quality disclosure under consumer loss aversion consumers experience a sense of loss when a product s quality does not match their expectations to alleviate consumer loss aversion cla firms can disclose information to reduce consumers uncer

competition under consumer loss aversion we address the effect of expectation based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase however some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution whereas others are perfectly informed all the time we show that if firms have symmetric costs a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more competitive outcome the reverse holds if cost asymmetry in duopoly is sufficiently large

reference dependent preferences and labor supply the case of new york city taxi drivers i develop a model of daily labor supply where preferences are dependent on a reference daily income level and i apply this model to data on the labor supply of new york city taxi drivers i find that there may be a reference level of income on a given day that affects labor supply however there is substantial day to day variation in a given driver s reference level and most shifts end before reaching the reference income level this pattern is inconsistent with an important role for reference dependent preferences

to know and to care how awareness and valuation of the future jointly shape consumer spending reducing spending in the present requires the combination of being both motivated to provide for one s future self valuing the future and actively considering long term implications of one s choices awareness of the future feeling more connected to the future self thinking that the important psychological properties that define your current self are preserved in the person you will be in the future helps motivate consumers to make far sighted choices by changing their valuation of future outcomes e g discount factors however this change only reduces spending when opportunity costs are considered correspondingly cues that highlight opportunity costs reduce spending primarily when people discount the future less or are more connected to their future selves implications for the efficacy of behavioral interventions and for research on time discounting are discussed

unions and strategic managerial incentives abstract this paper shows how strategic managerial incentives weaken union power at cournot nash duopoly equilibrium although because of a prisoner s dilemma unions are not averse to those contracts thus one should question whether oligopolists automatically maximize profits when bargaining with trade unions

risk aversion in a dynamic asset allocation experiment we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in the spirit of merton 1971 in which subjects dynamically choose their portfolio allocation between a risk free and risky asset using the optimal allocation of an investor with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility we fit the experimental choices to characterize the risk profile of our participants despite substantial heterogeneity decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion are the predominant types we also find some evidence of increased risk taking after a gain finally the session level risk attitudes show a different profile than the individual descriptions of risk attitudes

corruption norm violation and decay in social capital the paper studies the link between corruption and social capital measured as trust using data from a lab experiment subjects play either a harassment bribery game or a strategically identical but differently framed ultimatum game followed by a trust game in a second experiment we elicit social appropriateness norm of actions in the bribery game and ultimatum game treatments our experimental design allows us to examine whether subjects who have been asked to pay a bribe are less likely to trust than those in an isomorphic role in the ultimatum game we also uncover the underlying mechanism behind any such behavioral spillover results suggest that a there is a negative spillover effect of corruption on trust and the effect increases with decrease in social appropriateness norm of the bribe demand b lower trust in the bribery game treatment is explained by lower expected return on trust c surprisingly for both the bribery and ultimatum game treatments social appropriateness norm violation engenders the decay in trust through its adverse effect on belief about trustworthiness

optimal task assignments with loss averse agents abstract this paper studies optimal task assignments in a setting where agents are expectation based loss averse according to koszegi and rabin 2006 2007 and are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure in which tasks are technologically independent we show that the optimal task assignment is determined by a trade off between paying lower compensation costs and restricting the set of implementable effort profiles under multitasking we show that loss aversion combined with how much the marginal cost of effort in one task increases with the effort chosen in other tasks determines when multitasking saves on compensation costs but results in an implementation problem

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

lagged beliefs and reference dependent utility abstract models of expectation based reference dependent preferences proposes that the reference point to which consumption outcomes are compared is endogenously determined as a function of lagged probabilistic beliefs this paper presents an experiment designed to test some predictions of expectation based reference dependence models the design induces a stochastic reference point via a lottery and then measures valuations for a commodity the experimental results find no effect of the first stage lottery on commodity valuation

salient compromises in the newsvendor game abstract the newsvendor problem denotes the puzzle that a retailer facing an uncertain demand for some product underreacts to profit margins and hence adjusts the order quantity toward the expected demand due to its range of applications in operations management this problem has drawn much interest in recent years various articles have tried to reconcile the newsvendor problem with loss aversion under ad hoc assumptions on the underlying reference point we instead argue that the newsvendor problem is an application of the well studied compromise effect as the compromise effect is based on violations of the iia axiom we argue that models of context dependent behavior such as salience theory better explain newsvendor like behavior than loss aversion based models we conduct a novel experiment which allows us to clearly distinguish between the role of loss aversion and salience and find strong support for the latter thereby we also add to the agenda of comparing loss aversion based models and salience theory

job search requirements effort provision and labor market outcomes abstract how effective are effort targets this paper provides novel evidence on the effects of job search requirements on effort provision and labor market outcomes based on large scale register data we estimate the returns to required job search effort instrumenting individual requirements with caseworker stringency identification is ensured by the conditional random assignment of job seekers to caseworkers we find that the duration of un and non employment both decrease by 3 if the requirement increases by one monthly application when instrumenting actual applications with caseworker stringency an additionally provided monthly application decreases the length of spells by 4 in line with theory we further find that the effect of required effort decreases in the individual s voluntary effort finally the requirement level causes small negative effects on job stability reducing the duration of re employment spells by 0 3 per required application we find a zero effect on re employment wages

reference point formation and new venture creation in this study we introduce reference point formation as an important antecedent of new venture creation based on considerations from prospect theory we hypothesize that individuals who generally and consistently set more aspiring reference points have a higher intention to form a new venture testing our hypothesis with entrepreneurs and managers results show that entrepreneurs indeed set more aspiring reference points therefore they might find themselves more often in a perceived loss situation which in turn increases their risk taking behavior following the predictions of prospect theory in testing entrepreneurial intention of business graduate students results are shown to be robust we discuss theoretical and managerial implications of the findings and develop avenues for future research

disappointment in decision making under uncertainty decision analysis requires that two equally desirable consequences should have the same utility and vice versa most analyses of financial decision making presume that two consequences with the same dollar outcome will be equally preferred however winning the top prize of 10 000 in a lottery may leave one much happier than receiving 10 000 as the lowest prize in a lottery this paper explores the implications of disappointment a psychological reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a lottery to one s prior expectations for decision making under uncertainty explicit recognition that decision makers may be paying a premium to avoid potential disappointment provides an interpretation for some known behavioral paradoxes and suggests that decision makers may be sensitive to the manner in which a lottery is resolved the concept of disappointment is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive model

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

do employers use unemployment as a sorting criterion when hiring evidence from a field experiment the stigma associated with long term unemployment spells could create large inefficiencies in labor markets while the existing literature points toward large stigma effects it has proven difficult to estimate causal relationships using data from a field experiment we find that long term unemployment spells in the past do not matter for employers hiring decisions suggesting that subsequent work experience eliminates this negative signal nor do employers treat contemporary short term unemployment spells differently suggesting that they understand that worker firm matching takes time however employers attach a negative value to contemporary unemployment spells lasting at least nine months providing evidence of stigma effects

an endowment effect for risk experimental tests of stochastic reference points recent models of reference dependent preferences indicate that expectations may play a prominent role in the presence of behavioral anomalies a subset of such expectations based models predicts an endowment effect for risk that risk attitudes differ when reference points change from certain to stochastic in two purposefully simple risk preference experiments eliminating often discussed confounds i demonstrate both between and within subjects such an endowment effect for risk these results provide needed separation between expectations based reference dependent models allow for evaluation of recent theoretical extensions and may help to close a long standing debate in decision science on inconsistency between utility elicitation methodologies

is the endowment effect an expectations effect a hallmark result within behavioral economics is that individuals choices are affected by current endowments a recent theory due to k szegi and rabin 2006 quarterly journal of economics 121 1133 1165 explains such endowment effect with a model of expectations based reference dependent preferences departing from past work we conduct complementary experiments to disentangle expectations verified probabilistic beliefs held by subjects from other features of endowment such as assignment to a good hence allowing us to compare the effect of expectations with that of other variations while mere assignment can affect choices we do not find a large role in the effect for k szegi rabin expectations

the non equivalence of labour market taxes a real effort experiment under full rationality a labour market tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent with boundedly rational agents this equivalence is no longer obvious in a real effort experiment we study the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector subjective well being labour supply and on the job performance our findings suggest that employer side taxes induce preferences for a larger public sector subjective well being is higher under employer side taxes while labour supply is lower at least at the extensive margin we discuss three mechanisms that may underlie these results

what do fishermen tell us that taxi drivers do not an empirical investigation of labor supply recent empirical findings have cast doubt on the neoclassical model of labor supply however estimation issues and not workers behavior may be responsible for these findings this paper investigates this possibility by examining the daily labor supply of florida lobster fishermen i invariably find that fishermen work more when earnings are temporarily high behavior that is consistent with a neoclassical model of labor supply furthermore methods that do not control for measurement error and endogeneity of the wage not only produce downward biased estimates of labor supply elasticities but also generate a spurious negative and significant elasticity of daily hours

risk aversion and expected utility theory a calibration theorem within the expected utility framework the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave a person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor this paper provides a theorem showing that expected utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes within expected utility theory for any concave utility function even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes illustrative calibrations are provided

toward a theory of affordable loss although dozens of empirical studies have been published on effectuation as a whole much work remains to be done on elaborating each principle in more depth based on an exploratory study of seven ventures from the caribbean island of curacao this paper develops an elaborated process model of the affordable loss heuristic in effectuation the model breaks affordable loss into two components ability and willingness and connects these to the concept of loss aversion from prospect theory furthermore these components are encapsulated in a process involving identity affect and resourcefulness leading to the entry stage entrepreneurial investment decision

path dependence in risky choice affective and deliberative processes in brain and behavior decision makers show an increased risk appetite when they gamble with previously won money the house money effect and when they have a chance to make up for a prior loss the break even effect to explore the origins of these effects we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to record the brain activities of subjects while they make sequential risky choices the behavioral data from our experiment confirm the path dependence of choices despite the short trial duration and the many task repetitions required for neuroimaging the brain data yield evidence that the increased risk appetite after gains and losses is related to an increased activity of affective brain processes and a decreased activity of deliberative brain processes

employment in the british coal industry a test of the labour demand model the authors test the conventional model of labor demand against the alternative that bargaining takes place over both wages and employme nt for a time series cross section data set covering the british coal industry they note the difficulty of identifying the contract curve under the alternative hypothesis and suggest the use of variables affecting the union and management status quo points as instruments for the endogenous wage they find that outside variables such as benefits and manufacturing wages are important in determining the level of employment thus rejecting the labor demand model copyright 1988 by royal economic society

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

estimation of price cost margins and union bargaining power for belgian manufacturing abstract this paper extends hall s 1988 hall r e 1988 the relationship between price and marginal cost in us industry journal of political economy 96 921 947 methodology to analyze imperfections in both the product and the labor market for firms in the belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988 1995 we investigate the heterogeneity in price cost mark up and workers bargaining power parameters among 18 sectors within the manufacturing industry as well as the relationship between both parameters using a sample of more than 7000 firms our gmm results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labor market leads to an underestimation of the price cost margin evaluated at perfect competition in the labor market these findings are confirmed in the sectoral analysis sectors with higher workers bargaining power typically show higher price cost margins

disappointment aversion and social comparisons in a real effort competition we present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real effort competition specifically we study the contribution of social comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two person real effort competition gill d and v prowse a structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition american economic review 102 2012 469 503 to do this we compare social and asocial versions of the gill and prowse experiment where the latter treatment removes the scope for social comparisons if disappointment aversion simply reflects an asymmetric evaluation of losses and gains we would expect it to survive in our asocial treatment alternatively if losing to or winning against another person affects the evaluation of losses gains as we show would be theoretically the case under asymmetric inequality aversion we would expect treatment differences we find behavior in social and asocial treatments to be similar suggesting that social comparisons have little impact in this setting unlike in gill and prowse we do not find evidence of disappointment aversion jel c91 d12 d81 d84

union firm bargaining and the influence of product market power and production technology on systematic risk the relationship between the capm firm beta and the firm s microeconomic decisions is studied by a model under uncertainty which combines the feature of an ex ante inputs substituable production technology and the existence of a union which bargains over various economic dimensions of the firm it is shown that the earlier findings of a relationship between the firm beta the firm product market power and the labor capital ratio may be reinforced through the indirect channel of labor market bargaining but the relationship becomes more complex and heavily depends on the scope of the union firm bargaining process this yields the empirical prediction confirmed for a panel of belgian firms that any proper estimation of the determinants of firm beta must control for firms in the sample being unionized

new york city cab drivers labor supply revisited reference dependent preferences with rational expectations targets for hours and income this paper reconsiders whether cabdrivers labor supply decisions reflect reference dependent preferences following botond koszegi and matthew rabin 2006 we construct a model with targets for hours as well as income both determined by rational expectations estimating using henry s farber s 2005 2008 data we show that the reference dependent model can reconcile his 2005 finding that drivers stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with the negative wage elasticity of hours found by colin camerer et al 1997 and farber 2005 2008 the model yields sensible estimates that avoid farber s 2008 criticism that drivers income targets are too unstable to allow a useful reference dependent model of labor supply

are long term wage elasticities of labor supply more negative than short term ones standard models imply that the wage elasticity of labor supply is more negative the longer a wage change lasts i observe decreasing daily hours during short term wage increases but not during a long term one daily income goals adjusted in the long term

clean evidence on peer effects we study subjects who were asked to fill letters into envelopes with a remuneration independent of output in the pair treatment two subjects worked at the same time in the same room and peer effects were possible in the single treatment subjects worked alone and peer effects were ruled out we find evidence of peer effects in the pair treatment because the standard deviations of output are smaller within pairs than between pairs moreover average output is higher in the pair treatment thus peer effects raise productivity finally low productivity workers are the most sensitive to the behavior of peers

testing for regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty much of the experimental evidence concerning violations of von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory has been collected fr om experiments designed with conventional theory in mind and does not provide direct tests of alternative models such as regret theory and disappointment theory this paper reports and discusses recent evidence produced by an exp erimentspe cifically designed to test for the impacts of regret and disappointment and to indicate their relative importance copyright 1987 by royal economic society

wage premia price cost margins and bargaining power in belgian manufacturing abstract an asymmetric nash bargaining model as developed by j svejnar 1986 is empirically tested on industry wage negotiations in belgium union s relative bargaining power emerges from this model as the fraction of firm s profits per worker which the unions are able to capture in excess of the alternative wage the estimates of the bargaining power coefficients for blue as well as white collar workers reject the symmetric split the difference outcome determinants of the cross industry variation of bargaining power are explored as well

union firm efficient bargaining and test of oligopolistic conduct this paper applies a production function approach to the analysis of imperfection in product and factor markets and develops a test of efficient bargaining for wage and employment determination based on a translog function defined at the firm level estimates for the belgian chemical industry are consistent with the existence of product market power which is significantly eroded by union wage rents

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

if wages fell during a recession abstract many economies exhibit downward wage rigidity surveys of managers indicate that employers hold wages rigid because they believe morale will suffer after a wage cut otherwise there is little evidence for how employers beliefs contribute to wage rigidity and whether those beliefs are accurate using an experiment we demonstrate that effort falls after workers experience a wage cut despite this partial confirmation of the bewley 1999 morale theory half of the employers in our experiment cut wages and lose money as a result under nominal inflation real wage cuts do not have a significant effect on effort

narrow bracketing and dominated choices an experiment by tversky and kahneman 1981 illustrates that people s tendency to evaluate risky decisions separately can lead them to choose combinations of choices that are first order stochastically dominated by other available combinations we investigate the generality of this effect both theoretically and experimentally we show that for any decisionmaker who does not have constant absolute risk averse preferences and who evaluates her decisions one by one there exists a simple pair of independent binary decisions where the decisionmaker will make a dominated combination of choices we also characterize as a function of a person s preferences the amount of money that she can lose due to a single mistake of this kind the theory is accompanied by both a real stakes laboratory experiment and a large sample survey from the general u s population replicating tversky and kahneman s original experiment where decisionmakers with prototypical prospect theory preferences will choose a dominated combination we find that 28 of the participants do so in the survey we ask the respondents about several hypothetical large stakes choices and find higher proportions of dominated choice combinations a statistical model that estimates preferences from the survey results is best fit by assuming people have utility functions that are close to prospect theory value functions and that about 83 of people bracket narrowly none of these results varies strongly with the personal characteristics of participants we also demonstrate directly that dominated choices are driven by narrow bracketing when we eliminate the possibility of narrow bracketing by using a combined presentation of the decisions the dominated choices are eliminated in the laboratory experiment and are greatly reduced in the survey

is tomorrow another day the labor supply of new york city cabdrivers the labor supply of taxi drivers is consistent with the existence of intertemporal substitution my analysis of the stopping behavior of new york city cabdrivers shows that daily income effects are small and that the decision to stop work at a particular point on a given day is primarily related to cumulative daily hours to that point this is in contrast to the analysis of camerer et al who find that the daily wage elasticity of labor supply of new york city cabdrivers is substantially negative implying large daily income effects this difference in findings is due to important differences in empirical methods and to problems with the conception and measurement of the daily wage rate used by camerer et al

substitution between production labor and other inputs in unionized and non unionized manufacturing the ease of substitution between labor and other factors of production is an important determinant of the elasticity of demand for labor and thus of the economic effects of unionism all else the same the greater the elasticity of substitution the greater is the elasticity of derived demand and the greater the displacement of labor for a given union induced wage increase in sectors where this elasticity is large unions are likely to be relatively weak and able to win only slight wage gains freeman and medoff 1981 and forthcoming or if they win large gains will have to pay a high price in terms of lost jobs in the sectors where the elasticity is small unions may be able to extract a substantial wage premium at little cost in terms of employment moreover as a simple general equilibrium model indicates the elasticity of substitution between labor and other factors in the unionized sector is a key parameter in determining the impact of the iiunion wage effect on the earnings of nonunion workers and on the efficiency of the economy johnson and mieskowski 1970 despite the importance of the elasticity of labor demand for an analysis of unionism little attention has been given to the absolute and relative magnitude of this elasticity under collective bargaining while there is some discussion of technological change and the substitution of capital and nonproduction workers for organized production workers in the institutional literature e g slichter 1941 slichter healy and livernash 1960 bok and dunlop 1970 modern econometric work provides no estimates of the relevant parameters as a result johnson and mieskowski 1970 rees 1963 lewis 1964 and others have been forced to evaluate union effects with guesstimates of the elasticities of concern in union settings this paper attempts to fill some of the gap in our knowledge by providing estimates for u s manufacturing of the constant output elasticity of demand for unionized and nonunionized production workers and of the elasticity of substitution between these workers and other inputs the analysis concentrates on what we call the relative inelasticity hypothesis which states that the demand for production workers will be more inelastic in the presence of a union for two reasons the likelihood that unions have organized and survived in sectors with low elasticities and the effects of various contract provisions on the ability of management to substitute other factors for production labor the study is divided into four sections section i develops the rationale for the relative inelasticity hypothesis and describes the nature of the empirical analysis conducted to test its validity the second section uses a 1972 state by 2 digit standard industrial classification sic industry data file for manufacturing to estimate the elasticity of substitution between production labor and both nonproduction labor and capital in the union and nonunion sectors of u s manufacturing industries section iii provides estimates based on a 1968 72 sample of manufacturing establishments of the elasticity of substitution between production and nonproduction labor the only two inputs for which information is available the final section briefly summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for understanding the impact of trade unionism on the u s economy to preview the ensuing discussion our main conclusion is substitution between production labor and other inputs is generally lower in union received for publication march 6 1978 revision accepted for publication august 17 1981 both authors are with harvard university and the national bureau of economic research supported by u s department of labor grant no j 9 m 6 0094 national science foundation grant no apt77 16279 and the national bureau of economic research under its program of research on labor economics we are especially grateful to jane mather for her invaluable assistance on this project and to greg bialecki charles brown gary chamberlain kathy coons jon fay martin van denburgh and lori wilson for their significant contributions the study has not been reviewed by the board of directors of the national bureau

reference dependent behaviour of paua abalone divers in new zealand we study dynamic labour supply using data on paua abalone divers in new zealand the divers face stable flat prices per kilogram after each catch but experience transitory wage changes due to varying weather and water conditions and are free to vary their daily working hours and display an intermittent working pattern we find nonlinear wage elasticities rejecting the standard neo classical prediction that these divers should work long hours during days when wages are high and quit early during days when hourly wages are low we explore potentially distorting factors but find little evidence applying k szegi and rabin s 2006 theory where workers have both income and hours targets could explain our result in particular our divers appear to be primarily guided by the hours target

expectation based loss aversion and strategic interaction abstract by extending the equilibrium concepts of k szegi and rabin 2006 k szegi and rabin 2007 this paper analyzes the strategic interaction of expectation based loss averse players for loss averse players with choice acclimating expectations the utility from playing a mixed strategy is not linear but convex in the probabilities they assign to their pure strategies as a consequence they are generally unwilling to randomize and an equilibrium may fail to exist for players with choice unacclimating expectations by contrast randomizing over their pure strategies may indeed constitute a credible best response and an equilibrium always exists building upon these insights we delineate how expectation based loss averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected utility preferences derive novel strategic effects discuss equilibrium selection and derive equilibrium play for some simple games

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

your loss is my gain a recruitment experiment with framed incentives empirically labor contracts that financially penalize failure induce higher effort provision than economically identical contracts presented as paying a bonus for success an effect attributed to loss aversion this is puzzling as penalties are infrequently used in practice the most obvious explanation is selection loss averse agents are unwilling to accept such contracts i formalize this intuition then run an experiment to test it surprisingly i find that workers were 25 percent more likely to accept penalty contracts with no evidence of adverse or advantageous selection consistent with the existing literature penalty contracts also increased performance on the job by 0 2 standard deviations i outline extensions to the basic theory that are consistent with the main results but argue that more research is needed on the long term effects of penalty contracts if we want to understand why firms seem unwilling to use them

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

a model of mental accounting and reference price adaptation consumers possess a mental account that stores the worth of items purchased and yet to be consumed reference prices act as the book values of these items movements in the account the comparison between the reference price and the price paid at entry and the comparison between the benefit of consumption and the reference price at exit yield hedonic benefits the reference price is determined by a psychological process of adaptation to the price evoked by the trade the model is integrative in that it explains a wide array of observed anomalies such as sunk cost effects payment depreciation reluctance to trade preference for prepayment and the flat rate bias the model also generates new testable implications this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

reference dependent consumption plans we develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption because changes in wealth are news about future consumption preferences over money are reference dependent if news resonates more when about imminent consump tion than when about future consumption a decision maker might to generate pleasant surprises overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news people exhibit an unambiguous first order precautionary savings motive

producer decision making under uncertainty role of past experiences and question framing limited research examines the role of reference points or how uncertain outcomes are processed in producer decisions this study employs a survey containing a split sample choice experiment varying how uncertain outcomes are portrayed and assesses multiple candidate reference points results suggest that u s cattle producers use the best outcome experienced as reference points in their decisions and the method by which uncertain outcomes are presented impacts loss aversion marginal willingness to pay and market participation estimates this illustrates how research employing split samples multiple reference points and alternative methods of portraying uncertain outcomes may better identify producer decision making

reference points and effort provision a key open question for theories of reference dependent preferences is what determines the reference point one candidate is expectations what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs in a real effort experiment we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision we find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation based reference dependent preferences if expectations are high subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low

cognitive performance in competitive environments evidence from a natural experiment competitive situations that involve cognitive performance are widespread in labor markets schools and organizations including test taking competition for promotion in firms and others this paper studies cognitive performance in a high stakes competitive environment the analysis takes advantage of a natural experiment that randomly allocates different emotional states across professional subjects competing in a cognitive task the setting is a chess match where two players play an even number of chess games against each other alternating the color of the pieces white pieces confer an advantage for winning a chess game and who starts the match with these pieces is randomly decided the theoretical analysis shows that in this setting there is no rational reason why winning frequencies should be better than 50 50 in favor of the player drawing the white pieces in the first game yet we find that observed frequencies are about 60 40 differences in performance are also stronger when the competing subjects are more similar in cognitive skills we conclude that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that psychological elements affect cognitive performance in the face of experience competition and high stakes