adapting contract theory to fit contract farming this article discusses the current state of contract theory and its usefulness for conceptualizing issues related to agricultural contracting i will discuss the limitations of existing theory for applied work and what methodological improvements are needed to enhance the usefulness of the theory to agricultural economists one pervasive problem is that the canonical economic literature on contracts is rather fragmented and the various methodological strands are narrow in their focus as such there is a need for agricultural economists to engage in methodological research to develop applied contracting models that can capture higher order features of real world agricultural contracts while delivering generalizable comparative statics predictions the need for such research is obvious as contracting continues to expand along the entire modern food marketing channel in the latter part of this article i develop a simple model to illustrate how classic methodological approaches can be combined with recent developments in contract and game theory to construct applied theory models that are useful for capturing some important features of agricultural contracts

strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts this paper characterizes equilibrium exclusionary contracts between buyers an incumbent firm and a potential entrant when buyers can either vertically integrate or contract with the outside entrant in this setting exclusionary contracts are generally shown to be efficient and to deter inefficient entry that would otherwise occur with multiple unorganized buyers equilibrium contracts are shown to take a divide and conquer form and in some cases to deter some efficient entry in such cases efficient contracting can be restored by a policy that prohibits price discrimination and gives agents free reign to sign exclusionary agreements copyright 1994 by american economic association

producer price risk and quality measurement risk averse farmers in the produce industry grow a product whose market price is often quite unpredictable shippers or other intermediaries shield the farmer from much of this price risk however actual contracts between growers and shippers vary considerably across commodities in the residual price risk growers face we hypothesize that imperfect quality measurement results in a moral hazard problem and that price provides additional information regarding quality as a consequence an efficient contract does not shield growers from all idiosyncratic price risk we examine this hypothesis for the case of fresh market tomatoes

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

capital requirements under the credit risk based framework abstract this work aims to study the hypothesis of lower capitalization of banks under the risk based rules introduced in basel ii in this sense an assessment of the impact of these rules on the capital requirements for non financial firms credit risk is performed a comparison with basel i is presented and intervals of variation for the risk drivers such that capital requirements exceed the ones under basel i are established data for a european country supports the hypothesis of a smaller capitalization of banks under the risk based framework as far as credit risk in concerned

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

a century of research on agricultural markets this article provides a perspective on major innovations in research on agricultural markets over the past century we review research on market structure and performance vertical coordination arrangements and institutions for producer collective action contributions to empirical modeling of agricultural price determination and marketing margins are also evaluated as are innovations in research on spatial market relationships and the role of storage finally we discuss contributions to understanding market information systems and the functioning of market based mechanisms for agri

incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm what have we learned over the past 25 years incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm what have we learned over the past 25 years

reputation and discretion in financial contracting the authors explain the use of legally unenforceable discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible a discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract it is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states in addition discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation this explains discretion among highly confident letters holding company relationships mutual fund contracts bank loan commitments and other financial and nonfinancial contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

contract enforcement social efficiency and distribution some experimental evidence we use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration we find that if a third party e g government perfectly enforces contracts social efficiency is enhanced we also find that when third party enforcement is imperfect social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts however opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers growers with ex post profits below reservation levels finally partial or one sided third party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects ability to use informal enforcement instruments

agricultural supply response under contract agricultural producers typically face considerable production and price risk in their operations as a result the role of risk in shaping farm level decisions has been the focus of much research e g moschini and hennessy but why do risk averse producers face such risk in a world of complete markets and perfect information a profit maximizing intermediary would provide full insurance to producers thus some aspect of the production and marketing of agricultural commodities must limit the scope for this type of insurance when considering reasons why growers of fresh produce might face price risk hueth and ligon suggest the possibility of unobserved actions in the provision of quality if quality cannot be measured perfectly and some downstream price contains information about a farmer s investment in quality then conditioning a grower s compensation on this price may help the intermediary to monitor farmer effort a similar argument holds in the case of production risk if unobserved actions influence yield an optimal compensation scheme might expose farmers to considerable production risk in order to provide incentive for high output this suggests that the type of intermediation available to farmers can have important consequences for the risks that farmers face previous analyses of the role of risk in producer decisions make one of two polar assumptions regarding intermediation either there is none e g sandmo leland or producers have access to an exogenously specified source of intermediation that may take the form of a futures market e g holthausen public or private insurance e g ramaswami babcock and hennessy or perhaps a particular government program e g lin chavas and holt although each of these analyses represent important contributions toward an understanding of how producers respond in different risk environments they are each silent on how the institutions themselves

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

relational contracts and the value of relationships this article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known i consider a principal agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option i show that if the principal has the bargaining power she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power the principal wants to overstate her outside option to capture more surplus i characterize how information is revealed how the relationship evolves and how this depends on bargaining power jel c78 d82 d83 d86

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

regulating broiler contracts tournaments versus fixed performance standards grower discontent with tournaments as mechanisms for settling poultry contracts can largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers this article focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to prevent integrator companies from using tournaments and replace them with schemes that compare performance to a fixed standard the analysis shows that the mandatory replacement of tournaments with fixed performance standards absent any rules that regulate the magnitude of the piece rate can decrease grower income insurance without raising welfare however replacing tournaments with fixed performance standards can simultaneously increase income insurance and welfare provided that the magnitude of the piece rate is also regulated

broiler production contracts as a multi agent problem common risk incentives and heterogeneity the broiler industry presents two puzzles regarding production contracts why do processors control growers inputs and why do they use a statistically insufficient estimator to calculate growers compensation this paper provides an agency theoretic framework that explains these puzzles in terms of processors response to grower heterogeneity and production risk and to grower risk aversion processors control inputs to reduce the information rents paid to agents by forcing agents to bear additional income risk through the use of an imprecise estimator processors can increase profits due to the combined moral hazard adverse selection nature of the informational problem

producer protection legislation and termination damages in the presence of contracting frictions this study models producer protection legislation ppl that would grant growers the right to claim damages if their contracts are prematurely terminated in the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes producer protection legislation damages ppld would not be distortionary or redistributive if contracting frictions exist then ppld would have efficiency and redistributive effects though the direction and magnitude depends on the size of ppl damages vis a vis expected damages under existing contract law this study clarifies the conditions under which ppld would decrease efficiency and protect growers

valuing dealers informational advantage a study of canadian treasury auctions in many financial markets dealers have the advantage of observing the orders of their customers to quantify the economic benefit that dealers derive from this advantage we study detailed data from canadian treasury auctions where dealers observe customer bids while preparing their own bids in this setting dealers can use information on customer bids to learn about i competition that is the distribution of competing bids in the auction and ii fundamentals that is the ex post value of the security being auctioned we devise formal hypothesis tests for both sources of informational advantage in our data we do not find evidence that dealers are learning about fundamentals we find that the information about competition contained in customer bids accounts for 13 27 of dealers expected profits

the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games experimental evidence 1 for example in infinitely repeated prisoner s dilemma games with patient agents both cooperate and defect may be played in equilibrium even though the theory of infinitely repeated games has been used to explain cooperation in a variety of environments no definitive solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection when both cooperation and defection are possible equilibrium outcomes which one should we expect to prevail previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a specific equilibrium when they play a small number of infinitely repeated games some subjects attempt to establish cooperative agreements while others defect but how would behavior evolve as subjects learn from previous repeated games would cooperation prevail when it can be supported in equilibrium or will subjects learn

agricultural markets as relative performance evaluation relative performance schemes such as tournaments are commonly used in markets for a variety of livestock and processing commodities while explicit versions of these schemes are rarely used in markets for fresh fruits and vegetables and specialty grains we show how contracts for these latter commodities do in fact provide relative performance incentives albeit indirectly via a payment mechanism that depends on market prices in such contracts compensation is often an increasing function of revenue this implements a relative performance scheme by making each grower s payment an increasing function of his own output but a decreasing function of other s output in an important 1982 article holmstr om models the problem facing a group of agents each of whom produces an observable quantity of some good by taking an unobservable action a rather robust conclusion from this line of inquiry is that when the production of one agent is not independent of the production of another then the compensation awarded to the first agent should depend not only on his own production but also on the output of others in particular if agents production is positively correlated because of some common shock for example then an agent s compensation should be larger when other agents output is smaller a phenomenon which holmstr om terms relative performance evaluation relative performance evaluation ought to be particularly important for agricultural producers and the various intermediaries who purchase their output these producers face considerable common risk from aggregate production shocks and so one would expect that relative performance evaluation could improve efficiency in fact certain types of agricultural intermediaries do use explicit relative performance schemes as predicted by