risk sharing and contagion in networks we investigate the socially optimal design of financial networks that allows to tackle the trade off between risk sharing and contagion we identify conditions on the shock distribution under which full integration or maximal segmentation is optimal we also show that under different conditions the optimal network displays different levels of strength of linkages to other firms or intermediate degrees of segmentation in the latter case the individual and social incentives to establish linkages are not necessarily aligned when firms face heterogeneous distributions of risks they should optimally form linkages only with firms facing risks of the same kind

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

balanced bayesian mechanisms in the transferable utility case a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers we present a new easy to interpret condition and we show that it is strictly more general than all the other conditions found in the literature we also study conditions guaranteeing the bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms

the commodity terms of trade unit roots and nonlinear alternatives a smooth transition approach market price dynamics for north american oriented strand board markets are examined specifically the role of transactions costs are examined vis a vis the law of one price weekly data for the january 3rd 1995 through april 14th 2006 period are used in the analysis nonlinearities induced by unobservable transactions costs are modeled by estimating smooth transition autoregressions stars results indicate that nonlinearity is an important feature of these markets and that the parity relationships implied by economic theory are generally supported by the star models implications for the efficiency of spatial market linkages are examined by estimating generalized impulse response functions

the pecking order of segmentation and liquidity injection policies in a model of contagious crises we study a two country setting in which leveraged investors generate fire sale externalities leading to financial crises and contagion governments can affect the incidence of financial crisis and the degree of contagion by injecting public liquidity and additionally by segmenting the countries liquidity markets we show that segmentation allows a country to avoid contagion and fend off mild financial crises caused by a small shock to its liquidity demand at the cost of exposing it to more severe financial crises caused by a large shock we derive a pecking order result whereby segmentation is a second best measure that coordinated governments should use only when tax capacity constrains them from injecting liquidity even when segmentation is welfare enhancing it should be applied to public liquidity alone never restricting the free flow of private liquidity across countries uncoordinated governments tend to use segmentation excessively

a nonlinear approach to us gnp a univariate nonlinear model is estimated for us gnp that on many criteria outperforms standard linear models the estimated model is of the threshold autoregressive type and contains evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks over the business cycle in particular the nonlinear model suggests that the post 1945 us economy is significantly more stable than the pre 1945 us economy

post mortem examination of the international financial network abstract as the recent crisis has forcefully suggested understanding financial market interconnectedness is of a paramount importance to explain systemic risk stability and economic dynamics in this paper we address these issues along two related perspectives first we explore the statistical properties of the international financial network ifn defined as a weighted directed graph where nodes are countries and links represent debtor creditor relationships in equities and short long run debt we investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis has resulted in a significant change in the topological properties of the ifn our findings suggest that the crisis caused not only a reduction in the amount of securities traded but also induced changes in the topology of the network and in the time evolution of its statistical properties this has happened however without changing the disassortative core periphery structure of the ifn architecture second we perform an econometric study to examine the ability of network based measures to explain cross country differences in crisis intensity we investigate whether the conclusion of previous studies showing that international connectedness is not a relevant predictor of crisis intensity may be reversed once one explicitly accounts for the position of each country within the ifn we show that higher interconnectedness reduces the severity of the crisis as it allows adverse shocks to dissipate quicker however being central in the network may make countries that are not members of a rich club more vulnerable in times of crisis finally we find strong evidence of nonlinear effects once the high degree of heterogeneity that characterizes the ifn is taken into account

a folk theorem for bayesian games with commitment the set of all bayesian nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the bayesian game furthermore the various equilibrium payoffs which are achieved by means of different commitment devices are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal deterministic commitment game

financial fragility and distress propagation in a network of regions we investigate how the financial fragility in the real economy is affected by the average level of interdependence among agents across different regions of the economy to this end we develop a parsimonious agent based model of firms and banks organized in geographic regions the model is built on the framework of an existing class of models for business fluctuations the goal of our exercise is to clarify the effect on systemic failures of the interplay between network interconnectedness and financial acceleration in particular we investigate the probability of individual and systemic failures with varying levels of interconnectedness we find that in the absence of financial acceleration connectivity makes the system more resilient in contrast in the presence of financial acceleration the probability of both individual and systemic failures are minimized at intermediate level of diversification

the ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects in a differential information economy with quasi linear utilities monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints the associated ex ante core is generically non empty however we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms

the interbank network across the global financial crisis evidence from italy abstract this study examines the effects of the global financial crisis gfc on interbank market connectivity using network analysis more specifically using data on italian banks bilateral interbank positions between 1998 and 2013 we analyze the impact of the following events on each bank s network centrality the liquidity crisis in august 2007 the collapse of lehman brothers in september 2008 eurosystem s long term refinancing operations ltros between 2009 and 2012 the sovereign debt crisis in july 2011 and the announcement of outright monetary transactions omt in 2012 the results show that the 2007 liquidity crisis and especially the collapse of lehman brothers are associated with a marked reduction of the relative interconnectedness of the italian banking sector i e a shift in the distribution of banks centrality to the left away from the most connected bank in the following years the system progressively recovered its initial patterns of integration among banks which coincided with the main eurosystem s monetary policy interventions however the average outcome conceals different results across banks depending on their characteristics and initial positions within the system

efficiency despite mutually payoff relevant private information the finite case individuals have or observe partly private information they independently choose acts possibly including messages the center may also act individuals utilities may depend on all acts and information including others private information are there incentives depending only on public information that make desired behavior a bayesian equilibrium assume incentive payments are separable and fully transferable appropriate incentives exisit either if the center s information depends stochastically however slightly on all relevant private information or if individuals relative valuations of acts however divergent are not too dissimilarly affected by different states of nature more generally one gives necessary and sufficient conditions for existence whenever the strategy profile asks agents to reveal all private knowledge relevant to their beliefs about the center s information

modelling the ff mm rate by threshold cointegration analysis this paper investigates a sticky price model of exchange rate determination extension of krugman s target zone model with price inertia applied to the french franc a novel theoretical argument is considered threshold cointegration such that the long run relationship between the parity and its fundamentals is dormant within a certain range of disequilibria but is restored when the system crosses the boundaries over the period 1987 1993 nonlinearities in the ff dm rate consistent with the credibility of this target zone were detected by pointing out a band reversion mechanism a shock persistence analysis which highlights a nonlinear reversion of the exchange rate deviation is also implemented

rethinking macroeconomics what failed and how to repair it the standard macroeconomic models have failed by all the most important tests of scientific theory they did not predict that the financial crisis would happen and when it did they understated its effects monetary authorities allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low partly because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for efficiency and growth after the crisis broke policymakers relying on the models floundered notwithstanding the diversity of macroeconomics the sum of these failures points to the need for a fundamental re examination of the models and a reassertion of the lessons of modern general equilibrium theory that were seemingly forgotten in the years leading up to the crisis this paper first describes the failures of the standard models in broad terms and then develops the economics of deep downturns and shows that such downturns are endogenous further the paper argues that there have been systemic changes to the structure of the economy that made the economy more vulnerable to crisis contrary to what the standard models argued finally the paper contrasts the policy implications of our framework with those of the standard models

subjective and objective evaluations of teacher effectiveness research on the impact of teachers on student achievement e g jonah e rockoff 2004 steven g rivkin hanushek and john kain 2005 has established two stylized facts 1 teacher effectiveness varies widely and 2 outside of experience qualifications that determine a teacher s certification and salary bear little relation to outcomes this provides motivation to understand how to identify effective and ineffective teachers particularly early in their careers studies that examine how student achievement data can predict teachers impacts on student outcomes in the future e g robert gordon thomas j kane and douglas o staiger 2006 dan goldhaber and michael hansen 2010 conclude that using such data to selectively retain teachers could yield large benefits however value added measures of effectiveness are noisy and can be biased if some teachers are persistently given students that are difficult to teach in ways that are hard to observe thus using other information may achieve more stability and accuracy in teacher evaluations there is also a literature on subjective teaching evaluations i e evaluations by the school principal or evaluations based on classroom observation protocols or rubrics which also finds significant relationships between evaluations and achievement gains however these studies typically investigate how evaluations predict the exam performance of current not

where modern macroeconomics went wrong this paper provides a critique of the dsge models that have come to dominate macroeconomics during the past quarter century it argues that at the heart of the failure were the wrong microfoundations which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour e g incorporating insights from information economics and behavioural economics inadequate modelling of the financial sector meant they were ill suited for predicting or responding to a financial crisis and a reliance on representative agent models meant they were ill suited for analysing either the role of distribution in fluctuations and crises or the consequences of fluctuations on inequality the paper proposes alternative benchmark models that may be more useful both in understanding deep downturns and responding to them

can position limits restrain rogue trading this paper studies the imposition of position limits on commodity futures from the perspective of curbing excessive speculation and thus manipulation we present a simple general equilibrium model in a static rational expectations framework and agent heterogeneity to illustrate that excessive speculation serves to enrich other agents at the expense of the speculator position limits on the contrary are not only superfluous but also counter productive as they exacerbate market power and lead to a deterioration in efficiency position limits not only reduce social welfare but also cannot restrain market manipulation

integrating finance into global production networks coe n m lai k p y and wojcik d integrating finance into global production networks regional studies while successful in its aim of globalizing regional development the global production network gpn approach has thus far paid less attention to the role of finance in the dynamics of the global economy and regional development this lacuna is significant as finance is arguably even more globalized and networked than production to address this gap the paper distils the concept of the global financial network gfn from financial geography and related scholarship with advanced business services world cities and offshore jurisdictions at the core interactions between the gpn and the gfn are discussed focusing on the financing and financializing of gpns and the co evolution of globalization and financialization integrating finance into gpn research entails more than a simple extension of the approach it would also enrich it conceptually and enable it methodologically and empirically

informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies abstract in this paper we show that in quasilinear economies the incentive compatible coarse core is non empty if agents are informationally small in the sense of mclean and postlewaite 2002 and the strict core in each state is non empty

incomplete information incentive compatibility and the core abstract we consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts while communication of private information is permitted the true information state is not verifiable the enforcement of contracts is therefore limited by incentive compatibility constraints we formalize a notion of the core for such an economy our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of r wilson 1978 econometrica46 807 816 or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the notion of incentive efficiency of b holmstrom and r myerson 1983 econometrica51 1799 1819 while there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non empty our main result shows that is not generally true journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c72 d51

risk and global economic architecture why full financial integration may be undesirable integration of global financial markets was supposed to lead to greater financial stability as risks were spread around the world the finan cial crisis has thrown doubt on this conclusion a failure in one part of the global economic system caused a global meltdown the recent crisis has shown that in the absence of appro priate government intervention privately profit able transactions may lead to systemic risk this paper provides a general analytic framework within which we can analyze the optimal degree and form of financial integration within this general framework full integration is not in general optimal indeed faced with a choice between two polar regimes full integration or autarky in the simplified model autarky may be superior

a variable threshold band approach to measuring market linkages uncertain and changing economic conditions can have substantial effects on price relationships in spatially separated linked markets although numerous studies have analysed price relationships to characterize market linkage structures most assume that the relationships and associated linkages are time invariant this study extends the literature by modelling and estimating time dependent market linkages that are conditional on changes in exogenous factors the methodology is used to investigate price relationships in north carolina nc corn and soya bean markets empirical results indicate that generalized market linkage models provide a better representation of price relationships over time improving the understanding of price discovery dynamics and marketing strategies

capital market liberalization globalization and the imf one of the most controversial aspects of globalization is capital market liberalization not so much the liberalization of rules governing foreign direct investment but those affecting short term capital flows speculative hot capital that can come into and out of a country in the 1980s and 1990s the imf and the us treasury tried to push capital market liberalization around the world encountering enormous opposition not only from developing countries but from economists who were less enamoured of the doctrines of free and unfettered markets of market fundamentalism that were at that time being preached by the international economic institutions the economic crises of the late 1990s and early years of the new millennium which were partly or even largely attributable to capital market liberalization reinforced those reservations this paper takes as its point of departure a recent imf paper to provide insights both into how the imf could have gone so wrong in its advocacy of capital market liberalization and into why capital market liberalization has so often led to increased economic instability not to economic growth copyright 2004 oxford university press

a note on the incentive compatible core abstract we identify particular exchange economies with asymmetric information in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty provided that coalitions can allocate goods by means of random mechanisms both the use of random mechanisms and the restriction to a specific class of economies are crucial for the result indeed the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty i in our class of economies if coalitions can only use deterministic mechanisms and ii outside this class even if random mechanisms are allowed journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 d82 d51

price transmission and asymmetric adjustment in the u s beef sector the u s livestock sector has experienced numerous structural changes in recent years for example the meatpacking industry has experienced many mergers and acquisitions leading to significant increases in industry concentration in particular the four firm concentration ratio for steer and heifer slaughter a frequently cited statistic and an important indicator of industry concentration increased from 35 7 in 1980 to 79 8 in 1997 usda there have also been significant regional shifts in livestock production and changes in marketing practices with decreased use of public markets in many areas for some products traditional auction markets have been largely replaced by contract production and sales cattle inventories have also trended downward over the last two decades this has been accompanied by decreases in the number of producers and in some cases with significant increases in the scale of operations the vertical transmission of shocks among various levels of the market is an important characteristic describing the overall operation of the market of course price is the primary mechanism by which various levels of the market are linked the extent of adjustment and speed with which shocks are transmitted among producer wholesale and retail market prices is an important factor reflecting the actions of market participants at alternative market levels the nature speed and extent of adjustments to market shocks may also have important implications for marketing margins spreads and mark up pricing practices an extensive literature has examined mar

portfolio diversification and systemic risk in interbank networks abstract this paper contributes to a growing literature on the ambiguous effects of risk diversification in our model banks hold claims on each other s liabilities that are marked to market on the individual financial leverage of the obligor the probability of systemic default is determined using a passage problem approach in a network context and banks are able to internalize the network externalities of contagion through their holdings banks do not internalize the social costs to the real economy of a systemic default of the banking system we investigate the optimal diversification strategy of banks in the face of opposite and persistent economic trends that are ex ante unknown to banks we find that the optimal level of risk diversification may be interior or extremal depending on banks exposure the external assets and that a tension arises whereby individual incentives favor a banking system that is over diversified with respect to the level of diversification that is desirable in the social optimum

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

liaisons dangereuses increasing connectivity risk sharing and systemic risk the recent financial crisis poses the challenge to understand how systemic risk arises endogenously and what architecture can make the financial system more resilient to global crises this paper shows that a financial network can be most resilient for intermediate levels of risk diversification and not when this is maximal as generally thought so far this finding holds in the presence of the financial accelerator i e when negative variations in the financial robustness of an agent tend to persist in time because they have adverse effects on the agent s subsequent performance through the reaction of the agent s counterparties 2012 elsevier b v all rights reserved

incentives and the existence of pareto optimal revelation mechanisms abstract from the characterization of strongly and bayesian incentive compatible paretooptimal mechanisms with transferable utilities we derive the following results if there are only two types per individual then a strongly incentive compatible paretooptimal mechanism exists if there are only two individuals with more than three types then there are sets of beliefs open in the class of all beliefs for which no bayesian incentive compatible pareto optimal mechanism exists if there are more than two individuals then the class of beliefs for which such mechanisms exist is open and dense in the class of all beliefs

time varying threshold cointegration and the law of one price a theoretical model of the law of one price which allows for seasonality in transaction costs and supply and demand conditions between markets is developed bivariate three regime threshold vector error correction models are applied to natural gas markets to examine seasonality in threshold levels results indicate that there are nonlinear adjustments to the law of one price in seven pair wise markets chicago is used as the base market in the natural gas sector dynamic threshold effects relative to the chicago market vary depending on season geographical location and whether the market is an excess producing or consuming market

subgame perfect cooperation in an extensive game abstract we propose a new solution concept for games in extensive form that incorporates both cooperation and subgame perfection from its definition and properties the new solution concept named the subgame perfect core is a refinement of the core of an extensive game in the same sense as the set of subgame perfect nash equilibria is a refinement of the set of nash equilibria to further characterize the subgame perfect core we show that each subgame perfect core payoff vector can be implemented as a non cooperative solution as it is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium payoff vector of an extensive form game that is closely related to the original game we also motivate and introduce a related concept of subgame perfect strong nash equilibrium of an extensive game that is coalition proof

threshold cointegration and purchasing power parity in the pacific nations the paper uses a threshold cointegration methodology to explore the properties of long run purchasing power parity ppp in the pacific nations using japan and the usa as base countries it is shown that long run ppp holds for most asian countries but that the adjustment mechanism is asymmetric in contrast to symmetric error correction models it is found that asymmetric adjustments of nominal exchange rates play an important role in eliminating deviations from long run ppp

cooperation in strategic games revisited for two person complete information strategic games with transferable utility all major variable threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide this confluence of solutions by luminaries such as nash harsanyi raiffa and selten is more than mere coincidence staying in the class of two person games with transferable unility the article presents a more complete theory that expands their solution specifically it presents 1 a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components 2 an intuitive and computable closed form formula for the solution 3 an axiomatic justification of the solution and 4 a generalization of the solution to games with private signals along with an arbitration scheme that implements it the objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications jel codes c71 c72 c78 copyright 2013 oxford university press

is full banking integration desirable abstract we analyze the links between banking integration and economic development for a sample of oecd countries we measure banking integration considering indicators that merge not only openness but also connectedness with other banking systems we plug these indicators into income regressions also controlling for other relevant variables considered by the literature in contrast to previous initiatives this second stage explicitly takes into account the differing levels of economic development of the countries in our sample since the benefits of enhanced banking integration might not be generalizable to this end we implement quantile regression also considering the presence of endogenous regressors results show that bank connectedness is more important for economic development than bank openness but the combined effect i e banking integration overall is positive and significant the quantile regression models used in the second stage show that the effects are stronger for the poorest economies

how do foreign investors impact domestic economic activity evidence from india and china there has been renewed advocacy for restrictions on international financial flows in the wake of the recent financial crisis motivated by this trend we explore the extent to which cross border flows affect real economic activity unlike previous research efforts that focus on aggregated capital flows we exploit novel data on forced trading by global mutual funds as a plausible source of exogenous flow shocks such forced trading is known to generate large liquidity and price effects but its real impacts have not been studied extensively we find that both country and firm level investment growth rates are significantly affected by these exogenous capital shocks and that their effect is more pronounced for firms whose marginal investment decisions are more equity reliant

informational size incentive compatibility and the core of a game with incomplete information we study the ex ante incentive compatible core and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of mclean and postlewaite 2002a econometrica 70 2421 2453

leveraged network based financial accelerator abstract in this paper we build on the network based financial accelerator model of delli gatti et al 2010 modelling the firms financial structure following the dynamic trade off theory instead of the packing order theory moreover we allow for multiperiodal debt structure and consider multiple bank firm links based on a myopic preferred partner choice in case of default we also consider the loss given default rate lgdr we find many results i if leverage increases the economy is riskier ii a higher leverage pro cyclicality has a destabilizing effect iii a pro cyclical leverage weakens the monetary policy effect iv a central bank that wants to increase the interest rate should previously check if the banking system is well capitalized v an increase of the reserve coefficient has an impact similar to that produced by raising the policy rate but for the enlargement of bank reserves that improves the resilience of the banking system to shocks

price transmission and asymmetric adjustment in the spanish dairy sector asymmetric threshold vector error correction models are applied to monthly price data to analyse price relationships and patterns of transmission among farm and retail markets for a variety of dairy products in spain the results suggest that asymmetries affect a conspicuous part of the raw milk processed in spain implications for the organizational structure of spanish dairy markets are offered

core convergence with asymmetric information we analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies we show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately walrasian for the associated arrow debreu economy

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information abstract the core is extended to games with incomplete information the feasible set is characterized by incentive compatible mechanisms blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive compatible mediation plan membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure independent types and sidepayments an offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual utility scales that generalize the weighted utility scales of the inner core mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable

using threshold cointegration to estimate asymmetric price transmission in the swiss pork market this paper employs threshold cointegration tests that allow for asymmetric adjustment towards a long run equilibrium relationship to examine the relationship between producer and retail pork prices in switzerland the short run adjustments are also examined with asymmetric error correction models that are compared to the conventional symmetric error correction models the results indicate that price transmission between the producer and retail levels is asymmetric in the sense that increases in producer prices that lead to declines in marketing margins are passed on more quickly to retail prices than decreases in producer prices that result in increases in the marketing margins

spatial market integration in the presence of threshold effects a large body of research has evaluated price linkages in spatially separate markets much recent research has applied models appropriate for nonstationary data such analyses have been criticized for their ignorance of transactions costs which may inhibit price adjustments and thus affect tests of integration this analysis utilizes threshold autoregression and cointegration models to account for a neutral band representing transactions costs we evaluate daily price linkages among four corn and four soybean markets in north carolina nonlinear impulse response functions are used to investigate dynamic patterns of adjustments to shocks our results confirm the presence of thresholds and indicate strong support for market integration though adjustments following shocks may take many days to be complete in every case the threshold models suggest much faster adjustments in response to deviations from equilibrium than is the case when threshold behavior is ignored a large amount of empirical research has evaluated the extent to which spatially separate markets are integrated though the term is used loosely in the literature tests of market integration usually consider the extent to which shocks are transmitted among spatially separate markets the integration of markets can have important implications for price discovery and the operation of the market since persistent deviations from integration may imply riskless profit opportunities for spatial traders

spatial market arbitrage and threshold cointegration goodwin and piggott reported that corn and soybean prices in spatially separated markets in north carolina exhibited threshold cointegration and that commodity prices in different markets may persistently diverge here a multivariate approach is used to test for threshold cointegration and nonlinear cointegration the results suggest that departures from the law of one price do not persist indefinitely goodwin and piggott gp examined daily corn and soybean prices across spatially separated markets in north carolina and reported that bivariate pairings of prices were threshold cointegrated gp used a twothreshold model in which price differences across markets could persist indefinitely they concluded that empirical models should consider threshold effects in order to adequately characterize spatially integrated markets the purpose of this article is to extend the gp analysis in several directions gp employed the techniques of martens kofman and vorst which involve a multistepped search for thresholds in the residuals of a cointegrating regression this single equation search process is subject to potential misspecification so it is interesting to determine whether the direct multivariate test of threshold cointegration of hansen and seo provides confirmatory evidence in addition gp allowed two thresholds to affect each commodity pair without directly testing for the number of thresholds the second extension uses hansen tests to determine the number of thresholds two thresholds imply no arbitrage bounds that allow persistent departures from the law of one price one threshold is consistent with the traditional view that price differentials are fleeting as arbitrageurs drive excess returns to zero the final extension recognizes that spatially integrated markets might follow a nonlinear relationship that depends on transactions costs peter s sephton is professor school of business queen s university kingston ontario canada the author would like to thank nick piggott for providing his dataset and the dean s research fund in the school of business for financial assistance two anonymous referees provided helpful comments sufficiently large deviations from the law of one price should lead to a reduced price dispersion a direct test of nonlinear cointegration demonstrates that price differences tend to be resolved over time background