modelling the joint determination of household labour supplies and commodity demands in addition to choosing the allocation of total expenditure between commodities households may also be able to make decisions over the allocation of their time between market work and leisure in both theoretical and empirical work it has often been the case that these decisions have been analysed separately in this paper we stress the theoretical attractions of considering the joint determination of the allocation of time between work and leisure and the allocation of total expenditure between commodities in a utility maximising framework using a sample of individual households we attempt to evaluate the empirical importance of the joint determination model over the separate determination of labour supplies and commodity demands our approach follows that of abbott and ashenfelter i976 phlips i978 barnett i979 deaton and muellbauer i980 and atkinson and stern i980 here we pay particular attention to the following four important aspects of household decision making over commodity demand and labour supply the first concerns the commonly assumed restriction on the household s preferences of weak separability between goods and leisure this assumption allows the estimation of commodity demand systems and engel curves that exclude wage rate variables in cross section household budget data with large variation in wage rates across the sample the invalidity of this assumption would involve a serious mis specification any correlation between the excluded wage variable and the included price income and demographic variables would lead to biased parameter estimates and hence biased estimated elasticities similarly this assumption allows the estimation of labour supply curves that exclude relative price variables and its invalidity could produce biased labour supply elasticities a second aspect of household decision making which we wish to highlight arises from the suspicion commonly alluded to in labour economics texts that primary male workers may not be free to choose their hours of work thus we estimate a matched pair of rationed and unrationed systems following the work of neary and roberts i 980 and deaton and muellbauer i 979 the separability restriction is not unrelated to this point since without it we will see that the rationed hours of work enter demand systems in a complex fashion in effect

in kind transfers self selection and optimal tax policy abstract this paper examines the role of public provision of goods as a redistributive mechanism when tax policies are designed optimally on the basis of the information available to the government we characterize pareto efficient allocations that are attainable through the tax policy and derive the conditions under which public provision will enhance welfare above the maximum that can be achieved through a mix of a general income tax and commodity taxes price subsidies first when there are two produced goods we prove that public provision is always pareto improving the improvement is achieved through changing individuals actual consumption levels second with no restrictions on the number of goods we derive a sufficient condition for public provision to be pareto improving this is achieved by weakening self selection constraints so that welfare improving tax changes are made possible suitable examples include provision of day care basic health care and rights to a minimum old age pension

on the desirability of taxing capital income in optimal social insurance abstract this paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on labor income and savings in a two period life cycle model with ex ante identical households endogenous leisure demands in both periods and general processes of skill shocks over the life cycle we demonstrate that the atkinson stiglitz theorem breaks down under risk capital taxes are employed besides labor income taxes for two distinct reasons i capital taxes reduce labor supply distortions on second period labor supply since second period labor supply and saving are substitutes ii capital taxes insure first period income risk although this benefit is partially off set because first period labor supply and saving are complements our results imply that retirement saving should not be actuarially fair

consumption vs income taxes when private human capital investments are imperfectly observable abstract this paper considers optimal taxation in an endogenous growth model where private education investments are imperfectly observable consumption taxation is better than labor income taxation for public provision of goods unless educational investment is completely unobservable if subsidies are feasible for observed education investment the consumption tax rate is independent of the degree of observability but the subsidy rate is higher the lower is the observability if subsidies are not feasible the consumption tax rate is lower the more limited is the observability optimal tax rates for goods that provide consumption and education investment simultaneously are below normal rates for observed pure consumption growth and welfare are positively related to independent of the degree of observability without with subsidies

collective female labour supply theory and application this article deals with female labour supply in the collective framework it studies married couples and starting from the empirical observation that the husband s labour supply is generally fixed at full time it shows that in this case structural elements of the decision process such as individual preferences or the rule that determines the intra household distribution of welfare can be identified if household demand for at least one commodity together with the wife s labour supply is observed these theoretical considerations are followed by an application using french data

the effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies abstract recent analyses of entry deterrence strategies have required an incumbent s post entry output or pricing strategy to be profit maximizing however most papers have continued to assume that either an incumbent can commit not to exit after entry or that exit is never optimal when there are avoidable fixed costs of operating in any period however exit can be the optimal strategy in this situation entry deterrence strategies operate very differently than when exit is never optimal in fact the possibility of exit can make some previously effective strategies completely ineffective while improving the effectiveness of others

optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency with an externality in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency integrating them in a second best world with pollution by using an overlapping generations model the second best world is characterized by the comparative statics of green preferences the main results obtained are as follows first the marginal cost of public funds may be reduced by the externalities regardless of the choice of taxes second optimal environmental and non environmental tax rules are additively and directly affected by the dynamic efficiency of capital accumulation per unit labour decal and indirectly by it through the efficiency of the public sector environmental taxes going beyond pigovian ones may be welfare improving if the decal is improved by the environmental tax even optimal non environmental tax rules should additively and directly counter the dynamics of pollution to consider the income effects of the optimal tax system for the future third the additivity property or the principle of targeting does not hold even in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints the essential reasons for this are clarified as follows distortions that should be countered by taxes that is the income effects of the optimal tax system and the decal in this model break the equality between optimal environmental taxes and the externalities measured by governments finally growing environmental concerns may in fact increase pollution the inverse relationship between environmental and labour income taxes may not hold

an empirical model of discrete and continuous choice in family labor supply because of the interdependent nature of family labor supply decisions the nonnegativity constrai nt on women s hours of work will spill over into other consumption an d labor supply decisions of the family here the author develops an e conometric model of family labor supply that captures this spillove r while addressing the usual censoring issues as well the model i s based on a flexible direct utility function and permits unobservabl e differences in tastes the model is estimated by the maximum likeli hood method on a sample of about 1 200 families from the panel study of income dynamics copyright 1987 by mit press

social insurance with competitive insurance markets and risk misperception this paper considers an economy where individuals differ in productivity and in risk rochet 1991 has shown that when private insurance markets offer full coverage at fair rates social insurance is desirable if and only if risk and productivity are negatively correlated this condition is usually shown to be satisfied for many health risks but it appears to be violated for the old age dependency risk mainly because longevity in turn is positively correlated with productivity we examine the role of uniform and nonuniform social insurance to supplement a general income tax when neither public nor private insurers can observe individual risk and when it is positively correlated with wages consequently a rothschild and stiglitz 1971 equilibrium emerges in the private insurance market and low wage low risk individuals are not fully insured we show that even when social insurance provided to the poor has a negative incentive effect it also increases their otherwise insuficient insurance coverage social insurance to the rich produces exactly the opposite effects whichever of these effects dominates some social insurance is always desirable finally we introduce risk misperception which exacerbates the failure of private markets the insurance term now reflects the combined failure brought about by adverse selection and misperception now the low risk individuals are not only underinsured but also pay a higher than fair rate however and rather surprisingly it turns out that this does not necessarily strengthen the case for public insurance

the theory of taxation for developing countries tax policy has far reaching implications for economic development and public administration this book which presents a modern theory of public finance brings together many of the most distinguished economists who have written on the subject they provide coherent principles for tax design and a systematic framework for the analysis of practical questions of tax reform and pricing policy in developing countries the book is especially timely as countries experience increasing shortages of government revenue and the distortions brought about by poorly designed tax systems it pays particular attention to the special problems of developing countries such as the taxation of agriculture the aim throughout is to develop techniques that can be quantitatively applied given the data available and empirical case studies illustrate the methods in action the authors analyze the links between tax theory social cost benefit analysis and the pricing of publicly supplied goods and services they also explore the empirical and econometric problems of identifying the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency other topics treated include the analysis of labor markets the taxation of foreign private investment and of fuel and the pricing of education although the models used concentrate on developing countries most of the methods and discussion apply as well to the problems of more affluent countries

the friedman rule in an overlapping generations model with nonlinear taxation and income misreporting this paper models a two period overlapping generations economy with money populated with individuals of different skills they face a nonlinear income tax schedule and can engage in tax evasion money serves two purposes the traditional one modeled through a money in the utility function it also facilitates tax evasion the main message of the paper is that income tax evasion in this framework leads to the violation of the friedman rule the paper also shows that even in the absence of tax evasion when optimality requires differential commodity taxation complementarity of real cash balances and labor supply does not guarantee the optimality of the friedman rule as a boundary solution an additional assumption is required

measuring the deadweight loss from taxation in a small open economy a general method with an application to sweden the paper develops a simple general equilibrium framework for calculating the marginal deadweight loss from taxation in a small open economy the framework allows a decomposition of the deadweight loss from each tax instrument into the losses stemming from the contraction of the different tax bases the paper describes a method of calibrating the model which exploits the links between the various factor supply elasticities implied by the standard life cycle model it also develops a method of estimating effective tax rates that is consistent with optimising household and firm behaviour to illustrate how the model works it is calibrated to a data set for sweden the quantitative results highlight the importance of accounting for the interaction between the major tax bases when estimating deadweight loss

household bargaining and the design of couples income taxation this paper studies the design of couples income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses utilities bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple information structure and labor supply decisions follow the mirrleesian tradition however while the household s total consumption is publicly observable the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable with a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses marginal income tax rate includes a pigouvian paternalistic and an incentive term the pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy tax for the high weight low weight spouse whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low high the sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples in some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low weight spouse who may be female and a negative one for the high weight spouse possibly the male this is at odds with the traditional boskin and sheshinski results our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions finally we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model the calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower and possibly even negative marginal tax rate

optimal taxation with consumption time as a leisure or labor substitute abstract this paper studies the optimal commodity taxation problem when time taken in consumption is a perfect substitute for either labor or leisure it shows that while labor substitutability affects the optimal tax structure leisure substitutability leaves the classical optimal tax results intact in the ramsey tax framework with linear income taxes whether the consumers have the same or different earning abilities labor substitutes tend to be taxed at a higher rate than leisure substitutes with the tax differential being increasing in consumption time this is not necessarily the case when one allows for nonlinear income taxation

estimating utility consistent labour supply functions some results on pooled budget data abstract demand systems aids les are augmented to include labour supply and then estimated on pooled u k budget data allowing for time series and cross section variation in wages the results point to the danger of constraining the labour supply curve a priori by use of restrictive utility systems in addition hypothesis relating to effects of price wage movements on composition of full income are tested

family model of contributions to non profit organizations and labour supply in this article a model is presented in which the family decides the labour supply of both spouses and their time donations to non profit organizations for the estimation spanish data was used which showed that family size and pre school children influence decisions made about time distribution of husband and wife women with fewer family responsibilities work longer hours and donate more time whilst the effect on men is the contrary also monetary donations by the family are directly related to time donations by the spouses

a characteristics approach to optimal taxation line drawing and tax driven product innovation real world tax legislation assigns goods to different categories of tax rates on the basis of observable characteristics allowing the tax system to handle a constantly evolving set of available goods we recast the theory of optimal taxation in the language of characteristics and we show how to optimally draw lines that delineate tax rate regimes such lines are associated with notches in tax liability as a function of characteristics creating incentives to introduce goods with new combinations of characteristics in order to reduce tax liability with a restricted set of tax instruments such notches are in general part of the second best optimal tax system

the ces utility function non linear budget constraints and labour supply results on female participation and hours the most recent efforts in the study of labour supply decisions have concentrated on the estimation of explicit utility indices as a means to overcome the specification and endogeneity problems created by non linear budget constraints the presence of non convexities and the interest in making welfare comparisons between individuals are additional reasons that make the use of explicit utility functions in either direct or indirect form an essential requirement for labour supply studies it is therefore important to consider carefully the available possibilities from a utility index we want flexibility and ease of estimation the stonegeary function has proved its relative worth in consumption studies but its performance has been disappointing when leisure is incorporated into the set of commodities abbot and ashenfelter i976 found that for part of their sample estimated available time was less than hours worked and these results have pervasively reappeared in subsequent studies using this function hausman i980 has recently proposed a utility function which yields a linear hours function this is an important contribution which facilitates the task of estimation enormously this paper argues that the ces utility function despite not generating a linear hours function is also very convenient for estimation purposes in fact it is shown below that to estimate the parameters of the utility function there is no need whatsoever for any explicit hours function labour supply responses by married women have been previously estimated with british data but none of the available results has taken full account of the joint decision on participation and hours and of the non linear shape of the budget constraint that the tax system generates layard et al i980 consider the joint decision in their estimation procedure but ignore the tax system greenhalgh i980 takes into account the non linearity of the budget constraint but estimates labour supply responses by a method which treats participation and hours of work as separate and independent decisions in the present paper on the other hand using an explicit utility index we propose an estimation method which takes into account both the tax system and the joint hours participation decision

capacity entry and forward induction when avoidable fixed costs are introduced into the entry model of dixit 1980 and ware 1984 there arises a coordination problem in selecting among postentry nash equilibria elimination of weakly dominated strategies allows the entrant to use a market capturing strategy consisting of a large capacity commitment that selects the entrant s preferred postentry equilibrium and drives the incumbent from the market deterring the entrant s market capturing strategy typically requires the incumbent to reduce its initial capacity choice as avoidable fixed costs rise the incumbent must restrict its capacity by a greater amount and the relative advantage of the entrant rises

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

welfare effects of changing commodity tax rates toward uniformity abstract this paper presents a theory of tax reform that is applicable to a many good economy where i the initial tax structure is arbitrarily given ii no lump sum tax exists and iii the initial tax revenue must be maintained after the reform sufficient conditions are established under which tax changes definitely result in increases in welfare they indicate that in a wide class of situations the uniform tax structure can be a useful intermediate target on the way to optimum

optimal taxation with home production abstract optimal taxes for europe and the u s are derived in a realistically calibrated model in which agents buy consumption goods and services and use home capital and labor to produce household services the optimal tax rate on services is substantially lower than the tax rate on goods specifically the planner cannot tax home production directly and instead lowers the tax rate on market services to increase the relative price of home production the optimal tax rate on the return to home capital is strictly positive and the welfare gains from switching to optimal taxes are large

endogenous sequencing of firm decisions abstract when firms are symmetrically informed a stackelberg leader prefers to be leader rather than a cournot duopolist however when the leader has superior information about demand the leader may earn lower ex ante profits than it would earn if it was choosing quantities simultaneously with the follower in this paper i give the firm with superior information the option of delaying its quantity decision until the decision period of the less informed firm so that decisions are made simultaneously surprisingly in the unique stable outcome the informed firm moves first regardless of its private information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82 l10

labour supply welfare rankings and the measurement of inequality abstract this paper presents an analysis of inequality using utility based measures of welfare derived from different approaches to modelling household labour supplies the almost ideal demand system specification of preferences is selected for the estimation of a neoclassical household model and of individual decision models which incorporate different assumptions concerning the intra household distribution of income using the rosen 1976 tax perception methodology the study also explores the implications of a model which does not constrain time at home to leisure welfare rankings and inequality measures defined on equivalent income are compared for each type of model the analysis uses australian unit record data on 3 352 households drawn from the australian bureau of statistics 1981 82 income and housing sample survey file the results indicate the sensitivity of welfare orderings and inequality measures to the choice of decision model and to the specification of lump sum transfers between family members a comparative study of equivalent incomes and selected money income variables also illustrates the limitations of observed household and individual incomes as welfare indicators for the analysis of inequality and for policy design

taxing education in ramsey s tradition abstract assuming a two period model with endogenous choices of labour education and saving it is shown to be second best efficient to deviate from ramsey s rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour furthermore if the earnings function displays constant elasticity the choice of education should not be distorted with the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity

structural estimation of family labor supply with taxes estimating a continuous hours model using a direct utility specification this paper proposes a new method for estimating family labor supply in the presence of taxes this method accounts for continuous hours choices measurement error unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for work the nonlinear form of the tax code and fixed costs of work in one comprehensive specification estimated on data from the 2001 psid the resulting elasticities for married males are consistent with those found elsewhere in the literature but female wage elasticities are substantially smaller than those found in most of the literature simulations of recent tax acts predict small effects on the labor supply of married couples

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

small sample bias in synthetic cohort models of labor supply this paper investigates small sample biases in synthetic cohort models repeated cross sectional data grouped at the cohort and year level in the context of a female labor supply model i use the current population survey to compare estimates when group sizes are extremely large to those that arise from randomly drawing subsamples of observations from the large groups i augment this approach with monte carlo analysis so as to precisely quantify biases and coverage rates in this particular application thousands of observations per group are required before small sample issues can be ignored in estimation and sampling error leads to large downward biases in the estimated income elasticity copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

in kind versus cash transfers in the presence of distortionary taxes in kind transfers can pareto dominate cash transfers as a means of income redistribution if in kind transfers and leisure are hicks substitutes and leisure is a normal good the result holds when redistributive instruments also include a linear income tax the paper proves that if the poor receive more in kind transfers and the rich less than what they would choose for themselves then compared to cash transfers there will be a higher labor supply by the poor a lower labor supply by the rich and higher levels of aggregate pre tax income and tax revenues

taxation and the household abstract previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function to analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities as determined by the household resource allocation process

energy taxation reasons for discriminating in favor of the production sector abstract if a small open economy wishes to restrict it s greenhouse gas emissions it has to decide whether to impose uniform taxes on all polluters or to resort to a discriminatory policy in practice countries tend to impose higher taxes on households and to tax the industrial sector more leniently this paper identifies conditions under which this is efficient it is shown that an efficiency maximizing tax planner discriminates in favor of the production sector if i there are restrictions on the taxation of lump sum income or if ii labor supply exerts market power

tax evasion in an open economy abstract ignoring tax evasion possibilities a value added and a cash flow income tax have similar behavioral and distributional consequences yet the available means of tax evasion under each can be very different under a vat avoidance occurs through cross border shopping whereas under an income tax it can occur through shifting taxable income abroad given evasion we show that a country would make use of both taxes in order to minimize the efficiency costs of evasion activity relying relatively more on whichever tax is harder to evade we then make use of aggregate danish tax and accounting data from 1992 to measure the amount of evasion that occurred under the two taxes while the estimates of evasion activity are small the figures imply that denmark could reduce the real costs of evasion activity by relying more on value added taxes

education labor supply and market development in rural peru summary research suggests that education has a limited effect on subsistence farm productivity yet rural incomes include more than farming as households diversify their income portfolios furthermore education may affect the number of labor hours supplied utilizing data from peru this paper finds that farm households benefit from more education by finding more lucrative opportunities characterized by fewer hours the extent to which this is possible depends on how well local markets are developed since education policy takes time to yield returns policy makers have an additional tool at their disposal improving market access will also increase the returns to education

more and cheaper haircuts after vat cut on the efficiency and incidence of service sector consumption taxes abstract consumption tax rates targeted at specific sectors are often reformed without any empirical knowledge about the efficiency of these policies this paper sheds light on tax incidence as well as the efficiency issue the potential for welfare improving reform by studying the impact of value added taxes vat on prices and quantities of labor intensive services i utilize a vat reform targeted at a specific service sector which creates a natural experiment set up the vat for hairdressing services in finland was reduced from 22 to 8 and the previous tax treatment still applied to other labor intensive services the choice of the treatment and control groups was exogenous to circumstances in finland since these groups were selected from a wider european setting the results suggest that hairdressers cut their prices only by half of what a complete pass through would have implied and that there was hardly any adjustment in equilibrium quantity due to the reform hairdressers were able to increase their profits significantly there is important heterogeneity in the results according to firm size

household labour supply with rationing in spain this paper provides new empirical evidence on household labour supply with rationing to that end we use the latest spanish data in order to estimate three flexible functional forms namely the nles the quadratic and the hausman ruud forms and calculate the income and wage elasticities we find that the number of dependants has a negative effect on the labour supply of the female moreover the north and the east spanish regions have a clearly positive effect on the labour supply of the female whilst the north has the same effect on that of the male the elasticities of three functional forms are very similar male labour supply is slightly decreasing with the wage whilst for the female it is increasing leisure is a normal good for both spouses as expected whilst the labour hours are net substitutes

household labor supply and the gains from social insurance the marginal gains from social income insurance programs are captured by the gap in the marginal utility of consumption across states of nature to identify this gap in the context of the household this paper offers a new labor supply based approach that leverages household level economic interactions and optimality conditions we demonstrate that in frameworks of efficient household allocations spousal labor supply responses to shocks have direct implications for the gains from more generous government benefits to households we show that this holds for both intensive and extensive margin responses under fairly general conditions our analysis illustrates how labor market data can be used for assessing marginal welfare gains in a general class of social insurance schemes including the large and important programs of disability insurance and survivors benefits hence household labor supply behavior and responses to shocks which are widely studied in theoretical and empirical work hold valuable information for the optimal design of social insurance

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

taxes and time allocation evidence from single women and men the classic model of becker 1965 suggests that labor supply decisions should be analyzed within the broader context of time allocation and market good consumption choices but most empirical work on policy has focused exclusively on measuring impacts on market work this paper examines how income taxes affect time allocation during the entire day and how these time allocation decisions interact with expenditure patterns using the panel study of income dynamics from 1975 to 2004 we analyze the response of single women s housework labor supply and other time to variation in tax and transfer schedules across income levels number of children states and time we find that when the economic reward to participating in the labor force increases market work increases and housework decreases with the decrease in housework accounting for approximately two thirds of the increase in market work analysis of repeated cross sections of time diary data from 1975 to 2004 shows that home production decreases substantially when market hours of work increase in response to policy changes data on expenditures from the consumer expenditure survey from 1980 to 2003 show some evidence that expenditures on market goods likely to substitute for housework increase in response to a greater incentive to join the labor force the baseline estimates imply that the elasticity of substitution between consumption of home and market goods is 2 61 the results are consistent with the becker model meanwhile single men show little response to changes in tax policy and we are able to rule out an elasticity of substitution between home and market goods for this group of more than 1 52

a reinterpretation of elasticity formulae in optimum tax theory this paper presents a unified interpretation of three special cases which have been widely discussed in the theory of optimum taxation these are the corlett hague case and two versions of the inverse elasticity rule derived on the assumption that either the compensated or the uncompensated cross elasticities of demand are zero it is demonstrated that all three cases imply that it is the compensated elasticities which determine efficient tax differentiation and that complementarity with the untaxed numeraire emphasized by w j corlett and d c hague 1953 54 plays a role in the interpretation of all three cases copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

optimal taxes and the structure of preferences if optimal tax theory is to be the basis for calculating tax rates a close understanding is required of the relationship between the structure of preferences and the configuration of optimal tax rates otherwise hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience may completely determine the results independently of measurement this paper explores the relationship between various types of separability particularly weak and implicit separability and optimal tax rates in the various models discussed in the literature the use of distance functions and the antonelli matrix provides a significant unification of previously disparate results in the final analysis optimal tax theory should be the basis for actual calculation of tax rates although recently there have been great advances in theoretical results and in our understanding of their meaning we are still some way from a working knowledge of whether uniform commodity taxes are in practice optimal or if not which commodities should be discriminated against present theoretical formulae do not yield clear cut results except in special cases and it has recently become clear that optimal rates depend crucially on the detailed structure of consumer preferences for example atkinson and stiglitz 3 show that with an optimal nonlinear income tax discriminatory commodity taxes are only necessary to the extent that individual commodities are not weakly separable from leisure more recently deaton 6 has shown that a similar result holds for what is perhaps the most interesting of the standard models that where there are many consumers and only a linear income tax and proportional commodity taxes are allowed in this case separability between goods and leisure together with linear engel curves for goods removes the need for differential commodity taxation in consequence nothing can be learned about commodity taxes from consumer demand studies in which commodity demands are explained conditionally on total expenditure and commodity prices and which assume linear engel curves all such studies require separability from leisure as a maintained hypothesis and so are consistent with uniform commodity taxation these results suggest that the prospects for meaningful empirical calculations of tax rates are bleak econometricians estimating commodity demand and labor supply equations make generous use of separability assumptions to enable estimation at all in consequence it is likely that empirically calculated tax rates based on econometric estimates of parameters will be determined in structure not by the measurements actually made but by arbitrary untested and even unconscious hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience to remedy this situation and as a prelude to fruitful empirical work it is necessary to have a more explicit understanding of how preference structure affects optimal tax rates such is the object of this paper three different

optimum taxation and the allocation of time abstract a theory of optimal taxation is presented building upon becker s 1965 theory of the allocation of time optimal commodity taxation is governed by factor shares in household activities any market good which requires little household time or even saves time should carry a relatively low tax rate this policy rule does not require the estimation of price elasticities and is therefore more applicable than traditional ramsey rule taxation

atkinson and stiglitz theorem in the presence of a household production sector we show that the celebrated atkinson and stiglitz 1976 result on the uniformity of the commodity tax rates when preferences are weakly separable between goods and leisure does not hold when at least one of the goods is produced within the household the result is restored if preferences are weakly separable in market goods on the one hand and leisure and household goods on the other

a test of the unitary and collective models of household labour supply this paper tests the unitary and the collective household labour supply models within a structural framework a nonlinear unrestricted household labour supply system is postulated and the set of parametric restrictions imposed by each model is derived our results generally reject the income pooling restrictions embodied in the unitary model also the symmetry of cross wage effects is rejected however the collective model is not rejected for groups with no pre school children

optimal shadow prices for public production abstract the purpose of this paper is mainly expository in showing that within a very simple model famous and previously unrelated results on optimal public sector pricing emerge as special cases of a general optimal pricing formula it also examines the relationships between the elasticity of scale in private production and the optimal shadow prices for public production

optimal financing of the government s budget taxes bonds or money financing of the government s budget in particular we consider taxation bond issuance and money creation as alternative means of financing these issues are not new some of them were extensively explored in the public finance literature some of them were explored in the monetary theory literature what we believe to be new however is that our work integrates the relevant elements from both strands of literature into a unified general equilibrium framework with this approach we are able to jointly determine the optimal combination of tax rates the rate of inflation and the interest rate on government bonds this type of analysis enables us to ask whether the rate of inflation should be positive or negative and to provide simple conditions on compensated demand elasticities which determine the answer it also enables us to reconsider milton friedman s optimum quantity of money rule in a public finance framework without lump sum taxes and to show how this rule should be modified in addition we provide insight into the desirability of a social security scheme by showing that such a program is undesirable when social security payments are financed

utility based estimation of labour supply functions in the regular and irregular sectors recent theoretical work on labor supply has shown that the tax and transfer system can induce some individuals to work in the irregular labor market models designed to represent such behavior are unable to sign unambiguously the impact of the marginal tax rate as well as many key exogenous parameters on the hours supplied in the irregular market except under strong restrictions on preferences in this paper the authors estimate a simultaneous labor supply model that allows testing some of the more common assumptions found in the literature using a unique data set on the underground economy of the metropolitan area of quebec city canada estimates of elasticities with respect to predetermined variables are presented moreover they test and empirically reject the assumptions of perfect substitution between regular and irregular work activities as well as additive separability of the utility function copyright 1992 by royal economic society

collective decisions household production and labor force participation in this paper we generalize the collective model of household labor supply with domestic production to allow for the possibility of nonparticipation in the labor market we also relax the marketability assumption according to which domestic goods and market goods are perfectly substitutable our results are twofold first we show that the main structural components of the decision process can be retrieved from observed behavior second we estimate a system of market and domestic labor supply using the panel study of income dynamics and apply the theoretical results to recover the intra household sharing of resources

second best pollution taxes and the structure of preferences we characterize optimal taxes on polluting and nonpolluting goods in ramsey and mirrlees second best environments the polluting good tax differs from the pigouvian tax by ramsey terms in the first and by stiglitz mirrlees plus another adjustment term in the second these terms can be positive negative or zero if preferences are weakly separable in public and private goods with the private good subutility weakly separable in labor and produced goods nonpolluting goods are taxed uniformly and the concept of a tax differential between polluting and nonpolluting goods is well defined the differential is then less than the pigouvian tax in the ramsey framework but it can be greater equal to or smaller than the pigouvian tax in the mirrlees second best in mirrlees second best if preferences are separable in labor supply and other goods the second best tax differential is identical to the pigouvian tax

welfare criteria for tax reforms efficiency aspects there are essentially two types of problems to which the normative theory of taxation addresses itself one of these problems is that of designing de novo i e from scratch a tax system which is optimal in some appropriate welfare sense the other major problem is that of finding conditions under which tax reforms i e changes in an existing tax system are welfareimproving the efficiency aspects of the latter problem are the subject of this paper there has been a considerable interest in the theory of tax reform in the last decade in the earlier part of this decade most studies of tax reforms concerned themselves primarily with the question of changing price distortions e g foster and sonnenschein 1970 bertrand and vanek 1971 kawamata 1974 1977 dixit 1975 hatta 1977 and rader 1976 a common drawback of these studies however is that the kind of tax changes analyzed by them rely on an implicit lump sum tax transfer mechanism for instance some consider the question of whether a reduction in tax rates such as a radial decrease in distortions improves welfare such a reduction will most likely decrease the tax revenues accruing to the government and hence some lump sum tax will have to be introduced therefore it is difficult to draw policy relevant conclusions from these studies more recently there have been several studies e g guesnerie 1977 diewert 1978 dixit 1979 harris 1979 and weymark 1979 which deal

imperfect observability of emissions and second best emission and output taxes abstract this paper studies the second best tax design problem when emissions are publicly unobservable but can be discovered through costly monitoring a representative firm in industry chooses its emissions and declarations to maximize its expected profits the paper shows the pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions is modified to take account of the resource costs of monitoring and enforcement emissions from different sectors must be taxed at different rates every polluting good must face an effective emission tax that is less than the full marginal social damage of emissions emission taxes do not reflect standard optimal tax objectives output taxes have a pigouvian role so that the targeting principle fails

changes in relative wages and family labor supply the large changes in relative wages that occurred during the 1980s provide fertile ground for studying the behavioral responses of married couples to the wage changes of husbands and wives i find estimates of own wage and cross wage elasticities for men that are very small the own wage elasticity for women is positive and the cross wage elasticity for women suggests a strong negative response of female labor supply to changes in their husband s wages family labor supply behavior determines how changes in individual wage rates translate into family earnings changes the responses of women to changes in their husband s wages attenuated somewhat the increases in individual wage inequality at the family level the results suggest that the earnings of the wives of low income men would actually have fallen over the decade if women s labor supply did not respond to changes in their husbands wages however assortative mating implies that wage changes of husbands and wives are correlated and so family earnings inequality still grew during the decade of the 1980s

functional forms for labor supply and commodity demands with and without quantity restrictions one of the most important current questions in economic analysis is whether or not labor markets clear in the short run to answer this it is necessary to be able to distinguish between restricted and unrestricted behavior by consumers supplying labor this paper investigates the forms of preferences which lie behind linear models of labor supply and derives the functional forms for commodity demands which accompany them both with and without quantity restrictions in the labor market simple linkages between restricted and unrestricted demands are also considered as is the question of perfect aggregation over consumers in the presence of quantity restrictions

uniform labor income taxation and economic efficiency abstract this paper uses a two period representative agent optimal taxation model to characterize government tax policy when the interest rate is determined in equilibrium and is affected by policy choices it shows that dynamic tax smoothing may not be optimal and the response of the interest rate with respect to policy choices is extremely important in characterizing government s tax policy

are efficient linear taxes inequitable abstract i explore the household weights in the bergson samuelson social welfare functions which have a turning point at an efficient linear tax structure the inverse optima a tax structure is defined to be inequitable if every inverse optimum has weights that increase with household productivity over part of the productivity range i find that the inequity of an efficient tax structure depends on the normality of leisure on the number of households and on the natureof household demands an efficient indirect tax structure is not inequitable if the expenditure share of each taxed commodity is constant across households this has welfare implications for the choice of tax instrument to finance a project accepted under benefit cost analysis

the two part instrument in a second best world abstract standard pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions first many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two part instrument 2pi a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution it is a generalization of a deposit refund system drs second a different literature concerns the second best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions here we combine the two extensions by looking at the second best 2pi when government needs revenue is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller we find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions and we compare these to the rates in a first best model the tax subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect an environmental effect and a revenue effect the model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2pi we also discuss important caveats

time poor working super rich abstract this paper revisits the standard model of labor supply under two additional assumptions consumption requires time and some limited amount of work is enjoyable whereas introducing each assumption without the other one does not produce novel insights combining them together does if the wage rate is sufficiently high for top earners work has a positive marginal utility at the optimum and above a critical wage level it converts into a pure consumption good their labor supply curve is first backward bending and then vertical this can justify an optimal marginal tax rate on top incomes equal to 100 top earners in the vertical half line of the labor supply curve optimally refrain from spending their entire income at the macroeconomic level this can generate a lack of effective demand with some qualifications these findings carry over to models that include savings and philanthropy

how large is the optimal inflation tax abstract i examine the title question in a competitive framework where the transaction demand for money is modeled using a cash in advance constraint and only distortionary taxes are possible empirical evidence and simulations are used to document the plausibility of the assumptions which produce the friedman rule these findings suggest that it is not a good benchmark my results suggest that an optimal monetary policy calls for nominal interest rates that can exceed 6 per year

optimal commodity taxation and redistribution within households using a collective model of consumption we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household the main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household essentially taxation should discourage less the consumption of a certain group of goods those for which the slope of the engel curves is larger for the targeted person

the political economy of long term care we build a two dimensional political economy model to explain the provision and financing of long term care and income redistribution voting agents differ in need and income opening up two conflicts one sets families with disabled parents who are in favor of a public long term care program against the ones without such parents who oppose public financing the other sets the poor against the rich with the former preferring heavier income taxation than the latter we show that a structure induced equilibrium always exists and that it is unique if informal care is provided in equilibrium the equilibrium not only explains the negative association of income inequality and long term care financing but also allows predictions about how demographic change might impact long term care arrangements and expenses

should day care be subsidized in the presence of distortionary taxes on labor can subsidies on childcare flnanced by a further increase in taxes raise welfare by encouraging women with small children to work we approach this question in two difierent ways first we consider a set of stylized models where we prove analytically that under some conditions the ramsey optimal policy consists in making childcare expenses tax deductible then we construct a calibrated stochastic dynamic life cycle model of household decision making designed to capture some facts about labor supply in germany we flnd that the welfare gains associated with subsidizing childcare are considerable and that the maximum gains are realized when childcare is subsidized to an even greater extent than what tax deductibility implies

uncertainty and optimally uniform commodity taxes this paper examines the implications of uncertainty for the structure of optimal commodity taxes in the presence of a linear income tax consumers face uncertain income and commit to consumption of some goods before the resolution of uncertainty and to others after preferences are separable between labor and consumption goods we prove that optimal commodity taxes are i uniform within the category of noncommitted goods if their subutility is logarithmic ii uniform within the two categories if both subutilities are logarithmic and iii nonzero across categories with the tax rate on precommitted goods being lower than the tax rate on noncommitted goods starting with atkinson and stiglitz 1976 a number of economists have argued that under certain restrictions on preferences e g logarithmic a linear income tax is a sufficient tool for optimal tax policy see atkinson 1977 deaton 1979 and deaton and stern 1986 recently cremer and gahvari 1995a showed that these results do not carry to an economy in which individuals face wage uncertainty in models with uncertainty taxation is useful for the insurance it provides if consumption takes place both before and after the resolution of uncertainty commodity taxes will have different insurance properties depending on when consumption occurs this property makes differential tax treatment of these two types of goods optimal cremer and gahvari 1995a divided commodities into two categories the consumption levels in one category are committed to before the resolution of uncertainty and those in the other after their study pinpoints a fundamental difference between these categories of goods that calls for their tax treatment to be different however their analysis leaves open the question of the uniformity of tax rates within each category the main aim of the current paper is to address this question we shall examine the type of preferences for which the tax rates within each category have to be uniform in this way we will build a bridge between the results of cremer and gahvari 1995a and the literature on uniform taxation in the presence of a linear

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic