war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

a note on taxes and the pricing of treasury bill futures contracts futures contracts in general and treasury bill futures in particular are taxed in a manner that provides individual investors with an apparent opportunity the irs currently considers all futures contracts to be capital assets unlike other capital assets however the holding period for long term gains is six months for futures contracts but only long positions qualify all gains and losses on short positions are short term regardless of the holding period the asymmetrical tax treatment of short and long positions gives individual investors the opportunity to profit at the expense of the government the investor takes a long position in a futures contract with over six months to maturity and holds the position for six months if at that time he has a loss he sells the position recording a short term loss if he has a gain he holds the position another day and records a long term gain by this strategy all gains are taxed as long term gains and all losses are short term the opportunity is even greater in the treasury bill futures market cash treasury bills are not treated as capital assets so that all gains and losses are ordinary to take advantage of this fact the investor takes a long position in a futures contract with over six months to maturity if he has a gain on the last trading day he liquidates his futures contract and records a long term gain if he has a loss he waits until the contract matures and takes delivery of the bills

market trading structures and asset pricing evidence from the treasury bill markets earlier studies report signfficant price disparities betweenfutures andforward or spot markets examining the treasury bill markets this article demonstrates that differences in market trading structures explain these disparities treasury billfutures rates contain significantly lower liquidity and default premia than do syntheticforward rates this reflects the functioning of a futures clearing association and differences between an open outcry auction futures market and an over the counter dealer spot market the same factors that make futures contracts nonredundant securities also explain the existence in equilibrium of price disparities

the big push natural resource booms and growth a simple application of big push reasoning suggests that natural resource booms can be important catalysts for development in poorer countries in this paper we present evidence from seven latin american countries that natural resource booms are sometimes accompa nied by declining per capita gdp we present a model with natural resources increasing returns in the spirit of big push models and expectations to clarify some of the reasons this may happen q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the creation of effective property rights traditionally general equilibrium models have taken effective property rights to be given and have been concerned only with analyzing the allocation of resources among productive uses and the distribution of the resulting product but this formulation of the economic problem is incomplete because it neglects that the appropriative activities by which people create the effective property rights that inform allocation and distribution are themselves an alternative use of scare resources this paper develops two canonical general equilibrium models of resource allocation and income distribution that allow for the allocation of time and effort to the creation of effective property rights to valuable resources in one model the valuable resources are initially in common pool in the other models the analysis reveals how the amount of time and effort that agents allocate to the creation of effective property rights on the technology of production and on the scale of the economy the paper also analyses the security of initial claims to valuable resources and speculates about why initial claims are perfectly secure

voracious transformation of a common natural resource into productive capital i analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights i obtain a feedback nash equilibrium to the dynamic common pool problem and obtain political variants of the hotelling depletion rule and the hartwick saving rule resource prices and depletion occur too fast so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high the power struggle boosts output but depresses sustainable consumption genuine saving is nevertheless zero in a fractionalized society world bank estimates may be too optimistic

environmental depletion governance and conflict t he link between natural resource dependence and internal conflict has been approached from a variety of angles in a large and growing interdisciplinary literature while there is an expanding consensus as to what matters the most for such intra state violence episodes the feasibility discontent dichotomy still appears to characterize a disciplinary divide between economists and political scientists this paper attempts to help bridge the gap by allowing for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of potential rebels simple non cooperative bargaining yields a nonlinear impact of regulatory quality on the likelihood of conflict and shows that corruption and resource depletion jointly affect the outcome the empirical analysis that follows looks at the effect of environmental depletion and government corruption on the emergence of civil conflicts using a large panel dataset resource depletion the quality of governance and their interaction are found to be significant determinants of civil conflict incidence results are robust to several steps taken to address potential endogeneity concerns

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

natural resources and income inequality the role of ethnic divisions we hypothesize that natural resources raise income inequality in ethnically polarized societies but reduce income inequality in ethnically homogenous societies and we present empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

environmental performance in socially fragmented countries social fragmentation is often associated with reduced co operative behaviour which undermines public goods provision such as environmental protection the few studies linking social fragmentation and environmental performance have been confined to using ethnic fractionalisation as the only measure of social heterogeneity in this paper we contribute to the literature in a twofold manner first we bring into the analysis alternative measures of social fragmentation i e religious fractionalisation ethnic religious polarisation that have received considerable attention in development economics in recent years second this is the first study to our knowledge that makes use of a large panel dataset of several environmental indicators to explore links between ethnic religious diversity and the environment we find that all indices of social fragmentation are negatively linked to measures of environmental quality although for some of them the size of the effect is larger in the case of polarisation

do natural resource revenues hinder financial development the role of political institutions we hypothesize that natural resource revenues may deteriorate contract enforcement if political institutions are weak as poor contract enforcement leads to low financial development resource revenues may hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions we provide empirical support for this hypothesis based on within country variation in our sample covering the period 1970 2005 and 133 countries our results are robust to the use of additional control variables different samples and alternative measures of financial development and political institutions

money output and the expected real interest rate this paper tests the exclusion of lagged growth rates of money and output from regression equations with serially correlated disturbances for the expected real interest rate the authors empirical approach is an extension of the empirical strategies of eugene f fama 1975 and frederic s mishkin 1981 which invoke the orthogonality of the inflation forecast error to predetermined regressors under the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations they discuss the implications of their tests for simple real business cycle models copyright 1991 by mit press

employing financial futures to increase the return on near cash treasury bill investments the purpose of this article is to formulate and test a decision model to increase the return on a pool of liquid assets through the use of treasury bill futures contracts recent literature has documented inefficiencies in the pricing of t bill futures these inefficiencies can be exploited to increase the return on a portfolio of t bills without affecting the maturity of the portfolio the solution technique used is dynamic programming the results of applying a dynamic programming algorithm parameterized on available data to trade in real time are presented the rules lead to increased returns

industrial policy in an imperfect world theoretical analyses of industrial policy normally restrict the range of possible outcomes by abstracting from either market or government failures this paper thus studies industrial policy and its effectiveness in a model that includes both market and government imperfections we introduce a public agency responsible for industrial policy into the model of hausmann and rodrik 2003 and assume that this agency has limited information and is partly politically motivated we further extend the model to allow the public agency to communicate with entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs to engage in rent seeking we find that industrial policies are ineffective if the public agency is poorly informed but that they are not necessarily ineffective if the public agency is highly politically motivated given a highly politically motivated public agency industrial policies are effective if and only if the institutional setting ensures that such policies are modest e g by restricting the public agency s budget moreover our model helps us to understand why the same industrial policies that have failed elsewhere have been relatively successful in south korea and taiwan

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

natural resources education and economic development economic growth since 1965 has varied inversely with the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries four main channels of transmission from abundant natural resources to stunted economic development are discussed a the dutch disease b rent seeking c overconfidence and d neglect of education public expenditure on education relative to national income expected years of schooling for girls and gross secondary school enrolment are all shown to be inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries natural capital appears to crowd out human capital thereby slowing down the pace of economic development

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

intra day tests of the efficiency of the treasury bill futures market in this paper we use intra day prices to examine the efficiency of the treasury bill futures market the use of intra day data allows us to carefully match in time trades in the futures and cash markets by matching trades and allowing delays between observing apparent inefficiencies and the trade we are examining realistic trading strategies we find profitable arbitrage swaps and a preferred strategy for initial purchase these profits do not depend on an assumption of an equilibrium model hence these tests are direct tests of efficiency rather than a joint test of efficiency and equilibrium t his paper examines the efficiency of the treasury bill futures market this subject has been examined before by capozza and cornell 1979 cornell 1981 lang and rasche 1978 rendleman and carabini 1979 vignola and dale 1979 poole 1978 and puglisi 1978 there are a number of reasons why this paper makes an important contribution to the literature the first reason is that by using trade by trade futures prices we can make more realistic assumptions about the pnces at which trades could have taken place this paper uses intra day prices to examine efficiency prior studies at best used closing prices to examine apparent inefficiencies and assumed that transactions took place at these closing prices there are two problems with this procedure first simultaneous transactions cannot actually occur at closing prices there is almost an hour difference between the closing of the chicago futures and new york spot markets thus when the closing spot market price is observed the futures market has been closed for about an hour closing prices could be used to judge apparent discrepancies however it would be necessary to execute trades at the open making decisions based on closing prices and then assuming trades can take place at these prices is an approximation which could significantly affect results in addition using only closing prices ignores any intra day trades which could lead to profits in this study we match in time intra day prices in the spot and futures market these matched prices are used to identify apparently profitable trading rules we then assume trades take place at prices which are observed later in the day this is a test of a trading rule which an investor could actually follow as we discuss later in the paper our results differ from prior studies these differences are primarily due to using intra day prices and carefully matching times so that information used to initiate trades would actually be available to the investor at the time of the trade the second reason is that we examine more complex trading strategies than those which have been employed in other studies the random walk literature provides a useful analogy the original random walk studies simply correlated past and future prices or returns later studies examined filter rules and other more complicated trading rules in this study we employ alternative trading rules of increased complexity to test for the existence of trading profits finally we explicitly examine the consequence of t bills futures contracts being futures rather than forward contracts futures contracts unlike forward contracts involve flows every settlement day the intermediate cash flows on futures contracts can affect the profitability of any strategy the only prior study that even considered this effect is the one by rendleman and carabini 1979 they used the theoretical model of cox ingersoll and ross 1981 to try to estimate whether the difference between forward and futures prices was likely to be large enough to affect the payoff from alternative trading strategies this is a useful first attempt however ultimately the effect of daily settlement or marking to the market has to be examined directly as part of trading strategies to see if it affects the outcome of these strategies there are other problems with prior studies these involve gross estimates of prices and averaging data in a way that can mask inefficiencies since these problems are discussed in some detail in rendleman and carabini there is no reason to review them further here probably no area in finance has received more attention than the efficiency literature the reader may well wonder why even given the approximareceived for publication august 23 1982 revision accepted for publication may 20 1983 new york university new york university and baruch college respectively the authors would like to thank the center for the study of futures markets at columbia business school for financial support

oil and women a re examination abstract in a seminal article ross 2008 reports a negative correlation between oil production and women s representation in the labour force and politics across countries this article re examines these relationships exploiting variations in oil endowments to address endogeneity concerns we confirm that oil production causes decline in women s representation additionally we show that consistent with dutch disease effects oil production decreases women s employment in the traded sector however it also leads to an increase in women s employment in the nontraded sector we explore some social consequences of oil production and show that it results in women marrying earlier and having more children

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

dodging bullets the heterogeneous effect of political violence on greenfield fdi the relationship between political violence and greenfield foreign direct investment is contingent on the type of violence characteristics of the investment receiving sector and extent to which the investing firm is geographically diversified this paper presents an analysis with a dynamic fixed effects model for a panel of 90 developing countries from 2003 to 2012 the analysis shows that nationwide political conflict is negatively associated with total and non resource related greenfield foreign direct investment but not with resource related greenfield foreign direct investment the insensitivity to political conflict of multinational firms in the resource sector is associated with the high profitability of natural resource extraction and the companies geographic constraints on location choice during the period of estimation in the non resource sector the less geographically diversified firms are most sensitive to the risk of conflict

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

taxes and the futures forward price difference in the 91 day t bill market this paper investigates a tax based explanation for the futures forward price divergence in the ninety one day t bill the explanation is firstly in terms of the distinction between capital gains and losses and ordinary gains and losses and secondly in terms of investors to whom the above distinction applies and investors such as broker dealers to whom it does not the empirical results are encouraging though more ambiguous in the post 1981 period overall it would seem that other factors in addition to taxes are also at work copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

forward and futures prices evidence from the foreign exchange markets empirical studies of the treasury bill markets have revealed substantial differences between the futures price and the implied forward price these differences have been attributed to taxes transaction costs and the settling up procedure employed in the futures market this paper examines the forward and futures prices in foreign exchange in an attempt to distinguish between the competing explanations empirical studies of the treasury bill market have revealed differences between the futures price or rate and the implicit forward price derived from the term structure of interest rates 1 these differences have generally been attributed to market imperfections such as taxes and transaction costs see for example arak 1 capozza and cornell 2 and rendelman and carabini 6 recently however cox ingersoll and ross 3 henceforth cir derived a model in which forward and futures prices need not be equal even in perfect markets without taxes as long as interest rates are stochastic the significance of the cir effect may be hard to investigate using only data from the bill market because of the potentially complicating effects of taxes and transaction costs unique to this market by using data from the foreign exchange market we are able to eliminate the tax effect and reduce the impact of transaction costs the question we address is whether the discrepancies observed in the treasury bill market are also observed in the foreign exchange market if they are then we have evidence that the differences are due to a combination of the cir effect and the transaction costs common to both markets if they are not then either the magnitude of the cir effect is much less in the foreign exchange market or the treasury bill results are due to the unique tax treatment and transaction costs of that market this paper is organized as follows in section i the trading mechanics of the forward and futures markets in foreign exchange are discussed section ii reviews the explanations for the discrepancies between the forward and futures prices for treasury bills the institutional differences between the foreign exchange and bill markets are also summarized to show which of these explanations cannot apply to the foreign exchange market in section iii the data are decribed and the empirical results are presented the conclusions are summarized in the final section

natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development abstract why do african and middle eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet usa australia and norway seem blessed a growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions this paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system the model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies it also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes i test the model s predictions using fixed effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption