information school choice and academic achievement evidence from two experiments we examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower income families in a public school choice plan receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher performing schools parents with high scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose nonguaranteed schools with higher test scores using random variation from each experiment we find that attending a higher scoring school increases student test scores the results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options from which to choose

selling to overconfident consumers consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts this overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost followed by steep marginal charges this matches observed cellphone service pricing plans in the us and elsewhere an alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major us cellular phone service provider the model can be reinterpreted to explain the use of flat rates and late fees in rental markets and teaser rates on loans nevertheless firms may benefit from consumers losing their overconfidence

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

consumer biases and mutual ownership abstract we show how ownership of the firm by its customers as well as nonprofit status can prevent firms from using contractual terms that take advantage of consumer biases by eliminating an outside residual claimant with control over the firm these alternatives to investor ownership reduce the incentive of the firm to offer such terms however customers who are unaware of their behavioral biases may fail to recognize this advantage of non investor owned firms we present evidence from the consumer financial services market that supports our theory comparing contract terms we find that mutually owned firms offer lower penalties such as default interest rates and higher up front prices such as introductory interest rates than do investor owned firms however consumers most vulnerable to these penalties are no more likely to use mutually owned firms

pollution and politician productivity the effect of pm on mps applying methods of textual analysis to all 119 225 speeches made in the canadian house of commons between 2006 and 2011 we establish that air pollution reduces the speech quality of canadian members of parliament mps exposure to fine particulate matter concentrations exceeding 15 g m3 causes a 2 3 reduction in the quality of mps speech equivalent to a 2 6 month decrease in education for more difficult communication tasks the decrement in quality is equivalent to the loss of 6 5 months of schooling our design accounts for the potential endogeneity of exposure and controls for many potential confounders including individual fixed effects

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

environment health and human capital in this review we discuss three major contributions economists have made to our understanding of the relationship between the environment and individual well being first in explicitly recognizing how optimizing behavior particularly in the form of residential sorting can lead to nonrandom assignment of pollution economists have employed a wide range of quasi experimental techniques to develop causal estimates of the effect of pollution second economic research has placed a considerable focus on the role of avoidance behavior which is an important component for understanding the difference between biological and behavioral effects of pollution and for proper welfare calculations lastly economic research has expanded the focus of analysis beyond traditional health outcomes to include measures of human capital including labor supply productivity and cognition our review of the quasi experimental evidence on this topic suggests that pollution does indeed have a wide range of effects on individual well being even at levels well below current regulatory standards given the importance of health and human capital as an engine for economic growth these findings underscore the role of environmental conditions as an important factor of production jel i12 i31 j24 q51 q53

on the foundations of dynamic monopoly theory in coase s 1972 model of dynamic monopoly the sole supplier of a durable good quotes a price sequence to buyers who at every date regard current and future prices as beyond their control studies of certain versions of the model have shown that when prices are quoted in a time consistent manner and when buyers accurately forecast future prices the seller would earn more by leasing her good bulow 1982 or by writing price protection contracts that make it prohibitively costly for the seller to cut future prices stokey 1981 butz 1990 bagnoli salant and swierzbinski s 1989 recent article in thisjournal has questioned coase s assumption that buyers view future prices as beyond their control the authors analyzed examples of dynamic monopoly in which a finite number of buyers do not ignore the effect of their current purchases on future prices in the examples selling without price commitment was found to yield higher profits than either leasing or selling with price commitment by contrast with the earlier work on dynamic monopoly bagnoli et al s examples do not

the political economy of regulation in markets with naive consumers in a model of a competitive industry selling base goods and add ons we investigate the conditions under which citizen consumers will support policies that eliminate behavioral inefficiencies induced by naive consumers unregulated competitive markets have two effects they produce deadweight losses and they redistribute income away from biased consumers both unbiased and naive consumers believe that they benefit from this redistribution the naive consumers are wrong so support for efficiency improving regulation is limited extending our model to consumers with partial sophistication about their naivete we predict patterns of regulation consistent with the form and timing of the credit card accountability responsibility and disclosure card act of 2009

durable good monopoly and best price provisions best price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available if the seller subsequently cuts price then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund a durable good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments the provisions require special circumstances to be practical but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings three applications are discussed international commodity agreements markets for electric turbogenerators and markets for financial claims copyright 1990 by american economic association

micro finance competition motivated micro lenders double dipping and default abstract we develop a tractable model of competition among socially motivated mfis so that the objective functions of the mfis put some weight on their own clients utility we find that the equilibrium involves double dipping i e borrowers taking multiple loans from different mfis whenever the mfis are relatively profit oriented further double dipping necessarily leads to default and inefficiency and moreover borrowers who face relatively higher transactions costs optimally decide to double dip interestingly an increase in mfi competition can increase the extent of double dipping and default further the interest rates may go either way with the interest rate likely to increase with more competition if the mfis are very socially motivated

the effect of language on economic behavior evidence from savings rates health behaviors and retirement assets languages dier widely in the ways they encode time i test the hypothesis that languages that grammatically associate the future and the present foster future oriented behavior this prediction arises naturally when well documented eects of language structure are merged with models of intertemporal choice empirically i nd that speakers of such languages save more retire with more wealth smoke less practice safer sex and are less obese this holds both across countries and within countries when comparing demographically similar native households the evidence does not support the most obvious forms of common causation i discuss implications for theories of intertemporal choice

selection on observed and unobserved variables assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools in this paper we measure the effect of catholic high school attendance on educational attainment and test scores because we do not have a good instrumental variable for catholic school attendance we develop new estimation methods based on the idea that the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables in a model provides a guide to the amount of selection on the unobservables we also propose an informal way to assess selectivity bias based on measuring the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that would be required if one is to attribute the entire effect of catholic school attendance to selection bias we use our methods to estimate the effect of attending a catholic high school on a variety of outcomes our main conclusion is that catholic high schools substantially increase the probability of graduating from high school and more tentatively attending college we find little evidence of an effect on test scores

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

dynamic monopoly with nondurable goods abstract a nondurable good monopolist who posts a single price will generally achieve an inefficient outcome but is it possible that the monopolist would achieve efficiency by repeatedly posting prices before delivery if buyers recognize the effect of current purchases on future prices then under complementary ideal conditions the answer is yes on the other hand traditional concerns about monopoly are viable if the seller bears a small cost per buyer of market reopening journal of economic literature classification numbers d42 l12

futile attempts at self control we investigate costly yet futile attempts at self control when consumption of a harmful product has a binary breakdown no breakdown nature and individuals tend to underestimate their need for self control considering time inconsistent preferences as well as temptation disutility we show that becoming more sophisticated can decrease welfare and investigate what kind of mistaken beliefs lead to low welfare with time inconsistent preferences being close to perfectly understanding one s preferences but assigning zero probability to true preferences induces the worst outcome jel d03 d11 d91

overconfidence insurance and paternalism it is well known that when agents are fully rational compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of insurance markets we find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks compulsory insurance makes low risk agents worse off hence behavioral biases may weaken some of the well established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

what do consumers really pay on their checking and credit card accounts explicit implicit and avoidable costs consumers in the united states make billions of transactions each year using cash checks debit cards and credit cards bank and credit card accounts provide consumers with liquidity to clear and settle these transactions in return consumers pay a variety of fees and both explicit and implicit interest charges the importance of retail banking and credit markets to economic activity drives interest in many open policy and research questions do households borrow too much relative to a neoclassical benchmark christopher d carroll 2001 why do many households leave a substantial amount of money on the table in managing their accounts sumit agarwal et al 2006 david gross and nicholas souleles 2002 do firms structure pricing to exploit consumer cognitive biases or limitations stefano dellavigna and ulrike malmendier 2004 xavier gabaix and david laibson 2006 how do learning sumit agarwal john driscoll and gabaix 2008 and disclosure regulation stango and zinman 2009b interact with consumer decision making and firm strategy to determine market outcomes this paper examines some threshold questions that should inform the questions above what do people really pay to use their bank and credit card accounts and which cost components are the largest of all the costs that people pay which could they easily avoid by making different day to day choices and how stable are both the level of costs and the share of costs that are avoidable for a given person over time what do consumers really pay on their checking and credit card accounts explicit implicit and avoidable costs