scarce collateral the term premium and quantitative easing abstract a model of money credit and banking is constructed in which the differential pledgeability of collateral and the scarcity of collateralizable wealth lead to a term premium an upward sloping nominal yield curve purchases of long maturity government debt by the central bank are always a good idea but for unconventional reasons a floor system is preferred to a channel system as a floor system permits welfare improving asset purchases by the central bank

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

optimal monetary policy in a cash in advance economy i introduction this paper addresses the issue of optimal monetary policy within a particular general equilibrium model of the monetary transmission mechanism the model analyzed is a member of the recent class of liquidity models of the monetary business cycle 1 these liquidity models are something of a growth industry partly because they are potentially consistent with a monetary equilibrium in which monetary injections drive down nominal rates of interest and stimulate real activity stylized facts supported by evidence presented in for example christiano and eichenbaum 1992 an unexplored question is the role of monetary policy in these models this paper makes an attempt at remedying this deficiency by analyzing optimal monetary policy in a model with liquidity effects as in the liquidity models mentioned above the model analyzed here is constructed by imposing two trading frictions on an otherwise frictionless arrow debreu environment 2 the first is a requirement that all transactions be carried out in a decentralized fashion with the use of cash this friction is the well known cash in advance constraint first suggested by clower 1967 but now quite commonplace in models of monetary equilibrium as in lucas and stokey 1987 and cooley and hansen 1989 i impose this constraint because it is a tractable way of introducing a transactions demand for cash the qualitative results would be unaffected if a more general transactions technology was employed the second friction is unique to the liquidity models i assume that private agents cannot quickly move cash across markets this assumption of sluggish cash flow presumably motivated by transactions costs that are not explicitly modeled implies that cash may not be equally valued across markets with its value in a particular market determined by the amount of cash or liquidity contained in the market this friction introduces the so called liquidity effects on asset prices and real activity the paper proceeds as follows the next section develops the basic model and discusses the effects created by the assumed trading frictions section iii explores optimal monetary policy the nature of the trading frictions introduces a role for activist monetary policy in particular to the extent that the central bank can adjust liquidity more rapidly than the private sector there is a welfare improving role for monetary policy in some cases interest rate smoothing is a good idea while in others optimal policy will increase interest rate variability section iv links the results to the optimum quantity of money literature and offers up a few conclusions ii a model of monetary non neutrality the economy is populated with three types of agents households firms and financial intermediaries there are numerous identical agents of each type so that all behave as atomistic competitors given this assumption i will confine my discussion to a representative agent of each type the representative household is made up of two members a shopper and a worker the shopper s role is to use the household s assets to acquire consumption goods during each period while the worker supplies some portion of the household s time endowment equal to 1 each period to firms in exchange for payment the household s preferences over uncertain consumption and leisure streams are given by e summation of beta sup t u c sub t v 1 l sub t where t 0 to infinity where beta is an element of 0 1 c sub t and l sub t are time t consumption and work effort respectively v is increasing and concave and mathematical expression omitted the expectation is over realizations of the economy wide shocks the expression s sub t is an element of s subset r denotes the state of the world at time t where s is a compact set these states are i i d across time with a distribution function given by

trade credit bank lending and monetary policy transmission this paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy most models of the transmission mechanism allow the firm to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion in our model we introduce trade credit as an additional source of funding we predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in market and bank lending and an increase in trade credit this is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16 000 manufacturing firms

debt deleveraging and the liquidity trap a fisher minsky koo approach in this paper we present a simple new keynesian style model of debt driven slumps that is situations in which an overhang of debt on the part of some agents who are forced into rapid deleveraging is depressing aggregate demand making some agents debt constrained is a surprisingly powerful assumption fisherian debt deflation the possibility of a liquidity trap the paradox of thrift a keynesiantype multiplier and a rationale for expansionary fiscal policy all emerge naturally from the model we argue that this approach sheds considerable light both on current economic difficulties and on historical episodes including japan s lost decade now in its 18th year and the great depression itself

asymmetric information and demand for money in an overlapping generations economy this paper studies a pure exchange overlapping generations economy in which agents have asymmetric information pertaining to their income realizations such an information asymmetry introduces a role for fiat money that would otherwise be absent this information asymmetry can also drastically alter the equilibrium properties of the analogous model with perfect information in general the more severe the information asymmetry the greater the demand for fiat money

financial intermediary capital we propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households that is have a collateralization advantage intermediaries require capital as they have to finance the additional amount that they can lend out of their own net worth the net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity such as investment and financing the accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector the model is consistent with key stylized facts about macroeconomic downturns associated with a credit crunch namely their severity their protractedness and the fact that the severity of the credit crunch itself affects the severity and persistence of downturns the model captures the tentative and halting nature of recoveries from crises

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

size and performance of banking firms testing the predictions of theory abstract in recent years two important literatures on the theory of banking firms have developed one examines the economic functions of banks in environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed another considers the incentive effects moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance both theories make predictions about the relation between banking firm size and performance an empirical analysis of large bank holding companies investigates measures of market valuation and risk of failure limited support is provided for either set of theoretical predictions

bank size and macroeconomic shock transmission does the credit channel operate through large or small banks in this paper i use u s call report data to construct a larger panel dataset with bank level observations i find that larger banks lending is considerably more sensitive to the strength of their borrowers and their own balance sheets compared to smaller banks and that the sensitivities to borrower balance sheets are larger in magnitude compared to lender balance sheets when i incorporate various macroeconomic shocks identified by an estimated dsge model into the empirical model i similarly find that the transmission of shocks to the real economy operates mostly through large bank lending and borrower balance sheets

increasing returns to scale in financial intermediation and the non neutrality of government policy a general equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries is constructed and used to study the effects of some standard policy experiments one time increases in the growth rate and in the level of the stock of money have non neutral and sometimes surprising effects on interest rates the quantity of intermediated borrowing and lending the number of intermediary firms inflation and the price level optimal government macroeconomic policy is shown to reflect a tradeoff between public sector frictions and the capital market distortion created by increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition in private intermediation

the dynamics of credit markets in a model with learning abstract a dynamic credit market is modeled in which the production and processing of information leads to alternating and persistent periods of growth and contraction in the model the number of projects engaged in determines the precision of estimates of future returns obtained from current investment shocks to underlying returns to risky projects are magnified and prolonged by the learning process multiple equilibria may exist and the magnification effect may be even larger since shocks can move the credit market to a new equilibrium the allocation of credit is generally not a constrained pareto efficient allocation

refinancing mfis with market power theory and evidence this paper presents a model of the complete microcredit financing chain investor miv mfi micro borrower in which social minded mivs provide funds only to those mfis which do not exploit their bargaining power towards micro borrowers the mfis with the highest bargaining power do not use miv capital since eschewing their market power is most costly for them consistent with this prediction of the theoretical model we find empirically that the net interest margin as a measure of mfi market power negatively affects the likelihood of using miv finance this lends support to the view that social criteria play an effective role in mivs investment policies thereby also impacting mfis lending behavior

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

moral hazard under commercial and universal banking many claims have been made about the potential benefits and the potential costs of adopting a system of universal banlcing in the united states we evaluate these claims using a model where there is a moral hazard problem between banks and borrowers a moral hazard problem between banks and a deposit insurer and a costly state verification problem under conditions we describe allowing banks to take equity positions in firms strengthens their ability to extract surplus and exacerbates problems of moral hazard the incentives of universal banks to take equity positions will often be strongest when these problems are most severe for many decades commercial banks in the united states have been prohibited from making equity investments in the firms they serve rather they are restricted to providing them with loans in the form essentially of debt contracts this longstanding regulatory restriction1 results in distinctly different roles for bank lenders and equity investors and has had important implications for the entire financial sector the american system of commercial banking presents a sharp contrast with the banking systems of some other countries most notably germany in which banks are permitted to take equity positions under such universal banking arrangements banks can make equity investments as well as loans vote their equity shares and even hold seats on the boards of directors of nonfinancial firms in general they can be actively involved in all aspects of firm decision malqing in germany the control rights the authors have benefitted from the helpful comments of doug diamond joe haubrich ross levine stan longhofer joao santos and an anonymous referee the views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system 1 the key legislation which constrains u s banks equity investments is the glass steagall act of 1933 however a number of other laws also pertain to this issue particularly the bank holding company act of 1956 and its 1970 amendments incidentally there are some important exceptions to the equity investment prohibition in default situations banks are perrnitted to restructure loans into equity positions with the requirement of divestiture after a few years see james 1993 also bank holding companies are permitted to form separately capitalized venture capital subsidiaries for the expressed purpose of investing in start up enterprises john h boyd is a professor of finance in the carlson school of management at the university of minnesota and an adjunct consultant with the federal reserve bank of minneapolis chun chang is an associate professor of finance in the carlson school of management at the university of minnesota bruce d smith is a professor of economics at the university of texas ataustin

the coevolution of the real and financial sectors in the growth process the role of debt and equity changes over time and with the level of development what are these changes and why should they systematically occur across different countries and time periods this article characterizes financial innovation as a dynamic process that both influences and is influenced by the development of the real sector it focuses on the emergence and development of equity markets using a model that allows for growth and for capital accumulation that is financed externally through a combination of debt and equity as an economy develops the aggregate ratio of debt to equity will generally fall yet debt and equity remain complementary sources for the financing of capital investments the results suggest how various government policy actions might affect capital accumulation and equity market activity

financial development and economic growth the role of stock markets utilizing time series methods and data from five developed economies we examine the relationship between stock market development and economic growth controlling for the effects of the banking system and stock market volatility our results support the view that although both banks and stock markets may be able to promote economic growth the erects of the former are more powerful they also suggest that the contribution of stock markets on economic growth may have been exaggerated by studies that utilize cross country growth regressions

house prices borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle i develop a general equilibrium model with sticky prices credit constraints nominal loans and asset prices changes in asset prices modify agents borrowing capacity through collateral value changes in nominal prices affect real repayments through debt deflation monetary policy shocks move asset and nominal prices in the same direction and are amplified and propagated over time the financial accelerator is not constant across shocks nominal debt stabilises supply shocks making the economy less volatile when the central bank controls the interest rate i discuss the role of equity debt indexation and household and firm leverage in the propagation mechanism finally i find that monetary policy should not target asset prices as a means of reducing output and inflation volatility

sticky wages and sectoral labor comovement abstract a defining feature of business cycles is the comovement of inputs at the sectoral level with aggregate activity standard models cannot account for this phenomenon this paper develops and estimates a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model that can account for this key regularity my model incorporates three shocks to the economy monetary policy shocks neutral technology shocks and embodied technology shocks in the capital producing sector the estimated model is able to account for the response of the u s economy to all three shocks using this model i argue that the key friction underlying sectoral comovement is rigidity in nominal wages

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

in defense of usury laws usury law is often criticized by economists for curtailing lending and thus creating deadweight costs this paper shows that if moral hazard leads to credit rationing a just binding usury law creates a deadweight gain this property also holds in most market clearing equilibria independent of social insurance benefits or curbing present biased preferences interest rate caps have merit

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

identifying the role of risk shocks in the business cycle using stock price data i introduction the finance literature on the forecastibility of stock returns has concluded that stock market movements are by and large not because of changes in the expected future cash flow of firms but are primarily because of changes in the risk premium that is how the expected cash flows are discounted by stock market participants cochrane 2011 1 these changes in risk premia also have important implications for real variables in the economy especially for consumption and investment an increase in the risk premium prompts households to reduce current consumption as they start to discount expected future income more heavily more importantly changes in the required return on equity alter the cost of capital of corporations when they finance new investment for firms that rely on external debt to finance marginal investment a lower stock price translates into lower net worth and therefore a higher cost of borrowing bernanke gertler and gilchrist 1999 similarly firms that rely on new equity issues are able to raise less funds from each new share when their stock price is lower even for firms that finance investment exclusively through internal funds i e retained earnings plus depreciation allowance the required return on existing shares reveals the opportunity cost of internally financed investment tobin 1969 tobin and brainard 1977 this is because at least in principle these funds can be returned to existing shareholders as dividends and new funds can then be raised from the markets through new equity shares for which investors would demand a risk premium figure 1 omitted in the aggregate u s corporations are predominantly financed through equity the dotted line in figure 1 plots the credit market liabilities of u s non financial corporations as a percent of the sum of equity and credit market liabilities in their balance sheets 2 by this measure debt financing accounts for about a third of total financing averaged over the whole sample and equity financing accounts for about two thirds the solid line in figure 1 provides an alternative measure which takes into account all financial liabilities including items such as trade payables but nets out financial assets to obtain a measure of net debt mcgrattan and prescott 2005 now debt financing accounts for only 15 of total financing in the post war period and its importance has declined in the last two decades note that both of these series are stock measures as opposed to flow measures that is they refer to financing of all past investments and do not necessarily reflect how corporations are financing investment at the margin these measures can also be biased against debt financing because most debt items are recorded on a book value basis in the flow of funds but equity is recorded on a market value basis to overcome these caveats i consider the flow components of sources of funds i e internal funds net new equity and net new debt as a share of corporate tangible investment in figure 2 several patterns emerge first the ratio of internal funds to gross capital expenditures has been close to 1 throughout the post war period in other words at least in the aggregate u s corporate investment has been by and large financed internally second new equity issuance has not been an important source of financing in fact net new stock issues have been mostly negative in the latter part of the sample this mainly reflects the preference of corporations to distribute resources to shareholders through stock buybacks rather than ordinary dividend payments because of the preferential tax treatment of long term capital gains third net new debt has contributed to about a third of aggregate financing assuming that the discrepancy in the flow account is distributed proportionally to each financing component as internal funds and net new stock issues are fairly reliable data series we can reasonably lump the rather large discrepancy item in the ffa data with net debt

should central banks respond to movements in asset prices in recent decades asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries in light of this experience how if at all should central bankers respond to asset price volatility we have addressed this issue in previous work bernanke and gertler 1999 the context of our earlier study was the relatively new but increasingly popular monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting see e g bernanke and frederic mishkin 1997 in an inflation targeting framework publicly announced medium term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run the inflation targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank s forecast of inflation to a first approximation once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations in use now for about a decade inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice however so far this approach has not often been stress tested by large swings in asset prices our earlier research employed simulations of a small calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation targeting policy defined as one in which the central bank s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation might fare in the face of a boom and bust cycle in asset prices we found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule in our simulations one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2 0 substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices intuitively inflation targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices in our view there are good reasons outside of our formal model to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices including the fact that as history has shown the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable hence we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast in the spirit of recent work on robust control the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst case discussants robert shiller yale university glenn rudebusch federal reserve bank of san francisco kenneth rogoff harvard university

the impact of monetary policy shocks on stock prices evidence from canada and the united states abstract using structural var models with short run restrictions appropriate for canada and the united states we empirically examine whether trade and financial market openness matter for the impact on and transmission to stock prices of monetary policy shocks we find that in canada the immediate response of stock prices to a domestic contractionary monetary policy shock is small and the dynamic response is brief whereas in the united states the immediate response of stock prices to a similar shock is relatively large and the dynamic response is relatively prolonged we find that these differences are largely driven by differences in financial market openness and hence different dynamic responses of monetary policy shocks between the two countries that we model in this paper

the beliefs of borrowers and lenders and investment decisions abstract this paper examines the role of beliefs in the determination of equilibrium in a standard model of credit markets and investment project choice with asymmetric information it is shown that with ex ante asymmetric information the beliefs of entrepreneurs are important for the equilibrium level of aggregate investment and with ex post asymmetric information the beliefs of creditors are important for the types of projects selected by entrepreneurs

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

on the positive role of financial intermediation in allocation of venture capital in a market with imperfect information this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information we consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions about which the investors are imperfectly informed it is shown that when all investors have positive search costs the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects lemons only and the investors will not enter the venture capital market but put their funds in other low return investments an undesirable allocation of resources beginning with an initial undesirable situation the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a pareto preferred allocation leading the investors to a higher welfare state we focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive the distribution of returns on projects the fees charged by intermediaries and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium it is shown that i there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings and ii in other cases multiple equilibra may exist but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a pareto sense

intermediaries and payments instruments abstract we study an economy in which intermediaries have incentives to issue circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium we show that with arbitrarily small transactions costs only the liabilities of intermediaries will circulate and not those of other private sector agents therefore our model connects intermediation activity with the issuance of payments media a connection that has not been made in earlier literature we use our model to suggest a resolution of the banknote underissue puzzle of cagan in d carson ed banking and monetary studies richard d irwin publishing homewood il 1963

bayesian methods for dynamic multivariate models if dynamic multivariate models are to be used to guide decisionmaking it is important that probability assessments of forecasts or policy projections be provided when identified bayesian vector autoregression var models are presented with error bands in the existing literature both conceptual and numerical problems have not been dealt with in an internally consistent way in this paper the authors develop methods to introduce prior information in both reduced form and structural var models without introducing substantial new computational burdens their approach makes it feasible to use a single large dynamic framework for example twenty variable models for tasks of policy projections copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

internal debt crises and sovereign defaults internal and sovereign debt crises occur together and happen more frequently in economies with weak bankruptcy institutions this paper provides a novel explanation internal crises arise because of the inability to liquidate private debtors when many default in an optimal contract a successful entrepreneur repays yet an unsuccessful one defaults and liquidates his assets the bounds on liquidation generate however a second equilibrium where domestic borrowers default because others are also defaulting during these coordinated defaults tax collections fall which increases sovereign default risk in the model joint debt crises are an optimal response to informational problems in private sector lending

deposit insurance a reconsideration abstract this paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls in our economy the central issue in analyzing deposit insurance is how the government will make up any fdic losses deposit insurance premia matter only in so far as they affect the level of implied fdic revenue shortfalls moreover local variations in the magnitude of fdic losses will generically be irrelevant for the determination of any equilibrium quantities that affect agent welfare however large enough changes in these losses can matter there is no presumption that keeping these shortfalls low is a good idea finally we show that multiple pareto ranked equilibria can be observed the potential for multiplicity of equilibria may depend on components of fdic policy our analysis provides counterexamples to the following propositions 1 actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is always desirable 2 implicit fdic subsidization of banks through deposit insurance is always undesirable 3 large fdic losses are necessarily symptomatic of a poorly designed deposit insurance system 4 risk based deposit insurance premia can easily be used to reduce moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance provision

time varying risk aversion abstract exploiting portfolio data and repeated surveys of an italian bank s clients we test whether investors risk aversion increases following the 2008 crisis we find that after the crisis both qualitative and quantitative measures of risk aversion increase substantially and that affected individuals divest more stock we investigate four explanations changes in wealth expected income perceived probabilities and emotion based changes of the utility function our data are inconsistent with the first two channels while they suggest that fear is a potential mechanism underlying financial decisions whether by increasing the curvature of the utility function or the salience of negative outcomes

interest rates in a credit constrained economy when households face credit constraints in an economy with inside as well as outside money stationary equilibrium real interest rates are below the household rate of time preference they also depend significantly upon household risk aversion the demand for inside versus outside money bank costs bank reserves inflation and the marginal productivity of capital and capital depreciation rates in addition changes in financial variables affect per capita capital and output to a greater extent when households are credit constrained copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the information technology revolution and the stock market technological progress comes in waves the british industrial revolution 1760 1850 ushered in cort s puddling and rolling process for making iron crompton s mule for spinning cotton and the watt steam engine the second industrial revolution 1890 1930 witnessed the rise of electricity the internal combustion engine and the chemical industry the birth of information technology it may herald the start of a third industrial revolution a new technology or product is often developed by the single entrepreneur who initially finds it hard to get funds develop the product and find customers but if the product is good customers eventually line up and investors flock in other firms then move in to make the product and may drive the innovator out or acquire him whether he reaches the initial public offering ipo stage or is acquired by a listed firm though it takes time for the innovator to add value to the stock market indeed the innovation may at first reduce the market s value because some firms usually large or old will cling to old technologies that have lost their momentum figure 1 plots the market value of u s equity relative to gdp this paper argues that a the market declined in the late 1960 s because it felt that the old technologies either had lost their momentum or would give way to it and that b it innovators boosted the stock market s value only in the 1980 s if the stock market provides a forecast of future events then the recent dramatic upswing represents a rosy estimate about growth in future profits for the economy this translates into a forecast of higher output and productivity growth holding other things equal such as capital s share