efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extensions of recent results this paper investigates the rationale for a system of equalization transfers in a federal system of government the existing sources of inefficiency of resource allocation in economies with more than one level of government are synthesized in the framework of a simple decentralized multiprovince model with mobile factors of production the sources of inefficiency arise first because migrants respond at the margin to incorrect signals owing to the phenomena of rent sharing and fiscal exterality and second because of global rather than local inefficiencies the model is then extended to consider the role of the federal government in providing intergovernmental transfers in the face of such inefficiencies in addition to synthesizing the sources of inefficiency in federal models the equity arguments for equalization are briefly recounted efficacite et paiements de perequation dans un systeme federal de gouvernement synthese et extensions de certains resultats recents ce memoire examine la logique qui soustend un systeme de paiements de perequation dans un systeme fdderal de gouverement les auteurs utilisent un modele simple d un systeme multi provincial decentralise avec des facteurs de production mobiles pour definir les sources d inefficacite dans l allocation des ressources dans les dconomies qui possedent plus d un niveau de gouvernement ces inefficacites proviennent de ce que d abord ceux qui se deplacent le font en reponse a la marge a des signaux incorrects engendres par le partage de la rente sur la base de la residence et par les phenomenes d exteralites fiscales elles sont aussi le resultat d inefficacites globales plutot que locales dans le cadre de ce modele les auteurs analysent le role du gouvernement federal effectuant des transferts inter gouverementaux pour corriger ces inefficacites en plus de presenter une synthese des sources d inefficacite dans les regimes federaux les auteurs font un bref rappel en passant a l ensemble des arguments fondes sur l equite qu on utilise pour rationaliser les paiements de perequation this paper is a linear combination of two papers presented at the may 1982 meetings of the canadian economics association in halifax entitled the case for equalization payments by the authors and recent developments in the theory of regional economic policy in canada by boadway the authors are grateful for comments by the discussants jim johnson and baxter macdonald and by jack mintz brian scarfe gerard belanger david sewell tom courchene and the referees we are especially heavily indebted to dan usher for many stimulating comments and suggestions while the work was in progress some of the above persons will undoubtedly disagree with the emphasis we have chosen to put on various aspects of the analysis for policy purposes support for some of this work has been provided by the economic council of canada and is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xv no 4 november novembre 1982 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 82 0000 0613 01 50 1982 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 127 on wed 12 oct 2016 04 27 47 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 614 robin boadway and frank flatters

the effect of political risk on the forward exchange bias the case of elections abstract the unsuccesful search for explanations of the forward bias has concentrated on variables suggested by traditional models of risk political news although important to foreign exchange traders has not been considered as a determinant of the forward bias i present a model in which the forward bias changes when the governing party changes elections in major industrial countries provide a natural test of the model the forward bias changed as predicted after half of the 13 elections in canada france the united kingdom and the united states between 1973 and 1985 politics provides useful information for foreign exchange traders which economists should not ignore

should commuting expenses be tax deductible a welfare analysis abstract this paper asks whether or not commuting expenses should be tax deductible in order to answer this question a simple multiregion model of im perfect household and worker mobility is employed the paper shows that deductibility is clearly inefficient only if households are perfectly mobile and if households cannot choose their place of work if the region of work is not exogenously fixed commuting expenses should be deductible at more than 100 even if households choose simultaneously the place of work and the region of residence and even if tax rates are not standardized within the federation

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

choosing a place to live and a workplace espanolen este trabajo se estudia como la politica fiscal y los costos de transporte determinan la distribucion geografica de los trabajadores y las familias se utiliza un modelo simple de dos regiones con costos de transporte bienes publicos locales e infraestructura local se presenta una breve revision de literatura relacionada que estudia otros factores determinantes de la localizacion de los agentes se argumenta que las cuestiones estudiadas juegan un rol importante en la distribucion geografica de la actividad economica en el area urbana del gran buenos aires englishwe study how fiscal policies and commuting costs determine the geographical distribution of workers and households in an economy we characterize equilibrium outcomes in a simple two region model with commuting costs local public goods and local infrastructure we also provide a short survey of the related economic literature that discusses other important factors driving the localization decisions of agents finally we argue that the issues raise in this paper play a significant role in the geographic distribution of economic activity in the greater buenos aires urban area of argentina

fiscal externality rent sharing and equalisation transfers in japan this article describes a quantitative analysis of japanese equalisation transfers based on the fiscal externality models of hartwick boadway and flatters in particular it examines whether the actual level of equalisation transfers matches the theoretically optimal level from the efficiency point of view although the purpose of interregional fiscal transfer is not necessarily in the pursuit of an efficient allocation of resources equalisation transfer surely affects it it is often said in japan that the equalisation transfer may distort efficiency too much and that it is one of the causes of serious fiscal conflict between the metropolitan area and local rural prefectures the quantitative results show that the actual amount of transfers from resource rich to resource poor prefectures was below the optimal level in the 1980s however the resource poor prefectures have received an excessive transfer after 1990 specifically the direction of the optimal transfer might change in the second half of t

classifying technology policy from an evolutionary perspective abstract for the classification of technology policy in an evolutionary framework the taxonomy of mission and diffusion oriented policy design introduced by ergas ergas h 1987 the importance of technology policy in dasgupta p stoneman p eds economic policy and technological performance cambridge univ press cambridge is useful however ergas indirect method of identifying the respective policy style is only able to give a first and rough insight in the technology policy of a specific country to improve on that we developed a so called direct method aiming at a sound characterization of single policy measures and giving a more detailed picture about policy orientation to demonstrate the basic procedure of the suggested approach it is applied empirically on the german technology policy of the last 2 decades

incentive equivalence with fixed migration costs abstract if migration between communities is costless and if policy makers in each community anticipate the migration response to policy changes then the interests of the two communities are perfectly aligned decentralization is efficient this incentive equivalence is well known however the first order approach used in virtually all the literature may obscure the fact that no convexity assumptions need be made about technology or tastes this fact underscores the relevance of incentive equivalence even when there are scale economies in the public sector here the consequences of positive migration costs for this incentive equivalence are considered in contrast with much of the literature migration costs are assumed the same for everyone this formulation differs from the more common attachment to home assumption of heterogeneous migration costs conditional on the direction of migration interests of different communities are still perfectly aligned but natives of different communities may prefer different directions of migration weakening incentive equivalence if local policy makers have the power to induce large changes in migration flows however incentive equivalence fails only if economies of scale in population are important so that communities may be under populated

on price taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding abstract competitive equilibrium in a coalition production economy or a club economy typically does not exist when there is free entry for two reasons first there may be an integer problem as is familiar from club theory with anonymous crowding second optimal groups may have different compositions from the population and then even if there is no integer problem it may be impossible to partition the population into optimal groups i define a notion of approximate equilibrium and show that such an equilibrium always exists in a sufficiently large economy i focus on the optimal size of the economy rather than of clubs

transboundary pollution and household mobility are they equivalent abstract recent research has shown that perfect household mobility can serve as a disciplinary mechanism inducing national policy makers to internalize interregional externalities caused by transboundary pollution this paper develops a differential game to illustrate that the result is not necessarily robust when migration costs and explicit dynamics are introduced the paper shows that if governments constantly reoptimize imperfect household mobility leads to a tragedy of the commons and individual countries overemit even when pollution is purely local moreover these dynamic externalities get worse as the degree of household mobility increases and there is a qualitative difference between almost perfect and perfect mobilty that is a discontinuity at zero migration costs

unemployment and the democratic electoral advantage this article calls into question the conventional wisdom that incumbent parties are rewarded when unemployment is low and punished when it is high using county level data on unemployment and election returns for 175 midterm gubernatorial elections and 4 presidential elections from 1994 to 2010 the analysis finds that unemployment and the democratic vote for president and governor move together other things being equal higher unemployment increases the vote shares of democratic candidates the effect is greatest when republicans are the incumbent party but democrats benefit from unemployment even when they are in control the explanation for these findings is that unemployment is a partisan issue for voters not a valence issue and that the democratic party owns unemployment when unemployment is high or rising democratic candidates can successfully convince voters that they are the party best able to solve the problem

tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers abstract this paper analyzes the effects of spillovers on the equilibrium population distribution across jurisdictions in a local public good economy with free mobility spillovers are parametrized by a matrix ij where ij 0 1 when spillovers are symmetric and close to 0 or 1 pure local public goods and pure public goods all equilibrium jurisdiction structures are symmetric however any population distribution can be sustained in equilibrium for some value of the spillover parameter in the class of utility functions with additive externalities we identify the unique family of utility functions for which equilibria are symmetric except for an isolated value of this is a class of utility functions which are linear in the public good and a power function of the private good u c a 1 c with this specification of utility we show that an increase in results in a more fragmented equilibrium population distribution and that when spillovers are asymmetric and large a jurisdiction which is more centrally located i e benefits more from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions has a larger population in equilibrium

inter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents abstractinter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents regional studies this paper shows that if taxes on economic rent are assigned to anticipatory first moving regions and inter regional transfers are mandated centrally rents are under taxed relative to optimal levels this provides a possible explanation for low rent capture observed in australia and canada two resource rich federal economies that also have fiscal equalization transfers between regions

where should the elderly live and who should pay for their care we consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons elderly care is publicly provided there is one big city where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work and a number of small villages we show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees and we characterize the second best solution decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages

absorbing technological spillovers simulations in an evolutionary framework this paper offers a simulation analysis of firm strategies which differ by the degree of absorbing technical know how generated elsewhere it investigates the success of those firm strategies in a heterogeneous oligopoly setting in which firms compete by introducing new products and processes simulation results show that building up absorptive capacities tends to be a superior strategy in technologically heterogeneous environments reducing spillover effects leads to a slowdown of technological progress because cross fertilization effects are of minor relevance where markets competition is reduced the absorptive strategy tends to be only technologically superior copyright 1998 by oxford university press

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

testing the satisficing version of the political business cycle 1905 1984 this paper develops a test of the satisficing version of the political business cycle previous tests have focused on maximizing models of political behavior and are not sufficiently general to test for satisficing behavior using annual u s data for the period 1905 to 1984 we find evidence supporting the satisficing version of the political business cycle model but we reject the maximizing version in accordance with the satisficing hypothesis we find that increasing inflation or unemployment and decreasing monetary base growth in the third year of a presidential term are followed typically by reversals during the election year

redistribution within and across the regions of a federation the authors reconsider the literature on redistribution within a federation with mobile agents they conclude that redistribution is a function best assigned to the national government local governments with diverse preferences for redistribution distort individual migration decisions the authors also examine the fiscal externality literature which has made an efficiency argument for interregional transfers they show that if local governments have the same preferences for redistribution the nash equilibrium is efficient if preferences are diverse the authors show that nationally imposed interregional transfers do not address the source of the inefficiency nevertheless interregional transfers are shown to be a part of decentralized behavior

partisan views on the economy in this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented this model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y the policy maker sets x directly there exist two views on the relationship between x and y model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on we show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences

correlated pollutants interregional redistribution and labor attachment in a federation we examine the efficiency of federal policies in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership imperfect labor mobility and transboundary pollution selfish regional governments regulate correlated pollutant emissions by choosing pollution tax and abatement levels in anticipation of the center s redistributive policy the center s objective function obeys a proportional equity principle which implies that its choice of interregional transfer satisfies the equalization of weighted regional welfare levels regional and central governments make their choices subject to migration incentives we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the sequential game played by regional and central governments yields socially optimal policies

decentralized and efficient control of transboundary pollution in federal systems abstract decentralized control of transboundary pollution in federal systems can be efficient when population crowding is socially costly in this paper an upstream region abates pollution or makes an interregional income transfer to the downstream region with the sole intent of deterring immigration because either instrument abatement expenditure or interregional income transfer alone implements an efficient population distribution between the regions interregional income transfers are unnecessary for efficiency without explicit income transfers each region provides the efficient portion of the aggregate level of pollution abatement in the nash equilibrium

optimality free mobility and the regional authority in a federation abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of a federation characterized by strategically competing regions and freely mobile homogeneous individuals analyses of this economy have concluded that achieving a pareto optimal will require intervention by a national authority this paper makes one basic point the nash equilibrium of regional authority behavior is pareto optimal the implication is that there is no role for a national authority in either providing interregional transfers or correcting for decentralized provision of public goods the nash equilibrium involves samuelson public goods provision and regions purchasing preferred population distributions with optimal interregional transfers

partisanship theory macroeconomic outcomes and endogenous elections recently there has been a surge of interest in partisanship theories of macroeconomic political interaction unlike political business cycle theory in which economic policy is motivated only by reelection concerns partisanship theory maintains that policy is motivated along ideological lines political parties differ with respect to economic policy and consequently economic performance may differ as well indeed not only is there evidence that political parties in the united states have quite different policy priorities but that this difference in policy priorities is translated into differences in economic outcomes 2

population mobility and transboundary environmental problems abstract a standard result in the literature on environmental economics is that efficient environmental policies regulating transboundary pollution will be adopted only if there is interjurisdictional coordination efficient policies can be adopted as a result of interregional treaties or mandated by a central authority the present paper demonstrates that if there is perfect population mobility between the regions affected by the transboundary pollution the efficient outcome is a nash equilibrium of the policy game between regional authorities this is true independently of what policies are available to the regional authorities however there may be more than one nash equilibrium so that policy coordination may be necessary in order to achieve the best equilibrium

knowledge and urban economic development an evolutionary perspective knowledge is considered as a main source of economic growth for nations and regions it is the basis for technological development and for increasing the productivity of capital and labour this pa

public financing of innovation new questions economic theory justifies policy when there are concrete market failures the article shows how in the case of innovation successful policies that have led to radical innovations have been more about market shaping and creating through direct and pervasive public financing rather than market fixing the paper reviews and discusses evidence for this in three key areas i the presence of finance from public sources across the entire innovation chain ii the concept of mission oriented policies that have created new technological and industrial landscapes and iii the entrepreneurial and lead investor role of public actors willing and able to take on extreme risks independent of the business cycle we further illustrate these three characteristics for the case of clean technology and discuss how a market creating and shaping perspective may be useful for understanding the financing of transformative innovation needed for confronting contemporary societal challenges

should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate if jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately they tax only land because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital to exploit absentee owners however jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level as absentee ownership increases throughout the economy land taxation results in greater inefficiency to alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land the higher level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate uniform taxation of land and capital or property taxation thus may be more efficient than separate taxation jel classification h21 h71 est ce que la terre et le capital devraient etre taxes d une maniere uniforme si on permettait aux diverses juridictions de taxer capital et terre separement elles taxeraient seulement la terre parce que la fiscalite imposee au capital cree des distorsions dans l allocation du capital mobile mais pour exploiter les proprietaires absents les diverses juridictions imposent un fardeau fiscal sur la terre qui va au dela de ce que l efficacite commande a proportion que la propriete absente se developpe dans l economie la fiscalite imposee a la terre devient source de plus en plus grande inefficacite pour reduire cette inefficacite attribuable a la sur taxation de la terre le niveau senior de gouvernement intervient pour forcer les juridictions juniors a taxer capital et terre au meme taux parce que le desir d attirer le capital reduit le taux de taxation il se peut donc que la taxation uniforme de la terre et du capital ou de la taxation sur la propriete soit plus efficace que des taux d imposition differents

risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons in this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered it is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect in the nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region however which corresponds to the policies of the central authority regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation it is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely jel classification h77 e61 and f36 le partage du risque dans une federation ou la population est mobile et l horizon temporel long ce memoire examine le partage du risque entre personnes a l interieur des regions et entre regions dans une federation ou il y a mobilite de la population et horizon temporel infini on montre que les autorites regionales n exploiteront pas pleinement les gains en provenance d un partage inter regional du risque quand la mobilite de la population est imparfaite cependant dans un equilibre a la nash il y a partage complet du risque entre les individus de chaque region ce qui correspond aux politiques des autorites centrales les autorites regionales qui tiennent a leur reputation peuvent etre capables de s engager a une allocation efficace il est possible que les ameliorations dans le degre de mobilite rendent ces engagements moins probables

interregional competition spillovers and attachment in a federation abstract we examine decentralized environmental policy making in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility due to attachment to regions energy consumption generates positive consumption benefits but energy supply generates federal air pollution regional authorities regulate energy supply by controlling supplies of pollution permits energy and pollution permits are traded in interregional markets the center redistributes incomes after it observes regional supplies of pollution permits regions are populated by mobile and immobile households and profits are expatriated we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the federal policy game played by regional and central authorities is socially optimal

a model of competing jurisdictions with locally polluting environments and mobile populations in this model we consider a federation consisting oftwo geographically separated regional states withlocal taxing authority the residents of thefederation are identical in preferences and haveexplicit tolerance to pollution pollution is local innature and is a by product of production implying amore highly populated region would generate morepollution local authorities in the regions can andwill in the interest of local residents engage ingame theoretical taxation strategies the model isused to illustrate that nash equilibrium can resultwherein the two regions have different levels ofenvironmental quality the resulting nash conditionsimply for instance that residents of the cleanregion will subsidize those in the other region tostay in the more polluted environment in order foreach to accomplish their preferred consumption andenvironmental quality pair

pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility abstract we examine the non cooperative provision of a pure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the european union where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and the central government is a stackelberg follower a federation with decentralized leadership the center makes interregional income transfers after it observes the contributions to the pure public good imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region despite the degree of labor mobility we show that the pure public good and interregional transfers are generally allocated efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership

voting and economic factors in french elections for the european parliament this article builds and estimates several econometric models that explain and forecast the outcomes of the french elections for the european parliament these models show the influence of the change in the local unemployment rate to explain the vote for the moderate left and the moderate right in the french elections for the european parliament these models appear to be accurate in forecasting the elections of the past and their behavior for the 2009 french election for the european parliament is satisfactory

grey power and the economy aging and inflation across advanced economies what explains the cross national variation in inflation rates across countries in contrast to most literature which emphasizes the role of ideas and institutions this article focuses on electoral politics and argues that aging leads to lower inflation rates countries with a larger share of elderly exhibit lower inflation because older people are both more inflation averse and politically powerful forcing parties seeking their votes to pursue lower inflation logistic regression analysis of survey data confirms that older people are more inflation averse and more likely to punish incumbents at the ballot box for inflation panel data regression analysis shows that social democratic parties have more economically orthodox manifestos in european countries with more elderly people and that the share of elderly is negatively correlated with inflation in both a sample of 21 advanced economies and a larger sample of 175 countries aging therefore pushes governments to pursue lower inflation

are national pension systems efficient if labor is im perfectly mobile abstract in this paper we analyze the effects of labor market integration on national unfunded public pension systems that are organized according to a place of residence principle with this principle labor might migrate for purely fiscal reasons thus some kind of coordination becomes necessary we first show that for the case of unrestricted labor mobility the equalization of contributions is necessary and sufficient for efficiency if the pension systems remain decentralized however national decision makers do not in general have an incentive to voluntarily stick to equalized contributions with a segmented labor market where one segment is costlessly mobile whereas the other segment is completely immobile the coordination requirements are far more complicated if migration cannot compensate for differences in national fertilities if it can the efficiency of equalization turns out to be robust finally we show that replacing the principle of residence with the principle of nationality does not eliminate the risk of fiscal externalities

optimal diversity increasing returns versus recombinant innovation abstract choices regarding diversity play an important role in economics and innovation management but often remain implicit once made explicit the objectives of efficiency and diversity are usually posed as in conflict as efficiency relates positively and diversity negatively to various increasing returns to scale in markets such a perspective however neglects the benefits of diversity in terms of realizing system improvements through recombinant innovation or spillovers the latter implies a contribution of diversity to long term efficiency dominant economic approaches that address diversity such as option value and real options theories regard benefits of diversity as exogenous this paper proposes a simple model of variable endogenous diversity to analyse the optimal balance between increasing returns to scale and recombinant innovation it is discussed under which conditions one of four solutions is optimal complete specialization regardless of which option complete specialization in one specific option symmetric diversity perfect balance and asymmetric diversity the results give rise to a number of policy insights

the nature and importance of economic competence this chapter takes on three tasks 1 to survey the study of economic competence as it appears in economic literature 2 to give a meaningful and operational definition of economic competence as one of the factors contributing to macroeconomic growth and 3 to suggest a methodology pursued in greater depth elsewhere to generalize and link economic competence as defined at the micro firm individual level to macroeconomic growth through simulation on the micro based macroeconomic model of the swedish economic system moses by introducing knowledge in the micro setting of firm organizational competence we arrive at a very different interpretation measured at the macro industry level from that of standard neoclassical theory

the functions of technology infrastructure in a competitive economy abstract governments of industrialized nations play varied but important roles in providing the diverse technology infrastructure that supports a modern competitive economy an understanding of the structure and impacts of these roles as well as efficiency differences among alternative implementation schemes is particularly important at this time as competing industrialized nations are revamping their technology infrastructures in response to major shifts in thescope as well as the content of their growth strategies these shifts in scope can be described as evolutionary changes from single stage to multi stage strategies in that several modes of technology based competition are simultaneously pursued that is whereas an economy may have focused on innovation manufacturing high volume or niche markets etc most if not all of these must be pursued together in the future in order to diversify risk and achieve economies of scope effective implementation of the more complex multi stage growth strategy requires a consensus model of the appropriate functions for infrastructure and its institutions such a consensus model is necessary to efficiently guide strategic planning in both industry and government in particular a conceptual basis is needed for defining the critical interfaces between the government and industry roles including effective long range planning communication and cooperation the required technology infrastructure policy model is derived from a microeconomic model of the typical technology based industry existing national strategies have demonstrated the importance of efficiency at the production and market development stages as well as at the r d stage but the trend is towards promoting simultaneous efficiency at all these stages that is the model and the derived infrastructure functions must cover all stages and interfaces in the technology and related product life cycles

local property taxation with external land ownership abstract when housing in a local jurisdiction is produced using perfectly mobile capital and land owned by non residents a property tax on housing results in tax exporting this paper examines how property tax poll subsidy policies are determined in the presence of tax exporting and shows that the optimal property tax is the optimal tariff when residents are homogeneous when residents have different incomes and are mobile across jurisdictions the majority voting equilibrium property tax poll subsidy policy depends on factors such as tax exporting intrajurisdictional redistribution and congestion if the effect of intrajurisdictional redistribution is negligible for the median voter household mobility may result in a property tax poll subsidy policy that induces emigration of rich households

do political factors affect stock returns during presidential elections abstract this study investigates whether or not political factors such as government policy and political connections affected stock returns during the 2008 taiwanese presidential election we find that firms that benefitted from were threatened by the proposed three links policy of the winning party experienced positive negative stock returns during the election we use the sensitivities of firms returns to bilateral trade flows between taiwan and china to measure the government policy effect our results show that the effects of political connections weakly exist but they become more significant when the support ratio of the winning party increased in polling data we also find that only the government policy effect holds for different crash risk and corporate governance levels finally investment strategies based on both political factors can generate positive abnormal returns with respect to the fama french three factor model

income distribution in the united states political action has affected postwar income distribution in the united states mainly through policy induced variations in macroeconomic activity and government transfer benefits in proportion to total income we present a small dynamic model of the connections among the partisan balance of power macroeconomic fluctuations transfer spending trends and income distribution outcomes the model is based on the premise that the parties have different distributional goals and it is designed to identify how shifts in party control of the presidency and the strength of the parties in congress have affected the distribution of after tax after transfer income by influencing cyclical economic performance and the flow of resources to transfer programs we therefore extend the partisan theory of macroeconomic policy to the domain of income distribution outcomes

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

interregional spillovers in the presence of perfect and imperfect household mobility abstract when households are immobile across regions the decentralized provision of public goods that generate interregional benefit spillovers is inefficiently low we analyze this problem in an environment of interregional household migration and obtain the following results if households are perfectly mobile across regions then the decentralized provision of public goods generating spillovers is socially efficient there is no need for central government intervention if households are attached to particular regions for cultural or nationalistic reasons however at least one of two regions undersupplies the public good central government intervention can enhance efficiency

ex ante free mobility ex post immobility and time consistency in a federal system abstract this paper examines regional population distribution when there is an interregional transfer policy without commitment we introduce explicitly the following time structure of actions individuals assumed to be identical make decisions on locational choices freely ex ante but are immobile ex post the fiscal policies of the local governments and the central government are implemented after individuals migration decisions the basic result is that locally stable no commitment equilibria are single community equilibria when there is a pure local public good we then illustrate the possibility for the interregional transfer policy to reduce the efficiency of population distribution

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

elements of a schumpeterian catalytic research and innovation policy in this article we take a fresh look at research and innovation r i hereinafter policy and define a new notion schumpeterian catalytic r i policy such policy style amends and enriches the new mission oriented framework for innovation policy by assigning more weight to the microeconomic dimension of private actors actions and by being more concerned with the temporary nature of interventions we relate our argument to recent empirical trends in productivity dynamics and innovative activities these suggest that an innovation slowdown is taking place and consequently that a renewed interest in the re direction rather than on the intensity of innovative activities is key to the design of r i policy capable to tackle current challenges we use the evidence to build a schematic theoretical framework to inform policy design and we outlined the defining features of our proposed policy style

externalities vs internalities a model of political integration abstract decentralized government leads to inter regional externalities whereas an integrated jurisdiction solves the externality problem centralized government entails other costs in particular a neglect for minority interests the paper models formally the trade off between these two forces in determining the optimum as well as the equilibrium design of jurisdictions both the relative size of regions and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important parameters of the problem

mapping public support for innovation a comparison of policy alignment in the uk and france this paper proposes and tests a three dimensional model of public support design as a framework to compare public incentives for innovation in firms through time and across countries and consequently to compare forms of policy alignment of innovation objectives in an economy using data on 149 french and british policy programmes from the early 1980s to 2002 this paper shows that policy makers implement programmes within a different three dimensional design space in order to align several distinctive objectives and consequently strengthen the impact of governmental measures moreover as the objectives of the national players and policy makers evolved the portfolio of innovation policies also evolved in their separate ways nevertheless some similar trends are also observed

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

the timing of regional development abstract consider a country composed of regions of different qualities or endowments of amenities and natural resources for production and consumption initially only the highest quality regions are occupied as national population grows successively lower quality regions are occupied the equilibrium timing of occupation of uninhabited regions differs from the optimal timing typically being too late policies which would result in better timing are analyzed

policy mixes for sustainability transitions an extended concept and framework for analysis reaching a better understanding of the policies and politics of transitions presents a main agenda item in the emerging field of sustainability transitions one important requirement for these transitions such as the move towards a decarbonized energy system is the redirection and acceleration of technological change for which policies play a key role in this regard several studies have argued for the need to combine different policy instruments in so called policy mixes however existing policy mix studies often fall short of reflecting the complexity and dynamics of actual policy mixes the underlying politics and the evaluation of their impacts in this paper we take a first step towards an extended interdisciplinary policy mix concept based on a review of the bodies of literature on innovation studies environmental economics and policy analysis the concept introduces a clear terminology and consists of the three building blocks elements policy processes and characteristics which can be delineated by several dimensions based on this we discuss its application as analytical framework for empirical studies analyzing the impact of the policy mix on technological change throughout the paper we illustrate the proposed concept by using the example of the policy mix for fostering the transition of the german energy system to renewable power generation technologies finally we derive policy implications and suggest avenues for future research

optimal taxation global externalities and labor mobility this paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model we assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the dirty good that is causing damage to the environment the purpose is to compare the globally optimal second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium we show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of i transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments ii interaction effects between environmental and other policies and iii labor mobility

attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of an economy characterized by strategically competing regions and individuals with varying degrees of attachment to home in an otherwise standard fiscal externality setting regional authorities may make interregional transfers in purchasing preferred populations however there is a range of distributions of resources over which neither region makes transfers nevertheless all equilibrium allocations resulting from the nash behavior of regional authorities including those that involve no transfers are efficient therefore in contrast to the standard conclusions of the fiscal externality literature there is no efficiency role for a central authority

competitiveness and industrial policy from rationalities of failure towards the ability to evolve this article elaborates a dynamic rationale of industrial policy focusing on how to strengthen the socio economic system s ability to evolve i e how to achieve high real income together with qualitative change it highlights that the ubiquitous rationalities of failure be it of markets governments or systems are rooted in a peculiar habit of accepting hypothetical perfect states as normative benchmarks in contrast a dynamic logic of intervention should start from the question what the system aims to accomplish combining the structuralist ontology of micro meso and macro with the functional principles of evolutionary change the paper proposes a general typology of economic policies based on their respective contributions to the system s ability to evolve

a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with private savings and local borrowing regulation abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment in this model the central government is benevolent but cannot commit to ex post intergovernmental transfer policies while local governments act strategically after accounting for the ex post motives of the central government we then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze the effect of central control on local borrowing and show that central control is of no benefit because ex ante local taxation works to offset it we find the model yields different policy implications that central control is effective when extended to the case of residential mobility

optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second best world evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players abstract this paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question in a second best world should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally we find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small this result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution i e it uses uniform standards whereas local authorities use different shadow prices and therefore different standards

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions or when delegation induces inefficiencies this paper considers the problem of bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions about local public goods and head taxes it is shown that delegation to benevolent jurisdictions will in general induce distortions away from efficiency where efficiency means an efficient provision of local public goods and an efficient distribution of consumers this distortion is caused by 1 the divergence between social and jurisdictional objectives and 2 the impossibility for jurisdictions to realize side payments without modifying either the provision of local public goods or the distribution of consumers

incentives for secession in the presence of mobile ethnic groups abstract this paper presents a model on secessions and nationalism with special emphasis on the role of imperfectly mobile ethnic minorities individuals trade off political benefits of homogeneity against economic costs from increasing returns to scale in production the main findings are i mobility decreases the political motivation for independence because increased competition for labour forces the ethnic majorities in the separating countries to accommodate their policy ii the impact of mobility depends on whether separation is politically or economically motivated iii increased mobility leads to a less accommodated policy in case of no separation

transboundary environmental problems with mobile but heterogeneous populations most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant ignoringpopulation mobility we showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions and populations are homogeneous asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting even without any internationalenvironmental agreement in the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population and showthat when people differ a non cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient we alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient finally we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility butinefficient when there is population mobility

local pollution in federal systems it is widely accepted that decentralized control of local pollution is inefficient if the central and the local authorities are imperfectly informed this paper shows how the central authority can introduce a flexible grant in aid system that induces the local authority to use a weighted combination of local and central information when the local authority suffers from confirmatory bias if the central authority is highly uncertain about the environmental effects of a specific pollutant the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information to play an essential role in the environmental policy if the central authority is certain that a pollutant must not exceed a specific limit the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information little influence on the environmental policy

interregional interactions and population mobility the institutional level at which policies should be determined is an important issue that has been extensively treated in the economics literature in particular the literature has discussed to what extent decentralization of policy decisions give an inefficient outcome with a homogeneous population and perfect population mobility as it conventionally is modeled the following result is derived for a very general class of economies with interregional interactions a socially efficient outcome is a nash equilibrium of the game of decentralized and uncoordinated policy setting however if decisions about migration take a longer time to make than decisions of policy changes the general result above no longer holds with this decision sequence decentralization may give an inefficient outcome also in situations where the decentralized outcome is efficient in the absence of population mobility

an efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets abstract we examine joint tradable permit markets as a self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities e g smog and global warming by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions we find that joint domestic and international permit markets are pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences

international aspects of public infrastructure investment m odelling infrastructure as an international public good in a two country m odel of trade where each country s social planner behaves strategically we show that the equilibrium levels of infrastructure are sub optimal from a global perspective utilising an appropriate econom etric fram ework and data from 16 european countries over the period 1987 95 we find evidence that accords well with the m ain predictions of our theory thus we are able to offer a plausible theoretical explanation why public capital m ay be undersupplied as suggested by previous em pirical literature