policy spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants abstract we analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollutants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter the two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope they are regulated by distinct entities potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda we show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if the regulators anticipate that transboundary pollution will later be regulated through emission caps the regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope and not enough with economies of scope in contrast we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries in a lump sum way and that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is not linked to abatement costs

carbon leakage and capacity based allocations is the eu right competitiveness and carbon leakage are major concerns for the design of co2 emissions permits markets in the absence of a global carbon tax and of border carbon adjustments output based allocation is a third best solution and is actually implemented australia california new zealand the eu has followed a different route free allowances are allocated to existing or new capacities in proportion to a benchmark independent of actual production this paper compares these two schemes in a formal setting and shows that the optimal one is in fact a combination of both schemes or output based allocation alone if uncertainty is limited a key assumption of our analysis is that the short term import pressure depends both on the existing capacities and the level of demand which is typical in capital intensive and internationally traded sectors a calibration of the model is used to discuss the eu scheme for the cement sector in the third phase of the eu ets 2013 2020 this allows for a quantification of various policies in terms of welfare investment production company profits public revenues and leakage

bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution abstract intertemporal trading of emission permits banking is often identified as one of three promising market mechanisms for controlling pollution along with averaging and trading surprisingly the efficiency properties of permit banking systems have not been investigated using a simple optimal control model this paper investigates firms incentives for banking or borrowing emission permits and compares the emission and output streams firms would choose with the socially optimal solution we find that in many cases firms will suboptimally choose excessive damage and output levels in early periods and correspondingly too few in later periods if given the opportunity to freely move emissions between time periods we propose a simple alternative trading scheme we term modified banking that counters this problem and should be no more difficult for an environmental authority to implement than a straigth banking system

multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences abstractthis article examines multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences across countries under a planner who uses linear approximation for utility maximization we show that 1 a country is an income receiver if it has a higher productivity than the average in producing public goods enabling it to provide more public goods 2 the amount of transfers can be pinned down for all countries with an adjustment cost 3 each country obtains an identical utility increment and 4 the country with the lowest adjustment cost is the best candidate for the planner country all results are derived based on well known information regarding the cost of producing the public goods and income levels

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

why hasn t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom some quantitative lessons from the eu abstract the integration of european financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes the years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results instead of the dreaded race to the bottom in capital taxes the uk lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of france germany and italy while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries the uk increased its labor tax marginally but the other countries increased theirs sharply this paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices wealth distribution and fiscal solvency tax competition is modeled as a one shot game over time invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to european data the calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes the solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency there is no race to the bottom and the nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes in contrast if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency competition over capital taxes triggers a race to the bottom but this outcome entails large welfare gains surprisingly the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments

using contests to allocate pollution rights in this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable pollution permit market we outline a permit allocation contest pac that distributes permits to firms based on their rank relative to other firms this ranking is achieved by ordering firms based on an observable external action where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the firm that is independent of their choice of emissions in the tradable permit market we argue that this mechanism has a number of benefits over auctioning and grandfathering using this mechanism efficiently distributes permits allows for the attainment of a secondary policy objective and has the potential to be more politically appealing than existing alternatives

market power in emission permit markets theory and evidence from the eu ets a well known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm i show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone i then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase i of the eu ets i find that some firms excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions my results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets

origins and development of the eu ets the successful creation of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets was not inevitable countries such as canada and japan which might be thought to have a less complex and more cohesive cultural and institutional context failed to do so europe succeeded for a number of reasons with a single market for the economy the logic of a single market for environment is inexorable the european commission which had failed in its earlier efforts to introduce a carbon energy tax made the case for trading with great skill and persistence on the basis of qualified majority voting which meant no country had a veto the uk and denmark initiated their own national schemes and there was a serious risk of balkanising the market with up to 27 different schemes with the losses of scale and scope this would entail meeting the union s kyoto commitments required a substantive pan european response and eu ets was the most credible and effective way of doing so the european parliament and environmental non governmental organisations played a constructive role pushing for more auctioning of allowances and less of them allocated centrally free allocation managed by member states ms was a necessary condition to achieve the support needed so they failed to achieve these objectives in the initial phase but they characterize the commission s proposals post 2012

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending much attention has been given to the impact of fiscal competition on the level of public expenditure but relatively little to the impact on its composition using a broadly familiar and reasonably rich model of fiscal competition in the presence of mobile capital this paper establishes a systematic bias in public spending patterns starting from the non cooperative equilibrium and holding tax rates constant welfare would be improved by a coordinated reduction in the provision of local public inputs and a corresponding increase in the public provision of local public goods benefiting immobile consumers c 1997 elsevier science s a

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

international air travel and greenhouse gas emissions a proposal for an adaptation levy greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation services have been increasing rapidly and are likely to continue to do so in the absence of major policy changes at the same time while all countries will experience impacts from climate change developing countries are the most vulnerable significant financial assistance for adaptation is therefore needed for developing countries but current proposals are inadequate solutions to the challenges of both aviation greenhouse gas emissions and climate change adaptation finance are thus urgently required this paper proposes an international air travel adaptation levy that addresses both problems

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

an interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading ide iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments established the first large scale long term environmental program to rely on tradable emissions permitscalled allowances in this program to control pollution this program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulfur dioxide so2 emissions from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level beginning in 1995 it is of interest both as a response to an important environmental issue and as a landmark experiment in environmental policy this experiment comes at a particularly important time since emission trading is under serious consideration with strong u s backing for use to deal with global climate change by curbing emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of magnitude intergovernmental panel on climate change 1996 this article summarizes the results to date of our ongoing empirical analysis of compliance costs and allowance market performance under the u s acid rain program

the impact of china s carbon allowance allocation rules on the product prices and emission reduction behaviors of ets covered enterprises abstract it is an important task for china to allocate carbon emission allowance to realize its carbon reduction target and establish carbon trading market china has designed several allocation rules within seven pilot regions what influence those rules may cause is closely related with the enthusiasm of emission trading scheme ets covered enterprises participation in carbon market and more importantly with the mechanism design and sustainable development of carbon market for this purpose the multi stage profit model is developed to analyze the ets covered enterprises product prices and emission reduction behaviors under different allocation rules the results show that first under the rules of grandfathering self declaration and auctioning when deciding the optimal product price and optimal carbon emission reduction those enterprises may focus on maximizing current stage profit however under the rule of benchmarking those enterprises may care more about the impact of current decisions on the profit in next stage second the optimal product price policy is positively correlated with the price of the same kind products consumers low carbon awareness and government subsidy finally along with the increase of carbon price consumers low carbon awareness and government subsidy and the decrease of carbon emission cap those enterprises tend to reduce carbon emissions

carbon emission performance evaluation and allocation in chinese cities abstract this paper presents a dea approach with multiple abatement factors to evaluate co2 emission performance and allocate co2 emission quotas in chinese cities we first consider the difference of marginal abatement costs among cities and construct the non radial directional distance function with multiple abatement factors the total factor co2 emission performance index and its dynamic change index are then proposed to measure co2 emission performance considering equity and efficiency we develop a composite index by the hybrid method to allocate emissions quota which considers co2 emissions as well as co2 emission performance then we conduct an empirical study using inputs and outputs dataset of 71 chinese cities in 2005 2012 chinese cities have poor energy efficiency and still have high co2 emissions the eastern region outperforms the central region and the western region performs worst whereas the dynamic co2 emission performance of the central region has the largest increase the change of co2 emission performance is driven mainly by technological advances as for the co2 emission allocation the composite index method encourages cities to reduce emissions and enhance emission performance through carbon trading market it also motivates cities with high historical emissions to reduce their emissions by improving technology when they have poor co2 emission performance

the optimal initial allocation of pollution permits a relative performance approach the initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes we generalize the analysis of bohringer and lange 2005 eur econ rev 49 8 2041 2055 to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter firm relative performance comparisons including grandfathering and auctions as well as novel mechanisms we show that using firms historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting while using firms historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms instead it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor which is independent of output and emissions we then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism

burning peat in ireland an electricity market dispatch perspective abstract this paper examines peat power production in ireland under the three pillars of energy policy security competitiveness and environment peat contributes to energy security as an indigenous fuel it reduces dependency on imports during a period of low capacity margins the operation of the peat plants is useful from a system security perspective peat generation is being financially supported by consumers through an electricity levy the fuel also has high carbon intensity it is not politically viable to consider peat on equal economic criteria to other plant types because of history and location this paper reviews electricity generation through combustion of peat in ireland and quantifies the costs of supporting peat utilising economic dispatch tools finding the subsidy is not insignificant from a cost or carbon perspective it shows that while peat is beneficial for one pillar of energy policy security the current usage of peat is not optimal from a competitiveness or environmental perspective by switching from the current must run mode of operation for peat to the dispatched mode used for the other generation significant societal savings in the range 21 m per annum can be achieved as well as reducing system emissions by approximately 5 per year

carbon dioxide emissions allocation a review carbon dioxide co2 emissions allocation plays a fundamental role in determining reduction responsibility at economy level or emission permits at firm level past decades have seen the development and applications of various methods for co2 emissions allocation this paper provides a literature review of co2 emissions allocation with emphasis on the evolution of allocation methods used it begins with a summary of the most popular allocation principles and criteria that lay a foundation for the development of allocation methods we then classify the existing allocation methods into four groups namely indicator optimization game theoretic and hybrid approaches the main features and findings of past studies are identified and summarized while the fairness principle prevails in earlier studies the efficiency principle has been found to receive increasing attention recently we also present a comparison of the empirical results based on ten popular indicator methods to show how indicator choice affects the allocation results issues related to selecting appropriate methods in co2 emissions allocation are finally discussed further research may be carried out to strike a balance between fairness and efficiency so that the allocation results become more widely acceptable and economically feasible

on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances to meet its commitment under the kyoto protocol the eu plans to implement an emissions trading system whith grandfathering of allowances besides having distributional impacts the choice of the grandfathering scheme may affect efficiency if firms anticipate how future allocations depend on upcoming decisions in this paper we determine central design rules for optimal grandfathering within a simple two period model we find that for small open trading systems where allowance prices are exogenous first best second period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm specific decisions in the first period second best schemes correspond to a ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both previous emissions and output however ofr closed emissions trading systems i e endogeneous allowance prices firstand second best rules coincide and must not depend on previous output levels they consist of an assignment proportional to the emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firm specific decisions in either of the two periods

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

emissions trading with updated allocation effects on entry exit and distribution allocation of emissions allowances may have significant distributional and efficiency effects it is well known that cost efficiency may be achieved if allowances are auctioned or distributed in a lump sum manner e g based on emissions levels before the start of the system grandfathering bohringer and lange eur econ rev 49 2041 2055 2005 show that a cost effective outcome can also be achieved if the base year for allocation is continually updated updating given that banking and borrowing are prohibited in this paper we examine whether updating alters the entry and exit conditions for firms compared to grandfathering and how it affects profits for new and existing firms we find that the two schemes function surprisingly similar first the incentives to entry and exit are identical second the total value of free quotas to existing firms based on emissions before the system starts is also identical without any auctioning with updating initial claims for free allowances have a shorter lifetime compared to grandfathering but quota prices are higher as firms anticipate the effect of current emissions on future claims to free allowances the two effects exactly cancel each other out if there is some combination of auction and free allocation the total value of free quotas will always be highest under grandfathering if the auction rate is the same entry and exit incentives are still equal

stochastic pollution costly sanctions and optimality of emission permit banking abstract this paper identifies a new economic motive for pollution regulations that allow polluting firms to bank and borrow emission permits over time when aggregate pollution is stochastic an intertemporal permit trading regime can provide firms with efficient incentives for pollution abatement without the need for costly government enforcement actions that would otherwise be required

the climate policy hold up green technologies intellectual property rights and the abatement incentives of international agreements the success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of green technologies this requires that international environmental agreements ieas and trade related intellectual property rights trips interact productively using a simple and tractable model we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold up effect in anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non signatories turning the iea brown self enforcing ieas have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under trips countries hosting patent holders extract rents from trips but may be better off without them

sectoral and regional impacts of the european carbon market in portugal abstract across europe co 2 emission allowances represent one of the main policy instruments to comply with the goals of the kyoto protocol in this paper we use microdata to address two issues regarding the impact of the european carbon market eu ets first we analyze the sectoral effects of the eu ets in portugal the goal is to study the distributive consequences of imbalances with the novelty of taking into account firm financial data to put values into context we show that a large majority of installations in most sectors had surpluses and the opportunity to raise remarkable revenues in some cases we also look at the regional impact since the pre existing specialization of different regions in the production of different goods and services might lead to an uneven economic impact of the allowance market in particular portuguese data indicate a distribution of revenue from low income to high income regions or rather between installations located in those regions we focus on the first phase of the eu ets using data for each one of the 244 portuguese installations in the market as well as financial data for 80 of these installations although we also present data for 2008 and 2009

a proximate mirror greenhouse gas rules and strategic behavior under the us clean air act the development of climate policy in the united states mirrors international developments with efforts to initiate a coordinated approach giving way to jurisdictions separately taking actions the centerpiece of us policy is regulation in the electricity sector that identifies a carbon emissions rate standard intensity standard for each state but leaves to states the design of policies including potentially the use of technology policies emissions rate averaging or cap and trade differences in policies among states within the same power market could promote predatory behavior resulting in a geographic shift in generation and investment in new resources this paper examines the coordination problem using a detailed partial equilibrium model of operations and investment we demonstrate that leading jurisdictions have available a rich set of design options including targetted output based allocation that would impose costs on neighbors and may protect against strategic predation

regulation by prices quantities or both a review of instrument choice choosing appropriate policy instruments is an important part of successful regulation once objectives are agreed and suitable targets adopted policy makers can employ command and control regulation and or economic instruments and choose between fixing a price or a quantity this paper examines the relative advantages of price quantity and hybrid instruments according to their efficiency under uncertainty the trade off between credible commitment and flexibility implementation international considerations and political economy various illustrations of the theory are provided with two detailed applications to climate change and transport policy specifically congestion and safety pricing

trade climate change and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments the lack of real progress at the durban climate change conference in 2011 postponing effective action until at least 2020 has many causes one of which is the failure to address trade issues and in particular carbon leakage this paper advances two arguments first it argues that the conventional view of border carbon adjustments bcas as a dirty trade barrier should be turned on its head rather the absence of a carbon price comprises an implicit subsidy to dirtier production in non regulated markets second bcas could act as a game changer when climate policy negotiations move at a glacial pace if at all materially stronger progress could be achieved indirectly from the threat of unilateral trade policies the paper shows how this could come about using a simple political game theory model the appropriate game form is one in which parties move unilaterally and sequentially given the failure to agree on a common course of action and are fully aware of the impacts of their actions the paper shows that properly crafted bcas could help reduce trade distortions limit the competiveness effects and help build a broader coalition of interests for more global actions

output based allocations in pollution markets with uncertainty and self selection we study pollution permit markets in which a fraction of permits are allocated to firms based on their output output based allocations which are receiving increasing attention in the design of carbon markets around the world e g europe california new zealand are shown to be optimal under demand and supply volatility despite the output distortions they may create in a market that covers multiple sectors the optimal design combines auctioned permits with output based allocations that are specific to each sector and increasing in its volatility when firms are better informed about the latter or must self select the regulator resort to some free i e lump sum allocations to sort firms out numerical exercises illustrate the policy relevance of our results the gains from considering output based allocations can be substantial

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

policy cooperation among benevolent governments may be undesirable this paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable it also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency since the work of hamada 1976 investigating the effects of increasing policy cooperation among countries has been a major topic in international economics a standard conclusion of this work is that increasing policy cooperation among countries is desirable in a seminal paper rogoff 1985 has challenged this view using a simple monetary model rogoff shows that cooperation among policy makers can lead to a lower level of welfare than noncooperation does rogoff s result has caused much consternation among those who advocate policy cooperation and his work has been criticized along several dimensions for example some authors including canzoneri and henderson 1988 have noted that a key assumption in rogoff s model is that the objective function of each country s policy maker does not coincide with the objective function of its residents indeed if in his model policy makers maximize the welfare of their country s residents the counterexample is overturned and cooperation strictly dominates noncooperation this feature leads some to interpret rogoff s result as simply saying that if policy makers form a coalition against the private sector they may be worse off than if they do not others such as neck and dockner 1988 have claimed that rogoff s result depends on private agents acting strategically under this interpretation rogoff s result is relevant to say economies with a large trade union but not to economies with a large number of competitive private agents in a somewhat different vein persson 1988 and especially devereux 1986a b have questioned the significance of welfare comparisons across different institutional regimes in a model without a solid foundation for the behavioural relationships this paper presents a simple model in which governments are benevolent but cooperation is still undesirable the model is a two country version of fischer s 1980 optimal tax model in it private agents are competitive in that each agent takes both prices and government policies as uninfluenced by his actions and each government maximizes the welfare of its country s residents in the paper the two different regimes cooperative and noncooperative

intertemporal permit trading for the control of greenhouse gas emissions this paper integrates two themes in the intertemporal permitliterature through the construction of an intertemporal bankingsystem for a pollutant that creates both stock and flow damages a permit banking system for the special case of a pollutant thatonly causes stock damages is also developed this latter simpler case corresponds roughly to the greenhouse gas emissionreduction regime proposed by the u s department of state as ameans of fulfilling the u s commitment to the frameworkconvention on climate change this paper shows that environmentalregulators can achieve the socially optimal level of emissionsand output through time by setting the correct total sum ofallowable emissions and specifying the correct intertemporaltrading ratio for banking and borrowing for the case ofgreenhouse gases we show that the optimal growth rate of permitprices and therefore the optimal intertemporal trading rate hasthe closed form solution equal to the ratio of current marginalstock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stockdamages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere given a non optimal negotiated emission path we then derive apermit banking system that has the potential to lower net socialcosts by adjusting the intertemporal trading ratio taking intoaccount the behavior of private agents we use a simplenumerical simulation model to illustrate the potential gains fromvarious possible banking systems

a model of intertemporal emission trading banking and borrowing abstract this paper provides a general treatment of emission trading banking and borrowing in an intertemporal continuous time model using optimal control theory the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least cost solution attainable under joint cost minimization explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits the policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed

how can china reach its co2 intensity reduction targets by 2020 a regional allocation based on equity and development in late 2009 the chinese government committed to cut its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product gdp by 40 to 45 of 2005 levels by 2020 this has raised the issue of how to allocate the co2 reduction target regionally to meet the national reduction target to meet this objective the following aspects may be taken into consideration equity principles common but differentiated responsibilities intensity reduction target fulfillment and economic difference and reduction potential among provinces this paper selects per capita gdp accumulated fossil fuel related co2 emissions and energy consumption per unit of industrial added value as indicators for emission reduction capacity responsibility and potential respectively based on these three indicators a comprehensive index is developed and an intensity allocation model constructed as decision makers may have different preferences when allocating the reduction burden we allocate different weights to the indicators analyzing the results using cluster analysis the following aspects may also be considered together with the national regional development strategy to determine how to share the burden the reduction potential of various regions implementation potential of the plans and promotion of a highly efficient low carbon economic development model

the emissions trading paradox abstract this article considers the price history of co2 allowances in the eu emission trading scheme since european emissions trading started in 2005 the prices of allowances have varied between less than one and thirty euro per ton of co2 this previously unpredicted volatility and more notably a significant price crash in may 2005 led to the hypothesis that electricity producers might use their market power to influence the prices of allowances besides market power the combination of information asymmetry and price interdependencies between prices of primary goods especially electricity and allowances plays an important role in explaining the emissions trading paradox the model presented will show that banking can lead to such a price crash if market participators act rationally furthermore in such a scenario banking can be profitable for sellers at the cost of buyers

allowance price drivers in the first phase of the eu ets abstract in the first phase of the eu emissions trading scheme eu ets the price per ton of co 2 initially rose to over 30 the price then collapsed to essentially zero by mid 2007 by deriving a structural model of the allowance price under the assumption of efficient markets i examine the extent to which this variation in price can be explained by marginal abatement costs i then gradually relax the model by allowing for delayed adjustment of price to fundamentals as well as by introducing lagged lhs variables the pattern of results suggests that while prices were not initially driven by marginal abatement costs this inefficiency was largely corrected after the accounting of 2005 emissions in april 2006

a literature based multi criteria evaluation of the eu ets abstract this article reviews the existing literature on the european union emission trading scheme eu ets focusing on empirical ex post research since the end of the first period 2007 the literature is presented through a multi criteria evaluation concerning environmental effectiveness despite over allocation during the first period abatement is estimated between 2 5 and 5 trade driven carbon leakage was not observed even if long term economic models predict divergent leakage estimates for certain at risk sectors the abatement target was likely to be below an economically efficient level but was reached in a fairly cost effective way even if free allocation gave rise to several distortional effects equity concerns were manifold and constitute a major drawback to the policy finally institutional feasibility can be considered positive in that the eu ets passed the european legislative process unlike the previously proposed eu wide carbon tax

incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating abstract emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota or allowance price nevertheless according to bohringer and lange on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances europ econ rev 49 2005 2041 2055 such allocation schemes are cost effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms in this paper we show that the cost effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast moreover if a price cap or banking borrowing is introduced the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction or lump sum allocation in addition we show that with allocation based on updated emissions the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned

economic analysis of the climate pledges of the copenhagen accord for the eu and other major countries abstract this article uses the world gem e3 computable general equilibrium model to assess the economic consequences of the climate copenhagen accord the model allows analyzing the macroeconomic costs in terms of gdp the change in employment as well as the impacts on production of specific energy intensive sectors various 2020 climate scenarios are evaluated depending on the ghg mitigation pledges we find that the cost for the developed countries is around 0 5 of gdp in 2020 for the more ambitious pledges whereas the gdp effects are more heterogeneous across developing countries and russia reflecting the different pledges and the assumptions in the reference scenario across these countries further the article explores whether there is a form of double dividend in the eu when the revenues from auctioning or taxation of ghg emissions are used to reduce the social security contributions of employees we conclude that gdp and employment perform better compared to the free allocation of permits when more sectors are subject to auctioning or ghg taxes and the additional government revenues are used to reduce the cost of labour

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

growth in the shadow of expropriation we propose a tractable variant of the open economy neoclassical growth model that emphasizes political economy and contracting frictions the political economy frictions involve a preference for immediate spending while the contracting friction is a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt and expropriation we show that the political economy frictions slow an economy s convergence to the steady state due to the endogenous evolution of capital taxation the model rationalizes why openness has different implications for growth depending on the political environment why institutions such as the treatment of capital income evolve over time why governments in countries that grow rapidly accumulate net foreign assets rather than liabilities and why foreign aid may not affect growth

mitigation incentives with climate finance and treaty options abstract future greenhouse gas ghg mitigation action of current non climate policy np countries is considered to take two alternative forms 1 climate finance payments received in return for future reductions in its ghg emissions below a defined baseline and 2 join a climate treaty whereby the required emissions reductions are formally binding it is assumed that baselines defining climate finance payments and required emissions reductions under a treaty depend positively on current emissions it is then shown that making such future options available reduces current ghg mitigation in np countries leading to higher emissions in the short run this effect is stronger when future climate finance payments are higher the required relative emissions reductions under a treaty are greater when commitments under a treaty are longer lasting and mitigation targets depend more on current emissions such short run increases in emissions can sometimes more than fully eliminate the effect of the subsequent policy when climate finance and treaties are both future alternatives more generous climate finance can make it harder and more expensive to induce the country to join a climate treaty

international coordination of fiscal deficits abstract nearly all existing studies of international coordination of fiscal deficits focus on aggregate demand aspects of the problem in contrast this paper adopts a dynamic general equilibrium perspective and emphasizes the public finance side of fiscal deficits in a world with international capital mobility the fiscal deficit of any single government affects world interest rates and therefore influences intertemporal resource allocation in all countries the paper shows that these international externalities may result in inefficiently large fiscal deficits high interest rates and low levels of welfare if international policy coordination is absent

population policy through tradable procreation entitlements one of the first tradable rights proposal is boulding s the meaning of the twentieth century london george allen and unwin ltd 1964 dealing with overpopulation we discuss both tradable procreation allowances and exemptions domestically and globally to address underpopulation as well we focus on three effects notably the rights tradability entails that whereas exemptions or expensive enough allowances benefit the poor cheap allowances benefit the rich a natalist policy also worsens the average education level of the next generation whereas population control enhances it also if procreation rights are grandfathered to countries the scheme redistributes further our analysis suggests that procreation entitlements may be efficient in controlling population without being necessarily anti redistributive

top incomes in the long run of history a recent literature has constructed top income shares time series over the long run for more than twenty countries using income tax statistics top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income and total taxes paid hence aggregate economic growth per capita and gini inequality indexes are sensitive to excluding or including top incomes we discuss the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series including income definition and comparability over time and across countries tax avoidance and tax evasion we provide a summary of the key empirical findings most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the twentieth century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars and depression shocks top income shares do not recover in the immediate postwar decades however over the last thirty years top income shares have increased substantially in english speaking countries and in india and china but not in continental european countries or japan this increase is due in part to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes as a result wage income comprises a larger fraction of top incomes than in the past finally we discuss the theoretical and empirical models that have been proposed to account for the facts and the main questions that remain open

pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information abstract we consider the problem of determining the permit discount rate in pollution permit markets in which permits may be traded over time and polluting firms have better information about their abatement costs than does the regulator we show that the preferred permit discount rate may be greater than or less than the money discount rate we also consider whether or not the regulator should allow intertemporal trading to take place allowing intertemporal trading lowers social costs when the slope of the marginal damage function is less than the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function

taxing consumption to mitigate carbon leakage this is a post print version of an article published in environmental and resource economics made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the journal publisher no commercial re distribution or re use is allowed this version may contain minor differences from the journal s pdf version

emissions trading with offset markets and free quota allocations we study optimal climate policy for a policy bloc of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non policy fringe of countries such as with the cdm policy bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations which are updated according to either firms past emissions or outputs we show that the resulting abatement and its allocation between policy bloc and fringe are both inefficient when all quotas are traded freely at a single price the policy bloc chooses to either not constrain the offset market leading to suboptimal policy bloc mitigation or ban offsets completely the former latter case occurs when free allocation of quotas is not very generous and the offset market is large small it is preferable for policy bloc countries governments to instead buy offsets directly from the fringe at a quota price below marginal damage cost of emissions while the policy bloc quota price will be above this cost with maximization of global welfare and a unified quota price this price is higher and offsets constrained in fewer cases but the solution still inefficient full efficiency then requires a higher quota price in the policy bloc than in the fringe

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

stability of international climate coalitions a comparison of transfer schemes abstract this paper studies the impact of pragmatic and optimal transfer schemes on the incentives for regions to join international climate agreements with an applied model that comprises twelve world regions we investigate i a benchmark without transfers ii scenarios with allocation based rules where coalition members receive tradable emission permits proportional to initial or future emissions iii scenarios with outcome based rules where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to emissions and iv a scenario based on an optimal sharing rule where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to outside option payoffs we find that well designed transfer schemes can stabilise larger coalitions and increase global abatement levels in our applied setting we find that for allocation based and outcome based rules only small coalitions are stable and in the case of grandfathered emission permits there is no stable coalition at all some obstacles associated with grandfathered emission permits can be overcome by incorporating the expected growth of emissions in developing countries in the distribution of emission permits for the optimal transfer scheme we find that larger coalitions which include key players such as the united states and china can be stable but no transfer scheme is capable of stabilising the grand coalition

designing carbon markets part ii carbon markets in space this paper analyses the design of carbon markets in time i e intertemporally it is part of a twin set of papers that ask starting from first principles what an optimal global carbon market would look like by around 2030 our focus is on firm level cap and trade systems although much of what we say would also apply to government level trading and carbon offset schemes we examine the first principles of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater carbon price predictability and credibility over time

carbon pricing versus emissions trading a supply chain planning perspective abstract carbon pricing taxes and carbon emissions trading are two globally practiced carbon regulatory policy schemes this paper presents an analytical supply chain planning model that can be used to examine the supply chain performance at the tactical operational planning level under these two policy schemes model implementation and analyses are completed using actual data from a company operating in australia where these environmental regulatory policies are practiced numerical results provide important managerial and practical implications and policy insights in particular the results show that there are inflection points where both carbon pricing and trading schemes could influence costs or emissions reductions an erratic nonlinear emissions reduction trend is observed in a carbon pricing scheme as the carbon price increases steadily whereas emissions reduction in a carbon trading scheme follows a relatively linear trend with a nonlinear cost increase overall a carbon trading mechanism although imperfect appears to result in better supply chain performance in terms of emissions generation cost and service level even though a carbon tax may be more worthwhile from an uncertainty perspective as emissions trading costs depend on numerous uncertain market conditions

imperfect mobility and local government behaviour in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper reconsiders the implications of land value maximizing local governments in an overlapping generations model with imperfect mobility specifically residents develop an attachment to place or location specific capital once they reside in a town for a single time period the analysis shows that attempts by governments to capture the resulting rents from less mobile individuals create inefficient migration leave all workers worse off in an ex ante sense and place relatively high burdens on those workers who have high migration costs public good levels are also inefficiently chosen

free euas and fuel switching abstract this paper focuses on the impact of euas on the optimal policy of a competitive electricity producer the effect of grandfathering is consistently shown to introduce significant distortions to the system it is theoretically shown that there is a threshold value of carbon price so that for prices above this the eua becomes an incentive for reduced production rather than a penalty for inefficient producers these theoretical results are supported by the data of one producer from italy and one from germany furthermore the empirical evidence concludes that the high level of free allowances may generate a shift in production from less to more polluting technologies

the effect of allocation above emissions and price uncertainty on abatement investments under the eu ets abstract the european union emission trading scheme eu ets by far the largest in its kind has inspired several other carbon markets in the world based on interviews with plant managers from almost all belgian ceramics lime and cement producers this study describes how manager s perceptions on emission trading affected investment decisions in line with behavioural economics reference dependence is found to explain why free allocation below emissions creates a greater incentive to abatement investment compared to allocation above emissions in the ceramics sector allocation above emissions refrained managers from including carbon gains in payback times this contradicts the famous coase theorem which predicts that free allocation has no effect on abatement incentives the results indicate that auctioning part of the emission rights will reduce barriers to abatement investment carbon price uncertainty is seen as a disincentive for abatement investment by some managers and as an incentive by others intermediate levels of uncertainty add option value to abatement investments because the associated gradual learning adds flexibility in an uncertain carbon constrained future however high levels of uncertainty creating a risk of offshoring even when companies innovate creates an option value to postpone abatement investments narrow framing misperceiving the risk hedging counter cyclicality of carbon costs reinforces the option value to wait therefore policy should aim to reduce price uncertainty for very low and very high carbon prices not for an intermediary price range

a study of allocative efficiency of pm2 5 emission rights based on a zero sum gains data envelopment model abstract it is an urgent task for china to control haze emission in environmental treatment emission right trading is a feasible way to achieve the reduction of pollutant emission on the premise that the total pollutant emission amount is under control and the allocation of initial emission rights based on the target total amount is the key to emission right trading in this paper via the input oriented zsg dea model the inter provincial allocative efficiency of pm2 5 emission rights is investigated under the condition that the target total amount is fixed the results showed that 1 after initial emission rights were allocated in accordance with the zsg dea model pm2 5 emission amounts of all provinces would be in a new common dea frontier so as to realize the overall pareto optimality with a set total amount 2 two factors namely land areas and atmospheric environmental capacities of all provinces were considered in the actual allocation to avoid the homogenization of all evaluated units found in the previous evaluation literature on allocative efficiency thereby making the evaluation results more in line with the actual situations in all provinces such an investigation approach can provide guidance on the allocation of initial emission rights in emission right trading and the research results can offer empirical support for haze reducing work load conducted by central and local governments of china

pricing emission permits in the absence of abatement abstract if emissions are stochastic and firms are unable to control them through abatement the cap in a permit market may be exceeded or not be reached i derive a binary options pricing formula that expresses the permit price as a function of the penalty for noncompliance and the probability of an exceeded cap under the assumption of no abatement i apply my model to the eu ets where the rapid introduction of the market made it difficult for firms to adjust their production technology in time for the first phase the model fits the data well implying that the permit price may have been driven by firms hedging against stochastic emissions

robust policies to mitigate carbon leakage abstract unilateral climate policy induces carbon leakage through the relocation of emission intensive and trade exposed industries to regions without emission regulation previous studies suggest that emission pricing combined with border carbon adjustment is a second best instrument and more cost effective than output based rebating we show that the combination of output based rebating and a consumption tax for emission intensive and trade exposed goods can be equivalent with border carbon adjustment moreover it is welfare improving for a region that implements emission pricing along with output based rebating to introduce such a consumption tax the welfare gain is particularly large if output based rebating is already implemented for a sector that is not much exposed to leakage e g due to uncertainty about exposure or due to lobbying activities thus supplementing output based rebating with a consumption tax constitutes robust policies to mitigate carbon leakage

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

is it is or is it ain t my obligation regional debt in a fiscal federation this article studies the repayment of regional debt in a multiregion economy with a central authority who pays the obligation issued by a region with commitment the central government will use its economy wide taxation power in support of its objective to smooth distortionary taxes and consumption across regions absent commitment this tool of the central government may be exploited to induce it to bail out regional government deficits we characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications in particular we show when the gains from a federation may outweigh the welfare costs of a bailout we use these insights to comment on actual fiscal relations in three quite different federations the united states the european union and argentina

an optimal ad valorem tax subsidy with an output based refunded emission payment for permits auction in an oligopoly market in this paper we explores a hybrid mechanism of output based refunded emission payment and an ad valorem tax subsidy to remove the distortions emerging in the permit auction market and the product market we find that first best outcomes can be achieved under such a hybrid mechanism a clearing price equal to a pigouvian tax will endogenously result in the permit auction market moreover we extend the analysis to take into consideration the investment in abatement technology