strategic alliances venture capital and exit decisions in early stage high tech firms abstract we study the trade offs that biotech start ups face in the private equity market when they choose between raising firm level capital from venture capitalists or project level capital from strategic alliance partners increased alliance activity makes future alliances more likely but future vc activity less likely in contrast venture capital vc activity makes both future alliance and future vc activity more likely both types of private capital raise the hazard of going public acquisition as an alternative to initial public offering is made more likely by increased vc activity but the link between acquisition probabilities and alliance activity is less clear cut these results highlight both the importance of alliance partners in resolving asymmetric information problems in the capital acquisition process and the potential conflict of interest between different sources of private equity

simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty we consider full implementation in complete information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty we offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies

public subsidies and the employment growth of high tech start ups assessing the impact of selective and automatic support schemes the aim of this article is to assess the impact of public subsidies on the employment growth of new technology based firms ntbfs contingent on i the type of policy scheme either selective or automatic and ii the age of the firms at the time of receipt of the subsidy for this purpose we analyze a sample composed of 536 italian independent ntbfs observed during a 10 year period 1994 2003 we estimate augmented gibrat law type dynamic panel data models using different techniques aimed at controlling for the potentially endogenous nature of public financing namely the generalized method of moments system fixed effect instrumental variable and inverse probability treatment weights estimators the results of the estimates show that selective support schemes had a larger impact on employment growth than automatic ones but only if they were awarded in the very early period of the recipient firms lives however selective subsidies awarded to young ntbfs are rare in italy calling into question the capability of the italian industrial policy to sustain the growth of the high tech entrepreneurial sector

an experimental study of truth telling in a sender receiver game a recent experimental study of cai and wang 2005 on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis to evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying we show in a simple sender receiver game that subjects incurring in costs to punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the logit agent quantal response equilibria whereas subjects that do not punish liars after receiving a deceptive message play on the aggregate equilibrium strategies thus we can partition the subject pool into two groups one group of subjects with preferences for truth telling and one taking into account only material incentives

the endowment effect as blessing we study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation we pay specific attention to barter trade of the kind that was common in prehistoric societies and suggest that the endowment effect and the winner s curse could have jointly survived natural selection together we develop a new family of hybrid replicator selection dynamics and show that under such dynamics even if biases only partially compensate for each other individuals with both biases can survive in the population in the long run

promises and expectations abstract we investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects in a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second order expectations promisors expectations about promisees expectations leads to a significant change in promisor behavior we provide evidence that a promisor s aversion to disappointing a promisee s expectation leads her to behave more generously we propose and estimate a simple model of conditional guilt aversion that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases

carrot or stick the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model this paper studies the evolution and the co evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior firstly both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups this holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable secondly preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self interested preferences but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely finally the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively the existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers but punishers crowd out rewarders jel classification c72 d63 d64 d83

promises and endogenous reneging costs we present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency we explore a two player partnership game where before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort we allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises we demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging and show that these intermediate costs induce second best optimal outcomes

combining economic forecasts a method for combining forecasts may or may not account for dependence and differing precision among forecasts in this article we test a variety of such methods in the context of combining forecasts of gnp from four major econometric models the methods include one in which forecasting errors are jointly normally distributed and several variants of this model as well as some simpler procedures and a bayesian approach with a prior distribution based on exchangeability of forecasters the results indicate that a simple average the normal model with an independence assumption and the bayesian model perform better than the other approaches that are studied here

the participation of new technology based firms in eu funded r d partnerships the role of venture capital this paper investigates the participation of new technology based firms ntbfs in eu funded r d partnerships we examine whether venture capital vc backed firms are more likely to enter these partnerships than their non vc backed peers and the role of the ownership and governance of the vc investor we resort to a mixed method approach we use qualitative information collected through interviews with managers of ntbfs and vc firms to better illustrate our deductively derived theoretical hypotheses that are then tested through a large scale econometric analysis the econometric analysis takes advantage of the vico dataset which includes longitudinal data on 8346 ntbfs from seven european countries observed from 1995 to 2008 out of which 758 were vc backed the econometric results show that vc backing has a strong positive impact on ntbfs participation in eu funded r d partnerships but the magnitude of this effect rapidly decreases with ntbfs prior experience of this type of partnership moreover the magnitude of the impact of vc backing considerably differs depending on the type of investor with bank and government vc exhibiting the strongest positive effects

efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching abstract this paper investigates the sensitivity of recent evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism we study a literally random matching mechanism combined with a process of strategy adjustment based on the realized average performance of each strategy in the key class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games the pareto efficient equilibrium per se is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium as the probability of experimentation or mutation goes to zero furthermore convergence to the equilibrium is relatively fast we extend these results for example to games of common interest journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

on growth drivers of high tech start ups exploring the role of founders human capital and venture capital abstract in this paper we jointly analyze the effects of the human capital of founders and access to venture capital vc financing on the growth of 439 italian new technology based firms ntbfs we rely on econometric models that control for survivorship bias and the endogeneity of vc financing as to non vc backed firms the competence based argument that the capabilities of ntbfs coincide with founders skills is confirmed nonetheless once a ntbf obtains vc this coincidence vanishes pointing to the coach function performed by vc investors conversely the view that sees the scout function as the main task performed by vc investors is not supported

wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective abstract this paper develops a one population indirect evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer supplier and many a sufficiently large number of retailers to study how the retailer s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price its observability the error probability of the observed result on the rival s preference the market scale and the retailer s bargaining power this paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer we find that the profit revenue maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high low given an appropriate wholesale price the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers population the larger the market scale the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price the cross effects of the retailer s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process

an empirical evaluation of the determinants of research joint venture formation this paper empirically analyses the determinants of rm participation in research joint ventures rjvs a review of the theoretical literature highlights the di culty of identifying testable hypotheses using a large database of european rjvs we estimate a participation equation at the rm level using the logit procedure we nd that sectorial r d intensity industry concentration rm size technological spillovers and past rjv participation positively in uence the probability of forming rjvs by contrast patents eiectiveness reduce the likelihood of rjv formation last country xed eiects suggest that rms from larger countries are less likely to participate in cross border rjvs i introduction research joint ventures rjvs are agreements whereby rms decide to share technological knowledge while in principle continuing to compete against each other in the product market the aim of this paper is empirically to identify the rm and industry characteristics that determine rjv formation recent theoretical contributions have highlighted the complex mechanisms that underlie rjv participation first rjvs involve the internalisation of technological spillovers and r d cost sharing as well as the assimilation of knowledge that may be of strategic importance

new technology based firms in europe market penetration public venture capital and timing of investment we investigate the effect of public puvc and private prvc venture capital funds on the sales growth of 6513 european new technology based firms ntbfs during the period from 1992 to 2009 our results show that puvc backed ntbfs underperform with respect to prvc backed ones and do not grow more than non venture capital backed companies the impact of puvc is still not statistically significant even though it is positive when puvc funds target young ntbfs the only notable exception suggesting a positive and statistically significant impact for puvcs is when puvc funds cofinance with prvc funds and both target young firms

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

venture capital in europe and the financing of innovative companies european venture captial venture capital is considered to be the most appropriate form of financing for innovative firms in high tech sectors venture capital has greatly developed over the last three decades in the united states but much less so in europe where policy makers are striving to help channel more funds into this form of financial intermediation in this paper we provide the first assessment of venture capital in europe we document its development in the 1990s and compare it with that of american venture capital we find the wedge between them to be large and growing we then look at the involvement of venture capital with some of europe s most innovative and successful companies those listed on europe s new stock markets venture capital is effective in helping these firms overcome credit constraints and thus to be born in the first place using a unique hand collected data set from the listing prospectuses and annual reports of these companies we find european venture capital to have a limited effect on their ability to raise equity capital grow and create jobs we conclude that public support of the european venture capital industry should look at both its growth and at its maturation laura bottazzi and marco da rin

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

on the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner take all games abstract a long standing conjecture is that winner take all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk takers and the extinction of risk averters in many species a winner take all game determines the males right to reproduce and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk takers psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk taking than females using an evolutionary model of preference formation we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk taking in winner take all environments journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

communication coordination and nash equilibrium i note a methodological problem in studying the role of pre play communication in ensuring equilibrium to deal with this problem i define a solution concept for the extended game in which talk is followed by play that is intermediate between nash equilibrium and rationalizability in some games our solution concept implies a nash outcome while in others it does not

intergenerational transmission of preferences we propose a perfect empathy model of cultural transmission to capture the evolution of preferences in a population unlike existing imperfect empathy models focusing on stable interior equilibria we demonstrate that a corner outcome will eventuate however which corner outcome emerges is unknown and depends on the interplay of history and expectations

language meaning and games a model of communication coordination and evolution comment demichelis and weibull 2008 aer show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable i show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se finally i discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models

the impact of the affiliation of venture capital firms a survey the aim of this paper is to review the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of the affiliation of venture capital vc firms with a particular focus on the differences between europe and the us a main characteristic of vc firms is their high level of involvement in the management of funded firms however the vc industry is composed of heterogeneous actors the literature has studied to a great degree the independent funds that dominate the us market yet there also exist vc funds affiliated with banks or with industrial firm which can benefit from synergies with their parent corporation several studies have highlighted significant differences between these types of vc firms

capital market imperfections high tech investment and new equity financing highly variable returns asymmetric information and a lack of collateral should cause small high tech firms to have poor access to debt new equity financing has several advantages over debt but may be costly compared to internal finance we examine an unbalanced panel of over 2 400 publicly traded us high tech companies over the period 1981 98 most small high tech firms obtain little debt financing new equity financing in the form of the initial public offering is very important and permits a major increase in firm size after going public comparatively few firms make heavy use of external finacing

nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences abstract a population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game g the payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences however these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs when evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take the distribution of aggregate play must be a nash equilibrium of g weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c72

the evolution of monetary equilibrium abstract the hahn problem is that even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists why should we expect the former over the latter here i consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness with unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the sum of agents fitnesses in a standard bewley townsend model this implies selection of the monetary over the nonmonetary equilibrium and also implies the survival of agents with money in the utility function trust in fiat money is only a recent development and even today such faith is hardly universal cass and shell 1980

evolution of time preference by natural selection this paper entertains the hypothesis that human time preferences are in evolutionary equilibrium i e that no mutation changing time preferences could be favored by natural selection this hypothesis implies that the marginal rate of substitution mrs holding darwinian fitness constant must equal the mrs holding utility constant furthermore in a market economy the latter must equal the mrs in exchange exploiting these principles the author finds that the long term real interest rate should equal ln 2 per generation about 2 percent per year and that young adults should discount the future more rapidly than their elders copyright 1994 by american economic association

participation inertia in r d tax incentive and subsidy programs we examine how persistent firms participation is in rd the use of tax credits in contrast is unrelated to a firm s productivity our results suggest that r d tax incentives and r d subsidies are not substitutes and that any unintended misallocation of support is likely to persist

us and them the origin of identity and its economic implications we investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we propose an evolutionary explanation we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival in an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios one entailing rent seeking behavior and the other involving public good provision our results are in conformity with empirical evidence

why do people keep their promises an experimental test of two explanations numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games this paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect the first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word the second assumes that people dislike letting down others payoff expectations according to the latter account promises affect behavior only indirectly because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others i conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations the results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations this suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

commitment and conflict in bilateral bargaining building on crawford 1982 we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c our primary solution concept is iterated strict dominance if commitment attempts never fail there are three solutions in two solutions all the surplus goes to one player in the third solution there is a high probility of con ict if commitment attempts succeed with probability q 1 the unique solution entails con ict with probability q 2 when c 0 analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance

language meaning and games a model of communication coordination and evolution language is a powerful coordination device we generalize the cheap talk approach to pre play communication by way of introducing a meaning cor respondence between messages and actions and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages players have a lexicographic preference second to material payoffs against deviating from the meaning correspondence under two sided communication in generic and symmetric n 3 n coordination games a nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique pareto efficient out come of the underlying game we extend the analysis to one sided communica tion in arbitrary finite two player games jel c72 c73 z 3

when does corporate venture capital investment create firm value abstract over the past decade billions of dollars have been invested by established companies in entrepreneurial ventures what is often referred to as corporate venture capital yet there is little systematic evidence that corporate venture capital investment creates value to investing firms scholars have suggested that established firms face underlying challenges when investing corporate venture capital namely structural deficiencies inherent in corporate venture capital may inhibit financial gains however firm value may still be created as a result of other benefits from investing primarily providing a window onto novel technology in this paper we propose that corporate venture capital investment will create greater firm value when firms explicitly pursue corporate venture capital to harness novel technology using a panel of cvc investments we present evidence consistent with our proposition the findings are robust to various specifications and remain unchanged even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in investing firms our results have important implications for corporate venture capital in particular and technology strategy in general

when bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs the design of effective public venture capital programmes recently public efforts to finance small high technology firms have proliferated we review the motivations for these efforts and make some preliminary observations about their design we explore the underlying challenges that the financing of young growth firms poses the ways that specialised financial intermediaries address them and the rationales for public efforts to finance these companies the final section makes a set of observations about the ways in which the structure of these efforts can most effectively complement private sector activity a frequent fault in programme design is the presumption that technological criteria can be divorced from business considerations when evaluating firms the federal government has played an active role in financing new firms particularly in high technology industries since the soviet union s launch of the sputnik satellite in recent years european and asian nations and many us states have adopted similar initiatives while these programmes precise structures have differed the efforts have been predicated on two shared assumptions i that the private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms and ii that the government either can identify investments which will ultimately yield high social and or private returns or can encourage financial intermediaries to do so in contrast to other government interventions designed to boost economic growth such as privatisation programmes these claims have received little scrutiny by economists the neglect of these questions is unfortunate while the sums of money involved are modest relative to public expenditures on defence procurement or retiree benefits these programmes are very substantial when compared to contemporaneous private investments in new firms government programmes in this arena have been divided between those efforts that directly fund entrepreneurial firms and those that encourage or subsidise the development of outside investors in this paper i will focus on public venture capital initiatives programmes that make equity or equity like investments in young firms or encourage other intermediaries to make such investments in some such programmes such as the advanced technology program and the small business innovation research programmes discussed below the funds are provided as a contract or outright grant while these efforts have proliferated a consensus as to how to structure these programmes remains elusive while the design of regulatory agencies has been extensively studied from a theoretical and empirical perspective little work has

evolution and kantian morality what kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor we propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative individuals preferences are their private information the set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions we show that a certain class of such preferences that combine self interest with morality of a kantian flavor are evolutionarily stable and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable we also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of maynard smith s and price s 1973 notion of evolutionary stability of strategies

the evolutionary logic of honoring sunk costs i introduction economists claim that sunk costs should not figure in current decision making because by definition these expenditures cannot be retrieved and should be treated as bygones but there is a large literature both experimental and anecdotal in which people are observed to waste resources by honoring bygones that could not possibly make them better off see e g arkes and blumer 1985 arkes and ayton 1999 mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 thaler 1980 such excess in wasting resources is unlikely to have been tolerated by nature in the process of evolution if it did not serve some purpose to enhance fitness in our remote past the purpose of this study is to suggest such a function whereby evolutionary processes have hardwired a concern for sunk costs in human decision making 1 the concept of honoring sunk costs has been referred to in the literature as the concorde fallacy 2 arkes and blumer 1985 have a number of other examples of good money being thrown after bad economists have provided various explanations for why sunk costs appear salient to humans kanodia bushman and dickhaut 1989 and prendergast and stole 1996 propose a theory where reputational effects make agents unwilling to change their decisions mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 have suggested several models involving information content reputation or constraints on decision making that provide rational reasons for taking sunk costs into account likewise baliga and ely 2011 have proposed a model in which sunk costs may acquire salience as a memory kludge because they may contain information about the value of a project previously initiated but whose value has now been forgotten carmichael and macleod 2003 have proposed a model where in a bilateral bargaining situation the norm of taking account of sunk costs resolves the hold up problem that typically results in underinvestment thaler 1980 arkes and blumer 1985 and whyte 1986 suggested a prospect theory approach to understanding sunk cost effects arkes and blumer 1985 the philosopher nozick 1993 and others have argued that honoring sunk costs can alleviate problems of time inconsistency and temptation john may believe that going to the theater is a good thing but when the time comes he cannot rouse himself to do so because it would require relinquishing whatever else appears appealing at the time to circumvent this john buys tickets in advance as a precommitment device but to do this he must believe in the first place that his future self is going to honor sunk costs 3 whatever the reason for the time inconsistent preferences say hyperbolic discounting the honoring of sunk costs may be used to remedy the problem of time inconsistency but nozick for example offers no reason for why sunk costs are honored in the first place we offer an evolutionary reason to suggest why nature may have hardwired a proclivity in humans to honor sunks costs a reason that differs from those offered in the articles cited above we propose that the built in salience of sunk costs is an adaptation to the problem of self control self control problems may arise in decision making because contrary to our untutored perceptions the human brain has a triune 4 rather than a unitary structure maclean 1989 panksepp 1998 because of the way the brain has evolved different regions within it defined by their own neuroanatomical and neurochemical features deal with different aspects of action and behavior although interconnected through chemical and neuronal pathways the different control centers tend to act autonomously and may conflict in their responses to stimuli when the emotional or motivational centers which lie in the sub cortical limbic system push us to certain actions that the rational persona in the cortex wishes to deny there is a conflict and the problem of self control arises panksepp 1998 301 notes

corporate venture capitalists autonomy obstacles and performance abstract this report presents the results of a formal study of the corporate venture capital community in the united states and is based upon responses to a questionnaire completed by 52 corporate venture capitalists cvcs the central question addressed in this study involves which approach to corporate venture capital is most likely to produce successful results this question was addressed via cluster analysis which segregated the cvc community into two broad classes pilots which are marked by substantial organizational independence and copilots which are highly dependent on corporate management with respect to venture funding and decision authority pilots achieve equal or higher levels of performance and are plagued by far fewer obstacles than their highly dependent counterparts the results suggest the following 1 the corporate venture fund should be established as an independent entity and should have access to a committed separate pool of funds this will enable cvcs to respond aggressively to and manage investment opportunities with minimal corporate interference such an independent entity will defuse justifiable concerns on the part of entrepreneurs related to such interference 2 the fund should be managed by skilled venture professionals who may be drawn from the independent venture community or the small but growing pool of experienced cvcs corporate executives may comprise a part of the management team 3 if the corporate venture fund hopes to attract top quality managers it must be prepared to offer compensation and authority commensurate with their skill level in short corporate venture capitalists should be treated like independent venture capitalists by organizing the fund as an independent entity the political problem associated with establishing compensation levels above those of the corporation can be minimized 4 all cvcs should establish a primary focus on the realization of financial objectives i e return on investment strategic benefit objectives are not necessarily ill advised so long as they do not interfere with sound financial decision making when they do the corporate venture capital process is likely to become less effective for instance a corporate venture fund should only confine itself to investing in a few industries if there are sufficient high grade investment opportunities within those industries to ensure adequate deal flow the venture fund should not be pressured investments that appear exciting from a corporate perspective for technological or marketing reasons but are not financially attractive may well drain resources rather than produce opportunities 5 venture proposals failing on financial criteria might be referred to other parts of the corporation with the purpose of exploring an alternate relationship e g a development contract or joint venture if this is appealing to the corporation a mechanism such as a corporate liaison or reporting system might be established to facilitate the flow of information 6 a corporation should be willing to make a complete commitment of talent and capital if it establishes its own corporate venture fund the corporation should then be willing to accept a limited role if the corporation is unable to accept a limited role with respect to its own fund it may be best for it to participate as an investor in a traditional fund where such limitations will be enforced however this latter approach may significantly dilute or eliminate potential for strategic benefits

learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the centipede game abstract several studies show that evolution favors non selfish preferences only if preference types are observable we present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the centipede game where we adopt self confirming equilibrium to capture behavior we show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable

an evolutionary approach to pre play communication we add a round of pre play communication to a finite two player game played by a population of players pre play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs the paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability when there is no conflict of interest between the players only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics for general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

in search of complementary assets the determinants of alliance formation of high tech start ups abstract why do new technology based firms ntbfs cooperate starting from teece s teece d j 1986 profiting from technological innovation implications for integration collaboration licensing and public policy research policy 15 285 305 conceptual framework and taking advantage of subsequent literature on alliance formation in the resource and competence based tradition and in the social structure perspective we derive an empirical model that aims at highlighting the inducements and obstacles that these firms face in alliance formation according to firm specific characteristics and the nature of the alliance in particular a distinction is made between exploitative commercial alliances and explorative technological alliances the econometric estimates based on a large sample of italian young high tech firms that are observed from 1994 to 2003 provide strong evidence supporting two key intuitions of teece s work first the combination of specialized complementary assets appears to be a key driver of the formation of exploitative commercial alliances by ntbfs more specifically patent holding affects positively the likelihood to establish commercial alliances but this propensity is found to rapidly decrease with firm size suggesting that as long as ntbfs become larger and possess specialized commercial assets their urge for commercial alliances diminishes second following the parallelism set forth by teece between search for alliance partners and access to external financing the analysis indicates that potentially beneficial alliances may not take place because of the high transaction costs faced by smaller ntbfs in this respect our results clearly support the view that sponsor institutions as public research organizations venture and corporate venture capitalists may sensibly reduce these costs and that their role crucially depends on both the identity of the sponsor and the type of alliance

co operative r d why and with whom an integrated framework of analysis abstract firms use r d partnerships to access knowledge and build global r d networks this article develops an integrated framework to examine the determinants of the choice of partners with which firms co operate on r d this resource based perspective underscores the interactions between three major questions why co operate who does and with whom it argues in particular that the choice of partners is dictated by the complementary resources which the latter command the framework is then expanded to predict the relative efficiency of r d co operation with different partners including suppliers clients rivals academic institutions and foreign firms the empirical analysis which is based on responses to france s version of the second european community innovation survey cis 2 strongly supports the overall framework of analysis

trimmed opinion pools and the crowd s calibration problem we introduce an alternative to the popular linear opinion pool for combining individual probability forecasts one of the well known problems with the linear opinion pool is that it can be poorly calibrated it tends toward underconfidence as the crowd s diversity increases i e as the variance in the individuals means increases to address this calibration problem we propose the exterior trimmed opinion pool to form this pool forecasts with low and high means or cumulative distribution function cdf values are trimmed away from a linear opinion pool exterior trimming decreases the pool s variance and improves its calibration a linear opinion pool however will remain overconfident when individuals are overconfident and not very diverse for these situations we suggest trimming away forecasts with moderate means or cdf values this interior trimming increases variance and reduces overconfidence using probability forecast data from u s and european surveys of professional forecasters we present empirical evidence that trimmed opinion pools can outperform the linear opinion pool this paper was accepted by rakesh sarin decision analysis

percentage and relative error measures in forecast evaluation properties of two large families of scale free forecast accuracy measures that include popular measures such as mean absolute percentage error relative error and squared percentage error are examined in this paper we describe the optimal reports when forecasts are evaluated using these measures we also provide analytic expressions for the optimal bayes act associated with these measures under a general power transformation for several well known probability distributions we then show that using measures from these two families may inadvertently provide incentives for either pessimism or optimism among forecasters i e rewarding underforecasts or overforecasts relative to some reference measure of central tendency as an illustration of these concepts we examine the use of these measures for model selection in a forecast aggregation example using stock price forecasts derived from the thomson reuters institutional brokers estimate system this example illustrates how aggregation methods that alw

kinship incentives and evolution we analyze how family ties affect incentives with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings the siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty and they may transfer output to each other with equally altruistic siblings their equilibrium effort is non monotonic in the common degree of altruism and it depends on the harshness of the environment we define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship relatedness factor numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment and how this a ects economic outcomes

an example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria in this note we present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring in which all supergame equilibria with positive discount rates are bounded away from full efficiency uniformly in the discount rate provided the latter is strictly positive on the other hand if the players do not discount the future then every efficient one period payoff vector that dominates the one period equilibrium payoff vector can be attained by an equilibrium of the repeated game thus the correspondence that maps the players discount rate into the corresponding set of repeated game equilibrium payoff vectors is discontinuous at the point at which the discount rate is zero

alternative time patterns of decisions and dynamic strategic interactions this paper offers a simple approach to study steady state markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players are obliged to commit their actions for several periods it highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in such games the obtained results are then applied to various either micro or macroeconomic issues where time patterns of decisions matter

firms motivations for cooperative r d an empirical analysis of spanish firms abstract the aim of this paper is to analyze the motives that have caused industrial firms to cooperate in r d there are many theoretical works devoted to the theme but few empirical studies have been carried out with large samples to analyze the factors which determine why firms cooperate in r d we first review the reasons offered by the literature to explain technological cooperation with this allowing us to determine the conceptual framework and to propose some hypotheses we test these hypotheses with a sample of 1652 spanish firms that have carried out r d activities the results obtained suggest that firms motivations for cooperative r d are the complexity of technology and the fact that innovation is costly and uncertain we find that in order to undertake cooperative r d it is necessary to have certain internal capacities in this area with our results being supported by the theory of absorptive capacity however and by contrast with the results presented in other works questions related to market access and search for opportunities do not appear to exert an influence over cooperative r d besides the large sized firms resort more to cooperation and the reasons for cooperative r d differ as between large and small sized firms

two questions about european unemployment a general equilibrium search model makes layoff costs affect the aggregate unemployment rate in ways that depend on equilibrium proportions of frictional and structural unemployment that in turn depend on the generosity of government unemployment benefits and skill losses among newly displaced workers the model explains how before the 1970s lower flows into unemployment gave europe lower unemployment rates than the united states and also how after 1980 higher durations have kept unemployment rates in europe persistently higher than in the united states these outcomes arise from the way europe s higher firing costs and more generous unemployment compensation make its unemployment rate respond to bigger skill losses among newly displaced workers those bigger skill losses also explain why u s workers have experienced more earnings volatility since 1980 and why especially among older workers hazard rates of gaining employment in europe now fall sharply with increases in the duration of unemployment

cooperation secret handshakes and imitation in the prisoners dilemma building on a j robson 1990 j theoret biol 144 379 396 we introduce into the repeated prisoners dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a costly signal i e the secret handshake before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent we show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities we obtain similar results surprisingly in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d60

cultural integration and its discontents a community s culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms behavioural adaptations driven by pay offs to coordination and preference changes shaped by socialization and self persuasion this paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously it identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization the analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

a theory of endogenous commitment commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action the weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed as it is assumed this paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model we construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish but pay a switching cost if they do so we show that for games with two players and two actions there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple structure this equilibrium is independent of the order and timing of moves and is robust to other protocol specifications moreover despite the perfect information nature of the model and the costly switches strategic delays may arise in equilibrium the flexibility of the model allows us to apply it to various environments in particular we study an entry deterrence situation its equilibrium is intuitive and illustrative of how commitment power is endogenously determined copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

malthusian selection of preferences the authors study natural selection of preferences using a golden age model with endogenous population in equilibrium all agents have preferences with maximum biological fitness given resource constraints and total population is the maximum the environment can sustain naturally selected agents follow the golden rule acting as if they maximize the undiscounted sum of per capita felicities of current and future generations selected preferences and hence work saving consumption and population density vary predictably with environmental differences copyright 1990 by american economic association

cultivating trust norms institutions and the implications of scale we study the co evolution of honesty norms and institutions new trading opportunities require institutional changes to be realised since the initial vulnerability of institutions to opportunistic behaviour leads to the deterioration of norms we show how an escape from opportunism requires that institutional improvements outpace norm deterioration a key prediction emerges larger economies are more likely to evolve to steady states with strong honesty norms but need not have better institutions this prediction is tested using a cross section of countries population has a significant positive relationship with trust even when controlling for standard trust determinants and institutional quality

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

inefficiency in analysts earnings forecasts systematic misreaction or systematic optimism a rational analysis of analyst behavior predicts that analysts immediately and without bias incorporate information into their forecasts several studies document analysts tendency to systematically underreact to information underreaction is inconsistent with rationality other studies indicate that analysts systematically overreact to new information or that they are systematically optimistic this study discriminates between these three hypotheses by examining the interaction between the nature of information and the type of reaction by analysts the evidence indicates that analysts underreact to negative information but overreact to positive information these results are consistent with systematic optimism in response to information the literature on financial analysts defines the phrase forecast inefficiency to mean forecasts that fail to accurately incorporate new information on a timely basis and or that are biased these forecasts have also been described as irrational or suboptimal prior studies report inefficiency in analysts forecasts finding that they are upwardly biased and inaccurately reflect available information some studies conclude from this that analysts underreact to information other studies conclude that analysts overreact if markets treat analysts forecasts as both rational and statistically optimal then inefficient forecasts could have important implications for the efficiency of pricing in securities markets in this paper we reexamine the apparent tendency of analysts to misinterpret earnings information the intent of this study is to discriminate between three hypotheses 1 that analysts systematically underreact to new earnings information 2 that analysts systematically overreact to new earnings information and 3 that analysts are systematically optimistic in their reactions for hypotheses 1 and 2 the direction of the misinterpretation i e underor overreaction is independent of the nature of the information received in contrast hypothesis 3 predicts that analysts are optimistic in interpreting

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

venture capitalists and cooperative start up commercialization strategy this paper examines the possible impact of venture capital vc backing on the commercialization direction of technology based start ups by asking to what extent if at all do vc funded start ups engage in cooperative commercialization strategies strategic alliances or technology licensing or both relative to a comparable set of start ups and with what consequences to address these questions i assemble a novel data set that matches firms receiving a federal research and development subsidy through the u s small business innovative research program to vc funded firms by observable characteristics in five technology intensive industries these data allow decoupling of cooperative activity resulting from start up development via the passage of calendar time from that due to association with vcs an analysis of the 696 start ups in the sample split by an external funding source suggests substantial boosts in both cooperative activity associated with vc backed firms and in the likelihood of an initial public offering

how do social defenses work a resource dependence lens on technology ventures venture capital investors and corporate relationships interorganizational relationships offer many potential benefits but they also expose firms to dangers such as misappropriation which pull partners apart this tension between collaboration and competition is central to tie formation especially for young technology firms that have both a high need for resources and high appropriability of their own resources prior work has examined legal and timing defenses that enable interorganizational ties by such low power firms we focus here on social defenses in a longitudinal study of equity tie formation between young firms and established corporate sharks spanning five technology based industries and 25 years we unpack the effects of social defenses and find intriguingly that centrally positioned third parties are a particularly powerful social defense and that third party social defenses are especially significant when more traditional defenses are unavailable we thus offer the insight that third party chaperones central venture capital investors play a key role in helping young firms to mitigate and navigate vulnerabilities while mobilizing resources

the aversion to lying abstract we experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one sided asymmetric information a seller has private information about her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message four different treatments are compared one without communication one with free form communication and two treatments with pre specified communication in the form of promises of varying strength our results suggest that individuals have an aversion towards lying about private information and that the aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes