durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

rules communication and collusion narrative evidence from the sugar institute case detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion the sugar institute did not fix prices or output prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement coordinate on jointly profitable actions ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating and determine whether cheating had occurred in contrast to established theories cheating did occur but sparked only limited retaliation partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents jel l13 l41 this paper reexamines the cartel problem by studying the private discussions within one cartel while we find much that is in accord with george j stigler s 1964 basic insight that firms would structure an agreement conscious of their later incentive to cheat on it we also uncover puzzles for established theory and identify elements that a richer theory should encompass especially regarding the role of communication in collusion our window into the inner workings of a cartel is a remarkable series of notes on the weekly meetings of the sugar institute this trade association was formed in december 1927 in the wake of several years of falling margins and excess capacity by 14 firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the united states it operated until 1936 when the supreme court ruled its practices illegal among the top executives in regular attendance at the meetings was louis v place vice president of mccahan a midsize refinery in philadelphia place who was in charge of all activities of the company except production and raw sugar purchases wrote over 500 pages of single spaced detailed

toward a political theory of the emergence of environmental incentive regulation this article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy economists quasi unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within an incomplete contract approach to political economy we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic viewpoint their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians ability to distribute rents insights are provided on the emergence of incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee this article reexamines the experience of the joint executive committee an 1880s railroad cartel to assess the applicability of the green and porter 1984 and rotemberg and saloner 1986 theories of price wars after discussing necessary modifications to the theories i estimate a number of dynamic models to explore the causes of price wars the cyclical nature of pricing and the possibility that secret price cuts may have been given the estimates provide some support for the predictions of the first theory

capital market imperfections and the theory of optimum currency areas this paper studies how within and cross country capital market imperfections affect the welfare effects of forming a currency union the analysis considers a bank only world where intermediaries compete in cournot fashion and monitoring and state verification are costly the first part determines the credit market equilibrium and the optimal number of banks prior to joining the union the second part discusses the benefits from joining a currency union a competition effect is identified and related to the added monitoring costs that banks may incur when operating outside their home country through an argument akin to the brander krugman reciprocal dumping model of bilateral trade however in our framework whether joining a union raises welfare of the home country is ambiguous it depends on the relative strength of investment creation and intermediation diversion effects

cournot oligopoly characterization and applications preface part 1 introduction 1 introduction purpose and overview andrew f daughety part ii background 2 of the competition of producers augustin cournot translation by nathanial t bacon 3 review of walras s theorie mathematique de la richesse sociale and cournot s reserches sur les principles mathematiques de la theorie des richesses joseph bertrand translation by james w friedman 4 non cooperative games john nash part iii examining cournot s model 5 on the existence of cournot equilibrium william novshek 6 collusive behavior in non cooperative epsilon equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives roy radner 7 a non cooperative equilibrium for supergames james w friedman 8 reconsidering cournot the cournot equilibrium is consistent andrew f daughety 9 an experimental test of the consistent conjectures hypothesis charles a holt 10 quantity precommitment and bertrand competition yield cournot outcomes david m kreps and jose a scheinkman 11 on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentiation xavier vives 12 price competition vs quantity competition the role of uncertainty paul klemperer and margaret meyer part iv applications 13 cournot and walras equilibrium william novshek and hugo sonnenschein 14 duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand xavier vives 15 information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria esther gal or 16 uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit thomas r palfrey 17 losses from horizontal merger the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on cournot nash equilibrium stephen w salant sheldon switzer and robert j reynolds 18 delegation and the theory of the firm john vickers 19 a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 robert h porter 20 oligopoly and financial structure the limited liability effect james a brander and tracy r lewis

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

market power and collusion in the ocean shipping industry is a bigger cartel a better cartel i introduction the ocean shipping industry enjoys certain conditions that are extremely favorable for collusion such as antitrust immunity for explicit pricing agreements known as conference agreements and enforcement of those agreements by the u s government consequently studies 1 purporting to show evidence of price discrimination in ocean shipping were considered by some proof of the obvious the ocean shipping industry exercises market power due to its unique regulatory environment policymakers presume that collusive behavior pervades the industry as evidenced by senator metzenbaum s statement that the american people simply can t afford to give ocean shipping conferences unbridled discretion to raise prices reduce capacity neutralize low cost competitors and eliminate services to ports or other customers 2 thus the conventional view is that liner conferences act as effective cartels if this view is correct then the cartels should become more effective as they face less competition from outsiders that have refrained from joining the cartel we test this hypothesis by examining how liner conferences behave as their competitive position changes ocean shipping has a truly unique regulatory structure reflecting fears about destructive competition and excess capacity that have existed since the late 1800s at that time joint price setting behavior among ocean carriers became a common practice antitrust immunity for joint pricing agreements has been formally provided by u s legislation since 1916 policymakers granted that immunity in exchange for active regulatory supervision 3 under the current regulatory structure defined in the shipping act of 1984 each route contains a conference that consists of all carriers choosing to participate in an explicit joint pricing agreement which is free from antitrust action 4 some carriers typically choose to remain outside the pricing agreement these carriers are known as independent carriers conferences must be open so that any carrier may join or exit a conference with limited notice and without explicit penalties both conferences and independent carriers are required to file their rates with the federal maritime commission fmc an agency of the u s government the fmc is charged with monitoring and enforcing the published rates when the fmc detects secret discounting from published rates by either a conference or independent carrier it punishes those parties involved by assessing fines 5 however conference members are allowed to publicly deviate from the conference rate by publishing their own freight rate on a particular transaction after notifying the conference of their intention to do so with few exceptions to be discussed later conferences prohibit their members from independently entering into contractual arrangements with shippers although the ocean shipping industry s regulatory structure appears conducive to collusion other aspects of the industry are not hospitable to anticompetitive behavior first the absence of statutory restrictions on entry implies that carriers are free to transfer ships from one route to another or to enter the industry de novo secondly many countries subsidize shipbuilding which industry participants claim results in substantial excess capacity lastly the heterogeneity of both carriers and shippers may impede collusive behavior 6 previous empirical studies have argued that liner conferences effectively collude based purely on their finding that freight rates increase as the value of the cargo increases since ocean shipping is now widely containerized i e diverse commodities are shipped in uniform boxes that are handled in a largely uniform manner these value based rate differences are considered evidence of price discrimination by an effective cartel the major flaw in these tests of collusive market power is that they do not account for costs that may be positively related to the product s value such as implied damage liability costs or costs related to the quality of service

competition policy collusion and tacit collusion in this paper i pursue three goals the first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion the second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices investigation thresholds

optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines abstract this paper shows how antitrust laws against price fixing can be enforced efficiently in the presence of asymmetric information between the authorities and the industry and under different regimes of pecuniary punishment we consider two regimes of fines that are often used in practice the first involves a fine based on revenues of the industry while the second is related to the damage caused to consumers the analysis shows that since investigation is costly it is optimal from a welfare point of view to tolerate some degree of collusion in both cases comparing the deterrence levels we show that no regime is a priori better than the other in addition we show that for industries where the possibilities of collusion are small the first system dominates the second in terms of efficiency conversely for high possibilities of collusion the second system is better

optimal cartel trigger price strategies abstract a dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price in this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price the market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a downward demand shock

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

currency areas international monetary regimes and the employment inflation tradeoff we show that the employment inflation tradeoff facing a central bank depends on the size of the economy for which it sets monetary policy for inflation averse central banks the tradeoff improves the smaller the relevant economy the tradeoff facing the region whose central bank controls the exchange rate in a managed exchange rate regime does not change moving to a symmetric flexible exchange rate regime instead the core region in an asymmetric regime faces a worse tradeoff than under flexible exchange rates equipped with these results we explore the issue of the optimal size of a currency area both in a two and in a three region world 1998 elsevier science b v

internal cartel stability with time dependent detection probabilities abstract to account for the illegal nature of price fixing agreements per period detection probabilities that can vary over time are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly the resulting iccs for internal cartel stability indicate that for discount factors up to 10 per period detection probabilities of 5 are needed to reduce the number of cartel members by 50 for the special case of stationary supergames with constant per period detection probabilities p elegant rules emerge internal cartel stability requires the discount factor to increase with 100 p 1 p percent while a fixed fine of 100 1 p p percent of incremental cartel profits is required for making the icc always binding

government incentives when pollution permits are durable goods this paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a budget oriented government pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods and a pollution tax is seen as being equivalent to leasing out pollution permits first a general model is developed and then four stylized types of government are discussed a benevolent dictator a pure leviathan a green and a business friendly government we show that all types of government prefer a pollution tax system but this regime is not necessarily the best in social welfare terms the intuition is that a tax or leasing system makes it easier for the government to credibly commit to the budget maximizing level of pollution permits which is good for government revenues but not necessarily for social welfare

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

on the status of the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium in economic theory in economic theory the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium is a widely used equilibrium concept nevertheless the concept is frequently misunderstood and misleading explanations and interpretations are often given this paper presents a sample of such frequently appearing misleading explanations and goes on to explain why they are misleading the case for using the nash noncooperative equilibrium concept is stronger than what is implied by the many misleading statements found in the literature a basic issue is whether it can be argued that decisions in accordance with the noncooperative equilibrium theory are individually rational decisions this issue is not covered by the classical rationality postulate in economic theory this problem is tackled by stating certain postulates which may be taken as defining individual rationality in situations of noncooperative interaction it is shown that nash behavior satisfies these postulates

price wars and the stability of collusion a study of the pre world war i bromine industry between 1885 and 1914 us bromine producers colluded to raise prices and pro ts this collusion was disrupted by price wars bromine price wars are compared with the green porter and abreu pearce stacchetti models some price wars resulted from the imperfect monitoring problems which motivate these models several empirical implications of the aps model are borne out but the bromine industry s price wars were generally milder than contemplated by aps more severe price wars were part of a bargaining process in which rms tried to force renegotiation to a new collusive equilibrium with a diierent distribution of rents

the dynamics of a stable cartel the railroad express 1851 1913 i introduction the economic literature contains ample theoretical justification for the possibility of stable cartels for example osborne 1976 and porter 1983a but little in the way of empirical evidence about how stable cartels actually behave there is of course good reason for this shortcoming few stable cartels have ever existed cartel members find it too attractive to violate agreements in order to capture market share in eckbo s 1976 study of fifty one formal cartels the median lifetime of a cartel was only five years the mean was hardly better at 6 6 1 in general the dearth of stable cartels creates a problem for application of cartel theory 2 this paper however examines the exception to the rule what was probably the most successful cartel in u s business history the railroad express cartel the express cartel persisted for more than half a century by one reckoning from 1851 to 1913 during that time the five firms of the cartel agreed on prices territory and governance procedures and maintained a relatively stable environment within the industry moreover all five firms earned profits in virtually every year of the cartel s existence even during periods when the economy as a whole slipped into depression 3 periods of stress were present in the cartel but they tended to be short lived and contracts while subject to revision and dispute were never wholly abandoned aspects of the success of this cartel can be illuminated by various models in the industrial organization literature including some that explicitly treat cartel stability yet most of the literature on stability is deficient in that it typically examines only one kind of strategic interaction as this case shows long run success involves many strategies and other factors including the institutional framework the structure of costs the nature of internal transactions and the character of the technology the cartel s stability also was a dynamic process in which the organization acted continually to maintain conditions favorable to survival this paper will focus on two key elements in the success of the express cartel elements that would seem necessary for long run stability in any cartel 1 proficiency at deterring or at least limiting entry from outside and 2 ability to prevent defection among the members in fact deterrence and control are linked in the case of the express and the linkage was crucial to this industry s success the key feature was the creation and management of a joint distribution network this network it will be shown was the source both of the cartel s market power and of its internal stability after a brief historical overview the paper will examine the effects of the cartel s distribution system how it promoted a stable cartel ii overview the origin and history of the express cartel the railroad express industry controlled the parcel post service in the united states from 1839 until 1913 during that time the express provided the only established way of transmitting a parcel in the united states the industry also obtained economies of scope by combining parcel service with financial courier operations the express offered direct delivery of consignments and promised a full warranty on the contents in its first decade local express firms sprang up along key rail and steamship routes once established many express franchises were contested by new entrants at this time fixed costs were small encouraging entry efforts but incumbents often fought newcomers with price wars that drove out the entrant led to the bankruptcy of the incumbent or resulted in a merger 4 by 1850 two large regional firms the adams and american express companies had developed despite their histories of price warfare against potential competitors the two firms decided against conflict and in 1851 signed their first cartel agreement

markets and regulatory hold up problems abstract many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance a firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation we show that such incentives which resemble a hold up problem may not be overcome when government s only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax the hold up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits a time consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations even if no permits are traded and their market price is low indeed an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great

monetary policy interactions under managed exchange rates this paper studies a two country monetary system where one country sets its money stock but gives up control of the exchange rate and the other country gives up control of its own money stock but can set the exchange rate independently cournot nash equilibria under managed rates differ significantly from those under fixed or floating rates the country that controls the exchange rate can effectively offset inflationary shocks by changing the exchange rate at the expense of the foreign country and as a result can be better off than the foreign country this result provides an example of a successful disinflation through an exchange rate appreciation in a two country world and it indicates that managed exchange rate regimes tend to be unstable since both countries find it desirable to affect the exchange rate managed exchange rates however are a stable outcome when the center country is so much larger than its partner that changes in the real exchange rate do not affect its output and real income copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

the political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy abstract this paper develops a positive theory explaining pollution tax policy outcomes in a small open economy the equilibrium tax rate depends on lobby group membership the relative importance of lobbying activities and the tax elasticity of pollution the equilibrium properties are investigated the model is extended to incorporate pollution abatement and a pollution abatement subsidy we show that total pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate this effect arises because the equilibrium pollution tax rate may be decreasing in the subsidy rate due to altered political influence of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects abstract in an infinitely repeated cournot game with trigger strategy punishment we demonstrate that the relationship between market concentration and collusion sustainability depends on the strength of network externalities the latter is shown to interact with the number of firms and to affect the profitability of cooperation vs competition which delivers the result challenging conventional wisdom that lower market concentration can make collusion more stable