macroeconomic policy in a large unionised economy this paper models an economy with many sectors in each sector a monopoly union sets the nominal wage and then firms choose output the economy is large in that all agents treat the general price level as fixed the paper focusses on policy effects on employment an increase in government expenditure in one sector will increase decrease total employment as sectoral employment is above below average a general increase in government expenditure in fixed proportions will have a positive employment multiplier below unity policy which increases employment will lead to higher welfare

imperfect competition and the keynesian cross abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model in which the only non walrasian feature is imperfect competition in the goods market the model is shown to exhibit various keynesian characteristics in particular as competition in the goods market becomes less perfect the fiscal policy multipliers approach the values implied by the textbook keynesian cross

implementation of food distribution policies a case study in south india abstract public policy for foodgrains distribution and consumption in coimbatore district of south india involves processing through state trading institutions and distribution through fair price shops food for work and employment guarantee schemes policies are evaluated in terms of their objectives and institutions for the implementation of policy are analysed in terms of the way in which they mobilize and distribute resources foodgrains capital and labour although this deficit district has captured shares of tamil nadu state s publicly distributed grain which are disproportionate to its share of the state s vulnerable population nevertheless schemes to increase the latter s foodgrain consumption have been patchily implemented over space and time and they have had little measurable impact on intended beneficiaries

environmental taxation inequality and engel s law the double dividend of redistribution empirical evidence shows that low income households spend a high share of their income on pollution intensive goods this fuels the concern that an environmental tax reform could be regressive we employ a framework which accounts for the distributional effect of environmental taxes and the recycling of the revenues on both households and firms to quantify changes in the optimal tax structure and the equity impacts of an environmental tax reform we characterize when an optimal environmental tax reform does not increase inequality even if the tax system before the reform is optimal from a non environmental point of view if the tax system before the reform is calibrated to stylized data and is thus non optimal we find that there is a large scope for inequality reduction even if the government is restricted in its recycling options

on the optimality of the nordic system of dual income taxation abstract in recent years the nordic countries have introduced a so called dual income tax which combines a proportional tax on capital income with progressive taxation of labour income the paper argues that this asymmetric treatment of the two types of income can be defended on pure efficiency grounds because the progressivity of the labour income tax serves to reduce the private return to human capital investment thereby offsetting the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to discriminate in favour of such investment the analysis is based on an overlapping generations model of a small open economy where consumers face a trade off between investment in human capital and investment in non human capital extended versions of the model allow for liquidity constraints and an endogenous labour leisure choice

real rigidities and the non neutrality of money rigidities in real prices are not sufficient to create rigidities in nominal prices and real effects of nominal shocks and by themselves small frictions in nominal adjustment such as costs of changing prices create only small non neutralities but this paper shows that substantial nominal rigidity can arise from a combination of real rigidities and small nominal frictions the paper shows the connection between real and nominal rigidity given the presence of nominal frictions both in general and for two specific sources of real rigidity one arising from goods market imperfections and the other from labour market imperfections

on supply constrained equilibria abstract the paper gives sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with price rigidities and quantity rationing where i demand is never rationed ii net trades of an a priori chosen numeraire are never rationed and iii supply is rationed only when relative prices are downward rigid

environmental policy public goods and the marginal cost of public funds if private goods are perfect substitutes for public goods and environmental quality greener preferences reduce employment raise abatement and improve environmental quality if the elasticity of substitution between private goods and leisure exceeds one the tax rate increases thereby reducing private consumption however if labor supply bends backwards private utility rises while the tax rate and public consumption fall with imperfect substitution between private and public consumption greener policies boost labor supply if the substitution elasticity between private and public consumption and the elasticity of the effectiveness of public abatement are small and the labor supply curve bends backwards copyright 1994 by royal economic society

rural public works and food for work a survey abstract there are three separate strands to the debate on food for work first issues concerning labor intensive public works more generally in particular the tension between short run employment creation income generation and the size and distribution of the longer term income stream second how useful is food as a wage good in rural works overall generalizations as to the superiority of cash as against wages in kind are not sustainable third is food aid an appropriate resource to support rural works the relative success over the past decade of major schemes in south asia with food widely used as wage good justifies a reassessment of the potential of rural works both as food security mechanism and in expanding employment of disadvantaged groups in a situation of widespread structural underemployment less satisfactory longer term income distributional and asset generating impact of such schemes must remain a serious source of concern the impact of food aid to rural works appears more problematic in sub saharan africa scope exists for more flexible and innovative use of this resource

temporary pareto optimum theory abstract the purpose of this paper is to introduce bounded rationality in the framework of pareto optimality this is done by altering the usual definition of the attainable set to take account of the fact that agents are represented by expectation functions induced by their learning processes two polar cases are examined first we show that a temporary pareto optimum is a temporary competitive equilibrium when expectations are strongly roy consistent second in the general case of weak roy consistency the temporary version of the second welfare theorem cannot always be true moreover the characterizations of a temporary pareto optimum bear some resemblance to those of optimal taxation in an atemporal second best framework

marginal tax reform externalities and income distribution the paper examines welfare improving and revenue neutral directions marginal policy reforms for an economy with nonidentical individuals and an externality that has a feedback effect on the consumption of taxed goods it considers three types of policy instruments the indirect taxes the uniform poll transfer and public abatement this extends the framework set up by ahmad and stern 1984 bovenberg and de mooij 1994 and schob 1996 the theoretical model is illustrated for a specific externality namely congestion caused by peak car transport

what rate of return can you reasonably expect or what can the long run tell us about the short run conventional studies of long run returns on capital market assets because of changes in valuation between the starting date and the ending date obscure the basic return each asset earns consequently both absolute returns and measured risk premiums are distorted the basic return can be extracted by selecting widely separated dates with identical valuation levels over nearly 200 years the analysis for equities produced 63 episodes averaging 35 years with a mean nominal basic return of 9 6 percent and standard deviation of 1 6 percent 63 bond episodes averaging 43 years produced a mean nominal basic return of 4 9 percent and standard deviation of 2 3 percent equities revealed a tendency to regress to the mean over time but no such tendency was apparent in the bond data thus long run equity returns were more predictable than long run bond returns this conclusion applies with even greater force to real returns

are prices too sticky nominal price rigidity has a negative externality rigidity in one firm s price increases the variability of aggregate real spending which harms all firms this paper investigates whether this externality is large which would imply that stabilization policy can be highly beneficial even if the costs of making prices flexible are small there are three conclusions first both the private cost of price rigidity and the externality are second order in the size of fluctuations second the externality can nonetheless be arbitrarily large third in a simple model the externality is small for plausible parameter values

the terms of trade and the international coordination of fiscal policy this paper develops an example of a noncooperative game between fiscal authorities in two countries the key strategic link between countries is the terms of trade an equilibrium without cooperation is characterized by excessive tax rates and public spending levels in each country the outcome is analogous to the nash equilibrium of the static optimal tarif game in trade theory but in this model there is also a dynamic distortion caused by noncooperative behaviour this dynamic distortion depresses capital accumulation and reduces the equilibrium capital stock in each country numerical examples suggest a significant welfare benefit of cooperation

policy reform shadow prices and market prices how should public projects and policy reforms be assessed when market prices give misleading signals revenues and costs at market prices then give distorted measures of social gains and losses and our appraisal should use social opportunity costs or shadow prices we show how shadow prices may be integrated into an analysis of policy reform demonstrate the critical dependence of these prices on government policy and analyse their relations with market prices the model allows for a wide range of sources of impairment of price signals we also discuss key issues in the analysis of price reform and privatisation

environmental policy public finance and the labour market in a second best world abstract environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second best framework of optimal taxation households consume both clean and dirty commodities degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax a lower tax on labour less employment more public abatement and a cleaner environment if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts otherwise public consumption falls

the changing nature of stock and bond volatility this article examines the changing nature of u s stock and bond risk from 1871 through 2000 and the implications for asset allocation using geometric means and standard deviations we examine nominal and inflation adjusted monthly returns over nonoverlapping 5 year periods as well as annual returns over periods of approximately 25 years and we document how stock and bond volatility changed over the period our analysis suggests that the relative change in the volatility of stocks and volatility of bonds over the past 50 years has increased the importance of stocks in asset allocation the change is even more pronounced when inflation is considered

a model of tax reform for belgium abstract the paper deals with determining second best optima and existence conditions of pareto improving directions of tax reform for an economy experiencing keynesian unemployment i e characterised by excess supply of labour and commodities it is then tested whether these existence conditions were fulfilled in belgium in 1982 the model considers the taxation of seven consumption goods plus labour in a ten consumer economy empirical evidence suggests that welfare improving price directions can be found the whole set of these directions is then constructed

differentiated payroll taxes unemployment and welfare abstract this paper investigates the impact of payroll taxes on unemployment and welfare in a two sector economy characterised by imperfect competition in product and labour markets the two sectors differ in market competitiveness it turns out that only the relative tax pressure affects unemployment and welfare unemployment can be reduced by having the less competitive sector pay higher taxes moreover differentiated payroll taxes will in general improve efficiency which sector to tax relatively more is however not clear the government faces a trade off in the sense that unemployment is reduced only at the expense of reduced efficiency in the output mix

international integration risk and the welfare state how does international integration affect the welfare state does it call for a leaner or an expanded welfare state international integration may affect the distortions caused by welfare state activities but also the risks motivating social insurance mechanisms this paper addresses these potentially counteracting effects in a fully specified intertemporal two country stochastic endowment model focusing on the implications when product market integration reduces trade frictions across national product markets it is shown that lower trade frictions may increase the marginal costs of public funds which gives an argument for reducing steady state public consumption however tighter integration of product markets unambiguously leads to more variability in private consumption and this gives a case for expanding the social insurance provided via state contingent public sector activities automatic stabilizers jel classification e30 f10 h11

international policy coordination in interdependent monetary economies abstract an optimising equilibrium model of two interdependent monetary economies with no other assets except cash perfect foresight flexible exchange rates and imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods is analysed both non cooperative and cooperative market oriented outcomes are time inconsistent since each government has an incentive to renege and levy a surprise inflation tax international policy coordination without pre commitment can be counterproductive even though there are no tax distortions and the provision of public goods is optimal since it exacerbates the credibility problems perceived by the private sectors and therefore leads to a too low level of real money balances and excessive inflation

sticky prices as coordination failure this paper links the coordination failure and menu cost approaches to the microeconomic foundations of keynesian macroeconomics if a firm s desired price is increasing in others prices then the gain from price adjustment after a nominal shock is greater if others adjust this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity thus nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes jel e12 e30 keynesian macroeconomics waned in the 1970 s because economists grew disenchanted with its weak microeconomic foundations the central difficulty was that keynesian models were based on ad hoc rigidities in nominal wages and prices the 1980 s produced two approaches to reviving keynesian theory the menu cost literature n gregory mankiw 1985 george akerlof and janet yellen 1985 seeks to provide rigorous explanations for nominal rigidities these papers argue that small frictions in price setting are enough to produce large nominal rigidities in contrast the coordination failure literature russell cooper and andrew john 1988 abandons nominal rigidities and seeks alternative foundations for keynesian models the central idea is that many economic activities such as production e g john bryant 1983 trade e g peter diamond 1982 and investment e g nobuhiro kiyotaki 1988 exhibit synergism or strategic complementarity one agent s optimal level of activity depends positively on others activity strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria with high activity equilibria superior to low activity equilibria thus an economy may be stuck in an underemployment equilibrium even though a superior equilibrium exists models with nominal rigidities and models with coordination failures are often presented as competing paradigms 1 this paper shows that this view is incorrect we take a step toward unifying the foundations of keynesian economics by showing that the two sets of ideas are highly complementary nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes this failure has the essential features of coordination failures in previous models flexibility in one firm s price increases the incentives for other firms to make their prices flexible this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity equilibria with less rigidity more active price adjustment are often pareto superior to equilibria with more rigidity these results contribute to our understanding both of coordination failure and of nominal rigidity the range of keynesian phenomena explained by coordination failures is greatly expanded previous coordination failure models contain only real variables and thus ascribe no role to monetary policy or other determinants of nominal spending our results suggest that coordination failure is at the root of inefficient nonneutralities of money theories of nominal rigidities gain new empirical and policy im

international interdependencies in fiscal stabilization policies abstract trade links imply that business cycle fluctuations are transmitted among trade partners to the extent that fiscal policy can mitigate business cycle fluctuations international interdependencies in stabilization policies arise we analyse in a two country general equilibrium model the role of fiscal policy in mitigating risk or providing implicit insurance in the presence of capital market imperfections and adjustment failures rigid wages it is shown that there is a welfare case for an active stabilization policy and that it is larger in the presence of adjustment failures rigid wages non cooperative policy decisions imply inefficiencies in fiscal stabilization policies which in the case of flexible wages may imply too much stabilization whereas stabilization is always insufficient in the case of rigid wages

second best analysis with markets in disequilibrium public sector pricing in a keynesian regime the paper develops pricing rules for a public sector subject to a budget constraint in an economy where the private sector experiences keynesian unemployment excess supply of labour and of commodities both second best and welfare improving pricing rules are studied it is found that such rules can be defined in operational terms in general they are quite complex involve quantities which are not directly observable reservation wages and prices and require evaluation of income and employment multipliers the general equilibrium approach to second best theory thus involves standard macroeconomic concepts and techniques some discussion of methodological issues and of policy objectives inflation versus unemployment is offered in order to facilitate interpretation the corresponding results for an economy with a competitive private sector are first restated

union cooperation and nontraded goods in general equilibrium a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with traded and nontraded goods and sector specific trade unions is set up wage formation is either noncooperative or cooperative egalitarian union wage policy is shown to be the equilibrium under cooperation important asymmetries are encountered and an alternative model of cooperative behavior called bargaining cooperation is proposed bargaining cooperation is shown to have qualitatively different implications than simple cooperation the welfare and employment effects of bargaining cooperation compared to simple cooperation are ambiguous

worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation a strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party the firm has to reac h agreements with the other two each of which is a group of workers in the prebargaining stage the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately the main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production the analysis also considers possibilities for firm s strategic intervention in the unionization process copyright 1988 by royal economic society

unemployment equilibrium in an economy with linked prices wage inflexibility has been widely regarded in modern writing as a cause of unemployment almost any keynesian or non walrasian equilibrium which involves equilibrium excess supplies also contain some form of wage or price inflexibility yet the micro mechanism of wage inflexibility its causes and form remains somewhat a mystery in this paper we study the allocation of resources in an economy in which prices of some goods or services are linked to other goods or services this is not wage rigidity in the traditional sense but it is a form of rigidity which is widely observed following the recent literature on non walrasian equilibrium see for example dreze 1975 barro and grossman 197 l grandmont and laroque 1976 malinvaud 1977 and many others one would expect the allocation to be attained via a set of quantity constraints on net trades we show in this paper however that the allocation mechanism in the economy will not require a general set of limitations on excess supplies and excess demands but rather will tend to have the following two properties

the welfare effects of environmental taxation recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second best setting than in a first best setting this question has mainly been addressed indirectly by asking whether the second best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first best pigouvian rate even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly comparing the second best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first best value marginal social damage msd on closer examination however msd becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the pigouvian rate given these observations the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first best value the second best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements even in cases where the second best environmental tax is lower than its first best value the welfare gains may be greater than in a first best setting these results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit revenue recycling effect exceeds the marginal fiscal cost tax base effect over a range of environmental tax rates that for benchmark models extends above the first best pigouvian rate these findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

public production and shadow pricing in a model of disequilibrium in labor and capital markets abstract this paper develops second best rules for public investment and employment in various regimes of disequilibrium on the capital and the labour markets the model used is very simple so as to imply rules which can easily be interpreted and contrasted with the current literature on the subject another issue considered is that of possible changes of regimes within a process of welfare improvement involving adjustments in the public production plan it is dealt with through a numerical example which points out that such changes can indeed occur

international coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies we examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero we show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump sum taxation however if there are unremovable domestic distortions such as distorting taxes there can be gains to coordination even when a single country s policy cannot affect world prices these results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature the key distinction is that contrary to the tariff literature the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled

non cooperative bargaining and union formation we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar in the first case there is a wage differential which is more less than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller larger than that of the less productive in the second case there is no wage differential in this paper we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities they may form either a joint union or two separate unions depending on the relative size and productivity of the two groups the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game in which the two groups of workers bargain with each other as well as with a firm the labour market is sharply distinguished from the goods market by the widespread practice of collective bargaining usually several groups of workers with different characteristics for example skill level or geographical location are represented as a single unit and or several employers form a single bargaining unit against a giant union this multiplicity of bargaining units creates a complicated bargaining structure and makes the outcome hard to analyse the purpose of this paper is to provide a model which captures this complexity and at the same time clarifies the underlying structure of bargaining power although economists have been aware of the multiplicity problem for a long time it has been received little rigorous theoretical treatment until recently davidson 1985 examined the possible gains that can be obtained by trade unions through joint bargaining in an oligopolistic industry there is a positive externality due to the fact that a higher wage rate in one firm generates a larger demand hence a higher wage in competing firms when a joint union is organized these externalities are internalized to the benefit of workers horn and wolinsky 1985 investigated the equilibrium pattern of unionization in an industry where a firm employs two types of workers they found that workers tend to form a single union when the two types are substitutes in the sense that the incremental contribution of one group to the firm s revenue is decreasing with respect to the size of the other group since workers bargaining power comes from the loss that they can

relative prices in monetary union and floating we analyse a small open economy with a tradable and a sheltered sector if the unions that operate in each sector coordinate their wage demands sectorwise the choice of monetary regime floating cum inflation target vs emu may affect the relative wages and prices of the economy we show that emu results in lower prices for tradable goods and lower real wages in the traded sector while opposite results hold for sheltered sector prices and wages thus if large unions behave strategically the choice of monetary regime has far reaching structural implications

tax reform from the gradient projection viewpoint abstract this paper examines the problems of gradual tax reform desirable small moves of the tax system are determined using the principles of the well known gradient projection algorithm three classical models of public finance are considered for each of them a continuous time dynamic process is exhibited along which the social welfare function increases until convergence to local second best extrema although the selection of trajectories according to the gradient projection method has some arbitrariness it leads to intuitively and economically appealing rules such as a tax reform analog of the classical optimal taxation result on production efficiency

coordination of optimal taxation in a two country equilibrium model abstract the optimal determination of distortionary taxes on labour income in order to finance the provision of publicly provided private goods is considered within the context of a static two country equilibrium model it is shown that with cobb douglas utility functions the lack of international coordination of optimal taxation leads to excessive supplies of publicly provided private goods

privatization internal control and internal regulation abstract this paper develops a theory of the privatization of public enterprises the relevant decisions are modelled as a three stage process internal control internal regulation and privatization privatization is a move from an overcontrolled public firm to an overcontrolled private firm the firm never achieves the optimal extent of control because the necessary replacement of public by private managers leads not only to the desired reduction of bureaucracy but also to an undesired increase in profits moreover the reduction of overbureacratization is matched by a reduction in the quality of the supplied goods

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

the significance of federal taxes as automatic stabilizers using the taxsim model for the period 1962 95 we consider the federal tax system s impact as an automatic stabilizer despite the many changes in the tax system there has been relatively little change in its role as an automatic stabilizer we estimate that individual federal taxes offset perhaps as much as 8 percent of initial shocks to gdp we also suggest that the progressive income tax may help to stabilize output via its effect on the supply of labor an additional effect that may even be of similar magnitude to the more traditional path of stabilization through aggregate demand

macroeconomic externalities are pigovian taxes the answer basic welfare economics tells us that many types of externalities can be remedied by proper use of corrective taxes and subsidies this paper shows that this notion also extends to the macroeconomi

a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment this paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment the underlying economic model is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and public spending increases such policies are fiscally costly but can be financed by issuing government debt policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts the theory provides a positive account of the simultaneous determination of fiscal policy and unemployment the most important implication of the theory is that debt and unemployment levels should be positively correlated some evidence in support of this prediction is provided using data from a panel of developed countries

relative wages under decentralized and corporatist bargaining systems in studying the relationship between wage inequality and centralization in collective bargaining we distinguish central from local systems of wage determination by assuming that a central union takes the employment effects of negotiated wages into account whereas unions disregard these effects in decentralized systems two different sources of wage differentials are studied separately i heterogeneous workers with different skills and ii heterogeneous firms with varying levels of economic rent per employee with respect to skill levels the impact of centralization is ambiguous whereas inter firm wage differentials are likely to be lower in corporatist systems

privatization of public enterprises in this paper the following results of a transition from public to private ownership are obtained the manager of a public firm engages in less effort than is efficient in a privatized firm the manager s effort is chosen efficiently the reward to the manager of a public firm is more differentiated than efficient in the case of an unfavourable economic environment the reward is higher than efficient on the other hand the manager in a privatized firm is always rewarded efficiently it is irrelevant whether the public manager is incompletely informed about the particular mix of government s multiple objectives as long as the government chooses the incentive compatible reward for the manager

optimal fiscal policy in open economies with labour market distortions abstract we set up a general equilibrium model with unemployment owing to distortions in the labour market it is shown that a public expansion financed by a distortionary income tax may give rise to a decrease in unemployment even if public goods are pure waste such an expansion may give rise to an increase in welfare if it is associated with a decrease in unemployment since part of the gain from a fiscal expansion is achieved at the expense of welfare in other countries non cooperative policies tend to be too expansionary

the rise in unemployment a multi country study one of the most remarkable features of recent economic history has been the remorseless rise in unemployment throughout the industrialized countries however while the trend to higher unemployment is universal the experience of individual countries also differs widely the increase is especially marked within the european community where unemployment rates rival those reached in the interwar years by contrast in the scandinavian countries and japan unemployment is lower and has risen very much less experience in the united states lies somewhere between these extremes and in the last few years unemployment there has fallen sharply

general equilibrium when some firms follow special pricing rules in this paper we study the existence of a general equilibrium in an economy in which some of the firms behave competitively whereas others follow special pricing rules an even casual observation of economic reality confirms the need for the inclusion of price setting firms in the study of general equilibrium models and in fact this has been emphasized in the economic literature for some time we consider this a sufficient justification to present a general equilibrium model which allows for both types of behavior price setting as well as price taking behavior the model to be presented will account for a wide range of price setting rules we however find it appropriate to point out at the start that not all economically relevant price setting rules are covered although our model permits the drawing of useful conclusions for the general equilibrium theory of oligopolistic competition through prices it is not especially designed for that purpose in particular our results are not applicable to the general equilibrium analysis with price making monopolistic firms a subject on which there exists some literature 2 our motivation as well as our modelling options and assumptions are directed to two fields where an increased interest in the theoretical foundations recently could be noticed

optimal administered pricing under capacity constraints abstract this paper addresses the question of how pricing policies can improve the utilization of existing production capacities an optimizing input output model for the indian economy is developed for this purpose where the government s objective is to maximize growth subject to capacity constraints it is found that the optimal prices are related to the keynesian income multipliers associated with increases in the consumption of goods

shadow prices and public policies in a disequilibrium model of an open economy the paper focuses on the interaction between the goals of optimal stabilization and of allocative efficiency in project evaluation in an economy that is small as an exporter which must maintain trade balance and where some disequilibrium may prevail on goods and labour markets the criteria that are developed reflect an aggregation of profitability and reduction of unemployment additional foreign demand foreign currency savings should be evaluated in welfare terms after weighting by the gap between the relevant market and shadow prices the shadow prices also lead to the definition of an optimal taxation system

a model of imperfect competition with keynesian features the recent literature on the reappraisal of keynes has viewed keynesian equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities one problem with this approach is that it lacks a theory of price determination in particular of why prices are fixed in the present paper we show that a number of keynesian features arise in a model in which prices are fully flexible but where agents have some monopoly power one advantage of this approach is that it provides a theory of the determination of both prices and quantities

the gains from fiscal cooperation in the two commodity real trade model abstract this paper analyzes the gains from fiscal cooperation within the context of the standard two commodity real trade model it shows how the adjustment in the terms of trade is the critical factor in determining the effects of moving from a noncooperative equilibrium in general a noncooperative equilibrium leads to an overexpansion of government expenditure on the import good relative to a cooperative equilibrium the specific example of a logarithmic economy is also considered the paper discusses further the welfare effects resulting from the formation of a coalition of two countries among three

openness government size and the terms of trade this paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments both theoretically and empirically we argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels 1 a terms of trade externality whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and 2 the demand for insurance whereby trade raises risk and public transfers we provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter namely the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods moreover while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare the second is instead optimal in the empirical part of the paper we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants consistently with the terms of trade externality channel we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments

what really happened to u s bond yields analysts have been able to say surprisingly little about the sources of the very volatile yields of long term u s bonds in recent decades we used surveys of economists forecasts to decompose long term bond yields into expectations of future inflation expected real short term interest rates and the expected bond risk premium variation in the bond risk premium accounts for most of the variation in yields from period to period but declines in all three components have contributed to the decline in yields of the past decade and a half

wage interdependence through decentralized bargaining abstract the idea that sector specific unions are influenced by the wages obtained by other unions has mainly been used to support the empirical observation that wages are highly correlated among industries the sources of wage interdependence can mainly be found in unions preferences in the nature of technology and in price and demand determination the presence of externalities and of strategic complementarity among unions leads to suboptimal equilibria which generates non desired inflation unemployment and possibly also trade balance deficit this enforces the idea that part of current unemployment can be eliminated by improving the cooperation between social actors

an evaluation of indian government rice policy in tamil nadu abstract the indian government procures rice from wholesalers or producers at a price below the market price and then distributes it to low income consumers at a subsidized price this paper uses a simulataneous equations econometric model to evaluate the effects of this policy on supply demand of rice in the state of tamil nadu between 1956 and 1985 results show that production is more responsive to power for irrigation and fertilizer prices than to output prices because supply is inelastic producers bear the burden of the tax imposed by procurement even though rice is procured from the wholesaler rice distributed by the government displaces rice demanded in the open market and thus the government distribution of rice has not increased the total consumption of rice

what is new keynesian economics this research was supported by the national science foundation i am grateful to george williams for help with the data and to steven allen laurence ball olivier j blanchard timothy bresnahan charles calomiris dennis carlton robert chirinko russell cooper stanley fischer herschel grossman r glenn hubbard david laidler john leahy assar lindbeck n gregory mankiw david romer julio rotemberg dennis snower john taylor andrew weiss and two anonymous referees for comments on one or more earlier drafts i am also indebted to michael parkin and edmund s phelps for helping to establish the etymology of the phrase new keynesian

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

the role of taxes as automatic destabilizers in new keynesian economics abstract this paper analyses the effects of taxation in new keynesian economics the results show that taxes contribute to price and wage stickiness and moreover that the resulting fluctuations in welfare are magnified by the presence of taxes these results are at odds with the old keynesian idea of automatic stabilizers

wage setting under different monetary regimes in an economy with large wage setters like industry unions the monetary regime affects the trade off between consumer real wages and employment and profits faced by the wage setters this paper shows that an exchange rate target including participation in a monetary union is likely to involve lower wages in the traded sector and higher wages in the non traded sector than does a price target an exchange rate target also involves higher prices on non traded goods relative to on traded goods overall welfare is likely to be higher under a price target

optimal policy rules and regime switching in disequilibrium models this paper emphasizes the need to search for globally optimal policy levels for public production say in fix price disequilibrium analysis regime specific rules are inadequate they ignore the fact that moving a policy towards its optimal level may move the economy from its initial disequilibrium regime to a different regime where the rule no longer applies

the public sector and international integration abstract how does international integration affect public sector activities optimal public sector activities are shown to depend positively on a gains from trade effect and ambiguously on the standard distortion effect the bias in non cooperative policies may be strengthened by integration