old problems in the new solutions politically motivated allocation of program benefits and the new fertilizer subsidies summary fertilizer subsidies have been reinstituted in many african countries with innovations seeking to avoid the downsides of past programs the new subsidy paradigm however does not address how to curtail political manipulation which exacerbated inefficiencies of previous programs this paper analyzes whether politics affected voucher allocations in ghana s 2008 fertilizer subsidy program we find that more vouchers were targeted to districts that the ruling party had lost in the previous presidential elections and more so in districts that had been lost by a higher percentage margin this evidence shows that a significant threat to the efficiency of fertilizer subsidies remains

fiscal federalism quantitative studies we often think of fiscal decisions as being made by a single government but in the united states the reality is that an astounding number of entities have the power to tax and spend state local and federal governments all play crucial roles in the u s fiscal system and the interrelation has been the source of continuing controversy this fact is the focus of the seven papers and commentaries presented in this volume the result of a conference sponsored by the nber the contributors use various quantitative tools to study policy issues obtaining results that will interest policymakers and researchers working in the areas of taxation and public finance the first three papers study the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government john joseph wallis and wallace e oates look at the extend and evolution of decentralization in the state and local sector robert p inman examines the growth of federal grants and the structure of congressional decision making and jeffrey s zax investigates the effects of the number of government jurisdictions on aggregate local public debt and expenditures the next three papers look at the deductibility of state and local taxes on federal tax returns using an econometric analysis douglas holtz eakin and harvey s rosen examine the effects of deductibility on revenue sources and level of expenditures lawrence b lindsey looks at how deductibility affects the level and type of taxation george r zodrow uses a two sector general equilibrium model to investigate revenue effects of deductibility finally charles r hulten and robert m schwab analyze the problem of developing an accurate estimate of income for the state and local sector finding that conventional accounting procedures have underestimated the income generated by a startling 100 billion

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

granting votes exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within between specification for panel data instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors political goals this study uses a unique panel dataset on more than 500 croatian municipalities over a 12 year period to uncover the extent to which grant distribution is biased owing to grantors electoral concerns instead of the default fixed effects approach to modelling panel data we apply a novel within between specification aimed at uncovering the contextual source of variation focusing on the effects of electoral concerns on grant allocation within and between municipalities we find evidence of a substantial political bias in grant allocations both within and between municipalities particularly when it comes to local level electoral concerns the paper offers researchers a new perspective when tackling the issue of politically biased grant allocation using panel data particularly when they wish to uncover the simultaneous impact of time variant and time invariant factors or when they cannot apply a quasi experimental approach because of specific institutional contexts

organizational structure redistribution and the endogeneity of cost cooperatives investor owned firms and the cost of procurement abstract as an organizational type cooperatives are in general not the dominant form of enterprise nevertheless cooperatives and cooperative like organizations do play important roles in a number of sectors suggesting that in some circumstances they are more efficient than other business forms this paper explores the importance of membership goals on the relative efficiency of the cooperative form of organization the cooperative cost and hence production efficiency advantage is directly linked to the goal alignment between the cooperative and its members and is influenced by the extent of income redistribution between members and the degree of rent seeking that takes place in the organization when there is no aversion to income inequality the members produce at their first best levels however as aversion to inequality rises the production profile of the members converges to the production profile generated when the members face an iof regarding rent seeking if the more less efficient members are able to get their profits valued more total output is increased decreased as a consequence consumers may benefit from the lobbying that occurs inside a cooperative where the powerful members are the most efficient agents

the effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers differences in differences estimates for spain abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper tier grantor governments i e controlled by the same party will receive more grants than those that are unaligned we use a rich spanish database which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993 2003 from three different upper tier governments i e central regional and upper local since three elections were held at each tier during this period we have enough within municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences in differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source moreover the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple differences estimator which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones the results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities for example with majority governments at the two layers aligned municipalities receive over 40 more grants than unaligned ones

how are investments allocated in a publicly owned port system political factors versus economic criteria castillo manzano j i and fageda x how are investments allocated in a publicly owned port system political factors versus economic criteria regional studies this paper estimates the determinants of investments in port infrastructure in the spanish regions made by the central administration it is found that the use of the infrastructure in relation to capacity has some influence on the amount of investment received by a region furthermore specialization in containers is also relevant for receiving more resources however it is found that when greater political decentralization does not go hand in hand with greater financial decentralization the importance of tactical political aspects increases overall efficiency plays a more relevant role in the regional allocation of investments in ports than in other transport infrastructures

parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects abstract local public goods financed from a national tax base provide concentrated benefits to recipient jurisdictions but disperse costs creating incentives for legislators to increase own district spending but to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax costs while these common pool incentives underpin a variety of theoretical analyses which tend to predict inefficiencies in the allocation of public goods there is little direct evidence that individual legislators respond to such incentives to test for reactions to such incentives this paper analyzes 1998 congressional votes over transportation project funding the empirical results provide evidence that legislators respond to common pool incentives the probability of supporting the projects is increasing in own district spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending having found that legislators do respond to such incentives i use the parameter estimates to calculate the efficient level of public goods which suggest over spending in aggregate especially in politically powerful districts and large associated deadweight loss

the regional allocation of infrastructure investment the role of equity efficiency and political factors abstract this paper analyses the main determinants of the regional allocation of infrastructure investment the estimated investment equation is derived from a general specification of the government s objective function berhman and craig am econom rev 77 1987 315 which accounts both for the equity efficiency trade off and for deviations from this rule that arise because of political factors the reaction of investment to changes in the regional output provides information about the strength of the equity efficiency trade off the main political factor considered is a measurement of the electoral productivity of funds invested in each region the equation is estimated from panel data on investment and the capital stock of transportation infrastructure i e roads rails ports and airports for the spanish departments nuts3 during the period 1987 1996 we use a dynamic specification of the equation that allows for slow adjustment and which is estimated by gmm methods arellano and bond rev econom stud 58 1991 277 the results suggest that efficiency criteria play only a limited role in the geographical distribution of government infrastructure investment specific regional infrastructure needs and political factors both appear to be factors that do explain the regional allocation of infrastructure investment

on the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments a couple of months before the swedish election in 1998 the incumbent government distributed 2 3 billion sek to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities this was the first wave of a four year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development this temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government in this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants we find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes in particular we find strong support for the lindbeck weibull dixit londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters this result is statistically as well as economically significant we do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters

optimal regional redistribution under asymmetric information this paper studies optimal redistribution among two different regions in a federal state regional governments supply local public goods financed with distorting local taxes they have better information on their tax bases than the federal government we model this both as an adverse selection problem on the size of local tax bases and or as moral hazard problem on local tax enforcement moral hazard alone does not affect the first best redistribution rule which is a lump sum transfer from the rich to the poor region in all other cases the optimal transfer rule involves a lump sum tax on the rich regions and a premium for fiscal effort by the poor regions with the transfer falling short of the first best level in the equilibrium with moral hazard and adverse selection tax evasion occurs only in the poor region even though the possibility of lax tax enforcement benefits the rich and harms the poor region because it reduces equilibrium redistribution this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do local officials know something we don t decentralization of targeted transfers in albania abstract albania provides a small amount of social assistance to nearly 20 of its population through a system which allows a degree of community discretion in determining distribution this study indicates that relative to other safety net programs in low income countries social assistance in albania is fairly well targeted to the poor moreover the poverty targeting exceeds that which could be expected on the basis of proxy indicators of targeting alone communes appear to be using local information unlikely to be obtained on the basis of a questionnaire or formula this remains the case conditional on the level of funding allocated from the central government

contribution to productivity or pork barrel the two faces of infrastructure investment abstract this paper proposes a simultaneous equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth we model explicitly the political economy process driving infrastructure investments in doing so we eliminate a potential source of bias in production function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy our empirical findings on a panel of france s regions over 1985 92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were indeed significant determinants of the cross regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments by contrast we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending even after controlling for pork barrel

lobbying political competition and local land supply recent evidence from spain abstract we analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition and interpret the findings as indications of the influence wielded by land developer lobbies we use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2 000 spanish municipalities for the period 2003 2007 in spain land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities needing periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans the main policy variable in these plans and the one analyzed here is the amount of land classified for potential development we measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government this variable is however potentially endogenous since not only do votes affect policy but also policy is expected to affect votes to deal with this problem we instrument this variable using the votes at the first national legislative elections following the re establishment of democracy and votes actually obtained regionally at the same type of election the results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development this effect is found to be most marked in suburbs in towns with a high percentage of commuters and homeowners and in municipalities governed by the left

bankruptcy and agency costs their significance to the theory of optimal capital structure we support and generalize our original results 1978 in light of potential impediments to a pure market solution to agency problems and potential causal links between liquidation and bankruptcy in the case of bankruptcy costs market impediments are easily elimi nated through the inclusion of simple provisions in corporate charters and bond inden tures further we demonstrate that recent attempts to link liquidation costs to capital structure are without merit if the firm is to be liquidated on the basis of a rule other than one that maximizes the total value of all the claimants arbitrage profits arise and informal reorganization will discipline management to follow the liquidation rule that is optimal for existing securityholders also we find that the pure market solution is not readily generalizable to other classes of agency problems particularly the risk incentive problem how ever the alternative solution of the risk incentive problem through complex financing contracting may be useful in explaining complexities in contemporary financial contracts in a previous paper 1978 we employed arbitrage arguments to show that in a well functioning market bankruptcy costs are an insignificant determinant of a firm s capital structure we also pointed out that the decision to liquidate and its associated costs can be separated from the event of bankruptcy moreover any costs actually associated with the event of bankruptcy must be limited to the costs associated with an informal reorganization of the capital structure in the capital market prior to default these results were argued to hold under a com plex environment with multiple periods multiple securities and heterogeneous expectations we concluded that bankruptcy costs would be a significant deter minant of capital structure only in the face of irrationality on the part of market participants or unavoidable impediments to the arbitrage process since the publication of our paper there has been an accumulation of the

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

the contribution of local public infrastructure to private productivity and its political economy evidence from a panel of large german cities this paper proposes a simultaneous equation approach to theestimation of the contribution of infrastructure accumulationto private production a political economy model for theallocation of public infrastructure investment grants isformulated our empirical findings using a panel of largegerman cities for the years 1980 1986 and 1988 suggest thatcities ruled by a council sharing the state bundesland government s current political affiliation were particularlysuccessful in attracting infrastructure investment grants with regard to the contribution of infrastructure accumulationto growth we find that public capital is a significant factorin private production moreover at least for the samplestudied we find that simultaneity between output and publiccapital is weak thus feedback effects from output toinfrastructure are negligible

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

inter regional redistribution through infrastructure investment tactical or programmatic in this paper we study the political economy of the inter regional allocation of investment in infrastructure in an effort to disentangle tactical and programmatic motives where tactical politics refers to the discretionary allocation of investment to districts with more political clout and programmatic politics refers to the allocation of investment according to certain objective criteria e g income level we use a panel of data from the spanish electoral districts for the period 1964 2004 to estimate an equation in which investment depends both on economic and political variables the results show that tactical politics do matter since the districts receiving the most funds are those in which i the incumbent s vote margin is low ii few votes are needed to win an additional seat in the legislature iii the central and regional governments are controlled by the same party and iv regional parties play a pivotal role in the legislature however the results also show that programmatic politics matter since inter regional redistribution is shown to increase i with the arrival of democracy and european union funds ii under leftist governments and iii the weaker the correlation is between political clout and regional income

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

how the electoral college influences campaigns and policy the probability of being florida this paper analyzes how us presidential candidates should allocate resources across states to maximize the probability of winning the election by developing and estimating a probabilistic voting model of political competition under the electoral college system actual campaigns act in close agreement with the model there is a 0 9 correlation between equilibrium and actual presidential campaign visits across states both in 2000 and 2004 the paper shows how presidential candidate attention is affected by the states number of electoral votes forecasted state election outcomes and forecast uncertainty it also analyzes the effects of a direct national popular vote for president

fiscal flows in the united states and canada lessons for monetary union in europe regional flows of federal taxes and transfers within the united states and canada are used to analyze long term fiscal flows the redistributive element and short term responses to regional business cycles the stabilization element in the united states long run flows amount to 22 cents in the dollar while the stabilization effect is 31 cents in the dollar in canada the redistributive effect is larger 39 cents and the stabilization effect smaller 17 cents federal flows appears to depend on the institutional structure of the country concerned however in both countries the redistributive element is considerably larger than the amounts involved in the ec structural funds program as for stabilization national fiscal policies in the ec appear to have been as effective as federal governments in the united states and canada in cushioning shocks to incomes

the public value of improving a weather forecasting system in korea a choice experiment study abstractthe korean government plans to improve the quality of its weather forecasting system in order to increase its public utility the benefits arising from the implementation of this plan shoul

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

does political competition lessen ethnic discrimination evidence from sri lanka abstract the impact of political competition on ethnic discrimination remains largely unexplored to address this gap this paper explores the relationship between the level of political competition and the probability of receiving government transfers among ethnic minorities in sri lanka in the run up to the national elections of 2000 the paper shows that making politicians dependent on the votes of members of ethnic groups other their own can encourage moderation in discriminatory practices towards ethnic minorities specifically we find that political competition positively influenced the distribution of government food stamps among sri lankan tamils who otherwise are less likely to receive food stamps relative to the sinhalese majority the negative impact of political competition on discrimination is higher when minorities form part of swing constituencies than when they form part of the base support for political parties lessons learnt here suggest that having built in incentives in the design of the electoral process for intergroup bargaining and cooperation in countries with ethnically heterogeneous societies can be an effective restraint on ethnic discrimination this is consistent with other research that considers political institutions to be a key lever for making ethnically divided societies more inclusive

multi tier targeting of social assistance the role of intergovernmental transfers albania provides a small amount of social assistance to nearly 20 percent of its population through a system that allows some community discretion in determining distribution this study investigates how well this social assistance program is targeted to the poor relative to other safety net programs in low income countries social assistance in albania is fairly well targeted nevertheless the system is hampered by the absence of a clear objective criterion to determine the size of the grants from the central government to communes as well as limited information that could be used to implement this criterion substantial gains in targeting could be achieved if the central government better allocated transfers to local governments even holding local targeting at base levels

election goals and income redistribution recent evidence from albania this paper examines the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to sub federal levels of government we model the extent and direction of income redistribution as determined proximately by the political agendas of central decision makers and at a deeper level by the institutions within which they nd themselves operating we contrast two political objective functions that yield di erent empirical predictions of the ways in which politics should a ect scal policy lessons learned here may prove important in understanding limits on the types of redistribution possible via block grants given the institutional framework in both developing and developed countries 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation h1 h7 o1

the political economy of fema disaster payments a central contribution of public choice theory to the analysis of government activity is in viewing the activities of government not as determined by some single altruistic dictator but rather as the result of a process involving individual political agents who react to the incentives they face federal disaster relief administered by the federal emergency management agency fema is one activity that is ripe for political influence due to the process of disaster declaration and relief after a disaster strikes a particular state the governor makes a request to the president for disaster assistance following a governor s request the president then decides whether to declare the state or region a disaster area only after a disaster has been declared by the president can disaster relief be given fema is in charge of determining the level of relief funding for the area but additional appropriations are determined by congress in cases requiring large amounts of funding beyond fema s allocated budget the act which governs the rules of federal disaster declaration and expenditures gives the president the authority to declare a disaster without the approval of congress

the effects of party competition on budget outcomes empirical evidence from local governments in spain this paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election i e the difference between the vote share and 50 two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper on the one hand the leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector irrespective of the ideology of the party in power on the other hand the partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low i e parties on the left right will increase decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low these hypotheses are tested with information on spending own revenues and deficit for more than 500 spanish local governments over 8 years 1992 1999 and information on the results of two local electoral contests 1991 and 1995 the evidence favors the partisan hypothesis over the leviathan one we found that for left wing governments spending taxes and deficits increased as the electoral margin increases whereas for right wing governments a greater margin of victory led to reductions in all these variables

electoral institutions hometowns and favored minorities evidence from japanese electoral reforms this article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources the author exploits two electoral reforms in japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives 1 the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote sntv system to a mixed member majoritarian mmm system with a single member district smd component and a proportional representation component and 2 the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly smd system to a multimember sntv system using several new data sets the two main findings of this article are that 1 japanese representatives competing in multimember sntv districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in smds and that 2 intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around liberal democratic party ldp incumbents home offices under the multimember sntv system than under the mmm system the findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation

the political economy of intergovernmental grants evidence from a maturing democracy we evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental grants in portugal as it matured from a young to an established democracy using a large and unexplored dataset we show that political variables condition the granting system and that their importance changed over time while tactical manipulation in the distribution of grants among municipalities seems to exist only in the early years of democracy opportunistic effects are stronger in the latter years we argue that the latter effect is due to a change in the political environment and to the electorate s lack of information on intergovernmental grants

distributive politics and regional development assessing the territorial distribution of turkey s public investment turkey is often perceived as a country with low bureaucratic capacity and prone to political manipulation and pork barrel this article tests whether this is the case by analysing the extent to which politics rather than equity and efficiency criteria have determined the geographical allocation of public investment across the 81 provinces of turkey between 2005 and 2012 the results show that although the turkish government has indeed channelled public expenditures to reward its core constituencies socioeconomic factors remained the most relevant predictors of investment moreover in contrast to official regional development policy principles we uncover the concentration of public investment in areas with comparatively higher levels of development we interpret this as the state bureaucracy s intentional strategy of focussing on efficiency by concentrating resources on the better off among the most in need

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

taking time seriously dramatic world change has stimulated interest in research questions about the dynamics of politics we have seen increases in the number of time series data sets and the length of typical time series but three shortcomings are prevalent in published time series analysis first analysts often estimate models without testing restrictions implied by their specification second researchers link the theoretical concept of equilibrium with cointegration and error correction models third analysts often do a poor job of interpreting results the consequences include weak connections between theory and tests biased estimates and incorrect inferences we outline techniques for estimating linear dynamic regressions with stationary data and weakly exogenous regressors we recommend analysts 1 start with general dynamic models and test restrictions before adopting a particular specification and 2 use the wide array of information available from dynamic specifications we illustrate this strategy with data on congressional approval and tax rates across oecd countries

expanding contingent value sample estimates to aggregate benefit estimates current practices and proposed solutions a mail survey was administered to a panel of colorado consumers to obtain estimates of willingness to pay wtp for preserving union park detailed socioeconomic data for all surveyed individuals was available a priori we develop and employ the multiple

intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument empirical evidence from swedish municipalities are grants to swedish municipalities tactical in this essay i derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 swedish municipalities 1981 1995 in order to decide which regions that are politically powerful both election results and survey data from the swedish election studies are used the results although somewhat ambiguous support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes

electoral goals and center state transfers a theoretical model and empirical evidence from india we construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations these considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not a testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers we test this prediction using indian data for 14 states from 1974 75 to 1996 97 we find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16 higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non swing

infrastructure and education as instruments of regional policy evidence from spain regional policy and spain infrastructure and education as instruments of regional policy evidence from spain governments have often tried to influence the regional distribution of economic activity through supply side measures such as investment in training and infrastructure using evidence from spain we examine whether such policies can have an impact and whether they have done so in the past our results indicate that disparities in the stocks of human and public capital account for a third of observed regional inequality about evenly split between the two factors hence public investment can in principle be used to reduce regional disparity its actual impact however will depend both on its overall volume and on the extent to which its regional allocation does indeed vary with regional need in spain investment in infrastructure has made only a small contribution to regional convergence primarily because it has not in practice been allocated to redistribute across regions to any great extent in contrast efrd transfers have clearly been allocated among regions with redistribution in mind the impact of the fund has been significant but it has been limited by the relatively small size of the programme angel de la fuente and xavier vives

productive efficiency and growth policies for the caribbean productive economic efficiency and factors affecting it was evaluated in the caribbean between 1983 to 1992 results from non parametric programming indicated that efficiency i e pure technical allocative and economic measures were lower and more variable in caribbean than in other western hemisphere countries i e north america and latin america tobit regression analysis indicated higher levels of private and foreign investments productive infrastructure credit availability education level and consumption of domestically produced goods had positive impacts on the efficiency measures on the other hand higher levels of public expenditure income tax and export taxes and higher inflation rates had negative effects these results support the current trend towards advocating more open economies i e letting the free market work and encouraging governments to confine their functions to facilitative regulatory type roles and to undertaking tasks that are not generally undertaken by the privat

multichoice logit modeling incomplete preference rankings of classical concerts in this article we develop an econometric model to analyze data on incomplete information on preferences the available information consists of groups of alternatives that are preferred to other groups of alternatives only for the most preferred group is a full ranking observed the resulting model is estimated on data concerning preferences on classical concerts

constructing confidence intervals using the bootstrap an application to a multi product cost function a multi product cost function system is estimated for 387 banks in states that allow branch banking the bootstrap resampling method is used to construct confidence intervals for marginal costs output cost elasticities economies of scale and scope and allen elasticities of substitution confidence intervals for these measures are usually constructed using a first order variance approximation under a normality assumption but such confidence intervals are inexact if the measures are not normally distributed or the variance approximations are imprecise we find that the bootstrap standard error estimates can differ significantly from the usual estimates furthermore we use the bootstrap to expand the analysis of cost function regularity properties copyright 1990 by mit press

the road to power partisan loyalty and the centralized provision of local infrastructure this paper sets out a simple dynamic probabilistic voting model in which a government allocates a fixed budget across electoral districts that differ in their loyalties to the ruling party the model predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long run machine politics considerations and the more immediate concern to win over swing voters empirical results obtained from a panel of electoral districts in quebec provide robust evidence that districts which display loyalty to the incumbent government receive disproportionately more spending especially close to an election at odds with the standard swing voter view

the valuation of the ijmeer nature reserve using conjoint analysis this paper describes an application of conjointanalysis the subject of the valuation study isthe ijmeer nature reserve which will be partlydestroyed when the new residential area ijburgis built this paper addresses the followingquestion what is the extent of the loss ofgreen and recreational values in this study the conjoint analysis consists of threedifferent analyses based on a three piecevaluation question the respondents are askedto subsequently rank mark and indicate theacceptability of a set of six cards

cluster sample methods in applied econometrics inference methods that recognize the clustering of individual observations have been available for more than 25 years brent moulton 1990 caught the attention of economists when he demonstrated the serious biases that can result in estimating the effects of aggregate explanatory variables on individual specific response variables the source of the downward bias in the usual ordinary least squares ols standard errors is the presence of an unobserved state level effect in the error term more recently john pepper 2002 showed how accounting for multi level clustering can have dramatic effects on t statistics while adjusting for clustering is much more common than it was 10 years ago inference methods robust to cluster correlation are not used routinely across all relevant settings in this paper i provide an overview of applications of cluster sample methods both to cluster samples and to panel data sets

dept and input misallocation of agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives kim and maksimovic provide an empirical model to examine the effect of dept on a firm their model is adopted to examine agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives using a short run variable cost function we find firm efficiency decreases as dept increases a us 1 increase in indebtedness increases total short run variable costs by us 0 0167 or roughly 1 67 dept tends to shift input usage away from labour inputs a test developed by conrad and unger is applied to determine whether the agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives are at a long run equilibrium capacity it is found that most of the cooperatives were overinvested in capacity however dept does not explain this overinvestment finally the effect of dept on total productivity over the study period is examined it is found that dept has had a small positive impact on total factor productivity growth scale economics and non optimal capacity had large impacts on total factor productivity although dept is associated with short run misal

recovery and reinvestment act spending at the state level keynesian stimulus or distributive politics we examine the us state level pattern of american recovery and reinvestment act arra spending we relate spending to 1 keynesian determinants of countercyclical policy 2 congressional power and dominance and 3 presidential electoral vote importance we find that the arra is in practice poorly designed countercyclical stimulus after controlling for political variables coefficients on keynesian variables are often statistically insignificant when they are statistically significant they are often the incorrect sign on the other hand statistically significant effects are associated with majority party house of representative appropriations subcommittee and authorization committee membership one striking result is that the elasticity of arra spending with respect to the pre arra ratio of federal grants and payments to federal taxes paid is estimated to be greater than unity in most specifications states previously capturing large amounts of federal funds continue to do so under the arra stimulus

employment politics and economic recovery during the great depression in earlier studies economic historians found that political goals rather than social or humanitarian objectives motivated much of new deal spending using new information on annual state level employment for the 1930s this paper shows that while politics are still important responding to the needs of the unemployed was an important determinant of new deal spending

multiproduct cost relationships for retail fertilizer plants volume cost relationships developed from the statistical analysis of accounting data have long provided useful information for evaluating firm efficiency french previous descriptive and statistical analyses of accounting data as well as economic engineering cost studies of retail fertilizer firms have focused on a single product line anderson and miller raikes and heubrock williams foster and simpson service o rourke or have simply summarized industry accounting data akridge and downey problems associated with using accounting data to estimate statistical cost functions include a the failure to handle satisfactorily multiproduct firm cost relationships

distributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile abstractdistributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile regional studies this paper analyzes the influence of electoral concerns on investment distribution from the central government to chilean municipalities drawing upon panel data it shows that investment is mediated by pork barrel and political budget cycles as well as favouring the relatively better off areas estimations also reveal that resources are channelled to the municipalities where the vote margin in local elections is larger whereas national results are not relevant indicating that local governments lobbying capacity is prioritized over national electoral interests based on these results the implications for regional governance and for reducing the margin of arbitrary allocations are discussed

do formula based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting evidence from ghana abstract various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation in this paper we investigate a formula based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation specifically we study the sharing of resources of the district assemblies common fund dacf in ghana amongst the country s district governments over the period 1994 to 2005 we find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants per capita dacf grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower suggesting that swing districts were targeted we find evidence that dacf formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers

the effects of discretionary federal spending on parliamentary election results i introduction three compelling reasons to expect that discretionary federal spending will have a different impact on incumbent majority and opposition candidates in the canadian parliamentary system of government are only the prime minister and his appointed cabinet may propose spending or taxing initiatives the electorate only votes directly for their local member of parliament mp and if the prime minister declares a vote of confidence all majority party mps must vote with the prime minister or leave the party these three characteristics combined with the fact that the opposition does not have enough votes to successfully prevent passage of legislation make it very difficult for opposition mps to influence discretionary spending if the electorate is aware of this situation majority party candidates regardless of incumbency stand to reap the electoral benefits of additional federal discretionary spending furthermore opposition incumbents will lose votes as a consequence if majority candidates receive additional votes to some extent this must be at the expense of votes for opposition incumbents the purpose of this paper is to empirically test these two hypothesis the idea that discretionary spending can be used to influence election outcomes verges on the trite mass media discussions are rife with accusations of pork barrel politics this idea is implicitly contained the entire interest group theory of political decision making and it is formally modeled in papers such as weingast shepsle and johnsen 1981 despite the general agreement on the electoral motivations of discretionary spending empirical findings have been relatively unsuccessful in documenting either important or significant effects of discretionary spending or various other district level explanatory variables typical of this literature jacobson 1978 finds a negative and small effect of incumbent campaign spending and johannes and mcadams 1981 find no effect of case work on election outcomes as explained by fiorina 1981 rivers and fiorina 1989 and stein and bickers 1994 the presence of a simultaneous equation system has biased the empirical estimates since politicians are apt to shift resources towards those electoral districts where the election is expected to be closest ordinary least squares will underestimate the true effect stein and bickers demonstrate a negative correlation between the closeness of elections and the amount of pork barrel spending in congressional races in a more recent article case 2001 finds that federal block grants are negatively influenced by the expected closeness of the election in albania despite the recognition of a simultaneity bias attempts to overcome the problem have generally been unsuccessful a notable exception is that of levitt and snyder 1997 who uses spending outside of a district but inside a state as an instrument for spending in the district levitt and snyder find a positive and significant impact of discretionary spending on the share of the vote for incumbents in u s house elections this paper contributes to the discretionary spending and election literature in two ways using a newly created data set of canadian federal spending at the electoral district level the analysis of discretionary spending can be extended beyond the u s border and presidential system of government to a parliamentary system additionally the results contained herein provide a robustness check of levitt and snyder s methodology using instruments similar to those proposed by nagler and leighley 1992 and levitt and snyder 1997 consistent estimates indicate that increases in federal government spending and national gross domestic product gdp per capita have positive and significant effects on the share of the vote received by majority incumbents yet insignificant effects on opposition incumbents the sign of the point estimates are negative

the timing of elections in federations a disciplining device against soft budget constraints we introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints specifically we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse with synchronized elections i e simultaneous central and regional office terms or with staggered elections i e terms of office that do not coincide we find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare

a comparison of stated preference methods for environmental valuation this paper presents an empirical comparison of contingent valuation cvm and choice experiments which are used to value environmental quality changes both of these methods require individuals to state their preferences for environmental qualities however choice experiments differ from cvm in that environmental attributes are varied in an experimental design which requires respondents to make repeated choices between bundles of attributes the empirical application involved the effect of environmental quality changes arising from forest management practices on recreational moose hunting values significant differences were found between the values derived from the two methods however detailed examination of the implied choice behaviour suggested that respondents ignored substitute recreation areas in the cvm question restricting the choice experiment model to consider only the one site where quality was varied resulted in welfare estimates similar to the cvm model this highlights the importance of substitutes in environmental valuation and suggests that choice experiments may be more appropriate than cvm in some cases