eco labelling by a for profit certifier countervailing power and its consequences for profit certifier s eco labelling is common in industries where firms have some countervailing power on sharing gains from labelling we show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong power a certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain this switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard this is consequential for evaluating policies the dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used and ultimately upon firms countervailing power

cultural differences in consumer impatience abstract in this article the authors examine cross cultural variations in how people discount the future specifically they predict that people from western cultures are relatively less patient and therefore discount the future to a greater degree than do people from eastern cultures and thus westerners value immediate consumption relatively more furthermore on the basis of regulatory focus theory the authors predict that when easterners are faced with the threat of a delay in receiving a product i e a prevention loss they are more impatient whereas when westerners are faced with the threat of not being able to enjoy a product early i e a promotion loss their impatience increases this enhanced impatience manifests in preference for expedited consumption of a product purchased online in two studies in both studies the authors used a priming methodology on bicultural singaporean participants the results support the predictions in the second study they also found evidence in support

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

anticipation of future variety reduces satiation from current experiences abstractsatiation frequently occurs from repeated consumption of the same items over time however results from five experiments show that when people anticipate consuming something different in the future they satiate at a slower rate in the present the authors find the effect in both food and nonfood consumption settings using different approaches to measure satiation this effect is cognitive specifically anticipating variety in future consumption generates positive thoughts about that future experience the authors find two boundary conditions the future consumption outcome must be 1 in a related product category and 2 at least as attractive as the present consumption outcome the authors rule out potential alternative explanations such as mere exposure to variety the possibility that the future experience is more attractive rather than just different than the current one and perceptions of scarcity associated with the item consumed in the present

decisions by rules the case of unwillingness to pay for beneficial delays abstract since the emergence of neoclassical economics individual decision making has been viewed largely from an outcome maximizing perspective building on previous work the authors suggest that when people make payment decisions they consider not only their preferences for different alternatives but also guiding principles and behavioral rules the authors describe and test two characteristics pertaining to one specific rule that dictates that consumers should not pay for delays even if they are beneficial rule invocation and rule override the results show that money can function as the invoking cue for this rule that the reliance on this rule can undermine utility maximization and that this rule may be used as a first response to the decision problem but can be overridden the article concludes with a discussion of more general applications of such rules which may explain some of the seemingly systematic inconsistencies in the ways consumers behave

quality improvements and the incentive to leapfrog abstract in a model of an uncovered market of vertically differentiated products incentives of non identical duopolists to improve the technological maximum quality are analyzed it is assumed that initially firms offer products with different qualities and that the r d cost function changes exogenously this induces a reconsideration of firms quality decisions both firms have the same r d costs for improving the maximum quality quality changes within the existing quality range are assumed to incur only fixed adjustment costs it is shown that the firm which initially is in the low quality position always has a higher incentive to improve industry s quality than its rival if adjustments costs are sufficiently high persistence of dominance may occur for a low degree of initial differentiation low adjustment costs and r d cost functions with a high slope

income distribution and the contractionary effect of protection a theoretical analysis abstract in terms of a simple model we show that the removal of a tariff from a competing foreign brand is likely to expand the size of the domestic industry when income disparities exist a tariff increases the profits of the local monopolist but is capable of cutting down the size of the local industry after providing the general theoretical condition we construct an example from a class of examples where such an outcome holds in equilibrium

role of demand side strategy in quality competition abstract the research questions studied in this paper concern the role of demand side strategy for a firm engaged in duopolistic competition in quality and price a demand side strategy research looks towards markets and consumers unlike the traditional resource side strategy research that looks upstream into the firm s resources and its supply side we examine whether following a demand side strategy would benefit the firm the consumers or both in a market where two firms are competing with each other we first find the equilibrium quality and price levels for the traditional case where the two firms optimize their own profit function we use this case as a benchmark case for comparison next we let one firm the lower quality firm adopt a demand side strategy operationalized by an objective function where the profit is augmented by consumer surplus the equilibrium results show that a demand side strategy would increase the product quality level in the market and improve the adopter firm s competitiveness at the same time increasing the market consumer surplus we also study the case where the higher quality firm adopts demand side strategy and compare the results with the two cases mentioned above overall we find that adopting a demand side strategy would benefit the adopter firm s profitability and the consumers we therefore find evidence of what the strategy literature has been predicting about the role of demand side strategy

information goods vs industrial goods cost structure and competition we study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods as a result a monopoly will offer only a single product competition leads to highly concentrated information good markets with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects we study how the structure of the firms cost functions drives our results this paper was accepted by barrie r nault information systems

better product at same cost lower sales and lower welfare we consider a high quality dominant firm facing a low quality competitive fringe we show that the dominant firm s quantity is weakly increasing in its quality if and only if its marginal cost weakly exceeds that of the fringe otherwise it is strictly decreasing in quality this result is driven by the fact that a quality increase causes the marginal revenue curve to rotate clockwise rather than shift outwards and at a height equal to the fringe firms marginal cost this fact combined with the dominant firm s mr mc condition determines the result for closely related reasons the effect of a quality increase on consumer welfare also depends on the relationship between the costs it is possible that all consumers are weakly better off that some are better off and some worse off or that all are weakly worse off we also consider several extensions and variations of the model

agency problems auditing and the theory of the firm some evidence agency problems auditing and the theory of the firm some evidenceauthor s ross l watts and jerold l zimmermansource journal of law and economics vol 26 no 3 oct 1983 pp 613 633published by the university of chicago pressstable url http www jstor org stable 725039accessed 29 06 2008 23 14

monopoly and product quality abstract this paper points out that without restrictions on the cost function distribution of consumer types and on the extent of market coverage the standard parameterization of preferences cannot by itself guarantee that a monopolist would choose a separating menu moreover there may not be any quality distortion

single option aversion this article documents single option aversion an increase in consumers desire to search when faced with a single option this effect can lead to a product being chosen more often when competing alternatives are included in the choice set contrary to various rational models of search as well as to recent research on choice conflict showing that additional options can lead to higher deferral rates a series of lab studies document this effect differentiate it from other context effects and test some of its boundary conditions the results suggest that single option aversion is not driven by the information provided by the additional options that the desire to search is critical for this effect to occur and that the effects of single option aversion are not limited to the immediate choice set these results have both practical and theoretical implications for the understanding of consumer search and choice deferral

research joint ventures product differentiation and price collusion abstract we investigate the interplay between firms decisions in product development either joint or independent and their ensuing repeated pricing either collusive or bertrand nash a joint venture develops a single product whereas independent ventures develop their respective products which can be differentiated we prove that joint product development and the resulting lack of horizontal product differentiation may destabilise collusion whilst firms r d decisions have no bearings on collusive sustainability if differentiation is vertical we also discover the non monotone dependence of firms venture decisions at the development stage upon their time preferences as well as upon consumers willingness to pay

why do audits fail evidence from lincoln savings and loan this study describes and critiques the audit procedures applied to a set of material transactions from the lincoln savings and loan lsl audit failure auditor deposition testimony and audit working papers produced in the civil litigation against the auditors of lsl provide the basis for this analysis we propose alternative procedures based on information available to the auditors at the time of the audit that might have prevented the audit failure other research methods have provided only very limited evidence on the important question of why audits fail the following detailed analysis of lsl suggests potential reasons for audit failures particularly in cases involving management fraud this research also provides a starting point for future research to evaluate the

mixed strategy equilibria in a quality differentiation model abstract this paper shows that the standard quality differentiation duopoly model has in addition to the two well known pure strategy equilibria of maximum quality differentiation an infinity of mixed strategy equilibria in which firms choose mixed strategies in the first stage quality game in these equilibria maximum quality differentiation does not occur due to coordination failure total expected consumer surplus is the same at all mixed strategy equilibria and is higher than that under either pure strategy equilibrium total expected industry profit is the same at all mixed strategy equilibria and is lower than that under either pure strategy equilibrium

market and political regulatory perspectives on the recent accounting scandals not surprisingly the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting we do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political regulatory processes operate independently and the events are recent and not well researched so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural this paper offers conjectures on issues such as what caused the scandalous behavior why was there such a rash of accounting scandals at one time who killed arthur andersen the securities and exchange commission or the market did fraudulent accounting kill enron or just keep it alive for too long what is the social cost of financial reporting fraud does the united states in fact operate a principles based or a rules based accounting system was there market failure or was there regulatory failure or both was the sarbanes oxley act a political and regulatory overreaction does the united states follow an ineffective regulatory model

quality and quantity competition in a multiproduct duopoly author affiliation yi ling cheng ylcheng thu edu twshin kun peng speng econ sinica edu tw acknowledgment we are most grateful to three anonymous referees who generously offered a number of insightful comments to improve this article we have also benefited much from fruitful discussions with takatoshi tabuchi hong hwang and toshihiro matsumura which led to significant improvements in this article we are especially indebted to takatoshi tabuchi for his contributive comments and suggestions finally we would like to thank conference participants at 2010 association for public economic theory in istanbul society for the advancement of economic theory in singapore as well as seminar participants at institute of economics academia sinica and national taiwan university financial support from academia sinica and the national science council taiwan is gratefully acknowledged the usual disclaimer applies 1 introductionmost of the literature dealing with vertical product differentiation such as bonanno 1986 and motta 1993 assumes that each firm can produce only one product however multiproduct firms abound in the real world firms in various industries produce multiple quality differentiated goods for example mercedes benz provides three different classes of sedans namely its c class e class and s class and bmw has its 3 series 5 series and 7 series in addition both lenovo and sony supply around 20 kinds of laptops ranked in accordance with their central processing units and outfits 1a casual survey of the empirical evidence also suggests that any two multiproduct oligopolies usually differentiate the qualities of their products and the patterns of their quality differentiation can be classified into the segmented type and the nonsegmented type the former type implies that the products of one firm are always of higher quality and more highly priced than those of the other firm such as the sedans of bmw and honda all the sedans sold by bmw are more expensive and of higher quality than those of honda the latter type denotes completely different patterns where the products produced by the two firms have interlacing patterns of their prices qualities for example the prices of the mercedes benz c e and s classes are respectively 32 900 52 700 and 87 800 while the prices of bmw s 3 5 and 7 series are given as 33 600 45 800 and 80 300 respectively 2 the prices of their sedans are interlaced and it is inferred that their qualities are interlaced and nonsegmented other examples include the whiskey offered by johnnie walker and edrington and the plasma televisions provided by samsung and sony the nonsegmented patterns of differentiation between the multiproduct firms with similar technological capabilities are very common in reality however the related literature has not shed enough light studying them while the segmented type of quality differentiation has been characterized by champsaur and rochet 1989 1990 with a quality then price competition of multiproduct duopolists the nonsegmented one so far has not been captured and explained in the literature 3therefore this article intends to examine the equilibrium qualities as well as the number of products chosen by the multiproduct firms with identical similar technological capabilities such as mercedes benz and bmw our main purpose is to characterize the patterns of vertical product differentiation and to reveal the properties of quality differentiation between them the contributive articles gal or 1983 de fraja 1996 johnson and myatt 2003 2006 examine a variety quality and quantity competition between multiproduct firms 4 gal or 1983 de fraja 1996 and johnson and myatt 2003 proposition 6 conclude that firms with equal technological capabilities will compete head to head by producing identical products qualities

strategic choice of quality when quality is costly the persistence of the high quality advantage in a two firm two stage model of vertical product differentiation i show that for every convex fixed cost function of quality the firm that chooses the higher quality at the first stage earns the higher profits the result holds for the pure strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous quality game and it holds as well if firms choose their qualities in sequential order

life cycle individual thrift and the wealth of nations this paper provides a review of the theory of the determinants of individual and national thrift that has come to be known as the life cycle hypothesis lch of saving applications to some current policy issues are also discussed part i deals with the state of the art on the eve of the formulation of the lch some 30 years ago part ii sets forth the theoretical foundations of the model in its original formulation and later amendment calling attention to various implications distinctive to it and sometimes counter intuitive it also includes a review of a number of crucial empirical tests both at the individual and the aggregate level part iii reviews some applications of lch to current policy issues though only in sketchy fashion as space constraints prevent fuller discussion this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent s reaction toward market entrants this study widens the perspective from a firm s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation in each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels respectively and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor from the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high quality firms in our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high quality restaurant market in germany to test the theoretical findings while the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

optimal beliefs in the long run an overlapping generations perspective abstract people have the natural tendency to be optimistic and believe that good outcomes in the future are more likely but also want to avoid overestimation that could result in bad decision making brunnermeier brunnermeier and parker 2005 and brunnermeier et al 2007 established an optimal beliefs framework that balances these two incentives this paper follows and extends the optimal beliefs framework to consider optimal beliefs in the long run in an overlapping generations sense assuming no short selling results show that in almost all cases there does not exist a stable and interior long term optimal belief

innocuous minimum quality standards abstract the present note shows that innocuous minimum quality standards namely below the lowest quality level in a market may have effects on equilibrium outcomes such a mqs reduces the incentive to invest in r d by the quality leading firm

minimum quality standards and market dominance in vertically differentiated duopoly abstract the paper establishes conditions for low quality dominance within a vertically differentiated duopoly and studies the consequences for minimum quality standard policies gross surplus from unit consumption consists of a benefit from quality and a baseline benefit consumers are heterogeneous homogeneous with regard to the former latter marginal cost increases in quality the quality then price equilibrium exhibits low quality dominance first in market share and then in profit as baseline benefit increases relative to the willingness to pay for quality the preference structure determines the effect of a minimum quality standard in a way related to the pattern of dominance the standard reduces increases welfare under conditions that lead to low high quality dominance

a comment on a model of vertical product differentiation in a duopoly model with vertical differentiation if the firms do not cover the market the lower quality firm chooses a quality level exactly 4 7 of that of the higher quality firm and chooses a price that is 2 7 of the price of the higher quality firm copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

procrastination of enjoyable experiences abstract the tendency to procrastinate applies not only to aversive tasks but also to positive experiences with immediate benefits the authors propose that models of time discounting can explain this behavior and they test these predictions with field data and experiments a multicity study shows that people with unlimited time windows delay visiting desirable landmarks however procrastination is reduced when the window of opportunity is constrained similarly people procrastinate in redeeming gift certificates and gift cards with long deadlines more than those with short deadlines resulting in overall lower redemption rates these results run counter to participants predictions and typical models of impulsive behavior

an approach to statistical inference in cross sectional models with security abnormal returns as dependent variable several recent event studies test hypotheses about the association between event related abnormal security returns and firm characteristics using a three step procedure first forecast model parameters are estimated usually parameters of a market model second prediction errors or residuals are computed over an event period third prediction errors are regressed cross sectionally on firm characteristics hypothesized to influence the impact of the event on share values results of these regressions are used to draw inferences about the relation between abnormal returns and firm characteristics researchers who employ three step procedures acknowledge that crosssectional ols regressions lead to valid inferences if the disturbances are iid normal in cross section see for example leftwich 1981 p 23 and lustgarten 1982 p 138 while sufficient assumptions to draw valid inferences from ols regressions are clear these assumptions are violated if there is cross correlation and cross sectional heteroscedasticity in the firm return processes from which the prediction errors are estimated assumptions about the processes generating these prediction

cross sectional dependence and problems in inference in market based accounting research this paper provides a framework and some empirical evidence to evaluate the seriousness of problems in inference that arise in stockreturn based studies when the data are cross sectionally dependent the study is motivated on the grounds that statistical procedures designed to address such problems are often infeasible and even when they can be implemented they sometimes introduce other more serious difficulties thus researchers have frequently adopted an approach that ignores the cross sectional dependence e g ordinary least squares ols the objective of this paper is to help identify the contexts in which ignoring the dependence would lead to serious misstatement of significance levels cross sectional dependence in stock returns data is likely to exist when at least some of the returns are sampled from common time periods this would be the case in all studies of the reaction of stock prices to a

does auditor reputation matter the case of kpmg germany and comroad ag we study the stock and audit market effects associated with a widely publicized accounting scandal involving a public company comroad ag and a large reputable audit firm kpmg in a country germany that has long provided auditors with substantial protection from shareholder legal liability we use this event to study whether an auditor s reputation helps to ensure audit quality a rationale for which recent literature and events provide scant support given the absence of a strong insurance rationale for audit quality germany permits a relatively clean test of whether auditor reputation matters we find that kpmg s clients sustain negative abnormal returns of 3 at events pertaining to comroad and that these returns are more negative for companies that are likely to have higher demands for audit quality we also find an increase in the number of clients that drop kpmg in the year of the comroad scandal mostly smaller recently public companies that are similar to comroad overall our results provide support for the reputation rationale for audit quality

welfare in differentiated oligopolies with more than two firms abstract excessive differentiation in the quality or location dimension in order to soften price competition is a well established conclusion concerning duopolistic markets this has inspired authors to discuss policy measures that may improve welfare in a differentiated market in the present paper a general welfare analysis is conducted for a varying number of firms it is shown that outcomes are almost optimal when three or more competitors are in the market in light of this a laissez faire policy should be adopted for a range of entry costs market outcomes entail insufficient entry therefore a subsidy to entry may improve welfare

positive time preference the case for positive time preference is absolutely compelling unless there is an infinite time horizon with the expectation of unending technological advance combined with what we call drastically diminishing marginal utility this finding holds both in the positive and normative senses a corollary is that savings are interest elastic

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

specification seeking how product specifications influence consumer preference we offer a framework about when and how specifications e g megapixels of a camera and number of air bags in a massage chair influence consumer preferences and report five studies that test the framework studies 1 3 show that even when consumers can directly experience the relevant products and the specifications carry little or no new information their preference is still influenced by specifications including specifications that are self generated and by definition spurious and specifications that the respondents themselves deem uninformative studies 4 and 5 show that relative to choice hedonic preference liking is more stable and less influenced by specifications

certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed we compare certification to a minimum quality standard mqs policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observe the quality of the offered goods compared to the unregulated outcome both profits and social welfare would increase if firms could commit to producing a higher quality an mqs restricts the firms quality choice and leads to less differentiated goods this fuels competition and may therefore deter entry a certification policy which awards firms with a certificate if the quality of their products exceeds some threshold does not restrict the firms quality choice in contrast to an mqs certification may lead to more differentiated goods and higher profits we find that firms are willing to comply with an ambitious certification standard if the share of informed consumers is small in that case certification is more effective from a welfare perspective than a minimum quality standard because it is less detrimental to entry

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

time cost substitutability earlycutting threat and innovation timing with time cost substitutability a potential imitator could threat to earlycut the innovator by increasing experimental intensity the earlycutting threat or uncertainty about the potential imitator s experimental cost advantage usually drives down the new product s quality but advances its launching date

input price discrimination in the presence of downstream vertical differentiation abstract this paper investigates the competitive effects of input price discrimination ipd in a setting in which an upstream monopolist produces an essential input supplied to the downstream market where there is competition between two vertically differentiated retailers two different input pricing regimes are investigated i the uniform pricing regime in which third degree input price discrimination is prohibited and i i a discriminatory pricing regime under which the upstream monopolist may charge different prices to the two downstream firms we find that despite favoring the low quality firm ipd is welfare enhancing if and only if the quality gap is sufficiently high

exit with vertical product differentiation abstract this paper presents a duopoly model of exit from a declining industry with vertical product differentiation it extends previous io models on exit that have so far ignored demand effects the model shows how the interplay between demand and technological factors determine the order of exit therefore demand factors are relevant and should be taken into account thus the firm with a longer tenure as a profitable monopolist does not necessarily outlast its rival in addition this paper argues that the low quality firm may find it optimal to stay in the market despite making temporary losses to outlast its rival