inheritance law and investment in family firms entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs the size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers using a purpose built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10 004 firms from 38 countries in 1990 2006 we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms but does not affect investment in nonfamily firms moreover as the model predicts inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession jel g31 g32

law enforcement and transition abstract we present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality we analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem a first mechanism which we call dualism follows the scenario of chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non state sector follows market rules the second mechanism we put forward is accession to the european union we show that accession to the european union even without external borrowing provides a mechanism to eliminate the bad equilibrium provided the accessing country is small enough relative to the european union interestingly we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession

legal protection corruption and private equity returns in asia this article examines how private equity returns in asia are related to levels of legal protection and corruption we utilize a unique data set comprising over 750 returns to private equity transactions across 20 developing and developed countries in asia the data indicate that legal protections are an important determinant of private equity returns in asia but also that private equity managers are able to mitigate the potential for corruption the quality of legal system including legal protections is positively related to returns inefficient legal protections negatively impact transaction structures and economic certainty when exiting investments we also find that private equity managers irrespective of the quality of legal system they are operating within can mitigate the potential impact of corruption private equity returns are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption controlling for legal systems this finding is consistent with the view that private equity managers bring about organizational change to alleviate the costs of corruption our findings are robust to inclusion of controls for hofstede cultural variables economic conditions and transaction specific characteristics as well as consideration of econometric sample selection methods for unexited investments

finance and property rights exploring other directions there is a consensus that stronger property rights advance financial development we provide evidence that the reverse hypothesis is also true we isolate the structural component in the finance property rights relationship using an instrument for financial development private credit based on an index of exposure to foreign crises in addition to generalized method of moments approaches for panel data our results suggest a one standard deviation increase in private credit from its average in 2005 translates into a 0 5 to 1 0 point increase in property rights to contextualize this the difference in property rights between israel and uruguay two countries separated by about one standard deviation in the volume of private credit was 0 67 points

temporary stabilization a stochastic analysis abstract this paper develops a stochastic model of exchange rate based inflation stabilization in which agents have expectations of devaluation driven by a mixed diffusion jump process in a richer stochastic environment where a brownian motion drives the rate of devaluation and a poisson process determines the probability of devaluation we examine consumption and wealth equilibrium dynamics when a stabilization plan is implemented and contingent claims markets are unavailable we also assess the effects of exogenous shocks on consumption and welfare finally we use the proposed model to carry out a simulation experiment of the equilibrium dynamics

the value of marriage to family firms this paper presents the first empirical evidence showing that the marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations the results based on a uniquely comprehensive data set from thailand show that the family firm s stock price increases when the partner is from either a prominent business or a political family abnormal returns tend to be higher for firms whose operation depends on extensive networks in contrast marriages to ordinary citizens are not associated with any abnormal returns these findings are generally supportive of the value of networks in general and marriage in particular

a model of currency depreciation and the debt inflation spiral abstract this paper shows how a government that cannot make credible policy commitments might manage its exchange rate and fiscal stance in a world of rational expectations the dynamic game model developed here potentially can generate diverse patterns of macroeconomic behavior patterns that differ as a result of assumed differences in government objectives under some types of government the ongoing strategic interaction between the public and private sectors leads to a disinflationary outcome other governments may push the economy into a spiral of rising debt and inflation

do informal institutions matter for technological change in russia the impact of communist norms and conventions 1998 2004 summary we explore the impact of informal institutions on technological change in transition comparing the 89 regions of the russian federation we use panel data during the period of recovery and growth 1998 2004 the one country framework provides a constant background unlike for example in cross country studies against which variance in institution building may be observed property rights reform ranged from full enforcement in the northwest to blocking in communist regions in the southeast we find an unambiguous relationship between early strong reform and technological change in our model the quality of informal institutions is proxied by investment risk expertra regions rating agency

fiscal policy in a simple two country dynamic model abstract this paper analyzes the national and international effects of labor and capital income taxes in a two country infinite horizon perfect foresight neoclassical model with endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation two polar regimes of capital income taxation are considered the source based and the residence based the qualitative effects of labor income taxes are shown to be independent of the taxation regime whereas the effects of capital income taxes are not

institutional determinants of capital structure adjustment speeds abstract many authors relate a firm s performance to legal and political features and the regulatory environment in which it operates this article compares firms capital structure adjustments across countries and investigates whether institutional differences help explain the variance in estimated adjustment speeds we find that legal and financial traditions significantly correlate with firm adjustment speeds more narrowly institutional features also relate to adjustment speeds consistent with the hypothesis that better institutions lower the transaction costs associated with adjusting a firm s leverage such associations between institutional arrangements and leverage adjustment speeds are consistent with the dynamic trade off theory of capital structure choice

do venture capital firms benefit from international syndicates this paper examines the benefits of syndicating with foreign venture capital vc firms for domestic vc firms in emerging markets we find that the vc firms that are domestic to their invested companies and previously syndicated with foreign partners invest proportionately more frequently in riskier ventures after gaining syndication experience with foreign vc firms a larger number of their portfolio companies are successfully exited thereby suggesting improved performance we hypothesize that this outcome is due to the organizational learning effects while the previous research has shown benefits for foreign vc firms our results show that domestic vc firms also benefit from international syndication through improved investments

the rationale of the mean standard deviation analysis skewness preference and the demand for money publisher summary this chapter discusses the rationale of the mean standard deviation analysis skewness preference and the demand for money in january 1969 issue of the review of economic studies karl borch and martin feldstein separately criticized the widely used mean variance analysis of portfolio selection borch contended that any system of upward sloping mean standard deviation e s indifference curves can be shown to be inconsistent with the basic axiom of choice under uncertainty he pointed out that one can always pick any two points on an upward sloping indifference curve to represent two bernoulli distributions with probability 1 p of gaining the same amount x in both the cases and probability p of gaining y1 in the case of one distribution and y2 in the case of the second distribution with y2 y1 if the second distribution represents the point to the northeast of the other point then by the dominance axiom the second distribution must be preferred to the first which contradicts the basic meaning of indifference curves feldstein by using a log utility function and a lognormal distribution for investment outcome showed that e s indifference curves for a risk averter need not be convex downwards though upward sloping they would change from convex to concave once the standard deviation of the outcome exceeds the mean multiplied by on the face of it this seems to suggest that risk aversion might decrease as risk is increased beyond a certain extent

adjustment costs durables and aggregate consumption abstract previous tests of the permanent income hypothesis pih have focused on either non durables or durables expenditures in isolation this paper studies consumer purchases of non durables and durables as the outcome of a single optimization problem it is shown that with non separability in utility the presence of adjustment costs of changing durables stocks may affect the time series properties of both components of expenditure an econometric test of the pih based on the model developed in the paper is both more efficient and less prone to bias than those in some previous studies however this test confirms earlier rejections of the pih in aggregate quarterly data

choice of varieties by sri lanka rice farmers comparing alternative decision models sri lanka rice farmers are faced with a choice between traditional and high yielding rice varieties three risky choice models are compared to explain producer behavior forty farmers with typically small rice areas were studied choice criteria compared were multiple two attribute utility maximization single profit attribute utility maximization and expected profit maximization expected utility maximization performed better than expected profit maximization single attribute utility maximization outperformed the more complex multiattribute utility model the importance of careful elicitation of subjective probability distributions is emphasized rice farmers appear to allocate their land between available technologies in an economically rational way

spatial spillovers in the development of institutions abstract we examine spatial spillovers in institutional development dependent variables are institutional measures reflecting politics law and governmental administration the explanatory variable of interest is the level of institutions in bordering countries a spatial lag of the dependent variable our spatial model directly leads to the identification strategy for the endogenous spatial lag we implement new results in spatial econometrics to counter missing data problems usually rife in spatial empirics spatial institutional spillovers are statistically significant and economically important a counter factual exercise the non existence of the ussr reveals large direct and indirect spillovers numerous robustness exercises bolster conclusions including yearly cross section regressions fixed effects estimates and adding many extra explanatory variables moreover we provide a new theoretical result showing the robustness of estimates in the presence of omitted variables we extend the core model allowing different effects for better and worse neighbors using inverse distance weights estimating the spatial durbin model and using polity s institutional measure

simplified risk analysis in agricultural extension abstract attention is given to the major methods of assessing risk in order to make choices the literature frequently reports studies on mean variance e v analysis and stochastic dominance rules both of these methods are compared in an agricultural application with the approach outlined by hanoch and levy the empirical results suggests that hanoch and levy s criterion appear to reduce the size of the risk efficient set and that the sets of recommendations from the methods under comparison were consistent the two recommendations generated by hanoch and levy s rule were found to be reasonable for this particular decision process

on exchange rate stabilization abstract this paper extends calvo s 1986 and obstfeld s 1985 analyses of stabilization policies through predetermined exchange rates in a few directions the graphic and analytical techniques used here make it possible to perform a variety of policy experiments under a general utility function and in the presence of a consumer durable good or under time nonseparable preferences it also shows that the dynamic process of exchange rate stabilization exhibits hysteresis effects that is the steady state behavior of the economy depends on the initial condition and a temporary stabilization policy has a permanent effect on the economy

establishing local government in fragile states experimental evidence from afghanistan international and domestic policy makers often promote elections to establish village government in fragile states however two additional options are available in such countries formalization of self governing village councils and formalization of community development councils cdcs we designed a survey experiment in afghanistan that compares the consequences of elections to establish village councils to each alternative we find that elections and to a lesser extent formalization of cdcs improve support for democracy while formalization of customary councils improves support for reconciliation with the taliban moreover the consequences of transplanting elections are contingent on social norms and institutions supportive of democracy

incentives to provide local public goods fiscal federalism russian style abstract based on a unique data set on russian city budgets this paper shows that revenue sharing between regional and local governments provides local governments with no incentive to increase tax base or provide public goods any change in local government s own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues this leads to governmental over regulation of private businesses it is shown that fiscal incentives are a determinant of the formation of private business and the efficiency of public goods provision the russian federalism is compared to the chinese federalism where fiscal incentives reputedly are stronger in many provinces

too many mothers in law abstract developing countries with low tax capacity may rely on predation to finance government functions government predation in turn is often accused of imposing a choking effect on state owned enterprises soes contributing to the latter s poor performance we formalize this choking effect as a problem of inefficient predation that arises from time inconsistency and show that having multiple government bodies supervising the same soe may mitigate this problem our theory provides an efficiency rationale for the chinese style of decentralization before 1978 and challenges the wisdom of china s recent enterprise reform that attempted to consolidate supervisory power

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

bribery inefficiency and bureaucratic delay abstract we examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy the presence of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants consequently efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses or may never receive licenses as inefficient applicants are serviced ahead of them an increase in the proportion of honest officials while directly increasing the incidence of socially optimal decisions can also induce greater inefficiencies misallocation and delay from corrupt officials as a result social welfare may be non monotonic in the proportion of honest officials and small differences in monitoring costs may lead to very different levels of corruption competition between officials can hurt efficiency its desirability depends on the prevalence of applicants ability to pay bribes

is financial globalization beneficial this lecture examines whether financial globalization is beneficial to developing countries by first examining the evidence on financial development and economic growth and concludes that financial development is indeed a key element in promoting economic growth it then asks why if financial development is so beneficial it often does not occur it then goes on to examine whether globalization particularly of the financial kind can help encourage financial and economic development and argues that it can however financial globalization does not always work to encourage economic development because it often leads to devastating financial crises the issue is thus not whether financial globalization is inherently good or bad but whether it can be done right

legal institutions political economy and development this article reviews some of the recent literature on the relationship between the legal system and economic development we also look at the historical socio cultural and political factors that explain the differences in the characteristics of legal systems across countries and thus affect the link between the legal environment and economic outcomes although the field of law and economics of developing countries is still in its youth it is growing rapidly and is a fertile ground for exciting new findings both theoretical and empirical further progress in this field is likely to come from the studies of the elements of the legal system other than the substantive law enforcement and dispute resolution and should move beyond specific analyses of the impact of particular success or failure stories towards more general analyses of the determinants and outcomes of successful legal institutions

residential investment and the current account abstract residential investment is an important driving force in the current account this paper first builds the model to show that residential investment for the empirically relevant case where demand for housing services has nonzero income elasticity is fundamentally different from nonresidential investment owing to this income effect the dynamics of housing are subject to the additional integral constraint as well as the standard stock adjustment and euler equations the model is used to examine the effects of changes in government purchases on the tradeable good housing subsidies and productivity shocks on the current account

the antidirector rights index revisited the antidirector rights index has been used as a measure of shareholder protection in over a hundred articles since it was introduced by la porta et al law and finance 1998 journal of political economy 106 1113 55 a thorough reexamination of the legal data however leads to corrections for thirty three of the forty six countries analyzed the correlation between corrected and original values is only 0 53 consequently many empirical results established using the original index may not be replicable with corrected values in particular the corrected index fails to support three widely influential claims that shareholder protection is higher in common than in civil law countries that shareholder protection predicts stock market size or ownership dispersion and that weak corporate governance explains the extent of exchange rate depreciation during the asian financial crisis of 1997 1998 the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

the role of corruption culture and law in investment fund manager fees this article considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity funds to assess the role of law corruption and culture in setting fund manager fees with better legal conditions fixed fees are lower carried interest fees are higher clawbacks are less likely and share distributions are more likely countries with lower levels of corruption have lower fixed fees and higher performance fees and are less likely to have clawbacks and cash only distributions hofstede s measure of power distance is negatively related to fixed fees and the use of cash only distributions but positively related to performance fees and clawbacks overall the data strongly indicate that corruption culture and legal settings are much more significant in determining fees than fund manager characteristics and or market conditions

portfolio preferences of foreign institutional investors the authors examine the relationship between foreign investment and the attributes of emerging market countries and firms in which investment is made their findings indicate that countries with higher levels of economic development and floating exchange rate regimes tend to have greater ability to obtain foreign capital after controlling for the country s level of economic development they find that firms in countries with stronger shareholder rights and legal framework attract more foreign capital the authors also find that foreign institutions allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance after controlling for other country and firm attributes the main firm level measures of corporate governance are derived from accounting quality variables their results imply that steps can be taken both at the country and the firm level to create an environment conducive to foreign portfolio investment the analysis is based on a unique dataset consisting of equity positions of u s mutual funds in emerging markets

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

temporary stabilization predetermined exchange rates the paper analyzes the impact of a stabilization policy based on a temporary reduction in the rate of devaluation against a background in which a constant rate of devaluation has no real effects it is shown that the temporary policy does and furthermore that the real effects tend to become bigger in absolute value as the horizon of the temporary policy is shortened the central discussion is carried out in terms of a one good cash in advance model with perfect capital mobility and ramsey type consumers results are extended to account for home goods and variable velocity the roles of capital mobility and banking liberalization are briefly discussed

which firms went public in china a study of financial market regulation summary plagued by a notoriously weak legal system china has developed an alternative governance system based on de facto regulatory decentralization in its financial market development in which regional governments are responsible for selecting state owned enterprises soes to go public the effect of this regulatory system has been highly controversial but evidence is very scant in the literature this paper shows that regional governments tended to choose better performing soes in the pre listing stage to go public and thus substantial stock market investment funds were channeled into potentially productive companies china s experience demonstrates that administrative governance of capital markets may have been instrumental in jump starting capital markets in the absence of adequate market supporting legal institutions

deterioration of the terms of trade and capital accumulation a reexamination of the laursen metzler effect abstract this paper analyzes the effect of both a permanent and a temporary deterioration in the terms of trade on a small open economy the model based on intertemporal optimization emphasizes the labor leisure choice and the role of capital accumulation the transitional dynamics is shown to depend upon the long run response of the capital stock to the terms of trade shock this consists of a negative substitution effect together with a positive income effect whether or not the laursen metzler effect holds depends upon whether the income effect dominates the substitution effect

government spending and the real exchange rate i study the effect of government spending on the real exchange rate in an open economy version of the sidrauski model with a time varying rate of time preference that introduces complementarity between consumption at different points in time i show that a balanced budget fiscal expansion causes a real depreciation and a current account surplus if the expansion falls on traded goods if the increase falls instead on nontraded goods both the stylized results of a real appreciation and a current account deficit and the perverse result of an appreciation and a surplus can occur

the recursivity of law global norm making and national lawmaking in the globalization of corporate insolvency regimes for the past 15 years an enormous enterprise of global norm making and related national lawmaking has been underway in many areas of global commerce this article shows that leading global institutions such as the world bank imf and united nations are building an international financial architecture with law including corporate bankruptcy law as its foundation building on research on international institutions and three national cases china indonesia korea the authors propose a new framework for legal change in a global context the recursivity of law they argue that the globalization of bankruptcy law has proceeded through three cycles 1 at the national level through recursive cycles of lawmaking 2 at the global level through iterative cycles of norm making and 3 at the nexus of the two recursive cycles are driven by driven by four mechanisms the indeterminacy of law contradictions diagnostic struggles and actor mismatch thus the recursivity of law both revives and expands the soc

federalism as a commitment to reserving market incentives the authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures the salient features of federalism decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition help provide credible commitment or these purposes in addition the authors suggest that some federalism are self sustaining

contracts and exits in venture capital finance using a sample of european venture capital vc investments i study the relation between vc contracts and exits the data indicate that ex ante stronger vc control rights increase the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will exit by an acquisition rather than through a write off or an ipo my findings are robust to controls for a variety of factors including endogeneity and cases in which the vc preplans the exit at the time of contract choice my findings are consistent with control based theories of financial contracting such as aghion and bolton 1992

contract enforcement and investment a systematic review of the evidence summary this systematic review focuses on the empirical research that evaluates the causal link between contract enforcement and investment the evidence available in a variety of academic media reviewed with established procedures provides some but weak support for the existence of such link during 1990 2010 we only found 19 independent studies that empirically test the relationship and only one that directly examines the effects of an actual institutional reform few of the studies test alternative explanations perform robustness checks or critically assess the findings in sum the broadly accepted hypothesis of direct causation is still awaiting strong empirical backing

the capital inflows problem revisited a stylized model of southern cone disinflation in the late 1970s countries in latin america s southern cone initiated attempts to lower domestic inflation rates through the progressive reduction of a preannounced rate of exchange rate devaluation the stabilization programs gave rise to massive capital inflows real exchange rate appreciation and current account deficits this paper develops a stylized intertemporal framework in which the effects of a credible preannounced disinflation scheme can be studied it is shown that even when agents have perfect foresight and markets clear continuously the capital inflows phenomenon and the associated real appreciation may result while unanticipated permanent inflation changes are neutral in the paper anticipated inflation is neutral only in exceptional circumstances a preannounced disinflation operates by altering the path of an expenditure based real domestic interest rate that depends on expected changes in the prices of liquidity services and nontradable consumption goods

financial freedom and bank efficiency evidence from the european union this paper investigates the dynamics between the financial freedom counterparts of the economic freedom index drawn from the heritage foundation database and bank efficiency levels we rely on a large sample of commercial banks operating in the 27 european union member states over the 2000s after estimating bank specific efficiency scores using data envelopment analysis dea we develop a truncated regression model combined with bootstrapped confidence intervals to test our main hypotheses results suggest that the higher the degree of an economy s financial freedom the higher the benefits for banks in terms of cost advantages and overall efficiency our results also show that the effects of financial freedom on bank efficiency tend to be more pronounced in countries with freer political systems in which governments formulate and implement sound policies and higher quality governance

anarchy self governance and legal titling scholars and policymakers prescribe legal titling to improve prospects for economic development and political order however a public choice literature exists that has long recognized that self governance often works well and that the state may not be able to improve upon local economic institutions at reasonable cost although the implication that legal titling should proceed with caution is seemingly straightforward the literature on legal titling does not take anarchy seriously as a policy option in addition there is a public choice literature that presumes the state is the most important source of property rights this essay fills this gap in the property rights literature by applying the concept of efficient anarchy to legal titling in afghanistan original fieldwork evidence from rural afghanistan suggests that anarchy of land governance is a better option than legal titling the essay concludes by opening up the black box of state building by explaining why it often makes sense to sequence improvements in political capacity and political constraints prior to investing in legal titling

economic development legality and the transplant effect abstract we analyze the determinants of effective legal institutions legality using data from 49 countries we show that the way the law was initially transplanted and received is a more important determinant than the supply of law from a particular legal family countries that have developed legal orders internally adapted the transplanted law and or had a population that was already familiar with basic principles of the transplanted law have more effective legality than countries that received foreign law without any similar predispositions the transplanting process has a strong indirect effect on economic development via its impact on legality while the impact of particular legal families is weaker and not robust to alternative legality measures

coordination in heterogeneous federal systems abstract we compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization this type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws regulations standards or diplomatic policies contrary to the common wisdom decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important when coordination costs are symmetric decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences in the case of discontinuous network effects standardization never pareto dominates decentralization

in search of the holy grail policy convergence experimentation and economic performance we consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country s own circumstances but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little policy experimentation corrupt governments are reined in while honest governments are disciplined inefficiently our model yields distinct predictions about the patterns of policy imitation corruption and economic performance as a function of a country s location vis aa vis successful leaders in particular it predicts a u shaped pattern in economic performance as we move away from the leader in the relevant space of characteristics close neighbors should do very well distant countries moderately well on average with considerable variance and intermediate countries worst of all an empirical test with the experience of post socialist countries provides supportive results

the success and failure of reforms in transition economies this paper argues that an important reason why russia s performance and china s performance under capitalism have differed dramatically is that different arrangements governing the determination of prices and work practices evolved during the transition process in russia the arrangement which conferred monopoly rights to industry groups leftover from socialism prevented the adoption of better technology in china the arrangement that evolved contained no such monopoly elements the key factor in determining which arrangement evolved was the strength of the central government we put forth a model that implements these ideas and provide evidence in support of this theory

on the path dependence of tax compliance abstract this paper presents experimental evidence that tax compliance is path dependent for given values of the audit probability and the fine for tax evasion we compare the income declaration of subjects who faced a change in one of the two parameters to that of subjects who experienced no such parameter change we show that past tax enforcement regimes continue to have an impact on current income declarations this finding may be explained by reference dependent preferences and it has important policy implications for instance legal transplants cannot be expected to reliably yield similar behavior in countries with different legal histories

current account dynamics in a finite horizon model abstract this paper examines the response of the current account in a small open economy to a permanent change in the price of imported intermediate goods to do so it extends blanchard s 1985 open economy model to incorporate the capital stock with adjustment costs a la hayashi 1982 a price increase in imported intermediate goods can be viewed as a combination of transfer payments abroad and capital taxation the former effect leads to a current account deficit and the latter leads to a current account surplus the overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of these effects

corruption and reduced oil production an additional resource curse factor prominent contributions to the resource curse literature suggest weak governance and corruption are important factors behind the wide welfare variations observed among oil producing countries how weak governance and corruption influence revenue management and expenditure decisions as well as the possible welfare benefits derived from oil are broadly discussed how they impact upon volumes of oil produced has however attracted little attention this paper combines a review of the resource curse and oil production literatures with findings from qualitative interviews with oil sector experts to appreciate the feasibility of connections between corruption and oil production below its potential we make particular reference to environments where regulatory institutions or political accountability are weak and focus primarily on producer government and oil firm relations drawing on insights from geology political science and economics we suggest suboptimal production solutions can impact volumes of oil actually produced and create constraints on long term revenues for oil producing countries we argue greater disclosure of information on oil production efficiency on a field by field and country by country basis will assist further investigation of the relationships between corruption and volumes of oil produced

federalism and the soft budget constraint the government s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade off between political benefits and economic costs the latter depending on the decentralization of government two effects of federalism are derived first fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and thus serves as a commitment device the competition effect second monetary centralization together with fiscal decentralization induces a conflict of interests and thus may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation the checks and balance effect the authors analysis is used to interpret china s recent experience of transition to a market economy copyright 1998 by american economic association

preplanned exit strategies in venture capital abstract this paper empirically considers the role of preplanned exits the investor s initial strategy to sell the investee firm via an acquisition or an initial public offering ipo at the time of initial contract with the entrepreneur legal conditions and investor versus investee bargaining power in the allocation of cash flow and control rights in entrepreneurial finance we introduce a sample of 223 entrepreneurial investee firms financed by 35 venture capital funds in 11 continental european countries and these data indicate the following first preplanned acquisition exits are associated with stronger investor veto and control rights a greater probability that convertible securities will be used and a lower probability that common equity will be used the converse is observed for preplanned ipos second investors take fewer control and veto rights and use common equity in countries of german legal origin relative to socialist scandinavian and french legal origin third more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to get financed with common equity and less likely to be financed with convertible preferred equity while more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use common equity

statehood experience legal traditions and climate change policies this study investigates how the implementation of modern climate change policies is related to former colonies length of state history and their legal heritage we argue that countries with longer statehood experience around the time of colonization were better equipped to implement the legal philosophies transplanted by their colonial powers therefore the implications of receiving british common law versus french civil law should be particularly important in countries with a greater accumulated history of statehood using a cross section of up to 78 former colonies our results provide support for this hypothesis in particular our estimates demonstrate that common law countries have weaker modern climate change policies than civil law countries and the difference is inflated by a longer statehood experience measured by the length of state history from 1 to 1800 ad legal origin has no effect in areas which by the time of colonization had no statehood experience finally we report similar results for the pattern of labor market regulations jel k15 k31 k32 o44 q54 q58

do we see convergence in institutional quality a cross country analysis abstractdifferences in the quality of institutions may explain differences in per capita income yet we know relatively little on how institutions evolve this paper contributes to such knowledge by testing for convergence in legal bureaucratic and administrative institutional quality using cross section and panel methods on a large sample of countries from the 1970s to 2010 we find that countries with initially poor institutions tended to slowly catch up both when they shared the same initial conditions and when they did not however the convergence process seems to be a temporary effect following the end of the cold war

institutions for financial development what are they and where do they come from abstract among the fundamental causes of long run economic performance differences in institutions have received considerable attention in recent years at the same time a large body of theoretical and empirical work shows that financial development can have a big effect on economic performance this raises the more fundamental question as to why some countries have developed financial markets while others do not this paper reviews the theoretical and empirical research on this issue and shows that one of the channels whereby better institutions may have an effect on economic development is through the consolidation of larger and better financial markets an issue that is left aside in this paper relates to what regulations and policies lead to better functioning capital markets at some level one can think of regulations and policies as particular types of institutions nonetheless institutional problems are deeper causes leading to poor economic performance bad policies might simply be part of the channels through which they influence performance thus addressing the question of what determines the emergence of good institutions i e institutions that promote financial development seems particularly important recent research providing some answers to this question is also reviewed

tax rights in transition economies a tragedy of the commons abstract this paper develops the concept of tax rights to analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on economic development in transition economies a government s tax rights are poorly defined when it and other governments and agencies can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base existing evidence suggests that chinese local governments have gained more clearly defined tax rights than their russian counterparts using the big push model of industrialization murphy k shleifer a vishny r 1989 industrialization and the big push journal of political economy 95 1003 1026 within a common property resource framework we show that this difference in tax rights helps explain why china has been significantly more successful than russia

capital market regimes and bank structure in europe we hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish european capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth using bank level data from 13 european countries 1998 to 2004 we find evidence of positive effects of equity friendly market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both equity friendly and credit friendly market features on loan growth the findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of european banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely

venture capital exits in domestic and cross border investments abstract we compare and contrast the performance of cross border and domestic venture capital vc investments in terms of the time it takes vc backers to exit portfolio companies through initial public offering ipo trade sale m a or other routes initial analysis suggests that cross border investments are exited more quickly than domestic investments and this difference is driven by the cross border investments in north america we explore whether the difference between domestic and cross border exits can be explained by regional variations in economic market activity and legal systems we find it is important to allow for the impact of these macro variables on the time to vc exit to vary across regions this is crucial not just to capture the full impact of the macro factors but also to explain the differences in time to exit between domestic and cross border investments

how well do supranational regional grouping schemes fit international business research models international business ib research has long acknowledged the importance of supranational regional factors in building models to explain phenomena such as where multinational corporations mncs choose to locate yet criteria for defining regions based on similar factors vary substantially thus undermining consensus regarding which regional grouping schemes fit ib research models better in response we develop and empirically validate a theory of comparative regional scheme assessment for model building purposes assuming that 1 schemes can be classified based on their source of similarity and 2 schemes within the same similarity class can be assessed for their structural coherence based on group contiguity and compactness schemes with better structural coherence will also exhibit better fit with ib research models we document support for our theory in comparative analyses of regional schemes used to explain where us based mncs locate operations around the world geography culture and trade and investment based schemes with better structural coherence exhibit better initial fit with mnc location models and less change in fit after modest scheme refinement using a simulated annealing optimization algorithm our approach provides criteria for comparing similar regional grouping schemes and identifying best in class schemes tailored to models of mnc location choice and other ib research models

law endowments and property rights while scholars have hypothesized about the sources of variation in property rights for over 2500 years it is only very recently that researchers have begun to test these theories empirically this paper reviews both the theory and empirical evidence supporting and refuting the law and endowment views of property rights the law view holds that historically determined differences in national legal traditions continue to shape cross country differences in property rights the endowment view argues that during european colonization differences in climate crops the indigenous population and the disease environment influenced long run property rights

the role of law in economic growth a literature review abstract compared with other explanatory variables such as capital accumulation technological innovations geographical endowments economic openness and cultural factors institutions especially legal institutions have been regarded as a crucial condition for economic growth in recent years the importance of legal rules is systematically revealed by a series of cross country econometric studies conducted by la porta et al who claim that legal origins are central to understanding the divergence in living standards across the regions and countries of the world and compared with civil law countries especially those countries with french civil law tradition common law countries have enjoyed superior economic outcomes the controversies set off by la porta et al s proposition indicate that there are a number of questions that are difficult to explain by la porta et al s theory and hence call for more work on comparative analysis of different legal families before a consensus can be reached

using the law to change the custom the custom often acts as a powerful hindrance to equity increasing changes in this paper we present a simple model of legal dualism in which a progressive legal reform can under certain conditions shift the conflicting custom in the direction intended by the legislator formal law then acts as an outside anchor that exerts a magnet effect on the custom we also characterize the conditions under which a moderate reform performs better than a radical one in improving the welfare of the disadvantaged sections of the population we illustrate our insights using examples on inheritance marriage and divorce in sub saharan africa and india

state capacity and repression a model of colonial rule abstract state capacity in colonial regimes can have spillover effects on the welfare of citizens if the colonizer is removed this work shows that when spillovers are positive investments in state capacity and repression by the colonizer are strategic complements the colonizer needs a larger repression when state capacity is high because the latter increases the incentives of the colonized to rebel therefore determinants of investment in repression such as geographic factors or idiosyncratic features of the colonizer can affect state capacity this work contributes to explain the heterogeneous levels of state capacity in non settler colonies and has policy implications for present autocratic regimes

the impact of governance quality on economic growth the rise and decline of nations throughout history continuously puzzles economists experience shows that successful economic performance is a very complex process the scope of which goes well beyond the simplified neoclassical approach to growth business environment is a key determinant of successful performance of firms firms can not grow will not invest employ buy new technology and develop new technology unless the business environment is good it consists of numerous aspects of the institutional environment in an economy the rule of law property rights protection capital and financial market development labor market institutions international relations the role of the state presence of corruption etc the key institution that often manages or at least influences the development of all other institutions is the state therefore an efficient state is crucial for successful economic performance

legal efficiency and consistency abstract we analyze the efficiency and consistency of court decisions under common and civil law as a leading example we study the enforcement of property rights judges are of two types some are conservative and follow the precedent or the statute while others maximize social welfare when courts intervene ex post after the relevant economic choices have been made welfare maximizing courts face a commitment problem such an ex post bias has implications on the relative consistency and efficiency of each legal system surprisingly we find that court decisions are more consistent under common law than under civil law the welfare comparison between the two systems is instead ambiguous however in changing economic environments common law is more likely to dominate civil law because of its greater adaptability

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

to steal or not to steal firm attributes legal environment and valuation data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within country variation that decreases with the strength of investors legal protection a simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation investment opportunities external financing and ownership structure using firm level governance and transparency data from 27 countries we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets all relations are stronger in less investor friendly countries demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices

social structure and cultures of corruption abstract corruption often creates a briber s dilemma each of the clients competing for a rent allocated by a government official has an incentive to pay bribes to try to obtain preferential treatment but they would all be better off if they could mutually commit not to pay bribes this paper uses a model of linked games to show how informal relationships among the clients may enable them to enforce agreements or norms against paying bribes and how historical events can lead to the development of a culture of corruption that can subsequently prove hard to dislodge

private equity returns and disclosure around the world to obtain more funds from the institutional investors private equity pe fund managers may report inflated valuations of private investee companies that are not yet sold however such overvaluations may result in a reputational cost when those investments are realized using evidence from 39 countries we show that there are significant systematic biases in managers reporting of fund performance we find that these biases depend on the accounting and legal environment in a country and on proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between institutional investors and pe fund managers

are financial development and corruption control substitutes in promoting growth abstract while financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively their interaction has not we develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects but act as substitutes in doing so the substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent conversely financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it we test this substitutability by predicting growth of countries and industries using measures of financial development lack of corruption and a key interaction term both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor as well as to a substitutability between them the growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0 63 1 68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th the results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers omitted variables or other theories of growth and convergence

why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries an empirical investigation we examine the empirical role of difierent explanations for the lack of ows of capital from rich to poor countries the lucas paradox the theoretical explanations include difierences in fundamentals across countries and capital market imperfections we show that during 1970i2000 low institutional quality is the leading explanation for example improving peru s institutional quality to australia s level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the speciflc mechanisms our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions afiect long run development

macroeconomic policy exchange rate dynamics and optimal asset accumulation the paper develops a model of exchange rate and current account determination for a small economy peopled by infinitely lived utility maximizing households in this setting a central bank purchase of foreign exchange has no real effects when central bank foreign reserves earn interest at the world rate and proceeds are returned to the public in contrast an increase in the monetary growth rate does have real effects even in the long run the model developed here implies that an increase in government spending may lead to a surplus on current account the external adjustment process predicted by the model is one in which consumption real balances and external assets all rise or fall simultaneously

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government

government in transition abstract the speed of economic reforms is not the only important determinant of the success of the transition to a market economy the transition of government from a communist state to an institution supporting a market economy is as critical survey evidence shows that russia lags significantly behind poland in the transition of its government which may account for its inferior economic performance despite adopting similar economic reforms i argue that the lack of turnover of old communist politicians and the creation of inappropriate electoral and fiscal incentives for these politicians may account for the poor performance of the russian government and suggest some strategies for improving the situation

social norms and the enforcement of laws we examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws agents choose a behavior e g tax evasion production of low quality products corruption harassing behavior substance abuse etc and then are randomly matched with another agent there are complementarities in behaviors so that an agent s payoff decreases with the mismatch between her behavior and her partner s and with overall negative externalities created by the behavior of others a law is an upper bound cap on behavior a law breaker when detected pays a fine and has her behavior forced down to the level of the law equilibrium law breaking depends on social norms because detection relies at least in part on whistle blowing law abiding agents have an incentive to whistle blow on a law breaking partner because this reduces the mismatch with their partners behaviors as well as the negative externalities when laws are in conflict with norms and many agents are breaking the law each agent anticipates little whistle blowing and is more likely to also break the law tighter laws banning more behaviors greater fines and better public enforcement all have counteracting effects reducing behavior among law abiding individuals but increasing it among law breakers we show that laws that are in strong conflict with prevailing social norms may backfire whereas gradual tightening of laws can be more effective in influencing social norms and behavior

law and finance at the origin what are the key determinants of financial development and growth a large literature debates the relative importance of countries legal and political environment in this paper i present evidence from ancient rome where an early form of shareholder company the societas publicanorum developed i show that the societas publicano rum flourished in a legally underdeveloped but politically supportive environment roman republic and disappeared when roman law reached its height of legal sophistication but the political environment grew less supportive roman empire in the roman case legal development appears to have mattered little as long as the law as practiced was flexible and adapted to economic needs the law as practiced in turn reflected prevalent political interests after discussing parallels in more recent history i provide a brief overview of the literature on law and finance and on politics and finance the historical evidence suggests that legal systems may be less of a technological constraint for growth than previously thought at least at the origin