aid volatility policy and development summary we build on bulir and hamann s analysis of aid volatility bulir a hamann j 2003 aid volatility an empirical assessment imf staff papers 50 1 64 89 bulir a hamann j 2008 volatility of development aid from the frying pan into the fire washington dc imf paper submitted to this special section showing that the conclusions reached depend on the dataset used their argument that the poorest countries have the highest volatility appears not to be correct the impact of volatility on growth is negative overall but differs between positive and negative volatility the mix between responsive components of aid for example programme aid and proactive components for example technical assistance is important finally we conclude that measures which increase trust between donor and recipient and reductions in the degree of donor oligopoly reduce aid volatility without obviously reducing its effectiveness

aid and sectoral growth evidence from panel data this article examines empirically the proposition that aid to poor countries is detrimental for external competitiveness giving rise to dutch disease type effects at the aggregate level aid is f

power competition and the free trader vulgaris competition is taken for granted by neoclassical economics its cause is human nature and its functioning is the result of spontaneous interactions as such it is contrasted with power which is an unnatural restriction on human liberty by contrast marx discusses competition as a coercive mechanism historically competition develops with the development of market relations and what today appears as human nature is part of this process thus it is within competition and not outside of it that marx explains the coercive nature of capitalism his critique shows that competition and power appear to be antithetical because market relations are based on individual freedom however class relations are another essential aspect of capitalism by neglecting these relations neoclassical economists including those of a radical inspiration implicitly espouse the ruling class s viewpoint which they simply translate into rigorous mathematical terms in this sense they are the modern expression of what marx called the vulgar political economy

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

advances in supervision technology and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis abstract we analyze the impact of improvements in the technology by which employers monitor their workers it is unclear a priori whether workers should benefit or not from such advances on the one hand they decrease the total costs of hiring workers and stimulate labor demand on the other hand as supervision becomes less costly employers tend to substitute monitoring for wages as a means of motivating workers we show how the impact on firms and workers of such technological progress depends on the nature of the labor market equilibrium i e whether there is full employment or not and the cost technology of monitoring a distinct possibility is that unemployed workers welcome the changes in supervision because they promote employment while employed workers resist such changes and the more intensive supervision they encourage

on the empirics of foreign aid and growth the present paper re examines the effectiveness of foreign aid theoretically and empirically using a standard olg model we show that aid inflows will in general affect long run productivity the size and direction of the impact may depend on policies deep structural characteristics and the size of the inflow the empirical analysis investigates these possibilities overall we find that aid has been effective in spurring growth but the magnitude of the effect depends on climate related circumstances finally we argue that the collier dollar allocation rule should be seriously reconsidered by donor agencies if aid effectiveness is related to climate the usefulness of foreign aid in promoting growth in developing countries has been an area of controversy ever since rosenstein rodan in 1943 advocated for aid to eastern and south eastern europe browsing through successive editions of a leading textbook in development economics provides a telling illustration of how the confidence in aid effectiveness dwindled over the years in the first edition of leading issues in economic development meier 1964 dedicated a full 18 page section to the issue of foreign aid he started out asking how much aid by the time of the sixth edition meier 1995 the treatment of foreign aid had been cut into half and the questions in focus were why official assistance and does aid work in the 2000 edition meier and rauch 2000 foreign aid is not even listed in the index

the effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in israel 1989 1998 abstract we discuss the circumstances under which voters in local elections will reward fiscal responsibility and suggest that such circumstances evolved in israel in the mid 1990s we present empirical evidence that indeed fiscal performance of mayors substantially affected their reelection probability in the 1998 campaign but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns changes in the political environment enforcement of audit and financial reporting requirements tougher imposition of hard budget constraints and the development of local media are proposed as explanations the hypotheses that the fiscal variables reflect the income level at the locality or the mayor s success in extracting resources from the central government are tested and rejected

consequences of aid volatility for macroeconomic management and aid effectiveness we conclude that individual aid sector volatility matters as well as total aid volatility easily the most important contributor to total volatility is debt aid the most volatile aid sectors per se include debt industry and humanitarian and the least include education and health in several sectors volatility appears to have peaked around 2006 within individual countries sector volatility is often corrected for in the following period there are also sometimes knock on effects on other sectors finally we examine the impact of sector aid and aid volatility on school completion rates death rates internet usage and mobile phone subscriptions

fiscal incidence in an overlapping generations model with a fixed asset abstract we analyze a model of overlapping generations with a fixed factor land malleable capital and labor we consider the dynamic effects of various fiscal policies including taxes on rent wages and creation of public debt on capital accumulation land prices and intergenerational welfare minimal assumptions uniqueness and stability imply that a land tax may initially raise land values but the upper bound is less than one half of the tax revenues assuming homothetic utility the ratio between the long run capital responses to a land tax and to a lump sum transfer of equivalent revenue from the young to the old depends solely on the share of labor

technological change and the stock market tobin s average q has usually been well above 1 but fell below 1 during 1974 1984 our model explains this pattern and reconciles it with unchanging aggregate investment the stock market value in the numerator of q reflects ownership of physical capital and knowledge but the denominator measures just physical capital therefore q is usually above 1 periodic arrivals of important new technologies such as the microprocessor in the 1970 s suddenly render old knowledge and capital obsolete causing the stock market to drop national accounts measures of physical capital miss this rapid obsolescence then q appears to drop below 1 jel e44 o3 o41

social security reform and national wealth recent trends in common stock prices suggest a distinction between increases in national net worth and flows of physical investment in this paper we present a simple overlapping generations model in which such differences can arise technological progress occurs exogenously yet firms own new technologies for a time we examine possible consequences for social security reform reform which increases private saving depletes part of its force raising the capitalized price of proprietary technologies a calibrated example suggests an increase in physical capital one third smaller than without inelastic factors both steady states and transition paths are considered

interlinked contracts and social power patronage and exploitation in india s waste recovery market abstract interlinked contracts have been examined almost exclusively in the context of the rural sphere this article describes the nature of exchange regimes between two sets of primary collectors of recyclable waste that is waste pickers and itinerant buyers and their dealers in the city of delhi far from the casualised labour transaction commonly described for the unorganised urban sector the findings portray a picture of personalised and surprisingly long term exchange between the parties while a new institutional economics approach might explain the underlying motivation and consequent general form of the implicit contracts it cannot explain the differential nature of each it is suggested that in order to do that a political economy approach must be taken this would understand interlinked transactions as being embedded within and consequently influenced by the particular social context in this case of an inequitable and impermeable caste hierarchy amongst those that engage in waste work

the architecture of economic systems hierarchies and polyarchies the authors present new ways of looking at economic organizations andsystems individuals judgments entail errors they sometimes reject good projects and accept bad projects the architecture of an economicsystem specifying how the decision making units are organized togetherwithin a system who gathers what information and who communicates what with whom affects its performance both because it influences thenature of errors that individuals make within the system and becauseit has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals errors theperformance of two polar architectures decentralized polyarchical versus centralized hierarchical decision making authorities are analyzed and compared copyright 1986 by american economic association

the african political business cycle varieties of experience abstractwe seek to understand both the incidence and the impact of the african political business cycle in the light of a literature which has argued that with major extensions of democracy since the 1990s the cycle has both become more intense and has made african political systems more fragile with the help of country case studies we argue first that the african political business cycle is not homogeneous and occurs relatively infrequently in so called dominant party systems where a pre election stimulus confers little political advantage secondly we show that in those countries where a political cycle does occur it does not necessarily cause institutional damage whether it does or not depends not so much on whether there is an electoral cycle as on whether this cycle calms or exacerbates fears of an unjust allocation of resources in other words the composition of the pre election stimulus in terms of its allocation between different categories of voter is as important as its size

the role of intergenerational transfers and life cycle saving in the accumulation of wealth he purpose of this paper is to review what economists know at present about the following question how large a portion of the existing wealth is the result of a bequest motive that is of accumulation for the specific purpose of leaving bequests i will also endeavor to clarify why an answer to this question is of interest in the early keynesian period when the study of national saving first attracted wide interest relatively little attention was paid to what led people to save though it was generally understood that the main systematic reason was to leave bequests j m keynes in the famous chapter 9 of the general theory of employment interest and money 1936 had listed seven distinct motives for saving besides the leaving of bequests but five of these which include to increase one s future income or to insure one s independence and power implied that all or nearly all the accumulation would finally wind up as bequeathed wealth this in turn meant that most private wealth originated through bequests that is it either had been received through bequests or was destined to be bequeathed and indeed how else could society accumulate wealth however keynes 1936 p 107 also mentioned two further motives precaution that is to build up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies and foresight that is to provide for an anticipated future relation between the income and the needs of the individual or his family different from that which exists in the present as for example in relation to old age family education or the maintenance of dependents these motives in contrast to most of the previous ones have the

fiscal composition and aid effectiveness a political economy model summary in the long run tax effort we argue determines the effectiveness of aid and this relationship operates simultaneously with the negative link in the opposite direction observed by brautigam and knack 2004 and others tax effort and the ability of the state to diversify its taxation structure we find are significantly linked to growth and poverty indicators the key message for policy is that a broadening of the tax structure in low income countries is crucial in order to enable those countries to escape from the weak state low tax trap and to make aid effective

random earnings differences lifetime liquidity constraints and altruistic intergenerational transfers abstract this paper develops a model of private savings behavior in which households care about their descendants cannot have negative net worth and have lifetime earnings depending on random draws from an exogenous distribution of abilities the elements interact very lucky parents are likely to leave large estates constrained children are unusually likely to receive intergenerational transfers the paper proves the existence of a stationary cross sectional distribution of wealth endogenously determines where liquidity constraints will bind and shows that the long term interest rate must be such that ricardian neutrality fails its last section generates several illustrative numerical simulations

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

post walrasian and post marxian economics it is widely believed that the failure of the socialist experiment should have had a devastating effect on radical economics yet radical economics is not only alive and well but flourishing years before the official demise of marxist socialism they had broadened their critique of standard economics well beyond the received marxist literature indeed their arguments offered striking parallels with the mainstream critiques of walrasian economics provided by the newly developing strand of thought i shall refer to as information economics in walrasian economics information is free moreover there are no costs associated either with making or enforcing contracts but with imperfect and costly information and incomplete risk markets the field of information economics has established that 1 in general markets are not constrained pareto efficient 2 markets may not clear 3 markets may not exist or when they exist may be thin 4 rents are pervasive and indeed reputation rents are necessary to ensure that high quality products get produced that workers do not shirk and so on 5 even when there are many participants in a market competition may be highly imperfect and 6 the distribution of income matters for economic efficiency

u turns and full circles two decades of agricultural reform in malawi 1981 2000 abstract this paper traces the evolution of malawi s agricultural policy over the past two decades during this period the world bank has played a key role in shaping policy reform through its adjustment loans three distinct reform phases can be identified 1981 87 when policy was dominated by the dogmatism of the world bank s pricist and state minimalist policies 1988 94 when a more flexible position was taken by both the bank and the malawi government both of whom acknowledged the structuralist critique of earlier policies and 1994 to the present when the reform process in agriculture became more politicized and a schism developed between the bank and the government this latter period is used to illustrate some of the unresolved policy issues pertaining to similar low income agrarian economies

perfect competition and the creativity of the market from the perspective of the walrasian general equilibrium model entrepreneurial and opportunistic behavior seems foreign can the model be refashioned so that it can accommodate such behavior many would say no but we argue the contrary indeed we present a reformulation of the model that serves as a gateway to rather than a detour from such contemporary issues as innovation and incentives the trick is to reexamine what perfect competition means starting with an historical summary of general equilibrium we sketch an image of the perfect competitor as an active market opportunist seeking out profit potentials wherever he can

aid volatility and donor recipient characteristics in difficult partnership countries one factor limiting aid effectiveness is its volatility we examine aid volatility in 66 countries over 1975 2004 paying particular attention to the characteristics of difficult partnership countries and making a distinction between sector aid and total aid we explore whether weak recipient institutions and policies are associated with greater volatility allowing for differences in donor characteristics institutional quality and macroeconomic stability affect the stability of all kinds of aid as does reliance on a small number of donors however the relative importance of these effects varies across different aid types

social security reform and investment in education is there scope for a pareto improvement we propose a pareto improving policy which reduces the overall wage tax burden in an economy with intergenerational trade in a fixed factor of production here labelled as land we analyse a second best environment in which the government cannot resort to non distortionary land taxes reducing the social security contribution rate encourages investment in human capital future efficiency gains accruing to complementary land are capitalized in its value the capital gains may compensate land owning pensioners for reduced benefits we also explain why the unfunded pension system may have lost its appeal even for pensioners after its introduction

can the world cut poverty in half how policy reform and effective aid can meet international development goals abstract poverty in the developing world will decline by about one half by 2015 if the trends of the 1990s persist most of this poverty reduction will occur in asia however while poverty will decline only slightly in africa effective aid could make a contribution to greater poverty reduction in lagging regions even more potent would be significant policy reform in these countries we develop a model of efficient aid in which flows respond to policy improvements that create a better environment for poverty reduction and effective aid we investigate scenarios of policy reform and efficient aid that point the way to how the world can cut poverty in half in every major region

the macroeconomic impact of aid volatility we analyse the impact of aid volatility on gdp gnp shares of expenditure given the level of aid positive and negative volatility reduce investment and government expenditure shares but the former reduces import share and the latter increases consumers expenditure share

aid poverty reduction and the new conditionality the paper examines the effect of aid on poverty rather than on economic growth we devise a pro poor public expenditure index and present evidence that together with inequality and corruption this is a key determinant of the aid s poverty leverage after presenting empirical evidence which suggests a positive leverage of aid donors on pro poor expenditure we argue for the development of conditionality in a new form which gives greater flexibility to donors in punishing slippage on previous commitments and keys aid disbursements to performance in respect of policy variables which governments can influence in a pro poor direction

intergenerational transfers and savings in recent years the role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation has been the subject of substantial empirical and theoretical analysis the key question stimulating this research is what is the main explanation for savings is it primarily accumulation for retirement as claimed by albert ando richard brumberg and franco modigliani in their celebrated life cycle model of savings is it primarily intentional accumulation for intergenerational transfers or is it primarily precautionary savings much of which may be bequeathed because of imperfections in annuity markets this paper examines a range of findings on the importance of intergenerational transfers the strong conclusion that emerges from this evidence is that intergenerational transfers play a very important if not a key role in aggregate wealth accumulation while intergenerational transfers figure very large in savings the precise motivation for such transfers is unclear intergenerational altruism might appear the most likely candidate but at least sane stylized facts such as the equal allocation of bequests among children are strongly at adds with the altruism model other explanations involving imperfect insurance arrangements or payments for child services do not appear capable of explaining the substantial amounts of transfers actually observed sorting cut the relative contributions of different models to intergenerational transfers and the precise role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation remains an intriguing and exciting enterprise this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tax changes and phase diagrams for an overlapping generations model the literature evaluating tax changes within an intertemporal general equilibrium framework subdivides into representative agent and overlapping generations formulations papers in the former class have developed techniques analogous to those routine for static analyses i show that the same general approach works for the overlapping generations model the context is the system from auerbach and kotlikoff s dynamic fiscal policy the proposed methodology allows one to examine stability and determinancy issues for the model it deals precisely with small policy changes and it can easily handle bundles of changes i present comparative static results for comparison with existing work

political business cycles democratization and economic reform the case of africa abstract this paper presents cross country evidence that political business cycles are alive and well in the nascent democracies of the developing world africa provides fertile ground for the study of political business cycles this paper uncovers systematic electorally timed interventions in five monetary and four fiscal policy variables in a panel of african countries these findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory if africa s increasingly frequent elections are associated with reversals of fiscal and monetary policy reform there is a potential conflict between political and economic reform

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

aggregate returns to scale and embodied technical change theory and measurement using stock market data abstract we develop a new general equilibrium growth accounting framework that features increasing returns to scale imperfect competition and incorporates technological revolutions into the description of technical progress we propose a way to tell apart revolutionary changes in technology and incremental innovations using stock market data we use our framework to jointly estimate the overall embodied tfp change during 1953 1995 and the aggregate output elasticity we find that the it revolution raised the aggregate tfp level by about 20 we suggest a 1 09 1 11 range for the aggregate returns to scale

redesigning the aid contract donors use of performance indicators in uganda abstract the perceived failure of traditional ex ante conditionality has led to proposals for using performance indicators as a basis for aid allocations ex post conditionality in this article we assess the role of performance indicators and their impact on the aid contract between donors and the government of uganda in uganda the use of performance indicators has radically changed donor recipient relations by improving both program monitoring and donor coordination it has however not yet fundamentally changed the incentive structure in the aid contract to improve the incentive structure we propose a distinction between indicators used for monitoring and those designed to guide aid allocations

how should structural adjustment programs be designed abstract more than seven years have elapsed since the onset of the generalized debt crisis of 1982 yet the affected countries have still not managed to stabilize their economies these countries must now attempt structural adjustment in the midst of pervasive macroeconomic and political instability structural adjustment packages should be designed with this reality in mind this paper argues that structural adjustment programs should strive for sustainability rather than the economic liberalization that they presently stress illiberal policies which do not damage overall macro stability are preferable to liberal policies which are inherently unsustainable or engender macro instability liberalization programs that are not sustainable are likely to bring few benefits but have high costs in terms of private investment the paper discusses some of the chief implications of this opinion for the design of adjustment programs

darlings and orphans interactions across donors in international aid we examine how bilateral aid flows of an individual donor to a recipient depend on aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral donors to that recipient we thereby assess to what extent issues including donor coordination free riding selectivity specialization and common donor interests drive bilateral aid allocations we find that others bilateral flows lead to a significant increase in aid flows from a particular donor but primarily within a given year the effects are particularly pronounced for large donors and so called darling recipients overall the results suggest that herding is a dominant feature of aid inter relationships this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

the power of environmental indifference a critical discourse analysis of a collaboration of tourism firms international attempts have not succeeded in addressing climate change leaving an even heavier responsibility on countries firms and people as tourism is an expanding branch in the world economy it is crucial to focus on how climate change issues are addressed in this industry as well this paper analyses a group of tourism firms in norway that join together to promote growth and profitability in winter tourism the span in how these firms deal with environmental issues ranges from ecotourism till not addressing the subject at all although the majority of the firms have environmental issues on the agenda environmental issues are not included in the cooperation we use critical discourse theory to explore how this stance on environmental issues within a cooperation has come about and categorize the firms into three discourses neoclassical economics environmental economics and ecological economics our data indicate that the hegemonic power of neoclassical economics hampers an environmental focus in the network this power is exerted through the position of being environmentally indifferent the paper adds knowledge to economic discourses on firm level

volatility of development aid from the frying pan into the fire summary the paper building on the authors previous analysis examines the relative volatility of aid flows into developing countries and their domestic revenue using new data and three alternative measures of aid instability relative volatility vis a vis fiscal revenue unpredictability of aid disbursement relative to commitments and failure of aid to smooth fluctuations in aggregate income it finds that the volatility of aid flows is still much greater than that of domestic revenue and that this difference is not decreasing especially in very poor aid dependent countries this high volatility of inflows makes the macroeconomy hard to manage further the influence of aid has been procyclical and not countercyclical aid has failed to act either as a stabilizing force or as an insurance mechanism we argue that to counter these unwelcome trends donors need to be able to respond more speedily and effectively to large adverse shocks and their conditionalities need to become more flexible possibilities explicitly discussed elsewhere in this special section

stagnant productivity and low unemployment stuck in a keynesian equilibrium a major challenge is to build simple intuitive macroeconomic models for policy makers and professional economists as well as students a specific contemporary challenge is to account for the prolonged slow growth and stagnant productivity that has followed the post financial crisis recession along with low inflation despite low unemployment notably in the uk we set out a simple three equation model which extends the core model in our two recent books carlin and soskice 2006 2015 to one with two equilibria and two associated macroeconomic policy regimes one is the standard inflation targeting policy regime with equilibrium associated with central bank inflation targeting through monetary policy it is joined by a second keynesian policy regime and equilibrium with a zero lower bound zlb in the nominal interest rate and a zlb in inflation in which only fiscal policy is effective ragot 2015 our approach is related to the benigno and fornaro 2016 keynesian wicksellian model of growth with business cycles it diverges from new keynesian models because although we attribute model consistent expectations to the policy maker we do not assume that these are the basis for inflation and growth expectations of workers and firms we compare our approach to ravn and sterk s related multiple equilibrium new keynesian model ravn and sterk 2016

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

aid instability as a measure of uncertainty and the positive impact of aid on growth this article contributes to the literature on aid and economic growth we posit that uncertainty measured as the instability of aid receipts will influence the relationship between aid and investment how recipient governments respond to aid and will capture the fact that some countries are especially vulnerable to shocks when we account for uncertainty which is negative and significant we find that aid has a significant positive effect on growth largely due to its effect on the volume of investment the finding that uncertainty of aid receipts reduces the effectiveness of aid is robust when the regression is estimated for the sub sample of african countries these findings hold although the effectiveness of aid appears weaker than for the full sample

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

aid volatility and poverty traps abstract this paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology public spending is productive and time to build requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used the possibility of a poverty trap induced by high aid volatility is first examined in a benchmark case where taxation is absent the analysis is then extended to account for self insurance taking the form of a first period contingency fund financed through taxation an increase in aid volatility is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund but if future aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund as a result of a moral hazard effect on donors behavior the optimal policy may entail no self insurance