beyond gdp the quest for a measure of social welfare this paper critically examines the various approaches to the measurement of individual well being and social welfare that have been considered for the construction of alternatives to gdp special attention is devoted to recent developments in the analysis of sustainability in the study of happiness in the theory of social choice and fair allocation and in the capability approach it is suggested in the conclusion that although convergence toward a consensual approach is not impossible for the moment not one but three alternatives to gdp are worth developing jel i31 e23 e01

status effects and environmental externalities abstract this paper examines a static competitive economy where the production of a consumption good generates pollution that adversely affects human welfare preferences are defined over consumption leisure pollution and economic status each person s status increases with her own consumption but decreases with the average consumption of society the achievement of a pareto efficient resource allocation requires a consumption tax to offset the incentive to overconsume in the pursuit of enhanced status in contrast with standard prescriptions the efficient pollution tax generally exceeds the sum of individuals marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement these findings remain unaltered when preferences are modified to incorporate altruistic concern for others well being altruism however suggests a potential role for government intervention to achieve a desirable i e pareto efficient distribution of welfare between individuals

how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

behavioral spillover effects from a social information campaign abstract we investigate whether a social information campaign aimed at reducing water use causes a spillover effect on the use of electricity on average water use decreased by 6 percent for the treatment group we identify a positive spillover effect on electricity use among households that had efficient use of water before the campaign the effect is sizeable almost a 9 percent reduction we argue that these results are consistent with a model of cognitive dissonance where the efficient households infer information about electricity use from the water use information

signaling and indirect taxation commodities communicate we investigate optimal indirect taxation when both the intrinsic qualities of goods and signaling motivate consumption choices optimal indirect taxes are introduced into a monotonic signaling game we provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the d1 sequential equilibrium strategies in the case of pure costly signaling signaling goods can in equilibrium be taxed without burden when commodities serve both intrinsic consumption and signaling optimal taxes are characterized by a ramsey rule which deals with distortions resulting from signaling

measuring attitudes towards inequality individuals attitudes to inequality aversion are measured using survey data based on the leaky bucket experiment for several groups of students in australia and israel three forms of social welfare function are estimated it is found that measures of inequality aversion can be obtained with some precision and that these estimates are substantially lower than the values typically used by those measuring inequality and examining optimal tax structures furthermore a welfare function based on the gini inequality measure is generally found to give a better fit than forms based on constant relative or constant absolute inequality aversion jel classification c91 d63

a note on the estimation of the equity efficiency trade off for qalys abstract in this note the veil of ignorance approach is tested as a basis for empirically determining the shape of the social welfare function for qalys an experiment is carried out where the participants choose between different societies that differ with respect to per capita qalys and the distribution of qalys the answers are analyzed using logistic regression analysis according to the results the respondents are willing to give up 1 qaly in the group with more qalys to gain 0 45 qalys in the group with fewer qalys but this trade off is independent of the size of the difference in qalys between the groups

the growth of public health expenditures in oecd countries do government ideology and electoral motives matter this paper empirically evaluates whether government ideology and electoral motives influenced the growth of public health expenditures in 18 oecd countries over the 1971 2004 period the results suggest that incumbents behaved opportunistically and increased the growth of public health expenditures in election years government ideology did not have an influence these findings indicate 1 the importance of public health in policy debates before elections and 2 the political pressure towards re organizing public health policy platforms especially in times of demographic change

opportunistic and partisan election cycles in brazil new evidence at the municipal level this article tests the hypothesis of opportunistic and partisan cycle models using a new large data set of brazilian municipalities over the 1989 2005 period the results show an increase in total and current expenditures and a decrease in municipal investments local tax revenues and budget surplus in election years they also show that partisan ideology exerts a relative influence on the performance of the local public accounts these results confirm that both opportunistic and partisan cycles have occurred in the management of the budgets of brazilian municipalities after the end of the military government

optimal emissions tax rates under habit formation and social comparisons abstract the existing climate models ignore the behavioral anomalies of households and conclude that the optimal environmental tax rate should comove with business cycles however this assumption has received extensive criticism recently to this end this paper studies the optimal emissions tax rate when households are bounded rational in particular we calculate the optimal climate policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model that features households with habit formation internal habits and social comparisons external habits compared to the benchmark model without consumption externality the social comparisons model amplifies consumption volatility but produces a similar response of pollutant emissions in the presence of the three types of economic shocks considered in contrast the habit formation model decreases the volatility of both consumption and pollutant emissions in contrast to the previous result that the optimal emissions tax rate should be procyclical we find that the social comparisons model largely mitigates the procyclicality of optimal emissions tax rates and the optimal emissions tax rates under the habit formation model remain constant in response to all the economic shocks considered

choosing the joneses endogenous goals and reference standards a growing economic literature stresses the importance of relative comparisons e g for savings and consumption or happiness in this literature it is usually assumed that reference standards against which people compare themselves are exogenously given in contrast findings from social psychology suggest that people play an active role in determining their reference standards we introduce a social comparison model where people choose their reference standards to serve motives of self improvement and self enhancement the model predicts that reference standards increase in individuals abilities and that people thus tend to compare themselves to similar others the results of a questionnaire study confirm the prediction of the model

patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income we study the effects of cross border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when income varies across and within regions we use a salop model with a high middle and low income region in each region a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility of its residents when health care costs are financed by general income taxation in equilibrium regions with higher income offer better quality which creates an incentive for patient mobility from lower to higher income regions assuming a prospective payment scheme based on drg pricing we find that lower non monetary administrative mobility costs have i no effect on quality or welfare in the high income region ii a negative effect on quality but a positive effect on welfare for the middle income region and iii ambiguous effects on quality and welfare for the low income region lower monetary mobility costs copayments might reduce welfare in both the middle and low income region thus health policies that stimulate cross border patient mobility can be counterproductive when regions differ in income

social status and economic performance a survey abstract this survey combines ideas and results from sociology and economics recognizing that economic decisions are often shaped by social concerns and influences based on the sociological literature we define social status and describe its measurement we then describe the role of social status in economic analysis of saving and consumption wages and economic growth we review recent work on status determination in equilibrium including evolutionary models we conclude with some remarks on the need for further interaction between sociology and economics

the electoral dynamics of human development this paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980 2013 the incidence of partisan and political support effects is also taken into account a gmm estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development majority governments also influence it but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects the electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non oecd countries in countries with less frequent elections with lower levels of income and human development in presidential and non plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes they have also become more intense in this millennium

wages seniority and the demand for rising consumption profiles abstract in many occupations wages rise faster than productivity over the life cycle other authors have suggested a variety of explanations for this pattern we argue that these explanations fail for at least two occupations commercial airline pilots and intercity bus drivers we then explore an alternative explanation based on the assumption that satisfaction depends on not only the level of consumption but also its rate of change we argue that upward sloping wage profiles are an expedient substitute for personal savings as a means for achieving upward sloping consumpion profiles

are people inequality averse or just risk averse individuals preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries the median relative risk aversion which is often seen to reflect social inequality aversion is between 2 and 3 most people are also found to be individually inequality averse reflecting a willingness to pay for living in a more equal society left wing voters and women are both more risk and inequality averse than others the model allows for non monotonic swfs implying that welfare may decrease with an individual s income at high income levels which is illustrated in simulations based on the empirical results

is more always better a survey on positional concerns abstract we use survey data to provide some empirical information about concerns regarding relative standing respondents chose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one where everyone s endowment of the good is higher but the respondent has less than others questions asked about education attractiveness and intelligence for one s child and oneself income vacation time approval and disapproval from a supervisor and papers to write half of the respondents preferred to have 50 less real income but high relative income concerns about position were strongest for attractiveness and supervisor s praise and weakest for vacation time

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

measuring future grandparents preferences for equality and relative standing individuals aversion to risk and inequality and their concern for relative standing are measured through experimental choices between hypothetical societies it is found that on average individuals are both fairly inequality averse and have a strong concern for relative income the results are used to illustrate welfare consequences based on a utilitarian swf and a modified crra utility function it is shown that the social marginal utility of income may then become negative even at income levels that are far from extreme

we are what we eat obesity income and social comparisons abstract the empirical evidence of a non monotone relation between income and obesity is not well explained we build a theoretical model combining income inequality and social comparisons to explain the link between income and obesity and study tax policy implications for fighting obesity we assume that differences in food consumption patterns between poor and wealthy households partly reflect positionality which is the concern for social status our key assumption is that positionality for low calorie food consumption is positively related to a country s wealth in this framework body weight outcomes reflect competing income and positionality effects yielding the following results we explain the link between average obesity rates and standards of living and suggest the existence of a kuznets curve for obesity in accordance with empirical evidence for cross sections of the population we explain the observed correlation between income and obesity which is positive in poor countries and negative in rich countries we find that increasing the relative cost of high calorie food is less effective at decreasing the relative weight of poor individuals in rich countries than in poor countries

the optimal mix between funded and unfunded pension systems when people care about relative consumption the paper studies the optimal portfolio mix between funded and unfunded pension systems when people care about relative consumption in pay as you go systems with fixed contribution rates pensions are tied to wages this lowers the uncertainty of individuals future relative position thereby increasing the attractiveness of unfunded systems the paper shows analytically that the optimal share of funding decreases with the importance of relative standing a calibrated version of the model suggests that the concern for relative standing has also a quantitatively important impact on the optimal share of funding for reasonable assumptions it is typically around 20

the effect of religiosity and religious festivals on positional concerns an experimental investigation of ramadan this article examines the effect of religion on positional concerns using survey experiments we focus on two of the dimensions of religion degree of religiosity and religious festivals by conducting the experiments during both the most important day of ramadan the night of power and a day outside ramadan we find that ramadan overall has a small and negative impact on positional concerns detailed analyses based on the sorting of individuals degree of religiosity reveal that the decrease in the degree of positional concerns during ramadan is mainly explained by a decrease in positionality among individuals with a low degree of religiosity

election results and opportunistic policies a new test of the rational political business cycle model the literature on the rational pbc suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre election distortions in fiscal policy we propose a new test that explores the two way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory the test is implemented using a large panel of portuguese municipalities the results show that opportunism leads to a larger win margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win margin is small these results are consistent with the theoretical model

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

do treatment decisions depend on physicians financial incentives we study whether and how physicians respond to nancial incentives making use of detailed register data on the health care services provided to patients by general practitioners gps in norway over a six year period 2006 11 to identify gps treatment responses we exploit that specialisation in general medicine entitles the gps to a higher consultation fee implying a change in total and relative fee payments to control for demand and supply factors related to becoming a specialist we estimate a gp fixed effect model focusing on a narrow time window around the date of specialist certi cation our results show a sharp response by the gps immediately after obtaining specialist certi fication and thus a higher consultation fee the number of visits increase while the treatment intensity prolonged consultations lab tests medical procedures decline these fi ndings are consistent with a theory model where partly profit motivated gps face excess demand and income effects are sufficiently small finally we find no evidence for adverse health effects measured by emergency care centre visits on patients due to the change in gps treatment behaviour after becoming a specialist

price discrimination and social welfare with correlated demand abstract the paper analyzes the price output and welfare effects of third degree price discrimination triggered by the portfolio motive of a risk averse monopolist facing random and potentially correlated market demands it is shown that contrary to conventional wisdom price discrimination can occur with identical expected demands the relatively inelastic but risky market may be charged the lower price and despite linear demands aggregate expected output may fall while expected consumer and producer surplus may rise these results are shown to be driven by the risk aversion of the monopolist and the asymmetry in the risk and revenue characteristics of the markets