planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

are nonconvexities important for understanding growth everyday experience and a simple logical argument show that nonconvexities are essential for understanding growth compared to previous statements of this well known argument the presentation here places more emphasis on the distinction between two of the fundamental attributes of any economic good rivalry and excludability it also emphasizes the difference between public goods and the technological advances that are fundamental to economic growth like public goods technological advances are rionrival goods hence they are inextricably linked to nonconvexities but in contrast to public goods which are nonexcludable technological advances generate benefits that are at least partially excludable hence innovations in the technology are for the most part privately provided this means that nonconvexities are relevant for goods that trade in private markets consequently an equilibrium with price taking in all markets cannot be sustained concluding remarks describe some of the recent equilibrium growth models that do not rely on price taking and highlight some of the implications of these models this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the gatt in historical perspective the transformation of the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt into the world trade organization wto on january 1 1995 provides an opportune moment to take stock of the gatt s achievements and shortcomings alongside those of its 50 year old sister international institutions set up at bretton woods it is temptingly easy to attribute the astounding postwar economic expansion particularly when set against the turbulent interwar period when multilateral efforts to contain protectionist pressures failed miserably to the economic policies embodied in the gatt and to the initial stability provided by the bretton woods institutions yet a closer look at precisely what the gatt accomplished in its first decade suggests that trade liberalization under its auspices alone is far from sufficient to explain the postwar economic boom

on the design of hierarchies coordination versus specialization we consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used agents have ideas but these ideas conflict we suppose that decision making authority is determined by hierarchy each asset ha

an inquiry into the development process of village industries the case of a knitwear cluster in northern vietnam abstract while village industries are known to have high potential to grow their growth process has seldom been analysed this study explores the development process of a rapidly growing village based garment cluster in northern vietnam we found that both the human capital and social capital measured by the kinship ties with overseas vietnamese traders of the proprietors facilitated their innovative entry into new export markets furthermore general human capital acquired by schooling and specific human capital acquired by management experience are found to have contributed to the adoption of a vertically integrated production system which in turn contributed to enhanced enterprise performance

successful adjustment in indian industry the case of ludhiana s woolen knitwear cluster abstract this paper examines the case of adjustment in a labor intensive export industry woolen knitwear to understand how traditional sectors in developing regions cope with external crises and rise above them india s woolen knitwear industry concentrated in ludhiana recently survived two crises the collapse of its largest export market the former soviet union and the simultaneous opening up of the domestic market to freer trade after an unusually short downturn the cluster not only recovered rapidly but is increasingly diversifying into more demanding and competitive external markets four factors are key to explaining this surprisingly resilient recovery first the best performing firms had a strong and simultaneous presence in dynamic segments of the domestic market alongside exports this generated key organizational learning and built managerial and production capacities that helped firms adapt quickly to more demanding markets later second an important feature of the learning relationship between first time exporters and their foreign buyers was the small scale nature of contracts and a customization of fit between the producer and the feedback giving intermediary third better performing firms paid equal if not greater attention to making organizational changes in their work practices than to the purchase of new equipment fourth the embedded nature of production networks and the government s past programs to assist local firms have indirectly helped create a dynamic middle tier of locally rooted exporters who appear to be leading the cluster s transformation and modernization

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

an inquiry into the rapid growth of the garment industry in bangladesh abstractthe export oriented garment industry in bangladesh has grown rapidly for the last 3 decades and now ranks among the largest garment exporters in the world while its early success is attributed to the initial technology transfer from south korea such a one time infusion of knowledge alone is insufficient to explain the sustained growth for 3 decades this article uses primary data collected from knitwear manufacturers and garment traders to explore the process of the continuous learning of advanced skills and know how it finds among other things that the high profitability of garment manufacturing due to the initial infusion of specific human capital attracted a number of highly educated entrepreneurs to the industry that the division of labor between manufacturers and traders has facilitated the expansion of the industry and that enterprise growth has lasted long because of the continuous learning from abroad by the highly educated entrepreneurs

arm s length relationships without moral hazard i show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information jel d23 d82 d86 l20

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

the catalyst model of development lessons from bangladesh s success with garment exports abstract this paper identifies on a preliminary basis the major elements that have contributed to bangladesh s resounding success with garment exports the lessons to be learned from bangladesh s success with garment exports as they apply to the search for a workable development strategy in low income developing countries with very unfavorable initial conditions are profound enough to warrant further in depth research designed to generalize the preliminary findings the paper sketches a catalyst model of development based on the experience of bangladesh s success with garment exports the model can be considered as a foreword to as well as a hypothesis for this future research first the catalyst model of development is a model for initiating development in an outward oriented direction based on the pioneering efforts of foreign and local catalysts second the catalyst model of development is a model for transmitting throughout the entire economy the development initiated by catalysts third the catalyst model of development is a model for sequencing realistic policy reforms starting from equal footing export incentives i e equal footing with foreign competitors parallel to the increasing industrial competence gained through world market competition initiated and transmitted throughout the economy by the catalysts

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

virtual incubation in industrial clusters a case study in pakistan abstract in industrial clusters transaction costs are kept low and free riding is discouraged by a community mechanism developed through dense and repeated interactions among entrepreneurs in such environments new entrants without established reputations and connections are put at a distinct disadvantage this negative effect on new entry must be neutralised for an industrial cluster to expand using enterprise level data from pakistan this study finds that personal networks are indeed important for successful enterprise operation which works to the advantage of incumbents but that subcontracting plays the role of virtual incubation in nurturing new enterprises reinforcing the cluster s dynamism

the division of labor coordination costs and knowledge this paper considers specialization and the division of labor a more extensive division of labor raises productivity because returns to the time spent on tasks are usually greater to workers who concentrate on a narrower range of skills the traditional discussion of the division of labor emphasizes the limitations to specialization imposed by the extent of the market we claim that the degree of specialization is more often determined by other considerations especially emphasized are various costs of coordinating specialized workers who perform complementary tasks and the amount of general knowledge available

women s empowerment in agriculture implications for technical efficiency in rural bangladesh although a great deal of research exists on gender and agriculture few studies investigate the implications of reduced gender disparities in households for technical efficiency in this article i compare the levels of technical efficiency achieved on plots operated by households with different levels of gender disparities using plot level data from the 2011 2012 bangladesh integrated household survey and drawing on indicators derived from the women s empowerment in agriculture index i estimate a stochastic frontier production function model which includes women s empowerment in agriculture as an exogenous determinant of technical inefficiency i find that reduced gender disparities within households measured in terms of the empowerment gap between spouses are associated with higher levels of technical efficiency this result extends to plots that women jointly manage with their spouses as well as those that women do not actively manage

regionalism within multilateralism the wto trade policy review of canada the world trade organisation published a trade policy review of canada in 2003 in this paper we discuss the wto review and augment the discussion by presenting original data and reviewing the empirical literature the wto concludes that canada s trade regime is open and transparent but maintains barriers in a few important sectors we subject this claim to empirical scrutiny comparing canada s actual imports to a multilateral benchmark based on the gravity equation we show that canada imports about what should be expected given the size of its economy and its location in a second benchmarking exercise we show that canada s anti dumping initiations are in proportion to its imports and that canada s exports are targeted less by other countries anti dumping investigations than what might be expected based on canadian export levels like many other countries canada has pursued trade liberalisation through the world trade organisation while simultaneously signing multiple regional trade agreements our summary of the recent literature indicates that canada s regional trade agreements have generated more trade creation than trade diversion canada has also spurred imports from the least developed countries by unilaterally eliminating tariffs and quota barriers on 48 of the world s poorest countries in january 2003 we also discuss canadian progress in opening its agriculture and clothing industries overall we conclude that canada appears committed to advancing globalisation through multilateral trade liberalisation supplemented by unilateral and bilateral initiatives

finance and cluster based industrial development in china abstract china s rapid industrialization over the past several decades which has occurred in the absence of well functioning financial markets seems to defy conventional wisdom on the causal role of finance on industrialization by conducting an in depth case study on a fast growing cashmere sweater cluster in china we show that through clustering an integrated production process can be divided into many incremental steps as a result there is a wide range of investment options in the cluster and in many types of production capital barriers to entry are modest within clusters enterprises can often acquire trade credits from upstream or downstream firms and obtain informal financing from friends and relatives which are used to mitigate working capital constraints local governments can play an active role in providing necessary public goods and promoting cluster growth

on the emergence of an mfn club equal treatment in an unequal world motivated by gatt we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the mfn principle of non discrimination the underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade while an mfn club does not alter average tariff levels across countries it increases aggregate world welfare makes non members worse off and can immiserize its high cost members these results imply that i core wto rules such as mfn are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and ii the distributional effects of mfn maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted special and differential treatment at the wto jel classification f13 f10 f15

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

learning from global buyers an increasing number of developing countries engage in contract manufacturing for a decreasing number of global buyers this constellation characterises many labour intensive export sectors the positioning of developing country enterprises in such buyer driven chains is central to research concerned with identifying the winners and losers from globalisation this study contributes to this debate by seeking answers to two questions first what can researchers learn from global buyers about the relative strengths and weaknesses of developing country producers second what can these producers learn from global buyers and what circumstances facilitate or constrain such learning

do wto members have more liberal trade policy abstract this paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the world trade organization wto and its predecessor the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt is associated with more liberal trade policy almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with gatt wto membership trade liberalizations when they occur usually lag gatt entry by many years and the gatt wto often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years the exception to the rule is that wto members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the heritage foundation s index