bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions use of computerized nash competitors abstract results are reported from a series of first price sealed bid auctions where bidders face computerized nash equilibrium competitors the results provide strong support for employing this newly developed methodology as a testing procedure for nash equilibrium bidding models

competitive non linear pricing and bundling we examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly when consumers buy all their products from one firm the one stop shopping model nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare but often lower consumer surplus than linear pricing by contrast in a unit demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus in a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects compared with linear pricing nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when i demand is elastic ii there is substantial product differentiation iii there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand iv consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm and v a consumer s brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when i ii iv and v hold but iii does not

boys will still be boys gender differences in trading activity are not due to differences in over confidence abstract the fact that men trade more than women in financial markets has been attributed to men s overconfidence however evidence supporting this view is only indirect we directly test this conjecture experimentally by measuring confidence using monetary incentives before participants trade in a simulated market we find that men are more confident than women in our trading task men also trade more and they hold larger and less diversified portfolios than women however we do not find that differences in confidence explain any portion of the gender gap in trading activity we explore alternative candidate channels such as risk aversion financial literacy or competitiveness but find that these factors are also unlikely to play a role

risk aversion in a dynamic asset allocation experiment we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in the spirit of merton 1971 in which subjects dynamically choose their portfolio allocation between a risk free and risky asset using the optimal allocation of an investor with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility we fit the experimental choices to characterize the risk profile of our participants despite substantial heterogeneity decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion are the predominant types we also find some evidence of increased risk taking after a gain finally the session level risk attitudes show a different profile than the individual descriptions of risk attitudes

moral dimensions of the wta wtp disparity an experimental examination abstract contrary to welfare economic theory empirical evidence suggests that the amount of money people are willing to accept wta to forego a commodity will generally exceed the amount of money they are willing to pay wtp to gain the commodity this paper undertakes an experimental examination of the wta wtp disparity using conventional and ecologically produced eggs the results of this experiment reveal that the difference between the mean wtp and wta for conventional eggs is negligible while the mean wta is more than 1 5 times higher than the mean wtp in the case of ecological eggs an explanation for this result is offered following the boyce et al boyce r b brown t c mcclelland g h peterson g l schulze w d 1992 an experimental examination of intrinsic values as a source of the wta wtp disparity am econ rev 82 1366 1373 notion that an asymmetrical assignment of moral responsibility may cause wta to exceed wtp by comparing the two studies a tentative conclusion is that the valuation disparity is likely to increase with a corresponding increase in the degree of assigned moral responsibility

using first price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses abstract this paper considers three alternative ways to sell heterogeneous licenses via a first price format when there is single unit demand it has been suggested that incorporating a first price element may bolster competition in this case klemperer paul d 2002 what really matters in auction design journal of economic perspectives 16 169 189 in a controlled laboratory setting we compare the performance of the simultaneous first price auction the sequential first price auction and the simultaneous descending auction with that of the simultaneous ascending auction the experiments involve several bidding environments of varying complexity we find that the simultaneous ascending auction achieves the highest levels of efficiency but also has drawbacks i its revenues are low and variable ii per license profits vary and iii the incidence of winner s curse outcomes is high seller s revenues are highest when the licenses are sold in a sequential first price auction in decreasing order of quality

how trading institutions affect financial market performance some laboratory evidence i introduction trading institutions vary considerably across contemporary financial markets 1 but most can be classified into one of two basic types the continuous double auction da allows traders to submit public offers to buy or to sell and to accept other traders offers at any moment in time the double auction institution offers immediacy but non uniform transaction prices the other basic trading institution the clearinghouse ch gathers offers and clears them at a unified price at a pre specified time it sacrifices immediacy for uniform transaction prices 2 the two types of institutions have co existed and evolved for centuries but now are emerging in new electronic versions market participants and policy makers would like to know which institution or variant or combination is most efficient but theoretical and empirical work to date provides little guidance this paper reports on a series of laboratory asset markets experiments designed to compare variants of the double auction and clearinghouse trading institutions the markets are small usually with eight or nine traders but the traders are profit motivated and experienced with the trading institutions the traded asset has uncertain market value and traders receive useful but inconclusive private information they can only learn the asset s true value during the course of trade laboratory markets offer several advantages for empirical study of financial market institutions first private information is observable even controllable in the laboratory and therefore the investigator can directly measure market efficiency 3 second the complexity of the environment can be varied systematically in the laboratory and its effects on market performance can be separated from the effects of the market institution and other forces finally the market institution itself is controllable in the laboratory so it is possible to make valid causal inferences on how the market institution shapes market performance i begin with a survey of relevant literature and other preliminaries in the rest of this section section ii outlines the laboratory procedures the creation of trading environments of varying complexity the electronic implementation of the clearinghouse and double auction trading institutions the computation of theoretical benchmark prices and allocations and the measurement of market performance section iii collects the results following an illustrative account of a double auction trading period and a clearinghouse trading period i use descriptive statistics to summarize market performance in each of the thirty nine experiments the main conclusions are based on statistical comparisons of market performance across alternative market institutions the clearinghouse institution does surprisingly well it delivers greater market depth than the double auction discovers prices at least as efficiently and produces final allocations almost as efficient as the double auction the main institutional variants examined in this paper concern the amount of information made public regarding order placement orderflow the data suggest that public display of the orderflow enhances double auction efficiency but may impair clearinghouse efficiency a study of trading volume shows higher volume in the double auction in both institutions volume increases when important private news arrives and when the trading period is about to end the paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the results a companion paper friedman 1991 considers the effects of awarding various privileges to some but not all traders copeland and friedman 1987 1991 provide useful background information on laboratory procedures and computerized double auction markets instructions for the current experiments are available on request the need for empirical work a skeptic might argue that empirical work is unnecessary the mere fact that the double auction and clearinghouse institutions both persist in major financial markets implies that both are highly efficient because a more efficient institution would displace less efficient institutions

nonlinear pricing and exclusion ii must stock products dominant firms often are unavoidable trading partners buyers may consider switching a fraction of their requirements to rival products but that fraction is highly uncertain in rapidly evolving industries nonlinear pricing serves to adjust the competitive pressure placed on rival firms depending on the joint distribution of the buyer willingness to pay for the rival s good and the share of contestable demand concave price quantity schedules erect barriers to entry convex parts in schedules introduce barriers to expansion dominant firms use all units discounts to create high entry barriers for rival firms with intermediate levels of contestable demand

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

traders expectations in asset markets experimental evidence we elicit traders predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15 period lived asset we find that individuals beliefs about prices are adaptive and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market and when experienced they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur when prices deviate from fundamental values belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks

fees and the efficiency of tradable permit systems an experimental approach the paper presents the results of an economic experiment in which the effects of fees on allocative efficiency of tradable utilization permits e g pollution permits are explored laboratory subjects university students play the roles of firms whose generic product requires a specific input or permits scarcity is exogenously introduced by a fixed supply of tradable production permits three treatments are compared no fee imposed n a fixed tax per permit t and partial retraction of permits and subsequent redistribution by auction a treatments t and a represent two different ways of imposing fees which are designed to be revenue equivalent our results indicate that after controlling for deviation of permit prices from a prediction based on fundamentals fees have an impact on distribution of permits interestingly a fixed tax enhances efficiency compared to the case of no fees while retraction and reallocation by auction tends to reduce efficiency apparently subjects decision making is affected by the imposition of fees but how and to what extent depends on the method used

on two part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly abstract we explore aspects of two part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels competition in only one price component the fee or the rate may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms fixing one price component alters the nature of competition indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation endogenous market segmentation emerges with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm when no price component can be negative competition becomes softer profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival

learning to deal with repeated shocks under strategic complementarity an experiment experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements under identical shocks however repetition allows adaptive learning so that inertia in adjustment should fade away with experience if this finding proves to be robust inertia in adjustment may be irrelevant among experienced agents the conjecture in the literature is that inertia would still persist perhaps indefinitely in the presence of real world complications such as nonidentical shocks herein we empirically test the conjecture that the inertia in adjustment is more persistent if the shocks are nonidentical for both identical and nonidentical shocks we find persistent inertia and similar patterns of adjustment that can be explained by backward looking expectation rules a reformulation of naive expectations with similarity based learning approach is found to have a higher predictive power than rational and trend following rules

the chinese warrants bubble in 2005 2008 over a dozen put warrants traded in china went so deep out of the money that they were almost certain to expire worthless nonetheless each warrant was traded more than three times each day at substantially inflated prices this bubble is unique in that the underlying stock prices make warrant fundamentals publicly observable and that warrants have predetermined finite maturities this sample allows us to examine a set of bubble theories in particular our analysis highlights the joint effects of short sales constraints and heterogeneous beliefs in driving bubbles and confirms several key findings of the experimental bubble literature jel g12 g13 o16 p34

do prediction markets aid defenders in a weak link contest abstract laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states moves of nature however in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival this is particularly important in aggressor defender contests this paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor s action the results of the experiments indicate that the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender s win rate prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors decisions that is not being exploited by defenders and the existence of a prediction market does not alter the behavior of the aggressor whose behavior is being forecast

bounded rationality models tasks to become intellectually competitive abstract research in experimental economics has cogently challenged the fundamental precept of neoclassical economics that economic agents optimize the last two decades have seen elaboration of boundedly rational models that try to move away from the optimization approach in ways consistent with experimental findings nonetheless the collection of alternative models has made little headway supplanting the dominant paradigm we delineate key ways in which neoclassical microeconomics holds continuing and compelling advantages over bounded rationality models and suggest via a few examples the sorts of further difficult pushes that would be needed to redress this state of affairs closer collaboration between theoretic modeling and experiments is clearly seen to be necessary jel b40 c72 c90 d01 d21

market participation in delegated and intrinsic common agency games we study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals sellers affects market participation by a privately informed agent consumer when participation is restricted to all or nothing intrinsic agency the agent must choose between both principals contracts and selecting her outside option when the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract delegated agency competition is more intense the two games have distinct predictions for participation intrinsic agency always induces more distortion in participation relative to the monopoly outcome and equilibrium allocations are discontinuous for the marginal consumer under delegated agency relative to monopoly market participation increases respectively decreases when contracting variables are substitutes respectively complements on the intensive margin equilibrium allocations are continuous for the marginal consumer and the range of product offerings is identical to both the first best and the monopoly outcome

an antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts abstract consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market bundled loyalty discounts in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist have ambiguous welfare effects such discounts should not always be treated as a form of predatory pricing in some settings they act as tie in sales existing tests for whether such discounts violate competition laws do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus we apply a new test to an illustrative example based on smithkline that assumes the tied market has homogeneous goods if the tied market is characterized by hotelling competition bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price in numerical examples we find that this can deter entry or induce exit

the formation of price forecasts in experimental markets this study utilizes laboratory experimental methods to evaluate the empirical validity of 1 muthian rational expectations assumptions 2 an adaptive expectations model and 3 an extrapolative expectations model over 5 00 price forecasts from 146 participants in twelve experimental double auction m arkets with a cash reward structure are analyzed the forecasting objective is t hemean price over a sequence of trading periods governed by stationary market parameters the price forecasts are found to be inconsistent with strict muthian rational expectations and the extrapolative modelis not supported by the data however the forecasts generally support the adaptive expectations model copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

on booms that never bust ambiguity in experimental asset markets with bubbles we study the effect of ambiguity on the formation of bubbles and on the occurrence of crashes in experimental asset markets a la smith suchanek and williams 1988 we extend their framework to an environment where the fundamental value of the asset is ambiguous we show that when the fundamental value is ambiguous asset prices tend to be lower than when it is risky although bubbles form in both the ambiguous and the risky environments additionally bubbles do not crash in the ambiguous case whereas they do so in the risky one these findings regarding depressed prices and the absence of crashes in the presence of ambiguity are in line with recent theoretical work stressing the crucial role of ambiguity to account for surprisingly low equity prices high returns as well as herding in asset markets

on the nature and magnitude of cost economies in hog production in this article we assess the impact of farm size on production cost and evaluate the marginal costs and margins by considering that input prices may change with the scale of production by using french hog farm data we estimate a system of equations including a feed price function input demand functions and an output supply function based on a technology approximated by a combined generalized leontief quadratic form our results suggest that the marginal costs are over estimated when the adjustment of the feed unit prices to a change in farm size is not controlled for more specifically the cost economies for large farms enjoying the highest profits arise primarily from lower feed prices with technological scale economies having little impact in contrast farms with no hired labor exhibit technological scale economies and reach higher price cost margins compared to larger farms

a unified model of entrepreneurship dynamics we develop an incomplete markets q theoretic model to study entrepreneurship dynamics precautionary motive borrowing constraints and capital illiquidity lead to underinvestment conservative debt use under consumption and less risky portfolio allocation the endogenous liquid wealth illiquid capital ratio w measures time varying financial constraint the option to accumulate wealth before entry is critical for entrepreneurship flexible exit option is important for risk management purposes investment increases and the private marginal value of liquidity decreases as w decreases and exit becomes more likely contrary to predictions of standard financial constraint models we show that the idiosyncratic risk premium is quantitatively significant especially for low w

bubbles and financial professionals the efficiency of financial markets and their potential to produce bubbles are central topics in academic and professional debates yet little is known about the contribution of financial professionals to price efficiency we run 116 experimental markets with 412 professionals and 502 students we find that professional markets with bubble drivers capital inflows or high initial capital supply are susceptible to bubbles although they are more efficient than student markets in mixed markets with students bubbles also occur but professionals act as price stabilizers we show that heterogeneous price beliefs drive overpricing especially in bubble prone market environments

complexity and economic policy a paradigm shift or a change in perspective a review essay on david colander and roland kupers s complexity and the art of public policy in their recent book colander and kupers 2014 argue that viewing the economy as a complex adaptive system should change the way in which we make economic policy this would necessitate a paradigm shift economics has over time tried to produce a coherent model to underpin the dominant laissez faire liberal approach but we have never proved in that model that left to their own devices the participants in an economy will self organize into a satisfactory state this is an assumption complex interactive systems with direct interaction between heterogeneous agents may show no tendency to self equilibrate and will undergo endogenous crises economists should concentrate on the emergence of certain patterns colander and kupers suggest that we may be able to nudge the system into good basins of attraction a more radical view is that there are no fixed basins of attraction these change with the evolution of the system and it is illusory to believe that we can choose good basins we may be able to recognize and influence the emergence of certain states of the economy but we are far from leon walras s dream of economics as a science like astrophysics

information aggregation and belief elicitation in experimental parimutuel betting markets this paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behavior in experimental parimutuel betting markets in one treatment groups of eight participants who possess a private signal about the eventual outcome play a sequential betting game the second treatment is identical except that bettors are observed by eight other participants who submit incentivized beliefs about the winning probabilities of each outcome in the third treatment the same individuals make bets and assess the winning probabilities of the outcomes market probabilities more accurately reflect objective probabilities in the third than in the other two treatments submitting beliefs reduces the favorite longshot bias and making bets improves the accuracy of elicited beliefs a level k framework provides some insights about why belief elicitation improves the capacity of betting markets to aggregate information

pricing of conspicuous goods a competitive analysis of social effects abstract social needs play an important role in the purchase of conspicuous goods in this article the authors extend traditional economic models to accommodate social needs such as desire for uniqueness and conformism and examine their implications for pricing conspicuous goods first in the context of a duopoly the authors identify the conditions under which the desire for uniqueness can increase demand among some consumers as the price of a product increases second the authors show that though the desire for uniqueness leads to higher prices and firm profits a desire for conformity leads to lower prices and profits third the authors find that consumers purchase high quality products not because of their desire for uniqueness but despite it finally marketers of conspicuous goods may find it beneficial not to emphasize the functional differences among their products when the need for uniqueness is high in a laboratory test the authors find support for the claim that demand for a product amo

the formation of consumer inflation expectations new evidence from japan s deflation experience using a new data set we investigate the relationship between the inflation experience and expectations of households in japan focusing on the post 1995 deflationary era our first finding is that inflation expectations increase with age second we find that measured inflation rates also increase with age although age and inflation expectations continue to exhibit a positive correlation even after controlling for the household level inflation rate analysis suggests that the correlation between age and inflation expectations is driven largely by the correlation between cohort and inflation expectations which we interpret to represent the effect of historical inflation experience on inflation expectations

exclusion via non exclusive contracts we establish that non linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent s contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival the optimal contract we describe is a three part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent s marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities the optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry l exclusion par le biais des contrats non exclusifs nous etablissons que des contrats verticaux non lineaires peuvent permettre a un titulaire d exclure un rival en amont dans un cadre qui ne de pend pas de l exclusivite des contrats du titulaire avec les entreprises en aval ou des limites sur les canaux de distribution disponibles pour le titulaire ou un rival le contrat optimal que nous decrivons est un contrat de rabais en trois parties base sur la quantite pre voyant le versement d une indemnite a un distributeur en aval et un prix de gros marginal inferieur au cout marginal de l operateur historique pour des quantites suffisamment importantes le contrat optimal est robuste si on permet aux parties de renegocier les contrats en cas d entree

how to grow a bubble a model of myopic adapting agents abstract we present a simple agent based model to study the development of a bubble and the consequential crash and investigate how their proximate triggering factor might relate to their fundamental mechanism and vice versa our agents invest according to their opinion on future price movements which is based on three sources of information i public information i e news ii information from their friendship network and iii private information our bounded rational agents continuously adapt their trading strategy to the current market regime by weighting each of these sources of information in their trading decision according to its recent predicting performance we find that bubbles originate from a random lucky streak of positive news which due to a feedback mechanism of these news on the agents strategies develop into a transient collective herding regime after this self amplified exuberance the price has reached an unsustainable high value being corrected by a crash which brings the price even below its fundamental value these ingredients provide a simple mechanism for the excess volatility documented in financial markets paradoxically it is the attempt for investors to adapt to the current market regime which leads to a dramatic amplification of the price volatility a positive feedback loop is created by the two dominating mechanisms adaptation and imitation which by reinforcing each other result in bubbles and crashes the model offers a simple reconciliation of the two opposite herding versus fundamental proposals for the origin of crashes within a single framework and justifies the existence of two populations in the distribution of returns exemplifying the concept that crashes are qualitatively different from the rest of the price moves

the informational efficiency of experimental asset markets a fundamental difficulty in devising any test of general efficient market hypotheses is the specification of the relevant public and private information sets of traders without a consensus as to reasonable empirical specifications tests of the hypotheses remain minimal or controversial in this study we examine the efficiency of experimental asset markets in which one may unambiguously identify the public and private information sets of traders we focus on how market efficiency is affected by the presence of futures markets in settings that incorporate different types of uncertainty and inside information our experimental results support four conclusions 1 market outcomes tend to evolve toward strong form informationally efficient equilibria whether or not futures markets and or event uncertainty are present 2 the presence of futures markets clearly stabilizes spot prices 3 the presence of futures markets tends to speed the evolution of asset markets to more efficient equilibria where there

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset markets lack of common knowledge of rationality vs actual irrationality we report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets in a setting in which speculation is not possible bubbles and crashes are observed the results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation in markets where speculation is possible is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment

efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information an application of rational expectations models the study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one priced security returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature some agents insiders whose identity was unknown to other agents knew the state before the markets opened with replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational expectations model are relatively accurate prices adjusted immediately to near rational expectations prices profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from non insiders and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent

adaptive behavior and economic theory the relationship between psychological and economic views of behavior once a subject of heavy dispute is now understood in a very similar way by practitioners of both these disciplines and of our sister social sciences in general terms we view or model an individual as a collection of decision rules rules that dictate the action to be taken in given situations and a set of preferences used to evaluate the outcomes arising from particular situation action combinations these decision rules are continuously under review and revision new decision rules are tried and tested against experience and rules that produce desirable outcomes supplant those that do not i use the term adaptive to refer to this trial anderror process through which our modes of behavior are determined if one is interested in modeling particular decisions in any very explicit way it is obviously necessary to think about rather narrow aspects of an individual s entire set of decision rules his or her personality experimental psychology has traditionally focused on the adaptive process by which decision rules are replaced by others in this tradition the influence of the subject s or as an economist says the agent s preferences this essay uses a series of examples to illustrate the use of rationality and adaptation in economic theory it is argued that these hypotheses are complementary and that stability theories based on adaptive behavior may help to narrow the class of empirically interesting equilibria in certain economic models an experiment is proposed to test this idea

coordination on bubbles in large group asset pricing experiments abstract we present a large group experiment in which participants predict the price of an asset whose realization depends on the aggregation of individual forecasts the markets consist of 21 to 32 participants a group size larger than in most experiments multiple large price bubbles occur in six out of seven markets the bubbles emerge even faster than in smaller markets individual forecast errors do not cancel out at the aggregate level but participants coordinate on a trend following prediction strategy that gives rise to large bubbles the observed price patterns can be captured by a behavioral heuristics switching model with heterogeneous expectations

an experimental investigation of transaction costs abstract this research builds on hoffman and spitzer 1982 and 1986 and coursey hoffman and spitzer 1987 and investigates how transaction costs may alter price patterns and economic efficiency in markets sixteen experimental markets were conducted which were designed to have different levels of transaction costs the transaction costs were of two types either as a consequence of strategic price setting due to potential holdouts or due to the number of traders who had to contract to trigger a synergistic payoff the results of the markets indicated that transaction costs had the anticipated influence on the price patterns and the efficiency of the markets

on the anti competitive effects of quantity discounts abstract we analyze the competitive effects of quantity discounts in an asymmetric duopoly we find that for a sizeable set of parameter values quantity discounts harm the smaller firm and reduce consumers surplus they can even decrease social welfare i e the sum of producers and consumers surpluses however the circumstances in which quantity discounts may decrease social welfare are limited and difficult to identify in practice

margin short selling and lotteries in experimental asset markets the robustness of bubbles and crashes in markets for assets with finite lives is perplexing this paper reports the results of experimental asset markets in which participants trade two assets in some markets price bubbles form in these markets traders pay higher prices for the asset with lottery characteristics i e a claim on a large unlikely payoff however institutional design has a significant impact on deviations in prices from fundamental values particularly for an asset with lottery characteristics price run ups and crashes are moderated when traders finance purchases of the assets themselves and are allowed to short sell

on the complicated price dynamics of a simple one dimensional discontinuous financial market model with heterogeneous interacting traders abstract we develop a financial market model with heterogeneous interacting agents market makers adjust prices with respect to excess demand chartists believe in the persistence of bull and bear markets and fundamentalists bet on mean reversion moreover speculators trade asymmetrically in over and undervalued markets and while some of them determine the size of their orders via linear trading rules others always trade the same amount of assets the dynamics of our model is driven by a one dimensional discontinuous map despite the simplicity of our model analytical graphical and numerical analysis reveals a surprisingly rich set of interesting dynamical behaviors

how tournament incentives affect asset markets a comparison between winner take all tournaments and elimination contests abstract we investigate the impact of investment managers tournament incentives on investment strategies and market efficiency distinguishing between winner take all tournaments wta where a minority wins and elimination contests ec where a majority wins theoretically we show that investment managers play heterogeneous strategies in wta and homogeneous strategies in ec and markets are more prone to mispricing in wta than in ec experimentally we find that investment managers play more heterogeneous strategies in wta than in ec but this does not trigger significant differences in prices moreover prices in wta and ec do not differ significantly from markets composed of linearly incentivized subjects

overconfidence and excess entry an experimental approach psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative abilities and unreasonably optimistic about their futures e g shelly e taylor and j d brown 1988 neil d weinstein 1980 when assessing their position in a distribution of peers on almost any positive trait like driving ability ola svenson 1981 income prospects or longevity a vast majority of people say they are above the average although of course only half can be if the trait is symmetrically distributed this paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence economic behavior in one particular setting entry into competitive games or markets many empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years for example using plant level data from the u s census of manufacturers spanning 1963 1982 timothy dunne et al 1988 estimated that 61 5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79 6 percent exited within 10 years most of these exits are failures see also dunne et al 1989a 1989b d shapiro and r s khemani 1987

a simple testable model of double auction markets abstract we propose a model of price formation in double auction markets which employs the strong simplifying assumption that agents neglect strategic feedback effects and regard themselves as playing a game against nature agents otherwise are strict expected utility maximizers employing bayesian updating procedures we prove the optimality of simple aggressive reservation price strategies in our general model and propose a parametric form that yields very detailed and computable predictions of market behavior

to steal or not to steal firm attributes legal environment and valuation data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within country variation that decreases with the strength of investors legal protection a simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation investment opportunities external financing and ownership structure using firm level governance and transparency data from 27 countries we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets all relations are stronger in less investor friendly countries demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices

the disposition effect in securities trading an experimental analysis the disposition effect is the tendency to sell assets that have gained value winners and keep assets that have lost value losers disposition effects can be explained by the two features of prospect theory the idea that people value gains and losses relative to a reference point the initial purchase price of shares and the tendency to seek risk when faced with possible losses and avoid risk when a certain gain is possible our experiments were designed to see if subjects would exhibit disposition effects subjects bought and sold shares in six risky assets asset prices fluctuated in each period contrary to bayesian optimization subjects did tend to sell winners and keep losers when the shares were automatically sold after each period the disposition effect was greatly reduced

does volatility matter expectations of price return and variability in an asset pricing experiment abstract we present results of an experiment on expectation formation in an asset market participants in our experiment must provide forecasts of the stock future return to computerized utility maximizing investors and are rewarded according to how well their forecasts perform in the market in the baseline treatment participants must forecast the stock return one period ahead in the volatility treatment we also elicit subjective confidence intervals of forecasts which we take as a measure of perceived volatility the realized asset price is derived from a walrasian market equilibrium equation with non linear feedback from individual forecasts our experimental markets exhibit high volatility fat tails and other properties typical of real financial data eliciting confidence intervals for predictions has the effect of reducing price fluctuations and increasing subjects coordination on a common prediction strategy

professional accountancy organizations and stock market development this study investigates the relationship between the ethical educational and disciplinary development of professional accountancy organizations paos in a given country and the development of that country s stock market using a comprehensive measure based on the responses of the major paos in 36 countries to a questionnaire designed by the international federation of accountants to assess the development of paos internationally we find a significantly positive association between the development of paos and stock market development in addition we find the positive association between the development of paos and stock market development to be more pronounced in countries with higher levels of investor protection a stronger public enforcement environment or lower levels of corruption suggesting the importance of complementary institutions in the relationship between paos and stock market development we also find that better developed paos are associated with better quality financial reporting finally our result also shows that relative to the investigation and discipline mechanism and educational requirements imposed by paos the ethical development of a country s professional accountants appears to have the strongest positive association with a country s stock market development

optimal consumption portfolio rules with biased beliefs abstract we extend the model of optimal consumption and asset allocation by incorporating the biased agent beliefs overconfidence and overextrapolation it predicts that overconfidence entails overconsumption lower overconfidence induced hedging demand and overinvestment in the risky assets while overextrapolation induces underconsumption higher overextrapolation induced hedging demand and underinvestment our model provides an alternative explanation for an agent s mis consumption hedging and portfolio misallocation from the perspective of biased beliefs

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

the origin of predictable dynamic behavior abstract nonlinear dynamic theory implies optimal decisions often behave like random chaos such random target motion is impossible for imperfect agents to follow without error however they can still gradually approach the optimal target if and only if they partially adjust toward its perceived location so as to induce their behavior to converge to an equilibrium reducing dynamic errors through partial adjustment thereby induces a stable regularity in behavior that otherwise may never evolve this result agrees with the stability properties observed in experimental markets including cobweb auction and asset markets whose dynamics before reaching equilibrium exhibit adaptive rather than rational expectations

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding