sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division this paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors i show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game if stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games a simple condition is provided under which they exist in symmetric games furthermore symmetric stationary perfect equilibria of symmetric games generate a coalition structure which is generically unique up to a permutation of the players a general method for the characterization of equilibria in symmetric games is proposed and applied to the formation of cartels in oligopolies and coalitions in symmetric majority games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c71 1996 academic press inc

pricing and financial resources an analysis of the disk drive industry 1980 88 this paper empirically examines the long purse hypothesis formalized by patrick bolton and david scharfstein 1990 that incumbents may drive out entrants through aggressive pricing the author analyzes the pricing of 733 disk drives between 1980 and 1988 drives that are adjacent to those manufactured by thinly capitalized undiversified rivals are priced lower than other drives during the later years in the sample when little equity financing was available to these firms the results are robust to controls for alternative hypotheses and to other specifications of the hedonic regression copyright 1995 by mit press

the economics of predation what drives pricing when there is learning by doing predatory pricing a deliberate strategy of pricing aggressively in order to eliminate competitors is one of the more contentious areas of antitrust policy and its existence and efficacy are widely debated the purpose of this paper is to formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure our framework encompasses important phenomena such as learning by doing network effects switching costs dynamic demand and certain types of adjustment costs due to its prominent role in legal cases involving alleged predation we examine learning by doing in more detail we first show that predation like behavior arises routinely in our learning by doing model equilibria involving predation like behavior typically coexist with equilibria involving much less aggressive pricing to disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we next decompose the equilibrium pricing condition and develop alternative characterizations of a firm s predatory pricing incentives we finally measure the impact of these incentives on industry structure conduct and performance we show that forcing a firm to ignore the predatory incentives in setting its price can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation like behavior along with the predation like behavior however a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated

endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms in the context of an infinitely repeated capacity constrained price game we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities when firms are sufficiently patient there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms a firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel when a cartel is not all inclusive colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity contrary to previous work our results suggest that the most severe coordinated effects may come from mergers involving moderate sized firms rather than the largest or smallest firms

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

on the optimal timing of capital taxes for many kinds of capital depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation a worker obtains knowledge in period 0 then uses this knowledge in production in periods 1 and 2 and thereafter retires here depreciation accelerates it occurs at a 100 rate after period 2 and at a lower perhaps zero rate before that the present paper analyzes the implications of non constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income the main finding is that under natural assumptions the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital as in the above example and provided that the government can commit to the path of future tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital

the learning curve predation antitrust and welfare an economic definition of predation is applied to a dynamic model of duopoly competition with learning curves it is shown that rational predation occurs in equilibrium although below cost pricing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of predation a conceptual framework for antitrust analysis of predation shows that a prohibition of predation might help or harm consumer welfare depending on details of market structure although the informational requirements of fashioning an effective legal rule against harmful predation are formidable

entry deterrence and the free rider problem the public good aspect of entry prevention is examined in an industry characterized by an established oligopoly facing a potential entrant although incumbent firms act noncooperatively underinvestment in entry deterrence does not occur and in fact incumbents may find themselves in a pareto dominated arrangement in terms of profits by preventing entry

noncooperative entry deterrence uncertainty and the free rider problem previous authors who have considered the issue of noncooperative entry deterrence have not found the free rider problem to be a significant factor these authors however have only considered models in which the exact investment needed to deter entry is known with certainty in this paper i add uncertainty to the models investigated by these previous authors and demonstrate that the free rider problem can be significant but is not so in all cases that is for certain types of entry deterring investments the introduction of uncertainty causes the oligopoly to underinvest in entry deterrence however for other types no underinvestment result arises

oligopolistic entry deterrence under incomplete information recent work has investigated the effects of asymmetric information between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant this study extends the analysis to allow the initial market structure to be a noncooperative oligopoly we show that there is a bayesian nash equilibrium in which the incumbent firms although unable to collude strategically deter entry that would have occurred under complete information in contrast to the past limit pricing literature it is a high price that deters entry as it signals to the potential entrant that this is a high cost industry extending the model to allow for multiple potential entrants we find that increasing the degree of potential competition raises the preentry price and reduces the likelihood of entry

when does predation dominate collusion i study repeated competition among oligopolists the only novelty is that firms may go bankrupt and permanently exit the probability that a firm survives a price war depends on its financial strength which varies stochastically over time under some conditions including no entry an anti folk theorem holds when firms are patient so that strength levels change relatively quickly every nash equilibrium involves an immediate price war that lasts until at most one firm remains surprisingly the possibility of entry may facilitate collusion as may impatience the model can explain some observed patterns of collusion and predation

collusion and predation under almost free entry abstract this study investigates the degree of cooperation that firms can support in the absence of significant barriers to entry a free entry subgame perfect equilibrium is defined by q n where q is the collusive output rate and n is the number of active firms such that there is no incentive for an active firm to deviate output from q and there is no incentive for a potential entrant to enter the industry it is shown that for all n 1 if the discount factor is sufficiently high there exists a free entry equilibrium in which active firms sustain a non trivial degree of cooperation cooperation is supported by active firms credibly threatening to respond to entry with a period of aggressive competition

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

collusion under financial constraints collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one abstract this paper considers the possibility of collusion between financially constrained firms it is found that they cannot collude when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one while collusion emerges at lower discount factors

formation of a coalition proof stable cartel formation of coalitions in oligopolies is modeled as a noncooperative game in which firms strategies have a binary form to cooperate or not the author demonstrates a one to one correspondence between stable cartels defined by c d aspremont et al 1983 and the nash equilibria of this game using a coalition proof nash equilibrium they define the concept of a coalition proof stable cartel and prove that there is a unique equilibrium

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

social status entry and predation the case of british shipping cartels 1879 1929 the authors incorporate social status and regional affiliation two variables of central sociological interest into an economic analysis of entry and predation they build on scott morton s 1997 examination of entry and predation in the merchant shipping industry and examine whether the social status of an entrant owner impacts on the predation behavior of the incumbent cartels they find that high social status entrants are significantly less likely 40 to be preyed upon than the low social status entrants they discuss several interpretations of this result subsequent analysis supports the hypothesis that cartel members use social status as an indicator of an entrant s propensity to be a cooperative cartel participant

the dynamics of a stable cartel the railroad express 1851 1913 i introduction the economic literature contains ample theoretical justification for the possibility of stable cartels for example osborne 1976 and porter 1983a but little in the way of empirical evidence about how stable cartels actually behave there is of course good reason for this shortcoming few stable cartels have ever existed cartel members find it too attractive to violate agreements in order to capture market share in eckbo s 1976 study of fifty one formal cartels the median lifetime of a cartel was only five years the mean was hardly better at 6 6 1 in general the dearth of stable cartels creates a problem for application of cartel theory 2 this paper however examines the exception to the rule what was probably the most successful cartel in u s business history the railroad express cartel the express cartel persisted for more than half a century by one reckoning from 1851 to 1913 during that time the five firms of the cartel agreed on prices territory and governance procedures and maintained a relatively stable environment within the industry moreover all five firms earned profits in virtually every year of the cartel s existence even during periods when the economy as a whole slipped into depression 3 periods of stress were present in the cartel but they tended to be short lived and contracts while subject to revision and dispute were never wholly abandoned aspects of the success of this cartel can be illuminated by various models in the industrial organization literature including some that explicitly treat cartel stability yet most of the literature on stability is deficient in that it typically examines only one kind of strategic interaction as this case shows long run success involves many strategies and other factors including the institutional framework the structure of costs the nature of internal transactions and the character of the technology the cartel s stability also was a dynamic process in which the organization acted continually to maintain conditions favorable to survival this paper will focus on two key elements in the success of the express cartel elements that would seem necessary for long run stability in any cartel 1 proficiency at deterring or at least limiting entry from outside and 2 ability to prevent defection among the members in fact deterrence and control are linked in the case of the express and the linkage was crucial to this industry s success the key feature was the creation and management of a joint distribution network this network it will be shown was the source both of the cartel s market power and of its internal stability after a brief historical overview the paper will examine the effects of the cartel s distribution system how it promoted a stable cartel ii overview the origin and history of the express cartel the railroad express industry controlled the parcel post service in the united states from 1839 until 1913 during that time the express provided the only established way of transmitting a parcel in the united states the industry also obtained economies of scope by combining parcel service with financial courier operations the express offered direct delivery of consignments and promised a full warranty on the contents in its first decade local express firms sprang up along key rail and steamship routes once established many express franchises were contested by new entrants at this time fixed costs were small encouraging entry efforts but incumbents often fought newcomers with price wars that drove out the entrant led to the bankruptcy of the incumbent or resulted in a merger 4 by 1850 two large regional firms the adams and american express companies had developed despite their histories of price warfare against potential competitors the two firms decided against conflict and in 1851 signed their first cartel agreement

bertrand edgeworth equilibria when firms avoid turning customers away this paper provides a simple solution to the problem of nonexistence of pure strategy equilibria in bertrand edgeworth models with strictly convex costs the voluntary trading constraint in standard bertrand edgeworth models is generalized to allow for there being costs incurred when customers are turned away so long as the industry is sufficiently large the presence of such costs ensures that the competitive price will be an equilibrium there will be other single price equilibria but if the offense costs are small all equilibria will be close to the competitive outcome

colluding on excluding abstract in an oligopoly characterized by barriers to re entry a finite horizon complete information convex costs and the presence of three identical firms i show that in subgame perfect equilibrium two of them the predators can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third the prey decides to exit immediately in this predatory pricing equilibrium the predators can enjoy higher profits than in the best collusive equilibrium with three firms thus a coalition of two firms can benefit from colluding on excluding

industry structure with sequential technology choice abstract noncooperative entry deterrence arises in a market where firms enter sequentially and irreversibly choose a technology in the case of delegated entry deterrence the earliest firms enter with a normal technology and pass on entry deterrence responsibilities to subsequent entrants in the case of partial entry deterrence the earlliest firms choose an inferior technology that allows some but not full entry of later firms with a normal technology in both cases entry is deterred in that the equilibrium number of firms is smaller than would prevail if all firms were to choose a normal technology

on merger profitability in a cournot setting abstract in a setting where symmetric firms compete a la cour not and costsare linear the degree of concavity is identified as the main determinant of merger profitability this allows the results of salant et al 1983 and cheung 1992 to be generalized

bank deposit rate clustering theory and empirical evidence the market prices of stocks and other assets tend to cluster on round fractions a similar clustering is found in the interest rates paid on retail bank deposits however the theoretical rationales given for asset price clustering are incompatible with the clustering of retail deposit rates this paper proposes a theory based on depositors limited recall it shows that when banks exploit this phenomenon deposit rates will tend to be set at round fractions and will be relatively sticky at these levels the implications of this theoretical model are tested using money market deposit account and retail certificate of deposit interest rate data from a sample of more than 500 banks