what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the finance growth nexus evidence from bank branch deregulation this paper provides evidence that financial markets can directly affect economic growth by studying the relaxation of bank branch restrictions in the united states we find that the rates of real per capita growth in income and output increase significantly following intrastate branch reform we also argue that the observed changes in growth are the result of changes in the banking system improvements in the quality of bank lending not increased volume of bank lending appear to be responsible for faster growth

bank integration and state business cycles we investigate how integration of bank ownership across states has affected economic volatility within states in theory bank integration could cause higher or lower volatility depending on whether credit supply or credit demand shocks predominate in fact year to year fluctuations in a state s economic growth fall as its banks become more integrated via holding companies with banks in other states as the bank linkages between any pair of states increase fluctuations in those two states tend to converge we conclude that interstate banking has made state business cycles smaller but more alike i introduction the united states banking system was once anything but united until 1978 every state in the union barred banks from other states so instead of one national banking system we had more like 50 little banking systems one per state 1 once states opened their borders to out of state banks bank holding companies marched in and bought up or merged with banks all over the country in 1975 just 10 percent of the bank assets in the typical state were owned by a multistate bank holding company by 1994 this interstate bank asset ratio had risen to 60 percent figure i our paper investigates how the advent of interstate banking integration in the united states has affected economic volatility within states with the united states balkanized banking system the fate of a state and its banks were closely tied as went the state so went the banks the farm price deflation in the early 1980s bankrupted many farmers and many farm banks falling oil prices in the mid 1980s wiped out a lot of texans and a lot of texas banks shocks to commodity prices probably caused these contractions but frictions in the banking sector may have aggravated them by allowing a freer flow of bank capital and lending among states we maintain that interstate banking will reduce the drag that banking frictions can have on economic contractions

wage vacancy contracts and coordination frictions abstract we consider a directed search model with risk averse workers and risk neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage vacancy contracts i e contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants we establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage vacancy contracts we show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a monotonic expected utility property which is efficient furthermore we investigate the role of wage vacancy contracts on welfare and competition

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

optimal unemployment insurance in an equilibrium business cycle model abstract the optimal cyclical behavior of unemployment insurance is characterized in an equilibrium search model with risk averse workers contrary to the current us policy the path of optimal unemployment benefits is pro cyclical positively correlated with productivity and employment furthermore optimal unemployment benefits react non monotonically to a productivity shock in response to a fall in productivity they rise on impact but then fall significantly below their pre recession level during the recovery as compared to the current us unemployment insurance policy the optimal state contingent unemployment benefits smooth cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and deliver substantial welfare gains

do local officials know something we don t decentralization of targeted transfers in albania abstract albania provides a small amount of social assistance to nearly 20 of its population through a system which allows a degree of community discretion in determining distribution this study indicates that relative to other safety net programs in low income countries social assistance in albania is fairly well targeted to the poor moreover the poverty targeting exceeds that which could be expected on the basis of proxy indicators of targeting alone communes appear to be using local information unlikely to be obtained on the basis of a questionnaire or formula this remains the case conditional on the level of funding allocated from the central government

decentralizing eligibility for a federal antipoverty program in theory the informational advantage of decentralizing the eligibility criteria for a federal antipoverty program could come at a large cost to the program s performance in reaching the poor nationally whether this happens in practice depends on the size of the local income effect on the eligibility cutoffs china s di bao program provides a case study poorer municipalities adopt systematically lower thresholds roughly negating intercity differences in need for the program and generating considerable horizontal inequity so that poor families in rich cities fare better the income effect is not strong enough to undermine the program s overall poverty impact other factors including incomplete coverage of those eligible appear to matter more

channels of interstate risk sharing united states 1963 1990 we develop a framework for quantifying the amount of risk sharing among states in the united states and construct data that allow us to decompose the cross sectional variance in gross state product into several components which we refer to as levels of smoothing we find that 39 percent of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by capital markets 13 percent are smoothed by the federal government and 23 percent are smoothed by credit markets the remaining 25 percent are not smoothed we also decompose the federal government smoothing into subcategories taxes transfers and grants to states

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

intranational risk sharing and its determinants abstract we develop a model of risk sharing in which agents can pool their consumption risks in both national and local markets and then smooth the remaining consumption fluctuations with credit markets estimating the model with a unique dataset on chinese cities we find that the participation rate in risk sharing is low but upon entering the market agents tend to pool risk in the national market rather than the local market the welfare gain from reaching the perfect consumption risk sharing at the national market could be as large as 4 of the perpetual deterministic consumption flow however conditional on the estimated degree of risk sharing participation the welfare gain from pooling all income risks at the national market is only 0 1 empirical analysis on the determinants of city risk sharing reveals that the degree of risk sharing depends on initial economic development and share of gdp contributed by tertiary industry

are poorer states worse at targeting their poor abstract as a rule the governments of poor states provinces or countries do not seem to be very good at targeting public spending to their poor yet anti poverty programs often target poor states in the hope of reaching poor people should this change

credit constraints and demand for higher education evidence from financial deregulation abstract we use staggered banking deregulation across states in the united states to examine the impact of the resulting increased credit supply on college enrollment from the 1970s to the early 1990s our research design produces estimates that are not confounded by wealth effects due to changes in income or housing wealth we find that lifting banking restrictions raises college enrollment by about 2 6 percentage points 4 9 we rule out alternative interpretations by examining results for different income groups and bankrupt households we also find similar effects for two year or four year college completion and supporting evidence in household educational borrowing

decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program abstract developing country governments often delegate authority over the targeting of antipoverty programs to community organizations while retaining control over how much goes to each community we offer a theoretical characterization of the information structure in such programs and the interconnected behavior of the various players our model motivates an econometric specification for explaining distributional outcomes results for bangladesh s food for education ffe program indicate that within village targeting improved with program size lower land inequality less remoteness fewer shocks and less private redistribution there is no sign that the center took account of village attributes conducive to reaching the poor

full insurance in the presence of aggregate uncertainty this paper tests implications of full consumption insurance the object is to determine how much mileage can be obtained from a model with complete markets with such features as private information or liquidity constraints omitted the implication exploited is that individual consumption responds to aggregate risk but not to idiosyncratic risk the test involves regressing the change in household consumption onto the change in aggregate consumption and other right hand side variables such as the change in household income and change in employment status all variables other than the change in aggregate consumption are predicted to be insignificant in explaining the change in household consumption with observations on consumption and income for 10 695 households from the consumer expenditure survey the results are mixed the results for one specification exponential utility are mostly consistent with full consumption insurance the results for the other specification power utility are not

a simple test of consumption insurance are consumers effectively insured against idiosyncratic shocks to income or wealth either by formal institutions such as charities private insurance and government programs or by informal mechanisms such as gifts and loans from relatives friends and neighbors under full insurance consumption growth should be cross sectionally independent of idiosyncratic variables that are exogenous to consumers this proposition is tested by cross sectional regressions of consumption growth on a variety of exogenous variables full insurance is rejected for long illness and involuntary job loss but not for spells of unemployment loss of work due to strike and an involuntary move

consumption risk sharing over the business cycle the role of small firms access to credit markets abstract consumption risk sharing among u s states increases in booms and decreases in recessions these business cycle fluctuations in interstate risk sharing are driven mainly by states in which small businesses account for a large share of income or employment state level banking deregulation during the 1980s loosened the dependence of interstate risk sharing on the business cycle mainly through its impact on states with many small firms our results establish a major benefit from bank deregulation small firms access to credit and with it interstate risk sharing have improved mainly when it is most urgently needed in nationwide economic downturns

home bias and international risk sharing twin puzzles separated at birth abstract we document that international home bias in debt and equity holdings declined during the period 1993 2003 at the same time as international risk sharing increased using panel data regressions for oecd countries we demonstrate that less home bias is associated with more international risk sharing more generally we show that more financial integration is associated with more risk sharing when we measure financial integration as the ratio of foreign assets to gross domestic product our results indicate that risk sharing and international financial integration are closely related empirical phenomena

risk sharing and industrial specialization regional and international evidence the authors provide empirical evidence that risk sharing enhances specialization in production to the best of their knowledge this well established and important theoretical proposition has not been tested before the empirical procedure is summarized as follows first the authors construct a measure of specialization in production and calculate an index of specialization for each of the european community ec and non ec oecd countries u s states canadian provinces japanese prefectures latin american countries and regions of italy spain and the united kingdom then they estimate the degree of capital market integration a measure of risk sharing within each of these groups of regions the ec countries the non ec oecd countries the united states canada japan italy spain and the united kingdom and rely on another author s estimate for latin america finally they perform a regression of the specialization index on the degree of risk sharing controlling for relevant economic variables they find a positive and significant relation between the degree of specialization of individual members of a group of countries provinces states or prefectures and the amount of risk that is shared within the group the authors perform regressions using variables such as shareholder rights and the size of the financial sector relative to gdp as instruments for the amount of inter regional risk sharing these regressions confirm that risk sharing facilitated by a favorable legal environment and a developed financial system is a direct causal determinant of industrial specialization this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item