it s the weather stupid individual participation in collective may day demonstrations we investigate the possible explanations for variations in aggregate levels of participation in large scale political demonstrations a simple public choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual may day demonstrations of the danish labor movement and socialist parties taking place in copenhagen in the period 1980 2011 the most important explanatory variables are variations in the weather conditions and consumer confidence while political and socio economic conditions exhibit no robust effects as such accidental or non political factors may be much more important for collective political action than usually acknowledged and possibly make changes in aggregate levels of political support seem erratic and unpredictable

coalitional stability of multi party systems evidence from poland function form game that represents payoffs of electoral coalitions in a multi party system three empirical hypotheses are formulated under the assumption that seat maximizing parties modify coalitional structures to extract gains from coalescing the hypotheses say that party systems under stable voter preferences and electoral law tend to stability with respect to splits and coalescing the partition function is estimated for various coalitional structures for the polish party system with simulation based on district level election results and survey data the estimates show that the polish party system is split stable while the opportunities for gains from coalitions on the right were exhausted between the years of 1993 and 1997 some opportunities for such gains emerged on the left introduction

how communism could have been saved formal analysis of electoral bargaining in poland in 1989 during the 1989 roundtable talks solidarity and puwp the communist party were bargaining over the electoral law for the 1989 parliamentary elections in poland the first semi free elections held in the soviet bloc i show that the puwp consent to the elections was founded on an overly optimistic estimate of its popular support a surprising solidarity s victory led to the subsequent collapse of the communist regime in poland and initiated the fall of communism in other countries an alternative electoral law a single transferable vote would have been mutually acceptable to both parties while producing an outcome that would have been critically better for the communists

how efficient is the voting market it is by now well established that good macroeconomic conditions benefit the incumbent president and his congressional party confreres at the polls this result is not unanimous see for example stigler or arcelus and meltzer2 and may not be universal 3 however the basic results in kramer 4 the progenitor of the modern literature on the effect of economic conditions on elections seem to have stood the test of time the broad consensus of this literature is that voters in presidential and congressional elections 1 reward income growth and punish unemployment and inflation 2 probably give greater weight to income growth than to unemployment and inflation and 3 myopically ignore any information beyond the recent past say prior to the election year 5 so far however the data have outrun interpretation while economic conditions seem to matter we do not know why they matter or how plausibly to characterize the process by which voters translate information about economic conditions into voting decisions this article tries to fill that gap though it extends the empirical literature to gubernatorial elections its main con

in search of inclusion informal sector participation in a voluntary defined contribution pension system abstractthis paper examines who contributes and who persists in contributing in a national voluntary defined contributory pension programme where the government provides the incentive of matching contributions of a minimum amount usd 16 the paper uses proprietary data from a financial services firm where 12 per cent of customers 37 000 individuals chose to participate in this programme the evidence shows that only about 50 per cent of contributors reach the minimum amount for the co contribution but that participants persist in contributing even if they failed to contribute the minimum amount in a given year while this paper does not provide causal estimates it does present evidence of considerable interest among the informal sector in a state run voluntary pension programme in an emerging market where access to formal finance is otherwise poor

agriculture looks for shoes that fit the production responsibility system and its implications abstract by the end of 1981 problems clearly recognized within the communes included low productivity the failure to accumulate funds for modern inputs inefficient and corrupt cadres hidden unemployment inability to stimulate growth in other than major crops and disappointingly low levels of peasant incomes in many counties in north china peasants in 1980 began to divide up the collective fields on communes into smaller plots for cultivation by households and labour groups since then the face of china has been altered physically politically and organizationally by the creation of the responsibility system largely outside party control and influence document 75 of september 1980 sanctioning some form of production responsibility system was itself overtaken by events as a bewildering variety of forms emerged swamping the cadres practice was rapidly expanding beyond the theoretical discussions or pronouncements of officials like du runsheng the paper describes each of the many forms of contracting between peasant groups and the state now current in china with estimates of the relative proportions of the accounting units involved in each type table 3 new contradictions are already emerging in the changed rural set up partly because farm management problems bear similarities to those that confronted the open field strip farming of the european manor while the incentive to have more hands on family farms contradicts official chinese population policy

liquidity profiles of poor mexican households summary buffer stock savings theories predict that more vulnerable households build up liquid savings in order to cope with income variability using data from 1801 marginalized mexican households this paper examines how household liquidity levels vary by income level and use of banking the paper finds strong evidence of buffer stock savings in poor and vulnerable households it also shows that membership in a financial cooperative is a determinant of higher household liquidity levels financial instruments are used more to confront idiosyncratic shocks than systemic shocks idiosyncratic shocks and remittances are important determinants of liquidity levels in unbanked households

the pretence of knowledge lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 11 1974 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

misperceived social norms women working outside the home in saudi arabia we show that the vast majority of young married men in saudi arabia privately support women working outside the home wwoh and substantially underestimate support by other similar men correcting these beliefs increases men s costly willingness to help their wives search for jobs months later wives of men whose beliefs were corrected are more likely to have applied and interviewed for a job outside the home in a recruitment experiment with a local company randomly informing women about actual support for wwoh leads them to switch from an at home temporary enumerator job to a higher paying outside the home version of the job

diffusion and the international context of democratization democracy does not evolve sui generis the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions suggests that international factors play a prominent role in forg ing democracies as well as influencing their durability we argue that democracy often comes about as a result of changes in the relative power of important actors and groups as well as their evaluations of particular institutions both of which are often influenced by forces outside the country in question the scope and extent of con nections with other democratic countries in a region can strengthen support for dem ocratic reform and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies results from a transition model demonstrate that international factors can exert a strong influence on the prospects for transitions to democracy and the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions cannot adequately be explained by the hypothesized domestic social requisites of individual countries

expanding the life cycle model precautionary saving and public policy one of the key puzzles in understanding saving behavior is not so much why people save the title of this session but why people don t save according to the familiar life cycle model households should accumulate wealth to provide for their retirement consumption the surprising result from the data is the sizable fraction of the population who have accumulated so little even among those nearing retirement given that earnings will almost surely decline when households retire such behavior can imply poor living standards for the elderly some might interpret the low wealth accumulation as being evidence of myopia irrationality or a failure of households to enforce mental accounting richard thaler 1994 while others might view the low level of wealth accumulation as evidence of high individual rates of time preference determining the underlying causes of low wealth is crucial for public policies that seek to alleviate low aggregate saving rates in the united states as well as policies that seek to buttress the adequacy of financial resources for the elderly in this paper we outline what we believe to be the causes of why many people do not save we conclude by speculating about government policies that may be most effective at encouraging saving much of the research examining levels of consumption saving and wealth as well as their responsiveness to policy has been done using a life cycle model with the simplifying assumption of perfect certainty alan auerbach and laurence kotlikoff 1987 for example developed a model with 55 overlapping generations of individual lifecycle households each with empirically plausible age earnings profiles and utility parameters and used the model to address tax policy and demographic issues in a regime in which all households are identical within a generation and all generations know future earnings and interest rates more recently a line of inquiry has examined the effects of uncertainty on saving generally in the context of highly stylized models this research has shown that in these models uninsured earnings uncertainty can alter optimal saving behavior in a variety of important ways for a partial review of this precautionary saving literature see hubbard et al 1994 in two recent papers hubbard et al 1993 1994 we have combined these two strands of the literature by examining the implications of a life cycle model of consumption saving and wealth accumulation subject to what we think are the three most important sources of uninsured idiosyncratic risk facing households uncertainty about earnings medical expenses and length of life our intent has been to create a realistic model in which families live for many periods working for part of their lives and retiring later in life to parameterize the uncertainty facing families we estimate tdiscussants christopher carroll federal reserve board john b shoven stanford university laurence kotlikoff boston university

the tenure transition decision for elderly homeowners abstract there exists evidence of a sizable shift of elderly households away from homeownership the paper explores two sets of potential determinants of this decision one set derives from the life cycle hypothesis a second set is intended to apply to households that do not conform to the predictions of life cycle theory the results from estimating a tenure transition likelihood function provide some support for each set of explanations in particular they suggest that it is premature to dismiss the role of life cycle hypothesis behavior in explaining the decision of elderly households to terminate homeownership

life cycle responses to health insurance status this paper studies the lifetime effects of exogenous changes in health insurance coverage e g medicare ppaca termination of employer provided plans on the dynamic optimal allocation consumption leisure health expenditures status health and wealth and welfare we solve simulate and structurally estimate a parsimonious life cycle model with endogenous exposure to morbidity and mortality risks and exogenous health insurance by varying coverage we identify the marginal effects of insurance when young and or when old on allocations statuses and welfare our results highlight positive effects of insurance on health wealth and welfare as well as mid life substitution away from healthy leisure in favor of more health expenses caused by peaking wages and accelerating health issues

the institutional and political factors which influence taxation the ability of politicians to concentrate the benefits of spending while dispersing the costs of taxation makes taxation attractive distributive politics but the degree to which it is attractive varies widely among the states the objective of the research was to develop a fully specified model of per capita tax revenues of state governments not state plus local and thereby identify the political and institutional factors which cause the attractiveness of taxation to vary the resulting model includes 17 significant explanatory variables which together account for all but 10 of the variation in per capita tax revenue thirteen of the significant variables are institutional or political factors thus providing decisionmakers specific options for influencing the future size of government

locus of control and savings abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between individuals locus of control and their savings behavior i e wealth accumulation savings rates and portfolio choices locus of control is a psychological concept that captures individuals beliefs about the causal relationship between their own behavior and life events we find that households with an internal reference person a main respondent who believes that he she can generally control relevant aspects of life save more in terms of levels and in some cases as a percentage of their permanent incomes although the locus of control gap in savings rates is largest among rich households the gap in wealth accumulation is particularly large for poor households finally our findings indicate that households with an internal reference person are in a better position to save in forms that are harder to access such as pension wealth than otherwise similar households with an external reference person

the impact of income on the taste for revolt the question of how the level of development affects revolutionary support in society is of fundamental importance one approach to provide an answer has been to study the relationship between actual civil conflict and income at the national level this article takes a different approach it uses microdata sets based on surveys of revolutionary support across one quarter of a million people and identifies how the responses vary with their incomes we find that a rise in gdp of us 1 600 per capita in 2001 values decreases the chances of supporting revolt by 2 4 percentage points which represents a 41 drop in the proportion of people wanting a revolution for a person who jumps from the bottom to top income quartile within their country the probability declines by a similar amount the results are robust to controlling for country and year effects country specific time trends and take account of the potential endogeneity of gdp

contractual structure and wealth accumulation can historical wealth distributions affect long run output and inequality despite rational saving convex technology and no externalities we consider a model of equilibrium short period financial contracts where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability if agents have no bargaining power poor agents have no incentive to save poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes with no interclass mobility if instead agents have all the bargaining power strong saving incentives are generated the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and history does not matter eventually d31 d91 i32 o17 q15

health human capital height and wages in china abstract we estimate the returns to height using data from 12 chinese cities we present both ordinary least squares ols and two stage least squares tsls estimates in the latter height is instrumented using proxies for health human capital accumulated in childhood and adolescence which influence adult height the tsls estimates are much higher reflecting the fact that the ols estimates are determined by the random genetic factors influencing height while the tsls estimates also take into account returns from investment in health human capital during childhood and adolescence these results imply considerable returns to investment in health human capital

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

the incentive problem and the demise of team farming in china abstract this paper begins with a discussion of what can be inferred about the efficiency of collective farming from the demise of team production in rural china after reviewing the formal literature on incentives in collective farms it examines two problems that may have plagued the chinese teams first excessive egalitarianism which can be analyzed by modifying existing models and second monitoring problems which require a departure from the perfect information context of those models by numerical example it is shown that the superiority of household farming over forced collective farming does not preclude the possibility that some team production would have existed in a democratic equilibrium dominating both of them finally the post reform household contracting system is examined with special reference to distributive and allocative issues

psychology and savings policies many observers of the current economic scene are concerned about the low rate of personal saving in the united states one well known researcher laurence kotlikoff 1992 calls the situation a crisis he proposes that each american worker receive an annual statement from the social security administration with projected benefits upon retirement arguing that if each of us got this statement our attention would be caught and perhaps our psychology of saving which is in such urgent need of redress would really change p 107 i agree with the thrust of kotlikoff s recommendations and join him in applauding steps that will alter the general public s psychology of saving however as economists we need to recognize that the economic theory of saving is similarly in urgent need of redress if we are to understand why people are saving so little and are to make helpful recommendations as to how to get people to save more we have to incorporate more of the psychology of saving into our economic theories kotlikoff s policy proposal while a sensible one highlights the growing gap between theory and policy prescription in this domain if households are acting in accordance with the life cycle theory of saving then undersaving is impossible so why do they need to have their psychology redressed and how does this psychology fit into the model this example reflects an increasing frustration in the economics community about personal saving many observers have come to the conclusion that the low saving rate represents an important problem on two fronts macroeconomists worry that the low saving rate will produce too little investment and microeconomists worry that individuals particularly the baby boomers are not putting enough away to finance a satisfactory lifestyle in retirement these are serious concerns however the frustration comes from the realization that even if there was agreement that the saving rate needs to go up economic theory offers little help in constructing a solution in the standard life cycle framework the only policy variable is the after tax rate of return to saving yet it is well known that the theory does not specify the sign of the relationship between the saving rate and the interest rate raising the interest rate increases the returns to saving but decreases the amount of saving necessary to yield any given future consumption level furthermore empirical estimates offer little help most studies are unable to reject the hypothesis that the elasticity of personal saving with respect to the interest rate is zero clearly this is frustrating the theory only gives us one lever to use and we don t know whether to push or pull with this background i wish to supply what should be considered good news the theory is misspecified life cycle models of saving fail to describe actual household saving in three important ways this failure of the theory is good news because by incorporating some basic psychology we can enrich the theory and generate specific policy recommendations in this paper i will begin by characterizing the problems with the theory and then go on to discussing the implications of modifying the theory

a dynamic theory of the transition to democracy abstract a model of the transition to democracy is presented within a dynamic general equilibrium framework we demonstrate that democratic transitions occur endogenously in the course of economic growth or with economic contraction being fundamentally driven by the economic position of the middle class democratic transitions can occur rapidly or slowly because the autocrat faces an informational asymmetry regarding the effect of his policies on the political economic environment the model shows that the primary factors affecting the speed of democratic transitions are inequality the planning horizon of the autocrat the autocrat s perceived legitimacy and the rate of economic growth

the international diffusion of democracy the idea that democracy is contagious that democracy diffuses across the world map is now well established among policy makers and political scientists alike the few theoretical explanations of

protests and trust in the state evidence from african countries this paper provides empirical evidence that after protests citizens substantially revise their views on the current leader but also their trust in the country s institutions the empirical strategy exploits variation in the timing of an individual level survey and the proximity to social protests in 13 african countries first we find that trust in political leaders strongly and abruptly decreases after protests second trust in the country monitoring institutions plunges as well both effects are much stronger when protests are repressed by the government as no signs of distrust are recorded even a couple of days before the social conflicts protests can be interpreted as sudden signals sent on a leaders actions from which citizens extract information on their country fundamentals

the east european revolution of 1989 is it surprising that we were surprised many aspects of the east european revolution are controversial but on one point everyone agrees it caught the world by surprise even local dissidents were stunned by the sudden turn of events we will never know how many east europeans did foresee the explosion of 1989 but at each step accounts painted a picture of nations united in amazement to my knowledge only one study addresses the issue systematically four months after the breaching of the berlin wall the allensbach institute asked a broad sample of east germans a year ago did you expect such a peaceful revolution only 5 percent answered yes though 18 percent responded yes but not that fast fully 76 percent admitted to being totally surprised these figures are all the more remarkable given the i knew it would happen fallacy the human tendency to exaggerate foreknowledge baruch fischhoff and ruth beyth 1975 yet in hindsight the revolution appears as inevitable in each of the six countries the leadership was despised economic promises remained unfulfilled and basic freedoms existed only on paper more importantly winds of change in the soviet union were making soviet intervention increasingly unlikely but if the revolution was indeed inevitable why was it not foreseen what kept us from noticing signs that now after the fact are so plainly visible i preference falsification and revolutionary bandwagons

long term care utility and late in life saving older wealth holders spend down assets much more slowly than predicted by classic life cycle models this paper introduces health dependent utility into a model with incomplete markets in which pre

income transfers and assets of the poor contrary to the predictions of the standard life cycle model many low lifetime income households accumulate little wealth relative to their incomes compared to households with high lifetime income i use data from the panel study of income dynamics and a correlated random effects generalized method of moments estimator to decompose the rich poor gaps in wealth to permanent income ratio into the portions attributable to differences in characteristics such as labor market earnings income uncertainty observed demographics and the utilization of transfer programs which may have stringent income and liquid asset tests and those attributable to differences in the estimated coefficients on the respective characteristics the results suggest that wealth to permanent income ratios are increasing in permanent labor income and income uncertainty but that transfer income with or without asset tests discourages liquid asset accumulation the decompositions indicate that most of the rich poor wealth gap is attr

ration subsidies and incentives in the pre reform chinese commune a central feature of the egalitarianism said to have undermined work incentives in chinese agricultural produ ction teams during the 1960s and 1970s was the distribution of grain rations independently of work contribution this paper analyzes two m odels of grain rationing one drawn from existing theoretical literat ure and the other perhaps more closely based on chinese practice it finds that a scheme of the type commonly depicted was more costly to operate but provided better incentives to labor poor households unde r both schemes however the scope for material incentives was reduce d by grain ration guarantees and was smaller the poorer the team copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

extremism in revolutionary movements abstract a revolutionary entrepreneur strategically chooses the revolutionary agenda to maximize the likelihood of revolution citizens have different preferences and can contribute varying degrees of support we show 1 extremists exert a disproportionate influence over the revolutionary agenda 2 depending on the structure of repression more severe repression can moderate or radicalize the revolutionary agenda specifically increases in the minimum punishment marginal cost of revolutionary effort at its minimum radicalize the revolutionary agenda this presents the elite with a tradeoff between extreme but unlikely revolutions and moderate but likely ones 3 competition between revolutionary entrepreneurs can radicalize the revolutionary agenda

the institutional and political factors that influence voter turnout state data were used to develop an econometric model of voter turnout for an off year 1982 general election the premise of the research was that existing voter turnout models lacked some of the true explanatory variables in particular the political efficacy component of the decision to vote was believed to be under represented in those models

national health insurance and precautionary saving evidence from taiwan abstract by reducing uncertainty about future medical expenses comprehensive health insurance can reduce households precautionary saving we examine this effect using taiwan micro data spanning the 1995 introduction of national health insurance the effects of national health insurance are identified using employment based variation in prior insurance coverage replacement of the households prior insurance coverage with national health insurance is exogenous to the household so our estimates are not subject to selection bias compared with the preceding government insurance programs national health insurance reduced saving by an average of 8 6 13 7 with the largest effects for households with the smallest saving

medicaid insurance in old age the old age provisions of the medicaid program were designed to insure retirees against medical expenses we estimate a structural model of savings and medical spending and use it to compute the distribution of lifetime medicaid transfers and medicaid valuations across currently single retirees compensating variation calculations indicate that current retirees value medicaid insurance at more than its actuarial cost but that most would value an expansion of the current medicaid program at less than its cost these findings suggest that for current single retirees the medicaid program may be of the approximately right size

collective action with uncertain payoffs coordination public signals and punishment dilemmas how can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution we model a calculus of protest of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based only on personal information about their payoffs in deciding whether to revolt the citizen must infer both the benefit of successful revolution and the likely actions of other citizens we characterize conditions under which payoff uncertainty overturns conventional wisdom a when a citizen is too willing to revolt he reduces the incentives of others to revolt b less accurate information about the value of revolution can make revolt more likely c public signals from other citizens can reduce the likelihood of revolt d harsher punishment can increase the incidence of punishment and e the incidence of protest can be positively correlated with that of repression

egalitarianism subsistence provision and work incentives in china s agricultural collectives abstract collective agriculture in china failed because its reward system was too egalitarian to provide sufficient work incentives to the peasants a popular view attributes egalitarianism to the difficulties of monitoring work effort in a team an alternative view presented here argues that a the egalitarian provision of basic foodgrains to peasant households reflected more generally the consumption problem of the peasantry who were impoverished by the state s policy of extracting agriculture and b as a remuneration system time rates better served the work and income sharing purpose than piece rates and therefore better protected households with high dependency ratios egalitarianism survives under the household farming system

modeling earnings dynamics in this paper we use indirect inference to estimate a joint model of earnings employment job changes wage rates and work hours over a career we use the model to address a number of important questions in labor economics including the source of the experience profile of wages the response of job changes to outside wage offers and the effects of seniority on job changes we also study the dynamic response of wage rates hours and earnings to various shocks and measure the relative contributions of the shocks to the variance of earnings in a given year and over a lifetime we find that human capital accounts for most of the growth of earnings over a career although job seniority and job mobility also play significant roles unemployment shocks have a large impact on earnings in the short run as well as a substantial long term effect that operates through the wage rate shocks associated with job changes and unemployment make a large contribution to the variance of career earnings and operate mostly through the job specific error components of wages and hours

does means testing welfare discourage saving evidence from a change in afdc policy in the united states abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of a welfare program s asset test on the saving behavior of its target population the approach exploits a policy experiment the essential federalization of the afdc program s asset testing policy in 1981 data on female headed households from the national longitudinal survey young women are used to test the hypothesis that likely afdc users adjusted their asset stocks in response to this change the findings indicate additional saving between 1978 and 1983 of about 25 cents for each additional 1 increase in the limit in most states

liquidity constraints with endogenous income i introduction the existence of liquidity constraints remains a significant issue within intertemporal models of household choice as hayashi 1985b cox and jappelli 1993 and other studies detail the notion that consumers may be unable to borrow all they desire to finance current consumption carries important implications pertaining to ricardian equivalence as well as the dynamic effects of government spending versus tax policies liquidity constraints have also been advanced as a primary reason for empirical rejections of the permanent income life cycle hypothesis as discussed in zeldes 1989 testing for the existence of debt constraints with micro data has generated mixed results 1 hall and mishkin 1982 mariger 1987 zeldes 1989 hayashi 1985a and duca and rosenthal 1994 argue for the significance of liquidity constraints jappelli 1990 and duca and rosenthal 1994 contend that a nontrivial segment of the population faces credit rationing based upon information from the survey of current finances on the other hand the findings of altonji and siow 1987 runkle 1991 mariger and shaw 1993 and attanasio and weber 1995 provide little evidence of liquidity constraints this article investigates liquidity constraints with endogenous income it centers around the household s intertemporal model with nonseparable consumption and leisure following the methodology of zeldes 1989 and runkle 1991 the formulation allows for an individual household at a point in time to either face binding or nonbinding liquidity constraints our model extends this work by considering labor supply within the family s choice set as recommended by hayashi 1985a and attanasio and weber 1995 it includes endogenous wage income in the minimum wealth constraint these features allow for consideration of work related decisions within household utility maximization under liquidity constraints for example a family may choose increased labor supply to remove themselves from a debt constraint or to enable them to apply for a larger loan this behavior may take the form of increased overtime finding a second job or having the spouse enter the labor market the model works toward remedying several difficulties associated with empirical testing for liquidity constraints following alessie melenberg and weber 1988 we derive from the euler equations an estimable equation for employed households the equation holds for both liquidity constrained families as well as households that do not face a binding debt constraint this result addresses a well known problem involved with the standard consumption based utility formulation as discussed by hayashi 1985b and others the inability to directly estimate the euler equation s for liquidity constrained households consequently work such as hayashi 1985a zeldes 1989 and runkle 1991 use an a priori criterion to split the sample into suspected liquidity constrained and non liquidity constrained groups their tests are based upon parameter estimates from the group not considered to be debt constrained given estimated structural parameters from the consumption leisure model we can obtain estimates related to the individual lagrange multipliers pertaining to the minimum wealth constraint these estimated data series enable us to test directly for the presence of credit constraints within the general population primarily due to the difficulty in estimating the lagrange multipliers indirect means have generally been used to test for debt constraints over a sample of households hall and mishkin 1982 base their inferences on the excess sensitivity of consumption forecast errors to income innovations mariger and shaw 1993 raise doubts regarding their findings showing that such tests of the permanent income life cycle hypothesis can be biased toward rejection zeldes 1989 and fissel and jappelli 1990 criticize the general method since it assumes a constant proportion of liquidity constrained households

the role of freedom growth and religion in the taste for revolution a fundamental question about the determinants of civil conflict is the relative importance of political freedoms versus economic development this paper takes a new approach to provide an answer by using micro data based on surveys of revolutionary tastes of 130 000 people living in 61 nations between 1981 and 1997 controlling for personal characteristics country and year fixed effects more freedom and economic growth both reduce revolutionary support losing one level of freedom equivalent to a shift from the us to turkey increases support for revolt by 4 percentage points to reduce support by the same amount requires adding 14 percentage points onto the gdp growth rate being muslim in a free country has no effect on the probability of supporting revolt compared to a non religious person however being muslim in a country that is not free increases it by 13 percentage points being christian in a free country decreases the chance of supporting revolt by 4 percentage points compared to a non religious person and in a not free country by 1 percentage point

from extreme to mainstream the erosion of social norms social norms usually persistent can change quickly when new public information arrives such as a surprising election outcome people may become more inclined to express views or take actions previously perceived as stigmatized and may judge others less negatively for doing so we examine this possibility using two experiments we first show via revealed preference experiments that donald trump s rise in popularity and eventual victory increased individuals willingness to publicly express xenophobic views we then show that individuals are sanctioned less negatively if they publicly expressed a xenophobic view in an environment where that view is more popular

rational choice round robin and rebellion an institutional solution to the problems of revolution abstract two collective action problems plague successful revolution on the one hand would be revolutionaries confront a participation problem whereby no rationally self interested individual has an incentive to participate in rebellion on the other hand individuals face a first mover problem whereby no rationally self interested individual has an incentive to lead rebellion this paper argues that 18th century merchant sailors who confronted these problems devised a novel institution to facilitate maritime revolution and assist them in overthrowing abusive captains this institution was called a round robin round robins helped overcome both the participation and first mover problems by aligning the interests of individual sailors desiring mutiny and restructuring the payoffs of leading versus following maritime rebellion

income inequality and the taste for revolution abstract although property rights are the cornerstone of market economies throughout history existing claims have been frequently overturned by revolutions one unsettled question is whether income inequality affects the likelihood of revolt this paper takes an approach different from previous studies by introducing data derived from two surveys of revolutionary preferences across a quarter million randomly sampled individuals more people are found to have a preference for revolt when inequality in their nation is high a 1 standard deviation increase in the gini coefficient explains up to 38 percent of the standard deviation in revolutionary support the results hold after controlling for a set of personal characteristics and country and year fixed effects since higher levels of income are found to have a negative impact on the taste for revolt the results suggest that either going for growth or implementing policies that reduce inequality can buy off those individuals with revolutionary preferences

the taste for revolt abstract this paper tests for the characteristics affecting the revolutionary preferences of over 200 000 randomly sampled individuals from surveys taken over the 1970s to 1990s the chances of supporting revolt are higher if young lower in the income distribution or unemployed there are strong differences across ideological lines for people identifying with the religious right falling from the top to bottom income quartile increases the probability of supporting revolt by 2 percentage points whereas falling unemployed has no effect for those identifying with the non religious left both events increase the probability of supporting revolt by at least 5 percentage points

imputing consumption from income and wealth information we investigate the feasibility of deriving a measure of total expenditure at the household level from administrative micro data on income and wealth we use danish administrative data that provides measures of disposable income and the holding of different assets at the end of the year the ability to link the households in the 1994 6 danish expenditure survey to their administrative data for the years around the survey year offers a unique possibility for constructing a measure of total expenditure and of checking directly on the reliability of the imputation the results are promising

housing over time and over the life cycle a structural estimation we estimate a structural model of optimal life cycle housing and nonhousing con sumption in the presence of labor income and house price uncertainties the model postulates constant elasticity of substitution between housing service and nonhousing consumption and explicitly incorporates a housing adjustment cost our estimationts the cross sectional and time series household wealth and housing proles from the panel study of income dynamics 1984 to 2005 reasonably well and suggests an intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing and nonhousing consumption of 0 487 the low elasticity estimate is largely driven by moments conditional on state house prices and moments in the latter half of the sample period and is robust to different assumptions of housing adjustment cost we then conduct policy analyses in which we let house price and income take values as those observed between 2006 and 2011 we show that the responses depend importantly on the housing adjustment cost and the elasticity of sub stitution between housing and nonhousing consumption in particular compared with the benchmark the impact of the shocks on homeownership rates is reduced but the impact on nonhousing consumption is magnied when the house selling cost is sizable or when housing service and nonhousing consumption are highly substitutable