balancing terrorism and natural disasters defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort in this paper we apply game theory to identify equilibrium strategies for both attacker and defender in a fully endogenous model of resource allocation for countering terrorism and natural disasters the key features of our model include balancing protection from terrorism and natural disasters and describing the attacker choice by a continuous level of effort rather than a discrete choice i e attack or not interestingly in a sequential game increased defensive investment can lead an attacker to either increase his level of effort to help compensate for the reduced probability of damage from an attack or decrease his level of effort because attacking has become less profitable this can either reduce or increase the effectiveness of investments in protection from intentional attack and can therefore affect the relative desirability of investing in protection from natural disasters

does environmental policy stringency foster innovation and productivity in oecd countries abstract in this paper we test the weak and strong versions of the porter hypothesis using data from 14 oecd countries over the period 1990 2011 our analysis makes two contributions to the literature on the topic first we use a newly released environmental policy stringency index eps provided by the oecd as an indicator for the stringency of environmental regulations which addresses the multi dimensionality of environmental regulations second as a suitable method to deal with asymmetric distributions of the dependent variables we use a panel quantile regression model which allow us to test whether or not the hypothesis holds for all quantiles of the distribution of the corresponding dependent variable the findings indicate that in the short term a more strict environmental policy is associated with an increase in the number of patent applications and in total factor productivity tfp for the highest quantiles of the distribution of patents and for all quantiles of tfp respectively moreover environmental stringency has a positive effect on research and development expenditures rd only in the lower quantiles 10 25 in the long term the eps is affecting rd patents and tfp in all quantiles and hence more stringent environmental regulations promote cleaner production processes that could help improving energy efficiency

technical change external economies and the porter hypothesis abstract michael porter introduces the idea that environmental regulations may benefit affected firms this paper derives results consistent with porter s hypothesis by employing a general equilibrium framework with a large number of agents external economies of scale in production and discrete changes in technology the model shows that endogenous technical change makes porter s hypothesis feasible however a policy that produces results consistent with porter s hypothesis is not necessarily optimal

optimal healthcare decisions the importance of the covariates in cost effectiveness analysis abstract this paper deals with the decision problem of choosing an optimal medical treatment among m possible candidates when the states of nature are the net benefit of the treatments and regression models for the treatment cost and effectiveness are assumed in this setting a crucial step in the analysis is the construction of the population subgroups sharing characteristics specified by the covariates so that optimal decisions are now not for the whole population of patients but for patient population subgroups we argue that the existing formulations of population subgroups in the literature are too rigid and unrealistic for real applications and instead we formulate the population subgroups on the base of selected influential covariates the bayesian variable selector we use is an optimal one under the 0 1 loss function which means choosing the subset of covariates having the highest posterior probabilities based on the so called intrinsic priors an objective bayesian tool that exhibits an excellent performance for each population subgroup we study the optimal bayesian decisions for two different utility functions one optimal decision is that obtained maximizing the expected net benefit and the other maximizing the expected number of times that the treatment having the highest net benefit is chosen illustrations of the procedure for real data show that the subset of influential covariates may vary across treatments subgroup optimal treatments are derived and compared with those given by preceding methods

budgetary policies and available actions a generalisation of decision rules for allocation and research decisions the allocation problem in health care can be characterised as a mathematical programming problem but attempts to incorporate uncertainty in costs and effect have suffered from important limitations a two stage stochastic mathematical programming formulation is developed and applied to a numerical example to explore and demonstrate the implications of this more general and comprehensive approach the solution to the allocation problem for different budgets budgetary policies and available actions are then demonstrated this analysis is used to evaluate different budgetary policies and examine the adequacy of standard decision rules in cost effectiveness analysis the research decision is then considered alongside the allocation problem this more general formulation demonstrates that the value of further research depends on i the budgetary policy in place ii the realisations revealed during the budget period iii remedial actions that may be available and iv variability in parameters values

environmental regulation and competitiveness empirical evidence on the porter hypothesis from european manufacturing sectors abstract this paper investigates the weak and strong versions of porter hypothesis ph focusing on the manufacturing sectors of 17 european countries between 1997 and 2009 the hypothesis that well crafted and well enforced regulation would benefit both the environment and the firm was originally proposed by porter 1991 and porter and van der linde 1995 to date the literature has analyzed the impact of environmental regulation on innovation and on productivity mostly in separate analyses and focusing on the usa the few existing contributions on europe study the effect of environmental regulation either on green innovation or on performance indicators such as exports we instead look at overall innovation and productivity impacts first focusing on overall innovative activity allows us to account for potential opportunity costs of induced innovations second productivity impacts are arguably the most relevant indicators for the strong ph as a proxy of environmental policy stringency we use pollution abatement and control expenditures pace one of the few sectoral level indicators available we remedy upon its main drawback namely potential endogeneity by adopting an instrumental variable estimation approach we find evidence of a positive impact of environmental regulation on the output of innovation activity as proxied by patents thus providing support in favor of the weak ph this result is in line with most of the literature on the other front we find no evidence in favor of the strong ph as productivity appears to be unaffected by the degree of pollution control and abatement efforts

stochastic models for strategic resource allocation in nonprofit foreclosed housing acquisitions abstract increased rates of mortgage foreclosures in the u s have had devastating social and economic impacts during and after the 2008 financial crisis as part of the response to this problem nonprofit organizations such as community development corporations cdcs have been trying to mitigate the negative impacts of mortgage foreclosures by acquiring and redeveloping foreclosed properties we consider the strategic resource allocation decisions for these organizations which involve budget allocations to different neighborhoods under cost and return uncertainty based on interactions with a cdc we develop stochastic integer programming based frameworks for this decision problem and assess the practical value of the models by using real world data both policy related and computational analyses are performed and several insights such as the trade offs between different objectives and the efficiency of different solution approaches are presented

on the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system first mover advantage vs robustness abstract it is commonly accepted in the literature that when facing with a strategic terrorist the government can be better off by manipulating the terrorist s target selection with exposing her defense levels and thus moving first however the impact of terrorist s private information may significantly affect such government s first mover advantage which has not been extensively studied in the literature to explore the impact of asymmetry in terrorist s attributes between government and terrorist on defense equilibrium we propose a model in which the government chooses between disclosure sequential game and secrecy simultaneous game of her defense system our analysis shows that the government s first mover advantage in a sequential game is considerable only when both government and terrorist share relatively similar valuation of targets in contrast we interestingly find that the government no longer benefits from the first mover advantage by exposing her defense levels when the degree of divergence between government and terrorist valuation of targets is high this is due to the robustness of defense system under secrecy in the sense that all targets should be defended in equilibrium irrespective of how the terrorist valuation of targets is different to government we identify two phenomena that lead to this result first when the terrorist holds a significantly higher valuation of targets than the government s belief the government may waste her budget in a sequential game by over investing on the high valued targets second when the terrorist holds a significantly lower valuation of targets the government may incur a higher expected damage in a sequential game because of not defending the low valued targets finally we believe that this paper provides some novel insights to homeland security resource allocation problems

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

the irrelevance of inference a decision making approach to the stochastic evaluation of health care technologies the literature which considers the statistical properties of cost effectiveness analysis has focused on estimating the sampling distribution of either an incremental cost effectiveness ratio or incremental net benefit for classical inference however it is argued here that rules of inference are arbitrary and entirely irrelevant to the decisions which clinical and economic evaluations claim to inform decisions should be based only on the mean net benefits irrespective of whether differences are statistically significant or fall outside a bayesian range of equivalence failure to make decisions in this way by accepting the arbitrary rules of inference will impose costs which can be measured in terms of resources or health benefits forgone the distribution of net benefit is only relevant to deciding whether more information is required a framework for decision making and establishing the value of additional information is presented which is consistent with the decision rules in cea this framework can distinguish the simultaneous but conceptually separate steps of deciding which alternatives should be chosen given existing information from the question of whether more information should be acquired it also ensures that the type of information acquired is driven by the objectives of the health care system is consistent with the budget constraint on service provision and that research is designed efficiently

the effects of environmental regulation on china s total factor productivity an empirical study of carbon intensive industries abstract in this paper we first identify china s carbon intensive industries ciis by constructing a carbon intensive index taking both the scale and intensity of co2 emission into account then the strong version of porter hypothesis ph i e the positive effect of environmental regulation on total factor productivity tfp of china s ciis is tested in order to overcome the endogenous issue of model specification two stage least squares 2sls method is employed the results indicate that there is a significant inverted u shape relationship between environmental regulation intensity and the tfp of china s ciis demonstrating the inexistence of strong ph effect in a long run and the impact of environmental regulation on ciis is changing gradually from innovation offsets to compliance costs in addition optimal environmental regulation intensities for different ciis are also studied according to their locations on the inverted u shaped curve the production and supply of electric power and heat power industry has exceeded the optimal environmental regulation intensity while the remaining ciis have not reached their inflection points therefore specific policy proposals should be formulated according to the different stages of environmental regulation in various industries

environmental innovation and environmental performance abstract by estimating a simultaneous panel data model of environmental innovation and toxic air pollution this paper identifies bi directional causal links between the two we study a panel of 127 manufacturing industries over the period 1989 2004 pollutant emissions are an implicit measure of policy stringency and environmental patent counts are used to measure environmental innovation after accounting for the joint endogeneity we find that environmental innovation is an important driver of reductions in us toxic emissions conversely we find that tightened pollution targets induce environmental innovation however our estimates indicate that the environmental policy multiplier the proportionate contribution of induced innovation to long run emission reduction is small

impact of environmental regulations on trade in the main eu countries conflict or synergy in an increasingly integrated world with declining trade barriers environmental regulations can have a decisive role in shaping countries comparative advantages the conventional wisdom about environmental protection is that it comes at an additional cost on firms imposed by the government which may erode their global competitiveness however this paradigm has been challenged by some analysts in particular porter 1991 and porter and van der linde 1995 argue that pollution is often associated with a waste of resources and that more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may over compensate for the costs of complying with these policies this is known as the porter hypothesis while there is a broad empirical literature on the impact of trade on environment the empirical literature on the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows is relatively scarce very heterogeneous and presents mixed results the innovative feature of this paper is its attempts to estimate in a gravity setting augmented with a proxi of environmental stringency the impact of three major multilateral environmental agreements meas on 15 eu countries bilateral exports according to our estimates in the period 1988 2008 to be member of meas had a positive average impact on eu15 bilateral exports this evidence can be partly explained by a possible trade diversion effect with respect to countries that did not sign meas and a corresponding trade creation effect among members of the environmental agreements furthermore evidence coming from interaction effects estimates seems to show that for exporting countries having signed the unfccc and the montreal agreements partly mitigates by the amount of the estimated coefficient the negative impact of having a relatively more stringent environmental regulation on bilateral trade this result could have important policy implications for the future international trade environmental negotiations

the contagion effect of foreclosed properties although previous research shows that prices of homes in neighborhoods with foreclosures are lower than those in neighborhoods without foreclosures it remains unclear whether the lower prices are the result of a general decline in neighborhood values or whether foreclosures reduce the prices of nearby non distressed sales through a contagion effect we provide robust evidence of a contagion discount by simultaneously estimating the local price trend and the incremental price impact of nearby foreclosures at its peak the discount is roughly 1 per nearby foreclosed property the discount diminishes rapidly as the distance to the distressed property increases the contagion discount grows from the onset of distress through the foreclosure sale and then stabilizes this pattern is consistent with the contagion effect being the visual externality associated with deferred maintenance and neglect

tightening environmental standards the benefit cost or the no cost paradigm ms ff ichael porter and claas van der linde have written a paper that is interesting and to us at least somewhat astonishing it is a defense of environmental regulation indeed an invitation to more stringent regulation that makes essentially no reference to the social benefits of such regulation this approach contrasts starkly with the methods that economists and other policy analysts have traditionally used when assessing environmental or other regulatory programs the traditional approach consists of comparing the beneficial effects of regulation with the costs that must be borne to secure these benefits for environmental regulation the social benefits include the reductions in morbidity or premature mortality that can accompany cleaner air the enhanced recreational opportunities that can result from water quality improvements the increased land values that might attend the cleanup of a hazardous waste site the enhanced vitality of aquatic ecosystems that might follow reductions in agricultural pesticide use or any of the other potentially significant benefits associated with tighter standards from this benefit cost approach emerges the standard tradeoff discussed in virtually every economics textbook porter and van der linde deny the validity of this approach to the analysis of environmental regulation claiming it to be an artifact of what they see as a static mindset in their view economists have failed to appreciate the capacity of

mathematical programming for the efficient allocation of health care resources previous discussions of methods for the efficient allocation of health care resources subject to a budget constraint have relied on unnecessarily restrictive assumptions this paper makes use of established optimization techniques to demonstrate that a general mathematical programming framework can accommodate much more complex information regarding returns to scale partial and complete indivisibility and program interdependence methods are also presented for incorporating ethical constraints into the resource allocation process including explicit identification of the cost of equity

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple period attacker defender signaling game abstract in this paper we apply game theory to model strategies of secrecy and deception in a multiple period attacker defender resource allocation and signaling game with incomplete information at each period we allow one of the three possible types of defender signals truthful disclosure secrecy and deception we also allow two types of information updating the attacker updates his knowledge about the defender type after observing the defender s signals and also after observing the result of a contest if one occurs in any given time period our multiple period model provides insights into the balance between capital and expense for defensive investments and the effects of defender private information such as defense effectiveness target valuations and costs and also shows that defenders can achieve more cost effective security through secrecy and deception possibly lasting more than one period in a multiple period game this paper helps to fill a significant gap in the literature in particular to our knowledge no past work has studied defender secrecy and deception in a multiple period game moreover we believe that the solution approach developed and applied in this paper would prove useful in other types of multiple period games

multi objective stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with incomplete information abstract water supply networks are infrastructures pivotal to economic development and living standards of which the increasing complexity and interdependencies have brought challenges for the protection and enhancement of water supplies we address the problem on how to defend water supply networks with hydraulic characteristics against an interdictor by building a multi objective stackelberg game model with incomplete information in this model the defender and the interdictor both considered as rational players choose a subset of network components to defend or interdict based on their payoffs the defender with incomplete information on the interdictor s efforts initiates to trade off the two objectives of maximizing the expected network satisfaction rate and of minimizing defense efforts whereas the interdictor with no information on network operational capacity follows to trade off the objectives of minimizing the expected network efficiency and of minimizing interdiction efforts the algorithm of determining the final optimal defense strategies is presented which consists of three steps 1 develop the strategy sets by the assessments of network vulnerability and resilience 2 analyze the equilibrium through a nested heuristic genetic algorithm and 3 determine the final optimal defense strategy based on the minimax regret approach a case study of d town water supply network demonstrates the practical significance of the proposed approach furthermore the impacts of the incomplete information are analyzed to provide suggestions on the defense strategy making

a game theoretic model for resource allocation among countermeasures with multiple attributes abstract we study a strategic two player sequential game between an attacker and defender the defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets the attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack this paper proposes a model for determining optimal resource allocation by combining game theory with a simple multi attribute utility model given a set of possible attributes representing goals or preferences we allow each player to choose a weight for each attribute where the subset of attributes with nonzero weights represents that player s preferences every countermeasure is given a score for its effectiveness at both mitigating the effects of an attack in terms of each attribute and reducing the probability of the success of an attack furthermore the consequences of each possible attack are scored in terms of each attribute the multi attribute utility aspect of this model uses these scores along with the players weights to form the basis of the utility or disutility for each player we find that i the zero sum game where the attacker s and defender s weights are identical results in the worst losses for the defender ii in general cases the defender s equilibrium strategy has the result of making the attacker indifferent between multiple attacks and iii the use of target independent countermeasures i e countermeasures which operate at national levels as opposed to operating at differing levels for each target can increase the cost effectiveness of countermeasures

productivity growth and environmental regulation in mexican and u s food manufacturing many argued during the nafta debate that trade liberalization would favor mexican over u s food processors especially because of lax environmental laws south of the border we find through an examination of profit functions that productivity growth in mexico has outstripped that in the united states suggesting free trade indeed will benefit mexican suppliers u s pollution regulations have had no impact on the profitability or productivity of u s food manufacturing in contrast mexico s swiftly rising environmental standards have enhanced food processors productivity growth corroborating the porter hypothesis pollution law therefore has favored mexican over u s food processing but for reasons few had anticipated

a theoretical foundation of the porter hypothesis abstract this letter shows that by reducing agency costs an environmental regulation may enhance pollution reducing innovation while at the same time increasing firms private benefit

coordinating supply chains with competition capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing abstract this paper motivated by the experiences of a major us based semiconductor manufacturer presents an integrated model of incentive problems arising in forecasting and capacity allocation our model involves multiple product managers and multiple manufacturing managers who forecast the means of their respective demand and capacity distributions a central coordinator is responsible for allocating capacities to product lines when these distributions are unknown to the central coordinator and capacity is scarce the managers misrepresent their forecasts a product manager inflates his forecast to gain a greater allocation of the capacity a manufacturing manager deflates his forecast to cover for the uncertainties in production we propose a game theoretic model and design a mechanism a bonus scheme for all managers and an allocation rule to allocate realized capacity to the product managers that elicits truthful reporting by all managers the results herein show that the structure of the truth eliciting bonus schemes is rather simple with easily calculable parameters we also show that large classes of allocation rules including the current allocation practice of the firm are manipulable a bonus is often required for elicitation of truthful information we synthesize the implications of our results for the practitioners

a robust optimization approach to inventory theory we propose a general methodology based on robust optimization to address the problem of optimally controlling a supply chain subject to stochastic demand in discrete time this problem has been studied in the past using dynamic programming which suffers from dimensionality problems and assumes full knowledge of the demand distribution the proposed approach takes into account the uncertainty of the demand in the supply chain without assuming a specific distribution while remaining highly tractable and providing insight into the corresponding optimal policy it also allows adjustment of the level of robustness of the solution to trade off performance and protection against uncertainty an attractive feature of the proposed approach is its numerical tractability especially when compared to multidimensional dynamic programming problems in complex supply chains as the robust problem is of the same difficulty as the nominal problem that is a linear programming problem when there are no fixed costs and a mixed integer programming problem when fixed costs are present furthermore we show that the optimal policy obtained in the robust approach is identical to the optimal policy obtained in the nominal case for a modified and explicitly computable demand sequence in this way we show that the structure of the optimal robust policy is of the same base stock character as the optimal stochastic policy for a wide range of inventory problems in single installations series systems and general supply chains preliminary computational results are very promising

forced sales and house prices the market for housing differs in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals this implies that the price at which a house is sold can be influenced not only by general supply and demand conditions but also by idiosyncratic factors including the urgency of the sale and the effects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house first houses are productive only when people are living in them owning an empty house is equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a financial asset second houses are fragile assets that need maintenance and are vulnerable to van dalism unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable and expensive to protect third short term rental contracts involve high transactions costs resulting from the moving costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against damage fourth houses are expensive indivisible and heterogeneous assets each house has certain unique characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain poten tial buyers and not to others so selling a house requires matching it with an appro priate buyer because of the high costs of intermediation in housing this task is normally undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer fifth most home owners must finance their purchases using mortgages collateralized debt contracts that transfer home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the homeowner defaults the expansion of mortgage credit in the early 2000s and the recent decline in house prices have led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006 foreclosures transfer houses to financial institutions which must maintain and pro tect them until they can be sold foreclosed houses are likely to sell at low prices both because they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure pro cess and because financial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly in a liquid market an asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price but

innovation in pollution control comparisons of the various institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources effluent fees effluent control subsidies marketable permits and direct command and control regulation have usually focused on their static efficiency properties and institutional feasibility e g dales 1968 zerbe 1970 baumol and oates 1975 kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 spence and weitzman 1978 russell 1979 a relatively neglected area has been the study of how each arrangement influences innovation in pollution control a few studies e g kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 russell 1979 have casually claimed that the control methods that rely on economic incentives provide superior incentives for innovation but there have been few systematic studies of the question this paper provides a simple model of pollution control innovation by a profitmaximizing polluter who is subject to the various control methods the consequences of the methods will be explored in three major contexts first we assume that the polluter and the innovation is a small enough part of the overall pollution problem so that none of the important marginal conditions are changed by the innovation second we assume that the polluter and the innovation are important enough so that marginal conditions are changed by the innovations but that the governmental authority determining pollution control incentives or levels fails to make the appropriate adjustments third we again assume that the innovation causes marginal conditions to change but in this case the governmental authority makes the appropriate adjustments we use the term ratcheting to describe this last phenomenon in all cases we assume that the innovating polluter correctly predicts the reactions of the governmental authority and bases his innovation decisions on that prediction a profit maximizing entrepreneur would normally be expected to adopt any innovation that promised gains present discounted value to him in excess of initial

linking induced technological change and environmental regulation evidence from patenting in the u s auto industry a b s t r a c t this article uses a carefully screened patent database in automobile emission control technologies and a detailed regulatory action analysis to examine firms innovation in response to u s technology forcing auto emissions standards enacted between 1970 and 1998 the study finds that under the performance based technology forcing pbtf auto emissions regulations both automakers and compo nent suppliers innovated and introduced more advanced emission control technologies for automobile applications the study also shows that stringent pbtf regulation temporarily induced domestic u s firms to become more innovative than foreign firms that operated in the local u s market during the early phase of the regulatory regime findings of this research strongly imply that government intervention in the form of technology forcing regulation can drive firms to invest in technological innovation

determinants of environmental innovation in us manufacturing industries abstract this paper provides new evidence on the determinants of environmental innovation we employ panel data models to study how environmental innovation by us manufacturing industries responded to changes in pollution abatement expenditures and regulatory enforcement during the period 1983 through 1992 we find that 1 environmental innovation as measured by the number of successful environmental patent applications granted to the industry responded to increases in pollution abatement expenditures however 2 increased monitoring and enforcement activities related to existing regulations did not provide any additional incentive to innovate we also find some empirical evidence that environmental innovation is more likely to occur in industries that are internationally competitive

optimal sequential investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty this paper presents a mathematical model of sequential investment behavior under conditions of uncertainty the model addresses the problem of an investor with access to a limited pool of capital who makes sequential decisions on long lasting investments under uncertainty as to the timing or the quality of future opportunities we derive optimal investment strategies for the cases where the return from investment is a convex or concave function we present closed form solutions for commonly adopted return functions and we evaluate how the optimal investment behavior should change when changes occur in the environment or the underlying probability distributions in addition we analyze three modifications of the problem the results presented in this paper extend previous results on investment behavior for long lasting irreversible decisions in addition some results are in accordance with existing ones from portfolio theory and or search theory

a blotto game with incomplete information we consider a blotto game with incomplete information a pure strategy symmetric monotonic bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed

dynamic portfolio selection of npd programs using marginal returns selecting program portfolios within a budget constraint is an important challenge in the management of new product development npd optimal portfolios are difficult to define because of the combinatorial complexity of project combinations however at the aggregate level of the strategic allocation of resources across product lines investment in a program is not an all or nothing decision but can beadjusted resulting in a higher or lower program benefit e g higher or lower quality in some cases resources can be adjusted even for individual projects with this insight one can usemarginal analysis to optimally allocate the scarce budget this article develops a dynamic model of resource allocation taking into account multiple interacting factors such as independent or correlated uncertain market payoffs that change over time increasing or decreasing returns from the npd investment carry over of the investment benefit over multiple periods and interactions across market segments we characterize optimal policies in closed form and derive qualitative decision rules for managers

innovation and the international diffusion of environmentally responsive technology abstract new evidence is presented on environmental innovation and diffusion over the 1970s and 1980s at a global level a substantial amount of innovations occurred in the united states japan and germany the share of environmental patents in all patents varied between 0 6 and 3 and as such was higher than the corresponding share of pollution abatement expenditure in gdp japanese environmental innovation rates were consistently high certain plausible connections between environmental regulation and innovation also emerge across these three countries and over time innovation responded to pollution abatement expenditure an indicator of the severity of environmental regulations environmental patenting rates in developing countries were also high reaching 2 in many years in brazil developing country innovators obtained a non trivial number of patents most of which appear geared towards adapting imported technologies to local conditions however domestic innovation was only one path to new technologies imports of disembodied environmental technologies foreign patents registered in developing countries were substantial foreign patents were typically important or generic patents evidence also suggests that such patents protected intellectual property in equipment exported developing countries especially in east asia often chose to obtain technologies embodied in pollution abatement equipment

uncertainty and value of information when allocating resources within and between healthcare programmes a two stage stochastic mathematical programming formulation has been developed to optimally allocate resources within and between healthcare programmes when there is an exogenous budget and the parameters of the healthcare models are variable and uncertain this formulation solves the optimal resource allocation problem and calculates the expected value of acquiring additional information to resolve the uncertainties within the allocation it is shown that the proposed formulation has several advantages over the chance constrained and robust mathematical programming methods

environmental innovations and firm profitability unmasking the porter hypothesis we examine impacts of different types of environmental innovations on firm profits following porter s sci am 264 4 168 1991 hypothesis that environmental regulation can improve firms competitiveness we distinguish between regulation induced and voluntary environmental innovations we find that innovations which do not improve firms resource efficiency do not provide positive returns to profitability however innovations that increase a firm s resource efficiency in terms of material or energy consumption per unit of output have a positive impact on profitability this positive result holds for both regulation induced and voluntary innovations although the effect is greater for regulation driven innovation we conclude that the porter hypothesis does not hold in general for its strong version but depends on the type of environmental innovation our findings rest on firm level data from the german part of the community innovation survey 2008 cis 2008

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation