institutional selection in international relations state anarchy as order by the end of the medieval era three new competing institutions attempted to capture gains from trade and reduce feudal particularism sovereign territorial states cityleagues and city states by the middle of the seventeenth century city leagues and city states had declined markedly territorial states survived as the dominant form because they were able to reduce free riding lower transaction costs and credibly commit their constituents the selection process took place along three dimensions first sovereign territorial states proved competitively superior in the economic realm second states increasingly recognized only other sovereign territorial states as legitimate actors in the international system third other actors defected to or copied the institutional makeup of sovereign territorial organization the emergence of discrete territorial units in which only sovereign authorities represented their citizens as the predominant type of organization in international affairs created a new solution to the problem of markets and hierarchies

reply to white foreign aid taxes and public investment a further comment our paper presented and estimated a rather straightforward model of policymaker behavior in examining how developing countries allocate the foreign aid they receive in part our contribution was methodological refocussing the issue of aid impacts on intermediate short run variables and shifting the study of aid impacts from cross country to the analysis of behavior in a single country the paper has many obvious shortcomings the over restrictive formulation of the policy maker preference function and the constraints placed on their behavior the difficulty in empirically measuring the theoretical variables including the formulation of the targets by policy makers the assumed exogeneity of aid and interpreting time series estimates in light of the short run nature of the theoretical model our compromises we felt were reasonable and we explicitly laid out all the steps we followed in hopes that others if they found this approach interesting would improve on our methodology the comment by white illustrates some of these short comings but does little to improve on our analysis here we highlight some of the major issues he raises white repeats the valid theoretical criticism by binh and mcgillivray 1993 of the loss function we employed though as we point our in our reply gang and khan 1993 their alternative loss function empirically works out to not including a constant term in our estimating equations we also point out that the way forward is not through the problematic quadratic loss function but through the use of an asymmetric loss function or more flexible functional forms

the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

the changing technology of technological change general and abstract knowledge and the division of innovative labour abstract in the past most innovations have resulted from empiricist procedures the outcome of each trial yielding knowledge that could not be readily extended to other contexts while trial and error may remain the primary engine of innovation developments in many scientific disciplines along with progress in computational capabilities and instrumentation are encouraging a new approach to industrial research instead of relying purely on trial and error the attempt is also to understand the principles governing the behaviour of objects and structures the result is that relevant information whatever its source can now be cast in frameworks and categories that are more universal the greater universality makes it possible for the innovation process to be organised in new ways firms can specialise and focus upon producing new knowledge and the locus of innovation may be spread across both users and producers more generally the use of general and abstract knowledge in innovation opens up the possibility for a division of labour in inventive activity the division of innovative labour the implications for public policy especially that on intellectual property rights are discussed

a revelation scheme for allocating organizational resources abstract efficient resource allocation in a hierarchical organization frequently requires top management to obtain information from division managers but division managers may place personal interests above those of the organization and communicate distorted information designing simple and robust optimal game theoretic revelation schemes is difficult instead of making another attempt at this we analyze a project valuation scheme actually used by several us government agencies under certain environments the scheme encourages managers to truthfully reveal the relative benefits of alternative projects while some aspects of these environments do not have nice mathematical properties we argue that they may well represent better characterizations of the way managers actually view their situation

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

first branch or root the congress the president and the federal reserve much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues from an empirical perspective that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy in this paper a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the congress the president and one agency we use the u s federal reserve as an extended example can dictate policy outcomes the results of the paper include the congressional dominance theorem if more than 2 3 of house members and more than 2 3 of senate members agree on something they get it the theorem is obvious the proof is in the u s constitution but often forgotten in the substantive literature more realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of congress are more diverse powers of the president to influence policy with and without appointments are also analyzed

evidence of work related and incentive payments in gubernatorial pay the usual caveat applicable to such exploratory study also applies to this one i e the results should be viewed as mere association and does not imply causality however the results are interesting and consistent with a causal argument presented here we find some support to the monitoring arguments presented in the paper and the ways such monitoring information may be produced our evidence is also consistent with the argument that in the high competition states the executive power may be viewed as a necessary productive input while in low competition states such powers could be viewed as alternative ways of allocating political dividends which could be traded with monitory compensation

sectoral patterns of technical change towards a taxonomy and a theory abstract the purpose of the paper is to describe and explain sectoral patterns of technical change as revealed by data on about 2000 significant innovations in britain since 1945 most technological knowledge turns out not to be information that is generally applicable and easily reproducible but specific to firms and applications cumulative in development and varied amongst sectors in source and direction innovating firms principally in electronics and chemicals are relatively big and they develop innovations over a wide range of specific product groups within their principal sector but relatively few outside firms principally in mechanical and instrument engineering are relatively small and specialised and they exist in symbiosis with large firms in scale intensive sectors like metal manufacture and vehicles who make a significant contribution to their own process technology in textile firms on the other hand most process innovations come from suppliers these characteristics and variations can be classified in a three part taxonomy based on firms 1 supplier dominated 2 production intensive 3 science based they can be explained by sources of technology requirements of users and possibilities for appropriation this explanation has implications for our understanding of the sources and directions of technical change firms diversification behaviour the dynamic relationship between technology and industrial structure and the formation of technological skills and advantages at the level of the firm the region and the country

adaptive signal processing hierarchy and budgetary control in federal regulation control over agency budgets is a critical tool of political influence in regulatory decision making yet the causal mechanism of budgetary control is unclear do budgetary manipulations influence agencies by imposing resource constraints or by transmitting powerful signals to the agency i advance and test a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency to address this question the principal findings of the paper are two first presidents and congressional committees achieve budgetary control over agencies not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts second bureaucratic hierarchy increases the agency s response time in processing budgetary signals limiting the efficacy of the budget as a device of political control i also show that the magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased for executive branch agencies after 1970 due to executive oversight reforms i conclude by discussing the limits of budgetary manipulations as a device of political control and the response of elected authorities to adaptive signal processing by agencies

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

gridlock and delegation in a changing world fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time if left unattended such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation to better understand the mechanics of policy making in a changing world we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation of powers system we show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion institutional features that in isolation elicit widespread criticism can effectively ameliorate policies susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change the critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation which increases all decision makers well being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation of powers system we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium the presence of drift provides an opportunity for self interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency

money talks supplementary financiers and international monetary fund conditionality what explains the changes in international monetary fund imf conditionality i argue that imf conditionality agreements are influenced by supplementary financiers the imf regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payments imbalances as a result these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the imf and the design of its conditionality programs i consider the influence of one type of supplementary financier private financial institutions on imf conditionality conclusions are supported by a data set of 249 conditionality arrangements coded according to their terms and two case studies

an adaptive model of bureaucratic politics in this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics it departs from standard neoclassical approaches notably those of niskanen 1971 and peltzman 1976 in several important respects first our approach explicitly models a system of three way interaction among bureaus politicians and interest groups second it allows for institutional features of each type of participant third it is a model of dynamic process fourth participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing fifth participants are only minimally informed the result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior very much in the spirit of simon s 1947 behavioral tradition that offers a new perspective on political control bureaucratic power and the intelligence of democracy

the limits of tax and expenditure limits tel implementation as a principal agent problem previous scholarship has shown that tax and expenditure limits tels often fail to constrain government growth this paper views the implementation of tels as a principal agent problem agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents using panel data for the us states from 1970 through 2008 i conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal agent model for tels i find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government additionally state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action these findings contradict an alternative theory of tel implementation that looks towards the policy s origin my research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions tels effectively reduce government growth

on the sources and significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities abstract the set of technological opportunities in a given industry is one of the fundamental determinants of technical advance in that line of business we examine the concept of technological opportunity and discuss three categories of sources of those opportunities advances in scientific understanding and technique technological advances originating in other industries and in other private and governmental institutions and feedbacks from an industry s own technological advances data from the yale survey on industrial research and development are used to measure the strength of various sources of technological opportunity and to discern interindustry differences in the importance of these sources we find that interindustry differences in the strength and sources of technological opportunities contribute importantly to explanations of cross industry variation in r d intensity and technological advance

the institutional dynamics of policy administration bureaucratic influence over securities regulation theory a dynamic systems model of administrative politics that 1 relaxes restrictive causal assumptions among the president congress and an administrative agency 2 emphasizes aggregate institutional behavior and 3 analyzes both anticipated and unanticipated policy behavior is set forth as a more general means to investigate agency political relationships hypotheses the main set of hypotheses focus on the aggregate institutional relationships among the president congress and administrative agency these four possible hypotheses include bureaucratic influence bureaucratic autonomy mutual influence and political influence the purpose here is to assess the relative merits of competing explanations for bureaucratic behavior securities regulation is a perfect area of inquiry to investigate these competing perspectives since the findings of existing research on this topic are disparate methods vector autoregressive time series statistical methods are used to empirically test the dynamic systems model of administrative politics by examining three empirical models of sec enforcement behavior in relation to presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals for the 1949 92 annual period results the sec sends potent signals of their own via their changes in regulatory outputs that will affect the budgetary preferences of its political principles however the sec s administrative outputs are shown to be somewhat less sensitive to political budgetary preference signals than what one would expect presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals with respect to the sec are interdependent to a sizeable extent thus raising doubts about the separate independent effect democratic institutions have over the bureaucracy the implications of this study suggest that conventional theories of agency political relations serve as an oversimplified way to study administrative behavior future research on this topic

centralization vs decentralization in a multi unit organization a computational model of a retail chain as a multi agent adaptive system a computational model of a retail chain is developed in which store managers continually search for better practices search takes place over a rugged landscape defined over the space of store practices the main objective of this research is to determine how the amount of discretion given to store managers as to how they run their stores influences the rate of innovation at the store level we find that greater decentralization enhances firm performance when stores markets are sufficiently different the horizon is sufficiently long and markets are sufficiently stable

tests of institutional versus non institutional models of local public expenditure determination are institutional or non institutional factors more important determinants of local public expenditure decisions employing data that allows us to directly identify the entire distribution of voter expenditure demands we estimate models of deviations of actual expenditures from the expenditure demand of defensible benchmarks namely the median voter s expenditure demand and the mean of voters expenditure demands three competing paradigms are employed to specify these models namely a non institutional model the reform government movement s explanation of how institutions affect local government decisions and a transactions cost model of this same phenomenon predictions from these three competing models differ in many respects comparisons of results from estimating models of expenditure deviations are found to be generally more consistent with the non institutional model than with either of the two institutional models these results suggest that a competitive local public service market helps limit the ability of governments to tax and spend in excess of the demands of the median or mean voter

chandlerism in post war europe strategic and structural change in france germany and the uk 1950 1993 this paper examines the chandlerian model of corporate development in the light of new data on the strategies and structures of large european firms in the post war period conglomerate strategies continue to spread but these are typically less stable than strategies of related diversification the divisional structure now predominates in europe suppressing more indigenous forms the paper discusses implications both for economic arguments around the resource based view of the firm and for institutionalist arguments around the spread of american management ideas the paper concludes that chandler s original model is remarkably robust to both change over time and differences across countries copyright 1999 by oxford university press

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding

the theory of the knowledge creating firm subjectivity objectivity and synthesis the theory of the knowledge creating firm explains the differences among firms not as a result of market failure but as a result of the firm s visions of the future and strategy this paper proposes a framework to capture the dynamic process of knowledge creation in which knowledge is created through the dynamic interaction between subjectivity and objectivity knowledge is created through the synthesis of thinking and actions of individuals who interact with each other within and beyond the organizational boundaries

the technological competencies of the world s largest firms complex and path dependent but not much variety firm specific technological competencies help explain why firms are different how they change over time and whether or not they are capable of remaining competitive data on more than 400 of the world s largest firms show that their technological competencies have the following characteristics 1 1 they are typically multi field and becoming more so over time with competencies ranging beyond their product range in technical fields outside their distinctive core 2 2 they are highly stable and differentiated with both the technology profile and the directions of localised search strongly influenced by firms principal products 3 3 the rate of search is influenced by both the firm s principal products and the conditions in its home country however considerable unexplained variance suggests scope for managerial choice these findings confirm the importance of complexity and path dependency in the accumulation of firm specific technological competencies and show that managers are heavily constrained in the directions of their technological search they also show the limits of the notion of competition through variety given that the same specific field of technological competence is often essential to the development of a range of possible product configurations technological imperatives still exist

introduction epistemic communities and international policy coordination the growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult if decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions what factors shape their behavior under conditions of uncertainty what are the origins of international institutions and how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge while a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights at its core the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system level factors unit level factors or some complex interplay between the two whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create defend or expand their own wealth and power to enhance collective material benefits or to promote nonmaterial values a related question of

ethics incentives and conflicts of interest a practical solution couched in positive agency theory it is shown that the straight commission compensation system sccs creates a conflict of interest between the agent s and the client s self interests based on this it is hypothesized that the sccs will encourage agents to intend to act unethically towards their clients two hundred and forty five insurance agents in the u s were surveyed with 59 responding the results suggest that the sccs does not significantly affect agents ethical intentions positively or negatively this lack of empirical evidence may be due to the unique nature of the sample indeed the company which enabled this sample appears to have found a practical solution to temper the potential negative effects of the sccs in its commitment to selective hiring and marketing products which benefit both the client and the agent

the power of parallel thinking a small computer model demonstrates that an appropriate organization of boundedly rational individuals can find optimal policies in an environment that is overwhelmingly complex for unorganized decision makers the model is also used to identify conditions under which optimal or even good policies are not found the demonstrated adaptive power of the model is interpreted in light of recent developments in the theory of computational complexity that place new stress on powerful methods of search and of new models from computer science which markedly advance search effectiveness by harnessing parallel structures of information processing

foreign aid taxes and public investment a comment abstract in a paper recently published in this journal gang and khan 1991 analysed the relationship between foreign aid and the fiscal behavior of the indian government a number of behavioural equations were estimated each derived from a utility maximizing theoretical framework this paper identifies and seeks to correct some inconsistencies in this framework

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

scraps of paper agreements and the durability of peace in the aftermath of war what determines whether peace lasts or fighting resumes and what can be done to foster durable peace drawing on theories of cooperation i argue that belligerents can overcome the obstacles to peace by implementing measures that alter incentives reduce uncertainty about intentions and manage accidents a counterargument suggests that agreements are epiphenomenal merely reflecting the underlying probability of war resumption i test hypotheses about the durability of peace using hazard analysis controlling for factors including the decisiveness of victory the cost of war relative capabilities and others that affect the baseline prospects for peace i find that stronger agreements enhance the durability of peace in particular measures such as the creation of demilitarized zones explicit third party guarantees peacekeeping and joint commissions for dispute resolution affect the duration of peace agreements are not merely scraps of paper rather their content matters in the construction of peace that lasts

the impact of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and fdi a new institutional analysis the effects of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and foreign direct investment fdi have gone understudied we employ panel data reported by oecd nations over the 1995 2002 period to estimate the impact of iso adoptions on country pair economic relations we find iso diffusion to have no effect in developed nations but to positively pull fdi i e enhancing inward fdi and positively push trade i e enhancing exports in developing nations

an affinity to commons model of public support for environmental energy policy abstract as atmospheric co 2 continues to rise above 450 ppm policymakers struggle with uncertainty concerning predictors of citizen support for environmental energy policies eeps and preferences for their design topics which have received limited attention in empirical literature we present an original model of policy support based on citizens affinity to commons pathways by which individuals enjoy natural public goods that in turn shape preferences between alternative policy mechanisms we evaluate this model using a survey of southern california electricity customers with results indicating the model s utility in predicting public support of eep stronger community ties are associated with preferences for pull type subsidies whereas stronger connections to natural commons are linked to support for both pull and push type sanctions findings have implications for coalition building as advocates may engender support for green energy policy by framing sanctions as protecting natural commons and framing subsidies either in this same way and or as producing benefits for communities

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

a structural decomposition analysis of technological opportunity corporate survival and leadership this article considers corporate technological leadership and survival in the face of changing technological opportunities over the period 1930 1990 for firms selected from three broad industrial groups by using us patent data in a novel application of structural decomposition analysis it considers the extent to which selected firms positions of technological leadership benefited from a favorable change in the structure of their technological environment relative to changes caused through firm level choices copyright 2007 oxford university press

science policies as principal agent games institutionalization and path dependency in the relation between government and science national science policies seem to converge in policing the double edged problem of how to get policy and industry interested in the conduct of science and how to get science interested in the problems of policy and industry however similarity in the labels of institutes and instruments for science policy conceals traditional differences in the institutionalization of the relation between the state and science this article conceptualizes the relation between government and science as an ongoing principal agent game with different possibilities for stabilization each of these differ to the extent the principal or the agents can pursue their strategy institutionalization of the endless frontier ideology of consensus making and of competition between agents is elaborated path dependency emerges as costs for institutional changes are often higher than the accommodation of new instruments and policies to existing structures the argument is mainly and deliberately analytical but empirically illustrated by the development of foresight in the uk germany and the netherlands

can politicians police themselves natural experimental evidence from brazil s audit courts to enhance government accountability reformers have advocated strengthening institutions of horizontal accountability particularly auditing institutions that can punish lawbreaking elected offi

the dubious role of institutions in international business a road forward our commentary returns to the conundrum of how institutions matter in international business ib by revisiting the 2018 jibs decade award article by jackson and deeg 2008 on comparing capitalisms we first synthesize their main insights around institutional diversity and track its significant impact within ib and other management fields we then suggest three main takeaways that could move jackson and deeg s agenda further in terms of developing a more nuanced approach to institutions in ib we close with suggestions for future research and urge ib scholars to be more cautious when drawing on different strands of institutions theory

u s politics and greater regulation of inward foreign direct investment an analyst of u s foreign economic policy observes that each wave of antiforeign sentiment associated with the surge of foreign direct investment fdi coming into the united states washes ashore a flotsam of restrictive and exclusionary laws that recedes slightly or becomes buried and forgotten in the sand only to advance again with a new wave during the late 1980s the controversy generated by the sharp rise of japanese acquisitions in the united states washed ashore the latest flotsam of regulatory measures and further advanced the tangle of rules and regulations targeting inward foreign direct investment ifdi of the various types of fdi the present study is concerned mainly with the policy change toward foreign investment in an already established domestic business this type of investment often involves merger or acquisition and is distinct from a greenfield investment where the foreign investor establishes from scratch a new business in the host economy

the method of constant market shares analysis reconsidered constant market shares cms analyses are frequently used in applied studies of export development this paper reviews the development of the method and argues that it can be considerably improved a new version of the method is developed which in addition to the familiar cms effects also allows for the calculation of effects reflecting the ability of each country to adapt its export structure to the changes in the commodity and country composition of world imports the method is applied to a sample of 20 oecd countries for the period 1961 83

the vanishing hand the changing dynamics of industrial capitalism alfred chandler s portrayal of the managerial revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries does not extend well into the late twentieth century when widespread vertical disintegration began replacing the classical multi unit managerial enterprise this paper attempts to explain the new economy in a manner consistent with chandler by providing an enlarged theoretical account of industrial evolution in this account clusters of chandlerian firms appeared as a temporary episode within a larger smithian process of the division of labor

the political economy of state medicaid policy we develop and test a market based model to explain variations in states welfare medicine policy decisions the empirical results support the model of state policy outputs indicating that states spending efforts for welfare medicine are most sensitive to the supply of services within their borders we learn in addition that spending effort declines with demand for services indicating that the states spending the highest proportions of total personal income for the program are those who need it most and can afford it least measures of political system development affect spending effort positively and significantly suggesting that ideology diversity of interests and administrative professionalism increase states welfare efforts

steady change the 200 largest us manufacturing firms throughout the 20th century this paper discusses the existence of structural change in business activity and technological competence among the 200 largest us manufacturing companies throughout the 20th century the data were taken from chandler scale and scope 1990 and fortune magazine the analysis of corporate evolution in used to assess continuity versus turbulence of business organizations in the context of the neo schumpeterian long wave hypothesis the empirical results show that the giants of the late 20th century are not the same as those at the beginning of that period persistence in the sample is very limited moreover turbulence is not smooth but rather occurs by impulses that affect specific industries and it has increased over time overall the pattern of corporate entry and industry development is very indicative of the new opportunities emerging with information and communication technologies this process of open ended continuous transformation supports the case for putting change at the centre of economic analysis

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

the underemphasized role of established firms as the sources of major innovations we argue that established firms including industry incumbents and diversifying entrants play vital all underemphasized roles as the sources of major innovations in many industries the study presents empirical evidence showing that established firms are often sources of major innovations in the telecommunications and medical sectors we conduct an exploratory investigation of how variation in the types of technical and market change influence whether industry incumbents diversifying entrants or nets companies are the sources of major innovations copyright 1996 by oxford university press

conditionalities and the performance of european structural funds a principal agent analysis of control mechanisms in eu cohesion policy bachtler j and ferry m conditionalities and the performance of european structural funds a principal agent analysis of control mechanisms in european union cohesion policy regional studies in the context of debates on the performance of european union cohesion policy this paper considers how the european union has used control mechanisms to influence the use of structural funds by member states using the principal agent model this paper examines empirically three case studies of conditionalities applied to the absorption of funding decommitment rule outcomes of interventions performance reserve and targeting of expenditure earmarking in european union programmes over the 2000 2013 period the findings reveal different levels of effectiveness of the three conditionalities attributable to the differential scope for trade offs during the regulatory negotiations external pressure and principal self interest the paper discusses an effectiveness threshold for introducing controls the tensions