structural change in an open economy we study the importance of international trade in structural change our framework has both productivity and trade cost shocks and allows for non unitary income and substitution elasticities we calibrate our model to investigate south korea s structural change between 1971 and 2005 we nd that the shock processes propagated through the model s two main transmission mechanisms non homothetic preferences and the open economy explain virtually all of the evolution of agriculture and services labor shares and the rising part of the hump shape in manufacturing counterfactual exercises show that the role of the open economy is quantitatively important for explaining south korea s structural change

technical note delegating pricing responsibility to the salesforce in this paper we use an agency theory framework to address the issue of delegating pricing responsibility to the salesperson in this analysis it is shown that delegating the pricing responsibility to the salesperson is as profitable as centralization when the salesperson and the sales manager have identical information about the selling environment but delegation may be more profitable when the saleperson s information is superior to that of the sales manager s it is also argued that this characteristic is typical of market conditions where we observe delegation of such responsibility in cases identified by weinberg weinberg c b 1975 an optimal commission plan for salesman s control over price management sci 21 8 april 937 943 and stephenson cron and frazier stephenson p r w l cron g frazier 1979 delegating pricing authority to the salesforce the effects on sales and profit performance j marketing43 april 21 28

on the function of sales assistance the paper provides a formal rationale for the common practice of using sales assistance the argument is made in a model where a consumer s situation determines his needs the products are differentiated and the map identifying the best match between a consumer s situation and a product is known only to the sales assistant i look at procedure which involves the consumer revealing his needs and the sales assistant identifying the best matching product this is compared to several other procedures and found to be best when the number of possible consumer situations is large it is shown that reputational considerations may keep the sales assistant honest i look at the impact of guarantees and other modifications to the model and discuss normative implications

delegating pricing decisions in competitive markets with symmetric and asymmetric information delegating pricing decisions to the salesforce has been a salient issue for marketing academics and practitioners we examine this issue in a competitive market using standard agency theory with symmetric and asymmetric information under symmetric information we find that the optimal contracts have a nice property that allows managers to reach the upper bound on firms profit by using either centralized or delegated pricing and hence there are no incentive based reasons to prefer centralized versus delegated contract types thus managers can focus on the design of the optimal incentive scheme without worrying about the contract type under asymmetric information we find that there always exists an equilibrium where all firms use centralized pricing that is either unique or payoff equivalent to equilibria that have a combination of contract types these results are robust to a large class of agent and market parameters however if restrictions are exogenously imposed on contract form or observability the above results are no longer true as in earlier work we demonstrate our results by providing explicit solutions under the holmstrom and milgrom 1987 framework

delegation and incentives this article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives it extends the standard principal agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority the agent s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project we find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent in fact if the agent is protected by limited liability delegation is never optimal

why do salespeople spend so much time lobbying for low prices in business to business settings a company s sales force often spends considerable time lobbying internally for authorization to charge lower prices these internal lobbying activities are time consuming and divert attention from other tasks such as interacting with customers we explain why internal lobbying activities serve an important role they help the firm elicit truthful reporting of demand information from the sales force as a result it may be profitable for the firm to require lobbying and make the requirement onerous even though lobbying is a nonproductive activity that creates an additional administrative burden and imposes a deadweight loss

on the conservation of distance in international trade the volume of world trade has grown more than twice as fast as real world income since 1980 surprisingly the effect of distance on trade has increased during this period it could be that countries are trading greater volumes of goods that are highly sensitive to distance an alternative explanation is that distance has become more import for a significant share of goods using highly disaggregated bilateral trade data we find that adjustment in the composition of trade has not influenced the way in which distance affects trade in contrast for about 25 percent of industries distance has become more important this implies that the increased distance sensitivity of trade is a result of a change in relative trade costs that affects many industries as opposed to a shift to more distance sensitive products we also find that homogeneous products are twice as likely to have become more distance sensitive as compared with differentiated goods this is consistent with the hypothesis that falling search costs resulting from improvements in transport and communications are relatively more important for differentiated goods the results offer no evidence of the death of distance rather they suggest that distance related relative trade costs have remained unchanged or shifted in favor of proximate markets

what explains the industrial revolution in east asia evidence from the factor markets this paper presents dual estimates of total factor productivity growth tfpg for east asian countries while the dual estimates of tfpg for korea and hong kong are similar to the primal estimates they exceed the primal estimates by 1 percent a year for taiwan and by more than 2 percent for singapore the reason for the large discrepancy for singapore is because the return to capital has remained constant despite the high rate of capital accumulation indicated by singapore s national accounts this discrepancy is not explained by financial market controls capital income taxes risk premium changes and public investment subsidies jel o11 o16 o47 o53

tariffs and aggregate economic activity lessons from the great depression abstract we argue against the prevailing view that the macroeconomic role of tariffs during the great depression was small to understand the economic channels through which tariffs could have large effects we build a multi sector dynamic equilibrium trade model that captures key features of trade in the 1930s a substantial share of trade was in material inputs and the persistence of the tariff increases had the potential for significant effects on capital accumulation both of these features are important in generating the conclusion that even when trade only represents a small share of output tariffs can have a significant impact on gdp simulation of the model suggests that the global escalation of the tariff war precipitated the collapse of world trade along with declines of several percent in international output and investment

can cross country portfolio rebalancing give rise to forward bias in fx markets abstract this paper develops a model of exchange rate dynamics that takes into account positions in foreign and domestic equities in addition to standard short term riskless securities the modeling of cross country stock holdings is motivated by evidence that a large and ever increasing proportion of currency flows has been directed toward national stock markets to the extent that there is not perfect risk sharing investors tend to hold currency risk and international equity risk as a bundle this paper examines the impact of such cross country covariance risk on the relationship between exchange rate returns and interest rate differentials in particular we show that the sign and magnitude of the coefficient on the lagged interest differential is governed by a type of time varying beta risk that reflects the conditional covariance between exchange rate returns and the return differential between foreign and domestic equities as this cross country beta is predominantly negative our results have direct implications on the empirical failure of the uncovered interest parity uip hypothesis suggesting that the traditional uip regression equation is confounded in a non standard nonlinear way by the presence of cross country equity flows simulation experiments show that accounting for such portfolio rebalancing activities may in part help to explain the anomalous slope coefficient associated with the forward premium

an empirical analysis of sales force compensation plans among the array of direct and indirect methods of motivation and control available to the sales manager is sales force compensation in this article the authors summarize theoretical predictions from the economics marketing finance and accounting literatures on the structure of optimal sales force compensation plans guided by these insights they then construct empirical models to quantify the effect of various sales force factors firm and product factors and market factors on compensation using data from 286 firms in 39 industries the authors examine determinants of incentive components and total pay and the optimal horizon for incentive pay copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

stages of diversification this paper studies the evolution of sectoral concentration in relation to the level of per capita income we show that various measures of sectoral concentration follow a u shaped pattern across a wide variety of data sources countries first diversify in the sense that economic activity is spread more equally across sectors but there exists relatively late in the development process a point at which they start specializing again we discuss this finding in light of existing theories of trade and growth which generally predict a monotonic relationship between income and diversification

salesforce compensation plans in environments with asymmetric information in this paper we present a theory of salesforce compensation plans to provide insights into why it may be advantageous for a profit maximizing firm to offer members of its salesforce the opportunity to choose from a menu of compensation plans although such contractual arrangements are not commonly used in the industry they have been introduced and implemented by firms such as ibm and st regis paper as in our previous work on salesforce compensation plans basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 we use an agency theory framework in this paper we relax the assumptions of information symmetry and salesforce homogeneity and show the conditions under which it is optimal to offer a menu of compensation plans we also show that even when these assumptions are relaxed there are situations where offering a single plan characterized by basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 is still optimal insights gained from the analyses are discussed in the context of an existing compensation scheme

delegating pricing decisions an outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not this paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and in turn the impact of delegation on prices and incentives the theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions prices and sales agents effort specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 does competition affect the price delegation decision and if yes why 2 how do prices vary under price delegation and no price delegation scenarios 3 do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no delegation scenarios to address these issues we build a game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives these representatives are company employees sales are a function of prices and selling efforts the risk neutral firms decide whether or not to delegate the pricing decision to risk averse sales representatives the wages to the sales representatives consist of salary plus a commission on gross margins the commission on gross margins can be adjusted either through communicated marginal cost of production which we call virtual marginal cost or directly the firm and the sales representative are assumed to have the same information about the market that is there is no information asymmetry with competition in two dimensions the strategic nature of decision variableprice depends on the relative intensity of competition with unobservable contracts and risk averse sales representatives firms delegate the pricing decision when price competition is intense part of the uncertainty in demand is absorbed by the firm by keeping virtual marginal cost greater than the marginal cost of production the competing firm infers this through the risk aversion of the sales representatives under price delegation the sales representatives wages are higher and they set a price that is higher than what the firms would have set themselves this leads to softening of price competition that is to the advantage of both firms when the effort competition is dominant however the firms prefer to make the pricing decision themselves because this reduces the intensity of effort competition among agents a single instrument commission structure in which the firms adjust the virtual marginal cost is compared to a two instrument commission structure in which the firms can adjust the commission rate as well the virtual marginal cost under no price delegation the two incentive schemes are the same however under price delegation the risk premium with the two instrument scheme is lower however the prices and efforts are higher with the single instrument scheme when price competition is intense the increase in risk premium with the single instrument scheme is more than compensated for by the increase in profits this is the benefit of softening price competition through higher prices

the narrow moving band the dutch disease and the competitive consequences of mrs thatcher notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies abstract this paper presents a model of trade in which comparative advantage instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries evolves over time through learning by doing in this model arbitrary patterns of specialization once established tend to become entrenched over time the model sheds light on three widely held views that do not make sense in more conventional models first is the view that temporary protection of selected sectors can permanently alter the pattern of comparative advantage in the protecting country s favor second is the view that seemingly favorable developments such as the discovery of exportable natural resources may lead to a permanent loss of other sectors and reduce welfare in the long run third is the possibility that a temporary overvaluation of a currency due to tight money can lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness in some sectors

salesforce compensation scheme and consumer inferences we investigate the salesforce compensation strategy of a firm selling products in a category that several consumers find technically sophisticated such as electronics or financial products with legal fine print consumers are unable to judge the value difference between a baseline product and a product upgrade with add on features while the firm and the salespeople are informed of the value of these features consumers are uncertain thus consumers have to rely on sales assistance to evaluate alternatives the salesperson decision variables include selling effort and whether to oversell the consumer by overclaiming the value of added features because sales revenue depends on both the salesperson s selling effort and consumers valuation of the added features the salesforce incentive scheme which can consist of salary sales commission or consumer satisfaction based commission may induce the short term oriented salesperson to misrepresent the value of the upgrade exaggeration of the value of the added features however results in reduced satisfaction levels leading to lower profits for the firm we show that a salesperson selling products where the value of the upgrade is low prefers to make higher claims when the sales commission rate is sufficiently high we conjecture that consumers aware of the incentive structure facing the salesperson expect the true value of the add on feature to be lower than the claimed value we study the optimal compensation scheme of a firm which has to communicate her true type and retain its salesforce credibility we identify the conditions under which a high upgrade type firm indicates its true value by altering sales commission rate and satisfaction based commission rate

quota based compensation plans for multiterritory heterogeneous salesforces we compare quota based salesforce compensation plans with the blss plan i e the optimal curvilinear agency theory based compensation plans proposed in basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 a quota plan pays a fixed salary which is supplemented by commission income that is a prespecified fraction of the dollar sales that exceed the quota for a salesforce comprised of multiple salespersons territories we consider a basic quota plan where the commission rate and salary remain the same across salespersons however quotas vary across salespersons territories compared to the blss plan that is individually tailored to each salesperson territory the basic quota plan s total nonoptimality in profit has two components i a shapeinduced nonoptimality arising from the fact that the quota based plan does not have the same optimal shape as the curvilinear blss pl

the salesperson as outside agent or employee a transaction cost analysis this descriptive study explores the reasons for integration of the personal selling function i e the use of employee direct salespeople rather than manufacturers representatives reps a hypothesized model is developed based on both transaction cost analysis and the sales force management literature data from 13 electronic component manufacturers covering 159 u s sales districts are used to estimate a logistic model of the probability of going direct in a given district results are shown to be stable across specification and estimation methods and to fit the data well the transaction cost model is generally supported the principal finding is that the greater the difficulty of evaluating a salesperson s performance the more likely the firm to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism i e to use a direct sales force among other findings direct sales forces are also associated with complex hard to learn product lines and with districts that demand considerable nonselling activities several factors prove unrelated including company size the amount of travel a district requires and the importance of key accounts this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 3 pages 234 254 in 1985

the evolution of comparative advantage measurement and welfare implications using an industry level dataset of production and trade spanning 75 countries and 5 decades and a fully specied multi sector ricardian model we estimate productivities at sector level and examine how they evolve over time in both developed and developing countries we nd that in both country groups comparative advantage has become weaker productivity grew systematically faster in sectors that were initially at the greater comparative disadvantage the global welfare implications of this phenomenon are signicant relative to the counterfactual scenario in which an individual country s comparative advantage remained the same as in the 1960s and technology in all sectors grew at the same country specic average rate welfare today is 1 9 lower at the median the welfare impact varies greatly across countries ranging from 0 5 to 6 among oecd countries and from 9 to 27 among non oecd countries remarkably for the oecd countries nearly all of the welfare impact is driven by changes in technology in oecd countries and for the non oecd countries nearly all of the welfare impact is driven by changes in technology in non oecd countries

where ricardo and mill rebut and confirm arguments of mainstream economists supporting globalization most noneconomists are fearful when an emerging china or india helped by their still low real wage rates outsourcing and miracle export led developments cause layoffs from good american jobs this is a hot issue now and in the coming decade it will not go away prominent and competent mainstream economists enter into the debate to educate and correct warm hearted protestors who are against globalization here is a fair paraphrase of the argumentation that has been used recently by alan greenspan jagdish bhagwati gregory mankiw douglas irwin and economists john or jane doe spread widely throughout academia yes good jobs may be lost here in the short run but still total u s net national product must by the economic laws of comparative advantage be raised in the long run and in china too the gains of the winners from free trade properly measured work out to exceed the losses of the losers this is not by mysterious fuzzy magic but rather comes from a sharing of the trade induced rise in total global vectors of the goods and services that people in a democracy want never forget to tally the real gains of consumers alongside admitted possible losses of some producers in this working out of what schumpeter called creative capitalist destruction correct economic law recognizes that some american groups can be hurt by dynamic free trade but correct economic law vindicates the word creative destruction by its proof sic that the gains of the american winners are big enough to more than compensate the losers

exchange rate regimes and wage comovements in a ricardian model with money we construct a ricardian model of trade with money and trade costs the model predicts that the nominal wages of the trading countries exhibit stronger positive comovements when the countries fix their bilateral exchange rates while comovements of real wages are not affected by exchange rate regimes our numerical experiments suggest that a reduction in trade costs increases both nominal and real wage comovements regardless of regimes when downward nominal wage rigidity is introduced nominal wage comovements under the fixed regime remain stronger than under the flexible regime and the difference is smaller on the shorter time horizon while a slight difference in real wage comovements between the two regimes shows up and is larger on the shorter time horizon when we consider membership in the economic and monetary union of the european union as a fixed exchange rate regime panel regression results based on data from oecd countries are broadly consistent with our model and numerical experiments

diversification through trade a widely held view is that openness to international trade leads to higher income volatility as trade increases specialization and hence exposure to sector specific shocks contrary to this common wisdom we argue that when country wide shocks are important openness to international trade can lower income volatility by reducing exposure to domestic shocks and allowing countries to diversify the sources of demand and supply across countries using a quantitative model of trade we assess the importance of the two mechanisms sectoral specialization and cross country diversification and show that in recent decades international trade has reduced economic volatility for most countries

export diversification what s behind the hump hy should export diversification be taken as a policy objective per se there are two reasons that it should not first according to ricardo countries should specialize not diversify second the heckscher ohlin model implies that export patterns are largely determined by endowments so if anything we should worry about factor accumulation not diversification yet export diversification is a constant preoccupation of policymakers in developing countries as de ferranti et al 2002 note a recurrent preoccupation of latin american policymakers is that their natural riches produce a highly concentrated structure of export revenues which then leads to economic volatility and lower growth p 38 the notion that export patterns are fully determined by endowments is of course naive the relationship of endowments trade and growth is a complex and imperfectly understood one intra industry trade models showed long ago that many factors other than endowments including market failures and policies can affect trade patterns more recently hausmann hwang and rodrik 2007 argued that export patterns can display path dependence in the presence of externalities

social loss aversion and optimal contest design when managers are designing a contest to motivate effort by salespeople service employees franchisees or product development teams a key question is what should the optimal proportion of winne

designing optimal sales contests a theoretical perspective sales contests are commonly used by firms as a short term motivational device to increase salespeople s efforts conceptually sales contests and piece rate schemes such as salary commission or quotas differ in that in sales contests payment to salespeople is based on relative rather than absolute sales levels using the agency theoretic framework where the firm is risk neutral and the salespeople are risk averse we examine how a firm should design an optimal contest to maximize its profit through stimulating salespeople s efforts specifically we investigate how many salespeople should be given awards and how the reward should be allocated between the winners three commonly used sales contest formats are studied in the first format termed as rank order tournament there are many winners and the amount of reward is based on relative rank achieved with larger amounts awarded to higher ranks we also examine two special cases of rank ordered tournament a multiple winners format where the reward is shared equally and a winner take all format where a single winner gets the entire reward we model salespeople s behavior by considering utility of the reward from achieving one of the winning ranks in the contest and assessing incremental chances of winning by exerting more effort the analysis was done for two situations based on whether the total reward is large enough for salespeople to participate in the effort maximizing sales contest or not the analysis shows that factors impacting contest design include the salespeople s degree of risk aversion number of salespeople competing in the contest and degree of sales uncertainty which reflects strength of the sales effort relationship the results show that salespeople exert lower effort when there are larger numbers of participants or when sales uncertainty is high we find that the rank order tournament is superior to the multiple winners contest format in a multiple winners format the salesperson whose performance is just sufficient to win is better off than any of the other winners as he exerts the least effort to win but obtains as high a reward as any other winners specific recommendations on contest designs are obtained assuming that sales follow either a logistic or uniform distribution assuming that sales outcome is logistically distributed and the contest budget is high enough to ensure participation our analysis shows that the total number of winners in a sales contest should not exceed half the number of the contestants this result is due to the symmetric nature of the logistic distribution our analysis also indicates that the total number of winners should be increased and the spread decreased when salespeople are more risk averse when salespeople are more risk averse their marginal values for higher rewards become smaller the spread should increase with ranks when rate of risk tolerance is high and decrease with ranks when the rate of risk tolerance is lower in the extreme case of risk neutral salespeople the optimal design is a winner take all format we also conclude that since the probability of winning the contest decreases with number of contestants the optimal number of winners should increase and interrank spread decrease when there are a larger number of participants if the firm does not allocate a large enough budget for salespeople to participate in the effort maximizing sales contest then the firm may increase the number of winners to more than half the sales force increasing the number of winners and decreasing the spread are required to encourage the salespeople to participate particularly when there are many participants who are risk averse a counterintuitive result is that the number of winners should be reduced and the spread increased when sales uncertainty is high increasing sales uncertainty leads to lower equilibrium effort levels while keeping the expected utility of the contest rewards the same therefore increased uncertainty results in higher participation incentive the firm should thus relatively reduce the number of winners in high uncertainty situations under the assumption of uniformly distributed sales the recommendation is that a winner take all contest induces maximum efforts regardless of the level of risk aversion number of players or the degree of uncertainty when the winner take all format does not meet the participation constraint our analysis recommends offering a big reward to the top salesperson and a small reward to many other sales people the small reward should be just sufficient to ensure that all salespeople participate consistent with logistic distribution the spread should decrease when salespeople are more risk averse or there are more players but should increase when sales uncertainty is larger these results highlight that some of the conclusions drawn may be sensitive to distributional assumptions