the financial effects of fuel adjustment clauses on electric utilities during the 1970s fuel adjustment clauses facs were adopted by many electric utilities as a means of adjusting electricity prices when per unit fuel costs changed recently many state regulators have questioned the need for facs since fuel costs have become more stable some have been reluctant to abolish facs because of fear that an electric utility s financial risk will increase and with it the cost of capital for the utility this article shows empirically that the risk effects of facs may be quite small and that risk could actually decline if an fac is removed however a wealth effect may exist that should be considered before an fac is abolished copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

risk price regulation and irreversible investment abstract we show that regulators price setting rate base and allowed rate of return decisions are inextricably linked if prices are set so that regulated firms just break even whenever they are forced to invest breaking even ex ante is a necessary condition for ramsey pricing to be sustainable over time unless regulators adopt traditional rate of return regulation the irreversibility of much infrastructure investment significantly alters the results of the approach to price setting described by marshall et al 1981 marshall william j yawitz jess b greenberg edward 1981 optimal regulation under uncertainty journal of finance 36 4 909 921 in particular the practice of optimizing inefficient assets out of the regulated firm s rate base as occurs in total element long run incremental cost calculations in telecommunications exposes the firm to demand risk the firm requires an economically significant premium for bearing this risk and this premium is a function of both the systematic and unsystematic risk of demand shocks in addition we argue that if the firm is to break even under incentive regulation then the level of the rate base will exceed the optimized replacement cost by an amount which we interpret as the value of the excess capacity of the firm s assets if this component is excluded from the rate base incentive regulation will not be sustainable

sources procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation fabio arcangeli paul david frank engelman christopher freeman massimo moggi richard nelson luigi orsenigo nathan rosenberg michele salvati g n von tunzelman two anonymous referees and the participants at the meeting of the committee on distribution growth and technical progress of the italian national research council cnr rome november 16 1985 have helped with various redraftings a particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of moses abramovitz this work has been undertaken at the science policy research unit spru university of sussex as part of the research program of the designated research centre sponsored by the economic and social research council esrc earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the italian national research council cnr is also gratefully acknowledged the statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of stephano brioschi ilaria fornari and giovannu prennushi

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

regulatory balancing and the efficiency of green r d we identify and analyse several dynamic implications of setting environmental standards such as to balance marginal costs and benefits the adoption of such a regulatory approach is shown to effect i the speed of improvement of abatement technologies ii the direction in a sense to be defined of that improvement iii its source and the distribution of the rents from it and iv the rate of development of defensive averting technologies existing views are thoroughly synthesised in the context of a simple diagrammatic model several new results are derived and at least one conventional wisdom questioned the message of the analysis for legislators and regulators is that cost benefit balancing should be done with care

an examination of the equilibrium specification and structure of production for canadian telecommunications multiple output models of canadian telecommunications production are estimated under different production equilibria a specification test is conducted between the short and long run equilibrium models and the long run equilibrium is rejected in order to capture the nature of the disequilibrium a dynamic cost of adjustment model is estimated for bell canada there are significant adjustment costs and it is estimated that for 1 00 of marginal capital costs the carrier must incur an additional cost of 0 30 to install the new capital into the production process

regulation the opec oil supply shock and wealth effects for electric utilities a popular view among specialists in electric utility economics is that the regulatory process exacerbated the negative effects of the opec s oil price increases during the 1970s in contrast peltzman s theory of regulation suggests that regulators should buffer a firm from cost increases this paper examines these contending propositions by examining the stock returns for a sample of electric utilities during the opec oil shock of october 1973 the data are more consistent with a buffering effect than a regulatory lag

optimal regulation under uncertainty this paper is concerned with the problem of price regulation when demand is uncertain uncertainty gives rise to substantial difficulties in determining both the return a firm s owners should be provided and a set of prices capable of producing that return we argue that conventional approaches to price regulation are incapable of attaining the economically desirable objectives of efficiency and an equitable return to investors the deficiencies in current practices are attributable to the separation of the risk measurement return determination and price setting activities in the conventional approach we present a model of the regulated firm that synthesizes contemporary financial market theory and the theory of the firm under uncertainty in our approach the income stream produced by the firm is valued ex ante in the financial market according to investors perceptions and preferences over risk return characteristics we portray the firm as producing risk and return by choosing among available production technologies to maximize its market value given the prices set by regulators within this framework it is shown that regulators can choose the lowest prices consistent with an equitable return to investors we also show that prices so chosen induce the choice of the optimal technology by the firm in the traditional regulatory framework as thoroughly described and explained by bonbright 3 the goal of regulators is to set rates in such a way that all costs are covered including a return on invested capital commensurate with the risk of equity investment determination of the latter is difficult at best it is generally agreed that 1 the fair return depends on risk 2 the return required by investors as compensation for risk bearing is most accurately measured by observing the returns to competitive firms in otherwise similar circumstances and 3 estimation of required returns by observation of other regulated firms is generally inappropriate since the risk and regulation effects are confounded more recently myers 13 has argued for the application of finance theory to rate determination within the traditional regulatory framework in particular he argues that the capital asset pricing model capm developed by sharpe 14 lintner 9 and mossin 12 is especially well suited for this purpose since a single quantitative measure of risk is relevant in that model further since the capm offers an explicit equilibrium risk return relationship information about the risks and returns of all firms can be directly employed in determining the fair return to a regulated firm

recursive factor of production interrelations and endogenous cycling a multivariate linear rational expectations equilibrium version of the lucas prescott investment model is developed to study the behavior of factors of productions with recursive interrelations the connection between these interrelations and endogenous cycling is established in a testable way maximum likelihood estimates using annual postwar aggregate u s manufacturing data provide strong evidence of capital labor interrelations that induce a labor overshooting type of endogenous cycling this raises questions for the methodology of current real business cycle models which rule out the possibility of such interrelations copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

supply and demand factors of cleaner technologies some empirical evidence this article identifies and analyzes factors that affect the willingness of firms and consumers to develop and adopt cleaner technologies cleaner technologies is used as a general term for pollution abatement technologies re use systems and environmentally sound consumer products and materials the article also contains the findings of three case studies on cleaner technologies cfc substitutes low solvent paints and coatings and membrane technology in which the importance of the identified factors is investigated from the case studies some general conclusions are drawn about these factors and the way in which policy instruments can be used to stimulate innovation in and diffusion of cleaner technologies no single policy instrument is considered to be optimal instead a policy mix is needed involving a much wider use of economic instruments

the influence of market demand upon innovation a critical review of some recent empirical studies abstract a number of recent empirical studies of technical change at the level of the individual firm have concluded that market demand is the dominant influence upon the innovation process calling forth innovations in market economies the pace of innovation in the private sector heavily influences the growth of national output and productivity and these studies and their conclusions have therefore received much attention having been extensively quoted in discussions of appropriate government policy for the encouragement of innovation this paper reviews a number of these studies and concludes that their findings and the interpretations of their findings in the secondary literature are seriously flawed and in many cases invalid the proposition that market demand governs the innovation process is by no means conclusively demonstrated in these studies and they are therefore inadequate and inappropriate guides for the formulation of policy most of the studies examined employ a working definition of demand factors which is so broad as to embrace a range of possible influences upon innovation which should more properly be classified elsewhere the concept of demand utilized in these studies bears little resemblance to the more restrictive and precise definition of market demand found in economics in addition the phenomena analyzed in these studies are a very heterogeneous lot the studies do not address identical empirical questions and their findings are as a result neither uniform nor unambiguous both demand and supply side influences are crucial to understanding the innovation process and it is the exclusive preoccupation with only one set of these forces which is criticized in this paper some implications of the criticism for government policy toward innovation are discussed in the conclusion

the diffusion of clean technologies a review with suggestions for future diffusion analysis abstract this article gives an overview of the literature on clean technology diffusion followed by suggestions for future analysis findings from diffusion analysis are presented in the form of 10 stylised facts helping the reader to see the forest for the trees the overall conclusion is that the diffusion of clean technology same as the diffusion of normal innovations is governed by endogenous mechanism epidemic learning and learning economies and by exogenous mechanisms policy is important for clean technology diffusion but other factors are important too the characteristics of the clean technology absorptive capacities of potential adopters and the age structure of capital it is often overlooked that companies have a choice they can choose between an end of pipe solution a process change adaptation and a change of process substitution this means that the diffusion and evolution of one clean technology will be at the expense of the diffusion of another clean technology something overlooked in studies on clean technology diffusion further research is needed on the influence of public policy on clean technology choice expectations about learning economies and prices adjustment costs network externalities and complementary innovations on clean technology adoption choices

rate of return regulation with price flexibility rate of return regulation is the standard technique used to try to correct for the allocative inefficiencies arising from granting monopolies to firms in industries exhibiting economies of scale the idea behind current practice is that regulators should set an output price such that the firm s profits will provide investors with a fair expected rate of return on invested capital while there has been considerable debate on the appropriate rate of return the modern view as originally expressed by myers 1972 is that the fair rate should be equal to that expected by investors in other firms with equivalent risk this paper considers a change in rate of return regulation that will dominate standard price setting rather than fixing the price that the regulated firm must charge the regulator should grant the firm the option to charge any price less than or equal to a ceiling price hereafter called the price flexibility option if the regulated firm has this flexibility both the consumers and the firm are at least as well off this option to raise and lower prices within a range specified by the regulator will increase the ex ante value of the this paper considers a change in rate of return regulation that will dominate standard price setting rather than fixing the price that the regulated firm must charge the regulator should allow the firm to charge any price less than or equal to a ceiling price we demonstrate the advantages of our proposal and develop a methodology for determining fair regulatory ceilings the methodology explicitly takes account of the effect of regulation on financial risk and we develop a technique for measuring the importance of this effect finally an example is introduced to demonstrate our techniques and to show the potential quantitative importance of the analysis the authors thank alan marcus michael salinger anjan thakor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments it is with great sadness that we report that beth hayes was killed while riding her bicycle shortly after the completion of this paper 1 for a discussion of this debate see brennan and schwartz 1982 p 508

price cap regulation and technical change abstract existing analyses of the implications of price cap regulation for the development of cost reducing technologies assume that all r d is done by the regulated industry this is unrealistic we present a simple model of non cooperative r d by a regulated firm and a single external developer under a price cap regime of the sort characterised by cabral and riordan in equilibrium the external developer exerts less r d than is socially optimal the regulated firm may exert more or less a tightening of the regulatory regime impacts the r d incentives of both players though in different ways the optimal regulatory adjustment parameter may be bigger or smaller than that suggested by existing studies despite the scope for duplication of results research by an outsider necessarily enhances welfare

regulator selection and endogenous systematic risk a major issue in the financial literature of regulated industries is whether the cost of capital is endogenous to the regulatory process cross spectral estimates of the market model are used to determine if the method of regulator selection contributes to either frequency dependence or phase shift lead lag in electric utility systematic risk it is determined here that electric utilities regulated by elected commissions experience frequency dependence in systematic risk this finding lends support to the assertion that the cost of capital is endogenous to the regulatory process

imitation costs and patents an empirical study it has long been recognised that the costs of imitating new products have an important effect on the incentives for innovation in a market economy as arrow i962 and others have pointed out if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is substantially below the cost to the innovator of developing the innovation there may be little or no incentive for the innovator to carry out the innovation in their discussions of the innovation process economists frequently have called attention to the major role played by the costs of imitation but there has been little or no attempt to measure these costs to test various hypotheses concerning the factors influencing them or to estimate their effects in this paper we report some findings of what seems to be the first study of this topic in addition we present data regarding the effects of patents on imitation costs and on the rate of innovation

dynamic factor demands and the effects of energy price shocks a dynamic model is used to understand how sharp changes in energy prices affect investment behavior employment and energy use the authors discuss the theory behind their model selection model specifications estimation methods and data list parameter estimates and elasticities for the selected model and describe the simulations they conclude that 1 the data strongly reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale within their specification of aggregate production 2 the data indicate adjustment costs on labor are small and 3 their results help reconcile some of the conflicting estimates of energy demand elasticities appearing in recent literature 23 references 3 figures 3 tables

price margins and capital adjustment canadian mill products and pulp and paper industries abstract the purpose of this paper is to estimate a model incorporating non competitive behaviour in product and factor markets in addition capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs so that firms are not constrained to be in long run equilibrium the model is applied to two major canadian manufacturing industries pulp and paper and mill products the results show for both industries in each of three product markets and the wood input market that there is competitive behaviour in addition the industries are not in long run equilibrium as marginal adjustment costs cause marginal profit to exceed the rental rate on capital with the industries exhibiting short run competitive behaviour in product and factor markets new estimates are derived for scale economies and rates of technological change unlike the results from other studies both industries exhibit small scale economies and positive rates of technological change

innovation in pollution control comparisons of the various institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources effluent fees effluent control subsidies marketable permits and direct command and control regulation have usually focused on their static efficiency properties and institutional feasibility e g dales 1968 zerbe 1970 baumol and oates 1975 kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 spence and weitzman 1978 russell 1979 a relatively neglected area has been the study of how each arrangement influences innovation in pollution control a few studies e g kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 russell 1979 have casually claimed that the control methods that rely on economic incentives provide superior incentives for innovation but there have been few systematic studies of the question this paper provides a simple model of pollution control innovation by a profitmaximizing polluter who is subject to the various control methods the consequences of the methods will be explored in three major contexts first we assume that the polluter and the innovation is a small enough part of the overall pollution problem so that none of the important marginal conditions are changed by the innovation second we assume that the polluter and the innovation are important enough so that marginal conditions are changed by the innovations but that the governmental authority determining pollution control incentives or levels fails to make the appropriate adjustments third we again assume that the innovation causes marginal conditions to change but in this case the governmental authority makes the appropriate adjustments we use the term ratcheting to describe this last phenomenon in all cases we assume that the innovating polluter correctly predicts the reactions of the governmental authority and bases his innovation decisions on that prediction a profit maximizing entrepreneur would normally be expected to adopt any innovation that promised gains present discounted value to him in excess of initial

the diffusion of biological waste water treatment plants in the dutch food and beverage industry this article develops an economic model of environmental technology adoption decisions the model is applied econometrically to the diffusion of biological waste water treatment plants in the dutch food and beverage industry it shows that it is possible to explain the overall diffusion pattern of biological waste water treatment plants in terms of a rational choice model in which prospective adopters trade off the costs of effluent treatment against the savings on effluent tax payments effluent charges are shown to be a significant positive factor in the timing of adoption of biological effluent treatment plants this result is brought out by both the rational choice and the epidemic models none of the models however can explain year to year changes in the ownership of biological waste water treatment plants during the 1974 91 period which suggests that there are other factors not included in the model that affect the timing of adoption

intertemporal price indices for the firm abstract a notion of intertemporal price aggregation is analysed within the adjustment cost model of the firm and is shown to be feasible precisely for those technologies which imply an accelerator adjustment rule a unique feature of the common quadratic production function specification is established the analysis is shown to be relevant to the possibility of decentralization within the firm to functional form specification for dynamic demand functions and to comparative dynamics analysis

inventor networks in renewable energies the influence of the policy mix in germany technological change and gains in efficiency of renewable power generation technologies are to a large extent driven by governmental support various policy instruments that can broadly be categorized as technology push demand pull or systemic constitute part of the policy mix for renewable energies our goal is to gain insights into the influence of this policy mix on the intensity and organization of inventive activities for wind power and photovoltaics in germany since the 1980s we examine the effect of different instruments on the size and structure of co inventor networks based on patent data our results indicate notable differences between the technologies the network size for wind power is driven by technology push and systemic instruments while in photovoltaics demand pull is decisive for network growth by and large the instruments complement each other and form a consistent mix of policy instruments the structure of the networks is driven by demand pull for both technologies systemic instruments increase interaction especially in the wind power network and are complementary to demand pull in fostering collaboration