taming macroeconomic instability monetary and macro prudential policy interactions in an agent based model abstract we develop an agent based model to study the macroeconomic impact of alternative macro prudential regulations and their possible interactions with different monetary policy rules the aim is to shed light on the most appropriate policy mix to achieve the resilience of the banking sector and foster macroeconomic stability simulation results show that a triple mandate taylor rule focused on output gap inflation and credit growth and a basel iii prudential regulation is the best policy mix to improve the stability of the banking sector and smooth output fluctuations moreover we consider the different levers of basel iii and their combinations we find that minimum capital requirements and counter cyclical capital buffers allow to achieve results close to the basel iii first best with a much more simplified regulatory framework finally the components of basel iii are non additive the inclusion of an additional lever does not always improve the performance of the macro prudential regulation

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

the behavioralist visits the factory increasing productivity using simple framing manipulations recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can happen in markets such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments a missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally occurring field counterparts we provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to work with a chinese high tech manufacturing facility our study revolves around using insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research framing manipulations in an attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility using a natural field experiment we report several insights for example conditional incentives framed as both losses and gains increase productivity for both individuals and teams in addition teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains the magnitude of this framing effect is roughly 1 that is total team productivity is enhanced by 1 purely due to the framing manipulation importantly we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their significance over time rather the effects are observed over the entire sample period moreover we learn that repeated interaction with workers and conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long run this paper was accepted by gerard p cachon decision analysis

coordinating monetary and macroprudential policies this paper studies noncooperative games between a monetary authority and a macroprudential regulator whose objectives are a subset of those in the social loss function the analysis is based on a new keynesian model with a financial sector and a financial friction a la gertler and karadi 2011 when the friction affects the financing of all factors of production equally macroprudential policy is shown to be a powerful additional tool fully eliminating inefficiencies regardless of the source of the shock and no matter whether the central bank and the regulator cooperate but when trade offs are present and policy is discretionary the institutional arrangements become crucial while coordination leads to higher welfare than a setting in which each authority takes the decision rule of the other as given namely the nash equilibrium our analysis shows that a noncooperative setting in which the macroprudential authority acts as a leader within the period can be superior to cooperation finally our conclusions are unaffected by whether the macroprudential instrument affects funding costs or acts as a liquidity requirement

an interdisciplinary model for macroeconomics macroeconomic modelling has been under intense scrutiny since the great financial crisis when serious shortcomings were exposed in the methodology used to understand the economy as a whole criticism has been levelled at the assumptions employed in the dominant models particularly that economic agents are homogeneous and optimizing and that the economy is equilibrating this paper seeks to explore an interdisciplinary approach to macroeconomic modelling with techniques drawn from other natural and social sciences specifically it discusses agent based modelling which is used across a wide range of disciplines as an example of such a technique agent based models are complementary to existing approaches and are suited to answering macroeconomic questions where complexity heterogeneity networks and heuristics play an important role

the interbank market after august 2007 what has changed and why after the onset of the financial crisis spreads between interbank interest rates on unsecured and secured deposits for the major world currencies became exceptionally large and volatile first we find that the phenomenon was mainly driven by aggregate rather than bank specific factors notably risk aversion and accounting practices by contrast funding liquidity capital shortage and central bank interventions were not important determinants second prior to august 2007 the spread was broadly insensitive to key borrower characteristics whereas afterward it became somewhat more reactive to measures of creditworthiness third conditions for big borrowers became relatively more favorable during the crisis suggesting that moral hazard risks related to the too big to fail argument have increased these results are discussed in the light of theories on the interbank market during a crisis

money liquidity and monetary policy in a market based financial system banking and capital market developments are inseparable and funding conditions are closely tied to fluctuations in the leverage of market based financial intermediaries offering a window on liquidity the balance sheet growth of broker dealers provides a sense of the availability of credit contractions of broker dealer balance sheets have tended to precede declines in real economic growth even before the current turmoil for this reason balance sheet quantities of market based financial intermediaries are important macroeconomic state variables for the conduct of monetary policy

dynamic pricing strategies with reference effects we consider the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist firm in a market with repeated interactions where demand is sensitive to the firm s pricing history consumers have memory and are prone to human decision making biases and cognitive limitations as the firm manipulates prices consumers form a reference price that adjusts as an anchoring standard based on price perceptions purchase decisions are made by assessing prices as discounts or surcharges relative to the reference price in the spirit of prospect theory we prove that optimal pricing policies induce a perception of monotonic prices whereby consumers always perceive a discount respectively surcharge relative to their expectations the effect is that of a skimming or penetration strategy the firm s optimal pricing path is monotonic on the long run but not necessarily at the introductory stage if consumers are loss averse we show that optimal prices converge to a constant steady state price characterized by a simple implicit equation otherwise the optimal policy cycles the range of steady states is wider the more loss averse consumers are steady state prices decrease with the strength of the reference effect and with customers memory all else equal offering lower prices to frequent customers may be suboptimal however if these are less sensitive to price changes than occasional buyers if managers ignore such long term implications of their pricing strategy the model indicates that they will systematically price too low and lose revenue our results hold under very general reference dependent demand models

unemployment and inflation consequences of unexpected election results the empirical evidence toward rational partisan theory of business cycles is mixed and thus inconclusive this is due to the enormous heterogeneity of the existing empirical studies only a few of these test explicitly for the central theoretical innovation that post electoral blips in economic activity depend on the degree of the electoral surprise using polling data we present empirical evidence in favor of rational partisan theory for a panel of oecd countries

the effects of interbank networks on efficiency and stability in a macroeconomic agent based model we develop a macroeconomic agent based model that consists of firms banks unions and households who interact on labour goods credit and interbank markets the model endogenises pricing decisions by firms wage setting by unions and interest rate setting by banks on both firm and interbank lending banks also set leverage targets and precautionary liquidity buffers on the basis of internal risk models our model produces endogenous fluctuations driven by the pricing behaviour of firms and the wage setting behaviour of unions fluctuations lead to loan defaults which are exacerbated as lenders reduce lending and charge higher interest rates inducing a credit crunch we also study how making the inter banking network more connected affects the key outcomes of the economy and find that while the flow of funds from surplus banks to firms can be increased the latter effect is soon dominated by increasing instability in the real sector as firms default at higher rates while the banking sector experiences fewer defaults as a whole losses on the interbank market increase as a source of bank defaults

the financial instability hypothesis a stochastic microfoundation framework this paper examines the dynamics of financial distress and in particular the mechanism of transmission of shocks from the financial sector to the real economy the analysis is performed by representing the linkages between microeconomic financial variables and the aggregate performance of the economy by means of a microfounded model with firms that have heterogeneous capital structures the model is solved both numerically and analytically by means of a stochastic approximation that is able to replicate quite well the numerical solution these methodologies by overcoming the restrictions imposed by the traditional microfounded approach enable us to provide some insights into the stabilization policies which may be effective in a financially fragile system

fiscal and monetary policies in complex evolving economies what is the most appropriate combination of fiscal and monetary policies in economies subject to banking crises and deep recessions we study this issue using an agent based model that is able to reproduce a wide array of macro and micro empirical regularities simulation results suggest that policy mixes associating unconstrained counter cyclical fiscal policy and monetary policy targeting employment is required to stabilise the economy we also show that discipline guided fiscal rules can be self defeating as they depress the economy without improving public finances finally we find that the effects of monetary and fiscal policies become sharper as the level of income inequality increases

product and price competition with satiation effects consumers become satiated with a product when purchasing too much too quickly how much is too much and how quickly is too quickly depends on the characteristics of the product relative to the time interval between consumption periods knowing that consumers allocate their budget to products that generate less satiation effects retailers should then choose to sell products that induce minimal satiation but usually this is operationally more costly to study this trade off we provide an analytical model based on utility theory that relates customer consumption to price and satiation in the context of multiple competing retailers we determine the purchasing pattern over time and provide an explicit expression to determine the consumption level in steady state we derive market shares and show that they take the form of an attraction model in which the attractiveness depends on price and product satiation we use this to analyze the competition between firms that maximize long term average profit we characterize the equilibrium under three scenarios i price only competition ii product only competition and iii price and product competition the results reveal the interplay between a key marketing lever price and the firm s ability to offer products that generate less satiation in particular we show that when a firm becomes more efficient at reducing satiation its competitor may benefit if competition is on product only but not if it is on price and product we also find that when satiation effects are not managed a firm s profit may be significantly reduced while a strategic competitor can largely benefit this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

a search based model of the interbank money market and monetary policy implementation we present a search based model of the interbank money market and monetary policy implementation banks are subject to reserve requirements and the central bank tenders reserves interbank payments redistribute holdings and banks trade with each other in a decentralized over the counter market the central bank provides standing facilities where banks can either deposit surpluses or borrow to cover shortfalls of reserves overnight the model provides insights on liquidity trading volume and rate dispersion in the interbank market features largely absent from the canonical models in the tradition of poole 1968 and fits a number of stylized facts for the eurosystem observed during the recent period of unconventional monetary policies moreover it provides insights on the implications of different market structures

leverage induced systemic risk under basle ii and other credit risk policies abstract we use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies the first is the unregulated case which only imposes limits on maximum leverage the second is basle ii and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage induced risk with options when compared to the unregulated case both basle ii and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high this is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging which can destabilize the market none of these policies are optimal for everyone risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage banks prefer the perfect hedge policy and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage no one prefers basle ii

optimal design of social comparison effects setting reference groups and reference points in this paper we study how social planners should exploit social comparisons to pursue their objectives we consider two modes of social comparison referred to as behind averse and ahead seeking behaviors depending on whether individuals experience a utility loss from underperforming or a utility gain from overperforming relative to their peers modeling social comparison as a game between players we find that ahead seeking behavior leads to output polarization whereas behind averse behavior leads to output clustering a social planner can mitigate these effects in two ways i by providing the full reference distribution of outputs instead of an aggregate reference point based on the average output and ii by assigning players into uniform rather than diverse reference groups social planners may thus need to tailor the reference structure to the predominant mode of social comparison and their objective a performance focused social planner may set the reference structure so as to maximize the output of either the top or the bottom player depending on whether she puts greater marginal weight to larger or smaller outputs when the social planner also cares about utility she faces a dilemma because performance optimization may not be aligned with utility maximization inevitably the social planner will have to confront equity issues because better performance may not reflect greater effort or greater ability this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information a number of papers have shown that a strict nash equilibrium action profile of a game may never be played if there is a small amount of incomplete information see for example carlsson and van damme 1993a we present a general approach to analyzing the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information a nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust to incomplete information if every incomplete information game with payoffs almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the nash equilibrium we show that many games with strict equilibria have no robust equilibrium and examine why we get such different results from existing refinements if a game has a unique correlated equilibrium it is robust a natural many player many action generalization of risk dominance is a sufficient condition for robustness

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

income distribution credit and fiscal policies in an agent based keynesian model this work studies the interactions between income distribution and monetary and fiscal policies in terms of ensuing dynamics of macro variables gdp growth unemployment etc on the grounds of an agent based keynesian model the direct ancestor of this work is the keynes meeting schumpeter formalism presented in dosi et al 2010 to that model we add a banking sector and a monetary authority setting interest rates and credit lending conditions the model combines keynesian mechanisms of demand generation a schumpeterian innovation fueled process of growth and minskian credit dynamics the robustness of the model is checked against its capability to jointly account for a large set of empirical regularities both at the micro level and at the macro one the model is able to catch salient features underlying the current as well as previous recessions the impact of financial factors and the role in them of income distribution we find that different income distribution regimes heavily affect macroeconomic performance more unequal economies are exposed to more severe business cycles fluctuations higher unemployment rates and higher probability of crises on the policy side fiscal policies do not only dampen business cycles reduce unemployment and the likelihood of experiencing a huge crisis in some circumstances they also affect positively long term growth further the more income distribution is skewed toward profits the greater the effects of fiscal policies about monetary policy we find a strong non linearity in the way interest rates affect macroeconomic dynamics in one regime with low rates changes in interest rates are ineffective up to a threshold beyond which increasing the interest rate implies smaller output growth rates and larger output volatility unemployment and likelihood of crises

leaning against boom bust cycles in credit and housing prices this paper studies the potential gains of monetary and macro prudential policies that lean against house price and credit cycles we rely on a model that features borrowers and savers and allows for over borrowing induced by news shock driven cycles we find that policy that responds to changes in financial variables is socially optimal considering the use of a single policy instrument both types of agents are better off when the interest rate optimally responds to credit growth when we allow for the implementation of both interest rate and ltv policies heterogeneity in the welfare implications is key in determining the optimal use of policy instruments the optimal policy for the borrowers is characterized by a ltv ratio that responds countercyclically to credit growth which most effectively stabilizes credit relative to gdp in contrast the optimal policy for the savers features a constant ltv ratio coupled with an interest rate response to credit growth news shock driven cycles account for most of the gains from a policy response to changes in financial variables

timing is all elections and the duration of united states business cycles this paper presents a new method for empirically testing predictions of various political business cycle theories by using duration analysis the authors estimate the effect of presidential elections and their outcomes on the likelihood of the occurrence of business cycle turning points in the united states for the period from 1855 to the present as well as for subperiods representing the post world war i and post world war ii eras they find significant evidence that political events increase the likelihood of the end of both expansions and contractions holding constant the effect of duration dependence copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

a new approach to business fluctuations heterogeneous interacting agents scaling laws and financial fragility abstract in this paper we discuss a scaling approach to business fluctuations our starting point consists in recognizing that concepts and methods derived from physics have allowed economists to re discover a set of stylized facts which have to be satisfactorily accounted for in their models standard macroeconomics based on a reductionist approach centered on the representative agent is definitely badly equipped for this task on the contrary we show that a simple financial fragility agent based model based on complex interactions of heterogeneous agents is able to replicate a large number of scaling type stylized facts with a remarkable high degree of statistical precision

macroprudential and monetary policies implications for financial stability and welfare in this paper we analyze the implications of macroprudential and monetary policies for business cycles welfare and financial stability we consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with housing and collateral constraints a macroprudential rule for the loan to value ratio ltv which responds to credit growth interacts with a traditional taylor rule for monetary policy we compute the optimal parameters of these rules both when monetary and macroprudential policies act in a coordinated and in a non coordinated way we find that both policies acting together unambiguously improves the stability of the system in both cases this interaction is welfare improving for the society especially in the case of the non coordinated game there is though a trade off between borrowers and savers however borrowers can compensate the saver s welfare loss view the mathml sourcela kaldor hicks to achieve a pareto superior outcome

a macroprudential approach to financial regulation many observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely microprudential in nature a microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions by contrast a macroprudential approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole in the aftermath of the crisis there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction in this paper we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime might be designed our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system as well as one based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks is likely to be fragile we begin by identifying the key market failures at work why individual financial firms acting in their own interests deviate from what a social planner would have them do next we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures we conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the united states and to proposed global banking reforms

the emergence of economic organization abstract a model of decentralized markets is studied in which transactors follow simple adaptive rules transactions are coordinated by specialist trading firms that bear the costs of market disequilibrium starting from an initially autarkic situation in which none of the institutions that support exchange exist computer simulation shows that for a wide range of parameter values a fully developed market economy will emerge spontaneously moreover in virtually every case where a market economy develops one of the commodities traded will emerge as a universal medium of exchange being traded by every firm and changing hands in every act of exchange

winter is possibly not coming mitigating financial instability in an agent based model with interbank market abstract we develop a macroeconomic agent based model to study how financial instability can emerge from the co evolution of interbank and credit markets and the policy responses to mitigate its impact on the real economy the model is populated by heterogenous firms consumers and banks that locally interact in different markets in particular banks provide credit to firms according to a basel ii or iii macro prudential frameworks and manage their liquidity in the interbank market the central bank performs monetary policy according to different types of taylor rules we find that the model endogenously generates market freezes in the interbank market which interact with the financial accelerator possibly leading to firm bankruptcies banking crises and the emergence of deep downturns this requires the timely intervention of the central bank as a liquidity lender of last resort moreover we find that the joint adoption of a three mandate taylor rule tackling credit growth and the basel iii macro prudential framework is the best policy mix to stabilize financial and real economic dynamics however as the liquidity coverage ratio spurs financial instability by increasing the pro cyclicality of banks liquid reserves a new counter cyclical liquidity buffer should be added to basel iii to improve its performance further finally we find that the central bank can also dampen financial instability by employing a new unconventional monetary policy tool involving active management of the interest rate corridor in the interbank market

the financial accelerator in an evolving credit network we model a credit network characterized by credit relationships connecting i downstream d and upstream u firms and ii firms and banks the net worth of d firms is the driver of fluctuations the production of d firms and of their suppliers u firms in fact is constrained by the availability of internal finance proxied by net worth to the d firms the structure of credit interlinkages changes over time due to an endogeneous process of partner selection which leads to the polarization of the network at the aggregate level the distribution of growth rates exhibits negative skewness and excess kurtosis when a shock hits the macroeconomy or a significant group of agents in the credit network a bankruptcy avalanche can follow if agents leverage is critically high in a nutshell we want to explore the properties of a network based financial accelerator

basel iii leverage ratio requirement and the probability of bank runs abstract a new argument for the basel iii leverage ratio requirement is proposed the need to limit the risk of a bank run when there is imperfect information on the value of a bank s assets in addition to screening and monitoring borrowers banks provide liquidity insurance with the supply of short term deposits withdrawable on demand the maturity mismatch creates the risk of a disorderly bank run which can be exacerbated by imperfect information about the value of bank assets it is shown in a stylized basel iii framework that capital regulation should incorporate a liquidity risk component credit risk diversification and or a reduced probability of loan default which lead to a reduction of basel iii regulatory capital will increase the probability of a bank run the leverage ratio rule puts a floor on the basel iii risk weighted capital ratio allowing the limitation of such a risk

interest rate corridors and reserves abstract this paper evaluates reserves regimes versus interest rate corridors which have become competing frameworks for monetary policy implementation rate corridors relying on lending and deposit facilities to create ceilings and floors for overnight interest rates evince mixed results on controlling volatility reserve requirements allow period average smoothing of interest rates but even if remunerated are subject to reserve avoidance activities a system of voluntary period average reserve commitments could offer equivalent rate smoothing advantages if central banks created symmetric opportunity costs of meeting or falling short of period average reserve requirements or commitments they could achieve flat reserve demand on settlement day

liquidity monetary policy and the financial crisis a new monetarist approach a model of public and private liquidity integrates financial intermediation theory with a new monetarist monetary framework nonpassive fiscal policy and costs of operating a currency system imply that an optimal policy deviates from the friedman rule a liquidity trap can exist in equilibrium away from the friedman rule and there exists a permanent nonneutrality of money driven by an illiquidity effect financial frictions can produce a financial crisis phenomenon that can be mitigated by conventional open market operations working in an unconventional manner private asset purchases by the central bank are either irrelevant or they reallocate credit and redistribute income jel e13 e44 e52 e62 g01 liquidity is a class of assets that is useful in exchange some of these liquid assets are government liabilities federal reserve notes treasury bills and treasury notes some are private liabilities the deposit liabilities of banks and some asset backed securities for example conventional wisdom holds that the main role of a central bank is to manage public liquidity in a manner that controls inflation and enhances the provision of private liquidity and credit however the mechanism by which central bank actions work to perform this role still appears to be poorly understood as has been highlighted by the financial crisis and the ensuing policy responses the purpose of this paper is to build a model of public and private liquidity that captures the features of modern economies essential to the analysis of monetary policy and that can be used to shed light on some current monetary policy problems and questions what is a liquid asset and what roles do privately provided and publicly provided liquid assets play in exchange in a model where we capture these roles for liquid assets what are the implications for monetary policy under what circumstances can a liquidity trap occur how does monetary policy work when there is a positive quantity of excess reserves held by banks what does a financial crisis do to the supply of private liquidity and what should monetary policy do in response

the taylor rule and optimal monetary policy where it denotes the fed s operating target for the federal funds rate pt is the inflation rate measured by the gdp deflator yt is the log of real gdp and y t is the log of potential output identified empirically with a linear trend the rule has since been subject to considerable attention both as an account of actual policy in the united states and elsewhere and as a prescription for desirable policy taylor argues for the rule s normative significance both on the basis of simulations and on the ground that it describes u s policy in a period in which monetary policy is widely judged to have been unusually successful taylor 1999 suggesting that the rule is worth adopting as a principle of behavior here i wish to consider to what extent this prescription resembles the sort of policy that economic theory would recommend i consider the question in the context of a simple but widely used optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism which allows one to reach clear conclusions about economic welfare the model is highly stylized but incorporates important features of more realistic models and allows me to make several points that are of more general validity out of concern for the robustness of the conclusions reached the analysis here addresses only broad qualitative features of the taylor rule and attempts to identify features of a desirable policy rule that are likely to hold under a variety of model specifications

a leverage ratio rule for capital adequacy abstract this paper studies the economic foundations for maximum leverage ratio capital adequacy rules the paper makes three contributions to the literature first we show how to determine the maximum leverage ratio such that the probability of insolvency is less than some predetermined quantity two we show that a leverage ratio rule controls for the same risks as does a value at risk var capital adequacy rule third we argue that leverage ratio rules are better than var rules because they are more intuitive and easier to compare across firms

corridor system and interest rates volatility and asymmetry the corridor system in its current form is believed to reduce the volatility of overnight interest rates and to eliminate any chance of persistent upward or downward bias the model presented here serves to highlight two main findings one is that a central bank can further reduce the volatility of overnight interest rates by allowing banks some flexibility to meet their reserve targets within a small range as observed in the uk data the second is that a seemingly symmetric corridor may be asymmetric in practice due to several distortions as the uk and euro area data suggest

clean evidence on peer effects we study subjects who were asked to fill letters into envelopes with a remuneration independent of output in the pair treatment two subjects worked at the same time in the same room and peer effects were possible in the single treatment subjects worked alone and peer effects were ruled out we find evidence of peer effects in the pair treatment because the standard deviations of output are smaller within pairs than between pairs moreover average output is higher in the pair treatment thus peer effects raise productivity finally low productivity workers are the most sensitive to the behavior of peers

interest rate control and nonconvergence to rational expectations this paper investigates the feasibility of a monetary policy aimed at pegging the nominal rate of interest it shows that under general conditions such a policy would produce the well known cumulative process despite the fact that there exists a well behaved rational expectations equilibrium with no tendency for inflation to accelerate or decelerate the cumulative process shows up as the failure of learning to converge to rational expectations specifically the paper shows first in a conventional is lm model with an expectations augmented phillips curve and then in a micro based finance constraint model that if people follow any learning rule based on experience that satisfies a weak condition then the sequence of temporary equilibria under a policy of interest pegging cannot converge the nonconvergent path that will be observed accords with the familiar cumulative process in that inflation accelerates if the market rate of interest has been pegged below the natural rate

trade dynamics in the market for federal funds we develop a model of the market for federal funds that explicitly accounts for its two distinctive features banks have to search for a suitable counterparty and once they have met both parties negotiate the size of the loan and the repayment the theory is used to answer a number of positive and normative questions what are the determinants of the fed funds rate how does the market reallocate funds is the market able to achieve an efficient reallocation of funds we also use the model for theoretical and quantitative analyses of policy issues facing modern central banks

interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch evidence from the 2007 2009 crisis we study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the european interbank market using exhaustive portuguese loan level data we find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis the credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller with weaker banking relationships small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt furthermore the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks finally we find no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity but instead higher hoarding of liquidity

causes and consequences of hysteresis aggregate demand productivity and employment in this work we develop an agent based model where hysteresis in major macroeconomic variables e g gross domestic product productivity unemployment emerges out of the decentralized interactions of heterogeneous firms and workers building upon the schumpeter meeting keynes family of models cf in particular dosi et al 2016b 2017c we specify an endogenous process of accumulation of workers skills and a state dependent process of firms entry indeed hysteresis is ubiquitous however this is not due to market imperfections but rather to the very functioning of decentralized economies characterized by coordination externalities and dynamic increasing returns so contrary to the insider outsider hypothesis blanchard and summers 1986 the model does not support the findings that rigid industrial relations may foster hysteretic behavior in aggregate unemployment on the contrary this contribution provides evidence that during severe downturns and thus declining aggregate demand phenomena like decreasing investment and innovation rates skills deterioration and declining entry dynamics are better candidates to explain long run unemployment spells and reduced output growth in that more rigid labor markets may well dampen hysteretic dynamics by sustaining aggregate demand thus making the economy more resilient

deleveraging crises and deep recessions a behavioural approach macroeconomic dynamics are characterized by alternating patterns of periods of relative stability and large swings standard micro founded macro economic models account for these patterns through exogenous and persistent shocks in this paper we develop a fully decentralized and micro founded macro economic agent based model augmented with an opinion model which produces endogenous waves of pessimism and optimism that feed back into firms leverage and households precautionary saving behaviour a major emergent property of our model is precisely the complex successions of stable and unstable macro economic regimes the model is further able to account for a wide spectrum of macro and micro empirical regularities within this framework we analyse a series of macro economic phenomena of key relevance in the current macro economic debate especially the occurrence of deleveraging crises and fisherian debt deflation recessions our analysis suggests that the relative dynamics of prices and wages and the resulting income distribution along a deflation ary path are critical determinants of the severity of the recession and the chances of recovery

risk dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in n player games abstract in perfect foresight dynamics an action is linearly stable if expectation that people will always choose the action is self fulfilling a symmetric game is a pim game if an opponent s particular action maximizes the incentive of an action independently of the rest of the players this class includes supermodular games games with linear incentives and so forth we show that in pim games linear stability is equivalent to u dominance a generalization of risk dominance and that there is no path escaping a u dominant equilibrium existing results on n player coordination games games with linear incentives and two player games are obtained as corollaries

to bail out or to bail in answers from an agent based model since the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis almost half a trillion euros have been spent to financially assist eu member states in taxpayer funded bail outs these crisis resolutions are often accompanied by austerity programs causing political and social friction on both domestic and international levels the question of how to resolve failing financial institutions and how this depends on economic preconditions is therefore a pressing and controversial issue of vast political importance in this work we employ an agent based model to study the economic and financial ramifications of three highly relevant crisis resolution mechanisms to establish the validity of the model we show that it reproduces a series of key stylized facts of the financial and real economy the distressed institution can either be closed via a purchase assumption transaction it can be bailed out using taxpayer money or it may be bailed in in a debt to equity conversion we find that for an economy characterized by low unemployment and high productivity the optimal crisis resolution with respect to financial stability and economic productivity is to close the distressed institution for economies in recession with high unemployment the bail in tool provides the most efficient crisis resolution mechanism under no circumstances do taxpayer funded bail out schemes outperform bail ins with private sector involvement

schumpeter meeting keynes a policy friendly model of endogenous growth and business cycles this paper studies an agent based model that bridges keynesian theories of demandgeneration and schumpeterian theories of technology fueled economic growth we employ the model to investigate the properties of macroeconomic dynamics and the impact of public polices on supply demand and the fundamentals of the economy we find profound complementarities between factors influencing aggregate demand and drivers of technological change that affect both short run fluctuations and longterm growth patterns from a normative point of view simulations show a corresponding complementarity between keynesian and schumpeterian policies in sustaining long run growth paths characterized by milder fluctuations and relatively lower unemployment levels the matching or mismatching between innovative exploration of new technologies and the conditions of demand generation appear to suggest the presence of two distinct regimes of growth or absence thereof characterized by different short run fluctuations and unemployment levels

stabilizing an unstable complex economy on the limitations of simple rules abstract this paper offers a systematic comparison of a wide range of leaning against the wind interest rate policy rules within a macroeconomic stock flow consistent agent based model the model generates endogenous booms and busts along credit cycles as feedback loops on aggregate demand affect the goods and the labor markets the real and the financial sides of the economy are closely interconnected the baseline scenario is able to qualitatively reproduce a wide range of stylized facts we show that a monetary policy rule that targets the movements in the net worth of firms significantly dampens the credit cycles and reduces the employment costs of financial crises because this indicator incorporates early signals of financial imbalances performances of this three mandate taylor rule are also more robust to the specific parameter values and regulatory framework than the standard dual mandate taylor rules nonetheless none of the policy rules under study completely eliminates the high employment costs of financial crises

agent based stock flow consistent macroeconomics towards a benchmark model abstract the paper moves from a discussion of the challenges posed by the crisis to standard macroeconomics and the solutions adopted within the dsge community although several recent improvements have enhanced the realism of standard models we argue that major drawbacks still undermine their reliability in particular dsge models still fail to recognize the complex adaptive nature of economic systems and the implications of money endogeneity the paper argues that a coherent and exhaustive representation of the inter linkages between the real and financial sides of the economy should be a pivotal feature of every macroeconomic model and proposes a macroeconomic framework based on the combination of the agent based and stock flow consistent approaches the papers aims at contributing to the nascent ab sfc literature under two fundamental respects first we develop a fully decentralized ab sfc model with several innovative features and we thoroughly validate it in order to check whether the model is a good candidate for policy analysis applications results suggest that the properties of the model match many empirical regularities ranking among the best performers in the related literature and that these properties are robust across different parameterizations second the paper has also a methodological purpose in that we try to provide a set or rules and tools to build calibrate validate and display ab sfc models

selling to conspicuous consumers pricing production and sourcing decisions consumers often purchase goods that are hard to find to conspicuously display their exclusivity and social status firms that produce such conspicuously consumed goods such as designer apparel fashion goods jewelry etc often face challenges in making optimal pricing and production decisions such firms are confronted with precipitous trade off between high sales volume and high margins because of the highly uncertain market demand strategic consumer behavior and the display of conspicuous consumption in this paper we propose a model that addresses pricing and production decisions for a firm using the rational expectations framework we show that in equilibrium firms may offer high availability of goods despite the presence of conspicuous consumption we show that scarcity strategies are harder to adopt as demand variability increases and we provide conditions under which scarcity strategies could be successfully adopted to improve profits finally to credibly commit to scarcity strategy we show that firms can adopt sourcing strategies such as sourcing from an expensive production location supplier or using expensive raw materials this paper was accepted by preyas desai and pradeep chintagunta marketing

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

emergent dynamics of a macroeconomic agent based model with capital and credit in this paper we present and discuss a macroeconomic agent based model with capital and credit cc mabm which builds upon the framework put forward by delli gatti et al 2011 the novelty of this model with respect to the previous framework consists in the introduction of a stylized supply chain where upstream firms i e producers of capital goods k firms supply a durable and sticky input capital to the downstream firms who produce consumption goods c firms to be sold to households both c firms and k firms resort to bank loans to satisfy their financing needs there are two way feedbacks between firms and markets which yield interesting emerging properties at the macro level we show that the interaction of upstream and downstream firms and the evolution of their financial conditions in a nutshell capital and credit are essential ingredients of a crisis i e a sizable slump followed by a long recovery

bank liquidity interbank markets and monetary policy a major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs this paper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds we consider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to di erent implications for optimal policy by the central bank we show that when confronted with a distribu tional liquidity shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks the central bank should lower the interbank rate this view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and mon etary policy should be abandoned in addition we show that during an aggregate liquidity crisis central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity two di erent instruments interest rates and liquidity injection are therefore required to cope with the two di erent types of liquidity shocks finally we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs