prices institutions and determinants of supply in the malian cotton sector cotton both a source of livelihood for millions of poor rural households and a major source of export revenues is a vital commodity for the economic and social development of mali inefficiencies in the malian cotton system at the ginnery and producers cooperative levels e g late payment to farmers and poorly functioning credit schemes have recently led to an important decline in supply threatening the sustainability of the sector using regional data from 1998 1999 to 2008 2009 this study aims to quantitatively assess the contribution of key determinants such as cotton prices and timely payment toward the downward trend in cotton area a dynamic supply model based on adaptive expectations and partial adjustment is employed to estimate the effects of prices and institutional factors such as credit recovery rates and date of payment to farmers on the malian cotton supply results show that supply responds significantly to cotton prices relative to cereal and fertilizer prices date of payment varies across agricultural cycles and late payment negatively influences land devoted to cotton low credit repayment rates create disincentives to grow cotton therefore the revitalization of the malian cotton sector depends upon getting both prices and institutions right

determinants of donations in private nonprofit markets abstract we estimate the responsiveness of donations to a number of economic variables including price advertising and the availability of revenue from such other sources as government grants and program service sales utilizing a set of irs data on individual nonprofit organizations in each of seven industries including hospitals and higher education for the years 1982 1994 we find distinct overall patterns as well as notable variation across industries a nonprofit organization s fundraising expenditures are estimated to exert two countervailing effects on donations the direct advertising and information effect augments donations while the indirect effect on the price of donating has a negative effect we do not find evidence that fundraising is carried to the profit maximizing levels in some industries fundraising is substantially short of that level while in other industries it is excessive implying that the marginal return to fundraising is exceeded by the cost focusing on whether revenue from other sources affects donations to a nonprofit organization we find evidence that revenue from either government grants or from the organization s own program sales activity generally does not crowd out private donations to the contrary in most industries there are significant positive effects

are church and state substitutes evidence from the 1996 welfare reform abstract churches provide community services similar to those provided by the government but there has been no convincing analysis of the extent to which church activity can substitute for government activity to address this important issue this paper uses a new panel data set of presbyterian church usa congregations to regress both church member donations and a church s community spending on a number of variables including government welfare expenditures a provision of the 1996 welfare law that decreased the availability and use of welfare services by non citizens serves as an instrument to identify the causal effect of government spending on church activity the results show that church activities substitute for government activities extrapolating the findings to all denominations the estimated crowd out effect lies between 20 and 38 cents on the dollar the results are subjected to a number of robustness tests

effects of the price of charitable giving evidence from an online crowdfunding platform abstract a long literature has examined the effects of the price of giving that is the amount an individual must give for one dollar to accrue to the charitable activity itself on donative behavior we use data from donorschoose org an online platform linking teachers with prospective donors that are uniquely suited to addressing this question due to exogenous variation in overhead costs an increased price of giving results in a lower likelihood of a project being funded we also calculate the price elasticity of giving finding estimates between 0 8 and 2 finally we examine the effect of competition on giving and find that increased competition reduces the likelihood of a project being funded these results provide insight into the workings of the market for charitable gifts

demand for charity donations in private non profit markets the case of the u k abstract this paper presents estimates of the demand for donations for u k charities in 1985 these estimates make demand depend upon price fund raising expenditure a quality index and alternative revenue sources the price elasticity of donations found here shows for the most part an elastic response and is consistent with previous studies using u s data our empirical results suggest that non profits in the u k unlike their counterparts in the u s are net revenue maximisers we discovered no significant evidence that public donations crowded out private donations in our sample of 300 charities

why do people give testing pure and impure altruism abstract researchers measure crowd out around one level of charity output to identify whether giving is motivated by altruism and or warm glow however crowd out depends on output implying first that the power to reject pure altruism varies and second that a single measurement of incomplete crowd out can be rationalized by many different preferences by instead measuring crowd out at different output levels we allow both for identification and for a novel and direct test of impure altruism using a new experimental design we present the first empirical evidence that consistent with impure altruism crowd out decreases with output jel d64 l31

demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets can fundraising expenditures help overcome free rider behavior abstract economic theory ascribes the primary role in the provision of public goods to government this emphasis on government overlooks the role of the not for profit sector in providing collective type goods in this paper we seek to determine the factors influencing charitable contributions to private nonprofit organizations by estimating a demand function for the output of these collective good providers specifically we test the hypothesis that voluntary giving is responsive to conventional market variables such as advertising expenditures price and quality overall the results are strongly supportive

board composition and nonprofit conduct evidence from hospitals abstract this study uses data from hospitals to test the hypothesis that management representation on nonprofit boards leads to excessive ceo pay defined as compensation that exceeds the level predicted by a market wage model we document a relatively small but statistically significant positive association between ceo pay and insider boards that include the ceo and other employees as members additional tests confirm that this result is not driven by endogenous board structure and that excess pay is greater in the absence of competition from for profit hospitals we then examine whether management board representation is associated with larger underlying agency concerns that lead to reduced donations our tests do not support this hypothesis but do however reveal a negative correlation between donations and physician representation on the board suggesting a potential conflict between the interests of donors and non employee physicians our overall evidence provides empirical support for modeling nonprofit organizations as consisting of competing stakeholders

faith based charity and crowd out during the great depression abstract interest in religious organizations as providers of social services has increased dramatically in recent years churches in the u s were a crucial provider of social services through the early part of the twentieth century but their role shrank dramatically with the expansion in government spending under the new deal in this paper we investigate the extent to which the new deal crowded out church charitable spending in the 1930s we do so using a new nationwide data set of charitable spending for six large christian denominations matched to data on local new deal spending we instrument for new deal spending using measures of the political strength of a state s congressional delegation and confirm our findings using a different instrument based on institutional constraints on state relief spending with both instruments we find that higher government spending leads to lower church charitable activity crowd out was small as a share of total new deal spending 3 but large as a share of church spending our estimates suggest that benevolent church spending fell by 30 in response to the new deal and that government relief spending can explain virtually all of the decline in charitable church activity observed between 1933 and 1939

financial reporting quality and price competition among nonprofit firms donors increasingly rely on financial information reported by internal revenue service irs form 990 to allocate donations among nonprofit firms however competition among nonprofits creates an incentive for managers to under report management and fund raising expenditures to make their firms appear relatively efficient increasingly researchers suspect that information provided in the form 990 may not accurately portray the true financial condition of nonprofit firms inaccurate price information weakens the ability of donors to promote efficiency and discipline excess among nonprofit managers this article examines the reaction of donors to variation in form 990 reporting quality we find that donors reward nonprofit firms for investments in more accurate financial reporting additionally higher quality financial information sharpens the ability of donor markets to discipline nonprofit firms by increasing price sensitivity the primary implication of this study is that regulatory improvements in rep

how giving affects giving a long term analysis of donations social preferences theories suggest that at least some people show altruistic behaviour however this philanthropic behaviour ranges from pure altruistic preferences to reluctant altruists the fa

using nonprofit organization level financial data to infer managers fund raising strategies abstract using irs data from 1982 to 1994 this study finds the typical fund raising elasticities in seven categories of nonprofit organizations to be between zero and one these results are consistent with most nonprofit managers following intermediate strategies between pure program service maximization and pure organization size maximization however the distribution of fund raising elasticities contains extreme observations that can disproportionately affect mean elasticities and standard deviations as a result prior researchers tests of the difference of mean elasticities from zero may not properly characterize the behavior of typical nonprofit organizations

kids or cash exploring charter school responses to declining government revenues while the literature is extensive on school districts revenue sources less research has been done on the impact of donations on school district funds in this paper we extend the theoretical literature on crowding out of private donations by government grants for one type of nonprofit firm namely charter schools the theoretical model leads us to focus on the key relationships among fundraising effort enrollment which is tied to federal and state funding and donations using a dataset on texas charter schools we adopt a two stage approach to examine the empirical relationship between changes in nondonor revenues and the donations received by charter schools like the extensive empirical estimates of the effects of government grants on donations for other types of nonprofit firms we find evidence of crowding out with respect to our sample of charter schools we also find a significant positive effect of fundraising on donations with a 1 increase in fundraising associated to a 0 58 increase in donations a pattern consistent with overinvestment in fundraising enrollments exhibit a robust inverse relationship to changes in nondonor revenues jel h00 h32 h50

price floors and technical inefficiency in india s sugar processing industry in india cane is processed into sugar by cooperatives public enterprises and private for profit firms the indian government sets a unique floor price for each processor that is increasing in the firm s effectiveness in converting cane into sugar the floor price binds for public and private firms but not for cooperatives which rebate profits to members we argue that this price floor policy creates a disincentive for private and public firms to be technically efficient in converting cane to sugar in support of this hypothesis an analysis of 593 indian sugar factories from 1992 to 2007 reveals statistically significant differences in technical efficiency with cooperatives being the most efficient and public firms least efficient we estimate welfare losses due to the technical inefficiency attributable to the price floor policy and argue that it can be eliminated by enacting policy to base price floors upon quality of the cane input received by a factory

are two heads better than one monetary policy by committee two experiments were conducted to test the common hypothesis that groups make decisions more slowly than individuals one of these experiments imitates real life monetary policy decisions in both cases the hypothesis is found wanting groups are not slower than individuals in both experiments we also find that group decisions are on average better than individual decisions this holds regardless of whether the groups make decisions by unanimity or majority rule simple mechanical theories of group decisionmaking that the group follows its average player median player or best player do not explain the results group interactions seem to matter

managerial rewards and the behavior of for profit governmental and nonprofit organizations evidence from the hospital industry abstract studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers substantially less is known about differences among governmental religious nonprofit and secular nonprofit organizations we examine the compensation of hospital ceos to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives compensation levels the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives and the criteria organizations use to determine bonuses are analyzed we conclude that the ceo incentive contracts at religious nonprofit secular nonprofit and governmental hospitals imply substantive differences in the behavior of these organizations

the impact of technical change scale effects and forward ordering on u s fiber demands this paper estimates a complete system of input cost shares in u s textile production using time series data and a linear logit specification incorporating the impact of technical change and scale effects on derived demands for natural and manmade fibers the specification accounts for forward ordering dynamics in the textile industry technical change has decreased natural fiber use in u s textile mills in favor of manmade fibers decomposition analysis of economic factors affecting long run use of natural versus manmade fiber indicates that nonprice factors account for 70 of the decline in long run natural fiber use

agency problems and unrelated business income of non profit organizations an empirical analysis nonprofit organizations are traditionally assumed to dislike commercial activities in the usa they are however allowed to engage in commercial activities but the income they derive from these activities is then subject to the so called unrelated business income tax if npos do indeed dislike commercial income then why do they engage in these activities using a data set of 2103 us npos this study suggests that the presence of agency problems inside the organization can at least provide an explanation for the occurrence of unrelated business income

charity donations in the uk new evidence based on panel data abstract this paper presents a set of panel data estimates for 159 of the most prominent uk charities for the period 1983 1990 in evaluating alternative specifications we settle on a fixed effects estimation social welfare charities are shown to fund raise short of the point at which net revenues are maximized whereas health and overseas charities are found to net revenue maximize religious charities maximize total revenues estimates of price and fund raising elasticities are presented for charities overall and for four cohorts for alternative income sources no evidence of crowding out is found

has regulation of charitable foundations thrown the baby out with the bath water abstract regulations to curb tax avoidance and evasion through charitable foundations have been in place since the tax reform act of 1969 newly compiled longitudinal data makes it possible to estimate the effects of these regulations by comparing affected and unaffected foundations before and after the reform donations and entry dropped precipitously proxy variables suggest significant deterrence of abuses but half of the decline in donations can be explained by the increased cost of running a foundation the results highlight the potential for large reductions in the benefits of regulation when the cost of compliance affects externality producing actions such as charitable giving

the robustness of kingma s crowd out estimate evidence from new data on contributions to public radio we revisit kingma s kingma 1989 journal of political economy 97 1197 1207 widely cited study of charitable contributions to public radio kingma s estimate of partial but statistically significant crowd out remains a benchmark in the literature because he was able to match household level contributions data with station level data on revenue including revenue from government grants to the best of our knowledge no comparable data have become available until now we replicate kingma s estimates with the original data and then apply the same methodology to very similar data from 1996 kingma s estimates are not robust to the use of the newer data

private donations government grants commercial activities and fundraising cointegration and causality for ngos in international development cooperation ngos could help scale up foreign aid efforts by mobilizing private donations however fundraising activities do not necessarily result in higher donations and substitution effects between different sources of revenue may diminish the overall pool of ngos resources this paper examines the determinants of private donations to us based ngos engaged in international development cooperation we employ panel cointegration and causality techniques to analyze the interactions between private donations government grants commercial revenues and fundraising expenditures according to our results a marginal dollar spent on fundraising yields almost five dollars in new donations in the long run government grants crowd in private donations in the long run whereas commercial revenues crowd out donations in the long run moreover our panel vector error correction model reveals complex short run dynamics

do tax incentives affect charitable contributions evidence from public charities reported revenues this paper estimates the effect of the charitable contribution tax deduction on charities donation revenue from charities tax filings a one percent increase in the tax cost of giving causes charitable receipts to fall by about four percent an effect three times larger the consensus in the literature further analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in the tax response by subsector health care and home care are more tax sensitive than other charities while higher education and arts are less tax sensitive the results are consistent with substantial tax response heterogeneity within the sample and between sampled and unsampled charities implying that the mean tax elasticity of charitable contributions is a poor predictor of tax incentive effects for individual charities

balance sheet insolvency and contribution revenue in public charities abstract using form 990 data reported by public charities we document significant bunching of nonprofits at near zero net assets the threshold for insolvency bunching occurs despite the fact that creditors cannot force insolvent nonprofits into involuntary bankruptcy we show that the extent of bunching is greater among organizations that rely more heavily on contribution revenue and that by inflating their net assets bunching organizations are able to increase their contribution revenue relative to firms that report negative net assets charitable donors appear to use the net assets threshold as a heuristic for a charity s financial health nonprofit managers in turn respond to the preferences of their donors

impact of the 2014 suspension agreement on sugar between the united states and mexico in december 2014 the u s and mexico agreed to a suspension agreement that set a 22 25 cwt import price floor on u s sugar imports from mexico a partial equilibrium trade model was developed to estimate the economic impact the agreement would have had if it had been in effect from 2008 to 2014 in years when the price floor would have been binding on average u s producers would have gained 138 million and mexican producers would have lost 218 million however total mexican welfare would have actually increased by 11 5 million furthermore the average price floor that would have maximized total mexican welfare over that period is 22 76 cwt also under certain supply and demand elasticity conditions the average price floor that would have maximized joint u s and mexican producer welfare over that period is 21 91 cwt the latter two estimates are both close to the actual price floor agreed to in the 2014 suspension agreement

partners in giving the crowding in effects of uk government grants abstract this study examines the determinants of voluntary donations to uk charities using empirical specifications that combine error component and simultaneous equations methods in a series of tests we identify the one way fixed effects endogenous representation for government grants as the best empirical model when this endogeneity is taken into account government grants cause significant crowding in for the full sample and the two largest cohorts price coefficients are negative and fund raising coefficients are positive religion charities are net revenue maximizers whereas other charity cohorts fund raise short of net revenue maximization

impure altruism in dictators giving abstract we design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences by giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels we create an environment in which crowding out may occur we find that the behavior of 66 of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function

does negative advertising affect giving behavior evidence from campaign contributions abstract this paper contributes to a growing literature that explains why individuals contribute to political campaigns we build a panel dataset that follows contributors from primary to general elections to quantify the persistence of giving in political contests those who gave to winning candidates in the primary were most likely to contribute again in the general election next we use an instrumental variable strategy to document that within party negative advertising decreases the probability that individuals contribute to their preferred party in the general election regardless of whether they initially contributed to a winning or losing primary candidate

nonprofits with distributional objectives price discrimination and corner solutions abstract we characterize the patterns of pricing and rationing when paternalistic nonprofit organizations either private or governmental care about the level and distribution of consumer surplus provided to their clients equilibrium depends upon marginal cost the organization s distributional weights exogenous income levels and cream skimming by competing for profit firms in equilibrium some consumers pay their reservation price or a lower price above marginal cost some pay less than marginal cost some obtain the good for free and some are not permitted to buy the good at any acceptable price comparative statics here differs from that for output or profit maximizers with discontinuous price schedules shifting abruptly when exogenous income changes

how do nonprofit hospitals manage earnings abstract we hypothesize that unlike for profit firms nonprofit hospitals have incentives to manage earnings to a range just above zero we consider two ways managers can achieve this they can adjust discretionary spending hoerger t j 1991 profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals journal of health economics 10 259 289 and or they can adjust accounting accruals using the flexibility inherent in generally accepted accounting principles gaap to test our hypothesis we use regressions as well as tests of the distribution of earnings by burgstahler and dichev burgstahler d dichev i 1997 earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses journal of accounting and economics 24 99 126 on a sample of 1 204 hospitals and 8 179 hospital year observations our tests support the use of discretionary spending and accounting accrual management like hoerger 1991 we find evidence that nonprofit hospitals adjust discretionary spending to manage earnings however we also find significant use of discretionary accruals e g adjustments to the third party allowance and allowance for doubtful accounts to meet earnings objectives these findings have two important implications first the previous evidence by hoerger that nonprofit hospitals show less variation in income may at least partly be explained by an accounting phenomenon second our findings provide guidance to users of these financial statements in predicting the direction of likely bias in reported earnings

tax and expenditure limitations and the fiscal relationships between state and local governments this paper uses comprehensive data on state and local tax and spending limitations for forty nine states between 1976 and 1990 to estimate the effects of these limits on the fiscal relationships between state and local government results indicate that tax and spending limits on local governments are only partially effective in reducing revenues because political agents bypass limitations by transferring revenue reliance to unconstrained revenue sources or because unconstrained levels of government take on additional revenue responsibilities in particular the empirical analysis demonstrates that binding local government fiscal constraints are associated with reductions in local revenues and increases in state aid to local governments in contrast state government limitations are related to reductions in both state and local own source revenues

goodwill bazaar ngo competition and giving to development this paper builds a model of competition through fundraising between horizontally differentiated ngos ngos allocate their time resource between working on the project and fundraising which attracts private donations if the market size is fixed the fundraising levels increase with the number of ngos and the free entry equilibrium number of ngos can be larger or smaller than the socially optimal number depending on the efficiency of the fundraising technology if the market size is endogenous and ngos cooperate in attracting new donors fundraising levels decrease with the number of ngos and the free entry equilibrium number of ngos is smaller than the one that maximizes the welfare of donors and beneficiaries if ngos can divert funds for private use multiple equilibria with high diversion and no diversion of funds appear

would indian farmers benefit from liberalization of world cotton and sugar markets rich country support programs for cotton and sugar producers are frequently claimed to be detrimental for developing country farmers this study investigates whether a reduction in protectionist policies for organization for economic cooperation and development cotton and sugar producers would have a measurable effect on the welfare of indian farmers the fact that these sectors are intensively regulated within india might suggest that any such effect will be small however this study shows econometrically that prices in indian rural markets closely follow world prices and that indian farmers are flexible in the medium to long run in changing production according to price signals from these markets depending on the crop and the nature of liberalization producer surplus increases from 4 2 to 22 3 in the long run

price transmission asymmetric adjustment and threshold effects in the cotton supply chain a case study for vidarbha india this study examines price transmission asymmetries in vidarbha s india cotton supply chain from 2002 to 2012 the analysis takes account of thresholds in price adjustments toward their long run equilibrium the first stage considers the price dynamics between international and indian domestic cotton prices the second stage considers price transmission from domestic to farm gate cotton prices in vidarbha results from the first stage indicate that indian and international cotton markets are well integrated in contrast the second stage reveals significant threshold type nonlinearities as well as asymmetries in price transmission between domestic and farm gate prices the short run dynamics suggest that the pass through from domestic to farm gate prices is larger when domestic prices decrease than when they increase moreover back of the envelope calculations suggest that the loss in revenue for a typical farmer from a decrease in domestic price is larger than the gains from an increase in domestic price of the same magnitude the implication is that traders benefit from price fluctuations at the expense of farmers evidence from fieldwork in vidarbha suggest that asymmetries revealed in this analysis may be linked to trader s market power and inadequate market information among farmers

organizational structure and the optimal design of policymaking panels evidence from consensus group commissions revenue forecasts in the american states increasing both the size and diversity of policymaking panels is widely thought to enhance the accuracy of collective policy decisions this study advances the theoretical conditions in which improving collective accuracy necessitates an efficient trade off between a panel s size and its level of organizational diversity this substitution effect between these organizational characteristics is empirically supported with data on official general fund revenue forecasts made by consensus group cg independent commissions in the american states evidence of an asymmetric substitution effect is also uncovered whereby increasing organizational diversity in large cg commissions produces revenue forecasts that reduce collective accuracy by slightly more than three times as much compared to decreasing such diversity in small cg commissions this study underscores the limits of organizational diversity as a mechanism for improving collective judgments when policymaking authority is diffuse among many panel members