economic shocks wealth and welfare the immediate effects of the asian crisis on the well being of indonesians are examined using the indonesia family life survey an on going longitudinal household survey there is tremendous diversity in the effect of the shock for some households it was devastating for others it brought new opportunities a wide array of mechanisms were adopted in response to the crisis households combined to more fully exploit benefits of scale economies in consumption labor supply increased even as real wages collapsed households reduced spending on semi durables while maintaining expenditures on foods rural households used wealth particularly gold to smooth consumption

optimal collusion with internal contracting abstract in this paper two firms play an infinitely repeated bertrand game and each firm has an agent who produces the firm s output and holds private information about production costs the colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents information we develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information we show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

resale price maintenance and collusion the article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude we analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance rpm when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs in the absence of rpm retail prices react to retailers information and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect by eliminating retail price flexibility rpm facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short run gains from a deviation overall rpm can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it

could a monetary base rule have prevented the great depression abstract this paper continues an ongoing investigation of the properties of a policy rule that specifies settings of the monetary base that are designed to keep nominal gnp growing smoothly at a noninflationary rate counterfactual historical simulations for 1923 1941 are conducted with the rule and a small model of nominal gnp determination estimated with u s quarterly data with residuals fed in as estimates of the behavioral shocks that occurred the simulation results indicate that nominal gnp would have been kept reasonably close to a steady three percent path over 1923 1941 if the rule had been in effect

the theory of sovering debt and spain under philip ii this paper examines lending by a genoese led cartel to philip ii of spain 1556 98 from the perspective of theory on sovereign debt models in this literature suggest that the genoese linked specie deliveries from spain to the low countries to lending in order to create a penalty to enforce their loans the king tried to renege the genoese applied the penalty and the king ultimately repaid when the episode is used to examine theory the crown s observed debt ceiling and estimates of its cost of enduring the penalty and its ability to repay are in line with predctions of bulow and rogoff the nature of the penalty has the flavor of gole and kehoe s model its observation on the path of play is suggestive of atkeson s model

not just the great contraction friedman and schwartz s a monetary history of the united states 1867 to 1960 milton friedman and anna j schwartz published a monetary history of the united states 1867 to 1960 with princeton university press in 1963 to critical acclaim since then the book s reputation has grown and it clearly has become one of the most influential volumes in economics in the twentieth century in this paper we document the extraordinary impact of a monetary history and argue that the key to this success was the use of the narrative approach to the problem of identifying the effects of monetary policy on economic activity

tariffs and aggregate economic activity lessons from the great depression abstract we argue against the prevailing view that the macroeconomic role of tariffs during the great depression was small to understand the economic channels through which tariffs could have large effects we build a multi sector dynamic equilibrium trade model that captures key features of trade in the 1930s a substantial share of trade was in material inputs and the persistence of the tariff increases had the potential for significant effects on capital accumulation both of these features are important in generating the conclusion that even when trade only represents a small share of output tariffs can have a significant impact on gdp simulation of the model suggests that the global escalation of the tariff war precipitated the collapse of world trade along with declines of several percent in international output and investment

theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee this article reexamines the experience of the joint executive committee an 1880s railroad cartel to assess the applicability of the green and porter 1984 and rotemberg and saloner 1986 theories of price wars after discussing necessary modifications to the theories i estimate a number of dynamic models to explore the causes of price wars the cyclical nature of pricing and the possibility that secret price cuts may have been given the estimates provide some support for the predictions of the first theory

duopoly with both ruin and entry duopoly is modeled here as a prisoner s dilemma repeated in continuous time firms wish to maximize discounted flows of dividend payments which are paid when capitalization levels permit a firm is ruined when its capitalization falls below zero but each ruined firm is immediately replaced by a new entrant attempting to ruin a rival is not necessarily an attractive strategy here since the postentry game against the new rival may be a less favorable one on the other hand firms that are close to ruin have little to lose by playing aggressively and hence are attractive targets of aggression themselves equilibria are constricted that reflect these considerations

time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals abstract in a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments moral hazard in production leads to a nondegenerate distribution of income which the government would like to flatten ex post self enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution we investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem and show that in the constrained optimal equilibrium usually a linear tax schedule is imposed this remains true if renegotiation of the social agreement is possible journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 e6 h21

firm reputation and horizontal integration author s cai hongbin abstract we study effects of horizontal integration on firm reputation in an environment where customers observe only imperfect signals about firms effort quality choices firms cannot maintain reputations of high quality and earn quality premium forever even when firms are choosing high quality effort there is always a possibility that a bad signal is observed in this case firms must give up their quality premium at least temporarily as punishment a firm s integration decision is based on the extent to which integration attenuates this necessary cost of maintaining a good reputation horizontal integration leads to a larger market base for the merged firm and may allow better monitoring of the firm s choices hence improving the punishment scheme for deviations on the other hand it gives the merged firm more room for sophisticated derivations we characterize the optimal level of integration and provide sufficient conditions under which nonintegration dominates integration we show that the optimal size of the firm is smaller when 1 trades are more frequent and information is disseminated more rapidly or 2 the deviation gain is smaller than the honesty benefit or 3 customer information about firm choices is more precise

trade barriers and the collapse of world trade during the great depression 1 introduction the contraction in world trade during the first phase of the great depression stands out as the strongest adverse shock to international trade in modern history from 1929 to 1932 world import and export volume in the industrialized nations decreased about 30 however it is not well understood which factors were responsible for the collapse the factors that have been highlighted in the literature are declining demand escalating tariff and nontariff trade barriers increasing bilateral trade agreements and international exchange rate policies the importance attributed to each of these factors has often been controversial pollard 1962 p 200 for instance argues that for britain the fall in total foreign trade as a proportion of home production was a part of a secular trend and may well not have been caused by the tariff as such by contrast khan 1946 p 246 claims that within 12 to 18 months uk nominal imports of manufactures from most of europe and the united states were reduced by something like 60 as a result of the tariff similarly saint etienne 1984 p 29 argues that by the mid 1930 s international trade had become in large proportion barter trade as a result of the tariffs and nontariff barriers empirical studies have examined the effects of trade restrictions on incomes to explain the declining trade for individual countries the studies of crucini and kahn 1996 and irwin 1998 find that the tariffs were influential for the u s imports and exports in his study of nominal imports to the european countries friedman 1974 quantified the effects of trade barriers on nominal imports and ultimately income by means of dummies in periods of significant tariffs and nontariff barriers he found that trade restrictions had a significant impact on trade in a few countries however as friedman himself acknowledges the weakness of this approach is that strong and weak forms of trade barriers are restricted to impact equally on imports in the estimates coupled with the small sample problems that plagued his estimates the trade barrier dummies were unlikely to effectively have captured the effects of trade barriers on imports which explains substantial variations of the estimated effects of the tariffs and the nontariff barriers across countries the study of eichengreen and irwin 1995 is probably the most extensive analysis of trade flows in the interwar period using 561 cross sectional bilateral trade flows over three periods 1928 1935 and 1938 they estimate a gravity model of trade patterns they relate the value of bilateral flows to national income population distance contiguity trade and currency block indicators and exchange rate variability to examine the effects on trade of trade and currency blocks and exchange rate variability they observe a declining marginal propensity to import and export during the depression which they attribute to quotas and other binding trade restrictions but do not formally test their importance this paper seeks to estimate the contribution of income tariffs and nontariff barriers on world trade during the depression using panel data for 17 countries over the period from 1920 to 1938 the panel data approach enables the assessment of the influence on trade of nontariff barriers from estimates of import and export functions by using as an identifying assumption that the nontariff barriers were to some degree simultaneously imposed and relaxed across the industrialized nations during the interwar period the estimates and extensive evidence from the literature suggest that this identifying assumption is valid section 3 in section 4 the changes in world trade in the interwar period are decomposed into income effects tariff effects and nontariff barrier effects the trade effects of the tariff changes are furthermore decomposed into deflation inflation induced tariff changes and discretionary tariff induced changes

impossibility of collusion under imperfect monitoring with flexible production we show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when 1 goods are homogenous and firms compete in quantities 2 new imperfect information arrives continuously without sudden events and 3 firms are able to respond to this new information quickly the result holds even if we allow for asymmetric equilibria or monetary transfers the intuition is that the flexibility to respond to new information quickly unravels any collusive scheme and that signals about the aggregate behavior only cannot be used effectively to provide individual incentives via transfers our result applies both to a simple stationary model and a more complicated one with prices following a mean reverting markov process

profit margins and the business cycle evidence from uk manufacturing firms this paper presents some empirical models of profitability using panel data covering 709 large u k companies ove r the 1970s and 1980s focusing specifically on the role of aggregate demand shocks in shaping firm level profitability in basic regressi ons and in quite complex econometric models the results suggest that firm level profit margins fell heavily during the deep manufacturing recession of the early 1980s and as such are consistent with model s predicting the procyclical nature of profit margins this result hol ds across different product groups producer goods consumer durables a nd nondurables though the timing of the impact of aggregate shocks appears to differ copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

pricing strategies in supergames with capacity constraints some evidence from the u s portland cement industry abstract theory demonstrates that demand variations can have nonmonotonic effects on pricing in supergames with capacity constraints furthermore this nonmonotonic relationship can be a function of capacity utilization rates time series data from 25 regional cement markets are used to examine this results empirically no statistically significant relationship is found between demand variations pricing and excess capacity

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

cartel stability in an exhaustible resource model a simple oligopolistic common pool exhaustible resource game is considered by analysing punishment strategies including optimal punishments it is possible to determine which cartel agreements are implementable in a non cooperative play of the game joint profit maximizing allocations are sustainable for sufficiently low discounting but in general it is shown that no folk theorem exists for this model in particular for sufficiently high elasticities of demand it is shown that optimal punishments are not sufficiently severe to enforce most stationary symmetric extraction paths thus confirming the hypothesis that sufficient market power is needed for a cartel to be stable a simple common property exhaustible resource model in a discrete time infinite horizon framework will be considered by looking at punishments levelled against firms that deviate from an implicitly agreed extraction path it is possible to examine the extent to which different allocations can be supported as non cooperative equilibria we shall pay particular attention to the question of whether punishments can be severe enough to sustain implicit agreements that maximize joint profits and to the idea pindyck 1979 that cartel stability depends crucially upon market power this non cooperative approach to the question of cartel stability has been used by porter 1983 in a repeated oligopoly model with imperfect information see also green and porter 1984 while we assume perfect observability here the model is compli cated by the existence of a state variable in the form of the resource stock moreover we shall apply the idea of optimal punishments in this dynamic model abreu et al 1986 1990 have looked at general properties of the equilibrium set in the green porter model what we find is that by considering a more general strategy space than that conventionally studied cooperative extraction rates are sustainable in equilibrium for low enough discount rates in contrast to the over extraction results often obtained moreover in this model the predictions concerning the range of possible sustainable equilibria as the discount rate approaches zero are sharp while the cooperative solution belongs to the set of equilibria for low discount rates constant symmetric extraction paths below the maximum possible rate fail to be sustainable in the limit if the elasticity of demand is sufficiently high thus for low discount rates only extraction rates close to the cooperative rate are sustainable together with disagreement equilibria which involve very high extraction rates these results are in sharp contrast to those obtained from repeated games where in the limit the range of equilibria is very large the difference is explained by the existence of a state variable in the form of a declining stock of the resource these results are also in contrast to what can happen in our model when the demand elasticity is lower all constant symmetric extraction paths may be sustainable for low enough

the might of the pen a reputational theory of communication in international disputes i present a theory of effective diplomacy based on honesty and reputations i model diplomacy as a form of cheap talk and international interactions as an infinitely repeated game in which similar states find themselves in disparate situations over time the theory explains the success and failure of diplomacy reputations for honesty make honest communication possible a state caught bluffing is less able to communicate and less likely to attain its goals in the near future these findings imply that domestic audience costs are unnecessary for international signaling and that military strength is not the only way to build credibility

optimal cartel trigger price strategies abstract a dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price in this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price the market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a downward demand shock

labor productivity during the great depression abstract during the 1929 1933 contraction labor productivity was countercyclical in several manufacturing sectors evidence consistent with the view that large negative demand shocks pushed the economy down a static neoclassical production function this evidence does not readily square with explanations for the contraction emphasizing labor hoarding and increasing returns

the suboptimality of optimal punishments in cournot supergames we investigate within a cournot supergame whether optimal punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible we show that for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to optimal penal codes

a belief based approach to the repeated prisoners dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring abstract this paper extends the belief based approach to the repeated prisoners dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring we first find that the previous belief based techniques t sekiguchi efficiency in repeated prisoners dilemma with private monitoring j econ theory 76 1997 345 361 v bhaskar i obara belief based equilibria in the repeated prisoners dilemma with private monitoring j econ theory 102 2002 40 69 cannot succeed when players private monitoring technologies are sufficiently different we then modify the previous belief based approach by letting the player with smaller observation errors always randomize between cooperate and defect along the cooperative path of the play we show that with vanishing observation errors efficiency and a folk theorem can be approximated using our modified belief based strategies

how friedman and schwartz became monetarists during the late 1940s and the early 1950s milton friedman favored a rule under which fiscal policy would be used to generate changes in the money supply with the aim of stabilizing output at full employment he believed that the economy is inherently unstable because of endogenous movements in money supply under a fractional reserve banking system in her work anna schwartz downplayed the role of monetary factors in business cycles and the role of monetary policy as a stabilization tool we show how the joint work of friedman and schwartz from 1948 to 1958 led friedman to view money as the primary mover of the business cycle and underpinned his shift to a rule based on money growth so that discretionary monetary policy would not act as a source of destabilizing shocks the decisive factor in the evolution of friedman s thinking was the empirical confirmation that the great depression had been both initiated and deepened by the fed the largely neglected influence of clark warburton on the evolution of friedman s thinking provides a missing but crucial link in explaining friedman s recognition of the role of monetary factors in the great depression and of the fed s ability to offset the destabilizing effects produced by shifts from deposits into currency under a fractional reserve banking system

the distributional impacts of indonesia s financial crisis on household welfare a rapid response methodology analyzing the distributional impacts of economic crises is an ever more pressing need if policymakers are to intervene to help those most adversely affected they need to identify those who have been hurt most and estimate the magnitude of the harm they have suffered they must also respond in a timely manner this article develops a simple methodology for measuring these effects and applies it to analyze the impact of the indonesian economic crisis on household welfare using only pre crisis household information it estimates the compensating variation for indonesian households following the 1997 asian currency crisis and then explores the results with flexible nonparametric methods it finds that virtually every household was severely affected although the urban poor fared the worst the ability of poor rural households to produce food mitigated the worst consequences of the high inflation the distributional consequences are the same whether or not households are permitted to substitute toward relatively cheaper goods households with young children may have suffered disproportionately large adverse effects

retail price fixity as a facilitating mechanism previous theoretical explanations for retail price fixity show that fixed retail prices can be consistent with either competitive or imperfectly competitive behavior we develop a conceptual model of retail pricing wherein fixed price points are facilitating mechanisms for tacit collusion a non cooperative equilibrium in fixed retail prices is supported through credible threats to revert to nash pricing if cheating is suspected we test the implications of this model using a two stage ordered probit approach in weekly supermarket pricing data the results show that price fixity does support collusive equilibria among retailers but other factors may also explain retail price behavior

strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly abstract we compare steady states of open loop and locally stable markov perfect equilibria mpe in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment strategic incentives at the mpe depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether at the mpe there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity a full characterization is provided in the linear quadratic case then with price competition and costly production adjustment static strategic complementarity turns into intertemporal strategic substitutability and the mpe steady state outcome is more competitive than static bertrand competition

yuliy sannikov winner of the 2016 clark medal yuliy sannikov is an extraordinary theorist who has developed methods that offer new insights in analyzing problems that had seemed well studied and familiar for example decisions that might bring about cooperation and or defection in a repeated play prisoner s dilemma game or that affect the balance of incentives and opportunism in a principal agent relationship his work has broken new ground in methodology often through the application of stochastic calculus methods the stochastic element means that his work naturally captures situations in which there is a random chance that monitoring communication or signaling between players is imperfect using calculus in the context of continuous time games allows him to overcome tractability problems that had long hindered research in a number of areas he has substantially altered the toolbox available for studying dynamic games this essay offers an overview of sannikov s research in several areas

dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states abstract we consider a class of dynamic games in which each player s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players we develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state journal of economic literature classification numbers c63 c73

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

delegated information acquisition with moral hazard abstract we analyze a principal agent problem with moral hazard where a principal searches for an opportunity of uncertain return and hires an agent to evaluate available options the agent s effort affects the informativeness of a signal about an option s return based on the information provided by the agent the principal decides whether to exercise the option at hand we derive properties of the optimal contract in both static and dynamic versions of the problem we show that there are intermediate values of the prior probability that the option is of high quality at which positive effort cannot be sustained we also show that if the prior is below a threshold then the agent is rewarded for delivering bad news about the option s quality we derive distortions relative to the first best on the implemented effort level and optimal stopping decision for some parameter values it is optimal for the principal to commit to an ex post suboptimal stochastic decision to exercise an option

passenger shipping cartels and their effect on trans atlantic migration abstract we investigate the impact of passenger shipping cartels on trans atlantic migration during the early twentieth century we assemble from primary sources a detailed database of passenger flows and cartel operations and show that cartel operation reduced migratory flows by approximately 20 to 25 further we show that there was no strong intertemporal substitution in migration to north america at least in the short run and therefore that the effects of cartel operation were not undone by later migration lastly we find that cartel operation had no appreciable effect on the variability of migration flows providing evidence against the notion that unfettered competition was destabilizing to turn of the century transportation markets

currency and credit are equivalent mechanisms i study a pure exchange economy with many agents whose marginal utility of consumption is stochastically heterogeneous and independent of wealth with realized marginal utility of wealth private information i show that currency and credit are equivalent to a contract that is efficient when the privacy of information is viewed as a constraint and that the cash in advance constraint is an expression of an incentive constraint

review of a history of the federal reserve volume i 2003 by allan h meltzer abstract this is a book review of a history of the federal reserve volume i 2003 by allan h meltzer

tacit collusion with imperfect monitoring in the canadian manufacturing industry an empirical study this article undertakes a cross sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model of tacit collusion advanced by abreu pearce and stachetti 1986 specifically we assess the prevalence of a first order markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods through nonparametric tests the analysis focuses on 30 different industries in canada the evidence provides weak support for optimal collusion in one industry which is consistent with the idea that such kind of collusive arrangements is unusual or if collusion is all too common that price wars as deviations from collusion are rare

dynamic contractual enforcement a model of strikes this paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement a firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce if the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently then modulo discounting the first best is implementable but strikes are always off the equilibrium path if the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium the dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring the equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes

profit sharing with workers facilitates collusion among firms we show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand we first show that firm profits can always be increased by tying wages to market conditions the optimal agreement takes the form of an option and features partial sharing because increased sharing raises the expected price wage differential but reduces price wage variability we then show that given any cartel there exist market conditions such that simply giving some expected profit to workers raises expected firm profits via the transfer s impact on the incentive to cheat on the cartel

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

an example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria in this note we present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring in which all supergame equilibria with positive discount rates are bounded away from full efficiency uniformly in the discount rate provided the latter is strictly positive on the other hand if the players do not discount the future then every efficient one period payoff vector that dominates the one period equilibrium payoff vector can be attained by an equilibrium of the repeated game thus the correspondence that maps the players discount rate into the corresponding set of repeated game equilibrium payoff vectors is discontinuous at the point at which the discount rate is zero

cooperation secret handshakes and imitation in the prisoners dilemma building on a j robson 1990 j theoret biol 144 379 396 we introduce into the repeated prisoners dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a costly signal i e the secret handshake before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent we show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities we obtain similar results surprisingly in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d60

education in a crisis abstract the year 1998 saw the onset of a major economic and financial crisis in indonesia gdp fell by 12 that year the effect on education of the next generation is examined on average household spending on education declined most dramatically among the poorest households spending reductions were particularly marked in poor households with more young children while there was a tendency to protect education spending in poor households with more older children the evidence on school enrollments mirrors these findings poor households apparently sought to protect investments in the schooling of older children at the expense of the education of younger children

mortal managers and long term goals an impossibility result this article examines decision myopia under effort and risk neutrality an infinite non overlapping sequence of mortal managers is selected and their performance evaluated contracts admit premature termination plant condition depends on maintenance which induces an interstage linkage in production when ability and action are imprecisely known by employers no contract achieves the first best outcome furthermore if the manager discounts less than the owners inefficiency is partially due to moral hazard which resembles myopia optimal contracts infer ability and motivate behavior via manipulation of wage schedules and tenure guidelines

psychological health before during and after an economic crisis the 1997 indonesian financial crisis resulted in severe economic dislocation and political upheaval previous studies have established the detrimental consequences for economic welfare physical health and child education the crisis also affected the psychological well being of the indonesian people comparing responses of the same individuals interviewed before and after the crisis this study documents substantial increases in several dimensions of psychological distress among men and women across the age distribution it shows larger impacts of the economic crisis on the more vulnerable groups including those with low education the rural landless urban residents and those in provinces most affected by the crisis elevated psychological distress persists even after the economy returns to precrisis levels suggesting that the deleterious effects of the crisis may persist longer on the psychological well being of the indonesian population than on standard measures of economic well being

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

is there a free rider problem in lobbying endogenous tariffs trigger strategies and the number of firms there are two reasons we expect moreconcentrated industries to have advantages over less concentrated industries in playing the lobbying game one is that in a noncooperative setting as the number firms rises we expect the free rider problem to become worse this is the finding of rodrik 1986 the second is that we expect that the ability to maintain a cooperative outcome deteriorates as the number of firms in the industry rises the classic reference is mancur olson 1965 also see russell hardin 1982 and todd sandler 1992 among others in contrast with the second intuition this paper shows that there is no general presumption that maintaining cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of firms in the industry rises the ability of an industry to overcome the free rider problem is analyzed in a re peated tariff lobbying game where cooperation may be maintained through the use of a simple trigger strategy 2 the difficulty of maintaining cooperation is measured by the critical value of the discount parameter all values above this critical value are consistent with cooperation and all values below the critical value imply that cheating will prevent maintenance of the cooperative outcome there is no presumption that this critical value rises with the number of firms a separate but related question involves asymptotic results standard intuition suggests that as industry structure approaches perfect competition it becomes impossible to maintain cooperation in the context of this paper this intuition corresponds to the critical value of the discount factor converging to i as the number of firms increases to infinity in the general case it is shown that the critical value of the discount parameter converges to a value less than 1 in the limit as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large if the actual discount parameter lies above this value then cooperation may be maintained even with an infinite number of firms though the framework here is quite simple it provides results which contrast sharply to our standard intuition about how industry structure affects the ability to maintain cooperation there are two ways to interpret the results of this paper one is to assert that standard intuition is wrong and that there is in fact no presumption that maintaining cooperation becomes more difficult as the number

optimizing an international network of partially owned plants under conditions of trade liberalization for the last four decades the preferred economic philosophy in much of latin america was that of import substituting industrialization as a result multinational corporations mncs approached different countries with the expectation that each plant would primarily serve its domestic market each of these plants was partially owned by the mnc beginning in the late 1980s latin america countries began decreasing barriers to cross border trade this made competition between the units belonging to a common network possible for the first time operations which had subsisted side by side in spite of differences in costs and quality of output and which were under the control of different owners now found themselves in competition with one another and having to rationalize their efforts in this paper we analyze the problem of operating a network of plants under conditions of free trade and exchange rate fluctuations when the firms that compose it are partially owned subsidiaries of an mnc a model of three subsidiaries and four countries is developed for one industry based on actual corporate and economic data we study the problem of coordinating the activities of the subsidiaries and allocating the gains arising from coordination

oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints we provide a model of dynamic duopoly in which rms face nancial constraints and dissapear when they are unable to ful ll them we show that in some cases cournot outputs are no longer supported in equilibrium because if these outputs were set a rm may have incentives to ruin the other in these cases standard grim trigger strategies in which collusion is sustained by in nite reversion to cournot outputs cannot be used we show that there is a stationary markov equilibrium in mixed strategies where predation occurs with a positive probability we also obtain a modi ed folk theorem we show that any bankruptcy free outputs outputs in which no rm can drive another rm to bankruptcy without becoming bankrupt itself that attain individually rational pro ts re ecting bankruptcy consideration can be supported by a subgame perfect nash equilibrium when rms are su ciently long sighted

competitive risk sharing contracts with one sided commitment this paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post in any given period after having observed her income the agent can walk away from the contract while the intermediary cannot i e there is one sided commitment we consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses we demonstrate that not only autarky but also partial and full insurance can obtain depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary we then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption savings economy with one period arrow securities and a short sale constraint similar to bulow and rogoff 1989 from this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved

sequential equilibria in a ramsey tax model this paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a ramsey tax model more generally it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households by selectively incorporating euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem

cournot outcome and optimal collusion an example abstract we give an example of a repeated cournot oligopoly game with price uncertainty in which the optimal collusion is the cournot outcome thus there is no advantage from dynamic collusion the example is quite robust with respect to probability specifications and the number of firms

indeterminacy in credit economies abstract we characterize the equilibrium set of a two good pure credit economy with limited commitment under both pairwise and centralized meetings we show that the set of equilibria derived under not too tight solvency constraints alvarez and jermann 2000 commonly used in the literature is of measure zero in the whole set of perfect bayesian equilibria there exist a continuum of stationary equilibria a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity and a continuum of sunspot equilibria irrespective of the assumed trading mechanism equilibria featuring too tight solvency constraints can generate growing credit limits over time periodic credit shutdowns and heterogeneous debt limits across ex ante identical borrowers moreover we provide examples of credit cycles that dominate from a social welfare point of view all equilibria with not too tight solvency constraints

the effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games abstract the study of repeated games with imperfect public information began with abreu d pearce d stacchetti e 1986 optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring journal of economic theory 39 251 269 using dynamic decomposition and was settled in fudenberg d levine d maskin e 1994 the folk theorem with imperfect public information econometrica 62 997 1039 however we suggest that if the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered when punishment is exercised the set of perfect public equilibria and their payoffs would change

dynamic business share allocation in a supply chain with competing suppliers this paper studies a repeated game between a manufacturer and two competing suppliers with imperfect monitoring we present a principal agent model for managing long term supplier relationships using a unique form of measurement and incentive scheme we measure a supplier s overall performance with a rating equivalent to its continuation utility the expected total discounted utility of its future payoffs and incentivize supplier effort with larger allocations of future business we obtain the vector of the two suppliers ratings as the state of a markov decision process and we solve an infinite horizon contracting problem in which the manufacturer allocates business volume between the two suppliers and updates their ratings dynamically based on their current ratings and the current performance outcome our contributions are both theoretical and managerial we propose a repeated principal agent model with a novel incentive scheme to tackle a common but challenging incentive problem in a multiperiod s

at will relationships how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency abstract we theoretically and experimentally examine the effects from adding a simple empirically relevant action to a repeated partnership the option to walk away manipulating both the value of the outside option and its relative distribution among the partners we examine the behavior of human subjects in a repeated prisoners dilemma in particular we examine the degree of cooperation and the form of punishments used our findings indicate that cooperation rates are broadly unaffected by the value of the common outside option but that the selection of supporting punishments in relationship defections or walking away are dictated by individual rationality in contrast to the symmetric results when outside options for partners are asymmetric we find stark selection effects over cooperation with the potential for very high and very low efficiency dependent on the precise division rule

the political economy of indirect control this paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its authority we develop a dynamic principal agent model in which a principal a government delegates the prevention of a disturbance such as riots protests terrorism crime or tax evasion to an agent who has an advantage in accomplishing this task our setting is a standard dynamic principal agent model with two additional features first the principal is allowed to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players second the principal suffers from limited commitment using recursive methods we derive a fully analytical characterization of the likelihood intensity and duration of intervention the first main insight from our model is that repeated and costly interventions are a feature of the efficient equilibrium this is because they serve as a punishment to induce the agent into desired behavior the second main insight is a detailed analysis of a fundamental tradeoff between the intensity and duration of intervention which is driven by the principal s inability to commit finally we derive sharp predictions regarding the impact of various factors on likelihood intensity and duration of intervention we discuss these results in the context of some historical episodes

price cutting and business stealing in imperfect cartels although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns important puzzles remain standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment but they fail to explain two important factual observations first apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs second it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected we propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation

cartel stability and product differentiation abstract this paper employs a supergame theoretic model of collusion to analyze the effects of different levels of product differentiation on cartel stability in contrast to earlier work the ability of the parties to reach an agreement is assumed here the focus is on how greater product homogeneity increases both the gain to cheating on a collusive agreement and the magnitude of the punishments that follow a defection the total effect on the likelihood a cartel is stable is therefore unclear two particular differentiated products models are then used to demonstrate that contrary to the conventional view greater homogeneity can reduce cartel stability