cores of inventory centralization games abstract consider a set of n stores with single item and single period demands assume an option of centralized ordering and inventory with holding and penalty costs only in this case a cooperative inventory centralization game defines allocations of the cost we examine the conditions under which such an inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we prove the existence of nonempty core for demands with symmetric distributions and the existence of nonempty core for joint multivariate normal demand distribution we establish the equivalency of four different nonempty core conditions for the newsboy problem and demonstrate their efficacy for discrete independent and identically distributed iid demands journal of economic literature classification numbers c44 c62 c71

competition and cooperation in decentralized push and pull assembly systems in this paper we study a decentralized assembly system consisting of a single assembler who buys complementary components from independent suppliers under two contracting schemes push and pull in both schemes the component suppliers are allowed to freely form coalitions or alliances among themselves to better coordinate their pricing or production decisions we show that the sole driver of the inefficiency in a push system which is due to horizontal decentralization of suppliers is the number of alliances that were formed specifically it is shown that in a push system the assembler s profit the total profit of all suppliers and the consumers surplus are all decreasing in the number of coalitions and are thus maximized when the grand coalition is formed we further carry out a stability analysis of coalition structures to verify to what extent suppliers can reduce or eliminate the inefficiency due to their decentralization by forming alliances we show that in a push system with more than two

a new decision rule for lateral transshipments in inventory systems this paper deals with a single echelon inventory system consisting of a number of parallel local warehouses facing compound poisson demand there are standard holding and backorder costs as well as ordering costs at all warehouses normally the warehouses replenish from an outside supplier however lateral transshipments between the warehouses are also possible such transshipments take no time but incur additional costs when a demand occurs at a warehouse the question is whether the whole demand or part of it should be covered by a lateral transshipment from another warehouse given a set of alternative decisions our decision rule minimizes the expected costs under the assumption that no further transshipments will take place this rule is then used repeatedly as a heuristic a simulation study illustrates how the suggested technique performs under different conditions

stability and endogenous formation of inventory transshipment networks this paper studies a cooperative game of inventory transshipment among multiple firms in this game firms first make their inventory decisions independently and then decide collectively how to transship excess inventories to satisfy unmet demands in modeling transshipment we use networks of firms as the primitive which offer a richer representation of relationships among firms by taking the coalitions used in all previous studies as special cases for any given cooperative network we construct a dual price allocation under which the network is stable for any residual demands and supplies in the sense that no firms find it more profitable to form subnetworks under the allocation based on the marginal contribution of each firm to its network called the mjw value we show that various network structures such as complete hub spoke and chain networks are stable only under certain conditions on residual amounts moreover these conditions differ across network structures implying that a network structure plays an important role in establishing the stability of a decentralized transshipment system finally we consider the case when firms establish networks endogenously and show that pairwise nash stable networks underperform the corresponding networks in centralized systems

demand curves for stocks do slope down new evidence from an index weights adjustment weights in the toronto stock exchange 300 index are determined by the market values of the included stocks public floats in november 1996 the exchange implemented a previously announced revision of its definition of the public float this revision which increased the floats and the index weights of 31 stocks conveyed no information and had no effect on the legal duties of shareholders affected stocks experienced statistically significant excess returns of 2 3 percent during the event week and no price reversal occurred as trading volume returned to normal levels these findings support downward sloping demand curves for stocks an obvious event with which to examine the slope of demand curves for stocks is one that changes supply in the absence of new information a shift in supply should not affect stock prices if demand curves for stocks are flat scholes 1972 using a sample of secondary equity distributions asks whether stocks are unique works of art or merely abstract claims to residual cash flows with many close substitutes as is assumed in much of finance theory scholes finds that the negative price impact of secondary offerings depends on the seller s identity implying the revelation of unfavorable informationand rules out a pure supply effect mikkelson and partch 1985 also using a sample of registered and unregistered secondary offerings find weak evidence of downward sloping demand curves but are unable to cleanly distinguish this explanation from the alternative explanation based on unfavorable information a different class of events additions to widely followed stock market indexes ostensibly provides a setting where information effects should not be present shleifer 1986 documents a permanent price increase for stocks

global versus local asset pricing a new test of market integration should capital cost calculations be based on a global or local market benchmark the december 2000 redefinition of the morgan stanley capital international msci global equity index was a natural experiment addressing this question it is argued that this event triggered a portfolio shift by index funds large enough to affect the residual asset supplies constituting the global and local market benchmarks of all actively managed capital changes in the market benchmarks imply distinct and predictable changes to global and local stock betas exploring whether global or local beta changes best explain the cross section of event returns reveals that stocks in developed markets are priced globally and not locally jel g11 g14 g15

international asset pricing and portfolio diversification with time varying risk we test the conditional capital asset pricing model capm for the world s eight largest equity markets using a parsimonious generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity garch parameterization our methodology can be applied simultaneously to many assets and at the same time accommodate general dynamics of the conditional moments the evidence supports most of the pricing restrictions of the model but some of the variation in risk adjusted excess returns remains predictable during periods of high interest rates our estimates indicate that although severe market declines are contagious the expected gains from international diversification for a u s investor average 2 11 percent per year and have not significantly declined over the last two decades

operations research models for coalition structure in collaborative logistics abstract given a set of players and the cost of each possible coalition the question we address is which coalitions should be formed we formulate mixed integer linear programming models for this problem considering core stability and strong equilibrium the objective function looks for minimizing the total cost allocated among the players concerned about the difficulties of managing large coalitions in practice we also study the effect of a maximum cardinality constraint per coalition we test the models in two applications one is in collaborative forest transportation and the other one in inventory of spare parts for oil operations in these situations collaboration opportunities involving significant savings exist but for several reasons it may be better to group the players in different sub coalitions rather than in the grand coalition the models we propose are thus relevant for deciding how to partition the set of players we also prove that if the strong equilibrium model is feasible its optimal cost is equal to the optimal cost of the core stability model and consequently a coalition structure that solves one problem also solves the other problem we present results that illustrate this property we also present results where the core stability problem is feasible and the strong equilibrium problem is infeasible setting an upper bound on the maximum cardinality of the coalitions allows us to study the marginal savings of enlarging the cardinality of the coalitions we find that the marginal savings of allowing one more player significantly decreases as the bound increases

evaluating the evidence on union employment and wages using current population survey data for the years 1973 86 this study tests the hypothesis that the steep decline of union employment shares since 1973 is related to increases in union wages relative to nonunion wages the authors show that although the aggregate union wage premium has changed little since 1973 some industry specific premiums have risen substantially and the industries with the rising premiums are those experiencing declines in union employment shares the increase in the premium explains from 21 to 64 of the decline in union shares depending on the equation specification the paper also presents a detailed set of union wage premiums and employment shares for the sample period

where are all the self employed women push and pull factors influencing female labor market decisions previous research focuses on factors that influence self employment participation in part because entrepreneurship has been associated with economic growth this literature has tended to focus only on men or the comparison of women to men while ignoring substantial heterogeneity in employment decisions among women by investigating the impact of individual household and local economic and cultural characteristics on the labor market outcomes of different groups of women we get a more comprehensive picture of their self employment decision recognizing self employment as one of multiple labor market choices we use multinomial logit and two confidential geocoded micro level datasets to study women s career choices in urban areas we find that the effects of various push and pull factors differ between married and unmarried women in particular more progressive gender attitudes pull married women into self employment while household burdens associated with children push them into self employment for unmarried women the local business climate and individual characteristics have the strongest influence in both cases the motivations for women are quite different than men

institutional trades and intraday stock price behavior abstract this paper examines the price effect of institutional stock trading using a unique data set that reports the transactions large and small of 37 large institutional money management firms the direction of each trade and the identity of the management firm behind each trade are known although institutional trades are associated with some price pressure we find that the average effect is small there is also a marked asymmetry between the price impact of buys versus sells we relate our findings to various hypotheses on the elasticity of demand for stocks the cost of executing transactions and the determinants of market impact although market capitalization and relative trade size influence the market impact of a trade the dominant influence is the identity of the money manager behind the trade

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations abstract we study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments in every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization after observing the actual demand each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period while in a single shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals we show that it is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times we also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers order quantities and discount factors when n is large finally we provide conditions under which a system optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers and develop a contract for achieving a system optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied

a three stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers we present and study a three stage model of a decentralized distribution system consisting ofn retailers each of whom faces a stochastic demand for an identical product in the first stage before the demand is realized each retailer independently orders her initial inventory in the second stage after the demand is realized each retailer decides how much of her residual supply demand she wants to share with the other retailers in the third stage residual inventories are transshipped to meet residual demands and an additional profit is allocated our model is an extension of the two stage model of anupindi et al abz 2001 which implicitly assumes that all residuals enter the transshipment stage we show however that allocation rules in the third stage based on dual solutions which were used in the abz model may induce the retailers to hold back some of their residual supply demand in general we study the effect of implementing various allocations rules in the third stage on the values of the residual supply demand the retailers are willing to share with others in the second stage and the trade off involved in achieving an optimal solution for the corresponding centralized system

stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations this study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers each of them facing a newsvendor problem and a supplier groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by joint ordering and inventory centralization however we assume that the retailers impose some level of stock that should be dedicated to them in this situation we show that the associated cooperative game has a non empty core afterwards we concentrate on a dynamic situation where several model cost parameters and the retailers dedicated stock levels can change we investigate how the profit division might be affected by these changes we focus on four monotonicity properties we identify several classes of games with retailers where some of the monotonicity properties hold moreover we show that pairs of cooperative games associated with newsvendor situations do not necessarily satisfy these properties in general when changes in dedicated stock levels are in concern

who benefits from transshipment exogenous vs endogenous wholesale prices this paper studies how transshipments affect manufacturers and retailers considering both exogenous and endogenous wholesale prices for a distribution system where a single manufacturer sells to multiple identical cost retailers we consider both the manufacturer being a price taker and the manufacturer being a price setter in a single period setup under multivariate normal demand distribution in the case of the manufacturer being a price taker we provide several analytical results regarding the effects of key parameters on order quantities and profits in the case of the manufacturer being a price setter we characterize the stackelberg game that arises and provide several insights into how the game dynamics are affected by transshipments specifically we find that risk pooling makes retailers order quantities less sensitive to the wholesale price set by the manufacturer hence in general the manufacturer benefits from retailers transshipments by charging a higher wholesale price while retailers are often worse off the paper captures the effect of demand correlation and the effect of the number of retailers throughout and it illustrates the findings by a numerical example we also provide an interactive web page for numerical experiments

multiplayer allocations in the presence of diminishing marginal contributions cooperative game analysis and applications in management science we use cooperative game theory to investigate multiplayer allocation problems under the almost diminishing marginal contributions admc property this property indicates that a player s marginal c

the behavior of stock prices around institutional trades all trades executed by 37 large investment management firms from july 1986 to december 1988 are used to study the price impact and execution cost of the entire sequence package of trades that we interpret as an order we find that market impact and trading cost are related to firm capitalization relative package size and most importantly to the identity of the management firm behind the trade money managers with high demands for immediacy tend to be associated with larger market impact financial economists have long studied the equity trading process and its impact on stock prices much prior empirical research isolates individual trades and analyzes the behavior of the stock price around each trade see for example kraus and stoll 1972a holthausen leftwich and mayers 1987 1990 keim and madhavan 1991 petersen and umlauf 1991 hausman lo and mackinlay 1992 and chan and lakonishok 1993 evaluating the behavior of stock prices around trades provides a means of discriminating among various hypotheses as to the elasticity of the demand for stocks yields an estimate of the cost of executing trades and a measure of the liquidity of a market and permits tests of different models of the determination of quotes and transaction prices for many institutional investors however even a moderately sized position in a stock may represent a large fraction of the stock s trading volume accordingly an investment manager s order is often broken up into several trades it is often misleading therefore to consider an individual trade as the basic unit of analysis in the study of trading activity and its effects on prices this paper uses the record of trades executed by 37 large investment manage

large scale service marketplaces the role of the moderating firm recently large scale web based service marketplaces where many small service providers compete among themselves in catering to customers with diverse needs have emerged customers who frequent these marketplaces seek quick resolutions and thus are usually willing to trade prices with waiting times the main goal of this paper is to discuss the role of the moderating firm in facilitating information gathering operational efficiency and communication among agents in service marketplaces surprisingly we show that operational efficiency may be detrimental to the overall efficiency of the marketplace furthermore we establish that to reap the expected gains of operational efficiency the moderating firm may need to complement the operational efficiency by enabling communication among its agents the study emphasizes the scale of such marketplaces and the impact it has on the outcomes this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

industrial restructuring and economic growth the last two decades have been a period of structural change in industrialised countries the extent of this restructuring process has been different across countries and industries though in this paper we investigate the effect of lagging behind in the process of downsizing and deconcentration we find empirical evidence of industries that experienced only little downsizing when compared internationally to experience less subsequent growth on average however this effect is industry dependent and its magnitude depends upon whether firm or establishment data are used technologically advanced industries are found to be particularly sensitive to lack of restructuring

coalition formation as a dynamic process abstract we study coalition formation as an ongoing dynamic process with payoffs generated as coalitions form disintegrate or regroup a process of coalition formation pcf is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value compared to inaction this future value in turn is endogenous it depends on coalitional movements at each node we study existence of equilibrium pcfs we connect deterministic equilibrium pcfs with unique absorbing state to the core and equilibrium pcfs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set in addition we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium pcfs

transfer of newsvendor inventory and supply risks to sub industry and the public by financial instruments abstract we consider a two stage newsvendor model of a sub industry in which suppliers have short lead time capacity to produce goods for retailers that are selling non identical products we argue that the inventory and supply risks of the newsvendors due to demand uncertainty can be pooled and shared among different supply chains by treating reserved capacity as commodities and trading them as futures and options on futures to hedge the risks the risks will be further shared with and transferred to the public if speculators are allowed to play the game we show that this new mechanism of combining operational and financial risk hedging strategies offers industries a new way to more efficiently meet demand and improve profit

international asset allocations and capital flows the benchmark effect this paper studies channels through which well known benchmark indexes impact asset allocations and capital flows across countries the study uses unique monthly micro level data of benchmark compositions and mutual fund investments during 1996 2012 benchmarks have important effects on equity and bond mutual fund portfolios across funds with different degrees of activism benchmarks explain on average around 70 percent of country allocations and have significant impact even on active funds benchmark effects are important after controlling for industry macroeconomic and country specific time varying effects reverse causality does not drive the results exogenous pre announced changes in benchmarks result in movements in asset allocations mostly when these changes are implemented not when announced by impacting country allocations benchmarks affect capital flows across countries through direct and indirect channels including contagion they explain apparently counterintuitive movements in capital flows generating outflows from countries when upgraded and with large market capitalization and better relative performance

transshipment and its impact on supply chain members performance this note extends some of the key results of dong and rudi 2004 to general demand distributions this generalization is achieved in two steps first we build on the analysis of dong and rudi to demonstrate that an inventory problem with transshipment is equivalent to a newsvendor problem with an adjusted demand then we study the impact of transshipment by comparing the adjusted demand with the original demand in addition to extending the results in the existing literature this note presents a novel approach for analyzing the impact of risk pooling

the evolution of manufacturing technology and its impact on industrial structure an international study this paper shows that plant and firm size in manufacturing and especially in engineering industry in several western industrial countries has declined since the early 1970s two hypotheses explaining the decline are advanced one is de glomeration or specialization the divestiture of non core businesses in order to free up scarce resources particularly management time to defend and nurture core business activities the second hypothesis is that the emergence of new computer based technology has improved the quality and productivity of small and medium scale production relative to standardized mass production techniques which dominated previously

stable farsighted coalitions in competitive markets in this paper we study dynamic alliance formation among agents in competitive markets we look at n agents selling substitutable products competing in a market in this setting we examine models with deterministic and stochastic demand and we use a two stage approach in stage 1 agents form alliances coalitions and in stage 2 coalitions make decisions price and inventory and compete against one another to analyze the stability of coalition structures in stage 1 we use two notions from cooperative games the largest consistent set lcs and the equilibrium process of coalition formation epcf which allow players to be farsighted thus in forming alliances players consider two key phenomena first players trade off the size of the total profit of the system versus their allocation of this total pie and second they weigh the possibility that an immediate beneficial defection can trigger further counter defections that in the end may prove to be worse than the status quo in particular one such example is that of the grand coalition which we show to be stable in the farsighted sense even though players benefit myopically by defecting from it we also provide conditions under which a situation of a few lone players competing against a large coalition is stable we examine the impact of the size of the market n the degree of competition the effect of cost parameters and the variability of the demand process on the prices inventory levels and structure of the market we discuss the possible strategic implications of our results to firms in a competitive market and for new entrants

establishment size and local employment growth in a sample of more than 2000 u s counties smaller average establishment size is generally associated with faster subsequent growth rates of sectoral employment both within and across sectors the estimated effects are large in magnitude and thus economically important and are consistent with several theories previously developed these findings contribute toward a more precise understanding of the role of small businesses in economic growth and labor markets

formation of alliances in internet based supply exchanges in different industries such as automobiles chemicals or retailing competitors are joining forces in establishing electronic marketplaces to reduce inefficiencies in the purchasing process and cut costs by combining their buying power joining such an alliance leads to reduced costs including those of possible rivals because members share the development and operating costs a company that joins an alliance agrees to share its suppliers with others which may lead to more intense competition among the increased number of suppliers and it may further benefit an alliance member at the expense of companies left outside the alliance natural questions that could arise then are when would a firm prefer to take part in an electronic marketplace joint venture when would it prefer that other firms possibly rivals join the venture and what are the financial consequences of either joining an alliance or remaining independent in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the issues we have developed a model of three retailers whose products may have a certain degree of substitutability we provide some conditions in terms of product substitutability and compatibility of retailers that would lead to the formation of a three member alliance or a two member alliance or no alliance at all we also study the effect of alliance structure and compatibility of retailers on the profit of a company

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

relative wages efficiency wages and keynesian unemployment while modern economic theorists have produced a variety of explanations for the failure of wages to fall in the face of unemployment keynes emphasis on relative wages has not been reflected in most contemporary discussions this short paper suggests that relative wage theories in which workers productivity depends primarily on their relative wage provide the best available apparatus for understanding actual unemployment and its fluctuations such theories are very closely related to the efficiency wage theories that have received widespread attention in recent years this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

volume for winners and losers taxation and other motives for stock trading capital gains taxes create incentives to trade our major finding is that turnover is higher for winners stocks the prices of which have increased than for losers which is not consistent with the tax prediction however the turnover in december and january is evidence of tax motivated trading there is a relatively high turnover for losers in december and for winners in january we conclude that taxes influence turnover but other motives for trading are more important we were unable to find evidence that changing the length of the holding period required to qualify for long term capital gains treatment affected turnover investors responding to the tax incentives in the capital gains laws should produce predictable patterns in the volume of trading in a stock but not necessarily in its price this study uses past price patterns as a proxy to measure the incentives to sell or avoid selling a stock and observes trading volumes to estimate the extent to which investors respond to these incentives past price patterns may influence trading volumes for other non tax related reasons as well these are also considered we find that past prices influence current incentives to trade through both tax and non tax motives winners tend to have higher abnormal volumes than losers this would be expected if non tax related motives were predominant however the influence of tax related motives on trading volume is shown by seasonal variations in the relationship between past price changes and turnover as predicted by tax induced trading theories the volume of losers is higher than normal in december and the volume of winners is higher than normal in january we found no evidence that trading volume was affected by changes in the length of the holding period required to qualify for long term capital gains investors reactions to capital gains taxes are important for several reasons first a comprehensive understanding of investor behavior would include both price and volume understanding the relationship between taxes and volume is a fruitful and convenient method of contributing to this subject the resource allocation consequences of capital gains taxes are controversial in part because

the effects of market segmentation and investor recognition on asset prices evidence from foreign stocks listing in the united states non u s firms cross listing shares on u s exchanges as american depositary receipts earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year before listing and an additional 1 20 percent during the listing week but incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following listing we show how these unusual share price changes are robust to changing market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to the amount of capital raised at the time of listing our tests provide support for the market segmentation hypothesis and merton s 1987 investor recognition hypothesis the globalization of u s capital markets has accelerated dramatically in the past decade increasing numbers of companies from overseas have chosen to either raise capital through global equity issues or prepare for future capital raising by way of cross listings on u s exchanges as of 1997 about 1 300 non u s companies have listed their shares for trading on the new york stock exchange nyse the american exchange amex the national association of securities dealers automation quotation nasdaq system or

do demand curves for stocks slope down since september 1976 stocks newly included into the standard and poor s 500 index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the inclusion this return does not disappear for at least ten days after the inclusion the returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds consistent with the hypothesis that demand curves for stocks slope down the returns are not related to s p s bond ratings which is inconsistent with a plausible version of the hypothesis that inclusion is a certification of the quality of the stock

inventory games with permissible delay in payments abstract meca et al 2004 studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common item decide to cooperate and make joint orders with the eoq policy in this paper we extend their model to the situation where retailer s delay in payments is permitted by the supplier we introduce the corresponding inventory game with permissible delay in payments and prove that its core is nonempty then a core allocation rule is proposed which can be reached through population monotonic allocation scheme under this allocation rule the grand coalition is shown to be stable from a farsighted point of view

differences in state unemployment rates the role of labor and product market structural shifts state unemployment rates diverged dramatically in the 1980s differing unemployment rates across states are an important public policy concern because of equity concerns and the pure human consequences of higher unemployment moreover at the national level a greater dispersion in state and regional unemployment rates can increase the natural rate of unemployment and shift the phillips curve out because of an inefficient allocation of the labor force 3 38 one possible cause for the divergence in unemployment rates is national industrial restructuring u s industrial restructuring was suggested by lilien 26 as a cause for the rise in the national unemployment rate moreover national restructuring can have differential impacts across states because states can have dramatically different mixes of industries from each other one of the difficulties of national restructuring from a regional perspective is that it is difficult to avoid on the other hand if regional differences in unemployment are due to state idiosyncratic causes state and local public policy can potentially play a more active role for example the economic problems that plagued the northeast and california during the early 1990s have been typically attributed to national downsizing in the defense industries conversely economic problems in these states may have been driven by factors that are located within the state such as the collapse of their real estate markets

personality characteristics of self employed an empirical study this paper is concerned with the personality characteristics of self employed most existing studies on personality characteristics of entrepreneurs concentrate on factors like age educational profile and motivations to become self employed there is a lack of significant empirical findings to claim that entrepreneurs are psychologically different from the general population based on a large sample of 14 846 individuals we compare self employed with the general population and with wage and salary earners we empirically show that entrepreneurs differ from the general population and wage and salary earners in a number of characteristics entrepreneurs are more individually oriented than the rest of the population individual responsibility and effort are distinguishing characteristics when asked about important qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home entrepreneurs answer that it is important to teach children an ethic of working hard except for the latter characteristic the same holds if we compare self employed with wage and salary earners

an ampirical assessment of the contribution of small business employment to u s state economic performance small business proponents regularly couple their arguments for favorable government policies and reduced tax and regulatory burdens to the presumed benefits of increased proportions of small versus large sector employment though regularly espoused at both the state and national level these presumptions regarding the benefits of small business employment remain an empirical issue are the presumed benefits a reality a panel analysis of 48 u s states for a ten year period was used to evaluate the contribution of small businesses to growth in productivity growth in gross state product gsp unemployment and wage inflation at the state level the system of simultaneous equations revealed that states with higher proportions of very small business employment do indeed experience higher levels of productivity growth and gross state product growth while having less wage inflation and lower unemployment rates

union effects on productivity profits and growth has the long run arrived this article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity positive effects where they exist appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process lower profitability among unionized firms is well established more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long lived tangible and intangible capital the connection between unions investment behavior and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism s long run impact

inventory sharing and rationing in decentralized dealer networks an increasing number of manufacturers have started to pursue a strategy that promotes inventory sharing among the dealers in their distribution network in this paper we analyze a decentralized dealer network in which each independent dealer is given the flexibility to share his inventory we model inventory sharing as a multiple demand classes problem in which each dealer faces his own customer demand with high priority and inventory sharing requests from other dealers with low priority assuming that each dealer uses a base stock and threshold rationing policy for his inventory stocking and inventory sharing decisions we explicitly model the interactions between the dealers through inventory sharing and obtain aclosed form cost function for each dealer based on the steady state distribution of the inventory levels at the two dealers we then provide a detailed supermodularity analysis of the inventory sharing and inventory rationing game in which each dealer has a two dimensional strategy set stocking level and rationing level we show that the full sharing game in which dealers precommit to sharing all of their on hand inventory and the fixed sharing level game in which dealers precommit to sharing a portion of their on hand inventory are supermodular and thus a pure strategy nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for the rationing game in which dealers precommit to their stocking levels we show that there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium on the dealers sharing rationing levels finally a comprehensive computational study is conducted to highlight the impact of the manufacturer s incentives subsidies and or transshipment fees on the dealers sharing behavior

transshipment of inventories among retailers myopic vs farsighted stability the author considers a model of a decentralized distribution system consisting of n retailers selling an identical product retailers face a stochastic demand and must order their initial inventory before this demand is realized after demand realization retailers decide how much of their unsold inventory or unsatisfied demand they want to share with other retailers this is followed by a transshipment of leftover inventories and distribution of the additional profit generated through inventory sharing the author addresses the following issue suppose that the retailers distribute the profit from inventory sharing according to an allocation rule that induces retailers to share their residuals in a way that maximizes the additional profit such as the shapley value but may not belong to the core is it likely that in this framework all retailers will jointly share their residuals and not form subcoalitions previous research has looked at this problem from a myopic viewpoint and concluded that the grand coalition is not stable unlike the prior work the author looks at stability in a farsighted sense that is retailers do not consider only their immediate payoffs but are also concerned with reactions of other retailers to their actions in a symmetric setting with identical additional unit revenues from transshipments generated by all retailers farsighted retailers always maximize their allocations by not defecting from the grand coalition the author also provides conditions when the same is true for nonidentical additional unit revenues