frictionless commerce a comparison of internet and conventional retailers there have been many claims that the internet represents a new nearly frictionless market our research empirically analyzes the characteristics of the internet as a channel for two categories of homogeneous products books and cds using a data set of over 8 500 price observations collected over a period of 15 months we compare pricing behavior at 41 internet and conventional retail outlets we find that prices on the internet are 9 16 lower than prices in conventional outlets depending on whether taxes shipping and shopping costs are included in the price additionally we find that internet retailers price adjustments over time are up to 100 times smaller than conventional retailers price adjustments presumably reflecting lower menu costs in internet channels we also find that levels of price dispersion depend importantly on the measures employed when we compare the prices posted by different internet retailers we find substantial dispersion internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33 for books and 25 for cds however when we weight these prices by proxies for market share we find dispersion is lower in internet channels than in conventional channels reflecting the dominance of certain heavily branded retailers we conclude that while there is lower friction in many dimensions of internet competition branding awareness and trust remain important sources of heterogeneity among internet retailers

price discrimination through offers to match price in this paper a firm discriminates between two classes of customer who have a different cost of information by coupling a list price with an offer to match the pr ice of any other shop if the list price elsewhere is lower the firm will be successful in discrimination the list price of each firm is increasing in the number of sellers and the total sales are decreasi ng in the number of sellers furthermore if sellers coordinate they discriminate more efficaciously and increase their profits by increa sing their total sales copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

transparency and economic policy we provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability transfers are partly financed through government debt and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems the model provides an explanation of fiscal churning it also predicts that groups whose transfers are less visible to others receive higher transfers and that imperfect transparency of transfers may lead to underprovision of public goods from the policy perspective the main novelty of our analysis is a separate evaluation of the transparency of spending and the transparency of revenues we show that the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency transparency of spending is beneficial but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive because it endogenously leads to increased wasteful spending

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory political economy in general equilibrium preface acknowledgments list of results 1 a preview of the results 2 endogenous policy theory a diagrammatic approach part i endogenous policy theory with specific factors the theory of industry tariffs in partial equilibrium 3 the probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians 4 endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem 5 endogenous tariff theory 6 the power function model of endogenous industry lobbying 7 three simple tests of the stolper samuelson theorem 8 the invisible foot and the waste of nations lawyers as negative externalities part ii endogenous policy theory in general equilibrium a long run theory of national tariff levels 9 the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory 10 a prisoner s dilemma theory of endogenous protection the leontief model 11 the compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap 12 increasing returns to politics and factor endowments economic development and brazilian vitality versus the indian disease 13 endogenous protection in the united states 1900 88 14 a cobb douglas model 15 black hole tariffs 16 the endowment effect cross national evidence on endogenous tariffs part ii postscript 17 the senile industry argument for protection 18 optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst the politically efficient policy mathematical appendices references author index subject index

union negotiations and corporate policy a study of labor concessions in the domestic steel industry during the 1980s abstract this paper studies managerial compensation financial reporting and dividend policies of the seven major domestic steel producers during requests for union concessions substantial layoffs reported losses and sacrifices by nonunion stakeholders buttressed managers case for union concessions from 1980 to 1988 sample firms reduced their work force by about 300 000 almost two thirds and annual wage payments from 16 1 to 8 6 billion reported income is lower during union negotiations controlling for cash flows as is managerial pay with average ceo salary plus bonus declining 18 dividend reductions and white collar pay cuts are substantial pervasive and clustered during union negotiations

corporate unity in american trade policy a network analysis of corporate dyad political action this essay examines factors that produce political unity among large u s corporations advocating free trade expanding on old debates these data and analyses validate the importance of organizational and class cohesion approaches to corporate political action methodologically the political unity of pairs dyads of firms in trade policy activism is analyzed with quadratic assignment procedure regression shared membership in prominent policy networks and board interlocks positively predict corporate political unity across three areas of trade policy influence from the executive branch to the legislature non network organizational indicators also significantly predicted corporate trade policy activism the findings support business unity accounts of corporate political action and suggest that higher levels of firm embeddedness within intercorporate networks facilitate collective corporate political action

an empirical pooling approach for estimating marketing mix elasticities with pims data the pims profit impact of marketing strategies data entail sparse time series observations for a large number of strategic business units sbus in order to estimate disaggregate marketing mix elasticities of demand a natural solution is to pool different sbus the traditional a priori approach is to pool together those sbus which one believes in advance to be very similar with respect to their marketing mix elasticities we propose an alternative maximum likelihood latent pooling method for simultaneously pooling estimating and testing linear regression models empirically this method enables the determination of a fuzzy pooling scheme while directly estimating a set of marketing mix elasticities and intertemporal covariances for each pool of sbus our analyses reveal different magnitudes and patterns of marketing mix elasticities for the derived pools pool membership is influenced by demand characteristics business scope and order of market entry

markets for ownership the prevailing economic theory of the firm based on a property rights perspective has demonstrated that ownership by dispensable outside parties is an inefficient outcome relative to ownership by productive agents in order to better understand observed patterns of ownership this paper considers the outcome of ma rkets for ownership that operate prior to production taking place the main result is that outside parties will often become the equilibrium asset owners this is precisely because but for ownership such parties would not earn rents in contrast productive agents earn rents even when they do not own assets given that their contribution is complementary with other productive agents their willingness to pay for ownership is less than that of an outside party this result is robust to the introduction of moderate levels of inefficiency arising from outside ownership and to a consideration of opportunities for re sale before production begins the main conclusion drawn is that the nature of the operation of markets for ownership stands alongside incentive effects as important predictors of firm boundaries journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 l22

cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no deadline while with a deadline we identify delays both for positive and negative externalities without a deadline we find that 1 when externalities are positive there exists no spne in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay 2 when externalities are negative it may happen that all spne with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity this is the cyclical delay phenomenon

mixed pricing in oligopoly with limited monopoly we analyze price competition between two brands buyers consist of switchers and two segments of customers with limited brand loyalty we identify a unique symmetric mixed strategy price equilibrium and find that competition is most relaxed when there exists some switchers

trading between agents for a better match this paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post i show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract this causes principals to offer agents piece rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece rates they would offer if trading was not allowed although trading reduces an agent s effort and could increase the agent s outside option of rejecting a principal s ex ante contract principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes

the limits of monopolization through acquisition we address the question of whether competitive acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in complete or partial monopolization of a homogeneous product industry this question is modeled in terms of two distinct three stage noncoopera tive games analysis of subgame perfect pure strategy nash equilibria of these games discloses that under simplifying assumptions monopolization of an industry through acquisition is limited to industries with relatively few firms partial monopolization is either limited in scope or can be completely eliminated by prohibiting any owner from acquiring over 50 percent of the firms in the industry

stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities this paper studies infinite horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present we extend the analysis in jehiel and moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria jehiel p moldovanu b 1995a cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities rev econ stud 62 619 637 a characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers

bargaining without a common prior an immediate agreement theorem in sequential bargaining models without outside options each player s bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when this paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement the main result states that despite this if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future then in equilibrium they will agree immediately this result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism

over confidence may reduce negotiation delay abstract when a seller negotiates with multiple buyers how does over confidence affect the timing of trade in this paper we distinguish between over confidence about trade opportunities and over confidence about the terms of trade in bargaining environments without externalities both types of over confidence can cause delays in agreement if externalities are present the two forms of subjective bias have very different impacts on delay in particular over confidence about trade opportunities may reduce bargaining delay

waiting to settle multilateral bargaining with subjective biases abstract we study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power we show that if agents are extremely optimistic there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement we show that the game with extreme optimism is highly unstable in the finite horizon and we examine the ramifications of this instability on the infinite horizon problem finally we consider other voting rules and show that the majority rule may be more efficient than the unanimity rule when agents are optimistic

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

contracts and externalities how things fall apart a single principal interacts with several agents offering them contracts the crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are we study how such a principal unwelcome though he may be approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out two variants are considered when the principal cannot re approach agents there is a unique equilibrium in which contract provision is split up into two phases in phase 1 simultaneousoffers at good though varying terms are made to a number of agents in phase 2 offers must be made sequentially and their values are discontinuously lower they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options when the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent there is a multiplicity of equilibria in some of these the agents have the power to force delay they can hold off the principal s overtures temporarily but they must succumb in finite time in both models despite beingable to coordinate their actions agents cannot resist an invasion by the principal and hold to their best payoff it is in this sense that things eventually fall apart

naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities this paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts we use the strategic environment described by rasmusen ramseyer and wiley 1991 and segal and whinston 2000 where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent when discrimination is impossible the game resembles a stag hunt coordination game in which the buyers payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium two way non binding pre play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller when discrimination and communication are possible the exclusion rate rises divide and conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given finally secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent s power to profitably exclude

the political economy of administered protection trade restrictions are hardly ever voted directly by congress though the threat of direct congressional action is frequently present pressure for protection is usually applied through the major instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures and the escape clause mechanism in this paper we will examine these instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the form of the paper is not novel a theory of how these mechanisms work is developed then operational implications of this theory are deduced and tested over the record of countervailing duty antidumping and escape clause cases decided from 1975 through 1979 this is the period over which the trade act of 1974 was in force because the nature of these mechanisms is relatively unfamiliar a relatively large amount of institutional information is provided

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

waiting to persuade i analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power measured as the probability of making offers but learn as they play the game i show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date but never reach one before it given any discount rate if the learning is sufficiently slow the players agree immediately i show that for any speed of learning the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long provided that the players are sufficiently patient therefore although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn

why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control as moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers moreover share supply is shown to be upward sloping rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers furthermore higher takeover premia induced by competition translate into higher ownership concen tration and are thus beneficial finally one share one vote and simple majority are generally not optimal and socially optimal rules need not emerge through private contracting

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

learning self control this article examines how a decision maker who is only partially aware of his temptations learns about them over time in facing temptations individuals use their experience to forecast future self control problems and choose the appropriate level of commitment i demonstrate that rational learning can be perpetually partial and need not result in full sophistication the main result of this article characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for learning to converge to full sophistication i apply this result to a consumption savings environment in which a decision maker is tempted by present bias and establish a learning theoretic justification for assuming sophistication in this setting an individual who finds himself continuously repudiating his past plans may learn to distrust his future behavior and may do something about it strotz 1955

the return to independent invention evidence of unrealistic optimism risk seeking or skewness loving examining a sample of 1 091 inventions i investigate the magnitude and distribution of the pre tax internal rate of return irr to inventive activity the average irr on a portfolio investment in these inventions is 11 4 this is higher than the risk free rate but lower than the long run return on high risk securities and the long run return on early stage venture capital funds the portfolio irr is significantly higher for some ex ante identifiable classes of inventions the distribution of return is skew only between 7 9 reach the market of the 75 inventions that did six realised returns above 1400 60 obtained negative returns and the median was negative

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

rent seeking protectionism and innovation in the american steel industry trade protection in a declining industry can cause damages beyond those revealed in the usual trade diagram analysis using data on the us steel firms we show that trade protection in that industry rewards poor performance reduces incentives to innovate and frustrates the normal schumpeterian process of creative destruction free trade gives consumers the lowest prices nonetheless protectionism in various guises is pervasive this we show is probably due to political rentseeking by groups that expect to lose as trade patterns adjust to innovation and altered economic conditions these groups invest in political lobbying to secure future returns in trade protection we find empirical evidence that trade protection returns private benefits to the shareholders senior workers and ceo s of lobbying firms perhaps more disturbingly trade protection also appears to reward less innovative firms and may thus frustrate the schumpeterian development of an industry we examine us steelmakers among the most active lobbyers in recent decades steel firms that lobby congress for protection tend to be larger older less diversified and less profitable than non lobbyers they pay their workers and ceos more and their ceos have longer tenure and are more likely to have risen through the ranks of their companies this suggests the owners managers and workers of less dynamic steel firms stand to lose from free trade the announcement of protection raises the stock prices of us steelmakers but by much more for lobbyers than non lobbyers when comprehensive and enduring protection was finally announced lobbyers more than non lobbyers cut jobs while maintaining or possibly increasing wages once comprehensive protection is in place protection also leads to large pay increases for lobbyers ceos this seems consistent with rent seeking and inconsistent with protection helping lobbyers mitigate social consequences of downsizing like unemployment our most striking finding is that high past r d spending is negatively correlated with stock price changes when proteption is announced and positively correlated with subsequent exit from the industry this seems inconsistent with protection providing a hiatus for retooling rather it suggests

negative externalities may cause delay in negotiation we study the strategic equilibria of a negotiation game where potential buyers are affected by identity dependent negative externalities the unique equilibrium of long finitely repeated generic games can either display delay where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline or in spite of the random element in the game a well defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one

foreign subsidization and excess capacity abstract the u s steel industry has long held that foreign subsidization and excess capacity has led to its long run demise yet no one has formally examined this hypothesis in this paper we incorporate foreign subsidization considerations into a model based on staiger and wolak s 1992 cyclical dumping framework and illustrate testable implications of both cyclical excess capacity and structural excess capacity stemming from foreign subsidization we then use detailed product and foreign country level data on steel exports to the u s market to estimate these excess capacity effects while the full sample results provide evidence of both cyclical and structural excess capacity effects for exports to the u s market these effects are confined to such a narrow range of country product combinations that it is unlikely that such effects were a significant factor in the fortunes of u s steel firms over the past decades

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

equilibrium incentives for exclusive dealing in a differentiated products oligopoly we consider the incentives for oligopolistic manufacturers to adopt exclusive dealing manufacturers producing differentiated brands can choose to distribute through exclusive retail dealerships or nonexclusive dealerships with nonexclusive dealing manufacturers face an interbrand externality because brand enhancing investments made by one manufacturer may benefit the brands of other manufacturers although exclusive dealing eliminates this externality oligopolistic manufacturers may not choose exclusive dealing exclusive dealing enhances the incentive to invest but the promotional investments are a form of competition between manufacturers thus manufacturers might earn higher profits with nonexclusive dealing making lower promotional investments we find cases in which nonexclusive dealing is a dominant strategy we also find cases in which some but not all manufacturers adopt exclusive dealing moreover even if adoption of exclusive dealing by all manufacturers is the equilibrium it can arise from a prisoner s dilemma in that each manufacturer would prefer nonexclusive dealing

the value of administered protection a capital market approach the focus of this paper i s on the escape clause petitions filed under the trade act of 1974 section 201 first the capital marketevent study method is used to analyze the effects of protection decisions then cross section regressions are performed to examine the influence of key variables on the observed market reaction the authors conc lude that while protection is beneficial to beleaguered industries the extent o f such benefits is quite narrowly circumscribed and is conditional on internal v ariables for each firm protection is thus not the panacea that its advocates cl aim copyright 1986 by mit press

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

patent thickets courts and the market for innovation we study how fragmentation of patent rights and the formation of the court of appeals for the federal circuit cafc affected the duration of patent disputes and thus the speed of technology diffusion through licensing we develop a model of patent litigation which predicts faster settlement when patent rights are fragmented and when there is less uncertainty about court outcomes as was associated with the pro patent shift of the cafc we confirm these predictions empirically using a data set that covers patent suits in u s district courts during the period 1975 2000 finally we analyze how fragmentation affects total settlement delay considering both the reduction in dispute duration and the increase in the number of patent negotiations

habitual and occasional lobbyers in the u s steel industry an em algorithm pooling approach bernard yeung using u s steel firm data we find that lobbying for import protection appears to be habit forming to identify heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms we use an expectation maximization algorithm to sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby and estimate the determinants of lobbying in each group a two pool model emerges occasional lobbyers lobbying depends on their market performance and habitual lobbyers lobbying only depends on past lobbying the latter tends to be larger steel firms whose business is more focused in steel our evidence is consistent with dynamic economies of scale in protection seeking breeding protection dependent firms jel f13 1 introduction rent seeking activities plausibly have dynamic economies to scale past rent seeking experience should reduce the cost of further rent seeking and increase its return thus rent seekers may over time become more prone to further rent seeking and even become dependent on it given the large welfare losses theoretically associated with rent seeking e g bhagwati 1982 1988 and magee et al 1989 a better understanding of actual rent seeking behavior is required in particular empirical verification of the self sustaining nature of rent seeking is of fundamental importance lobbying for protection from import competition is a form of rent seeking this article uses data on lobbying for protection by firms in the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s to show that a habit forming effect does exist in a preliminary investigation we pool all firm level data and find that past lobbying increases the current tendency to lobby however not all firms have the same propensity to lobby to allow heterogeneity among firms dependence on past lobbying we apply an expectation maximization em algorithm approach dempster et al 1977 to a lagged dummy model heckman 1982a 1982b this lets our firms sort themselves into groups according to the determinants of their lobbying activity our statistical results suggest that an acceptable division of our data is a division into two groups occasional lobbyers whose lobbying depends on the firm s market performance and habitual lobbyers whose lobbying is essentially unrelated to the firm s business situation and depends mainly on past lobbying firms that never lobby for protection end up in the first group greater firm size and greater focus in steel production are associated with increased lobbying in both groups but the influence is stronger for occasional lobbyers past sales growth and spending on modern equipment are associated with curtailed lobbying by occasional rent seekers but are unrelated to lobbying by habitual rent seekers changes in cash flow have no influence in either generally habitual lobbyers are larger firms whose business is more concentrated on steel they are naturally more inclined than occasional lobbyers to initiate lobbying however their lobbying appears to have become a habit divorced from their market pe rformance these results are consistent with the presence of economies of scale in rent seeking and with rent seeking being habit forming e g magee et al 1989 in the next section we describe the intensive lobbying for protection in the u s steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s we justify our contentions that lobbying for protection by steel firms in the sample period may be habit forming and that different groups of firms should have dissimilar propensities to lobby for protection in section iii we explain the em algorithm approach we explain the data in the fourth section and report our results in section v section vi concludes ii habitual and occasional lobbying in the u s steel industry in the united states domestic firms under import competition pressure often complain to the government about unfair foreign practice