wages experience and seniority in this paper we study the sources of wage growth we identify the contribution to such growth of general sector specific and firm specific human capital our results are interpretable within the context of a model where the returns to human capital may be heterogeneous and where firms may offer different combinations of entry level wages and firm specific human capital development we allow for the possibility that wages are match specific and that workers move jobs as a result of identifying a better match to estimate the average returns to experience sector tenure and firm specific tenure within this context we develop an identification strategy which relies on the use of firm closures our data source is a new and unique administrative data set for germany that includes complete work histories as well as individual characteristics we find positive returns to experience and firm tenure for skilled workers the returns to experience for unskilled workers are small and insignificant after 2 years of experience their returns to sector tenure are also zero however their returns to firm tenure are substantial in this paper we study the growth of wages of young workers in germany knowing the extent and reasons for individual wage growth over the life cycle is important for a number of areas in economics just to mention two examples first it is a key element to understanding and designing active labour market programmes many such programmes offer temporary and often subsidized work opportunities examples are the new deal in the u k and the swedish programmes as well as a number of programmes in germany these programmes are based on the assumption that general skills are sufficiently enhanced while working so as to render the workers employable without a wage subsidy thus the success of these programmes depends on how skills improve on the job for the target population and whether this skill enhancement is transferable across jobs second it is a key to understanding the benefits and costs of job mobility this in turn matters for a number of policy issues including the design of pension policies relating for example to final salary schemes as a result of this widespread interest a large body of empirical research has focused on obtaining estimates for the returns of experience and seniority 1 our study uses a new and unique administrative data set with a number of features that are important for our analysis and allow us to avoid many problems encountered in earlier work in this field in our model wages grow due to learning by doing which may be heterogeneous across individuals moreover since firms offer different career profiles and because we allow for match specific effects on wages investments take the form of searching for the firm with the most desirable learning by doing characteristics career structure 2

a nonequilibrium analysis of unanimity rule majority rule and pareto i introduction voting theory is important for understanding economics as well as politics international organizations vote on trade regulations legislatures vote on minimum wage and governments vote on the provision of public goods voting also affects industrial organization for instance limited partnerships may vote on the allocation of resources to various units and shareholders may vote on investment decisions carrera and richmond 1988 what voting rule best achieves pareto optimal outcomes in such cases in the absence of transactions costs it is widely believed that unanimity rule is the best voting rule for promoting pareto efficiency berggren 1996 buchanan and tullock 1962 mueller 2003 buchanan 1967 writes it is evident that unanimous consent is the political counterpart of the pareto criterion for optimality p 285 traditionally viewed unanimity rule guarantees more efficient outcomes than majority rule because unanimity rule only passes proposals that make everyone better off other voting rules like majority rule can pass proposals that make some individuals worse off one of the assumptions that is either explicit or implicit in the these studies is the assumption of rational proposals we define a proposal as rational if it helps maximize the proposer s utility at the end of the game in our analysis proposals are not rational instead they are generated either randomly or sincerely in a single dimensional voting model and evaluated by the pareto criterion or pareto optimality this produces two striking results with regard to pareto optimality first if proposal generation is random then majority rule is usually more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule second if individuals propose their ideal points then majority rule always selects pareto optimal outcomes at least as well as unanimity rule considering all possible proposals as done in our random generation models has a long tradition in social choice literature arrow 1951 caplin and nalebuff 1988 niemi and weisberg 1968 riker 1982 sen 1979 it also has the advantage of modeling certain types of incomplete information modeling votes where bills are introduced for reasons other than making them pass see stewart 2001 pp 338 41 modeling exogenously generated proposals and for allowing mistakes by the proposer such foundational work should be of interest to those who relate unanimity rule to pareto principles in the study of public goods cornes and sandler 1996 lindahl 1967 political parties aldrich 1995 and legislative institutions colomer 2001 niou and ordeshook 1985 tsebelis 2002 to name a few ii previous studies perhaps the first in depth study of the relationship between unanimity rule and a pareto principle was buchanan and tullock s calculus of consent 1962 buchanan and tullock argued that if decision making costs were negligible unanimity rule would always be the most desirable k majority rule simply because it preserved the pareto principle p 88 although the exact pareto principle they had in mind is not entirely clear it seems that buchanan and tullock were arguing for the criteria of accepting a change from the status quo only if it lead to a pareto improvement otherwise the status quo should be preferred pp 92 93 sen 1979 p 25 1 mueller 2003 pp 138 and 140 41 further compared unanimity rule to majority rule and concluded that unanimity rule typically performs better in terms of the pareto criterion to illustrate his reasoning mueller describes a community voting on both the purchase of a new firehouse and the taxes needed to pay for it in a single bill if the decision was made under unanimity rule the distribution of taxes would be redefined until the firehouse benefited all otherwise the bill would not pass if the decision was made under majority rule a majority might distribute the taxes on a minority such that members of the majority would be net gainers and members of the minority would be net losers

long run effects of public sector sponsored training in west germany between 1991 and 1997 west germany spent on average about 3 6 bn euro per year on public sector sponsored training programmes for the unemployed we base our empirical analysis on a new administrative data base that plausibly allows for selectivity correction by microeconometric matching methods we identify the effects of different types of training programmes over a horizon of more than seven years using bias corrected weighted multiple neighbours matching we find that all programmes have negative effects in the short run and positive effects over a horizon of about four years however for substantive training programmes with duration of about two years gains in employment probabilities of more than 10 points appear to be sustainable but come at the price of large negative lock in effects

promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in austria in most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted two different viewsare presented to explain why the chicagoan view efficient redistribution hypothesis and the virginian view inefficient outcome of political bargaining a vertically structuredempirical model of the austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented

the unanimous voting rule is not the political equivalent to market exchange the unanimous voting rule is often viewed as analogous to voluntary market ex change this paper demonstrates that when third party pecuniary effects exist this analogy breaks down because unlike markets unanimous voting requires compensation for these ef fects thus efficient market outcomes typically will be rejected by the unanimous voting rule even when transactions costs are low enough to make compensation feasible the political outcome under unanimity will differ from the market outcome the distributional effects of unanimity provide the incentive for people to substitute rent seeking behavior for productive activity and reduce the incentive for productive change providing additional reasons why a less than unanimous voting rule may be optimal when resources are to be allocated politically

the effectiveness of targeted wage subsidies for hard to place workers targeted wage subsidies paid to employers are an important element of active labour market policies in germany this article uses propensity score matching to investigate their effect on the employment and unemployment rates of subsidized hard to place workers in a first scenario we estimate the average treatment effect of a subsidy on previously unemployed individuals a second scenario analyses the effects of a subsidy on employment probabilities conditional on taking up employment the third scenario investigates the additional effect of a subsidy on individuals who have participated in a short term training measure beforehand summing up and in line with the literature the results show that subsidies have a favourable effect on the employment prospects of participants

endogenous price policies and international wheat prices vanzetti and kennedy s herein vk comment on our earlier paper sarris and freebairn gives us the opportunity first to clarify the differences in the models to present a generalization of the analysis that includes their results as well as ours as special cases and then to point out some salient features of our model that seem to have been unnoticed by them consider our model of a homogenous commodity produced consumed and traded by n countries which are characterized by the following linear demand and supply curves notation follows vk except that we maintain the additive random variables and hence keep the time subscript

some neglected social costs of government spending in farm programs economic welfare analyses of farm programs typically assume that the direct social opportunity cost of subsidy payments is one dollar per dollar of government spending recent literature suggests that the marginal opportunity cost of a dollar of u s federal government spending is more likely to be in the range of 1 20 to 1 50 this implies that the net social costs of farm programs that involve government spending are significantly greater than the typical estimates in addition the normative efficiency ranking of alternative policies is sensitive to the marginal opportunity cost of government spending

efficient income redistribution for a small country using optimal combined instruments abstract in this paper i improve gardner s surplus transformation curve framework by assuming that governments are able to vary many policy instruments simultaneously instead of only one i use my framework to find the combination of the currently used instruments which provides the most efficient income redistribution for the austrian bread grains market comparing the most efficient policy with the actual policy reveals that 464 10 6 austrian shillings were wasted i theoretically compare for a small country the transfer efficiency of every possible pair of the four major agricultural policy instruments floor price production quota co responsibility levy and deficiency payments without considering the marginal cost of public funds mcf deficiency payments cum quota equal to a fully decoupled direct income support is the most efficient policy succeeded by floor price cum quota and floor price cum deficiency payments if the mcf is taken into account the ranking crucially depends on the market parameters the transfer level and the value of the mcf for the austrian bread grains market i empirically demonstrate that given the present support level a fully decoupled direct income support redistributes income most efficiently as long as the mcf is lower than 1 17 beyond this value a floor price cum quota policy becomes more efficient a floor price cum deficiency payments policy is never superior to the floor price cum quota

political preference functions and public policy reform a model of policy making is developed where governments seek to maximize support from social groups through the combination of both pert social welfare increasing and pert welfare transferring policies the implicit weights of a political preference function shift with a change in the relative cost of interest group organizing attention is paid to the degree of wealth transfers as total social welfare increases because of pert policy changes the model demonstrates that in the case of two competing groups the weight given to one group in the allocation of social surplus will increase as total social welfare increases with a bias toward the other group the relative weights placed on consumers and producers based on pest policies alone are misleading indicators of the political influence of groups a number of general implications of this political economic analysis for the reform of public policies are investigated

less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement comment the purpose of this comment has not been to question the main point of holcombe s paper unanimous legislative agreement if it occurs could be inefficient for the reasons put forth by holcombe the motivation for this comment is that holcombe s explanation for the existence of legislative unanimity is not a compelling one since it begs an important question that question is if the cooperation exists to maintain a unanimous coalition why does not the cooperation exist to maintain a less than unanimous coalition unless holcombe can answer this question satisfactorily his explanation for legislative unanimity is fundamentally flawed

earnings and employment effects of continuous off the job training in east germany after unification the effects of continuous off the job training oft for east germans after unification are analyzed in terms of their earnings and employment probabilities using the potential outcome approach to causality as general framework different matching procedures are suggested for the estimation they allow for permanent and transitory shocks that influence oft participation and labor market outcomes the matching procedures also take account of individually different starting dates the data are taken from the german socio economic panel gsoep 1990 1994 this dataset is very informative with respect to factors influencing the participation in training the results show no positive effects of training

get rid of unanimity rule the superiority of majority rules with veto power we study unanimous decision making under incomplete information we argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent we show that majority rules with veto power are i pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and ii ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations

an evaluation of the swedish system of active labour market programmes in the 1990s we investigate the presence of short and long term effects from joining a swedish labor market program vis a vis more intense job search in open unemployment overall the impact of the program system is found to have been mixed joining a program has increased employment rates among participants a result robust to a misclassification problem in the data on the other hand it has also allowed participants to remain significantly longer on unemployment benefits and more generally in the unemployment system this being particularly the case for those entitled individuals entering a program around the time of their unemployment benefits exhaustion

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

where does all the money go measuring effects of agricultural policy transfers on farm income discussion written and thought provoking the article by alston is intriguing in framing agricultural re search as one of a menu of policy options for transferring income to farmers underin vestment in agricultural research which is all but impossible to explain on social welfare grounds becomes easier to explain once it is viewed in these political economy terms as alston notes there is significant uncer tainty about whether the beneficiaries of agri cultural research will be producers consumers or both if producers as a whole benefit who among them will be beneficiaries when will they benefit and by how much one sug gestion for future research is to empirically examine whether these factors can explain differences in agricultural research spending across commodities other things equal al ston s framework suggests that agricultural commodities with a more stable set of produc ers over time and commodities where there is less heterogeneity among producers should be less likely to experience underinvestment in research the article by thompson mishra and dew bre is a valuable contribution to the literature

in search of rational government what political preference function studies measure and assume political preference function ppf studies assume that policy making can be described by a mathematical problem in which a rational government maximizes a function of interest groups welfares the purpose of my paper is to explain in depth ramifications of ppf study assumptions and methodology ppf studies that attempt to measure interest group political power do so by measuring marginal rates of transformation along a pareto frontier one can estimate political power with a ppf only if observed policies are pareto efficient which may depend on the assumed number of interest groups and policy instruments marginal rates of transformation need not reveal anything meaningful about interest group political power and may incorrectly measure the direction of transfers

are government transfers efficient an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis the efficient redistribution hypothesis says that no available government policies are pareto superior to observed government policies efficient redistribution from government policy is a central tenet of much recent theoretical and applied political economy literature in this paper limitations of previous attempts to test the efficient redistribution hypothesis are discussed and an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis that uses vector optimization theory and bootstrap methodology is presented

the grain sector of the european community policy formation price determination and implications for trade a coresponsibility levy was added to high domestic prices and export subsidies in the ec levels for policy instruments could result from negotiations which favor producers but are acceptable to the public higher domestic prices and levies but lower export subsidies would occur if levy exemptions cover domestic marketings if exemptions are excluded low domestic prices producer subsidies and export taxes would occur with exemptions improved farm income and treasury surpluses would be achieved without injury to the public exemptions might be excluded because producers are better off and public cost is about the same with either program but producer subsidies require expanded public financing export reductions would occur under either program given prevailing market conditions

shrouded costs of government the political economy of state and local public pensions abstract why do public sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits this paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers and government employees votes by promising compensation packages but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promised compensation if pension packages are shrouded so that public sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers then compensation will be highly back loaded in equilibrium the welfare of public sector workers could be improved holding total public sector costs constant if they received higher wages and lower pensions centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity more state level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs and that reduces pension generosity but a larger share of public sector workers will vote within the jurisdiction which increases pension generosity a short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states california and pennsylvania and two centralized states massachusetts and ohio suggests that centralization appears to have modestly reduced pensions but as the model suggests this is unlikely to be universal

employment and earnings effects of awarding training vouchers in germany participation in intensive training programs for the unemployed in germany is allocated by awarding training vouchers using rich administrative data for all vouchers and actual program participation the authors provide first estimates of the short run and long run employment and earnings effects of receiving a training voucher award based on a selection on observables assumption the results imply that after the award voucher recipients experience long periods of lower labor market success compared to had they not received training vouchers small positive employment effects and no gains in earnings were observed four to seven years after the receipt of the voucher award in addition the findings suggest stronger positive effects both for all low skilled individuals who were awarded and redeemed a voucher and for low skilled and medium skilled individuals who chose to take degree courses than for higher skilled recipients

estimation of price policies in senegal an empirical test of cooperative game theory abstract a game theoretic framework rationalizes the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in senegal policies are the outcome of a cooperative bargaining process among three archetypal players a farmer growing cash and staple crops an urban consumer buying imported cereals and a government marketing board intervening in agricultural markets the game is estimated and the bargaining strength of the players is recovered the axioms underlying the game are tested to discriminate among various bargaining game solutions the symmetry and efficiency axioms are rejected

a policy preference function for government intervention in the u s wheat market this paper estimates a policy preference function that explains the government s choices of target prices government held wheat stocks and public wheat research funding the policy preference function depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures an important innovation in this paper is the inclusion of interactions between public research expenditures and other public policy variables results indicate that the government places a premium of 25 to 45 on the welfare of wheat producers of relative to budget expenditures while wheat consumers welfare is discounted as much as 50 relative to budget expenditures the purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of government commodity programs stock accumulations and research expenditures in the u s wheat sector the explanation is based on a policy preference function ppf that depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures it is assumed that target prices reductions in or additions to government stocks and public research expenditures are chosen to maximize the policy preference function the central contribution of the paper is the estimation of a function that is consistent with the observed government interventions in the u s wheat market that is the paper explains the observed target prices government sales and public research expenditures as rational behavior by a government which seeks to maximize the estimated policy preference function the approach in this paper is based on the political interest group theories of peltzman and becker applications of these ideas to agriculture include rausser and freebairn s description of the beef industry gardner s 1985 analysis

efficient redistribution through commodity markets efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention the implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs the results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient given the political power of interest groups

non optimal unanimous agreement under majority rule reply i agree with lee that the possibility for stable less than unanimous coalitions exists however there are compelling reasons why unanimous coalitions will be more stable game theoretic models often do not have the clear cut answers that simple maximization problems do and this is one factor that makes the study of political coalitions interesting lee has raised some good issues regarding the applicability of my model of non optimal unanimous agreement examining the arguments on both sides i believe that my model is more descriptive than lee s alternative model of coalitions that exclude some people who want to join i will close by reiterating a fundamental point from my original article on which lee and i agree unless a unanimous decision rule is used unanimous agreement does not imply that a pareto superior move is made

non optimal unanimous agreement in collective decision making unanimous agreement is accepted as a benchmark for economic efficiency because with everyone in agreement on an issue a pareto superior move will result from the issue s approval 1 this view of unanimous agreement is not completely accurate though because when unanimous agreement occurs under a less than unanimous decision rule a situation could arise in which individuals could agree with a majority in order to avoid being in the minority there is an important distinction to be made between a decision rule of unanimity and unanimous agreement under a less than unanimous decision rule under a unanimous decision making rule every voter has veto power and so can vote against an issue to keep it from being approved this means that under a unanimous decision rule nobody will approve an issue unless approval makes the individual better off that the status quo under a less inclusive rule like simple majority rule an issue can be approved without the vote of any particular voter as long as a majority of the voters approve typically the voter s single vote will not affect the outcome of a majority rule election thus the voter faces the more complex choice of being in the majority coalition or in the minority coalition sometimes a voter will be better off in the majority coalition than in the minority coalition even if changes proposed by the majority coalition make the voter worse off than the status quo therefore one would not be justified in concluding that because there is unanimous agreement on an issue everyone is made better off unanimous agreement under majority rule may result from all voters in a majority rule system being better off in the majority rather than the minority even if the change that is unanimously approved is not a pareto superior move 2 the general idea behind non optimal unanimous agreement is relatively straightforward under majority rule a majority has the power to exploit the minority 3 therefore under some situations everybody joins the majority on an issue even though some find themselves worse off when the

do the skilled and prime aged unemployed benefit more from training effect heterogeneity of public training programs in germany this study analyses the treatment effects of public training programmes for the unemployed in germany based on propensity score matching methods we extend the picture that has been sketched in previous studies by estimating the treatment effects of medium term programmes for different skill and age groups our results indicate that programme participation has a positive impact on employment probabilities and earnings for almost all sub groups we find little evidence for the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects and the magnitude of the differences is quite small our results thus at least in part conflict with the strategy to provide training increasingly to individuals with better employment prospects

identifying effect heterogeneity to improve the efficiency of job creation schemes in germany previous empirical studies of job creation schemes in germany have shown that the average effects for the participating individuals are negative however we find that this is not true for all strata of the population identifying individual characteristics that are responsible for the effect heterogeneity and using this information for a better allocation of individuals therefore bears some scope for improving programme efficiency we present several stratification strategies and discuss the occurring effect heterogeneity our findings show that job creation schemes do neither harm nor improve the labour market chances for most of the groups exceptions are long term unemployed men in west and long term unemployed women in east and west germany who benefit from participation in terms of higher employment rates

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

an empirical study of age discrimination in norway and germany using a questionnaire and a sample of students and personnel managers we establish the existence of age discrimination in the hiring process in germany and norway as expected age discrimination is more prominent in germany where the hiring probability of equally qualified applicants is reduced by about 22 percentage points due to an age differential of 14 years as opposed to only 12 percentage points in norway within both countries the tendency to discriminate does not differ between students and personnel managers and does not depend on the age of the decision maker the phenomenon of unemployment among older workers is characterized less by the risk of becoming unemployed than by the problem of remaining unemployed and failing to find new work frerichs and naegele 1998 p 59

courses or individual counselling does job search assistance work how does labour market policy affect welfare recipients and long term unemployed people we investigate whether job search assistance jsa helps disadvantaged individuals to find jobs and whether courses or individual counselling is more successful in reaching this goal to evaluate individual employment effects we apply a quasi experimental design and construct suitable comparison groups using propensity score matching methods we compare participants to nonparticipants as well as participants of both schemes directly our article benefits from access to rich administrative data from the german federal employment agency when comparing participants to nonparticipants results suggest that the individual jsa does not affect participants employment prospects at all and that the course jsa even decreased their employment chances at the same time differences in these effects can be ascribed to programme design differences and to differences in the groups of participants therefore we compare both progr

cooperative game theory and the measurement of political power many studies using the political preference function ppf approach to measure the political powers of agricultural interest groups have been criticized for offering little theoretical justification for their methodology zusman p 447 beghin and karp p 51 bullock 1994 it has been claimed that cooperative game theory developed by nash 1950 1953 and harsanyi 1963 1977 provides a formal theoretical basis for ppf methodology zusman rausser and zusman 1992 forthcoming zusman and amiad beghin beghin and karp in this paper i present a brief discussion of the geometry of cooperative game theory and discuss and critique studies that have attempted to apply it to empirical studies of the political economy of agriculture