multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions abstract this paper presents an analysis of optimal regulation of a firm that has private information about both its cost and demand functions an earlier paper on the same topic lewis and sappington rand j econ 19 1998 438 457 is reviewed a difficulty with their analysis is discussed and an alternative formulation of their model is proposed two broad classes of problem are considered i the case where social and private incentives are roughly aligned which implies optimal prices are weakly above marginal costs and ii the case where social and private incentives diverge which implies pricing below marginal cost may be optimal journal of economic literature classification numbers d42 d82 l51

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

the impact of alternative forms of state regulation of at t on direct dial long distance telephone rates federal and state regulatory agencies have traditionally used rate of return regulation to set profit and rate levels for utilities a price cap framework in which the regulatory agency sets a maximum rate below which the regulated utility has pricing flexibility is possibly a more efficient alternative to rate of return regulation this article presents an econometric analysis that compares at t s prices of intrastate long distance telephone service in states that allow at t pricing flexibility with those in states that do not the results of this analysis suggest that at t s daytime evening nighttime and weekend rates are significantly lower in states that allow pricing flexibility than in states that use rate of return regulation

regulation moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks abstract a large class of major environmental risks are subject to severe moral hazard problems the purpose of this paper is to study the potential conflicts between cost minimization and safety care the intuition is that regulatory efforts or sheer competition inducing a greater focus on cost minimization may tilt the agents trade off towards taking too much risk here we study the problem in the context o regulation of a natural monopoly and see how high powered incentives may conflict with safety care we address the issue of moral hazard in environmental risk with adverse selection limited liability risk aversion and multiprincipals

multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design abstract incentive compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents types are multidimensional two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed first we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves and second we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist

price cap regulation and information acquisition abstract in this paper we endogenize the information structure under price cap regulation we show that in order to induce the firm to acquire valuable but costly information price cap mechanisms need to ensure high profits to the firm further we compare incentives for information acquisition under price cap regulation and under the optimal mechanism designed to deal with the standard case where asymmetric information is assumed we show that the latter provides higher incentives for information acquisition and that the welfare loss associated with price cap regulation with respect to the optimal regulatory mechanism increases when the issue of information acquisition is considered

aspects of the optimal management of exchange rates abstract this paper shows that the choice of the optimal exchange rate regime depends on the stochastic shocks affecting the economy the higher the variance of real shocks the larger the desirability of fixity of exchange rates the desirability of exchange rate flexibility increases the larger are the variances of the shocks to the demand for money to the supply of money to foreign prices and to purchasing power parities when the economy produces traded and non traded goods the desirability of exchange rate flexibility diminishes the higher is the relative share of non traded goods and the lower are the elasticities of demand and supply of the two goods

comparing the intensity of exchange market intervention with frenkel and aizenman s index of managed float abstract the large literature on the optimum intensity of foreign exchange market intervention contains two different characterizations of the central bank s policy choice variable most of the literature focuses on the central bank s intensity of intervention in the foreign exchange market and its implications for the domestic money supply an important contribution by frenkel and aizenman 1982 however carries out its analysis in terms of a so called index of managed float this note clarifies the relation between these policy measures by deriving the frenkel aizenman index from a standard specification of financial market equilibrium

strategic corporate social responsibility and economic performance this article proposes a novel corporate social responsibility csr index based on a data envelopment analysis dea model acknowledging the argument that companies might favour those csr dimensions that provide strategic competitive advantages we argue that the index can capture companies strategic approach to csr furthermore our findings reveal a neutral relationship between this strategic csr index and economic performance as measured by return on assets roa and tobin s q when controlling for firm unobserved heterogeneity and past economic performance by contrast an equally weighted index of the same csr indicators is found to be negatively related with roa which reinforces our claim that this specific dea based index is a measure of strategic csr

liability dollarization exchange market pressure and fear of floating empirical evidence for turkey the objective of this article is to examine the relationship between liability dollarization and the exchange market pressure emp in turkey within an autoregressive distributed lag ardl and granger causality framework using monthly data from 1991 12 to 2006 08 the findings suggest that there exists a long term equilibrium relationship between emp and liability dollarization where liability dollarization granger causes emp both in the short and long run with no evidence of reverse causality this suggests that the predominance of foreign currency liabilities in the banks balance sheets in turkey induces a selling pressure in the exchange market as well as a fear of floating

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

the forward exchange market speculation and exchange market intervention this paper examines two issues the first is the role of speculation in stabilizing the economy against stochastic disturbances increased speculation i stabilizes domestic income against disturbances in the domestic bond market and forward exchange market ii exacerbates the effect of foreign disturbances and iii may dampen or augment the effect of money market and output supply disturbances the second issue is the role of the forward market in stabilization policy forward market intervention does not provide monetary authorities additional leverage in stabilizing income beyond unsterilized spot market intervention intervention rules based on reactions to both the forward and the spot exchange rates however can outperform intervention policies responding to the spot rate alone regardless of the market in which intervention occurs

optimal contracting of separable production technologies abstract we analyze the class of agency problems with a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent in which hidden actions and hidden information on the agent s efficiency are jointly present technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule we show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent s inputs together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent s actions and indirect utility

cost reductions cost padding and stock market prices the chilean experience with price cap regulation we study the chilean electricity distribution industry and find that costs the ratio of reported costs to revenues have fallen since price caps were introduced cost reductions are u shaped since 1989 strong initial cost reductions reverse every four years coinciding with regulatory reviews a possible explanation is that firms are behaving strategically we then use stock market data to complement our study we construct a measure of cumulative abnormal returns for regulated firms around their quarterly announcements and a measure of naive cost expectations which excludes any indication of the occurrence of review periods in general cost reports in excess of naive cost expectations have a negative effect on returns even after we control for company fixed effects the exception is cost surprises that happen during review periods which increase abnormal returns the estimated effects fall over time this is consistent with the hypothesis of strategic firms and that the regulatory regime translates these games into higher rates in a way that is not completely anticipated by the market more generally the results suggest there may be value in complementing regulatory procedures with stock market information

is dea useful in the regulation of water utilities a dynamic efficiency evaluation the discussion about public utilities efficiency and its management has become increasingly important in the last decades we focus on the distribution of water which is one of the most important natural resources marshall 1879 this research shows the relationship between efficiency and institutional factors such as management system for this purpose we have data about some spanish water utilities under different provision systems during the period 1985 to 2000 using data envelopment analysis dea we estimate potential cost savings in this context we will extend the results obtained by thanassoulis 2000a b in attempt to guide the regulation of this sector

relative efficiency measurement and prospects for yardstick competition in brazilian electricity distribution abstract the paper considers the non parametric methodology of data envelopment analysis dea in the context of efficiency measurement for brazilian electricity distribution in 1997 98 indicating the existence of firms operating substantially below the efficiency frontier the potential and difficulties associated with the implementation of yardstick competition schemes are then discussed stressing in particular the role of relative efficiency scores obtained from the dea approach

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

csr disclosure and sustainable supplier management a small to medium sized enterprises perspective the respective literatures on corporate social responsibility csr disclosure and sustainable supplier management have grown in recent years but little scholarly attention has been paid to the li

additionality when redd contracts must be self enforcing this paper examines self enforcing contracts as a financial mechanism for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation when the opportunity cost of the land i e landholder type is private information and is imperfectly correlated over time i e partially persistent types because self enforcement limits the feasible incentives the conservation levels are constrained by the surplus created regardless of the degree of persistence of such opportunity costs across contracting periods a first best self enforcing contract can deliver additional carbon sequestration beyond the business as usual scenario only if the value of forest conservation is sufficiently high otherwise self enforcing contracts can induce some suboptimal level of carbon sequestration the degree of persistence of opportunity costs across periods does not affect the amount of total payments provided in the optimal menu of contracts but greater persistence of opportunity cost types leads to contracts that feature more of the total payment as a bonus in contracts for landholders with a high opportunity cost for their land and more of the total payment as an upfront fixed payment for landholders with a low opportunity cost

tariff based incentives for improving coal power plant efficiencies in india improving the efficiency of coal based power plants plays an important role in improving the performance of india s power sector it allows for increased consumer benefits through cost reduction while enhancing energy security and helping reduce local and global pollution through more efficient coal use a focus on supply side efficiency also complements other ongoing efforts on end use efficiency the recent restructuring of the indian electricity sector offers an important route to improving power plant efficiency through regulatory mechanisms that allow for an independent tariff setting process for bulk purchases of electricity from generators current tariffs based on normative benchmarks for performance norms are hobbled by information asymmetry where regulators do not have access to detailed performance data hence we propose a new incentive scheme that gets around the asymmetry problem by setting performance benchmarks based on actual efficiency data rather than on a normative basis the scheme provides direct tariff based incentives for efficiency improvements while benefiting consumers by reducing electricity costs in the long run this proposal might also be useful for regulators in other countries to incorporate similar incentives for efficiency improvement in power generation

real exchange rate overvaluation and wto dispute initiation in developing countries why and when do developing countries file trade disputes at the world trade organization wto although financial conditions have long been considered an important driver of trade policy they have been largely absent from the literature on trade disputes we argue that developing country governments bring more trade dispute to the wto when overvalued real exchange rates put exporters at a competitive disadvantage this dynamic is most prevalent in countries where large foreign currency debt burdens discourage nominal currency devaluations that would otherwise serve exporters interests our findings provide an explanation for differences in dispute participation rates among developing countries and also suggest a new link between exchange rate regimes and trade policy

getting into the energy efficiency scene does corporate social responsibility matter for energy efficiency in smes a growing body of literature argues that improving energy efficiency is an essential step that firms must take to mitigate climate change issues it is assumed that corporate social responsibility

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions we consider the design of regulatory policy when the regulator is imperfectly informed about both the firm s cost function and the demand function it faces to some extent the optimal policy here is the natural combination of the optimal policies when there is uncertainty only about either demand or cost important qualitative differences also exist however for example it may be optimal to set prices below marginal cost and the pricing authority delegated to the firm may be more limited when there is uncertainty about both cost and demand

currency fluctuations in the post bretton woods era the international monetary landscape that has emerged since the felling of bretton woods is characterized by a hybrid exchange rate system that lies somewhere between the textbook polar cases of a gold standard and a pure float this system has relatively flexible exchange rates between major countries active central bank intervention in the market for the major currencies and predominantly fixed exchange rates relative to the dollar or to some basket of currencies for less developed countries and newly industrializing nations the majority of research on currency markets since the early 1970s has focused on the characteristics of flexible exchange rates under this hybrid regime my thesis is that this research has been unsuccessful the proportion of monthly or quarterly exchange rate changes that current models can explain is essentially zero even after the fact forecasts that use actual values instead of forecasted values of the explanatory variables cannot explain major currency movements over the post bretton woods era this result is quite surprising since exchange rate changes would be entirely unpredictable only in very special cases of the theoretical models discussed as the discussion below will argue it is not a general implication of market efficiency that exchange rates follow a random walk process 1

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

how much discretion for risk regulators we analyze the regulation of firms that undertake socially risky activities but can reduce the probability of an accident inflicted on third parties by carrying out non verifiable effort congress delegates regulation to an agency although these two bodies may have different preferences toward the industry the optimal level of discretion left to the agency results from the following trade off the agency can tailor discretionary policies to its expert knowledge about potential harm but it implements policies that are too pro industry the agency should be given full discretion when the firm is solvent partial discretion is preferred otherwise we then investigate how this trade off changes as the political and economic landscapes are modified

transmission of csr requirements in supply chains investigating the multiple mediating effects of csr activities in smes in recent years scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the separate areas of corporate social responsibility csr and supply chain management scm however little scholarly attent

measuring the degree of exchange market intervention in a small open economy abstract in this article i introduce an index of intervention activity which can be calculated on the basis of observed data this intervention index measures intervention activity as the proportion of exchange market pressure relieved by exchange market intervention the properties of the intervention index are established analytically using a model of a small open economy with rational expectations the index is used to calculate measures of bilateral and multilateral intervention for canada over the period 1975 1990

on the optimality of the patent renewal system the patent system is mainly a renewal system the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees i ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research in such a model i show that renewal mechanisms possibly with subsidies are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on regardless of the objective function under plausible circumstances patents should have a uniform life rather than varying in length as typically occurs under a renewal system

on the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection abstract this paper characterizes a class of optimal incentive schemes in a simple principal agent model which allows for moral hazard and adverse selection we show that incentive compatible allocation can always be approximately implemented through a menu of quadratic incentive schemes it is also proved that the set of incentive compatible allocations is independent of the distribution of the additive uncertainty which affects the outcome informational requirements and economic interpretation of quadratic and linear schemes are discussed

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

good regulatory regimes assuming simple functional forms numerical methods are used to analyze linear regulatory rules that include cost plus and price cap regimes regulators are assumed to observe actual cost but not the disutility of cost reduction and are assumed unable to impose taxes or make transfers best linear regimes depend importantly on the level and form of uncertainty the regulatory objective function and the firm profitability constraint under uncertainty regimes in which price depends in part on actual cost generally substantially outperform pure price caps particularly in terms of consumers surplus

estimating cost functions in regulated industries characterized by asymmetric information abstract in this paper a structural model is developed to estimate a cost function that includes both an adverse selection and a moral hazard variable it is shown how traditional cost function estimates may produced biased results if moral hazard is present this gives an alternative reason to feinstein and wolak the econometric implications of incentive compatible regulation in g f rhodes ed advances in econometrics vol 9 159 204 jai press greenwich ct 1991 of why scale economics may be overestimated in regulated industries parameter estimates from our model can be used to design an optimal contract or any other regulatory mechanism we illustrate our approach using data from the norwegian bus transport industry

incentives in incentive contracting an application of the mimic model a handful of empirical studies have endeavoured to analyse the cost containment effectiveness of the incentive contracts that the department of defence has used for its acquisition of weapon systems a serious omission from all of these studies has been a consideration of the motivation of contractors to renegotiate these contracts many times since contract modification is an important and recognized part of incentive contracting it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to the contractor s incentive to seek these modifications the purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the effects of incentive contract cost sharing provisions and contract renegotiations on contractor cost savings effort

corporate social responsibility and corporate performance evidence from a panel of us listed companies we investigate whether inclusion and permanence in the domini social index dsi affects corporate performance on a sample of around 1000 firms in a 13 year interval by controlling for size industry business cycle and time invariant firm idiosyncratic characteristics our results find partial support to the hypothesis that corporate social responsibility is a move from the shareholders wealth to a multi stakeholders welfare target on the one side permanence into the domini index di is shown to increase reduce significantly total sales per employee returns on equity but not when large and r d investing firms are excluded from the sample on the other side lower returns on equity for domini firms seem nonetheless to be accompanied by relatively lower conditional volatility and lower reaction to extreme shocks with respect to the control sample an explanation for these findings suggested by the inspection of domini criteria is that social responsibility implies on the one side decisions leadi

a review of theories of the firm and their contributions to corporate sustainability corporate sustainability has arisen as an alternative to traditional short term profit oriented ap proaches to managing the firm by holistically balancing economic environmental and social issues in the present generation and for future ones although a number of theories of the firm have been pro posed within recent decades their application to corporate sustainability has been limited this paper presents an overview of the most widely used theories of the firm such as the stockholder theory the aggregate theory the contractual theory the resource based view and the stakeholder theory and analyses their contributions to corporate sustainability from an interpretative perspective the discus sion highlights the point that each of the theories on its own is limited in addressing sustainability s four dimensions i e the economic environmental social and time nonetheless each theory or group of theories has a particular perspective or principles that can contribute to one or more of the four dimensions the authors of this paper propose a sustainability oriented theory of the firm which is built upon elements of those theories as they relate to corporate sustainability this new theory can be useful in providing the firm s leaders and all of its stakeholders with a more complete vision of its ob ligations opportunities relations and processes that the firm should address as it engages in helping to make societies become more equitable and sustainable in the short and long terms

definition consistent measurement of exchange market pressure currencies can be under severe pressure but in a managed exchange rate regime that is not fully visible via the change in the exchange rate the literature has proposed a way to measure such exchange market pressure emp indirectly by adding interest rate changes and forex interventions to the exchange rate change we demonstrate that this measure is not consistent with the definition of emp and develop a new measure that is consistent this is first derived within the commonly used monetary exchange rate model then we generalize the analysis by avoiding the use of an exchange rate model we find that the interest rate should not be taken in the first difference form used so far but rather in level form and relative to the interest rate chosen if the country had no exchange rate objective applications on the european monetary system and east asian crises confirm that this improvement is highly relevant in practice

monitoring versus incentives abstract this paper analyzes the trade off between monitoring and incentives in a principal agent relationship with moral hazard we derive general results on the optimal monitoring incentives mix for the case where both parties are risk neutral and the agent faces a limited liability constraint we show that the principal uses less monitoring and stronger incentives if the agent s liability limit is relaxed or if monitoring costs increase to induce more effort on the part of the agent the principal resorts to more monitoring or to stronger incentives or both in particular there are cases where the cheapest way to induce more effort is to use lower powered money incentives but with much more precise monitoring

second sourcing and the experience curve price competition in defense procurement we examine a dynamic model ofprice competition in defense procurement that incorporates the experience curve asymmetric cost information and the availability of a higher cost alternative system we model acquisition as a two stage process in which initial production is governed by a contract between the government and the developer competition is then introduced by an auction in which a second source bids against the developer for remaining production we characterize the class of production contracts that are cost minimizing for the government and that induce the developer to reveal private cost information when high costs are revealed these contracts result in a credible cutoff of new system production in favor of the still higher cost alternative system

defence procurement and industrial structure in the u k defence ministries being monopsonists with considerable regulatory authority have the power to shape the electronics aerospace and engineering industries that supply them this paper uses the u k experience to investigate whether and how the government should influence industrial structure after reviewing market structure and policy it provides a quantitative measure of the impact of the new more competitive procurement practices on the size distribution of contracts and assesses the role of policy on the likely evolution of the structure of the european arms industry

optimal risk allocation for regulated monopolies and consumers abstract the model shows how a regulated monopolist s price should change as random cost and demand parameters are revealed the regulator has a ramsey type problem with a linear tariff a trade off between allocative efficiency and risk sharing typically exists the attitudes of the consumer and the firm to both income and price risk determine how the price should move sufficient conditions are found for price adjustment schemes used in practice to be optimal these schemes include full partial and zero pass through of marginal costs and price caps average cost pricing and caps on total revenue for demand risk

monitoring moral hazard asymmetric information and risk sharing in procurement contracting this article characterizes the optimal procurement contract for a monopsonistic purchaser who contracts with a risk averse supplier with private information about his costs and who contributes an unobservable effort the costs incurred by the supplier may be uncertain and the purchaser has access to a monitor of costs that may be subject to noise that complicates risk sharing the purchaser prefers to respond to the observability problem with afixed price contract and to respond to the private information problem with a cost plus contract with uncertain costs and a perfect monitor the optimal contract relieves the supplier of some risk and the purchaser prefers that the effort of the supplier be subsidized with deterministic costs and a noisy monitor the optimal contract places risk on the supplier and the purchaser may prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed procurement of goods and services is an important form of economic exchange that is often characterized by bargaining and contracting rather than by exchange in a competitive market the procurement setting analyzed here corresponds to the case in which the purchaser is a monopsonist who contracts with a single supplier as in the case of the department of defense contracting for the delivery of a military system in such a setting a principalagent model may be a reasonable representation of the relationship between the purchaser and the supplier and the economics of the procurement arrangement is then captured in the contract when the item procured is standardized the relevant information is likely to be common knowledge and risk may be minimal in such a case a fixed price contract may satisfactorily resolve the purchaser s contracting problem in contrast the model considered here is intended to represent the procurement of a nonstandardized item about which information is incomplete costs are uncertain and observability of supplier costs by the purchaser is limited procurement thus is complicated by the conjunction of adverse selection risk sharing and moral hazard problems

how elastic is the government s demand for weapons abstract we estimate the elasticity of the government s demand for specific weapons by econometric analysis of the relationship between quantity and cost revisions across the population of major weapon systems the cost revisions are due in part to technological information generated in the course of research and development the elasticity of demand is 0 55 and is significantly different from both zero and unity thus the government s demand for specific weapons is inelastic but not perfectly inelastic weapons acquisition is evidently characterized by increasing returns the elasticity of total cost with respect to quantity is about 0 75

monitoring of performance in organizational contracting the case of defense procurement this paper contains an agency theoretic analysis of procurement contracts in which the government designs optimal linear contracts for a risk averse supplier in the presence of moral hazard private information and imperfect monitoring optimal contracts deviate from first best risk sharing the direction of the deviation depends on the relative severity of the moral hazard and private information problems and on the precision of the monitor in contrast to the usual result in the moral hazard literature the government may in some cases prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed choice of the precision of the monitor and the categories of costs covered by the monitor are also studied

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

estimating the degree of interventionist policies in the run up to emu based on a theoretical monetary exchange rate model in continuous time this article establishes a sequential estimation framework which is capable of indicating central bank intervention in the run up to a currency union using daily pre european monetary union pre emu exchange rate data for the countries of the current euro zone we find mixed evidence of active pre emu intervention policies so called institutional frontloading strategies our estimation framework is highly relevant to economic and political agents operating in financial markets of the upcoming emu accession countries

a re examination of the monetary model of exchange market pressure canada 1963 1988 in re evaluating the performance of the girton and roper 1977 two country monetary model of exchange market pressure emp for canada estimates are provided for an extended specification that allows for unrestricted dynamics results show the hypothesized negative effect of domestic credit growth on emp to be supported throughout the relevance both of the dynamics and of the hypothesized unitary tradeoff between exchange rate and international reserve movements for bank of canada policy is demonstrated for the sequence of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes contained in the 1963 1 1988 1 sample

on efficiency inducing taxation for a non renewable resource monopolist the problem of using taxes to induce a monopolist supplier of a non renewable resource to extract efficiently has been solved under the assumption that the government has perfect information about the monopolist s cost function and reserves and is able to precommit to an entire sequence of taxes over time we extend this literature by constructing an efficiency inducing tax mechanism that does not require the government to have any information about the cost function or reserves and which does not require it to precommit to a sequence of taxes over time

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

regulating an externality generating public utility a multi dimensional screening approach abstract in this paper i present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs because of the nature of the optimal contracts bunching is never optimal even with n distinct types a characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent the variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs this allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered a fixed charge implements the optimal solution

on delegating price authority to a regulated firm this article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better information about demand conditions than does the regulator the regulator would like to tie prices to the firm s private information in a socially optimal way to do so the regulator must induce the firm either truthfully to reveal private information or equivalently unilaterally to set socially optimal prices this is accomplished by assessing lump sum subsidies or taxes that depend in an appropriate way on the prices announced by the firm this mechanism can be reinterpreted as a two part tariff scheme whereby both the service fee and price per unit respond to shifting demand conditions

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

using return policies to elicit retailer information we show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions roughly stated the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions a retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms as a consequence a retailer is less inclined to misstate market conditions by serving as an additional control instrument a returns policy reduces the manufacturer s need to ration cut production

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

the relationship between disclosures of corporate social performance and financial performance evidences from gri reports in manufacturing industry whether the corporate social performance affects the financial performance is still unclear in many manufacturing companies we commonly expect on one side that profitable corporations have stronger incentives to reveal information on the social performance in order to improve their publicity on the other hand companies may face the fear of rising costs due to corporate social responsibility csr activities with increasing concerns of csr it is timely to investigate the relationship between the disclosure of corporate social performance and the financial performance in this paper with the above study objective we use global reporting initiative gri reports of 75 sample companies collect evidences by applying the method of structured content analysis of the cases and attempt to identify this relationship the corporate social performance is measured by the indicators according to the gri guidelines i e within the categories of labor practices and decent work human rights society as well as product responsibility financial performance is measured by return on equity sales growth and cash flow sales ratio using statistical evaluation methods our results indicate that the categories of human rights society as well as product responsibility display a significant and positive correlation with the return on equity same conclusion also holds for many csr indicators nevertheless when examining the csr practices across different manufacturing sectors we have not observed significant differences the study results are important for understanding the development and implementation of csr practices in the manufacturing industry

the cost of contract renegotiation evidence from the local public sector the renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts however assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint to address this question we fit a structural principal agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts the model captures two important features of the industry first only two types of contracts are used in practice fixed price and cost plus second subsidies increase over time we compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment we conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators

the influence of csr on firm value an application of panel smooth transition regression on taiwan abstractprevious studies on the relationship between corporate social responsibility csr and firm value generally belong to one of the two opposing schools of thought the social impact hypothesis and the shift of focus hypothesis this study however proposes that the relationship between csr and company value is non linear and neither wholly positive nor negative we employed the corporate social responsibility index crsi to test this hypothesis the panel smooth transition regression pstr model was used to analyse listed taiwanese firms from 2010 to 2012 and calculate the value transition threshold of csr using csri as the transition variable we then applied pstr to determine whether csri shows a two regime non linear relationship as inferred by our model empirical findings show that the threshold value of csri is 13 082 thus we concluded that investment in csr does not contribute to enhancing company value until it exceeds the value transition threshold

effects of the change from rate of return to price cap regulation this article focuses on the use of incentive regulation in the telephone industry in the united states we first characterize some of the difficulties that have led regulators to move away from traditional rate ofreturn cost based regulation and toward systems of regulation that provide incentives for increasingly efficient production allowing firms to share in the social gains from efficiency with increased profits we then discuss the basic structure of incentive regulation as it has most commonly been adopted in the telephone industry in the united states the first is price cap pc regulation which typically allows the firm to

international coordination in the design of macroeconomic policy rules abstract the paper examines international issues that arise in the design and evaluation of macroeconomic policy rules it begins with a theoretical investigation of the effects of fiscal and monetary policy in a two country rational expectations model with staggered wage and price setting and with perfect capital mobility the results indicate that with the appropriate choice of policies and with flexible exchange rates demand shocks need not give rise to international externalities or coordination issues price shocks however do create an externality and this is the focus of the empirical part of the paper using a simple seven country model consisting of canada france germany italy japan the united kingdom and the united states optimal cooperative and non cooperative nash policy rules to minimize the variance of output and inflation in each country are calculated the cooperative policies are computed using standard dynamic stochastic programming techniques and the non cooperative policies are computed using an algorithm developed by finn kydland the central result is that the cooperative policy rules for these countries are more accommodative to inflation than the non cooperative policy rules

the handbook of international macroeconomics preface 1 introduction rick van der ploeg amsterdam 2 quantity constrained models of open economies neil rankin warwick 3 imperfect competition and open economy macroeconomics huw d dixon york 4 relative price movements in dynamic general equilibrium models of international trade david backus nyu patrick kehoe pennsylvania and finn kydland carnegie mellon 5 international fiscal policy coordination and competition assaf razin and efraim sadka tel aviv 6 capital taxation in the world economy a lans bovenberg tilburg 7 history of the international monetary system implications for research in international macroeconomics and finance barry eichengreen berkeley 8 on inflation unemployment and the optimal exchange rate regime george alogoskoufis athens 9 macroeconomic policy speculative attacks and balance of payments crisis pierre richard agenor and robert p flood imf 10 continuous time models of exchange rates and intervention giuseppe bertola princeton 11 stylized facts of nominal exchange rate returns casper g de vries leuven 12 partial versus general equilibrium models of international capital market equilibrium 13 sovereign debt kenneth kletzer santa cruz 14 growth and external debt daniel cohen cepremap 15 growth and deficits in an interdependent world index

environmental disclosure and stock market liquidity evidence from arab mena emerging markets abstractthe objective of this study is to examine the impact of environmental disclosure levels on the stock market liquidity of arab middle eastern and north african mena companies for that a self constructed disclosure index was applied to the annual reports for the years 2010 2011 and 2012 and the bid ask spread was used as a proxy for stock market liquidity results indicate that levels of environmental disclosure in mena companies are quite low in addition using a sample of 276 firm year observations multivariate analysis shows that the higher the level of environmental disclosure provided in the annual reports the lower the spread between the market bid and ask prices thereby indicating an increase in stock market liquidity

the choice of an exchange rate system and macroeconomic stability the recent theoretical literature regarding the choice of an exchange rate system has focused on how the choice of an exchange rate regime will affect the stability of the economy while the methodology and emphasis of the various theoretical arguments differ the common thread that runs through all is the notion that the appropriate exchange rate system will differ with the nature of the disturbance to the economy the substantive differences existing among the various studies are to a certain extent due to different criteria used for exchange system choice it is not surprising that one s beliefs with regard to the effect of exogenous shocks on exchange system choice will be sensitive to the objective function used for instance fischer 1977 and frenkel and aizenman 1982 focus on the minimization of real consumption shocks and derive the result that the greater the domestic money shocks the more likely is a float alternatively flood 1979 and aizenman 1983 with an objective of minimizing domestic price shocks conclude that the greater the domestic money shocks the more preferred is a fixed exchange rate while the evidence presented below will indicate which approach is more consistent with actual country practice we should first consider the rationale behind the criteria considered fischer appeals to basic micro theory when he says that concavity of utility functions expressed as a function of consumption justifies concern with the stability of consumption but it is not obvious that price stability is of itself undesirable

corporate responsibility in scandinavian supply chains this article examines corporate responsibility in the supply chains of four of the largest scandinavian multinational corporations ikea nokia novo nordisk and statoilhydro and offers two key findings first these scandinavian companies have all implemented responsible supply chain practices where suppliers in developing nations and the communities of these suppliers are engaged as key stakeholders and treated as partners second these supply chain practices all share the common bond of having honesty and the establishment of trust based relationships at their foundation as a result these scandinavian companies have developed a cooperative advantage in their ability to form successful long term partnerships in their respective supply chains

foreign exchange market intervention in two small open economies the canadian and australian experience abstract we examine intervention by the bank of canada and the reserve bank of australia for daily data from 1989 to 1998 both central banks intervene in response to excessive exchange rate volatility and uncertainty volatility is the implied volatility of foreign currency futures options uncertainty is the kurtosis of the implied risk neutral probability density functions we also examine the impact of inflation targets unlike other studies we also consider commodity futures prices these turn out to help explain the effectiveness of intervention central bank intervention was largely unsuccessful in both countries though volatility and kurtosis were modestly affected

capital structure with countervailing incentives the regulatedjirm s choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives the jirm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases when the jim s investment is large countervailing incentives lead both high and low cost jims to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium thus decoupling capital structure from private information when investment is small or medium sized the model may admit separating equilibria in which high cost jirrns issue greater equity and low cost jims rely more on debt jinancing

verifiable and non verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist abstract optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum existing non bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function while bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution we introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information our p rice based s ubsidy ps mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period the regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand cost or damage functions of the firm all of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost either immediately or asymptotically

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

prices vs quantities and delegating price authority to a monopolist this paper examines the desirability of allowing a monopolist to determine the market price we find that none of the regulatory mechanisms previously discussed in the prices vs quantities literature strictly dominates unregulated monopoly price setting furthermore despite suggestions by others price setting by a regulated monopolist whose profits coincide with society s net benefits is not always the most desirable means of control quantity setting by such a monopolist may instead be the preferred choice combining both into one incentive compatible mechanism provides the best regulatory scheme and one in which the regulator need not be informed about costs

simple cost sharing contracts we extend rogerson s 2003 intriguing analysis of the performance of simple procurement contracts to consider settings where the supplier s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly although the simple contract that rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely we show that in all settings under consideration though a fairly simple pair of contracts one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement can always secure more than 73 of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

robust optimization policy benchmarks and modeling errors in natural gas abstract the problem of regulating natural gas procurement has become a huge burden to regulators especially due to the plethora of complicated financial contracts that are now being used by local distribution companies ldcs for risk management purposes muthuraman aouam and rardin 2008 proposed a new benchmarking scheme called policy benchmarks and showed that these benchmarks do not suffer from the usual criticisms that are made against existing regulatory methods such policy benchmarks based regulation has however faced hurdles in being adopted one of the primary reasons has been concerns over its robustness we demonstrate in this paper that when modeling errors are present the policy benchmarks proposed earlier can backfire and are hence as suspected not well suited for regulation we begin our analysis with a more general model than the one that has been used earlier by accommodating the ldc s ability to reduce cost by exerting effort as in classical economics we derive solutions to the ldcos problem find closed form solutions for the regulator s optimal fee fraction along with risk sharing implications and provide insights into the policy benchmark selection we then construct a robust optimization based policy benchmarking mechanism that inherits all the original benefits we further demonstrate that these unlike the earlier benchmarks are robust against modeling errors

taylor rules and the canadian us equilibrium exchange rate abstract this paper identifies the canadian us equilibrium exchange rate based on a simple structural model of the real exchange rate in which monetary policy follows a taylor rule interest rate reaction function the exchange rate is explained by relative output and inflation as observable variables and by unobserved equilibrium rates as well as unobserved transitory components in output and the exchange rate using canadian data over 1974 2009 we jointly estimate the unobserved components and the structural parameters using the kalman filter and bayesian technique we find that canada s equilibrium exchange rate evolves smoothly and follows a trend depreciation the transitory component is found to be very persistent but much more volatile than the equilibrium rate resulting in few but prolonged periods of currency misalignments

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand the authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand than the regulator from the outset of their relationship the firm s cost structure is common knowledge but monitoring of output is prohibitively costly the authors find that when marginal production costs increase with output the firm command s no rents from its private information and the efficient price is established for each realization of demand in contrast with declining marginal costs the same price is established by the regulator for all demand realizations and the firm s rents can be substantial overall major qualitative differences in the optimal regulatory policy arise when the firm s private information concerns demand rather than costs copyright 1988 by american economic association

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

incentives for conservation and quality improvement by public utilities the author examines the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service e g electricity supply local telephone service and service enhancements e g energy conservation services improved clarity and speed of voice communication the optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly depending upon the information available to the regulator the price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation 35 refs 2 figs