optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility this paper studies optimal pay as you go social security with investment externalities positive bequests and endogenous fertility with an investment externality a competitive solution without social security suffers from under investment in capital and over reproduction of population we show the existence of time consistent optimal social security that improves welfare by reducing fertility and increasing capital intensity we also illustrate numerically that a small degree of this externality can justify the observed high ratios of social security spending to gdp

public pensions unemployment insurance and growth abstract we develop an overlapping generations model that highlights the interaction between an unfunded pension program and an unemployment insurance program in the presence of a labor market with union wage setting both programs are financed by earmarked proportional wage taxes levied on firms and their employees the equilibrium path entails endogenous growth and involuntary unemployment the presence of spillovers between pension programs and unemployment insurance programs has striking implications for growth policy efficiency issues and the transition to a fully funded pension system

an example of nonlinear endogenous business cycle model build in the trade union abstract this paper exemplifies that a trade union may become a causal factor of the business cycle we construct an overlapping generations og model with a monopoly trade union which bargains about the wage and the employment rate if substitution between the wage and the employment rate for the trade union is elastic then the dynamic behavior around the steady state may be oscillatory

the non monetary nature of gifts this paper addresses the prevalence of non monetary gifts over more highly valued and e cient monetary transfers in social relationships we demonstrate that under a wide variety of circumstances ine cient non monetary gifts will be o ered by a donor in lieu of cash in order to signal the donor s quality of information about the recipient s preferences this result emerges because gift giving is ine cient relative to cash and not because of any arbitrary assumptions regarding communication in particular the donor has available the strategy of o ering cash and saying what he would have purchased nonetheless there is still an important equilibrium role for buying gifts 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation a13 d10 d64 d82 z1

how to identify trust and reciprocity this paper uses a three games or triadic design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior a large literature on single game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality averse other regarding preferences such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other regarding preferences do not affect behavior in contrast experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory

workers response to job loss female and male industrial workers in brazil abstract it is often assumed that when formal sector workers in the third world lose their jobs during a recession they move into the informal sector lack of state support rules out long periods of unemployment above all for breadwinners a survey of industrial workers in brazil shows that following job loss in the early 1980s resorting to the informal sector was more common for women than men and less likely for the skilled than the unskilled unemployment and a return to industrial employment were most common experiences for male breadwinners workers preferences and the structure of labor market opportunities explain much of this behavior

gift giving and the evolution of cooperation gift giving is a practice common to many societies in an evolutionary model the social custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation the evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can be used as gifts for example gift goods may have little use value even at low levels of consumption although the gifts themselves are useless the institution is not

the tradeoff between wages and employment in trade union objectives this paper demonstrates that contrary to a widely held opinion the determination of the goals of unions is fully amenable to empirical analysis a characterization of the wage and employment setting process in unionized markets is adopted and its qualitative implications examined the first order condition for this model is fitted to time series data on the newspaper industry from ten cities the international typographical union s objective function reveals very restricted opportunities for substituting wages for employment in response to a change in the slope of the employer s labor demand function larger union locals place greater emphasis on wages versus employment than smaller union locals

long run effects of unfunded social security with earnings dependent benefits this paper examines the effects of unfunded social security with bequests fertility and human capital by considering a mix of earnings dependent and universal social security benefits we show that social security is more likely to promote growth by reducing fertility and increasing human capital investment if its benefits are more dependent on individuals own earnings through simulations we find that the differences in the effects of social security resulting from variations in the benefit formula can be too substantial to be ignored we also investigate the welfare effect in calibrated economies c 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first price auctions abstract overbidding with respect to risk neutral nash predictions in first price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature one possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments do not have a clear perception of probabilities which causes them to bid aggressively we test whether displaying probabilities of winning produces systematic differences in bidding in our design previous auction outcomes are not revealed across treatments no significant differences in behavior across treatments are obtained our results are in contrast to previous experiments which suggest that displaying probabilities could reduce the extent of overbidding

child policy solutions for the unemployment problem abstract using a simple overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility minimum wages and involuntary unemployment it is shown that the child tax can be used as an instrument to promote population growth and restore full employment

tax push inflation in a unionized labour market in this paper the effect of changes in the average rate and in the progressivity of direct taxes on a the level of wages and b the extent to which cost of living increases are transmitted to wages are considered for a unionized labour market these effects are derived theoretically for different union objectives and the models applied to data for italian industry in a form which allows discrimination between these different objectives the empirical estimates for the preferred model are then used to determine the effects of the postulated tax changes

socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities fertility and endogenous growth abstract this paper considers socially optimal government policies in a dynastic family model with physical capital human capital endogenous fertility and positive spillovers from average human capital such spillovers reduce human capital investment but raise fertility from their social optimum we first characterize the social optimum with a non convex feasible set due to the quantity quality tradeoff concerning children we then show that social security and education subsidization together financed by labor income taxes can fully eliminate the efficiency losses of the spillovers and achieve the social optimum under plausible conditions however none of the policies can do so alone

cross country differences in unemployment fiscal policy unions and household preferences in general equilibrium we develop a five period overlapping generations model with individuals who differ by ability and with an imperfect labour market union wage setting for the individuals of lower ability the model explains human capital formation hours worked and unemployment within one coherent framework its predictions match the differences in the unemployment rate across 12 oecd countries remarkably well a shapley decomposition of these differences reveals an almost equal role for fiscal policy variables and union preferences as to fiscal policy differences in unemployment benefits play a much more important role than tax differences differences in households taste for leisure are unimportant

can immigrant employment alleviate the demographic burden the role of union centralization this paper investigates the effect of labor immigration on public pensions when wage setting by a centralized trade union leads to unemployment it is shown that immigration improves the financial soundness of pay as you go pensions if and only if it diminishes total employment this occurs if the absolute value of the elasticity of labor demand exceeds the unemployment rate

altruism reciprocity and health a social experiment in restaurant choice abstract we used an experimental game to determine whether people imitate restaurant choice reciprocate food gifts and thus spread health choices we randomly paired 138 subjects and recorded their decision to give or keep restaurant vouchers and their choice of restaurant the majority 83 3 chose an unhealthy restaurant if their randomly assigned partner chose an unhealthy restaurant similarly 77 8 chose a healthy restaurant if their partner did p 0 005 the altruistic were more likely to choose a healthy restaurant p 0 017 in sum restaurant choice is influenced by reciprocity a cycle of projection gifting and reciprocation may explain the social dynamics of food choice we propose policies that capitalize on people s tendency towards altruism and imitation

does regret matter in first price auctions overbidding with respect to risk neutral nash predictions in first price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature one possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments may try to avoid regret induced by the knowledge of winning bids in case they do not win these auctions such considerations may drive bidders to bid aggressively in first price auctions we test whether differences in how auction outcomes are revealed produces systematic differences in bidding in our design where individuals bid against pre programmed computers differences in revelation of winning bids does not produce significant treatment differences our results are in contrast to previous experiments which report systematic treatment differences based on whether winning bids are revealed or not

gifts as economic signals and social symbols gift giving has often puzzled economists especially because efficient gifts like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for seem crass or inappropriate it is shown in a formal game theoretic model that gifts serve as signals of a person s intentions about future investment in a relationship and inefficient gifts can be better signals other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced and some stylized facts about gift giving practices are described many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts

subjective probabilities in games an application to the overbidding puzzle this article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games we conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first price auctions the experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction and indeed overbid when provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions subjects learn to make better predictions and to curb significantly overbidding the structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed

fiscal adjustment and labor market dynamics in an open economy this paper studies the labor market effects of fiscal adjustment in a two sector three good intertemporal framework key features of the model are an informal sector minimum wages unionized labor in the formal economy imperfect labor mobility and public production of intermediate inputs bluxuryq and wait unemployment prevail in equilibrium it is shown that if unions care sufficiently about employment and if the degree of openness is high an increase in the price of government services may reduce unemployment in the steady state a similar result would hold in an efficiency wage setting if the bdisciplinary effectq of unemployment is sufficiently strong d 2004 published by elsevier b v

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

endogenous fertility ricardian equivalence and debt management policy abstract the paper develops a model in which dynastic families optimally determine fertility government debt represents a tax on future generations and on childbearing the ricardian equivalence hypothesis does not hold debt is welfare reducing in that it distorts the fertility decision an increase in government debt induces a decline in fertility and an increase in the steady state capital labor ratio if a government inherits an existing stock of debt the first best policy is to eliminate the debt immediately in other situations the optimal debt management policy will not in general entail a total elimination of the debt

individual behavior of first price auctions the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets abstract this article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the nash equilibrium predictions of the first price sealed bid auction a subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer simulated bids the design used between subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral nash equilibrium our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments which after each auction reveals the winning bid only by means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior

rural urban migration in economic development abstract this paper provides a review of the theoretical literature on rural urban migration in contemporary ldcs the paper begins with a brief discussion of the lewis model before going on to discuss the todaro and the harris todaro models and the large literature which these models have spawned the question of job search in the context of migration and the role of family members in migration decisions are considered next the paper then takes a closer look at the informal sector and also sets out alternative migration functions to the ones usually employed in the literature the paper concludes with a brief note on some of the important implications arising from our study

social security and endogenous growth abstract this paper examines the effects of social security on the steady state growth of per capita income in an endogenous growth model in which agents care about their own consumption the number of children and the welfare of each child it shows that an unfunded program may simulate growth by reducing fertility and increasing the ratio of human capital investment per child to per family income when bequests are positive also it may cause faster growth than funded programs especially when receipts from funded programs are independent of contributions when voluntary saving is positive funded social security is neutral if receipts are linked to contributions and most likely depresses growth if receipts are independent of contributions

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

migration unemployment and development a dynamic two sector analysis abstract a time minimizing problem of attaining a full employment state is solved in a dual economy model with harris todaro migration mechanism and with a positive level of urban unemployment in the starting period it appears that the optimum solution lies in the specialization of investment in the urban sector at least in the initial stage of development if the per capita capital stock in the urban sector is very small in the starting period

asset bubbles labour market frictions and r d based growth employing an overlapping generations model of research and development r d based growth with labor market frictions this paper examines how employment changes induced by labor market frictions influence asset bubbles and long run economic growth asset bubbles can cannot exist when the employment rate is high low which leads to higher lower economic growth through labor market efficiency we also explore the steady state and transitional dynamics of bubbles economic growth and employment furthermore we show that policy or parameter changes that have a negative influence on the labor market can lead to a bubble burst

fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model in a neoclassical growth model it is possible to make a case for public debt because a balanced growth path may be dynamically inefficient this paper shows that this possibility no longer holds in an endogenous growth model with constant external returns to capital it is shown that an increase in public debt reduces the growth rate so there always exists a future generation that will be harmed and that a reduction in public debt although it increases the growth rate cannot be pareto improving one current generation must be harmed

macroeconomic adjustment under alternative lending arrangements abstract this paper investigates macroeconomic adjustment for a small open economy under alternative lending arrangements the arrangements considered all have the common feature of a link between international lending rates and measures of creditworthiness by employing an intertemporal maximizing model of a small open economy the paper analyzes adjustment paths for the stock of international debt the real exchange rate and consumption in response to economic shocks the paper finds that arrangements linking interest rates on lending to the outstanding stock of debt are consistent with a stable adjustment trajectory whereas arrangements linking interest rates to performance on the trade balance are likely to be unstable

wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the united kingdom abstract this paper analyses the effects of a non linear tax system on wage bargaining the main conclusions are an increase in the marginal income or payroll tax rate reduces the pre tax wage in the isoelastic case an increase in the average tax rate increases the pre tax wage by more than the tax increase and a measure of the progressivity of the tax system residual income progression is a sufficient measure of the effect of the tax system on wage pressure empirical evidence is presented to support these propositions and the predictions of the model regarding the effect of recent changes to the u k tax system on the distribution of earnings discussed

the timing of redistribution we investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted toward low income families but that may distort savings decisions can dominate early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted as a result of information constraints we use simple two period overlapping generations models with heterogeneous agents under six policy regimes a model calibrated to the u s economy benchmark two early redistribution lump sum regimes two targeted late redistribution regimes and finally a model without taxes and redistribution redistribution programs are financed by a labor tax on the young generation and a capital tax on the old generation we argue that if the programs are small in size late redistribution can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output better targeting of low income households cannot completely offset savings distortions in addition we find that the optimal transfer and tax policy implies a capital tax of 100 and transfers exclusively to the young generation

social security and endogenous fertility pensions and child allowances as siamese twins abstract this paper analyses public pensions and child support in a model with endogenous fertility we show that the individual fertility choice may not coincide with the social optimum due to the existence of external effects of children on society as a whole the market outcome without government intervention is efficient however as the externalities exactly cancel out in that case if the government wants to redistribute towards the old it cannot replicate the command optimum by merely applying lump sum transfers but rather needs a child allowance scheme to effectively alter the number of offspring finally we analyse whether a pareto improving social security reform is possible it is shown that merely reducing the payg scheme cannot be pareto improving but the introduction of a child allowance scheme can be