bubbles crises and policy in many recent cases financial liberalization has led to a bubble in asset prices the bursting of the bubble results in a banking crisis and recession it is suggested such bubbles are caused by an interaction of the risk shifting problem arising from agency relationships in intermediaries and uncertainty concerning the expansion of credit two important policy objectives are identified the first is the prevention of bubbles in asset prices the second is minimizing the impact of spillovers on to the real economy during post bubble banking crises the different policy approaches taken in norway and japan are compared copyright 1999 by oxford university press

the sources of business interest in social insurance sectoral versus national differences when and why have employers supported the development of institutions of social insurance that provide benefits to workers during various employment related risks the analysis developed in this article challenges the dominant explanations of welfare state development which are premised on the assumption that business opposes social insurance the article examines the conditions under which self interested profit maximizing firms support the introduction of a new social policy and it specifies the most significant variables explaining the variation in employers social policy preferences the model is tested in three political episodes of welfare state development in france and germany using policy documents submitted by various employers associations to bureaucratic and parliamentary commissions

the incidence of secured debt evidence from the small business community critics claim that theories of secured debt fail to explain the widespread use of collateral because they incorrectly predict when a loan will be secured this paper provides the first rigorous statistical test of the transaction cost models of secured debt data from two samples of over 1 000 small business loans generally support the common set of predictions of these theories the incidence of secured debt is positively related to probability of default loan size loan maturity and marketability of assets changes in the legal and economic environment also alter firms decisions regarding the pledging of collateral

uncertainty and risk in financial markets this paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the distinction between uncertainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents have incomplete preferences over statecontingent consumption bundles as in bewley 1986 without completeness individual decision making depends on a set of probability distributions over the state space a bundle is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all probabilities in this set when preferences are complete this set is a singleton and the model reduces to standard expected utility in this setting we characterize pareto optima and equilibria and show that the presence of uncertainty generates robust indeterminacies in equilibrium prices and allocations for any specification of initial endowments we derive comparative statics results linking the degree of uncertainty with changes in equilibria despite the presence of robust indeterminacies we show that equilibrium prices and allocations vary continuously with underlying fundamentals equilibria in a standard risk economy are thus robust to adding small degrees of uncertainty finally we give conditions under which some assets are not traded due to uncertainty aversion

the swedish banking crisis roots and consequences the article analyses the swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s newly deregulated credit markets after 1985 stimulated a competitive process between financial institutions where expansion was given priority combined with an expansive macro policy this contributed to an asset price boom the subsequent crisis resulted from a highly leveraged private sector being simultaneously hit by three major exogenous events a shift in monetary policy with an increase in pre tax interest rates a tax reform that increased after tax interest rates and the erm crisis combined with some overinvestment in commercial property high real interest rates contributed to breaking the boom in real estate prices and triggering a downward price spiral resulting in bankruptcies and massive credit losses the government rescued the banking system by issuing a general guarantee of bank obligations the total direct cost to the taxpayer of the salvage has been estimated at around 2 per cent of gdp copyright 1999 by oxford university press

growth and employment the scope of a european initiative this paper is an abridged version of a policy initiative paper prepared with a dozen colleagues in louvain la neuve and paris we propose a set of policies to cope with europe s persistent unemployment including two medium term programs a drastic reduction of the indirect cost of unskilled labour and an ambitious stimulation of targeted investments the bottom line is that policies addressing meaninfully europe s unemployment problem must be pursued on a bolder scale than currently contemplated

the information in the high yield bond spread for the business cycle evidence and some implications the market for high yield below investment grade corporate bonds developed in the middle 1980s we show that since this time the high yield spread has had significant explanatory power for the business cycle we interpret this finding as possibly symptomatic of financial factors at work in the business cycle along the lines suggested by the financial accelerator we also show that over this period the high yield spread outperforms other leading financial indicators including the term spread the paper bill spread and the federal funds rate we conjecture that changes in the conduct of monetary policy over time may account for the reduced informativeness of these alternative indicators all of which are tied closely to monetary policy copyright 1999 by oxford university press

an empirical investigation of u s firms in reorganization the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization we find the recontracting framework of chapter 11 to be complex lengthy and costly violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered these deviations may result from the bargaining process of chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder oriented management to preserve firm value an example of such recontracting addresses myers underinvestment problem an investigation of the effects of chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter

theories of choice under ignorance and uncertainty abstract in this paper knight s distinction between risk and uncertainty and its significance for economic analysis are examined the paper consists of a survey of some recent developments on the theory of choice under uncertainty and some applications of these theories to problems for which bayesian decision theory has not proved entirely satisfactory two problems are examined in detail the first is that of finance and insurance and the second is that of risktaking behaviour with special emphasis on lotteries

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

clarifying frank knight s discussion of the meaning of risk and uncertainty frank knight s 1921 famous distinction between risk and uncertainty has entered the jargon of economics and decision theory yet it appears to have gone unnoticed that his formulation suffers from an elementary confusion this note locates the source of the problem and proposes a reformulation that avoids it it is safe to say that frank knight 1921 is more widely quoted than read on his epony mous distinction between risk and uncertainty this of course is a fate that befalls many authorities and at least in the present case is probably not particularly serious for the knightian distinction has acquired a currency of its own that is both reasonably unambiguous and relatively widely understood certainly the convention of using the term risk to describe decision situations in which probabilities are available to guide choice and uncertainty to describe decision situations in which information is too imprecise to be summarised by probabilities is deeply ingrained in both economic theory and decision theory 1 that said and as those who are familiar with it will know the long disquisition on the meaning of risk and uncertainty that appears in chapter 7 of knight s risk uncertainty and profit is well worth reading 2 not only is his categorisation of different kinds of probability situation a good deal more subtle than the simple risk uncertainty dichotomy might imply he also has many interesting things to say about induction social laws the metaphysics of chance and the psychology of decision making under uncertainty in view of the many positive aspects of knight s discussion then not to mention how often it continues to be invoked it is particularly unfortunate that it turns out to suffer from an elementary confusion the purpose of what follows is to locate the source of this confusion and to propose a reformulation of knight s position that avoids it the hope is that readers may then be able to benefit from the many insights in knight s discussion

the uncertain foundations of the welfare state abstract the welfare state is often portrayed as provider of insurance against uncertainties in knight s 1921 sense of the term which would be refused or underinsured on private markets this image conflicts with the standard economic model of risk exchange founded on the subjective interpretation of probability which predicts that all individual uncertainties will be insured by private markets our aim in this paper is to explain why this prediction fails and building on contributions to decision theory that take seriously the idea of knightian uncertainty to show why social insurance may be justified

malaysian trade policy and the 2001 wto trade policy review the purpose of this paper is two fold to examine developments in trade and investment policy regimes in malaysia following the on set of the financial crisis using the trade policy review malaysia 2001 of the wto as a reference point and to evaluate the review in terms of the objectives of the wto trade policy review mechanism as set out in the marrakesh agreement it is found that by and large malaysia has managed to come out of the crisis without compromising on its long standing commitment to maintaining a relatively open trade and investment policy regime by the regional standards however there are some disturbing post crisis developments which deserve scrutiny in a future review these include increase in the degree of dispersion of tariff rates because of high tariff peaks relating to a few product lines increased reliance on non automatic import licensing to regulate imports of a significant number of products which directly compete with domestic production by public sector enterprises and unexplained delays in meeting commitments under the general agreement on trade in services gats

financial distress and the business cycle in this paper we argue that firms financial distress should play a greater role in the macroeconomic analysis of the business cycle we provide a non technical account of a general equilibrium model that exhibits financially driven equilibrium cycles we show that the empirical evidence is widely supportive of the key hypothesis and implications of our approach we use the model in order to evaluate the effects of several policy measures it turns out that deepening the market for second hand capital goods subsidizing the interest payments of companies which start up when financial conditions are tight and bailing out some companies in default can indeed stabilize the economy by way of generalization we may say that the policy reaction to a financially driven bust should be accommodating

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

eurosclerosis and the sclerosis of objectivity on the role of values among economic policy experts schumpeter once observed that frequently economists not content with their scientific task yield to the call of public duty and to their desire to serve their country and their age by acting as policy experts and policy advocates schumpeter i949 p 346 this raises the issue discussed by gunnar myrdal i958 p 4 of whether social scientists can be practical and at the same time objective what is the relation between wanting to understand and wanting to change society how can the search for true knowledge be combined with moral and political valuations myrdal s questions point to serious but rarely discussed issues of objectivity and values when economists and other social scientists become involved in the making of public policy often in areas of conflict between major interest groups in western societies see also myrdal i 929 i 958 blaug i 992 ch 5 1 in everyday life the roles of the policy expert and the policy advocate tend to merge this mixing can be understood in terms of sen s distinction between b sic values supposed to apply under all conceivable circumstances and nonbasic values expected to hold only under specified factual circumstances sen i970 p 59 policymaking is typically concerned with non basic values economists can change the goals and choices of policymakers by changing their views of what the facts are by acting as policy advisors many brilliant economists have undoubtedly done excellent service to their countries and their times in this context names such as that of john maynard keynes come to many people s mind however it has also been noted that economic policy advisers frequently rely on anecdotal evidence and misleading statistics stigler i965 rivlin i986 krugman i994 like bad weather this situation has typically been accepted as a necessary evil from the point of view of scientific progress as well as the democratic process however the intellectual responsibility of academic policy experts must be increased with only the threat of losing intellectual credibility as a potential sanction from time to time they should therefore be required to

income tax deductions for losses as insurance the federal income tax allows deductions for some categories of personal losses notably for casualty losses such as destruction of one s home or car and medical expenses above a threshold the latter even with lower marginal rates and further restrictions brought about by the 1986 tax reform involves more than a 3 billion annual revenue loss office of management and budget 1990 1 deductions like these act as partial insurance individuals receive a tax benefit equal to their marginal rate multiplied by the magnitude of their loss however this form of insurance is unnecessary when private insurance is available moreover as will be emphasized here these deductions have a perverse effect because they are allowed only for the uninsured portion of losses this induces individuals to be less protected against risk in the aggregate than if the implicit insurance provided by the tax system were unavailable if the tax rate is sufficiently high individuals would forgo insurance coverage altogether 2 it will be demonstrated that a tax system with no deductions for personal losses pareto dominates the current system these conclusions are demonstrated in section i using a simple model in which risk averse individuals may purchase actuarially fair insurance against loss and individual behavior does not affect the risk of loss no moral hazard section ii considers the applicability of the results when one allows for moral hazard administrative costs and other imperfections it also discusses the applicability of traditional notions of tax equity

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

uncertainty risk and trust russian and american credit card markets compared the strategies that russian and american banks use to evaluate the creditworthiness of prospective credit card holders are compared drawing on knight s theory of risk and uncertainty the authors argue that uncertainty inherent in any credit transaction can only be reduced to measurable risk if there are institutions that create stability over time categorize events properly and allow for verification and accumulation of information in the united states the gradual evolution of institutions underpinning rational calculation permits the transformation of uncertainty into risk in russia however such institutions are absent and a great degree of uncertainty prevails in consumer credit using data from original fieldwork in moscow this study demonstrates that when actors face uncertainty and are unable to calculate risk they rely on trust russian banks use and extend their existing social ties or in some cases build new ties they also exploit cardholders own networks unrelated to the bank to increase their accountability through anchoring these strategies however keep the market embedded limited in size and uninsurable the authors conclude that calculation of probabilities and economic rationality in its formal sense is not an innate human ability but a social capacity that exists courtesy of institutional arrangements

the relative absolute nature of knowledge and economic analysis central to economic analysis are assumptions and hypotheses concerning the extent and nature of the knowledge held by individuals in this respect it is a noticeable feature of realist accounts that they tend to focus upon the pervasiveness of uncertainty as an undeniable fact of economic life nonrealist or instrumentalist accounts in contrast tend to assume that agents have perfect information correct foresight rational expectations and so on it is also apparent that this realist focus upon uncertainty tends to give rise to a concentration of attention upon those situations in which possibly numerically measurable probabilistic knowledge is thought to be available clearly such accounts are important nevertheless i wish to suggest that such a restricted choice of focus for the realist is not entirely satisfactory since in particular it tends to lead to a neglect of the widespread observation that feelings of certainty and claims to truth are also pervasive in human society i want to suggest moreover that if we are to account for the latter observation and economists concerned with realism of analysis surely need to then various arguments and conclusions have to be taken on board which in turn appear to bear consequentially upon the nature and conduct of economic analysis in general section i below discusses such possible limitations of existing realist accounts of agent knowledge in some detail the suggested route for responding to and resolving apparent problems which involves the argument that aspects of knowledge can have a relative as well as an absolute character is described in sections ii and iii and the various analytical consequences of the account there set out are discussed in section iv section v contains concluding comments and touches upon ways in which the proposed account might be appraised and rnade operational

ambiguity and underwriter decision processes this paper provides empirical evidence that risk and ambiguity affect underwriters decisions on pricing insurance a field study of primary insurance underwriters in a random sample of commercial property and casualty insurance companies reveals that premiums are significantly higher for risks when there is either ambiguity regarding the probability of a particular event occurring and or uncertainty about the magnitude of the resulting loss the paper suggests economic and organizational rationales for this behaviour and offers several explanations as to why insurers in a competitive market can charge higher prices for ambiguous risks which promise to yield excess profits in the long run

endogenous cycles in a stiglitz weiss economy the literature on financial imperfections and business cycles has focused onpropagation mechanisms in this paper we model a purereversion mechanism such that the economy may converge to a two period equilibrium cycle this mechanism confirms that financial imperfections may have a dramatic amplification effect unlike in some related models contracts are complete indexation is not assumed away the welfare properties of a possible stabilizing policy are analyzed the model itself is a dynamic extension of the well known stiglitz weiss model of lending under moral hazard although stylized the model still captures some important features of credit cycles

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation