public provision of private goods as a redistributive device in an optimum income tax model public provision of a private good can alleviate the informational problems that restrict redistribution through the tax transfer system when the identity of high and low skill persons is hidden a pareto improvement may be achieved by publicly providin

a minimum wage can be welfare improving and employment enhancing abstract we examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal tax transfer scheme the government cannot observe household abilities only their incomes and is constrained to ensure that those working are at least as well off as those not working a minimum wage combined with the institutional features of typical welfare systems allows the incentive constraint to be severed at the ability level associated with the minimum wage if such a scheme can be enforced the government can increase the amount of redistribution from those working to those not working and possibly lower the number of unemployed

on the undesirability of commodity taxation even when income taxation is not optimal abstract an important result due to atkinson and stiglitz 1976 atkinson a b stiglitz j e 1976 the design of tax structure direct versus indirect taxation journal of public economics 6 55 75 is that differential commodity taxation is not optimal in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax given weak separability of utility between labor and all consumption goods this article demonstrates that this conclusion holds regardless of whether the income tax is optimal in particular given any commodity tax and income tax system differential commodity taxation can be eliminated in a manner that results in a pareto improvement also differential commodity taxation can be proportionally reduced so as to generate a pareto improvement in addition for commodity tax reforms that neither eliminate nor proportionally reduce differential taxation a simple efficiency condition is offered for determining whether a pareto improvement is possible

the motivation and bias of bureaucrats many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper and three primary results are shown first bureaucrats should be biased second sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal while in other cases they are more hostile to their interests for a range of bureaucracies those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes third self selection need not produce the desired bias instead selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal and those who are least preferred

taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences with the standard non linear income taxation framework with heterogeneity of preferences in this paper the optimality of workfare as a screening tool is examined it is assumed that workfare does not serve as a human capital investment participation is mandatory and administrative costs are negligible imposing alternative cardinalizations on individuals utilities allows for the possibility that the government optimally redistributes income to or from high disutility of labour individuals under either case it is never optimal to impose workfare on these individuals it is also shown that non productive workfare can be an e cient policy tool in contrast to the results found in besley and coate 1995 brett 1998 and beaudry and blackorby 1997 jel classification h21 h23 optimalite du workfare en presence de preferences heterogenes l auteur examine l timalite du workfare en tant qu instrument de tamisage a l aide du cadre conceptuel traditionnel d imposition non lineaire des revenus en presence de preferences heterogenes on postule que le workfare n est pas un processus d investissement en capital humain que la participatioun est obligatoire et que les couts d administration sont negligeables quand on postule aussi des utilites cardinales differentes pour les individus il devient possible pour le gouvernement de redistribuer optimalement les revenus en faveur ou au detriment des individus pour qui le travail a une tres grande desutilite dans l un et l autre cas on montre que le workfare n est jamais une politique optimale on montre aussi que le workfare dans des activites non productives peut etre un instrument de politique publique e cient contrairement a ce qu a rment besley et coate 1995 brett 1998 et beaudry et blackorby 1997

small industry in developing countries a discussion of issues abstract this paper first examines the changing size distribution of industry in developing countries by region and over time and by reference to firm level surveys it discusses the underlying causes the importance of markets generated by the growth of agriculture and rural incomes for the regional development of industry both small and large scale is noted second it discusses the entrepreneurship issue arguing that while small and largefirms alike are highly responsive to the growth of markets the measured entrepreneurial response is neither as full nor as efficient as is desirable the third and last part discusses small industry programmes and their relation to development policy financing and extension programmes are considered in detail and there is a discussion of the risks involved some parallels with agricultural credit are discussed in particular the default problem and the problems associated with concessionary finance it is also argued that small industries and by implication the programmes intended to support them would stand to benefit from more efficient and also more labour demanding policies towards agriculture and industry

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

in kind transfers self selection and optimal tax policy abstract this paper examines the role of public provision of goods as a redistributive mechanism when tax policies are designed optimally on the basis of the information available to the government we characterize pareto efficient allocations that are attainable through the tax policy and derive the conditions under which public provision will enhance welfare above the maximum that can be achieved through a mix of a general income tax and commodity taxes price subsidies first when there are two produced goods we prove that public provision is always pareto improving the improvement is achieved through changing individuals actual consumption levels second with no restrictions on the number of goods we derive a sufficient condition for public provision to be pareto improving this is achieved by weakening self selection constraints so that welfare improving tax changes are made possible suitable examples include provision of day care basic health care and rights to a minimum old age pension

female and small scale employment under modernization in ghana the hypothesis that female employment opportunities in agriculture and traditional small scale production are diminished in the early stages of industrialization is refuted in the case of ghana where female labor force participation has risen despite rapid industrialization this paper analyzes the impact of industrialization on small scale production and the predominance of women in such production female labor force participation increased from 57 to 64 in the 1960s while male participation declined from 89 to 84 however sectoral analysis of employment patterns reveals that womens employment gains were restricted to the traditional sectors the modern sector provided only 6 of new female employment compared with 61 of new employment for males on the other hand agriculture absorbed 46 of the increased female employment but only 10 of increased male employment small scale manufacturing accounted for 26 of the total employment increase in the 1960s female participation in these industries rose from 60 70 in 1962 70 whereas it fell from 23 18 in non small scale industries these results suggest that modernization is needed biased against female employment however there is no support in the case of ghana for the hypothesis that modernization occurs at the expense of cottage industry to utilize the resource of female labor power and to incorporate women into the development process policies need to be oriented toward generating demand for small scale production and avoiding subsidization of competing large scale firms

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

growth and trade vs trade and growth in the traditional trade literature there is a well developed area analyzing the effect of growth on trade and its reflection on income growth this literature developed already in the 1950s and 1960s generally speaking an interest in the effects of trade on growth has also existed for many years where trade has often been viewed as an engine of growth cases in point are the east asian tigers and japan which have especially benefited from outward looking policies in this paper we analyze the relationship between economic growth and growth in income terms of trade arguing that income terms of trade is a useful concept in analyses of the link between trade and growth our results suggest that fast growing countries have either specialized in sectors with a relatively favorable development with regard to world market prices or they have managed to successively improve quality within sectors thereby avoiding falling terms of trade in spite of large increases in export volumes

apprenticeship contracts small enterprises and credit markets in ghana the economics literature includes no systematic portrait of either the prevalence and scope of apprenticeship in manufacturing or the microeconomic details of the contracts involved this paper begins the process of filling in both those gaps by providing a quantitative assessment of the importance of apprenticeship in ghanaian manufacturing and presenting an analysis of the contractual relationships between apprentices and employers that characterize this institution understanding the structure of apprenticeship contracts is a first step toward an analysis of the usefulness of the institution in skill formation productivity increase and growth in the manufacturing sector this paper takes that first step by creating a descriptive portrait and beginning an institutional analysis using the results of a 1992 survey of 185 manufacturing firms in ghana the paper presents three major findings 1 the training of apprentices is both a widespread current activity and part of the training of a large fraction of entrepreneurs and manufacturing workers 2 there are two primary types of contracts those in which apprentices pay fees for their training and those in which they do not and 3 for those firms training apprentices the choice of contract appears to be strongly correlated with other characteristics of the firm particularly its use of credit finally the paper is divided into the four following sections 1 description of the data and the study from which it is drawn 2 broad quantitative discussion of the incidence of apprenticeship 3 description of the two primary types of contracts their importance and some characteristics of the individuals and firms who participate in them and 4 summary and questions for future research in the area

a general proposition on the design of a neutral business tax abstract a simple and general means of levying a business tax that is neutral in the sense that it does not affect the firm s decisions at the margin is discussed in particular we analyze the effect of a business tax of our design on the investment decision of the firm the well known imputed income and immediate write off methods of levying a neutral business tax are found to be special cases of our general tax design the implication of our results is that a neutral pure profits tax can be levied without the informational difficulties of the imputed income method or the cash flow disadvantages of the immediate write off method

agency and the design of welfare systems abstract transfers to the needy are administered by social workers whose job it is to tag welfare applicants to determine eligibility for disability benefits the accuracy of tagging depends on the effort of the social workers which is private information to prevent shirking and induce optimal effort costly monitoring is required using the framework of optimal non linear taxation we characterize the form of the optimal tax transfer system when the government operates a costly welfare system financed by income taxation higher income persons self select into the income tax system the needy apply for welfare if tagged they receive a disability benefit if untagged they receive general welfare benefits we characterize circumstances under which welfare recipients should or should not be induced to work the structure of the optimal tax transfer system and the optimal payment and monitoring of social workers

transfers in cash and in kind theory meets the data we review theoretical explanations for in kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence after reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self targeting we then discuss the large literature on in kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the samaritan s dilemma pecuniary effects credit constraints asymmetric information amongst agents and political economy considerations our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in kind transfer programs but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases political economy considerations must also be part of the story

on the design of a neutral business tax under uncertainty this paper extends the results of boadway and bruce journal of public economics 1984 24 231 239 and fane journal of public economics 1987 33 95 105 to describe a tax on business profits which is neutral with respect to investment and wind up decisions and default outcomes under uncertainty and bankruptcy risk the tax base allows deductions for depreciation and the cost of finance but requires knowledge of neither true economic depreciation nor the firm s required rate of return we show that the tax must treat taxable profits and losses symmetrically and that the tax rate must be a known constant even in the special case when the tax base coincides with the economic rent earned in each period

topping up or opting out the optimal design of public provision schemes there is extensive public provision of private goods in all developed countries the public provision scheme is often designed so that individuals can opt out but not top up supplement the publicly provided quantity quality using an optimal income ta

indirect taxation is superfluous under separability and taste homogeneity a simple proof indirect taxation is of no use when nonlinear income taxation is available in an economy where everyone has the same taste for goods an elementary proof of this result due to atkinson and stiglitz atkinson a stiglitz j 1976 the design of tax structure direct versus indirect taxation journal of public economics 6 55 75 is provided

how small enterprises in ghana have responded to adjustment ghana is often cited as an african country that has undertaken major macroeconomic reforms with generally positive results for economic growth within ghana s industrial sector the effects of structural adjustment policies have differed among subsectors and firms little is known however about the impact of adjustment on smaller firms a survey of small scale enterprises sses was carried out in november 1989 to learn more about the impact of the adjustment program on their operations to evaluate their potential contribution to dynamic industrial recovery and to identify appropriate measures that would accelerate the growth of sses in numbers size and productivity specific objectives of the survey were to 1 learn more about the characteristics of small firms and their owners 2 analyze how policy changes have affected small firms highlighting entrepreneurs strategies for adapting to their new environments and 3 identify constraints to the future growth of small firms results show that adjustment policies have forced the sses to become more competitive to survive and that significant structural changes are taking place across subsectors and within firms the overall business environment has generally improved during the adjustment program although shortcomings remain uncertainty about political and economic stability and lack of finance appear to be the most immediate restraints on investment

viewpoint innovations in the theory and practice of redistribution policy we present a survey of key results from second best optimal redistribution theory and their implications for tax transfer policy the core results include the corlett hague theorem the deaton conditions the production efficiency theorem the atkinson stiglitz theorem and the mirrlees saez characterization of the optimal non linear income tax system these have been augmented in recent years by optimal participation tax rates the implications of involuntary unemployment the use of unconventional instruments such as minimum wages in kind transfer and workfare and the optimal taxation of capital income and bequests l auteur presente un survol des principaux resultats theoriques de la redistribution optimale de second ordre et de leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts les resultats fondamentaux incluent le theoreme de corlett hague les conditions de deaton les theoremes d efficacite en production le theoreme d atkinson stiglitz ainsi que la caracterisation du systeme optimal d imposition non lineaire du revenu a la mirrlees saez ces derniers resultats ont ete enrichis au cours des dernieres annees par certains autres portant sur les taux d imposition decoulant des allocations conditionnelles les implications du chomage involontaire l usage d instruments non conventionnels tels que le salaire minimum les transferts en nature le workfare ainsi que l imposition optimale des revenus du capital et des legs ces resultats sont exposes et leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts sont discutees

taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs this paper explores how to optimally set taxes and transfers when taxation authorities 1 are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non market activities and 2 can observe both market income and time allocated to market employment we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment upwards for low wage individuals through decreasing wage contingent employment subsidies and distorting employment downwards for high wage individuals through positive and increasing marginal income tax rates in particular we show that whether a person is taxed or subsidized depends primarily on his wage with the optimal program involving a cut off wage whereby workers above the cutoff are taxed as they increase their income while workers earning a wage below the cutoff receive an income supplement as they increase their income finally we show that the optimal program transfers zero income to individuals who choose not to work

minimum wage legislation and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistribution the use of minimum wages and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistributing income is analyzed the government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two types of individuals who differ in ability the effect of introducing a minimum wage which induces involuntary unemployment will be to improve social welfare under weak conditions circumstances under which combining unemployment insurance with the minimum wage will be welfare improving are also considered

optimal marginal and average income taxation under maxi min using the mirrlees optimal income tax model with a maxi min social welfare function we derive conditions for a decreasing marginal tax rate throughout the skill distribution a strictly concave tax function in income and a single peaked average tax schedule with additive preferences and a constant labor supply elasticity marginal tax rates are decreasing below the modal skill level and will also decrease above the mode if aggregate skills are non decreasing with the skill level in this case and with a bounded skill distribution or with a constant hazard rate the tax function is strictly concave in income and the average tax rate single peaked when quasilinear utility functions apply in either consumption or leisure under fairly mild restrictions on the truncated or untruncated distribution function marginal tax rates are decreasing in skill and the average tax profile is single peaked the distribution of skills has the same quantitative influence for either case of quasilinearity these results continue to hold when there is bunching at the bottom due to a binding non negativity constraint we also illustrate how relaxing the assumption of constant elasticity of labor supply generally used in the literature modifies the results

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

informal financial markets under liberalization in four african countries abstract this paper presents survey evidence from four countries on how informal financial agents serve market niches that banks cannot readily reach their methodologies are effective in keeping down transaction costs and default risk relative to banks although informal agents exercise monopoly power in dualistic markets liberalization of repressive financial policies has had little effect on formal financial deepening while informal finance has continued to grow the paper concludes that informal financial institutions are an important vehicle for mobilizing household savings and financing small businesses and it recommends that informal finance be better integrated into financial development strategies

towards a theory of the direct indirect tax mix despite the fact that all developed economies levy broadly based indirect taxes alongside direct taxes little theory is devoted to explaining the direct indirect tax mix our purpose is to show that if different taxes have different evasion characteristics some optimal tax mix emerges naturally assuming that only income tax can be evaded and focusing on a two class economy we analyse the case for supplementing optimal non linear income taxation with commodity taxation and we develop conditions under which the latter should or should not be uniform

the effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income a panel study of the 1988 tax flattening in canada abstract federal tax reform in 1988 flattened the canadian personal income tax schedule changing the marginal tax rates for many individuals using methods similar to those applied by auten and carroll rev econ 81 4 1999 681 in the study of the effects of the 1986 u s tax reform act we estimate the responsiveness of income to changes in taxes to be substantially smaller in canada however we find evidence of a much higher response in self employment income in the labor income of seniors and from those with high incomes

problems with integrating corporate and personal income taxes in an open economy abstract this paper analyzes income tax integration in a small open economy when agents exploit all legal tax arbitrage opportunities the analysis shows that integration does not accomplish the objectives that have been attributed to it instead of eliminating the double taxation of equity income it simply removes the primary taxation of savings done through the corporation the analysis has implications for the choice of a personal tax base and for the design of the corporate tax

subsidies versus public provision of private goods as instruments for redistribution the literatures on differential commodity taxes and on quantity controls to supplement income taxation have developed separately this paper combines these two strands in the standard framework of optimal non linear income taxation we use a model with two types of households where the government has access to both subsidy policy and public provision of a good substitutable for leisure and households can supplement the publicity provided good from the market we present conditions under which policy should involve one or both of these two instruments alongside income taxation the model is extended to many ability types

a general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement this paper develops a general approach to characterizing optimal income tax and enforcement schemes our analysis clarifies the nature of the interplay between tax rates audit probabilities and penalties for misreporting in particular it is shown that for a variety of objective functions for the principal the optimal tax schedule is in general concave at least weakly and monotonic the marginal tax rates determine the audit probabilities and less harsh penalties lead to higher enforcement costs our results imply that there exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations in the enforcement context which is similar to that in the moral hazard context for tax policy it is well accepted by now that informational asymmetries generate important constraints on the formulation of economic policy an early and classic example is given by mirrlees 1971 who considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals differ in their ability to transform effort into income it is assumed that ability and effort of an individual cannot be observed at any cost whereas income which is the product of these two unobservables is perfectly and costlessly observable taxes can thus depend only on final income under these informational conditions the equity efficiency tradeoffs that constrain the choice of tax policy arise only because of the presence of moral hazard associated with taxation of income if there were no moral hazard i e individual efforts and therefore incomes were exogenous the problem of optimal income taxation would be a trivial one since by assumption individual incomes are perfectly and costlessly observable in much of the recent literature on optimal income taxation in the presence of costly enforcement reinganum and wilde 1985 border and sobel 1987 and others on the other hand individual incomes are treated as exogenous i e there is no moral hazard however informational constraints arise from another important consideration namely an individual s income cannot be directly observed it can only be verified through a costly

redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment abstract we study optimal redistribution policy in an economy with three types of unemployed persons those unable to work the voluntarily unemployed and the involuntarily unemployed both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous voluntary unemployment arises because individuals have different preferences while involuntary unemployment results from frictions in the labour market or from an efficiency wage we consider the employment policies of a well informed government when it can and cannot commit to its policies the model is simple yet rich enough to reflect real world policies including transfers to the disabled welfare for non working employables unemployment insurance employment subsidies and taxes on workers and firms

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

moral hazard vs liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance this paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance ui benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from ui using this evidence i show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by ui benefits is due to a liquidity effect rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search moral hazard by combining two empirical strategies first i find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity constrained households second lump sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households i derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities the formula implies that the optimal ui benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage the exact identification approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives

optimal labour taxation and search abstract this paper explores the optimal role of the tax system in alleviating labour market imperfections and raising revenue for this purpose the standard search model of the labour market is extended by introducing scarce entrepreneurial talent and arbitrage between the supply and demand sides of the labour market we study how these extensions affect the following two major implications of the standard model 1 only the ad valorem component of the wage tax should be employed to raise revenue 2 the optimal tax system should not distort labour market tightness

optimal unemployment insurance in search equilibrium should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline or increase over a worker s unemployment spell we examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment the model features worker firm bargaining over wages free entry of new jobs and endogenous search effort among the unemployed the main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the spell of unemployment numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system

financing education using optimal redistributive taxation abstract in this article the joint use of an income tax and public provision of education as instruments to achieve the government s distributional objectives is considered individuals differ in innate labour productivity and in aptitude to acquire skills through education actual labour productivity depends on both innate skill and the amount of education received using a generalized version of the mirrlees tax problem that incorporates these features qualitative properties of an optimal tax schedule are investigated

the desirability of commodity taxation under non linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes abstract this paper revisits the atkinson stiglitz result on uselessness of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal non linear income taxation in a more general setup namely when tastes are heterogeneous this general analysis displays the key economic assumptions under which the atkinson stiglitz result is robust a small tax on a given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure an application to the case of savings suggests that even in the presence of optimal non linear earnings taxation there is a role for a supplemental capital income tax in the standard overlapping generation model

a reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax abstract this paper investigates mirrlees model of optimal income taxation it provides a concrete example of utility and density functions for which the solution to the usual first order model is not implementable i e and example where the first order approach does not work adding second order conditions leads to an extended model and to implementable solutions if these conditions are binding one gets a kink in the optimal net income schedule and bunching of individuals occurs the properties of an optimal nonlinear income tax are reexamined within the extended model

vat tariffs and withholding border taxes and informality in developing countries abstract this paper explores the implications of a distinctive feature of the value added tax vat that is stressed by practitioners but has been largely overlooked by theorists that it functions in part as a tax on the purchases of informal operators from formal sector businesses and not least on their imports it also stresses the potential importance of the withholding taxes that are levied by many developing countries which have also been ignored it is shown in a simple model of informality that if both of these instruments are optimally deployed then the usual prescription that a small economy should not deploy tariffs remains valid even in the presence of an informal sector and a simple strategy is established generalizing the standard prescription developed in models without informality for deploying these instruments so as to preserve government revenue and increase welfare in the face of efficiency improving tariff cuts conditions are established under which a vat alone is fully optimal precisely because it is in part a tax on informal sector production but they are restrictive in general an efficient tax structure requires deploying both a vat and withholding taxes

food marketing liberalization and trader entry evidence from madagascar abstract food marketing liberalization was expected to induce massive trader entry and competitive markets in africa despite evidence of trader entry enterprise expansion remains difficult and many claim market power persists though perhaps in different hands this paper confronts this puzzle of substantial market entry that might not foster competition data from madagascar reveal distinct groups within rural food marketing channels separated by intraindustry mobility barriers that limit entry to a few niches moreover individuals place within the rural marketing network is defined largely by a priori social identity so the experience of food marketing liberalization varies across socially distinct subpopulations

minimum wage legislation as a second best policy mass unemployment is a striking phenomenon of the present economic situation of european market economies although the profession of economists has been criticized for not providing satisfactory cures it has produced a number of different explanations either complementary or contradictory for the occurrence of mass unemployment in this paper we examine the argument that unemployment is the consequence of minimum wage legislation which is socially desirable the observation of current wage legislations suggests that the above argument is broadly at least partly accepted by policy makers curiously enough a defence of this argument meeting the rigorous requirements of modern theory seems to be missing symmetrically attacks against minimum wage legislation often rely upon reasonings of dubious relevance i e the obvious remark that unemployment is a waste with first best efficiency criteria the present paper proposes a second best analysis where second best stems from informational asymmetries which prevent the implementation of lump sum transfers needed for a first best redistribution policy the question under scrutiny can be reformulated in a more precise way as follows does a second best optimal redistribution policy lead to minimum wage legislation and unemployment our elements of answer are gathered in 3 sections in section 2 the principles of the analysis of the desirability of quantity controls and existing results are recalled in section 3 the analysis of section 2 is specified to a simple prototype model for the study of linear income taxation in section 4

a pareto improving commodity tax reform under a smooth nonlinear income tax abstract this paper analyzes the welfare effects of commodity tax reform in an economy with a nonlinear income tax and linear commodity taxes the main result is that we can find a tax reform program that improves every consumer s utility in the pareto sense unless efficiency loss in the economy is minimized under incentive compatibility the tax reform rule proposed here applies to a broad class of economies with arbitrary smooth income taxes the expenditure function approach makes our analyses clear and simple some intuition is presented on the role of commodity taxation in a mixed tax economy the relationship with previous work in optimal tax and tax reform theory is also discussed we extend our result to the case where the government spends tax revenue to provide a public good

optimal income transfer programs intensive versus extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes optimal income transfers for low incomes labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin intensity of work on the job and along the extensive margin participation into the labor force when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer program is a classical negative income tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support and a large phasing out tax rate however when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer program is similar to the earned income tax credit with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income carefully calibrated numerical simulations are provided

optimal redistributive taxation in a search equilibrium model this paper characterizes optimal non linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labour markets redistributive taxation distorts labour demand and wages compared to their efficient values gross wages unemployment and participation are lower average tax rates are increasing marginal tax rates are positive even at the top finally numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable mirrlees type setting

morally motivated self regulation 2 this paper focuses on self regulation motivated by altruistic moral concerns the context is one in which individuals can voluntarily self regulate in the presence of opportunities to free ride on the self regulation of their trading partners moral preferences can mitigate free riding but moral preferences can be limited in the sense that they may be weaker the greater the socioeconomic distance from a trading partner and can depend on whether others are expected to reciprocate the scope of self regulation can be increased by moral suasion but individuals can also form organizations to reduce free riding this paper characterizes the scope of self regulation as a function of the form and strength of moral preferences and explains the effectiveness of organizations in expanding that scope moral preferences can be conditional on the actions of others or limited by socioeconomic distance a citizen thus may self regulate when interacting with someone close but not with someone far away moral preferences can also be conditional or unconditional unconditional moral preferences are independent of the action of others whereas with conditional preferences a citizen is more willing to self regulate if other citizens are expected to reciprocate 3

optimal taxation in a life cycle model we extend deaton s atemporal optimal commodity tax model to a life cycle envi ronment in which the individual may choose to work in many periods we are able to con firm the corlett hague intuition goods that are more complementary with leisure should be taxed at higher rates in addition we prove that in the microeconomic framework under lying some popular general equilibrium models if real wage and interest rates are constant over the life cycle the addition of some interest taxation to a consumption tax regime would be welfare improving and that optimal labour tax rates decline with age

on the desirability of input taxes abstract if it is not possible to tax all final goods and it is considered desirable to impose positive taxes on currently untaxed goods then it is desirable to tax inputs and intermediate goods at positive rates

market power firm performance and real wage growth in zimbabwean manufacturing abstract this paper uses a two year panel of data on 600 zimbabwean manufacturing workers and the employers to examine several aspects of the labor market response to the reforms introduced in the 1991 structural adjustment program the analysis then uses this evidence to explore a number of hypotheses about the functioning of formal urban labor markets in zimbabwe with particular attention to the issue of rent sharing first as one would expect liberalization of trade did indeed act to shift employment from import competing sectors to export sectors although total manufacturing employment was basically unchanged second real wages in manufacturing fell for most workers third the pattern of wage changes across sectors and firms is consistent with a view of labor markets as noncompetitive the evidence provides support for the idea that a rent sharing process of wage determination rather than one based on efficiency wages or government intervention is an appropriate characterization of this labor market

low wage employment subsidies versus the welfare state this paper is a brief for the introduction of a subsidy to any qualified firm for its use of low wage employees as a means to reduce the unemployment and raise the pay of disadvantaged workers there would be a case for such a wage subsidy in all the advanced market economies and certainly the american one regardless of recent trends the case has grown stronger however with the worsening of the relative wages and especially the unemployment rates of low age workers the globalization of investment and the bias of technical progress are the causes most often suggested i would add the growth of the welfare system the public entitlements to hospitalization to retirement and disability insurance and to the benefits labeled welfare in the narrow sense since this factor tends to be overlooked i devote section i to it section ii proceeds to the case for a low wage employment subsidy it will be clear that the beneficial effects of the subsidy on disadvantaged workers are the mirror opposite of the harmful side effects of the welfare system side effects that the subsidy would counteract i side effects of the welfare system

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

growth constraints on small scale manufacturing in developing countries a critical review abstract the question raised in this review is whether small scale producers in developing countries can expand or whether they are up against constraints which stunt their growth most of the literature has been optimistic on this score while internal constraints e g lack of managerial ability or external constraints e g discrimination from government are identified expansion is seen as an open ended process in other contributions this view has been severely criticized some allege that the small producers are exploited through various mechanisms others suggest that their road to expansion is blocked as a result of factors such as the pre existence of very advanced technology the control of large firms over product markets or difficulties in access to raw materials in discussing the arguments put forward in the debate an attempt is made to assess their theoretical bases and examine the extent to which they are supported empirically while most studies express explicitly or implicitly a definite view on the growth potential of small producers such judgement is rarely based on a comprehensive examination of the context which determines this potential

redistribution and education subsidies are siamese twins abstract we develop models of optimal linear and non linear income taxation with endogenous human capital formation to explore optimal education subsidies optimal subsidies on education ensure efficiency in human capital accumulation and thus play an important role in alleviating the tax distortions on learning induced by redistributive policies if the government cannot verify all investments in human capital education policy offsets some but not all tax induced distortions on learning non pecuniary educational costs benefits may increase decrease subsidies on education especially if they are complementary to work effort

financial market fragmentation and reforms in ghana malawi nigeria and tanzania this article reports the findings from surveys of formal and informal institutions and their clients in ghana malawi nigeria and tanzania it investigates the hypothesis that reforming financially repressive policies would not be sufficient to overcome fragmentation of financial markets because of structural and institutional barriers to interactions across different market segments the four countries have substantially fragmented financial markets with weak linkages between formal and informal segments and interest rate differentials that cannot be adequately explained by differences in costs and risks nevertheless the relatively low transaction costs and loan losses of informal institutions indicate that they provide a reasonably efficient solution to information transaction cost and enforcement problems that exclude their clients from access to formal banking services the findings imply that financial liberalization and bank restructuring in the african context should be accompanied by complementary measures to address institutional and structural problems such as contract enforcement and information availability and to improve the integration of informal and formal financial markets

optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions this article analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable we examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient we find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt

imperfect tagging in social insurance programs abstract this paper derives the optimal benefit structure of an earnings insurance program when a characteristic or tag imperfectly identifies those unable to work with a two sided classification error the optimal program is a dual work incentive system with a work non work consumption differential maintained for the tagged and untagged just sufficient to induce the able in each group to work and with more generous payments to tagged than to untagged individuals of the same work status it includes premiums to program eligible individuals who work a price missing in the u s social security disability system and in earlier attempts to characterize the optimal disability program

a sustainable biogas model in china the case study of beijing deqingyuan biogas project according to the paris agreement china has the ambition to develop non fossil energy which will account for 20 of the total energy consumption in 2030 china has abundant biomass potential implying the bioenergy should be an important option of non fossil energy in this analysis we present an representative biogas project the deqingyuan project dqy in beijing and conduct a cost benefit analysis for the whole value chain dqy is the first large scale biogas project in china that utilizes 100 chicken manure as a feedstock and integrates biogas production with ecological agriculture using advanced technologies dqy uses 80 000 t of chicken manure and 100 000 t of sewage each year to produce biogas which generates 14 million kwh of power annually and obtains an additional revenue of rmb 8 million yuan each year through the clean development mechanism cdm operating as an example of a sustainable bioenergy model dqy accomplishes the full use of a recycled resource while showing consideration for animal welfare during the entire production which is a fundamental component of the new rural energy strategy the circular economy model of dqy plays a prominent role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions mitigating pollution and increasing employment among other benefits this paper aims to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the typical demonstration model dqy in utilization of agricultural waste in china and further proposes a general development model of chinese biogas in the future

the elasticity of taxable income evidence and implications abstract a central tax policy parameter that has recently received much attention but about which there is substantial uncertainty is the overall elasticity of taxable income we provide new estimates of this elasticity which address identification problems with previous work by exploiting a long panel of tax returns to study a series of tax reforms throughout the 1980s this identification strategy also allows us to provide new evidence on both the income effects of tax changes on taxable income and on variation in the elasticity of taxable income by income group we find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is approximately 0 4 the elasticity of real income not including tax preferences is much lower we estimate small income effects of tax changes on reported income implying that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of taxable income are very similar we estimate that this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above 100 000 per year who have an elasticity of 0 57 while for those with incomes below 100 000 per year the elasticity is less than one third as large moreover high income taxpayers who itemize are particularly responsive to taxation our estimates suggest that optimal tax structures may feature tightly targeted transfers to lower income taxpayers and a flat or even declining marginal rate structure for middle and high income taxpayers

a fairness approach to income tax evasion abstract the tax that a taxpayer wishes to evade is determined on the basis of his perception of the fairness of his fiscal treatment with respect to both governmental supply of public goods and the perceived behaviour of other taxpayers the coercive powers of the state and the taxpayer s attitude toward risk determine the extent to which this desired level is undertaken in practice this approach is able to produce implications for the relationship between public expenditure tax rates and tax evasion which are more consistent with empirical evidence than the results of the conventional portfolio choice approach

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic