why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

local government efficiency determinants and spatial interdependence we analyse the determinants of local government efficiency taking into account the presence of spatial interactions among neighbouring municipalities to do so first we estimate an efficiency inde

politicians outside earnings and electoral competition this paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians outside earnings in our framework politicians face a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings the main hypothesis is that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition we test this hypothesis using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the german federal assembly and find that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings

tax policy and yardstick voting in flemish municipal elections recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions in these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions this paper reports an analysis of municipal elections in flanders during the period 1982 to 2000 and finds empirical evidence for yardstick voting incumbents are punished for higher tax rates importantly the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents

vertical contracts in the video rental industry a large body of theoretical work has explored the channels through which vertical contracts can induce efficiency improvements however it is also important to study vertical contracts empirically in order to gain insight into the relative size of different types of efficiency gains in this paper i empirically analyse a contractual innovation in the vertically separated video rental industry prior to 1998 video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing contracts in 1998 revenuesharing contracts were widely adopted i investigate the effect of the introduction of revenue sharing contracts on firms profits and consumer welfare i analyse a new panel data set of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers contract and inventory choices as well as rentals and contract terms for 246 movie titles and 6137 retailers in the u s during each week of 1998 and 1999 and the first half of 2000 a structural econometric model of firms behaviour is developed that describes the nature of firms contract choices estimates from this model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase by 10 under the revenue sharing contract for popular titles for less popular titles the effects can be even larger i also estimate that consumers benefit when revenue sharing contracts are adopted

the role of exclusive territories in producers competition reprinted in cartels stephen salant ed the international library of critical writings in economics edward elgar reference collections

political competition and politician quality evidence from italian municipalities we use data from italian local level governments for the years 1985 2008 to investigate whether political competition affects the quality of politicians as measured by some ex ante characteristics such as educational level and type of job held we handle endogeneity problems through an instrumental variable approach using as an instrument for political competition a variable taking into account whether the previous municipal council survived until the end of its legislative term two stage least square estimates support the view that political competition positively affects politician quality results are robust to different measures of political competition and to different estimation strategies

value for money german local government efficiency in a comparative perspective in this article we investigate the cost efficiency of german local governments in the state of baden wurttemberg in 2004 using a stochastic frontier approach besides being the first study on german data we add two elements to the literature first we provide a comparative perspective allowing us to embed our results in the broader literature second unlike most previous studies we explicitly account for exogenous or nondiscretionary influences when estimating municipal efficiency scores the results suggest that disregarding such exogenous factors can lead to significant and systematic bias in the estimated inefficiency levels particularly underestimation of efficiency occurs for municipalities with high tourist activity while the reverse is true for municipalities with high unemployment

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

multiple product firms a nested logit approach this paper proves the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with multiproduct firms using a nested logit model of demand the demand model is parameterized by two variables that characterize different dimensions of preference for variety these reflect intragroup heterogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity a group or nest being the set of products produced by a firm there are then two dimensions to market performance the total number of firms and the range of products produced per firm it is shown that the market equilibrium involves an excessive number of firms but each firm provides too few products copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

explaining differences in efficiency a meta study on local government literature this paper reviews the literature on local government efficiency by meta reviewing 360 observations retrieved from 54 papers published from 1993 to 2016 the meta regression is based on a random effect model estimated with the 2 step random effects maximum likelihood reml technique proposed by gallet and doucouliagos 2014 results indicate that the study design matters when estimating a frontier in local government we find that studies focusing on technical efficiency provide higher efficiency scores than works evaluating cost efficiency the same applies when using panel data instead of cross section data interestingly studies that use the free disposal hull fdh approach yield on average higher efficiency scores than papers employing the data envelopment analysis dea method thereby suggesting that in this literature the convexity hypothesis of the production set is a matter finally the efficiency of local government increases with the level of development of the analysed countries and is positively related to the national integrity of the legal system the opposite holds when considering the corruption

additional information for comments on alternative models of demand for automobiles by charlotte wojcik abstract in a recent paper in this journal econ lett 68 2000 113 wojcik argues that the nested logit is likely to be superior to demand specifications we and others have used in recent empirical work we review the relevant models and their uses consider her application and find that her conclusions are incorrect

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

vertical integration and firm boundaries the evidence since ronald h coase s 1937 seminal paper a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input output structures in the last twenty five years empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating we review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions first what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and second what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices quantities investment and profits throughout we highlight areas of potential cross fertilization and promising areas for future work

voluntary export restraints on automobiles evaluating a trade policy the authors evaluate the voluntary export restraint that was initially placed on exports of automobiles from japan in 1981 they evaluate the impact this policy had on u s consumer welfare firm profits and foregone tariff revenue from its initiation through 1990

on the welfare effects of anti discrimination regulations in the ec car market abstract cross country price discrimination in an oligopolistic setting is examined in the context of the market for cars in the european community two types of regulation aimed at limiting price discrimination are considered in one constraints are imposed on absolute cross country price differentials in the other constraints are imposed on price ratios the first rule turns out to be uniformly better than the second in a way that we make precise when a country with no domestic producer of cars is introduced it seems that the redistributional effects of antidiscrimination regulation may be more important than any possible gains in efficiency

exclusive territories and manufacturers collusion this paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains we show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers incentives to sustain tacit collusion first granting local monopolies to retailers softens competition in a one shot game hence punishment profits are larger thereby rendering deviation more profitable second exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands adjust their prices to the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer whereas intrabrand competition prevents such instantaneous reaction we show that the latter effect tends to dominate thereby making exclusive territories a more suitable organizational mode to cooperate these insights are robust to endogenous communication between manufacturers we also consider retailers service investments here a novel effect emerges that softens the procollusive value of exclusive territories retailers of a deviant manufacturer increase investments which renders deviation more profitable this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

on the determinants of local government performance a two stage nonparametric approach abstract this article analyzes the efficiency of local governments in the comunitat valenciana spain and their main explanatory variables the analysis is performed in two stages firstly efficiency is measured via nonparametric activity analysis techniques specifically we consider both data envelopment analysis dea and free disposable hull fdh techniques the second stage identifies some critical determinants of efficiency focusing on both political and fiscal policy variables in contrast to previous two stage research studies our approach performs the latter attempt via nonparametric smoothing techniques rather than econometric methods such as ols or tobit related techniques results show that efficiency scores especially under the nonconvexity assumption fdh are higher for large municipalities thus there is empirical evidence to suggest that resources may be better allocated by large municipalities however the inefficiency found is not entirely attributable to poor management as second stage analysis reveals both fiscal and political variables to be explicably related to municipality performance moreover the explanatory variables impact on efficiency is robust to the chosen technique either convex dea or nonconvex fdh

spatial differentiation and vertical mergers in retail markets for gasoline this paper studies an empirical model of spatial competition applied to gasoline markets the main feature is to specify commuting paths as the locations of consumers in a hotelling style model as a result spatial differentiation depends in an intuitive way on the structure of the road network and the direction of traffic flows the model is estimated using panel data on the quebec city gasoline market and used to evaluate the consequences of a recent vertical merger difference in difference and counterfactual simulation methods are compared and the results to a large extent validate the assumptions of the demand model jel g34 l13 l42 l81 q41 r41

competition in the political arena and local government performance competition reduces rent extraction in private sector firms in this article we empirically assess whether it similarly disciplines politicians by evaluating local level governments performance in flanders the results indicate that electoral competition measured via the number of parties competing in elections significantly positively affects the productive efficiency of municipal policy intertemporal competition measured as the volatility of election outcomes over time has a similar but weaker positive effect these beneficial effects are mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments which is shown to work against their productive efficiency overall though the beneficial effects outweigh the unfavourable ones in our sample

testing the market integration process in the european car sector evidence from pricing to market behaviour in this study we investigate the process of the european car market integration by analysing the evolution of cross country differences in the degree of pricing to market behaviour of united kingdom exporters we estimate these country differences by exploiting statistical information for pre tax retail prices and for export unit values conclusions from both independent data sets are in general quite consistent results support the claim that in the period before the block exemption regulation 1400 2002 came fully into force international price discrimination was an important source of car price dispersion within the euro area for a more recent period we found that estimated deviations in pricing to market behaviour across destinations have become lower this convergence suggests that car market integration was progressively improved at the end of the last decade

the effects of extended unemployment insurance over the business cycle evidence from regression discontinuity estimates over 20 years one goal of extending the duration of unemployment insurance ui in recessions is to increase ui coverage in the face of longer unemployment spells although it is a common concern that such extensions may themselves raise nonemployment durations it is not known how recessions would affect the magnitude of this moral hazard to obtain causal estimates of the differential effects of ui in booms and recessions this article exploits the fact that in germany potential ui benefit duration is a function of exact age which is itself invariant over the business cycle we implement a regression discontinuity design separately for 20 years and correlate our estimates with measures of the business cycle we find that the nonemployment effects of a month of additional ui benefits are at best somewhat declining in recessions yet the ui exhaustion rate and therefore the additional coverage provided by ui extensions rises substantially during a downturn the ratio of these two effects represents the nonemployment response of workers weighted by the probability of being affected by ui extensions hence our results imply that the effective moral hazard effect of ui extensions is significantly lower in recessions than in booms using a model of job search with liquidity constraints we also find that in the absence of market wide effects the net social benefits from ui extensions can be expressed either directly in terms of the exhaustion rate and the nonemployment effect of ui durations or as a declining function of our measure of effective moral hazard copyright 2012 oxford university press

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

competitive price discrimination strategies in a vertical channel using aggregate retail data we explore opportunities for targeted pricing for a retailer that only tracks weekly store level aggregate sales and marketing mix information we show that it is possible using these data to recover essential features of the underlying distribution of consumer willingness to pay knowledge of this distribution may enable the retailer to generate additional profits from targeting by using choice information at the checkout counter in estimating demand we incorporate a supply side model of the distribution channel that captures important features of competitive price setting behavior of firms this latter aspect helps us control for the potential endogeneity generated by unmeasured product characteristics in aggregate data the channel controls for competitive aspects both between manufacturers and between manufacturers and a retailer despite this competition we find that targeted pricing need not generate the prisoner s dilemma in our data this contrasts with the findings of theoretical models due to the flexibility of the empirical model of demand the demand system we estimate captures richer forms of product differentiation both vertical and horizontal as well as a more flexible distribution of consumer heterogeneity

political competition and state government size do tighter elections produce looser budgets we test implications of politicalcompetition theory concerning government size usingdata from u s states we find that greaterpolitical competition in the race for governor actsas a check against bigger government evidence onthe effectiveness of legal limits on expendituresand or revenues growth is mixed the democraticparty is associated with bigger government but onlywhen party representation in both the governor shouse and the legislature is strong the flypapereffect of grants is found to be strong our resultshave implications for models of fiscal illusion

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

estimating market power in a two sided market the case of newspapers the newspaper industry is a two sided market the readers market and the advertising market are closely linked by inter market network externalities we estimate market power in the italian newspaper industry by building a structural model which encompasses a demand estimation

the effect of public health expenditure on infant mortality evidence from a panel of indian states 1983 1984 to 2011 2012 abstractusing a panel data set of indian states between 1983 1984 and 2011 2012 this paper studies the impact of public health expenditure on the infant mortality rate imr after controlling for other relevant covariates like political competition per capita income female literacy and urbanisation we find that public expenditure on health care reduces the imr our baseline specification shows that an increase in public health expenditure by 1 per cent of state level net domestic product is associated with a reduction in the imr by about nine infant deaths per 1000 live births we also find that political competition female literacy and urbanisation reduce the imr

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

mergers brand competition and the price of a pint abstract mergers in the uk brewing industry have reduced the number of national brewers from six to four the number of brands in contrast has remained relatively constant we analyze the effects of mergers on brand competition and pricing brand level demand equations are estimated from a panel of draft beers to model brand substitution possibilities we estimate the matrix of cross price elasticities semiparametrically our structural model is used to assess the strength of brand competition along various dimensions and to evaluate the mergers in particular we compute equilibria of pricing games with different numbers of players

upstream horizontal mergers vertical contracts and bargaining abstract we study horizontal mergers in the upstream sectors of vertically related industries when bargaining is present and contract types are endogenous we demonstrate that the contract types used can have significant implications for the equilibrium market structure and vice versa when trading takes place through two part tariff contracts merger incentives are absent however when the downstream firms are powerful merger incentives are restored since the merger leads then either to the exclusive or to the partial use of wholesale price contracts finally we show that whenever a merger occurs it is welfare detrimental

political competition policy and growth theory and evidence from the us this paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth we test the predictions of the model on panel data for the us states in these data we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti growth policies higher taxes lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right to work laws we also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth

tiered co payments pricing and demand in reference price markets for pharmaceuticals health insurance companies curb price insensitive behavior and the moral hazard of insureds by means of cost sharing such as tiered co payments or reference pricing in drug markets this paper evaluates the effect of price limits below which drugs are exempt from co payments on prices and on demand first using a difference in differences estimation strategy we find that the new policy decreases prices by 5 percent for generics and increases prices by 4 percent for brand name drugs in the german reference price market second estimating a nested logit demand model we show that consumers appreciate co payment exempt drugs and calculate lower price elasticities for brand name drugs than for generics this explains the different price responses of brand name and generic drugs and shows that price related co payment tiers are an effective tool to steer demand to low priced drugs

a drawback of electoral competition in most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters we provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties in our model the larger the number of parties the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition the reason is that when the number of parties increases electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits the analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition thresholds of exclusion runoff electoral systems and majoritarian two party political systems jel d82 l15

efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance abstract this paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance we impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward and show with this feature added that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility the paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question what is the trade off between equality and efficiency in resource allocation journal of economic literature classification numbers d31 d63 d82 j65

optimal unemployment insurance with human capital depreciation and duration dependence this paper studies the effect of human capital depreciation and duration dependence on the design of an optimal unemployment insurance ui scheme our results partially confirm those obtained in most previous studies benefits should decrease with unemployment duration the optimal program also generates two main novel features which are not present in stationary models first if human capital depreciates rapidly enough during unemployment ui transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient program second we study the optimality of imposing a history contingent wage tax after reemployment our numerical simulations based on the spanish and us economies show that the wage tax should decrease with the length of worker s previous unemployment spell and become a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers as a by product of our study we develop a systematic approach suitable for studying recursively a wide range of dynamic moral hazard problems and other models with similar characteristics

double marginalization and cost pass through weyl fabinger and cowan meet spengler and bresnahan reiss consider the classical double marginalization problem of single product successive monopolies we show that the ratio of the cost pass through at the final sale relative to that at the wholesale level is characterized by the curvature of inverse demand in the final market we also apply cowan s 2012 method which utilizes the idea of pass through in an analysis of third degree price discrimination to compare consumer surplus under vertical integration and separation

structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer retailer interaction vertical strategic interaction research in empirical industrial organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers horizontal strategic interaction decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer pricing rules e g constant markup category profit maximization the appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market however is an empirical question this paper therefore empirically infers 1 the vertical strategic interaction vsi between manufacturers and retailer 2 the horizontal strategic interaction hsi between manufacturers simultaneously with the vsi and 3 the pricing rule used by a retailer the approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data where there is no information on wholesale prices researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices even manufacturers who have access to their own wholesale prices usually have limited information on competitors wholesale prices in the absence of wholesale prices we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer pricing rules we then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations while our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available early research on the inference of hsi among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data e g kadiyali et al 1996 1999 made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin this assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers in this paper we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail price coordination across brands hence the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing category management done by the retailer we find empirical support for this argument this highlights the need to properly model and infer vsi simultaneously to accurately estimate the hsi when using data at the retail level functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data but recent theoretical research on channels lee and staelin 1997 tyagi 1999 has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough while the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100 lee and staelin call this vertical strategic substitute vss the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100 vertical strategic complement vsc because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100 chevalier and curhan 1976 armstrong 1991 we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit vss and the multiplicative vsc functional form for the data we perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market we found that the vss implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model we also find that for both categories the best fitting model is one in which 1 the retailer maximizes category profits 2 the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg and 3 manufacturer pricing hsi is tacitly collusive the fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations the inference that the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82 in the yogurt market and 65 in the peanut butter market the result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature the finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about vsi hsi and the functional form the results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems

the evolution of price dispersion in the european car market car prices in europe are characterized by large and persistent differences across countries the purpose of this paper is to document and explain this price dispersion using a panel data set extending from 1980 to 1993 we first demonstrate two main facts concerning car prices in europe i the existence of significant differences in quality adjusted prices across countries with italy and the u k systematically representing the most expensive markets 2 substantial year to year volatility that is to a large extent accounted for by exchange rate fluctuations and the incomplete response of local currency prices to these fluctuations these facts are analysed within the framework of a multiproduct oligopoly model with product differentiation the model identifies three potential sources for the international price differences price elasticities generating differences in markups costs and import quota constraints local currency price stability can be attributed either to the presence of a local component in marginal costs or to markup adjustment that is correlated with exchange rate volatility the latter requires that the perceived elasticity of demand is increasing in price we find that the primary reason for the higher prices in italy is the existence of a strong bias for domestic brancs that generates high markups for the domestic firm fiat in the u k higher prices are mainly attributed to better equipped cars and or differences in the dealer discount practices the import quota constraints are found to have a significant impact on japanese car prices in italy france and the u k with respect to local currency price stability a large percentage of the documented price inertia can be attributed to local costs and a smaller fraction to markup adjustment that is indicative of price discrimination based on these results we conjecture that the emu will substantially reduce the year to year volatility observed in the car price data but without further measures to increase european integration it will not completely eliminate existing cross country price differences

the countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents electoral incentives we argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining these countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency typical of many young democracies we provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from mali tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies to explore the generalizability of these findings we analyze cross country panel data and show that political competition leads to better worse public goods provision under high low levels of party system institutionalization the paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas

revealed yardstick competition local government efficiency patterns in norway this paper investigates whether the production efficiency of norwegian local governments exhibits a spatial pattern that is compatible with the hypothesis of yardstick competition in order to check whether yardstick competition is really responsible for the observed spatial pattern and rule out alternative theoretical explanations the paper exploits unique information from a survey on local politicians attitudes towards comparative evaluation of local bureaus performances against other jurisdictions benchmarking merging the latter information with the observed interdependence in efficiency the paper provides evidence that comparative performance evaluation generates positive spatial auto correlation in local efficiency indicators

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

outsourcing and pass through a large share of international trade occurs through intra firm transactions we show that this common cross border organization of the firm has implications for the well documented incomplete transmission of shocks across such borders we present new evidence of an inverse relationship between a firm s outsourcing of inputs and its rate of exchange rate pass through we then develop a structural econometric model with final assemblers and upstream parts suppliers to quantify how firms organization of their activities across national borders affects their pass through behavior

exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry evidence from automobiles exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market we ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier and provide an empirical analysis of the european car market we first estimate a demand model with product and spatial differentiation and quantify consumers valuations for dealer proximity and dealer exclusivity we then perform policy counterfactuals to assess the profit incentives and possible entry deterring effects of exclusive dealing we find that there are no unilateral incentives to maintain exclusive dealing but there is a collective incentive for the industry as a whole furthermore a ban on exclusive dealing would raise the smaller entrants market share but more importantly consumers would gain not so much because of increased price competition but rather because of the increased spatial availability which compensates for the demand inefficiency from a loss of dealer exclusivity

cross country price dispersion in the euro era a case study of the european car market impact of the euro this paper investigates the effects of the european monetary union on cross country price differences in the european car market the analysis utilizes disaggregate bi annual data on the prices of almost all car models sold in the 15 countries of the european union over 1993 2003 the data refer to identical models with identical specifications and options to identify the euro s effect we exploit the fact that out of the 15 countries in our sample 12 joined euroland at the beginning of 1999 and officially adopted the euro as their national currency at the beginning of 2002 while 3 countries remained outside the monetary union we investigate whether there is a systematic difference in the evolution of cross country price dispersion between euroland members and non members after 1999 our analysis distinguishes between phase i monetary union with national currencies preserved 1999 2001 and phase ii official adoption of the euro as a national currency in 2002 we examine the evolution of both the absolute price differentials across countries and the speed with which deviations from the long term cross country differentials are eliminated we find that in the pre euro era countries that later joined euroland exhibited lower price differentials relative to the base country of the netherlands by approximately 6 the monetary union further reduced these differentials by a small but significant percentage about 1 5 between 1999 and 2001 this reduction happened while the price differentials in non euroland countries increased the price differentials in euroland countries further decreased following the official euro adoption in 2002 however we cannot attribute this decline to the euro as we witness an even faster decrease of price differentials in non euroland countries over the 2002 2003 period despite these reductions cross country price differences remain large even among members regarding the speed of convergence we find that even before 1999 the half life of price shocks was shorter in euroland countries compared to non euroland countries 0 65 versus 1 year however we do not find any evidence that the emu further affected the speed of convergence in a significant manner overall our results suggest a big role for exchange rate stability in reducing international price dispersion and a smaller role for a common currency the surprisingly high remaining international price differentials after the euro suggest the need for additional measures towards integration e g liberalization of the distribution system reduction of high registration taxes in particular countries pinelopi koujianou goldberg and frank verboven

competitive pressure and the adoption of complementary innovations liberalization of the european automobile distribution system in 2002 limits the ability of manufacturers to impose vertical restraints leading to a substantial increase in competitive pressure among dealers we estimate an equilibrium model of profit maximization to evaluate how dealers change their innovation adoption strategies following the elimination of exclusive territories using french data we evaluate the existence of complementarities between the adoption of software applications and the scale of production firms view these innovations as substitutes and concentrate their effort in one type of software as they expand their scale of production results are robust to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity

unemployment insurance and the business cycle what adjustments are needed author affiliation jeremy schwartz loyola university maryland department of economics 4501 north charles street sellinger 315 baltimore md 21210 usa e mail jsschwartz1 loyola edu acknowledgment i wish to thank donald parsons kerry richmond tara sinclair roberto samaniego and anthony yezer for their helpful comments and discussions regarding this article 1 introductionin most developed countries unemployment insurance ui is a static program that remains constant regardless of labor market conditions the united states along with canada are the only oecd countries that routinely adjust the generosity of their ui programs with the business cycle for instance during the 2007 2011 labor market downturn the length of time that ui benefits could be collected in the united states increased to an unprecedented 99 weeks from the standard 26 weeks available under normal economic conditions and the weekly benefit amount increased by 25 from an insurance perspective losing one s job during a recession is a greater loss than during an expansion and consequently a greater benefit may be appropriate however it is also known that increasing ui generosity has a negative effect on job search intensity and puts upward pressure on wages leading to lower job creation given these benefits and costs i seek to answer the following questions what structure of benefits over the business cycle is welfare maximizing is the current policy of increasing the generosity of ui during recessions optimal to accomplish this i develop a dynamic search model of the u s labor market which connects two parts of the optimal ui literature the first takes a partial equilibrium approach to determine the optimal adjustments to ui when job finding rates fall but does not consider ui s impact on job creation the second endogenizes job creation but does not address how the benefit system should adjust with the business cycle the model i present is unique in that it allows for both similar to studies that use the partial equilibrium approach one of the main factors driving the optimal ui program in this article is the moral hazard problem that arises from the inability to monitor the unemployed s job search shavell and weiss s 1979 seminal work shows that a sequence of ui benefits that declines with the length of unemployment provides the necessary incentives to encourage job search when the government s objective is to maximize welfare subject to a fixed budget although not explicitly modeling firm behavior hansen and imrohoroglu 1992 allow the ui budget to be endogenously determined similar to this article the authors also frame the moral hazard problem in terms of the government s inability to monitor rejections of job offers as well as allow for private savings they find that the optimal replacement rate is quite low just 0 15 in their baseline moral hazard case hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 focus on unobservable search intensity and develop a widely used recursive contract approach to determine the cost minimizing ui benefit schedule and employment tax where the policy parameters are contingent on an individual s complete work history a benefit amount that declines during one s unemployment spell and a subsequent employment tax that increases with the length of unemployment is optimal and results in utility falling continuously during unemployment pavoni 2007 extends this approach by including a guaranteed lower bound on utility which results in an optimal benefit schedule that falls sharply and includes a one time drop in benefits to a subsistence level alvarez parra and sanchez 2009 explicitly model this lower bound by including a hidden labor market where workers can continue to receive ui benefits undetected in this study the optimal benefit schedule falls slowly at first to ensure workers search in the formal sector and then falls sharply to zero allowing workers to derive consumption from the informal sector

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

electoral competition in the american states electoral competition is a concept that has played a central role in much of the state politics literature one commonly used indicator of competition in the states is the ranney index we offer an alternative indicator of competition one based on district level outcomes of state legislative elections after evaluating both indicators in terms of validity and reliability the analysis suggests that the district level indicator is both empirically and intuitively superior as a measure of electoral competition the implications of this finding are discussed

should unemployment insurance vary with the unemployment rate theory and evidence we study how the marginal welfare gain from increasing the unemployment insurance ui bene t level varies over the business cycle we do this by estimating how the moral hazard cost and the consumption smoothing bene t of ui vary with labor market conditions which we identify using variation in the interaction of ui bene t levels with the unemployment rate within u s states over time we nd that the moral hazard cost is procyclical greater when the unemployment rate is relatively low by contrast we do not nd evidence that the consumption smoothing bene t varies with the unemployment rate we use these empirical results to estimate the marginal welfare gain and we nd that it is modest on average but varies positively with the unemployment rate jel h5 j64 j65

vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers inference with limited data in this paper different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared demand estimates are used to compute price cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed the purpose is to identify the set of margins compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost and to select the model most consistent with the data among non nested competing models the models considered are 1 a simple linear pricing model 2 a vertically integrated model and 3 a variety of alternative strategic supply scenarios that allow for collusion non linear pricing and strategic behaviour with respect to private label products using data on yogurt sold in several stores in a large urban area of the u s the results imply that wholesale prices are close to marginal cost and that retailers have pricing power in the vertical chain this is consistent with non linear pricing by the manufacturers or high bargaining power of the retailers

liberalizing a distribution system the european car market we quantify the competitive effects of liberalizing the selective and exclusive distribution system in the european car market based on a model of oligopoly pricing with differentiated products we consider two possible competitive effects from liberalization i the creation of international intrabrand competition cross border trade which will result in a reduction of international price discrimination and ii a possible cumulative effect arising from a strengthening of national intrabrand competition which would result in reduced double marginalization we find that the reduction in international price discrimination mainly redistributes consumer gains across countries it has a positive but modest effect on total welfare if liberalization also has the cumulative effect of reducing double marginalization the welfare effects are much higher finally we find that the effects of liberalization on the manufacturers profits are either small or positive this finding implies that international price discrimination and softening competition through a double marginalization mechanism should not be interpreted as main profit motives for the previous distribution system but only as unintended side effects hence the industry rationale for maintaining the previous distribution system should be sought in other areas jel f15 l42

markets state franchise laws dealer terminations and the auto crisis abstract in fall 2008 general motors and chrysler were both on the brink of bankruptcy and ford was not far behind as the government stepped in and restructuring began gm and chrysler announced their plan to terminate about 2 200 dealerships in this paper we first provide an overview of franchising in car distribution how it came about and the legal framework within which it functions states earn about 20 percent of all state sales taxes from auto dealers as a result new car dealerships and especially local or state car dealership associations have been able to exert influence over local legislatures this has led to a set of state laws that almost guarantee dealership profitability and survival albeit at the expense of manufacturer profits available evidence and theory suggests that as a result of these laws distribution costs and retail prices are higher than they otherwise would be and this is particularly true for detroit s big three car manufacturers which is likely a factor contribut

the efficient allocation of consumption under moral hazard and hidden access to the credit market in this paper we describe the properties of the optimal allocation of consumption in a world with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending we discuss how and under what conditions the efficient allocation can be distinguished from that of the permanent income self insurance model we also compare our allocation with the complete markets full information case and with the standard moral hazard model with monitorable and fully contractible asset holdings jel d82 e21 jel d82 e21 jel d82 e21 jel d82 e21

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

public sector efficiency the roles of political and budgetary institutions fiscal capacity and democratic participation the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether efficiency in public service provision is affected by political and budgetary institutions fiscal capacity and democratic participation in order to address this issue we take advantage of a new global efficiency measure for norwegian local governments we find that high fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation contribute to low efficiency in addition there is some evidence that democratic participation increases efficiency while a centralized top down budgetary procedure is associated with low efficiency

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

optimal state contingent unemployment insurance since the probability of finding a job is aected not only by individual eort but also by the aggregate state of the economy designing unemployment insurance payments conditional on the business cycle could be valuable this paper answers a fundamental question related to this issue how should the payments vary with the aggregate state of the economy

political fragmentation party ideology and public expenditures in this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions the model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power we estimate the model in the case of the french departements our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the french departements depend on the effective political power of the majority

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets the case of the u s automobile industry this paper develops and estimates a model of the u s automobile industry on the demand side a discrete choice model is adopted that is estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey the estimation results are used in conjunction with population weights to derive aggregate demand on the supply side the automobile industry is modelled as an oligopoly with product differentiation equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions of the profit maximizing firms the estimation results are used in counterfactual simulations to investigate two trade policy issues the effects of the ver and exchange rate pass through

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

elections economic outcomes and policy choices in canada 1870 2015 in this paper we examine the relationship between economic and electoral outcomes in canada since confederation 1867 and the role that economic policy has played in influencing this relationship