factors influencing the incidence of bribery payouts by firms a cross country analysis this article explores micro and macro level variables that influence the incidence of bribery payouts by firms a rich data set with information from 55 countries was utilized to achieve this objective results of logit regression models indicate that there are a number of micro and macro level factors that significantly affect the incidence of bribery payouts this suggests that it is not only the characteristics of a firm but also the environment of doing business that affect the firm s bribery decision the results of this study provides information that may help firms develop strategies to reduce corruption in their respective industries and thereby improve their image of corporate social responsibility the analysis also points to possible policy directions that governments could undertake in order to reduce the incidence of bribery in their country

bribes lobbying and development paign contributions or influence buying through other means as an activity that is aimed at changing existing rules or policies we view bribery in contrast as an attempt to bend or get around existing rules or policies the analysis contrasts these two means of influencing politics we use the labels lobbying and bribery for convenience and not because they are perfect defini tions for the two rent seeking activities we study in reality bribery and lobbying differ in several di mensions first lobbying is a legal and regulated activ ity in many countries whereas bribery is not second a change in the rules as a result of lobbying often af fects an entire industry whereas the return to bribery is more firm specific third a government that ponders a change in the rules might have quite different concerns than a bureaucrat considering a bribe our model cap tures all these differences possibly the most important difference however and the driving assumption in the model is that bending the rules is only temporary bu reaucrats can seldom commit to not asking for bribes in the future because corrupt deals are not enforceable in courts and because firms deal with different officials over time a legislative change on the other hand al ters the status quo and is therefore likely to last longer although policies and politicians also change over time our key assumption is that changing the rules is long lasting relative to bending them 2

japanese and u s firms as foreign investors do they march to the same tune during the 1980s u s and japanese multinationals were attracted by some similar country characteristics low wage inflation low country risk good infrastructure and an educated work force both groups of investors displayed a persistence being strongly attracted to locations with significant past investment japanese firms started the decade as somewhat more fluid but as their investment levels surged they became much more persistent overall u s firms were more influenced by domestic market conditions and moved contrary to changes in host country trade intensity japanese investment had a somewhat greater affinity for trade reflecting their long standing interest in east asia some limited evidence suggests that factors driving the two groups of investors converged in the second half of the 1980s

endogenous objectives and the evaluation of targeting rules for monetary policy recent research in monetary economics has followed the advice of mccallum 1988 robustness properties of a rule for monetary policy carnegie rochester conference series on public policy 29 173 203 and investigated the robustness properties of monetary policy rules by evaluating them in a variety of models evaluation across models is typically based on an exogenously specified loss function however the theory on which many recent monetary policy models are based implies that changes in the structure of the model also have consequences for the policy objectives the central bank should pursue objectives are endogenous not exogenous to the model in this paper i investigate the impact of endogenous objectives on the evaluation of targeting rules for monetary policy r 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

remittances in nepal boon or bane abstract nepal is one of the highest recipients of remittances percentage of gdp in the world for a small land locked economy battered by a decade long maoist insurgency 1996 2006 prolonged political instability slow growth rate and large exodus of youths for employment overseas high inflow of remittances bears a huge significance both at micro and macro levels exploring various facets of high migration and remittances this article shows remittance induced dutch disease effects and policy laxity to improve investment climate in nepal since it is costly to sterilise the impact of remittances each year it might be prudent to learn to live with it and gradually channel remittances to productive usages with a goal to boost productivity

are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth firm level evidence exploiting a unique data set containing information about the estimated bribe payments of ugandan firms the authors study the relationship between bribe payments taxes and firm growth in uganda for the period 1995 97 using industry location averages to circumvent the potential problem of endogeneity and to deal with issues of measurement error they find that both the rate of taxation and the rate of bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth for the full data set a one percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with three percentage point reduction in firm growth an effect about three times that of taxation moreover after excluding outliers the authors find that bribery has a much greater negative impact on growth and taxation a considerably smaller one this provides some validation of firm level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards development even more than taxation does

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

how forward looking is optimal monetary policy we calculate optimal monetary policy rules for several variants of a simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism with sticky prices and or wages we show that robustly optimal rules can be represented by interest rate feedback rules that generalize the celebrated proposal of taylor 1993 optimal rules however require that the current interest rate operating target depend positively on the recent past level of the operating target and its recent rate of increase in a way that is characteristic of estimated central bank reaction functions but not of taylor s proposal we furthermore find that a robustly optimal policy rule is almost inevitably an implicit rule that requires the central bank to use a structural model to project the economy s evolution under the contemplated policy action however calibrated examples suggest that optimal rules place less weight on projections of inflation or output many quarters in the future than do rules often discussed in the literature on inflation targeting or in the current practice of inflation forecast targeting central banks

the effect of foreign aid on corruption a quantile regression approach abstract this paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on corruption using a quantile regression method we show that foreign aid generally reduces corruption and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries moreover this effect is different by different donor countries

are firm specific advantages location specific too much of the research on the role of firm specific advantages on firms subsidiary ownership preferences has been undertaken in the context of advanced country multinationals specifically u s mncs research has found that u s firms derive ownership advantages from their size experience and technological and marketing superiority perhaps having operated in the most developed and sophisticated home market many u s firms generate unique skills that give them absolute advantages over firms in almost all foreign host locations developing country mncs do not have absolute ownership advantages similar to those of the u s firms the relevance of a particular firm specific characteristic for a developing country mnc may be contingent not only upon the home country characteristics as in the case of u s mncs but also upon host country characteristics this study investigates the subsidiary ownership preferences among korean mncs and finds that the influence of three firm specific advantages technological intensity product differentiation and capital intensity on subsidiary ownership levels is contingent upon whether the subsidiary is located in a relatively less developed or a more developed country as compared to the home country although some authors have suggested that the influence of firm specific advantages may be contingent upon the characteristics of both home and host country locations empirical investigations to this effect have been nonexistent

intellectual property protection market orientation and location of overseas r d activities by multinational enterprises abstract this paper develops an analytical framework to explain the determinants of location of overseas research and development r d by multinational enterprises mnes in terms of the nature and extent of foreign direct investment fdi and host country resources and policy regimes empirical findings for us mnes suggest that mnes prefer to locate their r d activities in countries that are able to offer them among other things larger markets technological resources and infrastructure host market oriented affiliates are more likely to have r d units than the export oriented ones especially in developing countries the relative strength of the patent regime appears to affect the direction rather than the magnitude of r d investments made in a country

corruption and development new initiatives in economic openness and strengthened rule of law corruption is a major problem in many of the world s developing economies today world bank studies put bribery at over 1 trillion per year accounting for up to 12 of the gdp of nations like nigeria kenya and venezuela though largely ignored for many years interest in world wide corruption has been rekindled by recent corporate scandals in the us and europe corruption in the developing nations is said to result from a number of factors mass poverty has been cited as a facilitating condition for corruption just as an inability to manage a sudden upsurge in mineral revenues has been credited with breeding corruption and adventurous government procurement among public officials in countries like nigeria and venezuela virtually all developing nations that have serious corruption problems also have very limited economic freedom and a very weak enforcement of the rule of law in such nations corruption represents a regressive taxation that bears hard on the poor it has a dampening effect on development and it could result in the production of inferior goods as companies find ways to accommodate under the table payments finally corruption is a dangerous threat to the legitimacy of the governments of some of the developing nations themselves it is suggested that new urgent initiatives are needed to deal with the dangers posed by corruption in the developing economies they include making the economies of these nations more open by the withdrawal of the government from the productive sector and by the abolition of unnecessarily stringent restrictions on business conduct the rule of law needs to be strengthened in these nations and those countries like nigeria and venezuela should ignore scruples over sovereignty and seek foreign assistance in the management of their oil wealth finally multinationals should be made to disclose all the payments they make in developing nations to such organizations like international chamber of commerce or transparency international where they can be reviewed by anyone interested

are foreign owned firms more likely to pay bribes than domestic ones evidence from emerging markets summary an extensive literature exists on the adverse effects of corruption on inward fdi and the impact this may have on economic development but the reverse causality has not been fully explored legislation in the us and the eu prohibits firms from engaging in corrupt practices in foreign countries and this suggests that foreign owned firms might be less likely to pay bribes however such legislation may be ineffective because foreign firms have to adapt to local market conditions or risk being uncompetitive using firm level data for 41 emerging countries a probit model estimates the probability that a firm pays bribes to allow for possible endogeneity this probit analysis is repeated with an instrument to proxy for endogenous foreign ownership then a propensity score matching technique tests for differences in the propensity to pay bribes by domestic and foreign firms the paper finds no difference in the behavior of foreign owned and domestic firms with respect to corrupt practices results are robust to different levels of foreign ownership and support the view that foreign owned firms adapt to local practices and are neither more nor less likely to pay bribes than comparable domestic firms the paper finds that other variables including bureaucracy government contracts and perceived difficulties with civil society legal and political do have statistically significant effects on increasing bribery and that some others such as per capita gdp tend to reduce bribery the study concludes that there is no evidence that foreign ownership after investment has occurred tends to reduce bribery but it does support the view that foreign owned firms adopt local behavioral norms

understanding corruption and firm responses in cross national firm level surveys the issue of corruption is important to politicians citizens and firms since the early 1990s a large number of studies have sought to understand the causes and consequences of corruption employing firm level survey data from various countries while insightful these analyses have largely ignored two important potential problems nonresponse and potential false response by the firms we argue that in politically repressive environments firms use nonresponse and potential false response as self protection mechanisms corruption is likely understated in such countries we test our argument using the world bank enterprise survey data of more than 44 000 firms in 72 countries for the period 2000 2005 we find that firms in countries with less press freedom are more likely to provide nonresponse and false response on the issue of corruption therefore ignoring these systematic biases in firms responses could result in serious underestimation of the severity of corruption in politically repressive countries more important these biases are a rich and underutilized source of information on the political constraints faced by the firms firm managers can better evaluate levels of corruption not only by truthful answers to corruption questions but also by nonresponses and false responses to such questions

is corruption an efficient grease this paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework it analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency corruption and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries both developed and developing using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective it may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective we thus find evidence for the grease the wheels hypothesis in its weak and strong forms

prices activity and machinery exports an analysis based on new pricedata new data for the export prices of the united states germany and japan produced price elasticities for exports of machinery and transport equipment that were highest for the united states and lowest well below 1 for germany the effects of price changes on exports lasted at least two years in all three countries and possibly four years in the united states only in germany would most effects of price changes take place in the year of the change u s export income in foreign currency would not exceed its pre depreciation level until the third year after a depreciation

inflation persistence and robust monetary policy design this paper examines the performance of optimised interest rate rules when there is uncertainty about a key determinant of the monetary transmission mechanism namely the degree of persistence characterising the inflation process the paper focuses on the euro area and utilises two variants of an estimated small scale macroeconomic model featuring distinct types of staggered contracts specifications which induce quite different degrees of inflation persistence the paper shows that a cautious monetary policy maker is well advised to design and implement interest rate policies under the assumption that inflation persistence is high when there is considerable uncertainty about the prevailing degree of inflation persistence such policies are characterised by a relatively aggressive response to inflation developments and exhibit a substantial degree of inertia

how petty is petty corruption evidence from firm surveys in africa summary evidence suggests that corruption is costly for african firms this paper however shows that a minor difference in the way the question on bribe payments is asked has a large effect on estimates of the size of the burden on average firms report payments that are between 4 and 15 times higher when they report them as a percent of sales than when they report them in monetary terms the paper discusses several possible reasons for this but none explain the difference one plausible remaining reason is that firm managers overestimate bribes when they report them in percentage terms

the relationship between r d collaboration subsidies and r d performance empirical evidence from finland and germany this study focuses on the impact of innovation policies and r d collaboration in germany and finland we consider collaboration and subsidies as heterogeneous treatments and perform an econometric matching to analyze r d and patent activity at the firm level in general we find that collaboration has positive effects in germany subsidies for individual research do neither exhibit a significant impact on r d nor on patenting but the innovative performance could be improved by additional incentives for collaboration for finnish companies public funding is an important source of finance for r d without subsidies recipients would show less r d and patenting activity whilst those firms not receiving subsidies would perform significantly better if they were publicly funded copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

japanese investors choice of joint ventures versus wholly owned subsidiaries in the us the role of market barriers and firm capabilities this study analyzes how market barriers and firm capabilities affect multinationals choice of joint ventures versus wholly owned subsidiaries abroad in the study we compile a vector of variables that distinguish between industry specific barriers and firm specific capabilities to analyze japanese investors ownership decisions in the us our results in general support the hypothesis that japanese investors facing high market barriers in the target industry are more likely to choose joint ventures while those possessing strong competitive capabilities are more likely to set up wholly owned subsidiaries specifically marketing variables are more influential than technological factors in determining the choice of partial versus full ownership these findings however vary across sub samples that represent low versus high tech industries and consumer versus industrial products

institutions investment and growth new cross country and panel data evidence this paper outlines the alternative channels through which institutions affect growth and studies the empirical relationship between institutions investment and growth the empirical results indicate that i free market institutions have a positive effect on growth ii economic freedom affects growth through both a direct effect on total factor productivity and an indirect effect on investment iii political and civil liberties may stimulate investment iv an important interaction exists between freedom and human capital investment v milton friedman s conjectures on the relation between political and economic freedom are correct vi promoting economic freedom is an effective policy toward facilitating growth and other types of freedom jel o17 o40 p51

the optimal perception of inflation persistence is zero this study shows that in an economy with inflation persistence it is always welfare improving for a central bank that operates under discretion to behave as if there were no inflation persistence under reasonable assumptions about inflation persistence all of the inefficiency associated with discretionary policymaking is then removed

corruption institutions and economic development many scholarly articles on corruption give the impression that the world is populated by two types of people the sanders and the greasers the sanders believe that corruption is an obstacle to de velopment while the greasers believe that corruption can in some cases foster development this paper takes a critical look at these positions it concludes that the evidence supporting the greasing the wheels hypothesis is very weak and shows that there is no cor relation between a new measure of managers actual experience with corruption and gdp growth instead the paper uncovers a strong negative correlation between growth in genuine wealth per capita a direct measure of sustainable development and corruption while corruption may have little average eect on the growth rate of gdp per capita it is a likely source of unsustainable development

trust and inter firm relations in developing and transition economies the role of trust in facilitating economic growth has been highlighted in previous contributions to this journal in order to take this debate forward this article argues 1 that more attention needs to be given to the relationship between sanctions and trust and 2 that it is worth distinguishing between the minimal trust for making markets effective and the extended trust required for deeper kinds of inter firm co operation to work the article goes on to ask why minimal trust is lacking and so hard to construct in the republics of the former soviet union it then examines how extended trust grows or can be made to grow in industrial supply chains and clusters in developing countries

national culture transaction costs and the choice between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary transaction cost theory posits that culture plays a limited role in the choice between jv and wos in contrast research suggests that firms preferred level of ownership in their foreign subsidiaries is influenced primarily by cultural traits this study provides additional evidence in this ongoing debate by replicating hennart s transaction cost model of entry mode choice in two different national contexts japanese firms investing in the u s and the u s firms investing in japan the results suggest that the transaction cost explanation for the ownership choice holds in the both national contexts yet the propensity to choose jv or wos significantly varied between japanese and the u s firms

firm ownership preferences and host government restrictions an integrated approach two approaches may explain how multinational enterprises mnes select ownership structures for subsidiaries the first argues that mnes prefer structures that minimize that transaction costs of doing business abroad the second argues that ownership structures are determined by negotiations with host governments whose outcomes depend on the bargaining power of the firm this paper presents a framework integrating these two approaches and uses statistical methods to separate their effects empirically

determinants of export performance in east and southeast asia this paper examines the determinants of exports in eight east and southeast asian economies with an emphasis on the increasing importance of parts and components in total exports to see whether exports in parts and components are special and to allow comparisons export equations are estimated for three different export categories total merchandise exports manufacturing exports and exports of machinery and transport equipment sitc 7 the analysis is based on data for 1993 2008 a period over which parts and components trade burgeoned the estimations indicate that the growing importance in the export composition of parts and components within vertically integrated cross border production processes has tended to weaken the nexus of real exchange rate and export performance world demand and supply side factors including foreign direct investment tend to become more crucial in determining export performance

the mnc as an agent of change for host country institutions fdi and corruption most empirical research examines how the institutional environment of corruption shapes the behavior of multinational corporations mncs in this study we would like to highlight the other side of the picture how the presence of mncs may shape the institutional environment of corruption over time we propose three avenues through which the mncs may have an impact on its host institutions regulatory pressure effect demonstration effect and professionalization effect based on extensive data on foreign direct investment and corruption for a large sample of countries over the last 30 years the empirical results are generally consistent with our hypothesis such findings provide a glimmer of hope for the future of the host country where corruption is prevalent

corruption and cross border investment in emerging markets firm level evidence abstract this paper studies the joint impact of corruption on the entry mode and volume of inward foreign direct investment fdi using a unique firm level data set we find that corruption not only reduces inward fdi but also shifts the ownership structure towards joint ventures the latter finding supports the view that corruption increases the value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze however r d intensive firms are found to favor sole ownership

inflation targeting rules history dependent or forward looking abstract this note discusses the inflation targeting strategy if price setting gives rise to a hybrid phillips curve the strategy is inverted relative to private sector pricing behavior if private sector price setting is backward looking policy should be forward looking and vice versa

using micro surveys to measure and explain corruption summary this paper discusses survey techniques aimed at a better measurement of corruption at the micro level and argues that with appropriate survey methods and interview techniques it is possible to collect quantitative micro level data on corruption public expenditure tracking surveys service provider surveys and enterprise surveys are highlighted with several applications these surveys permit measurement of corruption at the level of individual agents such as schools health clinics or firms they also permit the study of mechanisms responsible for corruption including capture of public funds and bribery 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

what is wrong with taylor rules using judgment in monetary policy through targeting rules it is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule e ither ageneral targeting rule explicit objectives for monetary policy or a specific targeting rule a criterion for the forecasts of the target variables to be fulfilled essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extramodel information are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium

governance infrastructure and us foreign direct investment this paper examines the statistical importance of governance infrastructure as a determinant of us foreign direct investment fdi in broad terms governance infrastructure represents attributes of legislation regulation and legal systems that condition freedom of transacting security of property rights and transparency of government and legal processes our econometric analysis uses a two stage estimation procedure in the first stage the probability that a country is an fdi recipient is estimated the results indicate that countries that fail to achieve a minimum threshold of effective governance are unlikely to receive any us fdi countries that receive no us fdi are typically countries that do not promote free and transparent markets that have ineffective governments and that often have legal systems that are not rooted in english common law in the second stage the analysis is restricted to those countries that did receive fdi flows the estimated equations focus on the determinants of the amount of fdi received given that a country is a recipient of us fdi governance infrastructure including the nature of the legal system is an important determinant of the amount received

policy and non policy determinants of u s equity foreign direct investment this study examined the effects of policy and non policy variables on the location of new u s direct investment abroad as distinct from reinvested earnings of existing affiliates using 1977 and 1982 benchmark data the data revealed statistically significant effects for investment incentives positive performance requirements negative and host country effective tax rates negative with interesting differences between the two time periods and between developed versus developing countries significance was also found for non policy variables such as political stability cultural distance gdp per capita and infrastructure

international investment location decisions abstract in international location tournaments governments compete for foreign investment with tax and other short run incentives such tournaments can be won if agglomeration economies are sufficiently powerful to overcome investors desire to spread investments as a hedge against risk we focus on manufacturing investments by u s multinationals in the 1980s our econometric results suggest that agglomeration economies are indeed the dominant influence on investor calculations paradoxically short run incentives have limited apparent impact on location choice we conclude that high cost tournament play is unnecessary for countries with good infrastructure development specialized input suppliers and an expanding domestic market

politics economics and investment abstract few economists or laypeople would deny that political events can have an important sometimes even overwhelming impact on economic decisions in general and investment decisions in particular the first goal of this paper is to integrate a number of political and non traditional economic variables into the standard theory of investment based on the maximization of the expected value of the firm the second goal is to test this generalized investment theory on a particularly fertile field for gauging the interaction of political and economic factors the plant and equipment spending of foreign manufacturing affiliates of us multinationals in argentina brazil and mexico the results of these tests show that the generalized theory is far superior to the traditional alternatives in explaining the real investment of the sample for the 1958 1989 period

global foreign direct investment flows the role of governance infrastructure abstract it is widely argued that a country s economic performance over time is determined to a great extent by its political institutional and legal environment we refer to these institutions and policies as the governance infrastructure of a country we utilize newly developed indices to examine the effects of governance infrastructure on both foreign direct investment fdi inflows and outflows for a broad sample of developed and developing countries over 1995 97 in addition we examine the role of other forms of infrastructure including human capital and the environment the results clearly indicate that governance infrastructure is an important determinant of both fdi inflows and outflows investments in governance infrastructure not only attract capital but also create the conditions under which domestic multinational corporations emerge and invest abroad it would appear that investments in governance infrastructure are subject to diminishing returns so that the benefits in terms of inflows are most pronounced for smaller and developing economies