party system institutionalization and government formation in new democracies party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment stability in party systems ensures the presence of regularities that can be observed in government formation but most empirical research focuses on established democracies in new democracies party systems are less institutionalized which means that interactions between parties can be unpredictable and has significant implications for coalition formation this article presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design comparable to that of the leading research on western europe the author uses a new data set of potential coalitions in central and eastern europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized the results show first that incumbency is a disadvantage for governments in new democracies when formation occurs postelection this disadvantage is due to high levels of electoral volatility caused by policy failure and clientelistic practices incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place midterm as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative second the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition instead programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities and third established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation a possible indicator that a party system is becoming more institutionalized the article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions

the economics of export performance requirements this paper analyzes the resource allocation and welfare effects of export performance requirements imposed on foreign investors it argues that a satisfactory analysis must consider the presence of tariff distortions and oligopolistic behavior in host country markets these create a second best environment in which an evaluation of the welfare effects of such requirements is no longer straightforward it is concluded that export requirements can improve home welfare by reducing payments to foreign capital reducing the output of commodities which are being overproduced and shifting profits toward domestically owned firms

restricted perception equilibria and rational expectation equilibrium abstract this paper studies a cobweb economy in which agents make decisions using a misspecified model of their stochastic environment specifically the agents model of the price process is restricted to be a moving average of order q ma q minimizing the mean square of their forecast error we prove existence and uniqueness of this ma q optimal equilibrium and we show that as q goes to infinity the ma q optimal equilibrium converges in mean square towards the rational expectations equilibrium the speed of convergence is dictated by the persistence of the underlying exogenous process lastly we show that when all other agents use the correctly specified model the misspecified ma q model can provide accurate forecasts this suggests that if agents have to pay for their forecasting model and if the correctly specified model is more costly a situation in which all agents use the correctly specified model might not be an equilibrium

party systems and electoral volatility in latin america a test of economic institutional and structural explanations three different theoretical explanations are tested for the exceptionally high level of electoral volatility found in contemporary latin america economic voting institutional characteristics of political regimes and party systems and the structure and organization of class cleavages a pooled cross sectional time series regression analysis is conducted on 58 congressional elections and 43 presidential elections in 16 latin american countries during the 1980s and 1990s institutional variables have the most consistent effect on volatility while the influence of economic performance is heavily contingent upon the type of election and whether the dependent variable is operationalized as incumbent vote change or aggregate electoral volatility the results demonstrate that electoral volatility is a function of short term economic perturbations the institutional fragilities of both democratic regimes and party systems and relatively fluid cleavage structures

public venture capital and party institutionalization funding of parties is common and controversial in new democracies nonetheless the nascent literature about the effects of money in new party systems largely sidesteps the issue of public funding

institutions and legacies electoral volatility in the postcommunist world the postcommunist states of eastern europe and the former soviet union have witnessed levels of electoral volatility higher than both western europe and latin america levels that have deleterious

social changes in impressionable years and adult political attitudes evidence from jewish expulsions in nazi germany this study provides evidence that individuals who grew up during the 1930 s jewish expulsions are less likely to show interest and participate in politics the estimates imply that at the mean individuals in their impressionable ages at the time of the expulsions are about 13 less likely to be interested in politics and 26 less likely to participate in politics these results are not found for individuals who were older at the time of the expulsions nor for those growing up during world war wwii results are robust to fixed region and birth year characteristics various definitions of impressionable ages and composition bias induced by differential migration and mortality rates across regions and cohorts the estimates are also not driven by other regional differences in 1930 s political participation party support catholic share exposure and destruction during wwii urbanization and other regional characteristics we provide evidence that the adverse effects on political attitudes we find are explained by a model of political participation emphasizing the role of civic skills and socioeconomic status acquired at younger ages exposure to the expulsions when young is associated with lower adult volunteerism trust church attendance and socioeconomic status

opposition parties and the urban poor in african democracies africa s urban poor increasingly represent a key constituency for electoral mobilization opposition parties which are pivotal for democratic consolidation have nevertheless exhibited disparate success at obtaining votes from this constituency to explain why this study focuses on the case of zambia and draws on interviews with political elites as well as a survey of informal sector workers in lusaka instead of vote buying ethnic alignments or economic voting these data show that the urban poor s voting decisions are related to the strategies used by political parties to incorporate them into the political arena opposition parties that employ populist strategies are more likely to win support from the urban poor than parties reliant on alternative modes of mobilization the advantages of a populist strategy include greater differentiation from the myriad of purely personalistic parties in africa and greater congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor including service delivery and jobs

endogenous market structures in international trade natura facit saltum abstract almost all of the large literature on international trade with imperfect competition assumes exogenous market structures the purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model that generates alternative market structures as nash equilibria for different parameterizations of the basic model equilibrium market structure is a function of the underlying technology familiar configurations such as a duopoly competing in exports or a single multinational producing in both markets arise as special cases small tax policy changes can produce large welfare effects as the equilibrium market structure shifts implying discontinuous jumps in prices quantities and profits

tariff jumping antidumping duties abstract this paper examines the tariff jumping response of all firm and product combinations subject to us antidumping investigations from 1980 to 1990 using a newly constructed database previous studies have focused only on japanese fdi responses to antidumping protection and found large tariff jumping responses in contrast this paper finds quite modest tariff jumping responses and the evidence suggests that tariff jumping is only a realistic option for multinational firms from industrialized countries this may partially explain developing countries concerns about addressing ad protection in the wto despite high tariff jumping responses there is no evidence of a japanese specific propensity to tariff jump holding other economic factors constant

endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment abstract using bernheim and whinston 1986 common agency game we endogenize trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm where both firms influence the domestic government s trade policy via their contributions the foreign firm can jump over trade restrictions by undertaking foreign direct investment fdi in the domestic market the government prefers a voluntary export restraint ver to a tariff for two reasons first a ver leads to higher contributions from the foreign firm than a tariff second a ver provides a higher level of protection to the domestic firm without generating fdi by the foreign firm

dependency revisited international markets business cycles and social spending in the developing world while increased exposure to the global economy is associated with increased welfare effort in the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd the opposite holds in the developing world these differences are typically explained with reference to domestic politics tradables unions and the like in the developing world are assumed to have less power or interests divergent to those in the oecd interests that militate against social spending i claim that such arguments can be complemented with a recognition that developed and developing nations have distinct patterns of integration into global markets while income shocks associated with international markets are quite modest in the oecd they are profound in developing nations in the oecd governments can respond to those shocks by borrowing on capital markets and spending countercyclically on social programs no such opportunity exists for most governments in the developing world most of which have limited access to capital markets in tough times more significant incentives to balance budgets and as a result cut social spending at the times it is most needed thus while internationally inspired volatility and income shocks seem not to threaten the underpinnings of the welfare state in rich nations it undercuts the capacity of governments in the developing world to smooth consumption and particularly consumption by the poor across the business cycle the author would like to thank steph haggard kristin bakke wongi choe tim jones and seminar participants at duke university penn state university washington university mit and the university of new mexico for their helpful comments nancy brune mark hallerberg and rolf strauch and nita rudra were very generous in providing their capital account oecd fiscal and potential labor power data respectively

the political impact of economic crisis in latin america in the 1980s research on the political implications of economic conditions is separated into two relatively distinct bodies of literature i bridge the theoretical gap between them by examining the effects of economic crisis on electoral outcomes in latin america from 1982 to 1990 an analysis of 21 competitive elections indicates that crisis conditions undermine support for incumbents and provoke high levels of electoral volatility but without necessarily fostering the growth of political extremism or the exhaustion of elite consensus associated with the breakdown of democracy the results also suggest that the relationship between economic conditions and electoral instability is mediated by party system structure rather than democratic age paradoxically the findings buttress prior research on electoral outcomes in the comparatively stable and homogeneous organization for economic cooperation and development oecd nations while undercutting theoretical frameworks elaborated with specific reference to the breakdown and consolidation of third world democracy

sample autocorrelation learning in a capital market model adaptive agent models are supposed to result in the same limit behavior as models with perfectly rational agents in this article we show that this claim cannot by accepted in general even in a simple capital market model where the agents apply sample autocorrelation learning to perform their forecasts by applying this learning algorithm the agents use sample means the sample autocorrelation coefficient and the sample variances of prices to predict the future prices and to determine the demand for the risky asset therefore even if the agents are not perfectly rational we require that the agents forecasts are consistent with the underlying information in this article a sufficient condition for convergence is derived analytically and checked by means of simulations the price sequence as well as the sequence of parameters estimated by means of sample autocorrelation learning converge if the initial value of the price sequence is sufficiently close to the steady state equilibrium and a random variable derived from the dividend process is not too volatile to skip the price trajectory out of the attracting region therefore the market price can even diverge and the region of convergence could become very small depending on the underlying parameters thus divergence of the price sequences is not a pathological example since it possibly occurs over a wide range of parameters therefore the often claimed coincidence of adaptive agents models and ration agent models cannot be observed even in a simple capital market model author s abstract

introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium abstract this paper surveys the literature which examines the stability of the expectations that agents are assumed to have in a rational expectations equilibrium ree this issue is more complex than the usual statistical estimation problem because the relationship between observable variables and payoff relevant variables is endogenous one approach taken in the literature yields convergence to a ree but requires agents to have extensive knowledge about the structure and dynamics of the model that prevails while they learn a second approach does not assume that agents have correctly specified likelihood functions and finds that ree may not be stable

voluntary export restraints on automobiles evaluating a trade policy the authors evaluate the voluntary export restraint that was initially placed on exports of automobiles from japan in 1981 they evaluate the impact this policy had on u s consumer welfare firm profits and foregone tariff revenue from its initiation through 1990

neoliberalism and lower class voting behavior in peru it is often assumed that lower classes will resist market oriented neoliberal reforms that impose economic austerity on popular sectors and exacerbate social inequalities however the peruvian cas

behavioral learning equilibria we propose behavioral learning equilibria where boundedly rational agents learn to use a simple univariate linear forecasting rule with correctly specified unconditional mean and first order autocorrelation in the long run agents learn the best univariate linear forecasting rule without fully recognizing the more complex structure of the economy an important feature of behavioral learning equilibria is simplicity and parsimony which makes coordination of individual expectations on such an aggregate outcome more likely in a first application an asset pricing model driven by ar 1 ar 1 dividends a unique behavioral learning equilibrium exists characterized by high persistence and excess volatility and it is stable under learning in a second application the new keynesian phillips curve multiple equilibria coexist learning exhibits path dependence and inflation may switch between low and high persistence regimes

fdi policies under shared factor markets abstract we examine the consequences of foreign direct investment fdi policies in a general equilibrium setting with several oligopolistic industries by shifting labor demand across countries fdi raises the wage in the host country and lowers the wage in the source country thereby raising profits of source country firms at the expense of host country firms the extent of cross ownership of firms the relative number of firms and the relative supply of skilled labor alter the impact of fdi policy on national welfare the tension between profits and wages determines whether the optimal policy is designed to encourage fdi

the boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade this paper begins with a review of empirical evidence on multinational firms conceptual underpinnings of a theory are developed relying in particular on the notion of knowledge capital as a mobile joint input into geographically separated production facilities this idea is embedded in a simple two country general equilibrium model that supports multinational production in equilibrium under conditions consistent with the empirical evidence the final section examines internalization and shows why certain properties of knowledge capital also imply a preference for transferring technologies internally within the firm rather than through arm s length markets

strategic trade policy when firms can invest abroad when are tariffs and quotas equivalent abstract this paper investigates the equivalence of tariffs and quotas when the market in question is imperfectly competitive and open to direct foreign investment the absence of a foreign supply response under a quota so critical to the analysis of the differential impact of tariffs and quotas under imperfect competition is called into question by the potential occurence of direct foreign investment the paper proves the equivalence of optimal tariffs and quotas when the markets are oligopolistic and open to direct foreign investment

antidumping duties undertakings and foreign direct investment in the eu we study the effects of eu antidumping policy when foreign firms can jump antidumping duties through foreign direct investment fdi in the eu we show that duty jumping or duty pre empting fdi occurs if the eu administration has broader objectives than protecting eu industry s profitability and if cost advantages of foreign firms are transferable abroad the expectation of price undertakings reduces the incentives to engage in fdi and may even discourage fdi as long as products are not too differentiated the results are consistent with recent empirical findings on antidumping jumping fdi

taxes tariffs and the global corporation in this paper we develop some simple models of optimal tax and tariff policy in the presence of global corporations that operate in an imperfectly competitive environment the models emphasize two important differences in the practical application of tax and tariff policy tax but not tariff policy can apply to offshore output and tariff but not tax policy can be industryspecific recognizing that multinationals production decisions are endogenous to the tax and tariff policies they face we investigate how a government should tax or subsidize domestically owned firms and how government should set trade policy

consistent expectations equilibria and learning in a stock market abstract in this article we investigate the question whether the highly demanding informative requirements of rational expectations models are necessary to derive equilibria within capital market models in this analysis agents are only provided with publicly available information such as prices and dividends nevertheless we require that agents should behave like econometricians additionally we skip the assumption of rational expectations models that agents know the implied actual law of motion of the system by these assumptions the stock market can be considered as a hommes sorger consistent expectations model we show the existence of consistent expectations equilibria with myopic agents and independent identically distributed dividends the only cee is the rational expectations equilibrium in the simulation part we demonstrate how the steady state cee can be derived by means of sample autocorrelation learning thus we are able to derive a stock market equilibrium with less demanding requirements where this equilibrium is equal to the rational expectations equilibrium

quantitative restrictions and tariffs with endogenous firm behavior abstract this paper considers a foreign oligopoly which dominates an importing country s market with its exports of differentiated products it constructs a model where firm behavior is endogenously determined in an infinitely repeated game and it analyzes the impact of trade policies on market conduct and welfare optimal tariffs optimal quotas and optimal tariff quotas are characterized and compared one result is that quotas can enhance competition and increase welfare another result is that quotas can be superior to tariffs finally optimal tariff quotas are welfare superior to either tariffs or quotas alone

neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in latin america the peruvian case latin american populism is generally associated with the developmental stage of import substitution industrialization it is thus widely presumed to have been eclipsed by the debt crisis of the 1980s and the free market reforms of the neoliberal era however the leadership of alberto fujimori in peru suggests that new forms of populism may be emerging despite the fiscal constraints of neoliberal austerity this new variant of populism thrives in a context where economic crisis and social dislocation undermine traditional representative institutions enabling personalist leaders to establish unmediated relationships with heterogeneous atomized masses political support can be cultivated through populist attacks on entrenched political elites or institutions along with targeted but highly visible poverty alleviation programs this new form of populist autocracy complements the efforts of neoliberal technocrats to circumvent the representative institutions that are integral to democratic accountability the peruvian case thus demonstrates that populism has been transformed rather than eclipsed during the neoliberal era and that it should be decoupled theoretically from any particular phase or model of economic development

workers rights in open economies global production and domestic institutions in the developing world previous large n research suggests that globalization could have either positive or negative consequences for labor rights in developing nations this article examines the ways in which domestic political institutions and interests conditions the effects of economic globalization it develops several hypotheses regarding the impact of domestic factors on labor rights outcomes and uses the case of costa rica to assess these hypotheses the result is that although segments of the costa rican economy and labor force have benefited from industrial upgrading in recent years the enclave nature of the export oriented economy and the historical repression of organized labor render difficult the achievement of some internationally recognized core labor rights the article concludes by discussing some of the issues for future research that are highlighted by the costa rican case

ec members fighting about surplus vers fdi and japanese cars the distribution of consumer and producer surplus among ec members of three different trade regimes free trade a voluntary export restraint ver and a ver in conjunction with foreign direct inv

strategic trade policy and welfare foreign equity ownership is shown empirically to weaken significantly and occasionally reverse common strategic trade policy results existing levels of u s cross ownership for example reduce the average optimal export subsidy by 47 relative to the brander and spencer journal of international economics 1985 18 83 100 value in industries with particularly high cross ownership and relatively small imputed labor rents optimal subsidies fall to less than one seventh of their former level previous studies which overlook high rates of cross ownership overstate the effectiveness of strategic policies most sharply in sectors with above average expected profitability scope for strategic investments and barriers to rent dissipation

the crisis of german and japanese capitalism stalled on the road to the liberal market model german and japanese opinion leaders demand a decisive move toward the liberal market model yet their governments have been slow to act why can t germany and japan reform to unravel this puzzle we must understand how the german and japanese models of capitalism bind the potential winners from liberal reform such as competitive manufacturing exporters to the potential losers such as workers and protected service industries competitive exporters are reluctant to embrace reforms that might undermine valued relationships with workers financial institutions and other business partners moreover they cannot forge a strong reform coalition because they must work through industry associations and political parties that represent both competitive and protected sectors as a result germany and japan proceed cautiously with reform they package delicate compromises often compensating the potential losers they design reforms to preserve core institutions and they seek novel ways to build on the strengths

new protectionism and multinational companies abstract this paper examines the welfare effects of eliminating non tariff barriers ntbs when firms expand abroad via export or direct investment di two broad categories of ntbs are considered according to whether they discriminate only against the foreign exporter type i or also against the local subsidiary of the foreign owned firm type ii it is shown that the welfare impact of market integration depends upon its influence on firms international strategies and that such influence is a function of the type of measure removed the elimination of ntbs type i may lead to a fall in consumer surplus and a rise in producer surplus due to a shift from di to export instead when ntbs type ii are removed consumers are likely to gain more than suggested by traditional analysis as firms may shift from export to di these results are then applied to explain the welfare implications of the rise in intra eu di recorded during the late 1980s and early 1990s

policy positions issue importance and party competition in new democracies this article examines the dynamics of vote redistribution after new party entry in the context of east european democracies contrary to the dominant institutional and sociological approaches the author focuses on the strategic policy choices of the new contestants the author argues that a new party s choice about where to place itself in relation to existing parties and which issues to emphasize can determine its electoral success or failure aggregate and individual level analyses confirm this argument the findings underline the importance of policy based party competition in the region as a broader theoretical contribution the study underscores the relevance of issue importance and not just party issue positions in political competition

tests of rational expectations in a stark setting the authors test the hypothesis that subjects forecasts in a stark experimental setting are not predictably different than the actual process generating the data the particular process that they use is a random walk forty subjects predict realizations of random walks chosen to be consistent with the actual process generating the data the authors find that they cannot predict subjects deviations from rational expectations of the process actually generating the data for about half of the subjects the authors cannot predict the forecast errors of about 90 percent of the subjects with information actually available to them coauthors are arlington w williams raymond c battalio and timothy i mason copyright 1993 by royal economic society

tariff jumping fdi and domestic firms profits studies of the welfare implications of trade policy often do not take account of the potential for tariff jumping fdi to mitigate positive gains to domestic producers we use event study methodology to examine the market effects for u s domestic firms that petitioned for antidumping ad relief as well as the effect of announcements of fdi by their foreign rivals in the u s market on these u s petitioning firms on average affirmative u s ad decisions are associated with 3 abnormal gains to a petitioning firm when there is no tariff jumping fdi but no abnormal gains if there is tariff jumping fdi the evidence for this mitigating effect is strongest when announcements of the intended tariff jumping fdi have already occurred before an ad decision takes place which happened in fair number of cases we also find evidence that the announcements of plant expansions and to some extent new plants have significantly larger negative effects on u s domestic firms profits than other types of fdi including acquisitions and joint ventures

party system competition and private sector development in africa abstractdemocratic transitions by many african countries have generated much analysis of the organisational features of political parties or their role in voter mobilisation during elections yet scholars have largely overlooked how parties negotiate economic policymaking or interact with the private sector in countries that are incipient democracies and emerging markets this article argues that the stability or fragmentation of the party system affects patterns of private sector development and shapes linkages between the state business and labour it compares mozambique and zambia to demonstrate how variations in party system characteristics influence the relationship between economic and political interests

from formlessness to structure the institutionalization of competitive party systems in africa giovanni sartori once described african party systems as formless our contribution challenges this view in an era of resurgent multipartism that swept through the subcontinent in the early 1990s and continues until today the article brings together contemporary research on african party systems with the wider disciplinary literature on party system institutionalization using a data set including all continuous election sequences in africa from 1950 to 2008 we find that africa has some of the most volatile party systems ever recorded and yet tremendous diversity across regimes we test the relative impact of political institutions economic performance the history of party system development and social cleavage structure on party system institutionalization in africa we find that its party systems have been shaped by a set of factors unique to the subcontinent but some of the general global patterns of party system development hold true in africa as well

how much does money matter buying votes in japan 1967 1990 japanese elections are notorious for the money that flows between contributors politicians and voters to date however nobody has estimated statistically the impact of this money on electoral o

the ecological fallacy revisited aggregate versus individual level findings on economics and elections and sociotropic voting several aggregate level studies have found a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and election outcomes operating in intuitively plausible directions more recent survey based studies however have been unable to detect any comparable relationship operating at the individual voter level this persistent discrepancy is puzzling one recently proposed explanation for it is that voters actually behave in an altruistic or sociotropic fashion responding to economic events only as they affect the general welfare rather than in terms of self interested pocketbook considerations it is argued here that the discrepancies between the macro and micro level studies are a statistical artifact arising from the fact that observable changes in individual welfare actually consist of two unobservable components a government induced and politically relevant component and an exogenous component caused by life cycle and other politically irrelevant factors it is shown that because of this individual level cross sectional estimates of the effects of welfare changes on voting are badly biased and are essentially unrelated to the true values of the behavioral parameters of interest they will generally be considerable underestimates and may even be of the wrong sign an aggregate level time series analysis on the other hand will often yield reasonably good if somewhat attenuated estimates of the underlying individual level effects of interest thus in this case individual behavior is best investigated with aggregate rather than individual level data it is also shown that the evidence for sociotropic voting is artifactual in the sense that the various findings and evidence which ostensibly show sociotropic behavior are all perfectly compatible with the null hypothesis of self interested pocketbook voting

unstable politics fiscal space and electoral volatility in the indian states what explains variations in electoral volatility the authors argue that fiscal space availability of financial resources to enact policy initiatives and provide public programs possessed by govern

political parties and uncertainty in developing democracies this article lays out a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of political uncertainty on party development and strategies of mobilization and competition defining uncertainty as the imprecision with which political actors are able to predict future interactions the authors identify three types of political uncertainty regime uncertainty economic uncertainty and institutional uncertainty they argue that political uncertainty is particularly high among developing democracies contributing to puzzling empirical patterns of party development and competition in these contexts taking into account the role of uncertainty in the strategic decision making of party elites will help scholars better understand the differences between parties in advanced and developing democracies but it can also help scholars understand the less dramatic differences between parties even within advanced democracies the authors theoretical framework can be applied broadly since uncertainty informs the strategic

district magnitude economic performance and party system fragmentation in five latin american countries this article makes a fresh start in the attempt to explain the number of parties in party systems it develops a simultaneous equations model to differentiate between the psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude on party system fragmentation both effects are statistically significant and approximately equal however neither effect is very large in comparison to underlying patterns of politicization which are argued to be reflections of the number of political cleavages in society these cleavages predispose each party system to converge toward a country specific effective number of parties within 5 elections regardless of the initial level of fragmentation barring outside disturbances major devaluations may act as such disturbances but the evidence so far is inconclusive the analysis is based on new data from 62 elections in argentina bolivia colombia peru and venezuela supplemented by 30 additional elections in brazil chile costa rica ecuador mexico and uruguay for th

the populist road to market reform policy and electoral coalitions in mexico and argentina governing parties face two fundamental tasks they must pursue policies effectively and they must win elections their national coalitions therefore generally include two types of constituencies those that are important for policy making and those that make it possible to win elections in effect governing parties must bring together a policy coalition and an electoral coalition this distinction sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms it also provides a starting point for analysis of how two of latin america s most important labor based parties the peronist party in argentina and the partido revolucionario institucional pri in mexico maintained electoral dominance while pursuing free market reforms that adversely affected key social constituencies peronism and the pri are conceived of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally based subcoalitions a metropolitan coalition that gave support to the parties development strategies and a peripheral coalition that carried the burden of generating electoral majorities this framework permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics of peronism and the pri and sheds light on the current process of coalitional change and economic reform