does competition reduce price dispersion new evidence from the airline industry we analyze the effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 q1 through 2006 q3 competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination this effect is pronounced for routes with consumers characterized by relatively heterogeneous elasticities of demand on routes with a homogeneous customer base the effects of competition on price dispersion are smaller our results contrast with those of borenstein and rose who found that price dispersion increases with competition we reconcile the different results by showing that the cross sectional estimator suffers from omitted variable bias

race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car more than three hundred paired audits at new car dealerships reveal that dealers quoted significantly lower prices to white males than to black or female test buyers using identical scripted bargaining strategies ancillary evidence suggests that the dealerships disparate treatment of women and blacks may be caused by dealers statistical inferences about consumers reservation prices but the data do not strongly support any single theory of discrimination copyright 1995 by american economic association

consumer search and dynamic price dispersion an application to gasoline markets this article studies the role of imperfect information in explaining price dispersion we use a new panel data set on the u s retail gasoline industry and propose a new test of temporal price dispersion to establish the importance of consumer search we show that price rankings vary significantly over time however they are more stable among stations at the same street intersection weestablishtheequilibriumrelationshipsbetweenpricedispersionandkeyvariables from consumer search models price dispersion increases with the number of firms in the market decreases with the production cost and increases with search costs

who loses when prices are negotiated an analysis of the new car market we establish that there are large and persistent differences in final transaction prices for identical new cars and that demographic characteristics explain at least 20 of the observed variation older consumers perform progressively worse in negotiations and the age premium is greater for women than for men our results suggest that the complex nature of vehicle transactions leads to price dispersion in this market and that the worst performing groups older women have the lowest rates of market participation we conjecture that the results are driven by the sharp increases in women s education and labor force participation in recent decades

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in this paper we develop a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in the highly relevant marketing context of automobile transactions consumer brand choice is modeled as a multinomial probabilistic outcome and the individual consumer level transaction price is modeled to be consistent with the nash bargaining solution our simultaneous model introduces a natural way to account for price endogeneity in a microlevel choice setting when the price paid is individual specific and correlated with the idiosyncratic preference of a buyer it also accounts for the potential selectivity bias in studying the negotiated price by integrating consumer brand choice modeling we apply the proposed model to a data set of 4 795 consumer automobile purchases the empirical results show that the proposed approach not only better fits the data of consumer choice and negotiated price but it also provides additional insights into buyers and sellers behaviors in comparison with models that study only consumer choice or the negotiated price but not both simultaneously

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

is the effect of competition on price dispersion nonmonotonic evidence from the u s airline industry we investigate the effect of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 to 2008 we find a nonmonotonic effect of competition on price dispersion an increase in competition is associated with greater price dispersion in concentrated markets but with less price dispersion in competitive markets an inverse u relationship our empirical findings are consistent with an oligopolistic second degree price discrimination model and encompass contradictory findings in the literature

dealer price discrimination in new car purchases evidence from the consumer expenditure survey this paper documents the variation in dealer discounts for new cars using transactions price data from the consumer expenditure survey consumer specific characteristics fail to explain dealer discounts whereas model market specific and purchase transaction variables e g first time purchase trade in and financing through dealer do explain them the results contradict earlier findings of race and gender discrimination based on a controlled experiment this contradiction is reconciled by examining the higher moments of the empirical discount distribution while mean and median markups do not vary by race and gender minority purchases are characterized by higher dispersion this may rationalize the disparate treatment of minorities by dealers documented in the controlled experiment

trade in a tiebout economy the purpose of this paper is to explore both the positive and normative aspects of commodity trade in a tiebout economy by tiebout economy i mean an economy with a large number of small regions for example communities or states and no impediments to the mobility of individuals between these regions this type of economy has received widespread attention since the appearance of charles tiebout s classic 1956 article on local public goods in part because it bears a close relation to the standard competitive model this relation suggests that tiebout economies may serve as an

taxes and stimuli of investment under uncertainty this article considers the effect on an irreversible investment of a subsidy to investment in combination with a taxation of future profits it is shown that such a combination raising a zero expected revenue decreases the trigger value of investment the tax rate for which the stimulus works at zero expected cost decreases as heterogeneity in the group of investors increases the importance of the result is exemplified by the graduate tax

do local governments use their tax bases efficiently abstract this paper analyzes an economy with multiple governments and with mobility of individuals across jurisdictions where each government is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes a government is said to be competitive if the total benefits and costs of its decisions including the excess burden are perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there exists another set of distortionary taxes and public expenditures such that when private sector behavior adjusts to maintain equilibrium all individuals in the economy are better off thus competitive decentralized decision making does not lead to an efficient use of the available tax instruments it is also shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy which involves pricing the tax base is derived

one discriminatory rent or double jeopardy multicomponent negotiation for new car purchases about half of new car transactions actually consist of two transactions one in which the customer buys a new car from a dealer and the other in which the customer sells his or her existing car to the dealer as a trade in at most dealerships both the price of the new car and the price of the trade in are negotiated in such negotiations as a general rule car dealers are willing to trade off profits made on the new car versus profits made on the trade in to an economist this suggests that the dealer may see the new car customer as the source of a certain amount of extractable profit one discriminatory rent that can be subdivided into two arbitrary buckets the new car margin and the trade in margin economic models of bargaining tend to use a similar paradigm modeling the amount of total economic surplus created by the transaction and supposing that each party will get a share of that surplus that is determined by the party s bargaining power it is usually recognized that there are multiple price mechanisms that could convey the same division of surplus to the two parties if this is indeed a good description of how new car negotiations unfold then an observer comparing a similar set of transactions should expect new car and trade in profit margins to be negatively correlated the better the deal the customer gets on a new car the less good the deal one should expect the customer to get on the trade in an alternative view of this multicomponent negotiation is that customers or dealers or competition and market structure

estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes although bargaining is common in markets for heterogeneous goods it has largely been ignored in the hedonic literature in a break from that tradition we establish sufficient conditions that permit one to identify the effect of buyer and seller bargaining on hedonic models our model is estimated using a previously overlooked feature of the american housing survey that permits us to observe characteristics of both buyers and sellers results suggest that household wealth gender and other demographic traits influence bargaining power in addition variation in bargaining power arising from the presence of school age children accounts for anomalous seasonal patterns reported in various widely cited indices of quality adjusted house prices

bargaining power in apartment sales in corsica a latent class approach this paper extends the bargaining model of harding et al harding j rosenthal s and sirmans cf 2003 estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes review of economics and statist

education as an option to the student education provides many benefits in part education produces human capital by attending school and training on the job the student acquires marketable skills thereby sacrificing current labor income while augmenting future labor income among economists this concept is familiar beginning with the seminal work by mincer 1958 and becker 1964 models of the accumulation of human capital have been extended to the life cycle and more recently to uncertainty simultaneously several of these models have been tested empirically 2 to economists education also serves as a signal by completing a demanding educational program the student signals to prospective employers that he possesses greater innate productivity than other potential employees not completing similar programs this potentially greater productivity the employer then rewards with more favorable conditions of employment

tax incidence with endogenous quality and costly bargaining theory and evidence from hybrid vehicle subsidies abstract endogenous quality and bargaining are important features of many markets but are typically omitted from studies of incidence we develop a model with product upgrades and costly bargaining and find that tax rate pass through only partially characterizes the welfare impact of taxation consumers may respond to a tax or subsidy by changing product quality or by changing their bargaining effort we apply the insights of our theory to the study of subsidies for green goods specifically hybrid electric vehicles in canada we utilize highly detailed transaction data and leverage panel variation in subsidies across provinces for identification our baseline estimate finds that prices rises by 570 for every 1000 increase in the subsidy but this pass through estimate substantially underestimates consumer gains because a majority of this price increase 459 80 is due to increased product quality in the form of additional options and features

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

options on the maximum or the minimum of several assets using an intuitive approach that also provides new intuition concerning the black and scholes equation this paper extends the results of johnson and stulz to the pricing of options on the minimum or the maximum of several risky assets

imperfect mobility and local government behaviour in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper reconsiders the implications of land value maximizing local governments in an overlapping generations model with imperfect mobility specifically residents develop an attachment to place or location specific capital once they reside in a town for a single time period the analysis shows that attempts by governments to capture the resulting rents from less mobile individuals create inefficient migration leave all workers worse off in an ex ante sense and place relatively high burdens on those workers who have high migration costs public good levels are also inefficiently chosen

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

estimating the variance of wages in the presence of selection and unobserved heterogeneity abstract identification of potential wage distributions by education is important to the study of the causal links between education inequality and uncertainty potential wage inequality within an educational group that is the variance in wages if all workers had the same education exceeds the observed statistics because self selected education truncates wage distributions decomposing potential wage inequality into heterogeneity known to the agent making the educational choice and uncertainty unknown to the agent suggests that wage uncertainty does not necessarily rise with education it is unobserved heterogeneity not uncertainty that explains the observed relationship between college graduation and higher wage inequality

trade capital mobility and tax competition this paper examines a system of governments national state or local that finance public expenditures with taxes on mobile capital e g a property tax unlike previous research on tax competition explicit consideration is given to the general equilibrium determination of the prices at which goods are traded between regions the analysis identifies inefficiencies in government behavior that are not apparent in models in which the terms of trade are exogenously given capital taxation is shown to create an inefficient distribution of public good outputs across regions accompanied by an inefficient pattern of trade a model is presented in which the chosen levels of public good outputs differ across regions containing identical residents and production possibilities there is a wasteful diversity of public good supplies

automobile prices in market equilibrium with unobserved price discrimination in markets where sellers are able to price discriminate or the buyers to bargain individuals receive discounts over the posted prices that are usually not observed by the econometrician this paper considers the structural estimation of a demand and supply model a la berry et al 1995 when only posted prices are observed we consider that heterogeneous discounts occur due to price discrimination by firms on observable characteristics of consumers within this framework identification is achieved by assuming that the marginal costs of producing and selling the goods do not depend on the characteristics of the buyers we also require a condition relating the posted prices to the prices actually paid for instance we can assume that at least one group of individuals pays the posted prices under these two conditions the demand and supply parameters as well as the exact discounts corresponding to each type of consumers can be identified we apply our methodology to estimate the demand and supply in the new automobile market in france results suggest that discounting arising from price discrimination is important the average discount is estimated to be 10 5 with large variation depending on the buyers characteristics and cars specifications our results are in line with discounts generally observed in european and american automobile markets

bargaining versus posted price selling abstract two popular selling methods bargaining and posted price selling are compared here in a dynamic model when bargaining costs no more than posted price selling we find that bargaining is always optimal when bargaining costs more however bargaining is still preferred if and only if the common cost for both selling methods is large enough we also find that an increase in the discount rate or the seller s bargaining power favors bargaining finally we find that if the distribution becomes more dispersed and the increase in a buyer s valuation is sufficiently large bargaining is more likely to be adopted

do women pay more for new vehicles evidence from transaction price data recently there has been a debate concerning whether price discrimination by new vehicle dealers results in systematically higher prices for minority and female buyers ian ayres and peter siegelman 1995 and pinelopi koujianoi goldberg 1996 use different methodologies and different data sets and come to different conclusions ayres and siegelman use testergenerated paired audits and find that black and female test buyers were quoted higher prices than white males goldberg uses consumer expenditure survey ces data and finds no systematic evidence of price discrimination in transaction price discounts by race or sex but greater variation in discounts for blacks our paper contributes to the debate on price discrimination in new car purchases using a new j d power and associates database that reports gross profit directly from dealer financial software systems although our data set does not distinguish the race of the buyer we do get direct evidence on dealer profit for male and female buyers in a sample reflecting over 4 000 new vehicle transactions our paper addresses the previously obtained contradictory results and differs from the previous studies in several ways the database we use permits us to measure directly dealers self reported gross profit per vehicle the best measure of differential treatment the database reflects contemporaneously collected dealer data it comes from the same financial software programs that are used to automatically report data to the franchiser manufacturer financial institutions and motor vehicle bureaus as well as being used to calculate sales tax liabilities further the data set allows us to test for price discrimination in the profit contributions of ancillary tie ins such as service contracts credit life insurance and dealer residuals from financing the vehicle purchase in the ayres and siegelman study black auditors received initial offers or negotiated prices that were much higher than those for the paired white male auditors at the same dealerships 400 more for black females and 1 060 more for black males white female auditors received offers or negotiated prices that were 55 to 129 more than those for white males but the effect was not statistically significant ayres 1995 combined the paired audit data with additional unpaired data gathered in the same study and finds that final offers to white women were 216 higher than to white men and with a p value 0 06 approaching conventional significance levels under the audit technique no tester ever consummated a transaction so ayres and siegelman have no measure of vehicle profit from any sale goldberg 1996 argues that the offers obtained by the auditors do not reflect transaction prices in part because the protocol for the ayres and siegelman study called for auditors to adopt one of two bargaining strategies seller behavior should be different across classes of consumers if the classes have different demands e g different variances of reservations prices or different bargaining strategies goldberg maintains that since different classes of buyers may use different bargaining strategies the offers obtained by the auditors reveal information about seller behavior but not about transaction prices goldberg 1996 uses ces data from 1983 to 1987 to test for price discrimination by new vehicle dealers controlling for a number of variables she was unable to find reliable evidence that blacks or white females received smaller discounts on the manufacturer s suggested retail price msrp than white males the estimation results suggested that white females received discounts that were 130 smaller than those received by white males but the effect was statistically insignificant the gold department of economics virginia commonwealth university box 844000 richmond va 23284 we thank glenn mercer of mckinsey and company for providing us with access to the j d power and associates database