political cycles and economic performance in oecd countries empirical evidence from 1951 2006 this paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short term economic performance i employ data on annual gdp growth in 21 oecd countries over the 1951 2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests in countries with two party systems gdp growth is boosted before elections and under leftwing governments in the first two years of a legislative period these findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance my findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short term economic performance

option value empirical evidence from a case study of recreation and water quality a procedure for measuring option value and other preservation values of water quality is developed and applied to a case study area in the south platte river basin colorado benefits from water based recreation activities are the focus of the study the results provide an empirical test and confirmation of weisbrod s proposal that option value and other preservation values represent important social benefits and should be added to the aggregate consumer surplus of recreation activities to determine the total benefit of environmental amenities to society in the absence of such an estimate insufficient resources would be allocated by society to preservation of unique environments such as pristine mountain streams where mineral and energy development may irreversibly degrade water quality

the expected penalty for committing a crime several papers have noted and sought to explain the paradox of minimum wage law compliance compliance rates are high even though the penalty for violating the law is allegedly less than the underpayment to workers by comparison we show that the actual penalty exceeds the underpayment we combine our estimates of the costs of violating the law with estimates of the probability of apprehension to arrive at the expected cost of violating the law in contrast with previous work we find that the expected costs are sufficiently high to make compliance rational

how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

predatory versus productive government the case of u s agricultural policies this essay will argue that agricultural policy in the united states has led to both the enhancement of efficiency through productive policies and the transfer of wealth and income to special interests through redistributive or predatory policies these two activities can be labeled as pests and perts pest policies or political economic seeking transfers are meant to redistribute wealth from one social group to another and are not explicitly concerned with efficiency in contrast perts or political economic resource transactions are intended to correct market failures or to provide public goods these policies have neutral distributional effects at least in design a review of the history of public policy in agriculture reveals not only tension between the pert and pest roles of the public sector but also some coordination between these two types of activities as different interest groups pressure the political process the government trades off pests and perts in its attempts to acquire balance and secure political power at times this has led to combinations of programs that appear incoherent in such a world the challenge for economists is to design and advocate policies that are both economically productive and politically sustainable

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

political budget cycles with informed voters evidence from italy i exploit a reform that required italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheetsbefore elections to study whether having more informed voters aects the political budgetcycle to start inve

public enforcement private monitoring evaluating a new approach to regulating the minimum wage this paper examines compliance with federal minimum wage laws in the u s apparel industry and analyzes the impact of new methods of intervention designed to improve regulatory performance drawing

nonmarket performance evidence from u s electric utilities building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of political markets where firms transact over public policies with government policy makers we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms nonmarket strategies we propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians the firm s recent experience with policy makers and the opportunity to learn from other firms recent experiences and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of u s privately owned electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our arguments

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

fiscal policy deficits and politics of subnational governments the case of the german laender the first part of the paper briefly describesinstitutional aspects of the german federal system andexamines the economic and fiscal performance of thegerman laender since 1970 taking into account theinstitutional settings especially the fact that thegerman laender cannot set tax rates individually wedevelop a highly stylized model of subnationalgovernments that do not have access to the tax rateinstrument and thus have to use expenditures as apolicy variable the model implies an expendituresmoothing policy of subnational governments andcomplements the famous tax smoothing model theempirical section examines whether governments ofvarious ideology show significant differences infiscal stabilization policy our results indicatethat regional differences in public debt accumulationand public expenditure policy in general is largelydetermined by interregional differences in economicperformance whereas we do not find any significantimpact on the ideological composition of the laendergovernments

local political business cycles evidence from philippine municipalities abstract this paper establishes the existence of short term political business cycles in the philippines over the period 2003 2009 examining a balanced panel of 1143 municipalities shows that employment levels increase in the two pre electoral quarters and drop sharply in the two quarters following elections further results are consistent with the cycles being generated by incumbents attempts to increase their chances of re election cycles are stronger in sectors that incumbents are more able to influence and when they expect stronger electoral competition evidence suggests that these cycles are detrimental to development

the determinants of vote intentions in portugal this paper offers new insights on theinteractions between economics and politicsin portugal we use two unexplored datasets consisting of monthly polls on voteintentions for the main political partiesin portugal and responses to a consumersurvey containing a battery of questions oneconomic evaluations the analysis coversthe interval from 1986 to 2001 we findthat 1 right wing governments arepenalized for higher inflation while theleft wing ones are not 2 left winggovernments are more penalized forincreases in the unemployment rate 3 voters base their evaluations ofincumbents performances on perceptions ofpast and current economic conditions rather than on expected future economicoutcomes

political budget cycles in indonesia at the district level we find significant political budget cycles pbcs for indonesian districts only for direct not for indirect elections pbcs are significantly stronger if the incumbent runs for reelection they are well identified due to the exogenously different timing of elections

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

local government type and municipal bond ratings what s the relationship abstractthere is an extensive literature analysing the executive branch within local u s government jurisdictions this has largely revolved around the differences between elected mayors and appointed city managers much of the academic work has considered the potential efficiency gains that may be associated with either form of government and comparative analyses between the two however the empirical literature has been divided regarding the relative efficiency of either form this article attempts to add to that literature by considering how bond markets may perceive potential efficiencies that emerge from one executive type over the other by evaluating bond ratings for a sample of large municipal governments in the united states overall the results suggest that municipalities headed by a city manager are associated with increased bond ratings and thus lower borrowing costs which may lend support that this form of administration is on some margin relatively more efficient than others these re

the sign and size of option value we adapt the theoretical state preference model to value nonmarket public goods under individual uncertainty about use illustrating with an assessment of willingness to pay to prevent acid rain lake damage in the northeast united states individual

on compliance with the minimum wage law economic analyses of the effects of minimum wage laws usually assume implicitly that employers fully comply with such laws however in a recent article in this journal ashenfelter and smith 1979 hereafter as have shown that this is not the case using data collected from employees as estimate that for the united states in 1973 only 64 percent of the workers who would otherwise have earned less than the federal minimum wage actually received the minimum wage similar data collected from employers indicated a compliance rate of 77 percent the magnitude of these numbers clearly indicates the need for a better understanding of the factors influencing noncompliance with the federal minimum wage law ashenfelter and smith present a model which explains employers compliance behavior they conclude that the incentive to comply is lower a the lower is the market wage below the minimum wage and b the larger is the elasticity of demand for labor in absolute value p 336 they also argue that the requirement that a violating employer merely pay to employees a fraction of the difference between the minimum and the actual wage received does not constitute a penalty for noncompliance at all p 337 however by assuming that the amount of the penalty that employers pay if they do not comply is exogenously given as do not consider the employment effects of the minimum wage that is that noncomplying employers will have hired in general more workers than they would have if they had complied consequently the requirement that a noncomplying employer pay a fraction of the difference between the two wages to his employees constitutes a real penalty this note presents an alternative formulation of the model proposed by as which accounts for the fact that the penalty that the

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

two round elections one round determinants evidence from the french municipal elections using a new database of french municipalities that covers 821 towns and two elections 2001 and 2008 we examine how the budget structure degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent we take into account the institutional details of the two round structure of the electoral process created by french electoral rules dual ballot under plurality rules we show that in the first round of the electoral process spending on equipment including infrastructures can influence the voter and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent s score in the second round the incumbent s vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect we show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense the results suggest that the determinants of each round s outcome in a two round electoral process are different

electoral cycles in government employment evidence from us gubernatorial elections abstract incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards i investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment around us gubernatorial elections exploiting staggered gubernatorial election cycles across states i use both county fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference in gubernatorial election cycles consistent with manipulation state and local government employment per capita are higher leading up to elections afterwards employment abruptly returns to normal political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated including by election competitiveness term limits incumbent party affiliation and ideological alignment between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens differences across types of government employment and private sector employment are also explored

accountability and incentives of appointed and elected public officials political agency models suggest that elected public officials choose different policies than appointed officials do this paper is the first a to apply a clean empirical design to study whether t

regulator selection methods and electricity prices proponents of regulator change argue that elected utility commissions would perform better than appointed commissions but an unresolved issue is whether the method of regulator selection influences rate levels and rate structures this analysis presumes that regulators are more than mediators between producers and consumers i e that they act in their self interest to maximize their preference functions the authors hypothesize that directly elected regulators reflecting relatively higher voter input to regulatory decisionmaking permit lower electricity prices and that elected regulators will reflect strong opposition to rate increases economic analysis of the relevance of regulatory arrangement finds that this hypothesis is not valid although the direction in the movement of relative rates through time is consistent with their expectations 23 references 7 tables

electoral cycles in active labor market policies we examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote short term job creation such policies reduce measures of unemployment using german state data for the period 1985 to 2004 we show that election motivated politicians pushed job promotion schemes before elections

turning a blind eye costly enforcement credible commitment and minimum wage laws in many countries non compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread and authorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to a legislation that they have themselves passed but if enforcement is imperfect how effective can a minimum wage be and if non compliance is widespread why not revise the minimum wage this paper examines a minimum wage policy in a model with imperfect competition imperfect enforcement and imperfect commitment and argues that it is the combination of all three that produces results which are consistent with a wide range of stylized facts that would otherwise be difficult to explain within a single framework we demonstrate that turning a blind eye can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon with rational expectations subject to an ex post credibility constraint since credible enforcement requires in effect a credible promise to execute ex post a costly transfer of income from employers to workers a government with an objective function giving full weight to efficiency but none to distribution is shown paradoxically to be unable to credibly elicit efficiency improvements via a minimum wage reform

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

political budget cycles the case of the western german lander this paper focuses on the issue of the electoral andideological cycles in state government budget for the elevenwestern german lander we verify this hypothesis over theperiod 1974 1994 for the following budgetary variables totalexpenditures surplus deficit administration health care education roads and social security benefits while overallour results seem to show that generally the party variabledoes not play a systematic role in spending decisions theyprovide some support to the opportunistic cycle theory showingthat the only relevant phenomenon is the effect of theupcoming election on the government spending inclinations

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

the electoral dynamics of human development this paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980 2013 the incidence of partisan and political support effects is also taken into account a gmm estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development majority governments also influence it but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects the electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non oecd countries in countries with less frequent elections with lower levels of income and human development in presidential and non plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes they have also become more intense in this millennium

nonmarket strategy performance evidence from u s electric utilities this paper develops and tests a theory of the performance determinants of a firm s nonmarket strategy in shaping public policy outcomes building on the concept of political market attractiveness we argue that nonmarket performance is influenced by both the characteristics of a firm s regulatory and political environment especially rivalry among interest groups or politicians and by internal capabilities that enable a firm to mitigate political transaction costs using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by u s electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our approach

how do politicians save buffer stock management of unemployment insurance finance abstract we fit an empirical structural model of forward looking government savings behavior to data from the u s state unemployment insurance ui programs 1976 2008 states increase benefits or lower taxes when unemployment trust fund balances are high consistent with a desired target level of savings this can be explained by the representative state program behaving like a carroll 1992 buffer stock consumer who trades off a desire to expend savings impatience against the fear of running out of funds risk aversion we calibrate the model to the data and find that statistics from model simulations match similar statistics produced from the data for reasonable levels of risk aversion and impatience

political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election year recessions political budget cycles pbcs have been well documented in the literature albeit not for all circumstances however no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of pbcs the theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail re election chances this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than keynesian motives very robust evidence for this behaviour is found in portuguese municipalities in election years budget deficits go up even more and significantly so when a recession is expected

us presidential elections and real gdp growth 1961 2004 in this paper i show that since 1960 an electoral cycle in us output growth can both be seen by the naked eye in the raw data and confirmed by a statistical analysis that allows for rational partisan effects as well as a wide range of control variables that is controlling for multiple lags of interest rate changes inflation money growth energy prices lagged output growth government spending or its growth and temporary partisan effects the timing of elections exerts a significant influence on quarterly real gdp growth

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

rationality and the political business cycle the case of local government the empirical results which have been reported support the hypotheses implied by the model of rational political behavior set out in section 2 in pre election periods local government development expenditures deviate significantly from their normal levels the extent of deviation is approximately 20

regulator selection and endogenous systematic risk a major issue in the financial literature of regulated industries is whether the cost of capital is endogenous to the regulatory process cross spectral estimates of the market model are used to determine if the method of regulator selection contributes to either frequency dependence or phase shift lead lag in electric utility systematic risk it is determined here that electric utilities regulated by elected commissions experience frequency dependence in systematic risk this finding lends support to the assertion that the cost of capital is endogenous to the regulatory process

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

determinants of the assignment of eu funds to portuguese municipalities the paper examines the determinants of the assignment of eu funds to portuguese municipalities using a large and unexplored dataset covering all 278 mainland municipalities over 15 years empirical results reveal that besides normative objectives political motivations also influence the distribution of funds by the national government across municipalities grants to municipalities increase during local election years and more funds are transferred to municipalities where legislative elections have been closely contested and where the ruling national party had been supported by voters

budget institutions and political insulation why states adopt the item veto abstract forty three of the fifty states of the united states have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions in this paper i test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power using data from 1865 to 1994 i show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future liberal legislatures the results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas first by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions second it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily insulate policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power e g moe 1989 de figueiredo 2002

transparency political polarization and political budget cycles in oecd countries we investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance while some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies in contrast we show conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies using a sample of 19 oecd countries in the 1990s we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low er transparency countries while no such cycles can be observed in high er transparency countries furthermore we find in accordance with recent theory that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

is german domestic social policy politically controversial this paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using german data examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951 2007 period leftwing governments however spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after german reunification in 1990 since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon

regulated equity returns a puzzle abstract based on a database of u s electric utility rate cases spanning nearly four decades the returns on equity authorized by regulators have exhibited a large and growing premium over the riskless rate of return this growing premium does not appear to be explained by traditional asset pricing models often in direct contrast to regulators stated intent we suggest possible alternative explanations drawn from finance public policy public choice and the behavioral economics literature however absent some normative justification for this premium it would appear that regulators are authorizing excessive returns on equity to utility investors and that these excess returns translate into tangible profits for utility firms

on the economics of compliance with the minimum wage law this paper reexamines the issues of compliance with and enforcement of the minimum wage law recently addressed in this journal by ashenfelter and smith and by grenier pursuing a more rigorous methodology we are able to add new general conclusions and correct and reconcile some previous conflicting conclusions concerning the role of the disparity between the minimum and free market wages the level and elasticity of labor demand and the magnitude of deterring monetary sanctions on the noncompliance decision our formulation also addresses the law evasion reduced wages as well as the law avoidance modified employment aspects of the noncompliance decision which previous formulations have ignored

cost benefit analysis under uncertainty comment decision makers performing cost benefit analysis must often deal with the problem of how to aggregate the benefits across states of nature accruing from an uncertain public investment project option price and the expected value of consumer s surplus are two potential measures of these aggregate benefits 2 the expected value of surplus has been proposed because it is readily measured and because risk pooling paul samuelson william vickrey 1964 and risk spreading kenneth arrow and robert lind 1970 tend to encourage risk neutral behavior option price has been favored on the vague notion that people would be willing to pay something extra above expected surplus to preserve the opportunity to purchase a good burton weisbrod 1964 as daniel graham cogently argues in this review 1981 however option price is but one of an infinite number of contingent payment schemes the literature has provided no justification for focusing upon it as an ideal measure of benefits under individual risk graham further argues that policymakers ought to adopt the compensating contingent payment plan which maximizes expected revenue this maximum payment plan by definition is never less and will often exceed any other contingent payment scheme consequently graham argues that both the expected value of surplus and option price are underestimates of the true value of project benefits our purpose in this comment is twofold first we show the role of project and nonproject insurance in a model of individual risk and second we argue that option price not the maximum payment plan is the optimal rule when no fair insurance is available in section ii we show that if fair insurance is available against all risks all contingent payment plans yield identical revenue a similar result holds if insurance is available for nonproject risks and the effect of the project to an individual is small the arrow lind model in section iii we explore the case where either the project has a large uninsurable effect on the individual or there is no insurance against even nonproject risks we argue that the very phenomena moral hazard adverse selection and complexity that eliminate the market for private insurance also prevent the government from making otherwise desirable contingent payments if contingent payments are too costly the government s only remaining choice is to collect payments that are constant across states which makes option price the relevant measure of benefits

cost benefit analysis under uncertainty reply robert mendelsohn and william strang raise a number of issues which require clarification their misrepresentations of my results in several cases are easily corrected the analytical flaws in their own arguments are more difficult turning first to the issue of misrepresentations they incorrectly assert that i recommended the use of the maximum expected value of alternative contingent payment schemes as the measure of project benefits even a cursory reading of my introduction reveals that option price which does not maximize the expected value of revenue is the appropriate measure of benefit in situations involving similar individuals collective risk and certain costs despite their claims to the contrary i have not suggested that option price is an underestimate of the true value of project benefits option price is precisely the true value of project benefits in this case contradicting themselves in their first footnote they assert that i recommend the use of option price for cases involving certain costs and collective risks thus ignoring the crucial role of similar preferences other examples could be mentioned but it is perhaps sufficient to suggest that any reader wishing to know what i actually said would do well to review my paper the appropriate measure of benefits is the subject of the third section of my paper no mention is made in this general argument of expected value calculations similar preferences certain costs or any of the other special cases that are considered in the fourth section of my paper these special cases are exactly that situations in which the general answer because of the special circumstances takes a relatively simple form it is of course crucial not to forget the special circumstances when considering these results although mendelsohn and strang do not mention the distinction between collective and individual risks save for a passing reference in their first footnote this issue is central to the consideration of the appropriate measure of project benefits while the general procedure developed in my third section is compatible with any joint distribution of individual states option price measures the benefit to similar individuals of a project involving a collective risk when cost is certain expected value calculations on the other hand are only appropriate in situations involving individual risks these issues were examined in detail in my fourth section in dealing with the special case involving individual risks i argued that the magnitude of aggregate payments would be equal to the sum of the expected values of the individual payments with virtual certainty this was hardly a profound observation but it led to the result that if contingent payments are to be collected in such circumstances one should consider those payments that have the largest expected value since all contingent payment schemes including that associated with expected surplus involve the same difficulties of adverse selection moral hazard and so forth mendelsohn and strang in expressing the view that for the government to collect more revenue than the sum generated by the expected value of surplus the government must provide an additional service p 1098 fail to recognize that collecting the wrong contingent payments those associated with the surplus point involve the same difficulties as collecting the right contingent payments those associated with the fair bet point this mistake is not eliminated by their argument that when fair insurance is available the individual s willingness to pay locus becomes linear the presence of such a market makes it possible for an individual to trade a given payment liability in the market for contingent claims for another professor of economics duke university durham nc 27706

minimum wage noncompliance and the employment decision the employment effects of minimum wage noncompliance have been the focus of several theoretical contributions to the minimum wage literature the dominating conclusion being that the noncomplying employer while reducing employment below the free market level will still employ more labor than he would if complying allowing however for partial compliance this study applies a portfolio choice approach to the employer s problem concluding surprisingly that the minimum wage law may give rise to a full compliance employment effect even if it is partially evaded this result is further shown to hold with regard to labor market laws in general

it s not me it s you the functioning of wall street during the 2008 economic downturn public officials have blamed wall street and its complex financial products for causing the 2008 economic downturn this article addresses three popular claims saying that complex financial markets are at fault and need more regulation it argues that even in the midst of a major economic downturn the much maligned mortgage backed securities collateralized debt obligations credit default swaps and unregistered hedge funds functioned almost exactly as designed when macroeconomic conditions worsened firms and investors that were paid to assume certain risks had to assume them those that opted for safer investment vehicles with more levels of private protection faced fewer problems although many investment vehicles lost money one must differentiate between problems that manifested themselves in markets and problems with the market itself even though government policies caused many of the problems public officials always have an incentive to point the finger at wall street and to argue for more regulations when their policies negatively affect markets

explaining regulatory commission behavior in the electric utility industry a number of theoretical studies have examined regulated output price and regulatory lag as policy tools of regulatory commissions bailey and coleman argue that regulatory lag mitigates the averch johnson effect wendel uses a game theoretic model to show that regulators and firms strategies determine r and d expenditures and regulatory lag bailey argues that firms engage in r and d to earn excess profits because of regulatory lag which is set by regulators assuming cost plus regulation sweeney argues that increased regulatory lag can retard adoption of new technologies sappington presents a similar argument increasing lag induces waste bawa and sibley assume that regulators directly adjust price to affect rates of return and that regulatory lag is endogenously determined as a function of the difference between the actual and fair rate of return

election results and opportunistic policies a new test of the rational political business cycle model the literature on the rational pbc suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre election distortions in fiscal policy we propose a new test that explores the two way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory the test is implemented using a large panel of portuguese municipalities the results show that opportunism leads to a larger win margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win margin is small these results are consistent with the theoretical model

the impact of consumer advocates on regulatory policy in the electric utility sector we examine the effect of consumer advocate participation in administrative procedures on regulatory policy we use a unique panel database of rate reviews conducted for us electric utilities from 1980 to 2007 to assess how state consumer advocates affect public utility commission decisions on utilities allowed financial returns and rate structures we find first that utilities experience fewer rate reviews in states with consumer advocates consistent with utilities strategically postponing requests for rate increases second after controlling for observed and unobserved state characteristics we find that pucs in states with consumer advocates permit returns on equity that are on average 0 45 percentage points lower than states without advocates equivalent to a 7 9 million 3 7 reduction in average utility operating income all else equal third consumer advocates are associated with lower residential rates relative to other customer classes our findings provide statistical support for the thesis that institutionalizing interest group representation in administrative procedures is one way for legislatures indirectly to influence agency determined policies

candidate quality the personal vote and the incumbency advantage in congress most political observers agree that incumbent legislators have a considerable advantage over nonincumbents in modern congressional elections yet there is still disagreement over the exact source of this advantage and the explanation for its growth over time to address this debate we utilize a unique set of historical elections data to test for the presence of an incumbency advantage in late nineteenth century house elections 1872 1900 we find a modest direct effect of incumbency and a substantial candidate quality effect moreover the cartel like control of ballot access by nineteenth century political parties created competition in races that the modern market like system simply does not sustain our results suggest that candidate quality is a fundamental piece of the puzzle in understanding the historical development of the incumbency advantage in american politics

seeing the forest through the trees a meta analysis of political budget cycles despite a vast number of articles the political budget cycle literature contains many conflicting theories and empirical results i conduct the first ever meta analysis of this literature in order to establish whether a link between elections and government budgets exists using data on 1198 estimates across 88 studies published between 2000 and 2015 i find evidence of a statistically significant yet substantively small increase in government expenditures and public debt around elections and reductions in revenues and fiscal balance using meta regression analysis combined with bayesian model averaging i find support for some of the context conditional theories in the literature although the findings of political budget cycles are robust to publication bias as well as some of the methodological and study specific choices authors are forced to make they also shed light on how certain decisions may affect a study s findings this has implications for current and future research on political budget cycles

an empirical investigation of the strategic use of debt the paper examines the accumulation of debt by swedish local governments i find that right wing governments accumulate more debt when facing a higher probability of defeat whereas the opposite occurs for left wing governments these effects are sizable a right wing government increases its level of debt by 15 percent whereas a left wing government decreases its debt by 11 percent if they are both certain of being replaced as compared to when they are certain of remaining in office the results are consistent with the predictions from a strategic debt model developed by persson and svensson

the yield curve and the macro economy across time and frequencies this paper assesses the relation between the yield curve and the main macroeconomic variables in the u s between early 1960s and 2009 across time and frequencies using wavelet analyses the shape of the yield curve is modelled by latent factors corresponding to its level slope and curvature estimated by maximum likelihood with the kalman filter the macroeconomic variables measure economic activity unemployment inflation and the fed funds rate the cross wavelet tools employed coherency and phase difference the set of variables and the length of the sample allow for a thorough appraisal of the timevariation and structural breaks in the direction intensity synchronization and periodicity of the relation between the yield curve and the macro economy our evidence establishes a number of new stylized facts on the yield curve macro relation and sheds light on several results found in the literature which could not have been achieved with analyses conducted strictly in the time domain as most of the literature or purely in the frequency domain

option value an exposition and extension this article examines the role of the discount rate in making decisions that will have significant implications for the environment the authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting in general and by describing the main factors that determine

requiem for option value as freeman 1984 accurately notes a lot of ink has been spilled over the concept of option value during the last two decades graham in his seminal 1981 article outlined the specific conditions under which option price is and more significantly is not an appropriate and relevant measure of value under demand uncertainty while graham s article demonstrates that option value is relevant only under restrictive assumptions regarding preferences and the nature of the uncertainty both the tone and contents of recent articles on the

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

overlapping political budget cycles we advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches using municipal data we identify cycles independently for the two branches evaluate the effects of overlaps and account for general year effects we find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor in the case of coincident elections we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection to account for the potential endogeneity of that decision we apply an iv approach using age and pension eligibility rules

minimum wage legislation in a dual labor market the paper studies the equilibrium effects of minimum wage legislation in an economy with coexisting primary and secondary labor markets owing to difficulties in monitoring relative wages and the threat of job loss play a functional role in eliciting effort from primary sector workers minimum wage laws hence affect the primary wage and employment level even if the law only binds in the secondary labor market furthermore interaction between the two sectors can also alter the secondary outcome relative to the standard analysis and has implications for participation decisions and for the level of unemployment

the political economy of state level administrative procedure acts abstract one of the most important developments in theories of american bureaucracy has been the claim that organizational procedures that are enacted by public officials have a significant impact on the nature of both bureaucratic control and performance this development has been accompanied however by limited empirical investigation we address this gap by examining the conditions under which administrative procedure acts apas are adopted by the states in particular we test five hypotheses derived from the literature as to when a state level apa slapa will be adopted in general two conditions increase the likelihood that a slapa will be adopted 1 when democratic legislative supermajorities face a republican governor and 2 when democratic control is perceived to be temporary these results indicate that existing theories emphasizing agency and dynamic effects are empirically valid albeit with an important qualification there is a distinctive partisan bias in the usefulness of administra

revisiting the minimum wage employment debate throwing out the baby with the bathwater we revisit the minimum wage employment debate which is as old as the department of labor in particular we assess new studies claiming that the standard panel data approach used in much of the new minimum wage research is flawed because it fails to account for spatial heterogeneity these new studies use research designs intended to control for this heterogeneity and conclude that minimum wages in the united states have not reduced employment we explore the ability of these research designs to isolate reliable identifying information and test the untested assumptions in this new research about the construction of better control groups our evidence points to serious problems with these research designs we conclude that the evidence still shows that minimum wages pose a tradeoff of higher wages for some against job losses for others and that policymakers need to bear this tradeoff in mind when making decisions about increasing the minimum wage

are elections debt brakes evidence from french municipalities we show that voters are fiscal conservatives although in the long run only while the average over the mandate level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection pre election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection as the negative impact becomes larger as the debt level becomes higher it compensates for the short run effect elections thus appear as a disciplining device even if a weak one

are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition this presidential address assesses the crisis of the downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition based on a critical review of the literature and on the author s works on content analysis of policy speeches income redistribution politicians quality and political legislation cycles this address concludes that multidimensional downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

consumer capture of regulatory institutions the creation of public utility consumer advocates in the united states we examine the conditions under which state legislatures in the united states orga nized public utility consumers during the 1970s and 1980s by creating independent consumer advocates with resources and authority to intervene in public utility rate making procedures while economic factors notably utility fuel cost increases were important predictors state political conditions were estimated to have a larger impact on the probability of implemen tation we find that the pattern of adoption is consistent with the hypothesis that legislatures deploy institutions as a mechanism for insulating regulatory policies against future reform in general democrat controlled governments were significantly more likely to implement con sumer advocates when they were less certain about being re elected to office during this period we find also that the effect of political re election expectations was particularly acute for the creation of advocates representing solely residential consumers a relatively disorganized in terest group our results suggest that legislatures organize and publicly fund interest groups to protect supportive but vulnerable groups against adverse future political environments

evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector domestic workers in south africa what happens when a previously uncovered labor market is regulated we exploit the introduction of a minimum wage in south africa and variation in the intensity of this law to identify increases in wages for domestic workers and no statistically significant effects on employment on the intensive or extensive margins these large partial responses to the law are somewhat surprising given the lack of monitoring and enforcement in this informal sector we interpret these changes as evidence that strong external sanctions are not necessary for new labor legislation to have a significant impact on informal sectors of developing countries at least in the short run

lobbying and adjustment in declining industries abstract this paper explains the persistence of protection in terms of interaction between industry adjustment lobbying and the political response faced with a trade shock owners of industry specific factors can respond in two ways they can undertake costly adjustment or they can lobby politicians for trade protection and thereby mitigate the need for adjustment the choice will depend on the relative returns from adjusting relative to lobbying by introducing an explicit lobbying process it can be shown that the current level of protection is an increasing function of past protection and that declining industries contract more slowly over time the more responsive are politicians to lobbying in addition the model makes clear that the type of senescent industry collapse predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 is only possible under fairly special assumptions about the technology of lobbying

pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents despite the attention of scholars to that question the empirical results are mixed thus far the present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections i study the consequences of pork barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in slovakia between 2006 and 2018 finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection the same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years the effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are however moderated by municipal population more specifically a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas

regulator selection and financial performance for public utilities selection method and the returns experienced by common equity owners abstract this paper extends the work of others who have analysed the relationship between regulatory process and regulatory outcome and examines the hypothesis that there is a difference in regulatory treatment received by public utilities depending on whether their regulators are elected directly by the public or appointed the hypothesis of differential treatment is tested using the market based returns and risks realized by the utility s common stockholders the relevance of these measures is based on the premise that share prices incorporate all information about the future expected cash flows of the firm and thus reveal any perceived differences in the treatment received or expected to be received from the two subsets of regulators raw return and risk measures indicate higher returns and lower risks for equity owners of electric utilities regulated by appointed commissioners for the periods 1964 1968 and 1970 1979 the outcome was reversed for the period 1980 1984 with the equity owners of electric utilities regulated by elected commissioners earning higher returns than owners of firms regulated by appointed commissioners when standard statistical testswere applied the only significant differences in risk adjusted returns were those for 1964 1968 when the owners of firms under appointed commissioners earned higher risk adjusted returns than did owners of firms regulated by elected commissioners