securitization of taxes implicit in payg pensions to preserve solvency a pay as you go payg pension system needs to adjust contribution rates and pension promises over time currently it is not possible to hedge in the financial market against politically determined uncertainty as regards these parameters i consider a policy reform whereby property rights are established on the implicit lifetime tax levied by payg finance and are assigned to the pension institution these property rights are well defined if the reform also features rule based allocation of aggregate risk in the form of defined contribution or defined benefit schemes i show that a payg pension system may indeed be instantly restructured so as to minimize political risk and allow financial market diversification of risk a side benefit is securitization of human capital flows which are not traded in existing financial markets the new securities if traded in appropriately competitive financial markets are complementary to the notional account reforms of the 1990s however fiscal instability can increase if securitization is implemented in the absence of initial solvency and credible adoption of rule based methods to allocate aggregate risk salvador valdes prieto

development of financial markets and the size distribution of manufacturing establishments international comparisons abstract institutional determinants have largely been neglected in explaining international differences in the size distribution of manufacturing establishments this paper draws on recent developments in institutional analysis to derive certain hypotheses concerning the way in which the size distribution within manufacturing is affected by the degree of development of the markets for debt and equity these hypotheses are tested on the basis of an international cross section of 54 countries the results are generally supportive of the hypotheses especially in the case of developing countries

cooperation and entry induction as an extension of technological rivalry abstract this paper investigates how the structure of cooperation in an industry influences the dynamics of entry by start up firms competition over technological dominance induces the entry of start up firms into new subfields as incumbent firms seek to expand the consumer base using their technology by cooperating incumbent firms succeed to varying degrees in establishing their technologies as a dominant standard by building central positions in a cooperative network start ups tend to enter however if there is reasonable certainty that a dominant technology has been established we find strong support for the relationship between network centrality as a measure of technological dominance of a standard and the entry of start up firms into the semiconductor industry

law enforcement and transition abstract we present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality we analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem a first mechanism which we call dualism follows the scenario of chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non state sector follows market rules the second mechanism we put forward is accession to the european union we show that accession to the european union even without external borrowing provides a mechanism to eliminate the bad equilibrium provided the accessing country is small enough relative to the european union interestingly we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession

size age and firm growth in an infant industry the computer hardware industry in india abstract in contrast to the existing studies on the relationship of firm growth with size and age of the firm which typically focus on relatively mature industries in developed economies this study analyses firm growth patterns for an infant industry in a developing economy it is found that a age positively impacts growth which is the opposite of the result in previous studies b as in previous studies current size negatively impacts growth but the magnitude is much higher and c lagged size negatively impacts growth suggesting that fixed factors become a hindrance to growth in rapidly growing infant industries

growth of firms in developing countries evidence from cote d ivoire the paper presents evidence in support of a particular growth process of firms that is consistent with a missing middle in the size distribution of manufacturing firms in african countries firm growth is explained by size and age effects as a result of efficiency exploiting through scale enlargements and learning but is strongly moderated by reputation effects and formal legitimation which facilitate access to output markets and resources complementing the model with data on growth obstacles as perceived by the owners of firms medium sized firms are found to be strongly hurt by insufficient access to infrastructure and financial services

intraindustry structure and the ease of strategic change there has been considerable recent work in industrial organization emphasizing the importance of group stratification within industries the thrust of this literature is that in empirical work and in particular in investigating public policy problems differences across firms within an industry may be crucial this paper is intended as a contribution to the empirical literature of group structures in this paper i examine patterns of strategic group membership in a number of industries and analyze changes in the strategies used by firms in particular i provide a series of rather simple exploratory tests of the importance of intraindustry strategic differences in a number of industries

economies of scale and barriers to entry dixit has recently presented a model in which established firms select capacity to discourage entry but cannot employ threats they would not rationally execute after entry entry deterrence in a slight modification of this model involves the classical limit price output under linear or concave demand however the capital cost of a firm of minimum efficient scale is an upper bound on the present value of the monopoly profit stream that can be shielded from entry it is argued that this suggests the general unimportance of entry barriers erected by scale economies

small store presence in japan the determinants of the development of small store presence in japan are investigated using a fixed effects multinomial logit market share model large stores tend to have higher market shares in shop types with increasing shares in consumer expenditures increasing inventory turnover and increasing diversification but do not seem to be able to profit from scale economies in labour use

dynamic entry and exit with uncertain cost positions abstract we study the dynamics of entry and exit based on firms learning about their relative cost positions each firm s marginal cost of production is its own private information thereby facing ex ante uncertainty about its cost position the inelastic market demand can accommodate only a fraction of firms to operate and thus only firms with relatively lower costs are viable in the long run some firms in the market will exit if excessive entry or overshooting occurs we derive the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium the equilibrium properties are consistent with empirical observations i entry occurs gradually over time with lower cost firms entering earlier than higher cost firms ii exiting firms are among the ones that entered later indeed in the last period moreover equilibrium overshooting probability is shown to always be positive and decreasing over time

tunneling or not the change of legal environment on the effect of post privatization performance motivated by hoff and stiglitz s am econ rev 94 3 753 763 2004 theory we examine empirically how the creation of rules of the game affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy using a sample of chinese state owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006 we find that the post privatization performance ppp of firms depends on institutional factors before 2003 we observe severe post privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse ppp however from 2003 when the state issued regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined and ppp improved we find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement

science park location and new technology based firms in sweden implications for strategy and performance one logical way to assess the performance of science parks is to compare the performance of their firms to similar firms not located there a total of 273 new technology based firms ntbfs were surveyed of which 134 were on a science park and 139 were not on a park there were significant differences in the means of strategy dimensions between the on park and off park firms it can be seen that the ntbfs who located in science parks showed significantly greater emphasis on firm characteristics as innovation ability competitor and market orientation sales and employment growth high profits etc the differences indicates a slight advantage for the science park firms the off park sample reported proximity to other firms to be of higher importance than the on park sample in their choice of location however these differences do not show any clear pattern making it difficult to understand if ntbfs who locate on science parks are systematically looking for something different in their location

reward structures and the allocation of talent as relative rewards that different professions receive are a key factor in the allocation of talent what determines the reward structure of a society is an important question this paper develops an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities such as rent seeking the existence of rent seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards are endogenously determined the same externality can also lead to the existence of multiple equilibria each with different reward structures in a dynamic setting allocations of past generations as well as expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may get trapped in a rent seeking steady state equilibrium the paper also discusses how the non pecuniary reward structure can be influenced by equilibrium selection and a historical example that suggests the presence of a causal link from the allocation of talent to non pecuniary rewards

learning and capacity expansion under demand uncertainty a competitive dynamic model of entry into a new industry is set up and both its positive and normative aspects are studied the main assumptions are that entry is sequential that it occurs under imperfect information on the size of the market and that better information becomes available as time goes on the gradual improvement in information is due to the fact that later waves of entrants are able to observe the profitability of earlier entrants the major results reported here under suitable restrictions are that the equilibrium rate of entry is monotonically decreasing over time and that at any given point in time it is smaller than the socially optimal one when a new market opens as a result of a product being newly invented for instance or when an existing market starts to expand uncertainty with respect to its size is likely to prevail as a result of this uncertainty entry of firms into such markets typically will occur in waves some firms will enter initially while others will wait to see the consequences of that initial entry if the experience of early entrants is favourable entry will continue otherwise entry will cease hence with the introduction of a new product two phases are associated the growth phase typified by positive operating profits for existing firms and expansion of productive capacity due to entry of new firms and the mature phase typified by erosion of profits and fixed total productive capacity empiricists estimating the time pattern of investments during the growth phase have found an s shaped diffusion curve see mansfield 1986 and gort and klepper 1982 the purpose of the present paper is to theoretically characterize these time patterns and to investigate their welfare properties any attempt to model the type of entry described above must account for differences in both entry dates and resultant earnings in other words the theory must explain why the realized earnings of different cohorts of firms are not equal often such ex post differences are reconciled by assuming heterogeneity with respect to some latent underlying characteristic managerial ability for instance and attributing differences in earnings to differences in that characteristic in this paper instead earning differentials are attributable to luck only ex ante all firms are technologically identical and equally capable of forecasting market prospects and rationally acting upon those forecasts ex post some firms turn out to have entered at the right time and are for that reason more profitable the model developed in this paper analyzes a parametric example of a sequential entry problem in which the uncertainty over market size is gradually resolved over time in a bayesian setting in an environment of perfect competition and constant returns toscale a free entry equilibrium concept is introduced and the aggregate implications of the time path of investments are derived i then compare this actual time path to the optimum this comparison is interesting because the equilibrium is analysed under the

making it underground comparative material on the informal sector in western market economies this paper examines the informal economy and its relationship to commonly held theories of industrial development although these theories stem from very different intellectual traditions their general assumption has been that widespread informal economic activities are primarily a feature of third world economies in which they function as a refuge from destitution such activities are presumably destined to desappear with the advance of modern industry led growth evidence is presented that indicates that these assumptions including the identification of informality with conditions in the less developed countries are wrong alternative interpretations of the resilience of these activities in third world countries despite rapid industrialization and their continuity and apparent revival in the advanced economies and discussed

an evolutionary interpretation of van huyck battalio and beil s experimental results on coordination this paper proposes an adaptive interpretation of the results of some recent experiments with repeated tacit coordination games these experiments revealed several behavioral regularities including a systematic discrimination between strict nash equilibria in certain games that appear to be driven by strategic uncertainty and are not explained by traditional equilibrium refinements the observed patterns of discrimination correspond closely to predictions based on maynard smith s notion of evolutionary stability an adaptive model in the spirit of the evolutionary dynamics but recognizing the important differences between learning in human populations and evolution promises to yield a unified explanation of the results journal of economic literature classification numbers 020 026

entrepreneurial strategy and the presence of small firms a model is presented hypothesizing that the level of small firm presence in any given industry emanates from the exogenous stock of entrepreneurial talent a stochastic element of managerial and entrepreneurial talent entry deterrence and the entrepreneurial strategy deployed by small firms using data newly released by the u s small business administration the hypothesis is tested for a sample of 247 four digit standard industrial classification industries spanning the entire spectrum of firm sizes we find that consistently for all the measures of small firm size and for all of the time periods used the existence of entry deterrence and reliance upon innovative strategy explains a significant proportion of the variation in the presence of small firms

the small the young and the productive determinants of manufacturing firm growth in ethiopia abstract this study examines the relationships between firm growth and firm size age and labor productivity using annual census based panel data on ethiopian manufacturing firms the study explicitly addresses the ongoing statistical concerns in firm growth models such as sample censoring regression to the mean and unobserved heterogeneity our empirical results indicate that firm growth decreases with size smaller firms have faster rates of growth than larger firms even after compensating for their higher attrition rates the negative relation between age and growth predicted by the learning model is found to apply only to younger firms labor productivity affects firm growth positively which indicates that there is a market selection process at work during the period of economic reforms in ethiopia

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the relationship between firm growth size and age estimates for 100 manufacturing industries this study uses a sample of all firms operating in 100 manufacturing industries to examine some aspects of firm dynamics it finds that firm growth the variability of firm growth and the probability that a firm will fail decrease with firm age it also finds that firm growth decreases at a diminishing rate with firm size even after controlling for the exit of slow growing firms from the sample gibrat s law therefore fails although the severity of the failure decreases with firm size copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

age size growth and survival uk companies in the 1980s this paper examines growth and survival amongst quoted and unquoted u k companies in the period 1975 85 and compares the results with earlier u k and u s studies an examination of death rates shows that smaller companies had higher death rates but the largest and smallest companies were least vulnerable to takeover careful attention is therefore paid to problems of sample selection bias it is shown that smaller companies grew faster than larger companies that gibrat s law does not hold amongst smaller firms that age is negatively related to growth and that these results are not an artifact of sample selection bias copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

specificity of control the case of mexico s ejido reform abstract an important aspect of property rights is specificity the ability of a third party to enforce rights the empirical literature rarely isolates the effect of specificity because exogenous changes due to land reforms either simultaneously change both control and specificity or exclusively change control we investigate the effect of specificity in the context of the 1992 salinas land reforms in mexico which constitutionally changed individual control rights for all communal landholders but reserved changes to specificity for a subsequent voluntary land certification program we are able to address selection into the program by taking advantage of the peculiarities in the certification process using agricultural production data from before and after the reform we demonstrate that land certification significantly increases agricultural investments but only for investments directly affected by the changes in control we explain the results using a simple model that shows how specificity can better coordinate landholders beliefs about the implementation of changes in control

the informal sector elephant abstract different analysts have used the term informal sector to mean different things a data set with 2 200 small enterprises chosen using random procedures in seven countries makes it possible to test the relationships between different measures the analysis finds only limited parallels between definitions based on size on registration on conformity to fiscal and other regulations and on degrees of modernization wide variations appear from one country to another the term may be appropriate for examination of individual countries especially if the analyst defines it precisely but its use in multicountry analysis is fraught with difficulties

flexibility and the theory of the firm abstract the object of this paper is 1 to bring together and integrate the various concepts of flexibility found in the economic literature 2 to flesh out the meaning of various aspects of flexibility and their implications thereby bridging the gap between the existing highly abstract theories and the empirical facts and 3 in the process to give a rich and comprehensive enough description of an industry to stimulate further theoretical as well as empirical work the study tries to combine inductive and deductive reasoning using empirical observations based on indepth interviews with manufacturers in the metalworking industry in the united states and sweden

what explains the trend reversal in the size distribution of korean manufacturing establishments abstract although korea is known for a size distribution of manufacturing firms and establishments increasingly skewed toward large size this paper shows that there has been a significant reversal in that trend since the mid 1970s various explanations of the original trend and its reversal including technology government policy and transaction costs are examined with pooled cross section and time series data for manufacturing establishments between 1963 and 1988 the results show that two general types of factors stand out in explaining both the original trend and its subsequent reversal namely the changing characteristics of both domestic financial markets and international marketing

the role of oligarchs in russian capitalism using a unique dataset we describe the degree of ownership concentration in russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in russia in particular we find that russian oligarchs do control a substantial part of the economy while the relative weight of their firms in russian economy is huge they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating the oligarchs seem to run their firms more efficiently than other russian owners controlling for industry region and size

ownership changes and access to external financing this paper examines access to external financing in the privatization context and provides new evidence on the effects of financing constraints on performance and investment ownership reforms increase firms reliance on external financing empirically performance and investment changes around ownership reforms are increasing in country level measures of access to credit the presence of a severe prior public financing constraint contributes to stronger investment growth after privatization privatized enterprises do not outperform publicly owned industries all else given our analyses rely on new international sector and firm level data and correct for potential endogeneity of ownership changes

the virtues of gradualism and legitimacy in the transition to a market economy this paper presents a simplified model of sectoral restructuring in eastern europe a move towards allocative efficiency is desired by the reform minded government but the shift to higher productivity which such efficiency requires would lead to massive layoffs and labour reallocation in the transition period we look at the impact of political constraints unanimity and or majority worker approval on reform proposals when the government faces a heterogeneous workforce holding private information on relative outside opportunities when the budgetary consequences of exit compensations are so important as to make partial reforms preferable to full reforms gradualism emerges as the optimum in a dynamic context without government commitment it is also shown that under democratic majority rule a government in control of the agenda of reforms can win majority approval for plans which end up hurting majority interests intertemporally by threatening to switch majorities in future reform proposals this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

social security and self control preferences abstract we analyze the welfare effects of an unfunded social security system we do so using an overlapping generations economy wherein agents have self control preferences face mortality risk individual income risk and borrowing constraints given our specification of preferences unfunded social security helps reduce the agents temptation to consume in every period consequently the welfare costs it otherwise entails are substantially mitigated while both social security and self control when considered separately reduce welfare their combination renders this effect considerably less severe moreover if the cost of resisting temptation is very high the introduction of social security might even improve welfare

foreign trade potential small enterprise development and job creation in developing countries increasing american competitiveness in the international economy requires expanding trade with emerging markets especially in developing countries of asia latin america and africa historically as developing countries economies have grown the capacity for exporting and importing have both expanded in the future the capacity for trade in developing countries will depend increasingly on their ability to create sufficient numbers of jobs to absorb their rapidly growing labor forces

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

social capital structural holes and the formation of an industry network the formation of a network is determined by the opposition of two forces the first is the reproduction of network structure as a general social resource for network members the second is the alteration of network structure by entrepreneurs for their own benefit the idea of reproduction is a conventional one in organizational sociology but has taken on increased importance due to the work of bourdieu and coleman in contrast burt stresses the entrepreneurship of individual agents in exploiting structural holes that lie between constrained positions though complementary the theories of social capital and structural holes have fundamentally different implications for network formation this paper investigates these theories by examining empirically the formation of the interorganizational network among biotechnology firms we propose that network structure determines the frequency with which a new biotechnology firm or startup establishes new relationships network structure indicates both where soci

exit and voice after mass privatization the case of russia abstract mass privatization programs attempt to effect a global transformation of the economic and political environment since specific designs of such programs are shaped by the necessity to generate ex ante political support for a massive ownership transformation they may result in allocating control rights to agents who have incentives to oppose rather than to effect reallocation of resources within and across firms exemplifying this political exigency of the reform process the russian mass privatization program gave to enterprise insiders majority ownership in as many as 70 of russian companies the largest outside owners to emerge in the overwhelming majority of the companies in the insider dominated russian economy were the voucher privatization funds in this paper we attempt to shed some light on the corporate governance role and strategies of this group of outside investors we focus on two particular strategies of funds activities shareholder activism voice and trading exit each of which has different costs and benefits in postcommunist transition economies than in advanced market systems the econometric analysis is based on data collected in an empirical survey of 148 voucher investment funds in 28 different regions of russia the funds surveyed held stakes in 4 000 to 5 000 privatized companies thus offering a genuine window on the world of russian firms and their new institutional shareholders

the determinants of asset stripping theory and evidence from the transition economies abstract during the transition from plan to market managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon there have been no efforts to model measure and investigate this process empirically this paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence we argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm s potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement our econometric results for about 950 firms in five transition economies provide support for this argument

exiting a lawless state an earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset stripping and the prevalence of asset stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law highlighting a coordination failure this paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non rule of law state the paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition the inability under a rule of law to forgive theft this can lead to the perpetuation of the non rule of law state even when it might seem that the alternative is pareto improving

the role of small firms in the industrial development and transformation of czechoslovakia this article presents an analysis of the role of small firms in the formation and reform of the czechoslovak manufacturing sector it attempts to give an understanding of the industrial structure formed under the past regime within the framework of the mass production paradigm as manufacturing productivity gradually declined over the past 25 years and small firms have been virtually eliminated systemic preference has been given to the development of large monopolies consequently a monolithic coalition structure of enterprise managers state bureaucrats and political nomenklatura has arisen and continues to present itself as a serious hindrance to economic transformation while small firms have the potential to play a critical role in the democratic marketization of czechoslovakia current government preoccupation with the rapid privatization of the state sector risks damaging the development of a balanced distribution of firm size and in turn the revitalization of the society

market structure jobs and productivity observations from jamaica the purpose of this paper is to study the structure of the formal labor market in jamaica emphasis is placed upon the key institutional features of labor markets as they affect income and employment determination training and labor quality labor management conflict and industrial organization in particular a distinction is drawn between those jobs principally in the informal sector where easy entry and work sharing are the principal determinants of income earning opportunities and those which are protected by formal sector internal labor markets this distinction is critical for understanding how employment and productivity are affected by economic change and by institutional forces at the workplace

the role of legal status in influencing bank financing and new firm growth this paper examines the characteristics of new firm founders who use loans and overdrafts from the clearing banks to finance initially their business bank lending to new firms appears unrelated to the personal characteristics of founders but related to whether individuals provide personal savings and the legal status of the business this contrasts with the factors which influence the growth of new firms here the founder s age employment status and birthplace are associated with larger firms the only variable which appears to influence consistently both bank lending and the employment growth in firms is whether or not the business is a limited company

leaders and followers perspectives on the nordic model and the economics of innovation abstract what kinds of social and economic systems are most conducive to innovation we formulate a simple model in which countries can close the gap with the technological leader but where the cost of doing so may be so high that the country chooses to remain laggards observed disparities in productivity may be the result of a recognition that the cost of closing the gap exceeds benefit and there may therefore exist an international equilibrium in which there are leaders and followers even if it is granted that the united states is the leader and scandinavia are followers there are theoretical grounds for arguing that the nordic model may in fact be better for innovation suggesting that if the us adopted some of the nordic institutions innovations would be higher and societal welfare would be improved even more

modelling the informal sector formally abstract the theoretical characterization of formal informal sector dualism by labor market dualism is integrated with its empirical characterization by size dualism by supposing that the minimum formal sector wage is only enforced for firms greater than a certain size a firm s size varies directly with the talent of its enterpreneur manager and the choice between formal and informal sector entrepreneurship is determined endogenously it is then shown that the size gap between the smallest formal sector firm and largest informal sector firm varies directly with the formal informal sector wage differential which in turn is shown as expected to increase the further is the minimum wage above the market clearing wage the comparative statics of changes in the size of the firm above which the minimum wage is enforced are also examined

capital flight from russia this paper documents the scale of capital flight from russia compares it with that observed in other countries and reviews policy options the evidence from other countries suggests that capital flight can be reversed once reforms take hold the paper argues that capital flight from russia can only be curbed through a medium term reform strategy aimed at improving governance and macroeconomic performance and strengthening the banking system capital controls result in costly distortions and should gradually be phased out as part of that medium term strategy copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2001

growth acquisition activity and firm size evidence from the united kingdom this paper provides new empirical evidence on the relationship between size growth and acquisition activity of quoted companies in the united kingdom the evidence is based on some two thousand companies and covers the period i960 76 there has been no detailed systematic study for this period the results suggest some revisions to generally accepted views in the area and they have certain implications for industrial and competition policy pursued in the u k and the factors affecting aggregate concentration the paper is arranged as follows section i considers the broader economic context for the study whilst section ii notes some a priori expectations regarding the relationship between size and growth and size and acquisition activity sections iii v present empirical evidence and the last section provides a summary and policy implications of the results

growth and barriers to growth among nairobi s small and medium sized garment producers abstract few of nairobi s small and medium sized garment enterprises actually grow understanding why this should be so requires recognition both of their common problems and of the variations in their organization and market relations two factors appear critical for the growth of all of the producers demand for new clothing and the firm s initial capital other growth constraints differ according to the type of firm space constraints are highlighted as especially important for businesses presently operating in market stalls the design of policy and donor interventions needs to consider both the commonalities and the differences among firms

entry and exit under demand uncertainty abstract this paper presents a dynamic model of entry and exit in competitive markets with demand uncertainty and bayesian learning there is a unique equilibrium path characterized by a pair of simple zero expected profit equations

grassroots democracy and local governance evidence from rural china summary this paper studies the impacts of village elections on the accountability of the village committee local fiscal sharing and state taxation in rural china using data of 48 villages for the period of 1986 2002 elections are found to substantially increase the share of public expenditures in the village budget but reduce the shares of administrative costs and income handed to the township government these findings suggest that elections have enhanced the accountability of the village committee but weakened local fiscal sharing and the state s grip no strong evidence is found that state taxation is affected by elections nor is it found that the role of a more competitive election is different from that of a closed election

the dynamics of micro and small enterprises in developing countries abstract the number of people engaged in micro and small enterprises increases as a result of new enterprises being started and through an expansion of existing activities as a partial offset to these increases employment declines when existing businesses cease operations this article draws on recent survey work to examine the magnitude and determinants of enterprise births closures and expansions it explores the ways in which these different sources of change are influenced by the state of the macroeconomy and examines policy and project implications

the flexible few oligarchs and wealth defense in developing democracies based on an original large n dataset of individual ukrainian oligarchs and qualitative evidence this article tests competing perspectives on the political power of big capital we find surprising

the social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights costs must be incurred if an owner is to enforce private property rights effectively we show that in a perfectly competitive economy private decisions to enforce rights may result in either more or less enforcement than is socially efficient cases of multiple stable equilibria occur and an equilibrium may be locally but not globally efficient resources may not be employed in their socially most valuable uses and enforcement may be accompanied by inefficient investment in resource productivity

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

business culture and tax evasion why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist abstract this paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria in bad equilibria high cheating and corruption increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating the source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures as tax evasion and corruption become more common they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered a third externality that between firms and inspectors is the source of the perverse effect more cheating by firms is good for bribe taking inspectors and more bribe taking inspectors are good for cheating firms

small business in german manufacturing in recent years one observes a renaissance of small business research efforts the stimuli came from different directions one strand of more policy oriented research concentrated on the impact of small businesses on the creation of new employment opportunities 1 another host of studies paid attention to the relationship of innovation productivity of small versus large business 2 and industrial economics research examined the role of small businesses as actual and potential challengers of larger competitors in a given market 3 whatever motive guided this research it was emphasized that the cumulated knowledge about large business behavior is by far greater than about their small business counterparts

dictators and oligarchs a dynamic theory of contested property rights in an economy with weak economic and political institutions the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators the conventional wisdom presumes that as rent seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves institutions such as enforcement of the property rights will emerge eventually we explicitly model a dynamic game between oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent seeking the oligarchs choose either a weak dictator who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch or a strong dictator who can only be replaced via a consensus of oligarchs in equilibrium no dictator can commit to both i protecting the oligarchs property rights from the other oligarchs and ii not expropriating oligarchs himself we show that a weak dictator does not limit rent seeking a strong dictator does reduce rent seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs we show that even though eliminating rent seeking is pareto optimal weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent seeking continues this outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile

social divisions and institutions assessing institutional parameter variation this paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions it argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness which in turn should depress institutional payoffs absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income the empirical results support this hypothesis and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large

the importance of lifetime jobs in the u s economy though the u s labor market is justly notorious for high turnover and consequent high unemployment it also provides stable near lifetime employment to an important fraction of the labor force this paper investigates patterns of job duration by age race and sex with the following major conclusions 1 the typical worker today is holding a job which has lasted or will last about eight years over a quarter of all workers are holding jobs which will last twenty years or more sixty percent hold jobs which will last five years or more 2 the jobs held by middle aged workers with more than ten years of tenure are extremely stable over the span of a decade only twenty to thirty percent come to an end 3 among workers aged thirty and above about forty percent are currently working in jobs which eventually will last twenty years or more three quarters are in jobs which will last five years or more 4 the duration of employment among blacks is just as long as among whites even though the jobs held by blacks are worse in almost every other dimension they are no more unstable than those held by whites 5 women s jobs are substantially shorter than men s on the average only about a quarter of all women over the age of thirty are employed in jobs which will last over twenty years whereas over half of men over thirty are holding these near lifetime jobs this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

are they efficient in the middle using propensity score estimation for modeling middlemen in indian corporate corruption corrupt regulatory environment encourages firms to deploy middlemen for speedy and assured acquisition of different services from regulatory agencies using a world bank dataset of 2210 indian manufacturing firms this article examines how firms with middlemen deal with corrupt governmental agencies for its operational efficiency our results demonstrate that deployment of middlemen by the firms is often accompanied by a substantial increase in operational delay relatively trigger more consumption of senior management s time on regulatory disentanglement enhance the likelihood tendency to pay bribe and likely to face more court cases as a means of restitution of legal rights as firm specific attributes may contaminate our preliminary results we utilized the propensity score framework to examine relationships among variables of interests our study contributes to the inconspicuous part of the corruption literature by attempting to present a comprehensive but indirect assessment of the functions of middlemen that predominantly remained unattended except some scattered descriptive case based anecdotal presentations

small firm entry in us manufacturing a cross section empirical analysis examining the entry behavior of small firms is provided in this paper while the authors find that certain traditional market structure characteristics and entry barriers have a strong impact on small firm entry behavior the reliance upon innovative strategy by small firms also explains a significant amount of the variation in the pattern of entry by small firms they conclude that small firm entry is at least partially determined by entry barriers industry specific characteristics facilitating retaliatory conduct by incumbent firms and the reliance upon innovative strategy by small firms copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

the survival of new plants start up conditions and post entry evolution abstract this paper examines the longevity of entrants we find size to be an important determinant of the chances of survival this being particularly relevant to de novo entrants as compared with entry by established firms current size is also found to be a better predictor of failure than initial size moreover our findings indicate that after controlling for size differences past growth matters for survival suggesting a partial adjustment process for firm size in the post entry period finally new plants are more likely to live longer if they enter growing industries or industries with little entry activity

informality size and regulation theory and an application to egypt the paper shows how when the enforceability of regulationsis size sensitive price competition can lock firms into informality and thus smallness depending on the form of the production function in thatcontext exogenous help packages targeted to informal firms promote micro and small enterprises i e increase their numbers but do not develop them i e foster their growth the help only generates ashort term span of abnormal profits for existing informal firms and a long term income transfer toward informal market consumers the model istested in the context of egypt s micro and small enterprise sector

responders versus non responders a new perspective on heterogeneity this paper considers the implications of a particular type of heterogeneity one which characterizes a large number of economic environments but that has not received any systematic treatment in the literature the authors refer to this heterogeneity as responders versus nonresponders the paper begins by providing a general framework for the analysis of environments characterized by this heterogeneity and then shows how this framework can be used to help understand a wide variety of economic environments particular applications considered are near rationality network externalities and models of reputation copyright 1991 by royal economic society

cultivating trust norms institutions and the implications of scale we study the co evolution of honesty norms and institutions new trading opportunities require institutional changes to be realised since the initial vulnerability of institutions to opportunistic behaviour leads to the deterioration of norms we show how an escape from opportunism requires that institutional improvements outpace norm deterioration a key prediction emerges larger economies are more likely to evolve to steady states with strong honesty norms but need not have better institutions this prediction is tested using a cross section of countries population has a significant positive relationship with trust even when controlling for standard trust determinants and institutional quality

whither russia a review of andrei shleifer s a normal country in this review the author reflects on the heated debates around views about russia s postcommunist transition expressed in essays collected in new andrei shleifer s book a normal country russia after communism harvard university press 2005 which were initially published at different times during transition she focuses on the three questions that have been in the center of the debate among academics and policymakers what should the sequencing and the speed of reforms be should a country have political centralization for fiscal decentralization to be efficient is russia normal the author argues that russia s most recent history provides convincing evidence in support of the logic of political and economic transformation as it was understood by shleifer as early as the beginning of the 1990s

sunk costs firm size and firm growth for several decades the conventional wisdom has been that expected firm growth rates are independent of firm size a property known as gibrat s law however recent empirical work has found a negative relation between firm growth and firm size this paper provides a theoretical explanation for this negative relation in a model of new firm growth where capacity and technology choices involve some degree of sunkness additional empirical implications of the theory of sunk costs are also developed these relate to profit rates tobin s q exit rates degree of sunkness of capacity costs as well as size and growth rates copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

heterogeneous firms and the organization of production firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm this input must be allocated to two activities coordinating production and monitoring workers able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring a dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities the design of products and the organization of production the monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior

entrepreneurship and growth creative and equilibrating events this paper investigates the constraints on the growth of creative and equilibrating entrepreneurial events the empirical material is drawn from the greek economy it was observed that the two different levels of entrepreneurial events involve constraints of different kinds this paper analyses those constraints and their significance for entrepreneurial growth

small and medium size enterprises access to finance as a growth constraint abstract this paper presents recent research on access to finance by small and medium size enterprises smes smes form a large part of private sector in many developed and developing countries while cross country research sheds doubt on a causal link between smes and economic development there is substantial evidence that small firms face larger growth constraints and have less access to formal sources of external finance potentially explaining the lack of smes contribution to growth financial and institutional development helps alleviate smes growth constraints and increase their access to external finance and thus levels the playing field between firms of different sizes specific financing tools such as leasing and factoring can be useful in facilitating greater access to finance even in the absence of well developed institutions as can systems of credit information sharing and a more competitive banking structure

coase versus the coasians who should enforce laws or contracts judges or regulators many coasians though not coase himself advocate judicial enforcement we show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice we then compare the regulation of e nancial markets in poland and the czech republic in the 1990s in poland strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market in the czech republic hands off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market i introduction at the heart of economists traditional skepticism about government regulation is the coase theorem coase 1960 the theorem states that when property rights are well dee ned and transaction costs are zero market participants will organize their transactions in ways that achieve efe cient outcomes when they can do so it is not necessary for the government to engage in corrective actions through taxes regulations or even legal rules financial markets are often used to demonstrate the coase theorem s case against regulation advocates of the regulation of these markets point to a variety of potential failures such as the ability of security issuers to expropriate both potential and existing investors through misrepresentation or proe t diversion investors fear of such expropriation prevents e rms from raising external funds and keeps efe cient projects from being undertaken not so reply the coasians they point out that most securities transactions take place between sophisticated adults and that both the buyers and the issuers of securities have available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efe ciency including contracts such as corporate charters certie cation by intermediaries and various forms of bonding such contracts render most laws and regulations unnecessary stigler 1964 easterbrook and fischel 1991

firm size distribution and price cost margins in dutch manufacturing industrial economists surmise a relation be tween the size distribution of firms and performance usually attention is focused on the high end of the size distribution the widely used four firm seller concentration ratio c4 ignores what happens at the low end of the size distribution we investigate to what extent the level and the growth of small business presence influence price cost margins in dutch manufacturing we use a large data set of 66 industries for a thirteen year period this allows the investigation of both small business influences within a framework in which that of many other market structure variables is also studied evi dence is shown that price cost margins are influenced by large firm dominance growth in small business presence capital intensity business cycle international trade and buyer con centration

voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic this paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far sighted and myopic individuals all individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short term view instant gratification when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply consequently they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions henceforth when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving we consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters the payroll tax rate that determines the size or generosity of the system and the bismarckian factor that determines its redistributiveness individuals vote sequentially we examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind all far sighted or all myopic while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far sighted agents furthermore while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far sighted counterparts the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics

immigration and pension benefits in the host country this paper examines the role that low skilled immigration plays in determining pension benefits of the host population with an overlapping generations model which allows identifying which groups of native population are in favour or against immigration we find that despite immigrants having low average productivity an open borders policy would be implemented since most of current domestic cohorts gain from immigration only younger workers might be against immigration since they will coincide with immigrants in their retirement periods moreover we show how a larger immigrant quota would increase the probability of a pareto improvement for the current domestic population