tax induced emissions estimating short run emission impacts from carbon taxation under different market structures abstract this article finds that the introduction of a carbon tax increased short run carbon emissions in an imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity market the unique feature of the western australian setting is that the same carbon tax was introduced and later repealed but the market structure differed at each event at the repeal event the dominant firm had less incentive to exercise unilateral market power then the opposite result is observed emissions were lower with the tax i show how the short run impact of pollution taxation in imperfect markets depends on production technologies market structure and the size of the tax

sharing the burden for climate change mitigation in the canadian federation dividing the burden for greenhouse gas abatement amongst the provinces has proven challenging in canada and is a major factor contributing to canada s poor historic performance on greenhouse gas abatement as the country aims to achieve substantial cuts to emissions over the next decade and by mid century such burden sharing considerations are likely to be elevated in importance this paper uses a calibrated multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium model to compare a number of archetypal rules for sharing the burden of a joint commitment amongst members for the case of greenhouse gas reductions in canada because of the substantial heterogeneity amongst canadian provinces these different burden sharing rules imply signifcantly different relative abatement effort amongst provinces and also signifcantly different welfare implications when emission permits are allocated on an equal per capita basis welfare is increased in ontario british columbia quebec and manitoba and signifcantly reduced in alberta and saskatchewan in contrast when emission permits are allocated based on historic emissions alberta and saskatchewan are made better off and ontario british columbia quebec and manitoba are made worse off we compare these archetypal burden sharing rules to existing provincial emission reduction commitments and find that none of the standard burden sharing rules comes close to existing commitments we argue that the debate on burden sharing of greenhouse gas abatement in canada could be objectified if informed by coherent quantitative analysis such as the one presented here

computation techniques for intertemporal allocation of natural resources application of optimal control theory to applied problems is limited by the difficulty of numerical solutions typically terminal values for the production period price or production level have been assumed rather than optimized the use of an objective functional with explicit discounting gives direct solution values for n y t p t and rent or consumer surplus for continuous or discrete problems the method is usable for numerical solutions to problems with linear demand cost trend or expropriation risk it is illustrated with fisher s widely used discrete problem and with application to parameters representing remaining world oil resources for competitive and monopolistic assumptions

the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in economics in this paper i attempt to show that mathematical economics is unreasonably ineffective unreasonable because the mathematical assumptions are economically unwarranted ineffective because the mathematical formalizations imply non constructive and uncomputable structures a reasonable and effective mathematization of economics entails diophantine formalisms these come with natural undecidabilities and uncomputabilites in the face of this i conjecture that an economics for the future will be freer to explore experimental methodologies underpinned by alternative mathematical structures the whole discussion is framed within the context of the celebrated wignerian theme the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences

opec and the international oil market can a cartel fuel the engine of economic development abstract the opec cartel was formed to promote two economic goals one microeconomic low oil market volatility the other macroeconomic promotes economic development of its members these goals create a tension since the cartel s single tool is output quotas using this dual micro macro perspective we analyze oil exporting countries behavior we find that the effects of the cartel s choices will be reflected in oil market stability long term macroeconomic development and international oil market structure if an oil producing country cares about both oil industry profits and macroeconomic stability the goal of output stability may be inconsistent with cartel membership

opec market failure or power failure abstract the actions of opec and saudi arabia are discussed in terms of their objectives and their technical and social constraints it is concluded 1 that opec does not act as a cartel and 2 that hotelling s rule is not an important feature of pricing or production opec s more specifically saudi arabia s ideal policy is to keep price moderate to try to assure a market for their high reserves over the long run such an action would require heavy investments in capacity including in excess capacity for times of interruption of supply from other countries as in the 1990s and for times of high demand as in the 2000s the action may be inconsistent with other objectives and in any case may be too difficult to achieve

limit pricing and the in effectiveness of the carbon tax we present a theory of limit pricing monopoly in non renewable resource production facing a very inelastic demand an oil monopoly seeks to induce the highest price that does not destroy its demand unlike the conventional hotellian analysis the monopoly tolerates some ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high potential ones with limit pricing policy induced extraction changes do not obey the usual logic for example oil taxes have no effect on current oil production extraction increases when high potential substitutes are promoted but can be effectively reduced by supporting ordinary substitutes the carbon tax not only applies to oil it also penalizes its ordinary carbon substitutes whose market shares are taken over by the monopoly thus the carbon tax ambiguously affects current and long term oil production and carbon emissions

an oligopoly fringe non renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute abstract in accordance with recent empirical evidence we model the oil market as an oligopoly facing a fringe as well as competition from renewable resources within this framework we fully characterize i e for all vectors of initial resource stocks the equilibrium extraction paths of the fringe and the oligopolists we show that i the sequence of extraction in equilibrium crucially depends on the oligopolists market power ii there always exists a phase of simultaneous supply of the oligopolists and the fringe iii the oligopolists pursue a limit pricing strategy near the end of the extraction horizon and iv an increase in the reserves of the fringe may lead to a decrease in their initial supply

the political economy of opec abstract we develop a conceptual model that captures opec pricing behavior and apply it to explain the large gap observed between domestic fuel prices in opec countries and prices in the rest of the world we model opec as a cartel of nations not firms and assume that politicians use two instruments production quotas and domestic fuel consumption subsidies the cartel of nations model suggests that introduction of alternatives to petroleum products may lead opec to reduce exports and increase domestic fuel consumption the empirical analysis suggests that when opec sets production quotas it places similar weights on consumer and producer surplus but when opec countries set domestic fuel subsidies on average 6 more weight is given to consumer surplus with some of the opec countries pursuing very aggressive domestic cheap fuel policies

effectivity and constructivity in economic theory the implicit nonconstructive and noneffective contents of some aspects of general equilibrium theory are formally investigated in particular the claims of some applied computable general equilibrium cge theorists regarding the constructivity and effectivity of cge models are rigorously analyzed and shown to be unsubstantiated an attempt is also made to extract some general methodological guidelines for the meaningful mathematization of economic theory

the outlook for us oil dependence abstract oil dependence is defined as a dynamic problem of short and long run market power the potential monopoly power of an oil cartel depends on its market share and the elasticities of oil supply and demand while the economic vulnerability of oil consuming states depends most directly on the quantity of oil imported and the oil cost share of gross domestic product gdp of these factors only the market share of the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec cartel and the rate of growth of world oil demand are clearly different than they were 25 years ago opec still holds the majority of world oil and in the future will regain market share a hypothetical 2 year supply reduction in 2005 2006 similar in size to those of 1973 1974 or 1979 1980 illustrates the potential benefits to opec and harm to the us economy of a future oil price shock opec s revenues are estimated to increase by roughly 0 7 trillion while the us economy loses about 0 5 trillion strategic petroleum reserves seem ineffective against a determined multi year supply curtailment increasing the market s price responsiveness by improving the technologies of oil supply and oil demand can greatly reduce the costs of oil dependence each element of this interpretation of the oil dependence problem is well supported by previous studies this paper s contribution is to unite these elements into a coherent explanation and to point out the enormously important implications for energy policy

advancing the design of a dynamic petro dollar currency basket this study offers organization of petroleum exporting countries opec member nations a crude oil pricing currency basket based on currency liquidity in contrast with prior emphasis on opec trading patterns motivating the search for an alternative us dollar pricing of crude oil is the significant and inverse relationship r 0 82 p 0 01 between the us dollar major currencies index and crude oil price over the period january 1999 march 2009 a dynamically weighted petro dollar currency basket is proposed based on the five currency claims us dollar euro british pound japanese yen and swiss franc and their varying proportions of foreign exchange reserves held by central banks the major currencies us dollar index is compared against the proposed petro dollar index to reveal an average us 8 1 billion annual gain in favor of the petro dollar currency basket offering opec members a revenue stream of diversified and highly liquid currencies to transition away from complete dependence on the us dollar crude oil pricing the proposed petro dollar crude oil pricing schema offers opec a crude oil price dynamically denominated in currencies reflecting the global use and importance of crude oil this paper concludes with implementation issues facing a move toward the dynamically weighted petro dollar crude oil pricing schema

iranian oil free zone and international oil prices abstract one of the main elements of economic sanctions against iran due to its nuclear and military programs is crude oil exportation restrictions in addition to investment in iranian energy related projects senders of such sanction are interested in understanding the impacts of such embargos on international oil prices we apply unrestricted vector autoregressive var model using impulse response functions irf and variance decomposition analysis vda tools with annual data from 1965 to 2012 to analyze the dynamic response of international oil prices to iranian oil export sanction controlling for the supply of non iranian oil the world gdp per capita and post islamic revolution exogenous dummy variables we show that international oil prices respond negatively and statistically significant to increasing shock in absolute negative changes of the iranian oil exports our proxy of iran oil sanctions following the first 2 years after shock the main reason is the positive response of the non iranian oil supply to negative shocks in iranian oil exports filling the missing supply of iranian oil in international markets

corporate social responsibility theories mapping the territory the corporate social responsibility csr field presents not only a landscape of theories but also a proliferation of approaches which are controversial complex and unclear this article tries to clarify the sit uation mapping the territory by classifying the main csr theories and related approaches in four groups 1 instrumental theories in which the corporation is seen as only an instrument for wealth creation and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results 2 political theories which concern themselves with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena 3 integrative theories in which the corporation is focused on the satisfaction of social demands and 4 ethical theories based on ethical responsibilities of corporations to society in practice each csr theory presents four dimensions related to profits political performance social demands and ethical values the findings suggest the necessity to develop a new theory on the business and society relationship which should integrate these four dimensions

strategic resource dependence we consider a situation where an exhaustible resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a substitute but there is a time to build delay for the substitute we find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the hotelling model 1931 are reversed over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch under such a threat of demand change the supply does not reflect the current resource scarcity but it compensates the buyer for delaying the transition to the substitute the analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence

natural resource economics under the rule of hotelling abstract natural resource stocks held in situ are physical assets equilibrium in the assets market requires that their rates of return be such that their owners are just willing to hold on to them rather than invest elsewhere i discuss a number of factors relating to the evolution of extraction costs to the durability of the resource to market structure and to uncertainty that are important in correctly characterizing the rate of return on holding exhaustible natural resource stocks the emphasis is put on how those factors can potentially help bridge the gap between the basic hotelling s rule of natural resource exploitation and the historical behaviour of the flow price of a number of resources i also highlight some theoretical and empirical issues that need further attention

crude oil price fluctuations and saudi arabia s behaviour this study attempts to explain why crude oil prices fluctuate the main cause being the quota regime which characterises the opec agreements given that the saudi oil supply is inelastic in the short term a shock in the oil market is accommodated by an immediate price change by contrast a dominant firm behaviour in the long term causes an output change which is accompanied by a smaller price change this explains why oil prices overshoot the results of a general equilibrium model applied to saudi arabia support this analysis they also indicate that saudi arabia does not have any incentive for altering the crude oil market equilibrium with either positive or negative supply shocks as its welfare declines and that it has an incentive disincentive for intervening if a negative positive demand shock hits the crude oil market a second set of simulations is designed to understand what kind of oecd policy might help to bring down prices a tax cut would worsen the situation whereas policies that can increase the price elasticity of demand seem to be very effective

carbon taxation opec and the end of oil abstract i develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development r d to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil in equilibrium the cartel is forced to deter the substitute which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time credible carbon taxes are below the pigovian level implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality much less capture resource rents without carbon pricing the importer curtails long run pollution using a costly r d programme normatively climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green r d programmes only

on quota violations of opec members abstract over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for opec countries however the academic literature on opec focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns this paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain opec members incentives for abiding or violating quotas we first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice the model highlights the trade off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007 we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and opec s quota system disciplining its members in bad times

media legitimation effects in the market for initial public offerings in this study we argue that media provided information affects investors impressions of newly public firms in 225 initial public offerings ipos the volume of mediaprovided information had a negative diminishing relationship with underpricing and a positive diminishing relationship with stock turnover on the first day of trading the relationship between the tenor of media provided information and underpricing increases at a nonlinear rate and decreases similarly for turnover findings provide important evidence that publicly available information not only reflects ipos legitimacy but also adds to their legitimacy and influences investor behavior in the last 20 years an increasing amount of research on markets has been conducted from a social constructionist perspective emphasizing how social structures enhance the flow of useful and credible information that market participants use to reduce the uncertainty of market exchanges e g aldrich fiol 1994 zuckerman 1999 further recent organizational research has begun to stress the influence of information intermediaries such as financial analysts and the media on mar

is there really a green paradox abstract in the absence of a co2 tax the anticipation of a cheaper renewable backstop increases current emissions of co2 since the date at which renewables are phased in is brought forward and more generally future emissions of co2 will decrease the effect on global warming is unclear green welfare falls if the backstop is relatively expensive and full exhaustion of fossil fuels is optimal but may increase if the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to the cost of extracting the last drop of fossil fuels plus marginal global warming damages as then it is attractive to leave more fossil fuels unexploited and thus limit co2 emissions we establish these results by analyzing depletion of non renewable fossil fuels followed by a switch to a clean renewable backstop paying attention to timing of the switch and the amount of fossil fuels remaining unexploited we also discuss the potential for limit pricing when the non renewable resource is owned by a monopolist finally we show that if backstops are already used and more backstops become economically viable as the price of fossil fuels rises a lower cost of the backstop will either postpone fossil fuel exhaustion or leave more fossil fuel in situ thus boosting green welfare however if a market economy does not internalize global warming externalities and renewables have not kicked in yet full exhaustion of fossil fuel will occur in finite time and a backstop subsidy always curbs green welfare

modeling opec behavior economic and political alternatives the predominant approach to modeling opec behavior depends upon the assumption that economic self interest provides the best predictor of the cartel s price and production strategy with rational monopoly behavior the exogenous characteristics of the oil market determine an optimal price path for the group but opec members have diverse economic as well as political goals and uncertainty about oil market responses provides substantial leeway to argue about what is optimal an examination of the five key opec price decisions since 1973 shows that an operational code of advancing political priorities on arab israeli issues while deflecting security challenges better explains saudi arabia s decision making than the economic optimizing approach moreover no economic formula alone is consistent with saudi behavior the balance of internal and external forces of a political or security character on saudi leadership suggests more of a tilt toward price hawkishness than pure considerations of economic self interest would indicate this tilt is reinforced by a systematic weakness on the part of the u s government to exercise a sustained countervailing influence on the kingdom on behalf of moderation

cartel formation and oligopoly structure a new assessment of the crude oil market while economic theorists regard opec as a perfect example of a long lasting cartel energy economists strongly deny such view applying the ideas of new empirical industrial organization a market description is derived cartel theory and empirical evidence fit together well stable long lasting cartels can be explained only for subclasses of market models and exactly such type of model is obtained here a variety of different market models is tested opec and the market for crude oil is best described by a price leader model

why do oil prices jump or fall this paper discusses theories that can explain the zig zags of oil prices in general and in particular the recent jump more precisely the following explanations are discussed homo oeconomicus pure profit maximization if demand is dynamic and convex price reaction function price increases and respectively declines depend on capacity utilization cartelization contingent on output or revenues of which the latter can lead to backward bending supply segments and multiple equilibria statistical descriptions mean reversion homo politicus i e arguments for price hikes that are rational public choice despite the long run economic loss finally two approaches are presented that emphasize demand uncertainty one extending the above mentioned dynamic demand framework and the other considers a dynamic game of non competitive suppliers with lumpy investments summing up a demand shock seems to be the most suitable explanation of today s high prices indeed a shock given that international energy agency iea and department of energy doe were promising just a couple of years ago that we are going to have lots of oil at low prices while others and in particular politics have surprisingly little or no explanatory power

ordering the extraction of polluting nonrenewable resources energy markets are often characterized by the use of multiple nonrenewable resources such as coal and natural gas with different pollution characteristics the same resource may have different qualities as when high and low sulfur coal is used to generate electricity multiple resources are used in providing transportation services such as cars running on gasoline or plug in hybrids that may be fueled by electricity produced from coal when these nonrenewable resources contribute differentially to pollution what is the opti mal sequence of extraction over time harold hotelling 1931 developed the classical theory of extraction of a nonrenewable resource orris c herfindahl 1967 extended the hotelling model by considering many resources with different unit costs of extraction and proposed the least cost first principle extraction must be ordered by cost with the cheapest resource used first others have examined whether herfindahl s model remains valid in a variety of situations in a general equilibrium setting see murray kemp and ngo v long 1980 tracy r lewis 1982 in the presence of setup costs g rard gaudet moreaux and stephen w salant 2001 under het erogeneous demands chakravorty and darrell l krulce 1994 and when the extraction rate is constrained jean pierre amigues et al 1998 stephen p holland 2003 in these studies following hotelling and herfindahl resources were differentiated by cost alone in this paper we abstract from cost considerations and focus on how the sequence of extraction may be affected when resources are differentiated only by their pollution character istics we consider two resources one more polluting than the other without loss of generality consider coal to be the dirty resource and natural gas the clean one both may be used to generate electricity environmental regulation is imposed through a cap on the stock of pollution this may be a stylized approximation of an international agreement such as the kyoto protocol which aims to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 1 with heterogeneity in pollution the results are nonintuitive and do not depend on the emis sion rates of the resources when the economy is already at its allowable stock of pollution the clean natural gas is used first and use of the dirty coal is postponed to the future this is what one would expect armed with insights from the herfindahl model however when the economy starts from below the ceiling and accumulates pollution coal may be used first and use of the clean natural gas is postponed the optimal strategy is to benefit from natural dilution by build ing the stock of pollution as quickly as possible this is done by burning coal rather than natural

extraction of a resource with a substitute for some of its uses important resources e g oil may be used for several purposes there may exist good substitutes for such a resource in some of its uses but no substitute in other uses the price and extraction paths for the resource are analysed for several market structures some of these paths differ substantially from the corresponding paths for the case of no substitute and for the case of a substitute for all the resource s uses in particular a jump in the resource price may occur l extraction d une ressource quand il existe un substitut pour certains des usages qu on peut en faire certaines ressources importantes comme 1 huile par exemple peuvent etre utilisees a plusieurs fins dans certains cas il se peut qu il existe des substituts pour certains usages qu on peut en faire alors que dans d autres cas il n existe pas de substituts l auteur examine la tarification et les diverse strategies d extraction dans des structure de marches differentes certaines de ces strategies d extraction different substantiellement de celles qui auraient ete utilisees soit dans le cas oiu aucun substitut n existe soit dans le cas ou substitut existe pour tous les usages qu on peut faire de la ressource en particulier on peut observer un saut dans le prix de la ressource

the problem of the commons still unsettled after 100 years the problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when katharine coman led off the first issue of the american economic review as the us and other economies have grown the carrying capacity of the planet in regard to natural resources and environmental quality has become a greater concern particularly for commonproperty and open access resources the focus of this article is on some important unsettled problems of the commons within the realm of natural resources there are special challenges associated with renewable resources which are frequently characterized by open access an important example is the degradation of openaccess fisheries critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality a key contribution of economics has been the development of market based approaches to environmental protection these instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty first century global climate change jel q15 q21 q22 q25 q54

double limit pricing abstract we study oil extraction by a monopolist who faces demand from a climate aware and a climate ignorant region a renewable perfect substitute for oil is available at constant unit cost the climate aware region uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments due to heterogeneity in climate policies between regions the oil price path possibly contains two limit pricing phases we specify conditions under which a tightening of climate policies results in lower initial carbon emissions a renewables subsidy and a carbon tax effectively force the monopolist to sell more oil to the climate ignorant region during the stage when demand from the climate aware region has already vanished we calibrate the model and numerically investigate climate damage and welfare effects of the policies of the climate aware region we find that both the carbon tax and a renewables subsidy lower climate damage even though cumulative emissions are fixed

does opec still exist as a cartel an empirical investigation the aim of this paper is to determine if opec acts as a cartel by testing whether the production decisions of the different countries are coordinated and if they have an influence on oil prices relying on cointegration and causality tests in both time series and panel settings our findings show that the opec influence has evolved through time following the changes in the oil pricing system while the influence of opec is found to be important just after the counter oil shock our results show that opec is a price taker on the majority of the considered sub periods finally by dividing opec between savers and spenders we show that it acts as a cartel mainly with a subgroup of its members

does oilrig activity react to oil price changes an empirical investigation in this paper we analyze how oilrig activity in different non opec regions is affected by the crude oil price we estimate relationships between oilrig activity and crude oil prices using dynamic regression models augmented with latent components capturing trend and seasonality the results generally show a positive relationship between oilrig activity and the crude oil price but the strength of the relationship differs across regions overall there seems to be a clear relationship between the oil industry structure in the region and the oilrig activity s reaction to price changes on average the long run price elasticity for oilrig activity in non opec countries is around unity

monopoly unilateral climate policies and limit pricing abstract we examine the behavior of a fossil fuel monopolist who faces demand from two regions a climate club and the rest of the world row each region is able to produce a perfect substitute for fossil energy at constant marginal costs the climate club uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments the row is policy inactive we fully characterize the market equilibrium and show that due to differences in climate policies between the climate club and the row the monopolistic fossil fuel supplier may choose for two limit pricing phases to postpone entry of renewables producers first in the climate club and later in the row as soon as energy demand from the climate club shifts from fossil fuels to renewables the monopolist abruptly increases the fossil price for the row

protectionist oil policies a dynamic comparison for the usa rising us oil imports have spawned a variety of policies for increasing energy security we provide a qualitative comparison of policies using a dynamic optimal control model thirty year price and output paths for opec and the usa are simulated assuming that us producers are competitive and opec is a dominant firm we find that the policies have quite different effects on imports and welfare the tariff reduces imports the most followed by the gasoline tax a per unit tariff and gasoline tax are costly in terms of us welfare whereas an ad valorem tariff can both lower imports and enhance us welfare

the empirical role of the exchange rate on the crude oil price formation this paper adopts a novel empirical approach to the crude oil price formation for the purpose of understanding the price reactions of opec member countries to changes in the exchange rate of the us dollar against other major currencies and prices of other members the results are broadly consistent with the view of the absence of a unified opec determined price in the international crude market literature in addition the results also highlight a cross regional dimension of the crude oil market

sequential development and exploitation of an exhaustible resource do monopoly rights promote conservation this paper explores the problem of sequential exploitation of exhaustible resources by a monopolist when a setup cost must be incurred to access the next pool under certain circumstances the monopolist will always follow a more conservationist path of extraction and delay the introduction of new resource pools compared to a social planner however with other forms of consumer demand the monopolist may exhaust the resource more quickly especially if many new options will follow these results may apply especially to depletable resources like antibiotics or biotech products for which significant research and development costs are required followed by monopoly rights conferred by patents

patterns of attention to renewable energy in the british farming press from 1980 to 2013 abstract the farming sector is a major actor in developing renewable energy providing sites feedstock and investment media coverage can both drive and reflect levels of interest in renewable energy and affect policy support and farmer decision making about deployment this paper presents a content analysis of attention to renewable energy in the british farming press from 1980 to 2013 identifying the topics which sparked sustained media interest cycles of increased attention to specific types of renewable energy are made evident through quantification of article frequencies and qualitative analysis of content the findings contribute to the explanation of the role of information in the diffusion of renewable energy wind energy and liquid biofuels have received the most attention with multiple attention cycles whereas photovoltaics and anaerobic digestion have received focused attention only in recent years policy changes particularly support measures emerge as the most important driver of media attention although public controversies particularly in relation to wind energy lead to longer periods of attention attention typically increases when opportunities in renewable energy emerge and then quickly shifts to a longer stage of focused attention in which opportunities problems and solutions are explored and advice is offered before attention declines the media thus clearly play a role in informing farmers about opportunities arising in relation to renewable energy technology and policy developments but are less helpful in providing on going and consistent information about recurrent and more complex problems thus the farming press appears likely to have the strongest impact on early adopters of renewable technologies but is unlikely to contribute to diffusion at later stages when potential adopters are less willing to bear uncertainties

u s oil dependence 2014 is energy independence in sight abstract the importance of reducing u s oil dependence may have changed in light of developments in the world oil market over the past two decades since 2005 increased domestic production and decreased oil use have cut u s import dependence in half the direct costs of oil dependence to the u s economy are estimated under four u s energy information administration scenarios to 2040 the key premises of the analysis are that the primary oil market failure is the use of market power by opec and that u s economic vulnerability is a result of the quantity of oil consumed the lack of readily available economical substitutes and the quantity of oil imported monte carlo simulations of future oil market conditions indicate that the costs of u s oil dependence are likely to increase in constant dollars but decrease relative to u s gross domestic product unless oil resources are larger than estimated by the u s energy information administration reducing oil dependence therefore remains a valuable goal for u s energy policy and an important co benefit of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions

estimating and forecasting the real prices of crude oil a data rich model using a dynamic model averaging dma approach given that oil price fluctuations have been of great interest for macroeconomics in the recent years due to its important implications for future inflation economic growth and policy making the aim of this paper is to estimate and forecast west texas intermediate wti crude oil prices using a large monthly dataset that covers the period from march 1983 to december 2011 to achieve this aim forecasting with factor models offers a usual approach that utilizes large datasets however a forecasting model which simply includes all factors in state space equation and does not allow for time varying may be not suitable with a highly volatile market such as oil market to overcome these limitations an approach that accounts both for parameter and model uncertainty is employed in particular this study uses the dynamic model averaging dma approach suggested by koop and korobilis 2012 the key element of the dma approach is that it allows both for model and parameter to vary at each point of time by doing so the dma is robust to structural breaks empirical findings show that dma approach outperforms any other alternative model used in the forecasting exercise results also show that there is model but not parameter variation in this oil price forecasting exercise finally the findings suggest that the dma approach provides a better proxy of expected spot prices than future prices

in pursuit of monopoly power recent quantitative work in industrial economics this paper reviews empirical work in industrial organization devoted to the question of inferring the existence of monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes like profits and prices the discussion covers inter industry work long conventional in the area newer developments in intra industry analysis and case studies and concludes with some remarks on a small but growing body of work assessing market dynamics the wide range of studies reviewed all generally reveal that market power exists in many industries

on monopoly power in extractive resource markets abstract potential monopoly power in extractive resource markets is reduced by the depletability of reserves this paper examines the dependence of monopoly power on resource rent and on uncertainty over future reserve levels a model is developed that treats reserves as inventories that fluctuate stochastically over time as a result of exploration development and production activities solutions of the model illustrate how output and monopoly power vary with the elasticity of demand rent as a fraction of price and the variance of reserve fluctuations it is shown that uncertainty over future reserves can speed up production and by reducing resource rent restore part of the monopoly power otherwise lost because of depletion antitrust implications are discussed with reference to several resources

opec and cheating revisiting the kinked demand curve abstract given a formal or tacit group agreement by an oligopoly such as opec it is still necessary to understand what pricing and output decisions individual members actually make the well known kinked demand curve model of oligopoly behaviour is useful in this regarg the model is usually applied to a price and market share fixing oligopoly in a deterministic world with appropriate modifications it can be applied to opec as a price fixing cartel with varying degrees of cohesion from 1973 1986 and as a quantity fixing cartel since 1986 operating in an uncertain world

opec the seven sisters and oil market dominance an evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling approach abstract a methodological toolkit comprised of evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling is used to study opec and the seven sisters as they struggled for control over global petroleum markets during the 1960s and 1970s an evolutionary game theory model incorporates heterogeneous populations energy specific variables and behavioral considerations to capture the fundamentals of the applied problem an agent based model is used to provide detailed results and demonstrate the importance of the natural resource to the outcome of the model

the role of infomediaries csr in the business press during 2000 2009 given the important role that business media play in corporate life scarce attention has been paid to the role of media in the construction and popularization of corporate social responsibility c

opec and the u s oil import tariff open loop nash extraction plans of exhaustible resource producers in which producers take the plans of others as given are time consistent but proposed open loop oil import tariffs are almost always time inconsistent the paper derives a time consistent open loop nash tariff that can be readily computed for both competitive and a nash cournot specification of the oil market the authors illustrate the time sequence of the optimal import tariff for a simple model of the united states facing a duopolistic version of opec and a comparative fringe of oil producers and compare the outcome with the competitive equilibrium copyright 1991 by royal economic society

opec behavior a test of alternative hypotheses since interpretations of past and future oil price patterns depends on the model chosen the author tests and compares alternative theories of opec as a first step in validating the choice on any one model the results show that among opec countries the partial market sharing cartel model is the only model not rejected by at least some of the 11 members and gives the best explanation of production in comparison with 11 non opec countries the competitive model could not be rejected for 10 of the 11 non opec producers this raises the question of why if opec is a cartel friedman s predictions have not come true and introduces new questions for future research 19 references 3 tables

an analysis of factors affecting price volatility of the us oil market abstract this paper studies the price volatility of the crude oil market by examining the market structure of opec the stable and unstable demand structure and related elasticity of demand in particular the impacts of prosperity and recession of the world economy and the resulting demand shift on crude oil price are investigated the error correction model is used to estimate the demand relations and related elasticity the income effect on demand functions is evaluated to shed light on future prices a simulation of potential oil prices under different scenarios on a cut of one million barrels per day by opec is evaluated from our simulation given the 4 cut in opec production the oil price is expected to increase unless the recession is severe the magnitude and scope of a price hike would be diminished if non opec or domestic production were greatly expanded

how do oil producers respond to oil demand shocks abstract this paper analyzes the response of international oil producers to demand induced changes in the price of crude oil during 1975 2011 focusing on potential differences between opec and non opec countries the goal is to derive consistent estimates of the short run price elasticity of crude oil supply at the country level i find that oil producers hardly respond to demand shocks within the same month and that the corresponding impact price elasticities of supply are statistically indistinguishable from zero while there is little evidence of differences in the dynamic responses to a typical flow demand shock on average over the sample period opec members seem to curtail production in response to a speculative demand shock whereas non opec production expands significantly flow and speculative demand shocks account for a nontrivial fraction of the total variability in country level crude oil supply

optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium we analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with an externality through climate change from using fossil energy our central result is a simple formula for the marginal externality damage of emissions or equivalently for the optimal carbon tax this formula which holds under quite plausible assumptions reveals that the damage is proportional to current gdp with the proportion depending only on three factors i discounting ii the expected damage elasticity how many percent of the output flow is lost from an extra unit of carbon in the atmosphere and iii the structure of carbon depreciation in the atmosphere thus the stochastic values of future output consumption and the atmospheric co2 concentration as well as the paths of technology whether endogenous or exogenous and population and so on all disappear from the formula we find that the optimal tax should be a bit higher than the median or most well known estimates in the literature we also formulate a parsimonious yet comprehensive and easily solved model allowing us to compute the optimal and market paths for the use of different sources of energy and the corresponding climate change we find coal rather than oil to be the main threat to economic welfare largely due to its abundance we also find that the costs of inaction are particularly sensitive to the assumptions regarding the substitutability of different energy sources and technological progress

clustering in crude oil prices and the target pricing zone hypothesis abstract this paper studies the target pricing zone tpz hypothesis for crude oil by examining price clustering in the dollar digit it is hypothesized that price clustering occurs within an established tpz if opec is able to defend the upper and lower bounds through output changes the results show that prices strongly cluster around the dollar digit value of 9 within the tpz sub periods but not outside the sub periods furthermore the degree of clustering declines when production capacity utilization is high and when production significantly exceeds quotas consistent with opec s inability to defend the zone nine centered clustering also results in lower contemporaneous and next day volatility these results support the target pricing zone hypothesis of crude oil

opec vs us shale analyzing the shift to a market share strategy abstract in november 2014 opec announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share oil market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher cost producers notably us shale oil out of the market over the next year crude oil prices crashed with large repercussions for the global economy we present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a regime switch by opec i the growth of us shale oil production ii the slowdown of global oil demand iii reduced cohesiveness of the opec cartel and iv production ramp ups in other non opec countries while v reductions in us shale costs act against these factors we show that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014 2015 the model is calibrated to oil market data it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a market share strategy thereafter and explains large oil price swings as well as realistically high levels of opec output

on the economic determinants of oil production theoretical analysis and empirical evidence for small exporting countries abstract in this paper decisions regarding production in oil exporting countries are studied by means of theoretical analysis and empirical investigation in particular we aim at describing the relationship between oil production levels and changes in the world oil demand and prices intertemporal production decisions by a representative oil producer are modeled by means of a partial equilibrium model in this theoretical model oil producers are subject to exogenous shocks in world oil consumption and prices oil companies can change output levels only by incurring a fixed cost results from the simulation of this model show a strong relationship between oil production and changes in world oil consumption on the contrary the effects of changes in real oil prices on oil production decisions seem to be much lower results from the simulation of the theoretical model are then empirically investigated using time series econometric techniques the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that oil producing countries are characterized by different responses to changes in world oil demand and in real oil prices for many countries production rapidly adjusts to changes in consumption whereas responses of oil production to innovations in real oil prices are found to be not statistically significant in addition when non linearities in the relationship between world oil demand prices and output levels are allowed for evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks to exogenous variables on output levels is found for some countries

heterogeneous noncompliance with opec s oil production cuts abstract in this study we explore the heterogeneous noncompliance behavior among ten member nations of the organization of the petroleum countries opec overall we find that the three top oil producers saudi arabia iran and venezuela and the four relatively low oil producers libya indonesia algeria and qatar exhibit higher cheating frequencies and magnitudes while they tend to offset their peers conduct conversely the three mid oil producers uae nigeria and kuwait display much lower frequencies and magnitudes of noncompliance with opec s administered quotas while they largely demonstrate herding behavior among their peers the volatilities of the respective cheating magnitudes are rather similar across the three clusters though this study contributes to the economic literature by further illuminating the operational mode of opec and by exposing its three main subsets its interdependent structure and its members customary behavioral patterns

oil production responses to price changes an empirical application of the competitive model to opec and non opec countries abstract falling oil prices over the last decade accompanied by over production by some opec members and the growth of non opec supply warrant further empirical investigation of the competitive model to ascertain production behavior a supply function based on a modification of griffin s model is estimated using data from 1973 1997 the sample period unlike griffin s however includes phases of price increase 1970s and price decrease 1980s 1990s thus providing a better framework for examining production behavior using the competitive model the opec results do not support the competitive hypothesis instead a negative and significant price elasticity of supply is obtained this result offers partial support for the target revenue theory for most of the non opec members the estimates support the competitive model opec s loss of market share and the drop in the share of oil based energy should signal adjustments in price and quantity based on a competitive world market for crude oil

efficiency inducing taxation for a monopolistically supplied depletable resource author s bergstrom ted cross john porter dick abstract we show that for a depletable resource if the competitive time path of prices is known and if the profit function is concave then there is an easily described time path of taxes and or subsidies that would induce a monopolist to follow an efficient time path of extraction

modeling opec behavior theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions abstract theories of opec such as price leadership cartel or game theoretic models suggest an incentive for opec members to expand their production capacity well above current levels in order to maximize revenues yet individual opec members consistently explore for and develop oil fields at a level well below their potential the cause of low oil exploration and development efforts among opec members and even some non opec members may have to do with risk aversion this paper describes an alternative theory for opec behavior based on risk aversion using a two piece non neumann morgenstern utility function similar to fishburn and kochenberger 1979 decision science 10 503 518 and friedman and savage 1948 journal of political economy 56 the model shows possible low oil production behavior

aggregate production planning for process industries under oligopolistic competition abstract we consider a competitive version of the traditional aggregate production planning model with capacity constraints in the general case multiple products are produced by a few competing producers oligopoly with limited capacities production quantities prices and consequently profits depend on production and allocation decisions of each producer in addition there is competition for the raw material whose supplies are limited and where prices reflect these limitations such situations have recently occurred in several process industry settings including petro refining petrochemicals basic chemicals cement fertilizers pharmaceuticals rubber paper food processing and metals we use a successive bertrand cournot framework to address this problem and to determine optimal production quantities prices and profits at the producers and at the raw material supplier our analysis allows a new way to understand and evaluate the marginal value of additional capacity when there is competition for the market and raw materials

on efficiency inducing taxation for a non renewable resource monopolist the problem of using taxes to induce a monopolist supplier of a non renewable resource to extract efficiently has been solved under the assumption that the government has perfect information about the monopolist s cost function and reserves and is able to precommit to an entire sequence of taxes over time we extend this literature by constructing an efficiency inducing tax mechanism that does not require the government to have any information about the cost function or reserves and which does not require it to precommit to a sequence of taxes over time

are biofuels the culprit opec food and fuel the food commodity price boom of 2003 2008 was the most notable in the past several decades having a substantial impact on global economic activity it affected developing nations by impacting real output the balance of payments government budgetary positions and most important the well being of the very poor high commodity prices also affected developed countries by transmitting business cycle disturbances and creating inflationary pressures several recent studies tried to identify and quantify the factors that caused the food commodity price boom of 2003 2008 see for instance isabel vansteenkiste 2009 these studies suggest that one key factor is growth in demand which since the 1980s has outpaced growth in supply other studies argued that biofuel is the culprit since it increases demand for staple crops see for instance donald mitchell 2008 all these studies however assumed competitive markets and did not consider the impact of biofuel on energy costs to farmers moreover they ignored the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec these studies leave us perplexed regarding the true impact of biofuel on food commodity prices was it or was it not an important contributor to the recent food commodity boom we believe that to answer this question the interactions between energy and food must be modeled and opec introduced and the impact of biofuels compared with other factors that are argued by the literature to be important this paper aims to analyze the multiple contributions of energy and biofuels to the increase are biofuels the culprit opec food and fuel

opec and demand response to crude oil prices abstract this paper investigates demand response to crude oil price movements before and after the recent global financial and economic crisis it employs several market power indices to structurally estimate price elasticities a newly developed market power index for crude oil markets is implemented in this approach opec is the central player and acts as a dominant producer in the global oil market we quantify how a change in market structure such as changes in marginal cost of production would contribute to market power exercise of opec and have an ultimate impact on price elasticity of demand for oil our price elasticity predictions fall in a range reported in the literature however estimates for pre crisis deviate from the post crisis ones in fact demand response to crude oil prices has almost doubled during the crisis this severe change in price response can be associated with record price levels caused by supply shortages and surge in alternative renewable energy resources the key advantages of this methodology over the existing literature are that it is simple to use and estimates price elasticity using a competition framework without specifying demand supply function s and utilizes commonly observable market variables that can be applied to any admissible data frequency

on richard goodwin s elementary economics from the higher standpoint the aim of the article is to make an appraisal and an evaluation of richard goodwin s elementary economics from the higher standpoint a book which should be included amongst the few masterpieces of the economic literature of the past century still much worth reading and studying for the fresh and relevant message it conveys the book was published in 1970 10 years after sraffa s production of commodities by means of commodities and in a year in which a lively debate in capital theory between the two cambridges was coming to a close the first neoclassical synthesis was already accomplished and signs of what later became the rational expectations revolution were beginning to be seen the article brings to the fore the most significant aspects of goodwin s original contributions to economic analysis which are magnificently disseminated throughout the whole book in a pedagogical though rigorous and refined exposition not yet surpassed

investment and operating choice oil and natural gas futures prices and drilling activity abstract we present evidence that changes in oil and natural gas field investment measured by drilling rig use respond positively to changes in the futures prices of oil and natural gas consistent with predictions based upon value maximizing behavior these results hold for world regions dominated by private independent oil companies but not national oil companies in those cases where futures price changes are identified as drivers the role of spot prices is either absent or weak the results are robust to several alternative specifications including controls for changes in rig productivity

determinants of opec production implications for opec behavior we estimate models that identify the economic and organizational determinants of crude oil production by individual opec nations to clarify the interpretation of econometric results we model production with specifications that resolve the statistical ordering of variables and estimate models with techniques that can cope with stochastic trends in the time series we also analyze the short run dynamics for asymmetries that may carry important insights about opec behavior results indicate that quotas are an important determinant of production and their effects generally are symmetric which implies that opec is an organization that influences production and ultimately prices real prices generally have a positive effect on production and the size of this effect may depend on spare capacity which implies that opec behaviors also embody competitive elements finally all nations other than saudi arabia show some form of production sharing behavior which may imply that opec shares mismatches between the call for opec production and opec quotas

the market power of opec 1973 2001 we apply a multi equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of opec as a whole or different sub groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973 2001 our results indicate that the producers outside opec can be described as competitive producers taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits the opec members do not fit the behaviour of price taking producers our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for opec underpin the potential market power of the producer group and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies on the other hand our findings indicate that neither opec nor different sub groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973 1994 however we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit opec core as from 1994 thus although opec clearly has affected the market price the producer g

do opec announcements influence oil prices abstract this paper investigates the effect of opec production decisions increase cut maintain on both wti and brent crude oil prices between q1 1991 and q1 2015 by employing the event study methodology and by using two indices as benchmarks bci and s p gsci we employ an egarch model to take into account the high volatility of oil prices and some stylized facts characterizing this volatility we find that the impact of opec s announcements on oil prices i evolves over time and among decisions ii is more significant for production cut and maintain iii is different for wti and brent prices and iv is sensitive to the benchmark index moreover opec s decisions depend on the exploration and extraction cost of more expensive unconventional oil resources

testing the hypothesis of collusive behavior among opec members abstract this paper presents a test to discriminate among collusive and competitive behavior by producers of exhaustible resources in contrast to previous studies griffin 1985 jones 1990 which are based on static models our approach is based on of the dynamic implications of the optimization problem faced by a competitive producer we use this framework to test the hypothesis of collusive behavior within opec between 1983 and 1991 the existence of future markets allows us to sidestep the difficult issues related to the estimation of future prices and demand

opec and other commodity cartels a comparison abstract the economic literature provides specific characteristics for cartels although the theory of international cartels is not well developed in the literature and every cartel is unique some of these characteristics exist in each cartel this study investigates the existence of these characteristics in six known commodity cartels including opec in addition it compares the oil companies cartel the seven sisters to opec and summarizes the findings of opec econometric models developed in the literature in the last 25 years and concludes that the results do not support cartel or competitive models for opec although other cartels are more successful than opec many books and articles in economics use opec as a cartel example neither statistical tests nor theory support the popular use of opec as a cartel example indeed this article concludes that opec is composed of saudi arabia the dominant world producer plus several distinct sub groups and that separate models are required to explain the behavior of each assigning the power of some opec members to opec has caused confusion about its behavior recent opec success is attributed to political natural and technical capacity limitations in the oil fields that prevented countries from cheating on their quota in other words opec adherence to the quota except for saudi arabia is anything but voluntary

on comparing monopoly and competition in exhaustible resource exploitation abstract it is widely believed that exhaustible resource monopolies do not enjoy as much market power as standard non resource monopolies and may even produce in a socially optimal way we argue that this paradoxical result arises from an inappropriate comparison methodology when similar assumptions are applied to the resource and the conventional cases we show that the resource monopoly behaves as expected i e restricts supply

estimation of user s cost for a depletable resource such as oil abstract this paper presents an attempt to derive an empirically tractable definition of the user s cost for a depletable resource such as oil it is shown that in an intertemporal optimization framework the user s cost can be measured by the marginal replacement cost mrc of the resource defined as the cost of adding one unit to the stock of the resource this definition is applied to data for the middle east based on an econometric analysis of the proven reserves production process the user s cost is estimated for that area for the period 1960 76 the empirical results show that the user s cost is but a small fraction of the market price of crude oil for the period under consideration

nonparametric estimation of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss we apply nonparametric regression models to estimation of demand curves of the type most often used in applied research from the demand curve estimators we derive estimates of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss which are the most widely used welfare and economic efficiency measures in areas of economics such as public finance we also develop tests of the symmetry and downward sloping properties of compensated demand we work out asymptotic normal sampling theory for kernel and series nonparametric estimators as well as for the parametric case the paper includes an application to gasoline demand empirical questions of interest here are the shape of the demand curve and the average magnitude of welfare loss from a tax on gasoline in this application we compare parametric and nonparametric estimates of the demand curve calculate exact and approximate measures of consumers surplus and deadweight loss and give standard error estimates we also analyze the sensitivity of the welfare measures to components of nonparametric regression estimators such as the number of terms in a series approximation

the equilibrium price range of oil economics politics and uncertainty in the formation of oil prices abstract this paper attempts to clarify the articulation between economic and political factors in the formation of petroleum prices it begins with defining the political factors then it gives a definition of the dynamic equilibrium price of a mineral commodity market the essential point is that when actors control significant low cost reserves and will not or cannot adopt behaviour of a substantial economic rationality then the economic analysis does not allow a unique dynamic equilibrium price to be determined however it does permit definition of an equilibrium price range within which political preferences may be expressed finally the paper draws some conclusions on what could be discussed within the scope of a new oil producer consumer dialogue

will disruptions in opec oil supply have permanent impact on the global oil market abstract opec has long been a major stakeholder and strong player in the global energy market especially in the petroleum sub sector in recent time however there have been questions over the influence of opec in the sub sector due to changing petroleum production landscape specifically as a result of the discovery of unconventional energy resources in north america and emergence of non opec petroleum producing and exporting countries this development could have significant effect on the global energy market and the macro economy of opec member countries the stationarity or otherwise of opec oil production supply has important implications for determining whether fluctuations in opec market supply has temporary or permanent effect using the zivot andrews structural break stationarity test and production data of opec member countries from 1980 to 2011 this paper investigates whether fluctuations in opec market supply has temporary or permanent effect the empirical analysis shows that for only 5 opec members nigeria saudi arabia ecuador kuwait and uae is the hypothesis of unit root rejected this implies that for the five 5 opec members the effects of shocks to oil production are not permanent and future pattern of oil production can be predicted following past trend the practical implication of this finding is that opec production quota strategy may not have long term impact on the global oil market thus the cartel needs to improve oil production policy coordination among members and ensure strict adherence to production quota while also stressing the need for diversification in member countries

growth renewables and the optimal carbon tax optimal climate policy is investigated in a ramsey growth model of the global economy with exhaustible oil reserves an infinitely elastic supply of renewables stock dependent oil extraction costs and convex climate damages four regimes can occur depending on the initial social cost of oil being larger or smaller than that of renewables and depending on the initial oil stock being large or small we also offer some policy simulations for the first and second regime which illustrate that with a lower discount rate more oil is left in situ and renewables are phased in more quickly we identify the conditions under which the optimal carbon tax rises or decreases subsidizing renewables without a carbon tax induces more oil to be left in situ and a quicker phasing in of renewables but oil is depleted more rapidly initially the net effect on global warming is ambiguous abstract from author

imperfect cartelization in opec a model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by opec countries we define a measure for the degree of cooperation analogous to the market conduct parameter of cyert et al 1973 geroski et al 1987 lofaro 1999 and symeonidis 2000 this parameter is used to assess the incentives of different opec members to collude we find that heterogeneity in opec and the supplies of the non opec fringe create strong incentives against collusion more specifically opec s supply strategy although observed to be substantially more restrictive than that of a cournot nash oligopoly is found to still be more accommodative than that of a perfect cartel the strategy involves allocating larger than proportionate quotas to smaller and relatively costlier producers as if to bribe their participation in the cartel this is in contrast to predictions of the standard cartel model that such producers should be allocated relatively more stringent quotas furthermore we demonstrate that cartel collusion is more likely to be sustained for elastic than for inelastic demand since global oil demand is well known to be inelastic this observation provides another structural explanation for why opec behavior is inconsistent with that of a perfect cartel our study points to multiple headwinds that limit opec s ability to mark up the oil price 2016 elsevier b v