house price dynamics with dispersed information abstract we use a user cost model to study how dispersed information affects the equilibrium house price in the model agents are disparately informed about local economic conditions consume housing services and speculate on price changes optimists who expect high house price growth buy in anticipation of capital gains pessimists who expect capital losses prefer to rent because of short selling constraints on housing pessimistic expectations are not incorporated in the price of owned houses and the equilibrium price is higher and more volatile relative to the benchmark case of common information we present evidence supporting the model s predictions in a panel of us cities

performance contracting in after sales service supply chains performance based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital intensive industries such as aerospace and defense known as power by the hour in the private sector and as performance based logistics pbl in defense contracting it aims to replace traditionally used fixed price and cost plus contracts to improve product availability and reduce the cost of ownership by tying a supplier s compensation to the output value of the product generated by the customer buyer to analyze implications of performance based relationships we introduce a multitask principal agent model to support resource allocation and use it to analyze commonly observed contracts in our model the customer principal faces a product availability requirement for the uptime of the end product the customer then offers contracts contingent on availability to n suppliers agents of the key subsystems used in the product who in turn exert cost reduction efforts and set spare parts inventory investment levels we show that the first best solution can be achieved if channel members are risk neutral when channel members are risk averse we find that the second best contract combines a fixed payment a cost sharing incentive and a performance incentive furthermore we study how these contracts evolve over the product deployment life cycle as uncertainty in support cost changes finally we illustrate the application of our model to a problem based on aircraft maintenance data and show how the allocation of performance requirements and contractual terms change under various environmental assumptions

central bank design abstract starting with a blank slate how could one design the institutions of a central bank for the united states this paper explores the question of how to design a central bank drawing on the relevant economic literature and historical experiences while staying free from concerns about how the fed got to be what it is today or the short term political constraints it has faced at various times the goal is to provide an opinionated overview that puts forward the trade offs associated with different choices and identifies areas where there are clear messages about optimal central bank design

real rigidity nominal rigidity and the social value of information does welfare improve when firms are better informed about the state of the economy and can thus better coordinate their production and pricing decisions we address this question in an elementary business cycle model that highlights how the dispersion of information can impede both kinds of decisions and in this sense be the source of both real and nominal rigidity within this context we develop a taxonomy for how the social value of information depends on the two rigidities on the sources of the business cycle and on the conduct of monetary policy jel d21 d82 d83 e32 e52

sentiments and aggregate demand fluctuations we formalize the keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations when production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without persistent informational frictions externalities nonconvexities or strategic complementarities in production the models we consider are deliberately simple but could serve as benchmarks for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features

self fulfilling currency crises the role of interest rates abstract we develop a stylized currency crises model with heterogeneous information among investors andendogenous determination of interest rates in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium our modelcaptures three key features of interest rates the opportunity cost of attacking the currency respondsto the investors behavior the domestic interest rate may influence the central bank s preferences fora fixed exchange rate and the domestic interest rate serves as a public signal which aggregatesprivate information about fundamentals we explore the payoff and informational channels throughwhich interest rates determine devaluation outcomes and examine the implications for equilibriumselection by global games methods our main conclusion is that multiplicity is not an artifact ofcommon knowledge in particular we show that multiplicity emerges robustly either when adevaluation is triggered by the cost of high domestic interest rates as in obstfeld 1996 or when adevaluation is triggered by the central bank s loss of foreign reserves as in obstfeld 1986 providedthat the domestic asset supply is sufficiently elastic in the interest rate and shocks to the domesticbond supply are sufficiently small christian helliwigdepartment of economicsuniversity of california los angelesbox 951477los angeles ca 90095 1477arijit mukherjiuniversity of minnesotaaleh tsyvinskidepartment of economicsharvard universitylittauer centercambridge ma 02138 3001

complementarities multiplicity and supply information if traders can obtain private information about the payoff and the supply of a stock then there can exist i complementarity in information acquisition and ii multiple equilibria in the financial and information markets the additional dimension of supply information increases coordination possibilities in the financial market leading to multiple equilibria the existence of two information sources can lead to information acquisition being complementary the multiplicity of equilibria is suggestive of excess volatility and crashes the different financial market equilibria imply differing patterns of cost of capital and volume of trade 2009 by the european economic association

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

booms and busts with dispersed information abstract dispersed information can generate booms and busts in economic activity boom bust dynamics appear when firms are initially over optimistic about demand due to a noisy private news consequently they overproduce which generates a boom and depresses their markups because the news is private firms cannot relate these low markups to aggregate optimism as low markups can also signal low demand this overturns their expectations generating a bust we emphasize a novel role for imperfect common knowledge dispersed information makes firms ignorant about their competitors actions which makes them confuse high noise driven supply with low fundamental demand

investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies abstract we study the impact of price cap regulation on the level and timing of investment in an oligopolistic cournot industry facing stochastic demand we find that a price ceiling affects investment decisions in two mutually competing ways it makes the option to defer investment more valuable but at the same time it reduces the incentive for firms to strategically underinvest in order to raise prices we show that while sensible price cap regulation speeds up investment a low price cap can be a disincentive for investment there exists an optimal price cap independent of market concentration the competitive investment price trigger that maximizes investment incentives and in the long term increases industry installed capacity this optimal price cap becomes less effective and less robust as the market becomes more competitive and as demand volatility increases errors in estimation of the optimal price cap have asymmetric effects underestimation has more dire consequences than overestimation

stabilizing non fundamental asset price movements under discretion and limited information abstract inflation output and interest rate stabilization are all potential central bank objectives we explore whether monetary policy should respond to asset price fluctuations when they are driven by irrational expectational shocks to the future returns to capital in our model an optimistic shock to future returns generates both an increase in equity prices and physical investment the increased investment is inefficient and thus a central bank optimally responds to this expectations shocks this induces a trade off between stabilizing nominal prices and non fundamental asset price movements we compare the optimal policy under different assumptions full versus limited information and commitment versus discretion if the central bank has limited information about whether an asset price movement has a fundamental or non fundamental origin then the central bank responds less aggressively to the non fundamental exuberance shocks than under full information without commitment a central bank responds more aggressively to non fundamental exuberance shocks

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

managing expectations instruments vs targets should policymakers offer forward guidance in terms of a path for an instrument such as interest rates or a target for an outcome such as unemployment we study how the optimal approach depends on a departure from rational expectations people have a limited understanding of the behavior of others and of the general equilibrium ge effects of policy the bite of such bounded rationality on implementability and welfare is minimized by target based guidance if and only if ge feedbacks are strong enough this offers a rationale for why central banks should shine the spotlight on unemployment when faced with a prolonged liquidity trap a steep keynesian cross or a large financial accelerator

should we regulate financial information regulations that require asset issuers to disclose payoff relevant information to potential buyers sound like obvious measures to increase investor welfare but in many cases such regulations harm investors in an equilibrium model asset returns compensate investors for risk by making payoffs less uncertain disclosure reduces risk and therefore reduces return as high risk high return investments disappear investor welfare falls of course information is still valuable to each individual investor but acquiring information is like a prisoners dilemma each investor is better off with the information but collectively investors are better off if they remain uninformed the only cases in which providing information improves investors welfare are ones where there would otherwise be severe asymmetric information using a model of information markets the paper explores when such outcomes are likely to arise when we extend the model so that financial markets with information allocate the real capital stock more efficiently these conclusions do not change disclosure improves efficiency but more efficient firms do not have more risk and therefore do not offer investors higher return instead they simply command a higher price which only benefits the asset issuer since the efficiency gains are fully internalized by asset issuers who can choose to disclose without disclosure being mandatory the efficiency argument is not a logical rationale for regulation

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

higher order expectations in asset pricing we examine formally keynes idea that higher order beliefs can drive a wedge between an asset price and its fundamental value based on expected future payoffs we call this the higher order wedge which depends on the difference between higher and first order expectations of future payoffs we analyze the determinants of this wedge and its impact on the equilibrium price in the context of a dynamic noisy rational expectations model we show that the wedge reduces asset price volatility and disconnects the price from the present value of future payoffs the impact of the higher order wedge on the equilibrium price can be quantitatively large

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions we study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others actions every period each agent observes a public and private noisy signal centered around the aggregate action taken by the population the public signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a price or a quantity the private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and local interactions we identify conditions such that the average learning curve is s shaped learning is slow initially intensifies rapidly and finally converges slowly to the truth we show that increasing public information always slows down learning in the long run and under some conditions reduces welfare lastly optimal diffusion of information requires that agents strive to be different agents need to be rewarded for choosing actions away from the population average

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

learning over the business cycle policy implications abstract this paper studies the policy implications of the endogeneity of information about the state of the economy the business cycle can be made less noisy and more efficient by incentivizing firms to vary their pricing and production decisions more with their beliefs about the state of the economy this calls for countercyclical taxes complemented by a monetary policy that leans against the wind the optimal policies trade off allocative efficiency for informational efficiency

new directions for stochastic open economy models the paper develops a simple stochastic new open economy macroeconomic model based on sticky nominal wages explicit solution of the wage setting problem under uncertainty allows one to analyze the effects of the monetary regime on welfare expected output and the expected terms of trade despite the potential interplay between imperfections due to sticky wages and monopoly the optimal monetary policy rule has a closed form solution to motivate our model we show that observed correlations between terms of trade and exchange rates are more consistent with our traditional assumptions about nominal rigidities than with a popular alternative based on local currency pricing 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

forward guidance communication commitment or both abstract forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment odyssean by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information delphic i analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages without private information the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements pure odyssean forward guidance is redundant with private information communication can have social value forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank s private information about its own preferences or beliefs

price setting under uncertainty about inflation abstract we analyze the manipulation of inflation statistics that occurred in argentina starting in 2007 to test the relevance of informational frictions in price setting we estimate that the manipulation of statistics was associated with a higher degree of price dispersion this effect is analyzed in the context of a quantitative general equilibrium model in which firms use information about the inflation rate to set prices reporting inaccurate measures of the cpi entails significant welfare losses especially in economies with volatile monetary policy

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

public information and uninformed trading implications for market liquidity and price efficiency abstract we develop a rational expectations equilibrium model in which noise trading comes from discretionary liquidity traders the equilibrium quantity of aggregate noise trading is endogenously determined by the population size of liquidity traders active in the financial market by improving market liquidity public information reduces the expected trading loss of liquidity traders and thus attracts more such traders to the market which negatively affects information aggregation analyzing an alternative setting that models noise trading as coming from hedgers yields similar insights in a setting with endogenous information public information can harm information aggregation both through crowding out private information and through attracting noise trading

learning and complementarities in speculative attacks we study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision we show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions we show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market depending on how it is implemented

does competition spur innovation the case of yardstick competition this paper investigates the effect of yardstick competition on firms incentives to invest in cost reducing innovations we show that an increase in the intensity of yardstick competition for which we provide a natural measure increases the incentives to innovate

solving dsge portfolio choice models with dispersed private information abstract noisy rational expectations models in which agents have dispersed private information and extract information from an endogenous asset price are widely used in finance however these linear partial equilibrium models do not fit well in modern macroeconomics that is based on non linear dynamic general equilibrium models we develop a method for solving a dsge model with portfolio choice and dispersed private information we combine and extend existing local approximation methods applied to public information dsge settings with methods for solving noisy rational expectations models in finance with dispersed private information

policy with dispersed information information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society is only imperfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity and cannot be centralized by the government or any other institution in this paper we seek to identify policies that can improve the decentralized use of such dispersed information without requiring the government to observe this information we show that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of taxation on ex post public information regarding the realized fundamentals and aggregate activity when information is common as in the ramsey literature or when agents have private information only about idiosyncratic shocks as in the mirrlees literature the contingency on fundamentals alone suffices for efficiency when instead agents have private information about aggregate shocks the contingency on aggregate activity is crucial an appropriate combination of the two contingencies permits the government to i dampen the impact of noise and hence reduce non fundamental volatility without also dampening the impact of fundamentals ii induce agents to internalize informational externalities and hence improve the speed of social learning iii restore a certain form of constrained efficiency in the decentralized use of information and iv guarantee that welfare increases with the provision of any additional information jel c72 d62 d82

optimal policy in a model of endogenous fluctuations and assets assets are coupled to endogenous aggregate output fluctuations in a model of heterogeneous agents those agents wish to avoid reacting inadvertently to an unobservable noise process but to do so must elicit reactions to that noise from each other an abstract institution is modeled that optimizes this elicitation by strategically transmitting information about aggregates i designate this feedback feedback is used by agents and so influences the characteristics of aggregate fluctuations the optimal feedback policy minimizes asset rates of return maximizes the persistence of aggregate output fluctuations and causes the distribution of wealth to widen continually and without limit

an informational rationale for action over disclosure abstract the past two decades have seen a considerable increase in the amount of public information provided by policymakers are such disclosures desirable or is it instead preferable to use such information to condition a policy instrument such a tax or an interest rate this paper studies the relative merits of each means to use a policymaker s information in a flexible class of economies that feature dispersed information and payoff and learning externalities i provide conditions for when the exclusive use of a policy instrument or disclosure is optimal i then relate these to differences in the equilibrium and socially optimal use of information i conclude with a series of applications that show how my results apply to common beauty contest models competitive economies and a broad class of macroeconomic models among others

reprint of information percolation in segmented markets we study equilibria of dynamic over the counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information over time agents are privately informed by bids and offers investors differ with respect to information quality including initial information precision and also in terms of market connectivity the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities we characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives more liquid markets lead to higher equilibrium information acquisition when the gains from trade and market duration are sufficiently large on the other hand for a small market duration the opposite may occur if agents vary sufficiently in terms of their market connectivity c 2014 published by elsevier inc

when can changes in expectations cause business cycle fluctuations in neo classical settings abstract it is often argued that changes in expectation are an important driving force of the business cycle however it is well known that changes in expectations cannot generate positive co movement between consumption investment and employment in the most standard neo classical business cycle models this gives rise to the question of whether changes in expectation can cause business cycle fluctuations in any neo classical setting or whether such a phenomenon is inherently related to market imperfections this paper offers a systematic exploration of this issue our finding is that expectation driven business cycle fluctuations can arise in neo classical models when one allows for a sufficiently rich description of the production technology however such a structure is rarely allowed or explored in macro models in particular we identify a multi sector setting and a setting with a costly distribution system in which expectation driven business cycles can arise

insurance and opportunities a welfare analysis of labor market risk abstract using a model with constant relative risk aversion preferences endogenous labor supply and partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk this paper provides an analytical characterization of three welfare effects a the welfare effect of a rise in wage dispersion b the welfare gain from completing markets and c the welfare effect from eliminating risk the analysis reveals an important trade off for these welfare calculations on the one hand higher wage uncertainty increases the cost associated with missing insurance markets on the other hand greater wage dispersion presents opportunities to raise aggregate productivity by concentrating market work among more productive workers welfare effects can be expressed in terms of the underlying parameters defining preferences and wage risk or alternatively in terms of changes in observable second moments of the joint distribution over individual wages consumption and hours

competence implies credibility the credibility of monetary policy under discretion has been traditionally linked to the central bank s conservatism we show that another trait of the central bank cb her competence at doing her job or reputation thereof can be just as important to make her policy credible and transparent we analyze a static barro and gordon 1983 s game where the effects of monetary policy depend on an unknown state of the economy the cb forms her own private and imprecise view of this state that she may announce to p in a cheap talk game to explain and motivate her policy intentions the precision of the noise in the cb s view measures her competence the more accurate her assessment the clearer an idea she has about what to do the fineness of the equilibrium message space measures monetary policy s transparency in any equilibrium of the cheap talk game the cb credibly announces one of finite inflation targets that differ by at least a multiple of the inflation bias competence ratio if this ratio is too large the cb can credibly communicate only the direction of monetary policy as the cb s competence rises and this ratio falls p knows that the cb puts increasing weight on pursuing her objective targets relative to surprising expectations to stimulate output therefore the equilibrium message space becomes finer a more competent cb is also less likely to erroneously observe extreme realizations of the shocks so she is more able tofine tune expectations at times of business as usual

indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information the optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward looking variables are derived and interpreted both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment the private sector is assumed to have more information about the state of the economy than the policymaker certainty equivalence holds for the optimal reaction function in state space form t he coefficients are independent of the degree of uncertainty about the state of the economy however in the case of commitment certainty equivalence does not hold for the reaction function in integrative form the policy instrument cannot be written as a distributed lag of past estimates of past states of the economy instead optimal policy will generally depend on new estimates of past states of the economy and in ways that depend on the information structure furthermore the usual separation principle does not hold since the estimation of the state of the economy is not independent of optimization and is in general quite complex we present a general characterization of optimal filtering and control in settings of this kind and discuss an application of our methods to the problem of the optimal use of real time macroeconomic data in the conduct of monetary policy

limited information capacity as a source of inertia abstract we derive optimal time dependent adjustment rules from shannon s 1948 information theory in a continuous time lq prediction problem with a costly rate of information acquisition processing the optimal prediction evolves smoothly but jumps at an optimally chosen frequency when fresh information accrues a more volatile and persistent target raises the information rate required to maintain a sampling frequency this cost effect moderates and may even reverse the benefit effect on the value of information so optimal inertia is unresponsive to and nonmonotonic in the predictability of the environment conventional models with a fixed cost per observation imply no such cost effect so inertia rises quickly in the predictability of the environment

observing and shaping the market the dilemma of central banks while the central bank observes the market activity to assess economic fundamentals it shapes the market outcome through its policy interventions the more the central bank influences the market the more it spoils the informational content of economic aggregates how should the central bank act and communicate when it derives its information from observing the market this paper analyses the optimal central bank s action and disclosure under endogenous central bank s information for three operational frameworks pure communication action and communication and signaling action when the central bank takes an action it would be optimal for the central bank to be fully opaque to prevent its disclosure from deteriorating the information quality of market outcomes however in the realistic case where central bank s action is observable it may be optimal to refrain from implementing any action

should central banks respond to movements in asset prices in recent decades asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries in light of this experience how if at all should central bankers respond to asset price volatility we have addressed this issue in previous work bernanke and gertler 1999 the context of our earlier study was the relatively new but increasingly popular monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting see e g bernanke and frederic mishkin 1997 in an inflation targeting framework publicly announced medium term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run the inflation targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank s forecast of inflation to a first approximation once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations in use now for about a decade inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice however so far this approach has not often been stress tested by large swings in asset prices our earlier research employed simulations of a small calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation targeting policy defined as one in which the central bank s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation might fare in the face of a boom and bust cycle in asset prices we found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule in our simulations one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2 0 substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices intuitively inflation targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices in our view there are good reasons outside of our formal model to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices including the fact that as history has shown the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable hence we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast in the spirit of recent work on robust control the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst case discussants robert shiller yale university glenn rudebusch federal reserve bank of san francisco kenneth rogoff harvard university

optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge we study optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy with monopolistic competition where firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy information imperfections emerge endogenously because firms are assumed to have finite shannon capacity to process information we then ask how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on firms processing capacity when price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements we find that policy should nominally accommodate white noise mark up shocks for a large range of capacity values this fi nding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms processing capacity when mark up shocks are persistent accommodation may even have to increase in the medium term but has to decrease in the long run thereby generating a hump shaped price response and a slow reduction in output instead when prices are strategic substitutes policy tends to react with nominal demand contractions to mark up shocks in addition there might exist discontinuities between common knowledge equilibria and equilibria with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge

endogenous public information and welfare in market games this paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition pricecontingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information a payoff pecuniary externality related to aggregate volatility and a learning externality the impact of the first depends on whether competition is of the strategic substitutes or complements variety and the second induces agents to put too little weight on private information we find that with strategic substitutes and when the learning externality is not very strong agents put too much weight on private information and prices are too informative this will happen in the normal case where the allocational role of price prevails over its informational role under strategic complementarity there is always under reliance on private information the welfare loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information the analysis provides insights into optimal business cycle policy and a rationale for a tobin like tax for speculators in financial markets

information acquisition and welfare we study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information first we relate the in efficiency in the acquisition of information to the in efficiency in the use of information and explain why efficiency in the use is no guarantee of efficiency in the acquisition next we show how the acquisition of private information affects the social value of public information i e the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the quality of public information finally we illustrate the implications of the results in a monetary economy with price rigidities and dispersed information about productivity shocks

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

ambiguous information permanent income and consumption fluctuations abstract this paper studies asymmetric responses in consumption where the asymmetries are endogenously generated by agents preferences and incomplete knowledge about information quality agents form expectations about the future based on incomplete information which is assumed to be ambiguous and these future expectations distorted by ambiguity affect spending asymmetrically with a noisy signal of uncertain quality consumption features asymmetric responses the absolute size of the responses depends on whether the signal delivers good or bad news i estimate the model on the data for g7 countries by maximum likelihood and the estimation results suggest that the ambiguity mechanism plays a modest role in driving observed skewness in the data

trading frenzies and their impact on real investment we study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm s security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment this feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies in which speculators all wish to trade like others generating large pressure on prices coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency but speculators incentives push in the opposite direction so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable we analyze the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise

information percolation in segmented markets we study equilibria of dynamic over the counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information over time agents are privately informed by bids and offers investors differ with respect to information quality including initial information precision and also in terms of market connectivity the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities we characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives more liquid markets lead to higher equilibrium information acquisition when the gains from trade and market duration are sufficiently large on the other hand for a small market duration the opposite may occur if agents vary sufficiently in terms of their market connectivity c 2014 published by elsevier inc

market distortions and government transparency in this paper we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions we first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information our key result is that distortions limit communication even if transparency is ex ante pareto superior to opaqueness it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high we next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions jel d82 e61

optimal policy intervention constrained obfuscation and the social value of public information we study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation when policy makers ability to obfuscate information is constrained increasing public information precision can be welfare improving

on the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators abstract we describe a behavior of a central bank when its measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement errors in a framework of optimizing models with nominal price stickiness in our model a central bank sets the interest rate equal to its current estimate of the so called wicksellian natural rate of interest this is shown to imply that the interest rate responds to the central bank s estimates of both current inflation and output gap as advocated by taylor 1993 it is also shown that the noise contained in the indicators justifies a degree of policy cautiousness a reduced form representation of optimal policy should exhibit interest rate smoothing which is often found in the empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions

price dispersion private uncertainty and endogenous nominal rigidities this article shows that when agents learn from prices large private uncertainty may result from a small amount of heterogeneity as in a phelps lucas island model final producers look at the prices of their local inputs to infer aggregate conditions however market linkages between islands make the informativeness of local prices endogenous to general equilibrium relations in this context i show that a vanishingly small heterogeneity in local conditions is enough to generate an equilibrium in which prices are rigid to aggregate shocks and transmit only partial information i use this insight as a microfoundation for price rigidity in an otherwise frictionless monetary model and show that even a tiny amount of dispersion in fundamentals can lead to large non neutrality of money

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

a classical model of a small fixed exchange rate economy abstract this paper develops a monetary model of a small fixed exchange rate economy prices are flexible and aggregate supply plays a key role the model combines the barro ricardo theorem that government bonds are not wealth to the residents of the country of issue with the ultra rational view that the domestic component of the money supply is also not wealth the short run and long run effects of monetary policy fiscal policy and devaluations are examined monetary policy is neutral in both the short and long runs devaluations and fiscal policy however are not necessarily neutral in either the short or long run

procuring fast delivery sole sourcing with information asymmetry this paper studies a queuing model in which a buyer sources a good or service from a single supplier chosen from a pool of suppliers the buyer seeks to minimize the sum of her procurement and operating costs the latter of which depends on the suppliers lead time the selected supplier can regulate his lead time but faster lead times are costly although the buyer selects the supplier to source from possibly via an auction and dictates the contractual terms the buyers bargaining power is limited by asymmetric information the buyer only has an estimate of the suppliers costs while the suppliers know their costs precisely we identify a procurement mechanism that minimizes the buyers total cost procurement plus operating this mechanism is not simple it is a numerically derived nonlinear menu of contracts therefore we study several simpler mechanisms e g one that charges a late fee and one that specifies a fixed lead time requirement no menus no nonlinear functions we find that simple mechanisms are nearly optimal generally within 1 of optimal because asymmetric information conveys significant protection to the supplier i e the supplier is able to retain most of the benefit of having a lower cost renegotiation is another concern with the optimal mechanism because it does not minimize the supply chains cost the firms can be both better off if they throw away the contract and start over interestingly we find that the potential gain from renegotiation is relatively small with either the optimal or our simple mechanisms we conclude that our simple mechanisms are quite attractive along all relevant dimensions buyers performance supply chain performance simplicity and robustness to renegotiation

signaling new product reliability with after sales service contracts prior studies on performance based contracting pbc for after sales services have highlighted its advantages over traditional resource based contracting rbc when products are established and their reliability is known to all parties we develop a game theoretic model to investigate how these insights are affected when the vendor is privately informed about the reliability of a newly developed product a novel feature of our model is the interaction between reliability signaling private information and the vendor s discretionary investment in spares inventory private action which arises naturally in the setting we consider we find that this interaction leads to contrasting equilibrium outcomes under the two contracts rbc induces the vendor to focus on inventory savings leading to underinvestment in spares whereas pbc induces the vendor to focus on reliability signaling achieved through overinvestment in inventory as a result neither contract is efficient we investigate two means to mitigate this inefficiency but either approach has caveats a making inventory verifiable removes the trade off between reliability signaling and inventory investment but results in diverging contract preferences between the vendor and the buyer b pooling inventories across multiple buyers saves inventory costs but it also hinders reliability signaling potentially exacerbating inefficiency this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

unexpected monetary disturbances during the gold standard era abstract this empirical paper uses the barro methodology of estimating unexpected monetary shocks to determine the effect these shocks had on real output in the u s during the gold standard era between 1880 and 1913 it also investigates whether changes in a measure of financial intermediation had real effects the results indicate that neither expected nor unexpected money shocks affected output changes in financial intermediation however were significantly correlated with output this result lends support to theories which stress the endogeneity of broad measures of the money supply

monetary policy and the information content of prices rational expectations and cleared markets lead to the proposition that feedback monetary policy is irrelevant to real activity as in the analyses of sargent and wallace however if agents are differentially informed and have access to a common price then prospective monetary policy actions future feedback to imperfectly known current circumstances can alter real activity by changing the information content of prices

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

a theory of demand shocks this paper presents a model of business cycles driven by shocks to consumer expectations regarding aggregate productivity agents are hit by heterogeneous productivity shocks they observe their own productivity and a noisy public signal regarding aggregate productivity the public signal gives rise to noise shocks which have the features of aggregate demand shocks they increase output employment and inflation in the short run and have no effects in the long run numerical examples suggest that the model can generate sizable equilibrium dsge models of the business cycle include a large number of shocks to technol ogy monetary policy preferences etc but typically do not include expectational shocks as independent drivers of short run fluctuations 1 this paper explores the idea of expectation driven cycles looking at a model where technology determines equilibrium output in the long run and consumers receive noisy signals about technology in the short run the presence of noisy signals produces expectational errors this paper studies the role of these expectational errors in gener ating volatility at business cycle frequencies the model is based on two ingredients first consumers take time to recognize permanent changes in aggregate fundamentals although they may have good information on the current state of the individual firm or sector where they operate they have only limited information regarding the long run determinants of aggregate activity second consumers have access to public information that is relevant to estimate long run productivity this includes news about technological innovations publicly released macroeconomic and sectoral statistics financial market prices and public statements by policy makers however these signals provide only a noisy forecast of the long run effects of technological innovations this opens the door to noise shocks which induce consumers to temporarily overestimate or underestimate the productive capacity of the economy

good disclosure bad disclosure we study the implications of public information in a model where market prices convey information to relevant decision makers and the uctuation of market prices is driven by multiple factors disclosure has a positive direct eect of providing new information and an indirect eect of changing the price informativeness if disclosure is about a variable of which real decision makers are well informed then the indirect eect is also positive so that the direct eect is ampli ed leading to a positive overall eect on real e ciency if disclosure is about a variable that real decision markers care to learn much then the indirect eect is negative and the direct eect is attenuated moreover in markets which aggregate private information eectively the negative indirect eect can dominate so that disclosure can harm real e ciency

dynamic pricing and imperfect common knowledge abstract introducing private information into the dynamic pricing decision of firms by adding an idiosyncratic component to marginal cost can help explain two stylised facts about price changes aggregate inflation responds gradually and with inertia to shocks at the same time as individual price changes can be large the inertial behaviour of inflation is driven by privately informed firms strategically herding on the public information contained in the observations of lagged aggregate variables the model also matches the average duration between price changes found in the data and it nests the standard new keynesian phillips curve as a special case to solve the model the paper derives an algorithm for solving a class of dynamic models with higher order expectations

can yardstick competition reduce waiting times yardstick competition is a regulatory scheme for local monopolists e g hospitals where the monopolist s reimbursement is linked to performance relative to other equivalent monopolists this re

optimal monetary policy when information is market generated endogenous i e market generated signals observed by firms have crucial implications for monetary policy when information is endogenous firms gather a demand signal from their market that is both real and nominal as a result the traditional surprise channel of monetary policy is absent instead monetary policy works through a signaling channel as it affects firms information through the demand signal the optimal policy is then the signaling policy i e the policy that maximizes the information content of the demand signal in our setup the signaling policy targets a positive correlation between money supply and prices which emphasizes the natural response of prices to real shocks on the contrary in the more traditional case of exogenous information optimal monetary policy would stabilize prices as it acts through the surprise channel we show that the signaling policy is optimal regardless of the amount of attention that firms pay to central bank communication

a closer look at the behavior of uncertainty and disagreement micro evidence from the euro area this paper examines point and density forecasts of real gdp growth inflation and unemployment from the european central bank s survey of professional forecasters we present individual uncertainty measures and introduce individual point and density based measures of disagreement the data indicate substantial heterogeneity and persistence in respondents uncertainty and disagreement with uncertainty associated with prominent respondent effects and disagreement associated with prominent time effects we also examine the co movement between uncertainty and disagreement and find an economically insignificant relationship that is robust to changes in the volatility of the forecasting environment this provides further evidence that disagreement is not a reliable proxy for uncertainty

can more public information raise uncertainty the international evidence on forward guidance abstract central banks have used different types of forward guidance this paper reports cross country evidence showing that in general forward guidance mutes the response of government bond yields to macroeconomic news however calendar based guidance with a short horizon counter intuitively raises it using a stylized model where agents learn from market signals it shows that the public release of more precise information about future rates lowers the informativeness of market signals and as a consequence may increase uncertainty and amplify the reaction of expectations to macroeconomic news

information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle abstract we study firms incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to investigate the role of endogenous information in accounting for business cycles our model predicts that for a wide range of parameter values firms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when the economy has been in a recession and a pessimistic belief about the state of the economy prevails than after a boom when firms share an optimistic belief the equilibrium price system which features endogenous information transmission dampens aggregate fluctuations by discouraging information acquisition our welfare analysis reveals that information acquisition in the decentralized economy is not efficient this is due to inefficient employment dispersion arising from information heterogeneity in equilibrium time series data for the u s economy support the model s prediction of wages being more informative about total factor productivity after recessions than following booms

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

financial prices and information acquisition in large cournot markets abstract in the context of a large cournot market with dispersedly informed firms we show that while output decisions are strategic substitutes private information acquisition decisions can be strategic complements the reversal of incentives operates through the informational role played by the price of a financial asset whose payoff depends on firms output decisions our results rely on a novel mechanism whereby holding fixed the private information of financial traders when firms become more privately informed the financial asset price becomes less informative

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

optimal monetary policy with uncertain fundamentals and dispersed information this paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate fluctuations are driven by the private sector s uncertainty about the economy s fundamentals information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents and there are two aggregate shocks a standard productivity shock and a noise shock affecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they are realized despite the lack of superior information monetary policy can affect the economy s relative response to the two shocks as time passes better information on past fundamentals becomes available the central bank can then adopt a backward looking policy rule based on more precise information about past shocks by announcing its response to future information the central bank can influence the expected real interest rate faced by forward looking consumers with different beliefs and thus affect the equilibrium allocation if the announced future response is sufficiently aggressive the central bank can completely eliminate the effect of noise shocks however this policy is typically suboptimal as it leads to an excessively compressed distribution of relative prices the optimal monetary policy balances the benefits of aggregate stabilization with the costs in terms of cross sectional efficiency copyright wiley blackwell

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally