a dual definition for the factor content of trade and its effect on factor rewards in us manufacturing sector we introduce a dual definition of the factor content of trade fct using the concept of the equivalent autarky equilibrium estimating a symmetric normalized quadratic revenue function for the u s manufacturing sector between 1965 and 1991 we find that the fct for capital is positive while the fct for skilled and unskilled labor is negative suggesting that the leontief paradox is not present then the growth rate of the factor rewards is decomposed to the fct endowments and technological change effects we find that technological change is the most important determinant in explaining wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor

we the rich inequality identity and cooperation abstract inequality not only generates status differentials between rich and poor individuals it also generates status differentials between groups of different composition and income level we organise the social structure within which groups are embedded to manipulate their composition and relative status thus inducing weaker or stronger group identities in their members via the processes of social categorization identification and comparison we therefore manipulate the fundamental components of group identity rather than resorting to ad hoc identity reinforcement tasks how strongly individuals identify with each group will ultimately determine the degree of cooperativeness within the group and the whole society we find that the impact of inequality on social cooperativeness is not trivial cooperation varies with the strength of the group s identity as predicted by social identity theory in particular high endowment homogeneous groups cooperate most and increasingly over time low endowment homogeneous groups display intermediate levels of cooperation heterogeneous groups cooperate least a result driven by lack of cooperation on behalf of the rich as endowment sizes and groups are exogenously allocated we argue that our findings are a lower bound for the effects generated where endowments and groups are endogenously determined in or outside of the laboratory

agricultural productivity differences across countries abstract recent studies argue that cross country labor productivity differences are much larger in agriculture than in the aggregate we reexamine the agricultural productivity data underlying this conclusion using new evidence from disaggregate sources we find that for the world s staple grains maize rice and wheat cross country differences in the quantity of grain produced per worker are enormous according to both micro and macrosources our findings validate the idea that understanding agricultural productivity is at the heart of understanding world income inequality

does the allocation of property rights matter in the commons abstract a popular solution to the tragedy of the commons is to create private property rights to access the commons if resource users care about the welfare of others they may be unwilling to respect property rights regimes that lead to unfair or inequitable outcomes we explore in a series of laboratory experiments whether it is possible to undermine the efficacy of property rights solutions through the allocation process we find that both the extent to which property rights are enforced and how they are allocated significantly affect extraction and compliance our findings suggest that one of the most popular allocation methods is suboptimal we observe that occasional enforcement and the proportional allocation of property rights is dominated by no enforcement and the equal or inverse allocation of property rights our results support the view that allocation matters for property rights solutions to the commons problem

public good provision mechanisms and reciprocity this paper determines optimal public good provision mechanisms in an environment where agents are motivated by reciprocity in a two agent economy we show that the standard pivot mechanism is not strategy proof if at least one agent cares strongly enough about reciprocity truthful reporting maximises a player s own payoff and hence is viewed as selfish by his opponent who retaliates by understating demand for the public good incentive compatibility is restored if the mechanism is implemented sequentially when agents are asked to report their demands in turn a high report by the first mover he may result in him paying an unfairly large share of the provision cost should the second mover she understate her demand hence truthful reporting is not judged as selfish by the second mover who reciprocates by stating her true demand our results alert the institutional designer to the importance of game dynamics when agents are non selfish

the factor content of foreign trade in the factor proportions trade theory the heckscher ohlin theory the factor content of the pattern of trade plays a major role both in theoretical and in empirical investigations it is therefore valuable to identify restrictions on permissible vectors of the factor content of trade which necessarily hold in equilibrium if certain restrictions are empirically testable they can be used for preliminary testing of the theory before a more thorough examination is undertaken or they can be used to reject the theory it is my intention to develop in this paper a set of restrictions on the vectors of the factor content of trade which can be used for these purposes it is well known that autarky commodity prices impose restrictions on possible patterns of trade these restrictions provide a precise prediction of the pattern of trade for a two country two commodity world in the sense that the exporter of a good is readily identifiable from autarky price data as the country with the lower relative price of the good i will start by showing that in the presence of factor price equalisation autarky factor rewards impose restrictions on the factor content of trade patterns which are completely analogous to the restrictions imposed by autarky commodity prices on the commodity patterns of trade this result is in line with the view that in the factor proportions model trade in commodities represents indirect trade in factor services unfortunately these restrictions rely on autarky information and they are therefore not very useful for empirical work in order to overcome this difficulty i explore an alternative approach i argue that common predictions of the factor content of trade flows which are based on post trade observable data the data relevant for empirical studies rely on unnecessarily restrictive assumptions i e the assumption that preferences are homothetic and identical across countries and the assumption of factor price equalisation the assumption of identical homothetic preferences seems to be necessary when factor price equalisation is assumed because in this case there is an indeterminancy in the pattern of production nevertheless the two assumptions taken together imply the same factor content of a country s net import vector from the rest of the world for every equilibrium production pattern however in a many country world the factor content of bilateral trade flows depends on the realised production patterns and they cannot therefore be predicted i will show that in the absence of factor price equalisation which many

material interests moral reputation and crowding out species protection on private land we consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good such as endangered species this paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about reputation and land quality we examine optimal monetary transfer by designing an efficient mechanism which takes into account the crowding out effect of monetary rewards on socially responsible behavior we find landowners who have good reputation contribute more than the optimum level landowners with poor reputation sacrifices information rent rather they buy reputation

immaterial rewards and sanctions in a voluntary contribution experiment in this article we compare the causes and effects of immaterial rewards and sanctions on cooperation in a voluntary contribution experiment it appears that both rewards and sanctions increase contributions and that rewards are more effective than sanctions only when subjects interact repeatedly within the same group the effect is however insignificant which could be due to the higher variance in presence of rewards and sanctions furthermore it is evidenced that rewards have some negative effect on the future contribution for both the imposer and the imposed when the partner matching is applied but both rewards and sanctions have mainly positive effects under the stranger matching thus it seems that the recipient of the feedback takes the message as a reliable external evaluation of her contribution only under the stranger matching protocol when the strategic use of feedback can largely be excluded jel c92 h41

do binding agreements solve the social dilemma we investigate whether binding agreements can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods by signing a binding agreement players can prevent free riding by the contributors to a public good however a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient in our setting the individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global coalition is always the socially optimal structure agreements form sequentially and the equilibrium outcome is an asymmetric structure which consists of two coalitions our experiment therefore lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient in fact we observe an outcome which is even less efficient than that predicted by the equilibrium agreement structure however it seems that when subjects reach agreements they do so with the intention of cooperating rather than free riding furthermore it seems that they learn to cooperate over time and reach the global agreement more often towards the end of sessions keywords

determinants of the structure of u s foreign trade 1958 1976 abstract the heckscher ohlin model with three direct factor inputs is borne out for u s net exports of manufactures in annual cross section regressions for 1958 1976 the coefficient on unskilled labor became significantly more negative over the period and there is evidence that the negative sign on physical capital may reflect the inclusion of natural resource industries further analysis based upon 1960 and 1970 census years suggests the importance as well of skill and technological variables calculations of the total factor requirements of u s trade uphold the leontief paradox for 1958 but not for 1972

tax morale and prosocial behaviour evidence from a palestinian survey the first empirical investigation is conducted into the relationship between prosocial behaviour and tax morale in the context of state capacity building as in the palestinian territories we consider public spirit a positive attitude adopted by citizens for the benefit of the community and associational activity individuals engagement in voluntary activities two major expressions of prosocial behaviour and estimate their impact on palestinians tax morale intrinsic motivation to pay taxes the empirical analysis employs a unique palestinian public opinion survey conducted in 2007 in the west bank and the gaza strip by using a bivariate probit model we find that tax morale increases with public spirit but it is lower among palestinians involved in associational activities predicted conditional probabilities indicate that public spirit has more impact when the respondent has low confidence in the institutions and in the rule of law finally more public spirit is required for a self employed person in order to deal with tax compliance than for a worker in the public sector unless the worker in the public sector has lower confidence in the institutions and in the rule of law than the self employed person

on the effects of asymmetric and endogenous taxation in experimental public goods games abstract in our experimental public goods game subjects face exogenously or endogenously determined asymmetric minimum contributions endogeneity does not affect overall contributions if asymmetric contribution levels are approved of endogenously the disadvantaged subjects contribute significantly less than in case of exogenous determination

the transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma we formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool resource the diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations while individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource agents remain conditionally cooperative unless other individuals are misbehaving already we can observe a bubble of conditional cooperators slowly building up followed by a sudden burst which means that a transition from a cooperative social norm to non cooperation occurs interestingly in some parameter regions alternative stable states and limit cycles arise the latter implies that the same community goes through such a transition repeatedly over long time spans history thus repeats itself in the form of the creation and erosion of social capital

mass media instrumental information and electoral accountability journalism is widely believed to be crucial for holding elected officials accountable at the same time economic theory has a hard time providing an instrumental explanation for the existence of accountability journalism according to the common downsian reasoning rational voters should not be willing to pay for information out of purely instrumental motives because the individual probabilities of casting the decisive vote are typically very low we show that this rationale does not apply when a group of voters shares a common goal such as accountability and information is delivered via mass media in contrast to the pessimistic downsian view rational voters can have a considerable willingness to pay for the provision of instrumental information in these scenarios our model thus reconciles the rational voter approach with the common perception of journalism as a watchdog that holds elected officials accountable

reciprocity matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences we find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism vcm we also examine a game with different equilibria the weakest link mechanism wlm here in contrast participants match the minimum contribution of others

communal land and agricultural productivity this paper quantifies the aggregate impact of communal land tenure ar rangements that prevail in sub saharan africa such tenure regimes limit land transfer ability by prohibiting sales subjecting rented out land to the risk of expropriation and redistributing it to existing farmers in a progressive fashion we use a general equilibrium two sector selection model featuring agents heterogeneous in skills to compute the result ing occupational and operational choices as well as land allocations the quantification of the model is based on policies deduced from ethiopia in the sub saharan african context we find that such policies substantially dampen nominal agricultural relative to non agricultural productivity by 25 real relative agricultural productivity however only falls by 4 since cross sectoral terms of trade adjust strongly with excess agricul tural employment only amounting to some 1 5 percentage points the loss in gdp is small about 2 that serves as a reminder that ostensibly highly distortionary policies need not have substantial bite when individuals strategically adjust to them and equilib rium prices adapt for example the model predicts that at given prices 62 of farmers in an economy such as ethiopia would leave farming if tenure were secured casting land insecurity as a major obstacle yet only 9 would actually switch sectors after price adjustments are factored in

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

reputation in a public goods game taking the design of credit bureaus to the lab abstract we present the results of a new laboratory experiment designed to mimic the ways in which credit bureaus will alter microfinance markets where loans are taken in groups bureaus can build reputations for borrowers at the group or the individual level and the optimal contract is not obvious in a modified public goods game with ejection and re assignment played by guatemalan micro entrepreneurs we find the use of group reputation to be effective in increasing contributions given the costs of transitioning microfinance bureaus to the sharing of individual information our results suggest that this change would not be cost effective

do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders an experimental study feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like ebay or amazon marketplace this article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders through a set of experiments based on the trust game our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system however such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders in particular a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner s rating decision before making their own decision provides better results both in terms of trust and earnings

the factor proportions model with many nations goods and factors theory and evidence recently several authors have markedly improved our understanding of the factorproportions trade model when there are arbitrarily many goods factors and or nations vanek 1968 appears to be the first rigorously to derive theorems in the spirit of the simple heckscher ohlin h o theory concerning the factor content of a nation s total trade subsequently horiba 1974 has investigated conditions under which vanek s results hold bilaterally for trade among many nations lastly in harkness 1978 i considered the implications of vanek s model for a nation s total but not its bilateral commodity trade nonetheless none of these models nor their implications have been subjected to rigorous empirical tests this paper provides such tests on observed trade patterns among canada the united states and the rest of the world row section i briefly reviews the vanek horiba version of the factor proportions model demonstrating how a nation s total and bilateral net factor service trade flows are linked to her total and bilateral relative factor endowments the implications for direct commodity trade are derived in section ii by extension of my earlier 1978 results section iii deals with problems arising from the absence of some data necessary to empirical implementation of the model section iv presents the results of empirical tests conclusions are found in section v

crime in the lab detecting social interaction abstract according to the standard economic perspective criminal activities vary with the price of crime which depends on the severity of punishment and the detection probability an alternative view claims that crime is also influenced by social interaction phenomena such as peer pressure or neighbourhood effects detecting social interaction in the field is fraught with difficulties however in this paper we argue that given its extensive control possibilities experiments are well suited to show the potential existence of social interaction effects we present an experimental study where people can engage in criminal activities we find support for the importance of social interaction on average subjects steal the more the more others steal this behaviour can be interpreted in terms of reciprocity

group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas a survey and meta analytic evidence abstract we survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games public goods games common pool resources and the prisoner s dilemma the 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms endogenous endogenous with the option to play the game and exogenous on cooperation rates our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free riders independently of the sorting mechanism we complement the survey with a meta analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting what is more we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups these observations are related as we show in the survey the success of a sorting method in matching like minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked

retrospectives on the genius behind david ricardo s 1817 formulation of comparative advantage last year marked the 200th anniversary of ricardo s famous four numbers paragraph on comparative advantage which is one of the oldest analytical results in economics following the lead of james mill 1821 these four numbers have been interpreted as unit labor coefficients this interpretation has provided the basis for the development of the ricardian model from john stuart mill 1852 to eaton and kortum 2002 however if we accept the labor unit interpretation of these numbers ricardo s exposition in his 1817 principles of political economy and taxation makes little logical sense building on sraffa s 1930 interpretation of ricardo s numbers as labor embodied in trade our discussion reveals the amazing simplicity and generality of ricardo s comparative advantage formulation and gains from trade logic

factor prices and the factor content of trade revisited what s the use abstract this paper examines and extends a result of deardorff and staiger an interpretation of the factor content of trade journal of international economics 1988 24 93 107 d s who showed how the factor content of trade may indicate the factor price adjustments that can be attributed to that trade it elaborates on what this means and also extends it beyond several of the assumptions that d s used the strongest result in d s only for cobb douglas technology is extended to common constant elasticities of substitution and for small changes more general technologies also the assumption of nonspecialization is shown to be unnecessary with cobb douglas technology more generally noncompeting imports equate with hicks neutral technological improvements

indirect reciprocity and money using an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy as a basis we argue that a monetary system can be more stable than one would expect from individual rationality we show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system provided every participant considers the feedback of his choice to the stationary equilibrium if however the participants do not play stationary strategies and some participants notoriously refuse to accept money then due to negative reciprocity their behavior will eventually induce a break down of the monetary system

simultaneous decision making in competitive and cooperative environments we experimentally investigate simultaneous decision making in two contrasting environments a competitive environment a contest and a cooperative environment a voluntary contribution mechanism we find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism spills over to the contest decreasing sub optimal overbidding in the contest however contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the contest there is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and cooperative environments i e more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice versa this correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory

trade policy preferences and factor abundance abstract this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of public opinion towards free trade investigating cleavages both between and within countries we study the distributional effects of trade policy in a neoclassical heckscher ohlin economy with not just two but many input factors in production we demonstrate that the factor price changes induced by trade policy are negatively associated with the factor content of free trade and therefore factor abundance using large scale international survey data we test whether these predicted distributional effects are reflected in the trade policy preferences of workers with different labor market skills in order to isolate the effects of factor abundance from other skill related confounding factors we employ a within skill group estimator that exploits the cross country variation in factor abundance in line with theory the data show that individuals whose skills are in more abundant domestic supply have significantly more positive attitudes towards trade

conditional cooperation with negative externalities an experiment abstract empirically the commons are not as tragic as standard theory predicts the predominant explanation for this finding is conditional cooperation yet many real life situations involve insiders who are directly affected by a dilemma and outsiders who may be harmed if the insiders overcome the dilemma the quintessential illustration is oligopoly if insiders overcome their dilemma and collude this inflicts harm on the opposite market side in our experiment harm on outsiders significantly reduces conditional cooperation of insiders we can exclude that this result is driven by inequity aversion reciprocity or efficiency seeking only guilt aversion can rationalize our findings with guilt being most pronounced if the active insiders not only inflict harm on the outsider but increase their own payoff at the expense of the outsider

social hierarchies a laboratory study on punishment patterns across networks we experimentally study punishment patterns across network structures and their effect on cooperation in a repeated public goods setting subjects can only observe and punish their neighbors centralized structures like the star network outperform other incomplete networks and reach contribution levels like the ones observed in a complete network our results suggest that hierarchical network structures with a commonly observed player benefit more from sanctions not because central players punish more but because they follow and promote different punishment patterns while quasi central players in other incomplete architectures like the line network retaliate and get trapped in the vicious circle of antisocial punishment central players in the star network do not punish back increase their contributions when sanctioned by peripheral players and sanction other participants in a prosocial manner our results illustrate recent field studies on the evolutionary prevalence of hierarchical networks we document a network based rationale for this positive effect in an identity free fully anonymous environment jel c72 c91 c92 d90 h41

mandatory minimum contributions heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public good provision abstract in a public good experiment with heterogeneous endowments we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair share rule of equal contributions relative to one s endowment hofmeyr et al 2007 keser et al 2014 are influenced by minimum contribution requirements we consider three different schedules fixmin requiring the same absolute contributions relmin requiring the same relative contributions and progmin requiring minimum contributions that progressively increase with the endowment we find that minimum contributions exert norm giving character and may lead to an increase in average group contributions this is especially true for the progressive schedule on the individual level this schedule leads to higher relative contributions by the wealthier players and thus violates the fair share norm on the group level it leads to the highest contribution level and the lowest inequality in total profits as measured by the gini index

conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods we compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated publi c good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations subjects in the partners conditi on contribute from t he first period on significantly more to the publi c good than subjects in the strangers conditi on in the strangers conditi on contributions show a continual decay whil e in the partners conditi on contributions fluctuate on a high level until t hey decrease in the final periods we interpret subjects behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future oriented and reactive behavior

contributions in linear public goods experiments with stranger matching two motivations we investigated why subjects contribute to the public good in a linear public goods game with stranger matching in this experiment subjects were asked to determine their contributions to the publ

a specification test of the heckscher ohlin theory abstract under strong assumptions the heckscher ohlin model predicts not only that factor endowment differences alone determine trade patterns but that they do so in a particularly simple way the factor content of trade should be a linear function of national and world factor endowments the evident empirical shortcomings of this simple relationship need not however imply the more general empirical failure of endowment based trade theories this paper provides empirical evidence consistent with a more general endowment based model by showing that the strong heckscher ohlin relationship excludes important additional channels through which factor endowments affect the pattern of trade

rank order competition in the voluntary provision of impure public goods publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members we design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free riding in impure public goods in our rank order voluntary contribution mechanism rank order vcm group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good high contributors receive preferential access a larger share while low contributors receive restricted access a lower share in a laboratory experiment rank order vcm elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups in the control treatment with randomly assigned ranks the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time we thus provide evidence of rank competition in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible being efficiency enhancing

strategic behavior in public good games when partners drift apart abstract in a public good experiment one group member is replaced by another after a prespecified number of periods evidence of both strategic forward looking and adaptive backward looking behavior is observed

social learning and voluntary cooperation among like minded people many people contribute to public goods but stop doing so once they experience free riding we test the hypothesis that groups whose members know that they are composed only of likeminded cooperators are able to maintain a higher cooperation level than the most cooperative randomly composed groups our experiments confirm this hypothesis we also predict that groups of like minded free riders do not cooperate yet we find a high level of strategic cooperation that eventually col lapses our results underscore the importance of group composition and social learning by heterogeneously motivated agents to understand the dynamics of cooperation and free riding

morally motivated self regulation 2 this paper focuses on self regulation motivated by altruistic moral concerns the context is one in which individuals can voluntarily self regulate in the presence of opportunities to free ride on the self regulation of their trading partners moral preferences can mitigate free riding but moral preferences can be limited in the sense that they may be weaker the greater the socioeconomic distance from a trading partner and can depend on whether others are expected to reciprocate the scope of self regulation can be increased by moral suasion but individuals can also form organizations to reduce free riding this paper characterizes the scope of self regulation as a function of the form and strength of moral preferences and explains the effectiveness of organizations in expanding that scope moral preferences can be conditional on the actions of others or limited by socioeconomic distance a citizen thus may self regulate when interacting with someone close but not with someone far away moral preferences can also be conditional or unconditional unconditional moral preferences are independent of the action of others whereas with conditional preferences a citizen is more willing to self regulate if other citizens are expected to reciprocate 3

water resources as determinants for foreign direct investments in land a gravity analysis of foreign land acquisitions worldwide increasing demand for agricultural products poses the critical question of where this additional production will take place in this context the phenomenon of large scale foreign land acquisition fla is one strategy that has been controversially discussed in scientific and public debates a better understanding of what factors drive fla flows between investor and target countries is still needed this project applies a gravity model to estimate the effect of agro environmental determinants in target countries the response variables are derived from improved data obtained from the land matrix global observatory and the explanatory variables from a range of climatic and agricultural data sets the issue of large numbers of zero flows in such a data set is tackled using zero inflating regression models overall the results highlight the crucial role of water resources in particular the potential of rainfed crop production in the targeted areas and not just land abundance alone as found in previous studies moreover in line with previous studies we show that in contrast to other types of investment flows agricultural investment flows are not negatively affected by weaker institutional regulations or corruption

strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments abstract we conduct a repeated vcm voluntary contribution mechanism experiment using the strategy method and compare contribution behavior in a partner and a stranger matching in both a cold and a hot setting where the latter differs from the former by allowing participants to revise their strategies in each round irrespective of whether the setting is hot or cold we find that partners provide higher initial contributions than strangers in the cold setting without revision possibility partners contribute more on average but do not react differently to past contributions by others than strangers in the hot setting the dynamic contribution plans of strangers are somewhat upward shifted furthermore the contributions of partners decrease more strongly than those of strangers over time in a hot setting the reason for this effect lies in the fact that partners react much more strongly to negative experiences than strangers our design and results contribute to explaining the mixed evidence in the literature on partner versus stranger comparisons and allow us to understand under which conditions commitment can be conducive or harmful to achieving and sustaining higher levels of contribution

procompetitive gains from trade and comparative advantage having made the concepts of pro or anticompetitive output changes precise necessary and sufficient conditions for trade gains are derived under conditions of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition in a general equilibrium model with any finite number of goods and factors these conditions yield generalizations of the theorems of comparative advantage in goods and implicit factor trade the factor content version of the h o theorem other generalizations can be obtained if one assumes quasihomothetic preferences and that welfare effects are dominated by price rather than income effects copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

anyone for higher speed limits self interested and adaptive political preferences swedish survey evidence indicates that variables reflecting self interest are important in explaining people s preferred speed limits and that political preferences adapt to technological development drivers who believe they drive better than the average driver as well as drivers of cars that are newer and hence safer bigger and with better highspeed characteristics prefer higher speed limits in contrast elderly people prefer lower speed limits furthermore people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others vote on average indicating that we may vote less sociotropically than we believe ourselves one possible reason for such self serving biases is that people desire to see themselves as socially responsible

securing property rights a dilemma experiment in austria mexico mongolia south korea and the united states abstract secure property rights result from a combination of public enforcement private protective measures and voluntary norm compliance we conduct a laboratory experiment to study how culture interacts with institutions in shaping individuals behaviors and group outcomes in a property rights dilemma the experiment is conducted in five countries austria mexico mongolia south korea and the united states we find that the security of property varies with the experimentally available institutions and country level indicators such as trust and quality of government subjects from countries with higher levels of trust are more likely to abstain initially from theft devote more resources to production and support funding public protection of property through taxation our findings highlight the relevance of cultural and institutional factors and their interaction in addressing the collective action problem of safeguarding property rights

advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty we study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters preferences to uninformed political candidates we conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are initially unknown and change over time in the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections in the advocacy treatments voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences we find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group in fact we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups which convey new information and uninformative advocacy groups which do not overall advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter however advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation

the general validity of the heckscher ohlin theorem despite a number of attempts to extend it the heckscher ohlin theorem remains woefully restricted in terms of the generality of the assumptions needed for its proof in its traditional form as a statement about the commodity composition of trade the theorem is valid only in the highly abstract environment of the two factor two good twocountry model that has been the mainstay of trade theory for half a century a weaker version of the theorem involving the factor content of trade rather than its commodity composition has been proved for any number of factors goods and countries but this generality has so far been bought only at the cost of other and perhaps equally restrictive assumptions 2 the purpose of this paper is to provide statements and proofs of the heckscher ohlin h o theorem that are more general than those currently available the approach taken is similar to that used in my 1980 article for an extension of the theory of comparative advantage in terms of correlations between autarky prices and trade in section i i lay out the assumptions on which the analysis is based these assumptions provide the outlines of a reasonably general model in which there may be any numbers of goods and factors and in which factor prices may be equalized or not trade impediments in the form of tariffs or export taxes are permitted though transportation costs are not 3 in section ii i discuss the difficulty of inferring the factor content of trade in a world of unequal factor prices and i provide several alternative definitions of that concept for use later in the paper these together with the assumptions of section i are used in section iii to prove a theorem on the value at autarky prices of the factor content of trade in section iv this theorem is used to prove a first corollary that makes a more direct statement about the pattern of trade it says that worldwide there must be a negative correlation between the factor content of trade by factor and country and the corresponding autarky factor prices it is precisely these autarky factor prices that constitute the ohlin measure of factor scarcity therefore the corollary provides a formal statement of the general idea that countries tend to export the services of those factors which they have in relative abundance and it may be regarded as a generalization of the factor content version of the h o theorem finally a generalization of the commodity version of the theorem is proved in section v the concept of a covariance is generalized university of michigan i have benefitted greatly from the comments of paul degrauwe wolfgang mayer michael mussa carl simon and robert stern as well as others who participated in seminars at the universities of michigan chicago and cincinnati and at the national bureau of economic research an anonymous referee also made valuable comments with additional goods and factor price equalization the theorem runs afoul of the indeterminacy of production and trade noted by paul samuelson 1953 and james melvin 1968 without factor price equalization trade impediments and intermediate production can cause reversals of the pattern of trade as shown in my 1979 article if additional factors and countries are also added it becomes difficult even to state the theorem let alone to prove it 2melvin stated such a theorem for the three good two factor case and jaroslav vanek 1968 proved it for the general case but only by assuming factor price equalization trent bertrand 1972 and jon harkness 1979 were able to drop the factor price equalization assumption but replaced it with restrictions on consumption of either goods or factors by country of origin it is unclear to me however that these restrictions can ever be met in a model that is otherwise plausible harkness 1978 has also used the factor content version of the theorems as the motivation for a regression equation relating commodity trade to factor intensities this bears some resemblance to my analysis below in section v see however james anderson 1981 and edward leamer and harry bowen 1981 who have criticized his result with a reply by harkness 1981 3for ease of exposition i do not allow here for transportation costs these were included in an earlier version of this paper following the technique in my 1980 article

the effects of protection on the factor content of japanese and american foreign trade data on pre tokyo round tariffs and ad valorem approximations of nontariff barriers are used in the michigan computational model of world production and trade to calculate changes in commodity trade attributable to protection in japan and the united states data on factor requirements in production are then used to calculate the factor contents of these computed changes in trade results indicate that japanese protection is more distortionary of factor markets in japan and the united states than is american protection and that u s manufacturing labor would be the least likely to gain from trade liberalization in japan and or the united states copyright 1988 by mit press

strategic thinking in public goods games with teams abstract we experimentally investigate team behavior in repeated public goods games and use team chat logs to study motives for contribution subjects are matched into two person teams and each team makes a joint decision in each period we compare teams with individuals and find similar overall contributions however initial contribution is higher and endgame effects are more pronounced for teams we examine strategic discussions within teams and find strong evidence of concern for repeated game effects and limited backward induction we also find evidence of confusion and explore its potential sources

an interpretation of the factor content of trade abstract this paper shows that the factor content of trade can be used to indicate effects of trade on relative factor prices factor prices in two trading equilibria can be compared by comparing instead their two equivalent autarky equilibria constructed by changing factor endowments by the factor content of trade using relationships between autarky factor prices and factor endowments several relationships are derived between factor prices with trade and its factor content the most general result is a positive correlation between relative changes in the factor content of trade appropriately normalized and proportional changes in factor prices

nonlinear behavior of the socio economic dynamics for lake eutrophication control abstract to succeed in combating lake eutrophication cooperation of local inhabitants small factories and farmers in reducing phosphorus discharge is very important but the willingness of each player to cooperate would depend on the cooperation of other players and on the level of environmental concern of the society in general here we study the integrated dynamics of people s choice of behavior and the magnitude of eutrophication assumptions are there are a number of players who choose between alternative options a cooperative and environment oriented option is more costly than the other the decision of each player is affected by social pressure as well as by economical cost of the options the lake pollution increases with the total phosphorus released and a high pollution level in the lake would enhance the social pressure the model includes a positive and a negative feedback loops which create diverse dynamical behavior the model often shows bistability having an equilibrium with a high level of cooperation among people and clean water and the other equilibrium with low cooperation and polluted water which are simultaneously stable the model also shows fluctuation between a high and a low levels of cooperation in alternating years cycle with a longer periodicity or chaotic fluctuation conservatism of people stabilizes the system and sometimes helps maintaining cooperation the system may show unexpected parameter dependence the improved phosphorus removing efficiency might make water more polluted if it causes the decline in the environmental concern and cooperation among people

labour market effects of large scale agricultural investment conceptual considerations and estimated employment effects summary large scale agricultural investments lsais in general and their socio economic implications in particular have been heavily debated in recent years while some claim that lsais are an important catalyst for development in neglected rural areas others caution that they pose a risk to rural communities livelihoods the extent to which lsais provide benefits for local communities is hence still contested this paper sets out to conceptually understand what effects the establishment of a large scale farm has on the rural labor market in low and middle income countries in addition we empirically address the question of whether large scale farming as recorded in the land matrix creates or destroys employment we develop a transition matrix to identify several scenarios based on key determinants of the direct employment creation potential of lsais namely the former land use the crop type and the production model we empirically assess the actual importance of these scenarios and the employment creation to be expected from this sample of lsais based on labor intensities we further look into the net employment effects for land formerly used by smallholder farmers our analysis shows that lsais massively crowd out smallholder farmers which is only partially mitigated through the cultivation of labor intensive crops and the application of contract farming schemes this holds true for all regions targeted by lsais although regional differences are found in terms of magnitude the paper concludes that these effects tend to be large on the local scale i e in the immediate surroundings of the investment site but small in relation to total national employment in agriculture however indirect employment creation related to lsais which is discussed but not empirically addressed in this paper needs to be taken into account to have the full picture

rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma experimental evidence this paper presents experiments designed to examine the sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma the authors test the hypothesis by controlling the subjects ability to build reputations and by manipulating their beliefs that their opponent is irrational or altruistic the responses of subjects strongly support the sequential equilibrium prediction the results also suggest an important role for homemade altruism that is a natural tendency to cooperate that subjects bring to the experiment from the outside the authors find that there may be no difference between the beliefs that an opponent is altruistic and the actual chance it is so copyright 1993 by royal economic society

the impact of information provision on agglomeration bonus performance an experimental study on local networks the agglomeration bonus is an incentive mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland this paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the agglomeration bonus in achieving the socially optimal land management configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies and the strategic setting is unfavorable for efficient coordination the experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct and indirect neighbors actions they are more likely to produce the socially optimal configuration thus effectiveness of the policy can be improved by implementing information dissemination exercises among landowners however given the adverse strategic setting increased game experience leads to coordination failure and optimal land choices only at the localized level independent of the information available to subjects thus success of the agglomeration bonus scheme on real landscapes will have to take account of the roles of both information and experience on participant behavior

inter team contests with power differential abstract we investigate the impact of asymmetry on behavior in inter team contests in asymmetric environments one team has a greater probability of winning given the same contribution level unfair contests or has a lower cost of contributing uneven contests we explore how such asymmetries impact behavior asking how being advantaged or disadvantaged influences contributions we find both advantaged and disadvantaged teams contribute much more than theory predicts but in such a way that ex post winning probabilities of the contests are consistent with theoretical predictions at the individual level contributions are predicted by beliefs about own team and opponent team contributions the determinants of contribution by members of the disadvantaged team differ depending on the nature of asymmetry contributions by the disadvantaged team members are responsive to beliefs about contribution by opponents in unfair contests while in uneven contests they are responsive to beliefs about the contribution by teammates

reciprocal climate negotiators abstract do reciprocal preferences matter for participation in international environmental agreements combining the two canonical models of barrett 2003 and rabin 1993 i find that 1 the empty coalition is always stable 2 the grand coalition is stable if reciprocity preferences are sufficiently strong 3 if a minority of countries are not reciprocal a majority coalition can still be stable if reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread and 4 there is also a stable minority coalition if costs are moderate and the number of countries is not too small the latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences but barely improves on welfare and is characterized by negative sentiments the analysis illustrates that although models of reciprocity tend to be complex the context of a specific applied game may reduce this complexity

factor content functions and the theory of international trade this paper introduces the concepts of direct and indirect factor trade utility functions and uses them to derive marshallian and hicksian factor content functions which express the quantities of factors of production embodied in net imports as functions of the exogenous variables facing the economy the properties of these functions are discussed and they are used to derive a number of new results in particular it is shown that in certain circumstances the existence of gains from trade is sufficient for the heckscher ohlin theorem to hold in its factor content form

technology trade and factor prices abstract the view that recent changes in the distribution of income primarily reflect technology rather than trade may be the majority opinion but has been harshly criticized by some trade economists this paper will argue that the critique in fact misses the point essentially because the critics undertake the wrong thought experiments trade volumes are not irrelevant if one poses the question correctly one immediately realizes that small trade volumes are inconsistent with a story that attributes large distributional effects to trade the factor bias of technological change is not immaterial except in the case where such change takes place in a small open economy as opposed to one that can affect world prices and where technical change occurs only in that economy rather than occurring simultaneously in other economies as well since the real situation does not meet either criterion factor bias definitely does matter most surprisingly the much maligned use of a factor content approach to infer the effects of trade on factor prices turns out to be an entirely justified procedure when carefully applied

participation and commitment in voluntary coalitions to provide public goods this paper reports experimental evidence on the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide a public good participation and commitment in a coalition are either exogenously imposed or endogenously determined by the players themselves we find larger voluntary participation rates when commitments in the coalition are endogenously determined using a minimum contribution rule rather than exogenously determined however due to a trade off between participation and commitment coalitions with voluntary participation are less effective in facilitating cooperation compared to when all players are forced to participate this paper therefore confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from coalition formation theories

labor productivity and employment gaps in sub saharan africa drawing on a new set of nationally representative internationally comparable household surveys this paper provides an overview of key features of structural transformation labor allocation and labor productivity in four african economies new micro based measures of sector labor allocation and cross sector productivity differentials describe the incentives households face when allocating their labor these measures are similar to national accounts based measures that are typically used to characterize structural changes in african economies however because agricultural workers supply far fewer hours of labor per year than do workers in other sectors productivity gaps disappear almost entirely when expressed on a per hour basis what look like large productivity gaps in national accounts data could really be employment gaps calling into question the prospective gains that laborers can achieve through structural transformation these employment gaps along with the strong linkages observed between rural non farm activities and primary agricultural production highlight agriculture s continued relevance to structural change in sub saharan africa

cooperation and norm enforcement the individual level perspective abstract we explore the relationship between individuals disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas using a modified strategy method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns classifying n 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals however the data also reveal a sizable share of free riders that punish pro socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment we show that pro social punishers are important for achieving cooperation incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between and within group variation in cooperation

characterizing social value of information abstract this paper characterizes the social value of information in bayesian games with symmetric quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed public and private signals the main result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public or private information in so doing we represent welfare as a linear combination of the variance of a common term in an equilibrium strategy and that of an idiosyncratic term which are referred to as the common variance and the idiosyncratic variance of actions respectively the ratio of their coefficients is a key parameter in our condition if the coefficient of the common variance is relatively large welfare necessarily increases but if it is relatively small welfare can decrease using our condition we find eight types of games with different welfare effects of information

loopholes undermine donation an experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in israel article i nfo giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting lists as has been implemented in israel and singapore pro vides an incentive for registration and has the potential to increase the pool of deceased donor organs however the implementation of a priority rule might allow for loopholes as is the case in israel in which an individual can reg ister to receive priority but avoid ever being in a position to donate organs we experimentally investigate how such a loophole affects donation and find that the majority of subjects use the loophole when available the existence of a loophole completely eliminates the increase in donation generated by the priority rule when information about loophole use is made public subjects respond to others use of the loophole by withholding donation such that the priority system with a loophole generates fewer do nations than an allocation system without priority 2013 published by elsevier b v