a cost benefit analysis of a condom social marketing programme in tanzania this article uses the revealed preference willingness to pay approach to estimate the benefits in a cost benefit analysis of a condom social marketing csm programme in tanzania the demand curve used to derive the consumer surplus had unit elasticity and it was estimated from a cross sectional sample of 1272 persons people were willing to pay different prices for the condoms because perceived quality varied net benefits were close to zero for the minimum estimate that ignored external benefits with external benefits included the csm programme was judged socially worthwhile with our best estimate producing a benefit cost ratio ranging from 1 31 to 1 72

comparing the welfare effects of public and private health care subsidies in the united kingdom we use a calibrated analytical model to compare the welfare costs gross of externalities of increasing subsidies for public and private health care in the uk the model incorporates wait costs for rationed public care burdens that subsidies impose on the tax system and distributional weights for different households welfare costs are significantly higher for expanding public health care over a range of parameter scenarios both policies reduce average wait times but for public health care this is offset by new waiting costs incurred on extra treatments and the burden on the tax system is much larger for expanding public health care

if we knew ability how would we tax individuals abstract the suggestion to tax people on earnings capacity instead of earnings has been around for a long time and is attractive in terms of economic efficiency in this paper we reflect on the feasibility of such a system and give an exploratory empirical implementation we apply the leyden welfare function of income a survey based measure of an individual s welfare associated with income to derive implications for ability taxation under the assumption that iq and schooling reflect earnings capacity we derive the tax functions using different criteria to distribute the utility loss due to taxation

tax authority to the european parliament in this paper we analyze whether countries of the ec community should plead for a decentralized system to finance the european funds rather than using a uniform tax imposed by the european parliament the analysis is within a multistage game theoretic framework in which the implication of the financing system of a confederation on the investment behavior in the respective states is considered the paper is in the tradition of the literature which claims that from a view of global efficiency property rights structures inducing ex post efficient allocations may be worse than a system leading to an ex post inefficient allocation for this specific economic issue we elucidate the tradeoff between incentive effect and distributional policy especially we demonstrate that rather homogeneous countries benefit by installing a central tax institution if the countries are rather heterogeneous the countries may have opposing interests with respect to the answer of the question which is presented in the title it is possible that the high developed country prefers to install a central tax authority while the low developed country does not however in general the reverse ordering which is more in line with our intuition results

progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds abstract this paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds smcf for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals labour supply decisions a formula for the smcf indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals average and marginal tax rates respectively other well known formulas for the smcf are shown to be special cases of this formula the difference between this formula and the mayshar 1991 formula is shown to be due to different but equally valid ways of computing the change in the average tax rate the condition under which a marginal tax rate increase may lead to a reduction in revenues is derived

the marginal welfare cost of public funds theory and estimates abstract we derive a general analytic formula for the marginal welfare cost mwc of public funds without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences or technologies the framework encompasses the various special cases previously considered and reconciles the disparities among the reported estimates of mwc unresolved differences in existing estimates are fully explained by appropriate interpretations of intended thought experiments and alternative assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply with respect to public spending further progress in measuring mwc requires empirical estimation of labor supply functions that include government spending as an explanatory variable

labor supply responses and welfare effects of tax reforms during the late 1 980s and early 1 990s taxation of wage income has undergone a change towards a proportional tax regime in many countries our analysis shows that gradual tax reforms in norway may have removed some of the distortions on worker behavior moreover we find that proportional taxes may reduce the inequality in the distribution of disposable household income yet when the distributional consequences are related to changes in individual welfare we find that rich households may benefit far more than households at the other tail of the income distribution because they earn more without any significant increase in effort

fiscal interactions and the case for carbon taxes over grandfathered carbon permits this paper provides simple formulas for adjusting the costs of carbon taxes and tradable carbon permits to account for interactions with pre existing tax distortions in the labour market both policies reduce labour supply as they increase product prices and reduce real household wages the resulting efficiency losses in the labour market can be substantial relative to partial equilibrium abatement costs however much of this added cost can be offset and perhaps more than offset when additional distortions from the tax system are considered if revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits are used to reduce distortionary taxes consequently there can be a strong case on efficiency grounds for using carbon taxes or auctioned permits over grandfathered carbon permits copyright 2003 oxford university press

supplementing an emissions tax by a feed in tariff for renewable electricity to address learning spillovers abstract in the presence of learning spillovers related to renewable energy technologies an optimal strategy to mitigate climate change should complement an emissions tax by a subsidy for renewables this article addresses the question how such subsidy should be designed it is shown that the widely used approach of a revenue neutral fixed feed in tariff can yield an optimal outcome under restrictive conditions only it has to be adapted continuously as the electricity price changes moreover funding the tariff by a surcharge on the electricity price has important implications for the design of the emission tax the optimal tax rate has to be below the pigovian level differentiated across fossil fuels and adapted over time as the patterns of technological development change these requirements may pose a formidable challenge for practical decision making however it is important to point out that the eventual choices made with respect to the design and funding of a feed in tariff have to be based on a careful and more comprehensive policy assessment including inter alia economic effects beyond the electricity sector and existing institutional constraints

tax effects versus budget effects on labor supply this paper analyzes the effects on labor supply of parallel changes in taxes and public spending of various types a number of important recent developments in the labor supply behavior of households are highlighted by such a study of various types of budget effects rather than isolated tax effects this comes out in particular when considering cross substitution effects on labor supply of changes in public spending on goods and services or of the subsidization of goods and services provided by private markets moreover the income effects of tax changes are often mitigated or possibly even removed by the income effects of the accompanying expenditure changes

evaluation of four tax reforms in the united states labor supply and welfare effects for single mothers an emerging consensus is that labor force participation is more responsive to taxes and transfers than hours worked to understand the implications of participation responses for the welfare analysis of tax reform this paper embeds this margin of labor supply in an explicit welfare theoretic framework we apply the framework to examine the welfare effects on single mothers in the united states following four tax acts passed in 1986 1990 1993 and 2001 we propose a simulation method combining features of fully structural microsimulation studies and simple deadweight loss calculations our approach accounts for the observed heterogeneity in the microdata but is simple to implement because we do not need to specify utility functions and estimate utility parameters we find that each of the four tax acts created substantial welfare gains and that the gains were concentrated almost exclusively on the participation margin our results imply that standard approaches not modeling the participation decision can make large errors

the theory of taxation for developing countries tax policy has far reaching implications for economic development and public administration this book which presents a modern theory of public finance brings together many of the most distinguished economists who have written on the subject they provide coherent principles for tax design and a systematic framework for the analysis of practical questions of tax reform and pricing policy in developing countries the book is especially timely as countries experience increasing shortages of government revenue and the distortions brought about by poorly designed tax systems it pays particular attention to the special problems of developing countries such as the taxation of agriculture the aim throughout is to develop techniques that can be quantitatively applied given the data available and empirical case studies illustrate the methods in action the authors analyze the links between tax theory social cost benefit analysis and the pricing of publicly supplied goods and services they also explore the empirical and econometric problems of identifying the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency other topics treated include the analysis of labor markets the taxation of foreign private investment and of fuel and the pricing of education although the models used concentrate on developing countries most of the methods and discussion apply as well to the problems of more affluent countries

marginal welfare costs of taxation with human and physical capital i introduction marginal welfare cost of taxation is the amount by which the social cost of an additional tax dollar differs from 1 because of distortionary taxation browning and johnson 1984 stuart 1984 browning 1987 ballard 1988 and allgood and snow 1998 use static models of the u s economy in which labor supplies adjust but the stocks of human and physical capital are fixed to calculate estimates of this welfare cost relevant to cost benefit analysis the studies by lucas 1990 and perroni 1995 incorporate human and physical capital into calculations of excess burden for the purpose of comparing alternative tax systems but do not address the welfare costs of marginal tax and spending reforms ballard et al 1985 and judd 1987 provide estimates of welfare cost using models that allow the stock of physical capital to change in response to marginal reforms but the stock of human capital is exogenous in these studies however judd 2001 argues that there is ample evidence indicating that human capital investment decisions have a significant effect on the cost of altering the tax system which suggests that these decisions could also have an important influence on marginal welfare cost in this article we present estimates of welfare costs for marginal reforms to government tax and spending policies when labor supply saving and education decisions are all endogenous we focus our analysis on marginal reforms because as skinner and slemrod 1985 observe most policy reforms enacted do not involve replacing one tax or spending system with another but instead typically entail marginal adjustments in tax laws and government appropriations using a perfect foresight overlapping generations model with a three period life cycle we derive analytical expressions for the changes in labor supply saving and education and use them to calculate marginal welfare cost as shown by auerbach et al 1983 in overlapping generations models steady state welfare comparisons of alternative tax policies are biased unless households are compensated for intergenerational redistribution along the transition path to arrive at our steady state estimates of welfare costs we adapt the compensation method introduced by gravelle 1991 for analyzing fundamental tax reforms to the context of incremental tax and spending reforms in a static one consumer model triest 1990 has shown that marginal welfare cost mwc is positive solely because of tax leakage the decline in tax revenue caused by reductions in the tax base we extend this insight to an intertemporal context that incorporates tax leakage arising from changes in both human and physical capital investment we evaluate three sets of reforms first a revenue neutral reduction in the tax on capital income funded by a higher tax on labor income second spending on a public good financed by either a higher tax on labor or interest income third a per capita lump sum transfer or demogrant also funded by either a higher tax on labor or interest income we find that marginal welfare costs are uniformly lower in the dynamic model where investment decisions are endogenous than in the static model where investment decisions are fixed and that the majority of the difference between the dynamic and static estimates is attributable to human capital decisions the principal reason is that a reallocation of time between labor hours and human capital investment has opposing and potentially offsetting effects on effective labor supply as a result labor supply responds less elastically in the dynamic model and changes in labor supply are the main source of tax leakage because wage taxation is the main source of tax revenue we also find that shifting marginal financing from capital to labor results in a lower welfare cost the reason being that such a change encourages saving which increases wage rates and stimulates labor supply leading to a reduction in marginal welfare costs

technology adoption and agricultural price policy market interventions such as price supports or fertilizer subsidies can lead to gains from speeding up adoption of new technologies but the policies distort resource allocation a framework is developed for optimizing policies in light of the adoption allocation trade off based on adoption coefficients and production parameters from third world agriculture levels and duration of policies are estimated sensitivity analyses are performed gains are small at best and may be zero or negative in view of farmer costs of adjustment and deadweight losses from taxes profit technology adoption if new technologies are desirable why not use price supports or input subsidies to encourage faster technology adoption while frequently raised in policy deliberations this question has received little serious analysis particularly neglected has been the conflict or trade off between a gains in output as producers switch from old to new technologies and b the losses from resource use distortions brought about by price policies when output prices are raised or prices of inputs such as fertilizer are lowered the

on the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments a couple of months before the swedish election in 1998 the incumbent government distributed 2 3 billion sek to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities this was the first wave of a four year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development this temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government in this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants we find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes in particular we find strong support for the lindbeck weibull dixit londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters this result is statistically as well as economically significant we do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters

the additionality problem with offsets optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests abstract carbon offsets are a frequently discussed tool for reducing the costs of an emissions reduction policy however offsets have a basic problem stemming from asymmetric information sellers of offsets have private information about their opportunity costs leading to concerns about whether offsets are additional non additional offsets can undermine a cap and trade program or if the government purchases them directly result in enormous government expenditures we analyze contracts for carbon sequestration in forests that mitigate the asymmetric information problem landowners are offered a menu of two part contracts that induces them to reveal their type under this scheme the government is able to identify ex post how much additional forest each landowner contributes and minimize ex ante its expenditures on carbon sequestration to explore the performance of the contracting scheme we conduct a national scale simulation using an econometric model of land use change the results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 61 million acres government expenditures are 5 3 billion lower under the contracting approach compared to a uniform subsidy offered to all landowners this compares to an increase in private opportunity costs of just 110 million dollars under the contracts thus the contracting scheme is preferable from society s perspective

redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds abstract discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one consumer economy while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution this paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high wage to low wage workers in an optimal tax system the mcf will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one without optimality the mcf will in general differ between different sources of finance

the effect of taxation on human capital this study finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital of the few earlier studies to address this issue most suggested a negligible effect of taxation on investment in human capital this earlier conclusion is shown to be incorrect by using a model that is more general in several respects than the models used previously

the rate of return to the high scope perry preschool program abstract this paper estimates the rate of return to the highscope perry preschool program an early intervention program targeted toward disadvantaged african american youth estimates of the rate of return to the perry program are widely cited to support the claim of substantial economic benefits from preschool education programs previous studies of the rate of return to this program ignore the compromises that occurred in the randomization protocol they do not report standard errors the rates of return estimated in this paper account for these factors we conduct an extensive analysis of sensitivity to alternative plausible assumptions estimated annual social rates of return generally fall between 7 and 10 with most estimates substantially lower than those previously reported in the literature however returns are generally statistically significantly different from zero for both males and females and are above the historical return on equity estimated benefit to cost ratios support this conclusion

the relationship between the marginal cost of public funds and marginal excess burden a large literature has recently developed which attempts to measure the marginal cost shadow price of public funds the motivation for much of this literature is the recognition that many of the tax instruments used by governments generate substantial amounts of excess burden deadweight loss jerry a hausman 1981 for example estimates that for an average prime aged american male with a wage of ten dollars in 1975 the excess burden generated by the federal income tax was over fifty percent of the revenue raised from taxing that individual one might suspect that such large excess burden estimates would require a change in the way government project costs are calculated in benefit cost analysis if the revenue required to finance a project is raised through distortionary taxation then intuition would suggest that the excess burden generated by the increase in tax rates needed to finance the project should be incorporated into the cost of the project however this analysis is not entirely consistent with the theoretical literature on the optimal provision of public goods which are financed by distortionary taxation when distortionary taxes are used to finance public goods and the level of public good provision does not affect consumption of the taxed goods the standard samuelsonian rule which equates the sum over consumers of the marginal rates of substitution between a private good and a public good with the marginal rate of transformation between the two goods must be modified to account for the marginal effect of increases in tax rates on the revenue raised from the existing taxes 2 the intuition behind this result is that we need to correct for indirect leakages from existing government revenue sources when considering an incremental expenditure if the increase in tax rates needed to finance the project causes a reduction in the revenue raised by the current tax structure then we need to account for this loss in calculating the cost of the project it is important to note that this result concerns the values of uncompensated demand elasticities an example first provided by atkinson and stern 1974 illustrates this point consider a world where the only tax is on labor earnings and incremental expenditure on the public good does not affect the demand for leisure in this case the marginal rate of transformation will overstate the cost of the public good as long as the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is negative this is because an increase in the tax rate causes an increase in labor supply leading to an indirect increase in government revenue from the excess burden perspective described earlier this example is very puzzling it is well known that even if the uncompensated own price elasticity of a good is zero a tax on that good can still result in a large deadweight loss we instead need the compensated elasticity to be zero to ensure that there will be no excess burden however the department of economics university of california davis ca 95616 this paper is based on chapter two of my dissertation at the university of wisconsin madison i wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee martin david robert haveman chair and arthur goldberger for very helpful advice and comments i have also benefited from comments by don fullerton and bruce hamilton an anonymous referee provided unusually helpful comments and corrected an error in the figure 1don fullerton 1989 provides a recent survey and analysis of this literature 2this is shown by anthony atkinson and nicholas h stern 1974 and david e wildasin 1979 the effect of provision of the public good on consumption of the taxed goods must also generally be taken into account

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

defying the resource curse explaining successful state owned enterprises in rentier states the article explains how several gulf rentier monarchies have managed to create highly profitable and well managed state owned enterprises soe s confounding expectations of both general soe inefficiency and the particularly poor quality of rentier public sectors it argues that a combination of two factors explains the outcome the absence of a populist mobilizational history and substantive regime autonomy in economic policy making the author concludes that it is necessary to rethink the commonly accepted generalizations both about rentier states and arguably about public sectors in the developing world

the algerian retrenchment system a financial and economic evaluation the government of algeria has adopted a new retrenchment system to facilitate labor shedding in a public sector characterized by redundant workers and in an environment of already high unemployment this article assesses the financial viability of the retrenchment system and the inherent welfare costs and benefits associated with layoffs a financial flows model tracks the unemployment insurance fund s revenue and expenditure flows during the projected five year adjustment period it finds that even in the presence of massive retrenchment 21 percent of formal sector employment the fund accumulates reserves equivalent to nearly 2 percent of gross domestic product because many displaced workers will end up in the informal sector the resulting productivity gains or losses depend crucially on the initial level of productivity in the public sector at the same time retrenchment entails unambiguous benefits by reducing subsidies to state owned enterprises thereby generating efficiency gains considering these two effects together the welfare model estimates that retrenching 13 percent of the formal sector will generate annual net welfare gains ranging from costs of 358 million to gains of 774 million

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

a marginal cost of funds approach to multi period public project evaluation implications for the social discount rate abstract although the use of marginal cost of funds mcf has been widely appreciated in public finance literature discussions of mcf have been confined to a static setting this paper develops a multi period project evaluation rule that is based on mcf unlike previous approaches the parameters required for implementing the mcf rule are independent of projects under consideration a lesson from this paper is that the government discount rate policies that are largely based on the concepts of social discount rate and shadow price of capital should be rewritten with the use of parameters representing mcf

tax transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first it extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods second it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump sum and distortionary policies the analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism

a simulation based welfare loss calculation for labor taxes with piecewise linear budgets graduated income tax rates and transfer programs create piecewise linear budget constraints that consist of budget segments and kink points with any change in these tax rules each individual may switch between a kink point and a budget segment between two budget segments or between two kink points with errors in the estimated labor supply equation the new choice is uncertain and so the welfare effects of a tax change are uncertain we propose a simulation based method to compute expected welfare effects that is easy to implement and that fully accounts for uncertainties about choices around kink points our method also provides information about expected changes in working hours d 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

targeting in medicaid the costs and enrollment effects of medicaid s citizenship documentation requirement abstract the deficit reduction act of 2005 imposed a federal requirement that all individuals provide citizenship documentation when applying for or renewing medicaid coverage this represented a change in policy for 46 states using differences in differences to analyze data from the current population survey 2004 2008 this paper shows that the policy reduced medicaid enrollment among non citizens as intended and did not significantly affect citizens one in four adult non citizens in medicaid 390 000 total and one in eight child non citizens 81 000 were screened out by the policy annually child non citizens were more likely to become uninsured afterwards while adult non citizens appeared to shift from medicaid to other coverage overall the citizenship documentation requirement reduced medicaid participation among non citizens in an appropriately targeted way nonetheless a cost benefit analysis indicates that the policy was a net loss to society of 600 million through increased state administrative spending and compliance costs imposed on u s citizens applying for medicaid

precautionary savers with ricardian propensities in his seminal 1974 paper barro noted that ricardian equivalence may fail if agents face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk and governments finance tax rebates with higher future tax rates 5 higher tax rates reduce the dispersion of future after tax income decrease the precautionary demand for savings and hence tend to stimulate present consumption barro concluded however that the stimulus to consumption would be minor and would likely be offset by induced reductions in future labor income the recent revival of interest in the precautionary savings motive has refocused attention on this tax insurance effect tie 2 8 24 27 in particular two highly influential papers one by barsky mankiw and zeldes 6 and the other by kimball and mankiw 19 argue that the tax insurance effect generates consumption responses roughly equivalent to those obtained from keynesian models where agents ignore future tax liabilities entirely although the existence of a precautionary demand for savings and by implication a taxinsurance effect has received strong empirical support 9 15 21 the magnitude of the effect remains largely unknown the two most difficult empirical issues involve quantifying the degree of uninsured idiosyncratic risk faced by typical agents and determining the appropriate form and shape of agents utility functions on these issues the profession is far from a consensus studies from the labor economics literature 1 17 suggest idiosyncratic risk may be large and persistent whereas a recent paper by heaton and lucas 16 finds idiosyncratic risk to be small and largely transitory similarly the vast literature surrounding the equity premium puzzle highlights the profession s lack of consensus over the degree of risk aversion exhibited by typical agents in this paper i circumvent some of these controversial issues by extending barsky mankiw and zeldes model to include an explicit labor supply decision the introduction of a labor supply decision allows me to bring evidence from the literature on optimal income taxation 22 25 and the literature on the welfare cost of taxation 3 4 7 to bear on these issues the idea is simple under the conditions that make the tax insurance effect large i e very risky income distributions and a high degree of risk aversion agents will place great value on tax induced

is it wise to combine environmental and labour market policies an analysis of a swedish subsidy programme abstract in 1998 the swedish government launched its largest ecological subsidization programme to date the local investment programme lip by having two political objectives to step up the pace at which sweden transforms into an ecologically sustainable society and to reduce unemployment the programme did not conform to the one instrument per objective policy guideline often advocated by economists concentrating on a subset of the subsidized projects the projects for remediation of contaminated sites we evaluate how effectively the lip s separate political objectives were fulfilled between 1998 and 2002 670 million sek 6 2 billion were allocated to over 1800 different projects under the lip twenty four i e one percent of the projects aimed at remediation of contaminated sites these projects received a disproportionate amount six percent of the total lip subsidies by using data on both accepted and rejected remediation projects we find that the lip s ecological sustainability objective could have been achieved better if the most hazardous sites had been prioritized to a greater extent furthermore society s cost for the employment opportunities generated in the remediation projects was higher than society s cost for the equivalent number of employment opportunities generated in traditional labour market policies although other subsets of the lip projects may have been more successful in achieving the programme s separate objectives our results illustrate inefficiencies that may arise from a desire to attain several political objectives through a single policy instrument

lobbying and the measurement of conventional welfare cost it is widely accepted that the welfare cost of distortionary policy has two components the first component is the conventional welfare cost of lost economic surplus due to an inefficient allocation of resources the second component is the rent seeking cost associated with efforts to influence policy if the policy in question is an excise tax the partial equilibrium measure of conventional welfare cost is the harberger triangle of lost consumer and producer surpluses partial equilibrium rent seeking costs are measured by the amount spent to influence policy total welfare cost is the sum of the two measurements while how one determines and thus measures the equilibrium amount of rent seeking is the subject of much debate and modelling the measurement of conventional welfare cost is not controversial 1 furthermore conventional welfare costs are treated as independent of the manner in which rent seeking occurs for example consider the welfare cost of monopoly see tullock 1967 or posner 1975 the portion o f the total welfare cost due to underproduction is measured by the harberger triangle of lost surplus whatever the method by which monopoly rights are obtained the benefits of rent seeking accrue entirely to the holder of the monopoly right any rent seeking expenses are treated as fixed costs with no effect on the monopolist s output decision the form that rent seeking takes is irrelevant to the measurement of conventional welfare cost in other cases the form rent seeking takes is relevant consider a multi firm industry subjected to an excise tax if effective lobbying requires a collective lobbying effort and if a firm s share of the industry s rent seeking expenses vary with a firm s output rent seeking will affect the firm s and industry s marginal cost functions the impact of rent seeking on marginal cost if overlooked leads to mismeasurement of conventional welfare cost and thus the total welfare cost of the policy moreover the direction of measurement error

the substantial bias from ignoring general equilibrium effects in estimating excess burden and a practical solution we show that under typical conditions the simple excess burden triangle formula substantially underestimates the excess burden of commodity taxes in some cases by a factor of 10 or more this formula performs poorly because it ignores general equilibrium interactions most important interactions between the taxed commodity and the labor market many prior studies have shown that general equilibrium interactions affect excess burden but have not appreciated the bias associated with ignoring these interactions or the quantitative importance of this bias we derive an implementable alternative to the simple formula this alternative formula captures interactions that the simple formula omits as a result it is both unbiased and usually more accurate

the welfare effects of environmental taxation recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second best setting than in a first best setting this question has mainly been addressed indirectly by asking whether the second best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first best pigouvian rate even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly comparing the second best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first best value marginal social damage msd on closer examination however msd becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the pigouvian rate given these observations the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first best value the second best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements even in cases where the second best environmental tax is lower than its first best value the welfare gains may be greater than in a first best setting these results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit revenue recycling effect exceeds the marginal fiscal cost tax base effect over a range of environmental tax rates that for benchmark models extends above the first best pigouvian rate these findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods

tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model this paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income it turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare depending on the relative magnitude of i economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions a negative welfare effect is more likely the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter s labor income to average labor income we also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters

the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods abstract this note provides an alternative elementary proof of bergstrom blume and varian s well known result on the uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the private provision of a public good when all goods are normal

optimal provision of public goods a synthesis the standard approach to the optimal provision of public goods highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns a new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the income tax schedule we demonstrate that both approaches are derived from the same basic formula we also take the new approach further by deriving an intuitive formula for the optimal level of public goods without imposing strong assumptions on preferences this formula shows that distortionary taxation has a role to play as in the standard approach however the main determinants of optimal provision are different and the modified samuelson rule is likely to lead to underprovision

unemployment labour markets and structural change in eastern europe labour markets in eastern europe michael burda unemployment is a major concern in the transforming economies of central and eastern europe the modern flow approach to labour markets suggests both that unemployment is an important component of the transformation process and that the labour market institutions adopted will influence the rate of unemployment in the long run to date eastern european countries exhibit considerable divergences in several of these institutions especially in unemployment benefit systems collective bargaining structures and active labour market policies an aggregate matching function is successfully estimated for data from czech and slovak employment offices emerging labour markets in the east function not so differently from those in the west the implied dynamics make both big bang and benign neglect unattractive strategies for transformation a mixed bang is more appropriate quantitative evidence about the effects on unemployment of different labour market institutions in oecd countries is used to make long term projections of equilibrium rates of unemployment in central and eastern europe given the labour market institutions now in place there with the possible exception of the czech republic high unemployment is likely to be pervasive and persistent

the uniqueness of the subscription equilibrium with endogenous labor supply abstract this paper presents a proof of the uniqueness of the nash equilibrium if public goods are financed through private donations and distortionary income taxation

maize and the free trade agreement between mexico and the united states setting the price of maize in rural mexico above the world price is inefficient and likely to have negative distributional effects because many subsistence producers and all landless workers are net buyers in fact it screens out the relatively poor rather than the relatively rich the policy objective therefore should be to move toward free trade this would yield large gains in efficiency the free trade agreement provides an ideal opportunity to pursue this objective it will provide freer entrance into the united states for other agricultural products as well as a broad range of manufactured products ensuring secure and sustained access for labor intensive agricultural and manufactured products can help ease the impact on the labor market of a transition away from subsistence maize cultivation

labor supply taxes and government spending a microeconometric analysis the effect of government spending on labor supply behavior is critical to predicting the balanced budget effect of income taxes and to estimating the marginal social cost of public funds yet its very existence not to mention direction and magnitude has not been empirically investigated this research estimates a labor supply function that incorporates income taxation and government spending using microeconomic data for men and women the empirical results suggest that public sector spending may have a significant effect on labor supply thereby leading to estimates of the marginal social cost of public funds that differ from those typically calculated

nationalization privatization and the allocation of financial property rights in this paper i have shown that a purely economic theory of nationalization and privatization is conceivable on the basis of an analysis of government as a rationally discriminating operator acting as the agent of pressure groups competing for redistribution variations in cost of capital differentials between private investors and the state essentially due to the existence of taxation explain alternate policies of taking over privately owned corporations and divesting from state enterprises soes some initial empirical results are encouraging consequently i cannot reject the hypothesis that through nationalization and privatization episodes politicians after all do behave according to economic rationality

the cost disease and government growth qualifications to baumol changes in real world wage movements across sectors account for about a third of the rise in the cost of u s government services between 1959 and 1989 while relatively slower productivity in the public sector accounts for the remaining two thirds even though it is slower however the productivity record still is positive even in the labor intensive government sector consequently baumol argues that the public s likely future objection to necessary increases in the share of expenditures over the next 50 years will betray a fiscal illusion unless policymakers take pains to dissolve it but slower productivity may be equally due to the structural organization removing public monopolies reducing bureaucracies and undertaking privatization in education for example are other policy options that could radically change the productivity record meanwhile in his recent calculations of dramatic government expenditure increases expected in the next half century baumol omits reference to the marginal welfare cost of public funds which on our estimates will increase at least ten times to reach 1 71 by the year 2040

lifetime and annual marginal costs of redistribution in england sweden and the united states both the annual and lifetime marginal costs of redistribution in england sweden and the united states are calculated the annual marginal cost of redistribution is 2 90 in the united states 3 53 in england and 6 77 in sweden the lifetime marginal cost of redistribution is 4 46 in the united states and 7 96 in england the lifetime marginal cost of redistribution in sweden indicates that additional redistribution reduces the incomes of both the poor and nonpoor this study also shows that when there is greater income equality the marginal tax rate at which the incomes of the poor and nonpoor begin to be reduced will be at lower and lower levels copyright 1993 by mit press

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

dynamic coalition formation and equilibrium policy selection a model of policy formulation is proposed in which the government and the private sector form dynamic coalitions for the purpose of choosing policy actions however current players cannot commit their future selves to any particular actions defining an equilibrium to be an unblocked sequence of actions we show that an equilibrium exists and is unique even though in general cooperative outcomes are not time consistent our framework has the implication that when private agents and the government have identical preferences there are no distortions associated with the use of non lump sum taxes some empirical implications of this result are discussed

impure public goods and transfers in a three agent model abstract this paper extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods the analysis is developed in the context of international public goods under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical if the preferences are divergent a country may gain by giving a transfer the receiver may lose and these two phenomena may appear at the same time

when can carbon abatement policies increase welfare the fundamental role of distorted factor markets abstract this paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue neutral carbon tax and nonauctioned carbon emissions permits taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets the presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies this cost increase is much greater under emissions permits since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about 18 per ton of carbon in contrast an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare improving so long as environmental damages are positive

taxation base in developing countries abstract informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries this is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries we show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power and hence rents for the permitted entrants market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers the rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost the relevance of the theory is assessed with a sample of 64 countries empirical analysis supports the results of the paper

a generalized approach to multigeneration project evaluation 1 introductionit is well known that the choice of discount rate plays a significant role in the ranking of projects with varying time paths of costs and benefits for public projects the choice of the appropriate social discount rate sdr is not clear cut even in the context of short lived projects in which costs and benefits occur within a single generation in particular when capital taxes produce a wedge between gross and net rates of return should one discount at the economy s rate of return the before tax rate or the individual s rate of return the after tax rate in the single generation context the literature falls in two camps 1 one camp argues that the appropriate sdr is a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return with weights typically determined by the fractions of resources drawn from consumption and private investment respectively 2 a second camp argues that future benefits should be discounted at the net rate of return but that the initial investment should be multiplied by a scale factor so that the direct costs of the project can be expressed in terms of consumption units 3both approaches suffer from severe implementation problems for the first approach there is no general formula for the weights needed to calculate the sdr as a weighted average of two market rates of return dreze 1974 indeed the appropriate sdr to use is project specific stiglitz 1982 without a systematic methodology to derive project specific sdrs the weighted average approach is hard to implement for the second approach which equalizes the sdr to the net rate of return the scale factor the opportunity cost of public investment must be quantified the opportunity cost of public investment depends on whether resources come from private investment or consumption and on the calculation of the present value of the future consumption yielded by a unit of capital discounted at the net rate of return that is the shadow price of capital as lind 1997 points out however there is no general agreement on a specific procedure for calculating the shadow price of capital indeed the concept of the opportunity cost of public investment suffers the same project dependence problem as the first view of the sdr diamond 1968 multigeneration projects such as nuclear waste disposal natural resource conservation or even social security reform further complicate discount rate choice specifically intergenerational equity in addition to intertemporal efficiency plays a role in determining the appropriate social discount rate for multigeneration public project evaluation 4 as in the single generation context there are two competing views on the appropriate discount rate when evaluating multigeneration projects the descriptive and the prescriptive approaches 5the descriptive approach to discounting is a market based approach it does not rely on an explicit social welfare function swf or the pure time preference rate embedded in the swf however the descriptive approach works under the assumption that intergenerational compensation through changes in the tax debt policy is available 6 it is argued that under appropriate intergenerational compensation the market rates of return are still relevant for calculating the sdr for multigeneration project evaluation and in general the sdr should be a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return this descriptive view of setting the sdr equal to the market return appears to underlie the office of management and budget s omb adoption of 7 as the appropriate discount rate for federal programs 7the intent of the prescriptive approach is to use the social discount rate as an expression of ethical judgment on how consumption of future generations should be compared to consumption of current generations

policy dependency and reform economic gains versus political pains economic analysis condemns market intervention in favour of farmers as inefficient and ineffective and therefore worthy of radical reform practical experience however indicates that such lessons are hard to learn and implement economic analysis tends to ignore the path dependencies generated by the policy evolution process without reform strategies that take full account of these dependencies policy reform will continue to be reluctant slow and frequently counterproductive this paper reconsiders the evolution of farm policies and the economic assessment of their costs and benefits in so doing it re phrases conventional economic arguments in terms which seem to accord better with sensible intuition which may prove more accessible and credible to policymakers and advisors the difficulties of reconciling economic efficiency with political acceptability are identified the paper concludes with a substantial challenge to the agricultural economics profession

intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument empirical evidence from swedish municipalities are grants to swedish municipalities tactical in this essay i derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 swedish municipalities 1981 1995 in order to decide which regions that are politically powerful both election results and survey data from the swedish election studies are used the results although somewhat ambiguous support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes

measuring the efficiency cost of wage taxation with uncertain labor productivity abstract estimates of the marginal efficiency cost of wage taxation can vary between 7 and 21 of revenues raised using a consistent definition eliminates much of the variability in these estimates however all studies carried out evaluate the marginal efficiency cost within a certainty framework the inclusion of uncertain labor productivity dramatically changes the efficiency loss measurement by affecting the marginal utility of lump sum income and consequently altering the marginal efficiency cost of a tax change

tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in sweden abstract we assess the welfare cost of raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in a balanced budget general equilibrium framework the calculated social cost of an increment of public funds is sensitive to both the specific type of tax increase and the type of public spending used on the margin best guess assumptions on labor supply elasticities yield marginal costs of public funds for different fiscal mixes of between 0 67 and 4 51 at prevailing tax rates in sweden alternative labor supply assumptions well within the range of current estimates substantially affect the results and can imply infinite marginal welfare costs marginal welfare costs are also sensitive to assumptions about both the income and substitution effects of labor supply

funding transportation spending in metropolitan washington dc the costs of alternative revenue sources abstract this paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating the efficiency costs of raising additional revenue from taxes on labor property gasoline peak road use and higher transit fares for the washington dc area the model incorporates driving externalities and interactions between the different policies an economic case can be made for using congestion taxes and possibly gasoline and property taxes to raise extra revenue though it should be qualified for example the inelastic demand for driving limits the congestion benefits per dollar of revenue raised and these taxes have adverse employment effects in the same way that a tax on labor income does

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

rationalizing agricultural export subsidies export subsidies are an important form of agricultural policy especially for large traders such as the united states and the european community a number of small countries also use export subsidies in effect e g saudi arabian wheat or canadian dairy products in that the domestic price is set well above world levels and surplus production is dumped onto the world market a number of recent contributions to trade theory have argued that export subsidies can be welfare enhancing for the subsidizing country and by implication that the policy choice is consistent with the hypothesis that a benevolent government is pursuing pareto efficiency in the present paper we examine these arguments and present an alternative explanation of export subsidies utilizing the concept of efficient redistribution becker gardner 1983 in standard trade models arguments in favor of global export subsidies arise from failure to exploit market power in another good itoh and kiyono feenstra itoh and kiyono use a threegood model to show that subsidies on marginal goods defined as goods not exported at all or exported in small quantities can increase welfare in the subsidizing country a subsidy on marginal goods causes their production to increase and the supply of nonmarginal goods to decrease thereby raising the price of the nonmarginal goods and increasing the exporter s terms of trade feenstra also employs a threegood model and demonstrates that it is possible for the pattern of substitutability and complementarity across goods to allow subsidies to increase welfare the necessary condition is that the subsidized export be a stronger substitute for another exported good or a stronger complement for an imported good in the subsidizing country than abroad the export subsidy increases welfare by improving the terms of trade in the other imported or exported good the distortion in feenstra s model is the failure to exploit market power in the second or third market as an alternative to global export subsidies abbott paarlberg and sharples aps have examined targeted export subsidies and found that in some circumstances they can be welfare improving dutton later showed the aps result arises because they first constrain the export tax to the rest of the world to be zero so that it becomes theoretically possible for the best export tax to the targeted country to be negative the aps result hinges on differences in import demand elasticities and the exporting country s use of market power in order to price discrim

the effect of income taxation on consumption and labor supply we estimate the incentive effects of income taxation in a life cycle model of consumption and labor supply without intratemporal strong separability we find that consumption and hours worked are direct complements in utility both increase with a compensated increase in the net wage the compensated net wage elasticity is about 0 3 nearly double estimates for u s men from a linear labor supply specification estimated intertemporal elasticities indicate significant intertemporal smoothing of utility the estimated marginal welfare cost of government revenue is 6 20 which is about half the estimated welfare cost when additivity between consumption and leisure is incorrectly imposed

environmental tax interactions when pollution affects health or productivity abstract recent studies indicate that interactions with the tax distorted labor market increase the cost of pollution regulation however these studies make restrictive assumptions regarding preferences and ignore key links between pollution human health and labor productivity together these assumptions imply that pollution does not affect labor supply this paper develops an analytical general equilibrium model that considers several potential benefits from reduced pollution including improved health or productivity it shows that these benefits affect labor supply and thus create a benefit side tax interaction effect that can be of the same magnitude as the familiar cost side interaction when reduced pollution boosts labor productivity the effect substantially magnifies such benefits in contrast when pollution affects consumer health the effect tends to diminish the benefits of reduced pollution the paper considers only environmental regulation but these concepts apply equally to other policies affecting productivity or health such as research subsidies or occupational safety regulations

agricultural policies in the presence of distorting taxes this article analyzes how distortionary factor taxes affect the welfare impacts of production subsidies production quotas acreage controls subsidies for acreage reductions and cash transfers to farmers pre existing taxes substantially raise the costs of all these policies these additional costs reflect the welfare losses from financing certain policies by distortionary taxes they also reflect interactions with factor markets caused by changes in the costs of producing agricultural output previous studies ignore the latter types of effect consequently they significantly overstate the costs of production subsidies and understate the costs of production quotas acreage controls and subsidies for acreage reductions

reconciling alternative views about the appropriate social discount rate abstract this paper shows that in an economy with an exogenous rate of return and a given capital income tax distortion and with lump sum taxes as the marginal tax instrument the soc and mcf criteria both correctly identify all worthwhile projects if the criteria are properly applied the equivalence between the soc and mcf criteria continues to hold i if distortionary taxes are used to balance the budget and ii if the rate of return to capital is endogenous apparent differences between the soc and mcf criteria arise from different definitions of a project s indirect revenue effect neither criterion has an implementation advantage because the information requirements for each are identical

reexamination of the relative efficiency of the draft and the all volunteer army economists are in almost universal agreement that the all volunteer approach to recruiting military personnel is more efficient than the draft several related considerations form the basis for this agreement first the draft imposes a discriminatory tax on recruits equal to the difference between their market wages and the below market military wage plus a compensating differential for serving in the military second below market pricing of personnel under the draft leads to a military with too many recruits third the all volunteer approach attracts those recruits with the lowest opportunity costs and hence secures a given number of recruits at less cost these standard economic arguments for the all volunteer approach over the draft have been heavily influenced by hansen and weisbrod 7 and oi 10 the purpose of this paper is to argue that under certain conditions the above considerations fail to make a compelling case for the all volunteer approach over the draft the conventional economic case for the all volunteer approach fails to recognize that the relative difference between the cost of the all volunteer approach and the draft depends on the percentage of the eligible population recruited into the military and the dead weight loss associated with conventional taxation as the number of recruits increases relative to the eligible population the advantage of being able to discriminate between high and low opportunity cost recruits diminishes also the larger

a positive model of tax reform this paper is devoted to the explanation of tax policy from a behavioural theoretic point of view it for the first time brings together within a unified framework behavioural determinants of government expenditure taxation and tax reform administrative and compliance costs associated with taxation factors generally neglected in models of taxation as well as tax avoidance evasion deadweight losses and the costs that are involved in the tax reform process itself play a crucial role in the model the paper investigates how these factors influence the development of taxation and expenditure and the occurrence of tax reform

on the marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods abstract this paper argues that in models with heterogeneous agents the concept of the marginal cost of public funds mcpf will only be useful if it is compared with an analogous concept for the benefit side the mcpf does not assume a unique value and is not particularly illuminating in and out of itself also gone is the benchmark status of mcpf 1 turning to the provision of public goods using a mechanism design approach the paper constructs a two stage proof for kaplow s kaplow l 1996 the optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation national tax journal 49 513 533 proposition concerning the irrelevance of labor supply and distributional concerns in public good provision this highlights the two fundamental ingredients for his result first the provision of public goods per se when it satisfies the samuelson s rule is only potentially pareto improving second the actual pareto improvement will materialize when or if one reforms the income tax structure if the reform is not forthcoming the decision on public goods provision must rely on redistributional concerns finally the paper generalizes broadway and keen s boadway r keen m 1993 public goods self selection and optimal income taxation international economic review 34 463 478 result to a model with many types of agents many private goods and without making any assumptions regarding which self selection constraints are or are not binding

marginal welfare cost calculations differential analysis vs balanced budget analysis abstract in a differential analysis tax revenue collections are held constant in a balanced budget analysis the spending level is changed and the level of distortionary taxation is changed correspondingly here income effects are important and efficiency calculations depend chiefly on uncompensated elasticities unless government exhaustive expenditure is assumed to substitute closely for cash a small scale computational general equilibrium model is constructed and differential and balanced budget experiments are performed results show that marginal welfare costs calculated from balanced budget experiments can be negative when labor supply functions are backward bending interactions among parameter values and efficiency costs are explored

on the construction of marginal federal personal and social security tax rates in the u s abstract in this article i correct and extend my earlier series on marginal federal personal income tax rates i also construct a measure of the marginal social security tax rate and add this to the income tax rate to obtain a measure of the effective marginal tax rate on income due to federal taxes finally i compare my series on marginal income tax rates and its method of construction with those of barro and sahasakul

price adjustment and market structure abstract this paper shows how the extent of price inertia depends on the form of market competition we first establish that the speed of price adjustment depends on the curvature of the profit function in the region around the optimum price we then show how this depends on market structure we prove the following results 1 1 the speed of price adjustment depends positively on the price elasticity of demand 2 2 the speed of price adjustment depends positively on the number of firms in a market and 3 3 the speed of price adjustment depends negatively on the degree of collusion between firms

distortionary taxation and optimal public spending on productive activities mutsumi matsumoto using a general equilibrium model with endogenous factor supplies this article investigates the provision of factor augmenting public inputs such inputs are intermediate goods that affect production functions in a collective manner and give rise to increasing returns unlike with collective consumption goods deviation from the first best condition for a public input is inappropriate if taxes are set optimally when taxes are not optimal a second best rule must include a feedback effect on revenue as well as the deadweight cost of taxes implications for benefit cost analysis and for interpretation of estimates of the social returns to public capital are explored jel h21 h54 o4 i introduction government spending on public infrastructure and on human capital formation are often cited as important contributing forces to economic growth with reference to less developed economies isham and kaufmann 1999 show that the returns from public infrastructure investments are very high where the overall policy regime is basically sound turning to human capital psacharopolous and woodhall 1985 point out the sizable excess of social over private returns from education temple 1999 indicates that the importance of these public investments and others like them for example research and development is not limited to less developed countries appropriate levels are important across all economies the key characteristic of these sorts of commodities is that they exhibit positive externalities across productive entities in short they may be categorized as public intermediate goods or public inputs although such commodities are beneficial they are also costly spending on them takes a large portion of p ublic budgets moreover government financing of these costs typically involves the use of distortionary taxes those taxes create excess burden the magnitudes of which may be substantial for instance in an influential contribution browning 1987 21 suggests the marginal excess burden of taxes on labor income ranges from 31 8 to 46 9 the crux of this article is the relevance of distortionary taxes to decisions about public input expenditure bruce 1998 457 and musgrave et al 1987 288 89 suggest the incorporation of the deadweight cost of taxation as a cost when evaluating public projects boardman et al 1996 62 64 in their authoritative benefit cost text recommend the inclusion of deadweight loss in the assessment of net benefits of tax funded public projects these recommendations are intuitively appealing they are also consistent with the second best expenditure condition for spending on public consumption goods atkinson and stern 1974 show that marginal cost of a public consumption good must include the excess burden of the tax system indeed some of the most important recent empirical work on the returns from public capital have assessed those returns after netting out the deadweight loss of the tax system see morrison and schwartz 1996 and nadiri and mamuneas 1994 this article investigates the theoretical basis for deviating from the first best rule for public input provision when taxes are distortionary 1 one finding is that despite the deadweight losses a second best rule for public inputs should not be followed when taxes are set optimally the first best condition remains appropriate in effect the production efficiency theorem of diamond and mirrlees 1971 extends to a public input economy however and importantly for actual policy when taxes are not optimal then not only the excess burden but the impact of the public input on the government s budgetary position must be taken into account these qualifications need to be incorporated into empirical studies and benefit cost analysis ii the model the analysis makes use of a general equilibrium model of a competitive economy in which factor supplies are variable and there is a public input

the trade off between equality and efficiency this paper uses a 1976 microdata base to estimate the marginal cost of reducing income inequality with a policy that has distributional effects similar to the present tax transfer system the analysis uses a simulation methodology in which only the labor supply effects are evaluated other behavioral effects are ignored the most striking finding is that marginal cost is quite high even for modest labor supply elasticities for example in the benchmark case with a weighted average economy wide uncompensated wage elasticity of 0 2 and compensated elasticity of 0 31 the disposable money income of upper income quintiles of households is depressed by 9 51 for each dollar increase in the disposable money income of lower income quintiles when income equivalent values that take account of the value of leisure are compared the marginal cost for this case is estimated to be 3 49

shades of brown and green party effects in proportional election systems small parties play an important role in proportional election systems for exam ple the emergence and electoral success of environmental and anti immigration parties have constituted one of the central changes in the political landscape in europe over the last three decades but we do not know if this has actually had any implications for policy since no methods exist for credibly estimating the eect of legislative represen tation in proportional election systems because party representation is not randomly assigned both observable and unobservable factors in uence policy outcomes as well as party representation using a part of the legislative seat allocation that is as good as random i estimate the causal eect of party representation on immigration policy environmental policy and tax policy i use data swedish municipalities where key poli cies for each policy area are under direct jurisdiction of the municipal councils the results show that party representation has a large eect on the rst two policies but not on the tax policy

revisiting the cost of protectionism abstract most studies of the welfare impacts of trade policy have ignored interactions between these policies and pre existing distortions from the income tax this paper demonstrates that when these interactions are taken into account the potential gains or losses from tariffs import quotas or voluntary export restrictions are significantly magnified however as long as the trade barrier doesn t generate rents for domestic households the optimal level of the trade barrier is unchanged from the first best case trade policies which do increase domestic rents either in the form of quota rents or rents to fixed factors in production suffer an additional efficiency cost and the optimal policy in this case is less strict than in the first best case

private versus public charity reassessing crowding out from the supply side this paper tests a model where governmentand private charity are perfect substitutesin consumption but the cost of providingcharitable assistance differs betweenprivate and government suppliers theanalysis demonstrates that higher costs oftransferring through the government canaccount for the observed phenomenon of lessthan complete crowding out and theempirical results are broadly consistentwith that approach overall the evidenceis consistent with the hypothesis thatindividuals both care about the leakagesinvolved in transferring funds to the poorthrough government and respond in theirprivate giving to changes in thedifferential public cost