merit pay practices implications for pay performance relationships this study uses a monte carlo simulation to examine how the relationship between pay and performance is affected by the pay system measurement error in appraising performance the consistency of true performance over time and the rules governing promotion decisions the authors find that conventional merit systems achieve a considerably better link between pay and performance than does a bonus system with periodic adjustments in base wages a bonus system without periodic base wage adjustments also performs less well than conventional merit systems because merit systems benefit from the consistency of true performance over time one surprising finding is that even very substantial error in the measurement of performance has only a modest effect on the pay performance correlation

the value of hiring through employee referrals using personnel data from nine large firms in three industries call centers trucking and high tech we empirically assess the benefit to firms of hiring through employee referrals compared to nonreferred applicants referred applicants are more likely to be hired and more likely to accept offers even though referrals and nonreferrals have similar skill characteristics referred workers tend to have similar productivity compared to nonreferred workers on most measures but referred workers have lower accident rates in trucking and produce more patents in high tech referred workers are substantially less likely to quit and earn slightly higher wages than nonreferred workers in call centers and trucking the two industries for which we can calculate worker level profits referred workers yield substantially higher profits per worker than nonreferred workers these profit differences are driven by lower turnover and lower recruiting costs for referrals jel codes j24 m51 j30 j63

labor market segmentation a cluster analysis of job groupings and barriers to entry real expenditures on public assistance programs have increased substantially in the past two decades as has real per capita income investments in a variety of education programs have risen and a number of jobs programs have been tried although there have been some gains for example a decline in the percentage of the population in poverty 31 474 a number of disparities persist unemployment remains at record levels and the prospect for sizable reductions in the unemployment rate seems quite small there are persistent differences between the mean household incomes of blacks and whites that have not narrowed at all during the past two decades 15 there is also a widespread perception that a disadvantaged segment of the u s population has no effective access to good jobs and if such persons get them they do not stay employed for long this means that many such adults are caught in a cycle of unemployment welfare dependency bad jobs and intermittent employment whereas there is nearly universal agreement that the persistent disparities in well being are undesirable there is considerable disagreement on what to do about this in part the disagreement stems from ignorance about the facts for example rigorous operational definitions of good and bad jobs have not been developed the notion that some persons do not have access to the good jobs is primarily based on anecdotes fortunately longitudinal data bases are now available that permit more rigorous empirical analysis of such issues

payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice abstract by using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers attitudes toward each payment method we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity we find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types our policy experiments suggest that for the sub population who hold both credit and debit cards removing rewards would increase their share of paper based payment methods i e cash and checks measured in terms of in store transactions by no more than 4 percentage points

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

does marriage really make men more productive this paper presents new descriptive evidence regarding marital pay premiums earned by white males longitudinal data indicate that wages rise after marriage and that cross sectional marriage premiums appear to result from a steepening of the earnings profile data from a company personnelfile that includes information on job grades and supervisor performance ratings reveal large marital status pay differences within a narrow range of occupations managers and professionals and environments a single firm married workers tend to be located in higher paying job grades there are very small pay differentials within grades married men receive higher performance ratings than single men as a result they are much more likely to be promoted controlling for rated performance however eliminates the promotion differential sanders korenman is an assistant professor of economics and public affairs at princeton university and is a faculty associate of the office of population research at princeton university and a research affiliate of the national bureau of economic research nber david neumark is an assistant professor of economics at the university of pennsylvania and a research affiliate of the nber korenman wishes to acknowledge the hewlett foundation and the harvard university center for population studies for financial support the authors are grateful to james medofffor making available an extract from the company personnelfile questions regarding data availability should be directed to professor james

the economics of two sided markets at a local best buy a child places a new sony playstation 3 on the cashier s counter while the parents dig out their visa card the gaming system and the payment card may appear to have little connection other than this purchase however these two items share an important characteristic that is generating a series of economic insights and has important implications for strategic decision making and economic policymaking both video game systems and payment cards are examples of two sided markets broadly speaking a two sided market is one in which 1 two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform and 2 the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents typically through an externality in the case of a video game system the intermediary is the console producer sony in the scenario above while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the playstation if the other party is not similarly a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance where both consumers and merchants value each others participation many more products fit into this paradigm such as search engines newspapers and almost any advertisersupported media examples in which consumers often negatively value rather than positively value the participation of the other side as well as most software or title based operating systems and consumer electronics malls which seek retailers and consumers convention organizers which seek buyers and sellers dating services which seek men and women and the journal of economic perspectives which seeks content and readership all experience the economics of two sided markets the multi sided nature of many internet and high technology markets as well as

revisiting wage earnings and hours profiles abstract for the youngest cohorts whose entire working life can be observed hours start falling much earlier than wages wages do not fall if they fall at all until one s late 60s the data suggest that many workers start a smooth transition into retirement by working progressively fewer hours while still facing an upward sloping wage profile this pattern is not an artifact of staggered abrupt retirement or selection this evidence imposes restrictions on dynamic models of the aggregate economy and provide updated numerical profiles that can be readily used in quantitative macroeconomic analysis to incorporate this new pattern into aggregate models

a test of lazear s theory of delayed payment contracts according to lazear workers and firms enter into long term implicit contracts that discourage shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract such delayed payment contracts are less likely to occur in jobs in which it is comparatively simple to monitor worker effort this paper uses data from the national longitudinal survey and the dictionary of occupational titles to test that hypothesis in particular it tests whether jobs that involve repetitive tasks tend to be characterized by an absence of pensions mandatory retirement long job tenures and high wages for older workers

whither loose change the diminishing demand for small denomination currency while payment card usage has increased dramatically the stock of outstanding currency has not declined as rapidly we analyze changes in cash demand for 13 advanced economies from 1988 to 2003 by separating cash into three denomination categories to disentangle its store of wealth and payment functions defining denominations commonly dispensed by automated teller machines atms as the medium category we show that demand for small denomination currency decreases with greater debit card usage and with greater retail market consolidation in contrast the demand for high denomination notes decreases when interest rates rise but is generally unaffected by changes in debit card usage

are those paid more really more productive the case of experience this study uses computerized personnel microdata on the white male managerial and professional employees at a major u s corporation to address the following question can the additional earnings which are associated with more labor market experience at a point in time really be explained by higher productivity at the same point in time our answer to this question based on both cross sectional and longitudinal information is that performance plays a substantially smaller role in explaining cross sectional experience earnings differentials and earnings growth than is claimed by those who have adopted the human capital explanation of the experience earnings profile this response depends critically on our assumption that the performance ratings which supervisors give to their white male managerial and professional subordinates adequately reflect the subordinates relative productivity in the year of assessment we present a great deal of evidence which strongly supports this assumption

incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non marketable good this good is valued by a single principal and there is a verifiable measure of the agent s performance crucially the agent is intrinsically motivated due to warm glow altruism in addition the agent s budget which is controlled by the principal must not be less than the monetary performance cost faced by the agent this gives rise to a limited liability constraint it also restricts the agent s ability to under report costs in such environment we determine the link between the agent s budget and performance our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal agent problem and to most in the literature on mission motivated organisations and public services provision

comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies the role of legislative committee structure abstract this paper analyzes the impact of legislative committee structure on policy outcomes comparing a tax committee enacting tax expenditures and a decentralized system of specialized committees undertaking direct spending an endogenous commodity taxation framework is combined with models of legislative bargaining and committee voting the main conclusion is that the tax committee structure gives rise to lower subsidy levels under a wide range of circumstances however it is only under a more restrictive set of assumptions that social welfare is higher in the tax committee regime this theoretical analysis is illustrated by two examples of institutional change in congress

detecting and removing discrimination under equal opportunities policies abstract this paper surveys part of the recent voluminous literature on the economics of discrimination focusing on two key questions first how should discrimination be measured and can in fact unambiguous estimates be derived as the basis for detecting where discrimination is present and setting in train measures to eliminate it second to what extent has the implementation of equal opportunities legislation improved the relative standing of women and minority workers in the labour force this section includes a discussion of the likely effects of recent changes in the law such as the equal value amendment in the uk or the introduction of comparable worth in the usa the survey concludes that our ability to detect discrimination at all precisely is still rudimentary and consequently policy measures are likely to be inefficient for this reason

consumers use of debit cards patterns preferences and price response debit card use at the point of sale has grown dramatically in recent years in the united states and now exceeds the number of credit card transactions however many questions remain regarding patterns of debit card use consumer preferences when using debit and how consumers might respond to explicit pricing of card transactions using a new nationally representative consumer survey this paper describes the current use of debit cards by u s consumers including how demographics affect use in addition consumers stated reasons for using debit cards are used to analyze how consumers substitute between debit and other payment instruments we also examine the relationship between household financial conditions and payment choice finally we use a key variable on bank imposed transaction fees to analyze price sensitivity of card use and find a 12 decline in overall use in reaction to a mean 1 8 fee charged on certain debit card transactions we believe this represents the first microeconomic evidence in the united states on price sensitivity for a card payment at the point of sale

retaining winners can policy boost high growth entrepreneurship abstract we analysed the growth impact delivered by a high growth entrepreneurship policy initiative over a six year period using an eight year panel that started two years before the initiative was launched and propensity score matching to control selection bias we found that the initiative had more than doubled the growth rates of treated firms the initiative had delivered a strong impact also on value for money basis in addition to producing the first robust evidence on the growth impact delivered by a high growth entrepreneurship initiative we contribute to public sponsorship theory with the notion of capacity boosting activities to complement previously discussed buffering and bridging activities

pay for percentile we propose an incentive scheme for educators that links compensation to the ranks of their students within comparison sets under certain conditions this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort moreover because this scheme employs only ordinal information it allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessments this removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and eliminates opportunities to influence reward pay by corrupting assessment scales education authorities can employ separate no stakes assessment systems to track trends in scaled measures of student achievement jel i21 i28 j33 j45

measuring consumer expenditures with payment diaries payment diaries measure consumer expenditures by tracking authorization of payments by instrument cash check debit or credit card etc three notable results emerge from comparing the 2012 diary of consumer payment choice dcpc to other estimates of consumer expenditures 1 dcpc payments are 75 higher than consumer expenditure survey estimates 2 dcpc consumption estimates are 17 higher than comparable personal consumption expenditure estimates and 3 dcpc payments roughly equal comparably adjusted national income and product accounts personal disposable income the dcpc s relative success stems from measuring expenditures aggregated into lumpy payments shopping baskets relatively low respondent burden and effective random sampling jel e21 d12 d14

the impact of ownership on price setting in retail energy markets the german case abstract this paper analyzes whether public ownership has an impact on providers price setting under the assumption of more efficient energy provision which benefits customers a large number of former energy monopolists have been privatized in line with the liberalization of energy markets in germany at the end of the 1990s however current re municipalizations are justified by similar arguments in the public debate based on a dataset on the ownership structure of energy providers we find that public property or private property itself is not the decisive factor for lower retail and wholesale prices rather a high ownership concentration leads to low prices regardless of the type of owner as public investors often seek total ownership of a provider households which are less willing to switch benefit at least indirectly from public ownership tests for robustness of our results applying different owner and concentration measures confirm the results independently from the underlying estimation specification

does work experience increase productivity a test of the on the job training hypothesis using data on wage claims investigations of a state labor department we test the proposition that work experience increases productivity productivity is measured as the fraction of wages an employer allegedly owes an employee which the investigator is able to collect the recovery of back wages is accomplished without the availability of an official enforcement mechanism the empirical estimates indicate that investigators become significantly more productive during the first six years of job experience while the uniqueness of this occupation prevents generalizing this finding the study raises some important methodological issues

trading between agents for a better match this paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post i show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract this causes principals to offer agents piece rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece rates they would offer if trading was not allowed although trading reduces an agent s effort and could increase the agent s outside option of rejecting a principal s ex ante contract principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes

reliability and predictive validity of contingent values does the nature of the good matter abstract because the contingent valuation mechanism cvm elicits verbal reports of maximum willingness to pay and not actual willingness to pay analysts have expressed doubts about the reliability and validity of contingent values for commodities such as environmental amenities this skepticism is usually attributed to the amorphous nature of the commodity and to peoples lack of familiarity or experience however our comparison of two commodities which lie at polar extremes of the private good public good continuum suggests that the nature of the good may have little influence on the reliability and predictive validity of the cvm instead aspects of the cvm itself e g explicit payment obligation may be more important for high intention behavior consistency

incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy abstract a theoretical and empirical analysis of within job and promotion based incentives for middle managers is presented using personnel data from a firm within job incentives are stronger than implied by previous studies evidence is provided that promotions sort employees by ability and also generate incentives promotions are associated with large increases in lifetime earnings as long as performance is sustained in the future there is little evidence that the firm trades off within job and promotion based incentives as predicted instead it appears to use a simple incentive scheme resulting in declining incentives for those passed over for promotion

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

the public private sector gender wage differential in britain evidence from matched employee workplace data this article shows that little of the gender earnings gap in the public and private sectors in britain are explained by differences in employee characteristics the differences in workplace characteristics however make a significant sizeable contribution it is shown that performance related pay and company pension schemes are associated with higher relative earnings in the private sector whilst increased provision of family friendly employment practices in the public sector is associated with higher relative earnings for women

promotion incentives in the public sector evidence from chinese schools abstract we provide evidence that promotion incentives influence the effort of public employees by studying china s system of promotions for teachers predictions from a tournament model of promotion are tested using retrospective panel data on primary and middle school teachers consistent with theory high wage increases for promotion are associated with better performance teachers increase effort in years leading up to promotion eligibility and they reduce effort if they are repeatedly passed over for promotion evaluation scores are positively associated with teacher time use and with student test scores diminishing concerns that evaluations are manipulated

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

why do shoppers use cash evidence from shopping diary data des etudes recentes montrent que l argent comptant demeure un mode de paiement privilegie pour les transactions de faible montant malgre la prevalence d autres moyens de paiement comme les cartes de debit et de credit pour les decideurs publics il importe de savoir si les consommateurs preferent vraiment regler en especes ou plutot si les commercants restreignent l usage de ces cartes

how people pay evidence from grocery store data abstract empirical evidence based on grocery store transaction data shows that consumer payment behavior at the point of sale is important for understanding models of money demand there are statistically significant effects of transaction costs opportunity costs and product characteristics on the choice of payment instrument which then in turn affect money demand these results emphasize the overlap between the work of empirical researchers in payment choice and theoretical modelers of monetary economics and should inform both literatures

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the comparative advantage of public ownership evidence from u s electric utilities studies of the performance effects of public vs private ownership have found mixed evidence this paper draws on theory suggesting that public enterprise may have an advantage in producing goods and services whose quality attributes are difficult to specify a priori using a comprehensive data set of u s electric utilities to estimate cost functions we find that while privately owned systems achieve lower costs in generation public systems generally have an advantage in the end user oriented distribution function with its more non contractible quality attributes other evidence on quality differences by ownership type and by enterprise size supports this distinction jel classification l33 l94 l avantage comparatif de la propriete publique resultats pour la production d electricite auxetats unis les etudes de la performance des entreprises publiques et privees ont produit des resultats qui ne sont pas determinants ce memoire se fonde sur la theorie qui suggere que l entreprise publique peut avoir un avantage dans la production de biens et services dont la qualite est difficile a definir a priori a partir de donnees extensives sur les producteurs d electricite aux etats unis on definit des fonctions de couts il appert que quand ils sont entre des mains privees les systemes de production reussissent a obtenir des couts de generation plus bas d autre part les systemes publics ont un avantage pour ce qui est de la fonction de distribution orientee vers les besoins de l usager a cause des attributs de qualite plus difficiles a contractualiser d autres resultats quant aux differences de qualite par types de propriete et par tailles d entreprises viennent confirmer l importance de cette distinction

flexible mixture distribution modeling of dichotomous choice contingent valuation with heterogenity abstract this paper considers the performance of a model of mixture normal distributions for dichotomous choice contingent valuation data which allows the researcher to consider unobserved heterogeneity across the sample the model is flexible and approaches a semi parametric model since the normality assumption can be removed by augmenting the number of mixture distributions bayesian inference allows for simple estimation of the model and is particularly appropriate for conducting inference with finite data sets the proposed model is compared with other semi parametric and parametric approaches using monte carlo simulation under alternative assumptions regarding heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity in sample observations it is found that the mixture normal model reduces bias and improves performance with respect to an alternative semi parametric model particularly when the sample is characterized by heterogeneous preferences the application of the model to empirical data on the recreational value of natural areas in the canary islands confirmed the expected results

payment choice and currency use insights from two billion retail transactions abstract using three years of transactions data from a discount retailer with thousands of stores we study payment variation along three dimensions transaction size and location weekly and monthly frequencies and longer time horizons in each case we connect empirical patterns to theories of money demand and payments we show that cross sectional and time series payment patterns are consistent with a theoretical framework in which individual consumers choose between cash and non cash payments based on a threshold transaction size and we evaluate factors that may account for the variation in threshold distributions across locations and time

valuing new goods in a model with complementarity online newspapers many important economic questions hinge on the extent to which new goods either crowd out or complement consumption of existing products recent methods for studying new goods rule out complementarity by assumption so their applicability to these questions has been limited i develop a new model that relaxes this restriction and use it to study competition between print and online newspapers using new micro data from washington dc i estimate the relationship between the print and online papers in demand the welfare impact of the online paper s introduction and the expected impact of charging positive online prices

distribution free estimation with interval censored contingent valuation data troubles with turnbull contingent valuation cv surveys frequently employ elicitation procedures that return interval censored data on respondents willingness to pay wtp almost without exception cv practitioners have applied turnbull s self consistent algorithm to such data in order to obtain nonparametric maximum likelihood npml estimates of the wtp distribution this paper documents two failings of turnbull s algorithm 1 that it may not converge to npml estimates and 2 that it may be very slow to converge with regards to 1 we propose starting and stopping criteria for the algorithm that guarantee convergence to the npml estimates with regards to 2 we present a variety of alternative estimators and demonstrate through monte carlo simulations their performance advantages over turnbull s algorithm

cooperation among competitors some economics of payment card associations we analyze platforms in two sided markets with network externalities using the specific context of a payment card association we study the cooperative determination of the interchange fee by member banks the interchange fee is the access charge paid by the merchants banks the acquirers to cardholders banks the issuers we develop a framework in which banks and merchants may have market power and consumers and merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card after drawing the welfare implications of a cooperative determination of the interchange fee we describe in detail the factors affecting merchant resistance compare cooperative and for profit business models and make a first cut in the analysis of system competition

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

does the baseball labor market contradict the human capital model of investment this paper examines whether experienced players in major league baseball are paid more than their contribution to team revenue the author shows that wages increase with experience independently of productivity gains the results therefore contradict the human capital model of investment the evidence is in fact consistent with implicit contract models because most older players are relatively overpaid copyright 1992 by mit press

estimating multiple discrete choice models an application to computerization returns buyers in many markets face multiple discrete choices they can purchase multiple units as well as multiple brands at the same time this paper presents a multiple discrete choice model for the analysis of differentiated products demand users maximize profits by choosing the number of units of each brand they purchase i estimate the model using micro level data on the demand for personal computers i use the estimated demand structure to assess the welfare gains from computerization and technological innovation in peripherals the estimated return on investment in personal computers is 92 moreover a 10 increase in the performance to price ratio of microprocessors leads to a 2 2 gain in the estimated user surplus the personal computer pc market is of interest to industrial organization economists because of its size the continual technological change and above all because of the farreaching implications of pcs on the economy as a whole several distinct features make pc demand difficult to model pcs are a differentiated durable good in constant technological evolution moreover buyers make multiple discrete choices firms according to our data spread their purchases of pcs over different brands at the same time they buy pcs in blocks several units of each brand that they have chosen the aim of the paper is to present a model that captures these features and to use this model to estimate the welfare gains from computerization classical discrete choice models allow one choice among mutually exclusive alternatives in contrast the proposed framework allows users to demand multiple units and multiple brands the model can be applied to other cases of multiple discrete choices e g the composition of airline fleets car holdings per household the fields of the faculty in economics departments household cereals consumption or any other good consumed in more than one variety during a relevant time period although pervasive multiple discrete choice problems have received little attention because of their complexity a central issue regarding the pc market is the current controversy in the economics literature about the computerization puzzle this puzzle stems from the empirical finding that computerization has had no effect on firm productivity griliches and siegel 1991 and morrison and berndt 1990 contrary to those results hendel 1994 and lichtenberg 1995 using more disaggregate data than most previous studies report excess returns to computerization this indicates that data aggregation may have created the computerization puzzle in this paper i present a model consistent with the basic

binary choice valuation studies with heteregeneous preferences regarding the program being valued we investigate the effect of respondents heterogeneous preferences regarding the good to be valued in binary choice contingent valuationstudies this is especially important when the valuation options give rise to both highly negative and highly positive attitudes the survey design employs questionnaires which include separate items for willingness to favorandwillingness to contribute in monetary terms to the provision of the good in light of our analysis eliciting respondents differentpreferences for the project first without monetary considerations wouldimprove the wtp estimates as welfare measures our results alsosuggest that nonparametric estimation could offer another solution foraccounting for preference heterogeneity nonparametric estimation is less sensitive to those no responses which are in fact not intended toreflect the respondents wtp as such but merely to express their dislikefor the good at issue

spike models in contingent valuation spike models allow for a nonzero probability of zero willingness to pay in referendum style contingent valuation experiments they include many of the often used models as special cases and allow various analyses that are not possible in standard applications in this paper the economic rationale for the spike models and their estimation techniques are discussed and empirical illustrations are provided one study suggests that mean willingness to pay is zero and both studies strongly suggest that median wtp is zero these results have some bearing on the continuing debate of the incentive properties of hypothetical surveys and the construction of scenarios in contingent valuation experiments

the welfare effects of bundling in multichannel television markets we measure how the bundling of television channels affects short run welfare we estimate an industry model of viewership demand pricing bundling and input market bargaining using data on ratings purchases prices bundles and input costs we conduct simulations of a la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers we estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103 0 percent under a la carte these higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated 5 4 to 0 2 percent and 1 7 to 6 0 percent respectively jel d12 l11 l51 l82 m31

discontinuities in pension benefit formulas and the spot model of the labor market implications for financial economists in their analysis of corporate pension plans financial economists typically invoke the simplest and the most tractable model of the labor market this is the spot model where the worker s cash wage plus accruing pension benefit equals the value of his marginal product in each and every period this paper provides evidence against the empirical validity of the spot model and uses provisions common to most pension plans to do so these findings are relevant to the appropriate measurement of pension liabilities and thus to the present controversy surrounding the termination of overfunded plans and the recapture of surplus assets by the employer the existence of incentive effects ruled out by the spot model may help to unravel certain well known puzzles such as the failure of employers to fully fund their plans in spite of the tax advantages of doing so

explaining adoption and use of payment instruments by u s consumers this paper develops and estimates a structural model of adoption and usage of payment instruments by u s consumers we utilize a cross section from the survey of consumer payment choice a new survey of consumer behavior our empirical model combines the elements of a discrete continuous model where rst a consumer picks a product and then chooses how much to use it with a bundled choice model in which consumers can choose multiple products that may aect the utility derived from each other we consider how changes in the costs of adoption and usage may dierentially aect substitution patterns these results are particularly relevant for bank pricing of debit card services in response to the regulation of interchange fees on debit cards enacted by the durbin amendment to the dodd frank act which became eective on

the effects of human resource management on small firms productivity and employees wages this paper analyses whether employees and firms differently benefit from particular human resource hr practices the focus is on small firms that may be badly informed on the impact of hr practices on firm performance in this study on dutch pharmacies it is found that firms do not reward employees skills according to their contribution to firms productivity as 1 employees are over rewarded for their sector specific skills and under rewarded for the productivity enhancing effect of their computer skills and 2 employees work experience positively affects their wages but does not have real productivity effects moreover it is found that training employees in case of vacancy problems seems to be an adequate hr practice since it increases productivity without affecting the average wage level the opposite holds for offering higher wages to newly recruited employees furthermore we find that only the employees benefit from performance evaluation interviews whereas employing many employees by tem

employer seniority discrimination evidence from enterpreneurial occupational choice abstract this research examines the theories presented in the human capital literature by becker 1975 lazear 1979 1981 and others that the relative paths of earnings and value of marginal product henceforth vmp diverge over the worklife the findings support lazear s work incentive theory for professionals but reject its application to non professionals as predicted by orthodox human capital theory documentation is also developed that earnings for non professionals equal their vmp over the job life cycle on the other hand the analysis provides no support to becker s specific training model

incentives wages and promotions theory and evidence i study an incentive problem that has been largely ignored in the agency literature incentives for repeated human capital investment the optimal contract is very simple but still provides rich implications for incentive and wage structures in large organizations the empirical evidence is presented using personnel records of health insurance claim processors in a large u s insurance company these processors are white collar nonmanagerial female service industry workers a rapidly growing but rarely studied labor group the empirical findings are consistent with the main features of the optimal contract

seniority rules and productivity an empirical test the primary purpose of this paper is to test empirically the effect of labor quality on short run manufacturing productivity in doing so the study makes major advances in two areas for the first time a job tenure function is estimated and a time series of job tenure in manufacturing is developed this estimated tenure series empirically verifies the use of seniority rules in the firm worker employment relationship having generated a tenure series the authors then test whether tenure enhances productivity in manufacturing the results clearly indicate that seniority rules have a statistically significant positive impact on productivity and the pattern of the seniority rules is reminiscent of a model where human capital has a specific component copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

are bureaucrats paid like ceos performance compensation and turnover of top civil servants abstract recent research explores the effect of financial and career incentives on public sector hiring processes and subsequent performance the reverse relation between performance and bureaucrats compensation and turnover has received only limited attention due to the distinct features of public sector organizations bureaucrats are traditionally argued to require either permanent positions and fixed wages or low powered performance incentives this article studies how the performance of top civil servants in norwegian local governments affects their compensation and turnover we thereby build on a unique new dataset over the period 1991 2014 our results indicate that better performing top civil servants obtain a higher compensation and are less likely to be replaced nonetheless these incentives remain low powered in line with agency theory prescriptions

welfare evaluations in contingent valuation experiments with discrete response data comment in the case of private goods individuals reveal their preferences in the market place no similar market mechanism exists in the case of public goods however one obvious possibility is to ask people about their maximal willingness to pay for public goods or government expenditure johansson 1987 1990 miller in some recent contingent market valuation studies people instead have been asked to accept or reject a specified amount of money for a change in the provision of a public good different subsamples are confronted with different bids the resulting yes and no responses usually are analyzed by logit or probit techniques e g johansson and kristrom this raises the question of how to compute the average willingness to pay when only yes and no responses are available this point was advanced by hanemann in his seminal 1984 paper on welfare evaluations with discrete responses see also hanemann 1987 however we believe a minor imperfection in hanemann s presentation may confuse and mislead practitioners hanemann s approach assumes that negative bids cannot occur but at the same time gives the impression that it also applies to models that allow for negative bids we also extend hanemann s discussion of the choice of money measure in cost benefit analysis

the internal economics of a university evidence from personnel data using a rich personnel data set of a large european university we find strong evidence for the existence of an internal labor market first there is a strong port of entry at the lowest academic rank and in fact even prior to entering professorship resulting in very long internal careers second wages do not follow external wage developments we subsequently consider various incentive theories regarding the dynamics of promotions as organized through annual tournaments as expected a rigid set of research and teaching criteria determine the speed of promotions at the same time administrative rigidities play an important role

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

promotion signaling gender and turnover new theory and evidence we extend promotion signaling theory to incorporate gender and across firm mobility within and across job levels evidence from worker firm linked finnish panel data supports our theory for some groups controlling for worker performance inferred from performance related pay within firm promotion probabilities are increasing and wage increases from promotion are decreasing in educational attainment for some educational groups with results stronger for first than for subsequent promotions women have lower promotion probabilities than men and a greater sensitivity of promotion probability to educational attainment across firm promotions are rare but bring wage increases exceeding those for internal promotions and across firm lateral moves

strengthening state capabilities the role of financial incentives in the call to public service we study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in mexico different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites and job offers were subsequently randomized screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants intellectual ability personality and motivation this allows the first experimental estimates of i the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants ii the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer and iii the role of job attributes distance attractiveness of the municipal environment in helping fill vacancies as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities a theoretical model guides each stage of the empirical inquiry we find that higher wages attract more able applicants as measured by their iq personality and proclivity towards public sector work i e we find no evidence of adverse selection effects on motivation higher wage offers also increased acceptance rates implying a labor supply elasticity of around 2 and some degree of monopsony power distance and worse municipal characteristics strongly decrease acceptance rates but higher wages help bridge the recruitment gap in worse municipalities

employer learning productivity and the earnings distribution evidence from performance measures two ubiquitous empirical regularities in pay distributions are that the variance of wages increases with experience and innovations in wage residuals have a large unpredictable component the leading explanations for these patterns are that over time either firms learn about worker productivity but productivity remains fixed or workers productivities themselves evolve heterogeneously in this paper we seek to disentangle these two models and place magnitudes on their relative importance we derive a dynamic model of learning and productivity that nests both models and allows them to coexist we estimate our model on a 20 year panel of pay and performance measures from a single large firm the baker gibbsholmstrom data incorporating performance measures yields two key innovations first the panel structure implies that we have repeat measures of correlates of productivity as opposed to the empirical evidence on employer learning which uses one fixed measure second we can separate productivity from pay whereas the previous literature on productivity evolution could not we find that both models are important in explaining the data however the predominant effect is that worker productivity evolves idiosyncratically over time implying firms must continuously learn about a moving target therefore while the majority of pay dispersion is driven by variation in individual productivity wages differ significantly from individual productivity at all experience levels due to imperfect information we believe this represents a significant reinterpretation of the empirical literature on employer learning

interchange fees in payment card systems a survey of the literature abstract this paper surveys the recent literature about interchange fees in payment card systems interchange fees are used by payment platforms to allocate the total cost of a payment card transaction between the cardholder s bank the issuer and the merchant s bank the acquirer each time a consumer pays by card its bank receives an interchange fee from the merchants bank banks argue that interchange fees are needed to encourage the use of electronic payment instruments whereas merchants claim that they artificially inflate the cost of accepting cards this paper sheds light on the ongoing debate that opposes banks to the regulatory institutions or the competition authorities in various countries by reviewing the theoretical results of the literature and highlighting some unanswered issues

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

an endogenous policy model of hierarchical government endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents each enjoying some degree of autonomy in this paper policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy a legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups the combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group s depends on the exchange between the same interest group s and the agent at the other tier our results concerning multi tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one tier lobbying in particular the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies moreover the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier it is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures like federations or firms

asymmetric learning and the wage productivity relationship abstract a worker s current employer will typically acquire information concerning that worker s productivity that is not directly available to other potential employers a number of papers have considered this idea and argued that in such a setting these other firms will utilize the actions of the current employer as signals of productivity in this paper i argue that this perspective can explain the existence of puzzling results concerning the relationship between wage and productivity growth found in the classic studies of medoff and abraham 1980 1981

training and retirement patterns life cycle theory predicts that employers enter into implicit contracts with newly hired employees to ensure rent sharing and to decrease turnover after firm specific training investments typically these implicit contracts would include both upward sloping earning profiles and mandatory retirement in this article we empirically test the prediction that workers with firm specific skills are restrained in their options to continue working therefore they are more likely to retire at common mandatory retirement dates than those with general skills using the us national longitudinal survey of older men we find that workers who participated in firm specific training in their early careers do indeed retire earlier than those with general skills the results show that compulsory retirement plans force these older workers to retire when they reach the common mandatory retirement age of 65 the results presented in this article are highly relevant for public policies in european and other industrialized cou

external recruitment and intrafirm mobility i introduction competition for promotion has a very strong effect on employees work incentive in the stereotypic internal labor market described in doeringer and piore 1985 there are only a limited number of ports of entry into a hierarchical firm or organization so that existing employees are insulated to a large extent from external competition in their climb up the corporate ladder however lazear 1992 and baker et al 1994a 1994b find extensive external recruitments at almost all grade levels in their studies of different u s corporations if the boundary between internal and external labor markets is not impervious then the choice between external recruitment and internal promotion in filling openings becomes an important personnel decision with interesting implications on incentives opening up the competition to external applicants discourages collusion among candidates as well as offers a quick channel for absorbing external talents however it also reduces the probability of promotion for existing workers and thus their incentive to exert with adverse effect on the firm s profit in chan 1996 i suggest that work incentive for the internal promotion candidates can be maintained if external competitors are handicapped in the contest such favoritism for existing employees implies that senior positions tend to be filled internally more often than not and that a worker is recruited from the outside only if he or she demonstrates a significant margin of superiority over the internal candidates this is consistent with the observations that external recruits account for only about 15 to 20 of all appointments to top management positions see denis and denis 1995 warner et al 1988 and that roughly the same percentage of chief executive officers ceos of large u s firms are outsiders see agrawal et al 2002 chan 1996 parrino 1997 the handicapping hypothesis of promotion suggests a dilemma in personnel decisions although handicapping external applicants provides incentive for existing employees it also increases the chance of inferior internal contestants being promoted to senior positions where sorting of workers by ability into different particularly senior positions is important efficiency within the organization is compromised this tension between sorting and maintaining work incentive is explored in tsoulouhas et al 2001 unfortunately the gain in realism with the incorporation of sorting is offset by ambiguity in most of the results the ability of the firm to precommit to future compensation the relative abilities of the internal and external contestants the cost of work effort and commonality within the firm and within the industry all have a role in determining the direction and magnitude of the handicap with different combinations of these factors resulting in very different outcomes whether one starts with the chan model or the tsoulouhas model empirical evidence is important to establish the significance of the competitive handicap against external candidates there has been no shortage of empirical investigations of the incentive effects of tournaments most follow one of two different analytic approaches one approach uses cross sectional or nonpanel data such as data on executive salary across firms gibbons and murphy 1990 leonard 1990 main et al 1993 or data from professional sports tournaments see for example ehrenberg 1990 few of these studies address the distinction between internal or external contestants agrawal et al 2002 is an exception it tests implications of the handicapping hypothesis derived in tsoulouhas et al 2001 by analyzing more than 1 000 ceo successions in large u s firms from 1974 to 1995 even though some of the results are also consistent with a traditional human capital interpretation and the key hypothesis can be derived from the tsoulouhas model only under certain conditions they offer some support for the existence and relevance of the competitive handicap against external contestants

internal labour markets causes and consequences the paper analyzes the causes and consequences of internal labor market rules that yield long tenure promotion from within seniority pensions and due process in dismissals about half the workforce are estimated to be in such markets competitive reasons for internal labor markets as a response to specific training and arms length relationships between workers and firms are surveyed these reasons are found to be consistent with the pattern of internal labor markets among non union firms however some internal labor markets e g among small unionized firms are probably a response to union pressure and government regulations in these circumstances low labor mobility could pose problems for policy copyright 1991 by oxford university press

income effects and the inconvenience of private provision of public goods for bads the case of recycling in finland abstract absent or weak income effects reported in many contingent valuation studies have cast doubt on the reliability of the survey method we find that the income effect depends on the type of public good in question there is a negative income effect for willingness to pay for recycling which requires time and effort for sorting but a positive effect for the more convenient incineration hence high income low income individuals may display less more effort on environmental behavior this stresses the importance of comprehensive distributional analyses when assessing alternative environmental policies

enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in this article we extend that model in two ways first we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence second and more important we show that introducing task specific human capital allows us to produce cohort effects we further argue that task specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications we also discuss limitations of our extended approach

competitive markets without commitment in the presence of a time inconsistency problem with agency contracts we show that competitive markets can implement allocations that pareto dominate those achieved by a benevolent government and they induce more effort we analyze a model with moral hazard and a two sided lack of commitment after agents have chosen their work firms can modify contracts and agents can switch firms if the ex post market outcome satisfies a weak notion of competitiveness and sufficiently separates individuals it is pareto superior to a government s allocation with a complete breakdown of incentives moreover competitive markets without commitment implement more effort in equilibrium under general conditions

incentives at the counter an empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the netherlands in card payment systems no surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for card payments however such rules are prohibited in the netherlands dutch retailers are allowed to surcharge consumers for debit card use this setting permits an empirical analysis of the impact of surcharging card payments on merchant acceptance and consumer payment choice based on consumer and retailer survey data our analysis shows that surcharging steers consumers away from using debit cards towards cash half of the observed difference in debit card payment shares across retailers can be explained by this surcharge effect removing debit card surcharges may induce cost savings of more than eur 50 million in the long run

stakeholder theory corporate governance and public management what can the history of state run enterprises teach us in the post enron era this paper raises a challenge for those who assume that corporate social responsibility and good corporate governance naturally go hand in hand the recent spate of corporate scandals in the united states and elsewhere has dramatized once again the severity of the agency problems that may arise between managers and shareholders these scandals remind us that even if we adopt an extremely narrow concept of managerial responsibility such that we recognize no social responsibility beyond the obligation to maximize shareholder value there may still be very serious difficulties associated with the effective institutionalization of this obligation it also suggests that if we broaden managerial responsibility in order to include extensive responsibilities to various other stakeholder groups we may seriously exacerbate these agency problems making it even more difficult to impose effective discipline upon managers hence our central question is a strong commitment to corporate social responsibility institutionally feasible in searching for an answer we revisit the history of public management and in particular the experience of social democratic governments during the 1960s and 1970s and their attempts to impose social responsibility upon the managers of nationalized industries the results of this inquiry are less than encouraging for proponents of corporate social responsibility in fact the history of public sector management presents a number of stark warnings which we would do well to heed if we wish to reconcile robust social responsibility with effective corporate governance

information sharing in common agency when is transparency good when should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about the agent s unobservable effort for producing a public good in a model with two principals who offer linear incentive schemes we show that information sharing always increases total expected welfare if the principal who is less informed about the agent s effort also cares more about the agent s output if the less informed principal cares somewhat but not too much less than the other principal about the agent s output information sharing reduces total expected welfare in our model the efficient information regime emerges as an equilibrium outcome

the effect of mandatory retirement on earnings profiles in japan using data from the japanese basic survey on wage structure for 1981 and 1986 the authors estimate the effect of the age of mandatory retirement on the rate of growth of earnings with job tenure i

the effects of local market conditions on two pay setting systems in the federal sector the authors examine the sensitivity of wage setting in two federal pay systems the general schedule gs system covering white collar workers and the federal wage system fws covering blue coll

multiple discreteness and product differentiation demand for carbonated soft drinks for several of the largest supermarket product categories such as carbonated soft drinks canned soups ready to eat cereals and cookies consumers regularly purchase assortments of products within the category consumers often purchase multiple products and multiple units of each alternative selected on a given trip this multiple discreteness violates the single unit purchase assumption of multinomial logit and probit models the misspecification of such demand models in categories exhibiting multiple discreteness would produce incorrect measures of consumer response to marketing mix variables in studying product strategy these models would lead to misleading managerial conclusions we use an alternative microeconomic model of demand for categories that exhibit the multiple discreteness problem recognizing the separation between the time of purchase and the time of consumption we model consumers purchasing bundles of goods in anticipation of a stream of consumption occasions before the next trip we apply the model to a panel of household purchases for carbonated soft drinks

some evidence on the relationship between performance related pay and the shape of the experience earnings profile we investigate the relationship between performance related pay prp and the shape of workers experience earnings profiles in particular we argue that the slope of the profile depends critically upon the degree of equity held by workers in their enterprise as measured by the extent of prp the implication is that the slope of the profile for prp workers falls between those of their zero equity fixed wage and one hundred per cent equity self employed counterparts our empirical analysis of three british data sets namely the british social attitudes survey the british household panel survey and the british family expenditure survey supports this prior in this paper we explore the shape of the experience earnings profile for individuals employed under different types of contracts fixed wage performance related pay prp and self employment contracts we follow lazear 1979 1981 and lazear and moore 1984 in hypothesizing that the slope of the experience earnings profile reflects agency costs and the reduction thereof with increased agency costs inducing steeper profiles if monitoring costs are high firms may implement compensation schemes designed to encourage employees to self select behavior in the firms interests one such scheme defers a substantial amount of compensation until the later years of tenure the resulting experience earnings profile provides a penalty for shirking lazear and moore 1984 we therefore presume that the profiles of workers employed under fixed wage contracts are steeper than those of self employees for whom the issue of agency does not arise because of the duality of principal and owner lazear and moore 1984 the interesting case is that of workers employed under prp if such contracts represent a hybrid between fixed wage and self employment then one would expect their experience earnings profiles to lie somewhere between these two extreme