the macroeconomic consequences of raising the minimum wage capital accumulation employment and the wage distribution we study the quantitative impact of a rise in the minimum wage on macroeconomic outcomes such as employment the stock of capital and the distribution of wages our modeling framework is the large firm search and matching model our comparative statics are in line with previous empirical findings a moderate increase in the minimum wage barely affects employment while it compresses the wage distribution and generates positive spillovers on higher wages the model also predicts an increase in the stock of capital next we perform the policy experiment of introducing a 10 dollar minimum wage our results suggest large positive effects on capital 4 0 and output 1 8 with a decrease in employment by 2 8 the introduction of a 9 dollar minimum wage would instead produce similar effects on capital accumulation without harming employment

organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining comment the authors consider a wide number of applications of an intrafirm bargaining game within organizations where employees and the firm engage in wage negotiations under their presumption that contracts cannot bind employees to the organization the resulting stable wage and profit profiles give rise to an objective function for the firm that places weight on inframarginal profits in an economically significant manner the authors in turn employ this methodology to explore applications of organizational design hiring and capital decisions training and cross training the importance of labor and asset specificity managerial hierarchies preferences for unionization responses to competition and internal capital budgeting copyright 1996 by american economic association

destination competitiveness challenges a ugandan perspective this paper analyses and explicates the limiting role of multiple and varied challenges in the realisation of a country s tourism potential using uganda as an exemplar two objectives are pursued one that entails an assessment of the competitive potential of uganda s tourism and another an explication of the challenges that limit its full realisation the study is based on secondary data supplemented through in depth interviews with some key informants in ugandan tourism the paper identifies disparities in destination product and demand patterns inadequate marketing budgets in the face of a persistent negative image and inadequate institutional and managerial capabilities as key challenges it concludes that the complexity of challenges faced by uganda a non traditional destination makes the notion of competitive advantage used in conventional strategy and tourism destinations competitiveness literature seem inappropriate this has implications for tourism development and management in such destinations with particular focus on resource allocation and utilisation

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

wage compression within the firm evidence from an indexation scheme we revisit the role of labour market institutions by showing how they affect the sharing of firm specific rents between employers and employees we look at an italian wage indexation mechanism scala mobile that compressed the distribution of wages imposing real wage increases at the bottom of the distribution after developing a simplified version of a search model with intra firm bargaining and on the job search we document that skilled workers received lower wage adjustments when employed at firms with many unskilled workers and they tended to move towards more skill intensive firms moreover the system drove the least skill intensive firms out of the market

competition for jobs in a growing economy and the emergence of dualism we aim to explain the rising share of short term employment in europe using a matching model with growth we find that a slow down in growth of labour productivity leads to the emergence of temporary short term jobs that explains their increasing share in total employment lower growth rates also shift the beveridge curve to the right and weaken the bargaining position of workers these effects generate a relation between growth and unemployment which can be negative when the adverse effect of growth on wage setting dominates over its positive effect on labour demand in addition higher population growth increases the share of temporary jobs and unemployment finally the often blamed firing costs are found to be neutral when there is no floor on wages

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

cross sectional efficiency and labour hoarding in a matching model of unemployment we study positive and normative aspects of steady state equilibrium in a market where firms of endogenous size experience idiosyncratic shocks and undergo a costly search process to hire their workers the stylized model we propose highlights interactions between job security provisions and sectoral shocks in determining the natural rate of unemployment the allocation of labour and the extent of labour hoarding and rationalizes cross sectional asymmetries of gross employment flows at the firm level in our model where productivity and search costs are dynamically heterogeneous across firms decentralized wage bargains imply important cross sectional inefficiencies which overshadow the static search inefficiencies on which simpler models focus

the union threat this paper studies the impact of unions on wage inequality output and unemployment to do so it proposes a search and matching model of union formation in which unions arise endogenously through a voting process within firms in a union firm workers bargain their wages collectively in a nonunion firm each worker bargains individually with the firm because of this wage setting asymmetry a union lowers the profit of a firm and compresses the wage distribution of the workers furthermore to prevent unionization nonunion firms distort their hiring decisions in a way that also lowers the dispersion of wages after being calibrated on the united states the model shows that even though a partial equilibrium estimate would predict a small impact of unions on inequality removing the threat of unionization increases the variance of wages substantially completely outlawing unions increases wage inequality further moreover outlawing unions increases welfare and output and lowers unemployment these results suggest that even with a small membership unions might have a significant impact on the economy through general equilibrium mechanisms and the way they distort firms decisions i am greatly indebted to nobuhiro kiyotaki esteban rossi hansberg and oleg itskhoki for their invaluable advice and support throughout this project special thanks go to esteban for suggesting the title i also wish to thank manuel amador orley ashenfelter francisco buera jeff campbell pablo fajgelbaum henry farber baris kaymak david lee thomas lemieux benjamin moll justinas pelenis edouard schaal andrew shephard christopher sims liz tennant as well as seminar participants at princeton university and the chicago fed rookie seminar for helpful comments and suggestions i gratefully acknowledge financial support from the fonds quebecois de recherche sur la societe et la culture email mtascher princeton edu address 001 fisher hall department of economics princeton university princeton nj 08544 for the most recent version go to http sites google com site mathtd

the effectiveness of hiring credits this article analyses the effectiveness of hiring credits using comprehensive administrative data we show that the french hiring credit implemented during the great recession had significant positive employment effects and no effects on wages relying on the quasi experimental variation in labour cost triggered by the hiring credit we estimate a structural search and matching model simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features it was non anticipated temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages we estimate that the cost per job created by permanent hiring credits either countercyclical or time invariant in an environment with flexible wages would have been much higher

worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation a strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party the firm has to reac h agreements with the other two each of which is a group of workers in the prebargaining stage the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately the main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production the analysis also considers possibilities for firm s strategic intervention in the unionization process copyright 1988 by royal economic society

a theory of wages and labor demand with intra firm bargaining and matching frictions this article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within firm strategic bargaining we yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital the solution exhibits overemployment we show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power similarly the hold up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital beyond the neo classical analysis firms are the field of several strategic interactions between capital owners and labor between marginal employees and incumbents and more generally between different groups with various bargaining positions within the firm it is usually considered that the bargaining power of workers entails an employment level that is lower than in a competitive labor market and any increase in the bargaining power of workers raises unemployment these results are true for a wide class of models and notably in the now standard framework to analyze unemployment namely search and matching models of pissarides 2000 however stole and zwiebel 1996a 1996b show that the above results are totally changed in the intra firm bargaining model where employees engage in individual wage negotiation with the firm in fact under the assumption that contract incompleteness does not enable either party to commit to future wages and employment decisions they show that intra firm bargaining yields no rent for employees and gives rise to overemployment compared to a competitive labor market the basic idea of stole and zwiebel is that a firm with a diminishing marginal productivity of labor can decrease the bargained wage which increases in the marginal productivity of labor by raising employment in stole and zwiebel s setting firms overemploy strategically up to the point where workers get their reservation wage

evaluating the performance of the search and matching model abstract does the search and matching model fit aggregate u s labor market data while the model has become an important tool of macroeconomic analysis recent literature pointed to some significant failures in accounting for the data this paper aims to answer two questions i does the model fit the data and if so on what dimensions ii does the data fit the model i e what are the data which are relevant to be explained by the model the analysis shows that the model fits certain specifications of the data on many dimensions though not on all this includes capturing the high persistence and high volatility of most of the key variables the negative co variation of unemployment and vacancies and the behavior of the worker job finding rate a key role in this fit is played by the convexity of hiring costs and the stochastic properties of the separation rate the latter is a major component of the rate discounting the future value of the job worker match the paper offers a workable empirically grounded version of the model for the analysis of aggregate u s labor market dynamics

sunk capital unions and the hold up problem theory and evidence from cross country sectoral data abstract in this paper we study the hold up problem by considering the effect of union bargaining power on the level of investment per worker across sectors characterised by different levels of sunk capital investment we develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous sectors and ex post collective wage bargaining and test the predictions of the model using a difference in difference approach on manufacturing sector data in a set of oecd countries during the period 1980 2000 we find that union power reduces investment per worker particularly in sunk capital intensive industries we refine our empirical analysis showing that the underlying hold up problem is exacerbated when strikes are not regulated after a collective contract is signed and there is no arbitration while the presence of social pacts may sustain cooperative equilibria that alleviate the hold up problem our results are robust to a series of controls and possible endogeneity of union power

financial asset demand is elastic evidence from new issues of federal home loan bank debt abstract we estimate the slope of the demand curve for newly auctioned fhlb discount notes and investigate the impacts of arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs on demand elasticity our unique dataset of roughly 2900 observations of two price quantity pairs the first from a pre auction dealer survey the second from actual auction results provides the quantity shift necessary to identify demand in contrast to previous findings of downward sloping demand curves for equities we show that demand for newly issued fhlb notes is nearly perfectly elastic during normal market conditions we find however that frictions like arbitrage risk and to a lesser extent heterogeneity of investor beliefs negatively affect elasticity and explain the nearly 50 drop in elasticity observed during the recent financial crisis

on the timing and efficiency of creative destruction we analyze the timing pace and efficiency of ongoing job reallocation that results from product and process innovation there are strong reasons why an efficient economy ought to concentrate both job creation and destruction during recessions when the opportunity cost of reallocation is lowest incomplete contracting between labor and capital can disrupt this synchronized pattern and decouple creation and destruction transactional difficulties also lead to technological sclerosis characterized by excessively slow renovation government incentives to production may alleviate high unemployment but exacerbate sclerosis in contrast creation incentives increase the pace of reallocation an optimal combination of both policies restores economic efficiency

urban spatial structure transport related emissions and welfare in this paper we study the effects of urban design on pollution and welfare we build a theoretical model of residential choices with pollution externalities arising from commuting where the size of the central business district cbd and the demand for housing are endogenous we show that a polycentric city is desirable from welfare and ecological perspective provided that travel speed and or the number of roads directly connected with the cbd are sufficiently high the spatial extension of cities remains the critical variable to curb transport related urban pollution

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

employment and distributional effects of restricting working time we study the employment and distributional effects of regulating reducing working time in a general equilibrium model with search matching frictions job creation entails fixed costs but existing jobs are subject to diminishing returns we characterize the equilibrium in the de regulated economy where firms and individual workers freely negotiate wages and hours then we consider the effects of a legislation restricting the maximum working time while we let wages respond endogenously employment effects are sensitive to the representation of preferences in our benchmark small reductions in working time starting from the laissez faire equilibrium solution always result in a small increase in the equilibrium employment while larger reductions reduce employment the regulation benefits workers both unemployed and employed even if wages decrease and even in cases where employment falls but reduces profits and output

a theory of the firm with non binding employment contracts this paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power vis a vis the firm although they are not unionized the main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers the paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm s workforce the analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions the main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria the profit maximizing and stationa ry equilibria the unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient it exhibits inefficient over employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers reservation wage it confirms earlier results derived by stole and zwiebel 1996a b in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities in contrast in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark up over the reservation wage

efficiency wages revisited the internal reference perspective the missing wage rigidity in general equilibrium models of e ciency wages is an artifact of the external wage reference perspective conventionally adopted by the literature e ciency wage models based on an internal perspective in which the wage reference is made dependent on the flrm s ability to pay are capable of generating strong wage rigidity this paper makes the point in the context of the gift exchange framework originally proposed by akerlof 1982 jel classiflcation e24 e32 j50

labor and the market value of the firm what role does labor play in a firm s market value we explore this question using a production based asset pricing model with frictions in the adjustment of both capital and labor we posit that hiring of labor is akin to investment in capital and that the two interact with the interaction being a crucial determinant of the time series behavior of market value we use aggregate u s corporate sector data to estimate firms optimal hiring and investment decisions and the consequences for firms value the model generates a good fit of the data we decompose the estimated market value thereby quantifying the link between firms value and gross hiring flows employment gross investment flows and physical capital we find that a conventional specification quadratic adjustment costs for capital and no hiring costs performs poorly hiring and investment flows unlike employment and capital stocks are volatile and both are essential to account for market value volatility a key result is that firms value embodies the value of hiring and investment over and above the capital stock