varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment we experimentally test a rent seeking model under five levels of competition at one extreme a subject s probability of winning a prize is equal to her share of the total expenditures at lower levels of competition a subject s probability of winning is affected more by her own expenditures than by the expenditures of others predicted expenditure levels are positively associated with higher levels of competition consistent with previous rent seeking experiments we find that subjects spend significantly more than the nash equilibrium prediction at all levels of competition however expenditure patterns generally follow the nash prediction expenditures decrease as the level of competition decreases our experimental design also includes a lottery choice experiment to control for subjects risk preference we find that subjects who are more risk averse spend significantly less in the contest and this effect is particularly strong for female subjects

do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

selling favors in the lab experiments on campaign finance reform campaign advertising can provide benefits to constituencies when used to fund the distribution of useful information but voters can be harmed if candidates finance such advertising by trading policy favors to special interests in exchange for contributions we report data from novel laboratory campaign finance experiments that shed light on this tradeoff and that provide rigorous empirical evidence on formal campaign finance theory our key finding is that voters respond to advertising differently between special interest and publicly financed campaigns and that the nature of this difference is qualitatively consistent with formal models predictions

product innovation and firm growth evidence from the integrated circuit industry applied research on growth and innovation seems to suggest that successful innovations do not significantly enhance firm growth this paper tests the hypothesis that the level of observation at which applied research is typically conducted hampers identification of a significant association between innovation and sales growth rates exploiting a unique data set we find that product innovations commercialized in the immediate past positively affect the corporate revenue streams of semiconductor companies

how to identify trust and reciprocity this paper uses a three games or triadic design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior a large literature on single game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality averse other regarding preferences such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other regarding preferences do not affect behavior in contrast experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory

the social costs of monopoly and regulation posner reconsidered focuses on social costs of monopoly and trade regulation in the united states benefit of marginal changes on antitrust activities equality of cost in obtaining monopoly and expected profit of monopolist elasticity of inputs in obtaining monopoly ebsco

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly we study the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when there are costs for the follower to observe the leader s behavior in a contest the follower can pay to observe the leader s effort but cannot observe the effectiveness of that effort in a tournament the follower can pay to observe the effectiveness of the leader s effort but not the effort itself we show that this distinction matters significantly when observation is costly the value of commitment vanishes entirely in sequential and endogenous move contests regardless of the size of the observation cost by contrast in tournaments the value of commitment is preserved completely provided that the observation costs are sufficiently small

term premiums in bond returns abstract this paper examines expected returns on u s treasury bills and on u s government bond portfolios expected bill returns are estimated from forward rates and from sample average returns both estimation methods indicate that expected returns on bills tend to peak at eight or nine months and never increase monotonically out to twelve months reliable inferences are limited to treasury bills and thus to maturities up to a year the variability of longer term bond returns preempts precise conclusions about their expected returns

gordon tullock and experimental economics gordon tullock s research has substantially influenced the development of economic science in general and experimental economics in particular we present the first comprehensive survey of this significant achievement we show how tullock s research in bioeconomics influenced later developments in neuroeconomics and how his pioneering work on rent seeking generated a literature of laboratory tests of his hypothesis we also describe tullock s own experiments and draw attention to his early insights on trust games

the monotonicity of the term premium another look this paper reexamines existing evidence regarding the monotonicity of the term premium using a recently developed approach for testing inequality constraints we propose and conduct tests for whether the term premium is monotonic and reach different conclusions from those implied by individual t statistics on term premiums even under a bonferroni type adjustment our results generally support mcculloch s 1987 view that the liquidity preference hypothesis remains unrefuted

the impact of r d on productivity increase in japanese manufacturing companies abstract this paper estimates the impact of r d expenditures as a ratio to value added on the rate of total factor productivity increase using the data of 135 to 168 japanese manufacturing companies in each of two periods period i 1966 73 and period ii 1974 82 the rate of return on r d stock is estimated at 20 percent in period i and 17 percent in period ii but is found to decrease when industrial intercept dummies or the rate of deflated sales growth is added as an explanatory variable which is interpreted as suggesting the inter industry differences in the rate of exogenous technical progress and the existence of a learning effect interindustry differences in the rate of return on r d are also investigated

r d intensity firm performance and the identification of the threshold fresh evidence from the panel threshold regression model this article tests whether there is an optimal level of research and development r d intensity at which point a firm is able to maximize its performance an advanced panel threshold regression model is employed to investigate the panel threshold effect of r d intensity on firm performance among publicly traded taiwan information technology and electronic firms the results confirm that a single threshold effect does exist and show an inverted u correlation between r d intensity and firm performance this article demonstrates that it is possible to identify the definitive level beyond which a further increase in r d expenditure does not yield proportional rewards some important policy implications emerge from the findings

risk attitudes and heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential contests we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in rent seeking contests in which players are heterogeneous in both risk preferences and production technology given identical linear production technology if the number of risk loving players is large enough the aggregate investment in equilibrium will exceed the rent and all risk neutral and risk averse players will exit the contest in simultaneous and sequential contests with two players we can identify the favorite and underdog based on both players preference parameters our theoretical results suggest that subjects in some recent contest experiments behaved as if they were risk loving

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

an experiment on sequential rent seeking in an experiment on sequential rent seeking we find that the theoretically predicted first mover advantage does not exist empirically rather a second mover advantage can be observed though the subgame perfect equilibrium can not prevail in experiment individual behavior is highly reasonable nevertheless such that subjects appear to play a reduced form of the original game we also observe that the efficient fair outcome can not be achieved because of the exploitation opportunity for the second mover the observed behavior is quite different from that in ultimatum and trust game experiments 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

non prisoner s dilemma abstract all prisoner s dilemma experiments pre select contestants prevents them from communicating and changing partners in the middle of things this brief experiment changes all three of these conditions and gets a very high degree of cooperation

risk lovers and the rent over investment puzzle in this paper we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a rent seeking contest given a class of heterogeneous risk loving players we explore the role third order risk attitude plays in equilibrium and find that imprudence is sufficient for risk lovers to increase rent seeking investment above the risk neutral outcome moreover we show that rent can be fully dissipated in a standard tullock contest played by a large number of risk lovers

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

experimental comparison of multi stage and one stage contests this article experimentally studies a two stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one stage contest contrary to the theory the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest there is significant over dissipation in both stages of the two stage contest and experience diminishes over dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject s utility a simple behavioral model that accounts for a non monetary utility of winning can explain significant over dissipation in both contests it can also explain why the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest

house money effects on trust and reciprocity in a typical laboratory investment game experiment participants endowments are provided by the experimenter thus the worst case for the investor is that she loses all of her found money by contrast in naturally occurring environments investment decisions can often lead to a loss of one s own money this paper investigates whether trust found in one shot anonymous laboratory interaction is robust to own money environments our results show that consistent with previous investment game results most investors send a positive amount and most trustees return at least the transfer amount regardless of whether the investors purchase or are gifted their endowment however investments are on average lower when participants use their own money and the fraction of maximum investments the most risky investment decision is only half as large under own money as it is under gifted endowments our results explain why one should exercise caution in placing trust in any government s ability to spend other people s money prudently

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

the impact of process innovations on firm s productivity growth the case of spain the main aim of this paper is to investigate about the effect that a measure of the process innovation performance of a firm has on its labour productivity growth this analysis is mainly a consequence of two considerations the first one results from a clear differentiation of the role that product and process innovations have on a firm s performance the second one is to assume that the knowledge capital of a firm is mainly composed by its successful research the study demonstrates that process innovation has a positive and significant effect on firm s productivity growth moreover this result is robust under a wide range of alternative specifications and in any case the variable behaves much better than r d intensity following previous research the detected quadratic relationship between vertical product differentiation and process innovation performance leads to the existence of some firms for which there exist a trade off between quality and productivity

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

explaining the failures of the term spread models of the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure contrary to the predictions of the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates empirical evidence suggests that the term spread between long and short rates fails to forecast future movements of long term rates although its forecasts of future short term rates are in the correct direction in this paper the authors show that this puzzling behavior of the term spread alone can be explained by a time varying term premium that is correlated with the term spread once this is accounted for neither expression of the expectations hypothesis is against the predictions of the theory copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

an analysis of the length of labour and financial contracts a study for spain this study investigates the connection between the duration of financial contracts and that of labour contracts workers with long term contracts have incentives to invest in training this makes them attractive to the entrepreneur furthermore this behaviour will be reinforced if financial contracts are long term because it reduces the probability of an early liquidation as well as the dismissal of trained workers as a conclusion significant increases in the length of financing contracts should be accompanied by corresponding increases in the length of labour contracts support for this theoretical contention is found by testing it on a dataset composed of spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1991 2000

an experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking the debate about the measurement of the amount of rent dissipated in rent seeking activities is unable to be answered by observations from the naturally occurring environment current theoretical investigations have indicated that a number of factors will affect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking the theory of efficient rent seeking predicts that the number of rent seekers their risk posture their ability to enter and exit the rent seeking process and the manner in which the probability of receiving a rent is determined will affect the amount of rent that is dissipated

the term structure of very short term rates new evidence for the expectations hypothesis abstract empirical researchers have frequently rejected the expectations hypothesis the expectations hypothesis however has seldom if ever been tested at the extreme short end of the term structure where maturities are measured in days or weeks using overnight weekly and monthly repo rates i find that term rates are almost unbiased estimates of the average overnight rate this evidence provides new support for the expectations hypothesis

the monotonicity of the term premium abstract fama s evidence that the term premium on treasury securities is not monotonically increasing is found to depend entirely on the behavior of bid asked mean returns on 9 and 10 month bills and only during the subperiod 8 64 12 72 when transactions costs as reflected in the bid asked spread are taken into account there is found to be no way to exploit this non monotonicity the anomalous behavior of the quotations is attributed to the treasury s auctions of 9 month bills during the period 9 66 10 72 the hypothesis that the term premium is a monotonically increasing function of maturity remains unrefuted

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals