sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division this paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors i show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game if stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games a simple condition is provided under which they exist in symmetric games furthermore symmetric stationary perfect equilibria of symmetric games generate a coalition structure which is generically unique up to a permutation of the players a general method for the characterization of equilibria in symmetric games is proposed and applied to the formation of cartels in oligopolies and coalitions in symmetric majority games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c71 1996 academic press inc

optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

gentrification and failing schools the unintended consequences of school choice under nclb we examine the housing market and residential mobility changes that occur soon after a title 1 school fails to achieve adequate yearly progress ayp in charlotte north carolina students within attendance zones of failing schools are given priority in lotteries for oversubscribed schools potentially increasing the attractiveness of living in a failing school attendance zone we find that housing prices home buyer income and the probability of attending a nonassigned school increase in the highest quality neighborhoods within failing school attendance zones our results are driven largely by the behavior of new residents

information school choice and academic achievement evidence from two experiments we examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower income families in a public school choice plan receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher performing schools parents with high scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose nonguaranteed schools with higher test scores using random variation from each experiment we find that attending a higher scoring school increases student test scores the results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options from which to choose

rank order contracts for a principal with many agents for a principal with many agents rank order contracts remain incentive compatible even when information about agents performance is known only to the principal because the total payment from the principal to all agents taken together is independent of the outcome that occurs under wider conditions than those considered previously in the literature there is shown to exist a rank order contract equivalent exactly or approximately to any nonlinear piece rate contract under those conditions therefore results that depend on the unenforceability of piece rates under such asymmetric information disappear if rank order contracts can be used in principal agent models compensation paid to agents is based on their outputs because their inputs are not public information in this context information is public if it is verifiable in court so that a contract contingent on it is legally enforceable rank order contracts also called tournaments and contests make each agent s compensation a function solely of the ranking of his output relative to the outputs of other agents in contrast individual piece rate contracts make each agent s compensation a function only of his own output lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 and nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 all have results comparing the two when agents actions are not observed by the principal but only for the case in which the principal is risk neutral and the utility function of agents additively separable in income and action the main purpose of the present paper is to show that for the case of a continuum of agents these two kinds of contract are in fact formally equivalent or in some cases approximately equivalent under somewhat more general conditions than those considered so far in the

do better schools matter parental valuation of elementary education the evaluation of numerous school reforms requires an understanding of the value of better schools given the difficulty of calculating the relationship between school quality and student outcomes i turn to another method and use house prices to infer the value parents place on school quality i look within school districts at houses located on attendance district boundaries houses then differ only by the elementary school the child attends i thereby effectively remove the variation in neighborhoods taxes and school spending i find that parents are willing to pay 2 5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in test scores this finding is robust to a number of sensitivity checks

teacher quality in educational production tracking decay and student achievement growing concerns over the inadequate achievement of u s students have led to proposals to reward good teachers and penalize or fire bad ones the leading method for assessing teacher quality is value added modeling vam which decomposes students test scores into components attributed to student heterogeneity and to teacher quality implicit in the vam approach are strong assumptions about the nature of the educational production function and the assignment of students to classrooms in this paper i develop falsification tests for three widely used vam specifications based on the idea that future teachers cannot influence students past achievement in da ta from north carolina each of the vams exclusion restrictions are dramatically viola ted in particular these models indicate large effects of 5th grade teachers on 4th grade t est score gains i also find that conventional measures of individual teachers value added fade out very quickly and are at best weakly related to long run effects i discuss implic ations for the use of vams as personnel tools

heterogeneity tournaments and hierarchies tournament contracts are characterized that simultaneously elicit first best efficient effort levels and self selection of risk neutral heterogeneous workers into ability specific contracts comparisons across self selected ability types are shown to be sometimes necessary to attain efficiency rationales are explored for not commonly observing such contracts in hierarchical organizations

hedonic indices and housing programme benefits the availability of reliable measures of housing programme benefits is important for decisions that planners make about appropriate housing policies this paper advocates the use of hedonic price estimation techniques for the direct measurement of housing programme benefits in developing countries without restrictive characterisations of housing demand a market weighted economic welfare index is used to measure the housing benefits the benefits are the difference between estimated hedonic price equations before and after the implementation of a programme summed across all households and then multiplied by the cash equivalent of a unit of hedonic value the cash value of a unit of hedonic value is determined by dividing the observed aggregate market value of houses in an analysis sample by the estimated aggregate hedonic value for that sample measuring housing programme benefits from direct market valuation of programme induced changes in housing attributes does not imply that such programmes are necess

valuing school quality using boundary discontinuities abstract existing research shows that house prices respond to local school quality as measured by average test scores however higher test scores could signal higher academic value added or higher ability more sought after intakes in our research we show that both school value added and student prior achievement linked to the background of children in schools affect households demand for education in order to identify these effects we improve the boundary discontinuity regression methodology by matching identical properties across admissions authority boundaries by allowing for boundary effects and spatial trends by re weighting our data towards transactions that are closest to district boundaries by eliminating boundaries that coincide with major geographical features and by submitting our estimates to a number of novel falsification tests our results survive this battery of tests and show that a one standard deviation change in either school average value added or prior achievement raises prices by around 3

the efficiency of demand oriented housing programs generalizing from experimental findings typical production oriented housing programs offer potential recipients a highly limited set of previously unattainable commodity bundles from the household s viewpoint such programs have been highly inefficient from society s viewpoint such housing programs are generally horizontally inequitable and inefficient given that housing programs are not likely to be fully cashed out and incorporated into general income maintenance could housing programs be restructured to increase their efficiency this paper examines this question results indicate that demand oriented housing programs are substantially more efficient than are production oriented programs in fact in the aggregate the former programs approach unrestricted cash payments in their transfer efficiency

measurement problems in quantifying the distributional effects of subsidy programs abstract use of estimated compensating or equivalent variation benefit measures to analyze the distributional effects of subsidy programs can lead to biased results the vast majority of previous studies have used average elasticity parameters to calculate individual compensating or equivalent variations this can lead to measurement errors which are systematically related to program targeting criteria and result in biased distributional impacts being identified from analysis of cross sectional estimated program benefits the seriousness of this problem is illustrated in a case study with simulated data the results suggest that much greater effort and care are warranted in ascertaining the robustness of estimates of the cross sectional variation in the benefits of many subsidy programs

accountability incentives and behavior the impact of high stakes testing in the chicago public schools the recent federal education bill no child left behind requires states to test students in grades 3 to 8 each year and to judge school performance on the basis of these test scores while intended to maximize student learning there is little empirical evidence about the effectiveness of such policies this study examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in the chicago public schools in 1996 1997 using a panel of student level administrative data i find that math and reading achievement increased sharply following the introduction of the accountability policy in comparison to both prior achievement trends in the district and to changes experienced by other large urban districts in the mid west however for younger students the policy did not increase performance on a state administered low stakes exam an item level analysis suggests that the observed achievement gains were driven by increases in test specific skills and student effort i also find that teachers responded strategically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions by increasing special education placements preemptively retaining students and substituting away from low stakes subjects like science and social studies

help and factionalism in politics and organizations whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates this article analyzes incentives in a rank order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can distribute to his supporters some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for paybacks resulting in factionalism with leaders and supporters sorted by ability the number and the size of factions depend on the reward structure of the contest and the distribution of abilities these implications are corroborated by data on u s gubernatorial primary elections

good principals or good peers parental valuation of school characteristics tiebout equilibrium and the incentive effects of competition among jurisdictions good principals or good peers parental valuation of school characteristics tiebout equilibrium and the incentive effects of competition among jurisdictions by j esse m r othstein school choice policies may by aligning admin istrators incentives with parental demand yield improved efficiency in educational production milton friedman 1962 john e chubb and terry m moe 1990 but eric a hanushek 1981 cautions if the efficiency of our school systems is due to poor incentives for teachers and admin istrators coupled with poor decision making by consumers it would be unwise to expect much from programs that seek to strengthen market forces in the selection of schools p 35 empha sis added poor decision making is not required parents may rationally choose schools with pleasant surroundings athletic facilities cultural advantages ibid p 34 over those that most efficiently pursue academic performance they may prefer poorly run schools with good peer groups over those that are more effective but en roll worse students j douglas willms and frank h echols 1992 1993 or they may simply be unable to identify effective schools thomas j kane and douglas o staiger 2002 any factor that leads parents to choose any but the most effective available schools will tend to dilute the incentives for efficient management that choice might otherwise create this study examines the distribution of stu dent outcomes across schools within metropol itan housing markets for evidence on parental demand economists have long noted that par ents choices among residential locations are potentially informative about how more com plete choice systems may operate charles m tiebout 1956 melvin v borland and roy m howsen 1992 caroline m hoxby 2000 rothstein 2005 1 i ask whether school effec tiveness plays a sufficiently important role in these decisions to create meaningful incentives for more productive school management i adopt a specific understanding of effective ness appropriate to the question at hand a substantial portion of between school differ ences in student performance can be attributed to differences in student body composition this portion includes the effects of individual stu dent characteristics on their own test scores any direct peer group effects and any indirect ef fects of a school s composition on the quality of its instruction if wealthy schools attract better teachers joseph r antos and sherwin rosen 1975 or more parental involvement this is for my purposes a peer effect it depends on the quality of the school s administration only via school composition a school administrator cannot attract demand by offering a school with wealthy students as these can be offered only if wealthy families demand the school in the first place only the remaining portion of a school s contribution to test scores is effectiveness 2 department of economics and woodrow wilson school princeton university wallace hall 3 rd floor princeton nj 08544 e mail jrothst princeton edu i thank alan auerbach tom davidoff caroline hoxby jus tin mccrary rob mcmillan john quigley cecilia rouse emmanuel saez till von wachter four anonymous refer ees editor robert moffitt seminar participants at several institutions and especially david card for helpful sugges tions i am grateful to the college board for essential data and to a national science foundation graduate research fellowship and the fisher center for real estate and urban economics at uc berkeley for funding see cecilia elena rouse 1998 julie b cullen et al 2005 william g howell et al 2002 and alan b krueger and pei zhu 2004 for analyses of several existing nonresidential choice programs though none focuses on the particular issue studied here this definition avoids the need to find observable de terminants of effectiveness which have proved elusive hanushek 1986 my definition however ignores a school s contribution to nontest outcomes e g sports or music if such outcomes motivate parental choices i will conclude that parents do not demand effective schools of

teacher characteristics and academic achievement identifying the impact of teacher characteristics on academic achievement has been a salient and reoccurring topic in education we employ a twin by year identification strategy using matched teach

benefits and consumption effects of public housing programs in belgium some aggregate results in this paper we estimate some aggregate consumption effects and the benefits of public housing programs in belgium on the basis of a small sample of individual households specifying a stone geary utility function defined on housing and other goods we develop estimates of all required inputs to calculate hick s equivalent variation we further analyze changes in consumption patterns as well as the distribution of benefits over the sample our results provide the first information on the effects of public housing in belgium derived from micro data

the welfare effects of coordinated assignment evidence from the new york city high school match abstract coordinated single offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform we show that uncoordinated offers in nyc s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches one third of

do households prefer small school districts a natural experiment author affiliation h spencer banzhaf hsbanzhaf gsu edugarima bhalla gbhalla live unc edu acknowledgment we thank rajashri chakrabarti rob fleck jason fletcher john pepper jesse rothstein holger sieg david sjoquist todd sorensen christiana stoddard randall walsh anonymous referees and participants of a session at the 2006 southern economic association meetings and seminars at montana state university and the university of pittsburgh for valuable comments 1 introductionperennial discontent with the quality of public education in the united states is a constant motivation for new educational reforms one potential reform is to break up large urban school districts into smaller districts 1 this proposal emerges from two lines of logic first large districts may suffer from substantial diseconomies of scale a recent review of the evidence concludes that diseconomies may emerge in districts with as few as 15 000 students andrews duncombe and yinger 2002 see also barrow and rouse 2004 and duncombe miner and ruggiero 2005 by comparison the urban districts of new york city los angeles and chicago handle as many as 1 1 million 727 000 and 421 000 students respectively a second line of logic is that breaking up large school districts would provide more choice for households in particular the smaller districts may be differentiated horizontally with some emphasizing math others reading others specific extra curricular courses and so forth since smaller districts can respond better to parental input these differences can reflect local tastes additionally the new districts would have to compete with one another for students enhancing their incentive to improve their performance borland and howsen 1992 hoxby 2000 hanushek and rivkin 2003 sandstrom and bergstrom 2005 these reforms are subject to a market test following the logic of tiebout 1956 households should respond to exogenous changes in public goods by voting with their feet that is moving into improving communities and bidding up prices 2 consequently if households perceive that decentralizing large school districts is desirable for any of these reasons we would expect the ceteris paribus demand for housing to increase in school districts undergoing such reforms relative to nearby substitutes this article examines just such a market test studying the effect on local real estate markets surrounding the april 2000 breakup of the los angeles unified school district lausd into 11 subdistricts this breakup was only partial insofar as official authority remained vested in a single school board nevertheless the breakup delegated substantial power to a more local level creating 11 new superintendents and devolving authority over educational policy and curricula to the new subdistricts we employ a difference in differences hedonic methodology comparing changes in real estate prices before and after the breakup announcement within the lausd area to price changes in nearby districts our approach has three distinct advantages first the october 1999 announcement of the breakup plan was abrupt and surprising and was swiftly followed by official passage in april 2000 because the announcement was so abrupt and so well covered by the media we have an excellent proxy for households expectations and it is expectations after all that govern market behavior our proxies for expectations are based on the announcement date the implementation date and in some models an index of newspaper coverage second few of the benefits of the reform would be likely to spill over into other school districts making the lausd border a sharp boundary defining relevant control groups third the lausd area is not coextensive with the city of los angeles but rather includes some 24 cities this implies that any other potentially confounding political events over the period would affect real estate markets in only a portion of the lausd rather than the whole area a possibility that we can test

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

the benefits of in kind government programs abstract in this paper i present a methodology to calculate the benefits of in kind programs such as public housing which restrict consumption of some goods to the levels offered by the government most previous studies begin with an a priori specification of the direct utility function i begin with the ordinary demand function and then integrate demand to recover the indirect utility function and the expenditure function i argue that this approach gives additional flexibility in choosing a functional form which best describes the data i then use this methodology to estimate the benefits of the u s government s section 8 housing program

in kind transfers cash grants and the supply of labour abstract this paper corrects the notion that somehow benefits given in kind interfere less with the work leisure choice than cash grants of equivalent monetary value in a simple model the analysis proves that the true effect depends on the extent of the in kind transfer and the substitutability of the good in question with leisure

group decision making with uncertain outcomes unpacking child parent choice of the high school track predicting group decisions under uncertainty requires disentangling individual members utilities over the consequences of choice their expectations for uncertain outcomes and their choice process as a group i estimate simple bayesian models of child parent choice of high school track with subjective risk and unilateral or bilateral nonstrategic decisions by combining families actual choices with novel survey information about children s and parents subjective probabilities over choice consequences their individually preferred choices and their decision roles a set of policy counterfactuals confirms the importance of introducing the beliefs and decision roles of individual members in models and policy analysis of group decisions

the welfare cost of housing standards theory with application to jakarta abstract housing standards are likely to impose quantity constraints on the consumption possibilities of the poor this paper shows how an exact money metric of the welfare loss from such standards can be derived for any well behaved preference ordering recent results from the theory of consumer behavior under rationing permit the cost of standards to be interpreted in terms of the compensated demand function for the standardized good a housing demand function for the poor in jakarta is estimated using household level data and is used to calculate numerically the cost to them of introducing uniformly binding housing standards at unsubsidized prices estimates are also presented of the rate of price subsidy on housing needed for compensation

identification of treatment effects under imperfect matching with an application to chinese elite schools abstract this paper extends the treatment effect framework for causal inference to contexts in which the instrument appears in a data set that can only be linked imperfectly to the treatment and outcome variables contained in another data set to overcome this problem i form all pairwise links between information on the instrument and information on the treatment and outcome matched by the commonly recorded personal characteristics in both data sets i show how these imperfect conditional matches can be used to identify both the average and distributional treatment effects for compliers of the common units of the two data sets this multiple data source approach is then applied to analyze the effect of attending an elite middle school in a chinese city where schools admissions lottery records can only be linked imperfectly to the administrative student records

university choice the role of expected earnings nonpecuniary outcomes and financial constraints we investigate the determinants of students university choice in pakistan with a focus on monetary returns nonpecuniary factors enjoyed at school and financial constraints to mitigate the iden

does the market value value added evidence from housing prices after a public release of school and teacher value added value added data are an increasingly common evaluation tool for schools and teachers many school districts have adopted these methods and released the results publicly in this paper we study the release of value added data in los angeles by the los angeles times newspaper to identify how measured value added is capitalized into housing prices this analysis is the first in the us school valuation literature to examine property value responses to a value added information shock which is of interest as this measure is less correlated with demographics than typical school quality measures unique to this setting as well is the release of both school and teacher level value added data which allows us to examine how property values respond to both types of information using a difference indifferences methodology surrounding the release we find that neither school nor teacher value added scores are capitalized into home prices our results suggest that despite the contentiousness following these data releases homeowners do not consider value added models as currently constructed to be a relevant school quality measure on the margin

do high grading standards affect student performance abstract this paper explores the effects of high grading standards on student test performance in elementary school while high standards have been advocated by policy makers business groups and teacher unions very little is known about their effects on outcomes most of the existing research on standards is theoretical generally finding that standards have mixed effects on students however very little empirical work has to date been completed on this topic this paper provides the first empirical evidence on the effects of grading standards measured at the teacher level using an exceptionally rich set of data including every third fourth and fifth grader in a large school district over four years we match students test score gains and disciplinary problems to teacher level grading standards in models in which we control for student level fixed effects we find substantial evidence that higher grading standards benefit students and that the magnitudes of these effects depend on the match between the student and the classroom while dynamic selection and mean reversion complicate the estimated effects of grading standards they tend to lead to understated effects of standards

what parents want school preferences and school choice we investigate parents preferences for school attributes in a unique data set of survey administrative census and spatial data using a conditional logit incorporating characteristics of households schools and home school distance we show that most families have strong preferences for schools academic performance parents also value schools socio economic composition and distance which may limit the potential of school choice to improve academic standards most of the variation in preferences for school quality across socio economic groups arises from differences in the quality of accessible schools rather than differences in parents preferences although more advantaged parents have stronger preferences for academic performance

accountability and flexibility in public schools evidence from boston s charters and pilots charter schools are publicly funded but operate outside the regulatory framework and collective bargaining agreements characteristic of traditional public schools in return for this freedom charter schools are subject to heightened accountability this paper estimates the impact of charter school attendance on student achievement using data from boston where charter schools enroll a growing share of students we also evaluate an alternative to the charter model boston s pilot schools these schools have some of the independence of charter schools but operate within the school district face little risk of closure and are covered by many of same collective bargaining provisions as traditional public schools estimates using student assignment lotteries show large and significant test score gains for charter lottery winners in middle and high school in contrast lottery based estimates for pilot schools are small and mostly insignificant the large positive lottery based estimates for charter schools are similar to estimates constructed using statistical controls in the same sample but larger than those using statistical controls in a wider sample of schools the latter are still substantial however the estimates for pilot schools are smaller and more variable than those for charters with some significant negative effects

what do parents value in education an empirical investigation of parents revealed preferences for teachers this paper examines revealed preferences of parents for their children s education using parent requests for individual elementary school teachers and information on teacher attributes including principal reports of teacher characteristics that are typically unobservable on average parents strongly prefer teachers whom principals describe as good at promoting student satisfaction though they also value teacher ability to raise academic achievement these aggregate effects mask striking differences across schools families in higher poverty schools strongly value student achievement and appear indifferent to the principal s report of a teacher s ability to promote student satisfaction the results are reversed for families in wealthier schools

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

decentralization and the productive efficiency of government evidence from swiss cantons advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that among other benefits it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services this paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between expenditure decentralization and the productive efficiency of government using a data set of swiss cantons we first provide careful evidence that expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for legal local autonomy further panel regressions of swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment we also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types but that male students benefited more from educational decentralization closing for the swiss case the gender education gap

costs and benefits of housing subsidies to tenants from voluntary and involuntary rent control a comparison between tenures and income groups this paper estimates the economic subsides to housing for different groups using the 1988 joseph rowntree memorial trust sample survey of households an olsen type model is used to estimate consumber surplus to households from subsidized housing these estimates are compared to costs and housing services in the owner occupier market poorer families receive larger benefits than richer families transfer efficiency is not high but the local authority sector receives the greatest benefits from controlled rents

the household s decision to accept or reject a conditional transfer offer households deemed by society to have insufficient resources to purchase an adequate commodity bundle are often offered aid i e additional resources conditional upon the households purchasing a given level of some commodity e g food fuel or housing such conditional transfers attempt to modify the households normal behavior i e if the households would normally purchase the required level of the designated commodity upon receipt of the transfer the constraint would not be necessary how these incentives and constraints interact to affect the households behavior determines in large part the number and type of eligibles aided by the program aggregate program costs given payment levels and the types of commodity bundles purchased by the recipient households clearly understanding the decision to accept or reject a conditional transfer offer has widespread implications for the costs of the transfer program the impact on eligible households and the attainment of society s objectives numerous studies have investigated the size and distribution of recipient benefits in conditional transfer programs 1 3 6 8 9 14 16 21 to this author s knowledge however no analysis has estimated a model of the household s decision to participate in a conditional transfer program using household data and a theoretically appropriate measure for the household s net gain to overcome this gap in our understanding of the household s

a theory of gradual coalition formation we study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games based on underlying tu games in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements we distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements reversible actions and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game irreversible actions we show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions on the other hand we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty irrespective of the reversibility of actions agreements between players form the basis of much that game theory seeks to explain there are obviously many useful ways to categorize such agreements in multilateral negotiations that is with more than two participants it seems natural to distinguish between cases in which the coalition forms in one step and those in which the coalition grows to its eventual size by attracting new members thus recipients of marshall aid collectively agreed to american terms at the ceec in 1947 whereas a strict subset of these countries agreed to the schuman plan in 1950 with the other current members joining the eu over time similarly negotiations on climate change culminated in universal agreement at rio in 1992 whereas india and china only agreed to reduce cfc emissions in london in 1990 after other countries had signed up to the montreal protocol finally un security council resolution 242 urged that a multilateral conference be set up to establish a comprehensive settlement in the middle east whereas the process initiated by the oslo agreements and arguably camp david has consisted of a sequence of agreements between israel and its neighbours we will refer to cases in which the grand coalition forms in one step as involving immediate coalition formation or icf for short and cases in which a coalition grows as involving gradual coalition formation

alternative housing concepts and the benefits of public housing programs abstract almost all previous studies analyzing the benefits and consumption effects of public housing programs have used aggregation theorems to construct composite goods housing and all other goods in this paper we show that if it is more realistically assumed that households have preferences defined on housing characteristics benefits estimated using the composite approach are upward biased some empirical work suggests that the bias is large we therefore strongly advise to take into account the composition of the bundle of housing attributes provided under a public housing program when evaluating the program s economic effects

a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers abstract we extend the stahl rubinstein s alternating offer model ton person coalitional bargaining the key feature of the model is the random selection of proposers at every round no delay of agreement occurs in equilibrium for a super additive game in contrast to the fixed order model of chatterjeeet al rev econ stud 60 1993 463 477 when the discount factor of future payoffs is sufficiently high the agreement on the grand coalition is reached if and only if it has the largest value per capita among all coalitions moreover in the limit as the discount factor goes to one all players divide equally the value of the grand coalition regardless of who makes a proposal journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73 c78

estimation of complete demand systems from household budget data the linear and quadratic expenditure systems in this paper we explore two issues in empirical demand analysis the estimation of complete systems of demand equations using household budget data section i and the incorporation of demographic characteristics into such systems section ii although there are numerous studies which use time series data to estimate complete demand systems and many which estimate engel curves from household budget data there are virtually none which combine budget data from different periods to estimate complete systems since each budget study corresponds to a single price situation one might conjecture that estimation of complete systems would not be possible unless budget studies were available from a large number of periods this is incorrect in section i we argue that interesting complete demand systems can be estimated from a small number of budget studies despite the limited price variability represented in such data to demonstrate this we use budget study data for two periods to estimate a pair of related demand systems the familiar linear expenditure system les and a quadratic expenditure system qes a generalization of les in which the demand equations are quadratic in total expenditure the inclusion of demographic variables in the analysis of household consumption patterns is desirable because there are likely to be systematic differences in the consumption behavior of households with different demographic characteristics but the effects of demographic characteristics have seldom been studied within the framework of complete demand systems in section ii we propose translating as a general method for incorporating demographic variables into complete systems of demand equations this method has not previously been discussed as a general technique for bringing demographic variables into demand systems although it has been employed in several studies to improve the estimates of the les and the qes presented in section i we reestimate these two systems using translating to incorporate family size

coalitions incentives and risk sharing abstract this paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting it is shown that the principal can implement given efforts via non individualistic incentive contracts at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result for there is no coalition proof revelation mechanism improving the principal s welfare journal of economic literature classification number d82

the efficiency of housing search previous research in the housing market has largely focused on housing market outcomes e g the quantity of housing services demanded or supplied or the determination of equilibrium prices scant attention has been directed at the processes producing these outcomes recently economists have developed models of buyer and seller search processes in housing markets 6 22 but almost no empirical testing of these models has been done the importance of search in economic markets has been discussed by lippman and mccall 15 the difficulties encountered by deterministic theories of economic markets in explaining different prices for identical commodities and persistent positive levels of unemployed resources are overcome when search is introduced search may be of even greater importance in housing markets than in most other economic markets housing generally accounts for the largest item of consumption for most households for homeowners housing is usually the household s largest asset housing is a heterogeneous commodity that is traded in highly decentralized markets 2 the costs of moving can be substantial reducing the gains from relocation the consumption of housing also involves externalities that add to the heterogeneity of the consumption bundle finally recent theoretical work by courant 6 suggests that the rational search behavior of households facing discrimination in housing markets might act to perpetuate adverse market conditions facing such households given the importance of housing as a consumption commodity and as an asset and the above characteristics of housing and housing markets previous descriptive examinations

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives