feebates rebates and gas guzzler taxes a study of incentives for increased fuel economy abstract us fuel economy standards have not been changed significantly in 20 years feebates are a market based alternative in which vehicles with fuel consumption rates above a pivot point are charged fees while vehicles below receive rebates by choice of pivot points feebate systems can be made revenue neutral feebates have been analyzed before this study re examines feebates using recent data assesses how the undervaluing of fuel economy by consumers might affect their efficacy tests sensitivity to the cost of fuel economy technology and price elasticities of vehicle demand and adds assessments of gas guzzler taxes or rebates alone a feebate rate of 500 per 0 01 gallon per mile gpm produces a 16 percent increase in fuel economy while a 1000 per 0 01 gpm results in a 29 percent increase even if consumers count only the first 3 years of fuel savings unit sales decline by about 0 5 percent but sales revenues increase because the added value of fuel economy technologies outweighs the decrease in sales in all cases the vast majority of fuel economy increase is due to adoption of fuel economy technologies rather than shifts in sales

new parties and policy outcomes evidence from colombian local governments abstract in many democracies increasing political competition has changed the traditional party system and brought new parties into the political arena this study examines whether the presence of politicians from new parties affects the size of government measured by public spending and tax revenue the study focuses on colombian municipalities where new parties have been numerous and successful in recent years regression discontinuity estimates show that public spending and tax revenues are significantly higher in municipalities governed by a mayor from a new party using information about local politics and the features of the new parties i argue that this result is not associated with new party ideology but instead relates to new parties having lower probability of reelection which raises the incentives to increase short term rent seeking

1 000 cash back the pass through of auto manufacturer promotions automobile manufacturers frequently use promotions involving cash incentives while payments are nominally directed to either customers or dealers the ultimate beneficiary of the promotion depends on the outcome of price negotiation we use program evaluation methods to compare the incidence of these two types of promotions customers obtain 70 to 90 percent of a customer rebate but only 30 to 40 percent of a dealer discount promotion a 500 difference for a typical promotion our leading hypothesis is that pass through rates differ because of information asymmetries customer rebates are well publicized to customers while dealer discount promotions are not

federally supported commercial technology development solar thermal technologies 1970 1982 abstract the federal government has increasingly supported commercial technology development solar thermal technology development is one example at least two characteristics distinguish commercial technology development from traditional federal research roles basic rd independent private rd the public sector retains responsibility for managing the r d effort federally orchestrated r d projects become increasingly dubious as technologies approach commercialization an r d strategy that considers the unique characteristics of commercial technology development the market imperfections present and the impacts of alternative incentives could help coordinate public and private interests emphasizing the relative strengths of both sectors

how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

transparency and economic policy we provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability transfers are partly financed through government debt and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems the model provides an explanation of fiscal churning it also predicts that groups whose transfers are less visible to others receive higher transfers and that imperfect transparency of transfers may lead to underprovision of public goods from the policy perspective the main novelty of our analysis is a separate evaluation of the transparency of spending and the transparency of revenues we show that the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency transparency of spending is beneficial but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive because it endogenously leads to increased wasteful spending

anticipation tax avoidance and the price elasticity of gasoline demand summary least squares estimates of the response of gasoline consumption to a change in the gasoline price are biased toward zero given the endogeneity of gasoline prices a seemingly natural solution to this problem is to instrument for gasoline prices using gasoline taxes but this approach tends to yield implausibly large price elasticities we demonstrate that anticipatory behavior provides an important explanation for this result gasoline buyers increase purchases before tax increases and delay purchases before tax decreases rendering the tax instrument endogenous including suitable leads and lags in the regression restores the validity of the iv estimator resulting in much lower elasticity estimates copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd

do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed established democracies this paper investigates the impact of elections on the level and composition of fiscal instruments using a sample of 19 high income oecd democracies during the period 1972 1999 we find that elections shift public spending towards current expenditures at the cost of public investment although we find no evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit and overall expenditures we find a negative effect of elections on revenue attributed to a fall in direct taxation our results apply for predetermined electoral periods while endogenous elections seem to increase deficit and leave the composition of fiscal policy unaffected

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

modelling the impacts of a carbon emission differentiated vehicle tax system on co2 emissions intensity from new vehicle purchases in ireland abstract the increasing awareness of the effects of climate change on the environment and the economic pressure on oil supply has focused international attention on reducing co 2 emissions and energy usage across all sectors in order to meet their kyoto protocol commitments and in line with european union policy the irish government has introduced a carbon based tax system for new vehicles purchased from the 1st of july 2008 this new legislation aims to reduce carbon emissions in the transport sector a sector which is responsible for a significant proportion of both this paper presents the results of the development calibration and application of a car choice model which predicts the changes in co 2 emissions intensity from new vehicle purchases as a result of the changes in vehicle tax policy and fuel price in ireland the model also predicts the impact of such changes on tax revenue for the irish government and the changes in the split between the number of diesel and petrol vehicles purchased the investigation found that the introduction of these new carbon based taxes in ireland will result in a reduction of 3 6 3 8 in co 2 emissions intensity and a reduction in annual tax revenue of 191 m

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

local political business cycles evidence from philippine municipalities abstract this paper establishes the existence of short term political business cycles in the philippines over the period 2003 2009 examining a balanced panel of 1143 municipalities shows that employment levels increase in the two pre electoral quarters and drop sharply in the two quarters following elections further results are consistent with the cycles being generated by incumbents attempts to increase their chances of re election cycles are stronger in sectors that incumbents are more able to influence and when they expect stronger electoral competition evidence suggests that these cycles are detrimental to development

the effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in israel 1989 1998 abstract we discuss the circumstances under which voters in local elections will reward fiscal responsibility and suggest that such circumstances evolved in israel in the mid 1990s we present empirical evidence that indeed fiscal performance of mayors substantially affected their reelection probability in the 1998 campaign but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns changes in the political environment enforcement of audit and financial reporting requirements tougher imposition of hard budget constraints and the development of local media are proposed as explanations the hypotheses that the fiscal variables reflect the income level at the locality or the mayor s success in extracting resources from the central government are tested and rejected

uncertainty electoral incentives and political myopia we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and uncertainty when politicians ability is ex ante unknown and policy choices are unobservable elections improve political accountability and selection however incumbents underinvest in costly policies with future returns to signal high ability and increase re election probability surprisingly uncertainty reduces political myopia and may increase social welfare we also address the socially optimal political rewards and the desirability of a one term limit our predictions are consistent with several stylised facts and with a new empirical observation aggregate uncertainty is positively correlated with fiscal discipline

two round elections one round determinants evidence from the french municipal elections using a new database of french municipalities that covers 821 towns and two elections 2001 and 2008 we examine how the budget structure degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent we take into account the institutional details of the two round structure of the electoral process created by french electoral rules dual ballot under plurality rules we show that in the first round of the electoral process spending on equipment including infrastructures can influence the voter and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent s score in the second round the incumbent s vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect we show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense the results suggest that the determinants of each round s outcome in a two round electoral process are different

electoral rules political competition and fiscal expenditures regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities we exploit a discontinuity in the rules of brazilian mayoral elections to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on fiscal policy choices in municipalities with fewer than 2

does trade openness promote multilateral environmental cooperation this article puts forward a number of arguments why trade openness might promote multilateral environmental cooperation most of these arguments are grounded in the substantive self interest of the trading country it tests the proposition using a range of proxy variables for general trade openness as well as specific export interests the article examines whether countries open to trade are more likely to have signed three recent multilateral environmental agreements meas and are more likely to have ratified early on another three agreements with quasi universal membership after controlling for income political freedom and population size the empirical estimations find some weak evidence in favour of a possible synergy between trade openness and multilateral environmental cooperation world trade organisation membership as well as general export openness go hand in hand with greater willingness to participate in multilateral environmental cooperation in some cases however whether specific trade interests promote or hinder multilateral environmental cooperation depends on whether the relevant agreement is likely to threaten or accommodate the interests of exporting countries

how do elections affect international cooperation evidence from environmental treaty participation is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post electoral period however the cost of participating in these agreements is often lower for developing countries and they may enjoy indirect advantages which may make them more prone to ratifying in the pre electoral period these hypotheses are assessed empirically by studying the ratification process of 41 global environmental agreements censused in the environmental treaties and resources indicators database from 1976 to 1999 we use a duration model in which time is measured on a daily basis enabling us to precisely identify pre and post electoral periods a significant challenge in political cycles studies our investigation reveals the existence of political ratification cycles that are of substantial magnitude and non linear over the pre and post electoral years

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

kyoto protocol cooperation does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying in this paper we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby we use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of kyoto protocol ratification to test this hypothesis we find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification and the effect rises with the degree of corruption

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

the politics of related lending we analyze the protability of government owned banks lending to their owners we nd evidence that such lending has been used to transfer bank prots to the governments but only in localities where the incumbent politicians face signicant competition for reelection in localities where the incumbent party has a high probability of reelection there is no such evidence this result establishes a causal link behind extant evidence that banks lending to controlling parties owners and directors can result in looting of the banks we nd evidence that such looting occurs when controlling parties are at risk of losing control

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

the electoral dynamics of human development this paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980 2013 the incidence of partisan and political support effects is also taken into account a gmm estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development majority governments also influence it but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects the electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non oecd countries in countries with less frequent elections with lower levels of income and human development in presidential and non plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes they have also become more intense in this millennium

greening the vehicle fleet norway s co2 differentiated registration tax abstract in 2007 norway established its vehicle registration tax linked to vehicle co2 intensities in 2009 the tax was modified to a feebate structure but maintained its link to co2 intensities using a panel dataset to exploit the quasi experimental tax reforms we estimate that a 1000 nok 125 usd tax increment reduces new vehicle sales by 1 06 1 58 this result yields an elasticity of average co2 intensity to co2 price implied by the tax of 0 06 with a pass through of the tax to car prices of 88 the resulting elasticity of average co2 intensity to average car price is 0 53 thus the tax significantly shifts consumers toward lower emission vehicles our counterfactual simulations suggest that high emission vehicle segments lose market shares and become less co2 intensive while low emission vehicle segments gain market shares

political institutions and pollution control this paper models the selection of environmental policies under authoritarian and democratic regimes and tests the hypothesis that political institutions systematically affect the enactment of environmental regulations the results support the contention that political institutional arrangements rather than resource endowments largely determine policies concerning environmental regulation copyright 1992 by mit press

re election incentives and deforestation cycles in the brazilian amazon abstract despite expansive research on amazonian deforestation and its drivers the role of local politics is not well understood using a panel data set that combines municipal level deforestation and election data from 2002 to 2012 i estimate the effect of an incumbent mayor running for re election on deforestation rates in election periods i find that deforestation rates increase 8 10 in election years when an incumbent mayor runs for re election an amount equivalent to four percent of the total forest lost since the 2004 elections electoral deforestation cycles do not appear to be driven by changes in agricultural policy implementation and activity but are linked to corruption and campaign finance suggesting that weak institutional constraints facilitate electoral manipulation of forest resources this phenomenon is not likely limited to amazonian forests re election incentives could very well lead to misallocation of other natural resources in alternate geographies

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

mafia elections and violence against politicians organized crime uses political violence to influence politics in a wide set of countries this paper exploits a novel dataset of attacks directed towards italian local politicians to study how and why criminal organizations use violence against them we test two complementary theories to predict the use of violence i before elections to affect the electoral outcome and ii after elections to influence politicians from the beginning of their term we provide causal evidence in favor of the latter hypothesis the probability of being a target of violence increases in the weeks right after an election in areas with a high presence of organized crime especially when elections result in a change of local government

global samaritans donor election cycles and the allocation of humanitarian aid abstract this paper finds a large causal donor election cycle effect in humanitarian aid allocations on average humanitarian aid increases by 19 in the year before elections our identification strategy consists of focusing on donors with fixed election dates making elections clearly exogenous furthermore we find large interaction effects with natural and human disasters this evidence is consistent with our theory that incumbent governments responding to humanitarian disasters can increase voter support for their party and insure against the political fall out of not being seen as representatives of a country with global interests and influence however it is important to stress that despite our findings human and natural disasters explain a substantially larger share of the overall variation in humanitarian aid observed in the data

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

how responsive is saudi new vehicle fleet fuel economy to fuel and vehicle price policy levers abstract this paper investigates the drivers of recent improvements in saudi arabia s fleet fuel economy for new vehicles including passenger cars and light duty trucks vehicle choice models are estimated using both aggregate new vehicle sales data and disaggregate new vehicle buyer survey data the estimated models are used to simulate counterfactual policy scenarios simulation results suggest that the saudi gasoline price elasticity of demand for new vehicle fuel economy decreased slightly over recent years but it is still more elastic than that of the united states moreover the increase in domestic gasoline prices between 2014 and 2016 accounted for 42 of the increase in estimated new vehicle fleet fuel economy over that period finally the estimated elasticities and thus policy sensitivities vary by income and household size a revenue neutral household income and size based feebate policy could be more progressive than a gasoline price increase for improving the new vehicle fleet fuel economy

non economic engagement and international exchange the case of environmental treaties we examine the role of non economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange since far sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending countries with such non economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non economic relationships we present a theoretical model of these ideas and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross section of data on international crossholdings of assets and environmental treaties our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange

balancing act government roles in an energy conservation network government led interorganizational alliance networks present a sensible opportunity to overcome many societal challenges through collaborative governance in particular few researchers have studied alliance networks in the field of energy conservation in commercial buildings a sector with unique barriers to greater diffusion of innovative cost saving strategies we applied an analytic inductive case based method and social network analysis to study one particular alliance network the united states commercial building energy alliances representing interests from retail commercial real estate and healthcare sectors this alliance network was initiated by the united states department of energy with assistance from several federally funded research laboratories in the united states to promote the diffusion of knowledge and ultimately encourage greater deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy strategies in commercial buildings we draw upon interview data from 28 cases of private non profit and governmental organizations and complete network data from the alliance participants we honed in on eight focal cases of governmental organizations to provide insight on how the four forms of energy and environmental data information and knowledge shared within an alliance network address the challenge of a vastly underutilized energy resource namely conservation further we identify and discuss the public s four roles commissioner interpreter marketer and user in providing balance to the diffusion of both private and public goods in a network

the cost of commercializing energy inventions abstract inadequate financing is a common cause of failure among inventors and entrepreneurs striving to bring new energy technologies onto the market this paper describes the cost of commercializing energy inventions and sources of funds used by successful entrepreneurs based on data from the u s department of energy s energy related inventions program erip on average it has taken several years of work and 1 1 million for an erip technology to enter the market personal sources of funding play an important role throughout the development process while external investors are practically invisible until the technologies are into mature stages of prototype development the role for pre venture government programs is clearly indicated from these findings and is discussed

how much do incentives affect car purchase agent based microsimulation of consumer choice of new cars part ii forecasting effects of feebates based on energy efficiency abstract in this paper we simulate the car market in order to forecast the effects of feebate systems based on an energy labeling scheme using categories a to g very fuel efficient a cars receive a cash incentive highly inefficient g cars pay additional fees consumers have different price elasticities and behavioral options to react to feebates they can switch to a smaller sized car but as energy efficiency varies widely within size segments they can also stick to the preferred size class and choose a more efficient smaller engine in addition previously owned cars influence the next car to be chosen we use an agent based microsimulation approach particularly suited to predict environmental and market effects of feebates heteorogenous agents choose from a choice set drawn from a detailed fleet of new cars incentives of 2000 for a labeled cars induce an additional rated co 2 emission decrease of new car registrations between 3 4 and 4 3 with co 2 abatement costs between 6 and 13 per ton and otherwise little undesired market disturbance the risk of rebound effects is estimated to be low after adopting the frequencies of consumer segments to a given country the model presented is applicable to all european car markets

political budget cycles and fiscally conservative voters abstract i test whether the political budget cycle depends on the level of fiscal conservatism among voters to this end i use data from a referendum to collect revealed preferences for fiscal conservatism i find that pre election spending is increased only if voters have a sufficiently low level of fiscal conservatism if voters are highly fiscally conservative incumbents even decrease spending before elections

economic targets and loss aversion in international environmental cooperation in the standard emission problem each countryi s ruling party decides on an optimal level of emissions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country however such policy decisions are often influenced by political partiesi incentives to be elected voters tend to give higher priority to economic issues than they do to environmental ones as a result political parties have additional incentives to reach a critical economic benefit level at a cost of higher emission level in order to satisfy votersi expectations in economic issues therefore this study explores the implications of political parties being averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining an international environmental agreement on emission levels in doing so we allow countries to have asymmetric concerns about economic targets as well as asymmetric technology levels we find that stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could jointly sustain furthermore technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact these results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects

why cooperate public goods economic power and the montreal protocol this paper develops a correlated probit model to describe dichotomous choices that may contain a public goods component or some other forms of interdependency the key contribution of the paper is to formulate tests for interdependent behavior among agents in particular we examine the decisions by nations whether or not to ratify the montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer specifically we reject free riding as a motive for not ratifying the protocol and we find little evidence that individual nations were influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners hence the data suggest that with respect to the montreal protocol most nations acted without regard for the actions of other nations

the participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty a spatial probit analysis abstract this paper represents treaty participation as a two stage game for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages this spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages when the procedure is applied to the helsinki protocol we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized

economic targets and loss aversion in international environmental cooperation economic targets in environmental coopeartion in the standard emission problem each country s ruling party decides on an optimal level of emissions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country however such policy decisions are often influenced by political parties incentives to be elected voters tend to give higher priority to economic issues than they do to environmental ones as a result political parties have additional incentives to reach a critical economic benefit level at a cost of higher emission level in order to satisfy voters expectations in economic issues therefore this study explores the implications of political parties being averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining an international environmental agreement on emission levels in doing so we allow countries to have asymmetric concerns about economic targets as well as asymmetric technology levels we find that stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could jointly sustain furthermore technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact these results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects

the impact of tax reform on new car purchases in ireland we examine the impact of recent tax reforms in ireland on private car transport and its greenhouse gas emissions a carbon tax was introduced on fuels and purchase vehicle registration and ownership motor taxes were switched from engine size to potential emissions we use a demographic model of the car stock by age size and fuel and a car purchase model that reflects the heterogeneous distribution of mileage and usage costs across various engine sizes the model shows a dramatic shift from petrol to diesel cars particularly for large engines the same pattern is observed in the latest data on car sales this has a substantial impact on tax revenue as car owners shift to the lower tax rates the tax burden has shifted from car ownership to car use and that the overall tax burden on private car transport falls as diesel engines are more fuel efficient than petrol engines carbon dioxide emissions fall modestly or if we consider the rebound effect of travel costs on mileage minimally from the perspective of the revenue the costs per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided are very high

political budget cycles and the civil service evidence from highway spending in us states abstract we study political budget cycles in infrastructure spending that are conditional on bureaucratic organization bureaucrats can facilitate or hinder politicians ability to engage in voter friendly spending around elections to test this idea we use civil service reforms undertaken by us states in the second half of the 20th century to study political budget cycles in highway spending under civil service and patronage we find that under patronage highway spending is 12 higher in election years and 9 higher in the year before an election by contrast under civil service highway spending is essentially smooth over the electoral cycle these findings provide a novel way through which civil service rules can stabilize government activity

seeing the forest through the trees a meta analysis of political budget cycles despite a vast number of articles the political budget cycle literature contains many conflicting theories and empirical results i conduct the first ever meta analysis of this literature in order to establish whether a link between elections and government budgets exists using data on 1198 estimates across 88 studies published between 2000 and 2015 i find evidence of a statistically significant yet substantively small increase in government expenditures and public debt around elections and reductions in revenues and fiscal balance using meta regression analysis combined with bayesian model averaging i find support for some of the context conditional theories in the literature although the findings of political budget cycles are robust to publication bias as well as some of the methodological and study specific choices authors are forced to make they also shed light on how certain decisions may affect a study s findings this has implications for current and future research on political budget cycles

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

exploring the nature of inter country interactions in the process of ratifying international environmental agreements the case of the kyoto protocol international environmental agreements require negotiation and cooperation among countries this paper attempts to analyze the presence and nature of inter country interactions in the process of ratifying such agreements we develop a theoretical argument based on the notions of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity and study the interactions among three different peer types geographic neighbors trading partners and green investment projects partners in our case clean development mechanism projects partners we test for the presence of interactions by taking into account a temporal dimension which constitutes a methodological contribution to this end we introduce spatially lagged endogenous variables into a parametric survival model and apply the proposed framework to the kyoto protocol ratification process our data sample covers 164 countries for the period 1998 to 2009 we find evidence that while countries ratification decisions are basically strategic substitutes they become strategic complements once we focus on the ratification decisions of specific peers

the market impact and the cost of environmental policy evidence from the swedish green car rebate we quantify the effects of the swedish gcr a program to reduce oil dependence and greenhouse gas emissions in the automobile industry we find the gcr to increase the market shares of green cars and its cost to be 109 tonco2 saved thus 5 times the price of an emission permit since the main green cars in sweden are ffvs flexible fuel vehicles which can switch between petrol gasoline and ethanol we also account for fuel choice which increases the cost of the program finally we show that consumers would have purchased ffvs regardless of the rebate provided by the gcr

political cycles in a developing economy effect of elections in indian states the author studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of india from 1960 to 1996 she identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls she contrasts two levers of policy manipulation fiscal policy and public service delivery to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles the predictions of three models are tested 1 populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters 2 signaling models with asymmetric information 3 a moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents the empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes a positive effect on investment spending but no effect on deficits primarily because consumption spending is reduced with regard to public service delivery elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments strikingly the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads the author argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information she explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicians to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works

are elections debt brakes evidence from french municipalities we show that voters are fiscal conservatives although in the long run only while the average over the mandate level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection pre election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection as the negative impact becomes larger as the debt level becomes higher it compensates for the short run effect elections thus appear as a disciplining device even if a weak one

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

distributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile abstractdistributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile regional studies this paper analyzes the influence of electoral concerns on investment distribution from the central government to chilean municipalities drawing upon panel data it shows that investment is mediated by pork barrel and political budget cycles as well as favouring the relatively better off areas estimations also reveal that resources are channelled to the municipalities where the vote margin in local elections is larger whereas national results are not relevant indicating that local governments lobbying capacity is prioritized over national electoral interests based on these results the implications for regional governance and for reducing the margin of arbitrary allocations are discussed

a presumptive pigovian tax complementing regulation to mimic an emissions fee if regulations are used to make cars and fuels cleaner should gasoline taxes be used to manage demand for trips that pollute anaysis of a well composed program for mexico city indicates that the emission reductions would cost 24 percent more if a tax on gasoline was not introduced a simple analytical framework is developed to analyze the use of abatement requirements to make cars cleaner and a gasoline tax to economize on the use of cars the two instruments should be combined to mimic the incentives that would have beeen provided by an emissions fee thus cleaner cars and fewer trips are analogous to competing suppliers of emission reductions the planner should buy from both so that marginal costs are equal applying that rule the marginal cost of emission reductions is simply the gasoline tax rate divided by emissions per liter

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted

how a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy this paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators the firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy in equilibrium no one vote may be decisive so each legislator who seeks the firm s investment votes for the policy though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy and when votes reveal information about the district the firm s implicit promise or threat can be credible unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests

are there election cycles in wage agreements an analysis of german public employees in this article the possibility of nordhaus political wage cyclesin the west german public services during 1961 1965 is investigated since wage negotiations are centralized one might expect a systematicallyhigher wage increase shortly before a federal election a regression ofwage increases from 30 consecutive public sector pay contracts is run onan election variable and several additional explanatory variables thenull of no election influence is rejected for worker wage increases theestimated increase in wages due to an imminent election is predicted to bein the range of 2 5 to 3 percentage points

pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents despite the attention of scholars to that question the empirical results are mixed thus far the present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections i study the consequences of pork barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in slovakia between 2006 and 2018 finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection the same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years the effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are however moderated by municipal population more specifically a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas