seller reputation from word of mouth to centralized feedback abstract reputation is one of the most important incentives for trade and cooperation using the complete selling history of 125 135 sellers on eachnet com an ebay equivalent in china we show that sellers with a longer successful selling record enjoyed more repeat business reached more buyer regions sold in more product categories and had a higher completion rate even before eachnet introduced a centralized feedback system since the centralized feedback system the difference between reputable and non reputable sellers has decreased in terms of repeat business but enlarged in terms of market expansion these findings suggest that while reputation can facilitate trade through buyer experience and word of mouth it is not as effective as centralized feedback our study also shows that although completion rate and transaction price are the two outcomes most often examined in the literature seller reputation is important for buyer clientele market reach business scope and market survival

reputation and impermanent types i consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm s type evolves according to a markov process with two states a tough type who always fights entry and a weak type who prefers to accommodate there exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough above that level as the number of markets t increases in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence when t is infinite then regardless of the discount factor there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the incumbent s payoff is bounded below her stackelberg payoff both results are in contrast to the outcome when the incumbent s type is fixed one interpretation is that reputation is not permanent but must be renewed occasionally

demand information and competition why do food prices fall at seasonal demand peaks prices for seasonal food products fall at demand peaks price declines are not driven by falling agricultural input prices indeed farm to retail margins narrow sharply i use electronic scanner data from a sample of us supermarkets to show that seasonal price declines are closely linked to market concentration and are much larger in markets with several rivals than where a single brand dominates seasonal demand increases reduce the effective costs of informative advertising and increased informative advertising by retailers and manufacturers in turn may allow for increased market information and greater price sensitivity on the part of buyers

deliberative monetary valuation in search of a democratic and value plural approach to environmental policy the use of deliberative methods to assess environmental values in monetary terms has been motivated by the potential for small group discussion to help with preference formation and the inclusion of non economic values in this review two broad approaches are identified preference economisation and preference moralisation the former is analytical concentrates upon issues of poor respondent cognition and produces a narrow conception of value linked to utilitarianism the latter emphasises political legitimacy appeals to community values and tends to privilege arguments made in the public interest both approaches are shown to embrace forms of value convergence which undermine the prospects for value pluralism as a result exclusion and predefinition of values dominates current practice in order to maintain democratic credentials the importance attributed to monetary value needs to be left as an open question to be addressed as part of a process determining an agreement to pay to this end we identify a discourse based approach as a third way consistent with the democratic and value plural potential of deliberative monetary valuation

cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection abstract we study cooperation dynamics in repeated games with markovian private information after any history signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions but also makes the problem of coordinating current actions harder in equilibrium players may play aggressive or uncooperative actions that signal private information and partners tolerate a certain number of such actions we discuss several applications of our results we explain the cycles of cooperation and conflict observed in trench warfare during world war i show that price leadership and unilateral price cuts can be part of an optimal signaling equilibrium in a repeated bertrand game with incomplete information and show that communication between cartel members may be socially efficient in a repeated cournot game finally we show that the welfare losses disappear as the persistence of the process of types increases and the interest rate goes to zero

deliberative monetary valuation dmv issues in combining economic and political processes to value environmental change abstract this paper explores and contrasts the different social processes of valuation now appearing as economic means of valuing the environment monetary valuation via stated preference approaches has been criticised for assuming well formed and informed preferences and excluding a range of sustainability concerns such as rights fairness and equity deliberative monetary valuation dmv in small groups is a novel hybrid of economic and political approaches which raises the prospect of a transformative and moralising experience critics of standard contingent valuation approaches have advocated this as offering a way forward however there has been a lack of clarity as to the means of obtaining values the expected outcomes and their role moving to group settings of deliberation raises concepts of social willingness to pay and accept which are distinct from an aggregate of individual value although this does not seem to have been widely recognised a new classification of values is presented appropriate to the literature trying to merge economic and political processes values associated with the individual may be exchange values charitable contributions or fair prices while social values can be speculative expressive or arbitrated the use of dmv is shown to result in different values due to variations in the institutional setting and process of valuation

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

price changes in the euro area and the united states some facts from individual consumer price data prices of goods and services do not adjust immediately in response to changing demand and supply conditions this paper characterizes the average frequency and size of price changes in the euro area and its member countries investigates the determinants of the probability of price changes and compares the evidence for the euro area with available u s results the facts documented in this paper are based on evidence from individual price data recorded at the store level in all euro area countries except ireland and greece that is in datasets covering austria belgium finland france germany italy luxembourg the netherlands portugal and spain which together account for around 97 percent of euro area gdp the data used are the monthly price records underlying the computation of national consumer price indices and harmonized consumer price indices these data cover a large number of products selected on the basis of extensive household budget surveys

the timing and magnitude of retail store markdowns evidence from weekends and holidays we examine daily prices of eight goods at seventeen retail stores collected in ann arbor michigan over a four month period from november 1 to february 28 we focus on weekly and seasonal price patterns and on the frequency of price markdowns or sales there were frequent markdowns in the intensive shopping period prior to christmas and a tendency for such sales to occur on weekends we interpret these findings as evidence that a significant number of markdowns are timed to occur when shopping intensity is exogenously high we complement the imperfect information based motives for sales in the literature by contributing an additional element based on the role of bulk shopping and increasing returns in the shopping technology

to value or not to value that is not the question abstract should we reject money when we value nature like most environmentalists ecological economists are increasingly divided on this question synthesizing political ecology with ecological economics we argue that this way of framing the question is limited we propose a reformulation of the question into when and how to value with money and under what conditions we recommend four criteria for a sound choice environmental improvement distributive justice and equality maintenance of plural value articulating institutions and confronting commodification under neo liberalism we call for due attention to the socio political context within which a valuation is placed and the political goals it serves the relevance of this framework is demonstrated by applying it to three practical cases pollution damages water pricing and payments for ecosystem services

patterns of retail price variation we examine retail price variation across a range of goods and regions of the united states we find that the typical grocery product has a regular price and stays at that price at least 50 of the time and that most deviations from that regular price are downward temporary discounts or sales while infrequent account for 20 to 50 of the annual variation in retail prices for most product categories although existing models of retail sales yield predictions consistent with some aspects of the retail pricing distributions all of these models fail to explain other important aspects of retail pricing identified here

how deliberation affects stated willingness to pay for mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions an experiment respondents reported willingness to pay wtp for mitigating carbon dioxide emissions after structured group discussion or without this deliberation deliberation did not affect mean or median wtp but it increased the number of issues respondents considered with some issues becoming more frequently considered and others less survey only respondents considered issues relevant for responding to a request for a charitable contribution group mode participants considered issues relevant for a public policy assessment findings suggest that ordinary citizens can offer valid input to environmental policy decisions but that framing effects in ordinary wtp surveys may prevent them from providing such input

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

on the incentive effects of job rotation abstract a new employee may work hard to build his reputation this effect is greatest when he starts the longer he is employed at his job the more the firm will already have learned about his ability the incentives for an employee to influence the firm s perceptions of his ability decrease over time if rotating the employee to a different job leads to new uncertainty about his ability this generates a fresh impulse for effort however job rotation also reduces the employee s time horizon thus reducing future rents from reputation this trade off leads to a unique optimum we derive a simple rule of thumb for an optimal rotation time our main results still hold for cases of complete but imperfect information transmission the incentive effects of job rotation also prevail in a setting in which skills are job specific we study several extensions rotations across multiple employees absence of commitment to a rotation time different bargaining positions discounting over time and learning by doing effects

seasonality and the effect of advertising on price does advertising make markets more or less competitive this paper lays out an econometric strategy for estimating the effect of advertising on prices that exploits seasonal demand and imperfect targeting of consumers we find mostly negligible effects of advertising on prices at monthly frequency among the 35 of 131 product categories with sufficient advertising seasonality to justify second stage estimation only nine have a significant effect and those are typically small this finding is essentially the result of the much greater seasonality in advertising than price

research note additional learning and implications on the role of informative advertising observers argue that evidence for the persuasive role of advertising comes from competitive categories where increases in advertising lead to higher average prices conversely others claim that advertising serves a purely informational role here higher levels of advertising lead to better informed consumers and this should increase competition and stimulate lower prices the objective of this study is to neither confirm nor refute either of these perspectives it is rather to show that increases in informative advertisingalone can lead to both higher or lower prices i further show that the direction of this relationship depends on the level of differentiation between competing firms similar to grossman and shapiro 1984 i examine conditions where the differences between competing products are small but i also examine conditions where the differences are significant the role of advertising is to inform consumers about individual products and higher advertising for a product means that more of the potential market knows about it higher levels of advertising increase the relative importance of fully informed consumers compared to partially informed consumers this dynamic is the basis for explaining why informative advertising can push prices either up or down in a uniformly distributed spatial market

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

deliberative monetary valuation dmv and democratic valuation dv a response to bartkowski and lienhoop 2017 abstract bartkowski and lienhoop 2017 comment on the dv approach which i proposed in an earlier issue they conclude that dmv overcomes some flaws of conventional stated preference sp methods addresses many of my concerns and at the same time avoids some of the problems generated by dv several of their comments are debatable a closer look at dmv in comparison with dv and conventional sp methods shows that bartkowski and lienhoop s dmv approach addresses only one out of six major issues with conventional sp methods the lack of opportunities for group discussion my conclusion therefore remains unaffected due to the many technical issues with measuring individual willingness to pay wtp valuations based on majority voting principles are not only more transparent and more democratically legitimate than conventional sp or dmv they may also produce superior proxies for aggregated individual wtp

discourse based valuation of ecosystem services establishing fair outcomes through group deliberation discourse based methods involving small groups of citizens have yet to be thoroughly engaged in the practice of ecosystem valuation this remains true despite the fact that many ecosystem goods and services such as clean air biodiversity and unpolluted lakes and rivers are considered to be public goods the conventional application of ecosystem valuation relies heavily on methodologies such as contingent valuation in which individuals are asked to express the value they attach to ecosystem goods and services in social isolation the difference between the public nature of ecosystem services and their valuation through individual expression has thus recently led to calls for more deliberative forms of environmental valuation because the allocation of ecosystem services directly affects many people and raises normative questions about social equity it is argued that carefully designed discursive methods will help ensure the achievement of social equity goals in this paper we examine the theoretical and normative assumptions that rest beneath the proposed turn towards discourse based methods and identify procedures for testing their application in the field 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the effect of price advertising on prices evidence in the wake of 44 liquormart the 44 liquormart decision eliminating rhode island s ban on liquor price advertising made rhode island the subject of a natural experiment for measuring the effect of advertising on prices using massachusetts prices as controls we find that advertising stores substantially cut only prices of the products that they advertise prices of other products at both advertising and nonadvertising stores do not change advertising stores cut their prices on products advertised by rivals while nonadvertising stores do not we find no reductions in price dispersion across stores newspaper advertising stores appear to draw a higher share of customers after they advertise

impermanent types and permanent reputations we study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long run player in the classical reputation model with a long run player and a series of short run players we provide explicit lower bounds on the nash equilibrium payoffs of a long run player both ex ante and following any positive probability history under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero both bounds converge to the stackelberg payoff if the type space is sufficiently rich these limiting conditions hold in particular if the game is played very frequently

informative advertising and product match abstract this paper studies informative advertising in a variety of market structures for which some consumers are informed about two differentiated products while other consumers are uninformed we characterize a unique symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in advertising and pricing and analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium remarkably total surplus is non monotonic in advertising in a duopoly market the equilibrium level of advertising may be more or less than socially optimal we also study the effect of a trade association and compare these results with the first best solution and a multiproduct monopolist

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

advertising and coordination when market information such as price is difficult to communicate consumers and firms may be unable to take advantage of mutually beneficial scale economies so that coordination failures arise ostensibly uninformative advertising expenditures can be used to eliminate coordination failures by allowing an efficient firm to communicate implicitly that it offers a low price this provides a theoretical explanation for benham s 1972 empirical association of the ability to advertise with lower prices and larger scale advertising becomes necessary for optimal coordination when the identity of the efficient firm is uncertain an application to loss leader pricing is developed

advertising in competitive markets in this paper small firms sell a homogeneous good to small consumers under conditions of free entry but consumers receive price information only through firms advertising in equilibrium every firm on the continuous price distribution buys less advertising than is socially optimal the result is robust if firms advertise in just one medium if readers of different advertising media are positively correlated excess advertising can occur in media used exclusively to advertise discount prices copyright 1991 by american economic association

imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations we study the long run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types thus a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring

a simple theory of advertising as a good or bad our analysis treats advertisements and the goods advertised as complements in stable metautility functions and generates new results for advertising by building on and extending the general analysis of complements by assimilating the theory of advertising into the theory of complements we avoid the special approaches to advertising found in many studies that place obstacles in the way of understanding the effects of advertising we also use this approach to evaluate advertising from a welfare perspective whether there is excessive or too little advertising depends on several variables the effects on consumer utility the degree of competition in the market for advertised goods the induced changes in prices and outputs of advertised goods and whether advertising is sold to consumers

cooperation in community interaction without information flows we study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other s past actions they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship there is incomplete information regarding player types a subset of the population is myopic while the remainder have discount factors that permit cooperation in principle we define social equilibrium in such communities such equilibria are characterized by an initial testing phase followed by cooperation if the test is successful it is precisely the presence of myopic types that permit cooperation by raising barriers to entry into new relationships we examine the implications of increased patience which takes two forms an increase in the number of non myopic types and an increase in the discount factor of non myopic types these two notions turn out to have strikingly different implications for the degree of cooperation that can be sustained

coordination economies advertising and search behavior in retail markets we introduce a model of the retail firm in which consumers and active firms benefit collectively from coordination of sales at fewer firms using this model we show that ostensibly uninformative advertising plays a key role in bringing about coordination economies by directing consumer search toward firms that offer the best deals optimal consumer search takes the form of a simple rule of thumb that uses observed advertising information to guide search both industry concentration and social surplus are higher in the presence of advertising relative to a no advertising benchmark jel d83 l15 many observed advertisements seem to be at odds with rational behavior in a variety of ads mostly on tv and radio multiproduct sellers provide little hard information choosing instead to impart only vague slogans that are suggestive of good deals examples are plentiful a hardware store

limited records and reputation bubbles abstract this paper offers a tractable and fully rational model to study the economics of reputation in a dynamic market with limited record keeping i e a market in which new entrants observe only the last few periods of play of the long run player instead of the full history of the market we show that trust is gradually granted to the opportunistic long run player despite the fact that his type is perfectly observed by the short run opponents and the perfectly informed short run players ride and drive up reputation bubbles at the expense of their uninformed successors we characterize equilibrium payoffs uniformly over time which is useful for analyzing ongoing repeated relationships where the starting moments have passed

restricted feedback in long term relationships abstract this paper studies long term relationships modeled as repeated games with restricted feedback players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history as may be the case in online markets our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary restrictions on strategies we derive a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs similar to that of abreu pearce and stacchetti 1986 1990 2 3 for perfect public equilibria and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the largest fixed point of a monotone operator we use our characterization to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient trade in a repeated product choice game where costumers condition their purchase decisions only on the last performance signal

generalizing what is known about temporal aggregation and advertising carryover this paper provides a theoretical explanation for the inconsistent findings from previous econometric analyses of aggregated data concerning the duration of advertising carryover using this theoretical explanation and the knowledge of a data interval bias the paper reviews and summarizes the empirical work in the area of sales response modeling and then after adjusting for aggregation bias presents support for an empirical generalization that the average advertising duration interval is of brief duration typically between six and nine months

an institutional analysis of methods for environmental appraisal abstract this paper focuses on a set of issues when choosing between methods for environmental appraisal approaches like cost benefit analysis contingent valuation multicriteria analysis and deliberative methods are based on very different assumptions concerning the characteristics of environmental resources the capacities of the individuals involved and the role the methods play in framing the process the present paper views environmental appraisal methods as institutional structures they are seen as rules concerning a who should participate and in which capacity b what is considered data and which form data should take and c rules about how a conclusion is reached specifically the choice of method defines the logic of the appraisal process and next influences the output while cost benefit analysis is based on the assumption of individual rationality deliberative methods assume that individuals can act according to social rationality the first part of the paper is devoted to clarifying what institutions are and their role in the valuation process second the main features of environmental or ecosystem services and the demands they raise for decision making are described a general framework for evaluating appraisal methods is then developed finally this structure is elaborated in more detail as a basis for deciding over the choices of methods in the case of evaluating ecosystem services a set of unresolved issues are identified especially related to how the choice of appraisal methods themselves should be instituted

disappearance of reputations in two sided incomplete information games abstract this paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long lived players both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player this class namely reputation games with one sided moral hazard can capture economic interactions that may involve hidden information or hidden action extending the techniques of cripps et al 2004 it is found that neither player can sustain a reputation permanently for playing a noncredible behavior in these games and the reputations disappear uniformly across all nash equilibria

what s in a name reputation as a tradeable asset the author develops a model in which a firm s only asset is its name which summarizes its reputation and studies the forces that cause names to be valuable tradable assets an adverse selection model in which shifts of ownership are not observable guarantees an active market for names with either finite or infinite horizons no equilibrium exists in which only good types buy good names the reputational dynamics that emerge from the model are more realistic than those in standard game theoretic reputation models and suggest that adverse selection plays a crucial role in understanding firm reputation

a game theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer to peer commerce abstract we propose a dynamic game theoretic model to study how a reputation feedback system affects a peer to peer p2p trading platform continuums of buyers and sellers with bounded rationalities are paired to trade periodically sellers have private knowledge on their own types that encode tendencies to cheat their reputation scores are on the other hand visible to all and periodically updated by their trading partners a buyer can use a seller s score to assess the latter s characters and decide whether to trade using a continuity based fixed point theorem we first establish the existence of equilibria that convey information on traders behaviors as well as the type score composition on the market we then look into a special case which for model tractability includes two types of sellers with two score levels besides the proportion of prone to cheating sellers it indicates that how much sellers value their future payoffs also plays a major role in determining the prevalence of online frauds therefore reputation feedback systems are especially beneficial under high trading volumes which can in turn for instance be facilitated by attracting more buyers to the online marketplace

sustainable reputations with rating systems abstract in a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals to facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions e g ebay online shopping search engines e g bizrate com and consumer reports we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals and makes public announcements every period the set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system we show that absent reputation effects information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs however if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his stackelberg payoff after every history this is in contrast to cripps mailath and samuelson 2004 5 where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals we also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers while decreasing the seller s payoff

cycles of conflict an economic model abstract we propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions good actions may be misperceived as bad and information about past actions is limited conflict spirals start as a result of misperceptions but also contain the seeds of their own dissolution bayesian agents eventually conclude that the spiral likely started by mistake and is thus uninformative of the opposing group s type the agents then experiment with a good action restarting the cycle jel d72 d74 d83 z13

the dynamics of seller reputation evidence from ebay we construct a panel of ebay seller histories and examine the importance of ebay s reputation mechanism we find that when a seller first receives negative feedback his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 7 to a negative 7 subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25 more rapidly than the first one and don t have nearly as much impact as the first one we also find that a seller is more likely to exit the lower his reputation is and that just before exiting sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average we consider a series of theoretical models and measure them against these empirical results regardless of which theoretical model best explains the data an important conclusion of our paper is that ebay s reputation system gives way to noticeable strategic responses from both buyers and sellers

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

the seasonal cycle and the business cycle almost all recent research on macroeconomic fluctuations has worked with seasonally adjusted or annual data this paper takes a different approach by treating seasonal fluctuations as worthy of study in their own right our results show that seasonal fluctuations are an important source of variation in all macroeconomic quantity variables but are small or entirely absent in both real and nominal price variables the timing of the seasonal fluctuations consists of increases in the second and fourth quarters a large decrease in the first quarter and a mild decrease in the third quarter the paper demonstrates that with respect to each of several major stylized facts about business cycles the seasonal cycle displays the same characteristics as the business cycle in some cases even more dramatically than the business cycle that is we find that at seasonal frequencies as well as at business cycle frequencies output movements across broadly defined sectors move together the timing of production and the

predation and its rate of return the sugar industry 1887 1914 we show that the price wars following two major entry episodes were predatory our proof is twofold by direct comparison of price to marginal cost and by construction of a lower bound to predicted competitive price cost margins that we show to exceed observed margins predation occurred only when its relative cost to the dominant firm the american sugar refining company asrc was small its most clear effect was to lower the acquisition price of entrants and small incumbents it may also have deterred future capacity additions and raised asrc s share of industry profits predation operated by strengthening asrc s reputation as a willing predator

the effects of experience on preferences theory and empirics for environmental public goods this article develops a choice model for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences we develop a theoretical model of bayesian updating perform comparative statics over the model and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model our main findings are that in a random utility model rum discrete choice model a subject s scale should increase and the variability of scale should decrease with experience if subjects are bayesians we then estimate the model using field data regarding preferences for one particular public good water quality we find strong evidence that additional experience increases scale thereby making consumer preferences more predictable from the econometrician s perspective we find supportive but less convincing evidence that experience decreases the variability of scale across subjects

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

beyond rationality towards reasonableness enriching the theoretical foundation of deliberative monetary valuation economic valuation is often deemed an important source of information for land use decisions stated preference sp methods are a particularly potent class of economic valuation methods but they are also particularly controversial in response to accumulating criticism of sp deliberative monetary valuation dmv has been proposed as an alternative approach and has gained considerable attention in recent years however being a combination of elements from two theories neoclassical welfare economics and theory of deliberative democracy it lacks a convincing consistent theoretical foundation in our paper we propose some clarifying adjustments regarding rationality assumptions and aggregation issues by drawing upon the work of amartya sen we find that many of his ideas lead to a harmonisation of dmv s theoretical foundations e g meta rankings of preferences impartial spectator and the plurality of impartial reasons

public trust and government betrayal abstract this study presents a simple model of government reputation in which government type cannot be directly observed by households with the variation that government type rather than being permanent follows an exogenous markov process this formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes governments which betray public trust do so erratically public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than other governments

who wants a good reputation we examine a market in which long lived firms face a short term incentive to exert low effort but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort there are two types of firms inept firms who can only exert low effort and competent firms who have a choice between high and low effort there is occasional exit and competent and inept potential entrants compete for the right to inherit the departing firm s reputation consumers receive noisy signals of effort choice and so competent firms choose high effort in an attempt to distinguish themselves from inept firms a competent firm is most likely to enter the market by purchasing an average reputation in the hopes of building it into a good reputation than either a very low reputation or a very high reputation inept firms in contrast find it more profitable to either buy high reputations and deplete them or buy low reputations

democracy and valuation a reply to schlapfer 2016 abstract this paper is a critical appraisal of schlapfer s 2016 proposal of a democratic valuation dv methodology to value public goods while we appreciate attempts to address the shortcomings of conventional stated preference techniques we have some reservations regarding dv our paper critically reviews the following characteristics of the proposed methodology i referendum format as decision making mechanism ii single dimensionality in the description of the policy issue to be valued and iii preference formation through provision of detailed information finally we calibrate democratic valuation against another alternative to conventional stated preference approaches namely deliberative monetary valuation dmv we argue that dmv addresses many of schlapfer s concerns regarding stated preference techniques and at the same time avoids some of the problems generated by dv

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

the values jury to aid natural resource decisions congressional legislation emphasizes that public resource allocation should reflect the values citizens assign to those resources yet information about assigned values and preferences of members of the public including economic measures of value required by decision makers is often incomplete or unavailable existing sources of information about the public s values for use in resource allocation decisions and damage assessment include existing markets public surveys including contingent valuation and public involvement each of these sources has serious limitations

accounting for incomplete pass through recent theoretical work has suggested a number of potentially important factors in causing incomplete pass through of exchange rates to prices including markup adjustment local costs and barriers to price adjustment we empirically analyze the determinants of incomplete passthrough in the coee industry the observed pass through in this industry replicates key features of pass through documented in aggregate data prices respond sluggishly and incompletely to changes in costs we use microdata on sales and prices to uncover the role of markup adjustment local costs and barriers to price adjustment in determining incomplete pass through using a structural oligopoly model that nests all three potential factors the implied pricing model explains the main dynamic features of short and long run pass through local costs reduce long run pass through by a factor of 59 relative to a ces benchmark markup adjustment reduces pass through by an additional factor of 33 where the extent of markup adjustment depends on the estimated super elasticity of demand the estimated menu costs are small 0 23 of revenue and have a negligible eect on long run pass through but are quantitatively successful in explaining the delayed response of prices to costs we nd that delayed passthrough in the coee industry occurs almost entirely at the wholesale rather than the retail level

reputation with analogical reasoning we consider a repeated interaction between a long run player and a sequence of short run players in which the long run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same possibly mixed action in every stage game we depart from the classical model in assuming that the short run players make inferences by analogical reasoning meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long run player but do not recognize how this play varies across histories concentrating on 2 2 games we provide a characterization of equilibrium payoffs establishing a payoff bound for the rational long run player that can be strictly larger than the familiar stackelberg bound we also provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior showing that play begins with either a reputation building or a reputation spending stage depending on parameters followed by a reputation manipulation stage

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

accounting for u s real exchange rate changes this study measures the proportion of u s real exchange rate movements that can be accounted for by movements in the relative prices of nontraded goods the decomposition is done at all possible h

democratic valuation dv using majority voting principles to value public services the now dominant survey approaches to value public services remain contentious a common explanation is that stated preferences are generally difficult to measure i argue that the key problems of the dominant survey approaches can be explained more specifically by their ambition to measure individuals maximum willingness to pay wtp to estimate wtp researchers need to ask questions involving counterfactual prices to specify doubtful implementation rules and to aggregate preferences in a way that is inconsistent with political rights the procedures engender problems with scenario credibility incentive compatibility adequate information provision and democratic legitimacy as an alternative to the standard stated preference paradigm i propose a democratic valuation approach dv dv measures the exchange value of public services in the political domain in terms of the aggregate valuation implied by the median preferred expenditure level for public services the blueprint for survey design is the public finance referendum with multiple proposals i suggest that empirically straightforward and democratically legitimate exchange values may be a more powerful input to public policy decisions than theoretically correct but empirically problematic estimates of mean willingness to pay

exploring group dynamics in deliberative choice experiments abstract deliberative monetary valuation has emerged as a promising alternative to conventional stated preference studies of ecosystem services it promises to give respondents a better basis for decision making by exposing them to a more diverse set of knowledge arguments and opinions through group discussion however under certain conditions small groups may fail to effectively pool the individual knowledge of their members this paper examines the impact of the initial distribution of individual preferences in discussion groups on the outcome of deliberative choice experiments drawing on a deliberative monetary valuation study of forest ecosystem services in west saxony germany it is shown that the initial preference distribution in groups influences both the diversity of arguments exchanged during group discussions and respondents consideration of the costs of environmental policies furthermore results indicate that respondents post discussion willingness to pay is affected by the initial preference distribution in groups though these changes were not statistically significant the choice certainty of respondents was found to remain largely unaffected overall the empirical findings of this study provide preliminary evidence about the need to conduct future deliberative monetary valuation studies with groups with heterogeneous initial preferences as this may provide respondents with a more complete set of decision relevant information

communication in repeated games with costly monitoring abstract we study repeated games with discounting where perfect monitoring is possible but costly it is shown that if players can make public announcements then every payoff vector which is an interior point in the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game when the discount factor is high enough thus efficiency can be approximated even when the cost of monitoring is high provided that the discount factor is high enough

preference refinement in deliberative choice experiments for ecosystem service valuation choice experiments have gained considerable popularity in ecosystem service valuation in a one shot survey respondents are faced with a strenuous task asking them to discover and monetize their preferences for often unfamiliar ecosystem services in a previously unknown hypothetical market situation we present a deliberative choice experiment that aims to generate well rationalized value estimates for policy advice two aspects of deliberation discussion and time to reflect are examined in terms of their effect on preference refinement we find more comprehensive choice motives after deliberation as well as indications for preference adjustment and a slight increase in choice certainty jel q51 q57

opportunity cost estimation of ecosystem services land use changes rank among the most significant drivers of change in ecosystem services worldwide the enhancement of important services such as biodiversity and carbon sequestration requires modifications in land use that can lead to the decline in other ecosystems services targeting the most suitable areas for particular land uses based on comparative advantages requires opportunity cost information across large regions this is a demanding task because the input output relations are ill defined and determined by spatially heterogeneous operational and environmental conditions to address this methodological challenge this paper presents a two stage semiparametric technique that enables multi dimensional production possibility frontiers to be estimated from data provided by biophysical models specific advantages of the proposed frontier approach are its flexibility with regard to assumptions on the convexity of the production possibility set and its freedom from any separability assumptions for the input output space and the space of the heterogeneous background variables the method is illustrated for a case study of 18 central and eastern european countries results show that opportunity costs of changes in ecosystem services provision differ substantially between regions those areas having already relatively high levels of carbon sequestration have a comparative advantage in sequestering carbon opportunity costs of biodiversity are generally positively related with the level of biodiversity up to a turning point after which they are negatively related to illustrate the policy consequences of the observed economies and diseconomies of scope we compare two management regimes to illustrate the potential gains from smart land management

introductory price as a signal of cost in a model of repeat business a two period game between firms and consumers is considered firms are privately informed about their individual costs and consumers must pay a search cost in order to learn a firm s current price consumers thus have incentive to use introductory price as a signal of cost and hence second period price recent refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are employed and the resulting equilibria involve low introductory prices introductory sales