capturing strategic rent full line forcing brand discounts aggregate rebates and maximum resale price maintenance this paper examines the implications of a retailer s shelf space stocking decisions on the optimal marketing strategy of an upstream multiproduct monopolist when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is known full line forcing brand discounts and maximum resale price maintenance are sufficient to achieve the monopolist manufacturer s first best profit when these strategies are adopted the retailer s profit is reduced to the scarcity rents obtainable on her shelf space when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is unknown the use of aggregate rebates can act as a screening device to maximize channel profit copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

price dependent profit sharing as a channel coordination device we show how an upstream firm by using a price dependent profit sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes with this rule the upstream firm induces the retailers to behave as if demand has become less price elastic as a result competing downstream firms will maximize aggregate total channel profit when downstream firms are better informed about demand conditions than the upstream firm the same outcome cannot be achieved by vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance price dependent profit sharing may also ensure that the downstream firms undertake efficient market expanding investments the model is consistent with observations from the market for content commodities distributed by mobile networks

vertical control of price and inventory this paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain we consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts the price mechanism in which each outlet pays a two part price and chooses price and inventory virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently contracts that can elicit first best decisions include resale price floors or buy back policies retailer held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers

resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand abstract this paper considers a model where oligopolistic manufacturers sell to consumers through competitive retailers who face demand uncertainty the setup is a symmetric duopoly with product differentiation and a perfectly competitive retail market in the game with unconstrained price competition there is price dispersion in the retail market in the game with resale price maintenance rpm manufacturers profits are higher retail inventories are at least as high and total surplus is at least as high the effect of rpm on consumer surplus is ambiguous rpm also precludes possible coordination failure between the manufacturers

precommitment in competing vertical chains the design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization hence it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices a precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one s own favor schelling 1960 how these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey jel classification l22 l42 l81

on the equivalence of resale price maintenance and quantity restrictions abstract when demand is known with certainty there is a clear mapping between a monopolist s pricing and output decisions this suggests an equivalence between a monopolist manufacturer specifying a minimum maximum retail price and imposing a maximum minimum quantity on its retailers this paper shows that while the effect of maximum rpm can always be replicated by an appropriate quantity floor the minimum rpm outcome cannot always be replicated by an appropriately chosen quantity ceiling as such the analysis provides one reason that manufacturers will choose a price floor rather than quantity ceiling even though a quantity ceiling would appear to lead to lower monitoring costs

vertical control opportunism and risk sharing abstract a manufacturer who offers secret contracts faces an opportunism problem she undercuts her own input prices and fails to offset retail competition i show that this problem diminishes when retailers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty risk aversion and uncertainty create a bilateral risk sharing incentive that raises equilibrium input prices above marginal cost the manufacturer can therefore profit from downstream risk aversion when retail competition is fierce

returns system with rebates we consider a variant of the newsvendor problem atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand after the orders are filled the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not we show that in this setting a returns system with rebates with previously set buy back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold implements the optimal production and sales strategy attaining maximum expected profit in the channel

field of use restrictions in licensing agreements a widely used clause in license contracts the field of use restriction four precludes licensees from operating outside of the technical field specified when a technology has several distinct applications four allow the licensor to divide up his rights and attribute them to the lowest cost producer in each field of use this can improve production efficiency with complex technologies however the boundaries of fields of use may be difficult to codify entailing a risk of licensees rights overlapping we explore how this affects the optimal license contract in a moral hazard framework where the licensor s effort determines the probability of overlap we show that depending on the contracting environment the license agreement may include output restrictions and non linear royalty schemes

vertical contracts in the video rental industry a large body of theoretical work has explored the channels through which vertical contracts can induce efficiency improvements however it is also important to study vertical contracts empirically in order to gain insight into the relative size of different types of efficiency gains in this paper i empirically analyse a contractual innovation in the vertically separated video rental industry prior to 1998 video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing contracts in 1998 revenuesharing contracts were widely adopted i investigate the effect of the introduction of revenue sharing contracts on firms profits and consumer welfare i analyse a new panel data set of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers contract and inventory choices as well as rentals and contract terms for 246 movie titles and 6137 retailers in the u s during each week of 1998 and 1999 and the first half of 2000 a structural econometric model of firms behaviour is developed that describes the nature of firms contract choices estimates from this model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase by 10 under the revenue sharing contract for popular titles for less popular titles the effects can be even larger i also estimate that consumers benefit when revenue sharing contracts are adopted

subsidy and tuition policies in public higher education i introduction the much discussed and widely debated recent conditions in public higher education include expanding enrollments flat if not declining public appropriations per resident student and rapid increases in tuition rates 1 to many observers tuition policy in public higher education appears be explained as an attempt to set tuition at whatever level is necessary to compensate for shortfalls between public appropriations and instructional expenditures ehrenberg 2006 asserts that public higher education has been buffeted by a perfect storm in which state appropriations to public higher education institutions have failed to keep pace with per student expenditures in private higher education because of economic recession the priorities placed on alternative uses of state tax revenues such as elementary and secondary education medicaid welfare and criminal justice and efforts to reduce income and sales tax rates a considerable empirical literature examines the relationship between tuition in public higher education and state appropriations koshal and koshal 2000 identify a negative relationship between tuition and state appropriation a study of college costs and prices which is conducted by cunningham et al 2001 identifies an inverse association between tuition rates and annual budget appropriations but finds little evidence of a link between tuition and expenditures on instruction lowry 2001 treats state appropriations as exogenous in a resident tuition equation and discovers a significant negative relationship between state funding and tuition rizzo 2005 finds that increases in tuition are linked to declines in future levels of state funding which hints at a dynamic association rizzo and ehrenberg 2004 in one of the more extensive examination of the topic treat real state appropriations per student as an exogenous variable in their resident tuition equation and find that schools that receive higher state appropriations per student charge lower tuition though the elasticity is far from unity acknowledging the economic and demographic conditions of public higher education and the empirical literature linking appropriations and tuition raises a number of questions what activities are legislatures supporting when they allocate public funds to higher education what are the implied responsibilities for subsidizing residents versus nonresidents how are resident and nonresident tuition rates determined and what are the relationships among tuition rates resident and nonresident enrollments and state appropriations to higher education in particular there appears to be the need to develop a better understanding of the decision processes that determine both the public subsidy and the setting of tuition rates a goal of this article is to develop a conceptual framework for that process there is a widely held notion that residents should pay a lower tuition than nonresidents and as a result of a resident subsidy they do so in nearly all public universities one rationale for favorable treatment is that residents and their parents pay state taxes another claim which receives some support by groen 2004 is that residents are likely to remain in the state after graduation and thus contribute future tax revenues although the public subsidy to higher education is justified for these and many other economic development reasons some argue that the higher education subsidy is simply a payoff to special interest groups who influence legislatures and governors friedman 1968 and goldin and katz 1998 provide a general discussion of the objectives of subsidized higher education for whatever reasons resident students continue to receive a substantial publicfinanced subsidy while nonresidents pay close to full cost there are two basic arrangements for determining tuition rates in higher education 1 institutions determine tuition rates under the direction of an independent governing board and 2 state legislatures who are governed by statues and budget policies make tuition decisions

viewpoint canadian competition policy progress and prospects this paper discusses the state of competition policy in particular the economics of competition policy in canada today and considers its prospects going forward it argues that i the importance of competition policy has become accepted widely in canada and indeed throughout much of the world ii competition policy design and enforcement is in general well done in canada iii economists including many canadians have played a central role in the development of an efficient and effective competition policy in canada and elsewhere and iv competition policy in canada is today facing very serious challenges and economists should be concerned la politique de concurrence au canada progres et prospective ce memoire discute de l etat de la politique de concurrence en particulier l economie de la politique de concurrence au canada aujourd hui et examine ce qui l attend on suggere que i l importance de la politique de concurrence est devenue largement acceptee au canada et dans le gros du reste du monde ii le dessein et l application de la politique de concurrence sont en general bien faits au canada iii les economistes et plusieurs canadiens parmi eux ont joue un role central dans le developpement d une politique de concurrence efficace et effective au canada et ailleurs et iv la politique de concurrence au canada fait face a des defis tres serieux ces temps ci et les economistes devraient s en inquieter

resale price maintenance under asymmetric information we study resale price maintenance rpm and quantity fixing arrangements qf in a framework with successive monopolies under both adverse selection and moral hazard the analysis compares the private and the welfare properties of both contractual modes under asymmetric information both kinds of vertical contracts entail a double marginalization driven by the information rents distributed to a privately informed downstream retailer this forces the upstream producer to sell above his marginal costs the upstream producer always prefers rpm to qf but the impact of rpm on consumers surplus is ambiguous whenever rpm is the preferred contracting mode for the vertical structure from an ex ante viewpoint it also raises consumers surplus thereby producing a pareto improvement relative to qf contracts

the competitive effects of resale price maintenance the competitive effects of resale price maintenance rpm are theoretically diverse rpm can cause allocation distortions or promote productive efficiencies in the distribution process moreover extant cross sectional empirical evidence is incapable of distinguishing among the potentially disparate effects of rpm this paper conducts hypothesis tests of the alternative theories of rpm the empirical framework relates estimates of the effects of rpm for a cross section of observations to necessary conditions of the alternative models this analysis indicates that rpm is used both to foster cartels and promote efficiencies in the distribution process this result is consistent with the growing body of case study analysis that suggests that rpm is used for a variety of reasons this result also questions the current per se illegal status of rpm in the antitrust laws evidence is also provided concerning the strategic interaction between manufacturers and dealers in the distribution process and the use of financial data in analyzing propositions in industrial organization

distributional equity in the unemployment insurance system this study examines the distribution of unemployment insurance benefits across income classes the new data presented here support previous claims that a large share of unemployment insurance benefits flow to middle and upper income groups the data also show however that earlier studies underestimated the extent to which lower income groups benefit from the program in addition the paper investigates whether the household survey data used in studies such as this are so flawed by reporting errors that they yield biased results the author concludes that such errors have only a minimal effect the paper closes with an analysis of why upper income groups receive a relatively large share of unemployment insurance benefits

seasonality and the effect of advertising on price does advertising make markets more or less competitive this paper lays out an econometric strategy for estimating the effect of advertising on prices that exploits seasonal demand and imperfect targeting of consumers we find mostly negligible effects of advertising on prices at monthly frequency among the 35 of 131 product categories with sufficient advertising seasonality to justify second stage estimation only nine have a significant effect and those are typically small this finding is essentially the result of the much greater seasonality in advertising than price

suggestions for research themes and publications with the volume of world trade over 2 trillion and the sales of foreign affiliates of u s companies over 500 billion international marketing is a very large and complex activity yet existing research in international marketing does not do justice to the size and complexity of the subject in this note 3 major areas of research in international marketing are sketched out export marketing international marketing by multinationals and other topics the outline will be suggestive rather than comprehensive it does however indicate many areas where research is needed to expand our understanding of international marketing

territorial restrictions in franchise contracts i introduction efficient contracts establish the incentives for contractual parties through the assignment of rights or authority over decisions as well as shares of profit this insight has been widely used to explain the nature of the firm 1 the role of rights assignment in explaining specific business contracts however is relatively unexplored here we analyze contractual rights within franchise systems focusing on the right to add new franchisees to an existing franchise area the choice in a franchise contract is simple either grant the franchisor the right to add new franchisees in the future or allow existing franchisees the right to block the addition of new outlets the literature on vertical restraints assumes that the restraints specified in contracts are enforced and never renegotiated with respect to territorial exclusivity in particular the literature mainly takes two perspectives territorial protection either prevents franchisor hold up behavior the appropriation of franchisee returns from the investment in establishing the local market or it corrects distortions arising from competition among franchisees 2 our model extends the hold up story by recognizing the dynamic nature of contractual relations between parties contracts are always open for renegotiation and the initial contracts are designed with this in mind the key effect in assigning the right to add additional franchisees is on the status quo point in bargaining subsequent to the initial contract the central point is simple the party with the authority to add franchisees can extract a larger portion of the wealth created by investment in the system incentives depend on the appropriated portion of the return to investment therefore the optimal contract assigns the right to the party whose input is more valuable to the system 3 the next section offers a simple model that develops this theme in a subsequent section we examine some facts about franchise systems in place and illustrate alternative assignments of authority ii the model we consider the simplest franchise contract a franchisor f offers to a franchisee g a contract giving the right to collect profits from the use of the franchisor s brand name in a retail territory we assume that the level of economic profits cannot be verified by a third party such as a court this rules out explicit sharing rules for profits between the two parties 4 these profits depend upon the efforts of both the franchisor and franchisee in developing the market the efforts are undertaken immediately after the contract is signed the franchisee s input represents for example local advertising selling effort or quality and the franchisor s input represents for example national advertising or the maintenance of the brand name the profits from the venture are uncertain and depend on the realization of a draw should the system prove sufficiently successful it may be profitable to add another retail outlet the evolution of contracts will respond to any opportunity for profit enhancement and any restrictions in the initial contract preventing this realization will be open for renegotiation the role for territorial constraints in particular may be illustrated within a simple formal model the effort levels of the franchisor and franchisee are denoted by e sub f and e sub g and are measured in dollars the profits earned from the brand name depend upon a stochastic variable e g demand uncertainty denoted by theta which is realized after the efforts are undertaken after the realization of theta there is an opportunity for the franchisor to sell a position in the territory to a second franchisee a product idea that enjoys success warrants an expanded retail network as the market is mature at this point no further investment is required the key element of the contract for our interest is the allocation of authority over the admission of additional retailers to the territory in question does the contract guarantee to the original franchisee exclusive authority to the use of the brand name in the territory

costs and benefits of inducing intrabrand competition the role of limited liability when is inducing intrabrand competition via nonexclusive distribution an optimal strategy to address this issue a static model is developed to examine two settings the manufacturer uses exclusive distributors in the first setting and nonexclusive distributors in the second the analysis indicates that the choice of distribution rests critically on whether the manufacturer can effectively extract surplus from the distributors due to a variety of institutional reasons the distributors liability is often limited in performing on behalf of the manufacturer such limited liability restricts how much of the distributors surplus can be extracted when the distributors surplus cannot be fully extracted the manufacturer may prefer nonexclusive distribution even when distributors can free ride on each other s efforts

do msrps decrease prices abstract the nature of manufacturer s suggested retail prices msrps and whether they increase or decrease prices is poorly understood we exploit a policy experiment in which a ban on msrps was imposed and then lifted a year later and show that msrps decrease prices by 3 6 percent on average there is no indication that msrps lowered prices by acting as binding price ceilings instead we find suggestive evidence that msrps are aimed at consumers possibly providing a benchmark by which consumers can evaluate prices

beer and the tie did divestiture of brewer owned public houses lead to higher beer prices in 1989 the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice since that time however retail prices have risen this paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period the analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail organisational form that emphasises how exclusive dealing clauses and strategic factors interact in 1989 in an important decision the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice there is considerable doubt however that their objectives were achieved indeed since the time that the recommendations were implemented retail prices have risen it is not clear however if prices would have increased in the absence of divestiture one goal of my research is to provide an answer to this question the mmc s recommendations created an exceptional opportunity to assess the effects that different contractual arrangements have on retail prices indeed one would like to investigate this relationship ceteris paribus unfortunately however the choice of vertical market structure is normally endogenous and it is impossible to condition on all of the factors that affect the contracting decision in the uk beer industry in contrast the government ordered changes in the type and terms of the contracts under which national brewers could operate their licensed premises increased separation between brewer and publican therefore was not due to changes in economic conditions moreover some premises the free houses that were not owned by a brewer were not affected by the beer orders the existence of a control group facilitates the analysis by strengthening the conclusions that one can draw in recent years economists have moved away from simple theories of vertical

coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition this paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information free repair faster check out or after sales service differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high service retailers and lower price discount retailers therefore how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question yet the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard symmetric contracting assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination i bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation even if the retailers were ex ante identical in their cost and other characteristics the paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers next the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price service competition a manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice versa the paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers the framework that i develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity consumers are heterogeneous in their locations as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation and in their willingness to pay for retail services as in the models of vertical differentiation the model also uses a natural relationship in retail markets between the travel time cost incurred by a consumer and her willingness to pay the more affluent consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for retail services also have a higher cost for their personal time given these market features the paper analyzes the problem faced by a manufacturer who sells to competing retailers the paper shows that the standard notion in the literature of offering similar contracts to all the retailers is sufficient only in markets with substantial locational differentiation relative to the differences in the willingness to pay effective channel management in these markets simply requires mechanisms that ensure that retailer interests are aligned so that they compete by offering a mix of price and service that is desirable from the manufacturer s point of view however in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial diversity in consumer willingness to pay the manufacturer s problem is not just to align retailer interests but to also use the channel contract to induce the correct level of retail differentiation this helps the manufacturer to better cater to the diversity in consumer willingness to pay and to prevent the cut throat competition that the retailers would otherwise have indulged in the manufacturer can achieve this through the use of menu based contracts menu based contracts induce differentiated retailer behavior despite the fact that the retailers are not forced into accepting different terms of trade this aspect can be useful in shielding manufacturers from litigation under the robinson patman act the paper also shows that for relatively high ticket items retailers tend to be excessively biased towards competing in the provision of retail services the correlation between consumer willingness to pay for service and travel costs implies that for high ticket products the competing retailers will focus on the more service sensitive customers at the cost of ignoring the price sensitive consumers in the market the manufacturer is therefore likely to encourage greater price competition among the retailers in contrast for low ticket items the manufacturer prefers to reduce price competition and encourage greater provision of services this provides an endogenous rationale for the use of price ceilings versus floors the basic model is also extended to consider the effect of upstream competition between manufacturers under upstream competition coordinating retail price and service decisions is not always optimal for an individual manufacturer this extension to manufacturer competition provides a basis for understanding the role of retail price service differentiation in the context of a channel duopoly it also shows that a mixed distribution channel a channel in which one manufacturer chooses to be coordinated while the other chooses to be noncoordinated can be an equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

job match quality as an error component and the wage tenure profiler a comparison and test of alternative estimators the job matching hypothesis implies that the disturbance of the standard wage equation is correlated with one of the regressors tenure causing an overestimation of the effect of tenure on wages this hypothesis is tested and consistent estimates of wage equation parameters obtained using the methods of hausman 1978 the approach treats job match quality as a component of the disturbance term and an error components estimator is compared to a modified fixed effects estimator the results reject the hypothesis of no correlation between the disturbance term and tenure but the estimated value of the tenure effect is contrary to the matching model other models that may be consistent with these results are discussed

the role of foreign direct investment in the development of regional industrial systems current knowledge and suggestions for a future american research agenda o huallachain b 1985 the role of foreign direct investment in the development of regional industrial systems current knowledge and suggestions for a future american research agenda reg studies 20 151 162 the role of foreign direct investment in american regional industrial systems differs from the experiences found in other countries foreign investment in the us is increasing rapidly outside of the traditional industrial heartland it is highly integrated with the domestic economy and it does not seem to be developing the same truncated character found in other countries american research should concentrate on the impact increasing foreign investment is having on the technological makeup and total linkage structure of regional economies understanding these impacts will require a variety of research approaches ranging from sectoral studies to analysis of individual corporations this paper attempts to identify research priorities using the knowledge of foreign direct investment generated abroad

vertical control and price versus nonprice competition this paper considers a manufacturer distributing a product through retailers who compete in price and service which reduces the time it takes to purchase a good the mix of these instruments that maximizes collective profit is determined by the tastes of consumers on the product margin whereas decentralized retailers consider as well the tastes of consumers on the interretailer margins given search or travel costs consumers with low time costs are overrepresented on the interretailer margins in considering customers on the wrong margin retailers are therefore biased toward price competition this distortion that can be corrected with vertical restraints

fifty years of methodological trends in jibs why future ib research needs more triangulation we analyze methodological trends in empirical research in jibs from 1970 2019 our results point to the prevalence of the following patterns there has been an increase in the use of 1 large scale longitudinal cross national datasets 2 complex analytical techniques including the incorporation of multiple analytical techniques within the same study but 3 a decline in the diversity of methods in use we relate these trends to the underlying social technical and communicative conventions in the journal during the 50 year period the observed patterns are consistent with theory that posits scientific fields entrench a dominant paradigm over time resulting in a restricted set of methodological options being selected such restrictions jeopardize the quality of research because the study of any phenomenon requires the use of multiple methodological procedures to avoid the systematic biases errors omissions and limitations introduced by any single option therefore we propose the use of triangulation as a strategy for building methodological alternatives into research designs institutionalization of this principle in the field of international business has the potential to enhance both the rigor and scope of inquiry of future research

adoption transfers and incentives in a franchise network with positive externalities we study franchise arrangements that allow franchisees with exclusive territories to own their customers this permits franchisees to benefit from positive externalities in the franchise network through interfranchise transfers based on the purchases by their customers at other franchises on the network using the structure of a single franchisor and many franchisees we show that in general interfranchise transfers between franchisees and incentives for franchisee investment in the expansion of their customer base are critical both to the size and to the benefits derived from the franchise network specifically we find that when individual franchisees make investments in marketing effort to increase their customer base the franchisor s setting of the interfranchise transfer trades off the positive effects on network size with the negative effects of removing franchisee incentive for investment this result is due to the fact that interfranchise transfers encourage adoption but discourage full investment in marketing effort as compared to first best franchisee investment use of the royalty and the inter franchise transfer directly dissipates franchisee profits and indirectly dissipates franchisee profits through less than universal adoption thereby causing franchisees to underinvest as compared to traditional franchise systems however use of the interfranchise transfer results in franchises making greater investments than they otherwise would

the effects of advertising on resale price maintenance this research combines the market power and market competition perspectives on advertising under the framework of a generalized theoretical model in minimum resale price maintenance rpm in order to investigate the effects of advertising on rpm using the real options approach the effects of advertising on retail price will impact the value of rpm further influence the incentive of manufacturers to impose rpm through brand penetration and promotional pricing effects advertising is likely to influence rpm under the condition of retail price competition when the brand penetration effect is dominant advertising will discourage manufacturers from imposing rpm advertising will encourage manufacturers to impose rpm when the promotional pricing effect is dominant rpm not only substitutes advertising but also complements advertising

vertical integration in a monopolistically competitive industry abstract this paper considers forward vertical integration by a monopolist producer of an intermediate good when the downstream industry is monopolistically competitive alternative methods of vertical control are considered in addition to the usual input mark up these include franchise fees royalties and resale price maintenance it is found that these methods in combination achieve perfect or near perfect replication of the outcome under full vertical integration the case where downstream products are differentiated by location in a circular space is studied in detail and alternative outcomes are ranked according to their social desirability

a bargaining theory of distribution channels abstract a critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties in this article the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer one retailer channel to establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract they show that the institution of bargaining has force and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present the authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination thus there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members the authors rec

exchange rate pass through and international pricing strategy a conceptual framework and research propositions the extent to which exchange rate fluctuations affect international prices is called exchange rate pass through this paper develops a conceptual model in explaining how exchange rate fluctuations are channeled into international pricing strategy and offers research propositions our model posits that the extent of exchange rate pass through in international pricing is affected by the firm s pricing orientation performance orientation distribution policy and brand equity as well as by exchange rate uncertainty and competitive symmetry

vertical restraints and producers competition this paper examines the rationale for vertical restraints it shows that there are important circumstances under which these restrictions have significant anti competitive effects the paper focuses on the consequences of exclusive territorial arrangements among the retailers of two products which are imperfect substitutes such arrangements are shown to increase consumer prices under plausible conditions the increase in consumer prices is sufficiently large to more than offset the deleterious effects from double marginalization resulting from reduced competition among retailers the imposition of exclusivity provisions is may be part of a nash equilibrium among producers these results hold whether there are or are not franchise fees this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

foreign direct investment in vertically related markets we study an mne s choice of fdi mode in a vertically related market with local input sourcing we show how the market s vertical structure and trading features affect this choice an mne s incentives to expand through cross border acquisition rather than through greenfield investment are stronger in markets with higher upstream bargaining power upstream concentration and unobservable contract terms the opposite holds in markets in which wholesale price contracts instead of two part tariffs are used our welfare analysis suggests that the host country should not always welcome fdi and should discourage fdi through acquisition investissements exterieurs directs sur les marches verticaux dans cet article nous etudions le choix d une entreprise multinationale de proceder a un investissement exterieur direct dans un marche vertical avec sources d approvisionnement locales nous montrons la facon dont la structure verticale et les caracteristiques commerciales du marche ont une incidence sur une telle decision les mesures incitatives offertes aux entreprises multinationales pour se developper par l entremise d acquisitions transfrontalieres plutot que par l investissement dans de nouvelles installations sont plus fortes sur les marches dotes d un pouvoir de negociation et d une concentration en amont plus eleves ainsi que par des conditions contractuelles non observables l inverse s observe sur les marches ou les contrats a prix de gros sont utilises en lieu et place des tarifs binomes en termes de bien etre notre analyse suggere que le pays hote ne devrait pas toujours accueillir les investissements exterieurs directs et devrait decourager ces memes investissements realises par l entremise d acquisitions

resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry wide adoption abstract we consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance rpm to dampen competition we find that even though the motive for using rpm is thus anti competitive market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers indeed we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market consumer welfare under a laissez faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which rpm is banned government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry wide adoption of rpm can have adverse welfare effects in the model we further show that proposed guidelines in the united states and europe may come close to minimizing welfare

controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales in a make to stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts when retailers do not observe each other s stocks before choosing their prices an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market wide resale price maintenance rpm can restore monopoly power however other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts such as buyback contracts also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power we conclude that a more lenient policy toward rpm is unlikely to affect the producer s ability to control opportunism

when showrooming increases retailer profit abstractshowrooming the phenomenon of consumers visiting a brick and mortar b m store to learn about products but then buying online to obtain lower prices is attracting increased attention both in business practice and in academic literature it is considered a major threat to the b m retailers and determining how to fight it seems to be the only consideration however the manufacturer s need for retail informational services has always been one of the essential reasons for retailers to exist and is a means for retailers to achieve profitability the popular arguments about the threat of showrooming ignore the strategic role of the manufacturer in the distribution channel this article analytically shows that when the manufacturer s decisions are considered i e when the manufacturer retailer contract is endogenous consumers ability to engage in showrooming may lead to increased rather than decreased profitability for b m retailer s thus retail efforts to restrict showrooming behavior m

a model of recommended retail prices manufacturers frequently post nonbinding public price recommendations but neither the rationale for this practice nor its impact on prices is well understood i develop a model in which recommendations signal a manufacturer s production cost to searching consumers who then form beliefs about retail prices increasing search makes consumers reject offers for the manufacturer s and competitors products more often and i show that both consumers and the manufacturer prefer more search when the production cost is low and less search when it is high with incentives thus aligned manufacturer recommendations inform consumers via cheap talk and their removal harms both parties

delegating pricing decisions an outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not this paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and in turn the impact of delegation on prices and incentives the theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions prices and sales agents effort specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 does competition affect the price delegation decision and if yes why 2 how do prices vary under price delegation and no price delegation scenarios 3 do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no delegation scenarios to address these issues we build a game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives these representatives are company employees sales are a function of prices and selling efforts the risk neutral firms decide whether or not to delegate the pricing decision to risk averse sales representatives the wages to the sales representatives consist of salary plus a commission on gross margins the commission on gross margins can be adjusted either through communicated marginal cost of production which we call virtual marginal cost or directly the firm and the sales representative are assumed to have the same information about the market that is there is no information asymmetry with competition in two dimensions the strategic nature of decision variableprice depends on the relative intensity of competition with unobservable contracts and risk averse sales representatives firms delegate the pricing decision when price competition is intense part of the uncertainty in demand is absorbed by the firm by keeping virtual marginal cost greater than the marginal cost of production the competing firm infers this through the risk aversion of the sales representatives under price delegation the sales representatives wages are higher and they set a price that is higher than what the firms would have set themselves this leads to softening of price competition that is to the advantage of both firms when the effort competition is dominant however the firms prefer to make the pricing decision themselves because this reduces the intensity of effort competition among agents a single instrument commission structure in which the firms adjust the virtual marginal cost is compared to a two instrument commission structure in which the firms can adjust the commission rate as well the virtual marginal cost under no price delegation the two incentive schemes are the same however under price delegation the risk premium with the two instrument scheme is lower however the prices and efforts are higher with the single instrument scheme when price competition is intense the increase in risk premium with the single instrument scheme is more than compensated for by the increase in profits this is the benefit of softening price competition through higher prices

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

perspectives on multinational enterprises in emerging economies multinational enterprises mnes play a pivotal role in the development of many emerging economies in consequence they became the focus of scholarly research by economists and policy analysts in contrast international business scholars have been comparatively uninterested in analysing this role of mnes yet they could make important contributions to these debates first studies taking the individual firms as starting point would enhance understanding of the interaction between mnes and the local environment second theories and research methodologies developed in international business research could provide new insights into the dynamics of mnes in emerging economies the objective of this paper is to motivate more international business scholars to engage in research on positive and negative spillovers from foreign direct investment fdi in emerging economy societies to advance this research agenda scholars need to analyse the specific activities and capabilities of the firms involved and the impact of fdi on the broader social and environmental context for management this agenda raises the ethical question to what extent ought businesses to care about their local stakeholders

immiserising invention the private and social returns to r d under oligopoly a cost saving invention may so enhance a firm s market power that output price rises the private return to r d may then exceed the realised social gain these possibilities arise when integer constraints are important in determining industry size if economies of scale are exhausted at sufficiently low outputs for free entry to result in a zero profit equilibrium small inventions leave output price unchanged this mirrors arrow s perfectly competitive model but under oligopoly both fixed fees and possibly negative royalties are used by an inventor in earning a return which may exceed the potential social gain

supply chain performance and consumer surplus under alternative structures of channel dominance abstract supply chain partnerships exhibit varying degrees of power distribution among the agents this has implications for pricing and operational decisions in the channel and eventually influences the end customers to understand how different power schemes affect the supply chain partners performance and consumer surplus we study channel structures with a dominant manufacturer a dominant retailer and no single agent dominance under random and price sensitive demand channel dominance is interpreted in our setting as exerting power to determine the retail and wholesale prices as well as to transfer the inventory risk to the weaker party we analyze all problems in a game theory based framework and characterize the equilibrium retail price wholesale price and order production quantity we show that the manufacturer dominated channel structure leads to the highest production quantity the lowest retail price and the largest expected surplus for an individual buyer on the other hand the entire channel profit and the total consumer surplus are highest when the retailer holds the channel dominance while both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off when they become a power agent individually channel dominance does not always guarantee higher share of channel profits as we show under the manufacturer dominated structure further insights are derived analytically and numerically from comparisons of the manufacturer retailer dominance schemes with the no single agent dominance structure and integrated channel we also study extensions to investigate the effect of demand model and risk sharing and we address industry settings with alternative schemes of holding cost shortage penalty and salvage value

sequential peak load pricing the case of airports and airlines we investigate airport peak load pricing using a vertical structure of airport and airlines we find that a profit maximizing airport would charge higher peak and off peak runway prices and a higher peak off peak price differential than a public airport consequently airport privatization would lead to both fewer total passengers and fewer passengers in the peak period although peak travelling passengers benefit from fewer delays this low level of peak congestion is not efficient suggesting that airport privatization cannot be judged based on its effect on congestion alone we also examine pricing behaviour of a public airport constrained to charge a time independent price on etudie la tarification de pointe dans une structure verticale d aeroports et de compagnies d aviation on decouvre qu un aeroport qui maximise ses profits chargerait des prix plus eleves pour l usage des pistes tant aux heures de pointe qu en autre temps qu un aeroport public ainsi qu un differentiel plus grand entre ces differents moments en consequence la privatisation des aeroports va entrainer a la fois moins de passagers et moins de passagers aux heures de pointe meme si ceux qui voyagent aux heures de pointe vont devoir subir moins de delais cette moindre congestion n est pas efficace voila qui suggere qu on ne doit pas evaluer la privatisation des aeroports seulement a l aune de l impact sur la congestion les auteurs examinent aussi les strategies de tarification d un aeroport public contraint a imposer une tarification qui ne peut varier selon le moment d usage dans le temps

competition policy in the united states an overview this paper provides a summary of the basic policies in the united states that affect the state of competition in u s markets much of the paper focuses on antitrust policy but a substantial fraction of the paper is devoted to regulatory policies for both types of policies the paper explains the basic structures of the policies and also provides discussions of recent developments copyright 1993 by oxford university press

vertical restraints and the law evidence from automobile franchising abstract after a 2002 european commission regulation prohibited the use of dealer exclusive territories automobile franchise contracts in italy introduced price ceilings and standards on verifiable marketing and service inputs such as advertising and salespeople the contracts also imposed quantity floors a practice already in use before the regulatory change the introduction of standards suggests that consistent with a view of vertical restraints as coordination mechanisms manufacturers used exclusive territories to induce desired dealer services and once the use of exclusive territories was prohibited they switched to alternative contractual devices to achieve this goal the introduction of price ceilings despite free intrabrand competition also suggests that car manufacturers tried to prevent some dealers from gaming the quantity floors by selling to other dealers customers while charging monopolistic prices at their own locations

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

unemployment insurance in the united states layoff incentives and cross subsidies we survey unemployment insurance ui in the united states and provide new evidence on the ui payroll tax most ui receipt is due to firms that pay part of the ui costs of their layoffs but weak experience rating leads most firms to pay considerably less than the full costs industries consistently receiving subsidies from the ui system are construction manufacturing and mining finally a large fraction of layoffs resulting in payment of ui are made by firms that are not charged for the costs of the claim because they have employed the individual for less than 2 quarters

the rise of economics in competition policy a canadian perspective competition policy in canada and elsewhere has changed remarkably over the last 50 yearsin large measure due to advances in economics in this article we trace the impact of developments in industrial organization on the three central areas of competition policy cartels single firm conduct and mergers we focus on canadian competition policy but draw comparisons with developments in the united states and europe

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

entry deterrence by non horizontal merger we study when and how pure non horizontal mergers whether cross product or vertical can deter new entry organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition because heightened competition deters entry mergers can occur in equilibrium even when absent entry considerations they do not we show that in order to prevent a flood of entrants mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant

transaction cost theory inferences from clinical field research on downstream vertical integration a bulk of the marketing research on distribution channel design attempts to resolve the question of when a direct company owned sales operation would be preferred to an indirect independent distributor operation the widely accepted theoretical rationale is provided by transaction cost theory which indicates that the total costs of going to market inclusive of distribution as well as its administration is likely to be lower for the direct option when the sales transactions require investments in unique assets for effectively serving the end customer examples of unique assets are account specific sales teams and account dedicated repair and maintenance facilities conversely transaction cost theory indicates that an indirect option would be the more efficient one for sales transactions that require investments only in nonunique assets such as an inventory of standard parts since its formulation in 1975 the transaction cost framework has been empirically confirmed in a variety of marketing channel se