efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

a bargaining approach to profit sharing in joint ventures profit sharing arrangements in joint ventures are analyzed as a bayesian bargaining game between two parents with incomplete information about each other s cost function for inputs provided using the mathematics of mechanism design this article explores the sensitivity of the bargaining agreement to the timing of private information about costs a condition on demand and costs is derived under which the balanced budget constraint does not preclude the joint venture from achieving an ex post efficient level of production the proposed mechanism is then extended to the second best environment under the criteria of 1 ex ante optimality and 2 r b myerson s axiomatic neutral bargaining solution the direct revelation mechanisms are interpreted as corresponding indirect transfer pricing mechanisms a major result is that in all cases the outcome calls for equal allocation of realized joint venture net profit copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

optimal failure rates and penalty bonus policies in the offshore petroleum sector we characterize optimal time profiles of risk reducing expenditures and wreck probabilities for petroleum platforms the input to our analysis is the development of wreck cost direct and imputed particular attention is paid to the question of how private companies deviating from socially optimal standards may be induced to comply with such standards by means of a a time variant penalty b a no wreck bonus and c a time invariant penalty

defining the value of a statistical life reply abstract in general empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life vsl are biased however as pointed out by blomqvist 2001 a true blip in the hazard rate can be used to obtain an exact estimate of the vsl the question remains whether individuals and markets are able to value such short drops in the hazard rate

perspectives on mechanism design in economic theory economics began with xenophon s oeconomicus c 360 bce in which socrates interviews a model citizen who has two primary concerns he goes out to his farm in the country to monitor and motivate his workers there then he goes back to the city where his participation in various political institutions is essential for maintaining his rights to own this farm such concerns about agents incentives and political institutions are also central in economic theory today but they were not always two centuries ago economics developed as an analytical social science by focusing on produc tion and allocation of material goods developing methodologies of national income accounting and price theory questions about resource allocation seemed particularly amenable to math ematical analysis because flows of goods and money are measurable and should satisfy flowbalance equations and no arbitrage conditions from this perspective the classical economic problem was that people s ability to satisfy their desires is constrained by limited resources the classical economic result was that unrestricted free trade can achieve allocative efficiency in the sense that reallocating the available resources cannot improve everyone s welfare a shift of focus from allocation of resources back to analysis of incentives began from the time of augustin cournot 1838 when economic theorists began to analyze optimal decisions of rational individuals as a tool for understanding supply and demand in price theory see jurg

emerging economic viability of grid defection in a northern climate using solar hybrid systems high demand for photovoltaic pv battery and small scale combined heat and power chp technologies are driving a virtuous cycle of technological improvements and cost reductions in off grid electric systems that increasingly compete with the grid market using a case study in the upper peninsula of michigan this paper quantifies the economic viability of off grid pv battery chp adoption and evaluates potential implications for grid based utility models the analysis shows that already some households could save money by switching to a solar hybrid off grid system in comparison to the effective electric rates they are currently paying across the region by 2020 92 of seasonal households and 75 of year round households are projected to meet electricity demands with lower costs furthermore 65 of all upper peninsula single family owner occupied households will both meet grid parity and be able to afford the systems by 2020 the results imply that economic circumstances could spur a positive feedback loop whereby grid electricity prices continue to rise and increasing numbers of customers choose alternatives sometimes referred to as a utility death spiral particularly in areas with relatively high electric utility rates utility companies and policy makers must take the potential for grid defection seriously when evaluating energy supply strategies

optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders abstract we analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer depending on the realization of the privately observed valuations the concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified traders the traders virtual valuations now depend on the choice of the trading mechanism and are generally nonmonotonic we show that the trading mechanisms that maximize a broker s expected profit or expected total gains from trade are generalized double auctions which maximize the gains from trade measured in some modified monotonic virtual valuations for the traders the bunching phenomena will be a general feature in these mechanisms we also show that the optimal mechanisms converge towards simple bid ask price mechanisms as the number of participants in the market increases journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82

measuring risk reduction benefits with discounted longevity there are many ways to assess the benefits and costs of risk reduction policies this paper shows that discounted longevity as a measure of benefits and the negative of net output as a measure of costs can be deduced from the shepard and zeckhauser utility maximization model

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

rates of time preference and valuations of the duration of life abstract this paper develops a multi period markov model of the lifetime choice of occupational fatality risks the empirical model analyzes the wage effects of job risks using the 1982 university of michigan panel study of income dynamics in conjunction with death statistics from the u s national traumatic occupational fatality survey evidence regarding workers intertemporal choices with respect to risks with long term implications is broadly consistent with rational behavior workers implicit real rate of time preference with respect to future life years equals approximately 11 percent this rate of time preference decreases with education

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

ageing health and health care the population in the developed world has experienced a significant increase in life expectancy over the last 50 years simultaneously while the onset of comorbidities has been deferred to older age groups health care expenditure has grown dramatically primarily owing to the advancement of medical technology and the expansion of individual income levels along with population ageing in the wake of increased longevity however the contribution of population ageing to health expenditure growth is subject to some theoretical and empirical scrutiny this paper takes the question of ageing and health and health care to the data to evaluate the net impact of ageing we focus on two main questions namely the welfare valuation of longevity improvements for various oecd countries along with the red herring hypothesis which suggests that population ageing has a small and almost negligible impact on health care expenditure our estimates lead us to suggest an average gain in longevity of 4 5 years since 1980 corresponding to about 13 5 per cent of lifetime income of a 20 year old in 2000 furthermore we confirm a weak red herring claim that is that population ageing accounts for only a 0 5 per cent annual growth rate of health care expenditure finally we find that the rise in longevity leads to a further demand for life prolonging medical care

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

a non cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information verifiable types abstract we consider a non cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage we prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one further the ex post nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of independence of irrelevant types iit whereby the response of every type of a player is independent of allocations proposed to his other types and under a self selection property of their belief

the effect of increased longevity on capital accumulation one of the more startling demographic trends of the 1970 s has been the sharp rise in lifespan in the united states between 1970 and 1980 the life expectancy of 25year old men and women increased by at least two years while longevity has been steadily rising for many decades the recent spurt has hastened the trend the increase for both men and women in the 1970 s more than doubled the improvement of the 1960 s 1 the 1970 s were also characterized by a decline in labor force participation of older workers although rising income and increased disability payments may have explained some of the decline donald parsons 1980 it seems clear that expanding longevity has not been strongly associated with deferred retirement daniel hamermesh 1984 2 thus the retirement years have assumed greater importance in financial planning for the consumer as he or she retires earlier and lives longer the traditional life cycle model would predict greater savings rates as consumers increase accumulation of assets for their retirement consumption while young would drop and there might be an increase in labor supply as individuals substitute leisure while young for greater levels of life cycle consumption even under a social security system as long as the current generation s tax liabilities reflect their longer lifespan total savings private plus public should also rise 3 the predicted increase in savings is substantial a simple example using the modigliani ando brumberg life cycle model can illustrate the extent of the savings shift assume that earnings and consumption are constant over working years and lifespan respectively and that the interest rate is zero consumption is then a constant proportion k of earnings where k is the ratio of working years to one s lifespan if consumers made plans based on average lifespan the representative 25 year old would have saved 18 percent of earnings in 1970 1 40 49 when he plans to retire at age 65 and expects to live until age 74 in 1980 after a rise in life expectancy of two years the representative 25 year old would have increased savings to 21 percent of earnings or a net rise in the savings rate per worker of 17 percent that is this simple life cycle model implies that savings in the last decade should have risen other things held constant by approximately 17 percent or about 80 billion dollars per year the evidence from aggregate time series data appears to contradict the life cycle model s prediction of rising savings rates the net private savings rate in the united states declined from 7 8 percent of nnp in 1970 to 6 2 percent in 1980 while alan auerbach 1982 has suggested that some of the reported decline in savings may be caused by mismeasurement it seems clear that there has been no substantial rise in the savings rate there are numerous explanations for department of economics university of virginia charlottesville va 22901 i am grateful to maxim engers daniel hamermesh william r johnson laurence j kotlikoff john strauss and especially james davies and john r wolfe for helpful suggestions and comments life table data can be found in daniel hamermesh 1985 the life insurance fact book various years or in unpublished form from the national center for health statistics 2john wolfe 1983 provides an ingenious argument for why the social security benefit schedule has induced those with shorter life expectancies to retire early we might therefore expect some rise in the average retirement age as those expecting to live longer defer retirement until age 65 3if the social security taxes do not rise as expected lifespan increases perhaps because current tax proceeds are paid out as current benefits rather than retained in a trust fund young workers will save more to offset the lower expected benefits in the future 4in a two period model the percentage change in savings by the young is equal to the percentage change in aggregate savings

contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication abstract this paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment by allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature s common but overly restrictive focus on one shot direct communication in addition general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment first they allow us to identify the local downward incentive constraints as the relevant ones if the agent s preferences satisfy a single crossing property second we show how one may restrict the cardinality of the message spaces of the communication device an example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one shot direct communication

intergenerational flows of time and goods consequences of slowing population growth it is feared that low fertility and older age distributions in the developed countries might cause lower life cycle consumption because of the increased pension and health cost burden the theoretical literature on intergenerational transfers has addressed this question but has considered only the consumption of market goods and has made no serious empirical attempt to measure the theoretical concepts necessary to assess the problem this paper develops a theoretical model of intergenerational transfers incorporating time use with the aid of time budget and consumer expenditure surveys empirical estimates of the age profiles of various types of time and goods consumption are presented and we conclude that 1 the net direction of intergenerational transfers is from younger to older ages 2 under the golden rule assumption these transfers largely constitute an externality to childbearing and 3 they are not large enough to offset the capital dilution effect that would result from higher fertility a

bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply abstract rate regulation is studied as a bargaining process in which consumers and the firm negotiate output and payments under asymmetric information the feasible set of transactions given incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints is characterized the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms for the direct revelation game is also characterized sufficient conditions are given for efficient mechanisms to be full information efficient efficient mechanisms are identified which correspond to nonlinear monopoly pricing monosony compensation schedules and the baron myerson regulation model

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

public goods and the value of product quality regulations the case of food safety abstract the paper examines preferences for product quality regulations our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods the model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation the results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

contract renegotiation a simple framework and implications for organization theory this paper provides a unifying framework for studying renegotiation of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information we show that interim renegotiation does not constrain the set of contracts attainable with full commitment regardless of whether renegotiation offers are made by the informed or the uninformed agent ex post renegotiation however does constrain the set of attainable contracts these constraints depend on the identity of the agent making the renegotiation offer we then show how the theory of contract renegotiation can provide insights for organization theory specifically we show how decentralization of decision making can be an optimal response to the threat of ex post renegotiation finally we show that our framework can be used to analyse the trade off between internal and external markets

final offer arbitration and risk aversion in bargaining negotiations are often conducted under the stipulation that an impasse is to be resolved using final offer arbitration foa in fact foa frequently is not needed in major league baseball for instance more than 80 of the salary negotiations that could go to arbitration instead reach a bargained agreement we show that the risk aversion of at least one side explains this phenomenon we then model pay negotiation in baseball by applying a bargaining solution with a variable disagreement outcome representing foa studying the existence of pure nash equilibrium initial offers and their effects on the player s eventual pay and considering the nash solution as a special case

private information wage bargaining and employment fluctuations shimer 2005 pointed out that although we have a satisfactory theory of why some workers are unemployed at any given time we don t know why the number of unemployed workers varies so much over time the basic mortensen pissarides 1994 model does not generate nearly enough volatility in unemployment for plausible parameter values this paper extends the mortensen pissarides model to allow for informational rents productivity is subject to publicly observed aggregate shocks and to idiosyncratic shocks that are seen only by the employer it is shown that there is a unique equilibrium provided that the idiosyncratic shocks are not too large the main result is that small fluctuations in productivity that are privately observed by employers can give rise to a kind of wage stickiness in equilibrium and the informational rents associated with this stickiness are sufficient to generate relatively large unemployment fluctuations

information and the hold up problem we examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input we study how the resulting hold up problem is affected by the seller s information about the investing party s likely returns from its investment our principal focus is on the effects of the investment s being observable by the non investing party contrary to popular intuition we find that an improvement in the seller s information e g the investment s being observable rather than not can benefit the buyer and harm the seller we also find that other popular intuitions about this problem are either false incomplete or require strong assumptions to be valid

a theoretical and empirical comparison of free agent and arbitration eligible salaries negotiated in major league baseball this paper presents a theoretical and empirical comparison of determination of negotiated salaries in baseball s free agent market to that in its final offer arbitration foa system the theoretical bargaining model of each system is based on nash 1950 it is argued that farber s 1980 model of foa is not fully applicable in explaining baseball s foa process the free agent market and the arbitration system each determine negotiated salaries that are dependent on the different disagreement outcomes of the negotiators in the respective systems it is thus concluded theoretically that the two systems will determine salaries differently the theoretical analysis also suggests that there may be selection bias present when one empirically analyzes only negotiated settlements using a straightforward regression model that controls for productivity playing experience and the potential selection bias the empirical analysis substantiates the theory s results a method is then developed to estimate the effect that free agent salaries have on salaries for arbitration eligible players it is found that there is a significant positive relationship between them but the systems do not determine equal salaries for comparable players

your money or your life green growth policies and welfare in 2050 this paper proposes a simple index of economic progress that weighs in the monetary cost induced by climate change mitigation policies as well as the health benefits arising from the reduction in local air pollution the shadow price of pollution is calculated indirectly through its impact on life expectancy taking into account the health benefits of mitigation policies significantly reduces their monetary cost in china and india as well as in countries with large fossil based energy producing sectors australia canada and the united states

valuing future risks to life environmental policies that alter future mortality rates may affect both current and future generations this paper examines willingness to pay for future risk reductions from the perspective of the current generation the life cycle consumption saving model implies that an individual discounts future risks to himself at the consumption rate of interest if capital markets are perfect the consumption rate equals the market rate of interest otherwise the consumption rate exceeds the market rate and numerical results suggest that the implied discount factor may be substantial the overlapping generations model implies that a member of the current generation discounts the value of risks to future generations at the rate at which current consumption is substituted for a bequest

gifts as economic signals and social symbols gift giving has often puzzled economists especially because efficient gifts like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for seem crass or inappropriate it is shown in a formal game theoretic model that gifts serve as signals of a person s intentions about future investment in a relationship and inefficient gifts can be better signals other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced and some stylized facts about gift giving practices are described many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts

interim third party selection in bargaining abstract third party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information in this paper i consider the selection of a third party in a two person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness for a class of problems i find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary the selected third party s intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative this paper shows how the process of interim third party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third party intervention in bargaining

on the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence abstract this paper examines the strategic role of high levels of debt and bankruptcy threats in deterring entry into monopolistic markets in the context of an infinite horizon entry game we show that if a potential entrant has access to debt financing with limited liability the unique sub game perfect equilibrium involves the entrant successfully issuing a high level of debt entering the market and being met with cooperation if in addition to the entrant the incumbent also has access to debt with limited liability it will be highly levered and will completely pre empt any entry in equilibrium finally if the incumbent faces a variety of potential entrants with differing abilities to capture market shares its optimal capital structure will help pre empt the entry of the tougher entrants while allowing the weaker ones to share the market the results of extreme leverage are also shown to hold in an alternative formulation analyzed by kreps and wilson 1982 and milgrom and roberts 1982 and thus are robust to model specifications the empirical implications and possible application to high leverage industries are briefly discussed

uncertain lifetime life protection and the value of life saving abstract the analytic innovation is treating life s end as uncertain and life expectancy as partly the product of individuals efforts to self protect against mortality and morbidity risks the demand for self protection is modeled in a stochastic life cycle framework under alternative insurance options the model helps explain the trend and systematic diversity in life expectancies across different population groups as well as the wide variability in reported value of life saving estimates the analysis yields a closed form solution for individuals value of life saving that is estimable empirically it reflects the impacts of specific personal characteristics and alternative insurance options on both life expectancy and its valuation

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

competitive equilibrium with type convergence in an asymmetrically informed market this article studies an asymmetric information game with type convergence in which under some realizations of a common uncertainity inducing informed agents to reveal their types through self selection by contract choice is either costly or impossible under other realizations self selection permits costless distinctions between informed agents i obtain sufficient conditions under which contracting with options prior to the realization of the common uncertainity leads to the existence of a perfectly separating costless nash equilibrium applications to variable rate loan commitments and life insurance contracting are discussed article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the economics of risks to life this study asks two questions 1 what is the net value to the representative individual over his life time of activities that alter age specific mortality risks 2 what is the cost to the representative individual of activities that take a life at random at a given age results derived from an economic demographic model with full age specific accounting have a strong actuarial flavor alterations in the mortality schedule caused say by a medical breakthrough should be assessed on the utility of expected additional life years production and reproduction less expected social costs of support loss of life at a specific age due to an accident say should be assessed on the opportunity costs of expected lost years of living lost production and reproduction less expected social support costs the results show that current methods in general leave out an important social transfer term that value of a life lost is highly age dependent and that the degree of diminishing returns to consumption is crucial in calculations of the economic cost of risks

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

contract design and non cooperative renegotiation abstract we study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements in particular we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if having observed the agent s contract choice the principal can offer a new menu of contracts in its place an outcome function can be implemented in this setting if and only if it is optimal for the principal for some belief over agent types which is more pessimistic in the sense of the likelihood ratio order than the prior furthermore the outcome function cannot be too sensitive to variations in the agent s type we show that the direct revelation mechanism which implements such a function when renegotiation can be prevented will also implement it in any equilibrium when it cannot so the standard contract is robust to renegotiation

moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm abstract in the grossman hart moore property rights theory there are no frictions ex post i e after non contractible investments have been sunk in contrast in transaction cost economics ex post frictions play a central role we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by allowing for ex post moral hazard as a consequence central conclusions of the grossman hart moore theory may be overturned in particular even though only party a has to make an investment decision b ownership can yield higher investment incentives moreover ownership matters even when investments are fully relationship specific i e when they have no impact on the parties disagreement payoffs

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

parental and social valuations of child health information abstract we construct an endogenous risk model of the influence of more precise hazard information on the parental demand for child health a 256 observation data set is used to estimate the marginal value to parents and to society of risk information about the future consequences of children s body lead burdens our results indicate that the social value of risk information greatly exceeds the cost of providing it and that parents will purchase too little of this information

contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle the single agent case this paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism we show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent in contrast with the conventional revelation principle however the agent may not use this strategy with probability one our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent by reducing such problems to well defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment

on consumer preferences and the willingness to pay for term life insurance abstract we run a choice based conjoint cbc analysis for term life insurance on a sample of 2017 german consumers using data from web based experiments individual level part worth profiles are estimated by means of a hierarchical bayes model drawing on the elicited preference structures we then compute relative attribute importances and different willingness to pay measures in addition we present comprehensive simulation results for a realistic competitive setting that allows us to assess product switching as well as market expansion effects on average brand critical illness cover and underwriting procedure turn out to be the most important nonprice product attributes hence if a policy comprises their favored specifications customers accept substantial markups in the monthly premium furthermore preferences vary considerably across the sample while some individuals are prepared to pay relatively high monthly premiums a large fraction exhibits no willingness to pay for term life insurance at all presumably due to the absence of a need for mortality risk coverage we also illustrate that utility driven product optimization is well suited to gain market shares avoid competitive price pressure and access additional profit potential finally based on estimated demand sensitivities and a set of cost assumptions it is shown that insurers require an in depth understanding of preferences to identify the profit maximizing price

growth and welfare under endogenous lifetime we study the role of endogenous healthcare choices by households to extend their expected lifetimes on economic growth and welfare in a decentralized overlapping generations economy with the realistic feature that households savings are held in annuities we characterize healthcare spending in the decentralized market equilibrium and its effects on economic growth we then identify the moral hazard effect in healthcare investments when annuity rates are conditioned on average mortality and explain the conditions under which it will lead to over investment in healthcare moreover we specify the general equilibrium effects and macroeconomic repercussions associated with this moral hazard effect calibrating our model to oecd data we find that the moral hazard effect may be substantial and implies sizeable welfare losses of approximately 1 5 at a more general level our study suggests that welfare improvements from longevity increases may be quite lower than sometimes assumed when considered in planner economies

altruism fertility and the value of children health policy evaluation and intergenerational welfare abstract this paper accounts for the value of children and future generations in the evaluation of health policies this is achieved through the incorporation of altruism and fertility in a value of life type of framework we are able to express adults willingness to pay for changes in child mortality and also to incorporate the welfare of future generations in the evaluation of current policies our model clarifies a series of puzzles from the literature on the value of life and on intergenerational welfare comparisons we show that by incorporating altruism and fertility into the analysis of the recent u s experience the estimated welfare gain of a young adult from reductions in mortality easily doubles

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm abstract in the grossman hart mooreproperty rights approach to the theory of the firm it is usually assumed that information is symmetric ownership matters for investment incentives provided that investments are partly relationship specific we study the case of completely relationship specific investments i e the disagreement payoffs do not depend on the investments it turns out that if there is asymmetric information then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the expected total surplus specifically giving ownership to party b can be optimal even when only party a has to make an investment decision and even when the owner s expected disagreement payoff is larger under a ownership

investment and screening under asymmetric endogenous information this article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information bayesian environment an agent faces a hold up situation while making a cost reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal to prevent the hold up the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract the informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment for a large class of cost functions the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a power distribution

the costs and consequences of clean air act regulation of co2 from power plants us climate policy is unfolding under the clean air act mobile source and construction permitting regulations are in place most important the us environmental protection agency epa and the states will determine the form and stringency of the regulations for existing power plants it is widely believed that flexible approaches could be suggested in epa guidelines or proposed by states various approaches would create an implicit price on emitting greenhouse gases and create valuable assets that would be distributed differently among electricity producers consumers and the government we compare a tradable performance standard with three variations on cap and trade policies that would distribute the asset value in different ways keeping the value within the electricity sector by distributing it to fossil fueled producers or consumers or spending on energy efficiency has smaller effects on average electricity prices than a revenue raising policy these approaches impose greater social cost but comparable net benefits in the sector

information and bargaining in the hold up problem this article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold up problem the optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency the information rent effect and ex post efficiency the bargaining disagreement effect with one shot bargaining it occurs at an intermediate level of information asymmetry when there is repeated bargaining it is attained with perfect asymmetry asymmetric information the parameter that is frequently ignored in the literature turns out to be an important welfare instrument for the hold up problem our results therefore provide a basis for institutional design regarding the optimal control of information flow

substance abuse treatment and mortality abstract drug overdose deaths which have more than doubled over the past decade represent a growing public health concern though substance abuse treatment may be effective in reducing drug abuse evidence for a causal effect of treatment on drug related mortality is lacking i analyze the effect of substance abuse treatment on mortality by exploiting county level variation in treatment facilities driven by facility openings and closings the estimates indicate that a 10 increase in facilities lowers a county s drug induced mortality rate by 2 the estimated effects persist across individual and county characteristics and further indicate that spillovers of treatment reduce other related causes of death

labor market estimates of the senior discount for the value of statistical life abstract this article develops the first measures of age industry job risks to examine the age variations in the value of statistical life because of the greater risk vulnerability of older workers they face flatter wage risk gradients than younger workers which we show to be the case empirically accounting for this heterogeneity in hedonic market equilibria leads to estimates of the value of statistical life age relationship that follows an inverted u shape the estimates of the value of statistical life range from 6 4 million for younger workers to a peak of 9 0 million for those aged 35 44 and then a decline to 3 8 million for those aged 55 62 the decline of the estimated value of statistical life with age is consistent with there being some senior discount in the clear skies initiative analysis

health care expenditure in the last months of life in oecd countries a considerable share of health care expenditure hce is spent for the care of the terminally ill this paper derives the demand for hce in the last 2 years of life from a model that accounts for age mortality risk and wealth the empirical tests are based on data of deceased members of a major swiss sick fund the empirical evidence confirms most of the hypotheses derived from the model i e i hce increases with closeness to death ii for retired individuals hce decreases with age and iii low income individuals as compared to high income individuals incur lower hce in the last months of life

longevity complementarities under competing risks many of the high expenditure health programs established by international organizations or national and subnational governments involve disease specific interventions such as measles vaccinations hiv education programs mammogram screening malaria prevention and lung cancer research typically these programs are evaluated solely upon the success or failure of their impact on the targeted disease this paper argues that such an exclusive evaluation may significantly underestimate the overall effect of disease specific interventions when multiple risks act as competing forces on life we suggest that programs that target one disease may have important spillover effects on the mortality and morbidity of other causes of death in order to better understand and evaluate the overall effects of disease specific programs it is necessary to understand and measure these spillover effects this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the incentives introduced by disease specific mortality interventions more precisely we discuss predictions about health investment incentives as implied by the competing risk model which is the empirical framework almost exclusively used to study multiple cause mortality we show that important complementary effects between niultiple causes of death operate to equalize the occurrence of the causes we argue that this complementarity should alter the evaluation of cause specific interventions by discrediting the argument that interventions are wasted because competing mortality risks are just around the corner in support of the existence of such complementarities we present substantive evidence from one of the most important public health programs ever introduced in developing countries the expanded programme on immunization epi of the united nations the paper is organized as follows section i provides a theoretical analysis arguing that the competing risk model of multiple causes of mortality corresponds to the leontief production function of survival this implies that there are inherent complementarities between investments in the prevention of cause specific mortality risks both on the individual level and on the aggregate level for competing risks the marginal benefit of investing to avoid one cause of death increases as a function of the survival rates of other causes the implications of this complementarity are important and have not received sufficient attention in theoretical or practical evaluations of causespecific interventions when mortality is treated as exogenous a disease specific intervention may seem wasteful if members of the targeted group are likely to die from a second cause as soon as the first has been eliminated then reducing the mortality from one cause of death would not appear to substantially increase life expectancy indeed this argument is repeatedly made by economists and demographers about medical care interventions in old age however it is sguided to use the preintervention background mortality when assessing the effectiveness of an interventionbehavior under one policy should not be assumed to prevail under a new policy as the leontief nature of competing risks predicts health investments will be focused upon he most immediate cause of death so that there are dow department of health policy and administration cb 7400 university of north carolina chapel hill nc 27599 philipson irving b harris graduate school of public policy studies department of economics and the law school university of chicago 1155 east 60th street chicago il 60637 sala i martin department of econornics columbia university 420 west 118th street 1005 new york ny 10027 and universitat pompeu fabra we are thankful to three anonymous referees for comments that substantially improved the paper and we especially acknowledge the contributions of jessica holmes who was a research assistant and co author on early drafts of this work we also thank gary becker kate howe steen jorgenson casey mulligan sherwin rosen paul schultz and participants at numerous workshops for discussions dow acknowledges financial support from national institute on aging grant no t32 ag00244 philipson from the national science foundation and the rockefeller foundation this research was begun while all authors were at yale university during 1994

old age longevity and mortality contingent claims this paper analyzes the savings and longevity impacts of mortality contingent claims defined here as income measures such as annuities and life insurance under which earned income is contingent on the length of one s life the postwar increase in mandatory annuity and life insurance programs as well as the rapid increase in the life expectancy of older ages motivates a better understanding of the incentive effects that mortality contingent claims have on longevity related behavior we claim that these incentives in often alter the standard conclusions obtained about old age support when mortality is treated exogenously in particular we argue that annuities involve moral hazard effects that increase longevity and among other things introduce a positive interaction between public programs for health care and income support for the elderly programs that have grown enormously in developed countries

survival versus consumption we develop an indirect method to estimate utility and willingness to pay wtp for reductions in the risk of death at various ages using a life cycle model of consumption we assume that an individual sets his consumption level each year so as to maximize his expected lifetime utility alternative assumptions about opportunities for borrowing and annuities characterize two polar types of societies in our robinson crusoe case an individual must be entirely self sufficient and annuities are not available in our perfect markets case an individual can borrow against future earnings and purchase actuarially fair annuities we show that under these assumptions wtp is the sum of livelihood discounted expected future earnings and consumer surplus to illustrate our methods we derive wtp for an average financially independent american man under plausible assumptions the model is calibrated to 1978 earnings e g 18 000 per year for men aged 45 54 with at least some income in the robinson crusoe case wtp increases from 500 000 at age 20 to a peak of 1 250 000 at age 40 and declines to 630 000 at age 60 in the perfect markets case age variations are less pronounced wtp is 1 050 000 at age 20 peaks at 1 070 000 at age 25 and declines to 600 000 at age 60 these results suggest that individuals value risks to their lives at several times the pro rata share of their future earnings

cooperation in strategic games revisited for two person complete information strategic games with transferable utility all major variable threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide this confluence of solutions by luminaries such as nash harsanyi raiffa and selten is more than mere coincidence staying in the class of two person games with transferable unility the article presents a more complete theory that expands their solution specifically it presents 1 a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components 2 an intuitive and computable closed form formula for the solution 3 an axiomatic justification of the solution and 4 a generalization of the solution to games with private signals along with an arbitration scheme that implements it the objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications jel codes c71 c72 c78 copyright 2013 oxford university press

pricing and r d when consumption affects longevity we analyze goods for which the amount of consumption determines the duration of consumption focusing on health related consumption that affects longevity the characteristics of the demand for such goods lead to unique predictions about private pricing and investment in r d as well as the fiscal effects of public subsidies and taxes in particular we argue that there is an r d feedback for such goods when the market size expands through longevity induced population growth we also argue that as developed countries devote large shares of public spending to old age programs that may themselves affect longevity e g medicare and social security the nonstandard effects that these programs introduce may become increasingly important

bargaining with random implementation an experimental study abstract we use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation we modify the standard nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome rather with exogenous probability q one bargainer receives his her demand with the other getting the remainder we use an asymmetric bargaining set favouring one bargainer and disagreement payoffs of zero and we vary q over several values our results mostly support game theory s directional predictions as with conventional arbitration we observe a strong chilling effect on bargaining for q near one extreme demands and low agreement rates increasing q reinforces the game s built in asymmetry giving the favoured player an increasingly large share of payoffs but also raising efficiency these effects are non uniform over sizable ranges increases in q have minimal effect but for some q small additional increases lead to sharp changes in results

the dynamics of solar pv costs and prices as a challenge for technology forecasting an effective energy technology strategy has to balance between setting a stable long term framework for innovation while also responding to more immediate changes in technology cost and performance over the last decade rather than a steady progression along an established learning curve pv costs and prices have been volatile with increases or plateaus followed by rapid reductions the paper describes and considers the causes of recent changes in pv costs and prices at module and system level both international trends and more place specific contexts it finds that both module and system costs and price trends have reflected multiple overlapping forces established forecasting methods experience curves and engineering assessments have limited ability to capture key learning effects behind recent pv cost and price trends production scale effects industrial re organization and shakeouts international trade practices and national market dynamics these forces are likely to remain prominent aspect of technology learning effects in the foreseeable future and so are in need of improved more explicit representation in energy technology forecasting

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

the veil of public ignorance abstract a theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian standard of evaluation governing choices under complete information the task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information our first main result generalizes harsanyi s j polit econ 63 1955 309 classical result to situations of incomplete information assuming that group preferences satisfy bayesian coherence and interim pareto dominance these axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists we argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of bayesian preference aggregation under complete information

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

weighted randomized dictatorship and the asymmetric nash solution a characterization of the asymmetric nash bargaining solution is presented in it a weighted randomized dictatorship axiom plays a central role

virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information abstract the core is extended to games with incomplete information the feasible set is characterized by incentive compatible mechanisms blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive compatible mediation plan membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure independent types and sidepayments an offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual utility scales that generalize the weighted utility scales of the inner core mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable

the welfare value of fda s mercury in fish advisory a dynamic reanalysis assessing the welfare impact of consumer health advisories is a thorny task recently shimshack and ward 2010 studied how u s households responded to fda s 2001 mercury in fish advisory they found that the average at risk household reduced fish consumption by 21 resulting in a 17 reduction in mercury exposure at the cost of a 21 reduction in cardioprotective omega 3 fatty acids based on a static assessment of the health costs and benefits shimshack and ward concluded that the advisory policy resulted in an overall consumer welfare loss in this note we propose a dynamic assessment that links the long term cardiovascular health effects of the advisory to life cycle consumption we find that under reasonable assumptions the welfare loss might be much larger than suggested our analysis highlights the importance of accounting for dynamic effects when evaluating persistent changes in exposure to environmental health risks

posted pricing vs bargaining in sequential selling process we study the role of bargaining in a firm s sequential selling process the seller firm under consideration sequentially sells a fixed amount of stock to a random arrival stream of potential buyers who are heterogeneous in product valuation based on the stock level and the time to the end of the selling season the seller may dynamically choose either to post a take it or leave it price or to engage in bargaining with an arriving buyer we introduce a stochastic order called the scaled pricing order for the buyer s valuation distribution the scaled pricing order measures the average portion of trade surplus that the seller can obtain by posting a price for distributions with increasing length biased hazard rate checking the property of increasing decreasing scaled pricing order boils down to verifying the concavity convexity of the mills ratio we fully characterize the family of distributions that are invariant in the scaled pricing order which includes uniform and exponential distributions

optimal severance pay with incomplete information this paper contrasts optimal employment contracts in a world of full information and in a world in which the worker s alternative employment possibilities cannot be observed by the firm the difference between income and severance pay that is the opportunity cost of separating will be higher in more productive states of nature with complete wage insurance no longer possible we therefore have an explanation of higher ability individuals receiving high wages in the short run in long term contracts the explanation does not rely as past explanations have done on the imperfections in bonding arrangements or in loan markets

financial return for government support of large scale thin film solar photovoltaic manufacturing in canada as the ontario government has recognized that solar photovoltaic pv energy conversion is a solution to satisfying society s energy demands while reducing the adverse anthropogenic impacts on the global environment that compromise social welfare they have begun to generate policy and funding programs to support financial incentives for pv this paper provides a financial analysis for investment in a 1 gw per year turnkey amorphous silicon pv manufacturing plant the financial benefits for both the provincial and federal governments were quantified for i full construction subsidy ii construction subsidy and sale iii partially subsidize construction iv a publicly owned plant v loan guarantee for construction and vi an income tax holiday revenues for the governments are derived from taxation personal corporate and sales sales of panels in ontario and saved health environmental and economic costs associated with offsetting coal fired electricity both governments enjoyed positive cash flows from these investments in less than 12 years and in many of the scenarios both governments earned well over 8 on investments from 100s of millions to 2 4 billion the results showed that it is in the financial best interest of both the ontario and canadian federal governments to implement aggressive fiscal policy to support large scale pv manufacturing

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

technical note revenue management with bargaining static game theoretic models of bilateral bargaining assume that the seller knows his valuation for the item that is up for sale that is how the seller may determine this quantity is exogenous to these models in this paper we develop and analyze a stylized markov decision process that endogenizes the seller s computation of his marginal inventory valuation in an infinite horizon revenue management setting when each sale occurs according to a given bilateral bargaining mechanism we use this model to compare both analytically and numerically the seller s performance under four basic bilateral bargaining mechanisms with a tractable information structure these comparisons provide insights into the seller s performance under the following trading arrangements buyer and seller posted pricing negotiated pricing and rule based pricing