the swedish unemployment experience abstract since the 1960s sweden has sustained a remarkably low unemployment rate while the average duration of unemployment spells has been increasing over time this pattern is reproduced in an equilibrium search model incorporating progressive income taxes generous unemployment compensation and a program for preventing unemployed workers from abusing the system our analysis raises concerns about how well the swedish system is equipped to handle the current situation of high unemployment

the long run effects of unemployment monitoring and work search programs experimental evidence from the united kingdom this article examines the long run effects of the restart unemployment program in the united kingdom the program aimed at the long term unemployed involved a combination of tighter monitoring of benefit eligibility rules and increased job search assistance we compare the employment behavior of a treatment group who participated in the scheme with that of a randomly chosen control group for whom participation was delayed while there is little evidence of a long term benefit for women the unemployment rate among males in the treatment group was six percentage points lower than that of the control group 5 years after the initial experiment

nonstationarity in job search theory generally structural job search models are taken to be stationary in this paper models are examined in which every exogenous variable can cause nonstationarity for instance because its value is dependent on unemployment duration a general differential equation that describes the evolution of the reservation wage over time is derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated that focuses on the consequences of a downward shift in the level of benefits it appears that the elasticity of duration with respect to the level of benefits after the shift is much larger than the elasticity with respect to the level before the shift this paper examines the movement of a job seeking individual s reservation wage over time in a general nonstationary job search model also results concerning comparative dynamics of the reservation wage and the distribution of the duration of unemployment are derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated the nonstationarity originates from the decrease in the level of benefits when unemployment duration equals two years from the results some detailed policy recommendations can be deduced as one is able to distinguish the effect of a change in the level of benefits in the first two years of unemployment from the effect of a change in the level after that period recently the use of job search models for the analysis of unemployment duration has become widespread the reduced form approach in empirical studies see e g lancaster 1979 in which only the hazard of the duration distribution is estimated is gradually being replaced by a more structural approach the latter way of modelling is characterized by the explicit use in empirical analysis of the reservation wage equation as stated by the theory e g yoon 1981 lancaster and chesher 1983 lynch 1983 narendranathan and nickell 1985 and van den berg 1988 use the complete theoretical framework of job search theory to make inferences about search behaviour however the structural models used in these studies are stationary this implies that variables like unemployment benefits or the rate of arrival of job offers are assumed to be constant over the spell of unemployment which is often at variance with reality what is more various reduced form empirical studies indicate a significant durationdependence of the re employment probability which is generally interpreted as evidence in favour of the presence of nonstationarity see e g blau and robins 1986 kooreman and ridder 1983 lancaster 1979 and narendranathan nickell and stern 1985 consequently there is a need to model reservation wage movements over time based on a nonstationary theoretical framework

optimal social insurance with endogenous health this thesis consists of four independent papers covering macroeconomic topics such as unemployment insurance retirement business cycles and disability insurance the unifying theme connecting all papers is the importance of health when addressing these issues the first paper derives the optimal insurance against unemployment and disability in a setting where individuals can determine the probability of becoming disabled by exerting prevention effort the second paper develops a life cycle model of labor supply and retirement to study the interactions between health and the labor supply behavior of older workers in particular disability insurance and retirement the third paper looks at the role of health in a business cycle framework here health is treated as an asset that generates time and utility the last paper derives a theoretical model of the application decision for disability benefits and proposes an empirical strategy for measuring screening stringency in the disability insurance program

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences with the standard non linear income taxation framework with heterogeneity of preferences in this paper the optimality of workfare as a screening tool is examined it is assumed that workfare does not serve as a human capital investment participation is mandatory and administrative costs are negligible imposing alternative cardinalizations on individuals utilities allows for the possibility that the government optimally redistributes income to or from high disutility of labour individuals under either case it is never optimal to impose workfare on these individuals it is also shown that non productive workfare can be an e cient policy tool in contrast to the results found in besley and coate 1995 brett 1998 and beaudry and blackorby 1997 jel classification h21 h23 optimalite du workfare en presence de preferences heterogenes l auteur examine l timalite du workfare en tant qu instrument de tamisage a l aide du cadre conceptuel traditionnel d imposition non lineaire des revenus en presence de preferences heterogenes on postule que le workfare n est pas un processus d investissement en capital humain que la participatioun est obligatoire et que les couts d administration sont negligeables quand on postule aussi des utilites cardinales differentes pour les individus il devient possible pour le gouvernement de redistribuer optimalement les revenus en faveur ou au detriment des individus pour qui le travail a une tres grande desutilite dans l un et l autre cas on montre que le workfare n est jamais une politique optimale on montre aussi que le workfare dans des activites non productives peut etre un instrument de politique publique e cient contrairement a ce qu a rment besley et coate 1995 brett 1998 et beaudry et blackorby 1997

experimental evidence on unemployment insurance work search policies this paper describes findings from an experimental evaluation of alternative work search policies in the unemployment insurance ui program we find that the no work search treatment significantly increased ui receipt relative to the standard work search approach by 3 3 weeks and 265 per claimant and that the treatment with the most intensive requirements reduced ui payments by one half of a week or 70 per claimant the results suggest that work search requirements reduce ui spells by increasing the nonmonetary costs of remaining on ui rather than enhancing job search abilities we also find little treatment effects for wages earnings or total income suggesting that an increase in the nonmonetary costs of continued ui receipt are associated with more intensive job search rather than a reduction in the reservation wage

commitment coordination failures and delayed reforms abstract economic reforms are often postponed even if they are clearly beneficial i argue that this may reflect a government s need to improve its reputation before it can enact a reform successfully i study a model in which the government has a commitment problem in setting taxes that pay for reform market expectations about future policy which determine investment become fundamental for the reform s success reform may be postponed as the government builds credibility with a period of low taxes depending on expectations better equilibria may exist the robustness of this explanation and its policy implications are discussed

punitive sanctions and the transition rate from welfare to work in the netherlands the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency if they do not then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed this article investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich register data on welfare recipients we find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work

lessons from the u s unemployment insurance experiments recent social experiments have evaluated two reforms of the unemployment insurance ui system reemployment bonuses and job search programs the bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the length of ui receipt and provide weak evidence that an earlier return to work does not decrease earnings the experiments do not show the favorability of a permanent bonus program as they ignore its effect on the number of the claimants the job search experiments test several more promising reforms nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce ui receipt and have favorable cost benefit analyses earnings often increase though the estimates are imprecise

the effects of changes of the job offer arrival rate on the duration of unemployment generally it is acknowledged that changing the job offer arrival rate has two opposite effects on unemployment duration for a basic job search model sufficient conditions on the wage offer distribution have been derived ensuring that one of the effects dominates however these are not satisfied for the popular families of wage offer distributions here i show that the conditions can be weakened at virtually no cost the set of distributions satisfying the new conditions is considerably larger than the set previously established in particular it includes all wage offer distribution families that are popular in structural empirical research

experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior this paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions the experimental set up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed the ex post effect and the threat of getting a benefit sanction imposed the ex ante effect we find that both effects matter moreover the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect benefits sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment

the effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment sanctions or punitive benefits reductions are increasingly used as a tool to enforce compliance of unemployment insurance claimants with search requirements this article analyses sanctions using a unique administrative data set of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the netherlands in 1992 after correction for selectivity in the imposition of sanctions we find that sanctions substantially raise individual re employment rates

assessing the effect of public policy on worker absenteeism we analyze the effect of economic incentives on worker absenteeism using panel data on work absence for 1990 and 1991 with a sample of 1 396 swedish blue collar workers during this period sweden implemented major reforms of both its national income replacement program for short term sickness and income taxes both affected the worker s cost of missing work our econometric model allows for state dependent dynamic behavior and control for unobserved heterogeneity the latter proves to be an important consideration we find that the cost of being absent significantly affects work absence behavior

the long term effects of job search requirements evidence from the uk jsa reform this paper investigates long term returns from unemployment compensation exploiting variation from the uk jsa reform of 1996 which implied a major increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle search theory predicts that such changes should raise the proportion of non claimant nonemployed with consequences on search effort and labor market attachment and lower the reservation wage of the unemployed with negative effects on post unemployment wages i test these ideas on longitudinal data from social security records llmdb using a difference in differences approach i find that individuals who start an unemployment spell soon after jsa introduction as opposed to six months earlier are 2 5 3 more likely to move from unemployment into incapacity benefits spells and 4 5 less likely to have positive earnings in the following year this latter employment effect only vanishes four years after the initial unemployment shock also annual earnings for the treated individuals are lower than for the non treated these results suggest that while tighter search requirements were successful in moving individuals off unemployment benefits they were not successful in moving them onto long lasting or better jobs with fairly long lasting unintended consequences on a number of labor market outcomes

job search requirements effort provision and labor market outcomes abstract how effective are effort targets this paper provides novel evidence on the effects of job search requirements on effort provision and labor market outcomes based on large scale register data we estimate the returns to required job search effort instrumenting individual requirements with caseworker stringency identification is ensured by the conditional random assignment of job seekers to caseworkers we find that the duration of un and non employment both decrease by 3 if the requirement increases by one monthly application when instrumenting actual applications with caseworker stringency an additionally provided monthly application decreases the length of spells by 4 in line with theory we further find that the effect of required effort decreases in the individual s voluntary effort finally the requirement level causes small negative effects on job stability reducing the duration of re employment spells by 0 3 per required application we find a zero effect on re employment wages

unemployment insurance and male unemployment duration in canada a model of unemployment duration is estimated with weekly micro data on canadian men entitlement provisions in the unemployment insurance program and demand conditions are found to have a significant effect on the probability of leaving unemployment the probability of a worker leaving unemployment declines with the duration of unemployment holding unemployment insurance entitlement constant when entitlement is allowed to vary the probability of leaving first falls and then generally rises with unemployment duration these results are robust with respect to allowing for person specific unobserved heterogeneity and alternative specifications of duration dependence

the impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment abstract this paper examines the impact of the potential duration of unemployment insurance ui benefits on unemployment in the united states first we use a large sample of household heads to examine differences in the unemployment spell distributions of ui recipients and nonrecipients sharp increases in the escape rate from unemployment both through recalls and new job acceptances are apparent for ui recipients around the time of benefits exhaustion such increases are not apparent at similar points of spell duration for nonrecipients second our analysis of accurate administrative data from 12 states indicates that a one week increase in potential benefit duration increases the average duration of the unemployment spells of ui recipients by 0 16 to 0 20 weeks

do benefit cuts boost job finding swedish evidence from the 1990s in june 1995 the swedish parliament decided to cut the replacement rate in unemployment insurance from 80 percent to 75 percent a change that took effect on january 1 1996 this paper examines h

how do unemployment insurance and recall expectations affect on the job search among workers who receive advance notice of layoff this paper explores how advance notice of layoffs recall rehiring expectations and unemployment insurance ui benefits affected on the job search among a random sample of arizona ui recipients in 1975 76 the analysis which includes extensive controls for the characteristics of workers and their jobs indicates that pre unemployment search increased with length of notice and decreased with expected recall also among workers not expecting recall pre unemployment search decreased with the level of ui benefits available after layoff the authors argue that improved experience rating would encourage firms to give employees advance notice when layoffs are imminent and re employment bonuses for workers with zero or short unemployment spells would encourage early search

unemployment duration unemployment benefits and labor market programs in sweden abstract standard search theory as well as some empirical evidence suggest that an unemployed individual s probability of entering employment increases as he approaches the time when unemployment benefits are due to expire this pattern may not carry over to a country like sweden where labor market programs are targeted at the long term unemployed at risk of benefit exhaustion the paper examines transitions out of unemployment using data on unemployed individuals in sweden a semi parametric competing risks model for transitions to employment labor market programs and non participation is estimated there is some evidence that the exit rate from unemployment to employment increases as benefit exhaustion is approached

unemployment human capital depreciation and unemployment insurance policy summary this paper presents a structural estimation of a life cycle model with unemployment risk the model allows for human capital depreciation during unemployment it is estimated using german and us household level data the data suggest that the adverse impact of unemployment on individual productivity is important in both countries but quantitatively more relevant in germany moreover simulations show that the combination of skill depreciation with the generous unemployment insurance system that was in place in germany until recently is a key factor in explaining the differences in labour market performance between these countries copyright 2012 john wiley sons ltd

the macroeconomics of populism in latin america by populism this paper refers to an economic approach that emphasizes growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and deficit finance external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive nonmarket policies it analyzes two instances of populism chile under allende and peru under garcia these experiences are described in detail not as a righteous assertion of conservative economics but as a warning that populist policies ultimately fail and always at a frightening cost to the groups they were supposed to benefit this paper explores the question of whether some variant of populist policies could succeed it suggests that populist policies could succeed if they stayed clear of foreign exchange constraints emphasized reactivation for a brief initial period and then shifted to growth policies most important expansionary policies must reflect awareness of capacity constraints and must rely for financing on an extremely orthodox fiscal policy and rigorous tax adminsitration the paper concludes by warning that imf style policies unconcerned with growth of social progress may establish financial stability in the short run but inevitably open the door to yet another round of destructive reaction in the form of populist policies

temporary disability and economic incentives we investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance tdi spells the analysis is based on a large quasi experiment taking place in norway involving a complete overhaul of the tdi benefit system our findings show that the labour supply of tdi claimants does respond to both the benefit level and the level of local labour demand the estimated elasticity of the transition rate to employment with respect to the benefit level is 0 33 we also find that the tdi benefit level significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programmes

the timing of multilateral lending bargaining over the terms of multilateral lending can be a prolonged process we model failure to come to quick agreement as a screening device policy makers who find conditionality especially costly delay to signal their type we show that increased costs to not reaching agreement whether borne by borrowers or lenders can increase the chances of delay the imf s high profile involvement in recent crises in asia and russia illustrates the way international lenders and borrower governments delay to extract concessions loans from the fund and other international lenders such as the world bank and the united states treasury are accompanied by detailed requirements for policy changes borrower countries bargain hard on the package of reform measures they are obliged to adopt and standoffs in negotiations are common an example is the negotiations between the fund and the indonesian government beginning in autumn 1997 the fund was critical of the indonesian authorities failure to carry out a series of detailed structural reforms and hostile to the suharto government s expressed intention to introduce a currency board as a banker commented the more you talk about a currency board the more you delay the debt restructuring agreement it was not until april 1998 that an agreement was reached indonesia gave up on the currency board and the imf conceded that the government could continue subsidising food and energy a problem with the use of strategic delay to extract concessions is that the backdrop to such negotiations is often a worsening economic situation postponing agreement can severely exacerbate the costs to both borrowers and lenders if it leads to high inflation a loss of confidence in the banking system political backlashes or contagion the recent confrontation between indonesia and the fund raised the prospect of a break off of negotiations the indonesian rupiah fell by 25 the jakarta stock market declined by 20 prices skyrocketed and civil unrest worsened in this paper we use bargaining theory to analyse the timing of loan agreements between international lenders and governments in times of possible crises and rising costs of postponement our model works as follows a country approaches international lenders for a loan the lenders want as much reform as possible they propose a programme yielding economic benefits to the country that requires some amount of reform as a condition the country may accept the programme in which case we suppose reform occurs or it may reject the package in which case the lenders may revise their proposal

the effects of the unemployment insurance payroll tax on wages employment claims and denials abstract following a 13 year period when all employers in washington paid the same unemployment insurance ui tax rate washington was forced to adopt an experience rated tax system in 1985 we use this natural experiment to explore both tax incidence and the effects of experience rating we find that industry average tax rates are largely passed on to workers through lower earnings however our estimates imply that a firm can shift much less of the difference between its tax rate and the industry average rate our results also indicate that experience rating reduces turnover and ui claims and increases claim denials

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

does job search monitoring intensity affect unemployment evidence from northern ireland because unemployment benefit reforms typically package together a number of changes few existing evaluations have been able to isolate the effects of changes in job search monitoring intensity on benefit recipient stocks or flows those few studies that do so draw mixed conclusions this paper provides new estimates of monitoring impacts by exploiting plausibly exogenous periods where search monitoring has been temporarily withdrawn with the regime otherwise unchanged during a series of benefit office refurbishments in northern ireland as we would expect from search theory withdrawal of monitoring significantly increases the stock of unemployment benefit recipients via reduced outflows

labor market effects of unemployment insurance design with the emergence of the great recession unemployment insurance ui is once again at the heart of the policy debate in this paper we review the recent theoretical and empirical evidence on the labor market effects of ui design we also discuss policy issues related to ui design including the structure of benefits the role of liquidity constraints and the pros and cons of a ui system in which the generosity of ui benefits is varying over the business cycle finally we identify potential areas of future research

the internationalisation of public welfare policy with increasing globalisation of knowledge there are increased opportunities to learn from the experience of policy interventions elsewhere this paper presents evidence on the extent of international convergence in public policy with particular focus on labour welfare savings and retirement policy questions addressed in this framework include to what extent is policy diffusion or convergence a real and relevant phenomenon what role have economists played in the transfer of policy across national domains has policy transfer led to better public policy are there any practical limitations to policy convergence

sargent wallace meets krugman flood garber or why sovereign debt swaps do not avert macroeconomic crises this paper argues that the frequent failure of the debt swaps follows from fundamental forces driven by the market s assessment of the scarcity of fiscal revenue relative to the demand for fiscal outlays as a country approaches the range of partial default swaps may not provide the expected breathing room and could even bring the crisis forward our methodology combines three independent themes exchange rate crises as the manifestation of excessive monetary injections the fiscal theory of inflation and sovereign debt the integrated framework derives devaluation and external debt repudiation as part of a public finance optimising problem

poincare s stabilization abstract the data and press commentaries studied in this paper call for a reinterpretation of the french inflationary crisis and its stabilization in 1926 in contrast with sargent s interpretation there is evidence that the budgetary situation was well in hand and that only fear of a capital levy made the public unwilling to buy government bonds as a result the government had to repay the bonds coming to maturity with monetary financing only when poincare introduced a bill to shift the tax burden off bondholders did the demand for government bonds recover and inflation stop

experimental evidence on the effects of early meetings and activation we analyze the effects of four randomized social experiments involving early and intensive active labour market policy conducted in denmark in 2008 the experiments entailed different combinations of early and intensive treatment in terms of meetings and active labour market programmes we find that frequent meetings between newly unemployed workers and case workers can increase employment rates over the next two years by up to 10 weeks the effects continue to grow over the whole 4 year horizon studied for men we find evidence of a threat effect of having to participate in early active labour market programmes while no such effect is found for women we conduct a cost benefit analysis of each ofthe four experiments and find that meetings yield the largest net benefits

workfare or welfare abstract social welfare and workfare programs are considered in the context of an optimal income tax model both regressively and progressively weighted utilitarian social welfare functions are considered optimal program design can entail individuals foregoing productive employment opportunities for progressive social welfare functions regressive social welfare functions lead to overemployment

public employment agencies and unemployment spells reconciling the experimental and nonexperimental evidence econometric evidence strongly suggests that unemployed job seekers who use the services of a public employment agency pea have longer unemployment spells than those choosing alternative search methods yet in some well designed u s experiments increased use of pea services has been associated with faster transitions intojobs the author argues that the nonexperimental studies may be biased toward finding a positive relationship between unemployment spell duration and pea use because they ignore the possibility that peas are chosen by manyjobseekers only after other search methods have been tried unsuccessfully and a period of unemployment has elapsed an analysis of u k survey data with information on the timing of pea use in 1987 88 supports that hypothesis

raiding opportunities and unemployment this article studies the impact of raiding opportunities in a labor market in which worker abilities differ recruiting firms can either raid an elsewhere employed worker of known ability by bidding up his wage or go through costly search to find a good worker among the unemployed in equilibrium all types of workers experience unemployment high ability workers involuntarily the raiding opportunities give rise to involuntary unemployment without changing the basic properties of the competitive model and thus suggest new implications of various institutional parameters on unemployment in particular unemployment compensation minimum wages wage taxation and search requirements

modelling the dependency between currency and debt crises an option based approach abstract the interrelation between currency and debt crises is considered in a model relying on option pricing theory by capturing uncertainty and time aspects in this stochastic and dynamic framework we analyze parameters that determine the probabilities and dependencies of these crises

is the threat of reemployment services more effective than the services themselves evidence from random assignment in the ui system we examine the effect of the worker profiling and reemployment services system this program profiles unemployment insurance ui claimants to determine their probability of benefit exhaustion and then provides mandatory employment and training services to claimants with high predicted probabilities using a unique experimental design we estimate that the program reduces mean weeks of ui benefit receipt by about 2 2 weeks reduces mean ui benefits received by about 143 ana increases subsequent earnings by over 1 050 most of the effect results from a sharp increase in early ui exits in the treatment group relative to the control group jel j650

unemployment insurance and involuntary unemployment the case of adverse selection abstract this paper studies the private and public provision of unemployment insurance in a model where equilibrium unemployment results from the use of the wage as a worker selection device it is shown that private provision will not occur essentially because those workers most desired by a firm place least value on such coverage respecting the same informational constraints public provision necessarily gives rise to some distortions in participation decisions but nonetheless is welfare improving in the aggregate

does the unemployment benefit institution affect the productivity of workers evidence from the field this paper studies the effects of unemployment benefit schemes on individual productivity we created employment and unemployment in the field and compared workers productivity under no unemployment benefits to productivity under two different unemployment schemes in one scheme the unemployed received an unconditional monetary transfer in the other the monetary transfer was obtained conditional on the unemployed spending some time on an ancillary activity our results challenge the standard economic theory prediction that unemployment benefits especially unconditional compensations hinder workers effort we find that workers employed under the unconditional scheme are more productive than workers under the conditional one and both schemes make workers more productive than having no unemployment benefit we discuss two possible explanations for our results based on reciprocity and differential psychological costs of unemployment across unemployment benefit schemes data as supplemental material

optimal firm size taxes and unemployment abstract we analyze a model similar to the standard implicit contracting framework but assume that the size of the firm the number of workers under contract is endogenous some well known predictions from contract theory with firm size fixed exogenously are reversed in particular a result obtained by feldstein concerning unemployment insurance does not hold when firm size is chosen optimally he concludes an increase in experience rating the extent to which firms pay for unemployment benefits through their taxes reduces unemployment while we show that it increases unemployment under reasonable conditions

the benefit of crises for economic reforms when expenditures consistently outrun revenue the resulting inflation may have the effect of convincing the public and government that taxes must be raised to finance public investment in the advanced industrial countries income taxation and big spurts in taxation generally have become possible only under the impact of major emergency and crisis mostly in wartime in a number of developing countries in

optimal unemployment insurance with human capital depreciation and duration dependence this paper studies the effect of human capital depreciation and duration dependence on the design of an optimal unemployment insurance ui scheme our results partially confirm those obtained in most previous studies benefits should decrease with unemployment duration the optimal program also generates two main novel features which are not present in stationary models first if human capital depreciates rapidly enough during unemployment ui transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient program second we study the optimality of imposing a history contingent wage tax after reemployment our numerical simulations based on the spanish and us economies show that the wage tax should decrease with the length of worker s previous unemployment spell and become a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers as a by product of our study we develop a systematic approach suitable for studying recursively a wide range of dynamic moral hazard problems and other models with similar characteristics

the theory of optimal law enforcement the economic literature on optimal law enforcement is very recent becker s seminal paper on crime and law enforcement dates from 1968 and most papers which are the focus of this survey have been published in the last ten years the core result presented by becker is the following the probability and the severity of punishment deter crime therefore the fine should be maximal since it is a costless transfer whereas the probability of detection and conviction is costly much of the recent work has attempted to show why becker s result may not hold

optimal unemployment insurance in search equilibrium should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline or increase over a worker s unemployment spell we examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment the model features worker firm bargaining over wages free entry of new jobs and endogenous search effort among the unemployed the main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the spell of unemployment numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system

should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell abstract in this paper we investigate whether unemployment benefits should decrease with the unemployment spell in a model where both job search intensity and wages are endogenous wages are set by collective agreements bargained by insiders it is shown that a more declining time sequence of unemployment benefits leads to wage increases when the tax rate is given such an effect may imply an increase in unemployment and counteracts the response of job search intensity that can be found in standard job search models with a given wage distribution calibration exercises suggest that it costs twice as much in terms of welfare loss for the long term unemployed workers to reduce the unemployment rate by 1 when wages are endogenous than in the standard job search model

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

estimating equilibrium effects of job search assistance identifying policy relevant treatment effects from randomized experiments requires the absence of spillovers between participants and nonparticipants sutva or variation in observed treatment levels we find that sutva is violated for a danish activation program for unemployed workers using a difference in differences model we show that nonparticipants in the experiment regions find jobs more slowly after the introduction of the program than workers

do when and where matter initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings this article investigates the long term effects on immigrant earnings and employment of labour market conditions encountered upon arrival we find that early earnings assimilation depends crucially on a favourable national labour market exposure to high local unemployment rates also affects individuals for at least ten years to handle the issue of selective migration we compare refugees entering sweden during a severe and unexpected recession to refugees arriving during a preceding economic boom the analysis of effects at the local level exploits a governmental refugee settlement policy to get exogenous variation in local labour market conditions

the timing of stabilizations abstract a unified framework is developed for examining stabilization from high inflation in a stochastic environment optimality conditions for the delay in the adoption of a stabilization program and its possible abandonment are derived and analyzed the anticipation of external aid is shown to reinforce delay in the implementation of a stabilization also conditionality agreements become necessary to ensure that the administration of external aid will increase the probability of success of the program the presence of speculative activity reinforces delay in the implementation of stabilizations and is found to necessitate otherwise unnecessary frontloading of adjustment

endogenous adverse selection and unemployment insurance in this paper we consider how the presence of private information may explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance in particular we show how the interaction of private information regarding employees preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the absence of private unemployment insurance we also reflect on the implications of our findings for the role of the public sector in providing unemployment insurance

job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard abstract we consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth constrained workers suffer from moral hazard specifically effort on the job is non contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract higher unemployment benefits affect the workers outside option the latter is improved for low skilled workers hence they receive a larger share of the surplus which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity effects are reversed for high skilled workers moreover raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase

unemployment duration and the restart effect some experimental evidence in this paper we analyse the effect of ihe restart programme in the united kingdom this programme consisis of an interview of tbe long term unemployed to counsel them on effective job search failure to attend the interview carries the threat of the cessation of unemployment benefits the results using experimental data indicate that the programme has a significant effect of reducing unemployment duration estimation of an independent competing risks model distinguishing between exits from unemployment to a job a training placement or to signing off unemployment benefit shows that the channels through which restart works differs according to exit type

unemployment insurance in theory and practice a hallmark of modern labor economics is the close interplay between the development of theory data sources and econometric testing the evolution of the economic analysis of unemployment insurance provides a good illustration new theoretical approaches in particular job search theory have inspired a large amount of empirical research some of it methodologically innovative and most of it highly relevant for economic policy the paper presents a broad survey and an assessment of the economic analysis of unemployment insurance as it has evolved since the 1970s

the equilibrium impact of unemployment insurance on unemployment evidence from a non linear policy rule abstract we estimate the macro effect of an increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance ui on unemployment in sweden using regional data the national ui benefit formula features a benefit ceiling and a statutory replacement rate and does not take regional wage differentials into account changes in the national rules are useful for identification since a change in the benefit ceiling for example has a greater impact on ui generosity in a high wage region than in a low wage region because a greater fraction of the workforce will be affected by the benefit ceiling in the high wage region we implement this identification strategy using data for the swedish municipalities over the time period 1992 2014 our estimates suggest that the macro elasticity of an increase in ui on unemployment is around 3 this is twice as large as the corresponding micro elasticity which we estimate to 1 4 1 5 using data from the same time period

optimal workfare with voluntary and involuntary unemployment this paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy we consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment job search behavior is unobservable which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance ui benefits intended for unemployed workers as a consequence pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment we show that requiring unproductive activities workfare in exchange for ui benefits may generate a pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers and we characterize the situations where this is the case

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

competition between employed and unemployed job applicants swedish evidence we use the swedish applicant database to investigate empirically whether being unemployed per se reduces the probability of getting contacted by a firm all searchers looking for a new job are invited to submit their personal details to this database over the internet since we have access to exactly the same information as the firms we can minimize the problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity our results show that an unemployed applicant faces a lower contact probability than an otherwise identical employed applicant thus supporting the notion that firms view employment status as a signal of productivity

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

job search requirements for unemployed at the end of working life effects on unemployment dynamics and self employment probabilities this paper investigates the extent to which job search requirements in unemployment insurance u i increase the probability of self employment as a retirement route for causal identification we apply a difference in differences approach using a dutch 2004 policy reform that introduced job search requirements in u i for persons aged 57 5 and older unemployment dynamics and self employment probabilities are studied using a dynamic multinomial logit model with unobserved heterogeneity the results suggest that job search requirements stimulated people to exit unemployment and discouraged older workers to enter unemployment the probability of self employment as an exit route to retirement increased relative to u i but not relative to paid employment

high public debt in currency crises fundamentals versus signaling effects abstract this paper examines how public debt government credibility and external circumstances affect the probability of currency devaluations in a three period open economy version of the barro and gordon j polit economy 91 1983 589 model nominal public debt links current to future policy actions resisting a crisis may either enhance or undermine the sustainability of the exchange rate regime depending on whether what matters is the government s reputation or fundamentals i e the level of the debt the focus is on the impact of public debt debt maturity and the government s credibility on the expected devaluation in the current and future periods we can thus identify the factors that affect the short term interest rate and the forward rate hence derive predictions about the level and the slope of the yield curve

political booms financial crises political booms measured by the rise in governments popularity predict financial crises above and beyond better known early warning indicators such as credit booms this predictive power howev

effects of unemployment insurance work search requirements the maryland experiment this paper describes findings from a 1994 experimental evaluation of alternative work search requirements in the unemployment insurance ui program requiring additional employer contacts or verification of contacts reduced ui receipt by one week and 115 per claimant because these additional requirements did not entail additional re employment services the ui spell reduction can be attributed to increased non monetary costs for remaining on ui a job search workshop requirement reduced ui receipt by half a week and 75 per claimant and additional results indicate that the effects were due to increased costs of continued ui receipt rather than to enhanced job search productivity these treatments did not affect employment or earnings implying that reduced ui duration led to more intensive job search rather than a reduction in the reservation wage in contrast elimination of the employer contact requirement increased ui receipt and post ui earnings suggesting that delayed exit from ui improved job matches he unemployment insurance ui program is designed to provide temporary income support to involuntarily unemployed individuals while they search for work although the ui program provides only temporary income support for the involuntarily unemployed it can reduce the incentive to seek employment because ui benefits reduce the cost of being unemployed resulting in an increase in the reservation wage and longer spells of unemployment to partially offset the negative impact ui benefits have onjob search state ui programs typically impose work search requirements for continued benefit receipt

unemployment insurance and unemployment spells this paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations the paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment however the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations and the level and length of benefits the semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics copyright 1990 by the econometric society

age effects in swedish local labor markets abstract the paper studies age structure effects on local labor market performance results show that young workers benefit from large youth cohorts and that a one standard deviation increase in the share of workers aged 50 60 years raises overall unemployment by 1 1 percentage points

inventories layoffs and the short run demand for labor this paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the short run employment layoff and inventory strategies of firms on average more than two thirds of all layoffs in american manufacturing end in a rehire by the employer of origin martin feldstein 1975 david lilien 1980 these temporary layoffs have recently accounted for about half of all ongoing employer initiated spells of unemployment in that sector see table 1 and have led to a revised interpretation both of the involuntary nature of these separations costas azariadis 1975 feldstein 1976 martin baily 1977 and of the durability of employment relationships evidently a significant proportion of unemployed workers know that the conditions that generated their separations are temporary and so they expect to be recalled within some reasonable time the point of departure for this paper is in interpreting these findings as evidence of a privately and socially efficient stock of excess capacity held against contingent future demands that is as an inventory of a productive input this view leads to empirically refutable hypotheses regarding both the role of temporary layoffs and the circumstances under which they will be important in particular both excess capacity idle resources and inventories are devices by which firms may economize on the costs of rapid adjustments when faced with unstable market conditions george stigler 1939 in such an environment the demands for layoffs and for other buffer stocks are jointly determined elements of long run technology the choice among alternative stocks will depend on relative profitabilities and firms may choose to hold stocks of inputs as a substitute for inventory accumulation especially if the costs of varying capacity or of storage are important this reasoning implies that i the structure of short run employment and layoff decisions will vary across firms and industries and ii differences in these structures will be systematically related to the role of inventories in firms dynamic strategies some perspective is warranted at least since charles holt et al 1960 economists have recognized the production smoothing role of inventories and the necessity of predicting future demand in making current decisions david belsley 1969 gerald childs 1967 michael ward 1978 similarly one of the contributions of recent work on implicit labor contracts is in viewing the exchange of labor services as a bilateral and durable commitment both these lines of analysis are concerned with the methods firms use to respond to fluctuating demand yet the underlying interrelated nature of employment and inventory decisions has rarely been recognized roger miller 1968 m ishaq nadiri and sherwin rosen 1973 r g crawford 1979 robert hall 1972 this paper aims to provide a framework for evaluating these decisions and in so doing to explain some interesting features of observed labor markets the notion of substitution between inventories of human and physical capital suggests a more disaggregated look at the data table 2 shows the importance of temporary layoffs in the distribution of unemployment among manufacturing industries it reports layoff and total unemployment rates for twelve representative industries over the period 197376 and average layoff rates and recall frequencies for 1958 76 among all 21 twodigit manufacturing industries the correlation between layoff and rehire rates is 6 and the table illustrates this evidently industries with larger than normal layoff rates also tend to have larger rehire frequencies from firm initiated spells of unemployment this university of chicago i am indebted to gary becker robert cotterman sherwin rosen jose scheinkman michael ward finis welch the managing editor and an anonymous referee for discussions and comments at various stages the usual disclaimer applies

optimal reform postponement abstract the postponement of a reform program recognized to be necessary to control inflation is examined as a decision in an optimal control framework with a deteriorating and increasingly costlier inflation it is found that reforms are both more likely to be implemented and more likely to fail as inflation rises factors suggesting improved future conditions for a reform such as the possibility of external aid induce further postponement indexation and any other measures that reduce the current costs of inaction have the same effect

the design of income maintenance programmes this paper provides a comprehensive treatment of a basic income maintenance problem for a group of individuals who differ in their income generating abilities it stresses the impact that imperfect information about such abilities has on programme design the analysis serves two purposes first we are able to unify the theoretical literature on the income maintenance problem second we examine the impact of allowing the government to impose workfare on recipients of income support in addition to being of policy interest this is a theoretically challenging problem since it requires solving a multi dimensional screening problem the solution that we find is strikingly simple it separates the poor into two categories with the lower income groups subject to workfare while facing a 100 marginal tax rate on earnings the second group does no public work and is offered a benefit schedule which taxes earnings at a lower rate

mobility costs frictional unemployment and efficiency with imperfect job information flows it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed with word of mouth communication this condition is derived given this condition steady state equilibrium is not efficient with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral in this way workers become more selective in the jobs they accept

optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions this article analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable we examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient we find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt

can helping the sick hurt the able incentives information and disruption in a welfare reform the uk jobcentre plus reform sharpened bureaucratic incentives to help disability benefit recipients relative to unemployment insurance recipients into jobs in the long run the policy raised exits off diasability benefits by 10 and left unemployment outflows roughly unchanged consistent with i beneficial effects of reorganising welfare offices for both groups and ii a shift in bureaucrats efforts towards getting disability benefit recipients into jobs relative to those on unemployment benefit the policy accounted for about 30 of the decline in the aggregate disability rolls between 2003 and 2008 in the short run however we detect a reduction in unemployment exits and no effect on disability exits suggesting important initial disruption effects from the big reorganisation this highlights the difficulty of welfare reform as policymakers may focus on the short run political costs rather than the long run economic benefits

structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring to evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers it is important to take account of post unemployment wages and job to job mobility we structurally estimate a model with search channels using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized the data include registers and survey data on search behavior we find that the opportunity to move to better paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment job mobility compensates for adverse long run effects of monitoring on wages we examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path

a review of richard layard stephen nickell and richard jackman s unemployment macroeconomic performance and the labour market unemployment macroeconomic performance and the labour market by richard layard stephen nickell and richard jackman oxford university press 2005 is the second edition of a book first published in 1991 the second edition is identical to the first except for a long introduction which reviews the conclusions of the first edition in the light of the following fifteen years i basically agree with the authors that the book s framework and conclusions have withstood the test of time very well i then assess progress since 1991 and point to a number of directions in which progress needs to be achieved

improving incentives in unemployment insurance a review of recent research abstract this paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance can be improved we are particularly concerned with three instruments i e the duration of benefit payments or more generally the time sequencing of benefits monitoring in conjunction with sanctions and workfare our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid a growing number of empirical studies including randomized experiments are in line with this conclusion

optimal unemployment insurance abstract we investigate the design of an optimal unemployment insurance program using an equilibrium search model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments there are three main conclusions first insurance considerations suggest that the potential duration of ul benefits would be unlimited under an optimal program second if the potential duration to benefits were unlimited current replacement rates in the u s about 0 5 would probably be about right third the optimal replacement rate rises as the potential duration of benefits is increasingly limited reaching 1 when the potential duration of benefits is limited to 32 weeks