statistical efficiency of double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation the statistical efficiency of conventional dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys can be improved by asking each respondent a second dichotomous choice question which depends on the response to the first question if the first response is yes the second bid is some amount greater than the first bid while if the first response is no the second bid is some amount smaller this double bounded approach is shown to be asymptotically more efficient than the conventional singlebounded approach using data from a survey of californians regarding their willingness to pay for wetlands in the san joaquin valley we show that in a finite sample the gain in efficiency can be very substantial

implications of bid design and willingness to pay distribution for starting point bias in double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys we examine starting point bias in double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys we investigate 1 the seriousness of the biases for the location and scale parameters of the willingness to pay wtp in the presence of starting point bias 2 whether or not these biases depend on the distribution of wtp and on the bid design and 3 how well a commonly used diagnostic for starting point bias a test of the null that bid set dummies entered in the right hand side of the wtp model are jointly equal to zero performs under various circumstances monte carlo simulations suggest that the effect of ignoring starting point bias depends on the bid design and on the true distribution of wtp a well balanced symmetric bid design may result in very modest biases even when the anchoring mechanism is very strong the power of bid set dummies in detecting starting point bias is low they tend to account for misspecifications in the distribution assumed by the researcher for the latent wtp rather than capturing the presence of starting point bias

efficiency analysis for exogenously fixed inputs and outputs we evaluate by means of mathematical programming formulations the relative technical and scale efficiencies of decision making units dmus when some of the inputs or outputs are exogenously fixed and beyond the discretionary control of dmu managers this approach further develops the work on efficiency evaluation and on estimation of efficient production frontiers known as data envelopment analysis dea we also employ the model to provide efficient input and output targets for dmu managers in a way that specifically accounts for the fixed nature of some of the inputs or outputs we illustrate the approach using real data for a network of fast food restaurants

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

incentive incompatibility and starting point bias in iterative valuation questions we test for incentive incompatibility and starting point bias to describe the effects of iterative valuation questions on willingness to pay we compare double triple and multiplebounded models with data from two surveys with similar designs of the valuation questions we find that incentive incompatibility is present in both sets of data and starting point bias is present in one the efficiency of the willingness to pay estimate is improved in only one set of data the potential loss from using iterative questions without controlling for both incentive incompatibility and starting point bias is biased willingness topay estimates

reputation and the allocation of ownership we show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long term relationship where problems of opportunism are less severe unless agents are very patient ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives to cooperate the optimal control structure of the static game restricts the gain from deviation to be the lowest but also the punishment will be minimal the worst ownership structure of the one shot game is good in the repeated setting because it provides the highest punishment but bad because the gain from deviation is also highest we show that when investment costs are very elastic partnership and a hostage type solution arise in equilibrium while when costs are moderately elastic the results of the one shot game apply

treatment of don t know responses in contingent valuation surveys a random valuation model abstract this paper provides a utility theoretic interpretation of don t know dk responses in contingent valuation surveys using a referendum elicitation procedure the random valuation model in this paper assumes that each respondent of a contingent valuation survey has an implicit valuation distribution rather than a single true value as traditionally assumed in his her mind if an offered referendum bid is not clearly different from the mean value of one s valuation distribution the respondent may give a dk answer to the cv referendum question based on this model a maximum likelihood procedure is proposed for estimating respondents willingness to pay for a nonmarket good with referendum contingent valuation data which include dk responses an empirical illustration of this estimation procedure is also provided

information gathering transaction costs and the property rights approach the property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives while bargaining is ex post efficient in contrast transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies in the present paper a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory in particular ownership by party b may be optimal even though only the indispensable party a makes an investment decision

efficiency out of disorder contested ownership in incomplete contracts in many situations irreconcilable disagreements between players lead to costly ownership disputes over assets for example in case of joint ownership this article studies the role of such disputes in a situation where two players have to make a transaction specific investment and when contracts are incomplete i show that potentially contested ownership may mitigate the inefficiency of investments due to the incompleteness of contracts generating an exchange surplus that comes closer to the first best surplus as compared to any other ex ante distribution of ownership typically discussed in the literature following the influential work by grossman hart and moore if the contest is an all pay auction each player makes a transaction specific investment as if he or she owns the asset this article can explain why shared ownership as for example in equity joint ventures family firms start up partnerships and so on is an important part of today s corporate landscape

noncooperative bargaining hostages and optimal asset ownership this paper re examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels it obtains some results which contradict findings by sanford j grossman oliver d hart and john moore in particular it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser s investment incentive the difference between this paper and those authors papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining this paper also clarifies the role of relationship specific investments as a cause of integration copyright 1998 by american economic association

investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights abstract in the context of the property rights theory of the firm we study the role of investment spillovers in shaping the efficiency ranking of ownership regimes in our model spillovers arise from asset embodied investment and footloose investment under the former the benefits of investment can be appropriated only through asset control under the latter the benefits of investment can be appropriated independently of asset control our model predicts that asset embodied investment favors the adoption of non integration while joint ownership may prevail in the presence of footloose investment

alternative approaches for incorporating respondent uncertainty when estimating willingness to pay the case of the mexican spotted owl abstract this paper explores the sources and patterns of respondents uncertainty regarding their willingness to pay wtp and presents alternative approaches for incorporating this uncertainty into estimation of the logit model recently proposed approaches are compared to methods proposed in this paper which allows for incorporation of uncertainty regarding both yes and no responses these approaches are evaluated by comparing the goodness of fit and variability of mean wtp extreme recoding of uncertain yes responses as no responses reduces the logit goodness of fit and the precision of the wtp estimate incorporating the degree of uncertainty of yes responses results in the highest goodness of fit and the smallest variability of mean wtp among the various models addressing uncertainty a regression model is used to determine the significant determinants of respondent uncertainty

an evaluation of the efficiency of quebec s school boards using the data envelopment analysis method in this paper the efficiency of quebec s school boards during a period of severe cutbacks in their finance is examined using data envelopment analysis the average efficiency is found to be relatively high in spite of this potential savings could be achieved if school boards were fully efficient results were found to depend heavily on school boards socio economic conditions thus they were subjected to tobit analysis and the boards corrected efficiencies recalculated it is concluded that inefficiencies cost 800 million dollars of which 200 million dollars come from unfavourable socio economic conditions

thinking about the firm a review of daniel spulber s the theory of the firm in this review i describe how economists have moved beyond the firm as a black box to incorporate incentives internal organization and firm boundaries i then turn to the way that the theory of the firm is treated in daniel spulber s book the theory of the firm microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs firms markets and organizations spulber s goal is to explain why firms exist how they are established and what they contribute to the economy to accomplish this spulber defines a firm to be a transaction institution whose objectives differ from those of its owners for spulber this separation is the key difference between the firm and direct exchange between consumers i raise questions about whether this is a useful basis for a theory of the firm jel d21

starting point bias in dichotomous choice valuation with follow up questioning abstract follow up questions are frequently used to improve the efficiency of dichotomous choice contingent valuation questionnaires however a number of authors e g 12 16 have noted a significant difference between the wtp distributions implied by initial and follow up question responses this paper investigates starting point bias as one explanation for the phenomenon we develop a model of starting point bias in the context of dichotomous choice questioning with follow up using a monte carlo simulation to illustrate the potential bias imparted to wtp estimates an application is provided based on data from a cv study in northcentral iowa

modeling shifts in willingness to pay from a bayesian updating perspective this paper derives a structural shift empirical specification for a double bound dichotomous choice contingent valuation methodology premised upon willingness to pay wtp shifts ensuing from a representative model of respondent bayesian updating behavior we demonstrate by way of data simulations that a traditional structural shift specification may often fail at estimating true wtp in this context further simulations demonstrate that a simple extension of the traditional structural shift model derived explicitly from our bayesian framework can correct for much of the wtp bias with an empirical application confirming the simulation outcomes finally we investigate the relationship between strategic behavior and wtp shifts

does asset ownership always motivate managers outside options and the property rights theory of the firm this paper studies the grossman hart moore ghm property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating offers bargaining when managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation the ghm results obtain if taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining outcomes are very different sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with sometimes independent assets should be owned together sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately

discrete choice under preference uncertainty an improved structural model for contingent valuation abstract this paper is concerned with discrete choice contingent value estimation in the presence of response errors we attempt to extend the theoretical frameworks developed by hanemann 1984 amer j agric econom 66 332 341 and cameron 1988 j environ econom management 15 355 379 by introducing preference uncertainty with individual respondents we assume that respondents have incomplete knowledge about their true valuation of a nonmarket resource and thus may give wrong yes no answers on whether or not to pay a given bid amount for the resource a post decisional confidence measure for each observed yes no answer is elicited for characterizing the degree of preference uncertainty with the help of this confidence measure we develop an improved structural model for deriving value estimates data from a forest environment valuation survey are used for the empirical estimations

willingness to pay estimates using the double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation format a test for validity and precision in a bayesian framework the double bounded dichotomous choice db dc contingent valuation format is thought to yield more precise welfare estimates questions remain about its validity the initial bid may represent information with which respondents update their willingness to pay a bayesian model of respondent decision making is estimated for two data sets the results indicate updating or shifts in respondent willingness to pay between iterated valuations nonparametric testing of the welfare estimates reveals that the model incorporating updating yields different values from the standard model the expected increases in the precision of the db dc welfare estimates are lost when updating occurs

efficient estimation methods for closed ended contingent valuation surveys closed ended contingent valuation surveys can be very useful in the evaluation of nonmarket resources respondents merely state whether they would accept or reject a hypothetical threshold amount either as payment for giving up access to the resource or as a fee for its use the authors develop a maximum likelihood procedure which exploits the variation in the threshold values to allow direct and separate point estimates of regression like slope coefficients and error standard deviations without truncation bias their illustration uses data from a survey of recreational fisherman to examine factors which influence individuals willingness to pay copyright 1987 by mit press

investments in physical capital relationship specificity and the property rights approach abstract we reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts we explore the implications of different degrees of relationship specificity when there are two parties a and b who can make investments in physical capital instead of human capital if relationship specificity is exogenously given it turns out that joint asset ownership can be optimal only if the degree of relationship specificity is sufficiently small if relationship specificity can be freely chosen and if party a s investments are more productive then the parties deliberately choose a strictly positive level of relationship specificity and they always agree on sole ownership by party a

efficiency of educational production an analysis of new york school districts theoretical consideration of technical efficiency has existed since tjalling c koopmans 1951 which defined technical efficiency for production possibilities for which it is impossible to increase any output without simultaneously increasing any input the nonparametric approach to efficiency estimation is based not on this definition but rather on michael j farrell s 1957 index even after farrell efficiency is achieved there may exist additional slack in individual inputs implying that farrell efficiency doesn t measure inefficiency to solve this problem this paper suggests incorporating programming results into a second stage multivariate regression analysis for illustrative purposes this technique is applied to analyze new york state school districts copyright 1996 by mit press

respondent experience and contingent valuation of environmental goods abstract respondent experience i e a respondent s information set has long been suspected to influence contingent valuation estimates of environmental values we assess the influence of experience by explicitly modeling the relationship between respondent experience and both fitted individual resource values and the conditional variance of these estimated values using three different joint specifications for experience and wtp normal censored normal poisson censored normal and zero inflated poisson censored normal we find discrete jumps in resource values as experience increases from zero and that more experienced respondents have smaller conditional variances simulation of arbitrary levels of experience allows standardization of the amount of information when developing welfare estimates

a new model of contingent valuation most models of environmental regulation are based on some definition of the social benefits of environmental improvement social benefits include increases in citizens utility and where production is adversely affected by environmental decline increases in national income understanding these benefits is key to carrying out efficient environmental policy it is not surprising then that a large part of current environmental economics research re