investment based financing constraints and debt renegotiation we consider how equity holders bargaining power during financial distress influences the interactions between financing and investment decisions when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance we obtain four results first weaker equity holders bargaining power is more likely that the firm is financially constrained second the investment quantity is independent of equity holders bargaining power third the constrained credit spreads are increasing with equity holders bargaining power contrary to the unconstrained ones fourth higher volatility and weaker equity holders bargaining power are likely that the firm prefers to issue debt with renegotiation compared with debt without renegotiation c 2014 elsevier b v all rights reserved

a theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns this paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance i present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure cash holdings dividends and default while facing cash flows with long term uncertainty and short term liquidity shocks the model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice these interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows the optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows i also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

investment under uncertainty with strategic debt service the presence of a well designed bankruptcy code is an important part of the nancialarchitecture in developed economies by allowing the creditors to seize the assets of theborrowers who fail to make contractual payments the code generates bene cial ex ante e ectson debt capacity and rm value by giving the borrowers options to renegotiate their debtobligations and seek bankruptcy protection the code increases the likelihood that borrowersmay avoid ine cient ex post liquidation as hart 1999 notes the code should balanceex ante rm value maximization with ex post e ciency the bankruptcy codes in di erentcountries weight this tradeo di erently and hence vary in terms of the distribution of rightsand powers between borrowers and lenders in this paper we provide an inter temporal framework to examine how the creditors liquidation rights and the distribution of ex post bargaining powers in uence the rm s in vestment and nancing decisions and a ect ex ante rm value we show that strongerequityholders bargaining power lowers debt capacity reduces rm value and discouragesgrowth option exercising our calibration suggests that the quantitative e ects of ex poststrategic renegotiation on ex ante rm value may be large our paper provides an attempt to integrate nancial architecture into the theory of in vestment growth option exercising by building on two strands of literature investment anddebt pricing we extend the real options approach to investment pioneered by mcdonaldand siegel 1986 and brennan and schwartz 1985 to allow for capital structure decisionsunder strategic debt service we also draw insights from corporate debt pricing capital struc ture literature which focuses on leverage and security pricing after investment has alreadybeen made merton 1974 black and cox 1976 and leland 1994 our paper bridgesthe gap between these two strands of literature by characterizing the optimal investment and nancing decisions and the option value of waiting in closed form we show that the inter action between nancing and investment decisions in the presence of strategic debt servicegenerates new insights and also quantitatively important e ects on ex ante rm value

temporary versus permanent shocks explaining corporate financial policies we investigate corporate financial policies in the presence of both temporary and permanent shocks to firms cash flows in our framework cash flows can be negative and are imperfectly correlated with firm value and earnings volatility differs from asset volatility these results are consistent with empirical stylized facts they are also contrary to the implications of existing dynamic capital structure models that allow only for permanent shocks to cash flows temporary shocks increase the importance of financial flexibility and may provide an intuitively simple and realistic explanation of empirically observed financial conservatism and low leverage phenomena the theoretical framework developed in this article general enough to be used in various corporate finance applications jel g12 g32 g33

redevelopment decisions for commercial and industrial properties abstract the empirical work in this study serves as a test of the principle that redevelopment of a property will occur when the value of the existing bundle plus demolition costs is less than or equal to the price of vacant land the probability of a commercial or industrial property being redeveloped is predicted using the difference in the estimated value of a parcel in its redeveloped state and its current use correcting for sample selection bias the empirical results support the hypothesis that land is redeveloped when its value in the redeveloped state is high relative to its value in the current use

the option value of tax delinquency theory abstract how taxes are enforced matters current enforcement of real property taxes does not consider the option value of delinquency the ultimate penalty is confiscation of property sometime in the future but the value of the property to be confiscated is not known with certainty if redemption fees are sufficiently small it can be optimal to wait and see what the size of the penalty will be before paying taxes we show how this can lead to excessive abandonment and examine proposals for reform

the interaction of debt financing cash grants and the optimal investment policy under uncertainty abstract significant progress has been made toward understanding a levered firm s optimal investment policy under uncertainty to date however not much work has concentrated on the time scale trade off and collectively held real options we employ a game theoretic real option model between a firm and a government to analyze the effect of uncertainty and investment stimulus in the form of cash grants on optimal investment timing financing and investment scaling we find that the jointly held real option between the firm and the government leads to underinvestment regardless of whether the firm has the possibility to issue debt subsidies however reduce the level of underinvestment notably the results indicate that even though levered firms receive less support they invest more than unlevered firms this challenges recent findings that a firm s optimal investment level is not affected by the way it finances a project similarly we find that for realistic parameter constellations the levered firm s optimal investment threshold can be higher than that of its unlevered counterpart this indicates that the availability of tax shield benefits does not necessarily serve as an incentive to invest earlier finally we show that the effect of cash flow uncertainty on the equilibrium level of grants is ambiguous and triggers the switch from a subsidy to non subsidy regime

property taxes and urban housing abandonment this paper formulates and estimates an economic mode1 of landlord housing abandonment using new york city data a major focus of the study is to investigate the importance of property taxes in the abandonment decision as opposed to such factors as the types of buildings or the characteristics of households occupying the neighborhood there are two major results first cities can reduce the rate of abandonment by initiating foreclosure as soon as buildings go into arrears on property tax payments rather than allowing a grace period and second property taxes are an important and significant determinant of abandonment rates the benefits and costs of a policy whereby cities would systematically reduce property taxes in blighted neighborhoods by lowering assessment levels are also explored

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

measuring the agency cost of debt we adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt an underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen we identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change the model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt the optimal capital structure for a firm is now widely regarded to be determined by a broad range of factors including a mix of tax effects the various agency problems associated with different securities and the various costs of issuing securities including the costs created by adverse selection while the existence of a theoretical optimum has been demonstrated in a variety of papers a less explored area has been the construction of detailed models that enable us to measure each of the relevant factors for a particular company and thereby to determine the actual optimal mix for that firm this gap in our understanding is particularly glaring in the case of agency costs in order to allow a careful modelling of strategic relations the parameters of most agency models are either so simplified that it is impossible to associate them with measurable parameters of a real world case or else the models simply abstract from certain critical factors such as a robust measure of price risk that must be incorporated into any real application for example although we now understand that sinking funds dividend restrictions and other bond covenants help to resolve the conflict of interest between bondholders and equity we do not yet have much in the way of models with which to determine the optimal parameters of these very covenants contingent claims models can provide a consistent framework for multiperiod valuation that properly accounts for risk but they usually abstract from the agency factors entering capital structure decisions when using a contingent claims model to value a firm s securities it is common to take the value of the firm itself as governed by an exogenously defined stochastic process the value of the firm s securities are then derived from this underlying value and as merton 1974 points out in his paper on the pricing of risky debt the modigliani miller theorem obtains so that the value of the firm is independent of the value and the type of debt in order to apply the contingent claims techniques to a setting in which agency problems are central some adaptation is necessary in this paper we

using survey data to test standard propositions regarding exchange rate expectations survey data provide a measure of exchange rate expectations superior to the forward rate in that no risk premium interferes we estimate extrapolative adaptive and regressive models of expectations static or random walk expectations and bandwagon expectations are rejected current appreciation generates the expectation of future depreciation because variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate receive weight in comparing expectations to the process governing the spot rate we find statistically significant bias no variable is as ubiquitous in international financial theory and yet as elusive empirically as investors expectations regarding exchange rates in the past expectations have been modeled in an ad hoc way often by using the forward exchange rate there is however a serious problem with using the forward discount as the measure of the expected change in the exchange rate in that the two may not be equal the gap that may separate the forward discount and expected depreciation is generally interpreted as a risk premium most of the large empirical literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate for example has found it necessary either arbitrarily to assume away the existence of the risk premium if the aim

exchange rate determination and inflation in southeast asian countries abstract we estimate structural open economy models consistent with rational re and theories consistent tce expectations which incorporate cointegration to examine exchange rate determination and inflation in three southeast asian countries the re model is rejected in favor of the tce model our results show that while inflation in all three countries is affected by different external factors malaysia and singapore avoided high inflation despite high levels of economic growth through tight monetary policy in contrast the philippines had high inflation even with a stagnant economy due to loose monetary policy and the monetization of government debt

imperfect knowledge and behaviour in the foreign exchange market this paper explores the consequences of imperfect knowledge for exchange rate dynamics within the monetary class of models the authors framework which they call the theories consistent expectations framework provides a particular formalization of a world in which agents use theories in order to look forward but in which these theories provide only qualitative knowledge rather than quantitative knowledge about the economy the authors find that as long as agents possess at least some degree of imperfect knowledge the monetary models of the exchange rate generate dynamics consistent with the behavior observed in the literature copyright 1996 by royal economic society

was it real the exchange rate interest differential relation over the modern floating rate period in this paper we explore the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials in the united states germany japan and the united kingdom contrary to theories based on the joint hypothesis that domestic prices are sticky and monetary disturbances are predominant we find little evidence of a stable relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates we consider both in sample and out of sample tests one hypothesis that is consistent with our findings is that real disturbances such as productivity shocks may be a major source of exchange rate volatility this paper investigates the empirical relationship between major currency real exchange rates and real interest rates over the modern post march 1973 flexible rate experience the exchange rates examined here include the dollar mark dollar yen and dollar pound rates our two major findings are as follows first the data do not indicate a strong correspondence between real interest rate differentials short term or long term and real exchange rates this finding appears to conflict with the predictions of most monetary and portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination though the conflict can be substantially reconciled if aggregate disturbances are primarily real in nature i e changes in productivity tastes etc it is true that in many cases the sign of the estimated exchange rate interest rate differential relationship is consistent with the possible predominance of financial market disturbances but the relationship is not stable enough to be statistically significant second although one does find some evidence of a unit root in both real exchange rates and long term but not shortterm real interest differentials these two series do not appear to be linearly cointegrated hence the nonstationarity or near nonstationarity in the two series cannot be attributed to the same factor in section i we briefly describe a class of small scale monetary models of exchange rate determination the importance of this class of models for empirical work derives from its strong predictions about how the exchange rate will move

testing short run neutrality abstract this paper derives and implements a robust test of the short run neutrality of anticipated policy that is valid when the information set used to form expectations is incorrectly specified and the effect of unanticipated policy on deviations of output from the natural rate varies over time the test is based on the observation that if unanticipated policy affects output with a maximum lag of n quarters then any information prior to n should be uninformative about output movements the test is applied to quarterly data for the united states and the paper concludes that policy is not neutral

tax delinquency and abandonment an expanded model with application to industrial and commercial properties this study expands on the literature of residential abandonment by considering five types of industrial and commercial properties and three levels of explanatory variables parcel neighbourhood and city using data for cleveland ohio it shows that tax policies have a limited impact on abandonment instead two categories of variables not previously modelled are significant and policy relevant first the more specialised a property and the greater the cost of conversion to alternative uses the greater the likelihood of tax delinquency and abandonment suggesting policies to ease transition to new uses second abandonment spillovers are highly significant even after accounting for neighbourhood common factors this suggests that spatial solutions such as land use planning may be more effective than tax abatement policies in dealing with abandonment and approaches to abandonment must be differentiated by type of property residential abandonment should be re examined in light of these findings

empirical models of the exchange rate separating the wheat from the chaff various popular exchange rate models a standard monetary model a portfolio balance model and sticky price models are estimated and evaluated using u s canadian data for the 1970s nonnested hypothesis tests demonstrate that none are correctly specified the data suggest 1 the exchange rate persistence observed is not fully explained by any of the models 2 the small durbin watson statistics indicate longer lags are required 3 the current account is a useful explanatory variable 4 the portfolio balance model fits the data well but has potentially serious problems measuring the stock of foreign assets this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions a dynamic framework this article analyzes the interaction between a firm s dynamic investment operating and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs using numerical analysis we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects we find that higher production flexibility due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility enhances the firm s debt capacity thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing while higher financial flexibility resulting from lower recapitalization costs has a similar effect production flexibility and financial flexibility are to some extent substitutes we find that the impact of debt financing on the firm s investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant

optimal capital structure and investment decisions under time inconsistent preferences based on a continuous time model of quasi hyperbolic discounting this paper provides an analytically tractable framework of entrepreneurial firms capital structure and investment decisions under time inconsistent preferences inefficiency in both investment and default is caused due to time inconsistency if we view the time consistent benchmark as efficient compared to the standard trade off theory in corporate finance we clarify that debt financing under time inconsistent preferences brings a new trade off between the alleviation effect on investment inefficiency and the aggravation effect on default inefficiency the impact of time inconsistent preferences depends on the entrepreneurs belief regarding their future time inconsistent behavior i e sophisticated or naive concretely we find that naive entrepreneurs always choose higher leverages while sophisticated ones are more likely to choose lower leverages compared to the time consistent benchmark therefore time inconsistency can explain the observed leverage puzzle i e why firms choose different leverages even with similar fundamentals moreover we demonstrate that time inconsistent preferences delay investment and hasten default due to the interaction among the three effects option value effect payoff value effect and leverage effect in particular naive entrepreneurs invest later and default earlier than sophisticated ones leading to a shorter operating period these results support the empirical findings in entrepreneurial finance

asset sale debt restructuring and liquidation this paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time in the model we show the following results fewer asset sales lower financing debt renegotiation and running costs a lower premium to the debt holders a lower cash flow volatility and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation in the debt renegotiation process the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders the timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation most notably the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs the possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure

optimal exercise of jointly held real options a nash bargaining approach with value diversion this paper provides a two stage decision framework in which two or more parties exercise a jointly held real option we show that a single party s timing decision is always socially efficient if it precedes bargaining on the terms of sharing however if the sharing rule is agreed before the exercise timing decision is made then socially optimal timing is attained only if there is a cash payment element in the division of surplus if the party that chooses the exercise timing can divert value from the project then the first best outcome may not be possible at all and the second best outcome may be implemented using a contract that is generally not optimal in the former cases our framework contributes to the understanding of a range of empirical regularities in corporate and entrepreneurial finance

bailouts the incentive to manage risk and financial crises a firm s termination leads to bankruptcy costs this may create an incentive for outside stakeholders or the firm s debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms because of this implicit guarantee firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection however if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee extending parties to walk away i derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it allows high volatility choices while net worth is high however risk limits tighten abruptly when the firm s net worth declines below an endogenously determined threshold hence the model reproduces the qualitative features of existing risk management rules and can account for phenomena such as flight to quality

zero leverage and the value in waiting to have debt abstract this paper documents that the real option to have debt motivates some firms to remain debt free even when standard trade off theory predicts that these firms should have leverage the real option has a first order effect similar to the effect of bankruptcy costs in addressing the zero leverage puzzle the observation that many firms seemingly forgo sizable debt benefits by remaining debt free the debt free firms value includes the option whose value is derived from future debt benefits and hedging bankruptcy costs this paper proposes an optimal timing model for having debt and finds support for the model s predictions through calibrations and simulations

the effects of external financing costs on investment timing and sizing decisions abstract we develop a dynamic model in which a firm exercises an option to expand production on either a small or large scale with cash reserves and costly external funds an intermediate level of cash reserves which is insufficient for the large scale investment but sufficient for the small scale investment provides an incentive for the firm to invest early in the small scale project these results fill the gap between two types of results i empirical findings of a u shaped relation between the investment volume and internal funds and ii empirical predictions of a u shaped relation between the investment timing and internal funds in addition our results have real world implications for investment in alternative projects

on empirical exchange rate models what does a rejection of the symmetry restriction on short run interest rates mean abstract the purpose of this paper is to interpret the well documented rejection of reduced form symmetry restrictions on short run interest rates and to show that such a rejection implies a rejection of rational expectations re and or uncovered interest rate parity uip the paper also shows that if this rejection is due to failure of uip it cannot be explained by the presence of a standard risk premium in order to provide for well specified alternatives the paper explores the reduced form implications of imperfect capital mobility and a recent alternative to re called the theories consistent expectations framework

foreign exchange rate expectations micro survey data this paper analyzes the panel data of biweekly surveys on the yen dollar exchange rate expectations of forty four institutions for two years and contains four major findings first market participants are heterogeneous that is significant individual effects exist in their expectation formation second the individual effects have a characteristic of wishful expectations exporters expect yen depreciation and importers expect yen appreciation relative to others third many violate the rational expectations hypothesis fourth forecasts with long horizons show less yen appreciation than those with short horizons cross equation constraints implied by the consistency of the forecast term structure are strongly rejected in the data copyright 1990 by american economic association

dynamic investment and capital structure under manager shareholder conflict abstract this paper investigates the interactions between the investment and financing decisions of a firm under manager shareholder conflicts arising from asymmetric information in particular we extend the manager shareholder conflict problem in a real options model by incorporating debt financing we show that manager shareholder conflicts over investment policy increase not only the investment and default triggers but also coupon payments which lead to a decrease in the equity value moreover given the presence of manager shareholder conflicts debt financing increases investment and decreases total social welfare as a result there is a trade off between the efficiency of investment and total social welfare with debt financing these results fit well with the findings of previous empirical work in this area

liquidation fire sales and acquirers private information abstract we develop a dynamic model in which a distressed firm optimizes an exit choice between sell out and default as well as its timing we assume that the distressed firm is not informed about the acquirer s asset valuation we show that the firm delays liquidation to decrease the acquirer s information rent notably the firm can change the exit choice from sell out to default when the screening cost is high in this case shareholders declare default regardless of the acquirer s valuation which provides the acquirer the maximum information rent together with the deadweight costs of bankruptcy the maximal information rent which causes a wealth transfer from debt holders of the bankrupt firm to the acquirer lowers the sales price and debt recovery this mechanism can explain many empirical findings about fire sales and acquirers excess gains higher volatility leverage and asymmetric information increase the likelihood of a fire sale but higher bankruptcy costs could play a positive role in preventing a fire sale with asymmetric information the firm can reduce debt issuance to avoid the risk of a fire sale

debt valuation renegotiation and optimal dividend policy the valuation of debt and equity reorganization boundaries and firm s optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants two formulations of reorganization are presented debt equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions we study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distinguish liquidity induced defaults from strategic defaults we derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies the debt capacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

cointegration and exchange rate dynamics abstract we utilize systems methods of estimation which impose the unit root structure to estimate both the long run equilibrium relationship the cointegrating vector and the short run dynamics of an open economy macroeconomic model in which the exchange rate and the domestic price level are endogenously determined for the united states the model is estimated over the flexible exchange rate period and over two sub periods chosen by structural change tests on the exchange rate both rational and theories consistent expectations are utilized the models with theories consistent expectations outperform those with rational expectations

distressed exchange bargaining power and prior capital structure abstract financially troubled companies often make distressed exchange de offers to its creditors to postpone costly bankruptcy reorganization we derive the optimal terms and timing of a de offer consisting of debt reduction and an equity stake in the restructured firm the de terms and timing are affected by shareholder bargaining power with greater shareholder bargaining power resulting in earlier de offer smaller debt reduction and smaller equity stake the impact of shareholder bargaining power is greater when bankruptcy cost is larger and tax rate is higher we also show that renegotiability of debt increases ex ante firm value and results in a higher optimal leverage ratio both firm value and optimal leverage ratio are decreasing functions of shareholder bargaining power

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these