bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the european central bank evidence from a panel sample selection model abstract this paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations ltros of the european central bank we investigate how banks bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs interest rate expectations market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin size and experience a specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time therefore we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank s endogenous participation decision we find that bidding strategies depend on the banks attributes yet different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success there is evidence for the winner s curse effect in ltros indicating a common value component in banks demand for longer term refinancing

the possibility of informationally efficient markets abstract a rational expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price contrary to a wide held conjecture whereas a continuum of investors is inconsistent with fully revealing equilibrium finitely many investors with average portfolios demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size in an additive signal return model more information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off under fully revealing price information market equilibria both with and without information acquisition are pareto efficient

banking and interest rates in monetary policy analysis a quantitative exploration abstract the paper reconsiders the role of money and banking in monetary policy analysis by including a banking sector and money in an optimizing model otherwise of a standard type the model is implemented quantitatively with a calibration based on us data it is reasonably successful in providing an endogenous explanation for substantial steady state differentials between the interbank policy rate and i the collateralized loan rate ii the uncollateralized loan rate iii the t bill rate iv the net marginal product of capital and v a pure intertemporal rate we find a differential of over 3 p a between iii and iv thereby contributing to resolution of the equity premium puzzle dynamic impulse response functions imply pro or counter cyclical movements in an external finance premium that can be of quantitative significance in addition they suggest that a central bank that fails to recognize the distinction between interbank and other short rates could miss its appropriate settings by as much as 4 p a also shocks to banking productivity or collateral effectiveness call for large responses in the policy rate

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

the pricing effects of ambiguous private information when private information is observed by ambiguity averse investors asset prices may be informationally inefficient in rational expectations equilibrium this inefficiency implies lower asset prices as uninformed investors require a premium to hold assets and higher return volatility relative to informationally efficient benchmarks moreover asset returns are negatively skewed and may be leptokurtic inefficiency also leads to amplification in price of small changes in news relative to informationally efficient benchmarks public information affects the nature of unrevealed private information and the informational inefficiency of prices asset prices may be lower higher with good bad public information

a class of monotone economies in which rational expectations equilibria exist but prices do not reveal all information abstract some economies having excess demands which depend monotonically on agents information signals are examined if there are no multiple market clearing prices then these economies have strict rational expectations equilibria in which equilibrium prices alone do not transmit all information

complementarities multiplicity and supply information if traders can obtain private information about the payoff and the supply of a stock then there can exist i complementarity in information acquisition and ii multiple equilibria in the financial and information markets the additional dimension of supply information increases coordination possibilities in the financial market leading to multiple equilibria the existence of two information sources can lead to information acquisition being complementary the multiplicity of equilibria is suggestive of excess volatility and crashes the different financial market equilibria imply differing patterns of cost of capital and volume of trade 2009 by the european economic association

information and volatility in an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks we examine how the structure of private information in uences aggregate volatility the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks and display excess response to the aggregate shocks as in lucas 14 for any given variance of aggregate shocks the upper bound on aggregate volatility is linearly increasing in the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks our results hold in a setting of symmetric agents with linear best responses and normal uncertainty we establish our results by providing a characterization of the set of all joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure this tractable characterization extending results in bergemann and morris 8 can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the statistical moments of the economy

financial markets the real economy and self fulfilling uncertainties we develop a model of informational interdependence between financial markets and the real economy linking economic uncertainty to information production and aggregate economic activities in general equilibrium the mutual learning between financial markets and the real economy creates a strategic complementarity in their information production leading to self fulfilling surges in economic uncertainties in a dynamic setting our model characterizes self fulfilling uncertainty traps with two steady state equilibria and a two stage economic crisis in transitional dynamics

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

implementation in differential information economies abstract we consider the problem of implementation of social choice correspondences in differential information economies we provide necessary conditions for implementation and slightly stronger conditions which are sufficient to guarantee implementation

the long run relationship between inflation and output in postwar economies abstract we investigate the relationship between inflation and real output in a large sample of postwar economies our methodology is to use a structural vector autoregression to estimate the response of the level of real output to permanent inflation shocks separately for each country we find that a permanent shock to inflation is not associated with a permanent movement in the level of real output for most countries in our sample the main exceptions are certain low inflation countries in which permanent inflation shocks permanently increase the level of output we also find that permanent inflation shocks do not permanently influence real output growth rates in our sample

competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology abstract consider a financial market with n risk averse asymmetrically informed traders when n grows at the same rate as noise trading prices in competitive and in strategic rational expectations equilibrium converge to each other at a rate of 1 n equilibria in the two scenarios are close when noise trading volume per informed trader is large in relation to risk bearing capacity both equilibria converge to the competitive equilibrium of a limit continuum economy as the market becomes large at a slower rate of 1 n the results extend to endogenous information acquisition and the connections with the grossman stiglitz paradox are highlighted

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

price inference in small markets this paper investigates the effects of market size on the ability of price to aggregate traders private information to account for heterogeneity in correlation of trader values a gaussian model of double auction is introduced that departs from the standard information structure based on a common fundamental shock the paper shows that markets are informationally efficient only if correlations of values coincide across all bidder pairs as a result with heterogeneously interdependent values price informativeness may not increase monotonically with market size as a necessary and sufficient condition for the monotonicity price informativeness increases with the number of traders if the implied reduction in the absolute value of an average correlation statistic of an information structure is sufficiently small

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

nobel lecture the transformation of macroeconomic policy and research what i am going to describe for you is a revolution in macroeconomics a transformation in methodology that has reshaped how we conduct our science prior to the transformation macroeconomics was largely separate from the rest of economics indeed some considered the study of macroeconomics fundamentally different and thought there was no hope of integrating macroeconomics with the rest of economics that is with neoclassical economics others held the view that neoclassical foundations for the empirically determined macro relations would in time be developed neither view proved correct finn kydland and i have been lucky to be a part of this revolution and my address will focus heavily on our role in advancing this transformation now all stories about transformation have three essential parts the time prior to the key change the transformative era and the new period that has been affected by the change and that is the story i am going to tell how macroeconomic policy and research changed as a result of the transformation of macroeconomics from constructing a system of equations of the national accounts to an investigation of dynamic stochastic model economies

risk and insurance in a rural credit market an empirical investigation in northern nigeria credit contracts play a direct role in pooling risk between households in northern nigeria repayments owed by borrowers depend on realizations of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders the paper develops two models of state contingent loans the first is a competitive equilibrium in perfectly enforceable contracts the second permits imperfect information and equilibrium default estimates of both models indicate that quantitatively important state contingent payments are embedded in these loan transactions but that a fully efficient risk pooling equilibrium is not achieved the research is based on a year long survey in zaria nigeria conducted by the author

equilibrium price formation and the value of private information an economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets it is a well known paradox that if agents are price takers and prices are fully revealing then an equilibrium with costly information acquisition does not exist it is shown that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and agnets are not price takers then it is possible to have an equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

are micro and macro labor supply elasticities consistent a review of evidence on the intensive and extensive margins we evaluate whether state of the art macro models featuring indivisible labor are consistent with modern quasi experimental micro evidence by synthesizing evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins we find that micro estimates are consistent with macro estimates of the steady state hicksian elasticities relevant for cross country comparisons on both the extensive and intensive margins however micro estimates of intertemporal substitution frisch elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in aggregate hours by preferences the key puzzle to be resolved is why micro and macro estimates of the frisch extensive margin elasticity are so different

market composition and price informativeness in a large market with endogenous order types we analyse the joint determination of price informativeness and the composition of the market by order type in a large asset market with dispersed information the market microstructure is one in which informed traders may place market orders or full demand schedules and where market makers set the price market order traders trade less aggressively on their information and thus reduce the informativeness of the price in a full market order market price informativeness is bounded whatever the quality of traders information about the asset s dividend when traders can choose their order type and demand schedules are even marginally costlier than market orders then market order traders overwhelm the market when the precision of private signals goes to in nity this is because demand schedules are substitutes at high levels of precision a residual fraction of demand schedule traders is sufficient to take the trading price close to traders signals while the latter is itself well aligned with the dividend hence the gain from trading conditional on the price as demand schedule traders do in addition to one s own signal as all informed traders do vanishes

a quantitative analysis of capital income taxation this paper studies the quantitative impact of eliminating capital income taxation on capital accumulation and steady state welfare in a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of sixty five period lived individuals who face idiosyncratic earnings risk borrowing constraints and life span uncertainty under a wide range of parameter configurations the capital income tax rate that maximizes steady state welfare is positive even though eliminating it completely would raise the steady state capital stock toward the golden rule this is because the tax burden is shifted toward the younger and liquidity constrained years reducing the individuals ability to self insure copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

optimal factor tax incidence in two sector human capital based models abstract this paper studies the optimal factor tax incidence in a standard two sector human capital based endogenous growth model elucidated by lucas 1988 capital income taxes generate dynamic inefficiency for capital accumulation and labor income taxes create dynamic inefficiency for human capital accumulation a factor tax incidence is a tradeoff between these two inefficiencies a switch from capital income taxes to labor income taxes reduces the long run welfare coming from lower leisure and increases the long run welfare originated from higher economic growth and higher consumption because the representative agent s learning time and human capital are inseparable and thus affect learning activities at the same degree we find that based on the current us income tax code it is optimal to first tax capital income and to resort to taxing labor income only when tax revenue is insufficient to cover government expenditure

the credit channel transmission mechanism and the nonlinear growth and welfare effects of inflation and taxes with the credit channel effect driven by the central bank s open market operations this paper s model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation growth nexus which is evidenced by a number of cross country empirical studies the threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher the presence of the credit channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive and smaller than 1 tax rates on consumption labor income and capital income the optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet the credit channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing this provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets jel e58 e62 o42

fiscal policy elastic labor supply and endogenous growth abstract endogenizing labor supply leads to fundamental changes in the equilibrium structure of the ak growth model the balanced growth equilibrium can be described in terms of two tradeoff loci relating the equilibrium growth rate to the fraction of time devoted to leisure the implications of endogenous labor supply for fiscal policy are analyzed three issues are addressed first the effects of various distortionary tax changes and government expenditure changes on the equilibrium growth leisure employment tradeoff are analyzed second optimal fiscal policy is characterized finally the formal analysis is supplemented by numerical results focusing particularly on the quantitative welfare implications

implementation in economies with a continuum of agents we study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy we consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self selective first and second best allocations an upper hemicontinuity property of bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated using this we can for example conclude that if a given continuous mechanism implements uniquely a walrasian allocation in the continuum economy then all bayesian equilibria of large approximation economies will with probability close to one yield an allocation which is almost ex post pareto optimal

private information in large economies this paper examines the effect of private information in large economies we show that in a model with stochastic information structures the restrictions imposed on allocations by the presence of private information disappear in large economies we also show that for a large class of direct mechanisms the incentive for any agent to falsely report private information goes to zero as the number of agents becomes large these results provide an informational smallness analog to existing quantity smallness limiting results in the literature

optimal discretionary monetary policy in a micro founded model with a zero lower bound on nominal interest rate abstract this paper investigates optimal discretionary monetary policy under the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate zlb in the case of a distorted steady state due to monopoly and taxation solving a fully nonlinear micro founded fnl model using a global method i find that the central bank in a more distorted economy would cut the interest rate less aggressively under a particularly adverse demand shock this occurs because inflation and nominal interest rates are higher on average making the zlb less likely to bind and causing the economy to escape from the zlb sooner however the social planner would choose the optimal inflation rate of approximately zero the result emerges because the unconditional benefit of avoiding the zlb is not big enough to offset the cost of higher relative price dispersion when inflation is significantly positive in addition i show that the conventional linear quadratic lq method is inaccurate in the case of a sufficiently distorted steady state

private information and sunspots in sequential asset markets we study a model where some agents have private information about risky asset returns and trade to obtain capital gains while others acquire the risky asset and hold it to maturity forming expectations of returns based on market prices we show that under such a structure in addition to fully revealing rational expectations equilibria there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices consistent with rational expectations where the asset prices are subject to sunspot shocks such sunspot shocks can generate persistent uctuations in asset prices that look like a random walk in an e cient market

on the optimal inflation rate abstract in our incomplete markets economy households choose portfolios consisting of risky uninsurable capital and money money is a bubble it has positive value even though it yields no payoff the market outcome is constrained pareto inefficient due to a pecuniary externality each individual agent takes the real interest rate as given while in the aggregate it is driven by the economic growth rate which in turn depends on individual portfolio decisions higher inflation due to higher money growth lowers the real interest rate on money and tilts the portfolio choice towards physical capital investment modest inflation boosts growth rate and welfare

asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information the authors provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often there will be an allocation that is incentive compatible individually rational and nearly efficient the main theorem covers both the case in which aggregate uncertainty remains when the economy is replicated and the case in which replication eliminates aggregate uncertainty in addition the authors demonstrate how their theorem does or does not apply to standard asymmetric information problems such as the buyer s bid double auction problem akerlof s lemons problem and insurance with asymmetric information copyright 1992 by the econometric society

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

information acquisition price informativeness and welfare abstract we consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price we study the learning externalities that arise in this setting and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare when private signals are noisy so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices discouraging information gathering may be pareto improving complementarities in information acquisition can lead to multiple equilibria

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

the bank lending channel a favar analysis we examine the bank lending channel blc of monetary transmission in a factor augmented vector autoregression favar a favar exploits large numbers of macro economic indicators and allows us to consider an alternative identification of monetary shocks and analyze the lending response of banks at the aggregate and individual levels we find that the existence of the blc is more prevalent than previously thought using aggregated lending data while the lending response of individual banks are driven more by specific innovations than monetary shocks nonetheless the average individual bank response to a monetary shock is consistent with the existence of a blc

endogenous public information and welfare in market games this paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition pricecontingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information a payoff pecuniary externality related to aggregate volatility and a learning externality the impact of the first depends on whether competition is of the strategic substitutes or complements variety and the second induces agents to put too little weight on private information we find that with strategic substitutes and when the learning externality is not very strong agents put too much weight on private information and prices are too informative this will happen in the normal case where the allocational role of price prevails over its informational role under strategic complementarity there is always under reliance on private information the welfare loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information the analysis provides insights into optimal business cycle policy and a rationale for a tobin like tax for speculators in financial markets

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

international evidence on the long run impact of inflation in this paper i use a structural vector autoregression framework to analyze the effects of a permanent change in inflation on the long run real interest rate and real output level in 14 industrialized countries long run monetary superneutrality is rejected for all 14 countries using annual data the results indicate that a permanent increase in inflation lowers the long run real interest rate in each country a permanent increase in inflation also increases the long run real output level in a number of countries long run monetary superneutrality is also rejected for four out of the five countries examined using quarterly data under long run monetary superneutrality lrsn a per

inflation targeting with imperfect information in a global games setup with imperfect commitment technology we show that low targets the ones close to the optimal inflation under perfect commitment are unattainable leading to a trade off between low and credible targets moreover since noisy public information helps to coordinate expectations around the announced target our article supports unconventional policy prescriptions first weaker countries need to impose higher targets second less transparency helps to make the announced target credible and then reduces the optimally announced target results are based on a general central bank loss function encompassing models traditionally used to discuss central bank decisions

the optimal inflation rate in new keynesian models should central banks raise their inflation targets in light of the zero lower bound we study the effects of positive steady state inflation in new keynesian models subject to the zero bound on interest rates we derive the utility based welfare loss function taking into account the effects of positive steady state inflation and solve for the optimal level of inflation in the model for plausible calibrations with costly but infrequent episodes at the zero lower bound the optimal inflation rate is low typically less than two percent even after considering a variety of extensions including optimal stabilization policy price indexation endogenous and statedependent price stickiness capital formation model uncertainty and downward nominal wage rigidities on the normative side price level targeting delivers large welfare gains and a very low optimal inflation rate consistent with price stability these results suggest that raising the inflation target is too blunt an instrument to efficiently reduce the severe costs of zero bound episodes

how much information is incorporated in financial asset prices experimental evidence we propose a new estimation method and use experimental data from multiple double auction experiments in the literature to directly estimate how much information is incorporated in financial market prices we find that public information is almost completely reflected in prices but that surprisingly little private information less than 50 is incorporated in prices our estimates therefore suggest that while semi strong informational efficiency is consistent with the data financial market prices may be very far from strong form efficiency we compare our estimates with beliefs of economists surveyed at the econometric society meetings and find that economists and finance researchers alike expect market prices to reflect considerably more private information than what we estimated

the laffer curve revisited abstract laffer curves for the us the eu 14 and individual european countries are compared using a neoclassical growth model featuring constant frisch elasticity cfe preferences new tax rate data is provided the us can maximally increase tax revenues by 30 with labor taxes and 6 with capital taxes we obtain 8 and 1 for the eu 14 there 54 of a labor tax cut and 79 of a capital tax cut are self financing the consumption tax laffer curve does not peak endogenous growth and human capital accumulation affect the results quantitatively household heterogeneity may not be important while transition matters greatly

inflation and the capital stock there is a long literature examining the theoretical relationship between the rate of inflation and the size of the capital stock in an economy this literature has produced varied predictions about the effects of inflation on the capital stock in this paper we present some time series evidence on this issue we estimate a structural var model for thirty four countries and discover that for the majority of these countries there is no statistically significant long run effect of inflation on the capital stock moreover for countries where a significant effect is found the long run coefficient estimate is typically positive overall our empirical results support the view that the long run level of the capital stock is invariant to permanent changes in the inflation rate

labor market frictions and optimal steady state inflation in central theories of monetary non neutrality the ramsey optimal steady state inflation rate varies between the negative of the real interest rate and zero this paper explores how the interaction of nominal wage and search and matching frictions affect the policy prescription we show that adding the combination of such frictions to the canonical monetary model can generate an optimal inflation rate that is significantly positive specifically for a standard u s calibration we find a ramsey optimal inflation rate of 1 16 percent per year

rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices a mean variance example abstract the paper uses an intertemporal mean variance model of the market for a dividend paying risky asset to analyse rational expectations equilibria when all agents condition their expectations on past rather than current prices the main result shows that if the time span between successive market periods is short the market will approximate full informational efficiency arbitrarily closely yet the returns to being informed are bounded away from zero this contrasts with the grossman stiglitz proposition that markets cannot come close to informational efficiency if the acquisition of information is costly

the optimal rate of inflation with trending relative prices relative price trends mean that monetary policy cannot stabilize the nominal prices of all consumption categories if prices are sticky monetary policy must then trade off distortions within different categories more weight should be placed on stabilizing prices for which adjustment entails greater distortions with exogenous price stickiness a simple model calibrated to u s data implies that slight deflation is optimal even absent money demand considerations if price stickiness is endogenous because of fixed costs of adjustment small inflation or small deflation can be optimal depending on whether demand conditions or price adjustment costs vary across sectors

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

valuing dealers informational advantage a study of canadian treasury auctions in many financial markets dealers have the advantage of observing the orders of their customers to quantify the economic benefit that dealers derive from this advantage we study detailed data from canadian treasury auctions where dealers observe customer bids while preparing their own bids in this setting dealers can use information on customer bids to learn about i competition that is the distribution of competing bids in the auction and ii fundamentals that is the ex post value of the security being auctioned we devise formal hypothesis tests for both sources of informational advantage in our data we do not find evidence that dealers are learning about fundamentals we find that the information about competition contained in customer bids accounts for 13 27 of dealers expected profits

optimal taxation of capital income with imperfectly competitive product markets abstract we show that the steady state optimal tax on capital income can be negative positive or zero in a neoclassical growth model that allows for imperfectly competitive product markets the sign of the optimal tax rate depends crucially on 1 the degree of monopoly power 2 the extent to which monopoly profits can be taxed 3 the size of the depreciation allowance and 4 the magnitude of government expenditures for an empirically plausible set of parameters we find that the steady state optimal capital tax can range between 10 and 22

decentralized trading with private information the paper studies how asset prices are determined in a decentralized market with asymmetric information about asset values we consider an economy in which a large number of agents trade two assets in bilateral meetings a fraction of the agents has private information about the asset values we show that over time uninformed agents can elicit information from their trading partners by making small offers this form of experimentation allows the uninformed agents to acquire information as long as there are potential gains from trade in the economy as a consequence the economy converges to a pareto efficient allocation

implementation of walrasian expectations equilibria in an exchange economy with differentially informed traders non exclusivity of information nei is the condition that each trader s private information be perfectly predictable by an outside observer who has observed the private information of all other traders nei is one of a set of conditions which taken together are sufficient for the implementability of fully revealing expectations equilibria here we show that this condition is in fact necessary for the weak implementation of a much broader class of walrasian equilibria herein called expectations equilibria

optimal inflation rates with the trending relative price of investment abstract i study the effect of the trending relative price of investment on the optimal target rate of inflation in an estimated dynamic general equilibrium model of the u s economy the price of investment has a decreasing trend relative to that of consumption because of investment specific technological progress if the prices of investment goods are sticky a benevolent planner puts weight on stabilizing these prices which works to raise the optimal target rate of inflation in terms of the price of consumption the estimated model shows a high degree of price stickiness in an investment sector and the resulting optimal target rate of inflation is significantly positive this result is robust to an extended model in which the prices of some categories of investment goods are flexible

two by two international trade theory with many goods and factors this paper adopts a new approach to the problem of generalizing the properties of the two by two heckscher ohlin model asking whether we can obtain results which hold in very general models for dichotomous categories of commodities and factors using duality theory some results of this kind are derived which generalize certain properties of the heckscher ohlin model to models which allow for any number of goods and factors joint production international factor mobility and substitution between primary factors and intermediate inputs the consequences of assuming sector specific factors and equal numbers of goods and factors are also examined

information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle abstract we study firms incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to investigate the role of endogenous information in accounting for business cycles our model predicts that for a wide range of parameter values firms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when the economy has been in a recession and a pessimistic belief about the state of the economy prevails than after a boom when firms share an optimistic belief the equilibrium price system which features endogenous information transmission dampens aggregate fluctuations by discouraging information acquisition our welfare analysis reveals that information acquisition in the decentralized economy is not efficient this is due to inefficient employment dispersion arising from information heterogeneity in equilibrium time series data for the u s economy support the model s prediction of wages being more informative about total factor productivity after recessions than following booms

on the existence of rational expectations equilibrium abstract we prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information and maximize the expectation of a state dependent utility function the key to the result is a new idealization of what it means for a set of empirical distributions to support agents expectations this idealization depends on the notion that agents compare their expectations with continuous versions of the random empirical distributions that are generated by the workings of the economy the existence theorem covers all strictly concave utility functions arbitrary distributions of the state variable and situations in which the dimension of the state variable is large relative to the number of commodities

information and strategic behavior abstract does encouraging trader participation enhance market competitiveness this paper shows that when trader preferences are interdependent trader market power does not necessarily decrease with greater participation and traders need not become price takers in large markets thus larger markets can be less liquid and associated with lower ex ante welfare in the linear normal model the necessary and sufficient condition on the information structure is provided under which price impact is monotone in market size a condition is given when the rational expectations equilibrium which is typically not fully revealing within the considered class of preference interdependencies is obtained in large markets

employment flows capital mobility and policy analysis this article extends hopenhayn and rogerson s analysis of firing taxes by introducing a flexible form of capital and considering transitionary dynamics the article finds that capital is not important for understanding the long run and welfare effects of firing taxes however capital is crucial for determining the short run consequences of eliminating this type of policy

partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy abstract a class of pure exchange economies is considered in which some agents are informed of private information and others are uninformed existence of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium ree is proved without restricting attention to particular functional forms for utility functions and probability distributions without introducing noise into the model and without departing from the standard definition of ree the equilibrium is robust in the sense that if the primitives of the economy are slightly perturbed the economy continues to have a qualitatively similar ree with somewhat stronger assumptions placed on the economy the equilibrium is also the unique measurable ree

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha