selective entry and auction design abstract this article examines how different auction designs perform when entry is endogenous and selective by which we mean that bidders with higher values are more likely to enter in a model where potential bidders are symmetric we show that three alternative designs can significantly outperform the standard auction with simultaneous and free entry when entry is selective when bidders are asymmetric we show that level of bid preference that maximizes a seller s revenues is significantly affected by the degree of selection we also describe recent empirical and econometric work that shows that the degree of selection can be identified and estimated using standard types of auction data

institutional determinants of labor reallocation in transition the transition process differed in the countries of the former soviet union fsu and those of central and eastern europe cee in terms of reallocation of labor real wage employment and output adjustment we sift through the theoretical and empirical literature to find an explanation for these diverging adjustment trajectories and conclude that they can be explained by the fact that the cee countries adopted social policies that upheld wages at the bottom of the distribution forcing the old sector to restructure or collapse while the fsu countries allowed wages to free fall not forcing the hand of the old sector

investigating bid preferences at low price sealed bid auctions with endogenous participation abstract at procurement auctions with bid preferences qualified firms are treated special a common policy involves scaling the bids of preferred firms by a discount factor for the purposes of evaluation only introducing such an asymmetry has three effects first preferred firms may inflate their bids yet still win the auction second nonpreferred firms may bid more aggressively than in the absence of preferences third the preference policy can affect participation for different cost distributions we solve numerically for the equilibrium bid functions under different discounts and then simulate behaviour our approach allows us to quantify the relative importance of the three effects we find that the participation effect is relatively unimportant and in most cases a positive cost minimizing preference rate exists download download video 34mb video 1

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

collective bargaining and the interindustry wage structure international evidence this paper studies collective bargaining and industry wage levels using microdata and quantile regression techniques for the united states britain west germany austria sweden and norway for the 1980s the united states has higher industry wage differentials and union wage effects than other countries with particularly large impacts at the bottom of the distribution european wage structures are more compressed at the bottom for both nonunion and union workers relative to the united states with larger differences for nonunion workers these findings suggest more coordination contract extension and spillover to nonunion workers and more binding industry wage floors outside the united states

when do auctions ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of scarce inputs we determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs a supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value because once the input is acquired it is unavailable to rivals an unfettered auction often ensures the welfare maximizing allocation of an input increment however it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies

indicative bidding an experimental analysis indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale furthermore there exist alternative bid procedures that in theory at least guarantee 100 efficiency and higher revenue for the seller we employ experiments to compare actual performance between indicative bidding and one of these alternative procedures the data shows that indicative bidding performs as well as the alternative procedure in terms of entry efficiency while having other characteristics that favor it over the alternative procedure our results provide an explanation for the widespread use of indicative bidding despite the potential problem identified in the equilibrium analysis

regulating bidder participation in auctions regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry we show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms a standard first price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism as an empirical application we estimate parameters from first price auctions with free entry for bridge building contracts in oklahoma and texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly

a re assessment of the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rates 1974 1990 abstract this paper uses cointegration techniques and error correction models to re examine the link between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials the results show that real exchange rates and real interest rates are nonstationary however they are not cointegrated with each other on the other hand the dynamic models indicate that there might be a long run relationship between these variables but this cannot be verified the final conclusion is that there is little empirical evidence in support of a systematic relationship and this result is robust across exchange rates time periods and measures of expected inflation

entry and competition effects in first price auctions theory and evidence from procurement auctions motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the texas department of transportation tdot we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications for the first time we show that even within an independent private value paradigm as the number of potential bidders increases bidders equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive and the expected procurement cost may rise because the entry effect is always positive and may dominate the negative competition effect we then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity and use the recently developed semi parametric bayesian estimation method to analyse the data we select the model that best fits the data and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the entry effect and the competition effect with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

microeconomic issues in the transition to a market economy evidence from developing countries suggests that a one sided preoccupation with macroeconomic issues may be unfortunate as macro stabilization programs tend to unravel in the presence of an inadequate micro adjustment for example kiguel and liviatan 1990 this finding is important because the socialist system introduced microeconomic distortions that probably transcend those observed in the third world the recent developments in poland yugoslavia and the soviet union also support the hypothesis that macro stabilization will be difficult to achieve in the transforming socialist economies in the absence of adequate micro adjustments in this paper i address what i consider to be the most important micro issues related to the transition from socialist to market economies i first summarize the initial microeconomic conditions and then describe the main changes that have taken place in the early stages of the transition finally i discuss the micro policy agenda that needs to be addressed if the transition is to be successful

strategic design under uncertain evaluations structural analysis of design build auctions i investigate firms competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of design build db auctions reviewers design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder s perspective leading luck to curtail differences in firms chances of winning i model bidders behavior and derive semiparametric identification of the model primitives uncertain evaluations worsen the expected price of design quality and exacerbate an auctioneer s uncertainty in auction outcomes a simple adjustment in the auction mechanism may completely shut down the impact of uncertain evaluations on bidding incentives restoring efficient allocations of projects

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

auctions with selective entry abstract we consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the arbitrarily selective as model we characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 and levin and smith 1994 to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry we also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency showing that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher than efficient reservation prices and higher than efficient entry fees

changing beliefs and systematic rational forecast errors with evidence from foreign exchange this paper addresses a new interpretation to the appearance in the early 1980s of systematic errors in forecasting the dollar exchange rate following a change in the process of a fundamental variable market participants revise their beliefs about the process using bayes rule since the market does not immediately recognize the change forecast errors are on average wrong during a period when the market is rationally learning for conservative parameter values the learning behavior of the dollar exchange rate in the early 1980s appears consistent with about half of the dollar s underprediction implied by the forward market copyright 1989 by american economic association

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

when should sellers use auctions the simultaneous bid auction is a standard method for sellers to solicit offers from buyers a simple alternative is for a seller to ask buyers to make offers sequentially if it is costly for buyers to participate the sequential mechanism will tend to be more efficient than the simultaneous auction because later potential buyers can condition their participation decisions on earlier bids however the sequential mechanism s greater efficiency may not produce higher revenues because while the possibility of deterring later potential entrants can lead early bidders to bid aggressively the fact that later firms might be deterred will tend to reduce revenues the relative revenue performance of the mechanisms will therefore depend on whether the threat of potential future competition which can raise bids in the sequential mechanism is more valuable to the seller than actual competition which will tend to be greater in the simultaneous auction the relative revenue performance of these alternative mechanisms has direct implications for how assets should be sold in the case of how to structure the sale of corporations this question has attracted attention from practitioners and commentators since the delaware supreme court s 1986 revlon decision charged a board overseeing the sale of a company with the duty of getting the best price for the stockholders revlon v mcandrews and forbes holdings 1986 in practice

costly auction entry royalty payments and the optimality of asymmetric designs abstract we analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash with sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different ex ante probabilities when bidders are ex ante identical higher royalty rates which tie payments more closely to bidder valuations increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auction design further raising revenues when bidders differ ex ante in entry costs the seller favors the low cost entrant whereas when bidders have different valuation distributions the seller favors the weaker bidder if entry costs are low but not if they are high higher royalty rates cause the seller to favor the weaker bidder by less and the strong bidder by more

identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity in many procurement auctions the bidders unobserved costs depend both on a common shock and on idiosyncratic private information assuming a multiplicative structure i derive sufficient conditions under which the model is identified and propose a non parametric estimation procedure that results in uniformly consistent estimators of the cost components distributions the estimation procedure is applied to data from michigan highway procurement auctions private information is estimated to account for 34 of the variation in bidders costs it is shown that accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity has important implications for the evaluation of the distribution of rents efficiency and optimal auction design

banking on currency forecasts how predictable is change in money abstract the paper examines the predictive performance of four structural exchange rate models using both parametric and nonparametric techniques error correction versions of the models are fit so that plausible long run elasticities can be imposed on the fundamental variables of each model a variety of model evaluation statistics are reported our findings confirm that fundamental exchange rate models forecast no better than a random walk model for short term prediction horizons for longer horizons error correction terms can explain exchange rate movements significantly better than a no change forecast for a subset of the models and currencies we consider

increasing competition and the winner s curse evidence from procurement we assess empirically the effects of the winner s curse which in common value auctions counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases first we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders preferences have both common and private value components and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model second we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the state of new jersey for a large subset of these auctions we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies in this setting then asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

markets for communist human capital returns to education and experience in the czech republic and slovakia this research examines how the earnings structure in the czech republic and slovakia changed after the collapse of those countries communist governments tests of four similar micro data sets show that returns to education rose significantly with the transition to non communist governments for example returns to education rose from 2 4 to 5 2 for czech men between 1984 and 1993 though women had in general higher returns to education than men did returns for men increased more with the regime change among both sexes those with academic secondary education experienced particularly large earnings increases returns to experience on the other hand fell earnings structure changes appear to have been larger in the czech republic than in slovakia probably because transition occurred more rapidly and deeply in the former

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

a re examination of the exchange rate interest differential relationship evidence from germany and japan abstract this paper presents empirical evidence which links the exchange rate interest differential relation over the recent floating rate period using johansen s cointegration test we find a long run relationship between real exchange rates and expected real interest differentials in addition empirical evidence is provided to show that our error correction framework leads to real exchange rate forecasts that are superior to those generated by a random walk forecasting model moreover this superiority in out of sample predictability is supported statistically by the test of diebold and mariano

returns to human capital under the communist wage grid and during the transition to a market economy we estimate returns to human capital during communism and the transition using data on 2 284 men in the czech republic we show a extremely low and constant rates of return to education under the communist wage grid and dramatic increases in transition which do not differ by firm ownership b radical changes in returns to several fields of study and sheepskin effects in both regimes c identical wage experience profile in both regimes d similar 1996 returns to human capital obtained in communism and in transition and e changes in the interindustry wage structure a decomposition of the variance of wages finds individuals unobservable effects from communism to persist into transition but most of the variance is due to unobservable effects introduced in the transition

understanding the empirical literature on purchasing power parity the post bretton woods era abstract this paper argues that the empirical failure of statistical tests of ppp in post bretton woods data is largely due to the low power of the tests employed this result is demonstrated using monte carlo experiments on the size and power of different testing procedures a new procedure based on horvath and watson econometric theory 11 pp 984 1014 1995 has greater power than previous approaches using the horvath watson procedure we find moderate evidence in favor of ppp in the post bretton woods era

the bidder exclusion effect we introduce a new simple to compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric conditionally independent private values the test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics this object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers we illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent