nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

did bank distress stifle innovation during the great depression we find a negative relationship between bank distress and the level quality and trajectory of firm level innovation during the great depression particularly for r d firms operating in capital intensive industries however we also show that because a sufficient number of r d intensive firms were located in counties with lower levels of bank distress or were operating in less capital intensive industries the negative effects were mitigated in aggregate although depression era bank distress was associated with the stifling of innovation our results also help to explain why technological development was still robust following one of the largest shocks in the history of the u s banking system

consequences of bank distress during the great depression the consequences of bank distress for the economy during the depression remain an area of unresolved controversy since john m keynes 1931 and irving fisher 1933 macroeconomists have argued that bank distress magnified the extent of the economic decline during the depression as the intermediaries controlling money and credit banks were in a special position to transmit their distress to other sectors but the mechanism through which banking distress mattered for the economy has been hotly contested milton friedman and anna j schwartz 1963 saw the contraction in the money multiplier driven in their view by panicked depositors withdrawals of deposits as the primary mechanism through which banking distress affected the real economy they described the mechanism transmitting banking distress to the real sector as operating at the national level through changes in the aggregate supply of money and interest rates bank distress reduced the money supply available to the public either through the closure of banks and the consequent freezing of bank deposits or the withdrawals of deposits by depositors that feared bank failure ben s bernanke 1983 building on fisher 1933 emphasized the transmission of monetary shocks via their effects on the balance sheets of borrowers and on the supply of credit by banks borrowers balance sheets were worsened by debt deflation as the result of fixed dollar debt obligations borrowers net worth and cash flow declined with the rising value of debt service costs relative to income borrowers with positive net present value projects but weak balance sheets had less internally generated retained earnings to invest and could not qualify for credit furthermore bernanke argued that the contraction of the money supply produced contraction of nominal income and prices relative to fixed debt service which weakened borrowers balance sheets and in turn weakened banks not only did firms financial distress reduce the number of qualified borrowers the contraction in banks net worth forced a reduction in the supply of bank loans to qualified borrowers many firms and individuals relied on banks for credit and as those banks suffered losses of capital due to asset value declines and contractions in deposits as depositors reacted to bank weakness by withdrawing their funds even borrowers with viable projects and strong balance sheets experienced a decrease in the effective supply of loanable funds bernanke termed the combined weakening of borrowers balance sheets and the contraction in bank credit supply a rise in the cost of credit intermediation the scarcity of perfect substitutes for the positive net present value investments of firms with weak balance sheets and for the credit supplied by existing banks implies that the weakening of firms and banks balance sheets the disappearance of banks and the contraction in surviving banks lending made it more difficult for the economy to channel funds to their best use thus what began as a contraction in aggregate demand became a contraction in aggregate supply which magnified adverse economic shocks and prolonged and deepened the depression the financial distress of firms and banks and the decline in bank lending were not only symptoms of the depression but means for magnifying the shocks that caused the depression bernanke s statistical evidence in support of this story is derived from time series analysis at the national level in calomiris graduate school of business 601 uris hall columbia university 3022 broadway new york ny 10027 and national bureau of economic research e mail cc374 columbia edu mason department of finance drexel university 3141 chestnut street philadelphia pa 19104 e mail joe mason drexel edu we thank valerie ramey david wheelock charles himmelberg steve zeldes gary gorton two referees and seminar participants at columbia university wharton northwestern university and the 2001 economic history association meetings for helpful comments on an earlier draft we gratefully acknowledge support from the national science foundation the university of illinois and the federal reserve bank of st louis

why do bank runs look like panic a new explanation this paper demonstrates that even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria a bank run may still occur when depositors expectations on the bank s fundamentals do not change more specifically a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank specific information will be revealed or when they learn that precise bank specific information will not be revealed the results in this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs it also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs

regulating banks through market discipline a survey of the issues abstract the interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed new capital accord this paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation we start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms next a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced we evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have finally we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism in this respect the basle committee has taken the right approach

the taylor principle fights back part ii abstract the existing literature holds that the taylor principle often leads to indeterminacy in new keynesian models that allow for capital accumulation and limited asset market participation this conclusion is special however to the case of continuous full employment when the assumption of perfect wage flexibility is relaxed very slightly so that the labor market clears quickly but not instantaneously determinacy is the norm the threat of indeterminacy is limited to a tiny irrelevant corner of the parameter space where the elasticity of labor supply is unusually high and real wage adjustment is unbelievably fast everywhere else the taylor principle guarantees a unique rational expectations equilibrium the dramatic difference in results reflects the sensitivity of the monetary transmission mechanism to the speed of adjustment in the labor market

do depositors punish banks for bad behavior market discipline deposit insurance and banking crises this paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline we evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline we focus on the experiences of argentina chile and mexico during the 1980s and 1990s we find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises regardless of bank fundamentals and investors responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises

fundamentals panics and bank distress during the depression we assemble bank level and other data for fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure fundamentals explain bank failure risk well the first two friedman schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure the third friedman schwartz crisis is more ambiguous but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate the final crisis early 1933 saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role in pre 1933 bank failures even though those effects were not large in their aggregate impact

tail risk and systemic risk of us and eurozone financial institutions in the wake of the global financial crisis we evaluate multiple market based measures for us and eurozone individual bank tail risk and bank systemic risk we apply statistical extreme value analysis to the tails of bank equity capital losses to estimate the likelihood of individual institutions financial distress as well as individual banks exposure to each other spillover risk and to global shocks extreme systematic risk the estimation procedure presupposes that bank equity returns are heavy tailed and tail dependent as identifying assumption using both us and eurozone banks allows one to make a cross atlantic comparison of tail risks and systemic stability we also assess to what extent magnitudes of tail risk and systemic risk have been altered by the global financial crisis the results suggest that both tail risk and systemic risk in the us are higher than in the eurozone regardless of the considered sample period

the impact of affirmative action on labor demand a test of some implications of the le chatelier principle this paper presents an alternative approach to measuring the impact of affirmative action on firms affirmative action is modeled as a series of hiring quotas if the quotas are binding then a firm subject to affirmative action will operate with greater costs of production have less elastic demand for inputs and be less able to substitute between most inputs the results are consistent with the hypothesis that affirmative action regulations significantly constrain firms behavior own wage elasticities are less elastic and most inputs are less substitutable for constrained firms further affirmative action raises costs by 6 5 percent for firms subject to the program copyright 1992 by mit press

an examination of country member bank cash balances of the 1930s a test of alternative explanations around march 1933 commercial banks began accumulating unprecedented amounts of cash uncertainty over deposits and loans low interest rates relative to brokerage fees and costly de novo capital have been used to explain this behavior this paper employs aggregate call date data for country member banks in the 12 federal reserve districts to formally investigate the role of these factors in the accumulation the results indicate a minimal if any role for these factors the findings suggest that it was the unintended consequence of unprecedented deposit growth in the face of large scale related adjustment costs

building an incentive compatible safety net abstract bank safety nets originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems have become an important destabilizing influence government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net

inflation targeting regimes abstract this paper divides the monetary frameworks of countries that use an inflation target to define their monetary framework into three different regimes i full fledged inflation targeting ii implicit price stability anchor and iii inflation targeting lite the regimes are differentiated by the clarity and credibility of the commitment to the inflation target the revealed preference for different regimes is related empirically to cross country structural differences in economic and financial development policy implications of moving from one regime to another are drawn especially for emerging market countries aiming at full fledged inflation targeting

the political lessons of depression era banking reform ironically the primary motivations for the main bank regulatory reforms in the 1930s regulation q the separation of investment banking from commercial banking and the creation of federal deposit insurance were to preserve and enhance two of the most disastrous policies that contributed to the severity and depth of the great depression unit banking and the real bills doctrine other regulatory changes affecting the allocation of power between the fed and the treasury were intended to reduce the independence of the fed while giving the opposite impression the ill conceived banking legislation of the 1930s took very little time to pass but a great deal of time to disappear the overarching lesson is that the aftermath of crises are moments of high risk in public policy the great depression provoked banking reform legislation that was quick comprehensive and unusually responsive to popular opinion each of these three aspects increases the risk that regulation will have adverse consequences

investment and monetary policy learning and determinacy of equilibrium we explore determinacy and expectational stability learnability of rational expectations equilibrium ree in new keynesian nk models that include capital using a consistent calibration across three different models labor only firm specific capital or an economy wide rental market for capital we provide a clear picture of when ree is determinate and learnable and when it is not under a variety of monetary policy rules our findings make a case for greater optimism concerning the use of such rules in nk models with capital while bullard and mitra s 2002 2007 findings for the labor only nk model do not always extend to models with capital we show that determinate and learnable ree can be achieved in nk models with capital if there is i plausible capital adjustment costs ii some weight given to output in the policy rule and or iii a policy of interest rate smoothing

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

market contagion evidence from the panics of 1854 and 1857 to test a model of contagion where individuals hear some bad news and communicate it to their acquaintances who then pass it on leading to a market panic requires a knowledge of the information networks of participants something hitherto unavailable for two panics in the 1850s this paper examines the behavior of irish depositors in a new york bank as recent immigrants their social network was determined largely by their place of origin in ireland and where they lived in new york during both panics this social network turns out to be the prime determinant of behavior

bank runs and institutions the perils of intervention we study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create we show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals instead once a run is underway benevolent government institutions would allow additional deposit withdrawals placing further strain on the banking system when depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals their incentive to participate in the run increases in fact ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self fulfilling run to occur jel g21 g8

a critical review of contagion risk in banking the recent financial crisis has focused the attention of scholars and policymakers on how to improve financial stability through better macro prudential regulation and supervision in this paper we compare the existing theoretical and empirical literature on contagion through the banking system it is argued that the structure of the interbank market the size of banks the linkages among them the level of correlation of their investments and the transparency of the regulator are key factors in determining the possibility of contagion we discuss the different findings and present avenues for future research

double liability and bank risk taking this paper examines double liability as it existed in the united states prior to the great depression and assesses its impact upon bank risk taking under double liability shareholders of failing banks could lose in addition to the initial purchase price of shares an amount equal to the par value of shares owned this paper assesses whether or not banks chartered in states with double liability laws undertook less risk than banks operating under conventional limited liability the results suggest that double liability did reduce bank risk taking but did not guarantee bank stability in times of widespread financial distress

sticky price models of the business cycle can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem we construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations these fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles like volatile investment and smooth consumption we assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so we find that for a wide range of parameter values the amount of endogenous stickiness is small thus we find that in a standard quantitative model staggered price setting alone does not generate business cycle fluctuations

the design of monetary and fiscal policy a global perspective abstract we study the emergence of multiple equilibria in models with capital and bonds under various monetary and fiscal policies we show that the presence of capital is indeed another independent source of local and global multiplicities even under active policies that yield local determinacy we also show how a very similar mechanism generates multiplicities in models with bonds and distortionary taxation we then explore the design of monetary policies that avoid multiple equilibria we show that interest rate policies that respond to the output gap while potentially a source of significant inefficiencies may be effective in preventing multiple equilibria and costly oscillatory equilibrium dynamics

sources of panics evidence from the weekly data abstract we use weekly data 1867 1933 to investigate the sources of banking and financial panics we find that while a panic s exact starting date is unpredictable one can identify environments conducive to panics a lack of liquidity in financial markets seems to be a key source results also reveal the effectiveness of the aldrich vreeland act inelastizing the money supply and shortening the panic of 1914 and suggest that the panic of 1933 may have been caused by a speculative attack on the gold backed us dollar via the banks as opposed to a run on the banks directly

dynamic debt runs and financial fragility evidence from the 2007 abcp crisis we use the 2007 asset backed commercial paper abcp crisis as a laboratory to study the determinants of debt runs our model features dilution risk maturing short term lenders demand higher yields in compensation for being diluted by future lenders making runs more likely the model explains the observed tenfold increase in yield spreads leading to runs and the positive relation between yield spreads and future runs results from structural estimation show that runs are very sensitive to leverage asset values and asset liquidity but less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch the strength of guarantees and asset volatility

monetary policy rules based on real time data this paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules using taylor s rule as an example i demonstrate that real time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data further estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the federal reserve in real time these results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules

pitfalls of forward looking monetary policy a distinctive feature of the procedures recently adopted by inflation targeting central banks is their forward looking character forecasts of the economy s future evolution conditional upon alternative policies play a central role in the banks deliberations to an extent that the procedures adopted are sometimes characterized as forecast targeting this emphasis upon the future consequences of policy is unsurprising in an approach that tries to maintain as transparent as possible a relation between the banks9 decisions and the ultimate goals of monetary policy after all current decisions can still affect the future but not the past nonetheless common descriptions of how inflation targeting is or should be practiced go too far in proposing purely forward looking procedures i shall argue instead that an optimal framework for the conduct of monetary policy must generally be history dependent in ways

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

sticky prices in the euro area a summary of new micro evidence this paper summarises the vast evidence on micro price setting recently obtained for euro area countries we consider studies with micro data on consumer and producer prices as well as survey information the main findings are 1 prices in the euro area are sticky and stickier than in the us 2 downward price rigidity is only slightly more marked than upward price rigidity 3 heterogeneity and asymmetries are observed in price setting and 4 the relevance of theories that explain price stickiness such as implicit or explicit contracts marginal costs and coordination failure is confirmed whereas menu costs pricing thresholds and costly information explanations are judged much less relevant by firms jel c25 d40 e31

inflation targeting a new framework for monetary policy he world s central bankers and their staffs meet regularly in venues from basle to washington to share ideas and discuss common problems perhaps these frequent meetings help explain why changes in the tactics and strategy of monetary policymaking such as the adoption of money growth targets in the 1970s the intensification of efforts to reduce inflation in the 1980s and the recent push for increased institutional independence for central banks tend to occur in many countries more or less simultaneously whatever their source major changes in the theory and practice of central banking are of great importance for both individual countries and the international economy in this article we discuss a new strategy for monetary policy known as inflation targeting which has sparked much interest and debate among central bankers and monetary economists in recent years this approach is characterized as the name suggests by the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at one or more horizons and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy other important features of inflation targeting include increased communication with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary policymakers and in many cases increased accountability of the central bank

bank failures and bank fundamentals a comparative analysis of latin america and east asia during the nineties using bank level data abstract this paper uses bank level data from recent banking crises in east asia and latin america to address the following two questions 1 to what extent did individual bank conditions explain the failures 2 in terms of their fundamentals was it mainly the weak banks ex ante that failed in the crisis countries the results show that for the two regions bank level fundamentals significantly affect the likelihood of collapse for these banks systemic shocks both macroeconomic and liquidity that triggered the crises mainly destabilized the weak banks ex ante particularly in east asia which raises questions about the role that regional differences play for the degree of banking sector resilience to systemic shocks in the financial and macroeconomic environment

european inflation dynamics abstract we provide evidence on the fit of the new phillips curve npc for the euro area over the period 1970 1998 and use it as a tool to compare the characteristics of european inflation dynamics with those observed in the u s we also analyze the factors underlying inflation inertia by examining the cyclical behavior of marginal costs as well as that of its two main components namely labor productivity and real wages some of the findings can be summarized as follows a the npc fits euro area data very well possibly better than u s data b the degree of price stickiness implied by the estimates is substantial but in line with survey evidence and u s estimates c inflation dynamics in the euro area appear to have a stronger forward looking component i e less inertia than in the u s d labor market frictions as manifested in the behavior of the wage markup appear to have played a key role in shaping the behavior of marginal costs and consequently inflation in europe

the heterogeneity of animal spirits a first taxonomy of entrepreneurs with regard to investment expectations investment expectations are highly subjective and subjectivity is inherently diverse we propose an analytical taxonomy of entrepreneurs with regard to investment expectations of how diverse animal spirits are we draw on past research so as to outline the relevant independent classification variables motivations skills management styles and affective traits comprise our four groups of classification variables based on a field study using a sample of 289 entrepreneurs and performing two different cluster analyses we find 11 stable groups of entrepreneurs we portray them as ideal types a la weber there may be major and minor memberships our 11 groups are the neoclassical manager the builder the administrator the paternalistic manager the hero the mogul the prophet the craftsman the inventor the gambler and the explorer

suspension of payments bank failures and the nonbank public s losses abstract we present evidence on the effects of suspensions of payments from an episode that is close to a controlled experiment for examining those effects in 1861 about 44 of the banks in wisconsin closed 81 of the banks in illinois closed and noteholders suffered substantial losses the historical record suggests that an effective suspension of payments in wisconsin but not in illinois may explain the difference our statistical evidence indicates that the suspension of payments increased the probability of a bank remaining open by about 21 percentage points and decreased noteholders losses by about 14 cents per dollar

is forward looking inflation targeting destabilizing the role of policy s response to current output under endogenous investment we show that with endogenous investment virtually all monetary policy rules that set a nominal interest rate in response solely to expected future inflation induce real indeterminacy in models with i staggered prices ii staggered prices and staggered wages and iii staggered prices staggered wages and firm specific capital in i policy s response to current output can help significantly in ensuring determinacy with an infinite labor supply elasticity but little with empirically plausible labor supply elasticity in ii responding to output always helps a great deal though under low price stickiness and without capital adjustment cost it may call for a moderate response to output in order to ensure determinacy for a wide range of response to inflation in iii even a tiny response to output can always render equilibrium determinate for a wide range of response to inflation

alternatives for distressed banks during the great depression using data on individual banks during the great depression i find that institutions that failed during periods in which failures were especially numerous such as the banking panics appear to have been at least as financially sound as banks that were able to pursue alternative resolution strategies such as merging with another institution or suspending and recapitalizing during less extreme periods this result suggests that problems associated with having numerous banks in distress simultaneously during the depression may have exacerbated the number of banks closed and the economic downturn

firm specific capital nominal rigidities and the taylor principle in the presence of firm specific capital the taylor principle can generate multiple equilibria sveen and weinke new perspectives on capital sticky prices and the taylor principle j econ theory 123 2005 21 39 obtain that result in the context of a calvo style sticky price model one potential criticism is that the price stickiness which is needed for our theoretical result to be relevant from a practical point of view is somewhat to the high part of available empirical estimates in the present paper we show that if nominal wages are not fully flexible which is an uncontroversial empirical fact then the taylor principle fails already for some minor degree of price stickiness we use our model to explain the consequences of both nominal rigidities for the desirability of alternative interest rate rules

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

bailouts and bank runs theory and evidence from tarp during the recent financial crisis there were bank runs right after government bailout announcements this paper develops a global game model of information based bank runs to analyze how the announcement of bailouts affects investors bank run incentives the equilibrium probability of bank runs is uniquely determined i conclude that before the announcement the existence of such bailout policy reduces investors bank run incentives but after the announcement investors may run on the bank since such an announcement reflects the government s information about the bad bank asset the empirical evidence from tarp is consistent with my theory

too many to fail evidence of regulatory forbearance when the banking sector is weak this paper studies bank failures in 21 emerging market countries in the 1990s by using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak this too many to fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors financial crises the too big to fail effect domestic financial development and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers the paper also shows that the too many to fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit

new perspectives on capital sticky prices and the taylor principle abstract our main result is that dynamic new keynesian dnk models with firm specific capital feature a substantial amount of endogenous price stickiness we use this insight to assess the desirability of alternative interest rate rules and make the case for combining active monetary policy with interest rate smoothing and or some responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to real economic activity the key mechanism behind our results is also useful from a positive point of view the feature of firm specific capital increases the empirical appealingness of dnk models as documented by a growing body of literature

investment and interest rate policy abstract the paper s theorems reverse two standard results of new keynesian economics simply by appending endogenous investment to a benchmark imperfect competition sticky price model our results are a a passive interest rate rule where the monetary authority responds to inflation by lowering the real interest rate implies local equilibrium uniqueness whereas an active rule does not generate a locally unique equilibrium b a temporary exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate causes a temporary increase in output and investment extensions of the benchmark model including generalized preferences and alternative interest rate rules are also examined journal of economic literature classification numbers e12 e31 e52

real rigidities and the non neutrality of money rigidities in real prices are not sufficient to create rigidities in nominal prices and real effects of nominal shocks and by themselves small frictions in nominal adjustment such as costs of changing prices create only small non neutralities but this paper shows that substantial nominal rigidity can arise from a combination of real rigidities and small nominal frictions the paper shows the connection between real and nominal rigidity given the presence of nominal frictions both in general and for two specific sources of real rigidity one arising from goods market imperfections and the other from labour market imperfections

in which context is the option clause desirable the option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels it has been used within the diamond and dybvig j pol econ 91 401 419 1983 framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance this literature has however been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts it will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes bankrupt because of a bank run as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt it will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in a free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt related agency problems and b under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self fulfilling prophecies it will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt makes the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems

returns to scale market power and the nature of price rigidity in new keynesian models with self fulfilling expectations increasing returns to scale and firms market power are two potential sources of sunspot expectations in neoclassical models we show that in new keynesian models returns to scale and market power can have fundamentally different implications for broad macroeconomic issues including self fulfilling expectations depending on the nature of price rigidity our findings suggest that the design of stabilization monetary policy can depend on precise knowledge about the economy s real and nominal features therefore a clear understanding of the specific economic environment and its relevance to monetary policymaking for ensuring macroeconomic stability can be an integrated part of monetary policy practice

investment interest rate policy and equilibrium stability abstract carlstrom and fuerst 2005 investment and interest rate policy a discrete time analysis journal of economic theory 123 4 20 show that in the presence of investment activity and price stickiness indeterminacy of equilibrium is induced by forward looking monetary policy that sets the interest rate in response only to future inflation in a stochastic version of their model we find that this indeterminacy problem is due to a cost channel of monetary policy whereby inflation expectations become self fulfilling and the problem can be overcome once the forward looking policy responds also to current output or contains sufficiently strong interest rate smoothing since this prevents the self fulfilling expectations we also show that when e stability is adopted as the selection criterion from multiple equilibria even the forward looking policy generates a locally unique non explosive e stable fundamental rational expectations equilibrium as long as the policy response to expected future inflation is sufficiently strong

the evolution of a financial crisis collapse of the asset backed commercial paper market this paper documents runs on asset backed commercial paper abcp programs in 2007 we find that one third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the abcp crisis and that runs as well as yields and maturities for new issues were related to program level and macro financial risks these findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics have implications for commercial paper investors degree of risk intolerance and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures

inflation forecast targeting implementing and monitoring inflation targets abstract inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting the central bank s inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy the weight on output stabilization determines how quickly the inflation forecast is adjusted towards the inflation target money growth or exchange rate targeting is generally inferior than inflation targeting and leads to higher inflation variability commitment to target rules may be better than commitment to instrument rules

information contagion and bank herding we show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks when bank loan returns have a common systematic factor the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor the increase in a bank s cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality in addition to the systematic risk factor hence banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

blood and treasure exiting the great depression and lessons for today although avoiding the policy mistakes of the 1930s helped define how policy makers responded to the 2007 8 financial crisis and ensuing recession policy applications to the recovery phase are less well understood we draw on the experience of the us in the 1930s to shed light on exit strategies movements back to institutional conditions associated with steady state growth including stable inflation and broadly non interventionist credit and capital market policies we describe how policy responses to the deflation and banking crises of the 1930s coloured the exit policy debate after the great depression we show that a full exit from the great depression defined as the point at which interventionist credit and capital market policies and institutions were wound down did not occur in the 1930s it took until the 1950s for this to occur and for the federal reserve to regain its independence and return unfettered to its longer run

intertemporal substitution in labor supply evidence from micro data the sensitivity of the supply of labor to intertemporal variation in the wage is an important issue in macroeconomics the analysis of social security and pensions and the study of life cycle patterns of work this paper explores two approaches to the measurement of intertemporal substitution that have appeared in the literature the first approach is to use consumption to control for wealth and unobserved expectations about future wages in the labor supply equation the second approach is to estimate a first difference equation for hours in which labor supply from the previous period serves as a control for wealth and wage expectations the results indicate that intertemporal substitution elasticity for married men is positive but small

intertemporal substitution and constraints on labor supply evidence from panel data intertemporal substitution and constraints on labor supply evidence from panel data i introduction through much of the 1970s and 1980s macroeconomic stabilization analysis has been dominated by equilibrium models in which fluctuations in employment result from intertemporal substitution workers voluntarily vary their labor supply over time in response to movements in wages and interest rates a number of recent empirical tests of intertemporal substitution models for example altonji 1982 mankiw et al 1985 ham 1986 strongly reject the intertemporal substitution approach these results have led some economists to reject equilibrium macro models in favor of keynesian models in which workers face quantity constraints on labor supply in keynesian models employment fluctuations result from changes in the severity of constraints that is changes in involuntary unemployment rather than intertemporal substitution on the other hand many economists remain unconvinced by recent rejections of intertemporal substitution models because the results are consistent with many possible explanations for tractability empirical studies always impose restrictive assumptions such as separability of utility over time and between goods or such as the existence of a representative consumer data also suffer from numerous problems such as aggregation bias measurement error and the use of average rather than marginal wage rates consequently even the authors of the studies seem hesitant to draw firm conclusions they often simply conclude that workers behavior is explained either by quantity constraints or by a more complicated intertemporal substitution model than the one they have tested 1 this paper attempts to determine which of these explanations is correct are changes in employment a sophisticated form of intertemporal substitution or are they involuntary the crucial data come from questions in the panel study of income dynamics about whether workers experience unemployment or are unable to work as many hours as they want following ham 1982 1986 this information is used to classify workers as quantity constrained in their labor supply or unconstrained i then test a simple intertemporal substitution model for each group of workers if the tests suffer from overly restrictive utility functions or data problems then the model should be rejected for both samples on the other hand if some workers truly face quantity constraints then the model should perform better for the sample of unconstrained workers 2 the tests yield two main results first the model indeed performs worse for the constrained workers for this group the data reject the model s overidentifying restrictions and the parameter estimates contradict the model in contrast the results for the unconstrained workers are weakly consistent with the model as keynesian theories suggest quantity constraints alter workers behavior second the estimates of the intertemporal labor supply elasticity for prime age men are close to zero even for unconstrained workers even if workers are free to vary their hours they apparently choose to respond little to movements in wages the paper addresses two other issues first do constraints on borrowing influence labor supply in the intertemporal substitution model workers borrow and lend to smooth consumption while varying hours of work as this suggests the model performs best for workers who not only face no labor supply constraints but who also own substantial assets and thus are unlikely to face liquidity constraints finally the paper proposes a new approach to identifying intertemporal labor supply equations previous micro studies do not adequately address the problem that wages are correlated with unobservable characteristics that affect tastes for work i propose two identifying restrictions 1 changes in tastes are uncorrelated with levels of time in variant variables and 2 changes in tastes have no aggregate component

fiscal adjustment and inflation targeting in less developed countries inflation targeting may not be viable in less developed countries ldcs where policymakers rely too heavily on cuts in infrastructure investment to balance the budget using a mix of analytical and numerical methods we demonstrate that the equilibrium ceases to be saddle point stable under active policy when infrastructure cuts account for 30 70 of fiscal adjustment and the return on infrastructure exceeds a comparatively low threshold value the result is robust to the form of the taylor rule the degree of real wage flexibility the initial level of debt the choice of a balanced budget or debt targeting rule and the q elasticity of private investment spending

the banking panics in the united states in the 1930s some lessons for today in this paper we discuss the lessons learned from the us banking panics in the 1930s for the response by the federal reserve to the crisis of 2008 we revisit the debate over illiquidity versus insolvency in the banking crises of the 1930s and provide empirical evidence that the banking crises largely reflected illiquidity shocks in the recent crisis the fed under bernanke had well learned the lesson from the banking panics of the 1930s of conducting expansionary monetary policy to meet demands for liquidity however unlike in the 1930s the deeper problem of the recent crisis was not illiquidity but insolvency and especially the fear of insolvency of counterparties a number of virtually insolvent us banks deemed too big and too interconnected to fail were rescued by fiscal bail outs

investment and interest rate policy a discrete time analysis this paper analyzes the restrictions necessary to ensure that the interest rate policy rule used by the central bank does not introduce local real indeterminacy into the economy it conducts the analysis in a calvo style sticky price model a key innovation is to add investment spending to the analysis in this environment local real indeterminacy is much more likely in particular all forward looking interest rate rules are subject to real indeterminacy

bank asset liquidation and the propagation of the u s great depression we hypothesize that financial disintermediation during and after the great depression arose from the slow liquidation of failed bank deposits empirical results from incorporating the stock of failed national bank deposits for the period 1921 40 in vector autoregression var models suggest that the stock of deposits in closed banks undergoing liquidation is as important as money stock in terms of explaining output changes over forecast horizons from one to three years hence we infer that the dynamic effects of banking sector shocks were cumulative and pervasive during and after the depression

why does the cyclical behavior of real wages change over time the cyclical behavior of real wages has evolved from mildly countercyclical during the interwar period to modestly procyclical in the postwar era this paper presents a general equilibrium business cycle model that helps explain the evolution in the model changes in the real wage cyclicality arise from interactions between nominal wage and price rigidities and an evolving input output structure

understanding bank runs the importance of depositor bank relationships and networks we use a unique new database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run we use minute by minute depositor withdrawal data to understand the effectiveness of deposit insurance the role of social networks and the importance of bank depositor relationships in influencing depositor propensity to run we employ methods from the epidemiology literature which examine how diseases spread to estimate transmission probabilities of depositors running and the significant underlying factors we find that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing bank runs further our results suggest that social network effects are important but are mitigated by other factors in particular the length and depth of the bank depositor relationship depositors with longer relationships and those who have availed of loans from a bank are less likely to run during a crisis suggesting that cross selling acts not just as a revenue generator but also as a complementary insurance mechanism for the bank finally we find there are long term effects of a solvent bank run in that depositors who run do not return back to the bank our results help understand the underlying dynamics of bank runs and hold important policy implications

input demand elasticities for heterogeneous labor firm level estimates and an investigation into the effects of aggregation labor economists have paid increasing attention to the estimation of demand elasticities for heterogeneous labor the majority of these studies investigate the effect on wage rates resulting from exogenous changes in factor quantities i e the measurement of elasticities of complementarity examples of these studies abound borjas for example investigates the impact of differences in labor market representation on the earnings of racial groups 8 in another paper borjas defines immigrants as a separate labor group and is able to determine the impact of immigration on the wages earned by natives 9 berger defines labor inputs along education and gender lines thereby allowing for the investigation of changes in the age education composition of the work force on wage rates 5 and grant and hamermesh study the effect of increasing female labor force participation on the wages earned by youth and adults 17 less attention has been paid to the study of the responsiveness of employment to exogenous changes in wage rates i e the measurement of elasticities of substitution less attention has been focused on this issue because the data requirements are more stringent since in order to presume that wage rates are exogenously determined the unit of observation must be small ideally establishmentor firm level data would be used the relative inaccessibility of these type of data has led researchers to use more aggregated figures such as smsa level or industry level data to address microissues as long as wage rates are determined exogenously the unit of observation chosen is appropriate there are real concerns however about the adequacy of more aggregated units to describe the behavior of firms 2 this study addresses the issue of whether micro level data are in fact needed to accurately measure elasticities of substitution among labor groups a firm level data set that includes input

bank runs in emerging market economies evidence from turkey s special finance houses recent banking crises in emerging market countries have renewed debates about deposit insurance because insurance erodes banks incentives to manage risks prudently some argue that its elimination would improve bank stability yet eliminating insurance could be de stabilizing if it recreates risks of self fulfilling runs this paper examines dynamics of depositor behavior during a set of runs on turkey s special finance houses an uninsured sub sector of islamic banks detailed data on withdrawals are analyzed in a vector autoregressive framework that enables us to distinguish between informational and self fulfilling elements of runs we found that both types of dynamics were at work during the runs suggesting a role for deposit insurance judiciously used in ruling out expectational problems that fuel tendencies to run

cyclical correlations credit contagion and portfolio losses abstract we model aggregate credit losses on large portfolios of financial positions contracted with firms subject to both cyclical default correlation and direct default contagion processes cyclical correlation is due to the dependence of firms on common economic factors contagion is associated with the local interaction of firms with their business partners we provide an explicit normal approximation of the distribution of portfolio losses we quantify the relation between the variability of global economic fundamentals strength of local firm interaction and the fluctuation of losses we find that cyclical oscillations in fundamentals dominate average losses while local interaction causes additional fluctuations of losses around their average the strength of the contagion induced loss variability depends on the complexity of the business partner network

inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule the purpose of the paper is to survey and discuss in ation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules the paper provides a general conceptual discussion of monetary policy rules attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of in ation targeting compares in ation targeting to other monetary policy rules and draws some conclusions for the monetary policy of the european system of central banks jel classi cation e42 e52

an experiment on the causes of bank run contagions abstract to understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions we conduct bank run experiments in a modified diamond dybvig setup with two banks left and right the banks liquidity levels are either linked or independent left bank depositors see their bank s liquidity level before deciding right bank depositors only see left bank withdrawals before deciding we find that left bank depositors actions significantly affect right bank depositors behavior even when liquidities are independent furthermore a panic may be a one way street an increase in left bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the right bank but a decrease does not calm depositors

ripples of fear the diffusion of a bank panic community reactions against organizations can be driven by negative information spread through a diffusion process that is distinct from the diffusion of organizational practices bank panics offer

business cycles and the relationship between concentration and price cost margins using a newly constructed panel data base we examine changes in price cost margins in 284 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1981 a key finding is a dramatic narrowing of the spread between the margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries over this period we provide evidence that this narrowing is a result of the greater sensitivity of price cost margins in more concentrated industries to demand fluctuations this finding is robust to the inclusion of other industry variables and to measures of import competition the results indicate that cross sectional estimates of the concentration margins relationship are likely to be both biased and misleading

the information sensitivity of debt in good and bad times abstract we empirically show the dynamics of information production and information sensitivity of bank debt around the great recession as more precise information is produced at the onset of the crisis bank debt becomes informationally sensitive along two separate dimensions first precise information amplifies the effect of market expectations on default risk second for banks that are already expected to perform poorly more precise information further increases default risk both effects are muted in good times overall our findings are consistent with information based models of financial crises

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net argentina and the tequila shock abstract this paper tests the random withdrawals vs informed based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in argentina as a consequence of the mexican devaluation of december 20 1994 this evidence is unique in several ways it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme and a case in which the bank runs were triggered by a currency run the findings of the paper provide support to the informed based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency

do real balance effects invalidate the taylor principle in closed and open economies this paper examines the determinacy implications of forecast based monetary policy rules that set the interest rate in response to expected future inflation in a neo wicksellian model that incorporates real balance effects we show that the presence of such effects in closed economies restricts the ability of the taylor principle to prevent indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium the problem is exacerbated in open economies particularly if the policy rule reacts to consumer price rather than domestic price inflation however determinacy can be restored in both closed and open economies with the addition of monetary policy inertia

the federal reserve and panic prevention the roles of financial regulation and lender of last resort this paper surveys the role of the federal reserve within the financial regulatory system with particular attention to the interaction of the fed s role as both a supervisor and a lender of last resort the institutional design of the federal reserve system was aimed at preventing banking panics primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window this new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s after which the fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create stigma for window borrowing policies that contributed to the panics of the great depression the legislation of the new deal era centralized fed power in the board of governors and over the next 75 years the fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks nevertheless prior to the recent crisis the fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort with the latter role weakened further by stigma the fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly as the fed begins its second century there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention

depositor behavior under macroeconomic risk evidence from bank runs in emerging economies depositor behavior has been associated with bank specific characteristics random runs or contagion episodes using evidence on the 2000 02 bank runs in argentina and uruguay this paper shows that macroeconomic risk is also important few macroeconomic shocks can quickly cause large runs macroeconomic risk affects deposits regardless of traditional bank specific characteristics furthermore bank exposure to macroeconomic factors can explain differences in deposit withdrawals during crises the evolution of bank specific characteristics is mainly driven by macroeconomic factors while the informational content of bank specific variables declines overall depositors seem responsive to risk in a broader sense than that often considered by the literature

capital and macroeconomic instability in a discrete time model with forward looking interest rate rules abstract we establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for local real determinacy in a discrete time production economy with monopolistic competition and a quadratic price adjustment cost under forward looking policy rules for the case where capital is in exogenously fixed supply and the case with endogenous capital accumulation using these conditions we show that i indeterminacy is more likely to occur with a greater share of payment to capital in value added production cost ii indeterminacy can be more or less likely to occur with constant capital than with variable capital iii indeterminacy is more likely to occur when prices are modelled as jump variables than as predetermined variables iv indeterminacy is less likely to occur with a greater degree of steady state monopolistic distortions and v indeterminacy is less likely to occur with a greater degree of price stickiness or with a higher steady state inflation rate in contrast to some existing research our analysis indicates that capital tends to lead to macroeconomic instability by affecting firms pricing behavior in product markets rather than households arbitrage activity in asset markets even under forward looking policy rules

bank net worth and frustrated monetary policy abstract i present a model in which bank net worth determines both loan market competition and monetary transmission to firm borrowing rates in the model banks are local monopolists for borrowers near them when they are flush with equity banks expand their lending compete for customers at the edges of their markets and pass through changes in the monetary policy rate to their loan rates when they lose substantial equity banks consolidate retreat from rivalry and frustrate monetary transmission the model explains why interest rate pass through weakens after financial crises its predictions are consistent with several facts about bank to firm lending

arresting banking panics federal reserve liquidity provision and the forgotten panic of 1929 scholars differ on whether central bank intervention mitigates banking panics in april 1929 a fruit fly infestation in florida forced the u s government to quarantine fruit shipments from the state and destroy infested groves in july depositors panicked in tampa and surrounding cities the federal reserve bank of atlanta rushed currency to member banks beset by runs we show that this intervention arrested the panic and estimate that bank failures would have been twice as high without the federal reserve s intervention our results suggest that similar interventions may have reduced bank failures during the great depression

contagion and bank failures during the great depression the june 1932 chicago banking panic the authors examine the social costs of asymmetric information induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance their case study is the chicago bank panic of june 1932 the authors compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks copyright 1997 by american economic association

the performance of forecast based monetary policy rules under model uncertainty we investigate the performance of forecast based monetary policy rules using five macroeconomic models that reflect a wide range of views on aggregate dynamics we identify the key characteristics of rules that are robust to model uncertainty such rules respond to the one year ahead inflation forecast and to the current output gap and incorporate a substantial degree of policy inertia in contrast rules with longer forecast horizons are less robust and are prone to generating indeterminacy in light of these results we identify a robust benchmark rule that performs very well in all five models over a wide range of policy preferences