how do market reforms affect china s responsiveness to environmental policy a large percentage of total investment in china is allocated by the central government at below market interest rates in pursuit of non economic objectives this has resulted in low rates of return and a high number of non performing loans threatening the future health of the chinese economy as a result reform of capital markets is a high priority of the chinese government at the same time the country is implementing various environmental policies to deal with serious pollution issues in this paper we ask how reforms of the capital market will affect the functioning of a carbon tax this allows us to assess how china s willingness to join global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is influenced by china s current efforts to reduce investment subsidies we compare the costs of a carbon tax in a reformed economy with the costs of a carbon tax in the current subsidized economy we find that in the subsidized economy the tax interaction effect dampens the effect of a carbon tax resulting in smaller reductions in emissions than what would result in a reformed economy importantly we also find that the effect on economic welfare from a carbon tax is lower in the subsidized economy in fact for lower levels of reductions the carbon tax is actually welfare improving these results have important implications for an economy undergoing economic transition the carbon tax rate required to achieve a certain level of emission reductions will be higher in an economy with capital subsidies however the welfare implications of the tax indicate that the current system with capital subsidies is highly distorting implying that there is a high efficiency cost for the non economic objectives the government is pursuing by maintaining this system of subsidies

are environmental taxes a free lunch issues in modelling the macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes applied analysis of output and employment effects from revenue neutral environmental taxation depends critically on how the supply side of the economy is modelled despite the long history of theoretical and computable general equilibrium supply side models the empirical basis of much of this work has been quite weak until recently however most econometric attempts to capture factor substitution effects have not been based on theoretically consistent structures this paper examines the methodological issues that underlie these problems and compares the results of imposing environmental taxes in two different econometric modelling structures the implications of theories of endogenous technical progress on the simulation properties of such models are discussed and a simple empirically based model that embodies some of these features is presented

efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

majority voting and pareto optimality this investigation of the majority voting decision under various tax structures makes the following points first that majority voting cannot be relied upon to choose the pareto optimal level of output of the public good if the structure of taxes is predetermined what is chosen is an output level of the public good that is pareto optimal with respect to the particular tax structure another tax structure might exist that provides a better solution

commuting transport tax reform and the labour market employer paid parking and the relative efficiency of revenue recycling instruments in this paper the welfare effects of a budget neutral increase in taxes on car commuters are studied in a model that takes into account the presence of employer paid parking at the workplace it is found that the presence of employer paid parking substantially increases the welfare effect of such a tax reform independent of the use of the revenues congestion taxes not only correct congestion externalities they also reduce the inefficiency caused by employer paid parking moreover different congestion effects of alternative recycling instruments and the presence of employer paid parking jointly imply that recycling the tax revenues via higher public transport subsidies may yield much more favourable welfare effects than previously believed it can easily outperform recycling the tax revenues via lower labour taxes finally cashing out parking costs to public transport users is found to generate substantial positive welfare effects numerical analysis confirms the theory

energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications this paper studies the equity effects of energy and carbon taxes as policy instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and fulfil the legally binding reduction targets adopted in the 1997 kyoto protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate change unfccc the equity effects of taxes on energy products are studied in the broader context of a revenue neutral environmental fiscal reform the paper shows that carbon or energy taxes are mildly regressive and that impacts on low income households are less than expected the distributional implications depend on various issues such as whether the type of fuel being taxed heating transport and in particular how the revenues are recycled back to the economy the importance of compensation and mitigation measures is also discussed

comment on m hoel emission taxes versus other environmental policies the choice of the appropriate instrument in environmental policy is not only a question of theoretical importance it is also of considerable political relevance while environmental taxes are sometimes used to control pollution quotas and direct controls dominate in practice if this observed bias is only due to the nature of policymaking and not supported by economic reasoning politicians are not well advised to use quotas and direct controls instead of environmental taxes hoel discusses popular arguments that are often used by politicians in favour of direct controls and concludes that the results are typically not clear cut in this comment i would like to focus on the employment effects of revenue raising and nonrevenue raising instruments politicians as well as special interest groups often claim that emission taxes increase the cost of production thereby harming employment clearly in the face of high rates of unemployment in many industrialized countries potentially negative employment effects of environmental regulation raise political resistance to green policy the ongoing debate has put

public subsidies and the location and pricing of sports using public choice analysis we determine how government subsidies affect location and pricing decisions of sports teams we explain how voter referendums can create suboptimal outcomes for local communities and identify winners and losers in sport team subsidies subsidy bidding leads to higher subsidies and fewer sport franchises but does not alter team location sport subsidies generate additional revenue for owners and players at taxpayer expense and non fan taxpayers subsidize both the team and fans to increase political support for subsidies teams lower ticket prices below the apparent profit maximizing level which may cause inelastic ticket prices and ticket shortages

the double dividend second best worlds and real world environmental policy abstract the recent series of papers by bovemberg goulder parry and others argue that the double dividend is unlikely to exist because of second best problems they argue that the imposition of environmental tax in an economy already distorted by income taxes will further distort the economy by reducing incentives to supply labor our paper argues that this is not likely to be the case because of the restrictive assumptions made by these models and because of the role of the environment as a factor of production

perspectives on the u s current account deficit and sustainability this essay considers the underpinnings of the large u s current account deficit it then tackles the question of whether the u s current account deficit is sustainable a current account deficit is sustainable at a point in time if neither it nor the associated foreign capital inflows nor the negative net international investment position are large enough to induce significant changes in economic variables such as consumption or investment or interest rates or exchange rates even if the current account deficit is sustainable by this definition today its trajectory could still be creating future risks for the u s and global economy

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

computable general equilibrium model analysis of economywide cross effects of social and environmental policies in chile abstract the analysis of the linkages between development policies and social and environmental variables is a neglected area within the development literature this paper focuses on the key interrelations among the economic social and environmental elements of the sustainable development triangle a thorough review is undertaken of both social and environmental policies in chile underlining important economic growth and reforms using the static cge model ecogem chile the economywide impacts of several environmental social and combined policies are simulated for the chilean economy six different policies are simulated three environmental policies that impose different taxes on pm10 so 2 and no 2 emissions respectively the same tax on pm10 in a context of high unemployment one social policy that increases government transfers to households and a mixed social environmental policy package where the environmental tax on pm10 and the social transfer policy are simulated simultaneously the results show that environmental tax policies may have negative social effects using real disposable income by quintiles as proxy the impacts depend on the use of the new revenues and the status of employment taxing pm10 emission yields better environmental results than taxing so 2 and no 2 social policies do not show negative environmental impacts combined environmental and social policies improve results thus specific compensating social policies would improve environmental policy acceptance while also reducing poverty or strong income distribution disparities the evidence suggests that environmental policies may have social impacts but not vice versa the results show that the ecogem chile model is useful for analyzing systematically and holistically different economywide policies and their impact on the chilean economy winners and losers may be identified as well as the potential magnitude of gains and losses the results obtained are not all straightforward due to indirect effects

reduction of fossil fuel emissions in the usa a holistic approach towards policy formulation abstract in the united states the response of the federal government to the global initiative of reduction of emissions of co2 has been limited with the kyoto protocol having entered into force in february 2005 there will be renewed international pressure on the united states for action concurrently the us economy growing modestly is characterized by large current account and budget deficits this situation calls for garnering additional revenue through repealing of the recent tax cuts an option available is to impose a modest carbon tax the rationale of such a tax is that it would address the twin objectives of additional revenue and reduction of emissions in this paper the impact of a hypothetical carbon tax imposed in a revenue neutral context on 2001 household incomes is analyzed primarily to ascertain its progressivity progressivity of any tax is strongly associated with its political acceptability the incidence of the hypothetical carbon tax is computed across the income quintiles it is observed that only the households in the highest income quintile and the lowest income quintile are impacted by the tax it is found that this tax is weakly regressive in the us context

how robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns abstract this paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework we characterize the drivers for non uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences quantitatively assessing the case of price based co2 emissions control in the u s economy we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax the deviation from uniform emissions pricing however becomes non negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target downstream vs upstream taxation pre existing distortionary taxes and parametric uncertainty in firms and households equilibrium tax responses

what do we know about carbon taxes an inquiry into their impacts on competitiveness and distribution of income abstract the kyoto protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate change unfccc has set legally binding emissions targets for a basket of six greenhouse gases and timetables for industrialised countries it has also incorporated three international flexibility mechanisms however the articles defining the flexibility mechanisms carry wording that their use must be supplemental to domestic actions this has led to the open debates on interpretations of these supplementarity provisions such debates ended at the resumed sixth conference of the parties cop to the unfccc held in bonn july 2001 and at the subsequent cop 7 in marrakesh november 2001 the final wording in the bonn agreement reaffirmed in the marrakesh accords at least indicates that domestic policies will have an important role to play in meeting annex b countries emissions commitments carbon taxes have long been advocated because of their cost effectiveness in achieving a given emissions reduction in this paper the main economic impacts of carbon taxes are assessed based on a review of empirical studies on existing carbon energy taxes it is concluded that competitive losses and distributive impacts are generally not significant and definitely less than often perceived however given the ultimate objective of the framework convention future carbon taxes could have higher rates than those already imposed and thus the resulting economic impacts could be more acute in this context it has been shown that how to use the generated fiscal revenues will be of fundamental importance in determining the final economic impacts of carbon taxes finally we briefly discuss carbon taxes in combination with other domestic and international instruments

environmental policy public finance and the labour market in a second best world abstract environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second best framework of optimal taxation households consume both clean and dirty commodities degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax a lower tax on labour less employment more public abatement and a cleaner environment if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts otherwise public consumption falls

pollution permits and environmental innovation abstract this paper starts with a warning about the negative impact of plain pollution allowance markets on environmental pollution innovation stand alone spot markets enable the government to expropriate an innovation by offering a competing technology pollution permits that puts an arbitrary downward pressure on the licensing price advance allowances reduce expropriation but still create suboptimal incentives for innovation they have the further drawback that permits are inefficiently used when the innovation occurs options to pollute at a given striking price fare better than allowances because they create private incentives to phase out pollution in the case of innovation we characterize the social optimum and show that it can be implemented by issuing options to pollute inter alia finally the paper compares ex ante and ex post government procurement surprisingly ex post licensing by the innovator to the government may yield a higher licensing fee than an ex ante contract

higher price lower costs minimum prices in the eu emissions trading scheme this paper examines the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system ets when some emissions are regulated outside of the ets we theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare using a numerical simulation model of the european union we find that moderate minimum prices in the eu ets can reduce the costs of eu climate policy by up to thirty percent we also find that due to tax interaction effects the optimal minimum price in the eu ets should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non ets sectors this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

energy prices and carbon taxes under uncertainty about global warming this paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers welfare for uncertainty global warming follows an ito process stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version the unconstrained reversible case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case nevertheless interesting analytical properties e g about when to stop emissions implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply are derived and complemented by a numerical example

understanding carbon lock in abstract this paper narrative argues that industrial economies have been locked into fossil fuel based energy systems through a process of technological and institutional co evolution driven by path dependent increasing returns to scale it is asserted that this condition termed carbon lock in creates persistent market and policy failures that can inhibit the diffusion of carbon saving technologies despite their apparent environmental and economic advantages the notion of a techno institutional complex is introduced to capture the idea that lock in occurs through combined interactions among technological systems and governing institutions while carbon lock in provides a conceptual basis for understanding macro level barriers to the diffusion of carbon saving technologies it also generates questions for standard economic modeling approaches that abstract away technological and institutional evolution in their elaboration the question of escaping carbon lock in is left for a future paper

optimal gasoline tax in developing oil producing countries the case of mexico this paper uses the methodology of parry and small 2005 to estimate the optimal gasoline tax for a less developed oil producing country the relevance of the estimation relies on the differences between less developed countries ldcs and industrial countries we argue that lawless roads general subsidies on gasoline poor mass transportation systems older vehicle fleets and unregulated city growth make the tax rates in ldcs differ substantially from the rates in the developed world we find that the optimal gasoline tax is 1 90 per gallon at 2011 prices and show that the estimate differences are in line with the factors hypothesized in contrast to the existing literature on industrial countries we show that the relative gasoline tax incidence may be progressive in mexico and more generally in ldcs

political business cycles before the great depression abstract we test for the existence of political business cycles using annual data for the period from 1869 to 1929 finding only weak supportive evidence

the estimation of prewar gross national product methodology and new evidence the paper develops new methodology for the estimation of prewar gnp taps previously unused data sources and develops new estimates for the periods 1869 1908 and 1869 1928 primary among the new data sources are direct measures of output in the transportation communications and construction sectors and estimates of the consumer price index new measures of real gnp nominal gnp and the gnp deflator are developed the new estimates of real gnp are as volatile on average over the business cycle as the traditional kuznets kendrick series but dampen the amplitude of some cycles while raising the amplitude of others the new estimates of the gnp deflator are distinctly less volatile than the traditional series and in fact no more volatile than those in the postwar period

estimates from a consumer demand system implications for the incidence of environmental taxes abstract most studies suggest that environmental taxes are regressive making them less attractive policy options we consider the distributional effects of a gasoline tax increase using four incidence measures and under three scenarios for gas tax revenue use to incorporate behavioral responses we use consumer expenditure survey data to estimate a consumer demand system that includes gasoline other goods and leisure our estimates confirm that when revenues are not recycled a gasoline tax is regressive use of incidence measures that ignore demand responses however will substantially overstate this regressivity in contrast the differences between the equivalent variation and easier to implement consumer surplus measures are relatively small in addition our results suggest that using the additional gas tax revenue to fund labor tax cuts makes the policy substantially less regressive while using the revenue to fund lump sum transfers actually makes it progressive

the present value criterion and environmental taxation the suboptimality of first best decision rules this paper examines the links between environmental taxes and distortionary taxation in a dynamic model of climate change and economic growth under first best conditions labor and capital would remain untaxed and carbon dioxide emissions would be taxed at a rate equal to the present value marginal cost they impose on future society setting the discount rate equal to the marginal productivity of capital under secondbest conditions however this decision rule substantially understates optimal emissions taxes when the resulting revenues are used to provide targeted cuts in distortionary taxes conversely relatively low emissions taxes are economically justified given lump sum revenue recycling

political equilibrium and the provision of public goods this paper treats interest groups peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers asthe unit of account for representativevoting each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand at the margin the effort benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

choosing the right instrument the role of public revenues for environmental policy this paper analyses the optimal choice of second best optimal environmental policies using a partial equilibrium model the paper first reconfirms the well known result that the existence of a double dividend in its weak definition favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income without uncertainty environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate in the presence of uncertainty however the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good in the second part the paper therefore analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty the paper shows that the first best choice rule between price and quantity regulation weitzman 1974 remains valid in a second best world with distortionary taxation

the substantial bias from ignoring general equilibrium effects in estimating excess burden and a practical solution we show that under typical conditions the simple excess burden triangle formula substantially underestimates the excess burden of commodity taxes in some cases by a factor of 10 or more this formula performs poorly because it ignores general equilibrium interactions most important interactions between the taxed commodity and the labor market many prior studies have shown that general equilibrium interactions affect excess burden but have not appreciated the bias associated with ignoring these interactions or the quantitative importance of this bias we derive an implementable alternative to the simple formula this alternative formula captures interactions that the simple formula omits as a result it is both unbiased and usually more accurate

pollution taxes and revenue recycling abstract discussions of environmental policy and the tax system have emphasized the value of pollution tax revenues which can be used to reduce other tax distortions in the economy however by raising private marginal production costs environmental taxes also tend to reduce gdp and exacerbate the welfare costs of conventional taxes for environmental taxes in consumption goods industries the net welfare change from these two effects is negative unless this good is a relatively weak substitute for leisure an estimate for the optimal pollution tax with full revenue recycling is 63 to 78 of marginal environmental damages

escaping carbon lock in this article explores the climate policy implications of the arguments made in understanding carbon lock in unruh 2000 which posited that industrial countries have become locked into fossil fuel based energy systems through path dependent processes driven by increasing returns to scale carbon lock in arises through technological organizational social and institutional co evolution culminating in what was termed as techno institutional complex tic in order to resolve the climate problem an escape from the lock in condition is required however due to the self referential nature of tic escape conditions are unlikely to be generated internally and it is argued here that exogenous forces are probably required

combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change abstract uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave differently and leads to divergent welfare consequences although most of the debate on global climate change policy has focused on quantity controls due to their political appeal this paper argues that price controls are more efficient simulations based on a stochastic computable general equilibrium model indicate that the expected welfare gain from the optimal price policy is five times higher than the expected gain from the optimal quantity policy an alternative hybrid policy combines both the political appeal of quantity controls with the efficiency of prices using an initial distribution of tradeable permits to set a quantitative target but allowing additional permits to be purchased at a fixed trigger price even sub optimal hybrid policies offer dramatic efficiency improvements over otherwise standard quantity controls for example a 50 trigger price per ton of carbon converts the 3 trillion expected loss associated with a simple 1990 emission target to a 150 billion gain these results suggest that a hybrid policy is an attractive alternative to either a pure price or quantity system

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

political business cycles and endogenous elections empirical research of political business cycles pbcs may suffer from endogeneity bias when incumbent governments have discretion to call for an early election using an instrumental variable iv routine on data from japan and the u k we find strong evidence to support the notion that election timing is a function of the economy rather than the macroeconomy being driven by elections as assumed in pbc in single equation regressions no evidence of political cycles are found but hausman tests suggest elections are endogenous in our regressions a monetary cycle in japan and an inflation cycle in the u k are uncovered through iv estimation

biofuel subsidies versus the gas tax the carrot or the stick abstract this paper provides an analytical framework to examine the relative efficiencies of a revenue neutral biofuel subsidy and a gas tax in the presence of pre existing distortions and growing substitutability between fuels both policies are set to achieve a targeted reduction in gasoline use at the state level the model is then calibrated for a small open economy such as illinois which is one of the largest producers of biofuels such as ethanol in the u s the main result of the paper shows that raising the biofuel subsidy use reduces overall welfare by more than a higher gas tax both aimed to achieve a targeted reduction in pure gasoline the relative efficiency of the higher gas tax is primarily due to it exacerbating the pre existing distortion in the biofuel market by less than the subsidy moreover for current parameter estimates welfare improving policy combinations for achieving a targeted amount of energy security are higher gas taxes combined with lower biofuel subsidies and a lower tax on income however the preference for a gasoline labor tax swap shrinks as the elasticity of substitution between the two fuels rises

tradeable carbon permit auctions how and why to auction not grandfather abstract an auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change to minimize administrative costs permits would be required at the level of oil refineries natural gas pipe lines natural gas liquid sellers and coal processing plants to maximize liquidity in secondary markets permits would be fully tradable and bankable the government would conduct quarterly auctions a standard ascending clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery an auction is preferred to grandfathering giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions because it allows reduced tax distortions provides more flexibility in distribution of costs provides greater incentives for innovation and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents

energy taxation and the double dividend effect in taiwan s energy conservation policy an empirical study using a computable general equilibrium model abstract faced with pressure from greenhouse gas reductions and energy price hikes the taiwan government is in the process of developing an energy tax regime to reflect environmental external costs and effectively curb energy consumption as well as mitigate co2 emissions through an adequate pricing system this study utilizes a cge model to simulate and analyze the economic impacts of the draft energy tax bill and its complementary fiscal measures under the assumption of tax revenue neutrality the use of energy tax revenue generated for the purpose of reducing income tax is the best choice with double dividend effects since it will effectively stimulate domestic consumption and investment and consequently mitigate the negative impacts of the distortionary tax regime the double dividend effect is less significant however when the supplementary measures being used are for government expenditure nevertheless all supplementary measures have effectively reduced energy consumption which means they have delivered at least the first dividend in the sense of co2 emissions control it has been verified in this study that having adequate public finance policy measures is the key to realizing the double dividend effect

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a future for carbon taxes abstract carbon taxes have been frequently advocated as a cost effective instrument for reducing emissions however in the practice of environmental policies only six countries have implemented taxes based on the carbon content of the energy products in this paper we evaluate carbon taxes with regard to their competitiveness distributional and environmental impacts the evidence shows that carbon taxes may be an interesting policy option and that their main negative impacts may be compensated through the design of the tax and the use of the generated fiscal revenues

when can carbon abatement policies increase welfare the fundamental role of distorted factor markets abstract this paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue neutral carbon tax and nonauctioned carbon emissions permits taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets the presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies this cost increase is much greater under emissions permits since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about 18 per ton of carbon in contrast an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare improving so long as environmental damages are positive

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

energy taxes in the netherlands what are the dividends in this paper the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral energy tax in the netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium age model the effects of a small user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared while taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms the model contains a great level of detail with respect to emissions and environmental indicators greenhouse effect acidification eutrophication and waste which is helpful for assessing environmental quality the results show that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform not only improves the environment but also raises non environmental welfare which is due to an improvement of the efficiency of the tax structure

reflections on the double dividend debate we survey the history of carbon taxation the range of market based instruments mbis of environmental control and the state of the double dividend debate in order to suggest directions for future research into mbis returning mbi revenues as lower distortionary taxes rather than as lump sums raises aggregate welfare but we favour mbis which raise little or no revenue for reasons of political acceptability to interest groups at the same time the overall case for any environmental improvement is weaker because of general equilibrium interactions with prior distortionary taxes research seems most necessary on quantifying the efficiency benefits of market control of heterogeneous polluters the benefits of environmental improvement the tax interaction effect and the various information costs of an mbi all on a case by case basis for different pollutants and places

optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes general equilibrium analyses this paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other distortionary taxes are present we employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which in a second best economy optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the pigovian principle according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages both models indicate contrary to what several analysts have suggested that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the pigovian principle moreover the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre existing taxes this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

planes ships and taxes charging for international aviation and maritime emissions international aviation and maritime transport account for a significant and growing share of global carbon emissions yet they are not only excluded from the kyoto agreement and all current carbon pricing schemes but do not even pay fuel excises of the type standard for other transport activities moreover each sector benefits from preferential tax treatment failure to charge vat on international aviation and the application of tonnage tax regimes rather than the normal corporate tax in maritime this paper considers the design of fuel charges in these sectors to address these distortions and quantifies their impact on emissions revenue and welfare showing amongst other things that the gain from offsetting the pre existing tax distortions may be as significant as those from reducing emissions it shows too how compensation schemes can be designed to protect the poorest countries a key ingredient in the politics of the issue given the practical need for wide applicability of such charges the real challenge is to amass the degree of international cooperation required especially strong for maritime failure of which to some degree explains their current under taxation and unsurprisingly to decide who gets the money technically these charges should if anything be rather easy to implement michael keen ian parry and jon strand

a note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities abstract i consider the problem of optimal taxation with externalities in a general setup encompassing most of optimal taxation models found in the literature it is demonstrated that when direct taxation of externalities is possible optimal taxes can be expressed as the sum of the optimal pigouvian taxes and the optimal taxes in a related problem without externalities regardless of what other tax instruments are available this result generalizes the so called principle of targeting

on environmental taxation under uncertain environmental damage this paper addresses optimal taxation when therelationship between the consumption of a dirty good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers the main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty if on the other hand thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump sum tax in addition to the commodity tax it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion a similarresult emerges although for different reasons if the lump sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax

the two part instrument in a second best world abstract standard pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions first many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two part instrument 2pi a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution it is a generalization of a deposit refund system drs second a different literature concerns the second best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions here we combine the two extensions by looking at the second best 2pi when government needs revenue is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller we find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions and we compare these to the rates in a first best model the tax subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect an environmental effect and a revenue effect the model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2pi we also discuss important caveats

intergenerational effects of a green tax reform for a more sustainable social security system abstract green tax reforms are popular in some circles not only because of their direct effect on reducing pollution but also because their revenue capacity may allow to reduce other more distortionary taxes despite their potential benefits the political implementation of green tax reforms is not straightforward changes in environmental taxes have different intergenerational effects which need to be taken into account when considering their political support among a country s population in this paper we analyze the economic and intergenerational welfare effects of introducing a green tax reform to ameliorate the spanish social security system we consider two types of energy taxes an energy consumption tax and an energy input tax we find that both types of reforms are favored by young individuals but rejected by older generations the number of generations supporting the reform depends crucially on the disutility that individuals derive from pollution suggesting that an increase in environmental awareness may be needed for green tax reforms to be politically viable

labor supply and the double dividend abstract a series of recent articles have argued that environmental taxes and cap and trade permit systems generate large distortions in the labor market the claim is made that the higher prices for dirty goods induced by these incentive based systems generate a tax interaction effect leading to reductions in labor supply that are generally on net welfare reducing for this reason it is argued a double dividend seldom exists however price level increases both by lowering family income and by reducing cross spousal wage substitution effects will tend to have offsetting positive impacts on labor supply these effects are large enough to convert negative labor supply responses to rising prices into positive ones the empirical literature also supports a positive relationship between price level increases and labor supply these observations cast doubt on a central critical assumption underlying the critique of the double dividend in the tax interaction effect literature

the welfare effects and the distributive impact of carbon taxation on italian households in this work the welfare effects and the distributive impact on italian households of the italian carbon tax are calculated the carbon tax has been introduced in italy at the beginning of 1999 asking for smooth increases over a number of years in the prices of most fossil fuels its welfare effects have been calculated using true cost of living index numbers and the compensating variation the parameters have been obtained through estimation of a complete almost ideal demand system using households data from 1985 to 1996 the welfare loss turns out to be quite substantial and affects italian households in a non negligible way but the distribution of welfare losses across different levels of total monthly expenditures does not allow sustaining the regressivity of carbon taxation as the effect becomes bigger as we move up the income distribution this evidence might encourage the use of carbon taxes at least in the transport sector as cost effective instruments of environmental policy especially after the ratification of the kyoto protocol on climate change

comparing specific and ad valorem pigouvian taxes and output quotas when the production or use of a good creates an external cost an unregulated market produces a socially inefficient quantity of output one remedy for this inefficiency is to impose a pigouvian tax equal to the marginal external damage associated with the good in many circumstances privately optimizing agents facing a pigouvian tax make decisions that are consistent with the maximization of social welfare

co2 stabilization may be a no regrets policy restricting co2 emissions requires changing today s consumption pattern away from energy and emission intensive commodities towards cleaner goods the cost of stabilizing co2 emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000 say as compared to a business as usual trend is estimated by several researchers to be on the order of 1 of gnp we will argue that the cost may be overestimated because of a too simple model describing the working of the economic system and the evaluation of welfare we demonstrate that by expanding a model to include the actual tax system and negative externalities the cost to present generations from restricting emissions by a co2 tax may be negative that is some reduction may actually correspond to a no regrets policy the reasons are inefficiencies in today s tax system and non optimal handling of negative externalities our analysis suggests that a co2 tax and reduced emissions will lessen such inefficiencies

revisiting the cost of protectionism abstract most studies of the welfare impacts of trade policy have ignored interactions between these policies and pre existing distortions from the income tax this paper demonstrates that when these interactions are taken into account the potential gains or losses from tariffs import quotas or voluntary export restrictions are significantly magnified however as long as the trade barrier doesn t generate rents for domestic households the optimal level of the trade barrier is unchanged from the first best case trade policies which do increase domestic rents either in the form of quota rents or rents to fixed factors in production suffer an additional efficiency cost and the optimal policy in this case is less strict than in the first best case