empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric common value auctions this paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the outer continental shelf from 1954 to 1970 these are leases where bidders privately acquire at some cost noisy but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present we develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values we also use data on tract location and exposr values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition we find that bidders are aware of the winner s curse and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium

constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages a number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers while having to abide by the law of minimum wages firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what salary in such situations fair envy free allocations usually fail to exist to cope with this situation this paper proposes a new concept of fairness called constrained fairness among the set of constrainedly fair allocations the so called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular interest the reason for this is that the salaries are not only compatible with the minimum wages they are also optimal from the standpoint of cost minimizing firms and the assignment of jobs is efficient from the viewpoint of workers a convergent dynamic procedure that identifies constrainedly fair and minimal allocations is proposed furthermore strategic properties of the mechanism are derived and two notions of efficiency are evaluated

haggling over substitutes abstract using a model of substitutable goods i determine generic conditions on tastes which guarantee that fixed prices are not optimal the fully optimal tariff includes lotteries that is a profit maximising seller would employ a haggling strategy we show that the fully optimal selling strategy in a class of cases requires a seller to not allow themselves to focus on one good but to remain haggling over more than one good this throws new light on the selling strategies used in diverse industries these insights are used to provide a counter example to the no lotteries result of mcafee and mcmillan j econ theory 46 1988 335

on macro economic instability under a monetarist policy rule in a federal economy the feasibility of a monetarist policy rule has been the subject of a good deal of research all of which has implicitly assumed a unitary state in this paper the question is re examined for the case of a federal state with deficit financing non federal govemments the results of the paper indicate that the decision of non federal governments to deficit finance significantly lessens the feasibility of the monetarist policy rule and that this conclusion is true regardless of the degree to which economic agents perceive government debt as comprising a part of net wealth

comment on endogenous objectives and the evaluation of targeting rules for monetary policy 1 four mccallum principles itis bothanprivilege andapleasureformetoparticipateinthisconferenceinhonorofbennettt mccallum henceforthbtm thus beforeproceedingtomakespeci c comments regarding carl walsh s elegant paper on endogenous objectivesand targeting rules i would like to begin by providing some context in light ofbtm snumerouscontributionstotheanalysisofmonetarypolicy forthispurpose itishelpfultohighlightfourbasicprinciplesofeffectivemonetarypolicythatbtmhas consistently emphasized over the past several decades given the logicalcoherencyandintuitiveappealofhisworkonthissubject itisonlynaturaltorefertothesefourpointsasthe mccallumprinciples the rstmccallumprincipleisthatmonetarypolicymatters thatis theconductof monetary policy can have important consequences for social welfare btmanalyzedthetheoreticalandempiricalunderpinningsofthisprincipleinaseriesof

robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition in robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition t roughgarden i talgam cohen and q yan revisit the classic bulow klemperer result this result compares the revenues of two well know

double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint i consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant the objective is to select an assignment price pair that is envy free with respect to the agents true preferences i propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences i prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in nash and strong nash equilibrium the set of true envy free allocations

do exchange rates affect the capital labour ratio panel evidence from canadian manufacturing industries using industry level data for canadian manufacturing industries from 1981 to 1997 we find empirical evidence of a negative relationship between the capital labour ratio and the user cost of capital relative to the price of labour a 10 increase in the user cost of the machinery and equipment m e relative to the price of labour results in a 3 3 decrease in the m e labour ratio in the long run assuming complete exchange rate pass through into imported m e prices the maximum effect of a permanent 10 depreciation in the exchange rate is a 1 7 decline in the m e labour ratio this result implies that the cumulative growth of the m e labour ratio during the 1991 to 1997 period would have been 2 3 percentage points higher had the dollar not depreciated this may appear to be significant but considering both m e as a share of total capital and the capital share of nominal output are both approximately one third in terms of a simple growth accounting framework the effect on labour productivity is small

factor demands cost functions and technology measurements for regulated in this paper we provide some missing elements to the theory of the regulated firm and discuss implications for econometric specification particular attention is paid to situations where capital is quasi fixed under rate of return regulation which may lead to serious specification and interpretation errors if the current theoretical basis is not adjusted we also extend the analysis to arbitrary types of regulation and indicate precisely how the differential of factor demands can be specified and what regularity conditions it must satisfy the exact formula for the calculation of marginal products returns to scale and technological change are derived

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

macroeconomic implications of the government budget some basic considerations abstract we study the implications of changing the money bonds ratio in a highly stylized model with sidrauski type families and non synchronous staggered price setting we show that if the interest elasticity of the demand for money is less than unity an open market sale that permanently increases the bonds money ratio results in lower welfare no matter how strong is its impact on reducing the short run rate of inflation in addition we also show using simulation analysis the possibility that the short run output loss of such an experiment may be extremely large

approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values abstract this paper studies the revenue maximization problem in environments wherein buyers have interdependent values and correlated types we show that 1 when the system of feasible sets is a matroid and buyer valuations satisfy a single crossing condition the generalized vickrey clarke groves mechanisms with lazy reserves vcg l are ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational 2 if in addition the valuation distribution satisfies a generalized monotone hazard rate condition the vcg l mechanism with conditional monopoly reserves is approximately optimal then we construct an ascending auction that implements the truth telling equilibrium of a vcg l mechanism in ex post equilibrium finally we discuss the connection between the vcg l mechanisms and greedy algorithms studied in lehmann et al 2002 and deferred acceptance auctions studied in milgrom and segal 2014 and the impact of competition by proving a bulow and klemperer 1996 type result

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

monetarist principles and the money stock growth rule given the influence of milton friedman it is hard to keep from identifying monetarisms with the advocacy of a policy rule that would require the money stock to grow at a constant rate and prohibit cyclical adjustments in government spending or in tax schedules this identification is somewhat inaccurate since karl brunner and allan meltzer the other two leading proponents of monetarism have not always been advocates of a constant money growth rate it may nevertheless he useful to relate one s thoughts about monetarism to friedman s rule as will be done in this paper but the question that immediately arises is what more fundamental beliefs about the economy give rise to the idea that such a rule would be socially desirable at this more basic level there may he more agreement among monetarists than about the rule itself in any event it appears that there are two basic monetarist propositions that are of crucial importance as follows i cyclical and secular movements in nominal income are primarily attributable to movements in the stock of money relative to capacity output ii there is no permanent tradeoff between unemployment and inflation or any other characteristic of the path of the price level that is the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis is valid this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

endogenous growth and government debt the feasibility of the policy of perpetual debt financing given a particular path for expenditures and taxation has been questioned over the years sargent and wallace 17 argue that such a policy is not feasible in the sense that the debt gnp ratio will explode mccallum 8 and darby 2 argue that this policy will be feasible if and only if the long run growth rate of gnp exceeds the after tax real interest rate this particular condition was derived under the assumption of ricardian equivalence where the growth rate of gnp and the interest rate are exogenously given and are not affected by the path of debt miller and sargent 9 and weil 20 make the point that once the assumption of ricardian equivalence is dropped then simple comparisons of long run growth rates and interest rates are not sufficient to determine stability tirole 19 and o connell and zeldes 10 demonstrate in diamond s 3 model without ricardian equivalence that ponzi games such as this are feasible if and only if the economy is dynamically inefficient without debt all of these studies assume that the long run growth rate of gnp is exogenously given this assumption is particularly strong in the absence of ricardian equivalence in a separate literature a new generation of equilibrium growth models has recently been developed with positive sustained growth in the long run equilibrium in these models long run growth is endogenously determined rather than being imposed on the model as some exogenously given process 7 11 12 14 15 1 all of these models find some way of introducing increasing returns to scale into the neoclassical growth model and yet preserving the fact that it can be interpreted as a decentralized equilibrium this paper considers the feasibility of perpetual debt financing in an economy where the growth rate of gnp is endogenously determined and is a function of debt levels the model of endogenous growth presented here is a modified version of the one given in prescott and boyd 12 this particular model is chosen for two reasons first agents live for finite lengths of time so ricardian equivalence will not hold in general in this model also the production function is linear in the capital stock as will become clear below this implies that the equilibrium paths of the state variables can be characterized as first order linear difference equations

joint bidding in the name your own price channel a strategic analysis in this paper we study the name your own price nyop channel we examine theoretically and empirically whether asking consumers to place a joint bid for multiple items rather than bid one item at a time as practiced today can increase nyop retailers profits relatedly we also examine whether allowing consumers to self select whether to place a joint bid or itemwise bids increases retailers profits and consumers surplus we construct a dynamic model that incorporates both demand uncertainty and supply uncertainty to address these issues our theoretical analysis identifies the conditions under which joint bidding can increase both nyop retailers profits and consumers surplus we find that some consumers might bid more for the very same items when they place joint bids the increase in bid amount is related to the fact that joint bidding reduces the chance of mismatch between nyop retailers costs and consumer bids we conducted a laboratory study to assess the descriptive validity of some of the

auctions with online supply abstract online advertising auctions present settings in which there is uncertainty about the number of items for sale we study mechanisms for selling identical items when the total supply is unknown but is drawn from a known distribution items arrive dynamically and the seller must make immediate allocation and payment decisions with the goal of maximizing social welfare we devise a simple incentive compatible mechanism that guarantees some constant fraction of the first best solution a surprising feature of our mechanism is that it artificially limits supply and we show that limiting the supply is essential for obtaining high social welfare although common when maximizing revenue commitment to limit the supply is less intuitive when maximizing social welfare the performance guarantee of our mechanism is in expectation over the supply distribution we show that obtaining similar performance guarantee for every realization of supply is impossible

the package assignment model we study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several rather than single objects although buyers reservations values are non additive efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non linear in the objects constituting the packages the interconnections among the linear programming formulation walrasian equilibrium and the core are established in the single seller auction version a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 d44 d51

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

the effectiveness of english auctions abstract we study the performance of the english auction under different assumptions about the seller s degree of bayesian sophistication we define the effectiveness of an auction as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation total surplus we identify tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of the english auction for general private values environments and for private values environments where bidders valuations are non negatively correlated for example when the seller faces 12 bidders who the seller believes have non negatively correlated valuations whose expectations are at least as high as 60 of the maximal possible valuation an english auction with no reserve price generates an expected price that is more than 80 of the value of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

a simple selling and buying procedure abstract for the assignment game we analyze the following mechanism sellers simultaneously fix their prices first then buyers sequentially decide which object to buy also each buyer may report his or her indifferences along with the previous buyers indifferences to the following buyer the first phase determines the potential prices while the second phase determines the actual matching reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers moreover when buyers state their true indifferences the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

an ascending vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods we propose an ascending auction for the case when the seller is constrained to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid it extends easily to polymatroids applications include scheduling allocation of homogeneous goods and spatially distributed markets among others our ascending auction induces buyers to bid truthfully and returns the economically efficient basis unlike other ascending auctions for this environment ours runs in pseudopolynomial or polynomial time furthermore we prove the impossibility of an ascending auction for nonmatroidal independence set systems

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand the standard profit maximizing multi unit auction intersects the submitted demand curve with a preset reservation supply curve which is determined using the distribution from which the buyers valuations are drawn however when this distribution is unknown a preset supply curve cannot maximize monopoly profits the optimal pricing mechanism in this situation sets a price to each buyer on the basis of the demand distribution inferred statistically from other buyers bids the resulting profit converges to the optimal monopoly profit with known demand as the number of buyers goes to infinity and convergence can be substantially faster than with sequential price experimentation

the multivariate flexible accelerator model its empirical restrictions and an application to u s manufacturing this paper derives an exhaustive set of restrictions implied by the multistock flexible accelerator specification of the adjustment cost model for the firm the flexible accelerator specification of the demand for capital and labor is estimated using u s manufacturing annual data for the 1947 1976 period the consistency of the data with the model is examined by testing the validity of the derived restrictions finally the conditions which permit aggregation over firms are determined and tested empirically the flexible accelerator specification has been popular in the empirical literature on interrelated investment and employment decisions see nadiri and rosen 38 coen and hickman 10 and schramm 40 more recent examples include sargent 39 berndt fuss and wavermann 4 berndt and morrison 6 and meese 34 under suitable assumptions the specification may be rationalized by the adjustment cost model of the firm eisner and strotz 13 lucas 30 mortensen 35 extends the work of lucas and derives some empirically testable restrictions of the accelerator specification that are implied by the adjustment cost framework the broad objective of this paper is to provide a more rigorous and comprehensive test of the adjustment cost model than is presently found in the literature this objective is achieved in three stages first we offer an alternative derivation of the mortensen restrictions and more importantly we prove theorem 1 that his restrictions are exhaustive i e we establish an integrability result for the flexible accelerator adjustment cost model second the flexible accelerator specification of the demand for capital and labor is estimated using total u s manufacturing annual data for the 1947 76 period it is assumed that firms minimize expected production costs subject to a technology which implies that capital and labor stocks are costly to adjust while a third factor materials is freely adjustable the consistency of the data with the adjustmentcost framework is examined by testing for the validity of the derived restrictions further we test the validity of some separability restrictions on the adjustmentcost technology that to varying degrees are imposed a priori in all of the cited empirical studies finally we provide a complete characterization of the individual firm technologies which justify the common assumption of the existence of a representative firm this problem of aggregation over firms which has been

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

dynamic factor demands and the effects of energy price shocks a dynamic model is used to understand how sharp changes in energy prices affect investment behavior employment and energy use the authors discuss the theory behind their model selection model specifications estimation methods and data list parameter estimates and elasticities for the selected model and describe the simulations they conclude that 1 the data strongly reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale within their specification of aggregate production 2 the data indicate adjustment costs on labor are small and 3 their results help reconcile some of the conflicting estimates of energy demand elasticities appearing in recent literature 23 references 3 figures 3 tables

approximation in mechanism design this paper considers three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role approximation plays in resolving them challenge 1 optimal mechanisms are finely tuned to precise details of the distribution on agent preferences challenge 2 in environments with multi dimensional agent preferences economic analysis has failed to provide general characterizations optimal mechanisms challenge 3 optimal mechanisms are parameterized by unrealistic knowledge of the distribution of agents private preferences this paper surveys positive resolutions to these challenges with emphasis on basic techniques and their relevance to theory and practice

dynamic factor demands under rational expectations we model the industrial demands for structures equipment and blue and white collar labor in a manner consistent with rational expectations and stochastic dynamic optimization in the presence of adjustment costs but allowing generality of functional form we represent the technology by a translog input requirement function that specifies the amount of blue collar labor needed to produce an output level given quantities of three quasi fixed factors nonproduction workers equipment and structures a complete description of the production structure is obtained by simultaneously estimating the input requirement function and three stochastic euler equations we find adjustment costs are small in total but large on the margin and differ considerably across factors

envy freedom and prior free mechanism design abstract we consider the provision of an abstract service to single dimensional agents our model includes position auctions single minded combinatorial auctions and constrained matching markets when the agents values are drawn independently from a distribution the bayesian optimal mechanism is given by myerson 1 as a virtual surplus optimizer we develop a framework for prior free mechanism design and analysis a good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal mechanism for the distribution if there is a distribution moreover when there is no distribution this mechanism still provably performs well we define and characterize optimal envy free outcomes in symmetric single dimensional environments our characterization mirrors myerson s theory furthermore unlike in mechanism design where there is no point wise optimal mechanism there is always a point wise optimal envy free outcome envy free outcomes and incentive compatible mechanisms are similar in structure and performance we therefore use the optimal envy free revenue as a benchmark for measuring the performance of a prior free mechanism a good mechanism is one that approximates the envy free benchmark on any profile of agent values we show that good mechanisms exist and in particular a natural generalization of the random sampling auction of goldberg et al 2 is a constant approximation

a nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller abstract this paper describes a nearly optimal auction mechanism that does not require previous knowledge of the distribution of values of potential buyers the mechanism we propose builds on the new literature on the elicitation of information from experts we extend the latter to the case where the secret information shared by the experts potential buyers in our model can be used against them if it becomes public knowledge

multi item auctions a collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders and each bidder is to receive at most one item assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal in a suitable sense for the bidders in this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

an efficient multi unit ascending auction we provide an ascending auction that yields an e cient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward sloping demand our ascending auction both extends and generalizes ausubel s 1997 and yields the same outcome as perry and reny s 2000 generalization of vickrey s 1961 sealed bid auction there are two key components to our auction bidders are permitted both to

technological choices and regulation the case of the canadian manufacturing sectors the economic environment in which canadian manufacturing firms operate has changed substantially over the last 40 years technological changes new regulations deregulation and exogenous economic shocks all have been important aspects of this economic environment in this article we show how to include such changes in the economic environment faced by the firms in a behavioural model that includes the investment decision of the firm under uncertainty assumptions regarding the expectation formation process and technology are kept minimal we estimate the effects of innovations such as the free trade agreement the foreign investment review agency and the federal environmental policy on the economic decisions of fifteen canadian manufacturing sectors jel classification d24 choix de technologies et reglementation le cas des secteurs manufacturiers canadiens au cours des 40 dernieres annees l environnement economique des firmes manufacturieres canadiennes s est grandement transforme que ce soit a cause du changement technologique de la reglementation de vagues de dereglementation ou de chocs economiques exogenes les firmes ont du s adapter en modifiant leur technologie dans cet article nous montrons comment prendre en compte les changements de l environnement economique des firmes dans le cadre d un modele decisionnel de la firme en incertitude avec investissement les hypotheses concernant la technologie et les anticipations sont aussi generales que possible nous estimons l effet qu ont eu l accord de libre echange l agence de tamisage des investissements etrangers et la politique environnementale federale sur les choix de technologies des firmes de quinze secteurs manufacturiers canadiens