assessing the fdic s premium and examination policies using soviet put options abstract the fdic s total liability for insuring a bank s deposits during a fixed period diminishes as the frequency of examinations increases since a marginally solvent bank can be closed while losses are small the paper develops a technique for pricing the insurance liability over a fixed period during which there are multiple examinations under current policy most banks are examined annually and reviewed every six months at which time the fees for insurance may be adjusted since the current schedule of fees allows only a narrow range and a few discrete levels the fdic typically retains some positive or negative residual liability in each six month period and for the entire year we show how to estimate this net liability the calculations of total and net liability are illustrated for a sample of large banks

a multiobjective approach to vendor selection abstract purchases from vendors involve significant costs for many firms decisions related to these purchases include the selection of vendors and the determination of order quantities to be placed with the selected vendors such decisions are frequently multiobjective in nature that is they are evaluated by more than one criterion at least 23 criteria for various vendor selection problems have been identified in this article we present a multiobjective approach to systematically analyze the inherent tradeoffs involved in multicriteria vendor selection problems the approach is motivated by and demonstrated with an actual purchasing problem facing a division of a fortune 500 company

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

ranking disclosure policies in all pay auctions in this paper we study information disclosure policies in all pay auctions with incomplete information two symmetric players have either high or low private value the contest organizer observes players values ex post and can commit ex ante to four different symmetric information policies exhaustively she can fully disclose or conceal the players types and she can disclose their types if and only if when both are high or if and only if when both are low we characterize the unique equilibriums and completely rank the four policies by various criteria we find the full concealment policy extracts highest aggregate expected effort followed by the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are high the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are low induces least aggregate expected effort players enjoy highest expected payoffs under the policy of disclosing types if and only if when both are low the other three policies yield the same expected payoffs to players in terms of prize allocation efficiency the full concealment policy is ranked highest and the full disclosure policy is ranked lowest in between the other two policies rankings depend on the probability of high type jel c72 d44 d82 d83 j48

the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

rent seeking contests with private values and resale this paper studies rent seeking contests with private values and resale possibilities with a stochastic success function the resulting possible inefficiency creates a motive for aftermarket trade players valuations are determined endogenously when there is an opportunity of resale we characterize symmetric equilibria we assume that the winner has full bargaining power but the results extend to other resale mechanisms we show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more social resource waste since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

the role of information revelation in elimination contests in this article we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two round elimination contests we establish that no symmetric separating equilib rium exists under the full revelation rule and find that the non existence result is very robust we then characterise a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players valuations are uniformly distributed we finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximising the total efforts from the contestants within our framework more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes contests are widely used by various organisations wishing to select the best person or the best team sports for example are undoubtedly always in the form of contests science contests in schools are another example we can consider a contest as an auction in which players compete for prizes by submitting bids these bids once submitted have to be paid regardless of winning or losing rd 2 in political competition e g for the us presidency candidates first spend resources to secure their party s nomi nation and later if they are nominated spend more resources to get elected and 3 science contests among university or high school students e g the mathematics olympiad

rent seeking contests with incomplete information we consider rent seeking contests with two players who each have private information about their own cost of effort we consider both discrete and continuous distributions of costs and give results for each case focusing on existence of equilibrium

alternative forms of deposit insurance pricing and bank incentive issues abstract this paper derives formulas for a deposit insuring agency s liability and hence a fair value deposit insurance premium and the equilibrium value of bank equity considering a wide variety of factors affecting individual bank risk both fixed rate and variable rate risk sensitive insurance systems are analyzed consideration is made as to whether the deposit insuring agency makes direct payments to depositors or arranges mergers following bank closings the effect of these various policy choices on banks incentive for risk taking is also analyzed

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

how to win the political contest a monopolist vs environmentalists this paper sheds light on the political economy of local energypolitics both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective first a case study of a small town in southern germany schonau is presented where environmentalists have won thepolitical contest against the regional energy monopolist and havefounded an energy supply firm themselves the different stagesof the political process are explained and analysed second apolitical economy model is developed where environmentalists anda monopolistic utility firm confront each other both on thepolitical and on the energy market in the lobbying equilibriumthe probability of the environmentalists winning the gamedepends on the monopoly rent and the perceived social costs ofenergy production it is shown that it is optimal for themonopolist to reduce his output below the monopolistic output finally the winning strategy in the schonau case is discussedin the light of the theoretical results of the paper

incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests abstract in a deterministic contest or all pay auction all rents are dissipated when information is complete and contestants are identical as one contestant becomes stronger that is values the prize more total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically thus asymmetry among contestants reduces competition and rent dissipation recently this result has been shown to hold for other non deterministic contest success functions as well thereby suggesting a certain robustness in this paper however the complete information assumption is shown to be crucial i examine a tractable incomplete information model for which the complete information model is a special case with incomplete information regardless of how little total expenditures in a deterministic two player contest increase when one contestant becomes marginally stronger starting from a symmetric contest in fact both contestants expend resources more aggressively with complete information neither of them do so thus there is a discontinuity in the information structure

an improved model for supplier selection under capacity constraint and multiple criteria abstract ghodsypour and o brien 2001 the total cost of logistics in supplier selection under conditions of multiple sourcing multiple criteria and capacity constraint international journal of production economics 73 1 15 27 study multiple sourcing problem with multiple criteria and capacitated suppliers considering the buyer s quality requirements as a constraint they develop a mixed integer non linear programming model to find the least cost cyclic ordering policy for the buyer they propose to solve the model by enumerating over all possible supplier combinations although the problem is interesting and their analysis is correct we point out two issues with their assumptions namely capacitated suppliers and cyclic ordering policy we discuss two different capacitated supplier settings i long run average annual capacity and ii exact annual capacity first under long run average annual capacity assumption we propose a model which provides the same or a better solution and is much easier to solve than their model then we discuss how to modify our and their models to handle exact annual capacity assumption

information sharing in private value lottery contest we investigate players incentives to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a rent seeking contest information sharing arises in equilibrium if types are concentrated enough whereas sharing information is strictly dominated if types are sufficiently dispersed

sent seeking with private values we study a rent seeking contest in which the players valuations of the prize are private information we determinea bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists although players are ex ante symmetric increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding lopsidedness increases as players values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases we also compare theprivate information contest to a related public informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge the contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two but risk averse sellers of theprize are not

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back

how to split the pie optimal rewards in dynamic multi battle competitions abstract multi battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life in this paper we examine the effort maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi battle competitions between two players the organizer has a fixed prize budget and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three battle contest a full spectrum of contest technologies in the tullock family is accommodated we find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology in particular when it is in the low range winner take all is optimal for the intermediate range as discriminatory power increases the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner take all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum discouragement effect for the high range a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum discouragement effect is essential for effort maximizing prize design in dynamic multi battle contests

linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules we propose the use of nitzan s 1991 sharing rule in collective contests as a tractable way of modelling individual contests this proposal i tractably introduces noise in tullock contests when no closed form solution in pure strategies exists ii satisfies the important property of homogeneity of degree zero iii can be effort or noise equivalent to a standard tullock contest

efficiency out of disorder contested ownership in incomplete contracts in many situations irreconcilable disagreements between players lead to costly ownership disputes over assets for example in case of joint ownership this article studies the role of such disputes in a situation where two players have to make a transaction specific investment and when contracts are incomplete i show that potentially contested ownership may mitigate the inefficiency of investments due to the incompleteness of contracts generating an exchange surplus that comes closer to the first best surplus as compared to any other ex ante distribution of ownership typically discussed in the literature following the influential work by grossman hart and moore if the contest is an all pay auction each player makes a transaction specific investment as if he or she owns the asset this article can explain why shared ownership as for example in equity joint ventures family firms start up partnerships and so on is an important part of today s corporate landscape

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

a classification of literature on determining the lot size under quantity discounts abstract determining a lot size in the presence of either all units or incremental discounts has represented one of major interests of materials managers it is a common practice that the suppliers offer quantity discount to entice the buyers to purchase more and to achieve economies of scale for transportation and processing costs this paper will classify the literature on lot sizing determination under several types of discount schemes and discuss some of the significant literature in this area over two decades also some future research areas have been identified

uniqueness of equilibrium in two player asymmetric tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power abstract this paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in tullock contests between two players with asymmetric valuations when the discriminatory power r is between 1 and 2 our result complements that of ewerhart 2017 in filling up the remaining gap in the literature on the uniqueness of equilibrium in two player asymmetric tullock contests

an evaluation of vendor selection models from a total cost of ownership perspective abstract many different vendor selection models have been published in the purchasing literature however there has been no systematic approach to compare the relative efficiency of the systems in this paper we propose to use the concept of total cost of ownership as a basis for comparing vendor selection models we illustrate the comparison with a real life data set of the purchasing problem of ball bearings at cockerill sambre a belgian multinational company in the steel industry from a total cost of ownership perspective mathematical programming models outperform rating models and multiple item models generate better results than single item models for this specific case study

the impact of managerial change on performance the role of team heterogeneity when a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents as a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change but only when the team is suciently homogenous otherwise a new manager quickly makes similar choices as the old one did we investigate this hypothesis using a large data set on coach dismissals in the german football league where the selection of players is indeed a key task of the coach indeed we nd substantial evidence that coach replacements enhance team performance only in homogenous teams moreover from a methodological point of view we argue that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession eects which might reconcile previous ndings of no or even negative eects with the vast number of dismissals

quitters never win the adverse incentive effects of competing with superstars internal competition may motivate worker effort yet the benefits of competition may depend critically on workers relative abilities large skill differences may reduce efforts i use panel data from professional golf tournaments and find that the presence of a superstar is associated with lower performance on average golfers first round scores are approximately 0 2 strokes worse when tiger woods participates relative to when woods is absent the overall tournament effect is 0 8 strokes the adverse superstar effect varies with the quality of woods s play there is no evidence that reduced performance is attributable to media attention intensity or risky strategy adoption

rent seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts the objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive tullock s standard rent seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts a positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest because a contender s private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent seeking model the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is a priori ambiguous it is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful excessive aggregate efforts

should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets in a complete information setting we show that the standard lottery in which each lottery ticket is offered for the same price is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way bettors value the prize and the public good provided with the lottery proceeds when participants are more homogeneous it is optimal to offer discounts for the purchase of multiple tickets

on disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry we study how a contest organizer who seeks to maximize participant effort should disclose the information on the actual number of contestants in an imperfectly discriminatory contest with stochastic entry when each potential contestant has a fixed probability of entering the contest the optimal disclosure policy depends crucially on the properties of the characteristic function h f f where f is the impact function the contest organizer prefers full disclosure full concealment if h is strictly concave strictly convex however the expected equilibrium effort is independent of the prevailing information disclosure policy if a linear h tullock contest applies

asymmetric rent seeking with more than two contestants this article considers a rent seeking model with n asymmetriccontestants each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent oneof the n contestants is selected as the winner based ontullock s probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale a pure strategy nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

the power of money wealth effects in contests abstract the relationship between wealth and power has long been debated nevertheless this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game in this paper we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game two opposing effects arise wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest we consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth our theoretical analysis shows that the effects of wealth are strongly contest dependent it thus does not support general claims that the rich lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur conflicts

disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry abstract this paper models research contests as an all pay auction with stochastic entry and analyzes the effect of disclosing the actual number of participants on the expected winning bid i find that the classic disclosure irrelevance principle on expected revenue does not extend to the ranking on expected winning bid the ranking on expected winning bid crucially depends on the number of potential bidders participation probabilities and the distribution of bidders valuations when there are more than two potential bidders fully concealing the actual number of participants elicits a higher expected winning bid if potential bidders have low participation probabilities whereas the rank reverses if bidders have high participation probabilities and high chances of being high types

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed

on the evolution of prize perceptions in contests abstract we apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players perceived prize valuations in contests evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize s material value and induce overexpenditure we establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and the behavior induced by evolutionarily stable preferences

an approximate solution to rent seeking contests with private information abstract we propose an approximate solution to rent seeking contests in which participants have heterogeneous and private valuations the procedure only requires common knowledge about the mean of the distribution of valuations we obtain a closed form expression for an agent s level of investment and subject it to comparative statics analysis we then assess the performance of the model and find that the proposed solution provides a remarkably effective approximation of the optimal solution for a wide range of parameter specifications

information disclosure in contests a bayesian persuasion approach we examine optimal information disclosure through bayesian persuasion in a two player contest one contestant s valuation is commonly known and the other s is his private information the contest organiser can precommit to a signal to influence the uninformed contestant s belief about the informed contestant we show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant s valuation follows a binary distribution it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure otherwise such a restriction causes loss of generality we propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal which yields explicit solutions in some situations

vendor selection with price breaks abstract we study the problem of vendor selection where a buyer must choose order quantities to place with vendors in a multiple sourcing network the selection process is influenced by the price delivery and quality objectives of the buyer as well as by the production or rationing constraints of the vendors vendors are assumed to offer price breaks which depend on the sizes of the order quantities each proce break schedule is characterized by two attributes it represents either quantity discounts or surcharges and is either cumulative all units or noncumulative incremental we present linear and mixed binary integer programming models that provide unifying frameworks for models of vendor performance measures from the purchasing literature and models of price breaks from the operations research literature we argue that our models offer viable approaches to vendor selection with price breaks because of the availability of commercial software packages for personal computers that provide flexible and efficient computational tools for solving the models this implies that vendor selection with price breaks can be performed at the fingertips of purchasing managers

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

would you trust lobbies we consider the regulatory problem to approve or to ban a new product technology in the context of scientific controversy about its detrimental environmental and or health effects we formalize the regulator s decision making process as a tullock contest towards a theory of the rent seeking society texas a m university press texas 1980 the contestants being an industrial lobby representing the economic agents who have developed the new product technology and an environmental lobby representing the economic agents who will be harmed by the product or technology assuming that the industrial lobby has private information about the unfavorable environmental and or health effects but can be held liable for damage ex post we derive the equilibrium properties of the contest in particular we derive conditions under which it is socially preferable for the regulator to decide according to the contest s outcome rather than according to an ex ante cost benefit analysis using his prior beliefs we find that the contest outperforms the ex ante cost benefit analysis only if the risk of judgment proofness is not too high

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

determination of paths to vendor market efficiency using parallel coordinates representation a negotiation tool for buyers abstract this study demonstrates the use of data envelopment analysis for measuring vendor performance and efficiency an algorithm by inselberg is employed for determining points of vendor efficiency on multiple criteria this study then demonstrates how parallel coordinates graphical representation can be used to display the efficiency of vendors on multiple criteria and in so doing visually identify benchmark values on these criteria for negotiating with inefficient vendors an example of a firm purchasing in a jit manufacturing environment is used to illustrate this approach the results of this approach point to its flexibility for use in vendor negotiations

deregulation and bank financial policy the standard view that banks can value maximize by exploiting non risk rated deposit insurance ignores the potential loss of a valuable bank charter due to insolvency recognition of this effect changes the bank s optimal financial policy and can induce extreme risk averting as well as risk taking behavior however as the value of the bank charter falls the risk taking strategy is more apt to dominate therefore current deregulation of the banking industry by easing entry and devaluing charters holds the potential for increases in the incidence of insolvency unless offsetting policies are instituted

a general analysis of rent seeking games in this paper we reconsider the basic model of efficient rent seeking we stress the importance of the shape of the players reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game we give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria moreover the possibility of preemption by a stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent seeking available to the agents

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

improving the efficiency of the purchasing process using total cost of ownership information the case of heating electrodes at cockerill sambre s a improving the efficiency of the purchasing process provides important opportunities to increase a firm s profitability in this paper we introduce a mathematical programming model that uses total cost of ownership information to simultaneously select suppliers and determine order quantities over a multi period time horizon the total cost of ownership quantifies all costs associated with the purchasing process and is based on the activities and cost drivers determined by an activity based costing system our approach is motivated by the purchasing problem of heating electrodes at cockerill sambre a belgian multinational steel producer in this case quality issues account for more than 70 of the total cost of ownership making the quality of a supplier a critical success factor in the supplier selection process

a simple approach to better deposit insurance pricing abstract we examine the ability of simple insurance pricing schedules to match premiums with the values derived from a contingent claim model of deposit insurance we use a quadratic loss function to compare a flat rate pricing system to alternative pricing schedules incorporating measures of risk a simple two bracket schedule that distinguishes between high and low capitalization is a substantial improvement a pricing schedule under which the rate paid by low capital banks depends on their degree of undercapitalization is better still in addition the gains from using market value measures of capital rather than book value are great

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

give peace a chance the effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace abstract we study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource war is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries under complete or asymmetric information when there is no pre established distribution of the resource among countries when there is such a distribution of the resource under complete information peace is feasible for some initial distributions of the resource whereas under asymmetric information there are two classes of equilibria peaceful equilibria in which peace has a positive probability and aggressive equilibria which assign probability one to war surprisingly a little asymmetric information may yield war

risk based capital adequacy standards for a sample of 43 major banks abstract the paper extends the option theoretic framework for the estimation of risk adjusted deposit premiums to the calculation of risk based capital adequacy standards based on market data for equity and the book value of debt the model solves for the market value of the capital infusion required to lower the implied deposit premium to acceptable levels of risk this capital infusion can then be translated into market value capital adequacy standards and book value capital asset ratios the determination of which is within the current statutory discretion of regulatory agencies the model is empirically applied to a sample of 43 major u s banks

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

contest design and heterogeneity i show that the effect of heterogeneity on contest investments depends on the structure of the competition which implies that heterogeneity matters for optimal contest design this insight helps to explain empirical evidence on the comparison of different contest structures

pricing options with extendible maturities analysis and applications many common types of financial contracts incorporate options with extendible maturities this paper derives closed form expressions for options that can be extended by the optionholder and presents a number of applications including the valuation of american options with stochastic dividends junk bonds and shared equity mortgages we also derive closed form expressions for writer extendible options and discuss the writer s economic incentives for extending an out of the money option we apply these results to show that corporate debtholders have a strong incentive to extend the maturity of defaulting debt if there are liquidation costs we model and solve the debtholders optimal extension problem and show that the possibility of an extension can induce shareholders in highly levered firms to accept negative npv projects many common types of financial contracts and contingent claims incorporate options with extendible maturities for example a growing number of firms in many cases firms involved in leveraged buyouts are issuing bonds with maturities that can be extended at the firm s option options on real estate often allow the optionholder to extend the expiration date by paying an additional fixed amount to the option writer corporate warrants frequently give the issuing firm the right to unilaterally extend the life of the warrants a right that is often exercised in general any financial contract that could involve a rescheduling of payments a renegotiation of terms an early call or exercise provision or some similar type of flexibility over the timing of cash flows could be viewed as including an option with an extendible maturity this paper derives valuation expressions for extendible options examines the analytical properties of these prices and presents a wide variety of applications and examples in this analysis we distinguish between options that can be extended by the optionholder and options that are extended by the option writer since they differ fundamentally in their pricing implications focusing on the

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

information sharing in a contest game with group identity abstract in this paper we study a private information contest game with two stages in stage 1 players simultaneously choose whether to announce their group identity and in stage 2 each player simultaneously plays a within group lottery contest and an across group contest players information sharing incentives are analyzed and all symmetric equilibria of the game are fully characterized our results show that 1 full disclosure by both types is always one of the equilibria 2 full concealment by both types can be supported as an equilibrium information strategy when the relative magnitude of high and low valuations is large and when such a relative magnitude is small there is an equilibrium in which the high type randomizes and the low type fully conceals

favoring the winner or loser in repeated contests should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player s effort by artificially boosting the underdog s chances we apply this type of handicapping to a two period repeated contest between employees in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first period in this setting employees are strategic and forward looking such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first period contest result on the second period contest and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly the manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy if employees abilities are sufficiently different favoring the first period loser in the second period increases the total effort over both periods however if abilities are sufficiently similar we find the opposite result occurs total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first period winner

a procurement decision support system in business volume discount environments emergence of a new discount pricing schedule called business volume discount becomes a major obstacle for procurement managers in finding the best purchasing strategy in the context of business volume discount a supplier offers discounts on total dollar amount of sales volume not on the quantity or variety of the products purchased from the supplier this paper describes a procurement decision support system pdss that has been successfully implemented to improve the purchasing activities of regional bell telephone companies in most purchasing operations a flexible procurement plan is considered a necessity because of the uncertainties associated with product demand and procurement budget pdss provides this flexibility by combining two different purchasing strategies purchasing on an annual commitment basis and on an as ordered basis although the development of the system is motivated by a particular application procurement of transmission plug in in one of the regional telephone companies the system is being used for a variety of procurement decisions involving business volume discount in the telecommunications industry the results of the implementation indicate that cost savings of up to 15 are achieved pdss use is not limited to the companies in the telecommunications industry the pdss model is applicable to any organization having a centralized procurement operation with business volume discount

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

stakes and welfare in rent seeking contests using a public policy application oftullock s two player rent seeking contest this paper focuses on the relationshipbetween the aggregate expected utility ofthe players and their asymmetricvaluations in our game these valuationsare the players payoffs in the twopossible states of nature namely theapproval and rejection of the proposedpublic policy our main result provides thecondition that ensures that the aggregateexpected payoff of the two contestants theinterest groups that compete on theapproval of the proposed policy is positively related to the valuationparameters

the optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry a bayesian persuasion perspective abstract following a bayesian persuasion approach we establish that full disclosure resp concealment is the contest organizer s effort maximizing policy for disclosing the number of actual contestants if the characteristic function of the imperfectly discriminatory contest technology is strictly concave resp convex

a multicriteria model for assigning new orders to service suppliers abstract this paper describes a multicriteria model developed to support decisions on the assignment of new orders to service suppliers in this case contractors for the construction or renewal of pipeline networks for gas distribution the model comprises two phases i computation of a quota expressed as a percentage of total work orders budget for each supplier ii assignment of each particular order to a supplier selected on the basis of a multi attribute preference index evaluated for each candidate contractor the first phase is executed at the beginning of each year and then reviewed quarterly and the quotas are defined by a two criteria model the prices quoted by the supplier for standard works and the past performance of the constructor given by a performance appraisal system the paper describes the structuring phase of the model as well as the descriptors and corresponding partial value functions used in each stage to perform the evaluation within an additive aggregation framework

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

market valuation of bank assets and deposit insurance in canada we examine a sample of canadian banks and use option pricing theory to infer the market value of a bank s assets from the observed market value and volatility of its equity we find that market value estimates are significantly different from corresponding book values these differences vary significantly across banks suggesting that market values provide bank specific information not found in book values we also derive that risk adjusted deposit insurance premia for these banks our results suggest that the current fixed rate deposit insurance premium system has resulted in significant

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40