efficiency and information aggregation in auctions the tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality bidders receive a signal about the quality of the objects the k highest bidders get an object and pay a price equal to the k first highest bid we find conditions under which in the limit objects are allocated efficiently to those with the highest tastes and price converges in probability to the value of an object to the marginal taste type

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

the dark side of board political capital enabling blockholder rent appropriation resource dependence theorists argue that boards of directors with political capital can benefit focal firms by reducing uncertainty and providing preferential resources here we develop theory reg

capitalism s growth imperative a capitalist firm operating in a competitive market is subject to a growth imperative because uncertainty about the profit rate under a no growth policy makes the firm s prospects highly unattractive in finite time and bankruptcy practically certain in the long run a no growth policy determines consumption and investment so that they and capital would remain constant over time if the latter s expected return were realized with certainty simulation is used to arrive at the probability of bankruptcy by the end of t periods and the expected values of capital and money for relevant combinations of time and uncertainty under successively more realistic models of a no growth firm in a competitive market the sensitivity of the results to variation in the parameters in each of the models is evaluated finally we consider what firms might actually do to achieve the benefits of growth and more attractive prospects of survival

existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions we show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions including the first general existence result for double auctions the set of equilibria is invariant to the tie breaking rule the model incorporates multiple unit demands all standard pricing rules reserve prices entry costs and stochastic demand and supply valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed for double auctions we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade the existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous bayesian games

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

a behavioral theory of r d expenditures and innovations evidence from shipbuilding i base an integrated model of innovation development and launch on the behavioral theory of the firm this model specifies that research and development expenses are increased when low performance causes problemistic search and when excess resources cause slack search innovations generated by search are launched if low performance gives managers high risk tolerance using data from shipbuilding firms i show that high performance reduces r d intensity and innovation launches and high slack increases r d intensity as predicted

state capitalism and performance persistence of business group affiliated firms a comparative study of china and india business groups emerged in developing economies through direct or indirect support from the state in order to overcome a variety of institutional voids and or to further state objectives of economic growth however the efficacy of this organizational form and its associated governance structures have been debated given the dual possibility of business groups to allocate resources among its affiliates for cross subsidization or winner picking we argue that elements of the institutional environment comprising of the state s approach to organizations and the political context of these interactions vary across countries thereby influencing business groups resource allocation strategies and affecting the persistence of affiliated firms superior performance contrasting the types of state capitalism in china and india we develop and test our hypotheses we find that the effect of business group affiliation on firms superior performance persistence is stronger in a state led system of state capitalism e g china than in a co governed system e g india and that this divergence of the business group effect is weakened as affiliated firms internationalize our findings have implications for understanding business groups across institutional contexts and the influence of diversity in the types of state capitalism on organizational strategies

simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices abstract i consider a model in which several identical objects are sold simultaneously via an auction and a posted price mechanism the model explains several empirical regularities regarding bidding behavior in ebay auctions such as the finding that some bidders bid multiple times over the course of the auction and that bidders tend to bid with greater frequency near the end of the auction than the beginning i also show that sellers prefer to simultaneously use auctions and posted prices than to use either mechanism individually

adaptation bridging and firm upgrading how non market institutions and mncs facilitate knowledge recombination in emerging markets how do multinational corporation mnc subsidiaries and local institutions help or hinder emerging market suppliers to upgrade their capabilities drawing on insights from economic sociology and comparative capitalism we posit that in these contexts of scarce resources and inferior technologies upgrading depends on the ways in which organizational and institutional networks enable firms to integrate imported advanced knowledge with local applied knowledge using a combination of field work and unique survey data of argentine auto parts suppliers we show that process upgrading improves significantly when suppliers have ties to seemingly resource weak non market institutions that improve access to a variety of experiential knowledge these institutions act as knowledge bridges helping local firms tap into diverse applied knowledge embedded in isolated industrial districts and adapt frontier advanced practices to their local conditions moreover suppliers appear to benefit from ties to mnc subsidiaries only when they simultaneously collaborate with certain non market institutions that help them recombine experiential knowledge with the standards gained from the subsidiaries

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

frictions in internet auctions with many traders a counterexample abstract we show that when frictions are present the peters and severinov 2006 ps bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a pbe of the ps game researchers should be cautious when using the ps bidding rule in markets with frictions like ebay

explaining the effect of rapid internationalization on horizontal foreign divestment in the retail sector an extended penrosean perspective we adopt a penrosean perspective to study the effect of rapid international expansion on the subsequent divestment of international operations we draw on regional strategy theory and differentiate penrosean managerial resources by their geographical fungibility to argue that the effect of rapid international expansion on the divestment of international operations varies with the regional patterns of firms international expansion and international experience we test our hypotheses using two stage least squares 2sls estimation on data that capture the international expansion and divestment of retailers over the period 2003 2012

search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auctions a leading explanation for price dispersion in posted price markets is search costs we incorporate this insight into a model of competing second price auctions similar to ebay by doing so we extend the narrow literature on competing auctions to capture price dispersion and grow the already large literature on price dispersion to include auctions we provide evidence on search costs and price dispersion using data collected from ebay identifying search costs by exploiting a discontinuity in the visibility of auctions due to ebay s search tool 1 we thank aaron bodoh creed greg lewis steve tadelis and various seminar participants for helpful comments nate woody for programming assistance and the cornell university institute for social sciences for financial support the views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the u s department of justice 1

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

how do selling mechanisms affect profits surplus capacity and prices with unknown demand i analyze a model in which a seller wishes to sell multiple homogeneous goods to a large group of buyers with unknown demand the seller may either sell objects via a posted price mechanism a discriminatory price auction a uniform price auction their open bid analogs or a revelation mechanism in which the seller first asks all potential buyers to report their valuations and then sets a reserve price i show that the revelation mechanism leads to the greatest profits the auction mechanisms result in identical expected profits and the posted price mechanism results in the smallest profits however the more profitable mechanisms impose stronger informational requirements that may make these mechanisms infeasible in practice and the posted price mechanism also results in the greatest total surplus i also find the seller chooses a lower capacity and reserve price in an auction than in the posted price mechanism

varieties in state capitalism outward fdi strategies of central and local state owned enterprises from emerging economy countries institutional diversity characterizing state owned enterprises soes from emerging economies holds critical but under examined implications for their internationalization activities different types of soes can exhibit distinct motivations strategic resources and adaptive capabilities for penetrating foreign markets to understand how such idiosyncratic differences emerge we conceptualize the heterogeneity of soes as an outcome of multiple institutional reform processes administrative and fiscal decentralization industrial restructuring and market liberalization which create diversity between soes affiliated with central and local levels of government building on the idea of institutions as configurations we elucidate how such reforms reconfigure soes constellation of resources capabilities and priorities which shape the parameters of their ability to negotiate for home and host country institutional legitimacy specifically we propose that the restructuring of central soes into national champions exposes them to stronger institutional pressures from home and host country governments while local soes which have fewer obligations to serve national strategic prerogatives display greater managerial autonomy and market orientation but lower levels of monopolistic behavior we discuss how such contrasting attributes contribute to variations in soes international business diversification patterns foreign subsidiary establishment and ownership modes and overseas location preferences recognition of soes organizational diversity holds important implications for theories on state owned multinationals

friends acquaintances or strangers partner selection in r d alliances like governance structure and alliance scope partner selection may serve to safeguard firms intellectual assets in r d alliances we categorize potential alliance partners into friends acquainta

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

nonstandard bidder behavior in real world auctions empirical work on auctions has found that bidders deviate from standard behavior in important ways we investigate a range of these behaviors including nonrational herding auction fever quasi endowment effect and escalation of commitment our innovations are to more completely control for unobservables by using new data from a field experiment on ebay and by accounting for censoring of bids below the starting price consistent with standard auction theory and in contrast to the predictions of the nonstandard behaviors we find that auction starting price has no effect on bidder willingness to pay in a private values setting we conclude that there is little evidence that these nonstandard behaviors are important in the field

knowledge inheritance in global industries the impact of parent firm knowledge on the performance of foreign subsidiaries this paper analyzes the impact of inherited parent firm knowledge on the performance of foreign operations in global industries i argue that transfers of parent firm knowledge provide different ad

explicating political hazards and safeguards a transaction cost politics approach we apply the logical of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government we consider two strategies that investors may follow lobbying for the creation of a specialized political governance structure or the reliance on more general political mechanisms to influence policy in that sector on an ongoing basis we identify political hazards as crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards finally we highlight shift parameters in a nation s institutional environment that influence the choice between specialized and generalized political governance mechanisms

the evolving value of foreign partnerships in transitioning economies through studying joint ventures during the early 1993 and late phases 2001 of hungary s economic transition to market economy we demonstrate how institutional and economic transformation alter

beyond entry mode choice explaining the conversion of joint ventures into wholly owned subsidiaries in the people s republic of china while there is a vast amount of research on firms choice of ownership form when entering a foreign market little attention has been paid to changes in ownership forms of operation abroad after initial entry using transaction cost economics and institutional theory we identify a number of factors that may help to explain the likelihood of foreign firms converting their joint venture with a local firm into a wholly owned subsidiary we formulate a number of hypotheses and test them against data collected through a questionnaire survey of managers representing foreign subsidiaries in the people s republic of china prc that are run either as international joint ventures ijvs or as wholly owned foreign subsidiaries wfoes that have recently been converted from ijvs into a wfoe the paper contributes to research by showing that transaction cost based thinking is useful for explaining not only the initial choice of ownership mode when entering a new market but also the potential subsequent changes of this ownership mode by combining transaction cost theory with arguments from institutional theory the study identifies a number of factors that contribute to explaining post entry changes of foreign firms ownership forms in the prc and provides empirical evidence of this phenomenon

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

vertically differentiated simultaneous vickrey auctions theory and experimental evidence we study settings where a number of sellers simultaneously offer vertically differentiated vickrey auctions for imperfect substitute goods to unit demand buyers vertical differentiation can arise from differences in item quality item value certainty seller reliability or a combination of these factors we characterize the form of the bidding equilibria and derive expressions for the corresponding allocative efficiency and expected seller revenue when bidders are restricted to submit at most one bid our theory predicts the existence of a unique bayes nash equilibrium that resembles a form of probabilistic mating of likes allowing unit demand bidders to place an arbitrary number of bids induces complex strategy profiles where bidders place positive bids in all available auctions higher bidder types tend to follow more targeted strategies focusing their serious bids on fewer and generally higher quality auctions the nature of the bidding equilibria introduces allocative inefficiencies that arise from the lack of coordination in auction selection among bidders we test our theoretical propositions in a controlled laboratory experiment while also utilizing a domain specific risk score to help assess how the bidders risk type affects their bidding behavior in support of our theory we find evidence of a probabilistic assortative matching between bidder and auction types we also find that low risk type bidders tend to crowd on the highest auction and will pay a premium for the certainty it offers whereas high risk type bidders fail to appropriately adjust for risk associated with the lowest auction leading to overbidding these lead to an interesting focal anomaly whereby bids are concentrated on the highest and lowest auctions bypassing intermediate auctions

rationalizable outcomes of large private value first price discrete auctions abstract we consider discrete versions of first price auctions we present a condition on beliefs about players values such that with any fixed finite set of possible bids and sufficiently many players only bidding the bid closest from below to one s true value survives iterative deletion of bids that are dominated where the dominance is evaluated using beliefs that satisfy the condition the condition holds in an asymmetric conditionally independent environment so long as the likelihood of each type is bounded from below in particular with many players common knowledge of rationality and that all types are possible in an independent and private values auction implies that players will bid just below their true value

explaining ijv survival in a transitional economy through social exchange and knowledge based perspectives in this study we combine social exchange and knowledge based perspectives to develop a general path model of ijv survival we further refine our expectations by considering the transitional economic context of our study and the somewhat unique managerial values resulting from the legacy of marxist ideology results from structural equation modeling suggest that an imbalance in the management control structure between the parents leads to parental conflict and an increased likelihood of ijv failure an imbalance in the ownership control structure however had no influence on conflict or survival in general support from the foreign parent is positively related to ijv learning and ijv survival however higher levels of technical support provided by the foreign parent to the ijv reduced the level of parental conflict whereas management support had no effect on conflict our results suggest some dilemmas for firms pursuing ijvs in transitional economies although the foreign parent often contributes critical resources to the ijv providing it with bargaining power and a high level of influence an imbalance in management control between the partners may ultimately be detrimental to ijv survival copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

cross bidding impact throughout the product life cycle abstract two products at different points of the product life cycle have been chosen to analyse the effect of cross bidding in competing auctions the findings indicate that this strategy can have a different impact depending on the phase of the cycle

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

knowledge transfer capacity and its implications for the theory of the multinational corporation this study updates and extends research on foreign entry modes by examining the impacts of knowledge transfer capacity and knowledge tacitness research on international corporate expansion has long emphasized that deploying intangible knowledge based assets is required for successful international expansion more recently research from a knowledge based perspective has addressed the role of tacitness in constraining a firm s ability to transfer knowledge internationally we combine these perspectives to describe how knowledge tacitness affects the relative suitability of four archetypal entry modes exporting licensing establishing an alliance and wholly owned entry we then examine and develop conceptually a seldom studied firm characteristic knowledge transfer capacity we offer predictions that describe the combined effects of knowledge tacitness and transfer capacity on entry mode choice we distinguish between the transfer capacity of the organization that develops knowledge source transfer capacity and that of the organization that seeks to access that knowledge recipient transfer capacity the discussion addresses how our model generalizes to knowledge seeking strategies and to the study of ongoing multinational networks the study enriches and reconciles multiple theoretical perspectives on entry strategy it brings together the study of knowledge characteristics and firm heterogeneity in the theory of the multinational corporation and in international and strategic management more generally journal of international business studies 2003 34 356 373 doi 10 1057 palgrave jibs 8400037

the effect of competition on ebay i examine the effect of competition on ebay motors i specify a simple model of auction choice and show that the expected transaction price falls with an increase in the number of competitors i then test for this effect using data from 5 500 auctions for chevrolet corvettes to address potential endogeneity of the level of competition i introduce an instrument which takes advantage of the unique features of ebay results indicate that an additional competitor leads to a 6 reduction in the final transacted price 960 for the average car further i provide evidence that this effect is due to the thinning of the bidder market rather than dynamic bidding

the dynamic value of mne political embeddedness the case of the chinese automobile industry this paper examines the complex relationship between the embeddedness of multinational enterprises mnes in host country political networks and their long run competitive positions in host emerging markets we report the findings of a longitudinal study of the chinese automobile sector from the early 1980s to the mid 2000s using data from 142 interviews over 11 years and a wide range of secondary sources we explore the process through which the value of political embeddedness changed over time in the face of profound and rapid changes in host country business environments on the basis of this longitudinal study the paper unravels the underlying mechanisms that lead to the declining and even negative value of deep political embeddedness by mnes in a politically stable emerging economy

on the future of international joint venture research international joint ventures ijvs are an important type of international strategic alliance isa and have been studied by scholars for decades resulting in a plethora of empirical studies publications and reviews yet an inadequate accumulation of knowledge exists as a closer look reveals much more than providing a summary and critical assessment of past contributions this paper develops an expansive research agenda based upon a deep understanding of past research and comprehensive frameworks that distill this research we identify a number of research opportunities that would not only advance ijv research but also closely related literatures and disciplines such as isas theories of the multinational firm international business research and strategic management

is the relationship between inward fdi and spillover effects linear an empirical examination of the case of china this paper finds evidence for the coexistence within chinese manufacturing industry of both curvilinear and linear relationships between inward foreign direct investment fdi and the productivity of locally owned enterprises loes this complexity of spillover effects challenges the laissez faire view that all inward fdi into all types of domestic industry is equally valuable in terms of productivity spillover benefits our findings suggest that inward fdi into china leads either to spillovers that decline beyond a critical point or to effects that continue linearly depending on the ownership of foreign investors and the technological characteristics of the industry concerned our analysis yields original insights into the complex pattern of spillover effects from fdi into china and deeper understanding of its possible causes

from the editors endogeneity in international business research this essay builds on the exposition by thomas et al and focuses on analyzing cause and effect in international business research we attempt to explain how endogeneity problems occur and why they are so prevalent in international business research in a non technical fashion we then discuss the importance of explicitly identifying how the chosen research design best approximates a randomized controlled experiment finally we provide some guidelines on achieving this goal and emphasize the practices that seem most relevant to jibs reviewers in evaluating high quality international business research

convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate abstract consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers values for the traded good are private and independently drawn time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate we show that in all steady state perfect bayesian equilibria as approaches zero equilibrium prices converge to the walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation

the contingent effect of state participation on the dissolution of international joint ventures a resource dependence approach we adopt a resource dependence approach to explain the effect of state participation on the dissolution of international joint ventures ijvs while resource dependence theory rdt has been used to explain the formation of ijvs we propose an extension of the theory to explain their dissolution we do so by highlighting the match between foreign firms resource needs resource hierarchy and the resource provision roles of state controlled vs private local partners resource profiles we further argue that the effect of state participation on the dissolution of ijvs is moderated by foreign firms host country experience and ijv age we test our hypotheses by using data on 623 ijvs in china our results show that state participation reduces the risk of ijv dissolution and that the strength of this effect differs depending on the type of state controlled actor that is involved in an ijv we also find that host country experience and ijv age moderate the effect of state participation on ijv dissolution these findings enhance our understanding of ijv dissolution and contribute to the development of rdt

competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices abstract in this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts two variants of the model are studied one extends a model first analyzed by wolinsky rev econ stud 55 1988 71 84 in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers the other variant extends the model of mcafee econometrica61 1993 1281 1312 in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions the equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d41 d44 d82

an empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions abstract in undetermined this paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from peters and severinov peters m severinov s 2006 internet auctions with many traders journal of economic theory 130 220 245 the investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts

bidding behavior in competing auctions evidence from ebay much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction however in many online auctions a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from ebay our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid as the theory predicts the paper also shows that winning bidders who cross bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not

leviathan as an inventor an extended agency model of state owned versus private firm invention in emerging and developed economies we examine the relative merits of state soe and private poe ownership on firm invention output in emerging as well as developed economies firm soe affords a vehicle by which governments throughout the world encourage risky investment in new technological paths yet from a traditional agency theoretical standpoint soes are plagued by low powered incentives and dysfunctional involvement e g wasteful budgets and political meddling which reduces soe performance relative to poes to examine this paradox we build an extended agency model which rather than overlooking agency cost drivers entertains a more balanced view in which these so called agency liabilities in fact benefit soes particularly in the sphere of inventions we argue that given relatively higher levels of managerial autonomy soes may outperform poes in some types of inventive output we further propose that key boundary conditions operate to modify this base effect in that contexts lacking political constraints a condition found in most emerging economies increase the risk of political meddling reducing managerial autonomy so that any soe inventive advantages wane significantly we also hypothesize that this negative effect of weak institutions is attenuated in high invention productivity sectors empirically we track the frequency pioneerism and impact of patent inventions of 521 soes and matched poes for 16 years across 43 countries and 22 industries we find empirical support for our hypotheses based on a robust set of fixed effects regression analyses aided by a battery of checks to assess self selection and omitted variable bias

impact of historical conflict on fdi location and performance japanese investment in china historical relations between countries bring important explanatory power for foreign direct investment fdi decisions yet little is known on whether a home host country relation exhibits heterogeneous effects on fdi across the country s subnational regions in this study we examine the long term impact of historical conflict on fdi location choices and performance using a sample of 8 646 japanese fdi in china we show that civilian casualties in different provinces of china during the second sino japanese war exert deterring effects on japanese fdi location choices furthermore we demonstrate that civilian casualties negatively affect japanese fdi performance and political capital accumulation strategies in the forms of excessive tax payment and local employment can reduce this negative effect this study contributes to the discussion on how within country differences of historical factors affect fdi location decisions and performance the findings on firms political capital accumulation strategies also provide important implications for fdi operation in an environment characterized by historical animosity

search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets abstract a leading explanation for price dispersion in posted price markets is search costs we incorporate this insight into a model of competing second price auctions similar to ebay by doing so we extend the narrow literature on competing auctions to capture price dispersion and grow the already large literature on price dispersion to include auctions we provide evidence on search costs and price dispersion using data collected from ebay identifying search costs by exploiting a discontinuity in the visibility of auctions due to ebay s search tool

network composition collaborative ties and upgrading in emerging market firms lessons from the argentine autoparts sector what types of relational and institutional mechanisms shape knowledge flows and the upgrading capabilities of emerging market firms in the face of economic liberalization we analyze the argentine autoparts sector to distinguish the relative impact of different types of network relationships on a firm s process and product upgrading a few social ties to international assemblers appear to be most beneficial for local suppliers although they may be insufficient to compensate fully for the negative effect of being located in a lower tier supplier customer relationships that are part of regular disciplined discussions for product and process improvements appear to be especially beneficial for upgrading

the obsolescing bargaining model mnc host developing country relations revisited the traditional bargaining model of mnc host developing country relations has become obsolete today those relations are better understood as the result of a two tier multi party bargaining process tier 1 bargaining between the governments of host and home countries occurs bilaterally or through multilateral institutions it produces macro rules on fdi that affect micro negotiations in tier 2 per the traditional bargaining model the extent of fdi liberalization resulting from tier 1 bargaining varies predictably across home host country pairs and industries suggestions for testing the two tier bargaining model are also presented

knowledge acquisition from foreign parents in international joint ventures an empirical examination in the hungarian context in this paper we examine organizational characteristics structural mechanisms and contextual factors that influence knowledge acquisition from the foreign parent in international joint ventures ijvs we in turn relate assessments of knowledge acquisition to ijv performance the data come from a survey of ijvs in the hungarian context where learning and knowledge acquisition from the foreign parent is thought to be particularly critical adaptation mechanisms such as capacity to learn articulated goals and structural mechanisms such as the provision of training technology and managerial assistance by foreign parents all were positively associated with the degree to which ijvs reported acquiring knowledge from their foreign parents we also found limited support for the belief that cultural conflicts can impede knowledge acquisition but only for two party joint ventures with 50 50 equity arrangements we also looked at the relationship between knowledge acquisition and different dimensions for evaluating ijv performance the relationship between knowledge acquisition and performance was significant for all indicators of performance through knowledge acquisition from the foreign parent and the organizational characteristics hypothesized to enhance ijv knowledge acquisition affected assessments of some dimensions of performance more than others our findings contribute to advancing knowledge about the relationship between organizational characteristics and organizational knowledge acquisition in ijvs as well as the relationships between knowledge acquisition and different dimensions of ijv performance

competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice abstract we investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions of competing sellers with private valuations assuming that buyers face higher hassle costs in auctions we show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers offer posted prices rather than auctions if and only if they have a sufficiently high reservation value posted prices sell with lower probability but yield a larger revenue in case of trade using an empirical strategy to compare revenues of posted prices and auctions that takes selling probabilities explicitly into account we find our theoretical predictions supported by data from ebay auctions on ticket sales for the euro 2008 european football championship

the effects of information and competition on racial discrimination evidence from a field experiment abstract we study racial discrimination by simultaneously selling identical products on ebay in pairs of auctions posted under different racially identifying names we detect significant price differences which are indicative of in group biases white names receive higher prices for distinctively white products and black names receive higher prices for distinctively black products but price differences only emerge for sellers who have low ebay feedback scores in less competitive markets because the price differences dissipate as sellers accumulate credible reputations the patterns in the data are indicative of statistical discrimination overall the results suggest that mechanisms designed to reduce informational asymmetries and increased competition are both effective at reducing discrimination in online auctions

partnering with leviathan the politics of innovation in foreign host state joint ventures forming international joint ventures ijvs with political institutions in emerging economies involves both benefits and risks for multinational enterprises mnes while political partners can provide ijvs with various resources their political status equips them with a strong position to appropriate rents in ijvs we address this tension by examining how host state ownership affects both innovation inputs and outputs in china based ijvs over 2008 2013 despite the potential government opportunism we find more r d investment innovation inputs made in ijvs with state partners than in those with private ones thus r d investment can be politically motivated and symbolically managed to ensure continued resource exchanges with the host state this political pressure is mitigated when foreign parents directly transfer home country based technology to ijvs when the host market dependence of ijv is weak and when ijvs are located in a deregulated region moreover we find foreign host state jvs deliver fewer innovation outputs measured by patent data than foreign private jvs which implies the failure of state partners to adequately absorb foreign technologies these findings highlight both the state partners powerfulness to boost ijv innovation investment and their limits in shaping ijv innovation outcomes and bear rich implications for the management of mne host government relationships

toward a cooperative view of mnc host government relations building blocks and performance implications this study examines cooperation based relations between mncs and host governments we theorize that resource commitment personal relations political accommodation and organizational credibility are four building blocks for improving an mnc s cooperative relationships with governments analysis of 131 mncs in china validates the importance of these blocks in shaping mnc government relations and the importance of these relations in shaping the performance of mnc subsidiaries

accessing vs sourcing knowledge a comparative study of r d internationalization between emerging and advanced economy firms research and development r d internationalization is on the rise for advanced economy multinationals amnes as well as emerging economy multinationals emnes we study emne r d internationalization by comparing it to that by amnes in the context of an emerging knowledge intensive industry we find that these two are fundamentally different processes while the internationalization of amnes r d activities can largely be explained in terms of the twin strategies of competence exploitation and competence creation emne r d internationalization is rooted in the firms overall catch up strategy to get on par with industry leaders an in depth comparison of knowledge flows reveals that within amnes headquarters often serves the primary source of knowledge for r d subsidiaries in contrast within emnes headquarters accesses knowledge from r d subsidiaries in advanced economies for innovation catch up within this dichotomy the innovative capabilities of emne headquarters develop more slowly and with greater difficulty than those of amne subsidiaries

search and choice in online consumer auctions price dispersion in simultaneous online auctions is a puzzle in light of the relatively low search costs required to find the lower price much of this price dispersion appears to be due to a lack of switching by bidders between auctions which in turn could be due to inertia related to search costs we identify some of the influencing factors through a controlled field experiment involving pairs of simultaneous auctions keeping the sellers and the goods sold identical between two auctions we vary auction design features between and within pairs including shipping cost open reserve secret reserve price and duration and we provide bidders with incentives to search we use a choice model that examines individual choice between pairs of simultaneous auctions we find that within pair price dispersion is substantial and that prices and auction choice by bidders are indeed related to search costs we find strong inertia in auction choice and find that this effect significantly interacts with time left in the auction although individuals do not always choose a lower priced auction they are more likely to do so when search costs are low or search incentives are high

what s in a p reassessing best practices for conducting and reporting hypothesis testing research social science research has recently been subject to considerable criticism regarding the validity and power of empirical tests published in leading journals and business scholarship is no exception transparency and replicability of empirical findings are essential to build a cumulative body of scholarly knowledge yet current practices are under increased scrutiny to achieve these objectives jibs is therefore discussing and revising its editorial practices to enhance the validity of empirical research in this editorial we reflect on best practices with respect to conducting reporting and discussing the results of quantitative hypothesis testing research and we develop guidelines for authors to enhance the rigor of their empirical work this will not only help readers to assess empirical evidence comprehensively but also enable subsequent research to build a cumulative body of empirical knowledge

managing valuable knowledge in weak ip protection countries although knowledge assets provide multinational corporations mncs with competitive advantages in foreign markets it can be difficult for firms to protect their knowledge in foreign countries especially countries with weak intellectual property ip protection building on and extending the knowledge management institutional theory and expatriate literatures this article explores whether home country expatriates can substitute for weak ip protection and drive an increase in more and more valuable knowledge transfers to foreign operations located in weak ip protection countries because of their ties to headquarters knowledge of parent firm assets priorities and routines and activities in local operations i argue that home country expatriates can transform the local operation to offer higher protection for parent firm knowledge in weak ip countries in ways that local managers cannot the results from a comprehensive panel of us multinationals suggest that home country expatriates can substitute for weak ip protection but that this effect is contingent on the manufacturing and knowledge capabilities of foreign operations for higher value parent firm knowledge transfers overall this article extends our understanding of the global management and protection of knowledge by mncs by exploring how organizational practices can buffer country level institutional deficiencies for firm knowledge

a competitive distribution of auctions in this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded a competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism it is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller s best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market the purpose of this paper is to provide an equilibrium for an economy in which sellers compete by offering different direct mechanisms to buyers no attempt is made to give a complete characterization of all possible equilibria rather we focus on one equilibrium in which the contracts that are offered by sellers in equilibrium and buyer s behaviour under these contracts are both independent of traders beliefs about one another the equilibrium illustrates one of the reasons why contracts that are employed in practice may not be as finely tuned to beliefs as the theory of mechanism design says that they should be the answer is simply that contracts are not offered in a vacuum sellers in the model studied in this paper need to compete with one another in order to attract buyers highly tuned mechanisms tend to extract buyer surplus in such an environment sellers are able to attract many buyers by offering to use cruder mechanisms that leave some surplus for buyers in this paper sellers are allowed to have different costs for the commodity that is being traded nonetheless the equilibrium for the limit economy in which there are infinitely many buyers and sellers is such that every seller offers a second price auction and publicizes a reserve price equal to his cost in a standard monopoly auction the optimal reserve price for the seller exceeds his cost by an amount that depends on his beliefs about buyers valuations myerson 1981 a seller who raises his reserve price has his profits affected in two distinct ways by raising his reserve price the seller makes it unprofitable for some buyer types to participate in his auction the seller therefore loses any surplus that he might have earned by trading with these buyers the buyers who still find it profitable to participate in the seller s auction will end up having to pay a higher price when they win because of this increase in the seller s reserve price this means that the seller will be able to extract a bit more surplus from buyers who continue to participate the seller raises the reserve price until the marginal cost associated with raising the reserve price is just equal to the marginal gain associated with the ability to extract more surplus from remaining buyers competition mitigates this argument since there is a limit to the amount of surplus that the seller can extract from remaining buyers before they decide that they should instead choose one of the alternative auctions that are being held on the market with

balancing private and state ownership in emerging markets telecommunications infrastructure country industry and firm influences bargaining between host states and investors over the terms of investment in sensitive sectors of the economy generates political and economic tensions in this study we investigate the factors that contribute to the outcomes of those negotiations as measured by the private vs state owned share of newly consummated telecommunications infrastructure projects we find that private ownership is positively associated with overall economic development and investment liberalization in the host country and with greenfield vs divestiture and joint venture vs wholly owned projects private ownership is negatively associated with existing telecommunications infrastructure higher levels of state ownership of foreign investing firms and the technological sophistication of the projects our analysis also shows a curvilinear inverted u shaped relationship between investment policy hazards and private ownership this finding supports the insight from transaction cost economics that potential gains from internalization are greatest at intermediate levels of uncertainty

r d intensity and international joint venture performance in an emerging market moderating effects of market focus and ownership structure in this study we examine the contingent relationship between r d intensity and performance of international joint ventures ijvs in an emerging market context based on teece s 1986 arguments regarding the appropriability of innovation we identify two types of appropriability hazard related to ijvs r d activities in this context local market related and local partner related hazards we argue that a positive relationship between r d intensity and ijv performance is more likely to occur if these appropriability hazard can be mitigated results using a sample of manufacturing ijvs in china provide support for these arguments we find that r d intensity is positively related to performance in export market focused ijvs but not in local market focused ijvs in addition using a configuration approach we find that r d intensity is positively related to performance in ijvs that have an export market focus and in which the multinational companies mncs have a majority ownership but not in other market focus ownership structure configurations these findings contribute to our knowledge of r d activities of mncs overseas subsidiaries

the uppsala internationalization process model revisited from liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership the uppsala internationalization process model is revisited in the light of changes in business practices and theoretical advances that have been made since 1977 now the business environment is viewed as a web of relationships a network rather than as a neoclassical market with many independent suppliers and customers outsidership in relation to the relevant network more than psychic distance is the root of uncertainty the change mechanisms in the revised model are essentially the same as those in the original version although we add trust building and knowledge creation the latter to recognize the fact that new knowledge is developed in relationships

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha