efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

reciprocal relationships and mechanism design we study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves we model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players commitments we differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down we fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment we use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non participants the difference stems from the players ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts we discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal

a natural experiment on sick pay cuts sickness absence and labor costs abstract this study estimates the reform effects of a reduction in statutory sick pay levels on sickness absence behavior and labor costs german federal law reduced the legal obligation of german employers to provide 100 continued wage pay for up to six weeks per sickness episode in 1996 statutory sick pay was decreased to 80 of foregone gross wages within the reform s target group private sector employees this measure increased the proportion of employees having zero days of absence between 6 and 8 quantile regression estimates indicate that employees with up to 5 5 annual absence days reduced their days of absence by about 12 extended analyses suggest that in industries that enforced the cut behavioral effects were about twice as large we show that the direct labor cost savings effect stemming from the cut in replacement levels clearly exceeds the indirect effect due to the decrease in absenteeism our calculations about the total decrease in labor costs are very much in line with official data which suggest that total employer provided sick pay decreased by 6 7 or 1 7 billion per year

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

stylized facts and regime changes are prices procyclical we investigate empirically the stability of the correlation between output growth and inflation using a technique that allows for changes in regime we look at recent quarterly data for the g4 and at historical data for the u s and u k we find evidence of changes both in means and variances in both sources of data in the quarterly data we find that the covariance between output growth and inflation is typically negative in the historical data we find as suggested in previous studies that inflation was procyclical especially in the inter war years but has been countercyclical in the post war period

information revelation incentives and the value of a real option the real options approach to capital budgeting focuses on valuing benefits of project flexibility this paper presents an incentive consideration in such valuation operating flexibility not only allows a firm to change course in response to new information but also allows interested observers to make inferences based on the change in course or lack thereof such information conveyance through refined operating choices can alter observers incentives as a result an option to delay may prove valuable because it allows a firm to prolong informational advantages

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

belief based refinements in signalling games abstract there are many economic problems which when modelled as games of incomplete information give rise to many sequential equilibria severely limiting the usefulness of the model there has recently been a large literature devoted to refining the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs this paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and further proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties we also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c70 d82

how financial incentives induce disability insurance recipients to return to work using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in disability insurance di policy in norway we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce di recipients to return to work we find that many di recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives we further show that providing work incentives to di recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging di recipients to return to work

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

understanding the family gap in pay for women with children as the gender gap in pay between women and men has been narrowing the family gap in pay between mothers and nonmothers has been widening one reason may be the institutional structure in the united states which has emphasized equal pay and opportunity policies but not family policies in contrast to other countries that have implemented both the authors now have evidence on the links between one such family policy and women s pay recent research suggests that maternity leave coverage by raising women s retention after childbirth also raises women s levels of work experience job tenure and pay

collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values abstract the standard approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed disinterested third party who prior to the auction designs and implements a collusive mechanism in environments where collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties this approach may neglect information leakages from simply a proposal to collude we consider a model of collusion where one informed bidder proposes to another as in es and schummer 2004 we allow for general interdependent values and affiliated signals in contrast to third party modeling approaches collusion is inefficient from both a social perspective except for the case of pure common values and from the perspective of the ring both bidders are better off than without colluding but the surplus extracted from the seller is distributed asymmetrically between the bidders the potential for information leakage from proposing is bad for low types who reveal that they are weak competitors but is advantageous for high types because they are able to signal their strength we identify a so called briber s curse whereby acceptance of a proposal causes the proposer to downgrade her expected value for the object when there is additional competition in the form of bidders outside of the cartel the briber s curse significantly harms cartel profits and raises seller revenues

matching markets with adverse selection abstract this paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of rothschild and stiglitz quart j econ 90 1976 629 the major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open ended and constantly refilled by new participants e g by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market the major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable which is jointly determined with equilibrium contracts as frictions become small we show that the least cost separating contracts are always supported as an equilibrium outcome regardless of the distribution of types among entrants moreover we derive conditions under which this outcome is also unique

a two country model of stochastic output with changes in regime abstract this paper evaluates the transmission of business cycles between countries and presents evidence that world wide shocks dominate any transmission of business cycles i examine industrial production and look at the relationships of the united states with canada germany and the united kingdom in the process i present a specialized markov switching time series model and evaluate it relative to other more familiar stochastic models i show that for the data sets considered markov switching models have much better goodness of fit but larger forecast variance relative to arma or var models

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

auditing and property rights third party auditprovides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset when audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable we show that with interim participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor s report disregarding the agent s information furthermore the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation when a high asset value is reported this suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance

a non cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information verifiable types abstract we consider a non cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage we prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one further the ex post nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of independence of irrelevant types iit whereby the response of every type of a player is independent of allocations proposed to his other types and under a self selection property of their belief

price cap regulation and information acquisition abstract in this paper we endogenize the information structure under price cap regulation we show that in order to induce the firm to acquire valuable but costly information price cap mechanisms need to ensure high profits to the firm further we compare incentives for information acquisition under price cap regulation and under the optimal mechanism designed to deal with the standard case where asymmetric information is assumed we show that the latter provides higher incentives for information acquisition and that the welfare loss associated with price cap regulation with respect to the optimal regulatory mechanism increases when the issue of information acquisition is considered

a test for volatility spillovers abstract this paper proposes a new procedure for analyzing volatility links between different markets based on a bivariate markov switching model an empirical application of this procedure to three emerging markets is examined and discussed

contracts with endogenous information abstract i study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for general technologies of information acquisition when posteriors satisfy two dimensional versions of the standard first order stochastic dominance and concavity convexity of the distribution function conditions a first order approach is justified under the same conditions informativeness and riskiness of reports are equivalent high powered contracts that make the agent s informational rents more risky are used to increase incentives for information acquisition insensitive contracts are used to reduce incentives for information gathering the value of information to the agent is always positive the value of information to the principal is ambiguous

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

on transparency in organizations when is it best for the principal to commit to not disclosing all that he she knows in moral hazard interactions i show that whenever the agent would choose the same action under complete information at several distinct states then full transparency can generically be improved upon this implies that full transparency is generically suboptimal whenever the dimension of the information held by the principal exceeds the dimension of the agent s action in a simple class of problems i make further progress on the best disclosure policy assuming the principal can either disclose fully the state or remain silent

california s 2004 workers compensation reform costs claims and contingent workers the large excess fraction of difficult to diagnose injuries that occur on a monday was originally thought to reflect employees use of workers compensation to cover weekend injuries evidence has

revisiting incentive effects in workers compensation do higher benefits really induce more claims an important question to ask regarding social insurance programs such as workers compensation wc is to what extent do higher benefits lead to more claims the authors of this study revisit incentive effects of wc using 25 years of data 1977 2004 from the march current population survey cps to estimate the relationship between wc cash benefit levels and the frequency of wc receipt providing new evidence on the subject they demonstrate that conclusions regarding workers incentives to claim benefits differ dramatically depending upon how one controls for the confounding influence of an individual s past earnings the authors expanded empirical specifications which include flexible earnings controls yield benefit participation elasticities smaller than 0 1 their findings suggest that wc claims are not particularly responsive to changes in benefit levels and that labor supply disincentives may warrant less concern than economists or policymakers have typically exhibited the authors also find th

fiscal forward guidance a case for selective transparency abstract should the fiscal authority use forward guidance to reduce future policy uncertainty perceived by private agents using dynamic general equilibrium models we examine the welfare effects of announcing future fiscal policy shocks and show that selective transparency is desirable announcing distortionary future policy shocks can be detrimental to ex ante social welfare whereas announcing non distortionary shocks generally improves welfare sizable welfare gains are found with constructive ambiguity regarding the timing of a tax increase in a realistic fiscal consolidation scenario however being secretive about distortionary shocks is time inconsistent and welfare loss from communication may be unavoidable

informed principal problem with moral hazard risk neutrality and no limited liability abstract we consider a principal agent moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties and no limited liability in which the principal has private information the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented outcome these distortions can explain e g efficiency wages beaudry 1994 and muted incentives inderst 2001 we show that in a large class of environments these distortions vanish if the principal is allowed to offer sufficiently rich contracts

incentive schemes as a signaling device abstract this paper considers a model of moral hazard where the principal has private information for instance in an organizational setting the firm may be better informed about the profitability of a sales area for which it seeks to employ a new sales representative we show how this information asymmetry may lead to a game of signaling which can mute incentives

signaling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities this article analyzes the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility while risk neutral contractors undertake a non verifiable operating eort the design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government this feature reduces the agent s marginal incentives creating a trade o between signaling and moral hazard we provide extensions of our framework in several directions allowing for risk aversion on the agent s side double moral hazard and political delegation the model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry

comparing allocations under asymmetric information coase theorem revisited abstract this paper investigates the robustness of coase theorem under asymmetric information we identify the conditions under which the same allocation is attained as an equilibrium in a bilateral trade model no matter which informed or uninformed party has the bargaining power to make a contract offer

transparency in agency the constant elasticity case and extensions this paper considers a hidden action agency problem where the principal has a single source of hidden information concerning the agent s utility the agent s effort productivity or the agent s cost of effort we examine whether the principal should precommit to disclosing these different single sources of information to the agent if the optimal contract is invariant over the hidden information and thus the disclosure rules constant elasticity case such disclosure increases the agent s utility it can raise or lower profit and total surplus depending on the source of hidden information and non disclosure can be optimal if disclosure affects the agent s motivation if the contract varies with the hidden information and thus disclosure rule disclosure or non disclosure can be optimal depending on whether the party s payoff is convex or concave in the information variable respectively

on the role of commitment in a principal agent relationship with an informed principal abstract in many circumstances a principal who has private information when contracting with an agent may perform some further action simultaneously with or after the agent s choice of an action we analyze such a principal agent relationship with an informed principal as a noncooperative game and distinguish two extensive form games first the principal can commit to his subsequent action at the time of contracting second the principal s announcement for his action is not binding at the time of performance we show that commitment by the principal leads to separation and no commitment leads to pooling journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d82

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

interim third party selection in bargaining abstract third party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information in this paper i consider the selection of a third party in a two person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness for a class of problems i find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary the selected third party s intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative this paper shows how the process of interim third party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third party intervention in bargaining

banking crises and nonlinear linkages between credit and output in this article we analyse the asymmetric causality linkages between credit growth and output growth during banking crises we employ a recently developed procedure based on a bivariate markov switching model to test the hypotheses of independence causality and asymmetric causality between credit and output using a sample of 103 banking crises around the world we find that neither credit nor output takes precedence as a variable in calm and crisis periods although there is evidence of instantaneous interdependence between the banking and real sector during crises the results suggest that shocks propagate mostly within a year between the banking sector and the real economy the linear link between credit growth and output growth is also regime dependent

absenteeism efficiency wages and shirking we investigate the absence behaviour of workers when there is asymmetric information regarding worker health an individual s health is assumed to be private information to that individual and only observable to a third party at cost our aim is to complement the existing largely empirical studies of absence behaviour which have tended to treat the phenomenon exclusively as a labour supply decision on the part of workers cf allen 1981 barmby and treble 1991 barmby orme and treble 1991 and dunn and youngblood 1986 our approach is to draw out the interactive aspects of the employment relationship we assume that workers are ex ante uncertain as to their state of health and supply labour on the basis of an all or nothing utility maximising decision taken once a realisation of this state has been received utility is a function of income leisure and health and workers value leisure more the sicker they are firms are able to exert some control over individual behaviour by monitoring workers and threatening to fire shirkers that is workers absenting themselves with unacceptable sickness our model highlights an efficiency wage effect through which wages may be used as a method of absence control in particular the optimal response of the firm to an increase in the cost of monitoring is to discourage shirking by raising wages furthermore to the extent that

work environment and individual background explaining regional shirking differentials in a large italian firm the prevalence of shirking within a large italian bank appears to be characterized by significant regional differentials in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are substantially more prevalent in the south we consider a number of potential explanations for this fact different individual backgrounds group interaction effects sorting of workers across regions differences in local attributes different hiring policies and discrimination against southern workers our analysis suggests that individual backgrounds group interaction effects and sorting effects contribute to explaining the north south shirking differential none of the other explanations appears to be of first order importance i introduction whether individual behavior is determined by group interactions or by individual background is undoubtedly a fundamental question for the social sciences this question presented itself forcefully when we stumbled onto the following piece of evidence there appear to be significant regional differentials in the prevalence of shirking among the employees of a large italian bank in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are considerably more frequent in the southern branches of the bank in this paper we examine several potential explanations for this fact first individual preferences for shirking versus working may differ according to one s region of hirth we will refer to this hj othesis as one of different individual hackgrounds the second possibility is one of locational sorting low shirking types may tend to migrate to the north high shirking types may tend to migrate to the south or hoth third the northern and southern

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

moral hazard and sickness insurance abstract we study if the replacement level in the swedish national sickness insurance which replaces foregone earnings due to temporary illnesses affects work absence behavior we use micro data and estimate the effects of a major reform whereby the replacement level during the first 90 days in each absence spell was reduced on work attendance to separate out the effect of the reform from any trend in work absence we distinguish between the implications on the incidence of work absence i e the frequency of spells and the duration of the spells we also use a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effects on the prevalence of work absence finally we estimate elasticities with respect to the replacement level in the sickness insurance

signaling quality with increased incentives previous work on informed principal problems with moral hazard suggested that the principal should signal project quality by retaining a larger share of the project and hence lowering incentives for the agent we show that this view is incomplete if project quality and effort are complements and effort is more valuable for high quality projects a principal with a high quality project may separate from a principal with a low quality project by increasing incentives for the agent this holds with a risk neutral agent who is protected by limited liability as well as with a risk averse agent and unlimited liability a dynamic version of our model in which the agent learns project quality in later periods provides an explanation for the use of initially reduced royalty rates in business format franchising contracts

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

the growth in the social security disability rolls a fiscal crisis unfolding the u s social security disability insurance di program has grown dramatically over the last 20 years in size and expense this growth poses significant risks to the finances of the di program and the broader social security system and raises troubling questions as to whether the program is being misused by claimants this article first provides an overview of the disability insurance program describing who qualifies for the program how an individual applies for benefits and how the level of benefits is determined next we summarize the factors responsible for the growth in the di rolls and discuss how the characteristics of di recipients have changed as a result we then explore the extent of moral hazard in the di program and the effectiveness of the screening process in distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims finally we identify the challenges that the di program creates for social security finances and social security reform and discuss potential reforms to the di program

supplying information to facilitate price discrimination the authors examine the incentive of a seller to allow potential buyers to acquire private information about their tastes for the seller s product improved private information for buyers enables the seller to segment the market and charge higher prices to high value buyers however improved information can also provide rents to buyers in a variety of settings this tradeoff is optimally resolved at one of two extremes either buyers are supplied with the best available knowledge of their tastes or no information is supplied by the seller copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the case for presenteeism evidence from norway s sickness insurance program can a work first strategy control moral hazard problems in temporary disability insurance and accelerate recovery based on empirical analysis of norwegian data we show that it can activation requirements not only bring down benefit claims they also reduce the likelihood that long term sickness absence leads to inactivity our findings show that absentees who are assigned graded partial absence certificates by their physician have shorter absences and higher subsequent employment rates than they would have had on regular sick leave we conclude that the activation strategies that in recent years have permeated european and us welfare policy may fruitfully be carried over to sick leave insurance for temporary disabled workers

analyzing and forecasting volatility spillovers asymmetries and hedging in major oil markets crude oil price volatility has been analyzed extensively for organized spot forward and futures markets for well over a decade and is crucial for forecasting volatility and value at risk var there are four major benchmarks in the international oil market namely west texas intermediate usa brent north sea dubai oman middle east and tapis asia pacific which are likely to be highly correlated this paper analyses the volatility spillover and asymmetric effects across and within the four markets using three multivariate garch models namely the constant conditional correlation ccc vector arma garch varma garch and vector arma asymmetric garch varma agarch models a rolling window approach is used to forecast the 1 day ahead conditional correlations the paper presents evidence of volatility spillovers and asymmetric effects on the conditional variances for most pairs of series in addition the forecast conditional correlations between pairs of crude oil returns have both positive and negative trends moreover the optimal hedge ratios and optimal portfolio weights of crude oil across different assets and market portfolios are evaluated in order to provide important policy implications for risk management in crude oil markets

predicting markov volatility switches using monetary policy variables abstract this paper presents a procedure to analyze the reaction of stock market returns and output growth volatility to monetary policy in particular we study whether shifts in the variance of returns and gdp growth can be predicted by changes in a monetary policy indicator an empirical application to us data is examined and discussed

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

the incidence of mandated maternity benefits i consider the labor market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group the efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group specific wages i study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age i find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group correspondingly i find little effect on total labor input for that group jel 118 j32 h51 in an era of tight fiscal budget constraints mandating employer provision of workplace benefits to employees is an attractive means for a government to finance its policy agenda consequently in recent years there has been a growth of interest in mandated benefits as a tool of social policy for example the centerpiece of president bill clinton s health care proposal is mandated employer provision of health insurance and more than 20 states have man

the value of information in a principal agent model with moral hazard the ex post contracting case abstract in a principal agent model with moral hazard a signal about the principal s technology the stochastic mapping from the agent s action to the outcome is observed before the contract is offered the signal is either uninformative null information informative and observed only by the principal private information or also observed by the agent public information we show that from an ex ante standpoint before the signal is observed i the agent prefers private to both null and public information ii the principal sometimes prefers null to both private and public information and iii when the principal prefers public to null information she prefers public to private information whereas the agent prefers private to public information in this last situation we also show that iv for any separating equilibrium with private information there exists a contract with public information that both strictly prefer

informed principal moral hazard and the value of a more informative technology we analyze a principal agent model with moral hazard in which the principal has private information about the technology we characterize perfect bayesian equilibria of the contracting game that possess the following properties i a principal with a more informative technology ends up earning less profits than a principal with a less informative one does ii compared to the complete information case the actions implemented by the privately informed principal can be distorted iii the agent can end up being better off when the principal has private information

evaluation of contagion or interdependence in the financial crises of asia and latin america considering the macroeconomic fundamentals this article investigates the existence of contagion between countries on the basis of an analysis of returns for stock indices over the period 1994 to 2003 the econometrics methodology used is that of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity garch family volatility models particularly the dynamic conditional correlation dcc models in the form proposed by engle and sheppard 2001 the returns were duly corrected for a series of country specific fundamentals the relevance of this procedure is highlighted in the literature by the work of pesaran and pick 2003 the results obtained in this article provide evidence favourable for the hypothesis of regional contagion in both latin america and asia as a rule contagion spread from the asian crisis to latin america but not in the opposite direction

moral hazard in corporate investment and the disciplinary role of voluntary capital rationing this paper compares three capital budgeting rules the npv rule a high hurdle rate and capital rationing and explains why some firms may voluntarily impose capital rationing under both capital rationing and a high hurdle a restrictive investment criterion is used to control managerial shirking however implementation of these budgeting rules requires a mechanism to prevent the firm from expanding the investment scale ex post capital rationing in the form of a predetermined fixed budget differs from the high hurdle rate rule in that the former requires the firm to overcome the cost of raising additional capital before making further investment

loan commitments and the debt overhang problem the debt overhang problem is shown to arise in the context of an entrepreneurial project that requires a sequence of investments financed by an outside lender the entrepreneur not internalizing losses accruing to the lender which financed the initial investments may inefficiently cancel the project and instead pursue an outside opportunity it is shown that loan commitments contracts that allow the entrepreneur to borrow a variable amount at a set interest rate in return for a fixed fee are the optimal financial contracts in this setting strictly dominating standard debt the existence of the fixed fee allows loan commitments to set a relatively low interest rate improving the entrepreneur s incentives to continue the project the paper specifies the optimal contract fully derives robust comparative statics properties using an extension of milgrom and roberts 1994 and extends the results to more realistic settings e g allowing the market risk free rate to be stochastic

the effects of expanding the generosity of the statutory sickness insurance system summary this article evaluates an expansion of employer mandated sick leave from 80 to 100 of forgone gross wages in germany we employ and compare parametric difference in difference did matching did and mixed approaches overall workplace absences increased by at least 10 or 1 day per worker per year we show that taking partial compliance into account increases coefficient estimates further heterogeneity in response behavior was of great importance there is no evidence that the increase in sick leave improved employee health a finding that supports a shirking explanation finally we provide evidence on potential labor market adjustments to the reform copyright 2013 john wiley sons ltd

signalling and renegotiation in contractual relationships this paper examines how the possibility of renegotiation affects contractual outcomes in signaling games when an infinite number of rounds of renegotiations are allowed before contracts are executed the main results of the paper are 1 contracts may still contain distortions 2 the popular efficient separating equilibrium outcome is never an equilibrium outcome with renegotiation 3 incentive compatibility constraints can be generalized to incorporate renegotiation 4 equilibrium outcomes can be separating and nevertheless depend on the uninformed player s prior and 5 renegotiation in signaling games may lead to outcomes similar to equilibrium outcomes of screening games in which multiple contract purchases are allowed copyright 1993 by the econometric society

warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard this article examines the use of prices and warranties as signals of product quality to consumers who choose how to maintain their purchases the seller s incentives are strongly affected by the interaction of quality and maintenance in determining product reliability two different assumptions about this interaction are made a separating equilibrium in which high quality is signalled with a low warranty and low price is shown to be possible in both cases

optimal regulation of multinationals under collusion this paper analyses the optimal collusion proof mechanism for the regulation of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects there is a host country with a profitable investment opportunity either a multinational firm mnf or a local firm lf can undertake this project nonetheless due to its firm specific advantage and the mnf has the potential to create a larger surplus the host government faces an informational constraint such that it cannot observe the extra surplus the mnf can generate using this set up karabay 2010 shows that employing foreign ownership restrictions to force a joint venture jv can help the host government to partially overcome its information disadvantage in this paper we extend karabay 2010 by studying the host government s optimal regulatory policy when the mnf and the lf can collude it turns out collusion imposes no cost on the host government and the expected welfare attained in the absence of collusion can still be secured under collusion

ignorance promotes competition an auction model with endogenous private valuations we study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of n risk neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction we show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition as measured by the number of bidders furthermore in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information

information control in the principal agent problem this paper compares the principal s payoff in agency models under different assumptions about the agent s access to information the agent may make decisions before is uninformed or after is informed learning the state of nature when there are two possible outcomes the principal typically prefers informed to uninformed agents whether the agent receives the information before or after contracting this result is false when there are more than two outcomes conditions under which a principal prefers one agent to another when the agents differ only in their disutility of effort are also given copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

incomplete contracts and signaling this article presents a principal agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness i show that in the presence of transactions costs incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal s type two types of transactions costs are considered those incurred ex ante drafting costs and those incurred ex post enforcement or verification costs i prove that in the presence of either of these costs asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does

entrepreneurs and new ideas we study how early stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension such as technical feasibility correspondence to market demand legality or patentability to screen good ideas the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise sharing the idea however creates the risk that the expert would steal it yet the idea thief cannot contact any other expert lest he should in turn steal the idea thus stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary in such cases the entrepreneur can form a partnership with the experts thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other s information yet very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them

parental leave and mothers careers the relative importance of job protection and cash benefits parental leave regulations in most oecd countries have two key policy instruments job protection and cash benefits this paper studies how mothers return to work behavior and labor market outcomes are affected by alternative mixes of these key policy parameters exploiting a series of major parental leave policy changes in austria we find that longer cash benefits lead to a significant delay in return to work and that the magnitude of this effect depends on the relative length of job protection and cash benefits however despite their impact on time on leave we do not find a significant effect on mothers labor market outcomes in the medium run neither of benefit duration nor of job protection duration to understand the relative importance and interaction of the two policy instruments in shaping mothers return to work behavior we set up a non stationary job search model in which cash benefits and job protection determine decisions of when to return to work and whether or not to return to the pre birth employer despite its lean structure the model does surprisingly well in matching empirically observed return to work profiles the simulation of alternative counterfactual regimes shows that a policy that combines both job protection and benefits payments succeeds to induce mothers to spend some time with the child after birth without jeopardizing their medium run labor market attachment

pessimistic information gathering an agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent s effort contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering and there are both moral hazard in information gathering private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort an optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high powered productivity dependent screening options following good news with a fixed low powered option otherwise

labor market effects of u s sick pay mandates this paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of nine city and four state level u s sick pay mandates to assess their labor market consequences we use the synthetic control group method and traditional difference in differences models along with the quarterly census of employment and wages to estimate the causal effects of mandated sick pay on employment and wages we do not find much evidence that employment or wages were significantly affected by the mandates that typically allow employees to earn one hour of paid sick leave per work week up to seven days per year employment decreases of 2 percent lie outside the 92 percent confidence interval and wage decreases of 3 percent lie outside the 95 percent confidence interval abstract from author

the economic consequences of parental leave mandates lessons from europe this study investigates the economic consequences of rights to paid parental leave in nine european countries over the 1969 through 1993 period since women use virtually all parental leave in most nations men constitute a reasonable comparison group and most of the analysis examines how changes in paid leave affect the gap between female and male labor market outcomes the employment to populations ratios of women in their prime childbearing years are also compared with those of corresponding aged men and older females parental leave is associated with increases in women s employment but with reductions in their relative wages at extended durations