competing through information provision this paper studies the symmetric equilibria of a two buyer two seller model of directed search in which sellers commit to information provision more informed buyers have better differentiated private valuations and extract higher rents from trade when sellers cannot commit to sale mechanisms information provision is higher under competition than under monopoly in contrast when sellers commit to both information provision and sale mechanisms i identify simple conditions under which sellers post auctions and provide full information in every equilibrium ensuring that all equilibrium outcomes are constrained efficient sellers capture the efficiency gains from increased information and compete only over non distortionary rents offered to buyers

boundedly rational nash equilibrium a probabilistic choice approach we propose an equilibrium for n person finite games based on bounded rationality using the legit model of discrete choice theory at equilibrium each player uses appropriate choice probabilities given those used by the others rationality is parameterized on a continuum from complete rationality to uniform random choice results on the existence of equilibrium and on convergence to nash as rationality becomes perfect are similar to results due to mckelvey and palfrey we identify conditions such that for a given rationality parameter range the path of choices over time when the players use fictitious play converges to equilibrium c 1997 academic press

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

advertising learning and consumer choice in experience good markets an empirical examination this article empirically analyzes different effects of advertising in a nondurable experience good market a dynamic learning model of consumer behavior is presented in which i allow both informative effects of advertising and prestige or image effects of advertising this learning model is estimated using consumer level panel data tracking grocery purchases and advertising exposures over time empirical results suggest that in this market advertising s primary effect was that of informing consumers the estimates are used to quantify the value of this information to consumers and evaluate the welfare implications of an alternative advertising regulatory regime

pre sale information in markets as diverse as that for specialized industrial equipment or that for retail financial services sellers or intermediaries may earn profits both from the sale of products and from the provision of pre sale consultation services we study how a seller optimally chooses the costly quality of pre sale information next to the price of information and the product price and obtain clear cut predictions on when information is over and when it is underprovided even though we find that information quality does not satisfy a standard single crossing property buyers who are a priori more optimistic about their valuation end up paying a higher margin for information but a lower margin for the product when they subsequently exercise their option to purchase at a pre specified price

measuring and testing advertising induced rotation in the demand curve advertising can rotate the demand curve if it changes the dispersion of consumers valuations we provide an elasticity form measure of the advertising induced demand curve rotation in five demand models and test for its presence in the us nonalcoholic beverage market the almost ideal demand system aids model reveals that doubling advertising spending rotates the demand curves clockwise for milk and coffee and tea with associated slope changes of 7 and 12 soft drink advertising rotates its demand curve counterclockwise our policy suggestion is that milk and soft drink firms time advertising to coincide with high and low price periods respectively

the dynamics of learning with team production implications for task assignment we analyze optimal task assignment when a firm needs to learn the abilities of employees when projects require collaboration between juniors and seniors and only team outputs are observable having juniors divide their time between two projects junior sharing is less informative about their abilities but more informative about their senior teammates abilities than having juniors devote all their time to a single project no sharing in an overlapping generations model we show that no sharing is more less attractive than junior sharing if the prior uncertainty about abilities is small large relative to exogenous shocks to team production

entrepreneurship social mobility and income redistribution in south india development economists have been preoccupied with the problem of increasing the size of the gnp pie to the relative neglect of its distribution despite the recent disenchantment with the viewpoint that all classes share in the benefits of industrial growth empirical data on the distribution of income business opportunity and economic power are in short supply many of the studies on entrepreneurship and economic development when they are not apologetics for ruthless capitalist exploitation as paul baran suggests extol the achievements of the capitalist entrepreneur without examining class origins and monopoly advantage joseph schumpeter sees entrepreneurs irrespective of class origin as heroic figures with the dream and will to found a private kingdom to conquer adversity to achieve success for its own sake and to experience the joy of creation for gustav papanek 1967 the private entrepreneur who is frugal diligent far sighted remarkably able and willing to take political risks is in large part responsible for the success of pakistan in achieving rapid industrialization

stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games abstract a recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selection under noisy best response dynamics in this paper we present a complete picture of equilibrium selection for asymmetric binary choice coordination games in the small noise limit we achieve this by transforming the stochastic stability analysis into an optimal control problem which can be solved analytically this approach allows us to obtain precise and clean equilibrium selection results for all canonical noisy best response dynamics which have been proposed so far in the literature among which we find the best response with mutations dynamics the logit dynamics and the probit dynamics

decision making under uncertainty capturing dynamic brand choice processes in turbulent consumer goods markets we construct two models of the behavior of consumers in an environment where there is uncertainty about brand attributes in our models both usage experience and advertising exposure give consumers noisy signals about brand attributes consumers use these signals to update their expectations of brand attributes in a bayesian manner the two models are 1 a dynamic model with immediate utility maximization and 2 a dynamic forward looking model in which consumers maximize the expected present value of utility over a planning horizon given this theoretical framework we derive from the bayesian learning framework how brand choice probabilities depend on past usage experience and advertising exposures we then form likelihood functions for the models and estimate them on nielsen scanner data for detergent we find that the functional forms for experience and advertising effects that we derive from the bayesian learning framework fit the data very well relative to flexible ad hoc functional forms such as exponential smoothing and also perform better at out of sample prediction another finding is that in the context of consumer learning of product attributes although the forward looking model fits the data statistically better at conventional significance levels both models produce similar parameter estimates and policy implications our estimates indicate that consumers are risk averse with respect to variation in brand attributes which discourages them from buying unfamiliar brands using the estimated behavioral models we perform various scenario evaluations to find how changes in marketing strategy affect brand choice both in the short and long run a key finding obtained from the policy experiments is that advertising intensity has only weak short run effects but a strong cumulative effect in the long run the substantive content of the paper is potentially of interest to academics in marketing economics and decision sciences as well as product managers marketing research managers and analysts interested in studying the effectiveness of marketing mix strategies our paper will be of particular interest to those interested in the long run effects of advertising note that our estimation strategy requires us to specify explicit behavioral models of consumer choice behavior derive the implied relationships among choice probabilities past purchases and marketing mix variables and then estimate the behavioral parameters of each model such an estimation strategy is referred to as structural estimation and econometric models that are based explicitly on the consumer s maximization problem and whose parameters are parameters of the consumers utility functions or of their constraints are referred to as structural models a key benefit of the structural approach is its potential usefulness for policy evaluation the parameters of structural models are invariant to policy that is they do not change due to a change in the policy in contrast the parameters of reduced form brand choice models are in general functions of marketing strategy variables e g consumer response to price may depend on pricing policy as a result the predictions of reduced form models for the outcomes of policy experiments may be unreliable because in making the prediction one must assume that the model parameters are unaffected by the policy change since the agents in our models choose among many alternative brands their choice probabilities take the form of higher order integrals we employ monte carlo methods to approximate these integrals and estimate our models using simulated maximum likelihood estimation of the dynamic forward looking model also requires that a dynamic programming problem be solved in order to form the likelihood function for this we use a new approximation method based on simulation and interpolation techniques these estimation techniques may be of interest to researchers and policy makers in many fields where dynamic choice among discrete alternatives is important such as marketing decision sciences labor and health economics and industrial organization

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

customer return policies for experience goods this paper studies the economic rationale for customer return policies by focusing on the experience goods aspect of many products return policies allow consumers to defer their purchasing decisions until after they gain some experience with goods in so doing they insure consumers against ex post loss which allows a monopoly seller to charge more than otherwise it is shown that the seller adopts the return policy when consumers are highly risk averse or retail costs are high consumers are strictly better off under the return policy but there is too little adoption of the policy in equilibrium copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

information manipulation coordination and regime change this article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change there is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime s ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that taken at face value makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is this coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium s comparative statics holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens if the per unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow in contrast if the number of signals increases so that both total signal precision and the regime s costs of manipulation rise together then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control

payoff dependent mistakes and q resistant equilibrium abstract this paper proposes an extension of p dominance called q resistant equilibrium which has the largest resistance to payoff dependent mistakes the selection could differ from the risk dominant equilibrium and a sufficient condition for a q resistant equilibrium to follow risk dominance is provided

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

binary games with state dependent stochastic choice this paper studies a stochastic equilibrium selection model for binary coordination games players switch strategies stochastically so that the mistake probabilities are fully dependent on the population states a probabilistic behavior is said to be aspiration imitation resp oriented if strategy switches are mainly driven by the aspiration imitation resp effect in general a strategy switch by one player generates externalities on others strategies in a coordination game can be classified according to the relative magnitude of their externality effects it is shown that the selection outcome for a linear coordination game is determined in a specific way by the balance of the risk dominance the aspiration imitation and the externality effects it is also shown that an aspiration imitation resp oriented behavior tends to select payoff dominant maxmin resp equilibrium and that risk dominant equilibrium is always selected if and only if the aspiration and the imitation effects exactly cancel each other out which in turn makes the selection process insensitive to externality effects journal of economic literature classification number c72

the value of public information in monopoly the logic of the linkage principle of milgrom and weber 1982 extends to price discrimination a non linear pricing monopolist who sells to a single buyer always prefers to commit to publicly reveal information a liated to the valuation of the buyer

sales talk cancellation terms and the role of consumer protection this paper analyses contract cancellation and product return policies in mar kets in which sellers advise customers about the suitability of their oering when customers are fully rational it is optimal for sellers to oer the right to cancel or return on favorable terms a generous return policy makes the seller s cheap talk at the point of sale credible this observation provides a possible explanation for the excess refund puzzle and also has implications for the management of customer reviews when customers are credulous instead sellers have an incentive to set unfavorable terms to exploit the in ated beliefs they induce in their customers the imposition of a minimum statutory standard even if it is not binding can improve welfare and consumer surplus when at least some customers are credulous in con trast competition policy reduces contractual ine ciencies with rational customers but it is not eective with credulous customers

the effects of banning advertising in junk food markets we develop a structural model to analyze the eects of banning advertising on market equilibria and welfare in junk food markets we consider the impact on demand and prices and show how to quantify welfare eects when advertising might lead consumers to take decisions that are inconsistent with their underlying preferences we use transaction level data on the potato chips market and nd that banning advertising leads to a direct reduction in demand but also toughens price competition leading to lower prices and increased demand welfare increases as consumers benet from no longer making distorted

a simple theory of advertising as a good or bad our analysis treats advertisements and the goods advertised as complements in stable metautility functions and generates new results for advertising by building on and extending the general analysis of complements by assimilating the theory of advertising into the theory of complements we avoid the special approaches to advertising found in many studies that place obstacles in the way of understanding the effects of advertising we also use this approach to evaluate advertising from a welfare perspective whether there is excessive or too little advertising depends on several variables the effects on consumer utility the degree of competition in the market for advertised goods the induced changes in prices and outputs of advertised goods and whether advertising is sold to consumers

supplying information to facilitate price discrimination the authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller s product improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high value buyers however improved information can also provide rents to buyers in a variety of settings this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

gaussian demand and commodity bundling in an important and widely cited essay adams and yellen 1976 examine the use of package selling as a price discrimination device they consider a monopolist producing two goods with constant unit costs and facing buyers with diverse tastes the marginal utility of a second unit of either good is assumed to be zero for all buyers the two goods are independent in demand for all buyers so that any buyer s reservation price for the first unit of either good is independent of the market price of the other thus the maximum amount any buyer would pay for a bundle consisting of one unit of each good is the sum of the two reservation prices and buyers are completely described by the values of those two prices 2 resale markets are assumed away in order to obtain comparative results for alternative pricing strategies the distribution of reservation prices in the adams yellen framework is assumed to be bivariate normal implications of gaussian demand are explored pure bundling is shown to operate by reducing buyer diversity thus facilitating the capture of consumers surplus it generally makes buyers worse off than unbundled sales it is more profitable if average reservation prices are high enough mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales and it is generally strictly more profitable than either bundling which treats goods symmetrically seems most attractive under symmetric reservation price distributions i am indebted to severin borenstein for superb research assistance to the ford motor company for research support through a grant to m i t and to the harvard economics department for housing me as a visiting scholar while most of this research was performed of course only i can be held responsible for this essay s shortcomings 1 the first clear recognition of this possibility seems to have been by stigler 1968 but also see burstein 1960 2 paroush and peles 1981 relax the assumption that consumers purchase at most one unit of each good but they consider only two types of buyers both with linear demand functions they retain the assumption that demands are independent for all buyers telser 1979 and phillips 1981 use different frameworks to analyze bundling policies spence 1980 explores the relation between bundling across commodities as here and bundling multiple units of the same

price and quality in a new product monopoly in a signal extraction model of consumer behaviour higher prices signal higher quality products for a new product monopoly even without cost asymmetries across different qualities moreover higher quality products earn greater expected profits and the monopolist has an incentive to provide even transient improvements in quality finally the monopolist has a positive incentive to conduct market research about quality and produces more information than is socially optimal

the logit response dynamics we develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit response learning dynamics in games with arbitraryspecification of revision opportunities the result allows us to show convergence to the set of nash equilibria in the class of best response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games we also study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specificationof revision opportunities our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

inequality incomplete contracts and the size distribution of business firms this article analyzes the effects of intrafirm bargaining on the formation of firms in an economy with imperfect capital markets and contracting constraints in equilibrium wealth inequality induces a heterogeneous distribution of firm sizes allowing for firms both too small and too large in terms of technical efficiency the findings connect well to empirical facts such as the missing middle of firm size distributions in developing countries the model can encompass a nonmonotonic relationship between aggregate output and inequality it turns out that an inflow of capital may indeed decrease output in absolute terms

risk aversion and the choice between risky prospects the preservation of comparative statics results most results in what can be termed the comparative statics of risk aversion are obtained when there is only one source of uncertainty the primary example which originally motivated the definition of risk aversion is that more risk averse people are willing to pay a higher premium for insuring against risk it is known that the results do not generally carry over when there is another source of uncertainty the paper develops conditions under which comparative statics results are robust against the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty

risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run abstract this paper investigates the role that risk attitudes play in the evolution of conventions in the long run risk aversion is shown to be associated with the evolution of maximin conventions and risk seeking with the evolution of payoff dominant conventions

evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities abstract j bergin and b lipman econometrica 64 1996 943 956 show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in m kandori g mailath and r rob econometrica 61 1993 29 56 and p young econometrica 61 1993 57 84 is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states we here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy this is shown to corroborate the results in kandori mailath rob 1993 and under certain regularity conditions those in young 1993 journal of economic literature classification number c72

durable goods monopoly with stochastic values i analyze a durable goods model that allows consumers values to vary over time the optimal mechanism for a monopolist is computed and compared to both the sales and leasing equilibria i show that sales may implement the optimal strategy and that the dominance of leasing over sales is not necessarily true this implication is consistent with the prevalence of simple sales contracts in many markets copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

information control in the principal agent problem this paper compares the principal s payoff in agency models under different assumptions about the agent s access to information the agent may make decisions before is uninformed or after is informed learning the state of nature when there are two possible outcomes the principal typically prefers informed to uninformed agents whether the agent receives the information before or after contracting this result is false when there are more than two outcomes conditions under which a principal prefers one agent to another when the agents differ only in their disutility of effort are also given copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

choosing between risky prospects the characterization of comparative statics results and location independent risk we consider expected utility maximizers choosing from a family of risky prospects and examine how choice is influenced by the decision makers attitude to risk if the family of risky prospects can be ordered so that as decision makers are more risk tolerant they choose a gamble higher in the ordering then it is natural to say that the family of risky prospects admit a comparative static result the paper characterizes when comparative static results of this sort exist an application is to propose a criterion of location independent riskiness

commodity bundling by single product monopolies consider two products that have independent demands in the sense that all individual buyers consider them neither substitutes nor complements then if the two products are priced separately the demand for either is independent of the price of the other in his classic analysis of block booking of feature films george stigler shows that it may be profitable for a monopoly seller of two such products to bundle them by requiring a buyer to take both in order to get either his work provides a rationale for tying arrangements that does not depend on technological or other dependencies among the products involved 2 adams and yellen extend the analysis of multiproduct monopoly with independent demands 3 they discuss two different bundling strategies pure bundling in which the seller only offers the products in fixed proportions and mixed bundling in which buyers may either buy the products separately or purchase a bundle with fixed proportions of each in this note i consider a single product monopoly and investigate the profit and welfare implications of bundling its product for some other

efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching abstract this paper investigates the sensitivity of recent evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism we study a literally random matching mechanism combined with a process of strategy adjustment based on the realized average performance of each strategy in the key class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games the pareto efficient equilibrium per se is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium as the probability of experimentation or mutation goes to zero furthermore convergence to the equilibrium is relatively fast we extend these results for example to games of common interest journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

environmental efficiency and economic growth of china a ray slack based model analysis abstract the chinese economy has been experiencing rapid growth since the implementation of the reform and opening up policy however at the same time it faces issues regarding resource savings and environmental protection which are important aspects of the new industrialization therefore this study conducts data envelopment analysis dea to evaluate the environmental efficiency of chinese regions certain existing dea models account for undesirable outputs and do not elucidate the weak disposable relationship between undesirable and desirable outputs thus polar theory is introduced among the dea modeling in this study first drawing on stochastic frontier analysis ray stochastic frontier analysis and dea we propose a ray slack based model rsbm to evaluate provincial environmental efficiencies in china from 2004 to 2012 subsequently an rsbm malmquist luenberger total factor productivity index is structured finally economic growth environmental efficiency and energy consumption are analyzed using spatial panel econometrics as this study treats industrial waste as undesirable outputs the rsbm results show that the environmental efficiencies in the east are the highest while those in the central regions are the lowest the spatial econometric analysis reveals that the ratios of direct to total elasticity and those of direct to total effect for capital labor and energy input variables are fixed furthermore the study provides policy implications and suggestions for future research