the impact of land use planning and tax subsidies on the supply and price of housing in britain this article presents new empirical estimates of the impact of two types of policy intervention tax subsidies and land use planning on the housing market in britain the estimates are derived from a set of models representing the demand and supply sides of the market for the new private housebuilding which include an explicit land supply element the models are fitted to cross sectional data at the inter urban local authority level and then employed in medium period simulations of alternative policies modelling at this level enables estimates to be made of the extent of variation between local markets in the elasticity of supply and also in the impacts of policy measures including the capitalisation of tax subsidies

urban land prices and housing distribution monopolistic competition and the myth of the law of differential rent the currently dominant neoclassical models of urban ground rents and housing distribution as well as recent alternatives along neoricardian or ricardian marxian lines display major weaknesses which

international antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact this article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities we are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship the interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration we compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination

housing price land supply and revenue from land sales in a recent study peng and wheaton empirically examine the effect of restrictive land supply on hong kong house prices however we argue that the impact of the supply of new land by the hong kong government is not as important as they maintain in accounting for the volatile house prices in hong kong we show that there is no causal relationship between land supply and housing prices our estimations based on the annual data of hong kong s public land sales find that the government acts to maximise land revenue maximisation of revenue from land sales is however consistent with the efficient allocation of resources we also show that the amount of land sales by the government and land in developers land banks tend to decrease when market interest rates increase land banking behaviour is governed by economic conditions long term land holding costs should cover interest costs

absenteeism as a mechanism for approaching an optimal labor market equilibrium an empirical study this research examines absence as a response to a non optimal labor market equilibrium its basic premise is that workers may be using absenteeism to move themselves closer to an optimal equilibrium in situations where due to greater than desiredwork hours the workers marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure mrs is less than the wage rate for the last hour worked this notion is tested for a sample of workers using tobit analysis with individual data from company records on absence and wages and an empirical measure of each worker s mrs the results indicate a significant positive relationship between absence and the difference between a worker s mrs and wage

social interaction effects in disability pension participation evidence from plant downsizing we estimate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension participation among older workers in norway the problem of omitted variable bias is addressed using the exposure of an individual s neighbors to plant downsizing events as an instrument for the disability entry rate among the individual s previously employed neighbors our instrumental variable iv estimates suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent four year entry rate of older workers by about 0 4 percentage points numerous robustness and specification tests appear to support the validity of the identifying assumption in our iv strategy

strategic control of growth in a system of cities abstract this paper provides an analysis of the supply restriction model of growth controls growth controls in such a model harm consumers while enriching landowners and they will only be adopted if landowners have political power in the model this power is manifested in the city government s use of a social welfare that takes both landlord and consumer welfare into account since cities cannot be small if the supply restriction inherent in growth controls is to have an impact strategic interactions must be considered in the analysis of city choices a general model is presented and an extended example based on leontief preferences is then considered comparative static analysis of nash equilibria in the leontief case shows that perturbations of preferences or other characteristics of a single city can have important spillover effects that alter the choices of all cities in the region

optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority the dynamic behavior of a price fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed consistent with preceding static theories the cartel s steady state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection however contrary to those theories it is independent of the level of fixed fines it is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages

controlling the housing land market some examples from europe summary one major problem for the production of low cost housing in the uk is the continued lack of control over the market for housing land yet there is very little debate about ways of controlling land prices this paper assesses some alternative approaches to land use planning by focusing on high growth sub regions in britain france and sweden it examines the flexibility of these planning systems to changes in the demand for housing land and the relationship between land release land prices and house prices the paper argues that the british approach is subject to a high level of uncertainty exacerbating risk taking speculative behaviour and price inflation under the french system development uncertainty is reduced and house prices more rigidly controlled with the result that speculative behaviour is constrained the swedish system is dependent on the ability of local authorities to build up land reserves which act as a buffer against price inflation however pressure on land prices in the open market has made this approach increasingly hard to sustain

new supply and price dynamics in the singapore housing market in this paper var models are employed to trace the price response of existing houses to the quantity of new units launched by homebuilders in singapore between 1996 and 2009 contrary to the competition hypothesis prediction of a negative reaction it is found that marginal supply granger cause existing house prices in a positive manner the effect is robust to the inclusion of exogenous demand factors as well as price interaction in the primary new houses and secondary existing houses market segments the contagion effect is consistent with the hypothesis that developers due to their ability to predict the market are price leaders in the housing market it is also found that homebuilders exhibit herding behaviour in mimicking each other s timing on when to market their new residential projects

the costs of worker displacement this study identifies part of the social loss attendant upon displacement as the remaining value of the assets specific to the severed employment relationship a bargaining model is used to link wage tenure profiles to the amount of information firms and workers possess about the duration of that relationship if information is good the profile will flatten as displacement approaches using psid data for workers separated between 1977 and 1981 wage tenure profiles are found not to change this suggests that either workers or both firms and workers are surprised by the displacement the present value of that part of the social loss attributable to the worker s share of firm specific capital is around 7 000 1980 dollars

absenteeism and wages abstract we show that for assembly line type production processes a worker s wage is a sharply decreasing function of his probability of being absent absenteeism causes firms to hire redundant workers we also define the marginal product of assembly line workers

are risk aversion and impatience related to cognitive ability is the way that people make risky choices or tradeoffs over time related to cognitive ability this paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability risk aversion and impatience using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible measures we conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion and impatience over an annual time horizon for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1 000 german adults subjects also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability which correspond to sub modules of one of the most widely used iq tests interviews are conducted in subjects own homes we find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion and more pronounced impatience these relationships are significant and robust to controlling for personal characteristics educational attainment income and measures of credit constraints we perform a series of additional robustness checks which help rule out other possible confounds

global cartels leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation in this paper we analyze cartel formation and self reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions we are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies when international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated multi market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more effectively we then discuss the effects of information sharing among antitrust authorities as a function of how much and which type of information is exchanged we show that extensive information sharing might have an adverse effect on self reporting by cartel members

absenteeism efficiency wages and shirking we investigate the absence behaviour of workers when there is asymmetric information regarding worker health an individual s health is assumed to be private information to that individual and only observable to a third party at cost our aim is to complement the existing largely empirical studies of absence behaviour which have tended to treat the phenomenon exclusively as a labour supply decision on the part of workers cf allen 1981 barmby and treble 1991 barmby orme and treble 1991 and dunn and youngblood 1986 our approach is to draw out the interactive aspects of the employment relationship we assume that workers are ex ante uncertain as to their state of health and supply labour on the basis of an all or nothing utility maximising decision taken once a realisation of this state has been received utility is a function of income leisure and health and workers value leisure more the sicker they are firms are able to exert some control over individual behaviour by monitoring workers and threatening to fire shirkers that is workers absenting themselves with unacceptable sickness our model highlights an efficiency wage effect through which wages may be used as a method of absence control in particular the optimal response of the firm to an increase in the cost of monitoring is to discourage shirking by raising wages furthermore to the extent that

multi market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement this paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand related markets we show that cartel prosecution can have a knock on effect bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break up of the cartel in the adjacent market cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets we discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus explore antitrust spillovers the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms

do financial bonuses reduce employee absenteeism evidence from a lottery this paper investigates the effectiveness of a lottery based bonus reward system in reducing employee absenteeism starting in june 2002 a dutch manufacturing firm held a monthly lottery for workers who had taken no sick leave in the previous three months and had not previously won the lottery in a given lottery each of seven contestants whose names were randomly drawn received 75 euros the authors find statistically significant differences in absence patterns across groups of workers with different eligibility statuses depending on their attendance records and whether they had previously won one finding is that absenteeism rose among workers who having won already were ineligible for further participation nevertheless and although the reduction in firm wide absence associated with the lottery drifted from 2 4 percentage points to 1 1 percentage points after seven months the authors conclude that the lot tery was of net benefit to the firm a perennial question is how firms can most effectively use financial incentives to motivate workers and thereby boost pro ductivity in this paper we investigate this issue with respect to workplace absenteeism which is a measure of lost productivity 1 we

taxing education in ramsey s tradition abstract assuming a two period model with endogenous choices of labour education and saving it is shown to be second best efficient to deviate from ramsey s rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour furthermore if the earnings function displays constant elasticity the choice of education should not be distorted with the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity

estimating neighbourhood effects in house prices towards a new hedonic model approach a hedonic equation considers ols models with independently and identically distributed errors however quality of property and location tend to exhibit highly auto regressive correlation due to spatial dependence and heterogeneity a modification is made to multiple regression analysis based on the land rent concept so that the modified hedonic house price function can be determined this paper develops a stochastic approach which is able to correct autocorrelation bias in the hedonic function others tend to model the spatial autocorrelation through the error terms while this study models it through the constant term the sample was orientated by location to reflect the neighbourhood effects thus the neighbourhood effects can be separated from the random disturbance our model using data from hong kong incorporates adjustments reflecting net floor area ratio age floor level views transport accessibility and amenities such as availability of recreational facilities the stochastic model is a more

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

leniency programs for multimarket firms the effect of amnesty plus on cartel formation we examine the effect of amnesty plus on dynamic cartel formation in a multimarket setting the amnesty plus program has been adopted as part of the us corporate leniency policy in 1999 and is now vigorously advertised as one of the most compelling tools in generating successful cartel investigations amnesty plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms convicted in one market to report their collusive agreements in other markets we show that amnesty plus has two opposite effects on firms ability and incentives to collude which are both increasing in the fine reduction granted first amnesty plus can reduce the deterrence of cartel activities by making it easier for firms to sustain multimarket collusion through strategies involving self reporting after a first cartel detection second it can reduce the expected duration of cartels or delay their formation by increasing firms incentives to self report after a first cartel detection

absenteeism in a medium sized manufacturing plant 1991 absenteeism in a medium sized manufacturing plant applied economics vol 23 no 1 pp 161 166

parental job loss and children s school performance using norwegian register data we estimate how children s school performance is affected by their parents exposure to plant closure our estimates suggest that paternal job loss has a negative effect on children s school performance in contrast maternal job loss is associated with a non significant increase in school performance importantly the negative effect of paternal job loss appears largely unrelated to its effect on father s income father s employment status a shift in maternal time towards employment marital dissolution and residential relocation a disparate effect of job loss across fathers and mothers is however consistent with recent empirical studies documenting that the mental distress experienced by displaced workers is generally more severe for men than women

price fixing the probability of getting caught the authors estimate the probability that a price fixing conspiracy will be indicated by federal authorities to be at most between 0 13 and 0 17 in a given year the authors estimate is based on conspiracy durations calculated from data reported for a large sample of department of justice cases and a statistical birth and death process model describing the onset and duration of conspiracies copyright 1991 by mit press

the price of worker reliability abstract worker absenteeism is costly to firms that use assembly line production processes this paper shows why an assembly line firm may prefer to pay higher average wages and reduce sick pay entitlement relative to firms with constant returns

organizational change absenteeism and welfare dependency based on norwegian register data we set up a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model mmph to analyze nurses pattern of work sickness absence nonemployment and social insurance dependency from 1992 to 2000 and how that pattern was affected by workplace characteristics the model is estimated by means of the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator npmle we find that downsizing processes involve a significant increase in the level of sickness absence among still employed nurses they also cause a significant increase in the probability of entering into more long lasting health related social insurance dependency

cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection the cartel may either i gradually raise price to its steady state level or ii gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady state level antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices

collusion between two sided platforms abstract we study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market and whether users single home or multi home our most striking result is that one sided collusion leads to lower resp higher prices on the collusive resp competitive side if the cross group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong one sided collusion may therefore benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

the impact of leniency and whistle blowing programs on cartels antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements these programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion we compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals including firm employees can deter collusion in a more effective way we discuss possible adverse effects of whistle blowing programs on firms behavior and particularly on turnover incentives to innovate and cooperation we also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence

market structure and the price of housing services while many aspects of housing markets have been extensively analysed little empirical work has been undertaken on the supply of housing services despite this dearth of information many researchers have characterised the supply of housing as being competitive it is the intent of this article therefore to open up the discussion of the supply of housing services and to examine the extent of sellers market concentration over a set of multifamily rental housing submarkets new data on sellers concentration are presented a model to determine the effect of non competitive firm behaviour on the price of housing services is specified and estimated results support the hypothesis that the supply of housing services may not be perfectly competitive

is urban land price adjustment more sluggish than housing price adjustment empirical evidence this article hypothesises that due to factors such as thin trading and lack of publicly available data on transactions in the land market urban land prices react more sluggishly to shocks in market fundamentals than housing prices do based on a vector error correction model utilising quarterly data for the helsinki metropolitan area in finland over 1988q1 2008q2 the empirical analysis provides support for this hypothesis in particular the results suggest that new information regarding the market fundamentals is more rapidly reflected in housing prices than in land prices nevertheless it is the housing price level instead of land prices that adjusts towards a cointegrating long run equilibrium between housing prices land prices and construction costs

housing vacancy and rental adjustment evidence from hong kong the traditional rental adjustment equation is flawed in that the equilibrium paths for the adjustment of rents and vacancy rates cannot hold simultaneously over time this paper suggests a two equation model of rental adjustments based on adaptive expectations rather than the single equation model presented in the traditional literature and provides empirical tests annual data from the housing market in hong kong during the 1980 96 period are consistent with the adjustment equation the results also show that the rate of change of real rents is neutral with respect to inflation

an examination of the monopoly zoning hypothesis there have been several studies that have investigated the effect of zoning on housing prices one hypothesis is that the restrictiveness of zoning laws will vary with the monopoly power of a town the degree of monopoly power varies with the number of towns in the urban area urban areas with few zoning jurisdictions are likely to have higher housing prices than more fragmented urban areas previous research on this topic has shown mixed results the results in this article suggest that towns with more monopoly power do tend to have significantly higher housing prices than more fragmented urban areas

sick of being unemployed interactions between unemployment and sickness insurance this paper examines the incentive effects of interactions between unemployment insurance ui and sickness insurance si two important components of sweden s social insurance system the main topic is how the sickness report rate among the unemployed is affected by i the limit of 300 workdays for ui benefits and ii the difference in maximum compensation between ui and si benefits results obtained by duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the ui benefit expiration date approaches there is also evidence of an incentive effect on the sick report rate because si offers higher compensation than ui

on interdependent supergames multimarket contact concavity and collusion abstract following bernheim and whinston 1990 this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms ability to collude real world imperfections tend to make firms objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent firms payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others then multimarket contact always facilitates collusion it may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any the effects of conglomeration are discussed multigame contact is shown to facilitate cooperation in supergames other than oligopolies as long as agents objective function is submodular in material payoffs journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13 l21

the determination of the price of land received theories of the land market are inadequate since they ignore the supply of land it is known that occupiers of land are usually unwilling to sell at the market price but require compensation for being forced to move incorporating this as a theory of supply into land market theory allows us to explain or predict that a urban sprawl will occur in the absence of planning controls b a development gains tax will slow down the rate of development of land and increase its price c whether land is owner occupied or occupied by tenants will affect its development and d powers of compulsory purchase may be necessary for certain kinds of development but may cause social costs

contestability vs competition once more baumol willig and other advocates of contestability theory continue to urge the idea not only for its insights but also as a clear basis for many antitrust and regulatory decisions yet the limits of the theory remain the three key assumptions are extremely strict and two of them are in mutual conflict the theory is not robust to imperfections in order to displace effective competition with contestability baumol must adopt a sequence of implausible propositions which unfortunately have little analytical or empirical basis

the supply of land the supply of land to a use may result from individual suppliers maximizing utility as a consequence the slope of the supply curve cannot be determined a priori supply will be influenced by the distribution of non land income different tenure categories will behave according to the balance of substitution and welfare effects compulsory purchase may be necessary to surmount individual preferences and the effect of a development gains tax on change of use will depend upon the relation between the rate of tax the tax base and the supplier s compensating variation

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

optimal corporate leniency programs this study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward it is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony