optimal r d policy and endogenous quality choice abstract in a quality differentiated duopoly where i quality is endogenously chosen before production ii fixed costs are increasing and convex in quality and iii variable production costs are insubstantial an r d subsidy for the firm producing a high quality product improves social welfare irrespective of whether the ensuing product market competition is bertrand or cournot while an r d subsidy for the firm producing a low quality product improves social welfare only if bertrand and not if cournot

spatial competition monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity abstract this is a republication of a passage from william vickrey s 1964 book microstatics which presents important results in spatial competition and monopolistic competition

does unemployment make men less marriageable this paper distinguishes three marital states married cohabiting and single it examines applying the method of multinomial logit to data on men aged 18 30 drawn from the family expenditure survey for the uk the extent to which their probabilities of being in each of these states is affected by their economic status and by their educational level it concludes that being unemployed significantly reduces the chances of men being married

sophisticated entry in a model of spatial competition we analyze free entry equilibrium in a model of spatial competition in which locations of established firms are fixed and entrants profit expectations are rational our most interesting results concern large economies economies in which the number of firms is arbitrarily large when the average cost function is u shaped free entry equilibrium is unique socially optimal and characterized by zero profit in contract when there are no diseconomies of scale even large economies are stubbornly imperfect firms can earn substantial pure profit and free entry equilibrium is neither unique nor socially optimal

how do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a market for inventions competition and intellectual property ip protections are complements in stimulating innovation when ip is appropriable a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate competition among producers the demand side of the market for inventions and competition among inventors the supply side of the market for inventions create incentives to innovate when ip is not fully appropriable markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate firms vertically integrate r d and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to ip this implies that antitrust policy and ip protections are complements

strategic policy for product r d with symmetric costs in this paper i examine strategic policy for product r d in an international duopoly where domestic and foreign firms are identical it is shown that strategic r d policy is described by a subsidy schedule contingent on firms quality choices unilateral policy enables its domestic firm to produce a high quality product making equilibrium outcome unique with two active governments in equilibrium they implement different subsidy schedules two equilibrium outcomes exist which are identical except for the identity of the countries thus both countries have an equal chance to become the high

a note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies abstract in this note we show that the results developed in n singh and x vives 1984 rand j econ 15 546 554 are sensitive to the duopoly assumption if there are more than two firms prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition this will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements if goods are substitutes high quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition hence it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs abstract this paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an ldc and a developed country firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive third country market under bertrand competition unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low quality ldc and an investment tax by the developed country whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation under cournot competition unilateral policy is also reversed from the bertrand outcome but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries

is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation abstract not necessarily i consider two firms that compete both on the research market and on the product market assuming the product market outcome is ambiguous i e uncertainty is described by multiple distribution of outcomes i show that an increase in firms ambiguity aversion increases the ex ante likelihood that they invest in r d an increase in their risk aversion on the other hand decreases innovation the result holds when the innovation has a business stealing effect as in a cournot duopoly with vertical differentiation the key intuition is that ambiguity aversion exacerbates the competitive threat whereas risk aversion diminishes the profit incentive to invest in addition to showing that an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to more projects being pursued i show that an increase in ambiguity aversion can lead to an increase in investment for incremental projects in the case of more radical projects an increase in ambiguity aversion can but not necessarily lead to lower investment in equilibrium overall ambiguity aversion has a positive effect on most innovative projects but can sometimes have a negative effect on some of the more radical game changing ones

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

modelling imperfectly appropriable r d via spillovers abstract we provide an extensive comparison of the well known r d models of d aspremont jacquemin and kamien muller zang exposing full or partial conflict in key conclusions and policy prescriptions using a mix of formal and or intuitive criteria we argue that the first model is of questionable validity for large spillover values the latter being characterized by jointly increasing returns to scale in the r d process an argument leading to equivalence between the two r d processes but not to agreement on some key conclusions is exposited in conclusion the models emerge as fundamentally different although a unilateral shift in the cost function of the first leads to agreement in all equilibrium outcomes

symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets abstract equilibrium existence and optimality are analysed in a market for products differentiated by their variety a game of three stages is analysed firms enter in the first stage choose varieties in the second stage and choose prices in the third stage the existence of subgame perfect equilibria is established at equilibrium products are symmetrically located in the space of characteristics and are offered at equal prices the surplus maximizing solution is characterized and it is shown that surplus maximizing product diversity is lower than the equilibrium one

the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry abstract this paper investigates how the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry depend upon the degree of product substitutability when goods are imperfect substitutes both cournot and bertrand competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner would be willing to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit maximizing firm overinvestment may occur when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes similarly cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability is low and a weaker incentive if this degree is high

marriage and class here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable we utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria the model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria even with constant returns to matching excerpt

sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality abstract in this paper we examine how the timing of investment affects the levels of quality chosen by firms we show that in a model with vertical quality differentiation a game with sequential quality choice induces both firms to make smaller quality investments than they would in a game with simultaneous quality choice furthermore we show that while aggregate profit is higher both consumer and social surplus are lower under sequential quality choice

r d competition versus r d cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure this paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress it is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation production capacities of both firms are product specific it is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under investing if the new product is a substitute to the established product and higher profits and over investing in case of complements and lower profits compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game this anticipation effect is stronger in the case of r d cooperation furthermore since due to r d cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced in addition we show that under r d competition the firm that innovates first overshoots in new product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position taking into account all these effects the result is that if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product positive synergy effects in r d cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than r d competition

comparing cournot and bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product r d abstract this paper compares bertrand and cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product r d i find that r d expenditure prices and firms net profits are always higher under quantity competition than under price competition furthermore output consumer surplus and total welfare are higher in the bertrand equilibrium than in the cournot equilibrium if either r d spillovers are weak or products are sufficiently differentiated if r d spillovers are strong and products are not too differentiated then output consumer surplus and total welfare are lower in the bertrand case than in the cournot case thus a key finding of the paper is that there are circumstances where quantity competition can be more beneficial than price competition both for consumers and for firms

on the dynamic efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria abstract this paper compares bertrand and cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with r d research and development competition it shows that cournot competition induces more r d effort than bertrand competition however the price is lower and output is larger in bertrand than in cournot competition furthermore the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium if either r d productivity is low or spillovers are weak or products are very different if r d productivity is high spillovers are strong and goods are close substitutes then the bertrand equilibrium islessefficient than the cournot equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification number l13

on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentation in a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown under certain regularity conditions that if the demand structure is symmetric and bertrand and cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in cournot than in bertrand competition and as n grows both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least 1n if bertrand reaction functions slope upwards and are continuous then even with an asymmetric demand structure given any cournot equilibrium price vector one can find a bertrand equilibrium with lower prices in particular if the bertrand equilibrium is unique then it has lower prices than any cournot equilibrium

two state capital accumulation with heterogenous products disruptive vs non disruptive goods the paper considers the problem of a firm that while producing a standard product has the option to introduce an innovative product the innovative product competes with the standard product and will therefore reduce revenues of the standard product a distinction is made between innovative products that do or do not become even more relatively appealing as their market share grows e g because of network externalities it is shown that in the former case which we call a disruptive good history dependent long run equilibria can occur which are in line with recent real life economic examples

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

cooperative r d and vertical product differentiation abstract a partial equilibrium model with vertical product differentiation coumot competition and quality determined by r d expenses is analysed cooperative agreements on r d entail higher levels of r d quality output and welfare than at the non cooperative equilibrium under well denned conditions on spillover rates this confirms in a new setting a well known outcome of models with cost reducing r d further cooperation in r d allows a larger number of firms to operate in the industry than in the non cooperative case via a reduction in prices a new source of social gains from cooperative research is identified

timing of technology adoption and product market competition abstract this paper examines how product market competition affects firms timing of adopting a new technology as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives it demonstrates that adoption dates differ not only among symmetric firms but also among markets with different market features more specifically technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with cournot competition than in a market with bertrand competition it can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes therefore this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives when goods are sufficiently differentiated adoption occurs later than is socially optimal

helping minor firms reduces welfare the effect on national welfare of uneven technical progress and eli mination of a firm is analyzed under the existence of a cournot oligopolistic sector an increase in the share of an inefficient firm owing to its innovations results in a shift of production from more efficient firms to the inefficient firm causing a less efficie nt allocation of production it may decrease welfare even though the innovation itself is beneficial conversely policies keeping ineffic ient firms from innovations or eliminating them may increase welfare though they make the market structure more oligopolistic copyright 1988 by royal economic society

new product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents effects of size on strategy we analyze a duopoly where capacity constrained firms offer an established product and have the option to offer an additional new and differentiated product we show that the firm with the smaller capacity on the established market has a higher incentive to innovate and reaches a larger market share on the market for the new product an increase in capacity of the larger firm can prevent its competitor from innovating whereas an increase in capacity of the smaller firm cannot prevent innovation of its larger competitor in equilibrium the firm with smaller capacity on the established market might outperform the larger firm with respect to total payoffs

on the markovian efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria we characterize and compare closed loop feedback price and quantity strategies within a full fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets we allow for imperfect product substitutability which enables us to deal with price competition we show that the traditional result that the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium does not necessarily hold in a markovian environment either in the short run or at the stationary equilibrium or using the discounted sum of welfare as a criterion for relative efficiency

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

marital status in a developing economy gender ethnicity and family structure this article employs population survey data for trinidad and tobago to investigate the likelihood of being married both legal and common law in the present or the past as compared to being never married in a developing economy the article finds support for the sex specialized theory of marital formation with men valued more and women valued less for their economic contributions to the family socioeconomic status and ethnicity play an important role in marital formation with sex specialization less likely to occur among africans than the more advantaged ethnic groups one of the consistent findings is that family structure matters crucially in predicting both legal and common law marriages for example living in a large multigenerational household tends to impact the likelihood of marriage as compared to remaining single in opposite ways for men and women with men in large households more likely to be married but women less likely to be married

provision of a pure local public good in a spatial model with many jurisdictions abstract this paper examines the provision of a pure local public good in jurisdictions that are spaced evenly along an infinite line each jurisdiction either supplies the local public good or else its residents travel to another jurisdiction to consume the local public good the equilibrium spacing between jurisdictions which supply the local public good which can be uneven varying between a minimum spacing and a maximum spacing for given exogenous parameters can be greater than equal to or less than the socially optimal spacing

uneven spacing in free entry equilibrium for spatial product differentiation abstract this paper shows that the spacing of firms can be very uneven in free entry equilibrium in a familiar model of spatial competition in which potential entrants have sophisticated expectations about post entry prices