do japanese auto manufacturers behave as short run profit maximizers in the us market does the pricing behaviour following a major vehicle restyling of japanese manufacturers in the us market differ from that of domestic manufacturers over the 1977 92 period while we found that domestic manufacturers increase price significantly on restyled models we were unable to conclude that japanese manufacturers did the same in light of the demand and cost conditions developed this pricing behaviour by japanese manufacturers is difficult to reconcile with short run profit maximization

observable and unobservable determinants of replacement of home appliances despite the dominant role of replacement purchases in many consumer durable categories the research in this area has not been extensive only in the last few years has the economic theory made progress towards a more rigorous analysis of the dynamic nature involved in replacement decisions as a consequence of this applied researchers have switched from conventional discrete choice models to new econometric techniques e g duration analysis that allow for richer relationships between socioeconomic variables characteristics of the durable good and the likelihood of its replacement over time our study focuses on two home appliances taken from the residential energy consumption survey recs based on a duration model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity across households we conclude that household demographics and product features both observable and unobservable in general have statistical power to explain replacement decisions over time

inheritance law and investment in family firms entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs the size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers using a purpose built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10 004 firms from 38 countries in 1990 2006 we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms but does not affect investment in nonfamily firms moreover as the model predicts inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession jel g31 g32

technical change external economies and the porter hypothesis abstract michael porter introduces the idea that environmental regulations may benefit affected firms this paper derives results consistent with porter s hypothesis by employing a general equilibrium framework with a large number of agents external economies of scale in production and discrete changes in technology the model shows that endogenous technical change makes porter s hypothesis feasible however a policy that produces results consistent with porter s hypothesis is not necessarily optimal

market share market value and innovation in a panel of british manufacturing firms this paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations market share and stock market value new developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity we find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity furthermore the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares we argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre emptively innovate

taxing variable cost environmental regulation as industrial policy abstract conventional wisdom has it that a country that enacts strict environmental regulations will place its firms at a competitive disadvantage this view has been challenged recently some commentators argue that stricter regulation will enhance domestic competitiveness strict regulations induce innovation we evaluate this argument in a strategic trade model in very special cases a strengthening of regulation may result in a shift of profits from foreign to domestic firms this is not a general result however environmental regulation should of course be imposed to control externalities but it is unlikely that it will serve to generate industrial advantage

rates of time preference and consumer valuations of automobile safety and fuel efficiency this article estimates hedonic price models for automobiles using a data set on almost 3 000 households from the u s department of energy residential transportation energy consumption survey the standard hedonic models are generalized to recognize the role of discounting of fuel efficiency and safety yielding an estimated rate of time preference ranging from 11 to 17 percent this range includes the prevailing rate of interest for car loans in 1988 and is consequently consistent with market rates purchasers exhibit an implicit value of life ranging from 2 6 to 3 7 million which is within the range found in the labor market as well as other market contexts the model also estimates a significant price effect for auto injury risks and fuel efficiency

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

does the form of compensation matter abstract the role of fee contracts in the agency relation between investment bankers and client firms in tender offers is investigated using a sample of offers between 1978 and 1986 different fees have different payoff functions which can be used by firms to create incentives and by bankers to signal differences in abilities the effectiveness of fee contracts in resolving agency problems in tested with mixed results the evidence suggests that fee contracts are used as a tool by both firms and bankers and that contracts influence tender offer outcomes but that contracting is only a partial solution to the agency problem

an empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives abstract prior research on the factors influencing the use of debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing is extended by considering management incentives when alternative incentive variables are considered separately we find covenants have a significant negative relation to ceo cash compensation an insignificant relation to the value of ceo equity held and significant positive relations to both the ratio of the value of ceo equity holdings to cash compensation and the fraction of equity held by the ceo in two stage simultaneous equations models only the latter is significant when jointly considered with each of the other incentive variables

the impact of foreign board membership on firm value abstract this study examines the effect of foreign anglo american board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value tobin s q using a sample of firms with headquarters in norway or sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider anglo american board member s after a variety of firm specific and corporate governance related factors have been controlled for we argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by importing an anglo american corporate governance system such an import signals a willingness on the part of the firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial market

agency relationships in family firms theory and evidence does owner management necessarily eliminate the agency costs of ownership drawing on agency literature and on the economic theory of the household we argue that private ownership and owner management expose privately held owner managed firms to agency threats ignored by jensen s and meckling s 1976 agency model private ownership and owner management not only reduce the effectiveness of external control mechanisms they also expose firms to a self control problem created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which harm themselves as well as those around them jensen 1994 p 43 thus shareholders have incentive to invest resources in curbing both managerialand owner opportunism we extend this thesis to the domain of the family firm after developing hypotheses which describe how family dynamics and specifically altruism exacerbate agency problems experienced by these privately held owner managed firms we use data obtained from a large scale survey of family businesses to field test our hypotheses and find evidence which suggests support for our proposed theory finally we discuss the implications of our theory for research on family and other types of privately held owner managed firms

the efficiency of used vehicle markets the case of technological obsolescence and differential repair records this paper examines the effect of technological oboslescence differential maintanance expenditures and differential fuel efficiencies on the depreciated value of automobiles our results support the widely held belief that used vehicle markets are efficient we show that the significant decline in the depreciated values of used automobiles is predominantly due to age we also conclude that technological obsolescence causes a once and for all decrease in the depreciated value of used automobiles that for imported vehicle lines differential maintanance expenditures affect depreciated value and that for domestic vehicle lines differential fuel efficiencies impact depreciated value

disentangling pioneering cost advantages and disadvantages existing literature discusses a number of possible pioneering cost advantages and disadvantages in this paper we empirically test three different sources of long term pioneering cost advantage experience curve effects preemption of input factors and preemption of ideal market space and three different sources of pioneering cost disadvantage imitation vintage effects and demand orientation we disentangle these sources by breaking total cost of a business unit into three different components purchasing production and selling general and administrative sg a costs and identifying conditions that intensify or reduce the effect of the proposed source using two samples of business units one for consumer goods and one for industrial goods we find support for five of the six sources of pioneering cost advantage and disadvantage in both samples while the advantage due to preemption of ideal market space is limited to the consumer goods sample the unconditional analysis shows a pioneering purchasing cost advantage but even larger pioneering production and sg a cost disadvantages the complexity of our obtained findings suggests that managers need to think carefully about their particular conditions before making assumptions about the cost and therefore profit implications of a pioneering strategy

disclosure policy a discussion of leuz triantis and wang 2008 on going dark abstract ltw 2008 examine firms withdrawing from the sec reporting system but continuing to trade on pink sheets the paper finds that sarbanes oxley increased the propensity of firms to go dark but counter to conventional wisdom had no significant effect on the rate of going private transactions agency costs as well as poor growth opportunities proximity to financial distress and increased compliance costs arising from sox increase the propensity to go dark suggestions to improve the empirical implementation and interpretation involve including additional control and more suitable explanatory variables and more attention to causation issues and to the quantification of economic significance

negotiated block trades and corporate control we identify negotiated trades of large percentage blocks of stock as corporate control transactions when a block trades and the firm is not fully acquired cumulative abnormal returns average 5 6 and 33 of the chief executives are replaced within a year stock price increases are larger when control passes to the new blockholder when management does not resist the blockholder s effort to influence corporate policy and when the block purchaser eventually fully acquires the firm these findings suggest that the specific skills and expertise of blockholders and not just the concentration of ownership are important determinants of firm value we examine 106 negotiated trades of at least 5 of the common stock of new york stock exchange nyse and american stock exchange amex listed corporations our primary objective is to assess the impact of these transactions on the firms whose shares are traded we also investigate the importance of active block investor s specific managerial expertise and incentives for firm value the emerging literature on concentrated ownership focuses on how the level of ownership affects a blockholder s incentives to undertake a variety of corporate decisions although it has been recognized that a blockholder s identity also can be important less attention has been paid to this issue several recent studies however provide evidence that blockholders incentives and expertise are not homogeneous for example holderness and sheehan 1985 find that the stock market reacts more favorably to initial block accumulations by six controversial investors who are often portrayed in the press as raiders than to initial accumulations by a random sample of investors morck shleifer and vishny 1988 find that firm value tends to be lower when the firm is run by a member of the founder s family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder brickley lease and smith 1988 document that institutional blockholders are less willing to vote against management on antitakeover amendments when they are likely to have business dealings with the firm when a block trades the concentration of ownership typically does not change but the blockholder s identity does

deconstructing the pioneer s advantage examining vintage effects and consumer valuations of quality and variety several studies have demonstrated an order of entry effect on market share suggesting that pioneers outperform later entrants however other research has pointed out the limitations of these studies and found evidence that many pioneers fail or have low market share given this background the purpose of this research is to understand the conditions under which pioneers are more likely and also less likely to have an advantage we propose a game theoretic model that includes important sources of pioneer advantages as well as disadvantages specifically we incorporate a pioneer advantage due to preemption in markets with heterogeneous tastes in addition we incorporate a potential pioneer disadvantage due to technology vintage effects where later entrants utilizing improved technology can have lower costs and higher quality the model allows us to evaluate the extent of vintage effects necessary to overcome a pioneer s advantage key relationships are found between the magnitude of the pioneer advantage or disadvantage and consumer valuations of product attributes e g variety and quality we empirically validate the model with vintage effect data in 36 product categories and measures of consumer valuations of product variety and quality for 12 of these 36 categories the results show that pioneers do better in product categories wherevariety is more important and worse in categories where productquality is more important pioneers in categories with high vintage effects are shown to have lower market shares and higher failure rates similar results appear when analyzing persistence of market leadership over time further validating our model s major implications we also present two case studies that illustrate key elements of the model

has pricing behaviour in the us automobile industry become more competitive the literature in the us is divided over whether the character of the domestic automobile industry has changed recently becoming less oligopolistic this paper investigates whether domestic industry pricing policies have changed since the oil embargo the paper finds evidence that industry pricing policy has changed from that consistent with a target rate of return pricing to one more consistent with marginal cost pricing

innovation imitation and social welfare this paper focuses on the impact of competition by imitation more specifically copying for innovative activity and social welfare in part it is a response to recent empirical work 10 12 that has tried to measure the relationship between innovation and imitation costs these papers include a direct call for theoretical modeling that takes explicit account of such cost relationships and we try to answer this challenge specifically we examine the implications for product quality and social welfare when innovators anticipate that a successful product will be copied by rivals obviously previous empirical research is not the only source of interest in these issues the potential effects of imitation on innovative activity have long been both a theoretical and practical concern in recent years a variety of authors have addressed the appropriability issue raised by imitation and its implications for innovative activity 4 7 2 there has also been work on explicit copying i e photocopying 8 11 in the policy arena the protection of product design and intellectual property rights is the focus of much recent actual and proposed u s legislation and a major issue in the uruguay round of trade talks 1 21 our analysis of this topic differs from that of previous work in a number of important respects first we focus explicitly on product as opposed to process innovations second and perhaps even more important we do not restrict the firm s choice to be to innovate or not to innovate instead we allow the innovator to choose what kind or quality of new good to introduce into the market the higher the quality the higher is the development cost third when the innovating firm decides what kind of new product to market it does so under uncertainty about demand the popularity of the new product is not known until after the innovator has chosen the level of quality and sunk its product development costs fourth at the initial time at which the innovator chooses the quality of product to develop it does so with the knowledge that its innovation if it is popular will be copied by later rival entrants finally in direct response to the empirical work mentioned above we explicitly focus on the ratio of imitation to innovation costs our approach yields a number of insights not the least of which is a more precise identification of the potential gains and losses from imitative competition indeed using a quadratic development cost function we explicitly calculate the impact of copying on social welfare this explicit welfare analysis further distinguishes our analysis from most previous work

environmental policy and competitiveness the porter hypothesis and the composition of capital abstract the porter hypothesis suggests a win win situation in the sense that environmental policy improves both environment and competitiveness the suggestion received strong criticism from economists driven by the idea that if opportunities exist firms do not have to be triggered by an extra cost in this paper a model is developed which confirms this point but which also draws attention to some general mechanisms that relax the trade off considerably downsizing and modernization of firms subject to environmental policy will increase average productivity and will have positive effects on the marginal decrease of profits and environmental damage

south korean chaebols and value based management south korean industrial conglomerates chaebols are discussed in the context of value based management vbm recent economics and finance literature on the diversion of corporate resources from the firm to the controlling shareholders tunneling for which chaebols are notoriously known is discussed chaebols have engaged in empire building and expropriation of minority shareholders distorting the process of efficient resource allocation in south korea and became the root cause of the 1997 financial crisis we argue that the 1997 crisis should be viewed as a consequence of chaebols systematic deviation from the guiding principles of vbm we use tunneling within chaebols as an example of the need to directly address prohibition of the expropriation of minority shareholders as a primary postulate of vbm we argue that vbm should require that the value generated by the firm not be expropriated from minorities or any stakeholders by dominant shareholders we also examine moral and ethical considerations and present explanations as to why the unethical practice of tunneling has been tolerated by the south korean public we show that public opinion on tunneling is changing and that the treatment of minority shareholders by chaebols controlling families is becoming increasingly unacceptable to south koreans

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

switching costs in two sided markets in many markets there are switching costs and network effects yet the literature gen erally deals with these two concepts separately this paper bridges the gap by analyzing their interaction effects or indirect bargain in a dynamic two sided market i show that in a symmetric equilibrium the classic result that the first period price is u shape in switching costs does not emerge but instead switching costs always intensify first period price competition moreover an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first period price on the other side thus policies that ignore these effects may underestimate the welfare enhancing effects of switching costs

founders heirs and corporate opacity in the united states abstract we argue that information about firm activities can vary substantially in the presence of founder or heir ownership thereby influencing the risks borne by minority investors we explore two hypotheses with regard to these controlling shareholders and corporate transparency focusing on their role as monitor in place and their potential to exploit firm opacity to accrue private benefits of control to test these notions we create an opacity index that ranks the relative transparency of the two thousand largest industrial us firms and find founder and heir ownership in 22 and 25 of these firms respectively our analysis indicates that in large publicly traded companies both founder and heir firms are significantly more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms we also find that founder and heir controlled firms exhibit a negative relation to performance in all but the most transparent firms surprisingly additional tests reveal that concerns about divergences in ownership versus control management type dual class shares and board influence appear to be substantially less important than corporate opacity in explaining the performance impacts of founder and heir control finally we decompose corporate opacity into disclosure and market scrutiny components finding that the disclosure quality component appears to be of greater importance to investors however irrespective of whether these controlling shareholders create or stay in the firm because of corporate opacity our analysis suggests that founders and heirs in large publicly traded firms exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors

the asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation a panel threshold regression approach abstractprior research shows that chief executive officers ceos are rewarded for their earnings management we re examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach which allows the effect of earnings management on the ceo compensation to change across the level of earnings management and ceo compensation our results show that the effect of ceos discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation in particular for firms with moderate inordinate levels of earnings management and ceo compensation earnings management is rewarded penalized

corporate governance environmental regulations and technological change abstract this paper investigates the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation by focusing on the automobile industry in a cross country setting we provide empirical evidence that the presence of agency problems mitigates the negative effects of environmental regulations on overall r d activity which leads to full compensation when the degree of agency problems is sufficiently high guiding our empirical analysis we provide a general model consistent with the structure of existing ownership data specifically we model ownership structure as a combination of two extreme corporate governance types on the one extreme there are profit maximizers and on the other extreme there are managers who are only concerned with their private benefits the model leads to a simple country level ownership indicator and shows that if an economy is dominated by firms with higher agency problems then pollution tax might even increase overall r d while reducing pollution according to our estimations such an outcome is possible only for out of sample values of the ownership indicator where the degree of agency problems is extremely high

earnings and management incentives comments abstract in the preceding papers pourciau murphy and zimmerman and clinch and magliolo address the role of earnings in evaluating ceo performance for dismissal or compensation decisions and the implications for earnings management this comment evaluates the three papers and suggests avenues for future research into the stewardship role of accounting data and opportunistic financial reporting behavior

the investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice abstract this paper provides evidence on the cross sectional relation between firms investment opportunities their debt and compensation contracts their size and financial leverage and their accounting procedure choices this evidence is important because previous studies hypothesize that the link between firms investment opportunities and their accounting choices helps explain extant results on the size debt equity and bonus plan hypotheses however while i find that firms investment opportunities do affect the nature of their contracts i also find that the traditional explanations for accounting choice are important after controlling for the effects of the investment opportunity set

productivity growth and environmental regulation in mexican and u s food manufacturing many argued during the nafta debate that trade liberalization would favor mexican over u s food processors especially because of lax environmental laws south of the border we find through an examination of profit functions that productivity growth in mexico has outstripped that in the united states suggesting free trade indeed will benefit mexican suppliers u s pollution regulations have had no impact on the profitability or productivity of u s food manufacturing in contrast mexico s swiftly rising environmental standards have enhanced food processors productivity growth corroborating the porter hypothesis pollution law therefore has favored mexican over u s food processing but for reasons few had anticipated

the agency problems embedded in firm s equity investment we find that agency problems are embedded in firm s excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder s motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure the excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average the abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance our empirical evidences of 345 taiwanese non financial listed firms show that firm s excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder s cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control cash flow deviation and board affiliation the results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by la porta et al 2002 journal of finance57 1147 1171 and claessen et al 2002 journal of finance57 2741 2742 the negative relation between equity investment and firm s value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders this study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner s ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm s value

the reverse lbo decision and firm performance theory and evidence we investigate the transition from private to public ownership of companies that had previously been subject to leveraged buyouts lbos we show that the information asymmetry problem firms face when they go to public markets for equity as well as behavioral and debt overhang effects will produce a pattern in which superior performance before an offering should be expected with disappointing performance subsequently we find empirical evidence of this phenomenon by studying 62 reverse lbos that went public between 1983 and 1987 the market appears to anticipate this pattern in 1991 56 leveraged buyouts lbos returned to the public equity markets part of a broader phenomenon in which a large fraction of lbos go public again hence becoming reverse lbos kaplan 1991 reports that 45 percent of a sample of large lbos completed between 1979 and 1986 later returned to public ownership moreover reverse lbos tend to be larger than the average initial public offering ipo 1 in sum transitions from the lbo form to public ownership have become a widespread and economically significant phenomenon we find strong evidence that the return to public ownership of reverse lbos coincides with a peak in their operating performance their operating income as a percentage of total assets grew by about seven percentage points in the preoffering year comparison firms in the same industries show a slight decline in the same performance measure moreover in the preoffering year reverse lbos outperform continuing lbos in the year after the

ownership and firm innovation in a transition economy evidence from china we examine innovation performance of firms in a transition economy from an ownership perspective we focus specifically on the relationship between ownership structures and firm innovation performance drawing on data from 548 chinese firms we find volume of patent registration to be most strongly influenced by foreign ownership in the firm along with firm affiliation within a business group the influence of state and institutional ownership on innovation performance is positive but lagged contrary to expectations insider ownership leads to lower innovation performance and concentrated ownership has no significant impact our study has two principal contributions firstly we utilize a comprehensive treatment of ownership characteristics overcoming weakness in previous studies that have used a more narrow focus on ownership type secondly we contribute to understanding of how firms in transition economies build indigenous capabilities for innovation by drawing attention to the interplay of foreign and domestic control of agents innovation

does best practice in setting executive pay in the uk encourage good behaviour we examine how uk listed companies set executive pay reviewing the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and examining how this can conflict with what shareholders and other stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour we do this by considering current governance regulation in the light of interviews with protagonists in the debate setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration setters and showing how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts

a theoretical foundation of the porter hypothesis abstract this letter shows that by reducing agency costs an environmental regulation may enhance pollution reducing innovation while at the same time increasing firms private benefit

disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings this article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership using data for 1 301 publicly traded corporations in eight east asian economies we find that firm value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder consistent with a positive incentive effect but firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow ownership consistent with an entrenchment effect given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world

managerial ownership of voting rights abstract managers of firms with dual classes of common stock can choose different quantities of votes for a given cash flow interest by choosing different quantities of the two securities we study managerial stock holdings in 45 dual class firms and find that vote ownership per se is an important motivation for these holdings in that corporate officers and their families hold a median 56 9 of the votes and 24 0 of the common stock cash flows we also find significant family involvement in many sample firms and document four case studies in which explicit acquisition premiums were paid for superior voting shares

management and ownership effects evidence from five countries despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross national sample this study empirically examines the ownership concentration performance relationship across the nations of canada france germany the united kingdom and the united states essentially we argue that the correlation if any between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied 1998 john wiley sons ltd

strike when the force is with you optimal stopping with application to resource equilibria optimal investment in a nonrenewable resource project occurs when the rate of increase of the project s forward value falls to the force of interest this stopping rule yields a financial interpretation of resource quality as being a property of the project rather than of individual units of reserves it also leads to re interpretations of a rent as the present value of the project rather than of units of reserves and b hotelling s insight as not a rule for the path of rents but an equilibrium algorithm for price the analysis is extended to sequential development of pesticides antibiotics and forests

testing agency theory with entrepreneur effort and wealth we develop a principal agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model s predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental variables techniques we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk effort increases with ownership and effort increases firm performance the magnitude of the effects in the cross section of firms suggests that agency costs may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity

structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance the link between managerial ownership and corporate performance this paper presents a parsimonious structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership firm scale and performance and the empirical associations among them in particular variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well known hump shaped relation between tobin s q and managerial ownership to assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model the unfortunate conclusion is that at least in the ownership performance context proxy variables fixed effects and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias

the optimal timing of an exhaustible reversible wilderness development project decisions about wilderness development projects are almost always reached on a nowor never basis the entrepreneur developer seeks to undertake a project as soon as possible and the environmentalist preservationist tries to prevent it from ever occurring the decision process encourages this dichotomization some agency legislature or court listens to both views and declares one side the winner 1 in essence such a procedure restricts the choice to the two extreme points of what should logically be a continuous set these notes seek to illuminate the correct procedures for deciding when to undertake a wilderness development project from this more general view of the problem the usual decisions now or never emerge simply as possible corner solutions advocates of wilderness preservation have often in the past recommended postponement of a development project but on the grounds of uncertainty about the future benefits that will be derived from the preserved wilderness indeed there are two kinds of uncertainty one many of the uses of wilderness are unpriced or seriously underpriced which means that markets provide inaccurate if any information about willingness to pay and that conceptually and empirically more tenuous nonmarket estimators must be utilized 2 and two future uses of wilderness may be dramatically different in kind and not just amount and these may be currently unfathomable not to mention unquantifiable accordingly the expected benefits of an irreversible wilderness development

q and the tax bias theory abstract a growing body of literature analyzes the variation in q the ratio of financial market value to asset current replacement cost and makes inferences about attributes such as monopoly power profitability managerial performance etc these studies ignore potential biases embedded in q that result from non neutral tax policies this study examines the association between q and tax biases and establishes that differences in accumulated depreciation tax shields explain significant variation in q the implication that q should be adjusted for tax biases before use in empirical research is examined further adjusting q for tax biases at least with the factors herein leads only to minor changes in econometric analyses

induced innovation and energy prices this paper uses u s patent data from 1970 to 1994 to study the impact of energy prices on energy efficient innovations theories of technological change have focused both on demand side factors which spur innovative activity by increasing the value of new innovations and supply side factors such as scientific advancements that make new innovations possible data on demand side factors are easily obtained but data on supply side factors that influence innovation are not readily available this paper uses patent citations as a measure of the usefulness of the existing base of scientific knowledge citations to previous patents are used to construct productivity estimates which measure the usefulness of the existing stock of knowledge to inventors in a given energy field for any given year these estimates are then combined with data on demand side factors to estimate a model of induced innovation in energy technologies the results indicate that both energy prices and the supply of knowledge have strongly significant positive effects on innovation the paper concludes with a discussion of the implication of this work for environmental policy

sequential entry with brand loyalty caused by consumer learning by using we examine first mover advantages in a new product market with sequential entry effort is necessary to learn how to use new products and consumers are assumed to differ in their ability to expend such effort we consider the intertemporal pricing strategy of the first entrant who anticipates the late entry of a rival firm the first entrant s optimal strategy is to set a low introductory price this builds up a customer base which remains loyal despite the later entry of a lower priced rival and weakens price competition between the two firms thus brand loyalty makes entry into the market easier

distribution of environmental costs and benefits additional distortions and the porter hypothesis the porter hypothesis argues that environmental regulations benefit firms by fostering innovation we discuss four examples consistent with this idea highlighting either the distribution of benefits or costs or the presence of some additional distortion other than pollution examples are organized according to the list of market failures adding any one market failure creates the possibility that firms benefit from regulations while each example can be fully consistent with the porter hypothesis it is also possible that regulations benefit firms even without fostering innovation a result that would be empirically difficult to distinguish from the porter hypothesis

price differences between equity classes corporate control foreign ownership or liquidity abstract this paper is the first comprehensive study of price differences for dual class equity at the oslo stock exchange it analyzes the relative importance of corporate control foreign ownership restrictions and stock market liquidity for the price differences the norwegian market has the peculiar feature that in part of the sample period non voting shares were trading at a premium to voting shares i e what is usually termed the voting premium was negative this result can be rationalized by restrictions on foreign ownership in the later part of the period with no regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership the voting premium is positive and related to corporate governance and liquidity

the performance of privatized firms in the czech republic abstract with the growing importance of privatizations as a part of government policy most empirical studies of these privatizations conclude that firm performance immediately improves following privatization privatization has been the most important part of the transition from the centrally planned economies of central and eastern europe and has a larger impact on those economies than privatizations in other countries however few studies have looked at the performance of firms following mass privatization this study uses 453 separate firms 101 firms privatized in both waves for a total of 554 observations in the first and second waves of czech voucher privatization using methodology from previous studies we find that while the overall effects from privatization are positive the effects vary by privatization wave size and industry firms privatized in the first wave performed worse decline in performance following privatization than firms privatized in the second wave we also fail to find ownership concentration or debt as an important factor in restructuring the firm i believe that the results are consistent with two hypotheses first economic and political structure surrounding the privatization waves plays an important part in the success of privatization stable environments both political and economic help privatized firms restructure and improve operating performance as well as attract foreign investors and capital even in less developed countries but in transitional economies undergoing mass privatization in rapidly changing and developing economic and political environments hinder firms from restructuring and improving performance following privatization results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms with a longer preparation period prior to privatization an implicit seasoning improve performance following privatization

bundling and international market segmentation the paper shows how firms by bundling their products with nontradables may contribute to the segmentation of international oligopoly markets we develop a simple example with two products one that is homogeneous across markets and one that is bundled with a nontradable e g local services integration of the markets for the homogeneous product yields the expected price equalization across markets however integration of the markets for bundled products leaves the economy entirely unaffected hence the standard methodology of comparing a segmented and an integrated equilibrium would exaggerate the effects of integration in this economy

strategic it investments the impact of switching cost and declining it cost the declining cost of information technology it over time provides the later entrant in information intensive industries a cost advantage on the other hand the earlier entrant has the potential to build and retain its market share if consumers incur a cost in switching to the later entrant we investigate the impact of a decline in the it cost and the switching cost on it investment strategies of firms we find that a declining it cost always hurts the early entrant s profit the early entrant may assume an aggressive investment strategy or a defensive investment strategy in response to a decline in the it cost depending on whether the switching cost relative to the extent of decline in the it cost is high or low respectively a decline in it cost also hurts the later entrant s profit if the switching cost is high a surprising result is that when the decline in the it cost is higher than a critical value a higher switching cost increases consumer surplus when firms control the switching cost the early entrant increases its investment in quality and switching cost and maintains its quality and its market share leadership irrespective of the extent of decline in the it cost

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

an analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths implications for the managerial labor market abstract certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive s continued employment these wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty three events these abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive s status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive s talents and decision making responsibility and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement

does home bias affect firm value evidence from holdings of mutual funds worldwide this study finds strong evidence that home bias affects firm valuation at both country and firm levels at the country level increasing the bias of domestic investors toward home equity lowers the market valuation of home equity at the firm level firm value increases as the compositions of local equities held by domestic and foreign investors tend toward the firms global market capitalization weights but decreases as their weights deviate from global weights overall the evidence is consistent with the optimal global risk sharing hypothesis that the greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors in international capital markets reduces the cost of capital and hence enhances market valuation

does the bonding effect matter in a more integrated capital market world abstract this paper examines the bonding effect of cross listing before and after the stock market liberalization reforms in china consistent with the bonding hypothesis we find that chinese firms with foreign listings attain higher valuations than firms without foreign listings we also find that they manage earnings less than comparable purely domestic listed firms and have more informative stock prices further investigation indicates that the divergence in earnings quality between cross listed and non cross listed firms shrinks dramatically after the chinese stock market liberalization reforms in 2001 and 2002 overall the results suggest that the bonding effect is mitigated in an increasingly integrated capital market world

considering aquacultural externality in coastal land allocation decisions in india commercial aquaculture in india has come under attack for having caused negative agricultural and environmental impacts this paper formulates an interactive model of non renewable and renewable resources to characterize land allocations between aquaculture and agriculture in ecologically and economically sustainable fashion through an empirical application various economic and policy circumstances that affect the optimal land allocation mix are evaluated the aquaculture industry must address two economic effects off site negative effects on renewable food and other coastal resources and on site self pollution of shrimp ponds current regulatory and land use policies are inadequate to address these effects

strategic quality competition and the porter hypothesis abstract this paper offers new support for the porter hypothesis within the context of a quality competition framework we use a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which two firms simultaneously choose to produce either a high environmentally friendly quality or low standard quality variant of a good before engaging in price competition in this simple setting we show that a nash equilibrium of the game featuring the low quality good can be pareto dominated by a different strategy profile in which both firms opt in favour of the green product our analysis demonstrates that in such a case both firms stand to profit from the introduction of a rule penalizing any firm refusing to produce the environmentally friendly product we also find that consumers themselves may benefit from such regulations this is always the case when shifting from low quality to high quality production brings about a cost efficiency improvement

the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may and often do diverge and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear in creating these new relationships the quasi public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution it has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit seeking enterprise 1

determinants of environmental innovation in us manufacturing industries abstract this paper provides new evidence on the determinants of environmental innovation we employ panel data models to study how environmental innovation by us manufacturing industries responded to changes in pollution abatement expenditures and regulatory enforcement during the period 1983 through 1992 we find that 1 environmental innovation as measured by the number of successful environmental patent applications granted to the industry responded to increases in pollution abatement expenditures however 2 increased monitoring and enforcement activities related to existing regulations did not provide any additional incentive to innovate we also find some empirical evidence that environmental innovation is more likely to occur in industries that are internationally competitive

ownership structure investment and the corporate value an empirical analysis this paper examines the relation among ownership structure investment and corporate value focusing on whether ownership structure affects investment ordinary least squares regression results suggest that ownership structure affects investment and therefore corporate value however simultaneous regression results indicate that the endogeneity of ownership may affect these inferences suggesting that investment affects corporate value which in turn affects ownership structure the evidence shows that corporate value affects ownership structure but not vice versa these findings raise questions regarding the assumption that ownership structure is exogenously determined and bring into question the results in studies that treat ownership structure as exogenous

exploring the relationship between the markets for new and used durable goods the case of automobiles given that durable products are long lived there exists the possibility of secondary markets for used products as well as the potential for product obsolescence this is an important issue in markets where technology changes rapidly because the introduction of new versions of a product can make earlier versions obsolete more generally prices of older versions in the secondary market adjust in response to changes incorporated in new versions of the product thus another method of evaluating consumers response to a new product is by looking at the variation in market prices of the old product this paper develops a general model to explore the relationship between primary markets for new cars and secondary markets for used cars the results suggest that the depreciation of used cars is influenced strongly by the types of changes in new model cars

inside the family firm the role of families in succession decisions and performance this paper uses a unique dataset from denmark to investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance we focus on the decision to appoint either a family or an external chief executive officer ceo the paper uses variation in ceo succession decisions that result from the gender of a departing ceo s first born child this is a plausible instrumental variable iv as male firstchild firms are more likely to pass on control to a family ceo relative to female first child firms but the gender of a first child is unlikely to affect firms outcomes we find that family successions have a large negative causal impact on firm performance operating profitability on assets falls by at least four percentage points around ceo transitions our iv estimates are significantly larger than those obtained using ordinary least squares furthermore we show that family ceo underperformance is particularly large for firms in high growth industries and for relatively large firms overall the empirical results demonstrate that professional non family ceos provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they head

strategic environmental policy eco dumping or a green strategy abstract the porter hypothesis claims that a strong environmental policy best serves the interests of a nation s export industry while this hypothesis seems to be based on some form of bounded rationality this paper argues that governments may have good reasons for setting an especially strong environmental policy even though firms are fully rational if the available abatement technology turns the environment into an inferior input competitiveness is spurred by a strong environmental policy the government should take advantage of this and set an especially strict emission quota or an especially high emission tax the findings in the paper also has consequences for the desirability of international cooperation with respect to national environmental policy if a strict environmental policy spurs competitiveness the environment is better protected without cooperation

controlling the conflict of interest in management buyouts a controversial aspect of the management buyouts that were popular throughout the 1980s is the potential for a conflict of interest to arise when a manager bids to acquire the firm he manages this study examines 184 management buyouts and reports three findings first returns to prebuyout shareholders are greater when managers must bid against outside acquirers second bid revisions in the face of competition exceed revisions due to shareholder litigation and negotiations with boards third the incidence of competition is negatively related to the prebuyout share holdings of managers coauthors are ronald f singer anju seth and darla f lang copyright 1994 by mit press

managerial incentives and environmental compliance abstract this paper uses a principal agent model to analyze the role of monetary incentives to implement corporate environmental policy the model assumes that the agent has to split a limited amount of effort between two tasks profit enhancement and environmental risk reduction we find that when the agent s effort constraint is not binding wages should increase with performance in each task moreover the sharpness of the optimal monetary incentives for a given task should depend positively on the principal s eagerness to influence performance on this task and on the accuracy of the monitoring technology when the agent s effort constraint is binding however the necessity for the principal to provide insurance to the agent may make it inefficient to link managerial effort expended on environmental risk reduction to the corporate compensation system

corporate governance and equity prices evidence from the czech and slovak republics the 1992 czechoslavakia mass privatization program involving about 1 500 eneterprises and implemented through a voucher scheme with competitive bidding was a bold step in changing the ownership and governance of a large part of the economy it represents a clear test case of one approach and other countries may benefit from its lessons at the time much skepticisism was voiced about mass privatization it would lead to diffuse ownership and no effective corporate governance would result but innovative forces led to the emergence of investment funds that collected much of the individuals voucher points leading to a much more concentrated ownership structure it has been expected that this concentrated ownership would lead to improved corporate governance but the jury is still out so far only limited and largely anecdotal evidence is available on the impact investment funds have on the way firms are being managed too little time has passed and too many shocks have occurred for example the split of the czech and slovak republics to expect to find discernible changes in corporate governance on measures of actual firm performance an alternative approach is to investigate whether firms that ended up with more concentrated ownership and possibly improved governance sell for higher prices either in the last voucher round or in the secondary market since then in a forward looking financial market one can expect prices to incorporate the effects of better ownership on future firm performance and associated dividends to shareholders put differently one would expect that two firms with different shareholding structures but otherwise identical would trade at different prices with the firm with a more concentrated ownership and presumably better corporate governance trading at a higher price on a cross sectional basis ownership structure may thus be significant in explaining relative share prices the author explores this line of reasoning controlling for a number of firm and sector specific variables he finds 1 majority ownership by a domestic or foreign investor has a positive influence on firm prices 2 firms with many small owners have lower prices 3 ownership by many small scale investors makes it easier for any single investor to establish effective control but such control does not necessarily translate into higher prices the author also provides two possible explanations of why higher prices appear to be associated only with majority ownership by a single investor he finds 1 the corporate legal framework and the difficulty in collecting proxy votes in the czech and slovak republics may prevent a small investor from making the necessary changes in the way firms are managed thus keeping prices low and 2 commercial banks are both managers of invesment funds and creditors of individual firms funds managers may face conflicts of interest and not be interested in increasing the value of equity alone but also the value of credits this could explain why prices are relatively lower for those firms in which investment funds have effective control

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

who is afraid of political risk multinational firms and their choice of capital structure this paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk we focus on two choice variables the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate and we distinguish different types of political risk such as expropriation unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation in our theoretical analysis we find that as political risk increases the ownership share tends to decrease whereas leverage can both increase or decrease depending on the type of political risk using the microdatabase direct investment of the deutsche bundesbank we find supportive evidence for these different effects

entrenchment governance and the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths abstract to study managerial entrenchment i use the stock price reaction to unexpected senior executive deaths if a highly effective manager dies unexpectedly the stock price reaction should be negative if however death removes an entrenched manager when the board would or could not the stock price reaction should be positive while individually age and tenure only weakly correlate with the stock price reaction to a sudden death the reaction is strongly positive 6 8 if 1 the executive s tenure exceeds 10 years and 2 abnormal stock returns over the last three years are negative