an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

monetary policy and aggregate volatility abstract discretionary conduct of monetary stabilization policy can increase real and nominal aggregate volatility by arbitrary amounts when firms pay limited attention to aggregate shocks a conservative central banker with stronger preference for price stability eliminates the commitment problem thereby reduces output and price volatility and gives rise to a policy induced great moderation increased focus on price stability facilitates firms information processing and aligns their expectations better with policy decisions this coordination effect reduces aggregate real and nominal volatility consistent with empirical evidence the moderation manifests itself through reduced residual variance in vector autoregressions vars involving macroeconomic variables

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

real time decentralized information processing as a model of organizations with boundedly rational agents this paper studies the properties of real time decentralized information processing as a model of human information processing in organizations real time decentralized processingwhich models the computation of decision rules in a temporal decision problem by members of an organization captures both the cost of computation in terms of the members time and the constraints imposed by computational delay on the use of recent information unlike a batch processing model it has no single measure of delay because decisions are computed from data of heterogeneous lags furthermore decentralization does not unambiguously reduce delay because processing a message precludes processing current data 1 real time decentralized information processing

rational inattention dynamics inertia and delay in decision making we solve a general class of dynamic rational inattention problems in which an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions the solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model but it is biased towards an optimal default rule that does not depend on the realized state we apply the general solution to the study of i the sunk cost fallacy ii inertia in actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks and iii the tradeoff between accuracy and delay in decision making

optimal inattention to the stock market with information costs and transactions costs recurrent intervals of inattention to the stock market are optimal if consumers incur a utility cost to observe asset values when consumers observe the value of their wealth they decide whether to transfer funds between a transactions account from which consumption must be financed and an investment portfolio of equity and riskless bonds transfers of funds are subject to a transactions cost that reduces wealth and consists of two components one is proportional to the amount of assets transferred and the other is a fixed resource cost because it is costly to transfer funds the consumer may choose not to transfer any funds on a particular observation date in general the optimal adjustment rule including the size and direction of transfers and the time of the next observation is state dependent surprisingly unless the fixed resource cost of transferring funds is large the consumer s optimal behavior eventually evolves to a situation with a purely time dependent rule with a constant interval of time between observations this interval of time can be substantial even for tiny observation costs when this situation is attained the standard consumption euler equation holds between observation dates if the consumer is sufficiently risk averse

thinking ahead the decision problem we propose a model of costly decision making based on time costs of deliberating current and future decisions we model an individual decision maker s thinking process as a thought experiment that takes time and let the decision maker think ahead about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature by formulating an intertemporal state contingent planning problem which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature and by letting the decision maker deliberate ahead of the realization of a state we attempt to capture the basic observation that individuals generally do not think through a complete action plan instead individuals prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event when they arise

discrete actions in information constrained decision problems individuals are constantly processing external information and translating it into actions this draws on limited resources of attention and requires economizing on attention devoted to signals related to economic behaviour a natural measure of such costs is based on shannon s channel capacity modelling economic agents as constrained by shannon capacity as they process freely available information turns out to imply that discretely distributed actions and thus actions that persist across repetitions of the same decision problem are very likely to emerge in settings that without information costs would imply continuously distributed behaviour we show how these results apply to the behaviour of an investor choosing portfolio allocations as well as to some mathematically simpler tracking problems that illustrate the mechanism trying to use costs of adjustment to explain stickiness of actions when interpreting the behaviour in our economic examples would lead to mistaken conclusions

addiction and discounting abstract in 1988 becker and murphy becker g s murphy k m 1988 a theory of rational addiction journal of political economy 96 675 700 launched a theory in which they proposed that the perspective of rational decision making could be applied also to cases of addictive behaviour this paper discusses the theory s assumptions of interpersonal variation and stability in time preferences on the basis of estimates derived from three groups of people with different consumption levels of illegal intoxicants we find that active injectors of heroin and amphetamine have a higher discount rate than a group reporting that they have never used the substances of greater interest though not in accordance with becker and murphy s assumption of stability we also find that the discount rate among active and former users differs significantly these findings raise the question of whether a high time preference rate leads to addiction or whether the onset of an addiction itself alters people s inter temporal equilibrium

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

inattention in individual expectations abstract this paper investigates the expectations formation process of economic agents about inflation rate using the market expectations system of central bank of brazil we perceive that agents do not update their forecasts every period and that even agents who update disagree in their predictions we then focus on the two most popular types of inattention models that have been discussed in the recent literature sticky information and noisy information models estimating a hybrid model we find that although formally fitting the brazilian data it happens at the cost of a much higher degree of information rigidity than observed

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

a quantitative comparison of sticky price and sticky information models of price setting i estimate sticky price and sticky information models of price setting for the united states via maximum likelihood techniques reaching several conclusions first the sticky price model fits best and captures inflation dynamics as well as reduced form equations once hybrid behavior is allowed second the importance of hybrid behavior in sticky price models is potentially consistent with a role for some information imperfections such as sticky information as a complement to nominal price rigidities finally the favorable results herein for the hybrid sticky price model when evaluated by statistics that summarize the relative fit of different models is consistent with the existing literature that is both supportive and dismissive of such models as this literature has largely ignored fit in evaluating such models many previous studies have focused on ancillary issues such as the standard errors associated with certain parameters or granger causality tests that may not provide much information about sticky price models

bargaining in committees as an extension of nash s bargaining theory abstract this paper addresses the following issue if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives in the shadow of a voting rule that is any agreement can be enforced if a winning coalition supports it what general agreements are likely to arise in other words what influence can the voting rule used to settle possibly nonunanimous agreements have on the outcome of consensus we model the situation as an extension of the nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity in this setting a natural extension of nash s solution is characterized

perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration abstract we consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement the main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator who can only become active with the consent of both parties in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome we compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options journal of economic literature classification number c78

frictions or mental gaps what s behind the information we don t use and when do we care consumers suffer significant losses from not acting on available information these losses stem from frictions such as search costs switching costs and rational inattention as well as what we call mental gaps resulting from wrong priors worldviews or relevant features of a problem not being top of mind most research studying such losses does not empirically distinguish between these mechanisms instead we show that most highly cited papers in this area presume one mechanism underlies consumer choices and assume away other potential explanations or collapse many mechanisms together we discuss the empirical difficulties that arise in distinguishing between different mechanisms and some promising approaches for making progress in doing so we also assess when it is more or less important for researchers to distinguish between these mechanisms approaches that seek to identify true value from demand without specifying mechanisms behind this wedge are most useful when researchers are interested in evaluating allocation policies that strongly steer consumers towards better options with regulation traditional policy instruments and defaults on the other hand understanding the precise mechanisms underlying consumer losses is essential to predicting the impact of mechanism policies aimed primarily at reducing specific frictions or mental gaps without otherwise steering consumers we make the case that papers engaging with these questions empirically should be clear about whether their analyses distinguish between mechanisms behind poorly informed choices and what that implies for the questions they can answer we present examples from several empirical contexts to highlight these distinctions

recent trends in the size distribution of household wealth based on the survey of consumer finances the distribution of wealth in the united states became much more unequal in the 1980s and that trend continued albeit at a slower pace in the 1990s the only households that saw their mean net worth rise in absolute terms between 1983 and 1995 were those in the top 20 percent and the gains were particularly strong for the top one percent all other groups were particularly strong for the top one percent all other groups suffered real wealth losses including the median household and declines were particularly precipitous at the bottom racial disparities widened and young households also lost out over this period

a quantized approach to rational inattention abstract in this paper i propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables and still only a finite amount of information is being used this holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous that is the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece wise constant thus limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior rather than a source of noise the approach is applied to a simple static model of price setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks the effect of aggregate money shocks on output and prices is studied it is shown that as the variance of idiosyncratic shocks become large the aggregate log price level converges to a linear function of the aggregate money shock with a coefficient which is strictly between 0 and 1 consequently unanticipated aggregate money shocks have real effects on output in contrast to the sticky price model of caplin and spulber 1987 but these effects are smaller than in standard rational inattention models or in the lucas 1972 misperception model

a dual self model of impulse control we propose that a simple dual self model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi hyperbolic discounting and rabin s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small the model also implies that self control costs imply excess delay as in the o donoghue and rabin models of quasi hyperbolic utility and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist the base version of our model is consistent with the gul pesendorfer axioms but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load

signal extraction and rational inattention i introduction the objective of this paper is to compare two theories of information frictions in the first theory agents observe the state of the world with exogenously imposed noise we refer to this environment as the signal extraction se model 1 the second theory permits agents to design the distribution of noise terms by focusing limited attention on certain variables at the expense of others following sims 2003 we refer to this model as the rational inattention ri model 2 in both models agents respond to changes in the true underlying state slowly because it takes time for them to learn exactly what the new state is the key difference is that the noise distribution under ri is an outcome of optimal choice and thus can adapt to changing circumstances in the economy whereas under se the noise distribution is technologically fixed our goal is to explore this crucial distinction we explore the distinction between se and ri within a linear quadratic gaussian lqg setting we first study a univariate case for which the variance covariance matrix of the noise shocks can be solved in closed form first we note that at least within the lqg framework any variance covariance structure for the noise shocks derived from the ri problem can be exogenously imposed in the se environment so there is a sense in which the two environments are observationally equivalent the next result we find is that if the variance of the noise itself is fixed we can use a policy experiment to distinguish se from ri suppose that the variance of an exogenous shock is scaled up because of a change in policy in the se problem where the distribution of noise is exogenous an increase in the variance of the shock will lead to a different solution for the conditional variance and kalman gain consequently the change in policy will lead to a change in the model s dynamic behavior and the agent s payoffs in contrast in the ri problem if channel capacity is fixed a change in the variance of the exogenous shock will lead to the same change in the conditional variance of the state and the variance of the noise but will not affect the kalman gain that is inattentive agents with fixed capacity will behave as if they face noise shocks whose nature changes systematically as the dynamic properties of the economy change with policy furthermore we show that if we assume that the marginal cost of information is fixed capacity will be elastic with respect to a change in policy consequently the kalman gain in this case will also adjust in response to the policy change the losses of agents due to imperfect information depend on the value of the kalman gain therefore in general se and ri imply different policy recommendations in contrast we also find that in the univariate case if the ratio of the variance of the exogenous shock to that of the noise i e the signal to noise ratio snr is fixed the se and ri problems are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same dynamics of the model economy when the ratio of the conditional variance to that of the noise in the se problem equals a particular function of the channel capacity in the ri problem our results do not depend on the presence or absence of correlation between fundamental and noise shocks specifically in the presence of the correlation a change in the variance of the exogenous shock does not change the dynamic behavior of the model in the fixed capacity case whereas it changes the model s dynamics in the fixed information processing cost case in which both the variance of noise and the kalman gain are affected by the interactions between the correlation the variance of the fundamental shock and the conditional variance we then move on to study the multivariate case in this case given channel capacity the conditional variance covariance matrix can be obtained by solving a semidefinite programming problem in which the inattentive agent minimizes the expected loss due to information processing constraints

the nash program non convex bargaining problems we define and characterize an extension of the nash bargaining solution to non convex bargaining problems and in the spirit of the nash program of implementing cooperative solutions non cooperatively we show that this solution is supported by rubinstein s econometrica 50 1982 97 110 model of bargaining and its corresponding set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria

foundations for optimal inattention abstract this paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information an optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation net of a cognitive cost of attention the main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is the result of optimal inattention observing these choices permits unique identification of the agent s utility index the information to which she pays attention her attention cost and her prior whenever information is costly

limited information capacity as a source of inertia abstract we derive optimal time dependent adjustment rules from shannon s 1948 information theory in a continuous time lq prediction problem with a costly rate of information acquisition processing the optimal prediction evolves smoothly but jumps at an optimally chosen frequency when fresh information accrues a more volatile and persistent target raises the information rate required to maintain a sampling frequency this cost effect moderates and may even reverse the benefit effect on the value of information so optimal inertia is unresponsive to and nonmonotonic in the predictability of the environment conventional models with a fixed cost per observation imply no such cost effect so inertia rises quickly in the predictability of the environment

optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge we study optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy with monopolistic competition where firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy information imperfections emerge endogenously because firms are assumed to have finite shannon capacity to process information we then ask how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on firms processing capacity when price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements we find that policy should nominally accommodate white noise mark up shocks for a large range of capacity values this fi nding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms processing capacity when mark up shocks are persistent accommodation may even have to increase in the medium term but has to decrease in the long run thereby generating a hump shaped price response and a slow reduction in output instead when prices are strategic substitutes policy tends to react with nominal demand contractions to mark up shocks in addition there might exist discontinuities between common knowledge equilibria and equilibria with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge

a news utility theory for inattention and delegation in portfolio choice recent evidence suggests that investors are inattentive to their portfolios and hire expensive portfolio managers this paper develops a life cycle portfolio choice model in which the investor experiences loss averse utility over news and can ignore his portfolio in such a model the investor prefers to ignore and not rebalance his portfolio most of the time because he dislikes bad news more than he likes good news such that expected news causes a first order decrease in utility consequently the investor has a first order willingness to pay a portfolio manager who rebalances actively on his behalf moreover the investor can diversify over time and his consumption aligns with predictions of mental accounting i structurally estimate the preference parameters by matching stock shares and stock market non participation over the life cycle my parameter estimates are in line with the literature generate reasonable intervals of inattention and simultaneously explain consumption and wealth accumulation over the life cycle here it matters that news utility preserves first order risk aversion even in the presence of stochastic labor income which also causes stock shares to rise in wealth

information immobility and the home bias puzzle many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can but why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry we model investors endowed with a small home information advantage who choose what information to learn before they invest surprisingly even when home investors can learn what foreigners know they choose not to investors profit more from knowing information others do not know learning amplifies information asymmetry the model matches patterns of local and industry bias foreign investments portfolio outperformance and asset prices finally we propose new avenues for empirical research

fair bargains distributive justice and nash bargaining theory the suppes sen dominance relation is a weak criterion of impartiality in distributive justice i propose its application to nash bargaining theory the nash bargaining solution nbs is characterized by replacing the controversial independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the suppes sen principle this allows a clear interpretation of the nbs as a fair arbitration scheme in addition the proposed characterization is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems

income and consumption a micro semistructural analysis with pervasive heterogeneity we develop a model of consumption and income that allows for pervasive heterogeneity in the parameters of both processes introducing codependence between household income parameters and preference

is there a daily discount rate evidence from the food stamp nutrition cycle abstract quasi hyperbolic discounting predicts impatience over short run tradeoffs i present a direct non laboratory test of this implication using data on the nutritional intake of food stamp recipients caloric intake declines by 10 to 15 percent over the food stamp month implying a significant preference for immediate consumption these findings constitute a rejection of the permanent income hypothesis and are extremely difficult to reconcile with exponential discounting the data support an explanation based on time preference and reject several alternative explanations including highly elastic intertemporal substitution i explore implications for the optimal timing of transfer payments under alternative assumptions about preferences

alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems abstract this paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems the nash solution the egalitarian solution and the kalai smorodinsky solution our characterizing axioms are various extensions of nash s original axioms

time preference and the importance of saving for retirement abstract this study models the importance respondents place on saving for retirement as a function of time preference using a sample of 6812 undergraduate and graduate students individual time preference is measured by comparing dollar values over time and through a combination of intertemporal behaviors that may be the most theoretically appropriate measurement of the discount rate for utility over time results show strong correlations among decision making domains that involve time discounting time preference measured by comparing dollar amounts across time proves a much weaker predictor than a combination of intertemporal behaviors measured either as a linear scale or as factors in multivariate models a factor of intertemporal preventive health behaviors is a stronger predictor of the importance of saving for retirement than all other explanatory variables including age race parental income gender gpa and college major

the role of media for consumers inflation expectation formation the full information rational expectations model is clearly rejected by the data the expectation formation process has therefore important implications for macroeconomic outcomes we examine how consumers react to information provided by the media by taking into account that this information is imperfect we show that information rigidities play a role empirically intensive news reporting improves the accuracy of consumers inflation expectations because they receive more information however this effect depends on the tone of the news if news are badly toned the effect reverts

bounded rationality lifecycle consumption and social security abstract this paper explores an overlapping generations model of bounded rationality in which consumers only foresee the future over a subset of their life span we focus in particular on whether the model can in general equilibrium produce a hump shaped lifecycle consumption profile with a peak that matches data for the average u s consumer for a simple four period model we show that an increasing income profile along with exogenously imposed retirement are sufficient to induce a hump with no other mechanism that can account for a hump besides bounded rationality the model best fits the salient features of consumption data with a planning horizon of 20 years which is well supported by the behavioral evidence found in surveys on retirement planning finally we show that the age of the consumption peak is robust to the introduction of social security mortality risk and another species of bounded rationality quasihyperbolic discounting moreover social security can be welfare improving with a short planning horizon we can calibrate the model to jointly explain the timing of the consumption hump and the optimality of the current social security system with quasihyperbolic discounting instead we can calibrate the model so the current social security system is optimal but we cannot also account for the timing of the consumption hump if we add quasihyperbolic discounting in addition to a short planning horizon the present bias has a negligible effect in equilibrium

optimal price setting with observation and menu costs we study the price setting problem of a firm in the presence of both observation and menu costs in this problem the firm optimally decides when to collect costly information on the adequacy of its price an activity which we refer to as a price review upon each review the firm chooses whether to adjust its price subject to a menu cost and when to conduct the next price review this behavior is consistent with recent survey evidence documenting that firms revise prices infrequently and that only a few price revisions yield a price adjustment the goal of the paper is to study how the firm s choices map into several observable statistics depending on the level and relative magnitude of the observation vs the menu cost the observable statistics are the frequency of price reviews the frequency of price adjustments the size distribution of price adjustments and the shape of the hazard rate of price adjustments we provide an analytical characterization of the firm s decisions and a mapping from the structural parameters to the observable statistics we compare these statistics with the ones obtained for the models with only one type of cost the predictions of the model can with suitable data be used to quantify the importance of the menu cost vs the information cost we also consider a version of the model where several price adjustment are allowed between observations a form of price plans or indexation we find that no indexation is optimal for small inflation rates

a theoretical approach to deliberative valuation aggregation by mutual consent in deliberative valuation a small group of selected persons explores the values that should guide collective decisions through a process of reasoned discourse proponents argue that deliberative techniques enhance the effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of policy making by facilitating public participation this paper outlines an approach to deliberative valuation that is grounded in democratic theory social psychology and cooperative game theory emphasizing applications to the monetary valuation of environmental services the analysis suggests that deliberative groups that employ consent based choice rules may aggregate individual values in a manner that systematically departs from the additive aggregation procedures of standard cost benefit analysis

what accounts for the variation in retirement wealth among u s households even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics saving and wealth vary considerably life cycle models attribute this variation to differences in time preference rates risk tolerance exposure to uncertainty relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages and income replacement rates these factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and the shape of the consumption profile using the panel study of income dynamics and the consumer expenditure survey we find little support for these implications the data are instead consistent with rule of thumb mental accounting or hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation jel di d91 e21

setting the right prices for the wrong reasons we consider a model of nominal price adjustment with firm specific and aggregate shocks to economic fundamentals and incomplete dispersed information firms update their expectations about fundamentals based on their own cash flows revenues and wages we show that in a model with realistic levels of product level price dispersion the firms inference about aggregate shocks is very gradual yet in the aggregate prices adjust rapidly in response to aggregate nominal shocks when an aggregate shock occurs firms mistakenly attribute it to firm specific shocks but adjust prices nevertheless since the exact nature of the shock matters little for its optimal pricing decision

a theory of demand shocks this paper presents a model of business cycles driven by shocks to consumer expectations regarding aggregate productivity agents are hit by heterogeneous productivity shocks they observe their own productivity and a noisy public signal regarding aggregate productivity the public signal gives rise to noise shocks which have the features of aggregate demand shocks they increase output employment and inflation in the short run and have no effects in the long run numerical examples suggest that the model can generate sizable equilibrium dsge models of the business cycle include a large number of shocks to technol ogy monetary policy preferences etc but typically do not include expectational shocks as independent drivers of short run fluctuations 1 this paper explores the idea of expectation driven cycles looking at a model where technology determines equilibrium output in the long run and consumers receive noisy signals about technology in the short run the presence of noisy signals produces expectational errors this paper studies the role of these expectational errors in gener ating volatility at business cycle frequencies the model is based on two ingredients first consumers take time to recognize permanent changes in aggregate fundamentals although they may have good information on the current state of the individual firm or sector where they operate they have only limited information regarding the long run determinants of aggregate activity second consumers have access to public information that is relevant to estimate long run productivity this includes news about technological innovations publicly released macroeconomic and sectoral statistics financial market prices and public statements by policy makers however these signals provide only a noisy forecast of the long run effects of technological innovations this opens the door to noise shocks which induce consumers to temporarily overestimate or underestimate the productive capacity of the economy

individual discount rates and smoking evidence from a field experiment in denmark we elicit measures of individual discount rates from a representative sample of the danish population and test two substantive hypotheses the first hypothesis is that smokers have higher individual discount rates than non smokers the second hypothesis is that smokers are more likely to have time inconsistent preferences than non smokers where time inconsistency is indicated by a hyperbolic discounting function we control for the concavity of the utility function in our estimates of individual discount rates and find that male smokers have significantly higher discount rates than male non smokers however smoking has no significant association with discount rates among women this result is robust across exponential and hyperbolic discounting functions we consider the sensitivity of our conclusions to a statistical specification that allows each observation to potentially be generated by more than one latent data generating process

consumer inertia choice dependence and learning from experience in a repeated decision problem abstract understanding when and how individuals think about real life problems is a central question in economics this paper studies the role of inertia inattention state dependence and learning the empirical setting is a tariff experiment when optional measured tariffs for local telephone calls were introduced unanticipatedly we find that consumers tend to align their choices of tariff and telephone use levels correctly despite low potential savings mistakes are not permanent as individuals actively engage in tariff switching in order to reduce the monthly cost of telephone service ignoring unobservable heterogeneity and the endogeneity of past choices would have reversed these results

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

estimating individual discount rates in denmark a field experiment we estimate individual discount rates with respect to time streams of money using controlled laboratory experiments these discount rates are elicited by means of field experiments involving real monetary rewards the experiments were carried out across denmark using a representative sample of 268 people between 19 and 75 years of age individual discount rates are estimated for various households differentiated by socio demographic characteristics such as income and age our conclusions are that discount rates are constant over the 12 month to 3 year horizons used in these experiments and that discount rates vary substantially with respect to several socio demographic variables hence we conclude that it would be reasonable to assume constant discount rates for specific household types but not the same rates across all households

predicting retirement savings using survey measures of exponential growth bias and present bias in a nationally representative sample we predict retirement savings using survey based elicitations of exponential growth bias egb and present bias pb we find that egb the tendency to neglect compounding and pb the tendency to value the present over the future are highly significant and economically meaningful predictors of retirement savings these relationships hold controlling for cognitive ability financial literacy and a rich set of demographic controls we address measurement error as a potential confound and explore mechanisms through which these biases may operate back of the envelope calculations suggest that eliminating egb and pb would increase retirement savings by approximately 12 percent

information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle abstract we study firms incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to investigate the role of endogenous information in accounting for business cycles our model predicts that for a wide range of parameter values firms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when the economy has been in a recession and a pessimistic belief about the state of the economy prevails than after a boom when firms share an optimistic belief the equilibrium price system which features endogenous information transmission dampens aggregate fluctuations by discouraging information acquisition our welfare analysis reveals that information acquisition in the decentralized economy is not efficient this is due to inefficient employment dispersion arising from information heterogeneity in equilibrium time series data for the u s economy support the model s prediction of wages being more informative about total factor productivity after recessions than following booms

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

rational status quo abstract decision makers often stick to a status quo without explicitly reconsidering it yet their observed choices might be compatible with a fully rational model we ask when such a rationalization is possible we assume as observable only the choice of sticking to the status quo vs changing it as a function of a database of cases we state conditions on the set of databases that would make the decision maker change the status quo which are equivalent to the following representation the decision maker entertains a set of theories of which one is that her current choice is the best she is inert as long as that theory beats any alternative theory according to a maximum likelihood criterion

voting as a lottery supermajorities have their advantage as well as their disadvantage they provide an hedge against being in the minority but they make being in the majority less likely we characterize this trade oand compute the most preferred majority threshold the relevant parameters are voting power risk aversion and pessimism people who feel powerful prefer low thresholds high thresholds are preferred by risk averters or by those who are pessimistic about being in the majority further we study constitutional agreements on the voting rule members of the constituent assembly are heterogeneous in the parameters above we show that weak and minority members succeed in pushing forward on high and protective rules

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

optimal monetary policy with uncertain fundamentals and dispersed information this paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate fluctuations are driven by the private sector s uncertainty about the economy s fundamentals information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents and there are two aggregate shocks a standard productivity shock and a noise shock affecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they are realized despite the lack of superior information monetary policy can affect the economy s relative response to the two shocks as time passes better information on past fundamentals becomes available the central bank can then adopt a backward looking policy rule based on more precise information about past shocks by announcing its response to future information the central bank can influence the expected real interest rate faced by forward looking consumers with different beliefs and thus affect the equilibrium allocation if the announced future response is sufficiently aggressive the central bank can completely eliminate the effect of noise shocks however this policy is typically suboptimal as it leads to an excessively compressed distribution of relative prices the optimal monetary policy balances the benefits of aggregate stabilization with the costs in terms of cross sectional efficiency copyright wiley blackwell

overconfidence subjective perception and pricing behavior abstract we study the implications of overconfidence for price setting in a monopolistic competition setup with incomplete information our price setters overestimate their abilities to infer aggregate shocks from private signals the fraction of uninformed firms is endogenous firms can obtain information by paying a fixed cost we find two results i overconfident firms are less inclined to acquire information relative to the rational benchmark ii prices might exhibit excess volatility driven by non fundamental noise we explore the empirical predictions of our model for idiosyncratic price volatility

patience self control and the demand for commitment evidence from a large scale field experiment patience and self control are important non cognitive skills that are associated with favorable educational economic and social outcomes this paper provides empirical evidence to inform discussions on possible educational interventions to make children more forward looking or less present biased by putting forward a way to identify self control problems in children and exploring the role of commitment devices in mitigating such problems we report results from an experiment that measures planned allocations the demand for a commitment device and actual choices in the context of chocolate consumption over two days the experiment is conducted as part of a large field study on children s preferences which allows us to correlate behavior with variables related to the subjects socio economic background and educational environment as well as preference parameters elicited through other tasks and surveys we find a large demand for commitment among children in addition we identify important correlations between patience commitment demand and time inconsistency as well as student specific personality traits and outcomes such as school success