industry characteristics and interest group formation an empirical study the role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics however few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics in cross sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation we discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy

quality disclosure under consumer loss aversion consumers experience a sense of loss when a product s quality does not match their expectations to alleviate consumer loss aversion cla firms can disclose information to reduce consumers uncer

a dynamic model of brand choice when price and advertising signal product quality in this paper we develop a structural model of household behavior in an environment where there is uncertainty about brand attributes and both prices and advertising signal brand quality four quality signaling mechanisms are at work 1 price signals quality 2 advertising frequency signals quality 3 advertising content provides direct but noisy information about quality and 4 use experience provides direct but noisy information about quality we estimate our proposed model using scanner panel data on ketchup if price is important as a signal of brand quality then frequent price promotion may have the unintended consequence of reducing brand equity we use our estimated model to measure the importance of such effects our results imply that price is an important quality signaling mechanism and that frequent price cuts can have significant adverse effects on brand equity the role of advertising frequency in signaling quality is also significant but it is less quantitatively important than price in the printed version of marketing science vol 27 no 6 erdem et al 2008 was mistakenly identified as a research note it is a regular article and has been corrected here and in the online table of contents

involuntary unemployment in economies with efficient risk sharing abstract we study economies where employment lotteries determine random layoffs and incomes for employed and unemployed agents allocate risk efficiently we ask for which specifications are unemployed agents worse off a situation we call involuntary unemployment we show unemployed agents are worse off iff an exogenous increase in wealth decreases aggregate unemployment in a monetary economy we show that in equilibrium the unemployed are worse off iff high inflation implies high unemployment our model also generates nominal wage stickiness as an equilibrium phenomenon but neither involuntary unemployment nor nominal stickiness implies these economies are operating inefficiently or are out of equilibrium

buyer initiated vs seller initiated information revelation sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects one challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople s ability to communicate or customers ability to process there is limited bandwidth between the firm and customers one important decision then is which information should customers see what the firm chooses to tell customers may be informative in itself when constrained to a seller initiated information revelation format where the firm chooses which feature to show the firm never finds it optimal to offer more features than it is able to inform customers about consequently customers never find credible a claim that the product has all features the important implication is that price alone cannot serve as a signal of quality in this setting in contrast a buyer initiated information revelation format where customers decide which information to receive increases the probability of a sale and also results in the production of higher quality products in a competitive setting by adopting buyer initiated information revelation firms are able to attain positive profits this is due to the fact that customers infer the product s quality from the price along with the information revelation format customers know that at some prices firms find it profitable to produce high quality products and at other lower prices this is not the case thus customer empowerment leads to higher profits

how price promotions influence postpurchase consumption experience over time the current research examines how price promotions influence postpurchase hedonic consumption experience on the one hand getting a good deal can elevate moods and dampen the pain of payment thus enhancing consumption enjoyment on the other hand discounts also reduce sunk cost considerations and the need to recover one s spending as a result price promotions can lower attention during consumption which in turn diminishes consumption enjoyment the authors posit that the time delay between payment and consumption plays an important role in determining the relative strength of these competing effects four experiments involving real spending and consumption demonstrate that when consumption occurs immediately after payment discounts make consumption more enjoyable however this pattern reverses when consumption is delayed the experiments provide support for the roles of feelings and attention respectively in accounting for these effects while ruling out several alternative explanations including perceived quality absolute paid price and a direct sunk cost account

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

material interests moral reputation and crowding out species protection on private land we consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good such as endangered species this paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about reputation and land quality we examine optimal monetary transfer by designing an efficient mechanism which takes into account the crowding out effect of monetary rewards on socially responsible behavior we find landowners who have good reputation contribute more than the optimum level landowners with poor reputation sacrifices information rent rather they buy reputation

low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices how best to signal quality we investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second period sales are linked to first period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers when producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality optimal signalling is by price alone but when the cost differential is lower it will be optimal to set a low first period price not to serve all would be consumers at this price selective distribution and raise the price afterwards paradoxically this strategy allows a larger customer base to be reached than in the case of pure price signalling

biases in valuation vs usage of innovative product features we investigate biases in product valuation and usage decisions that arise when consumers consider a new generation of a product that offers an expanded set of capabilities of uncertain value two experiments using a novel computer game show evidence of a valuation usage disparity participants display a high willingness to pay for a new version of the game that offers a new set of controls but fail to fully exercise the option to use these controls after purchase this discrepancy is attributed to a fundamental difference in how new capabilities are valued at the time of purchase versus use consumer usage decisions appear to be driven by such myopic concerns as a desire to avoid short term learning costs whereas purchase decisions often fail to take into account the factors that drive usage and are further inflated by global optimism in the future usefulness of new capabilities we show that this lack of foresight can be explained by an intertemporal judgment model in which consumers attempt to value

endogeneity in brand choice models applications of random utility models to scanner data have been widely presented in marketing for the last 20 years one particular problem with these applications is that they have ignored possible correlations between the independent variables in the deterministic component of utility price promotion etc and the stochastic component or error term in fact marketing mix variables such as price not only affect brand purchasing probabilities but are themselves endogenously set by marketing managers this work tests whether these endogeneity problems are important enough to warrant consideration when estimating random utility models with scanner panel data our results show that not accounting for endogeneity may result in a substantial bias in the parameter estimates

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

the political economy of public subsidies the article presents a model to explain cross national variations in public subsidies the model incorporates demand and supply variables as well as the effects of policy linkages it predicts that public subsidies are higher in small countries where unemployment is high agriculture plays a large role in the economy left wing parties are in power and tariffs and social security transfers are low the findings tend to confirm six of the seven hypotheses the study supports cameron s 1978 assertion that the openness of the economy is a major factor in the expansion of the public economy even though the data do not clearly confirm or disconfirm any specific theoretical framework they are more consistent with the pluralist model with its insistence that political influence varies from issue to issue and that political actors play a major role in the policy process finally the most interesting finding pertains to the role of policy linkages

competitive strategies for late entry into a market with a dominant brand this paper considers optimal positioning advertising and pricing strategies for a firm contemplating entry in a market dominated by an entrenched competitor drawing on behavioral research on consumer preference formation we develop an individual level model that reflects differing consumer responses to similar products offered by the dominant brand and later entrants an effect we term asymmetric preferences from the resulting aggregate market response model we derive several competitive implications notably 1 that preference asymmetry can make a differentiated late entry strategy optimal even if preferences would appear to dictate otherwise and 2 that me too strategies are not equilibrium late entry strategies more generally our analysis suggests that preference asymmetry can contribute to the persistent competitive advantage of dominant brands

visits to the client when competing for new consulting contracts sourcing information or influencing the client consulting firms cfs sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts one frequently used strategy by cfs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders the reasons to the visits are 1 to influence the client in his decision making e g marketing bribing and or 2 to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted using a unique database on individual export proposals submitted to emerging markets which of these two reasons is the most important is examined empirically the estimations show that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits although it is not possible to determine whether this influence takes the form of bribing or marketing all conditions necessary for bribes to occur are fulfilled

the impact of utility balance and endogeneity in conjoint analysis adaptive metric utility balance is at the heart of one of the most widely used and studied methods for conjoint analysis we use formal models simulations and empirical data to suggest that adaptive metric utility balance leads to partworth estimates that are relatively biased smaller partworths are upwardly biased relative to larger partworths such relative biases could lead to erroneous managerial decisions metric utility balanced questions are also more likely to be inefficient and in one empirical example contrary to popular wisdom lead to response errors that are at least as large as nonadaptive orthogonal questions we demonstrate that this bias is because of endogeneity caused by a winner s curse shrinkage estimates do not mitigate these biases combined with adaptive metric utility balance shrinkage estimates of heterogeneous partworths are biased downward relative to homogeneous partworths although biases can affect managerial decisions our data suggest that empirically biases and inefficiencies are of the order of response errors we examine viable alternatives to metric utility balance that researchers can use without biases or inefficiencies to retain the desired properties of 1 individual level adaptation and 2 challenging questions

money talks an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money we experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side in which senders either use costless messages money or a combination of the two we find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases cheap talk tends to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages a behavioral model due to kartik 2009 assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best

reservation price as a range an incentive compatible measurement approach abstract drawing from the literature on buyers uncertainty in preference and product knowledge the authors suggest and empirically test the proposition that a consumer s reservation price for a product is more meaningfully and accurately represented as a range than as a single point given this conceptualization they propose an approach for incentive compatible elicitation of a consumer s reservation price range icerange that builds on becker degroot and marschak s 1964 point of purchase method two empirical applications of the approach provide an assessment of its practicality and its predictive performance relative to current methodologies for reservation price elicitation the results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms the benchmark approaches in terms of predictive validity and yields valuable incremental information about uncertainty in product valuation

the asymmetric effect of discount retraction on subsequent choice this article examines the subsequent impact of a temporary price discount on brand preference after the promotion is retracted theorizing that price salience has an impact on price sensitivity we propose that the effects of retracting a discount depend on the promoted brand s regular price quality positioning in a first experiment in which we track consumer choices across a sequence of choice occasions we show that retracting a discount posted by a higher quality higher price brand is detrimental to that brand in contrast a discount posted by a lower quality lower price brand is capable of enduringly diverting consumers away from high end brands a second experiment relies on process measures to provide evidence for the underlying price salience mechanism a third experiment tests our hypotheses with real incentives and offers additional support for our price salience theory by testing its most peculiar behavioral implication

does demand for product quality increase worker training abstract we uniquely examine the relationship between firm organized training and the sensitivity of consumer demand to product quality cross section panel fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates confirm that british workplaces provide more intensive training when their product demand is more sensitive to product quality robustness checks including using alternative key variable definitions and a counterfactual analysis examining the importance of competing on price support this confirmation

two part pricing for experience goods in the presence of adverse selection abstract because customers learn something when they purchase an experience good for the first time a firm selling experience goods may face different demand curves from new and repeat customers the firm can exploit these differences by using a two part pricing strategy to price discriminate between new and repeat customers the firm may also use a two part pricing strategy to mitigate the information problems of adverse selection when its quality is uncertain the analysis is particularly applicable to service markets where customers and firms seek long term relationships and firms maintain customer records which facilitate price discrimination

promotional reviews an empirical investigation of online review manipulation abstract firms incentives to manufacture biased user reviews impede review usefulness we examine the differences in reviews for a given hotel between two sites expedia com only a customer can post a review and tripadvisor com anyone can post we argue that the net gains from promotional reviewing are highest for independent hotels with single unit owners and lowest for branded chain hotels with multiunit owners we demonstrate that the hotel neighbors of hotels with a high incentive to fake have more negative reviews on tripadvisor relative to expedia hotels with a high incentive to fake have more positive reviews on tripadvisor relative to expedia jel l15 l83 m31

on the political economy of welfare expansion a comparative analysis of 18 advanced capitalist democracies 1960 1971 this article elaborates the thesis that economic growth and various types of collective action by class linked actors determine the expansion and decline of welfare spending in rich capitalist democracies our multivariate model of this thesis specified to 1960 1971 growth rates in direct cash transfer payments as proportions of gross domestic product is supported strongly by regression analyses these indicate that economic growth notably facilitates transfer payment growth they also suggest that rightist party participation in government notably dampens welfare expansion while leftist centrist and christian democratic party participation in government are conducive to welfare expansion and they suggest that the political influences of both unions and large industrial corporations are conducive to growth in transfers payments as well in addition state authorities appear to augment welfare spending in response to working class protests strike activity and capital investment disinvestment activ

how much does the market value an improvement in a product attribute a firm contemplating improvements to its product attributes would be interested in the dollar value the market attaches to any potential product modification in this paper we derive a measure of market value such that the comparison of the measure against the incremental unit cost of the attribute improvement is key in deciding whether or not the attribute improvement is profitable competition from other brands the potential for market expansion and heterogeneity in customer preference structures are explicitly modeled using the multinomial logit framework the analysis yields a closed form expression for the market s value for an attribute improvement mvai a key result we obtain is that customers should be differentially weighted based on their probability of purchasing the firm s product in particular customers who exhibit a very high or very low probability of choosing the firm s product should receive less weight in detemining mvai because the probability of choice varies across products the answer to the question of how much the market values an improvement depends on which firm is asking the question it is shown that customers whose utilities have a greater random component should be weighted less furthermore the measure developed is robust to the influence of outliers in the sample an empirical illustration of the mvai measure in the context of a new product development study is provided the study illustrates the advantages of the proposed measure over currently used approaches and explores the possibility of competitive price reactions

environmental protection a theory of direct and indirect competition for political influence how is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying this paper develops a model of direct lobbying the government and indirect persuading the public competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary however an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion or a rise of public environmental awareness induces substitution between the two the findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and growing public environmental awareness the size of its economic stake and hence the associated lobbying effort and the efficiency of its organization in exerting political influence how then can we explain why some environmental groups have been very successful against polluting industries when the latter s economic stakes seem very high and they lobby more and their interests are more efficiently organized some might suggest that the reason for the success of the environmental movement is that environmental groups have large memberships and can provide block votes 2 however according to olson 1965 a large membership of an interest group is not necessarily an advantage and it is still uncertain whether environmental groups are able to mobilize their members to cast votes based on such affiliations this paper suggests an alternative explanation by developing a theory of direct and indirect competition between special interests for political influence rather than marshalling block votes a primary feature of our framework is that two opposing interest groups an environmentalist group and an industrialist group compete directly and indirectly for political influence in a three stage game the indirect competition takes place in the first stage in which interest groups exert effort in persuading the public to indirectly influence government policy the direct competition takes place in the second stage in which interest groups exert effort in

do ethical values work a quantitative study of the impact of fair trade coffee on consumer behavior this study investigates the large french fair trade ft market and the importance of ft coffee within it in an attempt to identify some general features of ft consumers on the basis of 7 587 transactions the authors also determine the impact of ft characteristics on customer behavior the main result is somewhat surprising ft coffee purchases seem to involve a temporary commitment as ft coffee consumers appear less loyal than traditional coffee consumers the authors derive some business and academic implications

indivisible labor and the business cycle abstract a growth model with shocks to technology is studied labor is indivisible so all variability in hours worked is due to fluctuations in the number employed we find that unlike previous equilibrium models of the business cycle this economy displays large fluctuations in hours worked and relatively small fluctuations in productivity this finding is independent of individuals willingness to substitute leisure across time this and other findings are the result of studying and comparing summary statistics describing this economy an economy with divisible labor and post war u s time series

the price precision effect evidence from laboratory and market data we examine two questions does the roundness or precision of prices bias magnitude judgments if so do these biased judgments affect buyer behavior results from five studies suggest that buyers underestimate the magnitudes of precise prices we term this the precision effect the first three studies are laboratory experiments designed to test the existence of the precision effect and examine the underlying psychological processes in study 1 we find that precise prices are judged to be smaller than round prices of similar magnitudes for example participants in this experiment incorrectly judged 395 425 to be smaller than 395 000 in study 2 we show that precision is more likely to affect magnitude judgments under conditions of uncertainty study 3 demonstrates that manipulating prior experience with the pattern of roundness and precision in numbers can moderate the precision effect studies 4 and 5 examine whether the precision effect influences buyers willingness to pay for negotiated purchases e g houses in study 4 we conduct an experiment on a nationally representative sample of homeowners to demonstrate that participants are willing to pay more for houses when the sellers use precise e g 364 578 instead of comparable round e g 365 000 prices in study 5 we analyze data from residential real estate transactions in two separate markets and find that buyers pay higher sale prices when list prices are more precise these empirical results enrich our understanding of the psychological processes that underlie price magnitude judgments and have substantive implications for buyer and seller behavior

the advertising mix for a search good we extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising we model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product and determine a firm s equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information price information and horizontal match information equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is necessary the outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling lower quality firms need to provide more information for a given quality level as a function of consumer visit costs first quality information is disclosed then price information and then horizontal product information are added to the advertising mix some suggestive evidence is provided from airline ads in newspapers this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

eliciting and utilizing willingness to pay evidence from field trials in northern ghana we utilize the becker degroot marschak 1964 mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern ghana the bdm mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research allowing us to directly estimate demand compute heterogeneous treatment effects and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting we demonstrate the implementation of bdm along these three dimensions compare it to the standard take it or leave it method for eliciting willingness to pay and discuss practical issues for implementing the mechanism in true field settings jel classifications c93 d12 d82 l11 l31

price as a stimulus to think the case for willful overpricing consumers aware of a new benefit will often experience uncertainty about its personal relevance or usage value this paper shows that the decision to deliberate further to resolve this uncertainty and reach a polarized judgment of personal relevance critically depends on the posted price in particular a price above the consumer s initial willingness to pay might be thought provoking and enhance the perception of relevance with a certain probability this behavioral mechanism is introduced formally and by way of an experiment with reference to the purchase of organic lettuce and fair trade coffee accounting for the effect of price as a stimulus to think a monopolistic firm should either over price transgressive pricing or under price regressive pricing in comparison to the consumer s willingness to pay under certain circumstances the firm should also empower consumers with means that reduce the effort of deliberation

on modelling the natural rate of unemployment with indivisible labour this analysis investigates modelling the natural rate of unemployment in settings where labour s utilization has some lumpy aspect to it specifically the introduction of various nonconvexities into tastes and technology lead to unemploy ment in general equilibrium equilibria can emerge where 1 those currently unemployed have higher probabilities of being unemployed in the future than those currently employed 2 some agents are jobless while others work overtime and 3 seniority rules seemingly arise whereby old workers cannot be laid off so long as either new workers are being hired or some workers are doing overtime the relative welfare levels of employed and unemployed agents are analysed

employment with asymmetric information in an economy without informational and other distortions entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a pareto optimal allocation of resources this paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort in particular if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes employment will be less than fully pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature

the demand for military expenditures an international comparison earlier studies have explained inter country variations in the share of gnp devoted to military expenditures by international spillovers and by differences in the threat of attack related to relative incomes in this paper we use the theory of public choice to explain these differences we attempt to measure the importance of both international spillovers and relative incomes along with two other factors the tax price elasticity of demand and economies of scale in the consumption of security we find that international spillovers are significant and positive that the income elasticity of demand is greater than unity that the tax price elasticity of demand explains part of observed inter country differences and that there are considerable economies of scale in the consumption of military spending finally between 1960 and 1975 there was apparently a substantial increase in the value which each country derived from a dollar of military spending by its allies this phenomenon which seems related to the increased importance of deterrent weapons has tended to induce individual alliance members to reduce the share of their national income devoted to defense

multidimensional separating equilibria and moral hazard an empirical study of national football league contract negotiations this paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts using contract and performance data on players drafted into the national football league from 1986 through 1991 we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations in addition our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player s effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract

price endings when prices signal quality this paper provides a theoretical explanation for why firms behave as though they use round prices to signal quality by replacing the linear demand curve in bagwell and riordan s 1991 price as a signal of quality model with a kinked demand curve and analyzing what price endings firms are most likely to use the following observations can be made 1 firms that are using high prices to signal quality are more likely to set those prices at round numbers and 2 price endings themselves are not necessarily signals of quality a simulation was conducted to demonstrate that these findings generally hold true even in the presence of demand spikes at 9 ending prices e g schindler and kibarian 1996 finally empirical evidence is provided to demonstrate that firms tend to use more round prices for higherquality products and that this relationship is even stronger for product categories where consumers are less able to detect the true level of quality prior to purchase

strategic waiting for consumer generated quality information dynamic pricing of new experience goods in this paper we study the impact of consumer generated quality information e g consumer reviews on a firm s dynamic pricing strategy in the presence of strategic consumers such information is useful not only to the consumers that have not yet purchased the product but also to the firm the informativeness of the consumer generated quality information depends however on the volume of consumers who share their opinions and thus depends on the initial sales volume hence via its initial price the firm not only influences its revenue but also controls the quality information flow over time the firm may either enhance or dampen the quality information flow via increasing or decreasing initial sales the corresponding pricing strategy to steer the quality information flow is not always intuitive compared to the case without consumer generated quality information the firm may reduce the initial sales and lower the initial price interestingly the firm may get strictly worse off due to the consu

product variety and endogenous pricing with evaluation costs one important decision firms must make is to select the product line characteristics and number of products to offer consumers this paper explores the effect of the interaction between consumer evaluation costs and pricing on the optimal product line length to offer consumers before deciding to buy a product among all products offered a consumer learns the product line length given the product line length a consumer decides whether to evaluate the products available and their prices this decision to evaluate depends on the expected consumer surplus after the evaluation being greater than the evaluation costs when the firm offers few products the firm may not attract many consumers because of lack of product fit and may be forced to offer low prices when the firm offers many products all consumers will find a great product fit that is the variance of consumer valuations per product chosen is lower this allows the firm to charge high prices to extract ex post consumer surplus resulting in lower ex ante expected consumer surplus which may lead consumers not to evaluate the products in the first place that is by offering fewer products a firm can commit not to extract all possible consumer surplus these two forces may then lead to the existence of an interior optimal number of products to offer the optimal number of products offered is decreasing in the evaluation costs

dynamic models incorporating individual heterogeneity utility evolution in conjoint analysis it has been shown in the behavioral decision making marketing research and psychometric literature that the structure underlying preferences can change during the administration of repeated measurements e g conjoint analysis and data collection because of effects from learning fatigue boredom and so on in this research note we propose a new class of hierarchical dynamic bayesian models for capturing such dynamic effects in conjoint applications which extend the standard hierarchical bayesian random effects and existing dynamic bayesian models by allowing for individual level heterogeneity around an aggregate dynamic trend using simulated conjoint data we explore the performance of these new dynamic models incorporating individual level heterogeneity across a number of possible types of dynamic effects and demonstrate the derived benefits versus static models in addition we introduce the idea of an unbiased dynamic estimate and demonstrate that using a counterbalanced design is important from an estimation perspective when parameter dynamics are present

modeling choice strategies for noncomparable alternatives theoretical models are developed for two strategies consumers use to choose among noncomparable alternatives the models view consumers as trading off decision error and processing effort when selecting a decision strategy the models predict the use of choice strategies and implicit abstraction processes for noncomparable alternatives in a number of different circumstances

consumer deliberation and product line design this paper studies optimal product line design when consumers need to incur costly deliberation to uncover their valuations for quality to induce deliberation a firm must maintain quality dispersion and cut the price of the high end product so that consumers are motivated to deliberate in the hope that high end consumption fits their needs to prevent deliberation the firm may have to offer downgraded quality at a low price so that an impulsive purchase will not appear too wasteful whether the firm should induce deliberation depends on how much surplus it creates by aligning the supply of quality with heterogeneous demand for quality and how much surplus it captures during this process interestingly equilibrium firm profit consumer surplus and social welfare can all increase with the cost of deliberation we extend the model to accommodate consumers heterogeneous prior beliefs of their valuations for quality we also discuss how market research could benefit from taking into account the endogeneity of consumer deliberation

measuring consumers willingness to pay at the point of purchase abstract economists psychologists and marketing researchers rely on measures of consumers willingness to pay wtp in estimating demand for private and public goods and in designing optimal price schedules existing market research techniques for measuring wtp differ in whether they provide an incentive to consumers to reveal their true wtp and in whether they simulate actual point of purchase contexts the authors present an empirical comparison of several procedures for eliciting wtp that are applicable directly at the point of purchase in particular the authors test the applicability of becker degroot and marschak s 1964 well known incentive compatible procedure for assessing the utility of lotteries to measuring consumers wtp in three studies the authors explore the reliability validity and feasibility of the procedure and show that it yields lower wtp estimates than do non incentive compatible methods such as open ended and double bounded contingent valuation they show experimentally t

the effect of price on preference consistency over time construal level theory indicates that consumers tend to prefer products high in desirability greater functionality for distant future decisions but switch their preferences toward products high in feasibility greater usage convenience for near future decisions the current research demonstrates that price information traditionally considered as a feasibility cue can increase consumers near future preference toward products with greater functionality despite their low convenience leading to preference consistency over time as the underlying mechanism price information increases the functionality importance for near future decisions due to consumers enhanced value seeking tendency when seeing price and their lay belief that greater functionality represents higher value further when consumers are led to believe that greater convenience represents higher value price and the value seeking tendency result in a greater preference toward easy to use products for the distant future and lead to preference consistency across time as well theoretical implications are discussed

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

a dynamic small open economy model with involuntary unemployment it is well known that real business cycle small open economy soe models rely on greenwood hercowitz and huffman 1988 preferences to match the countercyclical trade balance observed in open economies as well as other second moments while standard preferences a la king plosser and rebelo 1988 are commonly labelled ineffective owing to their inability to yield the countercyclical trade balance in this paper i show that an soe model with standard preferences and involuntary unemployment with efficient risk sharing can obtain a countercyclical trade balance and match main empirical regularities in small open economies il est bien connu que les modeles de cycles d affaires reels dans une petite economie ouverte peo comptent sur des preferences a la greenwood hercowitz et huffman 1988 pour etre compatibles avec la balance commerciale contre cyclique observee dans les economies ouvertes ainsi que sur d autres second moments alors que les preferences standards a la king plosser et rebelo 1988 sont considerees comme ineffectives a cause de leur inhabilitea engendrer la balance commerciale contre cyclique dans ce texte l auteur montre qu un modele de peo avec preferences standards et chomage involontaire et partage efficient du risque peut engendrer une balance commerciale contre cyclique et s arrimer aux principales regularites observees dans les petites economies ouvertes

informing transforming and persuading disentangling the multiple effects of advertising on brand choice decisions prior behavioral research has suggested that advertising can influence a consumer s quality evaluation through informative and transformative effects the informative effect acts directly to inform a consumer of product attributes and hence shapes her evaluations of brand quality the transformative effect affects the consumer s evaluation of brand quality by enhancing her assessment of her subsequent consumption experience in addition advertising may influence a consumer s utility directly even without providing any explicit information this is the persuasive effect in this paper we propose a framework that formally models the processes through which all three effects of advertisements impact consumers brand evaluations and their subsequent brand choice decisions in particular we model source credibility confirmatory bias and bounded rationality on the part of consumers by appropriately modifying the standard bayesian learning approach our model conforms closely to prior behavioral literature and the experimental findings therein in our empirical analysis we get significant estimates of both informative and transformative effects across brands we find interesting temporal patterns across the effects for instance the importance of transformative effects seem to grow over time while that of informative effects diminishes finally we conduct policy experiments to examine the impact of increased ad intensity on advertising effects as well as the role played by consumption ambiguity

face value information and signaling in an illegal market author affiliation trevon d logan the ohio state university and nber 410 arps hall 1945 north high street columbus oh 43210 usa e mail logan 155 osu edu corresponding author manisha shah dagger university of california los angeles and nber 3250 public affairs building los angeles ca 91195 e mail manishashah ucla edu acknowledgment we would like to thank george akerlof rodney j andrews raj arunachalam andrea a cann lisa d cook brahima coulibaly scott cunningham angus deaton avinash dixit claudia d goldin karla hoff joseph kaboski simon loertscher joseph m newhard christina paxson john pepper ruth peterson patricia reagan seth sanders ebonya washington nathan woodfork three anonymous referees and numerous seminar participants who provided helpful suggestions the usual disclaimer applies 1 introductionformal enforcement is often seen as the cornerstone of contract design while information can overcome the problems of asymmetric information akerlof 1970 spence 1973 principals are unlikely to engage agents unless the information conveyed is credible and verifiable while the use of formal institutions such as courts is rare relative to the volume of transactions the standard argument is that the presence of formal institutions gives contracts their authority in schelling s 1960 classic terminology the power to sue and be sued gives parties the ability to make credible enforceable commitments a prerequisite to most transactions without means of redress the information that principals and agents share would a priori have little value numerous studies have documented how informal networks long term relationships and reputations overcome problems of asymmetric information indeed researchers have developed large literatures that look at limited contractibility hart 1995 tirole 1999 and situations in which formal enforcement is costly greif 1993 to consider the additional mechanisms that must be in place if existing institutions are lacking or unable to mediate disputes however the literature has not developed an empirical answer to whether the value of information without formal enforcement approaches its value when formal enforcement is present in this article we ask two questions i are formal enforcement mechanisms necessary for the information that principals and agents share to have value ii if not then what is the value of information in an environment without formal enforcement ideally we would like to analyze an illegal market to answer these questions illegal markets rule out the possibility that market function or variation in the information environment is due to the presence of formal enforcement similarly in an illegal market the information that principals and agents convey to one another may not be credible or verifiable and misrepresentation is not likely to be punished the problem is that most illegal markets have coarse information environments it is therefore challenging to obtain information on prices quantities and consumer and producer behavior making empirical answers to these questions especially difficult we overcome these problems by analyzing an illegal market with a rich information structure the online market for male sex work we begin with a general description of this seldom studied market we then document the ways in which the clients of male sex workers informally police the market by informing other clients of deceptive sex workers and by reviewing sex workers on independent client owned web sites the informal policing in the market raises the cost of misrepresentation for would be fraudulent escorts and rewards the truthful self disclosure of honest escorts encouraging truthful self disclosure we further exploit this institutional knowledge to identify the specific information clients treat as signals of escort quality

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality in a standard adverse selection world asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely then if consumers observe the investment but not the realization of product quality before purchase they can infer the probability distribution of high and low quality that may be put on the market we uncover two effects that may lead the firm to overinvest in quality compared to a market with full information first an adverse selection effect according to which a sufficiently large investment can avoid adverse selection and second an efficiency effect according to which a larger investment reduces the probability of having in the market low quality products that are not socially valuable

managerial incentives investment and aggregate implications scale effects we explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive problem arises because one input factor managerial effort is not publicly observed we show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first best in low states and that this phenomenon can account for greater cyclical variability in aggregate production and investment from the perspective of incentive scheme design a special feature of the model is that screening takes place over two variables investment and output rather than one as is customary

don t rest on your laurels reputational change and young technology based ventures abstract we combine resource based theory and social cognition theory to investigate the factors both limiting and related to between period reputational change of young firms in a dynamic technology based industry an analysis of computer graphics chipmakers during the period 1992 2003 provides evidence that operational signals are related to reputational change specifically receiving a product award in the current period is associated with positive change and gaps in product announcements are associated with negative change we find little support for our hypothesis that the reputations of older firms are less likely to change

a dynamic equilibrium model of inflation and unemployment a stochastic general equilibrium model is constructed which is capable of examining the covariance properties between inflation and unemployment both conditioned and unconditioned upon the state o

conspicuous consumption snobbism and conformism abstract we develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status in equilibrium the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends in an identifiable way on the number of consumers and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism the market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist we derive some unconventional policy implications concerning the taxation of luxuries and the voluntary provision of public goods

willingness to pay estimation with choice based conjoint analysis addressing extreme response behavior with individually adapted designs the increasing consideration of behavioral aspects in operations management models has prompted greater use of choice based conjoint cbc studies in operations research such studies can elicit consumers willingness to pay wtp a core input for many optimization models however optimization models can yield valid results only if consumers wtp is estimated accurately a simulation study and two field studies show that extreme response behavior in cbc studies such that consumers always or never choose the no purchase option harms the validity of wtp estimates reporting the share of consumers who always and never select the no purchase option allows for detecting extreme response behavior this study suggests an individually adapted design that avoids extreme response behavior and thus significantly improves wtp estimation accuracy

voluntary product safety certification this paper describes the incentives for firms to seek voluntary product safety certifications we consider a firm that makes the decision of whether or not to seek certification prior to selling the product we show that even when the firm and the consumers have the same beliefs about the product s safety there are incentives for the firm to seek safety certification the main analysis investigates the role of consumer moral hazard and shows that it can lead to greater incentives for voluntary certification when inherent product safety and effort are substitutes but smaller incentives when they are complements the analysis of consumer moral hazard provides a nuanced perspective on the so called risk compensation or the peltzman effect phenomenon which postulates higher levels of accidents for safer products in our paper products that are successfully certified can end up with a higher incidence of accidents we also uncover an interesting nonmonotonic relationship between effectiveness of consumer

the impact of capital structure on advertising competition an empirical study this article examines the interaction between capital structure and advertising competition using a sample of firms that raise significant amounts of capital we find that firms whose financial leverage has decreased as a result of their new funding increase their advertising significantly more than firms whose leverage has increased we also find that these firms industry rivals respond less aggressively with their own advertising when they have more debt in their capital structure overall our results support the view that financial leverage has a dampening effect on the intensity with which a firm chooses to compete in the product market

the discriminating consumer product proliferation and willingness to pay for quality abstract the authors propose that a crowded product space motivates consumers to better discriminate between options of different quality specifically this article reports evidence from three controlled experiments and one natural experiment that people are prepared to pay more for high quality products and less for low quality products when they are considered in the context of a dense as opposed to a sparse set of alternatives to explain this effect the authors argue that consumers uncertain about the importance of quality learn from observing market outcomes product proliferation reveals that other consumers care to discriminate among similar alternatives and in turn this inference raises the importance of quality in decision making

persuasive puffery sellers often make claims about product strengths without providing evidence even though such claims are mere puffery we show that they can be credible because talking up any one strength comes at the implicit trade off of not talking up another potential strength puffery pulls in some buyers who value product attributes that are talked up or emphasized while pushing away other buyers who infer that the attributes they value are relative weaknesses when the initial probability of making a sale is low there are more potential buyers to pull in than to push away so puffery is persuasive overall this persuasiveness requires that buyers have some privacy about their preferences so that the seller does not completely pander to them more generally the results show how comparative cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker can be credible and persuasive in standard discrete choice models used throughout marketing economics and other disciplines

product compatibility as a signal of quality in a market with network externalities abstract in this paper i consider the compatibility decision as a signaling device of the quality of a newly introduced technology of which users are not informed provided that firms are located sufficiently far apart in hotelling s 0 1 interval i find separating equilibria where low compatibility signals high quality this possible separation is due to the fact that low compatibility is more advantageous to the high quality entrant than to the low quality entrant since it can prevent users of the established technology from enjoying network benefits from the new technology very much

trade and the political economy of redistribution this paper shows how international trade affects the support for policies which redistribute income between workers across sectors and how the existence of such policies changes the support for trade liberalization workers who are imperfectly mobile across sectors vote on whether to subsidize ailing sectors thereby redistributing income but also distorting the labor allocation we present three main findings first redistributive policies are more likely to arise in a small open than in a closed economy for a broad range of parameters second if a redistributive policy is adopted in both situations income differences across sectors tend to be lower in the open economy third the possibility to redistribute income across sectors raises the political support for trade liberalization in the first place