equilibrium resource management with altruistic overlapping generations abstract we imbed a classic fishery model where the optimal policy follows a most rapid approach path to a steady state into an overlapping generations setting the current generation discounts future generations utility flows at a rate possibly different from the pure rate of time preference used to discount their own utility flows the resulting model has non constant discount rates leading to time inconsistency the unique markov perfect equilibrium to this model has a striking feature provided that the current generation has some concern for the not yet born the equilibrium policy does not depend on the degree of that concern

altruism and time consistency the economics of fait accompli this paper analyzes the strategic and intertemporal interaction between two economic agents who have overlapping concerns such as altruistic concerns for each other s welfare the agents may be two individuals a social bureau and a client or two units in an organization we show how the presence of such common concerns may lead to socially inefficient outcomes in which one economic agent free rides on the other s concern we also briefly how this inefficiency and free riding in the context of interaction between individuals might be mitigated by compulsory social security systems as another example we interpret the inefficiency in terms of kornai s soft budget constraints within organizations

competition and corporate performance are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance my investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct but they are not overwhelming furthermore the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak however the results reported here based on an analysis of around 670 u k companies do provide some support for this view most important i present evidence that competition as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth

market share market value and innovation in a panel of british manufacturing firms this paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations market share and stock market value new developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity we find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity furthermore the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares we argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre emptively innovate

efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform price auctions abstract we prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent value uniform price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy we show that the uniform price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of participants and asymptotically aggregates idiosyncratic bidder information into the market price more generally our analysis framework provides conditions justifying the use of nonatomic limit model approximations to analyze the large market behavior of game theoretic models we demonstrate continuity requirements on the economic primitives sufficient for the equilibrium strategies of the two models to converge as the number of participants in the finite game approaches infinity

market structure firm characteristics and innovative activity in this study the determinants of product innovation by west german firms operating in the metal industry are investigated a strong positive impact of imperfect competition on innovative activity is estimated aside from competition and barriers to entry factors like the ownership structure of a firm internal finance and the skill level of the workforce are considered one result is that firms led by hired managers tend to innovate less intensively than owner managed enterprises copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies abstract we consider exchange economies where each consumer may report or act according to any demand function provided that there exist situations that the consumer finds plausible in which the reported demand performs at least as well as the true demand we identify conditions under which as the size of the economy increases all the market clearing prices and allocations of the reported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

environmental regulation and competitiveness empirical evidence on the porter hypothesis from european manufacturing sectors abstract this paper investigates the weak and strong versions of porter hypothesis ph focusing on the manufacturing sectors of 17 european countries between 1997 and 2009 the hypothesis that well crafted and well enforced regulation would benefit both the environment and the firm was originally proposed by porter 1991 and porter and van der linde 1995 to date the literature has analyzed the impact of environmental regulation on innovation and on productivity mostly in separate analyses and focusing on the usa the few existing contributions on europe study the effect of environmental regulation either on green innovation or on performance indicators such as exports we instead look at overall innovation and productivity impacts first focusing on overall innovative activity allows us to account for potential opportunity costs of induced innovations second productivity impacts are arguably the most relevant indicators for the strong ph as a proxy of environmental policy stringency we use pollution abatement and control expenditures pace one of the few sectoral level indicators available we remedy upon its main drawback namely potential endogeneity by adopting an instrumental variable estimation approach we find evidence of a positive impact of environmental regulation on the output of innovation activity as proxied by patents thus providing support in favor of the weak ph this result is in line with most of the literature on the other front we find no evidence in favor of the strong ph as productivity appears to be unaffected by the degree of pollution control and abatement efforts

the two faces of competition dynamic resourcefulness and the hypercompetitive shift competition in the american economy has fundamentally changed over the last few decades from static to dynamic this study labels this important change the hypercompetitive shift and documents it across 200 industries of the us manufacturing sector during i958 to 1991 for industries that undergo a hypercompetitive shift there is an increase in the cross firm variance in performance and a rotation in the value rivalry relationship from a negative association to an inverted u as a consequence of these competitive changes the strategic focus of firms shifts from careful exploitation of given highly durable strategic assets to the steady creation of many new rapidly depreciable ones the key driver of hypercompetitive shift is the dynamic resourcefulness of an industry or the ease with which new strategic assets can be created determinants of dynamic resourcefulness include the dynamism of related transactors notably consumers and suppliers the knowledge base of the industry and structural condi

discounting values and decisions how do discount rates affect agents decisions and valuations this paper provides a general method to analyze this question allowing stochastic and managed cash flows stochastic discount rates and time inconsistency and including arbitrary learning and payoff or utility processes we show that some of these features can lead to counterintuitive answers e g a more patient agent stops earlier but we also establish under simple conditions theorems yielding robust predictions concerning the impact of discount rates on control and stopping decisions and on valuations we apply our theory to models of search experimentation bankruptcy optimal growth investment and social learning

a theory of intergenerational altruism modeling intergenerational altruism is crucial to evaluate the long term consequences of current decisions and requires a set of principles guiding such altruism we axiomatically develop a theory of pure direct altruism altruism is pure if it concerns the total utility rather than the mere consumption utility of future generations and direct if it directly incorporates the utility of all future generations our axioms deliver a new class of altruistic forward looking preferences whose weight put on the consumption of a future generation generally depends on the consumption of other generations the only preferences lacking this dependence correspond to the quasi hyperbolic discounting model which our theory characterizes our approach provides a framework to analyze welfare in the presence of altruistic preferences and addresses technical challenges stemming from the interdependent nature of such preferences

sources procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation fabio arcangeli paul david frank engelman christopher freeman massimo moggi richard nelson luigi orsenigo nathan rosenberg michele salvati g n von tunzelman two anonymous referees and the participants at the meeting of the committee on distribution growth and technical progress of the italian national research council cnr rome november 16 1985 have helped with various redraftings a particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of moses abramovitz this work has been undertaken at the science policy research unit spru university of sussex as part of the research program of the designated research centre sponsored by the economic and social research council esrc earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the italian national research council cnr is also gratefully acknowledged the statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of stephano brioschi ilaria fornari and giovannu prennushi

mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning we study learning in a dynamic setting where identical copies of a good are sold over time through a sequence of second price auctions each agent in the market has an unknown independent private valuation that determines the distribution of the reward she obtains from the good for example in sponsored search settings advertisers may initially be unsure of the value of a click though the induced dynamic game is complex we simplify analysis of the market using an approximation methodology known as mean field equilibrium mfe the methodology assumes that agents optimize only with respect to long run average estimates of the distribution of other players bids we show a remarkable fact in a mean field equilibrium the agent has an optimal strategy where she bids truthfully according to a conjoint valuation the conjoint valuation is the sum of her current expected valuation together with an overbid amount that is exactly the expected marginal benefit of one additional observation about her true pri

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

a theorist s view of experiments the paper springs from a position that economic theory is an abstract investigation of the concepts and considerations involved in real life economic decision making rather than a tool for predicting or describing real behavior it is argued that when experimental economics is motivated by theory it should not look to verify the predictions of theory but instead should focus on verifying that the considerations contained in the economic model are sound and in common use it is argued that when theory is motivated by experiments the theorist should not be hasty in adopting new functional forms but should try to identify the basic psychological themes which are revealed exposed by the experiment finally some critical comments on the methodology of experimental economics are presented 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classi cation b0 c9

firm size and r d intensity a re examination using data from the federal trade commission s line of business program and survey measures of technological opportunity and appropriability conditions this paper finds that overall firm size has a very small statistically insignificant effect on business unit r d intensity when either fixed industry effects or measured industry characteristics are taken into account business unit size has no effect on the r d intensity of business units that perform r d but it affects the probability of conducting r d business unit and firm size jointly explain less than one per cent of the variance in r d industry effects explain nearly half the variance two sets of well known hypotheses are associated with the later work of joseph schumpeter the first concerns the effects of market concentration on research and development investment and on innovative performance the second bears on the effects of firm size on r d and innovation in a recent paper levin cohen and mowery 1985 we re examined the first set of hypotheses simple regressions at the line of business level replicated the established findings that both r d intensity and innovative performance first increase and then decrease as industrial concentration rises the effect of concentration however was sharply attenuated when we controlled for interindustry differences in technological opportunity and in the appropriability of returns from new technology our results suggested that it is probably unwarranted to conclude that market concentration favors r d investment and innovation in this paper we investigate the schumpeterian hypothesis that large size is conducive to r d investment this relationship has been studied at least as intensively as the link between concentration and r d but our approach is novel in two respects first using data collected by the federal trade

persistence of innovative activities sectoral patterns of innovation and international technological specialization abstract in this paper we focus on the role of persistence and heterogeneity of innovative activities at the level of the firm in determining the patterns of technological change in different industries and countries we ask are persistence and heterogeneity associated with higher degrees of concentration in innovative activities stability in the ranking of innovators and lower degrees of entry and exit in the population of innovators or do the patterns of innovation depend on other variables like firm size and industrial concentration moreover what are the relationships between the patterns of innovative activities their determinants and the technological specialization of countries we compute indicators of persistence and heterogeneity using the otaf spru patent database at the firm level for five european countries over the period 1969 1986 for 33 technological classes then we estimate the relationships between our indicators of the sectoral patterns of innovative activities and international technological specialization on the one hand and our indicators of persistence heterogeneity and market structure on the other results show that persistence and asymmetries are important and strongly related phenomena that affect the patterns of innovative activities across countries and sectors while the role of market structure variables is less clear finally international technological specialization is associated to a competitive core of persistent innovators

are product and process innovations independent of each other this paper studies the relationship between product and process innovation after discussing the determinants of product and process innovation a simultaneous equation model is estimated a positive impact of product innovation on process innovation can be proved but no evidence for a reverse effect to the respect to the inclusion of product innovation

innovation diversity and diffusion a self organisation model a number of features of innovation diffusion are identified appropriability diversity expectations selection learning and spillover externalities a dynamic model is formul ated to embed the diffusion question into a more general framework of disequilibrium competition the model incorporates distinct vintage structures reflecting a change in technological trajectory learning by using a nd expectations driven investment rules of thumb simulation studies reveal robust quasi logistic curves but a complicated pattern of net market share gains and losses uncertainty regarding the rationality of early or late adoption it is argued ensures that the requisite behavioral variety is present to generate these diffusion patterns copyright 1988 by royal economic society

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

is everything neutral in his well known analysis of the national debt robert barro introduced the notion of a dynastic family this notion has since become a standard research tool particularly in the areas of public finance and macroeconomics in this paper we critique the assumptions on which the dynastic model is predicated and argue that this framework is not a suitable abstraction in contexts in which the objective is to analyze the effects of public policies we reach this conclusion by formally considering a world in which each generation consists of a large number of distinct individuals as opposed to one representative individual we point out that family linkages form complex networks in which each individual may belong to many dynastic groupings the resulting proliferation of linkages between families gives rise to a host of neutrality results including the irrelevance of all public redistributions distortionary taxes and prices since these results are not at all descriptive of the real world we conclude

the size distribution of innovating firms in the uk 1945 1983 a survey of 4 378 significant innovations shows that firms with fewer than 1 000 employees commercialized a much larger share than is indicated by their share of r and d expenditures innovations per employee have been consistently above average in firms with more than 10 000 employees and have become so in firms with fewer than 1 000 intersectoral variation in the size distribution of innovating firms can be explained as a function of r and d based technological opportunities and of technological ease of entry by user firms with principal activities outside the sector copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity i study a simple widely applicable approach to handling the initial conditions problem in dynamic nonlinear unobserved effects models rather than attempting to obtain the joint distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous variables i propose finding the distribution conditional on the initial value and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables the approach is flexible and results in simple estimation strategies for at least three leading dynamic nonlinear models probit tobit and poisson regression i treat the general problem of estimating average partial effects and show that simple estimators exist for important special cases copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values we study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values a trade of one asset or lack thereof can provide information about the value of other assets the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium we show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset values is suciently high the

schumpeterian competition in experimental markets abstract we report on a series of laboratory experiments that capture key elements of research and development r d rivalry the experimental environment has a small number of sellers who compete in terms of pricing and production decisions and in terms of cost reducing r d rewards for innovation depend on the profitability of product market competition the experiments capture a kind of dynamic schumpeterian competition there is a sharp contrast in experimental results between monopolies and four seller competitive markets aggregate r d is higher under competition than under monopoly and prices follow marginal cost reductions much more quickly under competition than under monopoly the paper examines market performance in the experiments and the sources of market performance problems

altruism within the family reconsidered do nice guys finish last this paper criticizes the view that altruism either increases the benefits of group interactions or improves the allocation of resources within families the authors identify a variety of circumstances in which members of a group would prefer to interact with less altruistic individuals and in which the efficiency of resource allocation is inversely related to the prevailing degree of altruism reasons that altruism might be a counter productive social force include 1 it can alter the social utility possibility frontier in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways 2 it can entail exploitability causing family members to behave in ways that leave all parties worse off 3 altruists may take inefficient actions to preempt exploitation and 4 family members may establish efficient resource allocation by punishing selfish behavior a rise in the level of altruism may lead to the exclusion of certain punishment strategies on the grounds of credibility 1 general positive result is that sufficiently high levels of altruism almost always lead to efficient resource allocation one should not necessarily expect to find strong altruistic linkages between spouses nor should altruism necessarily contributed to marital stability in addition to the connections between this work and the literature on family behavior this analysis has broader implications concerning the role of altruism in society and the evolution of social conscience

discounting and altruism to future decision makers is discounting of future decision makers consumption utilities consistent with pure altruism toward those decision makers that is a concern that they are better off according to their own likewise forward looking preferences it turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics literature in particular hyperbolic discounting of the form used by phelps and pollak rev econ studies 35 1968 201 and laibson quart j econ 112 1997 443 is consistent with exponential altruism towards future generations more generally we establish a one to one relationship between discount functions and altruism weight systems and provide sufficient as well as necessary conditions for discount functions to be consistent with pure altruism

r d and internal finance a panel study of small firms in high tech industries since joseph schumpeter economists have argued that internal finance should be an important determinant of r d expenditures yet almost without exception previous empirical studies have not found evidence of such a relation using newly available data the authors investigate this puzzle with a panel of 179 small firms in high tech industries under each estimation strategy they employ the authors find an economically large and statistically significant relationship between r d investment and internal finance their results are consistent with the view that because of capital market imperfections the flow of internal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small high tech firms acquire technology through r d copyright 1994 by mit press

innovation and industry evolution the theoretical literature on innovation has been concerned with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents by contrast we consider a market in which one firm is the current incumbent while the remaining firms are challengers moreover we consider a sequence of innovations so that success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly profits forever after but only until the next better innovation is developed we begin with a fully optimizing behavioral model and derive the equivalent of the schumpeterian process of creative destruction that is a firm enjoys temporary monopoly power but is soon overthrown by a more inventive challenger the essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers goods the new methods of production or transportation the new markets the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates schumpeter 1942 pp 82 83

innovation expenditures and the role of government in belgium abstract unlike suggestions from earlier research on the schumpeterian hypothesis it is argued and shown that sales and employment are not simply substitute size measures to test the r d behaviour of foreign and domestic companies operating in belgium further suggests that government sponsored r d has not substituted for privately funded r d foreign companies are found to behave differently and to do less r d the more they pay for externally supplied technology

r d appropriability opportunity and market structure new evidence on some schumpeterian hypotheses one of the largest bodies of literature in the field of industrial organization is devoted to the interpretation and testing of several hypotheses advanced by joseph schumpeter 1950 concerning innovation and industrial market structure one set of hypotheses focuses on the role of firm size as a determinant of r d spending and the rate of technological advance another set focuses on the effect of market concentration on r d and technological advance in this paper we reexamine the latter set of hypotheses at the industry level using new data on r d appropriability and technological opportunity collected by levin et al 1984 in a survey of r d executives in 130 industries

agency models in different stages of ceo tenure the effects of stock options and board independence on r d investment this study examines how r d investment is shaped by governance devices combining the two agency models of limited competence and managerial opportunism it suggests that governance devices exert differing effects in early vs later stages of ceo tenure early in ceo tenure r d investment is reduced by stock options and board independence whereas in later stages these effects reverse r d investment is enhanced by stock options and board independence an empirical test on a sample of u s companies provides support for the hypothesized effects for policy makers this study implies that r d investment can be enhanced by setting rules and standards of good governance that take into account ceo time in office and firm context

efficiency of large private value auctions we consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good players have private values possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply in this setting equlibria generally will be inefficient despite this we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are large and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior

implementation in economies with a continuum of agents we study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy we consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self selective first and second best allocations an upper hemicontinuity property of bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated using this we can for example conclude that if a given continuous mechanism implements uniquely a walrasian allocation in the continuum economy then all bayesian equilibria of large approximation economies will with probability close to one yield an allocation which is almost ex post pareto optimal

striving to be green the adoption of total quality environmental management many firms are undertaking environment friendly organizational change by applying the philosophy of total quality management with its emphasis on reducing waste and increasing efficiency their objective is to improve their management of pollution and increase customer satisfaction this article investigates the factors that lead to total quality environmental management tqem by large firms we find that internal considerations stemming from a firm s technical capability size absolute and relative to competing firms extent of operations and volume of past emissions are strongly associated with the tqem adoption decision the first four factors are proxies for the firm s costs and capabilities of adopting tqem while the fifth factor is related to the benefits from increasing efficiency and waste reduction and thus proxies for internally generated demand for tqem the desire to improve a firm s image with customers earning good will with regulators and the anticipation of future regulations do not a

cournot competition and green innovation an inverted u relationship we examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and r d aims to reduce emissions green innovation we present an n firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in green r d when environmental taxation is exogenous aggregate r d investment always increases with the number of firms in the industry next we analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a regulator committed or time consistent with the aim to maximise social welfare we show that an inverted u relationship exists between aggregate r d and industry size under reasonable conditions and is driven by the presence of r d spillovers

determinants of innovation the study examines how firm size market structure profitability and growth influence innovative activity in small to medium sized australian manufacturing businesses using the recently released confidentialised unit record file drawn from the business longitudinal survey of the australian bureau of statistics regression analysis is conducted to determine the factors that effect subsequent innovative activity for the full sample of businesses as well as for sub samples of firms from high and low technological opportunity industries most variables including size r d intensity market structure and trade shares are found to be conducive to further innovative activity for the full sample and for high tech firms for low tech industries fewer variables are significant

fiscal policy with impure intergenerational altruism recent work demonstrates that dynastic assumptions guarantee the irrelevance of redistributional policies distortionary taxes and prices the neutrality of fiscal policy ricardian equivalence is only the tip of the iceberg this paper investigates the possibility of reinstating approximate ricardian equivalence by introducing a small amount of friction in intergenerational links if ricardian equivalence depends upon significantly shorter chains of links than do these stronger neutrality results then friction may dissipate the effects that generate strong neutrality without significantly affecting the ricardian result however models with friction have other untenable implications and thus the theoretical case for ricardian equivalence remains tenuous copyright 1991 by the econometric society

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

schumpeterian patterns of innovation using patent data for four countries germany france united kingdom and italy for the period 1968 1986 the authors find that the patterns of innovative activities differ systematically across technological classes while remarkable similarities emerge across countries in the patterns of innovative activities for each technological class this result strongly suggests that technological imperatives and technology specific factors closely linked to technological regimes play a major role in determining the patterns of innovative activities across countries schumpeter proposed two major patterns of innovative activities the first one labelled by nelson and winter 1982 and kamien and schwartz 1982 as schumpeter mark i is proposed in the theory of economic development 1934 in this work schumpeter examined the typical european industrial structure of the late nineteenth century characterised by many small firms according to this view the pattern of innovative activity is characterised by technological ease of entry in an industry and by a major role played by new firms in innovative activities new entrepreneurs come in an industry with new ideas new products or new processes launch new enterprises which challenge established firms and thus continuously disrupt the current ways of production organisation and distribution and wipe out the quasi rents associated with previous innovations the second one labelled schumpeter mark ii is proposed in capitalism socialism and democracy 1942 in this work inspired by the features of the american industry of the first half of the twentieth century schumpeter discussed the relevance of the industrial r d laboratory for technological innovation and the key role of large firms according to this view the pattern of innovative activities is characterised by the prevalence of large established firms and by relevant barriers to entry for new innovators large firms have institutionalised the innovation process with the creation of r d laboratories filled with researchers technicians and engineers with their accumulated stock of knowledge in specific technological areas their advanced competence in large scale r d projects production and distribution and their relevant financial resources they create barriers to entry to new entrepreneurs and small firms

industry concentration and allocation of resources to basic research while the mainstream of western economic thought believes in competitive markets the schumpeterian school considers concentrated industry to be the ideal vehicle for the advancement of industrial technology empirical evidence on the schumpeterian hypothesis that a concentrated industry allocates relatively more resources to its research and development rd joglekar p m hamburg 1987 industry resource allocation to basic research under normally distributed benefits decision sci winter 1 24 who showed that industries consisting of smaller numbers of firms allocate relatively greater amounts of resources to their basic research than industries consisting of larger numbers of firms extending joglekar and hamburg s models here we find that when two industries consist of the same number of firms in most cases a heterogeneous industry falls as short of its pareto optimal investment in basic research as its comparable homogeneous counterpart numerical examples suggest that in some cases concentrated heterogeneous industries may do worse policy implications of the results as well as directions for further research are discussed

inter firm cooperation with imperfectly appropriable research abstract inter firm collaboration in pre competitive research is not always beneficial rather its effectiveness in raising social benefits relative to a non cooperative setup depends on both the nature of the agreement and the technological and market conditions of the industry in question joint ventures that simply allow members to coordinate their actions in pre competitive research can restore firm incentives for both pre competitive research and development in the presence of high knowledge spillovers and poor opportunities for innovation joint ventures which additionally improve the dissemination of information among member firms raise social benefits whenever the opportunities for innovation are not exceptionally good even in the presence of relatively insignificant spillovers

provision of a public good with multiple dynasties carbon emissions create externalities across countries and generations these externalities depend on the degree of contemporaneous cooperation and intergenerational altruism i study the relative importance of these features in determining equilibrium climate policy by imbedding an olg framework with intergenerational altruism into a differential game among dynasties each representing a coalition of nations there is an isomorphism between pure and paternalistic altruism i illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria using an analytic linear in state model equilibrium steady states are more sensitive to small changes in cooperation than altruism consideration of large changes in altruism and cooperation can reverse this ranking

appropriability and commercialization evidence from mit inventions the effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied but there has been little analysis of the effect of appropriability on the commercialization of existing inventions exploiting a database of 805 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions licensed from the massachusetts institute of technology mit between 1980 and 1996 we explore the influence of several appropriability mechanisms on the commercialization and termination of projects to develop products based on university inventions our central hypothesis is that the relationship between a licensee s decision to either terminate or commercialize the invention is driven by the current market value of the invention as well as the option value of delaying its commercialization we use a competing risks framework that allows for nonparametric heterogeneity and correlated risks we find that better appropriability in the sense of more effective patent strength and secrecy has a strong negative effect on the hazard of license termination the effectiveness of learning has a strong positive effect on the hazard of technology commercialization while lead time has a negative effect

does history matter for the relationship between r d innovation and productivity this paper analyzes the relationship between r d expenditures innovation and productivity growth taking into account the possibility of persistence in firms behaviour we study this relationship for a sample of spanish manufacturing firms between 1990 and 2005 estimating a model with four equations participation in technological activities r d intensity the generation of innovations and the impact of these technological outputs on total factor productivity growth our results reflect the existence of true state dependence both in the decision of r d investment and in the production of innovations the omission of this persistence leads to an overestimation of the current impact of innovations on productivity growth however the presence of persistence in technological inputs and outputs entails current r d activities having long run effects on a firm s productivity

how does probability of innovation change with firm age this paper looks at the probability of introducing innovations by manufacturing firms at different stages of their lives once differences related to activity and size are controlled for we examine how the probability of innovation varies over entry post entry ages and advanced ages of mature firms we also measure the association between exit from the market and pre exit innovation results show that the probability of innovating widely varies by activity and that small size per se broadly reduces the probability of innovation but also that entrant firms tend to present the highest probability of innovation while the oldest firms tend to show lower innovative probabilities some sets of firms with intermediate ages also present a high probability of innovation and exiting firms are clearly associated to lower levels of introducing process innovations

market versus corporate structure in plant level innovation performance this paper examines the effect which market and corporate structure have on the extent of innovation for a sample of circa 300 manufacturing plants located in scotland innovation is defined as the introduction of a commercially significant new product at the establishment level the theoretical model of geroski 1990 is extended to incorporate plant level variables such as size multiplant operation the presence of r d facilities and external indigenous ownership a distinction is made between the direct and indirect effects of these variables negative binomial estimations indicate that corporate structure influences are more important in determining the number of innovations than market structure and barrier to entry variables plant size foreign ownership and the presence of r d are all positively associated with innovation direct effects greatly outweigh indirect effects tobit estimations on the number of innovations per employee support the findings of acs and audretsch 1988 that smaller enterprises are more innovation intensive than larger enterprises at least up to a limit of around 1200 employees the positive effect of r d arises principally from increasing the probability of a plant becoming an innovator rather than from making a plant more innovation intensive by contrast the importance of size lies principally in encouraging further innovations among plants which are already innovators but less than proportionately with the increase in employment size

self control problems and the folk theorem abstract this paper generalizes the basic complete information pure action folk theorem such that it applies when discounting is present biased and the discount factor between two successive periods increases with the waiting time until the periods are reached we distinguish between time consistent decision makers who maximize their initial preferences and time inconsistent decision makers who maximize their current preferences and our folk theorem holds for both types since discount functions are not assumed to have any specific functional form decision makers are said to be patient if the sum of the discount factors for all periods is large

nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism abstract the paper develops a concept of equilibrium behaviour and establishes its existence in a model of nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism each generation derives utility from its own consumption and the utilities of its successors equilibrium capital stocks are time monotone and therefore converge to a steady state finally when each generation s utility depends on that of at least two successors equilibria may be inefficient this is shown by an example where feasible programs exist providing greater consumption compared to the equilibrium path for every generation

pivotal players and the characterization of influence a player s influence relative to a mechanism and opponents strategies is the maximum difference his action can make in the expected value of a collective outcome a player is pivotal if his influence exceeds a threshold we provide tight bounds on the number of pivotal players and on average influence these bounds are uniform over all mechanisms and action profiles and are achieved at mechanisms that take the form of a majority rule we illustrate our analysis with an example of provision of a public good where each individual compares the private cost of his contribution with its influence on the collective outcome journal of economic literature classification numbers d62 d89 h41

consistent climate policies what are the optimal climate policies when time preferences deviate from the standard exponential discounting and decision makers cannot commit to future policies we show that with time declining discounting the delay and persistence of climate impacts provide a commitment device to policy makers we quantify the commitment value in a climate economy model by solving time consistent markov equilibrium capital and emission taxes explicitly the returns on capital and climate investments are no longer equal leading to a large increase in the emission tax compared to a benchmark with equalized returns the commitment value increases the tax by a factor of 20 in our quantitative assessment

innovation firm size and growth in a centralized organization the optimal innovation firm size and growth are derived for a centrally controlled firm in which only the entrepreneur evaluates and restores current projects or evaluates and adopts new projects current projects are subject to failure due to entry and possible obsolescence while new projects may not be successful the optimal allocation of attention implies bounds on firm size and that the rate of innovation depends not only on monopoly profits firm size and technological opportunity but also on the probability of obsolescence the effects of monopoly power and firm size on innovation also depend on the degree of obsolescence

reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games with conflicting interests a two person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff suppose there is a positive prior probability that player one is a commitme nt type who will always play this strategy then player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one this result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast to the message of the folk theorem for games with incomplete information copyright 1993 by the econometric society

the persistency and volatility of the firm r d investment revisited from the perspective of technological capability abstract the persistency and volatility of firm rd however previous research has found mixed evidence concerning the persistency and volatility of firm rd positive shocks however technological capability offsets the internal cash flow effect and causes persistency in rd negative shocks these imply that r d investment is not a dichotomous decision between persistency and volatility and is conditional on each firm s technological capability

limit properties of equilibrium allocations of walrasian strategic games abstract we characterize the set of equilibrium allocations of walrasian strategic games where each agent manipulates his strategic demand map to his benefit we first show that for a finite economy the set of cournot nash equilibrium allocations will be large and the equilibrium allocation map will not in general possess a closed graph property then we show that with appropriate smoothness conditions and the regularity condition on the mean aggregate limit excess demand map true walrasian allocations in a large economy can be claimed to be sufficiently robust against strategic manipulations of agents demand maps

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

the existence of perfect equilibria in a model of growth with altruism between generations an intertemporal model of consumption and bequest behaviour is specified and analysed as a game between generations the main feature of this game is that no a priori restrictions like linearity are placed on the strategy choice of generations the paper gives an existence proof for perfect nash equilibria in finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and determines characteristic properties of equilibrium strategies the main result is to demonstrate existence of stationary perfect equilibrium if the time horizon is infinite

product and process innovation as a response to increasing imports and foreign direct investment the paper analyses the hypotheses that imports and inward foreign direct investment fdi have positive effects on the innovative activity of domestic firms because competition on the domestic market is thereby increased and domestic firms have to perform more efficiently to maintain their market position chamberlain s random effects probit approach which may account for individual heterogeneity depending on exogenous variables is used to analyse a panel data set containing 1270 firms of the german manufacturing industry from 1984 to 1988 it turns out that both import share and fdi share have positive and significant effects on product and process innovations

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

managerial efficiency and the schumpeterian link between size market structure and innovation revisited this research uses a unique survey on innovation conducted in belgian high tech industries to investigate a the effects of managerial efficiency on the firm s innovative activity and b the effects of controlling explicitly for managerial efficiency on the schumpeterian like relationship that firm size and market concentration are both conducive to innovation the key findings are managerial efficiency is an important determinant of the firm s innovation performance only when one controls for managerial variables considered as success factors for innovation the schumpeterian effect of the impact of the firm s market share emerges for a wide range of measures of performance which confirms rothwell s suggestion 18 that small firms have a advantage in the management of their innovation

long run versus short run decisions r d and market structure in spanish firms abstract i present new econometric evidence on the relation between market structure and r d using data on spanish firms i adopt a different approach from previous studies by distinguishing between long run and short run decisions of firms regarding r d i assume that the long run or strategic decision is whether to conduct r d or not and the short run choice is how much to invest once the firm decides to be innovative i argue that market structure affects long run r d decisions but does not affect short run ones a heckman type selection model is used to test such a relation the results are robust to several specifications and measures of monopoly power

college assignment as a large contest abstract we develop a model of college assignment as a large contest wherein students with heterogeneous learning costs compete for seats at vertically differentiated colleges through the acquisition of productive human capital we use a continuum model to approximate the outcomes of a game with large but finite sets of colleges and students the continuum approximation lends tractability to a rich model for studying investment incentives in rank order competitions by incorporating two common families of affirmative action mechanisms into our model admissions preferences and quotas we can show that legal admissions preference schemes and illegal quotas have the same sets of equilibria including identical outcomes and investment strategies

choosing among alternative technological strategies an empirical analysis of formal sources of innovation abstract this work aims to offer a detailed conceptual and empirical analysis of the inter firm differences in deciding the composition of their technological efforts using data for spanish firms in the period 1990 1996 the study begins with the standard analysis of the determinants of innovative investment then moves on to the less analysed question of the determinants of the generate versus import alternative and ends with a novel analysis of the characteristics which lead firms to organise research internally as compared to the possibility of contracting r d services externally in contrast to standard practice the econometric approach takes into account the existence of non linearities in the used data the results obtained support the conceptual ideas on which they are based

why are governmental r d and private r d complements it is well known that government r d and private r d have a complementary relationship however no previous study has provided an explanation for why that complementary relationship exists this paper argues that infratechnology is the critical link between governmental and private r d and that the observed complementarity is the result of technical complementarity at the production level between funding infratechnology and knowledge sharing a theoritical framework based on this argument is developed and examined empirically for supporting evidence evidence of technical complementary is found as well as evidence that governmental r d stimulates the sharing of knowledge

r d portfolio and market structure this article analyses how firms allocate their resources when they compete for multiple patents in heterogeneous research projects simultaneously a simple model shows that firms resource allocation is biased away from risky and basic research even when imitation is not possible and firms are fully rational therefore a market may lack major innovations despite large aggregate research expenditure and strong patent protection this article also shows that as a market becomes more competitive firms invest relatively less in basic research but more in risky research these results provide a novel explanation for an ambiguous empirical relationship between innovation and market concentration

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

r d determinants accounting for the differences between research and development the determinants of r d are an important topic of innovation studies the classical schumpeterian hypotheses about the influence of size and market power have been complemented with the role played by industry determinants such as demand pull technological opportunity and appropriability in determining r d investments however r d has always been considered as a whole even though research and development activities differ in many aspects we take advantage of a new panel database of innovative spanish firms pitec to distinguish between research and development efforts of firms we analyze the differentiated role played by traditional r d determinants in driving research and development results show that demand pull and appropriability have a higher effect on development while technological opportunity is more influential for research differences are statistically significant important in magnitude and robust to the use of different indicators for demand pull technological opportunity and appropriability and to several robustness checks

schumpeterian patterns of innovation are technology specific this paper examines the patterns of innovative activities at the technological and country levels using patent data for 49 technological classes in six countries usa japan germany france united kingdom and italy it is shown that the patterns of innovative activities differ systematically across technological classes but are remarkably similar across countries for each technological class in particular two groups of technological classes are identified schumpeter mark i and schumpeter mark ii in these two groups innovative activities are structured and organized in different ways the first represents a widening pattern concentration of innovative activities is low innovators are of small economic size stability in the ranking of innovators is low and entry of new innovators is high the second represents a deepening pattern concentration of innovative activities is higher than in the first group innovators are of larger economic size stability in the ranking of innovators is greater and entry is lower the former group comprises mechanical technologies and traditional sectors while the latter includes chemicals and electronics this result suggests that technology related factors such as technological regimes defined in terms of conditions of opportunity appropriability cumulativeness and properties of the knowledge base play a major role in determining the specific pattern of innovative activities of a technological class across countries within these constraints country specific factors introduce differences across countries in the pattern of innovative activities for a specific technological class finally the relationships between the specific features of the patterns of innovative activities and international technological specialization are examined technological advantages appear in general to be linked to higher degrees of asymmetries among innovators higher stability of the ranking of innovators smaller economic size of the innovating firms and lower entry rates of new innovators these relationships however are different in the two groups of technological classes in schumpeter mark i widening technological classes international technological specialization is associated with relatively higher degrees of asymmetries among innovators and entry of new innovators as well as smaller firm size while in schumpeter ii deepening technological classes international technological specialization is linked to the existence of a stable but competitive core of persistent innovators

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

the international economics of intellectual property right protection a welfare theoretic trade policy analysis abstract this paper provides an analytical construct for examining the trade policy effects of greater intellectual property protection in technology importing countries it is shown that two types of conflict are likely to arise between net technology importers and exporters the first relates to the level of protection with importers preferring a low level and exporters a high one the second conflict hitherto unexplored relates to the manner of protection with importers likely to prefer discriminatory regimes favoring local r d creation whereas exporters would prefer nondiscriminatory protection in importing countries

technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovative activities this paper focuses on the relationships between observed patterns of innovative activities within a sector and the related context and underlying microeconomic processes that might account for them it claims that there are some invariant features with respect to relative prices and incentives mechanisms of learning and knowledge accumulation that greatly affect the rate and structure of innovative activity these features are different across sectors the paper proposes that the specific pattern of innovative activity of a sector can be explained as the outcome of different technological regimes that are implied by the nature of technology and knowledge the notion of technological regime provides a synthetic representation of some of the most important economic properties of technologies and of the characteristics of the learning processes that are involved in innovative activities copyright 1997 by oxford university press

the less you discount the more it shows you really care interpersonal discounting in households abstract household members make monetary tradeoffs across time classical economics treats these decisions as if one rational individual makes them this assumption masks important other regarding concerns between spouses we designed an artefactual field experiment and collected data from 94 pairs of cohabiting couples to capture the complex nature of intra household time preferences estimation results show that 1 the interpersonal discount rate the rate used to tradeoff intertemporal payoffs between one s own payoff and the spouse s payoff is significantly different from the individual discount rate and 2 the interpersonal discount rate may provide an alternative way for people to express their other regarding preferences towards their spouses

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha