debt contracts with partial commitment this paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments and the lender offers long term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated no commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one respectively i show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare furthermore properties of equilibrium investment dynamics with partial commitment drastically differ from those with full and no commitment in particular investment is positively related to cash flow consistent with empirical findings

debt and financial expectations an individual and household level analysis in this article we show that optimistic financial expectations impact positively on both the quantity of debt and the growth in debt at the individual and household levels our theoretical model shows that this association is predicted under a variety of plausible scenarios in the empirical analysis we explore the determinants of debt and of growth in debt using british data we find convincing support for our theoretical priors and show that it is optimistic financial expectations per se that are important in influencing debt rather than the accuracy of individuals predictions regarding their future financial situation jel d18 d84 d91

the effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development abstract a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents with respect to wealth and ability shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice firm size credit output and income inequality counterfactual experiments are performed for latin american european transition and high growth asian countries with empirical estimates of each country s financial frictions and united states values for all other parameters the results isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the united states and depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative

recent developments in consumer credit and default literature this survey discusses recent contributions to the quantitative literature on unsecured consumer debt and default and some ongoing challenges for the literature key topics include the sources of the rise in personal bankruptcies the importance of asymmetric information and the effects of developments in information technologies on consumer credit markets delinquency and informal bankruptcy debt collection and restructuring of distressed debt the cyclical behavior of consumer debt and default and the insurance role of household debt implications for welfare analysis and policy design are discussed several theoretical contributions and approaches to modeling the consumer credit markets are also highlighted

communicating subjective evaluations consider managers evaluating their employees performances should managers justify their subjective evaluations suppose a manager s evaluation is private information justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal s scope for distorting her evaluation of the employee i show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the employee s performance was poor the justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation downwards for good performance however the manager pays a constant high wage without justification the empirical literature demonstrates that subjective evaluations are lenient and discriminate poorly between good performance levels this pattern was attributed to biased managers i show that these effects occur in optimal contracts without any biased behavior

a theory of contracts with limited enforcement we present a theory of contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset public enforcement relies on remedies for breach private enforcement comes from severing relationships we first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly whether a long term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller while under complete information the optimal contract would remain stationary non stationarity might arise under asymmetric information enforcement constraints are time dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes indeed a high cost seller may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship before breaching the contract later on yet such take the money and run strategy becomes less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments the optimal contract thus goes through two different phases first quantities and prices increase at the inception of the relationship later on the contract looks more stationary the public and private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase of contracting long run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement offering de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances

how good are standard debt contracts stochastic versus nonstochastic monitoring in a costly state verification environment the authors investigate ex ante efficient contracts in an environment in which implementation is costless in this environment standard debt contracts will typically not be optimal optimal contracts may involve defaults even in states in which the borrower is fully able to repay the authors then examine the welfare costs of arbitrarily restricting the set of feasible contracts to standard debt contracts when model parameters are calibrated to realistic values the welfare loss from exogenously imposing this restriction is extremely small thus if implementation costs are actually nontrivial as seems likely standard debt contracts will be very close to optimal copyright 1994 by university of chicago press

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency abstract this paper investigates the optimal contract design in a principal agent model where verification of an agent s action is endogenously determined through strategic interactions between contracting parties we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the first best outcome to be implemented as an equilibrium the equilibrium has the following features i the action level that the agent chooses is not verified even if it is possible ii nevertheless the first best can be attained by making a contract contingent on the unverified action journal of economic literature classification numbers d20 k40

inflation and relative price variability the case of internationally traded primary commodities abstract we examine the link between inflation and relative price variability for internationally traded primary commodities larger and unexpected movements in commodity prices induce greater relative price variability thus our results generally mirror similar findings for the prices of finished products

earnings news and small traders an intraday analysis abstract this study separates trading volume into buyer and seller initiated activities and examines the directional volume reaction in small and large trades to different types of earnings news good bad news triggers brief but intense buying selling in the large trades however a persistent period of unusually high buying activity is observed in the small trades irrespective of the news this anomalous proclivity of small traders to buy is robust across firm size trading volume and different earnings expectation models several explanations are discussed although the behavior does not seem fully explained by existing theories

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

monetary policy bank leverage and financial stability abstract this paper shows that with limited liability banks lever up excessively to finance new loans lower monetary policy rates can worsen or reduce these incentives depending on the size of the shock when equity financing is ruled out when this constrained is relaxed but the bank faces costly dividend adjustment lower monetary policy rates always worsen risk taking incentives and the effect is persistent the reason is that costly dividend adjustment lowers the opportunity cost of lending in this model capital requirements are closer to the source of the distortion and thus work better than loan to value caps in reducing excessive risk taking

cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future we study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation finally what classes of strategies do subjects employ we find that first cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings second some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation and third subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment

game theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium according to theory money supports trade in a world without enforcement and in particular in large societies where gift exchange is unsustainable it is demonstrated that in fact monetary equilibrium breaks down in the absence of adequate enforcement institutions and it collapses as societies that lack external enforcement grow large this unique result is derived by unveiling the existence of a tacit enforcement assumption in the literature that explains the advantages from monetary exchange and by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games and social norms

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

recent developments in consumer credit and default literature consumer credit and default literature this survey discusses recent contributions to the quantitative literature on unsecured consumer debt and default and some ongoing challenges for the literature key topics include the sources of the rise in personal bankruptcies the importance of asymmetric information and the effects of developments in information technologies on consumer credit markets delinquency and informal bankruptcy debt collection and restructuring of distressed debt the cyclical behavior of consumer debt and default and the insurance role of household debt implications for welfare analysis and policy design are discussed several theoretical contributions and approaches to modeling the consumer credit markets are also highlighted

corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors beliefs has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention we reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets building on shareholder manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof the optimal renegotiation proof contract induces overstatements by managers accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud

costly state verification with varying risk preferences and liability abstract in the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification we examine how the properties of the set of states different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments in particular we show that with risk averse debtors a general set of states a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states if the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral this non monotonicity of consumption disappears moreover given the loan size there is more monitoring under debtor risk aversion than risk neutrality we present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability finally we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework

banking risk and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract this paper develops a model of banking frictions and banking risk as a sort of systemic risk changes in banking risk lead to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity we decompose the macroeconomic effect of a banking risk shock into a pure default effect and a risk aversion effect when risk sharing among investors is imperfect when the shock generates a bank risk spread similar to the peak value during the global financial crisis the overall effect is a decline in employment by 4 66 the default effect leads to a 3 40 employment decline by a within model measure and a 3 51 decline by a between model measure the remaining is attributed to the risk aversion effect a practical implication of our analysis is that by developing financial safety net and improving risk sharing among investors the society can mitigate the adverse macroeconomic effects of banking risk shocks to some extent but cannot eliminate all of them

capital structure under costly enforcement we consider financial structure and repayment behavior in a setting where cash flows are private information to the entrepreneur and the cost of enforcing repayment differs across security holders if enforcement costs are lower for shareholders than for creditors a mixed capital structure with debt and equity can obtain in equilibrium under a mixed capital structure creditors intervene in low cash flow states while shareholders intervene in high cash flow states moreover strategic defaults costly bankruptcy shareholder intervention and violation of absolute priority occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path several of the predictions from our framework are consistent with evidence not readily explainable by existing theories

optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable a reply in a simple debt contract the investor seizes all of a firm s assets when the project return is below some threshold and receives a constant payment when the return is higher krasa and villamil 2000 show that simple debt contracts that are optimal ie give the investor the highest payoff among the class of deterministic contracts in the costly state verification model and that satisfy technical conditions al a2 and a reservation utility constraint are optimal in a more general costly enforcement model even when stochastic monitoring is possible 2 the italicized segment of this statement was not made explicit in theorem 1 in krasa and villamil 2000 as sharma points out this restriction is necessary for the result to hold sharma also points out that assumption a2 had a typographical error assumption a2 in krasa and villamil 2000 should have appeared

aggregate uncertainty and the supply of credit abstract this paper presents a model in which a bank can exhibit self insurance with loan supply contracting when uncertainty increases this prediction is tested with u s commercial banks where identification is achieved by looking at differential effects according to banks capital to assets ratio car increases in uncertainty reduce the supply of credit more so for banks with lower levels of car these results are weaker for large banks and are robust to controlling for monetary policy to different measures of uncertainty and to breaking the dataset in subsamples quantitatively the effect of uncertainty shocks on credit supply is about as important as that of monetary policy shocks

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

a model of financial structure and financial fragility this paper presents an asymmetric information model of financial structure the model has two types of financial institutions banks and securities markets both of which can hold loans made to firms to finance investment projects the securities markets have lower costs but they have a lemons problem because the banks have better information the result is an equilibrium that can exhibit fragility in the sense that small parameter changes such as changes in the cost advantage of the securities market or the risk structure of loans can lead to discontinuous changes in interest rates asset prices and market structure

managers compensation and misreporting a costly state verification approach i introduction the use of stock options in compensation packages as a way of providing the firm management with the right incentives has been quite popular in the 1990s the favor encountered by options started however to decrease in the past few years the decline in the use of option grants in top executives compensation packages occurred mainly as a reaction to the recent accounting scandals which has prompted the design of alternative stock based compensation schemes e g restricted stock grants or indexed options as reported by hall and murphy 2003 the grant date value of options assigned to all employees of an average standard poor s 500 firm measured in millions of 2002 constant us increased from 22 in 1992 to 238 in 2000 and subsequently decreased to 141 in 2002 although percentages varied from year to year the ceos share of the total grant has fallen from about 7 in the mid 1990s to less than 5 in 2000 2002 1 the decline in the use of options for top management is widely confirmed according to a pearl meyer partners study for the new york times stock option grants that accounted for 52 of the pay of the average ceo of a major company in 2002 were down to an estimated 35 in 2003 a recent watson wyatt report states that the value of new stock option awards granted to ceos at large companies fell by nearly 60 between 2001 and 2003 with the average value of new stock option grants declining from us 10 2 million in 2001 to us 4 2 million in 2003 the decline in options has been softened by the sharp increase in restricted stock grants and other long term incentive award values 2 in this paper we aim to reevaluate the role of stock options as an ingredient of top management compensation packages able to align the interests of managers and shareholders avoiding misreporting of the firm value at the same time 3 in a costly state verification csv model with moral hazard we show that incentive compatible contracts inducing both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value must entail a strictly convex compensation schedule that is a fixed payment wage when the firm value is sufficiently low and a state contingent claim increasing in the firm value otherwise a simple and commonly observed way to achieve a convex compensation scheme is to design a remuneration including a fixed wage and a call option on the firm equity as we will show such remuneration allows on the one hand to preserve top management incentives providing for a compensation increasing in equity value and on the other hand to reduce the verification costs that must be incurred to avoid misreporting as verification is not needed in the region where the remuneration is fixed 4 options are by no means the only way to achieve a convex compensation however many other schemes having otherwise desirable properties over options do not have the convex shape discussed above for instance combining a fixed wage with restricted stock grants defines a compensation linearly increasing in the firm s equity value which does not allow to reduce misreporting verification costs that always have to be sustained in this case using an incentive compatible compensation scheme fixed wage plus call options we characterize the contract offered by the firm under the assumption of a deterministic and perfect audit technology showing that for any given value of the option package the manager should receive the largest possible number of options at the highest strike price allowing shareholders to reduce the expected verification cost furthermore the strike price of the option turns out to be determined by incentive compatibility i e the option value must be such that the manager is induced to exert the desired level of effort while the magnitude of the fixed wage is defined by individual rationality there are three main policy implications of our analysis

fraudulent claims and nitpicky insurers insurance fraud is a major source of inefficiency in insurance markets a self justification of fraudulent behavior is that insurers are bad payers who start nitpicking if an opportunity arises even in circum stances where the good faith of policyholders is not in dispute we relate this nitpicking activity to the inability of insurers to commit to their auditing strategy reducing the indemnity payments acts as an incentive device for the insurer since auditing is profitable even if the claim is not fraudulent we show that optimal indemnity cuts are bounded above and that nitpicking remains optimal even if it induces adverse effects on policyholders moral standards

a proposition on short run departures from the law of one price unanticipated inflation relative price dispersion and commodity arbitrage abstract this paper proposes an explanation of short run departures from the law of one price based on the characteristics of the inflationary process and changes in the distribution of relative prices unexpected inflation gives rise to volatility of relative prices the more unexpected and hence uneven the rate of inflation the greater the difficulty in discerning from a given structure of relative prices commodity arbitrage opportunities which may be expected to persist and those transient opportunities which do not warrant a firm s incurring fixed costs of arbitrage an illustration portrays a risk averse firm confronting an international arbitrage opportunity

optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable this paper analyzes choice theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur an intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions the goal of the analysis is to characterize the effect of choice theoretic costly enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts the paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is limited and costly enforcement is a decision variable theorem 1 in contrast stochastic contracts are optimal when agents can commit to the ex ante optimal decisions theorem 2 the paper also shows that the costly state verification model can be viewed as a reduced form of an enforcement model in which agents choose payments and strategies as part of a perfect bayesian nash equilibrium

renegotiation of sales contracts this paper studies moral hazard contracts that may be renegotiated after an agent chooses an unobservable effort unlike in previous models a contract here contains only one compensation scheme and the agent has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation stage using a relatively weak forward induction refinement all equilibria are shown tb be second best efficient renegotiation occurs in every equilibrium if the effort set is rich the only equilibrium initial contract is a sales contract i e a scheme which sells the project to the agent this captures the idea that a party the principal who has an inherently weak renegotiation position will sometimes insist on a simple initial contract

using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions this article studies the optimal determination of bankruptcy exemptions for risk averse borrowers who use unsecured contracts but have the possibility of defaulting in a large class of economies knowledge of four variables is sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal or should be increased or decreased these variables are 1 the composition of households liabilities 2 the sensitivity of the credit supply schedule to exemption changes 3 the probability of filing for bankruptcy with non exempt assets and 4 the value given by households to a marginal dollar in different states which can be mapped to changes in households consumption i recover empirical estimates of the sufficient statistics using u s data over the period 2008 16 and find that increasing exemption levels improves overall welfare although there is substantial variation in estimated welfare gains across u s states and income quintiles

correlated default and financial intermediation financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state i show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers payoffs are correlated when projects have correlated outcomes learning the state of one project via enforcement provides information about the states of other projects a large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement as a result intermediation dominates direct lending intermediaries are financed with risk free deposits earn positive profits and hold systemic default risk

the recursive core core allocations may be defined for infinite horizon capital accumulation models if agents cannot trust each other in the sense of gale then agents may renege on their commitments their decisions appear time inconsistent a core allocation is a recursive core allocation provided no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any time given its accumulation of assets up to that period we show for every allocation of consumption in the initial core one can find a distribution of capital stocks among the agents where no coalition of agents will break the initial core contract at any date it follows that if the proper distribution of the streams of capital is achieved then the allocation in the core is also in the recursive core the latter therefore forges a link between the distribution of wealth capital the problem of trust and time consistent intertemporal contracts

investment risk cds insurance and firm financing abstract we develop a model in which investment risk drives the demand for cds insurance the model shows the efficiency of cds contracting over the state of the economy it shows that cds overinsurance insurance in excess of renegotiation surpluses is procyclical allowing for greater financing when the probability of default is lower our theory predicts that the incidence of so called empty creditors is largely constrained to firms that are safer face lower bankruptcy costs have more severe management creditor agency problems and whose assets are costlier to verify our analysis generates a number of empirical predictions and provides new insights into the regulation of cds markets

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

what drives the sensitivity of limit order books to company announcement arrivals abstract we provide evidence that recent losses amplify order book illiquidity shocks caused by non scheduled news moreover the faster markets reaction to scheduled and non scheduled news arrivals is in terms of order book illiquidity the more illiquid the order book becomes that is a fast reaction is a strong reaction additionally order book asymmetry observed before announcement arrivals is positively associated with the magnitude of illiquidity shocks