bilateral bargaining with externalities this paper provides an analysis of a non cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network we establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents that is we provide a non cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non cooperative surplus the resulting division is related to the myerson shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications we demonstrate this by examining buyer seller networks and vertical foreclosure

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

currency substitution and western european monetary unification the recent history of european monetary affairs may be interpreted as a slow movement towards the establishment of a european currency union characterized by fixed exchange rates and perhaps eventually a common european currency until very recently the desirability of european monetary union was analysed in terms of the traditional optimum currency area framework in that analysis the incentive for currency union comes from the potential improvements in efficiency in resource allocation from the use of a single money in a trade area recently however the question of the independence of monetary policy under flexible exchange rates has spawned a growing literature on currency substitution which includes implications for currency 2 union the earlier work suggested that a major benefit of flexible rates would be the liberation of domestic monetary policy from external balance concerns so that policy could be aimed singularly at internal balance 3 the currency substitution cs literature has demonstrated that if the currencies of two countries are close substitutes to money demanders then the central banks of these countries cannot follow independent monetary policies even under flexible exchange rates 4 the degree of currency substitution is an important empirical question and the analysis that follows should prove informative in determining the incentive for european monetary union is the european monetary system ems goal of reducing exchange rate fluctuations necessarily indicative of a european sensitivity to disturbances with a substantial part of the problem coming from substitution between monies girton and roper 1980 p 157 or rather a result of the traditional drive towards integration as envisioned by optimum currency area theory the following sections will suggest an answer

deep habits in the new keynesian phillips curve we derive and estimate a new keynesian phillips curve nkpc in a model where consumers are assumed to have deep habits habits are deep in the sense that they apply to individual consumption goods instead of aggregate consumption this alters the nkpc in a fundamental manner as it introduces expected and contemporaneous consumption growth as well as the expected marginal value of future demand as additional driving forces for inflation dynamics we construct the driving process in the deep habits nkpc by using the model s optimality conditions to impute time series for unobservable variables the resulting series is considerably more volatile than unit labor cost general methods of moments gmm estimation of the nkpc shows an improved fit and a much lower degree of indexation than in the standard nkpc our analysis also reveals that the crucial parameters for the performance of the deep habit nkpc are the habit parameter and the substitution elasticity between differentiated products the results are broadly robust to alternative specifications

the demand for money in secular perspective abstract this paper presents some evidence from norwegian data on some of the long standing empirical issues of money demand the choice of a scale variable and the issue of simultaneous equations bias is subjected to some recently developed statistical tests the outcome favours a permanent income model of money demand no significant simultaneity bias was detected various specifications of explanatory variables like the own yield on money interest rates and price expectations as well as the issues of price level homogeneity and stability between subperiods are also considered in the paper

insurer hospital bargaining negotiated discounts in post deregulation connecticut this paper uses unique data from the state of connecticut to examine discounting patterns in the state s hospital industry for the years following deregulation 1995 1998 the data provide a rare opportunity to study payer level differences in negotiated discounts for hospital services in addition to presenting descriptive evidence on how discounts vary across payers payer types and hospital types this study uses matched revenue data to analyze the economic determinants of discount magnitudes payer size appears to affect bargaining power but the economic significance of the effect is small the data exhibit patterns consistent with a bargaining explanation in which discount magnitudes depend critically on payers abilities to channel patients to hospitals with which favorable discounts have been negotiated

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in the author examines third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input the author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices in other cases discrimination raises some prices and lowers others the author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration copyright 1987 by american economic association

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

taxation of interest income deregulation and the banking industry removing interest rate ceilings on bank deposits or reducing the tax rate applicable to the interest earned on such deposits are alternative means of increasing the after tax return to depositors these alternatives however have differing impacts on the structure of a competitive banking industry this paper develops a model which focuses on a bank s choice between paying an explicit interest rate on its deposits and paying a return in the form of services the model allows banks to differ in their production technologies and depositors in their marginal tax rates and preferences for services the effects of tax rate changes and a ceiling on the explicit deposit interest rate are analyzed coinciding with the rise in market interest rates to levels significantly above regulation ceiling rates on bank and savings and loan deposits has been a move to reduce the level of taxation on interest income general proposals to reduce the tax on interest income seem to have gained support as a means of increasing after tax rates of return in order to increase aggregate savings while proposals to allow banks and savings and loans to offer tax free savings certificates are supported as a means of reducing the cost of funds for such thrift institutions for example the tax exempt all savers certificates were designed to yield higher after tax rates of return for some individuals while simultaneously lowering the cost of funds to the issuing institutions as a means of providing a higher return to depositors an obvious alternative to reducing the tax on interest income would be to speed the removal of interest rate ceilings which apply to deposits at banks and savings and loans tax changes and deregulation would both affect the banking industry by leading to changes in the after tax interest rate on deposits the composition of deposit return between explicit taxable interest payments and the provision at below cost of nontaxable services might also be affected along with the optimum level of deposits for an individual bank and the size of the banking industry unfortunately none of these implications all of which are relevant for analyzing recent tax and deregulation proposals have been studied within the framework of a model of the banking industry this paper develops a model which focuses on the bank s choice between paying an explicit interest rate on its deposits and paying a return in the form of services previous models have often ignored this choice assuming that only the total return and not its composition mattered to the bank kareken 11 klein

collusion exclusion and inclusion in random order bargaining this paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random order value e g the shapley value collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them say i this contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion which lets i exclude j s resource but not use it himself and inclusion which lets i use j s resource but not exclude j from it this representation yields a third difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion generalizing existing results for specific games namely collusion is profitable unprofitable when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced increased by other players

the now account experiment and the demand for money abstract the authors use the now account experience in new england from 1972 to 1978 to estimate the responsiveness of the demand for money to interest payments on checkable accounts such an estimate is important in considering the effects on the demand for money of nationwide now s and of variations in interest rates on transactions balances in the future with new england as the experimental region and the rest of the united states as a control group the authors develop a cross section time series framework to isolate and to estimate the interest rate responsiveness of money demand while accounting for effects of income interest rates and gradual adjustment

deposit market deregulation and interest rates the evolving deregulation of financial markets has sparked interest in the economic implications of increased flexibility in previously regulated markets much of the analysis has focused on deposit markets in which legislated maximum rates are being replaced by market determined equilibrium rates moreover because changes in deposit rates imply changes in the cost of funds to financial intermediaries concern has been voiced about the implications of deposit rate deregulation on the overall structure of interest rates specifically deregulation has been cited as one reason for the currently high rates of interest 2 in this paper we argue that this view of deregulation is flawed and we suggest that deregulation of deposit markets will lead to lower not higher loan and deposit rates furthermore we argue that previous analysis indicating that deposit deregulation leads to higher loan rates based on higher costs of funds to financial intermediaries depends on inadequate consideration of the role of implicit payments to depositors appropriate consideration of these implicit payments leads to results suggesting that deposit market deregulation should ceterus paribus lower loan rates the total cost of funds to banks falls as the interest rate ceiling is relaxed our theoretical results previewed here are admittedly at odds with some of the prior theoretical and empirical work on this issue our assumptions that the implicit deposit rate is flexible market determined and adjusts to clear the deposit market are crucial to our results

on measuring the relative size of the unregulated to the regulated money market over time abstract this paper develops a method based on the recent theories of index number monetary aggregation and money supply by which changes can be measured in the size of the unregulated money market umm relative to that of the regulated money market in developing countries while the method requires some knowledge of the initial umm assets and the growth rate of the monetary multiplier it is virtually parameter free in measuring the effects of asset substitution on the relative size of the umm for illustrative purpose it is applied to korea which appears to provide satisfactory results indicating the usefulness of the method

government revenue from monopoly supply of currency and deposits abstract this paper analyses the revenue maximising problem for a government with a monopoly over the entire money industry i e over the supply of bank deposits as well as currency in circulation in this case the government determines both the inflation rate and the nominal rate of interest on deposits provided currency and deposits are not perfect substitutes a positive nominal deposit rate is warranted illustrative estimates for turkey show that the revenue maximising deposit rate there would be 16 1 2 percent and the inflation rate 35 percentage points above the deposit rate i e 51 1 2 percent

price discrimination and bargaining empirical evidence from medical devices many important issues in business to business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous this paper uses new panel data on buyer supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market while many phenomena that restrict price discrimination are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs e g mergers group purchasing organizations and transparency i find that 1 non discriminatory pricing actually works against hospitals because competition is more intense under price discrimination and 2 results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect

a larger slice or a larger pie an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel this research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model we use the nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics the parties bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side the more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option the weaker the bargaining position we use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years firm size increases store brand introductions and service level differentiation in our empirical analysis of the german market for coffee we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer retailer pairs this result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner we are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits

bilateral oligopoly the efficiency of intermediate goods markets abstract we show that intermediate goods markets may be efficient despite the presence of commonly accepted signs of market failure such as high concentration both among sellers and buyers sparse trading networks price dispersion and externalities the results are derived in an extensive form model of bilateral bargaining with multiple buyers and multiple sellers and with externalities between the negotiations we also characterize the structure of the endogenous trading network i e how firms choose trading partners prices are dispersed and depend on both the concentration of capital and the concentration of sales consistent with some stylized facts on buyer power

financial innovation new assets and the behavior of money demand abstract two fundamental changes in us banking regulations have affected the behavior of money demand m1 the first authorized checkable deposit accounts paying explicit interest rates the second allowed these rates to be market determined the theoretical literature does not directly address the impact of these events suggesting that they are primarily an empirical issue however the empirical literature has yet to agree on the impact of financial innovation on money demand for example several studies report an increase in the elasticity of money demand several others report a decline this paper uses a lancaster type choice model to analyze formally the expected impact of these two changes on the demand for money the model derives specific conditions under which i the demand for money increases as new assets are introduced and ii the impact of either the introduction of new assets or the elimination of interest rate restrictions on the elasticity of money demand

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

inventories inflation dynamics and the new keynesian phillips curve abstract we introduce inventories into an otherwise standard new keynesian model and study the implications for inflation dynamics inventory holdings are motivated as a means to generate sales for demand constrained firms we derive various representations of the new keynesian phillips curve with inventories and show that one of these specifications is observationally equivalent to the standard model with respect to the behavior of inflation when the model s cross equation restrictions are imposed however the driving variable in the new keynesian phillips curve real marginal cost is unobservable and has to be proxied by for instance real unit labor cost an alternative approach is to impute marginal cost by using the model s optimality conditions we show that the stock sales ratio is linked to marginal cost we also estimate these various specifications of the new keynesian phillips curve using gmm we find that the predictive power of the inventory specification at best approaches that of the standard model but does not improve upon it

disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels the case of the nucleolus abstract this paper considers a bilateral market with two complementary commodities and gives a rationale for aumann s paradox the relationship between the notion of strong stability of a syndicate i e the property that no group of players wants to exit or to enter the syndicate and the notion of disadvantageous syndicates is summarized in two results if the two sides of the market are balanced in terms of endowments every syndicate is strongly stable if the two sides of the market are not balanced in terms of endowments then being advantageous in aumann s definition is necessary and sufficient for a syndicate to be strongly stable

the welfare effects of bundling in multichannel television markets we measure how the bundling of television channels affects short run welfare we estimate an industry model of viewership demand pricing bundling and input market bargaining using data on ratings purchases prices bundles and input costs we conduct simulations of a la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers we estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103 0 percent under a la carte these higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated 5 4 to 0 2 percent and 1 7 to 6 0 percent respectively jel d12 l11 l51 l82 m31

deep habits and exchange rate pass through abstract habit persistence at the level of individual goods varieties can explain incomplete exchange rate pass through to international prices deep habits give rise to a dynamic import demand function that leads to import price markup adjustments independently of nominal pricing frictions augmenting a two country dsge model with deep habits we obtain low exchange rate pass through to import prices even when nominal local currency price rigidities are negligibly low as nominal pricing frictions become more important the presence of deep habits further impedes the pass through of exchange rate fluctuations estimating model variants with limited information as well as full information methods we find that the deep habits model requires much lower degrees of nominal price rigidities to match empirical measures of the pass through of exchange rate fluctuations to us import prices

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

empirical evidence on the role of non linear wholesale pricing and vertical restraints on cost pass through abstract how a cost shock is passed through to final consumer prices may relate to nominal price stickiness and rigidities the existence of nonadjustable cost components strategic markup adjustments or other contract terms along the supply distribution chain this paper presents a simple framework to assess the potential role of nonlinear pricing contracts and vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance or wholesale price discrimination in the supply chain in explaining the degree of pass through from upstream cost shocks in the ground coffee category to downstream retail prices we find that resale price maintenance increases pass through rate

the role of money supply shocks in the short run demand for money abstract previous money demand models are either inconsistent with contemporaneous adjustment of the price level to expected changes in the nominal money supply or imply implausible interest rate fluctuations in response to innovations in nominal money we propose a shock absorber money demand model in which money supply shocks affect the synchronization of asset transactions and so engender a temporary increase or decrease in desired money holdings expected changes do not engender such fluctuations in real money inventories in simultaneous estimates for eight industrial countries the shock absorber model proved empirically superior

monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods deep habits can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter cyclicality of mark ups this implies can result in government spending crowding in rather than crowding out private consumption in the short run we explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors we then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our new keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy we find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy however despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy

aspirations health and the cost of inequality how does inequality motivate people and at what cost in a model of perpetual youth people have heterogeneous upward looking aspirations they value their consumption relative to the conditional mean of those above them in the distribution their survival depends on health capital produced from time investment and health goods higher fundamental inequality working through the aspirations gap motivates people to work and save more economic outcomes improve but income and consumption inequality worsen because the poor have less capacity to respond on the labor market by diverting resources from health production aspirations also worsen mortality especially for the poor though relative income has a strong negative effect on personal health inequality has a weak effect on population health explaining an empirical puzzle on the relative income and health gradient

buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations we study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides in case of a bilateral disagreement flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment a larger buyer pays a higher per unit price when buyers bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low and a lower price otherwise an analogous result holds for sellers these predictions and the implications of different technologies are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutual dependency and not an unequivocal source of power

the macroeconomic implications of financial deregulation abstract this paper explores the possible macroeconomic consequences of financial deregulation in an institutional environment where deregulation raises risks in banking the central bank is supposed to maximize an objective function in which the probability of bank failure is an argument it is then shown that the usual tradeoffs between policy objectives imply that financial deregulation will lead to more interest rate smoothing than would otherwise take place and further that because of restricted entry into banking deregulation will call for some inflation the transition toward deregulation raises special problems which are likely to require a more gradual approach toward the stationary equilibrium

competitive interest payments on bank deposits and the long run demand for money reply this paper tests two assumptions made in previous demand for money studies the first assumption concerns the role assigned to the interest rate in the demand for money function common practice identifies the rate of interest with the opportunity cost of holding money in section i this formulation is shown to blur an important distinction between the price of money and the price of money substitutes and to implicitly assume that the relevant price variable is the difference between these two distinct prices a second assumption is that the current ban on interest payments on demand deposits is fully effective in section ii i operationally define these price variables and estimate perfectly competitive interest payments on commercial bank deposits this is done by crudely measuring commercial bank marginal costs and assuming that all excess profit is passed on to depositors in indirect ways section iii presents estimates of a more complete longrun demand for money relationship which explicitly includes an own price and a cross price as separate influences and assumes that the prohibition of the payment of interest on deposits is totally ineffective although no firm conclusion is reached concerning the proper functional specification of the demand function the results significantly improve upon previous demand for money estimates which assumed that the interest payment prohibition is totally effective in section iv the results are summarized and implications of the analysis for monetary theory are presented my competitive demand for money formulation leads to a reinterpretation of the existing evidence on what is generally referred to as the interest elasticity of demand for money this estimate is shown to be significantly biased downward it also implies that the demand for and supply of money are more interdependent than is usually assumed

the translog utility function and the demand for money in the united states in recent years considerable effort has been directed towards establishing the nature of the relationship between money and nearmonies but with mixed success the approaches vary from multi interest rate single equation studies to the careful simultaneous equations studies summarized and amended by feige and pearce 1977 and extended recently by donovan 1978 offenbacher 1979 and barnett 1980 the empirical results also vary with numerous studies favoring only one interest rate see the surveys in fisher 1978 1983 some claiming that a variety of entities are close substitutes for money e g chetty 1969 and others showing that weak substitution or even complementarity may be the result of the measurement of elasticities of substitution between money and a number of other assets e g feige and pearce 1977 offenbacher 1979 and barnett 1980 the debate seems to have overshadowed a second and equally intriguing issue which centers on the establishment of an acceptable definition of money the basic idea of this study is to take an approach that takes account of the different degrees of moneyness possessed by the various monetary assets this paper produces quantitative estimates of the degree of substitutability of other monetary assets for money in the context of a flexible functional form model with a

var based estimation of euler equations with an application to new keynesian pricing abstract var based estimation of euler equations exploits cross equation restrictions that the theory imposes on a vector autoregressive var process for market expectations this paper shows that sargent s 1979 a note on maximum likelihood estimation of the rational expectations model of the term structure journal of monetary economics 5 133 143 original approach of imposing these restrictions on the endogenous variable of the euler equation i e computing the rational expectations solution implies multiple solutions and is therefore impracticable the paper shows that this identification problem can be circumvented by reverse engineering the cross equation restrictions on the forcing variable of the euler equation the proposed reverse engineering approach contrasts with the conventional approach in the literature that avoids the identification problem by constraining the system formed by the euler equation and the var process to yield a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium this uniqueness condition makes little economic sense because the var process is just a reduced form approximation of true market expectations and a simulation experiment shows that imposing uniqueness can lead to severe misspecification bias the severity of this misspecification bias is illustrated in practice with an application to gali and gertler s 1999 inflation dynamics a structural econometric analysis journal of monetary economics 44 195 222 hybrid new keynesian phillips curve

habit formation in consumption a meta analysis abstract we examine 597 estimates of habit formation reported in 81 published studies the mean reported strength of habit formation equals 0 4 but the estimates vary widely both within and across studies we use bayesian and frequentist model averaging to assign a pattern to this variance while taking into account model uncertainty studies employing macro data report consistently larger estimates than micro studies 0 6 vs 0 1 on average the difference remains 0 5 when we control for 30 factors that reflect the context in which researchers obtain their estimates such as data frequency geographical coverage variable definition estimation approach and publication characteristics we also find that evidence for habits strengthens when researchers use lower data frequencies employ log linear approximation of the euler equation and utilize open economy dsge models moreover estimates of habits differ systematically across countries

robustness of the estimates of the hybrid new keynesian phillips curve abstract gali and gertler 1999 inflation dynamics a structural econometric approach journal of monetary eonomics 44 2 195 222 developed a hybrid variant of the new keynesian phillips curve that relates inflation to real marginal cost expected future inflation and lagged inflation gmm estimates of the model suggest that forward looking behavior is dominant the coefficient on expected future inflation substantially exceeds the coefficient on lagged inflation while the latter differs significantly from zero it is quantitatively modest several authors have suggested that our results are the product of specification bias or suspect estimation methods here we show that these claims are incorrect and that our results are robust to a variety of estimation procedures including gmm estimation of the closed form and nonlinear instrumental variables also as we discuss many others have obtained very similar results to ours using a systems approach including fiml techniques hence the conclusions of gg and others regarding the importance of forward looking behavior remain robust