two sided search marriages and matchmakers this article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two sided search agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on 0 1 their utility is equal to the index of their mate in a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure if the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure if the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary

cities matching and the productivity gains of agglomeration abstract the striking geographical concentration of economic activities suggests that there are substantial benefits to agglomeration however the nature of those benefits remains unclear in this paper we take advantage of a new data set to quantify the role of one of the main contenders the matching of workers and jobs we show that thicker urban labor markets are associated with more assortative matching in terms of worker and firm quality when we estimate establishment level production functions we also find evidence of complementarities between worker and firm quality putting together the production and matching relationships we show that production complementarity and assortative matching is an important source of the urban productivity premium

estimating the stock flow matching model using micro data we estimate the stock flow matching model using micro level data from a well defined labor market using a dataset of complete labor market histories for both sides of the market we estimate hazard functions for job seekers and vacancies we find that the stock of new vacancies has a significant positive impact on the job seeker hazard over and above that of the total stock of vacancies there is an even stronger robust result for vacancy hazards thus we find evidence in favor of stock flow matching even when controlling for unobserved search heterogeneity and stratifying into submarkets defined by location and occupation

search intensity job advertising and efficiency this paper demonstrates that if both firms and workers search the other side of the market for job matches the equilibrium rate of unemployment is likely to be too high both sides ignore a positive externality of their search when they establish a job match they remove from the market a job searcher so they save society his search costs i show that there is no feasible wage rate that can internalize this externality under fairly weak restrictions on the technology of search

an equilibrium model of search unemployment this paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined we use this model to analyze the comparati

transferable skills job matching and the inefficiency of the natural rate of unemployment the idea of the natural rate of unemployment has been with us since friedman i 968 this can be interpreted simply as an assertion of the long run homogeneity of the walrasian or flexible price is lm system in prices see e g sargent i979 p 325 over the last ten years however attempts have been made to model the natural rate explicitly following the original friedman phelps idea that it could be thought of as the equilibrium rate of unemployment in a search framework although the main focus of attention especially on the empirical side has been on the determinants of the equilibrium rate and changes in this rate see johnson and layard i 984 it was soon recognised that in a search environment the equilibrium rate may not be efficient this point was made by tobin i972 among others who said the external effects are the familiar ones of congestion theory a worker deciding to join a queue or stay in one considers the probabilities of getting a job but not the effects of his decision on the probabilities that others face external effects also occur in the decisions of employers whether to fill a vacancy with the applicant at hand or to wait for someone more qualified recent papers by diamond and pissarides see diamond i 98 i i 982 pissarides i983 i984 have attempted to model these external effects in a stochastic matching model that can be described briefly as follows there are a number of jobs and workers who are paired by a stochastic matching process the number of jobs or workers may be fixed or determined by free entry conditions once a job and worker are paired the productivity of the match is determined by random draw and the partners must decide whether to accept or reject it there are potentially three margins of decision making in this type of model the decision to enter or exit the market the choice of lowest acceptable reservation productivity and the choice of search or advertising intensity it has been shown that individual decision making at each of these three margins may be socially inefficient what these inefficiencies have in common as pissarides i 983 makes clear is that they are all due to external effects that work through the matching technology that is when individuals choose to enter a market accept a match or search more intensively they ignore the impact of their decisions on the matching probabilities of other agents in the market one important limitation of the diamond pissarides model is that both firms and workers are assumed homogeneous we show in this paper that if this

desperate housewives communication difficulties and the dynamics of marital un happiness this paper develops a model of marital dissolution based on communication difficulties the quality of a marriage depends on the proximity of an action to a target the target is unknown and must be learned over time each individual receives private signals about the target and can communicate them only imperfectly to his or her spouse because of imperfect communication spouses may hold different beliefs about the optimal action the action actually chosen is a compromise of the spouses distinct beliefs if a couple s beliefs diverge too widely one or both of them may prefer to dissolve the marriage the paper explores how poor communication contributes to marital unhappiness as well as its implications for the dynamics of divorce risk the welfare properties of divorce decisions and the role of counseling when the distribution of decision making power in the household favors men wives but not husbands can find themselves trapped for prolonged periods in a marriage that leaves them as unhappy as it is possible to be without seeking relief through divorce

beauty vs earnings gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model abstract i develop a model of marriage matching where males and females care about two distinct characteristics of their spouse beauty and earnings each individual s beauty is exogenous but earnings depend on human capital investments made by each individual prior to entering the marriage market i show that even if males and females constitute ex ante identical populations with identical underlying preferences and equal access to human capital investment and labor market opportunities there can still exist an equilibrium where on average one gender invests more in human capital than the other and moreover members of one gender are more likely to prioritize beauty over earnings in a spouse while members of the other gender are more likely to prioritize a potential spouse s earnings over beauty

prices for cash and cash for prices theory and evidence on convenient pricing a transaction between a seller and a buyer incurs a payment cost the payment cost is borne by the seller depending on the payment instrument the buyer chooses cash or card card payment is more costly than cash payment so the seller prefers that the buyer pays cash in this article we study the strategy of the seller setting a convenient price which simplifies transactions and pushes the buyer to pay cash the theoretical analysis which models both the seller and the buyer in a game setting derives two propositions 1 the seller is more likely to set a more convenient price and 2 the buyer is more likely to pay cash a more convenient price the empirical analysis supports both propositions thus sellers adopt a convenience pricing strategy prices for cash and this strategy pushes buyers to pay cash cash for prices

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

marriage and class here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable we utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria the model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria even with constant returns to matching excerpt

search and the efficient assignment of workers to jobs in a model in which different types of workers form matches with different types of employers a method of calculating opportunity costs of workers and jobs is derived these are shown to differ systematically from the reservation wages and profits used by workers and employers to determine whether matches should be formed ex ante differences among workers and among jobs then generate externalities in the labor market resulting in inefficient assignments of workers to jobs and multiple equilibria intervention in the labor market by altering the assignment can increase aggregate output but may cause regressive redistribution copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

matching with noise and the acceptance curse abstract this paper explores matching with both search and information frictions specifically everyone observes only a noisy signal of the true type of any potential mate in this context matching decisions must incorporate not only information about a partner s attribute conveyed by the noisy signal but also as in the winner s curse in auction theory information about a partner s type contained in his or her acceptance decision we show that there exists an equilibrium exhibiting a stochastic positive assorting of types generalizing becker j polit economy 81 1973 813 846 in equilibrium selection is adverse being accepted reduces an agent s estimate of a potential partner s type a phenomenon that we call the acceptance curse effect

marriage markets and money a coasian theory of household formation this article integrates search based models of marriage and money we think about households as organizations the way coase thinks about firms as alternatives to markets that become more attractive when transactions costs increase in the model individuals consume market and home produced goods and home production is facilitated by marriage market frictions including taxes search and bargaining problems increase the marriage propensity the inflation tax encourages marriage because being single is cash intensive microdata confirm singles use cash more than married people we use macrodata over many countries to investigate how marriage responds to inflation taxation and other variables

minorities and endogenous segregation a theoretical analysis is proposed of segregation as an equilibrium phenomenon in a randommatching model of the marriage market otherwise identical partners possess a pay off irrelevant characteristic colour we derive the set of colour blind equilibria and show that they are generically constrained inefficient equilibrium segregation strategies are strategies that condition actions on the type of match it is shown that distributions of types exist such that segregation equilibrium pay offs pareto dominate colour blind pay offs for other distributions segregation also generates conflict where the majority unambiguously gains while the minority group may lose giving preferential treatment that is minority bias can increase overall welfare

more on middlemen equilibrium entry and efficiency in intermediated markets this paper generalizes rubinstein and wolinsky s 1987 model of middlemen intermediation by incorporating production and search costs plus more general matching and bargaining this allows us to study many new issues including entry efficiency and dynamics in the benchmark model equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others sometimes intermediation is essential the market operates if and only if middlemen are active if bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient if not there can be too much or too little economic activity this is novel compared to the original rubinstein wolinsky model where equilibrium is always efficient

birth control and female empowerment an equilibrium analysis we analyze from a theoretical perspective the impact of innovations in birth control technology on intrahousehold allocation of resources we consider a model of frictionless matching on the marriage market in which men as well as women differ in their preferences for children moreover men unlike women must marry to enjoy fatherhood we show that more efficient birth control technologies generally increase the power hence the welfare of all women including those who do not use them this empowerment effect requires that the new technology be available to single women an innovation reserved to married women may result in a disempowerment effect

rational expectations business cycles in search equilibrium we examine the rational expectations equilibrium paths of the model of search and barter in diamond s aggregate demand management in search equilibrium for some initial positions there are two equilibrium paths converging to different steady states with the high activity path pareto dominating the low activity path with some parameters there is also a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to another steady state moreover there can be cycles that are equilibrium paths even though the environment is stationary

long term partnership formation marriage and employment of course marriage and employment are different nevertheless a worker looking for a job a rm looking for worker or a single person looking for a marriage partner face similar problems as all are seeking a long term partner indeed forming long term partnerships is a common occurrence in life there are many other examples business people search for other business people to form a pro table relationship bridge players seek to nd a suitable partners students search for a good university we would all like to nd a good friend etc the problem becomes signi cant if there are substantial differences in the return obtained from forming a partnership with different partners for example employers differ in the wages they offer or in the work environment they provide in such a situation a worker may reject some job offers similarly as many have learned to their cost some make better marriage partners than others the problem is two sided while a worker is evaluating a potential employer the employer is also evaluating the worker it is this two sided aspect of the problem that generates a signi cant interest a worker s willingness to accept employment at a rm depends not only on the characteristics of the rm but also the other possible options open to the worker the better an individual s opportunities elsewhere the more selective he or she will be in evaluating a potential partnership an academic who believes harvard may make an offer in the near future will be more selective in evaluating offers from lesser universities in this way expectations play a role if a single man believes that few if any women will nd him an acceptable marriage partner then he may accept the rst opportunity that presents itself partnership formation typically does not comply with a classic market situation where all participants know everything and all trades take place at zero cost finding a job nding a husband or wife or nding a business partner is a time consuming activity where opportunities typically arrive over time at uncertain intervals of time of course we can act in ways that in uence the arrival rate of potential partner workers go to employment agencies or read help wanted advertisements in newspapers singles of a certain age go to discos or join tennis clubs the literature on search and matching sm see mortensen 1982 and pissarides 1990 for early examples 1 provides an excellent framework for the economic journal 109 june f307 f334 royal economic society 1999 published by blackwell publishers 108 cowley road oxford ox4 1jf uk and 350 main street malden ma 02148 usa

marriage and the city search frictions and sorting of singles this paper develops and tests a model where cities play an important role as marriage markets the idea is simple cities are dense areas where singles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas to enjoy those benefits they are willing to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices once married the benefits from meeting more potential partners vanish and married couples move out of the city attractive singles benefit most from a dense market and are therefore more likely to move to the city those predictions are tested and confirmed with a unique danish data set

education matching and the allocative value of romance societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non market goods such as marital partnerships we explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labour supply decisions of partnered couples we consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt these generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy while marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market the analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross country differences in educational investments and labour force participation based on matching regimes

structural estimation of marriage models a structural approach is used to examine who matches with whom a two sided matching model that allows for marital sorting in response to marriage market flexibility and agents preferences is utilized estimation is based on imbedding the numerical solution of a matching model within a maximum likelihood procedure results indicate that wage is more desirable than education in predicting marriageability for white men education is more desirable for black men the marriage market for white men is more flexible both marriage market flexibility and the chance of being classified correctly using agents wage and education decrease with age for white men

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

mobility costs frictional unemployment and efficiency with imperfect job information flows it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed with word of mouth communication this condition is derived given this condition steady state equilibrium is not efficient with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral in this way workers become more selective in the jobs they accept

consume now or later time inconsistency collective choice and revealed preference this paper develops a revealed preference methodology for exploring whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of nonstationarities at the individual level or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit an empirical application to household level microdata highlights that an explicit recognition of the collective nature of choice allows the vast majority of household behaviour to be rationalised by theory that assumes preference stationarity at the individual level for our particular short panel data set simply permitting limited intrahousehold heterogeneity in time preferences allows the choices of 98 4 of the sample to be rationalised by a model that assumes exponential discounting at the individual level we also find that couples characterized by lower divergence in spousal discount rates are older more likely to have children and wealthier which we take as indications of experiencing higher match quality

stable marriages and search frictions stable matchings are the primary solution concept for two sided matching markets with nontransferable utility we investigate the strategic foundations of stability in a decentralized matching market towards this end we embed the standard marriage markets in a search model with random meetings we study the limit of steady state equilibria as exogenous frictions vanish the main result is that convergence of equilibrium matchings to stable matchings is guaranteed if and only if there is a unique stable matching in the underlying marriage market whenever there are multiple stable matchings sequences of equilibrium matchings converging to unstable inefficient matchings can be constructed thus vanishing frictions do not guarantee the stability and efficiency of decentralized marriage markets

divorce remarriage and child support there is some evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families but that this gap declines with the aggregate divorce rate we develop a model in which the higher expectations for remarriage associated with higher divorce rates can trigger an equilibrium in which divorced fathers make more generous transfers that benefit their children and the mother in the aftermath of divorce as a result the welfare loss of children from the separation of their parents can be lower when divorce and remarriage rates rise

smart dating in speed dating how a simple search model can explain matching decisions abstract how do people in a romantic matching situation choose a potential partner we study this question in a new model of matching under search frictions which we estimate using data from an existing speed dating experiment we find that attraction is mostly in the eye of the beholder and that the attraction between two potential partners has a tendency to be mutual these results are supported by a direct measure of subjective attraction we also simulate the estimated model and it predicts rejection patterns matching rates and sorting outcomes that fit the data very well our results are consistent with the hypothesis that people in a dating environment act strategically and have at least an implicit understanding of the nature of the frictions and of the strategic equilibrium

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

some empirical evidence on the time series properties of four uk asset prices in this paper the authors examine the time series behavior of four u k asset prices and estimate two types of models for the differenced series much previous research has found the presence of time varying heteroskedasticity in the error process for asset prices a linear model with gqarch errors is compared to a joint bilinear model with gqarch errors the latter choice motivated by the ability of bilinear models to capture turbulent behavior the adequacy of these models is determined by examining simulations and also employing test statistics the forecasting performance of the two models is also compared copyright 1996 by the london school of economics and political science