why are taxes so high in egalitarian societies in an analysis of the relative income or relative consumption hypothesis it is shown that if the ratio of agent i s consumption to agent j s consumption enters into the utility function a tax on labor income may increase welfare for all agents if pretax wage inequality is low all agents will unanimously be in favor of such a tax thus there will be a tendency for taxes to be high in societies where pretax wage inequality is low copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

status seeking income taxation and efficiency abstract it is well known that status seeking produces distortions in consumption competition to achieve status leads to over consumption of those goods which confer status it has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to pareto improvements in this paper we extend a model of status which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax we show that a pareto improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax benefit scheme a number of results follow the model is extended to a two period analysis to accommodate the reputation building element of status achievement without altering the conclusions

simplified formulae for optimal linear income taxation the optimal income tax problem is simplified considerably if attention is confined to a linear tax schedule where there is a general lump sum subsidy or tax combined with a constant marginal tax rate following mirrlees 1971 this simplified problem was examined in a number of papers by e g sheshinski 1972 itsumi 1974 romer 1976 dixit sandmo 1977 and helpman sadka 1978 alternative expressions for the optimal linear income tax rate are derived in this paper our approach seems to lead to formulae which are quite readily interpretable i e the equity efficiency conflict emerges very clearly

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

altruism jealousy and the theory of optimal non linear taxation abstract this paper studies optimal non linear taxes in a world in which there is altruism and jealousy a formula for optimal marginal tax rates is derived which turns out to be a simple and intuitively appealing extension of a result due to mirrlees the paper shows that in this sort of economy all of optimal tax theory s general results either no longer hold or need not hold and it sets out appropriate modifications to standard tax rules

studying optimal paternalism illustrated by a model of sin taxes the classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices a great deal of evidence suggests however that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave in their own best interests economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational and in particular it may be fruitful for economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better choices we propose an approach for studying optimal paternalism that follows naturally from standard assumptions and methods of economic theory write down assumptions about the distribution of rational and irrational types of agents about the available policy instruments and about the government s information about agents and then investigate which policies achieve the most efficient outcomes in other words economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a mechanism design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational this approach has many advantages first and foremost by explicitly addressing when and how people do and don t pursue their own best interests economists will be better able to contribute to policy debates to contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions we must study whether financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and whether self control problems lead people to borrow too heavily to contribute to debates over teenage smoking we must study whether teenagers become smokers against their long run best interest economists will and should be ignored if we continue to insist that it is axiomatic that constantly trading stocks or accumulating consumer debt or becoming a heroin addict must be optimal for the people doing these things merely because they have chosen to do it a second advantage of our approach is that it forces us to look for the best feasible policy our

electoral cycles and the earnings of federal bureaucrats this paper analyzes the relationship between the timing of federal elections and the pay raises received by civilian employees of the federal government the theoretical framework discusses how electoral wage cycles are generated as a result of optimizing behavior on the part of voters bureaucrats and the government the empirical analysis uses a time series of wage rates for the twenty eight largest federal agencies over the period 1961 1978 the study indicates that pay hikes during the presidential election year are significantly greater about 2 to 3 percent higher than bureaucratic pay raises in other years

the dynamics of job separation the case of federal employees summary in this paper we develop a model of workers quit decisions using panel data on a sample of us federal government employees we use maximum likelihood techniques to determine how much of the observed decline in quits with job tenure is a result of declining individual quit propensities state dependence rather than dynamic sample self selection heterogeneity the latter is found to be much more important than the former the effects of relative federal government wages and other variables on quits are also estimated the results are useful for analysing federal compensation policies

the efficient side of progressive income taxation abstract this paper examines allocative properties of progressive income taxation when individuals care about their relative income it shows that introducing a progressive income tax can yield a pareto improvement if pre tax income is evenly distributed implementing undistorted choices of working hours requires a progressive tax schedule and the optimal degree of progressivity decreases with pre tax income inequality

non welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions in these situations the government might want to intervene indeed individuals might want the government to intervene to induce behavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing the analysis of such corrective interventions through taxes and subsidies might be called behavioral public economics however such analysis where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals is not new in public economics in these cases the government is said to be non welfarist in its objectives and there is a long tradition of nonwelfarist welfare economics especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes the object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non welfarist optimal taxation literature and secondly to present behavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework

fair income tax fairness is a key concept in redistribution issues in this paper we study how particular requirements of fairness can shed light on the design of the optimal income tax schedule we consider a population of heterogeneous individuals or households who differ in two respects first they have unequal skills and therefore unequal earning abilities second they differ in terms of their preferences about consumption and leisure and as a consequence typically make different labour time choices both kinds of differences generate income inequalities we study how to justify and compute a redistribution income tax in this context redistribution through an income tax usually entails distortions of incentives but the resulting efficiency loss has to be weighed against potential improvements in the fairness of the distribution of resources we address this efficiency equity trade off here by constructing social preferences which obey the standard pareto principle in addition to fairness conditions

monetary policy product market competition and growth in this paper we argue that monetary easing fosters growth more in more credit constrained environments and the more so the higher the degree of product market competition indeed when competition is low large rents allow firms to stay on the market and reinvest optimally no matter how funding conditions change with aggregate conditions to test this prediction we use industrylevel and firm level data from the euro area to look at the effects on sectoral growth and firm level growth of the unexpected drop in long term government bond yields following the announcement of the outright monetary transactions program omt by the ecb we find that the monetary policy easing induced by omt contributed to raising sectoral firm level growth more in more highly leveraged sectors firms and the more so the higher the degree of product market competition in the country sector

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

volatility and growth credit constraints and the composition of investment abstract how does uncertainty and credit constraints affect the cyclical composition of investment and thereby volatility and growth this paper addresses this question within a model where firms engage in two types of investment a short term one and a long term one which contributes more to productivity growth because it takes longer to complete long term investment has a relatively less cyclical return but it also has a higher liquidity risk the first effect ensures that the share of long term investment to total investment is countercyclical when financial markets are perfect the second implies that this share may turn procyclical when firms face tight credit constraints a novel propagation mechanism thus emerges through its effect on the cyclical composition of investment tighter credit can lead to both higher volatility and lower mean growth evidence from a panel of countries provides support for the model s key predictions

jealousy and equilibrium overconsumption the idea that the happiness of an individual depends upon the consumption of others is widely viewed as an important feature of our shared social existence recent research in finance has used this idea through consumption externalities to explore asset pricing anomalies consumption externalities potentially break the link between pareto optimality and competitive equilibria and open the door for beneficial government intervention e g lars ljungqvist and harald uhlig 2000 in this paper we delineate two effects that a consumption externality may have an increase in aggregate consumption may a raise the marginal utility of individual consumption relative to leisure and or b lower an individual s utility level we refer to a as keeping up with the joneses henceforth kuj following jordi gali 1994 and we refer to b as jealousy jealousy is a distinct concept from kuj under kuj an individual derives greater utility from additional own consumption relative to leisure when others consume more at the same time higher per capita consumption holding fixed individual consumption can trigger either jealousy so that individual utility falls or admiration so that individual utility rises in section i of this paper we show that jealousy implies that the laissez faire equilibrium consumption level is greater than the optimal level whether preferences exhibit kuj is not necessary for this main result intuitively in the presence of jealousy consumption is similar to pollution overpollution exists because individuals do not take into account the cost of polluting on others not because an increase in economywide pollution makes the return to individual polluting higher similarly overconsumption exists because individuals do not take into account the negative effect of own consumption on jealous others things go in the opposite direction when individuals are admiring in section ii we consider a functional form that encompasses several existing models we show that jealousy determines the optimal tax to correct overconsumption and that kuj is mainly important for asset pricing

measuring future grandparents preferences for equality and relative standing individuals aversion to risk and inequality and their concern for relative standing are measured through experimental choices between hypothetical societies it is found that on average individuals are both fairly inequality averse and have a strong concern for relative income the results are used to illustrate welfare consequences based on a utilitarian swf and a modified crra utility function it is shown that the social marginal utility of income may then become negative even at income levels that are far from extreme

institutional causes macroeconomic symptoms volatility crises and growth countries that have pursued distortionary macroeconomic policies including high inflation large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates appear to have suffered more macroeconomic volatility and also grown more slowly during the postwar period does this reflect the causal effect of these macroeconomic policies on economic outcomes one reason to suspect that the answer may be no is that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic policies also have weak institutions including political institutions that do not constrain politicians and political elites ineffective enforcement of property rights for investors widespread corruption and a high degree of political instability this paper documents that countries that inherited more extractive institutions from their colonial past were more likely to experience high volatility and economic crises during the postwar period more specifically societies where european colonists faced high mortality rates more than 100 years ago are much more volatile and prone to crises based on our previous work we interpret this relationship as due to the causal effect of institutions on economic outcomes europeans did not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions in areas where they faced high mortality once we control for the effect of institutions macroeconomic policies appear to have only a minor impact on volatility and crises this suggests that distortionary macroeconomic policies are more likely to be symptoms of underlying institutional problems rather than the main causes of economic

the employment effects of credit market disruptions firm level evidence from the 2008 9 financial crisis this article investigates the effect of bank lending frictions on employment outcomes i construct a new data set that combines information on banking relationships and employment at 2 000 nonfinancial firms during the 2008 9 crisis the article first verifies empirically the importance of banking relationships which imply a cost to borrowers who switch lenders i then use the dispersion in lender health following the lehman crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the availability of credit to borrowers i find that credit matters firms that had precrisis relationships with less healthy lenders had a lower likelihood of obtaining a loan following the lehman bankruptcy paid a higher interest rate if they did borrow and reduced employment by more compared to precrisis clients of healthier lenders consistent with frictions deriving from asymmetric information the effects vary by firm type lender health has an economically and statistically significant effect on employment at small and medium firms but the data cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect at the largest or most transparent firms abstracting from general equilibrium effects i find that the withdrawal of credit accounts for between one third and one half of the employment decline at small and medium firms in the sample in the year

labor turnover in the u s federal bureaucracy this paper presents an empirical analysis of labor turnover in the u s federal bureaucracy the results indicate that job experience in politically important federal agencies is valued by the private sector hence high level bureaucrats employed in these agencies have high turnover probabilities the analysis also shows that equalization of federal sector and private sector wage rates would lead to a relatively small increase in turnover but to substantial savings in federal payroll costs

redistributive taxation with heterogeneous relative consumption concerns this paper studies the impact of redistributive income taxation in a society where only some individuals are motivated by relative consumption concerns introducing this heterogeneity raises theoretical challenges since i earned income becomes an imperfect indicator of underlying ability and ii relative concerns may be inadmissable in the social objective a new behavioural model is developed in which only relatively concerned individuals choose work effort strategically linear tax transfer systems schemes are then characterized and simulated for a series of welfarist and non welfarist social objectives and for different degrees of preference heterogeneity a key result is that a government which understands the extent of relative consumption concerns but places no social weight on individuals with such preferences nevertheless sets a significantly more progressive tax system than a government which ignores relative consumption motivations altogether ce memoire examine l impact d une imposition redistributrice sur le revenu dans une societe ou certaines personnes sont motivees par des questions de niveaux de consommation relative cette sorte d heterogeneite souleve certains defis theoriques puisque i les gains sont un indicateur imparfait des habiletes sous jacentes et ii ces malaises quant a la consommation relative peuvent etre inadmissibles au plan de l objectif social on developpe un nouveau modele de comportement dans lequel seulement les personnes preoccupees par leur position relative definissent leur effort de travail strategiquement on definit des systemes d imposition et de transferts lineaires et on les soumet a des simulations pour une serie d objectifs sociaux a saveur welfariste et non welfariste et pour differents degres d heterogeneite de preferences un resultat crucial est qu un gouvernement qui comprend l importance des sensibilites aux resultats relatifs mais qui ne donne aucune valence sociale aux personnes qui ont de telles preferences neanmoins met en place une fiscalite plus progressive de maniere significative qu un gouvernement qui ignore completement ces motivations fondees sur la consommation relative

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association