micro data heterogeneity and the evaluation of public policy nobel lecture this paper summarizes the contributions of microeconometrics to economic knowledge four main themes are developed 1 microeconometricians developed new tools to respond to econometric problems raised by the analysis of the new sources of micro data produced after the second world war 2 microeconometrics improved on aggregate time series methods by building models that linked economic models for individuals to data on individual behavior 3 an important empirical regularity detected by the field is the diversity and heterogeneity of behavior this heterogeneity has profound consequences for economic theory and for econometric practice 4 microeconometrics has contributed substantially to the scientific evaluation of public policy

forms of trust and conditions for their stability of the three principal approaches to trust we decided to investigate in greater detail the one in which trust is regarded as a belief that the individuals involved hold about a relationship trust was defined as a delegatory relationship based on anticipation of the delegatee s behaviour we reached four main conclusions first the solution to the problem posed by the indeterminacy of trust lies in the differentiation and hierarchisation of the various forms of trust contractual organisational and tacit on the basis of their degree of irreversibility and stability second contractual trust is unstable because it comes up against the problem of guarantees of individual intentions this leads to the third conclusion rational evaluation by individuals cannot by itself establish trust which is based on collective beliefs practices and rules fourth we identified two conditions for the stability of trust the creation of irreversibilities through adherence to a rule and the creation of a confidence interval within which different interpretations of contradictory individual strategies are tolerated thus the viability of the various forms of trust depends on the ability of institutions and organisations to create rules that are likely when applied to produce an interval in which tolerance of mutual intentions is the norm these analyses of trust hence highlight the role of time and period of time in the notion of trust

macroeconomics after the crisis time to deal with the pretense of knowledge syndrome the recent financial crisis has damaged the reputation of macroeconomics largely for its inability to predict the impending financial and economic crisis to be honest this inability to predict does not concern me much it is almost tautological that severe crises are essentially unpredictable for otherwise they would not cause such a high degree of distress what does concern me about my discipline is that its current core by which i mainly mean the so called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach has become so mesmerized with its own internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world with the precision that it has about the real one this is dangerous for both methodological and policy reasons to be fair to our field an enormous amount of work at the intersection of macroeconomics and corporate finance has been chasing many of the issues that played a central role during the current crisis including liquidity evaporation collateral shortages bubbles crises panics fire sales risk shifting contagion and the like however much of this literature belongs to the periphery of macroeconomics rather than to its core i will discuss the distinction between the core and the periphery of macroeconomics as well as the futile nature of the integrationist movement that is the process of gradually bringing the insights of the periphery into the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium structure i argue that the complexity of macroeconomic interactions limits the knowledge we can ever attain and that we need to place this fact at the center of our analysis we should consider what this complexity does to the actions and reactions of the economic agent and seek analytical tools and macroeconomic policies that are robust to the enormous uncertainty to which we are confined

special remedies for special causes involuntary unemployment in keynes political writings this paper analyses the proposals keynes made in his political writings regarding unemployment extending arguments made in the general theory the first issue is the relevance of voluntary unemployment to an understanding of keynes views on structural unemployment the second issue is the connection between on the one hand keynes argument in favour of public works state planning and more generally the socialisation of investment and on the other the analysis of involuntary unemployment made in the general theory emphasis is placed on long term pessimistic expectations and on the market valuation of capital assets copyright the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

horizontalism a critique this article offers a critique of the horizontalist view of money that banks are passive in the face of credit demand it is argued that banks liquidity preference influences their responsiveness to the demand for credit their liquidity preference is expressed in risk assessment understood in terms of john maynard keynes s theory of uncertainty it is argued that rationing in the sense of adverse changes in risk assessment occurs systematically in the downturn of the business cycle systematic rationing also occurs with respect to particular classes of borrowers the focus here is on the case of small firms c 1996 academic press limited copyright 1996 by oxford university press

measuring the effects of regulation with stock price data this article examines the usefulness of stock returns in measuring the effects of regulation when the dates on which market expectations change are not known and standard sources e g the wall street journal are used to choose announcement dates twenty major changes in regulatory constraint since 1887 are considered tests using either monthly or daily data are found to have surprisingly little ability to detect the effects of regulation the evidence shows that formal regulatory announcements are generally anticipated in cases where it is unclear when expectations change

hedonic price indexes for spreadsheets and an empirical test for network externalities in this article i first estimate hedonic price equations for computer spreadsheet programs and then use the analysis to empirically test whether network externalities exist in this industry the study shows that consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for spreadsheets that are compatible with the lotus platform and for spreadsheets that offer links to external databases and a similar premium for spreadsheets that offer local area network externalities finally the quality adjusted real price of computer spreadsheets declined by approximately 15 per year from 1986 to 1991

dynamic competition with network externalities why history matters we consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network exter nalities a platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes focal in the current period in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists yet when faced with higher quality competition can a low quality platform remain focal in the finite horizon case the unique equilibrium is efficient for patient platforms with an infinite time horizon however there are multiple equilibria where either the lowor high quality platform dominates if qualities are stochastic the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability even when its realized quality is lower and this probability increases as platforms become more patient hence social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking

privatization in eastern europe irreversibility and critical mass effects abstract this paper proposes a model to shed light on two important policy features of privatization in central and eastern europe the idea of a necessary critical mass of privatization on one hand and the great difficulties encountered in the actual privatization process on the other the model incorporates a positive externality related to the size of the private sector multiple equilibria may arise for political and economic reasons policies of free distribution are analysed with the model they may eliminate the danger of policy reversals due to excess unemployment but may at the same time increase the relative cost of restructuring leading in some cases to pareto inferior outcomes

do bad bidders become good targets this paper empirically examines one motive for takeovers to change control of firms that make acquisitions that diminish the value of their equity firms that subsequently become takeover targets make acquisitions that significantly reduce their equity value and firms that do not become takeover targets make acquisitions that raise their equity value within the sample of acquisition by targets the acquisitions that reduce equity value the most are those that are later divested either in bust up takeovers or restructuring programs to thwart the takeover this evidence is consistent with theories advanced by marris manne and jensen concerning the disciplinary role played by takeovers

antitrust policy and mergers the wealth effect of supreme court decisions many believe that antitrust policy has had a dramatic impact on merger strategies in the united states for this to be true enforcement of antitrust laws must affect a wide range of firms not just those firms whose mergers are contested this study tests whether or not firms engaged in uncontested mergers are affected by antitrust enforcement as signalled by supreme court decisions using event study methodology we find that antitrust policy against mergers was binding during the 1960s and 1970s as it ulowered the value of targets in ucontested ongoing mergers

competing technologies the learning curve and rational expectations abstract the problem of choice between several variants of a technology subject to dynamic learning economies is examined in a rational expectations model with overlapping adopters it is shown that even with rational expectations the long term market outcome depends sensitively on the pattern of early chance events and that only one variant of the technology will come to dominate the market in the long run this variant need not be the one which is socially optimal or most promising technically

complexity and empirical economics this article explores the state of interplay between recent efforts to introduce complex systems methods into economics and the understanding of empirical phenomena the empirical side of economic complexity may be divided into three general branches historical studies the identification of power and scaling laws and analyses of social interactions i argue that while providing useful stylised facts none of these empirical approaches has produced compelling evidence that economic contexts exhibit the substantive microstructure or properties of complex systems this failure reflects inadequate attention to identification problems identification analysis should therefore be at the centre of future work on the empirics of complexity

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

platform selection in the lab abstract emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games these games converge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions we replicate the remarkable results of hossain and morgan 2009 in which such a game tips almost perfectly to the superior platform next we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly innocent increases in out of equilibrium payoffs are introduced the inflated payoffs keep the best reply structure unchanged and do not influence players security levels our design allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance we find that equilibrium selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is consistent with non rational learning furthermore and contrary to the literature we find that efficiency suffers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly

scaling in economics a reader s guide this paper discusses examples of scaling laws in economics and finance it argues that these regularities in data are useful for disciplining theory formation estimation of the conditional predictive distribution and estimation of impulse response functions is a main goal of econometric work scaling type regularities give useful information on the underlying data generating process the ability of scaling laws to suggest lines of potentially fruitful research was illustrated by the suggestion of several speculative research projects in this paper most importantly the paper stresses the challenges that face empirical and theoretical researchers who wish to make use of scaling law type regularities to improve econometric identification of the underlying causal data generating mechanism copyright 1999 by oxford university press

discrete choice with social interactions this paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects we study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking laws of large numbers are generated in such environments multiplicity of equilibria in these models which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self consistent means for average choice behaviour will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied the properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices finally a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

the costs of antimerger lawsuits abstract this paper presents tests of the hypothesis that the relief imposed in antimerger cases is costly for defendant firms stockholders previous research on this subject suggests that defendants case related losses are due entirely to legal expenses and the disruption of productive activity in this paper it is shown that two out of five portfolios of defendant firms earn abnormal losses when final decisions in antimerger cases are announced these losses are consistent with the imposition of costly constraints on some defendants by government antitrust enforcers the tests also show that when acquisitions are canceled following antimerger complaints the losses to the target firms are substantial and completely offset the gains generated when the acquisitions are proposed

zipf s law for cities an explanation zipf s law is a very tight constraint on the class of admissible models of local growth it says that for most countries the size distribution of cities strikingly fits a power law the number of cities with populations greater than s is proportional to 1 s suppose that at least in the upper tail all cities follow some proportional growth process this appears to be verified empirically this automatically leads their distribution to converge to zipf s law

network effects and welfare cultures we empirically examine the role of social networks in welfare participation using data on language spoken at home to better infer networks within an area our empirical strategy asks whether being surrounded by others who speak the same language increases welfare use more for those from high welfare using language groups this methodology allows us to include local area and language group fixed effects and to control for the direct effect of being surrounded by one s language group these controls eliminate many of the problems in previous studies the results strongly confirm the importance of networks in welfare participation

keynes s theory of liquidity preference and his debt management and monetary policies this paper seeks to bolster the view that keynes was a monetary economist concerned primarily with monetary and not fiscal policy his most fundamental policy conclusion for national economies was that the authorities could control the long term rate of interest and should do so to promote investment growth and employment keynes s theory of liquidity preference is presented as a theory of money as a store of value that leads to this fundamental policy conclusion the theory is then applied to explain the debt management monetary and international financial policies that were adopted in world war ii copyright 2006 oxford university press

causal parameters and policy analysis in economics a twentieth century retrospective the major contributions of twentieth century econometrics to knowledge were the definition of causal parameters within well defined economic models in which agents are constrained by resources and markets and causes are interrelated the analysis of what is required to recover causal parameters from data the identification problem and clarification of the role of causal parameters in policy evaluation and in forecasting the effects of policies never previously experienced this paper summarizes the development of these ideas by the cowles commission the response to their work by structural econometricians and var econometricians and the response to structural and var econometrics by calibrators advocates of natural and social experiments and by nonparametric econometricians and statisticians this paper considers the definition and identification of causal parameters in economics and their role in econometric policy analysis it assesses different research programs designed to recover causal parameters from data at the beginning of this century economic theory was mainly intuitive and empirical support for it was largely anecdotal at the end of the century economics has a rich array of formal models and a high quality database empirical regularities motivate theory in many areas of economics and data are routinely used to test theory many economic theories have been developed as measurement frameworks to suggest what data should be collected and how they should be interpreted econometric theory was developed to analyze and interpret economic data most econometric theory adapts methods originally developed in statistics the major exception to this rule is the econometric analysis of the identification problem and the companion analyses of structural equations causality and economic policy evaluation although an economist did not invent the phrase correlation does not imply causation 1 economists clari

inefficient standard adoption inertia and momentum revisited i introduction since the establishment of the theory of network effects economists have been concerned with the question of whether a market with network effects will tend to settle on the socially optimal standard it has been postulated that markets may exhibit excess inertia once a technological standard is in place a new superior standard may not displace it because of installed base effects alternatively markets may exhibit excess momentum consumers may adopt a new standard too quickly ignoring the stranding effect they are having on previous users similar issues arise in the adoption of language and social norms the literature has investigated various conditions under which one of these inefficiencies arises such inefficiencies are of particular concern for open technologies such as the qwerty and dvorak keyboards 1 the situation is somewhat different when individual firms own standards in that case a simple argument seems to indicate that there is no possibility that an inefficient standard will persist if a new standard is superior in any objective sense there are gains to be made from switching to it once the standard has been adopted the firm can appropriate these gains therefore the firm has incentive to lower the initial price enough to induce adoption of the standard the preceding argument is made in liebowitz and margolis 1999 and repeated in spulber 2002 spulber expresses a general skepticism about the likelihood of inefficiencies when property rights are defined and markets exist critics might claim that previous models that imply inefficient standard adoption are unrealistic in some way and that if such models were modified slightly the inefficiency would disappear i reconsider the issue of inefficient standard adoption using a parsimonious yet compelling model assuming only that there are successive generations of finitely lived consumers that preferences are heterogeneous and that there are network effects among users adoption decisions can be inefficient this is true even if consumers can coordinate efficiently within a generation and a firm can act as a coordinating device across generations the model presented here generates some of the same results found in other papers collectively but in a more general setting and with more robust results if there is an established standard and a superior alternative emerges no single generation of consumers will be willing to switch to the new standard if the switching cost the loss of network benefit from breaking with past users is too high it may be that the benefits to future generations of consumers are large enough that from a social standpoint it would be efficient for one generation to adopt the new standard even if it is privately optimal for that generation to retain the old standard on the other hand the current generation considers only its own switching cost and not the cost it imposes on the previous generation leading to potential overadoption of new technology even for proprietary standards it is not clear that the incentive of the firm to induce adoption matches the social incentive in particular if consumer preferences are heterogeneous the firm will not be able to price in such a way to extract all of the additional surplus gained from the new standard on the other hand the firm will be able to appropriate some of the surplus generated by the network effect itself which is present for any standard and thus does not affect the social incentive to change standards it is not possible to address this issue with a two period model as in some of the previous literature see for example choi 1994 choi and thum 1998 katz and shapiro 1986 if a new technology is introduced in the second period but then the game ends the welfare of future generations of consumers is neglected 2 this article also differs from previous infinite horizon models of technology adoption

private interest support for efficiency enhancing antitrust policies recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real as opposed to the stated purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition we argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face i introduction the traditional justification for the enactment and enforcement of antitrust legislation is that it serves the public interest by preventing businesses from engaging in practices that reduce competition over the last decade some economists have become skeptical of this justification a small but growing number of economists see the public interest justification for antitrust enforcement as a pretense for using government to promote the private interests of politically organized groups 1 within the private interest theory of government model it is natural to see antitrust activity as motivated by the desire to reduce rather than increase competition certainly a private interest is better served by obtaining an anticompetitive increase in the price of the product being sold than by obtaining a competitive reduction in the price of one of the many products being bought yet major contributors to and strong supporters of the private interest theory of government are reluctant to embrace the private interest explanation of at least the origins of antitrust policy george stigler for example has said so far as i can tell it s the sherman act a public interest law i like the sherman act 2 bork 1978 61 has argued that the legislative history of the sherman act displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumers welfare and according to posner 1976 23 the framers of the sherman act appear to have been concerned mainly with the price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels with the view prevalent even among those sympathetic with the private interest theory of government that antitrust legislation owes much to the desire for a more competitive economy it is not surprising that antitrust policy has been resistant to private interest explanations 3 our purpose is to weaken this resistance by arguing that the private interest theory of government is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that support for antitrust activity is motivated by the desire to increase the competitive efficiency of the general economy indeed we shall argue that the private interest theory of government suggests that organized interests may favor antitrust actions as a means of limiting their own anticompetitive practices it should be emphasized at the outset that we will not attempt to establish that antitrust enforcement does increase economic efficiency our more modest objective is to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent views of those who both accept a private interest theory of government and believe that economic efficiency is served by antitrust policy the difficulty of addressing the issue of the effect antitrust enforcement has on the overall efficiency of the economy is reflected in stigler s 1982 44 admission it would be gratifying to me if i could report that our profession s changing view toward support of antitrust policy was based upon the systematic study by economists of the effects of the policy in short that hard evidence carried the day unfortunately there have been no persuasive studies of the effects of the sherman and clayton acts throughout this century 4 in the next section we present a simple model of a coalition of industries each of which is interested in achieving its own protection in political competition with other industries

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

demand dynamics with socially evolving preferences in this work we first identify a few stylized facts concerning microconsumption acts second building on them we develop a simple model of boundedly rational consumers who endogenously evolve their preferences via both innovation and social imitation third we explore some statistical properties of the demand patterns generated by the model which despite its simplicity are surprisingly in line with the empirical evidence these results we suggest bring encouraging support to microfoundations of demand theory based on cognitive and behavioral foundations more in tune with the psychological and sociological evidence based on heterogeneous agents who are much less rational and much more social than in standard theory and who collectively discover along the way what they like within a growing universe of available commodities

economic history and the modern economist in this book nine economists and economic historians express their concern for the present state of economics and its development in the future from a variety of different approaches these scholars reassert the importance of economic history in the training of economists and urge that this perspective should not be lost in the future

scaling the volatility of gdp growth rates abstract the distribution of shocks to gdp growth rates is found to be exponential rather than normal their standard deviation scales with gdp where 0 15 0 03 these macroeconomic results place restrictions on the microeconomic structure of interactions between agents

networks or neighborhoods correlations in the use of publicly funded maternity care in california abstract this study focuses on network effects in the utilization of publicly funded prenatal care using vital statistics data from california for 1989 2000 networks are defined using 5 digit zip codes and a woman s racial or ethnic group like others we find evidence that the use of public programs is highly correlated within groups defined using race ethnicity and neighborhoods these correlations persist even when we control for many unobserved characteristics by including zip code year fixed effects and when we focus on the interaction between own group behavior and measures of the potential for contacts with other members of the group contact availability however the richness of our data allows us to go further and to conduct several tests of one important hypothesis about networks that the estimated effects represent information sharing within groups the results cast doubt on the idea that the observed correlations can be interpreted as evidence of information sharing in particular we find estimated effects to be as large or larger among women who have previously used the program as among first time users

sprayed to death path dependence lock in and pest control strategies theoretical literature on the economics of technology has emphasized the effects on technological trajectories of positive feedbacks in a competition among technologies that all perform a similar function the presence of increasing returns to adoptions can force all but one technology from the market furthermore the victor need not be the superior technology this paper provides an empirical study of one technological competition which illuminates this theoretical work it uses theoretical results to explain why chemical control of agricultural pests remains the dominant technology in spite of many claims that it is inferior to its main competitor integrated pest management copyright 1996 by royal economic society

the price dynamics of common trading strategies a deterministic trading strategy can be regarded as a signal processing element that uses external information and past prices as inputs and incorporates them into future prices this paper uses a market maker based method of price formation to study the price dynamics induced by several commonly used financial trading strategies showing how they amplify noise induce structure in prices and cause phenomena such as excess and clustered volatility

the loanable funds fallacy exercises in the analysis of disequilibrium this essay analyses the core proposition of loanable funds theory that changes in technology and time preferences directly and immediately affect interest rates applying what may be seen as a generalised financial buffers approach to the analysis of disequilibrium we find that loanable funds theory is flawed and should therefore be abandoned a challenge to the neo walrasian general equilibrium approach to monetary theory remains that of justifying the idea that by some mechanism intertemporal prices correctly reflect technology and time preferences copyright 2001 by oxford university press

event studies in management research theoretical and empirical issues we examined the use of event studies in management research and found that there was inadequate attention paid to theoretical and research design issues this lack of attention may lead to false in

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

direct comparison of agent based models of herding in financial markets abstract the present paper tests a new model comparison methodology by comparing multiple calibrations of three agent based models of financial markets on the daily returns of 24 stock market indices and exchange rate series the models chosen for this empirical application are the herding model of gilli and winker 2003 its asymmetric version by alfarano et al 2005 and the more recent model by franke and westerhoff 2011 which all share a common lineage to the herding model introduced by kirman 1993 in addition standard arch processes are included for each financial series to provide a benchmark for the explanatory power of the models the methodology provides a consistent and statistically significant ranking of the three models more importantly it also reveals that the best performing model franke and westerhoff is generally not distinguishable from an arch type process suggesting their explanatory power on the data is similar

short waves in hungary 1923 and 1946 persistence chaos and lack of control abstract monetary policies follow a complex and chaotic process one that is enhanced when monetary growth is taken to the extreme as in hyperinflation while we have a basic understanding of the complex dynamics of hyperinflation a less explored phenomenon accompanying hyperinflationary episodes is the effect that they have on institutional development building on recent advances in economic history examining monetary policy and institutions this analysis uses more explicit recourse to complexity theory and in particular complex adaptive systems to examine two separate hyperinflationary episodes in hungary 1923 and 1946 delving into the institutional and cultural roots of the inflationary policies of the hungarian government and detailing the institutional effects which succeeded hyperinflation this paper shows that the twin experiences of hungary were both chaotic and created a chaotic and complex aftermath the results of which are still being felt indeed hungary s 1923 and especially its 1946 hyperinflation shows that some economic chaos cannot be restrained by political institutions and in fact the institutions themselves were changed when staring into the abyss hungary also found that the abyss stared back

bad eggs learning by doing and the choice of technology we model long run economic development through technology adoption under scientific uncertainty about environmental effects there are four possible long run equilibria in a socially planned economy high growth adopt rapidly but abandon damaging technologies once revealed ddt cfcs cautious brake the introduction of new technologies to avoid mistakes genetically modified organisms no growth halt technological progress to preserve secondary knowledge and collapse adopt rapidly without ever abandoning damaging technologies in the base parameterization a short sighted social planner chooses the cautious strategy a far sighted planner chooses the high growth strategy unless damages are irreversible in which case the cautious strategy again dominates regulatory options in the market economy are investigated pollution taxes do not affect the firm s level of precaution if they can only be applied after the adopting firm has reaped the benefits however they do encourage the abandonment of damaging technologies liability rules do affect precaution but may lead to excessive caution or even a no growth trap

whatever happened to keynes s monetary theory some see a return to keynes s ideas in response to the crisis that began in 2007 but we argue that the resurrected ideas belong to that betrayal of keynes s thought known as keynesian economics what happened is almost a reversal of the whig history view of economics in which past knowledge is embodied in later theory keynes has been made a pre keynesian we trace this transformation mainly through his monetary theory though we range more widely where necessary we state what we consider to be his monetary theory then identify and summarise the key contributions to its destruction then in a speculative section we suggest a variety of motivations for this subversion of his ideas we end by assessing what has been lost in particular his monetary policy and suggest social and political pressures that may have been partly responsible

unconventional monetary policy ante litteram richard kahn and the monetary policy debate during the works of the radcliffe committee the appointment of a committee on the working of the monetary system in 1957 radcliffe committee in the uk gave the occasion to debate innovative ideas in the field of monetary policy many prominent economists participated in the committee s works which ended with the publication of the radcliffe report in 1959 making an exception to the rule of not mentioning individual contributions the radcliffe report claims to follow professor kahn in insisting upon the structure of interest rates rather than some notion of the supply of money as the centrepiece of monetary action as we reconstruct in the paper kahn based his proposals on a conceptual framework emphasising the link between inflation wages and aggregate demand and the importance of combining incomes policy and term structure control in view of achieving external equilibrium full employment and price stability one finding of our research is that kahn s recommendations regarding term structure control with their relevance to the present day are best understood in connection with his theory of liquidity preference as presented in kahn 1954 we also find that the radcliffe committee while espousing kahn s policy recommendations surrounded them with so many caveats as to render them de facto inoperative as we suggest in our reconstruction this depends partly on institutional considerations and partly on differences of opinion between kahn and the radcliffe committee regarding monetary policy transmission and the causes of inflation