airline choice switching costs and frequent flyer programmes switching costs are costs that customers face when switching from one firm to another in markets such as the airline market where repeated purchases are common switching costs may be substantial in this paper the switching costs are estimated for domestic airline routes in sweden between 1992 and 2002 in addition the determinants of these switching costs are tested for in particular to what extent factors such as frequent flyer programmes and flag carriers have an effect on switching costs a substantial switching cost is found although a large part of this calculated switching cost can be attributed to perceived quality differences it is also found that frequent flyer programmes contribute a non negligible part of the switching cost the paper ends with a brief discussion on the welfare consequences of switching costs where the connection between habit formation and switching costs is discussed

nonparametric and parametric analysis of calorie consumption in tanzania abstract the empirical literature on the demand for calories in developing countries suggests mixed results regarding the role of income and other socioeconomic characteristics on calorie demand this study employs both nonparametric and parametric methods to examine the impact of household expenditure and other socioeconomic variables on household demand for calories in tanzania using recent survey data the parametric methods include estimation strategies that ensure consistent estimates in the presence of behavioral endogeneity and measurement error under each estimation strategy we employ we find a strongly significant and positive relationship between household expenditure and calorie demand lending support to conventional wisdom that income growth can alleviate inadequate calorie intake the results also show a negative and significant relationship between food prices and calorie demand suggesting that effectively targeted food subsidies for very poor households may play a role in improving their calorie intake

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

disagreement in bargaining an empirical analysis of opec abstract we consider a stylised model in which two cartel members bargain over the aggregate production quota in a world of asymmetric information we show that when the two cartel members are sufficiently different the probability of agreement depends on both the current state of demand and initial production specifically the probability of agreement is much lower when demand is low and initial production is relatively high than when demand is high and initial production is relatively low we also find that regardless of the current demand state the more extreme is initial production the higher is the probability of agreement using an event study where we take as events opec production quota announcements we demonstrate empirically that the predictions of the model are borne out

the impact of maize price shocks on household food security panel evidence from tanzania abstract using three waves 2008 09 2010 11 2012 13 of the tanzanian national panel survey this study investigates the impact of maize price shocks on household food security between 2008 09 and 2012 13 calorie intake stagnated for urban households yet sharply deteriorated for rural households the latter was driven by a significant decline in the consumption of the major staple maize which showed strongest price hikes among all major food items fixed effects regressions indicate a clear negative relationship between maize prices and average household energy intake almost all population groups were found to be negatively affected by maize price shocks with rural landless households being the most vulnerable group in particular a 50 percent rise in maize prices decreases caloric intake for rural urban households on average by 4 4 5 4 percent and for rural landless households by 12 6 percent results further indicate that subsistence agriculture can act as an effective strategy to insure against food price volatility

optimal contracts with lock in the authors analyze incomplete long term contracts when buyers incur relationship specific set up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties if set up costs are observable the first best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot enforceably specify quality this does not even require long term contracts if set up costs are unobservable however then long term price contracts can strictly outperform short term contracts equilibrium may involve either inefficiently low quality with no buyer switching or efficient quality with inefficient switching a policy of taxing switching or the availability of budget breaking third parties can improve welfare copyright 1989 by american economic association

ideas interests and oil prices the political economy of trade reform during soeharto s indonesia indonesia since the late 1960s constitutes an excellent case study in the political economy of trade protection there have been major changes in the overall policy regime from liberalism to significant intervention and back towards liberalism there have been large though declining inter industry variations in effective protection there has been a lively domestic debate much of it dominated by non economists many actors at home and abroad have a stake in that debate and since the 1980s at least trade policy interventions have been reasonably well documented and quantified in this paper we show how quantitative analysis may be employed to shed light on changes in the trade policy regime over time we also examine the principal actors with an interest in and influence over trade policy delineating where possible how their influence translated into the policy arena finally we speculate on whether the framework developed in this paper is applicable to the very different circumstances prevailing in the post soeharto era

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

the cyclical behavior of the department of justice s antitrust enforcement activity abstract we study the cyclical behavior of antitrust enforcement as measured by the number of cases initiated by the us department of justice the key result is that antitrust case activity is countercyclical this finding is robust across alternate indicators of economic activity which include stock prices corporate profits and business cycles and across different types of cases the finding of countercyclical case activity does not appear to lend support to interest group theories that predict greater regulatory protection towards producers during economic contractions one interpretation of our result would be that antitrust violations tend to increase during economic downturns leading to an increase in the number of cases initiated the broad implication being that the antitrust division primarily acts as an antitrust law enforcement agency our results show that politics as measured by the party of the president and the republican versus democrat composition of the house and senate does not have a clear impact on case activity finally the number of cases initiated are significantly affected by the extent of funding

market structure and the value of overselling under stochastic demands in the operations management literature traditional revenue management focused on pricing and capacity allocation strategies in a two period model with stochastic demand inspired by travel and lodging industries we examine a two period model in which each seller may also adopt the overselling strategy to customers whose valuations are differentiated by timing of arrivals widely seen as a popular hedge against consumers skipping reservations we extend the stylized approaches of biyalogorsky carmon fruchter and gerstner 1999 and lim 2009 to understand the value of overselling under various market structures we find that contrary to existing literature the impact of period two pricing competition from overselling spills over to period one such that overselling may not always be a weakly dominant strategy once unlimited early demand ceases to hold in a duopoly regime we provide some numerical studies on the existence of multiple equilibria at the capacity allocation level which actually lead to different selling strategies at the equilibrium despite identical market conditions and firm characteristics

symmetry breaking in two player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity a synthesis abstract this paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure strategy nash equilibria these classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game and relies on the theory of supermodular games the underlying natural assumptions are satisfied in a number of two stage models with an investment decision preceding product market competition to illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach we present some existing models dealing with r d capacity expansion and information provision which motivated this study

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

industrial organization and public policy competition policy has been dominated by politics industrial organization can expect to exert an influence only insofar as it commands superior knowledge that is true with respect to the long run since economies of scale are limited to the short run competition is feasible in the long run therefore a trade off approach seeking to identify optimal market structures is misleading competition policy should instead be directed at prohibiting protective strategies of incumbents to deter entry competition being a process of creative destruction political viability of a competitive order requires competition policy to be supplemented by a social welfare policy

input subsidy programs in sub saharan africa a synthesis of recent evidence input subsidy programs have once again become a major plank of agricultural development strategies in africa ten african governments spend roughly us 1 billion annually on input subsidy programs isps amounting to 28 6 of their public expenditures on agriculture this article reviews the microlevel evidence on isps undertaken since the mid 2000s we examine the characteristics of subsidy beneficiaries crop response rates to fertilizer application and their influence on the performance of subsidy programs the impacts of subsidy programs on national fertilizer use and the development of commercial input distribution systems and finally the impact of isps on food price levels and poverty rates the weight of the evidence indicates that the costs of the programs generally outweigh their benefits findings from other developing areas with a higher proportion of crop area under irrigation and with lower fertilizer prices factors that should provide higher returns to fertilizer subsidies than in africa indicate that at least a partial reallocation of expenditures from fertilizer subsidies to r d and infrastructure would provide higher returns to agricultural growth and poverty reduction however because isps enable governments to demonstrate tangible support to constituents they are likely to remain on the african landscape for the foreseeable future hence the study identifies ways in which benefits can be enhanced through changes in implementation modalities and complementary investments within a holistic agricultural intensification strategy among the most important of these are efforts to reduce the crowding out of commercial fertilizer distribution systems and programs to improve soil fertility to enable farmers to use fertilizer more efficiently the challenges associated with achieving these gains are likely to be formidable

the impact of research led agricultural productivity growth on poverty reduction in africa asia and latin america abstract twenty percent of the world s population or 1 2 billion live on less than 1 per day 70 of these are rural and 90 are in asia and sub saharan africa research led technological change in agriculture generates sufficient productivity growth to give high rates of return in africa and asia and has a substantial impact on poverty currently reducing this number by 27 million per annum whereas productivity growth in industry and services has no impact the per capita cost of poverty reduction by means of agricultural research expenditures in africa is 144 and in asia 180 or 50 cents per day but this is covered by output growth by contrast the per capita cost for the richer countries of latin america is over 11 000

reward programs and tacit collusion reward programs a promotional tool to develop customer loyalty offer incentives to consumers on the basis of cumulative purchases of a given product or service from a firm reward programs have become increasingly common in many industries the best known examples include frequent flier programs offered by airlines frequent guest programs offered by hotels and frequent shopper programs offered by supermarkets despite the widespread business practice of reward programs research efforts on reward programs particularly in marketing have been scarce our paper takes an important step towards understanding the design of reward programs and its implications on pricing strategies we study a market that consists of two segments heavy and light user segments the key distinction between the two segments is that the heavy user segment purchases in each period and thus is a candidate for the reward programs in contrast the light user segment exits the market after one purchase and is not in a position to exploit reward programs an important feature of our model is that we allow for different price sensitivity between heavy user and light user segments our model closely examines the type of rewards a reward worth a dollar to the consumer might have different cost implications for the offering firm depending on the type of reward for example cash rewards have higher unit reward cost inefficient reward for the firm than a free product of the firm such as an airline ticket or long distance minutes efficient reward specifically we examine an interesting puzzle observed in the marketplace several firms offer a cash reward or a product not made by the firm such as jackets electronic items etc these firms could offer their own product as rewards and significantly lower their cost we examine whether there is any reason for such a seemingly suboptimal practice our analysis shows that reward programs weaken price competition by offering the incentives for repeat purchases reward programs increase a firm s cost to attract competing firms current customers because firms gain less from undercutting their prices equilibrium prices go up moreover as consumers become unwilling to switch because of potential rewards the firm with a larger market share in the heavy user segment charges higher prices therefore a low price in the first period which leads to a larger market share in the heavy user segment will always be followed by a high price in the second period in our model consumers are rational and can correctly anticipate firms incentive to offer lower prices initially to enroll them into the reward programs our paper offers an explanation as to why the type and amount of reward may vary across the programs we identify two determining factors for the selection of rewards size and relative price sensitivity of the heavy user segment we find that in a market with a small heavy user segment that is also much more price sensitive than the light user segment it is optimal for firms to offer the most inefficient rewards the intuition is based on the firms incentive to exploit the price insensitive light user segment by offering inefficient rewards firms are able to commit to weaker competition and therefore higher prices when the heavy user segment is large or not very price sensitive when compared to the light user segment competing firms should adopt the most efficient rewards to maximize their profit this may well be the case in a number of real world situations in which efficient rewards are quite prevalent we also find that optimal reward amount has a negative relationship with unit reward cost because both firms use rewards to attract the heavy users they tend to offer more when they adopt the more efficient rewards finally our paper identifies the relationship between market characteristics and theimpact of reward programs on firms profits and consumers benefits we find that firms gain from the adoption of reward programs as long as light users are not too price sensitive when light users are very price sensitive firms engage in intense price competition thus benefiting little from the loyalty of heavy users created through rewards because reward programs increase market prices light users who do not get the reward earn strictly lower benefit in contrast heavy users often stand to gain more from the reward program in most cases firms and the heavy users are better off at the expense of light users

methods for including income distribution in global cge models for long term climate change research abstract the consequences of climate policy and the impacts of climate change vary among different types of households depending on their income level expenditure pattern and other socioeconomic characteristics global economy environment models that are used to assess climate change issues traditionally do not distinguish households by income or other attributes to facilitate progress in this area we review and assess literature on methods to include household heterogeneity in global long term computable general equilibrium cge models we distinguish among three categories of approaches 1 the explicit modeling of multiple household types within the cge framework 2 micro simulation modeling and 3 direct modeling of income distribution for each of these approaches we describe the method key assumptions limitations and several prominent examples from the literature moreover we discuss data needs including the contents of household survey data their availability and processing we conclude with an overview of what each method could provide for global long term climate related research

understanding the mechanisms of economic development in this paper i advocate the investigation testing and modification of mechanisms as a progressive empirical research strategy for the field of economic development and other areas of applied economics i discuss three lines of work that have elucidated mechanisms that are relevant for development 1 connections between saving and growth 2 the determinants of commodity prices which are a key source of income for many developing countries and 3 some unexpected puzzles that arise in considering the linkages between income and food consumption in each case my discussion illustrates the positivist approach to the hypotheticodeductive method in this approach mechanisms are proposed key predictions derived and tested and if falsified the mechanisms are rejected or modified if the predictions of a mechanism are confirmed if they are sufficiently specific and if they are hard to explain in other ways we attach additional credence to the mechanism albeit provisionally since later evidence may undermine it sometimes the falsifications can be repaired by changing supplementary assumptions and sometimes they involve long steps backwards where the model is abandoned and often there is disagreement about which is the correct response but the end result is an accumulation of useful knowledge and understanding

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on quota violations of opec members abstract over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for opec countries however the academic literature on opec focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns this paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain opec members incentives for abiding or violating quotas we first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice the model highlights the trade off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007 we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and opec s quota system disciplining its members in bad times

the macro dimensions of food security economic growth equitable distribution and food price stability abstract rather than asking how to cope with hunger and famine the question might be how to escape their threat altogether important in this regard is recognizing that agriculture and the rural economy are greatly influenced by policies and outcomes in the rest of the economy strategies include economic growth with unchanging income distribution and growth with redistribution the latter encourages balanced growth to create non farm employment opportunities while investing in rural infrastructure

the cyclical behavior of strategic inventories this paper presents a model in which inventories are used by a duopoly to deter deviations from an implicitly collusive arrangement higher inventories allow firms to punish cheaters more strongly and can thus help to maintain collusion we show that when demand is high the incentive to deviate increases so that increases in inventories may be optimal for the duopoly this rationalizes the observed positive correlation between inventories and sales in our empirical section we show that as our model predicts this correlation is more important in concentrated industries we also provide several examples where inventories have been a factor in cartel behavior

bertrand edgeworth competition demand uncertainty and asymmetric outcomes abstract we analyze investment and pricing incentives in a symmetric bertrand edgeworth framework with uncertain demand firms choose production capacities before observing demand prices are chosen after demand is observed if the extent of demand variation exceeds a threshold level then a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies for capacities does not exist a smaller firm has no incentive ex ante to expand its capacity because capacity expansion would reduce its expected revenue in the event that demand is lower than expected output prices are predicted to have positive variance when demand is low and zero variance when demand is high journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

sustainable positive profit multiple price strategies in contestable markets abstract one of the most important features of contestable market is the incumbent s inability to react to entry while in the traditional literature this prevents the incumbent from earning positive profits in multiple price setting it allows him to make a binding commitment to maintain his strategy even if entry occurs it is shown that as a result of this pre commitment any natural monopolist can find a multiple price strategy that yields positive profit and prevents entry

artificial compatibility barriers to entry and frequent flyer programs if supplier firms can discriminate between buyers agents acting on behalf of employers principals and those making purchases for themselves then these firms may be able to create demand side entry barriers by creating what may be called artificial compatibility between otherwise unrelated goods or services even if there are no differences in costs between incumbent and potential entrant there will be an incentive to offer in kind inducements to agents these inducements may lead to entry barriers and their use may be a nash equilibrium we argue that frequent flyer programs are instances of the creation of such artificial compatibility

agricultural growth poverty and nutrition in tanzania abstract rapid economic growth does not appear to have significantly improved poverty and nutrition outcomes in tanzania we link recent production trends to household incomes using a regionalized recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium and microsimulation model results indicate some inconsistency between recent growth and poverty measurements in tanzania we also find that the structure of economic growth may have constrained the rate of poverty reduction agricultural growth has been driven by larger scale farmers who are less likely to be poor and has been concentrated among crops grown in specific regions of the country slow expansion of food crops and livestock also explain the weak relationship between agricultural growth and nutrition outcomes we find that accelerating agricultural growth particularly in maize strengthens the growth poverty relationship and enhances households caloric availability while also contributing significantly to growth itself

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

business cycles and the relationship between concentration and price cost margins using a newly constructed panel data base we examine changes in price cost margins in 284 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1981 a key finding is a dramatic narrowing of the spread between the margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries over this period we provide evidence that this narrowing is a result of the greater sensitivity of price cost margins in more concentrated industries to demand fluctuations this finding is robust to the inclusion of other industry variables and to measures of import competition the results indicate that cross sectional estimates of the concentration margins relationship are likely to be both biased and misleading

collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle this paper investigates the efiect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand uctuations in the absence of capacity constraints i e a limiting case of our model haltiwanger and harrington 1991 show that flrms flnd it more di cult to collude during periods of decreasing demand we flnd that this prediction can be overturned if flrms capacities are su ciently small capacity constraints imply that punishment proflts move procyclically so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive proflts are rising haltiwanger and harrington s main prediction remains valid for su ciently large capacities

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we explore the response of collusive prices to changing demand conditions when firms operate under capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we find support for the conventional view that periods of low demand lead through the emergence of excess capacity to a breakdown of collusive pricing we also find that the nature of price wars depends on the degree of excess capacity in the industry while small amounts of excess capacity can lead firms to engage in mild price wars characterized by uniform price reductions and market share stability more severe price wars characterized by price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is sufficiently great finally our results lend support to the view that market share instability is a symptom of ineffective collusion

how well do tree plantations comply with the twin targets of the clean development mechanism the case of tree plantations in tanzania the clean development mechanism cdm of the kyoto protocol is supposed to provide both carbon mitigation and poverty reduction this article reports from a model based study of market related carbon leakage and poverty reduction in the wake of a cdm tree planting project in tanzania a tree plantation was incorporated in a computable general equilibrium cge model with income differentiated household segments the study focused on sensitivity of carbon leakage and income distribution to different project ownerships and carbon premium allocations it turned out that the project value in terms of carbon premium has clear shortcomings as indicator of induced gdp growth and poverty alleviation the non poor rural and urban households benefit considerably more than the poor households however rising household income in all domestic project ownership arrangements increases demand for food raises use of fertilizer and crop yields a carbon cycle module for agricultural land use was incorporated in the cge model showing an increased carbon sequestration in agricultural soil representing a negative leakage through markets in the range of 60 120 of the certified emissions reductions as registered in the cdm tree plantation project

trade and the environment from a southern perspective the relationship between free trade and the environment is one of the main issues of contention between environmental and ecological economics environmental economics assumes a positive relationship between free trade economic growth and environmental policies environmental externalities may cause important damage however trade is not to be blamed for this instead the fault lies with policy inadequacies at the national level on the other hand some ecological economists criticise the assumptions of environmental economics especially the immobility of production factors and the positive correlation between income and environmental quality they plead for measures to prevent deterioration of northern environmental standards in a race to the bottom due to ecological dumping from the south in this paper we argue that neither environmental economics nor northern ecological economics take into account the structural conditions determining the international trade system based on some new empirical evidence on material flows we stress the notion of environmental cost shifting if physical and political ecology perspectives are adopted a southern approach to the trade and environment issue may arise 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

an alternating move price setting duopoly model with stochastic costs abstract this paper examines an alternating move price setting duopoly model in which marginal costs are stochastic without persistence it is shown that provided marginal costs do not fluctuate excessively equilibria in which firms match the current monopoly price do not exist by contrast equilibria in which firms always match their rival along the equilibrium path do exist in these equilibria deviations off of the equilibrium path result in extended price wars in which firms repeatedly undercut each other finally examples in which such price wars are observed in equilibrium are constructed

managing capacity through reward programs rewarding customers with own products or services has become an increasingly popular practice across a spectrum of industries such as airlines hotels and telecommunication in these service industries firms face demand uncertainty and strict short term capacity constraint when the market demand is low firms hold excess capacities that would lead to intense price competition in this paper we study the adoption and design of reward programs in the context of capacity management we demonstrate that it is optimal for firms to offer capacity rewards when the market demand varies from one period to the other by offering the reward programs firms can effectively reduce available capacities when the market demand is low and hence credibly show their unwillingness to undersell such a commitment can encourage their competitors to set their prices high when firms provide reward programs if a firm sets a higher price than the other and sells less today in the future the firm can benefit from the other firm s larger reduction in available capacity through rewards thus reward programs also provide additional incentives for firms to set higher current prices finally since reward programs can add flexibility in adjusting the available capacities to the market demand firms increase the size of regular capacities with reward programs

economic reform and smallholder agriculture in tanzania a discussion of recent market liberalization road rehabilitation and technology dissemination efforts abstract this paper discusses the reforms affecting tanzania s small farm sector during 1984 1993 it focuses on changes in marketing and input supply including the revival of regional cooperative societies the ending of the state monopoly in food crop procurement and changes in the export crop sector efforts to rehabilitate the country s road network and the effects of institutional change on a technology dissemination program sasakawa global 2000 are also discussed the author concludes that improvements in the performance of the smallholder sector cannot be expected to follow automatically from a withdrawal of government

structural adjustment and soil degradation in tanzania a cge model approach with endogenous soil productivity abstract in this paper a model of the nitrogen cycle in the soil is incorporated in a computable general equilibrium cge model of the tanzanian economy thus establishing a two way link between the environment and the economy for a given level of natural soil productivity profit maximising farmers choose input levels and hence production volumes which in turn influence soil productivity in the following years through the recycling of nitrogen from the residues of roots and stover and the degree of erosion the model is used to simulate the effects of typical structural adjustment policies like a reduction in agro chemicals subsidies reduced implicit export tax rate etc after 10 years the result of a joint implementation is a 9 higher gross domestic product gdp level compared to the baseline scenario the effect of soil degradation is found to represent a reduction in the gdp level of more than 5 for the same time period

tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the scope for tacit collusion i study whether discount factor fluctuations can have similar effects i find that collusion depends not only on the level of the discount factor but also and more surprisingly on its volatility collusive prices and profits increase with a higher discount factor level but decrease with its volatility these results have important implications for empirical studies of collusive pricing the role that collusive pricing may play in economic cycles and the study of cooperation in repeated games

countercyclical pricing in customer markets i present a dynamic model of price determination in customer markets that are subject to exogenous business cycle fluctuations the business cycle is described in terms of a markov process in which market demand alternates stochastically between fast growth boom and slow growth recession phases in the consumers preferred equilibrium outcome 1 prices are below the monopoly level and 2 prices are countercyclical when demand growth rates are positively correlated through time a firm faces a dynamic trade off when making its current price selection while a higher price may raise a firm s profit in the short term it also may diminish the firm s reputation for low prices leading to lower profits in the future

collusion and heterogeneity of firms we examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic bertrand competition we show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting first we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold with or without capacity constraints next we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria in the long run the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market

customer recognition in experience vs inspection good markets we study the effects of customer recognition and behavior based price discrimination bpd in a two period experience good duopoly with a discrete value distribution and we investigate the role of consumers ex ante valuation uncertainty in dynamic price competition through comparison with an inspection good duopoly several results are reached first the firms may reward repeat purchase when the probability of a high value is relatively low and when the high low value difference is large otherwise they may engage in poaching second bpd frequently increases each firm s total profits even in the poaching equilibrium these results contrast with the inspection good duopoly and the driver is that consumers period 2 product preference depends on their realized values in period 1 third consumers ex ante valuation uncertainty may increase or decrease firm profits without bpd and it weakly increases firm profits with bpd relative to the inspection good duopoly this paper was accepted by j miguel

overselling in a competitive environment boon or bane in this paper we study the practice of overselling in a competitive environment where late arriving consumers value the good higher than early arriving ones but the former s arrival is uncertain we show that overselling is a dominant strategy for the firms however it can lead to a prisoners dilemma situation in which all firms are worse off overselling we further show that only when demand from the late consumers far exceeds the supply and there is a sufficiently high profit margin from reselling does overselling result in a pareto dominant outcome for the firms

lumpy capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries in this paper we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment disinvestment we use our model to suggest answers to two questions first what economic factors facilitate preemption races second what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination with a series of examples we show that low product differentiation low investment sunkness and high depreciation tend to promote preemption races the same examples also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness tend to promote capacity coordination although depreciation removes capacity it might impede capacity coordination finally our examples show that multiple equilibria arise over at least some range of parameter values the distinct structures of these equilibria suggest that firms expectations play a key role in determining whether or not industry dynamics are characterized by preemption races and capacity coordination taken together our results suggest that preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand in hand with capacity coordination in the long run

how do incumbents respond to the threat of entry evidence from the major airlines this paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors as distinguished from their response to competitors actual entry it uses a case study from the passenger airline industry specifically the evolution of southwest airlines route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly when southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future we examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events we find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by southwest s entry into their routes this is true even after controlling in several ways for airport specific operating costs the response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where southwest does not operate e g fares drop on routes from chicago midway but not chicago o hare the largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand incumbents do experience short run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts this is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor we examine evidence relating this demand building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion there is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes

producing biofuels in low income countries an integrated environmental and economic assessment for tanzania this paper jointly evaluates the greenhouse gas emissions and economic impacts from producing biofuels in tanzania sequentially linked models capture natural resource constraints emissions from land use change economywide growth linkages and household poverty results indicate that there are economic incentives to convert unused lands to sugarcane ethanol production but only grasslands not forests have a reasonable carbon payback period there are also strong socioeconomic reasons to involve smallholders in feedstock production in order to reduce rural poverty especially since our results indicate that biofuels have little effect on food production yet smallholders require more land than large scale plantations and so face more binding natural resource and emissions constraints overall environmental constraints alter the socioeconomically optimal biofuel strategy for tanzania by limiting potential poverty reduction unlike previous studies our integrated assessment suggests that a mixed farming system with greater emphasis on large scale plantations is more appropriate for producing sugarcane ethanol in tanzania

the incentive to cheat an empirical analysis of opec relatively little is known about the payoffs to various kinds of strategies facing opec cartel members we propose an empirically tractable procedure to calculate the payoffs to relevant opec strategies fresh insights into the problem of the quota system and deterring cheating are presented stressing the importance of the nonrenewability of the oil stock the short run rigidity of demand short term capacity constraints the presence of a backstop technology and the different discount rates the cartel members are facing we conclude that punishment is a dominant strategy for the saudis and that the finite resource base in the oil industry substantially attenuates the incentive to cheat also the biased market quota system in favor of small producers weakens but does not eliminate their incentive to cheat in addition we compute the price paths and payoffs corresponding to competitive cournot and joint profit maximization solutions and contrast them with the actual historical patterns of opec beha

consumer inattention and bill shock regulation for many goods and services such as electricity health care cellular phone service debit card transactions or those sold with loyalty discounts the price of the next unit of service depends on past usage as a result consumers who are inattentive to their past usage but are aware of contract terms may remain uncertain about the price of the next unit i develop a model of inattentive consumption derive equilibrium pricing when consumers are inattentive and evaluate bill shock regulation requiring firms to disclose information that substitutes for attention when inattentive consumers are sophisticated but heterogeneous in their expected demand bill shock regulation reduces social welfare in fairly competitive markets which may be the effect of the federal communication commission s recent bill shock agreement if some consumers are attentive while others naively fail to anticipate their own inattention however then bill shock regulation increases social welfare and can benefit consumers hence requiring zero balance alerts in addition to the federal reserve s new opt in rule for debit card overdraft protection may benefit consumers

explaining the evolution of poverty the case of mozambique we provide a comprehensive approach for analyzing the evolution of poverty using mozambique as a case study bringing together data from disparate sources we develop a novel back casting framework that links a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to a micro simulation poverty module this framework provides a new approach to explaining and decomposing the evolution of poverty as well as to examining rigorously the coherence between poverty economic growth and inequality outcomes finally various simple but useful and rarely applied approaches to considering regional changes in poverty rates are presented copyright 2012 oxford university press

market power and price movements over the business cycle this paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly pricing model the model predicts that during a demand expansion the short run competitive price is a pure strategy nash equilibrium but in a recession firms set prices above the competitive price thus price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions the empirical analysis utilizes hamilton s time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly pricing model

tacit collusion in repeated auctions uniform versus discriminatory within an infinitely repeated game i compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions for this purpose i characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats i show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats but bidders deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the payoff irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem this discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in england wales and elsewhere

the value of collusion with endogenous capacity and demand uncertainty collusion has often been alleged in industries where long lived capacity investments are important this article develops a computational duopoly model with capacity investments demand shocks and either competitive or collusive pricing it shows that allowing for endogenous capacity investments can sometimes make collusion less valuable than competition and that it can change the normal relationships between the profitability of collusion and both the discount rate and industry wide demand shocks

estimating monopoly behavior with competitive recycling an application to alcoa this article develops a structural model of the aluminum industry during the period between world war i and world war ii it takes into account both the intertemporal nature of alcoa s cost minimization problem and the competitive recycling sector the model enables estimation of alcoa s degree of market power while allowing for the effect of competition from recycled aluminum previous work has emphasized alcoa s control over the size of the secondary sector in the long run as a source of market power for alcoa the results here indicate that alcoa could exert little influence in this regard but nonetheless had substantial market power

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

increasing agricultural productivity while reducing greenhouse gas emissions in sub saharan africa myth or reality the motivation for this study stems from two major concerns that are interlinked the first is the decades long food insecurity crisis faced by sub saharan african ssa countries which is still prevalent the second is the negative impact greenhouse gas ghg emissions from agriculture may have on future food production and which is likely to worsen the food insecurity problem the conundrum ssa farmers face is how to increase food output through productivity growth while minimizing ghg emissions to measure changes in productivity growth and ghg emissions this study evaluates the agricultural performance of 18 ssa countries by utilizing the malmquist luenberger index to incorporate good and bad outputs for the years 1980 2012 the empirical evidence demonstrates that productivity is overestimated when bad outputs are not considered in the production model the analysis provides a better understanding of the effectiveness of previous mitigation methods and which informs an appropriate course of action needed to achieve the twin objectives of increasing agriculture productivity while reducing ghg emissions

a taxonomy and research overview of perishable asset revenue management yield management overbooking and pricing this paper proposes the term perishable asset revenue management to denote the field that combines the areas of yield management overbooking and pricing for perishable assets after summarizing the characteristics common to problems in this field the paper discusses the objectives and constraints faced by decision makers then it offers a comprehensive taxonomy with 14 different elements and reviews the research that has been done related to each element finally it suggests some important areas of future research that can help bridge the gap between theory and application

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

are loyalty rewarding pricing schemes anti competitive abstract many economists and policy analysts seem to believe that loyalty rewarding pricing schemes like frequent flyer programs tend to reinforce firms market power and hence are detrimental to consumer welfare the existing academic literature has supported this view to some extent in contrast we argue that these programs are business stealing devices that tend to enhance competition in the sense of generating lower average transaction prices and higher consumer surplus in highly competitive environments this result is robust to alternative specifications of the firm commitment power and demand structures however it could be reversed if the number of firms is sufficiently small and if firms are restricted to use program designs with sufficiently weak commitment capacity

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

the protectionist bias of duty drawbacks evidence from mercosur in a political economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying it is shown that full duty drawbacks are granted to exporters who use imported intermediates in their production this in turn decreases their incentives to counter lobby against high tariffs on their inputs in equilibrium higher tariffs will be observed on these goods the creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium duty drawbacks will be eliminated on intra regional exports which in turn will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra regional exporters evidence from mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty drawbacks for intra regional exports led to increased counter lobbying by users of intermediate products in its absence the common external tariff would have been on average 3 5 percentage points 25 percent higher

the demand for food and calories we investigate nutrition and expenditure in rural maharashtra in india we estimate that the elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to total expenditure is 0 3 0 5 a range that is in accord with conventional wisdom the elasticity declines only slowly with levels of living and is far from the value of zero suggested by a recent revisionist literature in these indian data the calories necessary for a day s activity cost less than 5 percent of the daily wage which makes it implausible that income is constrained by nutrition rather than the other way around

competition in the economic crisis analysis of procurement auctions we study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions using data from austrian construction procurements we estimate bidders construction costs within a private value auction model we find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1 5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis markups of winning bids decrease by 3 3 percentage points we also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger these two pieces of evidence point to pro cyclical markups

a dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars we provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among jirms investment entry and exit it is a symmetric information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an activejim that is likely to exit in the near future numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to a noncollusive environment only the collusive industry generates price wars also the collusive industry offers both more and higherquality products to consumers albeit often at a higher price the positive effect of collusion on variety and quality more than compensates consumers for the negative effect of collusive prices so that consumer surplus is larger with collusion

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

short run supply with capacity constraints the behavior of industrial production and inventories over the business cycle has recently been a topic of considerable interest though macroeconomic issues motivate the discussion the hypotheses themselves are microeconomic short run supply might reflect costs and expectations or it might be heavily influenced by strategic considerations the strategic hypothesis is particularly attractive for those industries in which concentrated oligopolies use capital intensive production facilities to meet cyclically sensitive demand 2 thus there is a particular set of industries whose macroeconomic importance suggests a close investigation of the microeconomics of their supply behavior in this article we take up the analysis of an important standard case mass production achieved by flow processes in capitalintensive facilities where capacity adjusts slowly and is long lived in other words we focus on that part of the economy whose elementary

are duty drawbacks on exports worth the hassle many countries use duty drawbacks on exports yet there is no consensus whether countries should embrace or abandon them the answer depends on countries development priorities and economic conditions an increase in the drawback has a positive impact on export competitiveness but the welfare effect is ambiguous a welfare increase is more likely if the economy is small with high input tariffs low initial drawback low administrative costs and tariff leakages in china duty drawback removal after meeting its wto commitments improves welfare but hurts economic efficiency export competitiveness and real incomes further liberalization can mitigate these negative effects plusieurs pays utilisent ce genre de rabais de tarifs douaniers mais il n y a pas de consensus a savoir si on doit supporter ces mesures ou les abandonner la reponse depend des conditions economiques et des priorites de developpement des divers pays un accroissement de ces reductions a un effet positif sur la competitivite des exportations mais ses effets sur le niveau de bien etre sont ambigus un effet de bien etre positif est plus probable si l economie est petite et a des hauts tarifs sur les intrants de faibles rabais des couts administratifs faibles et peu de fuites en chine l elimination de ces rabais en accord avec les engagements exiges par l omc a ameliore le niveau de bien etre mais a eu un effet negatif sur l efficacite la competitive des exportations et les revenus reels une liberalisation accrue peut attenuer ces effets negatifs

does uncertainty matter consumer behavior under three part tariffs in communication information and other industries three part tariffs are increasingly popular a three part tariff is defined by an access price an allowance and a marginal price for any usage in excess of the allowance empirical nonlinear pricing studies have focused on consumer choice under two part tariffs we show that consumer behavior differs under three part tariffs and assess how consumer demand uncertainty impacts tariff choice we develop a discrete continuous model of choice among three part tariffs and estimate it using consumer level data on internet usage our model extends prior work in accommodating consumer switching to competitors thereby capturing behavior in competitive industries more accurately our empirical work shows that demand uncertainty is a key driver of choice among three part tariffs consumers expected bill increases with the variation in their usage steering them toward tariffs with high allowances consequently demand uncertainty decreases consumer surplus and increases provider revenue a further analysis of consumers responsiveness to the different elements of a three part tariff under the provider s current pricing structure reveals that prices affect a consumer s tariff choice more than her usage quantity and that the allowance plays a strong role in consumer tariff choice based on our results we derive implications for pricing with three part tariffs

collusion under risk aversion and fixed costs we analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk averse cartels that care about the utility derived from profits with sufficient risk aversion and non trivial fixed operating costs it becomes difficult for cartels to collusively restrict output both when demand is low and marginal dollars are highly valued and when demand is high and potential defection profits are high output relative to monopoly levels becomes a u shaped function of demand greater risk aversion or higher fixed operating costs make collusion more difficult to support in recessions but easier to support in booms

the political economy of indirect control this paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its authority we develop a dynamic principal agent model in which a principal a government delegates the prevention of a disturbance such as riots protests terrorism crime or tax evasion to an agent who has an advantage in accomplishing this task our setting is a standard dynamic principal agent model with two additional features first the principal is allowed to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players second the principal suffers from limited commitment using recursive methods we derive a fully analytical characterization of the likelihood intensity and duration of intervention the first main insight from our model is that repeated and costly interventions are a feature of the efficient equilibrium this is because they serve as a punishment to induce the agent into desired behavior the second main insight is a detailed analysis of a fundamental tradeoff between the intensity and duration of intervention which is driven by the principal s inability to commit finally we derive sharp predictions regarding the impact of various factors on likelihood intensity and duration of intervention we discuss these results in the context of some historical episodes

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

consumer choice and cournot behavior in capacity constrained duopoly competition in a two stage model of duopolistic capacity choice and subsequent price competition consumer switching costs can deter some consumers from seeking service at a low price firm that lacks sufficient capacity to serve the entire market in this setting firms residual demand functions are aggregatedfrom thefirm selection decisions of individual consumers based on firms prices and their induced degrees of service reliability if consumers are approximately risk neutral with respect to service reliability then capacity constrained duopoly competition has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which firms choose cournot capacities and prices the equilibrium robustness of cournot behavior extends to duopoly markets in which consumer switching costs are induced by subscription pricing