bidding behavior in descending and ascending auctions this research examines how individual differences and institutional practices influence consumer bidding in auctions bidders may be motivated by different goals e g thrill of winning the item with minimal attention to what they pay for it versus prudence winning the item at a price at or below its perceived value also innate or auctioneer induced differences may exist in the precision and salience of bidder cognitions about the item s value we report two studies on how these motivational and cognitive factors influence bids in descending and ascending auctions respectively each study also manipulated a situational variable wait time at each price step the two auctions realized different average prices for the same item set average bids were higher in the descending versus ascending auction in several study conditions in both auction formats bidders primed with thrill versus prudence bid higher but more precise and or salient values attenuated this goal effect among other results in the descending auction longer wait times elicited higher bids from bidders primed with thrill but not prudence in the ascending auction longer wait times produced lower bids for bidders primed with prudence but not thrill these findings on consumer bidding behavior have practical implications for auction design

transmission cost allocation by cooperative games and coalition formation the allocation of costs of a transmission system to its users is still a pending problem in many electric sector market regulations this paper contributes with a new allocation method among the electric market participants both cooperation and competition are defined as the leading principles to fair solutions and efficient cost allocation the method is based mainly on the responsibility of the agents in the physical and economic use of the network their rational behavior the formation of coalitions and cooperative game theory resolution mechanisms the designed method is applicable to existing networks or to their expansion simulations are made with sample networks results conclude that adequate solutions are possible in a decentralized environment with open access to networks comparisons with traditional allocation systems are shown and cooperative game solutions compare better in economic and physical terms

warrant valuation and exercise strategy abstract this paper demonstrates that warrant valuation and exercise strategy differ fundamentally from call option valuation simultaneous exercise of warrants is shown to be suboptimal and a monopolist owning all warrants can achieve a higher value unless warrants are perfectly divisible no satisfactory equilibrium exists for the valuation and exercise of widely held warrants the problems encountered appear to be quite general and stem from necessary assumptions about future corporate dividend policy and capital structure such assumptions are necessary for any model of corporate security valuation

warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets abstract we develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block we prove that the warrant bond price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant bond price equals the warrant bond price in the block constrained economy we illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long

a strategic analysis of sinking fund bonds abstract unlike most securities the pricing of sinking fund bonds is influenced by the distribution of ownership which summarizes the extent to which the market is cornered the effect of the distribution of ownership on the pricing of sinking fund bonds is examined by an explicit game in which the price obtained for bonds sold can depend upon the size of the investor s position this framework is used to contrast the valuation of sinking fund bonds with the valuation of amortizing bonds and straight debt we show that it is generally incorrect to view sinking fund bonds as being equivalent to serial bonds

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

pricing convertible bonds abstract convertible bonds are an important segment of the corporate bond market although their pricing is compromised by the presence of complex option features and difficulty in measuring the risk factors needed as inputs to standard valuation models using a unique sample of pure u s convertible bonds devoid of other optionality we show that underpricing is affected mainly by the degree of underlying asset volatility and liquidity convertible bonds with a greater debt component more credit sensitive longer time to maturity and lower quality credit ratings are also found to be more underpriced the global financial crisis gfc is an episode with high underlying asset volatility and one subject to short selling constraints during this period there was deep convertible bond discounting which highlights the importance of market conditions and the temporal rather than systematic nature of the pricing errors

a binary conflict ascending price bicap mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks the questions posed for study are motivated by controversies over how sweden might change from a centralized system of railroad management to a decentralized system the central rail administration banverket will retain ownership and maintenance responsibility of the tracks but will sell access to the tracks to private firms the questions are about the mechanism that might accomplish this task parties to the controversy have claimed that the technical aspects of networks will as a matter of principle preclude the operation of any decentralized method this paper explores the properties of a mechanism developed as a challenge to that claim the mechanism is examined in the context of a testbed experimental environment that contains many potential problem causing elements in the tests performed the mechanism operated to efficiently allocate access to the network and it did so for behavioral reasons that are understandable in terms of theory the paper closes with suggestions for further study of environments that might present additional challenges to a mechanism

an empirical analysis of sales force compensation plans among the array of direct and indirect methods of motivation and control available to the sales manager is sales force compensation in this article the authors summarize theoretical predictions from the economics marketing finance and accounting literatures on the structure of optimal sales force compensation plans guided by these insights they then construct empirical models to quantify the effect of various sales force factors firm and product factors and market factors on compensation using data from 286 firms in 39 industries the authors examine determinants of incentive components and total pay and the optimal horizon for incentive pay copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

selling formats for search goods the paper offers a comparative analysis of different ways to sell products selling formats when buyers incur evaluation costs since these costs are sunk at the moment of trade buyers may refrain from incurring them for fear of later opportunism on the part of sellers it is found that the use of many common selling formats can be explained in terms of their ability to alleviate this problem specifically i explain price advertising seller colocation and bargaining the theory explains much of the divergence in retail trading institutions and leads to several testable predictions

transmission loss allocation a comparison of different practical algorithms a pool operated electricity market based on hourly auctions usually neglects network constraints and network losses while applying its market clearing mechanism this mechanism determines the accepted and nonaccepted energy bids as well as the hourly market clearing prices as a result ex post procedures are needed to resolve network congestions and to allocate transmission losses to generators and demands this paper focuses on transmission loss allocation procedures and provides a detailed comparison of four alternative algorithms 1 pro rata pr 2 marginal allocation 3 unsubsidized marginal allocation and 4 proportional sharing a case study based on the ieee rts is provided different load scenarios covering a whole year are analyzed finally conclusions and recommendations are stated

convertible debt valuation and conversion in complex capital structures abstract the impact of conversion strategies on the value of convertible debt is examined it is shown that for capital structures comprised of multiple classes of convertible debt the optimal conversion policy for a given bond class is affected by the decisions of other bond classes using this optimal conversion strategy closed form solutions for bond prices are derived

transmission loss allocation i single energy market this paper presents a new methodology for allocating transmission losses to the participants of a single energy market the proposed approach is based on the incremental transmission loss concept and is implemented through two models basic and extended in the basic model the total system losses are estimated through the linear dc load flow equations while the extended model uses the exact ac formulation the concept of center of losses is used a fictitious bus in the system network where all transactions are compensated for transmission losses both models provide a sharing of transmission losses among generators and loads based on a predefined proportion for instance 50 50 for each participant class some important aspects related with the allocation fairness and transparency are illustrated by numerical applications with the ieee reliability test system the extension of this methodology to interconnected energy markets is treated in a companion paper

complex losses allocation to generators and loads based on circuit theory and aumann shapley method this paper presents a new method to allocate active and reactive losses simultaneously to generators and loads the allocation is calculated for each transmission branch identifying and quantifying the buses responsibilities in losses this is a two step process in the first step generators are modeled as current injections and loads as constant admittances in order to determine generator participations in losses in the second step loads are modeled as current sources and generators as constant admittances in order to determine load participations in losses the aumann shapley and circuit theories are used to calculate the participation of each real and imaginary current component considering them as independent players in the complex losses allocation game the properties of the aumann shapley method ensure equitable allocation and recovery of the total active and reactive losses counter flow cross subsidy and negative allocation issues are discussed numerical results are presented and discussed to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method

transmission loss unbundling and allocation under pool electricity markets this paper presents a methodology based on the circuit theories for unbundling and allocation of transmission losses among the participants of a pool based electricity market starting from a known operation point and using the basic network equations without additional assumptions an expression of the branch losses based on nodal current injections is derived since the power flow equations and circuit theories are satisfied the methodology turns explicit in a natural way separating the losses at each system branch and assigning the responsibility to the respective market participants it means that the loss allocation of each branch which is produced by each generator and consumer is obtained extensions and strategies considering unsubsidized and predefined proportion based loss allocation as well as issues related with the allocation fairness and transparency are also included comparisons with previous methods and validation tests of the proposed method are reported by using the ieee reliability test system

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

a weakly conditioned imputation of an impedance branch dissipation power in a sinusoidal steady state circuit how much of an impedance branch dissipation power should be assigned to each source the answer is the basis of electricity transmission pricing such as the pricing of line loss and line security due to thermal limit however it is difficult to obtain a unique and common consent answer because of the nonlinearity of power expression this paper presents two weakly conditioned imputation formulas respectively for dissipation active and reactive power to answer the question first a detailed form of shapley value formula and three weak conditions are proposed on this basis the two imputation formulas are then derived and proved mathematically the imputation formulas are explicitly in terms of source currents voltages thus analytic and easy to compute they possess eight mathematical and economic features that lay a good foundation for electricity transmission pricing the two imputation formulas are also extended to actual power systems where trades are conducted in mwh mvarh instead of amperes volts numerical examples illustrate their computing process and features

voluntary conversion of convertible securities and the optimal call strategy abstract we provide an explanation of why convertibles are called long after the conversion value exceeds the call price delaying the call benefits the firm if enough investors are expected to delay their voluntary conversions consistent with this theory we document that a substantial number of investors do not voluntarily convert when the common dividend exceeds the convertible s dividend plus its premium over conversion value we find that firms would not have increased common stock returns by switching to the strategy of calling to force conversion as soon as possible surprisingly we find that convertible preferreds frequently sell below conversion value

warrant exercise dividends and reinvestment policy in this paper we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants we analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies first we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding however sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders even absent dividends because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm s scale increases the riskiness of an equity share second oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding

warrant pricing jump diffusion vs black scholes this paper investigates the warrant pricing abilities of dilution adjusted versions of the black scholes and jump diffusion option pricing models because of the typically long lives of warrants their pricing is hypothesized to benefit from use of the jump diffusion model which relaxes the black scholes restriction against stock price jumps empirical results indicate that while the black scholes model almost uniformly provides more efficient estimates the jump diffusion model generally provides less biased estimates of market value particularly for the valuation of out of the money warrants and warrants on stocks with a history of large and or frequent jumps the jump diffusion model may be preferred

allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders market as a partial substitute for individual rationality we report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by zero intelligence programs that submit random bids and offers imposing a budget constraint i e not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure independent of traders motivation intelligence or learning adam smith s invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality

using laboratory experimental auctions in marketing research a case study of new packaging for fresh beef this paper illustrates the use of laboratory experimental auctions in a pretest market research program for new products we review the experimental auctions literature discuss the range of auction mechanisms available and present the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular mechanism for a laboratory pretest market we then present a step by step example of how a theoretically incentive compatible auction mechanism fifth price sealed bid was used in a laboratory pretest market for vacuum packaged beef based on the illustration we discuss the potential for using laboratory experimental auctions in pretest market research we present the limitations that may be encountered in such applications and outline research aimed at improving the behavioral properties of the technique

pricing options with extendible maturities analysis and applications many common types of financial contracts incorporate options with extendible maturities this paper derives closed form expressions for options that can be extended by the optionholder and presents a number of applications including the valuation of american options with stochastic dividends junk bonds and shared equity mortgages we also derive closed form expressions for writer extendible options and discuss the writer s economic incentives for extending an out of the money option we apply these results to show that corporate debtholders have a strong incentive to extend the maturity of defaulting debt if there are liquidation costs we model and solve the debtholders optimal extension problem and show that the possibility of an extension can induce shareholders in highly levered firms to accept negative npv projects many common types of financial contracts and contingent claims incorporate options with extendible maturities for example a growing number of firms in many cases firms involved in leveraged buyouts are issuing bonds with maturities that can be extended at the firm s option options on real estate often allow the optionholder to extend the expiration date by paying an additional fixed amount to the option writer corporate warrants frequently give the issuing firm the right to unilaterally extend the life of the warrants a right that is often exercised in general any financial contract that could involve a rescheduling of payments a renegotiation of terms an early call or exercise provision or some similar type of flexibility over the timing of cash flows could be viewed as including an option with an extendible maturity this paper derives valuation expressions for extendible options examines the analytical properties of these prices and presents a wide variety of applications and examples in this analysis we distinguish between options that can be extended by the optionholder and options that are extended by the option writer since they differ fundamentally in their pricing implications focusing on the

on the partition of transmission losses among generators due to the introduction of competition in the electrical power industry determining the percentage of transmission grid losses that should be attributed to each generator has become important usually this is accomplished by determining the percentage of each transmission branch losses that should be attributed to each generator using the aumann shapley theory this letter identifies the fairest way to share the nonseparable portion of losses amongst the generators the obtained result validates some approximations assumed in recent papers and contributes to strengthening circuit theory based methods

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

strategic analysis of the competitive exercise of certain financial options abstract warrants and convertible bonds are claims on the firm which change the outstanding number of common stock shares when exercised or converted exercise of such claims in competitive circumstances is modeled here as a noncooperative game played by a continuum of players first equilibria of the game are shown to exist by applying results of schmeidler second the game s equilibria are compared to outcomes that come about when one individual controls the exercise of all the claims but is constrained to exercise them in one block the results are analogues of earlier results by one of the authors on the competitive pricing of such claims

digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association

derivative pricing 60 years before black scholes evidence from the johannesburg stock exchange we obtain daily data for warrants traded on the johannesburg stock exchange between 1909 and 1922 and for a broker s call option quotes on stocks from 1908 to 1911 we use this new data set to test how close derivative prices are to black scholes 1973 prices and to compute profits for investors using a simple trading rule for call options we examine whether investors exercised warrants optimally and how they reacted to extensions of the warrants durations we show that long before the development of the formal theory investors had an intuitive grasp of the determinants of derivative pricing