reputation and impermanent types i consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm s type evolves according to a markov process with two states a tough type who always fights entry and a weak type who prefers to accommodate there exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough above that level as the number of markets t increases in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence when t is infinite then regardless of the discount factor there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the incumbent s payoff is bounded below her stackelberg payoff both results are in contrast to the outcome when the incumbent s type is fixed one interpretation is that reputation is not permanent but must be renewed occasionally

reputation in dynamic games abstract we analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long lived small players in which state variables affect players payoffs the large player s type is private information we give conditions under which in every nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game while our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government policy we show that for the durable goods monopoly reputation may fail to improve the monopolist s payoff journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73

analyst reputation communication and information acquisition earlier studies have shown that reputational concerns tend to reduce agents opportunistic behavior however a recent study by morris argued that analysts experts reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try to avoid being perceived as being misaligned with investors in this paper i examine the effect of reputational concerns on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously because both misaligned and aligned analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned in equilibrium aligned analysts will acquire more information than misaligned analysts as a result investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts type when the report is proven to be accurate therefore both types of analysts will have reputational incentives to communicate truthfully the paper also derives conditions under which the analysts reputational concerns have a nonmonotonic impact on aligned analysts equilibrium precision choices and investors welfare

informational asymmetries strategic behavior and industrial organization one of the most active and exciting areas of economic research over the last several years has been the use of noncooperative games of incomplete information to model industrial competition this work has yielded not only a remarkable number of papers but also several new insights on and explanations of fundamentally important issues the purpose of this paper is to attempt an appreciation and evaluation of this work because most of our individual and joint work since about 1979 has been in this mode it will come as no surprise that we are proponents of this line of research however there are several questions and potential problems that we see as arising in connection with this methodology and we will attempt to address these first a disclaimer we are not attempting a survey of the applications of asymmetric information games aig to industrial organization although we will refer in a highly selective fashion to a number of prominent strands in this literature in particular where any references are provided at all they are typically only to the earliest contributions to a subject even more we do not deal with work in which informational asymmetries are important but the analysis is not game theoretic for example search and price dispersion or the early work on the lemons problem and on moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets or with game theoretic treatments that assume complete information i aig methods and applications

the price effects of liquidity shocks a study of the sec s tick size experiment abstract do stock prices of publicly listed companies respond to changes in transaction costs using the sec s pilot program that increased the tick size for approximately 1 200 randomly chosen stocks we find a stock price decrease between 1 75 and 3 2 for small spread stocks affected by the larger tick size relative to a control group we find that the increase in the present value of transaction costs accounts for a small percentage of the price decrease we study channels of price variation due to changes in expected returns information risk investor horizon and liquidity risk the evidence suggests that trading frictions affect the cost of capital

exchange rate target zones a survey of the literature this work selectively reviews the literature on exchange rate target zones and their theoretical and empirical methodologies and examines whether they can be used to clarify to what extent this type of exchange rate regime could contribute to greater exchange rate stability we discuss the main contributions of the first and second generations of exchange rate target zone models in an attempt to reconcile the poor empirical performance of the krugman model with the reality of exchange rate target zone regimes this line of research integrates target zones with alternative underlying economic models such as imperfect credibility intra marginal interventions and sticky price models it was thus possible to understand the correlations observed between the exchange rate its fundamentals determinants and the interest rate differential and to explain the fact that the statistical distribution of the exchange rate is hump shaped rather than u shaped this implies that the initial emphasis of target zone models on nonlinearities honeymoon effect smooth pasting and marginal interventions has vanished exchange rate target zones are better described as similar to managed floating regimes with intra marginal interventions with some marginal interventions when the exchange rate reaches the edges of the floating band

comparing behavioral models using data from experimental centipede games the centipede game posits one of the most well known paradoxes of backward induction in the literature of experimental game theory given that deviations from the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium generates a pareto improvement several theoretical models have been employed in order to rationalize this kind of behavior in this social dilemma the available explanations range from social preferences including fairness altruism or cooperation motives errors in playing inability to perform backward induction or different depths of reasoning in the present study we use the blavatskyy s theoretical contribution and relax the assumptions of expected utility maximization and risk neutral attitudes to test an alternative explanation we compare various probabilistic decision theory models in terms of their descriptive in sample and predictive out of sample fit performance using data from experimental centipede games we find that introducing non expected utility preferences to the quantal response equilibrium model along with a nonlinear utility function provides a better explanation compared to alternative specifications such as the level k or the quantal response equilibrium model with altruistic motives jel c72 c92 d81 d82

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

the fundamental determinants of interest rate differentials in the erm the paper analyses the sources of persistent interest rate differentials vis a vis germany that have existed in belgium denmark france ireland italy and the netherlands in a target zone system like the erm interest rate differentials mainly reflect devaluation expectations which are measured here by raw 1 month euromarket interest rate differentials drift adjusted 1 month differentials and differentials in long term government bond yields the role of a large set of fundamental macroeconomic variables that may have affected these devaluation expectations is investigated within a vector autoregressive var setting by means of granger causality tests impulse response functions and variance decompositions we find no evidence that fundamentals are more relevant to drift adjusted devaluation risk than for unadjusted interest rate differentials a significant impact of inflation budget deficits and unemployment becomes evident for almost all erm participants

discussion of a laboratory investigation of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship the first question concerned the assumption of risk neutrality of both the principals and agents in the models specifically given this assumption it was not clear what element s in the modeling or experimental design precluded the principal s from simply selling or renting the firm to the agent s more important the risk neutrality assumption has a direct effect on the predictions of the models the experimental results and their interpretation finally it was suggested that new experimental techniques such as those developed by berg et al forthcoming might be used to induce specific risk preferences given a particular model to be tested and its attendant experimental design although these techniques have not been fully tested using them may reduce the need to make assumptions about subjects risk preferences and thereby overcome the kinds of questions raised on this issue a second issue dealt with why the experimental study of the moral hazard problem in the principal agent relationship was carried out in a market setting with several principals and agents rather than following

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

street crime and street culture a model shows how reputation concerns can support widespread street crime a street culture where the direct incentives for such behavior are weak there are social benefits to street reputations but those benefits are dominated when reputation concerns draw into crime those who obtain no direct gain from it the model matches facts about violent crime that a standard model cannot easily explain including low monetary returns disproportionate victimization of the young and poor and high variance in rates across small distances the model generates novel implications for policy and social science including a negative effect of social capital

signalling in a dynamic labour market this paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the spence job market signalling model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time the dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yield a multiplicity of sequential equilibria including ones that sustain implicit collusion even though the length of the game is finite emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the independence of never weak best response criterion of kohlberg and mertens 1986 it is shown that in the limit as the time between offers tends to zero any such equilibrium results in expectation in the unique stable outcome of the static spence model

target zones and exchange rate dynamics this paper develops a simple model of exchange rate behavior under a target zone regime it shows that the expectation that monetary policy will be adjusted to limit exchange rate variation affects exchange rate behavior even when the exchange rate lies inside the zone and is thus not being defended actively somewhat surprisingly the analysis of target zones turns out to have a strong formal similarity to problems in option pricing and investment under uncertainty

visits to the client when competing for new consulting contracts sourcing information or influencing the client consulting firms cfs sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts one frequently used strategy by cfs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders the reasons to the visits are 1 to influence the client in his decision making e g marketing bribing and or 2 to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted using a unique database on individual export proposals submitted to emerging markets which of these two reasons is the most important is examined empirically the estimations show that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits although it is not possible to determine whether this influence takes the form of bribing or marketing all conditions necessary for bribes to occur are fulfilled

an analytical approximation of target zone exchange rate functions the technique of collocation abstract this paper applies the analytical approximation technique of collocation to the stochastic sticky price exchange rate target zone model the technique can be used to trace out the resulting nonlinear exchange rate path with remarkable accuracy while requiring comparatively little computational effort

environmental labeling and incomplete consumer information in laboratory markets abstract survey evidence suggests that consumers care about the environment and are willing to pay a higher price for a product that generates less environmental harm we induce buyer preferences over quality in a laboratory posted offer market to study sellers incentives to offer products of differing quality buyers are unaware of the product quality before purchase as is often the case for goods with differing environmental quality we first document the market failure that arises from incomplete information when no signaling or reputations are possible we then study various treatments that could remedy this failure seller reputations and unverified cheap talk signals sometimes increase the number of higher valued green goods the only reliable way to improve product quality in the experiment however is to use a third party that charges a fee to certify product quality claims

trusting behavior in a repeated investment game we compare a seven period repeated investment game to the one shot investment game on an average in the repeated game player a the trustor sends more and player b the trustee returns a larger percentage than in the one shot game both the amount sent and the percentage returned increase up to period 5 and drop sharply thereafter the reciprocity hypothesis for b players behavior is compatible with the first five periods but in the two end periods most b players behaved strategically by not returning the reciprocity hypothesis for a players behavior is compatible for all periods of the game

research issues at the boundary of competitive dynamics and market evolution building on the observation that competitive dynamics and market evolution are inextricably linked and underresearched we propose a road map to guide and stimulate future research in the area a number of rationales have been proposed to explain why there is relatively little research directed toward understanding the links between competitive dynamics and market evolution these include the predominance of different research paradigms in each area a lack of data appropriate for analyzing the two areas together and the difficulty of obtaining robust and significant results with analysis that is by definition complex it must consider factors and outcomes both across firms and over time using this last rationale as a starting point we develop a series of research propositions related to key relationships where a insignificant or contradictory results have been obtained in extant research or b researchers have yet to delve the propositions are designed to deepen our understanding of the relationship between the areas throughout the analysis the key to developing the propositions is to recognize the importance of moderating factors mediating factors and covariates in addition where the approach to empirically test a proposition is new we propose categories measures and comparisons that can be used

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

reputation and exogenous private learning abstract short run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long run incumbent firm s type the history of signals which in the limit is fully revealing is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent as long as there is sufficient noise in the signals then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff

rational expectations and policy credibility following a change in regime we examine the dynamic path of an economy after a change in regime when neither the policy to be followed nor the reactions of the public are known the model is an application of kreps and wilson s reputation model to barro and gordon s macroeconomic policy game equilibrium is defined to be the dynamically consistent solution to a game between the government and the private sector it involves mixed strategies and bayesian learning by both sides until the uncertainty about government and public behaviour is resolved the absence of complete credibility of government policy and intransigence of private sector wage demands increase the output loss of disinflation the analysis also sheds light on the strategic nature of economic policymaking and the role of information in macroeconomics

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

exit as governance an empirical analysis recent theory posits a new governance channel available to blockholders threat of exit threat of exit as opposed to actual exit is difficult to measure directly however a crucial property is that it is weaker when stock liquidity is lower and vice versa we use natural experiments of financial crises and decimalization as exogenous shocks to stock liquidity firms with larger blockholdings experience greater declines increases in firm value during the crises decimalization particularly if the manager s wealth is sensitive to the stock price and thus to exit threats additional tests suggest exit threats are distinct from blockholder intervention

predation among supermarkets an algorithmic locational analysis abstract first an algorithm that finds certain polygonal tesselations of r 2 is described the polygons involved here are market areas of supermarkets in a city defined by prices and transport cost proportional to euclidean distance then statistics based on the adjacencies boundaries and sizes of all market areas in edmonton canada during 1959 1973 are used to test hypotheses on locational predation

exchange rate bands with price inertia this problem by committing member states to taking suitable action to prevent cross parities from straying outside some given publicly announced range and williamson s proposal for target zones was explicitly aimed at preventing exchange rate misalignment among the principal industrial countries subsequently the louvre accord struck between members of the group of seven in i 987 involved unpublished commitments designed to constrain fluctuation between the u s dollar and the currencies of its major trading partners funabashi i988 given the obvious practical importance of understanding the implications of such policy commitments for the economy in general and the exchange rate in particular it is perhaps not surprising that the seminal work by krugman i 988 i989 on exchange rate determination within a band has aroused considerable interest under the assumption that the velocity of money follows a brownian motion process he obtains an explicit solution for the exchange rate as a function of the fundamental which shows that the presence of a commitment to intervene so as to defend the band exerts a stabilising influence on the exchange rate even before any such intervention takes place in their contribution to this emerging literature froot and obstfeld i989 note that krugman s minimalist stochastic specification can be derived from a monetary model of exchange rates where prices are perfectly flexible and full employment prevails where international interest differentials match expected exchange rate changes and the exchange rate preserves purchasing power parity cf mussa 1976 and they show that the behaviour of the rate inside a currency band can be obtained using results on regulated brownian motion processes cf harrison i985 using the same framework and techniques flood and garber i989 indicate how the rate will respond to noninfinitesimal intervention and svensson i 989 examines the effect of bandwidth on the stochastic behaviour of interest rates klein i989 considers the effects of uncertainty about the width of the band

on the rationality of buying from a price predator abstract by means of a simple example i demonstrate that it may be rational for consumers to purchase at predatory prices even though the exit of the intended victim and the consequent price increase are correctly anticipated

modelling the ff mm rate by threshold cointegration analysis this paper investigates a sticky price model of exchange rate determination extension of krugman s target zone model with price inertia applied to the french franc a novel theoretical argument is considered threshold cointegration such that the long run relationship between the parity and its fundamentals is dormant within a certain range of disequilibria but is restored when the system crosses the boundaries over the period 1987 1993 nonlinearities in the ff dm rate consistent with the credibility of this target zone were detected by pointing out a band reversion mechanism a shock persistence analysis which highlights a nonlinear reversion of the exchange rate deviation is also implemented

the might of the pen a reputational theory of communication in international disputes i present a theory of effective diplomacy based on honesty and reputations i model diplomacy as a form of cheap talk and international interactions as an infinitely repeated game in which similar states find themselves in disparate situations over time the theory explains the success and failure of diplomacy reputations for honesty make honest communication possible a state caught bluffing is less able to communicate and less likely to attain its goals in the near future these findings imply that domestic audience costs are unnecessary for international signaling and that military strength is not the only way to build credibility

an interpretation of recent research on exchange rate target zones how do exchange rate bands work compared to completely fixed rates between realignments or more precisely what are the dynamics of exchange rates interest rates and central bank interventions within exchange rate bands does the difference between bands and completely fixed exchange rates matter and if so which of the two arrangements is best or more precisely what are the tradeoffs that determine the optimal bandwidth this article will present an interpretation of some selected recent theoretical and empirical research on exchange rate target zones with emphasis on main ideas and results and without technical detail

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

on the detection of collusion and predation abstract this lecture not only shows how game theory can contribute to the detection of collusion and predation but also how experts for the defense can use game theoretic arguments to make such detection difficult a few important european anti trust cases are discussed to illustrate

can green building councils serve as third party governance institutions an economic and institutional analysis abstract green building councils gbcs have been established in many different countries in recent years this paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a gbc can contribute positively to the development of a greener or more sustainable stock of buildings the paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view we argue that the investor s uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners dilemma trap the corresponding barriers for a transition toward a greener buildings market are analyzed gbcs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems they can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors by certifying the quality of a building they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer this task however raises some severe management challenges for the gbcs

bargaining with imperfect commitment abstract we study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two person bargaining games by establishing the reputation for being stubborn a player sometimes commits to her initial demand becoming unable to change her demands or to accept an inferior offer from her opponent when the probability of being stubborn is small the set of equilibria is shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness a player has greater bargaining power when she is more patient and or is more likely to be stubborn journal of economic literature classification number c78

bubbles and financial professionals the efficiency of financial markets and their potential to produce bubbles are central topics in academic and professional debates yet little is known about the contribution of financial professionals to price efficiency we run 116 experimental markets with 412 professionals and 502 students we find that professional markets with bubble drivers capital inflows or high initial capital supply are susceptible to bubbles although they are more efficient than student markets in mixed markets with students bubbles also occur but professionals act as price stabilizers we show that heterogeneous price beliefs drive overpricing especially in bubble prone market environments

signaling strategies in competitive interaction building reputations and hiding the truth abstract the authors develop a conceptual framework of how managers interpret competitors signals over time in various market contexts from the framework the authors generate hypotheses about the relative effectiveness of signaling strategies used by firms in different market contexts the authors conducted two empirical studies involving a repeated entry pricing game to test the hypotheses the results of study 1 show that the entrant s perceptions of the aggressiveness of the incumbent depend on the focus and strength of the incumbent s signals the results of study 2 show that the strength of the entrant s responses to the incumbent s signals depends on the incumbent s use of bluffs and the cost of information about the factors driving the incumbent s signals the implications of these findings for how firms should signal to achieve such strategic objectives as revealing or concealing information developing a desired reputation and influencing competitors responses over time are discussed the au

the linkage between speculative attack and target zone models of exchange rates in this paper we generalize the target zone exchange rate as model formalized by krugman 1988b to include finite sized interventions in defense of the zone the main contributions of these pages consist of linking the recent developments in the theory of target zones to the mirror image theory of speculative attacks on asset price fixing regimes and in using aspects of that linkage to give an intuitive interpretation to the smooth pasting condition usually invoked as a terminal condition this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

corporate compliance with debt covenants in this paper i present and test a model of corporate compliance with the debt covenant requiring payment of a current obligation this study adds to the empirical literature on forecasting financial distress by showing conditions under which debt default may be a rational economic decision by the firm s shareholders this analysis departs from empirical financial distress studies which are often not linked to an underlying economic theory the focus on covenant default also extends the literature which has modeled bankruptcy bulow and shoven 1978 and liquidation decisions titman 1984 but which has not considered a common first symptom of financial distress covenant default briefly the model examines the costs that influence shareholders decision to comply with or violate a particular debt covenant payment of a current obligation these costs include those associated with bondholders reaction to possible default the model predicts that shareholders will default when holding other factors constant i interest rates have declined relative to coupon rates stated in the debt issue ii the probability of paying future obligations is high and iii the cost of obtaining funds to pay the obligation is high the model also predicts when stockholders and bondholders will renegotiate the debt contract and the amount of wealth transferred in the renegotiation finally the

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

theoretical developments in the light of macroeconomic policy and empirical research macroeconomics is surveyed with emphasis on the implications of the new classical and rational expectations critiques for the keynesian paradigm and the role of macro policies at the background are the main macro developments of the 1 970s and 1 980s as well as the specific lessons of recent high chronic inflation processes a synthesis is emerging in which the basic keynesian view of the existence of market and price coordination failures as well as room for pareto improving policy intervention are maintained at the same time the theoretical underpinnings are undergoing substantial change mainly due to a rational expectations reformulation

antitrust predation and the antitrust paradox abstractthe widely recognized influence that the chicago school of law and economics had on the institution of antitrust is nowhere more apparent than in predatory pricing law starting with aaron director this movement had many distinguished contributors but even in this company robert bork stands out for his part in persuading the judiciary to refocus antitrust law on the interests of consumers rather than on the interests of competing firms in the antitrust paradox and other writings bork advanced the chicago school insight that the kind of aggressive price cutting that at the time passed for predatory pricing is instead an essential and for consumers beneficial attribute of competition the resulting change in direction that antitrust has taken in predatory pricing cases culminated in the court s matsushita matsushita electric industrial co v zenith ratio corp 475 u s 574 1986 and brooke group brooke group ltd v brown williamson tobacco corp 509 u s 209 1993 opinions both

an investigation of competitive preference structures and posterior performance through a bayesian decision theoretic approach in this paper we analyze competitive decision making situations in terms of their preference structures and posterior performance through a bayesian decision theoretic framework the setting is that of a two by two two person non zero sum and noncooperative game which is repeated over time the dynamic behavior of the competitors for different classes of games as identified by their preference structures is examined and a classification scheme is proposed for the purpose of unification the competitors dynamic behavior and posterior performance for some general classes of games is then derived and the relationship to the results implied from game theoretic considerations is discussed illustrative examples are given too

sacrifice tests for predation in a dynamic pricing model ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 meet ericson and pakes 1995 abstract to detect the presence of predatory pricing antitrust authorities and courts routinely ask whether a firm sacrifices current profit in exchange for the expectation of higher future profit following the exit of its rival because predatory pricing is an inherently dynamic phenomenon we show in this paper how to construct sacrifice tests for predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework along the lines of ericson and pakes 1995 in particular we adapt the definitions of predation due to ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 to this setting and construct the corresponding sacrifice tests

the term structure of interest rates in a sticky price target zone model abstract the term structure of interest rates in a sticky price target zone model with perfectly credible marginal central bank intervention is identified by means of an arbitage free valuation we find that an explicit credible target zone for the exchange rate is associated with an implicit target zone for the long term interest rate where the nonlinearity of the exchange rate function translates into a corresponding stabilizing nonlinearity of the long term interest rate imposing a target zone reduces the variability of short term and long term interest rates and induces a steeper term structure relative to freely floating exchange rates

bashing and coercion in monetary policy bashing and coercion in monetary policy i introduction we ve got excess plant capacity i don t think that growth is excessive i have not been overly concerned with inflation president bush in a february 14 1989 interview with the wall street journal p a8 with the economy running close to potential the risks seem to be on the side of a further strengthening of price pressure chairman greenspan in testimony before congress on february 21 1989 reprinted from the wall street journal february 22 1989 p a2 many investors appeared to be confused by conflicting statements by bush greenspan and other u s officials wall street journal february 22 1989 p a1 if the fed pushes interest rates significantly higher bush may go public with critism wall street journal march 24 1989 p a1 recent research in macroeconomic policy games by rogoff 1985 alesina 1988 tabellini 1987 and waller 1989a has concentrated on the importance of an independent central bank in a discretionary policymaking environment in the original work on policy games by barro and gordon 1983a 1983b no distinction was made between the monetary authority and the fiscal authority but these researchers argue that because the fiscal authority may have incentives to create excessive inflation giving the powers of money creation to an independent monetary authority whose inflation preferences differ from the current fiscal authority may enable society to reduce the equilibrium inflation rate this results holds even though monetary policy is still chosen in a discretionary fashion therefore backus and driffill 1985a 537 conclude autonomous central banks thus act as a precommitment device which may help to make noninflationary policies more credible and less costly implicit in the term independent is the belief that the central bank is free to choose monetary policy without interference from the fiscal authority administration however this is not generally the case the appointment of central bankers by the legislative or executive branch of the government governmental oversight of policy decisions or political pressure on the central bank by these branches will tend to influence the setting of monetary policy and subsequently the extent to which the central bank is truly independent 1 kane 1984 argues that even if it is not able to directly choose monetary policy the current administration still may be able to achieve its preferred monetary growth path by putting pressure on the monetary authority to do its bidding restricting the powers of the central bank public criticism of central bank performance here after referred to as bashing 2 exclusion from fiscal policy planning which hurts the egos of central bankers or undertaking actions which damage the post central bank income or opportunities of the central bankers are ways he suggests in which the administration can coerce cooperation from the central bank in creating excessive money growth such arguments have given rise to the view that the administration is engaged in a reputation building game with the central bank although the central bank has control of the money supply the administration can threaten to impose a welfare loss by bashing the central bank if it does not generate the monetary policy preferred by the administration the success of this strategy depends on the size of the bashing costs imposed on the central bank and also on the extent to which these threats are credible credibility in turn depends on the benefits and costs incurred by the administration in carrying out its threats as a result the administration may choose to bash the central bank if it does not produce the administration s preferred money inflation outcome by establishing a reputation for bashing the administration may be able to obtain its desired policy outcome in the future

target zones and realignments recent contributions emphasize that the presence of exchange rate target zones has important effects on the within band behavior of exchange rates when agents are forward looking the authors find that the implications of available models are inconsistent with european exchange rate data and they suggest that the frequent realignments occurring in the period they consider may be responsible for this they construct a model in which the likelihood of a realignment in the near future increases as the exchange rate approaches the limits of its fluctuation band and show that its implications are broadly consistent with the evidence copyright 1992 by american economic association

trade execution costs and market quality after decimalization this study assesses trade execution costs and market quality for nyse and nasdaq stocks before and after the 2001 change to decimal pricing several theoretical predictions are confirmed quoted bid ask spreads declined substantially on each market with the largest declines for heavily traded stocks the percentage of shares receiving price improvement increased on the nyse but not on nasdaq however those trades completed at prices within or outside the quotes were improved or disimproved by smaller amounts after decimalization and trades completed outside the quotes saw the largest reductions in trade execution costs as a class effective bid ask spreads as a percentage of share price arguably the most relevant measure of execution costs for smaller trades averaged 0 33 on a volume weighted basis after decimalization for both nyse and nasdaq stocks there is no evidence of systematic intraday reversals of quote changes on either market as would be expected if decimalization had damaged liquidity supply

reputation and the flow of information in repeated games this paper derives payoff bounds from reputation effects akin to those of fudenberg and levine 1992 for repeated moral hazard games in which a long run player interacts frequently with a population of short run players and the monitoring technology varies with the length of the period of interaction the bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on the relative entropy examples are shown where under complete informatione the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long run player converges as the period length tends to zero to the set of static equilibrium payoffs whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types reputation effects remain powerful in the frequent interaction limit

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

bank heterogeneity reputation and debt renegotiation this paper examines a process of debt renegotiation in which banks possess divergent interests and there is asymmetric information the authors assume that large banks must exert pressure on small banks in order to obtain participation of these in the provision of new money and in debt forgiveness making use of a reputational model they argue that the effect of asymmetric information as to the amount of pressure that large banks can exert on small banks makes the debtor countries worse off than absent these asymmetries in information this also provides a rationale for the growing popularity of exit bonds copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

do liquidity measures measure liquidity abstract given the key role of liquidity in finance research identifying high quality proxies based on daily as opposed to intraday data would permit liquidity to be studied over relatively long timeframes and across many countries using new measures and widely employed measures in the literature we run horseraces of annual and monthly estimates of each measure against liquidity benchmarks our benchmarks are effective spread realized spread and price impact based on both trade and quote taq and rule 605 data we find that the new effective realized spread measures win the majority of horseraces while the amihud 2002 illiquidity and stock returns cross section and time series effects journal of financial markets 5 31 56 measure does well measuring price impact

corporate and industry effects on business unit competitive position we partition the variances of market shares which we use as surrogates for competitive position of the business units of all public manufacturing companies available in the trinet data base into industry factors corporate parent specific factors and business unit specific factors our results differ somewhat from rumelt s 1991 which decomposed variances in profitability we find that corporate parent effects on market share are considerably greater than zero when lines of business are defined more narrowly when small business units are included and when firms are medium sized our results suggest that the relative importance of corporate industry and business unit effects depends on the types of criteria such as the level of industry aggregation whether small business units are included and firm size that are used to construct samples copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

target zone models with price inertia solutions and testable implications many recent papers suggest that the basic flex price target zone model does not perform well empirically this paper investigates the testable implications of a sticky price target zone model and finds that to a limited extent it has a better empirical performance than the simplest flex price model however in terms of nominal variables the sticky price model is found to be observationally equivalent to the flex price model when the latter is extended to include intramarginal intervention and realignments copyright 1994 by royal economic society

a response to glazer and rosenthal we are most grateful to glazer and rosenthal for the attention they have paid to our work abreu and matsushima 1992a b c in the process of criticizing our mechanism they have provided an elegant exposition of it which usefully supplements our own efforts the criticisms themselves we feel are misplaced and based on a close reading but narrow interpretation of our results glazer and rosenthal seek to show that in our mechanisms the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies is or indeed ought to be controversial in terms of conventional decision theory the iterative logic is impeccable when iterative deletion leads to a unique profile that profile is the unique rationalizable profile the unique nash equilibrium and so on of course the logic of iterative dominance entails common knowledge of rationality the theoretical coherence of this assumption has been questioned in the context of backward programming in extensive form games see luce and raiffa 1957 pp 80 81 rosenthal 1981 basu 1988 reny 1992a 1992b bonanno 1991 binmore 1987a 1987b and gul 1989 among others these paradoxes of common knowledge of rationality have been highlighted in stylized examples such as the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma and rosenthal s centipede game which in fact has been a seminal inspiration for this recent literature 2 but our mechanisms are simultaneous there is no opportunity to demonstrate irrationality strategic or otherwise and therefore no scope to rationalize iteratively dominated behavior from a decision theory perspective the glazer and rosenthal critique might therefore be viewed as an elaborate revival of the indefensible claim that players in a one short prisoners dilemma will choose not to confess because they are both better off doing so than by both playing their dominant strategies within the standard game theory paradigm there is really nothing more to be said before turning to issues of bounded rationality we note that the glazer and rosenthal critique is essentially premised on the existence of a countervailing focal point but what is a focal point the notion is notoriously vague and we are aware of no widely accepted definition 3 this is not to deny that in very simple and particular games certain behavior may be focal frequently focalness is identified with a pareto dominating equilibrium and this is the point of view glazer and rosenthal seem to adopt 4 this is implicit in their acknowledgement that when the social choice function does satisfy pareto optimality our objection loses much of its immediate

environmental ethics and information asymmetry among organizational stakeholders this paper addresses the conflicting environmental interests of a firm and the community an important stakeholder the short term profit maximization objective of a firm may stand in contrast with what the community wants a safe and clean environment this paper argues that the information regarding the environmental impact of a firm s products processes and waste may be asymmetrically distributed between the firm and the community the resultant information asymmetry may influence the probability of a firm acting opportunistically and ultimately a firm s ethical behavior the paper identifies information asymmetry between a firm and community as well as that within the community the perceived information asymmetry across various community segments may perhaps be a determinant of environmental discrimination the paper further contends that information asymmetry may diminish in the long run finally it examines the implications of information asymmetry for firms and government policy

intervention policy and mean reversion in exchange rate target zones the swedish the intervention policy of the swedish central bank is studied using daily intervention data for the late 1 980s in contrast to the first generation of target zone models we find that the interventions occur all over the exchange rate band and almost every day based on this evidence we estimate an exchange rate target zone model with intra marginal interventions the results go a long way towards explaining the well established hump shaped exchange rate distribution and lack of non linearities

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

merging reputation and repeated games with incomplete information we relate and unify several results that appeared in the following domains merging of probabilities perturbed games and reputation phenomena and repeated games with incomplete information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d83

investor protection and the value impact of stock liquidity this paper investigates the effect of investor protection on the value impact of stock liquidity using a sample of firms from 40 countries for the period between 1996 and 2010 we show that investor protection is positively associated with the value impact of stock liquidity this association is robust to the difference in differences approach based on a natural experiment further evidence shows that the positive effect of home country investor protection on the liquidity valuation association attenuates in countries with globally integrated capital markets

stock market liquidity and firm value this paper investigates the relation between stock liquidity and firm performance the study shows that firms with liquid stocks have better performance as measured by the firm market to book ratio this result is robust to the inclusion of industry or firm fixed effects a control for idiosyncratic risk a control for endogenous liquidity using two stage least squares and the use of alternative measures of liquidity to identify the causal effect of liquidity on firm performance we study an exogenous shock to liquidity the decimalization of stock trading and show that the increase in liquidity around decimalization improves firm performance the causes of liquidity s beneficial effect are investigated liquidity increases the information content of market prices and of performance sensitive managerial compensation finally momentum trading analyst coverage investor overreaction and the effect of liquidity on discount rates or expected returns do not appear to drive the results

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

competitive bluffing an examination of a common practice and its relationship with performance bluffing a common and consequential form of competitive behavior has been comparably ignored in the management literature even though misleading one s rivals is suggested to be an advantageous skill in a multifaceted and highly competitive environment to address this deficiency and advance scholarship on competitive dynamics our study investigates the moral reasoning behind competitive bluffing and using a simulated market entry game examines the performance effects of bluffing findings suggest that decision makers views on the ethicality of bluffing competitors differ from their beliefs on the ethicality of misleading other organizational stakeholders analysis also indicates that decision makers who view competitor bluffing as more ethical less unethical are more willing to engage in competitive bluffing finally while bluffing is often thought to be an effective business practice results show that in the context of repeated interaction bluffing is not conducive to high levels of performance and in fact can have undesirable consequences

credit bureau policy and sustainable reputation effects in credit markets welfare increasing reputation effects arise in credit markets when adverse selection gives rise to borrower reputation formation incentives that mitigate moral hazard problems this paper shows that welfare stemming from reputation effects will diminish over time as the private information of borrowers is revealed to lenders in the form of lengthening credit histories aggregate borrower welfare may therefore decrease over time unless reputation effects can be sustained restricting a lender s access to a borrower s credit history via credit bureau policy is shown to be one method of sustaining reputation effects and preventing a decline in welfare copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

manipulation and the allocational role of prices it is commonly believed that prices in secondary financial markets play an important allocational role because they contain information that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources this paper identifies a limitation inherent in this role of prices it shows that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the firm s stock when this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreases and the beneficial allocational role of the financial market weakens the trader profits from this trading strategy partly because his trading distorts the firm s investment we therefore refer to this strategy as manipulation we show that trading without information is profitable only with sell orders driving a wedge between the allocational implications of buyer and seller initiated speculation and providing justification for restrictions on short sales

signals and choices in a competitive interaction the role of moves and messages this study examines the effect of signals from a competitor on the decisions of managers in a situation of strategic interdependence the context is a multi period pricing simulation and the payoffs are structured in accordance with a prisoner s dilemma the signals consist of messages from the competitor and observations of the pricing decisions made by the competitor the managers responses to particular types of signals and particular combinations of moves and messages change over the course of the simulation suggestions for future research on competitive signaling are offered

lapm a liquidity based asset pricing model the intertemporal capm predicts that an asset s price is equal to the expectation of the product of the asset s payoff and a representative consumer s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution this paper develops an alternative approach to asset pricing based on corporations desire to hoard liquidity our corporate finance approach suggests new determinants of asset prices such as the distribution of wealth within the corporate sector and between the corporate sector and the consumers also leverage ratios capital adequacy requirements and the composition of savings affect the corporate demand for liquid assets and thereby interest rates starting with the capital asset pricing model capm derived by sharpe 1964 lintner 1965 and mossin 1966 market finance has emphasized the role of consumers time preference and risk aversion in determining asset prices the intertemporal consumption based asset pricing model e g rubinstein 1976 lucas 1978 breeden 1979 harrison and kreps 1979 cox ingersoll and ross 1985 hansen and jagannathan 1991 predicts that an asset s current price is equal to the expectation conditioned on current information of the product of the asset s payoff and a representative consumer s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution imrs while fundamental this dominant paradigm for pricing assets has some wellrecognized shortcomings see below and there is clearly scope for alternative and complementary approaches this paper begins developing one such approach based on aggregate liquidity considerations 1 our starting point is that the productive and financial spheres of the economy have autonomous demands for financial assets and that their valuations for these assets are often disconnected from the representative consumer s corporate demand for financial assets is driven by the desire to hoard liquidity in order to fulfill future cash needs in contrast with the

goliath s curse coercive threats and asymmetric power states typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries yet their threats often fail why expanding on a standard model of inter national crisis bargaining i argue that a theory of reputation building can help shed light on this puzzle the model casts reputation as a strategic problem showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors if challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands then even reputation conscious targets will acquiesce i argue however that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underesti mate their targets reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them in this way military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats the logic is illustrated by the 1939 russo finnish crisis and the argument s implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored

noise trading and takeovers a model of takeovers is investigated in which noise trading provides camouflage that makes it possible for a large corporate outsider to purchase enough shares at favorable prices so that takeovers become profitable although the model accommodates the possibility of dilution grossman and hart 1980 and a large incumbent shareholder shleifer and vishny 1986 neither dilution nor a large incumbent shareholder is necessary for costly takeovers to be profitable noise trading tends to encourage costly takeovers that otherwise would not occur and to discourage beneficial takeovers that otherwise would occur

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation