capital mobility fiscal policy and growth under self financing of human capital formation this paper which is to appear in a volume honoring the memory of doug purvis considers the effects of fiscal and financial policy on economic growth in open and closed economies when human capital formation by young households is constrained by the illi quidity of human wealth both endogeneous and exogenous growth versions of the basic olg model are analysed we find that intergenerational redistribution policies that discourage physical capital formation may encourage human capital formation despite common tech nologies and perfect international mobility of financial capital the noti tradedness of human capital and the illiquidity of human wealth make for persistent differences in productivity growth rates in the endogenous growth version of the model or in their levels in the exogenous growth version we also consider the productivity growth or level effects of public spending on education and of the distortionary taxation of financial asset income

competition between exchanges a research agenda this paper describes open research questions related to the competition and market structure of financial exchanges and argues that only a combination of industrial organization and finance can satisfactorily attack these questions two examples are discussed to illustrate how the combination of these two approaches can significantly enrich the analysis the network externality puzzle which refers to the question of why trading for the same security is often split across trading venues and the impact of the multi sided character of financial exchanges on pricing and profitability

estimating the open market desk s daily reaction function this paper presents the results of an empirical investigation into the proximate determinants of the federal reserve s daily open market operations using information available each morning at the fed conference call the author models the open market desk s choice of both the quantity and the type of operation using a friction model for the former and a multinomial logit framework for the latter different types of operations are shown to send different signals to the market about the underlying thrust of fed policy and open market operations in recent years are shown to have become increasingly keyed to the federal funds rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

time preference and international lending and borrowing in an overlapping generations model two economies represented by diamond type overlapping generations models and differing only in their pure rates of time preference are joined together capital formation balance of payments behavior and welfare are compared under autarky and openness with a positive natural rate of growth the low time preference country runs a current account surplus in the steady state but not necessarily outside it if preexisting capital is not shiftable between countries integration in the world economy makes the high time preference country worse off in the short run the ranking of stationary utility levels under autarky and openness is ambiguous

testing the expectations hypothesis in the brazilian term structure of interest rates a cointegration analysis in this article the expectations hypothesis eh is tested using cointegration techniques for maturities ranging from 1 to 12 months for the brazilian market we found evidence suggesting that for the period 1995 2006 the cointegration implication generally seems to hold we also found strong evidence supporting causality from short to long rates and also in the opposite direction empirical evidence supports the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates

optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth we study the problem of optimal taxation in three infinite horizon representative agent endogenous growth models the first model is a convex model in which physical and human capital are perfectly symmetric our second model incorporates elastic labor supply through a lucas style technology analysis of these two models points out the danger of assuming that government expenditures are exogenous in our third model we include government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation showing that the limiting tax rate on capital is no longer zero in numerical simulations we find similar effects on growth and welfare in all three models

the fed and short term rates is it open market operations open mouth operations or interest rate smoothing abstract it is widely believed that the fed controls the federal funds rate by altering the degree of pressure in the reserve market through open market operations when it changes its target for the funds rate recently however several analysts have suggested that the fed need not conduct open market operations to change the funds rate rather they argue it is sufficient that the fed indicate its desire for the funds rate this paper notes that there is yet a third alternative the interest rate smoothing hypothesis that suggests that the fed does not move rates per se but rather smooths the transition of rates to the new equilibrium required by economic shocks this paper tests the open market and open mouth alternatives using a methodology first used by cook and hahn journal of monetary economics 1989a 331 finding no evidence that either open market operations or open mouth operations can account for the close relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target a variety of evidence consistent with the interest rate smoothing hypothesis is considered the results suggest that many changes in the fed s funds rate target are an endogenous response to economic events and suggest that an alternative way to identify exogenous changes in policy is to identify exogenous changes in the fed s funds rate target

is everything neutral in his well known analysis of the national debt robert barro introduced the notion of a dynastic family this notion has since become a standard research tool particularly in the areas of public finance and macroeconomics in this paper we critique the assumptions on which the dynastic model is predicated and argue that this framework is not a suitable abstraction in contexts in which the objective is to analyze the effects of public policies we reach this conclusion by formally considering a world in which each generation consists of a large number of distinct individuals as opposed to one representative individual we point out that family linkages form complex networks in which each individual may belong to many dynastic groupings the resulting proliferation of linkages between families gives rise to a host of neutrality results including the irrelevance of all public redistributions distortionary taxes and prices since these results are not at all descriptive of the real world we conclude

public education under capital mobility the paper considers a two country model of overlapping generations economies with intergenerational transfers motivated by altruism and investment in human capital we examine in a non stationary competitive equilibrium the optimal provision of education with and without capital market integration first we explore how regimes of education provision public private or mixed arise and how they affect the dynamics of autarkic economies second we study the effects of capital market integration in equilibrium on the optimal provision of education third we show that capital market integration enhances government intervention in the provision of public education to improve the welfare of its constituents and consider various solutions to such a competition

tests of the expectations hypothesis resolving the anomalies when the short term rate is the federal funds rate abstract the expectations hypothesis eh of the term structure plays an important role in the analysis of monetary policy where shorter term rates are assumed to be determined by the market s expectation for the overnight federal funds rate with two exceptions tests using the effective federal funds rate as the short term rate easily reject the eh these exceptions are when the eh is tested over the nonborrowed reserve targeting period and when the test is performed only using data for settlement wednesdays the last day of bank reserve maintenance period this paper argues that these exceptions are anomalous in the former case the failure to reject the eh occurs when economic analysis suggests that the market should be less able to forecast the federal funds rate in the latter case it occurs when there are sharp spikes in the funds rate that cannot improve materially the market s ability to forecast the funds rate additional analysis shows that these anomalous results are a consequence of the procedure used to test the eh

large block transactions the speed of response and temporary and permanent stock price effects abstract the paper investigates how quickly prices attain new equilibrium levels after large block transactions and measures the associated temporary and permanent price effects we find that prices adjust within at most three trades with most of the adjustment occurring in the first trade the temporary price effect for seller initiated transactions is related to block size but the temporary price effect observed for buyer initiated transactions is no larger than that observed in 100 share trades most of the price effect associated with block trades is permanent and is related to block size regardless of the initiating party

the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of very short term rates statistical tests and economic value this paper re examines the validity of the expectation hypothesis eh of the term structure of us repo rates ranging in maturity from overnight to three months we extend the work of longstaff 2000a in two directions i we implement statistical tests designed to increase test power in this context ii more importantly we assess the economic value of departures from the eh based on criteria of profitability and economic significance in the context of a simple trading strategy the eh is rejected throughout the term structure examined on the basis of the statistical tests however the results of our economic analysis are favorable to the eh suggesting that the statistical rejections of the eh in the repo market are economically insignificant

the term structure spread and future changes in long and short rates in the g7 countries abstract according to the expectations hypothesis when the spread between long and short rates widens next quarter s long rate should rise in the united states however long rates decline instead of rising this anomaly is also present in canada the uk germany and japan four of the additional six g7 countries nevertheless in contrast to the us where long rates appear to overreact to expected future developments the anomalous short run movement of long rates in these other g7 countries is caused by an additive white noise error on long rates that does not materially affect the information in their term structure

the empirical failure of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of bond yields this paper tests the expectations hypothesis eh using us monthly data for bond yields spanning the 1952 2003 sample period and ranging in maturity from 1 month to 10 years we apply the lagrange multiplier test developed by bekaert and hodrick 2001 and extend it to increase the test power a by introducing economic variables as conditioning information and b by using more than two bond yields in the model and testing the eh jointly on more than one pair of yields while the conventional bivariate procedure provides mixed results the more powerful testing procedures suggest rejection of the eh throughout the maturity spectrum examined

capital asset prices with and without negative holdings prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 7 1990 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

competition and collusion in dealer markets this article develops a game theoretic model to analyze market makers intertemporal pricing strategies we show that dealers who adopt noncooperative pricing strategies may set bid ask spreads above competitive levels this form of implicit collusion differs from explicit collusion where dealers cooperate to fix prices price discreteness or asymmetric information are not required for collusion to occur rather institutional arrangements that restrict access to the order flow are important determinants of the ability to collude because they reduce dealers incentives to compete on price public policy efforts to increase interdealer competition should focus on such restrictions

the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target on market interest rates in the 1970s abstract this paper examines the influence of monetary policy on interest rates by estimating the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target the federal reserve s policy instrument on market interest rates in the 1970s we find that changes in the target caused large movements in short term rates and smaller but significant movements in intermediate and long term rates we hypothesize that the similarity of the reactions of three six and twelve month rates to changes in the target offers a possible explanation for the lack of support for the expectations theory from studies that have tested the theory using these rates

opening and closing the market evidence from the london stock exchange we investigate the performance of call markets at the open and close using a unique natural experiment provided by the london stock exchange where traders can choose between a call and an off exchange dealership system although the call market dominates dealers in terms of price discovery it suffers from a high failure rate to open and close trading especially when trading conditions are difficult the call s trading costs increase with asymmetric information slow trading order flow imbalances and uncertainty traders resort to use of call auctions is negatively correlated with firm size implying that the call may not be the optimal method for opening and closing trading of medium and small sized stocks

can transparent markets survive abstract this paper investigates whether transparent markets can survive when faced with direct competition from less transparent markets we first construct a game theoretic model in which in equilibrium the low transparency dealers capture early order flow and use the resulting informational advantage to quote narrower spreads and earn more profits than their more transparent competitors we then conduct a laboratory experiment that tests and supports all of these predictions a second experiment shows that most dealers choose to be of lower transparency when they are allowed to do so however the informational advantage of low transparency decreases as there are more such dealers while the high transparency dealers get increasing benefit from informed traders who attempt to broadcast deceptive trades as a result a small number of transparent dealers persist in our markets

automation versus intermediation evidence from treasuries going off the run this paper examines the choice of trading venue by dealers in u s treasury securities to determine when services provided by human intermediaries are difficult to replicate in fully automated trading systems when treasury securities go off the run their trading volume drops by more than 90 this decline in trading volume allows us to test whether intermediaries knowledge of the market and its participants can uncover hidden liquidity and facilitate better matching of customer orders in less active markets consistent with this hypothesis the market share of electronic intermediaries falls from 81 to 12 when securities go off the run electronic trading systems have been steadily increasing their share of securities trading in almost all financial markets as the amount of automation in financial markets increases it is natural to ask what services human intermediaries provide that are difficult or impossible to replicate in a fully automated trading system existing theory suggests that human intermediaries play at least two important functions first an intermediary s knowledge of the market and its participants may uncover hidden liquidity that facilitates quicker and more efficient matching of customer orders grossman 1992 the value of this matching function is greater when trading volume is low and matches are difficult to find second when information asymmetry is high the repeated interaction between an intermediary and its customers allows the intermediary to protect itself against informed trades and offer better prices to its customers seppi 1990 these two factors explain for example why electronic communications networks ecns have a greater market share for the largest and most actively traded nasdaq stocks while nasdaq market makers have a larger share in smaller less liquid stocks characterized by greater information asymmetry barclay hendershott and mccormick 2003 and why nyse specialists have higher participation rates in smaller less liquid stocks madhavan and sofianos 1998

competition among trading venues information and trading on electronic communications networks this paper explores the competition between two trading venues electronic communication networks ecns and nasdaq market makers ecns oier the advantages of anonymity and speed of execution which attract informed traders thus trades are more likely to occur on ecns when information asymmetry is greater and when trading volume and stock return volatility are high ecn trades have greater permanent price impacts and more private information is revealed through ecn trades than though market maker trades however ecn trades have higher ex ante trading costs because market makers can preference or internalize the less informed trades and oier them better executions technological innovations that enable high speed low cost electronic trading systems are dramatically changing the structure of nancial markets exchanges and markets around the world are merging or forming alliances to improve liquidity and reduce costs in the face of increased competition from each other and from these computerized trading systems trading volume on electronic communications networks ecns has grown rapidly over the past several years ecns are now involved in more than a third of nasdaq trading volume and are attempting to increase their market share in nyse listed

does anonymity matter in electronic limit order markets we develop a model in which limit order traders possess volatility information we show that in this case the size of the bid ask spread is informative about future volatility moreover if volatility information is in part private we establish that i the size of the bid ask spread and ii its informativeness about future volatility should change in the same direction when limit order traders identifiers stop being disclosed we test these predictions using data from the paris bourse as expected we find that the average quoted spread and its informativeness are significantly smaller when limit order traders identifiers are concealed these findings suggest that the limit order book is a channel for volatility information

risk aversion transparency and market performance using a model of market making with inventories based on biais 1993 we find that investors obtain more favorable execution prices and they hence invest more when markets are fragmented in our model risk averse dealers use less aggressive price strategies in more transparent markets centralized because quote dissemination alleviates uncertainty about the prices quoted by other dealers and hence reduces the need to compete aggressively for order flow further we show that the move toward greater transparency centralization may have detrimental effects on liquidity and welfare

a daily view of yield spreads and short term interest rate movements daily data on short term interest rates are used to show how changes in federal reserve operating procedures have affected the term structure yield spreads were helpful in predicting short term interest rate movements during the nonborrowed reserves targeting period 1979 82 but not during the earlier federal funds targeting period since the adoption of contemporaneous reserves accounting in 1984 yield spreads have been informative about short term interest rate movements principally because of the interplay between the market determination of the overnight funds rate on reserve settlement wednesdays and the fed s apparent commitment to stabilizing the funds rate on other days copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

ethnic capital and intergenerational mobility this paper analyzes the extent to which ethnic skill differentials are transmitted across generations i assume that ethnicity acts as an externality in the human capital accumulation process the skills of the next generation depend on parental inputs and on the quality of the ethnic environment in which parents make their investments or ethnic capital the empirical evidence reveals that the skills of today s generation depend not only on the skills of their parents but also on the average skills of the ethnic group in the parent s generation

monetary policy surprises and interest rates evidence from the fed funds futures market abstract this paper estimates the impact of monetary policy actions on bill note and bond yields using data from the futures market for federal funds to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components interest rates response to anticipated target rate changes is small while their response to unanticipated changes is large and highly significant these responses are generally consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure surprise target rate changes have little effect on expectations of future actions however which helps to explain the lack of empirical support for the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve

does risk sharing motivate interdealer trading we use unique data from the london stock exchange to test whether interdealer trade facilitates inventory risk sharing among dealers we develop a methodology that focuses on periods of extreme inventories inventory cycles we further distinguish between inventory cycles that are unanticipated and those that are anticipated because of worked orders the pattern of interdealer trade during inventory cycles matches theoretical predictions for the direction of trade and the inventories of trade counterparts we also show that london dealers receive higher trading revenues for taking larger positions

education borrowing constraints and growth abstract this paper studies the effects of educational borrowing constraints on economic growth and welfare we consider a three period lived overlapping generations model in which individuals finance their educational expenditures by borrowing we show that if the elasticity of human capital to educational expenditure is great enough the relationship between the tightness of the constraints and the growth rate is inverted u shaped when the constraints are binding moreover when the constraints cease to be binding the growth rate is constant we also show that a relaxation of the constraints cannot be pareto improving even if the growth rate rises

effects of market reform on the trading costs and depths of nasdaq stocks the relative merits of dealer versus auction markets have been a subject of significant and sometimes contentious debate on january 20 1997 the securities and exchange commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public to compete directly with nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders additionally superior quotes placed by nasdaq dealers in private trading venues began to be displayed in the nasdaq market we measure the impact of these new rules on various measures of performance including trading costs and depths our results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically without adversely affecting market quality

episodic liquidity crises cooperative and predatory trading we describe how episodic illiquidity arises from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants we first solve a one period trading game in continuous time using an asset pricing equation that accounts for the price impact of trading then in a multi period framework we describe an equilibrium in which traders cooperate most of the time through repeated interaction providing apparent liquidity to one another cooperation breaks down when the stakes are high leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity equilibrium strategies that involve cooperation across markets lead to less frequent episodic illiquidity but cause contagion when cooperation breaks down why is illiquidity rare and episodic pastor stambaugh 2003 detect only 14 aggregate low liquidity months over the time period 1962 to 1999 despite being of significant magnitude most of the episodes were short lived and were followed by long periods of liquidity 1 the origin of this empirical observation still remains a puzzle in this paper we attempt to shed light on this puzzle by developing a theoretical model in which a breakdown in cooperation between traders in the market manifests itself in predatory trading this mechanism leads to sudden and short lived illiquidity we develop a dynamic model of trading based on liquidity needs during each period a liquidity event may occur in which a trader is required to liquidate a large block of an asset in a relatively short time period this need for liquidity is observed by a tight oligopoly whose members may choose to predate or cooperate predation involves racing and fading the distressed trader to the market

term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia abstract numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate the conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks however such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than 3 months which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates the illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face

strategic trading in a dynamic noisy market this paper studies a dynamic model of a nancial market with a strategic trader in each period the strategic trader receives a privately observed endowment in the stock he trades with competitive market makers to share risk noise traders are present in the market after receiving a stock endowment the strategic trader is shown to reduce his risk exposure either by selling at a decreasing rate over time or by selling and then buying back some of the shares sold when the time between trades is small the strategic trader reveals the information regarding his endowment very quickly

long lived private information and imperfect competition we develop a multi period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long lived information we show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly in the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately these results are in contrast to those of kyle 1985 in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually and when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small market depth is constant over time fama 1970 defines a strong form efficient market as one in which security prices fully reflect all available information including both publicly and privately held information in a pioneering and influential article kyle 1985 develops a model in which a single privately informed trader with long lived information optimally exploits his monopoly power over time kyle s 1985 main results are i the informed trader trades in a gradual manner so that his information is incorporated into prices at a slow almost linear rate and ii when auctions are held continuously the depth of the market is constant over time however kyle s 1985 assumption of a single informed trader is strong in the sense that in actual financial markets it is reasonable to expect that at least a few players will have access to private information and will trade in the knowledge that they will face competition with other informed agents in the market 1 we develop a multi period auction model in which multiple strategic informed traders optimally exploit their long lived informational advantage we thus explore the restrictiveness of kyle s assumption of a single informed trader and also examine

a note on the expectations hypothesis at the founding of the fed abstract one of the most influential tests of the expectations hypothesis is mankiw and miron q j econ 101 1986 211 who found that the spread between the long term and short term rates provided predictive power for the short term rate before the fed s founding but not after they suggested that the failure of the expectations hypothesis after the fed s founding was due to the fed s practice of smoothing short term interest rates we show that their finding that the expectations hypothesis fares better prior to the fed s founding is due to the fact that the test they employ tends to generate results that are more favorable to the expectations hypothesis during periods when there is extreme volatility in the short term rate

expectations and the treasury bill federal funds rate spread over recent monetary policy regimes this paper shows that the spread between the 3 month treasury bill and the federal funds rate has significant predictive power for the future change in the federal funds rate during the volatile nonborrowed reserves operating regime but it has less and no predictive power during the borrowed reserves regime and the federal funds targeting regime respectively these findings suggest that treasury bill rates forecast future federal funds rates most accurately when the federal reserve follows a well defined rule that does not smooth the impact of shocks on the federal funds rate

transparency and liquidity a study of block trades on the london stock exchange under different publication rules this article examines whether reducing a market s transparency by delaying the publication of prices for block trades has any impact on liquidity the analysis uses a sample of 5987 blocks from the london stock exchange that cover three different publication regimes immediate 1987 88 90 minutes 1991 92 and 24 hours 1989 90 delaying publication does not affect the time taken by prices to reach a new level which is rapid under all regimes spreads differ across years but their size relates more closely to market volatility than to speed of publication there is therefore no gain in liquidity from delayed publication

anonymity adverse selection and the sorting of interdealer trades this article asks why london security dealers use more than one trading venue to trade with one another we argue that differences in the exclusivity liquidity anonymity and post trade transparency of each system permit a more efficient sorting of interdealer trades than if there were just one system our evidence comes from detailed data on where london dealers chose to place interdealer trades contrary to intuition we show that uninformed interdealer trades as measured by subsequent price impact tend to migrate to third party brokered systems where trade is anonymous by contrast informed interdealer trades tend to migrate to the direct nonanonymous public market additionally we show that this distribution of trades is supported by differences in the price improvement dealers receive in the direct and brokered markets our findings have implications for three strands of the market microstructure literature first they contribute to our understanding of the importance of anonymity and transparency in securities trading most theoretical models of the effects of anonymity and transparency predict that anonymous trading systems will attract more informed trades

risk allocation and inter dealer trading this paper contrasts an auction and a dealership market in the latter parallel to the public market market makers are allowed to trade with each other in a separate inter dealer market since market makers are assumed to be risk averse variations in asset holdings induced by trades with outside investors generate portfolio hedging trade we find that the price at which market makers trade with each other in the inter dealer market determines the prices quoted in the public market for outside investors it is shown that an investor gets a better price in the dealership market as long as the market makers and speculators are imperfectly competitive and the delay between executing the customer s order and trading in the inter dealer market is not too large

multimarket trading and market liquidity when a security trades at multiple locations simultaneously an informed trader has several avenues in which to exploit his private information the greater the proportion of liquidity trading by large traders who can split their trades across markets the larger is the correlation between volume in different markets and the smaller is the informativeness of prices we show that one of the markets emerges as the dominant location for trading in that security when informed traders can use their information for more than one trading period the timely release of price information by market makers at one location adversely affects the profits informed traders expect to make subsequently at other locations market makers competing to offer the lowest cost of trading at their location consequently deter informed trading be voluntarily making the price information public and by cracking down on insider trading article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

supply contraction and trading protocol an examination of recent changes in the u s treasury market we investigate liquidity and trader behavior in the u s treasury market during recent supply contractions as in the precontraction period dealers employ expandable order strategies to achieve greater than posted depth at the posted price and use expandable orders more often when expected information asymmetry is greater overall however dealers are less likely to discover greater than quoted depth during the supply contraction regimes we find that even after substantial losses in their market share of coupon treasury trading brokers reporting voice brokered trading through govpx provide an important protocol for depth discovery we investigate liquidity and trader behavior in the u s treasury market during recent supply contractions as in the precontraction period dealers employ expandable order strategies to achieve greater than posted depth at the posted price and use expandable orders more often when expected information asymmetry is greater overall however dealers are less likely to discover greater than quoted depth during the supply contraction regimes we find that even after substantial losses in their market share of coupon treasury trading brokers reporting voice brokered trading through govpx provide an important protocol for depth discovery

greenspan s conundrum and the fed s ability to affect long term yields in february 2005 federal reserve chairman alan greenspan noticed that the 10 year treasury yields failed to increase despite a 150 basis point increase in the federal funds rate as a conundrum this paper shows that the connection between the 10 year yield and the federal funds rate was severed in the late 1980s well in advance of greenspan s observation the paper hypothesize that the change occurred because the federal open market committee switched from using the federal funds rate as an operating instrument to using it to implement monetary policy and presents evidence from a variety of sources supporting the hypothesis the analysis has implications for central banks interest rate policies

institutional trades and intraday stock price behavior abstract this paper examines the price effect of institutional stock trading using a unique data set that reports the transactions large and small of 37 large institutional money management firms the direction of each trade and the identity of the management firm behind each trade are known although institutional trades are associated with some price pressure we find that the average effect is small there is also a marked asymmetry between the price impact of buys versus sells we relate our findings to various hypotheses on the elasticity of demand for stocks the cost of executing transactions and the determinants of market impact although market capitalization and relative trade size influence the market impact of a trade the dominant influence is the identity of the money manager behind the trade