a political economy model of congressional careers our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the united states congress we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset given estimates of the structural model we assess reelection probabilities estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages and quantify the value of congressional seat moreover we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in congress

incorporating cultural values for understanding the influence of perceived product creativity on intention to buy an examination in italy and the us extending our understanding of the effects of perceived product creativity this study contributes to the literature by empirically investigating the influence of cultural values on the relationship between the creativity dimensions of novelty and meaningfulness and intention to buy schwartz s values framework is employed to theorize cultural differences the results based upon 206 italian and 201 us consumers surveyed via a mall intercept approach indicate that novelty is a more important dimension of product creativity in the us i e a low resultant conservative high resultant self enhancement culture than in italy i e a high resultant conservatism low resultant self enhancement culture in influencing intention to buy and that meaningfulness is a more important dimension of creativity in italy than in the us in influencing intention to buy these results provide important standardization adaptation implications for international marketing academics and practitioners

country of origin effects on product evaluations this article reviews the literature regarding the effect of country of origin on buyer evaluations of products the issue is important for countries especially resource poor developing countries that need to increase manufactured exports and for firms that source products in countries different from where sold marketing inferences are drawn and implications for future research are developed

equilibrium analysis and corporate social responsibility for supply chain integration this paper evaluates the profit of coordination between manufacturers on corporate social responsibility csr under network equilibrium a three tier supply chain network with multiple manufacturers distributors and retailers is considered and several mathematical models are established to investigate behavior and profits in a decentralized supply chain network a centralized supply chain network and a supply chain network with csr the system optimal solution of a supply chain network problem is usually not achievable or stable since each member always tries to maximize its own profit in order to make such a system optimal solution in a stable state and ensure the maximization of total profits a strategy of coordination between manufacturers on csr is proposed the amount of payment in csr of each manufacturer is clearly defined a hybrid diagonalization method with a super network representation is proposed and tested with numerical examples the results show that by taking csr the total profits of the whole supply chain network can increase with or without coordination

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

voting on majority rules political economy models usually take as given the rules which govern the political decision making with the simple majority rule being the most popular model in this paper we develop a simple yet powerful positive model where the majority rule governing future elections is itself chosen in an election we observe a large variety of majority rules governing elections in the real world on the one side referenda are usually decided by a simple majority at the other extreme many international organizations require unanimity in votes among the member states in the european union s council of ministers some proposals require only a simple majority some a supermajority of about 71 62 votes out of 87 and some require unanimous consent 1 explicit supermajorities 2 are required in most countries for a change of the constitution but in some u s states also for a tax raise even more important could be what we might call implicit supermajorities in parliamentary systems with a strong committee organization a legislative proposal usually needs the support of both the respective committee and the house in parliamentary systems with two chambers certain legislative proposals need the support of both chambers 3 previous rationalizations of qualified majority rules focus on the problem of condorcet cycles under simple majority rule in n dimensional elections and on commitment problems see our literature review below our model presents a new rationale for rules requiring qualified majorities in elections we analyse an overlapping generations model of voting on reform opportunities which we model as similar to investment projects at first there is a cost and then there are benefits since voters have a finite lifetime old voters will be less keen on reforms

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

predictability and power in legislative bargaining the rules and procedures of legislatures often provide legislators with information bearing on the identities of upcoming proposers for a broad class of legislative bargaining games we establish that markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer whenever the information structure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance this result holds regardless of the recognition process and even if players vary in patience and risk aversion it raises the possibility that procedures adopted in the interest of transparency may contribute to the imbalance of political power

on the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods this study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods in order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency we extend the model of volden and wiseman am polit sci rev 101 79 92 2007 by considering quasi linear utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple majority to unanimity although unanimous agreements can be reached under weaker consensus requirements we show that pareto inefficiency is associated with non unanimous consent we also study how i the endogenous selection of the legislature s size or ii a sequential choice of collective and particularistic spending eliminates or attenuates the inefficiency problem

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

political selection and persistence of bad governments we study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions with a special focus on institutional flexibility a government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society the competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities e g by determining the amount and quality of public goods and each individual derives additional utility from being part of the government e g rents from holding office we characterize the dynamic evolution of governments and determine the structure of stable governments which arise and persist in equilibrium in our model perfect democracy where current members of the government do not have veto power over changes in governments always leads to the emergence of the most competent government however any deviation from perfect democracy to any regime with incumbency veto power destroys this result there is always at least one other less competent government that is also stable and can persist forever and even the least competent government can persist forever in office we also show that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the degree of incumbency veto power and the quality of government in contrast in the presence of stochastic shocks or changes in the environment a regime with less incumbency veto power has greater flexibility and greater probability that high competence governments will come to power this result suggests that a particular advantage of democratic regimes with a limited number of veto players may be their greater adaptability to changes rather than their performance under given conditions finally we show that royalty like dictatorships may be more successful than junta like dictatorships because in these regimes veto players are less afraid of change

country of origin effects for uni national and bi national products this study examines the effects of country of origin and brand name cues on consumer evaluations of uni national and bi national products and estimates the perceived values of such cues from personal interviews with a regional quota sample of household residents the study found the salience of country of origin in product evaluations under within subject experimental design finally managerial implications are discussed in regards to international branding and sourcing strategies

can democracy induce development a constitutional perspective we examine the constitutional design required for democratic societies to overcome poverty traps restricting agenda setting by ensuring subsistence levels of consumption and applying simple majority voting as a decision rule will not enable a society to overcome poverty we show that a combination of suitable constitutional rules can however overcome poverty and induce economic well being besides majority voting these rules include rotating agenda setting agenda repetition and tax protection rules we thus highlight the crucial role of democratic institutions for economic development

brand popularity country image and market share an empirical study this study examines how brand popularity in conjunction with other marketing variables influences market share directly as well as indirectly by interacting with country related intangible assets or simply country image the results of our empirical analysis show that a competitive analysis without the recognition of country image would be misleading we found that country specific intangible assets exist and that they significantly interact with marketing variables differently for u s and japanese brands in the subcompact car market in the usa brand popularity and advertising were found to be key factors for intangible assets for both the u s and the japanese brands brand popularity was the most significant factor for market share in both the short run and the long run japanese firms direct investment fdi in the target country directly influenced market share only in the short run several important implications for international marketing are presented

voting for voters a model of electoral evolution we model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote we adopt a number of simplifying assumptions the founders and the candidates are fixed the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period one vote is sufficient for admission and voters can support as many candidates as they wish voters assess the value of the streams of agents with whom they share the society while they belong to it in spite of these simplifications we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem the vote for friends may be postponed and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies we discuss the existence of different types of equilibria in pure strategies and point out interesting equilibria in mixed strategies

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

financial networks with intermediation risk management with variable weights in this paper we develop a framework for the modeling analysis and computation of solutions to multitiered financial network problems with intermediaries in which both the sources of financial funds as well as the intermediaries are multicriteria decision makers in particular we assume that these decision makers seek not only to maximize their net revenues but also to minimize risk with the risk being penalized by a variable weight we make explicit the behavior of the various decision makers including the consumers at the demand markets for the financial products we derive the optimality conditions and demonstrate that the governing equilibrium conditions of the financial network economy can be formulated as a finite dimensional variational inequality problem qualitative properties of the equilibrium financial flow and price pattern are provided a computational procedure that exploits the network structure of the problem is proposed and then applied to several numerical examples

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

the control of politicians in divided societies the politics of fear autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power in addition they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending i present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare the fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another group is enough to discipline supporters the model predicts extensive use of patronage ethnic bias in taxation and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader these predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance ethnic bias wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post colonial africa

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

matching product catgeory and country image perceptions a framework for managing country of origin effects the study of country of origin coo effects examines how consumers perceive products emanating from a particular country this study examines coo in terms of the fit between countries and product categories a framework is suggested which matches the importance of product category dimensions with the perceived image of the country of origin along the same dimensions such matches or mismatches can be either favorable or unfavorable managers can use product country match information to assess consumers purchase intentions and assist them in managing their product s coo data collected from consumers in ireland mexico and the united states demonstrate the product country match framework and its strategic implications

how cynical can an incumbent be strategic policy in a model of government spending abstract when parties with different preferences compete for election strategic manipulation of state variables for electoral purposes can occur even with rational voters this paper presents a model in which government resources can be used productivity for the benefit of everybody or unproductively for the benefit of the ruling party s constituency a government more inclined to unproductive spending may choose to collect public resources inefficiently in order to produce the importance of spending decisions in the election the model highlights the strategic role of policy decisions that affect incentives and constraints faced by future governments and their impact on election results

order independent equilibria we study a noncooperative game of coalition formation based on an underlying game in coalitional form we introduce order independent equilibria oie a strategy profile is an oie if for any specification of first movers in the sequential game it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff our results are 1 payoffs in oie that use pure stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form 2 if the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then for each payoff vector there exists an oie with the same payoff journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71 c72 c78

choosing how to choose self stable majority rules and constitutions constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society we study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society constitutions are stylized here to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly a different voting rule for making changes to the constitution we define an equilibrium notion for constitutions called self stability whereby under the rules of a self stable constitution the society would not vote to change the constitution we argue that only self stable constitutions will endure we prove that self stable constitutions always exist but that most constitutions even very prominent ones may not be self stable for some societies we show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic and there are many societies for which no such constitution is self stable we conclude with a characterization of the set of self stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business

social mobility and stability of democracy re evaluating de tocqueville an influential thesis often associated with de tocqueville views social mobility as a bulwark of democracy when members of a social group expect to join the ranks of other social groups in the near future they should have less reason to exclude these other groups from the political process in this article we investigate this hypothesis using a dynamic model of political economy as well as formalizing this argument our model demonstrates its limits elucidating a robust theoretical force making democracy less stable in societies with high social mobility when the median voter expects to move up respectively down she would prefer to give less voice to poorer respectively richer social groups our theoretical analysis shows that in the presence of social mobility the political preferences of an individual depend on the potentially conflicting preferences of her future selves and that the evolution of institutions is determined through the implicit interaction between occupants of the same social niche at different points in time

the political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians in the public finance literature the view prevails that taxcompetition among countries gives rise to an underprovision ofpublic goods and that coordinated tax increases are thereforedesirable public choice arguments in contrast suggest thattax coordination may not be in the interest of thetaxpayers citizens because imperfections of the politicalprocess political distortions may lead to a waste of taxmoney according to this view tax competition is a desirablecheck on the power to tax whereas tax coordination would onlyrelax the budget constraint of an inefficient public sector the present paper integrates the underprovision argument andthe public choice view into a common theoretical framework the government is assumed to consist of politicians andbureaucrats with diverging interests fiscal policy ismodelled as the outcome of a bargaining game between thebureaucrats and the politicians it turns out that coordinatedtax increases always raise the provision of public goods butalso increase the cost of political distortions the effect onthe welfare of the representative citizen may be positive ofnegative depending in particular on the distribution ofbargaining power between bureaucrats and politicians

a longitudinal study comparing perceptions of u s and japanese consumer products in a third neutral country finland 1975 to 1985 while substantial research has been done on the competitive struggle between u s and japanese consumer products few studies have examined the u s japan rivalry from a neutral third country perspective this study covering a ten year period 1975 1985 of data collection examines changes in finnish perceptions of u s and japanese consumer products and marketing efforts results indicate that while finnish consumer perceptions of u s products and marketing efforts have improved over time the corresponding perceptions of the japanese alternative have improved substantially more similarly in areas where u s competitors had initial advantages the study results indicate that by 1985 japanese firms were able to overcome such advantages and were perceived as superior in all categories

country of origin effects in developed and emerging markets exploring the contrasting roles of materialism and value consciousness despite growing evidence about differences in the attitudes and behaviors of consumers in emerging and developed markets there is little research on the differences in country of origin coo effects on their evaluation behavioral intentions bis and actual purchase of imported products this paper introduces a new conceptual framework incorporating consumer ethnocentrism cet materialism mat and value consciousness vc to hypothesize several differences in the influence of coo effects on consumers from developed and emerging markets a web based study with 1752 consumers in four countries representing two developed markets the uk and the usa and two emerging markets china and india shows significant differences in the moderating influence of cet mat and vc on the effects of coo on the evaluations and bis for a fictitious passenger car brand and on the actual choice of car brands owned by them the findings highlight the importance of looking beyond cet at other relevant psychographic variables to understand the differences in motivations underlying consumer perceptions and behavior towards imported products

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

why did the incumbency advantage in u s house elections grow theory a simple rational entry argument suggests that the value of incumbency consists not just of a direct effect reflecting the value of resources such as staff attached to legislative office but also of an indirect effect reflecting the fact that stronger challengers are less likely to contest incumbent held seats the indirect effect is the product of a scare off effect the ability of incumbents to scare off high quality challengers and a quality effect reflecting how much electoral advantage a party accrues when it has an experienced rather than an inexperienced candidate hypothesis the growth of the overall incumbency advantage was driven principally by increases in the quality effect methods we use a simple two equation model estimated by ordinary least squares regression to analyze u s house election data from 1948 to 1990 results most of the increase in the incumbency advantage at least down to 1980 came through increases in the quality effect i e the advantage to the incumbent party of having a low quality challenger this suggests that the task for those wishing to explain the growth in the vote denominated incumbency advantage is to explain why the quality effect grew it also suggests that resource based explanations of the growth in the incumbency advantage cannot provide a full explanation

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

a political theory of populism when voters fear that politicians may have a right wing bias or that they may be in uenced or corrupted by the rich elite signals of true left wing conviction are valuable as a consequence even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses populist policies i e policies to the left of the median voter as a way of signaling that he is not from the right truly right wing politicians respond by choosing more moderate or even left of center policies this populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in o ce is higher for the politician when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right wing politicians when politicians are indeed more likely to have a hidden right wing agenda when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive when politicians are more forward looking and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent we show that similar results apply when some politicians can be corrupted or in uenced through other non electoral means by the rich elite we also show that soft term limits may exacerbate rather than reduce the populist bias of policies

beyond country image favorability how brand positioning via country personality stereotypes enhances brand evaluations across four lab experiments and a field study we find that brands are evaluated more favorably when the brand is positioned in a manner that is congruent with the brand s home country personality stereotype than when brand positioning is incongruent results demonstrate that cultural authenticity mediates this effect we also uncover a moderating effect whereby brands are viewed more favorably when brand positioning and country personality stereotypes are incongruent rather than congruent under conditions of consumer animosity toward the firm s home country this study is the first to demonstrate how international firms can leverage country of origin personality stereotypes as a brand building advantage

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

effects of consumer preferences for foreign sourced products when deciding on overseas production locations the manager must take into account not only resource and cost benefits but the effect that country of origin may have on consumer evaluations an experiment conducted by a telephone survey procedure examined country of origin perceptions of twelve countries and eight products using both perceived quality and choice measures as hypothesized preferences were found to be more product specific for industrialized than less developed countries in addition hypotheses that performance risk and brand moderate the effects of country were upheld under most conditions

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

supply chain networks electronic commerce and supply side and demand side risk in this paper we develop a supply chain network model in which both physical and electronic transactions are allowed and in which supply side risk as well as demand side risk are included in the formulation the model consists of three tiers of decision makers the manufacturers the distributors and the retailers with the demands associated with the retail outlets being random we model the optimizing behavior of the various decision makers with the manufacturers and the distributors being multicriteria decision makers and concerned with both profit maximization and risk minimization we derive the equilibrium conditions and establish the finite dimensional variational inequality formulation we provide qualitative properties of the equilibrium pattern in terms of existence and uniqueness results and also establish conditions under which the proposed computational procedure is guaranteed to converge we illustrate the supply chain network model through several numerical examples for which the equilibrium prices and product shipments are computed this is the first multitiered supply chain network equilibrium model with electronic commerce and with supply side and demand side risk for which modeling qualitative analysis and computational results have been obtained

oligarchic versus democratic societies this paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes an oligarchic society where political power is in the hands of major producers protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entry barriers against new entrepreneurs democracy where political power is more widely diffused imposes redistributive taxes on producers but tends to avoid entry barriers when taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency because comparative advantage in entrepreneurship shifts away from the incumbents the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time the typical pattern is one of rise and decline of oligarchic societies an oligarchic society may first become richer but later fall behind a similar democratic society i also discuss how democracies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies how within elite conflict in oligarchies might cause a transition to democracy and how the unequal distribution of income may keep inefficient oligarchic institutions in place jel p16 o10

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

political careers or career politicians two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies there are career politicians i e politicians who work in the political sector until retirement and political careers i e there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector in this paper we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in a political economy with a private sector and a political sector where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability as well as their political skills we characterize the conditions under which the two career paths emerge in equilibrium and establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the quality of politicians and their careers

a supply chain network economic model with time based competition abstract this paper presents an integrated model for time cost competition between supply chains with heterogeneous customers the firms in our model can offer various time options for their production service to time sensitive customers this gives rise of a new concept of time based supply chain which we call t chain to be the basic element in the competition and extends the inter supply chain competition to a new dimension of time assuming the customers are heterogeneous in time cost bi criteria decision making we integrate the discrete choice theory into supply chain network competition and formulate the equilibrium conditions as a multinomial logit based variational inequality problem numerical examples are presented for model illustration and managerial insights such as profit maximization for a firm who participates in this supply chain network

dictators and their viziers endogenizing the loyalty competence trade off the possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history more competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler to avoid this rulers especially those who are weakandvulnerable sacrificethecompetenceoftheiragents hiringmediocrebutloyalsubordinates furthermore any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator s own survival we endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings the dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face jel d72 h00 c72 c82

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

electoral competition and political selection an analysis of the activity of french deputies 1958 2012 abstract in this paper we study the relation between electoral competition and political selection using a unique dataset containing detailed yearly information about members of the french national assembly from 1958 to 2012 first we innovate by proposing a measure of deputy activity to obtain insight into political selection as we gathered information on the many aspects of deputies individual work we use a nonparametric composite indicator of deputy activity that fully acknowledges the multidimensional nature of parliamentary work we argue that this measure of activity is positively correlated with competence and intrinsic motivation two components of politicians quality second we exploit the large time span of our dataset to study the evolution of the relationship between electoral competition and political selection over time overall our results show that deputies elected in a priori contested districts have a higher overall activity with the intensity of this relationship reaching its peak in the 80 s but constantly decreasing since then

cultural variations in country of origin effects abstract the authors examine the extent to which cultural orientation influences country of origin effects on product evaluations in two countries japan and the united states subjects were given attribute information about a mountain bike made in either japan or the united states the target product was described as either superior or inferior to competition respondents in japan evaluated the product that originated in the home country versus foreign country more favorably regardless of product superiority in contrast respondents in the united states evaluated the product that originated in the home country more favorably only when the product was superior to competition the authors explain these findings on the basis of the cultural psychological principles of individualism and collectivism specifically the authors show that the vertical dimension of individualism and collectivism explains country of origin effects the authors also discuss implications for global marketing strategies featurin

multiperiod effects of corporate social responsibility on supply chain networks transaction costs emissions and risk abstract this paper develops a framework for the analysis of the optimal levels of corporate social responsibility csr activities in a multiperiod supply chain network consisting of manufacturers retailers and consumers manufacturers and retailers determine their production quantities transaction quantities and the amount of social responsibility activities they want to pursue that maximize net return minimize emission and minimize risk over the planning horizon we investigate the interplay of the heterogeneous decision makers and compute the equilibrium pattern of product outputs transactions prices and levels of social responsibility activities the paper provides insights concerning the optimal allocation of resources to csr activities when considering a multiperiod time frame

the good the bad and the civil society abstract there are three signature features of autocracies first there is a wide variety across autocracies in terms of economic performance some do much better and some much worse than democracies second economic performance of a given autocracy is more sensitive to leader quality and exhibits higher volatility third all autocracies good or bad tend to have weaker civil societies than democracies do we attribute these features to the core of the autocratic political institution the incumbent leader selects the future leader as opposed to citizens at large selecting the future leader under democracy we deliver our analysis in an overlapping generations model where two kinds of dynamic free riding problems arise the first arises among different generations of citizens in implementing far sighted policies political leaders come in two types good ones aim to correct this first kind of dynamic free riding problem while bad ones do not care and only aim to steal public assets both types need a weak civil society to achieve their goals but a second dynamic free riding problem arises among different leaders when it comes to weakening the civil society the autocratic leader selection mechanism helps resolve this second dynamic free riding problem results in a continuously weakened civil society and generates large variations of economic performances both within a given autocracy and across different autocracies a rich set of comparative statics is derived

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

who monitors the monitor effect of party observers on electoral outcomes abstract we investigate whether electoral monitors who are in charge of assuring the fairness of elections interfere with their outcome more precisely does the monitors presence bias the results in favor of their own preferences to do so we construct a novel dataset from the raw voting records of the 2011 national elections in argentina we exploit a natural experiment to show that electoral observers cause on average a 1 5 increase in the vote count for the observers preferred party which can reach up to 6 for some parties this bias which appears under various electoral rules occurs mainly in municipalities with lower civic capital and weakens the accountability role of elections

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

an equilibrium model of the supply chain network under multi attribute behaviors analysis abstract this paper studies a supply chain network scn equilibrium model considering decision makers multi attribute behaviors from the perspective of behavioral finance in this paper an equilibrium model of an uncertain snc is constructed in which retailers choose their decisions according to their risk averse behavior loss averse behavior and regret averse behavior by using different weights to represent retailers attitudes to these three behaviors the retailers multi attribute utility functions are developed the equilibrium conditions of the manufacturers the retailers together with the network are established by the finite dimensional variational inequality formulation three numerical examples are solved in the first numerical example we illustrate the effect of each of these three behaviors on the equilibrium decisions the profits and the utilities of the decision makers in the other two numerical examples we explore the effects of changes in attitudes to these three behaviors on the equilibrium decisions profits and utilities of the decision makers the numerical results show that the equilibrium decisions are affected by each of these three behaviors very much moreover they are sensitive to the changes in attitudes to these behaviors

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

institutions and growth in limited access societies we build a dynamic political economy model with a two class society workers and the elite in which the elite formation the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous the model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence ex ante when facing constraints in choosing institutions the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy failures committing to such institutional arrangements prevents more harmful outcomes such as rapid entry and subsequent deterioration of the elite s economic and political power

a reform dilemma in polarized democracies abstract we study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies we develop a simple election model where i reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change and ii politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently we identify a so called reform dilemma which manifests itself in two variants from a static perspective low reform ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step this property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment from a dynamic perspective incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re elected regardless of their reform ability

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

seniority in legislatures we construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system we model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional issues modeled as a divide the dollar game however each session begins with a vote in which the legislators decide by majority rule whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the baron ferejohn rule an agenda setter is selected by a random recognition rule which in our model is a function of the seniority system selected the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues and the legislature then votes whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal if the legislature rejects the proposal another agenda setter is randomly selected and the process is repeated if the legislature accepts the proposal the legislative session ends and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their legislator or throw it out of office the voters verdict determines the seniority structure of the next period legislature we find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority system and that legislators are always reelected

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

dynamics and stability of constitutions coalitions and clubs a central feature of dynamic collective decision making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions for example current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations we develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness we show how this framework can be applied in political economy coalition formation and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs the explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision making 1 a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society 2 efficiency enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender

a cross cultural study of made in concepts cross cultural studies of the perceptions of countries of origin by industrial users have been few but they are important because of their managerial implications for multinational firms this study uses data obtained from american and french directors of purchasing of major industrial firms concerning their perceptions of 5 major made in concepts after the data were corrected for response bias results show both how the respondents perceive the made in concepts and the differences between the american and french perceptions

valuing operational flexibility under exchange rate risk in this paper we develop a stochastic dynamic programming formulation for the valuation of global manufacturing strategy options with switching costs overall we adopt a hierarchical approach first exchange rates are modeled as stochastic diffusion processes that exhibit intercountry correlation second the firm s global manufacturing strategy determines options for alternative product designs as well as supply chain network designs product options introduce international supply flexibility supply chain network options determine the firm s manufacturing flexibility through production capacity and supply chain network linkages third switching costs determine the cost of operational hedging i e the costs associated with reducing downside risks overall the firm maximizes its expected discounted global after tax value through the exercise of product and supply chain network options and or through exploitation of operational flexibility contingent on exchange rate realizations in this environment the firm must trade off fixed operating costs switching costs and the economic benefits derived from exploiting differentials in factor costs and corporate tax rates a multinomial approximation of correlated exchange rate processes is proposed that leads to a consistent and tractable lattice model for this compound option valuation problem we then demonstrate how the global manufacturing strategy planning model framework can be utilized to analyze financial and operational hedging strategies

country image and consumer based brand equity relationships and implications for international marketing this paper examines the relationships between consumers country level and product level images of a country and the equity they associate with a brand from that country using canonical correlation analysis results from mallintercept surveys conducted in an australian state capital city indicated that the consumer based equity of a brand was significantly associated with both the macro and micro images of the country of origin of the brand the relationship between these two sets of constructs was found to be positive as well as product category specific furthermore each consumer based brand equity dimension contributed differently to the relationship according to the product category while the contribution of both country image dimensions macro and micro was also product category specific results also showed that cars as a product category are more sensitive to country image than televisions these findings have direct and important implications for international marketers

persistence of politicians and firms innovation we empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political institutions affects the innovation activity of firms we use 12 000 firm level observations from three waves of the italian observatory over small and medium enterprises and introduce a measure of political persistence defined as the average length of individual political careers in political institutions of italian municipalities standard ols shows no raw correlation between political persistence and firms innovation activity however once the causal effect is isolated by means of instrumental variables using death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence we find a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process innovation this finding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder firms incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness as long as they can extract rents from long term connections with politicians

electoral rules and political selection theory and evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own this article explores how electoral rules such as district magnitude mediate this trade off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes we show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates results from a unique field experiment in afghanistan are consistent with these predictions specifically representatives selected by elections with a single multi member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed