directed matching and monetary exchange we develop a model of monetary exchange where as in the random matching literature agents trade bilaterally and not through centralized markets rather than assuming they match exogenously and at random however we determine who meets whom as part of the equilibrium we show how to formalize this process of directed matching in dynamic models with double coincidence problems and present several examples and applications that illustrate how the approach can be used in monetary theory some of our results are similar to those in the random matching literature others differ significantly

the inflation tax in a real business cycle model money is incorporated into a real business cycle model using a cash in advance constraint the model economy is used to analyze whether the business cycle is different in high inflation and low inflation economies and to analyze the impact of variability in the growth rate of money in addition the welfare cost of the inflation tax is measured and the steady state properties of high and low inflation economies are compared

the distribution of money and prices in search equilibrium this article considers a search theoretic model of monetary exchange agents bargain over both the amount of money and the quantity of goods to be exchanged in bilateral meetings determining endogenously the distributions of money and of prices i show that money is neutral if changes in the money supply are accomplished via proportional transfers however within the class of lump sum transfers an increase of the rate of monetary expansion tends to decrease the dispersion of wealth and prices and to improve welfare when inflation is low but when inflation is high enough the opposite effects occur

anonymous markets and monetary trading abstract we study infinite horizon monetary economies characterized by trading frictions that originate from random pairwise meetings and commitment and enforcement limitations we prove that introducing occasional trade in centralized markets opens the door to an informal enforcement scheme that sustains a non monetary efficient allocation all is required is that trading partners be patient and their actions be observable we then present a matching environment in which trade may occur in large markets and yet agents trading paths cross at most once this allows the construction of models in which infinitely lived agents trade in competitive markets where money plays an essential role

inflation and welfare in a monetary economy it is in everyone s private interest to try to get someone else to hold non interest bearing cash and reserves but someone has to hold it all so these efforts must simply cancel out all of us spend several hours per year in this effort and employ thousands of talented and highly trained people to help us these person hours are simply thrown away wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all

why do monetary policies matter an experimental study of saving and inflation in an overlapping generations model we study experiments of an overlapping generations model where inflation is determined by the monetary policy and by the amount of average saving within each period we use a new experimental setup that allows us to observe more details of the process of expectation forming and separate this process from the actual saving process in contrast to experimental findings by lim prescott sunder marimon spear sunder and marimon sunder we find that 1 agents do not form first order adaptive expectations 2 subjects over save for precautionary reasons as a result 3 the so called friedman conjecture holds i e monetary policies which are equivalent in static equilibrium exhibit different levels and different volatility of inflation in the experiment this may generate important policy trade offs between monetary regimes we discuss our findings and relate them to current research on adaptive learning and the role it may have in ranking alternative monetary policies

the long run relationship between inflation and output in postwar economies abstract we investigate the relationship between inflation and real output in a large sample of postwar economies our methodology is to use a structural vector autoregression to estimate the response of the level of real output to permanent inflation shocks separately for each country we find that a permanent shock to inflation is not associated with a permanent movement in the level of real output for most countries in our sample the main exceptions are certain low inflation countries in which permanent inflation shocks permanently increase the level of output we also find that permanent inflation shocks do not permanently influence real output growth rates in our sample

gift exchange versus monetary exchange theory and evidence abstract we study the lagos and wright 2005 model of monetary exchange in the laboratory with a finite population of sufficiently patient agents this model has a unique monetary equilibrium and a continuum of non monetary gift exchange equilibria some of which pareto dominate the monetary equilibrium we find that subjects avoid the gift exchange equilibria in favor of the monetary equilibrium we also study versions of the model without money where all equilibria involve non monetary gift exchange we find that welfare is higher in the model with money than without money suggesting that money plays a role as an efficiency enhancing coordination device jel c92 d12 e40 z13

inflation output and welfare this paper studies the effects of anticipated inflation on aggregate output and welfare within a search theoretic framework we allow money holders to choose the intensities with which they search for trading partners so inflation affects the frequency of trade as well as the quantity of output produced in each trade we consider the standard pricing mechanism for search models i e ex post bargaining as well as a notion of competitive pricing if prices are bargained over the equilibrium is generically inefficient and an increase in inflation reduces buyers search intensities output and welfare if prices are posted and buyers can direct their search search intensities are increasing with inflation for low inflation rates and decreasing for high inflation rates the friedman rule achieves the first best allocation and inflation always reduces welfare even though it can have a positive effect on output for low inflation rates

inflation tax in the lab a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation in this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting to do so we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations the model which provides a game theoretic foundation to rocheteau and wright 2005 s competitive search monetary equilibrium is used to derive theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment which we test with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework we find that the inflation tax is harmful with cash holdings production and welfare all falling as inflation rises and that its effect is relatively larger at low inflation rates than at higher rates for instance for inflation rates between 0 and 5 welfare in the two markets we consider 2 seller 2 buyer and 3 2 falls by roughly 1 percent for each percentage point rise in inflation compared with 0 4 percent over the range from 5 to 30 our findings lead us to conclude that the impact of the inflation tax should not be underestimated even under low inflation

information and prices with capacity constraints since george j stigler s 1961 seminal work the literature on consumer search has attempted to understand the relationship between the prices that are set by sell ers and the extent to which consumers can observe and compare these prices before purchasing a good in the theoretical branch of this literature one conclusion is almost universal as buyers become better informed about prices ex ante sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium 1 in fact this relationship is so engrained in the theory of consumer search that it is often accepted as manifest and applied to various markets and situations with little or no hesitation 2 in this paper i examine a completely standard consumer search model with one small yet often relevant additional restriction i assume that sellers possess a limited number of goods or can only serve a limited number of customers at once so that a given seller may be unable to meet realized demand in such an environment i show that the conven tional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold having more informed consumers can lead to either an increase or decrease in equilibrium prices or have no effect at all i characterize the regions of the parameter space where each is likely to occur the assumption that a seller s capacity may be fixed and that this constraint may be binding is a fairly important feature of many markets in some markets time is the constraint doctors and barbers and contractors can only serve a limited number of clients at once in other markets space is an issue private schools have a lim ited number of spots in each classroom while restaurants have a limited number of tables perhaps most common is markets in which sellers inventory is occasionally a limiting factor landlords have a limited number of apartments for rent and ticket agents have a limited number of concert tickets available in markets such as these consumers regularly trade off price and availability they are willing to pay more for

costs of control the source of economic rents for mcdonald s franchisees the main purpose of this article is to establish empirically using financial data that there are both ex ante and ex post rents left downstream at mcdonald s we find that the present value of the ex ante rents is around 300k 455k 1982 dollars ex post rents are of course even larger we argue that the ex post rents represent an incentive mechanism that complements the use of profit sharing rights at mcdonald s we also argue that ex ante rents arise here because franchisees wealth constraints prevent the up front extraction of the full present value of the ex post rents finally we note that mcdonald s desire for a particular type of individual to operate its franchises namely owner operators whose livelihoods are tied to the success of their outlets increases the likelihood that downstream operators face liquidity constraints this in turn contributes to the need for mcdonald s to leave ex ante rents downstream

state dependent pricing inflation and welfare in search economies abstract we investigate the welfare effects of inflation in economies with search frictions and menu costs we first analyze an economy where there is no transaction demand for money balances money is a mere unit of account we determine a condition under which strictly positive inflation is desirable we relate this condition to a standard efficiency condition for search economies second we consider a related economy in which there is a transaction role for money in the absence of menu costs the friedman rule is optimal in the presence of menu costs the optimal inflation rate is negative for our numerical examples provided menu costs are small a deviation from the friedman rule can be optimal depending on the extent of the search externalities

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the cost of inflation a mechanism design approach abstract i apply mechanism design to quantify the cost of inflation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone in an environment with pairwise meetings the money demand that is consistent with an optimal incentive feasible allocation takes the form of a continuous correspondence that can fit the data over the period 1900 2006 for such parameterizations the cost of moderate inflation is zero this result is robust to the introduction of match specific heterogeneity and endogenous participation decisions

money in search equilibrium in competitive equilibrium and in competitive search equilibrium we compare three market structures for monetary economies bargaining search equilibrium price taking competitive equilibrium and price posting competitive search equilibrium we also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry we study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure under bargaining trade and entry are both inefficient and inflation implies first order welfare losses under price taking the friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second and inflation may actually improve welfare under posting the friedman rule yields the first best and inflation implies second order welfare losses

the essentiality of money in environments with centralized trade abstract lagos and wright 2005 introduced an influential model of monetary exchange in which trade alternates between centralized and decentralized markets and money is essential a limitation of their model and of the literature that follows is that they do not provide a microfoundation for the process of exchange in the centralized market in this paper we show that how one models exchange in the centralized market matters for the essentiality of money by describing the centralized market as a strategic market game and studying conditions under which money is essential

economic rents in franchising do they exist abstract this work demonstrates the very existence of economic rents in franchising using for the first time the franchisees actual financial statements this finding makes franchising more appealing for applicants and supports the hypothesis that rents are efficient devices to motivate franchisees

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

risk averse rent seeking with shared rents this paper presents a nash equilibrium model of rent seeking behavior in which risk averse players expend resources to obtain a share of a rent as for example in contests for import quota licences results are obtained relating the equilibrium level of lobbying effort by each player to the value of the rent in particular reduced individual lobbying effort is associated with higher rents contested if players are sufficiently risk averse the question of whether the value of rents is a good measure of the resource cost of rent seeking is also considered a simple approximation involving risk and risk aversion parameters is derived for the proportion of rents dissipated in long run equilibrium risk and risk aversion are seen to reduce the rent dissipation ratio below unity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

bidding for money we analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches we consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining two different pricing mechanisms are used ex ante price posting and ex post bidding auctions also we consider settings both with and without lotteries we find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining but with different comparative static and welfare properties

the fee structure in franchising a property rights view abstract the paper offers a property rights explanation for the structure of royalties and initial fees in franchise relationships we argue that the structure of royalties and fees depends on the distribution of intangible assets between the franchisor and franchisee contrary to the agency theory our property rights approach predicts a positive relationship between royalties and fees this hypothesis was tested by using data from the austrian franchise sector

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

directed search coordination failure and seller profits an experimental comparison of posted pricing with single and multiple prices we experimentally examine posted pricing and directed search in one treatment capacity constrained sellers post fixed prices which buyers observe before choosing whom to visit in the other firms post both single buyer applied when one buyer visits and multibuyer when multiple buyers visit prices we find based on a 2 2 two buyers and two sellers market and a follow up experiment with 3 and 2 3 markets that multibuyer prices can be lower than single buyer prices or prices in the one price treatment also allowing the multibuyer price does not affect seller profits and increases market frictions

international evidence on the long run impact of inflation in this paper i use a structural vector autoregression framework to analyze the effects of a permanent change in inflation on the long run real interest rate and real output level in 14 industrialized countries long run monetary superneutrality is rejected for all 14 countries using annual data the results indicate that a permanent increase in inflation lowers the long run real interest rate in each country a permanent increase in inflation also increases the long run real output level in a number of countries long run monetary superneutrality is also rejected for four out of the five countries examined using quarterly data under long run monetary superneutrality lrsn a per

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

avoiding the inflation tax i study the effects of inflation on the purchasing behavior of buyers in the lagos wright monetary economy the standard framework fails to capture the long standing intuition that when inflation increases agents try to spend their money holdings speedily i propose a simple realistic extension in which buyers can rebalance their money holdings only sporadically i e not every period i show that in such a case higher inflation can induce buyers to spend their money faster by frontloading their consumption and searching more intensively for transactions these trade distortions have traditionally been associated with the economic costs of inflation

bargaining and the value of money abstract search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on nash 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica 18 155 162 bargaining or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade by considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first degree importance in monetary economics such as i the efficiency of monetary equilibrium ii the optimality of the friedman rule and iii the welfare cost of inflation

inventory accumulation in a search based monetary economy abstract this paper explores the implications of a search based model of money for the linkage between steady state inventory accumulation inflation and welfare because individual traders in the search economy do not internalize the positive effects inventory accumulation and search effort have on the aggregate economy they are too low relative to social efficiency it is established that a tax on money balances can alleviate these externalities and improve aggregate welfare it does so by i directly increasing the optimal search intensity choices of the individual trader and ii stimulating the accumulation of inventories through a mundeil tobin type effect an increase in the equilibrium level of inventory accumulation also positively affects search effort the implications for optimal monetary policy are discussed

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

emergence of money as a medium of exchange an experimental study findings are reported from an experiment that implements a search theoretic model of money as a medium of exchange the question is whether subjects learn to adopt the same commodities as media of exchange that the model predicts will be used in equilibrium it is reported that subjects have a strong tendency to play fundamental rather than speculative strategies even in environments where speculative strategies yield higher payoffs some possible motivations for subjects behavior are examined and it is concluded that subjects are mainly motivated by past payoff experience as opposed to the marketability considerations that the theory emphasizes

indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world experimental evidence the authors design and study an olg experimental economy where the government finances a fixed real deficit through seigniorage the economy has continua of nonstationary rational expectations equilibria and two stationary rational expectations equilibria the authors do not observe nonstationary rational expectations paths observed paths tend to converge close to or somewhat below the low inflation stationary state the adaptive learning hypothesis is consistent with the data in selecting the low inflation stationary state rational expectations equilibrium as a long run stationary equilibrium nevertheless simple adaptive learning models do not capture the market uncertainty or the biases observed in the data copyright 1993 by the econometric society

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

playing with money abstract experimental work in monetary economics is usually based on theory that incorporates an infinite horizon yet hard constraints on laboratory sessions lead to finite times when the game must with probability 1 end and then simple backward induction implies monetary equilibria cannot exist hence these experiments cannot evaluate subjects ability to settle on the use of money as a medium of exchange that ameliorates trading frictions as an equilibrium outcome to address this we present some finite horizon games where monetary exchange is an equilibrium outcome and report some experimental results using these games

experimental evidence on money as a medium of exchange abstract this paper presents an experimental examination of kiyotaki and wright s 1989 model of how money can arise as a medium of exchange while the results generally support the hypothesis that individuals are willing to utilize a good as a medium of exchange the trading patterns of a portion of the individuals deviated from the predicted patterns simulation studies suggest that while these deviations may have initially been a rational response by these subjects they persisted after they became less than optimal

welfare costs of inflation in a menu cost model recent years have seen substantial prog ress in our understanding of pricing decisions at the micro level access to large scale data sources on prices of individual products has given us rich information on how frequently prices change by what magnitude and how the aggregation of price changes in individual firms maps into aggregate inflation see among many others mark bils and peter j klenow 2005 these facts about price movements are a key input in recent quantitative models of the aggre gate effects of nominal rigidities e g mikhail golosov and robert e lucas 2007 in this paper we use both the new facts and the new quantitative models to revisit an old question namely that of quantifying the welfare benefits of low inflation our model includes two

contingent prices and money price posting with directed search is a widely used trading mechanism coles and eeckhout showed that if sellers are allowed to post prices contingent on realized demand instead of one price then there is real market indeterminacy in this article we fit this contingent price posting protocol into a monetary economy we show that as long as holding money is costly there exists a unique equilibrium rather than a continuum in this equilibrium sellers post a low price for when the buyer is alone a high price for when several buyers show up and buyers randomize between sellers and money holdings

rent seeking for budgetary allocation preliminary results for 20 countries in this paper we present quantitative measures of the proneness of different countries to respond to pressure groups in determining the composition of their spending these in turn help us to derive simple measures of the rent seeking done in relation to the government s spending pie

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back