information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

comparing approval procedures for new drugs we analyse how drug approval procedures influence the incentives of pharmaceutical firms to commercialise new drugs in the presence of international reference pricing since 1995 the european medicines agency ema coordinates a centralised approval procedure for specific new drugs in the eu with such a centralised procedure the ema grants simultaneous drug approvals for all eu countries alongside non centralised procedures coexist for approvals of other new drugs and approvals can be sequential we focus on the effects of the exogenous timing of drug approvals either simultaneous or sequential and we compare the effects of centralised versus non centralised procedures on the firms incentives to commercialise new drugs in different markets in a context of international reference pricing we show that a centralised procedure limits the number of countries where the firm commercialises new drugs compared to a non centralised procedure we also show in a simplified framework that countries are better off with non centralised procedures while pharmaceutical firms in theory prefer the drug to be approved everywhere as soon as possible as in an early centralised procedure this is in line with the stated objective of the ema to generate savings for the pharmaceutical firms

cournot and bertrand equilibria compared substitutability complementarity and concavity abstract this paper assesses the view that bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than cournot equilibrium we consider an oligopoly model with linear demand and a mixture of substitute and complementary products our results provide support for the conventional wisdom and also indicate its limitations we provide counter examples showing that no clear cut comparison of prices and quantities is possible without strategic complementarity in either of the two games however price competition is indeed more competitive according to the following criteria lower mark up output ratios larger average output and lower average price

price discrimination through offers to match price in this paper a firm discriminates between two classes of customer who have a different cost of information by coupling a list price with an offer to match the pr ice of any other shop if the list price elsewhere is lower the firm will be successful in discrimination the list price of each firm is increasing in the number of sellers and the total sales are decreasi ng in the number of sellers furthermore if sellers coordinate they discriminate more efficaciously and increase their profits by increa sing their total sales copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

friedman s plucking model of business fluctuations tests and estimates of permanent and transitory components in milton friedman s model output cannot exceed a ceiling level but occasionally is plucked downward by recession implying fluctuations are asymmetric recessions transitory and recessions duration dependent though expansions are not the empirical literature lends support but formal modeling has been absent the econometric model presented here encompasses both plucking and symmetric fluctuations around a stochastic trend we find gdp is well characterized by the plucking model implied recessions correspond to nber reference cycles and no role for symmetric cycles decomposition of the unemployment rate reveals a corresponding asymmetry and timing paths of ceiling output and trend unemployment are presented

do rice prices follow a random walk evidence from markov switching unit root tests for asian markets this study revisits the issue of mean reversion in the import rice prices of six asian countries over the period between 1995 and 2015 augmented dickey fuller tests with a conventional linear regression model support the presence of a unit root in the levels of the price data however when regressions allow for markov switching in coefficients and variances to capture periodic shifts in levels and volatilities there is strong evidence against the unit root null hypothesis in favor of stationarity over much of the observation period

cointegration and threshold adjustment this article proposes an extension to the engle granger testing strategy by permitting asymmetry in the adjustment toward equilibrium in two different ways we demonstrate that our test has good power and size properties over the engle granger test when there are asymmetric departures from equilibrium we consider an application namely whether there exists cointegration among interest rates for instruments with different maturities this issue has been widely tested with mixed results we argue that either cautious policy or possibly opportunistic behavior on the part of the federal reserve implies that an equilibrium relationship between short and long term interest rates exists but that adjustments from disequilibrium are asymmetric in nature empirical tests using u s yields confirm the asymmetric nature of error correction among interest rates of different maturities

markov switching stochastic trends and economic fluctuations abstract i investigate cointegrating relationships such that even though the long run attractors are assumed to be linear the dynamics of the equilibrium errors depends on the business cycle i postulate a markov switching common stochastic trends model to study both the short run responses to permanent shocks and the effects of recessions in the long run growth i apply these findings to explore the short and long run asymmetric relationships among output consumption and investment

price versus quantity rules in dynamic competition the case of nonrenewable natural resources price and quantity competition are compared in the dynamic game framework of a nonrenewable natural resource duopoly it is shown that a price decision rule quantity decision rule strategy dominates in terms of a higher present value of the initial resource stocks if the resources are complements substitutes this result is shown to hold for subgame perfect equilibria it holds although equilibrium price paths resulting from those two types of strategies will cross it is shown however that even though the price trajectories cross initial equilibrium prices resulting from the price rule strategy will be lower than the initial equilibrium prices resulting from the quantity rule strategy copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation abstract we consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation we prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone in the latter case the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both cournot and bertrand competition as well as social planning journal of economic literature classifications numbers c73 l13

durable good monopoly and best price provisions best price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available if the seller subsequently cuts price then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund a durable good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments the provisions require special circumstances to be practical but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings three applications are discussed international commodity agreements markets for electric turbogenerators and markets for financial claims copyright 1990 by american economic association

stochastic trends and economic fluctuations are business cycles mainly the result of permanent shocks to productivity this paper uses a long run restriction implied by a large class of real business cycle models identifying permanent productivity shocks as shocks to the common stochastic trend in output consumption and investment to provide new evidence on this question econometric tests indicate that this common stochastic trend cointegration implication is consistent with postwar u s data however in systems with nominal variables the estimates of this common stochastic trend indicate that permanent productivity shocks typically explain less than half of the business cycle variability in output consumption and investment copyright 1991 by american economic association

outsourcing vertical integration and price vs quantity competition abstract we show that standard conclusions about duopoly competition can be reversed when the production of key inputs is outsourced to a vertically integrated retail competitor with upstream market power under such outsourcing bertrand competition can produce higher prices higher industry profit lower consumer surplus and lower total surplus than cournot competition in addition to limiting the intensity of retail competition bertrand competition can limit the extent of wholesale competition by reducing the incentive of retail providers to produce key inputs themselves

interactions between real economic and financial sides of the us economy in a regime switching environment this objective of this study is to examine the linkages between real economic and financial variables in the united states in a regime switching environment that accounts explicitly for high volatility in the stock market and high stress in financial markets since the linearity test shows that the linear model should be rejected we employ the markov switching vecm to examine the same objective using the bayesian markov chain monte carlo method the regime dependent impulse response function rdirf highlights the increasing importance of the financial sector of the economy during stress periods the responses and their fluctuations are significantly greater in the high volatility regime than in the low volatility regime

technical note a comparison of bertrand and cournot profits in oligopolies with differentiated products we compare equilibrium profits of bertrand price and cournot quantity competition in oligopolies with an arbitrary number of nonsymmetric firms offering differentiated substitutable products under an affine demand function we provide a precise characterization of the profit relationship in terms of 1 the number of firms 2 their relative quality and cost differences and 3 the competition intensity defined as the maxiumum absolute value of total change in competitors demand over change in own demand due to a unit change in own price we first examine the case where firms have the same demand sensitivity to own price and the same demand sensitivity to competitor prices but different cost and quality parameters for this case we prove that the total profit of the industry under cournot competition is at least as high as the total profit under bertrand competition if the number of firms is less than 28 or if the competition intensity is less than 0 909 or if the differences in quality and cost competitiveness between firms are small we also prove that for each firm the profit achieved under cournot competition is at least as high as the profit achieved under bertrand competition if the number of firms is less than eight or if the competition intensity is less than 0 739 we then provide numerical and analytical results that qualitatively support the same conclusions for general affine demand functions with variable demand sensitivities to prices

can low price guarantees deter entry abstract this paper examines the strategic use of low price guarantees lpgs as an entry deterrent the entire space of contemporaneous lpg messages is partitioned according to their ability to deter entry and or increase the incumbent s profits while most price matching and price beating guarantees cannot deter entry into a perfectly contestable market there do exist special classes of price beating guarantees that enable the incumbent to prevent entry interestingly both price matching and price beating can be a part of the incumbent s strategy in subgame perfect equilibria of the game where the firms choose lpgs from 14 classes defined in the paper

strategic underinvestment in informative advertising the cases of substitutes and complements the authors analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts they show that whether the products are substitutes or complements there exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if the advertising cost is zero

equilibrium prices in the bertrand and cournot oligopolies abstract the equilibrium prices for the bertrand and cournot oligopolies with product differentiation are compared if all firms have linear demand and cost functions and if in addition the jacobian matrix of the demand functions has a dominant negative diagonal the cournot equilibrium prices are not lower than the bertrand ones the general condition for the comparison of the bertrand and cournot equilibrium prices can be derived even if the nonlinearity is involved in the cost and or demand functions

price vs quantity competition in oligopoly supergames abstract in a repeated oligopoly with differentiated products and firms following trigger strategies quantity competition leads to a less efficient outcome than price competition this result contrasts with the repeated duopoly result where price competition is less efficient under certain conditions

on pricing and hedging options in regime switching models with feedback effect abstract we study the pricing and hedging of european style derivative securities in a markov regime switching model with a feedback effect depending on the economic condition we adopt a pricing kernel which prices both financial and economic risks explicitly in a dynamically incomplete market and we provide an equilibrium analysis a martingale representation for a european style index option s price is established based on the price kernel the martingale representation is then used to construct the local risk minimizing strategy explicitly and to characterize the corresponding pricing measure

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

the effects of platform most favored nation clauses on competition and entry abstractin the context of sellers who sell their products through intermediary platforms a platform most favored nation pmfn clause is a contractual restriction requiring that a particular seller will not sell at a lower price through a platform other than the one with which it has the pmfn agreement contractual restrictions observed in markets for e books and travel services among other settings can be viewed as examples of this phenomenon we show that pmfn clauses typically raise platform fees and retail prices and curtail entry or skew positioning decisions by potential entrants pursuing low end business models

on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentation in a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown under certain regularity conditions that if the demand structure is symmetric and bertrand and cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in cournot than in bertrand competition and as n grows both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least 1n if bertrand reaction functions slope upwards and are continuous then even with an asymmetric demand structure given any cournot equilibrium price vector one can find a bertrand equilibrium with lower prices in particular if the bertrand equilibrium is unique then it has lower prices than any cournot equilibrium

matching own prices rivals prices or both many retailers promise that they will not be undersold by rivals and extend their promise to include their own future prices that is many retailers combine elements of both price matching guarantees and retroactive most favored customer clauses this is puzzling because the extant literature has shown that each practice independently has the potential to facilitate supracompetitive prices and thus one might think the two practices are substitutes in this paper we show that price matching guarantees and most favored customer clauses complement each other when offered unilaterally by a single firm and can lead to higher prices than either one could have facilitated by itself

the plucking model of business fluctuations revisited the recent surge of renewed interest in business cycles in general and real business cycles in particular brought to mind a plucking model of business fluctuations that i suggested some twenty five years ago but that has since sunk into complete oblivion 1 i was led to the model in the course of investigating the direction of influence between money and income did the common cyclical fluctuations in money and income reflect primarily the influence of money on income or of income on money one of the five kinds of evidence that i examined was the serial correlation of amplitudes of cycle phases 2 as i wrote is the magnitude of an expansion related systematically to the magnitude of the succeeding contraction does a boom tend on the average to be followed by a large contraction p 271 to find out i calculated rank difference correlations between measures of the amplitudes of expansions and successive contractions in three different series for the period 1879 to 1961 the three series were rate of change of the stock of money a physical index of general business and clearing debits as an indicator of dollar value change in general business similarly i asked the same question except starting with a contraction in the given series and correlating its amplitude with the amplitude of the succeeding expansion 3 the results were striking for all three series the correlation was trivial between the amplitude of an expansion and the amplitude of the succeeding contraction on the other hand for both the rate of change of the money stock and the physical index of general business the correlation was high and statistically significant between the amplitude of a contraction and the amplitude of the succeeding expansion for clearing debits this correlation too was low i concluded there appears to be no systematic connection between the size of an expansion and of the succeeding contraction whether size is measured by physical volume or by dollar value pp 272 73 on the other hand a large contraction in output tends to be followed on the average by a large business expansion a mild contraction by a mild expansion p 273 though that is not so for the dollar value of the expansion and contraction i went on this phenomenon if it should be confirmed by a fuller analysis of data for the united states and other countries would have important implications for the analysis of business cycles in general not solely for our monetary studies for one thing it would cast grave doubt on those theories that see as the source of a deep depression the excesses of the prior expansion the mises cycle theory is a clear example 4 for another it would raise serious questions about both the analytical models in terms of which most of us have come to approach the analysis of cycles and the statistical methods we use to analyze them our analytical models generally involve a conception of a self generating cycle in which each phase gives rise to the next and which may be kept going by a sequence of random shocks each giving rise to a series of damped perturbations the corresponding physical analogy is of an electrical network in which responses are described by sine waves the asymmetric serial correlation patter suggests that this analogy may be misleading that a better one is what can be termed a plucking model consider an elastic string stretched taut between two points on the underside of a rigid horizontal board and glued lightly to the board let the string be plucked at a number of points chosen more or less at random with a force that varies at random and then held down at the lowest point reached the result will be to produce a succession of apparent cycles in the string whose amplitudes depend on the force used in plucking the string the cycles are symmetrical about their troughs each contraction is of the same amplitude as the succeeding expansion

are the effects of monetary policy asymmetric huntley schaller by building on the hamilton 1989 markov switching model we examine questions like does monetary policy have the same effect in expansions and recessions given that the economy is currently in a recession does a fall in interest rates increase the probability of an expansion does monetary policy have an incremental effect on the growth rate within a given state or does it only affect the economy if it is sufficiently strong to induce a state change e g from recession to expansion as suggested by models with sticky prices or finance constraints interest rate changes have larger effects during recessions jel e52 e32 much of the recent work in macroeconomics has proceeded under the assumption that variables follow linear stochastic processes with constant coefficients as a result some of the richness of the burns mitchell analysis such as its focus on asymmetries between recessions and expansions may well have been lost blanchard and fischer 1989 7 i introduction for decades macroeconomists have debated whether monetary policy has the same effect on real output in expansions and recessions as far back as the 1930s keynes and pigou debated whether monetary policy would have less effect on output during a severe economic downturn in the 1960s there were active debates on a very different proposition namely whether the rightward portion of the aggregate supply curve was vertical so that monetary policy would have less effect on real output during expansions in this article we provide a new type of evidence on whether monetary policy has different effects depending on whether the economy is in an expansion or recession empirical evidence on this issue is particularly relevant in light of new theoretical work in macroeconomics that predicts asymmetric effects of demand shocks conditional on the state of the economy two examples of this work are s s type models of price adjustment and models in which there are agency costs of financial intermediation 1 the intuition for the latter class of models is simple 2 when there is information asymmetry in financial markets agents may behave as if they were constrained for a variety of reasons these finance constraints are more likely to bind during recessions when the net worth of agents is low an increase in interest rates will then have two effects on investment the standard effect of increasing the cost of capital and therefore reducing investment demand and an additional effect of reducing liquidity e g by increasing debt service obligations and thus reducing investment demand for constrained agents as a result monetary policy actions that change interest rates will have greater effects during a recession 3 the s s type price adjustment models of ball and mankiw 1994 caballero and engel 1992 and tsiddon 1993 lead to a convex aggregate supply curve and therefore also imply that monetary policy will have stronger effects during recessions one of the more frequently cited empirical papers on the potentially asymmetric effects of monetary policy is cover 1992 which finds evidence that positive monetary shocks have different effects from negative monetary shocks we are looking at a different type of asymmetry namely between booms and recessions we study asymmetries using an extension of the markov switching model developed by hamilton 1989 estimated over the period 1955 93 in hamilton s econometric specification the growth rate of output depends on a state variable that corresponds to an expansion or recession this approach has several advantages first unlike linear projections it allows for nonlinearities and asymmetries second in estimating the recession coefficients it gives greater relative weight to observations that most clearly correspond to recessions and similarly for the expansion coefficients

customer coalitions monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence abstract this paper analyzes the interplay between a profit maximizing monopolist and a set of consumers who are able to form coalitions that bargain with the monopolist and or integrate into production we show that the monopolist will deter the formation of these countervailing coalitions through strategic selection of generic limit price offers to each consumer these limit prices are derived as subgame perfect equilibria in two alternative models of customer monopoly interplay in both models price discrimination emerges in environments wherein it has previously been considered unprofitable welfare analysis of the equilibria demonstrates the procompetitive effects of potential customer coalitions and generally provides an efficiency based motivation for a government ban on price discrimination

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

prisoners dilemma in duopoly super games abstract the choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here it is shown that this relocates the prisoners dilemma backward from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion and where discount rates appear as the payoffs likewise a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior cooperative or non cooperative are simultaneously chosen journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

the right of first offer abstract this paper examines the right of first offer which requires a seller to bargain with the contracted buyer before subsequent buyers arrive the contract also prevents the seller from selling his unique asset to subsequent buyers at a price below what he offers to the contracted buyer the right of first offer makes the seller less aggressive in bargaining with the contracted buyer who is privately informed about his valuation such a contract can reduce inter temporal misallocation in which a subsequent buyer gets the asset when the contracted buyer has higher valuation but it also may cause misallocation in which the contracted buyer gets the asset when subsequent buyers have higher valuations overall whether the right of first offer can increase the joint surplus for the seller and the contracted buyer as well as social welfare depends on the contracted buyer s renegotiation power and the distribution of the buyers valuations this paper also discusses the differences between the right of first offer and the most favored customer clause

regime switching model of us crude oil and stock market prices 1859 to 2013 this paper examines the relationship between us crude oil and stock market prices using a markov switching vector error correction model and a monthly data set from 1859 to 2013 the sample covers the entire modern era of the petroleum industry which typically begins with the first drilled oil well in titusville pennsylvania in 1858 we estimate a two regime model that divides the sample into high and low volatility regimes based on the variance covariance matrix of the oil and stock prices we find that the high volatility regime more frequently exists prior to the great depression and after the 1973 oil price shock caused by the organization of petroleum exporting countries the low volatility regime occurs more frequently when the oil markets fell largely under the control of the major international oil companies from the end of the great depression to the first oil price shock in 1973 using the national bureau of economic research business cycle dates we also find that the high volatility regime more likely occurs when the economy experiences a recession

a systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of permanent and transitory shocks this paper proposes a systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic e ects of permanent and transitory shocks on a system of n economic variables we consider a two step orthogonolization on the residuals of a vecm with r cointegrating vectors the rst step separates the permanent from the transitory shocks and the second step isolates n r mutually uncorrelated permanent shocks and r transitory shocks the decomposition is computationally straightforward and entails only a minor modi cation to the choleski decomposition commonly used in the literature we then show how impulse response functions can be constructed to trace out the propagating mechanism of shocks distinguished by their degree of persistence in an empirical example the dynamic responses to the identi ed permanent shocks have properties similar to shocks to productivity the real interest rate and money growth even though no economic

the most favored nation pricing policy and negotiated prices previous work has viewed the most favored nation mfn contract as a practice capable of facilitating collusion among sellers but this paper shows that even a monopoly seller may gain by including the mfn provision in sales contracts we consider a case in which the seller negotiates price separately with each of two buyers by including a mfn clause in her contract with the first buyer the seller raises her cost of granting price concessions to the second buyer this increases the seller s bargaining strength with respect to the second buyer thereby helping her negotiate a higher price

agency and strategic contracts theory and evidence from r d agreements in the pharmaceutical industry we examine the use of strategic rights in research and development r d agreements between a client and an agent when an entrant may compete with the client for the license of non contracted discoveries developed by the agent the agent puts effort either in the contracted project or into other r d activities which can result in non contracted discoveries strategic rights help the client and the agent extract rent from the entrant and also motivate the agent to place effort into the contracted project accordingly firms are more likely to adopt strategic rights when the likelihood of entry is larger moreover strategic rights and termination rights are substitutes in mitigating agency problems by investigating r d agreements between pharmaceutical clients and bio tech agents we find consistent evidence of the positive impact of entry threat on the use of strategic rights as well as evidence of the substitution between strategic rights and termination rights

nonlinearity and the permanent effects of recessions this paper presents a new nonlinear time series model that captures a post recession bounce back in the level of aggregate output while a number of studies have examined this type of business cycle asymmetry using recession based dummy variables and threshold models we relate the bounce back effect to an endogenously estimated unobservable markov switching state variable when the model is applied to us real gdp we find that the markov switching regimes are closely related to nber dated recessions and expansions also the markov switching form of nonlinearity is statistically significant and the bounce back effect is large implying that the permanent effects of recessions are small meanwhile having accounted for the bounce back effect we find little or no remaining serial correlation in the data suggesting that our model is sufficient to capture the defining features of us business cycle dynamics when the model is applied to other countries we find larger permanent effects of recessions copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

on the markovian efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria we characterize and compare closed loop feedback price and quantity strategies within a full fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets we allow for imperfect product substitutability which enables us to deal with price competition we show that the traditional result that the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium does not necessarily hold in a markovian environment either in the short run or at the stationary equilibrium or using the discounted sum of welfare as a criterion for relative efficiency

price vs quantity competition in a vertically related market this paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of cournot and bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two part tariffs in such a market downstream cournot competition yields higher output lower wholesale prices lower final prices higher consumers surplus and higher total welfare than bertrand competition

comparing cournot and bertrand in a homogeneous product market abstract this paper examines some general notions relating to the comparison of cournot and bertrand equilibrium outcomes results obtained by vives in this connection are reconsidered in a homogeneous product market and it is shown that these results are sensitive to the market sharing rules it is found that the results are always true under those market sharing rules which have the property of including the competitive equilibrium in the set of bertrand equilibria for example the capacity sharing rule if however the sharing rule does not have this property for example the equal sharing rule then the results referred to above may not hold when costs are asymmetric journal of economic literatureclassification numbers l13

the cleansing effect of recessions the authors investigate industry response to cyclical variations in demand production units that embody the newest process and product innovations are continuously being created and outdated units are being destroyed although outdated units are the most likely to turn unprofitable and be scrapped in a recession they can be insulated from the fall in demand by a reduction in creation the structure of adjustment costs plays a determinant role in the responsiveness of those two margins the calibrated model matches the relative volatilities of the observed manufacturing job creation and destruction series and their asymmetries over the cycle copyright 1994 by american economic association

stochastic trends and economic fluctuations in a small open economy in this paper we describe how restricted vector autoregressions can be employed to examine the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations we show how cointegration restrictions can be used to identify a var system with common stochastic trends subject to transitory and permanent changes in average growth and how we may investigate the system s responses to permanent shocks i e to innovations to the trends theoretical cointegration vectors are derived from a small open economy growth model for terms of trade real gdp real consumption and real investments applying these methods to swedish annual data 1875 1986 we find that permanent real supply shocks account for most of the fluctuations in gdp even in the short run

the effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local firms i present a game theoretic model of competition between a national firm and local firms in which the introduction of most favored customer clauses into the sales contracts of the national firm decreases all industry prices the reason is that the price restriction makes the national firm a weak price competitor in each local market this produces a prisoners dilemma situation in which each local firm has the unilateral incentive to be more aggressive in nonprice decisions this increase in nonprice competition by all local firms causes prices to fall across the industry