what do we know about macroeconomics that fisher and wicksell did not the answer to the question in the title is a lot in this essay i argue that the history of macroeconomics during the 20th century can be divided into three epochs

how product standardization affects choice evidence from the massachusetts health insurance exchange this paper examines the effect of choice architecture on massachusetts health insurance exchange a policy change standardized cost sharing parameters of plans across insurers and altered information presentation post change consumers chose more generous plans and different brands but were not more price sensitive we use a discrete choice model that allows the policy to affect how attributes are valued to decompose the policy s effects into a valuation effect and a product availability effect the brand shifts are largely explained by the availability effect and the generosity shift by the valuation effect a hypothetical choice experiment replicates our results and explores alternative counterfactuals

uma breve historia sobre a abordagem de desequilibrio na macroeconomia this paper presents a brief history of non market clearing approach emphasizing its macroeconomics developments this episode is part of keynesian reaction to neoclassical synthesis crises while friedman and lucas classical reaction is widely known disequilibrium approach became a virtually forgotten episode in the history of economic thought disequilibrium authors aimed to develop a framework sustained in analytical primitives distinct from those that became dominant after new classical methodological victory in that scheme keynesian model was no longer a special case of the classical world but actually the exact opposite that was a singular episode which should not be understood as neoclassical synthesis height or the first movements toward new keynesian economics we also discuss the causes of its failure in became the new mainstream

regulating consumer financial products evidence from credit cards we analyze the effectiveness of consumer financial regulation by considering the 2009 credit card accountability responsibility and disclosure card act we use a panel data set covering 160 million credit card accounts and a difference in differences research design that compares changes in outcomes over time for consumer credit cards which were subject to the regulations to changes for small business credit cards which the law did not cover we estimate that regulatory limits on credit card fees reduced overall borrowing costs by an annualized 1 6 of average daily balances with a decline of more than 5 3 for consumers with fico scores below 660 we find no evidence of an offsetting increase in interest charges or a reduction in the volume of credit taken together we estimate that the card act saved consumers 11 9 billion a year we also analyze a nudge that disclosed the interest savings from paying off balances in 36 months rather than making minimum payments we detect a small increase in the share of accounts making the 36 month payment value but no evidence of a change in overall payments jel codes d0 d14 g0 g02 g21 g28 l0 l13 l15

retrospectives the origins of neoclassical microeconomics until recently the standard story line in history of thought textbooks was that a triumvirate of british and continental writers established demarcation between classical economics and neoclassical economics in the early 1870s the authors raise two objections to this potted history the first is that the tools of neoclassical economics were invented earlier recent work has demonstrated that the tools of neoclassical analysis were widely available across europe well before 1870 the notion that neoclassical economics experienced a tripartite immaculate conception around 1870 cannot stand the second objection is that the method of neoclassical economics was invented later as it stands the legend undervalues the key contribution of alfred marshall who put an indelible stamp on neoclassical economics by defining the appropriate method of economic inquiry when we refer to neoclassical economics today we usually mean the collection of tools of economic knowledge available to and invented by marshall channeled and directed into uses dictated by marshall s view of economic science yet as we shall see marshall had an eminent predecessor in method as well in the person of jules dupuit

price competition under limited comparability this paper studies market competition when firms can influence consumers ability to compare market alternatives through their choice of price formats we introduce random graphs as a tool for modelling limited comparability of formats our main results concern the interaction between firms equilibrium price and format decisions and its implications for industry profits and consumer switching rates we show that narrow regulatory interventions that aim to facilitate comparisons may have adverse consequences for consumer welfare finally we argue that our limited comparability approach provides a new perspective into the phenomenon of product differentiation

testing models of consumer search using data on web browsing and purchasing behavior using a large data set on web browsing and purchasing behavior we test to what extent consumers are searching in accordance to various classical search models we nd that the benchmark model of sequential search with a known distributions of prices can be rejected based on the recall patterns we observe in the data moreover we show that even if consumers are initially unaware of the price distribution and have to learn the price distribution observed search behavior for given consumers over time is more consistent with non sequential search than sequential search with learning our

an interview with edmond malinvaud this article contains an interview with edmond malinvaud professor malinvaud describes the origins of his interest in economics teachers who had a major influence on his development as an economist his visit to the cowles commission in 1950 the substance of his research and the contributions he made as a policy maker among the interesting tidbits in the interview is that professor malinvaud s popular textbooks in microeconomic theory macroeconomics and econometrics were a direct outgrowth of courses he taught at insee i am not good at speaking he said when not constrained by a written text

do private standards create exclusive supply chains new evidence from the peruvian asparagus export sector abstract developing countries are increasingly exporting fresh horticultural products to high income countries these exports increasingly have to comply with stringent public and private standards as well as other quality and safety issues there is an ongoing debate on the effect of private standards on the inclusion of small scale farmers in export supply chains with this paper we contribute to this debate by providing new evidence from the peruvian asparagus export sector and by addressing several important methodological shortcomings and gaps in the existing literature we describe export dynamics using a unique firm level dataset on 567 asparagus export firms from 1993 to 2011 and the evolution of certification to private standards using own survey data from a stratified random sample of 87 export firms we use an unbalanced panel of the surveyed companies on 19 years and several methods including fixed effects and gmm estimators to estimate the causal impact of certification to private standards on companies sourcing strategy we find that certification leads to vertical integration and significantly reduces the share of produce that is sourced from external producers with a larger effect for small scale producers when distinguishing between production and processing standards and between low level and high level standards we find that especially high level production standards have a negative impact on sourcing from small scale producers

price competition with consumer confusion this paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogenous product compete in both prices and price frames i e ways to present price information we model price framing by assuming that firms frame choices affect the comparability of their price offers consumers may fail to compare prices due to frame differentiation and due to frame complexity in the symmetric equilibrium the firms randomize over both price frames and prices and make positive profits this result is consistent with the observed coexistence of price and price frame dispersion in the market we also show that i the nature of equilibrium depends on which source of consumer confusion dominates and ii an increase in the number of firms can increase industry profits and harm consumers

it takes two to tango equilibria in a model of sales we show that the varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria a unique symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in contrast the 2 firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric for the n firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first order stochastic dominance this enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric

a voting architecture for the governance of free driver externalities with application to geoengineering abating climate change is an enormous international public goods problem with a classical free rider structure however it is also a global free driver problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril this exploratory paper develops the main features of a free driver externality in a simple model motivated by the asymmetric consequences of type i and type ii errors i propose a social choice decision architecture embodying the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule and derive its basic properties

oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search n identical stores compete by choosing prices for a homogeneous good with constant marginal costs consumers search sequentially with perfect recall for the lowest price one class of consumers called shoppers have zero search costs while all other consumers have a positive search cost c there is a unique symmetric nash equilibrium price distribution with the property that it changes smoothly from marginal cost pricing when all consumers are shoppers and or c 0 and monopoly pricing when no consumers are shoppers remarkably as the number of stores increases the nash equilibrium becomes more monopolistic copyright 1989 by american economic association

why does the law of one price fail an experiment on index mutual funds we conduct an experiment to evaluate why individuals invest in high fee index funds in our experiments subjects allocate 10 000 across four s p 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio s subsequent return subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees we can reject the hypothesis that subjects buy high fee index funds because of bundled non portfolio services search costs for fees matter but even when we eliminate these costs fees are not minimized instead subjects place high weight on annualized returns since inception fees paid decrease with financial literacy interestingly subjects who choose high fee funds sense they are making a mistake

shopping externalities and self fulfilling unemployment fluctuations we propose a novel theory of self fulfilling fluctuations in the labor market a firm employing an additional worker generates positive externalities on other firms because employed workers have more income to spend and have less time to shop for low prices than unemployed workers we quantify these shopping externalities and show that they are sufficiently strong to create s complementarities in the employment decisions of different firms and to generate multiple rational expectations equilibria equilibria differ with respect to agents rational expectations about future unemployment we show that negative shocks to agents expectations lead to fluctuations in vacancies unemployment labor productivity and the stock market that closely resemble those observed in the us during the great recession

inattentive consumers and product quality this paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone without attention to potential differences in product quality a firm may offer a low quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model firms choose prices with mixed strategies similarly to varian 1980 in which some consumers purchase from a random seller without attention to market prices in our model though firms also choose quality stochastically and there is both price and quality dispersion two stylized policy interventions are considered competition policy which acts to increase the number of sellers and market transparency reforms which act to increase the fraction of attentive consumers with fewer inattentive consumers firms are less likely to cheat i e cut quality which therefore improves welfare but profit and consumer surplus can either increase or decrease when there is a large number of sellers approximately half the sellers cheat regardless of the fraction of inattentive consumers and introducing more sellers boosts consumers surplus and reduces profit while the impact on welfare is ambiguous

the new keynesian synthesis the new keynesians made more rapid progress in understanding the microeconomics of unemployment than in understanding the microeconomics of nominal price rigidity but the past five years have seen important breakthroughs in this second area this paper will describe these breakthroughs discuss our current understanding of nominal rigidity and assess the work that remains to be done

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

truly costly sequential search and oligopolistic pricing we modify the paper of stahl 1989 stahl d o 1989 oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search american economic review 79 700 12 by relaxing the assumption that consumers obtain the first price quotation for free when all price quotations are costly to obtain the unique symmetric equilibrium need not involve full consumer participation the region of parameters for which non shoppers do not fully participate in the market becomes larger as the number of shoppers decreases and or the number of firms increases the comparative statics properties of this new type of equilibrium are interesting in particular expected price increases as search cost decreases and is constant in the number of shoppers and in the number of firms welfare falls as firms enter the market we show that monopoly pricing never obtains with truly costly search d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the perverse effects of wage and price controls in search markets abstract this paper examines the effects of price ceilings and minimum wages on the performance of markets in which agents must invest in costly search to become informed about prices or wages in this context it is found that the market equilibrium may respond to changes in policy instruments in strikingly counterintuitive ways in particular the imposition of price ceilings and minimum wages may respectively result in consumer price increases and wage decreases thus an important implication of our analysis is that when unions fight to increase wages by raising the minimum wage they may paradoxically actually be reducing the average wage of its members

deficient foresight a troublesome theme in keynesian economics the fact that john maynard keynes had made a distinguished contribution to the theory of probability 1921 no doubt predisposed many of his readers to imbue with great significance his subsequent remarks on the related topic of uncertainty in economic decision making among those who have provided commentaries on his work there are those who have singled out this uncertainty theme not only for its special importance but also for its potential for analytical subversion the purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the ideas involved in this particular aspect of keynes work together with the lines of argument that have emerged from those commentators who have pursued it the result of this scrutiny will be to call into question the idea that there is anything peculiarly subversive in the analytical consequences of broaching problems of uncertainty in economic decision making i shall argue rather that as an analytical issue it is depending on how it is handled either innocuous or else quite indiscriminately destructive

consumer protection and the incentive to become informed we discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumer incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market in a market with costly consumer search we find that imposing a cap on suppliers prices reduces the incentive to engage in search with the result that prices paid by consumers both informed and uninformed may rise in a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off

the role of prices in measuring the poor s living standards in this paper we revisit two pieces of conventional wisdom in the current debate about poverty paying close attention to the price data underlying these findings that the poor pay more than households of higher income for the goods and services they purchase and that poverty rates at least as measured by the u s census have remained essentially flat since the late 1960s raising questions about the success of the policies implemented to reduce poverty by examining scanner data on thousands of household purchases we find that the poor pay less not more for the goods they purchase and by extending the advances on price measurement in the recent decade back to the 1970s we find that current poverty rates are less than half of the official numbers

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

real time search in the laboratory and the market the standard model of labor market search posits repeated infinite horizon search from a fixed distribution of wages in a stationary environment under these circumstances the optimal search policy has a reservation wage property i e the decision to accept an offer involves a comparison of the offer with a time invariant constant w which itself is a function of the parameters characterizing the search environment a wage offer greater than or equal to w is accepted while any other is rejected and search is continued some early empirical job search studies however accumulated evidence of a declining trend in reservation wages over the course of an unemployment spell 1 since then several theoretical explanations for the declining reservation wage profiles have emerged all of which relax the stationarity assumption of the standard model for example reuben gronau 1971 assumes searchers have finite lives kenneth burdett 1977 gerard j van den berg 1990 james albrecht and susan vroman 2005 and others model short term unemployment benefits albrecht pieter a gautier and vroman 2006 permit directed search to heterogeneous prospects 2 john p danforth 1979 and silvio rendon 2006 consider general liquidity con strained search and burdett and tara vishwanath 1988 model learning about the job offer distribution behavioral explanations for declining reservation wages have been suggested by braunstein and schotter 1981 schotter and braunstein 1982 and others in this paper we present the results of the first ever to our knowledge real time search laboratory experiment performed in an effort to investigate this falling res ervation wage phenomenon where field studies of unemployed search often rely on strong identifying assumptions to recover searchers unobservable reservation wages in the laboratory we are able to elicit subjects complete reservation wage profiles in an incentive compatible manner 3 further in the laboratory we are able to

consumer search behavior and sunk costs abstract this paper presents the results of four economic experiments involving 41 undergraduate students who were assigned the task of searching for the lowest price from a known distribution of prices economic theory predicts that individuals should continue to draw until the expected gain of another search is less than the marginal search cost additionally once individuals have made a draw and then continued they should never return to a price drawn earlier exercise recall both of these predictions are tested in the paper and the results show that behavior is not always consistent with them it appears that individuals are making decisions based on the total return from searching rather than simply the marginal return from another draw

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting