bidimensional matching with heterogeneous preferences education and smoking in the marriage market we develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait and a binary attribute the model incorporates attributes for which there are heterogeneous preferences in the population regarding their desirability that is the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one dimensional attractiveness index we present a general resolution strategy based on optimal control theory and characterize the stable matching we then consider education and smoking status further specify the model by observing that there are more male than female smokers above each education level and derive additional predictions about equilibrium matching patterns and how individuals with different smoking habits marry down or marry up by education using the cps march and tobacco use supplements for the period 1996 to 2003 we find that the hypotheses based on our model predictions are borne out in the data

building the family nest premarital investments marriage markets and spousal allocations we develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by premarital investments the marriage market is characterized by assortative matching and endogenously determined sharing rules form the basis of intra household allocations by incorporating pre marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model we are able to identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously determined and maritally sustainable intra marital sharing rules in particular we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre marital investments and intra household allocations are efficient the efficiency of both pre marital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that for each couple the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market

selection investment and women s relative wages over time in theory growing wage inequality within gender should cause women to invest more in their market productivity and should differentially pull able women into the workforce our paper uses heckman s two step estimator and identification at infinity on repeated current population survey cross sections to calculate relative wage series for women since 1970 that hold constant the composition of skills we find that selection into the female full time full year workforce shifted from negative in the 1970s to positive in the 1990s and that the majority of the apparent narrowing of the gender wage gap reflects changes in female workforce composition we find the same types of composition changes by measuring husbands wages and national longitudinal survey iq data as proxies for unobserved skills our findings help to explain why growing wage equality between genders coincided with growing inequality within gender

the incidence of personal income taxation evidence from the tax reform act of 1986 abstract this paper studies the short run incidence of personal income taxation in the us by examining how the wage structure shifted after the tax reform act of 1986 i calculate the marginal tax rate for the median worker of each occupation during the 1980s to determine the professions whose workers were most affected by the tax change when controlling for trends over time in the wage structure by occupation i find that individuals in occupations that experienced large decreases in their median marginal tax rates received lower pre tax wages after 1986 as the number of workers and the hours worked in those professions increased the results suggest that consideration of the wage effects of tax reforms is important when using these reforms to identify behavioral parameters and evaluating their distributional consequences

does marriage really make men more productive this paper presents new descriptive evidence regarding marital pay premiums earned by white males longitudinal data indicate that wages rise after marriage and that cross sectional marriage premiums appear to result from a steepening of the earnings profile data from a company personnelfile that includes information on job grades and supervisor performance ratings reveal large marital status pay differences within a narrow range of occupations managers and professionals and environments a single firm married workers tend to be located in higher paying job grades there are very small pay differentials within grades married men receive higher performance ratings than single men as a result they are much more likely to be promoted controlling for rated performance however eliminates the promotion differential sanders korenman is an assistant professor of economics and public affairs at princeton university and is a faculty associate of the office of population research at princeton university and a research affiliate of the national bureau of economic research nber david neumark is an assistant professor of economics at the university of pennsylvania and a research affiliate of the nber korenman wishes to acknowledge the hewlett foundation and the harvard university center for population studies for financial support the authors are grateful to james medofffor making available an extract from the company personnelfile questions regarding data availability should be directed to professor james

irs as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints the model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models in particular the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative also it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance the government can increase welfare by playing the role of loan shark to people whose borrowing is constrained on the private market

skill biased technological change and rising wage inequality some problems and puzzles the recent rise in wage inequality is usually attributed to skill biased technical change sbtc associated with new computer technologies we review the evidence for this hypothesis focusing on the implications of sbtc for overall wage inequality and for changes in wage differentials between groups a key problem for the sbtc hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing advances in computer technology sbtc also fails to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality including the gender and racial wage gaps and the age gradient in the return to education

charitable giving by married couples who decides and why does it matter we examine how charitable giving is influenced by who in the household is primarily responsible for giving decisions looking first at single person households we find men and women to have significantly different tastes for giving setting up a potential conflict for married couples we find that with respect to total giving married households tend to resolve these conflicts largely in favor of the husband s preferences bargaining over charitable giving rather than letting one spouse take charge reduces giving by about six percent when the woman is the decision maker she will still make a significantly different allocation of those charity dollars preferring to give to more charities but to give less to each our results give new insights into both the demographics of charitable giving and the costliness of household bargaining

quality of available mates education and household labor supply we investigate the impact of sex ratios by education and metropolitan area on spouses bargaining power and labor supplies to capture the local and qualitative nature of mate availability using current population survey and census data for 2000 1990 and 1980 we estimate these effects in a collective household framework we find that a higher relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couple s metropolitan area reduces wives labor supply and increases their husbands the impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups but not significant for high school graduates results are similar across decades no such effects are found for unmarried individuals jel d1 j22 2008 western economic association international

returns to schooling for urban and migrant workers in china a detailed investigation abstractwe use a new data set the 2009 rural urban migration in china rumic to estimate returns to schooling in china using instrumental variable iv estimation after identifying a set of instruments we conduct comprehensive validity and relevance testing of different combinations of instruments as well as robustness analysis of our estimates for rural to urban migrants and urban residents in china we find that our point estimates are in the 6 9 range for urban workers compared to 7 8 for migrant workers returns for men at 8 9 are slightly higher than for women at 6 7 thus private returns to education in urban china in 2009 were not as high as other transition and developing countries but substantial and have increased over time comparing ols and iv estimates we also find that the attenuation bias due to measurement error is generally large and more important in the migrant sample compared to the urban sample

collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders abstract we show that efficient collusion by any subset of bidders in second price private value auctions is possible even when the bidders are heterogeneous an important property of efficient collusion is that a bidder s net payoff from participating in collusion is independent of her valuation we show that the cooperative game whose characteristic function evaluated at a coalition is the ex ante collusive surplus of that coalition has a nonempty core a feature of more technical interest is the mechanism characterization when the private information of agents does not enter in a linear or even piecewise linear manner

collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values abstract the standard approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed disinterested third party who prior to the auction designs and implements a collusive mechanism in environments where collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties this approach may neglect information leakages from simply a proposal to collude we consider a model of collusion where one informed bidder proposes to another as in es and schummer 2004 we allow for general interdependent values and affiliated signals in contrast to third party modeling approaches collusion is inefficient from both a social perspective except for the case of pure common values and from the perspective of the ring both bidders are better off than without colluding but the surplus extracted from the seller is distributed asymmetrically between the bidders the potential for information leakage from proposing is bad for low types who reveal that they are weak competitors but is advantageous for high types because they are able to signal their strength we identify a so called briber s curse whereby acceptance of a proposal causes the proposer to downgrade her expected value for the object when there is additional competition in the form of bidders outside of the cartel the briber s curse significantly harms cartel profits and raises seller revenues

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

does increasing women s schooling raise the schooling of the next generation the positive cross sectional relationship between the schooling of mothers and their children is substantially biased upward due to correlations between schooling and heritable ability as well as assortative mating an increase in the schooling of women would not have beneficial effects in terms of the schooling of children increased maternal schooling leads to reduced home time for mothers anticipating the consequences of investing in women s schooling requires attention to the role that schooling plays in the marriage market as well as to opportunities in the labor market for women

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

plea bargaining with the irs abstract the purpose of this paper is to propose a new evasion counteracting policy and to prove its welfare improving property the new fatota policy allows a target group of businesses to choose between the following two options paying a fixed amount of taxes thus exempting themselves from tax audits or paying only the amount they choose to pay and subject to possible tax audits it is shown that fatota is very similar to the plea bargaining system of the u s criminal proceedings and our results can be treated as an extension of the grossman katz analysis to the crime of tax evasion

tax evasion and labor markets abstract concern with revenue losses inequities and inefficiency that may result from tax evasion has produced a number of formal analyses of taxpayer dishonesty most of this work has concentrated on the behavior of individual evaders and has ignored the interaction between evasion and labor market equilibrium to remedy this our analysis uses a model with two labor markets which differ in the potential for evasion to examine how changes in various tax parameters affect evasion and labor market equilibrium we also simulate the effect of switching from a proportional to a progressive tax system in order to evaluate the well known claim that progressivity encourages evasion

schooling search and spouse selection testing economic theories of marriage and household behavior the implications of the economic theories of marriage and of household fertility behavior are tested in a framework in which educational investment marital search and marital matches are responsive to marriage market conditions and the personal traits of individual agents some of which are unobserved by the econometrician implications are also derived and tested for the effects of longevity attractiveness preferences and labor and marriage market conditions on schooling marriage age and spouse choice the empirical results indicate that inattention to heterogeneity and martial selection leads to a false rejection of the economic theory of marriage but to a false acceptance of the value of time fertility hypothesis

individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion abstract empirical evidence suggests some taxpayers never evade evasion increases with the tax rate and evasion decisions are interdependent these findings are not easily explained by the existing theory which models evasion as an independently made amoral gamble this paper uses nonpecuniary costs of evasion to reconcile theory with evidence once individuals are assumed to differ by an honesty characteristic taxpayers dichotomise into groups the more honest of which responds to a tax change as the evidence suggests a further extension is to introduce an endogenous reputation cost this suggests a positive relationship between the number of evaders and the tax rate

tax evasion and the optimum general income tax abstract this paper incorporates tax evasion into an optimum general income tax problem with endogenous labor supply it posits a two group model with high and low wage individuals to investigate the properties of optimal audit and tax structures the following main results are obtained first high wage persons are never audited while low wage persons are audited with a probability strictly less than one secondly high wage persons should face a zero marginal tax rate thirdly low wage individuals who have been audited and found innocent should pay a lower tax than those who are not audited fourthly there are two possible tax regimes low wage persons face a positive marginal tax rate under one regime and a zero rate under the other fifthly even if honesty cannot be rewarded the other results of the paper continue to hold

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

bribing and signaling in second price auctions abstract we examine whether a two bidder second price auction for a single good with private independent values is immune to a simple form of collusion where one bidder may bribe the other to commit to stay away from the auction i e submit a bid of zero in either of two cases where the potential bribe is fixed or allowed to vary the only robust equilibria involve bribing in the fixed bribe case there is a unique such equilibrium in the variable bribes case all robust equilibria involve low briber types revealing themselves through the amount they offer while all high types offer the same bribe only one such equilibrium is continuous bribing in all cases causes inefficiency

going the same weigh spousal correlations in obesity in the united kingdom the obesity epidemic has received widespread media and research attention however the social phenomenon of obesity is still not well understood data from the british household panel survey bhps show positive and significant correlations in spousal body mass index bmi this article explores the three mechanisms of matching in the marriage market social learning and shared environment to explain this correlation we apply a novel method of testing for social learning by focusing on how the addition of individual and partner health and marriage length affects the correlation in spousal bmi results show the importance of matching in the marriage market in explaining correlated bmi outcomes there is significant correlation in partner bmi even after controlling for own health spouse health marriage length and regional effects suggesting evidence of a social influence however it does not appear to be a learning effect as the spouse health and marriage length are insignificant

pareto efficient income taxation under costly monitoring abstract this paper studies the problem of pareto efficient fiscal policies when labour supply is elastic and the government has no a priori information on income earned the model is a two class economy with an official and an unofficial labour market official income is taxed non linearly while unofficial income is only observable after a costly audit upon which it is taxed at an exogenous penalty rate after characterisation of the pareto efficient audit and tax policies it is verified how these policies react to a higher government revenue requirement an increase in the penalty rate a stronger ambition to redistribute in the two last scenarios the effect on the marginal tax and the audit rate is shown to decompose into a government revenue effect and a substitution effect a numerical example shows that the substitution effects are of minor importance suggesting that first intuition about the best way for a government to cope with increased evasion opportunities substituting auditing effort for high marginal tax rates sketches only part of the picture

engines of liberation electricity was born at the dawn of the last century households were inundated with a flood of new consumer durables what was the impact of this consumer durable goods revolution it is argued here that the consumer goods revolution was conducive to liberating women from the home to analyse this hypothesis a beckerian model of household production is developed households must decide whether or not to adopt the new technologies and whether a married woman should work can such a model help to explain the rise in married female labour force participation that occurred in the last century yes the housewife of the future will be neither a slave to servants nor herself a drudge she will give less attention to the home because the home will need less she will be rather a domestic engineer than a domestic labourer with the greatest of all handmaidens electricity at her service this and other mechanical forces will so revolutionize the woman s world that a large portion of the aggregate of woman s energy will be conserved for use in broader more constructive fields thomas alva edison as interviewed in good housekeeping magazine lv no 4 october 1912 p 436

plea bargaining with the irs extensions and further results abstract chu journal of public economics 41 1990 319 333 proposes a tax scheme called fatota under which taxpayers are given the choice between paying a fixed amount of taxes and thus being exempted from tax audit or paying only what taxpayers claim they owe and being subject to tax audits for possible evasion in this paper we extend chu s finding with regard to the pareto improving property of fatota to a more general setting including nonlinear tax penalty schedules complicated audit rules and endogenous labor supply we also show that any tax system in which the highest income taxpayer faces audit risk and or tax distortion can be pareto improved upon by the introduction of fatota we relate this result to seade s journal of public economics 7 1977 203 235 celebrated finding in the optimal taxation literature that any income tax schedule with a positive marginal tax rate at the top of the scale can be replaced by another tax schedule which is strictly pareto improving

more on marriage fertility and the distribution of income according to pareto 1896 the distribution of income depends on the nature of the people comprising a society on the organization of the latter and also in part on chance in the model developed here the nature of the people is captured by attitudes toward marriage divorce fertility and children singles search for mates in a marriage market married agents bargain about work and the quantity and quality of children they can divorce social policies such as child support requirements reflect the organization of the society finally chance is modeled by randomness in income marriage opportunities and marital bliss

bribing in first price auctions abstract i study a symmetric 2 bidder ipv first price auction prior to which one bidder can offer his rival a bribe in exchange for the latter s abstention i focus on pure and undominated strategies and on continuous monotonic equilibria equilibria in which the bribing function is continuous and nondecreasing when types are distributed continuously on the unit interval such an equilibrium if it at all exists is necessarily trivial its bribing function is identically zero i provide a sufficient condition for its existence and sufficient conditions for its nonexistence when the minimum type is strictly positive a non trivial equilibrium may exist but it must be pooling i provide a sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium when types are distributed continuously on the unit interval and dominated strategies are allowed a non trivial non pooling equilibrium exists at least under the uniform prior

assortative mating and female labor supply this paper investigates married women s hours worked disaggregated by the husband s wage decile in the united states this pattern has changed from downward sloping to hump shaped we show that this development can be explained within a standard household model of labor supply when taking into account trends in assortative mating a quantitative analysis of our model shows that female wage growth and decreasing fertility are primarily responsible for the overall increase in wives hours since the 1970s the fact that the most pronounced increases are observed for wives married to high wage men is a result of trends in assortative mating

optimal linear income tax with random revenue abstract this paper introduces the concept of risk attitudes a government may take toward random revenue in the design of a linear income tax it shows that the familiar trade off formula between equity and efficiency can be derived either by assuming a risk neutral government attitude toward random revenue or by assuming no randomness of revenue we provide numerical analysis to demonstrate that optimum tax schedules for a non risk neutral government can significantly deviate from those for a risk neutral government

optimal auditing with heterogeneous income sources the optimal enforcement policy when households are heterogeneous with respect to both income level and to income source leads to more intense income auditing for easy to monitor sources we obtain the common result that within each income source any taxpayer reporting less than a predetermined cut off level will be audited while taxpayers reporting at least this level will never be audited however this audit policy leads to very different reporting behavior depending on the income source the internal revenue service does not audit only honest taxpayers and an increase in the audit budget may lead to a larger segment of full evaders

private monitoring in auctions abstract we study infinitely repeated first price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object while repetition of the stage game equilibrium is the unique nash equilibrium in public strategies with patient bidders there are simple nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect bayesian equilibrium epbe which ignores behavior after irrelevant histories our main result is the construction of epbea that improve upon bid rotation assuming symmetry the exclusionary schemes of skrzypacz and hopenhayn tacit collusion in repeated auctions j econ theory 114 2004 153 169 including asymptotically efficient ones are supported as epbea

marriage and divorce changes and their driving forces the family is not a static institution in recent decades marriage rates have fallen divorce rates have risen and the defining characteristics of marriage have changed the economic approach to the family seeks to explain these trends by reference to models that can also explain how and why families form gary becker s 1981 treatise on the family proposed a theory based on production complementarities in which husband and wife specialize in the market and domestic spheres respectively production complementarities also arise in the production and rearing of one s own children however production complementarities at least as initially described are decreasingly central to modern family life increased longevity and declining fertility mean that most of one s adult life is spent without one s own children in the household also the rise in marital formation at older ages including remarriage means that many families form with no intention of producing children moreover increases in female labor force participation suggest that household specialization has either declined or at least taken on a different meaning these changes have come about as what is produced in the home has been dramatically altered both by the emergence of labor saving technology in the home and by the development of service industries that allow much of what was once provided by specialized homemakers to be purchased in the market the availabil

randomness in tax enforcement abstract when there is tax evasion increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess generally leads to higher reported income and more revenue when reducing randomness is costly optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable income even if reducing randomness is costless taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated so that the government s revenue stays fixed

why not hang them all the virtues of inefficient punishment replacing a criminal punishment with another that both is more severe and has a lower ratio of punishment cost to amount of punishment while reducing the probability of conviction to maintain the same level of deterrence lowers both punishment cost and enforcement cost hence imprisonment is always dominated by execution and both are dominated by fines and other alternatives moden legal systems do not fit that pattern one possible explanation is that the ability enforces to profit by convictions and produce costly rent seeking examples include product liability litigation civil forfeiture and fraudulent prosecution motivated by rewards in eighteenth0 century england the problem was avoided by the use of infficient punishments in the legal system of saga period iceland and the private norms of shasta county california execution while not directly profitable for enforcers facilitates rent seeking through threats leading to out of court settlements

taxation with representation abstract in this paper a framework is developed for the joint analysis of tax preparation mode and tax non compliance estimation is performed using micro level audit data from the internal revenue service although tha availability of tax practitioners undoubtedly reduces many of the informational and computational barriers to tax compliance the results indicate that their use particularly the use of cpas and attorneys is associated with increased tax non compliance which may have negative implications for both tax equity and tax efficiency

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines should the penalty fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers these models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with lowfrequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected this article shows that if the judicial system is built on the reasonable doubt test then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent in particular as the penalty increases the probability of conviction falls as a result uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it this article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction that is the penalty should fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship generally treat both the probability and magnitude of fines as independent choice variables of the government this approach has led becker 1968 and others to conclude that it is optimal to set uniformly maximal penalties for all crimes and to set the probability of conviction at the minimum level necessary to enforce compliance with the law while this normative prescription is natural and intuitive there still remains a larger positive question of why in most nations of the world penalties are not uniformly high but rather rise with the severity of the crime one possible resolution of the positive and normative questions may lie in the fact that penalties and probabilities of conviction are not generally independent convictions are typically determined by judges or jurors who are instructed to convict only if the evidence convinces them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty psychologists however have found that a juror s willingness to convict may be influenced by more than just the evidence jurors are very sensitive to the potential penalties that defendants may pay

life cycle schooling and dynamic selection bias models and evidence for five cohorts of american males this paper examines an empirical regularity found in many societies that family influences on the probability of transiting from one grade level to the next diminish at higher levels of education we examine the statistical model used to establish the empirical regularity and the intuitive behavioral interpretation often used to rationalize it we show that the implicit economic model assumes myopia the intuitive interpretive model is identified only by imposing arbitrary distributional assumptions onto the data we produce an alternative choice theoretic model with fewer parameters that rationalizes the same data and is not based on arbitrary distributional assumptions

an analysis of out of wedlock childbearing in the united states this paper relates the erosion of the custom of shotgun marriage to the legalization of abortion and the increased availability of contraception to unmarried women in the united states the decline in shotgun marriage accounts for a significant fraction of the increase in out of wedlock first births several models illustrate the analogy between women who do not adopt either birth control or abortion and the hand loom weavers both victims of changing technology mechanisms causing female immiseration are modeled and historically described this technology shock hypothesis is an alternative to welfare and job shortage theories of the feminization of poverty excerpt

who profits from taxpayer confusion abstract when taxpayers are uncertain of true taxable income they must decide whether to resolve their uncertainty by seeking tax advice and then decide how much taxable income to report since tax advisors must sign their advisees tax returns the audit policy can depend on whether tax advice was sought in the optimal audit policy some taxpayers will not resolve their uncertainty and the optimal policy yields higher net revenue with uncertainty than without

bidder collusion at forest service timber sales allegations of bidder collusion at forest service timber sales in the pacific northwest were common in the 1970s of course prices may be low for reasons other than collusion we formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold the standard auction model is a special case it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion we also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

should we get married the effect of parents marriage on out of wedlock children i introduction while marriage remains the foundation of family life in the united states the traditional process of family formation specifically marriage before having children has been dwindling the proportion of american children born to unmarried parents has increased dramatically over the past three decades from 12 in 1970 to nearly one third of all births today siglerushton and mclanahan 2002 the decoupling of marriage and fertility behavior is particularly common among the low income less educated urban population mclanahan and sandefur 1994 unmarried parents often have fewer resources and their children tend to display inferior outcomes compared to those raised by two married parents 1 concerned with the rise in out of wedlock parenthood and its implications for the children involved policies in recent years have been geared toward promoting marriage among unmarried parents 2 however little is known about the potential benefits of marriage after childbirth couples who have children out of wedlock are known to be selectively different from those who marry before having children unmarried parents tend to be of lower socioeconomic standing face poorer prospects in the marriage market and have lower incentives for assortative mating brown 2004 garfinkel glei and mclanahan 2002 rosenzweig 1999 hence interpreting the outcome differences found in simple comparisons of children born to married versus unmarried parents as benefits of marriage can be misleading as these differences may largely reflect the more favorable characteristics of married parents this study examines whether marriage between the biological parents after childbearing benefits the children involved using data on a representative sample of children all born to unmarried couples drawn from the fragile families and child wellbeing study ffcws the ffcws is particularly well suited to address this question as it provides child assessment data and detailed marriage fertility and socioeconomic information on both biological parents for a large representative sample of children born outside of marriage we focus on the effect of marriage among parents who are romantically involved at childbirth on child cognitive ability measured at age 3 based on scores from the peabody picture vocabulary test ppvt a widely used interviewer administered measure of receptive hearing and verbal ability in addition effects of marriage on child health and behavioral outcomes are analyzed a significant fraction of children in our sample experience the marriage of their parents we analyze whether marriage after childbearing affects early developmental outcomes using an empirical strategy centering around a potential outcome framework similar to an experiment where the treatment marriage after childbirth is randomly assigned we draw on matching methods e g heckman ichimura and todd 1998 rosenbaum and rubin 1983 to identify the treatment effect exploiting the detailed information on the parents provided in the ffcws this approach addresses the selection into marriage by constructing an appropriate comparison group for children whose parents marry after childbirth we first estimate the probability of marriage among unwed parents with a newborn and then compare the outcomes of children whose parents share similar probabilities of marriage but differ only in whether their parents transitioned into marriage within 3 yr after their birth the present study also sheds light on the role of typically unobserved factors likely to be important determinants of selection into marriage including the father s attributes and the degree to which the parents have similar characteristics positive assortative matching while some studies have examined the determinants of marital union formation among the population of single mothers e g aassve 2003 relatively little is known about the factors influencing the transition into marriage and the role of similarities in traits between unmarried biological parents

waiting for mr right rising inequality and declining marriage rates abstract this paper demonstrates that women search longer for their first or second husband in cities with higher male wage inequality and examines several alternative explanations a causal link is established by controlling for city fixed effects and city specific time trends and by using inequality in the woman s state of birth as a proxy for local male inequality increasing inequality explains about 25 of the marriage rate decline over the last few decades and this is not due to the endogenous moving or labor force decisions of women nor to the marital decisions of men in reaction to changes in their own wages

health insurance and labor market outcomes joint decision making within households abstract most americans obtain access to health insurance through an employer in this paper we ask how the link between health insurance and employment affects labor market choices such as whether to work full time to understand the effect of the incentives embedded in the employer based insurance system we study the joint decision making of husbands and wives that determines the household s access to health insurance we estimate the effect on a wife s husband s labor market outcomes of husband s wife s health insurance allowing the health insurance of both spouses to be endogenous obtaining unbiased estimates of such effects is complicated by the likelihood that positive assortative mating creates correlations between a couple s characteristics and the possibility that there are important unobservable household income effects our innovation is to measure these biases by examining a second fringe benefit paid sick leave in addition to health insurance we find that as predicted spouse s insurance has statistically significant negative effects on being offered own employer insurance as well as on the probability of working full time with health insurance

consumption over the life cycle facts from consumer expenditure survey data this paper uses consumer expenditure survey data and a seminonparametric statistical model to estimate life cycle profiles of consumption controlling for demographics cohort and time effects we construct age profiles for total and nondurable consumption as well as expenditure patterns for consumer durables special emphasis is placed on the comparison of different approaches to control for changes in demo graphics over the life cycle we find significant humps over the life cycle for total nondurable and durable expenditures changes in household size account for roughly half of these humps bootstrap simulations suggest that our empirical estimates are tight in that standard errors are small

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

discretion in tax enforcement this paper deals with the issue of whether the revenue service rs should be allowed or even encouraged to negotiate settlement agreements with taxpayers subject to examination we consider the case in which the rs enjoys discretion at the settlement stage its stance being guided by officers professional judgment we show that discretionary settlements serve a desirable function as they allow the rs to better exploit taxpayer specific information and to take advantage of the bargaining power it can wield at the negotiation stage

accounting for the gender gap in college attainment i introduction one striking phenomenon in the u s labor market is the reversal of the gender gap in college attainment in 1980 57 of young men aged 25 34 compared with 46 of young women had some college education by age 34 by 1996 however female college attainment had reached 64 5 percentage points higher than that of the males in the same cohort in tact females overtook males in college attainment in 1987 and have led ever since a large body of empirical research emphasizes the role of the earnings premium as a key explanatory variable for the determination of education outcomes see e g becket 1967 mincer 1974 willis and rosen 1979 in addition an extensive literature shows that family background is an important determinant of the schooling decision see among others cameron and heckman 1998 2001 eckstein and wolpin 1999 ge 2008 kane 1994 recently several papers have argued empirically and theoretically that expected marriage is important in determining the schooling decision e g chiappori iyigun and weiss 2006 ge 2008 iyigun and walsh 2007 on the basis of this literature we construct a life cycle model that includes potential costs and benefits from the labor market and marriage market which determine individual college decisions in our model individuals with differing learning abilities first decide whether or not to enter college then they might get married and have children parents are altruistic and value their children s learning ability which increases with the parents education forward looking individuals take into account the impact of their own schooling on their children s learning ability other factors that affect an individual s decision on whether to pursue higher education include the expected direct labor market returns to college over one s lifetime the expected marriage market returns to college and the financial and effort costs of attending college these costs and benefits can differ by gender we calculate from panel study of income dynamics psid and current population survey cps parents education distributions the life cycle profiles of single marriage and divorce probabilities by education and the lifecycle profiles of earnings by education and marital status as exogenous inputs of the model we observe that the number of college educated parents increases over time in the marriage market a substantial increase of single probabilities and an increase of divorce probabilities has occurred for both genders regardless of college attainment status lifetime earnings by cohort are decreasing slowly for males of all marital statuses especially for married males lifetime earnings for married and divorced females are increasing gradually whereas those for single females are decreasing slightly to formally endogenize those changes is beyond the scope of our paper we instead focus on the mechanism in which under perfect foresight these changes affect education decisions we estimate the parameters of the model by matching data on college attainment by gender from the psid we present evidence on how well the model fits the data we then use the parameter estimates to simulate counterfactual experiments which break down the sources of changes in college attainment into the effects of changes in relative earnings changes in parental education and changes in the marriage market what accounts for the increase in college attainment over the past few decades we find that the increasing gap in earnings between college and high school graduates has important effects on the increase in college attainment for both genders when earnings are fixed at 1946 cohort levels attainment rates in 1996 drop by 15 5 and 14 2 percentage points for males and females respectively we also emphasize the importance of intergenerational persistence in schooling on the increase in college attainment for both genders

structural estimation of marriage models a structural approach is used to examine who matches with whom a two sided matching model that allows for marital sorting in response to marriage market flexibility and agents preferences is utilized estimation is based on imbedding the numerical solution of a matching model within a maximum likelihood procedure results indicate that wage is more desirable than education in predicting marriageability for white men education is more desirable for black men the marriage market for white men is more flexible both marriage market flexibility and the chance of being classified correctly using agents wage and education decrease with age for white men

mothers and sons preference formation and female labor force dynamics this paper argues that the growing presence of a new type of man one brought up in a family in which the mother worked has been a significant factor in the increase in female labor force participation over time we present cross sectional evidence showing that the wives of men whose mothers worked are themselves significantly more likely to work we use variation in the importance of world war ii as a shock to women s labor force participation as proxied by variation in the male draft rate across u s states to provide evidence in support of the intergenerational consequences of our propagation mechanism

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

women s college decisions how much does marriage matter this article investigates the sequential college attendance decision of young women and quantifies the effect of marriage expectations on their decision to attend and graduate from college a dynamic choice model of college attendance labor supply and marriage is formulated and structurally estimated using panel data from the nlsy79 the model is used to simulate the effects of no marriage benefits and finds that the predicted college enrollment rate will drop from 58 0 to 50 5 using the estimated model the college attendance behavior for a younger cohort from the nlsy97 is predicted and used to validate the behavioral model

robots computers and the gender wage gap abstract we analyze the effects of two automation technologies industrial robots and computing equipment on the gender wage gap in us local labor markets between 1990 and 2015 we find distinct impact of robot and computer capital an increase in robots decreases male wage more than female wage whereas an increase in computers reduces female wage more than male wage according to our estimates one additional unit of robot per thousand workers reduces gender wage gap by 0 3 log points and by contrast an increase in computer capital by one million dollars per thousand workers increases gender wage gap by 4 1 log points

catching up with the economy in his presidential address five years ago zvi griliches 1994 called attention to the severe difficulties that beset current attempts to measure the growth of labor productivity in the american economy because of these difficulties it is likely that the true rate of economic growth is substantially underestimated the root of the problem is the difficulty in measuring output in the service sector which now represents two thirds of the economy in such sectors as health care and information services the contribution to gross domestic product gdp is measured by inputs rather than outputs a procedure that makes it impossible to gauge accurately improvements in the quality of output thus in the case of computers which are transforming american society economists have been unable so far to find a measurable contribution of computers to the rise in labor productivity an astonishing paradox i want to follow up on this problem of mismeasurements my thesis is that the profession

taxation with little administration abstract this paper proposes a tax scheme in the vein of the implementation literature under complete information the tax scheme virtually obviates the need for tax administration besides little tax administration three desirable properties characterize our proposed tax scheme first complementing the regular tax system with our scheme can be pareto improving second our scheme eliminates the so called excess burden of tax evasion as defined by yitzhaki yitzhaki s 1987 on the excess burden of tax evasion public finance quarterly 15 123 137 third our scheme eliminates the usual excess burden of tax distortion caveats about our proposed scheme are also discussed

endowments and the allocation of schooling in the family and in the marriage market the twins experiment 03 we show how comparisons between the within twin correlations of human capital outcomes across identical and nonidentical twins can be used to identify the variability in the individual specific component of endowments and the responsiveness of schooling to individual specific endowments in the family and in the marriage market even when schooling is measured with error estimates from two twins samples indicate that 27 42 percent of the variance in log earnings obesity is due to variability in individual specific endowments allocations of schooling reinforce specific endowments and individual specific earnings endowments of men and their wives schooling are negatively associated

simple collusive agreements in one shot first price auctions abstract the paper demonstrates that collusion in a private value first price auction is likely to occur even in a one shot interaction the strategies of the colluding parties must be mixed since agreeing to submit a bid equal to the reservation price of the seller provides the incentive for that bidder to cheat on the designated winner we deal with a complete information environment with arbitrary number of bidders we characterize the sensible equilibrium outcome where the two bidders with the highest valuations collude we show that the equilibrium outcome is unique and that the probability of collusion exceeds 1 2

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

collusion and information revelation in auctions abstract the theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings however such analyses neglect to consider the effects of failed collusion attempts wherein information revealed in the negotiation process may affect bidding behaviour we experimentally test a setup in which theory predicts no collusion and no information revelation in first price auctions the results reveal a hitherto overlooked failing of the first price mechanism failed collusion attempts distort bidding behaviour resulting in a loss of seller revenue and efficiency moreover the first price mechanism does not result in less collusion than the second price mechanism we conclude that while the features of the first price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder collusion the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behaviour make it highly susceptible to distortions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation auction designers should take this phenomenon into account when choosing the auction mechanism

a partner in crime assortative matching and bias in the crime market abstract in the market for criminals the prisoner s dilemma creates an incentive for every criminal to find a partner with a higher likelihood of success in evading arrest if no one is arrested no one will have to talk to the police about the partnership and be at fault for the arrest of the other partner this incentive leads to an equilibrium pattern of positive assortative matching pam on the likelihood of success using individual matched report arrest data from the national incident based reporting system and a novel empirical strategy i find that offenders generally match according to pam on the probability of success i find that matching between criminals of different race can be subject to search frictions such as availability of potential partners matching between genders is likely biased as females have a higher probability of success than males contrary to unconditional success ranking this bias persists in groups of three but diminishes in matches between older criminals consistent with notions of discrimination the results are of interest to policy makers who want to impede criminals from organizing

bribing in first price auctions corrigendum abstract we clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of rachmilevitch 2013

educational homogamy positive assortative mating and income inequality in south africa an unconditional quantile regression analysis apart from being the first attempt at investigating the impact of education based homogamy and positive assortative mating on income inequality in a developing country context with very high levels

nonparametric panel estimation of labor supply in this article we estimate structural labor supply with piecewise linear budgets and nonseparable endogenous unobserved heterogeneity we propose a two stage method to address the endogeneity iss

constrained efficient fine cum tax rate structures the case of constant relative risk aversion this paper explores the possibility that fines and tax rates impose different welfare costs on different types of taxpayer so that the government may want to apply different fine tax rate treatments to different types of taxpayer under the assumption that taxpayers exhibit constant relative risk aversion we characterize the constrained pareto efficient fine tax rate structure showing that i the co existence of compliers the above ground economy and evaders the underground economy is typical at the pareto optimum and ii pareto efficiency requires compliers to face tax rates no higher and fines no lower than those faced by evaders

for richer for poorer assortative mating and savings preferences do couples share the same values the social sciences have mainly concentrated on comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of spouses but rarely consider their attitudes to risk and time in this paper we use conventional measurements and an original method of scoring we find that spouses are very similar in their savings preferences even when we control for the individual characteristics our results suggest that most of this relationship comes from marital sorting these conclusions are decisive in explaining the decision process within households and its implications for wealth inequalities between households since homogamy causes a divide in the population

college entry by blacks since 1970 the role of college costs family background and the returns to education college enrollment of black 18 19 year old high school graduates declined from 1980 through 1984 and then rebounded after 1984 this paper presents data from a time series of cross sections of 18 19 year old youths from 1973 through 1988 to test the role of family background direct college costs local economic conditions and returns to college in driving these trends the evidence suggests that on the one hand increases in direct college costs were driving enrollment rates downward throughout the eighties on the other hand dramatic increases in average parental education for black youths exerted upward pressure on college enrollment by blacks particularly in the latter half of the decade the net effect of these two factors contributed to the pattern of decline and recovery observed during the eighties

intergenerational persistence in health in developing countries the penalty of gender inequality this paper is motivated to investigate the often neglected payoff to investments in the health of girls and women in terms of next generation outcomes this paper investigates the intergenerational persistence of health across time and region as well as across the distribution of maternal health it uses comparable microdata on as many as 2 24 million children born of about 0 6 million mothers in 38 developing countries in the 31 year period 1970 2000 mother s health is indicated by her height bmi and anemia status child health is indicated by mortality risk and anthropometric failure we find a positive relationship between maternal and child health across indicators and highlight non linearities in these relationships the results suggest that both contemporary and childhood health of the mother matter and that the benefits to the next generation are likely to be persistent averaging across the sample persistence shows a considerable decline over time disaggregation shows that the decline is only significant in latin america persistence has remained largely constant in asia and has risen in africa the paper provides the first cross country estimates of the intergenerational persistence in health and the first estimates of trends

bribing in second price auctions an ipv 2 bidder second price auction is preceded by two rounds of bribing prior to the auction each bidder can try to bribe his rival to depart from the auction so that he the briber will become the sole participant bribes are offered sequentially according to an exogenously given order restricting attention to pure strategies and imposing a certain refinement i study the efficient equilibria of this game in any such equilibrium whenever the first mover offers a strictly positive bribe this bribe is given by his surplus his valuation minus the payoff that he would have received in the dominant strategy equilibrium of the auction i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium i also extend this equilibrium s construction to a model with general valuations not necessarily ipv