equilibrium behavior in crisis bargaining games this paper analyzes a general model of two player bargaining in the shadow of war where one player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war i derive conclusions about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints where these constraints hold regardless of the game form hence the qualitative results are game free i show that the higher the informed player s payoff from war the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling the dispute short of war and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war the latter result rationalizes the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war i then provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the probability of war

the quality effect does financial liberalization improve the allocation of capital abstract we document evidence of a quality effect of financial liberalization on allocative efficiency as measured by dispersion in tobin s q across firms we predict that financial liberalization by equalizing access to credit is associated with reduced variation in expected marginal returns we test this prediction using a new financial liberalization index and firm level data for five emerging markets india jordan korea malaysia and thailand we find robust evidence that financial liberalization rather than financial deepening is associated with improved allocative efficiency

a spatial model of international conflict 1 he model presented here assumes that nations initiate conflict to change the international status quo across one or more issues to an outcome they prefer their preferences for different issue outcomes are represented by a classical spatial utility function international coalitions are formed both to enhance the chance of a successful challenge and to counter existing challenges disputes are modeled as periods of competition between two coalitions through the recruitment of additional members erosion of support for the opposing coalition and escalation of the crisis the two nation model is analyzed in detail and the existence of the core for the resulting game is proved the two main conclusions of the two nation model are that nations have a general incentive to exaggerate their issue positions in disputes and that the possibility of issue trades enhances the likelihood of compromise because scientific understanding arises from theories the explication of theories is essential for the development of scientific understanding to understand international conflictthat is the resolution of disputes between nations by coercion or the threat of coercion a theory that can explain such conflict is needed this paper will present a model drawn from rational choice theory specifically game theory that explains national actions in conflicts as strategic choices made in order to gain preferred resolutions of the international issues in dispute compared to existing game theory models of international conflict the model presented here provides an explicit description of how each nation s evaluation of the issues in dispute affects its desire to pursue compromise or conflict a more detailed sequence of escalation allowing for the detailed study of escalation strategies and a framework that can explain the timing and extent of third party interventions into ongoing crises

bargaining in the shadow of power abstract often a bargainer can use some form of power legal military or political to impose a settlement how does the outside option of being able to impose a settlement albeit at some cost affect the bargaining and how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers these questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to rubinstein s game of dividing a pie each actor can accept an offer make a counteroffer or try to impose a solution imposing a settlement is however costly and each bargainer has private information about its cost journal of economic literatureclassification number c72

rationality and deterrence this essay explores the relationship between deterrence theory and two distinct notions of rationality associated with it the author argues that the concept of procedural irrationality which is the basis of many critiques of contemporary deterrence theory is not necessarily inconsistent with the instrumental definition of rationality implicit in many models of deterrence he also argues that some recent rational choice models of deterrence are nonetheless deficient in their application of the rationality postulate finally he provides an outline of a possible resolution of the paradox of deterrence

financial markets and development my views on this subject have been greatly affected both by the experience of developing countries during the past quarter century and by the major shift evolutionary if not revolutionary in the economists paradigm over that period we have seen that capital accumulation is not enough even the extremely high rates of savings of many of the socialist economies have not managed to compensate for their lack of ability in allocating capital and these countries have for the most part not fared well but extreme free market solutions have fared little better perhaps best illustrated by the experience of chile true believers in the doctrines of the left and the right have this in common they both claim that if the patient had only followed the doctor s orders more precisely the medicine would have worked

multilateral negotiations a spatial analysis of the arab israeli dispute a model for forecasting political choices and for explaining the perceptual conditions that lead to those choices is delineated the model based on the median voter theorem and on the axioms of expected utility maximization is applied to the prospects for a multilateral peace conference in the middle east the analysis helps provide insights into the motivations behind recent actions by leaders in the soviet union the united states jordan the palestine liberation organization and israel

foreign direct investment intra firm trade and ownership structure abstract asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold up problem in foreign direct investment selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increases the parent multinational s information rent that is protected from a host government s confiscatory taxation

the informational content of initial public offerings the ability of capital markets to distinguish firms of different value by the size of their initial equity offerings is attenuated when insiders can sell equity more than once a model is developed in which there is price risk from holding equity between periods when the uncertainty is small there must be pooling in the first period when uncertainty is large the pooling equilibria dominate the separating equilibrium the size of an entrepreneur s initial public offering of equity can be informative this point was made in leland and pyle 1977 and stiglitz 1982 an entrepreneur with a good project can signal the value of the project by his or her willingness to retain equity an implicit assumption of this analysis is that the entrepreneur has only one opportunity to sell equity the assumption of a single sale is important since once the entrepreneur has signalled his or her project value by retaining equity investors should be willing to purchase the remaining equity however if entrepreneurs with bad projects foresee this they too may wish to retain equity initially and render themselves indistinguishable from entrepreneurs with good projects the current paper develops a model with two trading periods to capture the impact of having repeat sales of equity there is a public offering in the first period then the entrepreneur can make an open market sale in the second period however there is exogenous price risk which makes it costly for the entrepreneur to wait to sell in this context the value of the entrepreneur s project may not be revealed in the first period retaining equity is not very costly when uncertainty is small and there will only be pooling equilibria in this case in such a situation no information is revealed in the first period when the level of uncertainty is great there does exist a separating equilibrium however the pooling equilibria pareto dominate the separating equilibrium throughout the analysis the focus will be on paretooptimal equilibria the idea that an informed agent can profitably trade over time has been examined in related contexts kyle 1985 looked at the optimal trading strategy for an insider whose sequence of purchases is hidden in the aggregate order flow in equilibrium the insider s information is not completely incorporated into the market price until the close of trading

the government financial system and large private enterprises in the economic development of south korea abstract the paper investigates the main characteristics of the government business relationship in south korea in the past three decades to find out how it may have contributed to south korea s economic development it proposes that the government and large private enterprises in south korea should be viewed as constituting an internal organization namely a quasi internal organization as such extensive intervention by the government with south korea s financial system can be viewed as an internal capital market and consequently it could have led to a more efficient allocation of credit than possible in a free market financial system it also argues that the quasi internal organization has made it possible for the government to efficiently implement its developmental policies it is however pointed out that for the quasi internal organization to be successful in accelerating the pace of economic development the country must have a political leadership committed to the goal of economic development and must adopt an outward oriented development policy

large investors regulatory taking and investor state dispute settlement abstract this paper offers an economic analysis of an international investor state dispute settlement regime isds in markets with large investors it identifies a reason for strategic overinvestment by the domestic industry leading to permissive regulation in the absence of isds an ideal investor state dispute settlement arrangement efficiency oriented transaction cost free with untouchable fully reliable and unbiased judges has positive and negative effects in this framework it generates an equal level playing field for domestic and foreign investors but it magnifies an existing overinvestment problem and may reduce world welfare the results explain anecdotal evidence according to which isds that protects foreign investors is liked by the domestic industry and disliked by other interest groups in the host country

the expected utility theory of conflict measuring theoretical progress we examine the progressivity of bruce bueno de mesquita s theory of conflict as originally developed in the war trap and as extended later bueno de mesquita offers the progressivity of the expected utility theory relative to other theories and approaches to conflict as his major defense in responding to critics bueno de mesquita essentially relies on imre lakatos definition of theoretical progress in presenting his argument a review of the literature addressing the concept of theoretical progress indicates that bueno de mesquita s application of lakatosian criteria is incomplete and that lakatos criteria are themselves flawed we review the philosophy of science literature dealing with theoretical progress or rational criteria for theory choice and evaluate the progressivity of the expected utility theory of conflict in light of criteria other than lakatos while we do recommend further elaboration of bueno de mesquita s theory we do not find it more progressive than its rivals

the scope and limits of financial liberalisation in developing countries a critical survey this article reviews the growing literature on financial reform in developing countries we draw both on the theoretical contributions outlining the case for and against liberalisation as well as on the experience of many developing countries with liberalisation we argue that the existence of market failures in financial markets hampers the liberalisation process and indeed suggests that the simple liberalising strategy envisaged in much of the literature is inappropriate we argue instead for an alternative strategy which integrates some aspects of liberalisation with the development of appropriate financial institutions designed to serve best the needs of the real economy

the variable rate of growth effect in the life cycle saving model the rate of growth in real gnp g affects the aggregate saving rate positively in life cycle saving models this rate of growth effect is invariably estimated as the coefficient of g in the saving function we show that other determinants of the saving rate influence the rate of growth effect in other words the rate of growth effect is not constant specifically the real rate of return on financial assets and the population dependency ratio determine the timing of saving over the life cycle and hence alter the rate of growth effect the dependency ratio also has an effect on the saving rate which is independent of g because it together with the foreign saving rate determines the level of saving over the life cycle

general deterrence between enduring rivals testing three competing models general deterrence unlike immediate deterrence has rarely been analyzed in a systematic comparative manner we outline a research design for doing so by studying the circumstances under which in a set of enduring rivalries challengers are likely to initiate militarized disputes we indicate the conceptual and operational steps necessary to make and empirically compare predictions stemming from three often competing theoretical frameworks rational deterrence a general model of rational conflict initiation and a cognitive psychological model of behavior emphasizing risk orientation and misperception the results of probit analysis on a pooled time series of enduring rivalries since 1945 provide support for hypotheses from each of the different theoretical models

the interest elasticity of savings in developing countries the existing evidence abstract this paper presents a critical analysis of some of the most recent empirical work on the interest elasticity of savings in developing economies supported by a set of empirical results the paper argues that a the real interest elasticity of savings is not easily detected using the existing empirical models which generally yield insignificant interest rate parameters in the seventies b the existing models suffer from serious defects that make if very difficult to interpret the estimated parameters

the macro impacts of korea s heavy industry drive re evaluated the korean heavy industry hci drive has been criticised for the misallocation of capital and for negative spillover effects on growth inflation the current account and debt however such criticism places too much blame on hci for the late 1970s economic deterioration and gives hci insufficient credit for the subsequent economic rebound korean hci was a catch up exercise which attracted cheap foreign capital to accelerate structural change nevertheless the mid 1970s decision to pursue hci as a big push was flawed since it did result in project bunching that strained implementation capacity despite the safeguards which korea built into its hci strategy

financial restriction and the developmental state in east asia toward a more complex political economy recent financial crises in asia have renewed debates over the appropriate degree and scope of government intervention in financial markets governments in two countries affected by financial crises

the effect of financial liberalization on the efficiency of credit allocation some evidence from korea abstract this paper examines korea s recent experience with financial liberalization to find empirical evidence for the mckinnon shaw hypothesis regarding the effect of financial liberalization on the allocative efficiency of credit this involves analyzing changes in the variation of average borrowing costs across different sectors and industries using consolidated balance sheets and income statements from firms it demonstrates that there has been a substantial improvement in the efficiency of credit allocation since 1980 when the korean government started to implement various financial liberalization reforms

the boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade this paper begins with a review of empirical evidence on multinational firms conceptual underpinnings of a theory are developed relying in particular on the notion of knowledge capital as a mobile joint input into geographically separated production facilities this idea is embedded in a simple two country general equilibrium model that supports multinational production in equilibrium under conditions consistent with the empirical evidence the final section examines internalization and shows why certain properties of knowledge capital also imply a preference for transferring technologies internally within the firm rather than through arm s length markets

strategic tax competition implications of national ownership abstract two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise mne which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors the mne contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in the two localisations it is shown that the distortions in the mne s real investment portfolio are determined by a trade off between fiscal externalities and equity externalities and that investments in the case of strategic tax competition may be lower than in the co operative case ownership matters and we show how the firm may reduce its overall tax payments by influencing the distribution of owner shares between investors in the two countries

when do power shifts lead to war we present and test a choice theoretic model of war decisions during shifts in power the model assumes a rising state that overtakes a declining state in capabilities in equilibrium the declining state yields at a critical point in the transition war can occur only before that critical time power shifts are more likely to lead to war as the challenger becomes more risk acceptant the declining state more risk averse the expected costs of war decrease the rising state s dissatisfaction with the status quo increases and during periods of equality between the two sides the rate of growth of the rising state s capabilities and the transition point do not affect the probability of war all these hypotheses are supported by an empirical analysis of all major power dyads since 1815 we also find that expected support from allies must be included in the calculation of a nation s capabilities the implications of the model for theories of hegemonic decline and war are discussed

what makes deterrence work cases from 1900 to 1980 the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives is an enduring feature of international politics force or the threat of force may be used either to change the status quo or to maintain it threatening the use of force to maintain the status quo often takes the form of deterrence defined by patrick morgan as the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else 1 deterrence sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails failures are attested to by numerous international wars of history in the nuclear age a failure could cost us our lives the conditions of successful deterrence thus require thorough logical and empirical analysis

from miracle to cronyism explaining the great asian slump explanations are about the only thing not in short supply in the asian crisis for all their diversity they can be collapsed into two meta interpretations reflecting deeper differences in beliefs about rationality and markets those whose world view emphasizes rationality self adjusting markets and market failure as exceptional except when governments introduce distortions tend to see the crisis as the result of rational calculations in a situation of market distorting government interventions and institutional weaknesses in asian economies those whose world view stresses non rationality or a different kind of rationality than that assumed by neoclassical theory routine failure of well working markets and the need for government interventions to modify market outcomes tend to see it as the result of non rational calculations in under regulated financial markets both national and international

informal financial markets under liberalization in four african countries abstract this paper presents survey evidence from four countries on how informal financial agents serve market niches that banks cannot readily reach their methodologies are effective in keeping down transaction costs and default risk relative to banks although informal agents exercise monopoly power in dualistic markets liberalization of repressive financial policies has had little effect on formal financial deepening while informal finance has continued to grow the paper concludes that informal financial institutions are an important vehicle for mobilizing household savings and financing small businesses and it recommends that informal finance be better integrated into financial development strategies

competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper models international competition for foreign direct investment as a common agency problem using the theory of menu auctions developed by bernheim and whinston in the model national governments act as principals and a multinational corporation as the single agent governments are assumed to maximize the net wage income generated by the corporation s investment it is shown that in the equilibrium of this game a high wage country may be able to attract investment even though all countries use subsidies furthermore it is shown that a country may choose to pay the highest subsidies even if it attracts less investment than in the unsubsidized regime our framework can also be used to study interregional subsidy competition within a country

design in context existing international agreements and new cooperation this research note highlights an important element missing from rational design theories of international agreements institutional context the presence or absence of existing and prior agreements between prospective partners in new cooperation if as rational design theorists argue agreement design is deliberate strategic and directed toward enhancing contracting parties ability to credibly commit to future cooperation then prior design successes should influence the terms of additional cooperation we test for this omitted variable problem in three agreement design outcomes ex ante limitations on agreement duration exit clauses and dispute settlement provisions through an augmentation and reanalysis of data from a key study in the rational design literature barbara koremenos s contracting around international uncertainty we show institutional context is positively correlated with inclusion of ex ante time limitations in negotiated agreements and negatively correlated with the inclusion of exit clauses and third party dispute settlement provisions institutional context also mediates and conditions the effects of the explanatory variable at the heart of existing rational design theories uncertainty about the future distribution of gains from cooperation our findings show that the collective appeal of particular design features varies not only with the nature of underlying strategic problems but also with degrees of shared institutional context

stability and the distribution of power the relation between stability and the distribution of power is an important and long debated problem in international relations theory the balance of power school argues that an even distribution of power is more stable while the preponderance of power school argues that a preponderance of power is more stable empirical efforts to estimate this relation have yielded contradictory results this essay examines the relation between stability and the distribution of power in an infinite horizon game theoretic model in which two states are bargaining about revising the international status quo the states make offers and counteroffers until they reach a mutually acceptable settlement or until one of them becomes so pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement that it uses force to impose a new settlement the equilibrium of the game contradicts the expectations of both schools and offers an explanation for the conflicting empirical estimates in the model stability is greatest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the expected distribution of benefits that the use of force would impose

partisanship and the path to financial openness the effect of traditional left right economic preferences on countries international financial openness is more subtle than existing studies have recognized the authors investigate the role that partisan politics played in the liberalization of international financial markets within 12 western european democracies from 1960 to 1986 the authors find that right governments tended to be active liberalizers of the capital account they were more likely than left governments to enact liberalizations and liberalizations were especially likely when new right governments entered office left governments typically acquiesced to these changes although less likely to enact liberalizations they were no more likely to impose new restrictions the authors findings are consistent with studies that show how financial integration does not undermine welfare states but is still subject to partisan contention

south korean and taiwanese development and the new institutional economics the publication of books by both alice amsden and robert wade provide an opportune moment to reflect on the study of east asian development after an initial surge of interest beginning in the 1970s the field has reached a plateau and scholars recently have cast a wide net in searching for ways to extend the field in assessing the state of the art regarding the economic development of the east asian newly industrialized countries nics this review will treat three themes first i will argue that the focus on states versus markets is becoming stale and that much of the scholarly interest lies in the politics behind the economics second i argue that political scientists have underexplored the historical origins of korean and taiwanese capitalism and that such attention promises to strengthen both theories and explanations of development third i argue that the international system has been more important in promoting development in east asia than accounts in the first wave have recognized the purpose of this review is to assess the field reveal

the war trap revisited a revised expected utility model the expected utility framework developed in the war trap is revised to correct several deficiencies risk taking orientations are now treated as an integral part of the model by introducing concavity or convexity into the utility functions the zero sum properties of the theory are largely eliminated and the tendency toward interpersonal comparisons of utility is removed several earlier results are replicated with the new model and with annual capabilities data new propositions are deduced that identify important limitations on conflict initiation and relationships resulting from differences in perceptions are tested support is found for the contention that the revised version of the theory of which the original model is a special case is a powerful tool for integrating many extant hypotheses about conflict and for explaining a substantial portion of the tendency for some threats to escalate to violence or warfare and for others to be resolved peacefully

monetary and exchange rate policies for international financial stability a proposal w v ithout a common monetary standard the remarkable integration of western european north american and the industrialized asian economies in both commodity trade and financial flows is less efficient and becoming untenable dissatisfaction with wildly fluctuating relative currency values euphemistically called floating or flexible exchange rates is a prime cause of the resurgence in protectionism in 1986 87 the overvalued yen forced japanese industrialists to close factories retire workers and write off once valuable investments in plant and equipment this parallels what their american counterparts were forced to do between 1981 and 1985 when the dollar suddenly became overvalued similarly the paring down of the british manufacturing base was precipitated when the pound unexpectedly became a strong petrocurrency in 1979 81 in agriculture japan and european countries are determined to insulate their domestic prices of farm products from unsettling international influences including volatile fluctuations in the yen dollar or mark dollar exchange rates thus unless exchange stability is first achieved the american government s attempt to broaden the general agreement on tariffs and trade to encompass agriculture and services is likely to fail but what keeps the three major industrial blocs from developing a common monetary standard to prevent exchange rate fluctuations although many people

the escalation of great power militarized disputes testing rational deterrence theory and structural realism realism we test the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches on the escalation of deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984 we derive a set of hypotheses from each model operationalize them for systematic empirical analysis and test the hypotheses on 97 cases of great power deterrence encounters by means of probit analysis the results are that the hypotheses derived from deterrence theory receive considerable support whereas none of the hypotheses derived from structural realism are supported in contemporary research on the causes of international conflict the realist paradigm has been the dominant theoretical approach within this broad framework however scholars have developed at least two prominent alternative models of the conditions under which conflict is likely to arise the first approach structural realism 1 focuses on the attributes of the international system while the second deterrence theory is largely dyadic and emphasizes the resolve and relative military capabilities of adversarial states while both theoretical approaches attempt to identify the conditions under which international crises and wars are likely to arise their

stability and centrality of legislative choice in the spatial context majority rule spatial voting games lacking a core still always present a near core outcome more commonly known as the copeland winner this is the alternative that defeats or ties the greatest number of alternatives in the space previous research has not tested the copeland winner as a solution concept for spatial voting games without a core lacking a way to calculate where the copeland winner was with an infinite number of alternatives we provide a straightforward algorithm to find the copeland winner and show that it corresponds well to experimental outcomes in an important set of experimental legislative voting games we also provide an intuitive motivation for why legislative outcomes in the spatial context may be expected to lie close to the copeland winner finally we show a connection between the copeland winner and the shapley value and provide a simple but powerful algorithm to calculate the copeland scores of all points in the space in terms of the modified power values of each of the voters and their locations in the space

principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard abstract this paper analyzes competition between two principals for the exclusive services of an agent of unknown ability the principals differ in their marginal and average valuations for the agent s input they compete by offering menus of incentive contracts a prominent feature of the equilibrium when neither principal fully dominates is that they both offer identical pooling contracts to an interval of intermediate ability types all these types supply a constant input level receive the same monetary rewards and yield zero profits to the principals in addition the effort of low ability types is greater than the efficient level and welfare may be lower than if there was only one principal journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 c72

multinationals tax competition and outside options abstract we analyze tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an outside option e g towards a third country an interesting finding is that more attractive outside options for firms may constitute a win win situation the firm as well as its present host countries may gain when this occurs the reason that it benefits the host countries is that an enhanced outside option reduces the inefficiencies of tax competition an implication of the result is that better outside options for multinational firms may reduce the gains from host countries policy coordination and thus reduce those countries incentives to coordinate their policies also with a development where outside options become more accessible the perceived costs of tax competition e g in terms of underprovision of public goods may be overestimated our findings may also have implications for international negotiations since it provides an argument for mutual reduction of entry barriers as this may improve outside options

south korea s 1980s financial reforms good bye financial repression maybe hello new institutional restraints abstract south korea s financial reforms in the 1980s have been consistent with high rates of savings and financial deepening but they have not followed liberal reform lines the korean financial system operates under the umbrella of an industrial policy and economic goals have been attained by means of investments in institutions rather than by exclusive reliance on the price mechanism

spillovers and international competition for investments abstract two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large multinational enterprise whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms the firm has private information about its efficiency and about spillovers it is shown that the firm may be harmed by tax competition relative to a cooperative tax agreement tax competition may induce excessive investments in the country where the positive spillover effects are lowest also with sufficiently asymmetric spillovers investments under competition will be excessively spread out not properly concentrated to the country where spillovers would be largest

the asian debt and development crisis of 1997 causes and consequences abstract interpretations of the asian crisis have coalesced around two rival stories the death throes of asian state capitalism story about internal real economy causes and the panic triggering debt deflation in a basically sound but under regulated system story that gives more role to external and financial system causes the paper presents the stories and assesses the evidence the evidence in particular the chronology of the crisis supports the second rather better than the first the paper discusses the interests driving capital account liberalization without a framework of regulation the single most irresponsible act of public authorities in the whole crisis us and uk financial firms allied with their treasuries and with the imf the wto and the oecd saw themselves at a chronic disadvantage in the asian system of long term relationships and patient capital this alliance supported by segments of asian political and financial elites achieved dramatic domestic financial sector liberalization and capital account opening in asia over the 1990s setting up the conditions for crisis paradoxically the crisis may be looked back upon not as the triumph of benign globalization and neoliberal economic doctrine but as the beginning of its end

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

the effect of financial liberalization on the capital structure and investment decisions of indonesian manufacturing establishments this article analyzes the consequences of financial liberalization using a large panel of indonesian manufacturing establishments it discusses whether financial reforms have had an impact on investment and on the allocation of credit and whether the effects differ depending on the type of firms the overall conclusion is that shifting from administrative toward market based allocation of credit has increased borrowing cost particularly for smaller firms but at the same time has benefited firms by giving them widened access to finance

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

internationally mobile firms and tax policy abstract this paper analyses how the government should tax internationally mobile firms the analysis finds that if tax authorities are unable to observe firms true mobility and domestic and foreign profitability are uncorrelated then 1 information rents are acquired by immobile inefficient firms and 2 the optimal policy will stimulate investment in the immobile sector compared to the complete information case another result of the paper is that the optimal allocation is implementable within the framework of a corporate income tax system where mobile firms self select more unfavourable capital allowances than immobile firms

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

models of financially repressed developing economies abstract the past decade has witnessed an explosion of research on financial sector models of financially repressed developing economies for the most part financial repression is interpreted to be the technique of holding interest rates particularly deposit rates of interest below their free market equilibrium levels the recent spate of activity in this field was produced by the simultaneous publication in 1973 of books by mckinnon and shaw both authors demonstrate how economic theory can be applied to the analysis of the effects of financial conditions on investment and the real rate of economic growth since 1973 models of financially repressed developing economies have been formalized mathematically extended to open economies in order to analyse exchange rate policies and tested empirically this paper presents a critical survey of the major contributions to the literature in this field since 1973

competing for a duopoly international trade and tax competition we analyse the tax subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of rms in a duopolistic industry competition between identical countries for a monopoly rm s plant is known to result in subsidy in ation which leaves the winning country indierent towards hosting the rm in sharp contrast we show that with two rms both are taxed in equilibrium and the host countries appropriate the entire social surplus generated within the industry despite the explicit non cooperation between governments we extend our baseline model to allow for dierences in country size we investigate when this size asymmetry becomes su ciently large to change the nature of the equilibrium inducing concentration of production in the larger country

testing theories of strategic choice the example of crisis escalation strategic choice explanations of international crisis escalation imply that because actors anticipate the likely responses of others and choose actions that avoid undesirable responses our observations of nations decisions to use force are interdependent and censored for example suppose a weak nation b is threatened by a powerful neighbor a if b believes a s threat then it should back down unfortunately this censors our ability to observe whether a would actually use violence many traditional methods ignore this censoring and mis specify the extent to which variables influence crisis behavior to ameliorate the problems of interdependence and censoring i develop the strategically censored discrete choice model estimating this model using bayesian markov chain monte carlo simulation methods i analyze bueno de mesquita and lalman s 1992 dyadically coded version of the militarized interstate dispute data gochmann and maoz 1984 based on bayesian model comparison statistics i conclude that strategic explanations outperform nonstrategic ones in explaining crisis behavior

a re examination of the demand for money in small developing economies this paper re examines the money demand function in three small open economies of asia korea pakistan and singapore in addition to using the relatively new procedure of error correction modelling the roles of variables such as a the expected change in the exchange rate b foregin interest rates and c foreign exchange risks on money demand are examined in testing the importance of these variables in the money demand function special attention is paid to testing the assumptions of the classical linear regression model the sample period for each country spans from 1973 1 through 1990 1 the empirical results suggest that the error correction specification performs very well in addition to the traditional variables the results suggest that at least some measure of foreign monetary developments appear to have some significant effect on money demand behaviour in these small developing economies

the multiprincipal nature of government abstract one of the theoretical tools required to open the black box of the government organization is the theory of multiprincipals which describes how different incentive mechanisms compete with each others in viewing the set of relationships between several government bodies and the entities they regulate as a set of competing contracts in which the control of the regulatory process is shared amongst these different regulators we can address the question of the costs and the possible benefits of such structural separation first this paper surveys the previous literature on the topic then it traces out the possible benefits of such structures to the non benevolence of regulators we discuss also how regulatory rights of control and communication channels must be designed all together to deal with this problem

reason and war a new specification of the expected utility model of international conflict places expected utilities within a polar coordinate system treats thirdparty choices in a manner more consistent with classical forms estimates the expected utilities derived from not challenging existing policies more fully represents the expected costs of conflict and normalizes expected utilities regardless of system size by assuming that the probability of escalation of a dispute increases monotonically with leaders expectations of gain we derive continuous functions for the probabilities of war intervention violence and peace the revised theory significantly improves our ability to discriminate between violent and nonviolent disputes and between violent disputes that escalated to warfare and those that did not in europe between 1816 and 1970 in this essay

the costs of war a rational expectations approach a model of war costs is presented that is based on the utility nations expect to derive from the war as well as on the technological gap between adversaries and the short term tactical tit for tat calculations that must occur on the battlefield this model explains nearly three quarters of the variance in battle deaths per million population per month of war experienced by war initiators approximately one quarter of the variance in war costs is accounted for by considering the position of the initiator s opponent a second model based on marginal changes in expected utility technological differences and tit for tat is shown to account for more than one third the variance regardless of whether war costs are viewed by the initiator or an opponent in a war this study therefore provides a useful explanation of war intensity and contributes to the cumulative lawlike implications of the expected utility approach on which it is based

regulation of multinational firms with two active governments a common agency approach abstract when a government agency imposes cost based taxes regulations on a multinational with private cost information it may initiate countervailing regulations by another of the governments with which the multinational interacts we analyze the problem of optimal regulation of a multinational under incomplete cost information via trade taxes by multiple governments as a problem of common agency with adverse selection by focusing on the game played by the competing governments we characterize the equilibrium trade taxes and show that the non cooperative behavior of the governments not only reduces aggregate national welfare but also reduces firm profits

multinational firms global strategies host country indigenisation of ownership and welfare abstract this paper examines the costs and benefits that may arise when host countries aim to indigenise the ownership of foreign subsidiaries it is shown that there may be an optimal level of indigenisation beyond which the marginal social costs of such policies will exceed the corresponding benefits the analysis also shows that the optimum indigenisation may depend among other things on whether the subsidiary is autonomous or fully controlled by the parent company a further result is that if the subsidiaries equity is purchased by private firms or individuals the privately optimum level of indigenisation is likely to be greater than the socially optimum

conflict resolution and peace this paper analyzes the escalation of conflict in crisis situations as the outcome of choices made by rational individuals in times of crisis national leaders must confront the conflicts of interest that might lie dormant under other circumstances a crisis is characterized as a constraint in the options available to decision makers they must choose either to negotiate or to fight the form that the resolution of the conflict takes is determined by the options chosen by assuming that the probability of a rational leader choosing a particular strategy is monotonic with the expected utility associated with that choice marginal contributions to the probability of an event are combined to provide functional forms that predict peace asymmetric escalation and war this approach yields a single theory of war and peace that also accounts for the occurrence of military interventions the more frequently observed form of conflict escalation it is also shown that peace is not simply the absence of war the theory is tested using a revised specification of the expected utility measures in 133 disputes involving european states

stagflationary effects of monetary stabilization policies a quantitative analysis of south korea this paper presents a macro model of the korean economy that focuses on short run macro economic adjustment and more in particular on the transmission channels of monetary policy between the financial and the real sector of the economy in addition to the usual link between monetary policy and aggregate demand via investment the link between monetary policy and the supply side of the economy via the financing of working capital with borrowed funds is incorporated this link can potentially reverse the short run impact of tight money on inflation and aggregate the impact on output both export prices and domestic prices show a significant sensitivity to cost of financing working capital this credit supply side link gives a stagflationary bias to restrictive credit policies the empirical relevance of this phenomenon is strongly supported by the simulation results derived with the model structurally section 2 of the paper focuses on the real sector part of the model section 3 discusses the financial sector in section 4 different monetary stabilization packages are simulated using the model presented in sections 2 and 3 and alternative policy measures are discussed the simulation runs show strong short run stagflationary effects of tight money policies

war and expected utility theory in his book the war trap bruce bueno de mesquita claims to offer a deductive theory of international conflict based on the assumption that foreign policy makers attempt to maximize their expected utility the theory is subjected to a systematic empirical test that seems to provide impressive confirmation the first part of this article examines bueno de mesquita s theory and argues that it cannot be derived from his assumptions the second part examines the operational version of the theory which was the one actually tested and argues that it can be more plausibly interpreted as a version of a different theory one that bueno de mesquita claims to have discredited the essay concludes by discussing the significance of this book with regard to the question of whether theories of individual rational choice can explain foreign policy decisions

pareto inefficiency of market economies search and efficiency wage models this paper shows that market economies with search and in which wages are affected by efficiency wage considerations are not constrained pareto efficient wages are not set at pareto efficient levels nor is the level of employment unemployment pareto efficient we identify the nature of the biases and the welfare improving government interventions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

rational deterrence theory i think therefore i deter deterrence theories purport to supply the auxiliary assumptions rational choice theories need to predict rational strategic behavior they generally assume that would be initiators are i instrumentally rational 2 risk prone gain maximizers 3 free of domestic constraints and 4 able to identify themselves correctly as defenders or challengers these assumptions are contradicted by empirical studies that indicate that risk prone gain maximizing initiators are relatively uncommon that leaders at times calculate as deterrence theories expect but behave contrary to their predictions and that the calculus of initiators generally depends on factors other than those identified by deterrence theories deductive theories of deterrence are also inadequate because they do not define their scope conditions nor can they accommodate deviation by initiators from processes of rational calculation rational deterrence theories are poorly specified theories about nonexistent decision makers operating in nonexistent environments