an empirical investigation of alternative approaches to estimating the equilibrium demand for housing two approaches to estimating the desired or equilibrium housing demand parameters have been utilized in recent literature one approach commonly referred to as the conventional model assumes that households continuously consume their temporal equilibrium housing services where a temporal equilibrium is defined with respect to the household s current economic and demographic characteristics based upon this assumption conventional demand studies have employed random samples which include a majority of households that have not recently moved see lee and kong 6 or carliner 2 a problem with this approach is its failure to recognize moving costs households must pay to alter their housing service consumption the existence of moving costs suggests that households may not respond rapidly to changes in their desired consumption of housing but instead remain in their dwelling unit until the cost incurred from consuming the non equilibrium level of services exceeds the cost of relocating if so demand samples employed in conventional studies may include a significant number of disequilibrium observations this causes two problems first there exist measurement errors in independent variables that have changed since the household was last in equilibrium second the true equilibrium effect of an independent variable may be incorrectly estimated due to its correlation with either the occurrence of disequilibrium or the length of the housing adjustment lag the second approach to estimating the equilibrium parameters attempts to minimize these problems by restricting the sample to households that have recently moved see hanushek and quigley 3 or aaron l

why don t people trust experts abstractcredence goods such as health care legal and financial services and auto repair create a conflict of interest by requiring experts to diagnose and provide services to uninformed consumers mistreatment of consumers appears widespread empirically but a simple explanation for mistreatment under realistic assumptions has proved elusive i generalize uwe dulleck and rudolf kerschbamer s credence good model to incorporate the highly realistic assumption that consumers do not observe experts cost functions the model guarantees equilibrium mistreatment in a wide range of price setting and market environments the model also yields testable implications regarding the nature of mistreating firms and the direction of mistreatment

credence goods markets with conscientious and selfish experts i study credence goods markets when there are both selfish and conscientious experts the selfish expert is a profit maximizer the conscientious expert wants to maximize profit and repair the consumer s problem there are two classes of equilibria uniform price equilibria and nonuniform price equilibria a consumer cannot infer the expert s type from his price list in a uniform price equilibrium but can do that in a nonuniform price equilibrium when the fraction of the conscientious expert is small the selfish expert will be honest about the severity of the consumer s problem when the fraction of the conscientious expert is large the selfish expert will cheat the consumer overcharging the consumer whenever he offers to repair the problem finally more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss when the fraction of the conscientious expert is close to one of the two extremes 0 and 1 more conscientious experts will result in smaller social loss when the fraction of the conscientious expert is in a middle range more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss

demand inducement and the physician patient relationship the physician patient relationship is a paradigm for any expert client relationship the physician both diagnoses the patient s illness and recommends a treatment this dual role gives the physician incentive to recommend treatments whose costs outweigh their medical benefits these socially inefficient treatments correspond to the notion of physician induced demand the level of inducement chosen by the physician is shown to depend on the price and potential medical benefits of treatment and the relative diagnostic skills of physician and patient this model offers several testable hypotheses some of which are confirmed by related studies

representative evidence on lying costs abstract a central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally these models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation to provide an empirically validated microfoundation for these models it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives we measure the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the german population by calling them at home in our setup participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport misreporting cannot be detected reputational concerns are negligible and altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role yet we find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs are large and widespread further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of communication

the economics of credence goods an experiment on the role of liability verifiability reputation and competition credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies such as under and overtreatment or market breakdown we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency we find that liability has a crucial but verifiability at best a minor allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence as predicted seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated jel d12 d82

the price of advice we develop a model of consulting advising where the role of the consultant is to reveal signals to her client that refine the client s original private estimate of the profitability of a project although the client can perfectly observe and evaluate these signals the consultant may only be able to do the same imperfectly or not at all this captures the idea that the expert may not fully understand the impact of her advice on the client we characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client it is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not the main result of the article is that in the optimal mechanism the consultant obtains the same profit as though she could perfectly observe and evaluate the impact of the signals whose release she controls on the client s profit estimate

second opinions and price competition inefficiency in the market for expert advice we consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer s need in our model experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions we explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort in particular the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum an intervention that limits price competition via price control increases welfare

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

systematic assessment error and intrajurisdiction property tax capitalization over the past twelve years considerable evidence has accumulated on the extent to which intercommunity differences in property tax burdens are capitalized into property values 17 21 8 7 25 recently linneman 14 has analyzed the validity of this evidence after taking into consideration alternative models of local government finance in the model that he believes best represents the spirit of the tax capitalization literature local government expenditures are financed wholly by property tax receipts he demonstrates that in this case a perfect correlation between taxes and public goods makes it econometrically impossible to estimate property value equations unless measurement errors and omitted variables are present he therefore asserts that existing results on the tax capitalization issue are of nebulous value

the income elasticity of demand for single family owner occupied housing an empirical reconciliation abstract past studies estimate the permanent income elasticity of demand for single family owner occupied housing to range from 0 14 to 1 5 a range much too broad to be of any use for solving policy questions data from the panel study of income dynamics are used herein to test the sensitivity of this income elasticity to several factors the results suggest that differences in sample population with respect to duration of housing tenure explain a large portion of the variation in the estimates of this elasticity the paper concludes that for short run applications the probable value of this elasticity is approximately 0 70 and for long run applications the probable value of this elasticity might best be taken as approximately 1 00

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

equilibrium informativeness in veto games abstract in a veto game a biased expert recommends an action that an uninformed decision maker can accept or reject for an outside option the arrangement is ubiquitous in political institutions corporations and consumer markets but has seen limited use in applications due to a poor understanding of the equilibrium set and an ensuing debate over selection we develop a simple method to construct every veto equilibrium and identify the most informative equilibrium in a setting that spans prior work we show that krishna and morgan s 2001 equilibrium is maximally informative and strengthen dessein s 2002 comparison of full delegation and veto in an application we study the relationship between a patient and a doctor with a financial incentive to overtreat and show that the doctor s bias harms the patient both through excessive treatment and information loss that the latter can be substantial and that insurance benefits both parties by improving communication

sales talk cancellation terms and the role of consumer protection this paper analyses contract cancellation and product return policies in mar kets in which sellers advise customers about the suitability of their oering when customers are fully rational it is optimal for sellers to oer the right to cancel or return on favorable terms a generous return policy makes the seller s cheap talk at the point of sale credible this observation provides a possible explanation for the excess refund puzzle and also has implications for the management of customer reviews when customers are credulous instead sellers have an incentive to set unfavorable terms to exploit the in ated beliefs they induce in their customers the imposition of a minimum statutory standard even if it is not binding can improve welfare and consumer surplus when at least some customers are credulous in con trast competition policy reduces contractual ine ciencies with rational customers but it is not eective with credulous customers

prices versus nudges what matters for search versus purchase of energy investments abstract we report the results of a field experiment where we exogenously vary the use of social comparison nudges and subsidies for participation in an in home energy audit program we follow subjects through to subsequent purchase of durable goods we therefore can compare the causal effect of financial incentives and nudges along two margins audits which we liken to search and purchase of durables using data on nearly 100 000 households we document that both prices and nudges cause a statistically significant increase in audits comparing point estimates effective nudges are worth roughly 50 70 however we find that neither nudges nor subsidies do not significantly impact installations

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

property taxation and the demand for housing an econometric analysis abstract there is disagreement among economists regarding the effect of a local increase in property taxation on the housing market in defining the price of housing services studies of the demand for housing have treated the property tax exclusively as an excise tax on housing consumption two recent theoretical developments suggest this is a misrepresentation of the tax one theory holds that the excise effects of property taxation may be shifted backward to the factors employed in the production of housing the other theory concludes that the property tax is not an excise but rather serves as an efficient price for local public services to investigate these hypotheses data from the annual housing survey were employed to estimate a housing demand model which included the net effective property tax rate among the set of independent variables in addition to revealing the property tax housing demand relationship the model provides more reliable estimates of income and price elasticities by eliminating specification errors found in previous studies results indicate that the property tax reduces the housing consumption of central city homeowners but does not distort the suburban housing market

on the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets a client has a problem but does not know whether it is serious or minor she consults an expert who can correctly diagnose and fix her problem this paper characterizes the equilibrium pricing and recommendation strategies of an expert under the assumptions that i the type of treatment is verifiable by the client ii the client has the option of rejecting any treatment recommendation and iii the expert is not liable for the outcome of the treatment it is found for any parameter configuration that there exist equilibria in which the expert makes fraudulent recommendations resulting in inefficient treatment the market outcome is compared with that under an alternative market environment in which the expert is liable for treatment outcome but the type of treatment performed is non verifiable it is shown that for some parameter configurations the equilibrium is more efficient when liability is in place than when the treatment is verifiable these findings stand in sharp contrast to the received wisdom that the market outcome under verifiability of treatment is efficient while the market outcome under liability for outcome is not finally this paper shows that the existence of some honest experts may induce more fraudulent behavior by opportunistic experts

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

consumer information in a market for expert services abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of the valuation they place for getting a serious problem fixed we introduce consumer information into this framework by assuming that prior to visiting an expert some consumers receive an information signal about whether they have a serious or a minor problem we show that when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is sufficiently high the expert does not cheat any low valuation consumer regardless of their information status but cheats the high valuation consumers those high valuation consumers with bad signals are the most frequent victims of cheating whereas those with good signals are the least likely victims when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is below a certain threshold however the unique equilibrium involves no cheating

an economic analysis on overbilling incentives and auditing programs an institutional auditing program typically consists of the following steps a sample audit the decision to move to the full audit a settlement offer and the full audit statistical sampling techniques are often used to estimate the overbilling percentage and amount this paper discusses the optimal settlement offer the net recovery through auditing the condition for the auditors to move to the full audit and how an auditing program can be truly cost effective this paper provides an evaluation for the statistical sampling techniques to an auditing program the economic incentives of a contractor to overbill are also identified finally it presents the key metrics and the managerial implications for auditing managers to design or enhance their auditing programs

testing a model of the kinked demand curve this paper analyzes survey data on the responses firms expect from their competitors when they change prices there is evidence of an assymmetry in expected responses which provides some support for modified versions of the kinked demand curve the asymmetry in responses is found to be cyclically sensitive and to differ with certain firm characteristics copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

when do experts cheat and whom do they target a credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer this information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed i propose two new theories of expert cheating suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers according to these theories cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination and experts cheat selectively for instance experts target high valuation and high cost customers finally selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

a model of physician behaviour with demand inducement we present a model of the physician patient relationship extending on the model by farley farley p j 1986 theories of the price and quantity of physician services journal of health economics 5 315 333 of supplier induced demand sid first we make a case for the way this model specifies professional ethics physician competition and sid itself second we derive predictions from this model and confront them with the neoclassical model finally we stress the importance of considering how sid affects patient welfare in providing an example where physicians ability to induce makes patients better off to evaluate patient welfare we derive approximations of the patients welfare loss due to physician market power in both the neoclassical model and the inducement model

the kinked demand curve a game theoretic approach in a simple model of duopoly firms price moves are modelled as an extensive form game where firms can respond to undercutting without delay when firms are not too dissimilar kinked demand strategies enforcing an arbitrary price may be nash equilibria however these strategies are dominated and perfect equilibrium is unique at the minimum optimal common price rather than implying price rigidity kinked demand strategies are a device for ensuring compliance with a collusive price leadership

experts vs discounters consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods this paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis the unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures this makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters we explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free riding on experts advice and we discuss policy options to solve the free riding consumers cheating experts problem

cost incentives for doctors a double edged sword abstract if doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication their objectives differ from their patients objectives because the patients are insured this misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if i the doctor s examination technology is sufficiently good or ii marginal costs of treatment are high enough if the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account he will opt for less than 100 optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and or doctor

kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation this paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand we show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games

credence goods experts and risk aversion abstract the existing literature on credence goods and expert services has overlooked the importance of risk aversion in this paper we extend a standard expert model of credence goods with verifiable service quality by considering risk averse consumers our results show that the presence of risk aversion reduces the expert s incentive to invest in diagnosis and may thus lead to consumers mistreatment

conflicts of interest information provision and competition in the financial services industry abstract in some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer s needs depending on the market structure this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers this paper studies this issue in the market for financial services the analysis presents a new model of competition between banks where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation we also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures specialized banking and one stop banking

ethics welfare and markets an economic analysis the present article examines society s welfare when goods with identical physical attributes can be produced using two alternative technologies one of them less ethically desirable but less expensive for at least some producers for the scenario where identification costs must be borne by producers and consumers of the high quality good the outcome under unregulated markets is identical to the optimal solution of a central planner constrained to neither ban the undesirable technology nor segregate the low quality good however under certain circumstances the unregulated market equilibrium may be improved upon by government intervention that shifts the burden of identification costs to the producers of the low quality good or which bans the production of the low quality good the optimal intervention needs to be determined case by case and depends on consumer preferences relative production costs and relative costs of identification and fraud prevention

does inflation affect real behavior the case of housing an important tradition in economics is to assume that demand depends upon relative prices and is homogenous of degree zero for the most part this has been interpreted as meaning inflation changes in the price level leaves demand unchanged recent work by a number of economists has challenged this position for the case of housing demand two arguments have been made that inflation acting in concert with existing institutions alters the quantity of housing demanded and the decision to rent or own a house the first argument states that inflation and the standard fixed payment mortgage combine to reduce the size of the mortgage loan a household can obtain for the purpose of buying a home this works to reduce the quantity of owner occupied housing demanded given the importance of mortgage finance to the demand for owner occupied housing the second argument focuses on the inflation adjusted after tax cost of owner occupied housing it simply states that an increase in the rate of anticipated inflation of the general price level reduces the after tax cost of housing thus increasing the demand for housing and the demand for homeownership there has been little empirical testing of these two arguments the purpose of this paper is to formulate and estimate a model which will give an indication of the quantitative significance of the two arguments a housing demand equation and a tenure choice equation own versus rent are estimated using a sample of about 6000 households from the 1975 annual housing survey 10 the estimates suggest that inflation dampens housing demand and homeownership opportunity for most households even though the inflation adjusted after tax cost of owner occupied housing declines as inflation heats up the paper consists of six sections including the introduction section two examines the ways inflation affects housing choices in more detail the third section contains the specification of the econometric model that forms the basis of the study section four is a discussion of econometric problems and the data used the results of the estimates are discussed in the fifth section the paper concludes with a presentation of the major conclusions and policy implications of the study

credence goods monopolists abstract with a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need therefore the seller acts as the expert determining the customers requirements this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services we analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behavior we consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller s incentives to be honest in three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services only in one scenario there is no trade

unobserved investment endogenous quality and trade a seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset s future returns the potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller s investment prior to trade nor does he receive any signal of it nor can he verify it in anyway after trade despite this severe moral hazard problem this paper shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability the outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining power between the parties with a holdup problem existing if the buyer has the bargaining power a consequence of the holdup problem is surplus reducing distortions in investment level perhaps counterintuitively in many situations this distortion involves an increase in the expected amount invested vis a vis the situation without holdup

a game theoretic explanation of the administrative lattice in institutions of higher learning abstract we provide a game theoretic model of academic organizations focusing on the strategic interaction of prototypical overseers administrators and professors by identifying key principal agent games routinely played in colleges and universities we begin to unpack the black box typically used to conceptualize these institutions our approach suggests an explanation for the seemingly inevitable drift of institutions of higher education into such well documented phenomena as academic ratchet and administrative lattice and builds an understanding of the organizational conditions in which drift would be restrained