platform pricing in mixed two sided markets when a consumer can appear on both sides of a two sided market such as a user who both buys and sells on ebay the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides i develop a general model for such mixed two sided markets and show that a monopolist platform s incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand which embody the bundling effect and price cost margins adjusted for network externalities which incorporate two sidedness the optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar lerner formula

the economics of two sided markets at a local best buy a child places a new sony playstation 3 on the cashier s counter while the parents dig out their visa card the gaming system and the payment card may appear to have little connection other than this purchase however these two items share an important characteristic that is generating a series of economic insights and has important implications for strategic decision making and economic policymaking both video game systems and payment cards are examples of two sided markets broadly speaking a two sided market is one in which 1 two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform and 2 the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents typically through an externality in the case of a video game system the intermediary is the console producer sony in the scenario above while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the playstation if the other party is not similarly a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance where both consumers and merchants value each others participation many more products fit into this paradigm such as search engines newspapers and almost any advertisersupported media examples in which consumers often negatively value rather than positively value the participation of the other side as well as most software or title based operating systems and consumer electronics malls which seek retailers and consumers convention organizers which seek buyers and sellers dating services which seek men and women and the journal of economic perspectives which seeks content and readership all experience the economics of two sided markets the multi sided nature of many internet and high technology markets as well as

real and nominal wage rigidities and the rate of inflation evidence from west german micro data the paper examines real and nominal wage rigidities we estimate a switching regime model in which the observed distribution of individual wage changes computed from west german register data for 1976 1997 is generated by simultaneous processes of real nominal or no wage rigidity and measurement error the fraction of workers facing wage increases that are due to nominal but mostly real wage rigidity is substantial the extent of real rigidity rises with inflation whereas the opposite holds for nominal rigidity overall the incidence of wage rigidity which accelerates unemployment growth is most likely minimized in an environment with moderate inflation

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple good monopolist abstract multiple objects may be sold by posting a schedule consisting of one price for each possible bundle and permitting the buyer to select the price bundle pair of his choice we identify conditions that must be satisfied by any price schedule that maximizes revenue within the class of all such schedules we then provide conditions under which a price schedule maximizes expected revenue within the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the n object case we use these results to characterize environments mainly distributions of valuations where bundling is the optimal mechanism in the two and three good cases

comments on gaussian demand and commodity bundling different commodities are often sold together as a bundle e g complete dinners in a restaurant stereo systems in mixed bundling strategies the individual components of the bundle are also offered for sale separately in block booking or pure bundling strategies they are not via simple hypothetical examples of two product firms stigler 1963 and adams and yellen 1976 have demonstrated that these selling practices can increase profit even if there is no cost advantage to bundling and the component products are independent in demand it is obvious from these examples that heterogeneity in consumer tastes especially in relative valuations of the firm s two products is a necessary condition for profitable bundling unfortunately more specific principles to describe concisely the necessary and or sufficient conditions for profitable bundling are not so obvious since consumer demand in the examples is represented by a complete enumeration of consumer reservation prices optimal prices and pricing strategies must be determined by trial and error marginal analysis is inappropriate or uninformative more important these numerical examples do not yield characterizations of profit for each strategy as functions of a small number of parameters that summarize the relevant features of the distribution of reservation prices in the consumer population by assuming that reservation prices for the firm s two products are distributed in the consumer population according to the bivariate normal probability law schmalensee in this issue has constructed a class of examples within which the profitability of bundling can be analyzed as a function of production costs the mean and variance of the reservation price for each commodity and the correlation between the two commodities reservation prices although this analysis is sometimes mathematically complex schmalensee is quite thorough subject to the normality assumption many of the questions suggested by the

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

a more general theory of commodity bundling this paper extends the standard model of bundling as a price discrimination device to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers whether integrated or separate firms have an incentive to introduce a bundling discount when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand alone products product substitutability typically gives an integrated firm a greater incentive to offer a bundle discount relative to the model with additive preferences while substitutability is often the sole reason why separate sellers wish to offer inter firm discounts when separate sellers coordinate on an inter firm discount they can use the discount to overturn product substitutability and relax competition

mixed bundling in two sided markets in the presence of installed base effects we analyze mixed bundling in two sided markets where installed base effects are present and find that the pricing structure deviates from traditional bundling as well as the standard two sided markets literature we determine prices on both sides fall with bundling mixed bundling acts as a price discrimination tool segmenting the market more efficiently consequently as a by product of this price discrimination the two sides are better coordinated and social welfare is enhanced we show unambiguously that platform participations increase on both sides of the market after theoretically evaluating the impact mixed bundling has on prices and welfare we take the model predictions to data from the portable video game console market we find empirical support for all theoretical predictions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

inflation and unemployment the world economy today is vastly different from the 1930s when seymour harris the chairman of this meeting infected me with his boundless enthusiasm for economics and his steadfast confidence in its capacity for good works economics is very different too both the science and its subject have changed and for the better since world war ii but there are some notable constants unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists statesmen journalists housewives and everyone else the connection between them is the principal domestic economic burden of presidents and prime ministers and the major area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics i have chosen to review economic thought on this topic on this occasion partly because of its inevitable timeliness partly because of a personal interest reaching back to my first published work in 1941

tying in two sided markets and the honor all cards rule abstract payment card associations offer both debit and credit cards and sometimes engage in a tie in on the merchant side through the so called honor all cards hac rule this article analyzes the impact of the hac rule using a simple model with two types of transactions subject to different competitive pressures in the no hac rule benchmark model the interchange fee if the transfer from the merchant s bank to the cardholder s bank on the card subject to platform competition is socially too low and the if on the card protected from competition is either optimal or too high in either case the hac rule not only benefits the multi card platform but also raises social welfare due to a rebalancing effect the paper then investigates a number of extensions of the benchmark model including varying degrees of substitutability between the two cards merchant heterogeneity and platform differentiation while the hac rule may no longer raise social welfare under all values of the parameters the basic and socially beneficial rebalancing effect unveiled in the benchmark model is robust

gaussian demand and commodity bundling in an important and widely cited essay adams and yellen 1976 examine the use of package selling as a price discrimination device they consider a monopolist producing two goods with constant unit costs and facing buyers with diverse tastes the marginal utility of a second unit of either good is assumed to be zero for all buyers the two goods are independent in demand for all buyers so that any buyer s reservation price for the first unit of either good is independent of the market price of the other thus the maximum amount any buyer would pay for a bundle consisting of one unit of each good is the sum of the two reservation prices and buyers are completely described by the values of those two prices 2 resale markets are assumed away in order to obtain comparative results for alternative pricing strategies the distribution of reservation prices in the adams yellen framework is assumed to be bivariate normal implications of gaussian demand are explored pure bundling is shown to operate by reducing buyer diversity thus facilitating the capture of consumers surplus it generally makes buyers worse off than unbundled sales it is more profitable if average reservation prices are high enough mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales and it is generally strictly more profitable than either bundling which treats goods symmetrically seems most attractive under symmetric reservation price distributions i am indebted to severin borenstein for superb research assistance to the ford motor company for research support through a grant to m i t and to the harvard economics department for housing me as a visiting scholar while most of this research was performed of course only i can be held responsible for this essay s shortcomings 1 the first clear recognition of this possibility seems to have been by stigler 1968 but also see burstein 1960 2 paroush and peles 1981 relax the assumption that consumers purchase at most one unit of each good but they consider only two types of buyers both with linear demand functions they retain the assumption that demands are independent for all buyers telser 1979 and phillips 1981 use different frameworks to analyze bundling policies spence 1980 explores the relation between bundling across commodities as here and bundling multiple units of the same

to bundle or not to bundle commodity bundling is studied in an environment where the dispersion of valuations unambiguously decreases when two or more goods are sold as a bundle only bundling is more likely to dominate separately selling the goods if marginal costs are low relative to the average valuation or if the distribution of valuations is very peaked around the mean

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

strong duality for a multiple good monopolist we characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them we show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure derived from the buyer s type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions this measure expresses the marginal change in the seller s revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types as a corollary we characterize the optimality of grand bundling mechanisms strengthening several results in the literature where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived as an application we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on c c 1 is a grand bundling mechanism as long as c is sufficiently large extending pavlov s result for two items pavlov 2011 at the same time our characterization also implies that for all c and for all sufficiently large n the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on c c 1 is not a grand bundling mechanism

profitability of product bundling using copulas to model the stochastic dependence of values this article establishes new general conditions for the profitability of product bundling a multiproduct monopolist generally achieves higher profit from mixed bundling than from separate selling if consumer values for two of its products are negatively dependent are independent or have sufficiently limited positive dependence the profitability of monopoly bundling also extends to situations where a multiproduct firm competes with a single product rival

analysis of esco activities using country indicators energy service companies escos are private sector instruments that offer energy emission improvement energy saving energy efficiency energy conservation emission reduction projects in the developed and in some developing countries literature reveals that energy emission improvements of countries may be related to their innovation and r d activity levels in this work we use a literature data on the activities and the sectors targeted by escos in 38 countries summarized in terms of the age of esco market aem number of esco companies ne and total value of esco projects ve along with the global innovation index gii data of the countries we investigate the relationships among the esco indicators eis aem ne ve sectors targeted by escos and the country indicators cis gii and per capita gdp energy consumption co2 emission we observe noteworthy dependencies between the eis and cis using the simple trend equations we estimate the missing ves in the original data we also project as a hint for the size and orientation of the upcoming turkish esco market the set of eis and the distribution of the sectors that are likely to be targeted by escos in turkey

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

real wage cyclicality in the eurozone before and during the great recession evidence from micro data we study the response of real wages to the business cycle in eight major eurozone countries before and during the great recession average real wages are found to be acyclical but this reflects in large part the effect of changes in the composition of the labour force related to unemployment variations over the cycle using longitudinal micro data from the echp and silc panels to control for composition effects we estimate the elasticities of real wage growth to unemployment increases between 0 6 and 1 over the period 1994 2011 composition effects have been particularly large since 2008 and they explain most of the stagnation or increase in the average wage observed in some countries from 2008 to 2011 in contrast at a constant labour force composition in terms of education and experience the figures indicate a significant decrease in average wages during the downturn particularly in countries most affected by the crisis overall there is no evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity during the great recession in most countries in our sample

armstrong meets rochet tirole on the equivalence of different pricing structures in two sided markets abstract we formally show that lump sum participation fees and per interaction fees charged by a monopoly platform in a two sided market are not interchangeable in the presence of price distortions such as ad valorem taxes