asset prices and institutional investors empirical evidence indicates that trades by institutional investors have sizable effects on asset prices generating phenomena such as index effects asset class effects and others it is difficult to explain such phenomena within standard representative agent asset pricing models in this paper we consider an economy populated by institutional investors alongside standard retail investors institutions care about their performance relative to a certain index our framework is tractable admitting exact closed form expressions and produces the following analytical results we find that institutions optimally tilt their portfolios towards stocks that comprise their benchmark index the resulting price pressure boosts index stocks while leaving nonindex stocks unaffected by demanding a higher fraction of risky stocks than retail investors institutions amplify the index stock volatilities and aggregate stock market volatility and give rise to countercyclical sharpe ratios trades by institutions induce excess correlations among stocks that belong to their benchmark index generating an asset class effect institutions finance their additional purchases of index stocks by taking on leverage a policy prescription that calls for a reduction in leverage while reducing the riskiness of institutional portfolios would also reduce the ability of institutions to tilt their portfolios towards index stocks depressing the index level

optimal asset allocation and risk shifting in money management this article investigates a fund manager s risk taking incentives induced by an increasing and convex relationship of fund flows to relative performance in a dynamic portfolio choice framework we show that the ensuing convexities in the manager s objective give rise to a finite risk shifting range over which she gambles to finish ahead of her benchmark such gambling entails either an increase or a decrease in the volatility of the manager s portfolio depending on her risk tolerance in the latter case the manager reduces her holdings of the risky asset despite its positive risk premium our empirical analysis lends support to the novel predictions of the model

product stereotypes strategy and performance satisfaction the case of chinese exporters does following a product strategy of price leadership result in superior performance satisfaction for chinese exporters does branding products and targeting less developed countries significantly improve chinese exporters satisfaction with export performance results indicate performance satisfaction decreased when chinese firms pursued price leadership product strategies while performance satisfaction increased when chinese exporters used a branding product strategy branding products and targeting other less developed countries with these brands significantly increased performance satisfaction over branding alone

is ecommerce boundary less effects of individualism collectivism and uncertainty avoidance on internet shopping from publicly available data we identified two national culture dimensions individualism collectivism and uncertainty avoidance and their interaction that influences internet shopping rates across a wide spectrum of countries together these factors accounted for 14 of the explained variance on top of the combined variance of 63 explained by national income level educational level economic growth rate unemployment rate and crime rate in predicting internet shopping rates for countries lower in uncertainty avoidance individualist cultures show higher internet shopping rates than do collectivist cultures implications for national and internet firm level web design strategies are discussed

choice of foreign market entry mode impact of ownership location and internalization factors firms interested in servicing foreign markets face a difficult decision with regards to the choice of an entry mode the options available to a firm include exporting licensing joint venture and sole venture several factors that determine the choice of a specific foreign market entry mode have been identified in previous literature these factors can be classified into three categories ownership advantages of a firm location advantages of a market and internalization advantages of integrating transactions this study examines the independent and joint influences of these factors on the choice of an entry mode multinomial logistic regression model is employed to test the hypothesized effects

china s transition and its implications for international business this paper focuses on institutional change as the central and most consequential contextual aspect of china s transition identification of key characteristics of china s emergent institutions leads to propositions on their relevance for international business practice china s transition also raises issues for theory development including the way that transition is modeled the need to draw upon multiple perspectives and the concomitants of a contextual approach

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

how mncs choose entry modes and form alliances the china experience this study examine two dimensions of firms foreign market entry strategy mode of entry and formation of alliances based on the existing literature we propose a model that describes how host country home country and industry specific factors affect foreign firms decisions on how they enter the market and whether they will enter with a partner firm or not the model also describes how operation related factors i e the location and the level of local government affect these decisions seven major hypotheses were tested using a longitudinal sample of 2 998 foreign business activities in china between 1979 and 1993 our sample consists of foreign investing firms from the u s europe japan and other asian countries by choosing china as a host country the study offers insights into how firms of different regional groups adapted their strategies to a changing host environment

strategic interactions and portfolio choice in money management theory and evidence the author study portfolio choice of strategic fund managers in the presence of a peer based under performance penalty while the penalty generates herding behavior correlated trading among managers is exacerbated when a strategic setting is considered the equilibrium portfolios are driven by the least restricted manager who may vary according to the realization of returns the author compare model predictions to evidence from the colombian pension fund management industry where six asset managers are incharge of portfolio allocation for the mandatory contributions of the working population these managers are subject to a peer based under performance penalty known as the minimum return guarantee mrg the author study trading behavior by managers before and after a change in the strictness of the mrg in june 2007 the evidence suggests that a tighter mrg results in more trading in the direction of peers a behavior that is more pronounced for under performing managers is how that these findings areconsistent with the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the theoretical model

the impact of order and mode of market entry on profitability and market share market share performance and profitability of overseas business activities has long been an important issue in international business in this study we explore the impact of order and mode of market entry into an overseas market we find that early entrants have significantly higher market shares and profitability than late followers we also find that equity joint ventures have a higher profitability than either wholly owned operations or contractual joint ventures a significant interaction exists between order and mode of market entry as expected firm efficiency and size affect the performance of firms these results are based on the business activities of a sample of 14 466 foreign firms in china in 1995

the eclectic paradigm of international production a restatement and some possible extensions this article reviews some of the criticisms directed towards the eclectic paradigm of international production over the past decade and restates its main tenets the second part of the article considers a number of possible extensions of the paradigm and concludes by asserting that it remains a robust general framework for explaining and analysing not only the economic rationale of economic production but many organisational and impact issues in relation to mne activity as well

riding the bubble with convex incentives we oer a simple portfolio choice based rationale for the documented failure of institutional investors to trade against mispriced securities in a dynamic model where informed and risk averse money managers face convex i e option like incentives we show that the standard mean variance component and hedging demand that make up their portfolio often imply opposite stances against mispricing the rst component represents managers bets against overpriced securities by contrast managers hedge against the risk of forfeiting an end of period bonus payment can over weigh overpriced securities even with respect to the market portfolio this bubble riding component is more likely to drive the managers portfolio as overpricing increases although we do not model the informed managers price impact our analysis suggests that the incentives of sophisticated investors might drive them to exacerbate security mispricing

employees willingness to adopt a foreign functional language in multilingual organizations the role of linguistic identity language holds a central role in sustainable international expansion for multinationals the choice of the functional language can facilitate or hinder communication between headquarters and subsidiary locations in order to communicate effectively with the parent organization host country employees often have to adopt a language that is not native to the subsidiary region we take a subsidiary employee perspective in presenting an interdisciplinary theoretical model of host country employees willingness to adopt a foreign language in multinational organizations the construct of linguistic identity shaped by the linguistic landscape of the host location is introduced as an important determinant in this process specifically the foreign functional language may pose a threat to the employees existing linguistic identity willingness to adopt the foreign functional language may depend upon the extent of this perceived threat we incorporate the effects of foreign language proficiency and individuals motivation for enhancement in the theoretical model both high proficiency in a foreign language and need for social economic and career enhancements can increase individuals willingness to adopt the foreign functional language finally we develop and present implications of the linguistic identity processes for entry mode location and language strategies

equity ownership in international joint ventures the impact of source country factors this study examines the impact of four source country factors on the equity ownership in international joint ventures ijvs these factors are exchange rate cost of borrowing export capability and management orientation based on a sample of 8 078 ijvs in china this study shows that equity ownership tends to be higher for parent firms from a source country with strong currency low cost of borrowing strong export capability and high uncertainty avoidance

asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs and relative performance we propose an equilibrium asset pricing model in which agents with heterogeneous beliefs care about relative performance we find that the concern with relative performance leads agents to trade more similarly a development that has two effects first similar trading directly decreases volatility second similar trading decreases the impact of dominant agents the second effect dominates the first when agents expect large differences between their final performances and vice versa when agents expect small differences between their final performances compared with the case in which agents are unconcerned about relative performance the stock return volatility is higher when the second effect dominates and lower when the first effect dominates this paper also demonstrates that the concern about relative performance influences investors holdings stock prices and risk premia

joint venture formation of very large multinational firms large firms differ from smaller firms in many aspects in this research note we investigate the relationship between the size of firm and the characteristics of equity joint ventures ejvs empirically we found that very large firms are more likely to have a higher equity stake in their ejvs seek alignment with other foreign firms engage in global industries and invest in large scale ejvs than smaller firms they are also less affected by the risk conditions of the host country empirical testing is based on a sample of 1 298 foreign ejvs in the people s republic of china between 1981 and 1998 interesting differences also exist among firms that are based in the u s japan and europe

determinants of foreign investment of u s advertising agencies this paper investigates the impact of several factors on the foreign investment of u s advertising agencies by using the theories on the determinants of foreign direct investment by manufacturing firms for the two years examined the hypotheses about the impact of host country market size host country geographic proximity firm size firm s international operations experience oligopolistic reaction and presence of home country customers abroad are all confirmed this paper also investigates the impact of oligopolistic reaction among the top ten and the second ten largest agencies and finds a stronger impact for the former

the effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode characteristics of national cultures have frequently been claimed to influence the selection of entry modes this article investigates this claim by developing a theoretical argument for why culture should influence the choice of entry two hypotheses are derived which relate culture to entry mode choice one focusing on the cultural distance between countries the other on attitudes towards uncertainty avoidance using a multinomial logit model and controlling for other effects the hypotheses are tested by analysing data on 228 entries into the united states market by acquisition wholly owned greenfield and joint venture empirical support for the effect of national culture on entry choice is found

determinants of congressional minimum wage support the role of economic education much has been made about the lack of economic education among the public at large yet little has been said about the limited education of members of congress this paper examines the economic education levels of members of congress voting on the 2007 increase in the minimum wage controlling for a variety of characteristics of members and constituents this study finds that members who majored in economics as undergraduates were less likely to vote for the minimum wage increase than their colleagues no other major had a consistent influence a large number of statistical specifications confirm the robustness of the finding

optimal risk sharing with effort and project choice we consider first best risk sharing problems in which the agent can control both the drift effort choice and the volatility of the underlying process project selection in a model of delegated portfolio management it is optimal to compensate the manager with an option type payoff where the functional form of the option is obtained as a solution to an ordinary differential equation in the general case the optimal contract is a fixed point of a functional that connects the agent s and the principal s maximization problems we apply martingale duality methods familiar from optimal consumption investment problems

equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management abstract this paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio the contract parameters the extent of delegation and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider symmetric fulcrum performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the sharpe ratios asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and sharpe ratios with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds excess performance

intermediary asset pricing abstract we model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary intermediaries face an equity capital constraint risk premia r

cultural differences in conducting intra and inter cultural negotiations a sino canadian comparison a study on conflict resolution strategies of canadian and chinese peoples republic of china executives was conducted responses to two types of joint project conflicts task related and person related with potential partners from their own culture or from the other culture were examined neither group of executives altered its strategy when negotiating across cultures chinese executives were more likely to avoid conflicts but recommended more negative strategies discontinue negotiation withdraw negotiation when conflict emerged person related conflicts were found to generate more negative responses than task related conflicts especially for chinese executives both canadian and chinese executives preferred to negotiate with canadians than with chinese

the transaction costs theory of joint ventures an empirical study of japanese subsidiaries in the united states this paper offers the first large sample empirical study of the factors which influence the choice of japanese firms between full or partial ownership of their u s manufacturing subsidiaries it studies for the first time the ownership policies of investors of a single home country in a single host country thus keeping variations within home and host countries constant one methodological improvement over previous studies is the use as independent variables of the relevant characteristics of the investing firms these had been proxied in previous studies by data on u s industries entered the results suggest that the degree of ownership taken by japanese manufacturing investors in their american subsidiaries is driven by the same general transaction costs variables that determine the choices made by their u s counterparts japanese parents joint venture when they need to combine with other firms intermediate inputs which are subject to high market transaction costs an intriguing result however is the lack of significance of two variables which in the u s case strongly push towards full control of foreign subsidiaries in this study neither the japanese parent s r d nor its advertising intensities had any significant impact on their ownership policies

choosing an appropriate alliance governance mode the role of institutional cultural and geographical distance in international research development r d collaborations we identify a variety of r d alliance modes in a knowledge intensive industry e g pharmaceuticals and classify them into four ordered categories which go beyond the traditional binary equity vs non equity alliance classification this enriches our understanding of alliance governance structures and broadens the application of alliance modes in what is today a more complicated international r d collaboration setting we then explore national industry and firm factors that determine the selection of an appropriate r d alliance governance mode using a sample of 237 international alliance deals the likelihood of using a more integrated alliance governance mode decreases as the difference or distance between nations of the partner firms increases in terms of human capital and cultural distance on the other hand a greater geographic and institutional difference is positively associated with the selection of more integrated alliance governance modes furthermore firms in the research stage are more likely to use a more integrated governance mode as opposed to firms in the development stage these findings advance research on alliance governance structure they reveal the factors affecting the r d alliance governance mode choice

international joint venture partner selection the role of the host country legal environment this study attempts to enhance our understanding of how a host country s legal environment influences international joint venture ijv partner selection criteria empirical results based on survey data collected on 169 ijvs revealed that host country rule of law perceptions negatively influence appropriation and coordination cost concerns which positively influence partner related criteria furthermore these concerns mediate the relationship between perceptions of host country rule of law and partner related criteria

rewarding trading skills without inducing gambling this paper develops a model of active portfolio management in which fund managers may secretly gamble in order to manipulate their reputation and attract more funds we show that such trading strategies may expose investors to severe losses and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient their trading skills are scalable and generate higher prot per unit of risk we study investment management contracts that deter this behavior if investors are short lived then the manager must leave rents to investors in order to credibly commit not to gamble if investors are long lived contracts that increase but defer expected bonuses after an outstanding performance implement the rstbest our model can explain a number of observed dierences

what makes and what does not make a real option a study of equity shares in international joint ventures this paper examines the boundaries of real options logic with an application to joint ventures jvs we distinguish between forms of uncertainty that are resolved endogenously and those that are resolved exogenously and theorize that only exogenous uncertainty will have the impact predicted by real options theory on a foreign investor s choice of how large an equity share to take in a jv we theorize that macroeconomic and institutional variables generate exogenous uncertainty whereas by contrast cultural distance and choices pertaining to corporate scope and product or process development activities involve endogenous sources of uncertainty that investors can both assess and act upon without having to wait and see using a sample of 6472 sino foreign jvs we find support for our predictions we discuss and implement proper methods to test for the existence of null effects as is relevant to establish the boundaries of a theory such as real options theory we draw implications for research and practice on jvs specifically equity share decisions which deserve more attention and real options including suitable uses and desirable extensions of the concept

how tournament incentives affect asset markets a comparison between winner take all tournaments and elimination contests abstract we investigate the impact of investment managers tournament incentives on investment strategies and market efficiency distinguishing between winner take all tournaments wta where a minority wins and elimination contests ec where a majority wins theoretically we show that investment managers play heterogeneous strategies in wta and homogeneous strategies in ec and markets are more prone to mispricing in wta than in ec experimentally we find that investment managers play more heterogeneous strategies in wta than in ec but this does not trigger significant differences in prices moreover prices in wta and ec do not differ significantly from markets composed of linearly incentivized subjects

compensation incentives and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness the common folklore that giving options to agents will make them more willing to take risks is false in fact no incentive schedule will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk averse this paper finds simple intuitive necessary and sufficient conditions under which incentive schedules make agents more or less risk averse the paper uses these to examine the incentive effects of some common structures such as puts and calls and it briefly explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse and gambles that increase or decrease risk with the growing interest in executive compensation and agency problems

optimal leverage and aggregate investment we analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and can also switch to less profitable riskier ventures optimal financial contracts can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk shifting problem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort problem is the most severe worsening of the moral hazard problems leads to decreases in investment and output at the macroeconomic level moreover aggregate leverage decreases with the risk shifting problem and increases with the effort problem

institutionalization delegation and asset prices abstract we study the effects of institutionalization on fund manager compensation and asset prices institutionalization raises the performance sensitive component of the equilibrium contract which makes institutional investors effectively more risk averse institutionalization affects market outcomes through two opposing effects the direct effect is to bring in more informed capital and the indirect effect is to make each institutional investor trade less aggressively on information through affecting the equilibrium contract when there are many institutions and little noise trading in the market the indirect contracting effect dominates the direct informed capital effect in determining market variables such as the cost of capital return volatility price volatility and market liquidity otherwise the direct informed capital effect dominates

asset pricing under optimal contracts we consider the problem of finding equilibrium asset prices in a financial market in which a portfolio manager agent invests on behalf of an investor principal who compensates the manager with an optimal contract we extend a model from buffa vayanos and woolley 2014 by allowing general contracts and by allowing the portfolio manager to invest privately in individual risky assets or the index to alleviate the effect of moral hazard agent is optimally compensated by benchmarking to the index which however may incentivize him to be too much of a closet indexer to counter those incentives the optimal contract rewards agent for taking specific risk of individual assets in excess of the systematic risk of the index by rewarding the deviation between the portfolio return and the return of an index portfolio and the deviation s quadratic variation

choice between non equity entry modes an organizational capability perspective many studies have examined the choice between different types of equity and non equity modes however none has focused on the choice between different types of non equity modes that service firms employ routinely this study develops a theoretical framework based on the organizational capability perspective to explain the choice between two non equity modes franchising and management service contracts while previous studies are based on the premise that foreign market entrants choose a mode equity or non equity that offers them most control given their particular circumstances the premise of this study is that foreign entrants choose a non equity mode that in addition offers effective transfer of the firm s capabilities to the host country venture

optimal contracts in a continuous time delegated portfolio management problem this article studies the contracting problem between an individual investor and a professional portfolio manager in a continuous time principal agent framework optimal contracts are obtained in closed form these contracts are of a symmetric form and suggest that a portfolio manager should receive a fixed fee a fraction of the total assets under management plus a bonus or a penalty depending upon the portfolio s excess return relative to a benchmark portfolio the appropriate benchmark portfolio is an active index that contains risky assets where the number of shares invested in each asset can vary over time rather than a passive index in which the number of shares invested in each asset remains constant over time fund managers compensation schemes in a delegated portfolio management setting have been of special interest to both academics and practitioners academic interest stems in part from the rapid growth of managed funds over the last two decades gompers and metrick 1998 report that by december 1996 mutual funds pension funds and other financial intermediaries held discretional control over more than half of the u s equity market it is thus of importance to study the impact of institutional trading on asset prices and to integrate into one model both asset pricing and delegated portfolio management compensation as advocated by brennan 1993 allen and santomero 1997 and allen 2001 it is also important to understand the relationship between a manager s trading strategies and his implicit incentives or career concerns see e g brown harlow and starks 1996 brown goetzmann and park 1997 chevalier and ellison 1999 and chen and pennacchi 2000 these concerns include internal promotion from a small to a large fund higher outside offers and the flow of money through the fund under management 1 the importance of fund manager compensation is also underscored by congressional passage in 1970 of the amendment to

the formation of japanese and u s equity joint ventures in china this study examines the characteristics of japanese and u s equity joint ventures ejvs in china over a 15 year period these ejvs were announced between 1979 and the end of 1993 substantial differences are found with respect to six key characteristics they are selection of the chinese partner selection of the second foreign partner when more than one foreign partner is involved foreign equity ownership foreign capital contribution ejv business scope and the ejv location tentative explanations for these differences are offered from the perspectives of risk orientation cultural similarities and the impact of political events in china 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

limits to international entry mode learning in smes despite extensive research the literature is unclear about the circumstances under which a firm learns from its past foreign entry modes and how this experiential learning is related to future mode choices building on the internationalization process ip model and the idea that some experiential learning is location bound while other learning is non location bound we develop and test theory to explain how experiential learning about foreign operation modes and markets impact future mode choices in new foreign markets overall we argue that mode based experiential learning is limited through the repeated use of a specific operation mode firms develop routines and processes that are non location bound and can be replicated in new foreign markets leading to the use of this same mode type in new locations but when complemented by experiential learning about a target market region firms opt for operation modes with greater commitment in new foreign markets drawing on a sample of german smes and examining four different types of entry modes we find some support however we also identify a number of notable exceptions to our theory in this way we help provide unique new insights informing future ip model experiential learning and international entry mode research

the delegated lucas tree we analyze the effects of the observed increased share of delegated capital for trading strategies and equilibrium prices by introducing delegation into a standard lucas exchange economy in equilibrium some investors trade on their own account but others decide to delegate trading to professional fund managers flow performance incentive functions describe how much capital clients provide to funds at each date as a function of past performance convex flow performance relations imply that the average fund outperforms the market in recessions and underperforms in expansions when the share of capital that is delegated is low all funds follow the same strategy however when the equilibrium share of delegated capital is high funds with identical incentives employ heterogeneous trading strategies a group of managers borrows to take on a levered position on the stock thus fund returns are dispersed in the cross section and the outstanding amounts of borrowing and lending increase the relation between the share of delegated capital and the sharpe ratio typically follows an inverse u shaped pattern jel g11 g12 g23 d02 d81 over the past thirty years there has been a gradual but profound change in the way money is invested in financial markets while almost 50 of u s equities were held directly in 1980 by 2007 this proportion decreased to approximately 20 see french 2008 what are the equilibrium implications of this shift in particular how does the increased presence of delegation affect trading strategies and prices to analyze the link between the incentives of financial institutions and asset prices we introduce financial intermediaries into a lucas exchange economy rather than study an optimal contracting problem we rely on empirical regularities inflows and assume a convex relation betweenflows and performance relative to the market as documented for example in chevalier and ellison 1997

capital immobility and the reach for yield abstract i build a model in which financial intermediation slows down capital flows investors optimally learn from intermediary performance to allocate capital toward profitable intermediaries intermediaries reach for yield i e they invest in high tail risk assets in an attempt to drive flows and reduce liquidation risk intermediaries with strong opportunities face a trade off between choosing a portfolio that maximizes profitability and choosing one that maximizes the speed at which capital flows in equilibrium reaching for yield is stronger among intermediaries with weak opportunities resulting in a reduction in the informativeness of performance investors thus take longer to learn and capital flows become less responsive to performance capital becomes slow moving because the reach for yield dampens learning the model predicts capital immobility to be stronger when tail risk is high when tail risk is under priced and in asset classes with large cross sectional variation in tail risk exposures

does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite this paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls under the manager s optimal policy the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money as the asset value goes to zero volatility goes to infinity however the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking sometimes the manager s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account furthermore giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility managers with convex compensation schemes play an important role in financial markets this paper solves for the optimal dynamic investment policy for a risk averse manager paid with a call option on the assets he controls the paper focuses on how the option compensation impacts the manager s appetite for risk when he cannot hedge the option position on one hand the convexity of the option makes the manager shun payoffs that are likely to be near the money under the optimal policy the manager either significantly outperforms his benchmark or else incurs severe losses furthermore in examples of optimal trading strategies asset volatility goes to infinity as asset value goes to zero yet option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking as asset value grows large or if the evaluation date is far away the manager moderates asset risk for example if the manager has constant relative risk aversion crra asset volatility converges to the merton constant as asset value goes to infinity in some situations the manager actually chooses a lower asset volatility than he would if he were investing on his own because the leverage inherent in his option magnifies his exposure to the asset volatility in addition with all constant or decreasing absolute risk averse utility functions from the hyperbolic absolute risk averse hara class giving the manager more options causes him to reduce asset volatility in the crra case for example the manager targets a fixed volatility for his personal

modes of foreign entry a transaction cost analysis and propositions a frontier issue in international marketing is the appropriate choice of entry mode in foreign markets the objective of this paper is to offer a transaction cost framework for investigating the entry mode decision this framework provides 1 a theoretical basis for systematically interrelating the literature into propositions 2 propositions about interactions which resolve the apparently contradictory arguments advanced to date specifically the paper illustrates the feasibility of clustering 17 entry modes into the degree of control the mode provides the entrant proposes that the most appropriate i e most efficient entry mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the cost of resource commitment advances testable propositions delimiting the circumstances under which each mode maximizes long term efficiency

the hierarchical model of market entry modes in this study we propose and test a hierarchical model of market entry modes entry modes can first be viewed as equity based versus non equity based within equity based modes the choice is between wholly owned operations and equity joint ventures while within non equity based modes the choice is between contractual agreements and export empirically we demonstrate that there are factors that exert substantial influences at the equity versus non equity level but rather weak influences at the lower level of choice hierarchy the empirical results are based on a sample of over 10 000 foreign entry activities into china between 1979 to 1998 the findings provide supportive evidence for the hierarchical model of market entry modes