on the strategic role of outside options in bilateral bargaining this paper studies a model of the situation in which two players are bargaining face to face over the partition of a unit size cake and moreover one of the players can choose to temporarily leave the negotiating table to search for an outside option a main conclusion is that the equilibrium outcome does not depend on whether a bargainer is allowed within the game form to choose to return to the negotiating table to resume bargaining after having searched for some finite time moreover it is shown that our strategic bargaining search game approximately implements an appropriately defined nash bargaining solution

bargaining search and outside options abstract this paper studies a two sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer the buyer has an outside option which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time two cases are considered in regime i both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters we find that in contrast to bargaining with complete information the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium however the no delay result still holds in regime ii where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option delay is possible the solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table

search and collusion in electronic markets we examine the impact of reduced search costs on prices of commodity products in electronic marketplaces conventionally reduced consumer search costs may be expected to engender stronger price competition between firms resulting in lower prices and improved consumer welfare this notion was formalized in stahl 1989 oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search american economic review vol 79 no 4 pp 700 712 in a model of static firm competition in this paper we show that these standard welfare conclusions may be neutralized or reversed in a dynamic environment we focus on self enforcing collusion by firms and characterize the conditions under which collusive equilibria exist we show that less costly consumer search can facilitate firms abilities to collude resulting in higher prices and reduced consumer welfare even with imperfect or no monitoring by sellers of each other s prices if the same technology that eases consumer search also allows firms to monitor each other s prices more easily then firms can more easily detect cheating on a collusive price arrangement allowing an even greater scope for collusion this raises antitrust concerns with respect to the electronic marketplace and suggests that at least some of the anticipated competitive gains from electronic market systems may be difficult to realize

to reveal or not to reveal strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation abstract within the bargaining literature it is widely held that negotiators should never reveal information that will lead to disclosure of their reservation prices we analyze a simple bargaining and search model in which the informed buyer can choose to reveal his cost of searching for an outside price which determines his reservation price to the uninformed seller we demonstrate that buyers can be made better off by revealing their search cost more interestingly we also find that depending on the assumed distribution of search costs sometimes buyers with relatively low search costs should reveal their private information whereas in other cases buyers with relatively high search costs should do so we then test our model experimentally and find that subjects behavior is not entirely consistent with theoretical predictions in general bargainers behavior is better explained by a bounded rationality model similar to fictitious play

co operatives and the poor a comparative perspective cooperatives have a universal appeal as an instrument of poverty alleviation and yet their record has been less than exemplary this paper highlights dilemmas faced in cooperative development between the objectives of growth and distribution and those of decentralization and equity the paper identifies the various internal and external prerequisites for a successful cooperative movement by examining the evidence with regard to marketing credit and production cooperatives it argues that in the absence of such prerequisites alternative forms of institutional arrangements may be at least as effective as cooperative institutions in any case a healthy movement that reaches the poor calls for institutional competition

bargaining with two sided incomplete information an infinite horizon model with alternating offers this paper examines an infinite horizon bargaining model incorporating five features two sided incomplete information with potentially information revealing strategies an infinite horizon uncertainty concerning the potential gains from trade an illumination of interesting qualitative bargaining issues and plausible free from arbitrarily specified out of equilibrium conjectures equilibria these features motivated in the paper have powerful implications a nash equilibrium exists and is generically both unique and sequential comparative static implications of variations in the game s specifications are developed we find that natural indications of bargaining strength emerge from the model and establish the intuitive result that an increase in a player s relative bargaining strength makes that player more likely to capture the gains from bargaining

european union energy policy integration a case of european commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism focusing on gas this article explores the role of the european commission in the process of european union energy security policy development and the extent to which the policy area is becoming increasingly supranational situating the article within the literature on agenda setting and framing it is argued that a policy window was opened as a result of enlargement to include more energy import dependent states a trend of increasing energy imports and prices and gas supply disruptions from the mid 2000s the commission contributed to a shift in political norms successfully framing import dependency as a problem requiring an eu level solution based on the institution s pre existing preferences for a diversified energy supply and internal energy market whilst member states retain significant sovereignty the commission has achieved since 2006 creeping competencies in the internal and to a lesser extent external dimensions of eu energy policy

matching search and bargaining abstract first the paper incorporates search for alternative opportunities into a model of strategic bargaining second this search and bargaining model is embedded in a market matching model the solutions are presented in a manner that clarifies the role of the search abilities and the details of the bargaining procedure in the determination of the outcomes the predictions of the model are contrasted with the related literature the main accomplishment is the attainment of a manageable model which is still rich enough to grasp important differences between environments which are not captured by the standard matching models

the role of external search in bilateral bargaining we consider the problem of bargaining between two individuals who can also search for possible alternatives to each other s offers we explicitly incorporate the search activity into the process of bargaining a disagreement in bargaining will lead each individual to search for an outside offer in the hope of improving his future bargaining position and attaining a more favorable outcome we model the interlaced phases of bargaining and search over time as an extensive noncooperative game we characterize the associated subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and strategies finally we show that superior search ability yields an individual a more favorable outcome and hence represents a greater bargaining strength

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

bargaining and search with recall a two period model with complete information two standard results of previous bargaining models state that delay is generally not expected to occur under complete information and bargaining outcome depends crucially on the bargainers intrinsic characteristics that determine their reservation prices and in general bargainers with better reservation prices tend to get better outcomes this paper considers a bilateral bargaining problem with complete information in which one of the bargainers the buyer is allowed to search while bargaining more importantly we assume that the buyer is allowed to recall past outside offers we find that quite contrary to the standard results of previous complete information bargaining models complete information renders no guarantee for immediate resolution of bargaining and the effect of changing the buyer s search cost on each player s bargaining outcome is unpredictable the major driving force of these two results is the assumption that the buyer can recall past outside offers

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

forms of business organization and rural enterprise development some examples from anglophone africa abstract for rural enterprises in transition from the informal to the formal sector the legal form of business organization adopted can significantly affect the management of the firm partnerships are simple and flexible but may be too loosely structured for some commercial ventures cooperative societies are more formally structured than partnerships and are subject to less complicated statutory requirements than companies although they are vulnerable to far reaching government intervention companies are generally more attractive to institutional lenders and passive investors however their complexity makes them better suited to entrepreneurs with substantial business experience

bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options abstract this paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search at a cost for an outside option the outside option cannot be credibly communicated and the seller s offer is recallable by the buyer for one period there are essentially two equilibrium regimes for sufficiently high search cost the game ends immediately otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option the seller is worse off and the game results in search for a smaller set of values of the search cost i e less equilibrium delay c72

bargaining under two sided incomplete information the unrestricted offers case chatterjee and samuelson chatterjee k l samuelson 1987 bargaining with two sided incomplete information an infinite horizon model with alternating offers rev econ stud 54 175 192 recently examined a noncooperative game theoretic bargaining model with two sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon results were obtained from the model with the help of restrictions on agents strategies this paper examines the model without these restrictions by doing so we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model and hence might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work we find that the basic results generalize as with the restricted model we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages a terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows compar

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

will the european commission s policy hinder gas supplies to central and eastern european countries opal case decision abstract natural gas has become one of the most important sources of energy the liberalization of the gas sector in the last decades brought a dynamic development of the energy infrastructure in the eu thus it must be underlined that the liquidity of the gas market is dependent on the outside supplies the study examines the european commission s policy taking into consideration specifically its decision on the exemption of opal gas pipeline from eu rules the main question is what would be the long term effect of such policy in the authors opinion there are several serious doubts whether the commission has made an appropriate decision the major one concentrate on the impact of the decision which according to the commission refers only to germany and czechia gas market nevertheless an analysis of gas flow based on the entsog leads to a conclusions that decision could have a substantial influence on slovakia and poland if so under the eu provisions the investment can not be excluded form the eu rules therefore the authors will analyze step by step the commission decision and present its possible future impact on the internal energy market

when the grace period is over assessing the new member states compliance with eu requirements for oil stockholding the accumulation of appropriate emergency stocks of crude oil and petroleum products has been at the heart of the european commission s efforts to increase the security of supply this study investigates how effectively the new member states comply with the requirements of council directive 2006 67 ec which imposes the obligation to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and or petroleum products the empirical focus of this analysis is not only motivated by the practical relevance of this issue but also by the fact that eleven of the twelve new member states were given grace periods between one and seven years to bring their national stockholding arrangements in line with the european requirements the granting of extended deadlines raises the question whether this instrument indeed facilitates the transposition process the empirical findings show that except for latvia compliance with the eu stockholding requirements is generally very good a more detailed analysis of the latvian case highlights that the transposition delays principally stem from budgetary constraints more generally the individual new member states capacity to cope with the financial burdens and the degree of adjustment pressure determine the variation in oil stock levels

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed