liquidation equilibrium with seniority and hidden cdo the aim of our paper is to price credit derivatives written on a single name when this name is a bank indeed due to the special structure of the balance sheet of a bank and to the interconnections with other institutions of the financial system the standard pricing formulas do not apply and their use can imply severe mispricing the pricing of credit derivatives written on a single bank name requires a joint analysis of the risks of all banks directly or indirectly interconnected with the bank of interest each name cannot be priced in isolation but the banking system must be treated as a whole it is necessary to analyze the contagion of losses among banks especially the equilibrium of joint defaults and recovery rates at liquidation time we show the existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium then the standard pricing formulas are modified by adding a premium to capture the contagion effects

network models and financial stability abstract systemic risk is a key concern for central banks charged with safeguarding overall financial stability in this paper we investigate how systemic risk is affected by the structure of the financial system we construct banking systems that are composed of a number of banks that are connected by interbank linkages we then vary the key parameters that define the structure of the financial system including its level of capitalisation the degree to which banks are connected the size of interbank exposures and the degree of concentration of the system and analyse the influence of these parameters on the likelihood of knock on defaults first we find that the better capitalised banks are the more resilient is the banking system against contagious defaults and this effect is non linear second the effect of the degree of connectivity is non monotonic i e initially a small increase in connectivity increases the contagion effect but after a certain threshold value connectivity improves the ability of a banking system to absorb shocks third the size of interbank liabilities tends to increase the risk of knock on default even if banks hold capital against such exposures fourth more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic risk all else equal in an extension to the main analysis we study how liquidity effects interact with banking structure to produce a greater chance of systemic breakdown we finally consider how the risk of contagion might depend on the degree of asymmetry tiering inherent in the structure of the banking system a number of our results have important implications for public policy which this paper also draws out

do buyers characteristics and personal relationships affect agricultural land prices the influence of buyer and personal relationship characteristics on agricultural land prices has received little attention in the literature recently perry and robison 2001 used a restricted nonlinear specification to model the influence of personal relationships on the implicit prices of land characteristics in this paper a more flexible alternative model is proposed an approach to general model specification and model selection is presented the results indicate that buyer characteristics and personal relationships exert nonuniform effects on the implicit prices of land characteristics our results support the hypothesis that social capital affects the terms of trade in the land market

contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

the impact of ethanol plants on surrounding farmland values a case study the expansion of the corn ethanol industry after 2003 increased corn prices throughout the united states and in some cases prices were shown to be higher with proximity to individual ethanol plants this leads to the hypothesis that the value of farmland in close proximity to ethanol plants is higher than comparable farmland located farther away this hypothesis was explored by examining the sale of 961 farmland parcels during 2004 2008 in the vicinity of two corn ethanol plants in northeastern nebraska hedonic models including land characteristics as well as spatial and plant proximity measures failed to show support for the hypothesis

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

liquidity risk and policy options abstract on the basis of a liquidity management model liquidity risks defined as the probability of payment failures in a real time gross settlement rtgs payment system may either stem from liquidity management inefficiencies or insufficient cash balances i will show that penalties charged on the amount of payment failures minimise liquidity risks without interfering with the bank s technology preferences i will instead show that liquidity requirements although as effective as penalties to contain the risk of liquidity shortage may distort the bank s technology preferences and cannot stem liquidity management inefficiencies i will also show that liquidity risks within rtgs payment systems are potentially smaller because they depend more on the liquidity management efficiency than on the randomness of cash inflows and outflows

macroeconomic shocks and banking regulation the recent crisis has brought to the fore the cyclical properties of banking regulation countercyclical buffers and enhanced capital requirements meant to stabilize banks balance sheets across the cycle are not costless and a delicate balance needs to be reached between providing incentives to generate value and discouraging excessive risk taking the paper develops a model in which in contrast with modigliani miller outside equity and capital requirements matter it analyses banking regulation in the presence of macroeconomic shocks and studies the desirability of self insurance mechanisms such as countercyclical capital buffers or dynamic provisioning as well as macro hedges such as cocos and capital insurance

urban sprawl and farmland prices a theoretical model of farmland valuation is developed to explicitly account for three effects of urban sprawl conversion of farmland to urban uses effect on agricultural returns and speculative effect as represented by farmland conversion risk this model is estimated using county level data in the continental united states evidence is found for all three effects of urban sprawl on farmland values counties more accessible to major urban centers have higher net agricultural returns subsidiary evidence supports that the latter effect may be attributed to survival of or conversion to high valued agriculture around urban centers

dynamics of a rural land market experiencing farmland conversion to acreages the case of saunders county nebraska this study analyzes an urban influenced real estate market that is experiencing land use transitions evaluating a three year period of unimproved real estate sales in saunders county nebraska has identified components that contribute to farmland values applying these components illustrates that buyers having special motivations often pay premiums to obtain agricultural land a model based on farmland productivity determines a crossover point where it becomes economically justifiable to convert farmland into acreage tracts illustrating productivity levels where concerns over development hold merit areas experiencing farmland development will obtain valuable information for land use and planning decisions from applying this research

a critical review of contagion risk in banking the recent financial crisis has focused the attention of scholars and policymakers on how to improve financial stability through better macro prudential regulation and supervision in this paper we compare the existing theoretical and empirical literature on contagion through the banking system it is argued that the structure of the interbank market the size of banks the linkages among them the level of correlation of their investments and the transparency of the regulator are key factors in determining the possibility of contagion we discuss the different findings and present avenues for future research

default and aggregate income abstract this paper studies how default varies with aggregate income we analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed idiosyncratic income by allowing for default default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance default penalties ensure that only these agents default we show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income we provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous

optimal liquidity management and bail out policy in the banking industry abstract we characterize the profit maximizing reserves of a commercial bank and the generated probability of a liquidity crisis as a function of the penalty imposed by the central bank the probability of depositors liquidity needs and the return on outside investment opportunities we demonstrate that banks do not fully internalize the social cost associated with the bail out policy if the liquidity needs of individuals are correlated and that competitive interbank markets will induce banks to raise their reserves under reasonable conditions the marginal benefits from an interbank market decrease as the correlation between the liquidity shocks of banks increases

payments systems and monetary policy abstract a dynamic spatial model is constructed where there is a role for money and for centralized payments arrangements and where there are aggregate fluctuations driven by fluctuations in aggregate productivity with decentralized monetary exchange and no centralized payments arrangements there is price level indeterminacy and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient a private clearinghouse arrangement improves efficiency but produces a real indeterminacy the pricing of daylight overdrafts is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation efficiency is achieved with a zero nominal interest rate on overnight central bank lending or through private overnight interbank lending

financial contagion through capital connections a model of the origin and spread of bank panics financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks the equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined we explore how the cross holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious eects conditional on the failure of a financial institution we show that contagion is possible in the unique equilibrium of the economy and characterize exactly when it may exist at the same time we identify a direction of flow for contagious eects which provides a rationale for localized financial panics simulations identify the optimal level of interbank deposit holdings in the presence of contagion risk our results suggest that when the probability of bank failure is low maximal levels of interbank holdings are optimal when cross holding of deposits is complete we demonstrate that the intensity of contagion is increasing in the size of regionally aggregate liquidity shocks

the interbank market after august 2007 what has changed and why after the onset of the financial crisis spreads between interbank interest rates on unsecured and secured deposits for the major world currencies became exceptionally large and volatile first we find that the phenomenon was mainly driven by aggregate rather than bank specific factors notably risk aversion and accounting practices by contrast funding liquidity capital shortage and central bank interventions were not important determinants second prior to august 2007 the spread was broadly insensitive to key borrower characteristics whereas afterward it became somewhat more reactive to measures of creditworthiness third conditions for big borrowers became relatively more favorable during the crisis suggesting that moral hazard risks related to the too big to fail argument have increased these results are discussed in the light of theories on the interbank market during a crisis

how excessive is banks maturity transformation we quantify the gains from regulating banks maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long term assets with non tradable debt banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises as in stein 2012 pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short the assessment is based on the calibration of the model to eurozone banking data for 2006 lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2 8 months to 3 3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion

the impacts of the tax deferred exchange provision on farm real estate values this study examines the effects of the section 1031 tax deferred exchange provision on agricultural land values the provision allows taxpayers to defer taxation for relinquished productive assets if a like kind asset is acquired within the allotted time of 180 days the analysis examines a set of 3 580 farm real estate transaction from 55 agricultural counties in indiana over the period 2003 2006 hedonic price analysis suggests that properties acquired under a like kind exchange are associated with a 1 32 price premium jel h23 q15

estimating bilateral exposures in the german interbank market is there a danger of contagion abstract credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock recent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages we use balance sheet information to estimate a matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the german banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion we find that in the absence of a safety net there is considerable scope for contagion that could affect a large proportion of the banking system the financial safety net in this case institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks considerably reduces but does not eliminate the danger of contagion even so the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15 of the banking system in terms of assets

an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices this paper develops a continuous time general equilibrium model of a simple but complete economy and uses it to examine the behavior of asset prices in this model asset prices and their stochastic properties are determined endogenously one principal result is a partial differential equation which asset prices must satisfy the solution of this equation gives the equilibrium price of any asset in terms of the underlying real variables in the economy in this paper we develop a general equilibrium asset pricing model for use in applied research an important feature of the model is its integration of real and financial markets among other things the model endogenously determines the stochastic process followed by the equilibrium price of any financial asset and shows how this process depends on the underlying real variables the model is fully consistent with rational expectations and maximizing behavior on the part of all agents our framework is general enough to include many of the fundamental forces affecting asset markets yet it is tractable enough to be specialized easily to produce specific testable results furthermore the model can be extended in a number of straightforward ways consequently it is well suited to a wide variety of applications for example in a companion paper cox ingersoll and ross 7 we use the model to develop a theory of the term structure of interest rates many studies have been concerned with various aspects of asset pricing under uncertainty the most relevant to our work are the important papers on intertemporal asset pricing by merton 19 and lucas 16 working in a continuous time framework merton derives a relationship among the equilibrium expected rates of return on assets he shows that when investment opportunities are changing randomly over time this relationship will include effects which have no analogue in a static one period model lucas considers an economy with homogeneous individuals and a single consumption good which is produced by a number of processes the random output of these processes is exogenously determined and perishable assets are defined as claims to all or a part of the output of a process and the equilibrium determines the asset prices our theory draws on some elements of both of these papers like merton we formulate our model in continuous time and make full use of the analytical tractability that this affords the economic structure of our model is somewhat similar to that of lucas however we include both endogenous production and

a reconsideration of minsky s financial instability hypothesis the worst and longest depressions have tended to occur after periods of prolonged and reasonably stable prosperity this results in part from agents rationally updating their expectations during good times and hence becoming more optimistic about future economic prospects investors then increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that would previously have been considered too risky so when a downturn does eventually occur the financial crisis and the extent of default become more severe whereas a general appreciation of this syndrome dates back to minsky 1992 jerome levy economics institute wp 74 and even beyond to irving fisher 1933 econometrica 1 337 357 we model it formally in addition endogenous default introduces a pecuniary externality since investors do not factor in the impact of their decision to take risk and default on the borrowing cost we explore the relative advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility and suggest a novel criterion for improvement of aggregate welfare

an international study of tax effects on government bonds it is shown that coupon bonds alone are not sufficient to span time dated claims on ordinary income capital gains and non taxable wealth in an incomplete bond market where the pure dated claims are not spanned by existing bonds marginal rates of substitution between present consumption and pure dated claims on ordinary income capital gains income and non taxable wealth respectively can differ across bondholders however the relative pricing of coupon bonds in each of these countries is shown to be consistent with the tax status of the major non tax exempt holders of government debt

bilateral exposures and systemic solvency risk en utilisant une structure des etats financiers des banques qui tient compte de leurs expositions bilaterales en termes d actions et de prets on developpe un modele structurel de faillite ce modele permet de distinguer les facteurs exogenes et endogenes dont depend la faillite on prouve l existence et l unicite de l equilibre de liquidation on etudie les consequences des chocs exogenes sur le systeme bancaire et on mesure le phenomene de contagion on illustre l usage de cette approche en l appliquant au systeme bancaire francais

a simple approach to interest rate option pricing a simple introduction to contingent claim valuation of risky assets in a discrete time stochastic interest rate economy is provided taking the term structure of interest rates as exogenous closed form solutions are derived for european options written on 1 treasury bills 2 interest rate forward contracts 3 interest rate futures contracts 4 treasury bonds 5 interest rate caps 6 stock options 7 equity forward contracts 8 equity futures contracts 9 eurodollar liabilities and 10 foreign exchange contracts article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the federal funds market excess reserves and unconventional monetary policy abstract following the bankruptcy of lehman brothers interbank borrowing and lending dropped whereas reserve holdings of depository institutions skyrocketed as the fed injected liquidity into the u s banking sector this paper introduces bank liquidity risk and limited market participation into a real business cycle model with ex ante identical financial intermediaries and shows in an analytically tractable way how interbank trade and excess reserves emerge in general equilibrium investigating the role of the federal funds market and unconventional monetary policy for the propagation of aggregate real and financial shocks i find that federal funds market participation is irrelevant in response to standard supply and demand shocks whereas it matters for uncertainty shocks i e mean preserving spreads in the cross section of liquidity risk liquidity injections by the central bank can absorb the effects of financial shocks on the real economy although excess reserves might increase and federal funds might be crowded out as a side effect

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

has the financial system become safer after the crisis the changing nature of financial institution risk abstract six years after the collapse of lehman brothers the question of whether the u s financial system has become less risky remains unanswered on the one side new regulations including dodd frank and basel iii have made improvements by requiring higher bank capital and financial institutions themselves have reduced risk taking activities on the other side it has been argued that the fundamental risks remained and the efforts of regulators and politicians were simply rearranging the deckchairs on the titanic baily and elliott 2013 this paper highlights the changing nature of financial institution risk from 2005 to 2011 it finds that while these institutions have become less risky individually after the crisis the financial market has become more vulnerable to systemic contagion the causal inference that the crisis and the post crisis legislation have gradually changed the nature of financial institution risk is drawn from a quasi experimental design this finding suggests that the ever more integrated financial system might experience more synchronized contractions in future crises providing empirical support for the proposals of the inter bank collective regulation of banks by acharya 2009 in addition to the intra bank collective regulations as in froot and stein 1998 and bis 1996 1999

financial integration and liquidity crises this paper analyzes the effects of financial integration on the stability of the banking system financial integration allows banks in different regions to smooth local liquidity shocks by borrowing and lending on a world interbank market we show under which conditions financial integration induces banks to reduce their liquidity holdings and to shift their portfolios toward more profitable but less liquid investments integration helps reallocate liquidity when different banks are hit by uncorrelated shocks however when a correlated systemic shock hits the total liquid resources in the banking system are lower than in autarky therefore financial integration leads to more stable interbank interest rates in normal times but to larger interest rate spikes in crises these results hold in a setup in which financial integration is welfare improving from an ex ante point of view we also look at the model s implications for financial regulation and show that in a second best world financial integrati

vegetable spirits and energy policy this study investigates the extent to which the 2005 energy policy act specifically the ethanol mandate contributed to the rise in farmland values we use the location of new ethanol plants to identify the capitalization effect of the mandate by these spatially advantaged operations we use a difference in difference propensity score matching estimator to control for the non random selection of ethanol production facilities the empirical strategy uses farmland parcel values from the 2001 7 june agriculture survey we find that new ethanol facilities had no effect on nearby farmland values prior to the mandate but had statistically significant effects after the policy copyright 2013 oxford university press

term structure movements and pricing interest rate contingent claims this paper derives an arbitrage free interest rate movements model ar model this model takes the complete term structure as given and derives the subsequent stochastic movement of the term structure such that the movement is arbitrage free we then show that the ar model can be used to price interest rate contingent claims relative to the observed complete term structure of interest rates this paper also studies the behavior and the economics of the model our approach can be used to price a broad range of interest rate contingent claims including bond options and callable bonds

the valuation of multivariate contingent claims in discrete time models there are several examples in the literature of contingent claims whose payoffs depend on the outcomes of two or more stochastic variables familiar cases of such claims include options on a portfolio of options options whose exercise price is stochastic and options to exchange one asset for another this paper derives risk neutral valuation relationships rnvrs in a discrete time setting that facilitate the pricing of such complex contingent claims in two specific cases joint lognormally distributed underlying variables and constant proportional risk aversion on the part of investors and joint normally distributed underlying variables and constant absolute risk aversion preferences respectively this methodology is then applied to the valuation of several interesting complex contingent claims such as multiperiod bonds multicurrency option bonds and investment options

implicit bank debt guarantees costs benefits and risks the expectation by market participants that public authorities might bailout the creditors of banks that are considered too important for financial system stability or another reason to be allowed to fail is commonly referred to as an implicit guarantee public authorities do not have any explicit commitment to intervene they may even honestly state that they not want to do so ex ante but may feel compelled to do so ex post a declared policy aim is to limit the value of implicit guarantees by making banks stronger more easily resolvable in case of distress as well as by imposing extra charges that rise as banks become more systemically important as part of the latter approach globally systemically important banks are identified and subjected to more costly and intrusive regulation there is little evidence that specific approach has been successful so far there is some evidence that the introduction of new resolution frameworks has been helpful while the use of newly available resolution tools and the involvement of bank creditors in the burden sharing associated with bank failure resolution has significantly reduced the value of implicit bank debt guarantees where it occurred in that sense actions speak louder than words

factors influencing illinois farmland values a hedonic model of illinois farmland values is estimated using county level cross section time series data explanatory variables include land productivity parcel size improvements distances to chicago and other large cities an urban rural index livestock production through swine operation scale and farm density measures population density income and inflation the inclusion of spatial and serial correlation components substantially improves the model fit farmland values decline with parcel size ruralness distance to chicago and large cities and swine farm density and increase with soil productivity population density and personal income

understanding farmland price changes this paper develops a structural model of land prices which includes the multidimensional effects of inflation on capital erosion savings return erosion and real debt reduction as well as the effect of changes in the opportunity cost of capital the results show that inflation and changes in the real returns on capital are major explanatory factors in farmland price swings in addition to returns to farming additionally the effects of credit market constraints and expectations schemes are considered explicitly in the analytical model

payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments abstract the first setup we study is a deterministic model with spatial separation where we consider alternative payments systems institutions and their implications for allocation and welfare a payments system with period by period settlement in outside money improves on decentralized exchange an efficient allocation is supported by a payments system where settlement is not imposed in the second model there is random matching and unobserved productivity shocks and preference shocks we explore how risk should be shared optimally in this economy and interpret the results in terms of how actual payments systems should operate journal of economic literature classification numbers e4 e5

access policy and money market segmentation abstract deviations between interest rates paid in the swiss franc unsecured money market and the respective libor rate are analysed for a period spanning the financial crisis first banks that have access to sources of secured central bank and interbank funding pay less than other banks second foreign banks not chartered in switzerland pay more than domestic banks third both lines of segmentation are economically relevant but limited due to open access to sources of secured funding thus access policy matters for monetary policy implementation and financial stability

financial contagion and the role of the central bank abstract we investigate the role of a central bank cb in preventing and avoiding financial contagion the cb by imposing reserve requirements on the banking system trades off the cost of reducing the resources available for long term investment with the benefit of raising liquidity to face an adverse shock that could cause contagious crises we argue that contagion is not due to the structure of the interbank deposit market but to the impossibility to sign contracts contingent on unforeseen contingencies as long as incomplete contracts are present the cb may have a useful role in curbing contagion moreover the cb allows the banking system to reach first best allocation in all the states of the world when the notion of incentive efficiency is considered if the analysis is restricted to constrained efficiency the cb still avoids contagion without however reaching first best consumption allocation the model provides a rationale for reserve requirements without the presence of fiat money or asymmetric information

efficiency and bargaining power in the interbank loan market using detailed transactions level data on interbank loans we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core which imposes a set of no arbitrage conditions on trades in the market for canada s large value transfer system we show that although the market is fairly efficient systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample the level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the bank of canada s operations as well as phases of the 2007 8 financial crisis we find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and surprisingly toward riskier borrowers

the changing roles of urban influence and agricultural productivity in farmland price determination between 2000 and 2010 inflation adjusted u s farmland values increased by over 80 this period of rapid price appreciation coincided with both the agricultural commodity price boom and the broader financial crisis this paper examines the degree to which the determinants of farmland prices changed over this period using a panel of farmland transfer declarations from 98 illinois counties hedonic price analysis demonstrates that the relative importance of urban influence decreased over this period while the relative importance of agricultural productivity increased the study carries important implications for farmers farmland owners and policy makers

factors influencing kansas agricultural farm land values land transactions typically involve a substantial investment of time and money for parties involved in the sale because of the size of the investment and infrequency of purchases sales significant personal interaction between buyer and seller often results in this study farmland sales in 104 of 105 kansas counties from 1986 2000 were examined to quantify the influence of personal relationships and changes over time transactions between related parties resulted in a 43 discount on the per acre sales price results indicated that social capital effects have increased over time with the discount on sales between related parties growing 2 per year

deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations the 2007 2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance in our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks consequently socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium deposit insurance or equivalently bank recapitalization corrects this market failure we find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation the optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system hence when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations

financial integration specialization and systemic risk this paper studies the implications of cross border financial integration for financial stability when banks loan portfolios adjust endogenously banks can be subject to sectoral and aggregate domestic shocks after integration they can share these risks in a complete interbank market when banks have a comparative advantage in providing credit to certain industries financial integration may induce banks to specialize in lending an enhanced concentration in lending does not necessarily increase risk because a well functioning interbank market allows to achieve the necessary diversification this greater need for risk sharing though increases the risk of cross border contagion and the likelihood of widespread banking crises however even though integration increases the risk of contagion it improves welfare if it permits banks to realize specialization benefits

incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism abstract the purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing multi party contractual clearing and settlement arrangements through which large value payments are typically made we are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made if a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide in this paper we address this question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic formal model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network

the pricing of call and put options on foreign exchange this paper derives pricing equations for european puts and calls on foreign exchange the call and put pricing formulas are unlike the black scholes equations for stock options in that there are two relevant interest rates interest rates are stochastic and boundary constraints differ in addition it is shown that both american call and put options have values larger than their european counterparts

pricing contingent claims under interest rate and asset price risk this paper presents a general framework for pricing contingent claims under interest rate and asset price uncertainty the framework extends ho and lee s 1986 valuation framework by allowing not only future interest rates but also future asset prices to depend on the current term structure of interest rates the approach is shown to provide risk neutral valuation relationships that are consistent with the initial term structure of interest rates and can be applied to valuation of a broad class of assets including stock options convertible bonds and junk bonds

banks as monitors of other banks evidence from the overnight federal funds market this study provides evidence that banks are effective monitors of their peers by showing that the interest rate paid on federal funds transactions reflects differences in credit risk across borrowers in addition the size and relative importance in the funds market of the trading institutions are shown to affect the rates charged for overnight borrowing thereby providing insight into the nature of competition in the federal funds market transaction volume and size of transaction effects are uncovered as is evidence of relationship banking between banks these results are made possible by unique data identifying individual federal funds transactions copyright 2001 by university of chicago press

heterogeneity and stability bolster the strong not the weak we first study a stylized model of self fulfilling panic among agents with differing fragilities to strategic risk and show that depending on the severity of coordination problems the panic trigger threshold can depend only on one type s fragility we then present a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities to financial spillovers concerns about potential spillovers generate strategic interaction triggering a pre emption game in which one tries to exit the market before others to avoid spillovers although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions systemic risk can critically depend on financial health of stronger in the contagion chain in this case bolstering the strong rather than the weak more effectively enhances systemic stability

financial networks and contagion we study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent financial organizations how discontinuous changes in asset values e g defaults and shutdowns trigger further failures and how this depends on network structure integration greater dependence on counterparties and diversification more counterparties per organization have different nonmonotonic effects on the extent of cascades diversification connects the network initially permitting cascades to travel but as it increases further organizations are better insured against one another s failures integration also faces trade offs increased dependence on other organizations versus less sensitivity to own investments finally we illustrate the model with data on european debt cross holdings jel d85 f15 f34 f36 f65 g15 g32 g33 g38 globalization brings with it increased financial interdependencies among many kinds of organizations governments central banks investment banks firms etc that hold each other s shares debts and other obligations such interdependencies can lead to cascading defaults and failures which are often avoided through massive bailouts of institutions deemed too big to fail recent examples include the us government s interventions in aig fannie mae freddie mac and general motors and the european commission s interventions in greece and spain although such bailouts circumvent the widespread failures that were more prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they emphasize the need to study the risks created by a network of interdependencies understanding these risks is crucial to designing incentives and regulatory responses which defuse cascades before they are imminent in this paper we develop a general model that produces new insights regarding financial contagions and cascades of failures among organizations linked through a network of financial interdependencies organizations values depend on each other e g through cross holdings of shares debt or other liabilities if an

the role of interbank markets in monetary policy a model with rationing the empirical research on monetary transmission has reported a number of puzzles challenging extant theoretical models of the transmission mechanism in this paper we argue that asymmetric information in the interbank market may be important to have a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the transmission process we show that asymmetric information may induce an equilibrium with rationing this in turn has two major implications first it reconciles the apparent irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy magnitude puzzle and second it shows that this impact will not be limited to short term credit supply but will also affect long term lending even if the corresponding interest rate is unaffected composition puzzle

financial networks contagion commitment and private sector bailouts i develop a model of financial networks in which linkages not only spread contagion but also induce private sector bailouts where liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the threat of contagion introducing this bailout possibility i show that linkages may be optimal ex ante because they allow banks to obtain some mutual insurance even though formal commitments are impossible however in some cases e g when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks the whole network may collapse i also characterize the optimal network size and apply the results to joint liability arrangements and payment systems linkages among agents in financial markets are a concern because of the risk of financial contagion that is the risk that a small shock to one agent will spread to other agents in a domino effect whether we should worry about these linkages is an open question the main goal of this paper is to show that a network in which agents are closely interlinked may be optimal both because of and despite the potential for contagion another goal is to characterize optimal networks that is whether and how agents should be linked to one another the basic intuition is as follows linkages present the threat of contagion to prevent collapse of the whole network agents who are lucky ex post may be willing to bail out those who are not in this way agents obtain the benefits of mutual insurance even though they cannot precommit to making payments

econometric modeling of the capitalization formula for farmland prices an econometric model is formulated to explain the dynamic behavior in farmland prices a second order rational distributed lag on net crop share rents received by landlords captures the dynamic movements of prices and performs well in conditional post sample forecasts the adjustment path of land prices in response to a perturbation in rents is a protracted dampened cycle the implicitly estimated tax free capitalization rate on rent associated with equilibrium land price is 4 0 neither the expected rate of inflation nor an exponential trend on rent expectations has a significant effect on land prices

systemic risk in financial systems we consider default by firms that are part of a single clearing mechanism the obligations of all firms within the system are determined simultaneously in a fashion consistent with the priority of debt claims and the limited liability of equity we first show via a fixed point argument that there always exists a clearing payment vector that clears the obligations of the members of the clearing system under mild regularity conditions this clearing vector is unique next we develop an algorithm that both clears the financial system in a computationally efficient fashion and provides information on the systemic risk faced by the individual system firms finally we produce qualitative comparative statics for financial systems these comparative statics imply that in contrast to single firm results even unsystematic nondissipative shocks to the system will lower the total value of the system and may lower the value of the equity of some of the individual system firms

the effect of agricultural policy on farmland values the extent to which agricultural support programs have been capitalized into farmland prices has been examined in this study a present value land price model was developed which decomposes returns to the land base into its two possible sources farm production and government subsidies and allows the discount rates associated with these two income sources to vary the empirical results indicate that government payments are discounted less than marketbased returns in ontario thus government payments have been viewed as a more stable source of income to ontario farm operators during the last half century than market based returns

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

failure and rescue in an interbank network this paper is concerned with systemic risk in an interbank market modelled as a directed graph of interbank obligations this builds on the modelling paradigm of eisenberg and noe eisenberg l noe th 2001 systemic risk in financial systems management sci 472 236 249 by introducing costs of default if loans have to be called in by a failing bank this immediately introduces novel and realistic effects we find that in general many different clearing vectors can arise among which there is a greatest clearing vector arrived at by letting banks fail in succession until only solvent banks remain such a collapse should be prevented if at all possible we then study situations in which consortia of banks may have the means and incentives to rescue failing banks this again departs from the conclusions of the earlier work of eisenberg and noe where in the absence of default losses there would be no incentive for solvent banks to rescue failing banks we conclude with some remarks about how a rescue consortium might be constructed this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

does risk aversion affect bank output loss the case of the eurozone abstract we propose a new model to infer the evolution of bank specific output losses due to the uncertainty in bank output prices losses are based on bank risk aversion with micro foundations tethered to the uncertainty regarding prices our model allows us to measure time varying bank specific output losses and risk aversion while taking into account all bank cross sectional heterogeneity we employ a panel data set to estimate the input and output elasticities with both parametric and non parametric techniques we are the first to document that increasing risk aversion among eurozone banks during the financial crisis resulted in sizable output losses although subdued thereafter losses have been resurging in recent years both conventional and unconventional monetary policy responses by the european central bank ecb mitigated uncertainty in bank output prices though unequally so across countries certain measures of unconventional monetary policy may have even enhanced bank risk aversion and thereby output losses but mainly so for large countries

the valuation of options on futures contracts rational restrictions are derived for the values of american options on futures contracts for these options the optimal policy in general involves premature exercise a model is developed for valuing options on futures contracts in a constant interest rate setting despite the fact that premature exercise may be optimal the value of this american feature appears to be small and a european formula due to black serves as a useful approximation finally a model is developed to value these options in a world with stochastic interest rates it is shown that the pricing errors caused by ignoring the location of the interest rate relative to its long run mean range from 5 to 7 when the current rate is 200 basis points from its long run value the role of interest rate expectations is therefore crucial to the valuation optimal exercise policies are found from numerical methods for both models in recent years there has been a steady growth in the number of financial assets which one might properly call derivative assets that are available for trading on the organized exchanges among these the most recent and notable are options contracts written on available futures contracts options are now traded on the futures contracts on stock market indexes on the futures contracts on treasury instruments on the futures contracts on foreign exchange rates and on the futures contracts on some metals in design these options contracts do not differ substantially from the well known options contracts on common stock except that the underlying asset is a futures contract the received theory of the valuation of these options suggests that such contracts provide a direct vehicle for investors to alter the terminal payoffs on their portfolios to a desired distribution in the absence of these contracts investors would be forced to pursue a dynamic portfolio policy at the expense of considerable transactions in order to achieve a similar distribution indeed the availability of put options on the futures contracts on stock market indexes now enables well diversified investors to purchase portfolio insurance in his seminal work black 1 provided a complete description of forward and futures contracts as well as the description and valuation of european options on forward contracts and on spot commodities breeden 3 has examined the use of commodity options in a theoretical framework and courtadon 6 has studied the valuation of options on treasury bond futures french 13 cox