gender differences in trust and reciprocity evidence from a large scale experiment with heterogeneous subjects this article examines gender differences in an experimental trust game recent studies have shown that men trust more and that women are more reciprocal in laboratory experiments participants in these studies however are typically university students who may not be representative of the entire population in this study we use data from a large scale experiment with heterogeneous subjects who are representative of the german population we find that men exhibit not only more trusting behaviour but also more reciprocating behaviour than women moreover our results are indicative of age dependent gender differences for men we find an inverse u shaped relationship between age on the one hand and both trust and reciprocity on the other however we do not find age effects for women

equilibrium behavior in crisis bargaining games this paper analyzes a general model of two player bargaining in the shadow of war where one player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war i derive conclusions about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints where these constraints hold regardless of the game form hence the qualitative results are game free i show that the higher the informed player s payoff from war the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling the dispute short of war and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war the latter result rationalizes the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war i then provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the probability of war

women ask for less only from men evidence from bargaining in the field abstract data from a tv show provide the opportunity to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining with sizable stakes a proposer and a responder who is selected by the proposer bargain over a fixed pie proposers are in a stronger bargaining position because they have a positive outside option and information on the size of the pie while responders have neither the matching between male proposers and female responders stands as the most favorable for proposers women as responders demand less only from male proposers which explains the difference in earnings

multilateral negotiations a spatial analysis of the arab israeli dispute a model for forecasting political choices and for explaining the perceptual conditions that lead to those choices is delineated the model based on the median voter theorem and on the axioms of expected utility maximization is applied to the prospects for a multilateral peace conference in the middle east the analysis helps provide insights into the motivations behind recent actions by leaders in the soviet union the united states jordan the palestine liberation organization and israel

race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car more than three hundred paired audits at new car dealerships reveal that dealers quoted significantly lower prices to white males than to black or female test buyers using identical scripted bargaining strategies ancillary evidence suggests that the dealerships disparate treatment of women and blacks may be caused by dealers statistical inferences about consumers reservation prices but the data do not strongly support any single theory of discrimination copyright 1995 by american economic association

bargaining and learning while fighting much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game ending costly lottery this article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse the model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power the analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly process literature i the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power ii it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty iii it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources and iv it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed

knowing when to ask the cost of leaning in women s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap popularizing the push for women to lean in and negotiate more examining an environment in which women achieve positi

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

capabilities perception and escalation the evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty we model crises as a game of two sided incomplete information players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities we derive four hypotheses testing them against crises in europe between 1815 and 1970 we show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement we answer five questions 1 how do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence 2 how do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence 3 what do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises 4 under what conditions can deterrence succeed 5 under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis

information power and war ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed the probability of conflict goes to zero however conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender s reservation value i employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power centric theories of world politics balance of power and power transition theory the formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity information asymmetries are greatest thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power centric explanations of world politics

democratization and international organizations international organizations ios have become increasingly pervasive features of the global landscape while the implications of this development have been studied extensively relatively little research has examined the factors that prompt states to enter ios we argue that democratization is an especially potent impetus to io membership democratizing countries are likely to enter ios because leaders have difficulty credibly committing to sustain liberal reforms and the consolidation of democracy chief executives often have an incentive to solidify their position during democratic transitions by rolling back political liberalization entering an io can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms espe cially if the organization is composed primarily of democratic members tests of this hypothesis based on a new data set of ios covering the period from 1965 to 2000 confirm that democratization spurs states to join ios in recent years international organizations ios have become increasingly perva sive features of the global landscape both the number of such organizations and the range of issue areas they cover have grown rapidly the implications of this development have been studied extensively and hotly debated in the field of inter national relations whereas some researchers believe that ios have little effect on state behavior many observers argue that the proliferation of these institutions will facilitate interstate cooperation and help to resolve the interstate conflicts that do arise 1 in contrast relatively little research has been conducted on the factors that prompt states to enter ios this gap in the literature is both surprising and important while many countries have rushed to join ios others participate in few of these organizations what determines the propensity of states to join ios

the power to hurt costly conflict with completely informed states according to common explanations of war since war is costly and risky rational states have incentives to strike a bargain and avoid conflict war is then the result of private information about capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent this information or inability to make credible commitments fearon 1995 this article presents another rationalist explanation which does not depend on either of these mechanisms by modeling warfare as a costly bargaining process the paper demonstrates that inefficient fighting can occur in equilibrium under very general assumptions favoring peace specifically it is assumed that peace can be supported in equilibrium and that fighting brings no benefits to either state only costs despite the fact that there exist many agreements that pareto dominate the final settlement states are unable to agree to them and fighting can occur in equilibrium the equilibrium is driven by the ability of states to impose costs on their opponent and bear costs the power to hurt the opponent establishes a range of acceptable settlements and the existence of such a range makes inefficient equilibria possible the article suggests that 1 states may fight if they believe that seeking peace means accepting an unpalatable settlement and 2 a diminished ability to hurt the enemy is a major reason for war termination historical examples are provided to illustrate these results

the global rise of democracy a network account we examine the influence of an interstate network created by intergovernmental organizations igos on the global diffusion of democracy we propose that igos facilitate democracy s diffusion by transmitting information between member states and by interpreting that information according to prevailing norms in the world society where democracy is viewed as the legitimate form of government we employ a network autocorrelation model to track changes in democracy among all of the world s countries from 1815 to 2000 we find that democracy does diffuse through the igo network and that the influence of democratic countries is stronger than that of undemocratic countries evidence indicates that the igo network serves as a basis for normative diffusion this is an important contribution to sociological accounts of globalization which tend to emphasize diffusion divorced from network structure or diffusion dependent on the coercive influence of a small set of international organizations

uncertainty shifting power and appeasement great britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state if those aims are limited then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state s demands rather than go to war to oppose them if however the rising state s demands are unlimited then the declining state prefers fighting and given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war this situation creates a trade off the earlier a state stands firm the stronger it will be if war ensues but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war in equilibrium the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions

war is in the error term at least since thucydides students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war rationalist explanations assume purposive action states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive durable and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war i show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate we cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante both to us as researchers and to the participants thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically however the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables however detailed the explanation serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives we can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic for example we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance the need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight otherwise states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty it has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic war is literally in the error term

gender differences in time preferences this paper reports the results from a large online experiment in which we examine gender differences in time preferences subjects choose in different situations between receiving an immediate payment and receiving a different sum later we find that more men than women are impatient and choose to receive the immediate payment at least if the implicit interest rate of the late option is neither too high nor too low

the might of the pen a reputational theory of communication in international disputes i present a theory of effective diplomacy based on honesty and reputations i model diplomacy as a form of cheap talk and international interactions as an infinitely repeated game in which similar states find themselves in disparate situations over time the theory explains the success and failure of diplomacy reputations for honesty make honest communication possible a state caught bluffing is less able to communicate and less likely to attain its goals in the near future these findings imply that domestic audience costs are unnecessary for international signaling and that military strength is not the only way to build credibility

efficient secrecy public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy this paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy conventional audience cost models suggest that state leaders must go public to reveal information in interstate crises because leaders cannot enhance their credibility by tying their hands if domestic audiences cannot observe their private signals i present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience the equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat albeit of limited credibility can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational ine cacy because secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war the logic of e cient secrecy may shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises the alaska boundary dispute illustrates this logic

when misperception matters this essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor s preferences in international relations the author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy although it can affect that actor s expectations as long as both actors are self interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences an actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other s misperception of its preferences and thus to avoid conflict not to create it three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable in a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war

of age sex and money insights from corporate officer compensation on the wage inequality between genders this paper shows that the gender and age of the wage setter are crucial determinants of the disparity in wages between sexes we document our findings using a data set on compensation of corporate officers that is uniquely suited for this analysis because officer wages are set by chief executive officers ceos we show that ceos pay officers of the opposite gender less than officers of their own gender even when controlling for job characteristics older and male ceos exhibit the greatest propensity to differentiate on the basis of sex female officers receive smaller raises if the firm is headed by a man our results suggest that ceo gender and age are economically more important determinants of officer compensation than are firm stock performance stock volatility or return on assets this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

gender differences in bargaining outcomes a field experiment on discrimination abstract relying on a commonly used fixed offer bargaining script we examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive and frequently used market the taxi market in lima peru our bargaining script secures that only the seller can change prices and terminate negotiations thus we are able to examine differences in the seller s entire path of negotiation and in the reservation price at which they are willing to trade we find that male and female passengers who use the same bargaining script are not treated equally men face higher initial prices final prices and rejection rates these differences are consistent with male drivers being more reluctant to give in to demanding negotiations by male passengers and with male passengers being perceived as having high valuations to identify whether taste based or statistical discrimination drives the inferior treatment of men we conduct an experiment where passengers send a signal on valuation before negotiating the signal eliminates gender differences and the response is shown only to be consistent with statistical discrimination thus in the limiting case of a highly competitive market with experienced traders we do not find evidence of taste based discrimination the differential observed is however consistent with statistical discrimination

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

the escalation of great power militarized disputes testing rational deterrence theory and structural realism realism we test the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches on the escalation of deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984 we derive a set of hypotheses from each model operationalize them for systematic empirical analysis and test the hypotheses on 97 cases of great power deterrence encounters by means of probit analysis the results are that the hypotheses derived from deterrence theory receive considerable support whereas none of the hypotheses derived from structural realism are supported in contemporary research on the causes of international conflict the realist paradigm has been the dominant theoretical approach within this broad framework however scholars have developed at least two prominent alternative models of the conditions under which conflict is likely to arise the first approach structural realism 1 focuses on the attributes of the international system while the second deterrence theory is largely dyadic and emphasizes the resolve and relative military capabilities of adversarial states while both theoretical approaches attempt to identify the conditions under which international crises and wars are likely to arise their

absolute and relative gains in international relations theory the problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism the former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation the latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states preferences using a simple game theoretic model this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states behavior the feasibility of cooperation and especially the states concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model

rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies several recent books have argued that comparative case studies of crises demonstrate the failure of rational deterrence theory they have offered certain empirical generalizations as substitutes this paper shows that such contentions are unwarranted first the empirical generalizations are impressive as historical insights but they do not meet the standards for theory set out by the most sophisticated case study analysts themselves second the tests of rational deterrence used in the case studies violate standard principles of inference and the ensuing procedures are so biased as to be useless rational deterrence then is a more successful theory than portrayed in this literature and it remains the only intellectually powerful alternative available case studies are essential to theory building more efficiently than any other methods they find suitable variables suggest middle range generalizations for theory to explain and provide the prior knowledge that statistical tests require their loose constraints on admissible propositions and suitable evidence are appropriate and even necessary for these tasks these same characteristics however inevitably undermine all attempts to construe case study generalizations as bodies of theory or tests of hypotheses

the third leg of the kantian tripod for peace international organizations and militarized disputes 1950 85 immanuel kant believed that democracy economic interdependence and international law and organizations could establish the foundations for perpetual peace our analyses of politically relevant dyads show that each of the three elements of the kantian peace makes a statistically significant independent contribution to peaceful interstate relations these benefits are evident even when the influence of other theoretically interesting factors such as relative power alliances geographic contiguity and economic growth is held constant increasing the number of shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations igos by one standard deviation reduces the incidence of militarized disputes by about 23 percent from the baseline rate for a typical pair of bordering states if both members of a dyad are democratic conflict is 35 percent less likely than the baseline increasing both the dyadic trade gdp ratio and the trend in trade by a standard deviation reduces the chance of conflict by 38 percent together all the kantian variables lower the probability of a dispute by 72 percent we check for reverse causation and find reason to believe that a feedback system is at work with igos reducing conflict and low conflict dyads joining igos democracies and interdependent states are more likely to join igos with one another bringing together the three elements of a system for kantian peace

domestic opposition and signaling in international crises this article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises it combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two party electoral choice one state has two strategic actors a government and an opposition party both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo the rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals the parties payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate the model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state s preferences this finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation

bargaining in the shadow of war when is a peaceful resolution most likely this article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war should it take place i show that the aggressor s demand curve can be below the defender s offer curve that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war a simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

investing in the peace economic interdependence and international conflict research appears to substantiate the liberal conviction that trade fosters global peace still existing understanding of linkages between cone ict and international economics is limited in at least two ways first cross border economic relationships are far broader than just trade global capital markets dwarf the exchange of goods and services and states engage in varying degrees of monetary policy coordination second the manner in which economics is said to inhibit cone ict behavior is implausible in light of new analytical insights about the causes of war we discuss and then demonstrate formally how interdependence can ine uence states recourse to military violence the risk of disrupting economic linkages particularly access to capital may occasionally deter minor contests between interdependent states but such opportunity costs will typically fail to preclude militarized disputes instead interdependence offers nonmilitarized avenues for communicating resolve through costly signaling our quantitative results show that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade democracy interest and other variables students of world politics have long argued that peace is a positive externality of global commerce theorists like montesquieu and kant and practitioners like woodrow wilson asserted that economic relations between states pacify political interaction mounting evidence in recent years appears to substantiate these claims multiple studies many identie ed with the democratic peace link interstate trade with reductions in militarized disputes or wars 1 while we concur with the evolving

pay differences among the highly paid the male female earnings gap in lawyers salaries this article uses very detailed information on graduates of the university of michigan law school to examine male female pay differences in that population men and women in this population have virtually identical human capital on graduation from law school allowing us to examine carefully the different impact of children and work history on men s and women s careers and earnings taking time from work in order to care for children reduces wages significantly but a rich set of controls including childcare work history school performance and job setting measures still leave one fourth to one third of the earnings gap unexplained

gender differences in experimental wage negotiations i introduction gender wage gaps have been the subject of extensive research in labor economics although this gap has narrowed in the last decades blau and kahn 2003 report that women still receive lower wages than men in many countries traditionally differences in the accumulation of human capital and discrimination are seen as the main factors responsible for this wage gap bertrand 2011 however even after controlling for various measures of human capital the wages of men and women differ significantly and this wage gap persists over time recently alternative explanations have been analyzed more closely such as gender differences in preferences croson and gneezy 2009 risk attitudes eckel and grossman 2008 and responses to competitive situations gneezy leonard and list 2009 in many labor relationships wages are determined by bilateral bargaining hence another source of the persistent gender wage gap could be differences in bargaining behavior between women and men babcock and laschever 2003 find that 57 of male graduate business students bargain over their starting salaries while only 7 of women do so consequently male starting salaries are 7 6 higher than those obtained by women investigating the salary negotiating behaviors and starting salary outcomes of graduating master of business administration mba students gerhart and rynes 1991 find that women obtain lower salary increments when negotiating than men wood et al 1993 report significant male female pay differences of law school graduates both 1 year and 15 years after graduation apart from wages team production hiring and promotion decisions are further domains where significant gender differences emerge sutter et al 2009 at least some of these differences might also be related to differences in the bargaining behavior of men and women this paper studies whether men and women behave differently in wage negotiations 1 the analysis is based on a laboratory experiment with face to face alternating offers wage bargaining allowing experimental subjects to see each other in face to face negotiations and thus to easily identify their bargaining partner s gender allows us to analyze gender differences our results suggest that gender and gender pairing play an important role in bargaining processes in our experimental wage negotiations male employees are able to negotiate higher wages than female employees moreover male employers pay lower wages to female employees than female employers pay to male employees we find that men acting as employees achieve more favorable outcomes than female employees because they already demand a larger share for themselves when making their first offers when acting as employers we do not find behavioral differences between men and women overall these results provide further evidence that part of the gender wage gap can be attributed to behavioral differences in wage negotiations the paper is organized as follows section ii provides a brief review of the literature on gender differences in bargaining experiments in section iii we present our experimental design section iv discusses the effects of gender and gender pairing in the bargaining process section v concludes ii gender differences and bargaining a number of studies have examined differences in the behavior of women and men in bargaining situations in a controlled field study ayres and siegelman 1995 analyze the bargaining outcomes of men and women negotiating the price of a new car they report that car sellers offer male buyers lower prices than female buyers ayres 1991 finds that women obtain worse bargaining outcomes than men negotiating with a female seller save soderbergh 2009 finds that female university graduates propose lower wage bids than male university graduates and also receive lower wage offers than male students conducting field experiments in lima peru castillo et al

capabilities uncertainty and resolve a limited information model of crisis bargaining this paper presents and solves a crisis bargaining game under limited information the sides alternate offers from three possible offers with war and its costs starting if the target s counteroffer is rejected the equilibrium of the model falls into four different cases these four cases are analyzed to determine how the sides communicate through their offers and how the costs of war initial beliefs misperceptions and distribution of capabilities drive the probabilities of a crisis and war the model demonstrates a joint selection bias misspecification problem in empirical studies of crises arising from the unobservable nature of beliefs several empirical studies of crisis bargaining are discussed in the light of this methodological problem new patterns of evidence are found that support the presence of the selection problem and their conclusions are reexamined

balance of power and the propensity of conflict we study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict our experimental results suggest in a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power if bargaining involves endogenous demand choices however the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players unequal fighting strengths strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced in turn the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power

the kantian peace the pacific benefits of democracy interdependence and international organizations 1885 1992 the authors test kantian and realist theories of interstate conflict using data extending over more than a century treating those theories as complementary rather than competing as the classical liberals believed democracy economic interdependence and international organizations have strong and statistically significant effects on reducing the probability that states will be involved in militarized disputes moreover the benefits are not limited to the cold war era some realist influences notably distance and power predominance also reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict the character of the international system too affects the probability of dyadic disputes the consequences of having a strong hegemonic power vary but high levels of democracy and interdependence in the international system reduce the probability of conflict for all dyads not just for those that are democratic or dependent on trade

do intergovernmental organizations promote peace a basic debate in world politics involves the impact of intergovernmental organizations igos on international conflict liberals functionalists and others see igos as capable of transforming global anarchy while realists emphasize the essential irrelevance of igos in managing such fundamental processes as war and peace recent quantitative studies also yield disparate conclusions depending on particular econometric assumptions implying variously that igos foster pacific relations among states have no impact on dispute behavior or even increase dispute propensity at least part of the problem is a lack of theoretical and empirical specificity the authors apply bargaining theory to develop a middle path between the realist and liberal perspectives only some igos those with security mandates and the most sophisticated institutional structures are likely to influence dispute behavior the authors combine the theory with two improvements in research design first igos vary in capability mandate and cohesion the authors construct a dataset of igo institutional heterogeneity and member cohesiveness second states join igos for reasons that are not unrelated to why states fight the authors control for the level of international involvement among countries and find support for their arguments in initial tests

testing theories of strategic choice the example of crisis escalation strategic choice explanations of international crisis escalation imply that because actors anticipate the likely responses of others and choose actions that avoid undesirable responses our observations of nations decisions to use force are interdependent and censored for example suppose a weak nation b is threatened by a powerful neighbor a if b believes a s threat then it should back down unfortunately this censors our ability to observe whether a would actually use violence many traditional methods ignore this censoring and mis specify the extent to which variables influence crisis behavior to ameliorate the problems of interdependence and censoring i develop the strategically censored discrete choice model estimating this model using bayesian markov chain monte carlo simulation methods i analyze bueno de mesquita and lalman s 1992 dyadically coded version of the militarized interstate dispute data gochmann and maoz 1984 based on bayesian model comparison statistics i conclude that strategic explanations outperform nonstrategic ones in explaining crisis behavior

conflict war and redistribution this article analyzes the circumstances under which conflict leads to the outbreak of war using a formal model which incorporates both the redistribution of resources as an alternative to war and imperfect information countries act as rational agents concerned with both consumption and the public bad of a war in the first period both countries can either consume or build arms whereas in the second period there can be either the threat or the use of force to reallocate resources if both countries are fully informed then there will be no war but rather a voluntary redistribution of resources in a situation of asymmetric information however in which one country is fully informed and the other is not a war can occur if the uninformed country uses a separating equilibrium strategy precommitting itself to a positive probability of war in order to prevent bluffing by the informed country

crisis bargaining escalation and mad although incomplete information is recognized to be an essential feature of crises game theoretic formulations have not generally modeled this explicitly this paper models a mutually assured destruction mad crisis as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information sufficiently simple that its equibria may be found these provide better game theoretic foundations for the notions of resolve and critical risk and their role in crises and also make it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics of this model with those of descriptively richer but incompletely specified models revealing several inconsistencies several analyses of mad conclude that the state with the greatest resolve in this contest of resolve will prevail many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate the greater its adversary s resolve in our model however the state with the weakest resolve sometimes prevails and some states prove more likely to escalate if their adversaries resolve is greater

the relative gains problem for international cooperation modern realism claims that the fear that others will enjoy relatively greater benefits frequently impedes international cooperation recent articles in this review by duncan snidal and robert powell modeled conditions under which the impact of relative gains varied joseph grieco criticizes snidal s model as based on assumptions that allow him to avoid rather than confront the realist arguments he also argues that powell s model while constructive ignores important additional sources of sensitivity to relative gains in response powell discusses the value of alternative assumptions about preferences and constraints in international relations snidal defends his analysis and presents an additional proof to support the independence of his central result the diminishing impact of relative gains with increasing numbers of states from assumptions of concern to grieco both responders emphasize their work as contributing to a contextually rich theory of international politics that builds on elements of both realism and neo liberalism

relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well in international politics this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy after discussing why states might seek relative gains i demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed relative gains do impede cooperation in the two actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner s dilemma problem but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner s dilemma relative gains seeking is much less consequential its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

modeling the forms of international cooperation distribution versus information the problems of distribution and information impede international cooperation they arise when actors select how they will cooperate an exploration of the interaction between these problems using a limited information model of cooperation leads to six conclusions first leadership solutions to coordination problems always exist but leadership here is very different from hegemonic provision of public goods second actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy even without a shadow of the future third diffuse reciprocal strategies arise naturally in coordination problems fourth norms and institutions are intertwined within successful cooperation fifth the form of cooperation on an issue varies with the relative importance of distribution and information finally and most important distributional and informational problems interfere with each other arrangements to cooperate can successfully address one but not both of these problems

the inefficient use of power costly conflict with complete information recent work across a wide range of issues in political economy as well as in american comparative and international politics tries to explain the inefficient use of power revolutions civil wars high levels of public debt international conflict and costly policy insulation in terms of commitment problems this paper shows that a common mechanism is at work in a number of these diverse studies this common mechanism provides a more general formulation of a type of commitment problem that can arise in many different substantive settings the present analysis then formalizes this mechanism as an inefficiency condition that ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient this condition has a natural substantive interpretation large rapid changes in the actors relative power measured in terms of their minmax payoffs may cause inefficiency