variations in trading volume return volatility and trading costs evidence on recent price formation models patterns in stock market trading volume trading costs and return volatility are examined using new york stock exchange data from 1988 intraday test results indicate that for actively traded firms trading volume adverse selection costs and return volatility are higher in the first half hour of the day this evidence is inconsistent with the admati and pfleiderer 1988 model which predicts that trading costs are low when volume and return volatility are high interday test results show that for actively traded firms trading volume is low and adverse selection costs are high on monday which is consistent with the predictions of the foster and viswanathan 1990 model academics investors and regulators alike are now intensively focused upon understanding the volatility of asset returns and its relation to trading volume this interest was undoubtedly piqued by the market break of october 1987 a time during which volatility and trading volume reached unprecedented levels but even beforehand researchers observed regular differences in the return process for various hours of the day and days of the week research concerning temporal patterns in stock market volatility and volume falls in two groups studies that document observed patterns and studies that develop models to predict patterns among the studies in the first group are oldfield and rogalski 1980 french and roll 1986 stoll and whaley 1990 harris 1986 and wood mcinish and ord 1985 who report evidence on seasonalities in daily and weekly return variances among the regularities that have been documented using interday data is that volatility is higher when the market is open than when it is closed oldfield and rogalski 1980 french and roll 1986 and stoll and whaley 1990 for example point out significant differences in return volatility between trading

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

the effects of ownership and benchmark competition an empirical analysis of u s water systems abstract should governments or private firms own water systems can yardstick or benchmark competition effectively discipline utilities little empirical research sheds light on these issues we use a panel dataset that includes every community water system in the united states from 1997 to 2003 to test the effects of ownership and benchmark competition on regulatory compliance we find that ownership does not generally affect compliance with the safe drinking water act sdwa greater benchmark competition however is associated with fewer sdwa violations the results suggest that ownership per se may not matter much but that competition even in its weaker form of benchmarking by consumers or regulators can improve performance

the price effects of liquidity shocks a study of the sec s tick size experiment abstract do stock prices of publicly listed companies respond to changes in transaction costs using the sec s pilot program that increased the tick size for approximately 1 200 randomly chosen stocks we find a stock price decrease between 1 75 and 3 2 for small spread stocks affected by the larger tick size relative to a control group we find that the increase in the present value of transaction costs accounts for a small percentage of the price decrease we study channels of price variation due to changes in expected returns information risk investor horizon and liquidity risk the evidence suggests that trading frictions affect the cost of capital

limit order submission strategies under asymmetric information abstract this paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit order submissions to shocks in a pure limit order market in the market we study informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads volatility momentum and depth by contrast uninformed traders are relatively insensitive to all these market conditions the dominance of the informed over limit order submissions is magnified by contrasts between them and the uninformed in the use of aggressively priced limit orders

is the corn futures market noisier the impact of high frequency quoting the paper pioneers research on high frequency hf quoting noise in electronically traded agricultural futures markets hf quoting quickly cancelling posted limit orders and replacing them with n

limit order book as a market for liquidity we develop a dynamic model of an order driven market populated by discretionary liquidity traders these traders must trade yet can choose the type of order and are fully strategic in their decision traders differ by their impatience less patient traders demand liquidity more patient traders provide it three equilibrium patterns are obtained the pattern is determined by three parameters the degree of impatience of the patient traders which we model as the cost of execution delay in providing liquidity their proportion in the population which determines the degree of competition among the liquidity providers and the tick size which is the cost of the minimal price improvement despite its simplicity the model generates a rich set of empirical predictions on the relation between market parameters time to execution and spreads we argue that the economic intuition of this model is so basic its main results must be robust in much more general models

minimum price variations discrete bid ask spreads and quotation sizes exchange minimum price variation regulations create discrete bid ask spreads if the minimum quotable spread exceeds the spread that otherwise would be quoted spreads will be wide and the number of shares offered at the bid and ask may be large a cross sectional discrete spread model is estimated by using intraday stock quotation spread frequencies the results are used to project 1 16 spread usage frequencies given a 1 16 tick projected changes in quotation sizes and in trade volumes are obtained from regression models for stocks priced under 10 the models predict spreads would decrease 38 percent quotation sizes would decrease 16 percent and daily volume would increase 34 percent article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

estimating the gains from trade in limit order markets we present a method to estimate the gains from trade in limit order markets and provide empirical evidence that the limit order market is a good market design using observations on order submissions and execution and cancellation histories we estimate both the distribution of traders unobserved valuations for the stock and latent trader arrival rates we use the resulting estimates to compute the current gains from trade the gains from trade in a perfectly liquid market and the gains from trade with a monopoly liquidity supplier the current gains are 90 of the maximum gains and 150 of the monopolist gains the majority of the world s stock exchanges operate some form of a limit order market a feature of good market design is that traders realize most of the potential gains from trade we develop a method for identifying and estimating the gains from trade in a limit order market and apply our method to a sample from a particular limit order market the vancouver stock exchange vse we find that gains from trade in the vse are approximately 90 of the gains from trade in a perfectly liquid market and approximately 50 more than gains from trade in a market in which liquidity is supplied by a profit maximizing monopolist our results therefore provide new empirical evidence that the limitorder market is a good market design a large number of experimental studies document that the gains from trade in a double auction are close to the maximum gains from trade see for example cason and friedman 1996 or the survey by holt 1995 similarly our empirical results show that the limit order market a market design similar to

liquidity adjusted intraday value at risk modeling and risk management an application to data from deutsche borse abstract this paper develops a high frequency risk measure the liquidity adjusted intraday value at risk livar our objective is to explicitly consider the endogenous liquidity dimension associated with order size by reconstructing the open limit order book of deutsche borse changes in the tick by tick ex ante frictionless return and actual return are modeled jointly the risk related to the ex ante liquidity premium is then quantified our model can be used to identify the impact of ex ante liquidity risk on total risk and to provide an estimation of the var for the actual return at a point in time in our sample liquidity risk can account for up to 32 of total risk depending on order size

rational expectations in microeconomic models an overview abstract this paper is an expository introduction to several topics of current research in the general equilibrium theory of rational expectations more specifically we discuss the existence of exact and approximate rational expectations equilibria the implementation of equilibria the behavior of learning and smoothing processes by which traders construct expectations from repeated observations of the market and the lagged use of the information revealed by prices in an intertemporal sequence of markets the purpose of this discussion is to introduce papers on these topics appearing in the journal of economic theory symposium on rational expectations in microeconomic models

so what orders do informed traders use we present a simple glosten milgrom type equilibrium model to analyze the decision of informed traders on whether to use limit or market orders we show that even after incorporating an order s price impact not only may informed traders prefer to use limit orders but the probability that they submit limit orders can be so high that limit orders convey more information than market orders we further show that the horizon of the private information is critical for this decision and is positively related to the use of limit orders our empirical analysis using torq suggests that informed traders do prefer limit orders to market orders and that limit orders are indeed more informative our model is in contrast to the literature that assumes that informed traders use market orders only and the literature that examines the limit order versus the market order decision of uninformed traders

can information heterogeneity explain the exchange rate determination puzzle empirical evidence shows that most exchange rate volatility at short to medium horizons is related to order flow and not to macroeconomic variables we introduce symmetric information dispersion about future macroeconomic fundamentals in a dynamic rational expectations model in order to explain these stylized facts consistent with the evidence the model implies that a observed fundamentals account for little of exchange rate volatility in the short to medium run b over long horizons the exchange rate is closely related to observed fundamentals c exchange rate changes are a weak predictor of future fundamentals and d the exchange rate is closely related to order flow

cross sided liquidity externalities we study the empirical relevance of the participation externality between liquidity suppliers makers and demanders takers i e whether liquidity demand attracts or reduces liquidity supply and vice versa we use exogenous shocks to exchange fees and technology as experiments to identify cross sided complementarities between liquidity suppliers and demanders in the u s equity market we find that the externality is large and positive on average however the externality is negative in periods of high adverse selection we quantify the economic significance of the externality by evaluating an exchange s revenue after a fee change the internet appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2016 2658 this paper was accepted by lauren cohen finance

imperfect competition in financial markets an empirical study of island and nasdaq the competition between island and nasdaq at the beginning of the century offers a natural laboratory to study competition between and within trading platforms and its consequences for liquidity supply our empirical strategy takes advantage of the difference between the pricing grids used on island and nasdaq as well as of the decline in the nasdaq tick using the finer grid prevailing on their market island limit order traders undercut nasdaq quotes much more than they undercut one another the drop in the nasdaq tick size triggered a drop in island spreads despite the island tick already being very thin before nasdaq decimalization we also estimate a structural model of liquidity supply and find that island limit order traders earned rents before nasdaq decimalization our results suggest that perfect competition cannot be taken for granted even on transparent open limit order books with a very thin pricing grid

aggregation determinacy and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information abstract we identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi complete for quasi complete economies we determine equilibrium trades show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria besides unifying some familiar settings such as those of grossman 1976 and milgrom and stokey 1982 the following new results are proved a the same restrictions that deliver gorman aggregation under symmetric information are sufficient for gorman aggregation under asymmetric information even under partially informative prices b the traditional assumptions of quadratic utilities and endowment spanning that result in the capm under symmetric information deliver a conditional capm under asymmetric information with prices that need not be fully informative c the linear equilibrium in grossman s 1976 model is the only equilibrium linear or not while minor changes in the normality assumptions result in indeterminacy and partially informative equilibria and d if there is no aggregate endowment risk asymmetrically informed agents with common priors sell the risky part of their endowment in every equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 g14 c62

a taxonomy of automated trade execution systems abstract a taxonomy of automated trade execution systems in financial markets is developed over 50 automated market structures in 16 countries are analyzed these markets consist of computerized rules governing both allowable message types and the means by which such messages are translated into trades computerized market structures are classified by ordered sets of trade execution priority rules trade matching protocols and associated degree of automation of price discovery and transparency to include informational asymmetries between classes of market participants differences in systems across types of financial instruments geographical locations and over time are analyzed jel g15 d44

tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets abstract perfect competition in liquidity provision in limit order markets is characterized by a tail expectation condition glosten 1994 in this paper we model imperfect competition in schedules by infinitely many liquidity suppliers quoting on a limit order book we show that there are zero rent mixed strategy equilibria featuring finite numbers of active liquidity suppliers none of the equilibria satisfies the competitive outcome not even on average considering a sequence of equilibria with the number of active liquidity suppliers becoming large we show that the aggregate stochastic marginal price schedule converges to the deterministic competitive marginal price schedule

an empirical behavioral model of liquidity and volatility abstract we develop a behavioral model for liquidity and volatility based on empirical regularities in trading order flow in the london stock exchange this can be viewed as a very simple agent based model in which all components of the model are validated against real data our empirical studies of order flow uncover several interesting regularities in the way trading orders are placed and cancelled the resulting simple model of order flow is used to simulate price formation under a continuous double auction and the statistical properties of the resulting simulated sequence of prices are compared to those of real data the model is constructed using one stock azn and tested on 24 other stocks for low volatility small tick size stocks called group i the predictions are very good but for stocks outside group i they are not good for group i the model predicts the correct magnitude and functional form of the distribution of the volatility and the bid ask spread without adjusting any parameters based on prices this suggests that at least for group i stocks the volatility and heavy tails of prices are related to market microstructure effects and supports the hypothesis that at least on short time scales the large fluctuations of absolute returns r are well described by a power law of the form p r r r r with a value of r that varies from stock to stock

disagreement portfolio optimization and excess volatility disagreement a key factor inducing trading has been receiving ever increasing attention in recent years most research has focused on disagreement about the expected returns several authors have shown that if the average belief coincides with the true expected return in the portfolio context prices are unaffected by disagreement in this paper we study the pricing effects of disagreement about return variances we show that i disagreement about variances has systematic and significant pricing effects more disagreement leads to higher prices and ii prices are very sensitive to the degree of disagreement even if the average belief about the variance is constant tiny fluctuations in the disagreement about the variance lead to substantial price fluctuations this second result may offer an explanation for the excess volatility puzzle when small changes in the degree of disagreement occur they induce relatively large price changes yet the changes in disagreement may be hard to directly detect empirically leading to apparent excess volatility

on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of noisy rational expectations models i study a general class of noisy rational expectations models that nests the standard grossman and stiglitz 1980 and hellwig 1980 models but relaxes the usual assumption of joint normality of asset pay offs and supply and allows for more general signal structures i provide a constructive proof of existence of equilibrium characterize the price function and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness within the class of equilibria with continuous price functions which are met by both the grossman and stiglitz 1980 models and the hellwig 1980 models with a continuum of investors my solution approach does not rely on the typical conjecture and verify method and i exhibit a number of non normal examples in which asset prices can be characterized explicitly and in a closed form the results presented here open up a broad class of models for applied work to illustrate the usefulness of generalizing the standard model i show that in settings with non normally distributed pay offs shocks to fundamentals may be amplified purely due to learning effects price drifts can arise naturally and the disagreement return relation depends in a novel way on return skewness

decomposing liquidity along the limit order book abstract in this paper we estimate the asymmetric information and order processing components of liquidity at extended depths along the limit order book using data from the inet ecn we find that the asymmetric information component decreases as depth increases inactive stocks have more information asymmetry at the inside quotes but it decreases more rapidly along the book than for active stocks the order processing component of liquidity has fixed and variable constituents consistent with a fixed cost per order as well as a variable portion based on the size of the order

an equilibrium analysis of information aggregation and fluctuations in markets with discrete decisions abstract this paper shows how the interaction between decentralized information gathering and discreteness of investment decisions at the individual level can generate random fluctuations in aggregate investment that involve occasionally large allocation errors this interaction is illustrated in a model in which private information is costly to acquire and prices reveal information the unique rational expectations equilibrium outcome of the model is shown to always be noisy and characterized by investment levels which may be high simply because uninformed investors are buying under the impression that the high price is a signal of good investment opportunities

the contribution of market makers to liquidity and efficiency of options trading in electronic markets this paper examines the contribution of market makers to the liquidity and the efficiency of the options market in a unique setup of an order driven computerized trading system in which market makers and other participants operate under equitable conditions the main findings are 1 liquidity increased a 60 increase in trading volume and a 35 decrease of bid ask spreads 2 the efficiency of shekel euro options trading improved deviations from put call parity decreased significantly by 12 and skewness decreased by about 30 we also find that the net cost to the exchange is out weighted by the benefit to the trading public and that the presence of market makers encouraged trading between other participants far beyond their own trading 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

market sidedness insights into motives for trade initiation we infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness we define trading as more two sided one sided if the correlation between the number of buyer and seller initiated trades increases decreases and assess changes in sidedness relative to a control sample around events that identify trade initiators consistent with asymmetric information trading is more one sided before merger news consistent with belief heterogeneity trading is more two sided before earnings and macro announcements with greater dispersion in analyst forecasts and after news with larger announcement surprises we examine the codeterminacy of sidedness bid ask spread volatility number of trades and order imbalance

reputation and the control of pollution this paper investigates the effectiveness of reputation in inducing a polluting firm to self regulate its emissions when consumers have imperfect information in particular we ask to what extent must consumers reward and punish the firm before it chooses self regulation as its dominant strategy we find that if payoffs in the stage game are such that both the consumer and the polluting firm have beliefs that are consistent with each others behaviors then the firm has a positive probability of playing clean in each period of a finite game further we find that a weak reward punishment scheme may have an adverse effect on the environment and that there are both environmental and welfare gains associated with strengthening the scheme

the informational content of prices when policy makers react to financial markets abstract when can policy makers use policy relevant information from financial market prices and how does policy affect price informativeness i analyze a novel setting with noise where a policy maker tries to infer information about a state variable from prices to improve policy decisions and policy in turn affects asset values i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of information revelation in equilibrium which might not be possible if the policy reaction to prices punishes traders for revealing their information if the policy maker is uninformed then policy objectives do not change price informativeness but they do if the policy maker has independent information about the state i also analyze policy maker transparency and find that policy makers with objectives having a large impact on asset values should publish their information before trading to make prices more informative in other cases intransparency can be optimal

trade and revelation of information abstract we consider an economy with asymmetric information and two types of agents fully informed and uninformed uninformed agents update their information observing equilibrium prices and the equilibrium levels of other agents excess demand we show that for a generic set of economies there are rational expectations equilibria which are partially revealing on an open dense set of signals of positive lebesgue measure provided that the dimension of the signal space is sufficiently larger than the dimension of the commodity space

information aggregation and allocative efficiency in smooth markets recent years have seen extensive investigation of the information aggregation properties of markets however relatively little is known about conditions under which a market will aggregate the private information of rational risk averse traders who optimize their portfolios over time in particular what features of a market encourage traders to ultimately reveal their private information through trades we consider a market model involving finitely many informed risk averse traders interacting with a market maker our main result identifies a basic asymptotic smoothness condition on prices in the market that ensures information is aggregated as long as portfolios converge furthermore under this assumption the allocation achieved is ex post pareto efficient asymptotic smoothness is fairly mild it requires that eventually infinitesimal purchases or sales should see the same per unit price notably we demonstrate that under some mild conditions algorithmic markets based on cost functions or equ

does information risk affect the implied cost of equity capital an analysis of pin and adjusted pin using a unique dataset of korean listed companies for which trade initiators are correctly identifiable we estimate bias free pin probability of informed trading that is no longer subject to the trade misspecification problem and test whether it is related to expected returns unlike prior studies we find that bias free adjpin the adjusted pin purged of a liquidity component is positively related to implied cost of equity our findings suggest that the errors in pin variables hamper a proper identification of pin pricing in prior studies

eighths sixteenths and market depth changes in tick size and liquidity provision on the nyse using limit order data provided by the nyse we investigate the impact of reducing the minimum tick size on the liquidity of the market while both spreads and depths quoted and on the limit order book declined after the nyse s change from eighths to sixteenths depth declined throughout the entire limit order book as well the combined e ect of smaller spreads and reduced cumulative limit order book depth has made liquidity demanders trading small orders better o however traders who submitted

can transparent markets survive abstract this paper investigates whether transparent markets can survive when faced with direct competition from less transparent markets we first construct a game theoretic model in which in equilibrium the low transparency dealers capture early order flow and use the resulting informational advantage to quote narrower spreads and earn more profits than their more transparent competitors we then conduct a laboratory experiment that tests and supports all of these predictions a second experiment shows that most dealers choose to be of lower transparency when they are allowed to do so however the informational advantage of low transparency decreases as there are more such dealers while the high transparency dealers get increasing benefit from informed traders who attempt to broadcast deceptive trades as a result a small number of transparent dealers persist in our markets

drink what you can pay for financing infrastructure in a fragmented water system the article investigates the relationship between environmental violations and water utility infrastructure investment in the houston metropolitan area through a lens of institutional fragmentation

adverse selection and competitive market making empirical evidence from a limit order market this article presents a new methodology for testing economic restrictions on the price schedules offered in a limit order book that are based on i break even conditions for marginal limit orders and ii rational updating conditions for order book revisions over time using order flow data from the stockholm stock exchange i find strong evidence of insufficient depth in the limit order books relative to the theoretical predictions an extended model which allows the model parameters to depend on market conditions captures some of the systematic variation in the observed order book depth article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the costs and determinants of order aggressiveness abstract this paper examines the costs and determinants of order aggressiveness aggressive orders have larger price impacts but smaller opportunity costs than passive orders price impacts are amplified by large orders small firms and volatile stock prices to minimize the implementation shortfall the optimal strategy is to enter buy sell orders at the bid ask aggressive buy sell orders tend to follow other aggressive buy sell orders and occur when bid ask spreads are narrow and depth on the same opposite side of the limit book is large small aggressive buys are more likely than sells to be motivated by information

the enforcement of pollution control laws inspections violations and self reporting targeting is the practice of inspecting firms most likely to violate a regulation this paper provides empirical evidence on the role of targeting in regulatory compliance i propose that self reporting by a firm is used to demonstrate that firms are willing to cooperate the results indicate that there is a one quarter penalty period following a violation inspections are also determined by the economic situation of the surrounding community demonstrating that targeting opens the door to interest group influence inspections that detect violations encourage self reporting showing that firms demonstrate their desire to cooperate with regulators by disclosing violations

the existence of fully rational expectations approximate equilibria with noisy price observations abstract nonrevealing fully rational expectations approximate equilibria exist in microeconomic pure exchange economies in which uninformed agents have suitably dispersed noisy price observations such traders maximize a state dependent expected utility conditional on the price vector they observe the distributions of noisy price observations and the correct equilibrium relationship between states of the world and prices in equilibrium aggregate excess demand is small with high probability in every state of the world and its expectation is also small this magnitude diminishes as the noisy price observations become more accurate equilibria are obtained by applying a fixed point argument to state dependent excess demand functions which are smooth because of the noisy price observations

auctions as algorithms abstract computerized auction systems are introduced as a new form of market institution characterized by communications technologies for passing messages between traders and a set of programmed rules that restrict the message space and process messages into transactions prices and quantities the stationary distributions of price quotations and transactions prices given order arrival rates conditioned on information available through the limit order book are derived for an automated continuous auction system with price and time priority rules the key to the analysis is the application of the theory of queues with preemptive priorities to the problem of two interactive queues the model then is used to characterize the structure of the electronic order book in terms of the distributions of the number of buy and sell orders in the system and the waiting time to trade execution the theoretical development is applied to a comparison of automated continuous and periodic single price auctions with respect to price volatility the magnitude of the bid ask spread and volume traded per unit of time

liquidity based competition for order flow we present a microstructure model of competition for order flow between exchanges based on liquidity provision we find that neither a pure limit order market plm nor a hybrid specialist limit order market hm structure is competition proof a plm can always be supported in equilibrium as the dominant market i e where the hybrid limit book is empty but an hm can also be supported for some market parameterizations as the dominant market we also show the possible coexistence of competing markets order preferencing that is decisions about where orders are routed when investors are indifferent is a key determinant of market viability welfare comparisons show that competition between exchanges can increase as well as reduce the cost of liquidity active competition between exchanges for order flow in cross listed securities is intense in the current financial marketplace examples include rivalries between the new york stock exchange nyse crossing networks and ecns and between the london stock exchange the paris bourse and other continental markets for equity trading and between eurex and london international financial futures and options exchange liffe for futures volume while exchanges compete along many dimensions e g payment for order flow transparency execution speed liquidity and price improvement will in our view be the key variables driving competition in the future over time high cost markets should be driven out of business as investors switch to cheaper trading venues moreover market structure is increasingly singled out by regulators exchanges and other market participants as a major determinant of liquidity 1

econometric models of limit order executions we develop and estimate an econometric model of limit order execution times using survival analysis and actual limit order data we estimate versions for time to first fill and time to completion for both buy and sell limit orders and incorporate the effects of explanatory variables such as the limit price limit size bid offer spread and market volatility execution times are very sensitive to the limit price but are not sensitive to limit size hypothetical limit order executions constructed either theoretically from first passage times or empirically from transactions data are very poor proxies for actual limit order executions r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification g23

do stylised facts of order book markets need strategic behaviour this paper studies the role of strategy and the order book market mechanism in price dynamics and the order o w behaviour to this end we analyse a zero intelligence agent model of a dynamic limit order market stylised facts of limit order markets are shown to be inuenced and in some cases governed by the market mechanism rather than strategic interaction positive correlation in order types for instance is the result of the market architecture and price movements may be predicted in the short term from analysing the state of the order book in contrast the absolute probabilities of order submission highlight the contribution of strategic behaviour

liquidity resiliency and market quality around predictable trades theory and evidence abstract we extend the theory of strategic trading around a predictable liquidation by considering the role of market resiliency our model predicts that even a monopolist strategic trader improves market quality and increases liquidator proceeds if trades temporary price impacts are quickly reversed and that competition among strategic traders strictly improves market quality we provide related empirical evidence by studying prices liquidity and individual account trading activity around the large and predictable roll trades undertaken by a large exchange traded fund etf the evidence indicates narrower bid ask spreads greater order book depth and improved resiliency on roll dates we find that a larger number of individual trading accounts provide liquidity on roll dates and do not find evidence of the systematic use of predatory strategies on balance the theory and evidence imply that traders supply liquidity to rather than exploit predictable trades in resilient markets

making cents of tick sizes the effect of the 2016 u s sec tick size pilot on limit order book liquidity abstract we use the 2016 u s sec tick size pilot to examine the effects of an increase in the minimum price variation on limit order book liquidity in nasdaq listed stocks on the nasdaq exchange for treatment stocks with an average pre pilot quoted spread less than 0 05 the tick size increase is binding and leads to a significant decrease in liquidity in the limit order book specifically the implied cost to trade at and away from the best bid and offer prices increases and the limit order book becomes less resilient the amount of time required for a deviation in liquidity to return to its long run mean for treatment stocks with an average pre pilot quoted spread of at least 0 05 the tick size increase is non binding and leads to either a slight decrease or no change in limit order book liquidity

informed traders and limit order markets abstract we consider a dynamic limit order market in which traders optimally choose whether to acquire information about the asset and the type of order to submit we numerically solve for the equilibrium and demonstrate that the market is a volatility multiplier prices are more volatile than the fundamental value of the asset this effect increases when the fundamental value has high volatility and with asymmetric information across traders changes in the microstructure noise are negatively correlated with changes in the estimated fundamental value implying that asset betas estimated from high frequency data will be incorrect

the dynamic properties of financial market equilibrium with trading fees we incorporate trading fees in a long horizon dynamic general equilibrium model in which traders optimally and endogenously decide when and how much to trade a full characterization of equilibrium is provided which allows us to study the dynamics of equilibrium trades equilibrium asset prices and rates of return in the presence of trading fees we exhibit the effect of trading fees on deviations from the consumption capm and analyze the pricing of endogenous liquidity risk we compare for the same shocks the impulse responses of this model to those of a model in which trading is infrequent because of trader inattention the current version reflects material that was previously in two papers w21421 and w19155

necessary conditions for the capm abstract the general restrictions on all economic primitives i e a endowments b preferences and c asset return distributions that yield the capm under the expected utility paradigm are provided these results are then used to derive the class of restrictions on preferences and the distribution of asset returns alone that provides the capm we also show that the conditions that provide the capm and derived preferences over mean and variance are equivalent consequently this paper also resolves the question of when mean variance maximization is consistent with expected utility maximization journal of economic literatureclassification numbers g12 g11 d50

the reputational penalties for environmental violations empirical evidence abstract this paper examines the sizes of the fines damage awards remediation costs and market value losses imposed on companies that violate environmental regulations firms that violate environmental laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity the losses however are of similar magnitudes to the legal penalties imposed and in the cross section the market value loss is related to the size of the legal penalty thus environmental violations are disciplined largely through legal and regulatory penalties not through reputational penalties

a closing call s impact on market quality at euronext paris abstract the paris bourse currently euronext paris refined its trading system to include electronic call auctions at market closings in 1996 for its less liquid continuous b stocks and in 1998 for its more actively traded continuous a stocks this paper analyzes the effects of the innovation on market quality our empirical analysis of price behavior for two samples of firms 50 b stocks and 50 a stocks for two different calendar dates 1996 and 1998 indicates that introduction of the closing calls has lowered execution costs for individual participants and sharpened price discovery for the broad market we further observe that market quality is improved at market openings albeit to a lesser extent we suggest that a positive spillover effect explains the closing call s more pervasive impact

when governments regulate governments this article advances a political theory of regulation that accounts for the choices of regulators and regulated entities when both are governments leading theories of regulation assume that governments regulate profit maximizing firms governments set rules to which firms respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior but often the entities that governments regulate are other governments we argue that government agencies and private firms often face different compliance costs and that agencies have greater incentives than firms to appeal regulations through political channels simultaneously the typical enforcement instruments that regulators use to influence firm behavior may be less effective against governments our empirical subjects are public and private entities compliance with the u s clean air act and safe drinking water act we find that compared with private firms governments violate these laws significantly more frequently and are less likely to be penalized for violations

the submission of limit orders or market orders the role of timing and information in the reuters d2000 2 system abstract recent work in the market microstructure literature suggests that the speed with which orders arrive in the market impacts traders order submission decisions in this study we use an asymmetric autoregressive conditional duration acd model to empirically investigate the influence on the submission of limit and market orders of changes in the time between the past submissions of different types of orders changes in the slope of the limit order book and changes in price uncertainty we find that the expected time between the arrivals of successive orders in the foreign exchange market depends on the previous type of order submitted and the slope on both sides of the order book price uncertainty volatility plays a secondary role after accounting for the impact of changes in the slope of the order book lastly we find that there are fundamental changes in the level of information contained in the submission of orders at the opening and closing of markets

competition signaling and non walking through the book effects on order choice abstract we investigate the effects of competition and signaling in a pure order driven market and examine the trading patterns of agents when walking through the book is not allowed our results suggest that the variables capturing the cost of a large market order are not informative for an impatient trader under this market mechanism we also document that the competition effect is not present only at the top of the book but persistent beyond the best quotes moreover it dominates the signaling effect for both a limit order and a market order trader finally we show that institutional investors order submission strategies are characterized by only a few pieces of the limit order book information this is consistent with informed traders placing orders based on their own private valuations rather than the state of the book

on the existence of rational expectations equilibrium abstract we prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information and maximize the expectation of a state dependent utility function the key to the result is a new idealization of what it means for a set of empirical distributions to support agents expectations this idealization depends on the notion that agents compare their expectations with continuous versions of the random empirical distributions that are generated by the workings of the economy the existence theorem covers all strictly concave utility functions arbitrary distributions of the state variable and situations in which the dimension of the state variable is large relative to the number of commodities

the revelation of information and self fulfilling beliefs abstract at a rational expectations equilibrium ree individuals are assumed to know the map from states to prices this hypothesis has two components that agents agree consensus and that they have point expectations degeneracy we consider economies where agents beliefs are described by a joint distribution on states and prices and these beliefs are fulfilled at equilibrium beliefs are self fulfilling if every price in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium price the corresponding equilibria are beliefs equilibria be the further restriction that agents have the same beliefs results in common beliefs equilibria cbe we study the relationship between be cbe and ree thus isolating the role of consensus and of degeneracy in achieving rational expectations journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 d82

partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy abstract a class of pure exchange economies is considered in which some agents are informed of private information and others are uninformed existence of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium ree is proved without restricting attention to particular functional forms for utility functions and probability distributions without introducing noise into the model and without departing from the standard definition of ree the equilibrium is robust in the sense that if the primitives of the economy are slightly perturbed the economy continues to have a qualitatively similar ree with somewhat stronger assumptions placed on the economy the equilibrium is also the unique measurable ree

technical analysis and liquidity provision the apparent conflict between the level of resources dedicated to technical analysis by practitioners and academic theories of market efficiency is a long standing puzzle we explore a previously unexamined feature of technical analysis namely its relation to liquidity provision we demonstrate that support and resistance levels coincide with peaks in depth on the limit order book and moving average forecasts reveal information about the relative position of depth on the book furthermore we show that these relationships stem from technical rules locating depth already in place on the limit order book copyright 2004 oxford university press