deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system abstract this paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system we liken the guarantee s value to that of a european style contingent claims portfolio the main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness to mitigate this incentive we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path dependent contingent claim by comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non mutual one we show that the former is less expensive but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks especially for undercapitalized institutions

the environmental kuznets curve environmental protection policy and income distribution abstract the effect of economic growth on pollution emissions differs substantially among high income countries i address this issue by analyzing public environmental policy decisions individual heterogeneity relative income effect and the political framework in which policy decisions are taken determine the emergence of the downward sloping segment of the environmental kuznets curve ekc income inequality produces a gap between the country s ability to pay for environmental protection and a country s willingness to pay i test this result by using oecd data on public r d expenditure for environmental protection the conclusion is that contrary to the ek hypothesis moments of the income distribution function other than the mean may be important for the emergence of a virtuous path of sustainable growth in high income countries

tiebout with politics capital tax competition and constitutional choices this paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation we describe a non cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes we show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries and even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction

inequality and the territorial fragmentation of solidarity a long tradition of research has shown decentralized political struc tures as an important cause behind lower levels of redistribution and higher levels of inequality this article offers an alternative interpretation of the association between fragmented fiscal structures and higher levels of inequality i argue that the distribu tive effects of decentralization depend on the preexisting territorial patterns of inequal ity therefore the political choice between alternative fiscal structures is largely driven by their expected distributive consequences as a result the territorial structure of inequality becomes an important factor to explain why some fiscal structures are more integrated than others two mechanisms link regional income distributions and preferences about the decentralization of redistributive policy differences in the demand for redistribution associated with interregional income differences and dif ferences in the demand for social insurance associated with the incidence of labor market risks i test the argument using a data set of fourteen countries in the orga nization for economic cooperation and development oecd over the period 1980 2000 in addition i illustrate the potential of the approach by analyzing why social solidarity remains territorially fragmented in the european union despite the fact that it has a common currency and a common market

how bank capital buffers vary across countries the influence of cost of deposits market power and bank regulation abstract this paper analyzes the bank and country determinants of capital buffers using a panel data of 1337 banks in 70 countries between 1992 and 2002 after controlling for adjustment costs and the endogeneity of explanatory variables the results show that capital buffers are positively related to the cost of deposits and bank market power although the relations vary across countries depending on regulation supervision and institutions their impact is the result of two generally opposing effects restrictions on bank activities and official supervision reduce the incentives to hold capital buffers by weakening market discipline but at the same time they promote higher capital buffers by increasing market power institutional quality has the two opposite effects better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance however have a clear positive effect on capital buffers by both strengthening market discipline and making charter value better able to reduce risk taking incentives

social identification and redistribution in heterogeneous federations evidence from germany and belgium recent evidence of increasing income heterogeneity within developed countries has reignited debates concerning the redistribution of income and wealth in this article we contribute to this debate

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

forbearance deposit insurance pricing and incentive compatible bank regulation abstract this paper examines the incentive compatible role of regulatory forbearance policy in the context of optimal bank regulation under moral hazard we show that when a bank s asset portfolio returns have market risk the regulator can influence the bank s choice of ex ante risk by delaying the closure of an insolvent bank the optimal closure policy involves co ordinating the closure decision with market wide performance such a policy may significantly alleviate the bank s ex ante risk shifting problem furthermore even fixed rate deposit insurance can be optimal when combined with a sound forbearance policy and a minimum capital standard

a theory of economic unions abstract after decades of successful growth economic unions have recently become the focus of heightened political controversy to understand why we develop a theoretical model of the effects on trade income distribution and welfare of economic unions that differ in size and scope our model shows that political support for international unions can grow with their breadth and depth provided member countries are sufficiently similar however differences in economic size and factor endowments can trigger disagreement over the value of unions our model is consistent with some salient features of the process of european integration and statistical evidence from survey data

public input competition abstract public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive this paper analyzes the nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition even though the regions are assumed identical the equilibrium may not be symmetric the problem with non cooperative behaviour is not only that regions invest too much but that too many regions may choose to invest depending on the parameter values the nash equilibrium may be efficient may be inefficient or may not exist at least not in pure strategies better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition the analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments competition to attract mobile factors

does deposit insurance increase banking system stability an empirical investigation based on evidence of 61 countries in 1980 97 the authors find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector

is the international convergence of capital adequacy regulation desirable the merit of international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of diierent central banks is examined the lack of a complementary variation between minimum bank capital requirements and regulatory forbearance leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies linking the central bank s forbearance to its alignment with domestic bank owners it is shown that in equilibrium a regression toward the worst closure policy may result the central banks of initially less forbearing economies also adopt greater forbearance i analyze the joint design of two bank regulatory mechanisms minimum capital requirements which are an ex ante mechanism to prevent bank failures and closure policy which is an ex post mechanism to manage the cost of bank failures at the heart of the paper is a simple but fundamental point ex post policies affect ex ante incentives and hence the design of an ex ante mechanism must take into account any feedback from the ex post policies the optimal design of capital requirements is thus tied to the extent of forbearance exercised by the central bank s closure policy this warrants a closer scrutiny of the merits of creating a level playing eld in capital requirements across countries as proposed and

reflections on northern rock the bank run that heralded the global financial crisis in september 2007 television viewers and newspaper readers around the world saw pictures of what looked like an old fashioned bank run that is depositors waiting in line outside the branch offices of a united kingdom bank called northern rock to withdraw their money the previous u k bank run before northern rock was in 1866 at overend gurney a london bank that overreached itself in the railway and docks boom of the 1860s bank runs were not uncommon in the united states up through the 1930s but they have been rare since the start of deposit insurance backed by the federal deposit insurance corporation in contrast deposit insurance in the united kingdom was a partial affair funded by the banking industry itself and insuring only a part of the deposits at the time of the run u k bank deposits were fully insured only up to 2 000 pounds and then only 90 percent of the deposits up to an upper limit of 35 000 pounds when faced with a run the incentive to withdraw one s deposits from a u k bank was therefore very strong for economists the run on northern rock at first seemed to offer a rare opportunity to study at close quarters all the elements involved in their theoretical models of bank runs the futility of public statements of reassurance the mutually reinforcing anxiety of depositors as well as the power of the media in galvanizing and channeling that anxiety through the power of television images however the storyline of the northern rock bank run does not fit the conventional narrative on september 13 2007 the bbc s evening television news broadcast first broke the news that northern rock had sought the bank of england s support the next morning the bank of england announced that it would provide emergency liquidity support it was only after that announcement that is after the

vertical and horizontal intra industry trade a cross industry analysis for the united kingdom a large theoretical literature has emerged directed at explaining the presence of intra industry trade iit one of the distinctions which comes out of these models is that between horizontal iit where goods are differentiated by attributes and vertical iit where goods are differentiated by quality in this paper horizontal and vertical iit in u k trade are disentangled using a unit value dispersion criterion and a range of industry characteristics the paper not only points up the relative importance of vertical and horizontal iit in the united kingdom it also demonstrates how a failure to separate them out can impact on the interpretation of empirical results copyright 1995 by royal economic society

economic integration and fiscal devolution abstract in this paper we investigate how economic integration influences the political decision of integration and separation of jurisdictions in a model with imperfect capital mobility we consider that not only the redistributive policy itself but also the level of policy centralization is decided by a majority vote we find that the net benefit from integration is not monotonic with the level of world capital market integration and present a case where integration of two regions occurs only for intermediate levels of mobility this conclusion relies on the comparison of the regional majorities utility under the various regimes the benefits from integration arise from the elimination of tax competition across jurisdictions which allows for more income redistribution whereas the costs are linked to the diversity of preferences across regions namely that of the decisive voters we also show that a federal regime is better than complete centralization in keeping a nation united

scale economies and intra industry trade abstract this investigation of the relationship between intra industry trade and scale economies shows industries with low scale economies more frequently have high rather than low intra industry trade shares theoretical studies should focus on causes of intra industry trade other than scale economies

credit market competition and capital regulation market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt but also from the asset side this will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply so that banks have to compete for projects in such a setting borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending thus creating an asset market based incentive for banks to hold capital borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid off since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds this implies that capital requirements may not be binding as recent evidence seems to indicate

the regulator s trade off bank supervision vs minimum capital abstract we develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks the regulator faces a trade off high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks profitability whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of intermediation and is costly for taxpayers we show that a mix of both instruments minimises the costs of preventing the collapse of financial intermediation once we allow for cross border banking the optimal policy is not feasible if domestic supervisory effort is not observable our model predicts a race to the bottom in capital requirement regulation therefore countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard

risk in banking and capital regulation this paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control it is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk utilizing the mean variance model the following results are shown a the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks b as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation the theoretically correct risk weights under the risk based capital plan are explicitly derived and c the theoretically correct risk weights are restrictions on asset composition which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms the recent increase in bank failures especially after the 1980 and 1982 deregulatory acts has again ignited a controversy over the risk portfolio of the banking industry given the importance of this sector there has been increased scrutiny of the industry s motives for risk taking and possible regulatory changes to improve its stability these investigations have centered around two rather complementary areas the first of these is the role of deposit insurance and how its current pricing procedure encourages risk taking and justifies current bank regulations the works of buser chen and kane 4 kane 9 and benston et al 2 have made substantive contributions the authors demonstrates the way in which our current fixed rate insurance system rewards risk taking by the firm and insulates it through deposit insurance from the market discipline that needs to exist to ensure proper risk evaluation this realization has led these authors to propose a series of regulatory changes to encourage proper portfolio choice within the industry these include a shift to market value accounting risk based deposit insurance premiums and additional capital regulation the last of these serves as a method of coinsurance whereby higher capital levels require the bank to absorb greater losses in the event of failure and encourage additional prudence in management in essense it is one method of risk reduction that may offset the risk preference imposed on the industry due to the inappropriate insurance pricing because the amount of capital influences the probability of bank insolvency and thus the soundness of the entire banking system the regulators ceteris paribus prefer more capital to

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

commercial policy and intra industry trade abstract this paper constructs a model of intra industry trade within a multi product industry whose output range is limited to that obtainable from a particular type of capital intra industry trade is a natural outcome in this structure without requiring increasing returns to scale or imperfectly competitive markets and with its pattern determined along traditional relative factor abundance lines the volume of this trade will vary inversely with the level of trade restrictions as observed empirically other policies are then considered for their influence on the range rather than the level of domestic production since the former is the more likely policy objective under these circumstances

deposit insurance around the world in the past two decades in a series of banking crises around the world banks have become systematically insolvent these crises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike to make such financial system breakdowns less likely and to limit their costs if they occur policymakers feel the need for financial safety nets these include such policies as implicit or explicit deposit insurance a lender of last resort function of the central bank bank insolvency resolution procedures and bank regulation and supervision of these policies explicit deposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes almost tripled with most oecd countries and an increasing number of developing economies adopting some form of explicit depositor protection in 1994 deposit insurance became the standard for the newly created single banking market of the european union establishing an explicit deposit insurance scheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advice given to developing economies

which banks choose deposit insurance evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system this article investigates adverse selection and moral hazard in the voluntary deposit insurance system of kansas which operated from 1909 to 1929 regulations were imposed to limit risk taking and membership was made voluntary to assuage objections that insurance forces conservative banks to protect depositors of high risk institutions the authors find however that risk prone banks were the most likely to join the system at its inception using a simultaneous equations model they also detect both adverse selection and moral hazard behavior throughout the system s first ten years copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

aspects of monetary and banking theory and moral hazard we consider two problems in monetary and banking theory in this paper the first of these deals with differences between monetary and tax transfer resolutions of risk sharing problems in overlapping generations 12 15 models of fiat money under uncertainty our second contribution the scenario for which is also motivated in part by interventions needed for risk sharing reasons is an attempt to provide a rationale for interest rate controls on the liabilities of intermediaries that invest in risky assets both models consider environments in which uncertainty exists private markets are incomplete and most importantly some material payoff relevant actions are not perfectly observable the goal of this research is to provide further momentum to theoretical developments that serve to integrate information based models of investment and intermediation with theories of unbacked fiat money and the control of monetary institutions in recent years there has been a great deal of research interest in explicating the micro economic foundations of fiat money i e valued government created assets which are unbacked by payoffs from productive investments or taxes and the uniqueness and criteria for regulation of depository intermediary firms important contributions have been among others the works of bryant 3 the papers in kareken and wallace 7 fama 6 merton 10 and diamond and dybvig 5 asymmetric information based foundations of intermediary functioning have been provided by the papers of leland and pyle 9 followed by diamond 4 in most of this work there has usually been a dichotomy between models that focus on providing and analyzing a role for fiat money and those which analyze the rationale regulation and pricing of capital market intermediaries and their contracts regrettably we persist in having this dichotomy in our work some recent work like fama 6 does merge these two aspects however by emphasizing perfect information complete market environments in which the financial structure irrelevance theorems of modigliani and miller 10 apply models of unbacked fiat money many different types of which are to be found in kareken and wallace 7 can be usefully dichotomized as being of two types in the first fiat money serves the function of opening up or expanding trading opportunities among contemporaneously living agents who have endowment

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

the effect of bank ownership and deposit insurance on monetary policy transmission abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical model with a representative bank whose ownership is shared between state and private sector the bank faces a risk of failure and provides private and public explicit deposit insurance banks owned to a larger extent by the government are more able to counteract a restrictive monetary policy because of their capacity to raise additional volume of deposits therefore the greater the state s share in the bank ownership the less the impact of a monetary tightening on the level of loan supply

deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations the 2007 2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance in our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks consequently socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium deposit insurance or equivalently bank recapitalization corrects this market failure we find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation the optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system hence when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations

financial opening deposit insurance and risk in a model of banking competition abstract we study the impact of competition on banks risk taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information while financial opening increases banks riskiness a risk based deposit insurance or alternatively the public disclosure of financial information are likely to mitigate this effect moreover the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors and risk based full deposit insurance yield the same equilibrium risk level although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

are banks really special new evidence from the fdic induced failure of healthy banks the fdic used cross guarantees in order to close 38 subsidiaries of first republicbank corporation in 1988 and 18 subsidiaries of first city bankcorporation in 1992 when lead banks from each of these texas based bank holding companies were declared insolvent i use this plausibly exogenous failure of otherwise healthy subsidiary banks as a natural experiment in order to study the impact of bank failure on local area real economic activity the resolution of these institutions was associated with a significant decline in failed bank lending that led to a permanent reduction in real county income of about 3 percent jel codes e5 g18 g33 keywords bank failures cross guarantee uniqueness of banks

a model of redistribution under social identification in heterogeneous federations abstract redistribution of resources to accommodate income heterogeneity within a federation is often fiercely debated e g belgium germany or the european union to help elucidate potential drivers behind such debates this article builds on social identity theory to develop a theoretical framework linking jurisdictional identification and preferences towards intra federation redistributive financial flows we show that federal rather than local identification can lead individuals to shift their redistribution preferences against their narrowly defined personal economic interest in contrast to predictions of standard models the sign and strength of this effect depends crucially not only upon individuals characteristics but also upon the social groups i e regions to which they belong we furthermore illustrate that federal rather than regional identification should be more widespread in poorer and or more populous regions within a federation but less common in regions which are very homogeneous internally or very dissimilar from the rest of the federation

who is against a common market this paper develops a theory of the endogenous formation of a common market in a three country two factor political economy model in the status quo home and foreign implement nondiscriminatory policies toward international factor flows in order to maximize the domestic median voter s welfare then the two countries simultaneously hold referenda on a common market initiative leading to the removal of the pre existing policies for factor flows between the member countries while no coordination is imposed on policies vis a vis the rest of the world several interesting results emerge in a common market the returns on factors moving between the members are more likely to increase the larger is the import demand of one country relative to the factor supply of the exporting partner factors that do not relocate are more likely to see their returns decrease when flows are large and import demands are inelastic importantly for the common market to emerge as an equilibrium some factors must continue to experience enhanced protection when the integration process is completed this result highlights the potential tension between social desirability and the political feasibility of the integration process jel f1 f2 p16

crises and capital requirements in banking we analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of and moral hazard by banks the regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects and impose capital adequacy requirements capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation and they otherwise substitute for screening ability crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case and contrary to conventional wisdom the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

intra industry specialization in a multi country and multi industry framework the paper tests alternative hypotheses as to the factors determining the extent of intra industry trade defined as the share of this trade in total trade in a multi country and multi industry framework the empirical results show that the extent of intra industry trade in a particular industry between any two countries depends on the characteristics of the industry and the countries concerned the explanatory power of the regressions for the entire group of countries exporting manufactured goods as well as for trade among the developed countries is relatively high and practically all the hypotheses concerning the impact of industry trade are supported by the empirical results lower coefficients of determination have been obtained for trade between developed and developing countries and for trade among developing countries but the estimates generally support the hypotheses put forward in the paper in these cases also

market discipline and deposit insurance cross country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking internationally deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage funding and management this reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured to inform this debate we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

moving toward risk based deposit insurance premiums in the european union the case of spain this article provides a scenario based analysis of how the european union proposal for a new funding model for deposit insurance systems diss would affect the spanish banking sector we examine the risk profiles of commercial banks savings banks and credit cooperatives over the period 2007 to 2011 and compare the contributions to the deposit insurance fund dif under the current flat rate regime with those that would have occurred under the new risk sensitive system we find that a risk based scheme could provide an incentive for sound management by reducing the premiums for credit institutions with better risk profiles we also conclude that the proposed reform may help to mitigate the moral hazard associated with larger credit institutions

tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice abstract the paper considers a two community model with freely mobile individuals individuals differ not only in their incomes but also in their tastes for a local public good in each jurisdiction the amount of public services is determined by majority vote of the inhabitants and local spending is financed by a residence based linear income tax when making their residential and political choices individuals thus face a trade off between the provisionary and redistributive effects of policies we analyze this trade off and show that tiebout like sorting equilibria often exist if the spread in tastes among individuals is very large an almost perfect sorting according to preferences emerges otherwise a partial sorting prevails and stratification into rich and poor communities is more pronounced importantly we demonstrate that all these sorting equilibria exist whether or not individuals are allowed to relocate after voting

distributive politics and the costs of centralization this paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting with centralization regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region specific projects the outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within region benefits the number of projects funded may be non monotonic in the strength of project externalities the efficiency gains from decentralization and the performance of constitutional rules such as majority voting which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization

the pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies the paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis despite of the potential moral hazard problems we argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance especially when the insured institution is insolvent applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option we first derive a closed form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies then we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for the properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk based pricing scheme