sustainability policy and environmental policy a theoretical representative agent economy with a depletable resource stock polluting emissions and productive capital is used to contrast environmental policy which internalises externalised environmental values with sustainability policy which achieves some form of intergenerational equity the obvious environmental policy comprises an emissions tax and a resource stock subsidy each equal to the respective external cost or benefit sustainability policy comprises an incentive affecting the choice between consumption and investment and can be a consumption tax capital subsidy or investment subsidy or a combination thereof environmental policy can reduce the strength of the sustainability policy needed more specialised results are derived in a small open economy with no environmental effects on utility

optimal growth with many consumers abstract a method is described for constructing all pareto optimal allocations for a dynamic economy with many heterogeneous consumers under certainty in which both the technology and consumer preferences are recursive but preferences need not be additively separable over time optimal perfect foresight competitive equilibrium allocations are obtained through the study of a dynamic program for an economy with one consumption good sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a unique interior stationary distribution of consumption and wealth for a two person exchange economy sufficient conditions are given for the global asymptotic stability of the unique interior stationary point

longitude matters time zones and the location of foreign direct investment abstract using bilateral foreign direct investment fdi data we find that differences in time zones have a negative and significant effect on the location of fdi we show that this finding is robust across different specifications estimation methods and proxies for time zone differences time zones also have a negative effect on trade but this effect is smaller than that on fdi finally the impact of the time zone effect has increased over time suggesting that it is not likely to vanish with the introduction of new information technologies

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

environmental tax policy and intergenerational distribution abstract we study the effects of environmental taxation within the context of an overlapping generations model the quality of the environment is modelled as a durable consumption good introduction of the environmental tax harms old existing generations and benefits young existing generations as well as all future generations increasing the tax in a pareto improving manner is easier the higher the pre existing tax the reverse holds if tax policy is decided by majority rule a suitably designed bond policy can be used to redistribute the efficiency gains due to the internalisation of environmental externalities across the generations

sustainability and the intergenerational distribution of natural resource entitlements abstract the paper describes an olg economy with a single exhaustible resource that has amenity value the steady states of this economy form a continuum implying path dependency we compare three policy scenarios first a zero extraction policy of enforced conservation that avoids environmental degradation possibly at the expense of intertemporal efficiency second a grandfathering policy that endows the present generations with all resources and that ensures efficiency but cannot prevent a persistent decline in lifetime utility from one generation to the next third a trust fund policy where future generations receive claims for the natural resource of the three only the trust fund ensures efficiency and protects welfare of all generations

optimal growth resource amenities and the preservation of natural environments this paper examines the conditions for which it is optimal to permanently preserve natural environments in which a productive natural resource is found the conditions are more restrictive than those previously indicated in the literature on the economics of natural environments increasing consumption and declining commodity prices are not sufficient to warrant permanent preservation the initial capital stock can be an important determinant of the optimal level of preservation in addition resource amenity values will increase the initial resource price and decrease the rate of growth of the resource price the natural world provides a variety of services to the human community natural resources are essential inputs in the production of goods and services in addition the natural world generates a variety of amenity services including the scientific recreational and aesthetic value of preserved natural environments krutilla 1967 krutilla and fisher 1975a this paper examines the impact of resource amenity values on the optimal growth of an economy which depends upon natural resource inputs for the production of goods and services in particular the paper examines the conditions under which it is optimal to permanently preserve some natural environments in which the productive resource is found the conditions which warrant permanent preservation are more restrictive than previously indicated by the literature on the economics of natural environments increasing consumption and declining commodity prices are not sufficient to warrant permanent preservation in addition the initial capital endowment can be an important determinant of the optimal level of preservation

corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational firms intangible assets like patents and trademarks are increasingly seen as the key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profit moreover they constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities in multinational enterprises mnes due to a highly intransparent transfer pricing process this paper argues that for both reasons mnes have an incentive to locate intangible property at affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate using panel data on european mnes and controlling for unobserved time constant heterogeneity between affiliates we find that the lower a subsidiary s corporate tax rate relative to other affiliates of the multinational group the higher is its level of intangible asset investment this effect is statistically and economically significant even after controlling for subsidiary size and accounting for a dynamic intangible investment pattern

aggregation and aggregation we discuss economic aggregation and political aggregation in the context of a simple dynamic version of the canonical political economy model the meltzer richard model consumers differ both in labor productivity and initial asset wealth and there is no physical capital under commitment over future tax policy and for economic preferences that imply aggregation in assets and productivity the induced policy preferences for individuals do not depend on any distributional characteristics other than means they imply time inconsistency with taxes changing between the first and the second periods and staying constant thereafter political aggregation in the form of a median voter theorem applies only in special cases jel d72 d78 e61 h23

an empirical model of labor supply in a life cycle setting this paper formulates and estimates a structural intertemporal model of labor supply using theoretical characterizations derived from an economic model of lifetime behavior a two step empirical analysis yields estimates of intertemporal and uncompensated substitution effects which provide the information needed to predict the response of hours of work to life cycle wage growth and shifts in the lifetime wage path

technological asymmetry among foreign investors and mode of entry how does the preferred entry mode of foreign investors depend on their technological capability relative to that of their rivals the authors develop a simple model of entry mode choice and evaluate its main testable implication using data on foreign investors in eastern european countries and the successor states of the former soviet union the model considers competition between two asymmetric foreign investors and captures the following tradeoffs while a joint venture helps a foreign investor secure a better position in the product market compared with its rival it also requires that profits be shared with the local partner the model predicts that the efficient foreign investor is less likely to choose a joint venture and more likely to enter directly relative to the inefficient investor the authors empirical analysis supports this prediction foreign investors with more sophisticated technologies and marketing skills relative to other firms in their industry tend to prefer direct entry to joint ventures this empirical finding is robust to controlling for host country specific effects and other commonly cited determinants of entry mode

contracts intellectual property rights and multinational investment in developing countries abstract the policy debate between multinational firms favoring strong contract law and host country governments who often oppose such protection motivates the paper local agents managers learn the multinational s technology and can defect to start a rival firm contract enforcement including binding the multinational itself makes the multinational better off outcomes for the host country are more complex depending on mode switches induced by enforcement if enforcement induces the multinational to switch from exporting to local production welfare improves if local production was occurring anyway enforcement may result in the loss of rents to local agents and lower welfare

foreign direct investment and intellectual property rights evidence from hollywood s global distribution of movies and videos abstract traditional thinking about intellectual property rights ipr suggests that as a country strengthens its ipr standards firms will move their governance structures away from equity based institutions such as foreign direct investment fdi towards more market based relations such as licensing agreements this hypothesis is explored by examining the behavior of hollywood studios in both the feature film and video markets in 40 foreign countries the analysis reveals that the behavior of hollywood studios is more complex than this although moderate iprs are associated with a high degree of licensing both high and low standards of ipr encourage more integrated governance structures

on the life cycle metaphor where ecology and economics diverge abstract there is an attractive analogy between nature and industry based on the similarity of natural functions and certain industrial activities for instance animals ingest eat and digest food finally there are metabolic wastes firms are analogous to organisms in several respects insofar as they consume material resources process digest them and produce output products and excrete wastes firms like organisms also compete with each other for resources curiously enough one of the apparent differences between natural and man made systems is actually not one like the industrial system the natural system does not recycle everything however there are at least four real and important differences between the biosphere ecology and the technosphere economy first there is no primary producer in the economic system analogous to what photosynthesizers play in the biosphere inputs to the economy are mostly natural resources capital services and labor second in the economic system output is a heterogeneous mix of manufactured products and services labor in economics is an input but not an output the economic system recycles much less than the ecological system but utilizes a far greater suite of elements in the biosphere there are no products as such growth is tantamount to accumulation of embodied solar exergy in the form of cellulose sugars lipids and proteins the biosphere produces only wastes and more of itself plus dead matter third in the biosphere there are no markets there is no medium of exchange like money and there is nothing analogous to paid labor exchanges are involuntary i e by predation parasitism or theft fourth evolution in nature is driven by differentiation by random mutations of the genome and darwinian selection based on reproductive success in economics differentiation is based on discovery invention and innovation by intelligent economic agents and selection is based on competition at the individual or firm level either way the economic system is not closely analogous to an ecosystem attempts to use ecological concepts in an economic context are often misleading and unjustified the paper discusses the implications of the eco eco mismatch for resource accounting and life cycle analysis

on the distributional effects of reducing capital taxes this article asks whether household heterogeneity and market incompleteness have quantitatively important implications for the welfare effects of tax changes we compare a representative agent economy to an economy in which households face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk the income process is consistent with empirical estimates and implies a realistic wealth distribution we find that capital tax cuts imply large welfare gains in the representative agent economy however when households are heterogeneous substantial redistribution during transition means that only a minority will support capital tax cuts whereas most households can expect large welfare losses

trips trade and technology transfer a north south model of unintentional technology transfer is developed where the stringency of southern patent protection provides the institutional backdrop for a strategic game in a high tech goods market the appropriability regime is set endogenously and combines elements of imperfect southern patent protection with the protection afforded by market made northern technology masking less stringent protection of northern intellectual property can work much like other strategic trade policies therefore developed countries appear to be right in demanding discussion of intellectual property rights in gatt

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

the boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade this paper begins with a review of empirical evidence on multinational firms conceptual underpinnings of a theory are developed relying in particular on the notion of knowledge capital as a mobile joint input into geographically separated production facilities this idea is embedded in a simple two country general equilibrium model that supports multinational production in equilibrium under conditions consistent with the empirical evidence the final section examines internalization and shows why certain properties of knowledge capital also imply a preference for transferring technologies internally within the firm rather than through arm s length markets

the dutch disease and intergenerational welfare governments in resource abundant economies face a tradeoff between transferring wealth to present generations and saving for future generations employing an overlapping generations framework with endogenous growth this article analyses the intergenerational welfare effects of 1 a wealth transfer policy where the entire wealth is transferred to the generations alive at present 2 an income transfer policy where the wealth is saved and the permanent income of the wealth is transferred to all present and future generations forever not surprisingly present generations are unambiguously better off with the wealth transfer policy less trivially however the wealth transfer policy can be associated with higher welfare also for future generations the intuition for this result is that while a wealth transfer depresses growth only in the periods subsequent to the transfer income transfers constitute a permanent drag on growth perhaps counter to the naive intuition the policy of saving the wealth and

licensee technological potential and exclusive rights in international licensing a multilevel model granting of exclusive rights is an important consideration for firms using licensing as a mode of entry into foreign markets as exclusive contracts reduce licensors flexibility in a given market during the term of the agreement by granting exclusivity to a licensee with greater technological potential the exchange partners can increase the potential transactional value of the licensing agreement at the same time a licensee with strong technological potential will increase the threat of transactional hazards due to underinvestment and rent appropriation in this paper we develop and empirically test a model that evaluates the balancing of transactional value and transaction costs in exclusive licensing in particular we identify the conditions under which exclusive contracts are likely to be granted to foreign licensees with strong technological potential empirical results from a multilevel model based on 375 international licensing agreements of us firms in high technology industries during 1995 2008 show that licensees with a stronger technological potential are more likely to be granted exclusive rights in countries with strong intellectual property rights protection and in industries with a high rate of technological change but are less likely to be granted exclusive rights when there is a high degree of overlap between licensor and licensee products

intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment abstract this paper develops a product cycle model with endogenous innovation imitation and foreign direct investment fdi we use this model to determine how stronger intellectual property rights ipr protection in the south affects innovation imitation and fdi we find that stronger ipr protection keeps multinationals safer from imitation but no more so than northern firms instead the increased difficulty of imitation generates resource wasting and imitation disincentive effects that reduce both fdi and innovation the greater resources absorbed in imitation crowd out fdi reduced fdi then transmits resource scarcity in the south back to the north and consequently contracts innovation

intellectual property rights licensing and innovation in an endogenous product cycle model abstract we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the product cycle to study the effects of stronger intellectual property rights iprs in the south on the incentives of firms in the north to innovate and to license advanced technologies innovation and licensing are random processes requiring resources stronger iprs increase the licensor s share of rents and reduce the costs of licensing contracts thus the returns to both licensing and innovation would rise while additional resources would be available for r d in consequence innovation and technology transfer would rise however the effect of stronger iprs on relative wages between regions is ambiguous

bidding for brains intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers we introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of nash equilibrium ipr policy choice among countries we show that governments have incentives to use iprs in a bidding war for global talent resulting in nash equilibrium iprs that can be too high rather than too low from a global welfare perspective these incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth thus allowing them to prevent the poaching of their brains by larger wealthier markets

the ideology of efficiency searching for a theory of policy analysis the potential pareto improvement criterion and other measures of economic efficiency do not pass the test of consistency and coherence within economic theory nor do such measures accord with what public decision makers seek in policy advice from economists such efficiency measures are nonetheless durable components of the ideology of economics in general and benefit cost analysis in particular the objectivity of the policy scientist has been confused with the objectivity of the science while economic efficiency has no claim to objectivity the policy scientist can be an objective analyst of policy choices

intellectual property rights foreign direct investment and industrial development this paper develops a north south product cycle model in which innovation imitation and the ow of fdi are all endogenously determined in the model a strengthening of ipr protection in the south reduces the rate of imitation and it increases the ow of fdi indeed

patent rights and trade analysis of biological products medicinals and botanicals and pharmaceuticals this article analyzes the effects of foreign patent rights on u s bilateral exports the empirical analysis covers three highly disaggregated drug industries over three decades we estimate bilateral trade equations for each industry using cross country data on the strength of national patent rights the findings show that strong foreign patent rights enhance the market power of u s drug exporters across countries with weak imitative abilities alternatively strong foreign patent rights stimulate the market expansion of u s drug exports across countries with strong imitative abilities these effects are larger in magnitude during the 1980 90s relative to the 1970s copyright 2002 oxford university press

path dependence in a ramsey model with resource amenities and limited regeneration this paper studies a ramsey optimal control economy with one consumer good extended to include several non renewable resources with amenity value the steady state equilibria of this economy are shown to form a continuum selection of the steady state to which the economy converges depends on the initial resource stocks hence unlike the usual ramsey models our model exhibits path dependency and postponement in the introduction of resource e ciency policies has long term e ects if the resource is renewable with a limited regeneration function the continuum becomes a turnpike that is optimal paths move along it towards the unique steady state the results also hold when there are several consumers 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

voting over redistribution in the meltzer richard model under interdependent labor inputs abstract this paper extends the median voter result of meltzer and richard 1981 to the case where a labor economy has any constant returns to scale production function under quasilinear preferences with constant wage elasticity average productivities of the different labor inputs depend on their relative abundance in the economy agents are heterogeneous due to their labor type and given type due to their relative efficiency they vote over income tax rates which in turn dictate the level of redistribution the paper shows that preferences over tax rates are single peaked and hence the median voter theorem applies this framework connects the scarcity of inputs to the most preferred tax rates

financial globalization inequality and the rising public debt abstract during the last three decades government debt has increased in most developed countries during the same period we have also observed a significant liberalization of international financial markets we propose a multicountry model with incomplete markets and show that governments may choose higher levels of debt when financial markets become internationally integrated we also show that public debt increases with the volatility of uninsurable income idiosyncratic risk to the extent that the increase in income inequality observed in some industrialized countries has been associated with higher idiosyncratic risk the paper suggests another potential mechanism for the rise in public debt jel d31 e62 f65 h63

the global stability of efficient intertemporal allocations this paper describes a continuous time model of an economy with finitely many infinitely lived consumers and a finite number of capital goods two objectives are achieved first recursive nonadditive utility functionals are formulated and analyzed second these preference functionals are applied to analyze the nature of efficient allocations in a dynamic economy two classes of global turnpike propositions are proven which provide the basis for a model of the long run distribution of wealth these propositions also provide new perspective regarding existing stability literature based on additive utilities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

trips trade and growth a two country model of endogenous growth is employed to assess the importance of intellectual property rights to trade growth and technology transfer the paper provides theoretical results linking the intellectual property rights regime to trade patterns aggregate r d worldwide growth and aggregate welfare measures failure to provide patent protection for foreign made innovations forces innovators to employ less than the best practice research technologies reduces aggregate r d activities worldwide effectively eliminates technology transfer across countries and reduces worldwide growth copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

patent protection southern innovation and welfare in a north south trade model in a north south trade model we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern innovation profits and welfare southern patent protection may make the northern firm worse off and the southern firm better off by increasing the southern firm s incentive for innovation and affecting the nature of competition in the world market the impact of southern patent protection on a country s welfare and on world welfare depends on the cost of southern innovation and the degree of product substitutability we provide important insights into the outcomes of international negotiations regarding patent enforcement in the southern countries

multinational firms and technology transfer the authors construct an oligopoly model in which a multinational firm has a technology superior to those of local firms in the host country workers employed by the multinational acquire knowledge of the superior technology and can spread their knowledge to local firms by switching employers the multinational chooses to pay a wage premium to prevent local firms from hiring away its workers if the local firms are sufficiently disadvantaged or if there are enough local firms diffusion of the superior technology benefits local firms at the expense of workers whose wages suffer the host government might have an incentive to attract foreign direct investment even when technology transfer will not result because of the wage premium local employees of the multinational firm earn also foreign direct investment with technology transfer may reduce the total economic rent the host country earns

efficiency of conservationist measures an optimist viewpoint abstract we consider an economy with a consumer good capital a natural resource that provides amenity values and heterogeneous overlapping generations we compare a benchmark grandfathering policy that ensures efficiency through privatization with a policy of enforced resource conservation it is shown that i conservationist measures do not cause any pareto inefficiency irrespective of whether they pass a cost benefit test moreover it is shown that ii there exist pareto optimal allocations that can only be reached through resource conservation and not through competitive markets irrespective of compensating income transfers finally iii equivalence is demonstrated between strict resource conservation and non dictatorship of the present generations over future generations as formalized in chichilnisky s sustainable welfare function the results are shown to hold in both a first best and a second best setting

compulsory licensing price controls and access to patented foreign products abstract we analyze how a price control and the threat of compulsory licensing cl affect consumer access in a developing country south to a patented foreign product in the model the southern government sets the level of the price control on a northern patent holder who chooses between entry and voluntary licensing vl while entry incurs a higher fixed cost licensed production is of lower quality if the patent holder does not work its patent locally the south is free to use cl the threat of cl ensures that consumers have access to a lower quality version of the patented good when the patent holder chooses not to work its patent locally improves the terms at which vl occurs can cause the patent holder to switch from vl to entry and can delay consumer access when cl replaces vl or entry we also show that a price control and cl are mutually reinforcing instruments

a tale of two property rights knowledge physical assets and multinational firm boundaries abstract the theory of multinational firm boundaries has been shaped by two major paradigms an earlier one emphasizing the role of integration in preventing the dissipation of knowledge and a more recent one stressing the role of firm boundaries in mitigating underinvestments into relationship specific assets in the face of contractual incompleteness this paper develops a novel model encompassing both approaches in a unifying framework the model predicts that the attractiveness of integration increases in the importance of the parent firm s knowledge capital and decreases in the importance of the affiliate s physical capital in a joint production process furthermore stronger intellectual property rights ipr protection in the affiliate s country is predicted to mitigate the effect of knowledge intensity on the attractiveness of integration i test these hypotheses using unique panel data on more than 100 000 firm pairs worldwide in line with the model s predictions knowledge intensive parent firms choose higher ownership shares in their affiliates yet this relationship is less pronounced the stronger the ipr protection in the affiliate s country in addition higher physical capital intensity of the affiliate is associated with lower ownership shares these findings are robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across countries industries and firms providing strong support for the unifying theory of multinational firm boundaries

entitlements missing markets and environmental uncertainty reply abstract at one level dore and ward seem intent on immunizing received doctrine they say that i did not prove that rights violated nozick s principles of justice and that i did not prove that missing markets were the problem more telling they allege i did not prove that my story was better than the particular story favored by dore and ward that is they argue that there is an alternative approach based on the theory of public economics which is indeed operational 3 they then use the bulk of their comment to explain and defend this alternative model they hope to convince the reader that the model of public economics survives intact in the face of my alternative model to the extent that their model allows one to define the problem away it is not difficult to see why they find it so compelling more seriously dore and ward fail to make a coherent argument about the concept of rights and duties and the logic of a particular rights structure that happens to prevail they seem concerned that my article was tampering with some sacred social construct the status quo rights structure and that my article threatened the received wisdom of both public economics and paretian walrasian bliss indeed theirs seems to be a genuine fear that if economists release their grip on the certitude of received orthodoxy the floodgates will be open to all manner of bumbling regulators seeking to shift rights and wealth positions across generations my article is apparently threatening because it seems to suggest that the received wisdom may at times be misleading

the effects of ageing and an environmental trust fund in an overlapping generations model on carbon emission reductions most currently employed integrated assessment models for climate change are of a dynastic nature they employ the ramsey rule linking the interest rate economic growth and the rate of pure time preference this paper argues that although a dynastic framework might be convenient for economic analysis it is restrictive and can be misleading overlapping generations models which do not employ the ramsey rule are more flexible and may give results different from those derived from dynastic models with the integrated assessment model alice 2 0 it is shown how various assumptions on demographic change and public institutions can affect the interest rate thereby influencing the efficient greenhouse gas emission reductions it is concluded that dynastic integrated assessment models are in many respects inappropriate for providing policy makers with quantitative figures about the costs of carbon dioxide emissions and their desirable reduction levels 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a measure of sustainable national income for the netherlands abstract we present calculations on the sustainable national income sni indicator first proposed by hueting which corrects net national income nni for the costs to bring back environmental resource use to a sustainable level using an applied general equilibrium age model specifying 27 production sectors we calculate different variants of sni for the netherlands in 1990 given a set of pre determined sustainability standards the age model is extended with emissions and abatement cost curves based on large data sets for nine environmental themes the model combines the advantages of a top down approach the age model with the information of a bottom up approach the environmental data and data on emissions reductions costs the presented numerical results show that in 1990 dutch sni is about 50 below nni though many uncertainties are still present in the data and the model the enhanced greenhouse effect is the most expensive environmental theme

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

quality ladders and product cycles we develop a two country model of endogenous innovation and imitation in order to study the interactions between these two processes firms in the north race to bring out the next generation of a set of technology intensive products each product potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times but quality improvements require the investment of resources and entail uncertain prospects of success in the south entrepreneurs invest resources in order to learn the production processes that have been developed in the north all r d investment decisions are made by forward looking profit maximizing entrepreneurs the steady state equilibrium is characterized by constant aggregate rates of innovation and imitation we study how these rates respond to changes in the sizes of the two regions and to policies in each region to promote learning

environmental regulations and the problem of sustainability moving beyond market failure abstract the standard metaphor of market failure is an impediment to the crafting of environmental policy that can escape policy lock in sustainability requires a policy process that can avoid this lock in sustainability concerns the creation of dynamic human processes that can respond to indeed anticipate unanticipated feedback from biological processes

why don t voters put the gini back in the bottle inequality and economic preferences for redistribution abstract the classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in market income inequality causes an increase in the size of government through majority voter support for an offsetting expansion of redistribution i argue that the predicted inequality redistribution relationship can break down when voters face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk with respect to future labor income and a timing differential between tax collections and government outlays this is formalized using an incomplete market heterogeneous agent dsge model with majority voting and time to build policy which suggests the collective demand for redistribution will not necessarily increase with growing income or wealth inequality this result implies that even with equal political power among voters democracies do not have a systematic mechanism to offset rising inequality as contrary to popular belief

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

fiscal policy with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets i undertake a quantitative investigation into the short run effects of changes in the timing of proportional income taxes for model economies in which heterogeneous households face a borrowing constraint temporary tax changes are found to have large real effects in the benchmark model a temporary tax cut increases aggregate consumption on impact by around 29 cents for every dollar of tax revenue lost comparing the benchmark incomplete markets model to a complete markets economy income tax cuts provide a larger boost to consumption and a smaller investment stimulus when asset markets are incomplete copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

an overlapping generations model of climate economy interactions a numerically calibrated overlapping generations model of climate change and the world economy is examined in this paper in the absence of intergenerational transfers efficient rates of greenhouse gas emissions abatement rise from 16 in the present to 25 in the long run while mean global temperature increases by 7 40c relative to the preindustrial norm a utilitarian optimum which attaches equal weight to each generation s life cycle utility yields abatement rates that rise from 48 to 89 with a long run temperature increase of 3 40c a second best utilitarian path in which intergenerational transfers are by assumption institutionally infeasible also supports stringent abatement measures i introduction the infinitely lived agent framework pioneered by frank ramsey 1928 has emerged as a central structure in the economics of climate change as characterized by ipcc 1996 working group iii climate change occurs when anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases principally carbon dioxide but also chlorofluorocarbons methane nitrous oxide and water vapor contribute to long term increases in mean global temperature potentially disrupting ecological systems and climate dependent production activities the best known study on the economics of this subject is nordhaus 1994 dynamic model of climate and the economy dice which incorporates assumptions regarding the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions in a standard one sector growth model in nordhaus analysis a 50 reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would reduce gross world output by 0 93 a doubling of greenhouse gas concentrations relative to the preindustrial norm which is expected to occur by the middle of the twenty first century would reduce output by

self enforcing intergenerational social contracts for pareto improving pollution mitigation we consider in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations under each contract agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives the transfer is financed in a pay as you go manner by the next young generation different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum we show that the existence of a contract which is pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income in a steady state with social contracts in each period the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions also steady state income and welfare are higher delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare in the second part of the paper we study a game theoretic setup taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible we show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy social contracts coexist with private savings

correcting the climate externality pareto improvements across generations and regions many argue that the present generation must reduce consumption to mitigate future climate change however as significant climate change is due to market failure the correction of market failures by definition gives rise to the possibility of pareto improvements in this paper we examine the implications of pareto improvements both within and across generations we employ the representative consumer model rice 10 a global model including different regions to see how we could potentially distribute any benefits across and within generations such that nobody loses the model shows that different combinations of present and future consumption along the pareto improving frontier yield different combinations of capital investment and emissions we also calculate a conventional social optimum while the social optimum by definition is on the pareto efficiency frontier it is not necessarily on the pareto improving segment of this frontier total emissions and hence temperature change vary significantly across different pareto improving scenarios it obviously matters which generations get the utility gain and one of our results is that for pareto improvements where none of the gain goes to the distant future and allowing transfers total emissions will be higher than in the social optimum even without any welfare gain to the distant future total emissions may be lower in the pareto improving scenarios we have considered than under the social optimum if transfers are not permitted moreover in this case carbon taxes differ substantially across regions for all pareto improvements

the political economy of international trade enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry a similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the new economics of institutions the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity in this survey the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined in addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or where there are answers no strong evidence in support of them this essay then in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics

social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes abstract it is often argued that with a positively skewed income distribution median less than mean a majority voting over proportional tax rates would result in higher tax rates than those that maximize average welfare and will accordingly reduce aggregate savings we reexamine this view in a capital accumulation model in which distorting redistributive taxes provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and income distributions evolve endogenously we find only small differences of either sign between the tax rates set by a majority voting and a utilitarian government for reasonable parametric specifications we show how these differences reflect a greater responsiveness of a utilitarian government to the average need for the insurance provided by the tax redistribution scheme these conclusions remain true despite the fact that the model simulations produce positively skewed distributions of total income across agents

politico economic consequences of rising wage inequality abstract this paper uses a dynamic political economy model to evaluate whether the observed rise in wage inequality and decrease in median to mean wages can explain some portion of the relative increase in transfers to low earnings quintiles and relative increase in effective tax rates for high earnings quintiles in the u s over the past several decades specifically we assume that households have uninsurable idiosyncratic labor efficiency shocks and consider policy choices by a median voter which are required to be consistent with a sequential equilibrium we choose the transition matrix to match observed mobility in wages between 1978 and 1979 in the panel study of income dynamics psid data set and then evaluate the response of social insurance policies to a new transition matrix that matches the observed mobility in wages between 1995 and 1996 and is consistent with the rise in wage inequality and the decrease in median to mean wages between 1979 and 1996 we deal with the problem that policy outcomes affect the evolution of the wealth distribution and hence prices by approximating the distribution by a small set of moments we contrast these numbers with those from a sequential utilitarian mechanism as well as mechanisms with commitment

natural capital and sustainability abstract this paper develops and rigorously analyses a model describing the optimal use of natural capital in a utilitarian framework natural capital is treated as an aggregate including exhaustibles renewables and environmentals performing several functions it is found that it converges to a steady state in which it is kept constant by simultaneous investments and use

determinants of foreign direct investment a tale of nine theoretical models abstract this paper presents a review of nine theoretical models of foreign direct investment fdi discussed are early studies of determinants of fdi 1 as well as determinants of fdi based on the neoclassical trade theory 2 ownership advantages 3 aggregate variables 4 the ownership location and internalization advantage framework 5 horizontal and vertical fdi models 6 the knowledge capital model 7 diversified fdi and risk diversification models 8 and policy variables 9 from each of the nine theories the relevant determinants of fdi are derived empirical studies indicate the importance of these determinants in the real world the paper shows that there is not one single theory of fdi but a variety of theoretical models attempting to explain fdi and the location decision of multinational firms therefore any analysis of determinants of fdi should not be based on a single theoretical model instead fdi should be explained more broadly by a combination of factors from a variety of theoretical models such as ownership advantages or agglomeration economics market size and characteristics cost factors transport costs protection risk factors and policy variables

intergenerational equity discounting and the role of cost benefit analysis in evaluating global climate policy when public policies with impacts far into the future are being debated the question inevitably is raised whether cost benefit analysis which discounts future costs and benefits is not biased against future generations and whether if such discounting is appropriate at all a lower rate should be used to avoid such bias the debate on global climate change is no exception this paper sketches and analyses the welfare foundations of cost benefit analysis and from this perspective analyses the role of cost benefit analysis in the climate policy debate particularly with reference to intergenerational effects the paper concludes that the cost benefit criterion cannot provide a definitive basis for deciding whether we should commit to a longer term programme to moderate climate change the issues of intergenerational equity are not that global climate change will significantly lower the gnp of future generations but relate to the possibility of science fiction like changes in the planet that will produce catastrophic effects in the future and the typical way in which the cost benefit problem is posed obscures the basic choices that we should be evaluating

conservationist government policies and intergenerational equity in an overlapping generations model with renewable resources abstract this paper shows that in overlapping generations models incorporating renewable natural resources competition may lead to perpetually declining living standards in environments in which it is technically feasible to achieve intergenerationally equitable distributions of consumption first and second best conservationist government policies are examined these include forced nationalization of the entire stock of natural capital government open market purchases and sales of natural capital taxation of industrial use of resources and subsidies to private investments in natural capital

corporate taxation and the choice of patent location within multinational firms corporate patents are perceived to be the key profit drivers in many multinational enterprises mnes moreover as the transfer pricing process for royalty payments is often highly intransparent they also constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities between multinational entities for both reasons mnes have an incentive to locate their patents at affiliates with a relatively small corporate tax rate our paper empirically tests for this relationship by exploiting a unique dataset which links information on patent applications to micro panel data for european mnes our results suggest that the corporate tax rate differential to other group members indeed exerts a negative effect on the number of patents filled by a subsidiary the effect is quantitatively large and robust against controlling for affiliate size the findings prevail if we additionally account for royalty withholding taxes moreover binding controlled foreign company rules tend to decrease the number of patent applications

how do foreign patent rights affect u s exports affiliate sales and licenses abstract this paper analyzes how foreign patent rights fprs affect us exports affiliate sales and licenses our approach is distinctive in three ways we apply ownership location and internalization concepts to link fprs with servicing decisions we account for the simultaneity of servicing decisions we estimate the relative effects of fprs on exports affiliate sales and licenses empirical findings show strong fprs increase us affiliate sales and licenses particularly across countries with strong imitative abilities further fprs have a larger effect on us knowledge transferred outside the country and firm relative to knowledge located inside the country and internalized inside the firm

long term substitutability between environmental and man made goods abstract substitutability between environmental and man made goods plays a major role in the sustainability debate the notion of substitutability covers a continuous spectrum with perfect substitutability at one end and poor substitutability at the other in this paper it is shown that if economic growth sustains a sharp distinction emerges between perfect and poor substitutability without any intermediate interpretation of substitutability if poor substitutability prevails environmental resources will eventually constitute the major part of total consumption value we relate our results to baumol s disease and assess the implications of this phenomenon for the compensation of environmental losses

a tale of three countries italian spanish and swiss manufacturing operations in china in this paper the choice of joint venture versus wholly foreign owned enterprise wfoe made by italian spanish and swiss multinationals in china as shaped by the risk of dissipation of intangible assets is investigated probit estimates based on an entirely new firm level dataset constructed by the author show that wfoe is more likely to emerge when know how easily spills over namely for firms endowed with more intangible assets or belonging to high tech sectors in line with the theoretical expectations

irreversibility and uncertainty cause an intergenerational equity efficiency trade off abstract two important policy goals in intergenerational problems are pareto efficiency and sustainability i e intergenerational equity we demonstrate that the pursuit of these goals is subject to an intergenerational equity efficiency trade off our analysis highlights two salient characteristics of intergenerational problems and policy i temporal irreversibility i e the inability to revise one s past actions and ii uncertainty of future consequences of present actions in human environment systems we employ a two non overlapping generations model that combines an intragenerational production decision on the use of circulating capital and a non renewable resource with a negative intergenerational externality as an unforeseen contingency if initially unknown problems become apparent and policy is enacted after irreversible actions were taken policy making faces a fundamental trade off between ex post pareto efficiency and sustainability that is one can achieve either one of these two goals but not both

patent protection and the industrial composition of multinational activity evidence from u s multinational firms using data on u s firms technology licensing to local agents in developing countries this paper examines the impact of patent protection on internal and arms length technology transfer the effects of protection vary across products according to their complexity consistent with theories of internalization we find that patent reforms enable local firms to attract more arms length technology transfer especially of simple products which are relatively easy to imitate affiliated licensing also rises among simple products but falls among complex products the results withstand several robustness checks including controlling for endogeneity by using colonial origin as an instrument and are equally strong whether patent protection is measured by its intensity or by the timing of reforms the results have significance for patent policy in the developing world where access to knowledge is critical through arms length technology contracts proprietary knowledge diffuses beyond firm boundaries enabling local agents to access not only the protected technology but also know how

intellectual property protection and the industrial composition of multinational activity in a north south model with endogenous fdi we examine the impact of southern ipr protection on the mode and industrial composition of international technology transfer a novel feature of the model is that due to technological reasons industries differ with respect to their susceptibility to imitation in equilibrium licensing occurs in industries where the risk of imitation is low and fdi where it is of intermediate magnitude stronger iprs in the south i alter the industrial composition of multinational activity towards licensing at the expense of fdi ii reduce local imitation and iii increase licensing and to a lesser extent fdi

technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities we examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology the relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality the clash between the foreign firm s choice and the local government s ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm ce texte examine les preferences d une firme etrangere et d un gouvernement du pays hote quant a deux modes d investissement direct de l etranger entree de novo de la firme etrangere versus acquisition d une firme domestique en place deux facteurs pris en compte sont la presence d externalites de reseau et d incompatibilite partielle entre la technologie locale et celle introduite par la firme etrangere l impact relatif des modes d entree sur le mieux etre local depend du degre de concurrence sur le marche et de l importance des externalites de reseau le conflit entre les preferences de l entreprise etrangere et les preferences du gouvernement local peuvent etre a la source de politiques qui limitent le degre de proprieteetrangere permis

licensing versus direct investment implications for economic growth we develop a symmetric two country model of foreign direct investment fdi that captures the internalization decision and its implications for both the rate and magnitude of innovations when mode choice licensing versus fdi is fixed a subsidy to multinational production increases the rate but decreases the size of innovations when mode can switch the rate and size of innovations both increase provided the subsidy is not too large although innovation size decreases for industries where firms already were choosing fdi innovation size increases for industries where firms switch from licensing to fdi because multinationals choose larger innovations than licensors 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

population aging health care and fiscal policy reform the challenges for japan we construct a transition analysis based on a general equilibrium life cycle model to investigate the effects of aging and we evaluate various policy alternatives designed to lessen the negative influence of aging in particular we analyze reforms of insurance benefits and tax financing tools that were recently the focus of a great amount of attention and debate in japan because of the tense financial situation there we show that although the potential reforms improve the welfare of future generations the political implementation of such reforms is difficult because of the large welfare costs for the current population our analysis suggests that a gradual reform with an intergenerational redistribution will be more politically implementable than an immediate reform