duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross market price constraints abstract we examine how universal service provisions and price restrictions across markets impact strategic entry and pricing we develop a simple multi market model with an oligopolistic profitable urban market and entry auctions for unprofitable rural service cross market price restrictions induce a firm operating in both markets to become a softer competitor thus placing the firm at a strategic disadvantage when we account for entry incentives and strategic bidding the downstream strategic disadvantage becomes advantageous leading to higher prices and profits price restrictions may also put outside firms even relatively inefficient ones at a strategic advantage

how does income inequality affect market outcomes in vertically differentiated markets the distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer s willingness to pay depends on his income this paper computes the shaked and sutton 1982 model for a general specification of consumers income distribution to investigate the effect of inequality on firms entry product quality and pricing decisions the main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants this is due to the elasticity of consumer demand for quality being higher in more inegalitarian economies more intense quality competition among firms causes them to locate their products in higher ranges of the quality spectrum closer to each other decreasing the degree of product differentiation competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices however when income inequality is very high the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market and the low price elasticity of demand of these consumers allows him to charge a higher price the conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation price level industry concentration and consumer welfare

efficiency aspects of increasing inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes this article tries to shed some light on the economic efficiency aspects of a tax reform that would increase inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes an analysis of labour market decisions following the activation of such a reform is presented an international comparison of inheritance tax collection shows that almost all industrial countries impose an inheritance tax however government revenue from inheritance and gift taxes in europe is lower than 1 of gdp and is very low in the united states as well applying the proposed reform could increase work hours and delay retirement decisions

judo economics in markets with asymmetric firms abstract i study a market entry game with price competition and perfectly substitutable products limiting the initial capacity judo economics is a plausible entry strategy i show that under asymmetry in production cost or product quality capacity limitation can become obsolete

minimum quality standards with more than two firms abstract this paper studies the effects of introducing a minimum quality standard mqs in a vertically differentiated market it is shown that previous results indicating beneficial effects of a mqs heavily depend on the duopolistic set up they had been developed in an example with three firms is then provided showing that not all reaction functions in quality levels are increasing we also show that the introduction of the standard decreases the profit levels of all firms the maximum quality level and the average quality consumed as a consequence despite the increase in consumer surplus any effective mqs would reduce welfare

country asymmetries endogenous product choice and the timing of trade liberalization abstract we analyze the effects of trade liberalization on firms decisions and profits in a vertical product differentiation model with countries which have different characteristics firms decide product specifications at the beginning of the game in which autarky is followed by trade liberalization whose date is anticipated our analysis suggests that a firm located in a large or rich country is the likely market leader at the trade equilibrium this outcome might be reversed if small country firms have a strong cost advantage transport costs are negligible or if the large country opens its market before the small one

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

bidimensional vertical differentiation in markets where product quality is important more than one characteristic is usually necessary for producers to define product quality standard theory maintains that i in a duopoly there will be a quality leader no matter whether the product can incorporate one or two vertical attributes ii differentiation pertains only to one attribute by contrast in our set up there are also equilibria where the quality leader is better in two attributes and others where there is cross leadership namely a situation where each firm designs a product to dominate the other in one characteristic applications to minimum quality standards and tax subsidy on quality products are sketched showing spill over effects from one to the other quality dimension

optimal pricing and quality choice when investment in quality is irreversible this paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product risk neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry it is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand in a stackelberg leader follower game the leader and follower pre commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty in this case the leader produces the higher quality good when uncertainty is higher than this threshold the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good

information goods vs industrial goods cost structure and competition we study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods as a result a monopoly will offer only a single product competition leads to highly concentrated information good markets with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects we study how the structure of the firms cost functions drives our results this paper was accepted by barrie r nault information systems

optimal tax policy under environmental quality competition this paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality the first best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax or a subsidy for buying green products the first best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality regardless of environmentally conscious consumers if only one instrument is available the second best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality a uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough

a comparison of lag length selection techniques in tests of granger causality between money growth and inflation evidence for the us 1959 86 this paper employs the granger test to examine the causal relationship between growth in the money supply and inflation for the us over the period 1959 to 1986 alternative procedures including bo

growth effects of flat rate taxes recent estimates of the potential growth effects of tax reform vary wildly ranging from zero to eight percentage points using an endogenous growth model we assess which model features and parameter values are important for determining the quantitative impact of tax reform we find that the critical parameters are factor shares depreciation rates the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the elasticity of labor supply the elasticities of substitution in production on the other hand are relatively unimportant the quantitative estimates in several recent papers are compared with each other and with some of the evidence from u s experience we find that robert lucas s conclusion that tax reform would have little or no effect on the u s growth rate is theoretically robust and consistent with the evidence

credence goods misleading labels and quality differentiation due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation we examine how consumers overestimation of the quality of intermediate quality products affects firms incentives to improve product quality the firms non cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity irrespective of the nature of second stage competition bertrand or cournot we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate quality firm and motivates it to raise its product s quality in response the high quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit overall average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves which raises consumer surplus social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities

environmental tax in a green market we examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices the unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed we show that the emission tax improves welfare thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation the higher the marginal environmental damage is the higher the optimal tax will be the optimal tax however becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large finally when marginal environmental damage is not too low the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly

does demand for product quality increase worker training abstract we uniquely examine the relationship between firm organized training and the sensitivity of consumer demand to product quality cross section panel fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates confirm that british workplaces provide more intensive training when their product demand is more sensitive to product quality robustness checks including using alternative key variable definitions and a counterfactual analysis examining the importance of competing on price support this confirmation

dynamics of government revenues and expenditures in industrial economies the sources of growth in government revenues and expenditures in 22 oecd countries is addressed the question of whether the revenue constraint is binding on the growth of government expenditures or whether the displacement effect of expenditure growth is binding is considered controls for the effects of the output gap and inflation rate on government revenues and expenditures in each of the 22 countries are presented a major conclusion is that reductions in spending are essential to reducing budget deficits and controlling government size

environmental policy in a green market this paper studies the impact of some frequently used environmental policies in a duopolistic market where purchasers are willing to pay more for less polluting goods when consumers differ in their environmental awareness a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist in equilibrium the higher the average willingness to pay for the good the lower are variants unit emissions but the higher are industrial aggregate effluents a maximum unit emission standard reduces unit emissions of both variants but boosts firms sales and consequently increases industrial aggregate emissions as a result social welfare may be reduced we also explore the effects of technological subsidies and product charges including differentiation of charges

workers skills product quality and industry equilibrium in this paper we develop a model of a vertically differentiated industry where the production of higher quality goods needs a higher fraction of specialized labour in the first stage firms choose the quality of their products in the second both good prices and skilled workers wages are determined we show that in duopoly though supplying different variants of the product firms tend to cluster either at the bottom or at the top of the quality ladder depending on skilled labour availability this switch in equilibrium qualities creates a discontinuous behaviour for the wage rate of skilled workers when the supply of skilled labour is made endogenous two equilibria are simultaneously possible one with low skill low quality the other with high skill high quality

quality and quantity competition in a multiproduct duopoly author affiliation yi ling cheng ylcheng thu edu twshin kun peng speng econ sinica edu tw acknowledgment we are most grateful to three anonymous referees who generously offered a number of insightful comments to improve this article we have also benefited much from fruitful discussions with takatoshi tabuchi hong hwang and toshihiro matsumura which led to significant improvements in this article we are especially indebted to takatoshi tabuchi for his contributive comments and suggestions finally we would like to thank conference participants at 2010 association for public economic theory in istanbul society for the advancement of economic theory in singapore as well as seminar participants at institute of economics academia sinica and national taiwan university financial support from academia sinica and the national science council taiwan is gratefully acknowledged the usual disclaimer applies 1 introductionmost of the literature dealing with vertical product differentiation such as bonanno 1986 and motta 1993 assumes that each firm can produce only one product however multiproduct firms abound in the real world firms in various industries produce multiple quality differentiated goods for example mercedes benz provides three different classes of sedans namely its c class e class and s class and bmw has its 3 series 5 series and 7 series in addition both lenovo and sony supply around 20 kinds of laptops ranked in accordance with their central processing units and outfits 1a casual survey of the empirical evidence also suggests that any two multiproduct oligopolies usually differentiate the qualities of their products and the patterns of their quality differentiation can be classified into the segmented type and the nonsegmented type the former type implies that the products of one firm are always of higher quality and more highly priced than those of the other firm such as the sedans of bmw and honda all the sedans sold by bmw are more expensive and of higher quality than those of honda the latter type denotes completely different patterns where the products produced by the two firms have interlacing patterns of their prices qualities for example the prices of the mercedes benz c e and s classes are respectively 32 900 52 700 and 87 800 while the prices of bmw s 3 5 and 7 series are given as 33 600 45 800 and 80 300 respectively 2 the prices of their sedans are interlaced and it is inferred that their qualities are interlaced and nonsegmented other examples include the whiskey offered by johnnie walker and edrington and the plasma televisions provided by samsung and sony the nonsegmented patterns of differentiation between the multiproduct firms with similar technological capabilities are very common in reality however the related literature has not shed enough light studying them while the segmented type of quality differentiation has been characterized by champsaur and rochet 1989 1990 with a quality then price competition of multiproduct duopolists the nonsegmented one so far has not been captured and explained in the literature 3therefore this article intends to examine the equilibrium qualities as well as the number of products chosen by the multiproduct firms with identical similar technological capabilities such as mercedes benz and bmw our main purpose is to characterize the patterns of vertical product differentiation and to reveal the properties of quality differentiation between them the contributive articles gal or 1983 de fraja 1996 johnson and myatt 2003 2006 examine a variety quality and quantity competition between multiproduct firms 4 gal or 1983 de fraja 1996 and johnson and myatt 2003 proposition 6 conclude that firms with equal technological capabilities will compete head to head by producing identical products qualities

environmental quality competition and taxation in the presence of green network effect among consumers we examine the impact of a green network effect in a market characterized by consumers environmental awareness and competition between firms in terms of both environmental quality and product prices the unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that an increase in the number of consumers of green brown product increases the satisfaction of each green brown consumer we show that paradoxically when the network effect of a green product is higher than that of a brown product this externality reduces product environmental quality and raises consumption of the green product conversely when the network effect of the brown product is higher the externality improves product environmental quality and raises consumption of the brown product in both cases the network effect does not affect the overall pollution level the externality correction requires the use of three optimal fiscal policies an ad valorem tax on products an emission tax and a subsidy or a tax on the green purchase a second best optimum can also be reached through the green taxation

on production costs in vertical differentiation models abstract we analyze the effects of the introduction of a unit production cost in a vertical differentiation model with fixed costs of quality improvement for a low high unit cost a rise in cost reduces increases product differentiation and prices

strategic choice of quality when quality is costly the persistence of the high quality advantage in a two firm two stage model of vertical product differentiation i show that for every convex fixed cost function of quality the firm that chooses the higher quality at the first stage earns the higher profits the result holds for the pure strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous quality game and it holds as well if firms choose their qualities in sequential order

is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation abstract not necessarily i consider two firms that compete both on the research market and on the product market assuming the product market outcome is ambiguous i e uncertainty is described by multiple distribution of outcomes i show that an increase in firms ambiguity aversion increases the ex ante likelihood that they invest in r d an increase in their risk aversion on the other hand decreases innovation the result holds when the innovation has a business stealing effect as in a cournot duopoly with vertical differentiation the key intuition is that ambiguity aversion exacerbates the competitive threat whereas risk aversion diminishes the profit incentive to invest in addition to showing that an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to more projects being pursued i show that an increase in ambiguity aversion can lead to an increase in investment for incremental projects in the case of more radical projects an increase in ambiguity aversion can but not necessarily lead to lower investment in equilibrium overall ambiguity aversion has a positive effect on most innovative projects but can sometimes have a negative effect on some of the more radical game changing ones

an instrumental variables approach to estimating tax revenue elasticities evidence from sub saharan africa this paper exploits the significant response of real gdp growth of sub saharan african countries to exogenous international commodity price and rainfall shocks to construct instrumental variables estimates of the tax revenue elasticity iv estimates yield that a 1 increase in gdp increases tax revenues by up to 2 5

sunk costs and trade liberalization a model of vertical product differentiation is applied to the study of trade between two countries of differing sizes firms in the small country choose lower quality products in autarky unlike a shaked and j sutton 1984 welfare effects of trade are fully analyzed and shown to depend on the degree of sunkness of costs if firms have not sunk costs losses from trade may arise for the small country in the short run when quality is fixed and for the large country in the long run when quality is variable if costs are sunk both countries always gain from trade copyright 1992 by royal economic society

autoregressive modelling and money income causality detection abstract a step wise procedure based on granger s concept of causality and abaike s final prediction error criterion is suggested as a practical means to identify the order of lags of each variable in a multivariate autoregressive process the model seems useful because it can serve as a reduced form formulation to avoid imposing often spurious or false restrictions of the model it also provides a reasonably powerful test of causality the idea is applied to u s postwar money and income data it is found that between m1 and gnp a bivariate feedback model fits the data best between m2 and gnp a one way causal model from money to income performs better diagnostic checks applied to our model seem to indicate the adequacy of our approach

dynamic pricing competition with strategic customers under vertical product differentiation we consider dynamic pricing competition between two firms offering vertically differentiated products to strategic customers who are intertemporal utility maximizers we show that price skimming arises as the unique pure strategy markov perfect equilibrium in the game under a simple condition our results highlight the asymmetric effect of strategic customer behavior on quality differentiated firms even though the profit of either firm decreases as customers become more strategic the low quality firm suffers substantially more than the high quality firm furthermore we show that unilateral commitment to static pricing by either firm generally improves profits of both firms interestingly both firms enjoy higher profit lifts when the high quality firm commits rather than when the low quality firm commits this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent s reaction toward market entrants this study widens the perspective from a firm s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation in each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels respectively and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor from the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high quality firms in our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high quality restaurant market in germany to test the theoretical findings while the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment

competition under generalized attraction models applications to quality competition under yield uncertainty we characterize the equilibrium behavior in a broad class of competition models in which the competing firms market shares are given by an attraction model and the aggregate sales in the industry depend on the aggregate attraction value according to a general function each firm s revenues and costs are proportional with its expected sales volume with a cost rate that depends on the firm s chosen attraction value according to an arbitrary increasing function whereas most existing competition papers with attraction models can be viewed as special cases of this general model we apply our general results to a new set of quality competition models here an industry has n suppliers of a given product who compete for the business of one or more buyers each of the suppliers encounters an uncertain yield factor with a given general yield distribution the buyers face uncertain demands over the course of a given sales season the suppliers compete by selecting key characteristics of their yield distributions either their means their standard deviations or both these choices have implications for their per unit cost rates

skimming the other s cream competitive effects of an asymmetric universal service obligation abstract we consider a common situation in energy markets an incumbent firm provides an essential good under ubiquity and uniform pricing requirements while competing in two part tariffs with an entrant providing a non essential substitute we find that consumers captivity to the essential good allows the incumbent to partly appropriate the surplus brought to the economy by the entrant surprisingly the ubiquity requirement induces more aggressive pricing by the incumbent below marginal cost and reduced entry despite cream skimming by the entrant far from being a burden universal service obligations might thus confer strategic advantages to incumbents

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality abstract in this paper we examine how the timing of investment affects the levels of quality chosen by firms we show that in a model with vertical quality differentiation a game with sequential quality choice induces both firms to make smaller quality investments than they would in a game with simultaneous quality choice furthermore we show that while aggregate profit is higher both consumer and social surplus are lower under sequential quality choice

a dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices abstract we develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyze the effects of competition on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level our model combines a differential game approach with a hotelling spatial competition framework and our analysis applies in particular to industries such as long term care health care child care and education if providers nursing homes hospitals schools nurseries use closed loop decision rules which imply strategic interaction over time we show that although increased competition leads to higher quality in the steady state quality provision is nevertheless lower than under open loop rules and also suboptimally low from a welfare perspective thus our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interaction between competing providers as a potential source of inefficiency in quality provision

the growth and variability of regional taxes an application to italy abstractthe growth and variability of regional taxes an application to italy regional studies this paper investigates the potential long term growth and short term cyclical stability of the italian regional tax system short and long run elasticities with respect to regional gross domestic product gdp are estimated between 2001 and 2012 for the surtax on central personal income tax rpit and for the regional tax on productive activities rtpa cyclical reactions are more marked for the rtpa and higher in the southern regions significant long run growth of the rpit and rtpa on the other hand is found only in the northern regions the results suggest that the behaviour of regional taxes may increase the italian north south gap and cast some doubt on these taxes in financing essential public services such as health in each region

equilibrium vertical differentiation in a bertrand model with capacity precommitment both quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition however their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed in this article we consider a three stage game in which firms choose quality then commit to capacity and finally compete in price when the cost of quality is negligible we show that firms do not differentiate their products in a subgame perfect equilibrium in other words capacity precommitment completely eliminates the incentive to differentiate by quality

national treatment at the wto the roles of product and country heterogeneity this paper analyzes the world trade organization s wto s national treatment nt clause in a two country model where quality of goods and or market size are heterogenous across countries when market size is symmetric across countries a reciprocal nt agreement i benefits the high quality country ii hurts the low quality country and iii delivers higher aggregate world welfare however such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high quality country s market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small i e goods are sufficiently alike the qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

a comment on a model of vertical product differentiation in a duopoly model with vertical differentiation if the firms do not cover the market the lower quality firm chooses a quality level exactly 4 7 of that of the higher quality firm and chooses a price that is 2 7 of the price of the higher quality firm copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentation in a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown under certain regularity conditions that if the demand structure is symmetric and bertrand and cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in cournot than in bertrand competition and as n grows both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least 1n if bertrand reaction functions slope upwards and are continuous then even with an asymmetric demand structure given any cournot equilibrium price vector one can find a bertrand equilibrium with lower prices in particular if the bertrand equilibrium is unique then it has lower prices than any cournot equilibrium

low quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with cournot competition abstract we model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains with the low quality firm taking the leader s role

on the economics of labels how their introduction affects the functioning of markets and the welfare of all participants are labels good or bad for consumers and firms the answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants this essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side effects in contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way we bring together the main results from all the relevant topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and model building techniques that underpin them the advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory we focus on quality labels and examine the impact of labeling on market structure the side effects of costly certification issues related to the label s trustworthiness the rationale for mandatory vs voluntary labeling the level at which the label s standard is set according to the agency that selects it the political economy of labels that is pro or anti label lobbying lobbying to affect the label s standard and lobbying in favor or against the label s mandatory imposition these topics cover a wide range of applications including genetically modified organism gmos organic produce geographic indicators controlled origin eco labels etc we conclude by identifying topics that require further research

economic growth and tax components an analysis of tax changes in oecd the paper examines empirically the changes in the tax mix of the oecd countries in response to economic growth from 1980 to 1999 it is found that economic growth measured by gdp per capita has had a significant effect on the tax mix of the oecd countries analysis reveals that different taxes respond differently to the growth of gdp per capita it is shown that while the shares of personal and property taxes have responded positively to economic growth shares of the payroll and goods and services taxes have shown a relative decline

quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice abstract in a vertical product differentiation model under cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long run quality for a quantity restriction at and in the neighborhood of the free trade import level average quality increases only when the low quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota voluntary export restraint the change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota the imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long run choice of quality

strategic it investments the impact of switching cost and declining it cost the declining cost of information technology it over time provides the later entrant in information intensive industries a cost advantage on the other hand the earlier entrant has the potential to build and retain its market share if consumers incur a cost in switching to the later entrant we investigate the impact of a decline in the it cost and the switching cost on it investment strategies of firms we find that a declining it cost always hurts the early entrant s profit the early entrant may assume an aggressive investment strategy or a defensive investment strategy in response to a decline in the it cost depending on whether the switching cost relative to the extent of decline in the it cost is high or low respectively a decline in it cost also hurts the later entrant s profit if the switching cost is high a surprising result is that when the decline in the it cost is higher than a critical value a higher switching cost increases consumer surplus when firms control the switching cost the early entrant increases its investment in quality and switching cost and maintains its quality and its market share leadership irrespective of the extent of decline in the it cost

imperfect price discrimination in a vertical differentiation model abstract we explore the competitive implications of third degree price discrimination based on consumer information of varying degrees of precision in a vertical differentiation duopoly model we show that if the cost of information is below a threshold only the high quality firm will acquire it and offer targeted promotions while the low quality firm will commit to a uniform price for any degree of consumer information precision equilibrium profits of the high quality firm are monotonically increasing and that of the low quality firm monotonically decreasing as a function of the consumer information precision finally social and consumer welfare are monotonically increasing with respect to the precision of consumer information

estimating the impact of anti dumping and anti cartel actions using intervention analysis intervention analysis is proposed as a method for estimating the effects of anti dumping actions in the presence of a domestic cartel data requirements and modelling effort compare favourably with traditional structural model approaches the method is applied to an antidumping action brought to the european commission and in which the european producers of the product were fined after an anti cartel action by the commission covering an overlapping period intervention analysis is applied to distinguish the effects of the anti dumping action from those of changes in cartel behaviour it has been argued that in the post uruguay round world anti dumping ad actions as with other contingent protection measures may become an instrument of choice in place of tariffs to restrict international trade messerlin and reed 1995 some reasons for this may be found in the political economy literature tharakan 1991 1995 where it is argued that such measures which are typically non transparent quasijudicial gatt legal and capable of being targeted at the level of an individual supplier may prove very tempting to both policymakers and those lobbying for protection if economists are to have an effective input to the debate on such measures then it is essential to be able to estimate the consequences of such protection preferably in a way that provides reasonable estimates without the need of onerous data or logistical requirements in this paper we propose a tractable time series based method that requires minimal data the unit value and volume of imports data series we illustrate the technique by reporting estimates of the costs to the united kingdom of the price undertaking that resulted from the successful ad action brought to the european commission in 1982 and directed at four japanese suppliers of polypropylene pp film the illustration is also of interest because a subset of those european pp producers bringing the ad action were the subject of an anti trust ruling that resulted in fines for collusive behaviour messerlin 1990 the anti cartel judgement covered the period during which the industry lodged the complaint of dumping and secured minimum price undertakings from thejapanese producers anti dumping actions in the european union may be resolved in favour of the complainants by the imposition of ad duties adds or more commonly by the foreign suppliers targeted in the actions voluntarily giving an under

economic growth and the expanding public sector a reexamination utilizing a granger causality approach the authors test whether there has been a causal rela tion between public sector growth and real economic growth rates for the oecd countries special emphasis is laid on feedback effects from economic growth to government growth that result from macroeconomic policy the authors find that government growth has had mixed effects on economic growth rates positive for some countries and negative f or others however for the majority of the oecd countries there was no discernable impact of government growth on the rate of real econo mic growth copyright 1988 by mit press

indirect competition with spatial product differentiation although two markets may appear to be separate sometimes one firm participates in both of them that firm provides a link between the two markets such a straddling firm transmits indirect competition from each market to the other since its actions reflect competitive conditions in both markets in a model of spatial product differentiation the author shows that indirect competition may make a market perform significantly better than the number of firms would indicate moreover total consumer surplus increases if two previously distinct markets are linked by a straddler finally the author considers implications of these results for antitrust analysis copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed we compare certification to a minimum quality standard mqs policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observe the quality of the offered goods compared to the unregulated outcome both profits and social welfare would increase if firms could commit to producing a higher quality an mqs restricts the firms quality choice and leads to less differentiated goods this fuels competition and may therefore deter entry a certification policy which awards firms with a certificate if the quality of their products exceeds some threshold does not restrict the firms quality choice in contrast to an mqs certification may lead to more differentiated goods and higher profits we find that firms are willing to comply with an ambitious certification standard if the share of informed consumers is small in that case certification is more effective from a welfare perspective than a minimum quality standard because it is less detrimental to entry

cross border travellers and parallel trade implications for asian economies this paper explores the impact of parallel trade in an export market by cross border travellers on welfare of the home country in a model with heterogeneous consumers perceptions we show that such parallel trade when it is organised trading always hurts the home country welfare however when parallel trade is unorganised trading it might benefit the home country welfare provided that the size of the export market is relatively small along these lines we suggest optimal policy responses in the home country to parallel trade by cross border travellers the results of the paper yield insightful policy implications for asian economies

the most favored nation pricing policy and negotiated prices previous work has viewed the most favored nation mfn contract as a practice capable of facilitating collusion among sellers but this paper shows that even a monopoly seller may gain by including the mfn provision in sales contracts we consider a case in which the seller negotiates price separately with each of two buyers by including a mfn clause in her contract with the first buyer the seller raises her cost of granting price concessions to the second buyer this increases the seller s bargaining strength with respect to the second buyer thereby helping her negotiate a higher price

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

add on pricing by asymmetric firms this paper uses an analytical model to examine the consequences of add on pricing when firms are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and there is a segment of boundedly rational consumers who are unaware of the add on fees at the time of initial purchase we find that consumers who know the add on fees can be penalized and increasingly so by the existence of boundedly rational consumers our consideration of quality asymmetries on base goods and add ons plus the inclusion of boundedly rational consumers leads to several novel findings regarding firm profits when quality asymmetry is on base goods only and with boundedly rational consumers add on pricing can diminish profit for a qualitatively superior firm and increase profit for an inferior firm i e a lose win result compared to when add on pricing is prohibited or infeasible when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and without boundedly rational consumers the opposite win lose result prevails when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and with boundedly rational consumers the result can be win win win lose or lose win depending on the magnitude of quality differentiation on add ons this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

personalized pricing and quality differentiation we develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing pp whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay we embed pp in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms choices over quality we show that firms optimal pricing strategies with pp may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations when the pp firm has high quality both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case conversely when the pp firm has low quality both firms lower their qualities although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with pp while it is optimal for the firm adopting pp to increase product differentiation the non pp firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space while pp results in a wider market coverage it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such pp policies despite the threat of first degree price discrimination we find that pp with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare

cooperative r d and vertical product differentiation abstract a partial equilibrium model with vertical product differentiation coumot competition and quality determined by r d expenses is analysed cooperative agreements on r d entail higher levels of r d quality output and welfare than at the non cooperative equilibrium under well denned conditions on spillover rates this confirms in a new setting a well known outcome of models with cost reducing r d further cooperation in r d allows a larger number of firms to operate in the industry than in the non cooperative case via a reduction in prices a new source of social gains from cooperative research is identified

designing a family of development intensive products faced with fragmented markets saturated and demanding customers and global competition firms increasingly must design and offer a line of innovative quality differentiated products to target customers with differing willingness to pay wtp in this context designing a special class of products that we term development intensive products dips for which the fixed costs of development far outweigh the unit variable costspresents some unique managerial challenges examples of such development intensive offerings abound in a number of industries including the pharmaceutical information and entertainment sectors of the economy our contributions in this paper are threefold a to show that managerial insights from the traditional approach to product line design developed for unit variable cost intensive products do not carry over to dips b to present new mechanisms and managerial guidelines for designing a family of products for which development costs cannot be ignored and c to illustrate the insights with an extended industry example we find that the design approach based on degrading or subtracting value from a high end product to obtain a subsumed low end edition shown in the literature to be an effective approach for designing unit cost intensive products can be inappropriate for dips this limitation of value subtraction has implications for the number of variants and the sequence in which they are developed as an alternative to a subsumed product design strategy we propose and examine the overlapped product design approach in which a low end product is not completely subsumed within its high end counterpart but differentiated on additional vertical quality dimensions our results both explain the recent challenges of firms with subsumed low end products and guide them in designing a product line to successfully address emerging low end market segments

equilibrium incentives for most favored customer clauses in an oligopolistic industry abstract this paper analyzes the economics of contemporaneous most favored customer clauses mfcc in a non cooperative n firm oligopoly in the first stage of a two stage game each firm independently decides whether to adopt mfcc in the second stage firms set prices non cooperatively given the first stage choices in contrast to work on retroactive mfcc by cooper the rand journal of economics 1986 17 377 388 our analysis shows that not adopting mfcc can be a dominant strategy the difference between our results and cooper s highlights important differences between retroactive and contemporaneous mfcc and suggests that mfcc are a less powerful facilitating practice than retroactive mfcc our analysis also sheds new light on grether and plott s economic inquiry 1984 22 497 507 experimental results regarding the effects of mfcc on average industry prices

valuing satellite systems to support fishing in a dynamic competitive model this article investigates the technology adoption decision of a new satellite system aimed at locating tuna shoals we propose a dynamic imperfect competition model with vertical differentiation in which each firm acts as a cournot oligopolist and takes the evolution of the natural resource into account in this dynamic setting the model cannot be solved analytically and we rely on a numerical approach results are derived for the northern bluefin tuna we find that high quality firms value more the technology than low quality firms a direct implication of this result is that the market value of the new technology can be maximized while serving only the highest quality firms we then evaluate how individual quotas can be used to increase the value that firms attach to the technology

monopolistic third degree price discrimination under vertical product differentiation this paper shows in a vertical product differentiation model with variable costs of quality that monopolistic third degree price discrimination always reduces welfare regardless of whether the quality is fixed or is endogenous the results provide rich implications for antitrust policy

trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation we first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality second we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading third there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low finally we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition but not on social welfare

input market price discrimination and the choice of technology recent concerns over the effects of the robinson patman act and so called priceprotection policies such as most favoredcustomer clauses mfc s 2 on market performance have given economists new reasons to examine the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in order to assess these effects correctly it is imperative that one understand how price discrimination influences market behavior joan robinson s 1933 work launched the formal inquiry into the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination building on the intuition presented by arthur pigou 1932 she showed that if a monopolist faces two independent linear demand curves the use of price discrimination will not affect industry output but will reduce welfare richard schmalensee 1981 extends these results to nonlinear demand curves and shows that an increase in total industry output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to be welfare improving hal varian 1985 broadens these results by deriving upper and lower bounds on the welfare change due to the use of price discrimination he shows that these results can be applied to markets in which there are nonzero cross price effects all of this work examines how the ability of a monopolist to price discriminate will affect the market outcome when all other characteristics of the market are treated as exogenous recently two lines of research have extended this inquiry beyond the case of a monopolist in a market with exogenously fixed parameters the first line considers the case of oligopoly the work of charles holt and david scheffman 1985 and thomas cooper 1986 has shown that restrictions on price discrimination imposed by the use of mfc s can facilitate collusion between oligopolists attempting to restrict output this implies that third degree price discrimination can be welfare improving the second line of research shows that price discrimination by a firm can affect nonprice decisions made by other market participants thus affecting the market outcome michael katz 1987 presents a model in which a large firm s ability to vertically integrate backward into the production of an input allows it to obtain a lower per unit price from the supplier of the input than can be obtained by smaller firms without this ability he shows that third degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it prevents inefficient backward integration degraba 1987 shows that the use or nonuse of price discrimination by a national firm can affect nonprice decisions made by local firms that compete with the national firm in this situation third degree price discrimination is welfare reducing because it induces local firms to produce a product that is overly differentiated from the product of the national firm in all of the work cited above price discrimination is important when sellers set prices in separate markets or charge different prices to different customers in the same market the following analysis which can be considered a contribution to the second line of research suggests that price discrimination can be important even when a seller faces a single market in which all customers are identical the intuition behind this result is that nonprice decisions made by downstream producers such as the choice of technology can be affected by the use or johnson graduate school of management cornell university ithaca ny 14853 i thank robert frank robert smiley richard thaler and the participants of the jgsm applied microeconomics workshop for their helpful comments see william baldwin 1987 pp 438 40 for a good summary of the debate 2see john kwoka and lawrence white 1989 pp 196 7

exit with vertical product differentiation abstract this paper presents a duopoly model of exit from a declining industry with vertical product differentiation it extends previous io models on exit that have so far ignored demand effects the model shows how the interplay between demand and technological factors determine the order of exit therefore demand factors are relevant and should be taken into account thus the firm with a longer tenure as a profitable monopolist does not necessarily outlast its rival in addition this paper argues that the low quality firm may find it optimal to stay in the market despite making temporary losses to outlast its rival

the effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local firms i present a game theoretic model of competition between a national firm and local firms in which the introduction of most favored customer clauses into the sales contracts of the national firm decreases all industry prices the reason is that the price restriction makes the national firm a weak price competitor in each local market this produces a prisoners dilemma situation in which each local firm has the unilateral incentive to be more aggressive in nonprice decisions this increase in nonprice competition by all local firms causes prices to fall across the industry