primary commodity prices and the oecd economic performance abstract the relationship linking primary commodity prices to the oecd economic performance is analyzed by explicitly accounting for the presence of a two way causality the macroeconomic model is built on a relatively small number of equations which represent the interplay of five markets primary commodity financial oecd labour oecd and ldc product market the difference between primary commodity and manufactured good price formation is emphasized quantitative results are provided on the basis of historical estimations and dynamic simulations

war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

combining economic and environmental dimensions value chain analysis of uk iron and steel flows this paper presents the methodology of value chain analysis developed for a study which combined a material flow analysis of the uk iron and steel sector with a consideration of the economic dimension of those material flows in order to shed light on concepts such as resource productivity and dematerialisation of the economy the methodology is used in this paper to map the current value chain of iron and steel flows through the uk noting the high value of scrap arisings at different stages of the production and use chain and the substantial cost of disposing of iron and steel as waste to examine the residual outputs generated by this industry and the value of applying industrial ecology principles to contrast the environmental impacts of different categories of materials with their values and to discuss the findings in terms of the global environmental burden of this sector of the economy with particular attention paid to international trade aspects it was found that while imports are substantial net imports are in terms of both weight and value a rather small part just under 20 of total uk iron and steel production and use defined as domestic production plus net imports the findings show that value chain analysis is a robust methodology for exploring various aspects of the economy environment interface and a useful complement to material flow or life cycle analyses with a potentially very widespread applicability the value chain analysis also provides a framework for coherent and integrated responses by industry as well as policy makers through its focus on linkages within different stages and actors in a chain and on the potential for systemic efficiencies

price formation in commodity markets this paper develops a theory consistent market model for storable commodities and illustrates its characterization of the data generating process for a set of major traded commodities the dynamics of the system incorporate recent advances in modelling techniques cointegrated variables in the demand functions are represented by the error correction mechanism ecm and expected prices in the stock demand relationship are generated by a rational expectations process the outside sample performance of the model is tested against the pure time series model used to formulate expected prices and is shown to have a smaller mean square error than that of the time series model thus the model provides comparatively efficient forecasts and unlike models constructed in their reduced form permits consideration of key behavioural relationships in commodity markets

dictators walking the mogadishu line how men become monsters and monsters become men history offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behavior significantly over time like zimbabwe s mugabe as well as dictators who displayed remarkable improvements like rawlings of ghana the authors show that such mutations can result from rational behavior when the dictator s flow use of repression is complementary to his stock of wrongdoings past wrongdoings then perpetuate further wrongdoings and the dictator can unintentionally get trapped in a repressive steady state where he himself suffers from ex post regret this then begs the question why such a dictator would ever choose to do wrong in the first place the authors show that this can be explained from the dictator s uncertainty over his degree of impunity in relation to wrongdoing which induces him to experiment along this dimension this produces a setting where any individual rising to power can end up as either a moderate leader or as a dreaded tyrant since derailment is accidental and accompanied by ex post regret increasing accountability can be in the interest of both the public and the dictator

common property resources storage facilities and ownership structures a cournot model of the oil market during the last decade economists have tried hard to convince meadows and his followers that market forces do not tend to exhaust our natural resources too rapidly as compared with the requirements of an intertemporal pareto optimum it is well known now that under well defined property rights and correct price expectations a competitive extraction industry brings about a pareto optimal depletion path and it has been shown that oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures may even produce a bias towards conservation 1 it is still an unresolved issue however which extraction path will result if property rights are imperfectly defined following the pioneering work of gordon 1954 there has been a large body of literature demonstrating that in the extreme case of free entry and myopic profit maximization there are strong reasons for excessive extraction 2 but this literature hardly yields reliable conclusions for the perhaps more realistic case where firms derive their behaviour from intertemporal optimization and where there is a common ownership but limited access to the resource the basic intuition behind the common pool problem is that the individual agent chooses an extraction policy other than the one he would choose under well defined property rights since he is afraid that part of the resource he leaves underground will be extracted and sold by others 3 despite the simplicity of this intuition there does not seem to be any publication that analyses it within an intertemporal equilibrium model with rational and far sighted agents this is the motivation for the present approach the approach studies the common pool problem in the context of an oligopolistic world market for oil it posits a given number of identical firms extracting oil from holdings between some of which there is mutual seepage the firms sell the extracted oil in the same market or they store it in privately owned seepage proof tanks each firm derives its behaviour from intertemporal optimization under perfect foresight of the time paths of the model variables but cournotesque conjectures about the reactions of its competitors except for the assumption of storage facilities this specification is closely related to models previously studied by khalatbari 1977 and kemp and long 1980 essay 10 4 the two models are very similar but they yield strikingly different conclusions while kemp and long find that the extraction path chosen by the firms is pareto optimal i e that the price of the resource rises at a rate given by the market rate of interest khalatbari contends that there is over extraction kemp and long convincingly demonstrate that khalatbari s model suffers from an inconsistency in the way the individual firm expects its rivals to respond to its own actions and they argue that this inconsistency is the reason for the divergence in results thus the casual reader gets the

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

option pricing and foreign investment under political risk abstract the paper analyses asset prices in a context of uncertainty over future government policy as current policy is maintained perceived risk abates thus leading to a gradual appreciation of asset prices and a gradual decrease in their conditional variance option values computed under this process have time series and the term structure of conditional volatility which in general are downward sloping in price series without a policy reversal implied volatility from option prices will exceed actual volatility with this wedge progressively disappearing this may be viewed as the volatility analogue of the peso premium for assets subject to large infrequent price drops

has political risk scared mineral investment away from the deposits in developing countries in reply to recent assertions of a sharp diversion of metal mineral exploration and mining investment from developing to industrialized countries the author argues that these worries are misdire

voracious transformation of a common natural resource into productive capital i analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights i obtain a feedback nash equilibrium to the dynamic common pool problem and obtain political variants of the hotelling depletion rule and the hartwick saving rule resource prices and depletion occur too fast so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high the power struggle boosts output but depresses sustainable consumption genuine saving is nevertheless zero in a fractionalized society world bank estimates may be too optimistic

the contribution of the mining sector to sustainability in developing countries abstract does the mining sector contribute to or detract from the achievement of sustainable development in developing countries sustainability is defined as development that will give future generations opportunities equal to or greater than those of the present generation treating gross income per capita as an imperfect proxy of these opportunities a test is made to investigate whether increases in mining gdp have led to long run increases in gnp per capita despite the exhaustibility of mineral deposits this is a more encompassing criterion than the conventional hartwick criterion which establishes necessary conditions for the achievement of a related definition of sustainability a vector autoregression model var is estimated for each of 19 non opec developing countries with large mining sectors using the impulse response functions the long run multiplier of mining income on gnp is calculated the sustainability criterion developed in the paper requires the multiplier to exceed a minimum value this test is carried out under alternative assumptions regarding future mining income

globalisation and unequalisation what can be learned from value chain analysis although many have gained from the process of globalisation there remains a stubbornly large number of people living in absolute poverty and a rise in inequality within and between countries the issue is thus not whether to participate in the global economy but how to do so in a manner which provides for sustainable and equitable income growth this study shows how value chain analysis can be used to chart the growing disjuncture between global economic activity and global income distribution and to provide causal explanations for this outcome in so doing value chain analysis provides valuable insights into policy formulation and implementation

segregating genetically modified and nongenetically modified corn in a marketing channel the adoption of gm corn in the united states depends on many factors including segregation costs which have minor impacts on aggregate welfare because the demand for nongm corn is small relative to its supply no premium for nongm corn can be generated in excess of the segregation costs an outward shift in the supply of corn resulting from the adoption of gm varieties has a greater impact on aggregate welfare than do the segregation costs required to satisfy the gm free demand a 10 increase in the aggregate supply of gm corn increases aggregate welfare by more than us 250 million however nonadopters of gm corn lose while adopters can gain or lose depending on the nature of the aggregate demand curve for us corn

transnational corporations and non fuel primary commodities in developing countries abstract this article first reviews trends in the involvement of transnational corporations tncs in the non fuel commodity industries of developing countries noting that while the role of these firms in primary production has been eroded somewhat their role in downstream activities is as strong as ever empirical estimates of the retained value from these industries are presented showing that the developing countries generally receive only a part of the value of exports and only a fraction of the retail price of the end products of the commodities the strategies of the developing producer countries are discussed focusing on the experience of taxation and state participation the article ends with some brief comments on the prospects for the future

oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world 1960 1999 the global oil market and its associated booms and busts have generated a large literature in political science one contention in this literature is that political instability is a near certain long term outcome of oil wealth another line of argument maintains just the opposite that oil makes authoritarian regimes stronger by funding patronage and repressive apparatuses in this article i conduct the first cross national tests of these arguments and investigate the effects of oil wealth and the oil booms and busts on political stability drawing on data from 107 developing countries between 1960 and 1999 i estimate the effects of oil wealth on regime failure antistate social protest and domestic armed conflict thus as a first goal this article addresses an analytic shortcoming in previous studies by separating regime survival empirically from both economic policy and regime type democratic or authoritarian and by focusing on the direct effects of oil wealth on several measures of political stability i address the relationship between oil wealth and these outcomes both by comparing exporters to the rest of the developing world and by comparing oil rich states across pre boom boom and bust periods the results indicate that oil wealth is robustly associated with more durable regimes and significantly related to lower levels of protest and civil war moreover

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

primary commodity prices and inflation primary commodities are products which have been only minimally processed agricultural foods which may either be directly consumed or form an input into the food processing industries industrial raw materials which may either be agricultural e g natural rubber or mineral mainly metals and most of important of all petroleum and petroleum products primary commodity prices are variable section ii and in part this variability is the result of macroeconomic fluctuations in the industrial ized countries rises in commodity prices will to a greater or lesser extent feed through into inflation

the fifth credit tranche abstract this paper asserts that for all practical purposes the compensatory financing facility cff of the imf has been abolished except in the name by an imf decision of 14 september 1983 since cff was originally intended to finance temporary and reversible deficits resulting from export shortfalls due to factors beyond a country s control drawings were usually authorized within a month at low conditionality the 1983 decision does away with this semi automaticity thereby accommodating cff to the high conditional upper credit tranches this development is symptomatic of a general tendency to limit the fund to high conditional financing regardless of circumstances

international commodity prices growth and the outbreak of civil war in sub saharan africa to learn more about the effect of economic conditions on civil war we examine whether sub saharan civil wars are more likely to start following downturns in the international price of countries main export commodities the data show a robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreak of civil wars we also find that sub saharan countries are more likely to see civil wars following economic downturns in their main oecd export destinations

insecure property and technological backwardness we consider the incentive to adopt superior technologies when private property is insecure the welfare costs of insecure property can be substantially greater than those commonly associated with diversion and with the disincentive effect induced by imperfect appropriation of returns when private property is sufficiently insecure anticipation of conflict over economic distribution gives rise to technological backwardness even though 1 superior technologies are readily available at zero cost and 2 the ex post diversion of resources might be small

inventory and equilibrium adjustments in international commodity markets a multi cointegration approach recent advances in cointegration tests and error correction models are applied to the analysis of commodity inventory behaviour multi cointegration was considered in inventory series of seven internationally traded products in contrast to previous works on inventory behaviour which first hypothesize a relationship and then gather empirical evidence to emulate the postulated behaviour an error correction model was used to represent theoretical inventory relationships which are established by multi cointegration tests the results support the use of this approach to determine the optimal stockpiling rules of producers and consumers

haddad lawrence john hoddinott and harold alderman eds intrahousehold resource allocation in developing countries models methods and policy baltimore md johns hopkins university press 1997 384 pp 55 00 in this volume economists demographers sociologists and anthropologists collaborate in the study of how resources are allocated within households in developing countries and why it matters from a policy perspective surveying a broad range of theory and evidence the contributors examine the many social and cultural factors that influence decisions about the family and household level about the allocation of time income assets and other resources ths contributors show that a more complete understanding of intrahousehold behaviour can increase the likelihood that policies will reach the people they are intended to affect

governance of global value chains in response to food safety and certification standards the case of shrimp from vietnam summary we use global value chain gvc theory to understand governance of vietnam s shrimp farming industry we describe this gvc as buyer driven with important food safety standards imposed by governments of importing countries and new certification systems promoted by nongovernmental organizations ngos governance relations are clear between governments in importing countries and vietnam and between importers and ngos governance relations become more fragmented further down the chain where large numbers of small scale producers and traders operate this fragmentation may adversely affect access to the most lucrative markets and have the unanticipated effect of marginalizing small scale farmers and traders

world coal and uk energy policy a company level perspective abstract as a contribution to the debate about the future of the uk coal industry this paper provides an overview of the corporate structure of the world coal industry detailing company diversification ownership transnationality concentration of production and profitability its main argument which has a strong bearing on coal import policy is that whereas the world coal industry and international trade currently exhibit all the signs of overproduction hypercompetition and declining profitability there is no reason to assume that this is a stable scenario the company structure of the export sector variously indicates a potential for supply disruption cost escalation and informal collusion all of which have implications for the future level of prices particularly as the market tightens once so called marginal producers like the uk are knocked out of the market

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

what stopped the inflation unemployment or commodity prices the main object of this paper is to argue that most of the deceleration of inflation in the oecd countries in general including britain that took place between i980 and i982 should be attributed not to the direct impact of higher unemployment on the labour market but to the fall in commodity i e primary product prices from i980 to i982 following their very sharp rise accompanying the second oil shock between i978 and i980 this led to a dramatic turn round of about 50 60 in the prices of primary products imported into the oecd countries from the rest of the world and from other oecd countries which in turn can account for the deceleration of about 20 25 in the import prices for the average industrialised country and our econometric estimates show that the pace of wage inflation is closely correlated with import prices by contrast our estimates for a variety of model specifications and choice of data do not show statistically significant correlations between aggregate unemployment and wage inflation we have not attempted to establish statistically that the turn round in commodity prices was caused mainly by the strength and duration of the posti979 recession in the industrialised countries as a whole but like most commentators we assume that this is the case given this assumption therefore our results imply that the recession in the industrialised world did not as is widely believed slow down the inflation by acting directly on the labour market e g by crushing the unions or bringing a new breath of realism into wage negotiations instead it worked by inducing a collapse of commodity prices or in the case of oil inducing a slight fall by comparison with the preceding sharp rise insofar as our results are valid there are various obvious implications for some central topical economic debates first if there is no stable direct relationship between unemployment within any country and its own rate of wage inflation then there would be no nairu and no clearly identifiable phillips curve as some other investigators have found hence debates as to whether and how far individual economies have unemployment rates above or below their nairus and so on are irrelevant in the conclusions we summarise what seem to be the main policy implications for individual countries but secondly insofar as levels of demand in the industrialised countries taken as a whole influence commodity prices which feed back on wage inflation via

investigation of production sales and inventory relationships using multicointegration and non symmetric error correction models the accumulated sum of a stationary series is called integrated if a linear combination of some of the integrated series is stationary it is said to be cointegrated this paper presents empirical results on inventories to consider the possibility of a deeper form of cointegration called multicointegration which is introduced in granger and lee 1989 a vector integrated series is multicointegrated if the accumulated sum of its stationary cointegrated linear combination is again cointegrated with itself inventory which is the accumulated sum of production minus sales is probably cointegrated with production and sales the empirical results generally support the presence of multicointegration of production and sales in many u s industries and industrial aggregates the results also favour the non symmetric error correction model providing evidence that the strength of attraction is different on both sides of the attractor a modified s s rule for inventory control is investigated in the context of a non symmetric error correction model and the results generally do not support the s s rule sufficient evidence is found to conclude that multicointegration is a useful concept in the area of inventory determination

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

trade gaps analytical gaps regime analysis and international commodity trade regulation studies of international regimes have sought to describe international collaborative arrangements in more systematic terms than in the past and to analyze their development in terms of major schools of international relations theory this article refines the commonly used definition of regimes and elucidates the major hypotheses of one theoretical school structural realism the strength and nature of the international commodity trade regime are systematically described and their development is analyzed in terms of the major hypotheses of structural realism in large part these hypotheses are supported by the analysis of what is a relatively weak international regime

commercialization and the balance of women s dual roles in non income pooling west african households barked on structural adjustment programs of which agricultural liberalization has been a major component as previously depressed farmgate prices are allowed to rise increasing incentives for farm households to produce marketed crops such liberalization has the side effect of accelerating commercialization through raising households real incomes it is expected to improve rural peoples physical well being both women and men in west african farm

on the timing of political regime changes in resource dependent economies we consider a resource dependent economy initially ruled by the elite the transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite the occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities both being driven by the elite s redistribution and repression policies first we show that when a political transition is inevitable the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office second we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance and how it relates to the elite s policies more resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime which may not be the case of a repressive regime finally we interpret the arab spring sequence in light of our findings

international trade constraints and commodity market models an application to the cotton market this paper presents a model that accounts explicitly for quantitative controls on international trade countries are classified into two groups depending upon whether or not their imports and exports are responsive to world prices with the result that all adjustment burdens are borne by a subset of the world market participants the model is tested with pooled time series cross section data for the cotton market m s odels of world commodity markets differentiate among market participants in a variety of ways single equation approaches make strong implicit assumptions about cross country similarities in consumer preferences and producer responsiveness while in other approaches world markets are disaggregated on the basis of time period income group or type of economic system the present paper develops a model that groups countries in terms of the presence or absence of controls on international trade as johnson and others have noted 1 quantitative controls on trade are prominent in the trade of many primary products with such restrictions domestic prices bear no necessary relationship to international prices and movements in world prices may be of limited relevance to explaining global consumer and producer behavior in the model in this paper countries are classified into two groups depending upon whether their consumers and producers are responsive to international prices the international market is then seen as one in which the burden of adjustment falls on the producers consumers and holders of stocks in the price responsive countries the estimation procedure uses a cross section time series data set in which country specific dummy variables allow for differential behavior among the various trade participants cotton is the focus of the paper as the cotton market is an especially good example of a market with quantitative restrictions cotton production is dominated by less developed countries ldcs and centrally planned economies cpes and exports are largely determined by the decisions of state trading monopolies i a trade constrained model the point of departure in developing the model is to group countries a priori according to whether their consumers producers and inventory holders are world price responsive r or non responsive n if x countries are fully insulated from world prices and z countries are responsive to world prices the global production utilization identity can be written as

optimal fossil fuel taxation with backstop technologies and tenure risk abstract the paper derives the global welfare optimizing time path for a tax on fossil fuels causing a negative stock externality climate change under increasing marginal extraction cost and in the presence of an unlimited backstop resource causing no externality in a basic competitive case the optimal tax equals the pigou rate equivalent to the present discounted value of marginal damage costs we consider two separate types of tenure insecurity for resource owners and their impact on the tax implementing the optimal policy when insecure control is with respect to future ownership to the resource competitive extraction is higher than otherwise and the efficiency implementing tax exceeds the pigou rate when tenure insecurity instead implies possible expropriation holdup of investment in extraction capacity it deters extraction and the optimal tax is lower than the pigou rate

interactions between hospital admissions cost per day and average length of stay hospital cost per day cost annual admissions per capita admit and average length of stay alos are important health policy variables because each variable provides important information about hospital industry performance this study uses country level data to explore the empirical relationships between cost admit and alosin three steps ols estimation application of the wu hausman endogeneity test and re estimation with two stage least squares the major results are i admitand alosexert exogenous influences on costand ii admitand alosare endogenously related with possible one way casuality from admitto alos

a dynamic theory of resource wars we develop a dynamic theory of resource wars and study the conditions under which such wars can be prevented our focus is on the interaction between the scarcity of resources and the incentives for war in the presence of limited commitment we show that a key parameter determining the incentives for war is the elasticity of demand our first result identifies a novel externality that can precipitate war price taking firms fail to internalize the impact of their extraction on military action in the case of inelastic resource demand war incentives increase over time and war may become inevitable our second result shows that in some situations regulation of prices and quantities by the resource rich country can prevent war and when this is the case there will also be slower resource extraction than the hotelling benchmark with inelastic demand our third result is that because of limited commitment and its implications for armament incentives regulation of prices and quantities might actually precipitate war even in some circumstances where wars would not have arisen under competitive markets copyright 2012 oxford university press

workers warriors and criminals social conflict in general equilibrium we incorporate appropriation activities social conflict into canonical models of trade and study how economic shocks and policies affect the intensity of conflict we show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conflict positive shocks to labor intensive industries diminish conflict while positive shocks to capital intensive industries increase it the key requirement is that conflict activities be more labor intensive than the economy as this determines how shocks affect the returns and costs of conflict our theory is consistent with several observed patterns of conflict and implies that empirical work should take into account the relative factor intensities of the productive and conflict sectors in each country incorporating appropriation into a canonic general equilibrium model affects what policies may be deemed desirable in order to reduce conflict and generate pareto improvements policy must be distortionary while reforms that appear efficiency enhancing under the unrealistic assumption of perfect property rights may backfire this offers one explanation for why reforms based on traditional models without appropriation may be delayed and become unpopular when implemented and why societies may sympathize with seemingly inefficient redistribution

portfolio models and planning for export diversification malawi tanzania and zimbabwe evidence is presented regarding strengths and limitations of portfolio approaches as applied to diversifying export earnings an empirical application using data from malawi tanzania and zimbabwe is used to demonstrate these strengths and limitations modifications of the typical portfolio approach to export diversification are presented these modifications help make the approach more plausible for use in developing countries the modified approach is shown to provide guidance to policymakers who seek simultaneously to increase export earnings and reduce their instability

efficiency differences between private and state owned enterprises in the international petroleum industry technical managerial scale and allocative efficiency differences between private and state owned firms in the international petroleum industry are estimated the estimation of aigner chu deterministic frontiers maximum likelihood stochastic frontiers and maximum likelihood gamma frontiers make this analysis the most complete and sophisticated testing of property rights theory available the empirical findings suggestceteris paribus that state firms could satisfy the demand for their output with something less than half of their current resource inputs simply by being converted to private for profit enterprizes

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

commodities in crisis an overview of the main issues abstract this introductory article provides a general review of some of the main issues facing the world commodity economy in the 1980s particularly those arising from the dramatic collapse in the foreign exchange earnings of developing countries from their exports of primary commodities the subject matter covered in this special issue of world development includes not only the more traditional concerns related to short term commodity market instability and longer term issues such as agricultural protectionism but also the relevance of the linkages between the commodity sector and the rest of the international economic system for the stability of the world economy as a whole this article covers more aspects of the commodity problem than can be considered in detail in the subsequent articles prepared for a single issue of this journal nonetheless the present introduction should make a contribution to identifying useful areas for further research as well as focusing on some of the options in the field of international commodity policy

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

ownership risk investment and the use of natural resources the effect of insecure ownership on ordinary investment and natural resource use is examined insecure ownership is postulated to depend on the type of government regime in power and the prevalence of political violence or instability the political determinants of economy wide investment are estimated from cross country data and the results are used to form an index of ownership security when introduced into empirical models of natural resource use this index has a significant and quantitatively important effect on the use of forests and petroleum contrary to conventional wisdom ownership risk slows resource use in some circumstances

testing the rational expectations hypothesis in an agricultural market a recent survey on models of agricultural supply equations listed over 500 studies in which variants of nerlove s adaptive expectations model were employed one might naively assume that the scientific evidence overwhelmingly favored the adaptive expectations hypothesis but this inference would not be warranted in particular there have been very few studies which have even attempted to estimate a rational expectations version of the traditional agricultural supply models and none that have explicitly tested the rational expectations hypothesis 2 in this paper we estimate a model of agricultural supply and demand for the chicken broiler industry under the maintained assumption of rational expectations in the sense of muth 1961 and provide a series of tests of the model specification we find that in this case the hypothesis of muth rationality receives strong support in recent years there has been increasing interest in models in which economic actors are assumed to form expectations of variables rationally for the most part empirical applications of the rational expectations hypothesis have employed single equation econometric methods these methods have permitted consistent estimation of equations under the assumption of the rational expectations hypothesis but do not allow for any explicit testing of the maintained hypothesis of rationality this paper presents estimates of a simultaneous equation model of the chicken broiler industry using maximum likelihood methods and provides a joint test of the rational expectations hypothesis and the model specification our econometric procedure is related to the recent theoretical work of wallis 1980 and combines time series analysis with traditional econometric estimation techniques under the assumption of rational expectations the model can be solved for the expected price as a function of the expected values of the exogenous variables this function can then be substituted into the model leading to a specification which contains the original endogenous and exogenous variables plus the expected values of the exogenous variables in general following this substitution the model will contain overidentifying restrictions time series analysis is utilized to generate the necessary forecasts of the exogenous variables the complete system of equations is estimated by full information maximum likelihood and the constraints are tested by a log likelihood ratio test the overidentifying constraints arise in the model because the suppliers are assumed to act as if they know both the underlying structure of the model and the stochastic processes governing the exogenous variables the two requirements of rational expectations while the expected price enters only the supply equation of our model it is necessary in the econometric formulation to specify the demand equation the instrumental variable procedures of mccallum 1976 and nelson 1975b are single equation methods and do not permit a test of the rational expectations hypothesis by specifying the complete model the additional structure imposed on the problem allows us to estimate the coefficients and test the implied restrictions there has not been universal agreement that the rational expectations hypothesis is the best theoretical device to model rational behavior according to muth s original formulation economic actors forecast endogenous variables according to the true reduced form equations of the model decanio 1979 and friedman 1979 have argued that the economic actors actually received for publication august 24 1981 revision accepted for publication march 2 1982 university of new mexico and university of california davis respectively we wish to thank g king r l huntzinger r pope and l wegge for advice on this project a nelson and e shaw contributed useful research assistance i the paper by askari and cummings 1977 provides references for these studies 2 huntzinger s 1979 paper is one of the first attempts at estimatitng a rational expectations model of agricultural supply

resource extraction and the threat of possible expropriation the role of swiss bank accounts this paper examines the consequences of resource owners being threatened with possible nationalization expropriation if shows that long s j econom theory10 42 53 1975 overextraction result critically depends on availability of a relatively safer investment alternative if all investment alternatives are similiarly uncertain then resource extraction is efficient but the overall savings consumption decision is distorted toward consumption

conflicts over property rights and natural resource exploitation at the frontier abstract competition for land at the frontier is analyzed by considering a game between a first settler and a contestant although the first settler is the legitimate owner of a plot of land his remoteness from the government s administrative center makes it difficult to prove it this creates incentives for a contestant to dispute his claims both contenders will expend resources in order to secure ownership due to transport costs the more remote a plot of land is the lower its output value this tends to discourage appropriative activities land degradation is sometimes used as a substitute to appropriative activities a lower discount rate may encourage land degradation

international tourism and export instability export diversification has been suggested as a strategy for decreasing the level of export earnings instability which is experienced by many developing countries in recent years the international tourism sector has made an increasingly important contribution to the economies of many low income countries this article examines whether diversification into the non traditional tourism sector has succeeded in decreasing the instability of export earnings it was found that although tourism has the advantage of high growth rates and is a major source of foreign currency receipts earnings from international tourism did not bring about a significant decrease in the instability of export earnings of most of the developing and industrialised countries considered furthermore a net increase in the instability of earnings from tourism and merchandise exports occurred in a number of countries and may be a particular problem in small open developing economies

the credibility of a threat to nationalize abstract this paper empirically estimates the credibility of the african national congress s recent threat to nationalize south african mineral assets while south africa s financial press argued that the threat was negatively affecting mineral investment and asset values mining industry executives were confident that the threat was not credible using financial market data i estimate the annual probability of nationalization to have been relatively low at 1 4 although specific to the south african political environment this result can serve as a benchmark when including political risk in applied models of land and natural resource valuation investment timing and resource extraction

piecewise closed loop equilibria in differential games with regime switching strategies we propose a new methodology exploring piecewise closed loop equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching actions we develop a general game with two players players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable and decide on the switching time from one regime to another compared to the optimal control problem with regime switching necessary optimality conditions are modified for the first player to switch when choosing her optimal switching strategy this player considers the impact of her choice on the other player s actions and consequently on her own payoffs in order to determine the equilibrium timing of regime changes we derive conditions that help eliminate candidate equilibrium strategies that do not survive deviations in switching strategies we then apply this new methodology to an exhaustible resource extraction game

natural resource extraction and civil conflict abstract based on evidence linking natural resources to civil conflict this paper studies two armed groups fighting to control a resource and possibly a second prize labor is used in the agricultural resource extraction and conflict sectors and the groups also buy a capital input to conflict subject to the constraint that capital spending cannot exceed resource earnings i find that exogenous shocks can have different effects on conflict intensity depending on whether the credit constraint binds in particular international policies to ban natural resource exports from conflict zones e g blood diamonds raise agricultural productivity or limit the import of weapons will limit conflict intensity if the credit constraint binds however if the credit constraint does not bind then the first two policies promote conflict and so could even the third policy the results therefore suggest some caution in international policymaking

risky business political instability and greenfield foreign direct investment in the arab world which foreign direct investments are most affected by political instability analysis of quarterly greenfield investment flows into countries in the middle east and north africa during the period from 2003 to 2012 shows that adverse political shocks are associated with significantly reduced investment inflows in the non resource tradable sectors by contrast investments in natural resource sectors and non tradable activities appear insensitive to such shocks political instability is thus associated with increased reliance on non tradables and aggravated resource dependence

the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior in households whose allocation decisions can be represented as nash bargained household decisions extrahousehold environmental parameters eeps serve as pure shifters of the threat points the comparative statics of changes in demands due to changes in these eeps are given these are incorporated into a comprehensive statement of the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior including a nash generalization of barten s 1966 fundamental matrix equation of the theory of consumer demand estimation and data requirements are discussed along with nested testing of the following structure the neoclassical model is nested in the nash bargained model which in turn is nested in an unrestricted model of household demands emphasized throughout is the enriched menu of explanatory variables for demand analysis provided by the nash model as well as the model s ability to jointly analyze i household formation and ii intrahousehold allocation decisions

political economy of dynamic resource wars abstract the political economy of exhaustible resource extraction is analysed in three contexts first if an incumbent faces a threat of being removed once and for all by a rival faction extraction becomes more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally second perennial political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or the partisan in office bias is large and political instability is high third resource wars are more intense if constitutional cohesiveness is weak the incumbent has a partisan in office bias reserves of resources are high the wage is low governments can be less frequently removed from office and fighting technology has less decreasing returns to scale resource depletion in such wars is more rapacious if there is more government instability the political system is less cohesive and the partisan in office bias is smaller

the mobilization of women s labor for cash crop production a game theoretic approach in the last decade or so economists have modeled phenomena such as household labor supply fertility behavior and child survival rates using the household as the unit of analysis this paper presents data that call into question the assumption that the household is a joint decision making unit which maximizes a neoclassical household utility function the data come from a study of the mobilization of women s labor by their husbands for irrigated rice production in north cameroon the first section of this paper describes briefly the massa rice and sorghum farming system and then considers the relationship between the amount of compensation women receive from their husbands for their labor on rice production and the amount of labor they allocate to rice production the findings suggest that a bargaining model may describe the intrahousehold relations of production and distribution better than the neoclassical model the second section specifies a nash bargaining model and contrasts it with the neoclassical model of the household using the bargaining framework the third section explores in more detail possible explanations of the allocative inefficiency which seems to characterize many of the rice cultivating households

investment in the absence of property rights the role of incumbency advantages in many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output this paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest depending on the advantages an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment the results are applied to autocrats investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

the rise and decline of rent seeking activity in the brazilian coffee sector lessons from the imposition and removal of coffee export quotas summary brazil the world s largest coffee exporter encouraged efforts in the 1960s to form the international coffee agreement ica which restricted total coffee exports via country export quotas the quotas led to significant domestic quota rents in producing countries this paper analyzes the effects of rent seeking in brazil the brazilian institute of coffee ibc which was responsible for coffee policy was the focus of rent seeking the paper models the policy instruments used by the ibc shows how rent seeking affected policy industry efficiency and the distribution of rents explains the causes and effects of ibc reforms in the late 1980s and draws lessons from the experience

a conceptual framework for analysis of primary commodity markets abstract the paper begins with a critique of the traditional neoclassical theory as a tool for analysing commodity markets and suggests that a viable theory needs to be developed from the concept of market power as expressed in the relative bargaining strengths of transnational corporations active in the commodity production and trade of developing countries and of the governments and business interests of host countries a discussion of the principal elements comprising relative bargaining strength divided into commodity specific country specific and international is followed by a brief consideration of alternative policy options for developing countries aimed at improving their share of the benefits from their commodity exports to developed countries

the statistical debate on the net barter terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactures a comment and some additional evidence i950 p s hypothesis according to this hypothesis the net barter terms of trade nbtt between primary products and manufactures have over the longrun exhibited a downward trend spraos presented a detailed and thorough analysis of both the adequacy of the various statistical series available to proxy the nbtt s behaviour over the long run and the wide range of conceptual including quality problems involved in such an exercise on the basis of his analysis spraos concluded that the balance of the evidence for the seventy year period ending with the outbreak of world war ii supported the p s hypothesis of a secular deterioration in the nbtt it should however be noted that the evidence also suggested that the particular series cho sen for analysis by prebisch i950 himself did appear to exaggerate possibly to a large extent the rate of deterioration however when the analysis was extended to include the post world war ii period spraos found that while the deteriorating tendency cannot be decisively refuted it is open to doubt when the record up to the i970s is taken into account i980 p i26 as we shall see in this paper closer scrutiny reveals a statistical problem with spraos s analysis and the purpose of this paper is to show that once appropriate action is taken to overcome this problem some quite strong evidence in support of the p s hypothesis emerges the paper is organised as follows section i briefly discusses spraos s methodology and section ii discusses an econometric issue arising from this analysis section iii presents our empirical evidence while section iv summarises the main findings of the paper

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption