efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

foreign firm entry in an open economy the case of portugal the purpose of this paper is to analyse the entry process of foreign direct investment fdi in portuguese industrial sectors portugal presents an interesting case where firms enter to take advantage of export opportunities the results suggest that foreign firms possess the ability to overcome existing entry barriers that affect domestic firms apparently foreign firms have different expectations about profitability than domestic firms possibly due to foreign firms export orientation to the rest of the european union eu they appear to desire industries where other foreign firms have clustered above all it appears that these foreign firms enter industries to exploit portugal s chief location advantage in western europe low wages portugal s fdi experience is relevant to other countries that have opened their economies to greater trade and investment and attracted export oriented firms

when does communication improve coordination we study costless pre play communication of intentions among inexperienced players using the level k model of strategic thinking to describe players beliefs we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 2 games one way communication weakly increases coordination on nash equilibrium outcomes although average payoffs sometimes decrease two way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 2 games we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination jel c72 d83

factors determining the location decisions of spanish mnes an analysis based on the investment development path on the basis of theoretical assumptions approached via the investment development path idp this study examines the most important factors for and against the location decisions in foreign direct investment taken by multinational enterprises considering host countries at very different stages of economic development latin american and european union countries we carry out different kinds of analysis on a sample of 103 firms belonging to a medium sized country that has recently achieved the status of developed country the results reveal that the importance that home country firm managers give to diverse location factors depends to a certain extent on the stage that each group of host countries has reached in the idp in line with prior research we find that firm managers consider mainly the group of factors associated with strategic asset seeking when deciding to locate their investments in the group of more developed countries european union in contrast our results show that when these firm managers choose the group of less developed countries latin america social and cultural factors play a more determinant role thus suggesting the importance of historical and cultural ties between the home and host countries

screening ethics when honest agents care about fairness we analyze a principal s ability to discriminate between honest and dishonest agents who have private information about the circumstances of the exchange honest agents reveal circumstances truthfully as long as the mechanism is suciently fair the probability that an equilibrium allocation is chosen by an agent who is lying should not be too large without intolerance for lying the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest with even a small intolerance for lying the optimal mechanism is discontinuously altered it may still involve ethics screening whereby some allocation chosen by a dishonest agent is never chosen by an honest agent it happens either when the dishonest is overstating circumstances or when the principal is forced to allow for some suboptimal announcements due to an excessive intolerance for lying with limited intolerance for lying ethics screening allows for doing better than in the standard setup where the agent is dishonest with certainty even if honesty is unlikely however if intolerance for lying is too strong the principal cannot improve upon the standard setup

evolutionary stability in games of communication abstract this paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff relevant action the informed player can communicate at little cost outcomes satisfying a set valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common interest games when there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable the paper introduces a nonequilibrium set valued stability notion of entry resistant sets for games with partial common interest the no communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

ownership based entry mode strategies and international performance this study examines the relationship between ownership entry modes and performance the ownership entry modes examined are the wholly owned modes of acquisition and new venture entry and the non wholly owned mode of joint venture entry a theoretical relationship is developed for international entry modes that is based on the contingency characteristics of resource requirements and organizational control factors this model suggests that different entry modes have different performance outcomes based upon their resource and organizational control demands the theoretical model although developed using the eclectic theoretical approach is based largely on concepts and relationships previously delineated in contingency theory our hypotheses suggest that new ventures should outperform joint ventures and joint ventures should outperform acquisitions an empirical test using a sample of 321 japanese firms entering the north american market provides supporting evidence

when is reputation bad abstract in traditional reputation models the ability to build a reputation is good for the long run player in ely j valimaki j 2003 bad reputation naj econ 4 2 http www najecon org v4 htm quart j econ 118 2003 785 814 ely and valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad this paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds the key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short run players and that every action of the long run player that makes the short run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long run player is bad we allow a broad set of commitment types allowing many types including the stackelberg type used to prove positive results on reputation although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the stackelberg type is too high the relative probability of the stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

stickiness and the adaptation of organizational practices in cross border knowledge transfers the reuse of organizational practices in multiple locations is a fundamental way in which mncs leverage knowledge to seek competitive advantage scholars approaching the issue of adaptation from both a market and an institutional perspective argue that in order to achieve fit with the local environment some degree of adaptation is advisable and the need for adaptation increases as the institutional distance between source and recipient locations increases however arguments to date have examined the effect of adaptation primarily on a subsidiary s long term performance a necessary precursor is to understand the effect of adaptation on the transfer process itself as transfer difficulty or stickiness may preclude the reuse of an organizational practice in the first place in this paper we explore how the adaptation of organizational practices affects the stickiness of cross border transfers we use structural equation modeling to analyze data from 122 internal transfers of best practice contrary to expectation we find that adaptation significantly increases rather than decreases the stickiness of cross border knowledge transfer

reputation for quality and adverse selection abstract we analyze a dynamic market with a seller who can make a one time investment that affects the returns of tradable assets the potential buyers of the assets cannot observe the seller s investment prior to the trade or verify it in any way after the trade the market faces two types of inefficiency the ex ante inefficiency i e the seller s moral hazard problem and the ex post inefficiency i e inefficient ex post allocations due to the adverse selection problem we analyze how the observability of information by future buyers through which the seller builds a reputation affects the two types of inefficiency as well as the interplay between them

the decision to establish a foreign bank branch or subsidiary an application of binary classification procedures this paper has two purposes first we model a key decision for inter national banks using data on the foreign direct investment fdi behavior of foreign banks in japan and california second we examine the utility of linear discriminant analysis and maximum likelihood logit analysis as statistical techniques for relating a qualitative dependent variable to a vector of inde pendent variables we apply these techniques to the decision by parent banks as to whether or not to have a subsidiary branch in california japan we treat the deci sion as a binary choice based on a consideration of various relevant factors the population for each of the countries consists of those foreign to the host country banks that already have a presence in the country the research ques tion then becomes given that a foreign bank is in the country does the extent of the parent bank s experience internationally and in the host country affect the probability that it will deepen its presence the choice of statis tical tools by which to examine this question gives rise to our methodological concerns

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

promises and endogenous reneging costs we present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency we explore a two player partnership game where before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort we allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises we demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging and show that these intermediate costs induce second best optimal outcomes

a synthesis of foreign direct investment theories and theories of the multinational firm this paper first presents a taxonomy of the foreign direct investment theories following the market imperfections paradigm it then focuses on recent developments pertaining to the theory of the multinational firm specifically the appropriability internalization and diversification theories subsequently the multinational phenomenon is seen as the result of an international differentiation of activities and an intrafirm integration across national borders all this within a markets and hierarchies approach last the paper points to areas for future research

choice of foreign market entry mode impact of ownership location and internalization factors firms interested in servicing foreign markets face a difficult decision with regards to the choice of an entry mode the options available to a firm include exporting licensing joint venture and sole venture several factors that determine the choice of a specific foreign market entry mode have been identified in previous literature these factors can be classified into three categories ownership advantages of a firm location advantages of a market and internalization advantages of integrating transactions this study examines the independent and joint influences of these factors on the choice of an entry mode multinomial logistic regression model is employed to test the hypothesized effects

costly predation and the distribution of competence an evolutionary game model shows how an equilibrium distribution of competence may evolve when members of a population prey on one another but when predatory competence is costly to acquire under one interpretation the competence distribution is an endogenously determined distribution of bounded rationality an example shows how tricksters and suckers might coexist in the long run the analysis leads to a curious result about a mixed equilibrium for a symmetric zero sum game an increase in the costs of one or more competence levels has exactly zero effect on the fraction of the population at those levels

the impact of order and mode of market entry on profitability and market share market share performance and profitability of overseas business activities has long been an important issue in international business in this study we explore the impact of order and mode of market entry into an overseas market we find that early entrants have significantly higher market shares and profitability than late followers we also find that equity joint ventures have a higher profitability than either wholly owned operations or contractual joint ventures a significant interaction exists between order and mode of market entry as expected firm efficiency and size affect the performance of firms these results are based on the business activities of a sample of 14 466 foreign firms in china in 1995

accounting for endogeneity when assessing strategy performance does entry mode choice affect fdi survival firms choose strategies based on their attributes and industry conditions therefore strategy choice is endogenous and self selected empirical models that do not account for this and regress performance measures on strategy choice variables are potentially misspecified and their conclusions incorrect i highlight how self selection on hard to measure or unobservable characteristics can bias strategy performance estimates and recommend an econometric technique that has been developed to account for this effect although this concern applies to a wide range of strategy questions to demonstrate its effect i empirically examine if entry mode choice acquisition versus greenfield influences foreign direct investment survival in specifications that do not account for self selection i find that greenfield entries have survival advantages compared to acquisitions this confirms previous findings however the significance of this effect disappears once i account for self selection of entry mode in the empirical estimates the results confirm that estimates from models that do not account for self selection of strategy choice can lead to incorrect or misleading conclusions

effects of inward investment on outward investment the venture capital industry worldwide 1985 2007 we identify inward investment as an important impetus to outward investment supplemental to the impetuses depicted in conventional internationalization frameworks by incorporating both the spillover and competition effects of foreign entrants we develop an integrated framework of the inward outward investment relationship for different investment modes and different home country and host country pairs our analysis of venture capital vc investments worldwide from 1985 to 2007 shows a positive spillover effect on outward investment for inward co investments and a negative competition effect on outward investment for inward standalone investments we find the strongest effects when the host country is a laggard in the vc industry and the home country is a leader

public vs private offers in the market for lemons we study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values short run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller when previous offers are observable bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse in contrast when offers are hidden agreement is always reached although with delay

cross cultural interaction the international comparison fallacy international management studies have been based primarily on the comparison of managerial behavior in countries around the world often these studies have implied that business people behave similarly with their domestic colleagues as with their foreign counterparts in questioning that assumption this study tests whether intra cultural behavior accurately predicts cross cultural behavior using a negotiation simulation and a sample of 462 japanese american and canadian businesspeople behaviors in cross cultural negotiations were found to differ in some important ways from those in intra cultural negotiations

global strategy and multinationals entry mode choice this paper makes a case directed towards establishing the importance of global strategic considerations in choosing multinationals entry mode specifically it is our contention that beyond the environmental and transaction specific factors well established in the literature to affect the entry mode decision we should also consider the strategic relationship a multinational envisages between its operations across borders in reaching this decision after incorporating various global strategic variables into an eclectic framework of the factors influencing the entry mode choice this paper tests both the validity of the overall framework and the importance of each entry mode determinant in differ entiating among entry modes this is done based on ninety six multinational managers responses to a survey questionnaire concerning their entry mode decision experiences the results suggest that an express incorporation of global strategic variables into an analysis of the entry mode decision is warranted

foreign market entry strategies and post entry growth acquisitions vs greenfield investments we examine the relationship between the foreign market entry strategy and the subsequent growth of a subsidiary we build upon the penrose theory of firm growth and on the organizational economics international management and foreign market entry strategy literatures we hypothesize that the post entry growth of acquisitions is positively associated with weak and codifiable interdependence within the multinational enterprise network whereas the post entry growth of greenfield investments is positively related to strong and complex interdependence empirical findings from a sample of japanese subsidiaries in the us lend support to our argument

using acquisitions to access multinational diversity thinking beyond the domestic versus cross border m a comparison prior research provides ambiguous results regarding the performance of international acquisitions drawing on a survey of 248 acquisitions we find that acquirers enhance their capabilities when they buy a target with a multinational geographic scope a financial event study uses a subsample of the acquisitions to show that the financial markets also value targets multinational scope both surveys and stock market based studies suggest that targets with access to heterogeneous resource environments provide the acquirer with greater potential for capability enhancement and financial performance in contrast simply acquiring firms across borders has less influence on post acquisition outcomes the study demonstrates greater value of the attributes of the target rather than of international expansion alone thus the multinational scope of the target is more likely to account for the resource diversity provided by the target than the country of origin of the target per se the study changes the emphasis on multinational acquisitions by shifting the focus from foreign market expansion country level emphasis to accessing geographically distributed resources that are embedded in target firms firm level emphasis

capabilities as a mediator linking resources and the international performance of entrepreneurial firms in an emerging economy this study investigates an under researched topic the relationships between capabilities resources and international performance among entrepreneurial firms in an emerging economy we combine the resource based view of the firm and the capability building perspective of rent creation to shed light on the crucial role of firm specific capabilities that transform key resources into performance outcomes employing a large sample of chinese entrepreneurial firms our investigation demonstrates that while the resources of institutional capital and managerial ties are important in the internationalization effort their effects on international performance are channeled through each firm s adaptive capability this adaptive capability is the firm s ability to coordinate recombine and allocate resources to meet the different requirements of foreign markets specifically our research is able to demonstrate support for the mediating role of capabilities in the relationship between resources and international performance the implications of these findings for theoretical development and future research are discussed

performance and survival of joint ventures with non conventional ownership structures the international joint venture jv literature has focused on two parent jvs formed between one foreign and one local firm yet other types of jvs exist this paper identifies four distinct forms of jvs based on the jv partners nationality and equity affiliation these are i jvs that are formed between affiliated home country based firms ii jvs that are formed between unaffiliated home country based firmsl iii jvs that are formed between home country based and local firms and iv jvs that are formed between home country and third country based firms our analysis of 737 japanese jvs in asia demonstrates that the conventionally assumed form of jv represented only 30 percent of the total further each of the four jv forms significantly differed in terms of incidence performance and survival likelihood

language meaning and games a model of communication coordination and evolution comment demichelis and weibull 2008 aer show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable i show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se finally i discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models

cross border takeovers corruption and related aspects of governance we use a panel of 4979 cross border and domestic takeovers to test the relation between host country corruption and premiums paid for local targets host country corruption is negatively associated with target premiums after correcting for other governance related factors such as political stability legal systems and financial disclosure standards we estimate that deterioration in the corruption index by one point on a 10 point scale is on average associated with a reduction of 21 of local targets premiums our results do not support the notion that local corruption constitutes a significant market barrier to foreign investors rather it represents a discount on local takeover synergies which affects foreign and domestic acquirers alike however we find that the major effects of corruption can alternatively be explained by government effectiveness pointing towards an endogenous relationship between bribery and bureaucracy

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences abstract we explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences to do so we define a limit nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit nash equilibria but not conversely modified evolutionarily stable strategies binmore and samuelson 1992 j econ theory 57 278 305 are limit nash equilibria modified evolutionary stability differs from lexicographic evolutionarily stability defined by extending the common characterization of evolutionary stability to lexicographic preferences in the order in which limits in the payoff space and the space of invasion barriers are taken

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

the experience factor in foreign market entry behavior of service firms the paper examines the effect of international experience on service firms selection of foreign markets and entry modes the investigation utilizes survey date from 151 united states based service firms results on market selection suggest that as their experience increases and becomes geographically more diversified service firms tend to choose markets that are culturally less similar to their home country on entry mode choice the paper departs from traditional linear conceptualizations and hypothesizes a u shaped relationship between experience and propensity for integrated entry modes results generally support the hypothesis the paper explains these findings and describes how service firms resemble and differ from manufacturing firms in their foreign market entry behavior

promises and conventions an approach to pre play agreements abstract i analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two player games specifically i assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other a central insight is that it is easier to sustain efficient informal agreements if actions are strategic complements than if they are strategic substitutes i complement this general insight by studying two specific cases where negotiators face uncertainty about the breach of the agreement i show that while the optimal agreement in a game with strategic substitutes must compromise on surplus maximization and efficiency the optimal agreement in a game with sufficiently strong strategic complements tends to maximize both the surplus and the probability of compliance especially if the game is symmetric

technological effects of m as in spanish manufacturing this article explores whether mergers and acquisitions m as generate differentiated impacts on the acquiring firms r d expenditures patents granted and product innovations considering m as as a way of foreign expansion we examine whether the technological effects differ between domestic and foreign owned acquirers assuming that the effects on the technological efforts and performance may differ across industries the availability of statistical information for a stable sample of manufacturing companies in spain during the 1990s allows us to follow a dynamic approach to the issue our findings confirm the existence of differentiated effects on technological inputs and outputs across industries as well as diversity between domestic and foreign owned firms involved in m as copyright 2009 the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

the effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode characteristics of national cultures have frequently been claimed to influence the selection of entry modes this article investigates this claim by developing a theoretical argument for why culture should influence the choice of entry two hypotheses are derived which relate culture to entry mode choice one focusing on the cultural distance between countries the other on attitudes towards uncertainty avoidance using a multinomial logit model and controlling for other effects the hypotheses are tested by analysing data on 228 entries into the united states market by acquisition wholly owned greenfield and joint venture empirical support for the effect of national culture on entry choice is found

evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection this paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved the differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated instead nash equilibria that specify different out of equilibrium behaviour appear in connected components of stationary states the stability properties of these components can depend critically on the perturbations to which the system is subjected we argue that it is then important to incorporate such drift into the model a sufficient condition is provided for drift to create stationary states with strong stability properties near a component of equilibria applications to questions of forward and backward induction are developed

technological capabilities of countries firm rivalry and foreign direct investment studies on foreign direct investment fdi have concentrated on sectoral effects but rarely on country patterns in this paper we use u s department of commerce data to identify the largest country shares of new fdi entries into the u s and the technological motivations for their investments based on the technological intensities of major investing countries in manufacturing industries we conclude that technological industries attract a disproportionate share of fdi entries however the acquisition of u s technology is not a major motivation the findings indicate that industry rivalry is an important dimension to understanding fdi

location specificity and the transferability of downstream assets to foreign subsidiaries we investigate the effect of firm specific advantages being local in scope and the influence of subsequent location specific disadvantages on the choice of foreign entry mode and subsidiary performance to look into this issue we examine japanese fdi data from the wholesale and retail industries two sectors that have productive activity concentrated in downstream processes and location bound resources our theoretical and empirical analyses demonstrate that in situations where required capabilities must be developed through local experience and where location specific resources were subject to market failure acquisition and joint venture strategies were preferred greenfield entries were successful in industries that permitted the offsetting of location specific disadvantages with firm specific advantages from our results we draw implications for the entry mode literature and offer a perspective on the performance of the entry mode choice

language meaning and games a model of communication coordination and evolution language is a powerful coordination device we generalize the cheap talk approach to pre play communication by way of introducing a meaning cor respondence between messages and actions and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages players have a lexicographic preference second to material payoffs against deviating from the meaning correspondence under two sided communication in generic and symmetric n 3 n coordination games a nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique pareto efficient out come of the underlying game we extend the analysis to one sided communica tion in arbitrary finite two player games jel c72 c73 z 3

new ventures or acquisitions the choice of swedish multinational enterprises this study examines the factors influencing the multinational enterprises choice between the takeover of already existing firms and investments in new ventures as a means of entering a foreign market the results suggest that the degree of industrial diversification of the parent company and the host country s per capita income seems to have a positive influience on the propensity for takeovers this propensity appears to be negatively related to the rate of growth of industrial production in the industry entered further we found that the more recent the entry into a foreign market the greater the probability for choosing acquisition

equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise this paper extends the internalization approach to the theory of the multinational enterprise mne to include an expanded role for equity joint ventures using the transaction cost paradigm of williamson this paper explains why joint ventures may sometimes be preferred over wholly owned subsidiaries also presented is empirical work on joint venture performance in developing countries which demonstrates that under certain conditions joint ventures can be the optimal mode of foreign direct investment

social stability and equilibrium in the field of noncooperative game theory nash equilibrium nash 1951 has played a central role as a solution concept in bold strokes one may discern two major interpretations of nash equilibrium in the context of rational players the first which is close to the eductive interpretation of binmore 1987 1988 and the complete information interpretation of kaneko 1987 assumes that the game is played exactly once if it is a repeated game the repetition occurs once and the players have sufficient knowledge and ability to analyze the game in a rational manner sometimes it is assumed that all players have consistent hierarchies of beliefs where the game and their priors are common knowledge bayesian interpretation such as proposed by aumann 1987 advanced this idea to the level that the players have a common prior from this point of view however nash equilibrium seems far from being satisfactory

the transaction costs theory of joint ventures an empirical study of japanese subsidiaries in the united states this paper offers the first large sample empirical study of the factors which influence the choice of japanese firms between full or partial ownership of their u s manufacturing subsidiaries it studies for the first time the ownership policies of investors of a single home country in a single host country thus keeping variations within home and host countries constant one methodological improvement over previous studies is the use as independent variables of the relevant characteristics of the investing firms these had been proxied in previous studies by data on u s industries entered the results suggest that the degree of ownership taken by japanese manufacturing investors in their american subsidiaries is driven by the same general transaction costs variables that determine the choices made by their u s counterparts japanese parents joint venture when they need to combine with other firms intermediate inputs which are subject to high market transaction costs an intriguing result however is the lack of significance of two variables which in the u s case strongly push towards full control of foreign subsidiaries in this study neither the japanese parent s r d nor its advertising intensities had any significant impact on their ownership policies

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

adverse selection and entrepreneurship in a model of development this paper presents a theory in which talented entrepreneurs are identified as the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation entrepreneurial skills are private information which prevents full risk sharing development into a modern industrial economy might fail to take place since potentially talented entrepreneurs may refrain from taking on the entrepreneurial risks as a way to avoid income shocks an interesting feature of the model is the fact that the informational asymmetries are endogenous to the process of development as they are related to the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills required in the manufacturing activities

greenfield vs acquisition the strategy of japanese investors in the united states multinational firms can enter a foreign market by taking over existing local firms acquisitions or by setting up new ventures greenfield investments surprisingly there has been limited empirical work on this topic this paper examines the determinants of this choice by looking at japanese entries into the united states by focusing on firms of one country entering a single market we are able to separate the impact of a firm s strategy from that of the characteristics of the target industry or country this paper tests simultaneously a number of competing hypotheses the results suggest that acquisitions are used by japanese investors with weak competitive advantages while investors with strong advantages find that greenfield investments are a more efficient way to transfer these advantages to the u s acquisitions are also chosen to enter industries with either very high or very low growth rates when entry is at a scale that is large relative to the parent and when entry is into a different industry the japanese investor s previous experience of the u s market its financial situation and its status as a follower in an oligopolistic industry have no statistically significant impact on the entry mode neither do u s stock market conditions

foreign direct investment and the sourcing of technological advantage evidence from the biotechnology industry this paper investigates the proposition that foreign direct investment in a high technology industry is motivated in part by the sourcing of country specific technological advantages embedded in foreign firms the empirical findings show that foreign equity investment is drawn to american biotechnology firms with high levels of patent activity we suggest that in the biotechnology industry foreign direct investment in the form of equity participation can be an efficient vehicle for tapping into country specific firm embodied technological advantages

investment and screening under asymmetric endogenous information this article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information bayesian environment an agent faces a hold up situation while making a cost reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal to prevent the hold up the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract the informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment for a large class of cost functions the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a power distribution

information and bargaining in the hold up problem this article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold up problem the optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency the information rent effect and ex post efficiency the bargaining disagreement effect with one shot bargaining it occurs at an intermediate level of information asymmetry when there is repeated bargaining it is attained with perfect asymmetry asymmetric information the parameter that is frequently ignored in the literature turns out to be an important welfare instrument for the hold up problem our results therefore provide a basis for institutional design regarding the optimal control of information flow

dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller we analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller the seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the beginning of the game which is unobservable to buyers at the interim stage of the game the information and payoff structures are the same as in the market for lemons our main result is that the possibility of trade does not create any efficiency gain if i the common discounting is low and ii the static incentive constraints preclude the mutually agreeable ex ante contract under which the trade happens with probability one our result does not depend on whether the offers by buyers are private or public

the impact of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and fdi a new institutional analysis the effects of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and foreign direct investment fdi have gone understudied we employ panel data reported by oecd nations over the 1995 2002 period to estimate the impact of iso adoptions on country pair economic relations we find iso diffusion to have no effect in developed nations but to positively pull fdi i e enhancing inward fdi and positively push trade i e enhancing exports in developing nations

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

an evolutionary approach to pre play communication we add a round of pre play communication to a finite two player game played by a population of players pre play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs the paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability when there is no conflict of interest between the players only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics for general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often

modes of foreign entry a transaction cost analysis and propositions a frontier issue in international marketing is the appropriate choice of entry mode in foreign markets the objective of this paper is to offer a transaction cost framework for investigating the entry mode decision this framework provides 1 a theoretical basis for systematically interrelating the literature into propositions 2 propositions about interactions which resolve the apparently contradictory arguments advanced to date specifically the paper illustrates the feasibility of clustering 17 entry modes into the degree of control the mode provides the entrant proposes that the most appropriate i e most efficient entry mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the cost of resource commitment advances testable propositions delimiting the circumstances under which each mode maximizes long term efficiency

an institutional approach to cross national distance cross national distance is a key concept in the field of management previous research has conceptualized and measured cross national differences mostly in terms of dyadic cultural distance and has used the euclidean approach to measuring it in contrast our goal is to disaggregate the construct of distance by proposing a set of multidimensional measures including economic financial political administrative cultural demographic knowledge and global connectedness as well as geographic distance we ground our analysis and choice of empirical dimensions on institutional theories of national business governance and innovation systems in order to overcome the methodological limitations of the euclidean approach we calculate dyadic distances using the mahalanobis method which is scale invariant and takes into consideration the variance covariance matrix we empirically analyze four different foreign expansion choices of us companies to illustrate the importance of disaggregating the distance construct and the usefulness of our distance calculations which we make freely available to managers and scholars

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage we consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that unlike in environments without unobservable storage the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade riskfree bonds among themselves in this paper we consider an environment in which individuals have random income and can accumulate assets through a storage technology their income realizations and their asset position are private information given these informational frictions we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk free bonds among themselves there is a large prior literature which examines the characteristics of efficient risksharing in dynamic settings in the presence of private information unlike our paper this literature generally finds that efficient allocations do not coincide with the equilibrium allocations of any economy with a competitive bond market see atkeson and lucas 1992 in particular the key difference between our paper and these preceding ones is that the earlier literature assumes either that agents cannot accumulate resources over time or that if they can this accumulation is observable in contrast we assume that both agents incomes and their stored resources are private information it is this combination of assumptions that leads to our result our findings are reminiscent of allen s 1985 he considers a dynamic principalagent relationship in which the agent is risk averse and has hidden stochastic income the

mitigating risk in international mergers and acquisitions the role of contingent payouts previous internationalization studies have focused on the entry modes employed by multinational firms but have not considered the contractual heterogeneity that underlies each mode it is important to examine these contractual details as the firm may be able to obtain some of the benefits typically associated with one entry mode while selecting another in the case of international mergers and acquisitions m as a key contractual variable is whether the parties agree to a performance contingent payout structure which can mitigate the risk of adverse selection in this paper we examine the antecedents of contingent payouts in the form of earnouts and stock payments the results indicate that firms lacking international and domestic acquisition experience turn to contingent payouts when purchasing targets in high tech and service industries firms tend to avoid contingent payouts in host countries with problems with investor protection and legal enforceability

comparative business failures of foreign controlled firms in the united states we explore the comparative business failures of foreign owned or controlled firms and domestically owned firms original data are collected regarding foreign controlled firms in the u s that filed for bankruptcy protection were involuntarily liquidated or ceased operations mainly due to poor financial performance during the 1978 1988 period our results show that foreign controlled firms fail less often than domestically owned firms the patterns of foreign controlled business failures and the impacts of entry modes ownership types and national culture on the failures of foreign controlled firms are also examined

financial performance and survival of multinational corporations in china this study investigates the impact of entry timing mode of entry market focus and location advantages on the financial performance and survival of multinational corporations mncs in china three major results were found first mncs that entered china in an earlier year had a higher level of profit than those that entered in a later year second equity joint ventures ejvs had a higher profit level than cooperative operations or wholly foreign owned subsidiaries third mncs that utilized well the location advantages in china had a higher profit we also found that ejvs were more likely to survive compared to cooperative operations while wholly owned subsidiaries did not differ from ejvs the findings are based on a 2 year study of about 1000 mnc operations in china copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

internationalization trajectories a cross country comparison are large chinese and indian companies different this paper explores whether the internationalization trajectories patterns over time in the level pace variability and temporal concentration of international expansion of large firms from china and india are fundamentally different from those of developed country firms a longitudinal cross country comparative study of 256 large firms for the 1990 2004 period shows that although internationalization trajectories of large and leading chinese and indian firms are indeed different there are also considerable similarities between established developed country firms and the new firms from emerging markets not in the least because they often interact within the same sector

social norms and economic incentives in firms abstract this paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms we introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents desire for or peer pressure towards social efficiency in a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms we show that one and the same norm can be output increasing neutral or output decreasing depending on the contract multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise

unobserved investment endogenous quality and trade a seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset s future returns the potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller s investment prior to trade nor does he receive any signal of it nor can he verify it in anyway after trade despite this severe moral hazard problem this paper shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability the outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining power between the parties with a holdup problem existing if the buyer has the bargaining power a consequence of the holdup problem is surplus reducing distortions in investment level perhaps counterintuitively in many situations this distortion involves an increase in the expected amount invested vis a vis the situation without holdup

special interests and the media theory and an application to climate change a journalist reports to a voter on an unknown policy relevant state competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter a reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests claims to the voter in equilibrium the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings the model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence

the internationalization of small and medium sized enterprises a policy perspective small and medium sized firms play an impor tant role in the process of creative destruction the focus of the paper is on the international diffusion of small and medium sized firms innovations small and medium sized firms face two challenges in globalization property rights protection and barriers to entry we suggest that these barriers can frequently be circumvented by using existing multinationals as interna tional conduits for small and medium size firms innovations however such intermediated modes of expansion is adversely affected by transaction difficulties and intermediator s rent extraction we raise two categories of questions i is the private sector systematically making the wrong choice between the direct and intermediated mode of international expansion and ii what should be the policy guidelines to improve the overall rate of international diffusion of innova tion by small and medium sized enterprises

large firms in the production of the world s technology an important case of non globalisation us patenting by 686 of the world s largest manufacturing firms shows that their share of the world s production of technology is less than their share of r d activities and varies greatly amongst sectors in most cases the technological activities of these large firms are concentrated in their home country the characteristics of which influence the volume and trends in their technological activities much more strongly then the international component of these activities at the same time these large firms are major elements in the volume and the pattern of sectoral specializations in their home countries technological activities

towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm this paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation market imperfections and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge including its fungible and taut character a framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

communication coordination and nash equilibrium i note a methodological problem in studying the role of pre play communication in ensuring equilibrium to deal with this problem i define a solution concept for the extended game in which talk is followed by play that is intermediate between nash equilibrium and rationalizability in some games our solution concept implies a nash outcome while in others it does not

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation