winding number criterion for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in linear rational expectations models abstract this paper develops a simple geometric criterion for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in linear rational expectations lre models the class of models considered is very general and includes models with infinitely many lags and or leads of endogenous variables i show that the criterion is tightly related to the familiar blanchard and kahn econometrica 48 5 1980 1305 hansen and sargent rational expectations and econometric practice 1981 and whiteman linear rational expectations models a user s guide 1983 conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in lre models the new criterion can be used to extend the policy rule robustness analysis of onatski and stock macroeconomic dynamics 6 1 2002 85 from purely backward looking models to forward looking models

estimating a model of strategic network choice the convenience store industry in okinawa this paper investigates a determinant of location choice for multistore retailing firms the trade off between the business stealing effect and the cost saving effect from clustering their own stores i present an empirical model of network choice by two multistore firms i use lattice theoretical results to address the computational burden of solving for an equilibrium in store networks the framework integrates the static entry game of complete information with post entry outcome data while using simulations to correct for the selection of entrants i present an application of the model to the case of the convenience store industry in okinawa island japan using unique cross sectional data on store networks and revenues i use parameter estimates to examine the impact of a hypothetical horizontal merger on store configurations costs and profits results suggest a retailer s trade off between cost savings and lost revenues from clustering its stores is positive across markets and negative within a market i find an acquirer of a hypothetical merger of two multistore firms would decrease its number of stores in suburbs but increase its number in the city center

product and price competition in a duopoly this paper examines the role of consumer preferences costs and price competition in determining the competitive product strategy of a firm in the model studied here there are two identical firms competing on product quality and price they face consumers who prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product but differ in how much they are willing to pay for quality the consumers can also choose a substitute if they don t like the product price offerings of the two firms for the firms a higher quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product the paper shows that the equilibrium strategy for each firm should be to differentiate its product from its competitor with the firm choosing the higher quality choosing the higher margin as well this differentiation however is not efficient that is it is possible to choose two other products and offer them at prices that cover their marginal cost and still satisfy consumers needs better in the aggregate a monopolist by contrast would differentiate his product line efficiently this suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition the paper also shows that if one firm enters the market first then it can defend itself from later entrants and gain a first mover advantage by preempting the most desirable product position

asymmetric promotion effects and brand positioning several studies have shown that promotions of national brands yield more effect than those of store brands e g allenby and rossi 1991 blattberg and wisniewski 1989 however the evolution of price quality data available from consumer reports over the last 15 years seems to reveal a reduction of the quality gap between store brands and national brands while price differences remain substantial simultaneously the share of private label brands has increased progressive grocer 1994 in this context we study whether we can maintain a view of the world where national brands may easily attract consumers from store brands through promotions whereas store brands are relatively ineffective in attracting consumers from national brands by such means we analyze consumer reactions to price discounts in a parsimonious preference model featuring loss aversion and reference dependence along dimensions of price and quality hardie johnson and fader 1993 tversky and kahneman 1991 the key result of our analysis is that given any two brands there is an asymmetric promotion effect in favor of the higher quality higher price brands if and only if the quality gap between the brands is sufficiently large in comparison with the price gap thus the direction of promotion asymmetry is not unconditional it depends uniquely on the value of the ratio of quality and price differences compared to a category specific criterion which we call if the ratio of quality and price differences is larger than this criterion the usual asymmetry prevails if such is not the case the lower quality lower price brands promote more effectively more precisely our model predicts that cross promotion effects depend on two components of brand positioning in the price quality quadrant first we define a variable termed positioning advantage that indicates whether relative to the standards achieved by another brand a given brand is underpriced positive advantage or overpriced negative advantage promotion effectiveness is increasing in this variable second cross promotion effects between two brands depend on their distance in the price quality quadrant this variable impacts promotion effectiveness negatively and symmetrically for any pair of brands positioning advantage and brand distance are orthogonal components of brand positioning irrespective of the degree of correlation between available price and quality levels in the market empirically we investigate the role of brand positioning in explaining cross promotion effects using panel data from the chilled orange juice and peanut butter categories we compute the independent positioning variables positioning advantage and brand distance from readily available data on price and quality positioning after obtaining our estimates of we next measure promotion effectiveness by estimating choice share changes in response to a price discount using a choice model that does not contain any information about quality price ratios finally we test the relation between the two positioning variables and the promotion effectiveness measures the data reveal that in the orange juice category lower quality lower price brands generally promote more effectively than higher quality higher price brands in the peanut butter data the opposite asymmetry holds in both cases inter brand promotion patterns are well explained by the positioning variables an attractive feature of our model is that in addition to the direction of promotion asymmetries it also explains the extent of those asymmetries a further interesting aspect of this approach is that we go beyond a categorization of brands into price tiers for instance lower tier brands in our data may promote more effectively than one national brand but less effectively than another consistent with our theoretical predictions the data presented here seem to confirm that such cases occur because the lower tier brand offers a favorable trade off of price and quality differences compared with one national brand and a less favorable trade off compared with the other the content of this paper is potentially relevant for brand managers or retailers concerned with predicting the impact of their promotions the paper is of particular interest to marketing scientists who study the performance of store brands versus national brands and may also appeal to those who wish to explore the marketing implications of behavioral decision theory finally our investigation does not reject blattberg and wisniewski s 1989 finding shared by allenby and rossi 1991 and hardie johnson and fader 1993 that national brands have a principle advantage in promotion effectiveness rather it formalizes when this principle advantage is overruled by positioning disadvantages of such brands

product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model abstract we extend the well known spatial competition model d aspremont gabszewicz thisse 1979 to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations we demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the center to delay the follower s entry leading to a non maximum differentiation outcome we also investigate how exogenous parameters affect the leader s location and firms values and in particular numerically show that the profit of the leader changes non monotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

a comment on rewarding impatience in lisa blaydes s article rewarding impatience a bargaining and enforcement model of opec international organization spring 2004 the oil production of members of the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec depends on the extent to which they discount future gains this comment discusses computer related errors in the original article and determines how the results change when the errors are rectified i then add country fixed effects and some additional control variables to the corrected models i would like to thank lisa blaydes for data and helpful discussions and to thank jim alt and mike kellerman for comments on previous drafts all remaining errors are my own

competitive strategies for late entry into a market with a dominant brand this paper considers optimal positioning advertising and pricing strategies for a firm contemplating entry in a market dominated by an entrenched competitor drawing on behavioral research on consumer preference formation we develop an individual level model that reflects differing consumer responses to similar products offered by the dominant brand and later entrants an effect we term asymmetric preferences from the resulting aggregate market response model we derive several competitive implications notably 1 that preference asymmetry can make a differentiated late entry strategy optimal even if preferences would appear to dictate otherwise and 2 that me too strategies are not equilibrium late entry strategies more generally our analysis suggests that preference asymmetry can contribute to the persistent competitive advantage of dominant brands

measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks the goal of this paper is to study the behavior of consumers dealers and manufacturers in the car sector and present an approach that can be used by managers and policy makers to investigate the impact of significant demand shocks on profits prices and dealer networks more specifically we investigate consumer demand substitution patterns and price decisions across different cars and dealer locations to identify dealerships with low margins or high fixed costs and measure the value of closing down dealerships for manufacturers we apply our model empirically to the san diego area using a transactional data set with information about the locations of dealers and consumers as well as manufacturer and retail prices we find strong consumer disutility for travel and find that dealers have local demand areas that are shared with a small set of competitors we show that a reduction of market demand by 30 over two years similar to the economic crisis of 2008 2009 results in an annual drop in prices of approximately 11 we discuss this price drop in the context of the 2009 federal policy measure known as the car allowance rebate system program we compare predictions and actual dealership closings in the general motors and chrysler dealer networks as an application of our approach

accounting for primary and secondary demand effects with aggregate data discrete choice models of aggregate demand such as the random coefficients logit can handle large differentiated products categories parsimoniously while still providing flexible substitution patterns however the discrete choice assumption may not be appropriate for many categories in which we expect consumers may purchase more than one unit of the selected item we derive the aggregate demand system corresponding to a discrete continuous household level model of demand we also propose a method of simulated moments procedure that provides consistent estimates of the structural parameters when only aggregate data are available the procedure also enables the researcher to control both for the potential endogeneity of marketing variables as well as potential heterogeneity in consumer tastes using our aggregate estimates we can measure the decomposition of price elasticities into incidence brand choice and purchase quantity components we also propose several empirical tests to assess the validity of the discrete continuous demand system versus that of the logit model in several simulation experiments we demonstrate the robustness of this model across datasets in which quantity choices may or may not be important our empirical calibration to store level data in the refrigerated orange juice category indicates a considerable improvement in fit of the observed aggregate sales using the discrete continuous model

aggregate fluctuations as an information transmission mechanism a model is presented in which individuals attempt to track shocks with a capital like quantity that is costly to produce and to adjust the shocks have separate individual specific and economy wide components individuals do not have direct access to desired information about economy wide shocks the information is potentially available from the observation of endogenous aggregates but because the aggregates are endogenous there is an informational externality associated with them two polar cases are considered when the desired information is about economy wide real shocks as in townsend 1983 the externality is potentially completely internalized when the desired information is about purely nominal aggregates as in lucas 1973 1975 aggregate fluctuations are a necessary condition of equilibrium

mcdonald s and kfc in china competitors or companions in this paper we study the entry and expansion decisions of mcdonald s and kfc in china using an originally assembled data set on the two chains expansion in the china market from their initial entry up to year 2007 we analyze how the presence of a rival affects each firm s strategies the results indicate that a rival s presence has a net positive effect on a chain s expansion decision we focus on testing two possible explanations for a positive rival impact market learning and demand expansion first we derive a set of theoretical predictions on how a chain s optimal expansion decision would react to its rival s expansion patterns when market learning versus demand expansion is the driving force of the rival s positive influence the empirical analysis based on these predictions consistently suggests that market learning is more likely to explain the positive effect of kfc on mcdonald s and that demand expansion is more plausible with mcdonald s positive spillover on kfc in other words the results are consistent with the presence of kfc signaling market demand potential and growth to mcdonald s and the presence of mcdonald s helping to cultivate consumer taste and generate demand for western fast food which benefits kfc

sequential product positioning under differential costs this paper examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures it shows that if the first mover knows the second mover to have a lower production cost it positions away from the most attractive location in the market further the larger the second mover s cost advantage the farther away the first mover positions from the most attractive location the paper also models uncertainty in the first mover s mind about the later entrant s cost structure and shows that an increase in this uncertainty in the sense of mean preserving spread also makes the first mover position farther from the most attractive location in the market overall this paper suggests that unless the first entrant in a market is certain that the later entrant will not have a superior cost structure it may be better off leaving the best position in the market vacant and having a niche or fringe product

defensive marketing strategies this paper analyzes how a firm should adjust its marketing expenditures and its price to defend its position in an existing market from attack by a competitive new product our focus is to provide usable managerial recommendations on the strategy of response in particular we show that if products can be represented by their position in a multiattribute space consumers are heterogeneous and maximize utility and awareness advertising and distribution can be summarized by response functions then for the profit maximizing firm it is optimal to decrease awareness advertising it is optimal to decrease the distribution budget unless the new product can be kept out of the market a price increase may be optimal and even under the optimal strategy profits decrease as a result of the competitive new product furthermore if the consumer tastes are uniformly distributed across the spectrum a price decrease increases defensive profits it is optimal at the margin to improve product quality in the direction of the defending product s strength and it is optimal at the margin to reposition by advertising in the same direction in addition we provide practical procedures to estimate 1 the distribution of consumer tastes and 2 the position of the new product in perceptual space from sales data and knowledge of the percent of consumers who are aware of the new product and find it available competitive diagnostics such as the angle of attack are introduced to help the defending manager this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 4 pages 319 360 in 1983

competitive pricing behavior in the auto market a structural analysis in a competitive marketplace the effectiveness of any element of the marketing mix is determined not only by its absolute value but also by its relative value with respect to the competition for example the effectiveness of a price cut in increasing demand is critically related to competitors reaction to the price change managers therefore need to know the nature of competitive interactions among firms in this paper we take a theory driven empirical approach to gain a deeper understanding of the competitive pricing behavior in the u s auto market the ability motivation paradigm posits that a firm needs both the ability and the motivation to succeed in implementing a strategy boulding and staelin 1995 we use arguments from the game theoretic literature to understand firm motivation and abilities in different segments of the auto market we then combine these insights from the game theoretic literature and the ability motivation paradigm to develop hypotheses about competition in different segments of the u s auto market to test our hypotheses of competitive behavior we estimate a structural model that disentangles the competition effect from the demand and cost effects on prices the theory of repeated games predicts that firms with a long run profitability objective will try to sustain cooperative pricing behavior as a stable equilibrium when conditions permit for example markets with high concentration and stable market environments are favorable for sustaining cooperative behavior and therefore provide firms with the ability to cooperate the theory of switching costs suggests that in markets in which a firm s current customers tend to be loyal firms have a motivation to compete very aggressively for new customers recognizing the positive benefits of loyalty from the customer base in the long run as consumer loyalty in the market increases the gains from increasing market share by means of aggressive competitive behavior are more than offset by losses in profit margins firms therefore have the motivation to price cooperatively empirically we find aggressive behavior in the minicom pact and subcompact segments cooperative behavior in the compact and midsize segments and bertrand behavior in the full size segment these findings are consistent with our theory based hypotheses about competition in different segments in estimating a structural model of the auto market we address several methodological issues a particular difficulty is the large number of car models in the u s auto market existing studies have inferred competitive behavior only in markets with two to four products they also use relatively simple functional forms of demand to facilitate easy estimation functional forms of demand however impose structure on cross elasticities between products such structure when inappropriate can bias the estimates of competitive interaction we therefore use the random coefficients logit demand model to allow flexibility in cross elasticities we also use recent advances in new empirical industrial organization neio to extend structural estimation of competitive behavior to markets with a large number of products we use the simulation based estimation approach developed by berry et al 1995 to estimate our model a frequent criticism of the neio approach is that its focus on industry specific studies limits the generalizability of its findings in this study we retain the advantages of neio methods but partially address the issue of generalizability by analyzing competitive behavior in multiple segments within the auto industry to see whether there is a consistent pattern that can be explained by theory theoretical modelers can use our results to judge the appropriateness of their models in predicting competitive outcomes for the markets that they analyze a by product of our analysis is that we also get estimates of demand and cost apart from competitive interactions for the market managers can use these estimates to perform what if analysis they can answer questions about what prices to charge when a new product is introduced or when an existing product s characteristics are changed

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

rivalry in price and location by differentiated product manufacturers in this article we estimate a model of strategic rivalry between food manufacturers in product design and pricing we derive a spatial structural model in which food manufacturers jointly select prices and the optimal attribute composition of their product lines we find that manufacturers have an incentive to locate yogurt products nearby others in attribute space and that products with the most similar attribute compositions enjoy the widest price cost margins our findings explain the observation that most consumer package goods tend to be very similar yet manufacturers appear to earn above normal profits copyright 2013 oxford university press

cross asset speculation in stock markets in practice heterogeneously informed speculators combine private information about multiple stocks with information in prices taking into account how their trades influence the inferences of other speculators via prices we show how this speculation causes prices to be more correlated than asset fundamentals raising price volatility the covariance structure of asset fundamentals drives that of prices while the covariance structure of liquidity trade drives that of order flows we characterize how speculator profits vary with the distributions of information and liquidity trade across assets and speculators and relate the cross asset factor structure of order flows to that of returns

capacity use in multi unit firms evidence for efficiency gains or strategic competition in the us restaurant industry in this article i examine both the full firm size distribution and establishment level capacity use to determine if efficiency gains or strategic competition account for the proliferation of multi unit firms in the us restaurant industry using us census microdata i find that multi unit firms operate a greater number of restaurants and larger individual restaurants in larger metropolitan statistical areas msas this evidence of increased profitability goes hand in hand with increases in capacity utilization through longer operating hours and more intensive production of meals and nonmeals output at individual establishments greater capacity exploitation is consistent with efficient firms rather strategic behaviour such as product proliferation or location preemption to limit rivalry furthermore these results hold true for multi unit firms but not for large national chain systems suggesting that efficiency gains accrue from firm specific capital not just from marketing or distribution scale econ

coordination and collaboration regimes in an anarchic world the study of regimes can contribute to our understanding of international politics only if regimes represent more than international organizations and less than all international relations the conceptualization of regimes developed here accepts the realist image of international politics in which autonomous self interested states interact in an anarchic environment yet there are situations in which rational actors have an incentive to eschew unconstrained independent decision making situations in which individualistic self interested calculation leads them to prefer joint decision making regimes because independent self interested behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes these situations are labeled dilemmas of common interests and dilemmas of common aversions to deal with these states must collaborate with one another or coordinate their behavior respectively thus there are different bases for regimes which give rise to regimes with different characteristics coordination is self enforcing and can be reached through the use of conventions collaboration is more formalized and requires mechanisms both to monitor potential cheating and to insure compliance with the regime the article elucidates the assumptions of such an interest based approach to regimes assimilates alternative explanations into this framework and develops the implications for regime maintenance and change

price increasing competition in a discrete choice model of product differentiation the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than equal to or higher than the single product monopoly price whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm s demand curve the joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determines the relative strength of these effects the analysis provides precise conditions for price increasing competition and reveals that it is unexceptional from a theoretical perspective

note competitive price and positioning strategies brand positioning and brand pricing are important strategic decisions for marketing managers such decisions are interrelated and depend upon competitive brand positions and prices however any unilateral decisions may encourage repositioning and price adjustment by competitors thus leading to either new market equilibria or a price positioning war this paper examines such price and positioning decisions in a competitive environment by extending the defender consumer model to more complex equilibria we assume that the brands are already in the market and that positions are sticky in the sense that brands cannot leapfrog one another among the insights for such incumbent brands are if prices are symmetric and held constant firms seek to reposition toward the center of the market but price advantages by central firms can mediate that central tendency such that an equilibrium exists with positive profits if brand positions are held constant the nash equilibria for prices exist and are unique and category profits the sum of brand profits are maximized for maximum brand differentiation for two and three brand markets the subgame perfect nash equilibrium where positioning decisions are made with foresight on the price equilibria causes firms to unilaterally seek maximum brand differentiation but for four or more brands greater foresight and or cooperation appears necessary to reach the point of maximum brand differentiation these results apply where the defender consumer model is an exact description of consumer response and where the competitive reaction assumptions hold in any empirical situation such forces might be softened resulting in differentiated but not maximally differentiated brands

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

the effect of ownership structure on prices in geographically differentiated industries i analyze how ownership structure and market geography jointly influence fast food prices i estimate a model of demand and supply that accounts for the market geography and run counterfactual experiments that demonstrate how mergers affect prices i find that the impact of mergers can be large that this impact decreases as the merging outlets are farther apart that mergers among market leaders generally increase prices more than mergers among weaker firms and that mergers can increase prices even if the outlets are so far apart that neither outleti s presence affects prices at the other before the merger

an analytical approach to new keynesian models under the fiscal theory abstract this article illustrates a widely applicable frequency domain methodology to solving multivariate linear rational expectations models as an example we solve a prototypical new keynesian model under the assumption that primary surpluses evolve independently of government liabilities a regime in which the fiscal theory of the price level is valid the resulting analytical solution is useful in characterizing the cross equation restrictions and illustrating the complex interaction between the fiscal theory and price rigidity we also highlight some useful by products of such method which are not easily obtainable for more sophisticated models using time domain methods

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

turf wars product line strategies in competitive markets in this paper we study product line scope and pricing decisions in a horizontally differentiated duopoly past research has shown that a firm may offer a broader product line to attract higher demand or charge a higher price or both and benefit at the expense of its competitor we show that such outcomes may be reversed especially when consumers have relatively high valuation and low heterogeneity in their preferences for the line extension we find that an equilibrium exists such that only one firm prefers to expand scope but profits may be higher for both firms even in the absence of market size expansion this is because a broader scope permits that firm to effectively price discriminate by raising prices for its core customers the competitor optimally responds by lowering prices to gain share and earn a higher profit thus higher prices for the firm expanding its product line translate into higher demand for the competing firm thus increasing profit for both we show that our results hold when firms deploy generic offensive or defensive strategies during product line expansion

rational expectations in stationary linear models linear time series models have come to dominate the macroeconomic literature on rational expectations and equilibrium business cycle theory but the explicit solution of such models has generally required strong restrictions upon the exogenous process of stochastic shocks e g temporal independence as well as upon the values of various demand and supply elasticities this paper exhibits a solution technique the method of z transforms which does not require one to impose such restrictions the value of this method is illustrated by applying it to completely characterize the symmetric stationary rational expectations equilibria of a naive linear model of land speculation this approach also permits systematic study of the informationally asymmetric equilibria of the model this paper develops a method for analyzing rational expectations re equilibria in linear economic models the methods i shall discuss usually enable one to determine whether or not a given model has a re equilibrium and if one exists to exhibit an explicit expression for the stochastic process of equilibrium prices the techniques apply to linear models driven by stationary processes of exogenous random shocks

price induced patterns of competition this research focuses on how price changes influence the observed pattern of brand competition the paper begins with a basic utility model formulation and examines the implications of three major classes of preference distributions on the expected patterns of competition a price tier model is proposed to operationalize the theory and to allow predictive testing the price tier model is estimated on 28 brands across four product categories the results show a specific asymmetric pattern of price competition higher price higher quality brands steal share from other brands in the same price quality tier as well as from brands in the tier below however lower price lower quality brands take sales from their own tier and the tier below brands but do not steal significant share from the tiers above the results are consistent with a bimodal preference distribution with the regular price indifference point being located toward the lower quality end of the preference distribution for the categories analyzed

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

rewarding impatience revisited a response to goodrich in rewarding impatience a bargaining and enforcement model of opec international organization spring 2004 i presented a theoretical model that suggested that in strategic situations where a bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners dilemma impatient actors earned better outcomes than their more patient rivals i also modeled the division of cartel profits in the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons and found that there is some threshold level for which states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better production offers than those that do not the critique presented in goodrich deals with the final section of the article which presents the results of statistical analysis testing the implications of these theoretical models i am grateful to jeff lewis drew linzer and ken schultz for suggestions and advice many thanks to thomas pla mper for sharing the computer code for his procedure to analyze fixed effects with time invariant covariates in stata the usual disclaimers apply

research note on the profitability of firms in a differentiated industry in a model of vertical differentiation the principal concern of this paper is to identify sufficient conditions for producing a higher or lower quality good to be more profitable in terms of profits and profit margin our basic model considers a short run scenario where the firms quality levels are fixed and they engage in price competition here our results are three first we develop the notion of relative cost efficiency and show that its increasing or decreasing monotonicity in product quality implies that of firm profitability in equilibrium a firm s relative cost efficiency refers to its quality adjusted cost dis advantage relative to its immediate competitors for a given distribution of consumer tastes second selling a higher quality good is more profitable when absolute cost efficiency defined as the ratio between a firm s quality and unit cost is increasing in quality third we also establish a set of lower and upper bounds on each firm s profitability the basic model is then extended in two directions we examine unit cost functions that demonstrate monotone profitability even when both quality and price are endogenous variables we also show that the spirit of relative cost efficiency and its associated sufficient condition hold valid for a logconcave consumer distribution

rewarding impatience a bargaining and enforcement model of opec in this article i make two primary contributions to the literature on international cooperation first i present a simple version of fearon s bargaining and enforcement model and show that impatience as captured in the discount factor can be a source of bargaining strength when the outcome of the bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners dilemma second i illustrate how to apply this model to the question of the division of cartel profits within the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons i find that for some critical threshold level states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better oil production offers than those that do not i examine empirical evidence that suggests that countries in opec fall into the range where this proposition holds in other words relatively poor populous countries and relatively unstable ones are allowed by opec to overproduce i am grateful to christino arroyo jim denardo joe gochal james honaker shuhei kurizaki drew linzer barry o neill art stein hiroki takeuchi george tsebelis jana von stein and two anonymous referees for helpful comments i am especially indebted to ken schultz for his advice and to randy calvert for a helpful discussion during the 2003 eitm summer institute at washington university in st louis

forecasting the forecasts of others implications for asset pricing we develop a dynamic asset pricing model with heterogeneously informed agents unlike previous research we focus on the general case where differential information leads to the problem of forecasting the forecasts of others and to non trivial dynamics of higher order expectations in particular we prove that the model does not admit a finite number of state variables using numerical analysis we compare equilibria characterized by identical fundamentals but different information structure we demonstrate that the distribution of information has substantial impact on equilibrium prices and returns in particular we show that asymmetric information can generate momentum in returns and high trading volume

the emperor has no clothes the limits of opec in the global oil market most scholars and policymakers believe opec can and does influence the price of oil by acting as a cartel this paper argues that most of the conventional wisdom about opec is wrong opec rarely if ever influences the oil production rate in its member states further opec has almost no lasting impact on world prices except under rare conditions there was one occasion on which opec did have a significant impact on world oil prices namely the 1973 oil crisis but opec s role in the event has been greatly misunderstood the circumstances of the crisis were highly exceptional making it unlikely that the organization could ever have a similar impact on world oil prices again this paper seeks to correct the misunderstanding about opec s role and replace it with a better understanding of the organization i argue that opec is dysfunctional as a cartel as it has little or no causal impact on its members choices about production levels or investment in production capacity opec s role is obscured in part by the complexity of the world oil market and in part by misdirection by policymakers especially within opec many scholars especially economists have argued that opec should be understood as a cartel designed to solve a prisoner s dilemma pd coordination game yet opec s persistence is better understood as a widespread failure to update beliefs about the organization a failure that is driven by information asymmetry and politics the fact that such a widespread belief about the world s most important commodity market could be wrong can help us better understand international regimes

product positioning and competition the role of location in the fast food industry this paper examines optimal product positioning strategies of asymmetric firms in the context of retail outlet locations in the fast food industry the relationships between profits and product differentiation reveal that both mcdonald s and burger king are better off avoiding close competition if the market area is large enough however in small market areas mcdonald s would prefer to be located together with burger king rather than have the two outlets be only a slight distance apart in contrast burger king s profits always increase with greater differentiation offsetting these incentives is the desirability of locating centrally to appeal to the most customers the equilibrium depends on the market s size in small markets mcdonald s locates near the center of the market and burger king locates to the side of the market in larger markets mcdonald s and burger king choose locations on opposite sides of the market although mcdonald s locates closer to the optimal central location than burger king i also show that the role of price competition on product positioning is fundamentally different under asymmetric competition than under symmetric competition price competition unambiguously induces symmetric firms toward differentiation in contrast with asymmetric firms price competition shifts burger king s incentives toward locating closer to mcdonald s even while price competition increases mcdonald s desire for differentiation as a result equilibrium locations with asymmetric firms are approximately the same regardless of whether prices adjust with location

an empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product type choices i describe a model of entry with endogenous product type choices these choices are formalized as the outcomes of a game of incomplete information in which rivals differentiated products have nonuniform competitive effects on profits i estimate the model for location choices in the video retail industry using a nested fixed point algorithm solution the results imply significant returns to product differentiation simulations illustrate the tradeoff between demand and intensified competition and the extent to which markets with more scope for differentiation support greater entry

commentaries and rejoinder to measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks by paulo albuquerque and bart j bronnenberg this series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on strategic and managerial issues arising from albuquerque and bronnenberg albuquerque p b j bronnenberg 2012 measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks marketing sci 31 1 4 23

does international law promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes evidence from the study of territorial conflicts since 1945 in this article we explain the role of international law in the resolution of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000 in doing so we focus on three outcomes of interest first when do states choose to revise the territorial status quo through negotiations instead of force second when are states able to reach a final settlement third when do states prefer a process of legal dispute resolution i e adjudication or arbitration to bilateral negotiations to answer these questions we argue that when the legal principles relevant to the dispute are unambiguous and clearly favor one side a law based focal point will emerge this focal point in turn facilitates the settlement process by helping leaders overcome distribution problems a central obstacle in reaching a final agreement we find strong and consistent empirical support for our hypotheses regarding international law and peaceful dispute resolution i s a legal advantage an important source of bargaining leverage for state leaders as they negotiate over security issues in international disputes does international law provide the foundation for the peaceful settlement of security related disputes in a system defined by anarchy there are reasons to question whether international law can play a central role in the orderly and peaceful resolution of disputes when security issues are at stake for leaders indeed many would argue that the shadow of military power is an ever present influence over such bargaining processes and that international law is therefore not a viable substitute for military strength and credible threats of force to secure the peace as a result although law may have an important role to play in governing international economic relations e g goldstein rivers and tomz 2007 simmons and hopkins 2005 von stein 2005 zangl 2008 where the parties will often have strong incentives to coordinate their behavior the role of law in settling disagreements over security related issues is a far more contentious question among scholars and policy makers in such situations leaders will often have divergent preferences over how the issue should be resolved making the identification of a mutually acceptable solution difficult the security aspect of the dispute compounds this problem because leaders will be reluctant to sign any agreement that they believe might decrease

choosing between order of entry assumptions in empirical entry models evidence from competition between burger king and mcdonald s restaurant outlets we demonstrate how a non nested statistical test developed by vuong 1989 can be used to assess the suitability of alternate order of entry assumptions used for identification purposes in empirical entry models as an example we estimate an entry model of mcdonald s and burger king restaurant outlets in united states the data set focuses on relatively small isolated markets for these markets the non nested tests suggest that order of entry assumptions that give burger king outlets a first mover advantage are statistically preferred last a monte carlo experiment provides encouraging results suggesting that the vuong type test yields reliable results within the entry model framework

solving generalized multivariate linear rational expectations models abstract we generalize the linear rational expectations solution method of whiteman 1983 to the multivariate case this facilitates the use of a generic exogenous driving process that must only satisfy covariance stationarity multivariate cross equation restrictions linking the wold representation of the exogenous process to the endogenous variables of the rational expectations model are obtained we argue that this approach offers important insights into rational expectations models we give two examples in the paper an asset pricing model with incomplete information and a monetary model with observationally equivalent monetary fiscal policy interactions we relate our solution methodology to other popular approaches to solving multivariate linear rational expectations models and provide user friendly code that executes our approach

the role of spatial demand on outlet location and pricing abstract in this article the authors consider the problem of outlet pricing and location in the context of unobserved spatial demand the analysis constitutes a scenario in which capacity constrained firms set prices conditional on their location demand and costs this enables firms to develop maps of latent demand patterns across the market in which they compete the analysis further suggests locations for additional outlets and the resultant equilibrium effect on profits and prices using bayesian spatial statistics the authors apply their model to seven years of data on apartment location and prices in roanoke va they find that spatial covariation in demand is material in outlet choice the 95 spatial decay in demand extends 3 6 miles in a region that measures slightly more than 9 5 miles they also find that capacity constraints can cost complexes upward of 100 per apartment as they predict price elasticities and costs are biased downward when spatial covariance in demand is ignored costs a

how equilibrium prices reveal information in a time series model with disparately informed competitive traders abstract accommodating asymmetric information in a dynamic asset pricing model is technically challenging due to the problems associated with higher order expectations that is rational investors are forced into a situation where they must forecast the forecasts of other agents in a dynamic setting this problem telescopes into the infinite future and the dimension of the relevant state space approaches infinity by using the frequency domain approach of whiteman linear rational expectations models a user s guide university of minnesota press minneapolis 1983 and kasa forecasting the forecasts of others in the frequency domain rev econ dynam 3 2000 726 756 this paper demonstrates how information structures previously believed to preserve asymmetric information in equilibrium converge to a symmetric information rational expectations equilibrium the revealing aspect of the price process lies in the invertibility of the observed state space which makes it possible for agents to infer the economically fundamental shocks and thus eliminating the need to forecast the forecasts of others

reputation and hegemonic stability a game theoretic analysis we develop and explicate a game theoretic model in which repeated play incomplete information and reputation are major elements a significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes the model is used to formalize certain aspects of the theory of hegemonic stability it shows that the dilemma or limits of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved unifying both benevolent and coercive strands of hegemony theory an example drawn from recent developments in the organization of petroleum exporting countries shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction we conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information

a robust hansen sargent prediction formula this paper derives a formula for the optimal forecast of a discounted sum of future values of a random variable where optimal is defined in terms of the minimized h norm of the forecast error this problem reflects a preference for robustness in the presence of unstructured model uncertainty the paper shows that revisions of a robust forecast are more sensitive to new information and discusses the relevance of this result to previous findings of excess sensitivity of consumption and asset prices to new information 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

endogeneity and heterogeneity in a probit demand model estimation using aggregate data two issues that have become increasingly important while estimating the parameters of aggregate demand functions to study firm behavior are theendogeneity of marketing activities typically price andheterogeneity across consumers in the market under consideration ignoring these issues in the estimation of the demand function parameters can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates for the effects of marketing activities endogeneity and heterogeneity have achieved prominence in large measure because of the increasing popularity of logit models to characterize demand functions usingaggregate data the logit model accounts for purchase incidence and brand choice by including a no purchase alternative in the consumer s choice set this allows for category sales to change as a function of the marketing activities of brands in the category there are three issues with using the logit model with the no purchase option to characterize demand when studying competitive interactions among firms 1 the marketing literature dealing with brand choice behavior at the consumer level has found that the iia restriction is not appropriate as each brand in the choice set is more similar to some brands than it is to others 2 studies have found that the purchase incidence decision is distinct from the brand choice decision hence it may not be appropriate to model the no purchase decision as just another alternative in the choice set with the iia restriction holding across all brands and the no purchase option 3 even if the distinction between the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions is accounted for via for example a nested logit specification accounting for the purchase incidence decision with aggregate data requires assumptions for computing the share of the no purchase alternative which is otherwise unobserved in this paper we propose a probit model as an alternative to the logit model to specify the aggregate demand functions of firms competing in oligopoly markets the probit model avoids the iia property that affects the logit model at the individual consumer level furthermore the probit model can naturally account for the distinction between the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions due to the general covariance structure assumed for the utilities of the alternatives we demonstrate how the parameters of the proposed model can be estimated using aggregate time series data from a product market in the estimation we account for the endogeneity of marketing variables as well as for heterogeneity across consumers our results indicate that both endogeneity as well as heterogeneity need to be accounted for even after allowing for a non iia specification at the individual consumer level specific to our data we also find that ignoring endogeneity has a bigger impact on the estimated price elasticities than ignoring the effects of heterogeneity a comparison of the elasticities obtained from the probit model with those from the corresponding logit specification indicates that therange of elasticities obtained from the probit model across brands is larger than that obtained from the logit the results have implications for issues such as firm level pricing in addition to specifying a probit model and providing comparisons with the logit model the paper also addresses the third issue raised above we propose a simple alternative to the purchase incidence brand choice specification by decomposing the demand for a brand into a category demand equation and a conditional brand choice share equation we provide a comparison of results from this specification to those from the specification that includes the no purchase alternative and find that estimated elasticities are sensitive to the specification used we also estimate the demand function parameters using a traditional specification such as the double logarithmic model here we find that the estimated elasticities could be signed in such a manner as to be not useful for firm level pricing decisions one of the key limitations of the proposed model is that while it accounts for the purchase incidence and brand choice decisions of households it does not account for differences across consumers in their purchase quantities the model and analysis are best suited for product categories in which consumers typically make single unit purchases another limitation is more practical in nature while recent advances have been made in computing probit probabilities it could nevertheless be a challenge to do so when the number of alternatives is large

new brand positioning and pricing in an oligopolistic market the positioning and pricing of a new brand requires knowledge about the relationship of both demand and cost with potential attribute locations and prices this paper addresses this problem and illustrates it in the context of the automobile market multi attribute expected utility theory which allows for consumer uncertainty about the brands is used to model individuals behavior attribute weights are estimated from market survey data on brands attributes and preferences using linmap as an estimation procedure expected utility is then updated using the multinomial logit model and choice data to account for the observation that stated preferences do not perfectly reflect the eventual choice it is hypothesized that when faced with an actual choice price may become more important to the consumer while other attributes may become more or less important than is reflected in stated preferences the resulting estimated choice probabilities are aggregated to form demand functions facing each brand which depend on all brands prices and attribute space locations assuming there is a price equilibrium in the existing market and that firms have the same variable cost function variable costs as a function of a brand s attribute levels are estimated given the demand and cost functions facing each firm including the potential new entrant the profit maximizing positioning and pricing of a new brand is analyzed using a game theoretic approach a solution is sought under the assumption that incumbents react to entry by changing their prices possible approaches to the translation of the perceptual attribute positioning of the new brand to physical and engineering attributes are reviewed improvements and future extensions of the study are discussed

multiple discreteness and product differentiation demand for carbonated soft drinks for several of the largest supermarket product categories such as carbonated soft drinks canned soups ready to eat cereals and cookies consumers regularly purchase assortments of products within the category consumers often purchase multiple products and multiple units of each alternative selected on a given trip this multiple discreteness violates the single unit purchase assumption of multinomial logit and probit models the misspecification of such demand models in categories exhibiting multiple discreteness would produce incorrect measures of consumer response to marketing mix variables in studying product strategy these models would lead to misleading managerial conclusions we use an alternative microeconomic model of demand for categories that exhibit the multiple discreteness problem recognizing the separation between the time of purchase and the time of consumption we model consumers purchasing bundles of goods in anticipation of a stream of consumption occasions before the next trip we apply the model to a panel of household purchases for carbonated soft drinks