the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

economic determinants of free trade agreements abstract the purpose of this study is to provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the economic determinants of the formation of free trade agreements ftas and of the likelihood of ftas between pairs of countries using a qualitative choice model we develop this econometric model based upon a general equilibrium model of world trade with two factors of production two monopolistically competitive product markets and explicit intercontinental and intracontinental transportation costs among multiple countries on multiple continents the empirical model correctly predicts based solely upon economic characteristics 85 of the 286 ftas existing in 1996 among 1431 pairs of countries and 97 of the remaining 1145 pairs with no ftas

how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

terms of trade and global efficiency effects of free trade agreements 1990 2002 this paper infers the terms of trade effects of free trade agreements ftas implemented in the 1990s we estimate large fta effects on bilateral trade volume in 2 digit manufacturing goods from 1990 2002 using panel data gravity methods to resolve two way causality the terms of trade changes implied by these volume effects are deduced for 40 countries plus a rest of the world aggregate using an endowments general equilibrium model some countries gain over 5 of real manufacturing income some lose less than 0 3 global efficiency of manufactures trade rises 0 9 based on a distance function measure of iceberg melting

correctly analysing the balance of payments constraint on growth the balance of payments constrained growth bpcg model provides an interesting hypothesis regarding economic growth the main implication is that world demand places the dominant constraint to which individual country growth adjusts i discuss this implication and argue that tests of the bpcg model have essentially been tests of the hypothesis that trade is balanced over the long run a plausible hypothesis but one that need not hold mainly through responses to world demand as transmitted via income elasticities i then discuss the role of relative prices and investment point out logical inadequacies in the traditional bpcg framework and suggest an alternative theoretical framework to investigate its robustness our theoretical and empirical explorations suggest that traditional tests of the bpcg model may be misleading including investment as a proxy for the capacity to export and addressing endogeneity issues for example noticeably weakens the influence of world demand the evidence presented contributes to reconciling evidence supporting the bpcg hypothesis with recent work that consistently finds an important role for the level of the real exchange rate and investment independently of world demand

dark costs missing data shedding some light on services trade a structural gravity model is used to estimate barriers to services trade across many sectors countries and time since the disaggregated output data needed to infer border barriers flexibly are often missing for services this paper derives a novel methodology for projecting output data the empirical implementation sheds light on the role of institutions geography size and digital infrastructure as determinants of border barriers the paper finds that border barriers have generally fallen over time but there are differences across sectors and countries notably border effects for the smallest economies have remained stable giving rise to a divergent pattern across countries

the global sanctions data base abstract this article introduces the global sanctions data base gsdb a new dataset of economic sanctions that covers all bilateral multilateral and plurilateral sanctions in the world during the 1950 2016 period across three dimensions type political objective and extent of success the gsdb features by far the most cases amongst data bases that focus on effective sanctions i e excluding threats and is particularly useful for analysis of bilateral international transactional data such as trade flows we highlight five important stylized facts i sanctions are increasingly used over time ii european countries are the most frequent users and african countries the most frequent targets iii sanctions are becoming more diverse with the share of trade sanctions falling and that of financial or travel sanctions rising iv the main objectives of sanctions are increasingly related to democracy or human rights v the success rate of sanctions has gone up until 1995 and fallen since then using state of the art gravity modeling we highlight the usefulness of the gsdb in the realm of international trade trade sanctions have a negative but heterogeneous effect on trade which is most pronounced for complete bilateral sanctions followed by complete export sanctions

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

self enforcing trade agreements evidence from time varying trade policy the bagwell and staiger 1990 theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs i increase with imports ii increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities and iii decrease with the variance of imports the authors find us import policy during 1997 2006 to be consistent with this theory a one standard deviation increase in import growth the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the us imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent by 88 percent and by 76 percent respectively

how trade and investment agreements affect bilateral foreign direct investment results from a structural gravity model the paper develops a new stand alone structural gravity model for explaining bilateral fdi patterns we employ the model to analyse the impact of preferential trade agreements ptas bilateral investment treaties bits and other policies on bilateral foreign direct investment fdi we use the unctad global database on bilateral fdi stocks and flows to control for the heterogeneous nature of ptas we employ two different indicators of pta depth we find that on average signing a pta increases bilateral fdi stocks by around 30 nevertheless we also find that deeper or comprehensive ptas e g including provisions on investment public procurement and intellectual property rights provisions do not have a significantly different impact than signing regular ptas belonging to the eu single market on the other hand has a strong impact and increases bilateral fdi by around 135 and signing a bit has an effect that is comparable to signing a pta

substituting the end for the whole why voters respond primarily to the election year economy according to numerous studies the election year economy influences presidential election results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term here we describe a series of surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for this pattern that runs contrary to standard political science explanations but one that accords with a large psychological literature voters we find actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative growth however since that characteristic is not readily available to them voters inadvertently substitute election year performance because it is more easily accessible this end heuristic explanation for voters election year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole the end heuristic explanation also suggests a remedy a way to align voters actions with their intentions providing people with the attribute they are seeking cumulative growth eliminates the election year emphasis

real exchange rate technological catching up and spillovers in a balance of payments constrained growth model abstract the main objective of this work is to investigate the theoretical interrelationships between economic growth the national innovation system nis and the real exchange rate rer in an export led growth model formally this work presents new changes in the kaldor dixon thirlwal s model by the introduction of the rer the nis and a function that captures the endogeneity of productivity in the industrial sector in the short term the equilibrium growth rate depends on the real exchange rate level and of the nis development which responds to the size of the technological gap the public and private investments in r d in relation to the output growth rate ratio and the absorption capacity for technological spillovers in the long run assuming the constancy of all exogenous variables the convergence of the growth process depends on the output growth elasticity in relation to exports the price elasticity of exports and the elasticity of productivity growth relative to output growth of the economy in general and to industry in particular

are regional trading arrangements trade creating an application of extreme bounds analysis in this study we use extreme bounds analysis to test the robustness of the hypothesis that regional trading arrangements rtas are trade creating extreme bounds analysis provides a more rigorous test of specification uncertainty than traditional econometric theory by incorporating prior information and using a systematic approach to testing the fragility of coefficient estimates the results show that the trade creation effect of most rtas is fragile using a least squares estimator where all weight is attached to the sampling distribution eight or more of the twelve rtas considered are found to be trade creating when the relative weight in the estimation is shifted from the sampling to the prior distribution the number of rtas that are trade creating falls to six at the 95 percent likelihood ellipsoid moreover when we specify that not all rtas are trade creating four rtas increase trade at the 95 percent likelihood ellipsoid at the extreme bounds when all weight is attached to the prior distribution none of the rtas are found to be trade creating as a result we conclude that the pervasive trade creation effect found in the literature reflects not the information content of the data but rather the unacknowledged beliefs of the researchers

r d and internal finance a panel study of small firms in high tech industries since joseph schumpeter economists have argued that internal finance should be an important determinant of r d expenditures yet almost without exception previous empirical studies have not found evidence of such a relation using newly available data the authors investigate this puzzle with a panel of 179 small firms in high tech industries under each estimation strategy they employ the authors find an economically large and statistically significant relationship between r d investment and internal finance their results are consistent with the view that because of capital market imperfections the flow of internal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small high tech firms acquire technology through r d copyright 1994 by mit press

one money one market the effect of common currencies on trade currency unions their dramatic effect on international trade a gravity model is used to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade the panel data bilateral observations for five years during 1970 90 covering 186 countries includes 300 observations in which both countries use the same currency i find a large positive effect of a currency union on international trade and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility even after controlling for a host of features including the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime these effects statistically significant imply that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies currency unions like the european emu may thus lead to a large increase in international trade with all that that entails andrew rose

import protection business cycles and exchange rates evidence from the great recession this research estimates the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on import protection policies over 1988 q1 2010 q4 for five industrialized economies the united states european union australia canada and south korea there is evidence of a strong countercyclical trade policy response in the pre great recession period of 1988 q1 2008 q3 during which increases in domestic unemployment rates real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates and declines in the gdp growth rates of bilateral trading partners led to substantial increases in new temporary trade barriers it then applies this pre great recession empirical model to realized macroeconomic data from 2008 q4 2010 q4 and find it predicts a surge of new import protection during the great recession e g for the us and eu the model predicts new trade barriers would cover an additional 15 percentage points of nonoil imports well above the baseline level of 2 3 percent of import coverage immediately preceding the crisis finally the research examines why the realized trade policy response differed from model predictions while exchange rate movements played an important role in limiting new import protection during the great recession there is also evidence of one particularly important change in trade policy responsiveness i e in this period governments refrained from imposing new temporary trade barriers against foreign trading partners experiencing their own weak or negative economic growth

asymmetric industrial energy prices and international trade this paper measures the response of bilateral trade flows to differences in industrial energy prices across countries using a panel for the period 1996 2011 including 42 countries 62 sectors and covering 60 of global merchandise trade we estimate the short run effects of sector level energy price asymmetry on trade we find that changes in relative energy prices have a statistically significant but very small impact on imports on average a 10 increase in the energy price difference between two country sectors increases imports by 0 2 the impact is larger for energy intensive sectors even in these sectors however the magnitude of the effect is such that changes in energy price differences across time explain less than 0 01 of the variation in trade flows simulations based on our model predict that a 40 65 tco2 price of carbon in the eu ets would increase europe s imports from the rest of the world by less than 0 05 and decrease exports by 0 2

international real business cycles we ask whether a two country real business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles with this question in mind we document a number of discrepancies between theory and data the most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries in the data outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions in the model we see the opposite

trade in environmental goods evidences from an analysis using elasticities of trade costs negotiations on the liberalization of environmental goods egs and services within the wto doha round mandated in november 2001 are facing specific challenges conflicting interests and differing perceptions of the benefits of increased trade in egs were reflected in different approaches proposed for determining egs using import data of 34 organisation for economic co operation and development oecd member countries and from a sample of 167 countries from 1995 to 2012 we discuss the trade effect of reducing barriers on egs we analyze the lists of egs proposed by the asia pacific economic cooperation and oecd using a translog gravity model we found that removing tariff barriers for egs will have a modest impact because for the biggest importers and exporters elasticities of trade costs are very low while for most trading relationships they are very high making it difficult for exporters to maintain their markets overall our results suggest that because of their substantial effect on international trade future negotiations on egs should also address the issues of standards and nontariff barriers

china s one belt one road initiative the impact of trade facilitation versus physical infrastructure on exports the one belt one road obor project is perhaps china s most significant international relations initiative in recent times it is based on openness harmony inclusivity mutual benefit and market operations and aims to connect the economically vibrant east asia and the developed europe by land and by sea and in the process it brings growth and development to tens of countries along the modern silk routes in this paper we compare the impact of the main initiatives of obor namely enhancements in physical infrastructure and improvements in border administration on the trade of countries that have signed on to this project especially countries along the six economic corridors we find overwhelming evidence that shows improvements in border administration has the greatest impact on exports of corridor countries although physical infrastructure is important for trade the chinese government should place equal attention to improvements in trade facilitation to ensure trade routes operate seamlessly across the various corridors

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

policymakers horizon and trade reforms the protectionist effect of elections this paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization we focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the u s congress in which house and senate members serve respectively two and six year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years we show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than house representatives however this result does not hold for the last generation of senators who face elections at the same time as house members suggesting that inter cameral differences are driven by term length considering senators alone we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two this result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills the protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats

how the electoral college influences campaigns and policy the probability of being florida this paper analyzes how us presidential candidates should allocate resources across states to maximize the probability of winning the election by developing and estimating a probabilistic voting model of political competition under the electoral college system actual campaigns act in close agreement with the model there is a 0 9 correlation between equilibrium and actual presidential campaign visits across states both in 2000 and 2004 the paper shows how presidential candidate attention is affected by the states number of electoral votes forecasted state election outcomes and forecast uncertainty it also analyzes the effects of a direct national popular vote for president

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

the role of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements although disputes are typically treated as synonymous with concerns about enforcement in economic models of trade agreements in reality most wto disputes seem to concern the interpretation of vague provisions or instances where the agreement is silent and some have suggested that the wto s dispute settlement body dsb could usefully grant exceptions to rigid contractual obligations these activist dsb roles could help complete an incomplete contract but how activist should the dsb be should dsb rulings set precedent we address these questions by characterizing the optimal choice of contract form and dsb mandate under various contracting conditions jel codes d02 d78 d86 f13 k12 k33

dynamics of the trade balance and the terms of trade the j curve the authors provide a theoretical interpretation of two features of international data the countercyclical movements in net exports and the tendency for the trade balance to be negatively correlated with current and future movements in terms of trade but positively correlated with past movements they document the same properties in a two country stochastic growth model in which trade fluctuations reflect in large part the dynamics of capital formation the authors find that their general equilibrium perspective is essential the relation between the trade balance and the terms of trade depends critically on the source of fluctuations copyright 1994 by american economic association

a swing state theory of trade protection in the electoral college this paper analyzes trade policy determination in the electoral college in the presence of swing voters it determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re election probability strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of electoral college votes an empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive u s states lends support to the theoretical findings

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

vote buying general elections we examine the consequences of vote buying assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up front binding payments and or campaign promises platforms that are contingent on the outcome of the election we analyze the role of the parties and voters preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters

growth and productivity a model of cumulative growth and catching up individually neither the cumulative growth approach of the post keynesian tradition nor the catching up theory of neoclassical derivation are able to account for the chief stylized facts of comparative economic growth a pooled cross section econometric model that integrates these two approaches is developed and tested by the authors over the period 1950 88 for a group of nine oecd countries for a group of nine latin american countries and for a group of seven east asian countries purchasing power parities for 1985 are employed to measure productivity levels the growth record of the oecd countries is satisfactorily assessed by the model the catching up effect is found to be relevant in explaining productivity growth in the oecd area and in east asia but not in latin america this differential outcome finds explanation in terms of the relative strength of dynamic increasing returns copyright 1997 by oxford university press

how much does geography deflect services trade canadian answers we estimate geographic barriers to trade in nine service categories for canada s provinces from 1997 to 2007 with novel high quality bilateral provincial trade data the border directly reduces average provincial trade with the united states relative to interprovincial trade to 2 4 of its borderless level incorporating multilateral resistance reduces foreign trade relative to interprovincial to 0 1 of its frictionless potential geography reduces services trade some seven times more than goods trade overall surprisingly intraprovincial local trade in services and goods is equally deflected upward implying that the border increases interprovincial trade much more in services than goods

evolution of bilateral capital flows to developing countries at intensive and extensive margins motivated by the rise in capital flows to low income countries lics we examine the nature of these flows and the factors affecting foreign investors decision recognizing the presence of fixed investment costs we analyze capital flows at both intensive and extensive margins to fix ideas we resort to the gravity literature for the estimating relationships which we embed into a two tier econometric framework with cross sectional dependence our main finding is that market entry costs are statistically and economically very detrimental to lics we also obtain the gravity type relationship for the destination income unconditionally but not after conditioning on relevant variables as well as establish labor productivity as a robust attractor of capital inflows

the changing incidence of geography the incidence of bilateral trade costs is calculated here using neglected properties of the structural gravity model disaggregated by commodity and region and re aggregated into forms useful for economic geography for canada s provinces 1992 2003 sellers incidence is on average some five times higher than buyers incidence sellers incidence falls over time due to specialization despite constant gravity coefficients this previously unrecognized globalizing force drives big reductions in constructed home bias the disproportionate predicted share of local trade and large but varying gains in real gdp 7 lf11 f14 r12 the large gravity literature has revealed much information about bilateral trade costs anderson and eric van wincoop 2004 but the literature has not addressed incidence the proportions of trade costs paid by sellers and buyers the omission is important because incidence is what matters for most issues of regional specialization welfare and policy for example even with uniform trade costs sectors with larger sellers incidence will tend to have smaller supply all else equal as for welfare and policy uniform trade cost reductions confer benefits with buyers and sellers incidence varying across trade partners recently discovered properties of structural gravity are used here to calculate sectoral incidence measures of trade costs for canada s provinces 1992 2003 we uncover a secular fall in sellers incidence that induces a fall in home bias and a rise in real gdp this reflects a previously unrecognized force of globalization specialization acting to reduce the trade cost bill we add to the gravity literature new methods and new empirical lessons about canada s trade costs 1 inward and outward multilateral resistance anderson and van wincoop 2003 2004

accumulation innovation and catching up an extended cumulative growth model this paper presents an extended model of cumulative growth in which the effects of innovation and catching up are considered innovation adds another source of cumulative growth to that of traditional models and allows a consideration of the importance of non price determinants of international competitiveness catching up is the major force leading to convergence in productivity owing to the effect of the diffusion of technology the model allows one to analyse whether cumulative forces may lead to stable growth and whether this solution generates convergence in productivity levels the structural model is tested for a set of oecd countries over the period 1965 94

the national system of innovation in historical perspective contrary to some recent work on so called globalisation this paper argues that national and regional systems of innovation remain an essential domain of economic analysis their importance derives from the networks of relationships which are necessary for any firm to innovate whilst external international connections are certainly of growing importance the influence of the national education system industrial relations technical and scientific institutions government policies cul tural traditions and many other national institutions is fundamental the historical examples of germany japan and the former ussr illustrate this point as well as the more recent contrast between east asian and latin american countries introduction the national system of friedrich list according to this author s recollections the first person to use the expression national system of innovation was bengt ake lundvall and he is also the editor of a highly original and thought provoking book 1992 on this subject however as he and his colleagues would be the first to agree and as lundvall himself points out the idea actually goes back at least to friedrich list s conception of the national system of political economy 1841 which might just as well have been called the national system of innovation the main concern of list was with the problem of germany overtaking england and for underdeveloped countries as germany then was in relation to england he advocated not only protection of infant industries but a broad range of policies designed to accelerate or to make possible industrialisation and economic growth most of these policies were concerned with learning about new technology and applying it the racialist and colonialist overtones of the book were in strong contrast to the inter nationalist cosmopolitan approach of the classical free trade economists and list s belief that holland and denmark should join the german bund and acquire german nationality because of their descent and whole character reads somewhat strangely in the european community of today nevertheless despite these unattractive features of his outlook he clearly anticipated many contemporary theories after reviewing the changing ideas of economists about development in the years since the second world war the world bank 1991 concludes that it is intangible investment in knowledge accumulation which is decisive rather than physical capital investment as was at one time believed pages 33 35 the report cites the new growth theory

suspiciously timed trade disputes abstract this paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes focusing on wto disputes filed by the united states during the 1995 2014 period we find that u s presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re election moreover u s trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states to explain these regularities we develop a theoretical model in which re election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity

international competitiveness in post keynesian growth theory controversies and empirical evidence a fundamental starting point for post keynesian theory concerning growth in open economies is succinctly expressed in the following statement by kaldor t he main autonomous factor governing both the level and the rate of growth of effective demand of an industrial country is the external demand for its exports and the main factor governing the latter is international competitiveness which in turn depends on the level of its industrial cost relatively to other industrial exporters kaldor 1971 p 7 italics added moreover thanks to increasing returns in manufacturing export expansion and international competitiveness would interact so as to create vicious or virtuous circles of cumulative causation a few years later kaldor having found a positive correlation between the time changes of the main industrial countries relative manufacturing export shares and that of their relative unit costs a correlation that became known as the kaldor paradox dismissed his original cumulative causation theory and adopted a version close to harrod s foreign trade multiplier the purpose of this paper is to reaffirm the kaldorian cumulative causation theory in its original version by providing a firmer analytical basis and showing that contrary to the kaldor paradox time changes in export performance must be explained by levels rather than by changes in unit costs

history versus equilibrium and the theory of economic growth a model of cumulative causation is developed and the limits of this model as a characterization of historical rather than equilibrium long run growth outcomes are discussed an extension of the model which postulates that cumulative causation occurs in the context of technological and institutional regimes is proposed outcomes in the extended model are shown to be more influenced by history than those in the original model the extended model also addresses a number of recent criticisms of cumulative causation copyright 1997 by oxford university press

audience features and the strategic timing of trade disputes if international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize procompliance domestic audiences as many existing theories argue why do countries wait so long before sounding the alarm world trade organization wto members often wait months or even years before objecting to their trading partners wto illegal barriers to turn a phrase trade cooperation delayed is trade cooperation denied so why wait to explain this variation i develop a theory of institutional alarm mechanisms in which 1 the preferences and strength of the audience hearing the alarm vary and 2 the decision to sound the alarm is strategic sounding the alarm is most valuable when strong audiences in the defendant country support compliance i test this prediction using competing risks models analyzing the timing of wto disputes against us tariff barriers consistent with the theory disputes are more likely during election years when macroeconomic indicators suggest broader support for free trade

unemployment and the real wage the economic basis for contesting political ideologies using the keynesian theory of effective demand this paper demonstrates how particular models such as that of cooperative capitalism enunciated by the left keynesian social democrats the marxian model of profit squeeze emphasizing distributive conflict and even the conservative model relying on supply side stimulus fit in as particular variants of a more general theoretical scheme through a reconstruction of the familiar is schedule the argument is weaved around the theme of the relations between unemployment and real wage in the context of both a closed and an open economy to explain the common macroeconomic basis of contesting ideologies copyright 1990 by oxford university press

a structural economic dynamics approach to balance of payments constrained growth this paper derives a balance of payments equilibrium growth rate analogous to thirlwall s law from a pasinettian multi sector macrodynamic framework the resulting formula which we call the multi sectoral thirlwall s law asserts that a country s growth rate of per capita income is directly proportional to the growth rate of its exports with such a proportionality being inversely directly related to sectoral income elasticities of demand for imports exports these income elasticities are weighted by coefficients that measure the share of each sector in total imports and exports respectively it is shown that several theoretical empirical and policy implications can be drawn from such a structural economic dynamics approach to balance of payments constrained growth

trade creation and trade diversion in the canada united states free trade agreement in this paper the changes in trade patterns introduced by the canada united states free trade agreement are examined variation in the extent of tariff liberalization under the agreement is used to identify the impact of tariff liberalization on the growth of trade both with member countries and non member countries data at the commodity level are used and the results indicate that the canada united states free trade agreement had substantial trade creation effects with little evidence of trade diversion jel classification f13 f14

sources of bias in retrospective decision making experimental evidence on voters limitations in controlling incumbents are citizens competent to assess the performance of incumbent politicians observational studies cast doubt on voter competence by documenting several biases in retrospective assessments of performance however these studies are open to alternative interpretations because of the complexity of the real world in this article we show that these biases in retrospective evaluations occur even in the simplified setting of experimental games in three experiments our participants 1 overweighted recent relative to overall incumbent performance when made aware of an election closer rather than more distant from that event 2 allowed an unrelated lottery that affected their welfare to influence their choices and 3 were influenced by rhetoric to give more weight to recent rather than overall incumbent performance these biases were apparent even though we informed and incentivized respondents to weight all performance equally our findings point to key limitations in voters ability to use a retrospective decision rule

dynamic gravity endogenous country size and asset accumulation the gravity equation is the most successful and celebrated empirical model in international trade over the past decade numerous gravity applications have resorted to panel data econometric techniques in order to account for the intrinsically dynamic nature of trade data with the theory of gravity being so far only static these empirical estimations lack solid structural foundations as a consequence a consensus on a unied dynamic gravity estimation approach is yet to be reached the contribution of this paper is threefold first we build a theoretical foundation for the gravity model in a dynamic setting second we use our structural framework to provide clear empirical implications for gravity type estimations with panel data and we consider applications finally to better understand the eect of trade policy in this dynamic framework we calibrate and numerically simulate our general equilibrium model and we compare its properties to those of the standard static gravity model

biases in approximating log production most empirical work in economic growth assumes either a cobb douglas production function expressed in logs or a log approximated constant elasticity of substitution specification estimates from each are likely biased due to logging the model and the latter can also suffer from approximation bias we illustrate this with a successful replication of masanjala and papagerogiou the solow model with ces technology nonlinearities and parameter heterogeneity journal of applied econometrics 2004 19 171 201 and then estimate both models in levels to avoid these biases our estimation in levels gives results in line with conventional wisdom

do wto members have more liberal trade policy abstract this paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the world trade organization wto and its predecessor the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt is associated with more liberal trade policy almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with gatt wto membership trade liberalizations when they occur usually lag gatt entry by many years and the gatt wto often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years the exception to the rule is that wto members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the heritage foundation s index