the democratic political economy of progressive income taxation why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two dimensionality of the issue space to give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two dimensional nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two party game whose players have complete preferences over a two dimensional policy space generically fails to exist i introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games based on the fact of factional conflict within parties each party is supposed to consist of reformists militants and opportunists each faction has a complete preference order on policy space but together they can only agree on a partial order nash equilibria of the two party game where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions and each party is represented by its partial order exist and it is shown that in such equilibria both parties propose progressive income taxation

investment uncertainty and liquidity we analyze the dynamic investment decision of a firm subject to an endogenous financing constraint the threat of future funding shortfalls lowers the value of the firm s timing options and encourages acceleration of investment beyond the first best optimal level as well as highlighting another way by which capital market frictions can distort investment behavior this result implies that 1 the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be greatest for high liquidity firms and 2 greater uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on investment

litigation risk and ipo underpricing abstract we examine the relation between risk and ipo underpricing and test two aspects of the litigation risk hypothesis 1 firms with higher litigation risk underprice their ipos by a greater amount as a form of insurance insurance effect and 2 higher underpricing lowers expected litigation costs deterrence effect to adjust for the endogeneity bias in previous studies we use a simultaneous equation framework evidence provides support for both aspects of the litigation risk hypothesis

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

nonpoint pollution control inducing first best outcomes through the use of threats abstract this paper develops an economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre specified environmental goal we show that such a policy can be designed to induce cost minimizing abatement without actually imposing the tax because the threat of imposition of the tax is sufficient to induce voluntary compliance thus the combined policy approach can not only be more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach but can also be less costly than a pure ambient tax approach however whether the cost minimizing choices are a unique equilibrium or not depends on the design of the tax policy and whether or not it can be applied retroactively all results still hold if the background threat takes the form of a reducing in government subsidies

information acquisition in global games of regime change abstract we study costly information acquisition in global games of regime change that is coordination games where payoffs are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the agents average action we show that only symmetric equilibria exist and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness we then characterize the value of information in these games and link it to the underlying parameters of the model we investigate equilibrium efficiency complementarities in information choices and the trade offs between public and private information we show that information acquisition can be inefficient and that strategic complementarities in actions do not always translate into strategic complementarities in information acquisition finally we find that public and private information can be complements these results contrast findings in linear quadratic models where payoffs depend continuously on both the unobserved state and the agents average action

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework many observers argue that political polarization particularly on social and cultural issues has increased in the united states how does this influence the political competition on economic issues we analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share in equilibrium candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically liberal voters as well as socially liberal and economically conservative voters we analyze how voters cultural preferences and candidates cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions jel d72 e62 h50 z13 many observers have argued that polarization between the two major parties in the united states particularly on noneconomic cultural matters has increased this is reflected both at the elite level in particular in congress poole and rosenthal 1984 1985 2000 and among democratic and republican activists and voters abramowitz and saunders 2008 harbridge and malhotra 2011 in the american national election survey respondents report their own ideological position on a scale from 1 very liberal to 7 very conservative the number of respondents who report one of the extreme positions 1 2 6 or 7 has grown from 20 and 21 percent in 1972 and 1976 to 31 and 30 percent in the 2004 and 2008 respectively moreover liberal and conservative voters have become considerably more reliable supporters of democrats and republicans respectively over the last generation 1 if we accept the widespread view that reagan s conservative revolution has created a cultural wedge between the parties that only widened in the 1990s and 2000s what consequences for the parties economic policies should we expect

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

acreage response under canada s western grains stabilization program an aggregate acreage supply model for the canadian prairies is estimated assuming that farmers base short run acreage decisions on the ex ante rational expectation and variance of per hectare revenue to account for the effects of government intervention a structural model of the western grains stabilization program is incorporated into the estimation framework results indicate the program contributed to modest increases in cropped acreage between 1976 and 1990

enduring impacts of land retirement policies evidence from the conservation reserve program we examine the persistence of cropland retirements induced by the conservation reserve program crp the largest u s conservation program we analyze micro data on observed land use choices following crp contract expiration over 1995 1997 and predict that 42 of crp acres would not have been returned to crops within a year if the program had expired in 1997 these results indicate that temporary cropland retirement payments under crp generate land use changes that often extend beyond contract periods the analysis suggests that targeted signing bonuses for first time enrollees would increase the longer term impacts of crp and perhaps other incentive based land use programs

the determinants of reforestation in brazil this article analyses the main determinants of reforestation in brazil during the 1980s and 1990s in the year 2000 brazil had the sixth largest planted forests area in the world the planted forests in brazil saw a huge increase from 1960 to 1985 since then however that stock has decreased but the demand for roundwood continues to increase that situation will result in a scarcity of roundwood from reforestation in brazil in few years the expected roundwood scarcity motivates an econometric study to compare market forces and economic policies in stimulating the reforestation in brazil considering the main firms reforesting in brazil it can be pointed out that small and medium farmers have been planting forests while private or public programmes are present otherwise large wood based firms consider factors other than prices such as their future demand for roundwood to be more important in their planting decisions those results cast doubts about the efficiency of the market price system in solv

the influence of decentralized taxes and intergovernmental grants on local spending volatility abstractthe influence of decentralized taxes and intergovernmental grants on local spending volatility regional studies this paper studies what affects the volatility of sub central public spending in 20 organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries the evidence based on data from 1972 to 2007 shows that the volatility of intergovernmental grants from upper levels is positively associated with the volatility of local expenditure on the other hand the volatility of local tax revenues mainly that of property taxes exerts the opposite effect these findings suggest that making local governments rely more on grants than own tax revenues adversely affects their spending stability allowing them to levy autonomously taxes relying on responsive tax bases provides incentives to smooth their expenditure

research note cost uncertainty is bliss the effect of competition on the acquisition of cost information for pricing new products we examine the optimal acquisition of information about a common uncertain cost factor by two competing firms seeking to price a new product we show that existing findings regarding the acquisition of demand information or the acquisition of either cost or demand information related to quantity decisions do not extend to this case for cost information with price competition the information acquisition strategies are strategic substitutes even though the price decisions that are based on the information are strategic complements competition decreases the expected value of cost information moreover when competition is intense and the cost of information low identical firms do not acquire the same amount of cost information even when information is free cost uncertainty acts like a fog that lessens the destructive effect of price competition when products are close substitutes and thus increases expected profits buyers on the other hand are better off when competing firms are informed about cost even though the expected value of cost information strictly decreases with competition the optimal price for industry specific cost information set by an information vendor increases with competition when the firms products are sufficiently substitutable

how much income redistribution an explanation based on vote buying and corruption this paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture a model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters in equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption when rich voters can bribe the government an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible the link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model

the politics of public provision of education public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind however does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well i analyze a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education agents differ in their income and in their age where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution i find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor they collude in order to reduce the size of government which benefits the rich and target some of its resources to education which benefits the young poor when the cohort size of the young is too large however income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium

party formation and minority ideological positions we develop a model where voters differ in their exogenous income and in their ideological views with racism as an illustration electoral competition takes place between an endogenous number of parties which propose platforms consisting of both an ideological and an economic dimension our objective is to explain the emergence of minority ideological positions and to understand the role played by political parties in this emergence we first show that in a pure citizen candidate model where parties are absent the only equilibrium consists of the majority ideological position we then show that allowance for the formation of political parties generates equilibria with minority ideological positions

redistribution pork and elections why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit many scholars focus on wedge issues such as religion or race but another explanation might be geographically based patronage or pork we examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide the dollar environments the model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution and under which rich voters support left wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution the model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs the model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior and it describes why right wing parties should have an advantage over left wing ones in majoritarian systems

program enrollment and acreage response to reforestation cost sharing programs five alternative sets of predictions are presented of the total acreage of southern pine that would have been planted after clear cut harvest if existing government forest improvement programs had made different levels of cost sharing available to nonindustrial private forest owners the predictions illustrate the importance of separating and accounting for both the number of tracts enrolled and for the size of enrolled tracts predictions are obtained from a profit maximization model that represents the owner s decision as a simultaneous choice of reforestation practice and size of tract to harvest and reforest

demutualization determinants and consequences of the mutual holding company choice we investigate the determinants and consequences of the mutual holding company mhc structure that allows mutual thrifts to issue stock to outside shareholders while maintaining the mutual form capital constrained firms with greater profit opportunities are more likely to choose a full demutualization demonstrating that the mhc choice can be used to control for over and under investment costs during periods of greater regulatory constraints mhc firms have lower offer day returns than full demutualizations mhc firms are also less likely to be acquired as the mhc structure provides protection from the market for corporate control demonstrating a clear preference by minority shareholders for the elimination of the mhc structure the announcement of a second stage conversion generates a 12 return

the impact of strategic interaction on earnings expectations associated with corporate product strategies abstract we examine how strategic interaction in an industry influences the earnings expectations of financial analysts with regard to new product strategies we find that following announcement of new products analysts revise earnings forecasts upward more for announcing firms competing in low strategic interaction industries than for firms competing in high strategic interaction industries for value enhancing value reducing product strategies earnings forecast revisions are more favorable for rivals competing under a high low degree of strategic interaction than for rivals competing under a low high degree of strategic interaction overall empirical evidence indicates that the nature of strategic competition within the industry is important in assessing the market expectations of earnings for new product announcers and their rivals

inequality redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates abstract we provide a model of electoral competition between an establishment and an outsider candidate in which each candidate has a fixed characteristic that voters care about and promises a policy of redistribution from skilled to unskilled voters the voters perceive the establishment candidate to be more beholden to special interests and therefore more likely to renege on a promise of a large policy change in favor of the status quo after the election the equilibrium features policy divergence and greater targeting of the electorally dominant voter group by the outsider candidate furthermore while higher income inequality leads to polarization of support for the two candidates it benefits the outsider candidate in a radical equilibrium with promises of greater redistribution these results provide a theoretical underpinning for the recent evidence that links voters economic distress due to trade exposure or skill biased technological change to support for outsider candidates

modeling expectations of bounded prices an application to the market for corn the presence of farm programs should directly affect the expectations of producers this paper analyzes the formation of price expectations when price supports constitute an effective lower bound on the distribution of the expectations we first investigate what the expected price would be if the usual rational expectations formula is used this leads to a relationship that is not estimable we suggest two alternatives one based on a tobit approximation and the other based on a perfect prediction of when the support is going to be effective using a simplified model of the u s corn market the methodology is demonstrated and compared to an alternative method of using futures prices as the expectation of harvest price the analysis of supply response for the major u s field crops is made difficult due to government intervention in these markets this intervention has been characterized by the use of price supports acreage diversion storage incentives etc during the last thirty years many studies have analyzed producer behavior in the presence of governmental involvement such studies have typically been concerned with modeling the effect of supports and diversions in an ex post sense rather than with how producers used the knowledge of farm programs to form their expectations if producers are rational economic agents their expectations of harvest prices should be conditioned both by free market forces and the type and degree of governmental intervention in the market of course farm programs have varied in nature and extent during the past thirty years and it is doubtful that any structural model could capture their complexities in this paper we attempt to introduce rational expectations in a simplified model of the u s corn market in essence we focus on the formation of price expectations when price supports constitute an effective lower bound on the distribution of the expectations we proceed by developing a theoretical model that connects the rational expectations model with a model of bounded price variation it is shown that one representation that may characterize the corn market is a triangular structural system with endogenous switching a full information maximum likelihood estimator is proposed for the system next an empirical model is specified and estimated the model is evaluated in comparison to an augmented model that contains a futures price so that some inferences may be made concerning the rational expectations model s success in summarizing relevant market information expectations under bounded prices consider a market that may be represented by a simple supply and demand system q a pt a2w el supply function pt b qt b2xt e2t demand function 1 where p and q represent market price and quantity w and x represent supply and demand shifters and p represents the rational expectation of product price at the time production decisions are made note that this system has a familiar recursive structure when the expected price variable is specified in terms of one or more lagged prices when the restricted reduced form of the structural system is solved for in terms of the expected price and this expression is used to replace pj wallis 1980 then models similar to those of goodwin and sheifrin 1982 and shonkwiler and emerson 1982

redistributive public employment abstract politicians may use disguised redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax transfer schemes first we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis next we provide evidence consistent with the prediction of the model namely that in u s cities politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device we find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher

endogenous private information structures we formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure we ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization any nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure we provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when nash is replaced by sequential we characterize the sequential nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a sequential nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition

why the poor do not expropriate the rich an old argument in new garb we consider a political economy with two partisan parties each party represents a given constituency of voters if one party labour represents poor voters and the other christian democrats rich voters if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue and if there are no incentive considerations then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity if however there are two issues tax policy and religion for instance then this is not generally the case the analysis shows that if a simple condition on the distribution of voter preferences holds then as the salience of the non economic issue increases the tax rate proposed by labour in equilibrium will fall possibly even to zero even though a majority of the population may have an ideal tax rate of unity 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

information value under demand uncertainty and endogenous market leadership in an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods we identify the circumstance under which a firm s having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership high demand volatility leads to stackelberg competition with the information advantaged firm leading in the n firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously in a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither one or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm s obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium but only when firms have different costs of information our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first mover advantage such as certain public good provision games jel c72 d82 l13

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

church state separation and redistribution we analyze how religion affects voting and redistribution our model directs attention away from the particular faith belief or risk attitudes of religious individuals and emphasizes instead how organized religion opens the door to standard group based distributive politics we argue that organized religion makes it possible for the rich and the religious poor to form electoral coalitions in favor of low taxes and limited redistribution such electoral coalitions form out of simple material self interest and they occur at the expense of the secular poor however the material reward to the religious poor from supporting such electoral coalitions depends on the institutional context as state support for religion increases poor religious voters have greater incentives to vote with poor secular voters in favor of parties that support high taxes the analysis therefore highlights the possibilities of understanding how religion affects politics without asserting that religious individuals differ systematically from secular ones in their values or preferences

redistribution and affirmative action abstract the paper develops an integrated political economy model in which individuals are distinguished by earning ability and an ascriptive characteristic race the policy space is a transfer payment to low income workers financed by a flat tax on wages and an affirmative action constraint on firms hiring decisions the distribution of income and the policy are endogenous with the latter being the outcome of a legislative bargaining game between three legislative blocs the model provides support for the common claim that racial divisions reduce support for welfare expenditures even when voters have color blind preferences we show that relatively advantaged members of both the majority and minority group benefit from the introduction of a second dimension of redistribution while the less advantaged members of the majority are the principal losers

an analysis of the implications of uncertainty and agency problems on the wealth effects to acquirers of private firms abstract extensive empirical work shows that bidders do not gain from the acquisition of publicly traded targets but experience positive excess returns in the acquisition of privately held firms this study investigates how two important differences between private and public firms namely informational uncertainty and ownership characteristics impact the returns to acquirers a sample of targets that were acquired shortly after filing for an ipo was collected to circumvent the lack of information on private firms in spite of the special characteristics of these targets the listing effect is still prevalent in this sample the results of the analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that acquirers gain in the acquisition of private firms because these targets have a relatively weaker bargaining position due to informational and agency problems and costly access to external capital markets to finance growth opportunities

cultural diversity and economic growth evidence from the us during the age of mass migration we exploit the large inflow of immigrants to the us during the 1870 1920 period to examine the effects that within county changes in the cultural composition of the us population had on output growth we construct measures of fractionalization and polarization to distinguish between the different effects of cultural diversity our main finding is that increases in cultural fractionalization significantly increased output while increases in cultural polarization significantly decreased output we address the issue of identifying the causal effects of cultural diversity by using the supply push component of immigrant inflows as an instrumental variable

do tender offers create value new methods and evidence abstract conventional techniques of estimating takeover value improvements measure only a fraction of the total gain and include revelation about bidder stand alone value to address these biases we develop the probability scaling method which rescales announcement date returns and the intervention method which uses returns at intervening events perceived value improvements are larger than traditional methods indicate we cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders on average pay fair prices combined bidder target stock returns are higher for hostile offers lower for equity offers and lower for diversifying offers these effects reflect revelation about bidder stand alone value not differences in gains from combination

the bright and dark side of staging investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns we believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship we find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry however staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely

heterogeneous preferences and in kind redistribution theory and evidence abstract this paper examines the impact of social heterogeneity on in kind redistribution we contribute to the previous literature in two ways we consider i the provision of several public goods and ii agents different not only in income but also in their preferences over the various goods provided by the public sector in this setting both the distribution and size of goods provision depend on the heterogeneity of preferences our main result is that preference heterogeneity tends to decrease in kind redistribution while income inequality tends to increase it an empirical investigation based on united states census bureau data confirms these theoretical findings

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

the right type of legislator a theory of taxation and representation abstract we develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen candidate model of legislatures individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics when these are positively correlated rich voters always prefer a rich legislator but poor voters face a trade off a rich legislator will secure more pork for the district but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution parties and class representation in legislatures we demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases as the standard common pool intuition suggests and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect

endogenous information acquisition in bayesian games with strategic complementarities abstract this paper studies covert or hidden information acquisition in common value bayesian games of strategic complementarities using the supermodular stochastic order to arrange the structures of information increasingly in terms of preferences we provide novel easily interpretable and verifiable though restrictive conditions under which the value of information is increasing and convex and study the implications in terms of the equilibrium configuration increasing marginal returns to information leads to extreme behavior in that agents opt either for the highest or the lowest quality signal so that the final analysis of this complex game simplifies greatly into that of a two action game this result can rationalize the complete information game as an endogenous outcome finally we also establish that higher quality information leads players to select more dispersed actions in the bayesian game

government support of nonindustrial production the case of private forests the forest incentives program fip was authorized by congress in 1973 under this program up to 75 of all tree planting and timber improvement costs incurred by private landowners are paid by the federal government the advisability of this as well as similar statewide programs have been a topic of considerable debate in the literature using the results of an extensive forest service survey mills and cain 8 9 10 find considerable evidence that the productivity benefits and financial returns from fip related timber improvements are quite high in a recent econometric study however wallace and silver 13 find little evidence of any harvesting and subsequent resforestation effort due to cost sharing the purpose of the present study is to examine the impact of programs such as fip on the supply of timber and to explain how seemingly contradictory findings such as those above are possible at the same time we wish to analyze the effectiveness of technological information provided to landowners by extension foresters and compare its impact on timber improvement and harvest activities with that of cost sharing after briefly describing the characteristics of nonindustrial forests in section ii we construct a model in section iii whereby nonindustrial private producers maximize their utility from both the timber and non timber growing uses of the land although such models have been constructed before by binkley 2 ours is unique in explicitly accounting

the gains to bidding firms from merger abstract this study examines the effect of mergers on the wealth of bidding firms shareholders bidding firms gain significantly during the twenty one days leading to the announcement of each of their first four merger bids these results fail to support the capitalization hypothesis that bidders gains are captured at the beginning of merger programs bidders abnormal returns are positively related to the relative size of the merger partners and the gains during the announcement period are larger for mergers which are successful though the gains are larger prior to 1969 merger bids after 1969 also significantly increase the wealth of bidding firms shareholders the results suggest that the inconclusive findings of the earlier studies may be due to methodological deficiencies the findings of this study are consistent with value maximizing behavior by the management of bidding firms

estimating supply response in the presence of farm programs previous empirical research on crop supply response has given insufficient attention to the fundamentally different nature of supply response under farm programs versus competitive markets a simple theoretical model is presented which highlights the program participation option in the farmer s acreage allocation decision the model also provides the basis for different expected supply elasticities under free market and farm program regimes for corn and soybeans econometric supply estimation for corn belt states for 1948 80 using a temporally disaggregated approach confirms a greater supply elasticity for corn and a lower supply elasticity for soybeans under acreage restricting feed grain programs

monopoly competition and information acquisition abstract an incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand but can acquire public information at a cost we determine how an entry threat affects the firm s information acquisition if returns to scale are constant and the state contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases then entry reduces information acquisition if however either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns or if the state contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion then entry can increase information finally entry can hurt consumers although entry always increases output it can decrease information consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly

investment efficiency and product market competition does more competition lead to more information production and greater investment efficiency this question is largely unexplored in the finance literature this article provides both a model and a series of extensive empirical tests the model features a 2 stage bayesian game in differentiated products market competition we find that competition causes firms to acquire less information and investments to become more inefficient relative to a first best case with the same market structure empirically the panel regression analysis provides strong support for the theory and shows that investment is more efficient in concentrated industries

optimal information acquisition for heterogenous duopoly firms abstract this paper analyzes a stochastic duopoly market in which heterogenous firms acquire costly information about the stochastic market demand prior to their production decisions the equilibrium amounts of information acquired by each firm are compared the comparative statics analyses show the differential effects of a change in information cost the degree of uncertainty in the market demand and the demand and cost function parameters journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l13 l15

the cost of segregation in social networks abstract this paper investigates the welfare effect of income redistribution in the private provision of public goods on networks we first show that the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by bonacich centrality then we develop an index based on the network structure of interactions which roughly speaking measures the welfare effect of income redistribution confined to a component of contributors the proposed index vanishes when applied to large components of contributors that display special segregated interactions which suggests an asymptotic neutrality of redistributive policies

the effect of discretionary price control decisions on equity values abstract the macro literature presents conflicting evidence on the effects of price controls in this study the fact that the macro economic effect of wage and price controls is the aggregation of the micro economic effects is used to implement a different approach to measure the effects of price controls the effect of price controls is inferred from examining the impact of discretionary regulatory decisions on the equity values of individual firms during phase ii of nixon s economic stabilization program the empirical results indicate that violators of the regulations incurred significant abnormal losses that were unrelated to the explicit penalties this suggests that implicit penalties were imposed on offending firms the analysis of price increase decisions provides weak evidence that these price commission decisions had an impact on equity values

strategic factor market intelligence an application of information economics to strategy formulation and competitor intelligence this paper develops a model of information acquisition decisions by firms that are competing in a strategic factor market barney 1986 to purchase a scarce resource whose value is unknown and differs across firms the model builds on the argument that more accurate expectations about the firm specific value of resources is other than luck the only way for firms to obtain the specific resources required for competitive advantage we address the more specific question of what types of information firms should gather to accomplish this goal the model generates a series of testable hypotheses about how a firm s optimal mix of different types of information is affected by a number of factors including the level of uncertainty about the value of the resource being acquired the rarity imitability and nonsubstitutability of that resource the level of inscrutability of firms pre existing stocks of resources and firms information gathering and information processing capacities

economic versus cultural differences forms of ethnic diversity and public goods provision groups between group inequality bgi we show that elf cultural fractionalization cf and bgi measure different things and that the choice between them has an important impact on our understanding of which countries are most ethnically diverse furthermore empirical tests reveal that bgi has a large robust and negative relationship with public goods provision whereas cf elf and overall inequality do not diversity is widely held to make governance more difficult such diversity is associated with low production of public goods poor economic growth and high levels of corruption violence and civil conflict but diversity hardly sentences a country to poor political and economic outcomes latvia for example has better governance indicators than brazil and zambia has better governance indicators than nigeria even though these pairs of countries have similar levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization elf why then do some countries cope more successfully with ethnic diversity than others this article addresses this question by focusing on the

diversity and the power of the elites in democratic societies evidence from indonesia this paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median typically poor agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites theory suggests that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions the wealthy elites influence on policy choices is endogenously higher when there is diversity in preferences among the poor the pattern of public good provision by local governments in indonesia is consistent with this intuition our analysis indeed shows that when individuals have different preferences here due to different ethnicities democratic policy outcomes are closer to the preferences of the elites rather than the preferences of the poor majority

diversity and redistribution abstract in this paper we analyze the interaction of income and preference heterogeneity in a political economy framework we ask whether the presence of preference heterogeneity arising for example from different ethnic groups or geographic locations affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich we study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties parties propose platforms and all individuals vote with the winning policy chosen by plurality political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible in that they belong to the pareto set of their members the platforms specify the values of two policy tools a general redistributive tax which is lump sum rebated or used to fund a general public good and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific targeted goods tailored to particular preferences or localities our analysis demonstrates that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests when the degree of taste diversity is low the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers as taste diversity increases in society the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution as diversity increases further however the only policy that can emerge supports exclusively general redistribution

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

mandated political representation and redistribution mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority group candidates are permitted to contest such quotas have been implemented in india for certain social groups and for women although gender quotas in the legislature are popular in several other countries this paper builds a political economy model to analyze the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium our model predicts that in situations where the minority group is economically disadvantaged and where voters favor candidates from their own group such a quota actually reduces transfers to poorer groups moreover redistribution in reserved districts leads to a rise in within minority group inequality

optimal market intelligence strategy when management attention is scarce this paper extends the theoretical literature on firms optimal information strategies to the situation when a firm s management attention capacity to process available data is scarce in this case a firm s optimal market intelligence strategy must trade off learning a little about a broad range of markets a broad strategy with gaining a very deep understanding of one or a few markets a focused strategy this trade off is not present when data are scarce an assumption made in most of the existing literature on optimal information search strategies however in data rich environments which are of increasing relevance given technology changes we show a focused market intelligence strategy is always best when managers need to process a substantial amount of data before beginning to gain insights i e there are increasing returns to attention interestingly this focused strategy can also be best with decreasing returns to attention when a managers are sufficiently efficient in processing the available data and b managers have sufficiently strong initial priors on the unknown market parameters we show a broad market intelligence strategy is only optimal when new data points are sufficiently redundant i e when the learning rate is sufficiently decreasing with the allocation of more attention our results also indicate that advances in information technology can account for the pressure on firms to become more focused and that competition increases the likelihood of a focused strategy competition can lead to asymmetric outcomes where firms focus on different markets finally we note that a focused market intelligence strategy and thus an asymmetric allocation of attention does not require a priori differences between firms markets or market specific core capabilities consequently a focused market intelligence strategy can result in market specific core competencies and produce firm differences from equivalent starting conditions

voluntary environmental agreements good or bad news for environmental protection abstract there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary agreements vas as an environmental policy tool this article uses a simple model to determine whether vas are likely to lead to efficient environmental protection we consider cases where polluters are induced to participate either by a background threat of mandatory controls the stick approach or by cost sharing subsidies the carrot approach the results suggest that the overall impact on environmental quality could be positive or negative depending on a number of factors including the allocation of bargaining power the magnitude of the background threat and the social cost of funds