exporting does sales volume make a difference this research examines the effect that the size of a firm has on export activities perceived problems in exporting and attitudes toward exporting the results indicate that broad generalizations concerning the size of firms and exporting appear to be inappropriate

monetary policy and fiscal limits with no default abstract this paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt two distortions prevail in the model economy income taxes and liquidity constraints possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt to gdp ratio zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues and a political intolerance of raising tax rates at the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency fiscal inflation which reduces the real value of nominal debt and open market operations which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector three regimes achieve this goal in all regimes monetary policy is passive in all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium the propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response in the form of tax rate changes to the level of government debt while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs in this regime most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases

decentralization and the duration of fiscal consolidation shifting the burden across layers of government this paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal decentralization the duration of fiscal consolidation episodes and their success for 17 oecd countries between 1978 and 2009 the consolidation of the general government budget appears to be of longer duration when expenditure decisions are more decentralized we also find that transfers from higher levels of government are cut during consolidation episodes suggesting that central governments shift the burden of consolidation towards lower tiers of government this is especially true when the latter have little legal autonomy to raise tax revenues and have little influence over executive decisions taken at the central level we document that this increases local governments public debt gdp ratios in terms of the success of consolidation episodes countries with greater degrees of decentralization appear to make smaller improvements in their primary balance when consolidating

interactions between monetary and fiscal policy rules the fiscal stability pact for emu implies that constraints on fiscal policy facilitate inflation control in this paper we identify two stable policy regimes when monetary policy seeks to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation a self stabilising fiscal policy is required to ensure model stability a fiscal policy which does not by itself ensure fiscal solvency constrains monetary policy to be relatively passive however in simulations we conclude that the central bank does not need to seek on this account the degree of debt stabilisation that appears to be implied by the fiscal stability pact

tales of fiscal adjustment fiscal adjustments why they can be expansionary this paper examines the evidence on fiscal adjustments in oecd countries from the early 1960s to today the results shed light on the recently observed phenomenon of fiscal tightening that produces non keynesian expansionary effects one interpretation is that a serious fiscal tightening increases demand wealth rises when future tax burdens decline and when interest rates decline credibility is restored and inflation or default risks abate both consumption and investment rise for this effect to produce an expansion the tightening must be sizeable and occur after a period of stress when the budget is quickly deteriorating and public debt is building up another interpretation emphasizes the supply side typically a fiscal consolidation based on tax increases is short lived to be long lasting it must include cuts in public employment transfers and government wages to be politically possible such a policy must be supported by trade unions these measures result in more efficient labour markets and boost the supply side based both on statistical evidence and on a detailed analysis of ten cases of major fiscal adjustment this article provides cautious support to the supply side view without denying a more limited role for the demand side channel alberto alesina and silvia ardagna

fiscal forward guidance a case for selective transparency abstract should the fiscal authority use forward guidance to reduce future policy uncertainty perceived by private agents using dynamic general equilibrium models we examine the welfare effects of announcing future fiscal policy shocks and show that selective transparency is desirable announcing distortionary future policy shocks can be detrimental to ex ante social welfare whereas announcing non distortionary shocks generally improves welfare sizable welfare gains are found with constructive ambiguity regarding the timing of a tax increase in a realistic fiscal consolidation scenario however being secretive about distortionary shocks is time inconsistent and welfare loss from communication may be unavoidable

the welfare state and competitiveness in all industrial countries fiscal policy is increasingly about redistribution in this paper the authors study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation they show that an increase in transfers financed by distortionary taxation has nonlinear effects on unit labor costs relative to the other countries depending on the degree of centralization of the wage setting process in the labor market the authors find considerable empirical support for the model in a sample of fourteen oecd countries copyright 1997 by american economic association

regime switching debt and taxation the effects of changes to the tax rate are studied within a framework where an estimated regime switching process for the debt output ratio is embedded in a standard growth model the regime is a hidden state variable so agents face a signal extraction problem consequently agents incorporate the possibility of switching to different fiscal regimes when forming expectations over future taxes decision rules have additional nonlinearity relative to fixed regime models income allocation and the tax elasticity of investment depend on agents inference regarding the regime specifically the tax elasticity can be either positive or negative depending on whether agents perceive a tax reform as an intra regime shock or change in regime

fiscal sustainability in a new keynesian model recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in new keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady state debt to follow a random walk in this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking we show that governments are tempted given inflationary expectations to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service we demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks the new steady state debt is equal to the original efficient debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government s objective function analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock we also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies but can be significant for discretionary policy finally we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises

fiscal consolidations quality economic conditions and success recent research has demonstrated theimportance of good quality of fiscaladjustments for the success of governmentbudget consolidations we extend thisapproach to analyze the importance of theeconomic conditions in which fiscalconsolidations are started for theirsuccess the cyclical positions of thedomestic and international economy theinitial debt level and the stance of fiscalpolicy in the oecd are all importantdeterminants of the likelihood of fiscalconsolidations they also affect thegovernment s choice of consolidationstrategy making them importantdeterminants of the success of fiscalconsolidations in contrast the monetarypolicy stance plays only a negligible rolefor fiscal consolidations we use theanalysis to test for any maastricht effectson the performance of european governmentsduring the 1990s such effects are weak atbest and occurred only during the firsthalf of the decade

how do experts forecast sovereign spreads this paper assesses how forecasting experts form their expectations about future government bond spreads using monthly survey forecasts for france italy and the united kingdom between january 1993 and october 2014 we test whether respondents consider the expected evolution of the fiscal balance and other economic fundamentals to be significant drivers of the expected bond yield differential over a benchmark german 10 year bond our main result is that a projected improvement of the fiscal outlook significantly reduces expected sovereign spreads this suggests that credible fiscal plans affect market experts expectations and reduce the pressure on sovereign bond markets in addition we show that expected fundamentals generally play a more important role in explaining forecasted spreads compared to realized spreads

equilibria under monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a portfolio choice model abstract this paper studies how the presence of income taxes changes the properties of general equilibrium models with monetary and fiscal policy interactions it is found that from a global perspective the only policy regime that leads to a unique equilibrium is one where fiscal policy is active i e the fiscal theory of the price level regime in sims 1994 from a local perspective there are three regimes in particular and relative to the previous literature following leeper 1991 a new third regime exists where a passive fiscal rule combined with a passive monetary rule can still deliver determinacy where the same area of the parameter space would lead to multiple solutions if taxes were lump sum to obtain the size of the new regime the paper characterizes analytically the extent to which tax cuts are self financing and how the distortionary tax laffer curve looks near the steady state in the new regime monetary and fiscal backstops are brought into play so as to rule out off equilibrium dynamics and inflation can temporarily increase in order to increase seigniorage revenues with this flexibility the monetary policy is consistent with the real debt remaining bounded and the arithmetic that follows is monetarist and unpleasant in the sense of sargent and wallace 1981

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

comparison of solutions to the incomplete markets model with aggregate uncertainty abstract this paper compares numerical solutions to the model of krusell and smith 1998 income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy journal of political economy 106 867 896 generated by different algorithms the algorithms have very similar implications for the correlations between different variables larger differences are observed for i the unconditional means and standard deviations of individual variables ii the behavior of individual agents during particularly bad times iii the volatility of the per capita capital stock and iv the behavior of the higher order moments of the cross sectional distribution for example the two algorithms that differ the most from each other generate individual consumption series that have an average maximum difference of 1 63 11 4

fiscal consolidations and heterogeneous expectations abstract we analyze fiscal consolidations using a new keynesian model where agents have heterogeneous expectations and are uncertain about the composition of consolidations we look at spending based and tax based consolidations and analyze their effects separately we find that the effects of consolidations and the output multipliers are sensitive to heterogeneity in expectations before and after implementation of a specific fiscal plan depending on the beliefs about the type of consolidation prior to implementation we show that heterogeneity in expectations may lead to optimism in the economy improving thus the performance of a specific fiscal plan or can work towards the opposite direction leading to pessimism amplifying the contractionary effects of the consolidation in general we find that spending based consolidations last longer and lead to deeper recessions when agents are boundedly rational compared to the rational expectations benchmark while the opposite holds for tax based consolidations

risk assessment under a nonlinear fiscal policy rule i introduction countries around the world are establishing nonlinear fiscal rules whereby governments respond more aggressively to lower deficits when debt is above some threshold level these policies range from the german style debt break which imposes limits on the deficits to fiscal rules that intensify fiscal consolidation at high debt levels the purpose of this paper is to study the implications of a nonlinear fiscal rule on solvency crisis do nonlinear fiscal rules allay the possibility of future insolvency does the increased responsiveness suggested by the nonlinear fiscal rules need to be exhibited at low levels of debt could fiscal authorities offset the stronger responsiveness at high levels of debt with a weaker responsiveness at low levels of debt without altering the probability of a solvency crisis we build on daniel and shiamptanis 2012 framework where negative shocks such as the 2007 2009 worldwide financial turmoil could lead a government to a position where agents refuse to lend thereby creating a solvency crisis to restore lending monetary and fiscal authorities could implement a policy switch in which the fiscal policy switches to active and the monetary policy to passive and the post crisis equilibrium is characterized by the fiscal theory of the price level ftpl 1 their analysis however utilizes a linear fiscal policy rule and assumes that authorities remain in the ftpl regime once they switch this paper modifies daniel and shiamptanis 2012 dynamic policy switching model to allow for a nonlinear fiscal policy rule that governs the evolution of the primary surplus relative to gdp and to allow the authorities to switch back to the original regime an important feature of the nonlinear fiscal rule is that it naturally yields an endogenous stochastic responsiveness to debt to capture changes in policy over time 2 we also build on bohn 1998 who argues that it is sufficient for a sustainable fiscal policy to satisfy the government s intertemporal budget constraint ibc bohn s analysis however does not incorporate a fiscal limit on the size of debt defined as the maximum level of debt that the country can repay bi 2012 bi et al 2010 2013 cochrane 2011 ghosh et al 2013 this paper can be viewed as an extension of bohn 1998 when a country faces fiscal limits we derive the criteria necessary for a nonlinear fiscal rule to satisfy both the government s ibc and eliminate explosive behavior the final contribution of the paper is empirical we apply the model to canada which is often cited as an example of a small open economy that implemented a significant fiscal adjustment lloyd ellis and zhu 2001 we estimate a nonlinear fiscal rule with annual data from 1970 to 2012 and utilize it to quantify the probability of a solvency crisis the following key results emerge first to eliminate explosive behavior the responsiveness of the nonlinear fiscal rule to debt should be larger than bohn s 1998 criterion second a nonlinear fiscal rule lowers the expected maximum level of debt on the path back to its long run target and also shortens the expected adjustment time third the strong responsiveness suggested by a nonlinear fiscal rule is very important to reduce the probability of a solvency crisis however this strength need not be exhibited until debt is high as long as the government has a stronger responsiveness at high levels of debt the responsiveness at low levels of debt has miniscule impact on solvency risk this paper is organized as follows section ii derives the necessary conditions for global stability and the dynamics leading to a solvency crisis under a nonlinear fiscal rule section iii estimates the policy parameters of the canadian fiscal rule and the probability of a solvency crisis section iv provides conclusions ii model we set up a simple small open economy model with a stochastic endowment

the fiscal state dependent effects of capital income tax cuts abstract using the post wwii data of u s federal corporate income tax changes within a smooth transition var this paper finds that the output effect of capital income tax cuts is government debt dependent it is less expansionary when debt is high than when it is low to explore the mechanisms that can drive this fiscal state dependent tax effect the paper uses a dsge model with regime switching fiscal policy and finds that a capital income tax cut is stimulative to the extent that it is unlikely to result in a future fiscal adjustment as government debt increases to a sufficiently high level the probability of future fiscal adjustments starts rising and the expansionary effects of a capital income tax cut can diminish substantially whether the expected adjustments are through a policy reversal or a consumption tax increase also a capital income tax cut need not always have large revenue feedback effects as suggested in the literature

fiscal stabilizations when do they work and why abstract this paper studies the determinants and channels through which fiscal contractions influence the dynamics of the debt to gdp ratio and gdp growth using data from a panel of oecd countries the paper shows that the success of fiscal adjustments in decreasing the debt to gdp ratio depends on the size of the fiscal contraction and less on its composition the rate of growth of output matters too but higher gdp growth does not drive the success of a fiscal stabilization in contrast whether a fiscal adjustment is expansionary depends largely on the composition of the fiscal maneuvre in particular stabilizations implemented by cutting public spending lead to higher gdp growth rates the effects of the composition on growth work mostly through the labor market rather than through agents expectations of future fiscal policy finally the evidence suggests that successful and expansionary fiscal contractions are not the result of accompanying expansionary monetary policy or exchange rate devaluations

expansionary contractions and fiscal free lunches too good to be true this paper builds a framework to jointly examine the possibility of both expansionary fiscal contractions austerity increasing output and fiscal free lunches expansions reducing government debt arguments supported by the austerity and stimulus camps respectively in recent debates we propose a new metric quantifying the budgetary implications of fiscal action a key aspect of fiscal policy particularly at the monetary zero lower bound we find that austerity needs to be highly persistent and credible to be expansionary and stimulus temporary responsive and well targeted in order to lower debt we conclude that neither are likely especially during periods of economic distress this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

the consequences of an unknown debt target abstract several proposals to reduce u s debt reveal large differences in their targets we examine how an unknown debt target affects economic activity using a real business cycle model in which bayesian households learn about a state dependent debt target in an endogenous tax rule recent papers use stochastic volatility shocks to study fiscal uncertainty in our setup the fiscal rule is time varying due to unknown changes in the debt target households infer the current debt target from a noisy tax rule and jointly estimate the transition probabilities three key findings emerge from our analysis 1 limited information about the debt target amplifies the effect of tax shocks through changes in expected tax rates 2 the welfare losses are an order of magnitude larger when both the debt target state and transition matrix are unknown than when only the debt target state is unknown to households 3 an unknown debt target likely reduced the stimulative effect of the arra and uncertainty about the sunset provision in the bush tax cuts may have slowed the recovery and led to welfare losses

fiscal crises and aggregate demand can high public debt reverse the effects of fiscal policy abstract this paper shows how the power of fiscal policy to affect consumption can vary depending on the level of public debt at moderate levels of debt fiscal policy has the traditional keynesian effects current generations of consumers discount future taxes because they may not be alive when taxes are raised or there will be a larger population available to pay the taxes but when debt reaches extreme values current generations of consumers know there is a high probability that they will have to pay extra taxes a fiscal deficit can have a contractionary effect in these situations

equilibrium in a production economy with an income tax this paper develops a method to study an infinite horizon production economy distorted by a state dependent income tax this setting permits taxes to depend on the capital stock an endogenous state variable and thus captures situations where the evolution for capital and taxes is jointly determined to solve this model the consumption function is represented as a fixed point of a nonlinear monotone operator that is defined such that its nth iteration computes the consumption function n steps away from the horizon for a corresponding finite horizon economy the oparator s monotonicity is exploited in proving the existence of and constructing an equilibrium copyright 1991 by the econometric society

sovereign default risk and state dependent twin deficits abstract this paper analyzes the impact of the government debt to gdp ratio on the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account above a government debt to gdp ratio of 90 percent the correlation of the two balances decreases by 0 16 in a sample of 12 euro area countries and by 0 17 for greece ireland portugal and spain this paper develops a small open economy model with defaultable government debt and riskless international capital markets to explain the empirical evidence of a state dependent change in the correlation in the model high public debt to gdp ratios raise sovereign risk premia as the default probability increases leading to higher uncertainty about future taxes in this case precautionary savings of households increase and partially compensate current account deficits that result from fiscal deficits the increase in households saving reduces the correlation of the two balances by the same magnitude as documented in the data the model calibrated to greece matches further business cycle moments and the empirical default frequency

fiscal policy in the new neoclassical synthesis we analytically derive the cyclical effects of fiscal policy shocks in a new neoclassical synthesis model price stickiness has the consequence that a rise in government demand affects labor demand while at the same time the usual wealth effect boosts labor supply the strength of the demand effect depends on the response of the real interest rate governed by the monetary policy regime when the central bank controls money growth fiscal expansions are deflationary and might even be contractionary whereas output wages and inflation can increase when the rise in the real interest rate is dampened by an interest rate rule however price stickiness alone is not sufficient to explain a rise in consumption as predicted by keynesian theory

debt dependent effects of fiscal expansions abstract economists often postulate that fiscal expansions are less stimulative when government debt is high than when it is low empirical evidence however is ambiguous using a nonlinear neoclassical growth model we show that the difference in government spending effects between high and low debt environments depends on the wealth effect on labor supply and on whether the government uses taxes or spending to retire debt because of interrelated state variables structural var estimations conditioning on debt alone can fail to isolate debt dependent effects also uncertainty on when the government will conduct fiscal consolidations generates wide confidence bands for spending multipliers further complicating efforts to estimate debt dependent government spending effects

finite lifetimes long term debt and the fiscal limit abstract the u s faces exponentially rising entitlement obligations i introduce a fiscal limit a point where higher taxes are no longer a feasible financing mechanism into a perpetual youth model to examine how intergenerational redistributions of wealth the average duration of government debt and entitlement reform impact the consequences of explosive government transfers three key findings emerge 1 growing government transfers cause more severe and more persistent stagflation than in representative agent models that do not capture intergenerational transfers of wealth 2 a longer average duration of government debt pushes the financing of government liabilities into the future and reduces the short run impacts of explosive transfers 3 the time it takes the economy to rebound from a period of growing transfers increases exponentially with the number of years it takes to pass entitlement reform

uncertain fiscal consolidations the paper explores the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidations whose timing and composition are uncertain drawing on the evidence in alesina and ardagna 2010 we emphasize whether or not the fiscal consolidation is driven by tax rises or expenditure cuts we find that the composition of the fiscal consolidation its duration the monetary policy stance the level of government debt and expectations over the likelihood and composition of fiscal consolidations all matter in determining the extent to which a given consolidation is expansionary and or successful in stabilizing government debt

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized