equilibrium behavior in crisis bargaining games this paper analyzes a general model of two player bargaining in the shadow of war where one player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war i derive conclusions about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints where these constraints hold regardless of the game form hence the qualitative results are game free i show that the higher the informed player s payoff from war the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling the dispute short of war and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war the latter result rationalizes the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war i then provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the probability of war

the stochastic convergence of co2 emissions a long memory approach in response to equity concerns surrounding the spatial distribution of co2 emissions and assumptions of co2 convergence within some climate models this paper examines the convergence of co2 emissions within the oecd over the period 1870 2004 more specifically using the local whittle estimator and its variants we examine whether relative per capita co2 emissions are fractionally integrated that is they are long memory processes which although highly persistant may revert to the mean trend in the long run our results suggest that co2 emissions within 13 out of 18 oecd countries are indeed fractionally integrated implying that they converge over time albeit slowly interestingly though the countries whose emissions are not found to be fractionally integrated are some of the highest polluters within the oecd at least in per capita terms our results have implications both for future studies of co2 convergence and for climate policy

bargaining on behalf of a constituency abstract we study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people who elect a representative to bargain with another party on their behalf a two phase bargaining model is developed in which a principal agent problem between the constituency and its representative is embedded with a natural refinement of sequential equilibrium we characterize the set of equilibria and examine its efficiency properties we show that agency problems in the delegation relationship rather than asymmetric information between the two bargainers can cause severe bargaining inefficiency i e delay in reaching agreements extensions of the model and applications to union firm bargaining are then discussed briefly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d82 j52

evidence on changes in aid allocation criteria have donors changed their aid allocation criteria over the past three decades toward greater selectivity a frequently stated goal of the international development community using data on how 22 donors allocated their bilateral aid among 147 countries over 1970 2004 the article finds that after the fall of the berlin wall in 1989 and especially in the late 1990s bilateral aid responded more to poverty and the quality of the policy and institutional environment in the recipient countries furthermore the sensitivity of aid allocation to the country s size and its debt burden has declined over time these results are robust to different samples and model specifications various econometric techniques and alternative measures of institutional quality while the specific factors causing these changes cannot be identified these presumably include geopolitical and economic concerns and the many changes in the international aid architecture donors still differ greatly in their selectivity this suggests that further multifaceted reforms are needed to ensure even greater selectivity of aid

a simple model of voice we think of voice as a means of information aggregation within groups operating in a variety of settings we explore how the characteristics of groups and their leaders influence voice in relatively homogeneous groups members farthest away from the leader have the best incentives to provide information and their voice tends to moderate policy decisions in large heterogeneous groups where leaders cannot identify individual members the possibilities for informational exchange are severely limited and any communication that exists pushes policies farther to the extreme

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

extremism campaigning and ambiguity this paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform we find that the farther away parties are from each other on average the less resources are spent on campaigning on average thus if parties are extreme less information is supplied than if parties are moderate we also show that if a public subsidy is introduced we have policy convergence given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy

the role of party reputation in the formation of policy abstract this paper shows that a party can credibly establish a platform more moderate than the ideology of its members and thereby raise the probability that the party s nominee wins the election a lame duck incumbent optimally implements his party s platform in order to maintain his party s reputation for having a moderate platform this increases the likelihood that his party retains power when candidates credibly locate themselves in policy space via this mechanism we show that if candidates are sufficiently impatient then their policies are bounded away from one another the policy convergence result is not robust

rethinking inequality decomposition with evidence from rural china we examine inequality decompositions by income source and describe a general regression based approach for decomposing inequality the approach provides an efficient and flexible way to quantify the roles of variables like education and age in a multivariate context we illustrate the method using survey data from china the empirical results demonstrate how sharply different conclusions can emerge for different decomposition rules we explain how these differences reflect the treatment of equally distributed sources of income and we discuss implications for how results from inequality decomposition are interpreted a renewed interest in economic growth political economy and the distribution of income has again placed the economics of income inequality firmly on the academic research agenda relatively poor performances in latin america have been contrasted with success stories in east asia and recent evidence on the changing income distributions of emerging economic giants like china has

assessing global co2 emission inequality from consumption perspective an index decomposition analysis abstract co2 emission inequality among countries is a key issue in international climate negotiations in view of the growing popularity of the consumption based emission accounting system in climate policy studies analyzing the emission inequality from the consumption perspective can help policymakers design emission abatement scenarios that are fairer to all parties using a new approach based on the theil index and the index decomposition analysis ida technique this paper examines global per capita consumption based emission inequality in 1995 2009 the sources and determinants of both the status and evolution of the emission inequality are quantified the empirical results show that the global emission inequality was sourced mainly from the emerging economies particularly china and india the global inequality decreased at an accelerating rate during the period studied the narrowing disparity among countries in per capita consumption level drove while the expanding disparity in consumption based emission intensity largely hindered the inequality reduction comparing the consumption based emission inequality with that under the production based principle reveals that the latter partly masked the inequality in the distribution of global co2 emissions through production outsourcing more detailed results and discussions are presented

future inequality in co2 emissions and the impact of abatement proposals this paper analyzes future carbon emissions inequality using a group decomposition of the gini index business as usual projections to the year 2100 for 135 countries show inequality in per capita emissions declines slowly next the impact on emissions levels and inequality of the kyoto protocol and other abatement proposals for annex ii countries in 2010 are measured with a focus on the gap narrowing and reranking effects substantial reranking of per capita emissions between annex ii and non annex ii countries will not occur unless the former reduce their emissions by at least 50 versus 1990 levels and the latter continue growing unabated

political reputations and campaign promises we analyze conditions under which candidates reputations may affect voters beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election we develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological we analyze an equilibrium in which voters strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates we characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and find that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate s reputation jel d8

distributional aspects of emissions in climate change integrated assessment models the recent failure of copenhagen negotiations shows that concrete actions are needed to create the conditions for a consensus over global emission reduction policies a wide coalition of countries in international climate change agreements could be facilitated by the perceived fairness of rich and poor countries of the abatement sharing at international level in this paper i use two popular climate change integrated assessment models to investigate the path and decompose components and sources of future inequality in the emissions distribution results prove to be consistent with previous empirical studies and robust to model comparison and show that gaps in gdp across world regions will still play a crucial role in explaining different countries contributions to global warming

the rationally uninformed electorate some experimental evidence this essay reports on a series of twenty four election experiments in which voters are allowed to decide between voting retrospectively and purchasing contemporaneous information about the candidate challenging the incumbent each experiment consists of a series of election periods in which dummy candidates choose spatial positions which represent either their policy while in office or a promise about policy if elected subjects voters are told the value to them of the incumbent s policy but they must decide prior to voting whether or not to purchase information about the value of the challenger s promise in general our data conform to reasonable expectations voters purchase less information and rely more on retrospective knowledge when the candidates strategies are stable and their likelihood of purchasing information during periods of instability is tempered by the likelihood that their votes matter by the reliability of the information available for purchase and by the degree of instability as measured by changes in each voter s welfare

international inequalities in per capita co2 emissions a decomposition methodology by kaya factors in this paper we provide a methodology for decomposing international inequalities in per capita co2 emissions into kaya multiplicative factors and two interaction terms we use the theil index of inequality and show that this decomposition methodology can be extended for analyzing between and within group inequality components we can thus analyze the factors behind inequalities in per capita co2 emissions across countries between groups of countries and within groups of countries the empirical illustration for international data suggests some points firstly international inequality in per capita co2 emissions is mainly attributable to inequalities in per capita income levels which helps to explain its recent reduction while differences in carbon intensity of energy and energy intensity have made a less significant contribution this result is strongly influenced by the performance of china and india secondly the between group inequality component which is the biggest component is also largely explained by the income factor thirdly the within group inequality component increased slightly during the period something mainly due to the change in the income factor and the interaction terms in a few regions

energy consumption in service industries challenging the myth of non materiality abstract this paper addresses the issue of energy consumption in service industries official energy statistics show that the amount of energy consumed in service industries is quite small and this is explained in the theoretical literature by the presumed intangibility of services our hypothesis however is that the energy consumed by services has been underestimated after identifying and analyzing the full range of sources of energy consumption in service industries we show that official energy statistics account for only a part of this consumption our work is based on a thorough rereading of the economics literature on services especially concerning the definition of services and the specificities of the service provision process done in light of our knowledge about energy consumption eventually using the 2007 french national transportation and travel survey we estimate one of the overlooked sources of energy consumption the one pertaining to mobility

club convergence in carbon dioxide emissions we examine convergence in carbon dioxide emissions among 128 countries for the period 1960 2003 by means of a new methodology introduced by phillips and sul econometrica 75 6 1771 1855 2007a contrary to previous studies our approach allows us to examine for evidence of club convergence i e identify groups of countries that converge to different equilibria our results suggest convergence in per capita co2 emissions among all the countries under scrutiny in the early years of our sample however there seem to be two separate convergence clubs in the recent era that converge to different steady states interestingly we also find evidence of transitioning between the two convergence clubs suggesting either a slow convergence between the two clubs or a tendency for some countries to move from one convergence club to the other

informative cheap talk in elections why do office motivated politicians sometimes espouse views that are non congruent with their electorate s can non congruent statements convey any information about what a politician will do if elected and if so why would voters elect a politician who makes such statements furthermore can electoral campaigns also directly affect an elected official s behaviour we develop a model of credible cheap talk costless and non binding communication in elections the foundation is an endogenous voter preference for a politician who is known to be non congruent over one whose congruence is sufficiently uncertain this preference arises because uncertainty about an elected official s policy preferences generates policymaking distortions due to reputation career concerns we show that cheap talk can alter the electorate s beliefs about a politician s policy preferences and thereby affect the elected official s behaviour informative cheap talk can increase or decrease voter welfare with a greater scope for welfare benefits when reputation concerns are more important

rational expectations in elections some experimental results based on a multidimensional model while our experimental results do not show convincingly the superiority of our model over alternative hypotheses these results do not reject the rational expectations approach to handling incomplete information in elections this is not to say of course that our model provides the most appropriate treatment of incomplete information since it relies primarily on one source of information polls certainly other data exist such as the historical record of the parties primary election outcomes and the coalitions observed at nominating conventions which voters might use for information on their choices what we hope our analysis has begun however is a more rigorous study of how citizens can interpret such data and the role played by the various media in supplying these data

determinants of co2 emissions in a small open economy abstract the aim of the paper is to explore the relationship between economic development and carbon dioxide co2 emissions for a small open and industrialized country austria we test whether an environmental kuznets curve relationship also holds for a single country rather than concentrating on panel or cross section data for a set of countries a cubic i e n shaped relationship between gdp and co2 emissions is found to fit the data most appropriately for the period 1960 1999 and a structural break is identified in the mid seventies due to the oil price shock furthermore two variables are additionally significant import shares reflecting the well known pollution haven hypothesis and the share of the tertiary service sector of total production gdp accounting for structural changes in the economy emission projections derived from this single country specification support the widely held opinion that significant policy changes are asked for when implementing the kyoto protocol in order to bring about a downturn in future carbon emissions

per capita carbon dioxide emissions convergence or divergence understanding and considering the distribution of per capita carbon dioxide co2 emissions is important in designing international climate change proposals and incentives for participation i evaluate historic international emissions distributions and forecast future distributions to assess whether per capita emissions have been converging or will converge i find evidence of convergence among 23 member countries of the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd whereas emissions appear to be diverging for an 88 country global sample over 1960 2000 forecasts based on a markov chain transition matrix provide little evidence of future emissions convergence and indicate that emissions may diverge in the near term i also review the shortcomings of environmental kuznets curve regressions and structural models in characterizing future emissions distributions

convergence in carbon dioxide emissions among industrialised countries revisited this paper examines the existence of stochastic and deterministic convergence of carbon dioxide co2 emissions in 23 countries over the period 1960 2002 for that purpose we conduct unit root testing by employing the recently developed panel stationarity test of carrion i silvestre et al carrion i silvestre j l del barrio castro t lopez bazo e 2005 breaking the panels an application to the gdp per capita econometrics journal 8 159 175 which assumes a highly flexible trend function by incorporating an unknown number of structural breaks we accommodate general forms of cross sectional dependence as well as control for finite sample bias through bootstrap methods overall our analysis provides strong evidence supporting both stochastic and deterministic convergence in co2 emissions thus confirming strazicich and list strazicich m c list j a 2003 are co2 emission levels converging among industrial countries environmental and resource economics 24 263 271 and westerlund and basher westerlund j basher s a 2007 testing for convergence in carbon dioxide emissions using a century of panel data environmental and resource economics forthcoming findings of convergence

an expanded approach to analyzing policy minded candidates a random pivot model is used to expand the theory of policy minded candidates previous results wittman 1977 1983 cox 1984 hansson and stuart 1984 are derived under weaker assumptions new results about candidate strategies in multiple elections are also obtained the thrust of these results supports calvert s 1985 finding that office seeking and policy mindedness are countervailing forces in election contests

the impact of polycentric development on regional gap of energy efficiency a chinese provincial perspective abstract a reasonable distribution of urban systems is essential for optimizing spatial energy allocation and the quality of economic growth for china this study discusses the impact of the polycentric development on the regional gap of energy efficiency rgee i e difference in energy efficiency levels among cities in the same region in the chinese provincial context by employing a novel method using nighttime lighting data from defense meteorological satellite program s operational linescan system dmsp ols to measure the spatial structure of provinces and stochastic frontier approach sfa to evaluate the total factor energy efficiency our results firstly show that the polycentric development has a narrowing effect on the rgee second they show that the more government intervention can narrow the rgee of a province but being more open having more foreign direct investment fdi and using more coal can widen the rgee of that province meanwhile the level of regional urbanization is shown to have no influence on rgee third they show that the polycentric development has a negative effect on the energy efficiency of large cities but a positive effect on that of small and medium size cities which accordingly narrows the rgee the conclusions of this study not only reveal insights for policies that aim to reduce the rgee but also provide an empirical basis for future urban development strategies in the chinese provincial context

the impact of income components on the distribution of family incomes attempts have recently been made to assign inequality contributions to various components of income this paper discusses the issues involved in such assignments and highlights the problems that follow from having a number of possible decomposition rules u s data on the distribution of family incomes are used to examine the relative influence of these income components and to evaluate empirically the performance of different decomposition rules a wide range of inequality contributions can be obtained even when restricted to only naturally derived decomposition rules some of the results are plainly absurd and serve to warn against the indiscriminate use of decomposition formulae without first investigating their properties

income inequality and carbon consumption evidence from environmental engel curves abstract i investigate the relationship between income inequality and the carbon dioxide co2 content of consumption i quantify the co2 content of household expenditure using input output analysis and estimate environmental engel curves eecs which describe the income emissions relationship using eecs for the united states between 1996 and 2009 i decompose the change in co2 over time and the distribution of emissions across households in both cases income is an important driver of household carbon finally i describe a potential equity pollution dilemma progressive income redistribution may raise the demand for aggregate greenhouse gas emissions i estimate that transfers raise emissions by 5 1 at the margin and by 2 3 under complete redistribution

convergence of per capita carbon dioxide emissions in the eu legend or reality abstract designing appropriate environmental and energy policies in order to meet the kyoto protocol s carbon dioxide co 2 reduction targets in the european union eu requires a detailed examination and thorough understanding of co 2 emission trends across the eu member states this paper investigates whether co 2 emissions have converged across 22 european countries over the 1971 to 2006 period the bayesian shrinkage estimation method is employed to do this work and the results reveal the following first the hypothesis of absolute convergence in per capita co 2 emissions is supported and a slight upward convergence is observed second the fact that countries differ considerably in both their speed of convergence and volatility in emissions makes it possible to identify different groups of countries third the results with respect to convergence do not vary much once the share of industry in gdp is accounted for in a conditional convergence analysis however a decreasing share of industry in gdp seems to contribute to a decline in per capita emissions these findings may carry important implications for both national and eu environmental policies

economic growth and environmental degradation the environmental kuznets curve and sustainable development abstract in this paper we critically examine the concept of the environmental kuznets curve ekc it proposes that there is an inverted u shape relation between environmental degradation and income per capita so that eventually growth reduces the environmental impact of economic activity the concept is dependent on a model of the economy in which there is no feedback from the quality of the environment to production possibilities and in which trade has a neutral effect on environmental degradation the actual violation of these assumptions gives rise to fundamental problems in estimating the parameters of an ekc the paper identifies other econometric problems with estimates of the ekc and reviews a number of empirical studies the inference from some such ekc estimates that further development will reduce environmental degradation is dependent on the assumption that world per capita income is normally distributed when in fact median income is far below mean income we carry out simulations combining ekc estimates from the literature with world bank forecasts for economic growth for individual countries aggregating over countries to derive the global impact within the horizon of the bank s forecast 2025 global emissions of so 2 continue to increase forest loss stabilizes before the end of the period but tropical deforestation continues at a constant rate throughout the period

knowledge is power a theory of information income and welfare spending no voters cast their votes based on perfect information but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others we develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters in us election survey data we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters as predicted by the model further in a panel of us states we fi nd that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information congress representatives vote more conservatively which is also in line with our theory

inequality of energy intensities across oecd countries a note abstract this paper proposes the use of theil s second measure to analyze international energy intensity differences this index allows differences to be broken down within and between groups of countries in a consistent manner an analysis of oecd countries for the period 1971 1999 shows some basic points first the fall in energy intensities differences is attributable both to within group and between group inequality components second between group inequalities are currently the main contributor to the whole inequality value finally a detailed exploration on within group inequalities reveals the significant explanatory role played by eu countries

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

inequality in co2 emissions across countries and its relationship with income inequality a distributive approach this paper analyses the inequality in co2 emissions across countries and groups of countries and the relationship of this inequality with income inequality across countries for the period 1971 1999 the research employs the tools that are usually applied in income distribution analysis the methodology used here gives qualitative and quantitative information on some of the features of the inequalities across countries that are considered most relevant for the design and discussion of policies aimed at mitigating climate change the paper studies the relationship between co2 emissions and gdp and shows that income inequality across countries has been followed by an important inequality in the distribution of emissions this inequality has diminished mildly although the inequality in emissions across countries ordered in the increasing value of income inequality between rich and poor countries has diminished less than the simple inequality in emissions lastly the paper shows that the inequality in co2 emissions is mostly explained by the inequality between groups with different per capita income level the importance of the inequality within groups of similar per capita income is much lower and has diminished during the period especially in the low middle income group

the hidden cost of raising voters expectations reference dependence and politicians credibility abstract two politicians compete to get elected each politician is characterized by a valence which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values high or low the representative voter prefers politicians with high valence but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low valence politician politicians make statements concerning their valence if the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer politicians statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place by introducing reference dependence and loss aversion we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise intuitively these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one s valence as overstatements may shift the electorate s preferences toward better skilled opponents

a comparison of prospective and retrospective voting with heterogeneous politicians a long standing empirical literature has been concerned with determining whether voters vote prospectively or retrospectively despite this interest little is known about the consequences of one voting regime versus another this study addresses this deficiency we find that voter welfare can be greatly affected by the candidate selection technique employed by voters among other findings we show that electing the best candidate does not always maximize voter welfare furthermore myopic voting is sometimes superior to farsighted voting these findings have implications for interpretations of empirical studies of voter behavior

elections with limited information a fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources a one dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested candidates do not know voter utility functions and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions a fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined using poll and endorsement data as information sources it is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters any equilibrium extracts all available information all participants voters and candidates alike act as if they were fully informed for fixed candidate strategies a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium and this process is shown to imply a bandwagon effect

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

sharing resources the global distribution of the ecological footprint abstract this paper examines how the human demand on bioproductive lands as measured by the ecological footprint is distributed across the globe using methods commonly used to measure the distribution of income measuring the distribution of natural resource use will be necessary to achieve an economy that is sustainable just and efficient currently different nations place different demands on the environment i e the ecological footprint is not evenly distributed across the globe calculation of the gini coefficient for total ecological footprint and its components explains the sources of inequality in overall resource use calculation of the atkinson index shows how inequality in the ecological footprint is related to the inequality of income and environmental intensity

manipulated news model electoral competition and mass media abstract this paper investigates the relationship between media manipulation the strategic suppression of relevant information by mass media and self mediatization the strategic exploitation of media coverage by candidates in elections in the model a voter cannot directly observe the policies proposed by two office motivated candidates the voter learns this information through media reports before voting takes place while the media outlet suppresses some of this information because the voter s decision making could be incorrect direct distortion the candidates have an incentive to win the election by influencing the media coverage through policy settings indirect distortion as a result policy convergence to the voter s ideal policy occurs if and only if the media bias is sufficiently small we then characterize the set of equilibria in terms of the degree of distortion the results suggest that if either strategic media manipulation or competition among the candidates is omitted then the distortion is nonnegligibly misspecified

a political theory of populism when voters fear that politicians may have a right wing bias or that they may be in uenced or corrupted by the rich elite signals of true left wing conviction are valuable as a consequence even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses populist policies i e policies to the left of the median voter as a way of signaling that he is not from the right truly right wing politicians respond by choosing more moderate or even left of center policies this populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in o ce is higher for the politician when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right wing politicians when politicians are indeed more likely to have a hidden right wing agenda when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive when politicians are more forward looking and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent we show that similar results apply when some politicians can be corrupted or in uenced through other non electoral means by the rich elite we also show that soft term limits may exacerbate rather than reduce the populist bias of policies

estimates of trends in global income and resource inequalities it is often argued that the inequality in the world is increasing we study the global income and resource inequality between 1960 and late 1990s income is measured in gdp capita in terms of both current market exchange rate and purchasing power parity ppp consumption of paper energy electricity food animal food as well as emissions of carbon dioxide is also studied changes in the absolute and relative gap between the top and bottom 20 consumers as well as the atkinson measure are used as inequality indicators some remarks are made on how to compare income across countries and how inequality should be measured we find that the inequality in terms of gdp capita measured in ppp terms is rather stable in relative terms but increasing in absolute terms we conclude that inequality as measured by the atkinson index is decreasing for all resources but that the gap in resource consumption in absolute terms is increasing for paper and electricity consumption

elections with privately informed parties and voters this paper studies a situation in which parties are betterinformed than voters about the optimal policies for voters weshow that voters are able to infer the parties information byobserving their electoral positions even if parties have policypreferences which differ substantially from the median voter s unlike previous work that reach opposite conclusions we assumethat voters have some private information of their own if theinformation available to voters is biased parties attempts toinfluence voters beliefs will result in less than fullconvergence even if parties know with certainty the optimalpolicy for the median voter

economic growth trade and energy implications for the environmental kuznets curve abstract the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis asserts that pollution follows an inverted u path with respect to economic growth the ekc has been explained in terms of structural changes in the composition of economic output and increased environmental regulation at higher income levels while some authors have incorporated the impact of trade policy orientation on the ekc the impact of the actual movement between countries of goods that embody pollution has not been considered this paper attempts to econometrically quantify the effect using pooled cross country and time series data the ekc hypothesis is examined with respect to commercial energy consumption the source of many serious environmental problems it was found that while both industrializing and industrialized countries have added to their energy requirements by exporting manufactured goods the growth has been substantially higher in the former at the same time industrialized countries have been able to reduce their energy requirements by importing manufactured goods exports of manufactured goods by industrialized countries has thus been an important factor in generating the upward sloping portion of the ekc and imports by industrialized countries have contributed to the downward slope

communicating on electoral platforms this paper proposes an analysis of strategic communication on platforms by candidates during an electoral campaign a candidate s platform in a possibly multidimensional policy space is fixed but is imperfectly known by voters a candidate strategically decides the emphasis he puts on the various issues and thus the precision of the information he conveys to voters on his position on each issue we show that if voters are fully rational then all the relevant information is revealed at equilibrium whatever the candidate s true position we then study a model of boundedly rational voters who take at face value the messages sent by the politicians without being able to decipher their strategies if voters are boundedly rational in this sense a politician will not transmit all the relevant information his communication strategy will depend on both the prior in the electorate and his true positions unknown to the electorate in particular we show that candidates address all issues with positive probability but tend to talk more often on issues on which they are a priori congruent with the representative voter thereby providing a nuanced version of petrocik s issue ownership theory

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

flip flopping ideological adjustment costs in the united states senate models of electoral competition in which candidates can change position at no cost predict the convergence of platforms in a two candidate election such convergence is at odds with empirical observation in this paper i undertake a study of candidate positioning in the united states senate and determine the extent to which electoral costs associated with changing position explain the ideological positions taken by senators using over 50 years of roll call voting data i use a simulated method of moments approach to estimate a dynamic model of candidate positioning for u s senators the ndings support a model in which senators face convex costs to changing position with the best tting model being one with linear costs of adjustment the model thus predicts severe punishments for ip opping senators those who make large changes in position as a result of the signi cant costs associated with adjusting position the empirical validity of the median voter theorem which depends upon candidates being able to change position at no cost is called into question

the political economy of the paris agreement income inequality and climate policy abstract we empirically assess how both between country inequality and within country inequality relate to climate policy ambition as defined by ndc pledges of the paris agreement cop21 we exploit the difference between high and low ambition targets submitted by parties to construct a climate policy ambition index we find that both inequalities shape countries pledges first low income countries tend to be more ambitious in setting their pledges when external support is received second within country inequality is associated with i lower mitigation ambition in low and middle low income countries and with ii higher mitigation ambition although non statistically significant for upperhigh and high income countries our results are discussed in terms of i climate policy being a superior good in rich countries and ii elites benefiting from emitting economic activities in poorer countries

co2 emissions and economic activity heterogeneity across countries and non stationary series this paper explores the relationship between co2 emissions and economic activity for 31 countries 28 oecd brazil china and india during the period 1950 to 2006 using cointegration analysis single country long run relationships are estimated and equality in the functional form the parameters and the turning point when appropriate are rejected this confirms the relevance of considering the differences among countries in the relationship between air pollution and economic activity to avoid wrong estimations and conclusions

international ecological footprint inequality a methodological review and some results scarcities of environmental services are no longer merely a remote hypothesis consequently analysis of their inequalities between nations becomes of paramount importance for the achievement of sustainability this paper aims on the one hand at revising methodological aspects of the inequality measurement of certain environmental data and on the other at extending the scarce empirical evidence relating to the international distribution of ecological footprint ef most of the techniques currently important in the literature are revised and then tested on ef data with interesting results we consider the underlying properties of different inequality indices those indices which fit best with environmental inequality measurements are cv 2 and ge 2 because of their neutrality property subgroup and source decompositions are also discussed from a methodological perspective empirically this paper contributes to the environmental inequality measurement of ef this inequality has been quite stable subgroup decomposition by using exogenous country groups world bank classification conclude that between group inequality explains almost the totality of international ef inequality source decomposition warns of the dangers of confining co 2 emissions reduction to crop based energies because of the implications for basic needs satisfaction

efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information an application of rational expectations models the study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one priced security returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature some agents insiders whose identity was unknown to other agents knew the state before the markets opened with replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational expectations model are relatively accurate prices adjusted immediately to near rational expectations prices profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from non insiders and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent

are co2 emission levels converging among industrial countries time paths of carbon dioxide emissions intwenty one industrial countries are examinedfrom 1960 1997 to test for stochastic andconditional convergence both panel unit roottests and cross section regressions areperformed overall we find significantevidence that co2 emissions haveconverged

candidate entry and political polarization an antimedian voter theorem we study a citizen candidate entry model with private information about ideal points we fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively extreme citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates whereas more moderate types never enter it generally leads to substantial political polarization even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates we show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office moreover when the number of citizens goes to infinity only the very most extreme citizens with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space become candidates finally our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates types that is revealed via parties

signaling character in electoral competition we study a one dimensional hotelling downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform this is unobservable to voters character is desirable and a voter s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate s character this structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters since a policy platform affects voters utilities not only directly but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate s character the model generates a number of predictions starting with a failure of the median voter theorem jel d72 d82

searching for a kuznets curve in environmental efficiency using kernel estimation abstract the paper constructs environmental efficiency indexes for a sample consisting of high and low income countries using nonparametric production frontier techniques and then establishes an environmental kuznets relationship for environmental efficiency by nadaraya watson kernel estimation methodology

aid policies and growth comment in an extraordinarily influential paper craig burnside and david dollar 2000 p 847 find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies this finding has enormous policy implications the burnside and dollar 2000 henceforth bd result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid if aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies this suggests that 1 aid can promote economic growth and 2 it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies international aid agencies public policy makers and the press quickly recognized the importance of the bd findings this paper reassesses the links between aid policy and growth using more data the bd data end in 1993 we reconstruct the bd database from original sources and thus 1 add additional countries and observations to the bd data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses and 2 extend the data through 1997 thus using the bd methodology we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies given our focus on retesting bd we do not summarize the vast pre bd literature on aid and growth we just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth and disagreements over econometric specification see gustav f papanek 1972 robert cassen 1986 paul mosley et al 1987 peter boone 1994 1996 and henrik hansen and finn tarp s 2000 review since bd found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results including paul collier and jan dehn 2001 carljohan dalgaard and hansen 2001 patrick guillaumont and lisa chauvet 2001 hansen and tarp 2001 robert lensink and howard white 2001 and collier and dollar 2002 these papers conduct useful variations and extensions some of which had already figured in the pre bd literature such as introducing additional control variables using nonlinear specifications etc some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables this literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample we differentiate our paper from these others by not deviating from the bd specification thus we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations but instead maintain the bd methodology this paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to bd thus we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997 easterly department of economics new york university 269 mercer street new york ny 10003 center for global development and national bureau of economic research e mail william easterly nyu edu levine department of finance carlson school of management university of minnesota 321 19th avenue south minneapolis mn 55455 and national bureau of economic research e mail rlevine csom umn edu roodman center for global development 1776 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 e mail droodman cgdev org we are grateful to craig burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper thanks also to francis ng and prarthna dayal for generous assistance with updating the sachs warner openness variable and to three anonymous referees craig burnside and henrik hansen for helpful comments 1 see for instance the world bank 1994 2001 2002 the u k department for international development 2000 president george w bush s speech march 16 2002 the announcement by the white house on creating the millennium challenge corporation white house 2002 as well as a washington post editorial february 9 2002 a financial times column by alan beattie march 11 2002 and the economist march 16 2002

polarization and inefficient policies of the economy in this case the costs of producing a public good the parties each propose a policy an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs two kinds of sequential equilibria exist revealing where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs and non revealing if parties preferences are polarized only non revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion if they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion thus less political polarization improves information revelation in electoral democracies policy motivated parties are likely to be better informed about the functioning of the economy than are voters this paper presents a model where two parties but not voters are informed about the cost of producing a public good we study whether an electoral democracy leads to efficient production of the public good given this asymmetry of information in particular under which circumstances will the implemented policy the level of the public good reflect actual costs the main result is that the policy will reflect costs if and only if at least one of the parties has preferences which are sufficiently similar to the median voter s in this sense polarization leads to inefficiency the public good can be for instance infrastructure medicare or military services both a continuum of voters and the parties have preferences over the amount of the good that is provided by the government the preferences of the two parties are situated on each side of those of the median voter the costs of providing the good are not precisely known to the voters who only know the distribution of costs and that they will pay for these costs as taxpayers on the other hand the parties know the costs

why donors of foreign aid do not coordinate the role of competition for export markets and political support development assistance has been criticised for a lack of coordination between aid donors this paper argues that competition for export markets and political support prevents donor countries from coordinating their aid activities between one another to test these hypotheses we perform logit and fractional logit estimations for a large sample of recipient countries and aid activities since the early 1970s our empirical results reveal that export competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination although less conclusive we also find some evidence that donors competition over political support prevents them from coordinating aid activities more closely

pooled mean group estimation of an environmental kuznets curve for co2 abstract we apply the pooled mean group estimator to test for the existence of an environmental kuznets curve for co2 in 22 oecd countries this approach allows for more flexible assumptions in a panel data framework the period goes from 1975 to 1998

spatial models of political competition under plurality rule a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take this paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections

what causes inequality in material productivity between countries abstract material productivity mp is a sustainability indicator that measures usage efficiency for raw materials the use of natural resources has grown steeply since the industrial revolution and this growth has even accelerated in recent decades it has thus become critical to monitor the intensity of natural resource usage when producing intermediate or final goods discovering which socio economic variables influence the mp indicator and explain differences between economic units is nowadays a key issue on average mp has increased over the past two decades but at the same time so has disparity between countries this paper s contribution consists in discovering the explanatory variables for both these phenomena in order to achieve that aim a regression based inequality decomposition rbid methodology is used the original fields rbid model has been transformed into a logarithmic model which allows us to directly obtain the elasticity of mp to changes in its drivers the sample we use is broadly representative of the worldwide situation in the years 1990 2010 our main results are that in terms of explaining inequalities and changes in mp the agricultural share of gdp is the most relevant explanatory variable and that this is followed by affluence the explanatory powers of population density and trade openness are perhaps surprisingly of much lower importance the results are useful not only in academic terms but also for policy guidance

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

income inequality and pollution a reassessment of the environmental kuznets curve abstract improvements in some measures of air and water quality can accompany rising per capita income as illustrated by the so called environmental kuznets curve for pollution variables which show such a relationship we hypothesize that a more equitable distribution of power contributes to these outcomes by enhancing the influence on policy of those who bear the costs of pollution relative to the influence of those who benefit from pollution generating activities an empirical analysis of international variations in seven indicators of air and water quality supports this hypothesis literacy political rights and civil liberties are found to have particularly strong effects on environmental quality in low income countries

is foreign aid concentrated increasingly on needy and deserving recipient countries an analysis of theil indices 1995 2015 abstract in the paris declaration on aid effectiveness of 2005 and related initiatives donor countries promised to render foreign aid more effective inter alia by increasingly concentrating aid on particularly needy recipient countries with relatively good governance in this study we re consider the question of whether bilateral and multilateral donors have adjusted their aid allocation accordingly we track the changes in different margins of theil indices of aid concentration between 1995 2004 and 2006 2015 we do so for the aggregate aid of the two groups of bilateral dac donors and multilateral donors as well as for nine major individual dac donors according to our findings the paris declaration did not change donors aid allocation systematically and consistently overall aid concentration has declined for the two donor groups as well as for the majority of individual dac donors in contrast to multilateral aid bilateral aid has become slightly more concentrated on poorer recipient countries still most donors have become less selective in granting aid to higher income countries furthermore the paris declaration did not help improve the merit based allocation of aid finally there is no compelling evidence suggesting that donors have become less self interested in using aid as a means to promote their own exports these results suggest that commitments to reward better governed recipients and not to misuse aid as an export promotion tool appear to be particularly hard to enforce overall the gap between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation persists

the causal factors of international inequality in hbox co _ 2 emissions per capita a regression based inequality decomposition analysis this paper uses the possibilities provided by the regression based inequality decomposition fields in res labor econ 22 1 38 2003 to explore the contribution of different explanatory factors to international inequality in hbox co 2 emissions per capita in contrast to previous emissions inequality decompositions which were based on identity relationships this methodology does not impose any a priori specific relationship thus it allows an assessment of the contribution to inequality of different relevant variables in short the paper appraises the relative contributions of affluence sectoral composition demographic factors and climate the analysis is applied to selected years of the period 1993 2007 the results show the important though decreasing share of the contribution of demographic factors as well as a significant contribution of affluence and sectoral composition

distribution dynamics of co2 emissions this paper uses nonparametric methods to examine the convergence in co2 emissions per capita on a sample of 100 countries for the period 1966 1996 industrial countries show a convergence pattern however there is little evidence of convergence for the whole sample

ecological footprint inequality across countries the role of environment intensity income and interaction effects recently white 2007 analysed the international inequalities in ecological footprints per capita ef hereafter based on a two factor decomposition of an index from the atkinson family atkinson 1970 specifically this paper evaluated the separate role of environment intensity ef gdp and average income as explanatory factors for these global inequalities however in addition to other comments on their appeal this decomposition suffers from the serious limitation of the omission of the role exerted by probable factorial correlation york et al 2005 this paper proposes by way of an alternative a decomposition of a conceptually similar index like theil s 1967 which in effect permits clear decomposition in terms of the role of both factors plus an inter factor correlation in line with duro and padilla 2006 this decomposition might in turn be extended to group inequality components shorrocks 1980 an analysis that cannot be conducted in the case of the atkinson indices the proposed methodology is implemented empirically with the aim of analysing the international inequalities in ef per capita for the 1980 2007 period and amongst other results we find that indeed the interactive component explains to a significant extent the apparent pattern of stability observed in overall international inequalities

selection vs accountability an experimental investigation of campaign promises in a moral hazard environment abstract we examine retrospective and prospective voting considerations in an experiment implementing a simple voting model in each period the official chooses how much rent to appropriate from a social endowment announcement of this choice is followed by an election between the official and a randomly selected challenger with the winner becoming the official in the next period we vary two features of the setting a the discount factor and b whether candidates can make costless non binding campaign promises about their behaviour if elected consistent with the model s predictions both raising the discount factor and introducing campaign promises lead to lower rent appropriation by officials and worse electoral outcomes other things equal for incumbents campaign promises despite being cheap talk have real effects promising less appropriation is rewarded by voters but breaking such promises is punished finally we find a weak positive association between campaign promises and officials subsequent behaviour

partisanship as information intuitively we associate different political parties with different types of policy in contrast this paper shows that in the absence of differential costs of membership among parties that is if party membership ischeap talk party labels cannot perfectly signal the ideologies of candidates however under certain conditions parties can signal candidate types imperfectly the paper therefore also provides an example of how costless communication can be effective in games of partial conflict

political rents and voter information in search equilibrium abstract political parties committed to grab rents may run for election and even win if citizens are uninformed but how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search we propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout we show that i the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies i i the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely u shaped in the information search cost i i i turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system

the environmental kuznets curve does one size fit all abstract this paper uses a new panel data set on state level sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from 1929 1994 to test the appropriateness of the one size fits all reduced form regression approach commonly used in the environmental kuznets curve literature empirical results provide initial evidence that an inverted u shape characterizes the relationship between per capita emissions and per capita incomes at the state level parameter estimates suggest however that previous studies which restrict cross sections to undergo identical experiences over time may be presenting statistically biased results

third parties in equilibrium under standard assumptions equilibria with three parties normally do not exist in spatial models of electoral competition in this paper i show that such equilibria are possible if it is assumed that voters are uncertain about the exact policies parties will adopt once elected substantive predictions can be derived from the model explaining some features of three party competition first the least risk party will always take the most moderate position second this position is also winning third the two riskier parties are always on opposite sides of the median voter and also of the moderate party

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero