what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

the political economy of corporate control and labor rents in a democracy a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital we argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors the model is consistent with the great reversal phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century we offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system

democracy comes to europe franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830 1938 abstract this paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in western europe during the period 1830 1938 our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate the election rule and electoral participation as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries we estimate panel regressions and find that 1 the gradual lifting of socio economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security 2 the female suffrage had a weak positive effect through spending on health education and welfare 3 the change from majority to proportional rule which took place in 10 of the countries did not contribute to growth in government spending and held back spending on health education and welfare 4 there exists weak complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy

partisan competition growth and the franchise we present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth we identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth when 1 there exists an economic conflict among the elite 2 landed classes are not politically strong and 3 there exists a critical mass of industrial workers we observe both growth and democratization the lack of conditions 1 or 2 resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition 3 drives growth deterring democratic expansions we provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries

the political economy of financial systems evidence from suffrage reforms in the last two centuries initially voting rights were limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets the franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the uncertainty and financial returns from stock markets our panel data evidence covering 1830 1999 shows that tighter restrictions on the voting franchise induce a greater stock market development whereas a broader voting franchise is more conducive towards the banking sector consistent with perotti and von thadden 2006 our results are robust to controlling for other political determinants and endogeneity

schumpeter redux a review of raghuram g rajan and luigi zingales s saving capitalism from the capitalists saving capitalism from the capitalists1 is an ambitious probe into capitalism s past present and future whereas joseph a schumpeter viewed capitalism as doomed because it was losing its political and social supports rajan and zingales see it more as threatened from within by established or incumbent industrialists and financiers who become enemies of free markets the authors contend that free financial markets foster economic progress while undermining the ability of incumbents to have their way rajan and zingales may overstate the significance of the great reversal of financial development in the middle decades of the twentieth century and their evidence and interpretations are sometimes flawed nonetheless they make a strong case for the fundamental importance of financial development for economic modernization and their warnings about the antimarket tendencies of incumbents are well worth pondering

political intervention in debt contracts this paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of an agricultural economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers because output is stochastic we allow for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks there may be default ex post we compare equilibria with and without political intervention intervention takes the form of a moratorium and is decided by voting when bad economic shocks are highly likely state contingent debt moratoria always improve ex post efficiency and may also improve ex ante efficiency moreover the threat of moratoria enhances efficiency when adverse macro shocks are unlikely state contingent moratoria always improve ex ante welfare by completing incomplete debt contracts

industry growth and capital allocation does having a market or bank based system matter are market based or bank based financial systems better at financing the expansion of industries that depend heavily on external finance facilitating the formation of new establishments and improving the efficiency of capital allocation across industries we find evidence for neither the market based nor the bank based hypothesis while legal system efficiency and overall financial development boost industry growth new establishment formation and efficient capital allocation having a bank based or market based system per se does not seem to matter much

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

workers of the world unite franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in europe 1820 1938 abstract we test the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise in europe was related to the threat of revolution we contend that international diffusion of regime contention and information about revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries generate the necessary variation in the perceived threat of revolution using two samples of european countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938 we find robust evidence which is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis we also find some evidence that war triggered suffrage reform

fees eat diversification s lunch although diversification is often spoken of as the only free lunch in investing the authors show that it is not free and that it must be considered in light of its costs they also show that fees on diversifying asset classes are high relative to their risk adjusted diversification benefit with the more exotic asset classes carrying higher price tags because there is meaningful cross sectional variation fees need to be considered when making strategic asset allocation decisions

the legal environment banks and long run economic growth this paper examines the relationship between the legal system and banlding development and traces this connection through to long run rates of per capita gdp growth capital stock growth and productivity growth the data indicate that countries where the legal system 1 emphasizes creditor rights and 2 rigorously enforces contracts have better developed banks than countries where laws do not give a high priority to creditors and where enforcement is lax furtherrnore the exogenous component of banking development the component defined by the legal environment is positively and robustly associated with per capita growth physical capital accumulation and productivity growth this paper addresses two questions first do crosscountry differences in the legal rights of creditors the efficiency of contract enforcement and the origin of the legal system explain cross country differences in the level of banking development second do better developed banks cause faster economic development that is is the component of banking development defined by the legal environment positively associated with long run rates of economic growth capital accumulation and productivity growth examining the relationship between the legal system and banking development is valuable irrespective of issues associated with long run growth first banks may influence the level of income per capita and the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations bernanke and gertler 1989 1990 second many economists stress that understanding the evolution of legal and financial systems is essential for understanding economic development north 1981 engerman and sokoloff 1996 consequently quantitative information on the relationship between the legal environment and banks will improve our understanding of business cycles and the process of economic development furthermore examining the causal links between banks and economic growth has both conceptual and policy implications on the conceptual front a long literature debates the importance of banks in economic development starting as early as bagehot 1873 economists have argued that better banks banks that are better at identifying creditworthy firms mobilizing savings pooling risks and facilitating transactions

property rights and competing for the affections of demos the impact of the 1867 reform act on stock prices the 1867 reform act in britain extended the electoral franchise to the skilled but propertyless urban working classes using stock market data and exploiting the fact that foreign and domestic equities traded simultaneously on the london market this paper finds that investors in british firms reacted negatively to the passage of this act we suggest that this finding is consistent with investors foreseeing future alterations of property rights arising from the pressure that the large newly enfranchised group would bring to bear on government policy we also suggest that our findings appear to be more consistent with the tory political competition explanation for the act rather than the whig threat of revolution explanation

a new database on the structure and development of the financial sector this article introduces a new database of indicators of financial structure and financial development across countries and over time the database is unique in that it combines a wide variety of indicators that measure the size activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets it improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks introducing indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial institutions and constructing measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets this article introduces a new database the first to provide comprehensive measures of the development structure and performance of the financial sector this database is the first to define and construct indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial intermediaries such as insurance companies pension funds and non deposit money banks it is also the first to include indicators of the size of primary equity markets and primary and secondary bond markets in constructing the database authors carefully deflate measures and match stock and flow variables

democracy war and wealth lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation in this article we use an original data set to provide the first empirical analysis of the political economy of inherited wealth taxation that covers a significant number of countries and a long time frame 1816 2000 our goal is to understand why if inheritance taxes are often very old taxes the implementation of inheritance tax rates significant enough to affect wealth inequality is a much more recent phenomenon we hypothesize alternatively that significant taxation of inherited wealth depended on 1 the extension of the suffrage and 2 political conditions created by mass mobilization for war using a difference in differences framework for identification we find little evidence for the suffrage hypothesis but very strong evidence for the mass mobilization hypothesis our study has implications for understanding the evolution of wealth inequality and the political conditions under which countries are likely to implement policies that significantly redistribute wealth and income

top incomes in the long run of history a recent literature has constructed top income shares time series over the long run for more than twenty countries using income tax statistics top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income and total taxes paid hence aggregate economic growth per capita and gini inequality indexes are sensitive to excluding or including top incomes we discuss the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series including income definition and comparability over time and across countries tax avoidance and tax evasion we provide a summary of the key empirical findings most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the twentieth century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars and depression shocks top income shares do not recover in the immediate postwar decades however over the last thirty years top income shares have increased substantially in english speaking countries and in india and china but not in continental european countries or japan this increase is due in part to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes as a result wage income comprises a larger fraction of top incomes than in the past finally we discuss the theoretical and empirical models that have been proposed to account for the facts and the main questions that remain open

determinants of democracy a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights the propensity for democracy rises with per capita gdp primary schooling and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment for a given standard of living democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle class share of income the apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant similarly the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation however negative effects from muslim and non religious affiliations remain intact

bank bias in europe effects on systemic risk and growth europe s financial structure has become strongly bank based far more so than in other economies we document that an increase in the size of the banking system relative to equity and private bond markets is associated with more systemic risk and lower economic growth particularly during housing market crises we argue that these two phenomena arise owing to an amplification mechanism by which banks overextend and misallocate credit when asset prices rise and ration it when they drop the paper concludes by discussing policy solutions to europe s bank bias which include reducing regulatory favouritism towards banks while simultaneously supporting the development of securities markets

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

comparative national balance sheets a study of twenty countries 1688 1978 raymond w goldsmith has combined his experience good sense and flair with figures to construct this groundbreaking comparative study of the balance sheets of twenty of the largest nations a pioneer in the field of national accounts goldsmith now presents a work that will be a valuable tool in tracking the economic progress of and between nations the majority of the balance sheets were created especially for this project their components gleaned from fragmentary and heterogeneous data there are approximately 3 500 entries each measuring the value of one type of tangible or financial asset or liability at a given date goldsmith s estimates are keyed to fifteen benchmark dates in the economic progress of the cited nations and for twelve nations he was able to construct balance sheets dating back to the nineteenth century or earlier combined worldwide balance sheet are included for 1950 and 1978 comparative national balance sheets will provide an essential basis for the quantitative analysis of the long term financial development of these nations in addition to national balance sheets for all large countries except brazil and china sectoral balance sheets for france germany great britain india japan and the united states in the postwar period are also included

wind power integration and power system flexibility an empirical analysis of extreme events in germany under the new negative price regime abstract in this article the flexibility of the german power market with respect to the integration of an increasing share of electricity from renewable energy sources was analysed flexibility limiting system components which cause negative prices are explained and illustrated for the german market the decision of the european energy exchange in leipzig to allow negative price bids is then explained the empirical data illustrate the flexibility of conventional generating capacities in germany from october 2008 to december 2009 of the 86 h of negative spot prices 19 h were significantly negative with prices of at least 100 mwh these extreme hours were analysed in greater detail by the examination of different system components thereby load wind power infeed and conventional generation by fuel type were observed as well as the market for negative tertiary reserve as indicators for market tightness although the market situations were found to be severe under the current conditions it could have been much worse in order to enable the market to clear at all times policy recommendations are provided and long run implications of an increasing res e share on the conventional generation capacity are discussed the article concludes with an outlook on additional power system flexibility options

cluster sample methods in applied econometrics inference methods that recognize the clustering of individual observations have been available for more than 25 years brent moulton 1990 caught the attention of economists when he demonstrated the serious biases that can result in estimating the effects of aggregate explanatory variables on individual specific response variables the source of the downward bias in the usual ordinary least squares ols standard errors is the presence of an unobserved state level effect in the error term more recently john pepper 2002 showed how accounting for multi level clustering can have dramatic effects on t statistics while adjusting for clustering is much more common than it was 10 years ago inference methods robust to cluster correlation are not used routinely across all relevant settings in this paper i provide an overview of applications of cluster sample methods both to cluster samples and to panel data sets

law and finance at the origin what are the key determinants of financial development and growth a large literature debates the relative importance of countries legal and political environment in this paper i present evidence from ancient rome where an early form of shareholder company the societas publicanorum developed i show that the societas publicano rum flourished in a legally underdeveloped but politically supportive environment roman republic and disappeared when roman law reached its height of legal sophistication but the political environment grew less supportive roman empire in the roman case legal development appears to have mattered little as long as the law as practiced was flexible and adapted to economic needs the law as practiced in turn reflected prevalent political interests after discussing parallels in more recent history i provide a brief overview of the literature on law and finance and on politics and finance the historical evidence suggests that legal systems may be less of a technological constraint for growth than previously thought at least at the origin