the political economy of development an assessment research in the field of economic development is increasingly engaged with questions of political economy of how political choices institutional structures and forms of governance influence the economic choices made by governments and citizens we summarize recent developments in the field and introduce a set of papers that illustrate key themes and methodological innovations associated with the new political

the political dynamics of economic growth summary we argue that an understanding of the political drivers of economic growth needs an explanation of the political dynamics around the transition from one growth phase to another and that the political drivers of early stage growth accelerations are different from that of growth maintenance informal institutions are likely to play a role in growth acceleration while formal institutions of credible commitment the provisioning of public goods and the overcoming of co ordination failures will be more important in growth maintenance we present empirical evidence drawn from country case studies and cross country econometric analysis that provides support to our theoretical propositions

raising children to work hard altruism work norms and social insurance children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market moreover parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non credible to promote work

the lens of contract private ordering james buchanan 2001 p 29 avers that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics he further contends that this fundamental understanding is better realized by examining economics through the lens of contract rather than the lens of choice buchanan 1975 because the latter has been the reigning paradigm in economics during the 20th century lionel robbins 1932 melvin w reder 1999 the lens of contract is understandably less fully developed interest in contractual approaches has nevertheless been building up whence the gap between these two has been closing this paper sketches some of these developments with emphasis on private ordering

did high debts distort loan and grant allocation to ida countries summary we examine the allocation of net loans net transfers and grants to ida countries over the period 1982 2008 focusing on the role of debt and debt sustainability in the decisions of multilateral and bilateral donors we find no evidence of defensive lending but strong evidence of defensive granting a significant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio indeed characterizes the decisions of both multilateral and bilateral creditors the impact of lower loans on the budget of debtor countries is however accommodated through higher grants in addition to debt relief these findings are consistent with a substitution of grants for loans and with the new approach to debt sustainability but question the efficiency and selectivity of foreign aid

the institutional reforms debate and fdi flows to the mena region the best ensemble summary this paper empirically examines the theoretical debate on the adoption of a best approach to reforming institutions identified by rodrik 2008 in the context of property rights protection and fdi flows to eight mena countries the first best approach comprises strengthening domestic institutional functions only while the second best comprises in addition entering into force bilateral investment treaties and the interaction between functions and treaties empirically both approaches to reducing investment expropriation risk encourage fdi flows the positive effect of the second best approach depends on the success of the first best approach suggesting the two approaches are complementary

transaction cost economics past present and future oliver williamson is the founder and chief developer of transaction cost economics tce in this brief essay on the occasion of his nobel memorial prize i offer a partial discussion of williamson s contributions by first summarizing some of the accomplishments of tce past and then sketching some of the opportunities for tce future most of the topics in both sections tce past and tce future start with a quotation from williamson s early work that i think still speaks volumes today that is while fellow travelers and successors have acted on one set of williamson s insights helping to produce the accomplishments of tce past another collection of williamson s insights has gone relatively unremarked creating some of the opportunities for tce future

the signaling effect of corporate social responsibility in emerging economies what signals do firms in emerging economies send to stakeholders when they adopt corporate social responsibility csr practices we argue that in emerging economies firms that adopt csr practices positively signal investors that their firms have superior capabilities for filling institutional voids from an institution based view we hypothesize that the institutional environment moderates the signaling effect of csr on a firm s financial performance based on a sample of firms from ten asian emerging economies we find a positive relationship between csr practices and financial performance this positive relationship is stronger in the less developed capital market than in the more developed one the financial benefits of csr practices are also more salient in the low information diffusion market than in the high one we emphasize that signaling theory and the institution based view can jointly contribute to the csr literature

can green building councils serve as third party governance institutions an economic and institutional analysis abstract green building councils gbcs have been established in many different countries in recent years this paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a gbc can contribute positively to the development of a greener or more sustainable stock of buildings the paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view we argue that the investor s uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners dilemma trap the corresponding barriers for a transition toward a greener buildings market are analyzed gbcs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems they can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors by certifying the quality of a building they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer this task however raises some severe management challenges for the gbcs

the hazards of piecemeal reform british civil courts and the credit market in colonial india abstract the colonial experience of developing countries provides valuable evidence regarding the impact of legal and institutional innovations on economic growth however there has been little effort by economists to study colonial policies to gain theoretical insights into the process of institutional reform this paper considers the introduction of civil courts in colonial india and its impact on agricultural credit markets in the bombay deccan drawing on historical records and a formal analysis of the credit market the paper finds that the reform led to increased competition among lenders ex ante we expect that this would have raised farmers welfare but increased competition also reduced lenders incentives to subsidize farmers investments in times of crisis leaving them more vulnerable in bad times

second best institutions the focus of reforms in the developing world has moved from getting prices right to getting institutions right this reflects the recognition that markets are unlikely to work well in the absence of a predictable and legitimate set of rules that support economic activity and dis pense its fruits governance reforms have become the buzzword for bilateral donors and multilateral institutions in much the same way that liberalization privatization and stabiliza tion were the mantras of the 1980s but what kind of institutions should reform ers strive to build it is easier to list the func tions that good institutions perform than it is to describe the shape they should take desirable institutions provide security of property rights enforce contracts stimulate entrepreneurship foster integration in the world economy maintain macroeconomic stability manage risk taking by financial intermediaries supply social insurance and safety nets and enhance voice and account ability but as the variety of institutional forms that prevail in the advanced countries themselves suggests richard freeman 2000 peter hall and david soskice 2001 each one of these ends can be achieved in a large number of different ways rodrik 2007a

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

the expectations hypothesis of the term structure when interest rates are close to zero abstract in an economy where cash can be stored costlessly in nominal terms the nominal interest rate is bounded below by zero this paper derives the implications of this non negativity constraint for the term structure and shows that it induces a nonlinear and convex relation between short and long term interest rates the long term rate responds asymmetrically to changes in the short term rate and by less than that is predicted by the benchmark linear model in particular a decrease in the short term rate produces a smaller response in the long term rate than an increase of the same magnitude the empirical predictions of the model are examined using data from japan

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

economic development legality and the transplant effect abstract we analyze the determinants of effective legal institutions legality using data from 49 countries we show that the way the law was initially transplanted and received is a more important determinant than the supply of law from a particular legal family countries that have developed legal orders internally adapted the transplanted law and or had a population that was already familiar with basic principles of the transplanted law have more effective legality than countries that received foreign law without any similar predispositions the transplanting process has a strong indirect effect on economic development via its impact on legality while the impact of particular legal families is weaker and not robust to alternative legality measures

a neoinstitutionalist interpretation of the changes in the russian oil model this paper deals with the current change of the institutional and organizational framework of the russian oil industry regarding this evolution the main characteristic is the increasing involvement of national oil companies in the upstream activities the point is to explain this reorganization by relying on the new institutional economics framework these theoretical works highlight that institutional environment and governance structures complement each other we argue that the current reorganization in an attempt to increase the coherence of the institutional arrangement governing the transaction between the russian state and the private oil companies

entitled to work urban property rights and labor supply in peru this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled entitled to work urban property rights and labor supply in peru new legal rights were issued in 1996 project teams providing titling service through 2003 in peru the study observed that between 1996 and 2003 the peruvian government issued property titles to over 1 2 million urban households the largest titling program targeted at urban squatters in the developing world this paper examines the labor market effects of increases in tenure security resulting from the program pre program squatters in program neighborhoods were significantly more likely to report improved tenure security by 60 percent similarly program participants were 18 8 percentage points less likely to report a high likelihood of eviction or invasion and 18 8 percentage points more likely to report that their dwelling was currently very secure from eviction or invasion the likelihood of working inside the home significantly falls by 11 6 percentage points for the average squatter family with two program periods

the economics of rotating savings and credit associations supported by the center for energy policy studies m i t and the japanese corporate associates program at the kennedy school of government

trade expansion and contract enforcement consider a world of traders separated in geographic economic or social space honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders but frequencies of meetings and information flows about cheating have local bias honesty is self enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world the extent of self enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self governing small community intermediate size worlds fare worst

the influence of governance infrastructure and corporate governance on profit shifting in this article we develop a conceptual model to examine the influence of quality of country level governance infrastructure and corporate governance effectiveness on profit shifting we empirically test propositions derived from the model with a unique firm level data set and using multiple indicators of governance infrastructure quality and corporate governance mechanisms we estimate that on average about 6 of total pre tax income is shifted out of foreign owned firms in india we show that governance infrastructure that improves collective action and transparency in both the foreign and host country reduces shifting on the other hand secure property rights and efficient contracting in the foreign country increases shifting we also find that monitoring by foreign institutional investors restricts shifting

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

the making of policy institutionalized or not this paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles their causes and their consequences in latin america finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies apts are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies the higher the potential damage they can cause the lower the wealth of the economy and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power moreover strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies for instance bribes by the rich and protests by the poor are likely to be countervailing forces and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions

is trust the missing root of institutions education and development we report evidence that trust is the missing root relating education institutions and economic development we observe that more trust both increases education and improves legal and bureaucratic institutions which in turn spurs economic development we substantiate this intuition with a series of regressions that provide evidence that trust determines both education and the quality of institutions and that education and institutions in turn affect gdp per capita

are the poor less well insured evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural china the authors test how well consumption is insured against income risk in a panel of sampled households in rural china they estimate the risk insurance models by generalized method of moments treating income and household size as endogenous insurance exists for all wealth groups although the hypothesis of perfect insurance is universally rejected those in the poorest wealth decile are the least well insured with 40 percent of an income shock being passed on to current consumption by contrast consumption by the richest third of households is protected from almost 90 percent of an income shock the extent of insurance in a given wealth stratum varies little between poor and nonpoor areas

partisan alignment effects on total factor productivity aray h partisan alignment effects on total factor productivity regional studies unlike the literature on political effects on real economy that suggests that partisan effects accrue through aggregate demand it is hypothesized that such effects could also accrue through aggregate supply using panel data for the spanish regions over the 1986 2010 period the main results are 1 partisan alignment effects only arise when central government enjoys a majority 2 there exist a positive contemporaneous effect and negative lagged effects and 3 in absolute value such effects vanish over time results are robust to different specifications and measures of total factor productivity tfp and methods of estimation

inventory investment and sectoral characteristics in some oecd countries this paper discusses the effects of sectoral structure on the long run macroeconomic inventory behaviour of national economies data on 15 oecd countries are included in the analysis which is based on correlation and cluster analysis methodologies the study is part of a long term research project exploring factors influencing the inventory behaviour of national economies first we introduce some basic characteristics of macroeconomic inventory formation in the 15 oecd countries we argue that our previous results on the existence of specific characteristic features of macroeconomic inventory investment are justified hence it makes sense to study the factors influencing these features we then examine the contribution of various sectors to the production of in the countries involved and the relationship between sectoral structure and inventory intensity annual inventory change gross value added we find that the high share of agriculture and manufacturing increases inventory intensity that the increasing share of services has a negative effect and that the role of construction and trade is not obvious the relatively low stability of the statistical results warns us to be cautious with our judgements further case by case analysis would be required to obtain more solid results

social structure and cultures of corruption abstract corruption often creates a briber s dilemma each of the clients competing for a rent allocated by a government official has an incentive to pay bribes to try to obtain preferential treatment but they would all be better off if they could mutually commit not to pay bribes this paper uses a model of linked games to show how informal relationships among the clients may enable them to enforce agreements or norms against paying bribes and how historical events can lead to the development of a culture of corruption that can subsequently prove hard to dislodge

the economics of governance the economics of governance is an effort to implement the study of good order and workable arrangements where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market which is a venerated tradition in economics adam smith 1776 friedrich hayek 1945 kenneth a arrow and gerard debreu 1954 and intentional order of a conscious deliberate purposeful kind chester irving barnard 1938 p 9 also i interpret workable arrangements to mean feasible modes of organization all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal avinash dixit 1996 pp 4 9 the object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of governance principally spot markets various long term contracts hybrids and hierarchies interest among social scientists economists included in the study and practice of good order and workable arrangements has been steadily growing in contrast with the orthodox lens of choice prices and output supply and demand the economics of governance is a lens of contract construction broadly in the spirit of james buchanan s 2001 p 29 observation that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics the economics of governance as herein described is principally an exercise in bilateral private ordering by which i mean that the immediate parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good order and workable arrangements to be sure the need for private ordering varies with the rules of the game as provided by the state distinctions between lawlessness where the state provides limited or unreliable protection for property and contract dixit 2004 and lawfulness where the state undertakes to protect property and enforce contracts in a principled way are pertinent the first of these applies mainly to primitive and transition economies the second is commonly associated with western democracies recourse to private ordering under conditions of lawlessness is altogether understandable given the absence of state support the walter a haas school of business university of california berkeley ca 94720 1900 the paper has benefited from workshop presentations at the university of california berkeley the university of valencia insead fountainebleau and the 2004 annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics an abbreviated version was also given as the horst claus recktenwald lecture at nuremburg on 4 november 2004 comments and suggestions from fred balderston ernesto dalbo avinash dixit robert gibbons witold henisz ian larkin steven tadelis and dean williamson are especially acknowledged 1 lon fuller s 1954 p 477 definition of eunomics as the science theory or study of good order and workable arrangements is very much in the spirit of what i refer to as governance 2 one of the immediate ramifications of insistently comparing feasible alternatives all of which are flawed is that the purported inefficiencies that are ascribed to failures to achieve first best optimality are not dispositive but invite the query as compared with what i return to this issue in section iv 3 excluding corporate governance the numbers of articles that used the word governance during the period 1998 2000 as compared with the period 1977 1979 in selected economics business management sociology organization and political science journals were 60 vs 1 76 vs 4 79 vs 18 and 60 vs 25 where the journals surveyed were the american economic review journal of political economy quarterly journal of economics rand journal of economics and journal of economic perspectives in economics strategic management journal management science academy of management journal and academy of management review in business management administrative science quarterly organization science american journal of sociology american sociological review and annual review of sociology in sociology organization and american political science review political science quarterly journal of politics and political research quarterly in political science combining these four categories articles using the word governance increased from 48 to 275 over this 20 year interval dixit 2004 pp 149 50 reports that the number of web pages that turn up under the search for governance is huge

institutions top down or bottom up a large research program in economics has established a persuasive link between institutions and economic development but what does this imply for development policymaking can a political leader or aid agency seeking to promote development readily change institutions this article starts off wildly general and then moves to specifics