the relative unimportance of a nonmarket willingness to pay for timber harvesting abstract the magnitude of a nonmarket willingness to pay for logging of native forests in southeastern australia is estimated using the contingent valuation method this willingness to pay is apparently motivated by both the monetary and social costs of unemployment and a nonmarket intrinsic production value we speculate that this nonmarket value for production may arise where a traditional land use is involved willingness to pay for intrinsic production value is small 4 in comparison to the nonmarket economic value of reserving the same forests in national parks whilst this result may not be transferable to resource allocation issues which involve significant traditional land use it does suggest that neglect of such a willingness to pay has not significantly prejudiced the results of past benefit cost analyses related to the preservation of natural environments

a joint investigation of public support and public values case of instream flows in new mexico abstract instream flow can be defined as the flow of water in its natural channels without diversion alone among the western us states new mexico nm fails to provide any mechanism for the protection of instream flows and has a long history of political resistance to any change in the status quo using the combined results from two statewide telephone surveys this study jointly investigates stated voting preferences for a proposed institutional change and stated valuation preferences for minimum instream flow protection the contingent valuation cv question uses a dichotomous choice dc elicitation format and a voluntary contribution trust fund payment vehicle results show a highly significant positive correlation between expressed voting preferences and expressed valuation preferences additionally those individuals who respond yes to the voting question have an expected willingness to pay wtp of 80 with a 95 confidence interval ci that is always positive 62 97 while those who respond no to the voting question have an expected wtp that is actually slightly negative 6 with a 95 ci containing zero 14 2 taken together these results provide evidence of construct validity estimation results are also shown to be temporally reliable across repeated samples thus there is strong evidence of public support for instream flow protection and its associated nonmarket benefits such evidence helps to provide instream flow concerns with standing in future nm water policy debates prominent examples include explicitly defining beneficial use and public welfare to allow consideration of instream flow protection

the effect of experience and quantity based pricing on the valuation of a curbside recycling program abstract quantity based pricing for garbage collection services and recycling programs are becoming increasingly popular methods of meeting municipal solid waste diversion objectives this article investigates household willingness to pay wtp for a pilot curbside recycling program crp in the presence of a quantity based pricing scheme for garbage collection services which allows a household to alter their garbage container size at a reduced price unlike previous studies that have modeled the simultaneity of these household decisions as a two step process we jointly estimate the household s intentions using a full information maximum likelihood fiml approach our results show a strong positive correlation between a household s wtp for a crp and its stated intention to reduce its garbage container size when a crp is offered the positive correlation suggests that wtp will be higher for households which are more likely to reduce their garbage container size thus in the presence of quantity based pricing a household s wtp for recycling more fully reflects the marginal social costs of garbage disposal

transfer pricing in a dynamic marketing operations interface abstract a transfer price mechanism is proposed to coordinate the strategies of the marketing and operations functional areas operating in a dynamic interface environment in a decentralized firm marketing and operations are strategic decision makers in a differential game in which marketing has price and advertising and operations has production as control variables and advertising goodwill and production backlog are state variables a constant transfer price is entered into the objective functionals for marketing and operations and subgame perfect feedback strategies are derived for price advertising and production as functions of the state variables the feedback strategies allow a solution for the dynamic system involving goodwill and backlog and the total payoff to the firm the sum of the payoffs to marketing and operations is determined as a function of the transfer price finally for certain parameter conditions an interior maximum of the payoff function is achieved and the optimal transfer price is identified

recreational demands for maintaining instream flows a contingent valuation approach recreational uses of streams although nonconsumptive increasingly conflict with traditional off stream uses of water in arid regions recreational demands for instream flows have collective good attributes such that the recreationists preferences may be inadequately reflected in water allocation decisions the contingent valuation approach was adapted to impute instream flow shadow prices from a sample of recreationists on the cache la poudre river in northern colorado during periods of relatively low flows the estimated instream flow marginal value exceeds the marginal value of water in irrigation suggesting a need for altered water allocation policies

a framework for scaling and framing policy problems in sustainability abstract it is argued that a necessary but lacking component of our approach in seeking policy responses to sustainability issues is some repeatable means whereby the relative magnitude and characteristics of these various policy problems faced in a given context can be analysed and described to this end a simple and tentative framework is constructed based on the definition of the key attributes which shape policy problems pertaining to environmental change these are spatial scale of cause and effect magnitude timing and longevity of possible impacts reversibility mensurability complexity and connectivity nature of cause s relevance to the given polity tractability availability and acceptability of means public concern and existence of goals these attributes inform a general taxonomy of micro meso and macro problems the attributes and the taxonomy are described with supporting examples to illustrate possible application of the framework it is discussed briefly in the contexts of operationalising the precautionary principle and policy instrument choice it is concluded that the framework can help focus debate and operationalise vague principles introduce relativity into the notion of sustainability and make policy choice more efficient

distributional preferences and the incidence of costs and benefits in climate change policy we explore the relationship between willingness to pay wtp for climate change mitigation and distributional preferences by which we mean individuals opinions about who should be responsible for climate change prevention and whether the share of climate change impacts borne by the poor is a cause for concern we use 1 770 responses to an online stated preference survey the domestic costs in our survey s policy choice scenarios are expressed as a set of randomized shares across four different payment vehicles and the international cost shares are randomized across four groups of countries we also elicit respondents perceptions of the likely regressivity of climate change impacts under a policy of business as usual wtp is higher when larger cost shares are borne by parties deemed to bear a greater responsibility for mitigation and when respondents believe and care that the impacts of climate change may be borne disproportionately by the world s poor that wtp for an environmental policy depends on the distributional consequences of the policy is an unsettling result efficiency assessments are typically assumed to be separate from equity considerations in most benefit cost analyses

rat race redux adverse selection in the determination of work hours in law firms this paper describes an organizational setting in which professional employees are required to work inefficiently long hours the focus of the authors investigation is large law firms the income sharing that characterizes legal partnerships creates incentives to promote associates who have a propensity to work very hard law firms use indicators of this propensity especially an associate s record of billable hours in promotion decisions reliance upon work hours as an indicator leads to a rat race equilibrium in which associates work too many hours the authors find evidence in support of this conclusion with data they collected from two large law firms copyright 1996 by american economic association

preservation or use a contingent valuation study of wilderness designation in utah evidence of strong opposition to wilderness proposals in utah suggested that the non market value of retaining those areas in multiple use management might be significant a contingent value analysis of both supporters and opponents of the two major proposals for wilderness designation in utah indicated that there existed significant non market willingness to pay on the part of opponents and that standard contingent valuation practice which does not explicitly consider these values could lead to a mis estimation of aggregate willingness to pay

matching markets with adverse selection abstract this paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of rothschild and stiglitz quart j econ 90 1976 629 the major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open ended and constantly refilled by new participants e g by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market the major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable which is jointly determined with equilibrium contracts as frictions become small we show that the least cost separating contracts are always supported as an equilibrium outcome regardless of the distribution of types among entrants moreover we derive conditions under which this outcome is also unique

price principle and the environment should preferences count as a normative discipline welfare and therefore resource economics postulates that preferences should count in the allocation of resources this postulate cannot be justified in relation to choice or to well being the nor mative qualities that attend choices e g ac countability responsibility commitment and consent explain why choices should count but not preferences which are not actions but theo retical entities constructed ad hoc from stipu lated descriptions of behavior they are then said to explain the satisfaction of preferences moreover has no demonstrable relation with any conception of welfare or well being not sim ply defined in terms of it jel a13

team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection abstract team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations combined with team incentives team production can create externalities among workers since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team s performance and therefore on their colleagues productivity we study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity we find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be pareto efficient separation of workers according to their productivity we further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence where under a particular condition on workers indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence

an evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection abstract the equilibrium nonexistence problem in rothschild and stiglitz s insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised profitable competitors contracts are imitated and loss making contracts are withdrawn occasionally a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts we show that rothschild and stiglitz s candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently similar to those currently on the market

product bundling and incentives for mergers and strategic alliances this paper analyzes firms choice between a merger and a strategic alliance in bundling their product with other complementary product we consider a framework in which firms can improve profits only from product bundling while mixed bundling is not profitable pure bundling is because pure bundling reduces consumers choices and thus softens competition among firms firms benefit the most from this reduced competit ion if they form an alliance firms do not gain as much from a merger because internalizing the complementarity between the two products a merged firm is inclined to pursue aggressive pricing to gain market share yet firms may be motivated to choose a merger over an alliance because of foreclosure possibility as foreclosure is not possible under strategic alliance however in response unmerged rivals can use a strategic alliance to avert foreclosure hence the possibility of counter bundling via strategic alliance by rivals reduces the incentives for merger in equilibrium

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

multidivisional firms internal competition and the merger paradox traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms insiders cooperate and maximize joint profits this approach has several unappealing results in quantity setting games for example mergers typically are not profitable for insiders but are profitable for non merging firms outsiders we take a different approach and allow for a parent company that can play each insider off one another in quantity setting games with our approach mergers are profitable for insiders unprofitable for outsiders socially beneficial and involve in a non monopolizing merger a small number of firms finally we find that the optimal strategy depends on whether firms compete in quantity or prices jel classification l000 entreprises multi divisionnelles concurrence interne et le paradoxe des fusions les modelisations conventionnelles des fusions suggerent que les entreprises fusionnees parties prenantes cooperent et maximisent leurs profits conjoints cette approche engendre plusieurs resultats contre intuitifs dans des jeux de concurrence par les quantites i e les fusions en general ne sont pas profitables pour les parties prenantes mais sont profitables pour des entreprises qui ne sont pas fusionnees les autres les auteurs adoptent une approche differente qui permet a l entreprise mere de jouer les parties prenantes l une contre l autre dans ce genre de jeu avec l approche adoptee les fusions sont profitables pour les parties prenantes non profitables pour les autres socialement benefiques et impliquent un petit nombre d entreprises dans une fusion qui ne cree pas un monopole finalement on trouve que la strategie optimale depend fondamentalement du fait que les entreprises se concurrencent par les prix ou par les quantites

confidence intervals for evaluating benefits estimates from dichotomous choice contingent valuation studies i evaluate the potential usefulness of nonmarket valuation concepts and techniques from environmental economics for improving wildlife conservation the concepts include distinguishing between on site recreation use value and off site passive use or

market structure and organizational form this paper studies the determinants of a firm s organizational form in the context of an imperfectly competitive industry there are two kinds of organizational forms the multi divisional form m form and the unitary form u form an m form firm suffers from ignorance of demand externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated in contrast in a u form firm demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists a firm s optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

the limits of monopolization through acquisition we address the question of whether competitive acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in complete or partial monopolization of a homogeneous product industry this question is modeled in terms of two distinct three stage noncoopera tive games analysis of subgame perfect pure strategy nash equilibria of these games discloses that under simplifying assumptions monopolization of an industry through acquisition is limited to industries with relatively few firms partial monopolization is either limited in scope or can be completely eliminated by prohibiting any owner from acquiring over 50 percent of the firms in the industry

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

using contingent valuation to explore willingness to pay for renewable energy a comparison of collective and voluntary payment vehicles abstract this study uses a split sample dichotomous choice contingent valuation survey of 1574 u s residents to explore willingness to pay wtp for renewable energy under collective and voluntary payment vehicles and under government and private provision of the good we also evaluate the impact of participation expectations on stated wtp we find some evidence that when confronted with a collective payment mechanism respondents state a somewhat higher wtp than when voluntary payment mechanisms are used similarly private provision of the good elicits a somewhat higher wtp than does government provision we also find that contingent valuation responses are strongly correlated with expectations for the wtp of others our results shed light on strategic response behavior and the incentive compatibility of different cv designs and offer practical insight into u s household preferences for how to support renewable energy

bertrand equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility this paper considers price competition among firms when there are capacity constraints and buyers have limited ability to visit firms a natural method of allocating buyers among firms arises in the equilibrium of the buyers search game sufficient conditions are given under which the buyers equilibrium varies continuously with the prices charged by firms capacity constraints are used to guarantee that this ensures existence of mixed strategy equilibria for the pricing game played by sellers we show that natural pure strategy equilibria arise when the game is made large in appropriate ways since bertrand s criticism of cournot it has been known that models where sellers compete with prices may have undesirable properties when the commodities traded are homogenous in the simplest models with constant marginal costs price may be driven down to the competitive level even when there are only two firms more problematic if sellers are subject to capacity constraints nash in prices equilibrium may not exist at all these problems all arise because of a discontinuity in firms profit functions that arises when the prices of two or more firms are equal there have been many attempts to resolve this problem the simplest is to constrain sellers prices to be equal and to force them to compete in quantities this is the basis of most of the literature on monopolistic competi

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection equilibria with adverse selection we construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection in particular it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and that in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that exist both when withdrawal costs are zero and when they are arbitrarily small but strictly positive we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome of our game this outcome is always constrained efficient and involves cross subsidization from low to high risk agents that is increasing in the share of low risks in the population under weak conditions on risk preferences

neutrally optimal mechanism under adverse selection the canonical insurance problem abstract this paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of rothschild and stiglitz 1976 we extend the three stage game in hellwig 1987 by allowing firms to endogenously choose whether or not to pre commit on their contractual offers menus we show how this mechanism can deliver the miyazaki wilson spence allocation as the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this allocation is the unique incentive efficient and individually rational maximizer of the utility of the most profitable type in fact given that the informed player has only two types it is the unique core allocation and thus the unique neutral optimum in the sense of myerson 1983

divide and conquer multiple leasing in common pool oil fields a theoretic model is developed to analyse strategic leasing behaviours of u s landowners in a non exclusively owned common oil pool oil field development is modelled as a simultaneous move two stage non cooperative game the landowners choose leasing strategies in the first stage independent lease operators choose extraction strategies in the second ownership structure is distinguished from operation structure and their relationship analyzed it is shown that in a non exclusively owned oil field it is individually rational for a landowner to subdivide his landholding and delegate production rights to multiple inde pendent firms although more dispersed production control leads to heavier common pool

valuing riverside wetlands the case of the donau auen national park abstract for two decades the establishment of the donau auen national park east of vienna has been on the political agenda in austria since 1991 concrete proposals have been worked out for several variants of a national park including hydraulic engineering concepts and hydroelectric power stations within this planning process a cost benefit analysis was carried out to estimate the economic impacts of the proposed projects one crucial question was how to value the ecological quality of wetlands these environmental goods were valued by means of a willingness to pay wtp survey two different kinds of variables were defined 1 costs and benefits depending on direct anthropocentric use including energy production with hydroelectric power stations shipping groundwater protection stabilisation of the river bed to stop channel erosion visitors benefits forestry farming fishing hunting and the costs of establishing a national park based on these variables the net present value for variants with hydroelectric power stations is higher than for variants without electricity production on the contrary the internal interest rate and the benefit cost ratio is higher for a pure national park without electricity production 2 taking also the austrians wtp for the donau auen national park as a substitute measure for ecological values into account only 20 percent of the wtp which was measured by means of contingent valuation is needed to make the net present value of the best national park variant equal to that of the best hydroelectric power variant this shows that the protection of natural goods like wetlands in a natural state might be more efficient from an economic viewpoint than development projects

divisionalization franchising and divestiture incentives in oligopoly a two stage game is used to model firms strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization franchising or divestiture firms simultaneously choose their number of competing units which then engage in cournot competition while it is costly to form autonomous units each firm does so in equilibrium thus reducing firm profits and increasing social welfare relative to the case where firms cannot form competing units with linear demand and costs duopolists choose the socially optimal number of competing units oligopolies with larger numbers of firms choose too many the case of nonlinear demand is also examined copyright 1996 by american economic association

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

how many franchises in a market abstract this paper studies how firms use their number of franchises as a strategic tool firms can commit to high output by creating many franchises however signing a single franchise contract with a low wholesale price is an equally effective way to generate output the value of granting many franchises is undercut when firms can sign contracts afterwards so firms place only a single franchise in a market this finding reverses previous results which did not model contracts the same issues arise in international competition policy where countries use anti trust policy to affect their number of exporters and use subsidies to affect the choices of exporters

giving birds a starting date the curious social solution to a water resource issue in the u s west abstract examining a natural resource management system we show that what first looks like rigid path dependency is actually stepped incremental change the theoretical question then arises of whether it is possible to predict when a natural resource governance system will follow such an incremental path of institutional change our investigation of the prior appropriation water rights system as administered in the state of wyoming reveals that mental models based on factors such as strong personal connections with administrators plus strong confidence in the system tend to favor incremental change we note that choosing incremental change is not without risk while systems that undertake wholesale and rapid change risk a good deal exposing themselves to a potential shower of unanticipated consequences systems that follow the path of incremental change also take risks incremental change may mean successful accommodation of new needs that demand attention or it may be too little too late ultimately allowing the pent up pressure of unmet needs to push the system over a threshold into collapse

further investigation of voluntary contribution contingent valuation fair share time of contribution and respondent uncertainty in the spirit of randall s resource energy econom 20 197 206 1998 argument for focusing on mapping the performance characteristics of alternative contingent valuation designs and formats the focus of this study is on three tests of the voluntary contribution mechanism we investigate the response effects of three crossed treatments 1 an informational treatment that randomly varies the total cost of providing the good to identify possible fair share effects 2 a split sample informational treatment that makes the time of contribution explicit and 3 elicitation formats that allow respondent uncertainty both as a follow up to a dichotomous choice question and asked directly in a split sample treatment

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

multidivisional firms internal competition and comparative advantage baye et al meet neary abstract we present a tractable general equilibrium model to capture the effects of divisionalization on trade in oligopolistic industries divisionalization reduces the incentives for diversification in production the extensive margins of trade expand as a result of divisionalization facilitating specialization toward the direction of comparative advantage with exports rising in the case of domestic divisionalization and imports rising in the case of foreign divisionalization this effect of internal competition on specialization is magnified when competition between divisions is staggered the factor market effects of divisionalization domestic and or foreign strengthen the expansionary effects on the extensive margins of trade

efficient estimation methods for closed ended contingent valuation surveys closed ended contingent valuation surveys can be very useful in the evaluation of nonmarket resources respondents merely state whether they would accept or reject a hypothetical threshold amount either as payment for giving up access to the resource or as a fee for its use the authors develop a maximum likelihood procedure which exploits the variation in the threshold values to allow direct and separate point estimates of regression like slope coefficients and error standard deviations without truncation bias their illustration uses data from a survey of recreational fisherman to examine factors which influence individuals willingness to pay copyright 1987 by mit press

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints abstract ever since the seminal work by rothschild and stiglitz q j econom 90 1976 629 on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non existence of equilibrium in pure strategies has received much attention in the literature we extend the original analysis by considering firms which face capacity constraints which might be due to limited capital we show that under mild assumptions an equilibrium exists where every consumer obtains his appropriate rothschild stiglitz contract

non discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market abstract a variant of the rothschild stiglitz model of a competitive insurance market is considered where each uninformed firm is allowed to renegotiate the contracts that its customers initially sign subject to the restriction that renegotiated contracts be offered to all the firm s customers such non discriminating renegotiation is shown to weaken the profitability of cream skimming to the extent that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome this outcome is that of miyazaki and spence i e the incentive compatible pair of zero profit contracts if efficient and the incentive compatible zero profit pair of contracts maximizing low risk utility otherwise

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection we construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome

increasing the profits of a subset of firms in oligopoly models with strategic substitutes consider an industry composed of n firms in a symmetric equilibrium designate a subset of s n firms and marginally reduce the strategic variables of the firms in the subset if the remaining firms simultaneously make the best reply to this exogenous displacement under what circumstances will profits of the firms in the designated subset increase we show that in the case of cournot competition among producers of perfect substitutes a marginal contraction is strictly beneficial strictly harmful if and only if the number of firms in the designated subset exceeds the adjusted number of firms outside it by strictly more strictly less than one the adjustment factor is unity when cost and demand functions are linear but more generally depends on the convexity of the cost and demand curves thus a marginal contraction of two firms in a triopoly has no effect on the profits of firms in the subset if cost and demand functions are linear if instead cost is linear but the inverse demand function is strictly concave strictly convex a marginal contraction will strictly decrease strictly increase profits the analysis is extended to the effects of nonmarginal exogenous changes in the outputs of the constrained firms this extension has implications for the relationship of stackelberg sequential move and nash simultaneous move equilibria our analysis has broad application to illustrate we show that it unifies results in the literature on export subsidies horizontal mergers and strikes the paper is organized as follows in section i our comparative static result is derived in section ii we present a wide range of applications in the conclusion and the appendix we generalize our analysis to other situations involving strategic substitutes

a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection the paper describes a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection and shows how refinements of equilibrium can be used to characterize uniquely the equilibrium outcome equilibrium exists under standard conditions it is shown that under certain conditions a stable set exists and is contained in a connected set of equilibria for generic models there exists a stable outcome that is all the equilibria in the stable set have the same outcome these ideas are applied to markets with one sided and two sided uncertainty under standard monotonicity conditions it is shown that the stable outcome is separating and implies a particular pattern of matches of buyers and sellers

a note on the specification of inter firm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection abstract this paper reconsiders the proposition due to jaynes that the rothschild stiglitz wilson insurence market with adverse selection has a nash equilibrium once the sharing of information about customers is treated endogenously as part of the game among firms the proposition is shown to be correct if and only if each firm s communication behaviour is conditioned on the set of contracts that are offered by the other firms this type of conditioning introduces a reactive element which is akin to the alternative approach of wilson

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search abstract this paper studies constrained efficiency in guerrieri et al s 2010 model of adverse selection and directed search buyers post contracts and sellers with private information about their type direct their search toward their preferred contract buyers and sellers then match bilaterally and trade if the guerrieri shimer wright equilibrium fails to achieve the first best then the planner subject to the frictions of the environment achieves strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not ex ante constrained efficient under certain conditions the planner achieves an allocation that even pareto dominates the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not interim constrained efficient under other conditions the planner can completely undo the effects of adverse selection and achieves the first best cross subsidization is the key to these results

the role of question order and respondent experience in contingent valuation studies abstract grand canyon white water boating was used to address issues in contingent valuation of question ordering and respondent experience question ordering effects were not identified for experienced boaters but did occur in some estimates for less experienced boaters an experience effect is further suggested if respondents value their actual white water trips differently than written scenarios of trips no effect was identified for experienced boaters but a significant difference did occur for less experienced boaters significant differences for less experienced boaters suggest that respondent experience may play a role in value formation resulting in survey instrument effects in valuation estimates

divisionalization and entry deterrence this paper assumes that incumbent firms can create new independent divisions more cheaply than potential entrants who must incur the additional overhead costs of new entry the main theoretical result is that such divisionalization ability leads perfectly informed incumbents to preempt all rational entry into their industries in contrast existing models of entry deterrence imply that informed incumbents even those with steadily decreasing average costs will often allow rational entry our result may explain why successful large scale entry by firms with no informational advantage is extremely rare the use of divisions to preempt entry may also explain why large firms in high profit oligopolies often divisionalize allowing their divisions to compete freely despite the negative pecuniary externality that each division imposes on others

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production