a principal agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system abstract mechanism design problems optimize contract offerings from a principal to different types of agents who have private information about their demands for a product or a service we study the implications of uncertainty in agents demands on the principal s contracts specifically we consider the setting where agents demands follow heterogeneous distributions and the principal offers a menu of contracts stipulating quantities and transfer payments for each demand distribution we present analytical solutions for the special case when there are two distributions each taking two discrete values as well as a method for deriving analytical solutions from numerical solutions we describe one application of the model in carbon capture and storage systems to demonstrate various types of optimal solutions and to obtain managerial insights

characterization of a class of moral hazard adverse selection games abstract studying a principal agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it but the moral hazard is not reducible shows that if the principal uses all signals then no solution exists i e there is no contract that elicits truth telling and motivates the agent to exert effort when the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used even though they obey the informativeness condition of holmstrom bell journal of economics 1979 10 74 91

equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits abstract this paper examines the equilibrium properties of a range of auctions and related procedures placing emphasis on the types of procedures that are likely to be of special interest in environmental management applications nash equilibrium properties are first derived for a very general class of auctions for multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous objects or permits next it is shown that given appropriate assumptions three broad classes of public allocation procedures that do not generate revenues for the government would yield participants equal expected profits these classes are 1 incentive compatible auctions where bidders receive equal lump sum refunds 2 non incentive compatible procedures where refunds are a function of participants bids and 3 free initial distribution of permits on a lump sum basis followed by trading via a competitive market the applicability of the general results is then demonstrated by examining the particular non incentive compatible fair division procedure originally suggested by knaster finally implications of the theoretical results for applications including the allocation of transferable discharge permits and water rights are discussed

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

taxation and excess burden a life cycle perspective a lifetime perspective is appropriate in assessing the welfare implications of government tax policies although a number of attempts have been made to ex amine the excess burden of taxation in life cycle models these have tended to ignore the role of human capital accumulation and or the leisure income choice in this paper we do numerical simulations with a model that takes both of these phenomena into account we find that under reasonable assumptions the failure to take into account distortions of human capital decisions produces substantial underestimates of the excess burden of income taxation in addition allowing for the endogeneity of human capital increases the efficiency of a personal consumption tax relative to that of an equal yield income tax this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

the licensing of patents under asymmetric information abstract this paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information the licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensor it is shown that there is a unique equillibrium satisfying cho and kreps intuitive criterion qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types

dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation abstract we study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely repeated screening model with long term contracts we propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist s profit is maximized after every history we show that the monopolist sequentially screens high type consumers and characterize second degree price discrimination policies the monopolist s ability to extract rent from high type consumers by distorting the allocation of low type consumers vanishes as all parties become more patient as a result all distortions disappear and the allocation becomes efficient

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

on the instability of the r d portfolio in a dynamic monopoly or one cannot get two eggs in one basket abstract firms innovation portfolios include several dimensions ranging from organizational aspects to cost reduction and product characteristics all of these efforts take place during the product life cycle and interact with each other in determining the spectrum of features of the product and its performance on the market this paper contributes to the related theoretical debate focussing on the possibility of having superior product quality levels at lower marginal production cost over time to deal with this issue we investigate the optimal r d portfolio of a single product monopolist investing in cost reducing activities accompanied by efforts improving the quality of its product over an infinite time horizon it turns out that the firm s relative incentives along the two directions are conditional upon market affluence measured by consumers willingness to pay for quality and r d efforts are complements in the neighbourhood of the steady state equilibrium however the dynamics of the two r d controls depend on both quality and marginal cost at every instant consequently as the stability analysis reveals the steady state equilibrium is indeed unstable due to the dynamics of marginal cost thereby implying that one should not expect the firm to supply an increasing quality level at a decreasing production cost hence the dynamic interplay between r d controls and the resulting instability affecting production costs also imply that one may not expect to observe product quality to increase and market price to decrease over the product life cycle

interpreting the results of empirical analyses of intertemporal allocation an identification problem abstract empirical analyses of household behaviour often find that behaviour is intertemporally non additive in the sense that past state variables affect current behaviour this may be because preferences are nonadditive because of habits or satiation or because budgets are non additive for example because of human capital formation or imperfections in credit markets in this note i show that there is a fundamental identification problem in that we cannot infer from observed quantities and prices whether any nonadditivity in behaviour is coming from the budget constraint or the utility function

optimal pricing of a congestible good with random participation abstract this paper studies the optimal pricing of a congestible network good offered by a monopoly who faces a double asymmetry of information concerning both users valuations and users unit waiting costs which leads to a random participation problem we show that the textbook price is lower than the price with random participation

the contribution of product mix versus efficiency and technical change in us banking abstract similar to a du pont analysis this paper divides the changes in returns on assets of us commercial banks for the period from 2000 to 2005 into conventional measures of bank performance the contribution of product mix is significant and offsets losses from technical change and operating efficiency banks respond to changes in the business environment by switching towards more lucrative traditional and nontraditional products large banks are found to benefit more than community banks from the switch to an optimal output portfolio mix including new products spawned by recent financial innovations and deregulation

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

how optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes abstract the impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated in one version preferences are quasilinear in leisure for this version it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone s optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates in the other version preferences are quasilinear in consumption for this version it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone s optimal before tax incomes and optimal marginal tax rates moreover the directions of change in the optimal marginal tax rates are the same for the two specifications of preferences

non linear pricing with a general cost function abstract in this paper we treat the one good monopolist non linear pricing problem with a general cost function if the monopolist sees the consumer type as the realization of a random variable then the solution is obtained by the usual pointwise maximization method however if the distribution of consumers types is the realized distribution of buyers then the solution is harder and is presented here

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

an empirical analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing abstract we estimate a model of competitive nonlinear pricing with multidimensional preference heterogeneity using individual level data on advertisements bought by local businesses e g doctors electricians from two yellow page directories in one u s city market variation in individual choices and payments allows us to identify the joint density of preferences marginal costs of publishing and common utility parameters our estimates suggest substantial welfare loss due to asymmetric information comparing duopoly outcomes with counterfactual monopoly outcomes we find that with less competition i producer surplus increases substantially ii more low type consumers are excluded iii product variety increases but benefits accrue only to the high type consumers iv total consumer surplus decreases v but its distribution across consumers does not change

the dominance of inefficiencies over scale and product mix economies in banking abstract this study measures and analyzes inefficiencies for all u s banks in 1984 inefficiencies are measured relative to a thick frontier cost function and are found to dominate measured scale and product mix economies most inefficiencies are operational in nature involving the overuse of physical inputs rather than financial involving overpayment of interest also technical inefficiencies proportionate overuse of all inputs dominate allocative inefficiencies improper mix of inputs these results suggest that competitive pressures in banking from deregulation will be focused primarily on banks that do not control costs rather than on those of a particular size or product mix

hiring and leasing with nonlinear prices this paper examines the problem of a monopolist setting an optimal nonlinear pricing schedule in the face of consumers of unknown type who arrive randomly over time and self select a choice of hire period the major determinant of pricing policy is the customer arrival distribution with the overall level of price higher than in the atemporal yield management nonuniform pricing solution by a margin which increases with the average frequency with which potential customers arrive by contrast the solution is generally fairly insensitive to variations in the time rate of discount although there is a tendency for the rate of price discount to increase with increases in the time discount rate

information exchange and distributional implications of price discrimination with internet marketing in agriculture a price discrimination model is proposed to explain why firms provide extraneous information on internet sites selling agricultural inputs whether an informative site is offered depends on price discrimination potential which depends on how much farmers reveal heterogeneity by internet behavior price discrimination is greater if information benefits are negatively correlated with farm size or other characteristics explaining why extraneous not product related information is offered on internet sales sites price discrimination adversely affects some farmers but may be beneficial on average because it generates free information outcomes depend on whether internet users are aware of price differentials on the basis of clickstream information

the impact of macroeconomic and regulatory factors on bank efficiency a non parametric analysis of hong kong s banking system abstract this paper assesses the relative technical efficiency of institutions operating in a market that has been significantly affected by environmental and market factors in recent years the hong kong banking system these environmental factors are specifically incorporated into the efficiency analysis using the innovative slacks based second stage tobit regression approach advocated by fried et al fried h o schmidt s s yaisawarng s 1999 incorporating the operating environment into a nonparametric measure of technical efficiency journal of productivity analysis 12 249 267 a further innovation is that we also employ tone s tone k 2001 a slacks based measure of efficiency in data envelopment analysis european journal of operational research 130 498 509 slacks based model sbm to conduct the data envelopment analysis dea in addition to the more traditional approach attributable to banker charnes and cooper bcc banker r d charnes a cooper w w 1984 some models for estimating technical and scale efficiencies in data envelopment analysis management science 30 1078 1092 the results indicate high levels of technical inefficiency for many institutions considerable variations in efficiency levels and trends across size groups and banking sectors and also differential impacts of environmental factors on different size groups and financial sectors surprisingly the accession of hong kong to the people s republic of china episodes of financial deregulation and the 1997 1998 south east asian crisis do not seem to have had a significant independent impact on relative efficiency however the results suggest that the impact of the last mentioned may have come via the adverse developments in the macroeconomy and in the housing market

the role of fixed costs and cost complementarities in determining scope economies and the cost of narrow banking proposals narrow banking proposals would separate insured deposits from most types of bank lending using data from large u s banks the authors examine the extent to which narrow banking proposals are likely to result in increased production costs production costs will rise for nonjoint provision of deposit and loan services if there are cost complementarities in producing the two outputs jointly or if joint production enables banks to spread their fixed costs more effectively unlike standard cost function approaches the authors methods allow them to estimate the fixed cost and cost complementarity effects separately they find the net production cost consequences of narrow banking to be negligible copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

push or pull performance pay incentives and information we study a principal agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input we show 1 performance pay may not be optimal even if output is the only informative signal of an essential input 2 total surplus tends to be higher if one input is unobservable than if both inputs are observable and 3 bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types we explore the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage r d activity but our results have applications beyond this context

price discrimination using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously abstract price discrimination practiced by using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously raises the average price for heterogenous consumers paying linear price but lowers for homogeneous group who pay nonlinear price discrimination lowers consumer surplus for both groups but increases total surplus

optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity we consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity averse monopolist the monopolist s subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by contamination of an additive probability we find that under a maxmin utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract and the distortion at the bottom is reduced other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity but they get a greater discount

work costs and nonconvex preferences in the estimation of labor supply models abstract works costs have not been adequately handled in labor supply estimation likely due to their complexity we show that if work costs are not accounted for in the budget and time constraints in a structural labor supply model they will be subsumed into the data generating preferences even if underlying preferences over consumption and leisure are convex the presence of unobservable work costs can make these preferences appear nonconvex however we show that under plausible conditions policy relevant calculations such as estimates of the effect of tax changes on labor supply and deadweight loss measures are not affected by the fact that estimated preferences incorporate work costs

traditional and nontraditional banking an information theoretic approach abstract this paper uses a multiproduct approach to analyze the costs of a sample of large banks where bank outputs are measured to account for the different types of information produced by banks diseconomies of scope are found between traditional banking activities of originating and monitoring loans and nontraditional activities of loan selling and buying this suggests maintaining fire walls between commercial bank functions and investment bank functions after the glass steagall act is repealed will not sacrifice joint production economies it also suggests that arguments for repeal of the act based on the existence of such economies are ill founded

price discrimination through refund contracts in airlines this paper shows how an airline monopoly uses refundable and non refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their travel our theoretical model predicts that the difference between these two fares diminishes as individual demand uncertainty is resolved using an original data set from u s airline markets we find strong evidence supporting our model price discrimination opportunities through refund contracts decline as the departure date nears and individuals learn about their demand

revenue implications of money creation under leviathan most governments possess a monopoly franchise in the creation of money economists provide an analytical justification for this institutional arrangement either in terms of the use of monetary aggregates for macro economic stabilization or in terms of the alleged inability of competitive markets to generate tolerably efficient monetary results any complete case for the government s monetary monopoly must however depend on a comparison of market and political arrangements a comparison that requires predictions about how governments are likely to behave once a monopoly franchise is assigned similarly such predictions are crucial in evaluating restrictions that might be imposed on the government s exercise of its money creation power in designing a monetary constitution in the analysis of political arrangements the revenue implications of the money creation power are probably more significant than considerations of either macro economic stability or optimality in the money supply although those revenue implications are incidental to demonstrating the nature of market failure in monetary arrangements they are fundamental in understanding how the government might exploit a monopoly in money creation once granted our interest in the revenue effects of money creation stems from a broader study of constitutional restrictions on the revenueraising authority of government see our book the power to create money is naturally encompassed in this restrictions on the revenue raising power must embody restrictions on the power to create money consequently the fiscal constitution has important implications for the monetary constitution in this paper we examine both the revenue implications of money creation and desirable consitutional restrictions on the money creation power within the context of a specific model of political processes

cost functions in non linear pricing abstract this paper compares the optimal selling strategies with symmetric and asymmetric information when monopolist s cost function depends both on individual and aggregate production we show how standard underproduction and higher exclusion with incomplete information are affected

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal nonuniform prices we consider optimal nonuniform pricing schedules where the price depends upon the amount purchased such schedules are regularly used by public utilities and other services welfare optimal nonuniform prices are related to the theory of optimal uniform prices developed by ramsey we characterize situations in which upward or downward discontinuities in pricing schedules are optimal our results are applicable to a number of related problems including optimal taxation insurance and incentives economic theory has confined most of its attention to markets with uniform prices in which the price per unit charged is invariant to the level of a customer s purchases this focus is warranted when goods are resellable since any attempt to charge nonuniform prices could be circumvented by reselling amongst customers but when goods are not resellable nonuniform prices are not only possible but common public utilities have declining block pricing with lower unit charges for large levels of consumption many agencies providing services including communications transportation even education use two part pricing with a fixed entry or retainer charge and a further charge per unit consumption nonuniform price schedules can be expected to be ever more common as services become a larger fraction of total output the increasing prevalence of nonuniform pricing policies have made them the focus of recent public and economic attention oi 1971 feldstein 1972 and ng and weisser 1974 have examined optimal two part pricing policies leland and meyer 1976 examine block pricing and show by example that optimal welfare policies may require nonuniform prices if zero profit constraints are binding in this paper we consider arbitrary nonuniform pricing policies using variational techniques two part and block pricing schedules are of course special cases of the environment we consider the work most closely related to our examination is the seminal paper by spence 1978 and subsequent analysis by roberts 1979 spence however does not pay explicit attention to the key role played by constraints on optimal pricing schedules roberts considers upward price discontinuities which lead to bunching of consumers at a given level of consumption but not downward price discontinuities which lead to regions in which no consumer chooses to consume gaps bunching or gaps may appear in the optimal price schedule even when underlying demand and cost functions are smooth and well behaved the prevalence of discontinuous pricing schedules e g the block pricing structures of public utilities argues that these questions are of practical as well as theoretical interest

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

efficiency in the international insurance industry a cross country comparison the purpose of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on frontier efficiency measurement in the international insurance industry a topic of great interest in the academic literature during the last several years a broad efficiency comparison of 6462 insurers from 36 countries is conducted different methodologies countries organizational forms and company sizes are compared considering life and non life insurers we find a steady technical and cost efficiency growth in international insurance markets from 2002 to 2006 with large differences across countries denmark and japan have the highest average efficiency whereas the philippines is the least efficient regarding organizational form the results are not consistent with the expense preference hypothesis which claims that mutuals should be less efficient than stocks due to higher agency costs only minor variations are found when comparing different frontier efficiency methodologies data envelopment analysis stochastic frontier analysis

a simple nonadditive preference structure for models of household behavior over time intertemporal separability is an almost universal assumption in empirical work on household behavior but a good deal of recent work on consumption and labor supply suggests that it may not be tenable the traditional weakening of this assumption is to allow for habit formation i propose an alternative structure for intertemporal preferences that nests intertemporal additivity in a simple way and yields closed form solutions for demand functions this structure includes the neoclassical durables model as a special case i derive a demand system that nests the almost ideal system as its time separable counterpart this model is estimated on u k aggregate time series data for seven goods time separability is decisively rejected moreover i find that ignoring temporal dependencies leads to considerable bias in the estimates of elasticities of the seven goods durables display the strongest nonseparable effect the estimated reactions are consistent with the neoclassical durables model

the impact of regulatory reforms on cost structure ownership and competition in indian banking this paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership cost efficiency relationship in indian banking it also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market we find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market results suggest technological progress once indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment this however does not translate in efficiency gains there is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change finally competition keeps building pace even in the re regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms

intertemporal nonseparability or borrowing restrictions a disaggregate analysis using a u s consumption panel we propose a method to test for liquidity constraints which relies on using the within period marginal rate of substitution condition as a benchmark to evaluate the intertemporal euler equation if spot markets for nondurable goods exist but financial markets either do not exist or are imperfect we show how the comparison of first order conditions involving the relevant spot and intertemporal prices can be used to detect the imperfection we apply our methodology to a large sample of u s households drawn from twelve years of the consumer expenditure survey allowing for a general nonseparable preference structure our estimates of first order conditions do not indicate the presence of liquidity constraints with the possible exception of young households

price augmenting returns to scale an application to nonseparable two stage technologies parameters to be estimated is small and since imposing regularity conditions in the estimation of these technologies is straightforward we illustrate the technique by estimating the nonseparable two stage leontief ces cost function using the familiar berndt wood khaled time series data on u s manufacturing output and compare our results with the familiar single stage translog cost function

the value of buyer s ignorance in monopoly abstract a non linear pricing monopolist always prefers to sell to buyers with no private information about their tastes for the product if the marginal production cost is smaller than the marginal utility of consumption for all buyers

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

when are local incentive constraints sufficient we study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings allowing for probabilistic mechanisms we give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces on many common preference domains including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences single peaked ordinal preferences and successive single crossing ordinal preferences local incentive compatibility suitably defined implies full incentive compatibility on domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition local incentive compatibility is not sufficient our sufficiency results hold for dominant strategy and bayesian nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

intertemporal quality discrimination of a durable good monopolist abstract consider a durable good monopolist facing the technology constraint that when he introduces a new product he cannot produce a cheaper variant without a time lag we show that the qualities of his high end and low end products are higher than their efficient quality levels

strategic environmental policy under incomplete information this paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy it is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition relative to the full information case incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour a countervailing effect tending to raise distortion is however revealed from the analysis this effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies the results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information when environmental standards rather than direct production subsidies are the strategic instrument

a multiproduct cost study of savings and loans this paper investigates the cost structure of savings and loans most studies of financial institutions have failed to take into account the multiproduct nature of these institutions using the multiproduct approach the existence of subadditivity multiproduct global and product specific economies of scale and scope and substitutability between inputs is investigated a translogarithmic cost function is estimated using 1982 data on california savings and loans restrictive functional forms also estimated are rejected standard errors for the statistics calculated are estimated and various statistical tests are conducted previous authors have not calculated standard errors for these statistics no evidence of subadditivity in the industry is found in order to investigate the impact of deregulation on the financial services industry it is necessary to know the cost structure of the industry optimal firm size and product mix can be determined once the structure is known the presence of scale economies would imply that smaller firms or entering firms that operate at a small scale would be at a cost disadvantage compared with larger established firms a finding of economies of scope i e economies of joint production would imply that firms that were specialized would be at a cost disadvantage and that regulations that restrict the outputs a firm is allowed to produce may lead to inefficient production

intertemporal preferences and labor supply in this paper the authors examine whether nonseparable preference structures ar e important in characterizing life cycle labor supply using longitud inal data on prime age males from the panel study of income dynamics they estimate a model of life cycle leisure and consumption under un certainty in which intertemporal preferences are allowed to be nonsep arable in leisure the model tests several alternative specifications considered in the literature they investigate the robustness of the ir findings to certain forms of population heterogeneity and types of model misspecification across alternative specifications the autho rs find that the standard assumption of intertemporally separable pre ferences for leisure is not consistent with the data copyright 1988 by the econometric society

profit maximizing nonlinear pricing if the preferences of the consumers are represented by utility functions that are differentiable quasi linear and satisfy the single crossing condition the characteristics of the profit maximizing nonlinear outlay schedule for a monopolist are well known we demonstrate that these characteristics are robust against weaker assumptions on the utility functions

do consumers pay for one stop banking evidence from an alternative revenue function abstract in providing financial services jointly banks may reduce costs due to complementarities in production cost economies of scope or raise revenues from complementarities in consumption revenue economies of scope cost economies of scope between bank deposits and loans have been found to be small revenue economies of scope are investigated here for the first time and found to be insignificant over 1978 1990 for both small and large banks and for those on or off the revenue efficient frontier the lack of complementarities between deposits and loans where benefits are most likely to occur suggests that claims of important synergies from an expansion of banking powers be taken with caution

profitable pricing when market segments overlap in this paper we analyze profitable pricing strategies when market segments overlap overlapping markets are segments that are not perfectly sealed and leakage between them can occur different consumers are assumed to incur possibly different transaction costs if they choose to purchase in the low price market a monopolist seller knows the distribution of transaction costs across consumers and must choose an optimal pricing strategy in particular the monopolist must decide whether to charge a single price or to price differentiate conditions are derived under which price differentiation will be the most profitable strategy when price differentiation is optimal the equilibrium amount of leakage is determined endogenously unlike the standard economics textbook model of price discrimination in which zero leakage is determined exogenously and is usually given as a necessary condition for price discrimination we show that zero leakage is not necessary for differential pricing to be optimal and that

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

a theory of banking structure abstract this paper proposes a theory to analyze the specialization of banking activities based upon the different functions that banks perform when rendering a variety of financial services the functional difference in the services performed by banks is based upon two dimensions the degree of information asymmetry involved in providing the service and the degree of verifiability of the value of the service rendered this has implications for the length of banking relationships and also determines whether banks develop the right degree of skill specialization and resource intensity for the existing task mix costly overspecialization occurs in certain deal type transactions and underspecialization occurs in relationship type transactions the paper examines how bank client relationships are structured and proposes an explanation for phenomena such as bank syndication first mover advantages and monopoly skills are also shown to be natural outcomes of the model the analysis has implications for banking regulation such as for the glass steagall act in the sense that it analyzes the effects of this specialization first enacted within the spirit of the act

nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation abstract this paper analyzes profit maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to price cap regulation two forms of regulatory constraint are considered i a cap on the firm s average revenue and ii a constraint that the firm must continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at the uniform price optimal nonlinear price schedules in these regimes are shown to have simple characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs that an unregulated monopolist would charge of the regulatory regimes the firm prefers the average revenue constraint to the option constraint and likes uniform pricing least consumers in aggregate prefer the option regime to uniform pricing and like the average revenue constraint least but there are also distributional effects between consumers although the optional tariff regime pareto dominates uniform pricing it is ambiguous whether welfare is higher under uniform pricing or under the average revenue regime an example is used to illustrate the nature of the ambiguity

towards a more general approach to testing the time additivity hypothesis a new procedure is proposed for re examining the assumption of additivity of preferences over time which although untenable is usually maintained in intertemporal analyses of consumption and labour supply the method is an extension of a famous work by browning however it is more general in permitting the estimation of intertemporal demand systems which are explicit in an unobservable variable price of utility but may lack a closed form representation in terms of observable variables such as prices and total outlay it also makes extensive use of duality theory to solve the endogeneity problem encountered in browning s study applying this method with an appropriate estimator to the australian aggregate data it is found that the time additivity hypothesis is decisively rejected which is consistent with browning s conclusion

equivalence between the diamond dybvig banking model and the optimal income taxation model abstract it is shown that the diamond dybvig journal of political economy 96 1983 768 banking model with a continuum of types of agents has the same analytical structure as the standard optimal income taxation model review of economic studies 38 1971 175 review of economic studies 43 1976 261 insights from the income taxation literature immediately imply that a bank run equilibrium exists in the banking model as long as the long term project is sufficiently costly to liquidate

durable products time inconsistency and lock in many durable products cannot be used without a contingent consumable product e g printers require ink ipods require songs razors require blades etc for such products manufacturers may be able to lock in consumers by making their products incompatible with consumables that are produced by other firms we examine the effectiveness of such a strategy in the presence of strategic consumers who anticipate the future prices of both the durable product and the contingent consumable under a lock in strategy the manufacturer has pricing power over the contingent consumable which she can use to extract additional rents from higher valuation consumers but such pricing power may also reduce consumers willingness to pay for the durable because it subjects them to being held up with higher consumables prices in the future restricting our attention to linear pricing policies we find that if the manufacturer can commit to shutting down production of her durable after an initial one time sale then competition from another consumable of an appropriately degraded level of quality can benefit the manufacturer by mitigating consumers fears of being held up on the other hand when the manufacturer cannot commit to shutting down production of her durable then her own output of additional durables gives her an incentive to keep consumables prices low and competition in the consumables market is less beneficial this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors

competitive screening under heterogeneous information we study the interplay between informational frictions and second degree price discrimination our theory recognizes that consumers differ in their tastes for quality as well as in the information they possess about available offers which leads to dispersion over price quality menus in equilibrium while firms are ex ante identical we show that their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus to consumers of all valuations we explore the cross section of equilibrium menus and variations in market conditions to generate empirical predictions on prices qualities and markups across firms and within a firm s product line for instance more competition may raise prices for low quality goods yet consumers are better off as the qualities they receive also increase the predictions of our model illuminate empirical findings in many markets such as those for cell phone plans yellow pages advertising cable tv and air travel

regulation competition and asymmetric information abstract this article studies a model of regulation under asymmetric information when there exists a competitive fringe of unregulated alternative producers the correlation between the unknown cost parameters of the fringe and of the regulated firm allows the regulator to use the threat of entry by the fringe to reduce the informational cost of regulation the presence of the fringe is welfare enhancing the allocative distortions can be larger or smaller than those in the no fringe case and the optimal contract sometimes allows inefficient entry the optimal contract can exhibit non standard bunching phenomena and discontinuities

a composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking the composite cost function the authors propose combines a quadratic output structure with a log quadratic input price structure and is well suited for examining economies of scope subadditivity and other important properties of multiproduct firms to compare the composite model with an appropriate set of alternative functional forms they develop a parsimonious but general specification that nests the standard translog cost function the generalized translog cost function a separable quadratic cost function and the composite cost function an application to economies of scope in banking confirms the advantages of the composite model copyright 1992 by mit press

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

optimal number of standards under economies of scope in quality abstract stivers stivers andrew e 2003 quality standards with exogenously distributed quality economics letters 80 1 130 136 finds the optimal segmentation of quality when the distribution of quality is exogenous this paper characterizes the optimal number of standards as the cost of information falls both the number of standards and the market coverage of the firm rise

the target incentive system vs the price incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect abstract in a dynamic adverse selection type of principal agent relationship where the principal is committed over time to a particular incentive system with fixed structure but variable parameters but not to any intertemporal incentive scheme with both fixed structure and parameters the ratchet effect arises but varies with different incentive systems we show that compared with using prices as the sole planning mode the principal can attenuate the ratchet effect by stipulating targets as well as a result the target incentive system entails higher expected welfare than the price incentive system in a perfect bayesian equilibrium

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers this paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter the buyers interpret new information via bayes rule we show that in this environment prices are not monotone in buyers prior valuations interestingly this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer reverse price discrimination we derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets

efficiency properties of non linear pricing schedules without the single crossing condition this paper investigates efficiency properties of profit maximizing non linear outlay schedules it demonstrates that some well known efficiency characteristics of the profit maximizing non linear outlay schedule may not continue to hold when the single crossing condition is relaxed

all units discounts and double moral hazard abstract an all units discount is a price reduction applied to all units purchased if the customer s total purchases equal or exceed a given quantity threshold since the discount is paid on all units rather than marginal units the tariff is discontinuous and exhibits a negative marginal price cliff at the threshold that triggers the discount this paper shows that all units discounts arise in optimal agency contracts between upstream and downstream firms that face double moral hazard i present conditions under which all units discounts dominate two part tariffs and other continuous tariffs i also examine these tariffs when the upstream market faces a threat of entry in the case considered all units discounts deter entry by less efficient rivals without distorting price and investment whereas continuous tariffs either accommodate such entry or deter it by distorting price and investment

why do amusement parks only charge a fixed admission fee abstract we come up with some explanations on why amusement parks adopt pass pricing even when no additional transaction costs exist for implementing non linear pricing schemes the related factors include much fun generated by any ride and a higher transportation cost

monopoly and quality distortion effects and remedies a monopolist that sells in a market in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality will distort and enlarge the range of products offered for sale we examine the positive and normative impacts of remedies used to counteract such distortions for the case of a price ceiling the monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market offsetting the distortion induced by the unregulated exercise of monopoly power social welfare can be shown to increase for a sufficiently slight degree of price regulation for minimum quality standards the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards may exclude some consumers from the market

malmquist type indices in the presence of negative data an application to bank branches in this paper we develop an index and an indicator of productivity change that can be used with negative data for that purpose the range directional model rdm a particular case of the directional distance function is used for computing efficiency in the presence of negative data we use rdm efficiency measures to arrive at a malmquist type index which can reflect productivity change and we use rdm inefficiency measures to arrive at a luenberger productivity indicator and relate the two the productivity index and indicator are developed relative to a fixed meta technology and so they are referred to as a meta malmquist index and meta luenberger indicator we also address the fact that vrs technologies are used for computing the productivity index and indicator a requirement under negative data which raises issues relating to the interpretability of the index we illustrate how the meta malmquist index can be used not only for comparing the performance of a unit in two time periods but also for comparing the performance of two different units at the same or different time periods the proposed approach is then applied to a sample of bank branches where negative data were involved the paper shows how the approach yields information from a variety of perspectives on performance which management can use

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

efficiency technical change and returns to scale in large us banks panel data evidence from an output distance function satisfying theoretical regularity abstract this paper provides parametric estimates of technical change efficiency change economies of scale and total factor productivity growth for large banks those with assets in excess of 1 billion in the united states over the period from 2000 to 2005 this is done by estimating an output distance function subject to theoretical regularity within a bayesian framework we find that failure to incorporate theoretical regularity conditions results in mismeasured shadow revenue and or cost shares which in turn leads to perverse conclusions regarding productivity growth our results from the regularity constrained model show that total factor productivity of the large us banks grew at an average rate of 1 98 over the sample period however our estimates also show a clear downward trend in the growth rate of total factor productivity and our decomposition of the primal divisia total factor productivity growth index into its three components technical change efficiency change and economies of scale indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this decline