reputation and impermanent types i consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm s type evolves according to a markov process with two states a tough type who always fights entry and a weak type who prefers to accommodate there exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough above that level as the number of markets t increases in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence when t is infinite then regardless of the discount factor there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the incumbent s payoff is bounded below her stackelberg payoff both results are in contrast to the outcome when the incumbent s type is fixed one interpretation is that reputation is not permanent but must be renewed occasionally

reputation in dynamic games abstract we analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long lived small players in which state variables affect players payoffs the large player s type is private information we give conditions under which in every nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game while our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government policy we show that for the durable goods monopoly reputation may fail to improve the monopolist s payoff journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73

analyst reputation communication and information acquisition earlier studies have shown that reputational concerns tend to reduce agents opportunistic behavior however a recent study by morris argued that analysts experts reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try to avoid being perceived as being misaligned with investors in this paper i examine the effect of reputational concerns on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously because both misaligned and aligned analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned in equilibrium aligned analysts will acquire more information than misaligned analysts as a result investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts type when the report is proven to be accurate therefore both types of analysts will have reputational incentives to communicate truthfully the paper also derives conditions under which the analysts reputational concerns have a nonmonotonic impact on aligned analysts equilibrium precision choices and investors welfare

the socioeconomic consequences of teen childbearing reconsidered we present new estimates of the consequences of teen childbearing that take into account observed and unobserved family background heterogeneity comparing sisters who have timed their first births at different ages the estimation is conducted using data from the u s national longitudinal survey of young women excerpt

the perceived returns to education and the demand for schooling economists emphasize the link between market returns to education and investments in schooling though many studies estimate these returns with earnings data it is the perceived returns that affect schooling decisions and these perceptions may be inaccurate using survey data for eighth grade boys in the dominican republic we find that the perceived returns to secondary school are extremely low despite high measured returns students at randomly selected schools given information on the higher measured returns completed on average 0 20 0 35 more years of school over the next four years than those who were not

material interests moral reputation and crowding out species protection on private land we consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good such as endangered species this paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about reputation and land quality we examine optimal monetary transfer by designing an efficient mechanism which takes into account the crowding out effect of monetary rewards on socially responsible behavior we find landowners who have good reputation contribute more than the optimum level landowners with poor reputation sacrifices information rent rather they buy reputation

indirect addilog translation of indirect utility functions the difficulty of specifying a set of consumer demand equations that can simultaneously display compatibility with rational economic behaviour regularity and have the capacity to represent a comprehensive spectrum of consumer behaviour flexibility is well known a variety of approaches have been investigated in the literature but scope for substantial improvement remains the approach of this paper is to start from indirect utility functions producing globally regular if inflexible systems and to improve flexibility by adding parameters through a device termed indirect addilog translation on connait bien la difficulte de specifier un ensemble d equations de demande du consommateur qui puisse en meme temps etre compatible avec un comportement economique rationnel regularite et avoir la capacite de representer un spectre comprehensif de comportements du consommateur flexibilite la litterature specialisee a propose une variete d approches mais il y a encore place a beaucoup d amelioration l approche suggeree dans ce memoire part des fonctions indirectes d utilite qui produisent des systemes globalement reguliers meme s ils sont inflexibles et en ameliore la flexibilite en ajoutant des parametres via un procede qu on a nomme traduction indirecte addilog

street crime and street culture a model shows how reputation concerns can support widespread street crime a street culture where the direct incentives for such behavior are weak there are social benefits to street reputations but those benefits are dominated when reputation concerns draw into crime those who obtain no direct gain from it the model matches facts about violent crime that a standard model cannot easily explain including low monetary returns disproportionate victimization of the young and poor and high variance in rates across small distances the model generates novel implications for policy and social science including a negative effect of social capital

predation firm specific assets and diversification this study examines the relationship between diversification and predation focusing on the firm s investments in sunk cost assets unlike the single product firm the diversified firm may employ assets that are not sunk to a product the ability to transfer these assets among uses or locations may lower the costs of predation the long purse and multimarket reputation may be viewed as special cases of this phenomenon the likelihood of predation may be reduced when the diversified firm is the target since it may be able to transfer assets back into an industry when the predator raises the price copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

utility functions and global regularity of fractional demand sytems fractional demand systems are utility derived demands having quantities or budget shares proportional to ag bf where g and f are functions of income and a and b vary across goods and are functions of prices many known demand systems that have large regular regions are fractional this paper derives the indirect utility functions that generate all fractional demand systems shows that these systems can all have large regular regions and provides sufficient conditions for their global or nearly global regularity an extension to rank three fractional demands is provided copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

reputation and exogenous private learning abstract short run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long run incumbent firm s type the history of signals which in the limit is fully revealing is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent as long as there is sufficient noise in the signals then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff

are credit unions too small abstract u s credit unions serve 93 million members hold 10 of u s savings deposits and make 13 2 of all nonrevolving consumer loans since 1985 the share of u s depository institution asse

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

on the rationality of buying from a price predator abstract by means of a simple example i demonstrate that it may be rational for consumers to purchase at predatory prices even though the exit of the intended victim and the consequent price increase are correctly anticipated

reputation and legislative leadership abstracting away other aspects of legislative leadership such as the nature of the collective action a leader tries to promote or the exact nature of the leader s own goals we have constructed a stylized model of one important aspect of the leader s problem the use of reputation reputation is really a problem of using the uncertainty of followers to the leader s best advantage to make the most of whatever real resources the leader actually has although the leadership game has multiple equilibria when the leader is precisely indifferent between costless punishment and acquiescence the slightest preference between those actions yields a unique equilibrium when the preference is for costless punishment this equilibrium involves creating a reputation and we can use its properties to draw conclusions about 1 the nature and strategy of reputation building and of the reactions of sophisticated followers and 2 the manifestations of these strategic considerations in institutional and political change in congress 1

can green building councils serve as third party governance institutions an economic and institutional analysis abstract green building councils gbcs have been established in many different countries in recent years this paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a gbc can contribute positively to the development of a greener or more sustainable stock of buildings the paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view we argue that the investor s uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners dilemma trap the corresponding barriers for a transition toward a greener buildings market are analyzed gbcs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems they can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors by certifying the quality of a building they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer this task however raises some severe management challenges for the gbcs

modelling zeroes in microdata although the literature contains a number of suggestions for dealing with problems caused by a preponderance of zero expenditure observations that frequently occur in micro level budget studies in general these suggestions seem to be either empirically intractable or theoretically unappealing in this paper it is argued that a natural theoretical specification can be motivated by duality theory and that the statistical technique of compositional data analysis provides a corresponding complementary stochastic specification the resulting model is a consistent theoretical and stochastic specification for handling the possibility of a zero demand over a range of expenditures and or prices the model is then applied to the 1988 89 australian household expenditure survey

on the empirical exploitation of consumers profit functions in static analyses abstract this paper proposes the empirical exploitation of the consumer s profit function in representing preferences and specifying estimable yet general demand systems an empirical application demonstrates the value of this generalisation and the feasibility of the proposed method

an empirical comparison of flexible demand system functional forms this paper compares the performance of eight frequently used flexible forms that are either 1 locally flexible 2 effectively globally regular or 3 asymptotically globally flexible results show that the functions with global properties generally perform better particularly those models having asymptotic properties results using us consumption data indicate substitutability among the components of consumption at most data points there is also some interesting substitution volatility around the time of recessions in the usa copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

predation by public enterprises abstract this paper demonstrates that in addition to the usual niskanen type losses generated by excess production by public firms there is an unrecognized second type of loss in order to sell their excess production public firms have to price their output below the competitive price and thereby cause more efficient firms at the margin to be eliminated the discussion is then extended to include the case where public enterprises finance additional expansions of output by price discriminating against inframarginal customers but then face the threat of competition for these inframarginal customers from new potential entry public enterprises are further shown to provide more credible threats to potential entrants since unlike private firms they value the increased output associated with predation and not merely the higher future benefits produced by it

the economic consequences of unwed motherhood using twin births as a natural experiment social scientists have long concluded that premarital childbearing exacerbates problems of both poverty and family instability out of wedlock and adolescent childbearing may reduce a mothers educational attainment lower the probability of her eventual marriage increase her probability of welfare recipiency and decrease family income the authors use an exogenous fertility event the birth of twins to estimate the economic effects of unplanned births the approach compares the economic outcomes of women experiencing premarital twin first births to those experiencing premarital single first births in the attempt to identify the consequences of an unplanned birth upon womens future fertility and marital decisions education labor force participation labor earnings welfare receipt and poverty status 1970 and 1980 us census micro data are used to identify twin births to unmarried women analysis found large short term effects of unplanned births on labor force participation poverty and welfare recipiency among unwed mothers but not among married mothers furthermore most adverse economic effects of unplanned motherhood dissipate over time for whites but larger and more persistent negative effects weigh upon black unwed mothers

do large banks have lower costs new estimates of returns to scale for u s banks this paper presents new fully nonparametric estimates of ray scale and expansion path scale economies for u s banks based on a model of bank costs unlike prior studies that use models with restrictive parametric assumptions or limited samples our methodology uses local polynomial estimators and data on all u s banks over the period 1984 2006 our estimates indicate that as recently as 2006 most u s banks faced increasing returns to scale suggesting that scale economies are a plausible but not necessarily only reason for the growth in average bank size and that the tendency toward increasing scale is likely to continue unless checked by government intervention

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

in high school and pregnant the importance of educational and fertility expectations for subsequent outcomes i introduction after an almost 40 decline in the incidence of teenage childbearing in the united states over a period of 15 consecutive years the number of children born to adolescent mothers rose for the first time in 2005 hamilton martin and ventura 2007 with a number of high profile celebrity teenage pregnancies gully 2008 and a recent widely publicized case of a high school pregnancy pact kingsbury 2008 our nation s attention is once again drawn to the issue of adolescent childbirth and its impact on the young mother s future this study finds that although the negative effect of a high school pregnancy on subsequent educational and earnings outcomes appears particularly large for young women from poor socioeconomic environments it can almost fully be explained by preexisting low educational expectations and early fertility expectations rather than by difficulties in coping with unplanned parenthood over three decades ago researchers first reported a large negative effect of early child bearing on the educational attainment of women waite and moore 1978 in a wealth of subsequent studies adolescent mothers were found to compare unfavorably to women who delay childbearing along a wide range of measures of economic well being from high school completion to postsecondary educational attainment to labor market employment and earnings however the difficulty with interpreting these associations between early childbirth and poor subsequent outcomes lies in the fact that the timing of childbearing is clearly nonrandom in particular women from poor socioeconomic backgrounds are likely to have low educational expectations and low expected labor market earnings trent 1994 trusty 1998 thus facing a relatively low opportunity cost of childbearing they may choose to have a child earlier or to be more likely to engage in behaviors that may lead to an unwanted pregnancy mccrate 1992 women with high educational expectations and a high opportunity cost of childbirth on the other hand may be less likely to become pregnant furthermore given that 40 of unwanted pregnancies in the united states are terminated finer and henshaw 2006 these women may be more likely to terminate a pregnancy if one were to occur as educational and fertility expectations are private information that is not directly observable to the researcher previous studies have employed a number of ways of accounting for the endogeneity of fertility timing such as controlling for observable socioeconomic and demographic characteristics using the siblings of adolescent mothers as the comparison group and exploiting natural experiments like twin births and miscarriages see hotz mcelroy and sanders 2005 for a review of the literature hotz mcelroy and sanders 2005 carried out arguably the most convincing study of the causal impact of teenage childbearing in their study they showed that long term outcomes of women whose teenage pregnancy ends in a miscarriage instead of a live birth are nevertheless very similar to outcomes of teenage mothers thus suggesting that teenage childbirth itself has a few long term negative consequences in this article we come to a similar conclusion by using the educational and fertility expectation data for young women from the sophomore cohort of the high school and beyond hs b study 1980 1992 to explicitly account for the endogeneity of fertility timing this approach is motivated by economic theory if young women behave optimally and form rational expectations over their future fertility education and labor market outcomes then measuring these expectations prior to childbirth should capture all relevant unobservable private information consequently examining how fertility and educational expectations differ between adolescent mothers and women who delay childbearing can help explain why hotz mcelroy and sanders 2005 did not find any causal effect of childbirth on subsequent educational and labor market outcomes despite the wealth of statistical evidence of the relationship

regular effective demand systems reds empirical demand analysis is usually conducted on the basis of either regularity or flexibility this paper takes a middle ground between regularity and flexibility offering a compromise in the form of a new specification termed reds

a system of demand equations satisfying effectively global regularity conditions a parametric specification of an indirect utility function in terms oaf expenditure and two unit cost functions is proposed specification of these unit cost functions in terms of regular functions leads to the notion of an effectively globally regular system of demand equations that is a system of demand equations that is regular over a cone in expenditure price space and for which the regular region includes all points in any given sample and all values of nominal expenditure and prices generating higher values of real expenditure than the sample minimum this general model nests a number of popular demand systems such as the linear expenditure system as special cases an empirical application illustrates some of these ideas copyright 1996 by mit press

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

corporate compliance with debt covenants in this paper i present and test a model of corporate compliance with the debt covenant requiring payment of a current obligation this study adds to the empirical literature on forecasting financial distress by showing conditions under which debt default may be a rational economic decision by the firm s shareholders this analysis departs from empirical financial distress studies which are often not linked to an underlying economic theory the focus on covenant default also extends the literature which has modeled bankruptcy bulow and shoven 1978 and liquidation decisions titman 1984 but which has not considered a common first symptom of financial distress covenant default briefly the model examines the costs that influence shareholders decision to comply with or violate a particular debt covenant payment of a current obligation these costs include those associated with bondholders reaction to possible default the model predicts that shareholders will default when holding other factors constant i interest rates have declined relative to coupon rates stated in the debt issue ii the probability of paying future obligations is high and iii the cost of obtaining funds to pay the obligation is high the model also predicts when stockholders and bondholders will renegotiate the debt contract and the amount of wealth transferred in the renegotiation finally the

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

antitrust predation and the antitrust paradox abstractthe widely recognized influence that the chicago school of law and economics had on the institution of antitrust is nowhere more apparent than in predatory pricing law starting with aaron director this movement had many distinguished contributors but even in this company robert bork stands out for his part in persuading the judiciary to refocus antitrust law on the interests of consumers rather than on the interests of competing firms in the antitrust paradox and other writings bork advanced the chicago school insight that the kind of aggressive price cutting that at the time passed for predatory pricing is instead an essential and for consumers beneficial attribute of competition the resulting change in direction that antitrust has taken in predatory pricing cases culminated in the court s matsushita matsushita electric industrial co v zenith ratio corp 475 u s 574 1986 and brooke group brooke group ltd v brown williamson tobacco corp 509 u s 209 1993 opinions both

sacrifice tests for predation in a dynamic pricing model ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 meet ericson and pakes 1995 abstract to detect the presence of predatory pricing antitrust authorities and courts routinely ask whether a firm sacrifices current profit in exchange for the expectation of higher future profit following the exit of its rival because predatory pricing is an inherently dynamic phenomenon we show in this paper how to construct sacrifice tests for predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework along the lines of ericson and pakes 1995 in particular we adapt the definitions of predation due to ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 to this setting and construct the corresponding sacrifice tests

an implicitly additive demand system the problem of endowing large applied general equilibrium models with numerical values for parameters is formidable for example a complete set of own and cross price elasticities of demands for the monash model of the australianeconomy involves in excess of 50000 items invoking the minimal assumptions that demand is generated by utility maximization reduces the load to about 26000 obviously still a number much too large for unrestrained econometric estimation to obtain demand systems estimates for a dozen or so generic commodities at a top level of aggregation categories like food clothing and footwear etc typically johansen s lead has been followed and directly additive preferences imposed upon the underlying utility function with the move beyond one step linearized solutions of applied general equilibrium models the functional form of the demand system adopted becomes an issue the most celebrated of the additive preference demand systems the linear expenditure system les has one

reputation and the flow of information in repeated games this paper derives payoff bounds from reputation effects akin to those of fudenberg and levine 1992 for repeated moral hazard games in which a long run player interacts frequently with a population of short run players and the monitoring technology varies with the length of the period of interaction the bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on the relative entropy examples are shown where under complete informatione the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long run player converges as the period length tends to zero to the set of static equilibrium payoffs whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types reputation effects remain powerful in the frequent interaction limit

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

regulatory errors with endogenous agendas how do a regulator s decisions depend on the characteristics and strategies of its external clients we develop a theory of approval regulation in which an uninformed regulator may veto the submission of a better informed rm the rm can perform

corporate and industry effects on business unit competitive position we partition the variances of market shares which we use as surrogates for competitive position of the business units of all public manufacturing companies available in the trinet data base into industry factors corporate parent specific factors and business unit specific factors our results differ somewhat from rumelt s 1991 which decomposed variances in profitability we find that corporate parent effects on market share are considerably greater than zero when lines of business are defined more narrowly when small business units are included and when firms are medium sized our results suggest that the relative importance of corporate industry and business unit effects depends on the types of criteria such as the level of industry aggregation whether small business units are included and firm size that are used to construct samples copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

collusion under financial constraints collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one abstract this paper considers the possibility of collusion between financially constrained firms it is found that they cannot collude when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one while collusion emerges at lower discount factors

nonparametric analysis of returns to scale in the us hospital industry this paper presents new estimates of scale economies for us hospitals we show that the common translog specification of hospital costs is a misspecification and employ nonparametric local linear estimation with both continuous and discrete covariates a bootstrap method is used to provide inferences regarding ray scale economies and expansion path scale economies for a large sample of hospitals covering 1984 1996 we find evidence of changes in the structure of hospital costs over the sample period as well as evidence of locally optimal hospital sizes copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

a response to glazer and rosenthal we are most grateful to glazer and rosenthal for the attention they have paid to our work abreu and matsushima 1992a b c in the process of criticizing our mechanism they have provided an elegant exposition of it which usefully supplements our own efforts the criticisms themselves we feel are misplaced and based on a close reading but narrow interpretation of our results glazer and rosenthal seek to show that in our mechanisms the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies is or indeed ought to be controversial in terms of conventional decision theory the iterative logic is impeccable when iterative deletion leads to a unique profile that profile is the unique rationalizable profile the unique nash equilibrium and so on of course the logic of iterative dominance entails common knowledge of rationality the theoretical coherence of this assumption has been questioned in the context of backward programming in extensive form games see luce and raiffa 1957 pp 80 81 rosenthal 1981 basu 1988 reny 1992a 1992b bonanno 1991 binmore 1987a 1987b and gul 1989 among others these paradoxes of common knowledge of rationality have been highlighted in stylized examples such as the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma and rosenthal s centipede game which in fact has been a seminal inspiration for this recent literature 2 but our mechanisms are simultaneous there is no opportunity to demonstrate irrationality strategic or otherwise and therefore no scope to rationalize iteratively dominated behavior from a decision theory perspective the glazer and rosenthal critique might therefore be viewed as an elaborate revival of the indefensible claim that players in a one short prisoners dilemma will choose not to confess because they are both better off doing so than by both playing their dominant strategies within the standard game theory paradigm there is really nothing more to be said before turning to issues of bounded rationality we note that the glazer and rosenthal critique is essentially premised on the existence of a countervailing focal point but what is a focal point the notion is notoriously vague and we are aware of no widely accepted definition 3 this is not to deny that in very simple and particular games certain behavior may be focal frequently focalness is identified with a pareto dominating equilibrium and this is the point of view glazer and rosenthal seem to adopt 4 this is implicit in their acknowledgement that when the social choice function does satisfy pareto optimality our objection loses much of its immediate

fulfilled expectations of entry i develop a two period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer s expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium i find that both expectations duopoly and monopoly are fulfilled in the incumbent s price setting game while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity setting game i also find that quantity is more entry deterring than price in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in the price setting game is higher than or equal to that of the quantity setting game

estimating components of ict expenditure a model based approach with applicability to short time series this article develops a microeconomic model based approach to estimation of national information and communications technology expenditure that is helpful when only very short time series are available the model specification incorporates parameters for network effects and national e readiness finally the model allows for observed nonhomotheticity and noise found in sample data with the latter attributed to country specific influences

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

incorporating generalized marginal budget shares in a mixed demand system this article extends a rotterdam type of mixed demand system by replacing its constant marginal budget shares with the ones derived from originally defined and specified mixed engel curves that take a generalized functional form using the box cox transformation an empirical illustration is given for japanese demand for fresh and processed fruits and vegetables the results show that the rotterdam parameterization of marginal budget shares which corresponds to those in linear mixed engel curves is preferred by the data and that improper assumptions of the form of mixed engel curves underlying a mixed demand system can bias its elasticities

merging reputation and repeated games with incomplete information we relate and unify several results that appeared in the following domains merging of probabilities perturbed games and reputation phenomena and repeated games with incomplete information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d83

an empirically oriented demand system with improved regularity properties while the almost ideal demand system has received increasing attention in empirical studies of consumer demand the fact that the underlying piglog cost function is not globally regular has often led to violation of negative semidefiniteness in the estimated slutsky matrix this paper suggests a modification to the piglog class of preferences termed mpiglog which preserves regularity in a wider region of expenditure price space in an empirical section the almost ideal demand system special case of piglog is compared with the analogous special case of mpiglog which the authors term maids the comparison demonstrates the improved regularity features of maids

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

bounding causal effects using data from a contaminated natural experiment analysing the effects of teenage childbearing in this paper we consider what can be learned about causal effects when one uses a contaminated instrumental variable in particular we consider what inferences can be made about the causal effect of teenage childbearing on a teen mother s subsequent outcomes when we use the natural experiment of miscarriages to form an instrumental variable for teen births miscarriages might not meet all of the conditions required for an instrumental variable to identify such causal effects for all of the observations in our sample however it is an appropriate instrumental variable for some women namely those pregnant women who experience a random miscarriage although information from typical data sources does not allow one to identify these women we show that one can adapt results from horowitz and manski 1995 on identification with data from contaminated samples to construct informative bounds on the causal effect of teenage childbearing we use these bounds to re examine the effects of early chilbearing on the teen mother s subsequent educational and labour market attainment as considered in hotz mcelroy and sanders 1995a 1995b consistent with their study these bounds indicate that women who have births as teens have higher labour market earnings and hours worked compared to what they would have attained if their childbearing had been delayed

new indices of money supply and the flexible laurent demand system the article begins by surveying the existing results on the new divisia monetary aggregates charts display the differences in behavior between the divisia aggregates and the federal reserve s official simple sum monetary aggregates the article then compares system wide fit for the simple sum and divisia monetary aggregates when used as data in the joint estimation of a system of demand equations the demand system is derived from a new laurent expansion approximation to the reciprocal indirect utility function the laurent expansion provides a better behaved remainder term than that of the more commonly used taylor series the results favor the divisia aggregates

credit bureau policy and sustainable reputation effects in credit markets welfare increasing reputation effects arise in credit markets when adverse selection gives rise to borrower reputation formation incentives that mitigate moral hazard problems this paper shows that welfare stemming from reputation effects will diminish over time as the private information of borrowers is revealed to lenders in the form of lengthening credit histories aggregate borrower welfare may therefore decrease over time unless reputation effects can be sustained restricting a lender s access to a borrower s credit history via credit bureau policy is shown to be one method of sustaining reputation effects and preventing a decline in welfare copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

robust nonparametric quantile estimation of efficiency and productivity change in u s commercial banking 1985 2004 this article uses a new nonparametric unconditional hyperbolic order quantile estimator to construct a hyperbolic version of the malmquist index unlike traditional nonparametric efficiency estimators the new estimator is both robust to data outliers and has a root n convergence rate we use this estimator to examine changes in the efficiency and productivity of u s banks between 1985 and 2004 we find that larger banks experienced larger efficiency and productivity gains than small banks consistent with the presumption that recent changes in regulation and information technology have favored larger banks

functional monetary aggregates monetary policy and business cycles abstract in this paper we take the economic approach to monetary aggregation in the context of highly disaggregated demand systems encompassing the full range of monetary assets in the united states we estimate the effectively globally regular minflex laurent ml and normalized quadratic nq flexible functional forms we produce the ml and nq functional monetary aggregates consistent with neoclassical microeconomic theory also addressing the issue of optimal monetary aggregation we highlight the influence of measurement on statistical inference by investigating whether the ml and nq functional monetary aggregates are of importance in resolving paradoxes associated with the measurement of money in doing so we also provide a comparison between the functional monetary aggregates and the fed s broad sum m2 aggregate and the center for financial stability broad divisia m3 and divisia m4 aggregates our detailed statistical analysis favors the functional monetary aggregates

reputation and hegemonic stability a game theoretic analysis we develop and explicate a game theoretic model in which repeated play incomplete information and reputation are major elements a significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes the model is used to formalize certain aspects of the theory of hegemonic stability it shows that the dilemma or limits of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved unifying both benevolent and coercive strands of hegemony theory an example drawn from recent developments in the organization of petroleum exporting countries shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction we conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information

switching costs in the wholesale distribution of cigarettes recent theories of price wars triggered by entry assign a critical role to switching costs in explaining price and output changes earlier elzinga and mills 1998 showed that actual switching patterns following an episode of new entry in an industry are driven by the fact that buyers have different switching costs the current paper draws on transaction specific price and shipments data surrounding the 1984 1985 price war in generic cigarettes to explore the size and determinants of switching costs among wholesale cigarette distributors results show that switching costs vary across firms and are nontrivial in magnitude several implications of the findings are discussed

goliath s curse coercive threats and asymmetric power states typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries yet their threats often fail why expanding on a standard model of inter national crisis bargaining i argue that a theory of reputation building can help shed light on this puzzle the model casts reputation as a strategic problem showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors if challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands then even reputation conscious targets will acquiesce i argue however that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underesti mate their targets reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them in this way military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats the logic is illustrated by the 1939 russo finnish crisis and the argument s implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored

nutrition transition and the structure of global food demand estimating future demand for food is a critical aspect of global food security analyses the process linking dietary changes to wealth is known as the nutrition transition and presents well identified features that help to predict consumption changes in poor countries this study proposes to represent the nutrition transition with a nonhomothetic flexible in income demand system known as the modified implicitly directly additive demand system maidads the resulting model is transparent and estimated statistically based on cross sectional information from faostat it captures the main features of the nutrition transition rise in demand for calories associated with income growth diversification of diets away from starchy staples and a large increase in caloric demand for animal based products fats and sweeteners the estimated model is used to project food demand between 2010 and 2050 based on a set of plausible futures trend projections and shared socioeconomic pathways scenarios the main results of these projections are as follows 1 global food demand will increase by 46 less than half the growth in the previous four decades 2 this growth will be attributable mainly to lower middle income and low income countries 3 the structure of global food demand will change over the period with a 95 increase in demand for animal based calories and a much smaller 18 increase in demand for starchy staples and 4 the analysis of a range of population and income projections reveals important uncertainties depending on the scenario the projected increases in demand for animal based and vegetal based calories range from 78 to 109 and from 20 to 42 respectively

quadratic engel curves and consumer demand this paper presents a model of consumer demand that is consistent with the observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers in a long time series of expenditure surveys and is also able to provide a detailed welfare analysis of shifts in relative prices a nonparametric analysis of consumer expenditure patterns suggests that engel curves require quadratic terms in the logarithm of expenditure while popular models of demand such as the translog or the almost ideal demand systems do allow flexible price responses within a theoretically coherent structure they have expenditure share engel curves that are linear in the logarithm of total expenditure we derive the complete class of integrable quadratic logarithmic expenditure share systems a specification from this class is estimated on a large pooled data set of u k households models that fail to account for engel curvature are found ro generate important distortions in the patterns of welfare losses associated with a tax increase

a land of milk and honey with streets paved with gold do emigrants have over optimistic expectations about incomes abroad millions of people emigrate every year in search of better economic and social opportunities anecdotal evidence suggests that emigrants may have over optimistic expectations about the incomes they can earn abroad resulting in excessive migration pressure and in disappointment among those who do migrate yet there is almost no statistical evidence on how accurately these emigrants predict the incomes that they will earn working abroad in this paper the authors combine a natural emigration experiment with unique survey data on would be emigrants probabilistic expectations about employment and incomes in the migration destination their procedure enables them to obtain moments and quantiles of the subjective distribution of expected earnings in the destination country the authors find a significant underestimation of both unconditional and conditional labor earnings at all points in the distribution this underestimation appears driven in part by potential migrants placing too much weight on the negative employment experiences of some migrants and by inaccurate information flows from extended family who may be trying to moderate remittance demands by understating incomes