property rights externalities and resource degradation locating the tragedy abstract resource degradation in the third world is largely driven by the demands of farm households for fuelwood and land for agriculture since resources are often controlled through indigenous systems of property the tragedy of the commons has been used to explain resource degradation as a result private property is suggested as a solution to resource degradation a dynamic model capable of examining household incentives for resource use under private and common property is developed results of the model reject the conventional wisdom that gives rise to the presumed optimality of private individual property in natural resources and the correlated indictment of group management regimes

international evidence on the demand for money one of the current questions in the literature on the demand for money is whethe r the adjustment of actual to desired money holdings is in nominal or real terms this paper describes a simple procedure that can be used to test the nominal against the real hypothesis the test is carried out for twenty seven countries the paper also tests the structural stability of the demand for money equations and the correctness of th e dynamic specification the results are strongly in favor of the nom inal adjustment hypothesis there is however some evidence of moder ate structural instability before and after 1973 the instability doe s not affect the conclusion that the nominal adjustment hypothesis do minates the real adjustment hypothesis copyright 1987 by mit press

the environment and emerging development issues development economics for the most part has failed to recognize renewable environmental resources as economic goods yet the lives of the poor in developing countries are intimately tied to the fate of their local common property resources soil fuel wood water and so on ignoring the loss of common property renewable resources via degradation centralization or privatization in calculations of net national product can mask the destruction of resources available to a country s poor behind the false appearance of a growing national economy this paper describes the difference between the problem of managing local common property resources in developing countries and the problem of protecting the global commons such as the atmosphere and oceans it outlines the calculations that would include the local commons in the national income accounting of capital assets and argues that the interests of those most dependent on the increasingly scarce local commons will be best served by placing control in their hands while the central government provides infrastructure and educational support to control the pollution of the global commons on the other hand the paper sketches a plan in which most countries would have a high incentive to participate a global allocation of limited tradable permits to discharge defined pollutants

inequality and rules in the governance of water resources this paper considers two types of farmer with unequal land endowments who voluntarily contribute to a joint project for the maintenance of an irrigation network the collective output water is distributed according to some allocation rule and used by each farmer in combination with land to produce a final good the analysis shows that the initial degree of inequality affects the allocation rule that maximises the amount of water collectively provided specifically two forces act in opposite directions the first effort augmenting force pushes the distribution of water towards the agent with the higher return to water in the attempt to maximise the aggregate level of effort this is the prominent force when efforts are highly substitute if efforts display some degree of complementarity the effort mix alongside with aggregate effort becomes important a second effort mix force then emerges that favours more egalitarian or even progressive water allocation rules

spatial evolution of social norms in a common pool resource game we study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common pool resource cpr game we consider three types of agents cooperators defectors and enforcers the role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest average payoffs on average using theoretical and numerical analysis we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game in particular we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist we also derive the stability of these equilibria finally we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria

an evolutionary approach to norms iorms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups even when there are more than two people and no central authority this paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality the dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies the results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable one interesting possibility is the employment of metanorms the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms including metanorms dominance internalization deterrence social proof membership in groups law and reputation

local common property exploitation with rewards this paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property while standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation in contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage a stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the tragedy of the commons outcome

functional unpleasantness the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self interested in divide the dollar ultimatum games participants turn down offers that would make them objectively better off similarly drivers stuck in a traffic jam fume at cars cruising by on the shoulder many stuck drivers would punish the moving ones if they could even at some cost to themselves such strategies appear irrational because they make the punisher worse off than accepting the situation or offer we examine explanations for costly punishment and relax the presumption that punishers themselves prefer cooperation using evolutionary game theory to show how uncooperative punishers can support cooperation

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

the effect of labor market performance on deforestation in developing countries under open access an example from rural nepal abstract this research examines the deforestation behavior of smallholder agriculturalists as off farm labor market conditions change a model of a representative village is proposed which incorporates dependence on open access forests for fuelwood and animal raising dynamic simulations are then presented which compare time paths of forest stocks deforestation levels and household labor supply under a variety of conditions despite the open access regime assumed in the model with a perfect albeit low wage off farm labor market the agro forestry system in nepal is basically stable an alternative model where there is no off farm labor market eliminates the important features of adjustment to deforestation which generate forest stability suggesting that the availability of off farm opportunities is an important determinant of deforesting behavior and equilibrium forest stock levels

an economic model of soil conservation by introducing soil depth and soil loss into a simple model of agricultural production this paper seeks to determine when the private path of erosion differs from the socially optimal path considering the depletion of soil only and abstracting from the environmental disruption caused by erosion the paper argues that under most institutional arrangements the social and private rates of erosion are the same the paper concludes that public policy should be directed toward reducing erosion only when it leads to significant pollution externalities

a note on defensive expenditures harmonised law diverse results in the context of many environmental hazards there is scope for self defence by victims multiple equilibria arise in a model of bilateral precaution under a regime of strict but incompletely enforced environmental liability this means that the same system of environmental law instigated in two economies may lead to very different outcomes it impacts upon policy analysis in a variety of ways and provides a channel for cultural factors to matter we explore the positive and normative effects of subsidising self defence

multiple equilibria coordination and transitional growth abstract we study a small open economy with two sectors and two factors of production in one of the sectors external economies of scale are generated through the industry level capital input this leads to a divergence between private and social production possibility frontiers as well as to multiple equilibria the equilibrium selection problem that arises is solved by agents who follow a simple trial and error learning rule the growth path of the economy as agents learn lies below the production possibility frontier and may display cyclical transitional dynamics we also show that coordination problems which may prevent the economy from attaining the good equilibrium may be alleviated by the temporary use of policy instruments that shape the allocation of resources

the tragedy of the commons and socialization theory and policy we revisit the tragedy of the commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheep they let graze on a common parcel of land while relying on di fferent forms of rationality nash players pure or impure kantian players we examine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow ing a vertical oblique socialization process a la bisin and verdier 2001 we study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land and we show that introducing a quota may in some cases reduce the proportion of kantians pure and impure and worsen the tragedy of commons with respect to the laissez faire finally we examine whether a government should promote either a pure or an impure kantian morality by comparing the relative fi tness of pure impure kantians and their interactions with the congestion of land

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

regulation and evolution of compliance in common pool resources the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a cpr stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics this evolutionary approach suggests that in long run equilibrium coexistence of both cooperative and non cooperative rules is possible under regulation stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels as an equilibrium outcome it might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities

carrot or stick the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model this paper studies the evolution and the co evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior firstly both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups this holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable secondly preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self interested preferences but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely finally the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively the existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers but punishers crowd out rewarders jel classification c72 d63 d64 d83

northwest coast indigenous institutions that supported resilience and sustainability abstract indians of the northwest coast of north america had cultural continuity for at least two millennia before contact with people from the old world this archeological fact suggests that their societies had achieved sustainability and resilience in relationships to their ecosystems and the salmon runs the governance principles used by northwest indians in managing fisheries and other resources provided resilience in addition to a land ethic these principles included exchange systems based on public reciprocity property rights were clear and trespass was a capital offense chiefs and titleholders had to be generous facilitators leadership authority over land was contingent upon adherence to ethical and generous behavior as well as good management these indigenous institutions were quite different from the rules currently governing the management of most ecosystems in critiquing current institutions many ideas similar to those in the indigenous systems have been proposed in isolation the example described in this paper suggests the importance of combining them

traditional production communal land tenure and policies for environmental preservation in the south pacific abstract instead of maximizing the expected monetary return of land usage pacific islanders manage land so that it renders an optimal mix of cash income and non monetary cultural goods evidence from cropping patterns in fiji suggests that the production of these cultural goods is linked to traditional agriculture which produces less ecological deterioration than its commercial counterpart the capacity for village land to support traditional activities is highest under a regime of communal land tenure where decision making is centralized a regime of private land tenure lowers this capacity because decentralized decision making raises the coordination costs of preserving special areas of land for traditional purposes this means that if development planners rush to replace traditional regimes of communal land tenure with modern systems of private land ownership they might also observe a correlated increase in land degradation even if new codes of private property are perfectly enforceable a two sector growth model can be used to show that the welfare neutral bribe required from the government to increase the amount of village land preserved in the steady state is lower under a regime of communal land tenure one counterintuitive result is that a high subjective discount rate does not always imply a high level of environmental degradation observations from the south pacific have application for environmental policy in other developing countries

market integration development and smallholder forest clearance a significant proportion of deforestation in latin america is caused by smallholders living at the frontier of modern rural markets this paper develops a household model that examines the roles of market integration subsistence time preference and non timber forest uses in the household s decision to clear forest for future agriculture the model explores the possible impacts of development programs that encourage market integration the model shows that rates of forest clearance should be exacerbated in areas in which market integration is most rapid an empirical estimation using household data from the tsimane people of bolivia tests hypotheses from the model

cooperation when n is large evidence from the mining camps of the american west abstract the sources of cooperation in small groups are well documented there is however less understanding about cooperation in large groups i study the enforcement of property rights in the mining camps of the american west miners demanded secure property rights and protection from violence to exploit the region s mineral wealth in the model miners must divide their labor between mining and supporting property rights institutions the main prediction of the model is that cooperation in property rights enforcement emerges only when social norms of cooperation are sufficiently widespread the model also predicts that social norms are less effective in mining camps with large populations or high labor productivity i test these predictions against detailed evidence from the letters diaries and reminiscences of miners in 25 camps in california colorado and montana and find that the evidence supports the predictions the results show that social norms can significantly lower the costs of collective action in large groups

natural resources agriculture and property rights abstract the study explores empirically forest resource and soil quality degradation under different property rights regimes in a subsistence agriculture framework the quantitative analysis is a direct test of the theoretical hypothesis of larson and bromley 1990 larson b bromley d 1990 property rights externalities and resource degradation locating the tragedy journal of development economics 33 2 that common property and private property rights may lead to similar incentives for resource protection a household model is formulated and applied empirically with data from indonesia to test rates of forest biomass and soil quality degradation under private and common property rights results show that the two regimes may equal each other by including bequest value sensitivity analysis is conducted by changing model parameters

soft versus hard targets for exchange rate intervention when targeting money prices or credit monetary authorities typically follow rules that combine flexibility over short horizons with discipline over longer horizons usually by committing to average targets for monetary aggregates or inflation over pre specified periods yet when targeting exchange rates monetary authorities typically follow rules that require strict adherence to announced targets in both the short and the long run in this paper we explore the implications of a policy for exchange rate intervention that combines flexibility over short horizons with discipline over long horizons our version of this soft target zone related to an idea ofjohn williamson 1985 requires a monetary authority to maintain the exchange rate on average rather than at all times as in the erm within a pre announced band we study the implications of this policy for the volatility of exchange rates and for the vulnerability of the exchange rate arrangement to speculative attacks practical reasons including the difficulty of targeting money and inflation on a continuous basis contribute to common use of soft i e average rules when targeting these aggregates more important however average targets allow

destabilizing effects of exchange rate escape clauses abstract this paper studies policy rules with escape clauses analyzing as an example fixed exchange rate systems that allow member countries the freedom to realign in periods of stress while well designed escape clause rules can raise society s welfare in principle limited credibility makes it difficult to implement such rules in practice an ems type institution that imposes political costs on policymakers who realign may raise welfare but can also produce equilibria far inferior to an irrevocably fixed exchange rate switches between multiple equilibria may have the character of sudden speculative attacks

on the enforcement of territorial use rights regulations a game theoretic approach territorial use rights commonly known as turfs in the literature consists in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and or groups to fish in certain geographical locations a requisite for these communities to be granted fishing rights is the formulation of a management and exploitation plan mep while thus far the literature on turfs has been centred on the biological and technical aspects of it to our knowledge there is no work squarely dealing with the issue of enforcement of the mep that the community once granted the fishing use rights have to comply with we formally explore this issue from an economic perspective by formulating a static game of norm compliance in a regime of common property resource exploitation the key characteristic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism where fishermen monitor and sanction one another we found that in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part of the fishing community turfs can not avoid the economic overexploitation of the fishery we discuss the importance of economic incentives and disincentives in the formulation of endogenous regulations aimed at ensuring compliance of the mep our results on the

expected and predicted realignments the ff dm exchange rate during the ems an empirical model of time varying realignment risk in an exchange rate target zone is developed expected rates of devaluation are estimated as the difference between interest rate differentials and estimated expected rates of depreciation within the exchange rate band using french franc deutsche mark data during the european monetary system the behavior of estimated expected rates of depreciation accord well with the theoretical model of bertola svensson 1990 we are also able to predict actial realignments with some success

tenure security human capital and soil conservation in an overlapping generation rural economy we develop an overlapping generation model of rural agricultural households to examine whether tenure security and subsistence needs influence the choice between unexploited topsoil and investment in children s human capital as the mode of transfer of wealth a unique dataset from bangladesh finds that tenure security is associated with greater topsoil conservation and lower human capital investment therefore there exists a tradeoff between these two modes of transfer we suggest that increased public expenditure on schooling which substitutes private expenditure may lower the pressure on land and soil resources

a dynamic approach to voluntary environmental contributions in tourism abstract in an evolutionary game theoretical model of tourism firms that use an endogenous natural common pool resource cpr we show that stable equilibria with voluntary environmental initiatives may coexist with other equilibria where voluntary abatement is absent the basins of attraction of the equilibria are identified and a bifurcation analysis is carried out producing two results with policy implications first there is a highly non linear relationship between the cost of abatement required to be green and the share of green firms second increases in the number of the cpr s users will ultimately dissipate the incentives to make abatement beyond regulation

a note on imitation based competition in common pool resources the tragedy of the commons refers to the dissipation of common ressources when several appropriators have access to it the nash equilibrium in common pool resource games describes such an overexploitation phenomena however some empirical facts and experimental results suggest that the degradation may exceed the nash equilibrium prediction rapid exhaustion of resources can then be explained by learning processes based on imitation behavior indeed when the number of players is limited the evolutionary outcome implies a higher level of dissipation than the nash equilibrium

soft exchange rate bands and speculative attacks theory and evidence from the erm since august 1993 we present a model of a soft exchange rate target zone and interpret it as a stylized description of the post august 1993 erm our central bank targets a moving average of the current and past exchange rates rather than the exchange rate s current level thus allowing the rate to move within wide margins in the short run but within narrow margins in the long run for realistic parameters soft target zones are significantly less vulnerable to speculative attacks than hard target zones these predictions are consistent with the erm s experience and the abatement of speculative pressure in european markets since the bands widening in 1993

fuelwood consumption and forest degradation a household model for domestic energy substitution in rural india this paper disusses domestic en ergy supply and demand in rural india links be tween forest scarcity and household fuel collec tion are analyzed in a non separable household model focusing on substitution of non commer cial fuels from the commons and the private do main based on data from villages bordering a protected area a novel maximum entropy ap proach is used for estimation it is found that households respond to forest scarcity and in creased fuelwood collection time by substituting fuels from private sources for forest fuelwood however the magnitude of the response appears insufficient to prevent current fuelwood collection practices from causing serious forest degrada tion jel q24

agricultural expansion and deforestation modelling the impact of population market forces and property rights abstract this paper compares four different modelling approaches to agricultural expansion and deforestation and explores the implications of assumptions about the household objectives the labour market and the property rights regime a major distinction is made between population and market based explanations many of the popular policy prescriptions are based on the population approach assuming subsistence behaviour and limited market integration within a more realistic particularly for the long term effects market approach well intentioned policies such as agricultural intensification programmes may boost deforestation many forest frontier contexts are also characterized by forest clearing giving farmers land rights deforestation becomes an investment to the farmer and a title establishment strategy land titling and credit programmes may therefore increase deforestation

changing time attitudes in intertemporal analysis intertemporal analysis is extended by generalizing the time weight function of an investor s utility function to account for changes in time attitudes the resulting measures of decreasing constant and increasing time attitudes are comparable to the arrow pratt measures of risk attitudes they help to enrich intertemporal theory provide meaningful hypotheses for testing and broaden the scope for decision analysis over time effects of the time attitude measures are illustrated in a model of an agricultural firm

evolution of social norms with heterogeneous preferences a general model and an application to the academic review process abstract the article presents a model of social norm evolution that suggests how the increase in optimal and actual first response times frt of economics journals can be related when the optimal frt and the norm about how much time refereeing should take increase it seems that the existence of a norm increases the average refereeing time the model suggests the surprising result that this is not necessarily true i also discuss applications of the model in other contexts differences in the optimal frt between disciplines the effects of the frt on the tenure process and strategic behavior of referees

dissecting the tragedy a spatial model of behavior in the commons abstract much of the discussion of the tragedy of the commons focuses on aggregate impacts often in data poor developing country settings few non experimental empirical studies shed light on contextual circumstances driving the extent of rent dissipation and overexploitation we utilize a high resolution data set to estimate a behavioral model of fishermen s spatial choices a unique policy setting allows us to measure the degree to which individual fishermen s choices appear aimed at mitigating the tragedy of the commons in a small numbers setting we find evidence of partial mitigation in excess of what we would expect under pure self interest but short of what would occur under group maximizing behavior we also examine how contextual factors in the fishery shape the degree of cooperation within the fishing season and find evidence that competition for the common pool resource distorts fishermen s implicit cost of distance creating a form of common property inertia

building on poor people s capacities the case of common property resources in india and west africa revised version of a paper commissioned by the international development research centre idrc of canada for a world bank conference on poverty environment growth linkages held in washington dc march 1999

common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation abstract in addition to the usual fixed costs we introduce variable costs in a community s effort to cooperate in extracting from a common pool resource using a standard supervision mechanism these variable costs are shown to be an increasing function of individual members incentives to default the model explains why we frequently observe communities that all cooperate and have relatively similar resource endowments and yet achieve very different levels of extraction

a new breed of exchange rate bands chile israel and mexico following inflation stabilization programmes where a fixed exchange rate is used as an anchor a number of countries have gradually shifted towards a regime of increased flexibility in particular chile israel and mexico have adopted for a few years a regime of crawling exchange rate bands this article documents and analyzes their unique experience of immediate concern is the question whether the shift from fixed to crawling bands is perceived as the signal of a tilt towards policy relaxation on the contrary it could be seen as a way of restoring external competitiveness after a period of real appreciation the evidence collected in this article supports the latter view as a way of moving towards a sustainable equilibrium the shift to crawling bands is found to have a stabilizing influence on financial markets on inflation expectations and on the passthrough from exchange rates to prices

linking common property resource management to human capital outcomes in regions where common pool resources provide significant support to their surrounding communities any climate change related shock could produce multiple livelihood repercussions in this paper a model explores how the health of common pool resources could impact upon human capital outcomes for communities that struggle to find alternate livelihood options when traditional means such as agriculture become unsustainable the management of common pool resources is modeled as a strategic interaction process between two heterogeneous communities that are directly or indirectly dependent upon it an unconstrained harvesting of common resources such as forestry not only depletes its stocks but it also indirectly affects crop output through soil degradation a number of situations are constructed where communities are able to successfully finance human capital accumulation through proper management of their common pool resources however results also warn that communities that are faced with limited opportunities towards accumulating human capital must plan ahead to prevent the depletion of their common resources below critical levels when non linear feedbacks to soil degradation emanate from low levels of common pool stocks human capital outcomes as well as future livelihoods of such communities are threatened

knowledge sharing and the dynamics of social capital abstract mutual aid often entails the sharing of knowledge we investigate how in turn knowledge sharing affects the long run dynamics of mutual aid in our economy agents with specific knowledge are held up by their principals inside communities agents aid each other by sharing their specific knowledge this process generates a new type of knowledge which exacerbates the specificity of the existing types and induces more agents to engage in mutual aid however since the knowledge generated is shared it progressively renders agents inside communities more flexible and thus less dependent on mutual aid we characterize conditions under which in the long run mutual aid spreads or is abandoned

locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal abstract illegal water diversions and lax rule enforcement are common on irrigation canals we present a mathematical programming model of a watercourse calibrated to a canal in maharashtra on which farmers voted to cooperate to control water theft the model solution computes the crop choices and profits of individually optimizing farmers who differ in their location it reveals the spatial distribution of gains and losses from cooperation it illuminates why voluntary bargaining will rarely achieve an efficient water allocation it also shows that landless laborers might well be against local cooperation if the expropriated water nurtures labor intensive crops

evolutionary stability of pure strategy equilibria in finite games abstract sufficient conditions for pure strategy nash equilibria of finite games to be lyapunov stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics the regular monotonic selection dynamics are discussed in particular it is shown that in almost all finite extensive form games all the pure strategy equilibria are stable in such games all mixed strategy equilibria close to pure strategy equilibria are also stable journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72

a dynamic approach to forest regimes in developing economies abstract in the developing economies optimal forest regimes should incorporate the socio economic characteristics of the user groups and since socio economic factors will change with time optimal forest regimes will also follow a dynamic path the two most important socio economic factors are the heterogeneity of the user group with respect to forest management and the direct dependence of the user group on forest normally the heterogeneity will increase and dependence will decrease with economic growth of user group an optimal control model is used to integrate the dynamics of natural system such as joint product of forests and its growth function and the dynamics of the two socio economic factors heterogeneity and dependence the model demonstrates that the dynamics of optimal forest regimes will depend upon the change in natural factors socio economic factors and on the interactions between natural and socio economic factors hence optimal forest management strategies would require a continuous refinement in forest management regimes instead of static state regimes as local communities in developing economies pass through different phases of economic growth

community enforcement of fisheries effort restrictions abstract this paper models the use of community sanctions to restrict effort in a simple gordon schaefer style model of the fishery with heterogeneous fishing costs the withdrawal of cooperation in other areas of life is used to both restrict effort and to sanction those who continue to cooperate with those who have not restricted effort coalition proof nash equilibria are generated by a combination of sanctions discouraging the defection of small groups and stock reductions discouraging noncooperation by large groups both entry restrictions and individual quotas can be supported by community sanctions under some parameter combinations however there are cases where each can generate lower total rents than would be available under open access relatively low cost fishers are more likely to support entry restrictions and ignore community attempts to restrict individual effort while high cost fishers are more likely to support quotas

the race for property rights economics literature on the evolution of property rights has increasingly emphasized the optimal timing for establishing those rights yoram barzel dale mortensen 2 and partha dasgupta and joseph stiglitz 3 for example have shown that competition among firms for the rents associated with innovative devices and ideas can lead to the dissipation of those rents in the process when property rights and the rents therefrom are up for grabs it is possible for expenditures to establish rights to fully dissipate the rents leaving the efficiency gains from privatization in question 4 before any conclusions about the welfare gains from establishing property rights can be reached attention must be paid to the evolutionary

participatory exclusions community forestry and gender an analysis for south asia and a conceptual framework abstract the idea of people s participation has long been part of development thinking but today the management of local natural resources by village communities is widely accepted as an institutional imperative it is therefore essential to examine how these institutions perform especially from the perspective of the more disadvantaged based on extensive fieldwork among community forestry groups in india and nepal and existing case studies this paper demonstrates how seemingly participatory institutions can exclude significant sections such as women it provides a typology of participation spells out the gender equity and efficiency implications of such exclusions and analyzes what underlies them it also outlines a conceptual framework to help analyze the process of gender exclusion and how it might be alleviated

the cultural transmission of environmental values a comparative approach this paper investigates the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes are partly determined by a cultural component our analysis tackles this issue both theoretically and empirically in the theoretical section of the paper we describe a model of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits in the empirical section we use survey data from the european values study to empirically identify this cultural component in environmental attitudes we use a comparative approach that exploits variations associated with european migration flows our findings suggest that culture has a persistent and statistically significant impact on the environmental values of migrants differences in environmental attitudes among migrants can be traced back to social values that persist in their countries of origin we also show that environmental attitudes are resilient to incentives derived from the external environment environmental conditions migrants have been exposed to in their countries of origin do not have a significant impact on their preferences when living in the host country our empirical findings are robust to a number of alternative assumptions and present interesting dimensions of heterogeneity concerning the cultural transmission process these results imply that in the presence of multiple environmental problems that require collective action comprehending the driving forces behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to effective policy formation

target zones and realignments recent contributions emphasize that the presence of exchange rate target zones has important effects on the within band behavior of exchange rates when agents are forward looking the authors find that the implications of available models are inconsistent with european exchange rate data and they suggest that the frequent realignments occurring in the period they consider may be responsible for this they construct a model in which the likelihood of a realignment in the near future increases as the exchange rate approaches the limits of its fluctuation band and show that its implications are broadly consistent with the evidence copyright 1992 by american economic association

market power in water markets abstract we model market power in water markets as multi market cournot competition with a river structure suppliers are connected through water balances which imposes resource constraints and they are connected to heterogeneous water users via a water delivery infrastructure our model captures a wide range of specific water market structures we establish conditions for existence of an equilibrium and we assess the effects of market power on water extraction delivery and water prices although the monopoly case is similar to standard economic theory three other specific water market structures illustrate that standard intuition has to be revisited

evolutionary stability and media of exchange abstract the kiyotaki and wright model 1989 of money as a medium of exchange is analyzed within an evolutionary framework it is shown that fundamental speculative and polymorphic states can all be stable and that there may exist a multiplicity of stable states stringent assumptions regarding information and rationality are therefore unnecessary in order to explain the use of money as a medium of exchange even when the existence of a stable medium requires some individuals to trade their production good for one with a higher storage cost or when otherwise identical individuals must adopt different exchange strategies

agricultural intensification common property resources and the farm household this paper evaluates the impact of agricultural price and intensification policies for common property resources and welfare of rural communities in developing countries in doing so we develop a new model for the farm household that has analytical advantages over the traditional one and that has significant potential for empirical application the major findings are technical assistance that increase productivity of land intensive agricultural outputs cereals livestock etc cause degradation of the communal resources and may cause immiserization policies that increase the prices of these goods cause identical effects by contrast similar policies applied to labor intensive outputs vegetables tubers etc contribute to improve the common resources and to increase the welfare of the rural communities

water allocation under distribution losses comparing alternative institutions abstract the distribution of water resources is characterized by increasing returns to scale distribution links water generation to its end use standard economic analysis overlooks the interaction among these micro markets generation distribution and end use we compare water allocation when there is market power in each micro market these outcomes are compared with benchmark cases social planning and a competitive business as usual regime simulations suggest that institutions with market power in generation and end use generate significantly higher welfare than the distribution monopoly and the competitive regime however if the policy goal is to maximize the size of the grid a distribution monopoly is preferred

explaining forward exchange bias intraday intraday interest rates are zero consequently a foreign exchange dealer can short a vulnerable currency in the morning close this position in the afternoon and never face an interest cost this tactic might seem especially attractive in times of fixedrate crisis since it suggests an immunity to the central bank s interest rate defense in equilibrium however buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as no devaluation occurs that is currencies under attack should typically appreciate intraday using data on intraday exchange rate changes within the european monetary system we find this prediction is borne out this article examines implications of the fact that interest rates are zero intraday in particular we focus on the foreign exchange fx market and ask whether trading strategies might be affected the answer to this question is of greater import than might first appear for example in times of fixed rate crisis central banks typically employ an interest rate defense raising domestic rates to attract a capital inflow and punish short sellers but if dealers are immune to this defense at least on an intraday basis then perhaps the viability of fixed rate regimes is undermined goldstein et al 1993 provide an overview of how central banks defended their currencies during the 1992 currency crisis a simple example helps with intraday interest rates of zero a dealer can short a high interest rate currency in the morning close her position in the afternoon and never face an interest cost if there is any likelihood of an intraday devaluation this appears to be an attractive strategy other things equal since the dealer is immune to the interest cost of an overnight short position other things should not be equal in equilibrium however buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as no devaluation occurs that is devaluation risk is offset by systematic appreciation further the greater the probability and size of the devaluation the greater the implied appreciation thus the absence of a role

contagious cooperation temptation and ecosystem collapse real world observations suggest that social norms o f cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a c ommon pool resource but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse we show that these patterns of erosion and 15 collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the tempta tion to overexploit the resource while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations we analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters including the size of the community and the rate of technological progress trigger catastrophic transitions from 20 relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation causing the social ecological system to collapse

effects on poverty and equity of the decline in collective tank irrigation management in tamil nadu india this paper investigates the factors influencing the decline in collective management of local commons and the impact of this decline on agricultural production and household consumption the analysis is based on a village and household data set collected in 1999 in tamil nadu india where tank irrigation systems are managed collectively for rice cultivation by informal water users organizations our statistical analyses find that one major reason for the decline in collective tank irrigation management is the dissemination of private well irrigation systems once the decline has occurred our analyses predict that the gap in rice yields between farmers who have access to private wells and those who must rely solely on tanks will widen with only the latter group suffering lower yields our analyses also find that the same pattern holds for levels of income and consumption because the affected farmers cannot sufficiently compensate for the loss of their rice income by diversifying their income sources to agricultural labor or non agricultural work in this way the decline in collective management results in greater inequality and poverty

on the uniqueness of equilibrium in cournot oligopoly and other games abstract in an average surplus sharing game such as a cournot oligopoly a group of agents share a production process each contributes an amount of input to the process and output is divided in proportion to the amount of input contributed uniqueness of the equilibrium is needed for any type of comparative static analysis however general uniqueness results for concave games have restrictive assumptions on preferences and technology specifically the conditions needed for uniqueness become more difficult to meet as the number of players increases a new theorem for uniqueness with easily interpretable conditions is given which is independent of the number of players journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d43

on the sustainability of common property resources abstract we provide a model where a common property resource is managed by two types of agents cooperators and non cooperators who adjust their extraction strategies in response to persistent differential payoffs in our model the social approval of cooperators works as a reward mechanism which as we show favors both the pervasiveness of cooperative behavior and the sustainable management of natural resources specifically we show that in the presence of such a reward mechanism a stable equilibrium can be reached with both strategies being practiced simultaneously and a decentralized and sustainable management of common property resources is possible

the buddha mushroom conservation behavior and the development of institutions in bhutan abstract common pool resource management institutions can be an effective means by which communities can regulate resource use while we are gaining a greater understanding of the characteristics that are associated with successful institutions we know less about why and how such institutions emerge and what role individual behaviors play in this process the bottom up emergence of institutions may depend on the patterns of heterogeneity in the cooperative behaviors of individual resource users likewise the emerging institutions serve to constrain subsequent resource collection behaviors and alter those patterns because institutions both emerge from and alter the behaviors of individual resource users it is useful to view the relationship between the two levels from a coevolutionary perspective here i focus on the motivations for the adoption of conservation behavior and discuss how these behaviors can impact emerging institutions this study is based on the harvest of a newly utilized commercially valuable mushroom in two communities geogs in bhutan i examined which collectors exhibited each of two cooperative conservation behaviors willingness to reduce one s harvest and punishment of non compliant harvesting techniques and determined the traits associated with these behaviors using logistic regression i found that predictors from each of four domains namely economic factors attitudes values knowledge perceptions of resource scarcity and social capital are important for fostering conservation behavior other regarding values high and low levels of wealth perceptions of resource scarcity and education are positively associated with a willingness to reduce ones harvest selfish values high and low levels of wealth and low levels of trust are associated with punishment changes in these individual characteristics may affect the frequency of cooperative acts and subsequently influence the success of the emerging institutions as such identifying the traits associated with the behaviors exhibited by individuals is an important step in understanding the dynamics of institutional evolution because this study captures perceptions and behaviors in the early stages of the harvest it can be used as the baseline for a longitudinal study exploring the coevolutionary dynamics between individual level behaviors and community level resource management institutions

choosing rules to govern the commons a model with evidence from mexico abstract i develop a model to assess distributive rules observed in field data on 48 mexican farmer managed irrigation systems households decide whether to contribute maintenance effort the aggregate amount of which affects the level of output distributive rules with congruence between the sharing of collective costs and benefits elicit the highest level of effort empirically however incongruent rules dominate the surveyed systems i argue that transaction costs offset some efficiency benefits of congruent rules i estimate a model of rule choice inequality and the age of the water users association strongly increase the likelihood that a system chooses proportional water allocation

collective action for local commons management in rural yunnan china empirical evidence and hypotheses using evolutionary game theory this paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management with the help of evolutionary game theory data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural yunnan china an econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided the degree of income disparity is quite small and resource restrictions are moderately problematic the finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders

stochastic devaluation risk and the empirical fit of target zone models in the model of this paper an exchange rate fluctuates between given boundaries for random lengths of time and jumps discretely when devaluation occur we provide explicit solutions for the stochastic processes followed by the exchange rate and by the expected rate of depreciation when the likelihood and the size of devaluations vary stochastically over time the model produces realistic patterns of covariation between exchange rates and interest rate differentials and provides interesting interpretations of available empirical evidence we also specify how to infer devaluation risk from target zone data

intervention policy and mean reversion in exchange rate target zones the swedish the intervention policy of the swedish central bank is studied using daily intervention data for the late 1 980s in contrast to the first generation of target zone models we find that the interventions occur all over the exchange rate band and almost every day based on this evidence we estimate an exchange rate target zone model with intra marginal interventions the results go a long way towards explaining the well established hump shaped exchange rate distribution and lack of non linearities

profit fluctuations signal eroding resilience of natural resources abstract a common pattern of environmental crises is a vicious cycle between environmental degradation and socio economic disturbances here we show that while such feedbacks may give rise to critical transitions in social ecological systems at the same time they can offer novel opportunities for anticipating them we model a community that has joint access to the harvest grounds of a resource that is prone to collapse individuals are tempted to overexploit the resource while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations both social and ecological collapses can be induced by environmental or socio economic driving forces regardless of the type and cause of collapse we find that upcoming transitions may be detected using simple socio economic response variables such as individual profits our findings suggest that such alternative sources of information can be used to detect upcoming critical transitions in social ecological systems however we also find that robust detection of critical transitions may be confounded by recovery attempts undertaken by resource users in the vicinity of an upcoming collapse which may be falsely interpreted as a stabilization of the social ecological system

rural poverty in latin america determinants and exit paths abstract while rural poverty in latin america has declined over the last three decades success has been uneven across countries and rural poverty remains huge reduction in the number of rural relative to urban poor has been mainly the outcome of migration not of successful rural development we show that rural incomes are explained by the asset position of households and the characteristics of the context where assets are used given heterogeneity in asset positions and contexts many strategies to escape poverty consequently exist we identify four paths out of poverty exit agricultural pluriactive and assistance successful rural development to promote the agricultural and pluriactive paths requires a wholesale new approach based on regional development decentralization and participation agricultural technology has a role to play in these two strategies in latin america however the bulk of the benefits from technological change has been captured through indirect effects via the price of food employment creation and contributions to aggregate growth

the management of common property resources collective action as an alternative to privatisation or state regulation can locally based collective action be a viable way to manage common property resources many writers on collective action and common property are sweepingly pessimistic about the ability of the people who face problems of common property to organize sustainable patterns of use for themselves this paper shows with reference to prisoners dilemma garett hardin s tragedy of the commons and mancur olson s logic of collective action that the analytical basis for this pessimism is weak in many situations of village based common property resource use there can thus be no general presumption that the collective action route to common property resource management will fail any more than there can be a general presumption that it will work the paper suggests a number of general factors to do with the characteristics of the resources the user group and group state relations on which chances of success depend

harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas we propose a dynamic model for studying the time evolution of fish stocks in an environment divided into two adjacent zones with different fishing policies we analyze two particular harvesting methods constant fishing effort and profit maximization in this case some agents engage in competition based on maximization of individual profit whereas others cooperate the asymptotic behavior of the system pinpoints that even if the presence of a reserve area leads to higher levels of sustainability in exploiting fish stocks attention should be paid in properly regulating the harvesting activity in order to avoid severe depletion of the resource

two cases for sand in the wheels of international finance the incompatibility of pegged exchange rates international capital mobility and national monetary autonomy is a basic postulate of open economy macroeconomies in the present environment of high capital mobility and political uncertainty even the possibility that governments may utilize their policy autonomy can defeat efforts to peg the exchange rate this leaves two possibilities one is to fix the exchange rate irrevocably through monetary unification the other is to live with floating rates either way a case can be made for throwing sand in the wheels of international finance where monetary unification is not an option this is a may to make distinct national currencies tolerable and international money and capital markets compatible with modest national autonomy in monetary and macroeconomic policy for eu counties striving to create a monetary union it is the only politically and economically feasible way of completing the transition to stage iii of the maastricht process

the gains from agricultural groundwater trade and the potential for market power theory and application this article models and estimates the efficiency gains from using market based instruments relative to command and control to manage groundwater a theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive groundwater market is developed to show how the magnitude and distribution of the gains from trade change as market structure varies market structure is a key consideration because future groundwater markets will likely feature geographic limitations to trade large agricultural players and a legal environment that is conducive to forming cartel like coalitions application of the model to a groundwater dependent agricultural region in southern california shows the existence of large gains from trade despite the potential for market power with benefits up to 36 greater than that under command and control distributional impacts however can be sizable even for small degrees of market power simulations that vary market conditions show that results likely generalize to other groundwater basins

the dynamic efficiency costs of common pool resource exploitation we conduct the first empirical investigation of common pool resource users dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real world data fishermen s strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players actions revealing the profit structure of the fishery we compare the fishermen s actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies jel d24 q21 q22

forest resource depletion soil dynamics and agricultural productivity in the tropics abstract a two sector dynamic model for agriculture and forestry is proposed agricultural yields are a function of the rate of deforestation the forest stock and purchased inputs we examine the impact of changes in the social discount rate net returns to agriculture and direct marginal benefits of the forest stock benefits on the optimal deforestation path under the assumption of a quadratic agricultural yield function finally steady state comparative static analysis is conducted

the evolution of social norms in common property resource use the problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources is examined within an evolutionary game theoretic framework it is shown that cooperative behavior guided by norms of restraint and punishment may be stable in a well defined sense against invasion by narrowly self interested behavior the resource stock dynamics are integrated with the evolutionary game dynamics effects of changes in prices technology and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long run stock are analyzed when threshold values of the parameters are crossed social norms can break down leading generally to the lowering of the long run stock and possibly to its extinction copyright 1996 by american economic association

the foreign exchange risk premium in a target zone with devaluation risk abstract the foreign exchange risk premium in an exchange rate target zone is derived when the exchange rate is heteroskedastic within the band and there is a separate devaluation risk the risk premium is then the sum of two separate risk premia arising from uncertainty about exchange rate movements within the band and from uncertainty about devaluations both real and nominal risk premia are considered real and nominal risk premia from movements within the band are very small real and nominal risk premia from devaluations are larger but still relatively small proportions of the interest rate differential

target zones and forward rates in a model with repeated realignments abstract this paper studies the term structure of forward premia in a target zone with imperfect credibility the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates which reflects the possibility of realignments of the band is studied for various intervention policies with different degrees of credibility forward market data is used to estimate the implied credibility of the french german target zone during the ems parameter estimates accord with the experience of the ff dm exchange rate during the 1980s although spot exchange rates display little sensitivity to anticipated intervention forward data can be used to detect the effects of intervention on exchange rate dynamics