walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria part i mixed strategies abstract we examine the connection between walrasian equilibria of a limit economy with infinitesimal firms and the noncooperative cournot equilibria of approximating finite economies with significant firms following earlier work of novshek and sonnenschein we allow for set up cost and permit a minimal form of mixed strategies we depart from them by requiring that the aggregate production set exhibits some degree however small of decreasing returns contrasting with their results it is shown that a regular walrasian equilibrium of a limit economy can always be approximated by a sequence of noncooperative equilibria for the tail of the approximating finite economies thus there is a surprising qualitative discontinuity when one passes from the novshek sonnenschein case of aggregate constant returns to scale of the decreasing returns case of this paper

identifying sectoral energy carbon water nexus characteristics of china abstract energy co2 emissions and water ecw are fundamentally linked holistic and in depth understanding of sectoral ecw nexus is essential to achieve socioeconomic sustainability this study employs environmental input output eio model to calculate the sectoral embodied ecw from 2002 to 2015 and adopts four indicators i e sectoral embodied ecw the proportion of direct ecw in embodied ecw and their changes to explore sectoral ecw nexus characteristics of china power egw and transport trs are key ecw nexus sectors in china with much larger embodied ecw and direct ecw sectors agriculture agr mining min and construction con show great changes in their ecw nexus characteristics between 2002 and 2015 sector agr is gradually becoming ecw intensive because agricultural modernization with the large scale adoption of modern water saving irrigation technologies leads to rapid increase in its energy and water use differentiated ecw related mitigation measures among sectors should be implemented through identifying their different ecw nexus characteristics as well as considering the synergies and co benefits of ecw related policies

a review of the water energy nexus abstract water and electricity are fundamentally linked at a basic level electricity generation requires water and water treatment and transportation use electricity historically there has been little reason to understand the nature of these links due largely to the presumption that water was not a threat to energy security nor electricity a threat to water security this presumption is now being challenged industry reforms increasing demand and more recently climate change are bringing into sharp focus the links between water and electricity in unprecedented ways general awareness of the links between water and electricity is increasing daily as the ramifications of the links are being felt the world over society s ability to deal with the challenges and uncertainties arising from the links between water and electricity is being hindered by limited understanding of the nature of the links and seeming lack of policy tools to effectively analyze them this paper reviews comprehensively the links between water and electricity presents a classification system for identifying links using the classification system this study further discusses these links by drawing upon examples from literature and follows with a synopsis of the nature of these links with this background the paper reviews and compares water energy studies in terms of scope objectives methodologies and key findings discusses major limitations of these studies and identifies important areas that would benefit from more in depth research this research contends that this type of approach is unsuitable in the longer term particularly when examining complex and multidimensional issues like the water energy nexus this work suggests that the nature of the nexus should and can be explored from a wider perspective by developing a suitable integrated methodological framework to serve as a platform for such exploration the purpose of this paper therefore is to outline the development of such a framework introduces integral theory and discusses how integral theory has shaped the development of the methodological framework employed in this research presents the framework and describes the suite of methods

water and energy price impacts on residential water demand in copenhagen while water price effects on residential water demand have been studied for several decades the impact of energy prices does not seem to have received much attention in this paper a residential water demand function derived from a model of household production of final consumption goods taking water energy and an aggregate of other goods as inputs is estimated on pooled time series data we find negative energy cross price elasticities around 0 2 and water price elasticities in the order of 0 1 or smaller

on the dominance solvability of large cournot games we consider cournot s model of oligopolistic competition in a market for a homogeneous good we seek conditions under which the oligopolists game is dominance solvable and hence the cournot equilibrium is the only outcome that survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies we focus on large oligopolies whereby we define an oligopoly to be large if both the demand and the supply side are replicated more than a certain finite number of times we show that large cournot oligopolies are dominance solvable if and only if the equilibrium of the approximated perfectly competitive market is globally stable under cobweb dynamics journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 1995 academic press inc

the enduring power of coase abstractby many measures ronald coase has been among the most influential economists of the past 60 years why is this so we suggest that coase s work has enduring appeal to and insight for social scientists in part because it addresses the biggest and most important social problems how do we solve governance and coordination problems when limited information common resource issues and public good issues produce conflicts among several people at once any scholar who works on issues of corporate or common pool governance pollution allocation of seats on legislative committees regulation of systemic risk in financial markets provision of military forces patent thickets creation of optimal communications networks regulation of decreasing cost industries or compensation of corporate officers can see his or her work stemming from several of coase s original insights just as john nash s work reshaped economic theory almost every field of economics and political science is shaped by coasean insights

when are plurality rule voting games dominance solvable this paper studies the dominance solvability by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies of plurality rule voting games for any number of alternatives and at least four voters we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance solvable ds and not to be ds these conditions can be stated in terms of only one aspect of the game the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives when the number of voters is large almost all games can be classified as either ds or not ds when the electorate is sufficiently replicated then if the game is ds a condorcet winner always exists and the outcome is the condorcet winner

impact of electricity prices and volumetric water allocation on energy and groundwater demand management analysis from western india abstract in recent years power tariff policy has been increasingly advocated as a mean to influence groundwater use and withdrawal decisions of farmers in view of the failure of existing direct and indirect regulations on groundwater withdrawal in india many researchers argue that pro rata electricity tariff with built in positive marginal cost of pumping could bring about efficient use of the resource though some argue that the levels of tariff in which demand becomes elastic to pricing are too high to be viable from political and socio economic points of view the paper presents a theoretical model to analyze farmers response to changes in power tariff and water allocation regimes vis a vis energy and groundwater use it validates the model by analyzing water productivity in groundwater irrigation under different electricity pricing structures and water allocation regimes water productivity was estimated using primary data of gross crop inputs cost of all inputs and volumetric water inputs the analysis shows that unit pricing of electricity influences groundwater use efficiency and productivity positively it also shows that the levels of pricing at which demand for electricity and groundwater becomes elastic to tariff are socio economically viable further water productivity impacts of pricing would be highest when water is volumetrically allocated with rationing therefore an effective power tariff policy followed by enforcement of volumetric water allocation could address the issue of efficiency sustainability and equity in groundwater use in india

the tradeoff of the commons under stochastic use abstract we develop a model of scarce renewable resources to study the problem of the commons our model formulation differs from the existing literature in that it assumes the use of the commons to be stochastic in nature one example is microwave spectrum for mobile and wireless communications we investigate three mechanisms of resource allocation free usage the exclusive franchise and a regulated monopoly we show that the welfare tradeoff among these three mechanisms depends on the characteristics of the commons and their usage patterns in particular we find that property rights are not always the best solution we then make four extensions that apply to spectrum allocations

industrial organization and public policy competition policy has been dominated by politics industrial organization can expect to exert an influence only insofar as it commands superior knowledge that is true with respect to the long run since economies of scale are limited to the short run competition is feasible in the long run therefore a trade off approach seeking to identify optimal market structures is misleading competition policy should instead be directed at prohibiting protective strategies of incumbents to deter entry competition being a process of creative destruction political viability of a competitive order requires competition policy to be supplemented by a social welfare policy

bertrand the cournot paradigm and the theory of perfect competition in this paper we extend to a general equilibrium context bertrand s classic critique of cournot we present a game theoretic model of a pure exchange monetary economy in which buyers as well as sellers announce both quantities and prices when buyers act strategically the edgeworth nonexistence problem is circumvented under weak conditions a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists for this game we make precise the bertrand idea that when agents in a finite economy are permitted to compete by price the resulting allocations will be competitive specifically the nash equilibria for our game yield allocations that are competitive allocations for the underlying exchange economy provided that there are at least two buyers and two sellers actively trading in every market under this characterization of strategic behaviour then two is enough for competition our objective is to provide a general equilibrium game theoretic formulation of the idea of bertrand price competition bertrand s classic critique of cournot can be paraphrased as follows when agents regard price rather than quantity as the strategic variable no price above the competitive equilibrium price can be sustained as a noncooperative equilibrium this idea is made precise in our game theoretic model of a pure exchange economy in which buyers as well as sellers act strategically our treatment of buyers behaviour is novel while sellers announce price and quantity vectors buyers specify sums of money and menus of alternative nonmonetary commodity bundles a buyer s action is a commitment to purchase any one of the specified commodity bundles in exchange for the sum of money our first result is that under weak conditions a nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists the paper thus also points to a way of resolving the classical edgeworth nonexistence problem second all nash equilibria yield allocations that are competitive for the underlying economy provided that in every market at least two buyers and two sellers are actively trading under this characterization of strategic

spectrum auctions yesterday s heresy today s orthodoxy tomorrow s anachronism taking the next step to open spectrum access abstract the auction paradigm for spectrum allocation has moved from heresy to orthodoxy but like its predecessors it will not be the end of history a better alternative not driven by the revenue needs of government is license free spectrum users would gain entry to frequency bands on a pay as you go basis instead of controlling a slice of the spectrum they would transmit their content together with access tokens these tokens are electronic money access prices would vary with congestion set by automatic clearinghouses of spectrum users spot and futures markets for spectrum access would emerge once technology and economics can solve the interference problem in ways other than exclusivity the question arises whether the right to use the spectrum for electronic speech is the government s to sell in the first place

price quantity strategic market games this paper is yet another in a rapidly growing series e g 2 11 on strategic approaches to economic equilibrium our aim here is to make precise the remark implicitly due to bertrand 1 or 10 ch 4 5 that if the agents in an economy use price setting strategies then the strategic nash equilibria will in fact be walrasian and this without any assumption of a large number of small agents however in our models not only prices but also quantities are set by the agents thus it might actually be more appropriate to call them bertrand cournot types of models we begin with a standard walras exchange economy with a finite number of traders and commodities this is recast as a game in strategic form in essentially two different ways there is a trading post for each commodity to which traders send contingent statements about how much they wish to buy and sell and at what prices in model 1 the trading point is determined by the intersection of the aggregate supply and demand curves in model 2 trade takes place so as to meet as many contingent statements as possible each buyer whose orders are filled pays the price he quoted using a fiat money which can be borrowed costlessly and limitlessly but after trade is over there is a settlement of accounts and a penalty is levied on those who are bankrupt no attempt is made to model the penalty in any detail it is simply described in the form of a disutility but this in turn may be imagined to stem from confiscation of assets see remark 5 or the necessity of procuring highly priced loans etc call a noncooperative equilibrium active if it turns out that no trader is isolated i e trapped as the sole buyer or seller at some trading post then our results may be described as follows in model 1 the active2 n e of the game coincide with the c e of the market furthermore there is a subset of tight active n e which also coincide with the c e and each n e in this subset is strong

ski lift pricing with applications to labor and other markets the market for ski runs or amusement rides often features admission tickets with no explicit price per ride therefore the equilibrium i nvolves queues which are systematically longer during peak periods s uch as weekends moreover the prices of admission tickets are much l ess responsive than the length of queues to variations in demand eve n when these variations are predictable despite the queues and stick y prices the authors show that the outcomes are nearly efficient und er plausible conditions they then show that similar results obtain f or some familiar congestion problems and for profit sharing schemes i n the labor market copyright 1987 by american economic association

the tradeoff of the commons we develop a model of scarce renewable resources to study the commons problem we show that contrary to conventional wisdom property rights can often be less efficient than a commons in particular we study two effects 1 waste which arises when individuals expend resources to use a resource unavailable due to congestion and 2 the risk of underutilization of the resource we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for each effect to dominate the other when the cost of determining the availability of a resource is low

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games abstract this paper extends the eductive learning approach in settings with non atomistic agents it shows the connection between the characterization of rationalizable sets by basu 1991 and the seminal result by guesnerie 1992 in the context of cournot oligopoly models

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

rationing rules and bertrand edgeworth equilibria in large markets abstract in a market with concave downward sloping demand and symmetric firms which compete in prices with constant marginal costs and capacity limits it is shown that the supports of the symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibria converge to the unique competitive price provided that unsatisfied demand is allocated according to the surplus maximizing rationing rule

efficient relocation of spectrum incumbents changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient to address this problem the fcc has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders often it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency in particular giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values but good public information about the cost of relocating the incumbent we examine the experience of broadband pcs entrants in relocating microwave incumbents we conclude with some remarks on how these ideas might be applied to digital television spectrum

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

administrative creation of property rights to radio spectrum abstract despite the 1934 communication act s ban on private ownership of radio spectrum the law leaves open to the federal communications commission a range of licensing regimes under which the commission may in its discretion grant spectrum users relatively strong or weak property rights to allotted frequencies this article examines numerous administrative decisions by the fcc to demonstrate how regulatory changes have affected the property interests conferred by spectrum licenses focusing on licensees rights to use divide and broker spectrum flexibly and to prevent unauthorized reception of their signals the article discusses the economic and legal significance of those changes and identifies areas for further reform the authors conclude that although important changes remain to be made the fcc has strengthened property interests on both the transmission and receiving ends of licensed frequencies and through the administrative process has eroded the importance of the statutory distinction

when costly voting is beneficial abstract we present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote when there is a zero cost to voting all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be by having a cost to voting only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost we show that by adding this cost welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of voters is high enough

an exploration of the eductive justifications of the rational expectations hypothesis this paper examines justifications of the rational expectations hypothesis that rely on the analysis of the agents mental forecasting educing activity which involves forecasting the forecasts of others etc the corresponding concept of eductive learning stability based on the game theoretical concept of rationalizability is primarily used within the classical muth model conditions for coordination of beliefs are interpreted and discussed they are robust to the introduction of noise more generally eductive stability fits economic intuition on coordination stability increases when the industry product differentiation increases and when decisions are sequential and observable copyright 1992 by american economic association

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

iterative computation of cournot equilibrium abstract in a homogeneous coumot model with quasi concave profit functions the problem of determining an equilibrium can be posed as one of solving an equation in one real variable total sales if the response functions are monotone or firms are identical then a certain iterative process based on averaging converges to an equilibrium such iterations have the interpretation that every firm responds to the average of sales by other firms in brevious periods

spectrum flash dance eli noam s proposal for open access to radio waves abstract as ronald coase posited in his famous article on the nature of the firm there are situations in which decentralized markets are relatively efficient for coordinating economic activity and situations in which they are not with spectrum access assigning property rights to clearly specified private owners is the socially efficient policy because the relevant transaction efficiencies will be internalized by competitive spectrum owners selecting to what degree rights should be subdivided and in what manner marketed where spot markets are optimal an owner will maximize profits by using them where long term contracts are efficient the owner will enter profitably into them hence eli noam s solution imposing open access rules on bands of radio frequencies by government mandate is a mistaken attempt to duplicate the efficiencies of markets by mandating a particular subset of market solutions such a policy predictably will result in underutilization of the spectrum resource

perfectly competitive markets as the limits of cournot markets a perfectly competitive partial equilibrium market for a single homogeneous good with a bounded continuum of infinitesimal firms is considered cost functions are essentially unrestricted and are allowed to vary smoothly across firms a sequence net of cournot markets each with a finite number of firms which converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both the inverse demand functions and the distributioon of firm technologies is introduced and it is shown that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a cournot equilibrium and all the cournot equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market

the rationality of u s regulation of the broadcast spectrum in his classic 1983 technologies of freedom ithiel de sola pool so elucidated the prevailing wisdom concerning broadcast licensure in the united states while the key legal questions surrounding this institution involve important first amendment questions hence pool s scarcity analogy to paper ink and presses economists and other policy analysts have often remarked on the more general incongruity in federal licensing while spectrum is regulated on the physical scarcity premise it is awarded to private users on a no fee basis thus conferring significant economic rents on private parties at substantial opportunity cost to the fisc moreover federal communications commission fcc 2 policies have openly sought virtually throughout the agency s entire life span to restrict broadcast licenses and competition for broadcasters particularly cable television to far below the quantity technically available 3 the

the spectrum as commons tomorrow s vision not today s prescription abstract eli noam has proposed using nascent technologies to treat the electromagnetic spectrum as an open access commons rather than as a subdivided collection of property rights in his view public auctions reduce competition threaten free speech foster fiscal mismanagement and presume illegitimate government ownership of spectrum but government auctioning is our collective decision to sell that which we all own to foster spectrum efficiency via the market threats to free speech are exaggerated especially when asserted on behalf of corporations noam correctly observes that a government auctioneer might make too little spectrum available but concerns about fostering oligopoly are exaggerated his open access alternative would likely increase the cost of assembling the substantial long term rights to use spectrum for standardized reliable telecommunication services if the benefits of open access ever exceed the costs spectrum owners could carry out the necessary subdivision management and

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

optimal allocation without transfer payments abstract often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return this may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs in this paper we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent while the designer cannot charge agents he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them we find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible is optimal in other cases those that send the highest signal should receive the goods however we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior also we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated

the stability of the cournot oligopoly model a reassessment abstract the stability properties of the cournot oligopoly model are examined for the continuous adjustment process sufficient conditions for instability are established which are shown to be of significance when the number of firms n is small local and global stability are shown under appropriate conditions which for global stability include the restriction n 5 the proof of global stability corrects a well known proof by f hahn rev econ stud 29 1962 329 331 results for the discrete time adjustment process are reported and the restrictiveness of the model s assumptions are discussed

iterated elimination of dominated strategies in a bertrand edgeworth model we consider a bertrand edgeworth model of price competition firms have identical and constant marginal costs and finite exogeneous capacities firms choose prices our interest is in the set of those prices which are left over after the iterated elimination of dominated strategies we show that in two circumstances this set will be close to the set containing only the marketclearing walrasian price i if any n 1 out of n firms assumed to be in the market have sufficient capacity to cover demand at marginal costs ii if any given total capacity is owned by a very large number of very small firms

the optimal product mix for a monopolist in the presence of congestion effects a model and some results the paper develops a model of product differentiation in which the quality of a product may be negatively affected by the number of consumers buying it as it is the case for any good affected by congestion it is shown that for any positive degree of heterogeneity among the consumers a monopolist will always find it more profitable to differentiate i e to sell more than one quality of the product at different prices

on the efficiency of competitive markets for operating licenses some economists and policy makers have suggested that market allocation of scarce operating licenses broadcasting licenses and airport slots for instance would lead to their efficient use this paper demonstrates that a competitive market allocation of operating licenses whether attained through auctioning selling or allowing resale of the rights does not in general assure efficiency the profit criterion that would guide the allocation of licenses in a competitive market would not necessarily lead to the uses that maximize social benefits the paper shows that the difference between private and social incentives in the allocation process can be quite large the theory is then applied to discussions of allocating airport takeoff and landing slots and broadcasting licenses

market size and substitutability in imperfect competition a bertrand edgeworth chamberlin model competition is often associated with the idea that there are many traders in the market or that each price maker is small as compared to the market this paper introduces this notion of market size in a model of price competition with imperfect substitutes by constructing a model which creates a bridge between the chamberlin and bertrand edge worth lines of work on price competition we investigate the role of two fundamental parameters in the existence of an equilibrium the market size given by the number n of competitors and the degree of substitutability we prove that a for a given number of n 2 of competitors a sufficiently large but finite degree of substitutability entails nonexistence this thus generalizes the bertrand edgeworth nonexistence result which applies only to perfect substitutes b conversely for a given upper bound on the degree of substitutability a sufficiently large number of competitors ensures existence which thus introduces a significant role for market size in models of imperfect competition we finally investigate the proximity of an equilibrium when it exists to a competitive outcome and we find that both high substitutability and large market size are a condition for competitiveness

water competition through the water energy nexus assessing the economic impacts of climate change in a mediterranean context abstract the impacts of climate change on water resources availability are expected to be adverse especially in drier climate regions such as the mediterranean increased water scarcity will exacerbate competition for water resources not only between sectors but also between countries sharing transboundary river basins due to the mutual dependence of the energy sector on water resources and of the water services provision sector on energy inputs the water energy nexus is acknowledged as a major challenge for the near future with hydropower representing one of the most direct links in this nexus the aim of this paper is to assess the economy wide impacts of the concurrent effects of climate change driven impacts on water availability and the sectoral and regional competition for scarcer water resources in order to accomplish that goal an integrated modelling approach is developed where a computable general equilibrium model including raw water as a production factor is linked to times pt a bottom up model of the energy sector a case study is provided for the mediterranean country of portugal results for 2050 show that macroeconomic impacts are significant and encompass important inter sectoral differences that in turn depend on the degree of competition between sectors impacts are stronger when water consumption by spanish sectors is considered as this intensifies water scarcity in portugal thus the paper allows to gain insight in the broader water energy economy nexus and the additional costs that the dependence on water resources availability in transboundary river basins represents to an economy both aspects being of utmost importance for climate adaptation and energy policy making

allocation of orbit and spectrum resources for regional communications what s at stake abstract contentious debate surrounds allocation of the geostationary orbit and electromagnetic spectrum two resources used by communications satellites an extensive economics literature alleges that the nonmarket administrative allocative procedures now in place are highly inefficient but no research has empirically estimated the welfare loss this article develops a conceptual framework and a computerized model to estimate the economic value of the resources the size and distribution of welfare costs associated with the present regulatory regime and the potential gains from more market like allocation

implementing a market based spectrum policy abstract the spectrum auctions were a step toward the herzel coase vision of a flexible and efficient market for spectrum this article examines what remains to be done spectrum must be unbundled from broadcast and transmission facilities the commoditization of spectrum will facilitate standardization price discovery and open access to diverse users a liquid secondary spectrum market will lower transactions and entry cost making telecommunications markets contestable auctions should be used to elicit a supply of spectrum from licensees as well as to allocate it to new users in closing the spectrum commons congress granted use to a privileged few unbundled spectrum property rights commoditization and open markets will give the public access to this public resource

new zealand spectrum policy a model for the united states abstract in 1989 the new zealand government began to auction management rights to the electromagnetic spectrum using sealed bid second price vickrey auctions subsequently the united states began to auction spectrum through ascending bid multiple round auctions although students of auction processes find the latter type of auction to be the more efficient form i find that the prices realized in the new zealand cellular auctions are very similar to those realized in the u s personal communications services auctions after adjusting for differences in demographics the flexibility of the new zealand management rights should theoretically allow the winning bidders to find the highest valued use for the spectrum but many of the auctioned rights remain unused several years later a country as small as new zealand simply cannot be as innovative in finding new uses for the spectrum because of the large initial costs of developing the requisite equipment for using it

property rights and wireless license values abstract while extending the scope of spectrum property rights promotes efficiency such reforms are often deterred by equity concerns theoretically however the windfalls may be negative relaxing license restrictions may increase profits by allowing enhanced productivity yet liberalization across a class of licensees can reduce the expected profits by increasing competitiveness this article examines license value changes for regimes that decisively shift toward private property rights in radio spectrum by analyzing the average prices paid in international cellular phone license auctions during 1995 2001 this unique data set encompasses 1 365 licenses assigned by competitive bidding in 38 auctions held in 24 countries licenses awarded by regimes with more expansive spectrum property rights generated winning bids that were 61 percent lower adjusting for other factors this evidence reverses the equity argument against liberalization over the policy margin studied and is consistent with coase s view

the cost of rent seeking evidence from cellular telephone license lotteries the inventors of the theory of rent seeking used an analogy with competitive markets to conclude that all monopoly rents would be dissipated in the competition to obtain the property rights to them 23 29 subsequent theorists showed that this conclusion is quite sensitive to assumptions about foresight risk aversion conjectures and bias 15 21 30 since little quantitative information about actual rent seeking competitions is available the theory has developed in an empirical vacuum in this paper we attempt to fill that vacuum with an estimate of rent seeking expenditure by applicants in the federal communications commission s fcc cellular telephone license lotteries held between 1986 and 1989 we go on to compare expenditures with estimates of the value of the licenses at stake these lotteries constitute a unique natural experiment any u s citizen was eligible to enter each geographic lottery once and only once for an expense which we calculate as modest the lotteries were widely publicized and heavily entered there were over 320 000 applications one per market filed for 643 cellular licenses and third party application preparers entered the market rapidly because licenses were awarded sequentially prospective participants in later lotteries could find out that expected net returns from earlier lotteries were positive because of undersubscription the value of the prize was known because sales of previously awarded licenses had begun to take place before later lotteries were held and market analysts were using such sale prices to value licenses not yet awarded the later lotteries seem almost optimally contrived to maximize the dissipation of rents yet comparing the resources invested in entry the price of a fully prepared application with the rents available the market value of cellular telephone licenses shows that dissipation was far short of complete

assigning property rights to radio spectrum users why did fcc license auctions take 67 years abstract while leo herzel 1951 and ronald coase 1959 persuasively argued for auctioning licenses issued by the federal communications commission fcc not until 1993 did the u s congress grant the fcc authority to assign wireless operating permits via competitive bidding why were auctions with obvious efficiency and equity advantages so long in coming why were comparative hearings in the public interest first abandoned as assignment tools in 1981 not for auctions but for lotteries and why were radio and tv licenses pointedly excluded from auctions four factors the special interest of regulators in influencing broadcasting content the limits placed on explicit program regulation by the u s constitution the recent increase in the relative economic importance of nonbroadcast wireless services and the agency problem embedded in central planning are used to explain both the political stability of economically inefficient licensing methods and recent reforms

walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria part ii pure strategies abstract we examine the connection between walrasian equilibria of a limit economy with infinitesimal firms and noncooperative cournot equilibria of approximating finite economies with significant firms nonconvex production sets decreasing returns in the aggregate and endogenous determination of the number of active firms are allowed a walrasian equilibrium is a limit of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria only if a condition loosely analogous to downward sloping demand in the partial equilibrium constant returns to scale case holds the condition is also sufficient to guarantee the existence of a robust sequence of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria which converges to the walrasian equilibrium

a characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games abstract the set of rationalizable strategies of a firm in a quantity setting oligopoly is characterized it is shown that as the number of firms in the industry increases the rationalizable solution converges to the interval from zero to the monopoly output

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

optimal abolition of fcc spectrum allocation ronald coase based his 1959 call for spectrum markets on theoretical conjecture today abundant evidence supports his case targeted liberalization in cellular markets as contrasted with regulatory planning of the digital tv transition and other traditional policies suggest enormous efficiency gains are available from wider use of the price system with exclusive frequency rights assigned to owners markets widely reconfigure spectrum use coordinating complex spectrum sharing resulting social gains include increased consumer surplus from enhanced technological innovation and wireless service competition a social bonus arrives in the benefits associated with wider scope for free speech yet the administrative allocation system continues to distribute rents and garner political support liberal reforms in contrast produce large but broadly dispersed efficiency gains and are undersupplied this paper proposes an incremental extension of property rights in spectrum to move beyond the current rent seeking equilibrium eliminating the federal communications commission s centralized spectrum allocation process and with it an attractive nuisance generating anticonsumer outcomes