the demand for lotto the role of conscious selection this article presents estimates of the elasticity of demand for lottery tickets using time series data in which there is variation in the expected value of a lottery ticket induced by rollovers an important feature of our data is that there are far more rollovers than expected given the lottery design we find strong evidence that individuals do not choose their lottery numbers uniformly from a uniform distribution that is conscious selection we use our estimates to derive the inverse supply function for the industry and this enables us to identify the demand elasticity we find the price elasticity to be close to unity which implies that the operator is revenue maximizing which is the regulator s objective

liberty and development a further empirical perspective this paper uses the wright ratings of economic freedom to investigate the relationship between economic freedom and economic development for most countries in the world this rela tionship is apparently strong and direct for such economic freedoms as freedom of property and freedom of movement but inverse for freedom of association these findings appear to be indepen dent of the type of economic system or civil liberties as measured by the gastil ratings which have their own important effects on economic development

communication competition and social gift exchange in an auction for public good provision abstract reverse auctions are an established policy instrument for allocating conservation contracts while the auction mechanism has been the subject of a number of studies less attention has been paid to the post bidding contract phase as contracts involving natural resource management are usually incomplete trust becomes crucial for the effectiveness of the programme we test the effect of communication between auctioneer and bidders on bidding behaviour and contract fulfilment using experimental economics we combine a repeated reverse auction with an effort level game and use a bilateral chatting tool as treatment variable without communication auctioneers tended to select the lowest priced bidders who invested substantially less than the socially optimal level of effort when fulfilling their contract to provide the public good relational contracting proved important with effort levels and profits tending to be higher when auctioneers and bidders entered into consecutive contract relationships in the communication treatment there was no evidence of price competition as auctioneers were more likely to accept high priced bids however an overall higher price level did not lead to efficiency losses since contractors realised higher effort levels in return establishing a social gift exchange our results demonstrate the importance of trust based relationships between the auctioneering institution and landholders

democracy and macroeconomic performance in underdeveloped countries an empirical analysis in this study the author examines how inflation and economic growth differ in more and less democratic regimes and in new and mature democracies the analysis is based on a panel research design featuring annual data from a large sample of underdeveloped countries and two way fixed effects regression analysis the author s central finding is that more democratic countries have higher inflation and slower growth than less democratic countries inflation apparently is higher than more democratic countries mainly because they have higher fiscal deficits and faster wage growth this higher inflation marginally reduces economic growth in these countries the author also finds that new and mature democracies do not have significantly different inflation and growth rates the findings suggest that unrestrained political participation and the resulting demands placed on state officials undermine democratic performance

democracy and economic growth a meta analysis despite a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature no firm conclusions have been drawn regarding the impact of political democracy on economic growth this article challenges the consensus of an inconclusive relationship through a quantitative assessment of the democracy growth literature it applies meta regression analysis to the population of 483 estimates derived from 84 studies on democracy and growth using traditional meta analysis estimators the bootstrap and fixed and random effects meta regression models it derives several robust conclusions taking all the available published evidence together it concludes that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth however democracy has robust significant and positive indirect effects through higher human capital lower inflation lower political instability and higher levels of economic freedom democracies may also be associated with larger governments and less free international trade there also appear to be country and region specific democracy growth effects overall democracy s net effect on the economy does not seem to be detrimental

trust reputation and relationships in grazing rights markets an experimental economic study abstract trust is frequently a requirement for economic exchanges and the management of natural resources providing public information on past actions can promote trust through the formation of reputations we developed an economic experiment to test whether a formal reputation mechanism could facilitate trusting relationships in the tradable grazing rights markets providing information to create formal public reputations for market participants did not increase the overall efficiency of the market however it did result in greater equality of income between partners suggesting that participants showed more concern for their partners when they knew they would be rated even with public reputation information bilateral relationships remained central to the market market failures in existing grazing rights markets may be better addressed by measures to increase communication between partners rather than simply relying on a formal reputation mechanism

the two freedoms economic growth and development an empirical study log linear methods are applied to categorical data containing economic freedom political freedom the level of income and the rate of economic growth for a panel of about 100 countries from 1975 to 1992 the main results are given economic freedom the rate of economic growth is independent of political freedom and the level of income given the level of income political freedom is independent of economic freedom and the growth rate the analysis suggests the fundamental effects of economic freedom in fostering economic growth and a high level of income as the condition of a high degree of political freedom

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

choice shifts in groups a decision theoretic basis the phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision making has received much attention in the social psychology literature faced with a choice between a safe and risky decision group members appear to move to one extreme or the other relative to the choices each member might have made on her own both risky and cautious shifts have been identified in different situations this paper demonstrates that from an individual decision making perspective choice shifts may be viewed as a systematic violation of expected utility theory we propose a model in which a well known failure of expected utility captured by the allais paradox is equivalent to a particular configuration of choice shifts thus our results imply a connection between two well known behavioral regularities one in individual decision theory and another in the social psychology of groups

inequality aversion and the natural rate of subjective inequality abstract this paper analyzes inequality aversion across countries and identifies factors which explain the empirical heterogeneity observed across these countries we do this by hypothesizing a natural rate of subjective inequality across countries and solving for the explicit country specific value of the inequality aversion parameter that is consistent with the hypothesized natural rate we present evidence consistent with the existence of a natural rate of subjective inequality by verifying that countries with low high tolerance for inequality have low high inequality as measured by the gini coefficient as well finally we explore the socio economic factors that are consistent with observed differences in inequality aversion across these countries finding important effects of female empowerment public education expenditures per capita income economic growth and population size

political liberty and social development an empirical investigation liberty is not only economic it is political whether the economic system promotes social development is one question whether the political system promotes social development is another question the empirical investigations indicate that for the world political liberty has a small though significant relationship with the level of social development

uncertainty and sustainability in the management of rangelands abstract we analyze a dynamic and stochastic ecological economic model of grazing management in semi arid rangelands the ecosystem is driven by stochastic precipitation a risk averse farmer chooses a grazing management strategy under uncertainty such as to maximize expected utility from farming income grazing management strategies are rules about which share of the rangeland is given rest depending on the actual rainfall in that year in a first step we determine a myopic farmer s optimal grazing management strategy and show that a risk averse farmer chooses a strategy such as to obtain insurance from the ecosystem the optimal strategy reduces income variability but yields less mean income than possible in a second step we analyze the long run ecological and economic impact of different strategies we conclude that a myopic farmer if he is sufficiently risk averse will choose a sustainable grazing management strategy even if he does not take into account long term ecological and economic benefits of conservative strategies

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

government policy and the firm s capital structure abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of commonly observed forms of government intervention on the firm s capital structure we show that since market claims against the firm are always properly priced the firm is forced to take market claimants interests into account on the other hand since government claims are usually not adjusted for risk the firm can take advantage of the government it does so by choosing strategies that extract maximum value minimum cost from these policies in particular the firm uses its capital capital structure to maximize the value of the policy thus leading to a determinate capital strucure

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

moderation in groups evidence from betting on ice break ups in alaska we use a large sample of guessed ice break up dates for the tanana river in alaska to study differences between outcomes of decisions made by individuals versus groups we estimate the distribution of guesses conditional on whether they were made by individual bettors or betting pools we document two major distinctions between the two sets of guesses 1 the distribution of guesses made by groups of bettors appears to conform more to the distribution of historical break up dates than the distribution of guesses made by individual bettors and 2 the distribution for groups has less mass in its tails and displays lower variability than the distribution for individuals we argue that these two pieces of evidence are consistent with the hypothesis that group decisions are more moderate either because groups have to reach a compromise when their members disagree or because individuals with extreme opinions are less likely to be part of a group

teams take the better risk abstract one reason why decision makers are often teams and not individuals may be that team decisions comply more closely with economic rationality we compare individual and team decisions when systematic deviations from the expected utility theory eut and the portfolio selection theory pst are to be expected we find almost no evidence for the greater compliance of team decisions with the principles of eut however there is substantial evidence for the consistency of team decisions with the pst compared to individuals teams accumulate significantly more expected value at a significantly lower total risk measured in standard deviation s d

buying a dream alternative models of demand for lotto existing lotto demand models utilize effective price computed as the face value of a ticket minus the expected value of prize money per ticket as their primary explanatory variable by contrast this article proposes a key role for consumption benefit or fun in the demand for gambling in general and lotto demand in particular it develops an alternative model of lotto demand that focuses on the maximum possible prize when this is tested against the traditional model using data from the u k national lottery we find that jackpot considerations exert an influence over and above that of variations in effective price

cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation abstract the amount of institutional intervention necessary to secure efficiency enhancing cooperation in markets and organizations in circumstances where interactions take place among essentially strangers depends critically on the amount of information informal reputation mechanisms need transmit models based on subgame perfection find that the information necessary to support cooperation is recursive in nature and thus information generating and processing requirements are quite demanding models that do not rely on subgame perfection on the other hand suggest that the information demands may be quite modest the experiment we present indicates that even without any reputation information there is a non negligible amount of cooperation that is however quite sensitive to the cooperation costs for high costs providing information about a partner s immediate past action increases cooperation recursive information about the partners previous partners reputation further promotes cooperation regardless of the cooperation costs

new evidence on the relationship between democracy and economic growth it is often maintained that democracy is a luxury which comes at a price in terms of subsequent slower increases in national living standards however various recent cross section studies on economic growth have found evidence that lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth using a new measure of democracy which is based upon the number of years that a country can be regarded as a democracy the robustness of this relationship is examined both direct and indirect effects of lack of democratic liberties are analysed our main conclusion is that the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not rubust

does democracy cause innovation an empirical test of the popper hypothesis abstract democratic countries produce higher levels of innovation than autocratic ones but does democratization itself lead to innovation growth either in the short or in the long run the existing literature has extensively examined the relationship between democracy and growth but seldom explored the effect of democracy on innovation which might be an important channel through which democracy contributes to economic growth this article aims to fill this gap and contribute to the long standing debate on the relationship between democracy and innovation by offering empirical evidence based on a data set covering 156 countries between 1964 and 2010 the results from the difference in differences method show that democracy itself has no direct positive effect on innovation measured with patent counts patent citations and patent originality

credible commitments and investment does opportunistic ability or incentive matter the more likely it is that the sovereign will alter property rights for his or her own benefit the lower the expected returns from investment and the lower in turn the incentive to invest north and weingast 1989 p 803 i introduction since at least hobbes social scientists have identified external agents as necessary for sustaining efficient outcomes in political economies 1 when such agents are absent efficient collective order is arguably impossible because individuals cannot by themselves coordinate actions to address common dilemmas external agents are thought to resolve this impossibility by credibly threatening to inflict punishments where members of a closed system have no incentive to punish themselves social scientists frequently characterize external agents as supplying incentive aligning services in return for a share of associated efficiency gains this remuneration scheme however provides agents with an incentive to not only create efficiency gains but to opportunistically manipulate the sharing of those gains moreover unless an agent can credibly commit against acting on this incentive potential subjects to its authority have reduced motivation to enter the game hence although external agents can make efficiency enhancing actions incentive compatible i e align individual incentives with group objectives credible commitments against opportunism are necessary for egoistic individuals to subject themselves to an agent s authority i evaluate the potential for two types of institutions to facilitate such commitments the first produces checks on the ability for political agents to act opportunistically to see how such an institution might work suppose that a polity formally diffuses authority among say an executive and legislature given this separation of powers political agents must act collectively to opportunistically expropriate their constituents product if the cost for a nonsingleton set of agents to act exceeds that for an individual then polities that diffuse authority e g establish veto players increase the cost for political agents to play opportunistic actions this increase in turn facilitates credible commitments against opportunism and encourages productive economic activity 2 the second type of institution shapes the planning horizons of external agents so that even egoistic agents have an incentive to build reputations as nonopportunistic types for example political agents who can complete only the term they are serving have relatively little incentive ceteris paribus to build or maintain reputations as nonopportunistic types besley and case 1995 formalize this conjecture to argue that with asymmetric information about politicians types or some imperfect information about the state of the world the reelection mechanism can raise effort or otherwise induce less opportunistic behavior besley and case 1995 p 769 emphasis added 3 interpreted in this light formal restrictions on planning horizons e g binding term limits diminish the capacity for political agents to credibly commit against opportunism and in turn the incentive for economic actors to engage in productive activity to evaluate the empirical relevance of these hypotheses i examine the association between investment and institutions that check the ability or incentive for political agents to play opportunistic actions 4 egoistic individuals allocate resources to investment if they can recognize a sufficient return hence not only are property rights over an investment s product important so is the stability of those rights stability in turn can be stronger when institutions increase the cost of political opportunism if i forgoing benefits from reputation building and ii expending resources to coordinate opportunistic actions are costs of opportunistically altering property rights then investment should exhibit a positive association with institutions that increase such costs

further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth often it is maintained that economic freedom may further high levels of economic growth using various measures of economic freedom constructed by scully and slottje the robustness of this relationship is examined both direct and indirect effects of lack of liberties are analysed our main conclusion is that the link between economic freedom and economic growth depends upon the measure used for some indicators of economic freedom there appears a robust direct relationship while for others there is no such relationship investment is not related to our indicators for economic freedom

market oriented institutions and policies and economic growth a critical survey this paper surveys recent evidence suggesting that market oriented institutions and policies are strongly related to economic growth focusing on studies using the economic freedom ef indicator of the fraser institute this index is critically discussed also various serious shortcomings of empirical studies using this index are identified nevertheless there are strong indications that liberalization i e an increase in the ef index stimulates economic growth this paper also reviews studies on the determinants of ef political liberalization is often found to enhance economic liberalization whereas there is less evidence for causality running in the other direction

the architecture of economic systems hierarchies and polyarchies the authors present new ways of looking at economic organizations andsystems individuals judgments entail errors they sometimes reject good projects and accept bad projects the architecture of an economicsystem specifying how the decision making units are organized togetherwithin a system who gathers what information and who communicates what with whom affects its performance both because it influences thenature of errors that individuals make within the system and becauseit has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals errors theperformance of two polar architectures decentralized polyarchical versus centralized hierarchical decision making authorities are analyzed and compared copyright 1986 by american economic association

a cross country analysis of electricity market reforms potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract the paper explores whether the question of why some countries are able to implement more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some countries have better institutions than others we analyze this question by using an empirical econometric model based on poisson regression with cross section data covering 51 states in the us 13 provinces in canada and 51 other countries in the course of the study we check the validity of three important arguments of new institutional economics nie for the power market liberalization process the first argument is the path dependency to test its impact on the reform progress we try to explain whether the background of the chairperson of the regulatory agency when reforms started or that of the governor minister responsible for energy policy at that time has an impact on the subsequent reform progress the second argument is the impact of democracy as an institution on the reform progress we look at the effect of two important indicators of democracy i e civil liberties and political rights on the reform progress the final argument of nie is about transaction costs we concentrate on the level of corruption in a country as one of the key factors that determine transaction costs and try to explore its impact on the reforms the results show that the backgrounds of the chairperson and the minister governor the level of democracy and corruption in a country are significantly correlated with how far reforms have gone in that country the negative relationship between reform progress and civil liberties may indicate that reforms may be limited in democratic countries with strong civil society institutions such as trade unions or other organized structures in the society that may consider reforms as harmful to their self interest

credibility of rules and economic growth a business environment characterized by incredible rules such as unclear property rights constant policy surprises and reversals uncertain contract enforcement and high corruption most likely translates into lower investment and growth the literature on growth and policies has suggested different ways to measure the relevant uncertainties this article proposes a new measurement approach based on firm level surveys and an indicator of the credibility of rules using data from a private sector survey conducted in 73 countries and covering more than 3 800 enterprises standard cross country growth and investment analysis indicates that low credibility of rules is associated with lower rates of investment and growth the survey was designed to capture local entrepreneurs views of the predictability of changes in laws and policies of the reliability of law enforcement of the impact of discretionary and corrupt bureaucracies and of the danger of policy reversals due to changes in governments conf

the political economy of growth democracy and human capital democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy we argue that there are significant indirect effects of democracy on growth through public health and education where economists use life expectancy and education as proxies for human capital we expect democracy will be an important determinant of the level of public services manifested in these indicators in addition to whatever direct effect democracy may have on growth we predict an important indirect effect through public policies that condition the level of human capital in different societies we conduct statistical investigations into the direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth using a data set consisting of a 30 year panel of 128 countries we find that democracy has no statistically significant direct effect on growth rather we discover that the effect of democracy is largely indirect through increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased secondary education in nonpoor countries t he relationship between democracy and economic growth has received considerable attention in recent years as yet however there is no consensus among analysts on the relationship between these two widely studied variables sound theoretical positions have been advanced suggesting that democracy is both an impediment and facilitator of growth careful quantitative tests of the relationship have produced contradictory results in our view existing studies fail to develop an adequate political theory of growth and as a result their empirical models are typically misspecified with competing arguments on both sides of the question many analysts merely add a variable for democracy to existing economic models and then look at the sign of the coefficient and its significance this is inadequate democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy we argue that there are important indirect effects of democracy on growth that are manifested through public health and education where economists typically use life expectancy and secondary school enrollment as proxies for human capital we expect that democracy will itself be an important determinant of the level of public services captured in these indicators thus in

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

in search of optimal stocking regimes in semi arid grazing lands one size does not fit all we discuss the search for optimal stocking regimes in semi arid grazing lands we argue that one size does not fit all and that different stocking regimes are appropriate under different conditions this paper is an attempt to move beyond polarization of the current debate towards a more integrative and flexible approach to grazing management we propose five different conditions as major influences on grazing regimes environmental variability and predictability degradation and thresholds property right regimes discount rates and market stability and prices we suggest a lack of connection between the micro economics literature and natural science and social anthropological literature it is timely to achieve greater integration around some key questions and hypotheses and recognize that policy prescriptions at national or even regional levels are likely to have limited value due to context specificity

on reputation a microfoundation of contract enforcement and price rigidity we study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterised by moral hazard problems social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially this effect is however associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities surprisingly reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences thus in markets characterised by moral hazard reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges reduce rents and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

voting and paying for public goods an application of the theory of the core abstract let any coalition with a majority of all voters have the power to choose the quantities of public goods under rule i a majority coalition bears a cost of its decision that is proportional to its size under rule ii it must bear the whole cost of its decision thus rule i imposes costs on minorities although they have no power to choose the quantities of public goods while rule ii allows goods to have some attributes of semiprivate goods it is shown that a nonempty core under rule i implies a nonempty core under rule ii but not conversely necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the properties of the von neumann morgenstern characteristic function are given

are two heads better than one monetary policy by committee two experiments were conducted to test the common hypothesis that groups make decisions more slowly than individuals one of these experiments imitates real life monetary policy decisions in both cases the hypothesis is found wanting groups are not slower than individuals in both experiments we also find that group decisions are on average better than individual decisions this holds regardless of whether the groups make decisions by unanimity or majority rule simple mechanical theories of group decisionmaking that the group follows its average player median player or best player do not explain the results group interactions seem to matter

harnessing the wisdom of crowds when will a large group provide an accurate answer to a question involving quantity estimation we empirically examine this question on a crowd based corporate earnings forecast platform estimize

rights equity and economic efficiency the adelman morris premise that economic development and equity are incompatible is not supported by the evidence of a strong relationship between equality of rights and the income distribution the premise that equity requires the denial of individual rights and the affirmation of state control is an oxymoron what has been overlooked in the literature on growth and equity is the effect of the rights structure on both economic efficiency and on the income distribution the evidence is that free societies have much larger shares of income going to the middle 60 percent of the distribution than is observed in societies where men are not free to choose in politically open societies compared to politically closed regimes the share of income to the middle three quintiles is q2 10 7 vs 8 0 q3 16 0 vs 11 5 and q4 22 9 vs 17 9 in the aggregate the shares to the middle quintiles are 49 6 vs 37 4 in nations that obey the rule of law compared to regimes in which the rights of the state relative to the individual are paramount the comparisons are q2 11 2 vs 7 4 q3 16 3 vs 10 6 q4 23 0 vs 17 3 summing the three quintiles yields a comparison of 50 5 vs 35 3 in countries that have private property market allocation of resources and minimum intervention by the state compared to command economies the shares of income to the middle quintiles are q2 10 8 vs 8 0 q3 16 0 vs 11 1 and q4 22 8 vs 17 7 aggregated the shares of the middle class in regimes with high levels of economic liberty are 49 6 vs 36 8 for regimes with restricted private economic rights

economic freedom culture and growth how do economic freedom and culture impact economic growth this paper argues that culture as measured by the world values surveys and economic institutions associated with economic freedom are both independently important for economic prosperity but the strength of their impact can be better understood only when both are included in the growth regression our results indicate that economic freedom is more important than culture for growth outcomes suggesting substitutability between the two we posit that culture is important for growth when economic freedom is absent diminishing in significance once economic freedom is established

the bias in favor of pro tariff lobbies abstract we show that the probability of success of the pro tariff lobby defined as a decreasing function of the ratio of consumer loss to producer gain rent generated by the tariff rises with the tariff under very general conditions this appears as an exception to becker s view that less distortionary measures tend to be adopted over their more distortionary counterparts we then provide a micro foundation for our probability definition using the imperfectly discriminating lobbying framework

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

credit reporting relationship banking and loan repayment how does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior we show in a laboratory credit market that information sharing increases repayment rates as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit this incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third party enforceable and lending is dominated by one shot transactions if however repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders ability to extract rents from relationships copyright 2007 the ohio state university

foreign aid and statehood in africa has foreign aid destroyed state institutions in africa african states depend on development assistance to conduct basic government operations yet few of these states are well governed or effective at providing public goods the two trends mounting foreign aid and static or diminishing state performance raise an obvious question is aid dependency contributing to misrule and state failure in africa many critics argue the two phenomena are related i find they are not my analysis fails to show a negative association between aid receipts and two measures of democracy and economic freedom instead the evidence is consistent with a small positive relationship between aid and these indicators of state performance since the international community seems bent on reducing foreign aid an important issue is how african states can maintain and improve their performance with less foreign assistance

financial freedom and bank efficiency evidence from the european union this paper investigates the dynamics between the financial freedom counterparts of the economic freedom index drawn from the heritage foundation database and bank efficiency levels we rely on a large sample of commercial banks operating in the 27 european union member states over the 2000s after estimating bank specific efficiency scores using data envelopment analysis dea we develop a truncated regression model combined with bootstrapped confidence intervals to test our main hypotheses results suggest that the higher the degree of an economy s financial freedom the higher the benefits for banks in terms of cost advantages and overall efficiency our results also show that the effects of financial freedom on bank efficiency tend to be more pronounced in countries with freer political systems in which governments formulate and implement sound policies and higher quality governance

tinpots totalitarians and democrats an empirical investigation of the effects of economic growth on civil liberties and political rights ronald wintrobe 1990 1998 has recently provided atheoretical foundation for estimating equations that attemptto explain the dependence of civil liberties and politicalrights in non democratic regimes on the history of economicgrowth this theory suggests that data from different kinds ofnon democratic countries should not be pooled without allowingcoefficients to vary with regime type it also placesinteresting restrictions on the signs of the coefficients ofeconomic growth in equations explaining freedom in the typesof regimes wintrobe identifies in this paper we employ theserestrictions to test wintrobe s theory some additionalhypotheses about the difference between democratic andnon democratic regimes and about the role of education notconsidered by wintrobe are also investigated the results indicate clearly that the relationship between thedegree of freedom as measured by the sum of the gastilindexes of civil liberties and political rights andeconomic growth varies significantly across all types ofregimes totalitarians that attempt to maximize power areclearly different than tinpots that just attempt to maintainpower in this respect and non democratic regimes differ fromdemocracies other aspects of the theory are partiallyconfirmed in particular in totalitarian regimes positivegrowth reduces freedom and negative growth increases it insome specifications the theory predicts the opposite patternfor tinpots and we do find that negative growth reducesfreedom in tinpot regimes however positive growth in tinpotsalso appears to reduce freedom in some cases which is not inaccord with the theory secondary schooling has a positive effect on freedom as inprevious empirical work a result that is shown here to holdeven when each type of regime is considered separately butthe effect of primary schooling is different in tinpot andtotalitarian regimes but not in democracies primaryschooling is associated with reduced freedom

the institutional framework and economic development the compound growth rates of per capita output and farrell type efficiency measures for 115 market economies over the period 1960 80 were compared with measures of political civil and economic liberty it was found that the institutional framework has significant and large effects on the efficiency and growth rate of economies politically open societies which subscribe to the rule of law to private property and to the market allocation of resources grow at three times the rate and are two and one half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are abridged

group decision making with uncertain outcomes unpacking child parent choice of the high school track predicting group decisions under uncertainty requires disentangling individual members utilities over the consequences of choice their expectations for uncertain outcomes and their choice process as a group i estimate simple bayesian models of child parent choice of high school track with subjective risk and unilateral or bilateral nonstrategic decisions by combining families actual choices with novel survey information about children s and parents subjective probabilities over choice consequences their individually preferred choices and their decision roles a set of policy counterfactuals confirms the importance of introducing the beliefs and decision roles of individual members in models and policy analysis of group decisions

length of compulsory education and voter turnout evidence from a staged reform this study estimates the impact of education on voter turnout the identification relies on a reform which increased the length of compulsory schooling in norway from seven to nine years the impact is measured both at the individual and the municipality level both sets of analysis suggest that additional education has no effect on voter turnout the impact of education on various measures of civic outcomes is also estimated of these only the likelihood of signing a petition is found to be positively affected by education

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

government and economic growth in the less developed countries an empirical study for 1960 1980 adam smith founded modern economics with a powerful argument that free markets are the best route to prosperity and economic growth his conclusion has been studied and debated by economists ever since including nobel prize winners friedman hayek kuznets lewis myrdal and schultz whatever economists have concluded since world war ii the majority of the less developed countries seem to have opted for extensive government regulation of the private sector and for a large public sector has the large government role slowed or accelerated the growth of ldcs obviously this is an important issue this study looks at government expenditure revenue raising and regulation greater emphasis is put on expenditure because 1 the revenue raised is presumably a function of the level of expenditure and 2 there are few internationally comparable measures of regulation there are virtually no empirical studies of the general impact of government on economic growth an extensive literature search turned up only three papers gemmell analyzed the impact of nonmarket sector growth on various measures of macroeconomic performance for 27 ldcs and developed countries for 1960 and 1970 he drew no general conclusions about the relation between the size of the nonmarket sector and economic growth marsden found a negative relation between tax gdp ratios and economic growth for a cross section of 20 ldcs and developed countries for the 1970 79 period 2 i found a negative relationship between the share of government consumption expenditure in gdp and the growth of per capita gdp for a cross section of 96 ldcs and developed countries over various time periods between 1961 and 1976 3 this paper extends the approach used in my 1983 article

the quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized organizations a central task of the leadership of any organization is the choice of its successors and subordinates corporate presidents spend a significant part of their time selecting upper management tenured faculty sometimes spends months deciding whether particular individuals should be admitted into their ranks the effort and contentiousness which often go into this process suggests that it has important consequences for the organization it is recognized that there are large differences in individuals abilities and that the abilities of those in leadership inevitably affect the performance and survival of the organization our objective here is to examine how the centralization or decentralization of decision making authority affects the quality of the managers who are actually selected this question is naturally dynamic because the quality of current managers is not only influenced by that of past managers but it in turn affects the quality of future managers we consider stylized economies consisting of an arbitrary number of hierarchies organizations of different sizes the size of a hierarchy is the number of managers within the hierarchy one of whom is the hierarch the boss and others are subordinates the current hierarch appoints his own successor and those of his subordinates but has no influence on any other hierarchy this assumption exaggerates somewhat the typical asymmetry of authority between the hierarch and the subordinates our definition of a more or less centralized economy is intuitive an economy is more centralized if it has a larger proportion of the total number of managers in larger hierarchies our main result is that there is a greater variability over time in the steady state quality of managers in a more centralized economy this is because highly capable decision makers have greater beneficial effects on the managerial choices in a more centralized economy by the same token highly incapable managers placed in the same positions have greater deleterious effects

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

the strategy of professional forecasting we develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters strategic behavior the first theory reputational cheap talk posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed the market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state if the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean with correct market expectations equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded the second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre specified rules in a winner take all contest equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated

how robust is the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth using various indicators for economic freedom it is shown that increases in economic freedom are robustly related to economic growth this conclusion holds even if the impact of outlying observations is taken into account the level of economic freedom is not related to growth

losers and winners in economic growth this paper examines the growth rates in 116 economies from 1965 to 1985 it finds that the lowest quintile had an average growth rate of real gross domestic product gdp per capita of 1 3 percent whereas the highest quintile averaged 4 8 percent the authors isolate five influences that discriminate reasonably well between slow and fast growers a conditional convergence effect whereby a country grows faster if it begins with lower real gdp per capita in relation to its initial level of human capital in the forms of educational attainment and health a positive effect on growth from a high ratio of investment to gdp although this effect is weaker than that reported in some previous studies a negative effect from excessively large government a negative effect from government induced distortions of markets and a negative effect from political instability overall the fitted growth rates for eighty five economies for 1965 85 had a correlation of 0 8 with the actual values the authors also find that female educational attainment has a pronounced negative effect on fertility whereas female and male attainment are each positively related to life expectancy and negatively related to infant mortality

the political economy of development a cross national causality test of development democracy growth hypothesis the empirical investigation of the development democracy growth hypothesis estimates positive correlations and causal associations between development and democracy and democracy and growth among the preconditions for the emergence of democracy market and culture show strong and highly significant positive effects which are largely transmitted directly development affects democracy directly and indirectly via education and investment the positive causal association between democracy and growth is transmitted both directly and indirectly via labor and welfare accordingly the hypothesized compatibility between economic development and political democracy is confirmed while rejecting the trade off between political democracy and economic growth

freedom and growth do constitutions matter this paper uses an augmented solow model with cross section data to measure the effect on per capita income of a the entrenchment of various rights in a country s constitution and b the level of economic freedom in a country broadly construed the results suggest that entrenchment per se of any single right seldom has a significant general economic effect while the effect of economic freedom is significant and substantial the paper then considers whether such evidence could support the proposition that constitutions do not matter while it concludes otherwise it does caution against incurring excessive negotiation costs to obtain entrenchment of a comprehensive wish list of rights

repetition and reputation implications for trust and trustworthiness when institutions change institutions change in iraq the formerly communist countries and many private and public organizations but do people adapt to the new institutional environment and if so how quickly this paper examines institutional change how long it takes people to transition from one institutional environment to another or put differently whether old institutional regimes have an afterglow more specifically we study whether trust and trustworthiness can be fostered by first exposing people to an environment conducive to trust we are interested in whether intrinsic trust and trustworthiness can be induced in the long run by providing extrinsic incentives for trust and trustworthiness in the short run reputation systems may provide incentives for trustworthiness and trust direct reputationbuilding may occur in repeated games where pairs of subjects play the same stage game repeatedly but repeat transactions are not necessarily the rule in today s global economy in population games where agents are randomly re matched in every period indirect reputation systems are a potential substitute for personal interactions provided information about others past behavior is available on ebay for example buyers are willing to pay a premium of 8 1 percent of the selling price to a seller with an established good reputation paul resnick et al 2003 this paper examines experimentally to what degree indirect reputation building substitutes for direct reputation building in repeat interactions in the short run and analyzes the effects these environments have on behavior in the long run in contrast most earlier experimental studies focus on one shot and repeat interactions in the short run we compare the effects of direct and indirect reputation building in a binary choice trust game where a buyer the trustor can either interact with the seller the trustee or exit the trustee can either honor or exploit trust the payoffs are such that a money maximizing trustee prefers exploiting to honoring trust in a one shot game while a money maximizing trustor prefers not offering trust to being exploited the unique nash equilibrium of the single shot game predicts no trade figure 1 presents the game we implemented with the actual payoffs in cents used in our experiment subjects participate in the trust game in two blocks of 10 rounds each which is common knowledge in phase 1 the first 10 rounds they are confronted either with a standard one shot random matching treatment stranger or s a fixed pairs finitely repeated game treatment partner or p or bohnet kennedy school of government harvard university 79 jfk street cambridge ma 02139 e mail iris bohnet harvard edu huck department of economics and else university college london gower street london wc1e 6bt united kingdom e mail s huck ucl ac uk we thank rachel croson and the participants at the 2004 assa meetings for their helpful comments and jeffrey bielicki for his excellent research assistance we gratefully acknowledge financial support from the russell sage foundation the leverhulme trust and the economic and social research council u k via else 1 for a recent survey see james andreoni and rachel croson 2004 studies examining the effects of different institutional environments over time include bohnet et al 2001 and ernst fehr and simon gachter 2003 2 the experiments were computerized using urs fischbacher s 1999 z tree software the instructions are available upon request

political freedom economic freedom and income convergence do stages of economic development matter in the literature theory and empirical evidence on the nexus of political freedom economic freedom and economic growth are mixed in this paper we test the hypothesis that the effect of political freedom on promoting economic growth is realized and detectable at later stages of social and economic development using panel data for a sample of 104 countries between 1970 and 2003 we find strong support for our hypothesis while economic freedom has greater effects on income convergence in the oecd countries political freedom clearly promotes the convergence among those oecd countries

economic freedom and equality friends or foes how does economic freedom mainly how property rights are designed and protected relate to income equality whilst this is argued to be theoretically ambiguous the empirical results reveal that there is a positive relationship between changes in economic freedom and equality the more a country increased its economic freedom between 1975 and 1985 the higher the level of equality around 1985 most important in this regard is trade liberalization and financial deregulation also there are signs that the level of economic freedom in 1985 is negatively related to the level of equality around that year plausibly because of less redistribution

does central bank independence really matter new evidence for developing countries using a new indicator abstract this paper provides a new indicator for central bank independence cbi based on the turnover rate of central bank governors for 82 developing countries over the period 1980 1989 using this new indicator it is concluded that this proxy for cbi is related to inflation only if the high inflation countries are included in the sample the view that both cbi and inflation are caused by effective opposition towards inflation is not supported using both the extreme bound analysis and sala i martin s method we do not find evidence that cbi is robustly related to economic growth

the political economy of growth a critical survey of the recent literature this article reviews the recent literature on the political economy of growth focusing on the research that has developed at the intersection of the endogenous growth literature and the new political economy it explores the relationship among four key variables economic growth and capital accumulation political instability political freedom and democratic institutions and income inequality

political sources of growth a critical note on measurement this note critically reviews the research on the link between political systems and economic growth empirical attempts to capture this patent relationship have been met with mixed success we conclude that the political variables used in these studies i e democracy and political instability do not adequately reflect the investors problem we suggest that a political variable that encompasses all kinds of potential discretionary state interventions would be more effective in explaining cross country differences in economic growth

ambiguity and the corporation group disagreement and underinvestment abstract we study a dynamic corporate investment problem where decisions have to be made collectively by a group of agents holding heterogeneous beliefs and adhering to a utilitarian governance mechanism in which each agent has a given influence in the decision in this setting we show that i group decisions are typically dynamically inconsistent ii dynamic inconsistency leads to inefficient underinvestment and iii the ability to trade securities among insiders or with outsiders may restore efficient investment decisions but it may in some cases lead to inefficient overinvestment our theory can help explain the empirical evidence on the effect of diversity of groups such as corporate boards on firms outcomes and more generally on the difference between group and individual behavior

explaining price policy bias in agriculture the calculus of support maximizing politicians a model is developed to explain observed patterns of policy intervention in agriculture we analyze the interaction between political support seeking politicians and supportsupplying citizens society consists of a rural and urban group we determine the effects on transfers of relative group size disparities in income endowments between groups and the deadweight loss of redistribution the framework advanced is an alternative to that of the interest group model and is used to explain for example why the export sectors in developing countries are taxed more and why the united kingdom is less adamant for higher price supports than germany

the institutional environment for infrastructure investment the empirical evidence that links political institutions to economic outcomes has grown dramatically in recent years however virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades this paper extends this empirical framework by performing a two century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over 100 countries the results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure copyright 2002 oxford university press

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

the consequences of regime type for public policy outputs most research has shown little association between regime type and public policy outputs in this article we employ a multivariate model and year by year data from 1960 1980 in latin america to analyze the relationship among regime type regime age and public policy the analysis shows regime type to be significantly associated with policy in five areas with regime age have an additional independent effect in several of these areas

are n 1 heads better than one the case of mutual fund managers abstract recent studies find that mutual funds exhibit differential and persistent performance which is frequently attributed to superior managerial decision making we extend the literature by examining the impact of the fund s management structure on performance outcomes specifically we examine directly whether superior outcomes in terms of risk adjusted returns may be explained by behavioral decision making theory that asserts that teams make better decisions than individuals empirical results are consistent with the classical decision making theory and the efficient market hypothesis

economic freedom and taxation is there a trade off in the locational competition between countries this paper investigates the relationshipbetween economic freedomand taxation we argue that an economicallyfree environment improvesthe attractiveness of a location which inturn enables governmentsto levy higher business taxes to test thishypothesis empirically weestimate the impact of economic freedom onthe national tax policy where the latter is measured by thecorporate tax revenue related tognp corporate tax ratio we utilize adata set of 46 developed and lessdeveloped countries between 1980 and 1997and find a clear confirmationof our hypothesis further a simulationanalysis reveals that the observedchange in economic freedom has equalizedthe international distributionof corporate tax ratios

private investment and democracy in latin america abstract this paper argues that the deterioration of latin american private investment in the 1980s may have been largely due to debt difficulties and not the concurrent wave of democratization after reviewing why more political systems may actually be conducive to investment we test an investment function for seven countries over 1973 1986 that includes traditional economic factors two debt measures and several political variables including measures of democracy worker power international monetary fund support and risk the results are quite congenial for our hypothesis under several reasonable alternative specifications for the economic determinants our democracy measure is positively signed and significant

economic freedom and growth decomposing the effects most studies of the relation between economic freedom andgrowth of gdp have found a positive relation one problem inthis area is the choice of economic freedom measure a singlemeasure does not reflect the complex economic environment anda highly aggregated index makes it difficult to draw policyconclusions in this paper we investigate what specific typesof economic freedom measures that are important for growth the robustness of the results is carefully analysed since thepotential problem with multicollinearity is one of thenegative effects of decomposing an index the results showthat economic freedom does matter for growth this does notmean that increasing economic freedom defined in generalterms is good for economic growth since some of thecategories in the index are insignificant and some of thesignificant variables have negative effects

political variables in cross country growth analysis the recent boom in cross country growth analysis has renewed the empirical interest in political sources of economic growth a large number of studies have tested political variables in growth regressions and a very heterogenous set of variables has been proposed to measure economically relevant differences in the political systems of countries this paper distinguishes five categories of relevant political variables democracy government stability political violence policy volatility and subjective perception of politics for each of these categories the specification testing method and results of the most relevant studies are presented and are critically discussed the paper concludes that measures of democracy are least successful and measures of policy volatility and subjective perception of politics most successful as explanatory variables in cross country growth regressions

the political economy of farmland ownership regulations and land prices one of the most ubiquitous forms of agricultural regulation is a restriction on farmland ownership one canadian example of a farmland ownership restriction is the saskatchewan farm security act fsa passed in 1974 the purpose of this article is to explain using a political economy framework why the fsa was implemented and to estimate the effect of the fsa on saskatchewan farmland values a present value pv model is used to estimate the relationship between land values rents and the regulation the hausman endogeneity test reveals that the regulation variable is endogenous with the land price the sign of the regulation variable is negative which fits with the theory i e the more stringent the regulation the lower the land value we estimate that the regulation lowered saskatchewan farmland prices by an average of 4 to 34 us acre depending on whether ordinary least squares ols or two stage least squares tsls is employed in the estimation over the period of 1974 2001