the fetal origins hypothesis in finance prenatal environment the gender gap and investor behavior we find that differences in individuals prenatal environments explain heterogeneity in financial decisions later in life an exogenous increase in exposure to prenatal testosterone is associated with the masculinization of financial behavior specifically with elevated risk taking and trading in adulthood we also examine birth weight those with higher birth weight are more likely to participate in the stock market whereas those with lower birth weight tend to prefer portfolios with higher volatility and skewness consistent with compensatory behavior our results contribute to the understanding of how the prenatal environment shapes an individual s behavior in financial markets later in life received may 2 2014 accepted september 30 2015 by editor david hirshleifer

status in markets this project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market we consider a special box design market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices we manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures in the first a subject s score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status in another subjects are assigned randomly to a higher status or lower status group in both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher status sellers face lowerstatus buyers and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers across all sessions the higher status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus earning significantly more than their lower status counterparts

long run welfare under externalities in consumption leisure and production a case for happy degrowth vs unhappy growth in this paper we contribute to the debate on the relationship between growth and well being by examining an endogenous growth model where we allow for externalities in consumption leisure and production we analyze three regimes a decentralized economy where each household makes isolated choices without considering their external effects a planned economy where a myopic planner fails to recognize both leisure and consumption externalities but recognizes production externalities and a planned economy with a fully informed planner we first compare the balanced growth paths under the three regimes and then we numerically investigate the transition to the optimal balanced growth path we provide a number of findings first in a decentralized economy growth or labor or both are greater than in the regime with a fully informed planner and hence are sub optimal from a welfare standpoint second a myopic intervention which overlooks consumption and leisure externalities leads to more growth and labor than in both the decentralized and the fully informed regime third we provide a case for happy degrowth a transition to the optimal balanced growth path that is associated with downscaling of production a reduction in private consumption and an ongoing increase in leisure and well being

equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences abstract a population of fully rational agents plays a symmetric 2 player game in biological fitnesses but each agent s play is determined by his payoffs which are free to evolve according to survival of the fittest pressures an equilibrium selection mechanism is assumed to exist and deliver a unique outcome for any given profile of payoffs this allows the evolution of payoffs to be modeled as a well defined replicator dynamics the existing static stability results that efficient strict nash implies stability and stability implies efficiency are translated to this dynamic context although the latter gives way to indeterminacy in the absence of a specific equilibrium selection mechanism a strong form of stability is established for the efficient outcome of games with common interests whilst a weaker stability result is provided for efficient mixed strategy equilibria of doubly symmetric games the results are illustrated using the equilibrium selection mechanism provided by global games

the endowment effect as blessing we study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation we pay specific attention to barter trade of the kind that was common in prehistoric societies and suggest that the endowment effect and the winner s curse could have jointly survived natural selection together we develop a new family of hybrid replicator selection dynamics and show that under such dynamics even if biases only partially compensate for each other individuals with both biases can survive in the population in the long run

a biological basis for expected and non expected utility abstract a biological model is developed here to determine the fittest attitude to risk with a fixed environment the type maximizing expected offspring is selected this yields the expected utility theorem when translated into a criterion for evaluating gambles over commodities with a random environment however the type selected is strictly less averse to idiosyncratic risk than to risk which is correlated across all individuals the implied criterion for choice over gambles does not satisfy the expected utility theorem and may induce choice of a gamble which is first order stochastically dominated journal of economic literature classification number d81

carrot or stick the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model this paper studies the evolution and the co evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior firstly both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups this holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable secondly preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self interested preferences but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely finally the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively the existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers but punishers crowd out rewarders jel classification c72 d63 d64 d83

on the faustmann solution to the forest management problem abstract this paper is concerned with optimal solutions to the forest management problem when future utilities are undiscounted by examining asymptotic properties of such solutions we find that i if the utility function is linear then the faustmann periodic solution is optimal ii if the utility function is increasing and strictly concave an optimal solution converges to the maximum sustained yield solution which we characterize as a golden rule these results may be viewed as a possible resolution to the debate in forestry economics about what constitutes an optimal policy in forest management

a barrier option framework for corporate security valuation abstract this paper proposes a framework for corporate security valuation based on path dependent barrier option models instead of the commonly used path independent approach we argue that path dependency is an intrinsic and fundamental characteristic of corporate securities because equity can be knocked out whenever a legally binding barrier is breached a direct implication of this framework is that equity will be priced as a down and out call option we provide empirical validation of the barrier model by showing that implied barriers are statistically and economically significant for a large cross section of industrial firms additional robustness tests confirm that barriers remain significant over a wide range of input variable estimates and finally we apply the barrier option framework to bankruptcy prediction and find that implied failure probabilities dominate z scores in most cases

the evolution of attitudes to risk lottery tickets and relative wealth abstract individual attitudes to risk are examined in an evolutionary model males obtain more offspring as a consequence of greater wealth both directly and because this attracts more mates the second effect induces gambling driven by relative wealth and can create pareto inefficiency fair bets involving small losses and large gains are taken if any fair bets at all are taken altogether the model accords with observations concerning bets taken and declined by typical individuals despite settings of widely varying per capita wealth journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

the evolution of monetary equilibrium abstract the hahn problem is that even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists why should we expect the former over the latter here i consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness with unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the sum of agents fitnesses in a standard bewley townsend model this implies selection of the monetary over the nonmonetary equilibrium and also implies the survival of agents with money in the utility function trust in fiat money is only a recent development and even today such faith is hardly universal cass and shell 1980

evolution of time preference by natural selection this paper entertains the hypothesis that human time preferences are in evolutionary equilibrium i e that no mutation changing time preferences could be favored by natural selection this hypothesis implies that the marginal rate of substitution mrs holding darwinian fitness constant must equal the mrs holding utility constant furthermore in a market economy the latter must equal the mrs in exchange exploiting these principles the author finds that the long term real interest rate should equal ln 2 per generation about 2 percent per year and that young adults should discount the future more rapidly than their elders copyright 1994 by american economic association

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

the evolution of preferences and competition a rationalization of veblen s theory of invidious comparisons we examine how preferences evolve by natural selection in a competitive environment similar to that characterizing much of our evolutionary past we find that the evolutionarily stable preferences in this context exhibit a concern not only for absolute payoffs but also for relative payoffs and that this intensifies the degree of competition relative to what obtains when players consider only absolute payoffs we argue that this has consequences for the equilibrium population size we argue that the premise of this analysis is consistent with the available anthropological evidence and that the prediction is broadly consistent with the findings of experimental game theory

us and them the origin of identity and its economic implications we investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we propose an evolutionary explanation we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival in an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios one entailing rent seeking behavior and the other involving public good provision our results are in conformity with empirical evidence

endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints abstract we consider a situation in which games are formed endogenously in two senses 1 there is a pregame in which agents choose to learn a subset of all feasible strategies and can then employ only these strategies in subsequent play and 2 agents choose their game partners through a costly search process we show that at any subgame perfect equilibrium agents will constrain their action sets in the pregame in such a way that a single social norm prevails thus all agents in a society will abide by the same ethical standard although what standard this will be cannot be predicted we also show that these are essentially the only spe outcomes we suggest that this provides at least a partial explanation for experimental observations that agents apparently choose strategies that do not maximize their payoffs

grouping in group bias and the cost of cheating abstract the tendency of people to divide into groups and to show in group bias preferential treatment for insiders is widely observed this paper shows that it arises naturally when people incur a moral cost when defecting against cooperators provided that this cost is concave in the number of such defections if some people are asocial i e insusceptible to the moral cost then under incomplete information free riding and cooperation can coexist within groups costly signaling of sociality enables groups to screen out free riders but its availability may decrease the welfare of all individuals in society finally the concave moral cost is shown to be evolutionary stable with respect to an invasion by a convex mutation

learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the centipede game abstract several studies show that evolution favors non selfish preferences only if preference types are observable we present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the centipede game where we adopt self confirming equilibrium to capture behavior we show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

the effects of risk preferences in mixed strategy equilibria of 2 2 games abstract we consider the effects of risk preferences in mixed strategy equilibria of 2 2 games provided such equilibria exist we identify sufficient conditions under which the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion we find that at least moderate degrees of risk aversion will frequently be beneficial in mixed equilibria

the origin of utility sexual selection and conspicuous consumption abstract this paper proposes an explanation for the universal human desire for increasing consumption and the associated propensity to trade survival opportunity off conspicuous consumption i argue that this desire was moulded in evolutionary times by a mechanism known to biologists as sexual selection whereby an observable trait conspicuous consumption in this case is used by members of one sex to signal their unobservable characteristics valuable to members of the opposite sex it then shows that the standard economics problem of utility maximisation is formally equivalent to the standard biology problem of the maximisation of individual fitness the ability to pass genes to future generations and thus establishes a rigorous theoretical foundation for including conspicuous consumption in the utility function

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

positional spending and status seeking in rural china focusing on a remote area in rural china we use a panel census of households in 26 villages to show that socially observable spending has risen sharply in recent years we demonstrate that such spending by households is highly sensitive to social spending by other villagers this suggests that social spending is either positional in nature i e motivated by status concerns or subject to herding behavior we also document systematic relations between social spending and changes in higher order terms of the income distribution we find that the implications of status seeking for spending are not unidimensional they vary across income groups and expenditure categories in particular and consistent with theories of rank based status seeking we find that the poor increase spending on funerals and gifts as competition for status intensifies in addition poor families of grooms expend more for wedding ceremonies as local income competition increases while the families of brides do not the welfare implications of spending in order to keep up with the joneses are potentially large particularly for poor households

asset prices and institutional investors empirical evidence indicates that trades by institutional investors have sizable effects on asset prices generating phenomena such as index effects asset class effects and others it is difficult to explain such phenomena within standard representative agent asset pricing models in this paper we consider an economy populated by institutional investors alongside standard retail investors institutions care about their performance relative to a certain index our framework is tractable admitting exact closed form expressions and produces the following analytical results we find that institutions optimally tilt their portfolios towards stocks that comprise their benchmark index the resulting price pressure boosts index stocks while leaving nonindex stocks unaffected by demanding a higher fraction of risky stocks than retail investors institutions amplify the index stock volatilities and aggregate stock market volatility and give rise to countercyclical sharpe ratios trades by institutions induce excess correlations among stocks that belong to their benchmark index generating an asset class effect institutions finance their additional purchases of index stocks by taking on leverage a policy prescription that calls for a reduction in leverage while reducing the riskiness of institutional portfolios would also reduce the ability of institutions to tilt their portfolios towards index stocks depressing the index level

rank matters the impact of social competition on portfolio choice tournament incentives schemes have been criticized for inducing excessive risk taking among financial market participants in this paper we investigate how relative performance based incentive schemes and status concerns for higher rank influence portfolio choice in laboratory experiments we find that both underperformers and over performers adapt their portfolios to their current relative performance preferring either positively or negatively skewed assets respectively most importantly these results hold both when relative performance is instrumental for higher payoffs in a tournament and when it is only intrinsically motivating and not payout relevant we find no effects when no relative performance information is given

social comparisons and contributions to online communities a field experiment on movielens we design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community we find that after receiving behavioral information about the median user s total number of movie ratings users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent when given outcome information about the average user s net benefit score above average users mainly engage in activities that help others our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision

on the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner take all games abstract a long standing conjecture is that winner take all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk takers and the extinction of risk averters in many species a winner take all game determines the males right to reproduce and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk takers psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk taking than females using an evolutionary model of preference formation we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk taking in winner take all environments journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

trust trustworthiness and the consensus effect an evolutionary approach abstract people often form expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes the so called consensus effect we study the implications of this for trust and trustworthiness in an evolutionary model where social preferences are endogenous trustworthy individuals are more optimistic than opportunists and are accordingly less afraid to engage in market based exchanges where they may be vulnerable to cheating depending on the distribution of social preferences in the population the material benefits from greater participation may compensate for the costs of being trustworthy by providing an explicit account of how individuals form and revise their beliefs we are able to show the existence of a polymorphic equilibrium where both trustworthiness and opportunism coexist in the population we also analyze the effect of enforcement distinguishing between its role as deterrence of future misbehavior and as retribution for past misbehavior we show that enforcement aimed at deterring opportunistic behavior has ambiguous effects on social preferences it may favor the spreading of trustworthiness crowding in but the opposite crowding out may also occur by contrast crowding out never occur when punishment is merely intended as retribution

nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences abstract a population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game g the payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences however these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs when evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take the distribution of aggregate play must be a nash equilibrium of g weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c72

social status culture and economic performance in analysing the differences in productive capacity among economies it is usual to concentrate on the physical aspects of the population the different attributes of capital including human capital and on the available production technologies societies also differ in culture in ways which are relevant for economic performance the sociological literature recognises that different occupations have different social status and that workers benefit not only from the wage they receive but also from being associated with a particular occupation cultural differences among societies may translate into different status of occupations and can therefore affect the choice of education and occupation and consequently the equilibrium level of output and wages conversely the economic choices of individuals influence the social status of occupations in particular it is well established by sociological research that the social status of an occupation is influenced by economic attributes such as the average wage and the average level of education in the occupation a major objective of our work is to illustrate that sociological and economic approaches can be combined within a unified framework this is in contrast to some social scientists who view the two approaches as competing with each other phelpsbrown i 977 ch 4 in this paper we construct a simple general equilibrium model in which both wages and status are determined endogenously we show that changes in the demand for status triggered by changes in preferences or in income distribution influence the wage structure the level of aggregate output and economic welfare the link between status and aggregate output is created by the fact that differences in occupational status imply occupational wage differences among workers of the same skill the larger is the demand for status the larger is the wage gap and the lower is aggregate output our discussion of status is closely related to the economic analysis of discrimination against ethnic or racial groups becker i 97 i arrow i 973

social rewards externalities and stable preferences this paper examines the role of social rewards as a corrective mechanism for activities which generate externalities the focus of this paper is on the circumstances under which social rewards provide effective and feasible incentive mechanism that may replace laws and regulations in particular social mechanism is effective only in a society in which individuals who care about their standing in the society can survive in the long run we show that the nature of economic interaction between matched players influences whether the socially minded individuals survive in the long run and restricts the effectiveness of social rewards however circumstances exist where the socially minded survive even though relative fitness is determined only by economic payoff 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework abstract the barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank the regulator insurer of a bank owns a down and in call option on the bank assets which can be balanced against the expected coverage cost raising the regulatory barrier critical asset level triggering bank closure leads to a transfer of wealth from stockholders to the insurer and reduces stockholder incentives to increase asset risk empirical tests on a sample of 152 one bank holding companies show that regulatory barriers are priced in the stock market and are inversely related to tier 1 leverage ratios

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

contests for ranks experimental evidence we use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance in our experiment i rank is defined as subjects relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and ii subjects earnings are independent of their performance we find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive and this result is independent of the group size in the large group the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives finally the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher prestige effect in additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the statusprize winners we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes the last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status the results are important for managerial practices

evolution and kantian morality what kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor we propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative individuals preferences are their private information the set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions we show that a certain class of such preferences that combine self interest with morality of a kantian flavor are evolutionarily stable and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable we also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of maynard smith s and price s 1973 notion of evolutionary stability of strategies

the evolutionary logic of honoring sunk costs i introduction economists claim that sunk costs should not figure in current decision making because by definition these expenditures cannot be retrieved and should be treated as bygones but there is a large literature both experimental and anecdotal in which people are observed to waste resources by honoring bygones that could not possibly make them better off see e g arkes and blumer 1985 arkes and ayton 1999 mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 thaler 1980 such excess in wasting resources is unlikely to have been tolerated by nature in the process of evolution if it did not serve some purpose to enhance fitness in our remote past the purpose of this study is to suggest such a function whereby evolutionary processes have hardwired a concern for sunk costs in human decision making 1 the concept of honoring sunk costs has been referred to in the literature as the concorde fallacy 2 arkes and blumer 1985 have a number of other examples of good money being thrown after bad economists have provided various explanations for why sunk costs appear salient to humans kanodia bushman and dickhaut 1989 and prendergast and stole 1996 propose a theory where reputational effects make agents unwilling to change their decisions mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 have suggested several models involving information content reputation or constraints on decision making that provide rational reasons for taking sunk costs into account likewise baliga and ely 2011 have proposed a model in which sunk costs may acquire salience as a memory kludge because they may contain information about the value of a project previously initiated but whose value has now been forgotten carmichael and macleod 2003 have proposed a model where in a bilateral bargaining situation the norm of taking account of sunk costs resolves the hold up problem that typically results in underinvestment thaler 1980 arkes and blumer 1985 and whyte 1986 suggested a prospect theory approach to understanding sunk cost effects arkes and blumer 1985 the philosopher nozick 1993 and others have argued that honoring sunk costs can alleviate problems of time inconsistency and temptation john may believe that going to the theater is a good thing but when the time comes he cannot rouse himself to do so because it would require relinquishing whatever else appears appealing at the time to circumvent this john buys tickets in advance as a precommitment device but to do this he must believe in the first place that his future self is going to honor sunk costs 3 whatever the reason for the time inconsistent preferences say hyperbolic discounting the honoring of sunk costs may be used to remedy the problem of time inconsistency but nozick for example offers no reason for why sunk costs are honored in the first place we offer an evolutionary reason to suggest why nature may have hardwired a proclivity in humans to honor sunks costs a reason that differs from those offered in the articles cited above we propose that the built in salience of sunk costs is an adaptation to the problem of self control self control problems may arise in decision making because contrary to our untutored perceptions the human brain has a triune 4 rather than a unitary structure maclean 1989 panksepp 1998 because of the way the brain has evolved different regions within it defined by their own neuroanatomical and neurochemical features deal with different aspects of action and behavior although interconnected through chemical and neuronal pathways the different control centers tend to act autonomously and may conflict in their responses to stimuli when the emotional or motivational centers which lie in the sub cortical limbic system push us to certain actions that the rational persona in the cortex wishes to deny there is a conflict and the problem of self control arises panksepp 1998 301 notes

an evolutionary approach to pre play communication we add a round of pre play communication to a finite two player game played by a population of players pre play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs the paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability when there is no conflict of interest between the players only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics for general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often

conspicuous spending and the income distribution of social groups using south african household expenditure data we analyze how the spending of a household on visible goods such as jewelry and clothes depends on the distribution of income within its social group we find that this spending is positively correlated with the share of peers who possess a similar income level to the household what we dub the local income share moreover we find that the spending of a household on visible goods is positively correlated with the average income of peers that are poorer than this household we interpret this as evidence for cascade effects through which income changes among the poorest in the social group can trigger adjustments in the visible spending patterns of the wealthy in line with previous research charles et al 2009 we also find that visible spending of a household is negatively correlated with the average income of its social group we present a simple model of status competition based on hopkins and kornienko 2004 that synthesizes these effects and can account for our results jel d12 d31 o12

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

cultivating trust norms institutions and the implications of scale we study the co evolution of honesty norms and institutions new trading opportunities require institutional changes to be realised since the initial vulnerability of institutions to opportunistic behaviour leads to the deterioration of norms we show how an escape from opportunism requires that institutional improvements outpace norm deterioration a key prediction emerges larger economies are more likely to evolve to steady states with strong honesty norms but need not have better institutions this prediction is tested using a cross section of countries population has a significant positive relationship with trust even when controlling for standard trust determinants and institutional quality

diversification and its discontents idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial risk in the quest for social status social status concerns influence investors decisions by driving a wedge in attitudes toward aggregate and idiosyncratic risks i model such concerns by emphasizing the desire to get ahead of the joneses which implies that aversion to idiosyncratic risk is lower than aversion to aggregate risk the model predicts that investors hold concentrated portfolios in equilibrium which helps rationalize the small premium for undiversified entrepreneurial risk in the model status concerns are more important for wealthier households consequently these households own a disproportionate share of risky assets particularly private equity and experience greater volatility of consumption consistent with empirical evidence diversification and risk sharing are fundamental principles of modern finance and macroeconomics however empirical evidence suggests that household portfolios are poorly diversified with many people reporting substantial holdings of a single stock for the wealthiest households large shares in closely held businesses constitute a particularly important source of risk e g heaton and lucas 2000a it is not surprising that entrepreneurs bear substantial undiversified risk since it is important for mitigating moral hazard and or adverse selection problems yet from a standpoint of portfolio theory entrepreneurship does not appear to be well compensated implying that many investors are willing to take poorly rewarded risks despite the availability of superior investment opportunities such as public equity that earns a large risk premium e g moskowitz and vissing j0rgensen 2002 hall and woodward 2007

resolving new keynesian anomalies with wealth in the utility function at the zero lower bound the new keynesian model predicts that output and inflation collapse to implausibly low levels and that government spending and forward guidance have implausibly large effects to resolve these anomalies we introduce wealth into the utility function the justification is that wealth is a marker of social status and people value status since people partly save to accrue social status the euler equation is modified as a result when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large the dynamical system representing the zero lower bound equilibrium transforms from a saddle to a source which resolves all the anomalies

relative wealth concerns and entrepreneurship we develop a model of entrepreneurship in which market frictions limit the possibilities for diversifying entrepreneurial risk a concern for relative standing arises even though individuals consume only standard commodities in contrast to complete markets an increase in sector specific aggregate risk increases entrepreneurship due to relative wealth concerns a change in the profile of the economy to include more risk averse people results in an even greater increase in entrepreneurship thus relative wealth concerns mitigate the reduction in entrepreneurship arising from the non diversifiability of entrepreneurial risk we examine the effects of uncertainty about economic policies such as market based reforms on entrepreneurship

market forces meet behavioral biases cost misallocation and irrational pricing psychological and experimental evidence as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples suggests that firms may confound fixed sunk and variable costs leading to distorted pricing decisions this article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions we envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real world accounting practices including ones that confuse the relevance of variable fixed and sunk costs to pricing decisions firms follow naive adaptive learning to adjust prices and reinforcement learning to modify their costing methodologies costing and pricing practices that increase profits are reinforced in some market structures but not in others this process of reinforcement causes pricing practices of all firms to systematically depart from standard equilibrium predictions

pre matching gambles abstract this paper investigates pre matching gambles and provides a new reason to gamble matching concerns examples of pre matching gambles include occupational choices before the marriage market college major choices before the labor market and portfolio management before attracting future clients in the financial market i show that people make risky investments they would not have made if not for their subsequent participation in a competitive matching market a fundamental and unique feature of the competitive matching market which i call the competitive matching effect induces gambling the paper also illustrates the relationship between social efficiency and inequality in this setting and shows how progressive taxation eliminates social inefficiency reduces inequality and generates government revenue

decision making under uncertainty and the evolution of interdependent preferences abstract this paper finds support for the evolution of interdependent preferences under natural selection from a perhaps surprising source decision making under uncertainty individuals choose from sets of risky alternatives the lotteries may involve either idiosyncratic risk or aggregate uncertainty or both robson j econ theory 68 1996 397 424 gives the evaluation criterion for lotteries that maximizes reproductive value and shows that it does not satisfy the expected utility theorem cooper and kaplan j theoret biol 94 1982 135 151 have demonstrated that when lotteries are aggregate the optimal decision rule involves randomization this paper reexamines robson s evaluation criterion using it to solve for the optimal amount of randomization the solution is characterized and an interpretation is offered that links maximizing reproductive value to maximizing expected relative offspring it is shown that when agents preferences arise from their own offspring relative to the average within the population a game is constructed out of the choice of lotteries and that the unique nash equilibrium distribution of actions maximizes reproductive value journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d71 d81

merit approbation and the evolution of social structure in this paper we study a society in which individuals gain utility from income and from social approbation income is correlated with class approbation is given to an unobservable trait which must be signalled through the agent s social mobility i e class change mobility is driven by a simple mechanism involving inheritance effort and ability thus social structure class composition is affected by individuals quest for approbation and we study how that affects the emergence and multiplicity of long run social organizations including hybrid forms of dynasties and meritocracies specifically we observe that even though social mobility is driven purely by a meritocratic mechanism pure dynasties can emerge we then introduce a feedback between the size of the upper class and its income value so that effort levels and social structure are jointly endogenous we derive results on equilibrium effort levels and stationary when they exist social structures social organization can converge to a unique steady state multiple long run equilibria or cycles

relativity rank and the utility of income relative utility has become an important concept in several disjoint areas of economics i present a cardinal model of income utility based on the supposition that agents care about their rank in the income distribution and that utility is subject to adaptation over time utility levels correspond to the leyden individual welfare function while utility differences yield a version of the prospect theory value function thereby providing a new and shared derivation of each i offer an explanation of some long standing paradoxes in the wellbeing literature and an insight into the links between relative comparisons and loss aversion

gender differentiation in risk taking behavior on the relative risk aversion of single men and single women we relate an observed difference between single men sm and single women sw in attitudes towards risk to the higher value assigned to social status by sm than by sw in the marriage market low status carries a harsher penalty for sm than for sw because when selecting a partner the social status of a man is more important to a woman than the social status of a woman is to a man correlating social status with relative wealth we show how intensified distaste at experiencing low relative wealth reduces relative risk aversion

the evolution of engel curves and its implications for structural change theory the tendency for expenditure engel curves to flatten out at high income levels is frequently cited as evidence that major shifts in household spending patterns take place as households become more affluent empirically little has been done to examine i how pervasive this tendency is across the engel curves of different goods and services ii whether the rate at which engel curves flatten out may significantly change over time and iii how robust engel curves are in the face of changes in the income distribution of households using data from the uk family expenditure survey we find evidence that the tendency for engel curves to flatten out which we dub saturation is indeed widespread across a wide range of goods and services however a tendency for their shape to shift over time and for these shifts to co move with changes in the income distribution of households casts some doubt on whether the declining slope of engel curves can be used to predict slowdowns in the growth rate of demand for particular goods and services

classical turnpike theory and the economics of forestry classical turnpike theory as originally conceived by samuelson pertains to optimal growth theory over a large but finite time horizon with given initial and terminal stocks in this paper we present two turnpike results in the context of the economics of forestry with given initial and terminal forest configurations our results depart from the general theory in that they concern a transitional production set which does not satisfy the assumptions of inaction and free disposal and rely on a recently discovered non interiority assumption on concave not necessarily differentiable benefit functions that implies and is implied by the asymptotic convergence of good programs

ranking games and gambling when to quit when you re ahead it is common for rewards to be given on the basis of a rank ordering so that relative performance amongst a cohort is the criterion in this paper we formulate an equilibrium model in which an agent makes successive decisions on whether or not to gamble and is rewarded on the basis of a rank ordering of the final position amongst competing players one application of this model is to the behavior of mutual fund managers who are paid depending on funds under management which in turn are greatly influenced by annual or quarterly rank orderings our model deals with a situation in which fund managers can elect either to pick stocks or to use a market tracking strategy in equilibrium the distribution of the final position will have a negative skew we explore how this distribution depends on the number of players the probability of success when gambling the structure of the rewards and on information regarding the performance of other players

social status and economic performance a survey abstract this survey combines ideas and results from sociology and economics recognizing that economic decisions are often shaped by social concerns and influences based on the sociological literature we define social status and describe its measurement we then describe the role of social status in economic analysis of saving and consumption wages and economic growth we review recent work on status determination in equilibrium including evolutionary models we conclude with some remarks on the need for further interaction between sociology and economics

wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective abstract this paper develops a one population indirect evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer supplier and many a sufficiently large number of retailers to study how the retailer s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price its observability the error probability of the observed result on the rival s preference the market scale and the retailer s bargaining power this paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer we find that the profit revenue maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high low given an appropriate wholesale price the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers population the larger the market scale the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price the cross effects of the retailer s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process

observations on cooperation we study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a prisoner s dilemma and each player observes a few of the partner s past actions against previous opponents we depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types the presence of committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation we present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various environments moreover we show that under an additional assumption of stationarity this combination of strategies is essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation and it is robust to various perturbations finally we extend the results to a setup in which agents also observe actions played by past opponents against the current partner and we characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation

the linkage between life insurer spread behaviour and credit swap transaction policyholder protection analysis the paper develops a contingent claim model to evaluate the equity of a life insurer when the insurer could act as a protection buyer or a protection seller in a credit swap transaction market the

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

on equilibrium cycles and normal forests in optimal harvesting of tree vintages abstract a normal forest that has an even land allocation between tree vintages has traditionally been taken as a desirable long run goal in forestry in contrast the presently favored economic hypothesis suggests that under positive discounting the optimal forest vintage structure typically evolves to a cycle without convergence toward the normal forest this paper proves the existence of the cyclical solution and its global stability properties using elementary methods the occurrence of cycles in forest harvesting is given a resource economics interpretation a numerical example that was previously analyzed incorrectly is clarified in the existing vintage model forest land has no competing uses in an extension with competitive land use the stationary cycles are shown to be replaced by a saddle point path with damped oscillations and convergence toward the normal forest

pure rank preferences and variation in risk taking behavior abstract assuming that an individual s rank in the wealth distribution is the only factor determining the individual s wellbeing we analyze the individual s risk preferences in relation to gaining or losing rank rather than the individual s risk preferences towards gaining or losing absolute wealth we show that in this characterization of preferences a high ranked individual is more willing than a low ranked individual to take risks that can provide him with a rise in rank relative risk aversion with respect to rank in the wealth distribution is a decreasing function of rank this result is robust to incorporating the level of absolute wealth in the individual s utility function

keeping one step ahead of the joneses status the distribution of wealth and long run growth assuming that the utility of each agent depends on its relative wealth position in the society this chapter constructs an endogenous growth model it is shown that even if the subjective discount rates differ across agents there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which each agent owns a positive share of the world wealth it is also shown that if the agents are identical then an increase in savings incentives always raises the long run growth rate but if they are heterogeneous then an increase in savings incentives may lower the long run growth rate

cooperation secret handshakes and imitation in the prisoners dilemma building on a j robson 1990 j theoret biol 144 379 396 we introduce into the repeated prisoners dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a costly signal i e the secret handshake before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent we show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities we obtain similar results surprisingly in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d60

conspicuous consumption snobbism and conformism abstract we develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status in equilibrium the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends in an identifiable way on the number of consumers and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism the market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist we derive some unconventional policy implications concerning the taxation of luxuries and the voluntary provision of public goods

cultural integration and its discontents a community s culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms behavioural adaptations driven by pay offs to coordination and preference changes shaped by socialization and self persuasion this paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously it identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization the analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours

efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching abstract this paper investigates the sensitivity of recent evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism we study a literally random matching mechanism combined with a process of strategy adjustment based on the realized average performance of each strategy in the key class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games the pareto efficient equilibrium per se is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium as the probability of experimentation or mutation goes to zero furthermore convergence to the equilibrium is relatively fast we extend these results for example to games of common interest journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

social comparisons status and driving behavior abstract the establishment of desirable social norms is an integral part of a well functioning civil society while recent evidence has demonstrated that social comparison can affect behavior in a variety of contexts it is not clear what type of comparative social information is most effective using a large scale field experiment to study driving practices we sent text messages containing different types of social information to drivers in tsingtao china we find two types of social information to be particularly effective in reducing traffic violations the driving behavior of those similar to oneself and the driving behavior of those with high status cars our results indicate that the combination of descriptive norms with social status is a cost effective yet powerful intervention for establishing better driving behavior in emerging markets

reign in hell or serve in heaven a cross country journey into the relative vs absolute perceptions of wellbeing abstract questionnaires exploring the relativist vs absolutist perception of wellbeing are administered to 3883 students in eight different countries four low income countries bolivia brazil kenya and laos 1924 respondents and four high income countries italy sweden switzerland and the uk 1959 respondents our data reveal that wellbeing is perceived mainly in relative terms with the strength of relativism being higher for respondents in high income countries however when the satisfaction of some basic needs is at stake the absolutist concern becomes powerful personal characteristics such as gender and background of studies have a significant role in determining respondents perception of wellbeing finally additional insights emerge from our study interpersonal comparisons take place by looking both upward and downward along the income scale not only income ranking but also the magnitude of reference incomes plays a role and the perception of wellbeing is more elastic to absolute rather than relative income

individual well being in a dynamic perspective this paper explores the determinants of individual well being as measured by self reported levels of satisfaction with income making full use of the panel data nature of the german socio economic panel we provide empirical evidence for well being depending on absolute and on relative levels of income in a dynamic framework this finding holds after controlling for other influential factors in a multivariate setting the main novelty of the paper is the consideration of dynamic aspects individual s own history as well as the relative income performance with respect to the others living in the society under analysis do play a major role in the assessment of well being

some theoretical results on the economics of forestry pose the value of timber from a tree is related to its age a according to a function ft and a discount rate of p 0 is given at what age should a tree or a stand of trees of the same vintage be cut down to maximize the present value of the timber content the answer to this question proposed by jevons 1871 wicksell 1911 and others can be stated as follows cut the tree at an age at which the increase in value of timber content of the standing tree over an additional unit time interval equals the interest that can be earned over an additional unit time interval if the revenue from cutting the tree is invested at an interest rate p from the point of view of the economics of forestry the above solution and indeed the above question is missing something more precisely the solution is based on the assumption that the land on which the stand of trees was growing is not used after the trees are cut down consequently it fails to encompass an important aspect of the forest rotation problem once trees are removed from a given area the land is available for new forest growth clearly the longer the felling of the existing forest is delayed the longer it takes to acquire revenues from future harvests the opportunity cost of utilizing the forest site for the existing stand of trees must be considered taking this reforestation aspect into account faustmann 1849 noted that the question to be asked is the following assuming that one had an empty tract of land and one were interested in maximizing the discounted sum of the value of timber content of trees harvested timber being evaluated at a constant price what pattern of planting and harvesting trees should one follow

promises and endogenous reneging costs we present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency we explore a two player partnership game where before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort we allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises we demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging and show that these intermediate costs induce second best optimal outcomes

on the economics of forest vintages abstract we study optimal harvesting of a multiple vintage forest system under discounting discrete time and strictly concave utility it is shown that at the optimal stationary state timber harvest may evolve cyclically over time the cycles occur because in the forest vintage model space is measured continuously and time in discrete units cycles disappear as period length moves toward zero when the faustmann rotation is not unique or when the discount factor approaches unity we develop an equivalent model that can be used to solve the vintage problem numerically from any initial state numerical examples suggest that the optimal solution converges to the stationary cycle from any initial vintage structure

why countries with the same technology and preferences can have different growth rates abstract a standard ak model of endogenous growth has been extended to allow for an intertemporal conflict between capitalists and workers for the dynamic game thus obtained an equilibrium solution in feedback nash markovian strategies have been computed however many equilibria in trigger strategies can dominate the former there are dominating strategies that depend on the country specific bargaining power of the workers versus capitalists they are both pareto optimal and subgame perfect this provides an explanation why countries which are completely identical in preferences technology and factor endowments can experience different long term growth rates

social context and the utility of wealth addressing the markowitz challenge abstract paradoxically there is a demand for both risk and insurance markowitz markowitz h 1952 the utility of wealth journal of political economy 60 151 158 laid the foundation for an explanation to this paradox markowitz challenged future researchers to build upon his foundation an operational specification of the taste for wealth this paper addresses the markowitz challenge by building social context variables into his model of individual utility verifiable implications about gambling insuring and peer selection are derived from the augmented markowitz utility function

intergenerational transmission of preferences we propose a perfect empathy model of cultural transmission to capture the evolution of preferences in a population unlike existing imperfect empathy models focusing on stable interior equilibria we demonstrate that a corner outcome will eventuate however which corner outcome emerges is unknown and depends on the interplay of history and expectations

does the secondary life insurance market threaten dynamic insurance there is a vast theoretical literature on dynamic contracts which has received very little empirical attention exceptions are pierre andr chiappori bernard salanie and julie valentin 1999 and hendel and lizzeri 2003 this paper describes how a recent development in the life insurance market further illustrates the usefulness and power of the dynamic risk sharing learning model originally proposed by milton harris and bengt holmstr m 1982 life settlements are a recent innovation in the life insurance markets secondary markets for life insurance policies started in large scale in the late 1980s in response to the aids epi demic terminally ill policyholders exchanged their coverage for liquidity provided by a third party a viatical firm in the late 1990s a mar ket for nonterminal settlements emerged creat ing a secondary market for long term policies a policy holder with a life expectancy not exceed ing 15 years can sell the policy to intermediaries who continue to pay the premiums in exchange for becoming the beneficiaries 1 although esti mates differ the amount of settled insurance has been growing rapidly from approximately 2 billion in face amounts in 2002 to a recent estimate by conning research and consulting 2007 suggesting settlements as high as 6 1 billion in 2006 settlements generate a health contingent liquidation value for life insurance policies this is an innovation in life insurance term policies typically offer no liquidation value and cash value policies offer surrender values that are independent of health status they reflect average mortality in the pool the gap between surrender values and actuarial value of existing policies which can be quite large is the target of the settlement industry 2 currently the settle ment industry targets the stock of long standing policies that were issued before the emergence of this market life insurance companies are now beginning however to react by modifying contracts

relative standing comparisons risk taking and safety regulations abstract we study the question of how relative standing comparisons or status seeking influence risk taking when utility is separable in consumption and status the following results apply with non systematic risks more concern for status leads to more less risk taking when in a sense made precise in the paper the utility function is less more concave in status than in pure consumption with systematic risk risk taking always increases with the concern for status however status seeking always implies socially excessive risk taking thus suggesting a role for public regulation of risky choices

inequality and risk taking behaviour this paper investigates social in uences on attitudes to risk and ofiers an evolutionary explanation of risk taking by young low ranked males becker murphy and werning 2005 found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status here their model is generalised by use of the insight of hopkins and kornienko 2010 that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments while becker et al found that risk taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament further it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is su ciently low thus the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are su ciently unequal finally as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling it can cause greater inequality of wealth

malthusian selection of preferences the authors study natural selection of preferences using a golden age model with endogenous population in equilibrium all agents have preferences with maximum biological fitness given resource constraints and total population is the maximum the environment can sustain naturally selected agents follow the golden rule acting as if they maximize the undiscounted sum of per capita felicities of current and future generations selected preferences and hence work saving consumption and population density vary predictably with environmental differences copyright 1990 by american economic association

individual vs aggregate preferences the case of a small fish in a big pond we study the relationship between the risk preferences of individuals and the risk preferences of the aggregate economy to emphasize the vast differences that can occur between individual and market preferences brought about through aggregation we assume an economy consisting entirely of risk seekers we show that such individuals can lead to an aggregate economy that is risk averse the converse is also true an aggregate economy that exhibits risk aversion does not imply an economy of individual risk averters an economy demanding a risk premium can be formed from individuals who do not demand such compensation understanding the relationship between the preferences of individuals and the preferences of the aggregate economy is crucial for understanding the connection between the behavioral finance literature which focuses on individual preferences and the asset pricing literature which focuses on aggregate prices we discuss empirical implications of these results this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance