demand curves for stocks do slope down new evidence from an index weights adjustment weights in the toronto stock exchange 300 index are determined by the market values of the included stocks public floats in november 1996 the exchange implemented a previously announced revision of its definition of the public float this revision which increased the floats and the index weights of 31 stocks conveyed no information and had no effect on the legal duties of shareholders affected stocks experienced statistically significant excess returns of 2 3 percent during the event week and no price reversal occurred as trading volume returned to normal levels these findings support downward sloping demand curves for stocks an obvious event with which to examine the slope of demand curves for stocks is one that changes supply in the absence of new information a shift in supply should not affect stock prices if demand curves for stocks are flat scholes 1972 using a sample of secondary equity distributions asks whether stocks are unique works of art or merely abstract claims to residual cash flows with many close substitutes as is assumed in much of finance theory scholes finds that the negative price impact of secondary offerings depends on the seller s identity implying the revelation of unfavorable informationand rules out a pure supply effect mikkelson and partch 1985 also using a sample of registered and unregistered secondary offerings find weak evidence of downward sloping demand curves but are unable to cleanly distinguish this explanation from the alternative explanation based on unfavorable information a different class of events additions to widely followed stock market indexes ostensibly provides a setting where information effects should not be present shleifer 1986 documents a permanent price increase for stocks

risk in dynamic arbitrage the price effects of convergence trading i develop an equilibrium model of convergence trading and its impact on asset prices arbitrageurs optimally decide how to allocate their limited capital over time their activity reduces price discrepancies but their activity also generates losses with positive probability even if the trading opportunity is fundamentally riskless moreover prices of identical assets can diverge even if the constraints faced by arbitrageurs are not binding occasionally total losses are large making arbitrageurs returns negatively skewed consistent with the empirical evidence the model also predicts comovement of arbitrageurs expected returns and market liquidity many hedge funds and other financial institutions attempt to exploit the relative mispricing of assets however from time to time the prices of the assets diverge forcing these institutions whom i will refer to as convergence traders or arbitrageurs to unwind some of their positions at spectacular losses the near collapse of the long term capital management ltcm hedge fund in 1998 is frequently cited as an example of this phenomenon 1 to what extent can these losses be attributed to the actions of arbitrageurs as opposed to unforeseen shocks why do other institutions with liquid capital not eliminate the abnormal returns around these events in this paper i develop a theoretical model to address these questions i show that such losses can occur in the absence of any shock i also show that even if the constraints faced by

smooth trading with overconfidence and market power we describe a symmetric continuous time model of trading among relatively overconfident oligopolistic informed traders with exponential utility traders agree to disagree about the precisions of their continuous flows of gaussian private information with enough disagreement an equilibrium exists in which prices reveal the average of all traders signals immediately but traders continue to trade gradually towards target inventories the price is a linear function of a trader s inventory the derivative of a trader s inventory and the average other traders valuations prices reflect a keynesian beauty contest faster than equilibrium trading generates flash crashes jel d8 d43 d47 g02 g14

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

dynamic portfolio choice with frictions abstract we show how portfolio choice can be modeled in continuous time with transitory and persistent transaction costs multiple assets multiple signals predicting returns and general signal dynamics the objective function is derived from the limit of discrete time models with endogenous transaction costs due to optimal dealer behavior we solve the model explicitly and the intuitive solution is also the limit of the solutions of the corresponding discrete time models we show how the optimal high frequency trading strategy depends on the nature of the trading costs which in turn depend on dealers inventory dynamics finally we provide equilibrium implications and illustrate the model s broader applicability to micro and macro economics monetary policy and political economy

existence and computation of mixed strategy nash equilibrium for 3 firms location problem location problems of firms on a closed interval were introduced by hotelling 3 and later investigated by eaton lipsey 2 firms sell a homogeneous product at a fixed price customers distributed along the interval buy one unit each from the firm nearest to them and firms aim to maximize the number of their customers it is well known that where the customers are evenly distributed along the interval and the number of firms is other than 3 the location problem has a pure strategy nash equilibrium see 2 the case of 3 firms is peculiar in that no pure strategy nash equilibrium exists for in any situation one of the extreme firms not located between the other two can increase its revenue by either moving towards or away from the other two firms the existence of mixed strategies is not obvious because the payoff functions are discontinuous whenever two or more firms are located at the same point in a recent paper dasgupta and maskin 1 investigate a class of games all derived from economic problems and all with some discontinuities in their payoff functions they demonstrate that the discontinuities in the payoff functions do not prevent the existence of mixed strategies nash equilibria in the games investigated in particular location problems of the type described earlier have such weak discontinuities and hence possess a mixed strategy nash equilibrium although their proof is constructive offering a method of approaching these equilibria as a limit of equilibria of finite games the equations involved very quickly become unmanageable in this note we compute a mixed strategy nash equilibrium for the 3 firms location problem let the customers be evenly distributed along 0 1 then a mixed strategy is a probability measure over 0 1 the symmetry of the problem suggests that the solution will be doubly symmetric in that all firms choose the same mixed strategy and that this strategy is symmetric around symmetric locations are given the same probabilities dasgupta and maskin confine their analysis to doubly symmetric solutions and prove that the strategies in any doubly symmetric equilibrium are atomless given the symmetric nature of the game and following the analysis of dasgupta and maskin we shall confine ourselves here to such doubly sym

from lotka s biophysics to georgescu roegen s bioeconomics abstract alfred lotka was one of the founders of modern ecology this paper explores lotka s contribution to biophysical economics resulting from the marriage of the three disciplines biology physics and economics lotka founded the concept of exosomatic evolution to characterise the economic activities in their biophysical environment as a continuation of biological processes like vernadsky he adopted a holistic perspective of planet system the biosphere georgescu roegen was one of the founders of ecological economics he explained the entropic nature of evolution and adopted lotka s exosomatic evolution concept in his bioeconomic approach georgescu roegen had several warnings for economists about the irrevocability of the entropic degradation of matter energy and the pressure on natural resources that goes hand in hand with economic processes in general this article aims at drawing a parallel between lotka s contribution and georgescu roegen s bioeconomics by shedding light not only on their similarities but also on the divergences that testify the novelty of georgescu roegen s approach

fairness and efficiency in multiportfolio optimization we deal with the problem faced by a portfolio manager in charge of multiple accounts we argue that because of market impact costs this setting differs in several subtle ways from the classical single account case with the key distinction being that the performance of each individual account typically depends on the trading strategies of other accounts as well we propose a novel tractable approach for jointly optimizing the trading activities of all accounts and also splitting the associated market impact costs between the accounts our approach allows the manager to balance the conflicting objectives of maximizing the aggregate gains from joint optimization and distributing them across the accounts in an equitable way we perform numerical studies that suggest that our approach outperforms existing methods employed in the industry or discussed in the literature

the nature of equilibrium in a location model models of location are appropriate in a number of contexts in economics and political science for example firms choose where to position stores and which of a spectrum of goods to produce and politicians select the nature of their platforms in such models it is natural to look for a collection of locations with the property that the location of each individual is optimal given the positions of all other individuals however the pure strategy nash equilibrium provides a solution which is both incomplete and unsatisfactory incomplete because in many cases no such equilibrium exists unsatisfactory because even when it does exist it may not be robust to the specification of the model

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

symmetric zero sum games with only asymmetric equilibria abstract we know that a two player symmetric zero sum games with non empty equilibrium sets always admit symmetric equilibria and that b two player and multiplayer symmetric non zero sum games might have only asymmetric equilibria fey 2012 but what about multiplayer symmetric zero sum games this paper shows that these games might also have only asymmetric equilibria one of the examples employed to illustrate this point is the three candidate version of the popular hotelling downs model of electoral competition this demonstrates that symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria are not technical paradoxes but are integrated in economics and political science literature for quite a while

large block transactions the speed of response and temporary and permanent stock price effects abstract the paper investigates how quickly prices attain new equilibrium levels after large block transactions and measures the associated temporary and permanent price effects we find that prices adjust within at most three trades with most of the adjustment occurring in the first trade the temporary price effect for seller initiated transactions is related to block size but the temporary price effect observed for buyer initiated transactions is no larger than that observed in 100 share trades most of the price effect associated with block trades is permanent and is related to block size regardless of the initiating party

electoral competition with third party entry in the lab abstract electoral competition between two vote share maximizing candidates in the context of the unidimensional spatial model leads to platform convergence both candidates end up proposing the ideal policy of the median voter downs 1957 palfrey 1984 famously argued that if third candidate entry is expected after the two main candidates choose their platforms the unique equilibrium is such that the two main candidates locate substantially far from each other by conducting a laboratory experiment we put this popular idea to test for the first time we allow entry to take place with four different probabilities and find that indeed the degree of polarization of the two main candidates platforms increases as third candidate entry becomes more likely to occur providing strong evidence in support of palfrey 1984 s formal results and underlying intuition

the east end the west end and king s cross on clustering in the four player hotelling game nicolaas j vriend i introduction despite the popularity of simple location models in industrial economics and voting theory in the tradition following hotelling 1929 and despite the recent rise of the experimental method in economics there have been only few experimental tests of such models brown kruse et al 1993 and brown kruse and schenk 1999 study models with elastic demand while collins and sherstyuk 2000 focus on the simpler case which we address too where demand is inelastic collins and sherstyuk implement a model with three agents who choose locations on a line segment with a uniform density of consumers who due to the assumption of inelastic demand can also be seen as voters with one vote each it is well known that this game has no pure strategy equilibrium see eaton and lipsey 1975 normalizing the line segment to the unit interval the unique mixed strategy equilibrium prescribes uniform randomization over the middle two quarters for all firms see shaked 1982 as it is a well established fact that experimental subjects have difficulties in randomizing see for example rapoport and budescu 1997 it is not very surprising that collins and sherstyuk do not find strong support for the equilibrium hypothesis their empirical distribution of choices is m shaped and has a considerably larger support than the equilibrium distribution in this study we analyze the case of four agents with uniform consumer density and inelastic demand as the equilibrium of this case implies that two firms locate at the edge of the first and second quarters and the other two at the edge of the third and fourth quarters this setup seems ideal for the investigation of various matters first there is no other number of agents where the equilibrium prediction has a better chance to be valid 1 with three competitors the unique symmetric equilibrium is mixed with five the unique equilibrium configuration is asymmetric and implies unequal payoffs and with six and more agents the equilibrium configurations cease to be unique thus only the two and the four agent cases yield unique pure and symmetric equilibrium configurations that give identical payoffs to all agents second the equilibrium in the four agent case has a property that makes it interesting from a behavioral and empirical point of view not only the focal midpoint is empty but the whole middle segment of the linear city is empty as well that is notwithstanding the nice theoretical properties the equilibrium is not entirely intuitive and is also conflicting with casual empirical evidence there are no cities without shops in the center nor are there democracies without parties located in the political middle ground the picture we will discern in our experimental data can be summarized in the following experimental result in the four seller case the equilibrium prediction is of substantial but limited help about one third of all choices are clustered around the equilibrium locations but in no session do we observe convergence to equilibrium at the same time the focal midpoint exerts a considerable attraction with almost 10 of all choices clustered around it consumers profit from this considerably in the form of lower transportation costs the remainder of the article is organized as follows in section ii we give a theoretical account of the model we implement in section iii we present the experimental design in section iv we analyze the results and explain the data and section v concludes ii theory consider a linear city in which four firms produce a good at constant marginal cost the price of the good is fixed due to some unmodeled features of the market consequently costs can be normalized to zero and the price to one to sell the goods the firms simultaneously choose a location on the unit interval 0 1

the behavior of stock prices around institutional trades all trades executed by 37 large investment management firms from july 1986 to december 1988 are used to study the price impact and execution cost of the entire sequence package of trades that we interpret as an order we find that market impact and trading cost are related to firm capitalization relative package size and most importantly to the identity of the management firm behind the trade money managers with high demands for immediacy tend to be associated with larger market impact financial economists have long studied the equity trading process and its impact on stock prices much prior empirical research isolates individual trades and analyzes the behavior of the stock price around each trade see for example kraus and stoll 1972a holthausen leftwich and mayers 1987 1990 keim and madhavan 1991 petersen and umlauf 1991 hausman lo and mackinlay 1992 and chan and lakonishok 1993 evaluating the behavior of stock prices around trades provides a means of discriminating among various hypotheses as to the elasticity of the demand for stocks yields an estimate of the cost of executing trades and a measure of the liquidity of a market and permits tests of different models of the determination of quotes and transaction prices for many institutional investors however even a moderately sized position in a stock may represent a large fraction of the stock s trading volume accordingly an investment manager s order is often broken up into several trades it is often misleading therefore to consider an individual trade as the basic unit of analysis in the study of trading activity and its effects on prices this paper uses the record of trades executed by 37 large investment manage

competition and collusion in dealer markets this article develops a game theoretic model to analyze market makers intertemporal pricing strategies we show that dealers who adopt noncooperative pricing strategies may set bid ask spreads above competitive levels this form of implicit collusion differs from explicit collusion where dealers cooperate to fix prices price discreteness or asymmetric information are not required for collusion to occur rather institutional arrangements that restrict access to the order flow are important determinants of the ability to collude because they reduce dealers incentives to compete on price public policy efforts to increase interdealer competition should focus on such restrictions

the price of liquidity the effects of market conditions and bank characteristics we study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics these prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks which is calculated over time using individual bank level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks consistent with the existence of short squeezing we also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes healthier banks pay less but contrary to what one might expect banks in formal liquidity networks do not state guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes

predatory trading stigma and the fed s term auction facility abstract predatory trading may affect the incentives for banks to raise liquidity in times of financial distress in these periods borrowing becomes a signal of illiquidity exposing borrowers to predatory trading and possible insolvency a stigma of borrowing thus arises leading distressed banks to take on more illiquid positions than they would otherwise the fed s term auction facility taf can alleviate this problem the taf s competitive auction format allows auction winners to signal that they are illiquid but relatively strong the taf may therefore be an effective policy tool during financial crises by altering the signal value of borrowing this facility supports the injection of liquidity into distressed banks in normal times however this auction facility becomes counterproductive by cream skimming the relatively strong banks the weakest banks are left as potential prey for predators this suggests that the taf is a policy best reserved for times of crisis

toward consilience between biology and economics the contribution of ecological economics abstract during its ten year history ecological economics has made a real difference in the way economists look at the natural world and in the way biologists look at the economy in this survey article we examine the contributions to the journal in terms of e o wilson s concept of consilience that is his argument that the methods and assumptions of any field of study should be consistent with the known and accepted facts in other disciplines in particular we examine the contributions of ecological economics to reconciling the economic theory of the consumer and producer with biophysical reality

it takes two to tango equilibria in a model of sales we show that the varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria a unique symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in contrast the 2 firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric for the n firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first order stochastic dominance this enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric

the economics of degrowth economic degrowth is ecologically desirable and possibly inevitable but under what conditions can it become socially sustainable how can we have full employment and economic stability without growth what will happen to public spending and to public debt how would production be organised in a degrowing economy and under what plausible socio political conditions could such grand changes happen standard economic theories and models ignore these questions for them economic growth is an axiomatic necessity this article reviews recent contributions in the economics of degrowth and identifies research avenues for ecological economists

collusion in bertrand vs cournot competition a virtual bargaining approach how do firms manage to collude without communicating why do we find more collusion in price competition than in quantity competition why is collusion so hard to detect we examine strategic behavior in competitive interactions by developing and applying the concept of virtual bargaining when decision makers virtually bargain they mentally simulate and choose among agreements that they could reach if they were able to explicitly negotiate with each other virtual bargainers focus on agreements that offer some protection against the possibility that their counterparts may deviate and best respond to these agreements we develop a formal account of virtual bargaining and demonstrate that it leads to collusion in bertrand but not in cournot competition in this framework collusion is a result of virtual bargaining as a mode of reasoning and requires neither communication nor dynamic considerations such as rewards and punishments between the players this paper was accepted by manel baucells decisi

incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent s reaction toward market entrants this study widens the perspective from a firm s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation in each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels respectively and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor from the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high quality firms in our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high quality restaurant market in germany to test the theoretical findings while the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment

georgescu roegen s flow fund theory of production in retrospect abstract this paper provides a synthetic account of georgescu roegen s flow fund theory as a contribution to the history of ecological economics it reconstitutes georgescu roegen s perspective on production and its relationships with other frameworks such as the neoclassical production function and input output tables the overall purpose is to clearly establish the foundations of the flow fund theory and to introduce the research perspectives it opens for ecological economics the paper puts particular emphasis on the relationships between the flow fund framework and two other aspects of georgescu roegen s thought first his methodological perspective on economics and the role of mathematical models allows for a better understanding of the foundations of the flow fund theory second this framework incorporates georgescu roegen s interest in the physical dimension of the economic process and the implications of the laws of thermodynamics overall the paper concludes that the flow fund theory has solid foundations and thus represents a credible alternative to standard theories of production however in order to show how this framework can shed light on contemporary issues in ecological economics more applications are needed especially at the theoretical level the main challenge for future research is to develop such applications while trying to be faithful to the foundations of the flow fund theory

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

in search of liquidity block trades in the upstairs and downstairs markets we analyze the ability of various market mechanisms to provide liquidity for large equity trades using data on 21 077 block transactions in dow jones stocks we find that the down stairs nyse floor market is a significant source of liquidity although negotiation in the informal upstairs market provides better execution than the downstairs market for large trades these differences are economically small we find however that upstairs markets are used by traders who can credibly signal that their trades are liquidity motivated thus upstairs markets allow trades that may not otherwise occur article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

optimal portfolio liquidation with distress risk we analyze the problem of an investor who needs to unwind a portfolio in the face of recurring and uncertain liquidity needs with a model that accounts for both permanent and temporary price impact of trading we first show that a risk neutral investor who myopically deleverages his position to meet an immediate need for cash always prefers to sell more liquid assets if the investor faces the possibility of a downstream shock however the solution differs in several important ways if the ensuing shock is sufficiently large the nonmyopic investor unwinds positions more than immediately necessary and all else being equal prefers to retain more of the assets with low temporary price impact in order to hedge against possible distress more generally optimal liquidation involves selling strictly more of the assets with a lower ratio of permanent to temporary impact even if these assets are relatively illiquid the results suggest that properly accounting for the possibility of future shocks should play a role in managing large portfolios

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

efficiency and bargaining power in the interbank loan market using detailed transactions level data on interbank loans we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core which imposes a set of no arbitrage conditions on trades in the market for canada s large value transfer system we show that although the market is fairly efficient systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample the level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the bank of canada s operations as well as phases of the 2007 8 financial crisis we find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and surprisingly toward riskier borrowers

liquidity resiliency and market quality around predictable trades theory and evidence abstract we extend the theory of strategic trading around a predictable liquidation by considering the role of market resiliency our model predicts that even a monopolist strategic trader improves market quality and increases liquidator proceeds if trades temporary price impacts are quickly reversed and that competition among strategic traders strictly improves market quality we provide related empirical evidence by studying prices liquidity and individual account trading activity around the large and predictable roll trades undertaken by a large exchange traded fund etf the evidence indicates narrower bid ask spreads greater order book depth and improved resiliency on roll dates we find that a larger number of individual trading accounts provide liquidity on roll dates and do not find evidence of the systematic use of predatory strategies on balance the theory and evidence imply that traders supply liquidity to rather than exploit predictable trades in resilient markets

need entitlement and desert a distributive justice framework for consumption degrowth abstract post growth societies seek socio ecological transformations towards a just and sustainable redistribution and reduced consumption of natural capital there is no one universally just and ecologically sustainable way of fulfilling these redistribution and consumption objectives it depends on the criteria used and their underlying ethical teleology we suggest three distribution criteria borrowed from the foundations of the environmental justice ej movement need entitlement and desert by juxtaposing and problematising the needs entitlements and deserts of nature and society these criteria comprise an ethical framework for consumption degrowth praxis in communities we present arguments for how each distribution criterion fulfils the aims articulated in the degrowth corpus based on these arguments we propose seven justice based community action principles for redistribution under degrowth in our discussion of these derived principles we demonstrate that like ej degrowth seeks consequential as well as deontological justice underscoring their deep complementarity therefore our need entitlement desert framework may serve as a useful guiding frame to include ethical distribution considerations in societies pursuit of post growth futures

episodic liquidity crises cooperative and predatory trading we describe how episodic illiquidity arises from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants we first solve a one period trading game in continuous time using an asset pricing equation that accounts for the price impact of trading then in a multi period framework we describe an equilibrium in which traders cooperate most of the time through repeated interaction providing apparent liquidity to one another cooperation breaks down when the stakes are high leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity equilibrium strategies that involve cooperation across markets lead to less frequent episodic illiquidity but cause contagion when cooperation breaks down why is illiquidity rare and episodic pastor stambaugh 2003 detect only 14 aggregate low liquidity months over the time period 1962 to 1999 despite being of significant magnitude most of the episodes were short lived and were followed by long periods of liquidity 1 the origin of this empirical observation still remains a puzzle in this paper we attempt to shed light on this puzzle by developing a theoretical model in which a breakdown in cooperation between traders in the market manifests itself in predatory trading this mechanism leads to sudden and short lived illiquidity we develop a dynamic model of trading based on liquidity needs during each period a liquidity event may occur in which a trader is required to liquidate a large block of an asset in a relatively short time period this need for liquidity is observed by a tight oligopoly whose members may choose to predate or cooperate predation involves racing and fading the distressed trader to the market

the upstairs market for large block transactions analysis and measurement of price effects this article develops a model of the upstairs market where order size beliefs and prices are determined endogenously we test the model s predictions using unique data for 5 625 equity trades during the period 1985 to 1992 that are known to be upstairs transactions and are identified as either buyer or seller initiated we find that price movements prior to the trade date are significantly positively related to trade size consistent with information leakage as the block is shopped upstairs further the temporary price impact or liquidity effect is a concave function of order size which may result from upstairs intermediation

heterogeneity and stability bolster the strong not the weak we first study a stylized model of self fulfilling panic among agents with differing fragilities to strategic risk and show that depending on the severity of coordination problems the panic trigger threshold can depend only on one type s fragility we then present a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities to financial spillovers concerns about potential spillovers generate strategic interaction triggering a pre emption game in which one tries to exit the market before others to avoid spillovers although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions systemic risk can critically depend on financial health of stronger in the contagion chain in this case bolstering the strong rather than the weak more effectively enhances systemic stability

on the nature of equilibria in a downsian model with candidate valence abstract i analyze mixed strategy equilibria in a downsian model with two office motivated candidates in which one candidate is endowed with a sufficiently large valence advantage that a voter might prefer this candidate even if the voter strictly prefers the other candidate s policies there is a discrete one dimensional policy space and the preferences of the median voter are uncertain i show that there is a range of moderate policies with no gaps that are optimal for the advantaged candidate there is also a range of liberal policies with no gaps and a corresponding range of conservative policies with no gaps that are optimal actions for the disadvantaged candidate the upper and lower bounds on these ranges of policies vary in predictable ways with the size of the advantaged candidate s advantage

spatial competition with three firms an experimental study the paper reports the results of an experimental study of the three firm location problem we compare the subjects behavior in the experiments with the symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium calculated by shaked 1982 overall the findings are consistent with the equilibrium prediction however the subjects locations were significantly more dispersed than predicted by the theory three alternative explanations of this phenomenon inexperience approximate equilibrium behavior and risk aversion are suggested and evaluated for their predictive power special attention is paid to risk aversion

transaction costs and asset prices a dynamic equilibrium model in this article we study the effects of transaction costs on asset prices we assume an overlapping generations economy with a riskless liquid bond and many risky stocks carrying proportional transaction costs we obtain stock prices and turnover in closed form surprisingly a stock s price may increase in transaction costs and a more frequently traded stock may be less adversely affected by an increase in transaction costs calculations based on the marginal investor overestimate the effects of transaction costs for realistic parameter values transaction costs have very small effects on stock prices but large effects on turnover

anonymity adverse selection and the sorting of interdealer trades this article asks why london security dealers use more than one trading venue to trade with one another we argue that differences in the exclusivity liquidity anonymity and post trade transparency of each system permit a more efficient sorting of interdealer trades than if there were just one system our evidence comes from detailed data on where london dealers chose to place interdealer trades contrary to intuition we show that uninformed interdealer trades as measured by subsequent price impact tend to migrate to third party brokered systems where trade is anonymous by contrast informed interdealer trades tend to migrate to the direct nonanonymous public market additionally we show that this distribution of trades is supported by differences in the price improvement dealers receive in the direct and brokered markets our findings have implications for three strands of the market microstructure literature first they contribute to our understanding of the importance of anonymity and transparency in securities trading most theoretical models of the effects of anonymity and transparency predict that anonymous trading systems will attract more informed trades

on the profitability of collusion in location games in this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition focusing on the case of pure location choices we find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players this result holds for location games played in k dimensional euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions for competition on the unit interval unit circle and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable the results have immediate implications for mergers in spatial markets

mixed equilibria in runoff elections abstract we demonstrate that the hotelling downs model with runoff voting always admits symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for any even or odd number of office motivated candidates provided they are at least four in specific a we show that the game does not admit any symmetric atomless equilibrium b we fully characterize a class of symmetric atomic mixed equilibria which exist for any distribution of the voters ideal policies and c we argue that these equilibria are more robust than pure strategy equilibria to introduction of uncertainty about the voters preferences

on existence of location equilibria in the 3 firm hotelling problem it is well known that the hotelling model of spatial competition with three firms admits no equilibrium solution see chamberlin 1933 and lerner and singer 1937 apparently this non existence result is associated with the assumption that customers patronize the nearest firm now empirical evidence supports the idea that consumers do not necessarily choose to buy from the closest firm since they also take variables other than distance into account as these variables are often unobservable firms cease to be fully informed about consumers motivations consequently they can at best determine the shopping behavior of a particular customer up to a probability distribution the purpose of this note is to reconsider the 3 firm hotelling problem within a probabilistic framework it is shown that two different types of equilibria emerge centrally agglomerated equilibria in which the three firms are clustered and symmetric dispersed equilibria in which the three firms have distinct locations these equilibria are compared to the socially optimal locations

the principle of minimum differentiation revisited return of the median voter we study a linear location model hotelling 1929 in which n with n 2 boundedly rational players follow noisy myopic best reply behavior we show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center re establishing the principle of minimum differentiation that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses thus our analysis of the best response dynamics shows that when considering market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses