discounting and divergence of opinion the objective of this paper is to adopt a general equilibrium model and determine the socially efficient discount factor risk free rate and discount rate when there are heterogeneous anticipations about the growth of the economy as well as heterogeneous time preference rates among others we tackle the following questions is the socially efficient discount factor an arithmetic average of the individual subjectively anticipated discount factors more generally can the arrow debreu prices the risk free rates the subjectively expected socially efficient discount factors and discount rates be obtained as an average of the individual subjectively anticipated ones can beliefs dispersion be analyzed as a sort of additional risk or uncertainty leading to possibly lower discount rates is it socially efficient when diversity of opinion is taken into account to reduce the discount rate per year for more distant horizons if so what is the trajectory of the decline

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

non convexities and the efficiency of equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract the nature of the efficiency frontier in models with adverse selection has not been studied in the literature we show that this frontier cannot always be strictly concave we obtain however that there is always a one to one correspondence between market equilibrium and second best efficiency whatever the shape of the efficiency frontier the results are illustrated with an insurance example

auctions with contingent payments there now exists a host of results concerning the revenue performance of various auction methods this note delves deeper into auction markets by examining the effects on sellers revenue of certain noncash means of payment the basic result that bidding mediums which include some contingent pricing feature generally yield the seller more revenue than do cash bids is intriguing by itself and also points out the limitations of received theory since what follows builds on the independent preferences framework it is useful to first note the assumptions of that model and the major results pertaining to it to model an auction in the independent preferences tradition one assumes that bidders have reservation values vi that are known only privately and that can be depicted as being drawn independently from some distribution f v the most important result for this model is the revenue equivalence theorem as given in john riley and william samuelson 1981 any auction involving risk neutral bidders for which the following four conditions hold a a buyer can make any bid above some minimum reserve price b the buyer making the highest bid is awarded the object c the auction rules are anonymous and d there is a common equilibrium bidding strategy in which each buyer makes a bid bi which is a strictly increasing function of his reservation value vi yields an expected revenue of

an empirical investigation of the process of knowledge transfer in international strategic alliances this research proposes and tests a basic model of organizational learning that captures the process of knowledge transfer in international strategic alliances based on a cross sectional sample of 147 multinationals and a structural equation methodology this study empirically investigates the simultaneous effects of learning intent learning capacity lc knowledge ambiguity and its two key antecedents tacitness and partner protectiveness on technological knowledge transfer in the interest of expanding our understanding of the organizational mechanisms that both hinder and facilitate learning the concept of lc is refined into three distinct components resource incentive and cognitive based lc further the strength of the relationships between these theoretical constructs and knowledge transfer is examined in light of the possible moderating effects of organizational culture firm size and the form and competitive regime of the alliance consistently learning intent as a driver and knowledge ambiguity as an impediment emerge as the most significant determinants of knowledge transfer moreover the effects of partner protectiveness and lc on the learning outcome are moderated by the firm s own culture towards learning the size of the firm the structural form of the alliance and the fact that partners may or may not be competitors

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

bidding securities in projects with negative externalities abstract we analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security bid auction in which i the allocation of the project to one bidder causes a negative externality to his opponents ii the winner has to pay a fixed cost to implement the project and iii the winner s implementation decision is not contractible to study the effect of such features on the seller s expected revenue we focus on a second price auction based on one of four securities i cash ii equity iii a fixed equity hybrid and iv a fixed cash hybrid we show that the fixed equity hybrid generates the highest expected revenue whereas equity generates the lowest even though it is the instrument with the highest linkage absent negative externalities equity would generate the highest expected revenue among these four securities the revenue ranking of the instruments is robust to the information structure and the presence of insurance deposits and entry fees

bidding with securities comment to feasible securities 1 their main finding concerns the role of the steepness of securities in determining the seller s revenue they show that the steeper the payment to the seller as a func tion of the realized value the higher is the seller s expected revenue a shift from a security say a debt to a steeper one say equity or call option flattens the surplus accruing to a bidder as a function of his future realized value and this levels the competitive gaps between bidders hence the competition becomes intensified 2 in this comment we wish to add to dks analysis a caveat that the adverse selection prob lem should be an important part of security and auction design consideration unlike cash bids security bids are difficult to evaluate when the seller does not know the buyer s exact type for instance a 40 percent share of an asset managed by a buyer may be less valuable than a 30 per cent share of the same asset managed by a different buyer if the latter is much more competent lacking such information a seller may fall victim to adverse selection choosing a wrong bidder this problem has been noted by several authors such as william samuelson 1987 simon board 2007 and charles zheng 2001 in the context of a fixed security design our concern here is its relevance for security design we show that the adverse selection problem may lead to rankings of alternative security designs that are quite different from and in fact opposite to those found in dks in particular under a reasonable circumstance a steeper security is more vulnerable to adverse selection and could result in a poorer revenue performance than a flatter security to illustrate suppose there are two buyers 1 and 2 buyer 1 2 has a project which gener ates a gross return of v and requires initial investment cost of x r suppose that vx v2 0 and xx x2 and also that vx xx v2 x2 that is buyer 1 s project generates a higher net return so is efficient to select but requires a higher investment than buyer 2 s project this assumption is reasonable a financially distressed or bankrupt firm will more likely turn profitable again under management willing to infuse more cash for instance or a firm that can generate a greater value from an underperforming target is more likely to have a higher opportunity cost e g of pursuing other target or standalone values the assumption is equally compelling in other contexts such as the government sale of oil leases

how much do your co opetitors capabilities matter in the face of technological change firms often lose their competitive advantage when a technological change renders their existing capabilities obsolete an important question that has received little or no attention is what happens to these firms competitive advantage when the technological change instead renders obsolete the capabilities of their co opetitors the suppliers customers and complementors whose very success may underpin that of the firm and with whom it must collaborate and compete this paper explores the effects on a firm of the impact of a technological change on its co opetitors it argues that a firm s post technological change performance decreases with the extent to which the technological change renders co opetitors capabilities obsolete it uses detailed data on the adoption of risc reduced instruction set computer technology by computer workstation makers to demonstrate the need to view resources as residing in a network and not in the firm alone copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

endogenous entry to security bid auctions we endogenize entry to a security bid auction where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate we first consider any minimum reserve security bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset s value when retained by the seller demarzo kremer and skrzypacz 2005 establish that with a fixed number of bidders auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues counterintuitively we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry further enhancing the revenues from such auctions we then establish that with optimal reserve securities auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues

do firms learn to create value the case of alliances we investigate whether firms learn to manage interfirm alliances as experience accumulates we use contract specific experience measures in a data set of over 2000 joint ventures and licensing agreements and value creation measures derived from the abnormal stock returns surrounding alliance announcements learning effects are identified from the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in alliance capabilities we find evidence of large learning effects in managing joint ventures but no such evidence for licensing contracts the effects of learning on value creation are strongest for research joint ventures and weakest for marketing joint ventures these results are consistent with the view that learning effects are more important in situations characterized by greater contractual ambiguity copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

optimal risk sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception the present paper thoroughly explores second best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection we start with a natural extension of the classical model assuming less than perfect risk perception we characterize the con straints on efficient redistribution and we summarize the incidence of incentives on the economy with the notions of weak and strong adverse selection finally we show in what sense improving risk perception enhances welfare a typical situation where the risk perception of the insurer and that of policy holders differ is one in which each party knows something that the other does not the insurer may correctly assess the impact on risk of an individual s character istics without observing them all whereas policyholders may know all their characteristics without relating them correctly to their risks these simple obser vations call for a modelling of imperfect risk perception and adverse selection

information distortion in a supply chain the bullwhip effect this article originally appeared in management science april 1997 volume 43 number 4 pp 546 558 published by the institute of management sciences consider a series of companies in a supply chain each of whom orders from its immediate upstream member in this setting inbound orders from a downstream member serve as a valuable informational input to upstream production and inventory decisions this paper claims that the information transferred in the form of orders tends to be distorted and can misguide upstream members in their inventory and production decisions in particular the variance of orders may be larger than that of sales and distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream a phenomenon termed bullwhip effect this paper analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect demand signal processing rationing game order batching and price variations actions that can be taken to mitigate the detrimental impact of this distortion are also discussed

effects of knowledge spillover on inter organizational resource sharing decision in collaborative knowledge creation collaborative knowledge creation is important for firms to gain new competitive advantages but knowledge outgoing spillover harms their existing competitive advantages which puts them into a dilemma when investing rd 2 because the leader invests resources first and faces moral hazards it has the incentives to participate in collaborative knowledge creation only when its benefits from collaborative knowledge creation fruits and knowledge incoming spillover are bigger than those of the follower and the more moral hazards it confronts the more it demands 3 the leader and the follower invest resources at ratios consistent with the benefits and costs the resources bring to them if they can determine the amount or the collaboration is unstable

the dynamics of learning alliances competition cooperation and relative scope we show how the tension between cooperation and competition affects the dynamics of learning alliances private benefits and common benefits differ in the incentives that they create for investment in learning the competitive aspects of alliances are most severe when a firm s ratio of private to common benefits is high we introduce a measure relative scope of a firm in an alliance to show that the opportunity set of each firm outside an alliance crucially impacts its behavior within the alliance finally we suggest why firms might deviate from the theoretically optimal behavior patterns 1998 john wiley sons ltd

strategizing niceness in co opetition the case of knowledge exchange in supply chain innovation projects abstract in this paper we take a novel approach to address the dilemma of innovation sharing versus protection among supply chain partners the paper conducts an exploratory study that introduces factors affecting a firm s optimum supply chain innovation strategy we go beyond the conventional prisoners dilemma with its limiting assumptions of players preferences and symmetry to explore a larger pool of 2 2 games that may effectively model the problem after classifying firm types according to collaboration motive and relative power we use simulation to explore the effects of firm type opponent type and payoff structure on repeated innovation interactions or equivalently long term relations and optimality of niceness surprisingly we find that opponent type is essentially irrelevant in long term innovation interactions and focal firm type is only conditionally relevant the paper contributes further by introducing reciprocation of strategy type nice versus mean showing that reciprocation is recommended while identifying and explaining the exceptions to this conclusion

optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders abstract i analyze the effects of heterogeneity in terms of bidders valuation distributions and standalone values in equity auctions auctions in which bidders offer equities rather than cash heterogeneity misaligns equity bids face values monetary values and bidder types making the seller s revenues sensitive to the auction design given heterogeneity i identify the mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue among all incentive compatible mechanisms of equity auctions i show how different sources of heterogeneity alter the optimal design revenues and allocational efficiency unlike optimal cash auctions myerson 1981 where bidders standalone values are irrelevant the allocation of optimal equity auctions favors bidders with lower standalone values because the seller can extract a larger proportion of their rents by contrast when bidders differ only in valuation distributions optimal equity auctions feature more efficient allocations than optimal cash auctions

horizontal mergers with synergies cash vs profit share auctions we consider takeover bidding in a cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target and bidders can influence rivals beliefs through their bids we compare cash and profit share auctions first and second price supplemented by entry fees since non merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low bidders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability nevertheless pooling does not occur unlike cash auctions profit share auctions are not revenue equivalent and the second price profit share auction is more profitable than the other auctions

ex post information in auctions assumptions maskin and riley 1984 show that when the amount a buyer is willing to pay for the auctioned object is not independent of his wealth expected revenue tends to be lower under open bidding in contrast milgrom and weber 1982 relax the assumption that valuations are independent and assume instead that buyers private estimates of the item s value are affiliated a buyer with a high estimate then tends to believe that other buyers will have higher estimates as well maintaining the other assumptions milgrom and weber show that expected revenue is higher in the open ascending bid auction the intuition behind this result is that in sealed high bid auctions a buyer s bid is determined not only by his own beliefs but via their bids by the beliefs of those with lower estimates a buyer with a low estimate believes that others are more likely to have low estimates as well he therefore bids less aggressively it follows that a buyer can beat all opponents who have lower estimates with a bid which is lower than it would be if beliefs were independent 2 milgrom and weber also show that if the seller purchases and then publicly reveals information which is positively linked to buyers valuations this also raises expected gross revenue from an auction the intuition here is that this helps to reduce the difference in bidders willingness to pay 3 that such a reduction should raise expected revenue is easily understood for the limiting case in which the seller s information includes all the buyers private information for then all buyer asymmetry is eliminated and so expected buyer profit is bid away to zero the seller therefore reaps the entire surplus in the following pages the implications of correlated signals are further explored while milgrom and weber emphasized the potential gains to a seller who reveals information ex ante the focus here is on ex post information in section 2 it is shown that under weak assumptions the sealed high bid auction is dominated by any auction

learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances building relational capital one of the main reasons that firms participate in alliances is to learn know how and capabilities from their alliance partners at the same time firms want to protect themselves from the opportunistic behavior of their partner to retain their own core proprietary assets most research has generally viewed the achievement of these objectives as mutually exclusive in contrast we provide empirical evidence using large sample survey data to show that when firms build relational capital in conjunction with an integrative approach to managing conflict they are able to achieve both objectives simultaneously relational capital based on mutual trust and interaction at the individual level between alliance partners creates a basis for learning and know how transfer across the exchange interface at the same time it curbs opportunistic behavior of alliance partners thus preventing the leakage of critical know how between them copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

the design of coordination and control mechanisms for managing joint venture parent relationships joint ventures jvs defined as independent organizations formed by the pooling of resources and sharing of equity by two or more firms are being formed at an increasingly rapid pace while much empirical research has examined the conditions which favor the formation of jvs less attention has been paid to the equally important issues of control and implementation which are the focus of interest in this study we identify two factors which are expected to influence the design of control mechanisms i e 1 the strategic interdependence between the jv and each parent and 2 the environmental uncertainty faced by the jv our empirical examination confirms the importance of the degree of strategic interdependence and the moderating role of environmental uncertainty in explaining the design of control mechanisms 1998 john wiley sons ltd

learning from competing partners outcomes and durations of scale and link alliances in europe north america and asia this paper investigates the outcomes and durations of strategic alliances among competing firms using alliance outcomes as indicators of learning by partner firms we show that alliance outcomes vary systematically across link and scale alliances link alliances are interfirm partnerships to which partners contribute different capabilities while scale alliances are partnerships to which partners contribute similar capabilities we find that partners are more likely to reorganize or take over link alliances than scale alliances by contrast scale alliances are more likely to continue without material changes the two types of alliances are equally likely to shut down at similar ages these results support the view that link alliances lead to greater levels of learning and capability acquisition between the partners than do scale alliances copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

scientific progress and irreversibility an economic interpretation of the precautionary principle abstract we consider the problem of the optimal use of a good whose consumption can produce damages in the future scientific progress is made over time that provides information on the distribution of the intensity of damages we show that this progress induces earlier prevention effort only if prudence is larger than twice absolute risk aversion this paper thus identifies the class of quite restrictive but plausible conditions such that scientific uncertainties justify an immediate reduction of the consumption of a potentially toxic substance

competition among sellers in securities auctions we study simultaneous security bid second price auctions with com petition among sellers for potential bidders the sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets upon observing auction designs potential bidders decide which auctions to enter we characterize all symmet ric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations in large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash we extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options jel d44 d82 g10 in economic and financial markets rights to control and exploit assets with the potential to generate cash flows are often sold through auctions while in some auc tions the winner s future profits from the asset cannot be used as a basis for payment so only cash bids are possible in many cases it is possible to observe and verify the ex post cash flows this means that bidders can submit their bids in the form of securities the values of which are contingent on future cash flows from the asset securities auctions are common in the real world examples include government sales of oil leases lead plaintiff wireless spectrum and highway building auctions many other transactions though not formally auctions are similar to securities auc tions in nature examples include corporate takeovers intercorporate asset sales book publishing advertising and venture capital markets 1 in this paper we analyze equilibrium auction mechanisms when sellers compete for potential bidders by altering security designs of their auctions rather than reserve prices as in the prior literature specifically we consider an environment in which

price regulation in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract the paper presents and discusses a regulatory policy in insurance markets it is based upon a two sided rule each company must propose at least one contract with full coverage and a ceiling is imposed on the level of premiums

increases in prudence and increases in risk aversion abstract this paper determines necessary and sufficient conditions for increases in absolute prudence to lead to increases in risk aversion and vice versa

strategic factor market intelligence an application of information economics to strategy formulation and competitor intelligence this paper develops a model of information acquisition decisions by firms that are competing in a strategic factor market barney 1986 to purchase a scarce resource whose value is unknown and differs across firms the model builds on the argument that more accurate expectations about the firm specific value of resources is other than luck the only way for firms to obtain the specific resources required for competitive advantage we address the more specific question of what types of information firms should gather to accomplish this goal the model generates a series of testable hypotheses about how a firm s optimal mix of different types of information is affected by a number of factors including the level of uncertainty about the value of the resource being acquired the rarity imitability and nonsubstitutability of that resource the level of inscrutability of firms pre existing stocks of resources and firms information gathering and information processing capacities

bidding with securities auctions and security design we study security bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities that is they offer payments that are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold the value depends on investment by the winner thus creating the possibility of moral hazard such auctions are commonly used both formally and informally in formal auctions the seller generally restricts bids to an ordered set such as an equity share or royalty rate by restricting the bids standard auction formats such as first and second price auctions can be used in informal settings with competing buyers the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront rather bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid based on his beliefs ex post we characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies in this setting and show that an informal mechanism yields the lowest possible revenues across all mechanisms we also determine the optimal formal mechanism and show that the security design is more important than the auction format we show that the revenue equivalence principle that expected revenues are independent of the auction format holds if the set of permissible securities is ordered and convex such as equity otherwise it need not hold for example when bidders offer standard debt securities a second price auction is superior on the other hand if bidders compete on the conversion ratio of convertible debt a first price auction yields higher revenues finally we examine how different forms of moral hazard impact our results

procedural justice strategic decision making and the knowledge economy collective knowledge building is a key strategic task for firms success today but creating and sharing knowledge are intangible activities that can neither be supervised nor forced out of people they happen only when individuals cooperate voluntarily a key challenge facing strategic management is obtaining the voluntary cooperation of individuals as firms formulate and implement their strategic decisions this essay draws on the rich body of procedural justice research to address this critical issue we argue that when people feel their strategic decision making processes are fair they display a high level of voluntary cooperation based on their attitudes of trust and commitment conversely when people feel that the processes are unfair they refuse to cooperate by hoarding ideas and dragging their feet in conceiving and executing strategic decisions we further develop this argument into team performance wherein the attitudinal and behavioral effects of procedural justice are corroborated with theory and initial evidence of their bottom line performance consequences we then build a theory which we call intellectual and emotional recognition theory that can explain why procedural justice invokes the side of human behavior that goes beyond outcome driven self interests and that is so critical in the knowledge economy 1998 john wiley sons ltd

national institutional structures transaction cost economizing and competitive advantage the case of japan japan s economic success since world war ii has been striking modern japan was the first major industrial economy to emerge from outside the western tradition economically devastated in 1945 by 1990 japan had the world s second largest economy and a gdp per head 20 percent greater than that of the united states in this paper it is argued that one reason for japan s success is that the costs of achieving cooperation and specialization are lower in japan than in the west cooperation and specialization have been acknowledged to have a beneficial impact upon productivity ever since adam smith wrote about cooperative specialization in the context of the division of labor modern economic theory however suggest that in a world of self interested individuals the costs of achieving cooperation and specialization are substantial in this paper it is argued that the cultural value system that japan has inherited from its preindustrial past and particularly the tokugawa period helps facilitate cooperation b

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society

the effects of corporate restructuring on aggregate industry specialization it has been widely argued that the purpose of corporate restructuring during the 1980s was to produce a population of more industry specialized competitive firms in response to intensifying global competition a number of studies show that corporate restructuring resulted in increased corporate focus during the 1980s however no study has yet examined whether corporate restructuring resulted in increased specialization at the industry level during the 1980s this study examines this issue first we examine whether or not aggregate industry specialization increased during the 1980s that is we ask did the average firm in any given u s industry become more or less specialized to that industry during the 1980s second we examine whether corporate restructuring was a significant determinant of change in aggregate industry specialization during the 1980s using a sample of 686 four digit sic industries and 64 two digit industry groups this study finds that aggregate industry specialization declined very slightly at both the four digit and two digit level between 1981 and 1989 this study also finds that sell offs of establishments through corporate control transactions or interfirm asset sales had no significant effect on aggregate industry specialization