efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

modeling inertia and variety seeking tendencies in brand choice behavior theories of exploratory behavior suggest that inertia and variety seeking tendencies may coexist within the individual implying that the same individual may exhibit inertia and variety seeking at different times depending on his her choice history past research has not allowed for such within consumer variability in these tendencies the purpose of this study is to present a choice model that allows us to identify such hybrid behavior i e a mixture of inertia and variety seeking and to distinguish hybrid behavior from simpler types of behavior such as pure inertia pure variety seeking and zero order behavior the model is estimated at the household level using panel data for three product classes covering a total of 1069 households the empirical analysis shows that more than half the households analyzed exhibited hybrid behavior rather than simpler types of behavior

a model of stochastic variety seeking in this paper we propose and test a stochastic model of consumer choice that incorporates attribute based variety seeking our stochastic variety seeking model svs has nested within it a fixed variety seeking model a zero order model of choice and a first order pure variety model we compare the svs model to alternative models under stochastic variety seeking we examine the nature of the variety sought and provide a test of the satiation hypothesis unlike fixed variety seeking models our model allows variety seeking to vary in intensity and consistency over individuals as well as over purchase occasions we show that the model is equivalent to a random utility model with the features that the attributes of brands relative to those of the brand previously bought influence choice and the extent of variety seeking is random over choice occasions for a given individual the model permits a closed form solution to the conditional switching probabilities parameterized by variety seeking parameters and dependent on brand attributes we apply our model to individual choice data obtained from a field study specifically designed for the purpose at hand

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

removing heterogeneity bias from logit model estimation this paper introduces a new estimation procedure for the logit model that is an extension of a conditional estimation procedure developed by chamberlain chamberlain g 1978 on the use of panel data working paper harvard university 1 52 chamberlain g 1980 analysis of covariance with qualitative data rev econom stud 47 225 238 the method eliminates heterogeneity bias which is present in the estimates produced by traditional estimation techniques it improves the goodness of fit and explanatory power of these models while incorporating purchase event feedback

variety seeking through brand switching a concept of variety seeking behavior is modeled as a stochastic brand choice model the model yields a measure of variety seeking for each individual consumer panel data for 28 products are analyzed for each household and the possibility of market segmentation by variety seeking behavior is explored

predicting utility under satiation and habit formation we introduce a modification of the discounted utility model that accounts for both satiation and habit formation in intertemporal choice preferences depend on the satiation level and the habitual consumption level these two state variables together with the shape of the value function drive the properties of the model one unique feature of our model is that it addresses the trade off between seeking variety and maintaining acquired habits we examine several properties of our model such as the nontrivial patterns of desirability willingness to pay for an additional unit of consumption or the effect of abstaining from consumption craving we explore the shape of optimal consumption patterns in discrete and continuous choice settings if subjects underestimate the changes in satiation and habituation levels as occurs under projection bias our model explains why people buy more when hungry or prefer variety in advance of consumption but stay with the same consumption good in actual use

technical note aggregating individual purchases to the household level household level panel data are the input for many types of marketing studies an interesting but until now unaddressed question is what is the effect of aggregating individual members purchases to the household level under standard assumptions the answer is unambiguous the household brand switching pattern looks more zero order than the typical individual family member s behavior when the standard assumptions are relaxed the overall spirit of the results do not change these conclusions give comfort to those who use brand switching data to partition product categories those looking for variety seeking behavior from household data are given some cause for concern as well as reasons for reinterpreting previous studies

reimbursing health plans and health providers efficiency in production versus selection the tradeoff between an insurer s or medical provider s incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply price analog to the demand price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee for service payments empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon the presence of contracting costs in a rothschild stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome

an investigation into the order of the brand choice process this paper investigates the order of the brand choice process at the individual family level using a variety of tests t likelihood ratio binomial runs and multinomial runs tests the test of stationarity developed permits separate analyses for stationary and nonstationary purchase sequences our analyses indicate that the purchase sequences of a majority of stationary consumers are consistent with the zero order assumption this result is observed for all the nine frequently bought packaged goods studied with the use of panel data and for a product category soft drinks using experimental data

modeling multiple sources of heterogeneity in multinomial logit models methodological and managerial issues we offer a framework to specify and estimate various sources of heterogeneity in multinomial logit brand choice models we let each brand specific intercept and each parameter of the explanatory variable vector vary randomly across households in addition we distinguish loyal households from the rest our results suggest that incorporating multiple sources of heterogeneity improves the model fit and suggests higher impact of marketing mix elements on brand choice we highlight the importance of incorporating multiple sources of heterogeneity the model we implement yields valuable managerial insights

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

bundled payments for healthcare services proposer selection and information sharing the centers for medicare and medicaid services cms has introduced a bundled payments for care improvement bpci initiative each bundle pertains to a specific medical condition a set of linked services and a length of time referred to as an episode of care proposers choose bundles design service chains and propose target values of quality metrics and payments per episode expert panels evaluate proposals based on cms announced relative weights but there is no limit on the number of proposers that may be selected moreover there is no minimum score that will guarantee selection which makes selection uncertain for proposers we develop normative models for the parameter selection problems faced by potential proposers within the cms proposal selection process proposers have private information about their costs of achieving different quality targets which determine their equilibrium responses we show that an optimal strategy for cms under its current approach may be to either announce a fi

an introduction to applicable game theory this paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists i try to give simple definitions and intuitive examples of the basic kinds of games and their solution concepts there are four kinds of games static or dynamic and complete or incomplete information complete information means there is no private information the corresponding solution concepts are nash equilibrium in static games of complete information backwards induction or subgame perfect nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information bayesian nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete information and perfect bayesian or sequential equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information the main theme of the paper is that these solution concepts are closely linked as we consider progressively richer games we progressively strengthen the solution concept to rule out implausible equilibria in the richer games that would survive if we applied solution concepts available for simpler games in each case the stronger solution concept differs from the weaker concept only for the richer games not for the simpler games

inferring the order of the choice process using consumer purchase histories the small sample properties of the multinomial runs mr test which is often used to test for effects of previous brand choices on current brand choice probabilities are explored in this article through a monte carlo study of different buyer level brand choice probability models the power and the actual size of this test under a null hypothesis of no previous brand choice effects are shown to depend on the nature of the true underlying model length of purchase history and skewness in baseline choice probabilities we provide some guidelines for when the mr test is more useful in empirical research

formal choice models in marketing the paper gives an overview and evaluates the theoretical traditions underlying choice models that are used in marketing in particular the emphasis of this essay is on the underlying assumptions limitations and empirical demands of these choice models four fundamental choice models are used as a basis to analyze this complex field the neoclassical economic theory as extended by lancaster the risk preference theory of choices under uncertainty the strict utility theory and the random utility theory these four choice models and their extensions are compared and contrasted along the three critical steps in the model building process theory generation parameterization and estimation

reference effects of price and promotion on brand choice behavior when consumers are exposed to pricing and promotional activity by frequently purchased packaged goods they may develop expectations that are used as points of reference in evaluating future activi

effects of price promotions on variety seeking and reinforcement behavior a stochastic model is proposed to examine how changes in frequency of price discounts affect brand choice decisions of consumers who exhibit variety seeking and reinforcement behavior it is shown that the effect on choice depends on whether the brand offering discounts is a major or minor brand in the product category this model extends the existing literature on stochastic models of variety seeking behavior by explicitly incorporating switching due to promotions along with intrinsic switching due to variety seeking the model yields testable hypotheses which are supported in a laboratory experiment and on analyses of the iri cracker data

reforming payments to healthcare providers the key to slowing healthcare cost growth while improving quality the seemingly intractable debate about how to slow the growth of healthhe seemingly intractable debate about how to slow the growth of healthcare costs in the united states and elsewhere has traditionally boiled care costs in the united states and elsewhere has traditionally boiled down to efforts to limit prices and quantities directly in public healthdown to efforts to limit prices and quantities directly in public healthcare programs the focus in the united states is often on tighter price regulation care programs the focus in the united states is often on tighter price regulation for example the balanced budget act of 1997 achieved most of its savings by for example the balanced budget act of 1997 achieved most of its savings by reducing the growth of regulated prices in medicare for physicians hospitals reducing the growth of regulated prices in medicare for physicians hospitals and most other healthcare providers the affordable care act of 2010 also and most other healthcare providers the affordable care act of 2010 also achieved most of its scored budgetary savings which were used as a partial achieved most of its scored budgetary savings which were used as a partial offset for the costs of coverage expansions through reducing medicare price offset for the costs of coverage expansions through reducing medicare price growth elmendorf 2010 a

split awards procurement and innovation in many procurement settings it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers in this article we develop a model of split award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous we characterize the set of equilibrium bids and allocations for optimizing agents in an environment in which suppliers are fully informed about each other s costs split award equilibria simultaneously exhibit strong collusive features and cost efficiency properties despite the former property of the equilibria upstream investment considerations may lead a buyer to prefer a split award auction format to a winner take all auction format

price competition in markets with consumer variety seeking we investigate price competition between firms in markets characterized by consumer variety seeking while previous research has addressed the effect of consumer inertia on prices there exists no research on the effects of variety seeking on price competition our study fills this gap in the literature using a two period duopoly framework as in klemperer s analysis of inertial markets we show that the noncooperative pricing equilibrium in a market with consumer variety seeking may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical market without variety seeking specifically our variety seeking model implies tacit collusion between firms in both periods unlike the inertia model of klemperer that implies tacit collusion between firms only in the second period but implies fierce price competition in the first period when consumers are assumed to have rational expectations about future prices the implied first period prices increase further which is consistent with what klemperer finds in an inertial market to summarize while our variety seeking analyses support two key results pertaining to second period prices and rational expectations previously derived for inertial markets by klemperer they depart from one key result pertaining to first period prices

a probit model of choice dynamics there are many products which are repeatedly purchased by consumers in such cases it is likely that choice history that is the sequence of choices made in the past as well as marketing variables affect subsequent choice decisions attempts to model the effects of choice history have been generally based on the inclusion of variables that represent brand loyalty and or variety seeking behavior in this paper we present a model of dynamic choice behavior which is more general and incorporates four characteristics the first characteristic labeled preference reinforcement and preference reduction represents loyalty and variety seeking the second is the short term reluctance of a consumer to move from the current brand inertia or the willingness to move to another brand mobility the third characteristic captures the effect of repetitive consumption the long term effect on inertia and mobility the fourth characteristic incorporates the similarity or dissimilarity of choice alternatives this is important in a dynamic model because choice on the current purchase occasion can be affected by whether a similar or dissimilar alternative was chosen on the previous occasion similarities of alternatives are represented in terms of distances the effect of price on choice behavior is also modeled individual level purchase data from a consumer panel are used to estimate a covariance probit and an independent probit specification of the model from a substantive perspective the model gives interesting insights into the dynamics of choice behavior the model predicts switches better than a benchmark model which incorporates only loyalty in addition it is superior to three benchmark models in overall predictive ability

a general choice model for bundles with multiple category products application to market segmentation and optimal pricing for bundles abstract the attribute based approach to study customer choices cannot deal with bundles of heterogeneous components which are usually drawn from different product categories the authors develop the comparability based balance model which is a unified framework for modeling bundle choices the model can be employed for any bundle regardless of the heterogeneity of bundle components under a pure bundling strategy the conjoint model and balance model are special cases of the general model the authors use mixture distributions in a hierarchical bayesian framework to incorporate consumer heterogeneity in a more flexible manner than the extant approaches such as latent class and random coefficient models the empirical tests of the model show that most attribute effects are significant and consistent with the model s predictions the model is superior to those that do not consider the issues of comparability of attributes latent class structure and heterogeneity among respondents the authors show how

bidding for contests the procurement of product development and production services brings special strategic considerations to the buyer seller relationship in industrial and institutional markets multiple sourcing in particular dual sourcing is a likely way of dealing with the increased risks faced by buyers however there is lack of dual sourcing models that analyze the selection and control process in an integrated fashion this omission had led to apparently contradictory findings in agency and auction theory the paper models the strategic issues for a cost containment contest between two suppliers the suppliers are drawn from several vendors who participate in a bidding competition the supplier with the lower final cost in the contest wins a larger share of the pooled profit fee propositions are derived for the optimal cost plus contest and comparisons are made with the common incentive contract for the integrated selection and control model the larger the winner s share the greater the effort the buyer can make a credible commitment to the optimal winner s share as the winner s share rises however the bid prices increase due to increased contract risk this incentive risk tradeoff determines a the optimal winner s share that minimizes expected procurement price b the corresponding profit fee bid by suppliers c the ensuing cost control effort and d the final price for the procurement comparisons with the common incentive contract tell us when the cost plus contest induces more effort and when bidding for a contest results in a lower final procurement price

a model of balanced choice behavior in some product categories consumers appear to alternate among items in a consistent and purposeful though not entirely deterministic fashion such alternation occurs even in the absence of any apparent external influences on choice to explain such balanced choice behavior we present a model based upon the premise that past consumption influences the utility of items on subsequent choice occasions individuals may seek variety on certain product attributes and exhibit loyalty toward others the model specification yields a logit choice model which may be calibrated using consumption diary panel data at the individual or cross sectional level

capturing consumption flexibility in assortment choice from scanner panel data this study develops and estimates a model to empirically identify two behavioral effects namely consumption flexibility and state dependence that may underlie temporal and horizontal assortment choice using scanner panel data where consumption information is unavailable the proposed approach permits a consumer s consumption utility to be dependent on previous consumptions thus capturing state dependence both across purchase occasions and within horizontal assortments moreover consumers purchase and consumption decisions are modeled at two distinctive and sequentially related stages which allows for incorporating the effect of consumption flexibility the model is estimated on scanner panel data of yogurt purchase it is found that the two captured effects provide strong empirical support with face validity for the temporal and horizontal assortment choice patterns observed in the data the behavioral insights derived from estimating the proposed model can also be translated into significant managerial implications

unintended impacts of public investments on private decisions the depletion of forested wetlands by affecting relative economic returns infrastructure investments can induce major changes in private land use the authors find that 30 percent of forested wetland depletion in the mississippi valley has resulted from private decisions induced by federal flood control projects despite explicit federal policy to preserve wetlands the model aggregates individual land use decisions using a parametric distribution of unobserved land quality dynamic simulations are used to quantify the impacts on wetlands of federal projects and other factors copyright 1990 by american economic association