asymmetry and revenue in first price auctions abstract we show by an example that in first price ipv auctions asymmetry in bidders valuations need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same amount of social surplus asymmetry need not reduce competition in first price auctions

spectrum auction designs and revenue variations this study examines a sample of 93 national 3g spectrum auctions for the period 2000 2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations an implied reduced form econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid per mhz per million populations values to regulator determined auction design characteristics auction competitiveness mobile wireless market conditions and spectrum package attributes identified from tender documents the analysis reveals that among other factors all auction design characteristics independently impact on realized 3g spectrum auction revenues

on the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first price auctions we establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first price auctions with asymmetric bidders interdependent values and affiliated one dimensional signals by extending a monotonicity result due to milgrom and weber 1982 we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational we avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second price auctions

mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets the effects on prices and efficiency abstract united states antitrust merger analysis has recently focused on simulating the unilateral effects of mergers we develop a model to simulate the unilateral price increase from a merger in an auction market we illustrate our results in the context of hospital mergers in the u s and calibrate our simulations to known market parameters we compare the price increases in our model to those suggested by analytically simpler models the simulation results suggest that the unilateral price increases predicted by our model are modest in general we also simulate the merger cost savings that are needed to offset the price effects

asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers abstract much of the theoretical auction literature assumes that there are no observable differences between the bidders of an auction in this paper i present an asymmetric auction model where the distribution of a bidder s value depends on some commonly observed characteristics the model is applied to joint bidding and mergers in auction markets the results provide additional evidence that first price auctions are less susceptible to the acquisition and exercise of market power than open auctions

the effects of tax policy on aggregate agricultural investment the effects of tax policies on aggregate agricultural investment are examined results from this analysis suggest that tax policies are effective in promoting agricultural investment nearly 20 percent of net investment in agricultural equipment during the period 1956 through 1978 is attributed to tax policy from 1956 to 1978 tax policy has stimulated in real dollars over 5 billion in net investment in equipment and in excess of 1 billion in structures

investment incentives in procurement auctions this paper investigates firms incentives to invest in cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction a format largely used for procurement two central features of the model are that we allow firms to be heterogeneous and that investment is observable we find that firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head on competition using the second price auction as a benchmark we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants and that this is socially inefficient these results have implications for market design when investment is important different market institutions provide different incentives for firms to reduce costs acquire information expand and so on in short to undertake any activity that affects their competitive positions accordingly the performance of these market institutions should be judged not only from a static perspective taking firms competitive positions as given but also from a dynamic perspective auction markets are a natural competitive environment to study because there is a clear sense in which we can design such markets by choosing appropriate rules for competition in this paper we study how the first price auction fpa a format commonly used for procurement affects firms incentives to invest in cost reduction many procurement markets are characterized by a small number of participants heterogeneity among firms and low rates of turnover therefore it is interesting to investigate to what extent the format used for the auction contributes to these characteristics the basic ingredients of our model are as follows there are n firms and one of them has the opportunity prior to the auction to make an investment we model this investment as an improvement in the ex ante distribution of costs for this firm the main question we ask is what are the firm s incentives to invest given that this investment is observed by its competitors clearly the benefits of such investment depend on how the firm s competitors react in other words to determine the firm s incentive to invest we need to compare the equilibrium at the procurement stage if it makes this investment and if it does not in section 3 we derive new comparative statics results for the fpa we find that after the investment the investor s opponents will bid collectively more aggressively this result holds generally when there are only two bidders or when the investor s opponents are symmetric proposition 1 otherwise a sufficient condition is that investment changes market leadership proposition 2 in the language of industrial organization investment has a negative strategic effect in the fpa this erodes 1

collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders abstract we show that efficient collusion by any subset of bidders in second price private value auctions is possible even when the bidders are heterogeneous an important property of efficient collusion is that a bidder s net payoff from participating in collusion is independent of her valuation we show that the cooperative game whose characteristic function evaluated at a coalition is the ex ante collusive surplus of that coalition has a nonempty core a feature of more technical interest is the mechanism characterization when the private information of agents does not enter in a linear or even piecewise linear manner

a study of collusion in first price auctions this paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in florida and texas during the 1980s in both states firms were convicted of bid rigging the data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways one cartel divides the market among members while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding we show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large in the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non cartel bidders the presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction the selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non cartel bidder the data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels

the stagnation of smallholder agriculture in malawi a decade of structural adjustment abstract malawi s efforts at structural adjustment have revolved around reforming the marketing and pricing of outputs and inputs in smallholder agriculture in practice the price oriented adjustment policies were not thorough enough and have led to disappointing results there is clearly a need to push for further reforms in pricing however structural adjustment in malawi will have to go beyond just getting prices right policies must also concentrate on structural and institutional weaknesses that constrain smallholder agriculture and contribute to widespread food insecurity and malnutrition

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

approaches to uprooting poverty in africa abstract poverty in africa is primarily a rural phenomenon its growing incidence is partly due to slow growth in gdp induced by economic policies that discriminated against agriculture urban bias in social spending has left the rural poor with little or no access to basic needs technological change improved rural infrastructure and an efficient marketing environment are needed to enhance agricultural growth and maximize returns to the rural producer improving the human capital of the rural poor will expand their employment opportunities cost effective transfer programmes would provide a safety net for the vulnerable poor

econometrics of ascending auctions by quantile regression this paper suggests an identification and estimation approach based on quantile regression to recover the underlying distribution of bidders private values in ascending auctions under the ipv paradigm the quantile regression approach provides a flexible and convenient parameterization of the private values distribution with an estimation methodology easy to implement and with several specification tests the quantile framework provides a new focus on the quantile level of the private values distribution in particular the seller s optimal screening level which can be very useful for bidders and seller an empirical application using data from the usfs timber auctions illustrates the methodology

a point decision for partially identified auction models this article proposes a decision theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models such as haile and tamer 2003 using data on transaction prices from english auctions the article employs gilboa and schmeidler 1989 for inference that is robust with respect to the prior over unidentified parameters it is optimal to interpret the transaction price as the highest value and maximize the posterior mean of the seller s revenue the monte carlo study shows substantial gains relative to the revenues corresponding to a random point and the midpoint in the haile and tamer interval

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

the impacts of tax reform on agricultural households estimates of tax reform s impacts usually concentrate on macroeconomic impacts but attention at the industry or sectoral level is often limited our study uses a computable general equilibrium cge model to estimate the disaggregated impacts of the tax cuts and jobs act tcja of 2018 which lowered personal and corporate tax rates focusing on agriculture we use survey data to calculate how the tcja would change the tax rates faced by farmers at the sector level we use internal revenue service data to calculate tax rates for all other producers we then simulate the economy wide and sectoral effects of tcja we find that the tcja would cause a reduction in agricultural output as resources would be reallocated to other sectors using our survey data we extend the cge results to measure the impacts to farm households from changes in on and off farm income we find that most farm households would have income gains from tax reform our tax reform scenario highlights the fact that investment weighs heavily on model results that is firms that are attractive to domestic and foreign investment have gains in demand for their products while other sectors such as primary agriculture experience decreases in production a sensitivity analysis that reduces the attractiveness of the united states in foreign investment shows smaller impacts of tcja especially for macroeconomic variables

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

are disadvanteged bidders doomed in ascending auctions a bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor when the prize has a common value component a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids especially cautiously and hence the advantaged bidder wins most of the time however contrary to what is often argued a disadvantaged bidder still wins with positive probability even if his competitor s advantage is very large and even if the disadvantaged bidder has the lowest actual valuation ex post therefore the disadvantaged bidder has an incentive to participate in the auction and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic effect on the seller s revenue

asymmetric budget constraints in a first price auction abstract i solve a first price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions and known valuations for one object i show that in any equilibrium the expected utilities and bid distributions of both bidders are unique if budgets are sufficiently low the bidders will bid their entire budget in any equilibrium for sufficiently high budgets mass points in the equilibrium strategies arise a less restrictive budget distribution could make both bidders strictly worse off if the budget distribution of one bidder is dominated by the budget distribution of the other bidder in the reverse hazard rate order the weaker bidder will bid more aggressively than the stronger bidder in contrast to existing results for symmetric budget distributions with asymmetric budget distributions a second price auction can yield a strictly higher revenue than a first price auction under an additional assumption i derive the unique equilibrium utilities and bid distributions of both bidders in an all pay auction

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

asymmetric first price auctions abstract a new approach to asymmetric first price auctions is proposed which circumvents the need to examine bidding strategies directly specifically the ratio of bidders endogenous payoffs is analyzed and compared to the ratio of the exogenous distribution functions that describe beliefs most of the results are inferred from this comparison in the existing theoretical literature assumptions of first order stochastic dominance or stronger imply that the latter ratio has very specific properties but no such assumptions are imposed here it is proven that first order stochastic dominance is necessary for bidding strategies not to cross when this assumption is relaxed in the numerical literature it is done in a manner that leads to exactly one crossing however it is straightforward to construct examples with several crossings finally bid distributions will cross in auctions with two bidders whenever second order but not first order stochastic dominance applies

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders abstract a mixed population of bidders consists of two asymmetric groups members of the first group are game theoretic players who maximize their expected profit and incorrectly believe that their opponents act similarly the second group of bidders adopts an irrational strategy they either choose their bids randomly following a given probability distribution in a naive form of bidding or follow a decision theoretic approach maximizing their expected profit under the assumption that all other bids are random in a sealed bid private value procurement auction we examine the optimal strategy of a new player who has perfect knowledge of the structure of the mixed bidder population and enters the auction the optimal bid of the new bidder is derived when the cost and mark up follow a uniform distribution in 0 1 the effect of the relative size of the group of game theoretic bidders and the population size on the optimal bid price is established

tax reform and land using sectors in the u s economy a general equilibrium analysis a computable general equilibrium model of the u s economy is used to assess the effects of the tax reform act of 1986 on land using sectors forestry and three classes of agriculture the model s components include twelve production sectors six consumer groups a balanced budget government sector and a zero surplus foreign sector in relative terms tax reform reduces total value added output in land using sectors to a greater extent than other sectors in the economy experiments are also performed comparing partial and general equilibrium specifications of the economy and the impact of choice of input substitution elasticities

the effects of uncertainty and adjustment costs on investment in the almond industry a neoclassical model of investment behavior is developed wherein firms are assumed to maximize the expected present value of net revenue under leontief technology prices and yields are assumed to be stochastic this framework yields investment as a function of the expected present value of the output from one unit of capital and the variance of the expected value this theory is applied to investment in the almond industry the model outperforms both a model without uncertainty and one with neither uncertainty nor adjustment costs using in sample and out of sample tests copyright 1989 by mit press

u turns and full circles two decades of agricultural reform in malawi 1981 2000 abstract this paper traces the evolution of malawi s agricultural policy over the past two decades during this period the world bank has played a key role in shaping policy reform through its adjustment loans three distinct reform phases can be identified 1981 87 when policy was dominated by the dogmatism of the world bank s pricist and state minimalist policies 1988 94 when a more flexible position was taken by both the bank and the malawi government both of whom acknowledged the structuralist critique of earlier policies and 1994 to the present when the reform process in agriculture became more politicized and a schism developed between the bank and the government this latter period is used to illustrate some of the unresolved policy issues pertaining to similar low income agrarian economies

comparative analysis of investment models for new york dairy farms traditional and dynamic investment models were estimated using farm level dairy data the traditional model predicted more variability in desired capital and less variability in the adjustment rate than did the dynamic model overall the traditional model performed better both models suggest a significant delay between changes in the determinants of desired capital stock and the actual investment expenditure new york dairy farmers may be making more extensive use of existing capital before making additional expenditures another explanation may be our use of farm level data where investment is periodic and discrete most other studies have used aggregate data

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

the effect of bidder heterogeneity on combinatorial conservation auction designs in an iterative combinatorial auction bidders can submit bids on individual and or on combinations of projects in a series of intermediate rounds where bid prices are revised before a final allocation is made the iterative format is useful for conservation service procurement as landholders can rely on market information revealed through the rounds to evaluate their choices of projects and bid prices however there is no single way of providing the market information different designs for generating price information have been proposed little is known about the performance of iterative combinatorial auction designs when heterogeneous bidders with different cost structures participate in an auction using an agent based model we evaluate a selected set of designs under different bidder heterogeneity scenarios we observe that higher degrees of heterogeneity lead to lower auction efficiency and that auction outcomes are highly sensitive to price feedback design choices

endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction we show how to numerically solve for a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity constrained firms we find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes otherwise firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric which softens competition and increases procurement costs we also find that forward looking bidding dampens the competition softening effects of asymmetry farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones this can undermine the goal of a bid preference style affirmative action program more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences

asymmetry in procurement auctions evidence from snow removal contracts differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procure ment auctions relying on a structural approach this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in montrthe empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of montrbecause of prohibitive equipment storage costs the extent of inefficiency due to asym metry is empirically assessed various policy experiments are performed a bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts when bidders willingness to pay depends in part on observable variables the princi pal s interest is not best served by creating a level auction playing field this article studies procurement auctions for snow removal contracts in montrit investigates the degree to which companies in disadvantageous locations should win even if they do not submit the lowest bid from the submitted bids a novel empirical methodology estimates the extent of cost variation across firms along with its variation within loca tion although the dispersion is substantial the gain from treating bidders unequally is limited when observed individual characteristics affect the firms costs and their bidding strategies all bidders cannot be treated alike these differences in characteristics or asymmetries among bidders may arise from their size as noted by laffont et al 1995 their capacity constraints as in jofre bonet and pesendorfer 2003 or the possession of better information as in hendricks and porter 1988 and hendricks et al 1994

entry and r d in procurement contracting abstract a model of competitive procurement and contracting is presented in this paper the key features of the model include precontract r d an endogenous number of homogeneous firms and sealed bid auction rules both diminishing and constant returns to scale drs and crs in r d expenditure technologies are considered i find that the sealed bid first price auction fpa is equivalent to the second price auction spa under drs technology the revenue equivalence theorems breaks down under crs because multiple equilibria arise in the r d stage when spa is used howerer spa yields a unique perfect equilibrium given sufficient heterogeneity among potential firms the free entry perfect equilibrium is also characterized the buyer prefers free entry through an appropriate selection of the reservation price

maize is life malawi s delayed green revolution abstract the pattern of maize seed development in malawi demonstrates the importance of farmers capacity to articulate their interests through collective action and institutions despite the vital significance of maize as a wage good in malawi limited effective demand for maize seed research prolonged the period of technical stagnation analysis of the institutional factors shaping the demand for maize seed research complements previous work on malawi s political economy the supply of seed technology and adoption with implications for current political changes in that nation the importance of farmers organizations and state commitment to agricultural research in sub saharan africa

agricultural incentives in developing countries measuring the effect of sectoral and economywide policies the impact of sector specific direct and economywide indirect policies on agricultural incentives for 18 developing countries for the period 1975 84 are estimated the direct effect is measured by the proportional difference between the producer price and the border price adjusting for distribution storage transport and other marketing costs the indirect effect has two components 1 the impact of the unsustainable portion of the current account deficit and of industrial protection policies on the real exchange rate and thus on the price of agricultural commodities relative to nonagricultural nontradables and 2 the impact of industrial protection policies on the relative price of agricultural commodities to that of nonagricultural tradable goods the authors found that a in almost all cases the direct effect is equivalent to a tax on exportable goods and to a subsidy for importables b the indirect effect also taxes agriculture and dominates the direct effect and c the direct policies for both importables and exportables stabilize domestic producer prices

structural adjustment and the welfare of rural smallholders a comparative analysis from sub saharan africa the direction and level of changes in real incomes brought about by structural adjustment are determined by a variety of factors including sources of income patterns of expenditures and movements in relative prices in the wake of adjustment an econometric model is used to derive an index of real income which is employed for data from cote d ivoire ghana malawi madagascar and tanzania no systematic changes in relative prices and especially in the ratio of tradable to nontradable prices were noted after the beginning of adjustment although the diversity of income sources implies that the implications of movements in relative prices on smallholder welfare are indeed complex the results indicate that there is no unequivocal pattern of increase or decline in the real welfare of the rural poor but that there are marked differences among countries and regions

public expenditures in sub saharan africa during a period of economic reforms abstract public expenditure restraint is the most direct means of reducing balance of payments and budget deficits and is consequently a key aspect of macroeconomic adjustment programs the results of this study indicate a steady increase in total central government and social services spending during 1977 1989 in sub saharan africa the growth in population however contributed to an overall erosion in per capita expenditures while total government expenditures as a share of gdp have been stable during the past decade they have declined net of interest repayments which represent an increasingly large share of total spending an analysis of spending in the three years before and after donor financed adjustment programs began reveals no pattern of increase or decrease in real levels of total and social sector expenditures or in social sector spending as a share of the total expenditures elasticities of health and education spending with respect to gdp were found to be greater than unity in recent years indicating that as countries develop social spending will constitute a larger share of gdp

the effects of tax policy on investment in agriculture the effects of tax policy on agricultural investment are investigated by estimating a dynamic interrelated input demand system net investment is specified to give rise to increasing internal costs of adjustment resulting in capital inputs being quasi fixed the system of demand equations is derived by incorporating a quadratic normalized restricted cost function into a long run dynamic optimization framework copyright 1991 by mit press

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

competition in the economic crisis analysis of procurement auctions we study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions using data from austrian construction procurements we estimate bidders construction costs within a private value auction model we find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1 5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis markups of winning bids decrease by 3 3 percentage points we also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger these two pieces of evidence point to pro cyclical markups

green gold burley tobacco smallholder agriculture and poverty alleviation in malawi abstract the abolition in 1990 of the estate monopoly on cultivation of burley tobacco is expected to play an important role in reducing poverty among smallholders in malawi a nationwide survey in 1993 shows that smallholder households cultivating burley also grow more hybrid maize use more fertilizer and are more food secure but resource poor households particularly those headed by women face land and labor constraints on burley adoption burley and hybrid maize increase the demand for hired labor but not enough to absorb the growth in the rural labor force broad based poverty alleviation requires technology and programs targeted at the majority of smallholders with holdings of 0 5 hectares or less

supply response and investment in the canadian food processing industry this paper reports on the estimation of a dynamic model of the food manufacturing industry in canada its major objectives are to analyze the determinants of investments and the production structure of the industry an important finding of the study is that the hypothesis of instantaneous capital adjustment to changing market conditions is statistically rejected capital stock adjustment to optimal levels takes approximately two and one third years another result is that although the industry is responsive to price changes a general pattern of inelastic factor demand and output supply prevails in the short run intermediate run and even in the long run