social norms regulation and environmental risk we add social norms into laffont s mechanism designed for environmental risk we find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms the optimal contract induces more less effort from the green brown firm

the effect of cognitive moral development on honesty in managerial reporting this study examines whether truth telling in the form of honest reporting is associated with cognitive moral development conventional agency theory assumes that people are self interested and willing to tell a lie to increase their personal payoffs while recent empirical evidence shows that some people give up monetary rewards to tell the truth e g evans et al account rev 76 537 559 2001 the social psychology literature suggests that cognitive moral development influences individuals ethical decisions we carried out an experiment whereby participants submitted managerial reports in which truth telling decreased their monetary payoff despite the fact that their decisions were not subject to monitoring auditing or reputation effects some participants reported honestly or partially honestly we find the relationship between honest reporting and cognitive moral development to be both positive and linear compared with those at lower stages of cognitive moral development participants at higher stages of cognitive moral development were more likely to submit an honest report and give up potential monetary gains from lying we further examine the economic impact of honest reporting on the firm s profit with the assumption of self interest and profit maximization antle and eppen manag sci 31 163 174 1985 suggest that a contract with a hurdle rate feature reduces managers information rent we find that in comparison with the expected outcome of a hurdle contract the firm can yield higher profits with a trust contract by hiring managers with a p score higher than 16 67

complex dynamics in a cobweb model with adaptive production adjustment abstract chaos occurs in a nonlinear cobweb model with normal demand and supply naive expectations and adaptive production adjustment the model differs from existing ones in that it includes adaptive production adjustment instead of adaptive expectations the model exhibits observable chaos strange attractors as well as topological chaos horseshoes associated with homoclinic points as numerical simulations show the faster suppliers adjust their production and the more inelastic demand is the more likely the market behaves chaotically

artificial adaptive agents in economic theory economic analysis has largely avoided questions about the way in which economic agents make choices when confronted by a perpetually novel and evolving world as a result there are outstanding questions of great interest to economics in areas ranging from technological innovation to strategic learning in games this is so despite the importance of the questions because standard tools and formal models are ill tuned for answering such questions however recent advances in computer based modeling techniques and in the subdiscipline of artificial intelligence called machine learning offer new possibilities artificial adaptive agents aaa can be defined and can be tested in a wide variety of artificial worlds that evolve over extended periods of time the resulting complex adaptive systems can be examined both computationally and analytically offering new ways of experimenting with and theorizing about adaptive economic agents many economic systems can be classified as complex adaptive systems such a system is complex in a special sense i it consists of a network of interacting agents processes elements ii it exhibits a dynamic aggregate behavior that emerges from the individual activities of the agents and iii its aggregate behavior can be described without a detailed knowledge of the behavior of the individual agents an agent in such a system is adaptive if it satisfies an additional pair of criteria the actions of the agent in its environment can be assigned a value performance utility payoff fitness or the like and the agent behaves so as to increase this value over time a complex adaptive system then is a complex system containing adaptive agents networked so that the environment of each adaptive agent includes other agents in the system complex adaptive systems usually operate far from a global optimum or attractor such systems exhibit many levels of aggregation organization and interaction each level having its own time scale and characteristic behavior any given level can usually be described in terms of local niches that can be exploited by particular adaptations the niches are various so it is rare that any given agent can exploit all of them as rare as finding a universal competitor in a tropical forest moreover niches are continually created by new adaptations it is because of this ongoing evolution of the niches and the perpetual novelty that results that the system operates far from any global attractor improvements are always possible and indeed occur regularly the everexpanding range of technologies and products in an economy or the everimproving strategies in a game like chess provide familiar examples adaptive systems may settle down temporarily at a local optimum where performance is good in a comparative sense but they are usually uninteresting if they remain at that optimum for an extended period a theory of complex adaptive systems based on aaa makes possible the development of well defined yet flexible models that exhibit emergent behavior such models can capture a wide range of economic phenomena precisely even though the development of a general mathematical theory of complex adaptive systems is still in its early stages the aaa models complement current theoretical directions they are

dynamic reform of public institutions a model of motivated agents and collective reputation abstract state capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public service motivation however when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment steady state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation reputation in the mission oriented sector exist reforming a low motivation institution requires a non monotonic wage path since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a high reputation institution but positive for a low reputation institution a transition to a high reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in followed by a wage decrease to crowd non motivated workers out

tax progression in lindahl equilibrium abstract this paper demonstrates that the incidence of benefit taxation depends on the ratio of income and price elasticities of demand for public goods several previously stated special cases of this formula are derived and some conflicting empirical evidence is discussed

agent based computational transaction cost economics this article explores the use of agent based computational economics ace for modelling the development of transactions between firms transaction cost economics neglects learning and the development of trust ignores the complexity of multiple agents and assumes rather than investigates the efficiency of outcomes efficiency here refers to minimum cost or maximum profit we model how co operation and trust emerge and shift adaptively as relations evolve in a context of multiple interacting agents this may open up a new area of application for the ace methodology a simulation model is developed in which agents make and break transaction relations on the basis of preferences based on trust and potential profit profit is a function of product differentiation specificity of assets economy of scale and learning by doing in ongoing relations agents adapt their trust in a partner as a function of his loyalty exhibited by his continuation of a relation they also adapt the weight they attach to trust on the basis of realized profit the model enables an assessment of the efficiency of outcomes relative to the optimum as a function of trust and market conditions we conduct a few experiments to illustrate this application of ace

heuristic learning and the discovery of specialization and exchange abstract i develop and calibrate an agent based model of boundedly rational adaptive agents in a two good production and exchange economy to replicate human subject outcomes in the same eight person experimental economy to test agents ability to capture human behavior i extend the model and use its output to make predictions about a second experimental environment in which the group of eight agents is slowly constructed by merging smaller groups this environment improves human subject performance in the specialization and exchange task and commensurate improvement emerges for some parameterizations of the agent based model this iterative process yields incremental improvement of decision level theories about economic discovery

demand for local public spending evidence from the british social attitudes survey the british social attitudes survey bsas is a uk wide survey that provides a rich source of information on individuals attitudes to a variety of topics including locally provided service in this paper we seek to model answers to questions on attitudes to local authority spending which invite the expression of a private demand for local public spending a convincing picture has emerged of locally provided public goods as imperfectly congested public goods with a price elastic and probably income inelastic demand the view that central government grants may induce voter confusion over tax prices of public services also finds support

simulating the effects of environmental and market variability on fishing industry structure abstract an agent based model comprising a fish stock a fishing fleet and a fish market is used to investigate the combined effects of environmental and market variability on the structure of a fishery over 15 year simulations agents make daily fishing decisions and annual entry exit and investment decisions based on the fishery s past economic outcomes and their individual risk preferences and opportunity costs e g an alternative source of income environmental variability is simulated through fishing success variability while market variability is simulated through changes in the elasticity of the demand curve i e the responsiveness of market prices to changes in daily landings our findings indicate that changes in variability lead to changes in economic and biological conditions of the fishery by influencing the composition of risk preferences within the fleet counter to expectations market stability did not dampen the negative impacts of environmental variability but rather stimulated over investment and increased harvesting by a small number of risk seeking fishers results from this research suggest that climate driven increases in fisheries variability coupled with increases in market integration that act to reduce local price signals may lead to inefficient investments and reduced fishery resources

agency relationships in family firms theory and evidence does owner management necessarily eliminate the agency costs of ownership drawing on agency literature and on the economic theory of the household we argue that private ownership and owner management expose privately held owner managed firms to agency threats ignored by jensen s and meckling s 1976 agency model private ownership and owner management not only reduce the effectiveness of external control mechanisms they also expose firms to a self control problem created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which harm themselves as well as those around them jensen 1994 p 43 thus shareholders have incentive to invest resources in curbing both managerialand owner opportunism we extend this thesis to the domain of the family firm after developing hypotheses which describe how family dynamics and specifically altruism exacerbate agency problems experienced by these privately held owner managed firms we use data obtained from a large scale survey of family businesses to field test our hypotheses and find evidence which suggests support for our proposed theory finally we discuss the implications of our theory for research on family and other types of privately held owner managed firms

is there agreement between beneficiaries on who should bear the costs of conserving farm landscapes abstract in recent years market based incentives have been regarded as a potential solution for addressing market failure related to environmental externalities determining the optimal payment schedule to facilitate such market mechanism typically involves a valuation exercise to capture the static benefits received by beneficiary groups from the public good in this study we augment the valuation estimates with a notion of fair share by assessing opinions of two beneficiary groups tourists and bed and breakfast owners regarding an acceptable division of the burden of financing the public good we find a significant difference in views tourists believe that their accommodation providers should contribute almost twice the amount that they themselves are willing to pay on the contrary a majority of bed and breakfast owners surveyed were against burdening tourists with any additional payments

complexity and the character of stock returns empirical evidence and a model of asset prices based on complex investor learning empirical evidence on the distributional characteristics of common stock returns indicates 1 a power law tail index close to three describes the behavior of the positive tail of the survivor function of returns pr r x x a reflection of fat tails 2 general linear and nonlinear dependencies exist in the time series of returns 3 the time series return process is characterized by short run dependence short memory in both returns as well as their volatility the latter usually characterized in the form of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and 4 the time series return process probably does not exhibit long memory but the squared returns process does exhibit long memory we propose a model of complex self referential learning and reasoning amongst economic agents that jointly produces security returns consistent with these general observed facts and which are supported here by empirical results presented for a benchmark sample of 50 stocks traded on the new york stock exchange the market we postulate is populated by traders who reason inductively while compressing information into a few fuzzy notions that they can in turn process and analyze with fuzzy logic we analyze the implications of such behavior for the returns on risky securities within the context of an artificial stock market model dynamic simulation experiments of the market are conducted from which market clearing prices emerge allowing us to then compute realized returns we test the effects of varying values of the parameters of the model on the character of the simulated returns the results indicate that the model proposed in this paper can jointly account for the presence of a power law characterization of the positive tail of the survivor function of returns with exponent on the order of three for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity for long memory in volatility and for general nonlinear dependencies in returns

willingness to pay for car safety evidence from sweden this study estimates a marginal willingness to pay wtp function for a road mortality risk reduction observed marginal wtp from the swedish car market is used and found to be positively correlated with the baseline risk of the cars no statistically significant relationships between examined owner attributes e g wealth and background risk and marginal wtp are found when comparing the estimated monetary value of a non marginal risk reduction derived from the integral of the marginal wtp function with an estimate based on marginal wtp we find in line with expectations that the difference between the estimates is negligible for smaller risk reductions and small 4 10 also for relatively large risk reductions

markets in equilibrium with firms out of equilibrium a simulation study abstract we explore the effect of the limited ability to process information on the convergence of firms toward equilibrium in the context of a cournot oligopoly with a unique and symmetric nash equilibrium firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm computational experiments show that while market production is close to equilibrium firm production is relatively far from the individual equilibrium level this pattern of firm heterogeneity is not an artifact of random elements built into the decisional process instead it comes from the market interaction of firms with cognitive limitations

financial statement comparability and expected crash risk this study examines the impact of financial statement comparability on ex ante crash risk using the comparability measures of de franco et al 2011 we find that expected crash risk decreases with financial statement comparability and this negative relation is more pronounced in an environment where managers are more prone to withhold bad news we also provide evidence that comparability can mitigate the asymmetric market reaction to bad versus good news disclosures our results suggest that financial statement comparability disinclines managers from bad news hoarding which reduces investors perceptions of a firm s future crash risk

equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private information games an experimental study abstract this paper examines the abilities of standard game theoretic solution concepts static nash equilibrium and a simple model of individual learning to describe subject behavior in an experiment involving private information games with mixed strategy nash equilibrium outcomes the experimental data are compared in several ways with the predictions of static nash equilibrium and the quite different predictions of the learning model which is based on the models of roth and erev 1995 games and economic behavior special issue nobel symposium vol 8 pp 164 212 nash equilibrium does not adequately describe subject behavior whereas the learning model performs well in describing aspects of the evolution in behavior over time

learning by imitation abstract this paper introduces a learning algorithm that allows for imitation in recursive dynamic games the kiyotaki wright model of money is a well known example of such decision environments in this context learning by experience has been studied before here we introduce imitation as an additional channel for learning in numerical simulations we observe that the presence of imitation either speeds up social convergence to the theoretical markov nash equilibrium or leads every agent of the same type to the same mode of suboptimal behavior we observe an increase in the probability of convergence to equilibrium as the incentives for optimal play become more pronounced

social norms of work ethic and incentives in organizations abstract in this paper i model the relation between the dissemination of social norms of work effort work ethic in a given society and the choice of incentives by firms and i motivate it by presenting evidence from three different datasets that suggests that work ethic is correlated with the intensity of firms incentives when the effort choices of different agents in a firm are complementary having hard working coworkers makes an agent more productive therefore in equilibrium she will work harder foreseeing that a work ethic is more useful to hard working agents parents will be more willing to transmit it in societies in which the probability that their offspring will have coworkers with strong work ethic is higher i then expand the model to incorporate the firm technology choice allowing firms to decide between complementary and separable production processes in societies with wide dissemination of work ethic firms will want effort to be complementary as in modern production processes while the opposite is true when the dissemination of work ethic is narrow finally i investigate the comparative dynamics of the model

deep impact geo simulations as a policy toolkit for natural disasters adverse post natural disaster outcomes in low income regions like elevated internal migration levels and low consumption levels are the result of market failures poor mechanisms for stabilizing income and missing insurance markets which force the affected population to respond and adapt to the shock they face in a spatial environment with multiple locations with independent but inter connected markets these transitions quickly become complex and highly non linear due to the feedback loops between the micro individual level decisions and the meso location wise market decisions to capture these continuously evolving micro meso interactions this paper presents a spatially explicit bottom up agent based model to analyze natural disaster like shocks to low income regions the aim of the model is to temporally and spatially track how population distributions income and consumption levels evolve in order to identify low income workers that are food insecure the model is applied to the 2005 earthquake in northern pakistan which faced catastrophic losses and high levels of displacement in a short time span and with market disruptions resulted in high levels of food insecurity the model is calibrated to pre crisis trends and shocked using distance based output and labor loss functions to replicate the earthquake impact model results show how various factors like existing income and saving levels distance from the fault line and connectivity to other locations can give insights into the spatial and temporal emergence of vulnerabilities the simulation framework presented here leaps beyond existing modeling efforts which usually deals with macro long term loss estimates and allows policy makers to come up with informed short term policies in an environment where data is non existent policy response is time dependent and resources are limited

can neoclassical economics handle complexity the fallacy of the oil spot dynamic abstract this paper is essentially a rebuttal of the view that neoclassical economics can handle complexity i have coined the locution oil spot dynamic to denote the neoclassical ability to subsume each and every new perspective the main part of the paper is devoted to showing why the oil spot dynamic cannot work with the complexity approach which is seen as a coherent stand alone research program that stems from the sfi economics program and manifests itself with different nuances the fallacy of the oil spot dynamic is relevant in this period in which economists are beginning to realize that the neoclassical samuelsonian paradigm no longer represents the common language of their profession the spread of the complexity approach and the dissolving notion of mainstream are here interpreted as indicative of a changing economics a short foray into the features of the process of change completes my arguments by showing that the shift from one paradigm to another has many interrelated dimensions and that there may be rigidities internalizing changes

the value of adaption climate change and timberland management abstract adaptation to exogenous change occurs on both intensive and extensive margins whether and how one accounts for human adaptation directly affects estimates of the economic consequences of environmental change estimates that are both critical in informing policy decisions and notoriously difficult to value this paper introduces and applies an analytical framework for placing an economic value on adaptation we explore the issue first in a stylized model that facilitates making concrete generalizations about the kinds of adaptations that generate high or low economic value we then test the soundness of our insights by incorporating learning and adaptive decision making into a structural dynamic forestry model where climate change is imposed exogenously and agents respond optimally using downscaled climate projections integrated with site and species specific timber productivity data we estimate the economic value of adaptation to climate change within the california timber industry we find on the intensive margin changing the rotation intervals will yield a low value of adaptation but on the extensive margin replanting more suitable tree species can yield significant value

product space and the development of nations a model of product diversification abstract hidalgo et al 2007 hidalgo and hausmann 2009 and hausmann and hidalgo 2011 propose an outcome based product space in which development traps can emerge due to low connectivity between products and countries lack of productive capabilities a recent stream of research suggests that this product space can be used as an instrument to guide public policy to assess the potential effects of these policies on an economy s export performance and on the ones of its competitors we build a micro founded simulation model of the evolution of countries positions on the product space we find that export subsidies and polices aiming at improving firm s innovation capabilities can be effective tools for increasing a country export performance however this increase occurs at the expense of competing countries as they support unpredictable changes in the variety of their exports

bonuses and managerial misbehaviour abstract profit based bonus payments have been criticised for encouraging managers to take excessively risky actions or to engage in other activities that are not in the firm s best interest we show however that large bonuses may discourage managers from such misbehaviour because they have more to lose in the event that misbehaviour is detected thus large bonuses may be an optimal way for firms to control misbehaviour our finding sheds new light on recent proposals to regulate bonuses

information processing and bounded rationality a survey this paper surveys recent attempts to formulate a plausible and tractable model of bounded rationality the author focuses in particular on models that view bounded rationality as stemming from limited information processing he discusses partitional models such as computability automata perceptions and optimal networks nonpartitional models and axiomatic approaches

a meeting of the minds informal agreements and social norms using coordination games we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists we combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior we demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion we estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10 of total earnings and more than 120 in the bertrand game we show that informal agreements affect behavior through their direct effect on social norms as well as through an indirect effect on beliefs this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

optimal contracting with endogenous social norms research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by their peers within an agency framework we model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent s cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action defined to be the average level of that action chosen by the agent s peer group we show how endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of monetary incentives determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents sensitivities to social norms are unobservable

risk preference forecasting accuracy and survival dynamics simulations based on a multi asset agent based artificial stock market abstract the relevance of risk preference and forecasting accuracy to the survival of investors is an issue that has recently attracted a number of theoretical studies by using agent based computational modeling this paper extends the existing studies to an economy where adaptive behaviors are autonomous and complex heterogeneous specifically a computational multi asset artificial stock market corresponding to blume and easley blume l easley d 1992 evolution and market behavior journal of economic theory 58 9 40 and sandroni sandroni a 2000 do markets favor agents able to make accurate predictions econometrica 68 1303 1341 is constructed and studied through simulation we present results that contradict the market selection hypothesis

money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents abstract we study the exchange economies of kiyotaki and wright 1989 in which agents must use a commodity or fiat money as a medium of exchange if trade is to occur our agents are artificially intelligent and are modeled as using classifier systems to make decisions in the assignment of credit within the classifier systems we introduce some innovations designed to study sequential decision problems in a multi agent environment for most economies that we have simulated trading and consumption patterns converge to a stationary nash equilibrium even if agents start with random rules in economies with multiple equilibria the only equilibrium that emerges in our simulations is the one in which goods with low storage costs play the role of medium of exchange i e the fundamental equilibrium of kiyotaki and wright

genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model this paper presents the cobweb model in which competitive firms in a market for a single good use a genetic algorithm to update their decision rules about next period production and sales the results of simulations show that the genetic algorithm converges to the rational expectations equilibrium for a wider range of parameter values than other algorithms frequently studied within the context of the cobweb model price and quantity patterns generated by the genetic algorithm are also compared to the data of experimental cobweb economies it is shown that the algorithm can capture several features of the experimental behavior of human subjects better than three other learning algorithms that are considered

empirical research on accounting choice abstract we review research from the 1990s that examines the determinants and consequences of accounting choice structuring our analysis around the three types of market imperfections that influence managers choices agency costs information asymmetries and externalities affecting non contracting parties we conclude that research in the 1990s made limited progress in expanding our understanding of accounting choice because of limitations in research design and a focus on replication rather than extension of current knowledge we discuss opportunities for future research recommending the exploration of the economic implications of accounting choice by addressing the three different reasons why accounting matters

interdependent behavior and the effect of taxes abstract the paper studies the effect of taxes on labor supply in a model with interdependent behavior i e individuals preferences depend on other people s behavior it is found that not taking the interdependency into account can lead to a serious bias in the predicted effects of a tax change it is also shown that interdependent behavior can give rise to spikes in the hours distribution such spikes often have been attributed to quantity constraints

the source of optimality in action it is well known that the nature of the information set and the axioms of rational choice are critical in determining the type of ranking on which agents are held to act in economic theory this paper argues that the concept of the optimising agent is also sensitive to the conception of the relation between a ranking of options facing an agent and concrete action what is termed the realisation process three conceptions of the realisation process are examined which are seen to lead to three quite distinct views on the role of agency the enabling conditions under which the concept of the optimising agent may be legitimately applied and the resulting domain of application of optimisation

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

beyond microfoundations towards a not too rational macroeconomics at ucla we are establishing a center for computable economics i have been very much involved in this effort this may surprise you that a non mathematical macro monetary economist should become an enthusiast for this project is one of those things that do not compute but then as i will explain we take a special interest in things that do not compute one may come to computable economics by many intellectual routes i will trace my own not because it makes a particularly edifying story but because it will tell you what kind of problems i hope we can make progress on by developing the field of computable economics but before we get to that i had better explain what i mean by computable economics

a model of learning and emulation with artificial adaptive agents we study adaptive learning in a sequence of overlapping generations economies in which agents live for n periods agents initially have heterogeneous beliefs and form multi step ahead forecasts using a forecast rule chosen from a vast set of candidate rules agents learn in every period by creating new forecast rules and by emulating the forecast rules of other agents computational experiments show that systems so defined can yield three qualitatively different types of long run outcomes 1 coordination on a low inflation stationary perfect foresight equilibrium 2 persistent currency collapse and 3 coordination failure within the allotted time frame

public goods and the distribution of income abstract this article addresses conceptual issues concerning the distributive incidence of public goods solutions depend on the specific purposes for asking the question of distributive incidence notably assessing the extent to which various public goods should be provided determining how the provision of public goods affects the desirability of income redistribution and providing a meaningful description of the distribution of well being in the course of the analysis a simple and intuitive version of the benefit principle of taxation qualitatively different from those commonly advanced in pertinent literatures is presented and some of the problems confronting empirical attempts to measure the distributive incidence of public goods are resolved

principals preferences for agents with social preferences abstract this study explores a nested representation of ethical moral social identity motivated opportunistic and reciprocal agent preferences to characterize screening contracts in a principal agent model under adverse selection this leads to a ranking of the type of social preferences that principals should seek in agents based upon the information rents associated with each agent type when moral hazard is introduced the ranking further depends upon the interaction of limited liability with self selection these results are interpreted in light of the 2010 dodd frank act and principal agent experiments

political economy based institutional industry complex and sustainable development the case of the salt chemical industry in huai an china abstract this article explains how the salt chemical industry may evolve over time from a high energy consumption based industry complex in the local community to a consolidated pro growth pluralist regime at the urban scale the salt chemical industry is resisting to restructure to a sustainable environmental friendly economic system by spilling over in the form of pro growth political economic coalition in local society theories of the logan and molotch s growth machine stone s urban regime together with the extension of unruh s thesis concerning the characteristics of lock in in the technological or institutional economics approach were used to propose an enlarged lock in political economic framework and pro growth institutional industry complex iic it is further used to explain the consensus building of the pro growth governance a study of the salt chemical and new material industry park in the huai an metropolitan area china serves as an illustrative case the article also suggests that the path dependence followed in constructing a pro growth coalition could serve as a program to unlock the pro growth institutional industry complex of salt chemical industry and foster the anti coalition needed

environmental goods and the distribution of income the paper presents a theoretical investigation of the distributional impacts of environmental commodities it introduces an appropriate framework defines concepts for measuring benefits and examines the determinants of benefit incidence within this setup its emphasis is on methodology and on recognizing the relevant economic variables and information it turns out that in an equal preference model the magnitude of the income elasticity of marginal willingness to pay for an environmental good is the crucial variable determining progressivity it is related to a number of other elasticities which are more easily accessible to an empirical estimation

a learning to forecast experiment on the foreign exchange market with a classifier system abstract this paper reports on an experiment of learning and forecasting on the foreign exchange market by means of an artificial intelligence methodology a classifier system which simulates learning and adaptation in complex and changing environments the experiment has been run for two different exchange rates the us dollar d mark rate and the us dollar yen rate representative of two possibly different market environments a fictitious artificial agent is first trained on a monthly data base from 1973 to 1990 and then tested out of sample from 1990 to 1992 its forecasting performance is then compared with the performance of decision rules which follow the prescription of various economic theories on exchange rate behaviour and the performance of forecasts given by var estimations of the exchange rate s determinants

can contracts signal social norms experimental evidence we investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences a one shot principal agent experiment is studied where prior to contract choice principals are informed about the past actions of other agents and thus have more information about norms of behavior compared with a setting in which principals are uninformed agents exert substantially higher effort under a fixed wage contract when they are aware that an informed principal chose this contract the informed principal s choice apparently signals a norm not to exploit trust which leads to more trustworthy behavior this mechanism s robustness is explored in further experiments data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2336 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

cross border electricity market effects due to price caps in an emission trading system an agent based approach the recent low co2 prices in the european union emission trading scheme eu ets have triggered a discussion whether the eu ets needs to be adjusted we study the effects of co2 price floors and a price ceiling on the dynamic investment pathway of two interlinked electricity markets loosely based on great britain which already has introduced a price floor and on central western europe using an agent based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a co2 market including banking we analyse the cross border effects of national policies as well as system wide policy options a common moderate co2 auction reserve price results in a more continuous decarbonisation pathway this reduces co2 price volatility and the occurrence of carbon shortage price periods as well as the average cost to consumers a price ceiling can shield consumers from extreme price shocks these price restrictions do not cause a large risk of an overall emissions overshoot in the long run a national price floor lowers the cost to consumers in the other zone the larger the zone with the price floor the stronger the effect price floors that are too high lead to inefficiencies in investment choices and to higher consumer costs

how vulnerable is the emissions market to transaction costs an abms approach abstract the impact of transaction costs on the early emissions trading market is examined by applying an agent based model and simulation abms approach for a realistic model set up bounded rationality stochastic characteristics and learning by doing are considered in our search processes marginal abatement cost parameters are obtained from yoo et al 2010 which is an experimental study on the emissions trading in the korean power sector sensitivity analyses are performed on market performance indices with regard to transaction cost parameters which represent scales and the learning elasticities of transaction costs a total of 960 simulations were run in this sensitivity analysis sensitivity analysis results consistently show that higher transaction costs worsen market performance the most remarkable finding in these results is that welfare performance of all the transactions decreases by up to 50 as the scale parameters of transaction costs increase implying that welfare gain from introducing emissions trading disappears significantly however with learning curve effect welfare performance could be regained by up to 26 in sum although transaction costs significantly encroach upon trade gains at the early stage based on our simulation results the welfare loss by way of transaction costs is lessened as the knowledge of market participants progresses

adaptive behavior and economic theory the relationship between psychological and economic views of behavior once a subject of heavy dispute is now understood in a very similar way by practitioners of both these disciplines and of our sister social sciences in general terms we view or model an individual as a collection of decision rules rules that dictate the action to be taken in given situations and a set of preferences used to evaluate the outcomes arising from particular situation action combinations these decision rules are continuously under review and revision new decision rules are tried and tested against experience and rules that produce desirable outcomes supplant those that do not i use the term adaptive to refer to this trial anderror process through which our modes of behavior are determined if one is interested in modeling particular decisions in any very explicit way it is obviously necessary to think about rather narrow aspects of an individual s entire set of decision rules his or her personality experimental psychology has traditionally focused on the adaptive process by which decision rules are replaced by others in this tradition the influence of the subject s or as an economist says the agent s preferences this essay uses a series of examples to illustrate the use of rationality and adaptation in economic theory it is argued that these hypotheses are complementary and that stability theories based on adaptive behavior may help to narrow the class of empirically interesting equilibria in certain economic models an experiment is proposed to test this idea

progression under the benefit approach to the theory of taxation abstract the implications for progression of the benefit approach to the theory of taxation are studied in this paper it is concluded that the case for progression rests on the degree of substitutability between public and private goods

what is benefit taxation abstract benefit taxation is a system in which individuals are taxed according to the benefits they receive from public expenditures this paper describes an alternative to the standard lindahl method of determining the distribution of individual benefits from government provided public goods and uses this alternative to calculate benefit taxes this alternative avoids some of the paradoxial features of lindahl pricing and generates outcomes in which all consumers benefit from reduced costs of providing public goods an illustrative calculation shows that benefit taxes defined in this way may be quite regressive

learning with misspecification in an artificial currency market abstract agents evolve their forecast rules over time via a modified genetic algorithm in a simple artificial currency market these forecast rules can be nonlinearly misspecified when the misspecification is suppressed learning tends to be complete when it is not suppressed learning can generate persistent exchange rate dynamics

varieties of agents in agent based computational economics a historical and an interdisciplinary perspective in this paper we trace four origins of agent based computational economics ace namely the markets origin the cellular automata origin the tournaments origin and the experiments origin along with this trace we examine how these origins have motivated different concepts and designs of agents in ace which starts from the early work on simple programmed agents randomly behaving agents zero intelligence agents human written programmed agents autonomous agents and empirically calibrated agents and extends to the newly developing cognitive agents psychological agents and culturally sensitive agents the review also shows that the intellectual ideas underlying these varieties of agents cross several disciplines which may be considered as a part of a general attempt to study humans and their behavior with an integrated interdisciplinary foundation

the evolution of preferences why sovereign preferences may not lead to sustainable policies and what to do about it abstract the conventional economic paradigm assumes that tastes and preferences are exogenous to the economic system and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences tastes and preferences usually do not change rapidly and in the short term this assumption makes sense sustainability is an inherently long term problem and in the long run it does not make sense to assume tastes and preferences are fixed and given if preferences are expected to change over time and under the influence of education advertising changing cultural assumptions etc the old assumption of consumer sovereignty is not adequate different criteria of optimality are needed how preferences change how they relate to the goal of sustainability and how they can or should be actively influenced to satisfy the new criteria needs to be determined ecological economics has emphasized the three rank ordered goals of ecological sustainability fair distribution and allocative efficiency this paper examines how preferences evolve and change over time and the implications of this for developing policies that meet these three goals in democratic societies

fuzzy inductive reasoning expectation formation and the behavior of security prices abstract this paper extends the santa fe artificial stock market model sfasm studied by lebaron arthur and palmer 1999 journal of economic dynamics and control 23 1487 1516 in two important directions first some might question whether it is reasonable to assume that traders are capable of handling a large number of rules each with numerous conditions as is assumed in the sfasm we demonstrate that similar results can be obtained even after severely limiting the reasoning process we show this by allowing agents the ability to compress information into a few fuzzy notions which they can in turn process and analyze with fuzzy logic second lebaron et al have reported that the kurtosis of their simulated stock returns is too small as compared to real data we demonstrate that with a minor modification to how traders go about deciding which of their prediction rules to rely on when making demand decisions the model can in fact produce return kurtosis that is comparable to that of actual returns data

uncertain health and survival effects on end of life consumption this article analyzes the impact of health and survival uncertainty on the saving and consumption decisions of retirees a dynamic programming approach is used to model the household s planning problem the utility parameters are estimated using panel data we find that a fall into poor health raises the marginal utility from consumption simulations are used to indicate the effects of falling into poor health and loss of spouse they reveal a large transfer from the healthy to the sick partner and a strong dependence of saving on the survivor benefits suggesting that concern about the surviving spouse is an important motive for saving

experimental evidence on money as a medium of exchange abstract this paper presents an experimental examination of kiyotaki and wright s 1989 model of how money can arise as a medium of exchange while the results generally support the hypothesis that individuals are willing to utilize a good as a medium of exchange the trading patterns of a portion of the individuals deviated from the predicted patterns simulation studies suggest that while these deviations may have initially been a rational response by these subjects they persisted after they became less than optimal

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

social norms and economic incentives in firms abstract this paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms we introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents desire for or peer pressure towards social efficiency in a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms we show that one and the same norm can be output increasing neutral or output decreasing depending on the contract multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise

genetic algorithms and inflationary economies abstract this paper studies overlapping generations economies in which agents use genetic algorithms to learn correct decision rules the results of computer simulations show that a genetic algorithm converges to the unique monetary steady state in case of a constant money supply policy and to the low inflation stationary equilibrium in case of a constant real deficit financed through seignorage features of the genetic algorithm adaptation are compared to the performance of other learning algorithms and to the behavior observed in experiments with human subjects in the same olg environments

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

social norms and gift behavior theory and evidence from romania in many developing and transitional countries with limited public income redistribution inter household transfers in general and gifts in particular are sizable and very important we use unique romanian survey data that enables us to isolate pure gifts from other private transfers we explicitly focus on the importance of community wide social norms and find that they indeed play a major role for both the occurrence and the values of gifts more exactly our results suggest that the overall predominant gift motive among romanian households is a norm of reciprocity moreover this norm seems to be dominating for gifts to middle and high income households even though poor households receive to the same extent norms of both impure altruism and reciprocity tend to be important hence although the poor may not reciprocate gifts to the same extent as the rich they still receive since there is a social norm to give especially to the poor

a multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy evidence from the financial services industry we use an incentive compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on the job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders and the normative expectations each group has of the other we examine whistle blowing on a peer an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client we find patterns of agreement among advisers among leaders and between the two groups that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante however we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers when there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers finally we show that when advisers personal ethical opinions do not match group norms this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

survival of businesses using collaborative relationships to commercialize complex goods authors with many theoretical and managerial perspectives argue that businesses commercializing technologically complex goods benefit when they collaborate closely with other businesses collaboration is viewed as a means for businesses to overcome competency limitations and to achieve the close configuration of components required for complex goods we predict that collaborative relationships often assist businesses to produce complex goods but that the relationships might also cause problems for the collaborating businesses we find that firms using development oriented and marketing oriented collaborative relationships in the hospital software systems industry are less likely to shut down than businesses that follow independent approaches when the environment changes gradually but businesses using collaborative relationships are sometimes susceptible to being acquired by other firms following a sudden environmental shock businesses with collaborative relationships for activities central to the shock became more likely to shut down while businesses with collaborative relationships for activities outside the focus of the shock became more likely to survive the study critically evaluates and tests the widely stated but little tested argument that interfirm collaboration is usually beneficial the results address the issue of whether organizational choices affect comparative business performance

rational choice the contrast between economics and psychology rational choice the published record of a conference on economics and psychology frames the issues as a contest between economic theory and the falsifying evidence from psychology according to a third perspective that of experimental economics most standard theory provides a correct first approximation in predicting motivated behavior in laboratory experimental markets but the theory is incomplete particularly in articulating convergence processes in time and in ignoring decision cost this view has roots in the work of herbert simon and sidney siegel but it is not plainly represented in contemporary research in economic pyschology

how control system design influences performance misreporting this paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance we argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers i e other managers at the same hierarchical level this effect depends on the design of the organization s control system in particular on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports the reward structure determines if peers monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance the information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms we present the results of a laboratory experiment as predicted we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others monetary gains in addition overstatements are lower under an open information policy where each individual s reported performance is made public compared to a closed information policy where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice