investigating bid preferences at low price sealed bid auctions with endogenous participation abstract at procurement auctions with bid preferences qualified firms are treated special a common policy involves scaling the bids of preferred firms by a discount factor for the purposes of evaluation only introducing such an asymmetry has three effects first preferred firms may inflate their bids yet still win the auction second nonpreferred firms may bid more aggressively than in the absence of preferences third the preference policy can affect participation for different cost distributions we solve numerically for the equilibrium bid functions under different discounts and then simulate behaviour our approach allows us to quantify the relative importance of the three effects we find that the participation effect is relatively unimportant and in most cases a positive cost minimizing preference rate exists download download video 34mb video 1

the cost of poverty alleviation transfer programs a comparative analysis of three programs in latin america summary a common criticism of antipoverty programs is that the high share of administrative nontransfer costs substantially reduces their effectiveness yet there is surprisingly little rigorous empirical evidence on program costs improved information and a better understanding of the costs of such programs are crucial for effective policymaking this study proposes and implements a replicable methodology for a comparative cost analysis of three similar poverty alleviation programs in latin america and assesses their cost efficiency the findings underscore that any credible assessment of cost efficiency requires a detailed analysis of program cost structures that goes well beyond simply providing aggregate cost information

learning from coarse information biased contests and career profiles an organization s promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly rational learning about ability the decision maker can bias noisy rank order contests sequentially thereby changing the information they convey the optimal final period bias favours the leader reinforcing his likely ability advantage when optimally biased rank order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information the leader is favoured in every period in other environments bias in early periods may i favour the early loser ii be optimal even when the workers are equally rated and iii reduce the favoured worker s promotion chances this paper presents a model of boundedly rational learning by an organization the aims are to represent in a simple form the costs of gathering processing or transmitting information and to analyse their implications for the procedures selected to handle information as well as for the decisions actually made like other recent work on the internal organization of firms this work explores to what extent organizational structure and behaviour as well as organizational performance can be explained by adaptation to the costs associated with information in the learning model we formulate the decision maker not only selects a rule specifying what action to take as a function of his observations but also chooses sequentially the information partitions generating those observations this general problem is interpreted in the context of an organization which needs to make an important promotion decision and which attempts to maximize the value of the information generated during the observation periods that precede the decision one of the motivations for this analysis was the finding by organizational sociologists that earnings and promotions in the later stages of a worker s career are strongly correlated with earnings and promotions in the early stages kanter 1977 rosenbaum 1984 later success is positively associated with early success even when one controls for the effect of observable characteristics likely to affect performance such as education one obvious source of this correlation is differences in ability that persist over time and that are not captured by the observable covariates in this paper we focus on differences in ability which are initially unobservable by organizations and their workers as well as by researchers we present a simple model of an organization trying to learn about differences in ability and show

fair trade organic coffee cooperatives migration and secondary schooling in southern mexico abstract we explore three trends in rural southern mexico fair trade coffee migration and conditional cash transfers that could explain the rapid rise in education from 1995 2005 using survey data from 845 coffee farming households in oaxaca and chiapas mexico results from a household fixed effects model show that household participation in a fair trade organic cooperative contributed to about a 0 7 year increase in schooling for girls us migration opportunities appear to have even stronger positive impacts on schooling for females although participation in fair trade organic cooperatives appears also to have increased male schooling increased migration opportunities have had an indeterminate effect for males

two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i examine players equilibrium effort levels in two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i first characterize the nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game i show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same i also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players probabilities of winning at the nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half then i examine how the equilibrium effort ratio the prize dissipation ratios and the players equilibrium effort levels respond when the players valuations for the prize or their abilities change jel d72 c72 i introduction a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending irreversible effort to win a prize typical examples are various types of rent seeking contests competition among firms to win a monopoly rent secured under government protection or by a government procurement contract competition between domestic and foreign firms to obtain governmental trade policies favorable to them competition among firms to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota and competition among firms to capture rents created by governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers other examples of contests include auctions patent races research and development r d competition among firms litigation competition for jobs among job candidates competition among candidates to win promotion to higher ranks election campaigns between political candidates and competition between local governments to invite business firms government institutions or government owned corporations into their districts naturally due to their prevalence and importance in economies such contests have been studied by many economists loury 1979 lee and wilde 1980 tullock 1980 rogerson 1982 rosen 1986 appelbaum and katz 1987 dixit 1987 hillman and riley 1989 hirshleifer 1989 ellingsen 1991 nitzan 1991 1994 krishna and morgan 1997 che and gale 1998 hurley and shogren 1998 and konrad 2000 to name a few in this vast literature on the theory of contests one of the main issues is how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize indeed it is of great interest because the players effort levels determine the profitability of the players engaging in the contest and in some cases they are revenues collected by the contest organizer or bribes given to government officials furthermore they account for other important outcomes of the contest for example in a rent seeking contest efforts expended by the players are viewed as social costs due to rent seeking activities so that total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency in an r d contest effort levels expended by the players these are r d expenditures of the firms determine the expected date of invention this article also addresses the issue how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize but it differs from previous research by dealing with contests with ratio form contest success functions 1 specifically the novelty of this article is to consider two player asymmetric contests in which each player s probability of winning is a function of the ratio of the two players effort levels two player contests with ratio form contest success functions or two player contests that can be best modeled with ratio form contest success functions are easily observed in the real world examples include various types of two player rent seeking contests litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant election campaigns between two parties or candidates and r d competition between two firms consider for example a rent seeking contest in which two firms potential monopolists compete with each other to win a government monopoly franchise contract

the theory of taxation for developing countries tax policy has far reaching implications for economic development and public administration this book which presents a modern theory of public finance brings together many of the most distinguished economists who have written on the subject they provide coherent principles for tax design and a systematic framework for the analysis of practical questions of tax reform and pricing policy in developing countries the book is especially timely as countries experience increasing shortages of government revenue and the distortions brought about by poorly designed tax systems it pays particular attention to the special problems of developing countries such as the taxation of agriculture the aim throughout is to develop techniques that can be quantitatively applied given the data available and empirical case studies illustrate the methods in action the authors analyze the links between tax theory social cost benefit analysis and the pricing of publicly supplied goods and services they also explore the empirical and econometric problems of identifying the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency other topics treated include the analysis of labor markets the taxation of foreign private investment and of fuel and the pricing of education although the models used concentrate on developing countries most of the methods and discussion apply as well to the problems of more affluent countries

evaluating alternative policy responses to higher world food prices the case of increasing rice prices in madagascar higher world food prices have led many developing countries to adopt policies to mitigate the impact on low income households this article sets out a partial equilibrium framework to evaluate the efficiency distributional and revenue implications of alternative policy responses the model is applied to evaluate tariff reductions and targeted transfers in madagascar although lowering tariffs generates substantial efficiency gains these accrue mainly to the top half of the welfare distribution and poor net sellers are actually worse off developing a system of targeted direct transfers to poor households is likely to be a substantially more cost effective approach to poverty alleviation

symmetric two stage contests with budget constraints the impact of a budget constraint on individual expenditures is examined in two models of two stage contests with homogenous and risk neutral players competing to win a single indivisible commonly valued rent the set of players is partitioned into equally sized groups in the first model one contestant from each group survives to compete on the second stage against the other survivors in the second model one group survives the first stage and its members compete against each other on the second stage we derive and discuss the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium solution for each model

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

evaluating transfer programmes within a general equilibrium framework we develop a general equilibrium model for evaluating domestically financed transfer programmes and derive analytical expressions which provide a framework for combining results from a computable general equilibrium model with disaggregated household data we separate the welfare impact into three components i e redistribution reallocative and distortionary effects we show how these are subsumed within one parameter the cost of public funds using a mexican programme for illustration we show that substantial welfare gains result from a switch from universal food subsidies to targeted transfers reflecting both the improved targeting efficiency of the latter and the relaxation the trade off between equity and efficiency when designing tax systems in an attempt to maximise the welfare impact of government transfers on lowincome households many governments in both developed and developing countries have moved towards better targeted transfer programmes in developed countries these transfers mostly take the form of cash transfers or tax credits whereas in developing countries they take the form of either cash transfers e g in latin america or infra marginal subsidised food rations e g in south asia l when evaluating the economic impact of such transfers it is useful to separate these into direct and indirect income or welfare effects the direct income effects reflect the design of the programme i e the rules for targeting transfers these are often referred to as first round effects and are captured by partial equilibrium approaches to policy evaluation the indirect effects capture the second round income changes brought about by the impact of cash transfers and their financing on the level and composition of demand and supply most evaluations of social safety net programmes focus on the partial equilibrium evaluation of programme targeting outcomes even those that focus on the indirect impacts tend to concentrate on their efficiency implications with only a very limited analysis of income distribution outcomes and with little attempt to combine both the equity and efficiency dimensions this is all the more limiting given that the central objective of these programmes is to improve income distribution in this paper we focus primarily on the indirect income effects in particular we show how the results from a computable general equilibrium model can be combined with the information available in standard household surveys to

optimal design of research contests procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations and if the buyer cannot extract up front payments from suppliers we study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment an auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants an experimental study is the right amount of effort exerted in multiperson tournaments where contestants have two different levels of initial endowments termed favorites and underdogs we develop theoretical predictions for the level of effort and the effect of varying the prize structure we test these predictions for three person tournaments using an economic experiment in a social environment where contest outcomes are publicly announced we find that both favorites and underdogs overexert effort relative to the theoretical point predictions moreover in the treatment with two favorites and one underdog favorites increase their effort when the number of prizes is increased from one to two contrary to the theory prediction we show that a generalized model that allows for psychological losses from losing for favorites and psychological gains from winning for underdogs because of social comparisons tracks the experimental results better than the standard theoretical model this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

competitive procurement with corruption we study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes with complete information and no corruption the efficient firm will win the contract for sure if the agent is corrupt and has large manipulation power however bribery makes it costly for the efficient firm to secure a sure win so in equilibrium the efficient firm loses the contract with positive probability the optimal scoring rule for the buyer deemphasizes quality relative to price and does not fully handicap and may even favor the efficient firm

farmers welfare and changing food prices nonparametric evidence from rice in madagascar this paper uses nonparametric density estimation and kernel smoothing techniques to examine the instantaneous distributional implications of rice price changes in madagascar while many farmers do not participate in product markets as either buyers or sellers and net sales or marketable surplus are fairly small for many others the roughly one third of rice farmers who fall below the poverty line face significant negative first order welfare effects from increases in the mean or variance of rice prices conversely the first order gains from rice price increases are highly concentrated among the largest rice farmers and particular regions in madagascar

repeated auctions of incentive contracts investment and bidding parity with an application to takeovers this article considers a two period model of natural monopoly and second sourcing the incumbent supplier invests in the first period after observing the incumbent s first period performance the buyer may break out in the second period the investment may or may not be transferable to the second source and it may be monetary or take the form of human capital we determine whether the incumbent should be favored at the reprocurement stage and how the slope of his incentive scheme should evolve over time we find that the gains from second sourcing are not so large as one might hope finally we reinterpret the second source as a raider and the breakout as a takeover we discuss the desirability of defensive tactics and obtain a rich set of testable implications concerning the size of managerial stock options the extent of defensive tactics the firm s performance and the probability of a takeover

favoring the winner or loser in repeated contests should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player s effort by artificially boosting the underdog s chances we apply this type of handicapping to a two period repeated contest between employees in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first period in this setting employees are strategic and forward looking such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first period contest result on the second period contest and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly the manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy if employees abilities are sufficiently different favoring the first period loser in the second period increases the total effort over both periods however if abilities are sufficiently similar we find the opposite result occurs total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first period winner

auction design and favoritism abstract the theory of auctions has ignored the fact that often auction designers not the principal design auctions in a multi attribute auction the auction designer may bias his subjective evaluation of quality or distort the relative weights of the various attributes to favor a specific bidder an ancient concern in the procurement of weapons in the auctioning of government contracts and in the purchase of electricity by regulated power companies the paper analyzes the steps to be taken to reduce the possibility of favoritism it is first shown that in the absence of favoritism quality differentials among firms are more likely to be ignored if the auction designer has imperfect information about the firm s costs second if the auction designer may collude with only one bidder the other bidders should be chosen if they are at least as efficient as the former bidder and no hard information about quality differentials is released by the auction designer that would justify fair discrimination in favor of the former bidder last if the auction designer can collude with any bidder the optimal auction tends to a symmetric auction in which quality differentials are ignored the possibility of favoritism reduces the auction designer s discretion and makes the selection process focus on non manipulable monetary dimensions of bids

a quantitative analysis of trade policy responses to higher world agricultural commodity prices the worldwide spike in prices of agricultural commodities in 2007 2008 elevated food security and social stability issues to the forefront especially in many food deficit countries in order to mitigate the global food commodity price pressure on domestic markets several major exporting and importing countries mostly developing economies adopted trade policy changes such as export bans or raising export restrictions or reducing import tariffs during the same period this paper estimates the potential impacts of these policies on the world prices and trade of major agricultural commodities using a set of multi country multi commodity and partial equilibrium models our findings suggest that over all the trade policy responses in various countries increased the prices of all agricultural commodities although the impact on the total net trade varies by commodity the simulation results show that the overall impact of trade policy distortions on the world rice price is most significant at 24 followed by wheat 14 and barley 9 in general the poorer food deficit countries regions which have limited power to manipulate their trade policies experienced higher price increases compared to those major trading countries that adopted policy interventions also the developing countries that are net importers which did not implement trade policy interventions experienced significant welfare losses resulting from interventions implemented by other major trading countries

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed

social loss aversion and optimal contest design when managers are designing a contest to motivate effort by salespeople service employees franchisees or product development teams a key question is what should the optimal proportion of winne