instability in short run adjustments to purchasing power parity results for selected latin american countries according to the theory of purchasing power parity ppp there is a tendency toward equalization of different countries price levels in common currency terms however even assuming that a long run ppp relationship exists its relevance for policy makers in less developed countries ldcs will depend not only on the average speed of adjustment toward this relationship but also on the variability of such short run adjustments we present evidence of extreme volatility in adjustments toward ppp for four latin american countries based on time varying parameter estimates of error correction models

entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross market price constraints abstract we examine how universal service provisions and price restrictions across markets impact strategic entry and pricing we develop a simple multi market model with an oligopolistic profitable urban market and entry auctions for unprofitable rural service cross market price restrictions induce a firm operating in both markets to become a softer competitor thus placing the firm at a strategic disadvantage when we account for entry incentives and strategic bidding the downstream strategic disadvantage becomes advantageous leading to higher prices and profits price restrictions may also put outside firms even relatively inefficient ones at a strategic advantage

one switch utility functions and a measure of risk consider the relative attractiveness to a decision maker of two financial gambles as the wealth of that individual varies it may seem reasonable that either one alternative should be preferred for all wealth levels or that there exists a unique critical wealth level at which the decision maker switches from preferring one alternative to the other decreasing risk aversion is not sufficient for this property to hold we identify the small class of utility functions for which it does we show how the property leads naturally to a measure of risk the results of this paper apply equally well to discounting functions for cash flows one switch discount functions permit at most one change in preference between cash flows as all payoffs are deferred in time

the monetary approach to exchange rate determination under rational expectations the dollar deutschmark rate abstract this paper reformulates the monetary approach after ascertaining that a money demand function with a partial adjustment mechanism had more empirical support than a money demand function which assumed instantaneous stock adjustment the resulting exchange rate equation is estimated by two rational expectations techniques the parameter estimates are reasonable and are robust to the estimation technique used to different specifications of the driving processes and to changes in the estimation period the structural model outperforms the random walk model and its own unconstrained equivalent a pure time series equation in outof sample forecasts

divestment investment sanctions and disinvestment an evaluation of anti apartheid policy instruments pressure for divestment and mandatory disinvestment sanctions directed against south africa are an instance of domestic interest groups in one country seeking policy change in another the link from shareholder divestment to disinvestment by firms is tenuous however since south africa active firms do not seem to suffer as a consequence of divestment pressure and legislated sanctions are likely to have unpredictable and sometimes perverse effects on the extent of apartheid practices

forecasting foreign exchange rates with an intrinsically nonlinear dynamic speed of adjustment model forecasting foreign exchange rates is an important but difficult process therefore it is important to use a superior forecasting model the paper takes up this criterion and proposes to describe and forecast foreign exchange rates by developing an intrinsically nonlinear model with variable and dynamic speeds of adjustment it is found that the speed of adjusting the random or expected to the equilibrium rate is very slow implying that fiscal policy statistically insignificat and monetary policy statistically significant may be ineffective to induce changes in the adjustment speed we also find that the nonlinear dynamic model improves forecasting performance implying that nonlinearities in the sense of functional forms are exploitable for improved point forecasting of foreign exchange rates

modelling and forecasting exchange rates with a bayesian time varying coefficient model this paper employs a multivariate bayesian time varying coefficients tvc approach to model and forecast exchange rate data it is shown that if used as a data generating mechanism a tvc model induces nonlinearities in the conditional moments and leptokurtosis in the unconditional distribution of the series it is also shown that leptokurtic behavior disappears under time aggregation as a forecasting device a bayesian tvc model improves over a random walk model the improvements are robust to several changes in the forecasting environment

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

monetary fundamentals and exchange rate dynamics under different nominal regimes we investigate the dynamic relationship between the us dollar exchange rate and its fundamentals across different exchange rate regimes using data going back to the late 1800s or early 1900s for six industrialized countries for these countries there is evidence of a long run relation between the nominal exchange rate and monetary fundamentals consistent with conventional theories of exchange rate determination we employ a markov switching vector equilibrium correction model that allows for regime shifts in the entire set of parameters and the variance covariance matrix our results suggest that the relative importance of exchange rates and fundamentals in restoring the long run equilibrium level implied by the exchange rate monetary fundamentals model varies significantly over time and is affected by the nominal exchange rate regime in operation

allocating and funding universal service obligations in a competitive market abstract we examine in a network market open to competition various mechanisms for allocating and funding universal service obligations among agents rival firms and consumers the obligations we consider are geographic ubiquity and nondiscrimination we analyze from both the efficiency and equity point of views the respective advantages of a restricted entry system where the entrant is not allowed to serve high cost consumers and a pay or play system we show that pay or play regulation always dominates restricted entry regulation under ubiquity constraint alone this result no longer holds when the regulator imposes also the nondiscrimination constraint

world war ii as reflected on capital markets abstract historical events are reflected in asset prices we analyze government bond prices of five european countries traded on the swiss bourse during wwii apart from the official outbreak of wwii loss and gain of national sovereignty influenced the capital market

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

forecasting foreign exchange rates in developing economies we investigate the ability of a variety of exchange rate models to forecast parallel exchange rates for developing economies in contrast to earlier studies which use actual values of the exogenous variables we employ time series forecasts of the exogenous variables an error correction version of a monetary model proposed by us that incorporates the dynamics of both short run and long run adjustment processes outperforms all other models that have been suggested earlier

why democracies may actually be less reliable allies recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies this need not be the case alliances serve as commitment devices adding ex ante credibility to states claims about ex post behavior variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments put simply democracies are most improved by formal commitments we offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically we test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention rather than on the duration or the number of commitments our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies

exchange rates innovations and forecasting in this paper an ex post forecasting experiment is performed on the basis of a version of the news model of exchange rate determination for several exchange rates the news formulation of monetary exchange rate models leads to relatively accurate ex port exchange rate forecasts at a number of forecasting horizons for a majority of the exchange rates studied however the results do not compare favorably with those obtained from the naive random walk forecasting rule thus the findings in this article provide mixed evidence with regard to a suggestion in the literature that the finding by meese and rogoff that structural models do not even outperform the random walk in an ex post forecasting experiment may be due to the fact that these models were not properly tested in a news framework the forecasting performance of structural exchange rate models has recently received considerable attention meese and rogoff 1983a b have studied the forecasting performance of several important structural exchange rate models while in sample studies of these models usually show quite satisfactory fits meese and rogoff s out of sample results based on instrumental variables estimates were not very encouraging the structural models failed to improve upon the simple random walk forecasting rule even though the models forecasts were based

colluding victims a public choice analysis of international alliances analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility maximising actors large allies are exploited by small allies when output is a public good empirical analysis of defence expenditures in nato yields results consistent with the proposition that exploitation increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good but why would large countries acquiesce a public choice analysis offers a different perspective if producers of armaments are rent seeking are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure

a contextual uncertainty condition for behavior under risk suppose that your choice between uncertain financial prospects is made more difficult by two independent contextual uncertainties concerning the size of your existing wealth one contextual uncertainty has a greater spread than the other if you could resolve one of these contextual uncertainties before making your choice would you rather it be the larger or the smaller in this paper we explore the intuitive notion that it ought to be more advantageous to resolve larger rather than smaller contextual uncertainties the utility function for wealth uw aw be cwa b c 0 is the only utility function that satisfies this condition and that is also increasing and risk averse at all wealth levels

sanctions on south africa what did they do this paper considers the economic sanctions that were applied in the mid 1980s to pressure the south african government to end apartheid it asks what role those sanctions played in the eventual demise of the apartheid regime and concludes that the role was probably very small an alternative explanation for the regime change is offered the communist bloc combined to bring about the change if one is to argue for the efficacy of sanctions two key obstacles are their limited economic impact and the substantial lag between the imposition of sanctions and the political change since sanctions preceded the change of government it is impossible to rule them out as a determinant however their principal effect was probably psychological the implication is that the south african case should not serve as the lone major instance of effective sanctions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a standard measure of risk and risk value models in this paper we propose a standard measure of risk that is based on the converted expected utility of normalized lotteries with zero expected values this measure of risk has many desirable properties that characterize the notion of risk it is very general and includes many previously proposed measures of risk as special cases moreover our standard measure of risk provides a preference based and unified method for risk studies since the standard measure of risk is compatible with the measure of expected utility it can be used explicitly or implicitly in an expected utility model under a condition called risk independence a decision could be made by explicitly trading off between risk and value which offers an alternative representation of the expected utility model named the standard risk value model finally we discuss some other applications of the standard measure of risk and extensions of our risk value tradeoff framework for descriptive decision making

racial discrimination dualistic labor markets and foreign investment abstract this paper presents a model of racial discrimination in a stylized two sector dual economy model with direct foreign investment racial discrimination is analyzed both in terms of preferences and in terms of regulations that favor one ethnic group at the expense of another the focus is on the gains to white labor that accrue from restrictions on employment of black labor both in a closed economy and in one open to direct foreign investment

two moment decision models and expected utility maximization two moment decision models are consistent with expected utility maximization only if the choice set or the agent s preferences are restricted this paper identifies a restriction which is sufficient to ensure this consistency and confirms that it holds in many economic models the implications for economic analysis are then derived two different approaches to representing an agent s preferences over strategies yielding random payoffs are in wide use under the mean standard deviation ms approach the agent is assumed to rank the alternatives according to the value of some function defined over the first two moments of the random payoff while the expected utility eu criterion assumes that the expected value of some utility function defined over payoffs is used instead the fact that there are these two competing approaches has generated a considerable literature some authors are concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of each while others deal with conditions under which the potentially different approaches would yield the same results or at least approximately so space does not

time varying parameters and the out of sample forecasting performance of structural exchange rate models varying parameter estimation techniques based on recursive application of the kalman filter are used to improve the predictive performance of a class of monetary exchange rate models i find that allowing estimated parameters to vary over time enhances the models forecasting performance for the dollar pound dollar mark and dollar yen exchange rates contrary to earlier results in the literature ex post forecasts for the dollar mark rate compare favorably with those obtained from the naive random walk forecasting rule

equity justifications for universal service obligations abstract equity is often invoked as a possible justification for the imposition of universal service obligations usos however no previous analysis supports a formal link between equity and uso in this paper we describe the extent to which the imposition of usos in oligopolistic network industries can meet the objectives of an inequality averse regulator we show that usos can be used for equity purposes provided that the regulator is able to control the competitive structure of the industry we also show that the uniform pricing constraint which is an obligation to offer the same price conditions to all consumers is welfare enhancing but rather surprisingly it does not necessarily improve equity

returns policy new model introduction and consumer welfare abstract this paper investigates how economic outcomes differ for new model introduction between two extreme contracts outright sales contract and returns policy contract with full credit under the outright sales contract we show that the retailer s incentive to introduce a new model can lead to a reduction of consumer welfare when the retailer is moderately risk averse the primary conclusion from this study is that the returns policy contract resolves this conflict between firms and consumers and that the supply chain introduces the new model only when consumer surplus from the new model is higher than that from the old model

skimming the other s cream competitive effects of an asymmetric universal service obligation abstract we consider a common situation in energy markets an incumbent firm provides an essential good under ubiquity and uniform pricing requirements while competing in two part tariffs with an entrant providing a non essential substitute we find that consumers captivity to the essential good allows the incumbent to partly appropriate the surplus brought to the economy by the entrant surprisingly the ubiquity requirement induces more aggressive pricing by the incumbent below marginal cost and reduced entry despite cream skimming by the entrant far from being a burden universal service obligations might thus confer strategic advantages to incumbents

foreign exchange market interventions and the exchange rate in the long run this article examines whether foreign exchange market interventions conducted by the bank of japan are important for the dollar yen exchange rate in the long run we rely on a re examination of the empirical performance of a monetary exchange rate model this is basically not a new topic however we focus on two new questions first does the consideration of periods of massive interventions in the foreign exchange market uncover a potential long run relationship between the exchange rate and its fundamentals second do forex interventions support the adjustment towards a long run equilibrium value our results suggest that taking periods of interventions into account within a monetary model does improve the goodness of fit of an identified long run relationship to a significant degree furthermore forex interventions increase the speed of adjustment towards long run equilibrium in some periods particularly in periods of coordinated forex interventions our results indicate that only coordinated inter

risk value models restrictions and applications abstract sarin and weber european journal of operational research 70 1993 135 and others have argued for the expression of preferences under risk by the use of risk value models which have the intuitively appealing property that absence of certainty enters the decision maker s preference function only through a well defined risk argument the present paper proposes axioms which should be satisfied by any such model and explores the restrictions that the axioms place on the preference function implications for absolute and relative risk aversion are considered and the usefulness of the approach is demonstrated with applications to portfolio theory and the theory of the firm

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

theocracy and resilience against economic sanctions abstract this paper provides a simply theory to explain the impact of sanctions on a regime s policies and behavior sanctions are generally put to strip the target country from its available rents and weaken the government s stance against growing discontent in the population we show however that sanctions may give legitimacy to an incumbent government by influencing the optimal level of religious ideology provided by the state and further stabilizing its grip to power and rents while in a good state of nature sanctions build resilience as long as religious ideology among the population is strong at bad times they compel the target country to move towards ideological moderation in a world of asymmetric information the target country always finds it optimal to send a signal that truly represents the prevailing state of nature in order to induce learning and reach a win win outcome

sanctions in networks the most unkindest cut of all the extensive literature on sanctions has mainly focused on a dyadic interaction between sender and target in contrast this paper examines sanctions when the sender and target are embedded in a network of linkages to other agents the sender can assemble a sanctioning coalition of neighbors to sever their links execute multi link cuts to the target and her allies efficacy of sanctions is now crucially dependent on the network architecture we characterize the structural properties of networks in which a sender can effectively sanction a target in the short run when links can only be deleted and the long run when links can be both deleted and added

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

exchange rate predictability the main goal of this article is to provide an answer to the question does anything forecast exchange rates and if so which variables it is well known that exchange rate fluctuations are very difficult to predict using economic models and that a random walk forecasts exchange rates better than any economic model the meese and rogoff puzzle however the recent literature has identified a series of fundamentals methodologies that claim to have resolved the puzzle this article provides a critical review of the recent literature on exchange rate forecasting and illustrates the new methodologies and fundamentals that have been recently proposed in an up to date thorough empirical analysis overall our analysis of the literature and the data suggests that the answer to the question are exchange rates predictable is it depends on the choice of predictor forecast horizon sample period model and forecast evaluation method predictability is most apparent when one or more of the following hold the predictors are taylor rule or net foreign assets the model is linear and a small number of parameters are estimated the toughest benchmark is the random walk without drift

on the short term predictability of exchange rates a bvar time varying parameters approach abstract in this paper we propose a bayesian vector autoregressive model with time varying parameters bvar tvp to examine the short term predictability of exchange rates an important contribution of the paper is the application of the bvar tvp model for the first time to daily data using information from financial markets another contribution is the production of forecasts in real time at the very short horizon of one trading day ahead typically used by traders and investors in financial markets we employ financial criteria and recently developed statistical tests to assess the exchange rate predictability we find that the bvar tvp model outperforms the random walk for all exchange rates these forecast gains are due primarily to the time variation of coefficients and secondly to information from other financial markets it is shown that international investors could have made statistically significant excess profits if they had followed an inter day trading strategy based on the buy sell signals generated by the model s one day ahead exchange rate forecasts even after allowing for transaction costs and risk factors

exchange rates and import prices in the united states a varying parameter estimation of exchange rate pass through this article estimates the import price function in the united states using a varying parameter model the results show that the short run nonoil import price changes have become relatively less responsive to exchange rate changes than to foreign cost changes since the generalized floating began in the early 1970s concomitantly the markup has varied significantly falling when the dollar fell and rising when it rose thus pricing to market is confirmed even for overall u s imports

on smart sanctions abstract we construct a game theoretic model of an oligarchic economy that potentially could be targeted by smart international sanctions oligarchs in this economy provide support for their leader a strong man and potentially an autocrat in return for favors that results in having income higher than the average income in the country we derive the conditions under which smart sanctions lead to compliance by the target country moreover we draw some comparison between the effectiveness of smart and dumb sanctions for these economies

distinguishing characteristics of degrees of success and failure in economic sanctions episodes this paper uses 104 episodes from the hufbauer et al 1985 1990 dataset to examine the correlates of classes of outcomes of economic sanctions the parsimonious equations presented identify the characteristics of sanctions episodes conducive to success rather than marginal success and the characteristics productive of failure rather than marginal failure failure is most likely if there is significant third party assistance to the target and if the pre existing trade linkage between sender and target is small success is most easily achieved when the objective is not classified as modest and when pre sanction relations between sender and target are cordial or neutral the equations presented overcome data and methodological flaws of earlier studies exhibit reasonable predictive accuracy and satisfy a battery of tests of statistical significance hypothesized coefficient sign goodness of fit high likelihood and informational efficiency

efficiency of uniform pricing in universal service obligations we provide an efficiency justification for the imposition of the uniform pricing constraint in universal service obligations uso where uso are defined as a set of constraints imposed on firms belonging to a network industry in addition to the uniform pricing up constraint which is an obligation to serve all consumers at an identical price constraints considered are the coverage constraint cc which is an obligation imposed on one of the firms to serve a given segment of the market and the license constraint lc which is a minimum or a maximum coverage restriction that is imposed on entrants we show that adding the up constraint to both a cc and a lc leads to an increase in welfare our contribution comes from the full recognition of the role of a lc in well designed uso and we illustrate this role with the particular case of linear demand

when are sanctions effective a bargaining and enforcement framework although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms using a game theoretic model we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders we demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms competitiveness the model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender s firm retains a moderate share of the target s market relative to its foreign competitors however the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success the empirical implications of the model are tested using the threat and imposition of economic sanctions ties data set

the hidden hand of economic coercion why do policymakers consistently employ economic sanctions even though scholars consider them an ineffective tool of statecraft game theoretic models of economic coercion suggest the success rate may be understated because of selection effects when the targeted country prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions the bulk of successful coercion episodes should therefore end with sanctions threatened but not imposed this contradicts the recent literature on sanctions which assumes that sanctions rarely if ever work at generating significant concessions from the targeted country and are imposed for domestic or symbolic political reasons if the game theoretic argument is correct the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented a statistical analysis of data on sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals strongly supports the gametheoretic argument these results suggest that the significance of economic coercion has been undervalued in the study of statecraft and international relations more generally

the effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local firms i present a game theoretic model of competition between a national firm and local firms in which the introduction of most favored customer clauses into the sales contracts of the national firm decreases all industry prices the reason is that the price restriction makes the national firm a weak price competitor in each local market this produces a prisoners dilemma situation in which each local firm has the unilateral incentive to be more aggressive in nonprice decisions this increase in nonprice competition by all local firms causes prices to fall across the industry

further evidence on exchange rate expectations abstract this paper considers a previously unexploited survey data set of exchange rate expectations which allows us to focus on differences between ems and dollar exchange rates we corroborate the earlier finding in the literature that exchange rate forecasts are not rational and that agents do not use all available information efficiently although extrapolative and adaptive expectations formation mechanisms describe non ems exchange rate expectations to a certain extent ems exchange rates forecasts seem to follow long run fundamentals more closely and would suggest that agents believe that ems exchange rate expectations undershoot their long run equilibrium values jel f31

some linear and nonlinear thoughts on exchange rates abstract after discussing the inconclusive results of linear structural models as applied to exchange rates this paper assesses the possibilities of using a particular form of nonlinear estimation called alternating conditional expectations as i a diagnostic tool and ii a forecasting method it contrasts the forecast performance of various linear in levels in differences error correction and nonlinear in levels in differences specifications of a sticky price monetary model augmented by a relative wealth variable the diagnostic results are as follows the optimal transformations are almost always nonlinear and often nonmonotonic forecasting results in sample and out of sample nonlinear forecasts yield substantial improvements over a random walk however in exercises with forecasts from rolling regressions the random walk specification still dominates over one quarter forecast horizons albeit only marginally and insignificantly so nonlinear specifications do slightly better than linear competitors at four quarter horizons

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

sanctions and civil conflict using a formal general equilibrium framework this paper analyses how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict it is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries moreover sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance the likelihood of success rises as this income increases

exchange rate evidence on the effectiveness of united nations policy this paper analyzes the effectiveness of international interventions through their impact on exchange rates if a specific intervention actually increases decreases a country s economic and political stability then its currency should appreciate depreciate estimates suggest that peacekeeping forces in lebanon caused long run appreciations while economic sanctions imposed upon south africa only caused temporary depreciations in both cases repeated u n resolutions condemning or demanding actions that were not backed by actual interventions did not cause changes in the exchange rate the results in this paper are supportive of predictions from the public choice approach applied to international organizations and policies

combining rent seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas economists continuing criticisms of protectionism make a valuable contribution to the general interest element of the forces which operate to keep propensities to protect somewhat in check mckenzie rightly warns however that proposals by economists for giving protection in more efficient forms run the danger of increasing the total supply of protection thus we agree that serious consideration should be given to the political economy responses which may be induced before one advocates ways of doing more efficiently what one believes should not be done in the first place it does not follow however that all such policies will have net negative unanticipated consequences in the case of tariffs versus quotas we do not believe that we have yet sufficient knowledge of all of the relevant political economy considerations to predict about the full effects of legislation which allowed trade protection to only take the form of tariffs we are doubtful however that such a measure would increase the total quantity of protection through the channels outlined by mckenzie we believe that the same type of basic public choice analysis of the individual incentives to lobby which suggests that consumer taxpayers will not force the political process to operate so as to maximize aggregate economic efficiency with respect to the level of protection also suggests that the net lobbying for quotas is likely to be higher on average than the net lobbying for tariffs political effectiveness and ability to overcome free riding on the part of tariff revenue seekers is likely to be low at the margin furthermore issues of visibility and institutional structure are likely to lessen the ability of anti protection forces to lobby against quotas placed within a broader framework public choice and rent seeking theory is consistent with the empirical evidence that where quotas are used protection is high

the theory of international economic sanctions a public choice approach comment william kaempfer and anton lowenberg in this review september 1988 have developed an engaging model of the sanctions process grounded in public choice they identify potentially influential private forces that might affect the nature of a sanctions package while the spirit of their effort is laudable the model fails to incorporate some absolutely essential information about the legal institutional and strategic framework in which sanctions decisions are made as a consequence they reach a conclusion that flies in the face of existing facts contrary to what is suggested by kaempfer and lowenberg kl and contrary to the implications of their model the evidence clearly indicates there is an unequivocal bias against the use of import restrictions in favor of export controls the recent history of economic sanctions shows that only somewhat more than one third of sanction episodes involved both export and import controls further gary hufbauer and jeffrey schott 1985 observe that in instances where only one or the other is invoked export controls are almost always preferred to restrictions on imports 2 an almost exclusive reliance on export controls in economic foreign policy measures is particularly evident in the actions of the united states in the 1970s 3 the purpose of this comment is to explore the causes of this asymmetry there are at least three reasons why export controls have been favored over import controls reasons that play no part in the kl model first the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt has institutionalized a bias against import barriers in favor of export controls second in the united states domestic legal constraints favor export controls and discourage import controls third as will be argued export controls are more easily reversed than import controls and reversibility is a desirable component in any foreign policy based trade intervention consider these points in turn in the 1946 1948 period during which time the gatt was first negotiated trade barriers were identified most often with those artificial impediments to trade that restrict foreign access to domestic markets especially tariffs for this reason gatt rules and actions have sought primarily to dismantle import barriers john jackson 1969 p 502 notes that despite the fact that extensive export controls do exist there has been only one complaint with respect to such controls reflected in gatt documents this is the czechoslovakian complaint against the united states in 1949 for the imposition of discriminatory export controls 4 jackson p 502 observes that there is very little if any effective gatt policing of export control policy and he comments later p 539 that insofar as any gatt obligations can be avoided without consequences this avoidance operates in effect as an exception this suggests that those foreign policy export controls that are pro department of economics university of arizona tucson az 85721 i thank alan deardorff bernard hoekman and robert stem for helpful discussions on work related to this note my thanks also to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments see p 28 and tables 4 1 4 5 pp 70 77 hufbauer and schott 1985 2ibid p 28 3see for example richard cooper 1987 pp 301 302 and p 305 and kenneth abbott 1981 p 741 4this is confirmed more recently by barry carter 1988 p 97 the only other event involving export restrictions challenged before the gatt was the u s embargo against nicaragua in 1985 which involved both import and export restrictions

the out of sample forecasting performance of exchange rate models when coefficients are allowed to change abstract this study examines the out of sample forecasting performance of models of exchange rate determination without imposing the restriction that coefficients are fixed over time both fixed and variable coefficient versions of conventional structural models are considered with and without a lagged dependent variable while our results on fixed coefficient models support most of the meese and rogoff conclusions we find that when coefficients are allowed to change an important subset of conventional models of the dollar pound the dollar deutsche mark and the dollar yen exchange rates can outperform forecasts of a random walk model the structural models considered are the flexible price frenkel bilson and sticky price dornbusch frankel monetary models and a sticky price model which includes the current account hooper morton

wars and markets how bond values reflect the second world war historical events are reflected in asset prices based on a unique data set we analyse government bond prices of germany and austria traded on the swiss bourse during the second world war some war events generally considered crucial are clearly reflected in government bond prices this holds in particular for the official outbreak of the war and the loss and gain of national sovereignty other events to which historians attach great importance are not reflected in bond prices most prominently germany s capitulation in 1945 the analysis of financial markets provides a fruitful method for evaluating the importance contemporaries attached to historical events

price discrimination competition and regulation this paper analyzes some effects of price discrimination policy in a model where a dominant incumbent firm faces an endogenous degree of competition in one of its two markets banning price discrimination tends to encourage more entry which is desirable if the entrant is as efficient as the incumbent but has ambiguous welfare effects more generally prices in both markets might fall price discrimination policy under different forms of price regulation is also examined if the incumbent s average price level is regulated then allowing price discrimination can lead to pricing below marginal cost with possible anticompetitive consequences

bilateral exchange rates and risk premia abstract the paper develops a theoretical model of the risk premium in a bilateral exchange rate representative agents in both countries are assumed to hold open positions in foreign exchange together with risky assets denominated in their own currencies also past surpluses in the current account of the balance of payments lead to net foreign asset positions which may partially be covered in the forward markets our two period mean variance model for optimizing investors is combined with standard assumption about the behavior of real exchange rates to give a reduced form equation for the discrepancies between spot rates and lagged forward rates the model is tested for the dollar dm dollar sterling and dollar yen exchange rates using monthly data for the period 1976 86 the null hypothesis of no risk premium is rejected for each of the currencies reported

a risk return model with risk and return measured as deviations from a target return two attribute risk and return models are very popular in the economics and finance literature for analyzing decisions under uncertainty their popularity stems primarily from the intuitive appeal of the dichotomy into risk and return and from the ease with which the concepts can be diagrammed in two dimensions the most commonly used risk return model is the mean variance model in which risk is measured as the variance and return by the mean of the probability distribution over outcomes the mean variance model has a number of shortcomings which are widely known but of particular concern here are the facts that 1 mean variance dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient for second degree stochastic dominance 2 unless the form of the probability distribution is restricted mean variance is consistent with von neumann morgenstern utility theory only if the utility function is quadratic and 3 as peter fishburn has noted

using threshold models to explain international relations the outcome of political opposition or revolution is a public good which suggests that free riding will diminish the effectiveness of these forms of collective action the private gains from contributing to collective goals are increased however if individuals place some value on ideological conformity or group identity nevertheless some external stimulus is often needed to set in motion a tendency toward social motivation that is strong enough to outweigh the free rider incentive this paper investigates the extent to which international pressure and demonstration effects can serve to signal support for the objectives of domestic groups in a target country and thereby mobilize collective action in pursuit of their goals it is of interest to know not only the extent to which inherent barriers to effective collective action are overcome by outside support but also to show how foreign economic policy can have an impact on political processes in the target country even when that policy itself has minimal economic effects

mean risk analysis with enhanced behavioral content abstract we study a mean risk model derived from a behavioral theory of disappointment with multiple reference points one distinguishing feature of the risk measure is that it is based on mutual deviations of outcomes not deviations from a specific target we prove necessary and sufficient conditions for strict first and second order stochastic dominance and show that the model is in addition a convex risk measure the model allows for richer and behaviorally more plausible risk preference patterns than competing models with equal degrees of freedom including expected utility eu mean variance m v mean gini m g and models based on non additive probability weighting such as dual theory dt in asset allocation the model allows a decision maker to abstain from diversifying in a positive expected value risky asset if its performance does not meet a certain threshold and gradually invest beyond this threshold which appears more acceptable than the extreme solutions provided by either eu and m v always diversify or dt and m g always plunge in asset trading the model provides no trade intervals like dt and m g in some but not all situations an illustrative application to portfolio selection is presented the model can provide an improved criterion for mean risk analysis by injecting a new level of behavioral realism and flexibility while maintaining key normative properties

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public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed