monitoring cost disutility of effort and the forcing employment contract abstract if the state of nature is not observable ex post but work effort is contracts between the risk neutral firm and the risk averse workers will stipulate the level of effort which will be monitored to ensure its delivery in this paper it will be shown that when effort is stipulated and monitored workers will be paid solely by a fixed wage payment independent of output the size of the wage payment will depend on the level of effort stipulated the marginal rate of substitution of effort for income and the cost of monitoring provided that the cost is not prohibitively high

power illusion in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis abstract one feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power game theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality we conduct an experimental test of the classical baron ferejohn model with five player groups holding real power constant we compare treatments with differences in nominal power we find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place finally and of particular importance as a methodological observation giving subjects a pause accelerates learning

media markets and localism does local news en espanol boost hispanic voter turnout the same time the availability of these products reduces the consumption of local news not only because some consumers prefer national and global content to local information but also because local media products that lose a significant number of consumers are forced to cut qual ity and they may even cease to exist if their audience falls below a critical threshold for these reasons some scholars claim that the rise of integrated media markets undermines local civic engagement robert d putnam 2000 against this backdrop many regulatory agencies including the federal communications commission fcc of the united states seek to protect local media and promote localism for instance by limiting ownership concentration 1 however localism is desirable only if there are in fact positive spillovers from the provision of local content that can help justify the loss of private welfare that integrated media markets would provide in this paper we propose a simple test for the existence of spillovers from local news pro gramming asking if the presence of local television news affects civic behavior the ubiq uity of local news programming across all us metro areas makes it impossible to study its effects on the general population in contrast the availability of spanish language news has increased considerably in recent years providing us with an experiment to study the effect of local news on one important measure of civic engagement voter turnout in local elections in particular we use a differencing approach asking whether hispanic voter turnout is higher in relation to non hispanic turnout in metro areas with spanish language local television news our results indicate that spanish language local television news raises hispanic turnout by more than 4 percentage points local news targeted at hispanics has no effect on the participa tion of non hispanics and as one would expect a significantly smaller effect in years with a presidential race in markets with spanish language news about a quarter of hispanics turn to these programs our estimates thus imply that news in spanish caused about a fifth of spanish language news viewers to start voting interestingly hispanics with access to news in spanish do not increase the time they spend watching news content analyses of spanish language news programs in the united states find that these shows are much more likely to report on

tests of a rational theory of the size of government in many countries the political party holding power changes more frequently than the trend growth rates in government spending and taxes shifts of political power are often preceded by rhetoric about meeting needs or cutting taxes which post election performances rarely match yet changes in the size of government up and down occur on average the size of government measured by the share of taxes or spending to output has increased in many countries during the past century but changes in size occur at diffrent rates and at times the relative size of government declines

political budget cycles with informed voters evidence from italy i exploit a reform that required italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheetsbefore elections to study whether having more informed voters aects the political budgetcycle to start inve

bargaining in bicameral legislatures when and why does malapportionment matter malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures it is widely argued confers disproportionate benefits to overrepresented jurisdictions ample empirical research has documented that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in bicameral legislatures the theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak it is commonly asserted that this stems from unequal voting power per se using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the closed rule infinite horizon model of baron and ferejohn 1989 we assess the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral legislature may lead to unequal division of public expenditures two sets of results are derived first when bills originate in the house and the senate considers the bill under a closed rule the equilibrium expected payoffs of all house members are surprisingly equal second we show that small state biases can emerge when 1 there are supermajority rules in the malapportioned chamber 2 the senate initiates bills which produces maldistributed proposal probabilities and 3 the distributive goods are lumpy we thank seminar participants at new york university the university of pennsylvania and the 2002 annual meeting of the american political science association for helpful comments james snyder and michael ting gratefully acknowledge the financial support of national science foundation grant ses 0079035 stephen ansolabehere gratefully acknowledges the support of the carnegie corporation under the carnegie scholars program this paper was written while michael ting was at the university of north carolina at chapel hill and he thanks the department of political science there for their support

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

senate representation and coalition building in distributive politics p7 vhe senate s equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics the great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal fttnds than others but all senators have equal voting weight as a result even though all senators votes are of equal value to the coalition builder they are not of equal prwice coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states building on formal models of coalition building two hypotheses are developed and tested first coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently second the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small state senators than large state senators the hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997 98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs the findings support both hypotheses

sending the pork home birth town bias in transfers to italian municipalities we ask whether the birthplaces of italian members of parliament are favoured in the allocation of central government transfers using a panel of municipalities for the years between 1994 and 2006 we find that municipal governments of legislators birth towns receive larger transfers per capita exploiting variation in birthplaces induced by parliamentary turnover for estimation we find that this effect is driven by legislators who were born in a town outside their district of election as a result we argue that our findings cannot be a consequence of re election incentives the usual motivation for pork barrel policies in the literature rather politicians may be pursuing other personal motives in line with this hypothesis we find that the birth town bias essentially disappears when legislative elections are near we explore several possible mechanisms behind our results by matching parliamentarians to a detailed dataset on local level administrators

the value of the vote a model and test of the effects of turnout on distributive policy the most plausible assumption is that if certain groups or classes of citizens habitually do not vote their interest will be neglected in the actions and policies of governments key 1950 506 i introduction this article investigates the effects of voter participation on the distribution of government funds a simple model shows why for some types of distributive policy incumbents will have a greater probability of reelection if high turnout regions receive more funds than do low turnout regions the model predicts therefore that politicians who seek reelection and similarly politicians including the ideologically driven selected into office because they set popular policy will tend to allocate more funds to regions with higher turnout i test the model s predicted relationship between turnout and spending for the south in the 1930s spending data are county level allocations by the federal emergency relief administration fera which was the early new deal s main program to provide relief to the unemployed the evidence suggests that turnout had a substantial effect on fera spending if an individual was a voter rather than a nonvoter it typically led to an increase on the order of 30 in the expected fera allocation for the individual s county the findings shed light both on the role of voting in representative democracies and on the historical role of voting rights in the southern political system elections voter participation and policy representative democracy creates a tendency for government to set policy that improves politicians prospects for reelection this may occur because politicians design policy for the purpose of winning reelection or it may occur because elections sort into office those politicians who for ideological or other reasons tend to set policy that wins votes 1 the type of policy that improves the prospects for reelection depends upon how voters respond to policy to illustrate this point consider the distribution of a fixed sum between different regions e g counties one key consideration is the extent to which voting behavior responds to distributive policy allocating funds to groups that do not respond will be less likely to lead to reelection groups that do not respond include those who will always vote in support of the incumbent those who will always vote in opposition to the incumbent and those who do not vote previous work on distributive politics has examined how distribution is influenced by constituents voting behavior with respect to whom they support when they do vote for example wright 1974 wallis 1984 1987 1991 kiewiet and mccubbins 1985 cox and mccubbins 1986 and fleck 1999 examine favoritism of swing and loyal voters 2 this article takes a different but complementary approach by focusing on the distributive effects of whether people vote quite simply winning the approval of a group of citizens has a larger effect on reelection if those citizens vote in large numbers than if they do not this provides a reason to expect that politicians will tend to allocate relatively little to those who do not vote this is consistent with the long recognized point that nonvoters have little influence on policy a point that key 1950 made clear and that follows naturally from economic models of voting such as that of downs 1957 bennett and mayberry 1979 show a similar effect of legislative representation on interstate redistribution states with more representatives per capita in congress tend to have lower ratios of taxes paid into the federal treasury relative to federal grants in aid received by modeling and estimating the effects of voter participation this article contributes to the general understanding of how voting influences the allocation of resources furthermore the substantial size of the estimated effects underscores the critical role that voting rights played in the southern political system

mass media and public policy abstract if more informed voters receive favorable policies then mass media should influence policy because it provides most of the information people use in voting this paper uses a simple model to analyze the effect of mass media provision of news on a number of policy issues redistribution the size of the government sector rents and corruption the effectiveness of lobby groups and political business cycles it is easy to deal with such a wide range of issues because existing models of political competition often include informed and uniformed voters modelling mass media simply endogenizes who is informed and who is not the paper also discusses empirical evidence and point to areas for future research

explaining voter turnout patterns an information theory voting research is rich in empirical regularities yet a parsimonious theory of voter turnout that can match the facts has proven to be elusive this paper argues that voter turnout patterns can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to include limited information a model is presented in which utility maximizing consumers receive higher payoffs from voting the more confident they are of their vote choice the model provides an explanation for the most important cross sectional voter turnout patterns in addition it suggests a novel explanation for the post 1960 decline in u s participation

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

sharing monitoring and incentives marshallian misallocation reassessed a general equilibrium model is presented wherein wage labor requires monitoring in order to extract effort landlords may also elect to adopt sharetenancy contracts in which workers have an incentive to supply unsupervised effort two distortions exist monitoring costs in one sector and a share tax in the other efficiency statements require second best comparisons adopting more specific functional forms this mixed wage sharetenancy economy is technically efficient and provides greater benthamite social welfare than a wage only economy when private incentives lead to mixing the incidence of sharetenancy is hypothesized to increase with monitoring costs density of tenants per landlord and labor intensity of production

multiple leasing under cropshare tenancy a note abstract this paper attempts to explain the perplexing tendency to multiple leasing by both landlords and tenants in some countries it shows that if the negotiation of share contracts involves significant transaction costs and there is some uncertainty regarding the output on tenanted plots a risk averse landlord maximizing expected utility will find it in his advantage to subdivide his land among several tenants and also permit his tenant to lease land from other landlords

the role of social capital in financial development to identify the effect of social capital on financial development we exploit social capital differences within italy in high social capital areas households are more likely to use checks invest less in cash and more in stock have higher access to institutional credit and make less use of informal credit the effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people these results are not driven by omitted environmental variables since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born

transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth it is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output the incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer the model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey offarmers and landowners in nebraska and south dakota

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

the political economy of government responsiveness theory and evidence from india the determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive this suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy the ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from india we show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater controlling for shocks where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

labor supervision and institutional conditions evidence from bicol rice farms this article analyzes labor supervision activities reported in a survey of rice farmers in the bicol region of the philippines we present a theoretical model that relates supervision intensity to institutional conditions we estimate a supervision intensity equation and control for the decision to hire labor the decision to supervise hired labor and the type of the labor contract the empirical estimates use different village level spatial and demographic indicators as proxies for institutional conditions the results are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model that supervision increases with weaker institutional conditions

gender interactions within hierarchies evidence from the political arena this paper studies gender interactions within hierarchical organizations using a large data set on the duration of italian municipal governments elected between 1993 and 2003 a municipal government can be viewed as a hierarchy whose stability over time depends on the degree of cooperation between and within ranks we find that in municipalities headed by female mayors the probability of early termination of the legislature is higher this result persists and becomes stronger when we control for municipality fixed effects as well as for non random sorting of women into municipalities using regression discontinuity in gender mixed electoral races decided by a narrow margin the likelihood that a female mayor survives until the end of her term is lowest when the council is entirely male and in regions with less favourable attitudes towards working women this evidence is suggestive that group dynamics are an important factor in driving the gender difference other interpretations receive less support in the data our results may provide an alternative explanation for the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions

broadband internet an information superhighway to sex crime does internet use trigger sex crime we use unique norwegian data on crime and internet adoption to shed light on this question a public program with limited funding rolled out broadband access points in 2000 2008 and provides plausibly exogenous variation in internet use our instrumental variables and fixed effect estimates show that internet use is associated with a substantial increase in reported incidences of rape and other sex crimes we present a theoretical framework that highlights three mechanisms for how internet use may affect reported sex crime namely a reporting effect a matching effect on potential offenders and victims and a direct effect on crime propensity our results indicate that the direct effect is non negligible and positive plausibly as a result of increased consumption of pornography

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

incentives and disutility of effort in a linear piece rated employment contract abstract previous studies on contracts which involve incentives and risk sharing seldom give explicit treatment of the impact of the agent s disutility of effort on the incentive properties of the contract it is shown that in a linear piece rated employment contract which pays workers according to both the time worked and output an increase in the piece rate does not necessarily induces more effort as generally taken for granted the incentive effect of the piece rate in fact depends on the extent to which the worker dislikes effort

lame ducks and local fiscal policy quasi experimental evidence from portugal i use the introduction of mayoral term limits in portugal to identify how an exogenous variation in eligibility for office affects policy decisions relying on a quasi experimental difference in differences approach i find that term limited incumbents pursue more conservative fiscal policies than those who are eligible for re election heterogeneous effects show that the treatment effects primarily reflect the behaviour of right leaning term limited incumbents results are in line with a model in which right leaning officeholders try to maintain a good reputation by pleasing an electorate prone to redistribution while they are eligible but adopt policies closer to their true preferences when term limited

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

property tax and property values evidence from the 2012 italian tax reform abstract this paper assesses the extent to which property taxes are capitalized into property values exploiting the 2012 italian tax reform municipal level variation in the level of the property tax rates is instrumented using the exogenous staggered timing of local elections we show that the incumbent local governments with upcoming elections in 2013 shifted the composition of fiscal revenues towards lower property tax our 2sls estimate shows that a one standard deviation increase in municipal level property tax intensity leads to a 2 7 reduction of municipal property values in the year of the reform we elicit information on the characteristics of the compliers and show that these municipalities feature inefficient public spending and low social capital

election results and opportunistic policies a new test of the rational political business cycle model the literature on the rational pbc suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre election distortions in fiscal policy we propose a new test that explores the two way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory the test is implemented using a large panel of portuguese municipalities the results show that opportunism leads to a larger win margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win margin is small these results are consistent with the theoretical model

behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers alternating offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs as well as in the role of the order of play the experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models we compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process

productivity and distribution under cropsharing tenancy abstract this paper develops a model of sharecropping assuming tenant autonomy competitive behavior of landlords and laborers and endogenously determined wage and share rental rates the coexistence of wage labor and sharecropping is explained in terms of their incentive labor process and risk sharing characteristics sharecropping serves as a surrogate for the direct supervision of the labor process its incidence is shown to rise in the presence of unemployment at a subsistence wage the model implies that the abolition of tenancy will raise output raise labor income and reduce land income

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

malapportionment and multilateral bargaining an experiment abstract members of collective decision making bodies often represent communities that differ in population sizes malapportionment results when decision making power is not allocated evenly across the population two well known institutions with malapportionment have emerged bicameralism and weighted voting this paper studies experimentally how agenda setting power affects the distribution of resources comparing across those two institutions conventional wisdom suggests that malapportionment favors scarcely populated states i find that this is the case under weighted voting but not necessarily in a bicameral system in the later case the allocation of agenda setting power can be used to eliminate distortions stemming from malapportionment

schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in indonesia evidence from an unusual policy experiment between 1973 and 1978 the indonesian government engaged in one of the largest school construction programs on record combining differences across regions in the number of schools constructed with differences across cohorts induced by the timing of the program suggests that each primary school constructed per 1 000 children led to an average increase of 0 12 to 0 19 years of education as well as a 1 5 to 2 7 percent increase in wages this implies estimates of economic returns to education ranging from 6 8 to 10 6 percent

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents despite the attention of scholars to that question the empirical results are mixed thus far the present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections i study the consequences of pork barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in slovakia between 2006 and 2018 finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection the same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years the effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are however moderated by municipal population more specifically a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price

tenancy choice in a competitive framework with transactions costs the choice between wage labor and sharecrop contracts is analyzed in a model that avoids both the pitfalls of previous models inefficiency of sharecropping and indeterminacy by introducing transactions costs with appropriate nonlinearities plantation data from the american south provide empirical support for the hypothesized nonlinearity in transactions costs and simultaneous determination of direct supervision and contractual choice