the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

the motivation and bias of bureaucrats many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper and three primary results are shown first bureaucrats should be biased second sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal while in other cases they are more hostile to their interests for a range of bureaucracies those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes third self selection need not produce the desired bias instead selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal and those who are least preferred

the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

envy in mission oriented organizations according to the labor donation theory workers adhering to their firms mission are willing to donate a portion of their paid labor in this paper we study how workers fairness concerns limit the firm s ability to extract labor donation from its employees we find that in sectors where the firm s mission is important optimal contracts are such that high ability employees perceive their wage as less fair than low ability employees and they must be rewarded with an envy rent the opposite is true in sectors where the firm s mission does not play a relevant role we empirically test the predictions of the model using the german socio economic panel finding support for our theoretical results

occupational choice and dynamic incentives we study an overlapping generations version of the principal agent problem where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium all individuals are workers when young but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital these rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints with a labour market that is subject to moral hazard the increased effort raises social welfare policies that reduce credit market imperfections or redistribute income may reduce welfare by dampening this effect

the sullying effect of recessions previous work has established that recessions involve a cleansing effect so that in downturns only high productivity jobs remain but empirical evidence suggests job quality is procyclical jobs created in recessions are likely to be low paying and temporary this paper modifies previous models by adding on the job search which leads to an additional sullying effect calibration of the model suggests this offsetting sullying effect is likely to be much larger than the cleansing effect and can account for the procyclical match quality we observe in the data

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

the real wage cyclicality of newly hired and incumbent workers in germany several recent macroeconomic models assume that real wages are rigid the wage rigidity of newly hired workers assumes a crucial role in these models as the decision of whether to open a vacancy is primarily influenced by real hiring wages this article analyses the cyclical behaviour of real wages in germany it considers recent concerns that not controlling for cyclical job up and downgrading leads to biased results the results indicate that wages are not rigid neither for all workers nor for newly hired workers but instead respond considerably to business cycle conditions

private versus social returns to human capital education and economic growth in india abstract this paper investigates whether differences between private and social returns to education of government sector employees can contribute to an explanation of the micro macro paradox in the literature on education and growth we hypothesize that in india educated people find privately rewarding jobs in a sector in which social returns are low namely the government sector this could help explain high returns to education at the micro level and small or negative coefficients on education growth in growth regressions at the macro level the empirical results which are consistent with this hypothesis are based on an analysis of state level data from india spanning 40 years

why are the wages of job changers so procyclical evidence on wage cyclicality shows job changers have more procyclical wages than job stayers previous work argued this arises because workers gain greater access to jobs in sectors such as manufacturing that offer high wages this article argues that workers who switch jobs in booms enter temporary jobs with unemployment risk and are merely compensated for subsequent losses i demonstrate that the two explanations can be distinguished using the relationship between unemployment insurance and wage cyclicality among job changers the evidence supports the compensation hypothesis that is that job changers might not experience real gains from higher paying jobs in booms

the macrodynamics of sorting between workers and firms we develop an equilibrium model of on the job search with ex ante heterogeneous workers and firms aggregate uncertainty and vacancy creation the model produces rich dynamics in which the distributions of unemployed workers vacancies and worker firm matches evolve stochastically over time we prove that the surplus function which fully characterises the match value and the mobility decision of workers does not depend on these distributions we estimate the model on us labour market data from 1951 2007 and predict the fit for 2008 12 we use the model to measure the cyclicality of mismatch between workers and jobs

separations sorting and cyclical unemployment abstract this paper establishes a new fact about the compositional changes in the pool of unemployed over the us business cycle using microdata from the current population survey for the years 1962 2012 it documents that in recessions the pool of unemployed shifts toward workers with high wages in their previous job and that these shifts are driven by the high cyclicality of separations for high wage workers the paper finds that standard theories of wage setting and unemployment have difficulty in explaining these patterns and evaluates a number of alternative theories that do better in accounting for the new fact jel e24 e32 j31 j63 j64

matching workers and jobs cyclical fluctuations in match quality using national longitudinal survey of youth data on tenure and wages this article analyzes the extent to which the level of job mismatching varies over the business cycle and how it is dealt with by the labor market i find significant cyclical variation in job match quality and an internalization of the variation by the labor market through wages mismatching occurs more during recessions but is primarily captured in starting wages the evidence suggests the cyclical phenomenon is one of general mismatching rather than an increased number of stopgap jobs during recessions

job to job flows in the great recession we develop prototype job to job flow measures to provide new evidence on labor turnover and earnings dynamics in the great recession we find a sharp drop in job mobility in the great recession much sharper than the previous recession and higher earnings penalties for job transitions with an intervening nonemployment spell focusing on residential construction separators in particular we find increasing rates of industry change and higher earnings penalties from job change in the great recession

real wages over the business cycle evidence from panel data one topic on which keynes did not disagree with classical economists was the cyclical behavior of real wages keynes 1936 as well as various classical writers predicted that real wages should move countercyclically quoting the general theory p 17 in general an increase in employment can only occur through the accompaniment of a decline in real wages thus i am not disputing this vital fact which the classical economists have rightly asserted as indefeasible this prediction is based on the premise of competition and a given short run capital stock increases in employment then correspond to more intensive use of capital and through diminishing product lower real wages for this reason evidence by dunlop 1938 and tarshis 1939 that real wages move procyclically was viewed as paradoxical both dunlop and tarshis based their findings on an observed positive correlation between real and money wages which given the procyclical movement of money wages implies a positive correlation between

did the job ladder fail after the great recession we study employment reallocation across employers through the lens ofa dynamic job ladder model workers always agree on a ranking ofemployers at all points in time and search for better jobs both offand on the job a parsimonious version of the model fits well the timeseries of gross worker flows by employer size from newly available usdata from the job openings and labor turnover survey focusing on the us experience in and around the great recession our evidence indicates that the job ladder stopped working then and has not fully resumed yet

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

cashier or consultant entry labor market conditions field of study and career success we measure impacts of entry conditions on labor market outcomes for the us college graduating classes of 1974 2011 a large recession reduces initial earnings by 10 through full time work and wag

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

excessive public employment and rent seeking traps we propose a model where the size of the public sector and aggregate output are interrelated through the occupational choice of agents who differ in their skill level and degree of public mindedness when the public sector attracts bureaucrats with low degree of public service motivation they will use their position to rent seek by employing an excessive number of unskilled workers this leads to an equilibrium with relatively high unskilled wages which lowers profits and deters entrepreneurship conversely an equilibrium with a lean public sector and greater private economic activity arises when public service motivated agents populate the state bureaucracy these agents exert high effort and employ a limited number of unskilled workers our model also shows that a bloated public sector with high wages may be supported by the unskilled agents

the effect of implicit contracts on the movement of wages over the business cycle evidence from micro data in this paper we address the question of whether wages are affected by labor market conditions in a manner more consistent with a contract approach than with a standard spot market model from a simple implicit contract model we derive implications about the links between wages and past labor market conditions using individual data from the current population survey and the panel study of income dynamics we find that an implicit contract model with costless mobility describes these links better than either a simple spot market model or an implicit contract model with costly mobility

enterprise inequality and economic development we characterize an equilibrium development process driven by the interaction of the distribution of wealth with credit constraints and the distribution of entrepreneurial skills when efficient entrepreneurs are relatively abundant a traditional development process emerges in which the evolution of macroeconomic variables accord with empirical regularities and income inequality traces out a kuznets curve if instead efficient entrepreneurs are relatively scarce the model generates long run distributional cycles driven by the endogenous interaction between credit constraints entrepreneurial efficiency and equilibrium wages

inter industry mobility and the cyclical upgrading of labor we investigate whether a market clearing model is consistent with industry employment and wage patterns related to the cyclical upgrading of labor we demonstrate that roy s 1951 market clearing

the cyclicality of real wages within employer employee matches using data from the panel study of income dynamics the author examines the cyclicality of wages within employer employee matches for the years 1970 91 recent research on wage cyclicality has suggested that wages are very procyclical tending to rise and fall with economic upturns and downturns even for workers who remain with the same employer the author finds however that the evidence for wage procyclicality within the matches he examines is rather weak except for the small group of workers who were paid by piece rate or commissions despite having acyclical wage rates men who were paid hourly had earnings movements that were very procyclical salaries exhibited little cyclicality but salaried workers who had income sources from bonuses commissions or overtime had procyclical earnings the results suggest that the increasing prevalence of incentive based pay will increase the procyclicality of wages within matches

a structural decomposition of the u s trade balance productivity demographics and fiscal policy abstract the us external deficits have been the most striking manifestation of global imbalances this paper investigates the contribution of productivity growth demographics and fiscal policy in accounting for the evolution of the us external imbalances against industrialized countries during the last three decades productivity growth plays a dominant role demographics explain a non negligible and nearly permanent component of the us trade deficit furthermore the international demographic transition is crucial for large us external imbalances to be consistent with the persistent decline of world real interest rates observed in the data fiscal policy is of minor importance

corruption as an occupational choice endogenous corruption and tax policy corruption is endemic in many countries and empirical studies have demonstrated how it impacts on macroeconomic indicators theoretical studies have generally assumed an exogenously given proportion of the population are corrupt or that the public sector is fixed in size far fewer explore how corruption emerges endogenously we endogenize corruption as an occupational choice workers choose private or public employment public employees can be honest or corrupt corruption is subject to a social sanction that results in a loss of self esteem those who care little about the social sanction choose to be corrupt when a firm meets a corrupt public employee it pays a bribe to secure a reduction in the tax rate the economy has two self sustaining equilibria with different levels of corruption corruption reduces tax revenue and the tax rate that maximizes revenue an increase in the social sanction reduces corruption but also reduces tax revenues if the economy is in a high corruption equilibrium paying a wage premium to public sector workers can result in all public sector workers being corrupt public sector audits to detect corrupt workers always reduce corruption but can only increase welfare when they are cheap to conduct and the economy is in a low corruption equilibrium

building a composite help wanted index abstract this paper builds a measure of vacancy posting over 1951 2009 that captures the behavior of total print and online help wanted advertising and can be used for time series analysis of the us labor market

small is beautiful motivational allocation in the non profit sector we build an occupational choice general equilibrium model with for profit firms non profit organizations and endogenous private warm glow donations lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non profit sector because of a higher incomein the for profit sector a stronger preference for giving or an inflow of foreign aid worsens the motivational composition and performance of the non profit sector we also analyze the conditions under which donors through linking donations to the motivational composition of the non profit sector non profits themselves through peer monitoring or the government using a tax financed public funding of non profits can eliminate the low effectiveness equilibrium we present supporting case study evidence from humanitarian emergencies and developing country ngo sector and humanitarian emergencies

political careers or career politicians two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies there are career politicians i e politicians who work in the political sector until retirement and political careers i e there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector in this paper we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in a political economy with a private sector and a political sector where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability as well as their political skills we characterize the conditions under which the two career paths emerge in equilibrium and establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the quality of politicians and their careers

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

thanks for nothing not for profits and motivated agents we re examine the labor donation theory of not for profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them or that they dominate for profits in terms of welfare but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non profit form more attractive to managers we show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not for profit firms would be competed out by for profit firms therefore in the choice between not for profit and for profit provision other than incentive problems the distribution of rents between management and workers and consequently the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role

persistent court corruption levels of court corruption differ widely across the world to give just one example in a recent survey of firms in transition economies the proportion of respondents who answered that firms in their line of business never have to make additional payments to deal with the courts ranged from 86 8 in hungary to just 37 2 in albania a second notable feature of court corruption is its persistence over time in spite of almost universal condemnation of the phenomenon and frequent government anti corruption campaigns this article presents a simple model that explains both the variation and persistence of corruption the main argument is as follows a major role of the legal system is to provide incentives to individuals to take or abstain from certain actions this is true of regulation criminal law contract law and tort law alike however when courts are corrupt the incentive effect provided by court enforced fines and other penalties is reduced to maintain incentives higher penalties are required but these higher penalties in turn raise the bribes that court officials can extract since the stakes to winning a court case are now higher finally higher bribes make court employment more attractive to dishonest individuals which raises the corruptibility of the court loosely speaking then corruption and penalties are complements corruption necessitates higher penalties while higher penalties engender corruption the feedback effect just described gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria that is apparently similar countries can have very different levels of court corruption one country may have a relatively honest pool of court officials and a low level of penalties while a second country may have the opposite moreover if a country in a high corruption equilibrium attempts to shift to using smaller penalties the immediate effect is a fall in the incentives provided by the legal system as such a country can find itself stuck in a high corruption equilibrium

intrinsic motivation and optimal incentive contracts i study the role of intrinsic motivation on optimal incentive contracts agents engage in efforts to generate projects with both financial return and intrinsic value to the agent in a neutral environment where intrinsic motivation has no direct effect on the disutility of effort static contracts are unaffected by intrinsic motivation in contrast the firm s profits from an implicit contract are increasing in the degree to which the agent is intrinsically motivated showing that implicit contracts and intrinsic motivation are complements the results are further extended to consider the role of multiple implicit contracts and product market strategy

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

public sector employment rent seeking and economic growth surplus labor in the public sector a characteristic of many developing countries is viewed in this paper as the consequence of rent seeking behavior a theory is presented of a segmented labor market with endogenous government hiring in response to unemployment a simple computable general equilibrium model is used to illustrate how this can give rise to dynamic social costs and to quantify them fiscal resources are diverted to support the unproductive sink the effect of surplus labor on economic growth is shown to be substantial while the government s attempt to reduce unemployment is shown to be futile copyright 1991 by royal economic society

bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation do wages in the civil service affect corruption and by how much abstract this paper presents what is to our knowledge the first empirical estimate of the effect of pay in the civil service on corruption first we show that theory is ambiguous on the relationship between civil service pay and corruption then we examine the issue using a new data set on wages for low income countries we find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative civil service pay and corruption in regressions based on cross country averages where we control for a wide array of variables the relationship implies that a rather large increase in wages is required to eradicate corruption solely by raising wages

excess worker reallocation workers face a trade off between macroeconomic and individual incentives to work in different occupations industries namely between search frictions and personal comparative advantages workers endowed with heterogeneous multi dimensional skills search for jobs that require different skill combinations in equilibrium specialized individuals contact few selected types of vacancies where they are likely to be hired those with weak comparative advantages are seldom chosen among competing applicants thus seek any job type in a tight labour market comparative advantages dominate waiting costs offsetting labour mobility across industries occupations excess worker reallocation is lower and matches are more successful consistently with direct and indirect evidence

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

the empirical content of the job search model labor mobility and wage distributions in europe and the us abstract job search models of the labor market hypothesize a very tight correspondence between the determinants of labor turnover and individual wage dynamics on one hand and the determinants of wage dispersion on the other this paper offers a systematic examination of whether this correspondence is present in the data by estimating a rudimentary partial equilibrium job search model on a three year panel of individual worker data covering 10 european countries and the u s we find that our basic job search model fits the data surprisingly well this also allows us to point at a number of interesting empirical regularities about wage distributions our results suggest that cross sectional data on individual wages contain the basic information needed to obtain a reliable measure of the magnitude of labor market frictions as measured by a parameter of the canonical job search model finally we use our results in a cross country comparison of the intensity and nature of job to job turnover we arrange countries into two different groups according to their turnover intensity we further show that the nature of job to job turnover is very different between those two groups turnover is predominantly voluntary in low turnover countries whereas it is to a large extent involuntary in high turnover countries

occupational specificity of human capital we find that returns to occupational tenure are substantial everything else being constant 5 years of occupational tenure are associated with an increase in wages of 12 20 moreover when occupational experience is taken into account tenure with an industry or employer has relatively little importance in accounting for the wage one receives this finding is consistent with human capital being occupation specific

entrepreneurial talent occupational choice and trickle up policies we study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection the severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs which is working for wages this links credit product and labor markets a rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem these multimarket interactions amplify productivity shocks and may generate multiple equilibria if it is impossible to screen entrepreneurs then all agents unanimously support a tax on entrepreneurs that drives out the less talented ones however if screening is possible e g if wealthy entrepreneurs can provide collateral for their loans then wealthy entrepreneurs do not support surplus enhancing taxes

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

managerial talent motivation and self selection into public management the quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries calls to attract the economy s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound this paper studies self selection into managerial and non managerial positions in the public and private sector using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation we find that if demand for public sector output is not too high the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector as a result relatively many of the more able managers self select into the private sector since this outcome is efficient our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private sector levels is not cost efficient

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

labour market structure and inequality a comparison of italy and the u s markets with rigid labour regulations and centralized wage setting are often thought to be inefficient but egalitarian using a model of off and on the job search and event history individual level data for italy and the u s we show that while the cross sectional wage distributions of young italian males are much more compressed than are the comparable distributions for young white u s males the estimated search model implies that the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more disperse in the u s than it is in italy our model implies that the high frequency of movements between labour market states leads to both a relatively equitable distribution of long run welfare in the u s and a high level of cross sectional inequality

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

unemployment fluctuations match quality and the wage cyclicality of new hires we revisit the issue of the high cyclicality of wages of new hires we show that after controlling for composition effects likely involving procyclical upgrading of job match quality the wages of new hires are no more cyclical than those of existing workers the key implication is that the sluggish behaviour of wages for existing workers is a better guide to the cyclicality of the marginal cost of labour than is the high measured cyclicality of new hires wages unadjusted for composition effects key to our identification is distinguishing between new hires from unemployment versus those who are job changers we argue that to a reasonable approximation the wages of the former provide a composition free estimate of the wage flexibility while the same is not true for the latter we then develop a quantitative general equilibrium model with sticky wages via staggered contracting on the job search and heterogeneous match quality and show that it can account for both the panel data evidence and aggregate evidence on labour market volatility

on the job search and precautionary savings in this paper i develop and estimate a model of on the job search in which risk averse workers choose search effort and can borrow or save using a single risk free asset i derive the implications for optimal savings behavior in this environment and relate this to the frictions that characterize the endogenous earnings process implied by on the job search savings behavior depends in a very intuitive way on the rate at which offers are received the rate at which jobs are destroyed and a worker s current rank in the wage distribution the implication is that workers who are identical in terms of preferences and opportunities have substantially different savings behavior depending on their history and current position in the wage distribution the mechanism that generates the substantial differences in savings behavior in the model is the dynamic of the wage ladder resulting from the search process there is an important asymmetry between the incremental wage increases generated by onthe job search climbing the ladder and the drop in income associated with job loss falling off the ladder the behavior of workers in low paying jobs is primarily governed by the expectation of wage growth while the behavior of workers near the top of the distribution is driven by the possibility of job loss the distributions of earnings wealth and consumption implied by the model suitably aggregated align reasonably well with the data with the notable exception of implying substantially less concentration of wealth among the richest one percent of the population in this paper i develop and estimate a model of on the job search in which risk averse workers choose search effort and can borrow or save using a single risk free asset i derive the implications for optimal savings behavior in this environment and relate this to the frictions that characterize the endogenous earnings process implied by on the job search savings behavior depends in a very intuitive way on the rate at which offers are received the rate at which jobs are destroyed and a worker s current rank in the wage distribution the implication is that workers at different point in the wage distribution have substantially different savings behavior resulting in wealth dispersion that is much greater than earnings dispersion the mechanism that generates the high degree of wealth dispersion in the model is the dynamic of the wage ladder resulting from the search process there is an important asymmetry between the incremental wage increases generated by on the job search climbing the ladder and the drop in income associated with job loss falling off the ladder this feature of the model generates differential savings behavior at different points in the earnings distribution the behavior of workers in low paying jobs is primarily governed by the expectation of wage growth while the behavior of workers near the top of the distribution is primarily driven by the possibility of job loss the wage growth expected by low wage workers combined with the fact that their earnings are not much higher than unemployment benefits causes them to dissave as a worker s wage increases the incentive to save increases the potential for wage growth declines and it becomes increasingly important to insure against the large income reduction associated with job loss the fact that high wage and low wage workers have such different savings behavior leads to a wealth distribution that is much more unequal 1