energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in oecd countries abstract this paper investigates the effect of energy liberalization compared to other drivers on policies that support renewable energy in a long panel of oecd countries we estimate this effect by accounting for the endogeneity of liberalization related to joint decisions within a country s energy strategy using regulation in other industries as instruments we find that energy liberalization increases public support for renewable energy the effect of liberalization is the second largest after the effect of per capita income and is mostly driven by reductions in entry barriers while the effect of privatization is unclear this finding suggests that a reduction in the monopolistic power of state owned utilities has a positive effect on renewable energy policies when various types of actors are ensured access to the grid instead of it being provided to only a few large private firms

testing for evidence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market a comment in 1994 puelz and snow presented empirical evidence of adverse selection in the market for automobile collision insurance using data from a private insurer they claimed to have found strong evidence of adverse selection in the insurer s portfolio their test was based on individuals choice of deductible in each risk class from the models of rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 it is well known that if residual adverse selection is present in some risk classes insurers will offer menus of contracts from which insureds will self select at equilibrium higher risk individuals will choose the smaller deductible and will be charged the higher price per unit of insurance dionne doherty and fombaron 2000 an empirical test of the theory is to verify in each risk class whether lower deductibles are chosen by insureds with higher accident proba

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

political instability corruption and policy formation the case of environmental policy abstract this paper develops a theory of environmental policy formation taking into consideration the degree of corruptibility and political turbulence the predictions that emerge are that the interaction between the two variables is important political instability has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations if the level of corruption is low but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high corruption reduces the stringency of environmental regulations but the effect disappears as political instability increases the empirical findings are fully consistent with the predictions of the model

middlemen as guarantors of quality abstract we analyze an experience good model with producer moral hazard which is based on shapiro quarterly journal of economics 1983 98 659 679 we develop conditions under which a good will be sold through a middleman instead of being sold directly by the producer when selling costs may even be increased by the presence of middlemen middlemen help to alleviate the producer moral hazard problem by dropping a producer s good and lowering her future sales if the good is not of its claimed quality the middleman engages in this policing activity in order to maintain his own reputation as a seller of high quality goods

competition in political and economic markets do anomalies play an important role in explaining economic and political choices are political decisions more prone to anomalies irrationality and inefficiency than economic decisions in their integration of results derived from experimental psychology and applied political economy frey and eichenberger 1990 argue that social scientists ought to answer these questions in the affirmative after examining a large body of choice data frey and eichenberger conclude that individuals deviate from the axioms of rational choice in their view the resultant anomalies in individual behavior are unaffected by the aggregation which occurs in the economic marketplace they conclude that political decision making systems correct no larger a proportion of these anomalies than are corrected by the economic market in many institutional settings outlined in their paper decision making systems can be expected to magnify individuals deviations from rational behavior system wide irrational behavior will then produce less frequent trading and a less efficient allocation of resources in this note we examine two components of frey and eichenberger s argument first we reconsider their evidence for irrational behavior in light of a larger body of experimental data which includes choices made in market settings second we argue that competition in political markets will tend to eliminate aggregate anomalies just as it does in economic markets experimental economists often generate data which distinguish between choices individuals indicate in unstructured environments and transactions individuals consummate in markets initial statements regarding choices are often inconsistent with subsequent trading behavior these data indicate that the economist s maximization paradigm based on tenets of rational choice is

corruption a review as is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development the aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research the paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models this is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption the paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

preemptive r d rent dissipation and the leverage theory this paper provides a new perspective on the validity of the so called leverage theory in a model of preemptive innovation in systems markets i examine the effect of bundling on r d incentives i find that bundling provides a channel through which monopoly slack in one component market can be shifted to another with the effect of mitigating rent dissipation in the systems market bundling can be profitable if this beneficial effect of reduced rent dissipation outweighs the negative effect of intensified price competition after demonstrating the private optimality of bundling its welfare implications are considered finally the results can be reinterpreted to analyze the relationship between compatibility decisions and r d incentives in mix and match models

do banks provide financial slack we study the decision to choose bank debt rather than public securities in a firm s marginal financing choice using a sample of 500 firms over the 1980 to 1993 time period we find that firms are relatively more likely to choose bank loans when variables that measure asymmetric information problems are elevated the sensitivity of the likelihood of choosing bank debt to information problems is greater for firms with no public debt outstanding these results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks help alleviate asymmetric information problems and that firms weigh these information benefits against a wide range of contracting costs when choosing bank financing why do some firms borrow from public sources while others rely exclusively on private lenders the answer to this question is not well understood existing theories suggest that a firm must consider the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of bank debt financing relative to other potential financing choices the potential benefits of bank financing include low moral hazard and adverse selection costs and ease of renegotiation in financial distress 1 the potential costs of bank financing include monitoring costs suboptimal liquidation outcomes and distortions induced by information monopolies 2 the goal of this paper is to identify whether adverse selection problems influence a firm s choice between new bank debt public debt or common stock in particular we are interested in assessing the empirical validity of the hypothesis that banks have the ability to accurately price a firm s claims thus inducing a preference for firms that are undervalued by the market to

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

environmentalism democracy and pollution control this paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature based on predictions generated by a lobby group model first we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries second we explore the interaction between democratic participation and political electoral competition the empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to positively affect the stringency of environmental policy moreover political competition tends to raise policy stringency in particular where citizens participation in the democratic process is widespread

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

effect of credit guarantee policy on survival and performance of smes in republic of korea this study evaluates the effect of credit guarantee on smes at the firm level to estimate the effect of credit guarantee we analyze relations between credit guarantee the survival of guaranteed firms and their productive performance the result indicates that credit guarantee frequency enabled guaranteed firms to achieve good performances in general on the contrary the effect of guarantee amounts is ambiguous in that there is difference between the contemporary effect and the lagged effect therefore we conclude that credit guarantee satisfied partially its goal to alleviate smes difficulty in acquiring finance and to stabilize employment

the mis allocation of capital is capital allocated so that its marginal product is equated to the market interest rate is the marginal product of capital equalized across its alternative uses this paper attempts to answer both of these questions using data from india and concludes that both these standard properties fail by a wide margin jel o16 g2

the voluntary provision of a pure public good the case of reduced cfc emissions and the montreal protocol abstract this paper applies the theory of the voluntary provision of a pure public good to the behavior of nations to curb chlorofluorocarbon cfc emissions during the late 1980s by devising an empirical test we determine that these cutbacks in emissions are consistent with nash behavior when taste parameters are controlled the relationship between emission cutbacks and national income is nearly linear as implied by the theory if the sample is purged of potential outliers then the linear relationship results a significant taste parameter is the extent of political and civil freedoms while a marginally significant parameter is geophysical position in terms of latitude

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

towards an understanding of the role of standard setters in standard setting abstract we investigate the effect of standard setters in standard setting we examine how certain professional and political characteristics of fasb members and sec commissioners predict the accounting reliability and relevance of proposed standards notably we find fasb members with backgrounds in financial services are more likely to propose standards that decrease reliability and increase relevance partly due to their tendency to propose fair value methods we find opposite results for fasb members affiliated with the democratic party although only when excluding financial services background as an independent variable jackknife procedures show that results are robust to omitting any individual standard setter

no deep pockets some stylized empirical results on firms financial constraints this paper is a survey of recent empirical work on financial constraints faced by firms it is organized as a series of stylized results which mirror what is generally understood about the severity of financial constraints and the effects that they have upon firms the review of the literature shows that a financial constraints are a widespread key concern for firms hindering their ability to carry out their optimal investment and growth trajectories and b the severity of such constraints depends on institutional and firm specific characteristics as well as on the nature of investment projects

does trade openness promote multilateral environmental cooperation this article puts forward a number of arguments why trade openness might promote multilateral environmental cooperation most of these arguments are grounded in the substantive self interest of the trading country it tests the proposition using a range of proxy variables for general trade openness as well as specific export interests the article examines whether countries open to trade are more likely to have signed three recent multilateral environmental agreements meas and are more likely to have ratified early on another three agreements with quasi universal membership after controlling for income political freedom and population size the empirical estimations find some weak evidence in favour of a possible synergy between trade openness and multilateral environmental cooperation world trade organisation membership as well as general export openness go hand in hand with greater willingness to participate in multilateral environmental cooperation in some cases however whether specific trade interests promote or hinder multilateral environmental cooperation depends on whether the relevant agreement is likely to threaten or accommodate the interests of exporting countries

is the growth of small firms constrained by internal finance this paper examines the long standing theory that the growth of small firms is often constrained by the quantity of internal finance under plausible assumptions when financing constraints are binding an additional dollar of internal finance should generate slightly more than an additional dollar of growth in assets this quantitative prediction should not hold for the relatively small number of firms which access external equity we test these predictions with a panel of more than 1 600 small firms and find that the growth of most firms is constrained by internal finance our results have implications for several different research literatures including models of firm growth

where do financial constraints originate from an empirical analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets despite the voluminous and growing literature on financial constraints the origins of the constraints are hardly ever empirically analyzed this paper offers such an analysis we study in particular the empirical prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets using a unique survey data on finnish small and medium sized enterprises smes the survey data suggest that adverse selection is empirically more prevalent than moral hazard in the capital markets that the smes face we also find that of the variables indicating the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard the former has more explanatory power in regressions modeling the availability of external finance to the smes than the latter finally we document that our proxies for adverse selection and moral hazard are inversely related to the age of firms just like peter diamond s 1989 model predicts

how do elections affect international cooperation evidence from environmental treaty participation is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post electoral period however the cost of participating in these agreements is often lower for developing countries and they may enjoy indirect advantages which may make them more prone to ratifying in the pre electoral period these hypotheses are assessed empirically by studying the ratification process of 41 global environmental agreements censused in the environmental treaties and resources indicators database from 1976 to 1999 we use a duration model in which time is measured on a daily basis enabling us to precisely identify pre and post electoral periods a significant challenge in political cycles studies our investigation reveals the existence of political ratification cycles that are of substantial magnitude and non linear over the pre and post electoral years

kyoto protocol cooperation does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying in this paper we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby we use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of kyoto protocol ratification to test this hypothesis we find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification and the effect rises with the degree of corruption

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

long term debt maturity and financing constraints of smes during the global financial crisis we use the recent financial crisis to investigate financing constraints of private small and medium sized enterprises smes in belgium we hypothesize that smes with a large proportion of long term debt maturing at the start of the crisis had difficulties to renew their loans due to the negative credit supply shock and hence could invest less we find a substantial variation in the maturity structure of long term debt firms which at the start of the crisis had a larger part of their long term debt maturing within the next year experienced a significantly larger drop in investments in 2009 this effect is driven by firms which are ex ante more likely to be financially constrained consistent with a causal effect of a credit supply shock to corporate investments we find no effect in placebo periods without a negative credit supply shock

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

political institutions and pollution control this paper models the selection of environmental policies under authoritarian and democratic regimes and tests the hypothesis that political institutions systematically affect the enactment of environmental regulations the results support the contention that political institutional arrangements rather than resource endowments largely determine policies concerning environmental regulation copyright 1992 by mit press

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

too much investment a problem of asymmetric information this paper shows that under plausible assumptions the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality this conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the stiglitz weiss model it is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance however under the stiglitz weiss assumptions used to derive an underinvestment result equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance

a strategic motivation for commodity bundling the analytical literature on commodity bundling explains the practice of selling two or more differentiated products in a single package as a surrogate for direct price discrimination in contrast this paper shows that imperfect competition creates a strategic incentive to bundle the profitability of bundling whether it adversely affects rival producers and whether it yields an overall efficiency gain depends inter alia on the nature of product market competition the role of complementarity in explaining why firms bundle is also explored copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

life cycle effects in small business finance this paper studies the life cycle profiles of small firms cost and use of credit using a panel of finnish firms the choice of method matters for the conclusions drawn about the relationship between firm age and financing costs the cross sectional age profiles of financing costs are hump shaped and consistent with hold up theories whereas methods that control for cohort fixed effects demonstrate that the financing costs decrease monotonically as the firms mature the life cycle profiles of the use of credit also indicate that firms are more dependent on financial intermediaries in the early periods of their lives furthermore the cohorts born during recessions pay higher financing costs and use smaller amounts of bank loans even after their creditworthiness is controlled for the recession cohort effect appears to be more related to the experience of starting up the firm in the recession than to the ceos growing up in a recession during their early adulthood

product bundling impacts of product heterogeneity and risk considerations abstract bundling has been extensively studied in the literature and its benefits have been manifested through three perspectives of achieving better price discrimination helping to save costs and preserving the power for deterring a potential entrant in this study we examine two aspects of bundling which have not been studied before we examine the impact of product heterogeneity on bundling decisions we also address risk considerations in a bundling problem specifically we consider a retailer who has the option of selling a bundle of two products pure bundling policy or selling the products separately no bundling policy the retailer could also face a product selection problem for which we consider three scenarios of choosing two products with perfectly positively correlated perfectly negatively correlated or independent reservation prices we use a mean variance approach to include retailer s risk through her profit variability when maximizing the expected value of profit we characterize the conditions under which a policy or scenario performs better than the others under the influence of product heterogeneity and or retailer s risk aversion among other findings we show that optimal bundling price chosen by a risk averse decision maker cannot be larger than the one chosen by a risk neutral decision maker

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

brand extension as informational leverage the marketing literature refers to the concept of brand capital and provides empirical evidence that firms with a large stock of well established brands have an advantage in introducing new products this paper develops a theory of brand extension as a mechanism for informational leverage in which a firm leverages off a good s reputation in one market to alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry encountered in other markets it is shown that brand extension helps a multi product monopolist introduce a new experience good with less price distortion thus the paper provides a theoretical foundation for the concept of brand capital

rational rationing in stackelberg equilibria in the contect of duopoly theory with differentiated products economic theorists usually consider the price as the choice variable for the firms given the prices the respective quantities demanded and profits can be computed in this paper we consider strategy spaces consisting of both price and production variables two models are developped in one model the firm will choose its price and the number of consumers it will serve a serving capacity while in the other model it will choose the price and the total quantity it will produce a production capacity we are particularly concerned in this paper with the existence of endogenously determined rationing in a leader follower duopoly framework we show that rationing is always may be present in equilibrium when strategies are expressed in terms of the price and the production serving capacity moreover only the leader or first mover will or may engage in rationing rationing appears therefore as a strategic variable what may appear as a fixed price equilibrium or a disequilibrium turns out in this case to be a strategic equilibrium with completely flexible prices an example is worked out this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

why cooperate public goods economic power and the montreal protocol this paper develops a correlated probit model to describe dichotomous choices that may contain a public goods component or some other forms of interdependency the key contribution of the paper is to formulate tests for interdependent behavior among agents in particular we examine the decisions by nations whether or not to ratify the montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer specifically we reject free riding as a motive for not ratifying the protocol and we find little evidence that individual nations were influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners hence the data suggest that with respect to the montreal protocol most nations acted without regard for the actions of other nations

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty a spatial probit analysis abstract this paper represents treaty participation as a two stage game for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages this spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages when the procedure is applied to the helsinki protocol we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized

umbrella branding as a signal of new product quality an example of signalling by posting a bond i present a signalling model in which a multiproduct firm can use its reputation as a bond for quality by using a brand name for an established product when it introduces a new experience good as out of equilibrium beliefs are specified a false signal may be taken to imply that both the established and the new product are of low quality in contrast the absence of a signal leaves open the possibility that one of the two products is of high quality hence the signal can be credible without excessive sunk costs as long as the bond posted is sufficiently large

does firm size matter evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in germany abstract this paper examines the link between liquidity constraints and investment behavior for german firms of different sizes from 1970 to 1986 results indicate that medium sized firms appear to be more liquidity constrained in their investment behavior than either the smallest or largest firms in the study suggesting that the unique german infrastructure designed to assist the small firm has indeed succeeded in alleviating to some degree such liquidity constraints findings also support the hypothesis that the emerging competition and internationalism which characterized the german financial markets in the 1980s have been improving access to capital for some groups of firms

corruption pollution and the kuznets environment curve abstract this paper examines the implications of corruption and rent seeking behavior by the government for the relationship between pollution and growth cases of both cooperative and non cooperative interaction between the government and the private firm are studied it is shown that corruption is not likely to preclude the existence of an inverted u shaped kuznets environmental curve under both these cases however for any level of per capita income the pollution levels corresponding to corrupt behavior are always above the socially optimal level further the turning point of the kuznets curve takes place at income and pollution levels above those corresponding to the social optimum

green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies abstract we employ a common agency model of policy making to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policies in two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution we show that the impact of green lobbying on environmental policy outcomes depends crucially on the prevailing trade regime cooperative or non cooperative on whether environmental agencies act in a unilateral or coordinated manner and on the size of the emission leakages and transboundary spillovers under free trade a unilateral increase in pollution taxes reduces domestic emissions at the cost of increased foreign emissions in this case if the emission leakages and the associated transboundary spillovers are large enough green lobbying can create a bias towards lower pollution taxes

exploring the nature of inter country interactions in the process of ratifying international environmental agreements the case of the kyoto protocol international environmental agreements require negotiation and cooperation among countries this paper attempts to analyze the presence and nature of inter country interactions in the process of ratifying such agreements we develop a theoretical argument based on the notions of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity and study the interactions among three different peer types geographic neighbors trading partners and green investment projects partners in our case clean development mechanism projects partners we test for the presence of interactions by taking into account a temporal dimension which constitutes a methodological contribution to this end we introduce spatially lagged endogenous variables into a parametric survival model and apply the proposed framework to the kyoto protocol ratification process our data sample covers 164 countries for the period 1998 to 2009 we find evidence that while countries ratification decisions are basically strategic substitutes they become strategic complements once we focus on the ratification decisions of specific peers

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

bundling new products with old to signal quality with application to the sequencing of new products abstract this paper provides a new rationale for bundling based on informational leverage bundling a product of established quality to one of unknown quality can mitigate the problem of asymmetric information encountered in the latter market leveraging reputation in one market into another has implications for the timing of new product introductions bundling motivated by informational leverage enhances efficiency by increasing consumer s access to costly information when the possibility of endogenous timing of product introduction is considered however the welfare consequences of bundling are ambiguous the positive effect of market creation must be weighed against the negative effect of market delay

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

how sensitive is investment to cash flow when financing is frictionless i analyze the sensitivity of a rm s investment to its own cash ow in the benchmarkcase where nancing is frictionless this sensitivity has been proposed as a measure of nancing constraints in earlier studies i nd that the investment cash ow sensitivities that obtain in the frictionless benchmarkare very similar both in magnitude and in patterns they exhibit to those observed in the data in particular the sensitivity is higher for rms with high growth rates and low dividend payout ratios tobin s q is shown to be a more noisy measure of near term investment plans for these rms does a high sensitivityof a rm s investment to its own cash ow indicate that the rm is nancially constrained a large body of research starting with fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 hereafter fhp suggests that rms facing nancing constraints should exhibit high investment cash ow sensitivities re ecting the wedge between the costs of external and internal funds empirical ndings seem to give support to this hypothesis since rms classi ed as constrained on a priori criteria such as size dividend payout or leverage do have higher cash ow sensitivities even after controlling for their investment opportunities by conditioning on tobin s q however the reliability of these results critically depends on whether q is a proper control for the investment opportunity set if q performs worse for certain classes of rms higher sensitivities may obtain for these rms simply because cash ow re ects information about investment opportunities this critique is not new in his discussion of fhp poterba 1988 was the rst to point out that measurement error in q may cloud the empirical results similar concerns have been raised in subsequent studies as well while the qualitative point is well known its quantitative impact on the investment cash ow sensitivity has not been analyzed can the linkbetween cash ow and the investment opportunity set account for the observed magnitudes of the sensitivity or are these magnitudes too large to be explained without nancing frictions