effects of piracy on quality of information goods it is commonly believed that piracy of information goods leads to lower profits which translate to lower incentives to invest in innovation and eventually to lower quality products manufacturers policy makers and researchers all claim that inadequate piracy enforcement efforts translate to lower investments in product development however we find many practical examples that contradict this claim therefore to examine this claim more carefully we develop a rigorous economic model of the manufacturer s quality decision problem in the presence of piracy we consider a monopolist who does not have any marginal costs but has a product development cost quadratic in the quality level produced the monopolist faces a consumer market heterogeneous in its preference for quality and offers a quality level that maximizes its profit we also allow for the possibility that the manufacturer may use versioning to counter piracy we unexpectedly find that in certain situations lower piracy enforcement increases the monopolist s incentive to invest in quality we explain the reasons and welfare implications of our findings this paper was accepted by lorin hitt information systems

optimal timing of sequential distribution the impact of congestion externalities and day and date strategies the window between a film s theatrical and video releases has been steadily declining with some studios now testing day and date strategies i e when a film is released across multiple channels at once we present a model of consumer choice that examines trade offs between substitutable products theatrical and video forms the possibility of purchasing both alternatives a congestion externality affecting consumption at theaters with heterogeneous consumer groups and a decay in the quality of the content over time our model permits a normative study of the impact of shorter release windows zero three months for which there is a scarcity of relevant data we characterize the market conditions under which a studio makes video release time and price selections indicative of direct to video day and date and delayed video release tactics during seasons of peak congestion we establish that day and date strategies are optimal for high quality films with high content durability i e films whose content tends to lead consumers to purchase both alternatives whereas prices are set to perfectly segment the consumer market for films with low content durability we find that lower congestion effects provide studios with incentives to delay release and price the video to induce multiple purchasing behavior for films with higher content durability however an increase in congestion effects can in certain cases actually lead to higher studio profitability we also show that at the lower range of quality an increase in movie quality should often be accompanied by a later video release time surprisingly however we observe the opposite result at the upper range of movie quality an increase in quality can justify an earlier release of the video

the electoral impact of economic conditions who is held responsible a variety of recent research has dealt with the impact of economic conditions on congressional elections the underlying assumption of this research has been that the effects of economic fluctuations are distributed evenly across members of the president s party by focusing on subgroups of congressional candidates we demonstrate that the importance of economic conditions varies widely specifically we show that the aggregate electoral margins of incumbents are far more responsive to economic conditions than are those for nonincumbents and that among in party incumbents the relationship is stronger among those with higher levels of tenure further we demonstrate that the previous lack of individual level confirmation of the aggregate relationship has been due to a failure to control for the contextual effects implied by our conditional aggregate analysis with controls for district incumbency we find a relationship between retrospective personal financial condition and vote choice that mirrors the aggregate relationship between retrospective performance of the national economy and congressional vote totals

a parsimonious model for forecasting gross box office revenues of motion pictures the primary objective of this paper is to develop a parsimonious model for forecasting the gross box office revenues of new motion pictures based on early box office data the paper also seeks to provide insights into the impact of distribution policies on the adoption of new products the model is intended to assist motion picture exhibitor chains retailers in managing their exhibition capacity and in negotiating exhibition license agreements with distributors studios by allowing them to project the box office potential of the movies they plan to or currently exhibit based on early box office results it is also of interest to practitioners in other software industries e g music books cd roms where the distribution intensity is highly variable over the product life cycle and is an important determinant of new product adoption patterns the model and its extensions are of interest to academic researchers interested in modeling distribution effects in new product adoption as well as forecasters looking for ways to leverage historical data on related products to forecast the sales of new products we draw upon a queuing theory framework to conceptualize stochastically the consumer s movie adoption process in two steps the time to decide to see the new movie and the time to act on the adoption decision the parameter for the time to decide process captures the intensity of information intensity flowing from various information sources while the parameter for the time to act process is related to the delay created by limited distribution intensity and other factors our conceptualization extends existing new product forecasting models which assume that consumers act instantaneously on the motivating information they receive about the new product the resulting model is parsimonious yet it accommodates a wide range of adoption patterns in addition the stochastic formulation allows us to quantify the uncertainty surrounding the expected adoption pattern in the empirical testing we focus on the most parsimonious version of the modeling framework boxmod i a model that assumes stationarity with respect to the two shape parameters that characterize the adoption process the model produces fairly accurate early forecasts using at most the first three weeks of data for calibration and the predictive performance of the model compares favorably with benchmark models we propose extensions of the basic model that account for more realistic non stationary distribution intensity patterns including a wide release pattern that relies on intensive distribution and promotion and a platform release pattern that involves a gradual buildup of distribution intensity finally we present an adaptive weighing scheme that combines initial parameter estimates obtained from a meta analysis procedure with estimates obtained from early data to produce forecasts of box office revenues for a new movie when little or no box office data are available an important finding from the empirical testing is that motion picture box office revenue patterns display remarkable empirical regularity we find that there are only three classes of adoption patterns and these can all be represented within the basic model by using a two parameter exponential or erlang 2 probability distribution or a three parameter generalized gamma distribution we also find that cumulative box office revenues can be predicted with reasonable accuracy often within 10 of the actual using as little as two or three data points however our attempts to predict revenue patterns without any sales data meet with limited success while the scale parameter can be estimated reasonably well from a historical database of parameter values we find that it is considerably more difficult to predict the shape parameters using historical data the parsimony we seek in developing the model comes at the cost of several limiting assumptions we assume that the time to decide subprocess and the time to act subprocess are independent which may not be the case if decisions on continued exhibition by retailers are endogenously related to box office revenues over the life cycle in the basic model formulation we also assume that the time to act process can be represented by an exponential distribution which may not always be the case while we provide some empirical evidence to support these assumptions further research could relax these and other assumptions to enrich the basic model although this would entail some loss in parsimony

fiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in american states clear fiscal policy effects appear in american state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992 independent of the effects of incumbency coattails term limits and macroeconomic conditions the results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations which differ for each party net of these expectations republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget democrats do not and indeed may be rewarded for small increases independent of this the incumbent governor s party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance taken together these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels partisan control expectations and institutions

tax policy and yardstick voting in flemish municipal elections recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions in these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions this paper reports an analysis of municipal elections in flanders during the period 1982 to 2000 and finds empirical evidence for yardstick voting incumbents are punished for higher tax rates importantly the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

software piracy an analysis of protection strategies software piracy by users is generally believed to harm both software firms through lower profits and buying customers through higher prices thus it is thought that perfect and costless technological protection would benefit both firms and consumers the model developed here suggests that in some circumstances even with significant piracy not protecting can be the best policy both raising firm profits and lowering selling prices key to the analysis is joining the presence of a positive network externality with the fact that piracy increases the total number of program users the network externality exists because consumers have an incentive to economize on post purchase learning and customization costs

learning by doing and the introduction of new goods a dynamic general equilibrium model is developed in which goods are valued according to the characteristics they contain the set of goods produced in any period is endogenously determined and learning by doing is the force behind sustained growth it is shown that the set of produced goods changes in a systematic way over time with goods of higher quality entering each period and those of lower quality dropping out the model is then used to study the effect of introducing a traditional sector in which there is no learning

keeping the public purse an experiment in windfalls taxes and the incentives to restrain government it is widely believed that natural resource wealth foreign aid and other types of windfall revenue increase corruption and undermine accountability a predominant claim in political science is that windfalls free politicians from the need to tax resulting in a more politically quiescent population yet there is surprisingly little evidence to substantiate not only whether taxation has this eect but also why i use novel experiments to provide the rst micro level causal test of claims that 1 taxes motivate citizens more than windfalls to hold politicians accountable and 2 citizens care more about wasted revenue when they pay taxes the experiments were embedded in a public awareness campaign conducted with 1 863 citizens in a resource rich district in indonesia the results measured through a survey and a postcard campaign show that taxes made participants more willing to monitor government and hold politicians accountable than windfalls primarily because of a stronger sense of ownership over public funds yet when better information on government spending is made available the windfall group proved just as intolerant of misspent revenue these ndings have important implications for understanding not only how taxation motivates political action but also how revenue shapes the ways in which citizens acquire and process information on government spending

sourcing flexibility spot trading and procurement contract structure we analyze the structure and pricing of option contracts for an industrial good in the presence of spot trading we combine the analysis of spot trading and buyers disparate private valuations for different suppliers products and we jointly endogenize the determination of three major dimensions in contract design i sales contracts versus options contracts ii flat price versus volume dependent contracts and iii volume discounts versus volume premia we build a model in which a supplier of an industrial good transacts with a manufacturer who uses the supplier s product to produce an end good with an uncertain demand we show that consistent with industry observations volume dependent optimal sales contracts always demonstrate volume discounts i e involve concave pricing however options are more complex agreements and optimal option contracts can involve both volume discounts and volume premia three major contract structures commonly emerge in optimality first if the seller has a high discount rate relative to the buyer and the seller s production costs or the production capacity is low the optimal contracts tend to be flat price sales contracts second when the seller has a relatively high discount rate compared to the buyer but production costs or production capacity are high the optimal contracts are sales contracts with volume discounts third if the buyer s discount rate is high relative to the seller s then the optimal contracts tend to be volume dependent options contracts and can involve both volume discounts and volume premia however when the seller s production capacity is sufficiently low it is possible to observe flat price option contracts furthermore we provide links between production and spot market characteristics contract design and efficiency

demand uncertainty in a durable goods monopoly abstract as is well known in the durability literature the monopolistic renter of durable goods is better off in terms of profits than a seller of durable goods this paper provides an explanation for the persistent and widespread use of sales contracts despite what would appear to be reduced profits it is shown that in the presence of demand uncertainty and risk averse firms the monopolist has an incentive to offer sales contracts in order to transfer the risk of future demand shocks to consumers however if the monopolist is risk neutral rental contracts remain superior to sales contracts despite the presence of demand uncertainty

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

unemployment and the democratic electoral advantage this article calls into question the conventional wisdom that incumbent parties are rewarded when unemployment is low and punished when it is high using county level data on unemployment and election returns for 175 midterm gubernatorial elections and 4 presidential elections from 1994 to 2010 the analysis finds that unemployment and the democratic vote for president and governor move together other things being equal higher unemployment increases the vote shares of democratic candidates the effect is greatest when republicans are the incumbent party but democrats benefit from unemployment even when they are in control the explanation for these findings is that unemployment is a partisan issue for voters not a valence issue and that the democratic party owns unemployment when unemployment is high or rising democratic candidates can successfully convince voters that they are the party best able to solve the problem

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

revenue management for durable goods using trade ins with certified pre owned options abstract the economics research suggests that firms can use trade ins as a revenue management device for price discrimination between new and replacement buyers of durabprle goods offering different prices to different groups of customers creates a market segmentation effect this study examines such an effect by considering trade ins and certified pre owned options for a durable goods firm where certified pre owned cpo represents the used goods market generated from the return flow of trade in transactions the optimal pricing and or trade in rebate is determined and the strategic choice between the two options is examined an analytical model is developed that incorporates the key durable goods features into model formulation specifically the deterioration rate or durability in a reverse measure and the variation in quality of the used goods our research findings indicate that i the magnitude of trade in rebates increases with the deterioration rate and quality variation ii the segmentation effect outweighs the cannibalization effect when the deterioration rate is moderately high iii the strategic choice of trade ins and cpo options is critically dependent on these two features and iv the majority of profit improvement is generated from trade in provisions although the cpo option can serve as a second profit boosting device

taxation and presidential approval separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians this literature however focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden in this paper we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the us president s approval ratings over the 1959 2006 period our results support this proposition specifically we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings

discussion of the influence of elections on the accounting choices of governmental entities kido petacchi and weber 2012 investigate whether the occurrence of a state gubernatorial election is important to understanding the accrual choices of preparers of the state s comprehensive annual financial report central to the authors argument is the idea that voters do not like budget deficits politicians in response have incentives to use accounting choices to mask deficits in the period before elections focusing on a specific accrual the changes in compensated absences liability the authors find evidence that the discretionary part of this accrual is smaller in the period before an election which is consistent with politicians attempting to improve the picture of the state s financial health in addition the authors show that accrual manipulation is positively associated with the vote share of incumbent governors in elections in my discussion i ask two questions 1 how strong are governors political incentives to manipulate accruals in the run up to elections 2 can the association between discretionary compensated absence accruals and elections be explained by forces other than politically motivated accounting manipulation i argue that the incentives to manipulate accruals might well be weak given strong disciplinary mechanisms that induce politicians to transparency what s more i document that elections might produce patterns in state employment as the compensated absences liability is linked to the payroll election induced changes in state employment might be reflected in this accrual evidence of an association between the compensated absences accrual and elections then does not necessarily imply that politicians manage accounting numbers to further illustrate this point i show empirically that gubernatorial elections have little explanatory power for state financial reporting choices that are unaffected by state employment jel classification h70 h72 m41

introduction strategy for new products with positive and negative word of mouth existing innovation diffusion models assume that individual experience with the product is always communicated positively through word of mouth for certain innovations however this assumption is tenuous since communicators of the product experience may transfer favorable unfavorable or indifferent messages through word of mouth this paper examines a diffusion model for products in which negative information plays a dominant role discusses its implications for optimal advertising timing policy and presents an application to forecast attendance for the movie gandhi in the dallas area

pricing substitutable products under consumer regrets abstract since many firms provide consumers with substitutable products which may be launched sequentially over several periods strategic consumers need to make their purchase or wait decisions at the beginning of the first period however they may face second period valuation uncertainty when such decisions are made and decisions made under uncertainty may lead to regrets ex post lots of empirical studies show that consumers anticipate these regrets and take anticipated regrets into consideration this paper studies the impact of valuation uncertainty and consumer anticipated regrets on consumer purchasing behavior firm s prices and pricing strategy we consider a firm selling two substitutable products over two periods one product for one period in a selling season the firm announces all its prices at the beginning of the selling season price commitment or announces each price at the beginning of each period dynamic pricing besides a consumer may experience purchase regret from missing a better choice if she chooses to buy in the first period and otherwise wait regret if she chooses to wait consumers make decisions based on the firm s prices and strategies and the anticipated regrets we find that a firm may need to set a lower price in the first period even when the average valuation in this period is higher second with price commitment the impact of each type of regret on the optimal second period price can be opposite and depends on the value of the uncertainty and regret parameters finally we show that price commitment dominates dynamic pricing and the value of price commitment depends on the uncertainty and anticipated regret

state economies and state taxes do voters hold governors accountable theory states have sufficient autonomy in the policies they adopt that voters hold state officials partly responsible for the condition of the state economy as the best known state official elected by a statewide constituency governors in particular are held accountable for the economic performance of their states with respect to taxes the clear locus of responsibility in state actions and the high visibility of certain taxes suggest that governors will also be held responsible for increased rates hypotheses the performance of the state economy tax increases and voters personal financial situations all influence voting behavior in gubernatorial elections methods logit equations using 1986 abc washington post exit polls in 34 of 36 gubernatorial races combined with economic and tax data from the states results a poor state economy increases in taxes and lowered personal finances all contribute to votes against incumbent governors and their parties

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

intergovernmental political competition in american federalism many policies in the united states are jointly determined by federal and state actions in the game theoretic model offered here politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods in line with peterson s 1995 theory of functional federalism the level of government that is better able to supply particular goods and services tends to take the lead in their provision even to the extent of fully crowding out much less efficient governments however under a broad set of circumstances both state and national politicians seek credit via public spending and their joint provision leads to a relative oversupply of public goods and services and thus to overtaxation under joint provision states vary in their responses to changing federal spending patterns based both on the causes of the national changes and on state characteristics

gubernatorial midterm slumps this article studies gubernatorial midterm slumps in u s state legislative elections we employ a regression discontinuity design which allows us to rule out the hypothesis that the midterm slump simply reflects a type of reversion to the mean generated by simple partisan swings or the withdrawal of gubernatorial coattails or anticipatory balancing our results show that the party of the governor experiences an average seat share loss of about 3 5 percentage points we also find evidence suggesting that a large share of the variation in gubernatorial midterm slumps can be accounted for by 1 crude partisan balancing and 2 referendums on state economic performance with approximately equal weight given to each

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

durability choice under demand uncertainty this paper examines the impact of demand uncertainty on a monopolist s durability choice within a simple two period framework the analysis shows that the firm will produce the socially optimal durability if its output is rented and demand uncertainty is small but that it may produce units with inefficiently short life spans if output is sold however the model reveals that this planned obsolescence may be reduced from certainty levels depending upon the impact of uncertainty on future demand thus uncertainty may actually increase the firm s product durability relative to certainty levels

optimal research for cournot oligopolists we extend the classical cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function by undertaking research firms can acquire private asymmetric information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision the model is a two stage game in the first stage research levels are chosen and in the second stage conditional on private research outcomes production decisions are made we find that for a linear continuous information structure there is a unique nash equilibrium to the game in the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well the model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

attribution error in economic voting evidence from trade shocks this article exploits the international transmission of business cycles to examine the prevalence of attribution error in economic voting in a large panel of countries from 1990 to 2009 we find that voters on average exhibit a strong tendency to oust the incumbent governments during an economic downturn regardless of whether the recession is home grown or merely imported from trading partners however we find important heterogeneity in the extent of attribution error a split sample analysis shows that countries with more experienced voters more educated voters and possibly more informed voters all conditions that have been shown to mitigate other voter agency problems do better in distinguishing imported from domestic growth jel e3 e6

who should be responsible for software security a comparative analysis of liability policies in network environments in recent years vendor liability for software security vulnerabilities has been the center of an important debate in the software community and a topic gaining government attention in legislative committees and hearings the importance of this question surrounding vendor security liability is amplified when one considers the increasing emergence of zero day attacks where hackers take advantage of vulnerabilities before the software vendor has a chance to release protective patches in this paper we compare the effectiveness of three software liability policies vendor liability for damages vendor liability for patching costs and government imposed security standards we find that vendor liability for losses is not effective in improving social welfare in the short run while liability for patching costs can be effective if either patching costs are large and the likelihood of a zero day attack is low or patching costs are small and zero day likelihood is high in the long run when the vendor can invest in reducing the likelihood of security vulnerabilities loss liability is still ineffective when the zero day attack probability is high but can increase both vendor investment in security and social welfare when zero day attack likelihood is sufficiently low when the zero day attack probability is high patch liability is ineffective if user patching costs are large but partial patch liability can boost vendor investment and improve welfare when patching costs are small in contrast in an environment with low zero day attack probability full vendor patch liability can be optimal finally comparing the effectiveness of the three liability policies under study we find that government imposed standards on software security investment can be preferable to both patching and loss liability on the vendor if zero day attack likelihood is sufficiently low however if zero day attacks are a common occurrence and patching costs are not too high partial patch liability is the most effective policy this paper was accepted by sandra slaughter information systems

network software security and user incentives we study the effect of user incentives on software security in a network of individual users under costly patching and negative network security externalities for proprietary software or freeware we compare four alternative policies to manage network security i consumer self patching where no external incentives are provided for patching or purchasing ii mandatory patching iii patching rebate and iv usage tax we show that for proprietary software when the software security risk and the patching costs are high for both a welfare maximizing social planner and a profit maximizing vendor a patching rebate dominates the other policies however when the patching cost or the security risk is low self patching is best we also show that when a rebate is effective the profit maximizing rebate is decreasing in the security risk and increasing in patching costs the welfare maximizing rebates are also increasing in patching costs but can be increasing in the effective security risk when patching costs are high for freeware a usage tax is the most effective policy except when both patching costs and security risk are low in which case a patching rebate prevails optimal patching rebates and taxes tend to increase with increased security risk and patching costs but can decrease in the security risk for high risk levels our results suggest that both the value generated from software and vendor profits can be significantly improved by mechanisms that target user incentives to maintain software security

a theory of finitely durable goods monopoly with used goods market and transaction costs we construct a dynamic game to model a monopoly of finitely durable goods the solution concept is markov perfect equilibria with general equilibria embedded in every time period our model is flexible enough to simultaneously explain or accommodate many commonly observed phenomena or stylized facts such as concurrent leasing and selling active secondary markets for used goods heterogeneous consumers endogenous consumption patterns depreciation an infinite time horizon and nontrivial transaction costs within our model consumers have incentives to segment themselves into various consumption classes according to their willingness to pay and nontrivial transaction costs to sell used goods put strong constraints on consumers consumption sequences in time as a direct consequence of the finite durability the market power of the monopolist remains intact leasing manifests itself as a facilitator of price discrimination by debundling the durable good into new and used portions that are naturally bundled together under outright sales the concurrent leasing and selling reflects the degree of the comparative advantage the monopolist has over consumers in disposing used goods this comparative advantage which is partially exploited by the monopolist and partially shared by the consumers provides a sufficient mechanism to gain pareto improvement on the market

research note the role of production lead time and demand uncertainty in marketing durable goods firms often have to make their production decisions under conditions of demand uncertainty this is especially true for product categories such as automobiles and technology goods where the lead time needed for manufacturing forces firms to make production decisions well in advance of the selling season once the firm has produced the goods the available production volume affects the firm s subsequent marketing decisions in this paper we study the relationship between the firm s production and marketing decisions for a durable goods manufacturer we develop a dynamic model of a durable product market in which the demand functions are developed from a micromodeling of consumer utility functions and an equilibrium analysis of consumer strategies after taking into account the demand uncertainty as well as the potential for cannibalization of future sales the manufacturer makes its production and sales decisions we find that the firm s optimal inventory level is u shaped in the durability of the product and that the firm suffers a larger loss due to uncertainty when it is leases rather than sells its products furthermore unlike the case for nondurables for durable goods we find that the effect of uncertainty persists even after the uncertainty has been resolved

modeling movie life cycles and market share we examine box office sales in the context of a market share model this is accomplished by developing a combination of a sliding window logit model and a gamma diffusion pattern in a hierarchical bayes framework we show that accounting for the full choice set available every week not only increases the fit of weekly movie sales but also leads to parameter estimates that depict a richer picture of the movie industry we show that movie studios appear to have a good understanding of the products they produce knowing when to support them and when not to we also show that the effect of the number of opening week screens is overestimated in traditional models our research indicates that actors have a direct and directors an indirect effect on consumers movie choice releasing a movie contemporaneously with other movies of the same genre adversely affects box office performance all around releasing a movie against movies of the same motion picture association of america mpaa rating hurts its sales in the beginning but there is a displacement effect which leads to a less severe sales loss in the long run

economic voting and multilevel governance a comparative individual level analysis an important component of incumbent support is the reward punishment calculus of economic voting previous work has shown that clarity of responsibility within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice where clarity is high low economic effects are greater less this article advances the clarity of responsibility argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting in institutional contexts of multilevel governance the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult this article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government individual level data from the comparative study of electoral systems module 1 are used to test this proposition results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance

the economic consequences of political donation limits the economic consequences of limits on political donations depend on the degree of political competition donors who are ideologically aligned with candidates decide how much to contribute to their own candidate they may benefit from rent seeking by their own candidate but dislike rent seeking by the opposition increased rent seeking by politicians thus generates campaign contributions for themselves but also mobilizes donations to the opposing candidate potentially to a greater extent this latter effect acts as a deterrent to rent seeking when contributions finance electoral campaigns and positively affect election chances when political competition is low incumbent donors outnumber opposition donors and limits reduce rent seeking when political competition is high donors are equalized and laissez faire reduces rent seeking consistent with these hypotheses data from the us states suggest that limits are associated with better policies and stronger growth performance at low levels of political competition whilst laissez faire is preferred when political competition is high

intertemporal price discrimination and sales strategy under incomplete information this article examines intertemporal price variations to provide a theoretical explanation for them when firms have only incomplete information about consumers reservation prices for the commodity we contend that some intertemporal price variations can result from attempts by firms to discriminate among consumers we demonstrate that such price discrimination is the optimal policy for a seller if consumers have a higher time discount rate than producers

optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers this paper considers the intertemporal pricing problem for a monopolist marketing a new product the key feature differentiating this paper from the extant management science literature on intertemporal pricing is the assumption that consumers are intertemporal utility maximizers a subgame perfect nash equilibrium pricing policy is characterized and shown to involve intertemporal price discrimination we compare this policy to the optimal policy for a monopolist facing myopic consumers and find that for any given state prices are always lower with rational consumers than with myopic consumers for plausible parameter values the assumption of consumer rationality can be shown to lead to large differences in optimal prices moreover if a monopolist facing rational consumers implements the optimal myopic consumer pricing policy profits can be significantly less than if the monopolist follows the equilibrium pricing policy for rational consumers

strategic customer behavior facing possible stockout an experimental study abstract this paper studies strategic customer behavior in a monopolistic seller system given the stock quantity and the selling prices a customer chooses either to buy at the full price to certainly obtain a product or to wait for a discount with the risk of stockout we model the behavior of strategic customers as a customer game it is shown that the customer game may have multiple nash equilibria specifically in the condition of weak incentive compatibility the trembling hand perfect equilibrium is all wait which is inconsistent with the all buy assumption in the literature we conduct laboratory experiments to investigate behavior of strategic customers the results show that customers behaviors exhibit a deviation from nash equilibria using a framework of quantal response equilibrium we develop behavioral models to effectively characterize the behavior of strategic customers

tax innovation in the states capitalizing on political opportunity this paper assesses the factors that prompt states to adopt taxes during the twentieth century we test five explanations of state tax innovation derived from the literature economic development fiscal health election cycle party control and regional diffusion using event history analysis a pooled cross sectional time series technique while little support is found for the economic development and party control explanations our empirical results are highly consistent with a political opportunity explanation of state tax adoptions 1 the presence of a long time until the next election 2 the existence of a fiscal crisis and 3 the presence of neighboring states that have previously adopted a tax all create opportunities for politicians to shield themselves from the political costs of supporting a tax increase and are all shown by empirical analysis to increase the probability of a tax adoption this empirical evidence is consistent across different tax instruments and different periods of analysis throughout the twentieth century

seasonality in the u s motion picture industry the observed seasonality of box office revenues reflects both seasonality in underlying demand for movies and seasonality in the number and quality of available movies i separately identify these aspects by estimating weekly demand for movies using movie fixed effects a long panel of movies weekly revenues and restrictions on their decay pattern i find that the estimated seasonality in underlying demand is much smaller and slightly different from the observed seasonality of sales the biggest movies are released at times when demand is highest amplifying the underlying seasonality price rigidities in the industry may facilitate this amplification effect

monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers fluctuating willingness to pay abstract demand volatility and production lead time oblige manufacturers of made to stock goods to use economic forecasts in deciding on production quantities manufacturers of finitely durable goods face an additional complication in making production decisions they must consider not only the uncertainty in demand for new goods but also how the future sales will be affected by the older goods that will become available via a secondhand market using a model of an infinite horizon sequential game between a monopolistic producer of durable goods and strategic consumers we investigate how demand volatility affects producers production and pricing decisions we formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete time markov decision process and prove certain structural properties of the sales and production policy these structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer s strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis we show that a simple myopic policy is optimal when each period s demand is independent and identically distributed i i d when demand is correlated across periods the producer s optimal production and sales policy is not myopic and in some states when the economy is poor the producer withholds some of the new goods inventory our numerical results suggest that in equilibrium the producer who is dealing with myopic rather than with forward looking consumers is more likely to sell some of these held back goods later as vintage goods

the politics of tax increases in the states this paper updates a recent study of the factors prompting states to adopt new tax instruments by testing the explanation supported in the original work over a longer time period and broadening the pooled cross sectional time series analysis to include increases in the rates of existing tax instruments our results are consistent with the original study s support for a political opportunity explanation that suggests that politicians are most likely to adopt tax increases when the electoral risks of doing so are minimized

organizational structure and the optimal design of policymaking panels evidence from consensus group commissions revenue forecasts in the american states increasing both the size and diversity of policymaking panels is widely thought to enhance the accuracy of collective policy decisions this study advances the theoretical conditions in which improving collective accuracy necessitates an efficient trade off between a panel s size and its level of organizational diversity this substitution effect between these organizational characteristics is empirically supported with data on official general fund revenue forecasts made by consensus group cg independent commissions in the american states evidence of an asymmetric substitution effect is also uncovered whereby increasing organizational diversity in large cg commissions produces revenue forecasts that reduce collective accuracy by slightly more than three times as much compared to decreasing such diversity in small cg commissions this study underscores the limits of organizational diversity as a mechanism for improving collective judgments when policymaking authority is diffuse among many panel members

are politicians really paid like bureaucrats abstract we provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay using u s data for 1950 90 we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians both across states and over time gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes we estimate that governors receive a 1 percent pay cut for each 10 percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4 5 percent increase in pay for each 10 percent increase in income per capita in their states there is evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of reward for performance the evidence for the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive but is suggestive of rent extraction motives finally we find that democratic institutions play an important role in shaping pay for example voter initiatives and the presence of political opposition significantly reduce the income elasticity of pay and increase tax elasticities of pay

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines