an analysis of interfirm cooperation theory and evidence from electric power pools this paper develops and tests a model for analyzing the extent to which an individual utility participates in a power pool it incorporates the benefits and costs of pool membership in a profit maximization model of an individual utility the study finds that coordination reflects the benefits and costs the degree to which other utilities are committed to the pool and the utility s behavior toward other utilities the results show that large firms are reluctant to pool with small firms and the us pools tend to be loosely coordinated policy implications are that regulatory commissions can be instrumental in coordination efforts and that interstate cooperation among regulatory authorities is needed to encourage pooling and obtain regional solutions to regional problems it is also important to reduce the transactional costs of pooling wherever possible 37 references 3 figures 1 table

government incentive strategies and private capital participation in china s shale gas development abstractshale gas development investments are uncertain and irreversible in the initial stage in china flexible incentive strategy is needed for governments to guide private capital participation at different development stages this study aims to provide analysis governments can use to encourage private investment in shale gas projects according to its plans in an extended real options framework a social benefits variable is introduced to determine the threshold of social benefits that determine whether the government will choose a deferred or instant incentives strategy by considering the efficiency factor we show the optimal arrangements of two kinds of incentives tax cuts and production subsidies to implement incentive targets the results indicate that current market demand and social benefits are the key factors that affect the government s choice of incentive strategy we also find that the optimal level of incentives either tax cuts or production subsidies are independent of current market

measuring returns to scale in dea models when the firm is regulated in the standard framework of data envelopment analysis dea models the returns to scale are fully characterized using the multiplier on the convexity constraint of inefficient decision making units dmu using the projection of the input output vector on the frontier in this note we investigate how the returns to scale measurements in dea models are affected by the presence of regulatory constraints these additional constraints change the role played by the convexity constraint in order to avoid biased estimation of the returns to scale we show that the interaction between the regulatory and the convexity constraints has to be taken into account

the impact of regulation on technical change input based regulation restricts a firm s input choices to a subset of those that characterize the production technology the averch johnson hereafter a j 1962 hypothesis states that rate of return regulation affects a firm s input demands for producing its selected output level given that firms can select the level of innovations in inputs through research and development rate regulation can also impact a firm s selection of innovations among inputs regulation s influence on the choice of innovations also impacts the rate at which technical change occurs in an industry the a j hypothesis has been examined extensively in the literature the impact of regulation on technical change has received less attention in the literature and is the focus of this paper the subject matter is of some importance in that regulation via the a j hypothesis leads to higher production costs regulation s impact on a firm s selection of innovations can magnify or dampen the rate at which technical change occurs a magnification dampening of the rate of technical change leads to lower higher production costs in addition to regulation s impact on input demands regulation s impact on the rate of technical change can lead to small or large changes in prices for consumers regulators can use the information on regulation and technical change to evaluate the effectiveness of policies aimed at enhancing technical change by how much do the policies affect production costs and how much would consumer prices change due to the policies regulators can also use the information to predict the impact deregulation would have on consumer prices both regulators and consumers can attempt to determine the amount by which consumer prices would change under deregulation smith 1974 and okuguchi 1975 examined the impact of regulation on a firm s choice of innovations they showed theoretically that regulation can alter a firm s choice of innovations

effects of regulation and capital market imperfections on the dynamic behavior of a firm the well known result in the theory of a regulated firm known as the averch johnson effect is that a profit maximizing firm subject to rate of return regulation uses an inefficiently high capital labor ratio to produce its chosen level of output numerous contributions in the literature have been instrumental in clarifying the implications and generalizing the model 1 these contributions however have been mostly couched within a static framework few attempts have been made to investigate the effect of rate of return regulation on the dynamic behavior of the firm in particular its investment plans 2 neoclassical models of investment often assume that the rate of investment under

the early exercise of american puts abstract this paper shows that american puts on dividend paying stocks are most likely to be exercised either just after an ex dividend date or just prior to expiration at any other time the option to exercise an american put early may have less value thus put writers and converters can predict when protection against premature exercise will be most valuable the probability of early exercise is shown to be sensitive to managerial policy regarding the suspension of dividend payments transaction costs and interest rates however dividend payments are demonstrated to be the primary deterrent to early exercise

capacity utilization and new source bias evidence from the us electric power industry abstract while prior research has shown that new source bias has increased construction costs and delayed the building of new electric power plants this research explores the empirical question of whether increased operating costs caused by new source bias are larger than the cost savings of newer technology if new sources do have higher operating costs an incentive exists to utilize order plants more intensively statistical evidence of these differing utilization rates is found

competition and cooperation in the market for exclusionary rights salop and david scheffman 1983 show that firms profitably can gain market power by conduct that raises their competitors costs raising rivals costs is a more credible route to market power than is predatory pricing because it is not necessary to cause the rivals to exit no deep pocket is required and the additional profits are gained immediately that paper argues that vertical restraints and contracts with input suppliers can be fertile ground for raising competitors costs by contracting with one or more suppliers to exclude rivals either by dealing with them on discriminatory terms or refusing to deal with them altogether a firm sometimes can increase its rivals costs as a result it can sometimes gain the power to raise price in the market in which it sells output this type of contract often can be characterized as the purchase of an exclusionary right from the input suppliers that is in addition to the purchase of inputs the predator also purchases the right to exclude some of its rivals from access to the suppliers inputs exclusionary rights contracts can exist in a variety of forms at one extreme are agreements that involve only exclusionary rights no inputs are exchanged at all for example it was reported in alcoa that at one time alcoa purchased exclusionary covenants from power companies from which it did not purchase electricity the contracts involved only the utilities promises not to sell electricity to other aluminum companies such naked exclusionary rights contracts are unusual of course most exclusionary rights are bundled with the sale of inputs for example stroh beer has alleged that the two major brewers purchase not only advertising time on network sports programs but also the right to exclude remaining brewers from advertising on those same programs even though the networks have other advertising time available it might be argued that such exclusionary conduct would always fail for two reasons the excluded rivals would have available effective counterstrategies to prevent their own exclusion and input suppliers would have no incentives to reduce their sales by excluding some customers these criticisms imply that raising rivals costs by contracting with suppliers would not be credible it surely is not true that exclusionary strategies to restrict rivals input purchases will always succeed in raising their costs for example where rivals easily can substitute to other equally cost effective inputs or where entry into the production of inputs is so easy that the excluded rivals can efficiently produce the input themselves then cost raising strategies will fail moreover where competition in the output market would be sufficient to maintain low prices despite the exit or increased costs of the excluded competitors then no profit maximizing firm would spend any resources trying to exclude those rivals these conditions are discussed in detail in our earlier paper 1985 tdiscussants ronald h coase university of chicago gregory k down yale university david sappington bell communications research and university of pennsylvania

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

optimizing inventory s contribution to profitability in a regulated utility the averch johnson effect the averch johnson effect is a well known economic phenomenon through which regulated utility companies prefer a capital resource input combination that differs from an efficient level through dynamic network data envelopment analysis ndea this paper first investigates the existence of this effect on a dynamic input that is inventory the analysis was performed for a group of public electric utilities from 2005 to 2014 the result implies that these firms procure a significant extra amount in inventory materials and supplies beyond their efficient levels in order to explore the connection of this effect to profit motives we construct an analytical model of the inventory policy controlling the extra buying of material and supplies that will be inventoried and added to the firm s rate base the model is based on maximizing the net present value of total profits in the deterministic case two results are observed i the firm could achieve a finite optimum by adding a finite amount of inventory above the normal base level which assumes no impact of inventory on the rate hearing and ii the firm could theoretically achieve infinite optimum under the unconstrained model the primary contribution of this paper is the special case of extending typical inventory replenishment models to including the impact on prices and in turn profits in a regulated supply chain

x inefficiency and interfirm rivalry evidence from the electric utility industry competition from the natural gas industry is shown to increase the efficiency of the work force of electric power utilities this conclusion is qualified to the extent that duopoly rivalry does not represent perfect competition in a free market as natural gas reserves decline however the impetus to improve efficiency will diminish but this will be offset by technological advances in both power generation and power transmission if regulators develop policies to encourage competitive interplay utility performance is more likely to improve 38 references 3 tables dck

profiting from countervailing power an effect of government control we demonstrate that a firm subject to government regulation might expect an increase in profit upon creation of an independent monopoly upstream such a monopoly serves to increase the expected cost of the regulated firm as a result even regulators who behave socially optimally will decrease the frequency with which they audit reports of high production cost the reduction in governmental investigation permits the firm to increase the rents it derives from its superior information about cost the possible implications of our model for a theory of political limit pricing are also briefly mentioned

some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing abstract price dynamics are characterized for a price fixing cartel antitrust laws reduce cartel prices even though cartel detection occurs with probability zero in response to cheating the non collusive price gradually moves from the collusive price to the static nash equilibrium price

effects of regulation on utility financing theory and evidence standing of these cross sectional variations might be afforded by the detailed examination of specific industry characteristics and their relationship to firms financing patterns the present study offers a methodology for approaching this issue the first step is to assemble joint theories of industry and financial structure in order to identify the ways in which changing industry conditions might be associated with changes in financing evidence on such simultaneous changes can then be examined in an attempt to identify the most plausible joint theory the methodology is used to investigate the effects of state commission regulation on the financing of electric utilities this is a natural candidate for study since regulation is such a salient feature of the industry in addition the regulatory system imparts some interesting special features to the very nature of utility capital structures inherent in all capital structures for example are opportunities for shifting wealth between bondholders and shareholders but under regulation these wealth shifting opportunities are expanded to encompass consumers as well finally the study of regulation has resulted in several relatively well specified theories of why regulation is imposed and what its observable effects should be in section i the different theories of capital structure and regulation are discussed and their joint implications are derived the capital structure theories include the perfect capital market theory the debt capacity theory and the financing hierarchy theory the regulatory theories include the public interest or market failure theory the political economy theory and the imperfect monitoring theory in section ii financing data from the early days of state commission utility regulation are used to try to distinguish

regulation of administered prices an empirical analysis of the microeconomics of price movement in finland 1972 77 curiously enough the concept of administered prices launched by gardiner means in his 1934 report to the u s secretary of agriculture still shows up in discussions on price policy and control today almost fifty years since it was coined and three decades after the discussion2 in which it should have been buried even more astonishing is the fact that its spin off administered inflation a term introduced by the kefauver committee in 1957 3 is still a part of economic language in some instances in the basic formulation that of means in 1935 administered prices are not assumed to be explicitly linked with market power but simply prices set by administrative action and held constant for a period of time means 12 p 78 although the hypothesis in this form was based on no economic reasoning of acceptable clarity it might still be accepted for the simple truism it is clearly some prices will change more seldom than others since for one thing costs of price changes will vary as is intuitively clear and as shown by sheshinski and weiss 17 pp 294 95 the optimal strategy of a firm in an inflationary environment will consist of longer intervals between successive price changes the higher the cost of such a change is under some very special assumptions risk aversion may also serve as an explanation to a decrease in the number of price changes relative to the number of changes in cost as indicated by the results of schramm and sherman 1 5 4 the administered inflation hypothesis as forwarded by means in his 1957 testimony before the kefauver committee means 12 pp 101 29 and by

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

the influence of the economic approaches to regulation on banking regulations a short history of banking regulations this article highlights the theoretical foundations of the regulations at work in the banking sector and examines their responsibility in the onset of the 2007 2008 financial crisis drawing a parallel between the main changes in banking regulations since the 1960s and the evolutions in the economic analyses of regulation over the same period it shows that the shift from the public interest theory of regulation that prevailed until the late 1960s towards the private interest theory of regulation accounts for the substitution of micro prudential regulations for macro prudential ones and explains a paradigmatic change in the conception of the regulatory instruments of the banking authorities it also shows that although the outcome of several factors the 2007 2008 crisis was also a consequence of the fact that the economic analysis of banking regulations supported micro prudential regulations that fail to take the global features and impact of banking activities into account and have proved unable to recommend effective solutions in a context of crisis

understanding index option returns this paper studies the returns from investing in index options previous research documents significant average option returns large capm alphas and high sharpe ratios and concludes that put options are mispriced we propose an alternative approach to evaluate the significance of option returns and obtain different conclusions instead of using these statistical metrics we compare historical option returns to those generated by commonly used option pricing models we find that the most puzzling finding in the existing literature the large returns to writing out of themoney puts is not even inconsistent with the black scholes model moreover simple stochastic volatility models with no risk premia generate put returns across all strikes that are not inconsistent with the observed data at the money straddle returns are more challenging to understand and we find that these returns are not inconsistent with explanations such as jump risk premia peso problems and estimation risk

the returns and risk of alternative put option portfolio investment strategies this paper is the second in a series of analyses we have prepared based on simulations of a variety of portfolio strategies over a significant period of time the first of these analyses examined the fully covered call option writing strategy and the buying strategy which combines purchase of call options and commercial paper in the study presented here we examine the uncovered put writing strategy and the buying strategy which combines the purchase of put options and the underlying stocks as a preface to the simulations we analyze the quantitative discrepancies between the parity model of put pricing and a model which takes into account the possibility of early exercise of the put in connection with this analysis we simulate the returns to the conversion strategy which combines the purchase of put options and the underlying stocks with the simultaneous sale of the corresponding call options as in our earlier paper on call option strategies we find in this study that investors can use uncovered putoption writing and protective put optionbuying strategies to produce patterns of returns for investment portfolios not reproducible by any simple strategy of combining stock with fixed income securities put options are viewed as term insurance insuring against a loss in value of underlying stock investors sell insurance by using the uncovered put writing strategies and investors buy insurance protecting the value of stocks within a portfolio by using protective put optionbuying strategies no put strategy or call strategy can dominate any other strategy if options are priced correctly although there is no single best strategy for all investors they are not indifferent among strategies because the patterns of returns differ we therefore show these important patterns of returns on put option strategies not only using single stocks but also using portfolios of stocks this research was financed in part by grants from donaldson lufkin jenrette new york the center for research in security prices university of chicago and the national science foundation washington d c 1 merton scholes and gladstein 1978 in the present paper all references to our earlier paper are to this study

internal cartel stability with time dependent detection probabilities abstract to account for the illegal nature of price fixing agreements per period detection probabilities that can vary over time are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly the resulting iccs for internal cartel stability indicate that for discount factors up to 10 per period detection probabilities of 5 are needed to reduce the number of cartel members by 50 for the special case of stationary supergames with constant per period detection probabilities p elegant rules emerge internal cartel stability requires the discount factor to increase with 100 p 1 p percent while a fixed fine of 100 1 p p percent of incremental cartel profits is required for making the icc always binding

regulation and investment use newly assembled data on regulation in several sectors of many oecd countries to provide evidence that regulatory reform of product markets is associated with an increase in investment a component of reform that plays a very important role is entry liberalization but privatization also has a substantial effect on investment sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are robust jel e22 l5

efficiency based rank assessment for electric power industry a combined use of data envelopment analysis dea and dea discriminant analysis da abstract this study discusses a combined use of dea data environment analysis and dea da discriminant analysis to determine the efficiency based rank of energy firms this type of performance evaluation is important because we often have a difficulty in accessing a large sample on energy firms to derive reliable empirical results the proposed approach is useful in dealing with such a limited number of energy firms often found in previous dea studies on energy industries in the world the proposed approach uses dea to classify energy firms into efficient and inefficient groups based upon their efficiency scores then it utilizes dea da to assess their efficiency scores and ranks in this stage we can find an adjusted efficiency score for each energy firm the proposed approach provides us with the following analytical capabilities all of which cannot be found in a conventional use of dea in assessing energy firms first the proposed dea approach can avoid zero in all multipliers on efficient energy firms by incorporating scsc strong complementary slackness condition so that it can handle an occurrence of multiple reference sets and multiple projections the dea result classifies all energy firms into efficient and inefficient groups second dea da applied to the two groups evaluates all energy firms by an industry wide evaluation not depending upon a limited number of efficient energy firms in a reference set as found in a conventional use of dea the analytical capability can reduce the number of efficient energy firms third the proposed approach can provide their efficiency based ranking scores finally we can conduct a rank sum test based upon their ranking scores to obtain a statistical inference as an application this study uses the proposed approach to examine the performance of japanese electric power industry we find two economic implications one of the two implications is that no major change has occurred in the operational performance of japanese electric power industry because of japanese sluggish economy from 2005 to 2009 the other implication indicates that there are strategic differences in the operation of japanese electric power firms after the liberalization

capital vintage time trends and technical change in the electric power industry beginning with tinbergen in 1942 economists have employed a time trend in cost or production functions to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced into the production unit in sufficiently flexible models of the production process the time trend may be used to obtain estimates of the rate as well as direction of technical change the use of the time trend is generally defended on pragmatic grounds as no theoretical justification exists for assuming that new technology is introduced at a steady rate that is independent of a firm s investment in r d education capital of a more recent vintage etc in recent years alternatives to the traditional time trend have been sought to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced research in this area has been concentrated in the telecommunications industry where the stock of r d or the percentage of calls completed by direct dialing or modern switching facilities have been employed as technological indices by nadiri and schankerman 32 denny et al 14 and christensen et al 7 the latter two studies indicate that explicit technological indices provide a better representation of the pace of innovation than the time trend this conclusion must remain tentative however as it is not possible to determine what is the true direction of technical change in these studies this shortcoming is overcome in a recent study by kopp and smith 24 who compare the performance of time trends and explicit technological indices in a study using pseudo data generated by process analysis models their results unambiguously support the use of technologically explicit indicators of technical change and indicate that the use of a time trend may not provide a consistent estimate of the direction of technical change this study does not however shed any light on the ability of a time trend to accurately reflect the rate of technical change the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of alternative technological indices on the estimated rate and direction of technical change in the electric power industry the performance of a time trend is compared with that of a vintage index computed as the average age of a firm s steam generating capacity this latter index is consistent with the notion that new technology is embodied in newly constructed capital an assumption sup

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

cost efficiency of electric grid utilities in china a comparison of estimates from sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls with the purpose of estimating the range of cost efficiency levels of the power grid sector in china we assembled a data set including 23 provincial power grid companies spanning from 2005 to 2009 and conducted an empirical study based on the sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls methodologies empirical results show that the average values of efficiency from different models vary from 0 85 to 0 92 depending especially on the assumptions underlying inefficiency content further results demonstrate that there is exogenous technical progress during the sample period and per capita gdp of the province is negatively related to the costs of the electric grid company located in the corresponding province we hope this empirical study will contribute to the debate on an efficiency based regulation scheme which was introduced to the chinese electric grid sector on a pilot base in 2014

service quality in the electricity industry the role of privatization and managerial behavior abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between privatization and service quality in the electricity industry and tests the hypothesis that managerial behavior is a significant intervening factor the sample includes 31 italian distributors over the period 1998 2004 their quality performance is represented by continuity of supply an aspect of quality that is both contractible and regulated results of the empirical analysis suggest that the transfer of shareholdings to private investors does not lead to quality degradation the results also suggest that managerial dominance translates into a reduction in supply quality this effect is likely to be particularly strong for public sector utilities

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article in this review by averch and johnson 3 on the fair rate of return regulation in public utilities industries or more generally regulated industries attracted the attention of many economists in essence averch johnson argues that the introduction of an active constraint of a fair rate of return type would induce the firm to invest more than the original profit maximizing value of capital and this would create an inefficient allocation of inputs in addition to frequent citations in verbal arguments it has invited some thieoretical extensions by economists such as wvestfield 8 and klevorick 5 all of the writers seem to accept the basic theoretical foundations set by averch and johnson for example klevorick 5 recently proposed that the fair rate of return should be inversely related to the size of the capital of a firm the intuitive basis for this is apparent for it in effect creates a penalty as the amount of capital used by the firm increases however it seems to me that averchjohnson s original arguments are sketchy and contain somewhat ambiguous logic at several important points although their conclusion for which they tried to find empirical support that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint seems to be correct it does not follow from their arguments in particular there seems to be a serious error which arises from confusing movements along a curve and shifts of a curve in section ii we clarify those ambiguities and if necessary correct the mistakes in the third section of this paper we shall provide a new formulation of the problem we shall find that the new formulation will give the same answer as averchjohnson namely that a firm will tend to invest more with the iiltroductioin of an active constraint it should be noted however that while the conclusion happens to be the same this was not the necessity for we needed a completely new formulation to obtain the old conclusion

factor price changes technical efficiency and revenue requirements regulation a regulatory framework is considered in which output price adjustments can be initiated only by a change in the price of a non capital input e g fuel at some time in the future which is uncertain at that time there is a processing period and then an adjustment of the output price so that the revenues of the firm meet an allowed rate of return s the regulated firm choosing a putty clay technology is shown to overcapitalize for large values of s and to undercapitalize for sufficiently small values of s a decrease in the length of the processing period is found to accentuate the extent of either the undercapitalization or overcapitalization resulting from the specified rate of return

time of use pricing for load management programs in taiwan power company load management programs have been actively performed by the utilities to reduce peak demand and improve system load factor in recent years the time of use tou tariff based on the peak load pricing theory has been one of the most effective load management strategies proper tou rate structure can actually reflect the generation cost of electricity supplying and give a guideline for customers to modify the power consumption pattern so that the system load factor can be improved the inverse electricity pricing rule can be applied as the basis of tou pricing in this paper the price elasticities of industrial customers of taipower system are solved by the statistical regression model with 2620 data samples

regulator heterogeneity and endogenous efforts to close the information asymmetry gap abstract the now standard principal agent model of regulator firm interactions typically assumes the presence of a single regulator and an exogenously determined information asymmetry between the principal and the agent in this paper we draw upon a unique data set of regulatory inspections conducted by the u s food and drug administration fda to explore the consistency of these assumptions with the actual practice of regulators we find that the canonical assumptions of the agency paradigm are strained by if not altogether inconsistent with the key practical realities of regulation by the fda our analysis uncovers several dimensions along which regulators actively and endogenously seek to close the information asymmetry gap we also find considerable regulator heterogeneity which in turn depends in part upon the specific training and experience of individual regulators

cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection the cartel may either i gradually raise price to its steady state level or ii gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady state level antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices

cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection this paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous we find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases during the transitional phase price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks during the stationary phase price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non collusion or simple monopoly the length of the transition phase is decreasing in the variance of cost shocks it is also shown that the cartel price path may overshoot its long run level so that price converges from above

regulated equity returns a puzzle abstract based on a database of u s electric utility rate cases spanning nearly four decades the returns on equity authorized by regulators have exhibited a large and growing premium over the riskless rate of return this growing premium does not appear to be explained by traditional asset pricing models often in direct contrast to regulators stated intent we suggest possible alternative explanations drawn from finance public policy public choice and the behavioral economics literature however absent some normative justification for this premium it would appear that regulators are authorizing excessive returns on equity to utility investors and that these excess returns translate into tangible profits for utility firms

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

efficient regulation with little information reality in the limit we present a regulatory scheme that converges to ramsey pricing and productive efficiency even if regulators have little information about technology or demand the model has firms selecting prices subject to the regulator s requirement that the firm earn a fair return on capital at today s capital stock and output levels regulators then review later performance and are more likely to request new rate hearings as the firm s return deviates more from the fair return as long as regulators do not review negative returns too fast relative to positive returns these conditions are sufficient for convergence to ramsey prices and productive efficiency public utility regulators generally set prices not rates of return per se these prices however often are meant to achieve approximately some target rate of return but when projecting how prices will affect rates of return regulators are often at the mercy of the firms for economic projections about the effects of various price vectors e g across customer classes upon profits so if realized rates of return deviate from targets regulators may call new rate hearings and they may expedite these hearings if the deviations are large 2 by formalizing these real world observations some rather surprising efficiency results appear suppose that regulators have no knowledge of demands and technologies but can observe past realizations of prices and quantities if the review probabilities are as noted above and satisfy an asymmetry condition then this regulatory process may converge not only to productive efficiency overcoming averch johnson over capitalization effects but to ramsey prices these conclusions are derived from unifying and extending work by bawa and sibley 1980 and vogelsang and finsinger 1979

pricing efficiency under rate of return regulation some empirical evidence for the electric utility industry the authors test quasi optimal pricing rules for rate of return regulation for a sample of electric utilities they estimate the regulated cost function and demand equations by class of customer for the sample to yield the cost and demand parameters required to assess the utility rate structures the results indicate that the price structure of electricity by class of customer is not quasi optimal and that welfare improvement might be possible under alternative prices searching for the price structure which satisfies the criteria they find that commercial users rates have been too high relative to residential and to a lesser extent industrial rates they note that commercial uses tend to be less organized and more poorly represented in the rate making process 16 references 8 tables

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

regulatory and life cycle influences on managerial incentives an important controversy persists in economics concerning the appropriateness of profit maximization as opposed to various competing nontraditional theories of the firm 13 of particular interest has been the comparative relevance of the sales maximization hypothesis suggested by baumol 4 and others a typical methodology employed to empirically analyze the profit versus sales maximization issue has been to question whether the financial rewards of top executives are more strongly influenced by corporate profit or sales performance it is implicitly assumed that the firm has a well defined set of organizational goals and that the structure of executive compensation is designed to provide executives with a consistent set of incentives therefore should profit performance constitute a significant determinant of executive compensation support for the profit maximization hypothesis would be gained on the other hand if executive compensation is closely related to firm sales then the nontraditional sales maximization hypothesis would be supported in an early empirical analysis of the issue mcguire chiu and elbing 14 found that sales and compensation were more highly correlated than were profits and compensation and therefore that the baumol hypothesis seemed most relevant lewellen and huntsman 12 pointed out however that mcguire et al had neglected to consider the deferred and contingent stock options etc elements of executive compensation and in so doing had perhaps biased their analysis against the profit maximization hypothesis by correctly considering the impact of corporate performance on the total compensation of top corporate executives lewellen and huntsman found strong support for the profit maximization hypothesis and no support for sales maximization in fact so convincing were the lewellen and huntsman results that they seemed to resolve the managerial motivation issue in favor of the traditional profit maximization model more recent empirical analyses however have tended to suggest that the issue is far from resolved baker 3 boyes and schlagenhauf 5 and ciscel and carroll 6 have all

regulatory restructuring and incumbent price dynamics the case of u s local telephone markets prior to the telecommunications act of 1996 many u s states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate of return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long distance markets and adopting price regulation price caps and price freezes using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services i investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators rate structures i find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross subsidization present in local telephone markets in addition the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition

price fixing policy abstract the prohibition against price fixing is competition law s most important and least controversial provision yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing and prevalent understandings cannot be reconciled with principles of oligopoly theory this article 1 presents a fundamental reconceptualization of our understanding of horizontal agreements 2 develops a systematic analysis of price fixing policy that focuses on its deterrence benefits and chilling costs and 3 compares this direct approach to commentators favored formulations that typically involve some sort of formalistic communications based prohibition by targeting a subset of means rather than the illicit ends conventional formulations tend to impose liability in cases with lower deterrence benefits and greater chilling costs than those reached under a direct approach and to incur greater administrative costs as well

how to organize crime in criminal organizations diffusing information widely throughout the organization might lead to greater internal efficiency in particular since these organizations are self sustaining through enhancing trust however this may come at the cost of leaving the organization more vulnerable to external threats such as law enforcement we consider the implications of this trade off and characterize the optimal information structure rationalizing both hierarchical structures and organization in cells then we focus on the role of the external authority characterize optimal detection strategies and discuss the implications of different forms of enforcement on the internal structure of the organization and policy finally we discuss a number of applications and extensions in this paper we study the interplay between trust within an illegal organization and its vulnerability to the authorities illegal organizations function more effectively when the people who constitute them trust each other we argue that information sharing is an important factor in building internal trust and cohesion but that can leave the organization vulnerable understanding how this trade off affects an organization s information structure and productivity can allow us to assess detection policies designed to destabilize such organizations since 9 11 the u s congress has passed a 400 billion annual budget for the war on terror new domestic institutions have been created or enhanced among many others the counterterrorism section at the u s department of justice s criminal division international intelligence cooperation has been strengthened and new protocols and controversial legal tools such as the patriot act have been developed however these new agencies and institutions face the same basic questions that have challenged the prosecutors fighting organized crime in italy south america and eastern asia as well as authorities fighting terrorism all over the world now and in the past how can we learn about the internal structure of criminal organizations how should we go about investigating a criminal organization in order to break its internal cohesion how does a criminal organization react to investigation policies we highlight the fact that simply understanding the information links within an organization gives us insight into addressing these questions the anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a wide heterogeneity across the information structures of different criminal organizations the most credited theory about the mafia developed in the early 1990 s has identified the so called cupola as the highest level of the organization supposedly consisting of agents who hold large amounts of information about the organization itself and carry out the enforcement needed for the organization to function 2 these crucial agents are shielded from the authorities since they are typically not directly involved in criminal activities this theory suggests a centralized information and enforcement structure 1 previous drafts have circulated under the titles power and organizational structure under an external threat

product complementarities capabilities and governance a dynamic transaction cost perspective the organization and governance of the transactions that comprise a bundling arrangement depend on the distribution of capabilities among firms and the amount of time during which the window of opportunity for earning rents is expected to remain open firms engaged in inter firm collaboration must undertake support transactions related to billing marketing customer support and product repair these support transactions differ from the core transactions that have traditionally been perceived as sufficient to provide a product bundle since support transactions create costs of their own the market may turn out to be an expensive means of governing collaborative arrangements undertaken for bundling purposes the telecommunications service sector provides an illustration copyright 1997 by oxford university press

an examination of the effect of ownership on the relative efficiency of public and private water utilities the behavior of privately and publicly owned water utilities is examined by estimating a generalized variable cost function containing the regular characteristics of the neoclassical cost function without requiring that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis assuming that unobserved shadow prices reflect the regulatory environment of the water industry tests for cost minimization are obtained by deriving shadow prices as functions of market prices the empirical results provide evidence that public water utilities are more efficient than private utilities on average but are more widely dispersed between best and worst practice

a note on allowed and realized rates of return of the us electric utility industry most empirical investigations of electric utility behavior use the realized rate of return as a proxy for the allowed rate of return we examine the validity of this assumption and investigate the relationship of the allowed and realized rates to the cost of capital between 1973 and 1982 we use two measures of the cost of capital one based on returns to book equity the other derived from a market price of equity while realized and allowed rates were generally higher than the book measure throughout the period both of the rates of return were less than the market price of capital after 1979 we also find firms did not earn their allowed rate of return after 1974 therefore the use of the realized rate as a proxy for the allowed rate in empirical models will lead to biased parameter estimates to help correct this bias we give data for allowed rates

integrated dynamic models for hedging international portfolio risks abstract we develop scenario based stochastic programming models for hedging the risks of international portfolios using options the models provide increasing level of integration in managing market and foreign exchange fx risks we start with a single stage model with currency options for selective hedging of fx risks while market risk is addressed through diversification we add stock options to hedge market risks and add quantos and currency options to develop an integrated model using an innovative method to price quantos on the scenario tree underpinning the stochastic program the models are extended to multi stage settings backtesting on market data over a 14 year period that includes the global financial crisis of 2008 we demonstrate the effectiveness of taking increasingly integrated views of risk management simultaneous hedging of market and fx risks using stock and currency options has the best ex post performance the differences are economically significant and statistical significance is established through rigorous hypothesis testing the models are particularly effective during the crisis test results show that two stage models outperform their single stage counterparts regardless of the hedging strategy

option portfolio strategies measurement and evaluation it is well known that options can increase the flexibility of returns available from investment strategies papers by ross 1976 breeden and litzenberger 1978 and arditti and john 1980 point toward spanning opportunities which increase the efficiency of the financial markets in meeting the investment objectives of investors while these and other studies have demonstrated the potential of option portfolio strategies in molding the return distribution to better fit risk preferences a number of other studies have used simulation techniques to give an empirical view of just what effect particular option stock and option bond strategies will have in altering risk return patterns a major study in this area is that of merton scholes and gladstein 1978 1982 their study presented in two papers one on call option portfolio strategies hereinafter msgl and the other on put option portfolio strategies hereinafter msg2 presents a broad and insightful discussion of many of the implications of combining options with stock portfolios the msg study employs a 12 5 year period for simulations in the first paper on portfolios using call options and a 14 year simulation period in the second paper on portfolios using put options as they are careful to point out their results depend on market trends which may not match ex ante expecta