a market to implement the core abstract i present a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core of an underlying convex tu game the mechanism resembles an asset market in which one of the players is randomly selected as a broker who centralizes trade in addition the rules of the mechanism are independent of the coalitional function therefore the mechanism is useful for an incompletely informed designer who wishes to implement the core of these games the mechanism is inspired by the reduced games relevant for the consistency of the core journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 and c72

simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems abstract this paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing subselections of the core correspondence of matching markets we provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many to one real life matching markets we show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism we also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games abstract this paper shows the equivalence between the stable solution set of any cooperative game in characteristic form g1 and the subgame perfect nash equilibria in pure strategies of a certain noncooperative game g2 players of g1 are named agents g2 is played by different players principals who compete in wages to attract agents the equivalence result holds when there are enough principals if the game is superadditive two principals suffice finally another related cooperative game g3 is constructed with both principals and agents as players for g2 and g3 the same result is then proven for any number of principals journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 and c72

production externalities and urban configuration abstract we formally explore jacobs idea that uncompensated knowledge spillovers are crucial for agglomeration by modeling location dependent interfirm production externalities in a general equilibrium linear city framework good and factor allocation firms and households locational choice and wages and land rents are all endogenously determined the unique equilibrium urban configuration may be concentrated with monocentric firm locations dispersed with completely mixed firm household locations or a combination depending on the population of firms transportation cost and firm interaction parameters due to distance dependent production externalities firms will be clustered together in any equilibrium thus ruling out the possibility of any multicentric urban configuration journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 r12

a finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search abstract i study a model in which a finite number of men and women look for future spouses via random pairwise meetings the central question is whether equilibrium marriage outcomes are stable matchings when search frictions are small the answer is they can but need not be for any stable matching there is an equilibrium leading to it almost surely however there may also be equilibria leading to an unstable matching almost surely a restriction to simpler strategies or to markets with aligned preferences rules out such equilibria however unstable even pareto dominated matchings may still arise with positive probability under those two restrictions combined in addition inefficiency due to delay may remain significant despite vanishing search frictions finally a condition is identified under which all equilibria are outcome equivalent stable and efficient

is national technology policy obsolete in a globalised world the japanese response it is increasingly argued that in a world where trade business and finance and science and technology cross national borders attempts by national governments and firms to appropriate the fruits of national technology programs are doomed to fail japan although a late globalizer is becoming increasingly globalized however japanese policymakers have responded by internationalizing japan s technology policy while retaining its national objectives this paper examines if these policies are doomed to fail or if they can be justified and if the latter whether the japanese case is special or if it is at least to some extent valid for large western countries c 1995 academic press inc copyright 1995 by oxford university press

effectiveness of policy measures in transforming the energy system abstract the effectiveness of public policy measures in creating energy impacts were investigated through 20 policy cases on renewable energy and efficient energy use the policies were grouped into subsidy type and catalyzing measures based on the use of the public financial resources the policy cost of subsidies ranged from 1 mwh up to over 100 mwh the feed in tariffs being clearly the most expensive choice the public measures that strive for catalyzing market breakthroughs lie in the range 0 1 1 mwh but some business driven and procurement type measures could come down to even 0 01 mwh the policy costs observed could decrease by 25 60 if accounting for lagging energy impacts the better policy efficiency of catalytic measures is most likely due to a stronger market and business sensitiveness understanding of market needs and focusing more on the end use sector with active stakeholder involvement the magnitude of the energy impacts were in average larger from the subsidy instruments but a few end use technologies linked to catalytic measures reached even higher effects due to the strong market penetration achieved

misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem it has been shown previously that for two sided discrete markets of the kind exemplified by the marriage problem no strategy proof procedure for aggregating preferences into stable outcomes exists here it is shown that nash equilibrium misrepresentation of preferences nevertheless results in a stable outcome in terms of the true preferences when the aggregation procedure yields the optimal stable outcome in terms of the stated preferences for one side of the market journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 025 026 0 1984 academic

national systems of biotechnology innovation complex interdependence in the global system this paper explores the relationship between national institutional context and the development of biotechnology in the united states united kingdom japan and germany national patterns in biotechnology r d are linked to the configuration of county specific institutional features into a system of innovation which supports or impedes the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge between the scientific and industrial communities building on this comparative analysis it is argued that the particular characteristics of national systems of biotechnology innovation form the basis for complex interdependence within the global system through international technological cooperation and the cross border adoption and adaptation of institutional forms and practices implications for national technological advantage and the stability of national institutional systems are discussed

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

non revelation mechanisms for many to many matching equilibria versus stability we study many to many matching markets in which agents from a set a are matched to agents from a disjoint set b through a two stage non revelation mechanism in the rst stage a agents who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to simultaneously make proposals to the b agents in the second stage b agents sequentially and respecting the quota choose and match to available a proposers we study the subgame perfect nash equilibria of the induced game we prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all a agents preferences are substitutable we also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the a agents in particular implementation holds when a agents preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non binding

increasing returns and perfect competition the role of land abstract the classical inconsistency between increasing returns and perfect competition is studied for example if firms must pay a fixed cost of entry but then can produce using a constant returns to scale technology they will generally operate at a loss necessitating a government subsidy in order to attain an efficient allocation here we provide examples demonstrating that perfect competition and increasing returns can be consistent by extending the alonso model to include production the key is that producers use intervals of land and the price they pay for land interior to the parcels can be adjusted to provide an implicit subsidy

hiring procedures to implement stable allocations abstract we implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in subgame perfect equilibrium we use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker first stage and then each worker accepts at most one proposal second stage moreover if agents preferences are additive this mechanism implements in subgame perfect equilibrium the firms optimal corre spondence when firms use undominated strategies finally we construct another simple sequential mechanism where the order of decisions is permuted and which implements the workers optimal correspondence when agents preferences are additive journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

analyzing the functional dynamics of technological innovation systems a scheme of analysis various researchers and policy analysts have made empirical studies of innovation systems in order to understand their current structure and trace their dynamics however policy makers often experience difficulties in extracting practical guidelines from studies of this kind in this paper we operationalize our previous work on a functional approach to analyzing innovation system dynamics into a practical scheme of analysis for policy makers the scheme is based on previous literature and our own experience in developing and applying functional thinking it can be used by policy makers not only to identify the key policy issues but also to set policy goals

a simple theory of smart growth and sprawl abstract this paper considers the simultaneous determination of residential density and the supply of local versus remote retail services possible equilibrium development patterns either correspond closely to what anti sprawl activists describe as smart growth or to its opposite equilibrium and optimal patterns of development do not always coincide when equilibrium and optimal patterns of development diverge optimal density is always discretely as opposed to marginally higher than equilibrium density this occurs in the absence of congestion externalities and is due to a free rider problem and a coordination problem the analysis indicates that a tax on large lots or a subsidy for small lots may be welfare improving under certain conditions

internationalization as a strategy to overcome industry barriers an assessment of the marine energy industry abstract research on conditions to develop new innovations within emerging renewable energy industries is often done with a national focus however recent research on international entrepreneurship has revealed that firms operate on international levels very early in their life time thus based on former research on international entrepreneurship and case examples we build the propositions that firms in the marine energy industry use internationalization as a strategy to overcome industry barriers our primary source of data is a unique dataset from a global survey of all the companies in the marine energy industry who are aiming to commercialize a wave or tidal energy device this paper is organized in two steps first we identified the most challenging industry barriers perceived by companies second we use these to form propositions which we assess through empirical data the two most challenging barriers perceived by the companies are need for capital and need for supportive political schemes our findings reveal that internationalization certainly is a common strategy to access capital and attractive support schemes in foreign countries the early internationalization has implications for researchers managers and policy makers

a simple selling and buying procedure abstract for the assignment game we analyze the following mechanism sellers simultaneously fix their prices first then buyers sequentially decide which object to buy also each buyer may report his or her indifferences along with the previous buyers indifferences to the following buyer the first phase determines the potential prices while the second phase determines the actual matching reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers moreover when buyers state their true indifferences the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

who gets what the mne the national state and the distributional effects of globalization globalization is the outcome of the interface between national states and mnes it is a negotiated solution rather than perfect market equilibrium even in a global liberalized world national states are trying to generate as much welfare for their residents as they can while mnes try to maximize their value this creates a bargaining situation a stylized game theory model is presented and discussed in order to gain insights into the income distributional effects of the globalization process two important features of the model are a that there is a need for a carefully spelt out strategy and b that optimal solutions depend on an ability to identify the elements of the bargaining where the opportunity cost is low a case study of the negotiation between the state of israel and intel is presented as an illustration for this general model

alonso s discrete population model of land use efficient allocations and competitive equilibria in his 1964 book w alonso proposed several concepts of land use equilibrium in terms of discrete population however the so called new urban economics has been concerned exclusively with continuous population models it is the authors belief that in order to develop logical foundations for continuous population models it would be useful to go back to the original models of alonso in this paper they focus on the additive land price model of alonso and examine its solution characteristics in particular the authors demonstrate the existence and pareto efficiency of equilibria and the supportability of efficient allocations through additive land price systems copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

technological learning in offshore wind energy different roles of the government offshore wind energy is a promising source of renewable electricity even though its current costs prevent large scale implementation technological learning has improved the technology and its economic performance already and could result in significant further improvements this study investigates how technological learning takes place in offshore wind energy and how technological learning is related to different policy regimes offshore wind energy developments in denmark and the united kingdom have been analysed with a technology specific innovation systems approach the results reveal that the dominant forms of learning are learning by doing and learning by using at the same time learning by interacting is crucial to achieve the necessary binding elements in the technology specific innovation system generally most learning processes were performed by self organizing entities however sometimes cultural and technical barriers occurred excluding component suppliers and knowledge institutes from the innovation system danish policies successfully anticipated these barriers and removed them therefore the danish policies can be characterized as pro active british policies shaped stable conditions for learning only therefore they can be characterized as active in the future barriers could hinder learning by interacting between the oil and gas industry the offshore wind industry and academia based on this study we suggest national and international policy makers to design long term policies to anticipate these barriers in order to contribute to technological learning

implementation in the many to many matching market abstract this paper deals with a discrete many to many matching market of firms and workers we analyze the following mechanism firms announce the set of workers they want to hire then workers select the set of firms with which they want to work the first phase of the game determines the potential partners while the second phase determines the actual matching we prove that subgame perfect nash equilibria spne always exist while strong equilibria se may not exist we characterize the spne outcomes as the pairwise stable matchings and show that there may be no spne outcome in the core when the preferences of the agents are not maximin however when the preferences of the firms respectively workers are maximin the core always contains the equilibrium outcomes

in search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred acceptance algorithm many centralized entry level labor markets use the firm proposing deferred acceptance da algorithm to compute the matching that is implemented among workers and firms we propose a definition of the strategic options a worker faces in the da algorithm then we develop a theory to advise workers who distinguish between the firms from which they believe not to receive a proposal the firms from which they might receive a proposal and the firms from which they certainly receive a proposal if a worker is not able to deduce which new proposals she receives after having rejected others then it is not profitable for her to submit a list that reverses the true ranking of any two acceptable firms furthermore it is not beneficial for her to include a firm in her submitted list that is unacceptable to her

the impact of corporate social performance on a firm s multinationality using panel data of 4 244 company years we examine whether and how corporate social performance csp affects a firm s capacity to achieve profitable sales in foreign markets based on our extension of instrumental stakeholder theory into the international arena we hypothesized a u shaped relationship between csp and multinationality results supported our contention that multinational enterprises mnes need to be substantially committed to social performance objectives if they are to recoup the cost of their csp investments and improve their capacity to compete in foreign markets mnes engaged in intermediate levels of csp achieve lower levels of multinationality than firms operating at either anchor of the social performance continuum in addition this study demonstrates that csp moderates a well established relationship in international business literature the relationship between r d investment and a firm s multinationality implications for research and practice are discussed

revealed preference and location choice abstract the assumption that population and structural densities are defined over parcels of land with zero area is problematic when interpreting the standard residential land use model as approximating a large finite economy this paper extends revealed preference theory to depict a spatial economy with land parcels of finite area the model generalizes the standard utility function approach allowing for many consumer types with different tastes and incomes and labor leisure choice to show that the most important predictions of the standard theory hold in the general finite framework studied here

equilibrium and the core in alonso s discrete population model of land use conventional wisdom tells us that with no market failure and local non satiation of preferences the core is at least as large as the collection of competitive equilibrium allocations we con rm this for a standard model featuring land next we consider the public land ownership version of the model if the role of land ownership and rent distribution is assumed by a government that ploughs back rent at least in excess of its agricultural value to its citizens the equilibrium remains efficient but no longer need be in the core

social welfare and income inequality in a system of cities abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of a system of core periphery cities to examine the main determinants of intra and inter regional income disparities the economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous unskilled and heterogeneous skilled workers unskilled workers whose wages are determined competitively specialize in food production in local cities skilled workers whose wages are determined according to a nash bargain manufacture a high tech commodity in the metropolis we establish conditions under which this core periphery equilibrium spatial configuration emerges we show that both intra and inter regional income disparities are present the determinants of each type of disparity and the social welfare implications are fully investigated our results suggest that public policy programs that improve income equality may not be necessarily welfare enhancing

implementation in undominated strategies a look at bounded mechanisms this paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems it is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies an example points out that the strength of this result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features in part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is rewarded this sort of tail chasing construction common in the constructive proofs of the literature is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form an equilibrium if such mechanisms are ruled out then the social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated strategies satisfy an incentive compatibility type condition called strategy resistence for social choice functions this is equivalent to strategy proofness this contrast suggests that this issue should be examined as it applies to other solution concepts used in implementation theory the last portion of the paper begins to explore the issue as it relates to nash implementation and undominated nash implementation

implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems abstract this note analyzes the possibility of implementing stable outcomes for marriage markets our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisms and the hypothesis of agents behavior considered in the nash equilibrium concept we analyze the possibility of implementing two sets of stable allocations by employing two types of mechanisms the first mechanism is a now or never choice process that permits us to implement in undominated nash equilibria the set of all the stable allocations the second choice process is the classic algorithm in matching theory the gale shapley mechanism a reversal property is observed in such a mechanism when agents act strategically the use of a mechanism which selects the best solution for one side of the market in the absence of strategic behavior yields the best stable solution for the agents on the other side under dominance solvability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d78 j41

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

big business and national governments reshaping the compact in a globalizing economy this paper was written by raymond vernon for the conference mapping the multinationals organized by bruce mazlish and alfred chandler in october 1999 professor vernon died on august 26 1999 at the age of 85 before the paper was finished and presented it was the last paper he wrote we are pleased to be able to publish it posthumously in this symposium with the permission of his daughter heidi vernon the paper was subject to minimal copyediting by the editor of jibs

uk innovation systems for new and renewable energy technologies drivers barriers and systems failures abstract a better understanding of the systemic processes by which innovation occurs is useful both conceptually and to inform policy making in support of innovation in more sustainable technologies this paper analyses current innovation systems in the uk for a range of new and renewable energy technologies and generates policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of these innovation systems although incentives are in place in the uk to encourage innovation in these technologies system failures or gaps are identified in moving technologies along the innovation chain preventing their successful commercialisation sustained investment will be needed for these technologies to achieve their potential it is argued that a stable and consistent policy framework is required to help create the conditions for this in particular such a framework should be aimed at improving risk reward ratios for demonstration and pre commercial stage technologies this would enhance positive expectations stimulate learning effects leading to cost reductions and increase the likelihood of successful commercialisation