optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

put call parity and expected returns this study examines the hypothesis that in the presence of market frictions relative put and call prices contain information concerning future returns of the underlying asset a measure of relative prices is derived from the put call parity relationship for index options and applied to a three year sample of oex option transactions the results show that the measure of relative index option prices leads the stock market by at least 15 minutes

airport congestion when carriers have market power this paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic showing how the results of the road pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power the analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist congestion is fully internalized yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions under a cournot oligopoly however carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves a toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic the analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence

integrating replenishment decisions with advance demand information there is a growing consensus that a portfolio of customers with different demand lead times can lead to higher more regular revenues and better capacity utilization customers with positive demand lead times place orders in advance of their needs resulting inadvance demand information this gives rise to the problem of finding effective inventory control policies under advance demand information we show that state dependent s s and base stock policies are optimal for stochastic inventory systems with and without fixed costs the state of the system reflects our knowledge of advance demand information we also determine conditions under which advance demand information has no operational value a numerical study allows us to obtain additional insights and to evaluate strategies to induce advance demand information

the interrelation of stock and options market trading volume data this research empirically investigates the relation between common stock and call option trading volumes the paper hyothesizes and tests a sequential flow of information between the stock and option markets if information trading for cboe listed firms is predominantly accomplished through option trading then existing research methodologies may be biased against finding any significant economic consequences in those instances where option listing is an important variable results indicate that trading in call options leads trading in the underlying shares with a one day lag black 2 suggests that information traders may prefer trading in options rather than shares due to economic incentives provided by reduced transaction costs capital requirements and trading restrictions and due to the greater action afforded by option trading manaster and rendleman 12 empirically support black s 2 option information trading preference finding incremental information content in option prices up to twenty four hours prior to its reflection in stock prices jennings and starks 10 report that the stock price adjustment process upon arrival of new information differs for those firms listed on the chicago board option exchange cboe and they demonstrate that stock price adjustment to new information occurs more rapidly for firms with listed call options the results in both papers appear to warrant consideration of an optiontrading variable in the design of empirical tests both manaster and rendleman 12 and jennings and starks 10 investigate the price relation between shares and call options this paper investigates trading volume copeland 4 posits the use of trading volume as a proxy for the rate of information arrival he concludes that the relation between absolute value of price changes and volume is positive and linear if one accepts a sequentialinformation arrival hypothesis as valid the present research hypothesizes and tests a sequential flow of information between the stock and option markets analyses presented are based on econometric tests for causality1 derived from the works of granger 6 and sims 22 if information trading takes place

portfolio return autocorrelation abstract this paper investigates whether portfolio return autocorrelation can be explained by time varying expected returns nontrading state limit orders market maker inventory policy or transaction costs evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that transaction costs cause portfolio autocorrelation by slowing price adjustment i develop a transaction cost model which predicts that prices adjust faster when changes in valuation are large in relation to the bid ask spread cross sectional tests support this prediction but time series tests do not

on the effect of demand randomness on inventories and costs we explore analytically cardinal effects of the extent of demand randomness on optimal inventory levels and the associated expected costs to model changes in demand randomness we make extensive use of a mean preserving transformation commonly used in probabilistic microeconomics as well as the notion of risk pooling aggregating independent demands for the single period news vendor model the order quantity and associated costs are shown to depend on the randomness parameter in a simple and highly interpretable manner we show by a simple example that in some situations risk pooling might neither reduce inventories nor move them closer to the mean or median demand the managerial relevance of such analyses is discussed

trading mechanisms and stock returns an empirical investigation this paper examines the effects of the mechanism by which securities are traded on their price behavior we compare the behavior of open to open and close to close returns on nyse stocks given the differences in execution methods applied in the opening and closing transactions opening returns are found to exhibit greater dispersion greater deviations from normality and a more negative and significant autocorrelation pattern than closing returns we study the effects of the bid ask spread and the price adjustment process on the estimated return variances and covariances and discuss the associated biases we conclude that the trading mechanism has a significant effect on stock price behavior

option prices as predictors of equilibrium stock prices the black scholes option pricing model modified for dividend payments is used to calculate jointly implied stock prices and implied standard deviations a comparison of the implied stock prices with observed stock prices reveals that the implied prices contain information regarding equilibrium stock prices that is not fully reflected in observed stock prices the implications of this finding are discussed this study investigates the role of call option prices as predictors of the equilibrium prices of their underlying stocks using the black scholes 3 bs model previous tests of the bs model have shown that the formula is highly successful in explaining the observed market prices of options see black and scholes 2 galai 8 chiras and manaster 6 and macbeth and merville 12 according to the model the option price is a function of the current value of the underlying stock the instantaneous variance of the stock s rate of return the time to maturity of the option the risk free rate of interest and the exercise price of the option 1 given an observed option price and known values of all input parameters to the bs model except the stock price one can determine the price of the underlying stock that equates the observed option price to its calculated value it follows from the underlying logic of the model that the implied price is the value of the underlying stock for which a continuously revised option bond portfolio would be a perfect substitute for the stock hence if options are actually priced according to the model implied stock prices will be the option market s assessment of equilibrium stock values previous empirical studies have assumed that observed stock prices are the relevant stock prices for option valuation however just as stock prices may differ in the short run from one exchange to another i e nyse midwest

distributional consequences of airport congestion pricing abstract imposition of airport congestion pricing redistributes welfare among commercial regional and general aviation this article extends daniel s econometrica63 327 370 1995 stochastic bottleneck model with dynamically adjusting traffic rates queuing delays and congestion fees to include elastic demand heterogeneous operating time preferences and heterogeneous layover and queuing time values using parameters from minneapolis st paul airport simulations of congestion pricing determine its effects on equilibrium traffic patterns queuing delays schedule delays airport revenues and social welfare gains by commercial aviation common travelers and airport authorities exceed losses by general and regional aviation the article evaluates several price and rebate programs and proposes several that are self financing and pareto improving

airport charges and capacity expansion effects of concessions and privatization abstract this paper examines the decisions on airport charges and capacity expansion made by airports with different objectives we find that allowing an airport to have profitable concession operations may be more welfare improving than the alternative of depriving the airport of all profits from concession operations furthermore the airport charge of a social welfare maximizing airport would be lower than that of a budget constrained public airport which in turn would be lower than that of a privatized airport pursuing profit maximization we also show that a constrained public airport would add capacity later than a social welfare maximizing airport whilst a privatized airport would add capacity later still given that constrained public airports represent the second best situation the capacity decisions of privatized airports would be socially suboptimal

reducing the cost of demand uncertainty through accurate response to early sales traditionally fashion products have incurred high losses due to stockouts and inventory obsolence because long lead times coupled with a concentrated selling season force all or at least most production to be committed before demand information is available under a quick response system lead times are shortened sufficiently to allow a greater portion of production to be scheduled in response to initial demand we model and analyze the decisions required under quick response and give a method for estimating the demand probability distributions needed in our model we applied these procedures with a major fashion skiwear firm and found that cost relative to the current informal response system was reduced by enough to increase profits by 60 relative to the cost that would have been incurred if no response were used optimized response reduces cost by enough to roughly quadruple profits

congestion pricing and capacity of large hub airports a bottleneck model with stochastic queues this paper models and estimates congestion prices and capacity for large hub airports the model includes stochastic queues time varying traffic rates and endogenous intertemporal adjustment of traffic in response to queuing delay and fees relative costs of queuing and schedule delays are estimated using data from minneapolis st paul simulations calculate equilibrium traffic patterns queuing delays schedule delays congestion fees airport revenues airport capacity and efficiency gains the paper also investigates whether a dominant airline internalizes delays its aircraft impose it tests game theoretic specifications with atomistic nash dominant stackelberg dominant and collusive airline traffic

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

air travel choices in multi airport markets abstract we study how air travel consumers departing from a multi airport region trade off across airport and airline supply characteristics we empirically investigate this trade off by estimating a weighted conditional logit model of airport airline choice using survey data on travels departing from one of three san francisco bay area airports and arriving at one of four airports in greater los angeles in october 1995 non price characteristics like airport access time airport delay flight frequency the availability of particular airport airline combinations and early arrival times are found to strongly affect choice probabilities we calculate marginal effects and counterfactual scenarios to compare the values of these characteristics among each other and across traveler type in order to examine the robustness of the conditional logit model we estimate a mixed logit model and find that the results are similar we attribute the similarity to our strictly defined travel market and to our distinction between leisure and business travelers thus controlling for two important sources of consumer heterogeneity we consider the implications of our empirical findings on vertical integration between airlines and airports on the effectiveness of airport dominance and on the competitive effect of entry by low cost carriers

third degree price discrimination in the presence of congestion externality this paper analyzes third degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served the model features the business passenger and leisure passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation and a less price elastic demand than leisure passengers our main result is the identification of the time valuation effect of price discrimination which can work in the opposite direction as the well known output effect on welfare this time valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output

congestible facility rivalry in vertical structures abstract this paper investigates rivalry between congestible facilities and its effects on facility charges capacities and congestion delays by incorporating the downstream carriers into the analysis we find that i the duopoly facilities have lower prices than the monopolist but they offer lower service quality only if capacity decisions are made prior to facility price decisions when the capacity and price decisions are made simultaneously the duopolists will provide the same service quality as the monopolist ii conditional on facility charges the monopolist will have the same capacity investment rules as the central planner if and only if the downstream carrier markets are perfectly competitive at both facilities if there is one carrier market that is imperfectly competitive the monopoly capacity rules will be different from the socially optimal capacity rules iii the monopolist will offer the same service quality at a facility as the central planner if the carrier market is perfectly competitive otherwise the monopolist offers a higher service level than the central planner we also find that for given capacities a the duopolists equilibrium prices increase with the time costs of either consumers or carriers b entrance of a new carrier to any of the facilities depresses the prices charged by both facilities and c lower marginal cost of the carriers at one facility induces a higher price at that facility but a lower price at the other facility

airport and airline competition for passengers departing from a large metropolitan area abstract in this paper an airport and airline choice model based on a nested multinomial logit model is developed to investigate both airport competition and airline competition in a metropolitan area with multiple departure airports the model can be used to analyze the effects of e g an improvement in accessibility of a specific airport in a metropolitan area it is shown analytically that if the frequency elasticity of demand is smaller than 1 unique airfare frequency and passenger charge equilibria exist next symmetric equilibria are derived analytically their properties are also examined finally asymmetric equilibria are derived numerically while their properties are discussed as well

airport pricing congestion tolls lumpy investment and cost recovery abstract in this paper we investigate the relationship between congestion tolls and capacity expansion costs for congestion prone transportation infrastructures with lumpy investment with constant variable costs and social marginal cost pricing this relationship determines the cost recovery status of an infrastructure authority the theoretical model for optimal user charges and the timing of capacity expansion shows that the relative magnitudes of total congestion tolls and total capacity costs in an investment cycle depend on the time pattern of traffic growth a point overlooked in the literature a queuing model is used to conduct a numerical experiment to determine the cost recovery ratios under various time paths of traffic growth

monopoly regulation under asymmetric information prices versus quantities we compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs fixing either the price or quantity for each instrument we consider sophisticated screening and simple bunching mechanisms we characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance with unknown demand and increasing marginal costs the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease the simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase with unknown costs both instruments are equivalent

optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports and the efficiency of atomistic charges abstract this paper investigates and compares airport pricing policies under various types of competition considering both per passenger and per flight charges at congested airports we show that an airport requires both pricing instruments to achieve the first best outcome and we distinguish their role by showing that congestion externalities need to be addressed through per flight tolls whereas the inefficiency caused by airlines market power exertion must be corrected with per passenger subsidies we also show that bertrand competition with differentiated products a type of behavior recently pointed out by the empirical literature as pertinent has policy implications that diverge from analyses that assume cournot competition the welfare gains and congestion reductions of congestion pricing would be higher than what has been advanced before the degree of self financing of airport infrastructure under optimal pricing would be increased and may approach exact self financing and the implied differentiation of charges between asymmetric airlines would be significantly smaller presumably enhancing the political feasibility of welfare maximizing congestion pricing as the potential distributional concerns would be decreased finally we numerically analyze second best policies and find that atomistic pricing may offer a relatively attractive alternative to first best congestion pricing

why option prices lag stock prices a trading based explanation while many studies find that option prices lead stock prices stephan and wvhaley 1990 find that stocks lead options we find no evidence that options even deep out of the money options lead stocks after confirming stephan and whaley s results we show their results can be explained as spurious leads induced by infrequent trading of options we show that the stock lead disappears when the average of the bid and ask prices is used instead of transaction prices hence we find no evidence of arbitrage opportunities associated with the stock lead in a perfect market price discrepancies should be instantly arbitraged away in particular option prices should neither lead nor lag stock prices in real markets only very short leads should occur traders with private information who are confident that their information is valid and that they will not be detected generally want highly leveraged positions to exploit their advantage thus we might expect options with their greater leverage to lead stocks if information trading is important manaster and rendleman 1982 bhattacharya 1987 and anthony 1988 find evidence that options

atomistic congestion tolls at concentrated airports seeking a unified view in the internalization debate abstract the goal of this paper is to bring some unity to the theoretical side of the debate on internalization of airport congestion by showing that all the literature s theoretical results can be derived within one simple and unified framework the analysis starts by replicating the results of brueckner brueckner j k 2002 airport congestion when carriers have market power american economic review 92 1357 1375 who showed that because airlines behaving in cournot fashion internalize congestion they should be charged low congestion tolls the analysis then validates the findings of daniel daniel j i 1995 congestion pricing and capacity of large hub airports a bottleneck model with stochastic queues econometrica 63 327 370 who argued that larger atomistic tolls are required in a model where a stackelberg leader interacts with competitive fringe airlines however it is shown that this result only holds approximately when the carriers outputs are imperfect substitutes

demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution this paper examines two ways channel members at the manufacturing and retail ends deal with asymmetric information in the context of new product introduction a manufacturer who has private information that demand for a new product will be high can differentiate itself from a manufacturer less confident of demand by undertaking high levels of pre launch advertising and offering a high wholesale price a retailer for its part can screen potentially high demand from potentially low demand products by stipulating a take it or leave it slotting allowance the assumption being that the offer will be accepted only by manufacturers confident of sufficient demand to recover the high initial cost of slotting allowances it is shown that manufacturers prefer to signal demand through advance advertising and wholesale price retailers to screen demand through slotting allowances it is shown that unless advance advertising is sufficiently effective slotting allowances yield higher total channel profits and higher social welfare

the impact of demand uncertainty on consumer subsidies for green technology adoption this paper studies government subsidies for green technology adoption while considering the manufacturing industry s response government subsidies offered directly to consumers impact the supplier s production and pricing decisions our analysis expands the current understanding of the price setting newsvendor model incorporating the external influence from the government who is now an additional player in the system we quantify how demand uncertainty impacts the various players government industry and consumers when designing policies we further show that for convex demand functions an increase in demand uncertainty leads to higher production quantities and lower prices resulting in lower profits for the supplier with this in mind one could expect consumer surplus to increase with uncertainty in fact we show that this is not always the case and that the uncertainty impact on consumer surplus depends on the trade off between lower prices and the possibility of underserving customers with h

the effect of air traffic delays on airline prices abstract a legislative change in takeoff and landing restrictions at laguardia airport provides an opportunity to study the effect of an exogenous shock to product quality on prices in the airline industry i test how the price response varies with the degree of competition in the market i find that prices fall by 1 42 on average for each additional minute of flight delay and that the price response is substantially larger in more competitive markets

congestion pricing of canadian airports abstract under congestion pricing canadian airports would annually save between 72 and 105 million social costs per landing and takeoff decrease about 300 at toronto and vancouver and 50 at calgary and montreal slot constraints fail to eliminate this airport congestion congestion prices are lower on average than existing weight based prices current airport capacity accommodates at least five more years of traffic growth before congestion reaches current levels substantial welfare gains occur even if dominant airlines already internalize their self imposed delays this article calculates equilibrium congestion pricing schedules traffic rates queuing delays layover times and connection times by time of day

dynamic oligopoly behaviour in the airline industry abstract this paper examines the dynamic interaction between united airlines and american airlines on a set of duopoly routes we estimate quarterly conduct parameters or conjectural variations and test constant behaviour bertrand cournot and collusive models we also test two regimeswitching models derived from the green porter price war model one based on reversion to bertrand behaviour during price wars the other on reversion to cournot behaviour the three constant behaviour models are all rejected the regime switching models can both describe the data but the cournot based version is preferred

pricing the major us hub airports abstract implementing congestion pricing at 27 major us airports would reduce delays by 13 passenger years and 1000 aircraft hours every day saving 3 5 million dollars daily chicago and atlanta would save about 1000 dollars per aircraft airport revenues would increase about 11 million dollars daily a bottleneck model with stochastic queues estimates substantial welfare gains whether or not airlines internalize self imposed delays erroneously imposing fees from the non internalizing specification on internalizing airlines however would be a costly mistake the model calculates equilibrium traffic rates queuing delays layover times connection times and congestion fee schedules by minute of the day

channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts abstract demand for a new product is often highly uncertain as the developer of a new product the manufacturer may reduce the uncertainty of the product s demand through observing progress in his product development process or receiving demand signals directly from customers this paper first shows that a centralized channel always benefits from improved demand information yet to realize this benefit in a decentralized manufacturer retailer channel the manufacturer needs to disclose his private demand information to the retailer we show that the manufacturer s incentive to share his improved demand information depends on the supply contract signed with the retailer furthermore mandating the manufacturer to disclose his improved demand information can actually reduce the total channel profit we provide managerial insights by analyzing three widely used contract forms we investigate whether these contracts are robust under an unanticipated demand information update observed by the manufacturer we show that the quantity flexibility contract with a high return rate is not robust the buyback contract however is robust and always achieves information sharing while preserving channel performance

effects of asymmetric information on airport congestion management mechanisms abstract we study and compare three different mechanisms for capacity slot allocation in a congested airport when airlines have one dimensional private information direct allocation of slots differentiated tolls and slot auctions with perfect information direct allocation is a first best policy which can be implemented through pigouvian taxes or slot auctions the mechanisms are equivalent in terms of social welfare with the introduction of asymmetric information this equivalence is lost direct allocation is always ex post inefficient and in some cases tolls and subsequent quantity delegation is a better alternative social welfare wise auctions may be superior or inferior to tolls we further show that naive application of pigouvian tolls is sub optimal when imperfect information exists

the economics of airport congestion pricing abstract conventional economic wisdom suggests that congestion pricing would be an appropriate response to cope with the growing congestion levels currently experienced at many airports several characteristics of aviation markets however may make naive congestion prices equal to the value of marginal travel delays a non optimal response this paper develops a model of airport pricing that captures a number of these features the model in particular reflects that 1 airlines typically have market power and are engaged in oligopolistic competition at different sub markets 2 part of external travel delays that aircraft impose are internal to an operator and hence should not be accounted for in congestion tolls and 3 different airports in an international network will typically not be regulated by the same authority we present an analytical treatment for a simple two node network and some numerical results to illustrate our findings some main conclusions are that second best optimal tolls are typically lower than what would be suggested by congestion costs alone and may even be negative and that cooperation between regulators need not be stable but that non cooperation may lead to welfare losses also when compared to a no tolling situation

overreaction and insider trading evidence from growth and value portfolios insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks we find that insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories insider buying also is greater after low stock returns and lower after high stock returns these findings are consistent with a version of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values do market prices reflect investor overreaction 1 the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on this question however new evidence is unlikely to change many minds if the findings depend on the newly controversial capital asset pricing model capm or multifactor models or if they involve datasnooping 2 we bypass these problems by not using capm or a benchmark model and by examining a new set of data we measure insider buying and selling in stocks that are ranked by measures such as the ratio of cash flow per share to price per share cf p 3 current practice refers to stocks with low cf p as growth stocks and to stocks with high cf p as value stocks we examine the direction of insider trades along the growth value spectrum to see if they are consistent with attempts to profit from market overreaction by overreaction we mean price movements that predictably reverse this experiment does not require an asset pricing model because we do not examine the returns accruing to insider trades 4

airlines strategic interactions and airport pricing in a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion abstract this paper analyzes efficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm unlike much of the previous literature we combine a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion and a vertical structure model that explicitly considers the role of airlines and passengers we show that a stackelberg leader interacting with a competitive fringe partially internalizes congestion and that there are various toll regimes that induce the welfare maximizing outcome widening the set of choices for regulators in particular charging the congestion toll that would apply for fully competitive carriers and that ignores any internalization to both the leader and the fringe yields the first best outcome

optimal metering in the bottleneck congestion model abstract this paper examines whether metering entry to highways can reduce commuting costs we consider a modified version of the bottleneck congestion model which includes travel time downstream of the bottleneck the highway authority s choice of an entry rate enables it to substitute queuing time for travel time the authority s choice is constrained by the road s speed flow curve we find that the benefits of metering increase as the speed that would prevail in the absence of metering decreases and as the speed flow curve gets flatter the major cost of metering is providing a holding area for vehicles waiting to enter

price vs quantity based approaches to airport congestion management abstract this paper analyzes price and quantity based approaches to management of airport congestion using a model where airlines are asymmetric and internalize congestion under these circumstances optimal congestion tolls are differentiated across carriers and a uniformity requirement on airport charges as occurs when slots are sold or tolls are uniform distorts carrier flight choices flight volumes tend to be too low for large carriers and too high for small carriers but quantity based regimes where the airport authority allocates a fixed number of slots via free distribution or an auction lead carriers to treat total flight volume and thus congestion as fixed and this difference generates an efficient outcome as long as the number of slots is optimally chosen

peak load pricing of a transportation route with an unpriced substitute abstract this paper considers two routes to work which could be two bridges a freeway and a tollroad or roadway travel and subway travel both routes are subject to pure bottleneck and queue congestion if peak load pricing can be imposed on both routes the first best solution is attained however if one route is unpriced then the other route should have a second best time varying toll that is negative at the tails of the rush hour positive near the peak of the rush hour and zero on average if the two routes have the same capacities and if the parameter g is 1 then two thirds of the total traffic should use the priced route and the efficiency gain of second best pricing is two thirds of the efficiency gain of first best pricing

prices capacities and service levels in a congestible bertrand duopoly we study the duopolistic interaction between congestible facilities that supply perfect substitutes and that make sequential decisions on capacities and prices the consumers time cost of accessing or using a facility is determined by the volume capacity ratio we analyze duopoly prices capacities and service quality defined as the inverse of time costs of using the facility and compare the results to monopoly and first best outcomes findings include the following first while price competition between duopolists is beneficial for consumers introducing capacity competition is harmful the duopolist offers lower service quality than the monopolist who does provide the socially optimal quality level second higher marginal costs of capacity may increase profits third asymmetric nash equilibria may result even when firms are ex ante identical more specifically when capacity is cheap or demand is relatively inelastic the only stable equilibria are asymmetric in such an equilibrium the large facility provides high quality at a high price and the smaller facility offers lower quality at lower prices in other words there is endogenous product differentiation by ex ante identical firms

the economic effects of non optimal pricing and investment policies for substitutable transport facilities a dynamic simulation model of subbstitutable transportation facilities demonstrated the welfare revenue and capacity implications of various non optimal pricing and investment policies applications to a major airport and an urban transportation system an expressway and a subway showed that in both cases the welfare surface surrounding the optimal policy is relatively flat for a substantial range and that existing policies are also on this range for both transportation systems a policy of financial self sufficiency is on this range for the airport but not for the urban transportation system author

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

price adjustment delays and arbitrage costs evidence from the behavior of convertible preferred prices price adjustment delays occur between in the money convertible preferred stock prices and common stock prices convertible preferred prices systematically deviate from the prices predicted from their conversion relations with common stocks the price predictability stems from price changes in the underlying common stocks leading the price changes in the convertible preferred stocks by up to nine hours cross sectionally about 70 percent of the variation in the unsigned size of the price deviations is explained by proxies for costs of arbitrage

left for dead anti competitive behavior in orbital space in a dynamic investment framework with depreciation we show incumbent satellite operators have incentives to warehouse a fraction of their assigned spectrum and orbital slots keeping nonoperational assets in place which reduces output increases prices and diminishes social welfare exploring three distinct market structures we model firms incentives to warehouse and show conditions under which firms choose to warehouse rather than replace nonfunctioning satellites we find a dominant firm with a competitive fringe produces more and longer duration warehousing relative to perfect competition or monopoly regulators could remediate warehousing by increasing a firm s marginal costs or by increasing the probability of reallocating orbital slots that do not have a fully functioning satellite

sequential peak load pricing the case of airports and airlines we investigate airport peak load pricing using a vertical structure of airport and airlines we find that a profit maximizing airport would charge higher peak and off peak runway prices and a higher peak off peak price differential than a public airport consequently airport privatization would lead to both fewer total passengers and fewer passengers in the peak period although peak travelling passengers benefit from fewer delays this low level of peak congestion is not efficient suggesting that airport privatization cannot be judged based on its effect on congestion alone we also examine pricing behaviour of a public airport constrained to charge a time independent price on etudie la tarification de pointe dans une structure verticale d aeroports et de compagnies d aviation on decouvre qu un aeroport qui maximise ses profits chargerait des prix plus eleves pour l usage des pistes tant aux heures de pointe qu en autre temps qu un aeroport public ainsi qu un differentiel plus grand entre ces differents moments en consequence la privatisation des aeroports va entrainer a la fois moins de passagers et moins de passagers aux heures de pointe meme si ceux qui voyagent aux heures de pointe vont devoir subir moins de delais cette moindre congestion n est pas efficace voila qui suggere qu on ne doit pas evaluer la privatisation des aeroports seulement a l aune de l impact sur la congestion les auteurs examinent aussi les strategies de tarification d un aeroport public contraint a imposer une tarification qui ne peut varier selon le moment d usage dans le temps

do carriers internalize congestion costs empirical evidence on the internalization question abstract economists have long suggested overhauling the existing u s airport landing departure fees to reflect market valuations of scarce runway capacity economists however do not agree on the optimal congestion based pricing scheme while some researchers advocate for a uniform congestion fee regardless of a carrier s airport market share others suggest that airport tolls should only reflect the congestion costs imposed on other carriers this paper uses ten years of ontime performance data to empirically determine if carriers internalize congestion costs while previous researchers e g mayer christopher sinai todd 2003a network effects congestion externalities and air traffic delays or why all delays are not evil american economic review 93 4 1194 1215 use excess travel time to measure flight delays the contribution of this paper is the addition of on time arrival and delay measures based on actual versus scheduled arrival and departure times we find that estimates based on these new delay measures reverse earlier findings by mayer and sinai 2003a network effects congestion externalities and air traffic delays or why all delays are not evil american economic review 93 4 1194 1215 and hence imply that carriers are not internalizing flight congestion costs

excludable public goods pricing and social welfare maximization abstract we compare two pricing strategies buffet pricing and usage pricing of excludable public goods for social welfare maximization buffet pricing is better than usage pricing for low consumer heterogeneity while the opposite holds for high consumer heterogeneity

the impacts of the full returns policy on a supply chain with information asymmetry abstract in contrast to the existing return policies literature assuming that information is symmetrical between the manufacturer and the retailer we study the full returns policy s impact on supply chains with information asymmetry we first study the case that the base level of the demand follows a discrete distribution with two states we find that the retailer benefits from the full returns policy in all circumstances while the manufacturer and the supply chain are better off under some conditions we then consider the situation in which the base level of the demand is a type of ar 1 process

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

network effects congestion externalities and air traffic delays or why not all delays are evil we examine two factors that explain air traffic congestion network benefits due to hubbing and congestion externalities while both factors impact congestion we find that the hubbing effect dominates empirically hub carriers incur most of the additional travel time from hubbing primarily because they cluster their flights in short time spans to provide passengers as many potential connections as possible with a minimum of waiting time non hub flights at the same hub airports operate with minimal additional travel time these results suggest that an optimal congestion tax might have a relatively small impact on flight patterns at hub airports jel l2 l5 l9 d6

intraday price change and trading volume relations in the stock and stock option markets this study investigates intraday relations between price changes and trading volume of options and stocks for a sample of firms whose options traded on the cboe during the first quarter of 1986 after purging the price change series of the effects of bid ask spreads multivariate time series analysis is used to estimate the lead lag relation between the price changes in the option and stock markets the results indicate that price changes in the stock market lead the option market by as much as fifteen minutes the analysis of trading volume indicates that the stock market lead may be even longer the intense trading activity in and in fact the very existence of organized stock option markets attest to the economic benefits that these financial contracts provide reduced transaction costs and increased financial leverage are two reasons why trading in the stock option market may be more attractive than trading in the market for the underlying stock in addition these cheaper and more flexible trading opportunities attract new and differently informed investors to the marketplace the resulting increase in trading activity together with the inextricable arbitrage linkage between stock and option prices imply an increase in market efficiency this study investigates empirically the intraday price change and trading volume relations between stocks and options for a sample of firms whose options were actively traded on the chicago board options exchange during the first quarter of 1986 in particular intraday call option price changes are translated into implied stock price changes using the american call option pricing model these intraday implied stock price changes are then compared with the actual stock price changes to identify which if either market leads the other in perfectly functioning capital markets there should be complete simultaneity between the series that is new information disseminating into the marketplace should be reflected in the prices and the trading activity of both securities simultaneously institutional factors however may make the stock option market more attractive to information traders this may cause price changes and trading activity due to new information to be observed in the option market first followed by price

another look at airport congestion pricing we study alternate approaches to implement congestion pricing at us airports conventional formulations toll all aircraft without determining whether a plane operated by a given airline delays other planes that it operates or planes operated by other airlines recent work points out optimal pricing calls for carriers to be charged only for the delay they impose on other airlines we find a small difference between the net benefits generated by the two congestion pricing policies because the bulk of airport delays are not internalized and because the efficiency loss from pricing internalized congestion is small jel l11 l93 r41

price changes of related securities the case of call options and stocks this paper tests the hypothesis that option prices contain information not reflected in con temporaneous stock prices an options transactions data base is used for the purpose the evidence suggests that the magnitude of anticipation of stock prices by option prices is insufficient to overcome the bid ask spread for intra day holding periods implications of the profits in the overnight holding periods are discussed

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

manipulable congestion tolls the recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency though agents are large enough to recognize self imposed congestion and exert market power over prices they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion tolls when large agents are confronted with tolls derived under this parametric assumption but understand the rule used to generate them the toll system will no longer guide the market to the social optimum to address this problem the present paper derives alternate manipulable toll rules which are designed to achieve the social optimum when agents anticipate the full impact of their actions on toll liabilities