estimates of effective marginal tax rates on factor incomes this chapter describes a method of calculating summary measures of effective factor income tax rates in the united states using readily available data the numbers resulting from application of this method in a study are reported in the chapter and some of their possible uses are discussed the estimated factor income tax rates behave over time in a manner quite consistent with the behavior of other broad measures of federal tax policy the postwar movement in the tax rate on income from labor relative to that on income from capital or more accurately the relevant components of these tax rates provides suggestive support for the miller scholes hypothesis that the federal personal income tax has been moving in the direction of a pure consumption tax the tax rates reported in the chapter are consistent with other studies that show a decrease since the 1950s in rates of taxation at the corporate level of income from corporate held capital they are also consistent with the view that rates of taxation of such income at the noncorporate level have risen but not quite sufficiently to offset the decline in the corporate tax burden

mexico and the brady plan mexico has throughout the 1980s been centre stage in the debates and events shaping the sovereign debt problem caught between a sudden collapse of its terms of trade and rising world interest rates mexico suspended debt service payments in august 1982 and ushered in what has since become known as the debt crisis in the following years lending to ldcs dried up and debtor countries were increasingly forced to run high trade surpluses to effect ever growing transfers from poor back to rich countries in the face of falling growth rates and rising inflation in the high debt countries then secretary of the treasury baker proposed the baker plan in return for economic reforms high debt countries would get new access to medium term new loans in addition to rolling over of amortization of old loans new loans had to come both from commercial creditors and the official lending institutions with access to capital markets restored the economic reforms would it was hoped allow the debtors to grow out of debt but experience in the high debt countries showed that the original hopes of the proponents of the baker plan went unfulfilled net transfers out of the borrowing countries went up rather than down as

transfer problem dynamics macroeconomics of the franco prussian war indemnity we study the classic transfer problem of predicting the effects of an international transfer on the terms of trade and the current account a two country model with debt and capital allows for realistic features of historical transfers they follow wartime increases in government spending and are financed partly by borrowing the model is applied to the largest historical transfer the franco prussian war indemnity of 1871 1873 in these three years france transferred to germany an amount equal to 22 percent of a year s gdp when the transfer is combined with measured shocks to fiscal policy and productivity over the period the model provides a very close fit to the historical sample paths of french gdp terms of trade net exports and aggregate consumption this makes a strong case for the dynamic general equilibrium approach to studying the transfer problem more generally our results provide striking evidence of the importance of international capital markets in the nineteenth century

re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

investment financing decisions and tax policy mists have analyzed the effects of taxes on capital spending most studies assume that firms respond to prices set in centralized securities markets such as market interest rates of tobin s q and firms undertake all profitable investment projects firms choose the mix or finance among internal funds debt and new equity independently the availability of finance does not limit investment the implications for tax policy are clear the marginal tax rate on returns from a new project matters for investment not the firm s average tax burden on returns from its investments in place for firms that face imperfect markets for

international transfers the relative price of non traded goods and the current account this paper considers the role of the relative price of non traded goods and the current account in the adjustment of a small open economy to the receipt of an international transfer the paper shows that the economy s macroeconomic adjustment to the transfer depends upon the relative capital intensities of the traded and non traded sectors of the economy as well as on the duration of the transfer the paper provides a new interpretation of france s current account surplus in the 1870s that accompanied the payment of reparations to germany following the franco prussian war and of germany s trade deficit in the 1920s that accompanied reparations payments associated with the first world war

some aspects of the taxation of capital gains abstract the analysis of the effects of capital gains taxation requires a careful modelling both of the details of the tax code and the imperfections in the capital market under the standard assumptions concerning perfect capital markets and under the standard idealizations of the tax code there are several strategies by which rational investors can avoid note only all taxes on their capital income but also all taxes on their wage income these strategies leave individuals consumption and bequests in each state of nature and at each date unchanged from what they would have been in the absence of taxes although certain detailed provisions of the tax code may limit the extent to which rational investors can avail themselves of these tax avoidance activities there are ways in a perfect capital market by which the effects of these restrictions can be ameliorated accordingly any analysis of the effects of capital taxation must focus on imperfect capital markets if individuals face limitations on the amounts which they can borrow and or if there are limitations on short sales then under some circumstances there is a locked in effect individuals do not sell securities which they would have sold in the absence of taxation but under other circumstances individuals are induced to sell securities that they otherwise would have held in order to take advantage of the asymmetric treatment of short term losses and long term gains a policy of realizing gains as soon as they become eligible for long term treatment dominates the policy of postponing the realization of capital gains provided the gains are not too large a simple general equilibrium model is constructed within which it is shown that the taxation of capital gains may increase the volatility of asset prices and lead individuals not to trade when they otherwise would while the analysis casts doubt on the significance of the welfare losses resulting from these exchange inefficiencies there are circumstances in which the tax leads to production inefficiencies e g terminating projects at other than the socially optimal date finally we argue that the focus of some recent policy debates on the short run revenue impact of a decrease in the tax rate on capital gains is misplaced even when the short run revenue impact is positive consumption may increase thus exacerbating inflationary pressures and private savings may decrease thus leading to a lower level of investment in the private sector moreover there is some presumption that the long run revenue impact is negative our analysis has some important implications for empirical research in particular it suggests that the impact of the tax is not adequately summarized by a single number such as the effective tax rate representing the average ratio of tax payments to capital gains moreover the impact of the tax cannot be assessed by looking only at reported capital gains and losses

labor unions and the adoption of new technology the paper examines whether unionization by workers discourages the adoption of labor saving techniques this is done in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small number of firms some of which are unionized we find that unionization can actually encourage the adoption of labor saving technology provided that the technological improvement is mild and that demand is sufficiently high or demand elasticity sufficiently low if there is an effective threat of entry that causes the union to moderate its wage demands then unionization may encourage the adoption of new technology even at low levels of demand

wage bargaining central bank independence and the real effects of money the effects of financial capital mobility on monetary policy autonomy are relatively well understood but the importance of particular monetary regimes in distinct national institutional settings is not this article is a theoretical and empirical exploration of the effects of monetary policy regimes on unemployment in different national wage bargaining settings based on a rational expectations two stage game of the interaction between the wage behavior of labor unions and the monetary policies of governments i argue that monetary policies have real employment effects in all but the most decentralized bargaining systems specifically in intermediately centralized bargaining systems a credible government commitment to a nonaccommodating monetary policy rule will deter militant wage behavior with salutary effects on unemployment in highly centralized systems by contrast restrictive monetary policies will clash with unions pursuit of wage distributive goals and produce inferior employment performance only in highly fragmented bargaining systems is money neutral in the sense that employment performance is unaffected by monetary regimes the model has clear consequences for the optimal design of central banks and collective bargaining arrangements and suggests new ways to study institutional change hereunder the causal effect of increasingly globalized capital markets the argument is supported by pooled time series data for fifteen oecd countries over a twenty one year period

the effects of taxation price control and government contracts in oligopoly and monopolistic competition abstract many government contracts with or policies towards oligopolistic sectors essentially involve private firms selling a given proportion or quantity of output to the government at a fixed price p r with the remainder being sold on the open market often this is combined with consumer rationing examples include cement and sugar in india and health housing and defence in many countries the paper investigates the effects of these schemes including sales and excise taxation on prices output and household welfare under oligopoly and monopolistic competition less government control reduced may raise prices and tax shifting can be above or below 100 percent

the u s evidence on optimal taxation over time abstract this paper considers a tax rule in which a uniform tax rate over time becomes optimal its implications are that 1 changes in the tax rate should arise only when there are changes in permanent government expenditures and 2 no variable other than permanent government expenditures should be of any value in predicting the tax rate these implications are tested using u s data for 1937 82 empirical results of the tests reveal that in addition to responding to permanent government expenditures the tax rate also responds to temporary defense purchases the general price level and a time trend

unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

the incentives to make commitments in wage bargains it is commonly believed that a workforce of identical workers will be better off organised in a single union rather than separate unions that bargain independently with an employer for this will prevent the employer playing off one union against another in this paper i show that there are circumstances where this need not be the case if it is impossible for the firm and workers to sign long term binding contracts on wages and employment then the firm will wish to invest in a capital stock below the efficient level by organising in separate unions the firm will be induced to raise its level of investment to ensure it has enough capacity with each union to make a threat to switch production to another union credible the effect on workers payoffs from a higher capital stock can outweigh the loss of bargaining power as a result of the workforce being in separate unions there will also be circumstances where the firm will invest in a capital stock that exceeds the efficient level

input market price discrimination and the choice of technology recent concerns over the effects of the robinson patman act and so called priceprotection policies such as most favoredcustomer clauses mfc s 2 on market performance have given economists new reasons to examine the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in order to assess these effects correctly it is imperative that one understand how price discrimination influences market behavior joan robinson s 1933 work launched the formal inquiry into the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination building on the intuition presented by arthur pigou 1932 she showed that if a monopolist faces two independent linear demand curves the use of price discrimination will not affect industry output but will reduce welfare richard schmalensee 1981 extends these results to nonlinear demand curves and shows that an increase in total industry output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to be welfare improving hal varian 1985 broadens these results by deriving upper and lower bounds on the welfare change due to the use of price discrimination he shows that these results can be applied to markets in which there are nonzero cross price effects all of this work examines how the ability of a monopolist to price discriminate will affect the market outcome when all other characteristics of the market are treated as exogenous recently two lines of research have extended this inquiry beyond the case of a monopolist in a market with exogenously fixed parameters the first line considers the case of oligopoly the work of charles holt and david scheffman 1985 and thomas cooper 1986 has shown that restrictions on price discrimination imposed by the use of mfc s can facilitate collusion between oligopolists attempting to restrict output this implies that third degree price discrimination can be welfare improving the second line of research shows that price discrimination by a firm can affect nonprice decisions made by other market participants thus affecting the market outcome michael katz 1987 presents a model in which a large firm s ability to vertically integrate backward into the production of an input allows it to obtain a lower per unit price from the supplier of the input than can be obtained by smaller firms without this ability he shows that third degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it prevents inefficient backward integration degraba 1987 shows that the use or nonuse of price discrimination by a national firm can affect nonprice decisions made by local firms that compete with the national firm in this situation third degree price discrimination is welfare reducing because it induces local firms to produce a product that is overly differentiated from the product of the national firm in all of the work cited above price discrimination is important when sellers set prices in separate markets or charge different prices to different customers in the same market the following analysis which can be considered a contribution to the second line of research suggests that price discrimination can be important even when a seller faces a single market in which all customers are identical the intuition behind this result is that nonprice decisions made by downstream producers such as the choice of technology can be affected by the use or johnson graduate school of management cornell university ithaca ny 14853 i thank robert frank robert smiley richard thaler and the participants of the jgsm applied microeconomics workshop for their helpful comments see william baldwin 1987 pp 438 40 for a good summary of the debate 2see john kwoka and lawrence white 1989 pp 196 7

closing large open economy models abstract a large class of international business cycle models admits multiple locally isolated deterministic steady states if the elasticity of substitution between traded goods is sufficiently low i explore the conditions under which such multiplicity occurs and characterize the dynamic properties in the neighborhood of each steady state models with standard incomplete markets portfolio costs a debt elastic interest rate or an overlapping generations framework allow for multiple steady states if the model features multiple steady states under financial autarchy if the excess demand for the foreign traded good is increasing in the good s own price in a given steady state the equilibrium dynamics around this steady state are unbounded otherwise the dynamics are bounded and unique by contrast with uzawa type preferences the steady state is always unique and the associated equilibrium dynamics are always bounded and unique the same results obtain under complete markets

an analysis of turkey s accession to the european union we build a two country dynamic general equilibrium model to study whether european citizens would bene t from the eventual accession of turkey to the european union eu the results of the simulations show that turkey s accession is welfare enhancing for europeans provided that turkish total factor productivity tfp increases suf ciently after enlargement in the benchmark model with no capital mobility the europeans are better off if the turkish tfp increase bridges more than 21 of the initial tfp gap between turkey and the eu this gure increases to 33 when capital mobility is introduced

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

intertemporal dimensions of international economic adjustment evidence from the franco prussian war indemnity few topics in international economics have generated the intense and persistent interest that surrounds analysis of the transfer problem in large part this reflects continuing fascination with the political and economic consequences of the victorious allies attempts to extract war reparations from germany after the first world war for economists interest in this episode is surely increased by the clear analytical parallel between international transfer payments and other payments obligations and in particular international debt service see e g arminio fraga 1986 more generally the economics of effecting an international transfer are immediately relevant for a broad range of questions in international economics including in particular the economics of devaluation and by extension the economics of alternative exchange rate regimes careful study of the macroeconomic consequences of episodes in which transfers were made would therefore provide important evidence on a much wider variety of issues than war reparations alone the problem is that few such episodes exist the world war i reparations are of little use here because transfers were not in any real sense made from germany to the allies rather the reverse the lending booms studied by frank w taussig jacob viner and others are of more use but are suspect because the lending was clearly associated with a goods market disturbance in the recipient countries there is thus an element of endogeneity in these transfers which makes it unclear whether observed economic fluctuations during the period of transfer are due to the transfer itself or to the goods market disturbance that induced the international flow of resources this paper studies some aspects of one of the few major economically exogenous international transfers in modern economic history the war indemnity that followed the franco prussian war of 1870 1871 this immense indemnity was demanded by and from an economy that was relatively unscathed by the war itself and the transfer was actually paid in this and other respects the franco prussian reparations seem to provide radically different economic and political lessons than those that have been drawn from the 1920 s 1 the focus here is on some intertemporal dimensions of international transfers these were somewhat neglected by the static theoretical discussions that eventually sorted out theoretical aspects of the keynes ohlin debate though contemporary analysis never lost sight of their importance see e g james w angell 1930

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

does neoclassical theory account for the effects of big fiscal shocks evidence from world war ii much debate surrounds the usefulness of the neoclassical growth model for assessing the macroeconomic impact of fiscal shocks we test the theory using data from world war ii which is by far the largest fiscal shock in the history of the united states we take observed changes in fiscal policy during the war as inputs into a parameterized dynamic general equilibrium model and compare the values of all variables in the model to the actual values of these variables in the data our main finding is that the theory quantitatively accounts for macroeconomic activity during this big fiscal shock

new perspectives on public finance recent achievements and future challenges abstract the advances in the economics of the public sector during the past quarter century have been as pronounced as in any field within economics public finance has become a rigorous branch of applied microeconomics incorporating the best thinking and most advanced tools of both theoretical economics and econometrics in the remarks below i will focus on a few key areas in applied and theoretical tax and expenditure policy drawing both upon the academic work of myself and others and my experiences in the policy arena both as chairman of the council of economic advisers and as chief economist of the world bank i shall address both the questions of what we have learned in the past few decades as well as the questions where further research is needed

employment effects of minimum and subminimum wages panel data on state minimum wage laws using panel data on state minimum wage laws and economic conditions for the years 1973 89 the authors reevaluate existing evidence on the effects of a minimum wage on employment their estimates indicate that a 10 increase in the minimum wage causes a decline of 1 2 in employment among teenagers and a decline of 1 5 2 in employment for young adults similar to the ranges suggested by earlier time series studies the authors also find evidence that youth subminimum wage provisions enacted by state legislatures moderate the disemployment effects of minimum wages on teenagers

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining an international perspective this paper critically reviews the research on how collective bargaining systems influence macroeconomic performance in industrialized countries the review considers effects of bargaining level coordination and corporatist institutional arrangements key empirical results turn out to be quite fragile and much of the paper explores issues of measurement and specification that account for the fragility the paper concludes that complementarities between key institutions and between institutions and the economic environment may be more important for macroeconomic performance than the effects of individual institutions and it suggests research strategies

commodity taxation in a differentiated oligopoly the authors introduce commodity taxation into a vertical differentiation model with endogenous product selection they show that a uniform ad valorem tax lowers both qualities distorts the allocation of consumers between firms and lowers the consumer prices of both variants a small uniform tax is always welfare improving over the no tax equilibrium a differentiation of tax rates may or may not be desirable on welfare grounds if a welfare improvement is possible through a nonuniform tax it is always the high quality variant that must be taxed at a higher rate copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly abstract we show that contrary to the key result of the standard cournot nash oligopoly model industry profits can increase with the number of firms if input prices are not exogenous but are determined by bargaining in bilateral oligopoly

what if alexander hamilton had been argentinean a comparison of the early monetary experiences of argentina and the united states abstract the contrast between the early nineteenth century argentinean experience of high inflation and the american experience of low inflation is interpreted in terms of an optimal taxation model it is argued that the two countries experiences diverged because of the different constraints they faced in financing wartime government expenditures in the presence of frequent wars ever tightening access to foreign capital and an inadequate tax base argentina s use of the inflation tax may be viewed as an optimal solution to its wartime problems by contrast with the exception of the revolutionary war the absence of such constraints in the united states required full tax smoothing with only a temporary use of the inflation tax during wartime such policies were embodied in alexander hamilton s fiscal package of 1790 which allowed the united states to bond finance most subsequent wartime expenditures

trade unions investment and employment the implications of long term wage contracts and investment in capital on non cooperative wage bargaining between a firm and a union are analysed the union maximises a utilitarian utility function and the firm faces a neoclassical investment problem with internal adjustment costs the monopoly union outcomes with binding contracts is time inconsistent because the union has an incentive to renege on announced low wage strategies once the capital stock has been accumulated the monopoly union outcome without binding contracts leads to credible strategies which correspond to higher wages and lower levels of employment investment and the capital stock efficient contracts give rise to higher employment than monopoly union outcomes whether with or without long term wage contracts the results are illustrated with a numerical example finally when the game between the union and firm is repeated reputational equilibira provide a solution to the problem of time inconsistency

dynamic optimal income taxation with government commitment abstract we analyze the optimal income tax problem when consumers work for many periods can information about abilities learned in one period be used later to attain more redistribution than is possible in a one period world when the government can commit to future policies and has the same discount rate as individuals intertemporal nonstationarity of tax schedules can lead to pareto improvements by relaxing lifetime self selection constraints analogous to randomization in a one period world more significant use of information is possible when the social discount rate is less than individuals rates the taxes converge over time to a nondistortionary schedule

the fiscal role of conscription in the u s world war ii effort an often overlooked role of conscription is as a method of lump sum taxation in times of war conscription of military personnel allows the fiscal authority to minimize wartime government expenditure and hence minimize tax distortions associated with war finance this paper presents a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to articulate this view and calibrates the model to the u s world war ii experience analysis of the calibrated model indicates that the welfare value of conscription as a fiscal policy tool is quantitatively large despite the fact that the american involvement lasted only four years conscription is worth approximately 2 of annual aggregate consumption in perpetuity

episodes of war and peace in an estimated open economy model we analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the u s france germany and the uk by means of an estimated open economy model the model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation sovereign default a military draft household preferences and spillovers on other exogenous processes productivity investment trade policy variables if the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the u s other factors are crucial in other countries we also discuss the size and state dependence of public spending multipliers and a counterfactual welfare exercise

to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the decision by firms under cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs considering classical models of union firm bargaining namely right to manage rtm and efficient bargaining eb we show that for a sufficiently low level of union power eb firms might adopt cost raising strategies this theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of eb and adds to the theoretical finding that eb might dominate rtm under unionized cournot nash oligopoly it also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel like services to oligopoly firms allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers

does the lucas critique apply during hyperinflation empirical evidence from four hyperinflationary episodes farmer review of economic studies 58 321 32 1991 suggests that in a model in which there are multiple rational expectations equilibria agents may find it useful to coordinate their expectations in a unique rational expectations equilibrium which is supported by a self fulfilling forecast rule having the property of being immune to the lucas critique in this paper farmer s hypothesis is tested using data from hyperinflationary episodes it is believed that those episodes are suitable for testing this hypothesis because an agent who lives in a hyperinflationary environment usually faces frequent changes in policy regime the agent may thus choose a selffulfilling forecast rule which is immune to the lucas critique as a way of hedging against unanticipated policy regime switches the empirical results show mixed evidence on farmer s hypothesis during the hyperinflationary episodes studied

indivisible labor lotteries and equilibrium abstract this paper considers an economy where labor is indivisible and agents are identical although the discontinuity in labor supply at the individual level disappears as a result of aggregation it is shown that indivisible labor has strong consequences for the aggregate bahavior of the economy it is also shown that optimal allocations involve lotteries over employment and consumption

indivisible labor and the business cycle abstract a growth model with shocks to technology is studied labor is indivisible so all variability in hours worked is due to fluctuations in the number employed we find that unlike previous equilibrium models of the business cycle this economy displays large fluctuations in hours worked and relatively small fluctuations in productivity this finding is independent of individuals willingness to substitute leisure across time this and other findings are the result of studying and comparing summary statistics describing this economy an economy with divisible labor and post war u s time series

moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation abstract this paper demonstrates that in an economy with moral hazard and more than one commodity competitive equilibrium is not constrained efficient to correct the market failure differential commodity taxation is necessary a general optimal tax formula is derived and special cases of is discussed

welfare effects of changing commodity tax rates toward uniformity abstract this paper presents a theory of tax reform that is applicable to a many good economy where i the initial tax structure is arbitrarily given ii no lump sum tax exists and iii the initial tax revenue must be maintained after the reform sufficient conditions are established under which tax changes definitely result in increases in welfare they indicate that in a wide class of situations the uniform tax structure can be a useful intermediate target on the way to optimum

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

distinguished lecture on economics in government the private uses of public interests incentives and institutions as a long time student of the public sector i welcomed the opportunity to come to washington as a member of the council of economic advisers and later to become the chairman of the council partly because it gave me an opportunity to study at first hand this immensely important part of our economy and society and to test my ideas against the reality of government in action to be sure i came also as an activist if not with a fully articulated agenda at least with a view about what it was that government should and should not be doing my reference point was the fundamental theorems of welfare economics which as some describe them proved that the market left to itself would produce efficient allocations many saw in these theorems the vindication of adam smith s faith in the invisible hand leading the self interested decisions of each person to maximize the well being of the nation as a whole today many of us look at the fundamental theorem not as a description of the world but as an explication of the conditions under which a market equilibrium will be pareto efficient these conditions are quite strong the importance of some of the more explicit assumptions like the lack of externalities and the completeness of markets has long been known in the last two decades we have explored much more seriously the consequences of the informational assumptions implicit in the belief that markets are efficient in particular it has been shown that in the presence of imperfect information or incomplete markets the economy will not be pareto efficient in other words there joseph stiglitz is senior vice president and chief economist world bank washington d c stiglitz was a member of the council of economic advisers from 1993 95 and chairman

financial globalization and real regionalization over the period 1972 1986 the correlations of gdp employment and investment between the united states and an aggregate of europe canada and japan were respectively 0 76 0 66 and 0 63 for the period 1986 to 2000 the same correlations were much lower 0 26 0 03 and 0 07 real regionalization at the same time u s international asset trade has significantly increased for example between 1972 and 1999 united states gross fdi and equity assets in the same group of countries rose from 4 to 23 percent of the u s capital stock financial globalization we argue that these two trends are intimately related we document that the correlation of real shocks between the u s and the rest of the world has declined we then present a model in which international financial market integration occurs endogenously in response to less correlated shocks financial integration further reduces the international correlations in gdp and factor supplies we find that both less correlated shocks and endogenous financial market development are needed to account for all the changes in the international business cycle

the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry abstract this paper investigates how the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry depend upon the degree of product substitutability when goods are imperfect substitutes both cournot and bertrand competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner would be willing to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit maximizing firm overinvestment may occur when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes similarly cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability is low and a weaker incentive if this degree is high

how does war shock the economy abstract wartime periods have frequently been treated as natural macroeconomic experiments but the international pooled time series evidence presented here shows that the literature has over emphasized the experience of the united states and the united kingdom wars fought exclusively on foreign soil do have marginally higher real output growth than peacetime periods but real growth during all other wars is sharply below peacetime levels evidence for foreign and domestic wars is consistent with monetarist fiscalist and mixed theories of wartime booms

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

distortionary taxation and labor supply this paper examines empirically the effects of distortionary taxation on labor supply using a general equilibrium framework the long term relations predicted by the model are derived and tested using data from canada united states germany and japan in all these countries labor tax changes are found to be persistent and to have played an important role in the observed downward trend in hours worked

monetary and fiscal policy switching a growing body of evidence finds that policy reaction functions vary substantially over different periods in the united states this paper explores how moving to an environment in which monetary and fiscal regimes evolve according to a markov process can change the impacts of policy shocks in one regime monetary policy follows the taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with debt in another regime the taylor principle fails to hold and taxes are exogenous an example shows that a unique bounded non ricardian equilibrium exists in this environment a computational model illustrates that because agents decision rules embed the probability that policies will change in the future monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth effects when it is possible that fiscal policy will be unresponsive to debt at times active monetary policy like a taylor rule in one regime is not sufficient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime and it can have the unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand effects of tax shocks the paper also considers the implications of policy switching for two empirical issues

dynamics of the trade balance and the terms of trade the j curve the authors provide a theoretical interpretation of two features of international data the countercyclical movements in net exports and the tendency for the trade balance to be negatively correlated with current and future movements in terms of trade but positively correlated with past movements they document the same properties in a two country stochastic growth model in which trade fluctuations reflect in large part the dynamics of capital formation the authors find that their general equilibrium perspective is essential the relation between the trade balance and the terms of trade depends critically on the source of fluctuations copyright 1994 by american economic association

union rent seeking intangible capital and market value of the firm abstract this study considers the effect of unions on intangi ble capital investment and profitability within the context of a market value rather than a more traditional accounting based approach theory is provided suggesting unions are able to affect profitability by sharing in the economic returns to firm specific intangible capital in support of this hypothesis we find unionization reduces the returns to r d and produces a corresponding limiting influence on r d investment at the firm level i introduction a n extensive literature in economics has ex amined the determinants of profitability with much of the focus centering on the role of market structure only recently however have the effects of labor unions on profitability been analyzed ths is surprising since labor economists long have emphasized union influences on wages and productivity that in turn may affect profitabil ity in recent studies freeman 1983 and karier 1985 report a significant limiting influence of unions on price cost margins in high concentra tion manufacturing industries using firm level data and the market based tobin s

the decentralization of collective bargaining a literature review and comparative analysis the author reviews evidence that the bargaining structure is becoming more decentralized in sweden australia the former west germany italy the united kingdom and the united states although in

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

on a non cooperative theory of technology transfer abstract this paper shows that it might be profitable for a firm with advanced technology to sell the knowledge to a competing firm with less efficient technology and still remain in the business a non corperative equilibrium with technology transfer may pareto dominate the initial equilibrium without technology transfer in this paper it is shown that technology agreement is likely to occur between firms which are reasonably close in terms of their initial technologies such an equilibrium is an interesting possibility in the absence of credibly sustainable collusive outcomes

utilitarianism and horizontal equity the case for random taxation this paper establishes that far from being able to derive the principle of horizontal equity from utilitarianism the principle is actually in consistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances we derive conditions under which a it is optimal to impose random tax schedules ex post randomization and b it is optimal to randomize the tax schedules imposed on a set of otherwise identical individuals ex ante randomization the implications for optimal tax theory are discussed more generally it is shown that there are a number of potentially important economic situations with which the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent not only with utilitarianism but even with pareto optimality this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

fiscal policy composition public debt and economic activity this paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model i toinvestigate how changes to different spending and revenue items of the budgetaffect economic activity and public finance and ii to evaluate thewelfare costs of alternative fiscal policy maneuvers the paper shows that unlike an increase in government purchases of final goods an increasein public employment and transfers can have a contractionary effect onthe economy in the same way as a rise in tax rates it also suggests thatfiscal adjustments implemented by cutting spending items increasehouseholds welfare and are more effective in reducing the primary deficitand public debt than are increases in tax rates

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

multiunit bargaining in oligopolistic industries a model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions local bargaining and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry in both cases the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages in addition industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement

the determination of r d empirical evidence on the role of unions abstract this paper examines the empirical evidence of the role of union bargaining on innovation we review the existing empirical evidence and emphasis some of the problems with the theoretical assumptions we outline a simple model of strategic rd b the union bargains only over wages

moneylenders and bankers price increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market abstract in many areas of the world a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision we present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs motivated by studies of rural credit markets we show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition increasing prices or inducing exit higher prices interest rates result from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities among suppliers the models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that infusions of government subsidized formal credit have not improved the terms offered by moneylenders

welfare reducing licensing abstract in this paper we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two part tariff contracts a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty reduces social welfare we show that it occurs if i the firms compete in prices ii the innovation is large enough but not drastic and iii the goods are close enough substitutes moreover we show that regardless of the type of competition first the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and second even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous

the mckenna rule and uk world war i finance abstract this paper argues that uk wwi scal policy followed the english method identi ed by sprague 1917 and his discussants and revived by the us to nance the korean war see ohanian 1997 during wwi uk scal policyadopted the mckenna rule named for reginald mckenna chancellor ofthe exchequer 1915 16 mckenna presented his scal rule to parliamentin june 1915 the mckenna rule guided uk scal policy for the rest ofwwi and the interwar period we draw on narrative evidence to show thatmotivation for the mckenna rule came from a desire to treat labour and cap ital fairly and equitably not pass wwi costs onto future generations andcommit to a debt retirement path and higher taxes however a permanentincome model suggests the mckenna rule adversely a ected the uk becausea higher debt retirement rate produces a lower consumption output ratio data from 1916 37 supports this prediction the views in this paper represent those of the authors and are not necessarily those ofthe federal reserve bank of atlanta the federal reserve system the reserve bankof new zealand norges bank or their respective sta s we thank ellis tallman formany useful comments and kateryna rakowsky for research assistance a version ofthis paper is forthcoming in the papers and proceedings of the american economicreview

unionization incomplete contracting and capital investment this article examines empirically the hypothesis that incomplete contracts and resulting opportunistic behavior over the return to sunk assets reduces investment union firm contracts are incomplete because they 1 do not prevent all actions aimed at changing the existing contract 2 cover a relatively short time period and 3 do not extend to union members yet to be hired the primary response of firms is to reduce investment in specific durable assets and also to reduce employment growth and increase debt the authors find fairly strong evidence of these effects in a sample of large publicly traded firms using firm specific measures of unionization copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

the welfare cost of capital income taxation in a growing economy the welfare cost of capital income taxation is analyzed in a general equilibrium framework where the private sector is represented by a competitive household endowed with perfect foresight and an infinite life the value of the welfare cost depends essentially on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the production function numerical estimates are presented for different values of the parameters of the model the welfare gain obtained by the abolition of the capital income tax is smaller when the private sector is not endowed with perfect foresight it is reduced by about 40 percent when expectations are myopic the allocation efficiency cost of the corporate tax dwarfs the intertemporal welfare cost

the international monetary fund in a time of crisis a review of stanley fischer s imf essays from a time of crisis the international financial system stabilization and development stanley fischer was deputy managing director of the imf from 1994 to 2001 and perhaps more than any other individual he personifies the international rapid response to financial crises in the 1990s this book is a collection of essays written during his tenure at the imf taken together the essays represent the strongest and most logical defense of imf initiatives in the 1990s in print my review essay comprises six parts in parts 2 through 4 i provide an overview of fischer s arguments in three central areas of contention stabilization policy the impact of imf programs on poverty and the imf s anticipation of and response to international financial crisis i then compare fischer s arguments to those raised by the imf s critics during that period the controversial issues of these parts can be resolved only through empirical investigation but on the issues of greatest importance from the financial crises of the 1990s both fischer and the imf s critics make logically consistent arguments with little empirical support in part 5 i review the recent empirical literature to illuminate what evidence has been found in support of or counter to the assertions of fischer and the imf s critics part 6 provides conclusions and suggestions for follow on empirical research

fiscal shocks and their consequences this paper investigates the response of hours worked and real wages to fiscal policy shocks in the post world war ii us we identify these shocks with exogenous changes in military purchases and argue that they lead to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates on capital and labor income and a persistent rise in aggregate hours worked as well as declines in real wages the shocks are also associated with short lived rises in aggregate investment and small movements in private consumption we describe and implement a methodology for assessing whether standard neoclassical models can account for the consequences of a fiscal policy shock simple versions of the neoclassical model can account for the qualitative effects of a fiscal shock once we allow for habit formation and investment adjustment costs the model can also account reasonably well for the quantitative effects of a fiscal shock

local and aggregate fiscal policy multipliers abstract using a newly constructed panel of state level defense contracts this paper studies the effect of defense spending on the u s macroeconomy summing observations across states we estimate aggregate income and employment multipliers comparing these to local multipliers estimated with the panel provides evidence that local multiplier estimates may be reliable indicators of fiscal policy s aggregate effects furthermore evidence of small positive spillovers is found across several specifications we estimate income and employment multipliers between zero and 0 5 this result is reconciled with the greater than one multipliers found in nakamura and steinsson 2014 by analyzing the korean war years impact on the estimation

how occupied france financed its own exploitation in world war ii can a vanquished country deliver significant resources to its occupier based on the failure of germany to pay its post world war i reparations conventional wisdom generally doubts the possibility yet german reparations represent the exception rather than the rule perhaps the most successful case was the transfer of resources that germany obtained from france during world war ii although they imposed huge payments the victors left the french to decide how to raise the funds after comparing the magnitude of france s payment to other episodes we employ a neoclassical growth model to assess both wartime and postwar policies the burden imposed on the french economy caused it to shrink at a rapid pace curtailing consumption and yielding large debt and money overhangs although vichy france intended to manage the postwar debt burden with higher tax rates the governments following liberation allowed inflation to slash the debt redistributing the adjustment cost higher taxes did not fund the debt but instead paid for expenditures associated with the rise of the welfare state

randomization in optimal income tax schedules abstract the optimal income tax problem is one of many problems in economics for which a randomized allocation may be desirable for a two class economy we characterize optimal random tax schedules and present necessary and sufficient conditions for local randomization either to be pareto improving or to extend the constrained pareto frontier we present another sufficient condition for nonlocal randomization to be pareto improving which need not violate ex post or ex ante horizontal equity lastly an example demonstrates that the gains from randomization may be large

tariffs licensing and market structure this paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm competition against a less efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy we show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm a host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm we show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment we also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and bertrand competition in the product market hence this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of kabiraj and marjit protecting consumers through protection the role of tariff induced technology transfer european economic review 47 113 124

pareto inefficiency of market economies search and efficiency wage models this paper shows that market economies with search and in which wages are affected by efficiency wage considerations are not constrained pareto efficient wages are not set at pareto efficient levels nor is the level of employment unemployment pareto efficient we identify the nature of the biases and the welfare improving government interventions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

real business cycle models past present and future in this paper i review the contribution of real business cycles models to our understanding of economic fluctuations and discuss open issues in business cycle research this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the macroeconomic effects of war finance in the united states world war ii and the korean war during world war ii government expenditures were financed primarily by issuing debt during the korean war expenditures were financed almost exclusively by higher taxes reflecting president truman s preference for balanced budgets this paper evaluates quantitatively the economic effects of the different policies used to finance these two wars counterfactual experiments are used to explore the implications of financing world war ii like the korean war and financing the korean war like world war ii the author finds that using a korean war policy during world war ii would have resulted in much lower output and welfare relative to the actual policy copyright 1997 by american economic association

labour markets bargaining and innovation much of the recent empirical work on the impact of unions on rd ii under some circumstances an increase in union strength can make both firms and unions worse off we survey a more recent theoretical literature which takes account of the fact that r d is often undertaken for strategic reasons by firms that are in competition with one another we show that in this framework the prevailing theoretical paradigm may be overturned thus when firms and unions can enter into long term bargains then an increase in union strength will increase decrease r d spending if successful innovation causes employment to rise respectively fall however when r d falls then this increase in union strength can cause both firms and unions to be better off when firms and unions engage in short term bargaining then an increase in union bargaining strength will cause r d to fall when bargaining is over wages alone however when bargaining takes place over wages and employment then if unions care a lot about employment the relationship between union strength and r d is inverse u shaped

unionization structure licensing and innovation we show the effects of the unionization structure viz decentralized and centralized unions on a firm s incentive for technology licensing and innovation the incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions we identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions if the union s preference for employment is high the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions however if the union s preference for wage is high enough the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex post innovation if the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases we further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure which occurs in our analysis when e g licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation with no licensing occurs only under a centralized union

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic