price distortions in agriculture and their effects an international comparison the central thesis of this paper is that agricultural pricing policies pursued by developing countries produce effects which are diametrically opposite to those produced by the pricing policies of many developed countries and that the policies of both are costly in terms of global welfare in general the agricultural sector in developing countries is heavily taxed while that in the developed countries receives substantial price protection the effects of agricultural price distortions on output consumption trade and rural employment are estimated for nine countries in addition the effects of price distortions on the distribution of income between producers and consumers on government revenue and foreign exchange and the net social losses of the policies are calculated the results indicate that there are large income transfers and impacts on migration from the rural to the urban sector in developing countries and from the urban to the rural sector in developed economies

agricultural price instability a survey of competing explanations and remedies there are two explanations for agricultural price dynamics one follows cobweb logic and models fluctuations driven by expectation errors but emphasises that these expectations create complex dynamics and possibly chaos the other stems from the rational expectations tradition of dynamics driven by real shocks the empirical evidence tends to support the latter but is not conclusive the rational expectations model generates an optimal dynamic path from which no improvement can be expected from public intervention however if we take account of all the potential market failures in agricultural markets and especially in developing countries this conclusion might require some qualifications although an appropriate policy design for stability has still to be achieved this paper surveys the positive and normative literature on agricultural prices highlighting empirical evidence and identifying remaining unresolved issues

a farm firm model of machinery investment decisions this article presents a multiperiod mixed integer programming mmip model of optimal machinery decisions infinite horizon valuation models of replacement and other investment situations are conceptualized in the context of a finite programming model dual properties of the mmip model are used to identify and value opportunity costs involved in investment decisions of farm machinery the interdependent nature of investment and production relationships necessary for solving these values emphasizes the importance of a holistic firm perspective in analyzing farm machinery investment strategies an empirical situation is used to demonstrate model application

on the transmission of world agricultural prices two questions are asked about the relationship between domestic prices and world prices of agricultural commodities are variations in world prices transmitted to domestic prices domestic prices are regressed on world prices in various forms taking into account the possible effects of exchange rates and inflation the empirical analysis is based on data from the food and agriculture organization of the united nations for 58 countries from 1968 78 and for the countries of the european community from 1961 85 the results show that most of the variations in world prices are transmitted and that they constitute the dominant component in the variations of domestic prices

forced information disclosure and the fallacy of transparency in markets a theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences for example wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility demand is disclosed to producers experimental markets studied here featured decentralized privately negotiated contracts typical of the wholesale electricity markets two conclusions emerge i such markets generally converge to the competitive equilibrium and ii forced disclosure works to the disadvantage of the disclosing side information disclosure would result in higher wholesale and thus higher retail electricity prices

does the per se rule deter vertical price fixing i introduction beginning with the wide scale introduction of branded goods in the late nineteenth century manufacturers have often tried to dictate minimum resale prices to the retail outlets carrying their products and since roughly the same time antitrust experts have debated why they would do so 1 less attention has focused on what manufacturers do when they can not impose minimum prices even though legal obstacles have forced them to look for alternatives so what do manufacturers do when they cannot legally set the prices their outlets charge 2 many antitrust officials believe they go right on setting prices either flaunting the law or finding some means to circumvent it barrett 1991 quotes former new york state antitrust chief lloyd constantine as saying that the practice is ubiquitous but based upon winks and nods rather than written agreements that could be used in court new york attorney general robert abrams 1991 argues that vertical price fixing is endemic claiming that antitrust officers can recount scores of tales of retailers calling our offices too scared to give their names telling of coercion and intimidation by manufacturers representatives and rival dealers because their prices were too low former ftc commissioner terry calvani argues that a manufacturer practicing resale price maintenance would have to have an i q two points lower than a carrot to get caught 3 the prospects for wink and nod resale price maintenance are not hard to appreciate for example suppose a manufacturer wants to impose a 500 sanction on any discount outlet if it cannot do so overtly it may instead impose a lump sum charge of 500 on all outlets and ex post reward non discount outlets with a 500 rebate given this scheme s transparency courts legislators and antitrust officials should not be fooled yet the rebates could be indirect and discreet they could be spread over several periods and parceled out in small quantities as compensation for point of sale services to defray overhead to pay for advertising or training and so forth hence it may be hard for outsiders to prove a link between what the manufacturer pays each retailer and that retailer s price moreover in some instances antitrust officials may want an excuse to loosen the legal restrictions on resale price maintenance and may themselves wink and nod at these practices finally antitrust officials cannot always and perhaps not often distinguish legitimate cost sharing arrangements from maneuvers to influence resale prices as such they must proceed carefully manufacturers can employ two other legal means to fix resale prices first manufacturers can coordinate retailers meet the competition guarantees antitrust experts have long believed that on occasion retailers can independently offer meet the competition guarantees to their customers to discourage price competition 4 here a manufacturer coordinates retailers efforts by financing some or all of the meet the competition related rebates they make so in equilibrium all retailers adopt the suggested price while previous models of meet the competition guarantees focus on tacit horizontal price fixing this paper examines explicit vertical price fixing second the manufacturer can persuade retailers to charge its suggested price by guaranteeing the margins of those victimized by price cutting rivals in equilibrium no outlet wants to cut price first so discounting does not occur at all manufacturers have various other means to influence their dealers resale prices in addition to such well known instruments as consignment sales and exclusive territories manufacturers can agree to buy back dealers unsold inventories or parcel out merchandise only as demand for it materializes they can also use devices such as markdown allowances to influence when and by how much dealers discount if demand turns out low presumably this list does not exhaust the possibilities for innovative manufacturers seeking to subsidize dealers that cooperate and to discriminate against those that do not

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

a nonlinear mixed integer multiperiod firm model abstract we formulate and test an advanced multiperiod model for strategic firm planning this has not been previously considered as a mixed integer nonlinear problem minlp our approach is to show the differences between a linear and a nonlinear mixed integer approach the key property of our model is the simplicity and efficiency of generating optimal firm strategies a cornerstone for managerial acceptance our purpose is to maximize the discounted value of net income and return on investment roi our model has been tested on some major finnish firms and it seems to give reliable results with the data of our sample firm for this paper optimal roi and optimal net income presuppose different strategies when optimizing roi the model balances between cash and fixed assets while optimizing net income results in an intensive investment program even if our sample firm is but one case the results are indicative of some fundamental principles governing managerial decision making

measuring macroeconomic instability a critical survey illustrated with exports series for at least 40 years the analysis of the causes and consequences of macroeconomic instability has greatly deepened our understanding of the handicaps faced by developing countries this concern on economic instability is evidenced by a broad spectrum of indicators based on the deviation of observed values of a given economic aggregate from its reference or trend value in general the choice of this or that indicator is not discussed advocating that the resulting instability indicators are closely correlated focusing on measurements of instability in export revenue data for 134 countries from 1970 to 2005 this paper finds that this assertion may be true for variancebased indicators measuring the average magnitude of deviations from the trend however great discrepancies may arise between different measures of the asymmetry or of the occurrence of extreme deviations around the trend when different trend computation methods are used our purpose is therefore to invite further discussions regarding the use of these indicators and to highlight the different dimensions of instability which have been so far unheeded by the economic literature

the effects of market practices in oligopolistic markets an experimental examination of the ethyl case this study reports on the performance of experimental markets characterized by industrial structure and practices similar to those at issue in the ethyl case the central question is whether price competition is affected by the practices of advanced notification of price changes and most favored nation contracts or is determined by industrial organization and concentration alone

the effects of group composition in a strategic environment evidence from a field experiment abstract recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision making this line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision making environment potentially miss critical features this study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally our experimental laboratory is large open air markets where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller s collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations this permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions and show that deviations from nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership

information disclosure in auctions an experiment we report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first price sealed bid auctions interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random matching protocol and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period when bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods prices are higher than the theoretical prediction however when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction we suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

market integration and price transmission in consumer markets of developing countries abstract world prices for agricultural commodities surged in 2006 08 and then again in 2011 12 in many developing countries consumer prices for staple foods such as bread and rice mirrored these movements this paper examines whether prices in urban consumer markets within developing countries are co integrated with prices in world agricultural commodity markets using a single equation error correction model we examine the response of consumer prices for wheat rice maize and sorghum to changes in world market prices and exchange rates in urban centers of the developing world analyzing over 60 country commodity pairings we find that developing countries consumer markets are co integrated with world markets yet we also find that the transmission of changes in both world prices and real exchange rates to domestic consumer prices is not high and that the movement of domestic consumer prices to new equilibrium with world prices after a shock to the latter is relatively slow

the global food crisis and guatemala what crisis and for whom summary international food prices rose sharply during 2006 08 precipitating the global food crisis we analyze the welfare effects of changes in prices over categories of households in guatemala and find three surprising results the first is that the transmission of international into domestic prices was quite modest the second is that most farm households are net buyers of food implying that they lost from rising prices the third is that farm households represent two thirds of all poor households losing from rising food prices stressing the importance of production for home consumption in sheltering the poor from the crisis

a dynamic bank portfolio planning model with multiple scenarios multiple goals and changing priorities abstract the paper discusses a practical application of a two stage linear goal programming model to the management of the domestic and foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities of a large bank in finland the planning horizon includes three one year planning periods a number of alternative scenarios are used to describe uncertainty concerning future developments in these periods the scenarios are related to general economic conditions as well as the state of the domestic and foreign financial markets the bank is assumed to have multiple conflicting goals with different and changing priorities the goals deal with expected profits risk liquidity capital adequacy growth customer relationships and several other aspects of the bank s operations

dynamic duopoly with best price clauses this article investigates best price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game best price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase two different price clauses are distinguished most favored customer and meet or release i examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods in each period new consumers enter the market i show that in this context meet or release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most favored customer clauses

commercial policy variability bindings and market access abstract protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time rules based disciplines such as wto tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services constrain this variability we examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of market access emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection as an illustration we provide a stylized examination of uruguay round bindings on wheat

a laboratory study of auctions for reducing non point source pollution abstract non point source pollution such as nutrient runoff to waterways from agricultural production is an environmental problem that typically involves asymmetric information land use changes to reduce pollution incur opportunity costs that are privately known to landholders but these changes provide environmental benefits that may be more accurately estimated by regulators this paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment in which landholder sellers in sealed offer auctions compete to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the regulator to subsidize abatement in one treatment the regulator reveals to landholders the environmental benefits estimated for their projects and in another treatment the regulator conceals the potential projects environmental quality the results show that sellers offers misrepresent their costs more for high quality projects when quality is revealed so total abatement is lower and seller profits are higher when landholders know their projects environmental benefits this suggests that concealing this information may improve regulatory efficiency

effects of macroeconomic policies on sectoral prices the effect of macroeconomic policies on the relative prices of internationally traded and domestic goods has been the subject of extensive study analysis of the way in which these policies then affect prices at the sectoral level is complicated by the beterogeneity of sectoral production even the prices of single products usually are determined by both domestic and traded components we present a framework which first traces the influence of macropolicy on the relative prices of exports imports and home goods it then accounts for each sector s degree of tradability which is based on the importance of trade in sectoral income and the influence of macroeconomic policy on sectoral prices to illustrate the use of this approach it is applied to a simulation of trade liberalization in argentina our results suggest that economywide policies had substantial negative effects on both the real exchange rate and the incentives to agricultural exports in an open economy the prices of tradable products are determined by world prices nominal exchange rates and taxes the prices of products which are not tradable are determined by domestic supply and demand which are themselves influenced by the actions and policies of the government some very important economic decisions depend on the price of tradables relative to that of nontradables the real exchange rate we examine here the way in which broader government policies affect the real exchange rate and through it prices at the sectoral level

an interest rate risk management model for commercial banks abstract this paper develops a goal programming model to assist a commercial bank in managing its exposure to interest rate risk the bank s objective is to immunize its equity position against innovations in interest rates while maximizing its market value to accomplish this task a duration gap framework is developed that does not require interest rate forecasts as decision variables the model includes assets liabilities and off balance sheet derivative securities the focus is on a protective put strategy that uses options on interest rate futures but to provide contrast a short interest rate futures position is examined as well application of the model to an illustrative environment indicates that for larger interest rate changes the option strategy provides better protection against interest rate risk than the short futures position

automated pricing rules in electronic posted offer markets i introduction electronic commerce affords the opportunity to automate the process by which buyers and sellers engage in an exchange at a mutually agreeable price for example buyers on the internet can use software agents to automate the gathering of information on price and other product attributes in online retail markets that are traditionally organized as posted offer markets 1 this technology obviously reduces the consumer transaction costs of comparing prices which presumably would induce stronger competition among sellers however as hal varian remarked in the e commerce magazine wired everybody thinks more information is better for consumers that s not necessarily true bayers 2000 215 the same technology that reduces consumer transaction costs can be employed by sellers to automate the monitoring of rivals prices which might mitigate or even overwhelm the procompetitive effect of reduced consumer search costs in addition electronic markets grant more than just ideal information on competitors pr ices with electronic commerce a seller can commit to implementing an automated algorithm that could possibly sustain tacitly collusive prices in this article we study the supply side effects of three automated pricing algorithms that use price information as an input that could be retrieved from consumer price gathering technology in an electronic market two of the three algorithms that we study have the theoretical potential to facilitate collusion low price matching and a trigger strategy the third and presumably more competitive algorithm which we refer to as undercutting is drawn from the common retail practice of beating competitors prices using the experimental method this article explores how sellers deploy these three automated pricing algorithms in electronic markets more specifically we ask 1 do sellers prefer to set their price manually or to adopt automated algorithms that adjust price more frequently 2 are markets with automated pricing algorithms more competitive or less competitive than markets with manually posted prices 3 does increased commitment to an automated pricing mechanism facilitate tacit collusion to study the impact of automated pricing on seller behavior we base our work on the model of price dispersion in retail markets by varian 1980 thus our article also explores how well a theory of mixed strategy pricing organizes the behavior of sellers in a market with a nearly continuous stream of differentially informed fully revealing customers 2 as a preview of the results we find that 1 sellers employ automated pricing algorithms more often than they manually set their own price 2a automated undercutting leads to prices similar to the game theoretic prediction 2b automated low price matching generates prices significantly higher than the game theoretic prediction 2c automated trigger pricing results in market prices below the game theoretic prediction and 3 greater commitment to automated low price matching shifts prices closer to the joint profit maximizing outcome the structure of the article is as follows section ii presents the three automated pricing algorithms we consider the experimental design and procedures are in section iii section iv presents and discusses our results and section v briefly concludes ii automated pricing algorithms the market environment is motivated by the model of sales in varian 1980 3 in this model there are n sellers that supply buyers who each desire to purchase at most one unit of a homogeneous product each seller has a commonly known constant marginal cost c of supplying a unit to a buyer and posts a price p which the buyer can accept or reject the private value v for each nonstrategic buyer is assumed to be a random variable drawn independently from a known uniform distribution with a support v v buyers differ based on the number of firms from which price quotes are received prior to making a purchasing decision

oligopolistic competition as a common agency game oligopolistic competition is analyzed in a complete information multi principal common agency framework where principals are firms supplying differentiated goods and the agent is a representative consumer we first propose a canonical formulation of common agency games and a parameterization of the set of equilibria based on the lagrange multipliers associated with the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints of each principal this is used to characterize the set of equilibria in the intrinsic and non intrinsic games the former includes the latter as well as the standard price and quantity equilibrium outcomes it may also include the collusive solution

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

the role of economic theory in modelling the long run this argues for a closer link between the modelling of the long run relations in applied economics and the intertemporal equilibrium notion from economic theory this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the political economy of agricultural protection east asia in an international perspective kym anderson and yujiro hayami allen and unwin australia japan research centre australian national university london sydney boston 185 pp

what do facilitating practices facilitate an empirical investigation of most favored nation clauses in natural gas contracts long term contracts often include most favored nation clauses mfns which are nondiscrimination guarantees that obligate a buyer or seller to treat all trading partners symmetrically in pricing decisions recent theoretical work has shown that such clauses can facilitate tacit collusion by increasing the cost of selective price changes aimed at attracting new business an alternative view is that mfns serve to facilitate efficient price adjustment in extended exchange relationships we test these competing hypotheses using data from long term natural gas contracts many of which employ mfns our conclusion is that the pattern of mfn adoption in conjunction with the structure of the nondiscrimination regions and the parallels with other nonstrategic price escalation provisions lends strong support to the efficiency rationale

market power and mergers in laboratory markets with posted prices in this article we use laboratory methods to evaluate determinants of supracompetitive pricing the experiment involves three treatments each with the same market supply demand and competitive price in the baseline treatment capacity is divided among five sellers so that the competitive price is a nash equilibrium market power is created in a second treatment by reallocating capacity among the sellers this market power raises observed prices in all sessions in a third treatment the three smallest sellers are merged in a way that holds market power constant the consolidation has little residual effect on prices

the impact of collusion on price behavior empirical results from two recent cases abstract we use extended arch and garch models to examine the differences in the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution during collusive and competitive phases of two recently discovered conspiracies citric acid and lysine according to our results the conspirators managed to raise prices by 9 and 25 cents per pound in the short run relative to non collusive periods also the variance of prices during the lysine conspiracy was lower and the variance of prices during the citric acid conspiracy was higher than during more competitive periods the proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and prosecution purposes

has world cereal market instability increased abstract this paper argues that world cereal prices are good indicators of the state of world cereal markets it tests whether real prices for wheat rice and maize exhibit deterministic or stochastic trends concluding that the underlying trends are most likely deterministic after appropriate deterministic detrending the paper tests for increased variance of the residuals of real cereal prices finding that there does not appear to be evidence for increased year to year price instability tests for increased intra year price variability also reject the hypothesis of increased variability discussion of recent changes in the pattern of world cereal production and trade suggests that these conclusions are not contrary to observed trends

managing interest rate risk in banking institutions abstract this paper develops and employs a multiperiod goal programming model to examine the normative effects of changing interest rates on the rearrangements of depository bank balance sheets and associated profits a two stage state preference framework allows a dynamic interpretation of the model s prescribed decisions as well as a natural incorporation of profit sensitivity to interest rate risk the model includes on and off the balance sheet decision variables experimental results indicate that constraining the latter decision can seriously curtail the bank s ability to achieve its profit objectives

structural changes in the time series of food prices and volatility measurement volatility in product prices is of considerable interest in the food and agricultural policy arena standard deviation sd type of measures including variance and the coefficient of variation have been commonly used for estimating realized volatility these methods are relatively simple to calculate and focus on the width of the data despite these merits they have a shortcoming in that the statistics can be amplified when the time series is nonstationary this study suggests a new way to measure price variation the structural breaks in the unconditional mean of a time series are determined and then the conventional sd type of measures for each regime are calculated this method addresses the weak point of the sd type of measure and is a competitive alternative to the conditional variance type or the trend deviation type of measures when the time series at comparison have notably different data generating processes or have nonstationarity

internal conflict market uniformity and transparency in price competition between teams abstract the way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict we experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams affects teams ability to compete vis a vis each other and consequently market outcomes participants took part in a repeated bertrand duopoly game between three player teams which had either the same or different levels of internal conflict uniform vs mixed profit division was either private pay high conflict each member received her own asking price or equal pay low conflict profits were divided equally we find that internal conflict leads to tacit coordination on high prices in uniform private pay duopolies but places private pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets but intensified in mixed markets we propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers d43 l22 c92

equilibrium incentives for most favored customer clauses in an oligopolistic industry abstract this paper analyzes the economics of contemporaneous most favored customer clauses mfcc in a non cooperative n firm oligopoly in the first stage of a two stage game each firm independently decides whether to adopt mfcc in the second stage firms set prices non cooperatively given the first stage choices in contrast to work on retroactive mfcc by cooper the rand journal of economics 1986 17 377 388 our analysis shows that not adopting mfcc can be a dominant strategy the difference between our results and cooper s highlights important differences between retroactive and contemporaneous mfcc and suggests that mfcc are a less powerful facilitating practice than retroactive mfcc our analysis also sheds new light on grether and plott s economic inquiry 1984 22 497 507 experimental results regarding the effects of mfcc on average industry prices

privileged traders and asset market efficiency a laboratory study the 39 experiments reported here examine the impact on trading profits and on market performance of awarding special trading privileges to some traders and not others in call market experiments the last mover and orderflow access privileges are both modestly prof itable and neither impairs market performance in continuous market experiments quicker access to orderflow information is quite profitable and more detailed access is possibly prof itable both privileges seem to enhance market performance slightly by contrast privileged marketmaking is extremely profitable and greatly impairs market performance