complexity in structured finance we study complexity in the market for securitized products a market at the heart of the financial crisis of 2007 9 the complexity of these products rose substantially in the years preceding the financial crisis we find that securities in more complex deals default more and have lower realized returns the worse performance is economically meaningful a one standard deviation increase in complexity represents an 18 increase in default on aaa securities however yields of more complex securities are not higher indicating that investors did not perceive them as riskier our results are consistent with complexity obfuscating security quality

on the relationship between corruption and migration empirical evidence from a gravity model of migration this paper shows the relationship between corruption and migration in particular countries with much corruption are shown to encourage emigration and discourage immigration because they provide worse and unpredictable economic conditions more insecurity and a lower quality of life this hypothesis is confirmed empirically with a cross sectional dataset with bilateral migration data covering 230 countries well known implications of the gravity model are confirmed here larger populations a common language and a common border increase migration while distance between two countries decreases migration furthermore education gdp per capita inflation in the destination country as well as corruption and education in the origin country can robustly explain migration corruption thus appears to be a push factor of migration

the gender gap fertility and growth changes in fertility have long been recognized as important correlates of economic growth with the relationship between the level of fertility and the level of income per capita being one of the strongest observable correlations in cross country data this paper examines the linkages between fertility and growth theory the structure of the model is presented in sections on production couples decision making system dynamics and steady state equilibria the first component of the model is that increases in capital per worker raise womens relative wages since capital is more complementary to womens labor input than to mens the second component is that increasing womens relative wages reduces fertility by raising the cost of children more than household income finally lower fertility raises the level of capital per worker a positive feedback loop generates demographic transition a rapid decline in fertility accompanied by accelerated output growth

domestic violence a nonrandom affair in this paper we develop and estimate a model of domestic violence we extend a noncooperative model of the family to include violence as a source of gratification and an instrument for controlling behavior we estimate the model by robust methods since the violence process appears to have a heavy tailed nonnormal error distribution we find that the properties of the equilibria depend on family income for low middle income families our results indicate an equilibrium in which one person s reservation utility constraint is binding whereas for higher income families both individuals may gain from the relationship

the cliometrics of international migration a survey abstract this is a survey of some of the key studies in the literature on international migration in history that may be described as cliometric this literature uses the concepts and approaches of applied economics to investigate a range of historical issues and there are strong parallels with the questions that have been addressed in the literature on contemporary migrations here i focus on the period 1850 1940 and chiefly on migration from europe to the new world the survey is organized around six themes that include the forces driving migration over time and across space the assimilation of migrants and their effects on wages and income distribution in source and destination countries and the evolution of immigration policy although this literature has drawn heavily on the tool kit of applied economists it also provides a wider perspective on many of the issues that concern migration today

a model of u k emigration 1870 1913 this paper develops a simple time series model of emigration and applies it to data for emigration from the united kingdom 1870 1913 the model is derived from a macroeconomic analysis of the migration decision and provides a specific functional form and dynamic structure it encompasses and explains many of the empirical findings of earlier research on the determinants of emigration over this historical period the results support the model strongly in most respects both wage rates and employment rates in the sending and in the receiving countries influenced fluctuations in emigration the short run fluctuations were driven largely by variations in employment rates while the long run level of emigration was determined largely by the relative wage

the effect of large investors on asset quality evidence from subprime mortgage securities abstract fannie mae and freddie mac the gses the dominant investors in subprime mortgage backed securities before the 2008 crisis substantively affected collateral composition in this market mortgages included in securities designed for the gses performed better than those backing other securities in the same deals holding observable risk constant consistent with the transmission of private information these effects are concentrated in low documentation loans and for issuers that were highly dependent on the gses and were corporate affiliates of the mortgage originators additional analysis of yield spreads shows that these performance differences were not reflected in prices

terror as a bargaining instrument a case study of dowry violence in rural india this ethnographic study examined the sociocultural context of domestic violence and dowry in india and describes a theoretical model and econometric methodology the model was tested with survey data collected from a sub caste of 149 potter families from 3 villages in karnataka state in south india interviews were conducted among 139 adult married women and 130 married men the case studies demonstrate that violence can be used as a way to redistribute resources bargaining over dowry amounts occurs twice once before the marriage and renegotiations after the wife had moved to the husbands family domestic violence may be a weapon in order to obtain higher transfers at the renegotiation stage the model assumes that the level of dowry and the occurrence of violence are determined simultaneously hypotheses tested whether increases in husbands family wealth in the dowry paid and husbands cost of violent behavior reduces the incidence of violence tests determined whether increases in wifes familys wealth and increases in wifes human capital husbands human capital or wifes cost of violence increase violence 23 reported wife beating at some time a 10000 rupee increase in the wifes parents income increased the risk of violence by 4 a 10000 rupee increase in the husbands parents income reduced the risk of violence by 10 a 10000 rupee increase in dowry reduced the risk by 5 an additional male child reduced the risk by 11 female sterilization increased the risk by 16 findings suggest that husbands beat wives when the wifes family is rich and when dowries are small

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

measuring and explaining cross country immigration policies summary the intensified international migration pressures of the recent decades prompted many developed countries to revise their immigration regulations and increase border controls however the development of these reforms as well as their effectiveness in actually managing immigration flows remain poorly understood the main reason is that migration regulations are hard to quantify which has prevented the construction of a universal measure of migration policy to fill this gap in the literature we construct an indicator of the restrictiveness of immigration entry policy across countries as well as a more comprehensive indicator of migration policy that also accounts for staying requirements and regulations to foster integration specifically we estimate a bayesian state space model to combine all publicly available data sources that are informative on migration policy this methodology allows us to account for measurement errors in the underlying indicators and increases data availability without imputations or other ad hoc manipulations the indexes that we obtain are then used to disentangle the factors determining the toughness of migration regulations our empirical framework accounts for cross country correlation in migration policies and combines elements from the median voter and interest group approach we find strong evidence of spatial correlation in particular in entry restrictiveness yet substantially less in overall immigration policy this suggests that there still remains a substantive national margin in immigration policies in particular in the less visible segments such as staying conditions and integration rights we also find indications of a global trend of increasing restrictiveness in migration entry policy after the financial crisis of 2007 08

who is against immigration a cross country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants abstract this paper empirically analyzes economic and noneconomic determinants of individual attitudes toward immigrants within and across countries the two survey data sets used covering a wide range of developed and developing countries make it possible to test for interactive effects between individual characteristics and country level attributes in particular theory predicts that the correlation between pro immigration attitudes and individual skill should be related to the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants in the destination country skilled individuals should favor immigration in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants and oppose it otherwise results based on direct and indirect measures of the relative skill composition are consistent with these predictions noneconomic variables also are correlated with immigration attitudes but they don t alter significantly the labor market results

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

europe s tired poor huddled masses self selection and economic outcomes in the age of mass migration during the age of mass migration 1850 1913 one of the largest migration episodes in history the united states maintained a nearly open border allowing the study of migrant decisions unhindered by entry restrictions we estimate the return to migration while accounting for migrant selection by comparing norway to us migrants with their brothers who stayed in norway in the late nineteenth century we also compare fathers of migrants and nonmigrants by wealth and occupation we find that the return to migration was relatively low 70 percent and that migrants from urban areas were negatively selected from the sending population keep ancient lands your storied pomp cries she with silent lips give me your tired your poor your huddled masses yearning to breathe free the wretched refuse of your teeming shore send these the homeless tempest tost to me i lift my lamp beside the golden door emma lazarus 1883

lender screening and the role of securitization evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets this article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the u s housing market using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank held loans we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders screening decisions in the subprime market for low documentation loans through two channels the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan the change in decision making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors examining the time series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings we exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non agency markets with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

love hate and murder commitment devices in violent relationships many violent relationships are characterized by a high degree of cyclicality women who are the victims of domestic violence often leave and return multiple times to explain this we develop a model of time inconsistent preferences in the context of domestic violence this time inconsistency generates a demand for commitment we present supporting evidence that women in violent relationships display time inconsistent preferences by examining their demand for commitment devices we find that no drop policies which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the charges result in an increase in reporting no drop policies also result in a decrease in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships move away from an extreme type of commitment device when a less costly one is offered

electoral accountability in a country with two tiered government in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters interests but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents with two levels of government the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians liable also for decisions made by the other level of government when the incumbent at one level acts as a stackelberg leader with respect to the other there is no risk of this leading to leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents

migration and institutions exit and voice from abroad a rapidly growing body of research examines the relationship between migration and institutions three strands of studies can be distinguished some studies focused on the role of domestic and foreign institutions in the decision to migrate others were interested by the impact of migration on institutional reforms in migrants countries of origin while the effect of migration on destination countries is largely documented recent studies focus on how migrants affect social and informal institutions in the destination countries this survey puts together these three strands of literature with three purposes first we offer a short definition and synthetic typology of institutions which provide a guide to understand several studies summarized and their results second our analysis is presented following the analytic framework exit voice and loyalty of hirschman in order to highlight the brain grain phenomenon for developing countries from an institutional point of view third we review the limited existing work on the very timely topic whether migrants are harmful or not to institutions in the host countries

securitization and loan performance ex ante and ex post relations in the mortgage market this study examines the relation between securitization and loan performance using a comprehensive dataset from a major national mortgage lender loans remaining on the bank s balance sheet ex post incurred higher delinquency rates than sold loans contrasting the negative relation between screening efforts and ex ante probability of loan sale explored by prior studies moreover the performance gap between sold and retained loans was wider among the subsample of loans that were perceived as easier to resell the investors seeming advantage over the originating bank can mostly be explained by information revealed during the time between loan origination and sale

bridging trade theory and labour econometrics the effects of international migration this paper surveys current theoretical and empirical research on international migration with a particular emphasis on the links between trade theory and labour empirics

international migration and the role of institutions we study the determinants of international migration with special attention to the role of institutional factors other than economic and demographic fundamentals we evaluate the impact of political institutions and of those institutions specifically targeted at attracting migrants for a dataset on 19th century migration we find that economic and demographic differentials play a major role but that the quality of institutions also matter we produce evidence that both political and migration institutions represent significant factors of attraction even after controlling for their potential endogeneity through a set of instruments exploiting colonial history and the institutions inherited from the past

employment and the risk of domestic violence does the breadwinner s gender matter abstractthis article studies the effect on the risk of female victimization of the employment status of the woman and her partner we use individual level data from the violence against women surveys for spain which also provide information on income and a rich set of sociodemographic characteristics to address the potential endogeneity of the binary employment indicators we exploit exogenous geographical information on the employment and unemployment rates by gender and age within a multivariate probit framework our estimation results show that male partner employment plays a major role in the risk of physical violence while female employment only lowers it when her partner is employed too the lowest risk appears for more egalitarian couples in which both partners are employed

did colonization matter for growth an empirical exploration into the historical causes of africa s underdevelopment we investigate the impact of 20th century european colonization on growth we 5nd that colonial heritage as measured by the identity of the metropolitan ruler and by the degree of economic penetration matters for the heterogeneity of growth performances in africa colonial indicators are correlated with economic and sociopolitical variables that are commonly employed to explain growth and there are growth gains from decolonization colonial indicators also add signi5cant explanatory power to worldwide growth regressions and are correlated with the sub saharan africa and the latin america dummies c

liar s loan effects of origination channel and information falsification on mortgage delinquency 1 this paper presents an analysis of mortgage delinquency between 2004 and 2008 using a loan level data set from a major national mortgage bank our analysis highlights two problems underlying the mortgage crisis a reliance on mortgage brokers who tend to originate lower quality loans and a prevalence of low documentation loans known in the industry as liar s loans that result in borrower information falsification while over three quarters of the difference in delinquency rates between bank and broker channels can be attributed to observable loan and borrower characteristics the delinquency difference between full and low documentation mortgages is due to unobservable heterogeneity about half of it potentially due to income falsification

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

factor endowments inequality and paths of development among new world economies whereas traditional explanations of differences in long run paths of development across the americas generally point to the significance of differences in national heritage or religion we highlight the relevance of stark contrasts in the degree of inequality in wealth human capital and political power in accounting for how fundamental economic institutions evolved over time we argue moreover that the roots of these disparities in the extent of inequality lay in differences in the initial factor endowments dating back to the era of european colonization we document through comparative studies of suffrage public land and schooling policies systematic patterns by which societies in the americas that began with more extreme inequality or heterogeneity in the population were more likely to develop institutional structures that greatly advantaged members of elite classes and disadvantaging the bulk of the population by providing them with more political influence and access to economic opportunities the clear implication is that institutions should not be presumed to be exogenous economists need to learn more about where they come from to understand their relation to economic development our findings not only contribute to our knowledge of why extreme differences in the extent of inequality across new world economies have persisted for centuries but also to the study of processes of long run economic growth past and present

behind the scenes the corporate governance preferences of institutional investors we survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms consistent with a number of theories we document widespread behind the scenes intervention as well as governance motivated exit these governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit we further find that long term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively finally we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions

asymmetric information in securitization an empirical assessment abstract asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages both securitized and not and using a methodology previously applied to insurance data that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability the main finding is that for given observable characteristics securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non securitized ones we show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons

on the political economy of immigration the authors study how immigration policies that impose capital and skill requirements would be determined under majority voting when native agents differ in their wealth holdings and vote to maximize their income the results of the model calculations indicate that the native population will be polarized between those who would like an immigration policy to maximize the domestic capital labor ratio and those who would like an immigration policy that would minimize it

tax burden and migration a political economy theory and evidence abstract the extent of taxation and redistribution policy is generally determined as a political economy equilibrium by a balance between those who gain from higher taxes transfers and those who lose the standard theory of the size of government in a representative democracy links the tax burden to measures of the pre tax income inequality we develop in this paper a theory which encompasses the existing literature and provides a complementary channel linking the tax burden in the presence of migration to the fiscal leakage from native born to the migrants in a stylized model of migration and human capital formation we show somewhat against the conventional wisdom that low skill immigration can lead to a lower tax burden and less redistribution than would be the case with no immigration even though migrants naturally join the pro tax transfer coalition data on 11 european countries over the period 1974 1992 are consistent with the implications of the theory a higher share of low education immigrants in the population leads to a lower tax rate on labor income and less generous social transfers

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

the economics of immigration this literature review concerns the impact of immigration on the economy of the host country focusing on the experience of the united states the emphasis is on the period from the 1970s to the 1990s the author shows that research earlier in this period generally concluded that the economic effects of immigration were positive but that more recent research on later migrations have generally concluded that immigration may be having an adverse effect on the earnings of native unskilled workers and be placing an increased burden on welfare programs the importance of such economic analysis for the formulation of appropriate migration policies is stressed

who is against a common market this paper develops a theory of the endogenous formation of a common market in a three country two factor political economy model in the status quo home and foreign implement nondiscriminatory policies toward international factor flows in order to maximize the domestic median voter s welfare then the two countries simultaneously hold referenda on a common market initiative leading to the removal of the pre existing policies for factor flows between the member countries while no coordination is imposed on policies vis a vis the rest of the world several interesting results emerge in a common market the returns on factors moving between the members are more likely to increase the larger is the import demand of one country relative to the factor supply of the exporting partner factors that do not relocate are more likely to see their returns decrease when flows are large and import demands are inelastic importantly for the common market to emerge as an equilibrium some factors must continue to experience enhanced protection when the integration process is completed this result highlights the potential tension between social desirability and the political feasibility of the integration process jel f1 f2 p16

federal acid rain games abstract federal environmental policy designed to control acid rain is shaped after the hierarchy of the system and is controlled simultaneously by regional and central governments each governmental level controls one of two policy instruments pollution abatement production and pollution tax in a two stage game where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and control pollution taxes the subgame perfect equilibrium is socially efficient but the subgame perfect equilibrium for a two stage game where the central government is the stackelberg leader and controls pollution taxes is inefficient it corresponds to the nash equilibrium for a game where regional governments control both policy instruments

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic