re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

a minimum wage can be welfare improving and employment enhancing abstract we examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal tax transfer scheme the government cannot observe household abilities only their incomes and is constrained to ensure that those working are at least as well off as those not working a minimum wage combined with the institutional features of typical welfare systems allows the incentive constraint to be severed at the ability level associated with the minimum wage if such a scheme can be enforced the government can increase the amount of redistribution from those working to those not working and possibly lower the number of unemployed

a search theoretic model of legal and illegal currency abstract using a search theoretic model of money we explore the conditions under which two currencies domestic and foreign will co exist despite legal restrictions on the use of foreign currency for internal trade we study how changes in government policy i e its enforcement of currency laws through fines or the rate of enforcement affects the acceptability of illegal currency the equilibrium value of both currencies and the implicit exchange rate first we construct a model with indivisible goods to show conditions under which legal currency is fully acceptable but illegal currency circulates with varying acceptability we then introduce bargaining to determine prices in legal and illegal currency we show that some enforcement polices can create multiple equilibria while others will not also some methods of enforcement are capable of driving the illegal currency out of circulation while others are not

the consequences of minimum wage laws some new theoretical ideas economists generally agree that the effect of a binding minimum wage law is to move firms backward along the demand curve for low skill workers however this prediction of worker displacement depends critically on the assumption that the productivity of firms labor is not dependent on the wage in this paper we show that in a conventional efficiency wage model a minimum wage may increase the level of employment in low wage jobs the formal logic of our model is similar to the case of labor demand under monopsony but arises in a model with a large number of employers

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

taxes redistribution and the minimum wage a theoretical analysis this paper considers a simple general equilibrium model that contains two types of workers with differing levels of ability and a social welfare maximizing government the paper shows that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing an optimal linear income tax with a minimum wage but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with a minimum wage

the minimum wage as a redistributive tool most analyses of the minimum wage focus on its unintended employment consequences the goal of a minimum wage is not of course to reduce employment but to redistribute earnings to low paid workers under what conditions can a minimum accomplish this are those conditions met in economies which otherwise rely extensively on markets to set wages such as the united states which in i994 rejected mandating health benefits that would have effectively raised the minimum or the united kingdom where in i995 the labour party promised a national minimum upon election who pays for the redistribution who benefits the redistributive effects of a minimum wage depend on the labour market and redistributive system in which it operates on the level of the minimum and on its enforcement at best an effective minimum wage will shift the earnings distribution in favour of the low paid and buttress the bottom tiers of the distribution from erosion at worst minimum wages reduce the share of earnings going to the low paid by displacing many from employment neither outcome is certain so that enacting a minimum is a risky but potentially profitable investment in redistribution it is the balancing of risk against gain that makes a minimum so controversial until the i980s i99os competitive labour markets in the united states and united kingdom produced rising real earnings for the low paid and falling earnings inequality so the risk of enacting a national minimum united kingdom or of raising substantially the national minimum united states seemed unnecessary why interfere with the competitive market when it produces socially desirable trends in earnings albeit a bit slower than one might accomplish with a legislated minimum two decades of falling real wages for lower decile workers in the united states and of rising earnings inequality in the united kingdom1 have however put the minimum back in play the job market is not doing much for lower paid workers in the united kingdom virtually all social groups accept the need for some redistribution though they differ on the best way to accomplish such in the united states pressures for tax cuts can be interpreted as a way for employees to gain real wage increases unavailable through the market the consensus favouring redistribution through the earned income tax credit disappeared in the midi 990s rush to reduce federal budget deficits this paper takes as its operating premise the goal of redistributing earnings

pareto improving minimum wage laws by increasing the expected wage in low skill jobs a minimum wage law can reduce the incentive for low skill workers to imitate high skill workers in the signalling process the gain from reduced investment in the signal can more than offset the loss from unemployment among low skill workers so that total output increases moreover with an appropriate poll tax on workers to compensate owners of capital the law can make all workers and owners of capital better off

income maintenance and labor force participation the paper studies the optimal tax subsidy schedules in an economy where the only decision of the agents is to work or not with an application to the case of france given an income guarantee provided by the welfare state the tax schedule that maximizes government revenue provides a benchmark the laffer bound above which it is inefficient to tax in fact under mild conditions a feasible allocation is second best optimal if and only if the associated taxes are lower than the laffer bound the only restriction that efficiency puts on the shape of the tax scheme is this upper laffer bound the laffer tax scheme itself can be computed from the joint distribution of the agents productivities and work opportunity costs depending on the economy it can take widely different forms and exhibit for instance negative marginal tax rates after estimating the joint distribution of productivities and work opportunity costs on french data i compute the laffer bound for two subpopulations single women and married women with two children or more quite surprisingly the actual incentives to work appear to be very close to the bound

endogenous currency substitution inflationary finance and welfare in some countries a foreign currency has replaced the domestic one to perform the functions of money this phenomenon is known as currency substitution this paper explores the relationship between currency substitution and inflationary finance in an overlapping generations model in which currency substitution is an endogenous equilibrium outcome the author describes when currency substitution may emerge and shows that it may be a purely expectational phenomenon he uses the model to discuss the welfare effects of inflation and the effects of policies that deal directly with currency substitution cs copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

who pays for the minimum wage this paper analyzes the eects of a large 60 and persistent increase in the minimum wage instituted in hungary in 2001 we propose a new approach to estimating the employment eects of a minimum wage increase that exploits information on the distribution of wages before and after the policy change we infer the number of jobs destroyed by comparing the number of pre reform jobs below the new minimum wage to the excess number of jobs paying at and above the new minimum wage our estimates imply that the higher minimum wage had at most a small negative eect on employment and so the main eect was pushing up wages we then use data on a large panel of firms to evaluate the economic incidence of the minimum wage increase contrary to theoretical models that attribute the small employment eects of minimum wage changes to monopsonistic wage setting we find no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage led to lower profitability among low wage employers instead we find that the costs of the minimum wage were largely passed through to consumers

minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search matching and endogenous contact rates building upon a continuous time model of search with nash bargaining in a stationary environment we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model they can be welfare improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market we discuss identification of the model using current population survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters we show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

optimal incentives for labor force participation abstract optimal taxation is analyzed under a rawlsian criterion in an economy where the only decision of the agents is to participate or not to the labor force the model allows for heterogeneity both in the agent s productivities and aversions to work at a first best optimal schedule the marginal agent who decides to work pockets all of her productivity while being just compensated for her work aversion when the planner does not observe work aversion financial compensation for work is lower than productivity theory puts little restrictions on the shape of the optimal tax schedules the usual first order conditions involving the elasticities of participation only apply for sufficiently regular economies we qualitatively show how the optimal incentive schemes depend on the underlying structure of the preferences 100 marginal tax rates or subsidies to work are related to specific features of the economies

the distributional and efficiency effects of increasing the minimum wage a simulation the generally accepted goal of minimum wage laws is to alter the distribution of income in favor of low income households however since a minimum wage will also disrupt low wage labor markets causing inefficiencies and imposing costs on some of the same workers the law is intended to help an evaluation of the policy requires a weighing of the distributional benefits against the efficiency costs quantification of these benefits and costs is clearly important to this evaluation while much effort has been devoted to estimating the employment effects of minimum wage laws relatively little work has been done to estimate the distributional benefits our simulations focus on this efficiency equity tradeoff by developing estimates of the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the level and distribution of real income across households previous work has concluded that minimum wages are not as beneficial in their distributional impact as generally supposed

risk sharing on the labour market and second best wage rigidities the starting point of the analysis is that a significant proportion of the labour force is not covered by efficient labour contracts in particular the non existence of forward labour contracts limits the opportunity of efficient risk sharing through private arrangements among young labour suppliers and capital owners in such a context state dependent labour taxes and employment subsidies would be required to achieve ex ante pareto efficiency in the absence of employment subsidies a certain limited degree of downward wage rigidity is in general pareto superior to full wage flexibility at the second best optimum so defined productive efficiency is sacrificed in some states in order to achieve greater efficiency in risk sharing thus the unemployment associated with wage rigidity is inefficient though voluntary due to the levels of benefits and second best efficient a limited degree of wage discrimination by hiring date is typically part of the second best policy

equity and efficiency in rationed labor markets the social welfare implications of income tax policy are shown to critically depend on whether or not labor markets are rationed i e on the existence of involuntary unemployment with rationed labor markets raising taxes on the employed and transfers to the unemployed might improve both equity and efficiency it improves equity by redistributing income from the employed to the unemployed it improves efficiency as it encourages people with a small utility surplus of employment to exit the labor market leaving their jobs for people with a higher utility surplus i derive conditions under which this result continues to hold when only part of the labor market is rationed when there is both frictional and rationing unemployment and when rationing endogenously follows from trade unions monopoly power

minimum wage legislation and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistribution the use of minimum wages and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistributing income is analyzed the government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two types of individuals who differ in ability the effect of introducing a minimum wage which induces involuntary unemployment will be to improve social welfare under weak conditions circumstances under which combining unemployment insurance with the minimum wage will be welfare improving are also considered

minimum wages in an equilibrium search model with diminishing returns to labor in production this article analyzes a minimum wage in a market with imperfect information and job search it establishes that employment effects of a minimum wage do not generally indicate welfare effects it shows that researchers interested in welfare consequences should ask two questions first is the existing minimum wage binding second do some firms that would be bound by a new minimum wage presently experience labor shortages if the answers to these questions are no and yes respectively this article supports the conclusion that a higher minimum wage is welfare improving regardless of its effect on the unemployment rate

an information based theory of international currency abstract this paper develops an information based theory of international currency based on search frictions private trading histories and imperfect recognizability of assets using an open economy search model with multiple competing currencies the value of each currency is determined without requiring agents to use a particular currency to purchase a country s goods strategic complementarities in portfolio choices and information acquisition decisions generate multiple equilibria with different types of payment arrangements while some inflation can benefit the country issuing an international currency the threat of losing international status puts an inflation discipline on the issuing country when monetary authorities interact in a simple policy game the temptation to inflate can lead optimal policy to deviate from the friedman rule the calibrated model can produce a welfare cost of losing international status for the issuing country larger than previous findings though estimates depend critically on inflation rates and information costs

endogenous multiple currencies in this paper i study a model in which households can decide which currency or currencies they will accept i provide a simple set of assumptions that are sufficient to prevent the indeterminacy of the exchange rate in the sense of kareken and wallace 1981 in a two country model stable equilibria have either a single currency or national currencies i also show currency substitution occurs as an endogenous response to high growth in the stock of a currency

currency substitution inflation and welfare abstract currency substitution affects the mapping between social welfare and inflation by altering the underlying money demand function and influencing interest rates in order to explore the essence of this effect i build a model with working capital under which foreign currency is substituted with the less liquid components of domestic money the framework closely mimics the actual pattern of currency substitution across varying rates of inflation and enables the study of an additional channel that works through the impact of currency substitution on interest rates it is found that there is a threshold inflation rate which turns out to be 44 under baseline calibration below which currency substitution decreases welfare and vice versa a practical implication is that at inflation rates lower greater than the threshold the potential welfare gains from disinflation to a near zero inflation rate are higher lower if there is currency substitution than otherwise

on the optimality of a minimum wage new insights from optimal tax theory we build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax we consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment workers differ in productivity the government does not observe workers productivity but only their wages hence the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem we show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low however if the government controls the bargaining power then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power

is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for redistribution textabstractwe analyze the redistributional dis advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets without imposing assumptions on the in efficiency of labor rationing compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change a minimum wage increase raises involuntary unemployment but also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment a minimum wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of inefficient labor rationing we show that this critically depends on how labor rationing is distributed among workers a necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum wage increase is that the public revenue gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment we write this condition in terms of measurable sufficient statistics our empirical analysis suggests that a minimum wage increase is undesirable in nearly all oecd countries a reduction in the minimum wage along with tax adjustments that keep net incomes constant would yield a pareto improvement

optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets this paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market and obtains two key results first we show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first importantly this result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers in that context a binding minimum wage enhances the effectiveness of transfers to low skilled workers as it prevents low skilled wages from falling through incidence effects second when labor supply re sponses are along the extensive margin only the co existence of a minimum wage with a positive tax rate on low skilled work is always second best pareto ineffcient a pareto improving policy consists of reducing the pre tax minimum wage while keeping constant the post tax minimum wage by increasing transfers to low skilled workers and financing this reform by increasing taxes on higher paid workers overall our results imply that the minimum wage and subsidies for low skilled workers are complementary policies pa

welfare reform in european countries a microsimulation analysis this article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in work benefits in the 15 pre enlargement countries of the european union we use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins and the euromod microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates we quantify the equity efficiency trade off for a range of elasticity parameters in most countries because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase out rates increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme in contrast the in work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

effects of the minimum wage on employment dynamics the voluminous literature on minimum wages offers little consensus on the extent to which a wage floor impacts employment we argue that the minimum wage will impact employment over time through changes in growth rather than an immediate drop in relative employment levels we show that commonly used specifications in this literature especially those that include state specific time trends will not accurately capture these effects using three separate state panels of administrative employment data we find that the minimum wage reduces job growth over a period of several years this finding is supported using several empirical specifications

optimal income transfer programs intensive versus extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes optimal income transfers for low incomes labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin intensity of work on the job and along the extensive margin participation into the labor force when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer program is a classical negative income tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support and a large phasing out tax rate however when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer program is similar to the earned income tax credit with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income carefully calibrated numerical simulations are provided

minimum wage legislation as a second best policy mass unemployment is a striking phenomenon of the present economic situation of european market economies although the profession of economists has been criticized for not providing satisfactory cures it has produced a number of different explanations either complementary or contradictory for the occurrence of mass unemployment in this paper we examine the argument that unemployment is the consequence of minimum wage legislation which is socially desirable the observation of current wage legislations suggests that the above argument is broadly at least partly accepted by policy makers curiously enough a defence of this argument meeting the rigorous requirements of modern theory seems to be missing symmetrically attacks against minimum wage legislation often rely upon reasonings of dubious relevance i e the obvious remark that unemployment is a waste with first best efficiency criteria the present paper proposes a second best analysis where second best stems from informational asymmetries which prevent the implementation of lump sum transfers needed for a first best redistribution policy the question under scrutiny can be reformulated in a more precise way as follows does a second best optimal redistribution policy lead to minimum wage legislation and unemployment our elements of answer are gathered in 3 sections in section 2 the principles of the analysis of the desirability of quantity controls and existing results are recalled in section 3 the analysis of section 2 is specified to a simple prototype model for the study of linear income taxation in section 4

optimal minimum wage legislation in this paper we present a model in which minimum wage legislation may be pareto optimal this arises because a higher wage would be preferred to the market clearing wage by demanders for and suppliers of labour even though unemployment is induced and minimum wage legislation is needed to support the preferred equilibrium consider a labour market where the quality of labour depends positively on the wage offered if labour quality is highly sensitive to wage increases effective unit labour cost will fall as the wage rises this would lead the representative firm to prefer paying an above market clearing wage and to ration job slots such an effect has been studied when quality depends on an individual firm s wage offer see for example weiss i980 or stiglitz i974 suppose however that labour quality depended not on any individual firm s wage offer but on the average market wage if firms were atomistic each invidual firm would have an incentive to undercut the optimal above marketclearing wage trying to get the quality benefits of high average wages while paying lower wages itself the high wage solution would not be viable legislation fixing minimum wages might be required to support the preferred equilibrium quality might depend on average market wages when workers must decide whether or not to enter a labour market before they can sample and obtain specific job offers migration into labour markets for example rural to urban migration in less developed countries provides one example as the decision to migrate and therefore the quality of the labour pool will depend on some average of expected wage offers the decision over which profession to enter at the beginning of the educational process provides another example of course imperfect information plays a key role here it is assumed that both firms and workers have imperfect information about the suitability of individual workers for jobs both before and to a lesser extent after employment has begun this lack of information will rule out both profitable selfselection mechanisms and wages strictly proportional to output so that firms will care about the quality of the labour pool the non optimality of market clearing prices which will be demonstrated makes this paper similar to a number of papers on the implications of adverse selection in labour and product markets one may mention two excellent papers on screening in labour markets by guasch and weiss i980 i98i this paper builds on some of the results in those papers stiglitz and weiss i98i show how credit rationing may arise from a similar type of argument wilson

a case for maximum wage in this paper we demonstrate that supplementing the optimal non linear income tax system with a binding maximum wage rule attains a pareto improvement by serving to mitigate the mimicking incentives of the high skill individuals without entailing distortions

the misallocation of housing under rent control the standard analysis of price controls assumes that goods are efficiently allocated even when there are shortages but if shortages mean that goods are randomly allocated across the consumers that want them the welfare costs from misallocation may be greater than the undersupply costs we develop a framework to empirically test for misallocation the methodology compares consumption patterns for demographic subgroups in rent controlled and free market places we find that in new york city which is rent controlled an economically and statistically significant fraction of apartments appears to be misallocated across demographic subgroups jel c25 d12 d61 r20

minimum wage unemployment and growth abstract this paper shows that in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth minimum wage legislation does not necessarily has negative consequences on economic performance such legislation can have positive effects on growth by inducing more human capital accumulation more precisely a low demand for unskilled labor induced by a minimum wage may create an incentive for workers to accumulate human capital moreover it is possible that a decrease in the minimum wage lowers the welfare of each agent in the economy

using shrinkage estimators to improve upon time series model proxies for the security market s expectation of earnings time series models box and jenkins 1976 and nelson 1973 of earnings expectations have frequently been used in capital market research to produce proxies for the security market s assessment of earnings surprise surrounding corporate earnings announcements see e g ball and brown 1968 beaver clarke and wright 1979 and foster olsen and shevlin 1984 these time series models are used to proxy for the market s assessment of unexpected earnings in situations wherever current analysts forecasts are not available e g small firms and quarterly earnings in a recent survey paper bathke and lorek 1984 suggest that three parsimonious time series models have been shown to be useful forecasting models of quarterly earnings per share viz those of 1 foster 1977 2 griffin 1977 and watts 1975 and 3 brown and rozeff 1979 using different samples of firms drawn from different time periods three classes of seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average sarima models have been identified as being the best univariate time series

currency substitution risk premia and the taylor principle abstract this paper studies the equilibrium determinacy properties of a simple interest rate rule in a small open economy subject to currency substitution i e the use of a foreign currency for domestic transactions and risk premia on foreign borrowing it shows that if currencies are substitute in the provision of liquidity services the rule s response to inflation has to be sufficiently above unity for the equilibrium to be locally determinate this reinforced taylor principle requirement appears to be more binding in economies characterized by a larger elasticity of currency substitution more debt elastic country risk premia and intermediate degrees of dollarization in transactions

currency competition in a fundamental model of money abstract we study how two fiat monies one safe and one risky compete in a decentralized trading environment the currencies equilibrium values their transaction velocities and agents spending patterns are endogenously determined we derive conditions under which agents holding diversified currency portfolios spend the safe currency first and hold the risky one for later purchases we also examine when the reverse spending pattern is optimal traders generally favor dealing in the safe currency unless trade frictions and the currency risk is low as risk increases or trading becomes more difficult the transaction velocity and value of the safe money increases

minimum wage policy with optimal taxes and unemployment abstract using a search model i derive a formula that links the welfare gains from the minimum wage to its effect on low skilled labor force participation and employment this formula shows that the minimum wage is welfare improving if pushing the low skilled labor market tightness downwards brings it closer to its efficient level i estimate the causal effect of the minimum wage on low skilled labor force participation and employment using federal and state minimum wage variation i discuss the policy implications of my estimates when viewed through the lens of the marginal welfare gain formula

aggregation bias in elasticities of substitution and the minimum wage paradox while the employment effects of minimum wages are usually reported to be small suggesting low substitutability between skill types direct estimates suggest a much larger degree of substitutability this article argues that this paradox is largely due to a bias induced by the aggregation of skill types into broad categories an assignment model is applied where skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs the implied pattern of substitutability reveals the sources of the bias estimation results for the united states show elasticities of complementarity to be underestimated by up to a factor 2 5 the methods laid out likewise can be applied to other markets where different quality types are close substitutes such as the housing market

optimal participation taxes addressing extensive labour supply responses the literature has established a case for larger transfers to the working poor than to even poorer non working people this paper casts new light on this result i argue that the result hinges crucially on the labour supply responses of people in income brackets above that of the working poor then distinguishing between more and less poor working people i show that if a single working type faces a negative tax it is the poorer one who does finally i endogenize wages and show that key conditions will be of the same form as before

minimum wage legislation in a dual labor market the paper studies the equilibrium effects of minimum wage legislation in an economy with coexisting primary and secondary labor markets owing to difficulties in monitoring relative wages and the threat of job loss play a functional role in eliciting effort from primary sector workers minimum wage laws hence affect the primary wage and employment level even if the law only binds in the secondary labor market furthermore interaction between the two sectors can also alter the secondary outcome relative to the standard analysis and has implications for participation decisions and for the level of unemployment

a pareto improving minimum wage this paper shows that a graduated minimum wage in contrast to a constant minimum wage can provide a strict pareto improvement over what can be achieved with an optimal income tax the reason is that a graduated minimum wage requires high productivity workers to work more to earn the same income as low productivity workers which makes it more difficult for the former to mimic the latter in effect a graduated minimum wage allows the low productivity workers to benefit from second degree price discrimination which increases their income

confidence in domestic money and currency substitution i introduction the prevalence of currency substitution cs that is the demand for foreign money by domestic residents has been endemic in several latin american and east european countries as well as some other parts of the world traditional explanations of the phenomenon tend to focus on its association with high levels of domestic inflation foreign money is a convenient hedge against the erosion of purchasing power over time 1 therefore the degrees of cs experienced by different countries are theorized as the consequences of the different monetary policies in those countries in particular a stabilization policy such as a decrease in domestic inflation should lead to a decline or even the elimination of cs this prediction however has not been observed empirically in several instances decreases in inflation to minimal levels subsequent to episodes of high inflation have not reversed the demand for foreign money the persistence or hysteresis in cs has been the subject of many theoretical and empirical studies 2 on the other hand interestingly a complete and rapid elimination of local currency has been rarely observed even with high levels of domestic inflation some theoretical explanations of the observed irreversibility of cs in the literature have focused primarily on the transactions technology associated with the use of two monies guidotti and rodriguez 1992 argue that there are costs associated with switching from the use of one currency to the other once an economy is dollarized these costs deter the switch back to the use of domestic money after inflation has abated uribe 1997 elaborates a similar model of cs hysteresis in which the transactions costs are endogenous in that they are a decreasing function of the aggregate level of cs in the economy sturzenegger 1997 postulates a model in which inflation instigates financial adaptation i e a move away from domestic money to the use of foreign money or other assets and transactions costs associated with cs are assumed to decline with an increase in the denomination of purchases in such a setting certain sectors of the economy become dollarized and reversion to the use of domestic money subseq uent to a decline in inflation need not occur in more general terms dornbuschet al 1990 characterize this process of financial adaptation as a shift in money demand for every rate of inflation there is now a lower demand for domestic money leading to hysteresis alternative explanations of cs have focused on public perceptions regarding various government policies one argument is that stabilization policies such as those leading to a decline in inflation lack credibility and hence are ineffective in rooting out cs melvin and fenske 1992 propose this as one explanation for the persistence of demand for foreign money in bolivia monetary reform in the late 1980s notwithstanding a similar conclusion is reached in clements and schwartz 1993 however this argument may imply that persistence in cs is in all likelihood a transitory phenomenon the demand for domestic money will rise eventually as stabilization policies earn credibility in tandon and wang 1999 yet another government policy the imposition of costly capital controls is brought to bear on the persistence of cs in an inflationary economy in such an environment cs arises and persists from balancing between the expected cost of capital controls associated with foreign currency and the loss in purchasing power associated with inflationary domestic money the principal contribution of the present article is the incorporation of agents subjective expectations and beliefs as the key determinant underlying the relative demand for domestic and foreign currencies we study a model in which the confidence in domestic money is partial as in weil 1987 and bertocchi and wang 1995 and extend the previous analysis to a two money environment

the dynamics of inflation and currency substitution in a small open economy abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between money and inflation in a small open economy where domestic and foreign currencies are perfect substitutes as means of payment it is shown that if the path of domestic money supply is such that individuals find it optimal to change the currency in which transactions are settled there will be an adjustment period during which domestic inflation adjusts to equal the foreign inflation rate the model captures the stylized fact that temporary increases in the inflation rate may have permanent effects in the use of foreign currency even without the introduction of dollarization costs

the consequences of the minimum wage when other wages are bargained over abstract this paper examines the impact of a binding minimum wage in a situation where unions dominated by skilled workers set wages it is shown that the relationship between the minimum wage the bargained wage and employment of skilled and unskilled workers depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor cases where minimum wage hikes increase both overall and unskilled employment are exhibited

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic