reciprocal relationships and mechanism design we study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves we model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players commitments we differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down we fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment we use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non participants the difference stems from the players ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts we discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal

privatization deregulation and capital accumulation author affiliation gerhard glomm department of economics indiana university wylie hall room 105 bloomington in 47405 usa gglomm indiana edufabio mendez department of economics walton college of business room 402 university of arkansas fayetteville ar 72701 usa fmendez uark edu corresponding author acknowledgment we are grateful to b ravikumar rowena pecchenino jeffrey wooldridge felix rioja stefan krause and seminar participants from the economics department at emory university for useful observations we are also grateful to cristian opazo and javier reyes for their assistance and to the editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments 1 introductionsince the early 1980s many countries have privatized and deregulated intermediate goods industries such as gas electricity or telecommunications that had traditionally been run by public monopolies the european union eu for example has adopted aggressive policies toward the elimination of monopolies in the telecommunication market and conducted a general privatization program whose sales receipts amounted to more than 3 of gdp between 1985 and 1995 constantinou and lagoudakis 1996 parker 1998 in other regions of the world countries like australia chile brazil argentina and the united states have implemented similar policies vickers and yarrow 1991 winston 1993 van der vlies 1996 while there is a large literature studying the microeconomic effects of privatization and deregulation the long run macroeconomic effects of such types of reforms have been subject to relatively less scrutiny in this paper we use a model of capital accumulation in order to investigate the long run effects of privatization and deregulation this paper complements a small literature that includes parente and prescott 1999 2000 schmitz 2001 and herrendorf and teixeira 2004 parente and prescott 1999 2000 and herrendorf and teixeira 2004 study the impact of monopoly rights on long run levels of income and find that the effect is large the latter authors find for example that monopoly rights can reduce aggregate income in the long run by a factor of seven schmitz 2001 uses a two sector model to calculate the impact of government production of investment goods on long run levels of labor productivity he finds that government production can lower labor productivity levels in the long run by about 30 our approach differs from herrendorf and teixeira 2004 who infer the extent of monopoly power from differentials in the relative prices of nontradeables instead we take the approach that monopoly power is likely to arise and exist in the public production of intermediate goods such as public utilities or telecommunication and that the size of these sectors relative to the rest of the economy can be directly estimated see world bank 1995 our approach also differs from schmitz 2001 in a fundamental way because he abstracts completely from the issue of monopoly rights in his model the only difference between the public and private production is that the government is endowed with a less productive technology than the private sector the long run income gains from privatization and deregulation in our paper are similar in magnitude to those found in schmitz 2001 in our base case calculation the long run income gain of changing from a public sector monopoly to a competitive market with private firms is 18 these welfare gains can be larger when there has been relatively low governmental investment in the public sector capital and when the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate input and physical capital is small like schmitz 2001 we view our results as less pertinent for rich economies like the united states where public sector involvement in intermediate good production is relatively small rather we view the results of our model as being applicable mostly to least developed countries ldcs such as egypt where governments typically play a large role in intermediate goods production

residual state ownership policy stability and financial performance following strategic decisions by privatizing telecoms we question previous research assuming that privatizing firm performance generally benefits from decreasing state ownership and the passage of time both of which purportedly align principal agent incentives promoting organizational decision making that increases shareholder value when state ownership shifts from majority and controlling to minority and non controlling the performance impact may be positive in the short run particularly where there is instability in the local investment policy environment consistent with this proposition we develop and test hypotheses derived from a minority and non controlling or residual state ownership framework grounded in credible privatization and institutional theory we propose that 1 residual state ownership positively affects shareholder returns after strategic decisions by privatizing firms because it signals state support for managerial initiatives 2 the passage of time since initial privatization negatively affects shareholder returns after strategic decisions by privatizing firms because initial undertakings in support of the privatizing firm are reversed and 3 home country investment policy stability moderates these two effects greater stability obviates the need for residual state ownership and slows policy reversals over time we find empirical support for our residual state ownership framework in event study analyses of cumulative abnormal returns cars associated with 196 major investments announced from 1986 to 2001 by 15 privatizing telecoms from around the world cars are positive at 5 25 state ownership levels but turn negative at higher state ownership levels cars turn sharply negative within 1 2 years from initial privatization dates increasing policy stability diminishes positive ownership and negative time effects on cars results confirm the potential supporting role that residual state ownership can play in enhancing strategic decision making and financial performance by privatizing firms particularly where there is instability in the home country investment policy environment

incumbent employees resistance to implementing privatization policy abstract the recent anti privatization trend in latin america france and south africa is a reminder that employees resist privatization because pre privatization firms tend to be over manned and to pay excessive wages we study the effect of employees resistance on the successful implementation of privatization in a stylized model in which the government interacts with employees of an unknown type the analysis clarifies some of the difficulties associated with the implementation process furthermore although common sense dictates that the government negotiates with the employees before finding an outside buyer we show that sometimes it is better off contacting an investor first

mixed markets and crime abstract this paper specifies and solves a two stage game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control in the first stage of the model private targets and the government choose levels of policing in the second stage criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit the paper s key results are as follows first private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less protected targets suffer second an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing this is an instance of a political incentive externality where private policing affects the objective function of the government specifically it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good third the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing in effect private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening this in turn may lead to an increase in the severity of crime fourth the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient and in some situations mixing may reduce the utility of all targets

rate base selection and the structure of regulation this article investigates the role played by rate base valuation rules in the context of rate of return regulation it shows 1 that there is nothing inherently fair about any particular valuation rule 2 that properly interpreted rate bases represent promises of future returns 3 that valuation rules can be fairly selected from a very broad class and 4 that once this is recognized rate of return regulation represents a highly effective and flexible means of avoiding the dynamic consistency problems associated with repeated regulatory reviews in addition the article investigates the nature of optimal rate base valuation rules

a folk theorem for bayesian games with commitment the set of all bayesian nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the bayesian game furthermore the various equilibrium payoffs which are achieved by means of different commitment devices are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal deterministic commitment game

varieties in state capitalism outward fdi strategies of central and local state owned enterprises from emerging economy countries institutional diversity characterizing state owned enterprises soes from emerging economies holds critical but under examined implications for their internationalization activities different types of soes can exhibit distinct motivations strategic resources and adaptive capabilities for penetrating foreign markets to understand how such idiosyncratic differences emerge we conceptualize the heterogeneity of soes as an outcome of multiple institutional reform processes administrative and fiscal decentralization industrial restructuring and market liberalization which create diversity between soes affiliated with central and local levels of government building on the idea of institutions as configurations we elucidate how such reforms reconfigure soes constellation of resources capabilities and priorities which shape the parameters of their ability to negotiate for home and host country institutional legitimacy specifically we propose that the restructuring of central soes into national champions exposes them to stronger institutional pressures from home and host country governments while local soes which have fewer obligations to serve national strategic prerogatives display greater managerial autonomy and market orientation but lower levels of monopolistic behavior we discuss how such contrasting attributes contribute to variations in soes international business diversification patterns foreign subsidiary establishment and ownership modes and overseas location preferences recognition of soes organizational diversity holds important implications for theories on state owned multinationals

state ownership and market liberalization evidence from china s domestic m a market abstract we study how state ownership affects the post merger performance of chinese acquirers and find that state owned acquirers soes experience a significantly larger long term performance improvement following mergers compared to their non state owned nsoe counterparts when partitioning the sample period into acquisitions made prior to and following china s split share reform of 2005 we find that the post merger performance improvement of soe acquirers is largely attributed to the post reform period in which controlling shareholders converted their non tradable shares into tradable status our results are consistent with the interpretation that state intervention in the form of capital market liberalization and alleviation of governance problems combined with political connections and privileged access to financing may have a positive effect on m a performance that outweighs the inefficiency cost of state ownership in china

slack in the state owned enterprise an evaluation of the impact of soft budget constraints abstract in this paper slack in resource utilization is estimated using data envelopment analysis for a sample of 67 indian state owned 63 private sector and 27 foreign owned enterprises on a comparative basis the study is cross sectional and carried out for the year 1991 to assess how far the operation of soft budget constraints has had an impact on the economic performance of indian firms particularly operated as state owned enterprises specifically the presence of debt capital provided primarily by government owned financial institutions is strongly and negatively related to performance the results show that if firms turn out to be all equally efficient then average materials costs human capital usage costs costs associated with other operating items and physical capital usage by each state owned enterprise sampled can be reduced by rs 203 million rs 201 million rs 53 million and rs 255 million respectively if existing levels of inputs are used efficiently then the average addition to the value of output by each state owned enterprise can rise by rs 693 million the analyses reveal significant slack in resource utilization in indian state owned firms resulting from soft budget constraints and the implications of the existence of slack are discussed

government s credit rating concerns and the evaluation of public projects we study how considerations regarding the credit rating of the government s debt affect privatization policy credit market discipline presses the government to put more weight on the monetary aspect of public projects relative to their social benefits as the anticipated income increases its creditors confidence in its ability to repay debt yet several informational problems undermine this discipline leading to a costly downgrading of the credit rating dynamic inconsistency occurs when the monetary to social benefi tt radeoff is made only after the credit market has priced government s debt such as in the decision of the toll on a road projects are operated with an excessive emphasis on social benefits adverse selection occurs when the government has private information regarding a prospective project s characteristics such as anticipated traffic project selection is tilted towards those with high social benefits and low monetary benefi ts we study the possible roles for privatization to alleviate these informational problems and evaluate the regimes with and without the option for privatization

trade and the environment with pre existing subsidies a dynamic general equilibrium analysis abstract countries that wish to erect trade barriers have a variety of instruments at their disposal in addition to tariffs and quotas countries can offer tax relief low interest financing reduced regulation and other subsidies to domestic industries facing foreign competition in a trade agreement countries typically agree to reduce not only tariffs but also subsidies we consider the effect of a free trade agreement on pollution emissions we show that while reducing tariffs may indeed increase output and pollution reductions in some subsides required by the trade agreement reduce pollution in general equilibrium for reasonable parameter values reducing subsidies has three effects on pollution 1 reducing subsidies to firms reduces pollution causing capital accumulation 2 if subsidized firms are more pollution intensive then reducing subsides moves capital and labor from more to less pollution intensive firms and 3 reducing subsidies concentrates production in more productive firms increasing output and thus pollution we derive straightforward conditions for which 1 and 2 outweigh 3 we then calibrate the model to china in 1997 and find that pollution has a more elastic response to reducing subsidies than to reducing tariffs while a 5 reduction in tariffs increases all pollutants by approximately 1 a 5 reduction in subsidies reduces pollution by 1 8 11 6 depending on the pollutant the reductions in pollution occur without any environmental side agreements or abatement policy changes

economic perspectives on privatization despite being one of the most fundamental issues in political economy the question of the appropriate boundary between public and private enterprise received relatively little attention in mainstream economic analysis until quite recently in the 1980s however programs of ownership reform were started in many developed and developing countries dramatic though some of these policies have been they are likely to be overshadowed in the 1990s by even greater privatization in the reforming socialist economies the opening sections of this paper are organized around three broad and interrelated questions how does ownership matter for the efficiency of enterprise performance what is the role for privatization in financing public debts and deficits what are the distributional and political implications of privatization finally we examine privatization in practice in three countries britain chile and poland

objectives and incentives evidence from the privatisation of great britain s power plants abstract does privatization increase plant productivity because the private owner s objective is different or because they are better able to control management and is privatization sufficient to improve productivity or is it only effective in combination with competition we answer these questions using the quasi experiment of great britain s electricity industry privatization to separate the effect of a change in objectives from a change in incentives we assume that the former only affects labor but not fuel productivity and assuming that effective competition was only introduced after privatization we are able to separately identify the effects of privatization and competition we find that privatization increased labor but not fuel productivity evidence for the importance of objectives there is no evidence that the introduction of effective competition after privatization increased labor or fuel productivity evidence that privatization increases productivity by itself

partial privatization and firm performance most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact this perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner using data on indian state owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability productivity and investment widespread privatization in recent decades has generated a large empirical literature concerning the effect of ownership on firm performance most studies find that privatization has a positive impact on the profitability and efficiency of firms see megginson and netter 2001 for a recent survey 1 the firms in these studies have had a majority of their assets privatized and control rights have been transferred from the government to private owners surprisingly little is known about the effect of partial privatization where the government remains the controlling owner this paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by investigating whether the performance of state owned enterprises in india is affected by the sale of non controlling equity stakes on the stock market

privatization strategic foreign direct investment and host country welfare recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment fdi we show that there is a two way causality between privatization and greenfield fdi privatization increases the incentive for fdi which in turn increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no fdi the optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms and on the foreign firm s mode of entry

privatization and bank performance in developing countries abstract we examine the postprivatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries our results suggest that i on average banks chosen for privatization have a lower economic efficiency and a lower solvency than banks kept under government ownership ii in the postprivatization period profitability increases but depending on the type of owner efficiency risk exposure and capitalization may worsen or improve however iii over time privatization yields significant improvements in economic efficiency and credit risk exposure iv we also find that newly privatized banks that are controlled by local industrial groups become more exposed to credit risk and interest rate risk after privatization

selection staging and sequencing in the recent chinese privatization selection in privatization is a decision making process of choosing state owned enterprises soes prioritizing and sequencing privatizing events and determining the extent of private ownership in partial privatization we investigate this process in an important but rarely studied case of china based on the soe population over 1998 2008 we track 49 456 wholly soes and identify 9 359 privatization cases over time our econometric analysis concludes i the privatization selection is a complex decision making process in which local governments balance between various economic financial and political objectives ii in the recent chinese privatization firm performance relates to the selection staging and sequencing in privatization in an inverted u fashion the worse and the best performing soes are more likely to remain state owned maintain higher state holding when privatized and are less likely to be privatized later in time these patterns suggest the privatization reform slowdown and the underlying changes in the privatization policy

privatization and foreign competition abstract this paper determines the equilibrium market structure in an international oligopoly where a state enterprise is sold at an auction the paper suggests that high greenfield costs and high trade costs do not necessarily induce foreign acquisitions in privatizations despite the fact that foreign firms would gain considerably from acquiring in such situations the reason is that domestic firms can then prevent foreign firms from becoming strong local competitors and thus their willingness to pay for the state assets is high

bayesian repeated games and reputation the folk theorem characterizes the subgame perfect nash equilibrium payoffs of an undiscounted or discounted infinitely repeated game with fully informed patient players as the feasible individually rational payoffs of the one shot game to which extent does the result still hold when every player privately knows his own payoffs under appropriate assumptions private values and uniform punishments the nash equilibria of the bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff equivalent to tractable completely revealing equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial bayesian game this characterization does not apply to discounted games with sufficiently patient players in a class of public good games the set of nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty while limit perfect bayesian nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game as players become infinitely patient do exist these equilibria share some features with the ones of multi sided reputation models

agriculture and the transition to the market agricultural sectors in eastern and central europe are large so that changes in producer prices farm employment and land ownership affect substantial numbers of people in the past food in the region was politicized for decades governments of eastern european countries and the ussr offered their citizens stable subsidized food prices and a steadily improving diet in an effort to demonstrate the superiority of communism over capitalism during the transition the context has changed but food remains politicized many consumers in the region are ill prepared to pay the real costs of food which are quite high the task of reducing those costs will be difficult involving restructuring of farms and fostering competition in processing and distribution management of the agricultural transition will affect the political sustainability of the process and influence agriculture s contribution to the growth of emerging market economies although the agricultural sector of eastern and central europe is large soviet agriculture dwarfs it in its impact on the region and the world a positive program to stop the decline in soviet agriculture could contribute to economic growth and political stability failure to remedy the fundamental flaws in soviet agriculture will speed the country s slide into poverty and ethnic turmoil and undermine the efforts of central and eastern europeans to succeed

brazilian privatization in the 1990s abstract this paper makes a partial assessment of the brazilian privatization program in the 1990s the article focuses mainly on the fiscal impact of asset sales which we argue has been relatively small we conclude that the failure of the governments attemps has reduced the fiscal benefits of privatization and inhibited the goverment s capacity to impose limits on buyers who have increased their market power through the acquisition of state owned enterprises in practice the main objective of the privatization program has been to highlight the commitment to market orieted reforms in a certain sense privatization has created its own logic beyond its original objectives

testing limits to policy reversal evidence from indian privatizations abstract we examine the effect of regime change on privatization in the 2004 indian election the pro reform bjp was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition stock prices of government controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the bjp dropped 3 5 relative to private firms government controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7 5 relative to private firms this is consistent with investor belief of a point of no return where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse further analysis suggests that layoffs combined with the privatization announcement served as a credible commitment to privatize

toward resource independence why state owned entities become multinationals an empirical study of india s public r d laboratories in this paper we build on the standard resource dependence theory rdt and its departure suggested by vernon to offer a novel explanation for why state owned entities soes might seek a global footprint and global cash flows to achieve resource independence from other state actors in the context of soes the power use hypothesis of standard rdt can be used to analyze the dependence of soes on other state actors such as government ministries and government agencies that have ownership and control rights in the soe building on vernon we argue that the soe can break free from this power imbalance and establish resource independence from other state actors by becoming a multinational firm and or by generating global cash flows we leverage a natural experiment in india and outline both quantitative and qualitative evidence from 42 indian state owned laboratories to support this argument

leviathan resists the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in turkey this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance it is found that favorable short run performance weak market potential higher employment lower socio economic development concentrated voter preferences and weaker representation of right wing parties in the firms locality delay the timing of privatization the paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale

interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information costs and benefits of privatized firms abstract in this paper we examine the interactions between investment timing and management effort in the presence of asymmetric information between the owner and the manager where the manager has an informational advantage we find that investment timing is later under asymmetric information than under full information implying a decrease in the value of equity option however in order to minimize any distortion under underinvestment management effort is greater under asymmetric information than under full information we show that there are trade offs in the efficiencies of investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information these results fit well with the findings of past empirical studies concerning the costs and benefits of privatized firms

the disciplinary role of takeovers this paper presents a theory of the disciplinary role of takeovers based on an explicit model of managerial incentive problems stemming from asymmetric information it is argued that an informed raider can reduce incentive problems by making managerial compensation more sensitive to information unavailable to shareholders the paper also highlights the importance of specifying the source of contractual inefficiencies when analyzing the effect of takeovers on incentives

the british electricity experiment the privatization of the electricity supply industry esi in britain which began 1990 is in itself an unremarkable event much of the esi is privately owned in several european countries and in the united states and the u k privatization program has embraced utilities since 1984 when british telecom was privatized the thing that is remarkable about recent policy toward the industry is the radical nature of the regulatory reform accompanying privatization a vertically integrated administered generation and transmission structure was replaced overnight on march 31 1990 by one that is deintegrated and market based generation and transmission have been separated and there has been an attempt to establish competition in generation a number of countries have been moving gradually in the direction of encouraging competition but nowhere else have such dramatic changes been implemented so quickly

endogenous asset ownership structures in deregulated markets abstract this paper determines the equilibrium ownership structure in an emerging market deregulated by a joint privatization and investment liberalization it is shown that bidding competition in the privatization stage is not sufficient for reaching an efficient equilibrium market structure competition in the ensuing entry stage is also required otherwise one firm can induce another to take the role of the weak firm in the subsequent product market competition by making concessions in the bidding in the privatization auction it is also shown that employment guarantees may help the buyer of the privatized firm abstain from investing and thus create a less competitive market structure

ownership changes and access to external financing this paper examines access to external financing in the privatization context and provides new evidence on the effects of financing constraints on performance and investment ownership reforms increase firms reliance on external financing empirically performance and investment changes around ownership reforms are increasing in country level measures of access to credit the presence of a severe prior public financing constraint contributes to stronger investment growth after privatization privatized enterprises do not outperform publicly owned industries all else given our analyses rely on new international sector and firm level data and correct for potential endogeneity of ownership changes

state owned and privately owned firms an empirical analysis of profitability leverage and labor intensity for some it is an article of faith that governmentowned firms must be less efficient or at least less profitable than privately owned firms maxim boycko et al 1996 argue that politicians cause government owned firms to employ excess labor inputs anne o krueger 1990 suggests that such firms may be pressured to hire politically connected people rather than those best qualified to perform desired tasks more generally government owned firms are thought to forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of social and political objectives such as wealth redistribution in addition the residual cash flow claims of these firms are not readily transferable like the shares of a private corporation this impairs residual claimant incentives to monitor managers and ultimately degrades firm performance as a consequence one expects government owned firms to be technically less efficient and therefore less profitable than private firms the implication is that in competitive markets without significant externalities private ownership is the superior organizational form the view that government firms are inherently less efficient than private ones however remains controversial among economists john vickers and george yarrow 1991 among others point out that agency problems arise in private firms as well as public ones in most large private corporations managers own little of the stock because monitoring managers is costly a divergence arises between their objectives and those of private shareholders private shareholders typically hold a small stake in any one firm and it may not pay any shareholder to bear the cost of monitoring management it follows from this discussion that whether government firms are more or less efficient than private firms is primarily an empirical issue to date the body of empirical evidence is mixed in this paper we report further empirical evidence on the relative efficiency of public and private enterprises we build on previous work by studying larger samples over longer time periods and by allowing for additional factors that influence firm performance in particular our analysis controls for time series variation in the general level of economic activity that may otherwise confound performance comparisons between government and private firms 2 we approach the issue in two different ways first using accounting numbers we conduct a large sample cross sectional comparison of government owned and privately owned corporations this comparison is similar in design to that of boardman and vining 1989 but our sample is three times the size of theirs and includes three

public private mixed delivery and information effects this paper analyses public private mixed delivery of essential public services under price regulation a private firm may have lower production costs and can potentially provide a performance benchmark for a public firm a public firm may offer higher quality service and can reveal the production cost of the private firm to the regulator however this paper shows that public private mixed delivery does not always dominate public delivery or private delivery mixed delivery is optimal only when i the cost uncertainty of the private firm is large ii the managerial incentive problem of the public firm is large and iii the performances of the public and private firms are highly correlated

bot projects incentives and efficiency abstract in recent years governments have been increasingly adopting build operate transfer bot contracts for large infrastructure projects however bot contracts have received little attention from economists the apparent agency problem in bot projects has never been analyzed in this paper we develop a model to examine the incentives efficiency and regulation in bot contracts we show that a bot contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency both license extension and price control are observed in many real world bot projects we also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors including time consistency price ceiling foreign ownership and the lack of price regulation

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

ownership and firm innovation in a transition economy evidence from china we examine innovation performance of firms in a transition economy from an ownership perspective we focus specifically on the relationship between ownership structures and firm innovation performance drawing on data from 548 chinese firms we find volume of patent registration to be most strongly influenced by foreign ownership in the firm along with firm affiliation within a business group the influence of state and institutional ownership on innovation performance is positive but lagged contrary to expectations insider ownership leads to lower innovation performance and concentrated ownership has no significant impact our study has two principal contributions firstly we utilize a comprehensive treatment of ownership characteristics overcoming weakness in previous studies that have used a more narrow focus on ownership type secondly we contribute to understanding of how firms in transition economies build indigenous capabilities for innovation by drawing attention to the interplay of foreign and domestic control of agents innovation

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

politicians and the ipo decision the impact of impending political promotions on ipo activity in china abstract this paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering ipo activity in certain politicized environments focusing on china we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development firms rely on political connections for access to capital rent seeking behavior is rampant and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency we find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an ipo temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events this effect holds for both state owned and non state owned entities for state owned firms the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity for non state owned firms the temporary increase in ipo activity appears to be rationally opportunistic in nature with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms political connections promotion period ipos underperform non promotion period ipos in terms of both future financial performance and long run stock returns have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering

financing infrastructure in developing countries this article develops a theoretical framework to analyse options for financing infrastructure in developing countries we build a basic model that gives motivations for using a combination of public finance private debt and private equity the model is then extended in a number of ways to examine factors that are important for developing countries we focus in particular on key institutional weaknesses that are often important for infrastructure investment overall we show that such weaknesses can be key in determining financing choices but that they do not all push in the same direction financing schemes must therefore be adapted to consider the institutional limitations that are most pertinent in any given context

when does privatization work the impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies this paper compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of central europe while controlling for various forms of selection bias it argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to whom it gives control in particular privatization to outsider but not insider owners has significant performance effects where privatization is effective the effect on revenue performance is very pronounced but there is no comparable effect on cost reduction overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners leads to a substantial overstatement of potential employment losses from postprivatization restructuring

rogues and regulation in global finance maxwell leeson and the city of london clark g l 1997 rogues and regulation in global finance maxwell leeson and the city of london reg studies 31 221 236 in this paper i explore the culture of the finance industry in general and in particular the problems of dealing with socalled rogue behaviour in the context of regulation and regulatory regimes the reference points for analysis are the recent cases of robert maxwell the british entrepreneur who is thought by many to have systematically fleeced his companies pension funds to finance complex corporate deals and nick leeson the barings trader in singapore who it is commonly believed single handedly bankrupted the bank while no doubt provocative and the subjects of considerable speculation regarding their true motives i argue that the maxwell and leeson cases are representative of a strategy of demonization and selective representation designed to protect the reputations of existing institutions in this respect i focus upon three issues the representation of behavio

takeover threats and managerial myopia this paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long term interests in order to boost current profits if stockholders are imperfectly informed temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price hence the managerial concern with current bottom line the magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors including the attitudes and beliefs of shareholders the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms

local financial development and growth using a unique sample of net domestic product data for districts in india i investigate the connection between banking sector development human capital and economic growth at the sub national level using disaggregate data avoids many of the omitted variable problems that plague cross country studies of the finance growth connection and facilitates an instrumentation strategy the findings show that the growth of many districts in india is financially constrained due to lack of banking sector development and that the relationship between finance and growth may be non linear for the districts in the sample moving from the 75th percentile of credit net domestic product to the 25th percentile implies an average loss of 4 percent in growth over the 1990s this indicates that the gains from increased banking sector outreach may be large the analysis shows that human capital deepening can reduce the effect of the financial constraint and help decouple growth from financial development in a district at the 25th literacy percentile the implied growth loss due to a constrained banking sector is twice as large as in a district at the 75th literacy percentile thus higher levels of human capital may activate alternative growth and production channels that are less finance intensive

do privatized banks in middle and low income countries perform better than rival banks an intra industry analysis of bank privatization abstract this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the pre and post privatization operating performance and stock market performance of privatized banks and their rivals in middle and low income countries first we find that privatization announcements elicit negative abnormal returns for rival banks the effects are more pronounced for subsequent tranche sales where the proportion of government ownership in the privatized bank is reduced second we observe that the privatized banks underperformed the benchmark index in the long run investors who bought shares of the privatized banks on the first day of trading and held them for 5 years instead of investing in the market index lost 24 of their wealth the underperformance is consistent with the negative long run returns that have been documented for initial public offerings third we document marginal improvements in the post privatization operating performance of the privatized banks though the privatized banks in middle and low income countries are better capitalized than rival banks they carry higher problem loans and are overstaffed relative to other private banks in the post privatization period since most of the sample firms are partially privatized we submit that perhaps the continued government ownership of the privatized banks might have hindered managers ability to restructure the firms

enterprise performance and management turnover in the czech republic abstract we study the effect of management turnover on changes in enterprise performance using a cross section of 706 czech firms over the 1993 1997 period controlling for initial conditions equity holdings by managers and firm and sector specific effects we find that the appointment of new managers is associated with improvements in profit margins and labor productivity particularly if those managers were selected by private owners the results highlight the importance of human capital in transition economies in bringing about improvements in corporate performance

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms evidence from developing countries this paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992 we use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures both unadjusted and market adjusted results show significant increases in profitability operating efficiency capital investment spending output employment level and dividends we also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples

factors influencing the privatisation of urban solid waste collection in spain this paper analyses some of the organisational aspects of urban solid waste collection it starts by discussing some of the theoretical issues of contracting out then an explanatory model is spec

varieties of capitalism and the internationalization of state owned enterprises this article sheds light on how the internationalization of state owned enterprises is influenced by the state involvement in ownership and by the home country s institutional settings integrating international business literature with the debate on the varieties of capitalism we contend that state dominated enterprises internationalize more less than privately owned enterprises in coordinated liberal market economies whereas they exhibit an inconstant behavior in state influenced market economies our analysis on a sample of enterprises pertaining to 20 oecd countries supports our hypotheses this article adds to studies on the influence of institutions on firms internationalization and has implications for both managers and policymakers

how does government ownership affect firm performance a simple model of privatization in transition economies abstract we present a game theoretical model of privatization in transition economies we consider the costs and benefits of government ownership and derive the net effect of government ownership on firm performance model predictions are consistent with empirical evidence in the literature

privatization public offerings and political objectives this paper empirically analyses the political and economic objectives underlying privatization on the stock market particularly the factors of sips underpricing are explained and the study analyses whether the change of political parties in government play a role on the issue the paper has two main findings first larger initial returns occurred in the early stages of privatization second the change of government from left wing to right wing did not lead to significantly higher levels of underpricing the results show that governments are quite pragmatic with respect to underpricing maximizing proceeds from sips shows to be more important than ideological differences between parties in government

state ownership and transparency in foreign direct investment we contribute to ib literature on state owned multinationals by examining an understudied element of mne strategy transparency drawing insight from accounting finance and political science we develop theory and hypotheses regarding ownership effects on fdi disclosure we argue that transparency of outward fdi depends on both state ownership and home and host country institutions we also posit that host governments harness their soes to exploit information disclosed by foreign mnes discouraging inward fdi transparency we test our hypotheses using a unique transaction level database from the global petroleum industry analyzing a sample of 965 investment disclosures across 81 developing and developed countries we find state ownership reduces mne transparency soes are less sensitive to host country political risk than private firms soes from better governed countries are more transparent and regardless of ownership foreign mnes are more opaque when investing in the presence of a host country soe

the ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects in a differential information economy with quasi linear utilities monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints the associated ex ante core is generically non empty however we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

an anatomy of state control in the globalization of state owned enterprises integrating agency theory with institutional analysis in international business we propose a state control perspective to analyze government control mechanisms in emerging economies globalization of state owned enterprises soes we identify two types of state control that influence soes globalization decisions and the degree of globalization dog state ownership control and executives political connections both of which are contingent upon the home country s evolving institutional environments using a two step corporate globalization decision model and 17 272 firm year observations of non financial chinese listed companies we find a strong impact of both types of state control on soes globalization although the impacts differ between the periods before and after domestic governance reform and across different globalization decision steps the diminishing impact of executives political connections and the increasing impact of state ownership control on firms dog demonstrate the evolving relationship between the state and the managers as well as the dynamics of state control in globalizing soes

value of corruption in china evidence from anti corruption investigation abstract using recent anti corruption investigation in china we show that chinese listed firms suffered an aggregate loss of usd 30 billion in firm value due to corruption furthermore we show that anti corruption investigation is more effective when top officials are targeted

a re examination of china s share issue privatization abstract previous studies show that in contrast to evidence that share issue privatization sip in most other countries have improved firm profitability china s sip of the 1990s had no such effect we argue that the main reason for the failure of china s sip is likely to have been the weak institutional environment in place at that time we examine china s sip in a more recent period in which the institutional environment was greatly improved using a matching sample method we find that sip firms continued to experience negative post sip profitability changes in our sample period however their performance decline was significantly less than that of their matched non sip soes we also find that the introduction of the independent director rule helped to improve firm performance our results reconcile the findings of the sip effect in china with international evidence and illustrate the importance of a developed capital market to ensuring the success of privatization schemes

enjoying the quiet life under deregulation evidence from adjusted lerner indices for u s banks abstract the quiet life hypothesis posits that firms with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents we propose a simple adjustment to lerner indices to account for the possibility of forgone rents to test this hypothesis for a large sample of u s commercial banks we find that adjusted lerner indices are significantly larger than conventional lerner indices and trending upward over time instrumental variable regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies however lerner indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies reveal a quiet life among u s banks

ownership concentration in privatized firms the role of disclosure standards auditor choice and auditing infrastructure we rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration since the expropriation of corporate resources by insiders hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden after controlling for other country level and firm level determinants we find weak no evidence that extensive disclosure standards auditor choice reduce ownership concentration in contrast we provide strong robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors consistent with ball s 2001 predictions collectively our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a big five auditor and better disclosure standards

profiting from government stakes in a command economy evidence from chinese asset sales abstract we examine the market response to an unexpected announcement of the sale of government owned shares in china in contrast to earlier work we find a negative effect of government ownership on returns at the announcement date and a symmetric positive effect from the policy s cancellation we suggest that this results from the absence of a chinese political transition to accompany economic reforms so that the benefits of political ties outweigh the efficiency costs of government shareholdings companies managed by former government officials have positive abnormal returns suggesting that personal ties can substitute for government ownership as a source of connections

the pitfalls of water privatization failure and reform in malaysia summary this paper examines why private participation in infrastructure ppi in water continues to be promoted despite poor results in developing countries it argues that the main characteristics of infrastructure discourage private investment and necessitate state subsidies which dilute private risks and incentives and facilitate rent seeking as a result ppi is characterized by public financing selective private investments and inconclusive efficiency gains this is reflected globally and in malaysia where ppi continues to be promoted because it provides captive rents the political factors that drive ppi invariably compromise institutional solutions as malaysia s water sector reforms illustrate

service quality in the electricity industry the role of privatization and managerial behavior abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between privatization and service quality in the electricity industry and tests the hypothesis that managerial behavior is a significant intervening factor the sample includes 31 italian distributors over the period 1998 2004 their quality performance is represented by continuity of supply an aspect of quality that is both contractible and regulated results of the empirical analysis suggest that the transfer of shareholdings to private investors does not lead to quality degradation the results also suggest that managerial dominance translates into a reduction in supply quality this effect is likely to be particularly strong for public sector utilities

place your bets towards an understanding of globalisation socio financial engineering and competition within a financial centre globalisation and technical change increase the intensity of competition within and between financial centres already subject to competitive pressures from an apparently highly mobile financial cap

full privatization through controlling rights transfer in china the extent of its success this article investigates the effect of the second step of privatization in china which is full privatization through controlling rights transfer after share issue partial privatization it finds that fully privatized firms perform worse than state controlled enterprises expropriation by private block shareholders is greater than that by state block shareholders furthermore increase in expropriation is negatively related to performance change the results suggest that full privatization may not yield the expected efficiency gains in transition economies with weak legal system they also emphasize the importance of preventing private block shareholders from exploiting minority shareholders in the process of full privatization

motivating wealth constrained actors we examine how owners of productive resources e g public enterprises or financial capital optimally allocate their resources among wealth constrained operators of unknown ability optimal allocations exhibit 1 shared enterprise profit the resource owner always shares the operator s profit 2 dispersed enterprise ownership resources are widely distributed among operators of varying ability 3 limited benefits of competition the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource and sometimes 4 diluted incentives for the most capable more capable operators receive smaller shares of the returns they generate implications for privatizations and venture capital arrangements are explored

mediators in position auctions abstract a mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play the mediator acts in a pre specified way based on messages received from the players however a mediator cannot enforce behavior that is players can play in the game directly without the mediator s help a mediator generates a new game for the players the mediated game the outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium monderer and tennenholtz introduced a theory of mediators for games with complete information we extend the theory of mediators to games with incomplete information and apply the new theory to position auctions a central topic in electronic commerce we provide a minimal set of conditions on position auctions which is sufficient to guarantee that the vcg outcome function is a mediated equilibrium in these auctions

exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks this paper evaluates the causes and consequences of episodes of turbulence in foreign exchange markets using data from 1959 through 1993 for twenty oecd countries we consider the antecedents and aftermath of devaluations and revaluations flotations fixings and speculative attacks which may not be successful we find that realignments of fixed exchange rates are alike devaluations are preceded by political instability budget and current account deficits and fast growth of money and prices revaluations are mirror images of devaluations speculative attacks resemble devaluations but money growth and inflation are more endemic and there is no last minute attempt to tighten monetary policy in contrast few consistent correlations link regime transitions like flotations or fixings to macroeconomic or political variables transitions between exchange rate regimes are largely idiosyncratic and are neither consistently provoked ex ante by systematic imbalances nor typically justified ex post by subsequent changes in policy we conclude that there are no clear early warning signals of many speculative attacks and no easy solutions for policy makers barry eichengreen andrew k rose and charles wyplosz

privatization financial development property rights and growth abstract this study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i e property rights contracting rights political institutions and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms performance capital markets development and economic growth most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance efficiency and profitability which percolates to economic growth privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions namely the french civil law countries the stronger the economic and the governing institutions the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth overall privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector

privatization policy in an international oligopoly this paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly the argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than in greenfield fdi models since these profi ts hifts are partly paid for by the foreign firms in the bidding competition effects of local equity requirements trade and investment policies are also studied it is for instance shown that small local equity requirements are likely to be beneficial but large ones are counterproductive by preventing welfare enhancing foreign acquisitions

the impact of ownership on price setting in retail energy markets the german case abstract this paper analyzes whether public ownership has an impact on providers price setting under the assumption of more efficient energy provision which benefits customers a large number of former energy monopolists have been privatized in line with the liberalization of energy markets in germany at the end of the 1990s however current re municipalizations are justified by similar arguments in the public debate based on a dataset on the ownership structure of energy providers we find that public property or private property itself is not the decisive factor for lower retail and wholesale prices rather a high ownership concentration leads to low prices regardless of the type of owner as public investors often seek total ownership of a provider households which are less willing to switch benefit at least indirectly from public ownership tests for robustness of our results applying different owner and concentration measures confirm the results independently from the underlying estimation specification

share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends abstract this study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price share allocation and other terms governments choose when they privatize state owned enterprises via a public share offering using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations sips with total proceeds of over 446 billion during the period 1977 1997 we find that governments consistently underprice sip offers tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors impose control restrictions on privatized firms and typically use fixed price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers all to further political and economic policy objectives

the benefits of privatization evidence from mexico critics of privatization often argue that its benefits come at a high cost to society the authors test the validity of this criticism for mexico s privatization program one of the world s largest case by case programs assessing the performance of newly privatized firms in such areas as profitability and efficiency they find that these firms quickly close the gap with their peers in the private sector their findings suggest that the firms profit gains come from productivity gains 52 percent layoffs 33 percent and higher prices 15 percent

the reverse lbo decision and firm performance theory and evidence we investigate the transition from private to public ownership of companies that had previously been subject to leveraged buyouts lbos we show that the information asymmetry problem firms face when they go to public markets for equity as well as behavioral and debt overhang effects will produce a pattern in which superior performance before an offering should be expected with disappointing performance subsequently we find empirical evidence of this phenomenon by studying 62 reverse lbos that went public between 1983 and 1987 the market appears to anticipate this pattern in 1991 56 leveraged buyouts lbos returned to the public equity markets part of a broader phenomenon in which a large fraction of lbos go public again hence becoming reverse lbos kaplan 1991 reports that 45 percent of a sample of large lbos completed between 1979 and 1986 later returned to public ownership moreover reverse lbos tend to be larger than the average initial public offering ipo 1 in sum transitions from the lbo form to public ownership have become a widespread and economically significant phenomenon we find strong evidence that the return to public ownership of reverse lbos coincides with a peak in their operating performance their operating income as a percentage of total assets grew by about seven percentage points in the preoffering year comparison firms in the same industries show a slight decline in the same performance measure moreover in the preoffering year reverse lbos outperform continuing lbos in the year after the

the financial and operating performance of privatized firms during the 1990s this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 85 companies from 28 industrialized countries that were privatized through public share offerings for the period from 1990 through 1996 we document significant increases in profitability output operating efficiency and dividend payments and significant decreases in leverage ratios for our full sample of firms after privatization and for most subsamples examined capital expenditures increase significantly in absolute terms but not relative to sales employment declines but insignificantly combined with results from two previous directly comparable studies these findings strongly suggest that privatization yields significant performance improvements during the past two decades the privatization of state owned enterprises has moved from being a radical almost desperate policy initiative of the thatcher government in britain to being an accepted economic policy for governments of all ideological stripes according to gibbon 1998 860 billion has been raised by governments worldwide through privatizations with the bulk of this total coming since 1987 and at least one commentator roche 1996 predicts that no less than 6 trillion will be raised through privatizations over the next two decades in 1997 alone sales of public enterprises totaled a record 161 billion worldwide with more than 110 billion of the total coming during the second half of the year and 1998 s total of almost 140 billion indicates that the pace shows no sign of slackening as we approach a new millennium

a dynamic model of privatization with endogenous post privatization performance this paper presents a dynamic model of privatization driven by improved institutional protection of private property rights and constrained by the buyer s financial constraints government ownership is more efficient than private ownership when private property rights are insecure improved institutional protection of property rights over time creates the need to privatize the buyer s financial constraints affect the timing of privatization causing the firm s post privatization performance either to improve or to deteriorate in the short run financial constraints also have the possibility of inducing an underpricing phenomenon during privatization where the firm is priced below both what the buyer is willing to pay and the buyer s ability to pay faster institutional development calls for earlier privatization but it also has the potential to either create or exacerbate deadweight losses associated with inefficient privatization a host of empirically testable implications are derived copyright wiley blackwell

incumbents and protectionism the political economy of foreign entry liberalization abstract this paper investigates the influence of incumbent firms on the decision to allow foreign direct investment into an industry using data from india s economic reforms the results show that firms in concentrated industries are more successful at preventing foreign entry state owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than privately owned firms and profitable state owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than unprofitable state owned firms the pattern of foreign entry liberalization supports the private interest view of policy implementation and suggests that it may be necessary to reduce the influence of state owned firms to optimally enact reforms

the real effects of government owned banks evidence from an emerging market using plant level data for brazilian manufacturing firms this paper provides evidence that government control over banks leads to significant political influence over the real decisions of firms i find that firms eligible for government bank lending expand employment in politically attractive regions near elections these expansions are associated with additional favorable borrowing from government banks further these persistent expansions take place just before competitive elections and are associated with lower future employment growth by firms in other regions the analysis suggests that politicians in brazil use bank lending to shift employment towards politically attractive regions and away from unattractive regions

market socialism a case for rejuvenation in this paper we will outline a feasible economic mechanism of competitive socialism our claim is that competitive markets are necessary to achieve an efficient and vigorous economy but that full scale private ownership is not necessary for the successful operation of competition and markets contrary to popular impression this claim has not yet been disproved by either history or economic theory it is the failure of both the political right and the left to disentangle the concepts of private ownership and the competitive market that has led to the premature obituaries for socialism in the second section we look at the question of the soft budget constraint as an agency problem under market socialism we then propose two variants of a bank centric system of insider monitoring as a viable solution to the agency problem the next section discusses the essential problem of political accountability and the difficulty of credible pre commitment in avoiding the soft budget constraint problem and suggests ways of minimizing this problem in our proposed system we then conclude by addressing some of the other standard objections to a proposal for market socialism

privatization and economic growth an empirical investigation from a sample of developing market economies this paper explores the economic determinants of privatization programmes and the macroeconomic impact of this institutional reform on the growth rate of the gdp a sample of thirty five developing market economies is considered over the 1988 92 period probit and tobit models are used to identify the determinants of successful privatization programmes then regressions are run where probabilities probit and expected values tobit are successively included as additional regressors beside the potential influence of other economic policy variables a significant positive effect is highlighted giving evidence of the importance of divestiture the economic effect is found to be stronger when this institutional reform took place in industry or infrastructure