an experimental investigation of the hahn noll revenue neutral auction for emissions licenses abstract this paper reports on three series of laboratory experiments designed to test the performance of the hahn noll revenue neutral auction rna an alternative institution a no rebate uniform price auction upa is also examined as a benchmark in these experiments the rna markets were little different from upa markets in terms of either prices or market efficiencies the two institutions did differ in terms of the distribution of the gains from exchange and of the propensity of bidders to engage in a certain type of overbidding

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary the paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint ver upon an importing firm a ver set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry the result follows as the imposition of a ver upon a free trade nash price competition forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader the ver raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare pourquoi les restrictions volontaires d 1 exportation sont volontaires ce memoire presente une analyse des effets de l introduction de restrictions volontaires a l exportation rve sur une entreprise qui importe dans un monde en equilibre oligopolistique on montre que l introduction de rve approximant le niveau des importations en regime de libre echange devrait augmenter les profits de toutes les entreprises dans l industrie cela decoule du fait que l imposition de rve sur un univers de concurrence par les prix a la nash en regime de libre echange force l entreprise domestique a devenir le leader en prix l introduction de rve augmente le niveau des prix de l industrie en facilitant la collusion et de ce fait reduit le niveau de bien etre des consomrnateurs

nonlinearly weighted convex risk measure and its application abstract we propose a new class of risk measures which satisfy convexity and monotonicity two well accepted axioms a reasonable and realistic risk measure should satisfy through a nonlinear weight function the new measure can flexibly reflect the investor s degree of risk aversion and can control the fat tail phenomenon of the loss distribution a realistic portfolio selection model with typical market frictions taken into account is established based on the new measure real data from the chinese stock markets and american stock markets are used for empirical comparison of the new risk measure with the expected shortfall risk measure the in sample and out of sample empirical results show that the new risk measure and the corresponding portfolio selection model can not only reflect the investor s risk averse attitude and the impact of different trading constraints but can find robust optimal portfolios which are superior to the corresponding optimal portfolios obtained under the expected shortfall risk measure

voluntary export restraints and expectations an analysis of export quotas in oligopolistic markets the frequency of export quotas imposed as voluntary export restraints has been increasing this tends to create the expectation that similar export quotas will be imposed in the future even if free trade is allowed now the author analyzes the effect of such an expectation he demonstrates that if a quota is expected to be imposed on foreign exporting firms it intensifies the exporting firms competition in the prequota period this offsets the protection which the export quota as a voluntary export restraint will provide for domestic import competing firms in the future quota period copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

international emissions trading under the kyoto protocol credit trading abstract the kyoto protocol allows emissions trading between countries the protocol does however not specify how such trade is to take place so far two options have been discussed in the literature government trading and permit trading this paper discusses a third option credit trading credit trading is based on abatement projects but differs from joint implementation in that it does not require direct foreign investment furthermore credit trading can be implemented both domestically and internationally the main advantages of credit trading are that it excludes trading in hot air while it still makes trade between private entities possible however the environmental effectiveness is doubtful especially when it is based on relative targets the paper shows that several interest groups prefer credit trading based on relative targets to permit trading also governments may have reasons to prefer credit trading to permit trading hence the political acceptability of credit trading is larger than that of permit trading making it more likely that credit trading will be allowed than permit trading

market equilibrium under the threat of a ver abstract this paper characterizes market equilibrium under oligopoly when a ver has introduced both asymmetry amongst exporters and uncertainty a restrained and an unrestrained exporter choose price strategically under the threat of a ver on the latter a pure strategy equilibrium is shown to result only when the probability of the ver is high otherwise a unique mixed strategy equilibrium results as the probability of the ver rises the expected domestic price rises even if the ver is not imposed

liquidity shocks size and the relative performance of hedge fund strategies abstract we examine whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period 1994 2005 had a negative impact on performance more specifically we study the relative performance of small versus large funds for each of the hedge fund strategies our results indicate that on an absolute return basis small funds outperform large funds on a risk adjusted return basis however we find that large funds outperform small funds and that large funds are also shown to hold less liquid assets and take on less systematic and idiosyncratic risk than small funds further funds that experience positive liquidity shocks generally outperform those that experience negative liquidity shocks we also find evidence that hedge fund managers that are aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that are conservative in dealing with liquidity shocks

endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment abstract using bernheim and whinston 1986 common agency game we endogenize trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm where both firms influence the domestic government s trade policy via their contributions the foreign firm can jump over trade restrictions by undertaking foreign direct investment fdi in the domestic market the government prefers a voluntary export restraint ver to a tariff for two reasons first a ver leads to higher contributions from the foreign firm than a tariff second a ver provides a higher level of protection to the domestic firm without generating fdi by the foreign firm

trade policy subtleties with multinational firms abstract regional trade blocks must specify domestic content rules that define the conditions under which a good qualifies as domestic and so may be freely traded within the block this paper analyzes such rules focussing on oligopolistic industries in which foreign multinationals rely much more on imported intermediate inputs that do domestic firms in such a situation we argue that domestic content provisions are anti competitive reducing overall final output of the industry and shifting rents to domestic firms these ideas are examined analytically and then numerically using an applied general equilibrium model of the north american auto industry

price leadership and discrimination in the european car market this paper explains differences in the price of the same good in different markets in the authors model n producers each play the role of stackelberg leader on their own market and there is one market with no domestic producer the authors show that even without demand differences between markets pretax prices will be higher on markets where there are high cost domestic producers and where taxes are low evidence from the european car market based on time series for individual models supports these results furthermore as the model suggests exchange rate changes are not passed through to car prices copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior abstract this paper studies the strategic reactions of firms to protectionist policies that are enforced with endogenous probability this probability is a function of firms actions firms in the country that may adopt the protectionist measures try to increase the probability of sanctions while foreign firms try to reduce this probability a simple framework is used to derive general results for uncertain protection this framework is used to analyze the responses to specific protectionist policies such as antidumping legislation and restrictions on the import market share finally the paper studies the welfare implications of the model

imperfect competition and pareto improving strategic trade policy abstract this paper addresses the concern that strategic trade policy will inevitably invite retaliation by presenting examples in which tariffs and export taxes subsidies can improve the welfare of importing and exporting nations at the same time we argue that retaliation is less likely in such cases the conditions required for these results depend upon the relative sizes of the markets in the trading countries the number of firms in each and the shape of market demand and cost functions

the economics of voluntary export restraint agreements the three substantive sections of this survey deal with the economic consequences of voluntary export restraint agreements vers e g the multi fibre arrangement and vers on japanese auto exports section 2 focuses on the disposition of quota rents under the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and the absence of substitute suppliers section 3 considers imperfect competition and the role of vers as cartelization instruments facilitating collusion section 4 analyzes the discriminatory effects of vers when there are third country suppliers a broad conclusion is that the economic consequences of vers are more complex than the standard trade policy analysis based on tariffs because of the issues discussed in sections 3 and 4 copyright 1989 by blackwell publishers ltd

survival look ahead bias and the persistence in hedge fund performance we analyze the performance persistence in hedge funds taking into account look ahead bias multi period sampling bias we model liquidation of hedge funds by analyzing how it depends upon historical performance next we use a weighting procedure that eliminates look ahead bias in measures for performance persistence in contrast to earlier results for mutual funds the impact of look ahead bias is exacerbated for hedge funds due to their greater level of total risk at the four quarter horizon look ahead bias can be as much as 3 8 depending upon the decile of the distribution we find positive persistence in hedge fund quarterly returns after correcting for investment style the empirical pattern at the annual level is also consistent with positive persistence but its statistical significance is weak

can double auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets abstract we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether the double auction institution can suppress market power in emissions trading markets we study 24 markets with varying market structure in a aba crossover design which controls for subject effects we find clear evidence of successful use of market power average prices rise under monopoly and fall under monopsony opening prices are affected much more than closing prices profits are redistributed in favor of the agent with power efficiency is not affected significantly analysis of convergence trends suggests that this is not a transitory phenomenon we interpret our results as evidence of successful price discrimination within a double auction market

trade policy with increasing returns and imperfect competition contradictory results from competing assumptions abstract a number of recent papers derive different results about the effects of trade and industrial policy on imperfectly competitive industries this paper sets out a single model within which policy under different market structures can be examined we consider the four types of market structure generated by oligopoly versus free entry and segmented markets versus integrated markets we conclude that the effects of policy are greater when markets are segmented than when they are integrated and that if transport costs are small policy is more potent when the number of firms is fixed than when there is free entry

content protection and tariffs under monopoly and competition abstract this paper compares the relative efficiency of local content schemes and tariffs as alternative means of achieving certain non economic distributional objectives the efficiency comparison is made under the alternative assumptions that an intermediate good component is produced a competitively and b by a single firm the paper shows how the ranking of tariffs and content schemes i is sensitive to these assumptions and ii depends on the local content ratio and the elasticity of demand for components the possible implications of vertical integration in the production process and rent revenue seeking behaviour are also considered insofar as they affect the ranking of policies

government policies market imperfections and foreign direct investment the internalization eclectic theory of foreign direct investment includes the important insight that government policies create market imperfections which make foreign direct investment an economically rational strategic alternative for firms this paper reexamines the effects of government policies on market imperfections and foreign direct investment fdi it broadens and refines the analysis of the impact of government policies by developing the following arguments 1 there is a wide range of government policies that affect firms fdi decisions via their effects on market imperfections 2 there are numerous dimensions of variability in government policies that need to be identified in order to understand fully the effects of government policies on market imperfections and hence fdi flows 3 some of the effects of government policies on market imperfections and fdi are the opposite of those previously noted in the fdi literature 4 the effects of government policies vary across the several individual components of fdi flows the paper thus examines the following variables and relationships more extensively and precisely than has the previous literature government policy variables as causal factors affecting fdi market imperfection variables as intervening factors in the causal connections between government policies and fdi and the multiple indicators of the various dimensions of fdi as dependent variables

protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry the political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import competing producers the regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving or instigating international collusion hence voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import competing producers and a de emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement similarly trigger price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti dumping measures to preserve fair competition likewise the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated but as demonstrated by kalt s econometric analysis contentious complaint of unfair foreign competition voluntary export restraints trigger price mechanisms and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors

an econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns the returns to hedge funds and other alternative investments are often highly serially correlated in sharp contrast to the returns of more traditional investment vehicles such as long only equity portfolios and mutual funds in this paper we explore several sources of such serial correlation and show that the most likely explanation is illiquidity exposure i e investments in securities that are not actively traded and for which market prices are not always readily available for portfolios of illiquid securities reported returns will tend to be smoother than true economic returns which will understate volatility and increase risk adjusted performance measures such as the sharpe ratio we propose an econometric model of illiquidity exposure and develop estimators for the smoothing prole as well as a smoothing adjusted sharpe ratio for a sample of 908 hedge funds drawn from the tass database we show that our estimated smoothing coecien ts vary considerably across hedge fund style categories and may be a useful proxy for quantifying illiquidity exposure

quota induced cycles we present a new framework to compare the dynamic effect of tariffs and quotas in the presence of oligopoly suppose that the domestic and the foreign firm play a quantity setting game over time in a perfectly stationary economy a markov perfect equilibrium has the foreign firm exporting at the constant rate under a tariff in contrast under the quota the rate of exports changes monotonically over the course of each year causing seasonal fluctuations in domestic production quota induced cycles can make dynamic market segmentation possible and raise profits for both the firms above what they earn under the equal import tariff

on pareto improving voluntary export restraints abstract this paper develops the argument that binding voluntary export restraints vers may raise the profits of all firms and the welfare of all trading partners this possibility is shown to arise in a model of cournot oligopoly and is consistent with the theory of the second best vers benefit unconstrained firms if the favorable effect due to the increase in domestic import price outweighs the adverse effect due to a loss in market share then vers will also benefit constrained firms vers will improve the importing country s welfare if they raise the profits of domestic firms more than they reduce domestic consumer surplus the paper synthesizes these findings and derives conditions for vers to be pareto improving

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

quantitative restrictions and tariffs with endogenous firm behavior abstract this paper considers a foreign oligopoly which dominates an importing country s market with its exports of differentiated products it constructs a model where firm behavior is endogenously determined in an infinitely repeated game and it analyzes the impact of trade policies on market conduct and welfare optimal tariffs optimal quotas and optimal tariff quotas are characterized and compared one result is that quotas can enhance competition and increase welfare another result is that quotas can be superior to tariffs finally optimal tariff quotas are welfare superior to either tariffs or quotas alone

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

vers and expectations extensions and evidence this paper analyses the effects of an expected future voluntary export restraint on the level of firms current exports to a market the traditional result that current exports increase is shown to depend on the degree of collusion in the exporting industry and the anticipated restrictiveness of the ver the former relationship is tested by reference to the effect of ec import surveillance on its imports surveillance is argued to indicate an increased probability of a ver in the future and it is found that while competitive industries respond to it by increasing exports to the ec less competitive ones curtail exports this constitutes one of the few empirical tests of the strategic part of strategic trade policy

designing organizations for trading pollution rights regulators and academicians have recently become interested in using a marketable permits program as a new way to control aggregate pollution emissions our research focuses on choosing a permit trading mechanism that is both economically efficient and politically viable we consider an organized trading process and a revenue neutral auction both of which involve an initial allocation of permits based on past history each is tested in a competitive and in a non competitive environment to determine which mechanism performs best the results of our research suggest that overall the organized trading process outperforms the revenue neutral auction

the statistics of sharpe ratios the building blocks of the sharpe ratio expected returns and volatilities are unknown quantities that must be estimated statistically and are therefore subject to estimation error this raises the natural question how accurately are sharpe ratios measured to address this question i derive explicit expressions for the statistical distribution of the sharpe ratio using standard asymptotic theory under several sets of assumptions for the return generating process independently and identically distributed returns stationary returns and with time aggregation i show that monthly sharpe ratios cannot be annualized by multiplying by 12 except under very special circumstances and i derive the correct method of conversion in the general case of stationary returns in an illustrative empirical example of mutual funds and hedge funds i find that the annual sharpe ratio for a hedge fund can be overstated by as much as 65 percent because of the presence of serial correlation in monthly returns and once this

strategic second sourcing by multinationals multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities we argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost the increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits we argue that this theory also has implications for the make or buy literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization

multi period performance persistence analysis of hedge funds since hedge funds specify significant lock up periods we investigate persistence in the performance of hedge funds using a multi period framework in which the likelihood of observing persistence by chance is lower than in the traditional two period framework under the null hypothesis of no manager skill no persistence the theoretical distribution of observing wins or losses follows a binormial distribution we test this hypothesis using the traditional two period framework and compare the findings with the results obtained using our multi period framework we examine whether persistence is sensitive to the length of return measurement intervals by using quarterly half yearly and yearly returns we find maximum persistence at the quarterly horizon indicating that presistence among hedge fund managers is short term in nature

ec members fighting about surplus vers fdi and japanese cars the distribution of consumer and producer surplus among ec members of three different trade regimes free trade a voluntary export restraint ver and a ver in conjunction with foreign direct inv

windfall profits and vertical relationships who gained in the japanese auto industry from vers this paper employs an event study to analyze the effect of the 1981 voluntary export restraint agreements on profits in the japanese automobile industry stock price movements of seven japanese automakers and sixty nine of their suppliers are examined the results indicate that the profits of japan s producers of passenger cars rose as a result of the voluntary export restraints while only some suppliers large ones and those producing specialized parts or services appear to have shared the benefits voluntary export restraints increased profits for some firms in the japanese auto industry but many suppliers did not share the windfall copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

research and development voluntary export restriction and tariffs abstract the effect of trade policy on domestic research development r d in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on the nature of policy instruments tariffs or non tariff barriers when the r d investment has uncertain consequences on marginal cost a voluntary export restriction ver decreases innovation by the domestic firm as compared to the free trade level this result holds both under cournot and bertrand competition a tariff increases r d investment it is a new rationale for southern firms to prefer ver as a policy instrument besides the well known argument that it facilitates collusion

import now an analysis of market share voluntary import expansions vies abstract proponents claim that voluntary import expansions vies increase foreign access to a domestic market while increasing competition and reducing prices using a bertrand model i show that a vie produces exactly the opposite results a vie that increases the market share of imports above the prevailing level results in higher prices in the domestic market this result holds even when the domestic market is assumed to be protected by a tariff type barrier prior to the imposition of a vie a vie and an equivalent import subsidy are shown to have opposite effects on prices

sufficient conditions for expected utility to imply drawdown based performance rankings the least restrictive sufficient condition for expected utility to imply sharpe ratio rankings is the location and scale ls condition see meyer 1987 the ls condition includes the normal and many other asymmetric and leptokurtic distributions commonly used in finance in this paper we argue that this condition is also sufficient for expected utility to imply drawdown based performance measure rankings because for investment funds satisfying the ls condition it does not matter whether funds are ranked with the sharpe ratio or with a drawdown based performance measure as the rankings are identical hence the same conditions that provide an expected utility foundation for the sharpe ratio also provide an expected utility foundation for drawdown based performance measures theoretically drawdown based performance measures are as good as the sharpe ratio

voluntary export restraints as protection policy the u s beef case there are several well known implications of international trade theory which are relevant to our study with a tariff an importing country s welfare can improve only if the excess supply curve is upward sloping under the large country assumption bhagwati has shown that a quota used by an importer can be equivalent to a tariff and mintz has contrasted features of tariffs quotas and vers empirical work has focused largely on the effects of tariffs and equivalent quotas generally exporting countries lose from such trade barriers in contrast we find that exporting countries gain and importing countries lose with a ver we also contrast the gains and losses of vers in the case of frozen boneless beef to an optimal tariff and optimal export tax the theoretical implications of vers for beef exporters were first recognized by freebairn and gruen

hedge fund portfolio construction a comparison of static and dynamic approaches abstract this article studies the impact of modeling time varying covariances correlations of hedge fund returns in terms of hedge fund portfolio construction and risk measurement we use a variety of static and dynamic covariance correlation prediction models and compare the optimized portfolios out of sample performance we find that dynamic covariance correlation models construct portfolios with lower risk and higher out of sample risk adjusted realized return the tail risk of the constructed portfolios is also lower using a mean conditional value at risk framework we show that dynamic covariance correlation models are also successful in constructing portfolios with minimum tail risk

the closed loop motive for voluntary export restraints this paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints in a dynamic game model of duopolistic competition it is shown that the imposition of a voluntary export restraint at the free trade level of imports increases the market price and the profits of all firms in the industry if free trade is identified as the closed loop subgame perfect cournot equilibrium of the game hence the authors conclude that the predictions of static cournot competition do not carry over to the dynamic case

anti dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly abstract this paper constructs a conjectural variations model of international oligopoly in which the home country s optimal policy responses to the foreign government s subsidies and foreign firms dumping can be calculated some theoretical support is found for tariffs that countervail part of the foreign export subsidy the optimal fraction depends on the size of own and cross effects in demand and on the extent of market competition however no normative case is found for anti dumping duties

price expectations and international quota trading an experimental evaluation this paper reports a preliminary experimental test of international quota trading on a market characterized by several dominant traders uncertain quota demand and supply imply true market clearing prices that in general differ from an expected competitive quota price however in the experiment the expected price level emerges as a focal point on which the bulk of quota trade contracts are keyed thus incomplete price discovery occurs

compositional standards import permits and market structure the case of canadian cheese imports the imposition of cheese compositional standards by the canadian authorities has created divisions within the canadian dairy industry and has motivated criticisms from several of canada s trade partners the standards impose minimum limits on the percentage of casein coming from fluid milk we develop a theoretical model to investigate the implications of canada s compositional cheese standards while accounting for canada s trade policy we illustrate why a type of cheese that is not directly impacted by the standards might be the most affected we show that the standards can decrease the domestic demand for milk or the value of imports our empirical investigation identified breaks in the processes determining import unit values shortly before or shortly after the beginning of the implementation of the standards

international competitiveness and industry pricing in canadian manufacturing this paper examines the effect of the international competitiveness of home producers on their pricing evidence based on the 1970 75 period supports the claim that in the canadian manufacturing sector domestic prices are set in accordance with a mixture of two pricing hypotheses the eastman stykolt pricing hypothesis esph and the monopolistic pricing hypothesis mph however in the 1975 80 period when their competitiveness increased prices were set solely according to the mph for the purposes of assessing the impact of free trade this paper shows the circumstances under which each or a mixture of these pricing hypotheses employed in the harris cox model on the gains from freer trade would be appropriate

voluntary export restraints profits and quality adjustment this paper develops a model of vertical differentiation to assess the impact of output constraints on the profits and quality choices of firms subject to them a competitive environment is developed with the automobile industry in mind multiproduct oligopolists producing differentiated goods who behave as coumot competitors the results show that an output constraint will not induce constrained firms to upgrade their product line when their unconstrained competitors produce higher quality models it is also shown that an output constraint can raise the profits of constrained firms despite output increases by unconstrained firms

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary an extension this paper presents a conjectural variation approach to examine the conditions under which voluntary export restraints are voluntary th e authors have shown that the value of the conjectural variation is a critical factor for determining the effects of voluntary export restraints in particular if the free trade equilibrium is more collusive than cournot the imposition of voluntary export restraints at the free trade level of imports leads to a reduction in the profit of the foreign firm unde r such circumstances voluntary export restraints are involuntary which is contrary to r harris s 1985 assertion

costly distribution and the non equivalence of tariffs and quotas when governments impose a quota or tariff on imports it is well known that the resulting rents and revenues trigger costly rent seeking and revenue seeking activities which are welfare reducing and may be economically more significant than the efficiency losses resulting from the protectionist induced resource misallocation repeated interaction among firms can eliminate wasteful rent and revenue seeking expenditures through cooperation we show that while aggregate outcomes are equivalent under tariffs and quotas if cooperation arises the conditions under which cooperation arises differ by policy this difference arises because a firm must incur additional cost to physically import and distribute the goods associated with additional quota licenses whereas there is no such cost when it comes to consuming additional tariff revenue thus quotas and tariffs are non equivalent we provide a simple sufficient condition under which cooperative elimination of rent seeking under quotas is easier than cooperative elimination of revenue seeking under tariffs and therefore a quota is the preferred policy whenever the policy admits cooperation

dodd franking the hedge funds abstract this paper analyzes hedge fund performance risk and fund flows before and after the implementation of the dodd frank act the data indicates that relative to non us hedge funds us hedge funds that are regulated under dodd frank have lower fund alphas in the post dodd frank implementation period both statistically and economically significant while the evidence on its effect on risk standard deviations and idiosyncratic risk is mixed we find evidence that there is more fund outflow or less fund inflow for certain us hedge fund strategies after the implementation of dodd frank we show some differences in these findings dependent on fund size and strategy the findings are robust to difference in differences analyses comparing us to non us funds

buyer liability and voluntary inspections in international greenhouse gas emissions trading a laboratory study this paper reports a preliminary laboratory experiment in which traders make investments to increase the reliability of tradable instruments that represent greenhouse gas emissions allowances in one half of the sessions these investments are unobservable while in the other half traders can invite costless and accurate inspections that make reliability investments public we implement a buyer liability rule so that if emissions reductions are unreliable i e sellers default the buyer of the allowances cannot redeem them to cover emissions we find that allowing inspections significantly increases the reliability investment rate and overall efficiency prices of uninspected allowances usually trade at a substantial discount due to the buyer liability rule which provides a strong market incentive for sellers to invest in reliability

financial intermediation in the theory of the risk free rate abstract this paper constructs a general equilibrium model of the interaction between financial intermediaries and financial markets that sheds some light on the short term volatility of real interest rates the main findings of the paper are as follows when financial intermediaries issue contingent non contingent liabilities an increase in the consumers relative risk aversion coefficient decreases increases the interest rate also the interest rate rises when capitalists are less risk averse and financial intermediaries are hit by a liquidity shock

impact of the 2014 suspension agreement on sugar between the united states and mexico in december 2014 the u s and mexico agreed to a suspension agreement that set a 22 25 cwt import price floor on u s sugar imports from mexico a partial equilibrium trade model was developed to estimate the economic impact the agreement would have had if it had been in effect from 2008 to 2014 in years when the price floor would have been binding on average u s producers would have gained 138 million and mexican producers would have lost 218 million however total mexican welfare would have actually increased by 11 5 million furthermore the average price floor that would have maximized total mexican welfare over that period is 22 76 cwt also under certain supply and demand elasticity conditions the average price floor that would have maximized joint u s and mexican producer welfare over that period is 21 91 cwt the latter two estimates are both close to the actual price floor agreed to in the 2014 suspension agreement

quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice abstract in a vertical product differentiation model under cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long run quality for a quantity restriction at and in the neighborhood of the free trade import level average quality increases only when the low quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota voluntary export restraint the change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota the imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long run choice of quality

index composition changes and the cost of incumbency abstract this paper provides evidence of information effects and portfolio rebalancing effects that occur when stocks are added to or excluded from the sp however the portfolio rebalancing effects dominate the industry information effects

a decision theoretic foundation for reward to risk performance measures abstract in this paper we prove that partial moments based performance measures e g omega kappa upside potential ratio sortino satchell ratio farinelli tibiletti ratio value at risk based performance measures e g var ratio cvar ratio rachev ratio generalized rachev ratio and other admissible performance measures are a strictly increasing function in the sharpe ratio the theoretical basis of this result is the location and scale property and two other plausible and mild conditions our result provides a decision theoretic foundation for all these frequently used performance measures moreover it might explain the empirical finding that all these measures typically lead to very similar rankings

more on the non equivalence of voluntary export restraints abstract this note demonstrates that vers limiting exporters to a percentage of the domestic market are not equivalent to other trade restrictions and that they can be inferior to equivalent import quotas even when the quota rents accrue to foreign exporters

voluntary export restraints and strategic technology transfers abstract this paper investigates the effects of voluntary export restraints vers in the presence of potential entrants and technology transfers it builds a model of a licensing game in a cournot oligopoly market and examines conditions under which vers induce restrained foreign firms to transfer technologies to potential suppliers i show that a ver can decrease the profit and output of the domestic incumbent by perturbing the no licensing equilibrium reached under free trade and inducing the market to move to a licensing equilibrium

tariffs quotas and voluntary export restraints with and without internationally mobile capital this paper presents a general framework for comparing the effects of tariffs quotas and vers voluntary export restraints both with and without international capital mobility expressions for the shadow price of foreign exchange and the shadow price of capital under each type of trade restriction are derived and it is shown that although international capital mobility raises the welfare cost of tariff protection it lowers the welfare cost of quantitative restrictions in most cases the effects of exogenous shocks in the presence of quotas are intermediate between those in the presence of tariffs and those in the presence of vers tarifs douaniers contingentements et restrictions volontaires d l exportation quand le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur presente un cadre general d analyse qu il utilise pour comparer les effets de tarifs douaniers de contingentements et de restrictions volontaires a l exportation dans des contextes ofu le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur derive le prix fictif du change etranger et le prix fictif du capital sous l un et l autre types de restrictions au commerce et montre que meme si la mobilite internationale du capital augmente le cofut en terme de bien etre de la protection tarifaire elle reduit le cofut en terme de bien etre des restrictions sur les quantites echangees dans tous les cas les effets de chocs exogenes quand des contingentements existent sont toujours dans la fourchette entre ceux qu on observe quand des tarifs douaniers existent et ceux qui prevalent quand des restrictions volontaires i l exportation existent

heterogeneity irreversible production choices and efficiency in emission permit markets abstract this paper investigates a class of market mechanisms for environmental regulation based on the clean air act tradable discharge permit program laboratory market experiments capture some of the more salient institutional features and focus on issues of firm technological heterogeneity and irreversible investment regarding the operation of the permit market experimental results suggest that higher degrees of abatement cost heterogeneity may lead to reduced trade volume while the implications of increased cost heterogeneity regarding price volatility are mixed finally increased cost heterogeneity appears to result in decreased laboratory efficiency

a welfare comparison between vers and tariffs under the gatt economic theory suggests that tariffs are welfare superior to voluntary export re straints vers in the presence of perfect competition however with imperfectly competitive markets some authors have found that vers may be welfare superior to tariffs we reconsider the comparison between a ver and a tariff in the context of gatt based constraints using a model of perfect competition we show that a ver can welfare dominate a tariff increase that is accompanied by a compensatory reduction in the tariff on another good or if the tariff is matched with a retaliatory tariff on domestic exports une comparaison des effets de bien e tre des restrictions volontaires a 1 exportation et des tarifs douaniers dans le cadre du regime du gatt la theorie economique suggere que

combining rent seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas economists continuing criticisms of protectionism make a valuable contribution to the general interest element of the forces which operate to keep propensities to protect somewhat in check mckenzie rightly warns however that proposals by economists for giving protection in more efficient forms run the danger of increasing the total supply of protection thus we agree that serious consideration should be given to the political economy responses which may be induced before one advocates ways of doing more efficiently what one believes should not be done in the first place it does not follow however that all such policies will have net negative unanticipated consequences in the case of tariffs versus quotas we do not believe that we have yet sufficient knowledge of all of the relevant political economy considerations to predict about the full effects of legislation which allowed trade protection to only take the form of tariffs we are doubtful however that such a measure would increase the total quantity of protection through the channels outlined by mckenzie we believe that the same type of basic public choice analysis of the individual incentives to lobby which suggests that consumer taxpayers will not force the political process to operate so as to maximize aggregate economic efficiency with respect to the level of protection also suggests that the net lobbying for quotas is likely to be higher on average than the net lobbying for tariffs political effectiveness and ability to overcome free riding on the part of tariff revenue seekers is likely to be low at the margin furthermore issues of visibility and institutional structure are likely to lessen the ability of anti protection forces to lobby against quotas placed within a broader framework public choice and rent seeking theory is consistent with the empirical evidence that where quotas are used protection is high

does the choice of performance measure influence the evaluation of hedge funds abstract the sharpe ratio is adequate for evaluating investment funds when the returns of those funds are normally distributed and the investor intends to place all his risky assets into just one investment fund hedge fund returns differ significantly from a normal distribution for this reason other performance measures for hedge fund returns have been proposed in both the academic and practice oriented literature in conducting an empirical study based on return data of 2763 hedge funds we compare the sharpe ratio with 12 other performance measures despite significant deviations of hedge fund returns from a normal distribution our comparison of the sharpe ratio to the other performance measures results in virtually identical rank ordering across hedge funds

the s p500 index effect reconsidered evidence from overnight and intraday stock price performance and volume abstract this study focuses on s p500 inclusions and deletions examining the impact of potential overnight price adjustment after the announcement of an s p500 index change we find evidence of a significant overnight price change that diminishes the returns available to speculators although there are still profits available from the first day after announcement until a few days after the actual event more importantly observing the tick by tick stock price performance and volume effects on the key days during the event window for the first time we find evidence of consistent trading patterns during trading hours a separate analysis of nasdaq and nyse listed stocks allows for a detailed examination of the price and volume effect at an intra day level we find that index funds appear to cluster their rebalancing activities near to and after the close on the event date suggesting that they are more concerned with tracking error than profit

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

cleaning up while cleaning up pollution abatement interest groups and contingent trade policies this paper analyzes the political economy of environmental policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection we argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing the preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers

environmental labeling and incomplete consumer information in laboratory markets abstract survey evidence suggests that consumers care about the environment and are willing to pay a higher price for a product that generates less environmental harm we induce buyer preferences over quality in a laboratory posted offer market to study sellers incentives to offer products of differing quality buyers are unaware of the product quality before purchase as is often the case for goods with differing environmental quality we first document the market failure that arises from incomplete information when no signaling or reputations are possible we then study various treatments that could remedy this failure seller reputations and unverified cheap talk signals sometimes increase the number of higher valued green goods the only reliable way to improve product quality in the experiment however is to use a third party that charges a fee to certify product quality claims