common law statute law and the theory of legislative choice an inquiry into the goal of the sherman act although the sherman antitrust act is more than a century old debate continues over its goals in contrast to what many have argued i contend that the act s main goal is to maximize economic efficiency rather than the welfare of consumers the sherman act is a modest extension of the common law which the law and economics literature indicates moves towards economic efficiency further unlike the interstate commerce act of 1887 sherman act decisions are made by courts not a regulatory agency thus the theory of legislature choice also implies that the goal of the act is to maximize economic efficiency

on the efficiency of law a public choice perspective economists have not yet developed a comprehensive theoretical framework incorporating transaction cost economics within a public choice perspective for predicting when there will be an efficiency problem with the law transaction cost reasoning and the rent seeking insight have not been applied systematically in a dynamic institutional context to evaluate when the law will be used to increase or not minimize problems of bounded rationality and opportunism this paper takes a first step at identifying and remedying this deficiency the paper first provides a critical review of relevant theoretical contributions made by becker 1983 1985 posner 1977 priest 1977 rubin 1977 1982 williamson 1975 1985 and others we then show how analysis of the efficiency of law can be synthesized into a broader whole by incorporating transaction cost economics more fully into existing understanding of rentseeking in the political realm thus within the public choice paradigm this paper develops a deeper transaction cost analysis of the efficiency of law building on prior research by the authors crew and rowley 1988a 1988b twight 1983 1988 the paper identifies variables that position legal rules on a spectrum that ranges from those that are predominantly transaction cost

voter preferences and state regulation of smoking i introduction tobacco taxation and smoking restrictions are two areas of regulation for which states have maintained a high level of control relative to the federal government 1 given this flexibility states have established a wide range of restrictions on smoking in areas such as government workplaces restaurants bars shopping malls indoor arenas and hospitals 2 although most states restrict smoking in hospitals there is considerable variation among states in restrictions in other areas in the 1998 99 period of this study about two thirds of states restricted smoking in restaurants whereas only four states restricted smoking in bars what has led to variation in smoking restrictions across states in a democratic society one would expect voter preferences to play an instrumental role in determining which policies are enacted and which are not this article provides the first empirical exploration of whether state level smoking restrictions are consistent with preferences of the citizenry taking into account both voting behavior and the role of smoking status in influencing whether an individual votes specifically we examine whether voters preferences for smoking restrictions in restaurants bars malls indoor sporting events and hospitals are consistent with state level restrictions on smoking in each of these public areas 3 our research draws on public choice models of policy making by state and local governments voters preferences typically play a central role because voting affects legislators incentives to support regulations 4 public choice research also finds that nonvoter factors may influence state and local policy making 5 in the case of smoking regulations public health advocates or tobacco industry lobbyists might influence regulatory policies the specific building block of our analysis of state restrictions on smoking is information on individuals voting behavior which we link to their smoking status and preferences over smoking restrictions our analysis uses measures of political pressure that account for individual preferences as well as their voting behavior to examine the possible role of interest group pressures we also control for nonvoter influences on smoking regulation including the proportion of the state population who smoke measures of state ideology and size of the tobacco industry with the exception of smoking in bars there is majority support for smoking restrictions unsurprisingly smokers are less supportive of restrictions than are nonsmokers nonetheless even smokers demonstrate a high level of support for many restrictions smokers are also less likely to vote than are nonsmokers even after controlling for other demographic factors the lower voting rate diminishes voter opposition to antismoking regulation but is usually not critical in view of the substantial support that most smoking restrictions have among smokers the political pressure indices for restrictions on smoking in each public area are generally significantly related to the probability that a state restricts smoking in that public area the nonvoter factors such as the smoking rate in the state and tobacco s role in the state economy are rarely influential policy debates over the desirability of smoking restrictions emphasize possible health risks due to exposure to environmental tobacco smoke ets and effects on business profitability the primary argument for expanding smoking restrictions is to protect workers and customers from exposure to ets 6 as our results show voters are generally supportive of smoking restrictions in public areas which would thereby protect workers as well as themselves and other customers however there is a substantial controversy over the extent of health risks associated with exposure to ets the basis for the push by the u s occupational and safety health administration osha for increased smoking restrictions to protect workers is the highly controversial u

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

education work and crime a human capital approach this article develops a model of crime in which human capital increases the opportunity cost of crime from foregone work and expected costs associated with incarceration older more intelligent and more educated adults should commit fewer street unskilled crimes white collar crimes decline less or increase with age and education predictions for age crime and education crime relationships receive broad empirical support in self report data from the national longitudinal survey of youth and arrest data from the uniform crime reports the effects of education training and wage subsidies as well as enforcement policies on criminal behavior are discussed

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

squealer dealers the market for information in federal drug trafficking prosecutions never rat on your friends and always keep your mouth shut jimmy conway goodfellas citing his invaluable aid in the war against the mafia a federal judge yesterday rewarded a once powerful mob figure who became a major government informer by sentencing him to just five years in prison despite his admitted involvement in 19 murders the new york times september 27 19941 i introduction since the seminal theoretical work of becker 1968 the economics of crime has developed an extensive empirical literature 2 this article adds to that literature by studying markets for information in federal prosecutions of drug trafficking conspiracies in these markets law enforcement demands information that can help prosecute and imprison suspected drug traffickers while other drug traffickers supply the information 3 the price over which demanders and suppliers higgle is the size of an informer s sentence reduction 4 mustard 2001 using federal sentencing data found that different demographic groups have different rates relative quantities of providing substantial assistance the federal legal term meaning information against other defendants 5 this article adds to mustard 2001 by using federal sentencing of convicted drug traffickers to uncover whether different demographic groups have different relative prices for their information i e whether different groups receive larger sentence reductions higher prices or smaller sentence reductions lower prices when providing substantial assistance then in a simple manner similar to well known examinations of the returns to education in the 1970s and 1980s levy and mumane 1992 murphy and welch 1989 price and quantity determine whether certain groups experience different relative demand or relative supply for their testimony groups experiencing high relative demand have their information highly sought by law enforcement and therefore have high rates quantities of providing substantial assistance and large sentence reductions prices when doing so those with low relative demand have low quantities and low prices groups with high relative supply of substantial assistance have high quantities but low prices while those with low relative supply have low quantities and high prices this article further adds to the literature by going beyond demographic factors and examining what criminality related factors e g criminal history role in a criminal conspiracy and type of drug dealt affect supply and demand for information and by examining supply and demand conditional on expected prison sentence results show that women and better educated defendants experience high relative demand for information while blacks hispanics and non u s citizens experience low relative demand groups facing long prison sentences dealers of harder drugs those with long criminal histories and high level dealers have high relative supply while those facing short sentences primarily low level dealers have low relative supply when controlling for expected sentence crack dealers high level dealers and dealers with long criminal histories experience low demand race specific estimations show that women of all races experience high relative demand for information the rest of this article is organized as follows section ii discusses the federal criminal justice system emphasizing reforms established by the sentencing reform act of 1984 and the anti drug abuse act of 1986 section iii discusses the data and provides summary statistics section iv discusses my empirical methodology section v shows results and section vi attempts to explain them section vii discusses results from race specific estimations and section viii concludes ii federal criminal sentencing through most of the 1980s and before federal judges possessed near total discretion in determining sentences for criminals convicted of violating federal statutes e

toward a positive economic theory of antitrust most economists associate antitrust policy with the sherman and clayton acts nonetheless there is in england and america a much older body of antitrust law namely the common law of restraint of trade this regulation like language and markets evolved over a long period of time this article examines whether the rules that the common law courts developed can be explained by a hypothetical wish to maximize social wealth and concludes that many of them can be the last part of the article outlines a theory of legal evolution

crime rates and local labor market opportunities in the united states 1979 1997 the labor market prospects of young unskilled men fell dramatically in the 1980s and improved in the 1990s crime rates show a reverse pattern increasing during the 1980s and falling in the 1990s because young unskilled men commit most crime this paper seeks to establish a causal relationship between the two trends previous work on the relationship between labor markets and crime focused mainly on the relationship between the unemployment rate and crime and found inconclusive results in contrast this paper examines the impact of both wages and unemployment on crime and uses instrumental variables to establish causality we conclude that both wages and unemployment are significantly related to crime but that wages played a larger role in the crime trends over the last few decades these results are robust to the inclusion of deterrence variables controls for simultaneity and controlling for individual and family characteristics

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

regulation and the theory of legislative choice the interstate commerce act of 1887 this article concerns the economic incidence of the interstate commerce act of 1887 ica our focus is the short haul pricing constraint a provision of the ica that prohibited railroads from charging higher rates to isolated primarily agrarian shippers than it charged to intercity shippers of similar commodities utilizing the event study methodology we find that the impending passage of the ica generated a distribution of abnormal returns to railroads and shipping firms that is consistent with the theoretical implications of our analysis of the short haul pricing constraint shpc however early interpretations of the shpc by the interstate commerce commission reduced some of the abnormal returns to railroads in a manner that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the short haul pricing constraint was an important mechanism of early railroad regulation the analysis does support a multiple interest interpretation of the interstate commerce act and has implications for the positive theory of regulation

government policy and the firm s capital structure abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of commonly observed forms of government intervention on the firm s capital structure we show that since market claims against the firm are always properly priced the firm is forced to take market claimants interests into account on the other hand since government claims are usually not adjusted for risk the firm can take advantage of the government it does so by choosing strategies that extract maximum value minimum cost from these policies in particular the firm uses its capital capital structure to maximize the value of the policy thus leading to a determinate capital strucure

how successful was the new deal the microeconomic impact of new deal spending and lending policies in the 1930s the new deal during the 1930s was arguably the largest peace time expansion in federal government activity in american history until recently there had been very little quantitative testing of the microeconomic impact of the wide variety of new deal programs over the past decade scholars have developed new panel databases for counties cities and states and then used panel data methods on them to examine the impact of new deal spending and lending policies for the major new deal programs in most cases the identification of the effect comes from changes across time within the same geographic location after controlling for national shocks to the economy many of the studies also use instrumental variable methods to control for endogeneity the studies find that public works and relief spending had state income multipliers of around one increased consumption activity attracted internal migration reduced crime rates and lowered several types of mortality the farm programs typically aided large farm owners but eliminated opportunities for share croppers tenants and farm workers the home owners loan corporation s purchases and refinancing of troubled mortgages staved off drops in housing prices and home ownership rates at relatively low ex post cost to taxpayers the reconstruction finance corporation s loans to banks and railroads appear to have had little positive impact although the banks were aided when the rfc took ownership stakes

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

cyclical quality adjustment in the labor market 1 introductionthe u s unemployment rate fell to very low levels during the 1990s even more impressively the unemployment rate for minorities and less educated individuals fell disproportionately convergence of relative unemployment rates in expansions and divergence in recessions has been a feature of the u s economy over the last 30 years there are many possible reasons for this feature for example if the costs of hiring and firing less skilled labor are low one would expect these individuals to have very procyclical employment in this paper i explore an alternative model when there is an excess supply of labor high skilled people take jobs that would normally be occupied by less skilled people in expansions the process reverses with less skilled workers getting access to jobs that they would normally not attain i refer to this process as cyclical quality adjustment reder 1955 p 834 was one of the first to discuss how hiring standards adjust to business cycle conditions quality variations in labor markets arise through upgrading and downgrading of members of the labor force relative to the jobs they are to fill when applicants become scarce employers tend to lower the minimum standards upon which they insist as a condition for hiring a worker to fill a particular job and vice versa when applicants become plentiful since then many papers have developed this idea theoretically and many economic commentators appear to share this view of the labor market for example the economic report of the president states that a strong labor market is particularly important to less advantaged groups in the labor market such as workers with less education younger workers racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants when employers find it hard to fill vacancies they are more willing to hire and train workers whom they might pass over when they have fewer openings and an abundance of applicants council of economic advisors 1999 p 103 likewise the expansion during the 1990s spawned many newspaper articles about the improvement in the types of jobs available to less skilled applicants however there is little systematic empirical work about changes in job assignment in the united states over the business cycle the empirical work in this paper seeks to redress this situation cyclical assignment changes are important for many reasons as mentioned earlier job upgrading is a potential explanation for the greater cyclical variation of employment experienced by less skilled workers it is well known that the unemployment rates of less skilled individuals and minorities are more countercyclical relative to more skilled individuals clark and summers 1981 kydland 1984 keane and prasad 1993 hoynes 1999 the standard explanation for this effect is that low ability workers are more likely to be laid off in downturns because training and hiring costs are lower for these workers no commensurate attention has been paid to the issue of how the decision of who to hire changes over the business cycle however assignment models present a natural explanation for the greater procyclicality of employment of the less skilled both the adjustment cost hypothesis and the upgrading hypothesis imply that less skilled workers will have more procyclical employment empirically they are distinguishable because the upgrading explanation implies that jobs obtained by comparable workers should vary systematically over the cycle the adjustment cost hypothesis relates to the composition of those whose jobs are terminated second these mechanisms suggest a reason why wages are particularly procyclical for job changers recent studies using panel data have indicated that the wages of job starters are much more procyclical than the wages of workers who do not change jobs researchers have suggested various explanations for this result beaudry and dinardo 1991 and macleod and malcomson 1993 present contracting models in which the wages of job starters depend on the state of the labor market when they join the firm

using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime comment previous empirical studies have uncovered little evidence that police reduce crime possibly due to simultaneity problems this paper uses the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections as an instrumental variable to identify a causal effect of police on crime increases in the size of police forces are shown to be disproportionately concentrated in mayoral and gubernatorial election years increases in police are shown to substantially reduce violent crime but have a smaller impact on property crime the null hypothesis that the marginal social benefit of reduced crime equals the costs of hiring additional police cannot be rejected

faith based charity and crowd out during the great depression abstract interest in religious organizations as providers of social services has increased dramatically in recent years churches in the u s were a crucial provider of social services through the early part of the twentieth century but their role shrank dramatically with the expansion in government spending under the new deal in this paper we investigate the extent to which the new deal crowded out church charitable spending in the 1930s we do so using a new nationwide data set of charitable spending for six large christian denominations matched to data on local new deal spending we instrument for new deal spending using measures of the political strength of a state s congressional delegation and confirm our findings using a different instrument based on institutional constraints on state relief spending with both instruments we find that higher government spending leads to lower church charitable activity crowd out was small as a share of total new deal spending 3 but large as a share of church spending our estimates suggest that benevolent church spending fell by 30 in response to the new deal and that government relief spending can explain virtually all of the decline in charitable church activity observed between 1933 and 1939

real wages over the business cycle evidence from panel data one topic on which keynes did not disagree with classical economists was the cyclical behavior of real wages keynes 1936 as well as various classical writers predicted that real wages should move countercyclically quoting the general theory p 17 in general an increase in employment can only occur through the accompaniment of a decline in real wages thus i am not disputing this vital fact which the classical economists have rightly asserted as indefeasible this prediction is based on the premise of competition and a given short run capital stock increases in employment then correspond to more intensive use of capital and through diminishing product lower real wages for this reason evidence by dunlop 1938 and tarshis 1939 that real wages move procyclically was viewed as paradoxical both dunlop and tarshis based their findings on an observed positive correlation between real and money wages which given the procyclical movement of money wages implies a positive correlation between

unemployment and crime is there a connection a panel of swedish counties over the years 1988 1999 is used to study the effects of unemployment on property crime rates the period under study is characterized by turbulence in the labor market the variation in unemployment rates was unprecedented in the latter part of the century hence the data provide a unique opportunity to examine unemployment effects according to the theory of economics of crime increased unemployment rates lead to higher property crime rates a fixed effects model is estimated to investigate this hypothesis the model includes time and county specific effects and a number of economic and socio demographic variables to control for unobservables and covariates the results show that unemployment had a positive and significant effect on some property crimes burglary car theft and bike theft

on the political economy of guest worker programs in agriculture guest workers have provided a source of agricultural labor supply in many countries recent legislative proposals on immigration reform in the united states have renewed discussions about the role of guest worker programs and highlighted the arguments for and against such programs even within the agricultural sector there has not been strong broad based support for an expansion in the number of guest workers a model is developed that considers competing interests between commodity groups horticulture crops and grain crops to explain this lack of support and then a series of simulations are conducted to highlight the possible economic effects of an expanded guest worker program results suggest that an increase in the labor supply would have much larger economic impacts for horticultural producers and firms in the supporting input markets furthermore under some conditions simulation outcomes show how an increase in the labor supply may lead to small revenue losses for both producers and input suppliers in grain markets

the value of the vote a model and test of the effects of turnout on distributive policy the most plausible assumption is that if certain groups or classes of citizens habitually do not vote their interest will be neglected in the actions and policies of governments key 1950 506 i introduction this article investigates the effects of voter participation on the distribution of government funds a simple model shows why for some types of distributive policy incumbents will have a greater probability of reelection if high turnout regions receive more funds than do low turnout regions the model predicts therefore that politicians who seek reelection and similarly politicians including the ideologically driven selected into office because they set popular policy will tend to allocate more funds to regions with higher turnout i test the model s predicted relationship between turnout and spending for the south in the 1930s spending data are county level allocations by the federal emergency relief administration fera which was the early new deal s main program to provide relief to the unemployed the evidence suggests that turnout had a substantial effect on fera spending if an individual was a voter rather than a nonvoter it typically led to an increase on the order of 30 in the expected fera allocation for the individual s county the findings shed light both on the role of voting in representative democracies and on the historical role of voting rights in the southern political system elections voter participation and policy representative democracy creates a tendency for government to set policy that improves politicians prospects for reelection this may occur because politicians design policy for the purpose of winning reelection or it may occur because elections sort into office those politicians who for ideological or other reasons tend to set policy that wins votes 1 the type of policy that improves the prospects for reelection depends upon how voters respond to policy to illustrate this point consider the distribution of a fixed sum between different regions e g counties one key consideration is the extent to which voting behavior responds to distributive policy allocating funds to groups that do not respond will be less likely to lead to reelection groups that do not respond include those who will always vote in support of the incumbent those who will always vote in opposition to the incumbent and those who do not vote previous work on distributive politics has examined how distribution is influenced by constituents voting behavior with respect to whom they support when they do vote for example wright 1974 wallis 1984 1987 1991 kiewiet and mccubbins 1985 cox and mccubbins 1986 and fleck 1999 examine favoritism of swing and loyal voters 2 this article takes a different but complementary approach by focusing on the distributive effects of whether people vote quite simply winning the approval of a group of citizens has a larger effect on reelection if those citizens vote in large numbers than if they do not this provides a reason to expect that politicians will tend to allocate relatively little to those who do not vote this is consistent with the long recognized point that nonvoters have little influence on policy a point that key 1950 made clear and that follows naturally from economic models of voting such as that of downs 1957 bennett and mayberry 1979 show a similar effect of legislative representation on interstate redistribution states with more representatives per capita in congress tend to have lower ratios of taxes paid into the federal treasury relative to federal grants in aid received by modeling and estimating the effects of voter participation this article contributes to the general understanding of how voting influences the allocation of resources furthermore the substantial size of the estimated effects underscores the critical role that voting rights played in the southern political system

budgetary policy with unified and decentralized appropriations authority the divestiture of the house appropriations committee in the1880 s has received considerable attention of an empiricalnature this paper presents a formal model of legislativedecisionmaking using a common agency formulation to representinterest group lobbying of legislators this framework is usedto analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriationsauthority the conditions under which decentralization leadsto higher spending are characterized it is argued that theconventional view that divestiture caused higher levels ofspending only holds if decentralization created barriers tolobbying and political bargaining across different committees in addition the role of specialized committee knowledge isexamined

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

voting and paying for public goods an application of the theory of the core abstract let any coalition with a majority of all voters have the power to choose the quantities of public goods under rule i a majority coalition bears a cost of its decision that is proportional to its size under rule ii it must bear the whole cost of its decision thus rule i imposes costs on minorities although they have no power to choose the quantities of public goods while rule ii allows goods to have some attributes of semiprivate goods it is shown that a nonempty core under rule i implies a nonempty core under rule ii but not conversely necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the properties of the von neumann morgenstern characteristic function are given

the theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation in this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states we find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors 1 the extent of public sector union membership which represents the interest group hypothesis has a positive influence on pro union legislation 2 the extent of employer opposition to unions as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections has a negative effect on bargaining laws 3 two taste variables the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state have a positive influence on these laws a result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation

the bias in favor of pro tariff lobbies abstract we show that the probability of success of the pro tariff lobby defined as a decreasing function of the ratio of consumer loss to producer gain rent generated by the tariff rises with the tariff under very general conditions this appears as an exception to becker s view that less distortionary measures tend to be adopted over their more distortionary counterparts we then provide a micro foundation for our probability definition using the imperfectly discriminating lobbying framework

striking at the roots of crime the impact of welfare spending on crime during the great depression abstractduring the great depression contemporaries worried that people hit by hard times would resort to crime president franklin roosevelt argued that the massive government relief efforts struck at the roots of crime by providing subsistence income to needy families after constructing a panel data set for 81 large american cities for the years 1930 40 we estimate the effect of relief spending by all levels of government on crime rates the analysis suggests that a 10 percent increase in relief spending during the 1930s reduced property crime by roughly 1 5 percent by limiting the amount of relief recipients free time work relief may have been more effective than direct relief in reducing crime more generally our results indicate that social insurance which tends to be understudied in economic analyses of crime should be more explicitly and more carefully incorporated into the analysis of temporal and spatial variations in criminal activity

identifying the effect of unemployment on crime abstract in this paper we analyze the relationship between unemployment and crime using u s state data we estimate the effect of unemployment on the rates of seven felony offenses we control extensively for state level demographic and economic factors and estimate specifications that include state specific time trends state effects and year effects in addition we use prime defense contracts and a state specific measure of exposure to oil shocks as instruments for unemployment rates we find significantly positive effects of unemployment on property crime rates that are stable across model specifications our estimates suggest that a substantial portion of the decline in property crime rates during the 1990s is attributable to the decline in the unemployment rate the evidence for violent crime is considerably weaker however a closer analysis of the violent crime of rape yields some evidence that the employment prospects of males are weakly related to state rape rates

random errors dirty information and politics rational voters assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased but affected by random errors clean information decreases these errors while dirty information increases them in politics most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically thus such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate they systematically affect politics this illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups it helps to explain various puzzles in public choice e g the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians incentives to produce dirty information

using stock price data to measure the effects of regulation the interstate commerce act and the railroad industry this article usesjinancial data to measure the effects of the passage of the interstate commerce act of 1887 and subsequent legislative and judicial developments on firms in the railroad industry the results indicate that the interstate commerce act had a significant positive impact on railroad stock prices and that court decisions in the 1890s which severely restricted the powers of the interstate commerce commission caused negative stock price reactions thesefindings offer support for the revisionist view of regulatory history according to which the railroads welcomed regulation as a means offacilitating the enforcement of cartel like agreements

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

us monetary and fiscal policy in the 1930s the paper provides a survey of fiscal and monetary policies during the 1930s under the hoover and roosevelt administrations and how they influenced the policies during the recent great recession the discussion of the causal impacts of monetary policy focuses on papers written in the last decade and the findings of scholars using dynamic structural general equilibrium modelling the discussion of fiscal policy shows why economists do not see the new deal as a keynesian stimulus describes the significant shift toward excise taxation during the 1930s and surveys estimates of the impact of federal spending on local economies the paper concludes with discussion of the lessons for the present from 1930s monetary and fiscal policy

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

transaction costs institutional design and the separation of powers abstract the internal organization of the government can be used as a constraint on the capture of political decision makers in a setting where multiple interest groups try to influence policy outcomes centralization i e the choice of a single agency dealing with all interest groups is costly because it induces a better coordination of their influences the choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture making agencies more immune to capture by interest groups more generally we discuss how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes

why have aggregate skilled hours become so cyclical since the mid 1980 s this paper documents and discusses a dramatic change in the cyclical behavior of aggregate hours worked by individuals with a college degree skilled workers since the mid 1980 s using the cps outgoing rotation data set for the period 1979 1 2003 4 we find that the volatility of aggregate skilled hours relative to the volatility of gdp has nearly tripled since 1984 in contrast the cyclical properties of unskilled hours have remained essentially unchanged we evaluate the extent to which a simple supply demand model for skilled and unskilled labor with capital skill complementarity in production can help explain this stylized fact within this framework we identify three effects which would lead to an increase in the relative volatility of skilled hours i a reduction in the degree of capital skill complementarity ii a reduction in the absolute volatility of gdp and unskilled hours and iii an increase in the level of capital equipment relative to skilled labor we provide empirical evidence in support of each of these effects our conclusion is that these three mechanisms can jointly explain about sixty percent of the observed increase in the relative volatility of skilled labor the reduction in the degree of capital skill complementarity contributes the most to this result

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

self regulation taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements an increasingly popular instrument for solving environmental problems is the public voluntary agreement va in which government offers technical assistance and positive publicity to firms that reach certain environmental goals prior papers treat such agreements as a superior low cost instrument that can be used to preempt a threat of traditional inefficient regulation we present a more general model in which public vas may instead be weak tools used when political opposition makes environmental taxes infeasible we explore the conditions under which taxes public vas and unilateral industry actions are to be expected and the welfare implications of the various instruments notably we also show that welfare may be reduced by the introduction of public vas 2002 elsevier b v all rights reserved

contracts job experience and cyclical labor market adjustments longitudinal estimates of the variability of individual wages hours and weeks worked over the course of changing demand states are provided for all workers generally and for workers of varied levels of job experience emphasis is placed on that part of job experience represented as years on current job a commonly used proxy for the magnitude of firm specific skills interpretation of resulting estimates in the context of the labor market contracting literature is attempted generally significant procyclical patterns are found for real weekly wages weekly hours and weeks worked the extent of weekly wage variability is much greater than is generally suggested in the literature furthermore workers with greater tenure exhibit greater cyclical wage and hours variability and less weeks variability finally empirical distinctions are drawn separately for white collar and blue collar as well as union and nonunion workers

the effect of welfare programs on criminal behavior a theoretical and empirical analysis a simple economic model of criminal behavior shows that welfare payments will reduce the time allocated to illegal activities under risk aversion and other reasonable assumptions this theoretical prediction is confirmed by the empirical findings using a set of cross sectional u s state data for 1987 it is found that cash or in kind welfare programs have a negative and often significant effect on property crime more general programs such as public housing seem to have a larger effect than those aimed primarily at women afdc medicaid and school lunch programs apparently have little effect on property crime

task assignment over the business cycle in this article i evaluate the hypothesis that firms respond to negative demand shocks by assigning workers to tasks that require less skill than the tasks they normally carry out using changes in employment in state industry cells as a measure of demand conditions facing individual firms i provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis furthermore the skill requirements of the tasks carried out by workers are procyclical the results are consistent with a specific capital model where employers move workers between tasks so that layoffs are concentrated on workers with low levels of firm specific human capital

crime and economic incentives we explore the role that economic incentives particularly changes in wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution play in determining crime rates we use data on the police force areas of england and wales between 1975 and 1996 and find relative falls in the wages of low wage workers lead to increases in crime we carry out a number of experiments with different wage measures including a wage measure that accounts for the effects of changes in the composition of employment these reinforce the picture of a strong association between the low wage labor market and crime the result that incentives play a central role is reinforced further by the strong impact on crime of deterrence measures and of a measure of the returns to crime

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

explaining price policy bias in agriculture the calculus of support maximizing politicians a model is developed to explain observed patterns of policy intervention in agriculture we analyze the interaction between political support seeking politicians and supportsupplying citizens society consists of a rural and urban group we determine the effects on transfers of relative group size disparities in income endowments between groups and the deadweight loss of redistribution the framework advanced is an alternative to that of the interest group model and is used to explain for example why the export sectors in developing countries are taxed more and why the united kingdom is less adamant for higher price supports than germany

allocation of goods by lottery i introduction many goods such as hunting permits oil drilling leases cellular telephone licenses and rights to fishing berths as well as some buds such as the military draft jury duty and who is to be thrown overboard on a sinking life raft are or have been allocated by lotteries in neo classical welfare economics the random distribution of property rights does not affect allocative efficiency as long as transferability is allowed and the transactions costs are non prohibitive lottery allocations however are generally not transferable thus lottery allocations are inefficient since the goods are not ultimately allocated to the users who value them the most a number of authors such as aubert 1959 fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 36 122 have argued that lotteries are chosen as the allocative instrument because it represents a fair or just means of allocating the goods rawls 1971 374 and eckhoff 1989 have noted that where it is impractical to divide the goods equally among those who desire them a lottery serves to satisfy both the requirement that the process be fair and that the allocation problem be resolved relatively costlessly elster 1989 113 however notes that lotteries are not the only fair allocation mechanism for example he points out that in jewish ethics the problem of allocating an indivisible good such as life saving resources is resolved by denying it to everyone even economists would probably prefer a lottery to this resolution the fairness hypothesis has a rich history in the old testament lotteries are deemed a fair way of allocating goods such as the inheritance of land numbers 33 54 lotteries are also used to allocate bads in perhaps the most famous biblical example of use of lots jonah was chosen by lot to be sacrificed to appease god who had brought a storm that threatened to wreck the ship the story goes that the lot selected jonah because he was shirking his duties elsewhere and should not have even been on the vessel jonah 1 6 1 notice that fair here is taken to mean just given this theological foundation it is not surprising that the lottery has seen frequent use in legal history as well one of the most interesting cases occurred in swedish and finnish trials in the 17th and 18th centuries in cases where a man was murdered by a mob lotteries were used to allocate punishment since the law required an eye for an eye no more and no less eckhoff says that if it was impossible to ascertain which of them had dealt the mortal blow the courts determined that one of the responsible parties be sentenced to death and that the person be selected by lottery 1989 19 a similar use of lotteries occurs in military history to deal with cases of mass desertion in roman armies every tenth man was executed decimated and the remainder pardoned in more modern times the lottery has been used in u s law 2 first of course is the use of a lottery to decide who shall sit on a jury a connection between fairness and lotteries however has also appeared in the common law in an 1842 case u s v holmes which has been discussed by fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 a ship sank in a heavy storm and the lone surviving life raft was in grave danger of sinking the crew threw overboard fourteen male passengers in an effort to save the rest when back in port after being rescued a crewman named holmes the only crew member who had not disappeared upon arrival to port was brought to trial for the deaths of the passengers the court ruled that the non essential members of the crew should have been thrown overboard before any passengers and if that was not sufficient then passengers should have been selected by lot which is the fairest mode elster 1989 65 the fact that a human life presumably a large cost was at stake ex post did not affect the decision 3 the environmental economics literature contains a number of references to the social preferences for and benefits of lottery allocations

private interest support for efficiency enhancing antitrust policies recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real as opposed to the stated purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition we argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face i introduction the traditional justification for the enactment and enforcement of antitrust legislation is that it serves the public interest by preventing businesses from engaging in practices that reduce competition over the last decade some economists have become skeptical of this justification a small but growing number of economists see the public interest justification for antitrust enforcement as a pretense for using government to promote the private interests of politically organized groups 1 within the private interest theory of government model it is natural to see antitrust activity as motivated by the desire to reduce rather than increase competition certainly a private interest is better served by obtaining an anticompetitive increase in the price of the product being sold than by obtaining a competitive reduction in the price of one of the many products being bought yet major contributors to and strong supporters of the private interest theory of government are reluctant to embrace the private interest explanation of at least the origins of antitrust policy george stigler for example has said so far as i can tell it s the sherman act a public interest law i like the sherman act 2 bork 1978 61 has argued that the legislative history of the sherman act displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumers welfare and according to posner 1976 23 the framers of the sherman act appear to have been concerned mainly with the price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels with the view prevalent even among those sympathetic with the private interest theory of government that antitrust legislation owes much to the desire for a more competitive economy it is not surprising that antitrust policy has been resistant to private interest explanations 3 our purpose is to weaken this resistance by arguing that the private interest theory of government is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that support for antitrust activity is motivated by the desire to increase the competitive efficiency of the general economy indeed we shall argue that the private interest theory of government suggests that organized interests may favor antitrust actions as a means of limiting their own anticompetitive practices it should be emphasized at the outset that we will not attempt to establish that antitrust enforcement does increase economic efficiency our more modest objective is to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent views of those who both accept a private interest theory of government and believe that economic efficiency is served by antitrust policy the difficulty of addressing the issue of the effect antitrust enforcement has on the overall efficiency of the economy is reflected in stigler s 1982 44 admission it would be gratifying to me if i could report that our profession s changing view toward support of antitrust policy was based upon the systematic study by economists of the effects of the policy in short that hard evidence carried the day unfortunately there have been no persuasive studies of the effects of the sherman and clayton acts throughout this century 4 in the next section we present a simple model of a coalition of industries each of which is interested in achieving its own protection in political competition with other industries

market wages and youth crime to study the problem of widespread youth crime i analyze a timeallocation model in which consumers face parametric wages and diminishing marginal returns to crime the theory motivates an econometric model that i estimate using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth my estimates suggest that youth behavior is responsive to price incentives and that falling real wages may have been an important determinant of rising youth crime during the 1970s and 1980s moreover wage differentials explain a substantial component of both the racial differential in criminal participation and the age distribution of crime

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

balancing environmental protection and energy production in the federal hydropower licensing process the u s federal energy regulatory commission ferc must balance environmental protection of riverine resources with the nation s growing demand for power production every time it issues a hydroelectric license this paper models the bureaucratic agency s decision making process in issuing these licenses data on nearly 500 hydro power licenses issued from 1983 to 2005 are utilized it is discovered that legislative and institutional constraints are by far the largest influences on ferc s regulatory decisions implying that if the current allocation of surface water in the united states is considered inefficient the most effective way to alter this allocation is by passing new legislation or by implementing institutional reform at ferc

the effect of education on crime evidence from prison inmates arrests and self reports we estimate the effect of high school graduation on participation in criminal activity accounting for endogeneity of schooling we begin by analyzing the effect of high school graduation on incarceration using census data instrumental variable estimates using changes in state compulsory attendance laws as an instrument for high school graduation uncover a significant reduction in incarceration for both blacks and whites when estimating the impact of high school graduation only ols and iv estimators estimate different weighted sums of the impact of each schooling progression on the probability of incarceration we clarify the relationship between ols and iv estimates and show that the weights placed on the impact of each schooling progression can explain differences in the estimates overall the estimates suggest that completing high school reduces the probability of incarceration by about 76 percentage points for whites and 3 4 percentage points for blacks we corroborate these findings using fbi data on arrests that distinguish among different types of crimes the biggest impacts of graduation are associated with murder assault and motor vehicle theft we also examine the effect of drop out on self reported crime in the nlsy and find that our estimates for imprisonment and arrest are caused by changes in criminal behavior and not educational differences in the probability of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime we estimate that the externality of education is about 14 26 of the private return to schooling suggesting that a significant part of the social return to education comes in the form of externalities from crime reduction

interest group politics under majority rule abstract we develop a model of interest group politics in which the groups and coalitions that arise and the form of redistributive policies sought are jointly determined the model generates three key results first programs intended to reduce income inequality are more likely to involve direct payments than are programs that redistribute wealth across groups with similar incomes second nonequalizing redistribution is unlikely unless the various participants in the political process face significantly different political and economic costs of obtaining transfers third many policies that induce asymmetries among interest groups also impose significant deadweight costs stable nonequalizing redistribution will therefore tend to involve indirect and economically inefficient methods of transferring income

skill heterogeneity and the business cycle this paper extends the real business cycle framework to incorporate ex ante skill heterogeneity among workers consistent with the empirical evidence skilled and unskilled workers in the model face the same degree of cyclical variation in real wages although unskilled workers are subject to substantially higher procyclical variation in employment systematic cyclical changes in the average skill level of employed workers are shown to induce bias in standard aggregate measures of cyclical variation in the labour input productivity and the real wage the introduction of skill heterogeneity improves the model s ability to match the empirical correlation between total hours and the real wage but the correlation between total hours and labour productivity remains higher than it does in the data

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

voter influence and big policy change the positive political economy of the new deal what conditions cause major policy changes under representative government this article addresses that question by providing a theoretically grounded analysis of a massive policy change the new deal it explains how the economic problems of the early 1930s initiated changes on several dimensions of policy federal spending labor market regulation and civil rights the article concludes by considering the broader lessons learned from the political economy of the new deal

the legislative history of the sherman act re examined according to robert bork s influential analysis the sherman act was expressly instituted by the 51st congress to advance consumer welfare but has often been misinterpreted by federal courts handing down anticonsumer decisions this paper suggests that the political coalition backing the 1890 antitrust statute sought multiple social ends and did not faithfully seek to impose economic efficiency the key evidence includes historical economic trends congressional debate the legislative agenda of senator john sherman and the political conflict generated by the most contentious and most electorally important issue of the 51st congress the highly protectionist mckinley tariff act i the consumer welfare hypothesis economists have singled out the sherman antitrust act as a uniquely proconsumer piece of legislation while the general economic analysis of political processes has proceeded from george stigler s presumption that a s a rule regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily in its benefit stigler 1971 114 no similar cynicism has enveloped the nation s preeminent antitrust statute strong evidence that the federal trade commission act of 1914 was shaped by the protectionist vision of louis brandeis mccraw 1981 or even a solid economic consensus as to the anticompetitive sentiment behind the 1936 antitrust law the robinson patman act see sowell 1980 210 ross 1984 243 schwartz 1986 has failed to cloud the sherman act s good name as stigler himself has concluded i like the sherman act so far as i can tell it s a public interest law in the same sense in which i think having private property enforcement of contracts and suppression of crime are public interest phenomena stigler 1984 46 see also stigler 1985 1 this proconsumer view of antitrust is all the more ironic in light of recent dissatisfaction with anticonsumer consequences of antitrust policy generally see goldschmid et al 1974 demsetz 1978 baxter 1980 brozen 1982 armentano 1982 johnson 1983 baumol and ordover 1985 hazlett 1986 bittlingmayer 1992 there is widespread concern that antitrust law has been employed against competitive market rivalry moreover the central paradox of an 1890 antimonopoly law remains why should an economy rapidly expanding outputs in virtually all major industrial sectors move to quash restrictions of output baxter 1980 dilorenzo 1985 particularly when such output increases were intrinsically tied to the emergence of large corporate forms chandler 1977 it is also troubling that the interstate commerce act of 1887 generally rejected as a proefficiency measure occurred under such close and similar political auspices hilton 1966 indeed a recent re examination of the commerce act has nicely revealed a multiple interest group demand for legislation gilligan et al 1989 perhaps the consumer welfare model differs sharply from the popular notions of monopoly that the sherman act sought to discourage in law yet this would tend to jeopardize the notion that the act was wholly proconsumer and american economists of the sherman act era in typically viewing competition as a dynamic market phenomenon largely rejected the antitrust approach as failing to advance the consumer s long run interests dilorenzo and high 1988 the proconsumer view of the sherman act has been most thoroughly elaborated by robert bork who writes the legislative history of the sherman act displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer welfare 1978 61 while competing motivations for antitrust legislation were admittedly advanced with only trivial exceptions it is impossible to find even colorable language suggesting most of the other broad social or political purposes that have occasionally been suggested as relevant to the application of the sherman act bork 1966 42

income distribution and infant mortality comparing two countries in which the poor have equal real incomes the one in which the rich are wealthier is likely to have a higher infant mortality rate this anomalous result does not appear to spring from measurement error in estimating the income of the poor and the association between high infant mortality and income inequality is still present after controlling for other factors such as education medical personnel and fertility the positive association of infant mortality and the income of the rich suggests that measured real incomes may be a poor measure of social welfare this paper considers and tests several possible explanations such as the provision of medical services the degree of urbanization the extent of female literacy and differences in the composition of births among different income groups none of these factors adequately accounts for the positive association between the incomes of the rich and infant mortality the geographical scope is worldwide excerpt

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

heterogeneous workers and occupations inequality unemployment and crowding out this article attempts to determine the factors behind the cyclical behavior of the skill premium using the current population survey outgoing rotation group the premium is found uncorrelated with contemporaneous output and lags the business cycle to account for this observation the article develops a framework that features search frictions agents are either high or low educated and firms post two types of vacancies the complex which can be matched with the high educated and the simple which can be matched with the high and the low educated on the job search for a complex occupation is undertaken by the high educated in simple occupations an aggregate technological shock induces firms to increase their posting of simple and complex vacancies as complex vacancies are more costly to create than simple ones the increase in the former lags that of the latter as the number of complex vacancies increases with a lag on the job search intensity increases on the expense of the hours of work of the high educated in simple occupations on the other hand the total hours of the high educated in complex occupations increases this lagged cyclical increase in the labor input of the high educated in complex occupations causes the skill premium to increase with a lag as well

spatial dynamics and heterogeneity in the cyclicality of real wages neither the issue of how local and aggregate labor markets interact over time nor the issue of how heterogeneity by education race and other factors interacts with these spatial dynamics has prev

does emergency financial assistance reduce crime abstract does emergency financial assistance reduce criminal behavior among those experiencing negative shocks to address this question we exploit quasi random variation in the allocation of temporary financial assistance to eligible individuals and families that have experienced an economic shock chicago s homelessness prevention call center hpcc connects such families and individuals with assistance but the availability of funding varies unpredictably consequently we can determine the impact of temporary assistance on crime by comparing outcomes for those who call when funds are available to those who call when no funds are available linking this call center information to arrest records from the chicago police department we find some evidence that total arrests fall between 1 and 2 years after the call for violent crime police arrest those for whom funds were available 51 less often than those who were eligible but for whom no funds were available single individuals drive this decrease the decline in crime appears to be related in part to greater housing stability being referred to assistance significantly decreases arrests for homelessness related outdoor crimes such as trespassing however we also find that financial assistance leads to an increase in property crime arrests this increase is evident for family heads but not single individuals the increase is mostly due to shoplifting and the timing of this increase suggests that financial assistance enables some families to take on financial obligations that they are subsequently unable to meet overall the change in the mix of crime induced by financial assistance generates considerable social benefits due to the greater social cost of violence

separating economic from political influences on government decisions abstract the public interest theory is a poor predictor of government decisions relative to interest group theories but a sophisticated public interest theory is a more serious alternative to the former testing the sophisticated theory s predictions is problematic however when public interest is coincident with an interest group s interests a four step method is developed that disentangles public interest and interest group interests by separating economic from political incentives applying the method to the national forest service decisions about wilderness designations indicates whether interest groups were successful in influencing allocation decisions and whether allocation decisions were in the public interest

the impact of legalized abortion on crime we offer evidence that legalized abortion has contributed significantly to recent crime reductions crime began to fall roughly eighteen years after abortion legalization the five states that allowed abortion in 1970 experienced declines earlier than the rest of the nation which legalized in 1973 with roe v wade states with high abortion rates in the 1970s and 1980s experienced greater crime reductions in the 1990s in high abortion states only arrests of those born after abortion legalization fall relative to low abortion states legalized abortion appears to account for as much as 50 percent of the recent drop in crime

the political economy of farmland ownership regulations and land prices one of the most ubiquitous forms of agricultural regulation is a restriction on farmland ownership one canadian example of a farmland ownership restriction is the saskatchewan farm security act fsa passed in 1974 the purpose of this article is to explain using a political economy framework why the fsa was implemented and to estimate the effect of the fsa on saskatchewan farmland values a present value pv model is used to estimate the relationship between land values rents and the regulation the hausman endogeneity test reveals that the regulation variable is endogenous with the land price the sign of the regulation variable is negative which fits with the theory i e the more stringent the regulation the lower the land value we estimate that the regulation lowered saskatchewan farmland prices by an average of 4 to 34 us acre depending on whether ordinary least squares ols or two stage least squares tsls is employed in the estimation over the period of 1974 2001