x efficiency in australian banking an empirical investigation this paper empirically investigates the x eaciency technical and allocative in australian banks a non parametric method of data envelopment analysis dea has been used to arrive at the eaciency scores banks in this sample were found to have low levels of overall eaciency compared with the banks in the european countries and in the us the results indicate that as a source of overall ineaciency the technical component was more important than the allocative component thus the ineaciency in australian banks can be attributed to wasting of inputs technical ineaciency rather than choosing the incorrect input combinations allocative ineaciency domestic banks were found to be more eacient than foreign owned banks the study has important implications such as guiding the government policy regarding deregulation and mergers since the study pinpoints the sources of ineaciency it would also help banks with strategic planning 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

whom can we trust to run the fed theoretical support for the founders views abstract the federal reserve has been called a bizarre policymaking structure this paper documents and formalizes a historical argument that the fed s structure was a response to public conflict over inflation s redistributive powers the paper shows that in the face of conflict over redistributive inflation policy by majority can lead to policy that is worse even for the majority than obvious alternatives in balancing the interests for and against surprise inflation the fed s structure can lead to a better outcome

limitation of liability and the ownership structure of the firm this paper models the optimal choice of shareholder liability if investors want managers to be monitored the monitors should be residual claimants shareholders and monitoring and firm value will increase as shareholders commit more of their wealth to the firm when liquidating wealth is costly contingent liability dominates direct investment as a wealth commitment device however if wealth is unobservable under this regime only relatively poor investors will hold shares in equilibrium this may be prevented at a cost by verifying shareholder wealth and restricting stock transfers comparative statics on various liability regimes are used to motivate actual contractual arrangements

determinants of bank growth choice abstract we study the determinants of bank growth in a two stage logistic regression model we first compare banks that branch bank acquire or product expand with banks that do not grow externally banks that are federally chartered in states with higher income growth and with higher labor prices are less likely to grow externally larger banks are more likely to grow externally in the second stage we study determinants of growth activity for banks that expand products branch or acquire other banks depending on the time period bank structure regulatory environment performance and balance sheet characteristics determine bank growth choices

inflation contracts and inflation targets under uncertainty why we might need conservative central bankers this paper compares the relative effectiveness of inflation contracts and inflation targets in the presence of uncertainty regarding the central bank s preferences and the underlying output target the model explains why discretion may be superior to a delegation solution we also show that there might be the need to combine inflation targets and contracts with the appointment of a rogoff type conservative central banker if contracts and targets cannot be made state contingent and that less flexible inflation targets may be appropriate with uncertain central bank preferences

animal spirits in the foreign exchange market it is traditionally assumed in finance models that the fundamental value of an asset is known with certainty in this paper we depart from that assumption we propose a simple model of the exchange rate in which agents have biased and unbiased beliefs about the fundamental rate we show that such a model produces waves of optimism and pessimism unrelated to the underlying fundamental value in addition the model shows that in a world characterized by the existence of heterogeneous beliefs about the fundamental exchange rate movements can be remarkably complex even if only fundamentalist traders operate in the market

central bankers in government appointed committees abstract i study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee who are appointed by the government central bankers balance their desire to protect the central bank s reputation against their interest to be reappointed committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures these gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small the former is associated with a low risk of being replaced for not supporting the government s preferred policy the latter meanwhile implies high probability that a single vote affects policy making any individual member more weary of potentially affecting the central bank s reputation through his vote

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

commercial bank offices and the mobilisation of private savings in selected sub saharan african countries the mobilisation of domestic savings has remained a thriving issue in discussions of ways and means of harnessing resources for development in africa this work attempts to examine the role of a deliberate policy of extending offices of banks to the rural areas in savings mobilisation efforts using ordinary least squares methods data from five african countries that have pursued this policy in recent times are examined to see if there is any significant relationship between the savings rate and their population per bank office ratio our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the extension of branch offices of banks to rural areas could help attenuate the poor savings performance in most african economies

an empirical investigation of changes in scale economies for the commercial banking firm 1979 1986 the period of the 1980s represents a particularly turbulent time for the banking industry a number of technological and regulatory changes have occurred including the elimination of regulation q which had limited the explicit interest payments that banks could pay on some types of deposits it would be expected that these changes would affect the structure of costs for banks the behavior of the cost function is studied over the 1979 1986 time period and in contrast to previous studies using earlier data increasing economies of scale are found in the later years for banks in both unit and branch banking states these results indicate that there may be increased cost pressure for smaller banks to become larger either through mergers and acquisitions or through internal growth this may lead to further consolidation pressures within the industry and reductions in the overall number of banking firms copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

federal reserve independence abstract the federal reserve is always called an independent agency the term independent is rarely defined the only attempt in the literature and internal records is based on chairman martin s statement that the federal reserve is independent with the government not independent of the government martin explained several times that independence within government meant that the federal reserve helped to finance government budget because they were approved by congress and signed by the president financing budget deficits is the very opposite of the principle adopted when congress approved the federal reserve act in 1913 in fact the federal reserve has supported treasury operations many times i conclude that it is far more important to have an enforceable policy rule such as the taylor rule but any rule must have a provision that permits the rule to be set aside

a dynamic structural model for stock return volatility and trading volume an examination is made of an adaptive beliefs model that is able to roughly reproduce the following features seen in the data 1 the autocorrelation functions of the volatility of returns and trading volume are positive with slowly decaying tails 2 the cross correlation function of volatility is approximately zero for squared returns with past and future volumes and is positive for squared returns with current volumes 3 abrupt changes in prices and returns occur that are hard to attach to news the last feature is obtained because the law of large numbers can fail in the large economy limit

the timing of partisan and nonpartisan appointments to the central bank some new evidence this paper empirically tests two prevalent but competing theories regarding the timing of appointments to the board of governors by presidential administrations both theories were developed simultaneously in the economics literature by havrilesky and gildea 1992 and waller 1992 and are observationally equivalent by suggesting that administrations will select partisans early in their four year terms and nonpartisans sectoral later in their four year terms although each bases this prediction on a different theoretical model several empirical replications with updated data sets presented here work to confirm the solutions put forth consistently by both models however the results of a new statistical test perhaps lends slightly more credence to the theoretical foundations of waller s bargaining model

reply to professor gilson in replying to ronald gilson s comment this issue we first state the points of agreement we then examine the points of disagreement we agree with the proposition that a major reason motivating states to allow incorporation of law and other professional service firms was to offer to these firms the advantage of superior tax benefits from the corporate form these tax advantages were related to the areas of pension and profit sharing plans group term life insurance health and accident insurance medical reimbursement plans wage continuation plans and keyman insurance see hayes 1978 while tax motives were important they are not the end of the story in particular we do not agree with gilson that for the period under consideration the pattern of law firm incorporation is income tax not liability driven p 421 as this is a factual issue we illustrate our understanding with a sample of lawyers who have written on this point rotgin 1980 a specialist on the professional legal corporation states that one of the principal advantages of the corporate business entity is the concept of limited liability while the professional legal corporation also offers attorneys limited liability this form of limited liability is not as broad in scope as the general corporate limited liability p 634 paas 1986 argues that the most significant non tax reason for incorporating a professional practice is to obtain limited liability attorneys who incorporate attempt to insulate their personal assets from claims arising in two kinds of cases first limited liability insulates personal assets from claims arising under the ordinary business debts of the professional corporation second limited liability bars claims arising out of the professional malpractice of a fellow attorney p 374 shores 1974 also argues that it would seem that the most significant non tax factor in favor of incorporating is the substantial reduction in exposure to malpractice liability which normally results in the case of incorporating a group practice p 711 as judged by these legal analysts liability issues are important for practices in deciding on their corporate structure

unlimited liability as a barrier to entry many but not all firms have the freedom to choose liability rules in some countries service professions have unlimited liability rules imposed by government historically banks in some countries faced unlimited liability why do governments impose unlimited liability this is the question we address with a simple model we illustrate the agency conflicts in firms limited liability solves these conflicts efficiently unlimited liability raises the cost of capital inefficiently small firms result but under some conditions selectively applied unlimited liability rules protect rents we test several propositions with data on scottish banking and u s law firms

correspondent services and cost economies in commercial banking abstract prior bank cost function studies have ignored the fact that some banks obtain a substantial amount of services from their correspondents if these services are paid for with compensating deposit balances their cost to the purchasing bank is not reflected in standard expense reports this paper investigates whether explicit consideration of theese correspondent costs materially affects estimated bank returns to scale the results indicate that the level of banksoperating costs is underreported by as much as 15 while scale economy estimates for unit banks are not significantly affected by the addition of correspondent service costs prior studies have overestimated branch bank scale economies by a small but statistically significant amount

taxation of interest income deregulation and the banking industry removing interest rate ceilings on bank deposits or reducing the tax rate applicable to the interest earned on such deposits are alternative means of increasing the after tax return to depositors these alternatives however have differing impacts on the structure of a competitive banking industry this paper develops a model which focuses on a bank s choice between paying an explicit interest rate on its deposits and paying a return in the form of services the model allows banks to differ in their production technologies and depositors in their marginal tax rates and preferences for services the effects of tax rate changes and a ceiling on the explicit deposit interest rate are analyzed coinciding with the rise in market interest rates to levels significantly above regulation ceiling rates on bank and savings and loan deposits has been a move to reduce the level of taxation on interest income general proposals to reduce the tax on interest income seem to have gained support as a means of increasing after tax rates of return in order to increase aggregate savings while proposals to allow banks and savings and loans to offer tax free savings certificates are supported as a means of reducing the cost of funds for such thrift institutions for example the tax exempt all savers certificates were designed to yield higher after tax rates of return for some individuals while simultaneously lowering the cost of funds to the issuing institutions as a means of providing a higher return to depositors an obvious alternative to reducing the tax on interest income would be to speed the removal of interest rate ceilings which apply to deposits at banks and savings and loans tax changes and deregulation would both affect the banking industry by leading to changes in the after tax interest rate on deposits the composition of deposit return between explicit taxable interest payments and the provision at below cost of nontaxable services might also be affected along with the optimum level of deposits for an individual bank and the size of the banking industry unfortunately none of these implications all of which are relevant for analyzing recent tax and deregulation proposals have been studied within the framework of a model of the banking industry this paper develops a model which focuses on the bank s choice between paying an explicit interest rate on its deposits and paying a return in the form of services previous models have often ignored this choice assuming that only the total return and not its composition mattered to the bank kareken 11 klein

a long history of fomc voting behavior we devise and apply a method for estimating monetary policy reaction functions for individual members of the federal open market committee fomc of the federal reserve our method uses members votes on the monetary policy directive in fomc meetings as the key source of data on individual preferences the analysis provides a ranking by preference for ease for 84 fomc members who served during the 1966 1996 period

the evolution of a free banking system the institutional features of models of unregulated monetary systems have often been arbitrarily and implausibly assumed this paper instead provides realistic grounding for important features by constructing a logical evolutionary account of free banking sophisticated and orderly arrangements are shown to emerge from competition and the pursuit of less costly methods of payment the emergence of standardized commodity money is followed by the development in turn of basic money transfer banking easily transferable bank liubilities and clearinghouses the features of an evolved free banking system differ from those assumed in recent models of competitive payments systems

nonlinear expectations in speculative markets evidence from the ecb survey of professional forecasters chartist and fundamentalist models have proven to be capable of replicating stylized facts on speculative markets in general this is achieved by specifying nonlinear interactions of otherwise linear asset price expectations of the respective trader groups this paper investigates whether or not regressive and extrapolative expectations themselves exhibit significant nonlinear dynamics the empirical results are based on a new data set from the european central bank survey of professional forecasters on oil price expectations in particular we find that forecasters form destabilizing expectations in the neighborhood of the fundamental value whereas expectations tend to be stabilizing in the presence of substantial oil price misalignment

scale and scope economies in the multi product banking firm abstract the multi product nature of the banking firm is examined utilizing the translog cost function this analysis indicates that contrary to conventional wisdom natural monopoly scale economies and product specific decreasing costs are not robust characterizations of the banking industry there is however evidence that the cost function is characterized by economies of scope the implications of these results are discussed and extensions of this approach suggested

the foreign exchange market a random walk with a dragging anchor this paper explores some anomalies in the foreign exchange market it is hard to find evidence of either short term overshooting or of longer term reversion to an equilibrium the forward exchange rate contains virtually no information on future spot rates discussions with practitioners indicate that longer term speculation based on fundamentals is strictly limited and survey data and other evidence suggest that expectations and speculation are based on a variety of models the interplay between speculation based on fundamentals and on a random walk or chartist approach influences the outcome this endorses the prior model of j a frankel and k a froot copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

scale economies and cost complementarities in commercial banks on and off balance sheet activities abstract bank off balance sheet obs activities have grown dramatically and have become significantly important especially at large banks we investigate whether failure to incorporate obs products may lead to a misspecification problem models that exclude deposits from the output specification suggest economies of scale which vanish when deposits are included we find that inclusion of obs products has little effect on the scale economies measures with only a few exceptions the results provide no evidence of cost complementarities in joint production the tremendous growth of bank obs activities in the 1980s may be explained by the very small approximately zero pecuniary cost of these activities

scale economies in banking a restructuring and reassessment the issue of scale economies in banking has a rich history most earlier studies report modest operating cost scale economies for small institutions those with less than about 50 million of deposits in 1968 dollars but are unclear where these economies might end if at all unfortunately these studies are limited in four important respects first those that were well specified did not measure the total cost of banking operations but concentrated on estimating scale economies for individual banking functions e g demand deposits separately from commercial loans second an average cost curve that could take a u shape over the full range of banks was not fitted either because larger banks were not included or because of the functional form used cobb douglas consequently the optimum or minimum cost size of a bank or office could not be determined third the variables measuring the costs of branching were misspecified fourth the branch

a note on cost structure and economies of scale in greek banking abstract this note studies the greek banking industry in 1980 1989 in order to estimate a representative cost structure functional form and search for economies of scale the constructed model uses a translogarithmic cost function that includes the size of assets capital labor and technological progress by using this model which has been used by benston et al 1982 hunter and timme 1986 and others we have been able to estimate for the first time an econometric form of the costs in greek banking and we have been able to investigate economies of scale in the greek banking industry although operating cost scale economies do exist total cost scale economies were not present this has been shown through the utilization of a large sample of pooled data of all greek banks for a period of ten years and the use of two other samples of large and small banks moreover by exploiting the properties of the model we shall be able to show whether technological progress has been a factor which lowers bank costs

scottish banking and the legal restrictions theory a closer look comment the use of scottish banling experience as counterevidence to the legal restrictions theory of money white 1987 rests on the view that the scottish system before the bank charter act of 1844 closed entry into note issue l warranted its traditional characterlzation as free banking that is the regulatory regime approximated laissez faire closely enough that its institutions practices and performance were basically those of an unregulated free market monetary system this interpretation of scottish banking has been challenged by tyler cowen and randall kroszner 1989 wishing to defend the legal restrictions theory whose vision of a laissez faire payments system does not coincide with the scottish experience they argue that the scottish regime did not closely enough approximate laissez faire to provide evidence damaging to the legal restrictions theory they cite three prlncipal deviations from laissez faire p 222 1 the act of 1765 raised impediments to interest bearing notes and proscribed small denomination notes 2 the prevailing system of liability and incorporation raised barriers to entry into banking and 3 the bank of england acted as a shadow central bank for scotland cowen and kroszner hereafter ck thus charactertze the scottish system as legally restricted from paying interest on circulating media as less than competitive and as dependent upon the bank of england

committees as substitutes for commitment in this article policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default or status quo policy i show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent the disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two crucial ingredients to obtain this result as a motivating example this article focuses on the time consistency of monetary policy

the multibank holding company effect on cost efficiency in banking abstract this paper tests the hypothesis that differences in the organizational form embodied in independent banks one bank holding companies and multibank holding companies result in differences in operating cost efficiency the transaction and agency cost paradigms for analysis of organizational efficiency provide theoretical motivation for the hypothesis the effects of organizational form on bank operating expenses for individual banks are evaluated on subsamples divided into quartiles based on total revenue results indicate that for banks having revenues in the lowest quartile both one bank and multibank holding company affiliates are cost efficient relative to independent banks multibank holding company affiliates are cost efficient relative to both one bank affiliates and independent banks for banks in the interquartile range no significant differences in cost efficiency are noted banks in the highest revenue quartile relative efficiency at the organizational level is also evaluated results provide evidence of lower operating costs for banking operations of both multibank and one bank holding company organizations relative to independent banks taken as a whole the results imply that holding company affiliation conveys cost advantages to banking units below the 75th revenue percentile

policy boards and policy smoothing partisan politics and random election outcomes generate policy uncertainty and partisan business cycles to reduce policy uncertainty society must design the policy making environment to overcome electoral uncertainty and partisanship i show that delegating policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers will produce substantial policy smoothing and lower policy uncertainty relative to a simple model in which elected officials set policy board members are chosen in a partisan noncooperative environment yet in the benchmark model policy variability is eliminated and the cooperative bargaining solution is replicated

the robustness of output measures in property liability insurance efficiency studies abstract we empirically examine two methods for measuring output in property liability insurer efficiency studies the value added approach and the flow or financial intermediation approach the approaches are not mutually consistent the value added approach is closely related to traditional measures of firm performance but the flow approach is not in addition efficient value added approach firms are less likely to go insolvent while firms characterized as efficient by the flow approach are generally more likely to fail we also find that the theoretical concern regarding the value added approach s use of losses as a measure of output is not validated empirically

economies of superscale in commercial banking most previous studies of scale economies in banking have excluded banks larger than 1 billion in assets thus study by contrast estimates cost functions for the 100 largest us commercial banks hedonic terms are incorporated to correct for the aggregated nature of the call report data available for these banks in addition we attempt to quantify the cost benefit of diversification in the model we estimate efficient bank scale to range from 15 billion to 37 billion in total assets a thousandfold increase over some previous findings these results are supported by comparison of actual average costs as well as by casual historical observation and the level of widespread concern over interstate banking our findings suggest some cost incentive or benefit to expansion or consolidation among large regional banks including interstate expansion or consolidation

the benefits of central bank s political independence abstract we consider a two tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject to the explicit influence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit influence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy we analyze the impact of granting independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker political independence increases those agency costs but significantly stabilizes the politically induced fluctuations of inflation and improves ex ante social welfare

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

threshold effects of financial status on the cost frontiers of financial institutions in nondynamic panels this article applies hansen s 1999 2000 threshold regression model to estimate translog cost frontiers in the hope of shedding light on the banking industry s production processes and the extent of its technical efficiency te the threshold technique allows for the existence of multiple technologies of production distinguished by an exogenous threshold variable strong evidence of multiple technologies is found in the industry irrespective of which financial indicator as constructed by factor analysis defines the threshold variable cost savings and scale economies among the various underlying technologies are compared herein we also highlight the differences between the threshold results and the conventional cost frontier

the dynamic in efficiency of monetary policy by committee this paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game committee members differ in their institutional power and in certain states of nature they also differ in their preferred instrument value preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inefficient and inertial around the previously agreed instrument value this model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and helps explain the empirical observation that the distribution of actual interest rate changes has a mode of zero

expectations driven distortions in the foreign exchange market this paper explores the phenomenon of lasting deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental value in the foreign exchange market motivated by empirical observations a chartists fundamentalists model is developed in which boundedly rational agents repeatedly choose between technical and fundamental trading rules to determine their speculative investment positions crucial for the dynamics is how the traders perceive the fundamental exchange rate this perception process is based on psychological evidence simulations give rise to bubbles but simultaneously display quite realistic exchange rate dynamics unit roots in the exchange rates fat tails for returns and volatility clustering

branching scale economies and banking costs abstract in this paper we develop and estimate a model of bank costs based on a theory of the branch cost function first we show that convenient branch location is important to banking customers and implies that banks do not necessarily operate branches at minimum average cost this theoretical result provides a rationale for including branch variables in the bank cost function second we estimate a statistical cost equation derived explicitly from assumptions about the branch cost function and including branch output variables our empirical results suggest substantial economies of scale at the branch level but no economies from expansion by branching finally we show that the resulting cost structure of the banking industry does not imply that a highly concentrated banking structure is necessary for efficiency thus economies of scale would not be expected to force small banks out of the market even if current restrictions on interstate banking are liberalized

heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations evidence on the chartist fundamentalist approach abstract this paper examines heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations whereas agents heterogeneity is key in modern exchange rate models evidence on determinants of heterogeneity is weak thus far our sample covering expectations from about 300 forecasters over 15 years shows remarkable time variation in dispersion determinants of dispersion are consistent with the chartist fundamentalist approach misalignments of the exchange rate and exchange rate changes explain heterogeneity the risk premium influences heterogeneity as well but possible impacts from macroeconomic variables and exchange rate s volatility are dominated by the other determinants

reliable and unreliable partisan appointees to the board of governors every new appointment to the board of governors in recent years has triggered speculation as to how the new governor will vote in fomc meetings while several studies have hinted at partisan voting behavior by governors no study has yet attempted to identify reliable and unreliable partisan voting behavior and to pinpoint the background characteristics of governors that distinguish between the two this paper indicates that board members with a background in economics consistently voted in line with the economic ideology of the appointing president noneconomists on the board however displayed no such partisan voting behavior and were seen to be influenced by pressures emanating from the administration and by the monetary environment prior to their appointment over the 1951 to 1987 period most presidents have appointed reliable governors earlier in their presidential terms when the returns from being able to influence subsequent monetary policy are great and have chosen unreliable governors later in their terms when election support from the interest groups that these unreliables represent is important the results of the present paper suggest skepticism toward the recent spate of rational expectations game theoretic models which feature a dictatorial policy maker gaming atomistic market participants whose only political activity voting generates monetary surprises followed by convergence to an equilibrium because of their obsession with the ceremonial formalism of their genre these models ignore a vast complementary literature and as a consequence display conspicuously flimsy institutional and historical premises instead the present paper argues for the greater relevance of models of uncoordinated interaction between multiple political and private principals and federal reserve agents

economies of scale in the us savings and loan industry 1973 83 the question addressed in this research is whether or not there exist economies of scale in the us savings and loan sl b that from 1979 to 1983 the minimum efficient scale for associations declined c that a substantial change has occurred in operating costs and the estimated augmented elasticity

bashing and coercion in monetary policy bashing and coercion in monetary policy i introduction we ve got excess plant capacity i don t think that growth is excessive i have not been overly concerned with inflation president bush in a february 14 1989 interview with the wall street journal p a8 with the economy running close to potential the risks seem to be on the side of a further strengthening of price pressure chairman greenspan in testimony before congress on february 21 1989 reprinted from the wall street journal february 22 1989 p a2 many investors appeared to be confused by conflicting statements by bush greenspan and other u s officials wall street journal february 22 1989 p a1 if the fed pushes interest rates significantly higher bush may go public with critism wall street journal march 24 1989 p a1 recent research in macroeconomic policy games by rogoff 1985 alesina 1988 tabellini 1987 and waller 1989a has concentrated on the importance of an independent central bank in a discretionary policymaking environment in the original work on policy games by barro and gordon 1983a 1983b no distinction was made between the monetary authority and the fiscal authority but these researchers argue that because the fiscal authority may have incentives to create excessive inflation giving the powers of money creation to an independent monetary authority whose inflation preferences differ from the current fiscal authority may enable society to reduce the equilibrium inflation rate this results holds even though monetary policy is still chosen in a discretionary fashion therefore backus and driffill 1985a 537 conclude autonomous central banks thus act as a precommitment device which may help to make noninflationary policies more credible and less costly implicit in the term independent is the belief that the central bank is free to choose monetary policy without interference from the fiscal authority administration however this is not generally the case the appointment of central bankers by the legislative or executive branch of the government governmental oversight of policy decisions or political pressure on the central bank by these branches will tend to influence the setting of monetary policy and subsequently the extent to which the central bank is truly independent 1 kane 1984 argues that even if it is not able to directly choose monetary policy the current administration still may be able to achieve its preferred monetary growth path by putting pressure on the monetary authority to do its bidding restricting the powers of the central bank public criticism of central bank performance here after referred to as bashing 2 exclusion from fiscal policy planning which hurts the egos of central bankers or undertaking actions which damage the post central bank income or opportunities of the central bankers are ways he suggests in which the administration can coerce cooperation from the central bank in creating excessive money growth such arguments have given rise to the view that the administration is engaged in a reputation building game with the central bank although the central bank has control of the money supply the administration can threaten to impose a welfare loss by bashing the central bank if it does not generate the monetary policy preferred by the administration the success of this strategy depends on the size of the bashing costs imposed on the central bank and also on the extent to which these threats are credible credibility in turn depends on the benefits and costs incurred by the administration in carrying out its threats as a result the administration may choose to bash the central bank if it does not produce the administration s preferred money inflation outcome by establishing a reputation for bashing the administration may be able to obtain its desired policy outcome in the future

inflation and central bank independence a meta regression analysis using 59 studies we perform a meta regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence cbi the studies considered are very different with respect to the cbi indicator used the sample of countries and time periods covered model specification estimators used and publication outlet we conclude that there is a significant publication bias however we also find a significant genuine effect of cbi on inflation differences between studies are not caused by differences in cbi indicators used

cost efficiency and scale economies in the turkish insurance industry this article examines the cost efficiency and scale economies of insurance firms in the turkish insurance industry over a 15 year period 1990 2004 using the stochastic cost frontier model cost efficiency scores and scale economies were estimated for each firm in the sample the results show that mean cost inefficiencies range between 18 3 and 36 9 of total costs and they do not tend to decrease over time on average small firms are more cost efficient than large firms economies of scale appear present and significant for any class size the results suggest that there is a substantial difference in scale economies between small and large insurance firms

bank regulation and monetary policy the depository institutions deregulation and monetary control act 1980 and the garn st germain depository institutions act 1982 are the two most significant pieces of bank legislation since the 193os their significance stems from the fact that they have sought to roll back a number of the regulations and restrictions imposed on bank activity and competition in the 1933 80 period among the important provisions of these acts are a gradual elimination of regulation q ceilings on time and savings deposits by march 1986 the amelioration of state imposed usury ceilings on loans the nationwide provision of interest bearing transaction type accounts negotiable order of withdrawal now and super now accounts permission for thritts to expand into bank like products such as commercial and industrial loans consumer loans and credit cards and the development of new types of savings accounts such as mmdas l in addition to legislative deregulation we have also witnessed homemade deregulation as banks have sought to exploit often with great success loopholes in the bank holding

financial costs operating costs and specialization of spanish banking firms as distribution dynamics there exists a remarkable concern among financial analysts and policy makers about the high level of cost dispersion in banking a model of distribution dynamics is applied to the spanish banking companies in order to analyse whether such a dispersion is so high and if some factors like for instance specialization factors might somewhat influence the dynamics of both financial and operating expenses results show that there does not appear to exist a decrease in the level of cost dispersion although firms relative positions are changing yet when controlling for the varying output mixes firms produce results which differ much as dispersion assessed by means of density functions estimated nonparametrically decreases substantially suggesting concurrence is higher among firms with similar output mixes

central bank design in general equilibrium we study the effects of alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in the context of a capital theoretic general equilibrium economy we consider three institutional arrangements for determining monetary policy the first unconditional majority voting always leads to a substantial inflation bias the second a simple form of bargaining which we interpret as a policy board generally improves on the unconditional majority voting outcome finally we consider a constitutional rule which always achieves the social optimum

the use of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market abstract technica or chartist analysis of financial markets involves providing forecasts or trading advice on the basis of largely visual inspection of past prices without regard to any underlying economic or fundamental analysis this paper reports the results of a questionnaire survey conducted on behalf of the bank of england among chief foreign exchange dealers based in london in november 1988 amongst other findings it is revealed that at least 90 per cent of respondents place some weight on this form of non fundamental analysis when forming views at one or more time horizons there is also a skew towards reliance on technical as opposed to fundamentalist analysis at shorter horizons which becomes steadily reversed as the length of horizon considered is increased a very high proportion of chief dealers view technical and fundamental analysis as complementary forms of analysis and a substantial proportion suggest that technical advice may be self fulfilling jel f31

monetary policy signaling from the administration to the federal reserve this chapter employs the index of monetary policy signaling from the administration to the federal reserve safer that was developed in chapter two the safer index is a simple weekly sum of articles that appeared in the wall street journal in which administration officials expressed a desire for easier 1 or tighter 1 monetary policy a key assumption is that systematically over time the financial media capture the essence of communication that is going on between the executive branch and federal reserve officials 1 the signaling index is employed in ordinary least squares regressions for the period from january 1964 to november 1991 cumulative values of the safer index over a three week period as an explanatory variable are found to have a statistically significant effect on the average federal funds rate during the third week as the dependent variable further evidence suggests that the safer index is granger causal with respect to the federal funds rate after classifying the signals by sources within the administration oval office council of economic advisers treasury and other and unidentified sources it is shown that for the overall 1964 1991 period signals from the treasury department and from other and unidentified sources have a statistically significant effect on the federal funds rate while signals from the oval office and the council do not when the data are segmented according to who was the chairman of the federal reserve board at the time ordinary least squares results indicate that the federal reserve did not systematically respond to executive branch signaling in a statistically significant way when william mcchesney martin g william miller and alan greenspan were chairmen but did respond statistically significantly to administration signaling during portions of the periods during which arthur burns and paul volcker were chairmen

a bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank abstract in this paper a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political system the major results of the paper are 1 the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy 2 changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president s term in office to the first period of the president s term will lead to more partisan monetary policy 3 in equilibrium nominations to the board are not rejected thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a rubber stamp process 4 lengthening the terms on the board relative to the electoral cycle will lead to more moderate appointments to the central bank and a reduction in partisan policymaking

foreign exchange rate expectations micro survey data this paper analyzes the panel data of biweekly surveys on the yen dollar exchange rate expectations of forty four institutions for two years and contains four major findings first market participants are heterogeneous that is significant individual effects exist in their expectation formation second the individual effects have a characteristic of wishful expectations exporters expect yen depreciation and importers expect yen appreciation relative to others third many violate the rational expectations hypothesis fourth forecasts with long horizons show less yen appreciation than those with short horizons cross equation constraints implied by the consistency of the forecast term structure are strongly rejected in the data copyright 1990 by american economic association

mergers and technical efficiency in spanish savings banks a stochastic distance function approach abstract the aim of this paper is to test the temporal variation of technical efficiency of spanish savings banks during the period 1985 1998 furthermore we test whether merged and non merged firms have different levels and temporal patterns of technical efficiency a stochastic output distance function r w shephard theory of cost and production functions princeton university press princeton nj is employed to accommodate multiple output technology the distance function provides the advantage that it does not need information about prices so it can accommodate the multi product nature of the financial sector only using the quantities as data an important point when the assumptions about perfectly competitive markets are unlikely to be met the temporal variation of efficiency is modeled extending the battese and coelli journal of productivity analysis 3 1992 153 169 approach in two ways relaxing the monotonicity of the temporal variation pattern of the efficiency term and allowing for different patterns of efficiency change between merged and non merged firms

evaluating the cost efficiency of the italian banking system what can be learned from the joint application of parametric and non parametric techniques abstract research on bank efficiency has developed in two separate streams econometric studies and data envelopment analysis a linear programming technique these two branches of literature have developed quickly but separately in this paper these two approaches have been tested on a common panel of 270 italian banks and this has suggested the following i econometric and linear programming results do not differ dramatically when based on the same data and conceptual framework ii when differences arise they can be explained by going back to the intrinsic features of the models moreover some findings on italian banks may be of interest also to the international reader i efficiency scores show a high variance ii the banking system is split in two between northern and southern banks iii there is a direct rather than inverse relationship between productive efficiency and asset quality iv the efficiency of italian banks did not increase over the period 1988 1992

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

learning with misspecification in an artificial currency market abstract agents evolve their forecast rules over time via a modified genetic algorithm in a simple artificial currency market these forecast rules can be nonlinearly misspecified when the misspecification is suppressed learning tends to be complete when it is not suppressed learning can generate persistent exchange rate dynamics

political shocks and public debt the case for a conservative central bank revisited abstract we explore the dynamics of public debt and optimal institutions in the presence of political shocks arising from electoral uncertainty under commitment optimal stabilization is established by combining an inflation target with a debt target the inflation target should be contingent on the political shocks while the debt target forces the government to fully absorb the political shocks in the period in which it occurs in the absence of such inflation and debt targets but with monetary commitment a conservative central bank enhances stabilization an even more conservative central bank is optimal if monetary policy cannot commit

branching restrictions and banking costs abstract previous research of banking costs has been limited by the choice of the functional form irregularities in the estimated cost functions and a failure to rigorously examine the difference between banks in branching states and banks in unit banking states this paper addresses these shortcomings banks are modelled as three input three output cost minimizing firms a three equation system is estimated using 1985 functional cost analysis data the findings indicate that banks in unit banking states experience diseconomies of scale banks in branching states experience diseconomies of scale at the bank level but economies of scale at the branch level we also find evidence of economies of scope for branch state banks but not for unit state banks

cost structures in multinational and domestic banking abstract prior research on international banking has proposed many reasons for the multinationalization of u s banks but provided little empirical support for its propositions using a pooled time series data set from 1987 to 1990 this study analyzes the ray and expansion path scale economies and expansion path subadditivity of u s based multinational banks mnbs both at the firm and the plant levels it also measures and analyzes inefficiencies for these banks inefficiencies are measured relative to a thick frontier cost function a similar analysis is conducted for domestic banks dbs for comparison purposes no support is found for the prior belief that similar cost structures exist for mnbs and dbs in general we find that mnbs are able to fully exploit economies of scale and face lesser diseconomies from joint production and lower inefficiencies than dbs

credibility and flexibility with independent monetary policy committees independent monetary policy committees are a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role for monetary policy if central bankers types are unknown then for a wide range of parameters an independent committee achieves higher social welfare than either a zero inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker a key reason for the committee s superior performance is that committee members are relatively likely to opt for low inflation and building a reputation when shocks are small when large shocks hit the economy the incentive to react outweighs the reputationbuilding benefit

monetary policy by committee consensus chairman dominance or simple majority this paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under four different voting protocols the protocols are a consensus model where a supermajority is required for a policy change an agenda setting model where the chairman controls the agenda a dictator model where the chairman has absolute power over the committee and a simple majority model where policy is determined by the median member these protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks the models are estimated by maximum likelihood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks namely the bank of canada the bank of england the european central bank the swedish riksbank and the u s federal reserve for all central banks results indicate that the consensus model fits actual policy decisions better than the alternative models this suggests that despite institutional differences committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions

the social costs of unit banking restrictions abstract many u s commercial banks are prohibited from establishing more than one full service office location in the absence of free entry to the banking industry this constraint may force unit banks to operate with a socially inefficient combination of inputs moreover entry to the industry in unit banking states may be more difficult than in branching states where market entrants need not necessarily acquire a new charter if so existing unit banks could price their output above marginal social cost earning excess profits and imposing allocational inefficiencies this paper demonstrates empirically that unit banking restrictions in the united states impose statistically and economically significant deadweight social costs

scottish banking before 1845 a model for laissez faire during the free banking era in eighteenth and early nineteenth century scotland there were a number of legal restrictions affecting the evolution of the system scottish banking was characterized by restrictions on small denomination and interest bearing notes there were also restrictions inhibiting the development of capital markets and entry into banking furthermore the bank of england operated as a shadow central bank for the scottish system these considerations call into question the use of the scottish banking experience as the appropriate model for laissez faire and as evidence against the legal restrictions theory of money and the new monetary economics copyright 1989 by ohio state university press