the choice of regulatory instrument when there is uncertainty about compliance with fisheries regulations noncompliance is an important problem for fisheries regulators and a number of studies have considered optimal enforcement issues within fisheries regulation our article extends this literature by studying the implications of noncompliance for the choice between tax and quota regulation we first develop a general stock recruitment model of a search fishery with illegal landings and show that compliance uncertainty where the regulator is uncertain about the extent of noncompliance generates an efficiency advantage for taxes over individual transferable quotas we also provide evidence that uncertainty about compliance is an important source of uncertainty for regulators copyright 2008 oxford university press

the private and social value of information exploration for exhaustible resources abstract in this paper i develop a model where exploration yields information about the size and location of the stock of an exhaustible resource this information is valuable in two ways first before production takes place reserves must be located through exploration the process of exploration changes unproven reserves which cannot be produced into proven reserves which can one value of exploration then is that it allows total production over time to expand the expansion effect second by exploring in an early time period a producer gains information about the true stock size prior to making a decision about how fast to exploit reserves with better information the extraction rate chosen by the producer will yield higher expected returns from the stock the timing effect i show that the expansion effect is undervalued by a firm relative to a social planner an increase in proven reserves increases production and lowers prices improving consumer welfare the timing effect however can be over or undervalued by a firm relative to a social planner if the exploring firm makes up a relatively small portion of industry and if consumers are not highly risk averse then the firm will overvalue the timing effect as a result firms may not explore some tracts where it is efficient to do so if however a firm finds it valuable to explore a tract it may explore earlier in time than is optimal

do oil producers act as oil igopolists in this paper the author analyzes an oligopoly model of exhaustible resource extraction and develop predictions about relative extraction patterns of different producers using the open quote oil close quote igopoly model of loury one can show that producers with large stocks produce a larger amount but a smaller percentage of their stocks than producers with small stocks the authors extend loury s model to cases where extraction costs differ among producers and where costs are a function of cumulative extraction an increase in extraction costs for a producer causes it to produce less relative to its rivals when extraction costs rise with cumulative extraction producers with large reserves tend to have lower extraction costs and a smaller ratio of cumulative production to initial reserves than producers with small reserves the authors test the predictions of the model using oil industry data and find that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of open quotes oil close quotes igopoly theory producers with larger reserves extract a smaller share of their reserves and have lower production costs than producers with smaller reserves this pattern holds for 73 countries with oil reserves during the time period 1970 1989 and for approximately 400 us oil companies in 1983 and 1984 more the observed pattern of production for both opec and non opec producers is consistent with open quote oil close quote igopoly theory opec producers do not appear to restrain production given their level of reserves relative to non opec producers thus viewing the oil market as containing one dominant firm opec with a competitive fringe may be misleading further the pattern of extraction observed in oil markets is inconsistent with the pattern predicted by competitive theory 29 refs 5 figs 6 tabs less

dynamic cournot duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints this paper studies a dynamic cournot duopoly in which suppliers have a limited amount of products available for two consecutive periods we derive optimal sales strategies and analyze welfare effects with and without commitment under commitment strategies do not depend on the rival s realized sales in this case there is a unique nash equilibrium for any allocation of initial supplies and prices increase over time absent commitment sellers can adjust their supply decision after the first period in this case a subgame perfect nash equilibrium does not always exist and prices may decline over time a more asymmetric allocation of stocks generally leads to higher first period prices whereas the impact on second period prices is ambiguous the larger firm typically prefers not to commit whereas the smaller firm is better off under commitment commitment generates a higher total surplus and almost always a higher consumer surplus our findings thus suggest that market transparency or flexible supply contracts can adversely affect welfare in situations where production precedes sales and firms face an intertemporal capacity constraint

oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets abstract most nash cournot oligopoly models of nonrenewable resources apply open loop equilibrium concepts and are based on physical resource depletion this paper studies feedback equilibria and economic depletion assuming affine quadratic functional forms the existence uniqueness and explicit solutions for the equilibria are derived for duopoly and n player oligopoly with multiple resource stocks for the cases of nonquadratic criteria we develop a numeric solution scheme for the nash feedback equilibrium this scheme is an application of a discrete time discrete state controlled markov chain approximation method originally developed for solving deterministic and stochastic dynamic optimization problems in our nash cournot equilibrium the degree of concentration in supply declines over time whereas the previous models with physical depletion and open loop equilibrium concepts predict that a nash cournot resource market will develop in the direction of monopoly supply

the influence of age on smes growth determinants empirical evidence this paper seeks to investigate whether age is a fundamental characteristic of the relationships between determinants and growth the empirical evidence obtained allows us to conclude that 1 age and size are restrictive factors of the growth of young smes but they are not important for the growth of old smes 2 cash flow and debt are of greater relative importance for growth in young smes than for growth in old smes 3 rd 4 interest on debt is of greater relative importance for diminished growth in young smes than for diminished growth in old smes and 5 r d intensity in situations of financial deficit is of greater relative importance for diminished growth in young smes than for diminished growth in old smes but only in context of high tech smes

dynamically consistent oil import tariffs the standard solution of the open loop optimal import tariff is normally time inconsistent the paper shows why and derives the dynamically consistent markov perfect tariff the two tariffs are compared they differ except for a special class of import demands the time paths of tariffs and the welfare cost of an inability to commit are calculated for a dominant importer the welfare costs of the inability to commit are small if its market share

imperfect competition in the international energy market a computerized nash cournot model this paper describes the conceptual structure properties and solution approach of a computerized model of the international energy market the model treats energy producers as players in a multistage noncooperative game the goal of each player or cartel of players is assumed to be maximization of discounted profit subject to technical political and resource constraints the model calculates that collection of intertemporal extraction and price paths from which a player can unilaterally deviate only at a loss the open loop nash equilibrium the model integrates the theory of exhaustible resources due to hotelling and the theory of oligopoly due to nash and cournot although useful as a teaching device to illustrate theoretical results its main function is to facilitate analysis of real world resource problems the model is flexible allowing the user to specify not only cost demand and reserve information but also assumptions about who belongs to what coalition two shortcomings deserve note t

strategic resource dependence we consider a situation where an exhaustible resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a substitute but there is a time to build delay for the substitute we find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the hotelling model 1931 are reversed over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch under such a threat of demand change the supply does not reflect the current resource scarcity but it compensates the buyer for delaying the transition to the substitute the analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence

natural resource economics under the rule of hotelling abstract natural resource stocks held in situ are physical assets equilibrium in the assets market requires that their rates of return be such that their owners are just willing to hold on to them rather than invest elsewhere i discuss a number of factors relating to the evolution of extraction costs to the durability of the resource to market structure and to uncertainty that are important in correctly characterizing the rate of return on holding exhaustible natural resource stocks the emphasis is put on how those factors can potentially help bridge the gap between the basic hotelling s rule of natural resource exploitation and the historical behaviour of the flow price of a number of resources i also highlight some theoretical and empirical issues that need further attention

the small the young and the productive determinants of manufacturing firm growth in ethiopia abstract this study examines the relationships between firm growth and firm size age and labor productivity using annual census based panel data on ethiopian manufacturing firms the study explicitly addresses the ongoing statistical concerns in firm growth models such as sample censoring regression to the mean and unobserved heterogeneity our empirical results indicate that firm growth decreases with size smaller firms have faster rates of growth than larger firms even after compensating for their higher attrition rates the negative relation between age and growth predicted by the learning model is found to apply only to younger firms labor productivity affects firm growth positively which indicates that there is a market selection process at work during the period of economic reforms in ethiopia

exhaustible resources non convexity and competitive equilibrium theoretical underpinnings of competitive equilibrium in an exhaustible resource market with non convex u shaped costs are proposed the analysis extends to intertemporal production novshek and sonnenschein s approximation of static competitive equilibrium by limits of cournot equilibria a problem with using novshek and sonnenschein s method is that oligopolistic equilibrium even an open loop equilibrium to which limits might be applied does not exist when there is a non convex technology using epsilon equilibrium as the equilibrium concept finesses this problem there are two types of limiting competitive equilibrium a third type of competitive equilibrium that has been prominent in the literature is found to be inconsistent with limiting approximations

on price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel fringe game abstract we consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members we show that i the outcomes of the closed loop and the open loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers the cartel fringe game a la salant 1976 coincide and ii when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop cartel fringe game thus the outcome of the cartel fringe open loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium however the interpretation of the cartel fringe model where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing nash cournot does not extend to the case where firms can use closed loop strategies

drivers of sme performance a holistic and multivariate approach to examine the drivers of small and medium sized enterprise sme growth we adopt a holistic multivariate modelling approach integrating macroeconomic determinants with the internal firm characteristics and firm strategy drivers more commonly investigated in firm growth studies utilising such an extended set of variables addresses a gap in the extant firm growth literature in relation to external growth factors offering novel insights on the seeming randomness of firm growth our system generalised method of moments estimation results indicate that the macroeconomic environment influences firm growth both directly and indirectly based on the study of manufacturing sme growth in ireland our findings provide evidence on the integrated effects of macroeconomic conditions firm characteristics and firm strategy for sme growth they also highlight from a theoretical perspective the need to acknowledge the multidimensional nature of sme growth

efficient environmental policy with imperfect compliance discussions of efficient environmental policytend to recommend taxes rather than quotas ongrounds of efficiency a uniform tax willequalize marginal abatement cost betweenpolluters when polluters actions are imperfectly observable the distinction betweentaxes and quotas becomes less clear taxes maybe evaded by underreporting of emissions whilequota violations will not always be discovered this paper explores the conditions under whichthe efficiency properties of taxes continue tohold even when evasion is possible and theextent to which the fine for quota violationsplays the same role as a tax on emissions withsimilar efficiency properties

a theory of oil igopoly cournot equilibrium in exhaustible resource markets with fixed supplies the emergence of an effective and powerful cartel in the international petroleum market has stimulated considerable effort among economists to develop models of pricing and supply behavior for this industry 2 this modeling task poses two basic difficulties first as in the standard oligopoly problem one must characterize the behavior of several sellers in a market aware of each other and of their effect on market price second there is here the added difficulty of treating the explicitly intertemporal nature of suppliers decision wherein a limited stock must be optimally allocated over time this paper studies the implications of the simplest non trivial postulates about these two aspects of the problem it is assumed that suppliers are non cooperative cournot nash players each of whom is imagined to select an optimal supply strategy taking as given the strategies of the others moreover it is hypothesized that the feasible strategies are limited to open loop paths chosen at the initial date to maximize the present value of profits in light of the paths of supply which the others have chosen 3 these basic postulates together with a few technical assumptions concerning the structure of resource demand permit one to demonstrate the existence of at least one non cooperative equilibrium concerning thisequilibrium we show that 1 the average and marginal return on resource stocks is inversely related to the size of a player s initial endowment 2 aggregate production decreases over time until all stocks are exhausted while firms with smaller stocks exhaust their supplies no later than firms with larger stocks do 3 the present value of price net of extraction cost declines over time 4 industry production maximizes a weighted average of intertemporal consumer s surplus and producers profits

impact of global economic crisis on firm growth the global economic crisis has had an adverse effect on and may continue to affect the entrepreneurial sector all over the world however even in a recessionary period there will always be some firms growing faster than others it is therefore imperative to understand the variables and processes that make some firms grow faster or more resilient to crisis than others in this paper we focus on firm size and its contributions to growth we examine whether growth rates of manufacturing and service industries are independent of firm size during the period of economic crisis based on a large sample of surviving firms in the manufacturing and hospitality industries the results of two step dynamic panel suggest that turnover growth is positively associated with companies size during the observed period of economic recession 2008 2013 in both industries large and medium sized firms exhibit higher growth than do small firms

steady state growth in a hotelling model of resource extraction this paper re examines the hotelling model of optimal nonrenewable resource extraction in light of stock effects and technological progress we assume functional forms for cost and demand so that the solution to the hotelling problem is a steady state consistent with the empirical observation that the growth rates of market prices have remained zero over a long period of time we use data on 14 minerals from 1970 to 2004 to estimate the supply and demand functions using sur and 3sls and to test the model we validate the model for 8 of 14 minerals c 2007 elsevier inc all rights reserved

learning and price volatility in duopoly models of resource depletion the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical model that can account for price fluctuations in depletable resource markets we do so by introducing learning into a hotelling style duopoly model of optimal resource depletion before the depletable resource becomes scarce the self confirming equilibrium of the model mirrors noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium in that supply is high and price is low although learning does induce occasional upward price spikes that are followed by a long period of falling price once the depletable resource becomes scarce the dynamics of the market change significantly with the self confirming equilibrium mirroring the cooperative rather than noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium supply is low and price is high price spikes still occur but against a background of increasing prices when scarcity is sufficient then the market is permanently in a self confirming equilibrium that is equivalent to cooperative rational expectations equilibrium

financial and legal constraints to growth does firm size matter using a unique firm level survey database covering 54 countries we investigate the effect of financial legal and corruption problems on firms growth rates whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size it is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial legal and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most there is only a weak relation between firms perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth we also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth

opec the seven sisters and oil market dominance an evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling approach abstract a methodological toolkit comprised of evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling is used to study opec and the seven sisters as they struggled for control over global petroleum markets during the 1960s and 1970s an evolutionary game theory model incorporates heterogeneous populations energy specific variables and behavioral considerations to capture the fundamentals of the applied problem an agent based model is used to provide detailed results and demonstrate the importance of the natural resource to the outcome of the model

opec and the u s oil import tariff open loop nash extraction plans of exhaustible resource producers in which producers take the plans of others as given are time consistent but proposed open loop oil import tariffs are almost always time inconsistent the paper derives a time consistent open loop nash tariff that can be readily computed for both competitive and a nash cournot specification of the oil market the authors illustrate the time sequence of the optimal import tariff for a simple model of the united states facing a duopolistic version of opec and a comparative fringe of oil producers and compare the outcome with the competitive equilibrium copyright 1991 by royal economic society

are renewable energy policies climate friendly the role of capacity constraints and market power abstract this paper studies the impacts of renewable energy support policies on energy prices fossil fuel supply and thus carbon emissions from fossil fuels such supports are climate friendly if the renewables are already competitive against fossil fuels but if the renewables are not yet competitive the climate change impacts are often ambiguous and are sensitive to capacity constraints of renewables production and to the fossil fuel market structure if the renewables do not have capacity constraints then the subsidies are subject to the green paradox under perfect competition but might be climate friendly under monopoly supports for capacity constrained renewables under perfect competition lead to more current fossil fuel supply but delay fossil fuel exhaustion time and these effects are reversed under monopoly our results highlight the importance of considering the long term effects on fossil fuel supply as well as capacity constraints and market power in designing renewable energy policies and evaluating their carbon footprints

high growth firms in changing competitive environments the us pharmaceutical industry 1963 to 2002 firms across sectors and regions are highly skewed in their ability to engage with innovation and even more skewed in their ability to translate investments in innovation into higher growth recent attention has been placed on the importance of high growth firms hgf for innovation policy our paper explores under what conditions hgf matter for translating r d investments into economic growth and how this depends on firm specific and industry specific factors we use quantile regression techniques to study the r d growth relationship in hgf compared to low growth firms unlike previous studies we pay particular attention to whether this relationship depends on the particular period in the industry s life cycle we focus on the us pharmaceutical industry from 1963 to 2002 and find that the r d growth relationship is sensitive to the changing competitive environment over the industry s history which suggests that innovation policy must focus not only on firm attributes but also competitive structures

when is gibrat s law a law the purpose of this article is to investigate if the industry context matters for whether gibrat s law is rejected or not using a dataset that consists of all limited firms in five digit nace industries in sweden during 1998 2004 the results reject gibrat s law on an aggregate level since small firms grow faster than large firms however gibrat s law is confirmed about as often as it is rejected when industry specific regressions are estimated it is also found that the industry context e g minimum efficient scale market concentration rate and number of young firms in the industry matters for whether gibrat s law is rejected or not

two remarks on cournot equilibria abstract we describe two simple results in the theory of cournot equilibria the first has to do with the effect of taxation in a cournot industry and the second describes under what conditions a cournot equilibrium will implicity maximize an objective function these results are probably known but are not well known and they seem useful enough to be worth spelling out

on the effects of the distribution of initial endowments in a nonrenewable resource duopoly abstract this paper studies the effects on equilibrium output and profits of modifying the resource endowments in a nonrenewable resource duopoly when the firms equilibrium terminal dates may differ

growth beyond gibrat firm growth processes and strategies firm growth studies have been focused on the question of whether firm growth is independent of firm size this shadow of gibrat s law has drawn attention to the randomness in firm growth however it has also clouded relevant research avenues that enquire into the role of firm growth processes and strategies this paper takes stock of the current state of the art of firm growth studies in small business economics and makes a plea for more specific research approaches that highlight the nature of the firm organization and growth paths this rejuvenation of firm growth studies comprises a search for necessary mechanisms and contingent conditions for the growth of firms

exhaustible resources and alternative equilibrium concepts we compare the open loop and feedback nash equilibria that obtain in oligopolistic resource markets when the resource is exhaustible and privately owned when the resource is common property the two equilibrium concepts are known to yield significantly different results under the regime of private property the choice of equilibrium concept does not appear to be as important restricting our attention to the cases of iso elastic demand and zero extraction costs and linear demand and quadratic extraction costs we identify instances where the open loop and feedback nash equilibria coincide and demonstrate that in other cases the two equilibria do not differ significantly

dynamic demand and noncompetitive intertemporal output adjustments abstract this paper integrates dynamics on the demand and on the supply side which are characteristic for many goods in particular fuels due to costly adjustments furthermore firms often pursue a quantity strategy and decide on output adjustments additional capacities etc instead of fixing prices e g opec moved from posting prices to adjusting output in 1986 this paper provides a corresponding framework surprisingly ignored in the literature and derives intertemporal market equilibria cooperative and noncooperative in open loop and in markov strategies the equilibrium in markov strategies is different mostly opposite to the much discussed sticky price models the qualitative properties are non trivial and some of them are even surprising e g increased demand sluggishness can raise supply

the impact of initial financial state on firm duration across entry cohorts recent theories of industry dynamics emphasize the role of financial frictions in determining post entry performance of firms testing these theories has been dicult because of the lack of financial data on the small young and private firms using a unique data set this paper considers the survival of new firm in canadian manufacturing from a financial perspective duration analysis quantifies the eects of firm

on nonrenewable resource oligopolies the asymmetric case we give a full characterization of the open loop nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game between two types of firms differing in extraction costs we show that i there almost always exists a phase where both types of firms supply simultaneously ii when the high cost mines are exploited by a number of firms that goes to infinity the equilibrium approaches the cartel versus fringe equilibrium with the fringe firms acting as price takers and iii the cheaper resource may not be exhausted first a violation of the herfindahl rule that may be detrimental to social welfare

when are nash equilibria independent of the distribution of agents characteristics author s bergstrom ted varian hal r abstract we present examples of nash equilibria that do not vary with the distribution of a parameter across agents and then offer a general theorem that characterizes this independence

defending gibrat s law as a long run regularity according to gibrat s law of proportionate effect the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the period examined while earlier studies tended to confirm the law more recent research generally rejects it this article reconciles these two streams of literature taking into account the role of market selection and learning in reshaping a given population of firms through time consistently with previous studies we find that gibrat s law has to be rejected ex ante since smaller firms tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts however a significant convergence toward gibrat like behavior can be detected ex post this finding is an indication that market selection cleans the original population of firms so that the resulting industrial core does not depart from a gibrat like pattern of growth from a theoretical point of view this result is consistent with those models based on passive and active learning and can be seen as a defense of the validity of the law in the long run

oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource the importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games the theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization for example questions about resource extraction advertising research and development investment in new capacity and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved however an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game the issue is the appropriate formulation of the players strategy spaces

aggressive oil extraction and precautionary saving coping with volatility the effects of stochastic oil demand on optimal oil extraction paths and tax spending and government debt policies are analyzed when the oil demand schedule is linear and preferences quadratic without prudence optimal oil extraction is governed by the hotelling rule and optimal budgetary policies by the tax and consumption smoothing principle volatile oil demand brings forward oil extraction and induces a bigger government surplus with prudence the government depletes oil reserves even more aggressively and engages in additional precautionary saving financed by postponing spending and bringing taxes forward especially if it has substantial monopoly power on the oil market gives high priority to the public spending target is very prudent and future oil demand has high variance uncertain economic prospects induce even higher precautionary saving and if non oil revenue shocks and oil revenue shocks are positively correlated even more aggressive oil extraction in contrast prudent governments deliberately underestimate oil reserves which induce less aggressive oil depletion and less government saving but less so if uncertainty about reserves and oil demand are positively correlated

the oil reserves production relationship abstract this paper considers the relationship between the extraction rates and remaining reserves of oil a simple exhaustible resources model suggests a linear extraction rule with slope terms common to all extractors when discount rates are homogeneous differences in pricing behavior and costs determine the intercept panel data from the world oil industry exhibit a robust and stable extraction reserves relationship across countries and through time common slopes characterize extraction over large ranges of reserves although there is a concave relationship across non opec members and a significantly lower estimated slope within opec countries these findings may be explained by risk aversion differences in discount rates and measurement error in the reserves data

imperfect cartelization in opec a model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by opec countries we define a measure for the degree of cooperation analogous to the market conduct parameter of cyert et al 1973 geroski et al 1987 lofaro 1999 and symeonidis 2000 this parameter is used to assess the incentives of different opec members to collude we find that heterogeneity in opec and the supplies of the non opec fringe create strong incentives against collusion more specifically opec s supply strategy although observed to be substantially more restrictive than that of a cournot nash oligopoly is found to still be more accommodative than that of a perfect cartel the strategy involves allocating larger than proportionate quotas to smaller and relatively costlier producers as if to bribe their participation in the cartel this is in contrast to predictions of the standard cartel model that such producers should be allocated relatively more stringent quotas furthermore we demonstrate that cartel collusion is more likely to be sustained for elastic than for inelastic demand since global oil demand is well known to be inelastic this observation provides another structural explanation for why opec behavior is inconsistent with that of a perfect cartel our study points to multiple headwinds that limit opec s ability to mark up the oil price 2016 elsevier b v