national animosity and cross border alliances we extend the cross border strategic alliance knowledge base by introducing dyad specific antagonism animosity between nation pairs and hold that the formation and the type of firm level cross border alliances are nontrivially impacted by conflicting relations and animosity between their home nations we examine the formation of alliances between firms among nation dyads with and without a history of conflicts the frequency and magnitude of conflicts increase the perception of likelihood of opportunism and dyad specific risks materially affect the context in which firms make alliance decisions as animosity between two nations increases the number and the probability of forming alliances within the dyad the nations form decreases conditional on the expected number of alliances increased antagonistic actions of nations outside the dyad and dissimilarity in the historical conflicts that each nation has engaged in outside the dyad i increase the number of equity alliances and ii decrease the number of nonequity alliances as a proportion of total alliances we find positive main effects of learning to contract through prior experience only for equity vs nonequity alliances the reputation effects of antagonism based on relationships with nations outside of the dyad negatively moderate the positive learning effects of prior equity alliance experience abstract from author

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first price auctions abstract overbidding with respect to risk neutral nash predictions in first price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature one possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments do not have a clear perception of probabilities which causes them to bid aggressively we test whether displaying probabilities of winning produces systematic differences in bidding in our design previous auction outcomes are not revealed across treatments no significant differences in behavior across treatments are obtained our results are in contrast to previous experiments which suggest that displaying probabilities could reduce the extent of overbidding

bargaining and learning while fighting much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game ending costly lottery this article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse the model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power the analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly process literature i the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power ii it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty iii it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources and iv it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

union contracts and money wage changes in u s manufacturing industries this paper analyzes the relationship between wage changes negotiated in selected large collective bargaining agreements and industry wide changes in average hourly earnings multiple regressions are used to examine the relationship in two digit manufacturing industries for the period 1958ii to 1978il negotiated wage changes are found to have a major impact on overall movements in hourly earnings the estimated equations have potential applications for short run wage forecasting and for policy analyses

capabilities perception and escalation the evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty we model crises as a game of two sided incomplete information players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities we derive four hypotheses testing them against crises in europe between 1815 and 1970 we show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement we answer five questions 1 how do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence 2 how do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence 3 what do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises 4 under what conditions can deterrence succeed 5 under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis

analyzing the impact of credit migration in a portfolio setting abstract credit migration is an essential component of credit portfolio modeling in this paper we outline a framework for gauging the effects of credit migration on portfolio risk measurements for a typical loan portfolio we find credit migration can explain as much as 51 of volatility and 35 of economic capital we compare through the cycle migration effects implied by agency rating transitions with point in time migration implied by edf expected default frequency transitions and find that migration of point in time credit quality accounts for a greater fraction of total portfolio risk when compared with through the cycle dynamics in a stylized analytic setting we show that when controlling for pd term structure effects higher likelihood of moving away from the current credit state does not necessarily imply greater risk finally we review methods for generating high frequency transition matrices needed for analyzing instruments with cash flows or contingencies whose frequencies are asynchronous to an available transition matrix we further demonstrate that the naive application of such methods can result in material deviations to portfolio analytics

measurement estimation and comparison of credit migration matrices abstract credit migration matrices are cardinal inputs to many risk management applications their accurate estimation is therefore critical we explore two approaches cohort and two variants of duration one imposing the other relaxing time homogeneity and the resulting differences both statistically through matrix norms and economically using a credit portfolio model we propose a new metric for comparing these matrices based on singular values and apply it to credit rating histories of s p rated us firms from 1981 2002 we show that the migration matrices have been increasing in size since the mid 1990s with 2002 being the largest in the sense of being the most dynamic we develop a testing procedure using bootstrap techniques to assess statistically the differences between migration matrices as represented by our metric we demonstrate that it can matter substantially which estimation method is chosen economic credit risk capital differences implied by different estimation techniques can be as large as differences between economic regimes recession vs expansion ignoring the efficiency gain inherent in the duration methods by using the cohort method instead is more damaging than imposing a possibly false assumption of time homogeneity

the principle of convergence in wartime negotiations if war results from disagreement about relative strength then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes i present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power in the markov perfect sequential equilibrium making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield however states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory the principle of convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat victory is not necessary to terminate initiate hostilities thus the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant

uncertainty shifting power and appeasement great britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state if those aims are limited then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state s demands rather than go to war to oppose them if however the rising state s demands are unlimited then the declining state prefers fighting and given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war this situation creates a trade off the earlier a state stands firm the stronger it will be if war ensues but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war in equilibrium the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions

war is in the error term at least since thucydides students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war rationalist explanations assume purposive action states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive durable and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war i show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate we cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante both to us as researchers and to the participants thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically however the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables however detailed the explanation serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives we can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic for example we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance the need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight otherwise states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty it has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic war is literally in the error term

when do power shifts lead to war we present and test a choice theoretic model of war decisions during shifts in power the model assumes a rising state that overtakes a declining state in capabilities in equilibrium the declining state yields at a critical point in the transition war can occur only before that critical time power shifts are more likely to lead to war as the challenger becomes more risk acceptant the declining state more risk averse the expected costs of war decrease the rising state s dissatisfaction with the status quo increases and during periods of equality between the two sides the rate of growth of the rising state s capabilities and the transition point do not affect the probability of war all these hypotheses are supported by an empirical analysis of all major power dyads since 1815 we also find that expected support from allies must be included in the calculation of a nation s capabilities the implications of the model for theories of hegemonic decline and war are discussed

does regret matter in first price auctions overbidding with respect to risk neutral nash predictions in first price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature one possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments may try to avoid regret induced by the knowledge of winning bids in case they do not win these auctions such considerations may drive bidders to bid aggressively in first price auctions we test whether differences in how auction outcomes are revealed produces systematic differences in bidding in our design where individuals bid against pre programmed computers differences in revelation of winning bids does not produce significant treatment differences our results are in contrast to previous experiments which report systematic treatment differences based on whether winning bids are revealed or not

peace war and the balance of power every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics war is least likely if power is distributed equally war is least likely if power is distributed unequally and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war i try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation i argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation the most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are 1 whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and 2 how many states interests will be affected by the outcome

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world abstract with the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community this paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries in a situation of asymmetric information in which the policy maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not we also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy maker additionally the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders

civil war and u s foreign influence we study how foreign interventions affect civil war around the world in an infinitely repeated game we combine a gambling for resurrection mechanism for the influencing country with the canonical bargaining model of war in the influenced country to micro found sudden shifts in power among the domestic bargaining partners which are known to lead to war due to commitment problems we test two of our model predictions that allow us to identify the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence i civil wars around the world are more likely under republican governments and ii the probability of civil wars decreases with the u s presidential approval rates these results withstand several robustness checks and overall suggest that foreign influence is a sizable driver of domestic conflict

stability and the distribution of power the relation between stability and the distribution of power is an important and long debated problem in international relations theory the balance of power school argues that an even distribution of power is more stable while the preponderance of power school argues that a preponderance of power is more stable empirical efforts to estimate this relation have yielded contradictory results this essay examines the relation between stability and the distribution of power in an infinite horizon game theoretic model in which two states are bargaining about revising the international status quo the states make offers and counteroffers until they reach a mutually acceptable settlement or until one of them becomes so pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement that it uses force to impose a new settlement the equilibrium of the game contradicts the expectations of both schools and offers an explanation for the conflicting empirical estimates in the model stability is greatest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the expected distribution of benefits that the use of force would impose

subjective probabilities in games an application to the overbidding puzzle this article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games we conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first price auctions the experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction and indeed overbid when provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions subjects learn to make better predictions and to curb significantly overbidding the structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed

the impact of bond rating changes on corporate bond prices new evidence from the over the counter market abstract i study the information content of bond ratings changes using daily corporate bond data from trace abnormal bond returns over a two day event window that includes the downgrade upgrade are negative positive and statistically significant although the reaction to upgrades is economically small monthly abnormal bond returns around downgrades and upgrades are statistically significant but overstate the magnitude of the reaction relative to two day abnormal returns unlike the bond market the stock market reaction to upgrades is statistically insignificant evidence suggests that the differing inferences on the effect of upgrades in the two markets can be attributed to wealth transfer effects rather than relative market inefficiencies in the cross section the bond market response is stronger for rating changes that appear more surprising rating changes of lower rated firms and upgrades that move the firm from speculative grade to investment grade

the economics of early warfare over land abstract we investigate the incidence of early warfare among foragers and farmers in prehistory our focus is specifically on conflict over land food is produced using inputs of labor and land and the probability of victory in a conflict depends on relative group sizes the group sizes are determined by individual migration and malthusian population dynamics both factors result in larger populations at better sites which deters attack there are two necessary conditions for warfare high enough individual mobility costs and large enough shocks to the relative productivities of the sites together these conditions are sufficient in particular technological or environmental shocks that alter the productivities of sites can trigger warfare but only if individual agents do not change sites in response these results are consistent with evidence from archaeology and anthropology

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

power transitions and great power war from westphalia to waterloo this study extends recent research on the power transition and hegemonic stability theory to the preindustrial era it improves on the original power transition theory by relaxing an assumption and by extending the empirical domain unlike the original power transition theory the revised version is not restricted to the period after the industrial revolution and can therefore be applied to the preindustrial era this study examines the empirical record prior to the industrial revolution to see whether the power transition and hegemonic stability theory holds for that period the data for 1648 to 1815 indicate strong support for the power transition contention that a rough equality of power between rival sides increases the likelihood of war that is when the challenging great power with its allies support catches up with the dominant power great power war is most likely

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

power alliance and the escalation of international conflict 1815 1965 a considerable amount of the internationalpolitics literature attempts to explain international conflict on the basis of the distribution of power between and among nations there are however divergent views of this linkage one view argues that wars are most likely to take place between nations of similar power while another asserts that wars are most likely when power is unequal research seeking to explore this phenomenon has not investigated the capability augmenting effects

pricing derivatives on financial securities subject to credit risk this article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two types of credit risks are considered the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default the second is where the writer of the derivative security may default we apply the foreign currency analogy of jarrow and turnbull 1991 to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a spot exchange rate arbitrage free valuation techniques are then employed this methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives such as swaps and caps the purpose of this article is to provide a new theory for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two sources of credit risk are identified and analyzed the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default paying off less than promised this is the case for example with imbedded options on corporate debt the second is the credit risk introduced by the writer of the derivative security who may also default examples include over the counter writers of options on eurodollar futures swaps and swaptions for pricing derivative securities involving credit risk there are currently two approaches the first views these derivatives as contingent claims not on the financial securities themselves but as compound options on the assets underlying the financial securities this is the case for example with the pricing of imbedded options on corporate debt see merton 1974 1977 black and cox 1976 ho and singer 1982 chance 1990 and kim ramaswamy and sundaresan 1993 or the pricing of vulnerable options see johnson and stulz 1987 in practice however this valuation methodology is difficult to use first the assets underlying the financial security are often not tradeable and therefore their values are not observable this makes application of the theory and estimation of the relevant parameters problematic second as in the case of corporate debt all of the other liabilities of the firm senior to the corporate debt must first and simultaneously be valued this generates significant computational difficulties as a result this approach has not

military capabilities and escalation a correction to bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict i show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions and i offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games

individual behavior of first price auctions the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets abstract this article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the nash equilibrium predictions of the first price sealed bid auction a subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer simulated bids the design used between subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral nash equilibrium our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments which after each auction reveals the winning bid only by means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior

introduction unipolarity state behavior and systemic consequences the united states emerged from the 1990s as an unrivaled global unipolar state this extraordinary imbalance has triggered global debate governments and peoples around the world are struggling to understand to how an american centered unipolar system operates and to respond to it what is the character of domination in a unipolar distribution to what extent can a unipolar state translate its formidable capabilities into meaningful influence will a unipolar world be built around rules and institutions or be based more on the unilateral exercise of unipolar power scholars too are asking these basic questions about unipolarity and international relations theory the individual contributions develop hypotheses and explore the impact of unipolarity on the behavior of the dominant state on the reactions of other states and on the properties of the international system collectively they find that unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics international relations under conditions of unipolarity force a rethinking of conventional and received understandings about the operation of the balance of power the meaning of alliance partnerships the logic of international economic cooperation the relationship between power and legitimacy and the behavior of satisfied and revisionist states

the effects of estimation error on measures of portfolio credit risk abstract this paper uses monte carlo simulations to assess the impact of noisy input parameters on the accuracy of estimated portfolio credit risk assumptions about input quality are derived from the distribution of historical sample statistics commonly used in default risk modelling the resulting estimation error in the distribution of portfolio losses is considerable losses that are judged to occur with a probability of 0 3 may actually occur with a probability of 1 the paper also shows that estimation error leads to biases in value at risk estimates and significance levels of backtests the biases can be corrected by analysing predictive distributions which average over the unknown parameter values

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

reason and war a new specification of the expected utility model of international conflict places expected utilities within a polar coordinate system treats thirdparty choices in a manner more consistent with classical forms estimates the expected utilities derived from not challenging existing policies more fully represents the expected costs of conflict and normalizes expected utilities regardless of system size by assuming that the probability of escalation of a dispute increases monotonically with leaders expectations of gain we derive continuous functions for the probabilities of war intervention violence and peace the revised theory significantly improves our ability to discriminate between violent and nonviolent disputes and between violent disputes that escalated to warfare and those that did not in europe between 1816 and 1970 in this essay

a model of spoils politics accounts of state failure in the developing world frequently highlight a logic of spoils politics in which a government and an opposing faction vie for control of the state and the accompanying spoils attempts to buy the opposition off play a key role in this logic and an informational problem often complicates these efforts because of limited transparancy the government generally has a better idea about the actual size of the spoils than the opposition does we formalize this aspect of spoils politics as a signaling game in which the government has private information about the size of the spoils and tries to co opt the opposition by offering a share of the spoils the opposition can accept the offer or reject it by fighting consistent with the strong empirical finding that the probability of civil war is higher when income is low the probability of breakdown increases as the size of the spoils decreases we also study the effects of uncertainty the opposition s military strength the cost of fighting and power sharing agreements on the probability of fighting

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

modeling of cpdos identifying optimal and implied leverage abstract when the subprime crisis started to emerge collateralized products based on credit default swap cds exposures combined with security features seemed to be a more rational alternative to classic asset backed securities constant proportion collateralized debt obligations cpdos are a mixture of collateralized debt obligations cdos and cppis with inverse mechanism this new asset aims at meeting the investors demand for credit derivatives with security enhancements but to our knowledge quantitative approaches for pricing other than simulation algorithms do not exist yet cpdos became famous notably by standard poor s rating model error which illustrated that closed form analytical pricing is necessary in order to evaluate and understand complex derivatives this article aims to shed a light on cpdos specific structural enhancements and mechanisms we quantify inherent risks and provide a dynamic closed form pricing formula

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

split bond ratings and rating migration abstract this paper examines the relationships between split ratings and ratings migration we find that bonds with split ratings are more likely to have future rating changes a one notch more than one notch split rating increases the probability of rating change within one year of initial issuance by about 3 6 furthermore we find that about 30 of split rated bonds have their two ratings converge after four years of initial issuance the rating convergence tapers off after three years and the rating agency with a higher lower initial rating generally maintains a higher lower rating in subsequent years if the two ratings do not converge we also show that rating transition estimation can be improved by taking into consideration split ratings we find that one year rating transition matrices are significantly different between non letter split rated bonds and letter split rated bonds and we show that the difference has an economically significant impact on the pricing of credit spread options and var based risk management models overall our results suggest that split ratings contain important information about subsequent rating changes

the inefficient use of power costly conflict with complete information recent work across a wide range of issues in political economy as well as in american comparative and international politics tries to explain the inefficient use of power revolutions civil wars high levels of public debt international conflict and costly policy insulation in terms of commitment problems this paper shows that a common mechanism is at work in a number of these diverse studies this common mechanism provides a more general formulation of a type of commitment problem that can arise in many different substantive settings the present analysis then formalizes this mechanism as an inefficiency condition that ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient this condition has a natural substantive interpretation large rapid changes in the actors relative power measured in terms of their minmax payoffs may cause inefficiency

politics at the water s edge parties voters and the use of force abroad this article examines the effects of party politics and presidential election cycles on u s recourse to force abroad i analyze a game theoretic model to generate predictions about these effects in the unique time consistent equilibrium outcome of the one shot game policy varies across political parties in a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated game the use of force is invariant to the partisan composition of government in neither case does policy respond to the electoral cycle an empirical analysis supports the predictions of the repeated game between 1870 and 1992 u s recourse to force abroad responds neither to partisan politics nor to the domestic political calendar it responds only to changes in u s power status and to the advent of general wars

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small