political support and tax reforms with an application to italy in 2001 the italian government introduced a personal income tax reform to be implemented in successive phases in 2004 taxes were reduced to all income levels with higher gains for low income and high income individuals than for middle income ones a large debate arised this paper explores the political economy reasons under this tax reform mainly the attempt of the government to attract the uncertain voters swing voters a probabilistic voting model is introduced to capture the importance of swing voters the model predicts that the average personal income tax rate tends to be lower for groups of lower income higher preference for leisure and containing more politically mobile voters swing voters however data from italian polls show that while the tax reform was a good strategy to attract swing voters the specific design of the reform which favored high income and low income individuals but not the middle class was not the more appropriate strategy

modelling long run comovements in equity markets a flexible approach abstract international equity markets linkages are characterized by nonlinear dependence and asymmetries we investigate shifts in long run comovements in stock markets by means of an interrupted markov switching cointegration specification this flexible approach allow us to study to what extent documented changes in global integration are permanent or whether market linkages are subject to changes using an illustrative sample from 1980 to 2012 for usa uk and hong kong stock price indices we find evidence of interrupted cointegration across these markets between may 1997 and april 2002 which is consistent with the decoupling of stock prices from fundamentals during the dot com bubble

regime switching cointegration tests for the asian stock index futures evidence for msci taiwan nikkei 225 hong kong hang seng and sgx straits times indices this study applies a cointegration system that considers regime shifts in order to study the long run relationship between the stock index and stock index futures markets the msci taiwan nikkei 225 hong kong hang seng and singapore exchange sgx straits times indices are examined the empirical evidence shows that the cointegration system with regime shifts performs better than the usual cointegration system without considering regime shifts

nonstationarity cointegration and structural breaks in the australian term structure of interest rates this article examines the unit root property of the australian short and long term interest rates using unit root tests that accommodate a single or two breaks under the null and or alternative hypothesis two breaks in interest rates are found to coincide with the 1982 83 and 1990 91 recessions or the 1993 inflation targeting period we further investigate the implications of these structural breaks on the cointegrating relationship implied by the single linear expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates while there is evidence that the data are consistent with the expectations hypothesis at the shorter end of the term structure breaks in interest rates generate a shift in the cointegrating relationship thus altering the information content of the term structure failing to account for a regime shift in the cointegration regression the data erroneously supports the expectations hypothesis at the longer end of the term structure these results have profound implications for polic

an introduction to the law and economics of intellectual property although economists have written on topics of intellectual property for a long time the impact of economics on public policy in this area has been slight especially as compared to the influence of professional writings in areas such as antitrust and taxation we believe that too few of the profession s resources have been devoted to these issues and that of those resources that have been employed too few have been devoted to empirical analyses we hope that this introductory essay and the three papers that follow will stimulate interest in this subject this introductory essay first describes some of the basic economic tradeoffs involved in intellectual property law and then describes the framework of the law in the six areas described above patent copyright semiconductor protection trademark trade secret and misappropriation it is intended both to provide thumbnail descriptions of the various intellectual property regimes to economists working in this area and to indicate where additional economic research might be useful

can socioeconomic heritage produce a lost generation with regard to entrepreneurship a considerable amount of literature deals with the influence of institutions on entrepreneurship but for all that little is known about the interplay between institutions and personal determinants of entrepreneurship in this paper the empirical evidence that older people in transition economies have low engagement in entrepreneurial activity is the starting point for analyzing how institutions moderate the relationship between individual characteristics and entrepreneurial choice the results show that the socioeconomic heritage of being exposed to socialism deters entrepreneurship an effect that is more pronounced for high impact entrepreneurship detailed analyses reveal that the effect is driven by devaluation of socialist work experience and the influence of socialism on mindset

who wants to redistribute the tunnel effect in 1990s russia abstract support for governmental redistribution tended to be greater for the poor than the rich in a representative sample of russian adults in 1996 however support for redistribution is higher amongst those who expect their welfare to fall and this effect is strongest amongst the currently well off a rising trajectory inhibits demand for redistribution support is also stronger in rural areas amongst those with less schooling those who fear losing their job the elderly and amongst women our results are consistent with albert hirschman s idea of a tunnel effect whereby prospects of mobility in both directions influence demand for governmental redistribution

bayes estimates of markov trends in possibly cointegrated series stylized facts show that average growth rates of u s per capita consumption and income differ in recession and expansion periods because a linear combination of such series does not have to be a constant mean process standard cointegration analysis between the variables to examine the permanent income hypothesis may not be valid to model the changing growth rates in both series we introduce a multivariate markov trend model that accounts for different growth rates in consumption and income during expansions and recessions and across variables within both regimes the deviations from the multivariate markov trend are modeled by a vector autoregression var model bayes estimates of this model are obtained using markov chain monte carlo methods the empirical results suggest the existence of a cointegration relation between u s per capita disposable income and consumption after correction for a multivariate markov trend this result is also obtained when per capita investment is added to the var

testing the unbiased forward exchange rate hypothesis using a markov switching model and instrumental variables this paper develops a model for the forward and spot exchange rate which allows for the presence of a markov switching risk premium in the forward market and considers the issue of testing the unbiased forward exchange rate ufer hypothesis using us uk data it is shown that the ufer hypothesis cannot be rejected provided that instrumental variables are used to account for within regime correlation between explanatory variables and disturbances in the markov switching model on which the test is based copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

a simple method of testing for cointegration subject to multiple regime changes abstract in this paper we propose a simple method of testing for cointegration in models that allow for multiple shifts in the long run relationship the procedure consists of carrying out conventional residual based tests with standardized residuals from an appropriate markov switching model our monte carlo results show that standard tests work well even though their asymptotic validity can be questioned because they are not based on least squares residuals an empirical application to the present value model of stock prices is also discussed

good bye lenin or not the effect of communism on people s preferences preferences for redistribution as well as the generosities of welfare states differ significantly across countries in this paper we test whether there exists a feedback process of the economic regime on individual preferences we exploit the experiment of german separation and reunification to establish exogeneity of the economic system from 1945 to 1990 east germans lived under a communist regime with heavy state intervention and extensive redistribution we find that after german reunification east germans are more in favor of redistribution and state intervention than west germans even after controlling for economic incentives this effect is especially strong for older cohorts who lived under communism for a longer time period we further find that east germans preferences converge towards those of west germans we calculate that it will take one to two generations for preferences to converge completely

intellectual property the law and economics approach he traditional focus of economic analysis of intellectual property has been on reconciling incentives for producing such property with concerns about restricting access to it by granting exclusive rights in intellectual goods that is by propertizing them thus enabling the owner to charge a price for access that exceeds marginal cost for example patentability provides an additional incentive to produce inventions but requiring that the information in patents be published and that patents expire after a certain time limit the ability of the patentee to restrict access to the invention and so a balance is struck is it an optimal balance this question and the broader issue of trading off incentive and access considerations has proved intractable at the level of abstract analysis with the rise of the law and economics movement the focus of economic analysis of intellectual property has begun to shift to more concrete and manageable issues concerning the structure and texture of the complicated pattern of common law and statutory doctrines legal institutions and business practices relating to intellectual property among the issues discussed in this paper are the length of protection for intellectual property the rules that allow considerable copying of intellectual property without permission of the originator the rules governing derivative works and alternative methods of providing incentives for the creation of intellectual property the emphasis is on copyright law which perhaps because of its complex legal structure and the relative neglect by economists of the arts and entertainment has tended to be slighted in the conventional economic analysis of intellectual property relative to patent law where economic analysis can draw on an extensive literature concerning the economics of innovation i also srichard a posner is a judge of the u s court of appeals for the seventh circuit and a

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

voting for redistribution under desert sensitive altruism we endow individuals that differ in skill levels and tastes for working with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy when altruistic preferences are desert sensitive i e when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard working to the lazy we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium we provide empirical evidence based on the issp 1992 dataset that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish and that desert sensitive motivations play a significant role we estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert sensitive in the us than in europe we believe that differences in desert sensitive preferences for redistribution help explain the different social contracts that prevail in both continents

individual preferences for political redistribution what drives people s support of governmental reduction of income inequality we employ data from a large international survey in order to evaluate the explanatory power of three competing forces referred to as the homo oeconomicus effect the public values effect and the social rivalry effect the empirical analysis reveals that at the aggregate level all three effects play a significant role in shaping individual preferences for political redistribution attitudes of citizens in formerly socialist countries turn out to differ from those of western citizens in a systematic way 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

social limits to redistribution in many countries equality of political rights including the right to vote over taxes and transfers goes along with substantial inequality of economic conditions this observation lies at the root of one fundamental issue in political economy one about the factors that limit the extent of redistribution in democracies the conventional economic wisdom on this issue can roughly be summarized by two arguments firstly redistributive taxation may be limited by various kinds of incentive costs of taxation as e g in james a mirrlees 1971 kevin w s roberts 1977 dennis n epple and thomas romer 1991 and thomas piketty 1995 secondly redistribution may be dampened by the lobbying activity of high income groups and by various imperfections inherent to the political process that determines the tax system as e g in gary s becker 1983 and john e roemer 1995 while both arguments offer illuminating insights into the phenomenon of redistribution they are also based on a very crude description of human behavior one which ignores social motivations of action both in the economic and the political sphere the present paper develops an explanation that takes such motivations into account specifically it shows that limits to redistribution may arise when economic inequality has an informational value for social decisions our approach is based upon the following observation many goods and decisions that heavily affect an individual s quality of life are not allocated or made through markets but through social interactions thomas scitovsky 1976 for instance although people have strong preferences over how they are treated by others and over whom they mate with these things are not the object of market transactions a number of sources of satisfaction like conversation dinners and parties playing with others and being observed and admired are nonmarket goods for which a keen social competition between individuals often develops as shown by harold cole et al 1992 the existence of social rather than market competition for some goods can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in the income distribution when information about relative income is private individuals become interested in the observable consumption differentials between them and their social competitors since consumption differentials are influenced by redistributive taxation the political attitudes of people toward redistribution will be shaped by its expected impact on social competition in some identifiable environments this concern for social success may be the crucial factor that limits the extent of redistribution desired by a majority of voters specifically while the middle class may obtain economic benefits from a large amount of redistributive taxation it may oppose an equalization of living standards since this would harm its social success the fear of losing social status in favor of the poor induces the middle class to enter a political alliance with the rich which supports conservative taxation programs in the sociological literature scholars of voting behavior have often suggested that the need for social recognition plays a crucial role in shaping political attitudes seymour m lipset 1967 pointed out that white collar workers tend to be socially valued similarly as those higher in the system and although their income may be only slightly larger than that of manual workers white collars are much more likely to corneo department of economics university of osnabruck rolandstrasse 8 d 49069 osnabruck germany cesifo munich and cepr london gruner department of economics university of mannheim d 68131 mannheim germany iza bonn and cepr london we would like to thank emmanuelle auriol dieter bos peter funk mike hout olivier jeanne peter jonas georg noldeke thomas piketty regis renault john roemer jens weidmann and three anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions we have also benefited from the comments of participants at workshops and conferences in barcelona bonn davis jena maastricht magdeburg mannheim montreal munich rotterdam silvaplana tel aviv tilburg toulouse and warwick at which we presented earlier versions of this work financial support from the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft sfb 303 at the university of bonn is gratefully acknowledged

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

when should we use intellectual property rights the economic analysis of property rights proceeds in two steps the first distinguishes rival from nonrival goods the second contrasts the welfare effects of property rights for these two types of goods for rival goods strong property rights lead to efficient outcomes for nonrival goods property rights involve the trade off formalized by william nordhaus 1969 weak property rights lead to under provision strong property rights create monopoly distortions recent discussions of copyright protection for recorded music have obscured the underlying economic issues interested firms deny that music sharing will reduce the incentives for firms to release new recordings artists and recording companies never acknowledge the efficiency costs of prices that far exceed marginal cost it is left to economists with no stake in the outcome to clarify these issues full disclosure i have not consulted for anyone in the napster case the stakes in the battle over the music business are small enough to get lost in rounding

the case against patents evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity unless productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equiboth theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on librium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects strong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generstrong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from ally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with

political self serving bias and redistribution we explore the impact of the self serving bias on the supply and demand for redistribution we present results from an experiment in which participants decide on redistribution after performing a real effort task dependent on individual performance participants are divided into two groups successful and unsuccessful participants success is exogenously determined because they are randomly assigned to either a hard or easy task however because participants are not told which task they were assigned to there is ambiguity as to whether success or failure should be attributed to internal or external factors participants take two redistribution decisions first they choose a supply of redistribution in a situation where no personal interests are at stake second they choose a redistributive system behind a veil of ignorance our results confirm and expand previous findings on the self serving bias successful participants are more likely to attribute their success to their effort rather than luck and they opt for less redistribution unsuccessful participants tend to attribute their failure to external factors and opt for more redistribution we demonstrate that the self serving bias contributes to a polarization of the views on redistribution

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

monetary policy in a markov switching vector error correction model monetary policy vector autoregressions vars typically presume stability of the long run outcomes we introduce the possibility of switches in the long run equilibrium in a cointegrated var by allowing both the covariance matrix and weighting matrix in the error correction term to switch we find that monetary policy alternates between sustaining long run growth and disinflationary regimes allowing state changes can also help explain the price puzzle and justify the use of commodity prices as a corrective measure finally we show that regime switching has implications for disinflationary monetary policy and can explain the variety of sacrifice ratio estimates that exist in the literature

cointegration and changes in regime the japanese consumption function in this paper we examine a model of cointegration where long run parameters are subject to switching between several different cointegrating regimes these shifts are allowed to be governed by the outcome of an unobserved markov chain with unknown transition probabilities we illustrate this approach using japanese data on consumption and disposable income and find that the data favour a markov switching long run relationship over a standard temporally stable formulation 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

a leaky bucket in the real world estimating inequality aversion using survey data existing evidence of inequality aversion relies on data from class room experiments where subjects face hypothetical questions this paper estimates the magnitude of inequality aversion using representative survey data with questions related to the real economy situations the respondents face the results reveal that inequality aversion can be measured in a meaningful way using survey data but the magnitudes of the estimates depend dramatically on how inequality aversion is measured no matter how measured the revealed inequality aversion predicts opinions on a wide range of questions related to the welfare state such as the level of taxation tax progressivity and the structure of unemployment benefits

views of economic inequality in latin america the authors assess the factors that affect judgments about the fairness of the distribution of wealth with pooled public opinion data from latinobarometro surveys conducted in 1997 2001 and 2002

russian equity market linkages before and after the 1998 crisis evidence from stochastic and regime switching cointegration tests abstract this paper examines the relationships between russian and other equity markets over the period of 1995 2004 to account for potential instability in the market relationships we apply a number of cointegration approaches gregory hansen 1996 residual based tests for cointegration in models with regime shifts journal of econometrics 70 99 126 test which allows for a structural break in the relationships a stochastic cointegration framework by mccabe 2003 testing for stochastic cointegration and evidence for present value models working paper the non parametric test by breitung 2002 nonparametric tests for unit roots and cointegration journal of econometrics 108 2 343 363 and a regime switching cointegration model in the spirit of ho 1999 financial liberalization and international capital mobility of taiwan a regime switching approach asian economic journal 13 4 407 417 the tests point to a significant agreement that the russian equity market remained isolated from the influence by international markets in the long run and that while a structural break might have occurred in august 1998 this did not alter the nature of long run relationships

horizontal and vertical differentiation the launhardt model we show how the spatial duopoly proposed by launhardt in 1885 where firms have access to different transportation technologies allows one to model in a simple and elegant way the two major types of product differentiation i e horizontal and vertical we consider the cases where firms are located near the market end points or near the market center launhardt s analysis of price determination is then extended by allowing firms to choose strategically their transportation rates subgame perfect nash equilibria involve minimum maximum vertical product differentiation when horizontal product differentiation is large small enough

international protection of intellectual property we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy we consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation after describing the determination of national patent policies in a non cooperative regime of patent protection we ask why is intellectual property better protected in the north than in the south we also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency jel o34 f13 during the 1980 s and early 1990 s the united states and several european countries expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection of intellectual property in many developing countries the developed countries made the upgrading of intellectual property rights iprs one of their highest priorities for the uruguay round of trade talks their efforts bore fruit in the agreement on traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights trips which was approved as part of the final act of the uruguay round trips establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of intellectual property for example in the area of new technology it essentially harmonizes

the structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution against the current consensus among comparative political economists we argue that inequality matters for redistributive politics in advanced capitalist societies but it is the structure of inequality not the level of inequality that matters our theory posits that middle income voters will be inclined to ally with low income voters and support redistributive policies when the distance between the middle and the poor is small relative to the distance between the middle and the rich we test this proposition with data from 15 to 18 advanced democracies and find that both redistribution and nonelderly social spending increase as the dispersion of earnings in the upper half of the distribution increases relative to the dispersion of earnings in the lower half of the distribution in addition we present survey evidence on preferences for redistribution among middle income voters that is consistent with our theory and regression results indicating that the left parties are more likely to participate in government when the structure of inequality is characterized by skew

can social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior abstract this study examines whether gender differences in some economic behaviors are due to differences in social preferences as measured by dictator allocation decisions we find that compared to men women are significantly more likely to be inequity averters and significantly less likely to be social surplus maximizers these differences in social preferences explain to a large extent why women send less than men in trust games inequity averters can ensure equal payoffs if nothing is returned by sending one fourth of the endowment while surplus maximizers can increase total payoffs by a factor of three for each dollar sent social preferences also help explain the size of gifts in dictator games and choice of compensation method for simple tasks however after controlling for social preference type gender is still influential in these decisions women give significantly more to charity than men even after accounting for our measure of social preferences women prefer egalitarian payment systems both because they are inequity averters and because low self confidence may lead them to believe they will earn more with equal sharing

location taxation and governments an exchange theory of intellectual property abstract the standard economic model of intellectual property is an efficient property rights solution to a market failure problem of investment in a non rival and non excludable good we propose an exchange theory of intellectual property based on a contracting approach in the context of market making and enforcement of economic rights in exchange for monopoly taxation rights we use a hotelling 1929 type spatial model to show the relationship between location and pricing decisions of innovating firms under differing intellectual property institutional quality and taxation regimes