is protectionism on the rise assessing national trade policies during the crisis of 2008 to understand the role of trade policies in the crisis of 2008 this paper constructs the overall trade restrictiveness indices for a wide range of countries using their tariff schedules in 2008 and 2009 the index summarizes the trade policy stance of a country taking into account the share of each good in trade as well as its corresponding import demand elasticity results show that there is no widespread increase in protectionism via tariff policies since the global financial crisis has unfolded while many countries have adjusted tariffs upward on selected products only a handful of countries such as malawi russia argentina turkey and china focus on products that have significant impacts on trade flows the united states and the european union by contrast rely mainly on anti dumping duties to shield domestic industries overall while the rise in tariffs and anti dumping duties in these countries may have jointly caused global trade to drop by as much as us 43 billion during the crisis period it explains less than 2 percent of the collapse in world trade

could tariffs be pro cyclical abstract conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter cyclical we analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied mfn tariffs using a disaggregated product level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011 strikingly and counter to conventional wisdom we find that tariffs are pro cyclical further investigation reveals that this pro cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries tariffs are acyclical in developed countries we present evidence that pro cyclical market power drives the pro cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy

capacity allocation ordering and pricing decisions in a supply chain with demand and supply uncertainties abstract this paper studies coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one original equipment manufacturer oem one manufacturer and one distributor and possesses uncertainties at both demand and supply sides these uncertainties emerge respectively from random demand the distributor faces and randomness of capacity with which the oem processes the manufacturer s outsourced quantity sharing supply and demand uncertainty information along the supply chain enables us to develop three models with different coordination efforts the oem and manufacturer coordination the manufacturer and distributor coordination and the oem manufacturer and distributor coordination and quantify the coordinated decisions in these three models our analysis of these coordination models suggests that coordinating with the oem improves the manufacturer s probability of meeting downstream demand and his expected profit yet coordinating with the manufacturer is not necessarily beneficial to the oem when downstream coordination is lacking

research note quantity discounts in differentiated consumer product markets in this paper we extend the standard hotelling model of product differentiation to incorporate a second dimension of consumer heterogeneity that relates to the quantity of the product consumers wish to buy this extension allows us to derive optimal nonlinear pricing rules chosen by competing sellers when offering differentiated products in the marketplace it also permits us to assess whether sellers find it optimal to offer quantity discounts in such a setting and the implications of such discounts on their profitability we find that offering quantity discounts corresponds indeed to equilibrium behavior the extent of discounting declines the less differentiated the products surprisingly when sellers offer to consumers a choice between two different sized packages their profits are at most as high as when such a choice is unavailable moreover when utilizing nonlinear pricing rules is not feasible the profits of the sellers actually decline when they offer consumers a choice between different sized packages a limited empirical investigation supports the comparative statics we derive in our theoretical model

implicit understandings in channels of distribution formal agreements can be used to achieve coordination among channel members these agreements work by exerting explicit control over the members who make the agreements however implicit understandings can be used as a partial substitute for more formal agreements in this paper we show that implicit understandings can develop as channel members learn about each other s behavior we show that this learning leads to the use of the implicit influence each channel member has over the other s behavior the learning leading to an implicit understanding requires some form of experimentation or historical observation this learning results in an oscillating retail price when only one channel member learns the other s behavior both channel members obtain greater profits than when neither member learns and both channel members obtain less profits than when both members learn however the member who does not learn obtains more profits than the member who learns we also show that implicit understandings r

the impact of the gatt agreement on eu fruit and vegetable policy abstract this paper examines the eu s plans for implementing the uruguay round gatt agreement on agriculture with respect to fresh fruits and vegetables it considers the import access export subsidy and domestic support commitments in particular the eu has decided to retain a minimum import price regime for fresh fruits and vegetables the new entry price system displacing the old reference price system is to apply on a consignment basis the entry price and reference price systems are compared and some conclusions drawn about the likely impact of entry prices on potential third country suppliers of the eu market

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

designing a firm s coordinated manufacturing and supply decisions with short product life cycles in this paper we consider a problem of joint coordination between a firm s manufacturing and supply departments the manufacturing department is responsible for meeting random demand of a product with a short life cycle the supply department s responsibility is to provide the sufficient amount of raw materials so that the required production level can be achieved when coordination prevails both departments decisions are jointly made otherwise decisions are made independently without an exchange of information if the random demand exceeds the amount produced a second production run can be expedited at a substantially higher cost our analysis yields insightful results to such a coordination problem between the two departments we provide conditions under which it is desirable to coordinate resulting in a significant increase in expected profit if coordination is optimal then the supply department would purchase additional reserved material for the second run under this scenario we analyze the effects of joint coordination on the expected profit we also find explicit conditions for which joint coordination is not beneficial i e the supply department should only order sufficient material to meet the first production run requirements we provide a detailed set of numerical examples and generate response surfaces indicating the desirability of coordination for different pairs of parameter combinations

a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits in this paper the joint problem of ordering and offering price discount by a supplier to his sole major buyer is analyzed the objective is to induce the buyer to alter his order schedule and size so that the supplier can benefit from lower set up ordering and inventory holding costs we generalize the quantity discount pricing model of monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 6 720 726 to 1 explicitly incorporate constraints imposed on the amount of discount that can be offered and 2 relax the implicit assumption of a lot for lot or order for order policy adopted by the supplier an algorithm is developed to solve the supplier s joint ordering and price discount problem

global supply chains and trade policy responses to the 2008 crisis the collapse in trade and the contraction of output that occurred during 2008 9 was comparable to and in many countries more severe than the great depression of the 1930s however it did not give rise to the rampant protectionism that followed the great crash the idea that the rise in the fragmentation of production across global value chains vertical specialization may be a deterrent against protectionism is under appreciated in the literature institutions also played a role in limiting the extent of protectionist responses world trade organization discipline raises the cost of using trade policies for member countries and has proved to be a stable foundation for the open multilateral trading system that has been built over the past 50 years using tradeand protection data for seven large emerging market countries that have a history of active use of trade policy the influence of these and other factors on trade policy responses to the 2008 crisis are empirically examined an instrumental variables strategy is used to identify their impact participation in global value chains is found to be a powerful economic factor determining trade policy responses

self enforcing trade agreements evidence from time varying trade policy the bagwell and staiger 1990 theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs i increase with imports ii increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities and iii decrease with the variance of imports the authors find us import policy during 1997 2006 to be consistent with this theory a one standard deviation increase in import growth the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the us imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent by 88 percent and by 76 percent respectively

the optimality of s s policies for a stochastic inventory problem with proportional and lump sum penalty cost in this paper we consider a single product multi period inventory problem for which the penalty cost consists of two parts a lump sum portion which is independent of the size of the shortage and a portion which is linear in the size of the shortage we show that for all nonincreasing demand density functions the expected total cost function is k convex and hence there is an optimal policy for the n period problem that is s s

the marketing channel as an equilibrium set of contracts nash bargaining theory and recent developments in economic contract theory are employed in the analysis of the marketing channels individual dyadic contracts involving payment schedules between members of a simple 3 level channel are investigated with particular reference to monitoring problems and intrachannel power relations the interrelations between individual contracts are examined and the equilibrium set of contracts constituting the channel derived the performance of the channel in terms of risk sharing allocative efficiency and the distribution of gains is then evaluated it is found that the risk aversion of channel members and the cost of monitoring and enforcement affect channel efficiency and that under certain types of interdependencies and externalities the nature of the power structure is crucial to channel efficiency

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

nonlinear pricing in markets with interdependent demand this paper provides a mathematical framework for modeling demand and determining optimal price schedules in markets which have demand externalities and can sustain nonlinear pricing these fundamental economic concepts appear in the marketplace in the form of mutual buyers benefits and quantity discounts the theory addressing these aspects is relevant to a wide variety of goods and services examples include tariffs for electronic communications services pricing of franchises and royalty fees for copyrighted material and patents this paper builds on several previous results from microeconomics and extends nonlinear pricing to markets with demand externalities the implications of this price structure are compared to results obtained for flat rates and two part tariffs in a similar context a case study is described in which the results were applied to planning the startup of a new electronic communications service

hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in europe although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime as an example great britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century but britain s behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability i advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a political business cycle

effective protection redux abstract this paper rehabilitates effective protection for use in political economy in general equilibrium the usual definition corresponds to no economically interesting magnitude the effective rate of protection for sector j is redefined here as the uniform tariff which is equivalent to the actual differentiated tariff structure in its effect on rents to residual claimants in sector j it permits political economic ranking of how much protection is given across sectors since higher uniform tariffs imply higher losses of welfare sacrificed to the interest groups demonstrating operationality the numerical results for the us economy for the old and new concepts are not significantly correlated

macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings evidence from four countries abstract this paper examines the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors real exchange rate fluctuations affect the two criteria for dumping in opposite ways making the overall effect on filings ambiguous in theory examining the filing patterns of the four major users of ad law during the 1980 98 period we find that real exchange rates and domestic real gdp growth both have statistically significant impacts on filings bilateral filing data indicate that a one standard deviation real appreciation of the domestic currency increases filings by 33 we also find one standard deviation fall in domestic real gdp increases filings by 23

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

competitor orientation and the evolution of business markets competitor orientation i e the focus on beating the competition rather than maximizing profits seems to thrive in business situations despite being by definition suboptimal for profit maximizing firms our research explains how a competitor orientation can persist and even thrive in equilibrium in markets that reward only profits we apply evolutionary game theory to business markets where reputation matters we use three games that represent classic interactions in business marketing chicken to illustrate competition for product adoption the battle of the sexes channel negotiations and the prisoners dilemma pricing battles initial populations are assumed to have both profit maximizing managers and competitor oriented managers i e those who gain additional utility from beating others we demonstrate that a competitor orientation can survive in equilibrium despite selection that is based solely on profits using chicken we show that a competitor orientation thrives and can even overrun the population we use the battle of the sexes to show that a competitor orientation will overrun one population in a two sided negotiation e g all retailers in a retailer manufacturer dyad last using the prisoners dilemma we show that competitor orientation is not selected against we conclude that evolutionary profit driven selection pressures cannot be assumed to eliminate nonprofit maximizing behavior even when selection is based purely on profitability

testing the endogeneity of tariff policy in the u s abstract endogenous tariff theory suggests tariffs are created in response to self interested political pressure using a varma model covering the period 1890 1970 in the u s we show that macroeconomic variables which proxy political pressure granger cause the tariff

a theory of managed trade this paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of normal trade volume coupled with episodes of special protection when trade volumes surge this dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game facing volatile trade swings high trade volume leads to a greater incentive to defect unilaterally from cooperative tariff levels therefore as the volume of trade expands the level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium to mitigate the rising trade volume and hold the incentive to defect in check copyright 1990 by american economic association

cheap talk and bogus network externalities in the emerging technology market many emerging technologies exhibit path dependent demands driven by positive network feedback such network effects profoundly impact marketing strategists thinking in today s network economy however the significant network externalities expected by many people often fail to materialize in the emerging technology market we analyze this phenomenon in the context of a technology distribution channel by studying cheap talk strategies under information asymmetry we show that incentive compatible contracts are essential for achieving credible information transmission in our model the better informed technology vendor has an incentive to inflate the retailer s ex ante belief of network externalities when a wholesale price contract is adopted when properly termed revenue sharing contracts are implemented there are information efficient cheap talk equilibria where truthful information transmission is mutually beneficial when the vendor s information is imperfect even revenue sharing contracts cannot guarantee credible information transmission if there is significant prior belief disparity between the vendor and the retailer this study demonstrates how information inefficient equilibria e g information blockage arise because of the conflict of interest or the conflict of opinion among channel members it also explores the role of cheap talk in facilitating channel coordination

the political economy of the tariff cycle how can protectionism and free trade succeed one another our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors political demands these actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry old regions have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment we show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks during troughs whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends ceteris paribus on the relative political strength of old import competing and old exporting interests if old import competing industries outweigh the old exporters then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential

efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes we examine the problem of developing supply contracts that encourage proper coordination of forecast information and production decisions between a manufacturer and distributor of high fashion seasonal products operating in a two mode production environment the first production mode is relatively cheap but requires a long lead time while the second is expensive but offers quick turnaround we focus on contracts of the form w1 w2 b wherewi is the wholesale price offered for production modei andb is a return price offered for items left over at the end of the season we find that such a contract can coordinate the manufacturer and distributor to act in the best interest of the channel the pricing conditions needed to ensure an efficient solution vary depending on the degree of demand forecast improvement between periods and the manufacturer s access to forecast information we also examine whether these conditions ensure a pareto optimal solution with respect to two traditional production settings

optimal myopic policy for a stochastic inventory problem with fixed and proportional backorder costs in this paper we consider a single product periodic review stochastic demand inventory problem where backorders are allowed and penalized via fixed and proportional backorder costs simultaneously fixed backorder cost associates a one shot penalty with stockout situations whereas proportional backorder cost corresponds to a penalty for each demanded but yet waiting to be satisfied item we discuss the optimality of a myopic base stock policy for the infinite horizon case critical number of the infinite horizon myopic policy i e the base stock level is denoted by s if the initial inventory is below s then the optimal policy is myopic in general i e regardless of the values of model parameters and demand density otherwise the sufficient condition for a myopic optimum requires some restrictions on demand density or parameter values however this sufficient condition is not very restrictive in the sense that it holds immediately for erlang demand density family we also show that the value of s can be computed easily for the case of erlang demand this special case is important since most real life demand densities with coefficient of variation not exceeding unity can well be represented by an erlang density thus the myopic policy may be considered as an approximate solution if the exact policy is intractable finally we comment on a generalization of this study for the case of phase type demands and identify some related research problems which utilize the results presented here

import protection business cycles and exchange rates evidence from the great recession this research estimates the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on import protection policies over 1988 q1 2010 q4 for five industrialized economies the united states european union australia canada and south korea there is evidence of a strong countercyclical trade policy response in the pre great recession period of 1988 q1 2008 q3 during which increases in domestic unemployment rates real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates and declines in the gdp growth rates of bilateral trading partners led to substantial increases in new temporary trade barriers it then applies this pre great recession empirical model to realized macroeconomic data from 2008 q4 2010 q4 and find it predicts a surge of new import protection during the great recession e g for the us and eu the model predicts new trade barriers would cover an additional 15 percentage points of nonoil imports well above the baseline level of 2 3 percent of import coverage immediately preceding the crisis finally the research examines why the realized trade policy response differed from model predictions while exchange rate movements played an important role in limiting new import protection during the great recession there is also evidence of one particularly important change in trade policy responsiveness i e in this period governments refrained from imposing new temporary trade barriers against foreign trading partners experiencing their own weak or negative economic growth

advertising in a distribution channel conventional wisdom suggests that one of the goals of manufacturer advertising is to reduce the cross price elasticity between products make one s own and rivals products appear to be less substitutable in the eyes of consumers conventional wisdom also suggests that all else being equal retailers will be able to obtain better terms of trade from manufacturers the more substitutable are the manufacturers products it follows that retailers should be opposed to advertising that has the effect of reducing cross price elasticities and thus that manufacturer advertising can be a source of channel conflict we show that these conventional wisdoms need not hold when only some consumers are exposed to the advertising messages using a hotelling model of demand we show that 1 manufacturers can be worse off from advertising that reduces the cross price elasticities between their products 2 channel conflict need not arise even when the sole purpose of advertising is to affect cross price elasticities and 3 depending on its bargaining power a retailer can be better off when the manufacturers products are perceived to be less substitutable

heterogeneity and aggregation implications for labor market fluctuations we demonstrate that aggregate employment and consumption can increase without a corresponding movement in productivity in a model with heterogeneous agents where the only aggregate disturbance is a productivity shock the interaction between incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor results in a low employment productivity correlation and creates a time varying wedge between the marginal rate of substitution for commodity consumption and hours and productivity our results caution against viewing the measured wedge as an inefficiency due to a failure of labor market clearing or as a fundamental driving force behind business cycles jel d31 e32 j22 j24 j31

game theoretic analyses of decentralized assembly supply chains non cooperative equilibria vs coordination with cost sharing contracts abstract this paper considers a multiple supplier single manufacturer assembly supply chain where the suppliers produce components of a short life cycle product which is assembled by the manufacturer in this single period problem the suppliers determine their production quantities and the manufacturer chooses the retail price we assume that the manufacturer faces a random price dependent demand in either additive or multiplicative form for each case we analyze both simultaneous move and leader follower games to respectively determine the nash and stackelberg equilibria and find the globally optimal solution that maximizes the system wide expected profit then we introduce appropriate buy back and lost sales cost sharing contracts to coordinate this assembly supply chain so that when all the suppliers and the manufacturer adopt their equilibrium solutions the system wide expected profit is maximized

water scarcity and food trade in the southern and eastern mediterranean countries abstract this study investigates food trade patterns in relation to water resources availability in the southern and eastern mediterranean countries semed examinations show that most of these countries have a high dependence on the import of water intensive crops cereal vegetable oil and sugar in the domestic food supply the region as a whole is marginally a net exporter of fruits and vegetables while variations are substantial across countries multi variable regression analyses show that intensification of water scarcity is an important factor in explaining the increase in food import in the semed countries during the past two decades it also finds that while gdp per capita has a strong influence on the level of food import in a country its impact on changes in the import during the same period is rather modest no significant relationship is found between the trade of fruits and vegetables and water resources availability the projection on food import with respect to the decline in per capita water resources availability results in an increase of 40 39 and 14 respectively for cereal vegetable oil and sugar by 2020 in the region holding other factors constant the european union eu is the major food trade partner of the semed countries except for cereal about 70 of the fruit export and 55 of the vegetable export of the region currently go to the eu market expanding the export of fruits and vegetables is conducive to improving the value of water use in the semed countries however the expansion is constrained partly by the barriers in the destination markets notably the eu

wto tariff commitments and temporary protection complements or substitutes abstract there is a long held notion in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection tp measures are substitutes despite this prediction there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping safeguard and countervailing duties based on recent theoretical advances i argue in this paper that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing tp measures is instead tariff overhangs the difference between wto bound and applied tariffs lower tariff overhangs constrain countries to raise their mfn applied rates without legal repercussions independent of past tariff changes using detailed sectoral data for a sample of 30 wto member countries during the period 1996 2014 i find strong evidence for an inverse link between tariff overhangs and tp activity this result implies that tariff overhangs and tp measures are substitutes vindicating the importance of existing tariff commitments as a key determinant of alternative protection instruments

the effect of the canada us free trade agreement on canadian multilateral trade liberalization in this paper show that the canada us free trade agreement cusfta tariff preferences have triggered a decline in canadian external tariffs explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998 next we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the us firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in canada this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the us and canada finally we estimate the effect of the cusfta on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity resume l effet de l accord de libre echange canada u s sur la liberalisation multilaterale du commerce canadien dans ce texte on montre que les preferences tarifaires de l accord de libre echange canada us alecus ont declenche un declin dans le niveau des droits de douane externes canadiens et expliquent une reduction de deux points de pourcentage dans le tarif moyen entre 1989 et 1998 ensuite on decouvre que les industries qui generent le moins de rentes des exportations vers les etats unis font l experience de reduction de tarifs plus importante au canada ce resultat revele une cooperation dans les politiques commerciales entre canada et etats unis enfin on evalue l effet de l alecus sur l intensite du lobbying industriel a propos de la politique commerciale au canada et on decouvre qu il n existe pas de relation entre la liberation preferentielle du commerce et l intensite de l activite de lobbying

an investigation of the equal commission rate policy for a multi product salesforce for a multi product sales force the policy of paying commissions as an equal percentage of realized gross margins is shown to be in general nonoptimal from the firm s profit maximization point of view for a homogeneous salesforce the nonoptimality results from the fact that earlier research while taking into account the effect of commission rates on a salesperson s allocations of total time to the multiple products has not incorporated the effect of commission rates on salesperson s total selling time resulting from his her trading off income vs total time to maximize utility the equal commission rate policy is however optimal for the cases of i salesperson with a fixed total selling time and a minimum income requirement and ii fair income salesperson whose total selling time is merely a function of income and not based on rate of change of income as in the utility maximization case if the salesforce is heterogeneous e g different salespersons have differing sales responses to selling time this makes the equal commission rate policy to be in general nonoptimal even for the restrictive cases i and ii it is suggested that the commission rates be set higher for products with greater elasticities relating quantities sold to selling times the common practice of paying commissions as a percentage of total dollar sales rather than gross margins is shown to be optimal under certain assumptions

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

rational conjectures in the theory of oligopoly abstract the paper employs the notion of rational conjectural equilibrium to remove the arbitrary nature of conjectures about rivals reactions which characterises the traditional non cooperative theory of oligopoly a general definition of these equilibria is given and the concept is then applied to a simple duopoly model the standard models of perfect competition monopoly limit price dominant firms are shown to emerge as special cases of rational conjectural equilibria

the march of an economic idea protectionism isn t counter cyclic anymore conventional wisdom holds that protectionism is counter cyclic tariffs quotas and the like grow during recessions while that may have been a valid description of the data before the first world war it is now inaccurate since the second world war protectionism has not been counter cyclic tariffs and non tariff barriers simply do not rise systematically during downturns i document this new stylised fact with a panel of data covering over 180 countries and 40 years using over a dozen measures of protectionism and six of business cycles i test and reject a number of potential reasons why protectionism is no longer counter cyclic a diagnosis of exclusion leads me to believe that modern economics may well be responsible for the decline in protectionism s cyclic behaviour economists are more united in their disdain for protectionism than virtually any other concept this in turn leaves one optimistic that the level of protectionism will continue to decline along with its cyclicality andrew k rose

modeling quantity discounts under general price sensitive demand functions optimal policies and relationships this paper presents models for determining optimal all unit and incremental quantity discount policies and investigates the effect of quantity discounts on increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions under general price sensitive demand functions the paper develops optimal quantity discount policies investigates their interrelationships and their benefits to both the supplier and the buyer and gains managerial insights for the scenarios of maximizing the supplier s profit and the joint profit we develop simple and efficient solution approaches for determining the all unit and the incremental optimal decision policies for general price sensitive demand functions we have three main findings first with price sensitive demand there are two incentives in offering quantity discounts increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions in most cases increasing demand dominates in justifying the offering of quantity discounts second using a single lot size associated with all efficient transactions as with the constant demand case does not hold with the price sensitive demand case third the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in benefiting both the supplier and the buyer

the price stabilization effects of the eu entry price scheme for fruit and vegetables the paper assesses the stabilization effects of the eu import regime for fresh fruit and vegetables based on the entry price system the analysis is carried out on the eu prices of tomatoes and lemons and those of imports from some of the main competing countries on the eu domestic markets morocco argentina and turkey it is based on the estimation of a threshold vector autoregressive econometric model that is shown capable of taking the workings of the import regime into account the model shows that prices behave differently when import prices are above below the trigger entry price this paper allowed to highlight the cases for which the isolation effect of eps seems reached and the resulting stabilization effects

are preferential trade agreements with non trade objectives a stumbling block for multilateral liberalization in many preferential trade agreements ptas countries exchange not only reductions in trade barriers but also cooperation in non trade issues such as labor and environmental standards intellectual property etc we provide a model of ptas motivated by cooperation in non trade issues and analyze its implications for global free trade and welfare we find that such ptas increase the cost of multilateral tariff reductions and thus cause a stumbling block to global free trade this occurs because multilateral tariff reductions decrease the threat that can be used in ptas and thus the surplus that can be extracted from them by explicitly modeling the interaction between preferential and multilateral negotiations we derive a testable prediction and provide novel econometric evidence that supports the model s key prediction the welfare analysis shows that the current wto rules allowing this type of ptas may be optimal for economically large countries thus the model can predict the rules we observe we also analyze alternative rules that constitute a pareto improvement

direct marketing indirect profits a strategic analysis of dual channel supply chain design the advent of e commerce has prompted many manufacturers to redesign their traditional channel structures by engaging in direct sales the model conceptualizes the impact of customer acceptance of a direct channel the degree to which customers accept a direct channel as a substitute for shopping at a traditional store on supply chain design the customer acceptance of a direct channel can be strong enough that an indepent manufacturer would open a direct channel to compete with its own retailers here direct marketing is used for strategic channel control purposes even though it is inefficient on its own and surprisingly it can profit the manufacturer even when so direct sales occur specifically we construct a price setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer direct marketing which indirectly increases the flow of profits through the retail channel helps the manufacturer improve overall profitability by reducing the degree of inefficient price double marginalization while operated by the manufacturer to constrain the retailer s pricing behavior the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because it will be accompanied by a wholesale price reduction this combination of manufacturer pull and push can benefit the retailer in equilibrium finally we show that the mere threat of introducing the direct channel can increase the manufacturer s negotiated share of cooperative profits even if price efficiency is obtained by using other business practices

note channel of distribution profits when channel members form conjectures it is well known that lower channel profits are achieved in the bilateral manufacturer reseller monopoly if manufacturer and reseller independently optimize their respective profits they take each other s decisions as given i e adopt decision rules that ignore their influence on the other channel member higher profits are achieved if they coordinate their profit maximizing decisions consequently there is an economic justification for 1 vertical integration that by definition prevents conflicting profit objectives or 2 contracts that change channel members incentives to the compatible objectives of shares of total channel profits this paper investigates the possibility that coordination might take place without formal arrangements like vertical integration or contracts the reason for this contention is the casual observation that channel members are often acutely aware of the interdependencies between channel participants we might thus expect that they will form conjectures about other channel members reactions to their own actions we show that rational conjectures lead profit maximizing channel members to adopt modified decisions rules can such conjectural decision making create at least partially channel coordination or cooperation in other words can channel members deviate from the nash equilibrium and thus achieve greater profits the answer given in this paper is a conditional yes

the salesperson as outside agent or employee a transaction cost analysis this descriptive study explores the reasons for integration of the personal selling function i e the use of employee direct salespeople rather than manufacturers representatives reps a hypothesized model is developed based on both transaction cost analysis and the sales force management literature data from 13 electronic component manufacturers covering 159 u s sales districts are used to estimate a logistic model of the probability of going direct in a given district results are shown to be stable across specification and estimation methods and to fit the data well the transaction cost model is generally supported the principal finding is that the greater the difficulty of evaluating a salesperson s performance the more likely the firm to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism i e to use a direct sales force among other findings direct sales forces are also associated with complex hard to learn product lines and with districts that demand considerable nonselling activities several factors prove unrelated including company size the amount of travel a district requires and the importance of key accounts this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 3 pages 234 254 in 1985

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

toward a business cycle model of tariffs a modified interest group model links movements in tariffs to changes in the level of economic activity within nations this model is introduced and tested for tariff behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in three nations the united states great britain and germany empirical analysis lends strong support to the model s central thesis that tariffs are sensitive to movements within a business cycle tariff changes occurring in the three nations with the exception of british tariff increases generally conform to the expectations of the model furthermore business cycle sensitivity provides an explanation of the behavior of tariffs superior to two prominent alternatives those based on ideology and on hegemonic stability

the effects of trade policies for fresh fruit and vegetables of the european union abstract this paper examines the economic effects of the trade policies for fresh fruit and vegetables adopted by the european union eu after the uruguay round agreement on agriculture uraa the new import regimes are based on entry prices that in effect work as minimum prices at the same time the eu has signed trade preference agreements particularly with southern mediterranean countries that are important suppliers of fruit and vegetables to the eu the management of the import regime is a balance between two conflicting objectives to support internal producers and to preserve trade flows from preferred countries on the side of export subsidies to handle the reduction commitments under the uraa the eu has introduced rationing trough tender procedures the analysis shows that such subsidies do not seem able to boost the exports of eligible products therefore eu policy makers should ask whether the eu should continue to offer such subsidies

pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information abstract a product costs the manufacturer c unit to produce the retailer sells it at p unit to the consumers the retail market demand volume v varies with p according to a given demand curve d p how would or should the players i e the manufacturer and the retailer set their prices in contrast to many studies that assume a dominant manufacturer implementing the manufacturer stackelberg ms game this paper examines how a dominant retailer should operate when his knowledge of c is imperfect we first derive optimal decisions some of them counter intuitive for the dominant retailer when he is restricted to choosing between rs retailer stackelberg and ms second we propose a reverse quantity discount scheme that the dominant retailer i e the downstream player can offer to the manufacturer note that the standard discount scheme is offered by the upstream player we show that this discounting scheme is quite effective compared to the considerably more complicated though nevertheless theoretically optimal menu of contracts we also reveal a largely overlooked function of discounting i e discounting enables an ignorant but dominant player to usurp the earnings attributable to the knowledge of the dominated player finally we also show that discounting works well when the demand curve is linear but becomes ineffective when the demand curve is iso elastic a result echoing the conclusions of some earlier related works

tariff binding and overhang theory and evidence abstract most market access commitments under the wto are in the form of bindings on applied tariff rates we observe two important regularities in the data first applied tariffs are often lower than the bound tariffs providing governments with substantial policy flexibility second the extent of flexibility varies substantially across sectors and countries in a sharp contrast to the prediction of standard trade agreement models we observe a strong negative correlation between tariff commitments and measures of import market power we model the trade off between discipline and flexibility in the design of trade agreements and argue that recognizing this trade off is the key to explain the observed patterns in the tariff binding commitments and applied tariffs under the wto

us trade wars in the twenty first century with emerging countries make america and its partners lose again in a context of rising protectionist rhetoric this paper looks at the potential impact of trade wars initiated by a change in us trade policies we use a static multicountry multisector general equilibrium model to evaluate six modalities of three potential trade wars for a total of 18 scenarios between the usa and china between the usa and mexico and a combination of the two previous conflicts in each case we evaluate various forms of trade retaliation by the us partner s the same level of import duty as the one imposed by the usa an import duty that minimises welfare loss a duty that minimises terms of trade deterioration a duty that generates the same amount of collected revenue and finally a nash equilibrium we conclude that there is no scenario in which the us government augments its domestic welfare or gdp there may be sectoral gains in value added in the usa but they are small and to the detriment of other sectors while losses for china are relatively small potential losses for the mexican economy are significant there are also free riders of these trade wars finally the way in which trade retaliations are designed matters greatly

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

u s trade policies in a changing world economy this collection of original essays focuses on issues of international trade and trade policy in a world that is undergoing structural adaptation and in the face of a serious increase in the us trade deficit they bring a new consolidation of analytical perspective to a wide variety of current trade policy issues in their overview chapter alan v deardorff and robert m stern discuss developments in trade and protectionism review the case for free trade and address the arguments in favor of trade intervention rudiger dornbusch and jeffrey frankel analyze the macroeconomic setting in which changes have been made in us tariffs and ntbs stephen p magee and leslie young develop a model of endogenous protection and use it to search for microeconomic and macroeconomic variables that may help to explain changes in tariff and nontariff protection in the us since 1900 paul krugman takes up the question of identifying strategic sectors and the extent to which international competition and national government policies may affect the returns to such sectors under conditions of imperfect competition or when externalities are present avinash dixit analyzes the responses that the us might make to other countries trade policies in terms of how these policies affect us real national income and national security he concludes that the us could use strategic advance responses to alter other countries trade policies in a mutually beneficial way richard n cooper evaluates trade policy as foreign policy by looking at changes through three periods of us history t n srinivasan scrutinizes the national defense argument for government intervention in foreign trade john h jackson in discussing alternative negotiation approaches for the conduct of us trade policies observes that the pursuit of multilateralism may be frustrating and that what may be needed instead is a minilateral approach to trade liberalization in conclusion w max corden offers a package of rules that he believes may be both desirable and possible for the international trading system to attain robert m stern is professor of economics at the university of michigan and director of the institute of public policy studies he is coauthor with allan v deardorff of the michigan model of world production and trade mit press 1985

a comparison of different quantity discount pricing policies in a two echelon channel with stochastic and asymmetric demand information abstract in this paper we study quantity discount pricing policies in a channel of one manufacturer and one retailer the paper assumes that the channel faces a stochastic price sensitive demand but the retailer can privately observe the realization of an uncertain demand parameter the problem is analyzed as a stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares quantity discount pricing schemes to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting the retail price and associated quantity proposed in the paper are four quantity discount pricing policies regular quantity discount fixed percentage discount incremental volume discount and fixed marginal profit rate discount optimal solutions are derived and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy

coordinating pricing and production decisions in the presence of price competition abstract in this paper we study the effects of coordinating pricing and production decisions on the improvement of a firm s position in a price competitive environment assuming duopolistic market conditions we use game theoretic concepts and models to analyze two scenarios a firm s marketing and production departments may vertically coordinate their pricing and production quantity decisions and the two firms may horizontally compete for price sensitive random demand the two scenarios include i no coordination and ii coordination in both firms we show that by coordinating their pricing and production decisions competing firms can increase their profitability especially when conditions are unfavourable i e with smaller market sizes higher unit costs and lower unit revenues while it may be intuitive to expect that coordination will outperform non coordination our models provide a means for formalizing and quantifying the differences between the two policies

jobs jobs jobs a new perspective on protectionism this paper analyzes the determinants of protectionism in a small open economy with search frictions in this environment jobs generate rents whose access depends on the level of trade protection by raising the domestic price of a good a government may attract more firms in a particular industry this raises the probability that workers will find jobs in this sector and in turn will benefit from the associated rents though simple this channel may help explainavarietyofstylizedfactsonthestructureoftradeprotectionandindividualtrade policy preferences jel f130 f160

vertical strategic interaction implications for channel pricing strategy this paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels using foresight i e price leadership and considering category implications i e product line pricing are price leadership and product line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member if not when does this occur and why by investigating these questions we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues in addition this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions as such this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the right demand specification at the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member s reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure specifically if a channel member s best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability vss if the best reaction is to increase the margin the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity vsc if the best reaction is no margin change it is referred to as vertical strategic independence vsi using a game theoretic approach we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products both carried by two competing retailers as such the model allows for retailer product line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition in addition this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature i e a bilateral monopoly jeuland and shugan jeuland abel steven m shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2summer 239 72 two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers mcguire and staelin mcguire timothy w richard staelin 1983 an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 92 and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing choi choi s chan 1991 price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer marketing sci 10fall 271 96 unlike many other channel studies most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves thus this paper provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions the paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set the manufacturer uses foresight the retailer uses foresight and neither channel member uses foresight we then show a one to one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership specifically a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for vss but prefers to be a follower for vsc for vsi channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue as it has no effect on channel member profits we also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non product line pricing to product line pricing such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by vss or vsc at a more general level this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge i e foresight and or product line pricing in making strategic marketing decisions in this way ignorance can be bliss we also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction we show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price interestingly we find that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function consequently in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear finally our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer s precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations

optimal trade policy with trade imbalances abstract optimal trade and capital control policies are characterized under a dynamic model with endogenous trade imbalances in the absence of capital controls optimal trade protection is counter cyclical optimal use of capital controls however dampens the time variation of optimal trade taxes generally trade imbalances are not predictive of optimal policy however optimal trade policy and equilibrium trade imbalances move together when a country grows consistently faster or slower than the rest of the world quantifying the model for the u s economy shows that welfare gains from optimal policy are largely due to static terms of trade effects implying that gains from time varying tariffs or capital controls are small

the hunt vitell general theoryof marketing ethics can it enhance our understanding of principal agent relationships in channels of distribution this paper advances the hunt vitell general theory of marketing ethics as a framework for enriching current understanding of both long term marketing relationships in general and principal agent associations specifically under economic models of agency theory manufacturer distributor relationships are conceptualized as principal agent associations where both parties are assumed be motivated exclusively by short term financial self interest within the logical constraints of zero sum game conditions as a general model of ethical decision making and behavior in marketing the hunt vitell theory illustrates how ethical decisions are predicated not only upon estimations of potential benefits or outcomes using teleological criteria but also deontological evaluations which invoke norms and values furthermore the recent ideas advanced in relationship marketing perspectives suggest that distribution channel associations premised upon non zero sum or symbiotic assumptions may be more effective and more jointly profitable based upon the hunt vitell model propositions are formulated that complement the understanding of agency theory within the context of marketing channel relationships and thus may represent a basis for more effective agency selection and interaction in marketing practice

ordering and pricing decisions in a two echelon supply chain with asymmetric demand information abstract this article examines coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer and faces random demand of a single product with a short life cycle we consider a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the supplier does not such a problem with asymmetric demand information can be viewed as an extension of the newsboy problem in which both the supplier and the retailer possess the same demand information combining the mechanism of sharing demand information and that of quantity discount and return policy enables us to develop three coordinated models in contrast with the basic and uncoordinated model we are able to show the ordinal relationship among the retailer s optimal order quantities in these four models under a general form of random demand and compare the supply chain profits and conduct sensitivity analysis analytically in four models under uniform random demand we also provide numerical results under normal random demand that bear a resemblance to those under uniform random demand

cooperation in wto s tariff waters this paper examines the extent to which tariff cooperation is observed among world trade organization members with the help of a simple political economy model we show that tariffs are positively

coordinated decisions for substitutable products in a common retailer supply chain abstract this paper studies coordination mechanisms in a supply chain which consists of two suppliers with capacity uncertainties selling differential yet substitutable products through a common retailer who faces price sensitive random demand of these two products we develop in a noncompetitive setting three coordination models revenue sharing return policy and combination of revenue sharing and return policy and contrast them with a basic and uncoordinated model we are able to establish the ordinal relationship among the retailer s ordering and pricing decisions and analytically compare the performances between certain models when two suppliers are identical we find that the retailer s ordering and pricing decisions in the model with return policy in the case of identical suppliers are independent of demand or supply uncertainty our numerical results reveal that the performances of coordination models in the case of nonidentical suppliers resemble those in the case of identical suppliers we find that the retailer will place a larger order quantity in models where her average cost per unit sold is smaller we also find that product substitutability and uncertainties have different effects on chain performances

distribution channels an extension of exclusive retailership the underlying channel structure in most studies to date has consisted either of exclusive dealers that sell only one manufacturer s brand or of a single retailer selling multiple brands little attention has been given to the larger segment of most consumer goods markets in which retailers compete to sell multiple brands at the same location this research seeks to add to the growing literature of channel competition by analyzing three channel structures the least constrained of which deals with two competing manufacturers and two retailers each of whom distributes both products in a noncooperative game with two nash s and one stackleberg equilibrium using differentiated products and a linear demand function we introduce the concept of store substitutability a measure corresponding to product substitutability representing competitiveness at the retail level between the two retailers we are able to obtain closed form solutions for all cases we show that the presence of competitive effects at both retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on profits and prices we also study the effects of various power relationships in the channel furthermore we compare these results to those obtained by previous research finally we propose some testable implications and suggest avenues for future research

seasonal protection of f v imports in the eu impacts of the entry price system the measures of border protection applied by the european union eu to imports of fruits and vegetables fv are complex and usually not well represented in trade models not only because of the range of instruments still constraining trade but also because of product differentiation and seasonality in these products this article assesses the impact of eliminating entry price ep constraints applied to a group of fv products the proposed model is of a partial equilibrium nature and takes seasonality into account we have applied the model to imports of tomatoes cucumbers clementines and table grapes trade impacts of eliminating ep are significant for particular origins during specific seasons most notably for moroccan tomatoes the volumes and prices of products originating in the eu experience moderate reductions

a stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry abstract we consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader follower type move each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm we show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally we then devise a simple to implement information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off we also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results

taxation and the political economy of the tariff traditional accounts of u s tariff policy emphasize trade strategies and interest group politics this article makes a departure it opens with an observation up until world war i the tariff was the largest single source of federal government revenues it then explores the significance of tariffs as taxes theoretically and empirically in its first part the article develops a theory of taxation politics and applies it to the tariff in its second part it submits the theory to an empirical test modeling changes in u s tariff rates from 1829 to 1940 the politics of tariff revision it argues followed from two characteristics of the tariff as tax from the extent of the treasury s dependence upon it and from the distributive pattern of its burdens and benefits taken together the article concludes revenue dependence and distributive incidence account for several diverse aspects of american tariff policy including the structure of its coalitions the shifts in its objectives and the timing of its innovations

inventory control with generalized expediting we consider a single item periodic review inventory control problem in which discrete stochastic demand must be satisfied when shortages occur the unmet demand must be filled by some form of expediting we allow a very general form for the cost structure of expediting we explicitly consider the case where expedited production is allowed to produce up to a positive inventory level we also consider the case where expedited production beyond the deficit is not permitted an alternate application for this model is an inventory system with general lost sales costs for the infinite horizon discounted problem we characterize the structure of the optimal stationary expediting policy and show that an s s policy is optimal for regular production for the special cases where the expediting cost function is concave or consists of a fixed and linear per unit cost we show that the optimal stationary expediting policy is generalized s s or order up to respectively a numerical study allows us to gain insight into when expediting above and beyond the deficit is cost effective

fruit and vegetable access to eu markets dissecting tariffs faced by mediterranean countries this paper analyzes the access of eastern and southern mediterranean countries to the eu fruit and vegetables market and provides a measure of the level of preferences from which they benefit to take into account the complexity of eu protection in the fv morocco has the highest preference while syria and israel have the lowest we simulated a multilateral reduction in the mfn tariffs as planned in the doha round and showed that this would reduce the heterogeneity within the zone by more strongly eroding the preferences of the most advantaged countries the classification of entry price products as sensitive products would either benefit or have no effect on most mediterranean countries

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

risk sharing and group decision making in a decision making problem where a group will receive an uncertain payoff which must be divided among the members of the group the ultimate payoff of interest is the vector of individual payoffs received by the members of the group in this paper preferences are quantified in terms of cardinal utility functions for such vectors of payoffs these utility functions can represent preferences concerning equitable and inequitable vectors of payoffs as well as attitudes toward risk the individual utility functions are aggregated to form a group utility function for the vector of payoffs and this latter function is in turn used to generate a group utility function for the overall group payoff and a sharing rule for dividing the group payoff into individual payoffs the resulting group decisions are pareto optimal in utility space properties of the sharing rule and the group utility function are investigated for additive and multilinear group utility functions

the eu entry price system for fresh fruits and vegetables paper tiger or powerful market barrier abstract the eu protects eu growers of 15 kinds of fresh fruits and vegetables against international competition by the entry price system eps which is designed to restrict imports below the product specific politically designated entry price level this study investigates the relevance of the eps per product and country of origin we develop two indicators for the effectiveness of the eps which serve as variables in a cluster analysis identifying four classes differing in the relevance of the eps the relevance of the eps is found to be heterogeneous among products as well as countries of origin it is highest for artichokes courgettes cucumbers lemons plums and tomatoes the influence of the eps on apples clementines and pears is significantly lower and of least relevance for apricots mandarins oranges peaches and nectarines and table grapes the eps has the greatest effect on countries which neighbour the eu whereas it is of minor importance for exports from far away countries with the exception of china and south africa

manufacturer s revenue sharing contract and retail competition this paper investigates a revenue sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers the manufacturer as a stackelberg leader offers a revenue sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season under the offered contract terms the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer prior to the season and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season the process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the bayesian nash game on the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers the manufacturer designs the revenue sharing contract adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods the study finds that the provision of revenue sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price only contract however the benefits earned under the revenue sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price sensitivity factors the paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers lastly it investigates how the competition between retailers factor influences the decision making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function