voter turnout and fiscal policy abstract in this paper we examine whether shocks in voting costs can impact elected representatives quality defined as the capacity to fund projects at the lowest cost using data on french municipalities and local variations in seasonal infections incidence as a shock on voting cost we estimate that higher incidence lowers voter turnout increases subsidies obtained by a municipality decreases harmful financial decisions and increases the municipality s investment in infrastructure we present a model where these predictions would hold in particular for municipalities with a high base level of turnout

two party competition with persistent policies abstract when campaigning for reelection incumbent parties promises to voters are constrained by their records in office while opposition parties can use their time away from power to develop new platforms in this paper i introduce incumbent policy persistence in a dynamic game of electoral competition between two policy motivated parties and characterise the long run outcomes of its markov perfect equilibria incumbents reduced policy flexibility leads to alternation in power and policy dynamics that converge to alternations at policies equally preferred by the median voter convergence of policies towards the median is a robust equilibrium outcome while convergence to the median is not while alternations far from the median are never limits of equilibrium dynamics alternations close to the median can be reached only if policy dynamics start exactly there i show that these results are robust to voters being forward looking and to limited policy commitment by parties

cycles in politics wavelet analysis of political time series spectral analysis and arma models have been the most common weapons of choice for the detection of cycles in political time series controversies about cycles however tend to revolve around an issue that both techniques are badly equipped to address the possibility of irregular cycles without fixed periodicity throughout the entire time series this has led to two main consequences on the one hand proponents of cyclical theories have often dismissed established statistical techniques on the other hand proponents of established techniques have dismissed the possibility of cycles without fixed periodicity wavelets allow the detection of transient and coexisting cycles and structural breaks in periodicity in this article we present the tools of wavelet analysis and apply them to the study of two lingering puzzles in the political science literature the existence of cycles in election returns in the united states and in the severity of major power wars

out of step out of office electoral accountability and house members voting does a typical house member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll call decisions we investigate the relationship between incumbents electoral performance and roll call support for their party controlling for district ideology challenger quality and campaign spending among other factors through a series of tests of the 1956 1996 elections the tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting first in each election an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party second this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants third a member s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party and this relationship holds for not only marginal but also safe members

political dynasties and the incumbency advantage in party centered environments a handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate centered electoral contexts we use candidate level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party centered closed list proportional representation setting of norway the results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party centered environment however in contrast to recent findings for the united states and the philippines we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties this finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties

discrimination competition and loan performance in fha mortgage lending this study tests for the presence of prejudicial or noneconomic discrimination on the part of mortgage lenders by evaluating the performance of home mortgage loans the approach differs from that of previous studies of loan performance in that it is based on the proposition that noneconomic discrimination should be more pronounced in less competitive lending environments while statistical discrimination should not using a rich set of fha insured loan records and measures of local market concentration to proxy the competitive environment we test for the prediction of better loan performance by minority borrowers relative to white borrowers in more concentrated markets we argue that this approach substantially reduces the potential for omitted variable bias that has cast a shadow on previous studies of lending discrimination results fail to reject the null hypothesis of no noneconomic discrimination

the looks of a winner beauty and electoral success abstract we study the role of beauty in politics using candidate photos that figured prominently in electoral campaigns our investigation is based on visual assessments of 1929 finnish political candidates from 10 011 respondents of which 3708 were finnish as finland has a proportional electoral system we are able to compare the electoral success of non incumbent candidates representing the same party an increase in our measure of beauty by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of 20 in the number of votes for the average non incumbent parliamentary candidate the relationship is unaffected by including education and occupation as control variables and withstands several other robustness checks

the glass ceiling in politics formalization and empirical tests there is a scarcity of women at the apex of political power as well as a lack of methods to disentangle the potential sources of this under representation this article suggests a four step method to test for whether women s under representation can be explained by the existence of a glass ceiling we emphasize that this concept implies discrimination in promotions within the political organization that the discriminatory promotions increase in severity at the top levels of power and that they increase in severity during an individual s career trajectory the proposed method is applied to subnational politics in sweden a long standing world leader in women s descriptive representation the results support the conjecture that a glass ceiling is hindering elected women s rise to political power in this context

incumbency advantages in the canadian parliament we apply a regression discontinuity approach to determine incumbency advantages in the canadian parliament finding that incumbents enjoy a 9 4 11 2 increased probability of winning over non incumbents owing to the presence of multiple parties an incumbency advantage in terms of vote share does not always translate to an increased probability of winning because incumbents do not necessarily obtain votes from their closest opponent also under the assumption that strategic exit is not an issue we are able to split the incumbency advantage into party incumbency and individual candidate incumbency components finding that the advantage is almost entirely due to the individual on utilise une approche par la methode de regression avec discontinuite pour determiner les avantages qu il y a aetre l elu en place dans les elections au parlement du canada on decouvre que les elus en place ont une probabilite de gagner de 9 4 a 11 2 de plus que leurs adversaires a cause de la presence de multiples partis politiques l avantage de l elu en place en termes de proportion du vote ne se traduit pas toujours par une probabilite accrue de gagner parce que les elus en place ne capturent pas necessairement les votes de leur plus proche adversaire de plus en presumant qu il ne s agit pas de sortie strategique on peut departager l avantage de l elu en place en composantes correspondant a l effet de parti et l effet de l individu on decouvre que l avantage est presque completement attribuable a l individu

simultaneous estimation of the supply and demand of differentiated audits evidence from the municipal audit market university of georgia we wish to thank linda bamber michael bamber and randal elder for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper we also acknowledge the constructive suggestions of an anonymous referee 1 studies that investigate the supply side determinants of audit fees include palmrose 1986 francis and stokes 1986 francis and simon 1987 and simon and francis 1988 studies that investigate the demand side determinants of auditor choice include eichenseher and shields 1986 francis and wilson 1988 palmrose 1984 rubin 1992 and simunic and stein 1987 some recent attempts to estimate supply and demand equations simultaneously include banker cooper and potter 1992 copley doucet and gaver 1994 and deis and giroux 1995 gaver and gaver 1995 provide an analytical framework for simultaneous estimation of the supply and demand for multiattribute audits

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the incumbency effects of signalling much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re election choosing actions to signal their types to voters we identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling because incumbents only care about clearing a re election hurdle signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re election this generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election we also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit

a statistical model for multiparty electoral data we propose an internally consistent and comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty district level aggregate election data this model can be used to explain or predict how the geographic distribution of electoral results depends upon economic conditions neighborhood ethnic compositions campaign spending and other features of the election campaign or characteristics of the aggregate areas we also provide several new graphical representations for help in data exploration model evaluation and substantive interpretation although the model applies more generally we use it to help resolve an important controversy over the size of and trend in the electoral advantage of incumbency in great britain contrary to previous analyses which are all based on measures now known to be biased we demonstrate that the incumbency advantage is small but politically meaningful we also find that it differs substantially across the parties about half a percent for the conservatives 1 for the labor party and 3 for the liberal party and its successors also contrary to previous research we show that these effects have not grown in recent years finally we are able to estimate from which party each party s incumbency advantage is predominantly drawn

political selection and persistence of bad governments we study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions with a special focus on institutional flexibility a government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society the competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities e g by determining the amount and quality of public goods and each individual derives additional utility from being part of the government e g rents from holding office we characterize the dynamic evolution of governments and determine the structure of stable governments which arise and persist in equilibrium in our model perfect democracy where current members of the government do not have veto power over changes in governments always leads to the emergence of the most competent government however any deviation from perfect democracy to any regime with incumbency veto power destroys this result there is always at least one other less competent government that is also stable and can persist forever and even the least competent government can persist forever in office we also show that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the degree of incumbency veto power and the quality of government in contrast in the presence of stochastic shocks or changes in the environment a regime with less incumbency veto power has greater flexibility and greater probability that high competence governments will come to power this result suggests that a particular advantage of democratic regimes with a limited number of veto players may be their greater adaptability to changes rather than their performance under given conditions finally we show that royalty like dictatorships may be more successful than junta like dictatorships because in these regimes veto players are less afraid of change

a natural experiment in proposal power and electoral success does lawmaker behavior influence electoral outcomes observational studies cannot elucidate the effect of legislative proposals on electoral outcomes since effects are confounded by unobserved differences in legislative and political skill we take advantage of a unique natural experiment in the canadian house of commons that allows us to estimate how proposing legislation affects election outcomes the right of noncabinet members to propose legislation is assigned by lottery comparing outcomes between those who were granted the right to propose and those who were not we show that incumbents of the governing party enjoy a 2 7 percentage point bonus in vote total in the election following their winning the right to introduce a single piece of legislation which translates to a 7 increase in the probability of winning the causal effect results from higher likeability among constituents these results demonstrate experimentally that what politicians do as lawmakers has a causal effect on electoral outcomes

the marginals never vanished incumbency and competition in elections to the u s house of representatives 1952 82 the average vote margin enjoyed by incumbent candidates for the u s house of representatives increased sharply during the 1 960s despite this and contrary to assumptions common in the literature on recent congressional elections electoral data show that house incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s the marginals properly defined have not vanished the swing ratio has diminished little if at all and competition for house seats held by incumbents has not declined vote margins increased without adding to incumbent security diminishing competition or dampening swings because the heterogeneity of interelection vote swings increased at the same time

electoral contributions and the cost of unpopularity when considering electoral campaigns candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding to offset this unpopularity effect politicians may either demand more money for campaign advertising from these industries in order to persuade less informed voters or shy away from unpopular contributors to avoid losing the support of the informed electorate our model predicts that the first effect dominates and electoral contributions are increasing in industry unpopularity by using u s house elections data and different identification strategies we provide robust evidence in favor of our predictions jel d72 p16

incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits abstract this paper presents a model which captures the three main arguments for and against campaign spending limits campaign spending limits are purported to restrict the incumbent s ability to exploit his fundraising advantage in contrast to conventional wisdom a ceiling increases the incumbent s probability of victory regardless of the candidates relative fundraising abilities as long as the challenger is not more effective in campaign spending if the challenger is more effective in campaign spending ceilings have a non monotonic effect when the incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage a moderate ceiling decreases the incumbent s probability of victory but further restricting the limit favors the incumbent irrespective of incumbency status the marginal benefit to quality decreases with a more restrictive cap in an open seat contest a more restrictive limit improves the electoral prospects of the superior quality candidate stricter ceilings may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected spending

constituency opinion and congressional policy making the reagan defense buildup representatives votes on a series of defense budget roll calls in the first year of the reagan administration s pentagon buildup are related to constituency opinions on defense spending during the 1980 election campaign the strong aggregate constituency demand for increased defense spending in 1980 is estimated to have added almost 17 billion about 10 to the total fiscal year 1982 pentagon appropriation the impact of constituency opinion was largely independent of specific political circumstances differential responsiveness in districts with partisan turnover intense districtlevel competition and strong presidential coattails together accounted for less than 1 billion in additional appropriations with the remaining 16 billion attributable to across the board responsiveness by even the most safely incumbent representatives t he appeal of representative democracy hinges on the responsiveness of elected politicians to the preferences and interests of their constituents given the theoretical and practical significance of the connection between constituents opinions and their representatives legislative activities it is remarkable that the large and in some ways quite sophisticated empirical literature addressing this connection includes so few direct estimates of the relationship between constituency opinion and specific legislative outcomes 1 my aim here is to provide one such estimate the policy issue i have chosen to examine is the level of total pentagon spending in the first fy 1982 defense appropriations bill of the reagan administration that bill the first in a series of annual appropriations resulting in a 40 real increase in defense spending during reagan s first five years in office is of obvious political significance but the issue of defense spending is also especially interesting from a broader theoretical perspective because the strong public demand for a defense spending increase at the beginning of the reagan era provides unusual analytical leverage for assessing the potential impact of public opinion on the making of public policy i shall describe some alternative mechanisms of congressional responsiveness to constituency opinion briefly characterize the politics of defense at the beginning of the reagan era present my analysis of representatives preferences regarding fy 1982 defense appropriations relating those preferences to constituency opinions on the defense spending issue and to other political characteristics of the representatives and their districts extend the analysis of fy 1982 defense appropriations from the individual to the aggregate level in an attempt to estimate the impact of congressional responsiveness on the total level of pentagon appropriations and finally touch upon some of the implications of my analysis for the study of linkages between public opinion and public policy

leviathan in the crosshairs following in the spirit of the leviathan hypothesis this paper empirically examines how the degree of local government market power influences efficiency in the local public sector market power is measured by the number and relative size distribution of similar government units in the same market area to avoid confusing market power with the comparative efficiency or superiority of larger sized organizations the relative size distribution of the individual government unit is held constant in the empirical analysis in the empirical test aggregate property values serve as the measure of efficiency the empirical results suggest that aggregate property values are lower and thus efficiency suffers in more concentrated municipal market areas ceteris paribus thus providing some evidence for leviathan type governments in connecticut

changes in the vote margins for congressional candidates a specification of historical trends recent research on house elections has focused on the decline in congressional competition since the mid 1960s however this body of research suffers from three major problems 1 an imprecise specification of the nature of change in the degree of congressional competition 2 its exclusive reliance on a limited time frame which calls into question the generalizability and adequacy of its explanations and 3 its overemphasis on incumbency oriented explanations using a multiple interrupted time series mits analysis of trends in aggregate electoral data from 1824 to 1980 we find that current low levels of congressional competition are not historically unique but instead constitute a continuation of a long term trend established in the mid 1890s in addition and in contrast to the general thrust described in the literature there appears to be a post 1965 trend toward greater competition although the absolute level of competition is lower after the mid 1960s finally a disaggregation of electoral results by incumbency status suggests a growth in the incumbency advantage since the mid 1890s but that lower post 1965 levels of congressional competition are the result of a winners and not an incumbency advantage such findings cast doubt on the adequacy of explanations that focus on post 1965 incumbency oriented factors

looking beyond reelection revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior this paper challenges the assumption inherent in most models of legislative behavior namely that congressmen are driven by the desire for reelection i offer an alternative perspective incumbents seek to maximize their discretionary investments and the income generated by the job the only constraint on this behavior is that legislators provide a satisfactory level of constituency service a product that i suggest entails slight opportunity and few manufacturing costs for congressmen and one that is unlikely to lose its value with increased production i also demonstrate that increases in salary and discretionary investments have lengthened congressional careers

simultaneity bias in mortgage lending a test of simultaneous equations models on bank specific data abstract this study uses simultaneous equations models and single equation models to test for simultaneity bias in mortgage refinance data compiled by a regional bank the purpose of the study is to assess the claim that single equation models of the lending decision produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates of endogenous mortgage terms bank specific data are analyzed to avoid bias resulting from uncontrolled policy training or underwriting differences across banks importantly the data contain all variables the regional bank identified as important factors in explaining its loan disposition results after controlling for applicants debt income credit history and requested loan term i find that the race coefficient in single equation models is biased upward while the loan to value ratio coefficient is biased downward although both biases are insignificant overall the results suggest that simultaneous equations models are preferable to single equation models in tests for discrimination and can be used to determine the extent of race coefficient and loan to value ratio coefficient bias in single equation models

incumbent challenger and open seat elections in a spatial model of political competition in groseclose am j political sci 45 862 886 2001 candidates with asymmetric valence scores and varying degrees of policy motivation simultaneously choose divergent policies i take a version of the groseclose model with policy motivated candidates and extend it to allow for sequential policy announcements this may be a suitable approach for incumbent challenger elections because the incumbent s policy is typically known before the challenger s i show that policy divergence is greater when candidates announce policies sequentially as opposed to simultaneously i also show that policy motivated incumbents benefit from a first mover advantage

mortgage lending in boston interpreting hmda data the home mortgage disclosure act was enacted to monitor minority and low income access to the mortgage market the data collected for this purpose show that minorities are more than twice as likely to be denied a mortgage as whites yet variables correlated with both race and creditworthiness were omitted from these data making any conclusion about race s role in mortgage lending impossible the federal reserve bank of boston collected additional variables important to the mortgage lending decision and found that race continued to play an important though significantly diminished role in the decision to grant a mortgage copyright 1996 by american economic association

endogenous leverage and asset pricing in double auctions abstract we propose a double auction mechanism for the exchange of leveraged assets and bonds in an agent based model in this framework we validate recent results in general equilibrium theory about endogenous leverage and its consequences for asset pricing we find that the institutional details of exchange are critical for a good match between the theoretical equilibrium state and the final state of the double auction specifically the outcome of the double auction is sensitive to the details of how markets for debt and collateral are coordinated and how collateral is cleared when trade is restricted to neighbours in a network final prices and allocations are significantly different from unrestricted equilibrium

win lose or withdraw a categorical analysis of career patterns in the house of representatives 1948 1978 the literature on incumbency advantage has focused on margin as an indicator for electoral security but while electoral margin is a goodex ante measure it is a poorex post measure of security further existing work has not integrated the choice of retirement with changes in the level of security to improve the specification and definition of marginality a multinomial logit model is proposed where the dependent variable is categorical account is therefore taken of all the ways a representative s term in office can end including reelection defeat retirement or pursuit of other office the sample includes all u s representatives elected for the first time between 1948 and 1978 the results indicate that 1 margin in the previous election is a significantex ante proxy for the probability of electoral defeat and 2 while the electoral safety of all incumbents in the house has been increased the increases are greater for members elected for the first time in the period since 1965

designing monetary policy committees we integrate monetary policy making by committee into a new keynesian model to assess the consequences of the committee s institutional characteristics for inflation output and welfare our analysis delivers the following results first we demonstrate that transparency about the committee s future composition is typically harmful second we show that short terms for central bankers lead to effective inflation stabilization at the expense of comparably high output variability third larger committees generally allow for more efficient stabilization of inflation but possibly for less efficient output stabilization fourth large committees and short terms are therefore socially desirable if the weight on output stabilization in the social loss function is low fifth we show that a central banker with random preferences may be preferable to a central banker who shares the preferences of society

preferential resource spending under an employment guarantee the political economy of mgnregs in andhra pradesh are ostensibly demand driven public works programs with high levels of safeguards nonetheless susceptible to political influence this conjecture is investigated using expenditure data at the local level from india s national rural employment guarantee scheme focusing on one state where accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts have been widely applauded there is no evidence of partisan influenced spending before the 2009 election however a statistically significant but small in magnitude effect after the 2009 election most variation in public works expenditures is explained by the observed needs of potential beneficiaries as the scheme intended

a simple theory of advertising as a good or bad our analysis treats advertisements and the goods advertised as complements in stable metautility functions and generates new results for advertising by building on and extending the general analysis of complements by assimilating the theory of advertising into the theory of complements we avoid the special approaches to advertising found in many studies that place obstacles in the way of understanding the effects of advertising we also use this approach to evaluate advertising from a welfare perspective whether there is excessive or too little advertising depends on several variables the effects on consumer utility the degree of competition in the market for advertised goods the induced changes in prices and outputs of advertised goods and whether advertising is sold to consumers

the quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources we propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians we extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections this gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions namely in countries with weak institutions it also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed this finding is corroborated in cross section regressions

do several winning coalitions exist in a state for senators of the same party evidence from an event study we argue that u s senators from the same state and in the same party form different winning coalitions we also develop a theory that stipulates that parties encourage these senators to form very distinct constituency coalitions parties use committee assignments as a carrot to give these senators an incentive to represent different groups in our empirical analysis we find that there are fewer overlapping committee assignments among senators in the same state when they are from the same party we also consider the case of john heinz and arlen specter both pennsylvania republicans when john heinz died in a plane crash political action committees pacs that bought influence from specter but not heinz now had the possibility that the new senator replacing heinz would include them in his resource constituency the resulting competition by the new pennsylvania senator and specter for campaign resources would lower the price these firms had to pay for representation thus improving their expected future earnings

barriers to competition and the effect on political shirking 1953 1992 economists and political scientists have offered a variety of explanations for why legislators might rationally choose to ignore the preferences of their constituents political parties and presidents the broad conclusion of this literature is that there is an element of shirking in congressional voting the objective of this paper is to suggest that the effects of shirking in congressional voting may have increased over time largely in response to the raising of barriers to competition in congressional elections thereby enabling legislators to vote their own preferences without fear of losing reelection we use a quasi experimental design that controls for the effects of party region electoral safety presidential control of the white house and constituency factors in isolating the causal effects of barriers to entry on a continuous series of roll calls regarding the raising of the debt limit between 1953 and 1992 we find that shirking in legislative voting on debt limit legislation is a post 1970s phenomenon

old voters new voters and the personal vote using redistricting to estimate the incumbency advantage we provide new estimates of the size of the personal vote in u s house elections from 1872 to 1990 we take advantage of the natural experiment that attends decennial redistricting every ten years most incumbents are given new districts that contain a combination of old and new territory by contrasting an incombent s vote in the new part of the district with his or her vote in the old part of the district we can estimate the magnitude of the personal vote the vote that the incumbent receives because he or she represented the voters in the past our estimates confirm prior work that shows that a large fraction of the incumbency advantage owes to the personal vote as opposed to challenger quality unlike past research we are able to estimate the relationship between district partisanship and the personal vote we find a significant interaction which shows that incumbents develop larger personal votes in areas where they are electorally most vulnerable here is no doubt that incumbents today have a substantial advantage over nonincumbents in u s house elections the overall size of this advantage has been fairly well established as has the fact that incumbents electoral strength has increased dramatically over the postwar period measured in terms of vote share the overall incumbency advantage grew from a modest 1 3 percentage point edge in the 1940s and early 1950s to a 7 10 percentage point edge in the 1980s and early 1990s 1 there is much less agreement about the sources of the incumbency advantage and the causes of its growth congressional scholars have identified a variety of factors that may be responsible which can be grouped into three broad categories the first and the focus of this paper is electoral advantage that stems from a legislator s homestyle members of the house are reputedly very responsive to their constituents in turn their constituents reward them with their votes mayhew 1974b fenno 1974 and others detail the sorts of activities that legislators do to build a widely known and respected name including casework frequent visits to the district position taking on issues and securing federal benefits a second source of the incumbency advantage is candidate quality incumbents may win because they are the best candidates running and they do noticeably worse when they face state legislators and other experienced challengers finally incumbency may simply act as a voting cue a label which voters rely on because party has become less relevant assessing the importance of these different factors has significant implications for our normative evaluations of the modern congress and our understanding

the determinants of campaign spending the role of the government jackpot a slave has but one master the ambitious man has as many masters as there are persons whose aid may contribute to the advancement of his fortune jean de labruyere des ouvrages de l esprit i introduction this paper builds a model of elections in which contributors give money to candidates in return for promises of government favors each candidate spends to increase his chances of victory the candidate s probability of winning and the value of government resources that would be his to distribute if he won the jackpot determine the amount he can raise the model suggests a way to measure the influence of the jackpot on spending while controlling for other effects such as the probability of winning the search for this result is interesting because we wish to know what influences the resources devoted to courting politicians is the growth of government truly to blame why if government is for sale do contributors give so little relative to the size of government to control so much and why as abrams and settle 1978 found does campaign spending sometimes not grow even though government grows do official limits on public debt reduce the politician s discretionary control over government resources and hinder his ability to sell favors how does ideology interfere with the candidate s demand for contributions empirical models of contributions that can serve as a guide have been of two sorts abrams 1981 following the work of crain and tollison 1977 crain deaton and tollison 1977 and gifford and santoni 1978 regressed campaign spending on several proxies for the jackpot and found a positive effect a more popular approach to explaining campaign outlays pioneered by jacobson 1978 has been to regress spending or contributions on the candidate s probability of victory and to ignore the role of the jackpot the implicit assumption in such models is that the candidate s net worth to contributors determines spending the candidate cares only about winning and raises as much as he can the greater his chances of winning the more he can raise and the more he will spend i call this the supply side view because spending depends only on the supply of contributions this approach goes some way to explaining contributions but neglects the role of the jackpot and cannot explain why some strong candidates who are sought after by contributors accept little or nothing such as former senator william proxmire of wisconsin the present study takes something from both approaches but argues that candidates may not wish to spend all they can raise because contributions do not come free of charge as baron 1989 pointed out the candidate s demand albeit bounded by potential supply determines contributions candidates probably run for election to control government wealth and must ponder how much of the jackpot to auction for contributions the candidate s demand for contributions can be derived from a utility function that rises with his probability of victory but diminishes with the contributions he accepts how much a candidate demands depends on the size of the bernoulli variance of the outcome which i call closeness and the size of the jackpot the greater the closeness and the larger the jackpot the greater the candidate s demand a close race is defined here not by the number of rivals or the margin of victory but as one in which the outcome is very uncertain the typical candidate does not spend all he is able to raise but the effect of closeness fades if the candidate wishes to win greatly the model describes the simultaneous relationship between spending and closeness and imposes identifying restrictions i carry out tests on samples drawn from the 1978 and 1986 contests for u s state governorships and find that jackpots affect election spending but that closeness is less important in addition i find that in states where the legislature is constitutionally required to balance the budget governors sell less of the jackpot

incumbency effects in political campaigns in this paper we examine two effects of incumbency first an incumbent may have an advantage in creating a favorable image in the eyes of the voters second the incumbent may have to chose a position before the challenger this second aspect of incumbency is modelled as stackelberg leadership in the model two candidates run for election by choosing a position in an ideological spectrum voters care about candidates chosen positions as well as non policy attributes of candidates which we call charisma charismata are not known when candidates choose policy positions they are only revealed on election day so that winning is not usually a certain prospect candidates care about the probability of winning but they also dislike compromising their own ideals

declining electoral competitiveness in the house of representatives the differential impact of improved transportation technology this paper advances the hypothesis that improvements in the national transportation and communication infrastructure are responsible for the vanishing marginals or the increased electoral security of u s representatives we assume that margin and security are directly affected by the amount of time a legislator or a member of her staff devotes to direct contact with constituents in the home district formally we demonstrate that a decline in the time opportunity cost associated with travel to the district improves victory margins where we proxy improvement in transportation technology by using a distance variable across three different historical samples 1890 1928 and 1970 this proposition offers a potentially more fundamental explanation of declining electoral competition than existing explanations focusing on professionalism careerism redistricting and bureaucratic casework in fact the technology communication hypothesis may well encompass such explanations the model specified here offers at best a crude test of the hypothesis that technology and communication are the cause of the vanishing marginals a superior test would include the actual time required to travel to each district in each sample year because a closer but more inaccessible location would be less electorally favorable according to the logic underlying our model while distance is therefore an imperfect proxy we are encouraged by the results of the preliminary test the next step for future research is to identify which technological innovations have had the greatest impact in order to accomplish this a more complete model of the link between legislators and constituents must be established

climbing the ranks incumbency effects in party list systems abstract incumbents tend to have a solid electoral advantage in candidate centered electoral settings do similar incumbency effects exist in more party centered environments we estimate incumbency effects in an open list proportional representation system exploiting that seats are first allocated across parties and then to candidates within party lists using data from norwegian local elections 2003 2015 we document that a candidate that barely wins a seat in the local council has about a 9 percentage points 43 higher probability of being elected in the next election compared to a candidate that just misses out on a seat on the same party list we find no evidence that voters contribute to this personal incumbency advantage rather it seems as if party elites are instrumental in securing the electoral success of their party affiliates we show that incumbents and non incumbents run again in the subsequent election at about equal rates but that incumbents tend to advance in the party hierarchy and obtain safer ballot positions in future elections which is what ultimately leads to electoral success

why did the incumbency advantage in u s house elections grow theory a simple rational entry argument suggests that the value of incumbency consists not just of a direct effect reflecting the value of resources such as staff attached to legislative office but also of an indirect effect reflecting the fact that stronger challengers are less likely to contest incumbent held seats the indirect effect is the product of a scare off effect the ability of incumbents to scare off high quality challengers and a quality effect reflecting how much electoral advantage a party accrues when it has an experienced rather than an inexperienced candidate hypothesis the growth of the overall incumbency advantage was driven principally by increases in the quality effect methods we use a simple two equation model estimated by ordinary least squares regression to analyze u s house election data from 1948 to 1990 results most of the increase in the incumbency advantage at least down to 1980 came through increases in the quality effect i e the advantage to the incumbent party of having a low quality challenger this suggests that the task for those wishing to explain the growth in the vote denominated incumbency advantage is to explain why the quality effect grew it also suggests that resource based explanations of the growth in the incumbency advantage cannot provide a full explanation

political influence in the distribution of agricultural disaster payments this paper examines the impact of committee membership and electoral votes on the distribution of ad hoc agricultural disaster payments across u s counties our results show that both house oversi

challenger entry and voter learning we develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters given incumbent failure in office challenger entry is more likely but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed at the same time challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter s positive assessment of incumbent qualifications how a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running depending on the electoral environment the model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting the incumbency advantage and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare while pointing to new interpretations of and future avenues for empirical research on elections

divided government versus incumbency externality effect quasi experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions abstract this paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections we ask 1 does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter s decision in subsequent town council elections 2 do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election the analysis mainprod type flply relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for germany we find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election moreover voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections throughout the paper we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government

campaign spending limits incumbent spending and election outcomes abstract we study the impact of campaign spending limits for candidates in canadian federal elections we first demonstrate that spending limits are binding mostly for incumbent candidates we then use this information to produce endogeneity corrected estimates for the impact of incumbent spending on electoral vote shares furthermore we examine the impact of spending limits on broader measures of electoral outcomes finding that larger limits lead to less close elections fewer candidates and lower voter turnout

mortgage lending to minorities where s the bias this paper examines mortgage lending and concludes that studies based on data created by the boston fed should be reevaluated a detailed examination of these data indicates that irregularities in these data when combined with the most commonly used research methodology appear to have biased previous research toward a finding of discrimination against minority applicants when the most severe data irregularities are eliminated evidence to support a hypothesis of discrimination disappears the currently fashionable flexible underwriting standards of mortgage lenders may have the unintended consequences of increasing defaults for the beneficiaries of these policies

the campaign value of incumbency a new solution to the puzzle of less effective incumbent spending a puzzle in research on campaign spending is that while expenditure is positively related to votes won this effect is far more strongly or even exclusively enjoyed by challengers rather than by incumbents we unearth a new explanation for the puzzle focusing on the hidden yet variable campaign value of office perquisites which incumbents deploy in their campaigns to win votes when these variable office benefits are unobserved then the effect is to make observed incumbent spending less effective than spending by challengers using data from the 2002 irish general election where incumbency was assigned a variable campaign value and included in declared campaign spending we are able to demonstrate this hidden incumbency effect and estimate its relationship to electoral success in terms of overall votes share of votes and probability of winning a seat contrary to previous research showing ineffective incumbent spending we find that when the campaign value of office is also measured public office value spending is not only very effective in winning votes but also seems to be more effective than regular incumbent spending

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

voter uncertainty and failure of duverger s law an empirical analysis real world simple plurality elections rarely bear out the strong duvergerian prediction that in equilibrium only two competitors receive votes recent advances in strategic voting theory demonstrate that voter uncertainty about competitors true support levels in the constituency may lead to limited strategic voting and hence incomplete desertion of trailing parties this is the first attempt to estimate empirically the impact of uncertainty on incentives to vote strategically calibrating a model of strategic voting to voting results from simple plurality elections in german constituencies it is found that strategic voters operate under high levels of uncertainty these results support the proposition that uncertainty about party support impedes formation of duvergerian equilibria

optimal gerrymandering sometimes pack but never crack standard intuitions for optimal gerrymandering involve concentrating one s extreme opponents in unwinnable districts packing and spreading one s supporters evenly over winnable districts cracking these intuitions come from models with either no uncertainty about voter preferences or only two voter types in contrast we characterize the solution to a problem in which a gerrymanderer observes a noisy signal of voter preferences from a continu ous distribution and creates n districts of equal size to maximize the expected number of districts she wins under mild regularity conditions we show that cracking is never optimal one s most ardent supporters should be grouped together moreover for sufficiently precise signals the optimal solution involves creating a district that matches extreme republicans with extreme democrats and then continuing to match toward the center of the signal distribution jel d72

politician preferences law abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions the effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a policy preference in contrast to the previous literature without politician policy preferences more restrictive binding caps always reduce expected aggregate contributions however the initial imposition of a cap increases contributions if the politician mildly favors the low valuation lobbyist s policy the introduction of policy preferences permits analysis of monied interests policy influence a more restrictive cap makes it more likely that the politician enacts the policy he would have enacted in the absence of lobbying even in cases where expected aggregate contributions increase

the disadvantaged incumbents estimating incumbency effects in indian state legislatures this paper estimates the incumbency effects using a large dataset on state legislative elections in india during 1975 2003 i use a regression discontinuity design rdd that estimates the causal effect of incumbency by comparing candidates in closely fought elections i find that there is a significant disadvantage to incumbency in indian state legislative elections and the adverse effect of incumbency has increased after 1991 also the incumbency disadvantage is higher in states that have lower availability of public goods such as health centers and lower employment poverty and per capita income

candidate uncertainty mental models and complexity some experimental results since the work of downs 1957 spatial models of elections have been a mainstay of research in political science and public choice despite the plethora of theoretical and empirical research involving spatial models researchers have not considered in great detail the complexity of the decision task that a candidate confronts two facets of a candidate s decision process are investigated here using a set of laboratory experiments where subjects face a fixed incumbent in a two dimensional policy space first we analyze the effect that the complexity of the electoral landscape has on the ability of the subject to defeat the incumbent second we analyze the impact that a subject s mental model which we infer from a pre experiment questionnaire has on her performance the experimental results suggest that the complexity of a candidate s decision task and her perception of the task may be important factors in electoral competition

informative and persuasive campaigning in this paper we use a simple downsian spatial model to analyze the properties of campaign contributions we first consider campaign contributions that are intended to inform voters of candidate positions we show that it is difficult to construct arguments in a downsian spatial model for why some voters would choose to contribute to a candidateand the candidate would want to spend the money contributed to inform voters of his position we then define persuasive campaign expenditures as those that are intended to convince an individual to vote for a candidate regardless of the candidate s position on issues in the presence of persuasive campaign expenditures some voters have an incentive to contribute to one or both candidates and the candidates have an incentive to spend the money we show why the nature of persuasive campaign expenditures may explain both their growth in recent years and the increasing advantage of incumbency

term limitation in a dynamic model of partisan balance in november 1992 voters in fourteen states considered ballot propositions to adopt term limits for members of congress all fourteen propositions passed ten received more than 60 support bringing the total number of states with congressional term limits to fifteen much of the discussion of term limitation has focused on issues of representation the strength of parties and the functioning of congress after the adoption of limits benjamin and malbin 1992 will 1992 this paper explores an important but less discussed consequence of term limitation its impact on the partisan balance of legislatures we inquire how electoral dynamics incumbent advantage and voluntary retirement interact with a term limit to produce a new balance between parties in a two party legislature which party is favored by the introduction of term limits how does the length of the term limit matter are there conditions such that one party will be favored by any limit regardless of how restrictive

election results and opportunistic policies a new test of the rational political business cycle model the literature on the rational pbc suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre election distortions in fiscal policy we propose a new test that explores the two way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory the test is implemented using a large panel of portuguese municipalities the results show that opportunism leads to a larger win margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win margin is small these results are consistent with the theoretical model

a reform dilemma in polarized democracies abstract we study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies we develop a simple election model where i reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change and ii politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently we identify a so called reform dilemma which manifests itself in two variants from a static perspective low reform ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step this property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment from a dynamic perspective incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re elected regardless of their reform ability

candidate quality the personal vote and the incumbency advantage in congress most political observers agree that incumbent legislators have a considerable advantage over nonincumbents in modern congressional elections yet there is still disagreement over the exact source of this advantage and the explanation for its growth over time to address this debate we utilize a unique set of historical elections data to test for the presence of an incumbency advantage in late nineteenth century house elections 1872 1900 we find a modest direct effect of incumbency and a substantial candidate quality effect moreover the cartel like control of ballot access by nineteenth century political parties created competition in races that the modern market like system simply does not sustain our results suggest that candidate quality is a fundamental piece of the puzzle in understanding the historical development of the incumbency advantage in american politics

allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders market as a partial substitute for individual rationality we report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by zero intelligence programs that submit random bids and offers imposing a budget constraint i e not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure independent of traders motivation intelligence or learning adam smith s invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality

the impact of campaign spending on votes in multiparty elections abstract the impact of candidate campaign spending on votes and abstention in multiparty elections is estimated from the specification of a structural model of voter behavior this model accounts for the endogeneity of campaign spending as well as the heterogeneity in voter preferences empirical results are estimated from aggregate actual election data the results demonstrate the importance of spending during the campaign period and voter heterogeneity with respect to these expenditures the own and cross expenditure vote share elasticity estimates reveal that political campaign spending not only redistributes voters across parties but also decreases the size of the abstaining group of the electorate

party cues in elections under multilevel governance theory and evidence from us states this is the authors accepted refereed and final manuscript to the article the final publication is available at www elsevier com

incumbency electoral safety and turnover in the house of representatives 1952 76 two hypotheses have received a great deal of attention from students of congressional elections first many analysts have concluded that an increase in the electoral value attached to incumbency accounts for the rise in incumbents victory margins observed since the mid sixties second many scholars have attributed the decline in electoral turnover to the percentage increase in victory margins analyzing the electoral histories of 13 house cohorts 1952 76 this study reexamines these two hypotheses within theframework of a quasi experimental design the results presented here in contrast to those of previous studies cast doubt on the increased incumbency effect moreover little relationship is found between an increase in electoral safety as reflected by increased victory margins and a decline in electoral turnover

systematically dependent competing risks and strategic retirement in many applications of survival analysis the risk of an event occurring for one reason is dependent on the risk of the same event occurring for another reason for example when politicians suspect they might lose an election they may strategically choose to retire in such situations the often used multinomial logit model suffers from bias and underestimates the degree of strategic retirement for example to what extent poor prior electoral performance diminishes electoral prospects to address this problem the present article proposes a systematically dependent competing risks sdcr model of survival analysis unlike the frailty model the sdcr model can also deal with more than two risks monte carlo simulation demonstrates how much the sdcr model reduces bias reanalysis of data on u s congressional careers box steffensmeier and jones 2004 documents the strategic retirement of representatives indicating that electoral pressure is more effective at turning out incumbents than previously recognized

dynamic responsiveness in the u s senate id evelop a theory of dynamic responsiveness that suggests that parties that win elections choose candidates who are more extreme and parties that lose elections choose candidates who are more moderate moreover the size of past victories matters close elections yield little change but landslides yield large rc hanges in the candidates offered by both parties i test this theory by analyzing the relationship between republican vote share in u s senate elections and the ideology of candidates offered in the subsequent election the results show that republican democratic victories in past elections yield candidates wh oa re more less conservative in subsequent elections and the effect is proportional to the margin of victory this suggests that parties or candidates pay attention to past election returns one major implication is that parties may remain polarized in spite of their responsiveness to the median voter

legislative turnover fiscal policy and economic growth evidence from u s state legislatures an examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the fifty u s states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it makes legislators short sighted turnover increases the size of government by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes in income in particular turnover increases capital expenditure and income taxes both of which may cause long run distortions in the economy further increased turnover by resulting in inefficient fiscal policy reduces long term economic growth

the price of pork the seniority trap in the u s house abstract using data on federal outlays and u s house elections i estimate the effect of the pork barrel on the quality of officeholders taking into account the fact that seniority creates a dynamic linkage across periods after estimating the parameters governing the influence of seniority on federal outlays and the parameters governing the distributions of candidate quality i conduct several policy experiments to uncover the size of the welfare loss created by the seniority system i find that the seniority system negatively impacts the quality of representatives but has little effect on the outcomes of elections furthermore the most commonly proposed solution to the distortion term limits may have a significant negative effect on the quality of sitting representatives instead of a quantity constraint term limits i propose a change in the relative price of seniority by way of a pigouvian tax on seniority such a policy achieves the first best outcome

stationary equilibria in asset pricing models with incomplete markets and collateral we consider an infinite horizon exchange economy with incomplete markets and collateral constraints as in the two period model of geanakoplos and zame 2002 households can default on their liabilities at any time and financial securities are only traded if the promises associated with these securities are backed by collateral we examine an economy with a single perishable consumption good where the only collateral available consists of productive assets in this model competitive equilibria always exist and we show that under the assumption that all exogenous variables follow a markov chain there also exist stationary equilibria these equilibria can be characterized by a mapping from the exogenous shock and the current distribution of financial wealth to prices and portfolio choices we develop an algorithm to approximate this mapping numerically and discuss ways to implement the algorithm in practice a computational example demonstrates the performance of the algorithm and shows some quantitative features of equilibria in a model with collateral and default

estimating incumbency advantage without bias in this paper we prove theoretically and demonstrate empirically that all existing measures of incumbency advantage in the congressional elections literature are biased or inconsistent we then provide an unbiased estimator based on a very simple linear regression model we apply this new method to congressional elections since 1900 providing the first evidence of a positive incumbency advantage in the first half of the century incumbency advantage is the most frequently studied factor in the last 15 years of congressional elections research discovery of the increase in incum bency advantage has sparked controversy over its origins historical pattern cur rent magnitude and electoral democratic and policy consequences even the most basic descriptive information about incumbency advantage is flawed be cause every previous measure based on aggregate data in this literature is plagued by selection bias inconsistencies and inefficiencies we prove this result and also propose a new unbiased and statistically efficient measure that is very easy to calculate congressional elections from 1900 to the present fit our theoretical model our empirical reanalyses do not challenge the existing scholarly consen sus that incumbency advantage is much larger than it once was however we do challenge the prevailing belief that incumbency advantage was nonexistent and the evidence that it was negative in house elections during the first half of this century alford and brady 1988 we show instead that the average advantage of incumbency in these elections was about two percentage points in section 1 of this paper we define incumbency advantage and section 2 gives an intuitive sense of the problems identifying it even in ideal electoral sys tems section 3 formally proves that sophomore surge and retirement slump are biased estimates of incumbency advantage and section 4 briefly reveals the flaws

field experiments testing the impact of radio advertisements on electoral competition results from previous studies of campaign spending imply that equal sized grants to both incumbents and challengers are a net benefit to challengers who on average spend less money and derive greater marginal returns from each additional dollar this study provides an experimental test of this proposition cities holding mayoral elections in november 2005 and 2006 were randomly assigned to broadcast nonpartisan radio ads that stated the names of the mayoral candidates reminded listeners about the date of the upcoming election and encouraged them to vote consistent with the findings of previous studies on the differential effects of incumbent and challenger campaign spending on election outcomes we find that these radio ads produced substantially more competitive elections the borderline statistical significance of our results however invites replication of this experiment

bubbles and crashes gradient dynamics in financial markets abstract fund managers respond to the payoff gradient by continuously adjusting leverage in our analytic and simulation models the base model has a stable equilibrium with classic properties however bubbles and crashes occur in extended models incorporating an endogenous market risk premium based on investors historical losses and constant gain learning when losses have been small for a long time asset prices inflate as fund managers increase leverage then slight losses can trigger a crash as a widening risk premium accelerates deleveraging and asset price declines

quality counts extending the strategic politician model of incumbent deterrence competitive elections are essential to representative democracy competition in u s house elections is low in part because incumbents have strategic advantages that deter strong potential candidates from running many observers conclude that incumbents retain their seats without full accountability to the electorate but the mechanisms of deterrence have never been fully explored from the perspective of strong potential candidates based on a survey of potential house candidates designed to capture perceptions of incumbents personal quality and reelection prospects we find strong evidence for the strategic politicians thesis black 1972 jacobson and kernell 1983 we extend the logic of the strategic model first by showing that incumbents reelection prospects are affected by their personal quality and second by demonstrating that incumbents personal qualities deter strong challengers from running independent of their electoral prospects our findings prompt us to suggest revisions to our understanding of competition and representation in contemporary house elections

using multimember district elections to estimate the sources of the incumbency advantage in this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats within the same district this allows us to identify both the direct office holder benefits and the incumbent quality advantage over nonincumbent candidates from the same party we find that the overall incumbency advantage is of similar magnitude as that found in previous studies we attribute approximately half of this advantage to incumbents quality advantage over open seat candidates and the remainder to direct office holder benefits however we also find some evidence that direct office holder benefits are larger in competitive districts than in safe districts and in states with relatively large legislative budgets per capita