short run impacts of a severance tax change evidence from alaska energy states face a fundamental tradeoff when increasing severance tax rates potential gains in tax revenues versus potential losses in exploration development and production activity despite the significant implications of this tradeoff there is very little empirical evidence on the short run responsiveness of extraction related activities to changes in severance taxes we conduct a comparative case study to evaluate the short term impact of a severance tax increase on oil related activities and development in alaska in 2007 the introduction of alaska s clear and equitable share aces more than tripled the tax liability for much of the oil already under production in alaska we construct a synthetic alaska from a set of u s energy states with the purpose of estimating the counterfactual evolution of oil production exploration and development wells gross state product and employment in the absence of aces overall our results indicate that there is no discernible difference in the outcome variables of interest between alaska and its synthetic control after the implementation of aces suggesting that aces had a minimal effect on alaskan oil related activity and development in the short run

is hotelling s rule relevant to domestic oil production a model of oil supply from known reserves is developed to incorporate geological and engineering principles in the oil field operator s decision problem oil production from existing wells within an oil field is isolated from the drilling of new wells the geo engineering

a model of endogenous government formation political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the formateur enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions however empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalition in support of gamson s law of portfolio allocation this article examines government formation as a process in which both the government coalition and the formateur are determined endogenously in equilibrium if parties have similar preferences over cabinet portfolios the share of seats they are allocated is proportional to the parties sizes

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

taxation depletion and welfare a simulation study of the u s petroleum resource abstract exhaustible resources in the united states are subject to taxes on property value production and corporate income as applied in practice each tax can cause high grading the elimination of incentives to explore develop and produce marginal resources and each can tilt the time path of production toward the present or the future the potential for such tax induced distortions has been shown in the theoretical literature due to the dynamic nature of resource exploitation and the resulting complexity of models developed to study it however purely theoretical exercises have been unable to provide detailed results of a sort that could help guide tax policy the present paper develops a simulation model of the u s petroleum resource and uses it to study the effects of taxation on exploration and production the model is partial equilibrium in scope and views the industry as a present value maximizing representative firm given expectations on the future time path of price and a function that relates reserve additions to exploratory effort the industry chooses time paths for exploration and production parameters of relevant functions are estimated with data for u s petroleum operations in the onshore region of the lower 48 states the simulated outcomes indicate that property and production severance taxes cause substantial deadweight losses a tax on corporate income from extraction imposes a very small deadweight loss and the property tax significantly biases utilization of the resource away from the future and toward the present

unconventional energy taxation and interstate welfare an analysis of pennsylvania s severance tax policy abstract natural gas production from unconventional sources has increased over the past decade a significant portion of this increase has come from output in the marcellus region of pennsylvania this output has altered gas markets and repositioned pennsylvania as a major gas exporter it has also put pennsylvania at odds with other states as it is one of a few without a formal severance tax on extractive resources in this paper we combine results from a structural demand model with a two sector trade model to analyze the interstate welfare impacts of pennsylvania s current severance tax proposal our results demonstrate that most of the welfare losses from this proposed policy are likely to be shifted to residents in other states we also demonstrate how fluctuations in gas prices can substantially reduce tax revenue these findings have important implications for both pennsylvania and u s energy policy given the significant rise in energy production from new sources throughout the u s

environmental and land use regulation in nonrenewable resource industries implications from the wyoming checkerboard this paper examines how the oil and soning that these effects should be similar gas industry responds to changes in environmental to those of production and property taxes and land use regulations pertaining to drilling by like stollery however they do not conexamining differences in regulatory practices on sider the situation where environmental federal and private land a simulation model for regulations directly affect explo ration and wyoming is used to estimate losses of oil and gas development output over the next 60 years because of higher activities in any case the drilling costs found on federal property the pres limited number of studies in this area and ent value of these losses comes to about 800 mil their narrow scope is surprising in light of lion a lso this case study is of interest because it the importance of environmental complishows that future production is more sensitive to ance costs to firms that produce from nonchanges in environmental regulations that apply to renewable resources and because of the drilling than to changes in severance taxes levied observation by jaffe et al 1995 that a on production

controlling private mineral exploitation firms using conditional license renewal schemes in the early 1980 s the governments of canada and newfoundland disagreed concerning jurisdiction over the hibernia oil field the dispute revealed the belief that the scope and kind of economic benefits generated by the development would depend on which level of government had control differences in objectives could have practical significance only if there exist control instruments with which to influence the pattern of resource exploitation we examine one such instrument here the government of a province or state can most strongly influence the form of the extraction program through direct management as it may be difficult for such a government to recruit the necessary expertise it might have no alternative but to import this by encouraging outside firms to extract in return for shares of the profits the local government is assumed to be interested in using the newly found revenues to finance a project such as a college or other training facility which will provide benefits after the deposit is exhausted such a project would require a near constant flow of funds over many periods an extraction firm maximizes the total discounted profit by extracting successively declining amounts each period unless the discount rate is zero and there are no stock effects on marginal extraction cost this implies that revenue from taxes on production or profit will also decline through time use of such taxes alone would force the government to save significant portions of the revenues from early periods to fund its new program later on this can create political problems for democratically elected officials since surpluses indicate to voters that their tax bills are excessive a forward looking government could earmark the newly found revenue to fund the new program effectively instituting a precommitment device see strotz 1955 56 its next task would be to find a way of altering the declining revenue flow so that tax collections over time are even or nearly so one simplistic solution would have the government require a fixed payment

a quantitative description of state level taxation of oil and gas production in the continental u s abstract we provide a quantitative description of state level taxation of oil and gas production in the continental u s for 2004 2013 aggregate revenues from production taxes nearly doubled in real terms over the period reaching 10 3 billion and accounting for 20 of tax receipts in the top ten revenue states the average state had a tax rate of 3 6 nationally the average dollar of production was taxed at 4 2 the oil specific rate estimated for the study period is 2 4 per barrel or 5 5 per ton of carbon lastly state level tax rates are two thirds higher in states excluding oil and gas wells from local property taxes suggesting that the policies are substitutes for one another

commodity price volatility with endogenous natural resources abstract natural resource reserves are exogenous in models of small commodity exporters changes in the stock of reserves play no role in the macroeconomy including in business cycle volatility trade dynamics or exchange rate volatility we consider richer supply dynamics and model exploration and depletion we show that an endogenous supply of reserves is important for capturing the stylised facts associated with commodity price shocks including a commodity currency the crowding out of non commodity activity dutch disease and a volatile business cycle we also consider how exploration and depletion affect the ranking of optimal monetary and taxation policies when natural resource reserves are held fixed monetary policy is an efficient tool for stabilising the effects of commodity price shocks however when exploration and depletion are accounted for using interest rates to stabilise the effects of commodity price changes becomes inefficient using taxes on the resource sector specifically an ad valorem royalty remains efficient

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games abstract this paper studies coalition formation payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers a power index is called self confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector unlike the shapley value and other commonly used power indices the nucleolus has this property the proof uses a weak version of kohlberg s siam j appl math 20 1971 62 balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium

cabinet survival and competing risks we attempt to resolve a recent controversy in the study of cabinet terminations pertaining to the shape of hazard rates on the one hand warwick 1992b provides evidence that cabinets are more likely to terminate the longer they are in office alt and king s 1994 analysis on the other hand suggests that hazard rates are constant over the life time of a cabinet this issue is of particular theoretical importance since a constant hazard rate would add support to the nonstrategic model of cabinet termination due to browne et al 1986 while an increasing hazard rate would seem to favor lupia and strom s 1995 strategic approach by applying a semi parametric competing risk approach to data on cabinet durations we are able to show that through its use of theory based censoring the previous literature in effect analyzed only one mode in which cabinets terminate the case where one cabinet is replaced by another without a new election once cabinet terminations that lead to chamber dissolutions with subsequent elections are analyzed directly we can show that they are governed by a very different stochastic process hazard rates are not flat as in the case of replacements but increase over the life of the government further the covariates governing replacement terminations fail to explain dissolution terminations these findings add support to the strategic approach suggested by lupia and strom

a parsimonious model of tax avoidance and distortions in petroleum exploration and development abstract we present a simple model of petroleum exploration and development that can be applied to study the performance of alternative tax systems and identify potential distortions although the model is highly simplified it incorporates many factors and some of the key tradeoffs that would influence an investor s investment behavior the model recognizes the role of enhanced oil recovery and treats the impact of taxation on exploration and development in an integrated manner consistent with an investor s joint optimization of investments at both stages of the process the model is simple and user friendly which facilitates application to a broad range of problems

tax policy can change the production path a model of optimal oil extraction in alaska we model the economically optimal dynamic oil production decisions for seven production units fields on alaska s north slope we use adjustment cost and discount rate to calibrate the model against historical production data and use the calibrated model to simulate the impact of tax policy on production rate we construct field specific cost functions from average cost data and an estimated inverse production function which incorporates engineering aspects of oil production into our economic modeling producers appear to have approximated dynamic optimality consistent with prior research we find that changing the tax rate alone does not change the economically optimal oil production path except for marginal fields that may cease production contrary to prior research we find that the structure of tax policy can be designed to affect the economically optimal production path but at a cost in net social benefit

negotiation in legislatures over government formation we question results claiming to extend non cooperative models of legislative bargaining to the theoretically general and substantively typical case with an arbitrary number of disciplined parties we identify problems with both the derivation of formal results and empirical evaluation of these no empirically robust formateur advantage is observed in field data on bargaining over government formation given this theoretical and empirical impasse we reconsider the substantive premises that should form the foundation for any new attempt to model this fundamental political process arguing that models should be grounded in binding constitutional constraints on the government formation process in parliamentary democracies

events equilibria and government survival theory a game theoretic model of government formation yields an equilibrium government the robustness of which may be explored by subjecting it to exogenous shocks this permits an examination of government durability and survival in a cruel political world hypotheses the vulnerability of a government to exogenous shocks depends upon the nature of the shock a government may be quite resistant to some classes of shock while it is highly vulnerable to others methods game theoretic analysis yields equilibrium results a simulation technology is crafted which allows us to subject this equilibrium to perturbations of its underlying parameters much in the spirit of wind tunnel experiments in engineering results the technology does indeed allow the systematic examination of well defined cases we find for the case of two european governments in the 1980s and 1990s that they differ considerably in their vulnerability to exogenous shocks

the political economy of oil production in latin america 1990s witnessed a significant increase in investments in the oil and gas sector in latin america in most countries private investment took the lead after the privatization and liberalization of the sector in argentina bolivia brazil ecuador and venezuela private oil investment or some form of privatization or both generated significant increases in hydrocarbon production and reserves in the last five years however the region has experienced a new wave of resource nationalism with increases in the government s take and state control oil taxes have risen significantly in argentina bolivia ecuador and venezuela in addition bolivia and venezuela have partially nationalized oil projects we argue that the recent trend is largely the outcome of the rise in the international oil price furthermore we show how the likelihood of expropriation increased after a period of successful investment in exploration and production at the same time the timing of these changes and direction in which the sector has evolved varies considerably across the region in contrast to most other countries in the region brazil colombia and peru have generally strengthened the institutional framework and the property rights of private oil producers this paper provides a political economy rationale for the divergent evolution

a unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies the literature on cabinet duration is split between two apparently irreconcilable positions the attributes theorists seek to explain cabinet duration as a fixed function of measured explanatory variables while the events process theorists model cabinet durations as a product of purely stochastic processes in this paper we build a unified statistical model that combines the insights of these previously distinct approaches we also generalize this unified model and all previous models by including 1 a stochastic component that takes into account the censoring that occurs as a result of governments lasting to the vicinity of the maximum constitutional interelection period 2 a systematic component that precludes the possibility of negative duration predictions and 3 a much more objective and parsimonious list of explanatory variables the explanatory power of which would not be improved by including a list of indicator variables for individual countries

spatially variable taxation and resource extraction the impact of state oil taxes on drilling in the us abstract we estimate the responsiveness of nonrenewable resource firms to taxes on output using spatially explicit data from the oil sector in the united states using a model of resource firm capital allocation over space we show that responses to spatially varying taxes differ from responses to equivalent changes in the common output price a larger response to tax rates occurs because the tax change only affects the returns to drilling in a single state whereas a price change affects both the returns to drilling in a state and the opportunity cost of not drilling in other states econometrically we estimate the effect of severance taxes on oil drilling we find that the response to a one dollar increase in tax per unit of production has an effect at least eight times as large as the effect of an equivalent decrease in output price the tax response is inelastic implying that an increase in state tax rate would increase revenue we do not find evidence of spillovers between states in the local areas near state borders