optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

technological systems and economic policy the diffusion of factory automation in sweden abstract this paper argues that technological systems defined as networks of agents interacting in each specific area of technology under a particular institutional infrastructure constitute a useful unit of analysis for not only innovation and diffusion studies but also work related to technology policy in the case of sweden s technological system for factory automation e g robots it is suggested that three features are central to explaining the extensive diffusion of new technology in the swedish engineering industry namely bridging institutions user supplier linkages and critical mass coupled to advanced economic competence among a key set of users as regards public policy it is argued that its role is to facilitate the formation of new technological systems and to enhance the functioning of existing systems rather than to rectify individual market failures this can be done by creating or strengthening bridging institutions and centers of excellence promoting speedy and wide diffusion of engineering competence and strengthening compensating mechanisms when important nodes in the networks fail given the difficulty of identifying future technological opportunities the simultaneous pursuit of alternative strategies early identification of important developments and increasing the absorptive capacity of the economy become important aspects of public policy

ironing out the kinks in executive compensation linking incentive pay to average stock prices abstract traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation applying a principal agent analysis we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices among other benefits averaging reduces volatility by about 42 making the incentive pay more attractive to risk averse executives holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price more importantly the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant s risk incentives after adjusting for option cost finally averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options

how to value employee stock options one of the arguments often used against expensing employee stock options is that calculating their fair value at the time they are granted is very difficult this article presents an approach to calculating the value of employee stock options that is practical easy to implement and theoretically sound it explicitly considers the vesting period the possibility that employees will leave the company during the life of the option the inability of employees to trade their options and the relevant dilution issues this approach is an enhancement of the approach suggested by the financial accounting standards board s statement of financial accounting standards no 123 because it does not require an arbitrary reduction in the life of the option to allow for early exercise caused by the inability of employees to trade their options

using auctions to price employee stock options the case of zions bancorporation esoars the first empirical analysis of zions bancorporation s 2006 and 2007 auctions of employee stock option appreciation rights securities esoars this study examined 1 the impact of auction rules on bidding strategies and allocations 2 the efficiency of the auction clearing prices and 3 the value gap between esoars auction clearing prices and various model based estimates it found that the design features of the auctions e g ending rules significantly affected bidding strategies but not final allocations which remained highly concentrated it also found that the clearing prices 1 displayed high price elasticities of demand suggesting efficient price discovery and 2 were low relative to some but not all model based estimates these findings suggest design improvements that might benefit auctions of other illiquid derivatives e g banks troubled assets currently being considered by the u s government

valuing employee stock options does the model matter in this numerical analysis of models for valuing employee stock options the focus is on the impact of a model on the resulting option prices and the sensitivity of pricing differences between models with respect to changes in the parameters for most models the price reduction relative to standard options is uniquely determined by the expected life of the option in fact with the exception of the financial accounting standards board 123 model pricing differences are negligible if the models are calibrated to the same expected life of the option consequently the application of models with several hard to estimate parameters such as the utility maximizing model can be greatly simplified by calibration because expected life is easier to estimate than utility parameters

comparing systems approaches to innovation and technological change for sustainable and competitive economies an explorative study into conceptual commonalities differences and complementarities this paper makes a distinction between three theoretical frameworks that have been highly influential in the discourse on innovation competitiveness and sustainability sectoral systems of innovation ssi technological innovation systems tis and socio technical systems st systems these frameworks share a common systems approach to innovation but are often positioned as different bodies of literature that correspond to different epistemic communities this paper is explorative and conceptual in nature it presents a systematic comparative review of ssi tis and st systems based on the following analytical dimensions 1 system boundaries 2 actors and networks 3 institutions 4 knowledge 5 dynamics and 6 policy approach in the concluding section commonalities and differences of the three approaches are presented and suggestions for complimentarily are made c 2010 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

integrating replenishment decisions with advance demand information there is a growing consensus that a portfolio of customers with different demand lead times can lead to higher more regular revenues and better capacity utilization customers with positive demand lead times place orders in advance of their needs resulting inadvance demand information this gives rise to the problem of finding effective inventory control policies under advance demand information we show that state dependent s s and base stock policies are optimal for stochastic inventory systems with and without fixed costs the state of the system reflects our knowledge of advance demand information we also determine conditions under which advance demand information has no operational value a numerical study allows us to obtain additional insights and to evaluate strategies to induce advance demand information

exercise behavior valuation and the incentive effects of employee stock options abstract we use a large database on eso exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior are manifested in option values and incentives option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations are compared to those computed from models used to value tradable options our analysis provides guidance to both academics and practitioners about how differences in exercise behavior and model choice affect measures of eso values and incentives and underscores the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying economic forces that affect the behavior of eso holders

the subjective and objective evaluation of incentive stock options owners of incentive options invariably hold undiversified portfolios this paper derives a model for the subjective and objective values of such options the subjective value the value to the holder is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective the objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values this value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount the model which is the black scholes model with modified parameters is simple to use

competitive dynamics and economic learning an extended resource based view in this paper a conceptual framework for the analysis of economic learning is developed economic learning by analogy with organizational learning results in the development of economic competences or capabilities shared between firms which rest on a foundation of economic resources from which value is generated and economic routines through which resources are utilized it is the mobility of resources and their exchange and production dynamics along evolutionary pathways which underpins the plausibility of a notion of economic learning the paper elaborates this framework as a resource based view rbv of the economy as a whole as an extension of the rbv of the firm such a framework captures the dynamics of exchange and circulation of technologies know how and intangible assets as well as of tangible assets and capital goods it is concerned with investment behavior by entrepreneurs rather than with the behavior of producers and consumers in goods and services markets within this resource economy framework it is possible to generate an account of the resource dynamics that underpin production of goods and services including resource propagation diffusion imitation replication and recombination these processes encompass evolutionary pressures experienced through resource variation selection and retention entrepreneurial initiatives take the form of resource recombinations while resource innovation captures the creation of new economic resources such as technological standards such a perspective brings into focus the resource specialization and configurations that drive real economies within firms and between firms that translates into enhanced or diminished performance of the economy as a whole copyright 2003 oxford university press

the competitive newsboy we consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory a splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory we examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated i e there is perfect substitutability then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory

a general framework for evaluating executive stock options abstract motivated by recent recommendations by both european and american accounting standards boards that executive stock options be expensed in firms statements we provide an analytical and flexible framework for their evaluation our approach takes into account the vesting period american style resetting and reloading provisions that are features of many option programs and also considers the trading restriction on executives we identify a recursive structure in the stream of options that are granted to the executive over the course of her employment by exploiting this we are able to obtain a near explicit formula for the option value this enables us to discuss the joint effects of the different features on the exercising strategies and firms granting cost especially we highlight some significant interactions among these features

optimal policies and approximations for a serial multiechelon inventory system with time correlated demand since clark and scarf s pioneering work most advances in multiechelon inventory systems have been based on demand processes that are time independent this paper revisits the serial multiechelon inventory system of clark and scarf and develops three key results first we provide a simple lower bound approximation to the optimal echelon inventory levels and an upper bound to the total system cost for the basic model of clark and scarf second we show that the structure of the optimal stocking policy of clark and scarf holds under time correlated demand processes using a martingale model of forecast evolution third we extend the approximation to the time correlated demand process and study in particular for an autoregressive demand model the impact of lead times and autocorrelation on the performance of the serial inventory system

too much pay performance sensitivity abstract we examine the relation between pay performance sensitivity pps the convexity of managerial compensation vega and future stock risk and returns for a large sample of firms between 1992 and 2004 higher pps and vega are both associated with lower future stock returns part of this negative relation can be explained by risk averse managers decreasing equity risk in response to increases in pps and vega however even after correcting for lower future risk future stock returns are negatively associated with the magnitude of option sensitivity this finding is consistent with previous studies that link high option compensation to manager owner agency problems

the analytic valuation of american options no analytic solutions exists for the valuation of american options written on futures contracts and foreign currencies for which early exercise may be optimal this article formulates the american option valuation problem in economically and mathematically meaningful ways this enables us to derive valuation formulas for american options the properties associated with the optimal exercise boundary are examined and a numerical technique to implement the valuation formulas is presented article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

underwater options and the dynamics of executive pay to performance sensitivities we empirically analyze the dynamics of executives pay to performance sensitivities option pay to performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay to performance sensitivity in other ways building a detailed data set on executives portfolios of stock and options we find that the responsiveness of pay to performance sensitivities created by all executive holdings of stock and options to changes in stock price is large the elasticity of pay to performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0 7 and is larger for high option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater the dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay to performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines on average these larger grants restore approximately 40 of the stock price induced pay to performance sensitivity declines option repricings are inconsequential in this regard despite the attention they have attracted in looking at positive returns we find the reverse higher returns both directly increase pay to performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants which raise pay to performance sensitivities further thus option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases

optimal policies for multiechelon inventory problems with markov modulated demand this paper considers a multistage serial inventory system with markov modulated demand random demand arises at stage 1 stage 1 orders from stage 2 etc and stage n orders from an outside supplier with unlimited stock the demand distribution in each period is determined by the current state of an exogenous markov chain excess demand is backlogged linear holding costs are incurred at every stage and linear backorder costs are incurred at stage 1 the ordering costs are also linear the objective is to minimize the long run average costs in the system the paper shows that the optimal policy is an echelon base stock policy with state dependent order up to levels an efficient algorithm is also provided for determining the optimal base stock levels the results can be extended to serial systems in which there is a fixed ordering cost at stage n and to assembly systems with linear ordering costs

employee stock option valuation with an early exercise boundary many companies are recognizing that the black scholes formula is inappropriate for employee stock options esos and are moving toward lattice models for accounting or decision making purposes in the most influential of these models the assumption is that employees exercise voluntarily when the stock price reaches a fixed multiple of the strike price effectively introducing a horizontal exercise boundary into the lattice in practice however employees make a trade off between intrinsic value captured and the opportunity cost of time value forgone the model proposed here explicitly recognizes and accounts for this reality and is intuitively appealing easily implemented and compliant with u s accounting standards

paper millionaires how valuable is stock to a stockholder who is restricted from selling it abstract many firms have stockholders who face severe restrictions on their ability to sell their shares and diversify the risk of their personal wealth we study the costs of these liquidity restrictions on stockholders using a continuous time portfolio choice framework these restrictions have major effects on the optimal investment and consumption strategies because of the need to hedge the illiquid stock position and smooth consumption in anticipation of the eventual lapse of the restrictions these results provide a number of important insights about the effects of illiquidity in financial markets

revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options abstract we develop a multiperiod framework to evaluate the incentive effects of executive stock options esos for a given increase in the grant date firm stock price and a concurrent increase in return volatility the increment of total value at the vesting date acts as a proxy for the incentive effects of esos if the option is attached to the existing contract without adjusting cash compensation we suggest that a firm should not always fix the strike price to the grant date stock price instead the strike price should vary with the length of the vesting period we also show that compared with at the money options restricted stock generates greater incentives to increase stock prices in some scenarios especially when equity based awards are vested early if the vesting period is long the firm could grant options instead of restricted stock to maximize incentives

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

optimal exercise of executive stock options and implications for firm cost this paper conducts a comprehensive study of the optimal exercise policy for an executive stock option and its implications for option cost average life and alternative valuation concepts the paper is the first to provide analytical results for an executive with general concave utility wealthier or less risk averse executives exercise later and create greater option cost however option cost can decline with volatility we show when there exists a single exercise boundary yet demonstrate the possibility of a split continuation region we also show that for constant relative risk averse utility the option value does not converge to the black and scholes value as the correlation between the stock and the market portfolio converges to one we compare our model s option cost with the modified black and scholes approximation typically used in practice and show that the approximation error can be large or small positive or negative depending on firm characteristics

a comparative analysis of photovoltaic technological innovation systems including international dimensions the cases of japan and the netherlands this paper investigates the development and diffusion of photovoltaic pv technology in japan and the netherlands both cases are analysed with the technological innovation systems tis framework which focuses on a particular technology and includes all those factors that influence the development and diffusion of a technology this framework proposes seven system functions key processes that need to be fulfilled for a tis to function well we include international factors in the framework such as import share export activities foreign direct investment and international knowledge exchange japan is found to have a well functioning pv tis with a strong industry and a large market for pv whereas the dutch have so far established considerably less based on the differences in the cases we formulate a number of lessons for the dutch pv tis 1 system functions such as guidance of the search f4 and advocacy coalitions f7 need to be strengthened in order to reinforce each other in a positive way 2 formulate maintain and translate consistent long term goals into long term policies and stimulation measures in order to allow a gradual build up of networks and skills expertise 3 build up and maintain legitimacy within the institutional setting and 4 strengthen the tis in order for the smes to grow in terms of capital and capabilities

technological clusters with a knowledge based principle evidence from a delphi investigation in the french case of the life sciences abstract recent works in the theory of technical change show the effect of irreversibility and lock in on the diffusion and creation of innovation processes which are able to stop the development of a generic technology therefore industrial policies play a major role in selecting and supporting the innovative process the purpose of this paper is to prove the possibility to derive a typology of future innovations in terms of generic technology from a delphi type technology survey thus it is possible to get a better understanding of the industrial dynamics and to design an interesting tool for industrial policies or for firm strategies as far as they aim at developing stable technological trajectories this is applied to the french case of the life sciences the paper suggests interesting explanatory trajectories in order to fight against diseases such as cancer alzheimer or schizophrenia

lower bounds for multi echelon stochastic inventory systems we establish lower bounds on the minimum cost of managing certain production distribution networks with setup costs at all stages and stochastic demands these networks include serial assembly and one warehouse multi retailer systems we obtain the bounds through novel cost allocation schemes we evaluate the bounds performance for one warehouse multi retailer systems by comparing them with simple heuristic policies the bounds are quite tight for systems with a small number of retailers we also present simplified proof of known optimality results for serial and assembly systems

valuing executive stock options with endogenous departure abstract executive stock options differ from exchange traded options because of vesting and portability restrictions executive departure from the firm forces early exercise reducing the value of executive options current methodology calculates the option value by multiplying the black scholes option price by the departure probability this ignores the possibility that executive departure is less likely when stock price is high and thus is correlated with the stock price we show that this correlation implies a substantial increase in option values a similar situation occurs in performance based option packages where the actual number of options granted depends on stock performance

risk ambiguity and the exercise of employee stock options abstract we investigate the importance of ambiguity or knightian uncertainty in executives stock option exercise decisions we develop an empirical estimate of ambiguity and include it in regression models alongside the traditional measure of risk equity volatility we show that each variable has a significant effect on the timing of option exercises with volatility causing executives to hold options longer to preserve option value and ambiguity increasing the tendency for executives to exercise early

optimal compensation and pay performance sensitivity in a continuous time principal agent model this paper studies the optimal contract between risk neutral shareholders and a constant relative risk aversion manager in a continuous time model several interesting results are obtained first the optimal compensation is increasing but concave in output value if the manager is more risk averse than a log utility manager second when the manager has a log utility a linear contract is optimal when there is no explicit lower bound on the compensation and an option contract is optimal when there is an explicit lower bound third optimal effort is stochastic state dependent fourth consistent with empirical findings and contrary to standard agency theory predictions the relationship between pay performance sensitivity and firm performance and that between pay performance sensitivity and firm risk can be nonmonotonic this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two stage supply chain we investigate a two stage serial supply chain with stationary stochastic demand and fixed transportation times inventory holding costs are charged at each stage and each stage may incur a consumer backorder penalty cost e g the upper stage the supplier may dislike backorders at the lower stage the retailer we consider two games in both the stages independently choose base stock policies to minimize their costs the games differ in how the firms track their inventory levels in one the firms are committed to tracking echelon inventory in the other they track local inventory we compare the policies chosen under this competitive regime to those selected to minimize total supply chain costs i e the optimal solution we show that the games nearly always have a unique nash equilibrium and it differs from the optimal solution hence competition reduces efficiency furthermore the two games equilibria are different so the tracking method influences strategic behavior we show that the system optimal solution can be achieved as a nash equilibrium using simple linear transfer payments the value of cooperation is context specific in some settings competition increases total cost by only a fraction of a percent whereas in other settings the cost increase is enormous we also discuss stackelberg equilibria

sticks or carrots optimal ceo compensation when managers are loss averse this paper analyzes optimal executive compensation contracts when managers are loss averse we calibrate a stylized principal agent model to the observed contracts of 595 ceos and show that this model can explain observed option holdings and high base salaries remarkably well for a range of parameterizations we also derive and calibrate the general shape of the optimal contract that is increasing and convex for medium and high outcomes and that drops discontinuously to the lowest possible payout for low outcomes finally we identify the critical features of the loss aversion model that render optimal contracts convex

non marketability and the value of employee stock options abstract we adapt the benninga et al 2005 framework to value employee stock options esos the model quantifies non diversification effects is computationally simple and provides an endogenous explanation of eso early exercise using a proprietary dataset of eso exercise events we measure the non marketability eso discount we find that the eso value on the grant date is approximately 45 of a similar plain vanilla black scholes value the model is aligned with empirical findings of esos gives an exercise boundary of esos and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share based employee and executive compensation using the model we give a numerical measure of non diversification in an imperfect market

analysis of a forecasting production inventory system with stationary demand we consider a production stage that produces a single item in a make to stock manner demand for finished goods is stationary in each time period an updated vector of demand forecasts over the forecast horizon becomes available for use in production decisions we model the sequence of forecast update vectors using the martingale model of forecast evolution developed by graves et al 1986 1998 and heath and jackson 1994 the production stage is modeled as a single server discrete time continuous state queue we focus on a modified base stock policy incorporating forecast information and use an approximate analysis rooted in heavy traffic theory and random walk theory to obtain a closed form expression for the forecast corrected base stock level that minimizes the expected steady state inventory holding and backorder costs this expression which is shown to be accurate under certain conditions in a simulation study sheds some light on the interrelationships among safety stock stochastic correlated demand inaccurate forecasts and random and capacitated production in forecasting production inventory systems

nontraded asset valuation with portfolio constraints a binomial approach we provide a simple binomial framework to value american style derivatives subject to trading restrictions the optimal investment of liquid wealth is solved simultaneously with the early exercise decision of the nontraded derivative noshort sales constraints on the underlying asset manifest themselves in the form of an implicit dividend yield in the risk neutralized process for the underlying asset one consequence is that american call options may be optimally exercised prior to maturity even when the underlying asset pays no dividends applications to executive stock options eso are presented it is shown that the value of an eso could be substantially lower than that computed using the black scholes model we also analyze nontraded payoffs based on a price that is imperfectly correlated with the price of a traded asset the economics of asset pricing when one or more of the assets in the opportunity set are either subject to trading restrictions or entirely nontraded is a matter of great interest viewed from a practical perspective we have several important examples of such assets that are subject to trading restrictions pensions which represent perhaps the most significant of assets held by individual households are subject to trading restrictions it is typically the case that assets in pensions are not available for immediate consumption borrowing against pension assets is subject to significant direct and indirect costs by way of taxes and early withdrawal penalties human capital is another example housing investment is also illiquid and subject to significant transaction costs together pensions human capital and housing constitute a substantial part of a typical household s assets the significance of such nontraded assets for risk premia has already been noted by bewley 1982 there are other circumstances where lack of unrestricted trading plays an important role executive compensation plans usually take the this article was presented at boston university we would like to thank the editor bernard dumas and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments we also thank nalin kulatilaka and seminar participants for useful suggestions ganlin chang fei guan and carlton osakwe provided valuable research assistance j detemple acknowledges support from the social sciences and humanities research

forecasting volatility using long memory and comovements an application to option valuation under sfas 123r horizon matched historical volatility is commonly used to forecast future volatility for op tion valuation under the statement of financial accounting standards sfas 123r in this paper we empirically investigate the performance of using historical volatility to forecast long term stock return volatility in comparison with a number of alternative forecasting methods in analyzing forecasting errors and their impact on reported income due to option expensing we find that historical volatility is a poor forecast for long term volatility and that shrinkage adjustment toward comparable firm volatility only slightly improves its per formance forecasting performance can be improved substantially by incorporating both long memory and comovements with common market factors we also experiment with a simple mixed horizon realized volatility model and find its long term forecasting perfor mance to be more accurate than historical forecasts but less accurate than long memory forecasts

easy money managerial power and the option backdating game revisited abstract this paper presents a model of a firm that backdates executive stock option grants in order to maximize actual compensation for a given level of reported compensation the model is used to estimate the magnitude of the difference between the actual and reported values of option grants although the sarbanes oxley act has reduced the likelihood of very large differentials it has had a relatively minor impact on the average differential misreporting has a greater magnitude on average when the share price is more volatile the options vest earlier or have shorter lifetimes or there is a longer window in which to grant the options we analyze more than 36 000 option grants between 2003 and 2019 and find that when recipients have more to gain from strategic backdating or when there is likely to be less monitoring from independent directors firms are more likely to exhibit behavior consistent with strategic backdating

market valuation of employee stock options this study investigates whether investors incorporate the value of a firm s outstanding employee stock options into its stock price i estimate the outstanding options value for a sample of firms for which outstanding fixed options exceed 5 of outstanding common shares in 1988 i find a negative correlation between the value of outstanding options and a firm s share price the correlation is stronger i for the option s intrinsic value than for the option s time value ii for options that are later in their vesting stage than earlier in their vesting stage and iii for large firms than for small firms in addition the fasb s method for calculating compensation expense has no explanatory power in the presence of this paper s calculation of the options value

managerial responses to incentives control of firm risk derivative pricing implications and outside wealth management a b s t r a c t we model a firm s value process controlled by a manager maximizing expected utility from restricted shares and employee stock options the manager also controls allocation of his outside wealth which allows partially hedging of his exposure to firm risk managerial control increases the expected time to exercise for his employee stock options it also reduces the gap between his certainty equivalent and the firm s fair value for his compensation but that gap remains substantial managerial control also causes traded options to exhibit an implied volatility smile with costly control the same basic patterns remain but the manager s risk taking is dampened

stocking up executive optimism option exercise and share retention abstract we show that an executive is optimistic about her company s prospects if and only if she retains some of the shares received whenever she exercises company stock options empirically an indicator of optimism based on this idea matches the expected relations between optimism and corporate decision making better than commonly used indicators based on the timing of option exercise this makes sense as our model of an executive s optimal option exercise and portfolio choice demonstrates that the timing of option exercise depends just as much on stock and other executive characteristics as it does on optimism

decentralizing cross functional decisions coordination through internal markets a firm faces many problems that are inherently cross functional to solve them successfully requires the coordinated actions of many functional representatives acting in a decentralized setting functional managers however respond to their own individual incentives and may consequently fail to maximize the overall profits of the firm we examine this issue in a setting in which the output of early actions limits the range of later actions and we propose an incentive scheme that allows the system to be successfully decentralized our mechanism is based on linear transfer prices for the intermediate output that are implemented through an internal market a market maker buys the output from one function and sells it to another she is not obliged to sell at the same price at which she bought and may set prices solely to provide incentives we illustrate the flexibility of the scheme by applying it to several models in the operations management literature

the exercise and valuation of executive stock options abstract in theory hedging restrictions faced by managers make executive stock options more difficult to value than ordinary options because they imply that exercise policies of managers depend on their preferences and endowments using data on option exercises from 40 firms this paper shows that a simple extension of the ordinary american option model which introduces random exogenous exercise and forfeiture predicts actual exercise times and payoffs just as well as an elaborate utility maximizing model that explicitly accounts for the nontransferability of options the simpler model could therefore be more useful than the preference based model for valuing executive options in practice

executive compensation and capital structure we examine the relation between capital structure decision and the incentive power of executive compensation that contains both cash and equity components our analytical model shows that executive

employee stock options as warrants abstract previous studies ignore the fact that employee stock options are warrants because these options have been an insignificant component of firms capital structures i show that this assumption is no longer correct for example for more than 36 of my sample firms employee stock options represent a more significant claim on firm value than the firm s debt and preferred stock combined moreover in contrast to the suggestions of previous research i show that employee stock options are a significant claim on firms throughout the economy including larger firms older firms and firms in old economy industries finally i show that the presumption in prior studies that employee stock options are not warrants causes a potential misunderstanding of the risk shifting interests of securityholders and biases the analysis of capital structure issues

competition and cooperation in a two stage supply chain with demand forecasts we consider a serial supply chain with one supplier and one retailer each obtains some demand forecast information which may be shared or not we investigate the members benefits from sharing information the forecasts follow a variant of the martingale model of forecast evolution mmfe we construct a simple transfer payment scheme to align the players incentives with that of the overall system the main finding is that unless the players incentives are aligned in this way sharing information makes little sense it might hurt one or the other player and the system as a whole

the nature and importance of economic competence this chapter takes on three tasks 1 to survey the study of economic competence as it appears in economic literature 2 to give a meaningful and operational definition of economic competence as one of the factors contributing to macroeconomic growth and 3 to suggest a methodology pursued in greater depth elsewhere to generalize and link economic competence as defined at the micro firm individual level to macroeconomic growth through simulation on the micro based macroeconomic model of the swedish economic system moses by introducing knowledge in the micro setting of firm organizational competence we arrive at a very different interpretation measured at the macro industry level from that of standard neoclassical theory

does stock return predictability affect eso fair value abstract executive stock options esos are modified american options that cannot be valued using standard methods with a few exceptions the literature has discussed the eso fair value by assuming unpredictable stock returns which are not supported by the available empirical evidence in this paper we obtain the fair value of american esos when stock returns are predictable and specifically driven by the trending ornstein uhlenbeck process of lo and wang 1995 we solve the executive s portfolio allocation problem for a simple buy and hold strategy when his wealth can be distributed between a risk free asset and a market portfolio this problem is jointly solved with the executive s optimal exercise policy we find that executives tend to wait longer the higher the predictability independently of the composition of executive s asset menu we have also analyzed the implications under the fas123r proposals for the eso fair value and found that even for low autocorrelations there is a meaningful mispricing when unpredictable returns are erroneously assumed

the development and use of machine tools in historical perspective abstract improvements and diffusion of machine tools have had a major impact on productivity in manufacturing industry since the industrial revolution the impact has been both direct and indirect the direct impact consists of rising labor productivity through the use of faster more accurate more mechanized machines and of the higher capital productivity through higher operating rates greater reliability and higher utilization rates the indirect impact arises as the use of new or improved machine tools has necessitated or facilitated organizational changes affecting both labor capital raw materials and energy the magnitude of these impacts has varied over the years with the areas of application as new production methods have made possible entirely new products or lowered the cost of existing products sufficiently to create new markets the first part of the paper contains a review of the historical development of machine tool technology since the industrial revolution paying particular attention to the role of interaction between producers and users of machine tools the second part focuses on the way in which recent development differs from that in earlier periods in particular it is found that the major changes in machine tool technology from the so called american system of manufactures in the early 19th century to the development of detroit automation in the 1950s have tended to improve mass production methods by contrast the development of numerical control beginning in 1948 has opened up the possibility of extending industrial production methods and automation to areas previously characterized more by handicraft methods even though this technology is not yet fully utilized it is clear that the economics of industrial production has been revolutionized by the cost reduction of small scale production relative to large scale and the degree of flexibility offered by the technology the third section of the paper deals with the present development trends particularly discussing the increasing importance of flexibility and the shifting emphasis from development of individual pieces of machinery to integration and control of entire manufacturing processes i a through the use of industrial robots the reasons for the need for greater flexibility in manufacturing are also identified

the role of inventory in delivery time competition the paper operationalizes the notion of shortage cost by considering the behavior of customers and competing firms and examines the role of inventory in response time competition we start with a single firm production control model in which customers are characterized by their preferences of price quality and delivery time the optimal production inventory policy and the optimal choice between make to order and make to stock operations are determined in simple newsboy like formulas the basic model is then extended to an n firm market game in which firms compete for orders from the aspect of early delivery one could think of this setting as an oligopoly racing market the analysis shows that competition can breed a demand for produce to stock just as other economic phenomena such as economies of scale uncertainty or seasonality can induce make to stock and that delivery time competition increases the buyer s welfare while decreasing the producer s welfare

structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance the link between managerial ownership and corporate performance this paper presents a parsimonious structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership firm scale and performance and the empirical associations among them in particular variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well known hump shaped relation between tobin s q and managerial ownership to assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model the unfortunate conclusion is that at least in the ownership performance context proxy variables fixed effects and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

pricing executive stock options under employment shocks abstract we obtain explicit expressions for the subjective objective and market value of perpetual executive stock options esos under exogenous employment shocks driven by an independent poisson process previously we obtain the executive s optimal exercise policy from the subjective valuation that is necessary for the objective one or fair value the perpetual eso is compared with the true finite maturity eso finding that the approximation is reasonably good to illustrate the usefulness of the objective valuation for accounting purposes we analyze the statistical distribution of the fair value when there is uncertainty about the employment shock intensity finally the role of esos in the design of executives incentives is also discussed

employee stock options equity valuation and the valuation of option grants using a warrant pricing model we investigate the use of a warrant pricing approach to incorporate employee stock options esos into equity valuation and to account for the dilutive effect of esos in the valuation of option grants for financial reporting purposes our valuation approach accounts for the jointly determined nature of eso and shareholder values the empirical results show that our stock price estimate exhibits lower prediction errors and higher explanatory powers for actual share price than does the traditional stock price estimate we use our valuation approach to assess the implications of dilution on the fair value estimates of eso grants we find that the fair value is overstated by 6 if we ignore the dilutive feature of esos furthermore this bias is larger for firms that are heavy users of esos small and r d intensive and for firms that have a broad based eso compensation plan

on manufacturing marketing incentives stereotypically marketing is mainly concerned about satisfying customers and manufacturing is mainly interested in factory efficiency using the principal agent agency paradigm which assumes that the marketing and manufacturing managers of the firm will act in their self interest we seek incentive plans that will induce those managers to act so that the owner of the firm can attain as much as possible of the residual returns one optimal incentive plan can be interpreted as follows the owner subcontracts to pay the manufacturing manager a fixed rate for all capacity he delivers each marketing manager receives all of the returns from his product in turn all managers pay a fixed fee to the owner under this plan the marketing managers will often complain about the stock level decisions even though these levels are announced in advance under a revised plan the owner can eliminate such complaints by delegating the stocking decisions to the respective marketing managers without any loss this plan is interpreted as requiring the owner to make a futures market for manufacturing capacity paying the manufacturing manager the expected marginal value for each unit of capacity delivered receiving the realized marginal value from the marketing managers and losing money on average in the process

american garch employee stock option valuation abstract we implement a flexible simulation based approach for the fair value of employee stock option eso that accounts for the vesting period departure risk and voluntary suboptimal early exercise we introduce garch effects on the underlying asset and we analyze the price bias with respect to the constant volatility case we also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in several eso characteristics we compare this valuation with fas 123 method revealing a fas overvaluation finally we value a real eso plan providing the confidence intervals for the estimated eso prices

employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis this paper describes the exercise behavior of over 50 000 employees who hold longterm options on employer stock at eight corporations employees typically exercise options years before expiration commonly sacrificing half of the black scholes value exercise is strongly associated with recent stock price movements the market to strike ratio proximity to vesting dates time to maturity volatility and the employee s level within the company these findings have implications for compensation planners the fasb as it develops a new accounting standard for options and financial statement users and preparers who apply and interpret the new fasb standard

non transferable non hedgeable executive stock option pricing abstract to value non transferable non hedgeable ntnh contingent claims and price executive stock options esos we use a replication argument to translate portfolios with ntnh derivatives into portfolios of primary assets only with stochastic portfolio constraints by identifying stochastic discount factors and finding subjective prices of ntnh european and american esos for block and continuous partial exercise we derive executives optimal exercise policies and use these to find objective prices costs of esos to firms through numerical simulations we obtain policy implications regarding esos incentivizing efficiency for the first time we demonstrate that unlike under block exercise subjective prices under continuous partial exercise may be higher than objective ones moreover volatility regimes and executives other wealth are important in eso pricing and are thus essential to empirical executive compensation studies

risk aversion and block exercise of executive stock options abstract it is well documented that executives granted stock options tend to exercise early and in a few large transactions or blocks standard risk neutral valuation models cannot explain these patterns and attempts to capture the exercise behavior of risk averse executives have been limited to the special case of one option this paper solves for the optimal exercise behavior for a risk averse executive who is granted multiple stock options we show that utility based models do not predict block exercise behavior rather the risk averse executive exercises stock options individually at a sequence of increasing price thresholds when in addition the executive faces frictions such as costly exercise he faces a trade off between exercising little and often to maximize return and exercising larger quantities on fewer occasions to minimize effort this generates realistic block exercise behavior and yields new predictions in particular executives should begin by exercising large blocks of options but the block sizes should become smaller over time our framework also allows us to study the impact of multiple exercise dates on estimates of the cost of options to the company we find that assuming the executive can only exercise on a single occasion underestimates the cost of the options compared with allowing for optimal exercise behavior

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

on and off the beaten path the evolution of four technological systems in sweden abstract this paper examines four swedish case studies of technological systems from the perspective of path dependence what are the similarities and differences in this regard between factory automation electronics and computers biotechnology and powder technology what are the distinctive features in each system which set it apart from similar systems elsewhere and what role does path dependence play in explaining these features the essential function of technological systems is to capture diffuse and magnify spillovers of technical and organizational knowledge therefore the nature of knowledge i e the characteristics of knowledge and how it can be transmitted in each system determines what types of spillovers are likely to occur as well as the mechanisms through which they occur other important influences are the initial conditions and the institutions including both organizations and rules of the game

the risk preferences of u s executives in this paper i elicit risk attitudes of u s executives by calibrating a subjective option valuation model for option exercising data 1996 to 2008 yielding approximately 65 000 values of relative risk aversion rra for almost 7 000 executives the observed behavior is generally consistent with moderate risk aversion and a median mean rra close to one three values are validated for chief executive officers ceos by testing theory based predictions on the influence of individual characteristics on risk preferences such as gender marital status religiosity and intelligence senior managers such as ceos presidents and chairpersons of the boards of directors are significantly less risk averse than non senior executives rra heterogeneity is strongly correlated with sector membership and firm level variables such as size performance and capital structure alternative factors influencing option exercises are tested for their influence on rra values this paper was accepted by brad barber finance

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

do stock options overcome managerial risk aversion evidence from exercises of executive stock options we report that the probability that executives exercise options early decreases with the volatility of the underlying stock return we interpret this to mean that executives subjective option value increases with volatility and that option grants increase executives risk appetite further decomposition reveals that the results are most pronounced for idiosyncratic volatility consistent with our conjecture that executives believe they can better predict or influence the resolution of idiosyncratic uncertainty than systematic uncertainty and thus favor the former data are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2016 2495 this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

ceo stock based compensation an empirical analysis of incentive intensity relative mix and economic determinants the use of stock based compensation for u s ceos has increased significantly throughout the 1990s research interest in particular on stock option compensation has similarly increased yet contradictory results create questions about the theoretical underpinnings therefore we revisit the controversy surrounding stock option awards and we further the understanding of restricted stock grants which have escaped similar research focus using a recent data set we obtain convincing empirical support for most theoretical predictions about stock option awards we also find that restricted stock due to its linear payoffs is relatively inefficient in inducing risk averse ceos to accept risky value increasing investment projects copyright 2000 by university of chicago press