efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

the value of corporate voting rights and control a cross country analysis this paper measures the value of corporate voting rights specifically of the control block of votes in a sample of 661 dual class firms in 18 countries in 1997 a consistent measure across countries is proposed the measure is adjusted for takeover probability block holding costs and dividend and liquidity differences between the share classes the value of controlblock votes varies widely across countries it is close to half of firm market value in south korea andclose to zero in finland the value of control block votes is interpretedas a lower bound for actual private benefits of the controlling shareholder the legal environment law enforcement investor protection takeover regulations andpower concentrating corporate charter provisions explain 68 of the cross country variation in the value of control block votes

the takeover deterrent effect of open market share repurchases this paper examines whether open market share repurchases deter takeovers we model pre repurchase takeover probability as a latent variable and examine its impact on the firm s decision to repurchase shares given specification tests reject the tobit model we turn to the censored quantile regression method of powell 1986 journal of econometrics 32 143 155 we find a significantly positive relation between open market share repurchases and takeover probability and we reconcile empirical findings in previous studies that contradict predictions repurchase activity is inversely related to firm size consistent with smaller firms having greater information asymmetry and is related to temporary but not permanent cash flows

expropriation and control rights a dynamic model of foreign direct investment abstract this paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country we analyze how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of creeping expropriation once his investment is sunk it is shown that this hold up problem may cause underinvestment if the outside option of the investor is too weak and overinvestment if it is too strong we also analyze the impact of spillover effects we give a rationale for tax holidays and we examine how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

pay and employment determination in britain what are labour contracts really like the recent growth of unemployment in western economies has prompted new research on the workings of the labour market there has been much interest in particular in the questions what determines the level of real pay and why is it apparently so insensitive to changes in aggregate demand and unemployment european economists now find it hard to take seriously the notion still taught to many undergraduate that wages are determined by the intersection of demand and supply curves roughly half of all british employees belong to trade unions a much higher percentage have their pay fixed by some kind of collective bargain in this country it is negotiations not impersonal com petitive markets which decide what most of us will be paid the difficult problem is that of how to understand this process or to put it differently of how to think up the right model of the world

an integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework this paper aims to embed two popular models of trade union behavior the monopoly model and the efficient bargaining model in a more general framework it does this by analyzing sequential bargaining models where wages are determined before employment and the power of the union in the two stages of the bargain differs as well as finding that the monopoly and efficient bargain models are special cases of this model a new class of models is also discovered this framework is used to analyze the relationship between union pow er and efficiency the empirical analysis of trade unions and the effects of trade union legislation copyright 1987 by royal economic society

structural adjustment policies and productive efficiency of socialist enterprises abstract the paper uses panel data from a five percent stratified random sample of yugoslav industrial enterprises to test several hypotheses about the determinants of productive efficiency the estimating procedure selects the production function best supported by the data and allows for industry specific production function parameters as well as from firm specific fixed or random effects the instrumental variable estimates suggest that productive efficiency is unaffected by the four structural policy variables whose effect we examine the extent of export orientation joint venture status divisionalization of the firm and the firm s market share

towards a green economy through innovations the role of trade union involvement abstract in this paper we address the overlooked issue of whether and how industrial relations might play a role in the process of greening the economy primarily through the levers of innovation adoption and organisational change we address our objective econometrically assessing the quality of industrial relations as a driver of environmental innovation adoption through the use of micro data on manufacturing firms the results yield two interesting main findings being a unionised firm is not associated with the adoption of environmental innovation however when we consider the industrial relations climate we observe a positive relationship between a cooperative industrial relations climate union involvement and the propensity to introduce environmental innovation two models are relevant a managerially oriented model unions are informed and a participatory model unions bargain on innovation adoption the contents of environmental innovations are also important union involvement is more relevant for adopting more complex and radical innovations to abate co2 and ems and iso practices

on the prevalence of labor contracts with fixed duration the prevalence of labor contracts with fixed duration seems surprising why is a fixed duration preferred to a stochastic duration that depends on the consumer price index in this paper the specification of the contract duration is determined endogenously the wage rate can be indexed to the consumer price index but there is a loss since the indexation must be the same for different types of shocks this loss increases with the variability of the contract duration since the loss due to the contracting cost depends on the expected discounted duration only a fixed duration is chosen copyright 1992 by american economic association

the market effects of zoning undeveloped land does zoning follow the market through restricting the uses of land zoning gives local governments the power to modify the dictates of unconstrained land markets many believe however that the regulations tend to coincide with or anticipate the market solution rather than modify it the validity of this assertion is an empirical question and has not yet been adequately addressed the purpose of this paper is to develop and apply an empirical test of the null hypothesis that zoning follows the market the null hypothesis can be rejected only if land uses under zoning differ from what they would be without zoning the first task in deriving the test is to differentiate between constrained and unconstrained land market allocations it is shown that parameter estimates for hedonic price functions when markets are zoned cannot be interpreted to imply that the regulations constrain market prices it is also shown that sample selection bias is a likely source of specification error in estimating hedonic price functions for zoned land markets since the sample selection of parcels to zone designations is unlikely to be random the selection process must be accounted for in ordinary least squares ols estimation of zone constrained hedonic price functions fortunately the correction for the specification error also provides a test for the market effects of zoning a bid price interpretation of hedonic price functions for land is presented in section ii the sample selection bias issues are also discussed in that section and a formal test for the market effects of zoning is introduced

local versus central wage bargaining with endogenous investments investment behavior may depend on whether wage bargaining takes place centrally or locally at the firm level the outcome of the wage bargain will in turn depend on previous investments ignoring other differences between the two bargaining regimes endogenous investments imply that wages are lower and profits higher under local wage bargaining than under central bargaining this does not necessarily imply that employment is highest under local bargaining since investments may differ in the two cases with a nash bargaining solution however reasonable assumptions imply that employment is highest under local wage bargaining

capitalists and workers knowledge and the strategic role of investment within the firm does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm the formation of a firm frequently represents an attempt by an individual to secure a return on knowledge and we demonstrate that in this context there can be an incentive to precommit capital before contracting with other members of the firm that is to be the capitalist results are also obtained on the investment level and wage rate the key ingredient of the model is emergence of a product market entry threat from within the firm this contrasts with the anonymous external potential entrant prevalent in the literature

sunk investment bargaining and choice of capital structure this paper shows how a firm might optimally choose debt to affect the outcome of bilateral bargaining with workers or other input suppliers it is shown that debt may alleviate the well known underinvestment problem associated with the inability to write precommitment contracts also in such circumstances debt could be pareto improving over complete equity financing the relationship between the optimal level of debt and asset specificity of investment and bargaining power of the firm vis a vis the workers is explored the williamson conjecture that higher asset specificity will lead to less debt is shown not to be valid in general

the macroeconomics of specificity specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences resources are underutilized factor markets are segmented production suffers from technological sclerosis job creation and destruction are unbalanced recessions are excessively sharp and expansions run into bottlenecks while depending on the shock expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization recessions should typically be softened in the long run institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation technology choice will also be affected with the appropriated factor partially excluding the other from production to reduce appropriation

bargaining structures and delay in innovation it is sometimes argued that fears about the employment consequences of introducing new technology may lead unions to wish to delay innovations and this may reduce incentives for firm to carry out r d we explore these issues in a model of two countries that compete over both market share and r d and we restrict attention to cases where unions would wish to delay innovation we show that allowing unions to bargain over the timing of innovation need not reduce the possibility of a firm successfully competing for r d however simulations suggest that for a particular model allowing unions to delay innovation does not help a firm compete over r d

unemployment and the labour management conspiracy we study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment and then choosing a wage the government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy an exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour because of the induced change in the endogenous wage unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a labour management conspiracy

targeting capital structure the relationship between risky debt and the firm s likelihood of being acquired in a takeover wealth transfers from bidder and target equityholders to target debtholders can occur if target debt is coinsured by either the bidder s assets or by the synergy itself such wealth transfers reduce bidder and target shareholder gains and could poison the acquisition with a sample from 1979 90 the author finds that as the coinsurance potential of a firm s debt measured as the amount of relatively risky debt outstanding increases its likelihood of being acquired decreases in particular he finds this coinsurance deterrent to be strongest during the 1985 90 period and strongest for firms with public debt outstanding copyright 1996 by university of chicago press

tests of alternative wage employment bargaining models with an application to the uk aggregate labour market abstract in this paper we propose a test that discriminates among alternative models of bargaining for wages and employment the test rests on a theoretical framework which encompasses both the labour demand and the efficient bargain models of wage and employment determination it is based on testing the cross equation restrictions implied for the coefficients of union power variables in reduced form wage and employment equations the test is illustrated for the layard and nickell model of the aggregate uk labour market for which it is found that one can reject both the labour demand model and the hypothesis that wage employment bargains are efficient in favour of a generalised model of inefficient bargaining for wages and employment

are small firms less vulnerable to overpriced stock offers we show an inverted u relation between targetiveness probability of being targeted and firm size however this pattern describes stock offers and is more pronounced during hot markets characterized by higher stock valuations for cash offers we find a negative and monotonic relation these contrasting patterns suggest that small firms in the bottom nyse size quartile are less vulnerable to overpriced stock offers in addition we find that the stock acquirers of small targets are less overvalued than those of large targets and that the announcement returns are less negative for stock acquirers of small targets than for those of large targets

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

sluggish institutions in a dynamic world can unions and industrial competition coexist during the 1930s and 1940s collective bargaining emerged as the workplace governance norm in much of the u s industrial sector following its peak in the 1950s union density in the u s private sector fell steadily to only 7 4 percent in 2006 governance shifted from a formalized union norm to one of constrained managerial discretion in competitive and dynamic economic environments a union tax on company earnings and slow response to economic shocks combine to produce poor performance by union companies two industries automotives and airlines are used to illustrate these points if worker based institutions are to flourish they must add value and permit companies to perform at levels similar to those obtained under evolving nonunion governance norms

wage employment determination and a union tax on capital can theory and evidence be reconciled if unions appropriate quasi rents from relation specific capital observed factor prices no longer reflect effective costs unionism has effects akin to a partial factor tax on capital demand curve settlements need not imply higher k l among union firms

the economic consequences of labor unionization evidence from stock price crash risk this study investigates the impact of labor unionization on stock price crash risk we find that labor unionization is negatively associated with stock price crash risk such negative relation is more pronounced when firms can intimate more credible evidence on unfavorable prospects and when firms face more powerful labor unions our findings are consistent with the notion that firms take strategic actions to reduce the bargaining advantages enjoyed by labor unions and that labor unions force firms to take less risky investments and discontinue underperformed projects more timely which leads to lower stock price crash risk

neighbourhood composition and residential land prices does exclusion raise or lower values hedonic price models are used to explore the degree to which land use and racial composition used as outcome proxies for local zoning practices influence residential land values in santa clara county california fiscal pressures have prompted many california communities to zone on the basis of tax yield potential especially in fast growing settings like santa clara county controlling for variables related to job accessibility as well as proximity to regional transport infrastructure the analysis shows that indicators of land use diversity and jobs housing balance generally correlate with high residential land prices while the fiscal instincts of californian municipalities is to shun housing in favour of commercial development and thus to create imbalanced land development patterns this research suggests these fiscal advantages are partly offset by lower land values and thus lower property tax intake racial diversity on the other hand lowered residential property values even when controlling fo

do firms undertake self tender offers to optimize capital structure this study investigates capital structure around 286 self tender offers from 1980 to 1997 firms that undertake self tender offers generally have debt ratios below their predicted levels before the offers the debt ratios following nondefensive self tender offers are close to predicted levels while the ratios following defensive self tender offers are above predicted levels further 20 and 43 of the debt ratings are downgraded following nondefensive and defensive self tender offers respectively finally the increases in debt ratios around the offers are negatively related to the difference from the predicted debt ratio before the offers