different paths to free trade the gains from regionalism we compare free trade reached through expanding regional trading blocs to free trade accomplished by multilateral negotiation with sunk costs the outcomes are different trade in an imperfectly competitive good flows disproportionately more between the original members of a regional agreement even after free trade is reached they secure a higher welfare level from regionalism than from free trade achieved multilaterally nonmembers however reach a lower welfare level a surprising result is that world welfare during free trade is greater when it is achieved by the regional path we conclude with some empirical evidence from the european union that is consistent with the model

the silent success of customs unions an earlier version of this paper is part of arevik gnutzmann mkrtchyan s thesis essays on the economics of trade agreements 2014 http hdl handle net 1814 34561

trade policy in a super size me world abstract when a foreign monopolist sets a single market clearing price for its product the sign of the optimal tariff is determined by the extent of pass through also known as the terms of trade effect however when a foreign monopolist employs a second degree price discrimination mechanism in the domestic market the calculus of welfare maximization is very different while there are still terms of trade effects from the imposition of a tariff the existence of such effects are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the sign of the optimal tariff instead the distribution of valuations within the population is the key determinant of the nature of policy intervention this result differs significantly from the uniform price case and is driven by the incentive compatibility constraint which places the distribution of types at the center of the analysis if there is a relatively large fraction of high valuation types in the population then domestic information rents may be increased by subsidizing imports thereby increasing the consumption of the low valuation types and moving the incentive constraint in favor of the high valuation types however if the share of high types in the population is relatively small then the increase in information rents will also be small but the fiscal implications of a subsidy will be large consequently the optimal policy will be to impose a trade tax

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

do big countries win tariff wars yes it is widely believed that tariffs invite retaliation and that the postretaliation equilibrium l eaves all countries worse off than they would be at free trade the a uthors present a simple pure exchange model with two countries and t wo goods and show which endowment patterns are consistent with this belief they find that if one country is substantially bigger than th e other it can expect to gain from a tariff war despite retaliation the model can be extended to show that the advantage obtained by bei ng part of a large trading unit can help explain the formation of cus toms unions copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system i evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas ftas on the world trading system i use an oligopolistic political economy model where the external tariffs of fta members as well as the decision to form ftas are endogenously determined in this context i show that ftas are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system this conclusion is based first upon the finding that ftas induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between fta members and non members while this ensures gains for the latter in general fta members may not gain i show however that governments will endorse only welfare improving arrangements in spite of their political motivations as a result fta members benefit from ratified arrangements as well finally i find that ftas by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments trade regime decisions also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level

optimal tariff equilibria with customs unions the authors construct a model of customs unions in which countries charge optimal tariffs customs unions internalize the externality that exists whenever two countries import the same good also customs unions make several countries into one large unit with more market power big customs unions can improve their members welfare relative to the free trade the authors model of customs unions separates the effects of tariff reduction from the effects of policy coordination the movement from nash equilibrium to a free trade association improves global resource allocations moving from a free trade association to a full customs union has ambiguous resource allocation effects

optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition abstract i investigate team formation in a legislative bargaining model in which both the surplus and recognition are endogenous i find that the optimal team size increases with stricter agreement rules and longer sighted agents but remains too small from the social perspective moreover the optimal size may not exhaust increasing returns to scale

asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage given incomplete factor markets appropriate time paths of flow variables must be chosen to build required stocks of assets that is critical resources are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor markets barney barney j 1986 strategic factor markets expectations luck and business strategy management sci october 1231 1241 sustainability of a firm s asset position hinges on how easily assets can be substituted or imitated imitability is linked to the characteristics of the asset accumulation process time compression diseconomies asset mass efficiencies inter connectedness asset erosion and causal ambiguity

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

bilateralism multilateralism and the quest for global free trade abstract we develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature bilateral or multilateral of trade liberalization are endogenously determined to determine whether and how bilateralism matters we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis we find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements by contrast under symmetry both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade

price discrimination by u s and german exporters the insensitivity of the u s trade balance to the sharp depreciation of the dollar in the past three years has revived interest in the relationship between exchange rates and the trade balance a central issue in most analyses of the relation between the current account and the exchange rate concerns the price adjustment process the simple integrated competitive market model predicts that local currency prices should change in proportion to the nominal exchange rate for a country too small to influence world prices the relationship between local currency import prices and exchange rates has been referred to as the pass through relationship in the empirical literature in international economics if the proportional relationship between import prices and exchange rates holds pass through is said to be complete accounts of recent u s experience cite the failure of dollar prices of imported goods to rise in proportion to exchange rates i e incomplete pass through as an important factor in explaining the persistence of the trade deficit unfortunately observations on pass through alone provide limited insight into the behavior of markets since incomplete pass through is consistent with at least two fundamentally different paradigms one is the standard competitive model of trade in which the law of one price holds but exchange rate fluctuations are associated with large changes in import demand due to other factors for example if dollar appreciation is correlated with increases in world demand and industry marginal cost is increasing then pass through will be less than complete the other is an imperfectly competitive model in which exporters are capable of price discriminating across destination markets a phenomenon paul krugman 1987 has labeled pricing to market in this model incomplete pass through is typically associated with fluctuations in the markup of price over marginal cost on exports 2 these fluctuations in markups are believed to be countryspecific they do not reflect the behavior of prices to other export destinations both models are plausible explanations of recent u s experience unfortunately it is impossible to distinguish between these competing models using only information on import prices and exchange rates for a single country in order to distinguish between the competing models an empirical analysis of goods prices and exchange rates must be capable of measuring either marginal cost or the markup over marginal cost either of these tasks poses formidable empirical problems much of the empirical literature in industrial organization has been concerned with precisely these issues since markups are an important measure of the competitiveness of industries

uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining abstract i provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk averse players my condition s implies condition c of merlo and wilson 1995 and is easy to verify in applications

the mfn clause welfare and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size abstract this paper analyzes mfn in a competing exporters model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that mfn yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off furthermore in a repeated game of tariff cooperation multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under mfn punishments relative to discriminatory ones this conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements overall the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries mfn and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature

comparing innovation systems a framework and application to china s transitional context abstract this paper proposes a generic framework for analyzing innovation systems anchored around five fundamental activities r d implementation end use education linkage and focused on the performance implications of a system s structure and dynamics rather than simply describing the role and performance of particular actors institutions and policies this approach focuses on system level characteristics including the distribution of these activities within the system the organizational boundaries around them coordination mechanisms evolutionary processes and the effectiveness of the system in introducing diffusing and exploiting technological innovations the framework is applied to a comparison of china s national innovation system under central planning and since reforms revealing the evolving structure and dynamics of this system and current inconsistencies and perverse incentives that policymakers must address to realize their development goals more generally it provides a basis for addressing the implicit assumptions of organizational types roles and convergence among innovation systems emerging in very different contexts whether national regional or industrial

import dynamics and demands for protection what kinds of changes in foreign competition lead domestic industries to seek import protection to address this question this paper uses detailed monthly u s import data to investigate changes in import composition during a 24 month window immediately preceding the filing of a petition for protection a decomposition methodology allows a comparison of imports from two groups of countries supplying the same product those that are named in the petition and those that are not the same decomposition can be applied to products quite similar to the imports in question but not subject to a petition the results suggest that industries typically seek protection when faced with a specific pattern of shocks first a persistent positive relative supply shock favors imports from named countries second a negative demand shock hits imports from all sources just prior to domestic industries petition for protection the relative supply shock is a broad one it applies both to named commodities and to the comparison product group the import demand shock by contrast is narrow hitting only named products the latter shock is also large import growth over the two year window is 15 percentage points lower in named products than in reference products with most of this gap arising in the final two quarters before the petition the negative import demand shock appears to be a key event in the run up to the filing of a petition it has been missed by previous studies using more aggregated data

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of free trade areas we consider the impact of the formation of free trade agreements on multilateral tariff cooperation we assume that countries are limited to selfenforcing multilateral arrangements that balance the gains from deviating against the costs of an ensuing trade war we find that the emergence of free trade areas will be accompanied by a temporary retreat from liberal multilateral trade policies as the initial balance supporting multilateral cooperation is upset eventually however as the full impact of the emerging free trade agreement on multilateral trade patterns is felt this initial balance tends to reemerge and liberal multilateral trade policies can be restored

do south south preferential trade agreements undermine the prospects for multilateral free trade due to trade diversion there has been concerns expressed over the proliferation of preferential trade agreements ptas between south countries in this paper we compare welfare across the various forms of bilateral free trade agreements ftas and customs unions cus and examine their implications for the stability of multilateral free trade while north north ptas tend to yield higher welfare we fi nd certain cases where south south agreements are more likely to lead to global free trade than north north or north south agreements but other cases where multilateral cooperation over free trade is the least likely under south south agreements we also examine how the expansion of existing agreements or the combination of separate agreements affects the potential for free trade

multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements abstract this paper examines the interaction between preferential trade agreements ptas and multilateral tariff reduction in a model of imperfect competition a growing literature finds that the formation of ptas alters the incentives for and the sustainability of multilateral tariff reduction we show that the causation is not one sided multilateral tariff reduction also affects the formation of ptas specifically tariff reduction enhances the incentives to form a pta and increases the likelihood that it is self enforcing thus each round of multilateral tariff reduction should lead to a new wave of ptas this may help to explain the current trend towards regionalism

dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information recent developments in dynamic game theory are applied to determine when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non cooperatively countries know their own level of protection but not the other country s level of protection using import trigger strategies cooperation in the form of low tariffs can be supported although there are periodic reversionary high tariff episodes however if terms of trade trigger strategies are used cooperation does not occur

legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly recognition abstract merging eraslan and merlo 2002 and yildirim 2007 i examine legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly recognition i show the uniqueness of the symmetric stationary payoff under monotone hazard rate and an inefficiently early agreement under unanimity

the size of trading blocs market power and world welfare effects abstract we construct an n country n commodity trade model to analyze the implications of bloc size for nash equilibrium tariffs and welfare the relationship between the absolute size of symmetric trading blocs and their market power is ambiguous and we illustrate how this relationship varies with model parameters in contrast sufficiently large increases in the relative size of a bloc enhance its relative market power and cause the welfare of its country members to rise above the free trade level we establish the existence of an optimal bloc size and study the dependence of optimal size on the parameters of the model

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

size inequality coordination externalities and international trade agreements abstract developing countries now account for a significant fraction of world trade and two thirds of the membership of the world trade organization wto however many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so we show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation such as the wto but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments in particular we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex post fines moreover a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds

multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions abstract we study the implications of customs union formation for multilateral tariff cooperation we model cooperation in multilateral trade policy as self enforcing in that it involves balancing the current gains from deviating unilaterally from an agreed upon trade policy against the future losses from forfeiting the benefits of multilateral cooperation that such a unilateral defection would imply the early stages of the process of customs union formation are shown to alter this dynamic incentive constraint in a way that leads to a temporary honeymoon for liberal multilateral trade policies we find however that the harmony between customs unions and multilateral liberalization is temporary eventually as the full impact of the emerging customs union becomes felt a less favorable balance between current and future conditions re emerges and the liberal multilateral policies of the honeymoon phase cannot be sustained

distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition i examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation the contest can either take place at a pre bargaining stage yielding persistent recognition to propose or recur throughout the bargaining yielding transitory recognition equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of active bargainers and individual s incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition

asset stock accumulation and the sustainability of competitive advantage reply authors reply to comments regarding their paper dierickx i k cool 1989 asset stock accumulation and the sustainability of competitive advantage management sci

trading rules and the environment does equal treatment lead to a cleaner world abstract in this paper we consider a three stage game in the context of a competing exporters model to compare and contrast the effects of discriminatory and uniform most favored nation mfn tariffs on countries choice over environmental standards for varying degrees of pollution spillovers because of the presence of punishment effects and stronger own and cross tariff effects we find that discrimination yields higher standards than mfn and free trade independently of the extent of pollution spillovers when pollution is local and incentives to free ride on other countries abatement efforts are weak we show however that welfare is larger under mfn than under discrimination in a dynamic setting we consider the impact of symmetric and asymmetric treatments on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement iea and obtain that multilateral cooperation is easier to sustain under discrimination than under mfn or free trade

international comparisons of pricing to market behavior this paper measures the degree of price discrimination across export destinations that is associated with exchange rate changes using u s u k german and japanese industry level data given the industries sampled more price discrimination across destinations is observed in the u k german and japanese data for industries that match across source countries however behavior is very similar across source countries furthermore destination specific price adjustment on exports to the united states from germany and japan is similar to price adjustment observed on shipments to other destinations most variation in the data appears to be related to industry copyright 1993 by american economic association

regionalism in a multilateral world recent regional initiatives have been addressed from a vinerian perspective of trade creation and trade diversion this is true of both policy oriented economists who tend to be critical of the initiatives and theorists who have added dynamic and gametheoretic elements to the vinerian structure this paper describes the stylized facts of much recent regional integration and develops an alternative model the analysis suggests that regional integration far from threatening multilateral liberalism may in fact be a direct consequence of the success of past multilateralism and an added guarantee for its survival

third country effects on the formation of free trade agreements the recent proliferation of free trade agreements ftas has resulted in an increasingly complex network of preferential trading relationships the economics literature has generally examined the formation of ftas as a function of the participating countries economic characteristics alone in this paper we show both theoretically and empirically that the decision to enter into an fta is also crucially dependent on the participating countries existing fta relationships with third countries accounting for the interdependence of ftas helps to explain a significant fraction of fta formations that would not otherwise be predicted by countries economic characteristics

trade diversion and declining tariffs evidence from mercosur abstract this paper empirically examines the alternative posed by richardson j intern econ 34 1993 39 to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies richardson s hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion and trade creation may actually cause tariffs to decline the hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence of a political component in the governments objective functions a cross sectionally rich data set on trade and tariffs from the mercosur pact countries primarily argentina is used the evidence yields surprising conclusions about the validity of endogenous tariff determination in models of trade integration

multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements a network formation approach we study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability we consider multi country settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a cournot oligopolist in each market under endogenous tariffs we find that the existence of a multilateral trade agreement is always necessary for the stability of the trading system and that the formation of preferential trade agreements is always necessary for achieving global free trade we also find that global free trade is efficient but not necessarily the only multilaterally stable trade equilibrium when countries are symmetric heterogeneous in terms of market size we derive conditions under which such a conflict between overall welfare efficiency and stability occurs

an audit of technological innovation capabilities in chinese firms some empirical findings in beijing china abstract recent studies have advocated different technological innovation capabilities tics and discussed their impact on a firm s competitive performance this paper introduces a study framework of innovation audit and examines the relevance of seven tics to building and sustaining the competitiveness of chinese firms empirical data was acquired through a recent study of 213 chinese firms in beijing china regression analysis was employed to examine the correlation between tics and innovation rate sales growth and product competitiveness among these firms the findings verify that r d and resources allocation capabilities are the two most important tics a strong r d capability could safeguard innovation rate and product competitiveness in large and medium sized firms whereas a resources allocation capability would enhance the sales growth in small firms however the impact of learning and organising capabilities on a firm s innovation performance has yet to be investigated the findings of this paper suggest that chinese firms should consider a more balanced focus on their tics harmonising enhancement in order to maintain their sustainable development effectively plan and implement their innovation strategies as well as enhance their whole innovation capability chinese firms should closely relate their tics to the formulation of technology strategy and harmonisation of innovation and r d activities

asset profiles for technological innovation abstract this paper proposes a conceptual distinction between four generic categories of assets for technological innovation 1 scientific research assets 2 process innovative assets 3 product innovative application assets and 4 aesthetic design assets technological innovation may sometimes require the activation of only one asset type but more often a specific constellation of more asset types has to be mobilized the asset categories differ profoundly with respect not only to their respective competence bases but also with respect to their functional contribution to industrial innovation and mostly also to their organizational attachment this way of conceiving technological innovation is opposed to the one dimensional r d conception that tends to view r d as one functional asset along with others like manufacturing or marketing it is argued that the different innovative assets are often located in different organizational settings within the corporation the coupling between assets is discussed in terms of inter asset specificity we illustrate the great variation of innovative asset profiles across a wide spectrum of product categories the concept of technological trajectories is reinterpreted in terms of asset profile oscillations and regroupings finally the framework is related to recent efforts to formulate a resource based theory of the firm and the implications for innovation strategy is discussed

preferential trade agreements and multilateral tariff cooperation are preferential trade agreements ptas building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization i address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly the central result is that when countries are symmetric a free trade agreement fta undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union cu does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members however when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost there exist circumstances where ptas facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation

recognition for sale abstract i examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game in each period the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder and all players pay their bids if players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power then the first proposer captures the entire surplus if a full consensus is needed for an offer to be accepted then the first proposer shares the surplus with at most one other player and as the period length between offers vanishes one player may capture virtually the entire surplus in settings with a stochastic or an endogenous surplus players are unwilling to efficiently delay agreement or invest in the surplus

the organization of innovation in a transitional economy business and government in chinese electronic publishing abstract the national innovation system that emerged in china in the 1990s integrates government science and technology efforts typically through the intermediation of public research institutes with the business activities of industrial enterprises in illustrating the institutional and organizational characteristics of this innovation system the case study of founder group world leader in pictographic language electronic publishing systems demonstrates both the strategic role of the state in the process of change and the increasing importance for economic success of the integration of investment strategy and organizational learning in industrial enteprises that compete for domestic and global markets

the customs union issue why do we observe so few of them the number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully edged customs unions this paper develops a political economy model of trade policy under imperfect competition to provide a positive explanation for the prevalence of free trade areas in a three country setting a representative from each prospective member is elected to determine the tarifis to be applied on imported goods under a customs union the necessity to coordinate tarifis leads voters to strategically delegate power to more protectionist representatives contrary to most of the existing literature we show that strategic delegation may imply that free trade areas increase welfare compared to customs unions moreover the model also indicates that free trade areas are more likely to be politically viable than customs unions