time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

the kogut and singh national cultural distance index time to start using it as a springboard rather than a crutch this counterpoint investigates the continued relevance of the 30 year old kogut and singh ks index of cultural distance ks was a seminal contribution highlighting the relevance of cultural differences in ib however since then simplistic replications of the original arguments and index have prevented us from progressing towards a better understanding of how cross national differences matter we discuss the mechanisms underlying the construct and how they relate to the algorithm data and its critiques we call for more theoretically informed approaches highlighting the underlying mechanisms and specifying which data and algorithms best capture those mechanisms in each research context

capital taxation and government debt policy with public discounting abstract this paper characterizes capital taxation and public debt policy in a quantitative macroeconomic model with an impatient government and uncertainty the government has access to linear taxes on capital and labor and to non state contingent bonds government impatience generates positive and empirically realistic long run levels of both capital taxes and public debt prior predictive analysis shows that the simulated model matches the distribution of both variables in a sample of 42 countries alongside other statistics the paper then presents econometric evidence that countries with higher political instability used as an approximation of unobservable public discount rates have both higher capital taxes and debt

occupational self selection a human capital approach to sex differences in occupational structure a rich and diverse literature exists concerning the distribution of labor incomes one approach namely that of human capital concentrates on lifetime accumulation paths of earnings capacity units human capital individual variations in human capital imply differences in earnings power thereby yielding strong implications concerning earnings distribution within a population despite its explanatory power the human capital model has been widely criticized one criticism centers on its inability to obtain inferences concerning occupational distribution the purpose of this paper is to alleviate at least some such criticism by applying the hedonic price approach so as to embed occupational choice into the human capital framework the significance is that neoclassical economic theory can be used to obtain implications concerning the determinants of occupational structure excerpt

how should control theory be used to calculate a time consistent government policy we study different solutions to a simple one dimensional linear quadratic game with a large number of private agents and a government a time consistent solution is defined as a solution to the hamilton jacobi bellman equation i e as a policy for which the government has noprecommitment capability this solution is compared to a policy where the government has an instantaneous pre commitment i e an equilibrium in which the government has a period by period leadership in both cases we show how control theory should be applied to calculate the equilibrium and how to relate these equilibria to the differential game literature

the role of investment specific technological change in the business cycle this is a quantitative investigation of the importance of technological change speci c to new investment goods for postwar us aggregate uctuations a growth model that incorporates this form of technological change is calibrated to us data and simulated using the relative price of new equipment to identify the process driving investmentspeci c technology shocks the analysis suggests that this form of technological change is the source of about 30 of output uctuations 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints abstract this paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is subject to the zero lower bound zlb constraint in a stochastic new keynesian economy in the baseline model calibrated to match key features of the u s economy it is optimal for the government to increase its spending when at the zlb in the stochastic environment by about 60 percent more than it would in the deterministic environment the presence of uncertainty creates a unique time consistency problem if the steady state is inefficient although access to government spending policy increases welfare in the face of a large deflationary shock it decreases welfare during normal times as the government reduces the nominal interest rate less aggressively before reaching the zlb

time consistent consumption taxation abstract we characterise optimal tax policies when the government has access to consumption taxation and cannot credibly commit to future policies we consider a neoclassical economy where factor income taxation is distortionary within the period due to endogenous labour and capital utilisation and non tax deductibility of depreciation contrary to the case where only labour and capital income are taxed the optimal time consistent policies with consumption taxation are remarkably similar to their ramsey counterparts the welfare gains from commitment are negligible while they are substantial without consumption taxation further the welfare gains from taxing consumption are much higher without commitment

boys will still be boys gender differences in trading activity are not due to differences in over confidence abstract the fact that men trade more than women in financial markets has been attributed to men s overconfidence however evidence supporting this view is only indirect we directly test this conjecture experimentally by measuring confidence using monetary incentives before participants trade in a simulated market we find that men are more confident than women in our trading task men also trade more and they hold larger and less diversified portfolios than women however we do not find that differences in confidence explain any portion of the gender gap in trading activity we explore alternative candidate channels such as risk aversion financial literacy or competitiveness but find that these factors are also unlikely to play a role

the impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement evidence using random assignment to real social groups due to incomplete contracts efficiency of an organization depends on willingness of individuals to take non selfish actions such as cooperating when there is no incentive to do so or punishing inefficient actions by others organizations also constitute a social boundary or group we investigate whether this social aspect of organizations has an important benefit fostering unselfish cooperation and norm enforcement within the group but also whether there is a dark side in the form of hostility between groups our experiment provides the first evidence free from the confounding effect of self selection into groups individuals are randomly assigned to different platoons during a four week period of officer training in the swiss army we conduct choice experiments simultaneous prisoner s dilemma games with and without third party punishment in week three random assignment significantly increases willingness to cooperate with fellow platoon members assignment does not lead to hostility in the sense of vindictive punishment of outsiders but does affect norm enforcement enhancing willingness to enforce a norm of cooperation towards fellow platoon members this suggests that the social aspect of organizations motivates efficient behavior even when ordinary incentives fail and helps to explain practices designed to foster social ties or group identification within an organization this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

limits to database protection fair use and scientific research exemptions a trend running diametrically opposed to the expansion of intellectual property rights ipr is the increasing awareness that dominant positions sustained by ipr may be mitigated through exemptions and statutory or compulsory licences it is argued that there are compelling economic reasons to protect valuable assets that are prone to copying but that there are equally compelling reasons to limit monopolistic claims and stimulate cross licensing practices compulsory licensing may serve as a stimulus to the bargaining process with private parties and research institutions alike another important category of information is public sector information access to information has become a concern and the european commission has followed up on its green paper on public sector information in the information society with a directive implementing its vision on affordable access for all and exploitation potential the right of access to information may be enforced through the european convention on human rights it not only guarantees the freedom of speech it also recognises the freedom to receive information

self selection and the efficiency of tournaments when exogenously imposed rank order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance bull schotter and weigelt 1987 however since the efficiency of performance related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees lazear 2000 it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments this paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments we show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament the average effort is higher and the between subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants we suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay

the introduction of formal insurance and its effect on redistribution abstract transfers motivated by altruism guilt and norms of giving play an important role in supporting individuals who suffer losses due to risk we present empirical evidence from an artefactual field experiment in ethiopia in which we introduce formal insurance in a setting where donors make redistributive transfers to recipients who experience losses we find that donors tend to reduce their transfers to recipients who are offered insurance whether or not they take it up when insurance is rejected by a recipient transfer reductions are larger for donors who firmly expect that the recipient would take up insurance the results are consistent with a framework in which the introduction of insurance erodes norms of giving by revealing differences in the extent to which individuals value precautionary behavior with respect to risk taking welfare calculations show that when formal insurance is introduced the welfare of those who fail to take it up may be reduced

the politics of fdi expropriation i examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries i e the lucas paradox using panel data from 1984 to 2014 i document that i developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment fdi ii countries subject to high investment risk ir receive low fdi inflows and iii ir is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies these findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and fdi through the ir channel i inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors the proceeds are used to finance group specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging fdi i show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment

heterogeneous risk loss aversion in complete information all pay auctions we extend previous theoretical work on n player complete information all pay auctions to incorporate heterogeneous risk and loss averse utility functions we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria with a given set of active players with any strictly increasing utility functions and characterize the players equilibrium mixed strategies assuming that players can be ordered by their risk aversion player a is more risk averse than player b if whenever player b prefers a certain payment over a given lottery so does player a we find that in equilibrium the more risk averse players either bid higher than the less risk averse players and win with higher ex ante probability or they drop out furthermore while each player s expected bid decreases with the other players risk aversion her expected bid increases with her own risk aversion thus increasing a player s risk aversion creates two opposing effects on total expected bid a sufficient condition for the total expected bid to decrease with a player s risk aversion is that this player is relatively more risk averse compared to the rest of the players our findings have important implications for the literature on gender differences in competitiveness and for gender diversity in firms that use personnel contests for promotions

optimal taxes without commitment abstract in the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital the optimal solution when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails that the tax on capital tends to zero in the limit with all the tax burden on labor it is well known however that this solution is time inconsistent so if the commitment power is not perfect this second best tax plan will not be sustainable we model explicitly the trade off between the cost of revising the tax plan and the benefit of the revision as a result when commitment is not possible both the limit tax rate and the steady state capital are different from their levels in the second best solution limit taxes on capital may be strictly positive but it may also be the case that the only sustainable plan has subsidies to capital the subsidies induce an overaccumulation of capital which becomes a commitment device against revisions of the tax plan journal of economic literature classification numbers h21 c73

an introduction to the law and economics of intellectual property although economists have written on topics of intellectual property for a long time the impact of economics on public policy in this area has been slight especially as compared to the influence of professional writings in areas such as antitrust and taxation we believe that too few of the profession s resources have been devoted to these issues and that of those resources that have been employed too few have been devoted to empirical analyses we hope that this introductory essay and the three papers that follow will stimulate interest in this subject this introductory essay first describes some of the basic economic tradeoffs involved in intellectual property law and then describes the framework of the law in the six areas described above patent copyright semiconductor protection trademark trade secret and misappropriation it is intended both to provide thumbnail descriptions of the various intellectual property regimes to economists working in this area and to indicate where additional economic research might be useful

some economics of trade secret law despite the practical importance of trade secrets to the business community the law of trade secrets is a neglected orphan in economic analysis this paper sketches an approach to the economics of trade secret law that connects it more closely both to other areas of intellectual property and to broader issues in the positive economic theory of the common law

cooperation and competition in intergenerational experiments in the field and the laboratory there is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers we investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in experiments conducted both onsite with the employees of two large firms and in a conventional laboratory environment with students and retirees we show that seniors are no more risk averse than juniors and are typically more cooperative both juniors and working seniors respond strongly to competition the implication is that it may be beneficial to define additional incentives near the end of the career to motivate and retain older workers

factor income taxation in a horizontal innovation model we consider the optimal factor income taxation in a standard r d model with technical change represented by an increase in the variety of intermediate goods in the model there are externalities both to working and to saving due to market power by firms incomplete appropriability of the benefits of inventions and the cost of economic activity in terms of public expenditures redistributing the tax burden from labor to capital will increase employment but in most cases reduce the rate of growth with conflicting effects on the deadweight loss from the externalities under plausible calibrations of the model the optimal tax rate on capital will be sizable

cooperation when n is large evidence from the mining camps of the american west abstract the sources of cooperation in small groups are well documented there is however less understanding about cooperation in large groups i study the enforcement of property rights in the mining camps of the american west miners demanded secure property rights and protection from violence to exploit the region s mineral wealth in the model miners must divide their labor between mining and supporting property rights institutions the main prediction of the model is that cooperation in property rights enforcement emerges only when social norms of cooperation are sufficiently widespread the model also predicts that social norms are less effective in mining camps with large populations or high labor productivity i test these predictions against detailed evidence from the letters diaries and reminiscences of miners in 25 camps in california colorado and montana and find that the evidence supports the predictions the results show that social norms can significantly lower the costs of collective action in large groups

optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model this paper develops the quantitative implications of optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model in a stationary equilibrium the ex ante tax rate on capital income is approximately zero there is an equivalence class of ex post capital income tax rates and bond policies that support a given allocation within this class the optimal ex post capital tax rates can range from close to independently and identically distributed to close to a random walk the tax rate on labor income fluctuates very little and inherits the persistence properties of the exogenous shocks thus there is no presumption that optimal labor tax rates follow a random walk most of the welfare gains realized by switching from a tax system like that of the united states to the ramsey system come from an initial period of high taxation on capital income

gender and competition at a young age gender gaps may be observed in a variety of economic and social environments one of the possible determining factors is that men are more competitive than women and so when the competitiveness of the environment increases the performance of men increases relative to that of women we test this hypothesis in a field study conducted with 9 year old children running on a track they first run alone and then in pairs over a short distance with different gender composition of the pairs the results support the hypothesis that performance in competition varies according to gender when children ran alone there was no difference in performance in competition boys but not girls improved their performance this finding relates to the discussion regarding single sex schools the outcomes of examinations in a mixed sex school can show a gender gap in favor of boys even when this gap does not reflect actual abilities girls who are as talented as boys will end up performing worse just because they are not as competitive and will not achieve as high scores in examinations as boys

time consistent public expenditures in this paper we study the optimal choice of public expenditures when there is no way of committing to future policy and reputational mechanisms are not operative this amounts to conflning our attention to markov equilibria the environment is a neoclassical growth model where consumers derive utility from a public good this environment gives rise to a dynamic game between successive governments and the private sector and this game is made interesting by the presence of a state variable the capital stock we characterize equilibria in terms of an intertemporal flrst order condition a generalized euler equation gee for the government and we use this condition both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computation the gee reveals how the government optimally trades ofi tax wedges over time it also allows us to discuss in what sense a current government may be strategically in uencing future governments in their taxation decisions for a calibrated economy we flnd that when the tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any moment in time the government still refrains from taxing at high rates in order to smooth distortions over time as a result the economy is far from the mix of public and private goods that would be optimal in a static context in return the savings distortion is not very severe and the capital stock is quite high

time consistent optimal fiscal policy this article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period s capital income tax rate we find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment first capital income tax rates are very high 65 on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment second labor income taxes are rather low on average about 12 versus a value of around 31 under full commitment finally labor income taxes are quite volatile whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero

gender differences in market competitiveness in a real workplace evidence from performance based pay tournaments among teachers recent lab and field experiments suggest that women are less effective than men in a competitive environment in this paper i examine how individual performance in a real work place is affected by a competitive environment and by its gender mix the competition is among math english and language teachers who participated in a rank order tournament that rewarded teachers with large cash bonuses based on the test performance of their classes the evidence suggest that the average ranking winning rate and awarded prize did not differ by gender nor between teachers in competition groups with only female teachers or with both genders i also find that the direct impact of the bonus program on students outcomes did not vary by male and female teachers or by the type of competitive environment in terms of gender mix of the participants as for mechanisms that can explain these results i found no differences by either gender or by the gender mix of the competition group in teachers awareness and familiarity with the program and its rules and in effort and teaching methods women though were more pessimistic about the effectiveness of teachers performance pay and more realistic than men about their likelihood of winning bonuses

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

sustainable plans and mutual default this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal taxation in which both private agents and the government can default on their debt as a benchmark we consider ramsey equilibria in which the government can precommit to its policies at the beginning of time but in which private agents can default we then consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational we adapt abreu s 1988 optimal trigger strategies to completely characterize the entire set of sustainable equilibria in particular we show that when there is sufficiently little discounting and government consumption fluctuates enough the ramsey allocations and policies in which the government never defaults can be supported by a sustainable equilibrium by way of an example we show that the larger the variance of government consumption the easier it is to support good outcomes we also show for moderate discount factors that in the best sustainable equilibrium tax rates are more volatile and debt is smaller than in the ramsey equilibrium

can t buy me love a field experiment exploring the trade off between income and caste status in an indian matrimonial market i introduction the relationship between economic motive and observance of discriminatory social customs is hardly new to economists this is implicit in the writings of becker 1957 1973 1974 on discrimination and other social customs and explicit in arrow s essay 1972 on discrimination and akerlof s work 1980 on the interactive relationship between economic incentives and discriminatory social customs as scholars like becker arrow and akerlof have investigated the relationship between economic incentives and the prevalence of custom based discrimination of which status based discrimination is an example it is natural to consult the related empirical evidence on the impact of economic incentives on the extent of status based discrimination surprisingly the extant empirical literature is mostly silent on how economic incentives may directly interact with status based discrimination 1 this is atypical as one would be hard pressed to find an issue as weighty as status based discrimination yet our knowledge in this aspect remains oddly limited our study aspires to rectify this gap this study investigates whether and what magnitude of economic incentive can diminish the incidence of status based discrimination by designing a controlled field experiment in an actual marketplace a reputable arranged marriage market that is conducted via newspaper advertisements the existing literature suggests that this market might be especially prone to strong discriminatory mate selection behavior based on the social identity status of an individual where caste identity of an individual is an easily measured indicator of social status the genesis of this discrimination can be attributed to a high status female s concern for a decline in her social status if she engages in a marital relationship with a low status male against this backdrop we ask whether a low status male could attempt to weaken this enduring form of discrimination by providing systematic economic incentive in the form of high monthly groom incomes to a high status female so that the former s marriage proposal receives preliminary consideration by the latter conditional on both individuals participation in this market the marketplace that we utilize is a well functioning arranged marriage market conducted via matrimonial advertisements in a widely circulated bengali language newspaper marriageable males in this market typically advertise their caste and income information among other attributes after these advertisements appear in the newspaper interested families contact the advertiser mostly in form of detailed letters expressing their interest in that advertisement this provides a confidential and reliable measure of first intent of the interested party in this case females therefore the conjunction of an exceptionally strong status based mate selection behavior a reputed market for arranged marriages and an exclusive correspondence process furnish us with a unique opportunity to investigate the main research hypothesis of our study to the best of our knowledge this is the first field experiment that exclusively focuses on how economic incentives can influence status based discrimination in an actual market 2 to operationalize the experiment we create nine unique matrimonial advertisements each representing a fictitious groom type 3 these potential grooms belong to one of the three blocks where each block contains three grooms from a given caste group we vary the caste status across these blocks we consider three different caste groups high middle and low strictly ranked so in the study region we vary the income features of grooms within a block we consider three different monthly income levels i e high medium and low that are considered feasible for each caste group in the study region furthermore we randomly assign other characteristics relevant for this market to all the potential grooms so that these features on average do not affect the behavior of responders

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

women in economics moving up or falling off the academic career ladder copyright 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 by the american economic association

a gender agenda a progress report on competitiveness i review the role of a new behavioral trait competitiveness on the gender agenda i first describe how to measure competitiveness in the laboratory and show that gender differences in competitiveness are robust i then establish the external economic relevance of the experimental measure of competitiveness competitiveness correlates with education and labor market outcomes and can help account for gender differences therein finally institutions can differ in the importance they place on competitiveness and hence can affect gender differences in economic outcomes exploring these institutional differences and their effects remains an open area of behavioral market design

gender differences in response to big stakes it is commonly perceived that increasing incentives improves performance however the reaction to increased incentives might differ between men and women leading to gender differences in performance in a natural experiment we study the gender difference in performance resulting from changes in stakes we use detailed information on the performance of high school students and exploit the variation in the stakes of tests which range from 5 to 27 of the final grade we find that female students outperform male students in all tests but to a relatively larger degree when the stakes are low the gender gap disappears in tests taken at the end of high school which count for 50 of the university entry grade jel d03 j16 i21 c30

persistent parochialism trust and exclusion in ethnic networks decentralized groups such as close knit residential neighborhoods and ethnically linked businesses often achieve high levels of cooperation while engaging in exclusionary practices that we call parochialism we investigate the contribution of within group cultural affinity to the ability of parochial groups to cooperate in social dilemmas we analyze parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders we show that there is a range of degrees of parochialism for which parochial networks can coexist with an anonymous market offering unrestricted trading opportunities

why does the law of one price fail an experiment on index mutual funds we conduct an experiment to evaluate why individuals invest in high fee index funds in our experiments subjects allocate 10 000 across four s p 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio s subsequent return subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees we can reject the hypothesis that subjects buy high fee index funds because of bundled non portfolio services search costs for fees matter but even when we eliminate these costs fees are not minimized instead subjects place high weight on annualized returns since inception fees paid decrease with financial literacy interestingly subjects who choose high fee funds sense they are making a mistake

the anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity abstract the increasing diversity of societies raises questions about the consequences for redistributive preferences this paper assesses the impact of social identity on distributional preferences in a modified dictator game i estimate individual level utility functions with two parameters that govern the trade offs between equity and efficiency and giving to self and to other subjects on average put less weight on income of the out group the out group treatment also changes the distribution of equity efficiency concerns however the experiment also uncovers a large individual heterogeneity of preferences an analysis of garp violations reveals that choices in both treatments overwhelmingly stem from well behaved yet systematically different underlying utility functions hence the evidence presented here suggests that the rational choice approach is a useful tool for understanding the effect of social identity on preferences

debt inflation and central bank independence abstract increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence although ex ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently the smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit over time inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt by contrast imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions

optimal ramsey taxation with endogenous risk aversion abstract in this paper we study optimal ramsey taxation under endogenous risk aversion formulation in an otherwise standard real business cycle economy we show that when the risk aversion coefficient co moves counter cyclically the canonical chamley judd chamley 1986 judd 1985 result does not hold true and the ramsey planner chooses a positive capital income tax rate in the long run we report that result is due to additional wedges both in the intratemporal and the intertemporal optimality condition of the representative household

preference for the workplace investment in human capital and gender we use a hypothetical choice methodology to estimate preferences for workplace attributes from a sample of high ability undergraduates attending a highly selective university we estimate that women on average have a higher willingness to pay wtp for jobs with greater work flexibility and job stability and men have a higher wtp for jobs with higher earnings growth these job preferences relate to college major choices and to actual job choices reported in a follow up survey four years after graduation the gender differences in preferences explain at least a quarter of the early career gender wage gap

optimal fiscal policy in the neoclassical growth model revisited this paper studies optimal taxation in a version of the neoclassical growth model in which investment becomes productive within the period thereby making the supply of capital elastic in the short run because taxing capital is distortionary in the short run the government s ability desire to raise revenues through capital income taxation in the initial period or when the economy is hit with a bad shock is greatly curtailed our timing assumption also leads to a tractable ramsey problem without state contingent debt which can give rise to debt financed budget deficits during recessions

endogenous capital utilization investor s effort and optimal fiscal policy abstract the present paper studies the implications of endogenous capital utilization and investor s effort on the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal policy the main results are that levies of old capital are distortionary and should therefore not be used at confiscatory rates that in a steady state capital and labor income should be taxed at the same rate and investment should be subsidized at the same rate as the tax rate and that the optimal tax policy can be made time consistent through debt restructuring

inflation and central bank independence a meta regression analysis using 59 studies we perform a meta regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence cbi the studies considered are very different with respect to the cbi indicator used the sample of countries and time periods covered model specification estimators used and publication outlet we conclude that there is a significant publication bias however we also find a significant genuine effect of cbi on inflation differences between studies are not caused by differences in cbi indicators used

markov perfect capital and labor taxes abstract this paper analyzes the markov perfect equilibrium of an economy were a benevolent government that lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices uses taxes on capital and labor income to finance the provision of a public good the main finding is that the government taxes capital and subsidizes labor so that only the dynamic inefficiency of future capital taxes remains if agents preference for the public good is sufficiently high then capital is confiscated setting bounds on taxes alleviates the dynamic inefficiency inherent in capital taxation but some implementations carry a high welfare cost allowing for endogenous capital utilization makes the current capital tax distortionary and implies capital and labor tax rates that are relatively close to those measured for the u s economy

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

upstream downstream transactions and watershed externalities experimental evidence from kenya abstract where environmental policies or projects seek behavioral change understanding underlying norms and preferences is essential to securing environmental outcomes this study models a payment for environmental services intervention in an experimental field laboratory in nyanza province kenya upstream and downstream individuals are paired in a standard investment game in which the upstream mover s investment represents land use decisions and the downstream mover responds with a choice of compensation payment the experimental intervention introduces an enforcement treatment on the downstream movers compensation decisions for a single round underlying social preferences and identity appear to shape individual transactions between upstream and downstream individuals upstream first movers are sensitive to the removal of the enforcement on their downstream partners in the second round and make decisions consistent with crowding out of social preferences the results suggest that environmental interventions may affect resource decisions for individuals who are not themselves direct targets of enforcement

can a common currency foster a shared social identity across different nations the case of the euro fostering the emergence of a european identity was one of the declared goals of the euro adoption now years after the physical introduction of the common currency we investigate whether there has been an effect on a shared european identity we use two different datasets in order to assess the impact of the euro adoption on the fostering of a self declared european identity we find that the effect of the euro is statistically insignificant we interpret this result as suggesting that the euro did not have the desired positive effect on feelings of european identity this result holds important implications for european policy makers it also sheds new light on the formation of social identities

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

on the joint determination of fiscal and monetary policy abstract the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy absent commitment depends on the interaction between the objective of smoothing distortions intertemporally and a time consistency problem when net nominal government obligations are positive both fiscal and monetary policies are distortionary and the choice of debt depends on how the anticipated response in future monetary policy affects the current demand for money and bonds there exists a unique steady state with positive net nominal government obligations which is stable and time consistent for any initial level of debt the welfare loss due to lack of commitment is small

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

why women don t run experimental evidence on gender differences in political competition aversion abstract women s underrepresentation in leadership positions has been well documented but the reasons behind it are not well understood we carry out a field experiment to test a prominent theory about the source of the gender gap in leadership ambition women s higher aversion to competitive environments using politics as a context for our study we employ two distinct subject pools highly politically active individuals and workers from an online labor market we find that priming individuals to consider the competitive nature of politics has a strong negative effect on women s interest in political office but not on men s interest hence significantly increasing the gender gap in leadership ambition

government policy in monetary economies i study how the specic details of a micro founded monetary economy aect the determination of government policy i consider three variants of the lagos wright monetary framework a benchmark were all markets are competitive a case which allows for nancial intermediaries and a case with trading frictions although intitutions frictions are shown to have a signicant structural impact in the determination of policy the calibrated articial economies are observationally equivalent in steady state the policy response to aggregate shocks is qualitatively similar in the variants considered however there are signicant quantitative dierences in the response of government policy to productivity shocks mainly due to the idiosyncratic behavior of money demand the variants with no trading frictions display the best t to u s post war data

hard to get the scarcity of women and the competition for high income men in urban china reports of the difficulties of elite women in finding suitable mates have been increasing despite the growing availability and value of men in china we rationalize this leftover women phenomenon within the directed competitive search framework which uniquely allows for equilibrium crowding out within this framework we show that the leftover women phenomenon can be the result of women s aversion to men who have a lower income than themselves hereafter alm and the long predicted complementarity between women s non market traits in particular beauty and male earnings for high income h women even when high income h men are more plentiful and richer the direct effect of the greater number of desirable men can be overwhelmed by the indirect effect of competitive entry by low income l women particularly the beautiful we test for these competitive search effects using online dating field experimental census and household survey data consistent with the competitive entry of l women when sex ratio and h men s income increase the search intensity of beautiful l women for h men increases in response to this competitive entry plain h women who are constrained by their alm to search predominantly for h men also increase the search intensity however only their marriage probability decreases our evidence is consistent with intra female competitive search for spouses who can cover the labor market opportunity cost of marriage and childbirth which increases with a woman s income

money or friends social identity and deception in networks abstract strategic communication occurs in virtually all committee decision environments theory suggests that small differences in monetary incentives between committee members can leave deception a strategically optimal decision crawford and sobel 1982 galeotti et al 2013 at the same time in natural environments social incentives can also play an important role in determining the way people share or withhold truthful information unfortunately little is known about how monetary and social incentives interact to determine truth telling we investigate this issue by first building a novel model and then testing its equilibrium predictions using laboratory data in the absence of social identity the model s predictions are supported there is more truthful communication between those who share monetary incentives than those who do not we find that the effect of identity is asymmetric sharing the same identity does not promote truth telling but holding different identities reduces truthfulness overall as compared to environments lacking social identity committees with both monetary and social incentives exhibit truthful communication substantially less frequently

fundraising intermediaries inhibit quality driven charitable donations charitable donations are frequently raised by an intermediary which accepts donations and subsequently sends the proceeds to the chairty for example a workplace campaign for united way a 5 km walk for susan g komen or buying cookies from a local troop for the girl scouts these fundraisers can greatly increase donations received by a given charity but how do they affect what types of charities we support this article shows intermediary fundraisers can make donors insensitive to differences in charity quality unattractive charities can receive the same financial support as an attractive charity in a series of across subject experiments when donations are framed as going directly to the charity unattractive charities receive fewer and smaller contributions relative to attractive charities however when donations for the same charities are collected by meaningless intermediary fundraising campaigns donations become indistinguishable across charities the fundraising campaign does not affect donor recall of charity identity or evaluation of charity quality it simply precludes donors from using these data in the donation decision follow up experiments suggest the results are driven by information overload jel a13 c91 c93 d61 d64 h41

public trust and government betrayal abstract this study presents a simple model of government reputation in which government type cannot be directly observed by households with the variation that government type rather than being permanent follows an exogenous markov process this formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes governments which betray public trust do so erratically public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than other governments

the impact of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on competitiveness we examine whether competitiveness in women is influenced by biological factors female participants in a laboratory experiment solve a simple arithmetics task first under a piece rate and then under a competitive tournament scheme participants can then choose which compensation scheme to apply in a third round we find that the likelihood of selecting into the competitive environment varies strongly and significantly over the menstrual cycle and with the intake of hormonal contraceptives the observed patterns are consistent with a negative impact of the sex hormone progesterone on competitiveness we show that the effect of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on competitiveness is due neither to an impact on performance nor to an impact on risk aversion or overconfidence

men women and competition an experimental test of behavior this study reports a series of experiments that examine outcomes when agents are able to choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance i e piece rate and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance i e a tournament we test for the presence and persistence of gender differences in performance and the rate of entry into the tournament option and whether these differences are sensitive to the structure of the tournament rewards in the winner take all wta condition only the best performer in the tournament for each round received a payment 4 50 in the graduated tournament condition the same payment 4 50 was divided among the first second and third finishers in the tournament in the wta condition men showed significantly lower forecast errors than women in addition a clear sorting effect occurs in the wta condition in early rounds of the wta condition male entrants into the tournament show significantly lower forecast errors than female tournament entrants however the difference disappears over time after controlling for forecasting skill gender did not predict entry into the tournament for the wta condition however lower forecasting skill reduced the probability of entry in the graduated tournament the situation was reversed men entered the tournament at significantly higher rates even after controlling for skill forecasting skill had no impact on the decision to enter the tournament while the average male entrant to the tournament had lower forecast errors than the average female entrant the men entered at much higher rates as a consequence men were much more likely than women to enter the tournament too frequently

sequential equilibria in a ramsey tax model this paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a ramsey tax model more generally it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households by selectively incorporating euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem

whose money is it anyway ingroups and distributive behavior abstract price theory is often used to explain reactions to rebates and subsidies that are meant to encourage charitable giving this paper describes the results of a laboratory experiment that tests standard price theory alongside an alternative perspective based on research on the perceptions and behavior of ingroups using a modified dictator game we find that rebates that decrease the price of giving only increase amounts given when they are exogenously funded by the experimenters when rebates are funded by members of one s group the decreased price of giving does not lead to increased amounts given the result suggests that the presence of an ingroup mentality can mediate the relationship between giving and price

fiscal policy under loose commitment due to time inconsistency or political turnover policymakers promises are not always fulfilled we analyze an optimal fiscal policy problem where the plans made by the benevolent government are periodically revised in this loose commitment setting the properties of labor and capital income taxes are significantly different than under the full commitment and no commitment assumptions because of the occasional reoptimizations the average capital income tax is positive even in the long run also the autocorrelation of taxes is lower their volatility with respect to output increases and the correlation between capital income taxes and output changes sign our method can be used to analyze the plausibility and the importance of commitment in a wide class of dynamic problems

a failure to communicate an experimental investigation of the effects of advice on strategic play abstract we investigate why two person teams beat the truth wins benchmark in signaling games cooper and kagel 2005 cooper and kagel 2009 by studying an advice treatment where advisees have the benefit of two individuals insight but not bilateral communication the tw benchmark states that the performance of a team for problems with a demonstrable correct solution should be no worse than the performance of its most able individual if one individual solves the problem the team solves it as well advisees whose advisors play strategically have significantly higher levels of strategic play but fall well short of the truth wins benchmark as i many advisors who play strategically do not provide advice to this effect and ii many advisees fail to follow sound advice effect i is largely attributable to female advisors who are far less likely to provide advice than men whether or not advice contains a clear explanation for its effectiveness has no effect on the likelihood of advisees strategic play a result at odds with the idea that economic agents regularly consider all the available alternatives

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

historic sex ratio imbalances predict female participation in the market for politicians we analyze the long term effects of gender imbalances on female labor force participation in particular in the market for politicians we exploit variation in sex ratios the number of men divided by the number of women in a region across germany induced by wwii in the 1990 elections women were more likely to run for office in constituencies that had relatively fewer men in 1946 we do not find a significant effect of the sex ratio on the likelihood of a woman winning the election these results suggest that while women were more likely to run for a seat in parliament in constituencies with lower historical sex ratios voters were not more inclined to vote for them voter demand effects thus do not appear to be as strong as candidate supply effects

human and financial capital for microenterprise development evidence from a field and lab experiment microenterprises constitute an important source of employment and developing such enterprises is a key policy concern in most countries but what is the most efficient tool for microenterprise development we study this question in a developing country context tanzania where microenterprises are the source of employment for more than half of the labor force and we report from a field experiment that jointly investigated the importance of a human capital intervention business training and a financial capital intervention business grant using data from three survey rounds a lab experiment and administrative records of the microfinance institution we present evidence on business performance management practices happiness business knowledge and noncognitive abilities our study demonstrates strong effects of the combination of the two interventions on male entrepreneurs while the effects on female entrepreneurs are much more muted the results suggest that long term finance is an important constraint for microfinance entrepreneurs but that business training is essential to transform financial capital into productive investments our study also points to the need for more comprehensive measures to promote the businesses of female entrepreneurs data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1933 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

contests with three or more heterogeneous agents abstract we study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort bid where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution these differences can either cause a player to drop out that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation or use all or nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice neither complete drop out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone bayesian nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex ante identical players or only two distinct participants

debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets we analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt we show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase by contrast under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit data for us government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness

endophilia or exophobia beyond discrimination the discrimination literature treats outcomes as relative but does a differential arise because agents discriminate against others exophobia or because they favour their own kind endophilia using a field experiment that assigned graders randomly to students examinations that did did not contain names we find favouritism but no discrimination by nationality nor by gender we are able to identify these preferences under a wide range of behavioural scenarios regarding the graders that endophilia dominates exophobia alters how we should measure discriminatory wage differentials and should inform the formulation of anti discrimination policy

public goods provision and redistributive taxation abstract this paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax deductible charitable contributions redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving the price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving substitution effect however redistribution leads to lower consumption for the contributors and therefore has a negative effect on contributions to the charity income effect the theoretical model developed in this paper demonstrates that under a general class of utility functions the substitution effect dominates the income effect hence charitable giving increases with the tax rate in purely egalitarian societies the public good is provided efficiently and the total welfare is maximized independent of the ex ante income inequality however the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account the cost of effort

incentives versus sorting in tournaments evidence from a field experiment existing field evidence on rank order tournaments typically does not allow disentangling incentive and sorting effects we conduct a field experiment illustrating the confounding effect students in an introductory microeconomics course selected themselves into tournaments with low medium or high prizes for the best score at the final exam nonexperimental analysis of the results would suggest that higher rewards induce higher productivity but a comparison between treatment and control groups reveals that there is no such effect this stresses the importance of nonrandom sorting into tournaments

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

selection into self improvement and competition pay gender stereotypes and earnings volatility abstract we examine whether men and women differ in their willingness to select into a contract that pays upon improving one s past performance experiment participants choose to perform a task under either a regular piece rate or a larger piece rate provided they improve relative to a previous round women are less willing than men to select into self improvement pay and this gender gap is largely explained by higher risk aversion and to a smaller extent lower self confidence high earnings volatility widens the gender gap and makes self improvement pay less attractive than competition pay we find no effect of gender stereotypes in the willingness to sort into self improvement the results provide insight into the feasibility and potential of using self improvement contracts as gender neutral incentive mechanisms

acting wife marriage market incentives and labor market investments do single women avoid career enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits like ambition to the marriage market while married and unmarried female mba students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates on exams and problem sets unmarried women have lower participation grades in a field experiment single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences other groups responses were unaffected by peer observability a second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers

optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model although most neoclassical growth models focus on competitive equilibria which are pareto optimal and ignore the role of government recent works by romer 28 29 judd 20 baxter and king s and bizer and judd 7 have shown that government can be introduced into and suboptimal equilibria can be studied in these models as well their studies however are positive analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in competitive equilibria the purpose of this paper is to apply ramsey s 27 theory of optimal taxation to the normative study of fiscal policy in a stocastic growth model ramsey studied a static representative consumer economy with many goods in his formulation a government consumes a fixed amount of these goods which it purchases at market prices and finances by levying flat rate excise taxes prices and quantities are determined in a competitive equilibrium the government is benevolent and its objective is to choose the optimal tax rates to maximize the representative consumer s utility a number of economists among them kydland and prescott 23 barro 3 turnovsky and brock 31 and lucas and stockey 26 have noted that ramsey s formulation can be applied to dynamic economies with uncertainty if one reinterprets the goods in static problems as dated state contingent goods in this framework a fiscal policy is a rule which specifies state contingent tax rates and the amount of public debt issue in each date the optimal fiscal policy is defined as the one which leads to a quantity