the optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer abstract this paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget constrained we consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function if the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint textbook monopoly pricing is optimal by contrast the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing to commit to a declining price sequence to require the buyer to disclose his budget or to offer financing journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d42 d45 d89 l12

multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders in the last few years governments in many parts of the world have aggressively sought to privatize socially held assets this wave of privatization has included the sale of industrial enterprises in the former soviet union and eastern europe the sale of public transportation systems in britain and scandinavia and the sale of radio spectra in the u s both the enormity and the importance of these sales have naturally led to an examination of how best to accomplish this task auctions have been proposed and have frequently been used as time honoured convenient and attractive mechanisms for such sales this in turn has led to a revival of interest in the theory of auctions particularly those involving multiple objects the magnitude of these privatization sales has meant that in many instances it is realistic to consider that buyers may run up against liquidity or borrowing constraints the presence of these financial constraints introduces important differences into traditional auction theory for instance pitchik and schotter 1986 and che and gale 1996 1998 have shown that when bidders are subject to such constraints the conclusion of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds when multiple objects are auctioned in the presence of budget constraints it may be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively on one object with a view to raising the price paid by his rival and depleting his budget so that the second object may then be obtained at a lower price in effect a bidder may wish to raise a rival s costs in one market in order to gain advantage in another thus unlike in traditional auction theory a particular bidder s payoff is affected by the price paid by a rival bidder it is important to note that this effect comes into play only when several objects are sold

monetary policy matters abstract this paper addresses hoover and perez s comments on our 1989 paper we first show that the estimated impact of monetary policy shifts remains large and ranges from marginally to strongly significant when oil shocks are controlled for we then extend our previous work by expanding the sample period and identifying an additional policy shift in december 1988 with this extension the estimated effects of monetary policy shifts are large and highly significant for all reasonable specifications of oil shocks we also demonstrate that hoover and perez s other objections have little bearing on our conclusions

post hoc ergo propter once more an evaluation of does monetary policy matter in the spirit of james tobin christina and david romer s paper does monetary policy matter advocates the so called narrative approach to causal inference we demonstrate that this method will not sustain causal inference first it is impossible to distinguish monetary shocks from oil shocks as causes of recessions second a world in which the fed only announces intentions to act cannot be distinguished from one in which it in fact acts third the techniques of dynamic simulation used in the romers study are inappropriate and quantitatively misleading and finally their approach provides no basis for establishing causal asymmetry

fluctuations in the foreign exchange market how important are monetary policy shocks abstract we study the effects of u s monetary policy shocks on the bilateral exchange rate between the u s and each of the g7 countries we also estimate deviations from uncovered interest rate parity conditional on these shocks the analysis is based on a structural vector autoregression in which monetary policy shocks are identified through the conditional heteroscedasticity of the structural disturbances unlike earlier work in this area our empirical methodology avoids making arbitrary assumptions about the relevant policy indicator or transmission mechanism in order to achieve identification at the same time it allows us to assess the implications of imposing invalid identifying restrictions our results indicate that the nominal exchange rate exhibits delayed overshooting in response to a monetary expansion depreciating for roughly ten months before starting to appreciate the shock also leads to large and persistent departures from uncovered interest rate parity variance decomposition results indicate that monetary policy shocks account for a non trivial proportion of exchange rate fluctuations

the impact of regulation on input substitution and operating cost we investigate the impact of rate of return regulation on the substitutability between pairs of inputs where substitutability is measured using morishima elasticities of substitution mes and on operating cost theory does not provide a qualitative characterization of the impact of regulation on input substitutability although it does provide a basis for speculation we test our speculation using a 1977 87 panel of 20 u s interstate natural gas pipelines that were subject to rate of return regulation during the period we find that regulation increased the mes of each rate base input for the non rate base input and reduced the mes between the two rate base inputs and of the nonrate base input for each rate base input we also find that the

monetary policy shocks testing identification conditions under time varying conditional volatility abstract we propose an empirical procedure which exploits the conditional heteroscedasticity of fundamental disturbances to test the targeting and orthogonality restrictions imposed in the recent var literature to identify monetary policy shocks based on u s monthly data for the post 1982 period we reject the non borrowed reserve and interest rate targeting procedures in contrast we present evidence supporting targeting procedures implying more than one policy variable we also always reject the orthogonality conditions between policy shocks and macroeconomic variables we show that using invalid restrictions often produces misleading policy measures and dynamic responses these results have important implications for the measurement of policy shocks and their temporal effects as well as for the estimation of the monetary authority s reaction function

collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects with and without complementarities collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects even with large complementarities in the buyers utility functions the bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves while keeping the prices low in the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized the scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases

auctions development and privatization efficient auctions with liquidity constrained buyers abstract we exhibit an efficient auction an auction for which the winner is the buyer with the highest valuation subject to the constraint that buyers may be budget or liquidity constrained

multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale abstract this paper discusses multiple unit auctions for industrial procurement where the cost structures of suppliers capture economies and diseconomies of scale caused by the nature of the production cost and the opportunity value of suppliers capacities the problem of winner determination and demand allocation is proven to be np complete we propose a binary tree algorithm with bounds btb which efficiently exploits the model s optimality properties btb outperforms general integer optimization software in computational time especially with existence of substantial economies and diseconomies of scale the algorithm complexity is linear in demand volume this property allows for efficient handling of high volume auctions and thus leads to increased benefit for the overall system under the assumption of the myopic best response strategies we investigate the behavior of suppliers and price dynamics for iterative multiple round bidding with appropriate allocation and stopping rules the allocation rules featured by several tie breakers for multiple optimal solutions to the allocation model in each round are proposed to induce suppliers dominant strategies and to improve the system s performance

contests with limited resources abstract many interesting phenomena electoral competition r d races lobbying are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources specifically the following game is analyzed two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests the players have limited resources budgets and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests in each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize mixed strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical blotto game are analyzed

money politics and the post war business cycle abstract the political economy literature has enshrined as stylized fact the view that lower inflation and temporarily lower growth follow the election of republican presidents and has emphasized political manipulation of monetary policy as an explanation support for the monetary explanation comes in econometric work that largely ignores identification issues that dominate the literature on measuring the effects of monetary policy we generalize a standard vector autoregression framework to accommodate discrete political party variables we find almost no support for the view that political effects on the macroeconomy operate through monetary policy and only weak evidence that political effects are significant at all

asymmetric reduced form auctions this paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions using this auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only this allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

floating exchange rates and inflation in germany are external shocks really irrelevant abstract german prices and u s short term interest rates are cointegrated while short term interest rates in both countries are not therefore moving to flexible exchange rates in 1973 has not completely isolated germany from external shocks

on the continuous equilibria of affiliated value all pay auctions with private budget constraints abstract we consider all pay auctions in the presence of interdependent affiliated valuations and private budget constraints for the sealed bid all pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of n bidders budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations we extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments an example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

optimal sequential auctions sequential sealed first price and open descending price procurement auctions are studied we examine which procurement auction rule achieves the low procurement cost we show that the answer to this policy question depends on whether the items are complements or substitutes with substitutes the first price procurement auction is preferred while with complements the open descending price procurement auction is preferred we also illustrate the procurement cost minimizing auction and the auction rule preferred by the bidders with substitutes bidders prefer the open descending price procurement auction while with complements bidders prefer the first price procurement auction

on the dynamic effects of oil price shocks a study using industry level data abstract this paper analyzes the effects of oil price shocks on demand and supply in various industries the impulse responses of identified var models indicate that for industries that have a large cost share of oil such as petroleum refinery and industrial chemicals oil price shocks mainly reduce supply in contrast for many other industries with the automobile industry being a particularly important example oil price shocks mainly reduce demand the paper suggests that oil price shocks influence economic activities beyond that explained by direct input cost effects possibly by delaying purchasing decisions of durable goods

a decision support framework for evaluating revenue performance in sequential purchase contexts abstract this paper studies the product ordering problem in sequential purchase contexts where sellers aim to maximize their revenue faced with budget constrained buyers we propose a multi layered decision support framework that combines empirical data with simulation optimization and econometric methods to address this problem our framework allows sellers to i compare revenue performances of limited information sequencing strategies ii quantify benchmark revenue levels that can be achieved via the optimal sequence based on detailed buyer information iii determine the costs of limited information and strategic buyers to the seller and iv identify the moderators of sequencing strategy performance we illustrate our framework through two applications in a business to business used car auction setting contrary to previous studies reporting practitioners tendency to sequence items from the lowest value to the highest our results suggest that the best performing limited information sequencing strategy depends on buyers bidding behavior we also find that the revenue difference between the optimal sequence and a limited information sequencing strategy can be substantial our results show that a significant portion of this revenue difference is associated with the seller s limited information on buyers budgets and product valuations our applications also provide various sensitivity analyses and develop new propositions on the moderators of the relationship between the seller s revenue and sequencing strategies

oil and the macroeconomy since world war ii all but one of the u s recessions since world war ii have been preceded typically with a lag of around three fourths of a year by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum this does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions evidence is presented however that even over the period 1948 72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the u s recessions prior to 1972 by extension energy price increases may account for much of post opec macroeconomic performance

a stochastic monopsony theory of the business cycle two distinct regimes contractions and expansions are generated in a model in which goods markets clear and all individuals are optimizing strict wage and price takers have fully rational expectations and are heterogeneous in both preferences and resource endowments involuntary unemployment asymmetric monetary policy effectiveness and a changing relationship between real wages and employment over the business cycle are the result of optimizing behavior by monopsonistic wage setting and price taking firms faced with price uncertainty an upward sloped supply of employees and efficiency wage behavior disequilibrium and involuntary unemployment can occur at the level of the individual firm s labor market jel e32 e52 j41 j42 i introduction for many economists three stylized facts are central to any plausible theory of the business cycle 1 friedman and schwartz 1963 and romer and romer 1994 concluded that monetary shocks have output employment and unemployment effects at least some of the time and such effects are asymmetric with respect to the state of the economy 2 unemployment is subject to fluctuations associated with recessions and expansions and in some recessions has been very high 1 3 the relationship between real wages and employment appears to be time period sensitive as reported by abraham and haltiwanger 1995 although first proposed by keynes modern economists such as benassy 2002 argue that at least some unemployment is best characterized as involuntary and indicates a state of disequilibrium in this article we consider a plausible alternative to disequilibrium explanations of these elements of the business cycle based on goods market imperfections such as those by benassy 2002 and dixon and rankin 1995 who considered monopoly power by firms in the goods market and benassy 1995 who assumed monopoly power by unions in the labor market we assume that the goods market is characterized by competitive market clearing but firms have some monopsony power as reflected in an upward sloped or bounded supply of labor to the firm and the ability to set the optimal wage before knowing the price they will receive for their output which is assumed to be stochastic and making their employment decision these modifications are embedded in an otherwise conventional general equilibrium model in which all agents firms and consumers workers capitalists are fully optimizing and form totally rational expectations and labor may exhibit efficiency wage behavior 2 this is not a representative agent model and cannot be reduced to such individuals are heterogeneous in both their endowments and preferences firms may be heterogeneous with respect to their production technology and the interests of firm owners are distinct from those of their employees the latter is essential to generate the changing regimes that produce predictions that correspond to the stylized facts monetary shocks affect output prices employment and unemployment in an asymmetrical manner consistent with the traditional business cycle the key to understanding these effects is the labor market if the expected quantity of money is generated then the competitive market clearing real wage will result lower than expected quantities of money generate a deficiency of aggregate demand lower than expected output prices and real wages above the competitive wage real wages above the competitive wage are associated with excess supply of labor and involuntary unemployment independent of that associated with efficiency wage behavior this contractionary regime will persist as long as the low quantities of money persist even though all agents have fully rational expectations are optimizing and the goods market clears in this regime increases in the quantity of money increase prices employment and output and employment varies negatively with the real wage efficiency wage behavior may decrease effort as the real wage rate is decreased

parametric analysis of cost inefficiency and the decomposition of productivity growth for regulated firms this paper examines the contributions of technical change scale economies regulation and efficiency on productivity growth in the interstate natural gas pipeline industry following bauer 1990 productivity growth for firms subject to regulation is decomposed into technical change scale economies regulation and efficiency components the data sample consists of 20 pipeline companies and covers the period 1977 to 1987 results indicate that scale economies cost inefficiency and regulation on average accounted for 64 16 and 4 of productivity growth respectively cost efficiency declined over the sample period most of which can be attributed to technical inefficiency

is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly a widespread practice particularly in public sector procurement and dispersal is to subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage arguments for such policies vary but they typically assume that benefits of subsidization must be large enough to outweigh a presumed economic cost of the subsidy when disadvantaged competitors compete in auctions the subsidy serves to make them more competitive rivals other bidders rationally respond by bidding more aggressively we consider a model of procurement auctions and show that a policy of subsidizing inefficient competitors can lower expected project cost and also enhance economic efficiency some subsidy is generally better than no subsidy for a wide range of parameters

competition and allocative efficiency the case of the u s telephone industry this study investigates the effect of competition on the productive efficiency of the u s telephone industry taking into account the fact that the industry was subject to rate of return regulation it is shown that competition induces the incumbents to use capital inputs closer to the unconstrained optima thereby reducing the allocative inefficiency caused by the averch johnson effect this effect is in addition to the usual technical efficiency improvement induced by competition empirical results based on annual data for the u s telephone industry for the 1951 90 period suggested that competition improved the allocative efficiency of the incumbent firms which had been under a rate of return regulation until 1989 copyright 1995 by mit press

perfect equilibria in budget constrained sequential auctions an experimental study this article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the nash equilibrium concept we find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices

optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers abstract we study the sale of an indivisible good to liquidity constrained buyers they cannot pay more than their budget regardless of their valuation both valuation and budget are private information we derive the symmetric revenue maximizing and constrained efficient auctions in this setting we show an implementation via a modified all pay auction the highest bidder need not win the good outright or stated differently the auction has pooling despite the usual regularity conditions subsidizing low budget buyers cannot increase revenue from a technical standpoint we contribute to auction design with multidimensional private information by working directly with reduced form allocation rules

identification and the narrative approach a reply to leeper abstract contrary to the arguments of leeper 1997 the problems that arise in var investigations of monetary policy do not arise with our use of the narrative approach the apparent high predictability of our monetary policy variable that leeper finds is due to overfitting and the estimated effects of our measure when variables other than output are considered are unsurprising given leeper s specifications

narrative and var approaches to monetary policy common identification problems abstract romer and romer romer c d romer d h 1989 does monetary policy matter a new test in the spirit of friedman and schwartz in blanchard o j fischer s eds nber macroeconomics annual 1989 mit press cambridge ma pp 121 170 romer c d romer d h 1994 monetary policy matters journal of monetary economics 34 75 88 adopted a narrative approach to address the identification problems in time series models of monetary policy based on federal reserve documents the romers created a dummy variable equal to one in periods when the federal reserve contracted in response to perceived inflationary pressures this paper shows 1 the dummy variable is predictable from past macroeconomic variables reflecting the endogenous response of policy to the economy 2 unpredictable changes in the dummy do not generate dynamic responses that look like the effects of monetary policy the identification problems that plague time series models also afflict the narrative approach

the deaton paradox in a long memory context with structural breaks this article contributes to the permanent income hypothesis pih and excess consumption smoothness debate in the context of fractional integration we show that the excess consumption smoothness result is a consequence of the quarterly data frequency commonly employed in the empirical work in fact the i 1 hypothesis is rejected for the income process with monthly data in favour of a fractional integration order lower than 1 moreover if a structural break is taken into account we observe a substantial reduction in the degree of consumption smoothness especially after the break found in 1975

information alliances in contests with budget limits we study the role of information exchange that may occur in alliances in a contest without noise contestants learn their own limits of what they can spend in a contest they may also form alliances and learn the limits of all players who are within the same alliance then they decide independently about their own contest efforts alliance formation for the purpose of information exchange is beneficial for members of the same alliance and neutral for all other players also a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members further we identify and discuss the set of stable alliance combinations

the rate of return regulated version of shephard s lemma abstract in this paper the rate of return regulated version of shephard s lemma is proved

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

simultaneous vs sequential auctions with risk averse bidders abstract in this paper we ask a basic question that is interesting for auctioneers and regulators when multiple units are on sale should multiple identical units be sold simultaneously through a single shot auction or sequentially we consider the risk effect of such a decision on bidders and show that in the independent private values setting the answer unambiguously depends on the pricing rule a bidder s payoff uncertainty increases when the sale is sequenced under a pay as bid rule but decreases under the vickrey rule we find that as a result the sequential auction is less desirable from revenue and ex post efficiency points of view under the pay as bid rule and more desirable under the vickrey rule when the reserves in all auctions are set revenue optimally

optimal auctions with endogenous budgets we study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets before bidding a bidder decides how much money she will borrow bidders incur a cost to borrowing we show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first price second price and all pay auction the all pay auction gives higher revenue than the first price auction which gives higher revenue than the second price auction in addition when the distribution of values satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition the revenue maximizing auction is implemented by an all pay auction with a suitably chosen reserve price

african american and white differences in the impacts of monetary policy on the duration of unemployment an emerging literature documents monetary policy s impacts on labor market outcomes for example willem thorbecke 200 and seth b carpenter and william m rodgers iii 2004 find that recursive vector autoregressions var and autoregressive distributed lag adl models indicate that the response of the employmentpopulation ratio unemployment rate and labor force participation rate to increases in the federal funds rate follows the hump shaped pattern in which the peak impact occurs several quarters after the initial shock carl e walsh 2003 an interesting dynamic occurs the drop in aggregate demand reduces the number of available jobs this reduction lengthens job search but not to the extent that job seekers leave the labor force an extension of this work is to identify the type of unemployment that contractionary monetary policy generates is the unemployment short or long term to answer this question rodgers 2007 uses published bureau of labor statistics bls data on unemployment duration and type of unemployment to estimate models to assess whether job loss is concentrated among shortor long term spells or whether a ripple

changes in business cycles evidence and explanations this paper shows that the volatility of annual real macroeconomic indicators for the united states and the average severity of recessions have declined only slightly between the pre world war i and post world war ii eras recessions have however become somewhat less frequent and more uniform it argues that the advent of macroeconomic policy after world war ii can account for both the observed continuity and change countercyclical monetary policy and automatic stabilizers have prolonged postwar expansions and prevented severe depressions at the same time policy induced booms and recessions have led to continued volatility of the postwar economy

deep recessions fast recoveries and financial crises evidence from the american record do steep recoveries follow deep recessions does it matter if a credit crunch or banking panic accompanies the recession moreover does it matter if the recession is associated with a housing bust we look at the american historical experience in an attempt to answer these questions the answers depend on the definition of a financial crisis and on how much of the recovery is considered but in general recessions associated with financial crises are generally followed by rapid recoveries we find three exceptions to this pattern the recovery from the great contraction in the 1930s the recovery after the recession of the early 1990s and the present recovery the present recovery is strikingly more tepid than the 1990s one factor we consider that may explain some of the slowness of this recovery is the moribund nature of residential investment a variable that is usually a key predictor of recessions and recoveries

semiparametric estimates of monetary policy effects string theory revisited we develop flexible semiparametric time series methods for the estimation of the causal effect of monetary policy on macroeconomic aggregates our estimator captures the average causal response to discrete policy interventions in a macrodynamic setting without the need for assumptions about the process generating macroeconomic outcomes the proposed estimation strategy based on propensity score weighting easily accommodates asymmetric and nonlinear responses using this estimator we show that monetary tightening has clear effects on the yield curve and on economic activity monetary accommodation however appears to generate less pronounced responses from both estimates for recent financial crisis years display a similarly dampened response to monetary accommodation

procurement and predation dynamic sourcing from financially constrained suppliers abstract this paper studies the relationship between a financially constrained firm and a stronger opponent who is not cash constrained when these firms repeatedly compete in a procurement context we characterize and discuss the procurement agency s optimal strategy when faced with such asymmetric firms we highlight a trade off between the long run benefits from competition and the short run benefits from reduced costs finally we show that to reduce costs in the short run the financially weak firm should be favored in future procurement

multi unit auctions with budget limits abstract we study multi unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature our main result is an impossibility there is no deterministic auction that 1 is individually rational and dominant strategy incentive compatible 2 makes no positive transfers and 3 always produces a pareto optimal outcome in contrast we show that ausubel s clinching auction satisfies all these properties when the budgets are public knowledge moreover we prove that the clinching auction is the unique auction that satisfies all these properties when there are two players this uniqueness result is the cornerstone of the impossibility result few additional related results are given including some results on the revenue of the clinching auction and on the case where the items are divisible

credit crises money and contractions an historical view abstract the relatively infrequent nature of major credit distress events makes an historical approach particularly useful using a combination of historical narrative and econometric techniques we identify major periods of credit distress from 1875 to 2007 examine the extent to which credit distress arises as part of the transmission of monetary policy and document the subsequent effect on output using turning points defined by the harding pagan algorithm we identify and compare the timing duration amplitude and co movement of cycles in money credit and output regressions show that financial distress events exacerbate business cycle downturns both in the 19th and 20th centuries and that a confluence of such events makes recessions even worse

budget constraints and demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions the possibility even if arbitrarily small of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending bid auctions induces strategic demand reduction and generates significant inefficiencies under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders values unconstrained bidders behave as if they were liquidity constrained even as the probability that bidders are budget constrained goes to zero

optimal bundling strategies in multiobject auctions of complements or substitutes we consider a problem at the interface of auctions and bundling our revenue maximizing seller seeking to auction one unit each of two complements or substitutes in the best of three formats the auction of the bundle separate auctions of the individual items and a combinatorial auction we draw on an analytical model to address the following questions i which of the auctioning strategies is optimal under the second price sealed bid format ii what is the optimal strategy for the bidders iii when the objects are asymmetrically valued e g super bowl ticket versus souvenir what is the optimal auctioning sequence under the pure components strategy our results suggest that separate auctions of the two objects are superior to the auction of the bundle for most substitutes and even moderate complements when there are at least four bidders the auction of the pure bundle is better suited for strong complements or with too few bidders when the combinatorial auction is an available option it weakly dominates the auction of the pure bundle but has domains of inferiority relative to the separate auctions when the objects are asymmetric in value it is optimal to auction the higher valued object first

assigning resources to budget constrained agents this article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget constrained agents schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of utilitarian efficiency the socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount an in kind subsidy and a cash incentive to discourage low valuation individuals from claiming the good copyright oxford university press

the war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information we provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue our example suggests that information non revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact

equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders the two bidder case we study an affiliated value second price auction with two financially constrained bidders we prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions comparative static results are provided journal of economic literature classification number d44

monetary analysis and monetary policy in the euro area 1999 2006 abstract this paper assesses the practical experience of monetary analysis at the ecb from the introduction of the euro in 1999 through 2006 the paper exploits a unique and rich real time data set containing both the vintages of data and the economic models that have been employed in the ecb s monetary analysis during the first eight years of monetary union it embodies both a description of how monetary analysis was conducted over this period and a quantitative evaluation of the indicators of risks to price stability that derived from this analysis a close investigation of this material is used to evaluate the role monetary analysis has played in the evolution of monetary policy in the euro area

sequential second price auctions with private budgets abstract we study an auction game in which two units of a good are sold via two second price auctions sequentially to three or more bidders who have private budgets that limit their spending in the auctions we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in equilibrium while bidders bid the minimum of their valuations and budgets in the second auction their aggression in the first round depends on two factors the competition from other bidders as measured by the probability of facing high budget bidders and the option value from participating the second auction as measured by the budget difference between various bidders the former factor makes bidders more aggressive and the latter makes them less aggressive in particular when the competition factor dominates the sequential auctions generate higher revenue in expectation than the uniform price auction

money may matter but how could you know abstract christina and david romers reply to our article post hoc ergo propter hoc once more misses the point our argument was never that monetary policy did not matter but that their methods could not provide useful evidence that it did yet they offer additional evidence of the same type with respect to the efficacy of monetary shocks without effectively replying to the criticisms of their methods we show point by point that such responses as they give leave our original conclusion intact their narrative statistical approach is a complicated version of the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc and as such will not sustain inferences with respect to the direction and strength of the causes of output fluctuations

regime switching and monetary policy measurement this paper applies regime switching methods to the problem of measuring monetary policy policy preferences and structural factors are specified parametrically as independent markov processes interaction between the structural and preference parameters in the policy rule serves to identify the two processes the estimates uncover policy episodes that are initiated by switches to dove regimes shown to granger cause both nber recessions and the romer dates these episodes imply real effects of monetary policy that are smaller than those found in previous studies

caps in sequential contests i introduction in many competitions we can often observe situations where severe constraints are imposed on contestants for example in the u s electoral campaign there is a specific maximum campaign contribution that a single agent can make to a candidate 1 in sports where equipment plays a major role e g sailing motor races etc explicit or implicit technological constraints are imposed on the allowed equipment also several sports leagues e g the national basketball association nba implement a salary cap which places a limit on the total amount of money a team can spend on players salaries salary caps are clearly binding and teams are sometimes forced to trade expensive players in order to make place for other needed team members the usual reason for applying salary caps is that they facilitate even competition between small and large city teams otherwise large city teams could pay more buy the best talent and ultimately destroy any semblance of competition in the league the goal of caps imposed by designers of competitions is to create what we call a competitive balance so that many players have a chance to win and not necessarily the strongest ones in addition if the contest is more competitively balanced the uncertainty of the outcome is higher and therefore the contest is more attractive furthermore competitive balance may lead to an improvement of the expected total performance of all the players rather than just the performance of the top player several other ways have been suggested to enhance the competitive balance in contests for example baye kovenock and de vries 1993 showed that in all pay auctions contests by excluding the strongest player the player with the highest value of winning the contest becomes more competitively balanced and then the players expected total bid may increase moldovanu and sela 2001 found that in all pay auctions under incomplete information when cost functions are convex several positive prizes may be optimal for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total bid in other words by increasing the number of the prizes the chances of the players with relatively low values of winning to win one of the prizes increase and therefore these players will increase their efforts accordingly cohen kaplan and sela 2008 studied all pay auctions with effort dependent rewards under incomplete information and demonstrated that when the designer maximizes the total bid effort and when there is a sufficiently large number of contestants the optimal reward decreases in the contestants bid this means that a designer will offer higher prizes to the players with relatively low values of winning those who exert lower efforts than to the players with relatively high values of winning those who exert higher efforts such a distribution of prizes balances the bids submitted by the players with high and low values of winning we focus here on the role of bid caps to enhance the competitive balance in contests relatively weak players players with low abilities or low values of winning usually exert low efforts which are lower than the level of the bid cap imposed by a designer in a contest with a bid cap if these players exert an effort that is equal to the bid cap they will have a higher chance to win since no one can exert a higher effort than the bid cap thus the weak players exert more effort than they would in a contest without a bid cap however relatively strong players players with high abilities or high values of winning usually exert higher efforts than the level of the bid cap thus the strong players exert less effort than they would in a contest without a bid cap hence the effect of the bid cap on the players total effort depends on the trade off between the increase of the weaker players efforts and the decrease of the stronger players efforts to be fully effective the bid cap system must guarantee that as many players as possible raise their efforts to the level of the bid cap and as less as possible reduce their efforts to this level

ordering revenue and anchoring in art auctions we estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential art auctions held by sotheby s and christie s we exploit a pre determined rotation of which of these two houses holds their auction first during auction week in new york city when the house that goes first has relatively expensive paintings compared to the other house we find that the sale premium for the week is around 21 higher relative to the mean sale premium and the fraction of paintings sold during the week is around 11 higher we provide evidence that this is due to an anchoring effect

repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges approximations and design ad exchanges are emerging internet markets where advertisers may purchase display ad placements in real time and based on specific viewer information directly from publishers via a simple auction mechanism advertisers join these markets with a prespecified budget and participate in multiple second price auctions over the length of a campaign this paper studies the competitive landscape that arises in ad exchanges and the implications for publishers decisions the presence of budgets introduces dynamic interactions among advertisers that need to be taken into account when attempting to characterize the bidding landscape or the impact of changes in the auction design to this end we introduce the notion of a fluid mean field equilibrium fmfe that is behaviorally appealing and computationally tractable and in some important cases it yields a closed form characterization we establish that an fmfe approximates well the rational behavior of advertisers in these markets we then show how this framework may be used to provide sharp prescriptions for key auction design decisions that publishers face in these markets in particular we show that ignoring budgets a common practice in this literature can result in significant profit losses for the publisher when setting the reserve price this paper was accepted by dimitris bertsimas optimization

generalized reduced form auctions a network flow approach we develop a network flow approach for characterizing interim allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints both ceilings and floors applications include a variety of settings of practical interest ranging from individual and group specific capacity constraints set aside sale partnership dissolution and government license reallocation

campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups abstract regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones are these regulations desirable this paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry in the absence of entry contribution caps improve welfare by leveling the political playing field with entry however a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions in particular a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo and even if better policies are chosen the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups creating costly rent seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying

monetary policy and asymmetric response in default risk abstract in this empirical study monetary tightening is found to significantly raise the default risk on baa bonds absolutely and relative to the default risk on aaa bonds monetary easing however does not have a statistically significant effect on either of these variables

budget constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information i study a budget constrained private valuation sealed bid sequential auction with two incompletely informed risk neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non monotonic functions of a bidder s type multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation efficiency and revenue the sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders the sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods if a particular good say is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale then auction revenue and the price of good are higher when good is sold first

forward looking behavior in ecb liquidity auctions evidence from the pre crisis period abstract using data from the pre crisis period we investigate banks joint bidding behavior in the ecb s main refinancing operations mro and longer term refinancing operations ltro we test whether banks bid at lower rates in mros before the ltro and at higher rates after the ltro compared to other operations we motivate this by findings from the auction literature suggesting that agents bidding behavior is forward looking and takes sequences of future auctions into account we offer two findings first we find that in general banks bid in the mro before the ltro at lower rates as compared to other mros moreover mro participants that also bid in the following ltro bid at even lower rates compared to peers not bidding in the ltro these findings support the hypothesis that banks view obtaining liquidity from the two operations as a substitute second we find that banks generally bid more aggressively in the mro after the ltro banks that participated also in the ltro preceding the mro bid at substantially higher rates these findings reflect that short banks with potentially large net liquidity needs in the mro after the ltro bid more aggressively although size plays a considerable role for bidding behavior the conclusions are valid for banks of different sizes

optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines a seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment with buyers that differ in their patience each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation first we derive the optimal mechanism neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline the deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer depending on the shape of the markup that the seller uses this can lead to a violation of the neglected incentive constraint we give sufficient conditions on the type distribution under which the neglected constraint is fulfilled or violated second for the case that the constraint cannot be neglected we consider a model with two periods and two buyers here the optimal mechanism is implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two the asymmetry which is introduced to prevent the patient type of the first buyer from buying in period one leads to pooling of deadlines at the top of the type space

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

market and non market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources a number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents agents have linear utility in money the designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics i solve for the optimal mechanism the choice between market or non market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay

a blotto game with incomplete information we consider a blotto game with incomplete information a pure strategy symmetric monotonic bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed

public capital and private productivity this paper uses three different approaches to investigate whether the declining provision of public capital is a major cause of declining labor productivity the juxtaposition of approaches removes

disinflation shocks in the eurozone a dsge perspective we investigate the effects of disinflation policies on key macroeconomic variables using euro area data and structural vector autoregressions svars we identify disinflation shocks as the only shocks that drive nominal variables to a lower long run level we find that in the immediate aftermath of a disinflation shock the euro area enters in a persistent recession we use these dynamic responses to estimate a dsge model with imperfect information about the disinflation shock we find that both nominal and real frictions and monetary policy gradualism have played a prominent role in the recessionary effect of disinflation shocks conversely allowing for imperfect credibility does not yield a better fit except when we shut key model s frictions down

collusion facilitating and collusion breaking power of simultaneous ascending and descending price auctions this article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a collusion incubator environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction theories of collusion producing behavior along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions these theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion the experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator then once the tacit collusion developed changing to the descending auction the change moved prices from collusive levels to near competitive levels