occupational downgrading and upgrading in britain the willingness of workers to move down an occupational hierarchy is a potentially important source of flexibility in the labour market but relatively little is known about the scale or pattern of occupational up and downgrading this paper examines who downgrades and the cyclical structure of up and downgrading we find that occupational downgrading is surprisingly large relative to flows into unemployment individuals who have a high payoff to skilled work such as educated workers are less likely to downgrade contrary to expectations the rate of downgrading is found to be greater in the boom while upgrading follows the more conventional expectation of also being procyclical this finding is interpreted as evidence consistent with the rationing of jobs in the downgrading process contrary to the assumptions of simple dual labour market models

male interracial wage differentials competing explanations persistent interracial wage differentials present a challenge for neoclassical models of discrimination which claim that long rung competition is not consistent with persistent discrimination this study provides an empirical examination of the missing variable and job competition models of interracial wage inequality the results argue strongly against the missing variables approach and strongly in favor of the job competition model specifically this study finds that about one half of the male african american white and latino white interracial wage differentials are due to market discrimination against african americans and latinos in addition the positive and significant coefficients on the race gender employment density variables strongly affirm the job competition model s contention that access to white especially male dominated jobs increases an individual s wage rate regardless of race racial job segregation then is an important explanatory variable for racial wage discrimination copyright 1999 by oxford university press

optimal state dependent rules credibility and inflation inertia abstract we use a state dependent model where pricing rules are optimal to examine the costs of a money based disinflation under various assumptions about the credibility of the policy change our analysis allows us to relate actual credibility and future inflation inertia to the asymmetry of the price deviation distribution an important implication of our state dependent setting is that disinflation can be attained without substantial cost even in a situation of low credibility provided that a mechanism of price alignment eliminates the asymmetry of the price deviation distribution we also develop an analytical framework for analyzing intermediate imperfect credibility cases

disinflation with imperfect credibility abstract this paper presents a theory of the real effects of disinflation as in new keynesian models price adjustment iis staggered across firms as in new classical models credibility is imperfect the monetary authority may not complete a promised disinflation the combination of imperfect credibility and staggering yields more plausible results than either of these assumptions alone in particular an announced disinflation reduces expected output if credibility is sufficiently low

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

inflation stabilization the experience of israel argentina brazil bolivia and mexico rampant inflation is a major economic problem in many of the less developed countries two out of three attempts to stabilize these economies fail inflation stabilization provides a valuable description and a critical analysis of the disinflation programs introduced in argentina bolivia brazil and israel in 1985 86 and discusses the possibility of such a program in mexico it documents the initial steps in stabilization as well as the reasons for failure as architects of the programs several of the authors are in key positions to assess which aspects were critical in getting the programs accepted and where to look for difficulties and failures in israel inflation was halted without recession the challenge to policy makers today is in shifting from stabilization to the revival of sustained growth this experience is described fully by michael bruno and sylvia piterman who examine the critical issue of exchange rates and by alex cukierman who uses modeling to analyze the interaction of money wages prices and activity under rational expectations that take the government s policy objectives into account endemic inflation and a sudden increase in external debt burden argentina s economy raising the wider issues of high inflation economies and stabilization that are discussed in the chapter by jose luis machinea and that by guido di tella and alfredo canavese eduardo modiano and mario simonsen take up issues of wages in brazil particularly the problem of finding an equitable way to deal with a wage freeze simonsen develops an ambitious game theoretic rationalization of incomes policy as a coordinating device for imperfectly competitive economies bolivia did reach hyperinflation price increases of more than 50 percent each month before stabilizing juan antonio morales shows how stabilizing the exchange rate in an economy where all pricing was already geared to the dollar achieved stabilization without a wage or price freeze and francisco gil diaz asks whether an incomes policy based program could work to control ever increasing inflation in mexico michael bruno is governor of the bank of israel guido di tella is a fellow of st anthony s college a professor at the di tella institute in buenos aires and a member of parliament in argentina stanley fischer is vice president of development economics and chief economist at the world bank rudiger dornbusch is ford international professor of economics at mit

state dependent pricing and the dynamics of money and output standard macroeconomic models of price stickiness assume that each firm leaves its price unchanged for a fixed amount of time we present an alternative model in which the pricing decision depends on the state of the economy we find a method of aggregating individual price changes that allows a simple characterization of macroeconomic variables the model produces a positive money output correlation and an empirical phillips curve in addition the impact of monetary shocks depends crucially on the current level of output which points to a natural connection between state dependent microeconomics and state dependent macroeconomics i introduction there is a long tradition in macroeconomics of attributing the real effects of nominal demand shocks to nominal price stickiness in this view if there is no change in prices when nominal demand rises then quantities must bear the burden of adjustment hence nominal price rigidity provides the friction needed for nominal demand shocks to be transmitted to the real economy standard models of this transmission mechanism such as fischer 1977 and taylor 1980 are based on the assumption that each firm leaves its price unchanged for a fixed amount of time the main reason for considering such time dependent pricing rules is their analytic tractability constraining firms to adjust their prices at prespecified times both simplifies the derivation of equilibrium strategies and allows the use of powerful time series techniques to analyze aggregate dynamics the main disadvantage of the timedependent approach is that between price adjustments firms are not allowed to respond even to extreme changes of circumstance this makes it difficult to know whether the qualitative effects of money in these models are the result of nominal rigidities per se or of the exogenously imposed pattern of price changes an alternative approach to modeling price stickiness is to allow the price setting decision to depend on the actual state of the

the behavior of prices and inflation an empirical analysis of disaggregat price data this paper analyzes the effects of inflation on the dispersion of prices as well as other aspects of price behavior using disaggregated data on prices of foodstuffs in israel during 1978 84 we find that the effect of expected inflation on intramarket price variability is stronger than the effect of unexpected inflation we show that even in times of high inflation price quotations are not trivially short and price changes are not synchronized across firms these facts taken together confirm that there is some staggering in the setting of prices we find that the distribution of real prices is far from being uniform as many menu cost based models assume or conclude in fact as inflation increases to very high levels this distribution is not even symmetric when the annual inflation rate reaches 130 percent there are equal chances of finding real prices above or below the market average but upward deviations in the real price are further away from zero than downward ones furthermore as the annu

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

monetary shocks in models with inattentive producers we study models where prices respond slowly to shocks because firms are rationally inattentive producers must pay a cost to observe the determinants of the current profit maximizing price and hence observe them infrequently to generate large real effects of monetary shocks in such a model the time between observations must be long and or highly volatile previous work on rational inattentiveness has allowed for observation intervals that are either constant but long e g caballero 1989 or reis 2006 or volatile but short e g reis s 2006 example where observation costs are negligible but not both in these models the real effects of monetary policy are small for realistic values of the duration between observations we show that non negligible observation costs produce both of these effects intervals between observations are infrequent and volatile this generates large real effects of monetary policy for realistic values of the average time between observations

on the job specific training and efficient screening employment relationships are governed by short term incomplete contracts and typically involve on the job screening and firm specific training this article studies a dynamic employment relationship with these features and identifies a potential conflict between the employer s twin objectives to screen and train the worker when the training technology is quite productive the employer may have to sacrifice from worker performance during the screening process the article thus offers an explanation for why firms may invest suboptimally on training which complements the standard inappropriable rents explanation based on ex post mobility of young employees

menu costs and markov inflation a theoretical revision with new evidence abstract we revisit a foundational theoretical paper in the menu cost literature sheshinski and weiss 1983 optimum pricing policy under stochastic inflation review of economic studies 50 3 513 529 one of the few to treat stochastic inflation with persistent deviations from trend in contrast to the original finding we show that optimal pricing in this environment entails using different s s bands in high inflation and low inflation states of the world the low inflation band is strictly contained within the high inflation band this revised solution has very different implications from the original one firms are generally risk loving not risk averse with respect to inflation an increase in the variance of inflation increases price dispersion when inflation is high and decreases price dispersion when inflation is low on an aggregate level this optimal pricing would lead to bunching of prices and non neutrality of money in the setting of caplin and spulber 1987 menu costs and the neutrality of money quarterly journal of economics 102 4 703 725 to test the main finding we construct an establishment level dataset from the months surrounding mexico s tequila crisis in 1995 in the high inflation state price increases are larger and establishments allow their prices to vary more widely around their respective long run mean relative prices cross establishment price dispersion is lower but this result seems due to decreased establishment heterogeneity rather than narrower s s bands overall the evidence suggests that establishments employ wider s s bands in the high inflation state

dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi hyperbolic discounting and no commitment this paper examines a dynamic model of nonlinear income taxation in which the government cannot commit to its future tax policy and individuals are quasi hyperbolic discounters who cannot commit to future consumption plans the government has both paternalistic and redistributive objectives and therefore uses its taxation powers to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that reflects individuals true long run preferences under first best taxation quasi hyperbolic discounting exerts no effect on the level of social welfare attainable under second best taxation quasi hyperbolic discounting increases resp decreases the level of social welfare attainable when separating resp pooling taxation is optimal in stark contrast to previous studies this result implies that some individuals can actually be better off in the long run as a result of their short run impatience

ex ante randomization in agency models we consider how a principal can use randomized strategies in designing optimal contracts in agency settings we distinguish between ex post randomization overfee schedulesfollowing act selection by the agent and ex ante randomization overfee schedules before act selection we show that ex ante randomization may be efficient in both full information and private information settings under certain assumptions regarding preferences and the production technology it is particularly significant that additive separability and concavity ofthe agent s utility function as well as concavity of the production function do not rule out efficient ex ante randomized contracts in private information settings although as is known they rule out ex post randomization

optimal social insurance with linear income taxation we study optimal social insurance aimed at insuring disability risk in the presence of linear income taxation optimal disability insurance benefits rise with previous earnings optimal insurance is incomplete even though disability risks are exogenous and verifiable so that moral hazard in disability insurance is absent imperfect insurance is optimal because it encourages workers to insure themselves against disability by working and saving more thereby alleviating the distortionary impact of the redistributive income tax on labor supply and savings

endogenous incomplete contracts a bargaining approach in this paper we argue that by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts this point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once for all bargain over the entire stream a long term contract or through a series of bargaining rounds a short term contract within this structure short term contracts arise as equilibrium outcomes under very general conditions because a short term contract implies reduced bargaining costs for one of the agents in essence reduced transaction costs produce a short term contract jel classification l14 c78

optimal disinflationary paths abstract this paper characterizes optimal monetary policy in the context of a general equilibrium model with optimizing agents and staggered price setting starting from a steady state with positive inflation a rapid disinflation is desirable when announcements of future monetary policy are fully credible disinflationary policy yields substantial losses in output and employment when the monetary authority lacks credibility nevertheless the benefits of disinflation still exceed the costs disinflation often fails to be welfare improving however when lost seignorage revenues must be replaced using other distortionary taxes

imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time dependent pricing the real effects of an imperfectly credible disinfl ation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity therefore the study of how policymakers credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments in this paper we examine how the policymaker s credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation in a model with endogenous time dependent pricing rules both the initial degree of price ridigity calculated optimally and more notably the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility we initially evalute the costs of disinfl ation in as etup where credibility is exogenous and then allow agents to update beliefs about the type of monetary authority that they face we show that in both cases the interaction between the endogeneity of time dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation

social norms and moral hazard the probability of income loss depends on talent and effort effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence the social no

money demand the cagan model and the inflation tax some latin american evidence this paper examines the demand for money under conditions of very high inflation in argentina bolivia brazil chi le and peru during the 1970s and 1980s the authors test whether the monetary and inflationary experiences of these countries can be adequately characterized by the cagan 1956 model using an econometric procedure that is not reliant on any particular assumpti on concerning expectations formation except that forecasting errors are stationary the authors also examine the importance of foreign asset substitution in domestic portfolios and the hypothesis that monetary policy was tantamount to maximization of the inflation tax revenue before testing the rational expectations hypothesis copyright 1993 by mit press

detecting and removing discrimination under equal opportunities policies abstract this paper surveys part of the recent voluminous literature on the economics of discrimination focusing on two key questions first how should discrimination be measured and can in fact unambiguous estimates be derived as the basis for detecting where discrimination is present and setting in train measures to eliminate it second to what extent has the implementation of equal opportunities legislation improved the relative standing of women and minority workers in the labour force this section includes a discussion of the likely effects of recent changes in the law such as the equal value amendment in the uk or the introduction of comparable worth in the usa the survey concludes that our ability to detect discrimination at all precisely is still rudimentary and consequently policy measures are likely to be inefficient for this reason

comment on stopping inflations big and small response to article in this issue p 759 dynamic effects of monetary policy to interpret observations on the apparent output losses associated with stabilizing large and small inflations peter ireland constructs and calibrates a model with occasional costs of adjusting nominal prices in interpreting the observations with this model ireland takes for granted that the stabilizations described in papers by robert gordon and myself were responses to credible deflations credible in the sense that once they began they were anticipated as ireland stresses the assumption that these stabilizations were anticipated is critical in diiterentiating the adjustment dynamics presented in the current paper from the very diiterent dynamics exhibited in a companion paper ireland 1995 ireland 1995 follows fischer 1986 in interpreting an adaptive expectations scheme as a shorthand description of what application of bayes law might imply in the context of an equilibrium analysis in which the public is unsure of the monetary authority s purposes for example its type and uses the history of what the government does gradually to infer its purpose its type thus ireland and fischer interpreted adaptive expectations in terms of a learning scheme with cho and matsui s 1995 inductive property through particular patterns of behavior the government can eventually manipulate the key state variable the public s beliefs about inflation ireland 1995 describes how this specification aitects a government s optimal plan for stabilizing a high inherited inflation economy the induction property discourages gradualism and rewards policies that rapidly persuade the public of the government s intentions to sustain low inflation these dynamics are entirely driven by the process of acquiring credibility the present paper studies an opposite case in which the government so freely sets the public s beliefs that they disappear as state variables the only reason that prices appear as state variables is ireland s specification of the technology for setting nominal prices ireland s specification is designed to build in a short term trade oit between inflation and output and an impact eitect of monetary expansion it would be easy to undo the nonneutrality by tampering with ireland s specification of the price setting technology for example by letting firms set the pair pt pt l during

differential mortality and social security this paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between individuals who differ in their lifespans we discuss aspects related to the objective function and argue that aversion to multiperiod inequality should be taken into account then we study the properties of the social optimum both with full information and with asymmetric information we highlight the role of aversion to multiperiod inequality and show that it has substantial consequences on the design of social security schemes in particular we show that for a low resp high aversion to multiperiod inequality a negative resp positive implicit tax rate on continued activity is desirable

new perspectives on public finance recent achievements and future challenges abstract the advances in the economics of the public sector during the past quarter century have been as pronounced as in any field within economics public finance has become a rigorous branch of applied microeconomics incorporating the best thinking and most advanced tools of both theoretical economics and econometrics in the remarks below i will focus on a few key areas in applied and theoretical tax and expenditure policy drawing both upon the academic work of myself and others and my experiences in the policy arena both as chairman of the council of economic advisers and as chief economist of the world bank i shall address both the questions of what we have learned in the past few decades as well as the questions where further research is needed

the earnings of male immigrants in england evidence from the quarterly lfs in this paper we estimate earnings functions for native born and foreign born white and non white males in the english labour market using data from the quarterly labour force survey our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between native born and foreign born males when investigating the labour market experience of ethnic minorities furthermore the earnings performance amongst white immigrants varies considerably

pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities abstract this paper studies pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely lived individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two state markov process the study yields three main results first when individuals are risk neutral in any period the only individuals whose earnings are distorted are those who currently are and have always been low ability in addition the degree to which these perpetual low ability types have their earnings distorted decreases over time converging to zero if the time horizon is long enough second the earnings distortions are continuous with respect to the degree of risk aversion at the risk neutral solution third pareto efficient income tax systems can be time consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is large the condition for time consistency suggests a novel theoretical reason why the classic equity efficiency trade off may be steeper in a dynamic environment than previously thought

the relationship between relative prices and the general price level it is very nearly a truismi amaong neoclassical economists that the public is wont to confuse changes in the general price level with relative price changes correspondingl y one might speak of the independence between the two as one of the central postulates of the neoclassical tradition william stanley jevons was aml ong the first to identify this basic dichotomin economic life as well as to attempt to explain the ordinary citizen s seenming incapacity to understand it

social security retirement age and optimal income taxation it is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement in a world of laissez faire or of first best efficiency there would be no such implicit taxation the point of this paper is that when first best redistributive instruments are not available because some variables are not observable the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirement decision consequently the inducement of early retirement may be part of the optimal tax transfer policy we consider a model in which individuals differ in their productivity and their capacity to work long and choose both their weekly labor supply and their age of retirement we characterize the optimal non linear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when weekly earnings and the length of active life are observable while individuals productivity and health status are not observable c 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

menu costs and phillips curves this paper develops a model of a monetary economy in which individual firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as general inflation sellers can change price only by incurring a real menu cost we calibrate this cost and the variance and autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic shock using a new u s data set of individual prices due to klenow and kryvtsov the prediction of the calibrated model for the effects of high inflation on the frequency of price changes accords well with international evidence from various studies the model is also used to conduct numerical experiments on the economy s response to various shocks in none of the simulations we conducted did monetary shocks induce large or persistent real responses

selection and monetary non neutrality in time dependent pricing models for a given frequency of price adjustment monetary non neutrality is smaller if older prices are disproportionately more likely to change selection for the age of prices provides a complete characterization of price setting frictions in time dependent models selection for older prices is weaker and non neutralities are larger if the hazard function of price adjustment is less strongly increasing selection is weaker if there is heterogeneity in price stickiness finally selection is weaker if durations of price spells are more variable in particular the taylor 1979 model exhibits maximal selection for older prices whereas the calvo 1983 model exhibits no selection

price setting with menu cost for multi product firms we model the decisions of a multiproduct firm that faces a fixed menu cost once it is paid the firm can adjust the price of all its products we characterize analytically the steady state firm s decisions in terms of the structural parameters the variability of the flexible prices the curvature of the profit function the size of the menu cost and the number of products sold we provide expressions for the steady state frequency of adjustment the hazard rate of price adjustments and the size distribution of price changes all in terms of the structural parameters we study analytically the impulse response of aggregate prices and output to a monetary shock the size of the output response and its duration both increase with the number of products they more than double as the number of products goes from 1 to 10 quickly converging to the response of taylor s staggered price model

why are prices sticky preliminary results from an interview study this paper reports preliminary results from a large research project on business pricing which is currently underway the idea is to use interviews with actual price setters to assess the validity of a dozen theories of price stickiness the rather unorthodox for economists methodology is defended the research design is described briefly and a few results based on the first 72 interviews out of a projected 200 are presented this sample suggests that the median firm changes its price annually and that price adjustments typically lag 3 4 months behind shocks to demand or cost this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions abstract we study a model where bidders have perfectly correlated valuations for two goods sold sequentially in two ascending price auctions the seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction despite the lack of commitment by the seller we characterize an equilibrium and study its properties strategic non disclosure of information takes the form of non participation in the early auction by low valuation bidders while high valuation bidders bid up to their true valuations some buyers who would profitably buy at the reserve price refrain from participating in order to decrease the second auction reserve price

dynamic optimal income taxation with government commitment abstract we analyze the optimal income tax problem when consumers work for many periods can information about abilities learned in one period be used later to attain more redistribution than is possible in a one period world when the government can commit to future policies and has the same discount rate as individuals intertemporal nonstationarity of tax schedules can lead to pareto improvements by relaxing lifetime self selection constraints analogous to randomization in a one period world more significant use of information is possible when the social discount rate is less than individuals rates the taxes converge over time to a nondistortionary schedule

time dependent or state dependent wage setting evidence from periods of macroeconomic instability administrative data on monthly wages in iceland during 1998 2010 provide new insight into nominal wage rigidity unlike the data used in previous work ours have a higher frequency minimal measurement error and a long sample including a period of substantial macroeconomic instability we find that the monthly frequency of nominal wage changes is 13 percent although nominal wage cuts are rare their frequency rises following a large macroeconomic shock timing of wage changes is both time dependent and state dependent we find evidence of synchronization of adjustment and contracts of fixed duration but also that inflation and unemployment over the wage spell affect the timing of adjustment

paralyzed by fear rigid and discrete pricing under demand uncertainty we propose a new theory of price rigidity based on firms knightian uncertainty about their competitive environment this uncertainty has two key implications first firms learn about the shape of their demand function from past observations of quantities sold this learning gives rise to kinks in the expected profit function at previously observed prices making those prices both sticky and more likely to reoccur second uncertainty about the relationship between aggregate and industry level inflation generates nominal rigidity we prove the main insights analytically and quantify the effects of our mechanism our estimated quantitative model is consistent with a wide range of micro level pricing facts that are typically challenging to match jointly it also implies significantly more persistent monetary non neutrality than in standard models allowing it to generate large real effects from nominal shocks

costs of price adjustment and the welfare economics of inflation and disinflation this paper studies the welfare consequences of inflation and disinflation in a model in which monopol istic firms incur a fixed cost of price adjustment it is shown that a moderately increasing price level is associated with higher social welfare than a perfectly stable price level and the model therefore provides theoretical support for the widespread belief that a little bit of inflation is good for the economy nevertheless it is also tr ue that the eradication of a moderate inflation leads to an increase in social welfare copyright 1988 by american economic association

choosing between time and state dependence micro evidence on firms price reviewing strategies because of recent findings based on survey data it is now well known that firms differ from each other with respect to their price reviewing strategies while some firms review their prices at fixed intervals of time others prefer to perform price revisions in response to changes in economic conditions some theories have been suggested to explain this however empirical evidence on the relative importance of the factors that determine the different strategies of firms is virtually non existent in this paper we help to fill this gap by investigating the factors that explain why firms follow time dependent state dependent or both time and state dependent price reviewing rules we find that the strategies of firms vary with firm characteristics that have a bearing on the importance of information costs with the variability of the optimal price and with the sensitivity of profits to non optimal prices

monetary shocks in models with observation and menu costs we study economies where price stickiness arises due to the simultaneous presence of both menu and information costs we identify the relative importance of these costs using firm s survey data and analyze the response of prices and output following a permanent unexpected monetary shock for a given frequency of price adjustment we find that the information friction significantly amplifies the real effect of the shock when the shock is small or when it is not known by firms instead when the shock is large and known to firms the flexibility of prices increases and the real effects gradually vanish

the economic situation of first and second generation immigrants in france germany and the united kingdom a central concern about immigration is the integration into the labour market not only of the first generation but also of subsequent generations little comparative work exists for europe s largest economies france germany and the uk have all become perhaps unwittingly countries with large immigrant populations albeit with very different ethnic compositions today the descendants of these immigrants live and work in their parents destination countries this article presents and discusses comparative evidence on the performance of first and second generation immigrants in these countries in terms of education earnings and employment it is widely believed that many european countries have a serious problem with the integration of immigrants and their children leed 2006 many northern european countries have accumulated sizeable populations of immigrants but the lack of longterm strategies and policies to integrate these into societal structures and the labour market is often cited as one reason for social and economic exclusion of the children of these immigrants in the past decade southern european countries such as spain and italy have experienced similar if not larger immigrations than the large northern european economies france germany and the uk in the late 1950s to early 1970s again it seems that there is little thought devoted to long term strategies for immigrants and their descendants the experience of those countries that had large scale immigration in the last half of the twentieth century should be of importance for devising future immigration and integration policies however there is rather little hard evidence in the literature about the relative position of immigrants and their descendants in these countries in a manner that allows comparisons to be made in this article we aim to provide a comparative study of a number of outcomes education earnings and employment of both first and second generation immigrants of different origins in the three largest european economies france germany and the uk

piece rate incentive schemes this paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece rate compensation schemes the informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century the formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting the main result is as follows in a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior then no compensation scheme piece rate or otherwise can induce the worker not to restrict output

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

income taxation with intergenerational mobility can higher inequality lead to less progression abstract we introduce the notion of social mobility into an optimal income tax model this is done by allowing earning abilities to be partly innate and partly acquired through investments in human capital education the implications for the optimal re distributive policy are studied

price points and price dynamics abstract a standard model of price setting is extended to include an important role for price points as well as sticky information it makes empirically reasonable predictions about the frequency of price adjustments the sizes of price increases and decreases the shape of the hazard function the fraction of price changes that are price increases and the relationship between price changes and inflation when the model of price setting is integrated into a small scale dsge model it implies plausible aggregate effects of monetary policy in contrast to a model with a prominent role for price points but no information rigidities

what makes the output inflation trade off change the absence of accelerating deflation in japan it is standard to model the output inflation trade off as a linear relationship with a time invariant slope we assess empirical evidence for two sets of theories that allow for endogenous variation in the slope of the short run phillips curve at an empirical level we examine why large negative output gaps in japan in the late 1990s did not lead to accelerating deflation but instead coincided with stable albeit moderately negative inflation our results suggest that this episode is most convincingly interpreted as reflecting a gradual flattening of the phillips curve we find that this flattening is best explained by models with endogenous price durations these models imply that in any economy where trend inflation is substantially lower or substantially higher today than in past decades time variation in the slope of the phillips curve has become too important to ignore

a tale of two rigidities sticky prices in a sticky information environment macroeconomic models with microeconomic foundations allow for comparisons with macro and micro empirical evidence this paper proposes a model wherein firms i acquire information infrequently generating sticky information mankiw and reis 2002 and ii face menu costs producing state dependent sticky prices i estimate parameters via indirect inference and show that under considerable real rigidity sticky prices in a sticky information environment are consistent with micro and macro evidence sticky prices not only help match micro data on price changes size and durations between adjustments they also improve the model s fit with the macro data as embodied in an empirical phillips curve

the distribution of consumer price changes in the united kingdom this paper rejects the hypothesis that relative commodity price changes are normally distributed using monthly u k data from 1962 to 1983 the presence of skewness in the distribution of price changes across commodities suggest that the asymmetric price response hypothesis may be a good description of the relation between the moments of the distribution of price changes the authors use granger causality tests to investigate this hypothesis but it is not supported by the data they also examine the major time series features of the individual price series copyright 1990 by the london school of economics and political science

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

the macroeconomic effects of infrequent information with adjustment costs we extend the macroeconomic literature on ss type rules by introducing infrequent information in a kinked adjustment cost model we first show that optimal individual decision rules are both state and time dependent we then develop an aggregation framework to study the macroeconomic implications of such optimal individual decision rules in our model a vast number of agents act together and more so when uncertainty is large the average effect of an aggregate shock is inversely related to its size and to aggregate uncertainty these results contrast with those obtained with full information adjustment cost models jel classification e0 e1 e2 e3 les effets macroeconomiques de l information infrequente quand il y a des couts d ajustement les auteurs etendent la portee de la litterature specialisee sur les regles de type ss en proposant des postulats d information infrequente et de fonction de couts d ajustement pliee on montre que les regles de decision optimales des individus dependent a la fois de l etat de l environnement et du moment on developpe alors un cadre d agregation pour etudier les impacts macroeconomiques de ces regles optimales de decision dans ce modele un grand nombre d agents agissent de concert et optimales ce d autant plus que l incertitude s accroit l effet moyen d un choc au niveau global est inversement reliea son importance et au niveau d incertitude agregee ces resultats contredisent ceux qu on obtient dans des modeles de couts d ajustement avec pleine information

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

an analysis of the male racial earnings differential in the uk using the general household survey 1986 an analysis of the male racial earnings differential in the uk using the general household survey applied economics vol 18 no 11 pp 1233 1242

endogenous time dependent rules and inflation inertia in this paper we endogenize fixed price time dependent rules to examine the output effects of monetary disinflation we derive the optimal rules in and out of inflationary steady states and develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through time because of strategic complementarities we have to solve both problems simultaneously this allows us to reassess the output costs of monetary disinflations including aspects such as the roles of the initial level of inflation and of the degree of strategic complementarity in price finally we relax the strict assumption of pure time dependent rules by allowing price setters to re evaluate their rules at the time disinflation is announced

is firm pricing state or time dependent evidence from u s manufacturing abstract if pricing is state dependent firms are more likely to adjust whenever aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks reinforce each other and trigger desired price changes in the same direction using measures of technology shocks derived from production function estimates for four digit u s manufacturing industries i find that sectoral inflation rates are more sensitive to negative as opposed to positive technology disturbances in periods of higher economy wide inflation commodity price increases and expansionary monetary policy shocks i argue using a state dependent sticky price model that matches salient features of the u s microprice data that these results suggest that pricing is state dependent in u s manufacturing

the equilibrium and optimal timing of price changes this paper studies the welfare properties of the equilibrium timing of price changes staggered price setting has the advantage that it permits rapid adjustment to firm specific shocks but the disadvantages that it causes unwanted fluctuations in relative prices and that by creating price level inertia it can increase aggregate fluctuations because each firm ignores its contribution to these problems staggering can be a stable equilibrium even if it is highly inefficient in addition there can be multiple equilibria in the timing of prices changes indeed whenever there is an inefficient staggered equilibrium there is also an efficient equilibrium with synchronized price setting

optimal price setting with observation and menu costs we study the price setting problem of a firm in the presence of both observation and menu costs in this problem the firm optimally decides when to collect costly information on the adequacy of its price an activity which we refer to as a price review upon each review the firm chooses whether to adjust its price subject to a menu cost and when to conduct the next price review this behavior is consistent with recent survey evidence documenting that firms revise prices infrequently and that only a few price revisions yield a price adjustment the goal of the paper is to study how the firm s choices map into several observable statistics depending on the level and relative magnitude of the observation vs the menu cost the observable statistics are the frequency of price reviews the frequency of price adjustments the size distribution of price adjustments and the shape of the hazard rate of price adjustments we provide an analytical characterization of the firm s decisions and a mapping from the structural parameters to the observable statistics we compare these statistics with the ones obtained for the models with only one type of cost the predictions of the model can with suitable data be used to quantify the importance of the menu cost vs the information cost we also consider a version of the model where several price adjustment are allowed between observations a form of price plans or indexation we find that no indexation is optimal for small inflation rates

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

aggregation and optimization with state dependent pricing the literature on the aggregation of s s policies has ignored the impact of aggregate behavior on the individual s optimization problem in the case of pricing the feedback effects are clear not only do pricing strategies determine the evolution of the price level but the evolution of the price level also influences the optimal pricing strategies in this paper we provide a consistent treatment of aggregation and optimization we use this model to analyze three issues in the menu cost pricing literature the relationship between strategic complementarity and the real effects of money the relationship between the variance of the money supply and the correlation between money and output and the relationship between the cost of price adjustment and the size of price adjustment questions concerning the dynamics of aggregate variables such as prices employment investment and consumption represent the core of business cycle analysis one striking feature of these variables is the radical difference between properties of these aggregates and the nature of the individual behavior that underlies them the behavior of a firm s prices investment and employment and the behavior of an individual s consumption all involve frictional elements that lead to discrete adjustment at the microeconomic level heterogeneity among individuals however tends to smooth the behavior of the corresponding aggregates in recent years a large body of research has developed to examine the manner in which microeconomic frictions influence aggregate dynamics one of the centerpieces of this research has been the s s model developed by arrow harris and marschak 1951 the key element of this model is the state dependence of individual decisions agents act when a state variable crosses some critical threshold which balances the cost and benefits of adjustment the aggregate implications of this form of microeconomic behavior have been analyzed by blinder 1981 caplin 1985 and mosser 1991 in the context of inventory dynamics by caplin and spulber 1987 caballero and engel 1991 1993 and caplin and leahy 1991 in the context of prices and by bertola and caballero 1990 caballero 1993 and eberly 1994 in the context of con sumer durables one of the most limiting aspects of these models is that they focus exclusively on the impact that microeconomic inertia has on aggregate dynamics they 1we would like to thank michael harrison loannis karatzas john leahy sr andreu mas colell a co editor and four anonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments and the national science foundation and the sloan foundation for financial support

union wage settlements during a disinflation this paper examines the role of union wage contracts in the persistence of inflation and the implication of these contracts for the problem of disinflation in the united states a quantitative model of overlapping con tracts explicitly oriented toward the major union sector is developed the model takes account of expectations of future wage price and employment conditions as in more aggregated models that have been used in macroeconomic research in addition the distribution of workers according to contract length as well as deferred wage increases and escalator clauses are explicitly used in the model the main aim of the model is to determine the constraints which these contracts impose on disinflation paths the model indicates that the maximum speed of disinflation is extremely slow in the early phases if a rise in unemployment is to be avoided but increases considerably before the new lower rate of inflation is reached the disinflation path is considerably slower than that observed after hyperinflation periods however the existence of a path of inflation reduction raises questions about whether the institution of union wage con tracts is really the direct cause of costly disinflations or whether their influence works indirectly by raising credibility problems about a monetary disinflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the rigidity of prices this paper uses evidence on individual transaction prices to analyze price behavior the evidence shows that for many transactions pricesremain rigid for periods exceeding one year the rigidity of price ispositively correlated with industry concentration for several productsthe correlation of price changes across buyers is low the paper alsoinvestigates the relationship between price rigidity price change andthe length of time a buyer and seller have been doing business together the author interprets the evidence as emphasizing the importance of nonprice rationing and the inadequacy of models in whichprice movements alone clear markets copyright 1986 by american economic association

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

on the stubbornness of sticky prices this paper presents a simple menu cost example in which there is a clear distinction between price stickiness and downward rigidity of prices while price stickiness may or may not exist in menu cost models downward rigidity shows up whenever there is a reduction of the expected rate of inflation this reduction changes the optimal target and threshold for each firm for some it also implies an immediate increase of their own price this upward jump of prices in case of a disinflationary attempt is interpreted as downward rigidity since there are no symmetric forces when expected inflation increases copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

optimum pricing policy under stochastic inflation we describe aggregate inflation as a stochastic process in which the rate of change of the price level can be positive or zero where the times spent in each state are of random duration this class of processes includes two state markov chains and renewal processes as special cases it is shown that the optimal pricing policy of a monopolistic firm with non convex costs of price adjustment is s s in its real price i e its nominal price relative to the price level a basic certainty equivalence result is proved i e the firm behaves as if it faces a certain and fixed rate of inflation higher than the actual expected rate the difference between the two rates being a risk premium which depends on the real interest rate and the parameters of the stochastic process one can thus apply previous results from the case of certainty sheshinski and weiss review of economic studies 1977 to obtain comparative static results in particular one finds that an increase in the variance of expected inflation leads firms to choose a pricing policy with larger amplitude in real price the paper also addresses the question of consistency in firms expectations when the price level is determined by the firms actions in this paper we consider pricing policies of individual firms in an inflationary environment each firm expects the general price level to increase and must determine the rate of increase of its own price it is assumed that the firm incurs an adjustment cost when it changes its nominal price consequently firms choose to change prices occasionally rather than continuously

intertemporal common agency and organizational design how much decentralization abstract in common agency where one agent contracts with several principals to what extent should the principals cooperate and centralize provision of incentives if the agency is over contract complements where an increase in activity for one principal increases the marginal value of contracting with other principals complete centralization seems optimal since this internalizes all externalities we show that this intuition is not generally valid for dynamic agency situations for although centralization provides more accurate incentives to the agent it also aggravates the ratchet effect and this negative effect may dominate the optimal degree of decentralization is discussed and partly characterized

on inflation and output with costly price changes a simple unifying result this paper determines the real effects of credible disinflation when price setting is staggered the results are surprising a fairly quick disinflation causes a boom this finding suggests that nominal price rigidity alone does not explain why disinflation is costly in actual economies this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

state dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output economists have long suggested that nominal product prices are changed infrequently because of fixed costs in such a setting optimal price adjustment should depend on the state of the economy yet while widely discussed statedependent pricing has proved difficult to incorporate into macroeconomic models this paper develops a new tractable theoretical state dependent pricing framework we use it to study how optimal pricing depends on the persistence of monetary shocks the elasticities of labor supply and goods demand and the interest sensitivity of money demand

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

dynamic income taxation redistribution and the ratchet effect abstract in this paper we extend the classic optimum linear income tax model to a twice repeated game a utilitarian policy maker decides on the second period tax system on the basis of observed first period behaviour we summarise our findings as follows first the static optimal linear tax results cannot be expected to hold in a dynamic setting second more productive households are likely to mimic the behaviour of less productive households third the optimal dynamic first period tax rate might be negative then income is redistributed from low to high income households fourth if the utility function is well behaved then the optimal dynamic first period tax rate is lower than the optimal static tax rate fifth if the optimal static tax rate separates then the dynamic and the static optimal tax rates coincide sixth if a zero tax rate separates then the optimal dynamic tax rate is positive

black white male earnings and employment prospects in the 1970s and 1980s evidence for britain abstract using a sample of around 80 000 whites and 2500 blacks the paper highlights not just the economic disadvantage of blacks but also that this disadvantage worsened in the 1980s in britain

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic