strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

overreaction delayed reaction and contrarian profits this paper presents a decomposition of short horizon contrarian profits into various sources based on an analysis os stock price reactions to common factors an firm specific information in sharp contrast with the conclusions in the extant literature we find that the lead lag structure in stock prices contributes less than 5 of the observed contrarian profits with most of the profits being attributable to stock price overreaction

the regulation of privatized monopolies in the united kingdom this article examines the experience in the united kingdom with the regulation of privatized monopolies its conclusions are 1 that there are significant differences between rpi x or price cap and u s rate of return regulation which provides greater scope for bargaining in the former system 2 that u k regulators have taken seriously their duty to promote competition but that the existing economic literature is of limited help in this task 3 that price regulation is likely to be more effective where technology is changing slowly and or where technology is changing rapidly and 4 that the case for rpi x price cap rather than rate of return regulation is strongest in telecommunications gas supply and electricity supply and least strong in gas and electricity transmission grids

asset price and wealth dynamics in a financial market with heterogeneous agents abstract this paper considers a discrete time model of a financial market with one risky asset and one risk free asset where the asset price and wealth dynamics are determined by the interaction of two groups of agents fundamentalists and chartists in each period each group allocates its wealth between the risky asset and the safe asset according to myopic expected utility maximization but the two groups have heterogeneous beliefs about the price change over the next period the chartists are trend extrapolators while the fundamentalists expect that the price will return to the fundamental we assume that investors optimal demand for the risky asset depends on wealth as a result of crra utility a market maker is assumed to adjust the market price at the end of each trading period based on excess demand and on changes of the underlying reference price the model results in a nonlinear discrete time dynamical system with growing price and wealth processes but it is reduced to a stationary system in terms of asset returns and wealth shares of the two groups it is shown that the long run market dynamics are highly dependent on the parameters which characterize agents behaviour as well as on the initial condition moreover for wide ranges of the parameters a locally stable fundamental steady state coexists with a stable non fundamental steady state or with a stable closed orbit where only chartists survive in the long run such cases require the numerical and graphical investigation of the basins of attraction other dynamic scenarios include periodic orbits and more complex attractors where in general both types of agents survive in the long run with time varying wealth fractions

price dynamics in a market with heterogeneous investment horizons and boundedly rational traders this paper studies the effects of multiple investment horizons and investors bounded rationality on the price dynamics we consider a pure exchange economy with one risky asset populated with agents maximizing crra type expected utility of wealth over discrete investment periods an investor s demand for the risky asset may depend on the historical returns so that our model encompasses a wide range of behaviorist patterns the necessary conditions under which the risky return can be a stationary iid process are established the compatibility of these conditions with different types of demand functions in the heterogeneous agents framework are explored we find that conditional volatility of returns cannot be constant in many generic situations especially if agents with different investment horizons operate on the market in the latter case the return process can display conditional heteroscedasticity even if all investors are so called fundamentalists and their demand for the risky asset is subject to exogenous iid shocks we show that the heterogeneity of investment horizons can be a possible explanation of different stylized patterns in stock returns in particular mean reversion and volatility clustering

hostages as a commitment device a game theoretic model and an empirical test of some scenarios abstract hostage posting is a mechanism of cooperation in social and economic relations with incentive problems a game theoretic model of hostage posting as a commitment device is presented cooperation via hostage posting is individually rational if it is supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium maximin properties of such equilibria are also considered predictions derived from the model were tested in several experiments results support the empirical significance of subgame perfect equilibria and of maximin strategies the institution of hostages is an ancient technique that deserves to be studied by game theory as does the practice of drinking wine from the same glass or of holding gang meetings in places so public that neither side could escape if it subjected the other to massacre schelling 1960 p 135

wealth driven selection in a financial market with heterogeneous agents we study the co evolution of asset prices and individual wealth in a financial market with an arbitrary number of heterogeneous boundedly rational investors using wealth dynamics as a selection device we are able to characterize the long run market outcomes i e asset returns and wealth distributions for a general class of competing investment behaviors our investigation illustrates that market interaction and wealth dynamics pose certain limits on the outcome of agents interactions even within the wilderness of bounded rationality as an application we consider the case of heterogeneous mean variance optimizers and provide insights into the results of the simulation model introduced by levy levy and solomon 1994

trading frequency and volatility clustering abstract volatility clustering with autocorrelations of the hyperbolic decay rate is unquestionably one of the most important stylized facts of financial time series this paper presents a market microstructure model that is able to generate volatility clustering with hyperbolically decaying autocorrelations via traders with multiple trading frequencies using bayesian information updates in an incomplete market the model illustrates that signal extraction which is induced by multiple trading frequencies can increase the persistence of the volatility of returns furthermore we show that the volatility of the underlying time series of returns varies greatly with the number of traders in the market

lemons hypothesis reconsidered an empirical analysis abstract this paper tests the hypothesis that there is no difference in the average maintenance expenditures required for cars acquired used and those acquired new the results showed no evidence that cars acquired used required more maintenance expenditures than those of a similar age acquired new

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale abstract this paper surveys the analysis by means of cooperative game theory of economies in which there are increasing returns to scale in the first section necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a core of a general equilibrium economy are considered in the second section the partial equilibrium approach to increasing returns production which developed along with the natural monopoly literature is surveyed the close relationship between the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium approaches is emphasized

investor heterogeneity asset pricing and volatility dynamics abstract we provide an explicit characterization of the equilibrium when investors have heterogeneous risk preferences given market completeness investors can achieve full risk sharing thus a representative agent can be constructed though this agent s risk aversion changes over time as the relative wealths of the individual investors change we show that volatility depends on the covariance of aggregate risk aversion and stock returns we find that heterogeneity increases volatility produces volatility clustering arch effects and leverage like effects option prices exhibit implied volatility skews there is predictability and we assess the magnitude of investors hedging demands and trading volume further diversity is beneficial to all agents and entails welfare gains that can be substantial

a tale of three schools insights on autocorrelations of short horizon stock returns this article reexamines the autocorrelation patterns of short horizon stock returns we document empirical results which imply that these autocorrelations have been overstated in the existing literature based on several new insights we provide support for a market efficiency based explanation of the evidence our analysis suggests that institutional factors are the most likely source of the autocorrelation patterns

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

changes in institutional ownership and stock returns assessment and methodology although the relation between quarterly changes in institutional investor ownership and contemporaneous stock returns is well documented the source of the relation remains unclear because institutional ownership data are unavailable at higher frequencies in this study we develop a method to generate estimates of higher frequency covariances when one variable is observed at lower frequencies e g quarterly changes in institutional ownership and monthly stock returns our method provides evidence that institutional trading has both temporary and permanent price effects and that the latter is associated with information effects

monopoly rents in contestable markets random choices of prices and product characteristics can be used by a contestable monopolist to deter entry and fully extract the monopoly rent we develop this idea in a model of bertrand price competition in equilibrium one firm enters the market and makes choices that are unpredictable to its competitors this prevents price undercuts and keeps other firms out of the market the entrant firm collects the monopoly rent despite the existence of potential competitors this result raises an alert for regulatory practices based on the conventional wisdom that contestability is associated with low prices and profits

the persistence of monopoly an investigation of the effectiveness of the united kingdom monopolies commission a sample of twenty eight markets investigated by the uk monopolies and mergers commission is taken and market share changes are analysed for subsequent erosion of dominance the evidence points to a modest erosion for leading firms but only rarely to a loss of leadership although there is no significant difference between the rates of decline for leading firms in the mmc sample and a control group the achievement of some erosion of dominance in markets where entry barriers were reduced may represent some limited success for competition policy