markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant the problem of noncompliance and enforcement in transferable discharge permit tdp markets has not received much attention this paper examines the consequences of noncompliance for a tdp market given fairly general assumptions about the characteristics of the enforcement policy in place the analysis reveals that when firms are noncompliant tdp markets retain their efficiency property only under some fairly stringent conditions the effect of noncompliance on the equilibrium permit price raises some important questions about the ability of a tdp market to achieve and remain in equilibrium when firms are noncompliant

substitution in the electric power industry an interregional comparison in the eastern us abstract the electric power industry is restructuring as regulations move from states to regional and national levels estimates of regional fuel and input substitution are essential for practitioners and policy makers this paper estimates substitution under static and dynamic scenarios examining changes in technology and total factor productivity from 2001 to 2008 two stage estimation reveals regional characteristics and underlying elements in fuel and factor choice processes substitution varies widely depending on the region coal technology capital investment and r d activities

the impact of the eu emissions trading system on low carbon technological change the empirical evidence abstract this paper reviews the empirical literature analysing the effects of the eu emissions trading system eu ets on low carbon technological change the emerging evidence is assessed with references to both relevant economic concepts and the evolving regulation of the eu ets through the years the two most robust indications of the literature are a free allocation grandfathering tended to hamper low carbon investments in phases i 2005 2007 and ii 2008 2012 and b the eu ets appears to have been relatively more effective in stimulating innovation of low carbon technologies than their adoption importantly however a complete general picture of the impact of the eu ets on low carbon technological change is missing the main gap regards the lack of empirical evidence for phase iii 2013 2020 especially econometric studies are only few due to the lack of suitable databases accessible to researchers a problem that the relevant public authorities are urged to address thanks to the recent reforms of the eu ets the incentives for innovation and adoption of low carbon technologies are probably stronger today than ever before

tradeable permits missing markets and technology this paper examines the effects of missing markets heterogeneous pollutants and the pollution technology of firms on the efficacy of transferable pollution permits under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets we show that if firms can substitute among pollutants then setting the optimal number of permits for only one pollutant will not in general lead to an efficient outcome the degree of the inefficiency will depend on the information set available to the regulator and the substitutability among pollutants by firms when establishing transferable pollution rights regulators should therefore consider the technology of firms if firms discharge pollutants in the same fixed proportions then the regulator need only set a market for one of the pollutants to ensure an efficient outcome where firms can substitute among pollutants however establishing a market for only one pollutant provides an incentive for firms to substitute to unregulated ones this is an important policy issue as substitutability among pollutants within and across production processes may dampen the dynamic advantages of a tradeable permit policy

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

implementing marketable emissions permits the environmental protection agency is introducing bubbles offsets and banks as a way of controlling pollution with market incentives to obtain standards for each source and guide the reallocation of emissions the new method is not a true market because polluters must go through the permitting procedure in order to trade emission allowances this study examines whether an efficient market without source by source review is feasible it considers the importance of enough participants competitiveness sensitivity to geographic emission patterns and trading flexibility to sustain marketable permits the design features that address these problems are permit life market definition market initiation and market operation a stable permit market eliminates some of the uncertainties in decision making because it allows firms to select a preferred level of risk 9 references dck

emission standards and stochastic waste load empirical work regarding the impact of environmental regulations on firm behavior has been developed under the assumption that emissions of pollutants are deterministic the implication is that the regulation is effective only when the constraint is exactly satisfied in real life however it is seldom the case that emission constraints are exactly satisfied the purpose of this paper is to find out whether regulation schemes are ineffective or whether the structure is an optimal reaction to random fluctuations in emissions the swedish pulp and paper industry is used as an empirical illustration

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

the innovation impact of the eu emission trading system findings of company case studies in the german power sector abstract this paper provides a detailed analysis of how the european emission trading system eu ets as the core climate policy instrument of the european union has impacted innovation towards this end we investigate the impact of the eu ets on research development and demonstration rd d adoption and organizational change in doing so we pay particular attention to the relative influences of context factors policy mix market factors and public acceptance and firm characteristics value chain position technology portfolio size and vision empirically our qualitative analysis is based on multiple case studies with 19 power generators technology providers and project developers in the german power sector which were conducted in 2008 09 we find that the innovation impact of the eu ets has remained limited so far because of the scheme s initial lack of stringency and predictability and the relatively greater importance of context factors additionally the impact varies significantly across technologies firms and innovation dimensions and is most pronounced for rd d on carbon capture technologies and organizational changes our analysis suggests that the eu ets on its own may not provide sufficient incentives for fundamental changes in corporate innovation activities at a level which ensures political long term targets can be achieved

benchmarking in the european union emissions trading system abatement incentives abstract this paper investigates abatement incentives for allowance allocation based on output and sector specific benchmarks here called output based allocation or benchmarking special attention is given to updated allocation and we assume that allowances can be traded with other sectors open cap we confirm earlier studies that output based allocation based on ex ante data provide the same abatement incentives as auction or grandfathering and also confirm that output based allocation with updated output and ex ante benchmarks provides as high abatement incentives as auction but constitutes a production subsidy however we also find that benchmarking with updated output and updated benchmarks reduces abatement incentives somewhat but less so than updated grandfathering an allocation rule where the sector cap is prescribed ex ante for instance based on historic emissions and distributed to installations in proportion to their updated production preserves full abatement incentives and avoids some of the costs associated with the determination of benchmarks however this rule also constitutes a production subsidy which decreases with industry concentration if a sector is split into smaller groups each with one benchmark per sub sector benchmarking evolves toward grandfathering since benchmarking is conditioned on production this allocation method protects production from leakage i e migrating to areas where firms face no emissions cost this may actually be the most compelling reason for choosing benchmarking

pollution from the electric power sector in japan and efficient pollution reduction abstract under the scheme of the kyoto protocol there are plans for the efficient reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the electric power sector nuclear power generation which emits no carbon dioxide in the process of generating electricity has come under scrutiny however this energy produces a new environmental issue the disposal of radioactive waste first we derive shadow prices of carbon dioxide and low level waste as marginal abatement costs in the case of the electric power sector in japan employing a directional output distance function it is found that the shadow prices are us 39 per tonne for carbon dioxide and us 1531 per liter for low level waste secondly we calculate the indirect morishima elasticity between carbon dioxide and low level waste in order to identify their substitutability and it is found that the substitution of low level waste for carbon dioxide is easier than the reverse this result suggests that with the amount of generated electricity fixed carbon dioxide can be substituted more easily by low level waste when the relative price of carbon dioxide increases for example as a result of implementation of a carbon dioxide tax or an emissions trading system

toward a political theory of the emergence of environmental incentive regulation this article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy economists quasi unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within an incomplete contract approach to political economy we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic viewpoint their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians ability to distribute rents insights are provided on the emergence of incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation

is the troika bad for the environment an analysis of eu countries environmental performance in times of economic downturn and austerity memoranda abstract in this paper we examine the effect of the current economic crisis on the environmental performance of the eu countries by employing hierarchical linear multilevel hlm modeling we find that for the period 2000 2015 a drop in the national gdp a recession effect as well as endorsing a memorandum of understanding mou for receiving a imf eu ecb financial rescue package a troika effect have non significant to positive impacts on a number of national environmental quality and policy indicators over and above other economic political and governance predictors for eurozone and non eurozone countries alike nevertheless this changes drastically if we examine these two factors interaction experiencing a recession while being a recipient of a troika sponsored rescue package has detrimental effects on an eu country s national environment

capacity utilization and new source bias evidence from the us electric power industry abstract while prior research has shown that new source bias has increased construction costs and delayed the building of new electric power plants this research explores the empirical question of whether increased operating costs caused by new source bias are larger than the cost savings of newer technology if new sources do have higher operating costs an incentive exists to utilize order plants more intensively statistical evidence of these differing utilization rates is found

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

fiscal interactions and the costs of controlling pollution from electricity i quantify the costs of controlling so 2 carbon and nox emissions from power generation accounting for interactions between environmental policies and the broader fiscal system i distinguish a dirty technology coal that satisfies baseload demand and a clean technology gas that is used at peak period and i distinguish sectors with and without regulated prices estimated emissions control costs are substantially lower than in previous models of fiscal interactions that assume a single constant returns technology and competitive pricing the results are reasonably robust to alternative scenarios such as full price deregulation and market power in the deregulated sector

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

parametric efficiency tests economies of scale and input demand in u s electric power generation duality theory has been applied increasingly in recent years to study the structure of production a major advantage of using duality theory is that systems of input demand equations can be derived by simple differentiation facilitating the use of flexible functional forms also use of duality theory makes it possible to choose a representation of the technology which has desirable properties for estimation such as exogeneity of the regressors however the use of a dual representation of production structure is appropriate only if the corresponding maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior e g cost minimization or profit maximization is valid the perceived advantages of the dual approach to studying production structure have led to some applications in which the maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior is unlikely to be appropriate for example neoclassical cost functions have been used to study the characteristics of production in regulated industries despite an extensive theoretical literature indicating that a profit maximizing regulated firm would not minimize costs subject to market prices 2 in this paper we propose a generalized cost function that retains the principal advantages of the neoclassical cost function but does not require that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis in our model firms are assumed to base their production decisions on unobservable shadow prices which reflect the effects of regulation on the effective prices of inputs parametric tests for cost minimization are obtained by expressing shadow prices as functions of market prices the generalized cost function is estimated with data for regulated electric utilities the parametric restrictions corresponding to cost minimizing behavior subject to market prices are rejected implying that the use of a neoclassical cost function is not appropriate in this application 3

the benefits of spatially differentiated regulation the response to acid rain by u s states prior to the acid rain program location is a crucial driver of both the marginal abatement and damage costs of sulfur dioxide emissions by u s coal fired power plants before the start of the acid rain program in 1995 old boilers were subject to emission rate standards set by individual states we investigate how individual states adjusted their sulfur regulation laws in response to acid rain and whether they accounted for differences in marginal abatement costs vulnerability to agricultural damages special industry interests or inter state externalities the welfare gain compared to a uniform reduction in emission rate standards is estimated to be 21 million in 1995 dollars annually

erratum standards versus standards the effects of different pollution restrictions when economists refer to pollution standards they almost universally mean uniform restrictions on pollution emissions e g william j baumol and wallace e oates 1975 ch 13 susan rose ackerman 1973 david besanko 1978 however in practice standards take many forms not only emissions restrictions but restrictions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an input restrictions on the use of a polluting input or mandated use of a particular pollution control technology these specifications of regulations will have a variety of effects on a firm s resource allocation decisions for instance allowing pollution per unit of output as the standard instead of directly restricting the level of pollution gives the firm some choice in addition to reducing pollution it can increase its output to dilute the pollution this paper examines the effects of five different forms of pollution standards on input decisions the level of production and firm profits the results show that the different standards by providing firms with different incentives change the firm s allocation decisions and affect the relative profitability of the standards section i reviews the existing literature on the incentives of different instruments the following section describes the model to be used five different forms of pollution constraints are individually examined in section iii using a graphical approach their relative effects as well as some special cases are assessed in section iv finally section v raises the case of different standards when firms are not identical

a new approach to measuring shadow price reconciling engineering and economic perspectives abstract shadow price is one of the most important pieces of information in environmental decision making two different approaches namely economic and engineering have been applied to obtain the shadow price of undesirable outputs while using different methodological backgrounds and perspectives the current study proposes a new conceptual framework and an economic estimation model to reconcile the shadow price estimates derived via the two approaches we also suggest a new mapping rule that incorporates the concept of abatement level which is a basic element in the engineering approach as a result the proposed model generates continuously changing estimates i e comprising a shadow price curve based on the abatement level we further investigate the determinant factors of shadow price by using second step regression the suggested methodology is used to investigate the shadow price of carbon emissions in south korean electricity generating plants thus yielding relevant policy implications

the welfare consequences of mixed environmental policy instruments with voluntary provision this article evaluates the welfare consequences of a mixed regulatory framework with a voluntary cap and trade program and intensity standards using data from the texas electricity industry i construct and estimate a structural model of the compliance choices of power generating units to recover their abatement costs then i simulate for the counterfactual equilibrium under a mandatory cap and trade regulation results show that the mixed policy framework mainly benefits generating units with small capacity and high abatement costs however a mandatory cap and trade regulation with redistribution policies could bring in substantial pareto improvement

environmental regulations and productivity growth the case of fossil fueled electric power generation this paper measures and analyzes the effect of sulfur dioxide emission restrictions on the rate of productivity growth in the electric power industry over the 1973 79 business cycle a firm specific measure of regulatory intensity is developed which depends on the severity of the emission standard the extent of enforcement and the unconstrained emission rate relevant to each utility the results indicate that emission regulations result in significantly higher generating costs primarily from the increased use of low sulfur fuels the average rate of productivity growth was reduced by 0 59 percentage points per year for constrained utilities

does globalization affect growth evidence from a new index of globalization the study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions economic integration social integration and political integration using panel data for 123 countries in 1970 2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth as the results show globalization indeed promotes growth the dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries although less robustly information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect

the costs of water pollution regulation in the pulp and paper industry this paper studies plant level data on actual and permitted levels of water pollution emissions for the pulp and paper industry there is widespread and substantial overcompliance with the relevant regulations aggregate bod emissions in 1992 were only 50 of the amount allowed overcompliance appears to imply a zero marginal abatement cost and its prevalence therefore has the potential to substantially change the debate over the costs of regulation we show instead that plants incurred substantial costs to overcomply marginal abatement costs were roughly 13 000 ton in 1992 we discuss possible explanations for costly overcompliance and their implications for estimation

the new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the american political science association september 1 5 atlanta ga and the 2000 annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 27 30 chicago il the authors thank steffen ganghof philip genschel mark hallerberg alex hicks william keech dennis quinn and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and dennis quinn for generously sharing data duane swank thanks the german marshal fund of the united states and marquette university for support of work incorporated in this paper data utilized in this paper are available from duane swank marquette edu

valuation of marginal co2 abatement options for electric power plants in korea the electricity generation sector in korea is under pressure to mitigate greenhouse gases as directed by the kyoto protocol the principal compliance options for power companies under the cap and trade include the application of direct co2 emission abatement and the procurement of emission allowances the objective of this paper is to provide an analytical framework for assessing the cost effectiveness of these options we attempt to derive the marginal abatement cost for co2 using the output distance function and analyze the relative advantages of emission allowance procurement option as compared to direct abatement option real option approach is adopted to incorporate emission allowance price uncertainty empirical result shows the marginal abatement cost with an average of 14 04 ton co2 for fossil fueled power plants and confirms the existence of substantial cost heterogeneity among plants which is sufficient to achieve trading gains in allowance market the comparison of two options enables us to identify the optimal position of the compliance for each plant sensitivity analyses are also presented with regard to several key parameters including the initial allowance prices and interest rate the result of this paper may help korean power plants to prepare for upcoming regulations targeted toward the reduction of domestic greenhouse gases

assessment of initial emission allowance allocation methods in the korean electricity market abstract korea will introduce an emission trading policy from 2015 the rules for the initial allocation of emission allowances have not been decided yet this paper assesses the effect of various initial emission allowance allocation methods of the korean electricity market this study employs the mixed complementarity problem which is able to incorporate operation investment and emission trade decisions in the deregulated electricity market in order to provide more realistic results in particular the allocation rules to existing plants and new entrants are modeled separately in this study the model quantifies the impacts of different allocation rules on emissions capacity mix emission allowance prices electricity prices and social welfare we examine typical allocation rules such as auction to all power plants best available technology bat benchmark to all power plants fuel specific benchmark to existing power plants along with bat benchmark to new entrants and fuel specific benchmark to all power plants we find that giving free allocations to new power plants prompts more new investment and this raises overall social welfare even though the direct cost of achieving the emission reduction target rises while the auction is the most powerful policy to reduce emissions in the electricity sector giving away permits to all power plants based on a fuel specific benchmark encourages investment increases output and leads to a greater level of welfare from an imperfectly competitive industry

discounting and distributional considerations in the context of global warming the economics of global warming is reviewed with special emphasis on how the cost depends on the discount rate and on how costs in poor and rich regions are aggregated into a global cost estimate both of these factors depend on the assumptions made concerning the underlying utility and welfare functions it is common to aggregate welfare gains and losses across generations and countries as if the utility of money were constant but it is not if we assume that a e co2 equivalent dlubling implies costs equal to 1 5 of the income in both high and low income countries a pure rate of time preference equal to zero and a utility function which is logarithmic in income then the marginal cost of co2 emissions is estimated at 260 590 usd ton c for a time horizon in the range 300 1000 years an estimate which is large enough to justify significant reductions of co2 emissions on purely economic grounds the estimate is approximately 50 100 times larger than the estimate made by nordhaus in his dice model and the difference is almost completely due to the choice of discount rate and the weight given to the costs in the developing world as well as a more accurate model of the carbon cycle finally the sensitivity of the marginal cost estimate with respect to several parameters is analyzed

competitiveness and exemptions from environmental taxes in europe a number of european countries have introduced a variety of environmental taxes a common characteristic of their implementation is the inclusion of exemptions and tax relief in particular for some sectors of manufacturing industry this paper analyses the pattern and motivation of exemptions as they have developed in western european countries making clear the difference between the nominal and effective tax rates once the exemptions have been taken into account the principal motivation for exemptions relates to concern about competitiveness while particular environmentally intensive sectors may have some grounds for concern even these might be able to achieve cost effective environmental improvements such that their competitive position is not over disadvantaged while for an economy structured like the uk s an environmental tax plus rebate scheme sometimes called an ecological tax reform would be likely to yield benefits in terms of competitiveness the exemptions usually run counter to the environmental economic logic of using environmental taxes to internalise social costs and give economic signals that are based on the full costs of production and they are likely to increase the costs of achieving a given level of emission reduction with little justification for them also on the grounds of competitiveness it would therefore be undesirable on both economic and environmental grounds for them to remain a feature of the implementation of environmental taxes in the future

lobbying and asymmetric information informational lobbying the use by interest groups of their alleged expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies is often regarded as an important means of influence this paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting on the one hand the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker whilst on the other hand the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to mis report or conceal its private information

the effect of environmental regulation on optimal plant size and factor shares the method for measuring the effects of environmental regulation on the size distribution of industrial plants and the distribution of factor shares described in this paper focuses on the 20 industries with highest per unit pollution abatement costs and the 20 with the lowest costs the study finds that compliance with environmental laws has not only reduced the number of plants in the affected industries but has placed a greater burden on small rather than on large plants besides redistributing within industry market shares environmental regulation has increased the use of capital relative to labor although the disproportionate burden placed on small plants in the high abatement cost industries may have been unintended it is likely that large firms will be less vocal opponents of environmental regulation than are small firms 22 references 12 tables

emissions trading with updated allocation effects on entry exit and distribution allocation of emissions allowances may have significant distributional and efficiency effects it is well known that cost efficiency may be achieved if allowances are auctioned or distributed in a lump sum manner e g based on emissions levels before the start of the system grandfathering bohringer and lange eur econ rev 49 2041 2055 2005 show that a cost effective outcome can also be achieved if the base year for allocation is continually updated updating given that banking and borrowing are prohibited in this paper we examine whether updating alters the entry and exit conditions for firms compared to grandfathering and how it affects profits for new and existing firms we find that the two schemes function surprisingly similar first the incentives to entry and exit are identical second the total value of free quotas to existing firms based on emissions before the system starts is also identical without any auctioning with updating initial claims for free allowances have a shorter lifetime compared to grandfathering but quota prices are higher as firms anticipate the effect of current emissions on future claims to free allowances the two effects exactly cancel each other out if there is some combination of auction and free allocation the total value of free quotas will always be highest under grandfathering if the auction rate is the same entry and exit incentives are still equal

the effect of sulfur regulations on the u s electric power industry a generalized cost approach abstract this paper estimates the effects of sulfur dioxide emission regulations on the us electric power industry during the 1975 1990 period by utilizing a generalized cost function along with shadow input prices in the presence of various regulations including those intended to control sulfur dioxide emissions firms will likely fail to minimize production costs the null hypothesis of cost minimization is rejected implying that the use of a neoclassical cost function is inappropriate for this study a comparison of the results obtained by estimating a generalized cost function and those obtained with a neoclassical cost function reveals that the use of a neoclassical restriction brings an underestimation of the average percentage increase in cost by 1 1 percentage points

potential cost savings from internal external co2 emissions trading in the korean electric power industry abstract korea plans to introduce an emissions trading scheme for the controlling greenhouse gas emissions in 2015 using shephard s 1970 output distance function we first estimate the shadow price of co 2 for power generators in the korean fossil fueled electric generation industry then by assuming that each power generator is required to reduce co 2 emissions by one ton we compute the potential cost savings from internal trading among generators within the same plant and from external trading across plants at prevailing market prices the results indicate that on average the generators paid 14 63 to abate one ton of co 2 emissions in 2007 plants realized additional gains through external trading in particular cost savings from trades between different fuel fired plants were substantial

the opportunity criterion consumer sovereignty without the assumption of coherent preferences this paper proposes a formulation of consumer sovereignty for use in normative economics which does not presuppose individuals preferences to be coherent the fundamental intuition that opportunity and responsibility have moral value is formalised as a responsibility criterion for assessing opportunities in an economic system a model of an exchange economy is presented in which rational arbitrageurs compete to make profits by trading with non rational consumers in equilibrium this economy satisfies the responsibility criterion one interpretation of this result is that in a competitive environment the overall effects of money pumps are benign even if individuals preferences are persistently incoherent

panel data analysis of regulatory factors shaping environmental performance this is the publisher s version also available electronically from http www mitpressjournals org doi abs 10 1162 003465304323023895 u1q6giuvdgi

explaining government choices for promoting renewable energy abstract many advanced industrialized countries have in recent years experienced a significant expansion of electricity production from renewables yet we know quite little about the dynamics of the underlying policychoices in this area using new data on adoptions and changes in feed in tariff and green certificate schemes in 26 advanced industrialized countries over 20 years we examine both domestic driving forces as well as international determinants the findings suggest that three factors play a particularly important role in pushing countries towards market based support systems characteristics of the existing energy supply system a federalist structure of the political system and eu membership particularly noteworthy is the finding that higher shares of fossil and nuclear energy in the national energy supply as well as higher co 2 intensity of the economy do not as we had expected stand in the way of policies for supporting renewables in electricity production to the contrary they increase the likelihood of a country adopting such policies we also find however that higher economic growth and higher growth in solar and wind energy capacity tend to reduce the political appetite for reforms of existing schemes

multilateral productivity comparisons when some outputs are undesirable a nonparametric approach multilateral productivity comparisons of firms producing multiple outputs some of which are undesirable are obtained by making two modifications to the standard farrell approach to efficiency measurement the restriction that production technology satisfy strong disposability of outputs is relaxed to allow for the fact that undesirable outputs may be freely disposable and the efficiency measures are modified to allow for an asymmetric treatment of desirable and undesirable outputs performance measures that satisfy these requirements are calculated as solutions to programming problems the methodology is applied to a sample of mills producing paper and pollutants

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

abatement and allocation in the pilot phase of the eu ets we use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over allocation that took place across european countries during the pilot phase 2005 2007 of the european union emission trading scheme using a dynamic panel data model we estimate the counter factual business as usual emissions scenario for eu member states comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions we find that both over allocation and abatement occurred along with under allocation and emissions inflation over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over allocation of approximately 280 million euas and total abatement of 247 mt co2 however we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 mt co2 also occurred possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features

regulatory constraints on environmental markets abstract there have been several recent regulatory reforms aimed at promoting economic efficiency these reforms fall into two broad categories those aimed at promoting competition in specific industries and those aimed at addressing problems that cut across several industries this analysis examines two reforms that fall into the latter category both of these policies are specifically designed to enhance environmental quality while promoting cost savings the analysis focuses on the biases and inefficiencies associated with the use of these policies the paper concludes with a discussion of the possibility of designing more efficient alternatives in light of the political constraints that are imposed on regulators

the political economy of environmental regulation towards a unifying framework there are several theories that attempt to explain various aspects of environmental policy building on insights from this theoretical work and recent advances in our understanding of instrument performance this paper constructs a more complete theory of environmental regulation there are two primary contributions of this research the first is to provide more satisfactory explanations for a number of observed patterns of environmental policy for example there is as yet no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive based mechanisms such as marketable permits and effluent fees the second contribution of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework for understanding many important aspects of environmental policy this framework suggests the outputs of environmental policy emerge from a struggle between key interest groups

domestic and international influences on green taxation economists have made a strong case for the relative efficiency of market based mechanisms for environmental regulation such as cap and trade and green taxes yet the spread of these forms has been limited and traditional command and control regulation still predominates the authors explain geographical and temporal variation in green tax burdens by considering their domestic and international determinants modeling international influences using spatial lags hypotheses are tested using panel data on organisation for economic co operation and development member states from 1995 to 2004 at the domestic level the authors show that green tax burdens are influenced by the left right and environmental positions of legislative medians and the power of the energy producing sector among other factors the authors also show that ideas about policy diffuse through international networks generated by trade and environmental intergovernmental organizations but they do not find compelling evidence for intern

incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating abstract emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota or allowance price nevertheless according to bohringer and lange on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances europ econ rev 49 2005 2041 2055 such allocation schemes are cost effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms in this paper we show that the cost effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast moreover if a price cap or banking borrowing is introduced the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction or lump sum allocation in addition we show that with allocation based on updated emissions the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned

are left wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment evidence from panel analysis of air pollution in oecd countries abstract the effect of left wing party strength and corporatism on air pollution levels in up to 21 oecd countries over the period 1980 or 1990 1999 is tested with both fixed effects and random effects estimators controlling for scale composition technique as well as aggregate time effects robust evidence is found that parliamentary green left libertarian party strength is associated with lower pollution levels the rise of ecologically oriented parties has thus had a real impact on air pollution levels traditional left wing party strength is possibly also associated with lower pollution levels but the evidence is less consistent and robust combined left wing party strength in government is possibly associated with higher pollution levels but this result is also far from robust and is practically small no evidence is found for a consistent systematic impact of corporatism on pollution levels

tradeable carbon permit auctions how and why to auction not grandfather abstract an auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change to minimize administrative costs permits would be required at the level of oil refineries natural gas pipe lines natural gas liquid sellers and coal processing plants to maximize liquidity in secondary markets permits would be fully tradable and bankable the government would conduct quarterly auctions a standard ascending clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery an auction is preferred to grandfathering giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions because it allows reduced tax distortions provides more flexibility in distribution of costs provides greater incentives for innovation and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents

taxes versus tradable discharge permits a review in the light of the u s and european experience the u s and west european environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution the u s has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes the countries of the european community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits a review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system

fuel switching and climate and energy policies in the european power generation sector a generalized leontief model abstract the purpose of this paper is to analyze a the role and the nature of price induced switching behavior between fossil fuels i e coal oil and natural gas in the western european power sector as well as b the fuel choice impacts of a number of public policies implemented in this sector during the last 20 years the analysis is conducted within a generalized leontief cost function framework and employs pooled data across eight countries over the time period 1978 2004 we present short run own and cross price elasticities of fossil fuel demand and assess the impacts of a set of government policies implemented over this time period the empirical results show evidence of notable short run interfuel substitution between oil and gas and particularly in countries where fossil fuels are used extensively for both base and peak load purposes these findings support the notion that ex post fossil fuel substitution takes place in dual and multi fired plants by switching load between different single fuel fired plants as well as through the conversion of power plants to be able to burn alternate fuels the results also illustrate that different public policies i e removal of coal subsidies electricity market liberalization etc have had profound impacts on fossil fuel choices and have in particular favored power generation gas use at the expense of coal finally the paper makes use of the empirical results to simulate the fuel switching impacts of different carbon prices within the european emissions trading scheme eu ets

dutch books and conditional probability an oddsmaker who does not update odds in accordance with conditional probability can be subjected to a sure loss such a losing situation is called a dutch book this is often presented as an argument for setting odds in accordance with conditional probability the authors point out that if the strategic aspects of oddsmaking are taken into account choice of odds is a strategic choice in games against bettors then it is possible that in the equilibrium of the game posted odds need not be updated correctly this calls into question the role of such arguments in the foundations of decision theory copyright 1994 by royal economic society

environmental regulation whose self interests are being protected special interest can explain why environmental policy limits economic activity in areas where air quality is above minumum standards locational competition among region helped create a policy that raised factor mobility cost from slower to faster growing regions analysis of votes shows greater support for this policy was received from northern urban constituencies and the greatest opposition came from the south and the west pollution abatement costs per unit of output are higher in areas with higher not lower air quality

cost minimizing regulation of sulfur emissions regional gains in electric power environmental regulations set maximum allowable rates for sulfur dioxide emissions from electric utilities by ignoring firm differences in marginal abatement costs and preventing emissions trading these standards do not minimize the cost of reducing einissions this paper estimates marginal abatement cost functions for 56 utilities for 1973 79 marginal costs vary substantially across firms due to differences in the price of low and high sulfur fuels and the intensity of regulation the potential savings from a cost minimizing reallocation of abatement resources are estimated for five regions current expenditures are found to be 47 higher than cost minimizing levels i mplementation of the 1970 clean air act amendments relies extensively on technology based emission standards economists long have recognized that these standards can result in an inefficient allocation of pollution control resources engineering based restrictions ignore or oversimplify differences in abatement costs among polluters limited empirical research suggests that current standards result in substantially higher costs as much as ten times higher than a cost minimizing regulatory scheme 2 these studies however are based on engineering estimates of marginal abatement costs the models often assume that all polluters adopt control technologies that are required only for new plants and that have been largely unadopted by polluting firms 3 the impact of changing factor prices on marginal abatement costs typically is ignored the difficulty is that the resulting estimates of the cost of regulation neither adequately reflect the range of control options available to polluters nor take into account how polluters actually have responded to environmen

the political economy of pollution markets historical lessons for modern energy and climate planners this article explores some of the central economic and political problems with the use of tradable permits to solve environmental problems drawing from transaction cost economics political economy and market theory it does so by looking at the history of three programs for curbing pollution in the united states the clean air act the leaded gasoline phase out and water permits in wisconsin the article begins by briefly summarizing the history of each of these programs before looking at a host of challenges related to political compromises in program design transaction costs spatial distortions such as geographic sensitivity and wrong way trading of credits temporal distortions such as the episodic nature of pollution and volatility of market prices and market abuses these concerns are raised with an eye for how historical experience may inform the current debate about how to design effective market mechanisms to respond to climate change and other forms of energy related environmental degradation

impacts of alternative allowance allocation methods under a cap and trade program in power sector emission trading is considered to be a cost effective environmental economic instrument for pollution control however the policy design of an emission trading program has a decisive impact on its performance allowance allocation is one of the most important policy design issues in emission trading not only for equity but also for policy performance in this research an artificial market for sulfur dioxide so2 emission trading was constructed by applying an agent based model the performance of the jiangsu so2 emission trading market was examined under different allowance allocation methods and transaction costs the results showed that the market efficiency of emission trading would be affected by the allocation methods when the transaction costs are positive the auction allowance allocation method was more efficient and had the lowest total emission control costs than the other three allocation methods examined however the use of this method will require that power plants pay for all of their allowance and doing so will increase the production costs of power plants on the other hand output based allowance allocation is the second best method

fishing quota markets abstract in 1986 new zealand responded to the open access problem by establishing the world s largest individual transferable quota itq system using a 15 year panel dataset from new zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas we assess trends in market activity price dispersion and the fundamentals determining quota prices we find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices ecological variability and market interest rates controlling for these factors our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization overall this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well implying that itqs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management

a composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking the composite cost function the authors propose combines a quadratic output structure with a log quadratic input price structure and is well suited for examining economies of scope subadditivity and other important properties of multiproduct firms to compare the composite model with an appropriate set of alternative functional forms they develop a parsimonious but general specification that nests the standard translog cost function the generalized translog cost function a separable quadratic cost function and the composite cost function an application to economies of scope in banking confirms the advantages of the composite model copyright 1992 by mit press

party policy diffusion do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems this research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating foreign successful incumbent parties spatial econometric analyses of parties election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed by showing that parties respond to these foreign incumbent parties this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition furthermore we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion as we suggest that political parties are important vehicles through which public policies diffuse

environmental tax reform efficiency and political feasibility although market based environmental measures like uniform co2 taxes reach a given standard at minimal cost they do not prevail in real world policies an effciency oriented environmental policy fails as it involves a redistributen of pollution rights resulting in a strong and generally effective opposition of the groups that forego economic rents the present paper analyzes the tradoff between efficiency and political feasibility of several co2 tax and reimbursement schemes using a computable general equilibrium model of switzerland the simulation results indicate that a policy combining a uniform co2 tax with differentiated labor subsidies preventing intersectoral redistribution is a better solution for the tradeoff than the presently existing tax schemes in various countries

a ten year rule to guide the allocation of eu emission allowances abstract member states in the european union eu are responsible for national allocation plans governing the initial distribution of emission allowances in the co2 emission trading system including rules governing allocations to installations that close and to new entrants the european commission has provided guidelines to discourage the use of allocation methodologies that provide incentives affecting firms compliance behavior for example by rewarding one type of compliance investment over another we find that the treatment of closures and new entrants by member states is inconsistent with the general guidelines provided by the eu we propose stronger eu guidance regarding closures and new entrants a more precise compensation criterion on which to justify free allocations and a ten year rule as a component of future eu policy that can guide a transition from current practice to an approach that places greater weight on efficiency

environmental policy convergence the impact of international harmonization transnational communication and regulatory competition in recent years there is growing interest in the study of cross national policy convergence yet we still have a limited understanding of the phenomenon do we observe convergence of policies at all under which conditions can we expect that domestic policies converge or rather develop further apart in this article we address this research deficit from a theoretical perspective we concentrate on the explanatory power of three factors namely international harmonization transnational communication and regulatory competition in empirical terms we analyze if and to what extent we can observe convergence of environmental policies across twenty four industrialized countries between 1970 and 2000 we find an impressive degree of environmental policy convergence between the countries under investigation this development is mainly caused by international harmonization and to a considerable degree also by transnational communication whereas regulatory competition does not seem to play a role

interdependence in comparative politics substance theory empirics substance interdependence is ubiquitous and often central across comparative politics indeed as the authors show first theoretically any situation involving externalities from one unit s actions on others implies interdependence positive or negative externalities induce negative or positive interdependence which spurs competitive races or free riding with corresponding early or late mover advantages and thus strategic rush to act or delay and inaction the authors show next how to model interdependent processes empirically how not doing so risks omitted variable biases favoring domestic and exogenous external accounts over interdependence but how doing so naively risks simultaneity biases with the opposite substantive implications they then discuss how to estimate properly specified interdependence models and finally how to interpret and present estimated spatio temporally dynamic effects response paths and long run steady states with associated standard errors they illustrate by replicating a not

bretton woods blueprint for a greenhouse gas agreement abstract this paper describes the remarkable parallels between the problems faced in the drafting of the 1944 bretton woods agreement which established the rules and institutions governing the international financial system and the problems faced in drafting a greenhouse gas agreement the parallels include the need to induce countries to sacrifice economic sovereignty in order to provide a public good the need to facilitate capital investment and provide adjustment loans to be fair to developing versus developed nations to offer technical assistance monitor behavior punish offenders and promote a globally efficient allocation of resources it is claimed that between them the organizations which emerged from the bretton woods agreement namely the imf gatt and world bank have the necessary attributes of the needed global atmospheric control agency furthermore it is argued that there are striking parallels between the reserve accounts at the imf and the crediting and debiting of greenhouse gas emissions and absorptions between special drawing rights sdrs and rights for greenhouse gas emissions as well as in numerous other characteristics the paper concludes by noting that the almost half century of influence of the bretton woods institutions suggests we might borrow from their charters organizational designs membership incentives and procedures for adaptation and change

differential environmental regulation effects on electric utility capital turnover and emissions this paper tests the hypothesis that differential regulations reduced the rate of capital turnover in the electric utility industry resulting in increased emissions of sulfur dioxide based on a sample of forty four privately owned electric utilities operating over the period 1969 83 the authors results indicate that 1 regulation increased the age of capital by an average of 3 29 years 24 6 percent 2 increases in the age of capital have no statistically significant impact on emissions and 3 in the absence of regulation emissions would have increased by 3 79 tons per million kwhs 34 6 percent copyright 1993 by mit press

the political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy abstract this paper develops a positive theory explaining pollution tax policy outcomes in a small open economy the equilibrium tax rate depends on lobby group membership the relative importance of lobbying activities and the tax elasticity of pollution the equilibrium properties are investigated the model is extended to incorporate pollution abatement and a pollution abatement subsidy we show that total pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate this effect arises because the equilibrium pollution tax rate may be decreasing in the subsidy rate due to altered political influence of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium

charging the earth the promotion of price based measures for pollution control abstract this paper seeks to consider the ways in which the theory and application of economic instruments in particular price based instruments is shaped by the interests values and ideologies of those who are promoting and implementing them although economists have been advocating the use of economic instruments for pollution control for decades it is only in recent years that they have been embraced by business groups and governments looking for a way to avoid stricter and more costly regulations that might inhibit economic growth and as a way of correcting and therefore preserving the free market system this paper examines the rationale for price based instruments and explains how economists have managed to enroll the support of other interest groups even those that have conflicting interests

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies abstract we employ a common agency model of policy making to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policies in two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution we show that the impact of green lobbying on environmental policy outcomes depends crucially on the prevailing trade regime cooperative or non cooperative on whether environmental agencies act in a unilateral or coordinated manner and on the size of the emission leakages and transboundary spillovers under free trade a unilateral increase in pollution taxes reduces domestic emissions at the cost of increased foreign emissions in this case if the emission leakages and the associated transboundary spillovers are large enough green lobbying can create a bias towards lower pollution taxes

exploring new ways of assessing the effect of regulation on environmental management abstract studies indicate that while a variety of factors positively influence voluntary environmental management regulatory pressures are among the most important however most research examines samples representing large manufacturers or single industries essentially assuming a level of regulatory constraint using a sample of heterogeneous facilities this study finds that facilities can be classified according to the level of regulatory constraint and that group membership impacts the choice of environmental management strategy when assessed within a utility maximization framework more extensively regulated facilities implement more individual environmental management practices but participate in fewer formal voluntary environmental programs veps compared to other facilities

the intergovernmental network of world trade igo connectedness governance and embeddedness membership in certain intergovernmental organizations igos such as the world trade organization has long been argued to stimulate trade yet evidence linking igos to trade is mixed the authors argue that identifying the influence of igos requires attention not only to the institutions igos enact but also to the network through which they enact them this approach allows them to demonstrate that trade between two countries increases by an average of 58 with every doubling of the strength of igo connection between the countries they also contribute to debates regarding the mechanisms through which structural relationships influence economic behavior by showing that substantial trade benefits occur not only through economic igos but also through igos that were formed for social and cultural purposes and that connections through igos that are organizationally strong have more impact than those through minimalist igos

compliance avoidance and evasion emissions control under imperfect enforcement in steam electric generation environmental regulation takes place in a world in which firms search for least cost adaptations to emission standards firms may substitute inputs change the desired level of output or defy the standard if they perceive enforcement to be lax this article estimates the impact of pollution control standards for fly ash and thermal waste heat within a joint model of production the model recognizes that effective control requires both the enactment and the enforcement of the legal standard empirical results substantially different from those of previous studies show that the level of enforcement is an important determinant offly ashcontrol costs and that fly ash control costs are many times greater than previously estimated a this article estimates the effects of pollution control standards for both fly ash and thermal emissions on the ex ante technology of steam electric generation i model the firm as both a cost avoider and a cost evader as a cost avoider the firm decides on the least costly emissions control strategy within the legal environment one possible fly ash control strategy is to substitute oil or gas for coal as a cost evader the firm may choose not to comply with the legal emissions standard the expected cost of evasion will decrease as enforcement becomes more lax this increases the opportunity for successful evasion i model this relationship by explicitly including an enforcement variable to model emissions control i use a joint production framework that captures potential interdependent effects between electric generation and emissions control my analysis suggests that both the fly ash standard and its degree of enforcement are important determinants of the marginal costs of fly ash control i find that the costs are several times greater than those previous studies have estimated the results suggest that firms substituted gas or oil for coal to reduce the anticipated costs of fly ash control and that the level of the fly ash emission standard and the degree of enforcement altered desired plant output in what follows i first review previous studies of fly ash and thermal waste heat control and discuss several modelling issues that affect estimates of firms responses to an emissions

reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty an explosion has occurred during the past decade in the foundations of decision making under risk and uncertainty the long dormant challenges of allais i 953a b to the von neumann morgenstern i944 independence axioms of allais and of ellsberg 1 96 i to savage s i 954 sure thing principle and of may 1954 and tversky i969 to the transitivity of preferences have sprung to new life through widespread empirical corroboration in the wake of the new evidence an array of representations of preferences has been proposed to accommodate failures of one or more of the traditional axioms 2 although some new models are solely descriptive kahneman and tversky 1979 others have normative interest as competitors of the von neumannmorgenstern expected utility theory quiggin i982 machina i982 chew i982 i983 fishburn i982 or of savage s subjective probability expected utility theory bell i982 loomes and sugden i982 i987 schmeidler i984 gilboa i985 luce and narens i985 fishburn i984 b i986b one benefit of recent foundational work is a deeper understanding of the content and implications of expected utility coupled with a new appreciation of the underlying issues that divided decision theorists a generation ago i am thinking especially of the 1952 paris colloquium on decision under uncertainty allais 1979 pp 446 7 at which allais confronted defenders of expected utility de finetti friedman marschak samuelson savage with his insistence on riskless measurement of the utility of wealth and violations of independence axioms the colloquium appears to have ended in a standoff but enabled each side to sharpen its own position

how emission certificate allocations distort fossil investments the german example despite political activities to foster a low carbon energy transition germany currently sees a considerable number of new coal power plants being added to its power mix there are several possible drivers for this dash for coal but it is widely accepted that windfall profits gained through free allocation of ets certificates play an important role yet the quantification of allocation related investment distortions has been limited to back of the envelope calculations and stylized models so far we close this gap with a numerical model integrating both germany s particular allocation rules and its specific power generation structure we find that technology specific new entrant provisions have substantially increased incentives to invest in hard coal plants red to natural gas at the time of the ets onset more precisely disproportionate windfall profits compared more than half the total capital costs of a hard coal plant moreover shorter periods of free allocations would not have turned investors favours towards the cleaner natural gas technology because of pre existing economic advantages for coal in contrast full auctioning of permits or a single best available technology benchmark would have made natural gas the predominant technology of choice

environmental pressure group strength and air pollution an empirical analysis there is an established theoretical and empirical case study literature arguing that environmental pressure groups have a real impact on pollution levels our original contribution to this literature is to provide the first systematic quantitative test of the strength of environmental non governmental organizations engos on air pollution levels we find that engo strength exerts a statistically significant impact on sulfur dioxide smoke and heavy particulates concentration levels in a cross country time series regression analysis this result holds true both for ordinary least squares and random effects estimation it is robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of engo strength with the help of instrumental variables the effect is also substantively important strengthening engos represents an important strategy by which aid donors foundations international organizations and other stakeholders can try to achieve lower pollution levels around the world

on money pumps abstract the question of whether money pump arguments justify standard consistency assumptions about behavior has remained unresolved partly because of the absence of an appropriate analytical framework we present a new framework which fills this gap provide a formal definition of invulnerability to money pumps and formulate a requirement of maximal opportunism we show that behavior which satisfies none of the standard consistency assumptions can be both invulnerable and maximally opportunist we present two conditions which combined with maximal opportunism imply the existence of a choice function rationalized by an ordering and satisfying the sure thing principle journal of economic literature classification numbers b41 c73 d81