globalization and rural poverty as is common in most contentious public debates different people mean different things by globalization some interpret it to mean the global reach of new technology and capital movements some refer to outsourcing by domestic companies in rich countries others protest against the tentacles of corporate capitalism or us hegemony economic military or cultural in this chapter i shall limit myself to interpreting globalization simply as openness to foreign trade and long term capital flows i shall ignore here the important issues arising from the devastation caused to fragile economies by billions of dollars of volatile short term capital stampeding around the globe in herd like movements or the substantial poverty reducing potential of international unskilled labour flows from poor to rich countries even if allowed in temporary and regulated doses

market failure in incentive based regulation the case of emissions trading abstract among the existing evaluations of the us epa s emissions trading program a consensus has emerged while the program has resulted in significant cost savings it has not even approximately achieved a cost effective allocation of the control responsibility the cost savings have been smaller and the trades fewer than might have been expected at the outset of the program in this article we explore one hypothesis which purports to explain the divergence between the cost minimizing and the observed pattern of trades for nonuniformly mixed pollutants the trading process hypothesis attributes some significant proportion of this divergence to the nature of the process by which emission reduction credits are traded under the bubble policy an examination of actual bubble trades reveals that the actual trading process is sequential and bilateral and hence differs considerably from the implicit process modeled in the existing empirical studies simulations of this more realistic trading process suggest that the resulting equilibria deviate considerably from cost effective allocations of the control responsibility

when two wrongs make a right second best point nonpoint trading ratios most research on point nonpoint trading focuses on the choice of trading ratio the rate point source controls trade for nonpoint controls although the first best ratio is jointly determined with the optimal number of permits in practice program managers often do not have control over the number of permits only the trading ratio the trading ratio in this case can only be second best we derive the second best trading ratio and using a numerical example of trading in the susquehanna river basin we find the values are in line with current ratios but for different reasons than those that are normally provided

economic incentives to improve water quality in agricultural landscapes some new variations on old ideas agricultural nutrients and other emissions remain a primary source of water quality degradation in much of the nation many such sources are classified as nonpoint sources under the clean water act and are therefore exempt from most federal regulations and enforceable standards in addition many agricultural nonpoint source emissions are difficult to measure and the damages that result from them depend on the amount that is transported to the waterways nutrient runoff particularly nitrogen and phosphorous from intensive row crop agriculture in much of the cornbelt exemplifies these issues both the lack of enforceable standards and the physical characteristics of nutrient fate and transport make the design of efficient policy challenging as witnessed by the lack of significant progress over the last several decades this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item thi this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality a theoretical development the purpose of this paper is to develop and explore a theory dealing with an important facet of agricultural runoff problems agricultural runoff is a nonpoint externality with notable implications for both research and policy a nonpoint externality exists whenever the externality contributions of individual economic agents cannot be practically measured by direct monitoring without monitoring regulations on emissions cannot be enforced and charges or subsidies cannot be assessed thus policies which are usually suggested for pollution abatement are not available there is great need for a theoretical base that can adequately capture these facts such a theory yields some important implications even before specific empirical applications the economic problem of agricultural runoff can be separated into three distinct categories first the sediment nutrients and chemicals removed by runoff represent a loss of resources to the individual farmer these costs are borne privately by farmers second if the discount rate of the individual farmer is greater than the social discount rate or if the farmer has a planning horizon which is shorter than society s the farmer will mine the soil resource at a rate which is more depletive than is socially optimal this is a temporal externality a third category involves the conservation of mass physical resources lost by the individual farm must appear elsewhere in the environment in sufficient quantities these resources are pollutants since water is the primary transport media for these resources it is water that is polluted by soil nutrients and agricultural chemicals this spatial externality has been the focus of much research here we intend to develop a theory for these issues to employ it to suggest a revised research methodology and to provide some important conclusions about alternative runoff policies only two of the three categories of agricultural runoff problems involve externalities and only the spatial externality is considered here

point nonpoint effluent trading with spatial heterogeneity potential earnings from permits sales may provide an incentive for farmers to accept water quality regulation we derive optimal adjustments of point nonpoint effluent trading ratios for heterogeneity in marginal environmental damage and degradation retention of the pollutant across locations in a watershed a simulation based on data from the kymi river valley finland indicates that farmers are the greatest suppliers of permits as expected but that gains from trading vary substantially some farmers may become net buyers of permits and thus net losers from regulation the benefits of effluent trading are distributed unevenly among point sources as well copyright 2008 oxford university press

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

a trading ratio system for trading water pollution discharge permits abstract the fact that water flows to the lowest level uni directionally is a very specific and useful property of water by utilizing this property we design a trading ratio system trs of tradable discharge permits for water pollution control such a trading ratio system has three main characteristics 1 the zonal effluent cap is set by taking into account the water pollutant loads transferred from the upstream zones 2 the trading ratios are set equal to the exogenous transfer coefficients among zones and 3 permits are freely tradable among dischargers according to the trading ratios this paper shows that the trs can take care of the location effect of a discharge and can achieve the predetermined standards of environmental quality at minimum aggregate abatement costs problems with hot spots and free riding can be avoided and the burdens on both dischargers and the environmental authority should be relatively light

ambient taxes under m dimensional choice sets heterogeneous expectations and risk aversion we consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk neutral and risk averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events unlike prior work we showthat under these conditions optimal ambienttaxes must be firm specific and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters choices of abatement techniques

costs of a practice based air quality regulation dairy farms in the san joaquin valley facing the difficulty of accurately measuring pollution from agriculture economists have recommended regulatory approaches using proxies such as management practices to reduce agricultural pollution using farm level cost data on a panel of dairy farms i estimate the effects of a practice based air quality regulation for dairy farms in the san joaquin valley in california as opposed to ex ante analyses my econometric results indicate that the air quality regulation has not significantly affected the total costs of milk production estimates also suggest that the regulation might have differential effects on different elements of costs i support the econometric findings with evidence on how dairy farms comply with the regulation calculated adoption rates of different pollution mitigation practices using administrative data reveal that dairy farms have mainly adopted labor intensive practices to comply with the regulation

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

the regulation of non point source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information abstract this paper develops a bayesian framework for discussing the role of information in the design of non point source pollution control mechanisms an ambient concentration tax is examined allowing for spatial transport among multiple zones imposition of the tax requires costly measurement of concentrations in selected zones and the selection of zones for measurement must be undertaken without perfect information regarding several parameters of the problem potentially crucial information issues discussed include a the impact of asymmetric priors regarding fate and transport b the cost of measuring ambient concentration and c the optimal acquisition of information regarding fate and transport

endogenous transport coefficients implications for improving water quality from multi contaminants in an agricultural watershed the effectiveness of imperfect pollution control instruments is examined for a diffuse source multi contaminant problem in which the transport coefficients for sediment bound residuals are endogenous similar evaluations fix the percentage of sediment deposited and optimize either for a single firm managing the whole watershed or on a firm by firm basis this study shows that ignoring the dependence of the transport coefficients on intervening land uses creates a positive externality the filtering potential of activities conducted by firms close to the receptor permits firms further away to undertake more profitable but erosive practices optimizing management choices and consequently endogenizing the transport coefficients for all firms simultaneously removes the externality an empirical application combines hydrological simulation models with an economic optimization model for nutrient pollution of surface and ground water within an agricultural watershed although firms are homogeneous in abatement costs differences in spatial location leave uniform instruments unable to achieve the water quality goal efficiently an ambient tax subsidy scheme can achieve the water quality goal efficiently but the informational requirements will be excessive in most situations where the transport mechanisms for residuals are dependent upon the practices of independent decision making units

ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices economic research on environmental policy design has largely been concerned with the merits of emissions based economic incentives e g emissions charges emissions reduction subsidies transferable discharge permits ambient based tax subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions based instruments expanding especially on segerson s seminal article this article examines the optimal design and budget balancing properties of ambient tax subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms choice sets than prior research

efficient estimation with panel data when instruments are predetermined an empirical comparison of moment condition estimators i examine the empirical performance of instrumental variables estimators with predetermined instruments in an application to life cycle labor supply under uncertainty the estimators studied are two stage least squares generalized method of moments gmm forward filter independently weighted gmm and split sample instrumental variables i compare the bias efficiency trade off for the estimators using bootstrap algorithms suggested by freedman and by brown and newey results indicate that the downward bias in gmm is quite severe as the number of moment conditions expands outweighing the gains in efficiency the forward filter estimator however has lower bias and is more efficient than two stage least squares

markets for tradeable emission and ambient permits a dynamic approach this paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollutionpermit markets proofs are given that sequential bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permitsconverges to a market equilibrium with minimal totalcosts of pollution control if ambient or depositionpermits are traded the convergence of bilateraltransactions occurs only in the case of a singlereceptor for multiple receptors the proof ofconvergence for tradeable emissions and ambientpermits is given for two trade mechanisms sequential multilateral trade and a walrasian auction

has latin america s post reform growth been disappointing after years of poor economic performance many latin american countries undertook ambitious programs of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform in recent years this change in policy created high expectations for the region and some observers have questioned whether actual growth outcomes have lived up to these expectations the authors offer evidence that the response of economic growth to reforms in latin america has not been disappointing because of their significant policy changes and despite a global slowdown latin america did well to return to its historic growth rate of 2 percent per capita in 1990 93 latin america has responded to changes in policy variables as would have been predicted by the experience of other times and places those earlier experiences are summarized by a panel regression spanning many countries and multi year periods from 1960 to 1993 to get consistent estimates of the parameters linking growth and policy variables the authors use a dynamic panel methodology that both controls for unobserved time and country specific effects and accounts for the likely internal dynamism of the explanatory variables

contract design for the purchase of environmental goods from agriculture an environmental stewardship program whereby farmers are paid directly for the environmental goods they provide is developed by combining the microparameter distribution model with mechanism design principles the program overcomes the information asymmetry between farmers and governments and accounts for the deadweight losses from distortionary taxes the characteristics of optimal input and payment schedules of the program are derived these optimal schedules are determined by the tradeoffs between farming profits environmental benefits and deadweight losses from taxes and are second best except under restrictive conditions on deadweight losses from taxes and on the marginal product of inputs and marginal pollution costs

why are latin america s savings rates so low an international comparative analysis abstract this paper presents a theoretical and empirical assessment of the determinants of savings rates with special emphasis on latin american savings rates the study is based on international comparisons using data from 36 countries for 1970 1992 a distinction is made between private and public savings the later are endogenously determined by economic and political variables per capita income growth is the most important determinant of private and public savings public savings are lower in countries with higher political instability public savings crowd out private savings but less than proportionately low latin american savings are due to the magnitudes of their determinants rather than structural differences

reversing property rights practice based approaches for controlling agricultural nonpoint source water pollution when emissions aggregate nonlinearly nonpoint source water pollution remains a major issue despite decades of research and sizable conservation programs we suggest that by taking advantage of contemporary modeling and optimization approaches good approximations to physical relationships can be constructed so that even in the presence of unobservable field emissions and nonlinear fate and transport relationships standard economic tools of command and control requirements performance standards and trading can be implemented the boone river watershed in the u s state of iowa is used for empirical demonstration although the approach can be used to construct voluntary conservation policies the described policies involve imposing requirements on agricultural polluters rather than relying on voluntary actions alone

what drives private saving around the world the authors investigate the policy and non policy factors behind saving disparities using a large panel data set and an encompassing approach including several relevant determinants of private saving they extend the literature in several dimensions by 1 using the largest data set on aggregate saving assembled to date 2 using panel instrumental variable techniques to correct for endogeneity and heterogeneity 3 performing robustness checks on changes in estimation procedures data samples and model specification their main empirical findings a private saving rates show considerable inertia are highly serially correlated even after controlling for other relevant factors b private sector rates rise with the level and growth rate of real per capita income so policies that spur development are in indirect but effective way to raise private saving rates c predictions of the life cycle hypothesis are supported in that dependency ratios generally have a negative effect on private saving rates d the precautionary motive for saving is supported by the finding that inflation conventionally taken as a summary measure of macroeconomic volatility has a positive impact on private saving holding other facts constant e fiscal policy is a moderately effective tool for raising national saving f the direct effect of financial liberalization are largely detrimental to private saving rates greater availability of credit reduces the private saving rate financial depth and higher real interest rates do not increase saving

differences in social and public risk perceptions and conflicting impacts on point nonpoint trading ratios if stochastic nonpoint pollution loads create socially costly risk then an economically optimal point nonpoint trading ratio the rate point source controls trade for nonpoint controls is adjusted downward a risk reward for nonpoint controls encouraging more nonpoint controls however in actual trading programs ratios are adjusted upward in response to nonpoint uncertainties a risk premium for nonpoint controls this contradiction is explained using a public choice model in which regulators focus on encouraging abatement instead of reducing damages the result is a divergence of public and social risk perceptions and a trading market that encourages economically suboptimal nonpoint controls copyright 2001 oxford university press