wicksell lindahl and the theory of public goods wicksell s and lindahl s ideas on public goods and decisions are reviewed in light of later developments in the theoretical economics literature i begin by discussing their normative ideals in particular the notion of justness and the sources of the difficulties in reaching them wicksell s and lindahl s ideal states as well as the obstacles that they perceive are compared to more recent views on free riding and on the behavior of elected representatives their views on political bargaining are then related to later concepts in particular to the core of the economy

pricing free bank notes abstract during the pre civil war period us banks issued distinct private monies called bank notes a bank note is a perpetual risky non interest bearing debt claim with the right to redeem on demand at par in specie this paper investigates the pricing of this private money taking into account the enormous changes in technology during the period namely the introduction and rapid diffusion of the railroad a contingent claims pricing model for bank notes is proposed and tested using monthly bank note prices for all banks in north america together with indices of the durations and costs of trips back to issuing banks constructed from pre civil war travelers guides evidence is produced that market participants properly priced the risks inherent in these securities suggesting that wildcat banking was not common because of market discipline

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

incentives and barriers for wind power expansion and system integration in denmark in denmark expansion of on shore near shore and off shore wind power is planned to increase the wind power share to 50 of electricity consumption by 2020 in this situation a continuation of past policies will not suffice and a dual track incentive system that both establishes incentives for investing in wind power and integration infrastructure with integration between the electricity heating and transportation sectors is required the current danish taxation system discourages electricity use and works against this integration likewise the current day ahead electricity spot market is not appropriate for a high wind future as wind reduces price levels but integration across sectors can partly assist in increasing demand and prices the european emission trading system does not suffice in providing a level playing field for wind power and thus needs a revision another barrier for on shore and near shore wind power expansion is a growing citizens resistance due to an unequal distribution of benefits and burdens ownership should be open for more types of investors especially local investors in order to ensure public support and local acceptance of wind power projects the danish political system needs to address these issues in order to promote further expansion of wind power in denmark

incentives in government contracts abstract this paper is concerned with the structure of compensation schemes that a government might employ when contracting with a private firm we characterize the class of all compensation schemes that induce contracting firms to share their inside information with the government

misintermediation and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract individuals plan consumption and production for different point in the future using interest rates of various maturities as a guide however the financial intermediaries individuals work through traditionally do not match the maturity structure of their assets and liabilities as a result aggregate production plans and aggregate consumption plans for each period in the future need not coincide the resulting discrepancy will eventually appear as a recession or boom involving an unanticipated change in interest rates and production inside the original intertemporal production possibilities frontier maturity transformation is therefore not an essential function of financial intermediation but rather a mis function one which we call misintermediation

cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity this paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity within a n country prisoner s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect in addition to the standard non cooperative equilibrium cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a nash equilibrium in an emission game however where countries can choose their abatement level continuously equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient nash equilibrium finally in a two stage game on coalition formation the presence of equity interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains here even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached

the federal funds market under bank deregulation the introduction of competitive interest rates on deposits is shown to effect the optimal decisions of banks by altering their optimal forecast of the federal funds rate the movement toward co mpetitive deposit rates increases the size of the monetary base neces sary for the fed to maintain its deposit targets when deposits and the monetary base are substitutes in addition there is less uncertainty in the federal funds market under competitive deposit rates when deposits and the monetary base are substitutes and the source of uncertainty is not from the supply of deposits copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

public goods and minimum provision levels does the institutional formation affect cooperation we investigate experimentally the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding minimum contribution level to a public good groups either face the minimum level exogenously im

who should abate carbon emission we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 4 the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these condition are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

money is an experience good competition and trust in the private provision of money the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money is studied with commitment trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency without commitment competition plays no role trust does play a role but requires a bound on efficiency stationary inflation must be non negative and therefore the friedman rule cannot be achieved the quality of money can be observed only after its purchasing capacity is realized in this sense money is an experience good

coalition stability in public goods provision testing an optimal allocation rule we test the canonical model of international environmental agreements ieas in a laboratory setting with asymmetric agents iea participation represents coalition formation and public good provision where there are gains to cooperation but an incentive to free ride we test four competing methods of dividing the coalition s worth a recently proposed optimal rule which accounts for subjects payoffs as a single free rider the shapley value the nash bargaining solution and an equal split each treatment generates the theoretically predicted coalition size more often than not the shares of the potential gains to cooperation achieved by each rule are 51 36 40 and 13 respectively these results highlight the importance of using an optimal rule to improve ieas and more broadly for voluntary public good provision

free bank failures risky bonds versus undiversified portfolios almost 30 of the 872 banks established under the free banking system 1837 62 are considered failures unable to reimburse noteholders for the full value of their bank notes upon closure lacking sufficient data economists have focused on one of two general failure explanations poor regulation design or undiversified bank portfolios i test both explanations within hazard functions using warren weber s annual balance sheet data for almost every antebellum bank my results suggest that free banking s bond secured note issue was the underlying problem but individual banks could have avoided failure by diversifying their assets with loans and controlling their circulation

contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models abstract settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory i e where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes if contracts have no memory a repeated agency game can be played myopically there are no gains to long term relationships conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented in an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract in a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome domain additivity implies no memory

nonconventional renewable energy governance in brazil lessons to learn from the german experience abstract this paper presents a comparative analysis of energy governance regarding nonconventional renewable energy sources ncres in brazil and germany brazil is a world leader in the use of conventional renewable energy sources such as hydro power while germany has been achieving outstanding results in fostering ncres the focus is on two critical issues the legal and regulatory framework and the institutions created to support the ncres market development the comparison shows that despite the very different energy situations and policy drivers valuables lessons can be extracted from the german experience the main lesson for brazil is to think ncres as a strategic opportunity to rely less on fossil fuel and large hydroelectric power plants to decentralize the electric power sector to use the huge solar biomass and wind power potential available in the country and to create a environment friendly ncres industry to this end three critical points were identified 1 the legal and regulatory framework should be improved 2 long term energy planning taking into account social economic and climate issues and 3 the current institutions supporting ncres in brazil should be upgraded and or new ones such as more specific energy agencies should be created

voluntariness and efficiency in the provision of public goods abstract this paper presents a characterization of lindahl allocations which makes no reference to personalized prices lindahl equilibria are characterized here by two conditions pareto efficiency and a voluntariness condition voluntariness requires that no consumer may benefit from a reduction in his contribution if this means that the vector of public goods must be reduced in the same proportion the intersection of the large set of voluntary allocations and that of efficient ones turns out to be under differentiability the set of lindahl allocations

the impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goods abstract we investigate how burden sharing rules impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents we compare different rule based contribution schemes where agents can first suggest a minimum provision level of the public good before the smallest common denominator is implemented we find that rule based contribution schemes significantly increase payoff levels relative to the vcm while significant differences exist between the rules importantly the equal payoff rule maximizes payoffs for all player types this also holds relative to a scheme where different types of players separately can determine their minimum contribution levels our results lend insights into the efficient institutional design for voluntary private provision of public goods and how burden sharing rules interact with efficiency when agents are heterogeneous

preference representation and randomization in principal agent contracts abstract conditions on an agent s preferences that induce a demand for ex ante randomization are derived when the agent has constant absolute risk aversion in wealth but additive separable preferences in wealth and effort optimal contracts often require randomization under additive separability the principal can use randomization to exploit the interaction between incentive considerations and the agent s outside opportunities however when the agent has constant absolute risk aversion in wealth but multiplicative separable preferences participation and incentive considerations separate hence optimal contracts do not exhibit ex ante randomization

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

the effects of risk aversion on production decisions in decentralized organizations this paper presents a principal agent model in which subsequent to contracting the risk averse agent becomes informed about the production process communication of the agent s information is always valuable the optimal contract given this information asymmetry is characterized by less production and a larger risk premium than when information is symmetric leading to an efficiency loss comparative statics show that the loss in expected production increases as the agent becomes more risk averse

who should abate carbon emissions an international viewpoint abstract we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 1993b the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these conditions are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

justifying the lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation the motivation for the lindahl equilibrium is mostly a rather artificial price mechanism even though the analogy to a competitive market was emphasised by lindahl himself his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas behind his concept in the present paper we therefore show how the lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from some simple equity axioms these normative assumptions are the benefit principle on the one hand and the equal sacrifice principle or equivalently a non envy condition as a postulate for distributional equity on the other fairness among agents with different preferences and incomes is taken into account by considering their marginal willingness to pay as shadow prices in this way the reason why the lindahl solution can be perceived as an outcome of fair cooperation might become more understandable

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

the suppression of state banknotes a reconsideration george selgin it is generally believed that congress in imposing a prohibitive 10 tax on state banknotes in 1865 made the public better off by doing away with inferior brands of currency while simultaneously helping finance the civil war by stimulating bond sales to national banks in truth the tax served neither purpose the true purpose of the 10 tax was not to enhance bond sales or to improve the quality of the currency but to offset the inflationary effects of greenbacks and national banknotes in the long run the public might have been better off had state banks retained their right to issue currency jel g21 n21 let us have a bank currency that will be recognized in the next town a currency that will be recognized in new york philadelphia boston new orleans chicago or any other part of the united states representative john f farnsworth illinois april 28 1864 congressional globe 38th congress 1st session 1934 i f the national banks with the great advantages which they enjoy cannot compete successfully with the state banks it simply shows that the latter subserve better the interests of the business community and should not be destroyed representative francis kernan new york february 16 1865 congressional globe 38th congress 2d session 833 i introduction during the civil war a 10 tax was placed on any issuance of notes of state chartered or incorporated banks deliberately forcing state banks out of the paper currency business and making the regulation and issuance of currency a prerogative of the federal government and of federally chartered national banks this paper reexamines the congressional decision to suppress state banknotes american monetary historians have conventionally viewed the decision as reflecting 1 the public s intolerable disgust with an unregulated currency hammond 1957 11 compare dunbar 1922 220 and 2 the government s desire to boost the demand for national bank charters so as to expand the market for its debt e g hughes and cain 1998 373 74 dowd 1992 230 i plan to argue that neither view accounts adequately for the 10 tax the first view in particular begs important questions that have gone unaddressed if state banknotes were clearly inferior to national banknotes why was a prohibitive tax needed to drive them out of circulation just how were consumers supposed to benefit from having their choices restricted i explore several responses to these questions and ultimately conclude that consumers considered some state banknotes to be just as desirable as their national bank counterparts i argue that the 10 tax served not to overcome any banknote market failure but to force the withdrawal of relatively high quality state banknotes i then proceed to show that the tax was not needed to secure adequate bond sales to national banks proponents of the tax were striving not to increase the number of applications for national bank charters but to limit growth in the aggregate money stock i conclude by suggesting that because state banks of issue could have accommodated market demands that national banks failed to satisfy consumers might have been better served had state banknotes been allowed to survive ii the chase plan when the first shots of the american civil war were fired at fort sumter the paper currency of the united states consisted of over 200 million in banknotes issued by nearly 1 500 state chartered banks the quality of these banknotes varied according to their issuers management and regulatory environment 1 some banknotes circulated at par only near their source and at fluctuating discounts elsewhere so that persons carrying notes from state to state risked incurring currency exchange losses of the sort borne by international travelers today a few were subject to especially heavy discounts or were refused altogether because their issuers solvency was in question

friedman versus hayek on private money review essay abstract few areas of economic activity can claim as long and unanimous a record of agreement on the appropriateness of governmental intervention as the supply of money benjamin klein 1974 p 423

has government any role in money abstract recent interest in monetary reform has been sparked by the emergence of a world irredeemable paper money system in light of this interest we review the current validity of four good reasons friedman advanced in 1960 to rationalize government intervention we conclude that the forces that produced government involvement in the past will persist deregulation of financial intermediaries is desirable on grounds of market efficiency though it is an open question whether government should continue as lender of last resort we expect that the present world fiat money standard will neither degenerate into hyperinflation nor revert to a commodity standard

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

an international policy architecture for the post kyoto era in february 2005 the kyoto protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate change came into force but without participation by the united states its impacts on emissions of greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide co2 the primary anthropogenic driver of climate change will be trivial but scientific robert t watson 2001 and economic charles d kolstad and michael a toman 2001 analyses point to the need for a credible international approach because the kyoto protocol s ambitious targets apply only to the short term 2008 2012 and only to industrialized nations the agreement will impose relatively high costs and generate only modest short term benefits while failing to provide a real solution joseph e aldy et al 2003 for these reasons most economists see the agreement as deeply flawed richard n cooper 1998 david g victor 2001 warwick j mckibbin and peter j wilcoxen 2002 although some see it as an acceptable first step axel michaelowa 2003 virtually all agree however that the protocol is not sufficient to the overall challenge we describe the basic features of a postkyoto international global climate agreement which addresses three crucial questions who when and how the respective elements are first a means to ensure that key nations industrialized and developing are involved second an emphasis on an extended time path of action employing a cost effective pattern over time and third inclusion of market based policy instruments i who expand participation to include all key countries

public goods and the distribution of income abstract this article addresses conceptual issues concerning the distributive incidence of public goods solutions depend on the specific purposes for asking the question of distributive incidence notably assessing the extent to which various public goods should be provided determining how the provision of public goods affects the desirability of income redistribution and providing a meaningful description of the distribution of well being in the course of the analysis a simple and intuitive version of the benefit principle of taxation qualitatively different from those commonly advanced in pertinent literatures is presented and some of the problems confronting empirical attempts to measure the distributive incidence of public goods are resolved

laissez faire monetary theorists in late nineteenth century america economists have recently begun to reconsider many forms of regulation of money and banks from what may be termed a laissez faire perspective some have questioned fundamentally the rationale for any government role this development raises an interesting question for historians of thought what intellectual support did the concept of a free market monetary system receive in the 19th century the heyday of classical liberalism and laissez faire thought this paper takes up the question by critically surveying american monetary writings from the last half of the 19th century 2 we find that the idea of a laissez faire monetary policy was never very popular in the united states though it did have proponents whose work was often insightful most of the relevant literature was written in response to consequences wrought by the monetary legislation of the civil war that legislation included not only the national bank acts 1863 4 but also an ancillary measure effective 1866 placing a prohibitive tax on state bank notes these laws forced banks of issue to become national banks and thus to buy federal bonds as collateral for their notes which had the intended effect of creating an extra demand for the federal government s wartime debt in addition congress authorized the issue of legal tender greenback currency by the treasury a frequent theme in the post bellum monetary literature was the alleged deficiency or inelasticity of the currency supply some the greenbackers and silverites wanted the government to increase its contributions to the money supply others especially toward the end of the century argued for the establishment of a centralized agency with special powers of note issue a handful of writers renewed the radical jacksonians campaign for laissez faire in money and banking 3 in their view the defects of existing arrangements could best be solved by deregulation of banking and by removal of the federal government from the business of supplying money

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

improving energy efficiency and smart grid program analysis with agent based end use forecasting models electric utilities and regulators face difficult challenges evaluating new energy efficiency and smart grid programs prompted in large part by recent state and federal mandates and financial incentives it is increasingly difficult to separate electricity use impacts of individual utility programs from the impacts of increasingly stringent appliance and building efficiency standards increasing electricity prices appliance manufacturer efficiency improvements energy program interactions and other factors this study reviews traditional approaches used to evaluate electric utility energy efficiency and smart grid programs and presents an agent based end use modeling approach that resolves many of the shortcomings of traditional approaches data for a representative sample of utility customers in a midwestern us utility are used to evaluate energy efficiency and smart grid program targets over a fifteen year horizon model analysis indicates that a combination of the two least stringent efficiency and smart grid program scenarios provides peak hour reductions one third greater than the most stringent smart grid program suggesting that reductions in peak demand requirements are more feasible when both efficiency and smart grid programs are considered together suggestions on transitioning from traditional end use models to agent based end use models are provided

state restrictions on local debt their role in preventing default abstract default by a local government can impose a negative externality upon other localities within a state because the state s ability to enforce debt repayment depends upon the proportion of municipalities favoring repayment localities benefit from maintaining their state s reputation for enforcement hence jurisdictions not wishing to default favor enforcement of repayment by other jurisdictions a debt limit increases support for enforcement by reducing the proportion of municipalities preferring default we characterize when such a limit is optimal we also examine the role of special districts which typically neither are subject to a debt ceiling nor fully backed by the jurisdiction

environmental goods and the distribution of income the paper presents a theoretical investigation of the distributional impacts of environmental commodities it introduces an appropriate framework defines concepts for measuring benefits and examines the determinants of benefit incidence within this setup its emphasis is on methodology and on recognizing the relevant economic variables and information it turns out that in an equal preference model the magnitude of the income elasticity of marginal willingness to pay for an environmental good is the crucial variable determining progressivity it is related to a number of other elasticities which are more easily accessible to an empirical estimation

interpreting new evidence about china and u s silver purchases abstract this paper offers a reinterpretation of the influence on china of america s silver policy in the early 1930 s recently compiled evidence about events in china are described and interpreted in light of a model of free banking under a commodity standard our interpretation is that the u s silver purchase program did not set off a chain of bad economic events which eventually forced china off silver and onto a fiat standard rather china was forced off silver by its own government which wanted to make itself the beneficiary of the capital gain associated with the appreciation of silver and to relieve itself of the restrictions that are imposed on government finance by a commodity standard

anniversary article a perspective on asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation the paper asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation by harris kriebel and raviv was published in the june 1982 issue ofmanagement science in this article written as part of this journal s 50 year anniversary celebration we highlight the significance of the harris et al paper for research in managerial accounting we first formulate and solve a continuous version of the harris et al model to illustrate the key assumptions and findings of their paper we then review several strands of the resource allocation literature in managerial accounting that have taken their inspiration either directly or indirectly from the work of harris et al

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

financial structure and aggregate economic activity an overview this paper surveys literature that explores the possible links between the financial system and aggregate economic behavior the survey is in two parts the first reviews the traditional work and the second discusses new research copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

choosing rules to govern the commons a model with evidence from mexico abstract i develop a model to assess distributive rules observed in field data on 48 mexican farmer managed irrigation systems households decide whether to contribute maintenance effort the aggregate amount of which affects the level of output distributive rules with congruence between the sharing of collective costs and benefits elicit the highest level of effort empirically however incongruent rules dominate the surveyed systems i argue that transaction costs offset some efficiency benefits of congruent rules i estimate a model of rule choice inequality and the age of the water users association strongly increase the likelihood that a system chooses proportional water allocation

do open market operations matter theory and evidence from the second bank of the united states abstract modigliani miller theorems for open market operations describe conditions under which central bank portfolio rearrangements will have no consequences for allocations relative prices or the time path of the price level such theorems for government owned central banks have limited applicability and hence are difficult to test we develop a modigliani miller theorem for privately owned central banks and test its implications using data from the second bank of the united states the data are consistent with an absence of price level effects due to open market operations and are inconsistent with standard versions of the quantity theory of money

progression under the benefit approach to the theory of taxation abstract the implications for progression of the benefit approach to the theory of taxation are studied in this paper it is concluded that the case for progression rests on the degree of substitutability between public and private goods

what is benefit taxation abstract benefit taxation is a system in which individuals are taxed according to the benefits they receive from public expenditures this paper describes an alternative to the standard lindahl method of determining the distribution of individual benefits from government provided public goods and uses this alternative to calculate benefit taxes this alternative avoids some of the paradoxial features of lindahl pricing and generates outcomes in which all consumers benefit from reduced costs of providing public goods an illustrative calculation shows that benefit taxes defined in this way may be quite regressive

egalitarian equivalent cost sharing of a public good in an economy with one public and one private good egalitarian equivalent cost sharing consists of finding the highest public good level x such that consuming x for free yields a feasible utility distribution the corresponding feasible allocation typically unique called egalitarian equivalent is in the core of the economy conversely any cost sharing method satisfying pareto optimality cost monotonicity nobody suffers a utility loss if the production technology improves upon ceteris paribus and individual rationality no single agent coalition objects or no private transfers no agent receives a positive amount of private good must select an egalitarian equivalent allocation in every economy copyright 1987 by the econometric society

determinants of collective action on the local commons a model with evidence from mexico i develop a model of cooperation in small irrigation systems i give conditions under which an equalizing redistribution of wealth increases the level of equilibrium cooperation but also show that some redistributions that increase inequality can also increase cooperation the distributive rule a combination of arrangements for maintenance cost sharing and water allocation also affects the cooperation level i estimate statistical models of cooperation for three maintenance indicators using field data from a study of mexican irrigation societies social heterogeneity and landholding inequality are significantly associated with lower maintenance distributive rules that allocate water proportionally to landholding size likewise reduce maintenance

bank regulation and deposit insurance the subject of government bank regulation is intimately intertwined with that of government deposit insurance if the government is to insure bank deposits it should also have some say in the risks that insured banks are allowed to take otherwise it would leave itself wide open to unlimited potential losses john h kareken in this issue comes close to arguing that banks without government deposit insurance could provide satisfactorily safe transactions accounts i would go one step further and argue that government deposit insurance is not just unnecessary but actually undesirable banks that offer transaction deposits are supposedly subject to an inherent instability problem that makes them prone to self realizing depositor panics traditionally transaction deposits are denominated as a fixed number of currency units while the assets corresponding to these deposits are mostly finite term securities or commercial loans if depositors all want their money at once the banks simply do not have it to the extent that their assets are marketable the banks can sell them off to meet withdrawals with only minimal losses but if there is a run on the banking system as a whole the banks scramble for funds could conceivably drive interest rates up and asset prices down to the point at which the banks are actually insolvent simply because of depositor fears that they might fail to the extent that bank assets consist of poorly marketable commercial loans they are even more exposed to the risk of runs this inherent instability problem is the most commonly cited argument for government deposit insurance and the careful government regulation it entails or ought to entail however the money market mutual fund mmmf is a recent market innovation that completely solves this inherent instability problem of the payments system as kareken points out in his paper mmmfs like all mutual funds are run proof since their obligations to their investors are simply pro rata shares in the current market value of the

asymmetric information and optimal bank reserves one traditional argument in favor of bank reserve requirements holds that since a b ank and its depositors are asymmetrically informed as to the bank s reserve position and its portfolio the bank will hold too few reserves and too risky a port folio this being the case presumably a central banking authority is equipped t o impose and to monitor a minimal reserve requirement yielding a pareto superior outcome this paper analyzes this position in the context of a formalmodel and shows that at least for some parameters of the model there is such a case for a minimal reserve requirement copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

voluntary provision of a public good and individual morality abstract we examine both in general games in strategic form and in games of voluntary provision of a public good some implications of the assumption that individuals may obey ethical codes of conduct the notion of morality considered captures the intuition often attributed to kant that a moral action leads to the best outcome when it is properly universalized we propose a formalization of this idea which generalizes earlier attempts made in this direction in the literature by allowing the players to differ both in their strategy sets and their preferences we show that it is easy to find examples of games in which no moral behavior of this type exists or where the only existing kantian code of conduct leads to a pareto inefficient outcome we then more specifically examine the issues of existence and pareto efficiency of kantian norms of behavior in games of voluntary provision of a public good we find in this context that there is no conflict between morality and pareto efficiency since any kantian norm of behavior is pareto efficient we also prove the existence of a kantian norm of individual contribution

multistage capital budgeting for shared investments this paper studies the performance of delegated decision making schemes in a two stage multidivision capital budgeting problem for a shared investment with an inherent abandonment option applying both robust goal congruence and sequential adverse selection frameworks we show that the optimal capital budgeting mechanism entails a capital charge rate above the firm s cost of capital in the first stage but below the cost of capital in the second stage further the first stage asset cost sharing rule depends only on the relative divisional growth profiles and equal cost sharing can be optimal even when the divisions receive significantly different benefits from the shared investment project in the presence of an adverse selection problem all agency costs are incorporated into the second stage budgeting mechanism leaving the first stage capital charge rate and asset sharing rule unaffected even though the agency problem induces capital rationing at both stages this paper was accepted by mary barth ac

explaining the demand for free bank notes abstract this paper explains why the risky notes of banks established during the free banking era 1837 1863 were demanded even when relatively safe specie gold and silver coin was an alternative free bank notes were demanded because they were priced to reflect the expected value of their backing the empirical evidence supports this explanation specifically in new york wisconsin and indiana the expected value of backing was sufficient for free bank notes to circulate at par which they did in minnesota the backing for notes was very poor they exchanged well below par being treated as small denomination securities

the emancipation proclamation confederate expectations and the price of southern bank notes we examine the behavior of a semimonthly series of the confederate dollar price of bank notes these notes traded at par with confederate dollars from october of 1861 until november 5 1862 we use a model of the demand for two currencies to argue that this departure from par results from altered southern expectations after the 1862 congressional elections assured the enactment of the emancipation proclamation previously southerners believed a win or a negotiated settlement would allow a return to the union intact when these expectations changed bank notes appreciated against confederate dollars in addition our empirical work shows that notes appreciated following northern victories

solvency regulations and the management of banking risks abstract in the recent years international banking authorities have succeeded implementing harmonized solvency regulations however two stages can be distinguished 1 up to 1993 a rigid approach has prevailed with the cooke ratio for credit risks and the standardized approach to market risks 2 since then a movement towards flexibility has been acknowledged notably with the validation of internal models of the var type and the precommitment proposal of kupiec and o brien the objective of this article is to discuss the pros and cons of these different approaches within a coherent conceptual framework that applies contract theory to the regulation of banking

private money and banking regulation we show that the regulation of lending practices is desirable for the optimal provision of private money in an environment in which bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors neither an unregulated banking system nor a form of narrow banking in which banks hold 100 in reserves can provide the socially efficient amount of money if bankers provided such an amount then they would prefer to default on their liabilities we show that a regulation that increases the value of the banking sector s assets e g by limiting competition in credit markets will mitigate the commitment problem if the return on the banking sector s assets is made sufficiently large then it is possible to implement an efficient allocation

ecological sufficiency individual liberties and distributive justice implications for policy making we investigate the prospects of voluntary ecological sufficiency for environmental and climate policy under the constraints implied by political liberalism we find that freedom of choice restricts sufficiency to rather wealthy societies and that a sufficiency threshold cannot be derived by referring to the poor sufficiency can be in conflict with the demands of social justice i e if the sufficiency threshold is below the social minimum implied by social justice benefits from sufficiency are highly related to individual perceptions such benefits cannot be expressed in a standard preference framework consequently alternative measures of welfare and inequality are required if sufficiency is a significant phenomenon in society standard environmental policies can have a pronounced interaction with voluntary sufficiency i e if quantity regulation is present overall the voluntary notion of sufficiency causes a dilemma as sufficiency is largely a matter of civil society however voluntary sufficiency is expected to make important contributions to the preservation of ecological resources if properly balanced with social and environmental policies and framed by public discursive control

interest risk sensitive deposit insurance premia stable ach estimates abstract the parameters of interest rate uncertainty are estimated by maximum likelihood for the period 1952 1982 and used to evaluate bank or thrift deposit insurance as a function of duration mismatching capital asset ratio and the recent history of interest rate forecasting errors homoskedasticity is overwhelmingly rejected in favor of adaptive conditional heteroskedasticity ach even after removing this heteroskedasticity normality gives much lower likelihood than paretian stable distributions with characteristic exponent in the range 1 614 to 1 714 the conditional deposit insurance values fluctuate by factors in excess of 300 for some duration gaps over the past three decades

bank panics government guarantees and the long run size of the financial sector evidence from free banking america governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector but observing the long run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult we look to america s free banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the indiana centered panic of 1854 to the panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government s ability to honor its guarantees

banks free banks and u s economic growth the federalist financial revolution may have jump started the u s economy into modern growth but the free banking system 1837 1862 did not play a direct role in sustaining it despite lowering entry barriers and extending banking into developing regions we find in county level data that free banks had little or no effect on growth the result is not just a symptom of the era as state chartered banks seem to have strong and positive effects on manufacturing and urbanization jel g21 n21 o43

participation and commitment in voluntary coalitions to provide public goods this paper reports experimental evidence on the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide a public good participation and commitment in a coalition are either exogenously imposed or endogenously determined by the players themselves we find larger voluntary participation rates when commitments in the coalition are endogenously determined using a minimum contribution rule rather than exogenously determined however due to a trade off between participation and commitment coalitions with voluntary participation are less effective in facilitating cooperation compared to when all players are forced to participate this paper therefore confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from coalition formation theories

equity fairness and lindahl equilibria abstract the purpose of this paper is to establish a criterion of justice called l fairness for an economy with public goods the concept of l fairness is set up in such a way as to extract the ethical judgement from lindahl s equilibrium concept then it is shown that the lindahl equilibria are qualified as l fair that is any lindahl equilibrium net trade is strongly l fair and conversely any strongly l fair net trade must be a lindahl equilibrium net trade as a corollary to this proposition it is also shown that any lindahl equilibrium allocation with equal wealth is strongly l fair and conversely that any strongly l fair allocation has to be that of lindahl equilibrium with equal wealth

hierarchical structure and responsibility accounting the literature on responsibility accounting offers two broad imperatives first a manager is best evaluated based on what he controls second responsibility follows a hierarchical arrangement the departmental manager is responsible for the controllable departmental activities the plant manager is responsible for the activities in the various departments within the plant the division manager is responsible for the aggregate activities of various plants and so on this literature embodies a variety of theories of behavior and organization examples include expectancy theory ronen and livingstone 1975 and brownell and mcinnes 1968 contingency theory bruns and waterhouse 1975 and merchant 1984 neoclassical economics gordon 1964 and principal agent modeling baiman 1982 principal agent modeling emphasizes information asymmetries in understanding responsibility accounting in particular the link between controllability and informativeness holmstrom 1979 1982 baiman and demski 1980 and antle and demski 1988 has been well explicated and the use of relative performance evaluation antle and smith 1986 demski and sappington 1984 and ma moore and turnbull 1988 has received significant attention 1 far less attention has been afforded the hierarchical aspect of responsibility accounting this is the focus of our analysis

supergrid or smartgrid competing strategies for large scale integration of intermittent renewables this paper defines and compares two strategies for integrating intermittent renewables supergrid and smartgrid while conventional energy policy suggests that these strategies may be implemented alongside each other the paper identifies significant technological and socio economic conflicts of interest between the two the article identifies differences between a domestic strategy for the integration of intermittent renewables vis a vis the smartgrid and a cross system strategy vis a vis the supergrid policy makers and transmission system operators must understand the need for both strategies to evolve in parallel but in different territories or with strategic integration avoiding for one strategy to undermine the feasibility of the other a strategic zoning strategy is introduced from which attentive societies as well as the global community stand to benefit the analysis includes a paradigmatic case study from west denmark which supports the hypothesis that these strategies are mutually exclusive the case study shows that increasing cross system transmission capacity jeopardizes the feasibility of smartgrid technology investments a political effort is required for establishing dedicated smartgrid innovation zones while also redefining infrastructure to avoid the narrow focus on grids and cables smartgrid investment trusts could be supported from reallocation of planned transmission grid investments to provide for the equitable development of smartgrid strategies

the causes of free bank failures a detailed examination abstract in this paper we propose and test a new explanation of bank behavior during the free banking era 1837 1863 arguing against the conventional view that free bank failures were due to wildcat banking we claim they were caused by falling asset prices confronting both explanations with our new and detailed data set developed from state auditor reports we find that the falling asset price explanation of free bank failures explains far more failures than does the wildcatting hypothesis

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies