ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions this paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once these games span the standard categories static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information for each game the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the nash equilibrium or relevant refinement in each case however a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior these contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others decisions

pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second best pigouvian tax this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non linear taxes it is demonstrated that the optimal second best tax on an externality generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds since it equals one in the optimal tax system in the optimum distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains if the government does not have access to a non distortionary marginal source of finance the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution the optimal second best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the pigouvian level the findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative agent models shedding new light on the weak double dividend hypothesis and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes

compulsory versus voluntary voting an experimental study abstract we report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions if voting is compulsory then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely i e against their private information if voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed then sincere voting in accordance with a voter s private information is always rational while participation may become strategic we find strong support for these theoretical predictions in our experimental data moreover voters adapt their decisions to the voting institution in place in such a way as to make the group decision accuracy differences between the two voting institutions negligible the latter finding may serve to rationalize the co existence of compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in nature

voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice abstract the efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common interest issues critically depends on voter motivation i e on voters willingness to cast an informed vote if voters are motivated voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes we experimentally study a common interest situation in which we vary voters information cost and the competence of the expert we find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict although strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the strategic interdependence implied by those theories i demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized strategic interaction i show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use monte carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values finally i reanalyze a well known game theoretic model of war bueno de mesquita and lalman s 1992 international interaction game my results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model

multicandidate elections aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory the rational voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions the paradox of voting and duverger s law are at odds with reality recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an arguably unrealistic assumption the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate in this paper we propose direct empirical evidence of the effects of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections adopting a theory based experimental approach we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non duverger s law equilibria in plurality elections our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions

a payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games abstract this paper investigates how well a simple two sided incomplete information game with a full support prior can be used to explain non nash equilibrium outcomes observed in the centipede game experiments i estimate the variance of the uncertainty about preferences in several versions of the model select two models and compare these models to the estimation results of the altruism model and the quantal response models it is shown that the two selected models have a better fit than the one parameter altruism and quantal response models and that the estimated variance can explain all qualitative features of these experimental results journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c19 c 44 c91

learning and noisy equilibrium behavior in an experimental study of imperfect price competition we consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique bertrand nash equilibrium the high price firm has a nonvanishing market share however and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share this relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy logit best responses to expected payoff differences the resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high price firm s market share varies the model accurately predicts the final period price averages a naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices

dea based auctions we discuss the design of a multi dimensional procurement mechanism that combines data envelopment analysis dea and auction theory the mechanism selects an agent to provide a project characterized by multiple attributes the optimal configuration of the multiple attributes is settled endogenously by trading off the costs to the provider with the benefits to the acquirer this is done within a context of asymmetric information and strategic behavior as well as possibly correlated costs the mechanism makes it individually rational and incentive compatible to participate and reveal costs and the outcome is socially optimal allocatively efficient

the role of environmental factors in water utilities technical efficiency empirical evidence from spanish companies this article computes input specific scores of technical efficiency for a sample of water utilities located in the southern spanish region of andalusia in addition differences in efficiency between different operating environments are investigated concerning the debate about ownership and efficiency we find that privately owned companies outperform public utilities in their management of labour furthermore technical efficiency is found to be greater among firms located in highly populated areas and for utilities providing water services to tourist municipalities finally no empirical evidence supporting the greater technical efficiency of consortia of water utilities a managerial strategy strongly encouraged by regional politicians is found

benchmarking and incentive regulation of quality of service an application to the uk electricity distribution networks abstract quality of service has emerged as an important issue in post reform regulation of electricity distribution networks regulators have employed partial incentive schemes to promote cost saving investment efficiency and service quality this paper presents a quality incorporated benchmarking study of the electricity distribution utilities in the uk between 1991 92 and 1998 99 we calculate technical efficiency of the utilities using data envelopment analysis technique and productivity change over time using quality incorporated malmquist indices we find that cost efficient firms do not necessarily exhibit high service quality and that efficiency scores of cost only models do not show high correlation with those of quality based models the results also show that improvements in service quality have made a significant contribution to the sector s total productivity change in addition we show that integrating quality of service in regulatory benchmarking is preferable to cost only approaches

the effect of minimum wage laws on the distribution of employment theory and evidence abstract recent research casts doubt on the view that minimum wage laws reduce employment we show that in a simple model of bilateral search with heterogeneous workers a minimum wage law increases employment however the increased competition from higher productivity workers makes lower productivity workers worse off without making higher productivity workers better off we provide evidence that minimum wage laws shift employment from adults to teenagers and students this raises concerns about the distributional consequences of minimum wages even when they increase employment

information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees this paper reports results from a laboratory experiment comparing voting behavior and decision making efficiency in standing and ad hoc committees where decisions are made by unanimity rule we also compare sequential and simultaneous secret ballot voting procedures the data are remarkably consistent across treatments in both qualitative comparative statics and quantitative terms the different procedures and the ad hoc or standing nature of the committees generally do not seem to lead to the selection of different equilibria with the exception of some evidence of bandwagon effects in the sequential procedure

an experimental study of jury decision rules we present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury we consider three treatment variables group size three or six number of votes needed for conviction majority or unanimity and pre vote deliberation we find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule a large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence this is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of feddersen and pesendorfer although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision contrary to feddersen and pesendorfer in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule in the case of no deliberation we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium

the effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium an experimental study when two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median there are three main effects first the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate second the equilibrium is statistical in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome third the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter we test these three predictions using laboratory experiments and find strong support for all three we also observe some biases and show that they can be explained by quantal response equilibrium

the optimal timing of unemployment benefits theory and evidence from sweden this paper provides a simple yet robust framework to evaluate the time profile of benefits paid during an unemployment spell we derive sufficient statistics formulae capturing the marginal insurance value and incentive costs of unemployment benefits paid at different times during a spell our approach allows us to revisit separate arguments for inclining or declining profiles put forward in the theoretical literature and to identify welfare improving changes in the benefit profile that account for all relevant arguments jointly for the empirical implementation we use administrative data on unemployment linked to data on consumption income and wealth in sweden first we exploit duration dependent kinks in the replacement rate and find that if anything the moral hazard cost of benefits is larger when paid earlier in the spell second we find that the drop in consumption affecting the insurance value of benefits is large from the start of the spell but further increases throughout the spell in trading off insurance and incentives our analysis suggests that the at benefit profile in sweden has been too generous overall however both from the insurance and the incentives side we find no evidence to support the introduction of a declining tilt in the profile

minimum wage policy with optimal taxes and unemployment abstract using a search model i derive a formula that links the welfare gains from the minimum wage to its effect on low skilled labor force participation and employment this formula shows that the minimum wage is welfare improving if pushing the low skilled labor market tightness downwards brings it closer to its efficient level i estimate the causal effect of the minimum wage on low skilled labor force participation and employment using federal and state minimum wage variation i discuss the policy implications of my estimates when viewed through the lens of the marginal welfare gain formula

the marginal voter s curse an intuitive explanation for voter abstention is that a voter is uncertain which policy or candidate to vote for and so defers to the rest of the electorate to make the decision in majoritarian elections this has been formally modelled as a strategic response to the swing voter s curse which arises because the rare event of a pivotal vote conveys substantial information in electoral systems other than majority rule however the standard pivotal voting calculus may not apply this paper analyzes one such system namely proportional representation where additional votes continue to push the policy outcome in one direction or the other a new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case to avoid the marginal voter s curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction intuitively conditioning on the rare event of a pivotal vote might seem to have a greater impact on behavior but the marginal voter s curse actually presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter s curse this and other predictions of the model are con rmed empirically by a series of laboratory experiments

is dea useful in the regulation of water utilities a dynamic efficiency evaluation the discussion about public utilities efficiency and its management has become increasingly important in the last decades we focus on the distribution of water which is one of the most important natural resources marshall 1879 this research shows the relationship between efficiency and institutional factors such as management system for this purpose we have data about some spanish water utilities under different provision systems during the period 1985 to 2000 using data envelopment analysis dea we estimate potential cost savings in this context we will extend the results obtained by thanassoulis 2000a b in attempt to guide the regulation of this sector

common value elections with private information and informative priors theory and experiments abstract we study efficiency and information aggregation in common value elections with contin uous private signals and informative priors we show that small elections are not generally efficient and that there are equilibria where some voters vote against their private signal even if it provides useful information and abstention is allowed this is not the case in large elections where the fraction of voters who vote against their private signal tends to zero in an experiment we then study how informativeness of priors and private signals impact efficiency and information aggregation in small elections we find that there is a substantial amount of voting against the private signal moreover while most experimental elections are efficient we find that it is not generally the case that better private information leads to better decisions

a minimum wage can be welfare improving and employment enhancing abstract we examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal tax transfer scheme the government cannot observe household abilities only their incomes and is constrained to ensure that those working are at least as well off as those not working a minimum wage combined with the institutional features of typical welfare systems allows the incentive constraint to be severed at the ability level associated with the minimum wage if such a scheme can be enforced the government can increase the amount of redistribution from those working to those not working and possibly lower the number of unemployed

the three is of public schools irrelevant inputs insufficient resources and inefficiency abstractwe examine the educational production function and efficiency of public school districts in illinois using non parametric kernel methods we find that most traditional schooling inputs are irrelevant in determining test scores even in a very general setting property tax caps are the only relevant factor that is related to districts financial constraints and have predominantly negative associations with test scores therefore insufficient resources may be partially responsible for the lack of growth in test scores for most other relevant inputs we find substantial heterogeneity in the returns which helps reconcile some of the puzzling results in the literature we further find that there exist inefficiencies in school districts moreover the level of test scores commonly used as a measure of school effectiveness while related differs substantially from our efficiency scores and standard parametric approaches drastically underestimate school efficiency we discuss the policy implicati

taxes redistribution and the minimum wage a theoretical analysis this paper considers a simple general equilibrium model that contains two types of workers with differing levels of ability and a social welfare maximizing government the paper shows that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing an optimal linear income tax with a minimum wage but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with a minimum wage

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search matching and endogenous contact rates building upon a continuous time model of search with nash bargaining in a stationary environment we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model they can be welfare improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market we discuss identification of the model using current population survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters we show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic

in defense of unanimous jury verdicts mistrials communication and strategic voting the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials is widely believed to reduce the likelihood of convicting the innocent this belief depends largely upon the assumption that jurors will vote nonstrategically based on their impression of the trial evidence recent literature however has questioned this assumption and feddersen and pesendorfer propose a model in which it is never a nash equilibrium for jurors to vote nonstrategically under unanimity rule and equilibrium behavior produces higher probabilities of both convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty under unanimity rule than under numerous alternatives i extend this work by incorporating two additional features of actual jury procedure the possibility of mistrial and communication among jurors under each circumstance i demonstrate that nonstrategic voting is a nash equilibrium under fairly general conditions and that unanimity performs better than any alternative rule in minimizing probability of trial error and maximizing expected utility

minimum wages in an equilibrium search model with diminishing returns to labor in production this article analyzes a minimum wage in a market with imperfect information and job search it establishes that employment effects of a minimum wage do not generally indicate welfare effects it shows that researchers interested in welfare consequences should ask two questions first is the existing minimum wage binding second do some firms that would be bound by a new minimum wage presently experience labor shortages if the answers to these questions are no and yes respectively this article supports the conclusion that a higher minimum wage is welfare improving regardless of its effect on the unemployment rate

voting with endogenous information acquisition experimental evidence abstract the condorcet jury model with costless but informative signals about the true state of the world predicts that the efficiency of group decision making increases unambiguously with the group size however if signal acquisition is made an endogenous and costly decision then rational voters have disincentives to purchase information as the group size becomes larger we investigate the extent to which human subjects recognize this trade off between better information aggregation and greater incentives to free ride in a laboratory experiment where we vary the group size the cost of information acquisition and the precision of signals we find that the theory predicts well in the case of precise signals however when signals are imprecise free riding incentives appear to be much weaker as there is a pronounced tendency for subjects to over acquire information relative to equilibrium predictions we rationalize the latter finding using a quantal response equilibrium that allows for risk aversion

the use of data envelopment analysis in the regulation of uk water utilities water distribution abstract regulation is increasingly playing a major role in defence of the public interest in the uk and other economies in the aftermath of the privatisation of utilities operating in near monopoly environments this paper gives an account of the use of data envelopment analysis dea by the regulator of water companies in england and wales in 1994 in the context of setting price limits dea is a general purpose linear programming based method for assessing the productive efficiencies of operating units such as bank branches or schools the paper details the use of dea to estimate potential savings in the specific context of water distribution and discusses the use of the results obtained it also highlights certain generic issues arising in the use of dea and more generally performance measurement methods in the regulatory context

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement qualifications and explanations for differences from previous work are also presented

special issue of games and economic behavior in honor of richard d mckelvey richard d mckelvey died on april 22 2002 at the age of 57 and the social sciences lost a great scholar he will be especially missed by fellow game theorists and academics who use game theory in their scholarly studies of economic and political institutions and behavior his students colleagues and friends will also miss a very humble and thoughtful human being who unselfishly contributed his time and intellectual energies throughout his career he influenced the careers of many of us and worked hard for many organizations and journals this journal in particular

is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for redistribution textabstractwe analyze the redistributional dis advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets without imposing assumptions on the in efficiency of labor rationing compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change a minimum wage increase raises involuntary unemployment but also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment a minimum wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of inefficient labor rationing we show that this critically depends on how labor rationing is distributed among workers a necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum wage increase is that the public revenue gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment we write this condition in terms of measurable sufficient statistics our empirical analysis suggests that a minimum wage increase is undesirable in nearly all oecd countries a reduction in the minimum wage along with tax adjustments that keep net incomes constant would yield a pareto improvement

information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections this paper compares strategic abstention in ad hoc committees versus standing committees ad hoc committees meet only once and then dissolve while standing committees the central finding from this study is that most of the predictions of swing voter curse theory hold up in large elections conducted under controlled laboratory conditions there is significant abstention and significant balancing of partisans by uniformed voters and vote balancing increases with the partisan imbalance elections with no partisan imbalance successfully aggregate information and lead to efficient outcomes consistent with swing voter curse theory this efficiency falls off as partisan imbalance increases but to a significantly greater extent than is predicted in equilibrium it is instructive to compare these findings in large elections with results from the elections reported in battaglini et al 2007 all of the qualitative results are the same concerning the comparative statics balancing and abstention one slight difference is that there was less irrational voting for in the small elections than in the large elections except for the 5 9 m 0 treatment where we observed 20 voting for in the small elections compared with 10 voting for in the large elections these differences were reflected in slightly different efficiency results between small and large elections with the comparisons mirroring the differences in voting for more irrational voting results in lower e ciency we conclude that this scaled up study successfully replicates the initial swing voter s curse experiment reported in battaglini et al 2007 obtaining very similar findings in laboratory committees that are three times the size of those in the original study the one caveat is that we found evidence of a slight increase in irrational nonequilibrium behavior voting for in the larger elections whether this trend would continue as election size is further scaled up is an open question a swing voter s curse environment

optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment we characterize optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills and their values of non market activities search matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment wages labor demand and participation are endogenous average tax rates are increasing at the optimum this shifts wages below their laissez faire value and distorts labor demand upwards the marginal tax rate is positive at the top of the skill distribution even when the latter is bounded these results are analytically shown under a maximin objective when the elasticity of participation is decreasing in the skill level and are numerically confirmed under a more general objective under the maximin above approximately 20 000 per year our model recommends higher marginal tax rates than a comparable competitive setting

minimum wage legislation as a second best policy mass unemployment is a striking phenomenon of the present economic situation of european market economies although the profession of economists has been criticized for not providing satisfactory cures it has produced a number of different explanations either complementary or contradictory for the occurrence of mass unemployment in this paper we examine the argument that unemployment is the consequence of minimum wage legislation which is socially desirable the observation of current wage legislations suggests that the above argument is broadly at least partly accepted by policy makers curiously enough a defence of this argument meeting the rigorous requirements of modern theory seems to be missing symmetrically attacks against minimum wage legislation often rely upon reasonings of dubious relevance i e the obvious remark that unemployment is a waste with first best efficiency criteria the present paper proposes a second best analysis where second best stems from informational asymmetries which prevent the implementation of lump sum transfers needed for a first best redistribution policy the question under scrutiny can be reformulated in a more precise way as follows does a second best optimal redistribution policy lead to minimum wage legislation and unemployment our elements of answer are gathered in 3 sections in section 2 the principles of the analysis of the desirability of quantity controls and existing results are recalled in section 3 the analysis of section 2 is specified to a simple prototype model for the study of linear income taxation in section 4

the swing voter s curse in the laboratory this paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on pivotal voter models our experiment controls for different information levels of voters as well as the size of the electorate the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters the design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world our results support the equilibrium predictions of the feddersen pesendorfer model and clearly reject the notion that voters in the laboratory use naive decision theoretic strategies the voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter s curse and adjust their behavior to compensate while the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behavior we find that aggregate outcomes such as efficiency turnout and margin of victory closely track the theoretical predictions

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

an explanation of anomalous behavior in models of political participation this paper characterizes behavior with noisy decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions applications include voting participation games candidate entry the volunteer s dilemma and collective action problems with a contribution threshold a simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a quantal response equilibrium and the resulting predictions are compared with nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner

rational choice and the condorcet jury theorem abstract in a recent paper austen smith and banks 1996 amer polit sci rev 90 34 45 criticize the current literature on the condorcet jury theorem as neglecting the behavioral underpinnings of decision making they leave open the question whether allowing mixed strategies would sustain the conclusions of the condorcet jury theorem in this paper it is shown that these conclusions can hold in equilibrium in other words a rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals is derived journal of economic literatureclassification number d72

revisiting the minimum wage employment debate throwing out the baby with the bathwater we revisit the minimum wage employment debate which is as old as the department of labor in particular we assess new studies claiming that the standard panel data approach used in much of the new minimum wage research is flawed because it fails to account for spatial heterogeneity these new studies use research designs intended to control for this heterogeneity and conclude that minimum wages in the united states have not reduced employment we explore the ability of these research designs to isolate reliable identifying information and test the untested assumptions in this new research about the construction of better control groups our evidence points to serious problems with these research designs we conclude that the evidence still shows that minimum wages pose a tradeoff of higher wages for some against job losses for others and that policymakers need to bear this tradeoff in mind when making decisions about increasing the minimum wage

ignorance and bias in collective decisions we study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best but each member can acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule in the experiment as predicted by bayesian equilibrium voters are more likely to acquire information under majority rule and attempt to counter the bias in favor of one alternative under unanimity rule as opposed to bayesian equilibrium predictions however many committee members vote when uninformed moreover uninformed voting is strongly associated with a lower propensity to acquire information we show that an equilibrium model of subjective prior beliefs can account for both these phenomena and provides a good overall fit to the observed patterns of behavior both in terms of rational ignorance and biases

the effect of minimum wages on low wage jobs we estimate the eect of minimum wages on low wage jobs using 138 prominent state level minimum wage changes between 1979 and 2016 in the u s using a dierence in dierences approach we first estimate the eect of the minimum wage increase on employment changes by wage bins throughout the hourly wage distribution we then focus on the bottom part of the wage distribution and compare the number of excess jobs paying at or slightly above the new minimum wage to the missing jobs paying below it to infer the employment eect we find that the overall number of low wage jobs remained essentially unchanged over the five years following the increase at the same time the direct eect of the minimum wage on average earnings was amplified by modest wage spillovers at the bottom of the wage distribution our estimates by detailed demographic groups show that the lack of job loss is not explained by labor labor substitution at the bottom of the wage distribution we also find no evidence of disemployment when we consider higher levels of minimum wages however we do find some evidence of reduced employment in tradable sectors we also show how decomposing the overall employment eect by wage bins allows a transparent way of assessing the plausibility of estimates

minimum wage shocks employment flows and labor market frictions we provide the first estimates of the effects of minimum wages on employment flows in the u s labor market identifying the impact using policy discontinuities at state borders we find that minimum wages have a sizable negative effect on employment flows but not stocks separations and accessions fall among affected workers we interpret our findings using a job ladder model in which minimum wage increases can reduce job to job transitions we find that a standard calibration of the model generates predicted relative magnitudes of the employment stock and flow elasticities that are very close to our reduced form estimates

unanimous rules in the laboratory we study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory in line with theoretical predictions we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule we also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior finally we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects veto s welfare properties

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

dea and its use in the regulation of water companies abstract this paper begins with an introduction to the basic principles of data envelopment analysis dea dea is a linear programming based method for assessing the productive efficiencies of operating units such as bank branches sales outlets schools or individuals this paper then goes on to describe the use of dea in the regulatory framework regulation employed to safeguard the public interest is increasingly playing an major role in great britain and other countries in the aftermath of the privatisation of publicly owned companies including utilities which still enjoy a good degree of monopoly power this paper gives an account of the use of dea to estimate potential cost savings at water companies in the context of the price review conducted by the regulator of water companies in england and wales in 1994 it also highlights certain generic issues arising in the use of dea in the regulatory context this paper should prove of interest both to those who want to know about dea as a tool in general and to those interested in efficiency measurement under regulation

information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation a laboratory experiment abstract this paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyzes voter participation in common interest proportional representation pr elections comparing this with majority rule consistent with theoretical predictions poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed a dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under pr so abstention is higher in pr in contrast with private interest environments and welfare is lower deviations from nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium qre which allows for voter mistakes

who pays for the minimum wage this paper analyzes the eects of a large 60 and persistent increase in the minimum wage instituted in hungary in 2001 we propose a new approach to estimating the employment eects of a minimum wage increase that exploits information on the distribution of wages before and after the policy change we infer the number of jobs destroyed by comparing the number of pre reform jobs below the new minimum wage to the excess number of jobs paying at and above the new minimum wage our estimates imply that the higher minimum wage had at most a small negative eect on employment and so the main eect was pushing up wages we then use data on a large panel of firms to evaluate the economic incidence of the minimum wage increase contrary to theoretical models that attribute the small employment eects of minimum wage changes to monopsonistic wage setting we find no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage led to lower profitability among low wage employers instead we find that the costs of the minimum wage were largely passed through to consumers

divided majority and information aggregation theory and experiment this paper studies theoretically and experimentally the properties of plurality and approval voting when a majority gets divided by information imperfections the majority faces two challenges aggregating information to select the best majority candidate and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate under plurality the majority cannot achieve both goals at once under approval voting it can welfare is strictly higher because some voters approve of both majority alternatives in the laboratory we find i strong evidence of strategic voting and ii superiority of approval voting over plurality finally subject behavior suggests the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies

minimum wage legislation and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistribution the use of minimum wages and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistributing income is analyzed the government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two types of individuals who differ in ability the effect of introducing a minimum wage which induces involuntary unemployment will be to improve social welfare under weak conditions circumstances under which combining unemployment insurance with the minimum wage will be welfare improving are also considered

estimating most productive scale size using data envelopment analysis abstract the relation between the most productive scale size mpss for paparticular input and output mixes and returns to scale for multiple inputs multiple outputs situations is explicitly developed this relation is then employed to extend the applications of data envelopment analysis dea introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes ccr to the estimation of most productive scale sizes for convex production possibility sets it is then shown that in addition to productive inefficiencies at the actual scale size the ccr efficiency measure also reflects any inefficiencies due to divergence from the most productive scale size two illustrations of the practical applications of these results to the estimation of most productive scale sizes and returns to scale for hospitals and stem electric generation plants are also provided emphasize the advantage of this method in examining specific segments of the efficient production surface

can words get in the way the effect of deliberation in collective decision making we quantify the effect of deliberation on the decisions of us appellate courts we estimate a model in which strategic judges communicate before casting their votes and then compare the probability of mistakes in the court with deliberation with a counterfactual of no communication the model has multiple equilibria and preferences and information parameters are only partially identified we find that there is a range of parameters in the identified set when judges tend to disagree ex ante or their private information is imprecise in which deliberation can be beneficial otherwise deliberation reduces the effectiveness of the court

optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets this paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market and obtains two key results first we show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first importantly this result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers in that context a binding minimum wage enhances the effectiveness of transfers to low skilled workers as it prevents low skilled wages from falling through incidence effects second when labor supply re sponses are along the extensive margin only the co existence of a minimum wage with a positive tax rate on low skilled work is always second best pareto ineffcient a pareto improving policy consists of reducing the pre tax minimum wage while keeping constant the post tax minimum wage by increasing transfers to low skilled workers and financing this reform by increasing taxes on higher paid workers overall our results imply that the minimum wage and subsidies for low skilled workers are complementary policies pa

anomalous behavior in a traveler s dilemma the notion of a nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions moreover the nash equilibrium and closely related game theoretic concepts are being widely applied in other social sciences and even in biology where evolutionary stability often selects a subset of the nash equilibria many people are uneasy about the stark predictions of the nash equilibrium in some contexts where the extreme rationality assumptions seem implausible kaushik basu s 1994 traveler s dilemma is a particularly convincing example of a case where the unrelenting logic of game theory is at odds with intuitive notions about human behavior the story associated with the dilemma is that two travelers purchase identical antiques while on a tropical vacation their luggage is lost on the return trip and the airline asks them to make independent claims for compensation in anticipation of excessive claims the airline representative announces

efficiency equity and timing of voting mechanisms we compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete in many political institutions ranging from small committees to mass elections voting is sequential which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters for a stylized model we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems which we test using controlled laboratory experiments most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games we find a tradeoff between information aggregation efficiency and equity in sequential voting a sequential voting rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information environments but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs

the performance of german water utilities a semi parametric analysis germany s water supply industry is characterized by a multitude of utilities and widely diverging prices possibly resulting from structural differences beyond the control of firms management but also from inefficiencies in this article we use data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis to determine the utilities technical efficiency te scores based on cross sectional data from 373 public and private water utilities in 2006 we find large differences in te scores even after accounting for significant structural variables like network density share of groundwater usage and water losses

the effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria the logit version of quantal response equilibrium predicts that equilibrium behavior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes if all other factors are held constant including the nash equilibria of the game we explore this in the context of a set of asymmetric 2x2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria the data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the logit equilibrium model we extend the theoretical quantal response equilibrium model to allow for heterogeneity and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly better

expert information and majority decisions this paper shows theoretically and experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double edged sword for collective decision making we present a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members in theory there are bayesian nash equilibria where the committee members voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision however there is also a class of potentially inefficient equilibria where a supermajority always follow expert information and the majority decision does not aggregate private information in the laboratory the majority decisions and the subjects voting behaviour were largely consistent with those in the class of inefficient equilibria we found a large efficiency loss due to t he presence of expert information especially when the committee size was large we suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee members

on the empirical content of quantal response equilibrium the quantal response equilibrium qre notion of mckelvey and palfrey 1995 has recently attracted considerable attention due largely to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects we show that this ability to t the data as typically measured in this literature is uninformative without ap riori distributional assumptions a qre can match any distribution of behavior by each player in any normal form game we discuss approaches that might be taken to provide valid empirical evaluation of the qre and discuss its potential value as an approximating empirical structure

cost benefit analyses versus referenda we consider a planner who chooses between two public policies and ask whether a referendum or a cost benefit analysis leads to higher welfare we find that a referendum leads to higher welfare than a cost benefit analysis in a common value environment cost benefit analysis is better in a private value environment

production versus revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity theory and evidence from pakistan to fight evasion many developing countries use production inefficient tax policies this includes minimum tax schemes whereby firms are taxed on either profits or turnover depending on which tax liability is larger such schemes create nonstandard kink points which allow for eliciting evasion responses to switches between profit and turnover taxes using a bunching approach using administrative data on corporations in pakistan we estimate that turnover taxes reduce evasion by up to 60 70 percent of corporate income incorporating this in a calibrated optimal tax model we find that switching from profit to turnover taxation increases revenue by 74 percent without reducing aggregate profits

do lower minimum wages for young workers raise their employment evidence from a danish discontinuity we estimate the impact of youth minimum wages on youth employment by exploiting a large discontinuity in danish minimum wage rules at age 18 using monthly payroll records for the danish population the hourly wage jumps up by 40 percent at the discontinuity employment falls by 33 percent and total input of hours decreases by 45 percent leaving the aggregate wage payment almost unchanged we show theoretically how the discontinuity may be exploited to evaluate policy changes the relevant elasticity for evaluating the effect on youth employment of changes in their minimum wage is in the range 0 6 1 1

boundedly rational nash equilibrium a probabilistic choice approach we propose an equilibrium for n person finite games based on bounded rationality using the legit model of discrete choice theory at equilibrium each player uses appropriate choice probabilities given those used by the others rationality is parameterized on a continuum from complete rationality to uniform random choice results on the existence of equilibrium and on convergence to nash as rationality becomes perfect are similar to results due to mckelvey and palfrey we identify conditions such that for a given rationality parameter range the path of choices over time when the players use fictitious play converges to equilibrium c 1997 academic press

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

credible research designs for minimum wage studies a response to neumark salas and wascher the authors assess the critique by neumark salas and wascher 2014 of minimum wage studies that found small effects on teen employment data from 1979 to 2014 contradict nsw the authors show th

participation recruitment selection and the minimum wage this paper reexamines the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search matching model with bargained wages and free entry assuming that firms hire their best applicants we state that participation is insufficient whatever workers bargaining strengths the reason for this is that when holding a job the marginal participant should receive the entire output as a consequence introducing a small minimum wage raises participation job creation and employment therefore the aggregate income of the economy is enhanced

are micro and macro labor supply elasticities consistent a review of evidence on the intensive and extensive margins we evaluate whether state of the art macro models featuring indivisible labor are consistent with modern quasi experimental micro evidence by synthesizing evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins we find that micro estimates are consistent with macro estimates of the steady state hicksian elasticities relevant for cross country comparisons on both the extensive and intensive margins however micro estimates of intertemporal substitution frisch elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in aggregate hours by preferences the key puzzle to be resolved is why micro and macro estimates of the frisch extensive margin elasticity are so different

unemployed but optimistic optimal insurance design with biased beliefs biased perceptions of risks change the perceived value of insurance and the per ceived returns to avoiding these risks i show empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how quickly they will nd work but underestimate the return to their search eorts i analyze the consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance with biased beliefs contracts equalizing the marginal smoothing ben e t and the moral hazard cost of insurance are suboptimal social and private insurance diverge a paternalistic social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for the distortion in the insured s eort choice while private insurers focus on the perceived rather than the true smoothing bene ts when unemployed workers are optimistic privatizing unemployment insurance may result in ine ciently low or rapidly decreasing unemployment bene ts

do matching frictions explain unemployment not in bad times this paper models unemployment as the result of matching frictions and job rationing job rationing is a shortage of jobs arising naturally in an economic equilibrium from the combination of some wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor during recessions job rationing is acute driving the rise in unemployment whereas matching frictions contribute little to unemployment intuitively in recessions jobs are lacking the labor market is slack recruiting is easy and inexpensive so matching frictions do not matter much in a calibrated model cyclical fluctuations in the composition of unemployment are quantitatively large

who follows the crowd groups or individuals abstract in games of social learning individuals tend to give too much weight to their own private information relative to the information that is conveyed by the choices of others weizsacker 2010 in this paper we investigate differences between individuals and small groups as decision makers in information cascade situations in line with results from social psychology as well as results on bayesian decision making charness et al 2006 we find that groups behave more rationally than individuals groups in particular are able to abandon their own private signals more often than individuals when it is rational to do so our results indicate that the intellective part of the decision task contributes slightly more to the superior performance of groups than the judgmental part our findings have potential implications for the design of decision making processes in organisations finance and other economic settings

optimal taxation in the extensive model abstract we study optimal taxation under extensive preferences the agents utilities are constant for positive actions up to a maximal productivity level utilities may be discontinuous at the origin reflecting fixed costs of participation allowing for general distributions of work opportunity costs and productivity and for income effects we characterize optimal incentive compatible tax schedules we then give sufficient conditions for society to desire redistribution when these conditions hold upward distortions of the financial incentives to work can only occur for low skilled workers such upwards distortions are indeed always present when the fixed participation costs are pecuniary

committee design with endogenous information this paper is concerned with the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information the analysis identifies some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers referees managers jurors etc in situations where decision makers are useful only in so far as they expend some effort to gain information about the alternatives at hand these situations are common one being the refereeing process where an editor requires the opinions of a number of experts who must read the paper acquire information in order to give an opinion as to publication analogously in committees which screen applicants to a programme the committee members must gain information about the applicant s qualifications and likelihood of success in order to evaluate whether to admit him her finally in trial juries it is important that jurors pay attention to the evidence in order to make an informed judgement 1 we focus on environments where information is a public good in the sense that the social benefits of one decision maker acquiring information exceed the private benefits a good mechanism in this environment must not only aggregate information efficiently but also induce the decision makers to acquire information we analyse the design of voting mechanisms our problem is to choose two parameters which determine both the incentive to acquire information and the efficiency with which information is aggregated the first parameter is the size of the decision making unit the number of committee members the second is the plurality required to overturn the status quo the voting rule our main result is this a voting rule that requires a large plurality in the extreme unanimity to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each committee member is sufficiently accurate when individual information is noisy the drawback

efficiency in the public and private french water utilities prospects for benchmarking this article uses a data envelopment analysis dea and a stochastic frontier analysis sfa to assess the relative technical efficiency of 177 decision making units in the french water supply sector in 2009 water utilities can be directly managed by the local authorities or contracted out and then managed by a private operator the use of a three stage model mixing dea and sfa enables us to dissociate managerial inefficiencies from the structural inefficiencies and statistical noise after having taken the environmental variables into account we find that private management are on average slightly less efficient than public management an explanation to this performance gap can be different resource management

get out the costly vote institutional design for greater participation institutions designed to increase turnout appeal to democratic sentiments but are highly debated as they entail two potentially countervailing eects while generating more pieces of information they may decrease the average voter s information quality we examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing participation abstention penalties used in 32 countries around the world and lotteries providing a prize to one randomly chosen participant as proposed on the 2006 arizona ballot we analyze a benchmark rational choice model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly we illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes though lotteries are a more eective instrument asymptotically in an array of lab experiments we empirically assess institutional performance we nd strong evidence for selective participation lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced however because subjects vote more often than the equilibrium predictions these institutions entail less welfare benets than theory prescribes lotteries do fare better than nes suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory

the curse of uninformed voting an experimental study we study majority voting over two alternatives in small groups individuals have identical preferences but are uncertain about which alternative can better achieve their common interest before voting each individual can obtain information by buying a valuable but imperfect signal about the better alternative voting is either voluntary or compulsory in the compulsory mode each individual must vote between the two alternatives while in the voluntary mode they can also abstain an uninformed random vote generates a negative externality since it may override an informative group decision in pivotal events in our experiments participants in randomly re matched groups obtain information more often with compulsory than voluntary voting and the average number of signals is greater in larger than smaller groups surprisingly uninformed voting is common even in the voluntary mode finally group performance is poor in all treatments indicating the need to reconsider current practice of jury and committee voting

the impact of minimum wages on labour market transitions we investigate dierences in labour market transition rates in high versus low minimum wage regimes using canadian data spanning 1979 to 2008 the data include consistent questions on job tenure and reason for job separation for the whole period over the same time frame there were over 140 minimum wage changes in canada we nd that higher minimum wages are associated with lower hiring rates but also with lower job separation rates importantly the reduced separation rates are due mainly to reductions in layos occur in the rst 6 months of a job and are present for unskilled workers of all ages our estimates imply that a 10 increase in the minimum wage generates a 3 9 reduction in the layo rate we present a search and matching model that ts with these patterns and test its implications overall our results imply