economic and spatial effects of land value taxation in an urban area an urban computable general equilibrium approach this paper studies the effects of switching from a capital property tax to a land value tax using an urban computable general equilibrium model calibrated to the features of the atlanta georgia area our model differs from prior simulation studies in that we assume that residents own a fixed amount of land rather than assuming an absentee landowner we consider three income groups rather than just one we consider cases in which housing capital is not completely mobile and we allow for a labor leisure choice

an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

procrastination at the patent office abstract pointing to a limited set of statistics suggesting that examiners turn in much of their work product at the end of quota periods the commerce department has recently raised concerns over examiner procrastination and its consequences for examination quality end loading of review completions alone however is not dispositive evidence of procrastination in this paper we confirm that examiners complete a substantial percentage of reviews at the end of both bi weekly and quarterly quotas and then proceed to test for additional markers that may separate a procrastination explanation for these findings from a range of alternative theories among other tests explored in this regard we predict and find evidence of an immediate spike in end loading upon the onset of examiner telecommuting a change in work environments that likely exacerbates self control problems our findings support a procrastination interpretation for at least some portion of the observed end loading of reviews with our outcomes analysis suggesting that the predominant consequence of this behavior for examination quality is an increase in examination durations

the strategic implications of sunk costs a behavioral perspective abstract this paper examines some of the strategic implications of the sunk cost phenomenon in sequential allocation decisions drawing from psychology and behavioral decision theory we first present a taxonomy of possible causes for the sunk cost effect the tendency of many managers to throw good money after bad we then present the analysis of some implications of this behavior in strategic situations a two period strategic game is developed and analyzed to derive optimal allocations as a function of one player s sunk cost behavior we establish when this behavior can be used as a successful precommitment strategy by the sunk cost player and when it is exploitable by an opponent welfare implications are also explored the sunk cost effect constitutes a form of strategic preference manipulation in which a credible preference change can be induced to provide a strategic advantage to one of the players

who benefits from local job growth migrants or the original residents bartik t j 1993 who benefits from local job growth migrants or the original residents reg studies 27 297 311 this paper surveys research on whether the new jobs resulting from growth in a local economy e g a metropolitan area go to inmigrants or the original local residents the empirical evidence suggests that around one quarter of the new jobs from local growth increases the labour force participation rates of local residents in the long run these long run effects may occur because local growth provides residents with valuable employment experience research also suggests that minorities benefit most from growth and that higher wage industries provide greater employment benefits for local residents bartik t j 1993 qui est ce qui beneficie de la croissance d emploi locale les migrants ou la population autochtone reg studies 27 297 311 cet article etudie la recherche effectuee dans le but d evaluer si les nouveaux emplois dus a la croissance d une economic locale par exemple une

saving puzzles and saving policies in the united states in the past two decades the widely reported personal saving rate in the united states has dropped from double digits to below zero first we attempt to account for the decline in the national income and product accounts nipa saving rate the macroeconomic literature suggests that 40 50 per cent of the drop since 1988 can be attributed to households spending stock market capital gains another 30 per cent is accounting transfers from personal saving into government and corporate saving because of the way pensions and capital gains taxes are treated in the nipa second while nipa saving measures are well suited to measuring the supply of new funds for investment and capital accumulation it is not clear that they should be the target of government saving policies finally we emphasize that the nipa saving rate is not useful in judging whether households are preparing for retirement or other contingencies many households have accumulated significant wealth primarily through retirement saving vehicles and capital gains even as the saving rate slid there remains a segment of the population who save little and whose behaviour appears untouched either by the stock market boom or the slide in personal saving we explore reasons and policy options for their puzzling low saving rate copyright 2001 oxford university press

read this paper later procrastination with time consistent preferences a model of time consistent procrastination is developed to assess the extent to which the observed behavior is compatible with rational behavior when a finite work requirement must be completed by a deadline the remaining time for leisure is an exhaustible resource with a positive rate of time preference the optimal allocation of this resource results in more hours spent working and fewer in leisure the closer the deadline key qualitative findings of psychological studies of academic procrastination are consistent with the standard natural resource management principles implied by the model when suitably adapted to task aversiveness uncertainty and multiple deadlines however quantitatively the fully rational model appears to require an extremely high rate of time preference or elasticity of intertemporal substitution to generate serious procrastination furthermore it cannot explain undesired procrastination

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

time inconsistent preferences and social security in this paper we examine the role of social security in an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals with time inconsistent preferences who face mortality risk individual income risk and borrowing constraints we find that unfunded social security lowers the capital stock output and consumption for consumers with time consistent or time inconsistent preferences however it may raise or lower welfare depending on the strength of time inconsistency

this time is the same using bank performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises if yes why in this paper we show that a bank s stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis this effect is economically large our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank s risk culture and or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises banks that relied more on short term funding had more leverage and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises

financial intermediation as a beliefs bridge between optimists and pessimists this paper proposes a new framework for understandingnancial intermediation in contrast to previous research we consider a setting in which intermediaries possess no inherent information processing or monitoring advantages instead in an economy with overly optimistic entrepreneurs who require funding from overly skeptical pessimistic investors we show that intermediaries can arise endogenously in such a setting only a rational intermediary will be su ciently optimistic tond it worthwhile to invest in a technology for screening entrepreneurs projects and yet be pessimistic enough to use this technology our framework produces implications consistent with heretofore unexplained stylized facts and a number of others which are as of yet untested

pension plan characteristics and framing effects in employee savings behavior abstract defined contribution pensions in many postsecondary institutions are funded by a combination of an employer premium and a mandatory employee premium individuals can also contribute to a supplemental savings account holding constant total compensation standard reasoning suggests that supplemental savings should depend negatively on the sum of the employer and employee pension contributions contrarily we find that the supplementary savings of professors are significantly more sensitive to employee contributions than to employer contributions this asymmetry is consistent with different marginal propensities to save out of the salary and pension components of compensation nevertheless impacts on lifetime utility are relatively modest

discounting values and decisions how do discount rates affect agents decisions and valuations this paper provides a general method to analyze this question allowing stochastic and managed cash flows stochastic discount rates and time inconsistency and including arbitrary learning and payoff or utility processes we show that some of these features can lead to counterintuitive answers e g a more patient agent stops earlier but we also establish under simple conditions theorems yielding robust predictions concerning the impact of discount rates on control and stopping decisions and on valuations we apply our theory to models of search experimentation bankruptcy optimal growth investment and social learning

intertemporal trades and problems of self control abstract this paper develops a model which explains how individuals manage self control strategies for situations in which an average level of activity per unit time is what needs controlling the focus of the model is intertemporal trades times when for example a dieter decides to eat dessert with lunch by promising himself he will forego dessert at dinner self control is managed successfully by those who learn to complete such trades the paper analyzes the process of learning about the reliability of ones strategies for intertemporal trades

commitment flexibility and optimal screening of time inconsistency this paper develops a theory of optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both commitment and flexibility and whose preferences differ in the degree of time inconsistency if time inconsistency is observable both a planner and a monopolist provide devices that help each person commit to the efficient level of flexibility however the combination of unobservable time inconsistency and preference for flexibility causes an adverse selection problem to solve this problem the monopolist and possibly the planner curtail flexibility in the device for a more inconsistent person at both ends of the efficient choice range moreover they may have to add unused options to the device for a less inconsistent person and also distort his actual choices this theory has normative and positive implications for private and public provision of commitment devices

time tradeoff sequences for analyzing discounting and time inconsistency this paper introduces time tradeoff tto sequences as a general tool to analyze intertemporal choice we give several applications for empirical purposes we can measure discount functions without requiring any measurement of or assumption about utility we can quantitatively measure time inconsistencies and simplify their qualitative tests tto sequences can be administered and analyzed very easily using only pencil and paper for theoretical purposes we use tto sequences to axiomatize quasi hyperbolic discount functions we demonstrate the feasibility of measuring tto sequences in an experiment in which we tested the axiomatizations our findings suggest rejections of several currently popular discount functions and call for the development of new ones it is especially desirable that such discount functions can accommodate increasing impatience

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

investment under uncertainty and time inconsistent preferences abstract while standard real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference there is substantial evidence that agents are impatient about choices in the short term but are patient when choosing between long term alternatives we extend the real options framework to model the investment timing decisions of entrepreneurs with time inconsistent preferences the impact on investment timing depends on such factors as whether entrepreneurs are sophisticated or naive in their expectations regarding their future time inconsistent behavior and whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time the model is extended to the case of a competitive equilibrium

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

the retirement consumption puzzle a marital bargaining approach abstract evidence from several countries reveals a substantial drop in household consumption around the age of retirement that is difficult to explain with life cycle models using food consumption data from more than 550 households from the panel study of income dynamics for the years 1979 1986 and 1989 1992 we find that married couple households decrease their expenditures on both food consumed at home and away from home by about 9 following the retirement of the male household head no significant decrease in consumption is found for single households either in a sample of males or a pooled sample of single males and females these results are consistent with a model of marital bargaining in which wives prefer to save more than their husbands do to support an expected longer retirement period and relative control over household decisions is affected by control over market income the pattern of the consumption decline which is increasing in the age gap between husband and wife lends further support to this interpretation

hyperbolic discounting and the phillips curve using a standard dynamic general equilibrium model we show that the interaction of staggered nominal contracts with hyperbolic discounting leads to inflation having significant long run effects on real variables

smoking cessation a model of planned vs actual behavior for time inconsistent consumers we offer a simple model of intertemporal choice to characterize how planned versus actual behaviors evolve for time inconsistent smokers our results suggest that smokers participation and cessation decisions are governed by the interplay between three effects the cessation effect leads smokers to advance their plans to quit smoking whereas the procrastination effect leads them to consecutively revise their planned quitting age upwards consequently the duration of smoking is effectively governed by which one of these two effects is dominant finally for certain consumer segments a threshold effect causes an all or nothing type of extreme smoking behavior based on certain critical values of present biased preferences our results provide some preliminary evidence that both marketing efforts by tobacco firms and public policy initiatives can have a significant influence on smoking behavior in particular we find that reductions in the age at which individuals start smoking may not only vastly extend their duration of smoking but also convert potential never smokers into lifetime smokers finally we estimate a hazard model using survey data from over 800 smokers to provide evidence in support of our theoretical model

modelling time inconsistent preferences abstract the paper reviews some recent theoretical contributions on the modelization of time inconsistent preferences as well as implications for individual behavior the focus is on the interpretation of the concepts and the link with concepts in psychology

time inconsistent preferences investment and asset pricing in this paper we present a production based asset pricing model in which agents have time inconsistent preferences we find that the time inconsistent preferences lead to under investment over consumption and higher interest rate these variables are distorted more in the economy with naive agent than the economy with sophisticated agent in particular the sophisticated agent invests more and consumes less than the naive agent but invests less and consumes more than the time consistent agent the interest rate in the sophisticated agent economy is lower than that in the naive agent economy but higher than that in the time consistent agent economy

self control and incentives an analysis of multiperiod quota plans it is well known that individuals often fail to exert proper self control in organizational settings this can lead to reduced productivity and profits we use the literature on present biased preferences to model employees self control problems and examine how firms can design compensation plans to reduce the negative consequences of their employees self control problems our results suggest that firms can mitigate self control problems by delaying payment to the employees this can be achieved by using multiperiod quotas such as annual quotas to compensate employees for their cumulative performance although such plans are prevalent in the market there is little theoretical research that shows when multiperiod quota plans can be optimal the paper provides one potential explanation for the widespread use of such quota plans interestingly we find that such plans may be optimal despite the fact that they encourage more procrastination we also find that such plans lead to higher effort by the employees and can sometimes improve the welfare of not only the firm but also the employees

rational addiction with learning and regret we present a theory of rational behavior in which individuals maximize a set of stable preferences over goods with unknown addictive power the theory is based on three fundamental postulates that consumption of the addictive good is not equally harmful to all that individuals possess subjective beliefs concerning this harm and that beliefs are optimally undated with information gained through consumption although individual actions are optimal and dynamically consistent addicts regret their past consumption decisions and regret their initial assessment of the potential harm of the good addict prone individuals who believe it could not happen to them are most likely to be drawn into a harmful addiction

economic conditions and alcohol problems this study investigates the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and two alcohol related outcomes liquor consumption and highway vehicle fatalities fixed effect models are estimated for the 48 contiguous states over the 1975 1988 time period alcohol consumption and traffic deaths vary procyclically with a major portion of the effect of economic downturns attributed to reductions in incomes rather than employment the intake of hard liquor is the most sensitive to the state of the macroeconomy there is no evidence however that fluctuations in economic conditions have a disproportionate impact on the drunk driving of young adults

masters of our time impatience and self control in high level chess games this paper presents empirical findings on gender differences in time preference and inconsistency based on international high level chess panel data with a large number of observations including a control for ability due to the time constraint in chess it is possible to study performance and choices related to time preferences the results suggest that men play shorter games on average and pay a higher price to end the game sooner they also perform worse in shorter game compared to women but better in longer games furthermore women perform worse in time pressure the 40th move time control the results are consistent with the interpretation that men are more impatient with a lower discount factor but also more inconsistent in the sense that they tend to be too impatient women on the other hand are more inconsistent as they tend to over consume reflection time in the beginning leading to time pressure later

stop go monetary policy we propose and estimate several discrete choice models of monetary policy decision making that feature time varying inertia the models permit us to account for three stylized facts characterizing monetary policymaking in the united states 1 target interest rates are gradually adjusted in small discrete movements 2 there are some long stretches of time in which rates are repeatedly moved and 3 there are other long stretches in which the policy rate does not change our models are used to account for the fed s failure to adopt promptly an easier policy stance during the recession of 2001 they are also used to explain delay in tightening the policy stance during the 2003 2006 period that featured a bubble in house prices and was followed by a financial crisis in 2008

roscas as financial agreements to cope with self control problems abstract we consider a model in which people with limited self control can sign binding financial agreements among themselves thereby forming coalitions we show that these financial agreements may help them to alleviate their self control problems we then demonstrate that there exists a stable structure of coalitions in which people form rotating savings and credit associations roscas we therefore provide a behavioral rationale for one of the most prevalent and puzzling financial institutions in developing countries finally we derive and discuss some empirical predictions

how many paychecks an example of a self imposed constraint i introduction the case of ulysses and the sirens is one of the most interesting puzzles for the model of rational behavior 1 ulysses knew enough about himself to know that he would not be able to control his behavior when under the spell of the sirens so he had himself bound to the mast had wax put into the ears of his crew and instructed them to completely disregard any gestures he might make it is reasonable to ask if ulysses knew enough to know that he would lose control when under the spell of the sirens why didn t he know enough to maintain control more generally if you are rational enough to know you are going to be irrational why can t you stop the irrationality apparently things are not so simple psychiatrist george ainslie 1975 1992 argues based upon a large body of experimental evidence in psychology that individuals have an inherent tendency to be myopic and this leads them to have to develop rules of behavior which limit options given the story of ulysses the process of imposing such constraints on oneself is sometimes called binding the christmas club is the traditional example of a self imposed constraint 2 the local credit union offers an account which has all of the attributes of the normal savings account and the added characteristic that the account holder cannot make any withdrawals until a specified date close to christmas given that the lack of flexibility inherent in the christmas club is combined with no compensating advantage of any sort e g higher interest rates standard analysis suggests the christmas club would have no takers but in fact there are many christmas club members 3 apparently a large number of individuals feel they cannot trust themselves to save money for christmas shopping in a normal savings account the christmas club gives them a way of tying their hands it is a self imposed constraint in this paper i examine behavior which might also be an example of a self imposed constraint at the college of william and mary a full time faculty member has the option of receiving her salary in eighteen equal payments over the nine month academic year or in twenty four equal payments over the entire year starting in september the twenty four month option has the look of a self imposed constraint 4 the faculty member who takes this option is foregoing interest earnings from a simple plan which deposits eighteen payments earns interest and finances the summer perhaps the faculty members who elect the twenty four payment option are like ulysses they know enough to know that they will not follow the plan they know enough to make a preference for the twenty four payment option is not necessarily evidence of a self imposed constraint taking eighteen payments squirreling away some of each payment and financing one s summer expenditures from what had accumulated during the academic year is a costly endeavor therefore a standard economic model based on transactions costs could also explain a preference for the twenty four payment option the purpose of this paper is to present a test of these two models ii theoretical analyses of the choice of the twenty four payment option a standard economic model the task at hand is to explain the demand for the twenty four payment option as compared to the eighteen payment option since the total salary is the same in both cases at any nonzero interest rate the present value of the eighteen payment option dominates the present value of the twenty four payment option this suggests that on a strict basis of economic rationality there would be no takers for the twenty four payment option at william and mary however over 67 percent of the faculty choose the twenty four payment option there is however a clear difficulty with simply comparing present values in this case such a comparison implicitly assumes that trips to the bank are costless a complete model should consider transactions costs

political preference functions and public policy reform a model of policy making is developed where governments seek to maximize support from social groups through the combination of both pert social welfare increasing and pert welfare transferring policies the implicit weights of a political preference function shift with a change in the relative cost of interest group organizing attention is paid to the degree of wealth transfers as total social welfare increases because of pert policy changes the model demonstrates that in the case of two competing groups the weight given to one group in the allocation of social surplus will increase as total social welfare increases with a bias toward the other group the relative weights placed on consumers and producers based on pest policies alone are misleading indicators of the political influence of groups a number of general implications of this political economic analysis for the reform of public policies are investigated

to be consumed with moderation abstract we study the optimal behavior of a hyperbolic discounting agent who has incomplete information about his own preferences and can only learn them through consumption we show that even if moderate current consumption and moderate future consumption always dominates abstinence the agent may optimally decide not to consume as a commitment device against inefficient learning that would lead to future excesses this provides a rationale for why smokers gamblers or compulsive buyers stick to second best personal rules of behavior such as abstinence without invoking standard habit formation arguments we also study how urges modify the strategy of the individual

why bank governance is different this paper reviews the pattern of bank failures during the financial crisis and asks whether there was a link with corporate governance it revisits the theory of bank governance and suggests a multi constituency approach that emphasizes the role of weak creditors the empirical evidence suggests that on average banks with stronger risk officers less independent boards and executives with less variable remuneration incurred fewer losses there is no evidence that institutional shareholders opposed aggressive risk taking the financial stability board published principles for sound compensation practices in 2009 and the basel committee on banking supervision issued principles for enhancing corporate governance in 1999 2006 and 2010 the reports have in common that shareholders retain residual control and executive pay continues to be aligned with shareholder interests however we argue that bank governance is different and requires more radical departures from traditional governance for non financial firms

temptation and taxation we study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self control problems embedding the class of preferences developed by gul and pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting we first prove in a two period model that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by excessive impatience the savings subsidy improves welfare because it makes succumbing to temptation less attractive we then study an economy with a long but finite horizon which nests as a special case the phelps pollak laibson multiple selves model thereby providing guidance on how to evaluate welfare in this model we prove that when period utility is logarithmic the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any finite horizon moreover as the horizon grows large the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy in contrast to the well known chamley judd result

investment shocks consumption puzzle and business cycles a mass of recent research shows that investment shocks are primary driving forces of business cycles a thorny issue however arises due to countercyclical consumption behavior following the investment shocks this article contributes to the literature by resolving this anomalous issue in a model that features time inconsistency modeled as naive hyperbolic discounting the proposed model delivers positive responses of consumption to an investment shock and thus produces comovement of key macroaggregates which is in line with the observed u s business cycles furthermore this article also substantiates the validity of the proposed model by producing comovement following an investment news or anticipated investment shock additional analyses on changes in model structure and parameter value do not reverse the main finding jel e3 e7

how do contribution limits affect contributions to tax preferred savings accounts abstract contributions to tax preferred savings accounts are typically constrained by a contribution limit these limits influence contributions not only for taxpayers currently constrained by the limit but also for those contributing less than the limit i develop a simple life cycle model in which taxpayers exhibit use it or lose it contribution behavior this connects current contributions to future contribution limits and implies that an increase in contribution limits can decrease contributions empirical evidence from microdata provides support for the model using variation from canadian limit reforms i find that larger future contribution room is associated with smaller contributions

individual and collective time consistency this paper reconsiders the strotz pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame perfectness such a refinement is offered through an analysis based on greenberg s theory of social situations the properties of this refinement are investigated and illustrated a unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one person planning as a problem of individual time consistency and renegotiation proofness as a problem of collective time consistency are captured through the same general concept

reconsidering the moral hazard risk avoidance tradeoff the received model for optimal demand side cost sharing trades off moral hazard and risk avoidance this model appears to lie behind recent increases in initial cost sharing such as those embodied in health savings accounts and health reimbursement accounts at the same time there is evidence that lower cost sharing for certain drugs can reduce future total health care costs and or improve future health and this may be true of other medical services as well to the degree that individuals remain in the same common insurance pool lower cost sharing that induces increases in certain services that reduce total costs including future costs represents a classic case for a subsidy and will minimize an employer s labor costs even if total costs increase the value of a change in health could increase more in that case such a subsidy is consistent with recent work in behavioral economics for those with self control problems

nonmarket institutions for credit and risk sharing in low income countries the design credit and risk institutions in low income countries provides one of the most exciting testing grounds for theories of contracting with imperfect information and limited enforcement this paper reviews some of the recent literature with a special focus on nonmarket institutions that cope with risk and provide credit this literature attempts to bring together insights from economic theory especially information economics contract theory and mechanism design theory however it is also applied being motivated by the circumstance of the poor countries that their authors have visited and studied

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

april 15 syndrome i introduction the popular characterization of completing and mailing individual tax forms is that people wait until the last minute to fill out their returns and then rush to mail them at their nearest post office which has extended its hours until midnight this phenomenon which we call april 15 syndrome has large private costs we estimate that for tax year 1988 the 73 2 million taxpayers claiming refunds gave up nearly one billion dollars in interest or an average of about 13 50 per return due to filing the forms later than the earliest possible time 1 more incomprehensible from an economic standpoint but of less quantitative significance are the impatient tax filers 10 5 million taxpayers who owed the internal revenue service irs money and passed up 46 million in interest by mailing in their taxes before the filing deadline in addition to these direct costs tax returns done in haste at the last minute may be more prone to error to the extent they are not caught by the irs this adds to the capriciousness of the tax burden correcting the errors due to rushed completing of forms also adds to the administrative costs of the irs many cities and towns keep their post offices open late for no reason other than to accommodate the severe procrastinator finally return processing is slowed by the avalanche of returns filed in mid april we present some exploratory analyses of april 15 syndrome using 1988 tax return data after describing in section ii the legal framework for tax filing in section iii we discuss the data and present the basic facts with which any model of filing behavior has to contend there is a wide distribution of filing times and a substantial fraction of households which despite being owed refunds file late or which despite owing taxes file early in section iv we consider some basic models of the decision as to when to file one s taxes we note that the simplest model fails to rationalize the most obvious characteristic of the data the substantial heterogeneity of filing times in the baseline rational model individuals simply maximize their income less effort which involves either complete procrastination or prompt filing adding imperfect information does not seem to eliminate the result we are led to a model in which individuals have a stochastic opportunity cost of doing their taxes this model generates a wide distribution of filing times for returns which will get refunds and rationalizes procrastination however our framework fails to generate early filing of returns with taxes due and we consider the issue again after our analysis of the data in section v we take the predictions of our model to the data we examine the various characteristics of refund and remittance returns and perform some reduced form regressions of the determinants of return filing time most supportive of our interpretation of late filing for refunds there is much less procrastination for returns which are filled out by a paid preparer than for returns which are filed by the taxpayer further we find that the complexity of forms delays filing both for returns with tax due and for those with refunds people with a higher marginal valuation of time proxied by higher incomes are more likely to file later and the larger the refund value the sooner the return is expected to be filed returns which are completed by professional tax preparers do not exhibit these last two characteristics finally cross year analysis demonstrates that filing late is habitual suggesting that households have persistently different values of time or propensities to procrastinate we conclude by speculating on the objectives and constraints which might generate early filing by individuals with taxes due and by considering the implications of our findings we believe that our investigation of the timing of tax return filing informs us about other examples of apparently non optimal timing of economic behavior

credit market competition and capital regulation market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt but also from the asset side this will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply so that banks have to compete for projects in such a setting borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending thus creating an asset market based incentive for banks to hold capital borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid off since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds this implies that capital requirements may not be binding as recent evidence seems to indicate

procrastination and obedience in this lecture i shall focus on situations involving repeated decisions with time inconsistent behavior although each choice may be close to maximizing and therefore result in only small losses the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors may be quite large thus in my examples decision makers are quite close to the intelligent well informed individuals usually assumed in economic analysis but cumulatively they make seriously wrong decisions that do not occur in standard textbook economics this lecture discusses and illustrates several pathological modes of individual and group behavior procrastination in decision making undue obedience to authority membership of seemingly normal individuals in deviant cult groups and escalation of commitment to courses of action that are clearly unwise in each case individuals choose a series of current actions without fully appreciating how those actions will affect future perceptions and behavior the standard assumption of rational forwardlooking utility maximizing is violated the nonindependence of errors in decision making in the series of decisions can be explained with the concept from cognitive psychology of undue salience or vividness for example present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs

bank capital in the crisis it s not just how much you have but who provides it abstract bank capital is the cornerstone of bank regulation and is considered a key determinant of a bank s ability to withstand economic shocks in the area of bank capital regulation the general view is that more bank capital is better irrespective of who provides it in this paper we investigate whether the investment horizon of bank capital providers matters for bank performance during the recent financial crisis we observe that banks with more short term investor ownership have worse stock returns during the crisis further exploration suggests that this is partially because banks with higher short term investor ownership took more risk prior to the crisis but mainly because they experienced higher selling pressure during the crisis our results confirm the economic benefit of bank capital in helping banks to perform better during crises however when we decompose bank capital by the nature of its providers we show that more capital is associated with worse performance when it is provided by short term institutional investors

state and local impacts of a revenue neutral shift from a uniform property to a land value tax results of a simulation study this paper reports on the results of simulating a revenue neutral shift from a statewide uniform property tax to a land value tax the statewide economic impacts of such a tax reform are projected to be generally positive and also persistent in a state like new hampshire however substantial variations in those impacts among the state s counties could be expected to occur

the source of optimality in action it is well known that the nature of the information set and the axioms of rational choice are critical in determining the type of ranking on which agents are held to act in economic theory this paper argues that the concept of the optimising agent is also sensitive to the conception of the relation between a ranking of options facing an agent and concrete action what is termed the realisation process three conceptions of the realisation process are examined which are seen to lead to three quite distinct views on the role of agency the enabling conditions under which the concept of the optimising agent may be legitimately applied and the resulting domain of application of optimisation

the behavioral life cycle hypothesis self control mental accounting and framing are incorporated in a behavioral enrichment of the life cycle theory of saving called the behavioral life cycle blc hypothesis the key assumption of the blc theory is that households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible even in the absence of credit rationing specifically wealth is assumed to be divided into three mental accounts current income current assets and future income the temptation to spend is assumed to be greatest for current income and least for future income considerable empirical support for the blc theory is presented primarily drawn from published econometric studies

hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets does the existence of secondary markets for durable goods affect price and allocation on primary markets we study competitive equilibria for durable goods where the possibility of future trade on secondary markets does not affect consumer behaviour in the primary market provided consumers are exponential discounters if consumers are hyperbolic discounters however secondary markets are no longer neutral as they allow consumers to postpone their purchasing decisions in this case the equilibrium price in the primary market is decreasing in the number of periods in which the good can be traded hence primary producers have an incentive to close down secondary markets if secondary markets never close hyperbolic discounters may use collusive intrapersonal strategies which lead to a pareto improvement for all incarnations of the same consumer we characterise the set of all stationary equilibrium prices and show that the competitive equilibrium allocation may be inefficient

a theory of haste abstract we consider a hyperbolic discounting agent at each period he can undertake an irreversible consumption decision that yields an uncertain current benefit and a delayed cost if he decides to defer consumption for the future some information exogenously flows in we show that the agent may rationally decide to consume with negative expected net present value npv only to prevent himself from consuming in the future which could be profitable from a future perspective but highly detrimental from the current viewpoint comparative statics reveal that the value of information is u shaped

commitment and self control abstract the literature on self control problems has typically concentrated on immediate temptations this paper studies a gul and pesendorfer temptation and self control econometrica 69 2001 1403 1435 self control and the theory of consumption econometrica 72 2004 119 158 style model in which decision makers are affected by temptations that lie in the future while temptation is commonly understood to give rise to a demand for commitment it is shown that temptation by future consumption can induce its absence the model also exhibits procrastination provides an alternative to projection bias as an explanation for some experimental results and can simultaneously account for myopic and hyperopic behavior the evidence on preference reversals supports temptation by future consumption and suggests that it may not be restricted to short time horizons

paradoxical effects of drug policy in a model with imperfect competition and switching costs this paper presents a stylized model of the market for hard drugs we assume that there is imperfect competition that the demand side is dominated by addicts and that the presence of switching costs leads to consumer loyalty drug policies affect the values of the parameters of the model including the degree of consumer loyalty and the static price elasticity of demand taking into account these effects it is shown that tough policies may lead to an increase in the marketing activities by suppliers and cause a long run increase in the number of addicts and total consumption

the role of rebates in the hybrid competition between a national brand and a private label with present biased consumers abstract over the past years rebates have been increasingly used by national brand nb manufacturers conventional wisdom suggests that rebates are beneficial to firms as long as positive slippage exists based on the present biased preference theory we investigate the performance of nb rebates as a counterstrategy to the retailer s private label pl game theoretic models are developed to characterize channel dynamics involving consumers knowledge levels of the present biased preferences our model reveals multiple insights first a positive slippage rate does not necessarily benefit the nb manufacturer if the rebates fail to expand the demand of the nb second the retailer s commitment to the original nb price plays a positive role in improving the equilibrium profits of both parties third for loss averse consumers under preference uncertainties the nb manufacturer and the retailer prefer a low redemption cost in contrary to the conventional idea that sellers take advantage of consumers with high redemption costs

life cycle consumption of a harmful and addictive good david goldbaum this article demonstrates that the endogenous desire to quit smoking can result from a rational consumption path chosen at the time the consumer begins smoking this result is obtained without relying on hidden costs or unknown preferences a finite lived agent chooses a path of consumption of a harmful and addictive good to maximize present discounted utility the consumer chooses his consumption rate to account for the future health consequence of smoking and the withdrawal costs of quitting a consumer may choose to smoke even if it means a lowered utility level for the majority of the time spent smoking jel d91 c61 i12 i introduction some of what we consume for pleasure can be harmful economists assume that consumers take measure of the potential harm and balance it against the pleasure derived from consumption when both the pleasure and the harm occur at the time of consumption the decision is straightforward some goods though impose a cost borne at some future date requiring intertemporal planning these present a greater challenge to the consumer and to the economist trying to explain the consumer s behavior at times observed behavior implores us to question whether the consumer is properly weighing the costs and benefits in a manner that maximizes his or her utility theoretically for each item under consideration the rational consumer properly balances the lifetime benefits derived from the consumption against the lifetime costs some observed behavior seems to contradict this rational approach to consumption in particular it is common for people to begin smoking cigarettes during their youth only to endogenously make a decision to quit at a future date to integrate this behavior with rationality modelers have proposed hidden costs multiple selves changing preferences or other strategies that limit the decision making ability of the youth in all of these cases for some consumers the decision to smoke is a mistake made during youth that has to be reversed at some cost as a middle aged adult this article aims to demonstrate that a lifetime path of consumption in which a person consumes a harmful and addictive good while young and quits at some later date is a path that is perfectly consistent with rational behavior it is not necessary to assume that mid life quitters are displaying irrational or time inconsistent behavior if all information regarding a good s harmful properties is revealed some consumers will still choose a path that requires quitting mid life this paper primarily examines the consumption of cigarettes but also includes analysis of a nonaddictive unhealthy good both of these harmful goods provide the consumer with immediate pleasure but at the cost of decreasing life expectancy background becker and murphy 1988 bm introduced the concept of rational addiction the idea that addicts are forward looking rational consumers present consumption choices reflect not only current utility considerations and budget constraints but also incorporate the anticipated impact of present consumption on future utility and budget constraints bm examine the behavior response of addicts to exogenous shocks changes from a steady state including the desire to quit originate only from exogenous shocks such as a change in the relative price of the good or a revelation about the detrimental health consequences of the addictive good that alters the consumer s utility derived from consumption the model offers no mechanism by which smokers may choose to alter behavior endogenously in contrast to bm s smokers many of today s smokers appear to quit in absence of an external shock anyone who began smoking after 1966 has been subjected to the legislated health warnings appearing on cigarette packages since that time 1 antismoking messages in radio and television advertisements during the 1950s and 1960s also helped to make the health consequences of smoking common knowledge

a model of addiction and social interactions many consumer behaviors are both addictive and social understanding how these two phenomena interact informs basic models of human behavior and matters for policymakers when the behavior is regulated i develop a new model of demand that incorporates both addiction and social interactions and show that under certain conditions social interactions reinforce the effects of addiction i also show how the dynamics introduced by addiction can solve the pernicious problem of identifying the causal effects of social interactions i then use the model to illustrate a new and important identification problem for studies of social interactions existing estimates cannot be used to draw welfare conclusions or even to deduce whether social interactions increase aggregate demand finally i develop a method that allows researchers to distinguish between two common forms of social interactions and draw welfare conclusions jel d11 h20

myopia and addictive behaviour we present a theory of addictive behaviour which can account for addicts apparent disregard for the future consequences of their current actions the discounting of future utility is increasing in past consumption indicating increasingly myopic behaviour as consumption increases the intertemporal complementarity generated by the endogenous discounting produces multiple steady states which can account for the simultaneous existence of myopic addicts and non myopic non addicts within a time consiste nt expected utility framework the theory also accounts for the probabilistic incidence of addiction and successful rehabilitation and the possibility of recurrence

discouraging rivals managerial rent seeking and economic inefficiencies we argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers decisions in general managerial rent seeking affects not only the level of investment but also the form our basic hypothesis is simple given the now well established scope for managerial discretion managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation and a manager s pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management the board of directors and rival management teams or takeover artists this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

testing hyperbolic discounting in consumer decisions evidence for argentina abstract the paper focuses on deep parameter estimates following the gmm approach applied to a modified euler equation which nests the case of a quasi hyperbolic discount function parameter estimates for argentina match with a discount function in which procrastination is a key feature

a model of focusing in economic choice we present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on and hence overweights attributes in which her options dier more our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated in intertemporal choice because the relative concentrations of an option s costs and benets can be dierent from the perspective of a single period and the perspective of the entire choice problem the decisionmaker often exhibits a form of time inconsistency she is present biased when the costs of current misbehavior are distributed over many future dates such as in harmful consumption but future biased when the benet of many

motor fuel taxation energy conservation and economic development a regional approach abstract combustion of motor fuels has a variety of environmental impacts on local regional and global scales taxing motor fuels more heavily would mitigate those environmental impacts however many governments are reluctant to increase motor fuel taxes because they fear that the tax incidence will be regressive and that economic development will be impeded using data for the new england region of the united states this paper argues that an oil importing region can conserve energy avoid regressive impacts and encourage economic development by taxing motor fuels more heavily and rebating the incremental revenues to owners of motor vehicles

spreading academic pay over nine or twelve months economists are supposed to know better but do they act better our article empirically considers two general hypotheses related to the literature of behavioural economics first we test the null hypothesis that individuals behave on average in a manner more consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis than with the idea of self control in the face of hyperbolic discounting in their saving decisions second along a variety of dimensions we examine whether individuals exhibit herbert simon s notion that the goal formation of individuals will differ depending upon their relative levels of experience and knowledge perhaps there are significant differences among groups in their saving decisions that depend upon their apparent levels of intelligence education and knowledge finally using a variety of individual specific control variables we test for robustness of the results

choice and procrastination author s o donoghue ted rabin matthew abstract recent models of procrastination due to self control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self control problems we develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self control problems this menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones a person might forego completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never to be completed option hence providing a non procrastinator additional options can induce procrastination and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones

the employment effects of credit market disruptions firm level evidence from the 2008 9 financial crisis this article investigates the effect of bank lending frictions on employment outcomes i construct a new data set that combines information on banking relationships and employment at 2 000 nonfinancial firms during the 2008 9 crisis the article first verifies empirically the importance of banking relationships which imply a cost to borrowers who switch lenders i then use the dispersion in lender health following the lehman crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the availability of credit to borrowers i find that credit matters firms that had precrisis relationships with less healthy lenders had a lower likelihood of obtaining a loan following the lehman bankruptcy paid a higher interest rate if they did borrow and reduced employment by more compared to precrisis clients of healthier lenders consistent with frictions deriving from asymmetric information the effects vary by firm type lender health has an economically and statistically significant effect on employment at small and medium firms but the data cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect at the largest or most transparent firms abstracting from general equilibrium effects i find that the withdrawal of credit accounts for between one third and one half of the employment decline at small and medium firms in the sample in the year

habits and the anomalies in intertemporal choice this paper analyzes a model of discounted utility under habit formation habit formation means that utility in each period is determined by the difference between the received outcome and the customary outcome at that point in time preferences are rational in the sense that the decision maker correctly anticipates the habit formation process and behaves in a dynamically consistent manner i e plans are truly carried out the purpose is to demonstrate that this generalization of the discounted utility model accounts jointly and in a meaningful way for the most striking anomalies with respect to classical discounted utility theory the common difference effect is explained first this effect also called decreasing impatience effect has usually been viewed as evidence against exponential discounting then the frequently observed preference for increasing sequences of outcomes is examined such preference under the traditional discounted utility model would be regarded as a paradoxical case of negative discounting a discussion of the descriptive prescriptive and normative values of the model is included

decision making approaches and the propensity to default evidence and implications abstract this paper examines heterogeneity in the responsiveness to default options in a large state retirement plan focusing on individuals decision making approaches as well as their economic and demographic characteristics analyses of a survey of plan participants show that procrastination and the need for cognitive closure are important determinants of the likelihood of default this paper also explores an important implication of defaulting individuals who default are significantly more likely to subsequently express a desire to enroll in a different plan the desire to change plans is also correlated with numerous economic and decision making characteristics including procrastination

procrastination in teams and contract design abstract we study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard we show that players might procrastinate to exploit the future externalities of team production contract design is shown to be a powerful tool to mitigate the problem of procrastination and enhance efficiency the team s ability to write discriminatory contracts is therefore central we also show that deadlines are not beneficial for a team provided that players can choose efforts frequently and design contracts optimally

implications of a land value tax with error in assessed values land value taxation has numerous potential advantages compared to conventional property taxes on capital and land the models that establish these advantages however are grounded in the unlikely assumption that land values are assessed without error this paper demonstrates that levying taxes based on land values assessed with error is equivalent to the application of one tax rate to the true value of land and a different effective tax rate to capital the model demonstrates that a land value tax will have at most the distortion effects of a property tax even with the worst possible land value assessment errors

what accounts for the variation in retirement wealth among u s households even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics saving and wealth vary considerably life cycle models attribute this variation to differences in time preference rates risk tolerance exposure to uncertainty relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages and income replacement rates these factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and the shape of the consumption profile using the panel study of income dynamics and the consumer expenditure survey we find little support for these implications the data are instead consistent with rule of thumb mental accounting or hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation jel di d91 e21

the intertemporal dynamics of consumer lock in this article examines how dynamic changes in information cost structure and time preferences affect consumers search and switching behavior over time and lead to lock in the information cost structure is conceptualized as a trade off of initial setup costs and ongoing usage costs lock in is defined as consumers decreased propensity to search and switch after an initial investment which is determined both by a preference to minimize immediate costs and by an inability to anticipate the impact of future switching costs the results of three experiments support the proposed mechanism experiment 1 shows that a small initial investment is sufficient to produce lock in experiment 2 shows that the results of a prior investment on lock in are not due to psychological commitment but to a shift in relative costs of incumbent and new options experiment 3 shows that respondents fail to anticipate how their prior investment will lock them in

ramsey meets laibson in the neoclassical growth model the neoclassical growth model is modified to include a variable rate of time preference with no commitment ability and log utility the equilibrium features a constant effective rate of time preference and is observationally equivalent to the standard model the extended framework yields testable linkages between the extent of commitment ability and the rates of saving and growth the model also has welfare implications including the optimal design of institutions that facilitate household commitments steady state results are obtained for general concave utility functions and some properties of the transitional dynamics are characterized for isoelastic utility

how are preferences revealed revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize an economic agent s observed actions normative preferences represent the agent s actual interests it sometimes makes sense to assume that revealed preferences are identical to normative preferences but there are many cases where this assumption is violated we identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity between revealed preferences and normative preferences passive choice complexity limited personal experience third party marketing and intertemporal choice we then discuss six approaches that jointly contribute to the identification of normative preferences structural estimation active decisions asymptotic choice aggregated revealed preferences reported preferences and informed preferences each of these approaches uses consumer behavior to infer some property of normative preferences without equating revealed and normative preferences we illustrate these issues with evidence from savings and investment outcomes

strategic ignorance as a self disciplining device we analyse the decision of an agent with time inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare the extent of the externality is initially unknown but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure we show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions incomplete learning may occur on a markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra personal game in such a case each agent s incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self restricted information this conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance all equilibria featuring this property strictly pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs

symposium on organizations and economics m t r ost production in modern economies occurs within organizations and this production is regulated only to a limited extent by prices the size of some of the largest organizations like general motors or ibm or att if managers didn t they would be replaced and firms that didn t maximize value wouldn t survive accordingly what went on inside the black box was mere detail the behavior of the firm could be described completely without knowledge of those details