how to identify trust and reciprocity this paper uses a three games or triadic design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior a large literature on single game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality averse other regarding preferences such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other regarding preferences do not affect behavior in contrast experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

on representative social capital abstract this paper analyzes the behavior of subjects randomly drawn from the dutch population who reveal their capacity to provide and sustain social capital by their propensity to invest and reward investments in an economic experiment we find that heterogeneity in behavior is characterized by several asymmetries men the young and elderly and low educated individuals invest relatively less but reward significantly more investments the age effects are found to corroborate existing findings whereas those of gender and education do not higher expected levels of investments by others are found to have a positive and significant effect on own investments finally a laboratory experiment with student subjects is found to provide a lower bound of the population level of social capital

if the worst comes to the worst dictator giving when recipient s endowments are risky abstract donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really needs their help does this uncertainty deter generosity we experimentally investigate a situation in which donors do not know the financial endowment of the recipient for certain but still have some information on the distribution the endowments are drawn from in the experiment we find that uncertainty does not deter generosity in fact if we filter out selfish dictators under most specifications of uncertainty dictators give more compared with the donation dictators make to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty they are particularly concerned about the possibility of a recipient leaving the lab with no payoff from the game

distinguishing trust from risk an anatomy of the investment game the role of trust in promoting economic activity and societal development has received considerable academic attention by social scientists a popular way to measure trust at the individual level is the so called investment game berg dickhaut and mccabe 1995 it has been widely noted however that risk attitudes can also affect decisions in this game and thus in principle confound inferences about trust we provide novel evidence shedding light on the role of risk attitudes for trusting decisions to the best of our knowledge our data are the first rigorous evidence that i aggregate investment distributions differ significantly between trust and risk environments and ii risk attitudes predict individual investment decisions in risk games but not in the corresponding trust games our results are convergent evidence that trust decisions are not tightly connected to a person s risk attitudes and they lend support to the trust interpretation of decisions in investment games

gordon tullock and experimental economics gordon tullock s research has substantially influenced the development of economic science in general and experimental economics in particular we present the first comprehensive survey of this significant achievement we show how tullock s research in bioeconomics influenced later developments in neuroeconomics and how his pioneering work on rent seeking generated a literature of laboratory tests of his hypothesis we also describe tullock s own experiments and draw attention to his early insights on trust games

trust and cooperation social capital and community resource management social capital is one of the main determinants of community resource management success we use the average amount sent in a trust game as a measure of social capital in five rural villages in india combining these experimental data with household surveys we analyze i how the amount sent is correlated with socio cultural community characteristics ii how social capital affects community resource management and iii to what extent experimental play is consistent with real on farm behavior in terms of providing a semi public good the results are interesting from a policy perspective and provide insight into bridging the gap between lab experiments and the field

the rise and fall of unions in the united states abstract union membership in the united states displayed a shaped pattern over the 20th century while income inequality sketched a a model of unions is developed to analyze these facts there is a distribution of productivity across firms in the economy firms hire capital plus skilled and unskilled labor unionization is a costly process a union chooses how many firms to organize and the union wage simulation of the model establishes that skill biased technological change which affects the productivity of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor can potentially explain the observed paths for union membership and income inequality

conditional choice probability estimation of dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity we adapt the expectation maximization algorithm to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity into conditional choice probability ccp estimators of dynamic discrete choice problems the unobserved heterogeneity can be time invariant or follow a markov chain by developing a class of problems where the difference in future value terms depends on a few conditional choice probabilities we extend the class of dynamic optimization problems where ccp estimators provide a computationally cheap alternative to full solution methods monte carlo results confirm that our algorithms perform quite well both in terms of computational time and in the precision of the parameter estimates

separating reputation social influence and identification effects in a dictator game abstract this study explores the ways in which information about other individual s action affects one s own behavior in a dictator game the experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient s within game reputation on the dictator s decision reputation causing indirect reciprocity social influence and identification the separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise the statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators actions than the social influence and identification

informal risk sharing in an infinite horizon experiment author s charness gary b genicot garance abstract this paper presents the first laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment our experiment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents in the model two individuals interact over a potential infinite horizon and suffer random income shocks risk averse individuals have incentives to smooth consumption by making transfers to each other these transfers being voluntary only self enforcing risk sharing arrangements are possible transfers can never be so large as to tempt individuals to renege on them this constraint when binding has strong implications for the shape of the constrained optimal risk sharing arrangement in our experiment participants are matched in pairs each period one of them randomly drawn receives a given amount in addition to its regular income after observing both incomes each person in a pair chooses a non negative transfer to make to the other person two features of the experimental design are crucial first it is common information that all pairs will be dissolved at the end of each period with a given probability participants are informed when this occurs and randomly re matched this replicates the effect of infinite horizon and discounting in the model second at the end of the experiment a single period is randomly drawn to count for cash payment this feature is essential for individuals to care about the utility outcome of each period we find evidence generally consistent with risk sharing with most transfers coming from individuals who received h in the period moreover in support of the theory transfers are much higher with a higher continuation probability and they also are highly correlated with the individual s degree of risk aversion however while the model predicts an increase in transfers with ex ante inequality we observe the opposite effect this may reflect considerations of identity or group membership

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

the right amount of trust we investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance we find that individual income is hump shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population coupled with the tendency of individuals to extrapolate beliefs about others from their own levels of trustworthiness could generate this non monotonic relationship highly trustworthy individuals tend to form overly optimistic beliefs to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population on the other hand less trustworthy individuals form overly pessimistic beliefs and avoid being cheated but give up profitable opportunities therefore underperforming the cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by foregoing college our findings in large scale survey data are supported and extended with experimental findings we show that in the trust game own trustworthiness and beliefs about others trustworthiness are strongly correlated and persistent and that patterns in earnings lost due to incorrect beliefs are comparable to those in the survey data

a dynamic approach to environmental compliance decisions in u s electricity market the acid rain program revisited the acid rain program arp was implemented in 1995 since then coal fired boilers have had to choose among three main compliance alternatives purchase pollution permits switch to an alternative lower sulfur coal or adopt a scrubber this decision problem is driven by the evolution of several economic variables and is revised when significant changes to prices quality of inputs output level technology transport costs regulations among others occur using a structural dynamic discrete choice model i recover cost parameters and use them to evaluate two different counterfactual policies the results confirm there is a trade off between fuel switching and scrubbing costs with the latter having a higher investment cost and a lower variable cost and also the existence of regional heterogeneity finally the arp implied cost savings of approximately 4 7 billions if compared to a uniform emission rate standard and 14 8 billions if compared to compulsory scrubbing for the 1995 2005 period

public trust and corruption perception disaster relief public trust in government and nongovernment organizations is essential to the public s willingness to donate and to support those organizations we measure public trust in disaster aid using people s perception of these organizations effectiveness in delivering aid relief to the victims of two recent major earthquakes in china based on the survey data collected in 2013 from about 2100 residents in hong kong we document the vulnerability of these residents trust perceptions in aid delivery we find that the sharp decline in trust perception is highly negatively correlated with their perception of corruption of local governments in china

house money effects on trust and reciprocity in a typical laboratory investment game experiment participants endowments are provided by the experimenter thus the worst case for the investor is that she loses all of her found money by contrast in naturally occurring environments investment decisions can often lead to a loss of one s own money this paper investigates whether trust found in one shot anonymous laboratory interaction is robust to own money environments our results show that consistent with previous investment game results most investors send a positive amount and most trustees return at least the transfer amount regardless of whether the investors purchase or are gifted their endowment however investments are on average lower when participants use their own money and the fraction of maximum investments the most risky investment decision is only half as large under own money as it is under gifted endowments our results explain why one should exercise caution in placing trust in any government s ability to spend other people s money prudently

temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences abstract a core element of economic theory is the assumption of stable preferences we test this assumption in public goods games by repeatedly eliciting cooperation preferences in a fixed subject pool over a period of five months we find that cooperation preferences are very stable at the aggregate level and to a smaller degree at the individual level allowing us to predict future behavior fairly accurately furthermore our results provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences the personality dimension agreeableness is closely related to both the type and the stability of cooperation preferences

the specification and estimation of dynamic stochastic discrete choice models a survey our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the united states congress we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset given estimates of the structural model we

the potential for cost savings in the sulfur dioxide allowance market empirical evidence from florida since the passage of the 1990 clean air act amendments researchers have hastened to appraise the new market for sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances as the epa s program moves into its second phase some analysts question whether large enough savings are available to induce widespread market participation this study calculates the shadow prices of emission reductions for power plants that serve florida and compares the actions of utility owners to the actions predicted by the shadow prices the evidence suggests that plant owners have not taken full advantage of the opportunities the allowance market has provided to date

collective trust behavior this paper investigates trust behavior in situations where decision makers are large groups and the decision mechanism is collective theories from behavioral economics and psychology suggest that

can social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior abstract this study examines whether gender differences in some economic behaviors are due to differences in social preferences as measured by dictator allocation decisions we find that compared to men women are significantly more likely to be inequity averters and significantly less likely to be social surplus maximizers these differences in social preferences explain to a large extent why women send less than men in trust games inequity averters can ensure equal payoffs if nothing is returned by sending one fourth of the endowment while surplus maximizers can increase total payoffs by a factor of three for each dollar sent social preferences also help explain the size of gifts in dictator games and choice of compensation method for simple tasks however after controlling for social preference type gender is still influential in these decisions women give significantly more to charity than men even after accounting for our measure of social preferences women prefer egalitarian payment systems both because they are inequity averters and because low self confidence may lead them to believe they will earn more with equal sharing

individual s religiosity enhances trust latin american evidence for the puzzle this paper explores the effect of religious observance and affiliation to the dominant religion catholicism on trust in institutions towards others and market attitudes the analysis is performed using a latin american database of twenty thousand respondents from 2004 by means of ordered probit models the most interesting results are i trust toward others is positively correlated with religious observance and with catholic affiliation ii there is a positive correlation between