walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes in this paper we study the problem of efficient production and allocation of indivisible objects among a set of consumers we assume that the agents preferences depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they consume furthermore we assume that preferences are quasilinear in money and that agents have a large endowment of money with indivisibilities it is well known that many familiar properties of the utility functions fail to ensure existence in their striking analysis of the matching problem kelso and crawford 5 introduce the gross substitutes gs condition which ensures the non emptiness of the core we propose two new conditions and show that with quasilinearity they are equivalent article id jeth 1999 2531 available online at http www idealibrary com on

the environment and emerging development issues development economics for the most part has failed to recognize renewable environmental resources as economic goods yet the lives of the poor in developing countries are intimately tied to the fate of their local common property resources soil fuel wood water and so on ignoring the loss of common property renewable resources via degradation centralization or privatization in calculations of net national product can mask the destruction of resources available to a country s poor behind the false appearance of a growing national economy this paper describes the difference between the problem of managing local common property resources in developing countries and the problem of protecting the global commons such as the atmosphere and oceans it outlines the calculations that would include the local commons in the national income accounting of capital assets and argues that the interests of those most dependent on the increasingly scarce local commons will be best served by placing control in their hands while the central government provides infrastructure and educational support to control the pollution of the global commons on the other hand the paper sketches a plan in which most countries would have a high incentive to participate a global allocation of limited tradable permits to discharge defined pollutants

multi item vickrey dutch auctions descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments for instance in flower fish and tobacco auctions in this paper we introduce ex post efficient descending auctions for two environments multiple non identical items and buyers with unit demand valuations and multiple identical items and buyers with non increasing marginal values our auctions are designed using the notion of universal competitive equilibrium uce prices and they terminate with uce prices from which the vickrey payments can be determined for the unit demand setting our auction maintains linear and anonymous prices for the homogeneous items setting our auction maintains a single price and adopts ausubel s notion of clinching to compute the final payments dynamically the auctions support truthful bidding in an ex post nash equilibrium and terminate with an ex post efficient allocation in simulation we illustrate the speed and elicitation advantages of these auctions over their ascending price counterparts

comparative statics in matching markets abstract this paper studies the comparative statics of adding agents to matching markets that generalize the marriage and college admissions markets of d gale and l shapley amer math monthly 69 1962 9 15 it is shown for the wide class of matching markets studied by a roth econometrica 52 1984 47 57 that adding an agent to one side of the market weakens the competitive positions of the other agents on that side and strengthens the competitive positions of the agents on the other side

using first price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses abstract this paper considers three alternative ways to sell heterogeneous licenses via a first price format when there is single unit demand it has been suggested that incorporating a first price element may bolster competition in this case klemperer paul d 2002 what really matters in auction design journal of economic perspectives 16 169 189 in a controlled laboratory setting we compare the performance of the simultaneous first price auction the sequential first price auction and the simultaneous descending auction with that of the simultaneous ascending auction the experiments involve several bidding environments of varying complexity we find that the simultaneous ascending auction achieves the highest levels of efficiency but also has drawbacks i its revenues are low and variable ii per license profits vary and iii the incidence of winner s curse outcomes is high seller s revenues are highest when the licenses are sold in a sequential first price auction in decreasing order of quality

material use and material efficiency in latin america and the caribbean different world regions have followed very different trajectories for natural resources use over the recent decades latin america has pursued a development path based largely on exports of primary resources adopting this path has characteristic environmental and social impacts in this paper we provide the first broad based estimate of material use and material efficiency for the region beginning in 1970 and extending to the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 the results show a region with rapidly growing primary materials consumption which is simultaneously becoming less efficient at converting those resources into national income using an ipat framework we found that population growth and rising per capita incomes made comparable contributions to growing material use while technological change as reflected in material intensity did not moderate consumption increasing materials intensity observed for the region as a whole is also observed for most individual countries this contrasts with some other world regions and implies that many countries in latin america and the caribbean will confront higher environmental pressures than expected when expanding their extractive industries to take advantage of new demand from other world regions while simultaneously supplying the requirements for their own domestic industrial transformations and urbanization

household and economy welfare economics of endogenous fertility mark nerlove assaf razin and efraim sadka academic press new york 1987 pp xii 155

the strategy structure of some coalition formation games in coalitional games with side payments the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared the predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully these difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form as the collection of pairs of buyer seller in an assignment game the incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection furthermore the relationships with vickrey clarke groves mechanisms are drawn

internet advertising and the generalized second price auction selling billions of dollars worth of keywords we investigate the generalized second price gsp auction a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising although gsp looks similar to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism its properties are very different unlike the vcg mechanism gsp generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies and truth telling is not an equilibrium of gsp to analyze the properties of gsp we describe the generalized english auction that corresponds to gsp and show that it has a unique equilibrium this is an ex post equilibrium with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of vcg

material flow accounting in an irish city region 1992 2002 abstract this paper aims to measure raw material inputs and waste flows in an irish city region in order to analyse i whether there was absolute dematerialisation in the particular case study over the period 1992 2002 and ii whether material consumption and waste generation were decoupled from economic growth and increases in disposable income over the same period it was found that the selected material flow indicators showed no evidence of absolute dematerialisation over the given study period although more recent evidence at the national level suggests that a decline in construction activity and extraction of non metallic minerals has resulted in an absolute reduction in material consumption and it is likely that this will be mirrored at the system boundary level it was found that domestic material consumption dmc per capita and direct material input dmi per capita increased at a faster rate than domestic processed output dpo per capita and direct material output dmo per capita between 1992 and 2002 which indicates relative decoupling of consumption from waste generation in addition it was found that there was relative decoupling of consumption and waste generation from disposable income growth over the study period finally it was found that average dmc and dmi figures for the selected case study were lower than the national averages but broadly similar to results for other city regions in the european union eu on a methodological note it was concluded that material flow accounting mfa for city regions in ireland is constrained due to a lack of disaggregated data for material flows with the exception of local waste data and it is recommended that bottom up analysis should be used to complement disaggregated top down data

double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint i consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant the objective is to select an assignment price pair that is envy free with respect to the agents true preferences i propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences i prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in nash and strong nash equilibrium the set of true envy free allocations

nash equilibrium bidding strategies in a bilateral electricity market this paper examines bidding strategies in a bilateral market in which generating companies submit bids to loads a load accepts electricity delivery from the generator with the lowest bid at its bid price as long as this price is not higher than the load s willingness to pay necessary and sufficient conditions of nash equilibrium ne bidding strategy are derived based on a generic generating cost matrix and the loads willingness to pay vector the study shows that in any ne efficient allocation is achieved furthermore all nash equilibria are revenue equivalent for the generators based on the necessary and sufficient conditions this problem is formulated as an optimal assignment problem network optimization techniques are applied to calculate ne bid prices for the generators

strategy proof house allocation with price restrictions abstract this paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions this type of housing market contains e g the assignment market and the student placement problem as special cases a mechanism called the minimal rpe mechanism is defined and two main results are obtained first it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain r second it is proved that there is a subset r r of the full domain containing almost all profiles in r such that the minimal rpe mechanism is strategy proof in that subset

an algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations the concept of a fair and optimal allocation was recently introduced by sun and yang sun n yang z 2003 a general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism economics letters 81 73 79 this note states some basic properties of fair and optimal allocations and provides a simple algorithm for identifying them c 2007 elsevier b v all fights reserved

competitive fair division several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players whose bids for the goods determine their prices an equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair division procedure called the gap procedure that ensures 1 nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the good 2 pareto optimality though coupled with possible envy 3 monotonicity such that higher bids never hurt in obtaining a good 4 sincere bids that preclude negative utility and 5 prices that are partially independent of the amounts bid as in a vickrey auction a variety of applications are discussed

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

operative gift and bequest motives the ricardian equivalence theorem which is the proposition that changes in the timing of lump sum taxes have no effect on assumption or capital accumulation depends on the exist of operative altruistic motives for intergenerational transfers these transfers can be bequests from parents to children or gifts from children to parents in order for the ricardian equivalence theorem to hold one of these transfer motives must be operative in the sense that the level of the transfer is not determined by a corner solution resulting from a binding non negativity constraint this paper derives conditions that determine whether the bequest motive will be operative the gift motive will be operative or neither motive will be operative in a model in which consumers are altruistic toward their parents and their children this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the cost of natural capital consumption accounting for a sustainable world economy abstract the system for integrated environmental and economic accounting seea has been criticized in this journal for ignoring the benefits of ecosystem services for human well being this paper argues that extended national accounts should not attempt measuring economic welfare rather they could and should assess the environmental sustainability of economic activity as the cost of natural capital consumption the global application of seea concepts and methods demonstrates the feasibility of international green accounting for the world economy sustainability costs run to about 3 trillion us or 6 of world gdp large variations at national and regional levels suggest that conventional economic indicators may significantly overstate economic progress in some parts of the world data gaps and lack of data comparability affect these first estimates national and international statistical services should be more aggressive in greening the national accounts more prudent and more sustainable economic policies might be the result

ascending price vickrey auctions abstract we show that an ascending price auction for multiple units of a homogeneous object proposed by ausubel i raises prices for packages until they reach those nonlinear and non anonymous market clearing prices at which bidders get their marginal products and ii the auction is a primal dual algorithm applied to an appropriate linear programming formulation in which the dual solution yields those same market clearing prices we emphasize the similarities with efficient incentive compatible ascending price auctions to implement vickrey payments when there is a single object or when objects are heterogeneous but each buyer does not desire more than one unit a potential benefit of these common threads is that it helps to establish the principles upon which vickrey payments may be implemented through decentralized incentive compatible procedures

transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants a market design approach this paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses the idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market including the one that he is currently possessing or continue renting the house he is currently occupying the main contribution is the identification of an individually rational equilibrium selecting and group non manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles in this restricted domain the identified mechanism is the minimum price equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants we also relate the theoretical model and the main findings to the u k housing act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer ownerships of houses to existing tenants

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

modes of extraction unequal exchange and the progressive underdevelopment of an extreme periphery the brazilian amazon 1600 1980 the demographic ecological and infrastructural effects of extractive economies differ significantly from those of productive economies analysis of underdevelopment in extractive export economies requires time lagged models of the cumulative effects of the sequence of local modes of extraction organized in response to world system demands such a model organized aroud the predominance of specific commodities at different times is derived from a critical synthesis of various theories of development and underdevelopment the propositions in this model are examined through a case study of the sequence of extractive export economies in the amazon basin from the time of colonial conquest to the present

efficient advert assignment we develop a framework for the analysis of large scale ad auctions where adverts are assigned over a continuum of search types for this pay per click market we provide an efficient mechanism that maximizes social welfare in particular we show that the social welfare optimization can be solved in separate optimizations conducted on the time scales relevant to the search platform and advertisers here on each search occurrence the platform solves an assignment problem and on a slower time scale each advertiser submits a bid that matches its demand for click throughs with supply importantly knowledge of global parameters such as the distribution of search terms is not required when separating the problem in this way exploiting the information asymmetry between the platform and advertiser we describe a simple mechanism that incentivizes truthful bidding has a unique nash equilibrium that is socially optimal and thus implements our decomposition further we consider models where advertisers ad

from the bankruptcy problem and its concede and divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution abstract we revisit two classic problems the assignment problem in which matched pairs of agents create value and the bankruptcy problem in which we need to share an endowment among agents with conflicting claims since core selection constrains us to exactly divide the value created by matched agents the assignment problem corresponds to multiple two player bankruptcy problems from this we obtain equivalence between the concede and divide aumann and maschler 1985 sharing method for the bankruptcy problem and the fair division solution thompson 1981 for the assignment problem in bankruptcy problems the minimal rights of a claimant is what is left of the endowment when all claimants but himself have received their full claims by the minimal rights first property it is irrelevant if we distribute the minimal rights first or proceed on the original problem by adapting the property to the assignment problem we obtain two characterizations of the fair division solution

the package assignment model we study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several rather than single objects although buyers reservations values are non additive efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non linear in the objects constituting the packages the interconnections among the linear programming formulation walrasian equilibrium and the core are established in the single seller auction version a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 d44 d51

seea 2003 accounting for sustainable development abstract the revised seea 2003 elaborates physical and hybrid environmental economic accounts details valuation techniques for natural resources but rejects monetary valuation of environmental degradation as modeling preference for physical accounting and corresponding loss of systemic coherence as compared to the seea 1993 prevents meeting the proclaimed objective of assessing sustainable development

pricing combinatorial auctions abstract single item auctions have many desirable properties mechanisms exist to ensure optimality incentive compatibility and market clearing prices when multiple items are offered through individual auctions a bidder wanting a bundle of items faces an exposure problem if the bidder places a high value on a combination of goods but a low value on strict subsets of the desired collection to remedy this combinatorial auctions permit bids on bundles of goods however combinatorial auctions are hard to optimize and may not have incentive compatible mechanisms or market clearing individual item prices several papers give approaches to provide incentive compatibility and imputed individual prices we find the relationships between these approaches and analyze their advantages and disadvantages

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

auction protocols for decentralized scheduling decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents market mechanisms use prices derived through distributing bidding protocols to determine schedules we investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems the quality of equilibrium solutions and the behavior of an ascending auction mechanism and bidding protocol to remedy the potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to complementarities in preference we introduce additional markets in combinations of basic goods finally we consider direct revelation mechanisms and compare to the market based approach journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 c70 d44

empirical analysis of the efficiency of job assignment auctions for some hard to fill jobs the navy awards assignment incentive pay using an auction like format with respect to the optimal job assignment auction format however there is only a very limited academic literature furthermore the extant literature assumes all bidders are equally qualified in the navy assignment context this is not a tenable assumption as other considerations such as relocation and en route training costs must be considered when making an assignment the lower the weight on the bid the greater the weight that can be attached to the qualification component in the objective function the lower the weight however the weaker the incentive to bid near one s reservation wage the consideration of such other criteria precludes the implementation of the incentive compatible vickery leonard assignment auction we relax the assumption that bid amounts alone determine the assignment set and experimentally estimate the efficiency reductions associated with decreased bid weights the estima

ascending price vickrey auctions for general valuations ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price using this traditional definition no ascending price auction can achieve the vickrey clarke groves vcg outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting we relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of the auction or alternatively calculating the discounts dynamically during the auction while still maintaining a single price path using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the vcg outcome using ascending price auctions we define a broad class of ascending price combinatorial auctions in which truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post nash equilibrium any auction in this class achieves the vcg outcome and ex post efficiency for general valuations we define two specific auctions in this class by generalizing two known auctions in the literature 11 24

patterns of change in material use and material efficiency in the successor states of the former soviet union the successor states of the former soviet union present a unique opportunity to study the changes in the socio metabolic profile of a cohort of nations which underwent a radical and contemporaneous shift in economic system that change was from being regions within an economically integrated centrally planned whole to being independent nations left to find their own place in the global economic system the situation of these nations since the dissolution of the soviet union provides a rare experiment in which we might observe the influence of the different starting conditions of each nation on the development path it subsequently followed and the attendant socio metabolic profiles which resulted here we take the opportunity to examine patterns for the region as a whole and for three individual countries we also examine the relative importance of three different drivers of material consumption using a version of the ipat framework finally an area for follow on investigation was suggested by a significant positive correlation observed between the economic growth of individual successor states and the degree to which they improved their material productivity this latter is of potential importance in assessing whether dematerialization acts primarily to accelerate or retard economic growth

allocation of track capacity experimental evidence on the use of priority auctioning in the railway industry allocation of track capacity concerns multiple users facing demand indivisibilities running trains over an inelastic supply of railway tracks the paper suggests a vickrey type mechanism to handle incentive aspects of this technically complex optimisation task here the price for operating a train will correspond to the bids foregone by other operators who are pushed off their preferred routes the paper reports the results of 11 experimental markets using variations of this mechanism where each market includes up to 10 trading periods and subjects bid for routes over a highly stylised railway network the experiments generated solutions that capture 90 100 of potential benefits

use and usefulness of sustainability economics abstract sustainable development is at the roots of sustainability economics baumgartner and quaas 2010 define sustainability economics as the combination of economic efficiency and justice in the distribution of nature s services van den bergh in press criticizes their approach as axiomatic and incomplete lacking a discussion of environmental externalities and dogmas like the gdp dogma the focus on non measurable welfare or happiness in both articles impairs the use and usefulness of their sustainability notions for applied economics and policy alternatively environmentally modified national accounts offer a quantifiable sustainability concept of produced and natural capital maintenance for practical reasons sustainability economics should therefore deal with sustainable economic performance and growth coordination with other social goals has to be left to politics

the material basis of the global economy worldwide patterns of natural resource extraction and their implications for sustainable resource use policies abstract material flow accounting and analysis mfa has been established as an influential framework for quantifying the use of natural resources by modern societies so far however no reference data for overall scale and trends of global extraction of natural resources and their distribution between different world regions has been available this paper presents the first comprehensive quantification of the material basis of the global economy i e used domestic extraction in a time series from 1980 to 2002 we analyse time trends for major material groups fossil fuels metals industrial and construction minerals and biomass disaggregated into seven world regions this allows for a an illustration of the global economy s physical growth driven by worldwide processes of economic integration over the past decades and b an indication of the worldwide distribution of environmental pressures associated with material extraction the results show that annual resource consumption of the world economy increased by about one third between 1980 and 2002 this indicates that scale effects due to economic growth more than compensated for other effects such as the relative increase of the service sectors contribution to gdp structural effect and the use of new production technologies with higher material and energy efficiency technology effect the observed growth of natural resource extraction is unevenly distributed over the main material categories with metals showing the highest growth rate the regional analysis shows the increasing importance of asia and latin america in global resource extraction on the global level material intensity i e resource extraction per unit of gdp decreased by about 25 indicating relative decoupling of resource extraction from economic growth the paper concludes with policy recommendations for a more sustainable use of natural resources

the english auction with differentiated commodities abstract we study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes gs condition we define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in excess demand eventually leads to the smallest walrasian prices this procedure is a generalization of the auction studied by g demange d gale and m j sotomayor polit econ 94 1986 863 872 in our auction truthful revelation of demand is a perfect bayesian equilibrium if the smallest walrasian prices correspond to the vickrey clarke groves payments however no dynamic auction can reveal sufficient information to implement the vickrey mechanism if all gs preferences are allowed journal of economic literature classification numbers d4 d44 d5 d51

core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market abstract flexible firms compete by means of wages in the assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the marriage market workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the marriage market respectively assignment market are not robust to the entrance of flexible respectively rigid firms to this market a new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid respectively flexible firms from this market meaningful comparative static results are derived

the market for evaluations recent developments in computer networks have driven the cost of distributing information virtually to zero creating extraordinary opportunities for sharing product evaluations the authors present pricing and subsidy mechanisms that operate through a computerized market and induce the efficient provision of evaluations the mechanisms overcome three major challenges first evaluations which are public goods are likely to be underprovided second an inefficient ordering of evaluators may arise and third the optimal quantity of evaluations depends on what is learned from the initial evaluations

protective behavior in matching models this paper analyzes the use of a version of lexical maximim strategies called protective behavior in two sided matching models it restricts attention to mechanisms which produce stable matchings that is matchings which are individually rational and pairwise optimal the main results of the paper show that truth telling is the unique form of protective behavior in two such mechanisms the first is the one which selects the student optimal stable matching in the college admissions model while the second is the mechanism which selects the buyer optimal matching in the shapley shubik assignment model journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d81

competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general utility functions we present an exact characterization of utilities in competitive equilibria of two sided matching markets in which the utility of each agent depends on the choice of partner and the terms of the partnership potentially including monetary transfer examples of such markets include sellers and buyers or jobs and workers demange and gale showed that the set of competitive equilibria in this type of market forms a complete lattice with each extreme point of the lattice representing an equilibrium with the highest utilities for the agents on one side and the lowest utilities for the agents on the opposite side our characterization is based on establishing a connection between the competitive equilibria of a market and the competitive equilibria of certain strict subsets of that market each obtained by removing exactly one agent this characterization captures the effect of competition when agents are added to the market or removed from the market it gives a precise procedure for constructing competitive eq

trading networks with price setting agents abstract in a wide range of markets individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries who determine prices via strategic considerations typically not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market we model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers sellers and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders we show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect nash equilibrium and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods finally we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure roughly a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an essential connection in the network thus providing a graph theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders

common and conflicting interests in two sided matching markets abstract this paper reviews and synthesizes some of what is now known about what i will call two sided matching markets a number of such models which arise naturally in the study of certain labor markets have been shown to have surprising implications about the common and conflicting interests of the agents and about the incentives they face

a general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism abstract this paper studies a general problem of efficiently and fairly allocating n indivisible objects like jobs or houses with a certain amount of money to n persons with a requirement that each person be assigned with one object the precise preferences of individuals over both the objects and money are unknown and manipulable but assumed to follow some general patterns to ensure the existence of a fair allocation a mechanism is developed that elicits honest preferences over both the objects and money and that assigns the objects with some money to individuals efficiently and fairly

the strategy structure of two sided matching markets we study two sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women the agents are to form partnerships which provide them with satisfaction and at the same time make monetary transfers e g salaries or dowries the core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability the idea of using walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively the scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions the competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly in general this procedure may run into two difficulties first nonuniqueness if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented and second manipulability if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data however as we will show here using the walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets these are the matching markets of our title and they include markets for single items like houses where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item they also include labor markets in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries it turns out that in these markets both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a

multi item auctions a collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders and each bidder is to receive at most one item assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal in a suitable sense for the bidders in this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy

dematerialization and capital maintenance two sides of the sustainability coin abstract the reductionist trend of equating sustainable development with sustained economic growth needs to be reversed new accounts and balances help to operationalize the elusive notion of sustainability they provide a coherent picture of the interaction between environment and economy greened national accounts measure economic sustainability in terms of produced and natural capital maintenance balances of material flows assess ecological sustainability as the dematerialization of production and consumption both concepts aim to preserve environmental assets but differ in scope strength and evaluation of sustainability first results for germany indicate weak sustainability of the economy strong sustainability is not in sight because of insufficient reduction of material throughput attaining sustainability through integrated policies needs the support of share and stakeholders of sustainable development

endogenous fertility and optimal population size pareto optimality which is the standard criterion of efficiency in general equilibrium models takes population size as given and therefore cannot be directly applied to analyze the question of optimal population size the criterion then for optimal population size must be based on a more restrictive definition of optimality this paper extends peter diamonds 1965 golden golden rule growth model by assuming that individuals derive utility from their own consumptionand from their own children offspring are assumed to consume resources before reaching adulthood the authors show that the optimal steady state utility yields a higher population growth rate when it converges to the golden rule allocation they then demonstrate that a voluntary social security program in which the size of the transfer to a particular agent is directly tied to his own fertility leads the competitive allocation to be identical to the allocation corresponding to the maximum of the steady state utility of the representative individual

multi item vickrey english dutch auctions abstract assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item this paper defines a polynomial time multi item auction that locates the vcg prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices this auction is called the vickrey english dutch auction and it contains the vickrey english auction sankaran j k 1994 on a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem math soc sci 28 143 150 and the vickrey dutch auction mishra d parkes d 2009 multi item vickrey dutch auctions games econ behav 66 326 347 as special cases by means of numerical experiments it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the bidders value distributions the vickrey english dutch auction is weakly faster than the vickrey english auction and the vickrey dutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent respectively of the investigated problems a greedy version of the vickrey english dutch auction is demonstrated to perform even better in the simulation studies

a geographically and socio economically disaggregated local household consumption model for the uk abstract a key challenge for local environmental and economic planning is to predict resource flows and material waste arisings at a high level of geographical localisation this paper presents an approach to household consumption modelling in which the material demands of small socio economically homogeneous neighbourhoods are estimated on the basis of consumer expenditure data in conjunction with census data household waste arisings are estimated through incorporation of a household metabolism model selected material flows of consumer commodities such as household appliances carpets and clothing are examined in case study areas representing extremes of relative deprivation and neighbourhoods representing typical examples of the uk national output area classification oac the model will be of use in sustainable consumption policy making and local waste strategy planning

biophysical structure of the ecuadorian economy foreign trade and policy implications abstract at the core of this paper lays the notion that a systematic analysis of material flow accounts enables us to discuss the sustainability of an economic model ecuador is going through a socio ecological transition from an agrarian towards an industrial regime based on the use of nonrenewable sources of materials and energy direct material flow indicators are used in this article to analyze the ecological dimension of the economy of ecuador during 1970 2007 this approach enables the concept of societal metabolism to become operative the paper compares societal metabolic profiles showing that per capita use of materials is still at about one fifth of the average in the high income countries of the world physical flows of trade indicate that there is an ecologically unequal exchange whereas a positive trade balance is desirable from an economic policy its counterpart in physical units has been a persistent net outflow of material resources the extraction of which causes environmental impacts and social conflicts

on auction protocols for decentralized scheduling abstract this note shows that for the combinatorial market goods defined by wellman et al 2001 there may not exist an optimal allocation that is in equilibrium moreover this result holds even if the value of each processed job is independent of its completion time the proposed algorithm for finding an equilibrium allocation using an assignment model fails due to complementarity even for instances that admit an optimal allocation which is in equilibrium

entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games abstract this paper presents several comparative statics results concerning the entry problem in assignment games the results compare sets of equilibria and hence do not require the usual assumption of a unique equilibrium by the device of a competing group generator the set of players is decomposed into three interest groups for which three forms of entry effects are identified for the group with the strongest entry effect it is found that generically 1 the benefit functions form a complete ordering and 2 the turnover effect dominates the unemployment effect the implications of these results to bargaining immigrations and matching problems are discussed

non manipulable house allocation with rent control in many real life house allocation problems rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration this is known as rent control because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept called rationing price equilibrium tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control an allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and group non manipulable for almost all preference profiles in its bounding cases the rule reduces to a number of well known mechanisms from the matching literature in this sense the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework

connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple partners assignment game multiple partners assignment game is the name used by sotomayor the multiple partners game in m majumdar ed equilibrium and dynamics essays in honor of david gale the macmillan press ltd new york 1992 the lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game int j game theory 28 1999 567 583 to describe the cooperative structure of the many to many matching market with additively separable utilities stability concept is proved to be different from the core concept an economic structure is proposed where the concept of competitive equilibrium payoff is introduced in connection to the equilibrium concept from standard microeconomic theory the paper examines how this equilibrium concept compares with the cooperative equilibrium concept properties of interest to the cooperative and competitive markets are derived