analysing stock market behaviour in a small capital market abstract this paper investigates the behaviour of the stock market prices for a small capital market as is the case of the greek market the results suggest that the behaviour of the stock market index is mainly related to alternative investment opportunities and socio political factors as compared to companies profits and economic activity

the control of technology alliances an empirical analysis of the biotechnology industry we examine the determinants of control rights in biotechnology alliances through three case studies and a quantitative analysis aghion and tirole 1994 argue that control rights will be assigned so as to maximize the value of the final output as long as the r d firm has sufficient financial resources consistent with this framework the allocation of control rights to the r d firm increases with the firm s financial resources the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between control rights and the stage of the project at the time the alliance is signed is more ambiguous

necessary and sufficient conditions for factor price equalization although models with factor price equalization are used frequently in both theoretical and applied research in international economics only sufficient conditions for factor price equalization have been presented in the literature in this paper the authors present necessary and sufficient conditions for factor price equalization under quite general assumptions about the technologies of different countries the necessary and sufficient conditions they derive are consistent with joint production decreasing returns to scale and substantive differences in the technologies and endowments of different countries the authors results enable them to reconcile the classical approach and the integrated equilibrium approach to factor price equalization

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

economies of scale and barriers to entry dixit has recently presented a model in which established firms select capacity to discourage entry but cannot employ threats they would not rationally execute after entry entry deterrence in a slight modification of this model involves the classical limit price output under linear or concave demand however the capital cost of a firm of minimum efficient scale is an upper bound on the present value of the monopoly profit stream that can be shielded from entry it is argued that this suggests the general unimportance of entry barriers erected by scale economies

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting in a partnership game each player s utility depends on the other players actions through a commonly observed consequence e g output profit price which is itself a function of the players actions and an exogenous stochastic environment if a partnership game is repeated infinitely and each player s payoff in the infinite game supergame is the long run average of his expected one period utilities then efficient combinations of one period actions can be sustained as nash equilibria of the supergame even if the players cannot observe other players actions or information but can only observe the resulting consequences

pretia ex machina prices and process in long term contracts aimong the primary motives for writing contracts identified in both the law and economics literatures is the desire to protect against the hazards inherent to exchange where one or both parties have invested in reliance or relationship specific assets in support of the transaction because such investments have a higher value in their intended than in their next best use parties have an incentive to engage in haggling or other forms of opportunism in hopes of influencing the distribution of the resulting quasi rents contracts promote efficiency by securing the distribution of those rents ex ante thereby avoiding costly repetitive bargaining over the terms of trade and reducing the risk for each party of relying on the performance of the other in reality this description of the role and functioning of contracting is oversimplified as a number of legal and economic scholars have emphasized contracts are not the precise mechanically enforced documents often encountered in economic theory 2 indeed contracts are extremely

trade liberalization and factor price convergence abstract this paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on international disparities in factor real returns in a model with more factors than goods existing trade interventions are assumed to be restricting trade we find that any bias for or against factor price convergence depends on the underlying source of comparative advantage where trade is based on differences in factor endowments trade liberalization has a bias towards factor price convergence where trade is based on technology differences biases are more difficult to detect but if they exist they are likely to work against factor price convergence

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

the relationship between factor endowments and commodity trade abstract the paper establishes general propositions concerning the relationship between a nation s factor endowments and its pattern of commodity trade in a multi factor multi product context inequality relationships between endowments and autarky prices autarky and free trade prices and between autarky prices and free trade net exports are established using a general model of trade attention is then restricted to a multi product multi factor version of the heckscher ohlin samuelson model of trade from an initial autarky equilibrium a comparative statics analysis yields the effect on net exports of a change in one nation s endowment a bilinear inequality between the changes in endowments and net exports is established it is also shown that if a good were to be exported imported when endowments changed and world prices were held fixed then it will continue to be exported imported when world prices have adjusted to re establish free trade equilibrium

wage convergence and trade we examine differences in wage rates across countries for workers employed in the same industry distinguishing workers in the low medium and high skill groups these differences are large and show persistence over time we ask nonetheless whether there is evidence of convergence much as is done in studies of convergence in per capita income across countries with our focus on the micro level we expect convergence to reflect at least in part the degree of integration of a country or industry into the world economy and examine particularly the role of market integration and trade our results show strong evidence of convergence in a diverse sample of 39 countries which includes most large economies whether rich or poor the estimated convergence rate over the period from 1995 to 2008 is about 4 per year for workers in all skill groups higher in the more integrated economies of the eu than in other economies without such open borders and lower in industries supplying services rather than manufactures also we find evidence that the rate of growth of domestic output impacts positively on the growth of wages in an industry providing a source for ongoing deviations from the convergence prediction

entrepreneurial strategy and the presence of small firms a model is presented hypothesizing that the level of small firm presence in any given industry emanates from the exogenous stock of entrepreneurial talent a stochastic element of managerial and entrepreneurial talent entry deterrence and the entrepreneurial strategy deployed by small firms using data newly released by the u s small business administration the hypothesis is tested for a sample of 247 four digit standard industrial classification industries spanning the entire spectrum of firm sizes we find that consistently for all the measures of small firm size and for all of the time periods used the existence of entry deterrence and reliance upon innovative strategy explains a significant proportion of the variation in the presence of small firms

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

incomplete written contracts undescribable states of nature this paper extends the classic two armed bandit problem to a many agent setting in which n players each face the same experimentation problem the difference with the single agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others thus experiementation produces a public good and a free rider problem in experimentation naturally arises more interestingly future experimentation by others encourages current individual experimentation the paper provides an analysis of the set of markov equilibria in terms of the free rider effect and the encouragement effect

trade in goods and factors with international differences in technology a general model of trade caused by international differences in production technology is developed using techniques of duality theory for the caseof product augmenting differences in technology it is shown that there is a positive correlation between net export and technological superiority such that a country will on average export goods for which the country has superior technolor if some factors are permitted to be internationally traded it is demonstrated via this correlation that the volume of trade must increase thus unlike trade caused by factor endowment differences goods trade caused by product augmenting differences in production technolody is always in this sense complementary with factor trade for factor augmenting technology differences in the absence of factor trade the goods trade pattern is as if it was caused by factor endowment differences with factor trade goods trade and factor trade can then be either complements or substitutes this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

factor trade and goods trade world equilibria with trade in both goods and some factors are studied when international factor endowment differences are the cause of trade a generalized heckscher ohlin theorem is presented the goods trade patterns with and without factor trade are compared factor trade and goods trade tend to be substitutes complements if traded and non traded factors are cooperative non cooperative

a formalisation and test of the factor productivity explanation of international differences in service prices this paper extends and integrates previous models of the determinants of international differences in the prices of services relative to tradable commodities the authors provide a model capable of identifying the effects of differences in total factor productivity on service price differences separately from the effects of factor endowment differences they propose a method for measuring these factor productivity difference effects and apply this to a sample of sixty countries in 1980 the authors results provide support both for the endowment difference and productivity difference explanations suggesting that in this context at least the two hypotheses are complements rather than competitors copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the employment impacts of an investment incentive differential efficiency of the industrial revenue bond krmenec a j 1990 the employment impacts of an investment incentive differential efficiency of the industrial revenue bond reg studies 24 95 107 capital subsidy programmes like the industrial revenue bond irb are presumed to be employment generators theoretically there is no reason to expect this demand for labour should increase only if the output effect of the subsidy outweighs the substitution effect evidence generated from a municipal user survey across northeastern illinois indicates that the irb is a weak employment generator rather the irb appears to act more as an employment stabilizer irb recipient firms exhibited less annual variation in employment change than nonrecipient firms estimated cross elasticities of the demand for labour do not exhibit significant variation sectorally or geographically programme targeting therefore may not substantially improve the effectiveness of this economic development instrument krmenec a j 1990 les effets d emploi d une incitation a

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

firless firwoes how preferences can interfere with the theorems of international trade abstract an example is presented of a two country two factor four good trade model in which free trade causes factor prices to be drawn farther apart than they were in autarky the example is equivalent to a two good model with a double factor intensity reversal fir and thus demonstrates that the problems associated with firs can arise in many dimensions without them these problems include the undermining of other trade theorems as well and can be avoided only by making some assumption about demand as well as about technology for example the model becomes well behaved if preferences and technology are both cobb douglas

globalisation and factor returns in competitive markets abstract the standard competitive trade model extended to include many goods and factors is used to analyze the effect of goods and factor market integration on average international disparities in the real returns of internationally immobile factors it is shown that goods market integration decreases international real return differentials for all factors we derive sufficient conditions for this result to hold for the subgroup of internationally immobile factors as well while there is a presumption for similar results to hold with international factor market integration we show that this is true for international migration but in general not for international investment

ownership and control rights in internet portal alliances 1995 1999 we examine the structure of more than 100 alliances by internet portals and other firms between 1995 to 1999 from a contract theory perspective models of incomplete contracts frequently invoke unforeseen contingencies the cost of writing contracts and the cost of enforcing contracts in justifying the assumption of incompleteness the setting in which internet portals formed alliances was rife with these sorts of transaction costs we argue that these alliances can be viewed as incomplete contracts and find that the division of ownership and the allocation of control rights are consistent with the incomplete contracting literature copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms evidence from technology development projects formal contracting addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via explicit terms designed to achieve incentive alignment alternatively when firms expect to interact repeatedly relational mechanisms may achieve similar results without the associated costs however as we now know from a growing body of theoretical and empirical work the resulting intuition that relational mechanisms will be substituted for formal ones whenever possible does not generally hold the extent to which firms substitute relational mechanisms for formal ones in the presence of repeated interaction is an empirical question that forms the basis of this paper we study a sample of 52 joint technology development contracts in the telecommunications and microelectronics industries and devise a coding scheme to allow empirical comparison of contract terms counter to the above intuition but consistent with recent research we find that a firm s contracts are more detailed and more likely to include penalties when it engages in frequent deals whether with the same or different partners our results suggest complementarity between formal and relational contracts and have implications for optimal contracting particularly in high technology sectors

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

entrepreneurship and growth creative and equilibrating events this paper investigates the constraints on the growth of creative and equilibrating entrepreneurial events the empirical material is drawn from the greek economy it was observed that the two different levels of entrepreneurial events involve constraints of different kinds this paper analyses those constraints and their significance for entrepreneurial growth