nonlinear effects of exchange rate volatility on the volume of bilateral exports in this paper we investigate empirically the impact of exchange rate volatility on real international trade flows utilizing a 13 country data set of monthly bilateral real exports for 1980 1998 we compute one month ahead exchange rate volatility from the intra monthly variations in the exchange rate to better quantify this latent variable we find that the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade flows is nonlinear depending on its interaction with the importing country s volatility of economic activity and that it varies considerably over the set of country pairs considered copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

the second best core an economy with a single output and input is considered for the case of economies of scale in production equilibria are studied for a cooperative game of joint production in which goods are allocated by a price system the paper proposes a second best core in which allocations that are feasible for a coalition must be attainable by a price system existence is examined and properties of second best core allocations are analyzed copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

reforming residential electricity tariff in china block tariffs pricing approach the chinese households that make up approximately a quarter of world households are facing a residential power tariff reform in which a rising block tariff structure will be implemented and this tariff mechanism is widely used around the world the basic principle of the structure is to assign a higher price for higher income consumers with low price elasticity of power demand to capture the non linear effects of price and income on elasticities we set up a translog demand model the empirical findings indicate that the higher income consumers are less sensitive than those with lower income to price changes we further put forward three proposals of chinese residential electricity tariffs compared to a flat tariff the reasonable block tariff structure generates more efficient allocation of cross subsidies better incentives for raising the efficiency of electricity usage and reducing emissions from power generation which also supports the living standards of low income households

the ramsey problem for congestible facilities abstract in recent years a new set of models drawing on vickrey 1969 has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities these models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers time of use decisions and the congestion technology standard models in contrast simply assume the general form of the cost function we apply the new approach to analyze the ramsey problem for a congestible facility and show that the solution generally entails cost inefficiency standard models have failed to reveal this result because they treat the cost function as completely determined by technology

the welfare effects of different pricing schemes for electricity distribution in finland the main components of electricity prices can be divided into the wholesale price the price of network operations and taxes even if the wholesale price is determined efficiently total welfare can be significantly disturbed if network operations are priced inefficiently in this study we calculate network prices based on four alternative methods these are marginal cost pricing ramsey pricing fdc pricing and optimal two part tariffs the welfare effects on the prevailing pricing system are compared we show that potentially significant improvements in welfare can be achieved by using marginal cost prices or optimal two part tariffs also ramsey pricing indicates that prevailing prices are inefficient

game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale abstract this paper surveys the analysis by means of cooperative game theory of economies in which there are increasing returns to scale in the first section necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a core of a general equilibrium economy are considered in the second section the partial equilibrium approach to increasing returns production which developed along with the natural monopoly literature is surveyed the close relationship between the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium approaches is emphasized

product market competition and the impact of price uncertainty on investment some evidence from us manufacturing industries the authors estimate the impact of price uncertainty on investment using a panel of u s manufacturing industries pooling the data for all industries uncertainty has no impact on current investment however for industries that have low levels of seller concentration and thus are likely to be highly competitive the estimated impact is negative and statistically significant while for industries with high levels of seller concentration the impact is always small and not significantly different from zero the finding of a negative relationship between investment and price uncertainty in competitive industries is broadly consistent with models that incorporate irreversibility of capital investment copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

socially optimal pricing with rivalry and economies of scale this article examines the nature of economically efficient tariffs when there exists rivalry among firms that produce imperfectly substitutable outputs with economies of scale and that operate under a viability constraint pricing principles are derived and related to the rules developed in the literature for the regulated monopolist for some firms excess profits may prevail at efficient prices and the form of the inverse elasticity rule is altered in markets with rivalry however the standard efficient pricing rules and increased welfare results if regulators are empowered to implement lump sum interfirm payments a numerical example is provided

second best taxation as a game second best theory usually lies in the realm of normative analysis it focuses attention on the best solutions which still can be obtained in problems where constraints of various natures forbid the attainment of first best pareto optimal situations its central concern is the characterization of such second best solutions and a large part of the literature concentrates on the optimal design of taxes or of policies of public firms taking a second best problem we try in this paper to shift the emphasis from normative to positive considerations the solution we are interested in is not optimal with respect to some a priori given social welfare function embodying justice objectives but it is supposed to reflect the power of the different agents in a negotiation process clearly the conceptual tools required for such an analysis are to be found in game theory and it is actually a game theoretical approach that we follow here the model we are looking at is presented in section ii it formalizes one of the simplest second best problems that can be imagined we have a twogood economy with one private good and one public good agents have different wealth in private good and the public good is financed through a wealth tax this latter fiscal system is clearly not flexible enough to adjust contributions with marginal willingnesses to pay so that we actually face a second best situation there is one decision variable in the society the tax rate which determines the public good production about which the agents have conflicting desires to this problem we associate a game which provides a precise framework for the analysis of the power of the agents the positive outcomes of the negotiation process are supposed to belong to the core of this game sections iii and iv concentrate on the analysis of the core the results strongly contrast with those obtained in the classical studies of the core of 67 0022 053 l 81 040067 25 02 00 o

optimum tariffs for vertically differentiated products with an application to indian tea exports optimum export tariffs are typically related to the elasticity of demand for exports in homogeneous goods markets in this paper we set up a simple model for large exporters of quality differentiated products and estimate optimum tariffs based on the quality of the good restrictions on demand parameters implied by the theoretical model are used in estimating demands for different qualities of indian tea exports we use the estimated model to find optimum tariffs for two qualities of indian tea exports and find that optimum export tariffs for high quality teas should on average be 14 higher than the tariff on low quality tea exports

on the investment sensitivity of debt under uncertainty abstract we investigate the impact of debt on a panel of u s manufacturing firms capital investment behavior as the underlying firm specific and market level uncertainty changes our estimates show that the influence of leverage on capital investment may be stimulating or mitigating depending on the effects of uncertainty

uncertainty determinants of firm investment abstract we investigate the impact of measures of uncertainty on firms capital investment behavior using a panel of u s firms increases in firm specific and capm based measures have a significant negative effect on investment spending while market based uncertainty has a positive impact

optimal non linear pricing with regulatory preference over customer type abstract in this paper we characterize the pareto optimal set of non linear pricing schedules when non negative weights are assigned to each customer type our analysis first compares general non linear tariff schedules and sets of self selecting two part tariffs when there are two customer types and the cost function is linear we then derive optimal sets of two part tariffs for arbitrary numbers of customer types and general cost functions we also consider the sustainability of non linear pricing schedules under the threat of entry of rival firms

neopatrimonialism and the political economy of economic performance in africa critical reflections during the past two decades neopatrimonialism has become the convenient all purpose and ubiquitous moniker for african governance the school of thought behind this research program which the author refers to as the neopatrimonialism school has produced an impressive literature on africa its analysis informs policymakers and its language permeates media reportage on african states while neopatrimonialism has long been a focus of development studies in recent times it has assumed politically and economically exigent status the school identifies causal links between neopatrimonialism and economic performance and makes predictions drawing from what is referred to as the logic of neopatrimonialism neopatrimonialism is said to account for trade policies hyperinflation economic stagnation low investment in infrastructure urban bias andultimately the lack of economic development in africa this article examines the empirical basis of predictions and policy prescriptions it argues that while descriptive of the social practices of the states and individuals that occupy different positions within african societies the concept of neopatrimonialism has little analytical content and no predictive value with respect to economic policy and performance

a core selection for regulating a single output monopoly we consider a single output production economy in which all coalitions of agents have access to the technology under increasing returns to scale the corresponding cooperative game without side payments is convex and hence has a large core we propose a core selection that is obtained by considering the lowest price of output relative to input such that the corresponding vector of indirect utilities is feasible the constant returns equivalent allocation is feasible and achieves this utility vector it satisfied the property of technological monotonicity when the production possibility set expands no agent faces a utility loss technological monotonicity and the core property together characterize the constant returns equivalent solution

two part tariffs as regulatory constraints abstract this paper introduces a regulatory two part monopoly pricing mechanism with desirable properties assuming that firm managers are informed about cost and demand functions no detailed prior information of the regulator about the regulated firm and its environment is required also subsequent observations of the regulator are restricted to verifiable bookkeeping data nevertheless the pricing formula is simple and easily interpreted the firm may freely choose the variable price of the two part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint the firm will then in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing the current approach requires no government subsidies

an exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem abstract we propose a novel method to find nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive compatibility constraints from non cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a linearization or relaxation of integrality conditions the reformulation offers a new approach to obtain and interpret dual variables to binary constraints using the benefit or loss from deviation rather than marginal relaxations the method endogenizes the trade off between overall societal efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of individual players we provide existence results and conditions under which this problem can be solved as a mixed binary linear program we apply the solution approach to a stylized nodal power market equilibrium problem with binary on off decisions this illustrative example shows that our approach yields an exact solution to the binary nash game with compensation we compare different implementations of actual market rules within our model in particular constraints ensuring non negative profits no loss rule and restrictions on the compensation payments to non dispatched generators we discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare efficiency and allocational equity

economic statism private capital and the dilemmas of accumulation in nigeria abstract nigeria s persistent economic stagnation is attributable to a mutually reinforcing political dynamic comprising a weak developmental state and pervasive rent seeking within the private sector this syndrome was a source of nigeria s initial economic crisis in the early 1980s and it continues to impede structural adjustment initiatives economic policy reform has been compromised by state strategies designed to preserve the gains of elite rentier groups while private entrepreneurs have responded to policy change by seeking new rental havens in finance and other nontradable sectors in consequence structural adjustment has failed to elicit a supply response or to generate significant political support for a more propitious enabling environment nigeria s experience reinforces the perception that changes in nominal incentives must be accompanied by broader institutional transformation if economic reform is to be effective

industry wide versus firm specific uncertainty and investment british company panel data evidence this paper presents evidence on the prediction that the impacts of firm specific and industry wide uncertainty on investment will be different results show that these work in opposing directions and that the effect of industry specific uncertainty is stronger in concentrated industries

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

shifting fortunes the political economy of financial liberalization in nigeria abstract on the recommendation of the world bank nigeria began to liberalize its financial sector in 1986 contrary to the prediction of financial repression theory savings and investment decline in the wake of banking deregulation by 1995 the nigerian financial system was in a state of collapse the paper locates the main failure of nigeria s financial deregulation in the political and institutional setting of reform the institutional mechanisms needed to supervise and regulate banking under the new system were absent while private sector banking capacities were weak moreover financial liberalization was quickly captured by a clientalist state as a means of reallocating rents to strategic constituents an additional precipitating factor was macroeconomic instability the paper points to the importance of incorporating political and institutional variables into any model of financial reform or transformation

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

heterogeneity in the dynamic effects of uncertainty on investment how does aggregate profit uncertainty influence investment activity at the firm level we propose a parsimonious adaptation of a factor autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model to exploit information in a subindustry sales panel for an efficient and tractable estimation of aggregate volatility

shadow prices consistency and the value of life this paper examines the consequences of inconsistent shadow pricing the principal example of such inconsistency is the value of life safety second best shadow pricing policy is shown to depend upon how public sector budgets are allocated and the principle that public sector decision makers should agree to a consistent shadow price is shown to require information unlikely to be available a weaker consistency principle requiring minimal information is then developed

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

patent protection market uncertainty and r d investment the real options investment theory shows that greater uncertainty about market revenues reduces current r d investment by increasing the value of waiting this paper presents empirical evidence that patent protection mitigates the effect market uncertainty on r d investment

optimal two part pricing in a carbon offset market a comparison of organizational types author affiliation murray fulton johnson shoyama graduate school of public policy diefenbaker building university of saskatchewan saskatoon sk s7n 5b8 canada e mail murray fulton usask ca corresponding author james vercammen food and resource economics and sauder school of business 2053 main mall university of british columbia vancouver bc v6t 1z2 canada e mail james vercammen ubc ca acknowledgment the authors would like to thank tom ross and ralph winter for valuable comments on an early version of this article as well as the southern economic journal editor and two anonymous reviewers the usual caveats apply 1 introductionone of the consequences of the kyoto protocol kp and the increased focus on the role of greenhouse gases ghgs in climate change is that market based approaches to reducing ghg emissions are being actively developed in europe the european union eu operates an emissions trading scheme ets 1 while in the united states the chicago climate exchange ccx trades carbon offsets among exchange members 2 in canada a number of provinces have announced plans for carbon trading schemes four of them have joined the western climate initiative wci a consortium of canadian provinces and states developing a regional cap and trade system wci 2008 the wci and the regional greenhouse gas initiative rggi a consortium of northeastern and mid atlantic states see rggi 2008 are part of the international carbon action partnership a group of countries and regions from around the world that has formed to actively pursue the development of mandatory cap and trade systems in carbon 3the agriculture and forestry sectors are likely to be important suppliers of carbon offsets to the carbon market both through carbon sequestration activities for example the storing of carbon in the soil or in trees and through activities that reduce ghg emissions for instance estimates made by the united states at the time the kp was being negotiated projected that forest cropland and grazing land management sinks could have accounted for about half of u s reduction commitments u s department of state 2002 in canada the federal government estimated that agricultural and forestry sinks could provide in the order of 15 20 million metric tons of carbon offsets relative to a total of 270 300 million metric tons of reductions required under the kp government of canada 2005 food and agricultural organization fao estimates indicate that dryland soils in the world could sequester somewhere in the range of 12 000 16 000 million metric tons of carbon fao 2004 in the case of agriculture since carbon offsets are sold in units that are much larger than most individual farmers can supply carbon sequestration from a number of producers must be aggregated to fulfill contracts 4 as a consequence market intermediaries or aggregators as they are known are emerging to perform this economic function some of these aggregators are organized as for profit firms while others are organized by farmers associations examples of for profit firms are as follows c green aggregators ltd a privately owned company that contracts with farmers in manitoba saskatchewan and alberta for carbon sequestration the carbon they acquire is sold on the ccx c green aggregators 2008 and agcert international an irish company founded to generate emission reductions from livestock farms agcert international 2008 much of agcert s sales of carbon credits has been direct to individual emitters on the producer association side the iowa farm bureau has created agragate climate credits corporation to aggregate carbon credits for sale on the ccx agragate climate credits corporation 2008 agragate administers the project transacts trades on the exchange and distributes earnings to project participants

economic openness democracy and income inequality an empirical analysis scholars have studied effects of economic openness and democracy on national income inequality in two literatures in democracy studies scholars agree democracy reduces inequality but empirical evidence is ambiguous in globalization studies effects of economic openness on inequality are debated but have not been rigorously examined this article is the first systematic statistical study of the effects of both economic openness and democracy on income inequality these effects need to be studied together the authors measure national income inequality from a comprehensive gini coefficient data set economic openness is measured from trade flows foreign direct investment inflows and financial capital inflows the period studied is 1960 to 1996 the unit of analysis is a country decade and the sample includes 69 countries the authors find that democracy and trade reduce income inequality foreign direct investments increase income inequality and financial capital does not affect income inequality policy implications are discussed

investment and uncertainty is there a potential role for a common european policy abstract this paper contributes to the long running debate on the relationship between uncertainty and investment our results show that uncertainty negatively affects investment they are also favorable towards a common european economic policy oriented both to the support and the stabilization of aggregate demand

corporate investment in emerging markets the role of commodity prices we examine how firm level and country specific macroeconomic variables determine corporate investment in emerging markets in particular we investigate how investment decisions are affected by changes in country specific commodity export prices using firm level data from 38 emerging markets for the period 1990 2013 we show that in addition to the standard firm level variables such as expected future profitability cash flows leverage and new debt flows commodity export prices play a significant role in driving corporate investment moreover we show that the sharp decline in commodity prices since 2011 has been a key factor explaining the sizable slowdown in private investment growth during this period especially in regions with large net commodity exporters

political instability in africa a rent seeking approach the foregoing analysis developed the paradigm of self interest motivated revolutionary activities in effect the construct presented differs from the by product theory developed by tullock only in its specific modeling of government created rents as the engine which drives the violent political behavior the empirical test of the positive relationship between rent creation by the government and the amount of destabilizing political activity yields strong support for the structuring of politically destabilizing activities as rent seeking in nature it is the authors hope that further empirical investigation and a more general and rigorous modeling of revolution as a rent seeking activity will become an important part of the literature in public choice

efficient excise taxation the evidence from cigarettes we develop a model in which optimizing policy makers in adjacent government jurisdictions levy excise taxes on a commodity that has a unique point of production from which all shipments emanate from this model we derive an unusually specific predicted geographical pattern of those excise taxes in which these taxes rise at a decreasing rate as one moves outward from the point of production we compare these predictions to the observed pattern of cigarette taxes imposed by state governments in the united states and find the data to be fully consistent with our model among these predictions is the existence of a ripple effect which reduces taxes in many other jurisdictions due to low taxes at the point of production we estimate that these induced tax reductions in other states save cigarette producers and consumers a minimum of 110 million per year

economic reform and political transition in africa the quest for a politics of development the 1980s were bracketed by crises in africa as protracted economic malaise was succeeded by a wave of political reform analysts have sought to understand the sources of economic decline as well as the political requisites for recovery in the region neoclassical and structuralist analyses have been challenged by state centric views of economic change the latter perspective emphasizes the need for capable developmental states as a basis for long term adjustment but a political theory of economic change is still lacking such a theory must address the institutional foundations of growth as well as the shifting basis of social coalitions in african regimes political liberalization suggests the possibility of a new setting for economic reform though the effects of political reform on institutions and coalitions remain ambiguous and democratization cannot be regarded as a panacea for the region s developmental failure future research must look more closely at the interests and structures in transitional regimes and scholars should adopt a more comparative vantage on africa s challenges of reform

the equity and efficiency of two part tariffs in u s natural gas markets abstractresidential natural gas customers in the united states face volumetric charges that average about 30 percent more than the marginal cost of gas this inefficient departure from marginal cost pricing allows gas utilities to cover their fixed infrastructure and operating costs proposals for recovering these costs instead through fixed monthly fees are often opposed because of a widespread belief that current rate schedules have desirable distributional consequences using nationally representative household level data we show that the correlation between household income and natural gas consumption is indeed positive but surprisingly weak so current rate schedules are only mildly progressive in part we argue that this is because poor households tend to have larger families and less energy efficient homes we calculate bill impacts under a variety of scenarios and show that even a modest energy assistance program would more than offset the distributional impact of tariff rebalancing for most low

scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices abstract the size of the firm relative to market demand is crucial to a determination of whether there exist sustainable monopoly prices in the one product case the size of the firm is its minimum efficient scale in the multiproduct case size is defined by a set of outputs at which cost complementarities are present the analysis shows that when the size of the firm is sufficiently large there exist anonymously equitable aumann shapley prices further at these prices natural monopoly is sustainable against rival entry the aumann shapley price are also shown to be quantity sustainable in the sense of brock and scheinkman

pricing efficiency under rate of return regulation some empirical evidence for the electric utility industry the authors test quasi optimal pricing rules for rate of return regulation for a sample of electric utilities they estimate the regulated cost function and demand equations by class of customer for the sample to yield the cost and demand parameters required to assess the utility rate structures the results indicate that the price structure of electricity by class of customer is not quasi optimal and that welfare improvement might be possible under alternative prices searching for the price structure which satisfies the criteria they find that commercial users rates have been too high relative to residential and to a lesser extent industrial rates they note that commercial uses tend to be less organized and more poorly represented in the rate making process 16 references 8 tables

nigeria during and after the oil boom a policy comparison with indonesia nigeria and indonesia provide an interesting contrast with regard to performance and policy during and after the oil boom roughly a decade after the first oil shock nigeria is faced with several economic problems including a serious decline in its agricultural sector and a deteriorating external debt situation while some decline in the nonoil traded goods sector reflects efficient adjustment to the oil boom policy with regard to public expenditure exchange rates pricing and the trade regime could exacerbate such decline and impede readjustment as the boom subsides the links between oil prices deficits inflation and real exchange rate appreciation are analyzed and nigerian and indonesian fiscal and exchange rate and agricultural and foreign borrowing strategies are compared it is concluded that with the exception of cuts in the deficit since 1984 nigerian policy following the boom has not been conducive to adjustment to the current period of low oil prices and high real interest rates corrective measures and policy options are discussed

investment and demand uncertainty this paper investigates the effects of uncertainty on the investment decisions of a sample of italian manufacturing firms using information on the subjective probability distribution of future demand for firms products according to the entrepreneurs the results support the view that uncertainty weakens the response of investment to demand thus slowing down capital accumulation consistent with the predictions of the theory there is considerable heterogeneity in the effect of uncertainty on investment it is stronger for firms that cannot easily reverse investment decisions and for those with substantial market power we show that the negative effect of uncertainty on investment cannot be explained by uncertainty proxying for liquidity constraints

first and second best pricing with uncertain demand as has been well known since at least the work of hotelling 6 marginal cost pricing is the ideal regulatory policy in a simple certainty setting however when economies of scale exist in production such a policy will in general entail a revenue shortfall for the firm ideally the regulator should meet such a short fall by raising lump sum taxes but that solution is liable to prove infeasible ramsey pricing popularized by baumol and bradford 4 examines the second best pricing policy when firms receive no tax subsidy so prices must exceed marginal costs the celebrated inverse elasticity rule shows that with demands for the various goods independent goods whose elasticity of demand is proportionately less should have their price exceed marginal cost proportionately more further complications arise when one takes into account the uncertainty involved in economic decisions in recognition of this there has recently been considerable discussion of first best pricing with stochastic demand 5 the general conclusion of this discussion is that marginal cost pricing continues to be the first best policy in order to reach this conclusion however the literature has in effect assumed that regulators are risk neutral compared to this large literature on stochastic first best pricing the only two papers known to us that treat second best pricing with stochastic demand are by sherman visscher 11 and by wecker upton 15 both these treatments assume the marginal utility of income of the regulator is constant and so also require that there be risk neutrality in this work on the other hand we will consider both first and second best pricing policies when the regulator is explicitly allowed to be risk averse in the former case we will be interested in whether marginal cost pricing will continue to be the first best policy whereas in the latter case we will examine whether the simple inverse elasticity rule can hold despite considerations of risk and the risk behavior of regulators finally we will directly relate the results of our first best analysis to our study of the second best problem in much of the paper the source of demand uncertainty will be arbitrary we will

optimal pricing of local telephone service although payment for nearly all other goods and services including toll long distance telephone calls increases with greater consumption nearly 90 percent of the residential telephone subscribers and more than half the business subscribers in the united states now pay a flat monthly rate for local calls see larry garfinkel recently however the telephone companies and regulatory commissions have been moving cautiously toward imposing usage charges for local telephone calls there is renewed interest in what is currently termed usage sensitive pricing t usp it is due to the combined forces of inflation increased local usage and competition from independent firms that sell telephone terminal equipment and supply private toll lines to business customers under usp the pricing of such services as telephone installation directory assistance and minutes of calling is based on incremental rather than average costs since world war ii technological advances have benefited long distance far more than local telephone calling development in microwave communications coaxial cable satellites and waveguides have dramatically lowered the costs of long distance transmission in contrast the costs of local service have moved upward since the late 1960 s at a rate not far below the general price index see at t 1975 faced with a continuing stream of requests for local telephone rate increases state regulatory commissions are finding the concept of tying prices to usage increasingly attractive at t and some of the independent telephone carriers are beginning to test usp plans in several cities with flat rate tariffs increases in local calling add to carrier costs but not to their revenues the local calling rate per subscriber has increased by an average of 2 percent for the past seven years at t s chairman has stated we are moving more and more in the direction of usage sensitive pricing see washington star news p a12 and according to newspaper accounts of at t management documents the bell system plans to phase out flat rate telephone service and begin charging for each local call in major metropolitan areas in 1978 80 see seattle postintelligencer pp 1 10 still regulatory commissions consumer groups and the carriers themselves remain cautious about requiring usage sensitive tariffs for all subscribers the prospective gains from prices more closely related to costs are at least partially offset by the added costs of metering equipment and billing most telephone subscribers prefer flat rates according to bell system marketing surveys see garfinkel p 28 and it is by no means clear which groups of subscribers will be helped and which harmed by such revisions in local tariff structures will the poor end up paying more because they use their phones more should different prices be charged for calls at different times of day on what bases should the monthly and per call rates be determined the purpose of this paper is to sort out some of the questions of economic efficiency and equity that arise when changes are considered in the methods of pricing local telephone services in section i i construct a department of economics the rand corporation and the international institute of management berlin this study was supported under a grant from the john and mary r markle foundation i am indebted to walter s baer for numerous contributions to this paper to s c littlechild and patricia munch and to the managing editor and a referee of this review for critical and constructive review of a draft i have benefited as well from the comments and suggestions of james h alleman stanley m besen william s comanor john m drew leland l johnson john a kay edward d lowry carl pavarini john rolph ralph turvey and chris witze bryant mori assisted with the computer programming see my 1976 paper for a more extensive version of this paper which also discusses optimal flat rate and optimal peak load tariffs

investments and uncertainty revisited the case of the us economy this article examines the relationship between investments and uncertainty for the us economy as the latter is approximated by consumer sentiment purchasing managers prospects and economic polic

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

monetary instability the predictability of prices and the allocation of investment an empirical investigation using u k panel data it is often argued that monetary instability reduces the informational content of market signals and thereby hinders the efficient allocation of investment in this paper we use a signal extraction framework to give empirical content to this idea in particular we show why this framework predicts that as monetary uncertainty decreases the cross sectional distribution of investment widens we then explore this hypothesis using panel data information for uk companies over twenty years our data generally support the view that monetary instability may affect investment allocation through its effect on the predictability of prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

the making of a rentier class wealth accumulation and political control in senegal political and economic dynamics set in motion by efforts to consolidate post colonial regimes have contributed to the continuing weakness of indigenous bourgeoisies throughout much of post colonial africa this article suggests that state power has been used to foster private rent seeking rather than productive local private investment in order to promote and sustain the political cohesion of ruling classes the political consolidation of dominant rentier classes forged through state patronage and clientelist mechanisms of control creates obstacles to the emergence of local class strata interested in or capable of using state power to promote the expanded accumulation of capital be it local or foreign a study of senegal illustrates this point

economic policy uncertainty and the supply of business loans abstract using a vector autoregressive framework of analysis we show that banks contract their supply of business credit in response to an exogenous increase in economic policy uncertainty this contraction takes two main distinct forms on the one hand banks restrict their supply of spot funds which we document using flows of loans and term loan originations on the other hand banks also curtail their provision of liquidity insurance reducing the amount of new credit lines and embedding in them a pricing structure that reduces the probability of borrowers drawing down on the lines at the peak of the responses we find that a one standard deviation increase in epu causes a contraction in the supply of business loans between 3 and 5 on the extensive margin