are preferences for fiscal discipline endogenous differences in voters fiscal preferencesare examined taking advantage of theexceptional swiss institutional setting empirical evidence suggests thatpreferences are determined by strictlycultural patterns cultural area measuredby language thus fiscal preferences canbe considered as being largely exogenous this implies that except for specialcases it is not possible to find simpleproxy variables for fiscal preferences anad hoc index of fiscal preferencesought to be built up when the introductionof this variable is required forcomprehensive explanatory models of fiscaldiscipline or for other related studies

temporal aggregation in political budget cycles electoral cycles have been widely debated since the pioneering studies of the 1970s on monetary and fiscal policy 1 drazen sums up the evidence in terms of active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy while expansionary fiscal policy is the main impulse behind electoral cycles monetary policy has an accommodating role 2 recently there has been a flurry of empirical work on political budget cycles pbcs using cross country panels the most influential works concentrate on the budget surplus because it can capture both increases in expenditures and tax cuts before elections and is thus the most sensitive indicator of aggregate pbcs 3a drawback of these extant studies is their reliance on annual observations since elections take place between january and december annual data do not allow one to identify the election year precisely to get around this problem other schemes have been proposed for example by the rule of the semester the previous year is counted as the election year if elections take place before july 4 what are the consequences of temporal aggregation for the measurement of pbcs instead of being concentrated in the election year pre electoral effects may be spread out over the two years leading up to elections more important if the sign of policies is reversed after elections lower frequency data may mask pbcs because the effects in the election year cancel out as akhmedov and zhuravskaya point out in their country study of russia 5to illustrate the differences between using annual and quarterly data to identify the election year imagine that elections take place in june furthermore assume there is a pre electoral deterioration in the budget surplus surplus 1 during the four quarters running up to elections followed by an improvement surplus 1 the next four quarters in the calendar year in which elections take place the net effect on the budget surplus is zero elections are not always in june of course what happens if elections are evenly spread out over the year table 1 presents a simulation where y 0 is the calendar year of elections y 1 is the year before and y 1 is the year after for elections in the first quarter of the election year namely y 0 q 1 our textbook example of a pre electoral expansion in the deficit during the four quarters prior to elections followed by a contraction the next four quarters implies that the surplus equals 1 from y 1 q 2 to y 0 q 1 it equals 1 from y 0 q 2 to y 1 q 1 and it equals 0 otherwise when the budget surplus is at its average value normalized here at zero the same procedure is followed for elections in the other three quarters if we aggregate the effects by calendar year there is a serious underestimation of pbcs in the election year since pre electoral expansions are almost cancelled out by post electoral contractions leaving a net expansive effect that is only 25 percent of the total stimulus before elections the least affected by temporal aggregation are post electoral fiscal adjustments since 62 5 percent of the total effect is reflected the year after elections on the other hand if there were no post electoral fiscal adjustments the problem of temporal aggregation would be much less severe since 62 5 percent of the total expansive effect would be reflected the calendar year of elections and 37 5 percent the year before this paper tackles the issue of temporal aggregation in pbcs head on we build a cross country panel with annual and quarterly data from nineteen latin american countries and twenty member states of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd over the 1980 2005 period 6 quarterly data allow us to identify the election year more precisely with annual data the election year is the calendar year in which elections take place with quarterly data the election year comprises the election quarter plus the three prior quarters we introduce two nonstandard features in our analysis

do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed established democracies this paper investigates the impact of elections on the level and composition of fiscal instruments using a sample of 19 high income oecd democracies during the period 1972 1999 we find that elections shift public spending towards current expenditures at the cost of public investment although we find no evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit and overall expenditures we find a negative effect of elections on revenue attributed to a fall in direct taxation our results apply for predetermined electoral periods while endogenous elections seem to increase deficit and leave the composition of fiscal policy unaffected

what does export diversification do for growth an econometric analysis it is frequently suggested that export diversification contributes to an acceleration of growth in developing countries horizontal export diversification into completely new export sectors may generate positive externalities on the rest of the economy as export oriented sectors gain from dynamic learning activities due to contacts with foreign purchasers and exposure to international competition vertical diversification out of primary into manufactured exports is also associated with growth since primary export sectors generally do not exhibit strong spillovers yet there have been remarkably few empirical investigations into the link between export diversification and growth this paper attempts to examine the hypothesis that export diversification is linked to economic growth via externalities of learning by doing and learning by exporting fostered by competition in world markets the diversification led growth hypothesis is tested by estimating an augmented cobb douglas production function on the bas

value for money german local government efficiency in a comparative perspective in this article we investigate the cost efficiency of german local governments in the state of baden wurttemberg in 2004 using a stochastic frontier approach besides being the first study on german data we add two elements to the literature first we provide a comparative perspective allowing us to embed our results in the broader literature second unlike most previous studies we explicitly account for exogenous or nondiscretionary influences when estimating municipal efficiency scores the results suggest that disregarding such exogenous factors can lead to significant and systematic bias in the estimated inefficiency levels particularly underestimation of efficiency occurs for municipalities with high tourist activity while the reverse is true for municipalities with high unemployment

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

local political business cycles evidence from philippine municipalities abstract this paper establishes the existence of short term political business cycles in the philippines over the period 2003 2009 examining a balanced panel of 1143 municipalities shows that employment levels increase in the two pre electoral quarters and drop sharply in the two quarters following elections further results are consistent with the cycles being generated by incumbents attempts to increase their chances of re election cycles are stronger in sectors that incumbents are more able to influence and when they expect stronger electoral competition evidence suggests that these cycles are detrimental to development

business cycle and political election outcomes evidence from the chilean democracy this paper explores the influence of economic variables in chilean presidential elections we use a panel where the dependent variable corresponds to the share of the vote obtained by the incumbent at a municipal level in the presidential elections of 1989 1993 and 1999 we focus on the unemployment rate and the output gap and find that both have a significant influence on the vote we also find that if the mayor is from the same coalition as the incumbent people will further punish the incumbent when regional unemployment is above national unemployment

budget institutions and fiscal policy in the u s states this paper summarizes state balanced budget requirements and the available empirical evidence on the effect of these rules on state fiscal policies existing state rules differ from many current proposals at the federal level they are typically restricted to part of the state budget they frequently permit short term borrowing and they lack formal enforcement mechanisms the paper also surveys previous research on how anti deficit provisions affect state fiscal policy the available evidence indicates that stringent anti deficit provisions lead to more rapid adjustment of state taxes and expenditures when fiscal deficits emerge this suggests that changing the federal budget process has the potential to affect federal fiscal policy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

political uncertainty and public financing costs evidence from u s gubernatorial elections and municipal bond markets this research investigates how political uncertainty around u s gubernatorial elections in uences the borrowing costs of public debt measured by yields of municipal bonds our evidence from both the new issuance market and the secondary market shows that yields of municipal bonds increase sharply by 6 to 8 basis points before elections and then reverse afterward elections have more pronounced impact during economic downturns when outcomes are less predictable and when states have more outstanding debt several state institutions such as gaap budgeting spending limits and tax increase limits help to mitigate the adverse impact of political uncertainty

tales of fiscal adjustment fiscal adjustments why they can be expansionary this paper examines the evidence on fiscal adjustments in oecd countries from the early 1960s to today the results shed light on the recently observed phenomenon of fiscal tightening that produces non keynesian expansionary effects one interpretation is that a serious fiscal tightening increases demand wealth rises when future tax burdens decline and when interest rates decline credibility is restored and inflation or default risks abate both consumption and investment rise for this effect to produce an expansion the tightening must be sizeable and occur after a period of stress when the budget is quickly deteriorating and public debt is building up another interpretation emphasizes the supply side typically a fiscal consolidation based on tax increases is short lived to be long lasting it must include cuts in public employment transfers and government wages to be politically possible such a policy must be supported by trade unions these measures result in more efficient labour markets and boost the supply side based both on statistical evidence and on a detailed analysis of ten cases of major fiscal adjustment this article provides cautious support to the supply side view without denying a more limited role for the demand side channel alberto alesina and silvia ardagna

discussion of the influence of elections on the accounting choices of governmental entities kido petacchi and weber 2012 investigate whether the occurrence of a state gubernatorial election is important to understanding the accrual choices of preparers of the state s comprehensive annual financial report central to the authors argument is the idea that voters do not like budget deficits politicians in response have incentives to use accounting choices to mask deficits in the period before elections focusing on a specific accrual the changes in compensated absences liability the authors find evidence that the discretionary part of this accrual is smaller in the period before an election which is consistent with politicians attempting to improve the picture of the state s financial health in addition the authors show that accrual manipulation is positively associated with the vote share of incumbent governors in elections in my discussion i ask two questions 1 how strong are governors political incentives to manipulate accruals in the run up to elections 2 can the association between discretionary compensated absence accruals and elections be explained by forces other than politically motivated accounting manipulation i argue that the incentives to manipulate accruals might well be weak given strong disciplinary mechanisms that induce politicians to transparency what s more i document that elections might produce patterns in state employment as the compensated absences liability is linked to the payroll election induced changes in state employment might be reflected in this accrual evidence of an association between the compensated absences accrual and elections then does not necessarily imply that politicians manage accounting numbers to further illustrate this point i show empirically that gubernatorial elections have little explanatory power for state financial reporting choices that are unaffected by state employment jel classification h70 h72 m41

the political costs of taxes and government spending the marginal political costs of different types of taxes and government spending as well as voter preferences over different fiscal variables are examined using two different specifications for political cost one based on the probability of incumbent defeat and the other based on the incumbent s percentage of the vote models associated with these two specifications in which voting behaviour depends on disaggregated taxes and government expenditures are estimated using clata from canadian provincial elections the empirical results which indicate that different types of taxes and expenditures have quite different marginal political costs have important implications for models that incorporate voter pref erences

on government centralization and fiscal referendums abstract several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum this outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy it may also be caused by citizens fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature in this paper we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision making in the unique institutional setting of switzerland using a panel of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities

simultaneous decision making in competitive and cooperative environments we experimentally investigate simultaneous decision making in two contrasting environments a competitive environment a contest and a cooperative environment a voluntary contribution mechanism we find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism spills over to the contest decreasing sub optimal overbidding in the contest however contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the contest there is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and cooperative environments i e more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice versa this correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory

bread and the attrition of power economic events and german election results aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post war germany were determined by the weighted average growth of real per capita disposable income each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in germany no other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model however attrition of power reduced the vote share in election years 1961 1994 and 1998

do state balanced budget requirements matter testing two explanatory frameworks balanced budget requirements bbrs affect all aspects of financial operations previous studies relied on characterizations that highlight a constitutional statutory distinction hou and smith public budgeting finance 26 3 22 45 2006 instead propose a political technical construct this article uses probit estimation six measures of balance and long panels to test which framework offers more explanatory power the findings suggest that bbrs matter to varying degrees technical requirements exert bigger effects than political ones the effects are more obvious on narrower than broader measures of balance and in the later phases of the budget cycle and the political technical construct offers more explanatory power than the constitutional statutory distinction

sovereign risk premia the link between fiscal rules and stability culture abstract there is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy such as fiscal rules reduce sovereign risk premia nevertheless it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters in our analysis of european bond spreads before the financial crisis we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies these proxies refer to a country s past stability performance government characteristics and survey results related to general trust we find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules yet the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture

the line item veto and public sector budgets evidence from the states abstract the paper examines the claim that gubernatorial line item veto power reduces state spending analysis of a rich set of state budget data indicates that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto and that in the short run the item veto s potency is contingent upon the political setting in certain circumstances governors with political incentives to use an item veto alter spending and revenues in a statistically significant and quantitatively important fashion these results suggest that state budgets have not been importantly altered as a result of the existence of the line item veto and shed doubt on the use of the line item veto to reduce federal government spending

stages of diversification this paper studies the evolution of sectoral concentration in relation to the level of per capita income we show that various measures of sectoral concentration follow a u shaped pattern across a wide variety of data sources countries first diversify in the sense that economic activity is spread more equally across sectors but there exists relatively late in the development process a point at which they start specializing again we discuss this finding in light of existing theories of trade and growth which generally predict a monotonic relationship between income and diversification

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

learning in common value auctions some initial observations abstract inexperienced bidders in first price common value auctions suffer from a winner s curse losing money on average with experience bidders approximate the nash equilibrium the mechanisms underlying this adjustment are 1 a market selection effect as the most aggressive bidders are less likely to return for subsequent sessions and 2 players who lose money bid less experiential learning and those who would have lost money had they won the auction with the high bidder s signal bid less observational learning

the political economy of direct legislation direct democracy and local decision making local fiscal referenda the dampening effect on taxes and spending local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and given the decentralization trend in oecd nations this is likely to increase how should this spending be governed this article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision making at the state and local level to support this we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes the basic argument concerns voter control under representative democracy citizens only have direct control at election time with referenda and initiatives citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens preferences as a result fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences we empirically test this on swiss data since switzerland provides a natural laboratory for local governance the governance structures of swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels specifically we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 swiss cantons and 1990 data on 134 local communities it is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue and at the local level also on public debt combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens lars p feld and gebhard kirchgassner

equilibria in open common value auctions abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness of nash equilibrium in second price common value auctions is identified we establish that there exists a continuum of equilibria in irrevocable exit common value auctions for the case of two bidders we provide plausible sufficient conditions under which the expected seller revenue is maximized at the symmetric equilibrium an example in which the auctioneer s revenue at the symmetric equilibrium in a second price auction is strictly greater than the revenue at many asymmetric equilibria in the corresponding irrevocable exit auction is provided

lame ducks and local fiscal policy quasi experimental evidence from portugal i use the introduction of mayoral term limits in portugal to identify how an exogenous variation in eligibility for office affects policy decisions relying on a quasi experimental difference in differences approach i find that term limited incumbents pursue more conservative fiscal policies than those who are eligible for re election heterogeneous effects show that the treatment effects primarily reflect the behaviour of right leaning term limited incumbents results are in line with a model in which right leaning officeholders try to maintain a good reputation by pleasing an electorate prone to redistribution while they are eligible but adopt policies closer to their true preferences when term limited

cross game learning experimental evidence from first price and english common value auctions abstract experience in first price auctions improves performance in english auctions but experience in english auctions has no transfer value to first price auctions these results are discussed in terms of psychologists models of learning generalizability and the learning literature in economics

continuous ascending vs pooled multiple unit auctions abstract we examine a seldom studied multiple unit auction format known as a pooled auction we use both theory and economic experiments to compare the pooled auction to the continuous simultaneous ascending auction on the grounds of revenue and efficiency generation the results show that due to very aggressive bidding in the pooled auction it generates substantially more revenue than the ascending auction while achieving equivalent efficiency levels we then attempt to explain the overbidding in the pooled auction and find that neither risk nor loss aversion can explain it we present instead a model with an attentional bias that is related to models of probability underweighting and show that it can explain the data

revealed preferences for car tax cuts an empirical study of perceived fiscal incidence voting in an election in which elimination of the local car tax is the central issue shows how a highly visible universal tax cut can prevail in the electoral process even if benefits are skewed toward upper income households these results are consistent with positive models of fiscal structure choice in which fiscal systems are the consequence of support maximizing politicians attempting to supply net benefits to easily identifiable interest groups without generating significant opposition from other groups

long term evidence of retrospective voting a natural experiment from the german democratic republic abstract the paper investigates long lasting electoral punishment decades of communist socialization and the repressive rule of a single party have left their left wing fingerprint on east germany in this paper we show that voters act rationally given negative life circumstances experienced under the rule of the communist party they display retrospective voting even decades later our insight is based on the analysis of 19 years of revealed and stated party preferences we argue that life at the border region to west germany was particularly hard and find that east german voters who lived close to the inner german border before the reunification of the two states are 5 9 percentage points less likely to lean toward the successor party to east germany s communists given that over the years roughly every fifth person has revealed preferences for the communists in the east this translates to over thirty percent reduction we confirm the preferences with administrative data the electoral punishment estimated at the district level amounts to a reduction of 1 3 percentage points of votes for the party

independent and competing agencies an effective way to control government controlling government is a primary focus of the politico economic literature recently various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective most importantly balanced budget rules fiscal federalism and direct democracy however one type of institution has been neglected so far elected competitors to the government such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the swiss local level where finance commissions compete with the government in some parts of switzerland local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda which are then voted on by the citizens thus they become strong competitors to the government we econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 swiss cantons we find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures

export diversification what s behind the hump hy should export diversification be taken as a policy objective per se there are two reasons that it should not first according to ricardo countries should specialize not diversify second the heckscher ohlin model implies that export patterns are largely determined by endowments so if anything we should worry about factor accumulation not diversification yet export diversification is a constant preoccupation of policymakers in developing countries as de ferranti et al 2002 note a recurrent preoccupation of latin american policymakers is that their natural riches produce a highly concentrated structure of export revenues which then leads to economic volatility and lower growth p 38 the notion that export patterns are fully determined by endowments is of course naive the relationship of endowments trade and growth is a complex and imperfectly understood one intra industry trade models showed long ago that many factors other than endowments including market failures and policies can affect trade patterns more recently hausmann hwang and rodrik 2007 argued that export patterns can display path dependence in the presence of externalities

government subsidies and presidential election outcomes evidence for a developing country summary we explore the effects of government subsidies on presidential elections in chile in 1989 99 we use a panel with three periods the elections of 1989 1993 and 1999 and 229 counties we correct for the potential simultaneity problem deriving from the fact that an incumbent facing a difficult political scenario might react by increasing subsidies to improve his her electoral performance our results indicate that the greater the coverage of these types of programs i e the percentage of people receiving subsidies the higher the votes for the incumbent