their customers seeking to raise capital despite this cost firms may choose to use such an intermediary if there are sufficiently large scope economies in combined lending and underwriting the authors demonstrate that the regulatory separation of such combined intermediation may be optimal if firms recognize the intermediary s subsequent incentive conflict when choosing projects to be funded and if there is a social cost to bank funding of poor quality projects they also examine the conditions for intermediaries reputation building to mitigate the incentive conflict without the need for regulation

issuer surplus and the partial adjustment of ipo prices to public information abstract this study develops a model in which rational issuers maximize the expected surplus from going public by choosing an offer price that weighs the benefit of higher proceeds if the offer is completed against the cost of foregone surplus if the offer fails increases in the market valuation of comparable firms during the waiting period imply higher surplus associated with going public issuers respond with a partial revision in the offer price to elevate the probability of completion the model offers insights into many facts associated with initial public offering pricing including partial adjustment to market returns the inverse relation between withdrawal and market returns the asymmetric price adjustment to up versus down market returns hot issue markets and unconditional underpricing

risk reputation and ipo price support immediately following an initial public offering underwriters often repurchase shares of poorly performing offerings in an apparent attempt to stabilize the price using proprietary nasdaq data i study the price effects and determinants of price support some of the key findings are 1 stabilization is substantial inducing price rigidity at and below the offer price 2 i find no evidence that stocks with larger information asymmetries are stabilized more strongly 3 larger underwriters stabilize more perhaps to protect their reputations with investors and 4 investment banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize much more than other banks inconsistent with the view that stabilization benefits primarily institutional investors

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

the berlin stock exchange in imperial germany a market for new technology analysing 474 cases of firms going public in the german capital between 1892 and 1913 we show that innovative firms could rely on the berlin stock market as a source of financing the data also reveal that initial public offerings ipo of innovative firms were characterized by particularly low underpricing comparatively high first trading prices and no long run underperformance we interpret these empirical results as evidence for the surprising fact that contemporary investors had rational expectations

information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections this paper compares strategic abstention in ad hoc committees versus standing committees ad hoc committees meet only once and then dissolve while standing committees the central finding from this study is that most of the predictions of swing voter curse theory hold up in large elections conducted under controlled laboratory conditions there is significant abstention and significant balancing of partisans by uniformed voters and vote balancing increases with the partisan imbalance elections with no partisan imbalance successfully aggregate information and lead to efficient outcomes consistent with swing voter curse theory this efficiency falls off as partisan imbalance increases but to a significantly greater extent than is predicted in equilibrium it is instructive to compare these findings in large elections with results from the elections reported in battaglini et al 2007 all of the qualitative results are the same concerning the comparative statics balancing and abstention one slight difference is that there was less irrational voting for in the small elections than in the large elections except for the 5 9 m 0 treatment where we observed 20 voting for in the small elections compared with 10 voting for in the large elections these differences were reflected in slightly different efficiency results between small and large elections with the comparisons mirroring the differences in voting for more irrational voting results in lower e ciency we conclude that this scaled up study successfully replicates the initial swing voter s curse experiment reported in battaglini et al 2007 obtaining very similar findings in laboratory committees that are three times the size of those in the original study the one caveat is that we found evidence of a slight increase in irrational nonequilibrium behavior voting for in the larger elections whether this trend would continue as election size is further scaled up is an open question a swing voter s curse environment

a theory of the syndicate form follows function we relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi rents this improves incentives for individual bankers to cultivate investor relationships that translate into greater expected proceeds reputational concerns of lead bankers amplify the effect we derive conditions under which restricted entry and designation of a lead banker strictly pareto dominate in which case it is also strictly pareto dominant for the syndicate s fee to be greater than members cost of participation copyright the american finance association 2001

investment banks as corporate monitors in the early twentieth century united states we study the effect of financial relationships on firms investment decisions and access to external finance in the early twentieth century securities underwriters commonly held directorships with american corporations section 10 of the clayton antitrust act prohibited bankers from serving on the boards of railroads for which they underwrote securities we find that following the implementation of section 10 railroads with strong preexisting relationships with underwriters saw declines in their investment rates valuations and leverage and increases in their costs of external funds reassuringly we do not observe similar effects among industrials and utilities which were not subject to section 10 our results are consistent with underwriters on corporate boards acting as delegated monitors and highlight the potential for regulations intended to address conflicts of interest to disrupt valuable information flows

advertising effects in presidential elections presidential elections provide both an important context in which to study advertising and a setting that mitigates the challenges of dynamics and endogeneity we use the 2000 and 2004 general elections to analyze the effect of market level advertising on county level vote shares the results indicate significant positive effects of advertising exposures both instrumental variables and fixed effects alter the ad coefficient advertising elasticities are smaller than are typical for branded goods yet significant enough to shift election outcomes for example if advertising were set to zero and all other factors held constant three states electoral votes would have changed parties in 2000 given the narrow margin of victory in 2000 this shift would have resulted in a different president

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

media and political persuasion evidence from russia this paper compares electoral outcomes of 1999 parliamentary elections in russia among geographical areas with differential access to the only national tv channel independent from the government it was available to three quarters of russia s population and its signal availability was idiosyncratic conditional on observables independent tv decreased aggregate vote for the government party by 8 9 percentage points increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 6 3 percentage points and decreased turnout by 3 8 percentage points the probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals who watched independent tv even controlling for voting intentions measured one month before elections jel d72 l82 p26

a passion for voting we model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters a voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it we find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects when the signal is sufficiently strong the majority outcome is biased this is a possible reason for persistence of public policies

ipos with buy and sell side information production the dark side of open sales the proposed model by incorporating both 1 banker screening of new issues and 2 costly evaluation by investors is the first to admit endogenous double sided information production it demonstrates a nontrivial link between these two sides the banker wishes to structure a sale conducive to investor research because selling to an uninformed pool would result in his own shirking one application of this paradigm indicates that contrary to the findings of most ipo models larger investor pools are not always better this result resolves the participation restriction puzzle of why bankers do not open sales to all bidders even when doing so would maximize competition and reduce underpricing copyright 2005 oxford university press

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

traders vs relationship managers reputational conflicts in full service investment banks we present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients interest on the other hand banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so a behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities the model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral and type reputation concerns

does voting history matter analysing persistence in turnout individuals who vote in one election are also more likely to vote in the next modelling the causal relationship between consecutive voting decisions however is intrinsically difficult as this positive association can exist due to unobserved heterogeneity i e some fixed but unobserved characteristics makes voters consistently turn out to vote or habit formation i e past turnout decisions influence subsequent turnout decisions this paper overcomes this problem using longitudinal data from the british national child development study ncds to examine voting behaviour across three elections utilising techniques developed in the econometrics literature we find that failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity overestimates the extent of habit formation by almost 100 estimating a dynamic model of voter turnout allowing for unobserved heterogeneity implies that voting in one election increases the probability of voting in the next by about 13 this figure is far less than previous studies have identified

sole versus dual sourcing in stochastic lead time s q inventory models when supply lead times are uncertain the simultaneous procurement from two sources offers savings in inventory holding and shortage costs economies are achieved if these savings outweigh the increase in ordering costs in this paper we analyze dual sourcing in the context of the reorder point order quantity inventory model with constant demand and stochastic lead times and compare it with single sourcing two cases are studied using the uniform and the exponential distributions which may be thought of as two extreme ways of representing stochastic lead times in our two vendor model the order quantity is split equally between the two vendors and the split orders are placed simultaneously when the inventory position reaches the reorder level a comparison of the total expected costs suggests that when the uncertainty in the lead times is high and the ordering costs are low dual sourcing could be cost effective

corporate social responsibility in the banking industry motives and financial performance abstract the current study investigates the association between corporate social responsibility csr and financial performance fp and discusses the driving motives of banks to engage in csr three motives namely strategic choices altruism and greenwashing suggest that the relationship between csr and fp is positive non negative and non existent respectively we obtained our sample which covered 2003 2009 from the ethical investment research service eiris databank and bankscope database the data consists of 162 banks in 22 countries we then classified the banks into four types based on their degree of engagement in csr this study proposes the use of an extended version of the heckman two step regression in which the first step adopts a multinomial logit model and the second step estimates the performance equation with the inverse mills ratio generated by the first step the empirical results show that csr positively associates with fp in terms of return on assets return on equity net interest income and non interest income in contrast csr negatively associates with non performing loans hence strategic choice is the primary motive of banks to engage in csr

optimal soft order revisions under demand and supply uncertainty and upstream information abstract demand patterns for products with short life cycles or seasonal demand do not follow a discernible pattern for individual sales events and seasons due to uncertainty associated with effectiveness of product promotions willingness of major retailers to carry product and their support competition and other unforeseen marketplace events factors these atypical demand patterns can be volatile and unsuitable for traditional demand forecasting in such cases buyers utilize market signals to regularly update demand forecasts under these settings sharing early soft order i e order forecast with the supplier reduces buyer s risk of supply shortages in this study we propose an optimal order revision policy for a buyer facing atypical demand and supply uncertainty for a single selling season based on a stochastic dynamic program we demonstrate the value of soft orders as well as supplier s inventory position information for the buyer we make several key contributions i we introduce a decision model for buyer to optimally revise soft orders under supply uncertainty with or without supplier s inventory position information under a deposit scheme ii we characterize the relationship between the optimal soft order and final firm order under demand forecasts and revisions demonstrating that optimal orders may be aggressive conservative or match the demand forecast iii we identify settings under which inventory position information of the supplier is beneficial to the buyer iv we offer a mechanism for identifying the minimum unit deposit cost that will lead to truthful soft orders from the buyer a detailed analysis explores the structure of the optimal ordering policies as well as the effect of cost parameters and sources of uncertainty on buyer performance

bias in the post ipo earnings forecasts of affiliated analysts evidence from a chinese natural experiment investment banks and issuers of chinese domestic ipos became fully responsible for ipo offer prices only on june 10 2009 before this regulatory reform the optimistic bias in post ipo earnings forecasts is highly comparable across affiliated and unaffiliated analysts afterward the forecasts of affiliated analysts are 33 percentage points more positively distorted on average in the first 90 days after an ipo this relative forecast bias even increases to 63 percentage points and enlarges further when the issuer s stock price drops in the aftermarket affiliated analysts distort especially their forecasts for fiscal years further away from the forecast release date

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

originator performance cmbs structures and the risk of commercial mortgages this article examines information and incentive problems that can exist in the market for commercial mortgages that are pooled and repackaged as commercial mortgage backed securities cmbss we find that mortgages that are originated by institutions with large negative stock returns in the quarters prior to the origination date tend to have higher credit spreads and default more than other mortgages with similar observable characteristics properties financed with these mortgages also exhibit weaker post securitization operating performance in addition stock price loser institutions are anxious to securitize mortgages they originate more quickly finally we find that credit rating agencies require higher levels of subordination for cmbs pools i e view these pools as riskier that include more mortgages originated by underperforming originators this evidence is consistent with reputation models in which poorly performing originators have less incentive to carefully evaluate the credit quality of prospective borrowers thereby letting relatively riskier mortgages pass through their weaker screening standards the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information we analyze two candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters each voter has noisy private information about the state variable we show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity nevertheless elections fully aggregate information in the sense that the chosen candidate would not change if all private information were common knowledge equilibrium voting behavior is to a large extent determined by the electoral rule i e if a candidate is required to get at least x percent of the vote in order to win the election then in equilibrium this candidate gets very close to x percent of the vote with probability close to one finally if the distribution from which preferences are drawn is uncertain then elections will generally not satisfy full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero

the peaceful conspiracy bond markets and international relations during the pax britannica this article provides foundations to polanyi s famed argument that monopoly power in the global capital market served as an instrument of peace during the pax britannica 1815 1914 our perspective is novel we focus on the role of intermediaries and certification we show that when information and enforcement are imperfect there is scope for the endogenous emergence of prestigious intermediaries who enjoy a monopoly position and as a result control government actions they can implement conditional lending they subject the distribution of credit to the adoption of peaceful policies prestigious intermediaries act that way because of their concern with maintaining an unblemished track record when wars increased risks of default our analysis which brings together insights from different disciplines provides a significant extension to and departure from recent research on how countries accumulate reputational capital

investment bank reputation and the price and quality of underwriting services the relation between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of bond underwriting services is studied here after controlling for endogeneity in issuerunderwriter matching i find that reputable banks obtain lower yields and charge higher fees but issuers net proceeds are higher these relations are pronounced in the junk bond category in which reputable banks underwriting criteria are most stringent these findings suggest that banks underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns and are thus informative of issue quality they also suggest that economic rents are earned on reputation and thereby provide continued incentives for underwriters to maintain reputation in capital markets investment banks play the important role of bridging firms that need capital with investors that seek investment opportunities intermediation services are valuable first because the banks specialization in the sales and marketing of securities helps lower the issuers transactional costs of borrowing but perhaps more importantly investment banks can provide value through their role in lowering the issuers informational cost of capital this role arises from the information asymmetry that typically exists between insiders the issuing firms and outsiders the investors in security issuance events such an information gap as akerlof demonstrated in his classic 1970 paper at best causes investors to discount the securities and at worst can threaten the existence of the market investment banks standing between the insiders and the outsiders seem to be in the perfect position to reduce information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital that issuers would otherwise have to pay but how does an investment bank solve its own information problem visa vis the investor one solution is the reputation capital at stake for the intermediary a key difference between investment banks and ordinary issuers lily hua fang is from finance area insead this paper is based on a chapter of my dissertation i am indebted to my advisors gary gorton robert holthausen andrew metrick david musto and ayako yasuda for their guidance and support i owe special thanks to an anonymous referee whose insightful comments helped me improve the paper greatly i also want to thank franklin allen john core petra todd jay ritter and robert stambaugh the editor for valuable feedback comments and suggestions from seminar participants at boston college insead

the effect of lender identity on a borrowing firm s equity return previous research demonstrates that a firm s common stock price tends to fall when it issues new public securities by contrast commercial bank loans elicit significantly positive borrower returns this article investigates whether the lender s identity influences the market s reaction to a loan announcement although we find no significant difference between the market s response to bank and nonbank loans we do find that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns this evidence complements earlier findings that an auditor s or investment banker s perceived quality signals valuable information about firm value to uninformed market investors previous studies show that certain types of loan announcements generate significantly positive abnormal returns to the average borrower s equity 1 this finding contrasts with the negative equity returns generally associated with a corporation s issuance of public securities smith 1986 this difference in market reactions indicates that private and public securities are not perfect substitutes for the average firm in this sense lender identity defined as public versus private lender significantly impacts the borrower s abnormal equity return the standard theoretical explanation for this difference is that private lenders either obtain private information about the firm s value or they have the incentive and ability to monitor firm behavior more effectively than other outside monitors can although the empirical literature on private lending has evaluated primarily commercial bank loans and lines of credit these theoretical arguments apply equally to any type of private

financial innovation in microcap public offerings abstract this paper examines external financing of small and growth firms using a regulatory experiment in the us microcap market the paper focuses on a new financing method for entrepreneurial firms small public offerings under regulation a which was significantly expanded by 2015 amendments regulation a offerings serve as a financing alternative for issuers that seek public capital but are unable to conduct a traditional registered public offering compared to small registered public offerings regulation a involves fewer requirements and draws smaller younger companies often raising capital without intermediaries or on a best efforts basis regulation a companies raise less capital on average after accounting for their historical financials the use of regulation a increased significantly following the 2015 shock particularly in market segments that had more private placements and traditional public offerings different types of issuers are pursuing regulation a and registered offerings and regulation a does not appear to draw issuers away from traditional public offerings

public information and electoral bias abstract we present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate these findings suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences e g through pre election polls or expert forecasts may undermine the democratic process our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences is common knowledge then the unique type symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in which each alternative is equally likely to win the election by contrast when citizens are ignorant about the preference distribution the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower welfare is therefore unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the preference distribution

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

investment bank reputation information production and financial intermediation we model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market either directly or using an investment bank investment banks who interact repeatedly with the equity market evaluate entrepreneurs projects and report to investors in return for a fee setting strict evaluation standards unobservable to investors is costly for investment banks inducing moral hazard investment banks credibility therefore depends on their equity marketing history investment banks evaluation standards their reputations underwriter compensation the market value of equity sold and entrepreneurs choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously

anatomy of initial public offerings of common stock initial public offerings of common stocks ipos are typically underpriced in this paper the author develops and tests the hypothesis that underpricing serves as a form of insurance against legal liability and the associated damages to the reputations of investment bankers the empirical results based on samples of ipos that were brought to the market before and after the securities act of 1933 provide considerable support for the implicit insurance hypothesis specifically gross underpricing and market segmentation between prestigious and fringe investment bankers in originating unseasoned new issues appear to be peculiar to the post 1933 era a number of studies have documented that unseasoned common stocks typically garner large positive abnormal returns during a short period following the initial offering in his recent review of the empirical evidence on the initial returns of common stock offerings smith 36 concluded that the returns from offer price to after market price have exceeded fifteen percent his calculations did not include some of the earlier results obtained by mcdonald and fisher 23 and logue 20 when their samples are combined with those in smith s review the initial returns of unseasoned equity offerings appear even larger over seventeen percent these results imply that underwriters consistently offer the securities at substantial discounts from their values that are set in the after market in other words initial public offerings ipos appear to be underpriced what is even more puzzling is the fact that in some time periods underpricing appears to be systematically larger than in other periods ibbotson and jaffe 15 and ritter 29 have documented that during the postwar era there have been a number of periods in which the initial returns of common stocks have been extremely high ritter for example reported that the average return from the offer price to the first after market price was over forty eight percent for ipos in 1980 and 1981 1 similarly the initial returns of unseasoned issues of common stock brought to the market in 1950 1951 1961 and 1968 were unusually large these periods in which ipos were grossly underpriced are referred to as the hotissue markets why do investment bankers underprice ipos why do issuers

price stabilization in the market for new issues abstract this study examines price stabilization in new equity issues stabilizationtruncates the distribution of post issue prices at a floor price lowering the risk of adverse price moves and hence in a competitive dealer market reducing the bid ask spread using 1 523 nasdao traded firm commitment initial public offerings issued between 1982 and 1987 we find that spreads narrow when the market price is close to the offer price and stabilization is most likely moreover significant negative returns are documented after the hypothesized termination of stabilizing activities suggesting that stabilization and its cessation affect market prices

who benefits from secondary market price stabilization of iops abstract initial public offerings that receive secondary market price support from their underwriters are characterized by severely attenuated selling by small quantity presumably retail traders and more aggressive selling by large quantity presumably institutional traders the increase in institutional trading is concentrated in the first day of trading while the attenuation of retail trading persists this pattern exists in spite of the likelihood that retail investors receive relatively large initial allocations of fully priced stabilized offers thus the evidence is consistent with institutional investors being the primary beneficiaries of price stabilization efforts and with the use of penalty bids to constrain retail selling activity

investment banker reputation and two stage combination carve outs and spin offs abstract this study examines whether investment banker reputation impacts the initial period returns of two stage combinations carve outs followed by spin offs all prior literature regarding investment banker reputation is based on single stage events ipos an analysis is conducted of all completed two stage carve outs spin offs from 1981 to 2002 findings indicate that underwriters for two stage combinations retain their reputation in contrast with the single stage findings of carter et al carter r b dark f h piwowar m s 2002 ipos and underwriter reputation redeeming the value of reputation working paper iowa state university that investment bankers redeemed cashed in their reputation also this study finds that the carter et al reputation factors dominate the loughran and ritter loughran t ritter j r 2002 why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos the review of financial studies 15 2 413 443 reputation factors

analytical issues in external financing alternatives for sbes as the amount of information about an enterprise is generally not neutral with respect to firm size financiers have problems to identify the default risk associated with a borrower or to have control over a borrower s investments this review paper analyses how various control mechanisms are fit to reduce this information problem and how various types of capital suppliers are endowed to finance small business enterprises

why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos one of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings ipos is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first day closing market price and the offer price the average ipo leaves 9 1 million on the table this number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm we present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls this results in an explanation of hot issue markets we also offer a new explanation for why ipos are underpriced copyright 2002 oxford university press

moral bias in large elections theory and experimental evidence in this article we provide evidence that voters in large elections tend to vote against their material self interest and to vote for a morally or ethically appealing alternative it may seem puzzling that voters might behave differently in small elections than they do in large ones however we show that such behavior is a logical consequence of voters having a conflict between obtaining a better material outcome and choosing a moral action we develop a simple model of this conflict and show that decreasing the probability that a single vote is decisive i e pivot probability reduces the importance of outcomes relative to actions in voter decision making because pivot probability is generally small in large elections alternatives that are understood by voters to be morally superior are more likely to win in large elections than in small ones thus compared to the preferences of voters election results will be biased in favor of moral alternatives 1 the model produces a set of predictions that we test in a laboratory experiment to clarify ideas consider a situation in which two outcomes are possible a and b assume that b gives

a simple test of baron s model of ipo underpricing abstract this paper tests baron s 1982 model of initial public offering ipo underpricing that model relies on information asymmetries between issuers and underwriters and predicts that offer prices will be lower than would prevail in the absence of asymmetric information we examine the initial public offerings of 38 investment banks that went public in the period 1970 1987 and participated in the distribution of their own securities we find that contrary to the implication of baron s model such self marketed offerings are characterized by statistically significant underpricing comparable to that of other ipos

economic theories of voter turnout i the voting paradox why would the rational individual bother to spend time and resources to become well informed go to the polls on the election day and maybe even wait in a queue why would a rational voter vote downs 1957 ii the paradox of indeterminacy if they vote why do they care who they vote for kirchgassner 1992 kirchgassner and pommerehne 1993 iii the paradox of ignorance to the extent that information is costly the rational voter must be ignorant about relevant aspects of his decision making downs 1957

a behavioral model of turnout the so called paradox of voting is a major anomaly for rational choice theories of elections if voting is costly and citizens are rational then in large electrorates the expected turnout would be small for if many people voted the chance of anyone being pivotal would be too small to make the act worthwhile yet many people do vote even in large national elections to address this puzzle we construct a model of adaptive rationality citizens learn by simple trial and error repeating satisfactory actions and avoiding unsatisfactory ones their aspiration levels which code current payoffs as satisfactory or unsatisfactory are also endogenous themselves adjusting to experience our main result is that agents who adapt in this manner turn out in substantial numbers even in large electorates and even if voting is costly for everyone standard conceptions of rational behavior do not explain why anyone bothers to vote in a mass election turnout is the paradox that ate rational choice theory fiorina 1990 334 we would like to thank stephen ansolabehere sorin antohi glenn ellison dedre gentner sunil kumar david laitin tze lai arthur lupia elijah millgram lincoln moses scott page tom palfrey john patty paul pfleiderer adam simon joel sobel carole uhlaner three anonymous referees and the participants in the political economics seminar at the gsb the stanford caltech workshop the unc american politics research group the ucla conference on cognition emotion and rational choice panels at the annual meetings of the mpsa and the apsa the agent 2000 workshop the seventh annual wallis conference the cmu pitt colloquium series and the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences seminar series for their helpful comments this paper was written while ting was at the university of north carolina at chapel hill and he thanks unc s department of political science for its support it was revised while bendor was a fellow at the casbs and he is grateful for the center s financial and intellectual support

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

implicit contracts a survey 7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets otherwise contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction there is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory contracts smooth consumption but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks this result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis however the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different contracts embody a nonlinear two part pricing scheme the lump sum part allocates the income consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization this implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects flexible though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity furthermore the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work sharing and layoffs contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

analysis of a q r t inventory policy with deterministic and random yields when future supply is uncertain abstract this paper considers a stochastic inventory model where the quantity ordered sometimes may not be available due to strikes etc we represent the supplier s availability process as a two state continuous time markov chain where one state corresponds to availability and the other state corresponds to unavailability of the supplier the problem is to determine the reorder point the order quantity when the system is found in on state and how long to wait before the next order if system is in off state it is assumed that the state of the system is identified at a cost using the renewal reward theorem we construct the objective function as the long run average cost numerical sensitivity analysis results are provided we also analyze the problem when the yield i e amount received if available is random and discuss an example with beta distributed yield

ipo pricing in hot market conditions who leaves money on the table this paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on ipo pricing using a model in which the aftermarket price of ipo shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment i show that ipos can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return a sample of recent french offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model individual investors demand is positively related to market conditions moreover large individual investors demand leads to high ipo prices large initial returns and poor long run performance the end of the nineties was one of the hottest ipo markets ever in this period both the number of initial public offerings and the level of initial returns have reached unprecedented peaks ritter documents that in 1999 and 2000 only 803 companies went public in the united states raising about 123 billion and leaving about 62 billion on the table in the form of initial returns periodically such periods of ipo euphoria occur these so called hot issue markets are characterized by high ipo volumes and high levels of initial return see ibbotson and jaffe 1975 and ritter 1984 as well as positive serial correlation of ipo initial returns and correlation between recent levels of initial return and current ipo volume surprisingly however pre ipo shareholders do not seem to be upset about leaving so much money on the table loughran and ritter 2002 explain this phenomenon by the fact that insiders of ipo companies consider not only the shares they sell in the ipo but also those they retain which benefit from the large initial price run up ljungqvist and wilhelm 2003 show that during the 1999 to 2000 period ipo companies were significantly different from usual

joseph schumpeter lecture ideology i develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained yet individually rational distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets in processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education health insurance pensions etc individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects or their children s versus the costs of misinformed decisions because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial endogenous social cognitions emerge thus an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government conversely an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand with public sector capital this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history dependent dynamics the model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views even when ex post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news jel h11 d72 d83 p16 z1

evidence on whether banks consider carbon risk in their lending decisions banks face a dilemma in choosing between maximising profits and facilitating the sustainable use of resources within a carbon constrained future this study provides empirical evidence on this dilemma investigating whether a bank loan announcement for a firm with high carbon risk conveys information to investors about the firm s carbon risk exposure collected through a bank s pre loan screening and ongoing monitoring we use a sample of 120 bank loan announcements for asx listed firms over the period 2009 2015 we measure high low carbon risk exposure based on whether firms meet do not meet the reporting threshold of the nger scheme we document positive and significant excess loan announcement returns for loan renewals for high carbon risk firms but not for loan initiations further we document a more significant loan announcement return for renewals with favourable term revisions finally we find no evidence that the market differentiates between domestic and foreign lenders taken together our results suggest that investors perceive that banks incorporate carbon risk considerations into their lending decisions our results highlight the value of banks as financial intermediaries given the information asymmetry surrounding firms carbon risk exposure and more generally the need to extend modern banking theory to consider issues such as the impact of banks csr reputation on lending decisions

bond underwriting by banks and conflicts of interest evidence from japan during the pre war period abstract article 65 of the securities and exchange law of japan which was carried into effect in 1948 prohibited banks from underwriting corporate securities partially because of the concern that combining the banking and securities businesses might result in a potential conflict of interest this paper studies the pricing and long term default performance of industrial bonds underwritten by commercial banks the industrial bank of japan ibj and trust firms as compared to those underwritten by investment houses during the pre war period in japan when banks were allowed to underwrite industrial bonds the evidence rejects the concern about the conflicts of interest

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

anticompetitive financial contracting the design of financial claims this paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product market channels in standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets a firm s use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms we find that in order to deter entry the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky i e equity in contrast to the standard branderlewis 1986 result that debt deters entry the model sheds light on the policy debate on the separation of banking as to whether banks should be permitted to hold equity in firms it also provides an explanation for why venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start up firms

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

ordering quantity decisions considering uncertainty in supply chain logistics operations abstract this research seeks to determine the optimal order amount for a retailer given uncertainty in a supply chain s logistics network due to unforeseeable disruption or various types of defects e g shipping damage missing parts and misplacing products mixture distribution models characterize problems from solitary failures and contingent events causing network to function ineffectively the uncertainty in the number of good products successfully reaching distribution centers dcs and retail stores poses a challenge in deciding product order amounts because the commonly used ordering plan developed for maximizing expected profits does not allow retailers to address concerns about contingencies this research proposes two improved procedures with risk averse characteristics towards low probability and high impact events several examples illustrate the impact of a dc s operation policies and model assumptions on a retailer s product ordering plan and resulting sales profit

why do ipo underwriters allocate extra shares when they expect to buy them back i argue that overallocation is used as a marketing strategy to increase the offer price and aftermarket price of an initial public offering ipo i show that when there is weak demand it can be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position the issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price this is in spite of the fact that in equilibrium allocating more shares when there is weak demand requires greater underpricing when there is strong demand

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

stabilization syndication and pricing of ipos we argue that in the after market trading of an ipo the underwriting syndicate by standing ready to buy back shares at the offer price price stabilization compensates uninformed investors ex post for the adverse selection cost they face in bidding for ipos this domi nates ex ante compensation by underpricing the reason is that stabilization exploits ex post information about investor demand whereas underpricing must be based on ex ante infor mation however liquidity and syndication costs constrain the use of stabilization which in equilibrium generates some underpricing as well we develop a model that formalizes this intuition and generates several empirical implications

is the ipo pricing process efficient this paper investigates underwriters treatment of public information throughout the ipo pricing process two key findings emerge first public information is not fully incorporated into the initial price range while the economic magnitude of the bias is small it is puzzling because it is not clear who benefits from it further it indicates that the filing range midpoint is not an unbiased predictor of the offer price as prior literature has assumed second while public information is similarly not fully incorporated into the final offer price the small economic significance of this relation indicates that the ipo pricing process is almost efficient

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

signalling by underpricing in the ipo market abstract empirical evidence suggests the existence of hot issue markets for initial public offerings in certain periods and in certain industries new issues are underpriced and rationing occurs this paper develops a model consistent with this observation which assumes the firm itself best knows its prospects in certain circumstances firms with the most favorable prospects find it optimal to signal their type by underpricing their initial issue of shares and investors know that only the best can recoup the cost of this signal from subsequent issues

underwriter price support and the ipo underpricing puzzle abstract this paper reassesses the apparent systematic underpricing of initial public offerings ipos investigation of the distribution of initial returns following ipos shows that positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially unobserved left negative tail moreover most ipos with zero one day returns subsequently fall in price suggesting that underwriter price support may account for the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average initial ipo returns even if offering prices are set at expected market value this paper thus challenges the presumption underlying previous research that positive average initial ipo returns result primarily from deliberate underpricing

public information ipo price formation and long run returns japanese evidence the price formation process of jasdaq ipos is more transparent than in the united states the transparency facilitates analysis of important issues in the ipo literature why offer prices only partially adjust to public information and adjust more fully to negative information and why adjustments are related to initial returns the evidence indicates that early price information conveys the underwriter s commitment to compensate investors for acquiring and or disclosing information offer prices reflect pre ipo market values of public companies and implicit agreements between underwriters and issuers that originate well before the offering underadjustment of offer prices is substantially reversed in the aftermarket copyright c 2009 the american finance association

differential information and security market equilibrium we propose a simple model of equilibrium asset pricing in which there are differences in the amounts of information available for developing inferences about the returns parame ters of alternative securities in contrast with earlier work we show that parameter uncer tainty or estimation risk can have an effect upon market equilibrium under reasonable conditions securities for which there is relatively little information are shown to have relatively higher systematic risk when that risk is properly measured ceteris paribus the initially very limited model is shown to be robust with respect to relaxation of a number of its principal assumptions we provide theoretical support for the empirical examination of at least three proxies for relative information period of listing number of security returns observations available and divergence of analyst opinion

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

voting when money and morals conflict an experimental test of expressive voting abstract moral considerations may matter much in voting because the costs of expressing support for a morally worthy cause may be low in a referendum these costs depend on whether a voter expects to affect the outcome of the referendum to test the low cost theory of expressive voting we experimentally investigate a proposal to tax everyone and to donate tax revenues the analysis of expectations and voting decisions shows that the low cost theory fails to explain voting decisions instead we find that voters tend to approve of the proposal if they expect others to approve too

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

the pricing of initial public offerings a dynamic model with information production this paper presents an information theoretic model of ipo pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the ipo and the secondary market have private information about their firm s prospects and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm high value firms knowing they are going to pool with low value firms induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information the information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity giving a higher expected stock price for high value firms