the economics of investor protection isds versus national treatment abstract investor state dispute settlements isds are supposed to protect foreign investors against domestic policies causing unjustified harm this paper scrutinizes the effects of isds and national treatment provisions in a two period model where foreign investment is subject to a hold up problem it shows that isds may increase welfare but comes with additional regulatory distortions in the first period a national treatment provision avoids these regulatory distortions but implies entry distortions because it makes the hold up problem also apply to domestic firms if the domestic regulatory framework applies to many domestic firms a national treatment provision welfare dominates isds

network externalities discrete demand shifts and submarginal cost pricing the introduction of a new product often causes a massive discrete demand shift to the new product this study demonstrates that if a large scale demand shift to a new product is accompanied by network externalities it may result in submarginal cost pricing by which the seller sets its price below the marginal cost this finding casts new light on dumping and safeguard issues in the real world jel classification d42 externalites de reseaux deplacements discrets de la demande et tarification en deca du cout marginal l introduction d un nouveau produit engendre souvent un deplacement massif discret de la demande vers le nouveau produit cette etude montre que si un tel deplacement de la demande est accompagne d externalites de reseaux il peut s ensuivre une tarification en deca du cout marginal ou le vendeur fixe son prix en dessous du cout marginal ce resultat jette une lumiere nouvelle sur les problemes de dumping et de protection dans le monde reel

the effect of old age assistance on retirement abstract researchers have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the impact of social security on retirement with mixed findings however the means tested program old age assistance oaa dwarfed social security until the 1950s and coincided with the early decline in elderly labor force participation also oaa benefits were determined by the states a key source of policy variation i estimate the relationship between oaa benefits and elderly participation using individual data from the 1940 and 1950 censuses oaa s impact is found to be strong and implies that participation would have risen slightly instead of falling if benefits had not increased during the 1940s

anti dumping what are the numbers to discuss at doha while tariff barriers have decreased worldwide through various gatt rounds anti dumping has surged to play a crucial role as the most important non tariff barrier after much debate and opposition anti dumping is on the agenda of the doha round of multilateral trade negotiations and it is one of the most important issues especially for developing countries as they are the main targets of this policy instrument with this prospect it is important to assess the relevance of anti dumping not only by focusing on traditional users but by analysing the experience of new users which are now major players in the field this paper improves upon existing studies by providing a comprehensive assessment on the use of anti dumping first data on the time pattern of worldwide implementations of anti dumping laws are presented this time profile shows interesting relationships with legal developments in gatt and wto dispositions second usual sources of data are complemented with various other sources this allows the inclusion of recent heavy users like china russia taiwan and ukraine which are ignored in similar studies but important for their trade volumes this enlarged and updated dataset shows that new users are even more important than previously thought with implications for the doha negotiations

ec trade protection law produmping or antidumping this paper argues that the anticipation of protection can have astimulating effect on exports instead of the commonly claimed effect of harassment if protection serves market cartelization by fixing export quantities or prices exporters may have an incentive to increase their sales abroad in order to secure a large share of the expected rent which is brought about by the anticipated import restriction this may even result in sales below marginal costs or dumping the effect of the protectionist threat may then be the reverse of what is intended it can raise the speed of import penetration and it can provoke dumping a formal model and a supportive institutional analysis of ec trade protection is supplemented by preliminary empirical evidence

the continued dumping and subsidy offset act an economic analysis under the continued dumping and subsidy offset act cdsoa of 2000 the u s government distributes the revenue from anti dumping and countervailing duties to domestic firms alleging harm in this article we develop a simple model to examine the economic effect of the cdsoa for the case in which the offset payments to domestic firms are linked to the volume of foreign imports the cdsoa may increase foreign imports when the domestic market is more competitive than in the cournot equilibrium this finding runs contrary to what the e u and some exporting countries have claimed but if the market is less competitive than in cournot the cdsoa becomes an instrument of trade protectionism

a politico economic theory of income redistribution this study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public good nature of redistribution and political scientists who focus on conditions that lead to demands that the state intervene to assist the poor and on the development of institutions that facilitate such demands we propose a testable theory of redistribution and apply it to data from the american states the empirical analysis addresses determinants of the aid to families with dependent children guarantee adjusted for medicaid and food stamps to which a family receiving the guarantee would be entitled we posit significant links between the guarantee and both observable explanatory variables such as per capita income and latent constructs such as liberal party control we specify observable indicators for the latent constructs and use the lisrel method to estimate parameters for the indicators and structural coefficients the findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee

anticipatory effects of voluntary export restraints a study of home video cassette recorders market 1978 86 abstract this paper investigates the impact of voluntary export restraints vers at the pre implementation stage when exporters have a good prospect for the vers distinctive features of the vcr market in 1978 86 provide a testable hypothesis to analyze the effect of the ec japan vers which were implemented in the fiscal years of 1983 85 the paper finds consistent evidence that the vers affected firms pricing behavior in the u s market prior to the ver period as a result of japanese exporters anticipation of the vers

antidumping law as a collusive device in the united states many antidumping petitions are withdrawn before the investigations are completed prusa 1992 argues that petitions are used by domestic industries to induce foreign industries into collusive agreements in his model all antidumping petitions should be withdrawn which is not the case this paper provides a model in which only some petitions are withdrawn withdrawal depends on two key parameters coordination cost and bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries a new data set is constructed to test the model on the u s experience for the period 1980 97 the econometric analysis supports the theoretical conclusions of the model

domino dumping i competitive exporters when exporting firms face the prospect of voluntary export restraints they have an incentive to export more than with no prospect of a voluntary export restraint since greater exports lead to larger license allocations in the event of a voluntary export restraint export country governments incentives differ leading either to export tax or subsidy depending on the circumstances the prospect of one departure from free trade thus leads to another a domino effect antidumping enforcement will ordinarily not eliminate and ironically may increase dumping copyright 1992 by american economic association

has the byrd amendment affected us imports the continued dumping and subsidy offset act cdsoa also known as the byrd amendment allows the u s government to distribute revenues from antidumping duties to domestic firms alleging harm prior to the amendment these revenues were not distributed to firms in this article we formally test the hypothesis that the byrd amendment effectively provides double protection to u s firms to the extent that it further restricts u s imports as argued by the e u and eleven other u s trading partners using a rich panel of 362 u s manufacturing industries for the period 1998 to 2003 we find that whether or not the byrd amendment restricted u s imports depends crucially on the level of competitiveness in the import competing industry specifically we find that the byrd amendment served to restrict imports only in industries where competition is relatively weak while the amendment is associated with an increase in imports in more competitive industries

vers and expectations extensions and evidence this paper analyses the effects of an expected future voluntary export restraint on the level of firms current exports to a market the traditional result that current exports increase is shown to depend on the degree of collusion in the exporting industry and the anticipated restrictiveness of the ver the former relationship is tested by reference to the effect of ec import surveillance on its imports surveillance is argued to indicate an increased probability of a ver in the future and it is found that while competitive industries respond to it by increasing exports to the ec less competitive ones curtail exports this constitutes one of the few empirical tests of the strategic part of strategic trade policy

trade diversion from tomato suspension agreements trade barriers can cause output to be diverted to other countries and into other products we study the effect of a voluntary price restraint vpr on mexican tomatoes entering the united states the diversion caused by the vpr is statistically and economically significant representing over four fifths of the direct effects of the trade barrier when the vpr was binding mexico exported more tomatoes to canada the united states cut back on exports while canada increased their exports to the united states the vpr also diverted fresh tomatoes in mexico into paste production which was then exported to the united states des barrieres commerciales peuvent entrainer la diversion de l output vers d autres pays ou d autres productions on etudie la diversion causee par les accords de restriction volontaire des prix arvp des tomates mexicaines entrant sur le marche americain la diversion causee par les arvp a ete statistiquement et economiquement significative representant plus des quatre cinquiemes des effets directs de la barriere tarifaire quand les arvp ont ete contraignants le mexique a exporte plus de tomates au canada les etats unis ont reduit leurs exportations alors que le canada augmentait ses exportations vers les etats unis les arvp ont aussi entraine une diversion des tomates fraiches au mexique vers la production de puree de tomate un produit qui a alors ete exporte vers les etats unis

antidumping investigations and the pass through of antidumping duties and exchange rates comment well in excess of 100 percent based on their understanding of the us antidumping calculation however the hypothesis is based on an incorrect understanding of the antidumping calculation under us law when corrected for this error the hypothesis would lead to a prediction of simple 100 percent pass through at most dumping refers to selling a product in an export market at less than its normal value a benchmark that is most commonly based on sales in the domestic market of the same product antidumping laws set tariffs to offset the amount of dumping the excess of normal value over export price in us practice a dumping complaint is brought on behalf of an industry against rival imports with the cases defined by product and by country a successful case results in the potential imposition of antidumping duties over and above any normal tariffs an unsuccessful case results in no duties being imposed american antidumping law and practice have the somewhat unusual characteristic that anti dumping duties are estimated and used to set duty deposits for a forward looking period in an initial investigation then are recalculated and actually assessed for the same period now back ward looking in a later review with some variation the later review is typically completed about two years after the initial investigation the review sets a new deposit rate and a second review determines the actual assessment rate retrospectively this can be repeated indefinitely the ini tial duty estimate resulting in a deposit rate allows companies to modify their pricing behavior so as to affect the actual dumping duties that are later assessed blonigen and haynes exploit this characteristic of the us administration of its antidump ing law to examine the effects of the imposition of antidumping duties on the pass through to us pricing the dumping investigation and resulting deposit rate provide information that the company can use in its subsequent sales in order to reduce or eliminate its dumping liability in the eventual review by comparing the antidumping deposit rates with eventual us pricing the degree of pass through of antidumping deposits can be estimated and the effects on exchange rate pass through of a potential antidumping dumping duty can be studied here i focus on the factual underpinnings that lead to blonigen and haynes s pricing model rather than the empirical results that model predicts that the method by which the us department of commerce usdoc calculates ad duties will lead to pass through of estimated antidump ing duties at twice the level of those estimated duties if companies wish to eliminate the eventual dumping duties by studying the outcomes of a series of ad cases concerning steel from canada they conclude that pass through of estimated duties exceeds 160 percent broadly consistent with

demographic effects on public charity to the aged this study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public good nature of

the financial markets and customer satisfaction reexamining possible financial market mispricing of customer satisfaction we investigate the association between information contained in the american customer satisfaction index acsi metric and future stock market performance some past research has provided results suggesting that the financial markets misprice customer satisfaction i e firms advantaged in customer satisfaction are posited to earn positive future period abnormal stock returns we reexamine this relationship and find that statistically significant evidence of financial market mispricing of customer satisfaction is limited to firms in the computer and internet sector the results suggest that the mispricing anomaly reported in past research appears not to stem from a systemic failure of the financial markets to impound the financial implications of customer satisfaction into current stock price but rather from abnormal returns achieved by a small group of satisfaction leaders in the computer and internet sector over the period of study analyses based on unconditional risk covariates and analyses using conditional risk covariates estimated from short window high frequency data support this finding

dumping and signaling abstract a model of predatory dumping based upon incomplete and asymmetric information is developed the foreign firm may induce exit by the home firm through acting like a low cost competitor irrespective of its actual costs the home firm must infer the foreign firm s cost through its export price by tying the export price to the price that the foreign firm charges in the foreign market a home county antidumping law raises the cost of signaling low production costs to the home producer the law has signal enhancing or inhibiting effects which may adversely affect the home firm with ambiguous welfare consequences

welfare costs of the u s antidumping and countervailing duty laws abstract the antidumping ad and countervailing duty cvd laws in the united states have become the most pervasive form of import relief sought by domestic producers this paper estimates the collective economic effect of the hundreds of active u s ad cvd orders using a computable general equilibrium model we estimate that the collective net economic welfare cost in 1993 of these orders to be 4 billion this welfare estimate is sensitive to various modeling assumptions which are explored in the paper with the implementation of the uruguay round agreements the ad cvd laws remain one of the costliest programs restraining u s trade

dumping as a signal of innovation in the r d intensive industries where technologies change rapidly an innovative foreign firm may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal the level of the new technology it possesses we find that such actions lead to sales below cost if the foreign firm has a relatively poor reputation for innovation has a sufficiently high discount factor or possesses a new technology that significantly cuts its cost we also show that antidumping reduces the costs of signaling benefits the home firm and may raise the profit to the foreign firm in the pre duty period

foreign investment quotas and rent extraction under uncertainty abstract this study examines the effects of quantitative restrictions on foreign firms entry into a domestic industry foreign firms investment policy and the equilibrium value of their entry right are studied under various rationing and rent extracting schemes when foreign firms are left free to compete for the scarcity rents induced by a quota their policy exhibits a suboptimal rent run entry occurs at the optimal pace only until a threshold level of investment is reached the last group of firms enters early and dumps output at below marginal cost

endogenous protection foreign direct investment and protection building trade abstract we introduce the possibility of foreign direct investment fdi in a strategic oligopolistic setting with endogenous protection and find that a number of unique subgame perfect equilibria may arise including a new result we call protection building trade this phenomenon occurs in our model when foreign firms locating production in the home country try to increase protectionist pressures in the home country through increased exports to provide larger barriers against other foreign competitors in future periods we discuss how the foreign firm behavior surrounding significant u s protectionist actions including the vers on japanese automobiles may be consistent with protection building trade behavior

population age structure and the size of social security this paper uses a general overlapping generations model to analyze social security rather than focusing on intertemporal price and income considerations however the paper focuses on the effect of contemporaneous same period prices and income the analysis shows that the old age dependency ratio acts as a shadow price for old age benefits with this new shadow price the equilibrium price and quantity of social security benefits and the level of the payroll tax rate are determined in a demand supply framework with individual utility maximization three explicit demand functions intergenerational contracts are analyzed the model is tested using u s time series data for the social security old age and survivors oasi program excerpt

domino dumping ii anti dumping abstract domino dumping anderson american economic review 1992 82 65 83 arises when exporting firms dump to obtain more export licenses in the future when there is a positive probability of a future ver anti dumping policy may then be in the public interest for the importing country via lowering the probability of a ver increased enforcement may perversely lead to a rise in dumping also it may increase the probability of a ver and may reduce the probability of free trade it is possible for the public interest to require some enforcement however it is normally in the public interest to permit some dumping

rationalizing agricultural export subsidies export subsidies are an important form of agricultural policy especially for large traders such as the united states and the european community a number of small countries also use export subsidies in effect e g saudi arabian wheat or canadian dairy products in that the domestic price is set well above world levels and surplus production is dumped onto the world market a number of recent contributions to trade theory have argued that export subsidies can be welfare enhancing for the subsidizing country and by implication that the policy choice is consistent with the hypothesis that a benevolent government is pursuing pareto efficiency in the present paper we examine these arguments and present an alternative explanation of export subsidies utilizing the concept of efficient redistribution becker gardner 1983 in standard trade models arguments in favor of global export subsidies arise from failure to exploit market power in another good itoh and kiyono feenstra itoh and kiyono use a threegood model to show that subsidies on marginal goods defined as goods not exported at all or exported in small quantities can increase welfare in the subsidizing country a subsidy on marginal goods causes their production to increase and the supply of nonmarginal goods to decrease thereby raising the price of the nonmarginal goods and increasing the exporter s terms of trade feenstra also employs a threegood model and demonstrates that it is possible for the pattern of substitutability and complementarity across goods to allow subsidies to increase welfare the necessary condition is that the subsidized export be a stronger substitute for another exported good or a stronger complement for an imported good in the subsidizing country than abroad the export subsidy increases welfare by improving the terms of trade in the other imported or exported good the distortion in feenstra s model is the failure to exploit market power in the second or third market as an alternative to global export subsidies abbott paarlberg and sharples aps have examined targeted export subsidies and found that in some circumstances they can be welfare improving dutton later showed the aps result arises because they first constrain the export tax to the rest of the world to be zero so that it becomes theoretically possible for the best export tax to the targeted country to be negative the aps result hinges on differences in import demand elasticities and the exporting country s use of market power in order to price discrim

dynamics and discriminatory import policy although the general agreement on trade and tariffs prohibits discriminatory import tariffs gatt rules include means by which this prohibition can be circumvented the previous literature use static models to show that discriminatory tariffs increase welfare in a dynamic model this is not necessarily true for example with consumer switching costs current market share is valuable in this case discriminatory tariffs are higher for firms with a higher market share in expectation of such policies firms price less aggressively if switching costs are significant relative to exporting country asymmetries then this adverse affect on incentives can result in lower importing country welfare this suggests that it might be in the interests of importers to abide by the gatt mfn principle

voluntary export restraints and strategic technology transfers abstract this paper investigates the effects of voluntary export restraints vers in the presence of potential entrants and technology transfers it builds a model of a licensing game in a cournot oligopoly market and examines conditions under which vers induce restrained foreign firms to transfer technologies to potential suppliers i show that a ver can decrease the profit and output of the domestic incumbent by perturbing the no licensing equilibrium reached under free trade and inducing the market to move to a licensing equilibrium

anti dumping a growing problem in international trade this paper discusses the issue of anti dumping ad proliferation ad is used more frequently by more countries and against more products than ever in its history i review ad filing patterns with an emphasis on the scope of countries and industries seeking protection recent trends suggest that the widespread embrace of ad protection makes the prospect for ad reform increasingly unlikely ad is no longer being used solely by high income developed countries it is increasingly being used by middle income and even lower income countries new users have chosen to use ad very intensively per dollar of imports the new users have filed ad cases up to 15 20 times more frequently than the traditional ad users such as the us and eu the evolving set of ad users complicates ad negotiations in the near term strong opposition by the us and eu makes reform a highly unlikely outcome in the longer run rising use of ad against the us and eu could conceivably weaken their support for ad yet the same trends that might finally cause the us and eu to realise ad is a failed policy will likely make reform impossible

do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps abstract this paper examines how the country breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import competing and foreign exporting firms the contribution of the analysis is to show how firm level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country breadth i show that a country specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade in contrast a broadly applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import competing firm but will slow down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm s adoption of new technology the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed

voluntary export restraints antidumping procedure and domestic politics a voluntary export restraint ver is preferred to a tariff by a government concerned about electoral returns when the influence of industry profits is large relative to the losses to consumers from higher prices if the foreign firm is uncertain of these pressures the antidumping code facilitates the complete transfer of the relevant information and generates a ver rather than a tariff in equilibrium the choice across instruments is determined by the political attributes domestic and foreign profits rise with the antidumping generated ver and the ver lowers the volume of trade by more than the expected duty copyright 1996 by american economic association