sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division this paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors i show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game if stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games a simple condition is provided under which they exist in symmetric games furthermore symmetric stationary perfect equilibria of symmetric games generate a coalition structure which is generically unique up to a permutation of the players a general method for the characterization of equilibria in symmetric games is proposed and applied to the formation of cartels in oligopolies and coalitions in symmetric majority games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c71 1996 academic press inc

dynamic savings decisions in agricultural environments with incomplete markets we develop a methodology for examining savings behavior in rural areas of developing countries that explicitly incorporates the sequential decision process in agriculture the approach is used to examine the relative importance of alternative forms of savings in the presence and absence of formal financial intermediaries our results based on stage specific panel data from pakistan provide evidence that the presence of financial intermediaries importantly influences the use of formal savings and transfers for income smoothing we also find that there are significant biases in evaluations of the savings income relationship that are inattentive to the within year dynamics of agricultural production

partial international coordination in the great fish war this study extends the great fish war model of levhari and mirman levhari d and mirman l 1980 bell journal of economics 11 322 344 by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination nash equilibrium first findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained second the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters finally if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player there always exist one or two welfare improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem

inside china s cities institutional barriers and opportunities for urban migrants one of the most glaring legacies of 20thcentury chinese socialism is a sharp and widened divide between china s urban and rural areas china s widened urban rural divide arose from a socialist industrialization process which created a hastened heavy industrial base at the expense of its rural population china s vast rural population not only endured a standard of living far below that in the urban sector they were also denied access to many social welfare benefits and social mobility opportunities martin king whyte 1996 this urban rural gap in social and economic wellbeing together with a massive reservoir of rural surplus labor and an acute shortage of consumer goods formed the driving forces for china s change of migration control policy and for the rapid increase of rural migrants in chinese cities though the exact number of migrants is still hard to ascertain due to both a lack of consensus in the definition of migrant and the absence of an authoritative national survey migrants prominent presence in chinese cities is hardly disputable in china s largest cities for instance it is often quoted that at least one out of every five persons is a migrant and most likely a migrant from rural areas in shanghai the number of migrants rose tenfold in one decade from 0 26 million in 1981 to 2 81 million in 1993 the percentage of local residents who were migrants correspondingly rose from less than 5 percent in the early 1980 s to 21 7 percent in 1993 changming sun 1997 in beijing the number of migrants was 3 29 million in 1994 compared to a locally registered population of 10 63 million for the whole municipality and 6 million for its city districts dangsheng ji et al 1996 p 95 in city districts one out of every three persons in beijing is a temporary migrant from elsewhere most of these recorded migrants are also genuine migrants not short term visitors more than 60 percent had stayed for more than half of a year and only 17 percent had been in beijing for less than one month three quarters of all the surveyed migrant population listed business or employment as their purpose of stay ji et al 1996 pp 96 97 rural migrants account for over threequarters of all migrants in large chinese cities in shanghai for instance a survey in 1995 found that 88 1 percent of all migrants had their place of household registration in the countryside wang and zuo 1997 similarly in beijing where one expects to see a higher circulation of urban to urban migrants close to 80 percent of migrants surveyed in late 1994 were peasants before moving into beijing xiuhualiu 1996 p 112

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

behavioral responses to risk in rural china does risk perpetuate poverty in a credit constrained economy jalan and ravallion study portfolio and other behavioral responses to measured risk using household panel data for rural china one quarter of wealth is held in unproductive liquid forms but only a small share of this appears to be a precaution against income risk the authors estimate that eliminating income risk would reduce the share of wealth held in liquid form by less than 1 percentage point moreover that effect is confined largely to middle income groups high income households do not it seems need to hold unproductive cautionary wealth and the poor probably cannot afford to do so the authors find no evidence that income risk discourages schooling but risk does inhibit the out migration of labor generally the results provide only limited support for the idea that uninsured risks promote unproductive portfolio behavior in this setting there is such an effect but it is small in magnitude and cannot be deemed an important cause of poverty

china s uneven progress against poverty while the incidence of extreme poverty in china fell dramatically over 1980 2001 progress was uneven over time and across provinces rural areas accounted for the bulk of the gains to the poor though migration to urban areas helped the pattern of growth mattered rural economic growth was far more important to national poverty reduction than urban economic growth agriculture played a far more important role than the secondary or tertiary sources of gross domestic product gdp rising inequality within the rural sector greatly slowed poverty reduction provinces starting with relatively high inequality saw slower progress against poverty due both to lower growth and a lower growth elasticity of poverty reduction taxation of farmers and inflation hurt the poor external trade had little short term impact

the nature of precautionary wealth abstract this paper uses the panel study of income dynamics to provide some of the first direct evidence that wealth is systematically higher for consumers with predictably greater income uncertainty however the apparent pattern of precautionary wealth is not consistent with a standard parameterization of the life cucle model in which consumers are patient enough to begin saving for retirement early in life wealth is estimated to be far less sensitive to uncertainty than implied by that model instead our results suggest that over most of their working life time consumers behave in accordance with the buffer stock models of saving described in carroll 1992 1997 or deaton 1991 in which consumers hold wealth principally to insulate consumption against near term fluctuations in income

precautionary behavior migrant networks and household consumption decisions an empirical analysis using household panel data from rural china abstract we develop a test of precautionary behavior in the consumption decisions of rural agricultural households among surveyed households facing a median level of consumption risk 10 of savings can be attributed to a precautionary motive and this increases to 15 for households with consumption per capita below the poverty line we next use distant lags of local rainfall shocks uncorrelated with current consumption growth to identify the size of migrant networks outside the village and then present evidence that both poor and nonpoor households engage in less precautionary saving as the size of the village migrant network increases

the evolution of income inequality in rural china abstract in this article we analyze trends in income inequality and the distribution of income in rural china from 1987 to 1999 we find an uneven but long run increase in inequality in rural china and show that nearly half of the rural population was not much better off in 1999 than at the start of the period we rule out geography as the most important factor for explaining income differences and the increases that occurred over time much more important were growing differences between households living in the same village province or region we also find that access to nonagricultural incomes from local wage employment and family businesses contributes to inequality but that employment outside the county in which a household lives and accessed through temporary migration is relatively equalizing finally we document important strengths and weaknesses of the primary data set used for our analyses relative to other data sources available for study of inequality and poverty in rural china

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

cooperative and non cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery abstract we examine cooperative harvesting in a sequential fishery with stochastic shocks in recruitment two fleets harvest in a stochastic interception fishery we analyze cooperative management as a non cooperative game where deviations from cooperative harvesting are deterred by the threat of harvesting at non cooperative levels for a fixed number of periods whenever the initial stock falls below a trigger level we illustrate the sequential harvesting game with an application to the northern baltic salmon fishery cooperative harvesting yields participants substantial gains in terms of expected payoffs the greatest gains accrue to the fleet harvesting the spawning stock the actions of which are not observed by the competitor an explanation for the prevalence of fish wars is provided even if a cooperative agreement is reached shocks in recruitment trigger phases of non cooperative harvesting further the cooperative solution can only be maintained when stock uncertainty is not too prevalent

strategic dynamic interaction abstract the motivation for this paper is fishing legislation that divides a fishery into regions each of which is exploited by a single firm as the regions have common borders an analysis based on models with one firm and one region would lead to erroneous results an alternative motivation is the problem of a fishery with several interacting species each exploited by a single firm in this paper we assume that fish move between regions therefore the stock in one region depends not only on previous stock and catch in the region but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions in the multiple species interpretation these movements correspond to the interactions between species we use a multisectoral differential duopoly model in order to capture the strategic interactions of the firms over time the model is solved for an example in which varying levels of dependence between regions can be compared

precautionary saving and subjective earnings variance abstract in this paper i examine a model of precautionary saving and i show that the fact that people may insure against income risk makes it difficult to evaluate the extent of precautionary accumulation by simply looking at the relationship between wealth and earnings variance i also argue that occupations may represent a bad proxy for income risk

a theory of the consumption function with and without liquidity constraints fifteen years ago milton friedman s 1957 treatise a theory of the consumption function seemed badly dated dynamic optimization theory had not been employed much in economics when friedman wrote and utility theory was still comparatively primitive so his statement of the permanent income hypothesis never actually specified a formal mathematical model of behavior derived explicitly from utility maximization instead friedman relied at crucial points on intuition and verbal descriptions of behavior although these descriptions sounded plausible when other economists subsequently found multiperiod maximizing models that could be solved explicitly the implications of those models differed sharply from friedman s intuitive description of his model furthermore empirical tests in the 1970s and 1980s often rejected these rigorous versions of the permanent income hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis that many households simply spent all of their current income today with the benefit of a further round of mathematical and computational advances friedman s 1957 original analysis looks more prescient than primitive it turns out that when there is meaningful uncertainty in future labor income the optimal behavior of moderately impatient consumers is much better described by friedman s original statement of the permanent income hypothesis than by the later explicit maximizing versions furthermore in a remarkable irony much of the empirical evidence that rejected the permanent income hypothesis as specified in tests of the 1970s and 1980s is actually consistent both with friedman s original description of the model and with the new version with serious uncertainty there are four key differences between the explicit maximizing models

dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements abstract in terms of the number of signatories one observes both large and small international environmental agreements the theoretical literature based on game theory discusses different concepts and mechanisms regarding stability of coalitions the conclusion has been reached that in all circumstances under farsightedness both large and small stable coalitions can occur this theory is based on behavioural reaction patterns but does not take account of the interaction with the dynamics of emission adjustments this paper shows that when these two dynamical processes are integrated large and small stable coalitions can still occur but only if the costs of emissions are relatively unimportant as compared with the costs of abatement

international fisheries agreements a game theoretical approach this paper surveys the application of game theory to the economic analysis of international fisheries agreements the relevance of this study comes not only from the existence of a vast literature on the topic but especially from the specific features of these agreements the emphasis of the survey is on coalition games an approach that has become prominent in the fisheries economics literature over the last decade it is shown that coalition games were first applied to international fisheries agreements in the late 1990s addressing cooperative issues under the framework of characteristic function games then progressively this cooperative approach was combined with non cooperative elements such as the stability analysis of the agreements finally partition function games which model coalition formation endogenously were introduced and became the standard approach to study the formation and stability of international fisheries agreements a key message that emerges from this literature strand is that self enforcing cooperative management of internationally shared fish stocks is generally difficult to achieve hence the international legal framework and regulations play a decisive role on ensuring cooperation over the use of these resources

risk pooling precautionary saving and consumption growth in this paper we model the evolution of income risk and consumption growth we decompose the time series innovation of the income process into its common and cohort specific components from these we compute conditional variances which are used as separate risk terms in a consumption growth equation using a long series of british household data we exploit the time series variation to identify precautionary saving effects and find strong evidence of their importance specifically after allowing for demographic and labour market status there is an independent role for income risk in explaining consumption growth rather than the component that is common across cohorts however it is the cohort specific element that is important in determining changes in consumption growth this result points to a failure of between cohort insurance mechanisms

stable coalition structures with externalities this paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions in many interesting economic games coalition formation creates either negatie externalities or posi tie externalities for nonmembers examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions i characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation the open

wealth weather risk and the composition and profitability of agricultural investments despite the growing evidence that farmers in low income environments are risk averse there has been little empirical evidence on the importance of risk in shaping the actual allocation of production resources among farmers differentiated by wealth the authors use panel data on investments in rural india to examine how the composition of productive and nonproductive asset holdings varies across farmers with different levels of total wealth and across farmers facing different degrees of weather risk income variability is a prominent feature of the experience of rural agents in low income countries the authors report evidence based on measures of rainfall variability that the agricultural investment portfolio behavior of farmers in such settings reflects risk aversion due evidently to limitations on consumption soothing mechanisms such as crop insurance or credit markets the authors results suggest that uninsured weather risk is a significant cause of lower efficiency and lower average incomes a one standard deviation decrease in weather risk measured by the standard deviation of the timing of the rainy season would raise average profits by up to 35 percent among farmers in the lowest wealth quartile moreover rainfall variability induces a more unequal distribution of average incomes for a given distribution of wealth wealthier farmers are willing to absorb significant risk without giving up profits to reduce production risk smaller farmers have to invest their limited wealth in ways that reduce their exposure to risk at the cost of lower profit rates the authors found that at high levels of rainfall variability differences in rates of profit per unit of agricultural assets were similar across classes of wealth but over the sample range of rainfall variability these rates of profit were always higher for the poorer farmers than for the wealthier ones suggesting that the disadvantages of small farmers in risk diffusion are more than offset by their labor cost advantage

equilibria in a stochastic resource management game under imperfect information abstract the paper considers equilibrium solutions in a stochastic resource management game the countries choose frequently between cooperative and noncooperative retaliation modes of play the choices between cooperative and noncooperative subgames are based on imperfect estimates of the fishing efforts fleet sizes of the co harvesting country during the previous period if either of the countries concludes that the fishing activity of the co harvesting country has been too intensive during the previous period i e the estimated fishing effort exceeds a trigger value then either a noncooperative retaliation period follows or cooperation is continued after a noncooperative period the countries begin to cooperate once again it is shown that equilibria in which cooperative and noncooperative periods alternate can occur in dynamic games different types of equilibria for the game exist the countries may be able to sustain efficient cooperation all the time they may oscillate between cooperation and noncooperation or they may fail to cooperate at all conditions under which an equilibrium coincides with a pareto optimal solution are studied

fishing as a supergame abstract this paper considers how cooperative solutions to games of sharing fish resources can be supported by threat strategies with highly mobile fish stocks the number of agents compatible with a cooperative self enforcing solution is not very high for reasonable values of the discount rate but sensitive to changes in the discount rate and costs and to cost heterogeneity with migrating stocks where growth and reproduction depend on how much all agents leave behind after harvesting the likelihood of a cooperative self enforcing equilibrium is increased with a dominant player and a competitive fringe the rents and optimum stock level of the dominant player fall quickly as the share of the competitive fringe increases

a great fish war model with asymmetric players this paper analyzes the coalitional great fish war model under the assumption that players differ in their time preferences and use different discount rates we derive the equilibrium payoffs of this coalitional game and investigate the impact of the asymmetry assumption on the extreme schemes of cooperative and non cooperative equilibria we then proceed to the computation of stable coalitions using time consistent harvest sharing policies for the partial coordination scheme in the case where players are divided into two groups high and low discount rates we find that asymmetry has a significant impact on the way the resource is shared and on the profitability of coalitions we also find that asymmetry is not a sufficient feature to overcome the puzzle of small coalitions

input choices and uncertain demand the theory of the firm under demand uncertainty has to date assumed that the firm s input decisions are unaffected by the stochastic nature of demand this assumption is not usually made explicitly but it is implied by the assumption that the firm s cost function presumably derived by finding the minimum cost combination of inputs for any given level of output is unaffected by the uncertainty however if firms must choose some of their inputs before the uncertainty regarding demand is resolved then different input decisions may involve different levels of risk since firms decisions regarding price and output are affected by demand uncertainty and non linear risk preferences as previous authors have shown it seems reasonable to suspect that their input decisions will also be affected but if input decisions are affected then firms cost functions are not invariant to uncertainty and the results of previous studies must be reexamined three different types of firms are considered in this paper the competitive firm the quantity setting imperfect competitor and the price setting imperfect competitor input decisions of the competitive firm and the quantity setting imperfect competitor are shown to be unaffected by demand uncertainty and hence the assumption of an unchanging cost function is appropriate in these cases for the price setting imperfect competitor however input decisions are influenced by demand uncertainty and an unchanging cost function is therefore not appropriate this case is considered in some detail and conditions under which results can differ from those previously reported in the literature are examined

how does future income affect current consumption this paper tests a straightforward implication of the basic life cycle model of consumption that current consumption depends on expected lifetime income the paper projects future income for a panel of households and finds that consumption is closely related to projected current income but unrelated to predictable changes in income however future income uncertainty has an important effect consumers facing greater income uncertainty consume less the results are consistent with buffer stock models of consumption like those of deaton 1991 or carroll 1992a 1992b where precautionary motives greatly reduce the willingness of prudent consumers to consume out of uncertain future income

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

earnings uncertainty and precautionary saving abstract we test for the presence of precautionary saving using a self reported measure of earnings uncertainty drawn from the 1989 italian survey of household income and wealth the effect of uncertainty on wealth accumulation is consistent with the theory of precautionary saving and with decreasing prudence but explains only a small fraction of saving the results cast doubts on the empirical relevance of precautionary saving in response to earnings uncertainty but are not in contrast with the importance of the precautionary motive per se beside earnings uncertainty other risks such as health and mortality may be important determinants of wealth accumulation

wage risk and employment risk over the life cycle we specify a structural life cycle model of consumption labour supply and job mobility in an economy with search frictions that allows us to distinguish between different sources of risk and to estimate their effects the sources of risk are shocks to productivity job destruction the process of job arrival when employed and unemployed and match level heterogeneity our model allows for four main social insurance programmes in contrast to simpler models that attribute all income fluctuations to shocks our framework allows us to disentangle the effects of the shocks from the responses to these shocks estimates of productivity risk once we control for employment risk and for individual labour supply choices are substantially lower than estimates that attribute all wage variation to productivity risk increases in productivity risk impose a considerable welfare loss on individuals and induce substantial precautionary saving increases in employment risk have large effects on output and primarily through this channel affect welfare the welfare value of government programs such as food stamps which partially insure productivity risk is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides partial insurance against employment risk and no insurance against persistent shocks

farsightedness in a coalitional great fish war we explore the implications of the farsightedness assumption on the conjectures of players in a coalitional great fish war model with symmetric players derived from the seminal model of levhari and mirman bell j econ 11 649 661 1980 the farsightedness assumption for players in a coalitional game acknowledges the fact that a deviation from a single player will lead to the formation of a new coalition structure as the result of possibly successive moves of her rivals in order to improve their payoffs it departs from mainstream game theory in that it relies on the so called rational conjectures as opposed to the traditional nash conjectures formed by players on the behavior of their rivals for values of the biological parameter and the discount factor more plausible than the ones used in the current literature the farsightedness assumption predicts a wide scope for cooperation in non trivial coalitions sustained by credible threats of successive deviations that defeat the shortsighted payoff of any prospective deviator compliance or deterrence of deviations may also be addressed by acknowledging that information on the fish stock or on the catch policies actually implemented may be available only with a delay dynamic farsightedness in that case the requirements are stronger and the sizes and number of possible farsighted stable coalitions are different in the sequential move version which could mimic some characteristics of fishery models the results are not less appealing even if the dominant player or dominant coalition with first move advantage assumption provides a case for cooperation with the traditional nash conjectures

using weather variability to estimate the response of savings to transitory income in thailand this paper measures the extent to which farmers are able to use savings and dissavings to smooth consumption in response to unexpected shocks to income time series information on regional rainfall is used to construct estimates of transitory income due to rainfall shocks the relationship between these measures of transitory income and savings indicates that farm households save a significantly higher fraction of transitory income than nontransitory income jel d91 016 the incomes of farm households in developing countries are notorious for being both low and uncertain policies that increase the incomes of farmers may well be different

consumption and the timing of income risk abstract when formulating a plan for savings does the timing of income risks matter should one be concerned with whether uncertainty in income is in the near term or the distant future of course and the impact of the timing of income risk is the subject of this article using a three period framework we provide approximate solutions for optimal consumption choices for preferences that display constant relative risk aversion and derive the relationship between innovations to income and innovations to consumption growth these results are contrasted with those for quadratic preferences and preferences that display constant absolute risk aversion we analyze consumption saving plans for several different situations of near term and distant future income risk and different kinds of preferences we conclude with a demonstration of the high degree of accuracy of our consumption approximations by comparing them to exact values computed by stochastic simulation

consumption puzzles and precautionary savings abstract when marginal utility is convex agents accumulate savings as a precautionary measure against labor income eventualities this paper shows that precautionary savings can go a long way in making the excess growth excess smoothness and excess sensitivity features of consumption consistent with the stochastic processes of labor income observed in the u s at the microeconomic level

smoothing consumption by smoothing income hours of work responses to idiosyncratic agricultural shocks in rural india while research has demonstrated that farm households in developing economies are able to protect consumption from idiosyncratic crop shocks little evidence shows how this is achieved this paper examines the extent to which labor markets allow households to shift labor from farm to off farm employment and the extent to which such a shift explains the observed lack of correlation between consumption and idiosyncratic crop shocks the empirical analysis uses a novel measure of the idiosyncratic crop income shock which utilizes information on start of season cropping choices to more accurately estimate household expectations of weather

international fish wars the strategic roles for fleet licensing and effort subsidies abstract this article examines the problem of noncooperative international fishing by analyzing the strategic rent shifting roles for such well known national management policies as fleet licensing and effort subsidies it is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each policy takes the form of a prisoner s dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery it is also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation the models developed in this article may help to provide an explanation for the persistence of large and excessively subsidized national fleets that exploit depleted international fish stocks

migration and incomes in source communities a new economics of migration perspective from china the objective of this paper is to understand the effects of china s migration on source communities and to discuss their policy implications we draw from new economics of labor migration nelm theory to understand how migration and migrant remittances can relax or tighten market constraints in china s rural economy using simultaneous equation econometric techniques and household survey data from china we estimate net sectorspecific effects of migration on rural household income focusing on farm production and self employment our econometric findings indicate that the loss of labor to migration has a negative effect on household cropping income in source areas however we provide evidence that remittances sent home by migrants positively compensate for this lost labor effect contributing to household incomes directly and indirectly by stimulating crop and possibly self employment production this finding offers evidence in support of the nelm hypothesis that remittances loosen constraints on production in the imperfect market environments characterizing rural areas in less developed countries taking into account both the multiple effects of migration and the change in household size participating in migration increases household per capita income between 14 and 30 percent migration and incomes in source communities a new economics of migration perspective from china china is experiencing the largest peacetime flow of labor out of agriculture ever witnessed in world history solinger 1999 rozelle et al 1999 despite the rapid expansion of labor migration china s work force is still disproportionately employed in agriculture compared to other countries at similar levels of per capita gdp taylor and martin 2001 hence as china s economy continues to expand the flow of labor to urban areas will continue and even accelerate johnson 1999 the massive flow of labor away from farms has intensified research interest in china s migration in recent years however as in the broader literature on migration in less developed countries most recent studies on china s migration have focused on determining the size and composition of the labor flow macroeconomic implications of increased migration and the effects of migration on urban areas zhao 1999 yang 1999 1997 less emphasis has been placed on researching the effects of migration on the rural communities that migrants leave even though evidence shows that the rural household in the village of origin is typically the central concern of all those involved in migration both those who leave and those who stay behind exceptions include wang and zuo 1999 bai 2001 moreover the recent increase in migration has left policy makers particularly concerned regarding the way source communities will be affected moa 1999 they are concerned that as labor flows away from farms food production and crop income will decline potentially threatening china s food security furthermore policy makers are concerned about the increasing gap between urban and rural household incomes if migration exacerbates this gap some fear that as it grows rural residents eventually will flood cities ill equipped to absorb them others fear that discontent over a rising urban rural income gap could even spill over into political unrest yang 1999 because china s markets and other modern economic institutions are still relatively undeveloped migration may play a pivotal role in creating or overcoming constraints caused by the lack of well functioning markets and or institutions knight and song 1999 benjamin and brandt 2000 the new economics of labor migration nelm literature analyzes migration as a household decision rather than as an individual decision stark 1991 the nelm hypothesizes that rural households facing imperfect market environments decide

risk financial markets and human capital in a developing country this paper explores the link between financial market incompleteness and human capital accumulation we examine how child school attendance responds to seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households using panel data from rural india to pinpoint market imperfections we study responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic as well as to anticipated and unanticipated income shocks our main finding is that seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a form of self insurance but one which does not result in a substantial loss of human capital on average

the compleat fish wars biological and dynamic interactions abstract in this article we study an example of a fishery in which there are two agents each harvesting two species of fish there are two externalities in the model the dynamic externality studied in levhari and mirman 1980 and the biological externality examined in fischer and mirman 1992 this model allows us to study the interactions between agents in a model in which the species of fish interact we find the unique closed loop nash equilibrium in the context of a differential game and we compare the resulting catch ratios to the results of the earlier papers which allow for only one externality we also study the efficiency of the solution

risk and household grain management in developing countries a dynamic model is presented of a household s joint production storage and trade decisions when facing transaction costs and risk in prices and yields grain management decisions balance the goals of maximising profits and reducing consumption price risk model solutions calibrated to chinese data show that grain s consumption role makes it an attractive form of precautionary saving even when households have access to credit the joint nature of production and savings decisions limits the income loss associated with risk coping and the desire to store grain can explain why subsistence households are frequently net purchasers but rarely net sellers of grain

are the poor less well insured evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural china the authors test how well consumption is insured against income risk in a panel of sampled households in rural china they estimate the risk insurance models by generalized method of moments treating income and household size as endogenous insurance exists for all wealth groups although the hypothesis of perfect insurance is universally rejected those in the poorest wealth decile are the least well insured with 40 percent of an income shock being passed on to current consumption by contrast consumption by the richest third of households is protected from almost 90 percent of an income shock the extent of insurance in a given wealth stratum varies little between poor and nonpoor areas

geographic poverty traps a micro model of consumption growth in rural china how important are neighbourhood endowments of physical and human capital in explaining diverging fortunes over time for otherwise identical households in a developing rural economy to answer this question we develop an estimable micro model of consumption growth allowing for constraints on factor mobility and externalities whereby geographic capital can influence the productivity of a household s own capital our statistical test has considerable power in detecting geographic effects given that we control for latent heterogeneity in measured consumption growth rates at the micro level we find robust evidence of geographic poverty traps in farm household panel data from post reform rural china our results strengthen the equity and efficiency case for public investment in lagging poor areas in this setting copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

how prudent are consumers using data from the consumer expenditure survey this paper presents a simple test that provides an explicit estimate of the parameter in the utility function that reflects the strength of the precautionary saving motive the coefficient of relative prudence the test yields a fairly precise estimate of a small precautionary motive in fact the estimate is too small to be consistent with widely accepted beliefs about risk aversion the presence of liquidity constrained households does not appear to explain this finding and there is some evidence that self selection of households into risky environments also cannot explain the results

leaders managers and the organization of township and village enterprises in china abstract the managerial contractual form in china s township and village enterprise tve sector has evolved rapidly during the past 10 years our paper uses descriptive data and a theoretical model to demonstrate that these changes may be occurring in response to the rapid development of markets in transitional rural china we econometrically test the model s main hypotheses showing that the driving force behind the movement from a leader run fixed wage contract to a fixed payment contract with better incentives for the manager is the relative value of non marketed inputs owned by local leaders and firm managers firm technical structure and local market setting also plays a role in the determination of firm contractual form

networks in the modern economy mexican migrants in the u s labor market this paper attempts to identify job networks among mexican migrants in the u s labor market the empirical analysis uses data on migration patterns and labor market outcomes based on a sample of individuals belonging to multiple origin communities in mexico over a long period of time each community s network is measured by the proportion of the sampled individuals who are located at the destination the united states in any year we verify that the same individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying nonagricultural job when his network is exogenously larger by including individual fixed effects in the employment and occupation regressions and by using rainfall in the origin community as an instrument for the size of the network at the destination

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

stability and success of regional fisheries management organizations according to international law straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations rfmos this paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical gordon schaefer bioeconomic model results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation but the lower is the likelihood of large rfmos being stable it is also shown that new entrants increase the incentives of rfmo members to leave and decrease the incentives of non members to join it moreover the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency

natural natural experiments in economics the recent literature exploiting natural events as natural experiment instruments is reviewed to assess to what extent it has advanced empirical knowledge a weakness of the studies that adopt this approach is that the necessary set of behavioral market and technological assumptions made by the authors in justifying their interpretations of the estimates is often absent the methodology and findings from twenty studies are summarized and simple economic models are used to elucidate the implicit assumptions made by the authors and to demonstrate the sensitivity of the interpretations of the findings to the relaxation of some of these assumptions