global inequality how large is the effect of top incomes abstract despite the growing interest in global inequality assessing inequality trends is a major challenge because individual data on income or consumption is not often available nevertheless the periodic release of certain summary statistics of the income distribution has become increasingly common hence grouped data in form of income shares have been conventionally used to construct inequality trends based on lower bound approximations of inequality measures this approach introduces two potential sources of measurement error first these estimates are constructed under the assumption of equality of incomes within income shares second the highest income earners are not included in the household surveys from which grouped data is obtained in this paper we propose to deploy a flexible parametric model which addresses these two issues in order to obtain a reliable representation of the income distribution and accurate estimates of inequality measures this methodology is used to estimate the recent evolution of global interpersonal inequality from 1990 to 2015 and to examine the effect of survey under coverage of top incomes on the level and direction of global inequality overall we find that item non response at the top of the distribution substantially biases global inequality estimates but more importantly it might also affect the direction of the trends

the effect of land scarcity on farm structure empirical evidence from mali abstractwe analyze the individualization of farm units in mali in the sense of a transformation of purely collective farms into mixed units in which private plots coexist with collective fields since a moral hazard in team problem plagues production on the latter and the household head extracts his income from it he faces a trade off between efficiency and capture we show within the framework of a patriarchal farm household model that private plots become profitable for the head once land becomes sufficiently scarce specifically greater land scarcity raises both the probability to find private plots in afarm and the share of farmland allocated to these plots on the basis of firsthand data collected in southern mali we test and confirm the two predictions yielded by the above theory moreover we show that a higher number of married men within the household has the same effect as land scarcity thus suggesting an interesting refinement of the moral hazard in team argument

share contracts and their rationale lessons from marine fishing most of the existing literature on share contracts is based explicitly or implicitly on agriculture a sector in which share contracts are seldom dominant and apparently on the decline moreover since agricultural activities have some rather special characteristics the purpose of the present article is to analyse contractual choice and especially the choice of share contracts in a sector in which share contracts are dominant namely fishing in the process of explaining the dominance of share contracts in fishing the article also explains a some heretofore neglected features of these share contracts such as the way in which shares are calculated and the treatment of repair and maintenance expenditures b the nature and extent of interlinked transactions c the exceptional cases where share contracts are not used and d the relevance of varying environmental conditions and especially those of poor developing countries to the nature of contracts in fishing and to the differences therein between

a framework for the analysis of evolving patron client ties in agrarian economies abstract this paper looks systematically at the various factors that can account for the disappearance or the transformation of the institution of patronage that used to structure labor and other relationships in many agrarian societies of the past it is an attempt to offer a unifying framework capable of guiding one s attention to the relevant variables and to the way they interact in this process the rather simplistic view according to which there is a unique linear path through which patronage evolves is called into question and a number of different scenarios are instead presented these alternatives are illustrated with reference to asia

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

labor tying in a poor agrarian economy a theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper we show how tied labor contrary to its common characterization as a feudal relic and as a symptom of economic stagnation may actually be strengthened by capitalist agricultural development we construct a simple two period theoretical model of a two tiered labor market to show how the proportional importance of voluntary labor tying contracts may increase with yield increasing improvements and with a tightening of the labor market we then provide in support of these hypotheses some general historical as well as more detailed econometric evidence from a variety of cross sectional data in rural india

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

what does she see in him the effect of sharing on the choice of spouse all husbands and wives share in the spoils of marriage sharing makes each partner a residual claimant and encourages spouses to provide marital inputs however because each spouse is only a partial residual claimant each may be inclined to provide a suboptimal level of marital inputs the choice of spouse influences the level of distortion and under some circumstances the eficient mating is between individuals of equal value people tend to end up choosing partners of approximately their own social worth romantic choices appear to be a delicate compromise between one s desire to capture an ideal partner and one s realization that he must eventually settle for what he deserves

pareto models top incomes and recent trends in uk income inequality i determine uk income inequality levels and trends by combining inequality estimates from tax return data for the rich and household survey data for the non rich taking advantage of the better coverage of top incomes in tax return data which i demonstrate and creating income variables in the survey data with the same definitions as in the tax data to enhance comparability for top income recipients i estimate inequality and mean income by fitting pareto models to the tax data examining specification issues in depth notably whether to use pareto i or pareto ii generalized pareto models and the choice of income threshold above which the pareto models apply the preferred specification is a pareto ii model with a threshold set at the 99th or 95th percentile depending on year conclusions about aggregate uk inequality trends since the mid 1990s are robust to the way in which tax data are employed the gini coefficient for individual gross income rose by around 7 or 8 between 1996 7 and 2007 8 with most of the increase occurring after 2003 4 the corresponding estimate based wholly on the survey data is around 5

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

limited liability and the existence of share tenancy abstract the paper considers the problem confronting an absentee landlord who can lease out his land on a fixed rent contract share rent contract or a mixture of the two it is argued that in poor areas it is natural to have each contract underwritten by an implicit limited liability clause which allows a person to forego paying rent under extreme crop failures in the presence of such an implicit clause a certain tension appears between a tenant and a landlord with the former preferring risky projects and the latter preferring safe ones it is shown that in such a case share tenancy turns out to be the dominant system from among the class mentioned above because it minimises the tension between the landlord and the tenant the result is then used to discuss conditions under which share tenancy will tend to wither away

interlocking transactions obstacles precursors or instruments of agrarian capitalism abstract rural labor arrangements often change rapidly and in ways that prevailing theories cannot explain explicit understanding of the exercise of power in rural society sheds considerable light on how and why rural labor arrangements change in the course of economic development this paper shows how different labor tying arrangements embody exclusionary mechanisms that can serve as instruments of both labor management and social control macro political and economic conditions shape the ways in which these mechanisms operate and are in turn influenced by them viewing labor arrangements in this way helps resolve problems confronted by the prevailing theories and allows for a broader understanding of dynamic processes

the formation of risk sharing networks this paper examines the formation of risk sharing networks in the rural philippines we find that geographic proximity possibly correlated with kinship is a major determinant of mutual insurance links among villagers age and wealth differences also play an important role in contrast income correlation and differences in occupation are not determinants of network links reported network links have a strong effect on subsequent gifts and loans gifts between network partners are found to respond to shocks and to differences in health status from this we conclude that intra village mutual insurance links are largely determined by social and geographical proximity and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversification of income risk the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of dyadic models

targeting child labor in debt bondage despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor several important questions have yet to be addressed how pervasive is the phenomenon are there systematic correlations between the incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic legislative and financial development indicators of the economy how does an understanding of these correlates affect the way national and international policy measures aimed at targeting this form of child labor are perceived this article addresses each of these questions the empirical findings suggest strong correlation between the likelihood of the incidence of child labor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy the stage of financial development and enforcement of core labor rights building on this evidence the article presents a theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and merits of a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child labor in debt bondage

market failure and control of labour power towards an explanation of structure and change in indian agriculture part 1 1 although existing approaches do on occasion shed light on certain specific aspects of indian agriculture in general they run into problems of methodology or content or more frequently both in particular it is misleading to treat indian agri culture in peasant economy no markets or neoclassical perfect market terms and problematic to view it as semi feudal markets subordinate to extra economic factors 2 analysis of the relationships between farm size land productivity sharecropping and mechanisation suggest the need for an integrated model which emphasises both the unemployment and poverty of poor peasants and the problems of supervision and control of wage labour and tenants 3 proper appreciation of the interlinked role of these factors can help to explain the system s inability to combine the abundant labour of the poor with resources owned largely by the rich it can also go on to explain institutional responses like sharecropping as partial solutions to the problem of intensifying labour use and technological ones such as mechanisation as a means of delinking large farm growth from the need to intensify labour use 4 the tensions and choices between these responses underlie both the problem of stagnation and the phenomenon of switches from sharecropping to mechanisation 5 for associated reasons more rapid growth in indian agriculture is unlikely without major institutional changes to create much new employment and is likely to be more capital intensive than is usually assumed

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

permanent labour and land tenancy contracts in agrarian economies an integrated analysis extending the existing models of land and labour contracts this study attempts to build a general model of long term agrarian contracts the model implies that where tenancy is an available option the fixed wage permanent labour contract will not be chosen if it is chosen under institutional constraints on tenancy contracts resulting resource allocations will be inefficient empirical relevance of the model is tested on data from the philippines

targeting child labor in debt bondage evidence theory and policy implications despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor several important questions have yet to be addressed how pervasive is the phenomenon are there systematic correlations between the incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic legislative and financial development indicators of the economy how does an understanding of these correlates affect the way national and international policy measures aimed at targeting this form of child labor are perceived this article addresses each of these questions the empirical findings suggest strong correlation between the likelihood of the incidence of child labor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy the stage of financial development and enforcement of core labor rights building on this evidence the article presents a theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and merits of a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child labor in debt bondage

land and power theory and evidence from chile many employment relationships concede rents to workers depending on the political institutions the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers political behavior such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot we examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in chile in 1958 on voting behavior before the reforms localities with more pervasive patron client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right wing parties traditionally associ ated with the landed oligarchy after the reform however this difference across localities completely disappeared jel d72 n46 o13 o15 o17

land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers this paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated prior to acquisition the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer and ex ante incentives of tenants and landlord to make specific investments in agricultural productivity efficiency considerations are shown to require farmers be over compensated in the event of conversion

the impact of connectivity on market interlinkages evidence from rural punjab up to the 1980s it was generally accepted that many key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding of market interlinkages recently however this theory has lost its importance in development literature based on a household level survey from rural pakistan this paper seeks to re introduce the importance of interlinkages by illustrating their exploitative potential particularly in unequal isolated villages where landlords are essentially monopolist monopsonist the solution proposed is to break isolation making use of an exogenous shock found in the construction of a motorway the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely it does significantly reduce their exploitative nature

the effects of profit sharing on employment wages stock returns and productivity evidence from uk micro data this paper provides evidence based on u k firm level data that 1 the authors cannot reject the view that profit sharing firms view the total level of remuneration as the marginal cost of labor which is contrary to much of weitzman s analysis 2 there is some support for the popular view that profit sharing raises total remuneration and can therefore be inflationary and 3 the introduction of profit sharing does lead to higher productivity but this combined with the employment reducing consequences of 2 leads the authors to conclude that the net employment effect is small and uncertain copyright 1990 by royal economic society

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

productivity effects of worker participation in management profit sharing worker ownership of assets and unionization in u s firms abstract in this paper we provide our first econometric estimates of the effect of worker participation in decision making ownership and profits on productive efficiency participation has the potential for exerting several conflicting influences on firm performance simultaneously as a result both the direction and magnitude of its impact are empirical issues previous studies have empirically measured the impact of each of these forms of participation however no prior study has controlled for the influence of the other forms because of the potential for correlation among these forms of participation it is possible that omitted variables bias has affected the previous results using a new panel data set with simultaneous measures of all four types of participation in u s manufacturing establishments we model participation as disembodied technical change and estimate production function coefficients for each type while controlling for the others we use both ols and instrumental variables in order to guard against potential simultaneity the iv results indicate that participation in decision making has a large positive productivity effect while the impacts of unionization and profit sharing depend upon regression specification moderate amounts of indirect worker ownership affect productivity positively while the estimated effect of direct worker ownership is negative however this last result may reflect the industrial concentration of the direct ownership firms in our sample

tenancy and family resources a model and some empirical analysis abstract in this paper we discuss with the help of a simple model the role of family resource endowments in determining the extent of land leased in or leased out by a household this becomes important when the market for some of these resources is either not functioning at all or is functioning imperfectly we focus on three such resources which have some relevance in indian agriculture these are 1 the family s managerial skill 2 its endowment of human labour and 3 its endowment of draft animal labour household level data from six villages of maharashtra and andhra pradesh are also utilized to test some of the hypotheses

water allocation inefficiency and inequity in a government irrigation system abstract efficient and equitable allocation of irrigation water in a large multi user system must consider spatial temporal and seasonal differences in farm water use in developing countries centralized government management of canal systems typically allocates water according to simple fixed rules water allocation over a six year period is analyzed for a philippine government system and compared with estimated variability in farmer water utilization inflexibility of the present allocation is found to be inefficient with inequitable distribution of irrigation benefits among farmers

tenure systems in traditional china i a general equilibrium model of tenure preference classical marginalists at least after john clark provide an unequivocal solution for the conventional factor market where people sell the productive services of their resources to producers the productexhaustion theorem says that if factors are priced according to their marginal products incomes of all resource owners will exactly exhaust the value of total products in the long run competitive equilibrium this holds true regardless of which factor is variable and which is fixed and regardless of which group of resource owners perform as producers who buy productive services of other resources in the market and claim residuals for themselves in an agrarian economy with land and labor as the inputs a land owner may cultivate his land and purchase the labor input from outside paying a wage rate in accordance with labor s marginal product the land owner is then the residual claimant alternatively he may lease out his land and receive a fixed rental rate per unit of area equal to the marginal product of land in this case the tenant is the producer and claims the residual income distribution between the two parties remains the same under each land arrangement wage and rent are therefore identical conceptually the classical marginal analysis has not presented a satisfactory theory of share tenancy which instead of being a seller buyer transaction in a conventional factor market is essentially a partnership arrangement between two persons who own complementary factors hence the term land renting will hereafter denote the fixed rent system exclusively in fact the direct application of marginal analysis to share tenancy has created considerable confusion in early economic literature only recently some general equilibrium models of land tenure systems have been developed for better understanding of the

understanding declining mobility and inter household transfers among east african pastoralists we model interhousehold transfers between nomadic livestock herders as the state dependent consequence of individuals strategic interdependen ce resulting from the existence of multiple opposing externalities a public good security ext ernality among individuals sharing a social e g ethnic identity in a potentially hostile en vironment creates incentives to band together self interested interhousehold wealth transfers fro m wealthier herders to poorer ones may emerge endogenously within a limited wealth space as a mea ns to motivate accompanying migration by the recipient the distributional reach and size o f the transfer are limited however by a resource appropriation externality related to the use of com mon property grazing lands when this effect dominates it can induce transfers from households who want to relieve grazing pressures caused by others herds our model augments the extant li terature on transfers and is perhaps more consistent with the limited available empirical evi dence on heterogeneous and changing transfers patterns among east african pastoralists the core principles of our model possibly apply more broadly for example to long distance migrants or e ven among foot soldiers in street gangs

the distribution of top earnings in the uk since the second world war much of the change in individual earnings has occurred at the top this paper provides new evidence about the earnings distribution in the uk the evidence is new in that it provides detail about what has happened within the top 10 covering groups such as the top 1 and the top 0 5 the aim is to set the recent rise in top earnings in historical perspective and to make international comparisons the evidence is new in that it covers the whole of the postwar period allowing a contrast to be drawn with the golden age of the 1950s

top incomes in the long run of history a recent literature has constructed top income shares time series over the long run for more than twenty countries using income tax statistics top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income and total taxes paid hence aggregate economic growth per capita and gini inequality indexes are sensitive to excluding or including top incomes we discuss the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series including income definition and comparability over time and across countries tax avoidance and tax evasion we provide a summary of the key empirical findings most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the twentieth century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars and depression shocks top income shares do not recover in the immediate postwar decades however over the last thirty years top income shares have increased substantially in english speaking countries and in india and china but not in continental european countries or japan this increase is due in part to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes as a result wage income comprises a larger fraction of top incomes than in the past finally we discuss the theoretical and empirical models that have been proposed to account for the facts and the main questions that remain open

evidence on incentive effects of subjective performance evaluations the authors investigate the effect of managerial performance evaluation styles on employee work effort using panel data on 4 080 employees in a swiss unit of an international company for the period 1999 2002 they test two hypotheses using paid and unpaid overtime work as effort indicators the company applies two performance based remuneration mechanisms an individual surprise bonus and one in which salary is affected by the extent to which an individual has reached personalized targets the authors hypothesize that effort is higher in departments in which individual performance evaluations are more flexible over time as well as when surprise bonuses are used more frequently both hypotheses are supported and the estimated effects are substantial increases in rating flexibility or bonus payments by one standard deviation above the mean increase average overtime hours by more than 20 the findings are robust and suggest that surprise bonuses and flexible performance evaluations over time provide ef

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

coercive contract enforcement law and the labor market in 19th century industrial britain british master and servant law made employee contract breach a criminal offense until 1875 we develop a contracting model generating equilibrium contract breach and prosecutions then exploit exogenous changes in output prices to examine the effects of labor demand shocks on prosecutions positive shocks in the textile iron and coal industries increased prosecutions following the abolition of criminal sanctions wages differentially rose in counties that had experienced more prosecutions and wages responded more to labor demand shocks coercive contract enforcement was applied in industrial britain restricted mobility allowed workers to commit to risk sharing contracts with lower but less volatile wages

interlinked contracts an empirical study this study investigates the contractual relationship between farmers and sugar mills in colonial taiwan our investigation is based on a model of interlinked contracts which is adapted from gangopadhyay and sengupta 1987 the validity of our model s predictions is verified by analyzing a data set consisting of contracts between taiwan s cane farmers and sugar mills during the period of japanese occupation our data suggest that the contractual relationship is consistent with a second best scenario where the interest rates charged by sugar mills on cash loans to farmers are set in order to prevent diversion of funds to non production uses

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

the long reach of cotton in the us south tenant farming mechanization and low skill manufacturing abstract this paper examines the long run impact of cotton agriculture on local development in the us south focusing on a novel aspect of structural change exploiting climate based variation in cotton production i show that cotton specialization in the late 19th century had a negative impact on local development that lasts through 2010 this negative relationship however only became evident in the second half of the 20th century i argue that the change was caused by the mechanization of cotton production which began in the 1950s after the mechanization local manufacturing absorbed displaced cotton tenants with low human capital in response to the inflow of cotton tenants labor productivity in manufacturing began to decline and the effects persisted in the long run the persistent decline in manufacturing productivity is explained by directed technical change that reduced demand for skills in manufacturing these results indicate that depending on the agricultural background structural change can negatively affect the evolution of technology and productivity in the industrial sector

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

when fishery rhymes with poverty a first step beyond the old paradigm on poverty in small scale fisheries abstract in this paper we first look retrospectively at the perceptions embraced by academics international agencies and practitioners of the relation between fisheries and poverty in developing countries and we try to identify the underlying paradigms which have structured these perceptions the review reveals how the debate has focused on the economic low income and biological overexploitation aspects of the problem we then revisit these perceptions in the light of the recent conclusions drawn from other sectors and in particular from the new consensus on poverty proposed by the international community incorporation of the recent research on poverty helps to show how socio institutional mechanisms governing people s access to fisheries resources rather than the resources themselves play such a critical role in vulnerability to poverty finally a typology identifying four different categories of intrasectoral exclusion mechanisms is developed and illustrated through empirical studies derived from african and asian fisheries

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

the new development economics abstract the theory of rural organization based on rational peasants in environments where information is imperfect and costly provides a simple explanation for a wide variety of phenomena in ldcs it provides insights into both why sharecropping is so widespread and why it takes on the particular forms that it does it provides an explanation of the interlinkage of credit and land markets and of cost sharing the paper argues that this theory provides a better explanation of these phenomena than do the competing theories this theory can be viewed as an important application of a more general paradigm the imperfect information paradigm which has been useful in explaining economic phenomena under a wide variety of settings under competition oligopoly and monopoly in labor markets capital markets in insurance markets and product markets and in developed and less developed countries

contingent loan repayment in the philippines abstract using data from the philippines this article seeks to understand how households in the study area apparently manage to avoid falling into a debt trap in spite of frequent borrowing findings suggest that this is achieved via three institutional features first most informal debt carries no interest second for all debts repayment is postponed in case of a borrower s difficulty this is the only insurance feature of debt repayment third while debt principal is seldom forgiven or reduced interest bearing debt does not carry additional interest if debt repayment is delayed this prevents interest charges from accumulating and debt from snowballing

the economics of polygyny in sub saharan africa female productivity and the demand for wives in cote d ivoire polygyny is still practiced throughout much of sub saharan africa with important social consequences this paper makes the first attempt to link african polygyny directly to the productivity of women in agriculture using micro data i develop a structural model of the demand for wives that disentangles wealth and substitution effects using a large household survey from cote d ivoire i find that marked geographic diversity in cropping patterns leads to regional variation in female labor productivity i also find that conditional on wealth men do have more wives when women are more productive that is cheaper this substitution effect may explain why polygyny declined in rural areas of cote d ivoire during agricultural development

recent trends in top income shares in the usa reconciling estimates from march cps and irs tax return data although the majority of research on us income inequality trends is based on public use march cps data a new wave of research using irs tax return data reports substantially higher levels of inequality and faster growing trends we show that these apparently inconsistent estimates are largely reconciled if the inequality measure and the income distribution are defined in the same way using internal cps data for 1967 2006 we closely match irs data based estimates of top income shares reported by piketty and saez 2003 our results imply that any inequality increases since 1993 are concentrated among the top 1 percent of the distribution

the productivity effects of employee stock ownership plans and bonuses evidence from japanese panel data the authors report the first results for japanese firms on the effects of employee stock ownership plans esops and bonuses by estimating production functions using new panel data they find that the introduction of an esop will lead to a 4 5 percent increase in productivity this productivity payoff takes three to four years there is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system the authors also find evidence that the productivity effect of bonuses is enhanced by the existence of esops suggesting that esops may create a climate conducive to profit sharing by enhancing long term commitment and peer monitoring copyright 1995 by american economic association

pareto and the upper tail of the income distribution in the uk 1799 to the present the pareto distribution has long been a source of fascination to economists and the pareto coefficient is widely used in theoretical and empirical studies as a summary of the degree of concentration of top incomes this paper examines the empirical evidence from income tax data concerning top incomes in the uk contrasting the dramatic changes that took place in the twentieth century after 1918 with the much more modest changes in the preceding nineteenth century probing beneath the surface the paper identifies a number of features of the evolution of the uk income inequality that warrant closer attention these include the changing shape of the upper tail where there is a link with pareto s theory of elites the need for a richer functional form to describe top incomes and the limited evidence at the top of the distribution for a kuznets curve in nineteenth century britain

the effects of workers participation on enterprise performance empirical evidence from french cooperatives abstract the results of estimating production functions augmented by various measures of workers participation on a large enterprise level data set of french cooperatives are reported value added is found to be an increasing function of participation in profits in collective membership and in ownership even when a wide assortment of enterprise specific and environmental factors are taken into account this finding is very robust surviving tests between alternative specifications of technology for reverse causality for simultaneous equation bias and for multicollinearity the typical productivity effect from participation however is small around 5 of output the results suggest that western policymakers should investigate ways to increase workers participation in capital stakes and profit shares

an inquiry into quasi credit contracts the role of reciprocal credit and interlinked deals in small scale fishing communities in agrarian village societies beset with many hazards and uncertainties people evolve various means of coping with risk what is perhaps less known is that credit transactions can sometimes serve the function of reducing risk in such societies this article is concerned with examining several insurance motivated credit arrangements in small scale fishing communities a hunger insurance mechanism of reciprocal credit and a system of interlinked contracts aimed at insuring against risks in the spheres of labour and marketing relations will be extensively dealt with moreover the concept of triadic relationships will be shown to have special relevance in the case of traditional insurance arrangements aiming at controlling problems of moral hazard

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

collective agricultural production a solution for transition economies abstract the paper examines theoretical reasons and provides examples for productivity differences between agricultural service cooperatives and collectives service cooperatives can utilize economies of scale enhance competitiveness and provide technical information advantages that often outweighed problems of free riding low investment and excessive political intervention agricultural collectives while not adding substantial advantages are in addition associated with problems of supervision and effort supply tendencies to substitute casual workers or mechanization for regular members and low investment incentives while collective forms of organization in transition economies respond to high risk and market imperfections they do so inefficiently policies that create conditions for service cooperatives to compete may lead to large productivity gains

the political value of land political reform and land prices in chile in this article we argue that when patron client relations are grounded in economic relationships such as between landlord and worker we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy the state and the political system work but also how the economy works we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed landlords patrons provide economic rents to workers and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords as votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents vote control increases the demand for labor and for land the model implies that the introduction of the australian ballot which destroys this form of clientelism should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron client relationships are strongest we test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in chile around may 31 1958 for which we collected original data a characteristic of rural chile at this time were patron client relations based on the inquilinaje system by which a worker the inquilino entered into a long term often hereditary employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord s estate we show that the introduction of the australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26 in land prices in the areas where these patron client relationships were predominant

off farm work technical efficiency and rice production risk in taiwan this article investigates the differences in yield production production efficiency and yield risk for farmers both with and without off farm work using a nationwide survey of rice farmers in taiwan we estimate two stochastic production frontier models that accommodate technical inefficiency and production risk simultaneously for farmers both with and without off farm work the stochastic dominance criterion is then applied to compare the differences in the distributions of the estimated technical efficiency and yield risk between groups the empirical results indicate that these two groups of farmers use resources in different ways and off farm work is not necessarily associated with lower technical efficiency for farmers in the lower percentiles of the efficiency distribution those with off farm work are more efficient than their counterparts without off farm work in addition farmers with off farm work face higher production risk and this result is robust for the entire distribution

annual bonuses employment and productivity change in taiwan s manufacturing sector abstract taiwanese manufacturing firms have traditionally made annual bonus payments to employees concentrated around the lunar new year holiday this paper uses industry data to investigate the connection between compensation volatility and the volatility and growth rate of employment we observe a significant relationship between employment and seasonally predictable compensation volatility implying that industries in which firms commit themselves to paying regular new year bonuses employ more workers more stably we also investigate the relationship between compensation profits and productivity growth we find a significant role for productivity growth in the determination of profits and for profits in the determination of bonuses however it appears that productivity growth itself is mainly determined by exogenous factors and is only slightly responsive to the bonus system