financial dollarization the role of foreign owned banks and interest rates abstract why in many economies households and firms borrow and make deposits in foreign currency expanding on the existing literature our framework addresses this question allowing for interest rate differentials and access to foreign funds to play a role in explaining this process of asset substitution or financial dollarization using a newly compiled data set on transition economies and employing a standard panel as well as a panel var methodology we find that increasing access to foreign funds leads to higher credit dollarization while it decreases deposit dollarization interest rate differentials matter for the dollarization of both loans and deposits

decision costs in legislative bargaining an experimental analysis we conduct an experiment to assess the effects of different decision rules on the costs of decision making in a multilateral bargaining situation specifically we compare the amount of costly delay observed in an experimental bargaining game under majority and unanimity rule our main finding is that individual subjects are more likely to reject offers under unanimity rule this higher rejection rate as well as the requirement that all subjects agree leads to more costly delay this result provides empirical support for a classic argument in favor of less than unanimity decision rules put forth by buchanan and tullock the calculus of consent logical foundations of constitutional democracy university of michigan press ann arbor 1962

axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary abstract this paper formulates the principle of ordinal welfare egalitarianism in a general model of collective choice where both the feasibility constraints and the preferences may vary an axiomatization of all choice rules satisfying this principle is presented the key axiom is a solidarity property with respect to changes that may occur possibly jointly in the feasibility constraints and the preferences solidarity with respect to changes in the feasibility constraints and solidarity with respect to changes in the preferences together imply only a weaker form of egalitarianism journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d70

impartiality priority and solidarity in the theory of justice the ethic of priority is a compromise between the extremely compensatory ethic of welfare equality and the needs blind ethic of income equality we propose an axiom of priority and characterize resource allocation rules that are impartial prioritarian and solidaristic they comprise a class of rules which equalize across individuals some index of resources and welfare consequently we provide an ethical rationalization for the many applications in which such indices have been used e g the human development index index of primary goods etc

bargaining and reputation an experiment on bargaining in the presence of behavioural types we conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining the experiments implement the abreu and gul 2000 bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types which are obstinate in their demands creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers the data are qualitatively consistent with the theory as subjects mimic induced types furthermore we find evidence for the presence of complementary types whose initial demands acquiesce to induced behavioural demands however there are quantitative deviations from the theory subjects make aggressive demands too often and participate in longer conflicts before reaching agreements overall the results suggest that the abreu and gul 2000 model can be used to gain insights to bargaining behavior particularly in environments where the process underlying obstinate play is well established

early birds late risers and sleeping beauties bank credit growth to the private sector in central and eastern europe and in the balkans abstract following a period of privatization and restructuring commercial banks in central and eastern europe and more recently in the balkans have expanded rapidly their lending to the private sector this paper studies whether these developments are consistent with a process of convergence and structural financial deepening by estimating an equilibrium level of the bank credit to gdp ratio it concluded that while there is no clear evidence that the recent increases in bank credit ratios is inconsistent with financial deepening policy makers will have to evaluate carefully its implications for macroeconomic developments and financial stability

why do firms default on their foreign currency loans the case of hungary abstract i isolate the effect of the choice of foreign currency on the loan performance of firms borrowing in different currencies in crisis times i use a novel micro level dataset from hungary to decompose the factors contributing to the worse loan performance of foreign currency borrowers compared to local currency debtors i find that foreign currency denomination can worsen loan performance considerably while selection also contributes significantly to the default differences on the one hand per se less creditworthy firms borrowed in foreign currency and during the crisis the foreign currency shocks further weakened their loan performances on the other hand more creditworthy firms that were also well prepared for the currency risks also borrowed in foreign currency my results suggest that not the institution of foreign currency lending per se that should be blamed for the bad loan performance of foreign currency borrowers instead one should consider the characteristics of the borrowers

the effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade abstract mindful of the market structure conduct performance paradigm fundamental to industrial organization research this paper uses laboratory experimental techniques to study the impact of conspiratorial opportunities on market performance we compare posted offer markets where sellers but not buyers are all conspiratorial opportunities with observations from three control groups 1 posted offer markets without conspiratorial opportunities 2 double auction markets with conspiratorial opportunities and 3 posted offer markets with true single seller monopolists the basic conclusions generated by our experimental design are 1 seller conspiracies in posted offer markets tend to raise prices but not profits relative to similarly organized markets without conspiracies 2 posted offer conspiracies tend to generate higher prices but not profits than double auction conspiracies and 3 posted offer monopolies tend to generate higher profits but not prices then posted offer conspiracies

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

government turnover in parliamentary democracies in this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena 1 cabinet terminations due to replacement or early election 2 cabinet reshuf es 3 minority and surplus governments 4 the relative instability of minority governments

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

inefficiency in legislative policymaking a dynamic analysis this paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining the policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation the productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens e g national defense and the distributive spending is district specific transfers e g pork barrel spending investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods the analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of

saving growth and investment a macroeconomic analysis using a panel of countries this paper provides a descriptive analysis of the long and short run correlations among saving investment and growth rates for 123 countries over the period 1961 94 three results are robust across data sets and estimation methods i lagges saving rates are positively related to investment rates ii investment rates granger cause growth rates with a negative sign iii growth rates granger cause investment with a positive sign

foreign banks and foreign currency lending in emerging europe based on survey data from 193 banks in 20 countries we provide the first bank level analysis of the relationship between bank ownership bank funding and foreign currency fx lending across emerging europe our results contradict the widespread view that foreign banks have been driving fx lending to retail clients as a result of easier access to foreign wholesale funding our cross sectional analysis shows that foreign banks do lend more in fx to corporate clients but not to households moreover we find no evidence that wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on fx lending for either foreign or domestic banks panel estimations show that the foreign acquisition of a domestic bank does lead to faster growth in fx lending to households however this is driven by faster growth in household lending in general not by a shift towards fx lending

bank funding securitization and loan terms evidence from foreign currency lending we examine how bank funding structure and securitization activities affect the currency denomination of business loans we analyze a unique data set that includes information on the requested and granted loan currency for 99 490 loans granted to 57 464 firms by a bulgarian bank our findings document that foreign currency lending is at least partially driven by bank eagerness to match the currency structure of assets with that of liabilities our results also show that loan currency as well as loan amount and maturity are adjusted to make loans eligible for securitization

welfarism in economic domains abstract in economies with public goods and agents with quasi linear preferences we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms pareto optimality symmetry and solidarity this last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare of any of them journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 h41

dollarization of bank deposits causes and consequences abstract this paper assesses the benefits and risks associated with dollarization of bank deposits we provide novel empirical evidence on the determinants of deposit dollarization its role in promoting financial development and on whether dollarization is associated with financial instability we find that a the credibility of macroeconomic policy and the quality of institutions are both key determinants of cross country variations in dollarization b dollarization is likely to promote financial deepening only in a high inflation environment and c financial instability is likely higher in dollarized economies the implications of these findings for financial sector and monetary policies are briefly discussed

theory and experiments on spatial competition we present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market identical consumers with non increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line we solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor the set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs in laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes non binding communication led to collusion

households foreign currency borrowing in central and eastern europe abstract foreign currency loans represent an important feature of recent financial developments in ceecs this might pose a serious challenge for macroeconomic stability against this background we study the determinants of foreign currency loans of households using data on the behavior of households in nine ceecs our results reveal that foreign currency loans are driven by households lack of trust in the stability of the local currency and in domestic financial institutions moreover special factors including remittances and expectations of euro adoption play an important role in selected regions the financial crisis reduced foreign currency borrowing but there is some indication this effect might be only temporary

the replacement principle in economies with single peaked preferences abstract our objective is to investigate the implications of the replacement principle for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single peaked preferences the principle says that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved changes all of the relevant agents should be affected in the same direction they all gain or they all lose we apply it to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may change under the name ofwelfare domination under preference replacement we show that there is no selection from the no envy and pareto solution satisfying it then we weaken it by limiting its application to situations in which the change is not so disruptive that it turns the economy from one in which there is too little of the commodity to one in which there is too much or conversely we show that there is only one selection from the no envy and pareto solution satisfying this property andreplication invariance it is the uniform rule a solution that has played a central role in previous analyses of the problem journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 d63 d70

the euroization of bank deposits in eastern europe in central eastern and southeastern europe a substantial share of bank deposits are denominated in foreign currency deposit euroization poses key challenges for monetary policy and financial sector supervision on the one hand it limits the effectiveness of monetary policy interventions on the other hand it increases financial sector fragility by exposing banks to currency risk or currency induced credit risk policymakers disagree on whether countries in the region should tackle deposit euroization with dedollarization policies or should rather strive to adopt the euro as their legal tender assessing the potential effectiveness of dedollarization policies requires a clear understanding of which households hold foreign currency deposits and why they do so on the basis of survey data covering 16 375 households in ten countries in 2011 and 2012 we provide a comprehensive household level analysis of deposit euroization in central eastern and southeastern europe we examine how households preferences for and holding of foreign currency deposits are related to individual expectations about monetary conditions and network effects we also examine to what extent monetary expectations and deposit euroization are the legacy of past financial crises or the outflow of current policies and institutions in the region our findings suggest that deposit euroization in central eastern and southeastern europe can be partly tackled by prudent monetary and economic decisions by today s policymakers the preferences of households for euro deposits are partly driven by their distrust in the stability of their domestic currency which in turn is related to their assessment of current policies and institutions however our findings also suggest that a stable monetary policy may not be sufficient to deal with the hysteresis of deposit euroization across the region first we confirm that the holding of foreign currency deposits has become a habit in the region second we find that deposit euroization is still strongly influenced by households experiences of financial crises in the 1990s our findings question the effectiveness of supply side interventions e g bank regulation or demand side interventions e g local currency capital market development in de euroizing household savings first we show that deposit euroization is largely demand driven second we show that households already have access to a broad range of savings products in local currency

behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers alternating offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs as well as in the role of the order of play the experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models we compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process

what drives credit dollarization in transition economies abstract this paper provides an in depth analysis of the use of foreign currencies in the lending activities of banks in transition economies the impact of bank and firm variables on credit dollarization is studied in an optimal portfolio allocation model and estimated using new aggregate data for 21 transition economies for the period 1990 2003 empirical results provide evidence that credit dollarization is the combined outcome of domestic deposit dollarization and banks desire for currency matched portfolios beyond regulatory requirements the effects of international financial factors and natural hedges are less robust across alternative specifications the paper further discusses the role of regulations in affecting the impact of these factors on credit dollarization and calls for more developed domestic forward foreign exchange markets

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price