rational panics and stock market crashes abstract this paper offers an explanation for stock market crashes which focuses on the role of rational but uninformed traders we show that uninformed traders can precipitate a price crash because as prices decline they surmise that informed traders received negative information which leads them to reduce their demand for assets and drive the price of stocks even lower the model yields several implications such as that crashes can occur even when the fundamentals are strong and that the magnitude of the crash depends on the fraction of uninformed investors and the amount of unsophisticated passive investing present in the market

information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

the effects of devaluation on the trade balance a critical view and re examination of mile s new results abstract in a often cited article miles 1979 claims to have shown empirically the validity of the global monetarist proposition that devaluations do not affect the balance of trade this paper first uses mile s own framework of analysis to reveal serious deficiencies in his methodology and tests that cast doubt on the validity of his results in a respecified trade balance equation we show that devaluations do affect the trade balance in the traditionally predicted direction the pivotal difference between the two specifications arises from our inclusion of relative price effects and longer lag structure for the exchange rate variable

when transparency improves must prices reflect fundamentals better no in the presence of speculative opportunities investors can learn about both asset fundamentals and the beliefs of other traders we show that this learning exhibits complementarity learning more along one dimension increases the value of learning about the other as a result regulatory changes may be counterproductive first increasing transparency i e making fundamental information cheaper to acquire can make prices less informative when investors respond by learning relatively more about others second public disclosures discourage private learning about fundamentals while encouraging information acquisition about others accordingly disclosing more fundamental information can decrease overall informational efficiency by decreasing price informativeness received april 20 2016 editorial decision september 30 2017 by editor itay goldstein

clustering and competition in asset markets economists financial commentators regulatory agencies and the legal community have recently criticized the nasdaq stock market inc because there is greater clustering of stock quotations on even eighths on nasdaq than on the new york stock exchange or the american stock exchange a phenomenon which critics attribute to collusion or some other defect in nasdaq market structure however as this article demonstrates clustering occurs in varying degrees in many other incontestably competitive financial markets including the nyse the amex the london stock exchange the london gold market and the international foreign exchange market this article provides a competitive theory of clustering that emphasizes the effect of uncertainty the size of transactions volatility and the informational and transactional roles of quotations on the degree of clustering in addition the article examines how market structure can affect the degree of clustering and considers the relation between clustering spread

is it time to split the s p 500 futures contract by october 1996 the value of the s p 500 index futures contract had grown to five times its value at its inception in april 1982 one way to make the contract more accessible to small investors and to smooth out trading is to split the contract splitting the contract could increase transaction costs although competition would probably limit the amount of the increase less clear is the need for increasing the minimum percentage tick size the current minimum tick size is small for s p 500 futures compared with that of other futures and also common stocks the larger tick size could affect volume however by increasing trading costs and reducing the willingness to trade

the possibility of informationally efficient markets abstract a rational expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price contrary to a wide held conjecture whereas a continuum of investors is inconsistent with fully revealing equilibrium finitely many investors with average portfolios demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size in an additive signal return model more information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off under fully revealing price information market equilibria both with and without information acquisition are pareto efficient

complementarities multiplicity and supply information if traders can obtain private information about the payoff and the supply of a stock then there can exist i complementarity in information acquisition and ii multiple equilibria in the financial and information markets the additional dimension of supply information increases coordination possibilities in the financial market leading to multiple equilibria the existence of two information sources can lead to information acquisition being complementary the multiplicity of equilibria is suggestive of excess volatility and crashes the different financial market equilibria imply differing patterns of cost of capital and volume of trade 2009 by the european economic association

information acquisition dissemination and transparency of monetary policy this paper examines the role of transparency in a benevolent monetary author ity s policies each firm s payoff depends on unobservable macroeconomic conditions and firms may incur a cost to acquire private information about macroeconomic conditions the policy authority attempts to infer the underlying macroeconomic conditions from a noisy measure of aggregate actions and makes a public announcement to inform firms of this inference high quality announcements provide firms the incentive not to gather private information and base actions solely on information contained in policy announce ments however this makes the observed actions of firms less informative to the policy authority jel classification e52 e58

a day end transaction price anomaly a large mean price change is observed on the last daily nyse transaction this suggests that closing prices may not consistently represent stock values transaction prices are studied to further characterize the day end price rise and to determine whether it is due to any limited subsample of stocks or dates the results indicate that the phenomenon is pervasive over most firms and days some evidence suggests that it is caused by a change in the frequency of ask prices at day end

speculation and hedging in segmented markets we analyze a model in which traders have different trading opportunities and learn information from prices the difference in trading opportunities implies that different traders may have different trading motives when trading in the same market some trade for speculation and others for hedging and thus they may respond to the same information in opposite directions this implies that adding more informed traders may reduce price informativeness and therefore provides a source for learning complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and price jumps our model is relevant to various realistic settings and helps to understand a variety of modern financial markets

minimum price variations discrete bid ask spreads and quotation sizes exchange minimum price variation regulations create discrete bid ask spreads if the minimum quotable spread exceeds the spread that otherwise would be quoted spreads will be wide and the number of shares offered at the bid and ask may be large a cross sectional discrete spread model is estimated by using intraday stock quotation spread frequencies the results are used to project 1 16 spread usage frequencies given a 1 16 tick projected changes in quotation sizes and in trade volumes are obtained from regression models for stocks priced under 10 the models predict spreads would decrease 38 percent quotation sizes would decrease 16 percent and daily volume would increase 34 percent article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

do investors prefer even eighth prices evidence from nyse limit orders abstract using a large sample of limit orders on nyse stocks we find that investors submit more limit orders with even eighth prices than odd eight prices however even though there are a greater number of even eighth limit orders the proportion of executing limit orders submitted with even prices is greater than those submitted with odd prices for a large portion of our sample we find that clustering on even prices is a positive function of stock price and various proxies for the dispersion in investors reservation prices the preference for even prices affects stock quotes investors are more likely to submit a quote improving limit order if the limit price is even and quoted depth is higher for even quotes than for odd quotes

internalization and stock price clustering finnish evidence abstract internalization the practice of brokers executing trades in house is a significant phenomenon in the helsinki stock exchange during the continuous trading session 97 5 upstairs market trades are internalized the corresponding figure for after hours upstairs market trades is 73 1 the prices of internalized trades are somewhat more clustered than the prices of other trades during the continuous trading session but they are not more clustered than the prices of negotiated trades in the after hours upstairs market this suggests that finnish brokers do not use a more discrete set of prices for internalized trades than for other upstairs trades

the value of diffusing information abstract how does the speed by which information diffuses affect its value to a stock market investor in a structural model solved in closed form this speed has two opposing effects on the empirically dominant term of the value of information faster diffusing information means quicker and less noisy profits but also increases competing informed trading impounding more information into prices and eroding profits structural empirical analysis of stock market reaction to drug approvals using media coverage as a proxy for the transmission rate of information finds that the value of information is hump shaped in its future transmission rate moreover the estimated amount of noise trading is small

stock price clustering and discreteness stock prices cluster on round fractions clustering increases with price level and volatility and decreases with capitalization and transaction frequency clustering is pervasive price clustering will occur if traders use discrete price sets to simplify their negotiations exchange regulations require that most stocks be traded on eighths clustering on larger fractions will occur if traders choose to use discrete price sets based on quarters halves or whole numbers an econometric model of clustering is derived and estimated projections from the results suggest that traders would frequently use odd sixteenths when trading low price stocks if exchange regulations permitted trading on sixteenths article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a note on the wang and wang measure of the quality of the compass rose abstract h wang and c wang visibility of the compass rose in financial asset returns a quantitative study j bank financ 26 2002 1099 1111 derive a measure of the visibility of the radial patterns that appear in a plot of current and past returns which are more commonly known as the compass rose in theory this measure should be positively related to the tick volatility ratio in practice however we find that this relationship does not hold for higher tick volatility ratios that are common to stock market data thus the use of this measure is limited in real world applications we propose a correction factor that improves the behaviour of the quality measure over higher tick volatility ratios however further research is required to fully identify and correct the problem

price clustering in bitcoin investor and media attention in bitcoin has increased substantially in recently years reflected by the incredible surge in news articles and considerable rise in the price of bitcoin given the increased attention there little is known about the behaviour of bitcoin prices and therefore we add to the literature by studying price clustering we find significant evidence of clustering at round numbers with over 10 of prices ending with 00 decimals compared to other variations but there is no significant pattern of returns after the round number we also support the negotiation hypothesis of harris 1991 by showing that price and volume have a significant positive relationship with price clustering at whole numbers

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

imperfect competition in financial markets an empirical study of island and nasdaq the competition between island and nasdaq at the beginning of the century offers a natural laboratory to study competition between and within trading platforms and its consequences for liquidity supply our empirical strategy takes advantage of the difference between the pricing grids used on island and nasdaq as well as of the decline in the nasdaq tick using the finer grid prevailing on their market island limit order traders undercut nasdaq quotes much more than they undercut one another the drop in the nasdaq tick size triggered a drop in island spreads despite the island tick already being very thin before nasdaq decimalization we also estimate a structural model of liquidity supply and find that island limit order traders earned rents before nasdaq decimalization our results suggest that perfect competition cannot be taken for granted even on transparent open limit order books with a very thin pricing grid

tick size share prices and stock splits minimum price variation rules help explain why stock prices vary substantially across countries and other curiosities of share prices companies tend to split their stock so that the institutionally mandated minimum tick size is optimal relative to the stock price a large relative tick size provides an incentive for dealers to make markets and for investors to provide liquidity by placing limit orders despite its placing a high floor on the quoted bid ask spread a simple model suggests that idiosyncratic risk firm size and visibility of the firm affect the optimal relative tick size and thus the share price in stock markets around the world the average price per share differs substantially the median u s stock for example sells for about 40 a typical london stock sells for about 5 7 50 and a typical hong kong share is about 2 furthermore when stock prices rise above a country s usual trading range firms often split their stocks to restore prices to that range why are these price ranges so different among countries these trading ranges can be remarkably stable over time during the half century from 1943 to 1994 the s p composite index increased over 1 500 percent yet the average new york stock exchange nyse share price was

spurious tests and sign reversals in international economics empirical tests of numerous theories in international economics e g the monetary explanation of the balance of payments exchange rate the portfolio balance model of capital flows purchasing power parity and covered interest rate arbitrage usually impose the subtractive linear constraint that corresponding foreign and domestic explanatory variables have equal but opposite effects on the dependent variable rasulo and wilford 15 investigate empirically the bias in general caused by such a restriction in monetary models of the balance of payments exchange rate 2 what is not recognized however is the peculiar nature and potential severity of the bias including sign reversals which results from subtracting as opposed to aggregating explanatory variables and the wide range of tests in international economics which may be spurious because of this type of bias

an explanation for the compass rose pattern abstract the compass rose pattern cannot be observed in daily returns in the spot foreign exchange forex market but is observable when intraday forex returns are used monte carlo simulations show that the pattern is visible only when the tick volatility ratio is above some threshold level a condition that is readily met with intraday returns

market composition and price informativeness in a large market with endogenous order types we analyse the joint determination of price informativeness and the composition of the market by order type in a large asset market with dispersed information the market microstructure is one in which informed traders may place market orders or full demand schedules and where market makers set the price market order traders trade less aggressively on their information and thus reduce the informativeness of the price in a full market order market price informativeness is bounded whatever the quality of traders information about the asset s dividend when traders can choose their order type and demand schedules are even marginally costlier than market orders then market order traders overwhelm the market when the precision of private signals goes to in nity this is because demand schedules are substitutes at high levels of precision a residual fraction of demand schedule traders is sufficient to take the trading price close to traders signals while the latter is itself well aligned with the dividend hence the gain from trading conditional on the price as demand schedule traders do in addition to one s own signal as all informed traders do vanishes

the relationship between bilateral and multilateral models of exchange rates abstract bilateral specifications of exchange rate models are expedient and widely used but their appropriateness in a multilateral world has not been examined formally this paper demonstrates that bilateral specifications are appropriate if i cross exchange rates are consistent ii multilateral weights are symmetric iii exchange rates are linear functions of domestic and foreign variables and iv coefficients on corresponding domestic and foreign variables are equal but opposite in sign conditions i iii and iv are common assumptions and evidence suggests that condition ii is met in approximate terms among most of the g 7 countries with the exceptions involving canada and japan

price clustering on the shanghai stock exchange abstractwe investigate price clustering of intraday trades and negotiated block trades on the shanghai stock exchange sse from 2003 to 2009 prices of traded assets tend to cluster on certain final digits such as 0 and 5 in chinese culture 8 is associated with good luck and 4 with death so these numbers may be attractive or avoided we find that price clustering on the final digit of 0 is significantly higher during the morning call auction and early in the trading day we find no evidence of price clustering for the digit 8 but there is a significant dearth of prices ending in the inauspicious number 4 price clustering is significantly higher for negotiated block trades for which about 28 end with 0 multivariate analysis shows that price clustering is lower for more liquid firms but higher for firms with higher return volatility a higher price level or when the market is volatile our evidence supports the costly negotiation hypothesis our results also support the attraction hypothesis in t

penny wise dollar foolish buy sell imbalances on and around round numbers this paper provides evidence that stock traders focus on round numbers as cognitive reference points for value using a random sample of more than 100 million stock transactions we find excess buying selling by liquidity demanders at all price points one penny below above round numbers further the size of the buy sell imbalance is monotonic in the roundness of the adjacent round number i e largest adjacent to integers second largest adjacent to half dollars etc conditioning on the price path we find much stronger excess buying selling by liquidity demanders when the ask falls bid rises to reach the integer than when it crosses the integer we discuss and test three explanations for these results finally 24 hour returns also vary by price point and buy sell imbalances are a major determinant of that variation across price points buying selling by liquidity demanders below above round numbers yield losses approaching 1 billion per year this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of noisy rational expectations models i study a general class of noisy rational expectations models that nests the standard grossman and stiglitz 1980 and hellwig 1980 models but relaxes the usual assumption of joint normality of asset pay offs and supply and allows for more general signal structures i provide a constructive proof of existence of equilibrium characterize the price function and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness within the class of equilibria with continuous price functions which are met by both the grossman and stiglitz 1980 models and the hellwig 1980 models with a continuum of investors my solution approach does not rely on the typical conjecture and verify method and i exhibit a number of non normal examples in which asset prices can be characterized explicitly and in a closed form the results presented here open up a broad class of models for applied work to illustrate the usefulness of generalizing the standard model i show that in settings with non normally distributed pay offs shocks to fundamentals may be amplified purely due to learning effects price drifts can arise naturally and the disagreement return relation depends in a novel way on return skewness

an analysis of trade size clustering and its relation to stealth trading abstract nyse and nasdaq trades increasingly cluster on multiples of 500 1 000 and 5 000 shares such clustering varies over time and across stocks and tends to increase with the level of trading activity furthermore rounded trades tend to have more persistence both in occurrence and in trade initiation finally medium sized rounded trades tend to have greater relative price impact than large rounded trades from these observations we surmise that trade size clustering is consistent at least in part with the actions of stealth traders who tend to use medium sized rounded transactions in an attempt to disguise their trades

information markets and the comovement of asset prices traditional asset pricing models predict that covariance between prices of difierent assets should be lower than what we observe in the data this model generates high covariance within a rational expectations framework by introducing markets for information about asset payofis when information is costly rational investors will not buy information about all assets they will learn about a subset because information production has high flxed costs competitive producers charge more for low demand information than for high demand information a price that declines in quantity makes investors want to purchase a common subset of information if investors price many assets using a common subset of information then a shock to one signal is passed on as a common shock to many asset prices these common shocks to asset prices generate excess covariance the cross sectional and time series properties of asset price covariance are consistent with this explanation

estimating the value of information we derive a general expression for the value of information to a price taking investor in a dynamic environment and provide a framework for its estimation we study the value of both private and public information and break it into its instrumental and psychic parts to illustrate we estimate and rank the values of leading macroeconomic indicators gdp employment etc using variations in option prices we find that consumer investors with conventional preference parameters would pay 3 to 5 bps of their wealth for a one time private peek into these indicators such signals provide substantial instrumental value but a minor psychic value received august 29 2016 editorial decision june 6 2018 by editor itay goldstein authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

an equilibrium analysis of information aggregation and fluctuations in markets with discrete decisions abstract this paper shows how the interaction between decentralized information gathering and discreteness of investment decisions at the individual level can generate random fluctuations in aggregate investment that involve occasionally large allocation errors this interaction is illustrated in a model in which private information is costly to acquire and prices reveal information the unique rational expectations equilibrium outcome of the model is shown to always be noisy and characterized by investment levels which may be high simply because uninformed investors are buying under the impression that the high price is a signal of good investment opportunities

learning and complementarities in speculative attacks we study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision we show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions we show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market depending on how it is implemented

insider trading without normality in this paper we analyse the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a particular class of monopolistic rational expectations models we show the equivalence between the kyle 1985 model of insider trading where the insider observes the amount of noise trading and the kyle 1989 model of informed speculation when there is one risk neutral insider and many risk neutral market makers we show that in these two equivalent models i there exists a unique equilibrium independently of the distribution of uncertainty ii this equilibrium minimizes the expected gains of the informed agent under incentive compatibility constraints we extend our results to a class of signalling games

the initiation and withdrawal of odd eighth quotes among nasdaq stocks an empirical analysis christie and schultz 1994 journal of finance 49 1813 1840 nd that market makers in many active nasdaq stocks avoid odd eighth quotes this paper studies 67 58 nasdaq stocks whose market makers initiate withdraw odd eighth quotes these regime shifts are often completed within the span of a day and coincide with dramatic changes in dollar percentage and e ective spreads in most cases we are unable to identify comparable changes in the costs of making markets we do identify long run changes in average prices that may provide a partial explanation however we also nd

quote based competition and trade execution costs in nyse listed stocks abstract this study examines quotations order routing and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large capitalization nyse listed stocks the competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures the probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes execution costs for non nyse trades when the local market posts competitive non competitive quotes are virtually the same substantially exceed costs for matched nyse trades collectively these results imply a significant degree of quote based competition for order flow and are consistent with off nyse liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better than normal trade executions

competition and collusion in dealer markets this article develops a game theoretic model to analyze market makers intertemporal pricing strategies we show that dealers who adopt noncooperative pricing strategies may set bid ask spreads above competitive levels this form of implicit collusion differs from explicit collusion where dealers cooperate to fix prices price discreteness or asymmetric information are not required for collusion to occur rather institutional arrangements that restrict access to the order flow are important determinants of the ability to collude because they reduce dealers incentives to compete on price public policy efforts to increase interdealer competition should focus on such restrictions

price clustering of chinese ipos the impact of regulation cultural factors and negotiation abstractduring june 2009 may 2012 the china securities regulatory commission csrc suspended window guidance that limits issue prices using this regime change as a natural experiment we test th

reprint of information percolation in segmented markets we study equilibria of dynamic over the counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information over time agents are privately informed by bids and offers investors differ with respect to information quality including initial information precision and also in terms of market connectivity the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities we characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives more liquid markets lead to higher equilibrium information acquisition when the gains from trade and market duration are sufficiently large on the other hand for a small market duration the opposite may occur if agents vary sufficiently in terms of their market connectivity c 2014 published by elsevier inc

does order preferencing matter 1we would like to thank david easley eugene kandel the referee g william schwert the editor participants at the dealer markets conference at ohio state university and an anonymous referee for helpful comments we gratefully acknowledge financial support from the johnson graduate school of management and the national science foundation 1 abstract this study examines how order preferencing affects the competitiveness and efficiency of laboratory financial markets we operationalize preferencing by allowing some dealers to execute a portion of the order flow by matching the most favorable quotes available increasing the proportion of order flow that is preferenced can increase bid ask spreads reduce the informational efficiency of prices and benefit dealers at the expense of liquidity traders preferencing has none of these effects however when two or more dealers are not receiving preferencing orders preferencing may significantly degrade market performance if preferencing arrangements affect all or virtually all dealers

antitrust and prices this study examines the effects of antitrust prosecution on prices charged by firms indicted for price fixing in a survey of 25 cases filed between 1973 and 1984 prices are found to gradually rise by about 7 percent over the 4 years following an indictment however the severity of penalties is negatively correlated with prices these two findings suggest either that penalties are too lenient or that prosecution is too broad penalizing economically efficient conspiracies along with those that are inefficient

the effect of public information and competition on trading volume and price volatility in a one period model of market making with many exogenously informed traders we first show that the variance of prices and expected trading volume depend on the public information released at the start of trading this is accomplished by representing beliefs with elliptically countoured distributions for which the form of optimal decision rules does not depend on the specific distribution used second if the model is altered so that the decision to become informed is made endogenous then the decision rules of the market maker and infomed traders depend on the public information third in a multiperiod model with many informed traders and long lived private information recursion formulas similar to those of kyle 1985 hold for all elliptically contoured distributions trading volume is autocorrelated and unless per period liquidity trading is bounded away from zero as new trading periods are added informed traders profits vanish article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

information percolation in segmented markets we study equilibria of dynamic over the counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information over time agents are privately informed by bids and offers investors differ with respect to information quality including initial information precision and also in terms of market connectivity the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities we characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives more liquid markets lead to higher equilibrium information acquisition when the gains from trade and market duration are sufficiently large on the other hand for a small market duration the opposite may occur if agents vary sufficiently in terms of their market connectivity c 2014 published by elsevier inc

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

on acquisition of information in financial markets in their paper information acquisition in financial markets this journal 2000 barlevy and veronesi present a model of a one period financial market and claim that for an open set of parameter values the value of information increases with the mass of informed agents that claim is shown here to be false the property of strategic substitution is robust in their model

why nasdaq market makers avoid odd eighth quotes recent studies argue that implicit collusion explains the tendency of nasdaq market makers to avoid odd eighth price quotes this paper focuses on the role that preference trading plays in determining quoted spreads under the postulated effects of preference trading an analysis of the relation between spreads and price fractions explains the paucity of odd eighth quotes on nasdaq empirical results from a comprehensive data set show that exogenous economic characteristics explain the distribution of price fractions across securities and illustrate the stability of that distribution over time these results contradict empirical results offered as support for the collusion hypothesis

liquidity provision contracts and market quality evidence from the new york stock exchange we exploit a discontinuity in the new york stock exchange designated market maker dmm contract to identify causal effects of dmm participation on equilibrium market outcomes we document that contractual features that enhance dmm participation are associated with increased depth narrower bid ask spreads and higher rates of price improvement with most of the improvements attributable to increases in liquidity provision on markets other than the nyse these results cannot be attributed to the mechanical effects of the contractual changes and support the interpretation that market making is characterized by strategic complementarity received october 7 2017 editorial decision december 10 2018 by editor itay goldstein

clustering in crude oil prices and the target pricing zone hypothesis abstract this paper studies the target pricing zone tpz hypothesis for crude oil by examining price clustering in the dollar digit it is hypothesized that price clustering occurs within an established tpz if opec is able to defend the upper and lower bounds through output changes the results show that prices strongly cluster around the dollar digit value of 9 within the tpz sub periods but not outside the sub periods furthermore the degree of clustering declines when production capacity utilization is high and when production significantly exceeds quotas consistent with opec s inability to defend the zone nine centered clustering also results in lower contemporaneous and next day volatility these results support the target pricing zone hypothesis of crude oil

do investors prefer round stock prices evidence from israeli ipo auctions abstract we find round number clustering in orders submitted by investors in israeli ipo auctions explanations offered for price clustering such as dealer collusion or implicit agreement to simplify negotiations cannot explain price clustering in this market therefore this is direct evidence that investors prefer round numbers

clustered pricing in the corporate loan market theory and empirical evidence abstract existing theories explaining security price clustering as well as clustering in the retail deposit and mortgage markets are incompatible with the clustering in the corporate loan market we develop a new theoretical model that the attitude of the lender toward the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower leads to the clustering of spreads our empirical results support our theoretical model and we find that clustering increases with the degree of uncertainty between the lender and the borrower in contrast clustering is less likely when the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower has been reduced through repeated access and through prior interactions of the lender and the borrower

tick size bid ask spreads and market structure we propose a link between market structure and the resulting market characteristics tick size bid ask spreads quote clustering and market depth we analyze transactions data of stocks traded on the london stock exchange a dealer market we conclude that market charateristics are endogenous to the market structure the london dealer market does not have a mandated tick size and it exhibits higher spreads higher quote clusterings and higher market depth than the nyse auction market clustering of trade prices is similar in london and new york

effects of market reform on the trading costs and depths of nasdaq stocks the relative merits of dealer versus auction markets have been a subject of significant and sometimes contentious debate on january 20 1997 the securities and exchange commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public to compete directly with nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders additionally superior quotes placed by nasdaq dealers in private trading venues began to be displayed in the nasdaq market we measure the impact of these new rules on various measures of performance including trading costs and depths our results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically without adversely affecting market quality

a psychological reexamination of the bertrand paradox the bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost in laboratory experiments this equilibrium is not generally observed existing empirical works on bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models we find that such models are useful in organizing behavior in early stages of the game but less so in later stages we show that a new model coarse grid nash equilibrium based on the assumption that subjects discretize the strategy space explains the data better

market maker quotation behavior and pretrade transparency we examine the impact of differing levels of pretrade transparency on the quotation behavior of nasdaq market makers we find that market makers are more likely to quote on odd ticks and to actively narrow the spread when they can do so anonymously by posting limit orders on electronic communication networks ecns from a public policy perspective our findings suggest that making the level of pretrade transparency on nasdaq more opaque by allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads further

informed traders and limit order markets abstract we consider a dynamic limit order market in which traders optimally choose whether to acquire information about the asset and the type of order to submit we numerically solve for the equilibrium and demonstrate that the market is a volatility multiplier prices are more volatile than the fundamental value of the asset this effect increases when the fundamental value has high volatility and with asymmetric information across traders changes in the microstructure noise are negatively correlated with changes in the estimated fundamental value implying that asset betas estimated from high frequency data will be incorrect

a model of competitive stock trading volume a model of competitive stock trading is developed in which investors are heterogeneous in their information and private investment opportunities and rationally trade for both informational and noninformational motives i examine the link between the nature of heterogeneity among investors and the behavior of trading volume and its relation to price dynamics it is found that volume is positively correlated with absolute changes in prices and dividends i show that informational trading and noninformational trading lead to different dynamic relations between trading volume and stock returns

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

implications of the discreteness of observed stock prices stock prices on the organized exchanges are restricted to be divisible by 1 8 therefore the true price usually differs from the observed price this paper examines the biases resulting from the discreteness of observed stock prices it is shown that the natural estimators of the variance and all of the higher order moments of the rate of returns are biased an approximate set of correction factors is derived and a procedure is outlined to show how the correction can be made the natural estimators of the beta and of the variance of the market portfolio on the other hand are nearly unbiased the behavior of stock prices has been an issue of interest to the financial economist for many years this interest resulted in a growing number of empirical studies which attempt to estimate this behavior e g blattberg and gonedes 2 fama 6 fama and roll 7 8 barnea and downes 1 to date stock price behavior is estimated under the assumption that the observed trading price is the true equilibrium price however observed stock prices and stock price changes on the organized exchanges are restricted to multiples of 1 8 of a dollar 1 therefore if the true distribution of stock prices is continuous an observed trading price can be different from the true price this paper examines the biases in estimating the moments of stock price changes caused by the discreteness of observed stock prices the major focus of the paper is in noting this problem providing a model which explains the source of these biases and quantifying their size section i demonstrates that due to the discrete nature of observed stock prices the natural estimators for the variance and for the higher order moments of the rate of returns are biased upward this bias is larger for stocks with lower prices and smaller standard deviation for instance assuming that the standard deviation a is 0 001 the stock price is one dollar the true probability distribution of stock prices is lognormal and the observed prices are as close as possible to the true prices then the natural estimator of r has expectation 0 01400 hence it is biased upward by 1300 significant biases have important implications in option pricing we derive an approximate set of correction factors which can be applied to the

information acquisition in financial markets tions agents have exponential utility and random variables are normally distributed these assumptions are often necessary to obtain closed form solutions we present an example with alternative assumptions and demonstrate that some of the conclusions from previous literature fail to hold in particular we show that in our example as more agents acquire information prices do not necessarily become more informative and agents may have greater incentive to acquire informatioln learning can therefore be a strategic complement allowing for the possibility of multiple equilibria

symposium on market microstructure focus on nasdaq abstract this special issue of the journal of financial economics includes six articles that analyze the market microstructure of nasdaq in various ways the question of the costs of trading on nasdaq has become contentious in both the academic and legal regulatory arenas since the christie and schultz 1994 article first noted that many actively traded nasdaq stocks were almost never quoted on odd eights the articles in this symposium bring new and interesting insights to this debate

payments for order flow on nasdaq we present a model of nasdaq that includes the two ways in which marketmakers compete for order f low quotes and direct payments brokers in our model can execute small trades through a computerized system preferencing arrangements with marketmakers or vertical integration into market making the comparative statics in our model differ from those of the traditional model of dealer markets which does not capture important institutional features of nasdaq we also show that the empirical evidence is inconsistent with the traditional model which suggests that preferencing and vertical integration are important components in understanding nasdaq

a comparison of centralized and fragmented markets with costly search how does quotation transparency affect financial market performance biais s irrelevance proposition in 1993 shows that centralized markets yield the same expected bid ask spreads as fragmented markets other things equal however de frutos and manzano demonstrated in 2002 that expected spreads in fragmented markets are smaller and market participants prefer to trade in fragmented markets this paper introduces liquidity traders costs of searching for a better quote into the biais model and derives opposite conclusions to these previous studies expected spreads in centralized markets are smaller and liquidity traders prefer centralized markets while market makers prefer fragmented markets

information quality and options microstructure researchers have long understood that information quality has an effect on price formation in the underlying asset market however option researchers have largely ignored the fact that information quality might also impact the options market this article characterizes the nature of the impact by showing how option prices and implied volatility levels are related to the forward looking information quality path this result follows from a noisy rational expectations model that abandons the normal distribution in favor of the gamma distribution but maintains the standard assumption of exponential utility thus the new model bridges the gap between the microstructure literature that relies so heavily on the normal exponential framework and the options literature that relies exclusively on models that are consistent with the limited liability of stock prices the model s tractability allows for a robustness check against the standard framework and provides a viable setting for analyzing the empirical implications of information quality for the options market jel d8 gl

what s not there odd lots and market data we investigate odd lot trades in equity markets odd lots are increasingly used in algorithmic and high frequency trading but are not reported to the consolidated tape or in databases such as taq in our sample the median number of odd lot trades is 24 but in some stocks odd lots are 60 or more of trading odd lot trades contribute 35 of price discovery consistent with informed traders using odd lots to avoid detection omitting odd lot trades leads to inaccuracies in order imbalance measures and makes sentiment measures unreliable excluding odd lots from the consolidated tape raises important regulatory issues

partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy abstract a class of pure exchange economies is considered in which some agents are informed of private information and others are uninformed existence of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium ree is proved without restricting attention to particular functional forms for utility functions and probability distributions without introducing noise into the model and without departing from the standard definition of ree the equilibrium is robust in the sense that if the primitives of the economy are slightly perturbed the economy continues to have a qualitatively similar ree with somewhat stronger assumptions placed on the economy the equilibrium is also the unique measurable ree

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

bank deposit rate clustering theory and empirical evidence the market prices of stocks and other assets tend to cluster on round fractions a similar clustering is found in the interest rates paid on retail bank deposits however the theoretical rationales given for asset price clustering are incompatible with the clustering of retail deposit rates this paper proposes a theory based on depositors limited recall it shows that when banks exploit this phenomenon deposit rates will tend to be set at round fractions and will be relatively sticky at these levels the implications of this theoretical model are tested using money market deposit account and retail certificate of deposit interest rate data from a sample of more than 500 banks