what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

a bilevel model of taxation and its application to optimal highway pricing we consider a bilevel model where the leader wants to maximize revenues from a taxation scheme while the follower rationally reacts to those tax levels we focus our attention on the special case of a toll setting problem defined on a multicommodity transportation network we show that the general problem is np complete while particular instances are polynomially solvable numerical examples are given

occupier requirements in commercial real estate markets changes in the business environment associated with globalisation innovation in information and communications technologies and the drive towards more flexible production systems should be reflected in changes in occupational requirements for property although much research assumes that property as a derived demand will simply be supplied in response to changed demand in practice the institutional structure of the market can act as a constraint on the provision of appropriate space empirical research into new working practices and their impact on the property portfolio suggest that change is muted and gradual in part this reflects resistance to the adoption of working practices in part it reflects the inertia of a traditional model of property procurement however there is growing evidence of innovation in the nature of provision and more active and strategic management of the property resource research in this area as in many other areas of real estate is hampered by lack of reliable and a

mutual holding companies evidence of conflicts of interest through disparate dividends abstract the mutual holding company mhc structure establishes a dual class stock that creates a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor owners to new minority shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends we show that mhcs are priced higher than comparable non mhcs and dividend policy is a significant component of this valuation we also show that mhc thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non mhc thrifts and that an office of thrift supervision ots ruling reducing the potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in lower dividends these results have policy implications of special significance given that the ots reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use of the mhc structure in the financial service industry

sequential importance sampling and resampling for dynamic portfolio credit risk we provide a sequential monte carlo method for estimating rare event probabilities in dynamic intensity based point process models of portfolio credit risk the method is based on a change of measure and involves a resampling mechanism we propose resampling weights that lead under technical conditions to a logarithmically efficient simulation estimator of the probability of large portfolio losses a numerical analysis illustrates the features of the method and contrasts it with other rare event schemes recently developed for portfolio credit risk including an interacting particle scheme and an importance sampling scheme

appearance and reality in deposit insurance the case for reform abstract this paper argues that the staffs and explicit insurance reserves of u s deposit insurers have been overwhelmed by de facto financial disaster the full costs of financing federal deposit insurance have become enormous and increasingly inequitable in distribution to reduce voluntary risk taking authorities must reprice and redesign the system of de facto deposit insurance coverage six complementary reforms are discussed 1 accounting for institutional assets liabilities and net worth at market value 2 enhancing opportunities for deposit insurers to manage their risk exposure 3 recalibrating insurance coverages 4 imposing risk rated premiums 5 mixed private and governmental competition in deposit insurance and 6 constraining insurance agency and federal reserve authority to bail out insolvent institutions

the s l debacle public policy lessons for bank and thrift regulation this book describes the period of failures of savings and loan associations and sets out a program of policies to prevent future debacles it explains the regulatory actions and inactions that created the incentives for large numbers of thrifts to make excessively risky and ill conceived and in some cases fraudulent and criminal investments it describes the failure of the accounting system to provide adequate information to regulators and in many cases even to the managers of the thrifts themselves concerning the health and riskiness of individual thrifts it also discusses how the regulatory system that had been conceived in an earlier and highly regulated era was overwhelmed in the deregulated environment of the early 1980s it shows how the reforms that were made in response to the growing crisis were too little and too late and finally it offers a set of policy reforms that could prevent future crises in the savings and loan industry this work should be of interest to political and financial economists

the role of insider influence in mutual to stock conversions using a sample of 347 demutualizing thrifts from 1991 to 2004 we show that the level of inside participation is not a traditional signal of firm performance we conclude that unanticipated inside participation reflects the incentives of insiders to reduce the size of the offer to influence the level of expected initial public offer ipo returns we find unanticipated inside participation is related to lower offer size and higher initial returns but we do not find a relationship between inside participation and post ipo performance

bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis this paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the us mortgage crisis real estate related assets are overvalued in banks balance sheets especially those of bigger banks compared to the market value of these assets banks with large exposure to mortgage backed securities also provision less for bad loans furthermore distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage backed securities to inflate their books our results indicate that banks balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules

computing optimal recovery policies for financial markets the current financial crisis motivates the study of correlated defaults in financial systems in this paper we focus on such a model which is based on markov random fields this is a probabilistic model in which uncertainty in default probabilities incorporates experts opinions on the default risk based on various credit ratings we consider a bilevel optimization model for finding an optimal recovery policy which companies should be supported given a fixed budget this is closely linked to the problem of finding a maximum likelihood estimator of the defaulting set of agents and we show how to compute this solution efficiently using combinatorial methods we also prove properties of such optimal solutions and give a practical procedure for estimation of model parameters computational examples are presented and experiments indicate that our methods can find optimal recovery policies for up to about 100 companies the overall approach is evaluated on a real world problem concerning the major banks in scandinavia and public loans to our knowledge this is a first attempt to apply combinatorial optimization techniques to this important and expanding area of default risk analysis

the legal environment banks and long run economic growth this paper examines the relationship between the legal system and banlding development and traces this connection through to long run rates of per capita gdp growth capital stock growth and productivity growth the data indicate that countries where the legal system 1 emphasizes creditor rights and 2 rigorously enforces contracts have better developed banks than countries where laws do not give a high priority to creditors and where enforcement is lax furtherrnore the exogenous component of banking development the component defined by the legal environment is positively and robustly associated with per capita growth physical capital accumulation and productivity growth this paper addresses two questions first do crosscountry differences in the legal rights of creditors the efficiency of contract enforcement and the origin of the legal system explain cross country differences in the level of banking development second do better developed banks cause faster economic development that is is the component of banking development defined by the legal environment positively associated with long run rates of economic growth capital accumulation and productivity growth examining the relationship between the legal system and banking development is valuable irrespective of issues associated with long run growth first banks may influence the level of income per capita and the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations bernanke and gertler 1989 1990 second many economists stress that understanding the evolution of legal and financial systems is essential for understanding economic development north 1981 engerman and sokoloff 1996 consequently quantitative information on the relationship between the legal environment and banks will improve our understanding of business cycles and the process of economic development furthermore examining the causal links between banks and economic growth has both conceptual and policy implications on the conceptual front a long literature debates the importance of banks in economic development starting as early as bagehot 1873 economists have argued that better banks banks that are better at identifying creditworthy firms mobilizing savings pooling risks and facilitating transactions

political influence and declarations of bank insolvency in japan this paper investigates how politics affects bank supervision by examining determinants of bank failures in japan during 1999 2002 a period during which bank regulators were called upon to resolve insolvent banks in preparation for the lifting of a blanket deposit guarantee the empirical results suggest that japan s bank regulators had tendency to delay declarations of insolvency in prefectures that supported senior politicians of the ruling liberal democratic party ldp this result which is robust to a host of bank level and prefecture level controls suggests that bank supervision is prone to political influence that delays efficient resolution of insolvency

pricing derivatives on financial securities subject to credit risk this article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two types of credit risks are considered the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default the second is where the writer of the derivative security may default we apply the foreign currency analogy of jarrow and turnbull 1991 to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a spot exchange rate arbitrage free valuation techniques are then employed this methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives such as swaps and caps the purpose of this article is to provide a new theory for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two sources of credit risk are identified and analyzed the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default paying off less than promised this is the case for example with imbedded options on corporate debt the second is the credit risk introduced by the writer of the derivative security who may also default examples include over the counter writers of options on eurodollar futures swaps and swaptions for pricing derivative securities involving credit risk there are currently two approaches the first views these derivatives as contingent claims not on the financial securities themselves but as compound options on the assets underlying the financial securities this is the case for example with the pricing of imbedded options on corporate debt see merton 1974 1977 black and cox 1976 ho and singer 1982 chance 1990 and kim ramaswamy and sundaresan 1993 or the pricing of vulnerable options see johnson and stulz 1987 in practice however this valuation methodology is difficult to use first the assets underlying the financial security are often not tradeable and therefore their values are not observable this makes application of the theory and estimation of the relevant parameters problematic second as in the case of corporate debt all of the other liabilities of the firm senior to the corporate debt must first and simultaneously be valued this generates significant computational difficulties as a result this approach has not

inconsistent regulators evidence from banking we find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented we study supervisory decisions of u s banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors state regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently under federal regulators banks report worse asset quality higher regulatory capital ratios and lower return on assets leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds the discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and to some extent differences in regulatory resources we find no support for regulator self interest which includes revolving doors

the demise of the mutual organizational form an investigation of the life insurance industry we investigate the role of organizational structure in financial services markets by examining the u s life insurance industry traditionally stock and mutual life insurers were equally represented but now the industry is mainly composed of stock firms we find operational efficiency access to capital and tax savings are important determinants for this shift the incentive to demutualize differs by the type of conversion full demutualization is chosen for efficiency and access to capital reasons and partial conversion using a mutual holding company is chosen for tax savings firm operational efficiency improves after conversion we also find the efficiency of the stock organizational form dominates that of the mutual structure during our sample period 1995 to 2004

asset returns and economic disasters evidence from the s l crisis abstract this paper shows that depositors lost confidence in fslic during the two years prior to passage of firrea legislation which recapitalized the deposit insurance fund in 1989 during this period promised returns on retail cds reflected the expected loss and return standard deviation on these securities in the absence of government insurance cross sectional analysis is used to estimate both the probability and the conditional price of risk associated with fslic default the results suggest that increased uncertainty about both output and inflation in this disaster scenario drove the price of fslic default risk to extremely high levels the results also indicate that the market for retail deposits is characterized by less than perfect arbitrage across geographical regions

determinants of thrift institution resolution costs this paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980 1988 a simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution this model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies the empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s this evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator s closure rule our econometric evidence moreover is consistent with the hypothesis that for troubled institutions tangible net worth systematically understates market value net worth in addition the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed the sharp increase in market interest rates in late 1979 and early 1980 and the deregulation of deposit rates led to record losses in the thrift industry in the early 1980s and to a major erosion of the industry s capital many institutions never fully recovered from these problems and most currently insolvent thrift

the politics of bank failures evidence from emerging markets this paper studies large private banks in 21 major emerging markets in the 1990s it first demonstrates that bank failures are very common in these countries about 25 percent of these banks failed during the seven year sample period the paper also shows that political concerns play a significant role in delaying government interventions to failing banks failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after this result is robust to controlling for macroeconomic and bank specific factors a new party in power early elections outstanding loans from the imf as well as country specific time independent factors this finding implies that much of the within country clustering in emerging market bank failures is directly due to political concerns

organization structure and credibility evidence from commercial bank securities activities before the glass steagall act we examine the two ways in which us commercial banks organized their investment banking operations before the 1933 glass steagall act forced the banks to leave the securities business as an internal securities department within the bank and as a separately incorporated affiliate with its own board of directors while departments underwrote seemingly higher quality firms and securities than did comparable affiliates the departments obtained lower prices for the issues they underwrote the higher risk premium associated with the internal department is consistent with investors discounting for the greater likelihood of conflicts of interest when lending and underwriting are within the same structure as a result commercial banks evolved toward choosing the separate affiliate structure our results suggest that internal structure is an effective commitment mechanism and absent other distortions market pressures would propel banks to adopt an internal structure that would address regulators concerns about conflicts of interest

cycles and steps in british commercial property values this paper examines cyclical behaviour in commercial property values over the period 1956 to 1996 using a structural times series unobserved components approach the influence of the transition to short rent reviews during the late 1960s and the short and long term impacts of the 1974 and 1990 property crashes are also incorporated into the analysis via dummy variables it is found that once these variables are taken into account a fairly regular cyclical pattern can be discerned with a period of about 7 8 years furthermore the 1974 and 1990 property crashes are shown to have had a major long term impact on property value growth presumably via their influence on investors expectations

credit contagion and aggregate losses abstract credit contagion refers to the propagation of economic distress from one firm to another this article proposes a reduced form model for these contagion phenomena assuming they are due to the local interaction of firms in a business partner network we study aggregate credit losses on large portfolios of financial positions contracted with firms subject to credit contagion in particular we provide an explicit gaussian approximation of the distribution of portfolio losses this enables us to quantify the relation between the volatility of losses and the determinants of credit contagion we find that contagion processes have typically a second order effect on portfolio losses they induce additional fluctuations of losses around their averages whose size depends on the number of business partners of the firms

property in a global risk society towards marketing research in the office sector this paper suggests that the current uncertainty hovering over the property industry is not simply the result of an internal economic dynamic dooming the industry to damaging booms and slumps rather the novel sense of risk colouring contemporary development activities is the consequence of wider cultural technical and commercial shifts from which property development is not immune the current supply oriented interests of property research predominantly concerned with the collection and analysis of statistical data are unable to respond to these wider questions simply creating more data banks will not help the paper argues that in order to understand the shifting nature of demand property research needs to complement econometric modelling with a more occupier focused marketing research one that is sensitive to the dynamics of the risk society we now inhabit accordingly the paper provides a detailed account of structured market research which should form part of a broader property research agenda in particular structured demand analysis is shown to provide a framework for understanding the complex dynamics of the demand market so demonstrating how the supply industry can improve its efficiency the paper suggests that the scale of the latest property crash offers an opportunity for the industry to improve the efficiency of supply by blending intimate knowledge of changing market demand with established dynamics of provision such a research strategy may provide the key to a more stable mutually profitable property business appropriate to a rapidly changing world economy of risk

elections political competition and bank failure abstract we exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the us using hazard analysis we show that bank failure is about 45 less likely in the year leading up to an election political control i e lack of competition can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate in particular we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature i e complete control heading into an election

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

too many to fail evidence of regulatory forbearance when the banking sector is weak this paper studies bank failures in 21 emerging market countries in the 1990s by using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak this too many to fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors financial crises the too big to fail effect domestic financial development and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers the paper also shows that the too many to fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit

regulatory incentives and the thrift crisis dividends mutual to stock conversions and financial distress during the 1980s insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts regulators induced nearly 10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual to stock conversions we test a theory of how regulators encouraged capitalimpaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital we estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 federal deposit insurance corporation improvement act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress