the pricing of currency risk in japan abstract previous work on the pricing of exchange rate risk has primarily focused on us firms and surprisingly found stock returns were not significantly affected by exchange rate fluctuations in this paper we conduct an in depth investigation that examines whether exchange rate risk is priced in the equity market of japan using an intertemporal asset pricing testing procedure that allows risk premia to change through time in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions our multiperiod asset pricing tests show that the foreign exchange rate risk premium is a significant component of japanese stock returns specifically the results suggest that currency risk exposure commands a significant risk premium for multinationals and high exporting japanese firms the currency risk factor is found to be less influential in explaining the behavior of average returns for low exporting and domestic firms however it is shown to exhibit large return volatility that is likely to be perceived by investors who wish to control portfolio risk as an important underlying source of risk furthermore japanese stock returns are found to be related to the relative distress and size factors above and beyond the covariation explained by the currency risk factor

optimal pricing of intraday liquidity abstract this paper presents a general equilibrium model where intraday liquidity is needed because the timing of payments is uncertain a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be efficient is that the nominal intraday interest rate be zero even when the overnight rate is strictly positive because a market for liquidity may not achieve efficiency this creates a role for the central bank i allow for the possibility of moral hazard and study policies commonly used by central banks to reduce their exposure to risk i show collateralized lending achieves the efficient allocation while for certain parameters caps cannot prevent moral hazard

inheritance law and investment in family firms entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs the size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers using a purpose built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10 004 firms from 38 countries in 1990 2006 we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms but does not affect investment in nonfamily firms moreover as the model predicts inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession jel g31 g32

mutual funds ownership and firm performance evidence from china mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in china this study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds ownership on firm performance in china using a large sample for the period of 2001 2005 we find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance the result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in china to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial

controlling risk in payment systems over the past twenty years the growing integration of financial markets the development of new financial instruments and the advance of computer technology have all contributed to a remarkable growth of financial activity in the main industrialized countries one of the most significant consequences of this growth has been the unprecedented increase in the volume of trade on the largevalue interbank payment systems see table 1 which itself has resulted in a massive increase in intraday overdrafts on those systems see table 2 the central banks of the large industrialized countries concerned with the risks that this growth was creating for their banking systems have been studying the risks on interbank payment systems work that has borne fruit with the angell report bank for international settlements bis 1989 and the lamfalussy report bis 1990 both under the aegis of the bis and the padoa schioppa report european community 1992 under the aegis of the eec of particular concern is the organization of interbank large value transfer systems banks have traditionally concluded among themselves multilateral netting arrangements which settle at discrete time intervals this is the modern form of clearinghouses which still operate for small value transfers these arrangements

clearinghouse banks and banknote over issue abstract the paper presents a model of banks as clearinghouses of private debt where money is used as the means of payment implications of the model include i the private provision of banknotes or a discount window may be needed to avoid the insufficient debt clearing that results from an inflexible currency stock and ii an uncontrolled total money stock may result in a multiplicity of equilibria including an inflationary banknote over issue

firm valuation earnings expectations and the exchange rate exposure effect consistent with previous research we fail to find a significant correlation between the abnormal returns of our sample firms with international activities and changes in the dollar we investigate the possibility that this failure is due to mispricing lagged changes in the dollar are a significant variable in explaining current abnormal returns of our sample firms suggesting that mispricing does occur a simple trading strategy based upon these results generates significant abnormal returns corroborating evidence from returns around earnings announcements as well as errors in analysts forecasts of earnings is also provided it is a widely held view that exchange rate movement should affect the value of a firm standard economic analysis implies that the profitability and value of most u s firms with foreign sales or operations abroad should increase decrease with an unexpected depreciation appreciation of the dollar as expected foreign currency cash flows translate into larger smaller u s

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

do esops enhance firm performance evidence from china s reform experiment abstract china introduced employee stock ownership plans esops in 1992 purely as an employee incentive scheme the government initiated the policy experiment on esops as part of china s reform of its state owned enterprises and it was abruptly terminated 2 years after initiation this policy experiment resulted in an exogenous sample of esops that allows us to provide the first evidence from chinese firms on the performance esop relation after examining a variety of performance measures including roa roe tobin s q and productivity we find little difference in performance between esop firms and non esop firms

does the form of compensation matter abstract the role of fee contracts in the agency relation between investment bankers and client firms in tender offers is investigated using a sample of offers between 1978 and 1986 different fees have different payoff functions which can be used by firms to create incentives and by bankers to signal differences in abilities the effectiveness of fee contracts in resolving agency problems in tested with mixed results the evidence suggests that fee contracts are used as a tool by both firms and bankers and that contracts influence tender offer outcomes but that contracting is only a partial solution to the agency problem

an empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives abstract prior research on the factors influencing the use of debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing is extended by considering management incentives when alternative incentive variables are considered separately we find covenants have a significant negative relation to ceo cash compensation an insignificant relation to the value of ceo equity held and significant positive relations to both the ratio of the value of ceo equity holdings to cash compensation and the fraction of equity held by the ceo in two stage simultaneous equations models only the latter is significant when jointly considered with each of the other incentive variables

the impact of foreign board membership on firm value abstract this study examines the effect of foreign anglo american board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value tobin s q using a sample of firms with headquarters in norway or sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider anglo american board member s after a variety of firm specific and corporate governance related factors have been controlled for we argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by importing an anglo american corporate governance system such an import signals a willingness on the part of the firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial market

agency relationships in family firms theory and evidence does owner management necessarily eliminate the agency costs of ownership drawing on agency literature and on the economic theory of the household we argue that private ownership and owner management expose privately held owner managed firms to agency threats ignored by jensen s and meckling s 1976 agency model private ownership and owner management not only reduce the effectiveness of external control mechanisms they also expose firms to a self control problem created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which harm themselves as well as those around them jensen 1994 p 43 thus shareholders have incentive to invest resources in curbing both managerialand owner opportunism we extend this thesis to the domain of the family firm after developing hypotheses which describe how family dynamics and specifically altruism exacerbate agency problems experienced by these privately held owner managed firms we use data obtained from a large scale survey of family businesses to field test our hypotheses and find evidence which suggests support for our proposed theory finally we discuss the implications of our theory for research on family and other types of privately held owner managed firms

executive shareholding compensation and analyst forecast of chinese firms abstractwe examine the impact of executive and leadership shareholding and cash compensation on analyst forecast error and dispersion as proxies for information asymmetry we find that firms pay higher compensation or excess compensation to executives and directors are associated with higher information asymmetry the positive association is stronger where executives and directors shareholdings are higher shareholding appears to facilitate managerial entrenchment and gives highly paid executives leadership stronger structural power which adversely affects information disclosure leading to larger forecast error and dispersion these results are robust to different measures of compensation and alternative models controlling for the predictability of firm level earnings our findings indicate that executive director shareholding and compensation do not provide sufficient incentives for information disclosure by chinese firms

exchange rates and firms liquidity evidence from adrs abstract exchange rate changes can in principle affect a firm s value by affecting the firm s earnings or its cost of funds existing studies using monthly data over long sample periods find little or no impact of changes in exchange rates on a firm s valuation we examine a different potential path for exchange rate effects namely the effect of exchange rate variability on a stock s liquidity using transactions data we examine the microstructure characteristics of united kingdom and mexican american depositary receipts adrs around two major exchange rate crises the pound sterling withdrawal from the european exchange rate mechanism in september 1992 and the mexican devaluation of december 1994 we conclude that these events of exchange rate turbulence had little or no effect on the trading costs of adrs in the united states the results suggest that the impact of exchange rate volatility on market liquidity is not a conduit by which stock values are affected

disclosure policy a discussion of leuz triantis and wang 2008 on going dark abstract ltw 2008 examine firms withdrawing from the sec reporting system but continuing to trade on pink sheets the paper finds that sarbanes oxley increased the propensity of firms to go dark but counter to conventional wisdom had no significant effect on the rate of going private transactions agency costs as well as poor growth opportunities proximity to financial distress and increased compliance costs arising from sox increase the propensity to go dark suggestions to improve the empirical implementation and interpretation involve including additional control and more suitable explanatory variables and more attention to causation issues and to the quantification of economic significance

negotiated block trades and corporate control we identify negotiated trades of large percentage blocks of stock as corporate control transactions when a block trades and the firm is not fully acquired cumulative abnormal returns average 5 6 and 33 of the chief executives are replaced within a year stock price increases are larger when control passes to the new blockholder when management does not resist the blockholder s effort to influence corporate policy and when the block purchaser eventually fully acquires the firm these findings suggest that the specific skills and expertise of blockholders and not just the concentration of ownership are important determinants of firm value we examine 106 negotiated trades of at least 5 of the common stock of new york stock exchange nyse and american stock exchange amex listed corporations our primary objective is to assess the impact of these transactions on the firms whose shares are traded we also investigate the importance of active block investor s specific managerial expertise and incentives for firm value the emerging literature on concentrated ownership focuses on how the level of ownership affects a blockholder s incentives to undertake a variety of corporate decisions although it has been recognized that a blockholder s identity also can be important less attention has been paid to this issue several recent studies however provide evidence that blockholders incentives and expertise are not homogeneous for example holderness and sheehan 1985 find that the stock market reacts more favorably to initial block accumulations by six controversial investors who are often portrayed in the press as raiders than to initial accumulations by a random sample of investors morck shleifer and vishny 1988 find that firm value tends to be lower when the firm is run by a member of the founder s family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder brickley lease and smith 1988 document that institutional blockholders are less willing to vote against management on antitakeover amendments when they are likely to have business dealings with the firm when a block trades the concentration of ownership typically does not change but the blockholder s identity does

institutional ownership stability and bhc performance abstract in this study the association between performance of bhcs and institutional ownership stability is investigated and contrasted to those found for the less regulated utility and industrial firms in order to determine whether regulation displaces owner monitoring we employ a simultaneous equations model treating firm performance and institutional ownership stability as endogenous variables several results are obtained first bhc performance is positively associated with institutional ownership stability second this association is weaker for bhcs than for comparable utility and industrial firms possibly because of the substitution of regulation for owner monitoring in banking third this association is stronger in the recent deregulated years and for bhcs with lower likelihood of regulatory intervention

corporate governance and equity prices evidence from the czech and slovak republics the 1992 czechoslavakia mass privatization program involving about 1 500 eneterprises and implemented through a voucher scheme with competitive bidding was a bold step in changing the ownership and governance of a large part of the economy it represents a clear test case of one approach and other countries may benefit from its lessons at the time much skepticisism was voiced about mass privatization it would lead to diffuse ownership and no effective corporate governance would result but innovative forces led to the emergence of investment funds that collected much of the individuals voucher points leading to a much more concentrated ownership structure it has been expected that this concentrated ownership would lead to improved corporate governance but the jury is still out so far only limited and largely anecdotal evidence is available on the impact investment funds have on the way firms are being managed too little time has passed and too many shocks have occurred for example the split of the czech and slovak republics to expect to find discernible changes in corporate governance on measures of actual firm performance an alternative approach is to investigate whether firms that ended up with more concentrated ownership and possibly improved governance sell for higher prices either in the last voucher round or in the secondary market since then in a forward looking financial market one can expect prices to incorporate the effects of better ownership on future firm performance and associated dividends to shareholders put differently one would expect that two firms with different shareholding structures but otherwise identical would trade at different prices with the firm with a more concentrated ownership and presumably better corporate governance trading at a higher price on a cross sectional basis ownership structure may thus be significant in explaining relative share prices the author explores this line of reasoning controlling for a number of firm and sector specific variables he finds 1 majority ownership by a domestic or foreign investor has a positive influence on firm prices 2 firms with many small owners have lower prices 3 ownership by many small scale investors makes it easier for any single investor to establish effective control but such control does not necessarily translate into higher prices the author also provides two possible explanations of why higher prices appear to be associated only with majority ownership by a single investor he finds 1 the corporate legal framework and the difficulty in collecting proxy votes in the czech and slovak republics may prevent a small investor from making the necessary changes in the way firms are managed thus keeping prices low and 2 commercial banks are both managers of invesment funds and creditors of individual firms funds managers may face conflicts of interest and not be interested in increasing the value of equity alone but also the value of credits this could explain why prices are relatively lower for those firms in which investment funds have effective control

exchange rate exposure and industry characteristics evidence from canada japan and the usa abstract this paper examines industry level exchange rate exposures for canada japan and the usa measuring exposure by adding the change in the exchange rate to the domestic market model of industry portfolio returns some industries in all three countries display significant exposures moreover for each country the exchange rate is important for explaining industry returns at the economy wide level to explore whether exchange rate exposures are systematically linked to the activities of the industries we model exposure as a function of industry characteristics for all three countries the relation between exposure and industry characteristics is broadly consistent with economic theory jel f3

the performance effect of managerial ownership evidence from china abstract by examining a sample of non listed chinese firms we provide the first evidence from china for the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance in matching sample comparisons we find that firms of significant managerial ownership outperform firms whose managers do not own equity shares our further results indicate the relation between firm performance and managerial ownership is nonlinear and the inflection point at which the relation turns negative occurs at ownership above 50 compared with previous studies our results are less likely to suffer from an endogeneity problem due to the non list nature of our sample and the unique institutional environment in china

south korean chaebols and value based management south korean industrial conglomerates chaebols are discussed in the context of value based management vbm recent economics and finance literature on the diversion of corporate resources from the firm to the controlling shareholders tunneling for which chaebols are notoriously known is discussed chaebols have engaged in empire building and expropriation of minority shareholders distorting the process of efficient resource allocation in south korea and became the root cause of the 1997 financial crisis we argue that the 1997 crisis should be viewed as a consequence of chaebols systematic deviation from the guiding principles of vbm we use tunneling within chaebols as an example of the need to directly address prohibition of the expropriation of minority shareholders as a primary postulate of vbm we argue that vbm should require that the value generated by the firm not be expropriated from minorities or any stakeholders by dominant shareholders we also examine moral and ethical considerations and present explanations as to why the unethical practice of tunneling has been tolerated by the south korean public we show that public opinion on tunneling is changing and that the treatment of minority shareholders by chaebols controlling families is becoming increasingly unacceptable to south koreans

the asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation a panel threshold regression approach abstractprior research shows that chief executive officers ceos are rewarded for their earnings management we re examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach which allows the effect of earnings management on the ceo compensation to change across the level of earnings management and ceo compensation our results show that the effect of ceos discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation in particular for firms with moderate inordinate levels of earnings management and ceo compensation earnings management is rewarded penalized

founders heirs and corporate opacity in the united states abstract we argue that information about firm activities can vary substantially in the presence of founder or heir ownership thereby influencing the risks borne by minority investors we explore two hypotheses with regard to these controlling shareholders and corporate transparency focusing on their role as monitor in place and their potential to exploit firm opacity to accrue private benefits of control to test these notions we create an opacity index that ranks the relative transparency of the two thousand largest industrial us firms and find founder and heir ownership in 22 and 25 of these firms respectively our analysis indicates that in large publicly traded companies both founder and heir firms are significantly more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms we also find that founder and heir controlled firms exhibit a negative relation to performance in all but the most transparent firms surprisingly additional tests reveal that concerns about divergences in ownership versus control management type dual class shares and board influence appear to be substantially less important than corporate opacity in explaining the performance impacts of founder and heir control finally we decompose corporate opacity into disclosure and market scrutiny components finding that the disclosure quality component appears to be of greater importance to investors however irrespective of whether these controlling shareholders create or stay in the firm because of corporate opacity our analysis suggests that founders and heirs in large publicly traded firms exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors

earnings and management incentives comments abstract in the preceding papers pourciau murphy and zimmerman and clinch and magliolo address the role of earnings in evaluating ceo performance for dismissal or compensation decisions and the implications for earnings management this comment evaluates the three papers and suggests avenues for future research into the stewardship role of accounting data and opportunistic financial reporting behavior

the real bills doctrine versus the quantity theory a reconsideration two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models the real bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such intermediation the quantity theory prescription in contrast is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate money from credit although our models are consistent with quantity theory predictions about money supply and price level behavior under these two policy prescriptions the models imply that the quantity theory prescription is not pareto optimal and the real bills prescription is

the bullionist controversy theory and new evidence the bullionist controversy in the united kingdom is one of the first debates about the determination of the price level and the exchange rate under a paper money standard despite the importance of the debate in the development of monetary theory there remains little empirical evidence that uses modern multivariate time series techniques the evidence that does exist provides support for the anti bullionist position the purpose of this paper is to review the debate and develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that is capable of capturing key features of the 19th century british financial system the model is estimated using bayesian procedures to test the competing hypotheses the paper provides support for the bullionist position

the investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice abstract this paper provides evidence on the cross sectional relation between firms investment opportunities their debt and compensation contracts their size and financial leverage and their accounting procedure choices this evidence is important because previous studies hypothesize that the link between firms investment opportunities and their accounting choices helps explain extant results on the size debt equity and bonus plan hypotheses however while i find that firms investment opportunities do affect the nature of their contracts i also find that the traditional explanations for accounting choice are important after controlling for the effects of the investment opportunity set

ceo duality as a double edged sword how boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command when a firm s chief executive officer is also the chairperson of its board directors have opposing objectives according to organization theory such ceo duality establishes strong unambiguous le

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

transferability finality and debt settlement abstract payment fundamental to exchange in a decentralized economy often takes the form of transfers of inside money i e specialized forms of debt associated with each type of inside money is a set of rules that governs both the legitimacy of such transfers as means of extinguishing other debts and the allocation of the ensuing risks in this paper we develop a model of debt as inside money in a simple mechanism design framework we show that transferable debt that can be used to settle other debt obligations with finality can be a welfare improving arrangement in the presence of limited enforcement powers transferable debt has two advantages over simple chains of credit it allows for removal of less than perfectly reliable agents from the chain in a timely fashion and it allows agents to direct payments to the proper party without direct communication with other members of the credit chain

the agency problems embedded in firm s equity investment we find that agency problems are embedded in firm s excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder s motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure the excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average the abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance our empirical evidences of 345 taiwanese non financial listed firms show that firm s excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder s cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control cash flow deviation and board affiliation the results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by la porta et al 2002 journal of finance57 1147 1171 and claessen et al 2002 journal of finance57 2741 2742 the negative relation between equity investment and firm s value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders this study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner s ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm s value

the reverse lbo decision and firm performance theory and evidence we investigate the transition from private to public ownership of companies that had previously been subject to leveraged buyouts lbos we show that the information asymmetry problem firms face when they go to public markets for equity as well as behavioral and debt overhang effects will produce a pattern in which superior performance before an offering should be expected with disappointing performance subsequently we find empirical evidence of this phenomenon by studying 62 reverse lbos that went public between 1983 and 1987 the market appears to anticipate this pattern in 1991 56 leveraged buyouts lbos returned to the public equity markets part of a broader phenomenon in which a large fraction of lbos go public again hence becoming reverse lbos kaplan 1991 reports that 45 percent of a sample of large lbos completed between 1979 and 1986 later returned to public ownership moreover reverse lbos tend to be larger than the average initial public offering ipo 1 in sum transitions from the lbo form to public ownership have become a widespread and economically significant phenomenon we find strong evidence that the return to public ownership of reverse lbos coincides with a peak in their operating performance their operating income as a percentage of total assets grew by about seven percentage points in the preoffering year comparison firms in the same industries show a slight decline in the same performance measure moreover in the preoffering year reverse lbos outperform continuing lbos in the year after the

ownership and firm innovation in a transition economy evidence from china we examine innovation performance of firms in a transition economy from an ownership perspective we focus specifically on the relationship between ownership structures and firm innovation performance drawing on data from 548 chinese firms we find volume of patent registration to be most strongly influenced by foreign ownership in the firm along with firm affiliation within a business group the influence of state and institutional ownership on innovation performance is positive but lagged contrary to expectations insider ownership leads to lower innovation performance and concentrated ownership has no significant impact our study has two principal contributions firstly we utilize a comprehensive treatment of ownership characteristics overcoming weakness in previous studies that have used a more narrow focus on ownership type secondly we contribute to understanding of how firms in transition economies build indigenous capabilities for innovation by drawing attention to the interplay of foreign and domestic control of agents innovation

does best practice in setting executive pay in the uk encourage good behaviour we examine how uk listed companies set executive pay reviewing the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and examining how this can conflict with what shareholders and other stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour we do this by considering current governance regulation in the light of interviews with protagonists in the debate setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration setters and showing how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts

u k and u s trading of british cross listed stocks an intraday analysis of market integration this article analyzes intraday patterns for u k and u s trading of british cross listed stocks for each market the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar non cross listed stocks there is a 2 hour period each day when cross listed stocks are traded both in new york and in london this overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information originating in new york gets incorporated into prices in both markets cross border competition for order flow tends to reduce already declining spreads in london by contrast new york specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap overall the evidence indicates that order flow for cross listed securities is segmented article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

performance thresholds in managerial incentive contracts performance thresholds are commonly used in executive compensation contracts we examine the contractual nonlinearity associated with performance thresholds and its incentive implications incorporating a performance threshold into a standard principal agent model of a linear contract we show that pay schemes using a performance threshold are optimal by truncating a linear scheme at poor performance the threshold mitigates agency costs associated with the downside risk of production examining ceo compensation data we find evidence of the role of performance thresholds as a consequence of under threshold performance the tobit estimator is shown to increase pay performance sensitivity notably improving upon the standard ols estimator

disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings this article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership using data for 1 301 publicly traded corporations in eight east asian economies we find that firm value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder consistent with a positive incentive effect but firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow ownership consistent with an entrenchment effect given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world

payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments abstract the first setup we study is a deterministic model with spatial separation where we consider alternative payments systems institutions and their implications for allocation and welfare a payments system with period by period settlement in outside money improves on decentralized exchange an efficient allocation is supported by a payments system where settlement is not imposed in the second model there is random matching and unobserved productivity shocks and preference shocks we explore how risk should be shared optimally in this economy and interpret the results in terms of how actual payments systems should operate journal of economic literature classification numbers e4 e5

a financial model of foreign exchange exposure the paper describes a model of foreign exchange exposure this is defined as the sensitivity of a specific investment s value in reference currency to changes in exchange rate forecasts this sensitivity may result because some share of the investment cash flows are denominated in foreign currency alternatively a share of cash flows denominated in reference currency which are affected by future exchange rates can also generate sensitivity

managerial ownership of voting rights abstract managers of firms with dual classes of common stock can choose different quantities of votes for a given cash flow interest by choosing different quantities of the two securities we study managerial stock holdings in 45 dual class firms and find that vote ownership per se is an important motivation for these holdings in that corporate officers and their families hold a median 56 9 of the votes and 24 0 of the common stock cash flows we also find significant family involvement in many sample firms and document four case studies in which explicit acquisition premiums were paid for superior voting shares

management and ownership effects evidence from five countries despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross national sample this study empirically examines the ownership concentration performance relationship across the nations of canada france germany the united kingdom and the united states essentially we argue that the correlation if any between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied 1998 john wiley sons ltd

testing agency theory with entrepreneur effort and wealth we develop a principal agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model s predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental variables techniques we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk effort increases with ownership and effort increases firm performance the magnitude of the effects in the cross section of firms suggests that agency costs may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity

structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance the link between managerial ownership and corporate performance this paper presents a parsimonious structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership firm scale and performance and the empirical associations among them in particular variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well known hump shaped relation between tobin s q and managerial ownership to assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model the unfortunate conclusion is that at least in the ownership performance context proxy variables fixed effects and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias

q and the tax bias theory abstract a growing body of literature analyzes the variation in q the ratio of financial market value to asset current replacement cost and makes inferences about attributes such as monopoly power profitability managerial performance etc these studies ignore potential biases embedded in q that result from non neutral tax policies this study examines the association between q and tax biases and establishes that differences in accumulated depreciation tax shields explain significant variation in q the implication that q should be adjusted for tax biases before use in empirical research is examined further adjusting q for tax biases at least with the factors herein leads only to minor changes in econometric analyses

rediscounting under aggregate risk abstract this paper compares three institutions that offer an elastic currency open market operations a discount window and a private banknote issuing clearinghouse in an economy with financial markets otherwise hampered by a lack of liquidity when this economy is subject to aggregate financial shocks these alternative forms of central banking are shown to differ in their implications for risk sharing interesting implications include i central bank losses and monetary innovations that are part of an efficient equilibrium and ii desirable quantity restrictions at the discount window

price differences between equity classes corporate control foreign ownership or liquidity abstract this paper is the first comprehensive study of price differences for dual class equity at the oslo stock exchange it analyzes the relative importance of corporate control foreign ownership restrictions and stock market liquidity for the price differences the norwegian market has the peculiar feature that in part of the sample period non voting shares were trading at a premium to voting shares i e what is usually termed the voting premium was negative this result can be rationalized by restrictions on foreign ownership in the later part of the period with no regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership the voting premium is positive and related to corporate governance and liquidity

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

the performance of privatized firms in the czech republic abstract with the growing importance of privatizations as a part of government policy most empirical studies of these privatizations conclude that firm performance immediately improves following privatization privatization has been the most important part of the transition from the centrally planned economies of central and eastern europe and has a larger impact on those economies than privatizations in other countries however few studies have looked at the performance of firms following mass privatization this study uses 453 separate firms 101 firms privatized in both waves for a total of 554 observations in the first and second waves of czech voucher privatization using methodology from previous studies we find that while the overall effects from privatization are positive the effects vary by privatization wave size and industry firms privatized in the first wave performed worse decline in performance following privatization than firms privatized in the second wave we also fail to find ownership concentration or debt as an important factor in restructuring the firm i believe that the results are consistent with two hypotheses first economic and political structure surrounding the privatization waves plays an important part in the success of privatization stable environments both political and economic help privatized firms restructure and improve operating performance as well as attract foreign investors and capital even in less developed countries but in transitional economies undergoing mass privatization in rapidly changing and developing economic and political environments hinder firms from restructuring and improving performance following privatization results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms with a longer preparation period prior to privatization an implicit seasoning improve performance following privatization

rediscounting under aggregate risk with moral hazard freeman 1999 proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different effects this is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable

exchange rate variability and the riskiness of u s multinational firms evidence from the breakdown of the bretton woods system abstract we examine the relation between exchange rate variability and stock return volatility for u s multinational firms and decompose this relation into components of systematic and diversifiable risk focusing on two five year periods around the 1973 switch from fixed to floating exchange rates we find a significant increase in volatility of monthly stock returns corresponding to the period of increased exchange rate variability even relative to the increase in stock return volatility for three control samples in conjunction with this increase in total volatility there is also an increase in market risk beta for multinational firms

does increased equity ownership lead to more strategically involved boards according to jay lorsch boards will be increasingly expected to exercise more leadership even strategic leadership in the running of a firm in order to align directors to the best interest of the firm directors are increasingly required to purchase the equity of the companies on whose board they serve and in the majority of cases the minimum shareholding is 1000 shares the rationale for this is that the directors will take the perspective of real owners of the company partly based on a study by the national association of corporate directors in 1995 using behavioral economics this paper makes some counterintuitive predictions about how involved boards are likely to react to an offer for a hostile takeover by studying their reactions the paper inductively analyzes the use of equity ownership as an incentive mechanism

firm ownership and productivity a study of family and non family smes motivated by a lack of consensus in the current literature the objective of this paper is to reveal whether family firms are more or less productive than non family firms as a first step this paper links family business research to the theoretical notion that family involvement has an effect on the factors of production from a productivity standpoint second by using a cobb douglas framework we provide empirical evidence that family labour and capital indeed yield diverse output contributions compared with their non family counterparts in particular family labour output contributions are significantly higher and family capital output contributions significantly lower interestingly differences in total factor productivity between family and non family firms disappear when we allow for heterogeneous output contributions of family production inputs these findings imply that the assumption of homogeneous labour and capital between family and non family firms is inappropriate when estimating the production function

the exchange rate exposure of u s multinationals this article examines the exposure of u s multinationals to foreign currency risk evidence is presented that the relationship between stock returns and exchange rates differs systematically across multinationals given these results the study focuses on the determinants of exchange rate exposure the comovements between stock returns and the value of the dollar is found to be positively related to the percentage of foreign operations of u s multinationals copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

real time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy abstract using a neoclassical monetary model we investigate the welfare cost of a payment system that operates as a real time gross settlement rtgs system we illustrate how the cost of such systems ultimately derives from the credit constraints imposed by rtgs the effects of these constraints can be undone if the central bank makes intraday credit freely available if intraday credit is only available on a collateralized basis however rtgs will always impose a liquidity cost

monetary stability and liquidity crises the role of the lender of last resort we study an economy where agents are subject to liquidity demand shocks and banks arise endogenously to insure consumers against these shocks in this environment we evaluate the desirability of a lender of last resort who can provide liquidity loans to banks in distress in the absence of a lender of last resort the economy has a unique stationary equilibrium the introduction of unlimited and costless lender of last resort services allows the economy to achieve a steady state allocation that is pareto optimal however this economy also displays a continuum of hyperin ationary equilibria we then explore restrictions on the provision of lender of last resort services that rule out such monetary instability while preserving some of the e ciency obtained by unrestricted lender of last resort services when the lender of last resort charges an interest rate on liquidity loans the economy has a unique steady state equilibrium and when the interest rate charged is high enough no hyperin ationary equilibria arise finally when the lender of last resort faces an upper bound on loanable funds there is again a unique long run equilibrium and when the upper bound on loanable funds is small enough hyperin ationary equilibria are ruled out

exposure to exchange rate movements abstract this paper suggests an approach to measuring a firm s exposure which depends on the stochastic relationship between the firm s real rate of return and exchange rate movements using a simplified two country model exposure is shown to depend on the extent to which individual asset prices adjust with exchange rates the distribution of such adjustments between countries and the relationship between domestic inflation and exchange rate movements while the distribution of real and nominal positions across countries is also a determinant of exposure it is shown that purely domestic firms no foreign assets or liabilities will typically be exposed

an analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths implications for the managerial labor market abstract certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive s continued employment these wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty three events these abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive s status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive s talents and decision making responsibility and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

does home bias affect firm value evidence from holdings of mutual funds worldwide this study finds strong evidence that home bias affects firm valuation at both country and firm levels at the country level increasing the bias of domestic investors toward home equity lowers the market valuation of home equity at the firm level firm value increases as the compositions of local equities held by domestic and foreign investors tend toward the firms global market capitalization weights but decreases as their weights deviate from global weights overall the evidence is consistent with the optimal global risk sharing hypothesis that the greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors in international capital markets reduces the cost of capital and hence enhances market valuation

does the bonding effect matter in a more integrated capital market world abstract this paper examines the bonding effect of cross listing before and after the stock market liberalization reforms in china consistent with the bonding hypothesis we find that chinese firms with foreign listings attain higher valuations than firms without foreign listings we also find that they manage earnings less than comparable purely domestic listed firms and have more informative stock prices further investigation indicates that the divergence in earnings quality between cross listed and non cross listed firms shrinks dramatically after the chinese stock market liberalization reforms in 2001 and 2002 overall the results suggest that the bonding effect is mitigated in an increasingly integrated capital market world

the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may and often do diverge and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear in creating these new relationships the quasi public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution it has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit seeking enterprise 1

inside the family firm the role of families in succession decisions and performance this paper uses a unique dataset from denmark to investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance we focus on the decision to appoint either a family or an external chief executive officer ceo the paper uses variation in ceo succession decisions that result from the gender of a departing ceo s first born child this is a plausible instrumental variable iv as male firstchild firms are more likely to pass on control to a family ceo relative to female first child firms but the gender of a first child is unlikely to affect firms outcomes we find that family successions have a large negative causal impact on firm performance operating profitability on assets falls by at least four percentage points around ceo transitions our iv estimates are significantly larger than those obtained using ordinary least squares furthermore we show that family ceo underperformance is particularly large for firms in high growth industries and for relatively large firms overall the empirical results demonstrate that professional non family ceos provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they head

the payments system liquidity and rediscounting in an economy where fiat money serves both as a medium of exchange and the means by which debts are cleared it is shown that nonoptimal equilibria of constrained liquidity may arise optimality may be restored by temporary expansions of the monetary base e g an active central bank discount window copyright 1996 by american economic association

production hidden action and the payment system abstract using a modified version of freeman s 1996 payment system model the optimal intraday rate is examined the production set is modified to account for a non degenerate distribution of settlements within a day in addition to the modified production set the consumption set is modified a positive intraday interest rate may be able to implement the planner s allocation

controlling the conflict of interest in management buyouts a controversial aspect of the management buyouts that were popular throughout the 1980s is the potential for a conflict of interest to arise when a manager bids to acquire the firm he manages this study examines 184 management buyouts and reports three findings first returns to prebuyout shareholders are greater when managers must bid against outside acquirers second bid revisions in the face of competition exceed revisions due to shareholder litigation and negotiations with boards third the incidence of competition is negatively related to the prebuyout share holdings of managers coauthors are ronald f singer anju seth and darla f lang copyright 1994 by mit press

financial crises payment system problems and discount window lending in a developed economy financial crises are rapidly conveyed to the payment system which tends to rely on private credit extensions in most countries while many authors recommend that the central bank do no more than provide adequate aggregate liquidity during a crisis this policy requires well functioning private credit markets to channel liquidity to solvent but illiquid firms this paper presents a model of private lending which defines a crisis as a time when lenders become uncertain about how to assess financial risks and therefore rationally withdraw from making new loans in such an environment a government lender of last resort can improve social welfare copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

who is afraid of political risk multinational firms and their choice of capital structure this paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk we focus on two choice variables the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate and we distinguish different types of political risk such as expropriation unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation in our theoretical analysis we find that as political risk increases the ownership share tends to decrease whereas leverage can both increase or decrease depending on the type of political risk using the microdatabase direct investment of the deutsche bundesbank we find supportive evidence for these different effects

entrenchment governance and the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths abstract to study managerial entrenchment i use the stock price reaction to unexpected senior executive deaths if a highly effective manager dies unexpectedly the stock price reaction should be negative if however death removes an entrenched manager when the board would or could not the stock price reaction should be positive while individually age and tenure only weakly correlate with the stock price reaction to a sudden death the reaction is strongly positive 6 8 if 1 the executive s tenure exceeds 10 years and 2 abnormal stock returns over the last three years are negative