altruistic egoistic and biospheric values in willingness to pay wtp for wildlife abstract we attempt to measure general attitudes and ethical beliefs towards preservation as well as the importance of each of the three considered value orientations biospheric egoistic and altruistic in wtp estimates in the present study we apply the gac scale to a contingent valuation exercise for the recovery of the common murre uria aalge in galicia spain up to now only a few studies in the field of environmental and ecological economics have analyzed value orientations under the environmental concern ec framework obtaining mixed results in the present work we conclude that ethical aspects affect the individuals decision making process and that value orientations play an important role in the pro environmental attitude formation these value orientations affect willingness to pay wtp estimates for environmental goods

collective action and group heterogeneity voluntary provision versus selective incentives several studies have concluded that heterogeneity within a group facilitates the initiation of collective action however a recent analysis found that heterogeneity can either facilitate or impede collective action depending on factors like the strength of the temptation to free ride reconciling these conclusions is difficult because the earlier studies assumed that public goods are provided voluntarily whereas the later analysis assumed that selective incentives like norms or laws can mandate cooperation i examine the link between group heterogeneity and collective action in three regimes voluntary systems in which actors make unrestricted decisions to participate in collective action compliance systems in which actors create and enforce norms that compel others to participate in public goods production and balanced systems in which actors can create and enforce compliance norms or oppose such norms the analysis reveals a complex link among group heterogeneity collective action and the type of regime by fostering the organization of previously atomized groups and weakening the cohesion of highsolidarity groups heterogeneity in contribution costs and valuation of the public good can reduce social power differentials

micro incentives and municipal behavior political decentralization and fiscal federalism in argentina and mexico summary this article analyzes the mixed results of political and fiscal decentralization in latin america by comparing taxing and spending policies in six cities in argentina and mexico consistent with previous studies we find that decentralization has been frustrated by overconcentration of power at the provincial level and large vertical fiscal imbalances though we characterize these as functional elements in a system of redistributive policy making that benefits a wide array of provincial and municipal actors we seek to add a new dimension to the literature by arguing that micro level incentives conditions and circumstances particular to specific places are more important determinants of municipal behavior than macro level structures those policy and institutional changes intended to make officials more responsive to local conditions federalism local elections intergovernmental transfers and own source revenues we conclude that the theory of decentralization relies on a flawed conception of the causal mechanisms that are hypothesized to create responsiveness in local officials

the ambiguous impact of inequality on local resource management abstract the impact of inequality on the ability of human groups to undertake successful collective action is investigated with special reference to overexploitation of common property resources in voluntary provision problems on the one hand inequality has an ambiguous impact on the feasibility of the efficient outcome even though better endowed agents contribute more to collective action in regulated settings on the other hand inequality tends to reduce the acceptability of available regulatory schemes and therefore to make collective action more difficult

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

conceptualising environmental collective action why gender matters this paper demonstrates how institutions for natural resource management such as community forestry groups which appear to be participative equitable and efficient can be found lacking on all three counts from a gender perspective it also examines possible gender differences in social networks values and motivations although there is little to suggest that women are inherently more conservationist than men the distinctness of women s social networks embodying prior experience of successful cooperation their higher dependence on these networks as also on the commons in general and their potentially greater group homogeneity relative to men could provide an important and largely ignored basis for organising sustainable environmental collective action the paper also outlines the factors that can constrain or facilitate women s participation in formal environmental management groups illustrative examples are drawn from rural south asia

partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector theory and evidence from norway this paper provides an empirical test of a principal tenet of fiscal federalism that spending discretion when granted to localities allows public good levels to adjust to suit local demands the test is based on a simple model of partial fiscal decentralization under which earmarking of central transfers for particular uses is eliminated allowing funds to be spent according to local tastes the greater role of local demand determinants following partial decentralization is confirmed by the paper s empirical results which show the effects of the 1986 norwegian reform

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

learning theory and the logic of critical mass the oliver marwell theory of critical mass is a prominent solution to the free rider problem that plagues collective action in large groups i reformulate the theory as a stochastic learning model in which cooperative responses are shaped by the social sanctions and cues generated by the responses of others this relaxes four assumptions in the original formulation that the actors are rational decisions are isolated events outcomes are deterministic and public goods have pure jointness of supply and collective profit computer simulations then show how adaptive actors become trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium and how they escape through attainment of critical mass start up problems arise from accommodation to social costs and not from low returns to early contributors as previously believed simulations also identify a new dilemma of group size and show why solidarity tends to emerge in response to crisis finally normative solidarity appears to be a consequence rather than cause of critical mass but may promote recovery from random deviance

ecological public functions and fiscal equalisation at the local level in germany abstract the concept of sustainability requires the acknowledgement and appropriate financing of ecological economic and social public functions at all levels of government whereas the significance of socio economic functions has a comparably long tradition in federal systems the respective consideration of ecological functions is still waiting to be fully realised the aim of this article is to analyse the roles fiscal federalism and fiscal instruments can play in addressing ecological public functions assigned to decentralised jurisdictions in federal systems for this purpose an investigation of intergovernmental fiscal relations and their significance for the local level is carried out by way of example for the federal republic of germany based on a status quo analysis of the various german fiscal equalisation laws at the local level the article presents options for systematically integrating neglected ecological functions and indicators into the existing legal framework the empirical analysis shows that end of the pipe and infrastructure related ecological functions are already strongly integrated by way of conditional grants however precautionary functions such as nature and resource conservation issues are still largely absent therefore a comprehensive consideration of ecological public functions in germany calls for the integration of nature conservation issues and respective indicators into the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations

growing state federal conflicts in environmental policy the role of market based regulation abstract in recent years cases in which state governments chose to override federal environmental regulation with tighter regulations of their own have become increasingly common even for pollutants that have substantial spillovers across states this paper argues that this change arose at least in part because of a shift in the type of regulation used at the federal level from command and control regulation toward more incentive based regulation under an incentive based federal regulation a state imposing a tighter regulation will bear only part of the additional cost and thus has more incentive to tighten regulation than it does under federal command and control this difference helps to explain observed patterns of regulation in addition it has implications for the choice of regulatory instruments for a pollutant that causes both local and spillover damage a federal pollution tax is likely to yield a more efficient outcome than federal command and control policy or a federal system of tradable permits

second generation fiscal federalism political aspects of decentralization and economic development summary this essay contributes to second generation fiscal federalism sgff which traces the implications of incentives created by political and fiscal institutions the approach explores how various forms of fiscal federalism work in the presence of political officials who rather than being benevolent social planners face various forms of political incentives the paper focuses on three sets of positive models first it explores self enforcing federalism that is how federal systems are held together given various tendencies for federal systems to become centralized or fall apart second it considers how specific political institutions such as democracy interact with decentralization finally it studies various political impediments to economic growth again highlighting the interaction with decentralization 2013 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

a theory of the critical mass i interdependence group heterogeneity and the production of collective action collective action usually depends on a critical mass that behaves differently from typical group members sometimes the critical mass provides some level of the good for others who do nothing wh

backward looking social control rational choice theorists stress the need for social control to overcome the free rider problem in collective action critics counter that mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement are themselves public goods that presume collective action rather than explain it in response heckathorn 1989 proposed an analytic solution based on hypocritical cooperation in which rational actors calculate the optimal allocation of resources between compliance with collective obligations and their enforcement i relax these forward looking behavioral assumptions and show how social control might evolve among backward looking pragmatists computers simulations test the ability of various sanctioning regimes to generate cooperation as well as resist stampedes that risk overcooperation and needless sacrifice external moral sanctions produce too little cooperation while internalized sanctions produce too much

protected areas local governments and strategic interactions the case of the icms ecologico in the brazilian state of parana various conservation initiatives have been implemented in developing countries with increasing involvement on the part of local governments a concern in entrusting decisions to local governments is that the effectiveness of the conservation instrument can be threatened by interactions among these local governments we examine this concern with respect to an ecological fiscal transfer mechanism the icms ecologico implemented in brazil in the early 1990 s in order to reduce biodiversity loss the mechanism enables states to reward municipalities for the creation and management of protected areas we describe this mechanism present a conceptual framework aimed at understanding the potential sources and consequences of interactions among local governments on the effectiveness of a decentralized mechanism aimed at promoting the creation of protected areas and propose an empirical application using a bayesian spatial tobit model our empirical investigation on the creation of protected areas in the state of parana between 2000 and 2010 reveals strategic substitutability in municipalities conservation decisions this finding also leads us to discuss the issue of identification of a negative spatial lag coefficient when there is a positive spatial error correlation

a macroeconomic model with a financial sector this paper studies a macroeconomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents we pursue four sets of results i the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes as volatility spikes agents precautionary motive increases depressing prices even further log linear approximations fail to capture these non linear effects that can cause economies to be significantly depressed for long periods of time ii endogenous risk during volatile episodes increases asset price correlations iii financial experts impose a negative externality on each other and on the labor sector by not maintaining adequate capital cushion and funding structure iv while risk sharing within the financial sector through securitization and derivatives contracts reduces many inefficiencies it can also amlify systemic risks

the emergence of generalized exchange the existence of generalized exchange characterized by unilateral resource giving has been a puzzle when we assume rational actors because free riding can occur this article first identifies pure generalized exchange in which each actor gives resources to the recipient s of his choice then it proposes the fairness based selective giving strategy an actor adopting this strategy selects a recipient whose behaviors satisfy her criterion of fairness provided perfect information is given the results of evolutionary simulation show that pure generalized exchange can emerge among egoists without collective norms even in societies in which individuals have information only about their immediate neighbors

strikebreaking or solidarity in the great steel strike of 1919 a split labor market game theoretic and qca analysis split labor market theory provides insight into the development of ethnic and racial antagonism but has failed to address interracial solidarity and has tended to ignore the role of the state the authors modify heckathorn s formal model of collective action to derive predictions concerning the possibility of interracial solidarity or strikebreaking given split labor market conditions predictions are then examined using qualitative comparative analysis for 16 northern cities that participated in the 1919 steel strike results show that interracial solidarity developed in cities that had strong local union organizations and nonrepressive governments while black strikebreaking emerged in cities with higher proportions of recent black migrants and either repressive local governments or weak unions

inequality and inefficiency in joint projects a group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable the output is divided according to some given vector of shares a share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs when the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable and all other vectors can be improved via lorenz domination for higher elasticities of substitution perfect equality is no longer unimprovable our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action

the long run information effect of central bank communication abstract why do long run interest rates respond to central bank communication whereas existing explanations imply a common set of signals drives short and long run yields we show that news on economic uncertainty can have increasingly large effects along the yield curve to evaluate this channel we use the publication of the bank of england s inflation report from which we measure a set of high dimensional signals the signals that drive long run interest rates do not affect short run rates and operate primarily through the term premium this suggests communication plays an important role in shaping perceptions of long run uncertainty

financial intermediaries and liquidity creation trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets these securities which can arise endogenously have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents bank debt deposits is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content high grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples implying that a money market mutual fund based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits

coping with the tragedy of the commons game structure and design of rules the paper provides an assessment of some recent results of the large amount of new institutional economics analyses investigating a common pool resource setting with a specific focus on game theory models most of the studies have used a non cooperative approach in order to explain how under provision for the resource or its over use the so called tragedy of the commons can be avoided within given management rules they show how the characteristics of the game payoff matrix repetition or of the users group size wealth heterogeneity and moral norms may give incentives for the latter to play in a way that benefits all users by contrast much fewer articles have used a formalized approach to assess the possibility for players to design new rules to overcome the initial tragedy of the commons the article ends with some proposals of directions for future research

federalism as a commitment to reserving market incentives the authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures the salient features of federalism decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition help provide credible commitment or these purposes in addition the authors suggest that some federalism are self sustaining

learning to cooperate stochastic and tacit collusion in social exchange the prisoner s dilemma formalizes the social trap that arises when individually rational choices aggregate with mutually undesirable consequences the game theoretic solution centers on the opportunity for tacit collusion in repeated play however not all actors grasp the strategic implications of future interaction accordingly this study reformulates the game as a stochastic learning model in which the behavior of interdependent actors is constinually shaped by sanctions and cues generated by their interaction computer simulations of a two person game show that adaptive actors are led into a social trap more readily than are fully rational actors but they are also better at finding their way out prosocial norms appear to be a consequence rather than cause of cooperation but useful in promoting forgiveness of random deviance the model is then elaborated as an n way prisoner s dilemma simulations show how the effects of network size density mobility and anonymity derive from a fundamental princi

a model of capital and crises we develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in determining asset prices the model is cast within a dynamic general equilibrium economy and the role for intermediation is derived endogenously based on optimal contracting considerations low intermediary capital reduces the risk bearing capacity of the marginal investor we show how this force helps to explain patterns during financial crises the model replicates the observed rise during crises in sharpe ratios conditional volatility correlation in price movements of assets held by the intermediary sector and fall in riskless interest rates

the deposits channel of monetary policy we propose and test a new channel for the transmission of monetary policy we show that when the fed funds rate increases banks widen the interest spreads they charge on deposits and deposits ow out of the banking system we present a model in which imperfect competition among banks gives rise to these relationships an increase in the nominal interest rate increases banks market power inducing them to increase deposit spreads and hence restrict deposit supply households respond to the increase in deposit prices by substituting from deposits into less liquid but higheryielding assets consequently changes in the nominal interest rate aect banks cost of capital and lending using branch level data on the universe of u s banks we show that following an increase in the fed funds rate deposit spreads increase by more and supply falls more in areas with less deposit competition we control for changes in banks lending opportunities by comparing branches of the same bank we control for changes in macroeconomic conditions by showing that deposit spreads widen immediately after a rate change and even if this change is fully anticipated our results imply that monetary policy has a signicant impact on how the nancial system is funded on the quantity of safe and liquid assets it produces and on its provision of loans to the real economy

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

decentralization effects in ecological fiscal transfers a bayesian structural time series analysis for portugal portugal has a unitary system in which the central government transfers funds to lower government levels for their public functions in 2007 portugal introduced ecological fiscal transfers eft where municipalities receive transfers for hosting protected areas pa we study whether introducing eft in portugal incentivized municipalities to designate pa and has led to a decentralization of conservation decisions we employ a bayesian structural time series approach to estimate the effect of introducing eft in comparison to a simulated counterfactual time series quantitative results show a significant increase in the ratio of municipal and national pa designations following portugal s eft introduction which we infer to be a causal consequence the analysis furthermore places emphasis on the importance of relevant municipal conservation competencies for the functioning of the instrument results have important implications for conservation policy making in terms of allocating budgets and competencies in multi level governments

the paradox of group size in collective action a theory of the critical mass ii many sociologists incorrectly believe that larger groups are less likely to support collective action than smaller ones the effect of group size infact depends on costs if the costs of collective goods rise with the number who share in them larger groups act less frequently than smaller ones if the costs vary little with group size larger groups should exhibit more collective action than smaller ones because larger groups have more resources and are more likely to have a critical mass of highly interested and resourceful actors the positive effects of group size increase with group heterogeneity and nonrandom social ties paradoxically when groups are hetero geneous fewer contributors may be needed to provide a good to larger groups making collective action less complex and less expensive

determinants and benefits of household level participation in rural drinking water projects in india abstract using data from households in 45 villages in rural india this paper finds that wealth literacy household and village size are often determinants of two measures of participation in community based development projects meeting attendance and capital cost contributions using propensity score matching this study concludes that participation leads to benefits for the households that participate although these benefits are strongest in regions with higher levels of overall participation this study finds no evidence of elite capture with both poor and wealthy households benefiting from their participation

monetary policy as financial stability regulation this paper develops a model that speaks to the goals and methods of financialstability policies there are three main points first from a normative perspective the model defines the fundamental market failure to be addressed namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an externality in which intermediaries issue too much short term debt and leave the system excessively vulnerable to costly financial crises second it shows how in a simple economy where commercial banks are the only lenders conventional monetary policy tools such as open market operations can be used to regulate this externality while in more advanced economies it may be helpful to supplement monetary policy with other measures third from a positive perspective the model provides an account of how monetary policy can influence bank lending and real activity even in a world where prices adjust frictionlessly and there are other transactions media besides bank created money that are outside the control of the central bank

intermediary asset pricing abstract we model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary intermediaries face an equity capital constraint risk premia r

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

social networks and collective action a theory of the critical mass iii most analyses of collective action agree that overcoming the freerider problem requires organizing potential contributors thus making their decisions interdependent the potential for organizing depends on the social ties in the group particularly on the overall density or frequency of ties on the extent to which they are centralized in a few individuals and on the costs of communicating and coordinating actions through these ties mathematical analysis and computer simulations extend a formal microsocial theory of interdependent collective action to treat social networks and organization costs as expected the overall density of social ties in a group improves its prospects for collective action more significant because less expected are the findings that show that the centralization of network ties always has a positive effect on collective action and that the negative effect of costs on collective action declines as the group s resource or interest heterogeneity increases these nonobvious resu

can decentralization be beneficial abstract a conventional justification for government hierarchy in the fiscal federalism literature is based upon asymmetry in policy tools or in information access that is available to different levels of government this paper demonstrates that even if these asymmetries are eliminated addition of local regional governments to a one tier central government can be strictly welfare improving

motives behind willingness to pay for improving biodiversity in a water ecosystem economics ethics and social psychology this paper reports on empirical work extending the standard economic approach to valuation by including psychological and philosophical factors more specifically a contingent valuation method survey was applied to biodiversity improvement while simultaneously assessing rights based beliefs consequentialism and the theory of planned behaviour the latter was assessed using measures of attitudes subjective norms and perceptions of control over willingness to pay the results show that standard socio economic explanatory variables are far inferior to those of social psychology and philosophy and that these factors offer a better understanding of the motives behind responses to contingent valuation the implication is that alternative means of measuring an individual s pluralistic values should be taken into account in order to assess the validity and meaning of willingness to pay

running for the exit community cohesion and bank panics bank panics attract scholarly interest because they reflect distrust of each bank that experiences a run as a result of diffusion of information rumors about such bank runs trigger additional runs elsewhere however the contagion of bank runs is highly selective for reasons that are unrelated to the financial strength of the individual banks this presents a puzzle that extant theories on institutions and reputations cannot fully explain to solve this puzzle we turn to the characteristics of the community in which the banks operate we develop theory on how communities with diverse affiliation structures and economic inequality have weaker community cohesion and communication making such communities less likely to experience widespread distrust and hence bank runs we test hypotheses on the effects of community ethnic diversity national origin diversity religious diversity and wealth inequality using data from the great bank panic of 1893 and we find strong community effects on bank runs these f

margin based asset pricing and deviations from the law of one price in a model with heterogeneous risk aversion agents facing margin constraints we show how securities required returns increase in both their betas and their margin requirements negative shocks to fundamentals make margin constraints bind lowering risk free rates and raising sharpe ratios of risky securities especially for high margin securities such a funding liquidity crisis gives rise to bases that is price gaps between securities with identical cash flows but different margins in the time series bases depend on the shadow cost of capital which can be captured through the interest rate spread between collateralized and uncollateralized loans and in the cross section they depend on relative margins we test the model empirically using the credit default swap bond bases and other deviations from the law of one price and use it to evaluate central banks lending facilities jel g01 g12 g13 e44 e50 the paramount role of funding constraints becomes particularly salient during liquidity crises with the one that started in 2007 being an excellent case in point banks unable to fund their operations closed down and the funding problems spread to other investors such as hedge funds that relied on bank funding therefore traditional liquidity providers became forced sellers interest rate spreads increased dramatically treasury rates dropped sharply and central banks stretched their balance sheets to facilitate funding these funding problems had significant asset pricing effects the most extreme example being the failure of the law of one price loop securities with nearly

beggar thy neighbor testing for free riding in state level endangered species expenditures an important public policy question that remains unresolved iswhether devolution will enhance sensible policy making byexploiting informational asymmetries or instead trigger a beggar thy neighbor response and stimulate free ridingamongst localities we analyze this question within theframework of u s environmental policymaking by scrutinizing aunique panel data set on state level endangered speciesexpenditure patterns our empirical estimates are consistentwith the notion that states free ride which may lead to anexpenditure equilibrium that is not pareto efficient

second generation fiscal federalism the implications of fiscal incentives abstract first generation fiscal federalism fgff studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners second generation fiscal federalism sgff studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials the paper focuses on three aspects of sgff first it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers while fgff emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity sgff emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity sgff extends fgff approaches by showing how non linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth second the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies third the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism

economic appraisal of profitability and sustainability of peri urban agriculture in bangkok abstract promoters of urban and peri urban agriculture generally stress its positive role in terms of food security income employment and improvement of the urban environment unfortunately competition with agricultural and non agricultural uses of peri urban farm land often translates into intensive farming systems that are detrimental to the environment based on two original surveys of peri urban farms in the area of bangkok this paper ranks four cropping systems fish shrimp rice and fruits according to their economic profitability a second step of the analysis aims at taking into account the cost of water into the analysis so as to assess whether the hierarchy formerly established is modified although all environmental costs are not introduced and environmental benefits are ignored this work paves the way for further research in the area of taking into account the environmental impact of farming activities

rollover risk and market freezes the debt capacity of an asset is the maximum amount that can be borrowed using the asset as collateral we model a sudden collapse in the debt capacity of good collateral we assume short term debt that must be frequently rolled over a small transaction cost of selling collateral in the event of default and a small probability of meeting a buy to hold investor we then show that a small change in the asset s fundamental value can be associated with a catastrophic drop in the debt capacity the kind of market freeze observed during the crisis of 2007 to 2008 one of the many striking features of the crisis of 2007 to 2008 was the sudden freeze in the market for the rollover of short term debt from an in stitutional perspective the inability to borrow overnight against high quality but long term assets was a market failure that effectively led to the demise of a substantial part of investment banking in the united states more broadly it led to the collapse in the united states the united kingdom and other countries of banks and other financial institutions that had relied on signifi cant maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities and in particular on the rollover of short term wholesale debt in the asset backed commercial paper abcp and overnight sale and repurchase repo markets in this paper we are interested in developing a model of a sudden collapse in the ability to borrow short term against long lived assets in the absence of obvious problems of asymmetric information or fears about the value of col lateral we refer to this phenomenon as a market freeze more precisely a market freeze occurs when the debt capacity the maximum amount of collat eralized borrowing that can be supported by an asset is a small fraction of the fundamental value the economic value measured by the net present value npv of the stream of future returns an extreme form of a market freeze occurs when the fundamental value is close to the maximum possible value of the asset whereas the debt capacity is close to the minimum possible value of the asset

when does one bad apple spoil the barrel an evolutionary analysis of collective action this paper studies collective action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork a leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players quantal response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails a full characterization of long run play reveals the determinants of success these include the correlation between players costs of provision and their valuations for the good the addition of an extra bad apple player can spoil the barrel by destabilizing successful teams and so offers a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

public open space conservation under a budget constraint abstract this paper analyzes the fiscal and land value impacts of public open space conservation in a budget constrained city it derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for open space conservation to increase the level of municipal services and the total land value within the city the theoretical results together with the empirical evidence found in the literature suggest that open space conservation can increase the level of municipal services and total land value in a significant share of american cities even if it generates no amenities open space conservation will likely increase total land values and municipal services in metropolitan areas that have stringent land use regulations high development densities and relatively little open space but will likely reduce municipal services and total land values in small lightly regulated cities surrounded by rural land and fiscally constrained in providing essential public goods h4 r3 q2

does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs evidence from bolivia this paper examines whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment to local needs using a unique database from bolivia empirical tests show that investment patterns in human capital and social services changed significantly after decentralization these changes are strongly and positively related to objective indicators of need nationally these changes were driven by the smallest poorest municipalities investing devolved funds in their highest priority projects the findings contradict common claims that local government is too corrupt institutionally weak or prone to interest group capture to improve upon central government s allocation of public resources d 2002 published by elsevier b v

the differential impact of user heterogeneity in resource management a case study from india abstract this paper analyses the heterogeneous users decision to participate in co management which is an institutional alternative proposed in the wake of state s failure in managing the cochin estuarine fisheries in kerala india since a collective action under co management require not only user s active participation in terms of their labor but also involve various types of organizational and managerial costs the users were given the following choices on co operation firstly the users had the choice to contribute their labor in conservation activities which would ensure sustainability of the fisheries secondly they could make a voluntary contribution towards meeting the organizational costs of collective action thirdly they could contribute in terms of labor as well as in monetary terms finally they had the choice not to participate at all keeping in view the problems of free rider and the chances for adoption of strategic behavior by users some incentives were given for each of the above ways of co operation a multinomial logit analysis of the decision of about 369 sample fishermen to participate in co management as defined above shows the differential impact of user heterogeneity in resource management while heterogeneity in terms of the present legal status of the users motivate them for contributing their labor even in the absence of any additional economic incentives heterogeneity in economic status and membership in formal organizations matters when it comes to making monetary payments in addition to these the overall optimism of the users motivates them to both physically engage in conservation activities as well as make monetary payments adoption of strategic behaviors by at least some users cannot however be ruled out on the whole it is seen that the heterogeneous fishermen s decision to participate depends upon their anticipation of the distribution of benefits from co operation however one must be cautious that those who anticipate disproportionate benefit from co operation are likely to take a lead role therefore care must be taken to prevent them from deciding the rules of the game in such a manner that they are disproportionately in their favor

compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers the case of india this paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in india especially we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods illustrations are also provided for india