unemployment growth and taxation in industrial countries unemployeement and taxes do taxes affect the rate of umemployeement to the layman the upward trend in european unemployment is related to the slowdown of economic growth we argue that the layman s view is correct the increase in european unemployment and the slowdown in economic growth are related because they stem from a common cause an excessively rapid growth in the cost of labour in europe labour costs have gone up for many reasons but one is particularly easy to identify higher taxes on labour if wages are set by strong and decentralized trade unions an increase in labour taxes is shifted onto higher real wages this has two effects first it reduces labour demand and thus creates unemployment secondly as firms substitute capital for labour the marginal product of capital falls over long periods of time this in turn diminishes the incentive to invest and to grow the data strongly support this view according to our estimates the observed rise of 14 percentage points in labour tax rates between 1965 and 1995 in the eu could account for a rise in eu unemployment of roughly 4 percentage points a reduction of the investment share of output of about 3 percentage points and a growth slowdown of about 0 4 percentage points a year francesco daveri and guido tabellini

an example of nonlinear endogenous business cycle model build in the trade union abstract this paper exemplifies that a trade union may become a causal factor of the business cycle we construct an overlapping generations og model with a monopoly trade union which bargains about the wage and the employment rate if substitution between the wage and the employment rate for the trade union is elastic then the dynamic behavior around the steady state may be oscillatory

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

workers response to job loss female and male industrial workers in brazil abstract it is often assumed that when formal sector workers in the third world lose their jobs during a recession they move into the informal sector lack of state support rules out long periods of unemployment above all for breadwinners a survey of industrial workers in brazil shows that following job loss in the early 1980s resorting to the informal sector was more common for women than men and less likely for the skilled than the unskilled unemployment and a return to industrial employment were most common experiences for male breadwinners workers preferences and the structure of labor market opportunities explain much of this behavior

do regions benefit from active labour market policies a macroeconometric evaluation using spatial panel methods dauth w hujer r and wolf k do regions benefit from active labour market policies a macroeconometric evaluation using spatial panel methods regional studies the effect of active labour market policies on all job seekers in a region is assessed using the variation in the participation in these programmes across regions over time the starting point is an augmented regional matching function which is extended by allowing for a heterogeneous search effectiveness parameter for current participants and job seekers who finished a measure recently a spatial dynamic panel data model is estimated by using a quasi ml estimation procedure it is found that job schemes in the non profit sector wage subsidies and advancement of apprenticeships significantly increase the regional number of matches

toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation its many dimensions from the perspective of market economics this new thrust was consolidated in 1976 by s peltzman who developed a formal market model in which regulations were viewed as commodities brokered via political markets in response to bids and counter bids by those who stood to gain or to lose from specific regulation outcomes the subsequent contribution by becker 1983 added insights and institutional flesh to the stigler peltzman embryo confirming regulation as an integral component of mainstream market economics an important implication of such contributions especially those from the chicago perspective is that regulation for the most part confirms resource efficiency within market process that political markets in the absence of entry barriers are just as effective as are competitive commodity markets in achieving economic efficiency defined within a comparative institutions framework nowhere is this complacency more apparent than in the conclusion drawn by becker 1983 from a detailed formal analysis of competition among pressure groups for political influence

the long run demand for skilled and unskilled labor in colombian manufacturing plants this note estimates the long run demand for skilled and unskilled labor using panel data for colombian manufacturing plants unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error problems that commonly arise in microdata production estimates are examined output measurement errors cause ols estimators to underestimate the output and wage response of employment demand time difference estimators exaggerate the measurement error biases instrumental variable estimates of the output elasticities are 0 89 and 0 76 and own wage elasticities are 0 42 and 0 65 for skilled and unskilled labor respectively the output elasticity is larger for skilled labor whereas the wage elasticity is larger for unskilled labor in virtually every industry

decentralisation of active labour market policy the case of swedish local employment service committees decentralisation of decision making in active labour market policy makes it possible to use local information to the fullest but may also impinge on the fulfilment of national objectives as suggested by principal agent theory the purpose of this study is to examine the effects of a swedish pilot programme in 1996 which strengthened the role of the local authorities in labour market policy in parts of the country survey evidence suggests a non negligible divergence between the objectives of the municipality representatives and the central government s goals regarding programme effects our econometric findings do not indicate any increase in geographical lock in of the unemployed but decentralisation seems to spur local initiatives in the form of labour market programmes organised by the municipalities in addition targeting on outsiders is to some extent more common in municipal projects than in others

cyclical effects of government s employment and goods purchases distinguishing between the goods purchase and employee compensation components of government spending is important shocks to government goods purchases and shocks to government employment have the opposite effects on private output private employment and private investment moreover with this distinction in place quantitative analysis reveals that government spending is no longer a significant driving source of the u s business cycle on the contrary the components of government spending are procyclical in the u s data primarily because of their positive responses to the output fluctuations generated by technology shocks copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

social security privatization a structure for analysis this paper identifies the key economic issues that must be addressed in the debate over a privatized social security system we examine a two pillar plan the first pillar would consist of a demogrant a small indexed pension of the same dollar amount for all retirees who had contributed to the system over a full lifetime of work the second pillar would consist of a fully funded individual defined contribution account financed by payroll taxes held in financial institutions and directed by participants we explore how such a system would affect the risks households face how it would alter the distribution of income and how it might influence household behavior including incentives to work and save and portfolio choices we also examine macroeconomic issues how the transition to a private plan would occur and what the likely effects would be on national saving we conclude that a two pillar system offers several positive features namely a reduction in political risk an increase in household portfolio choice and improved work incentives disadvantages include less redistributiveness and national risk sharing and increased administrative costs this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effectiveness of active labour market policies a meta analysis this paper provides a meta analysis of microeconometric evaluation studies on the effectiveness of active labor market policies the analysis is built upon a systematically assembled data set of causal impact estimates from 57 experimental and quasi experimental studies providing 654 estimates published between january 1990 and december 2017 we distinguish between the short and longer term impacts in our analysis at 6 12 24 and 36 months after program start after correcting for publication bias and country specific macroeconomic characteristics subsidized labor and public employment programs have negative short term impacts which gradually turn positive in the longer run schemes with enhanced services including job search assistance and training programs do not have these negative short term effects and stay positive from 6 until 36 months after program start

an evaluation of active and passive labour market policy this paper reports results of an empirical study on the effectiveness of labour market policy data from austria france germany great britain sweden and the united states are used to apply a simultaneous equation model with wages and employment being the endogenous variables in order to explain employment the amount of unemployment benefits per unemployed passive labour market policy and payment for wage subsidies and training per employed and unemployed person active labour market policy are used in addition to real wages and output wages and output have their expected impact on total employment it turns out that passive labour market policy has a negative and active labour market measures a positive effect on the number of persons employed

optimal public sector wages i build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions to determine the optimal public sector wage policy public sector wages are crucial in achieving efficient allocation of jobs high wages induce too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs in turn raising unemployment the optimal wage depends on the frictions in the two sectors following technology shocks public sector wages should be pro cyclical and deviations from the optimal policy significantly increase the volatility of unemployment

macroeconomic effects of active labour market programmes in a union wage setting model the recent western european policy debate on unemployment has emphasized the benefits of active labor market programs the authors analyze the effects on wage pressure and equilibrium employment in a union wage setting framework programs are wage reducing to the extent that they help maintain effective labor force participation but they may also weaken insider incentives for wage restraint as the disutility of layoffs becomes smaller targeting the long term unemployed is crucial for the success of active labor market policy since the welfare effects on the laid off then are more heavily discounted and employment opportunities are redistributed from insiders to outsiders copyright 1995 by royal economic society

learning from social security reforms two different cases chile and argentina abstract this paper compares two of the most important structural reforms of social security in latin america the chilean private fully funded system and the public private argentinean integrated pay as you go fully funded program chile was the first country in the world to completely privatize the old public pension system this landmark reform has had a strong influence on other pension reforms not only in latin america but also in other developing and developed countries the argentinian model has important differences in comparison with the chilean model 1 a more inter and intragenerational solidarity 2 b relatively lower transition costs to be covered by the state 3 c higher coverage of self employed workers 4 d a more comprehensive regulatory framework and 5 e less gender inequality given these elements the argentinian pension model offers new insights to countries currently reforming their pension systems the paper concludes addressing important questions regarding the weaknesses of the new argentinian model

public sector wage policy and labor market equilibrium a structural model we develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates a sizable public sector in a labor market with search frictions the wage distribution and the employment rate in the public sector are taken as exogenous policy parameters overall wage distribution and employment rate are determined within the model taking into account the private sector s endogenous response to public sector employment policies job turnover is sector specific and transitions between sectors depend on the worker s decision to accept alternative employment in the same or different sector by comparing the value of employment in the current and prospective jobs the model is estimated on british data by a method of moments we use the model to simulate the impact of various counterfactual public sector wage and employment policies

opening the pandora s box trade openness and informal sector growth this article constructs a labour transition model combining the features of job loss and job creation in the formal sector of an economy the theoretical model examines the impact of trade liberalization on net job transition from formal to informal sector in the light of our model we establish certain pre conditions based on simulations under which trade liberalization is accompanied by rising informal sector the model outcome conforms to the empirical evidence of rising informality with openness which we find in 18 central eastern european and former soviet union countries

what has 20 years of public private pay gap literature told us eastern european transitioning vs developed economies this paper surveys the literature on public private sector pay differentials based on 20 years of research in transitioning countries of eastern europe ee and compares the results with estimates obtained from developed market economies the majority of empirical studies from ee economies found evidence of public sector pay penalties during the period of economic transition from a communist to market based economy in developed economies however the average differential is usually around zero or positive the public sector pay inequality reducing effect relative to the private sector is greater in transitioning economies than in developed economies nevertheless there is evidence that the sign of the public sector pay gap as well as the relative public sector pay distribution change with the progress of economic transition towards those usually observed in developed economies different pay setting arrangements between private and public sectors and competition for workers seem to be major arguments for the existence of systematic pay differences between the two sectors

wasteful public spending and state aid control the conventional academic rationale for supranational intervention to curb state aids to industry appeals to transfrontier spillovers however competition policy practitioners often speak in terms of curbing wasteful spending regardless of whether or not any international spillovers are involved although it is often argued that such wasteful spending calls not for supranational state aid control but rather for better domestic political accountability this paper argues that wasteful spending may be a by product of accountability not a symptom of its absence specifically we describe a model in which politicians fund projects that are wasteful as a way to signal their diligence and voters rationally reward them for this we discuss implications for the role of state aid control mechanisms 2006 by the european economic association

macroeconomic adjustment and the poor analytical issues and cross country evidence the author studies the links between macroeconomic adjustment and poverty first he summarizes some of the recent evidence on poverty in the developing world second he reviews the various channels through which macroeconomic policies affect the poor third the author emphasizes the role of the labor market he develops an analytical framework that captures some of the main features of the urban labor market in developing countries and studies the effects of fiscal adjustment on wages employment and poverty fourth he presents cross country regressions linking various macroeconomic and structural variables to poverty the author finds that output growth and real exchange rate depreciations tend to lower poverty while illiteracy income inequality and macroeconomic volatility tend to increase poverty in addition the impact of growth on poverty appears to be asymmetric and to result from a significant relationship between episodes of increasing poverty and negative growth rates

do matching frictions explain unemployment not in bad times this paper models unemployment as the result of matching frictions and job rationing job rationing is a shortage of jobs arising naturally in an economic equilibrium from the combination of some wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor during recessions job rationing is acute driving the rise in unemployment whereas matching frictions contribute little to unemployment intuitively in recessions jobs are lacking the labor market is slack recruiting is easy and inexpensive so matching frictions do not matter much in a calibrated model cyclical fluctuations in the composition of unemployment are quantitatively large

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

job matching temporary public employment and equilibrium unemployment abstract the paper presents a theoretical analysis of the macroeconomics effects of temporary public employment programs relief jobs the framework is a matching model where wages are determined by nash bargains between individual firms and workers public employment programs have a direct job placement effect which tends to reduce unemployment there is also an effect on wage pressure the direction of this effect hinges on whether the programs are aimed at increasing unemployment outflow of reducing unemployment inflow a policy targeted at unemployment outflow has in general ambiguous effects on equilibrium unemployment since the job placement effect and the wage effect work in opposite directions by contrast a policy targeted at unemployment inflow will always reduce unemployment since the job placement effect is reinforced by the induced wage moderation

the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european unemployment the aggregate evidence two key facts about european unemployment must be explained the rise in unemployment since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences while adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross country differences alternatively while explanations focusing on labour market institutions explain current heterogeneity well many of these institutions pre date the rise in unemployment based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 oecd nations since 1960 we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylised facts

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

does active labour market policy increase employment theoretical considerations and some empirical evidence from sweden does active labour market policy increase employment theoretical considerations and some empirical evidence from sweden

the effect of public sector employment on local labour markets this paper considers the impact of public sector employment on local labour markets using english data at the local authority level for 2003 2007 we find that public sector employment has no identifiable effect on total private sector employment however public sector employment does affect the sectoral composition of the private sector specifically each additional public sector job creates 0 5 jobs in the non tradable sector construction and services while crowding out 0 4 jobs in the tradable sector manufacturing when using data for a longer time period 1999 2007 we find no multiplier effect for non tradables stronger crowding out for tradables and consistent with this crowding out for total private sector employment

real wage determination and labour market policies the swedish experience it is a common view that labor market programs reduce unemployment and restrain wages by increasing the competition for jobs the swedish case is often advanced as a blueprint to follow this article questions the conventional wisdom on the swedish labor market policies it finds empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that job creation and training programs weaken the incentives for wage restraint as a consequence it appears likely that labor market programs have strong crowding out effects on regular employment copyright 1991 by royal economic society

fiscal policy and the structure of production in a two sector developing economy abstract this paper develops a two sector model of a developing economy and examines the role of the informal sector in limiting the government s ability to increase tax revenues a key feature is the introduction of auditing of the informal sector and degree of tax enforcement in that sector we emphasize the interdependence between tax policy and enforcement in achieving a developing economy s fiscal objectives and show that by judicious policy choices the presence of the informal sector need not hinder its ability to raise tax revenues we supplement the formal analysis with numerical simulations highlighting the contrasting intertemporal tradeoffs implied by higher tax rates and tax enforcement levels

market sentiment and macroeconomic fluctuations under pegged exchange rates this paper models changes in market sentiment as a temporary increase in the premium faced by domestic private borrowers on world capital markets the effects of this shock are studied in an intertemporal optimizing framework of a fixed exchange rate economy where firms demand for working capital is financed by bank credit depending on the perceived length of this shock the model is capable of predicting a rise in domestic interest rates capital outflows and a drop in official reserves a reduction in bank deposits and the supply of credit a fall in private consumption a contraction in output and an increase in unemployment these predictions are consistent with observed facts associated with several recent episodes of turbulence on international financial markets

intergenerational transfers of public sector jobs a shred of evidence on nepotism the attractiveness of public sector jobs in italy may induce parents working in this sector to use their positions and the network of relationships to favor their sons daughters in gaining access to public sector jobs we verify whether children of public employees effectively enjoy an advantage estimating a model of the probability of working in the public sector controlling for individual characteristics and labor market conditions we show that if the father is a public employee the probability of his child working in the same sector is increased by a huge 44 this advantage is larger for low ability individuals stayers and southern italian residents we interpret these findings as evidence of nepotism in public employment

unions role in argentine and chilean pension reform abstract the 1981 privatization of chilean pensions created immediate winners and observable benefits it also created a model for latin american pension reform this study compares the chilean and argentine experiences by using political economy models of social welfare development as a framework for discussion we suggest privatizing pensions could divide workers or create opportunities for unions to garner control over financial capital investments the argentine pension reform may diverge substantially if unions increase their participation in the pension fund management and worker education

the making of the turkish financial crisis abstract at the turn of the century the turkish economy was in need of an urgent stabilization in order to halt a treacherous process of inflation unsustainable public debt accumulation and increasing financial fragility resulting from irresponsible policies and lack of fiscal discipline that had been endemic since the early 1980s the stabilization program launched with support from the imf has however failed to deliver its promises plunging the economy into an unprecedented recession largely because of serious shortcomings in its design as well as in crisis intervention which appears to have drawn no useful lessons from recent crises in emerging markets

redistributive public employment abstract politicians may use disguised redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax transfer schemes first we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis next we provide evidence consistent with the prediction of the model namely that in u s cities politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device we find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher

fiscal adjustment and labor market dynamics in an open economy this paper studies the labor market effects of fiscal adjustment in a two sector three good intertemporal framework key features of the model are an informal sector minimum wages unionized labor in the formal economy imperfect labor mobility and public production of intermediate inputs bluxuryq and wait unemployment prevail in equilibrium it is shown that if unions care sufficiently about employment and if the degree of openness is high an increase in the price of government services may reduce unemployment in the steady state a similar result would hold in an efficiency wage setting if the bdisciplinary effectq of unemployment is sufficiently strong d 2004 published by elsevier b v

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

mobility and labor market segmentation the urban labor market in el salvador there is now a large literature examining the hypothesis that there are barriers to mobility between sectors of the labor market in developing countries though there are many explanations for barriers to mobility most versions of the segmented labor market hypothesis are based on restricted access to a higher wage primary or formal sector and free access to a lower wage secondary or informal sector the testable predictions of the hypothesis are the implications of the assumption of excess supply to the primary sector most studies have found results consistent with these predictions including different structures of wages between sectors lower returns to human capital in the secondary sector and lower job tenure by sectors for some demographic groups but as several authors have recently noted it is difficult to distinguish this hypothesis from other competitive explanations for these patterns the competitive model is also consistent with the testable predictions of the segmented labor market hypothesis though the competitive model is consistent with the observed patterns the observed patterns do put restrictions on the version of the competitive model that is appropriate for developing countries for example the finding that earnings tend to be lower in the informal sector is consistent with compensating differentials but this applies only to compensating differentials that are based on formal sector employment as being less desirable such as job flexibility similarly the finding of lower returns to human capital in the informal sector is consistent with life cycle models of investment in human capital but only models in which there is lower labor market attachment of those employed in an informal sector and thus less time to recuperate investments in on the job training but most of the necessary assumptions are reasonable and as a result tests of the segmented labor market hypothesis cannot distinguish among competing explanations

the political economy of public employment programs abstract what are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs almps have to please the employed majority this issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker firm wage bargaining it turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of almps and the political weight attributed to firm interests if firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure the employed will opt for excessive program activity

public sector employment in an equilibrium search and matching model in this paper we extend the standard diamond mortensen pissarides model of equilibrium unemployment to incorporate public sector employment we modify the model in three ways first we assume that workers are heterogeneous in terms of human capital second we assume that productivity is match specic and that the distribution of match specic productivity is more favorable in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance the higher is a worker s human capital third we allow for both private and public sector employment we prove existence of equilibrium and numerically analyze the eects of public sector employment policy on the distributions of wages productivities and human capital levels in the two sectors and on overall employment and welfare using data from colombia

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

taxes subsidies and equilibrium unemployment this paper considers the effects of wage taxes employment subsidies and unemployment benefits in a simple model of equilibrium search unemployment is determined by the equality of job matchings and job separations job vacancies are determined by a zero profit condition and wages by a nash bargain between the meeting firm and worker i show that marginal wage taxes influence the firm s and worker s equilibrium sharing rule whereas employment subsidies and unemployment benefits influence only the surplus shared hence tax financed subsidies reduce wages and raise employment and vacancies whereas tax financed unemployment benefits raise wages and reduce employment and vacancies in this paper we consider the effects of wage taxes employment subsidies and unemployment benefits on equilibrium search unemployment in a model where wages are determined competitively by the meeting firm and worker discussions about the desirability of taxes and subsidies and their effect on employment and wages abound in the labour economics literature yet the only tax or subsidy that has been systematically discussed in a competitive search framework is a lump sum unemployment benefit the reason for this might be that the structure of the model is such that it is ideally suited to the study of unemployment benefits whereas traditional supply and demand analysis could arguably cope with other kinds of taxes this might be true in some cases but if it is at all appropriate to think of equilibrium unemployment as coming out of an essentially competitive framework when the process which brings together jobs and workers is characterized by frictions traditional supply and demand analysis may not be rich enough to give us all the answers we need 1 the model of this paper is a simple equilibrium model with endogenous unemployment supply of jobs i e demand for labour and real wages unemployment exists because unemployed workers and unfilled jobs cannot find each other instantaneously in the interval of time required to match all workers and jobs some existing job worker pairs break up providing a new flow into unemployment thus unemployment can never be eliminated in equilibrium flows into and flows out of unemployment are equal wages are set endogenously by generalized nash bargains between the individual firm and worker the equilibrium wage rate is shown to depend on all the parameters of the model and to be determined simultaneously with equilibrium unemployment the driving force in the model which provides the link between wages and unemployment is the rate of job vacancies the total number of jobs is determined by zero profit conditions because of constant returns to scale the number of jobs taken up each period depends positively on the number of job vacancies because a typical unemployed worker will have a better chance of locating a job when there are more vacancies if the real wage rate falls the expected profits from a job rise firms open up more vacancies to take advantage of this and so more jobs are taken up but as vacancies rise and

on the job search in a developing country an analysis based on indian data on migrants job search by those who are employed has received increasing attention in recent years in both the theoretical and the empirical literature on labor markets in developed countries much of the interest stems from the observation that job changes often take place without an intervening period of unemployment and that there is a close relationship between searching for a job and quitting the current job also on the job search affects the rate of unemployment during the period between jobs a major preoccupation of the empirical research has been to estimate the returns to on the job search and to test the determinants of job search the bulk of this work uses data for the united states and the united kingdom 2 job search theory has not been empirically tested in the context of a developing country on the job search particularly in the so called informal sector of the urban labor market is an important feature of probabilistic models of migration in developing countries in the vein of michael p todaro and of john r harris and todaro 3 such models hypothesize that individuals migrate to urban centers with the aim of obtaining employment in the formal sector and that informal sector employment is a transitional phase during which migrants are searching for formal sector jobs recent work by gary s fields has formalized the theoretical aspects of this job search process within the framework of a multisector model 4 thus it would be of interest to find out if there are significant differences between developed and developing countries with respect to the determinants of on the job search

macroeconomic adjustment with segmented labor markets this paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal and labor market policies in a developing economy with an informal sector and a heterogeneous work force a permanent reduction in government spending on nontraded goods leads in the long run to a deprecia tion of the real exchange rate a fall in the market clearing wage for unskilled labor an increase in output of traded goods and a lower stock of net foreign assets a permanent reduction in the minimum wage improves competitiveness and expands the formal sector the effect of changes in unemployment benefits are also analyzed q 1999 elsevier science

public employment and labour market performance public employment does it increase unemployment we explore the consequences of public employment for labour market performance theory suggests that public employment may not only crowd out private employment but also increase overall unemployment if by offering attractive working conditions it draws additional individuals into the labour force empirical evidence from a sample of oecd countries in the 1960 2000 period suggests that on average creation of 100 public jobs may have eliminated about 150 private sector jobs slightly decreased labour market participation and increased by about 33 the number of unemployed workers theoretical considerations and empirical evidence however suggest that the crowding out effect of public jobs on private jobs is only significant in countries where public production is highly substitutable to private activities and the public sector offers more attractive wages and or other benefits than the private labour market

do government purchases affect unemployment we estimate the effect of government purchases on unemployment in 20 oecd countries for the period 1980 2007 an increase in government purchases equal to one percent of gdp is found to reduce unemployment by about 0 3 percentage points in the same year the effect is greater and more persistent under less employment friendly labour market institutions and greater and more persistent under a fixed exchange rate regime than under a floating regime the effect is also greater in downturns than in booms the effect on unemployment reflects a corresponding positive effect of increased government purchases on the employment to population rate this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

altruism the samaritan s dilemma and government transfer policy this paper shows that altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor the framework is one in which there are rich altruists and risk averse poor who face some possibility of loss the government represents the rich and makes transfers on their behalf with unconditional transfers the poor may forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss this reliance on private charity has adverse efficiency effects these may be avoided if the government makes in kind transfers of insurance copyright 1995 by american economic association

labour market policies and unemployment in the oecd unemployment policies richard jackman christopher pissarides and sawas savouri the massive increase in unemployment throughout the oecd since the early 1970s has led governments in many countries to introduce or to expand labour market policies such as training schemes employment subsidies public works or schemes of counselling or assistance in job search such programmes have the objective of reducing unemployment by improving the workings of the labour market after a description of these programmes this article proposes a framework based on the relationship between unemployment and vacancies or beveridge curve within which the rise in unemployment can be analysed and the effects of policies and of institutions examined this framework helps to identify the main factors which have affected the unemployment and vacancy rates in 14 of the main oecd countries over the period 1970 88 the main results are that while corporatism remains the institutional feature with the biggest single impact in sustaining low unemployment rates labour market policies also have had a significant and well defined effect on unemployment which appears large relative to the budgetary costs of the programmes

stabilization policy and public sector prices abstract this paper analyzes the impact of public sector price increases combined with employment cuts in a dynamic optimizing model if the government adopts a tough layoff policy the real wage is highly flexible and the reforms are perceived to be permanent there is a strong presumption that real output will be higher and inflation lower over all time horizons problems may arise during the adjustment process however when the reforms are not credible or the real wage adjusts slowly to clear the labor market

rural urban migration in economic development abstract this paper provides a review of the theoretical literature on rural urban migration in contemporary ldcs the paper begins with a brief discussion of the lewis model before going on to discuss the todaro and the harris todaro models and the large literature which these models have spawned the question of job search in the context of migration and the role of family members in migration decisions are considered next the paper then takes a closer look at the informal sector and also sets out alternative migration functions to the ones usually employed in the literature the paper concludes with a brief note on some of the important implications arising from our study

labour market policy and unemployment the paper discusses three aspects of the system for unemployment support first active labour market programmes as a means of re allocating labour from high unemployment to low unemployment sectors are analysed and it is concluded that wage raising accommodation effects may be a serious problem second the possibility of strengthening incentives for wage moderation by differentiating employee and or employer contributions to unemployment insurance are discussed third the question is raised whether there may exist other institutional set ups for providing unemployment support that are more efficient in terms of returning the unemployed to work than government run systems

active labour market programmes in latin america and the caribbean evidence from a meta analysis abstractwe present a systematic review and meta analysis of impact evaluations of active labour market programmes almps in latin america and the caribbean lac we extract 296 impact estimates f

government size and unemployment evidence from industrial countries using data from 19 industrial countries for the period 1985 to 2002 this paper analyzes how the size of the government sector affects unemployment controlling for the impact of the business cycle as well as for the impact of all major labor market institutions and unobserved country effects we find that a large government sector is likely to increase unemployment it appears to have a particularly detrimental effect on women and the low skilled and to substantially increase long term unemployment it seems that dominant stateowned enterprises a large share of public investment in total investment as well as high top marginal income tax rates and low income threshold levels at which they apply are particularly detrimental

taxation wage controls and the informal sector abstract in this paper we study the effects of taxation and wage controls in a developing economy with an informal sector for that purpose we build a model with firm heterogeneity in which a formal and an informal sector endogenously emerge in some productive branches of the economy based on the assumption that the marginal cost of tax and regulation evasion increases with the size of the firm our model offers an explanation for the observed discontinuity in the distribution of firms size the missing middle three forms of dualism scale wage and evasion consistent with market segmentation are obtained the model accounts for the presence of waiting unemployment that seems particularly pervasive in urban regions a computable general equilibrium cge model for cameroon is built incorporating these features various reforms of the tax and regulation system are simulated and their effects on the extent of the informal sector are analyzed

a framework for analyzing the political support for active labor market policy abstract we develop a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of active labor market policy on unemployment wages and the welfare of the employed this framework is used to assess the political support in favour of such policies and to relate it to the working of such policies and other parameters characterizing the economic environment the main finding is that if the employed have little exposure to unemployment and if the demand for unskilled labour is inelastic then there may be political support for policies which actually raise the equilibrium level of total unemployment

migration unemployment and development a dynamic two sector analysis abstract a time minimizing problem of attaining a full employment state is solved in a dual economy model with harris todaro migration mechanism and with a positive level of urban unemployment in the starting period it appears that the optimum solution lies in the specialization of investment in the urban sector at least in the initial stage of development if the per capita capital stock in the urban sector is very small in the starting period

macroeconomic adjustment under alternative lending arrangements abstract this paper investigates macroeconomic adjustment for a small open economy under alternative lending arrangements the arrangements considered all have the common feature of a link between international lending rates and measures of creditworthiness by employing an intertemporal maximizing model of a small open economy the paper analyzes adjustment paths for the stock of international debt the real exchange rate and consumption in response to economic shocks the paper finds that arrangements linking interest rates on lending to the outstanding stock of debt are consistent with a stable adjustment trajectory whereas arrangements linking interest rates to performance on the trade balance are likely to be unstable

mobility costs frictional unemployment and efficiency with imperfect job information flows it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed with word of mouth communication this condition is derived given this condition steady state equilibrium is not efficient with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral in this way workers become more selective in the jobs they accept

macroeconomic implications of cash limits in the public sector a cash limit is a fixed amount of money available for pay prior to the wage negotiations in the public sector this paper examines the macroeconomic implications of cash limits in a unionized economy with decentralized wage bargaining in both private and public sectors i focus in particular on the linkages between changes in the cash limit wage setting and employment in public and private sectors equilibrium unemployment is independent of the size of the public sector if there are no sectoral differences in the unions relative bargaining power in general unemployment may rise or fall by public sector expansion accomplished by means of an increase in the cash limit unemployment increases if unions are relatively more powerful in the public than in the private sector

public sector price increases credibility and welfare abstract this paper examines the dynamics of inflation and unemployment when the government increases public sector prices and wage indexation prevents the labor market from clearing in the short run credible reforms are virtually certain to be immediately deflationary and welfare improving even when the labor market clears very slowly temporary price increases however usually produce higher inflation after a short period of time and often reduce welfare when higher inflation provokes the government to reverse the reform there exist multiple self fulfilling equilibria

on the benefits from rigid labour markets norms market failures and social insurance the common view that far reaching labour market deregulation is the only remedy for high european unemployment is too simplistic first the evidence suggests that deeply rooted social customs are

pension reform and gender gaps in latin america what are the policy options abstract several latin american countries have implemented structural reforms in their social security pension systems these reforms have modified the traditional public pay as you go defined benefit payg db schemes introducing multipillar systems where fully funded defined contribution ff dc schemes play an important role gender gaps in coverage and benefits under pagy db and ff dc schemes have been one of the policy issues missing in most of the reforms in part because it has been certainly underresearched in the literature this paper studies the sources of pension gender gaps and provides the pros and cons of a set of policy options that may contribute to overcoming the gaps found in both schemes these policies are divided on the one hand into specific policies that directly affect the determination of pension benefits by modifying formula design or eligibility conditions and on the other hand policies that indirectly affect the level of benefits and the likelihood of being entitled to them by changing incentives in labor market conditions

efficiency wages disinflation and labor mobility abstract the paper analyzes the role of labor market segmentation and relative wage rigidity in the transmission process of disinflation policies in an open economy facing imperfect capital markets wages are flexible in the nontradables sector and based on efficiency factors in the tradables sector with perfect labor mobility a permanent reduction in the devaluation rate leads in the long run to a real appreciation a lower ratio of output of tradables to nontradables an increase in real wages measured in terms of tradables and a fall in the product wage in the nontradables sector under imperfect labor mobility unemployment temporarily rises