testing for evidence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market a comment in 1994 puelz and snow presented empirical evidence of adverse selection in the market for automobile collision insurance using data from a private insurer they claimed to have found strong evidence of adverse selection in the insurer s portfolio their test was based on individuals choice of deductible in each risk class from the models of rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 it is well known that if residual adverse selection is present in some risk classes insurers will offer menus of contracts from which insureds will self select at equilibrium higher risk individuals will choose the smaller deductible and will be charged the higher price per unit of insurance dionne doherty and fombaron 2000 an empirical test of the theory is to verify in each risk class whether lower deductibles are chosen by insureds with higher accident proba

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

the economics of poverty traps and persistent poverty an asset based approach abstract longitudinal data on household living standards open the way to a deeper analysis of the nature and extent of poverty while a number of studies have exploited this type of data to distinguish transitory from more chronic forms of income or expenditure poverty this paper develops an asset based approach to poverty analysis that makes it possible to distinguish deep rooted persistent structural poverty from poverty that passes naturally with time due to systemic growth processes drawing on the economic theory of poverty traps and bifurcated accumulation strategies this paper briefly discusses some feasible estimation strategies for empirically identifying poverty traps and long term persistent structural poverty as well as relevant extensions of the popular foster greer thorbecke class of poverty measures the paper closes with reflections on how asset based poverty can be used to underwrite the design of persistent poverty reduction strategies

evaluation of the subjective probabilities of survival in the health and retirement study in the health and retirement study respondents were asked about the chances they would live to 75 or to 85 we analyze these responses to determine if they behave like probabilities of survival if their averages are close to average probabilities in the population and if they have correlations with other variables that are similar to correlations with actual mortality outcomes we find that generally they do behave like probabilities and that they do aggregate to population probabilities most remarkable however is that they covary with other variables in the same way actual outcomes vary with the variables for example respondents with higher socioeconomic status give higher probabilities of survival whereas respondents who smoke give lower probabilities we conclude that these measures of subjective probabilities have great potential use in models of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty

random choice and private information we consider an agent who chooses an option after receiving some private information this information however is unobserved by an analyst so from the latter s perspective choice is probabilistic or random we provide a theory in which information can be fully identified from random choice in addition the analyst can perform the following inferences even when information is unobservable 1 directly compute ex ante valuations of menus from random choice and vice versa 2 assess which agent has better information by using choice dispersion as a measure of informativeness 3 determine if the agent s beliefs about information are dynamically consistent and 4 test to see if these beliefs are well calibrated or rational

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

eliciting temptation and self control through menu choices a lab experiment unlike present biased individuals agents who suffer self control costs as in gul and pesendorfer 2001 may choose to restrict their choice set even when they expect to resist temptation to identify these self control types i design an experiment in which the temptation was to read a story during a tedious task the identification strategy relies on a two step procedure first i measure commitment demand by eliciting subjects preferences over menus that did or did not allow access to the story i then implement preferences using a random mechanism allowing to observe subjects who faced the choice yet preferred commitment a quarter to a third of subjects can be classified as self control types according to their menu preferences when confronted with the choice virtually all of them behaved as they anticipated and resisted temptation these findings suggest that policies restricting the availability of tempting options could have larger welfare benefits than predicted by standard models of present bias

expectations life expectancy and economic behavior this study analyzes responses to a questionnaire designed to elicit subjective expectations and probabilities of survival people do extrapolate past improvements in longevity when they determine their subjective horizons and they are fully aware of levels of and movements within todays life tables the subjective distribution has greater variance than its actuarial counterpart and the subjective variance decreases with age the implications of these findings for optimal social security for the construction of annuities for the analysis of savings behavior and for evaluating lifetime earnings are discussed the data were collected in the united states from a sample of 411 white male economists and a sample of 363 white males in a midwestern smsa excerpt

behavioural characterizations of naivete for time inconsistent preferences we propose non parametric definitions of absolute and comparative naivete these definitions leverage ex ante choice of menu to identify predictions of future behaviour and ex post random choices from menus to identify actual behaviour the main advantage of our definitions is their independence from any assumed functional form for the utility function representing behaviour an individual is sophisticated if she is indifferent ex ante between retaining the option to choose from a menu ex post or committing to her actual distribution of choices from that menu she is naive if she prefers the flexibility in the menu reflecting a mistaken belief that she will act more virtuously than she actually will we propose two definitions of comparative naivete and explore the restrictions implied by our definitions for several prominent models of time inconsistency

a testable theory of imperfect perception we provide a new characterization of bayesian expected utility maximization the novel feature of the model is our separation of actions from prizes the signature of the resulting theory is the impossibility of raising utility by switching wholesale from one action to another we provide applications to robustness to the recovery of utility from choice data and to model

monetary policy stock prices and consumption externalities abstract we study interest rate rules responding to stock prices in a sticky price sticky wage new keynesian framework subject to consumption externalities for given wage rigidity such rules are beneficial to equilibrium determinacy if households preferences feature sufficiently strong keeping up with the joneses externalities

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

are there gender differences in demand for index based livestock insurance abstractrisk management plays a role in avoiding and escaping chronic poverty throughout the world particularly for women who are disproportionately negatively affected by shocks using three years of household survey data administrative records and qualitative interviews this paper examines the relationship between gender and demand for index based livestock insurance ibli among pastoralists in southern ethiopia ibli appears to be equitably accessed by men and women alike and we find limited evidence of gender differentiated demand for ibli we also find only modest differences associated with age and share of income from livestock

advantageous selection in insurance markets this article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision risk tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk averse types taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients allowing a strict pareto gain this result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies as does the novel finding of a pure strategy partial pooling subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the insurance market copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

learning about monetary policy rules abstract we study macroeconomic systems with forward looking private sector agents and a monetary authority that is trying to control the economy through the use of a linear policy feedback rule we use stability under recursive learning a la evans and honkapohja learning and expectations in macroeconomics princeton university press princeton new jersey 2001 as a criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules in this context we find that considering learning can alter the evaluation of alternative policy rules

monetary policy and the financial sector in this paper we study whether central banks should react to financial sector variables in their policy rules we find that responding to asset prices does not affect the determinacy conditions however responding to entrepreneurial net worth increases the likelihood of determinacy

too certain to invest public safety nets and insurance markets in ethiopia researchers efforts to introduce index insurance in developing countries have met with little demand despite its great potential to help farmers mitigate economic risk i argue that researchers have overlooked institutional context s critical role in the formation of private markets when designing insurance contracts using micro level evidence from ethiopia i show that recipients of a preexisting effective large scale public safety net fail to take up a new highly subsidized private insurance offer government safety net programs can decrease demand for private index insurance forming an additional barrier to index insurance take up a direct implication of this research is that policymakers should design private and public insurance products that account for or even complement each other

determinacy stock market dynamics and monetary policy inertia we study equilibrium determinacy in a new keynesian model where the central bank responds to asset prices growth unlike taylor type rules that react to asset prices the proposed alternative does not harm dynamic stability and in certain cases promotes determinacy by inducing interest rate inertia

naive diversification strategies in defined contribution saving plans there is a worldwide trend toward defined contribution saving plans and growing interest in privatized social security plans in both environments individuals are given some responsibility to make their own asset allocation decisions raising concerns about how well they do at this task this paper investigates one aspect of the task namely diversification it is shown that some investors follow the 1 n strategy they divide their contributions evenly across the funds offered in the plan consistent with this naive notion of diversification it is found that the proportion invested in stocks depends strongly on the proportion of stock funds in the plan

determinacy learnability and monetary policy inertia we show how monetary policy inertia can help alleviate problems of indeterminacy and non existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly studied monetary policy rules we also find that inertia promotes learnability of equilibrium the context is a simple forward looking model of the macroeconomy widely used in the rapidly expanding literature in this area we conclude that this might be an important reason why central banks in the industrialized economies display considerable inertia when adjusting monetary policy in response to changing economic conditions

foundations for optimal inattention abstract this paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information an optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation net of a cognitive cost of attention the main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is the result of optimal inattention observing these choices permits unique identification of the agent s utility index the information to which she pays attention her attention cost and her prior whenever information is costly

private information and insurance rejections across a wide set of nongroup insurance markets applicants are rejected based on observable often high risk characteristics this paper argues that private information held by the potential applicant pool explains rejections i formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk i first derive a new no trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections i then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no trade condition can explain rejections the methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents beliefs i apply this approach to three nongroup markets long term care disability and life insurance consistent with the predictions of the theory in all three settings i find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected i find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance and i show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected the results suggest that private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets publication abstract

risk management in the cooperative contract agricultural cooperatives have long played an important role in helping their members manage risk yet the typical cooperative co op does a much better job of helping its members manage some sorts of risk than it does others in particular co ops are good at helping members manage marketing risk or idiosyncratic variation in prices observed within the course of a single season however agricultural cooperatives seem not to be particularly good at helping their members to manage production risk which involves variation in yield over the course of several years this paper argues that by taking advantage of the multi year nature of most members relationship with the cooperative the cooperative can also provide a useful though limited form of insurance against crop shortfalls agricultural producers face various sorts of risk some of these are difficult to manage using standard institutions agricultural cooperatives can play an important role in helping their members to manage these sources of risk for example marketing co ops traditionally help to reduce price risk by pooling sales across time and space and could reduce production risk by making some payments to members on the basis of predetermined shares rather than on actual delivery or patronage however just because a cooperative can help its members manage risk does not mean that membership in a cooperative will serve as a useful means for dealing with risk the details of a cooperative s by laws management of equity mechanisms governing the transfer of delivery rights methods of capitalization pooling rules and expansion options can all have a big impact on the usefulness of the cooperative structure as a risk management tool for users here we provide an enumeration of some different sorts of shocks which may be important to agricultural producers and then describe the manner in which a typical cooperative market pooling mechanism

should central banks respond to movements in asset prices in recent decades asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries in light of this experience how if at all should central bankers respond to asset price volatility we have addressed this issue in previous work bernanke and gertler 1999 the context of our earlier study was the relatively new but increasingly popular monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting see e g bernanke and frederic mishkin 1997 in an inflation targeting framework publicly announced medium term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run the inflation targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank s forecast of inflation to a first approximation once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations in use now for about a decade inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice however so far this approach has not often been stress tested by large swings in asset prices our earlier research employed simulations of a small calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation targeting policy defined as one in which the central bank s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation might fare in the face of a boom and bust cycle in asset prices we found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule in our simulations one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2 0 substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices intuitively inflation targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices in our view there are good reasons outside of our formal model to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices including the fact that as history has shown the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable hence we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast in the spirit of recent work on robust control the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst case discussants robert shiller yale university glenn rudebusch federal reserve bank of san francisco kenneth rogoff harvard university

evidence of demand for index insurance experimental games and commercial transactions in ethiopia abstractwe present results of experimental games with smallholder farmers in tigray ethiopia in 2010 in which participants in the games allocated money across risk management options one of the options was index insurance that was the same as commercial products sold locally participants exhibited clear preferences for insurance contracts with higher frequency payouts and for insurance over other risk management options including high interest savings the preference for higher frequency payouts is mirrored in commercial sales of the product with commercial purchasers paying substantially higher premiums than the minimal low frequency option available this combined evidence challenges claims that the very poor universally choose minimal index insurance coverage and supports concerns that demand may outpace supply of responsible insurance products

insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi this brief summarizes the insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi the farmers were offered loans for the november 2006 planting season does production risk suppress the demand for credit the author implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to adopt a new crop technology the study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in malawi where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall the author randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high yielding hybrid maize and groundnut seeds for planting in the november 2006 crop season the other half of farmers were offered a similar credit package but were also required to purchase at actuarially fair rates a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall surprisingly take up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan take up was 33 0 percent for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan there is suggestive evidence that reduced take up of the insured loan was due to farmers already having implicit insurance from the limited liability clause in the loan contract insured loan take up was positively correlated with farmer education income and wealth which may proxy for the individual s default costs by contrast take up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with these farmer characteristics

is there too much hype about index based agricultural insurance abstract individual crop insurance has been largely abandoned in developing countries and replaced by insurance pilots based on weather indices these pilot schemes have encountered low demand research suggests that better off farmers may already be insured via income diversification their assets and social networks and may achieve profit maximising portfolios without formal insurance contracts they would be interested in such contracts only if they reliably reduced their exposure to risk at lower costs than their self insurance mechanisms conversely poor farmers are not able to self insure adequately have to trade off returns for reduced risk and could therefore benefit from a well designed insurance but they are cash credit constrained and therefore cannot advance the money before sowing time to buy insurance that pays out only after the harvest index insurance therefore cannot be scaled up even if a few farmers purchase it governments still will need to run relief programmes for the un

utility risk and demand for incomplete insurance lab experiments with guatemalan cooperatives we play a series of incentivized laboratory games with risk exposed cooperative based coffee farmers in guatemala to understand the demand for index based rainfall insurance we show that insurance demand goes up as increasingly severe risk makes insurance payouts more partial payouts are smaller than losses but demand is ad versely effected by more complex risk structures in which payouts are probabilistic it is possible that a shock occurs with no payout we use numerical techniques to esti mate a flexible utility function for each player and consequently can put exact dollar values on the magnitude of the behavioral response triggered by probabilistic insur ance exploiting the group structure of the cooperative we investigate the possibility of using group loss adjustment to smooth idiosyncratic risk our results suggest that consumers value probabilistic insurance using a prospect style utility function that is concave both in probabilities and in income and that group insurance mechanisms are unlikely to solve the issues of low demand that have bedeviled index insurance markets

poverty risk aversion and path dependence in low income countries experimental evidence from ethiopia in most low income countries rural households depend on mixed rain fed agriculture livestock production which is very risky due to numerous market failures there are few ways to shift risks to third parties the literature has focused on what determines the responses of households in such environments of special concern are path dependencies in which households experiencing failure are prone to further failure and potential poverty traps this paper estimates levels and determinants of risk aversion in the highlands of ethiopia we find high risk aversion and evidence that constraints have important impacts on risk averting behavior with perhaps significant implications for long term poverty the results also suggest the possibility of path dependence and offer insights into links between risk aversion and poverty traps copyright 2009 oxford university press

group based funeral insurance in ethiopia and tanzania a funeral is a costly occasion this paper studies indigenous insurance institutions developed to cope with the high costs of funerals based on evidence from rural areas in tanzania and ethiopia these institutions are based on well defined rules and regulations often offering premium based insurance for funeral expenses increasingly they are also offering other forms of insurance and credit to cope with hardship the paper argues that the characteristics and inclusiveness of these institutions make them well placed as models to broaden insurance provision and other developmental activities in these communities the history of these institutions is characterised by a resistance to attempts of political capture and helps to understand their apparent resistance to engage more broadly with ngos and government agencies as a result any attempt to expand their activities will have to be done cautiously

evidence on adverse selection equilibrium signaling and cross subsidization in the insurance market the configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system using contractual data from a representative insurer we estimate a reduced form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage the data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks

the taylor rule and optimal monetary policy where it denotes the fed s operating target for the federal funds rate pt is the inflation rate measured by the gdp deflator yt is the log of real gdp and y t is the log of potential output identified empirically with a linear trend the rule has since been subject to considerable attention both as an account of actual policy in the united states and elsewhere and as a prescription for desirable policy taylor argues for the rule s normative significance both on the basis of simulations and on the ground that it describes u s policy in a period in which monetary policy is widely judged to have been unusually successful taylor 1999 suggesting that the rule is worth adopting as a principle of behavior here i wish to consider to what extent this prescription resembles the sort of policy that economic theory would recommend i consider the question in the context of a simple but widely used optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism which allows one to reach clear conclusions about economic welfare the model is highly stylized but incorporates important features of more realistic models and allows me to make several points that are of more general validity out of concern for the robustness of the conclusions reached the analysis here addresses only broad qualitative features of the taylor rule and attempts to identify features of a desirable policy rule that are likely to hold under a variety of model specifications

optimal interest rate smoothing this paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions it shows in the context of a simple model of optimizing private sector behaviour that assignment of an interest rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be desirable even when reduction of the magnitude of interest rate changes is not a social objective in itself this is because a response of policy to irrelevant lagged variables may be desirable owing to the way it steers private sector expectations of future policy

monetary policy and asset prices with belief driven fluctuations abstract we present a heterogeneous agents new keynesian model subject to a cost channel of monetary policy transmission constant turnover between long time traders and newcomers in market activities combined with restricted trading opportunities introduces a feedback from the stock market to real activity making stock prices non redundant for the business cycle we show that strict inflation targeting can lead to equilibrium indeterminacy even if the policy rule satisfies the taylor principle a belief driven shock to stock price generates relative volatilities of key financial variables which are very close to what is observed in u s data this result hints to the possibility that the financial instability witnessed since the mid to late 1990s was the result of waves of rational exuberance and pessimism in financial markets our analysis suggests that a mild response to stock prices in the central bank s policy rule can restore equilibrium determinacy and therefore rule out non fundamental volatility

preference for flexibility and random choice we study a two stage model where the agent has preferences over menus as in dekel lipman and rustichini 2001 in the first period and then makes random choices from menus as in gul and pesendorfer 2006 in the second period both preference for flexibility in the first period and strictly random choices in the second period can be respectively rationalized by subjective state spaces our main result characterizes the representation where the two state spaces align so the agent correctly anticipates her future choices the joint representation uniquely identifies probabilities over subjective states and magnitudes of utilities across states we also characterize when the agent completely overlooks some subjective states that realize at the point of choice

monetary policy and stock prices in an open economy this paper studies monetary policy in a two country perpetual youth model where agents can invest their wealth in both stock and bond markets in our economy the foreign country is financially dominant in the sense that it hosts the only active equity market where all agents also residents of the home country can trade stocks of listed foreign firms we show that contrary to what happens in a closed economy the central bank in the economy endowed with an active stock market should grant a dedicated response to movements in stock prices driven only by local productivity shocks moreover we show that the other central bank should also optimally respond to stock price movements in the other economy as they affect the budget constraint of domestic residents optimal monetary policy pursuing price stability requires dedicated response to stock price dynamics driven by productivity shocks in addition to what implied by the simple existence of the terms of trade channel of policy transmission determinacy of rational expectations equilibria and approximation of the optimal policy by simple monetary rules are also investigated

revealed preference rational inattention and costly information acquisition we develop a revealed preference test for optimal acquisition of costly information the test encompasses models of rational inattention sequential signal processing and search we provide limits on the extent to which attention costs can be recovered from choice data we experimentally elicit state dependent stochastic choice data of the form the tests require in simple cases tests con rm that subjects adjust their attention in response to incentives as the theory dictates

dynamic logit with choice aversion we characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets the discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a preference for flexibility in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu other cases display varying levels of choice aversion where the agent prefers to remove items from a menu if their ex ante value is below a threshold we show that higher choice aversion as measured by dislike of bigger menus also corresponds to an increased preference for putting off decisions as late as possible

optimal information disclosure a sender randomly draws a prospect characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver the receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and accepts the prospect if his bayesian inference about the prospect s relevance exceeds his opportunity cost the sender s profits are typically maximized by partial information disclosure whereby the receiver is induced to accept less relevant but more profitable prospects switches by pooling them with more relevant but less profitable ones baits extensions include maximizing a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus and allowing the sender to use monetary incentives

the demand for microinsurance a literature review summary microinsurance has recently received much attention as a promising tool to protect poor individuals from important shocks yet voluntary demand from people has been low shedding doubt on the viability of microinsurance as a useful risk management tool to better understand this puzzle this paper reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature on the demand for insurance while people s lack of understanding of insurance does seem to limit the demand for it several more fundamental factors such as price quality limited trust in the insurer and liquidity constraints also seem to have an important role in explaining the puzzle

dynamic inefficiencies in insurance markets evidence from long term care insurance we examine whether unregulated private insurance markets efficiently provide insurance against reclassification risk the risk of becoming a bad risk and facing higher premiums to do so we examine the ex post risk type of individuals who drop their long term care insurance contracts relative to those who are continually insured consistent with dynamic inefficiencies we find that individuals who drop coverage are of lower risk ex post than individuals who were otherwise equivalent at the time of purchase but who do not drop out of their contracts these findings suggest that dynamic market failures in private insurance markets can preclude the efficient provision of insurance against reclassification risk this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

intrinsic variability in group and individual decision making the paper examines the random preference model which can explain inherent variability of preferences in managerial and individual decision making and provides axiomatizations for the utility components of two such models differentiated by the structure of core preferences expected utility eu and betweenness like preferences we then examine the possibility of violations of weak stochastic transitivity for these models and for a model with core dual eu preferences such violations correspond to the existence of condorcet cycles and therefore the analysis has implications for managerial decision making and for majority rule voting the paper also investigates implications of its findings for two popular experimental settings this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

how might climate change influence farmers demand for index based insurance the low observed uptake of non subsidised index based insurance policies in developing countries has been puzzling researchers for about a decade this paper analyses the role of drought frequency in farmers demand for index based insurance in developing countries while it is typically assumed that an increase in exposure to risk would result in higher demand for index insurance this paper finds the opposite an increase in drought frequency may result in lower demand for index insurance under fairly standard conditions in an expected utility model we show that the demand for insurance is an inverted u function of drought frequency we further show that downside basis risk decreases insurance demand under frequent drought conditions it implies that insurance against similar but more frequent events cannot meet large demand from farmers to check the empirical relevance of these effects we conduct an insurance field experiment in burkina faso with 205 farmers we analyse insurance demand for different drought frequencies different levels of basis risks and different loading factors through incentivised lottery choices this analysis confirms that for higher drought frequencies insurance demand is lower insurance demand also decreases with basis risk and the loading factor

intrinsic preference for information abstract suppose agents value information not only to make contingent plans but also intrinsically how are such attitudes toward information related to attitudes toward risk we generalize the kreps porteus recursive expected utility model dropping both recursivity and expected utility there is a geometric analogy between risk and information we characterize intrinsic information loving in general by a substitution property analogous to multivariate risk loving and for smooth preferences by the convexity of gateaux derivatives even with recursivity preference for information does not imply expected utility we provide an example we examine connections between information loving and risk aversion for early and late resolving risks journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d80 d81

do rural banks matter evidence from the indian social banking experiment lack of access to finance is often cited as a key reason why poor people remain poor this paper uses data on the indian rural branch expansion program to provide empirial evidence on this issue between 1977 and 1990 the indian central bank mandated that a commercial bank can open a branch in a location with one or more bank branches only if it opens four in locations with no bank branches we show that between 1977 and 1990 this rule caused banks to open relatively more rural branches in indian states with lower initial financial development the reverse is true outside this period we exploit this fact to identify the impact of opening a rural bank on poverty and output our estimates suggest that the indian rural branch expansion program significantly lowered rural poverty and increased non agricultural output

competitive insurance markets with two unobservables i study a screening game in a competitive insurance market in which insurance customers differ with respect to both accident probability and degree of risk aversion it is shown that indifference curves of customers may cross twice thus the single crossing property does not hold when differences in risk aversion are sufficiently large firms cannot use policy deductibles to screen high risk customers types may be pooled in equilibrium or are separated by raising premiums above actuarially fair levels this leads to excessive entry of firms in equilibrium