on the fixed nature of sharecropping contracts newbery and stiglitz i979 suggest four stylised facts of sharecropping which theories should attempt to explain the first is the persistence of sharecropping and its coexistence with fixed rental and wage markets under a variety of conditions over centuries of time the second is that in modern developed economies there appears to be a decline in share tenancy thirdly share tenancy is often but not alwavs associated with lower productivity than fixed rental land finally in many economies contracts involve shares of around one half for landlord and tenant this does not vary from contract to contract and does not seem to be the object of negotiation smith i776 and many subsequent authors have likened sharecropping to a tax they argue that under this type of contract tenants choose their labour supply to equate their marginal disutility of labour with their proportionate share of the marginal product instead of the full marginal product they therefore regard sharecropping as an inefficient form of land tenure however this view is difficult to reconcile with the first observation given the coexistence of fixed rent and share contracts it is reasonable to expect that if share contracts were relatively inefficient they would quickly die out this does not appear to have happened more recently it has been argued most notably by cheung i969 that if there is certainty and transactions costs are the same for all contracts then provided a share contract specifies the labour supply of the tenant it leads to the same efficient allocation of resources as a fixed rent or wage contract cheung has used this result as the basis of an explanation for coexistence he suggests that the transaction costs for share contracts are higher than for wage and fixed rent contracts however share contracts have the advantage that they allow the risk to be shared between the landlord and tenant whereas with fixed rent contracts the tenant bears all the risk and with wage contracts the landlord does given varying degrees of risk aversion among landlords and tenants it is possible that for some parties the risk sharing advantages outweigh the transaction cost disadvantages so that they will prefer share contracts whereas with others the reverse is true one problem with this argument raised by stiglitz i974 and newbery i977 is that given constant returns to scale the risk sharing properties of share contracts can be attained with mixtures of fixed rent and wage contracts if these do indeed have lower transaction costs share contracts would not then be observed

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

incentives and the efficiency of public sector outsourcing contracts abstract outsourcing the provision of traditionally publicly provided services has become commonplace in most industrialized nations despite its prevalence there still is no consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude and determinants of expected cost savings to the government nor the sources of those savings this article considers the arguments for and against outsourcing and then examines the empirical evidence pertaining to whether any observed savings occur and whether they persist over time in addition we examine the existing evidence for the redistribution hypothesis and the quality shading hypothesis which critics have used to argue that outsourcing lowers government expenditure by lowering wages and conditions and or lower quality services finally we consider the impact of contract design on outsourcing outcomes while the power of incentives is a strong theme in economics recent work has suggested that high powered incentives may be suboptimal for many public sector services because they may crowd out intrinsic motivation particularly in instances where agents are highly motivated we discuss the implications of this insight for the efficiency of public sector outsourcing

vertical contracts in the video rental industry a large body of theoretical work has explored the channels through which vertical contracts can induce efficiency improvements however it is also important to study vertical contracts empirically in order to gain insight into the relative size of different types of efficiency gains in this paper i empirically analyse a contractual innovation in the vertically separated video rental industry prior to 1998 video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing contracts in 1998 revenuesharing contracts were widely adopted i investigate the effect of the introduction of revenue sharing contracts on firms profits and consumer welfare i analyse a new panel data set of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers contract and inventory choices as well as rentals and contract terms for 246 movie titles and 6137 retailers in the u s during each week of 1998 and 1999 and the first half of 2000 a structural econometric model of firms behaviour is developed that describes the nature of firms contract choices estimates from this model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase by 10 under the revenue sharing contract for popular titles for less popular titles the effects can be even larger i also estimate that consumers benefit when revenue sharing contracts are adopted

uncertainty and incentives empirical work testing for a trade off between risk and incentives has had at best mixed success this article provides two simple reasons associated with subjectivity of performance appraisals why we might not expect to see any negative relationship both reasons relate to empirically observed problems associated with monitoring i supervisors sometimes bias their evaluations based on their personal feelings toward their subordinates and ii supervisors will sometimes offer evaluations that reduce their costs these aspects of monitoring are ignored in the standard model and can reverse the usual negative trade off between risk and incentives

an empirical analysis of risk incentives and the delegation of worker authority the authors empirically test prendergast s 2002 theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives using data from the 1998 british wers the authors investigate whether there is 1 evidence of a risk incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal agent model 2 evidence of a positive relationship between incentive pay and the delegation of worker authority 3 evidence of a positive relationship between risk and authority 4 support for the main testable implication of prendergast s model namely that the evidence favoring a risk incentives tradeoff should strengthen when authority controls are added to the empirical model the answers are affirmative for all four questions thereby providing evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

incentives and moral hazard plot level productivity of factory operated and outgrower operated sugarcane production in ethiopia we investigate the unique contractual arrangement between a large ethiopian sugar factory and its adjacent outgrower associations the only significant difference between the sugarcane production on the factory operated sugarcane plantation and on the outgrower operated plots is the remuneration system and thus the incentives to the workers we compare the productivity of the factory operated plantation with the outgrower operated plots based on a new cross sectional plot level data set that includes all plots that are operated by the sugar factory and its adjacent outgrower associations as sugar cane production depends on various exogenous factors that are measured as categorical variables e g soil type cane variety etc we estimate the production function by a nonparametric kernel regression method that takes into account both continuous and categorical explanatory variables without assuming a functional form and without imposing restrictions on interactions between the explanatory variables in order to obtain meaningful productivity measures we impose monotonicity in input quantities using the constrained weighted bootstrapping cwb method our results show that outgrower operated plots have ceteris paribus a statistically and economically significantly higher productivity than factory operated plots which can be explained by outgrowers having stronger incentives to put more effort into their work than the employees of the sugar factory

self selection and market power in risk sharing contracts abstract although the theory of optimal contracts and the principal agent model are now well established in the literature empirical support for this theory has been mixed at best we use economic experiments to test contract theory and assess the empirical relevance of two possible confounding factors that may explain why the theory has not received stronger empirical support first parameters of interest may be biased if agents self select into projects with differing risk profiles based on risk preferences second differing levels of market power on either side of the market could shift contract terms in ways contrary to theoretical predictions in general we find support for classical contract theory augmented to accommodate market power and self selection based on risk preferences we also find evidence for a third confound in the form of the characteristics of agents not party to the transaction affecting the terms of the contract

implications of agency theory for optimal land tenure contracts explores landowner tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation introduction of principal agent models influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner tenant risk sharing need to study adequate tenant incentives this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

natural resource economics and conservation contributions of agricultural economics and agricultural economists research by agricultural economists on natural resources has been distinguished by an interdisciplinary emphasis and a dynamic perspective it has recognized technological and institutional constraints has been oriented toward solving concrete resource management and policy problems and has emphasized empirical and quantitative analysis agricultural economists have introduced methods for evaluating natural resource conservation efforts for predicting adoption of resource conservation technologies and for designing efficient and sustainable resource management policies they have identified ways of improving land management and preventing land degradation proposed reforms of institutions governing water allocation and water quality and introduced policies for balancing environmental and efficiency considerations in the management of pests biodiversity and livestock diseases their research has had substantial impacts on the formulation of resource conservation policies

a theory of sharecropping the role of price behavior and imperfect competition this paper proposes a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets we consider a contractual setting between one landlord and one tenant with seasonal variation of price where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage we consider two different classes of contracts i tenancy contracts and ii crop buying contracts it is shown that sharecropping is the optimal form within tenancy contracts and it also dominates crop buying contracts provided the price variation is not too large then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy and crop buying elements and show that there are multiple optimal interlinked contracts finally proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect competition in the rural product market it is shown that the unique contract that is robust to this refinement results in sharecropping

tenants landlords and soil conservation it has long been argued that tenants tend to overexploit land but this conventional wisdom has been derived largely without consideration of landlords actions we examine what happens when landlords can invest in durable conservation measures in addition to choosing rental contract terms when tenants are risk neutral landlords overinvest in conservation under cash rental contracts but can achieve first best levels of output and protection against land degradation when conservation investment is combined with share rental when tenants are risk averse the first best is unattainable in this case conservation investment combined with share rental results in output levels below the first best while equilibrium conservation investment may be greater or less than the first best these results suggest that contract form and conservation investments are likely made simultaneously so that econometric studies of conservation practice adoption that treat rental status as exogenous are likely subject to bias

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

the diversity of land markets and regulations in europe and some of its causes abstractthe creation of optimal land institutions attracted renewed attention in the 1990s because of its central role in the transition process in former communist countries in the former soviet union and eastern europe and more recently because of large scale land investments in developing countries this article documents the existence of large variations in land institutions markets and regulation using current and historical data from western and eastern europe it then offers explanations for these differences and draws implications for the role and optimality of land institutions in development with special reference to the current debate on large scale land acquisitions

global land investments in the bio economy evidence and policy implications for countries dependent on agriculture the recent wave of investor interest in farmland could in principle help set in motion a virtuous cycle of economic growth and poverty reduction a large literature documenting failure of such investments documents the risks involved to appreciate associated opportunities and challenges we review past experience quantify country level potential for area expansion versus intensification and identify determinants of countries attractiveness for investors in the initial stages of the land rush the fact that weak land governance seems to increase rather than reduce land demand justifies an emphasis on improving institutions transparency and accountability while at the same time providing concrete suggestions for policy and research

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

management response to the demands of global fresh fruit markets rewarding harvesters with financial incentives abstract competition in global fresh fruit markets is now much more intense than a decade ago producers and exporters face an increasing number of quality requirements and regulations that are costly and challenge established practices paying harvesters by the amount they harvest and trying to control quality with sanctions based on a field study this article discusses how lemon producers in northern argentina are responding to these challenges why some have responded only by introducing non contractual innovations while others by rewarding harvesters for careful performance to insure fruit quality the findings elucidate arguments about the instrumentality of transaction costs on the choice of both managerial practices and forms of remunerating labourers it also illustrates that added quality demands of foreign markets eased the task of harvesters but had a varying effect on labourers income

production organization and efficiency during transition an empirical analysis of east german agriculture enterprise restructuring is expected to improve efficiency in transition economies with data from former east germany we compare the efficiency of family farms and partnerships with large scale successor organizations of the collective and state farms lsos using parametric and nonparametric techniques we show that lsos display lower technical efficiency than do family farms and partnerships but that this difference is small and declining during transition mainly as a result of structural changes in agriculture family farms are not as scale efficient as partnerships and lsos and partnerships are superior to all other organizational forms

history institutions and economic performance the legacy of colonial land tenure systems in india we analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the british in india and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators these areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices

sharing monitoring and incentives marshallian misallocation reassessed a general equilibrium model is presented wherein wage labor requires monitoring in order to extract effort landlords may also elect to adopt sharetenancy contracts in which workers have an incentive to supply unsupervised effort two distortions exist monitoring costs in one sector and a share tax in the other efficiency statements require second best comparisons adopting more specific functional forms this mixed wage sharetenancy economy is technically efficient and provides greater benthamite social welfare than a wage only economy when private incentives lead to mixing the incidence of sharetenancy is hypothesized to increase with monitoring costs density of tenants per landlord and labor intensity of production

testing between competing models of sharecropping the marshallian approach assumes a prohibitively high cost of monitoring the sharecropper s activities while the monitoring approach argues that landlords stipulate and effectively monitor sharecroppers activities i present new evidence using detailed data collected from eight indian villages most tenants own some land of their own this provides a controlled environment in studying the impact of contractual arrangements the differences in input and output intensities on owned minus sharecropped land of the same household are found to be sizable and significant suggesting a rejection of the monitoring approach and supporting the notion of the marshallian productive inefficiency of sharecropping

evidence on performance pay and risk aversion abstract making use of a unique representative data set we find clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly significant and substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee s pay is performance contingent which confirms the well known risk incentive trade off

customs and incentives in contracts this article examines contractual practices that are often assumed customary in particular it examines discreteness in agricultural contracts and focuses on the distinction between the use of simple discrete fraction terms in cropshare contracts and the nearly continuous payment terms used in cash rent contracts we show that the pattern of shares is best explained as a response to moral hazard problems spread over large numbers of inputs a contracting model explains the pattern of shares the difference in flexibility with cash rent contracts and the lower bound on shares empirical analysis using micro data on over 3 000 contracts are used to test implications of the model a wide range of support is found for a model based on moral hazard and measurement costs copyright 2009 oxford university press

from plantations to smallholder production the role of policy in the reorganization of the sri lankan tea sector summary the sri lankan tea sector has changed from one dominated by vertically integrated plantations to one where independent processors of black tea purchase their input green leaf tea from small independent growers this paper provides a unifying conceptual framework to characterize three major factors affecting the changes in vertical coordination arrangements transaction production and management costs regulation and government policy have altered these determinants of organizational change transaction costs have been reduced by state intervention into the price for green leaf which subsequently lowered the risk of processors re negotiating prices downward production costs which continue to be dominated by labor expenses due to the lack of technological developments for harvesting have increased more for plantations than independent producers due to union pressures

how does the economy shape the financial advisory profession we examine whether economic conditions have a long term impact on the composition of available financial advisors in the profession we find that financial advisors who start their career in recess

contributions of oliver hart and bengt holmstrom to contract theory oliver hart and bengt holmstrom were awarded the 2016 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory this article offers a short summary and discussion of their path breaking work

colonialism and modern income islands as natural experiments abstract using a new database of islands throughout the atlantic pacific and indian oceans we find a robust positive relationship between the number of years spent as a european colony and current gdp per capita we argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience we instrument for length of colonization using variation in prevailing wind patterns we argue that wind speed and direction had a significant effect on historical colonial rule but do not have a direct effect on gdp today the data also suggest that years as a colony after 1700 are more beneficial than earlier years we also find a discernable pecking order among the colonial powers with years under u s british french and dutch rule having more beneficial effects than spanish or portuguese rule our finding of a strong connection between modern income and years of colonization is conditional on being colonized at all since each of the islands in our da

evidence on the incentive properties of share contracts abstract ever since adam smith share contracts have been condemned for their lack of incentives sharecropping tenants face incentives to undersupply productive inputs since they receive only a fraction of the marginal revenue the empirical literature reports that lands under sharecropping are indeed less productive and employ inputs less intensively than those operated by owners this paper shows that 1 sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy are both associated with low quality lands 2 plots under sharecropping and fixed rent present on average the same unconditional productivity 3 controlling for observed land quality and input use their average productivities are also identical to those of owner operated plots and 4 the input choices satisfy the same profit maximization conditions for all land contracts these results challenge the conventional wisdom connecting sharecropping to incentive distortions they support an alternative view that farmers optimally employ more input resources into

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

multidimensional heterogeneity and the economic importance of risk and matching evidence from contractual data and field experiments we measure the cost of risk and the benefits of matching heterogeneous workers to risk levels within a firm that pays its workers piece rates the workers of this firm are heterogeneous in two dimensions risk preferences and ability our results suggest that workers willingness to pay to avoid risk is heterogeneous it can attain 40 of their expected net earnings but averages to only 1 moreover the benefits to the firm of matching are relatively small profits are predicted to increase by only 2 3 4 if we restrict attention to cases where matching is possible although labor market sorting contributes to this result the workers in this firm are relatively risk tolerant it is not the primary cause more important is the relative homogeneity of risk conditions in this firm that give rise to limited opportunities for matching

intertemporal discounting and tenurial contracts a simple two period model without uncertainty and strategic complementarity in the labor market or asymmetric information of any kind is employed to study the nature of contracts signed between a landlord and a tenant in a rural economy the paper provides conditions under which different types of contracts may prevail q 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the nature of the farm abstract using a model based on a trade off between moral hazard incentives and gains from specialization this paper explains why farming has generally not converted from small family based firms into large factory style corporate firms nature is both seasonal and random and the interplay of these qualities generates moral hazard limits the gains from specialization and causes timing problems between stages of production by identifying conditions in which these forces vary we derive testable predictions about the choice of organization and the extent of farm integration to test these predictions we study the historical development of several agricultural industries and analyze data from a sample of over 1 000 farms in british columbia and louisiana in general seasonality and randomness so limit the benefits of specialization that family farms are optimal but when farmers are successful in mitigating the effects of seasonality and random shocks to output farm organizations gravitate toward fa

the role of risk and transaction costs in contract design evidence from farmland lease contracts in u s agriculture the objective of this article is to provide new empirical evidence on landlord tenant choices of share versus cash rent contracts in u s agriculture the focus is on the contribution of explanatory variables that represent transaction costs risk sharing incentives or both an empirical model of contract choice is tested against the 1999 agricultural economics and land ownership survey aelos and finds mixed evidence for low transaction cost and risk sharing incentive motives for landlord tenant choices of a share versus cash rent contract however the behavior of landlords and tenants is consistent with them being risk averse although it is standard to control for the riskiness of the principal s task that is contracted we find that other attributes of the landlord are an important part of a relatively complex story for u s land tenancy contacting the latter results have generally been ignored in other published landlord tenant contracting studies

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

rural reforms and agricultural growth in china this paper employs province level panel data to assess the contributions of decollectivization price adjustments and other reforms to china s agricultural growth in the reform period decollectivization is found to improve total factor productivity and to account for about half of the output growth during 1978 84 the adjustment in state procurement prices also contributed positively to output growth its impact came mainly from the responses in input use the effect of other market related reforms on productivity and output growth was very small reasons for slowdown in agricultural growth after 1984 are also analyzed copyright 1992 by american economic association

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk we analyze optimal contract choice in agriculture when there is joint moral hazard on the part of the farmer in the supply of effort and the riskiness of the technique of cultivation in the presence of limited liability high powered incentive contracts such as fixed rental contracts will induce the farmer to adopt techniques of cultivation that are too risky from the point of view of the landlord on the other hand low powered incentive contracts such as fixed wage contracts will induce the farmer to supply too little effort we show that sharecropping contracts emerge as a natural solution to balance these two conflicting considerations

broiler production contracts as a multi agent problem common risk incentives and heterogeneity the broiler industry presents two puzzles regarding production contracts why do processors control growers inputs and why do they use a statistically insufficient estimator to calculate growers compensation this paper provides an agency theoretic framework that explains these puzzles in terms of processors response to grower heterogeneity and production risk and to grower risk aversion processors control inputs to reduce the information rents paid to agents by forcing agents to bear additional income risk through the use of an imprecise estimator processors can increase profits due to the combined moral hazard adverse selection nature of the informational problem

inequality does cause underdevelopment insights from a new instrument consistent with the provocative hypothesis of engerman and sokoloff 1997 2000 this paper confirms with cross country data that agricultural endowments predict inequality and inequality predicts development the use of agricultural endowments specifically the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane as an instrument for inequality is this paper s approach to problems of measurement and endogeneity of inequality the paper finds inequality also affects other development outcomes institutions and schooling which the literature has emphasized as mechanisms by which higher inequality lowers per capita income it tests the inequality hypothesis for development institutional quality and schooling against other recent hypotheses in the literature while finding some evidence consistent with other development fundamentals the paper finds high inequality to independently be a large and statistically significant barrier to prosperity good quality institutions and high schooling

collectivization and china s agricultural crisis in 1959 1961 the agricultural crisis in china in 1959 61 after the initial success of the collectivization movement resulted in 30 million extra deaths in this paper a game theory hypothesis proposes the main cause of this catastrophe i argue that because of the difficulty in supervising agricultural work the success of an agricultural collective depends on a self enforcing contract in which each one promises to discipline oneself a self enforcing contract however can be sustained only in a repeated game in the fall of 1958 the right to withdraw from a collective was deprived the nature of the collectivization was thus changed from a repeated game to a one time game as a result the self enforcing contract could not be sustained and agricultural productivity collapsed the empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis

percentage rent contracts between co stores abstract high rental rates and space scarcity in popular retail areas are encouraging retailers to share available space creating co stores co stores with complementary products enjoy a boost in foot traffic thus higher sales when the space is owned by one a common practice for retailers is to engage in a revenue sharing agreement we study the optimal design of a percentage rent contract between two co stores each having his her own random sales dependent on effort levels of both retailers since the effort level exerted by a retailer is often unverifiable it results in a double moral hazard problem we show that a linear percentage rent which is composed of a sales share and a based rent achieves the second best effort levels the landlord may also find it optimal to set a fixed rent by setting the sales share to zero with cobb douglas sales and power disutility of effort functions we obtain closed form expressions for the optimal contract we show that the landlord charges a high sales share for a tenant with low demand externality and a high sales scale the landlord is better off renting out space to a small but high revenue generating retailer rather than one generating larger traffic but with lower sales scale when the landlord s externality potential is low but he is successful in generating sales optimal sales share is low but the base rent is high the percentage rent can increase the landlord profit by up to 13 compared to the conventional fixed rent

moral hazard land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the philippines abstract introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a principal agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade off between production and land quality maintenance using data from the philippines a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

economic history and modern india redefining the link this paper argues that to restore the link between economic history and modern india a different narrative of indian economic history is needed an exclusive focus on colonialism as the driver of india s economic history misses those continuities that arise from economic structure or local conditions in fact market oriented british imperial policies did initiate a process of economic growth based on the production of goods intensive in labor and natural resources however productive capacity per worker was constrained by low rates of private and public investment in infrastructure excessively low rates of schooling social inequalities based on caste and gender and a delayed demographic transition to lower birthrates and the resultant heavy demographic burden placed on physical capital and natural resources

labour market effects of large scale agricultural investment conceptual considerations and estimated employment effects summary large scale agricultural investments lsais in general and their socio economic implications in particular have been heavily debated in recent years while some claim that lsais are an important catalyst for development in neglected rural areas others caution that they pose a risk to rural communities livelihoods the extent to which lsais provide benefits for local communities is hence still contested this paper sets out to conceptually understand what effects the establishment of a large scale farm has on the rural labor market in low and middle income countries in addition we empirically address the question of whether large scale farming as recorded in the land matrix creates or destroys employment we develop a transition matrix to identify several scenarios based on key determinants of the direct employment creation potential of lsais namely the former land use the crop type and the production model we empirically assess the actual importance of these scenarios and the employment creation to be expected from this sample of lsais based on labor intensities we further look into the net employment effects for land formerly used by smallholder farmers our analysis shows that lsais massively crowd out smallholder farmers which is only partially mitigated through the cultivation of labor intensive crops and the application of contract farming schemes this holds true for all regions targeted by lsais although regional differences are found in terms of magnitude the paper concludes that these effects tend to be large on the local scale i e in the immediate surroundings of the investment site but small in relation to total national employment in agriculture however indirect employment creation related to lsais which is discussed but not empirically addressed in this paper needs to be taken into account to have the full picture

the composition of growth matters for poverty alleviation this paper contributes to explain the cross country heterogeneity of the poverty response to changes in economic growth it does so by focusing on the structure of output growth the paper presents a two sector theoretical model that clarifies the mechanism through which the sectoral composition of growth and associated labor intensity can affect workers wages and thus poverty alleviation then it presents cross country empirical evidence that analyzes first the differential poverty reducing impact of sectoral growth at various levels of disaggregation and the role of unskilled labor intensity in such differential impact the paper finds evidence that not only the size of economic growth but also its composition matters for poverty alleviation with the largest contributions from labor intensive sectors such as agriculture construction and manufacturing the results are robust to the influence of outliers alternative explanations and various poverty measures

performance pay delegation and multitasking under uncertainty and innovativeness an empirical investigation it has been recently noted that the trade off between risk and incentives that agency theory predicts turns out to be rather weak we examine predictions from agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 danish firms we find that the relation between performance pay and environmental uncertainty is indeed weak we examine the relation between delegation and environmental uncertainty and find that this relation is confirmed we also examine the multi tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases the flexibility of agents is restricted we fail to find support for this hypothesis

inside the family firm the role of families in succession decisions and performance this paper uses a unique dataset from denmark to investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance we focus on the decision to appoint either a family or an external chief executive officer ceo the paper uses variation in ceo succession decisions that result from the gender of a departing ceo s first born child this is a plausible instrumental variable iv as male firstchild firms are more likely to pass on control to a family ceo relative to female first child firms but the gender of a first child is unlikely to affect firms outcomes we find that family successions have a large negative causal impact on firm performance operating profitability on assets falls by at least four percentage points around ceo transitions our iv estimates are significantly larger than those obtained using ordinary least squares furthermore we show that family ceo underperformance is particularly large for firms in high growth industries and for relatively large firms overall the empirical results demonstrate that professional non family ceos provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they head

behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture in this essay we develop a framework for analysing the major institutions governing the production and exchange of output and the primary factors of production in rural areas the analysis incorporates general considerations of risk and information constraints jointly with the principal material attributes of agriculture and of agricultural production factors the framework is used to analyse barriers to the existence of the major intertemporal and factor markets it is applied specifically to land scarce environments for which it provides an internally consistent explanation for many of the well documented institutional features of such settings in addition the analysis provides new implications for among other phenomena the inter relationships among ownership holdings operational scale family size and factor productivity for the scarcity of animal rental markets and use of animals as collateral for the renting out of land by small landowners and for the existence of plantations for certain crops

do landlord tenant relationships influence rental contracts for farmland or the cash rental rate a considerable portion of north america s farmland is rented out by nonfarmer landlords our survey of farmers in southern ontario canada provides a refined understanding of who these landlords are and whether variations in landlord tenant relationships influence rental contract choice and or the magnitude of cash rent we find that crop share arrangements are more likely to emerge among family relations however we do not find strong evidence that family relations explain variation in the magnitude of cash rental rates

the role of risk and risk aversion in adoption of alternative marketing arrangements by the u s farmers the objective of this article is to analyse the relationship between farmers risk aversions and the riskiness of various agricultural enterprises to see which marketing arrangements would typically emerge relying on the basic agency theory model we hypothesize the prevalence of alternative marketing arrangements amas in situations with high risk averse farmers and high risk enterprises and the prevalence of spot cash markets for low risk averse participants and less risky enterprises our empirical tests are carried out using the 2004 agricultural resource management survey arms the empirical results are largely supportive of the agency theory of contract choice

sorting incentives and risk preferences evidence from a field experiment abstract we conducted experiments within a firm to measure the risk preferences of workers who face substantial daily income risk we find that these workers are significantly more risk tolerant than individuals from the broader population this is consistent with sorting risk tolerant workers are attracted to high risk occupations

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

conjectures regarding empirical managerial accounting research abstract the empirical managerial accounting literature has failed to produce a substantive cumulative body of knowledge this literature has not matured beyond describing practice to developing and testing theories explaining observed practice like other areas of accounting research while the lack of publicly available data is a popular reason for this literature s underdeveloped state it is not the only one other conjectures include its inductive approach researchers incentives its use of non economics based frameworks the lack of empirically testable theories and its emphasis on decision making not control

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

does the market value ceo styles abstract we study how investors perceive the skill set that different types of ceos bring into their companies we compare ceos who started their careers during a recession with other ceos we show

the lay system in commercial fisheries origin and implications abstract in most commercial fisheries the crew is remunerated via some form of the lay system under the lay system the crew is paid with a share of revenues or a share of revenues less costs naturally the presence and the functioning of the lay system are well known and accepted as one of fishery s important institutions compared with share contracts in agriculture however the lay in fisheries has garnered relatively little research this article has two goals first we provide an explanation for the existence of the lay system as an incentive mechanism to alleviate a potential team agency problem this explanation of the lay system explains anomalies such as the presence of wages in some fisheries that are odds with the theory of pure risk sharing second we show the implications of the lay system for econometric modeling of fisheries and for understanding firm behavior in general we conclude that models that fail to account explicitly for the incentive properties of shares are likely to provide poor representations of fishing firm behavior the thrust of the paper is that the formation and working of the lay system are a fundamental force in fisheries influencing firm behavior and research results in a way that has been largely ignored

farmland rental prices in gm soybean areas of argentina do contractual arrangements matter abstractin this paper we study the determinants of the rental price of farmland in the argentinian pampas in particular we examine the price of lease contracts using a hedonic price model while controlling for other potential sources of variation using firsthand data for 255 plots our results indicate that both short term contracts and contracts with sowing pools push rental prices upwards we also find that soybean yields have a significant impact on land rental prices these results suggest that if argentina intends to protect the enormous natural advantage it has for agricultural production it should consider strictly regulating land rental contracts

explaining agricultural and agrarian policies in developing countries the paper describes and as far as possible explains variations in policies programs and institutions that influence agricultural growth agrarian relations and rural welfare across developing countries and over time it evaluates the impact of distorted policy patterns on agricultural production and rural poverty and identifies conditions under which policy reforms meant to bring about greater efficiency and equity are likely to be initiated and sustained it draws upon a broad range of literature to show how material conditions missing markets and government policies affect static welfare outcomes patterns of accumulation state formation and the establishment of political institutions it suggests ways to improve policy advice and proposes directions for future research

structural estimation of rank order tournament games with private information in this article we propose and solve a game theoretic model of a rank order tournament with private information using the contract settlement data from a poultry company we estimate a fully structural model of a symmetric nash equilibrium of this game we show that growers equilibrium effort depends on four factors the spread in piece rates between the performance brackets the number of players in each tournament the number of performance brackets used and the density of growers private shocks we use estimates to simulate how changes in the tournament characteristics affecting equilibrium effort impact the growers and the integrator s welfare in most sporting events prizes are awarded not on basis of absolute performance but based on relative performance or tournaments be sides sporting events tournaments are also frequently used in labor contracts the name tournament typically suggests a rank order ordinal scheme such as is considered by lazear and rosen 1981 whereas a broader definition applies to any compensation scheme based on relative performance e g nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 tsoulouhas and vukina 1999 despite the sizeable theoretical litera ture on tournaments empirical work related to these models remains rather limited most of the theoretical literature on tournaments see mclaughlin 1988 for a survey has been con cerned primarily with the comparison of tour naments against various independent reward structures under various assumptions about risk preferences the number of participants and prizes specifications of production shocks and the asymmetry of information previous empirical work has largely focused on testing the predictions of the theoretical models this includes articles on executive compensation e g main o reilly and wade 1993 ericksson 1999 gibbons and murphy 1990 profes sional sports e g ehrenberg and bognanno

tenancy choice in a competitive framework with transactions costs the choice between wage labor and sharecrop contracts is analyzed in a model that avoids both the pitfalls of previous models inefficiency of sharecropping and indeterminacy by introducing transactions costs with appropriate nonlinearities plantation data from the american south provide empirical support for the hypothesized nonlinearity in transactions costs and simultaneous determination of direct supervision and contractual choice