intertemporal borrowing to sustain exogenous consumption standards under uncertainty abstract consider an agent who is attempting to maintain a given consumption level over time in the face of a stochastic technology he is permitted to borrow and lend at given rates of interest the main results are i if the borrowing rate of interest exceeds the lending rate the expected net indebtedness of the agent must grow unboundedly large unless the consumption target is attainable with at most one loan and ii the probabilities of the two events becoming increasingly indebted and accumulating unbounded wealth sum to unity

capacity constraints and cycles in property casualty insurance markets underwriting cycles are unexpected in a structurally competitive industry where financial capital is the major determinant of output capacity arbitrage theories explain underwriting cycles as largely an artifact of institutional lags and reporting practices capacity constraint theories view insurance markets as characterized by real frictions that cause underwriting cycles by temporarily reducing the industry s capacity to insure risks arbitrage theories imply nofsystematic relationship between capacity and underwriting margins while capacity constraint hypotheses predict a negative relationship this article provides a test of the two theories by examining the empirical relationship between casacity and underwriting margins the results using data on four insurance lines generally support the capacity constraint hypothesis unanticipated decreases in capacity cause higher profitability and prices

political support and tax reforms with an application to italy in 2001 the italian government introduced a personal income tax reform to be implemented in successive phases in 2004 taxes were reduced to all income levels with higher gains for low income and high income individuals than for middle income ones a large debate arised this paper explores the political economy reasons under this tax reform mainly the attempt of the government to attract the uncertain voters swing voters a probabilistic voting model is introduced to capture the importance of swing voters the model predicts that the average personal income tax rate tends to be lower for groups of lower income higher preference for leisure and containing more politically mobile voters swing voters however data from italian polls show that while the tax reform was a good strategy to attract swing voters the specific design of the reform which favored high income and low income individuals but not the middle class was not the more appropriate strategy

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

adverse selection commitment and renegotiation extension to and evidence from insurance markets with asymmetric information full commitment to long term contracts may permit markets to approach first best allocations however commitment can be undermined by opportunistic behavior notably renegotiation we reexamine commitment in insurance markets we present an alternative model which extends laffont and tirole s procurement model to address uncertainty and competition which involves semipooling in the first period followed by separation this and competing models e g single period models and no commitment models have different predictions concerning temporal patterns of insurer profitability a test using california data suggests that some automobile insurers use commitment to attract selective portfolios comprising disproportionate numbers of low risks

a framework for the analysis of evolving patron client ties in agrarian economies abstract this paper looks systematically at the various factors that can account for the disappearance or the transformation of the institution of patronage that used to structure labor and other relationships in many agrarian societies of the past it is an attempt to offer a unifying framework capable of guiding one s attention to the relevant variables and to the way they interact in this process the rather simplistic view according to which there is a unique linear path through which patronage evolves is called into question and a number of different scenarios are instead presented these alternatives are illustrated with reference to asia

a new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations abstract this note presents a new subgame perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game which has basu s triadic model as the stage game oxford econ pap 38 1986 259 the payoff for the laborer is the same as in basu s model the equilibrium is more robust than the naqvi and wemhoner s solution j dev econ 47 1995 191 in the sense that the equilibrium does not require the same high degree of rationality simple well known strategies are applied and both the landlord and the merchant are better off than in the stage game in the equilibrium outcome the merchant receives a share of the extra profit from the extortionary labor contract

a theory of interlinked rural transactions this paper argues that the interlinking of labor output and credit contracts often observed in rural economies can be regarded as an attempt to improve allocative efficiency in the face of moral hazard it advances an economic explanation of the phenomenon which is rooted in the view that prevalent modes of transaction of which interlinked contracts are an example are shaped by technological considerations interlinking is shown to be an efficient economic response to unequally distributed information arising from the uncertainty which characterizes subsistence agriculture all pareto efficient allocations require a combination of wage cum output sharing with consumption credit contracts the analytical framework set up to demonstrate the results is used to examine the response of the contractual parameters to changes in i the returns to alternative occupations available to tenant laborers ii the cost of credit to the village economy and iii the riskiness of cultivation the analysis concludes that public policy to alleviate rural poverty must recognize the relationships between technological considerations and modes of transaction in the absence of a complete set of markets

power coercion and the games landlords play abstract if an agent introduces triadic relationships through a threat when relations are dyadic without this threat and if by such a threat this agent reduces the welfare of others then this agent may be said to exercise power we construct a minimal model with three agents landlord laborer and merchant and three commodities and demonstrate that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of a finite move extensive form game of complete and perfect information there is no powerful individual we show next that in the infinitely repeated game there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the landlord wields power

the liability insurance market t his paper offers an overview of the u s liability insurance market and the link between its performance and developments in tort law over the last few decades the dominant feature of the insurance market has been the intermittent periods of rapidly rising premiums and cutbacks on the availability of coverage the insurance cycle appears to be increasing in amplitude and since the 1960s has been concentrated increasingly in liability lines an episode of rising premiums in the late 1960s was followed by a six year period of declining and eventually negative growth rates in total liability insurance premiums over the 1975 1977 period the annual growth rate jumped to 30 percent then followed another period of declining real premiums until premiums nearly tripled in 1984 1986 accompanied by cancellations of policies and massive withdrawal of insurers from some lines this crisis had an economic impact beyond the insurance market leading to the withdrawal of many goods and services from u s markets in mid 1987 the market began to turn again with premiums falling by as much as 40 percent for some commercial policies since then aggregate revenue from premiums has been relatively stable the liability insurance market is intertwined with the tort system in addition to providing incentives to avoid accidents the tort system allocates the risks of accident costs in providing compensation for accident victims the modern expansion of liability in tort law as described by priest in this issue represents a shift in the burden of supplying insurance from first party insurance markets to liability or third party insurance markets clearly this shift will

carbon pricing revenues could close infrastructure access gaps introducing a price on greenhouse gas emissions would not only contribute to reducing the risk of dangerous anthropogenic climate change but would also generate substantial public revenues some of these revenues could be used to cover investment needs for infrastructure providing access to water sanitation electricity telecommunications and transport in this way emission pricing could promote sustainable socio economic development by safeguarding the stability of natural systems which constitute the material basis of economies while at the same time providing public goods that are essential for human well being for a scenario that is consistent with limiting global warming to below 2 c we find that domestic carbon pricing without redistribution of revenues across countries has substantial potential to close existing access gaps for water sanitation electricity and telecommunication however for the majority of countries carbon pricing revenues would not be sufficient to pave all unpaved roads and for most countries in sub saharan africa they would be insufficient to provide universal access to all types of infrastructure except water if some fraction of the global revenues of carbon pricing is redistributed e g via the green climate fund more ambitious infrastructure access goals could be achieved in developing countries our paper also bears relevance for the design of climate finance mechanisms as it suggests that supporting carbon pricing policies instead of project based finance might not only permit cost efficient emission reductions but also leverage public revenues to promote human development goals

credit markets in northern nigeria credit as insurance in a rural economy this article addresses the issues of imcomplete markets and imperfect information in the context of credit markets in rural northern nigeria in much recent theoretical literature the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are assumed to be decisive for the organization of agrarian institutions in contrast it is found that in the four villages surveyed credit transactions take advantage of the free flow of information within rural communities information asymmetries between borrower and lender are unimportant and their institutional consequences the use of collateral and interlinked contracts are absent credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between households through the use of contracts in which the repayment owed by the borrower depends on the realization of random production shocks by both the borrower and the lender

the political economy of naturalization this paper presents a political economy model in which self interested natives decide when citizenship and or voting rights should be granted to foreign born workers native voters know that immigrants hold different political preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible they also consider however that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration we find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity quality productivity and preferences of potential immigrants the political composition and the age structure of the native population as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

crises in medical malpractice insurance evidence of excessive price cutting in the preceding soft market abstract prior work suggests that heterogeneous information or weak incentives for solvency could have caused some general liability insurers to charge low ex ante prices during the early 1980s and mid to late 1990s putting downward pressure on other firms prices and plausibly aggravating subsequent periods of rapid premium growth we analyse whether the 1994 1999 soft market in medical malpractice insurance led some firms to underprice grow rapidly and subsequently experience upward revisions in loss forecasts loss development which could have aggravated subsequent market crises consistent with the underpricing hypothesis the results indicate a positive relation between loss development and premium growth among growing firms underpricing was likely more prevalent among non specialist malpractice insurers

risk overhang and market behavior we show that exposure from past business transactions risk overhang can reduce activity in related business lines sometimes to the point where no new trade occurs we focus primarily on the role of overhang in nonlife insurance market disruptions our model predicts that the relative impact duration and character of supply disruptions are related to the extent of overhang these predictions are consistent with differences between the mid 1980s liability insurance crisis and the early 1990s catastrophe reinsurance crisis the overhang model predicts attributes of these crises that prior explanations relying on adverse selection do not we also discuss applications of the overhang model to disruptions in lending and securities markets

the impact of connectivity on market interlinkages evidence from rural punjab up to the 1980s it was generally accepted that many key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding of market interlinkages recently however this theory has lost its importance in development literature based on a household level survey from rural pakistan this paper seeks to re introduce the importance of interlinkages by illustrating their exploitative potential particularly in unequal isolated villages where landlords are essentially monopolist monopsonist the solution proposed is to break isolation making use of an exogenous shock found in the construction of a motorway the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely it does significantly reduce their exploitative nature

adverse selection private information and lowballing in insurance markets recent contributions to the adverse selection literature have focused on a multiperiod competitive environment in this setting a clean distinction arises between the predictions of competing models cooper and hayes extend the model of rothschild and stiglitz to multiple periods the result is a self selecting equilibrium characterized by price highballing or systematically overcharging new business kunreuther and pauly suggest that information asymmetries between competing insurance firms render such price quantity policies infeasible their model results in a pooling equilibrium that is characterized by price lowballing or systematically undercharging new business our evidence is consistent with the kunreuther and pauly model and reveals the persistence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

redistribution tax under non benevolent governments i analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system i employ these assumptions members gain special benefits in the majority parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers the member s utility function is given in a quasi linear function the government s objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and i classify governments according to the weight the four main results are a stable majority dose not support myopic government the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers the stable transfer of non benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy

electoral equilibria with restricted strategies we construct a spatial election model in which candidates inherit initial positions in the strategy space presumably from previous political activity and they are restricted to strategies close to their initial positions we establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium the equilibrium need not entail an expectation of a zero plurality for each candidate we then apply this model to a sequence of elections in which a series of opposition candidates challenge incumbents given certain regularity conditions the result will be an apparent incumbency advantage corresponding to that observed in recent congressional elections

segmentation collateral undervaluation and the rate of interest in agrarian credit markets some evidence from two villages in south india this paper examines certain issues pertaining to the structure of agrarian credit markets in developing countries using empirical evidence on credit transactions from two villages in south india first the bases for the segmentation between formal and informal sectors of the credit market are identified as being 1 the type of collateral offered on credit contracts and 2 the purpose for which credit is taken secondly the paper shows the occurrence of a systematic association between rates of interest and types of collateral the evidence supports the hypothesis that lower marketability of collateral security and hence higher undervaluation increases the rate of interest charged on a loan thirdly the evidence shows an inverse relationship between the value of land owned by a borrower and the rate of interest on a credit contract copyright 1991 by oxford university press

imperfect information screening and the costs of informal lending a study of a rural credit market in pakistan many governments have perceived the rural moneylender as usurious this article takes a first step toward directly testing the validity of this view in a study of services costs and charges of fourteen informal market moneylenders and their clients in chambar pakistan the article examines whether the high implicit interest rates charged reflect the actual costs of operating in that market estimates of the resource costs incurred by informal lenders for screening pursuing delinquent loans overhead and cost of capital including unrecoverable loans suggest that lenders charges are equal to their average cost of lending but exceed their marginal cost this finding is consistent with the view that the informal credit market is characterized by excess capacity and monopolistic competition in the presence of imperfect information

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

the thai rural credit system public subsidies private information and segmented markets thailand has sought to increase farmers access to credit by government intervention in 1966 it created a government agricultural bank to lend solely to farm households and beginning in the late 1970s it required commercial banks to lend heavily in the rural sector either directly or by making deposits in the agricultural bank the result was an enormous expansion of credit in the rural sector but because formal lenders were either unable or unwilling to solve the information problems involved in the broad range of rural credit transactions the informal credit sector wbich charged interest rates many times higher than the formal sector continued to thrive using household surveys and surveys of moneylenders this article provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which lenders in the informal sector have solved the information problems of providing credit the authors argue that the informal sector is competitive and that high interest rates reflect high information costs not the scarcity of funds this article reports on a set of investigations of the impact of thai government policies to expand bank lending in the rural sector their purpose was to increase farmers access to capital and reduce their dependence on informal lenders fifteen years after the principal government measures were introduced we hope to be able to answer several questions how has the expansion of formal sector lending affected the informal sector did the increase in the supply of formal credit reduce the business of informal lenders and lower interest rates in the informal market what has been the performance of the formal credit system in terms of coverage efficiency and incidence lacking time series data on the informal sector we cannot give a direct answer to these questions but we can with confidence say that the informal lenders are still very much alive by examining the behavior of the rural credit market at the present time we can throw an indirect light on what transpired over the last fifteen years our main findings are the following on the basis of our 1984 85 survey of households and moneylenders

adverse selection and statistical discrimination an analysis of canadian automobile insurance abstract statistical discrimination occurs when a characteristic such as sex is used as an indicator of the risk group of an individual the theory of adverse selection is used to explain the occurrence of statistical discrimination a model of the market for collision insurance which is based on the theory of adverse selection is estimated on canadian data the results suggest that adverse selection occurs in this market simulations of the effect of prohibiting sexual discrimination in the 21 24 age group indicate that the premiums for single females would increase substantially and that a significant proportion would no longer purchase collision insurance

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

political influence economic interests and endogenous tax structure in a computable equilibrium framework with application to the united states 1973 and 1983 we consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model ofa competitive political economy in which the economic interestsof groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibriumpolicy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed the model incorporates an amended version of the gemtap taxmodel calibrated to data for the united states for 1973 and1983 emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of gemtaphouseholds into homogeneous groups affects the numericalrepresentation of interests and influence for representativemembers of each group

a model of stability and persistence in a democracy abstract we develop an intertemporal model of political competition which accounts for three stylized facts of political life in representative democracies i political stability and the absence of discrimination ii a limited degree of political competition and iii the persistence of different political outcomes in otherwise similar economies in our model political stability is desirable for risk averse voters voters only vote for decent policy proposals which do not discriminate against single groups we derive properties of the set of possible political outcomes and study the issue of robustness against renegotiation journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d70 d72

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

the modern expansion of tort liability its sources its effects and its reform this paper reviews the development of tort law during the 20th century with particular attention to the broad expansion of liability since the 1970s it attempts to explain the origins of the expansion of liability to present examples of its effects on product and service markets and to analyze the extensive efforts of the past five to six years toward liability reform efforts which i conclude have had only a slight relationship to the underlying sources of modern liability problems though the empirical evidence is thin virtually all studies of the effects of specific modern rules demonstrate that modern tort law has substantially dislocated product and service markets as one might expect of an assertive legal regime founded on largely noneconomic principles as we shall see market dislocations especially for insurance have increased sharply during the past decade

elections and income redistribution this paper has analyzed a model of elections in which each candidate selects a reputation for the distribution of income that can be expected if he is elected the first result established that whenever there are three or more groups of voters and no single group has half or more of the voters if the candidates believe that the voters choices are determined solely by the candidates redistributional reputations then there is no electoral equilibrium the candidates expectations about the voters choices were then reformulated using a qualitative response model the next result established that this alternative model leads to the existence of electoral equilibria the remainder of the paper analyzed the nature of these equilibria for any given electorate among other things the results established that there is always a unique equilibrium provided a simple procedure for finding the precise location of this equilibrium and showed that this location implicitly maximizes the sum of the voters utility functions on the possible income distributions the penultimate sections provided some simple examples which illustrate the main results in the paper and a discussion of these results in terms of the politics of redistribution

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates