asset pricing implications of pareto optimality with private information we compare the empirical performance of a standard incomplete markets asset pricing model with that of a novel model with constrained pareto optimal allocations we represent the models stochastic discount factors in terms of the cross sectional distribution of consumption and use these representations to evaluate the models empirical implications the first model is inconsistent with the equity premium in the united states united kingdom and italy the second model is consistent with the equity premium and the risk free rate in all three countries if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is roughly 5 and the quarterly discount factor is less than 0 5

characterizing cross country consumption correlations general equilibrium models of international fluctuations that assume complete asset markets predict that consumption will be highly correlated across countries while the data display correlations that are rather low it has become common to characterize this empirical regularity by noting that cross country consumption correlations tend to be lower than corresponding output correlations this note reconsiders that charac terization and demonstrates that it is not particularly robust it also documents a related regularity that is more pervasive consumption fluctuations are more highly correlated with domestic production than with world output this provides an alternative standard for evaluating models of international fluctuations

reference dependent ambiguity abstract motivated by experimental and empirical evidence i study a framework where reference points such as a status quo endowment or default option can distort the way an individual responds to ambiguity i characterize a model of reference dependent maxmin expected utility and provide behavioral foundations for comparing reference dependent ambiguity attitudes i also illustrate some implications of reference dependent ambiguity for trade in an asset market including underdiversification no trade and the potential for a market collapse

the impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the french legislative elections of 1993 we use regression analysis to estimate the effect that campaign money had on the votes of challengers and incumbents in the 1993 elections to the french legislative assembly incumbent candidates can at best expect to win 1 01 of the popular vote for each extra franc they spend per registered voter in their district challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as this simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals the regression analysis also suggests that voters react negatively to candidates who rely heavily on their own money for their outlays and reward candidates who rely on contributions from private individuals these results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition and that voters may resist a candidate who relies on narrow sources of funding

similarities and convergence in g 7 cycles this paper examines the properties of g 7 cycles using a multicountry bayesian panel var model with time variations unit specific dynamics and cross country interdependences we demonstrate the presence of a significant world cycle and show that country specific indicators play a much smaller role we detect di erences across business cycle phases but apart from an increase in synchronicity in the late 1990s find little evidence of major structural changes we also find no evidence of the existence of an euro area specific cycle or of its emergence in the 1990s

risk sharing by households within and across regions and industries abstract cochrane 1991 journal of political economy 99 957 976 and mace 1991 journal of political economy 99 928 956 test if risk sharing across households is complete in the sense that household consumption moves one for one with aggregate consumption in their studies the source of income risk is idiosyncratic and agents can share risk across the entire economy using a sample of households from the panel study on income dynamics psid we explore whether households share the risk associated with their industries and regions across households in other regions and industries we find that a large fraction of risk faced by households is not shared across regions and industries

consumption smoothing and the welfare consequences of social insurance in developing economies studies of risk in developing economies have focused on consumption fluctuations as a measure of the value of insurance a common view in the literature is that the welfare costs of risk and benefits of social insurance are small if income shocks do not cause large consumption fluctuations we present a simple model showing that this conclusion is incorrect if the consumption path is smooth because individuals are highly risk averse hence social safety nets could be valuable in low income economies even when consumption is not very sensitive to shocks

precautionary wealth accumulation evidence from canadian microdata this paper estimates the effect of labour income uncertainty on wealth accumulation using two data sources wealth information is obtained from the master files of the new canadian survey of financial security 1999 sfs labour income risk proxies are constucted by industry using the canadian survey of labour and income dynamics slid between 1996 and 2001 the empirical results suggest the presence of a strong precautionary saving motive among canadian households for broad definitions of wealth furthermore consistent with the buffer stock saving model the level of precautionary funds significantly increases when households face liquidity constraints ce texte calcule l effet de l incertitude du revenu de travail sur l accumulation de la richesse a l aide de deux sources de donnees les donnees sur la richesse sont tirees des resultats de l enquete sur la securite financiere esf de 1999 les coefficients de risque attaches aux diverses industries sont developpes a partir des resultats de l enquete sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu edtr entre 1996 et 2001 les resultats empiriques suggerent la presence d une forte motivation des menages canadiens aepargner aux fins de precaution si l on accepte des definitions assez comprehensives de la richesse de plus d une maniere qui correspond au modele d epargne pour stockage tampon le niveau des fonds aux fins de precaution s accroit de maniere significative a proportion que les menages font face a des contraintes de liquidite

estimating the effect of campaign spending on senate election outcomes using instrumental variables o examine the traditional view that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent spending 7 i reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate s ability to raise campaign funds such as candidate wealth levels hhen the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal in contrast to previous research showing that because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending the incumbent s spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates this article shows that in an average senate election the incumbent s spending advantage yields a 6 increase in the incumbent s vote share that incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform my findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers in american congressional elections incumbents routinely win reelection even in the 1994 republican landslide change in the partisan makeup of congress occurred mainly through open seats switching from the democrats to the republicans a common explanation for high congressional reelection rates is the large campaign spending advantage enjoyed by incumbents it is widely believed that challenger spending is very important but there is surprisingly little evidence in the academic literature that incumbent campaign spending has an important effect on congressional election outcomes in light of the substantial effort incumbents devote to fundraising as well as some nagging methodological questions about existing academic studies the effect of incumbent spending on election outcomes remains an unresolved issue accurately measuring how incumbent spending leads to votes is of obvious importance politicians want to win elections and so if money matters then this will influence their behavior if campaign spending effects are trivial then concerns about politicians being

a new method of estimating risk aversion i show existing evidence on labor supply behavior places an upper bound on risk aversion in the expected utility model i derive a formula for the coefficient of relative risk aversion in terms of the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to wage elasticity and degree of complementarity between consumption and labor i bound the degree of complementarity using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies across states using labor supply elasticity estimates i find a mean estimate of 1 then show generating 2 requires that wage increases cause sharper labor supply reductions jel d81 j22

the introduction of formal insurance and its effect on redistribution abstract transfers motivated by altruism guilt and norms of giving play an important role in supporting individuals who suffer losses due to risk we present empirical evidence from an artefactual field experiment in ethiopia in which we introduce formal insurance in a setting where donors make redistributive transfers to recipients who experience losses we find that donors tend to reduce their transfers to recipients who are offered insurance whether or not they take it up when insurance is rejected by a recipient transfer reductions are larger for donors who firmly expect that the recipient would take up insurance the results are consistent with a framework in which the introduction of insurance erodes norms of giving by revealing differences in the extent to which individuals value precautionary behavior with respect to risk taking welfare calculations show that when formal insurance is introduced the welfare of those who fail to take it up may be reduced

nutritional status during an economic crisis evidence from russia between 1996 and 1998 russia experienced a spectacular decline in economic activity which was followed by a dramatic rebound between 1998 and 2000 we use panel data to examine the impact of variation in household resources on six dimensions of nutritional status distinguishing longer run from short term fluctuations in resources nutritional status is very resilient to short term variation in household resources gross energy intake adult weight and child stature change very little as expenditure deviates from its long run average longer run resources have a substantively large positive and significant effect on energy intake diet quality adult weight and child stature the evidence indicates that individuals and households are able to weather short term fluctuations in economic resources at least in terms of maintaining body mass and energy intake increased globalisation has resulted in many less developed countries becoming more integrated into world markets this integration carries both benefits and costs for the populations of those countries an oft cited cost is elevated risk of exposure to economic fluctuations which has been manifest in several spectacular economic crises across the globe in the last few decades there is however little evidence on the extent to which individuals and families are able to mitigate deleterious effects of these economic upheavals on their well being in spite of its importance for understanding the consequences of globalisation this article provides new evidence on this issue specifically we examine the relationship between several dimensions of nutritional well being and variation in household resources during the russian economic crisis in the late 1990s the economies of the former soviet bloc have been especially volatile since the transition to market based economies which began in the early 1990s nowhere has this been more true than in russia where in the last half of 1998 real gdp collapsed by around 30 and then rapid growth brought the economy back to its pre crisis level by 2000 the time path of changes in gdp is closely mimicked by changes in the incomes and expenditures of russian households using extremely rich longitudinal household survey data from the russian longitudinal monitoring survey rlms we examine the impact of these large fluctuations in household resources on nutrient intake and on anthropometric markers of nutritional status at the individual level in so doing we address an important issue in the literature regarding the extent to which households in low income settings are able

habit formation in consumer preferences evidence from panel data this paper tests for the presence of habit formation using household data a simple model of habit formation implies a condition relating the strength of habits to the evolution of consumption over time when the condition is estimated with food consumption data from the panel study on income dynamics the results yield no evidence of habit formation at the annual frequency this finding is robust to a number of changes in the specification it also holds for several proxies for nondurables and services consumption created by combining psid variables with weights estimated from consumer expenditure survey data

marriage and consumption insurance what s love got to do with it when markets are incomplete individuals may choose to marry to diversify their labor income risk love however can complicate the picture if love is fleeting or the resolution of agents income uncertainty occurs predominantly later in life then marriages with good economic matches last longer in contrast if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty to agents income occurs early then marriages with good economic matches are more likely to be caught short with too little love to save a marriage consequently once married the partners will be more likely to divorce evidence is provided to distinguish between these alternative scenarios

risk pooling between households and risk coping measures in developing countries evidence from rural bangladesh abstract using data from rural bangladesh i test whether income risks are pooled among villagers between neighboring households and between related households living in different villages i find evidence that risks to food consumption are pooled between neighboring households and between related households but not among villagers as for nonfood consumption i find little evidence of risk pooling except between unrelated neighboring households i also find that while households belonging to a neighborhood network do not take any special measures during an economic hardship those not belonging to any such network try to smooth consumption by selling off livestock and other assets and by getting interest free loans negative income shocks are found to have little effect on labor supply or private transfers

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

poverty and the welfare costs of risk associated with globalization summary globalization implies change and uncertainty over future change may affect household welfare we use data on lorenz curves over the last 50 years for a sample of 53 mostly developing countries treating each country quintile year as an observation we first account for variation in consumption expenditures finding that global shocks are of less importance than country level shocks in explaining variation in country quintile consumption growth while poorer households experience more rapid consumption growth than do wealthier households they also bear much more risk however we find no evidence that this greater risk is related to globalization

human capital bankruptcy and capital structure we derive a firm s optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk while equity holders can diversify this risk away in the presence of corporate taxes our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice it also makes a number of predictions for the cross sectional distribution of firm leverage consistent with existing empirical evidence it implies persistent idiosyncratic dierences in leverage across firms an important new empirical prediction of the model is that ceteris paribus firms with more leverage should pay higher wages

the effect of prime age adult mortality on household composition and consumption in rural ethiopia abstract using panel data from ethiopia covering 1994 1997 we estimate the impact of prime age adult mortality on household composition household expenditures and dietary diversity we employed propensity score matching with a difference in difference estimator to control for endogeneity of mortality to the outcomes of interest households losing a productive adult did not replenish the lost labor regardless of economic status sex or status of the deceased adult with the exception of non poor households adult mortality resulted in increased dependency ratios but did not adversely affect households expenditure patterns total food and non food expenditures regardless of the sex and position of the deceased and the economic status of the households although food expenditures were protected a decline in dietary diversity especially among the poorest households reflected increased nutrition insecurity associated with adult mortality

an analysis of congressional voting on legislation limiting congressional campaign expenditures congressional voting on proposed floor amendments concerned solely with setting the level of the election campaign expenditure ceiling provision of the house administration committee s broad campaign finance reform bill of 1974 is analyzed for consistency with either the public interest or economic theories of regulation the benefit or cost to the individual congressman of a given ceiling is defined as the implied increase or decrease in his probability of reelection under the ceiling logit regression analysis provides the preponderant support for the economic theory of regulation by indicating that the likelihood of voting for a given ceiling varies directly with the implied change in reelection probability under the ceiling and is quite sensitive to the implied change

campaign finance reform a public choice perspective the federal election campaign act as passed in 1971 and amended in 1974represented landmark federal legislation it imposed new restrictions oncampaign contributions and contained path breaking provisions for the useof public funds to partially finance the campaigns of qualifyingpresidential candidates the nominal intent of the legislation was torestrain the skyrocketing campaign costs and the feared abuses thatgrowing dependencies on such money engendered three decades later withthe campaign spending arms race still raging congress sought toimpose further constraints on campaign spending with enactment of thebipartisan campaign reform act of 2002 bcra competing theories ofgovernment regulation are reviewed to better understand the intent andlikely consequences of the 2002 legislation in particular and campaignfinance regulation in general a simple model of the campaign spendingprocess highlights the likely causes of the rapid growth in campaignspending data and evidence are presented to test hypotheses concerningthe timing of and underlying motivations for bcra

household search and the aggregate labor market we develop a theoretical model with labour market frictions incomplete financial markets and with households which have two members households face unemployment risks but their members adjust their labour supplies to insure against unemployment we use the model to explain the cyclical properties of aggregate employment and participation as in the u s data the model predicts that the participation rate the fraction of individuals that want jobs is not strongly correlated with aggregate economic activity this property is in sharp contrast to the strongly procyclical participation predicted by both neoclassical models and models with search frictions when we assume bachelor households or households with infinitely many members complete markets in the two member household model and in the data primary earners are always in the labour force secondary earners have a mildly countercyclical participation rate and a mildly procyclical employment rate their behaviour insures the household against unemployment risks

working in public and private firms abstract we develop a theoretical framework for comparing incentives labor productivity and the allocation of effort in public versus private enterprises we incorporate socializing an activity which yields utility for workers and affects a firm s output into a multitask model of work organization we establish the two following results first the optimal workers compensation policy displays a larger incentive intensity in the private firm than in the public firm second labor productivity in the private firm may be higher or lower than in the public firm both results fit well with the findings of empirical work

a critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature after substituting actual and real changes for proposed and nominal changes in budgetary and employment levels it is clear that the size and scope of the federal leviathon had not been reduced over 1982 83 it is also clear that the agencies which witnessed real budget cuts over this period were of minor importance in terms of the total u s budget future research on why only small agencies receive real budget cuts will provide us with a better understanding of the budgetary process

political power and the market for governors the statistically insignificant results for the budget power and veto power variables suggest that for some reason these power characteristics are not particularly salable to consumers of governmental favors it may simply be the case that political competition pushes governors to adopt median voter public policy outcomes despite the existence of discretionary budget and veto powers which permit them to behave otherwise this suggests that discretionary powers may only be of value in those states where political competition is weak or where deviations from the wishes of the median voter are relatively costless in terms of the value of votes lost to the party or candidate in power however attempts to test this hypothesis using an interaction term between measures of inter party competition and the governors budgetary and veto powers proved unsatisfactory perhaps intra party competition in one party states makes candidates just as responsive to the preferences of the median voter as are candidates in states with strong inter party competition

testing efficient risk sharing with heterogeneous risk preferences previous papers have tested e cient risk sharing under the assumption of identical risk preferences in this paper we show that if in the data households have heterogeneous risk preferences the tests proposed in the past reject e ciency even if households share risk e ciently to address this issue we propose a method that enables one to test e ciency even when households have difierent preferences for risk the method is composed of three tests the flrst one can be used to determine whether in the data under investigation households have homogeneous risk preferences the second and third test can be used to evaluate e cient risk sharing when the hypothesis of homogeneous risk preferences is rejected we use this method to test e cient risk sharing in rural india using the flrst test we strongly reject the hypothesis of identical risk preferences we then test e ciency with and without the assumption of preference homogeneity in the flrst case we reject e cient risk sharing at the village and caste level in the second case we still reject e ciency at the village level but we cannot reject this hypothesis at the caste level this flnding suggests that the relevant risk sharing unit in rural india is the caste and not the village

imperfect insurance and differing propensities to consume across households abstract this paper extends previous tests of consumption insurance by splitting the sample to examine whether the marginal propensity to consume mpc out of idiosyncratic income shocks is larger for low wealth households than it is for high wealth households using data from the psid i find 1 the mpc of low wealth households is higher than that of high wealth households there are indications that both precautionary savings behavior and liquidity constraints contribute to this difference 2 splitting the data using two different measures of wealth indicates that households perceive housing equity as illiquid 3 when low wealth households are split into two subgroups the mpc of the very low wealth group is smaller reflecting the insurance aspects of means tested safety net programs

precautionary savers with ricardian propensities in his seminal 1974 paper barro noted that ricardian equivalence may fail if agents face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk and governments finance tax rebates with higher future tax rates 5 higher tax rates reduce the dispersion of future after tax income decrease the precautionary demand for savings and hence tend to stimulate present consumption barro concluded however that the stimulus to consumption would be minor and would likely be offset by induced reductions in future labor income the recent revival of interest in the precautionary savings motive has refocused attention on this tax insurance effect tie 2 8 24 27 in particular two highly influential papers one by barsky mankiw and zeldes 6 and the other by kimball and mankiw 19 argue that the tax insurance effect generates consumption responses roughly equivalent to those obtained from keynesian models where agents ignore future tax liabilities entirely although the existence of a precautionary demand for savings and by implication a taxinsurance effect has received strong empirical support 9 15 21 the magnitude of the effect remains largely unknown the two most difficult empirical issues involve quantifying the degree of uninsured idiosyncratic risk faced by typical agents and determining the appropriate form and shape of agents utility functions on these issues the profession is far from a consensus studies from the labor economics literature 1 17 suggest idiosyncratic risk may be large and persistent whereas a recent paper by heaton and lucas 16 finds idiosyncratic risk to be small and largely transitory similarly the vast literature surrounding the equity premium puzzle highlights the profession s lack of consensus over the degree of risk aversion exhibited by typical agents in this paper i circumvent some of these controversial issues by extending barsky mankiw and zeldes model to include an explicit labor supply decision the introduction of a labor supply decision allows me to bring evidence from the literature on optimal income taxation 22 25 and the literature on the welfare cost of taxation 3 4 7 to bear on these issues the idea is simple under the conditions that make the tax insurance effect large i e very risky income distributions and a high degree of risk aversion agents will place great value on tax induced

taxes and international risk sharing abstract we extend a standard model of international risk sharing to include an empirically plausible distortion taxes the tax inclusive theory implies even under full risk sharing a predictable relationship between consumption growth and the consumption and capital income tax rates both within and across countries we find strong empirical evidence in favor of this relationship while idiosyncratic output fluctuations account for substantially more of cross country consumption growth variability than do taxes trends in tax differentials are found to be informative about the dynamic evolution of international risk sharing in particular adjusting for capital taxes reveals a marked improvement in risk sharing over the last three decades that is absent in baseline measures this improvement has been driven by the convergence of average tax rates on capital income across oecd countries toward the united states average capital tax rate

presidential campaign expenditures evidence on allocations and effects this paper analyzes the impact of presidential campaign spending on election results analyses of expenditures and voting are often plagued by simultaneity between campaign spending and expected vote share however game theoretic models of resource allocation decisions made by a central actor i e a presidential campaign suggest that candidates will spend more in close races and in races likely to be pivotal we provide empirical support for this theory using federal communications commission data from the 1972 presidential election we find that expenditures were higher in states where the election was expected to be closer and in states likely to be pivotal we use these two factors as instruments in a two stage least squares model to estimate the effect of spending on votes we find that contrary to previous theory and research presidential campaign spending significantly increases a candidate s vote share

labour market institutions and household consumption insurance within oecd countries this paper tests empirically whether the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks on aggregate consumption depends on institutional features of national labour markets the results show that in a sample of 15 oecd countries institutional heterogeneity is a significant determinant of the response of household consumption to country specific income shocks this is consistent with the idea that institutionally provided social insurance may help increase income stability when people differ in their ability to access financial markets and smooth consumption fluctuations

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

risk sharing between and within families this paper uses the panel study of income dynamics to test whether risk sharing is complete between or within american families the tests accommodate a wide variety in the configuration and availability of family data the test results reject inter as well as intra family full risk sharing even assuming that leisure is endogenous or that leisure and consumption are nonseparable

the determinants of campaign spending the role of the government jackpot a slave has but one master the ambitious man has as many masters as there are persons whose aid may contribute to the advancement of his fortune jean de labruyere des ouvrages de l esprit i introduction this paper builds a model of elections in which contributors give money to candidates in return for promises of government favors each candidate spends to increase his chances of victory the candidate s probability of winning and the value of government resources that would be his to distribute if he won the jackpot determine the amount he can raise the model suggests a way to measure the influence of the jackpot on spending while controlling for other effects such as the probability of winning the search for this result is interesting because we wish to know what influences the resources devoted to courting politicians is the growth of government truly to blame why if government is for sale do contributors give so little relative to the size of government to control so much and why as abrams and settle 1978 found does campaign spending sometimes not grow even though government grows do official limits on public debt reduce the politician s discretionary control over government resources and hinder his ability to sell favors how does ideology interfere with the candidate s demand for contributions empirical models of contributions that can serve as a guide have been of two sorts abrams 1981 following the work of crain and tollison 1977 crain deaton and tollison 1977 and gifford and santoni 1978 regressed campaign spending on several proxies for the jackpot and found a positive effect a more popular approach to explaining campaign outlays pioneered by jacobson 1978 has been to regress spending or contributions on the candidate s probability of victory and to ignore the role of the jackpot the implicit assumption in such models is that the candidate s net worth to contributors determines spending the candidate cares only about winning and raises as much as he can the greater his chances of winning the more he can raise and the more he will spend i call this the supply side view because spending depends only on the supply of contributions this approach goes some way to explaining contributions but neglects the role of the jackpot and cannot explain why some strong candidates who are sought after by contributors accept little or nothing such as former senator william proxmire of wisconsin the present study takes something from both approaches but argues that candidates may not wish to spend all they can raise because contributions do not come free of charge as baron 1989 pointed out the candidate s demand albeit bounded by potential supply determines contributions candidates probably run for election to control government wealth and must ponder how much of the jackpot to auction for contributions the candidate s demand for contributions can be derived from a utility function that rises with his probability of victory but diminishes with the contributions he accepts how much a candidate demands depends on the size of the bernoulli variance of the outcome which i call closeness and the size of the jackpot the greater the closeness and the larger the jackpot the greater the candidate s demand a close race is defined here not by the number of rivals or the margin of victory but as one in which the outcome is very uncertain the typical candidate does not spend all he is able to raise but the effect of closeness fades if the candidate wishes to win greatly the model describes the simultaneous relationship between spending and closeness and imposes identifying restrictions i carry out tests on samples drawn from the 1978 and 1986 contests for u s state governorships and find that jackpots affect election spending but that closeness is less important in addition i find that in states where the legislature is constitutionally required to balance the budget governors sell less of the jackpot

incentives and aggregate shocks this paper presents an incentive based theory of the dynamics of the distribution of consumption in the presence of aggregate shocks the paper builds on the models concerning the distribution of income or consumption and incentive problems of green 1987 thomas and worrall 1991 phelan and townsend 1991 and atkeson and lucas 1992 by incorporating aggregate production shocks the model allows an examination of the interactions between individual and aggregate consumption series given incomplete insurance further the methodology outlined allows the incorporation of incentive considerations to macroeconomic environments similar to rogerson 1988 and hansen 1985

risk sharing with limited commitment and preference heterogeneity structural estimation and testing in order to analyze the role of limited commitment and preference heterogeneity in explaining the consumption allocation i propose a theoretical and empirical framework to estimate and evaluate a risk sharing model where insurance transfers have to be self enforcing and the coefficient of relative risk aversion may depend on observable household characteristics i compare this model to benchmark models with full commitment and or without preference heterogeneity using data from three indian villages i find that the limited commitment model with heterogeneous preferences outperforms the benchmark models in a statistical sense and in terms of i explaining the dynamic response of consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks ii accounting for the variation of consumption unexplained by household and time effects and iii capturing the variation of inequality across time and villages and predicting changes in inequality i also use the estimated models to predict the effects of a counterfactual tax and transfer policy on the consumption allocation the limited commitment model with preference heterogeneity predicts larger benefits to the poor than its homogeneous counterpart

moral hazard vs liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance this paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance ui benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from ui using this evidence i show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by ui benefits is due to a liquidity effect rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search moral hazard by combining two empirical strategies first i find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity constrained households second lump sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households i derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities the formula implies that the optimal ui benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage the exact identification approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives

redistribution and risk sharing in italy learning from the past abstractredistribution and risk sharing in italy learning from the past regional studies this paper investigates the role of public policies in italy by assessing both the redistribution and the risk sharing functions of interregional net fiscal flows in the long run its comparative approach allows one to contrast results obtained for two periods characterized by diverse regional policy and dynamics of regional convergence although based on a specific example the evidence supports more general conclusions when assessing the regional redistributive and risk sharing power of national fiscal policies many different factors related to the existing policy regime should be accounted for particularly the distribution of government spending between current expenditure and public investment

village and larger economies the theory and measurement of the townsend thai project i have spent close to 20 years cataloging transactions between households in thai villages along with a research team just this past summer we documented a number of ways in which even relatively poor villages have money markets not dissimilar in some ways from new york financial markets with borrowing and repayment passing along links in credit chains in another project we have been looking at month by month school attendance grade level completion and graduation for children in these villages following them from birth to graduation the townsend thai project is a theory based data collection endeavor measuring and mapping village and larger economies into general equilibrium frameworks this paper reviews a number of findings implications applications and lessons learned and considers next steps

market consumption and hidden consumption a test for substitutability in this paper an empirical analysis is performed on the relationship between private consumption and underground economy for the italian case it is found that private market consumption and underground or hidden consumption may be defined as complementary goods an increase in underground consumption tends to increase family market consumption and increase its marginal utility an implication of this result is that the nonmarket sector does not offer hedging opportunities to the consumer worker as stressed by busato and chiarini s 2004 artificial economy moreover wealth effects associated with a change in underground consumption are negative a statistical model confirms this structural interpretation

financial integration and international risk sharing abstract conventional wisdom suggests that financial liberalization can help countries insure against idiosyncratic risk there is little evidence however that countries have increased risk sharing despite widespread financial liberalization we show that the key to understanding this puzzling observation is that conventional wisdom assumes frictionless international financial markets while actual markets are far from frictionless financial contracts are incomplete and contract enforceability is limited when countries remove official capital controls default risk is still present as an implicit barrier to capital flows if default risk were eliminated capital flows would be six times greater and international risk sharing would increase substantially

causal effects of health shocks on consumption and debt quasi experimental evidence from bus accident injuries abstract endogeneity between health and wealth presents a challenge for estimating causal effects of health shocks using a quasi experimental design comprising exogenous shocks sustained as bus accident injuries in india with controls drawn from travelers on the same bus routes one year later i present new evidence of causal effects on consumption and debt using primary household survey data i find that households faced with shock related expenditures are able to smooth consumption on food housing and festivals with small reductions in educational spending debt was the principal mitigating mechanism households used leading to significantly larger levels of indebtedness

campaign spending in congressional elections campaign spending in congressional elections i introduction empirical studies of the effects of campaign spending on the outcome of congressional elections have found that campaign spending by incumbents is not as effective as that of their challengers indeed kau and rubin 1982 and jacobson 1985 1987 find that incumbent spending reduces the number of votes they receive and netter 1983 that it increases the challenger s votes incumbents seeking reelection however are very successful winning nine times out of ten in the postwar era if their campaign spending is so inefficient why do incumbents continue to outspend their challengers in a majority of elections we argue that these researchers counterintuitive findings are the result of using models which do not adequately correct for the simultaneous determination of the election outcome and campaign contributions and which do not include an electoral check on incumbent behavior 1 in their studies jacobson and netter as well as lott 1986 and laband and lentz 1985 assume the incumbent s ability to repel challengers is independent of his or her behavior while in office few would agree that the electoral check is so ineffective we develop a simultaneous model to correct these deficiencies it captures the effects of campaign expenditures tenure the consistency of the incumbent s votes with his constituents preferences and the size of the voter turnout on the votes received by incumbents and challengers in four congressional elections between 1978 and 1984 the model is very robust over these four elections the use of primary election data insures model identification ii model and empirical measures we assume that the platforms of any two candidates for a political office can be measured along a single left right spectrum voters know their preferred position on the dimension but cannot observe the positions of the two candidates with certainty because of rational ignorance a theory accepted since downs 1957 following congleton 1986 we assume voters are risk averse and receive more utility from candidates with positions closer to the voters preferred position but lose utility as the candidate s position becomes more uncertain voters compare the candidates and vote for the one that provides them greater expected utility voters can observe the incumbent s performance and are thus less uncertain of his views and credibility uncertainty should decrease with an incumbent s tenure in office tenure provides voters with knowledge of the incumbent s position and the incumbent with political capital this accumulation of political capital may make it more difficult for challengers to mount a successful campaign in this sense tenure acts as a barrier to entry 2 if all incumbents were at the same point on the spectrum as the median voter of their districts all incumbents would win reelection if all potential challengers were aware of this fact they would not challenge since campaigns are costly but one observes many challengers and some defeated incumbents so we proceed from the hypothesis that challengers enter the race when they perceive a gap between the position of the incumbent and that of the median voter and assume this position as their platform a large difference between the incumbent s position and the median voter s position increases the likelihood of a successful challenge if voters were certain of the positions of both candidates and the challenger s assessment was correct the challenger would win but challengers are usually less well known than incumbents and this additional uncertainty gives incumbents an advantage thus the challenger must convince the voters that his or her position is closest to the median voter s position and advertising is the primary means to that end 3 repetition of the message reduces the voters uncertainty over a challenger s position

insurance and opportunities the welfare implications of rising wage dispersion this paper develops a series of heterogeneous agents economies in order to characterize analytically the welfare implications of changes in the uncertainty in individual labor productivity we perform two types of welfare calculations first we compute the welfare consequences of a rise in labor market risk given a particular asset market structure complete markets incomplete markets autarky second we compute the expected gain from completing markets starting from autarky or incomplete markets for a given level of wage dispersion we are able to derive intuitive closed form expressions for these welfare eects which depend only on preference parameters and the size of the change in wage dispersion a higher level of productivity dispersion has always two eects it tends to reduce welfare in presence of partial insurance but it also tends to improve production opportunities in presence of flexible labor supply we can separate analytically the insurance and the opportunity components we quantify the welfare consequences of the rise in wage inequality observed in the united states over the past three decades as roughly 3 of lifetime consumption moreover we calculate that completing the asset markets given the current level of inequality would lead to a welfare improvement equivalent to 35 of lifetime consumption

risk sharing within families evidence from the health and retirement study abstract we report strong empirical support for the presence of self interest based risk sharing within extended families in the u s a standard model of self interest based risk sharing predicts that the share of current family income consumed by a child positively depends on that child s permanent income it follows that parental transfers to children that are expected to earn more over the period of risk sharing arrangements should exhibit less sensitivity to the recipient s income fluctuations we test this distinguishing prediction of self interest based risk sharing by exploiting the variation of transfer receipts among siblings observed over 17 years of longitudinal data spanned by the health and retirement study

decreasing relative risk aversion risk sharing and the permanent income hypothesis this article develops a method for testing the risk sharing hypothesis rsh against various versions of the permanent income hypothesis pih while allowing for heterogeneity in risk preferences across households using 1 year and longer differences in household total nondurable consumption data from indian villages we find evidence that favors the rsh over the pih at the village level

constrained labor supply and risk aversion abstract this paper extends previous work by showing that consumption constraints typically increase individuals risk aversion even if the illiquid good e g leisure has good substitutes calibrations indicate time use constraints may raise risk aversion considerably under many common scenarios

communication commitment and growth abstract we study the effect on the growth of an economy of alternative financing opportunities in a stochastic growth model with incentive constraints efficient accumulation mechanisms are designed and computed for economies that differ in their incentive structure we show that when borrowing is subject to information constraints there is a computable efficient transfer mechanism that does not affect capital accumulation and investment patterns even though consumption patterns and the distribution of wealth are affected in contrast enforcement constraints can severely reduce the outside financing opportunities and affect investment patters and economic growth we adapt numerical algorithms for obtaining numerical solutions of these models

consumption risk sharing in italy this paper analyses the issue of consumption risk sharing in the 20 italian regions during the period 1983 94 the tests proposed allow for regional specific departures from the hypothesis of complete risk sharing and for the existence of non separabilities among groups of commodities empirical evidence suggests the rejection of the hypothesis of complete consumption risk sharing

full insurance in the presence of aggregate uncertainty this paper tests implications of full consumption insurance the object is to determine how much mileage can be obtained from a model with complete markets with such features as private information or liquidity constraints omitted the implication exploited is that individual consumption responds to aggregate risk but not to idiosyncratic risk the test involves regressing the change in household consumption onto the change in aggregate consumption and other right hand side variables such as the change in household income and change in employment status all variables other than the change in aggregate consumption are predicted to be insignificant in explaining the change in household consumption with observations on consumption and income for 10 695 households from the consumer expenditure survey the results are mixed the results for one specification exponential utility are mostly consistent with full consumption insurance the results for the other specification power utility are not

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

international risk sharing and commodity prices cole and obstfeld 1991 exposited a classic result where equilibrium movements in the terms of trade could make ex ante risk sharing arrangements unnecessary a unity elasticity of substitution across goods and production specialization this paper extends their model to n countries and m commodities n m here the terms of trade provides insurance against commodity specific shocks not country specific shocks using commodity level production data at the national level and world commodity prices we document significant terms of trade variability and positive responses of nation specific production to terms of trade improvements the endogenous terms of trade insurance mechanism highlighted in co is virtually non existent cole et obstfeld 1991 ont developpe un resultat classique montrant que les mouvements d equilibre dans les termes d echange pouvaient faire l economie d arrangements ex ante pour le partage du risque une elasticite de substitution unitaire entre biens et specialisations dans la production ce texte developpe leur modele pour n pays et m biens n m les termes d echange fournissent l assurance contre les chocs specifiques a certains biens mais non contre les chocs en provenance de certains pays utilisant des donnees de production au niveau des biens au plan national et des prix des biens au niveau mondial on observe une variabilite significative des termes d echange et des reponses positives de la production specifiquement nationale aux ameliorations dans les termes d echange le mecanisme endogene d assurance via les termes d echange mis en lumiere par co est virtuellement non existant

a simple test of consumption insurance are consumers effectively insured against idiosyncratic shocks to income or wealth either by formal institutions such as charities private insurance and government programs or by informal mechanisms such as gifts and loans from relatives friends and neighbors under full insurance consumption growth should be cross sectionally independent of idiosyncratic variables that are exogenous to consumers this proposition is tested by cross sectional regressions of consumption growth on a variety of exogenous variables full insurance is rejected for long illness and involuntary job loss but not for spells of unemployment loss of work due to strike and an involuntary move

on the empirics of risk sharing across mena countries in this article we compute the potential welfare gains and the realized gains from risk sharing among middle east and north african mena countries including the oil rich gulf region and the resource scarce economies we find that the overall potential welfare gains across mena countries are positive for all countries under the assumption of full risk sharing the potential welfare gains among the six gulf cooperation council gcc countries are positive even though the magnitudes are smaller compared to those of the rest of the mena region we also quantify the extent of risk sharing for the mena region and show that it is significant for the mena region and its subgroups however we could not find any sign of inter temporal smoothing across the same groups decomposing the aggregate output shocks shows that the extent of risk sharing is significant when only positive output shocks exist across the resource scarce mena economies however we observe that gcc countries share output risks with each oth

intertemporal choice and consumption mobility the theory of intertemporal consumption choice makes sharp predictions about the evolution of the entire distribution of household consumption not just about its conditional mean in the paper we study the empirical transition matrix of consumption using a panel drawn from the bank of italy survey of household income and wealth we estimate the parameters that minimize the distance between the empirical and the theoretical transition matrix of the consumption distribution the transition matrix generated by our estimates matches remarkably well the empirical matrix both in the aggregate and in samples stratified by education our estimates strongly reject the consumption insurance model and suggest that households smooth income shocks to a lesser extent than implied by the permanent income hypothesis jel d52 d91 i30

networks in economic development this chapter surveys the implications of some studies in network economics research for economic development we focus on information flow and risk sharing two topics where work in theory empirics and policy analysis have been especially intensive and complementary in analysing information we distinguish models of information diffusion and aggregation highlight how different models imply very different guidance regarding the right way to seed information in discussing risk sharing we look at the key frictions that impede efficient informal insurance and some potential unintended consequences when policymakers intervene to help throughout we stress practical insights that can be used with limited measurement of the details of networks

consumption and investment in resource pooling family networks this paper examines a novel motive for resource pooling in family networks in rural economies to relax credit constraints and facilitate investment in non collateralizeable assets for which credit market imperfections are most binding we thus complement established literatures examining risk sharing motives for resource transfers within family networks as well as motives based on kinship tax obligations we do so exploiting the progresa program data in which family networks can be identified households are subject to large exogenous resource inflows and detailed responses on consumption and an array of investments can be tracked in a household panel over five years we find that for every dollar that accrues to the family network through progresa transfers food consumption expenditures increase by around 65c for both households eligible for progresa and ineligible members of the same family network hence the marginal propensity of families to invest save out of every dollar is around 35 and we document how this is channelled towards easing credit constraints poorer network members face in financing non collateralizable investments into their children s human capital we show these consumption and investment benefits of being embedded within a family network are sustained five years after households first experience resource transfers from progresa hence the interplay between resource inflows and resource pooling by family networks can place network members on sustained paths out of poverty this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

contingent loan repayment in the philippines abstract using data from the philippines this article seeks to understand how households in the study area apparently manage to avoid falling into a debt trap in spite of frequent borrowing findings suggest that this is achieved via three institutional features first most informal debt carries no interest second for all debts repayment is postponed in case of a borrower s difficulty this is the only insurance feature of debt repayment third while debt principal is seldom forgiven or reduced interest bearing debt does not carry additional interest if debt repayment is delayed this prevents interest charges from accumulating and debt from snowballing

identifying vulnerability to poverty a critical survey in the economic literature on poverty various methods have been proposed for measuring a phenomenon known as vulnerability however after more than a quarter century of research no consensus has been reached on how to identify such vulnerable individuals within a given population some misunderstandings have also arisen from the overlapping of other closely related concepts such as the expectation of being poor expected poverty multi period poverty and risk exposure this paper offers a detailed conceptual discussion on vulnerability to poverty and its related elements reviewing a wide range of identifying criteria provided in the literature it is found that according to the state of the art in this field of research two key elements stand out in identifying vulnerable individuals an expected well being below the poverty line and a relevant risk of falling into poverty due to downside deviation from a reference level of well being the traditional classification of vulnerability approaches has been updated into four groups i those that stress the element of exposure to risk ii those that emphasize the element of expected poverty iii those that define vulnerability through a utility gap and iv those that are supported by a mean risk dominance criterion

the effect of income taxation on consumption and labor supply we estimate the incentive effects of income taxation in a life cycle model of consumption and labor supply without intratemporal strong separability we find that consumption and hours worked are direct complements in utility both increase with a compensated increase in the net wage the compensated net wage elasticity is about 0 3 nearly double estimates for u s men from a linear labor supply specification estimated intertemporal elasticities indicate significant intertemporal smoothing of utility the estimated marginal welfare cost of government revenue is 6 20 which is about half the estimated welfare cost when additivity between consumption and leisure is incorrectly imposed

a simple explanation for why campaign expenditures are increasing the government is getting bigger abstract this paper shows that most of the large recent increases in campaign spending for federal and state offices can be explained by higher government spending this result holds for both federal and state legislative campaigns and gubernatorial races and across many different specifications the irony is that those who seem most concerned about the level of campaign expenditures are also frequently the ones who most strongly support increasing the size of government evidence is also examined on whether it is the composition and not just the level of expenditures that determines campaign expenditures and whether higher government expenditures similarly results in more candidates competing for office finally by focusing on the symptoms and not the root causes of ever higher campaign expenditures this paper argues that the current public policy debate risks changing the form in which payments are made rather than actually restricting the level of competition

decreasing relative risk aversion and tests of risk sharing the relative risk aversion rra coefficient of a household whose consumption is close to the subsistence level may be very high for example if consumption is exactly at the subsistence level the household may not be willing to bear any risk if this is the case then the rra coefficient must be a decreasing function of wealth for poor households therefore we should allow the possibility of decreasing rra drra in testing the full risk sharing hypothesis however existing tests in the empirical literature are derived using preferences that exhibit either increasing or constant rra even when they are applied to data containing low income households we therefore use a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility which implies increasing constant and decreasing rra as special cases to test full risk sharing hypothesis using the international food policy research institute ifpri and the international crops research institute of the semi arid tropics icrisat household level data sets we find evidence in support of the drra hypothesis along with evidence favoring full risk sharing hypothesis at the village level and evidence against the hypothesis at the inter village level when rra is restricted to be constant we replicate the previous results in the literature reject the full risk sharing hypothesis at both levels our tests however reject this restriction and favor drra in almost all cases these results suggest that it is important to allow for drra in testing the full risk sharing hypothesis when data containing low income households are investigated this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

insuring consumption against illness one of the most sizable and least predictable shocks to economic opportunities in developing countries is major illness we investigate the extent to which families are able to insure consumption against major illness using a unique panel data set from indonesia that combines excellent measures of health status with consumption information we find that there are significant economic costs associated with major illness and that there is very imperfect insurance of consumption over illness episodes these estimates suggest that public disability insurance or subsidies for medical care may improve welfare by providing consumption insurance

do stockholders share risk more effectively than nonstockholders abstract this paper analyzes the extent of risk sharing among stockholders and nonstockholders to evaluate the empirical importance of market incompleteness it is essential to determine whether idiosyncratic shocks are important for the wealthy who have access to better insurance opportunities but also face different risks than the average household we study a model where each period households decide whether to participate in the stock market by paying a fixed cost due to this endogenous entry decision the testable implications of perfect risk sharing take the form of a sample selection model which we estimate using a semiparametric gmm estimator proposed by kyriazidou 2001 using data from psid we strongly reject perfect risk sharing among stockholders but perhaps surprisingly do not find evidence against it among nonstockholders this result appears to be robust to several extensions this finding suggests further focus on risk factors that primarily affect the wealthy such as entrepreneu

long term wage fluctuations with industry specific human capital exploiting long term interindustry demand shifts this article provides evidence that 1 industry level wages do not respond to industry demand conditions 2 at the industry level the employment of young workers responds more to demand shifts than does the employment of experienced workers and 3 the postdisplacement wages of displaced workers are strongly affected by demand in their predisplacement industries these findings are consistent with a model in which worker s investments in industry specific skills pose a barrier to interindustry labor mobility and wages do not respond to spot labor market conditions

the role of food stamps in consumption stabilization although the food stamp program is the largest universal entitlement program in the social safety net little is known about its stabilizing role in household income and consumption using data from the panel study of income dynamics spanning 1980 99 we estimate the volatility of income with and without food stamps coupled with a variance decomposition of consumption among families at high ex ante risk of food stamp participation food stamps reduced income volatility by about 12 percent and food consumption volatility by about 14 percent there was however a marked decline in consumption smoothing benefits of the program in the early 1990s relative to the 1980s

risk sharing and industrial specialization regional and international evidence the authors provide empirical evidence that risk sharing enhances specialization in production to the best of their knowledge this well established and important theoretical proposition has not been tested before the empirical procedure is summarized as follows first the authors construct a measure of specialization in production and calculate an index of specialization for each of the european community ec and non ec oecd countries u s states canadian provinces japanese prefectures latin american countries and regions of italy spain and the united kingdom then they estimate the degree of capital market integration a measure of risk sharing within each of these groups of regions the ec countries the non ec oecd countries the united states canada japan italy spain and the united kingdom and rely on another author s estimate for latin america finally they perform a regression of the specialization index on the degree of risk sharing controlling for relevant economic variables they find a positive and significant relation between the degree of specialization of individual members of a group of countries provinces states or prefectures and the amount of risk that is shared within the group the authors perform regressions using variables such as shareholder rights and the size of the financial sector relative to gdp as instruments for the amount of inter regional risk sharing these regressions confirm that risk sharing facilitated by a favorable legal environment and a developed financial system is a direct causal determinant of industrial specialization this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

contribution limits and transparency in a campaign finance experiment we experimentally compare electoral outcomes when donor contribution limits are varied the effect of contribution limits is studied under three levels of transparency one where donors preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public and one where they are observed by all we find that a combination of stricter contribution limits and full transparency is most successful at limiting donors influence on policy choice we also find that stricter contribution limits improve social welfare in some treatments we further find that the partial and no anonymity settings lead to centrist bias whereby implemented policies on average are more centrist than the candidate s preferences in most treatments

does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents the theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name the existing literature ignores the fact that the marginal return to current campaign expenditures depends on the candidate s stock of brand name this simple observation is then used to provide a possible explanation for the negative empirical relationship observed between an incumbent s campaign spending and how well he does

a median voter model of economic regulation a basic median voter model is developed and extended to analyze issues of economic regulation and public policy outcomes the model is used to generate comparative static results relating changes in public policy outcomes to changes in relative group sizes total population information costs and population heterogeneity the model is also used to explore the issue of optimal group size the size of the special interest group that maximizes the group s per capita public policy gains comparative static analysis reveals how optimal group size and gains per capita are affected by changes in population heterogeneity the size of the total population and relative knowledge levels

unemployment and the smoothness of consumption in business cycle models the permanent income hypothesis means that dynamic general equilibrium models fail to produce a hump shaped response for consumption even if they do so for other variables this article shows that the introduction of non separable preferences and unemployment can solve this problem

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district