decentralization and corruption evidence from u s federal transfer programs while some recent evidence suggests that more decentralization is associated with reduced corruption no empirical work has examined whether different types of decentraliz ation have differential effects on corruption the theoretical literature has emphasized that expenditure decentralization will only be effective if accompanied by the devolution of rev enue generation to local governments in this paper we examine this hypothesis empirically by studying the mismatch between revenue generation and expenditure in u s states larger federal transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public office supporting the theory that soft budget constraints created by federal transfers are potentially problematic

liquidity and exchange rates abstract we present a two country extension of lucas s 1988a work on cash in advance constraints in asset markets in the model there is temporary separation between the goods and asset markets and money is used for transactions in both we first find that the exchange rate level depends on the share of money used for asset transactions a greater share appreciates the currency second stochastic open market operations increasing the domestic bonds supply appreciate the domestic currency third the liquidity effects of bond supply shocks cause an excess volatility of nominal exchange rates even when their fundamental value is constant

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

an exploration in the theory of exchange rate regimes three exchange rate regimes a float a one sided peg and a cooperative peg are evaluated and compared in terms of efficiency and welfare levels the framework of analysis embodies country specific monies with the money of each country being used to transact in its commodity markets and its currency denominated bonds welfare levels depend only on consumption levels in the presence of perfect foresight all equilibrium allocations are pareto efficient in a floating exchange rate regime the perfect foresight equilibrium allocation coincides with an equilibrium of a costless barter economy the same result holds in a one sided peg if the pegging country s exchange rate stabilizing authority breaks even over time in a cooperative peg regime there is a different equilibrium allocation for each combination of exchange rate levels and monetary policies problems of policy coordination and conflicts in desired monetary policies are discussed

do giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal armed conflicts we use new data to examine the effects of giant oilfield discoveries around the world since 1946 on average these discoveries increase per capita oil production and oil exports by up to 50 percent but these giant oilfield discoveries also have a dark side they increase the incidence of internal armed conflict by about 5 8 percentage points this increased incidence of conflict due to giant oilfield discoveries is especially high for countries that had already experienced armed conflicts or coups in the decade prior to discovery

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity i study a simple widely applicable approach to handling the initial conditions problem in dynamic nonlinear unobserved effects models rather than attempting to obtain the joint distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous variables i propose finding the distribution conditional on the initial value and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables the approach is flexible and results in simple estimation strategies for at least three leading dynamic nonlinear models probit tobit and poisson regression i treat the general problem of estimating average partial effects and show that simple estimators exist for important special cases copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

natural resources decentralization and risk sharing can resource booms unify nations previous studies imply that a positive regional fiscal shock such as a resource boom strengthens the desire for separation in this paper we present a new and opposite perspective we construct a model of endogenous fiscal decentralization that builds on two key notions a trade off between risk sharing and heterogeneity and a positive association between resource booms and risk the model shows that a resource windfall causes the nation to centralize as a mechanism to either share risk and or prevent local capture depending on the relative bargaining power of the central and regional governments we provide cross country empirical evidence for the main hypotheses finding that resource booms i decrease the level of fiscal decentralization with no u shaped patterns ii cause the former due to risk sharing incentives primarily when regional governments are relatively strong and iii have no effect on political decentralization

currency prices terms of trade and interest rates a general equilibrium asset pricing cash in advance approach currency prices terms of trade and interest rates a general equilibrium asset pricing cash in advance approach

multinational oil companies and the adoption of sustainable development a resource based and institutional theory interpretation of adoption heterogeneity sustainable development is often framed as a social issue to which corporations should pay attention because it offers both opportunities and challenges through the use of institutional theory and the resource based view of the firm we shed some light on why more than 20 years after sustainable development was first introduced we see neither the adoption of this business model as dominant nor its converse that is the total abandonment of the model as unworkable and unprofitable we focus on multinational corporations mncs because they were among the organizations first called to take action in order to illustrate the institutional pressures mncs face and their strategic response to these pressures we analysed four major oil and gas multinationals subject to similar sustainable development pressures climate change biodiversity renewable energy development and social investment we argue that normative and coercive isomorphism does not occur at the global level because sustainable development is largely a stakeholder driven rather than a broad social pressure that is host country interpretation of sustainable development pressures varies across an mnc s subsidiary network based on the analysis of the four major mncs annual reports from 2000 to 2005 we argue that mimetic isomorphism may occur but since it implies the use of complex and intangible resources mimetic processes are slow rare and discretionary

liquidity exchange rates and business cycles abstract this paper presents a two country two good two currency model to study the role of liquidity effects in exchange rate determination and the international transmission of economic fluctuations the model provides an exchange rate equation which is different from the simple purchasing powerparity law of exchange rate determination both monetary injections and real disturbances can lead to exchange rate fluctuations and comovements of interest rates prices and output of the two economies whether the covariances of variables in the two countries are positive negative or zero depends critically upon the substitutability of the two consumption goods in consumers preferences

floating exchange rates with liquidity constraints in financial markets abstract we construct a two country model in which there exist cash in advance constraints in commodity as well as in asset markets the seller s currency is used for transactions in commodity markets and the lender s money is used for transactions in the bond markets the exchange rate equation that emerges from this structure has a new feature it exhibits a bias towards depreciation of the borrowers currency we describe the equilibrium dynamics of this type of a world economy and show that it may exhibit cyclical movements

on the determinants of fiscal centralization theory and evidence abstract this paper presents a simple model that unifies most of the results of the literature on fiscal federalism the model describes an economy characterized by two levels of government one public good and a private good the predictions of the model are tested by using a new set of measures of fiscal centralization the main findings are that country size income per capita ethnic fractionalization and level of democracy are negatively correlated with the degree of fiscal centralization the model is tested using ols tobit and semi parametric estimators the paper also shows that the variables included in the regression are helpful in the prediction of changes in the level of centralization

liquidity capital controls and exchange rates abstract we present a two country extension of lucas 1990 work on how cash in advance constraints in asset markets affect the pricing of financial assets in the model there is some degree of separation between the goods markets and the asset markets and money is used for transactions in both markets the main results of the paper are the following first the equilibrium level of the exchange rate depends on the share of money used for asset transactions a greater share corresponds to a more appreciated currency second capital controls in the form of taxes on foreign asset acquisitions tend to appreciate the exchange rate third the maturity structure of the public debt affects the equilibrium exchange rate in particular a move towards a longer maturity structure will tend to depreciate the exchange rate jel 31

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

international interest rates exchange rates and the stochastic structure of supply in a dual currency flexible exchange rate model both nominal and real foreign exchange premia depend on investor risk attitudes consumption parameters and the stochastic structure of currency and commodity supplies when supplies are random their joint correlation structure determines the sign of the premia if the money supplies are identically distributed then all foreign exchange premia regardless of the currency of denomination are zero a positive correlation between the value of a country s currency and its nominal interest rate need not indicate real interest rate movements relative bond prices can be negatively correlated with the terms of trade recently there has been a great deal of interest in the construction and use of general equilibrium models of an international economy subject to random disturbances 1 however with the exceptions of stulz 1984 domowitz and hakkio 1985 hodrick and srivastava 1986 and stockman and svensson 1987 little effort has been devoted to expressing the relationships examined in these models in terms of parameters describing the underlying stochastic processes of the exogenous variables 2 stockman and svensson incorporated international capital flows into the model of svensson 1985 and calculated covariances between investment the current account the exchange rate and the terms of trade in terms of exogenous money and commodity supplies focusing more on financial market issues domowitz and hakkio and hodrick and srivastava simplified the case in advance model of lucas 1982 by assuming that the exogenous variables are independently lognormal and that investors have loglinear utility functions a procedure which allowed them to relate the premium required on forward exchange contracts to money supply variances stulz obtained similar results in a continuous time model where real money balances enter the utility function this paper employs a model similar to that developed by domowitz and hakkio 1985 and hodrick and srivastava 1986 but its emphasis and objectives are quite different those authors were concerned only with demonstrating that a time varying risk premium is a theoretical possibility prior to conducting a series of empirical tests only loosely related to the model itself consequently they did

the role of saving and investment in exchange rate determination under alternative monetary mechanisms abstract we argue that the demand for national currencies depends on existing payment arrangements for imports and exports therefore exchange rate movements depend on these arrangement as a result the relationship between exchange rate movements and various macroeconomic aggregates like saving and investment depend on what we call the monetary mechanism these points are explicitly demonstrated by studying two extreme monetary mechanisms one in which all payments are done with the seller s currency and one in which all payments are done with the buyer s currency

monetary policy liquidity and foreign exchange markets an exploration abstract this paper explores empirically the fluctuations of money demand arising from financial markets fluctuations in financial markets liquidity are reflected in interest rates and asset returns the paper uses daily data on the swiss franc and other currencies from january 1 1980 until december 31 1987 and is based on a priori knowledge on the timing of liquidity shocks in the empirical analysis i ask whether at the time liquidity shocks occur abnormal rates of return can be observed in the foreign exchange markets

dynamics of a floating exchange rate regime we study the full equilibrium dynamics of a two country world economy with a floating exchange rate traded and nontraded goods and explicit modeling of the use of money the resulting exchange rate equation depends on several details of the economic structure such as the supply structure and propensities to spend on various goods although real exchange rate movements have the usual association with the current account the ordinary exchange rate may appreciate or depreciate when there are deficits on current account even when the quantities of money do not change deviations from purchasing power parity and the fisher equation are shown to be the rule rather than the exception