the effect of experience on security analyst underreaction abstract we examine if analysts more fully incorporate prior earnings and returns information in their current quarter forecasts as their experience following a firm increases we measure analyst firm specific forecasting experience as the number of prior quarters for which the analyst has issued an earnings forecast for the firm we find that analysts underreact to prior earnings information less as their experience increases suggesting one reason why analysts become more accurate with experience

spatial competition and vertical integration cement and concrete revisited reply in this review 1983 mark mcbride reconsiders the federal trade commission s ftc enforcement policy toward vertical mergers between cement and ready mix concrete firms in response to a significant increase in acquisitions of ready mix concrete firms by cement manufacturers during the 1960 s the ftc undertook a series of legal actions to block or dissolve the mergers the actions of the ftc constituted one of the most intensive efforts undertaken to date to challenge vertical mergers in a single industry mcbride p 1012 notes that the actions of the ftc provoked considerable debate concerning the motivation for the mergers both in the industry and in academe a significant number of articles were published advancing various reasons for the mergers in addition to the ftc s main contention that the mergers were motivated by a desire for captive markets it has been suggested that there were economies of integration or that the mergers were the outcome of an erroneous view of the potential benefits to foreclosure held by executives in the beleaguered cement industry 2 mcbride s 1983 paper offers another explanation for the mergers his argument is that vertical integration was undertaken to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing in the cement industry 3 the empirical results presented by mcbride suggest that vertical integration was a significant factor in the decline of cement prices in the 1960 s the purpose of this comment is to point out some of the problems with mcbride s analysis in particular we show that the experimental design of his testing equation is faulty and does not offer a test of his hypothesis as a result mcbride s analysis does not provide convincing evidence on whether cement firms vertically integrated to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing or if cement firms were merely reacting to prices that had already begun to decline our intent however is not to challenge mcbride s contention that vertical integration can provide lower prices to consumers rather we would argue that the evidence presented at the ftc hearings involving cement and ready mix concrete firms as well as mcbride s and others analyses illustrate the problems in discerning the motives for mergers 4

precommitment in competing vertical chains the design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization hence it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices a precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one s own favor schelling 1960 how these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey jel classification l22 l42 l81

comparisons and combinations of long and long short strategies market neutral long short strategies get their returns from alphas and short rebates long strategies get their returns from alpha and the market differing return and risk sources complicate their comparison partly because of the strong market referenced focus of conventional performance analysis compelling theoretical advantages of active return per unit of active risk suggest that long short strategies are better able to deliver excess return than are conventional institutional long strategies long short strategies even with tiny positive alphas are seen to improve investors efficient frontiers when added to a traditional t bill long portfolio mix mostly because their risk sources are uncorrelated surprisingly the improvement occurs even if long short strategies are sharpe ratio inferior to long strategies these results provide theoretical support for including long short strategies in most investors mix of assets

the efficiency gains of long short investing long short strategies have generated controversy and institutional interest for more than 10 years we analyzed the efficiency gains of long short investing where we defined efficiency as the information ratio of the implemented strategy the optimal portfolio relative to the intrinsic information ratio of the alphas the efficiency advantage of long short investing arises from the loosening of the surprisingly important long only constraint long short and long only managers need to understand the impact of this significant constraint long short implementations offer the most improvement over long only implementations when the universe of assets is large asset volatility is low and the strategy has high active risk the long only constraint induces biases particularly toward small stocks limits the manager s ability to act on upside information by not allowing short positions that could finance long positions and reduces the efficiency of traditional high risk long only strategies relative t

on the optimality of the full cost pricing abstract this article is aimed at defining the full cost pricing as a leader follower game in two tier organizations i the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost ii the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost in the cournot oligopoly case the full cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules there exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost for which the full cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules in terms of gross profit

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

slotting allowances as a facilitating practice by food processors in wholesale grocery markets profitability and welfare effects slotting allowances which are lump sum transfers paid by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in return for various retail concessions are becoming increasingly common in wholesale grocery markets this article extends the literature on slotting allowances by considering two features that previously have been ignored the role of food processors in determining these pricing arrangements and the effect of slotting allowances on the size and distribution of economic surplus slotting allowances motivated by food processors increase procurement quantities and farm prices and this raises farm surplus increases total producer surplus and improves consumer welfare in the food system

vertical structure and strategic environmental trade policy abstract the idea that environmental trade policy can be used to achieve competitive advantage in international markets has important implications for the way we conceive free trade this paper considers strategic environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the traded good including intranational vertical relationships in the analysis of strategic environmental trade policy has substantial qualitative effects when vertical contracts are allowed the optimal policy to levy on a polluting input under both quantity and price competition in the international market is the pigouvian tax

loss function assumptions in rational expectations tests on financial analysts earnings forecasts abstract prior research concludes that financial analysts do not process public information efficiently in generating their earnings forecasts the ordinary least squares ols regression based tests used in prior studies assume implicitly that analysts face a quadratic loss function in contrast we argue that analysts likely face a linear loss function and hence try to minimize their absolute forecast errors we conduct and compare rational expectations tests using these two alternative loss functions we reproduce most prior findings of forecast inefficiency with ols regressions but find virtually no evidence of forecast inefficiency with least absolute deviation regressions where we explicitly assume a linear loss function

note on duopolistic vertical restraints abstract this paper reexamines a three stage game previously applied by gal or duopolistic vertical restraints european economic review 35 1237 1253 1991 to model manufacturers choice of vertical restraints with downstream exclusive dealers we show that the main result of the original paper hinges upon the used linear demand specification employing a modified demand technology we find that a lp lp equilibrium can be compatible with high product differentiation as long as total demand is sufficiently inelastic the elasticity of total demand turns out to have a decisive but so far neglected influence on double marginalization and on manufacturers choice of contract

the rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations abstract this paper finds that firms that meet or beat current analysts earnings expectations mbe enjoy a higher return over the quarter than firms with similar quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations further such a premium to mbe although somewhat smaller exists in the cases where mbe is likely to have been achieved through earnings or expectations management the findings also indicate that the premium to mbe is a leading indicator of future performance this premium and its predictive ability are only marginally affected by whether the mbe is genuine or the result of earnings or expectations management

corporate risk management and the incentive effects of debt this paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets commonly referred to as the asset substitution problem is related to the level of observable risk in the firm when observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated increases decreases in observable risk generate the incentive for manager equityholders to increase decrease unobservable risk thus credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm s manager equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt this provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level in the last few years a sizeable literature has emerged which is devoted to explaining how shareholders can benefit from hedging undertaken by the firm such hedging may include the purchase of insurance the use of financial futures and options and even diversification at the level of the firm four lines of reasoning have been pursued in the literature smith and stulz 1985 and campbell and kracaw 1987 rely on the fact that under optimal contracting between managers and shareholders managers are less diversified than are shareholders hedging by the firm which reduces the manager s exposure to risk can improve on the optimal compensation contract between the manager and equityholders this argument may be applied to a firm with any capital structure or any degree of leverage the other arguments apply to firms which are financed with risky debt smith and stulz show that hedging may be useful in reducing expected bankruptcy costs they also show as does macminn 1985 that hedging by the firm may reduce the probability that depreciation tax shields may be lost due to financial distress finally diamond 1984 has shown that monitoring costs may be reduced through diversification macminn s result is of particular interest part of his analysis is based on an earlier paper by green and talmor 1985 which demonstrates that the equityholders of a levered firm will have an incentive to underinvest in risky assets if the firm cannot capture its interest and depreciation tax shields with certainty in green and talmor s analysis the firm has no mechanism to reduce or hedge the uncertainty surrounding its tax shields other than to alter its investment decisions however as macminn argues if the firm is allowed to hedge its risks

consensus expectations and international equity returns numerous studies of u s markets have shown that stock selection models have been able to isolate securities that earn returns above those predicted by a simple market model models examining the relation between analyst expectations and returns have been particularly useful unexpected earnings changes in analysts earnings per share forecasts the number of analysts revising their forecasts all these measures have been found to be useful in predicting abnormal returns in u s equity markets at least two of these measures changes in analysts eps forecasts and the number of analysts changing their forecasts are also related to abnormal returns in several international markets

vertical coordination antitrust law and international trade this paper demonstrates that vertically aligned private or public organizations are capable of generating strategic trade advantage similar to that acquired through direct government export subsidization the model considers two forms of vertical coordination that lead to advantageous trade positions in international markets upstream vertical restraint and downstream equity sharing such practices are commonly employed both by state trading agencies and by private firms in nations with lenient antitrust laws the finding has important implications under new world trade organization wto rules intended to reduce government intervention in international transactions recent reforms in the wto favor nations that sanction highly refined vertical linkages between firms while nations with stringent antitrust legislation have an incentive to negotiate for greater harmonization of international laws

technological change and the boundaries of the firm the authors examine a firm s decision either to produce an essential input itself or to hire a subcontractor to produce the input the authors focus on how this decision is affected by technological change in the industry in general cost reducing technological change leads the firm to produce the input itself more often the firm s calculus is shown to depend on whether the subcontractor s skills are idiosyncratic or transferable in the latter case technological progress can even be detrimental to the firm and to society as a whole copyright 1991 by american economic association

on the optimality of long short strategies we consider the optimality of portfolios not subject to short selling constraints and derive conditions that a universe of securities must satisfy for an optimal active portfolio to be dollar neutr

unions in oligopolistic vertically connected industries a model of two unionized vertically connected oligopolistic industries is analyzed economic performance measured by consumer prices depends on the institutional setting of wage bargaining two externalities may occur namely an integration and a competition externality which have contrary effects with decentralized bargaining no externalities can be internalized resulting in low consumer prices with bargaining at the industry level only the competition externality is internalized resulting in high prices with centralized bargaining both externalities can be internalized resulting again in low prices with at least two firms in each industry the decentralized setting performs best performance improves with an increase in the competition of the product markets author s abstract

process innovation product differentiation and channel structure strategic incentives in a duopoly in this paper we analyze the joint implications of two effects a inserting independent profit maximizing retailers into thechannel system provides buffering to the manufacturers from price competition when their products are highly substitutable and intrachannel contracts are observable as shown by mcguire and staelin 1983 under the assumption of constant marginal production costs and b lack of channel coordination results in a reduction in manufacturer s incentives to invest in efforts to reduce production costs as shown by jeuland and shugan 1983 for the case of bilateral monopoly we show that both these results are robust in the sense that the first holds even in the presence of the vertical externality of manufacturer s effort reduction in a noncoordinated channel and the second holds regardless of the degree of substitutability between the competing channel s products specifically we analyze a four stage game with two manufacturers and two retailers where the intrachannel contracts are linear and observable and manufacturers make investments in process improvements to reduce their production costs we find that the optimal channel structure decision depends on interactions between two parameters the degree of substitutability between products and the level of investments required to achieve production cost reduction these parameters represent what have been widely interpreted in the management literature as the two primary generic strategies that most organizations follow in order to gain competitive advantage cost leadership and product differentiation porter 1980 thus our analysis brings out the strategic and interdisciplinary nature of the channel structure decision that can significantly affect firm profitability our main results are as follows first we find that decentralized noncoordinated channels appear as more profitable equilibrium than integration or perfectly coordinated channels at high product substitutability even when process innovation dimension is accounted for in agreement with the literature however the range of substitutability over which decentralization is an equilibrium strategy is smaller the easier it is to reduce production costs intuitively the easier the cost reduction the larger the cost penalty that the channel incurs as a result of not coordinating investment and pricing decisions between channel members and thus smaller the range over which decentralization is an equilibrium this implies that there is an explicit tradeoff between efficiency and strategic incentives in distribution channel design second we show that decentralized manufacturers invest less in process innovation than integrated manufacturers do regardless of the structure of the competing channel and the degree of substitutability between products consequently a decentralized channel has higher costs charges higher prices and produces lower quantities than an integrated channel does moreover these differences get larger the easier the cost reduction the effect on manufacturer profits however is not that clear manufacturers make higher profits by decentralizing if products are highly substitutable inagreement with mcguire and staelin 1983 and coughlan and wernerfelt 1989 however we also find that the relative profitability of decentralization at high substitutability and of integration at low substitutability increases the easier the cost reduction moreover the range of substitutability over which decentralization is more profitable than integration is itself larger the easier the cost reduction though decentralization is an equilibrium strategy over a smallerrange thus process innovation accentuates the profit difference between integrated and decentralized channels andmakes the prisoner s dilemma situation worse in the choice of distribution channel structure finally we analyze two examples of coordinated decision making in a channel a divisional integrated system and franchising in the first case we find that decentralization can emerge as a unique and more profitable equilibrium at high product substitutability in contrast to mcguire and staelin 1983 in the second case we find that decentralization is not always a unique equilibrium and it is not always more profitable than integration in sharp contrast to the results by coughlan and wernerfelt 1989 thus franchising does not provide a sure way of achieving channel coordination when marginal production costs are not constant in sum this paper highlights the importance of simultaneously considering both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of interorganizational relations on one hand and on the other paying attention to cross functional interactions across marketing and operational decisions to better understand the underlying incentives that shape firm and market structures conventional focus of marketing on demand side effects and of operations on cost side effects can lead to suboptimal decisions

individual analyst characteristics and forecast error the purpose of the study reported here was to investigate how characteristics of analysts affect their forecast errors previous research has found positive serial correlation in forecast errors which can be attributed to underreaction to new information especially to bad news the relationship between an analyst s behavior and that analyst s characteristics is not clear however because most previous work was based solely on consensus estimates by using detailed historical data i found a stronger serial correlation among the herd to consensus analysts that is the group with a small average distance between their forecasts and the consensus forecast than among other analysts moreover average distance to consensus itself has a positive serial correlation and it may be attributed to an analyst s personality optimistic or pessimistic i found strong positive serial correlation in the average distance to consensus among the herd to consensus analysts these results show that herd to consensus ana

portfolio constraints and the fundamental law of active management active portfolio management is typically conducted within constraints that do not allow managers to fully exploit their ability to forecast returns constraints on short positions and turnover for example are fairly common and materially restrictive other constraints such as market capitalization and value growth neutrality with respect to the benchmark or economic sector constraints can further restrict an active portfolio s composition we derive ex ante and ex post correlation relationships that facilitate the performance analysis of constrained portfolios the ex ante relationship is a generalized version of a previously developed fundamental law of active management and provides an important strategic perspective on the potential for active management to add value the ex post correlation relationship represents a practical decomposition of performance into the success of the return prediction process and the noise associated with portfolio constraints we verify the accuracy of these relati

equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly abstract the central purpose of this paper is to examine vertical integration as an equilibrium phenomenon we model it as integration between cournot oligopolists in both the upstream and the downstream stages we consider the issue of private profitability versus collective profitability and show that under several situations the equilibrium outcomes may result in a prisoner s dilemma the analysis is extended to consider equilibrium outcomes in a dynamic setting where we find no integration to be a relatively common outcome

performance attribution and the fundamental law the reported study operationalized the fundamental law of active management in the context of a factor based performance attribution system the system incorporates factor payoffs in the linear regression framework that many portfolio managers and external reviewers use to judge what is being rewarded in the market the study indicates that parameters of the fundamental law can be used to approximate and interpret the results of the regression based performance attribution system the procedure is illustrated by the use of security holdings returns and factor exposure data for two portfolios benchmarked to the s p 500 index for april 1995 to march 2004

a note on market neutral portfolio selection abstract long short equity strategies allow investors to benefit potentially from both undervalued and overvalued securities the present study develops a normative portfolio model under the practical conditions that a market neutral strategy entails the offsetting long and short equity holdings are established jointly and without any constraints by the underlying market index while accurately capturing institutional procedures for short selling the model contains the analytical and economic properties as required for a ranking approach to filter out any undesirable securities under consideration in view of its practical features the analysis should be of interest to practitioners for assisting their long short investment decisions

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

the dampening of competition effect of exclusive dealing using the dampening of competition approach to understanding vertical relationships this paper shows that in the absence of intrabrand retailer competition firms earn greater profits using exclusive dealing the paper explains the frequent simultaneous appearance of exclusive dealing and exclusive territoriality the results are used to analyze the famous 1949 standard stations case the author concludes that the 1949 court did the right thing for a wrong reason copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

on back testing zero investment strategies zero investment strategies typically involve forming a long portfolio in one set of securities and a short portfolio in another with the two identified by the use of some trading rule when back testing such strategies the ex post difference in their abnormal returns represents an unbiased estimate of their economic profitability in perfect markets and thus serves as an indication of market efficiency however regulation t s short selling constraints are a potentially significant imperfection facing retail and institutional investors after development of a procedure that recognizes these constraints in measuring returns the impact of these constraints on economic profitability is analyzed copyright 2000 by university of chicago press