financial crises and economic recovery cross country heterogeneity and cross sectional dependence abstract this paper estimates the impulse responses of output to financial crises using a local projections panel estimator that accounts for cross country heterogeneity and cross sectional dependence using a long span of data 1870 2016 for a group of 17 advanced economies we show that once we control for unobserved common factors and parameter heterogeneity in the panel there is strong evidence of economic recovery within the first 10 years after a financial crisis

access pricing and investment with stochastically growing demand abstract this paper examines the effect of access charges on firms incentives to invest in a network facility with a stochastically growing demand an access to bypass equilibrium is characterized in terms of an access charge and a level of network investment cost in the equilibrium a leader first enters a market by building a new network then a follower makes a sequential investment for the construction of an additional network after accessing the incumbent s network in an open access environment we confirm that the incentive for preemption can be enhanced by an increase in the access charge

innovation and imitation in a duopoly in a duopoly where one firm has the idea for a non patentable innovation the expected profits from the innovation will not be a monotonic function of the cost of innovating furthermore a costly innovation may be undertaken where an inexpensive one would not have been all other things being equal

do financial crises erode potential output evidence from oecd inflation responses this paper presents evidence from a panel investigation of oecd countries that inflationary pressures tend to be stronger during recovery from financial crises compared to recovery from non crisis economic downturns indicating impairment in productive potential

on the interplay of informational spillovers and payoff externalities this thesis consists of four independent essays which consider different topics in information economics and political economy the first two papers are variants of the same idea an uninformed principal e g a government will make a decision in order to gain more information it may consult two experts however these experts have a private interest in certain policies being implemented the question is to gain as much information as possible should the principal consult experts who are biased in the same direction or experts who prefer different decisions the main result is that as long as collusion between experts can be prevented homogeneous panels are superior to heterogeneous ones and this advantage increases with the experts informational precision in the third paper two firms consider entry in a new product market and must decide when to enter the market and how to design their product firms do not know for certain what the best design is so both firms want to outwait the other s decision in order to gain more information the focus of the paper is on which firm will make the first decision the main result is that if products are strong strategic substitutes the worst informed firm makes the first decision in equilibrium the analysis should apply to a range of other contexts such as investors trading decisions or the policy choices of political candidates the final paper asks the following question could it be that parties in a two party system may benefit from using several candidates in the same election to promote the use of multiple candidates i assume that a party never runs the risk of having its votes split up among its candidates despite this it turns out that parties have a strong incentive to restrict their number of nominees paradoxically it seems that the more uncertain parties are about voter opinion the fewer candidates they want to use in particular with a uniform voter distribution the optimal number of candidates is one

estimating the financial crisis impact on potential output abstract i use a multivariate blanchard quah decomposition to investigate the financial crisis impact on potential output in the euro area the us japan and the uk i detect an impact for all countries which is especially severe for the uk

the war of attrition in continuous time with complete information this paper provides a complete characterization of the nash equilibrium outcomes for the war of attrition when time is continuous and information is complete it allows for asymmetric payoffs and an arbitrary time horizon in addition to certain asymme tric pure strategy equilibria that always exist the authors establi sh the conditions under which there is also a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria these are most likely to exist when either the horizon is infinite or the game is symmetric copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

herd behavior the penguin effect and the suppression of informational diffusion an analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency this article analyzes a technology adoption process in which the effect of informational spillover interacts with network externalities the interplay of informational externalities and payoff interdependency induces risk averse and clustering behavior in the technology adoption process the analysis differs from the herd behavior literature in focusing on how the herd behavior of subsequent users influences the initial adoption decision moreover herd behavior in this article stems from each agent s desire to inhibit the revelation of new information that can be used in a way detrimental to her rather than from each agent s effort to free ride on information contained in the decisions made by predecessors

strategic investment and timing of entry the authors introduce competition over entry time into a sequential output choice model to show how profit differences will be dissipated this resolves a problem in the standard stackelberg model that the order of moves is exogenously specified yet an earlier position in the order is usually preferred to a later one if capacity costs are not too low the authors solution applies even if firms cannot commit to sell their entire output introducing positive capacity costs slightly modifies the static stackelberg results since endogenous cost asymmetries arise the framework therefore partially rehabilitates the stackelberg model copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

leaders followers and equity risk premiums in booms and busts abstract we study an investment problem in which two asymmetric firms face competition and the regime characterizing the economic condition follows a markov switching process we derive the value functions and investment thresholds of the leader and follower the option value of regime uncertainty is found to be quite important for the investment decision of firms we also show the relationship between the equity risk premium and the economic cycle that has not been done in previous studies which proxy economic conditions by the level of demand or other state variables

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

technology diffusion and public policy a useful typology of technological change is provided by the schumpeterian trilogy invention the generation of new ideas innovation the development of those ideas through to the first marketing or use of a technology and diffusion the spread of new technology across its potential market until recently policy schemes in most oecd countries have tended to focus predominantly on the invention and innovation or science and r d end of this technology spectrum see e g limpens et al i 992 although it is generally realised that it is the process of diffusion or use of technology that creates productive potential and competitiveness policy initiatives have largely bypassed opportunities to improve the diffusion process if this may seem misplaced emphasis it does in fact reflect the state of the academic literature which is wide ranging and extensive as it relates to policies on r d but small and fragmented as regards policies on diffusion currently a gradual reorientation of policy direction toward diffusion seems to be taking place the us and uk governments for example have recently proposed major technology policy initiatives that despite differences in emphasis both stress the importance of creating an infrastructure conducive to a rapid spread of awareness and knowledge of innovations we argue that although sensible in themselves such policies may be too limited in scope and that a broader policy stance may be needed this paper has two main objectives the first is to provide an overview of why policy intervention in the diffusion process may be desirable and what form it might take this discussion is rather long since to the best of our knowledge there is no published systematic synthesis of the diffusion policy literature though see stoneman i987 for an earlier attempt the second aim is to look at actual diffusion policies and their impacts to make the task manageable we are restricting this paper to a discussion of the diffusion of new process technologies although similar issues apply to new consumer technologies these are not explicitly addressed we also consider diffusion policy only within the context of a given institutional and macroeconomic environment although it may well be that the supply of skilled manpower the nature of the capital market animal spirits and entrepreneurship fiscal and monetary policies will all impact upon the diffusion path improvements in these areas will also impact upon a whole host of other aspects of the economy s performance to use a plea for diffusion policy as a rationale for changes in such areas would be equivalent to the tail wagging the dog and thus they fall outside the remit of this paper

competition and irreversible investments abstract incumbent monopolists frequently claim that the introduction of competition will reduce future profits and therefore delay future investments in this paper we show that not only is this not generally true but in the oligopolistic industry model of dixit and pindyck investment under uncertainty 1994 this is never the case we extend this result to situations in which investments have positive externalities and situations in which the monopolist has multiple investment opportunities

plant turnover and productivity growth in canadian manufacturing entry is important because new firms and new plants provide an important source of competition to incumbents they are a source of new products and technologies in this paper we outline the size of the turnover in plants that have entered and exited the canadian manufacturing sector over each of the last three decades 1973 79 1979 88 and 1988 97 we also examine the contribution of plant turnover to labour productivity growth in the manufacturing sector over the three periods plant turnover makes a significant contribution to productivity growth as more productive entrants replace exiting plants that are less productive we also find that a disproportionately large fraction of the contribution of plant turnover to productivity growth is due to multi plant or foreign controlled firms closing down and opening up new plants the plants opened up by multi plant or foreign controlled firms are typically much more productive than those opened by single plant or domestic controlled

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

uncertainty competition and the adoption of new technology faced with the decision of whether or not to adopt a new technology whose economic value cannot be gauged with certainty the manager of the firm may elect to decrease the uncertainty by sequentially gathering information at a unit cost of c 0 updating his prior beliefs in a bayesian manner uncertainty regarding the actions of a competitor however cannot be reduced our model allows a manager to account for potential competition either substitute or complementary by inclusion of strategic considerations modelled in a game theoretic setting we show that the firm s best response mapping satisfies a dynamic programming recursion even when the one period reward function is unbounded providing management with a familiar tool to solve its problem best response behavior is characterized by a monotone sequence of pairs of threshold numbers which give rise to a cone shaped continuation region the continuation region is shown to shift up down with increases in the expected level of substitute complementary competition making the firm less more likely to adopt the innovation finally the existence of a nash equilibrium in cone shaped strategies is established

learning and payoff externalities in an investment game abstract this paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a two player irreversible investment game each player learns about the quality of his project by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent i characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in a timing game that features a second mover advantage allowing for arbitrary correlation in project qualities despite private learning the game reduces to a stochastic war of attrition in contrast to the case of purely informational externalities all investments happen at the same real time instant irrespective of the sign of the correlation and beliefs never get trapped in a no learning region provided that the second mover advantage is sufficiently high

strategic timing of adoption of new technologies under uncertainty abstract in this paper we introduce experience effects into a duopoly game of timing of adoption of new technologies which exhibit exogenous technological progress departing from the existing literature with this model we obtain continuous and downward sloping reaction functions we find that a higher level of uncertainty increases the extent of dispersion between the equilibrium timings of adoption furthermore we find that the equilibrium timings are even more dispersed when the leader takes the follower s reaction into account when firm roles are made endogenous we find that if there is an incentive to lead follow the equilibrium timings are more less dispersed finally we show that it is possible for collusive adoption to improve welfare

regulation and preemptive technology adoption two rival firms must decide if and when to adopt a new technology knowing how adoption costs decline over time and how profit flows vary with adoption patterns in many cases price and entry regulations beneficially slow technology adoption by making preemption strategies less attractive in some cases these regulations can so discourage a firm from preemption as to change the order in which firms adopt new technologies speeding one firm s adoption date and slowing the other s in the context of a particular scenario for cable and telephone companies adoption of new fiber optic technologies the case for lifting the cross ownership ban depends on the extent to which telephone companies are able to implement a superior technology reregulation of cable companies strengthens this case

first versus second mover advantage with information asymmetry about the profitability of new markets is it better to move first or second to innovate or to imitate we show that if one player s information about the profitability of new markets is only modestly superior the possibility of foreclosing the market can lead to a first mover advantage on the other hand more extreme information superiority can reverse this leading to a second mover advantage knowing more surely what is the best choice the better informed player wants to delay to keep his information private and the less informed player wants to delay to learn because of this more accurate information can actually lead to inefficiency by increasing the incentive to delay and exogenous costs of delay can aid efficiency by neutralizing that strategic incentive in fact in some circumstances a player may purposely coarsen his information to deter imitation

adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability the argument has frequently been made that the pattern of diffusion associated with most new innovations will typically have certain characteristics a diffusion curve for an innovation is usually defined as the proportion of its potential users who have already adopted as a function of time measured from the first adoption many empirical studies by both economists and other social scientists have shown that diffusion curves nearly always have two distinct characteristics i they are s shaped the proportion adopted is an increasing function of time which is initially convex but eventually becomes concave and ii they tend to be right hand skewed the inflection point occurs at a time corresponding to a proportion adopted which is less than one half so that the function is concave over the greatest amount of time in fact this skewing is occasionally severe enough to make the diffusion curve appear concave everywhere the focus of most empirical studies of innovation diffusion has centered on identification of either the major determinants of the speed of diffusion or the characteristics of firms which determine how long they delay adoption the seminal contributions are griliches 6 study of hybrid corn and mansfield s 121 study of 12 industrial innovations these studies and most of the similar ones following conclude that diffusion is faster for innovations with higher profitability and that large firms tend to be the earliest adopters some studies e g mansfield 121 herregat 71 have attempted to ascertain

acquisition of project specific assets with bayesian updating we study the impact of learning on the optimal policy and the time to decision in an infinite horizon bayesian sequential decision model with two irreversible alternatives exit and expansion in our model a firm undertakes a small scale pilot project to learn via bayesian updating about the project s profitability which is known to be in one of two possible states the firm continuously observes the project s cumulative profit but the true state of the profitability is not immediately revealed because of the inherent noise in the profit stream the firm bases its exit or expansion decision on the posterior probability distribution of the profitability the optimal policy is characterized by a pair of thresholds for the posterior probability we find that the time to decision does not necessarily have a monotonic relation with the arrival rate of new information

first movers non movers and social gains from subsidising entry in markets for nature based recreational goods abstract the importance of ecosystem services for mankind stresses the issue of identifying different institutional solutions to effectively secure their adequate provision much focus has been on services of the public good type and instruments like payments for environmental services we extend this work to consider the possible social gains from supporting development of new markets for nature based recreational goods which may alleviate negative externalities caused by congestion problems our three main questions are i why is there a lack of market development ii can there be social gains from intervention and supporting the development of such markets and iii if so then how could such intervention be best performed we use a two stage non cooperative bayesian simultaneous move game model and show that in spite of apparent potential first mover advantages in a developing market demand uncertainty and sunk costs may equally well result in widespread presence of non movers on the supplier side we show that social gains can be made from offering a subsidy towards the sunk costs analysing three possible subsidy schemes we show a that fixed costs may make rationing optimal b that sequential rationing does not necessarily dominate strict rationing because c the more subsidies are offered the larger each subsidy must be to induce participation and that d the longer a single agent on the market may keep market information to himself the better a non rationing scheme will perform relative to rationing schemes finally e subsidies for second mover entry may be optimal in some cases

long term payoffs of near term low carbon deployment policies abstract recent climate change negotiations indicate that near term policies to address climate change are likely to vary across countries with countries employing a range of different policy options one option frequently mooted at the national level is to promote via policy the deployment of low carbon technologies promoting the deployment of low carbon technologies can involve a near term cost if such technologies are more expensive overall or require more upfront capital than emitting alternatives however it lowers future costs of emissions abatement by reducing emissions in the near term and potentially accelerating rates of improvement in targeted low carbon technologies we derive a globally cost effective near term international technology investment strategy to achieve a long term climate goal and show that it employs a diversified international technology investment portfolio across countries we also explore the degree to which independent national technology deployment policies align with collaboratively determined regimes we show that conditions exist under which there are substantial gains to international cooperation in the deployment of diverse low carbon technologies and also circumstances in which domestic outcomes align with the global outcome

strategic intrafirm innovation adoption and diffusion 1 introduction this paper addresses two empirical observations that are common in the extensive literature on innovation diffusion first a firm usually adopts an innovation over time not instantaneously that is there are intrafirm diffusions mansfield 1968 nasbeth and ray 1974 romeo 1975 stoneman 1981 1983 second the time path of an intrafirm diffusion has a predictable shape diffusion curves plot the extent of adoption against time and are generally s shaped that is they are initially convex reach an inflection point and then are concave thereafter often they are also skewed in that they are initially convex for less than half of the length of the diffusion this skewing can be so severe that the diffusion curve is essentially concave davies 1979 stoneman 1983 given the voluminous literature on innovation diffusion it is surprising that intrafirm diffusions have not received more attention with few exceptions noted below the theoretical literature assumes adoption is a discrete choice variable and so occurs instantaneously moreover empirical studies typically assume adoption occurs at the date of first use of the innovation by the firm to the extent intrafirm diffusions occur these studies clearly overestimate the speed at which the innovation is put into use and thus the speed at which its benefits accrue to the firm and society intrafirm diffusions are especially common in the case of capital embodied new process innovations because adoption involves adjustment costs as well as acquisition costs in a seminal study mansfield 1968 found that the time interval between 10 and 90 usage of diesel locomotives ranged from three to more than 14 years for firms in the u s railroad industry more recent examples abound most readers have undoubtedly experienced at least once the adoption of new computer equipment in their workplace from my own experience not all users are upgraded to the new equipment within a day a week or even a month hence in this paper i analyze the intrafirm diffusion of a new process innovation in a differential game model of an oligopoly the model s predictions are consistent with the empirical regularities noted above first an intrafirm diffusion occurs in equilibrium because the marginal cost of adoption is increasing in the rate of adoption it is not optimal to adopt instantaneously just as it is not optimal to adjust to the desired level of a stock instantaneously when adjustment costs are increasing at the margin second the equilibrium intrafirm diffusion curve is either s shaped or concave moreover this diffusion curve is more likely to be sshaped the more competitive the industry the larger the marginal cost of adoption or the preinnovation unit cost of production or the smaller the demand the analysis also shows a firm s diffusion is longer and so the extent of its adoption at any date is lower the more competitive the industry the larger the marginal cost of adoption or the pre innovation unit cost of production or the smaller the demand that is a diffusion is longer the smaller the incentive to adopt whether due to lower flow profit or higher adoption flow cost one surprising result is that an increase in the unit cost reduction from the innovation has an ambiguous effect on the intrafirm diffusion the reason is that there are two conflicting effects first as is obvious a larger cost reduction allows each firm to earn a larger flow profit at every date from the same rate of adoption however a more subtle effect is that it also allows the firm to earn the same flow of profit with a slower rate of adoption and so lower adoption costs that is the firms also have an incentive to spread out the diffusion over a longer period of time to save on adoption costs these results are important for two reasons first they show that diffusion curves are more likely to have an s shape for longer diffusions

experimentation in markets we present a model of entry and exit with bayesian learning and price competition a new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality we assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable as agents learn from the experiments of others informational externalities arise we determine the markov perfect equilibrium prices and allocations in a single market the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation if the new product is launched in many distinct markets the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows in multi agent learning situations informational externalities may reduce the number of experiments undertaken below the socially efficient level as buyers choose among new experience goods or firms decide whether to adopt a new technology the availability of information from others decisions gives rise to a free rider problem rather than perform a costly experiment herself a buyer may opt to wait and see how the market evaluates the new product in this paper we develop a simple market model of experimentation and analyse the informational effects in a model with buyers and sellers in contrast to the one sided experimentation problems we find that equilibrium experimentation often exceeds the pareto optimal level in two sided models the first model we consider is a dynamic duopoly in continuous time with homogeneous buyers two firms with differentiated products engage in price competition over time one product has a known value while the other is new and its true value is initially uncertain to all the parties in the model the value of the product is determined by the quality of the match between consumer preferences and product characteristics additional information is acquired only through repeat purchases in each period buyers observe a noisy signal of the true value of the product we assume that all signals are publicly observable and that all uncertainty is about a common value component with this assumption all buyers and sellers condition their behaviour on the same information and we can abstract from individual differences in past observations this is justified in economic situations where public data on other buyers choices is available and informative for example when choosing among providers of communication or transportation services such as mail delivery firms or airlines it is reasonable to rely on consumer reports and other published data in addition to one s private experience we also show that our model has an alternative interpretation as one where a flow of buyers make a once and

irreversible investment and r d spillovers in a dynamic duopoly investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of rd an increase in uncertainty delaying the equilibrium calls for higher subsidization rates third numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader s and the follower s maximum value functions accordingly our model can help generate realistic market betas

innovation adoption and welfare under uncertainty the incentives of firms to adopt a new process need not coincide with maximum expected consumer surplus or social welfare if there is uncertainty before the process is adopted and if the only loss from failure is a fixed cost in some cases no firm will adopt an innovation likely to fail although expected welfare is maximized if one adopts in other cases both firms will adopt an innovation likely to succeed although expected welfare is maximized if one firm adopts this occurs because rivalry between firms leads them to adopt together when total expected profits are higher if one firm adopts copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

reputations in the adoption of a new technology abstract this paper studies the effects of uncertainty on the timing of adoption of a new technology in a duopoly firms are uncertain of the innovative capabilities of their rivals and about the profitability of adoption these features lead to a richer and in some respects more plausible theory of adoption in which rents from delayed adoption are always realized and returns are not equalized across adoption times

has monetary policy become more efficient a cross country analysis over the past twenty years macroeconomic performance has improved in industrialized and developing countries alike in a broad cross section of countries inflation volatility has fallen markedly while output variability has either fallen or risen only slightly this increased stability can be attributed to either 1 more efficient policymaking by the monetary authority 2 a reduction in the variability of the aggregate supply shocks or 3 changes in the structure of the economy in this paper we develop a method for measuring changes in performance and allocate the source of performance changes to these two factors our technique involves estimating movements toward an inflation and output variability efficiency frontier and shifts in the frontier itself we study the change from the 1980s to the 1990s in the macroeconomic performance of 24 countries and find that for most of the analyzed countries more efficient policy has been the driving force behind improved macroeconomic performance

technological diffusion with social learning this paper attributes the slow diffusion of innovations to an informational externality in the adoption process the profitability of new technologies is uncertain but firing can learn progressively through observing the adoption experience of others given this prospect of social learning every firm would prefer that other firms adopt before it does in the absence of explicit coordination the firms could end up in a sequence of waiting contests this results in staggered adoptions even when all firms are ex ante identical the pace of diffusion is determined endogenously and shown to depend on the characteristics of the innovation copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

timing of investment under technological and revenue related uncertainties the effects of two forms of uncertainty on the timing of irreversible investment are considered technological uncertainty is modeled as a poisson arrival process that reduces the cost of investment while revenue uncertainty is modeled as a diffusion process technological uncertainty has no effect on the optimal investment policy when revenue uncertainty is absent however when combined with revenue uncertainty increased technological uncertainty makes investment less attractive relative to waiting the paper also makes a more general point in clarifying the difference in how diffusion type of uncertainty and unidirectional stochastic progress affect investment timing

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

investment uncertainty and pre emption this paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so we show that the possibility of pre emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a single agent real options model the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows in contrast the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases in fact we show that under certain parameter values greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier these findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players applications to industry situations are also discussed

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

investment timing and learning externalities abstract we study a duopoly model of investment in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information and possibly the experience of his rival investment costs are private information and the background signal takes the form of a poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low the resulting attrition game has a unique symmetric equilibrium which depends on initial public beliefs we determine the impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing and how equilibrium is affected when a first mover advantage is introduced

second mover advantage and entry timing we describe a model of entry timing assuming that a second mover can benefit from observing the experience of a first mover we focus on how market attractiveness characteristics such as size and cost affect the time until first entry the effects depend on whether the number of participants is exogenous or endogenous in the former case a more attractive market leads to earlier entry in the latter case it leads to later entry treating the number of firms as an integer free entry leads to non monotone but testable effects of market attractiveness on entry timing

r d rivalry with licensing or imitation the authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post development dissemination of the innovation such as licensing or imitation this dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery when this occurs conventional results in the economics of r d no longer need apply they find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult copyright 1987 by american economic association

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

the anatomy of productivity growth slowdown and recovery in canadian manufacturing 1970 79 abstract a micro database that tracks individual establishments plants in the canadian manufacturing sector through the 1970s is used to analyse the productivity growth slowdown and partial recovery that occurred over that decade the data allow us to distinguish between the performance within individual plants and structural changes such as entry and exit and intra and inter industry shifts in the distribution of output as contributing factors to changes in productivity growth the main finding is that fluctuations within plants were responsible for nearly all of the slowdown and for most of the partial recovery though the latter was also helped by a reallocation of output shares within manufacturing towards lower cost industries

information acquisition and the adoption of new technology the profitability of a new technology is rarely known with certainty at its announcement date consequently prior to making an adoption decision it behooves the firm considering the adoption of this innovation to reduce the level of uncertainty associated with its profitability the firm accomplishes this by sequentially gathering information updating its prior estimate of profitability in a bayesian manner quantifying the uncertainty regarding the innovation permits application of dynamic programming techniques criteria are derived which tell the firm when to stop collecting information and make the adoption decision it will be shown that it is optimal for the firm to continue to collect information until its estimate of profitability crosses one of two thresholds upon crossing the upper threshold the firm adopts the technology whereas the firm rejects the technology if the lower threshold is crossed the model predicts that even the manager who behaves optimally will occasionally adopt unprofitable technologies and reject profitable ones

investment in oligopoly under uncertainty the accordion effect this paper studies investments in new markets where more than two anticipated identical competitors are present in case of three firms an accordion effect is detected an exogenous demand shock results in a change of the wedge between investment thresholds of the first and second investor that is qualitatively different from the change of the wedge between the second and third investment threshold furthermore it turns out that in the three firm case the investment timing of the first investor lies in between the one and the two firm case these results are numerically extended to the n firm case

defending against rival innovation we analyze how an incumbent defends its competitive advantage with a focus on the under examined methods of actively defending against the threats posed by rival innovation we describe delineate and analyze the set of such defenses and their likely effects the set of such defenses differs substantially from many standard defenses such as those aimed at defeating the threat of imitation the further study of these pre emptive innovation defenses is important because these defenses are different and because they can substantially affect the sustainability of firm profits and the pace of different of types of innovation

economic policy uncertainty ceo characteristics and firm r d expenditure a bayesian analysis this paper applies a linear bayesian regression model to study the effects of economic policy uncertainty epu and chief executive officer ceo characteristics on firm research and development r

second mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty abstract this paper introduces technological uncertainty into a timing game of new technology adoption it is shown that the timing neither necessarily involves first mover advantages in precommitment equilibria reinganum review of economic studies xlviii 1981 395 405 nor rent equalization due to the threat of preemption fudenberg and tirole review of economic studies lii 1985 383 401 rather there may be second mover advantages because of informational spillovers furthermore the model predicts that the equilibrium payoffs will typically be discontinuous and non monotonic in the probability that the new technology is profitable a welfare analysis reveals several market failures and suggests that policy intervention should adequately depend on the nature of uncertainty and the rate of technological progress

investment under regime uncertainty impact of competition and preemption abstract in this study we analyze the investment timing problem and introduce a model of two firms competing for investment preemption each of which knows in advance the time at which the economic condition that will have an impact on the investment changes we qualitatively show how two firms strategically optimize their investment timing taking into account competition and preemption

do national level policies to promote low carbon technology deployment pay off for the investor countries abstract national level policies to promote deployment of low carbon technologies have been suggested and used as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the context of international climate change mitigation the long term benefits of such policies in the context of international climate change mitigation depend on their effects on near term emissions abatement and resultant long term technological change that will reduce abatement costs of achieving global mitigation goals there is also an argument that these policies might foster early mover advantages in international low carbon technology markets we first review the factors that could influence such benefits and use a global integrated assessment model to present an illustrative example to understand the potential magnitude of these benefits we find that reductions in long term abatement costs might not provide sufficient incentives to justify policies to promote the deployment of low carbon technologies in particular the emerging higher risk and currently expensive alternatives we also find that early mover advantages can potentially provide substantial benefits but only if these advantages are both strong and persistent our results suggest a role for international cooperation in low carbon technology deployment to address the existence of free riding opportunities in the context of global climate change mitigation

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

impact of bayesian learning and externalities on strategic investment we investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns we examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which i a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and ii externalities exist between the investments of two firms we find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs in particular we find that contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move an increase in the rate of learning which tends to benefit the follower can hasten the first investment this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

dynamic patent licensing abstract this paper shows one way a fixed fee can dominate an auction if no one knows whether the innovation will succeed or not when it appears and if its life exceeds the life of the patent then selling one licence by fixed fee maximizes inventor profit for some probabilities of success the reason is a nonlicensee is better off when a rival buys a license because this reveals the nature of the innovation if it succeeds the nonlicensee can adopt in the future after the patent has expired this expected future gain can outweigh the expected loss during the life of the patent

does monetary policy lose effectiveness during a credit crunch this article investigates the effectiveness of monetary policy during a credit crunch by estimating a vector autoregression on the us economy we present evidence that interest rate cuts have a diminished impact on growth due to impairment in the relationship between monetary policy and the supply of intermediated credit

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

adoption externalities as public goods abstract a public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities for positive externalities agents furnish a public good by taking an action similarly for negative externalities agents furnish a public good by not taking an action we examine these externalities in a binary choice problem i e adoption externalities in each case there is a potential role for government intervention even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed since one equilibrium pareto dominates all others we analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

strategic investment in technological innovations abstract the aim of this paper is to determine the optimal timing of technology investment of a single firm in a duopoly framework as time passes different technologies are invented which after sometime become available for the firm to adopt the question here is not only when a firm should invest but also which technology should be adopted for different scenarios the optimal technology investment decision is determined outcomes range from pre emption equilibria to equilibria with second mover advantages

patent litigation as an information transmission mechanism patent litigation reveals important information about the validity of the contested patent to other potential entrants this paper explores the implications of such informational externalities for entry dynamics in the presence of multiple potential entrants the nature of the entry game can be one of either waiting or preemption depending on the degree of patent protection therefore the payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are discontinuous in the degree of patent protection furthermore strengthening intellectual property rights is not necessarily desirable for the patentee the analysis may also help explain the apparently puzzling practice of delaying patent suits copyright 1998 by american economic association

what do we know about investment under uncertainty recent theoretical developments relating to investment under uncertainty have highlighted the importance of irreversibility for the timing of investment expenditures and their expected returns this has subsequently stimulated a growing empirical literature which examines uncertainty and threshold effects on investment behaviour this paper presents a review of this literature a variety of methods have been used to investigate the empirical implication of irreversibility in investment the majority focusing on the relationship between investment flows and proxy measures of uncertainty a general conclusion is that increased uncertainty at both aggregate and disaggregate levels leads to lower investment rates this suggests that there is an irreversibility effect under which greater uncertainty raises the value of the call option to delay a commitment to investment this effect appears to dominate any positive impact on investment arising from the fact that greater uncertability under certain circumstances increases the marginal profitability of capital the methods used raise a number of issues which call into question the reliability of the findings and these are addressed in the paper however if such irreversibility effects are present then their omission from traditional investment models casts doubt on the efficacy of such specifications jel classification d81 d92 e22

estimating total factor productivity growth in singapore at sectoral level using data envelopment analysis trends in total factor productivity growth tfpg are examined in the ten major sectors of singapore data are drawn from the yearbook of statistics singapore various issues and economic survey of singapore series ranging from the year 1985 to 2000 due to the heterogeneous characteristic of each sector and non availability of reliable input price data this study uses a non parametric frontier methodology known as data envelopment analysis dea to obtain the malmquist productivity index at the sectoral level the results can help singapore identify the best practice sector and laggards in three aspects efficiency change technical change and tfpg which is the qualitative productivity improvements needed for long term economic growth the three sets of productivity estimates are adjusted for effects of inflation and business cycles so that they are more reliable for policy implications this exercise will provide a platform for more detailed study on the determinants of tfp growth in different s

credit rationing and effective supply failures the topic of this paper is among the oldest and most fundamental in monetary theory how and why does monetary policy affect real economic activity traditional answers hold that the central bank can manipulate aggregate demand by engineering expansions or contractions of the medium of exchange in its monetarist variant this story posits a direct link between something called m and aggregate spending in its keynesian variant the story holds that adjustments in asset prices brought about by a change in m lead to more spending especially on capital goods in either case short run stickiness of prices is needed to translate some of the changes in demand into movements of real output in recent years these conventional stories have become increasingly implausible as stiglitz and i blinder and stiglitz i 983 have argued elsewhere with money becoming more and more difficult to define it is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that the central bank can cause a recession by contriving a shortage of an arbitrary subset of assets called m put differently the point seems both simple and compelling if there are ready substitutes for money control of money will not give the authorities much leverage over the real economy hence this paper develops an explanation for how central bank policy affects

endogenous leadership in a new market in this article i analyze strategic investment under uncertainty in a new market where firms face a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility the model predicts asymmetric equilibria under fairly general conditions even though firms are ex ante identical and have symmetric opportunities to enter the market in equilibrium one firm commits to early investment and the other firm follows a wait and see strategy in the ex post outcome firms end up with asymmetric sizes if the market profitability turns out close to or lower than expected firms end up in symmetric position if the market turns out highly profitable if uncertainty is small the model yields approximately stackelberg outcomes