labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions this paper examines the impact of labor unemployment risk on corporate financing decisions theory suggests that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of mitigating worker exposure to unemployment risk using changes in state unemployment insurance benefit laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells we explore the connection between unemployment risk and the corporate financing decisions of public firms in the united states we find that increases in legally mandated unemployment benefits lead to increases in corporate leverage the impact of reduced unemployment risk on financial policy is especially strong for firms that have greater layoff separation rates labor intensity and financing constraints the estimated premium required to compensate workers for unemployment risk due to financial distress is about 57 basis points of firm value for a bbb rated firm these findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions

corporate conservatism and relative compensation this paper demonstrates that in a simple setting with managerial concern for reputation and asymmetric information on ability most managers may refrain from undertaking innovations that stochastically dominate an industry standard common components of uncertainty lead to market inferences of managerial ability based on relative performance managers who undertake the industry standard are consequently evaluated with a more accurate benchmark than those innovating discontinuities in compensation when performance is low because of firings lead managers to have differing valuations of an accurate benchmark depending on type in particular very high and very low ability managers are more likely to undertake superior innovations than those of average ability

impairment of monetary autonomy case of trilemma vs duo abstract in a unified framework comprising 33 diverse economies this study investigates the role of flexible exchange rate regime vis a vis capital controls in providing insulation against monetary autonomy impairment we find both of them to be equally effective we also investigate the debate between the mundellian trilemma and the duo our findings show that in the presence of capital openness the flexible exchange rates restrict autonomy impairment only at the shorter horizon of 3 months not at the longer horizon of 12 months

good ipos draw in bad inelastic banking capacity and hot markets we posit that screening ipos requires specialized labor which is in fixed supply a sudden increase in demand for ipo financing increases the compensation of ipo screening labor this results in reduced screening encouraging sub marginal firms to enter the ipo market further fueling the demand for screening labor the model s conclusions are consistent with empirical findings of increased underpricing during hot markets positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing and with tipping points between hot and cold markets finally the model makes sharp predictions relating the ipo market to fundamental values of firms and to investment banking returns

experimentation and job choice in this article we examine optimal job choices when jobs differ in the rate at which they reveal information about workers skills we then analyze how the optimal level of experimentation changes over a worker s career and characterize job transitions and wage growth over the life cycle using the dictionary of occupational titles merged with the national longitudinal survey of youth 1979 we then construct an index of how much information different occupations reveal about workers skills and document patterns of occupational choice and wage growth that are consistent with a trade off between information and wages

moral hazard in strategic decision making abstract this paper develops a theory of moral hazard in which the agent takes the role of strategic decision maker career concerns give rise to preferences over risk which in turn create an incentive for the agent to manipulate the project s risk return tradeoff to the disadvantage of the principal the resultant moral hazard can be ameliorated by an incentive contract the optimal non decreasing wage involves granting in the money options in the context of academic tenure the optimal tenure standard requires the agent to exceed expectations and lies within one standard deviation of the expected outcome

a test of lazear s theory of delayed payment contracts according to lazear workers and firms enter into long term implicit contracts that discourage shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract such delayed payment contracts are less likely to occur in jobs in which it is comparatively simple to monitor worker effort this paper uses data from the national longitudinal survey and the dictionary of occupational titles to test that hypothesis in particular it tests whether jobs that involve repetitive tasks tend to be characterized by an absence of pensions mandatory retirement long job tenures and high wages for older workers

credible threats in a wage bargaining model with on the job search abstract this note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on the job search renegotiation does not require mutual consent if the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model

multi period insurance contracts this paper examines the form of insurance contracts in the presence of asymmetric information about consumers accident probabilities our goal is to understand the adjustment in contract terms as a function of accident histories in a finite horizon model we also compare these adjustments between alternative market structures our principal findings indicate that history dependent insurance contracts serve a useful sorting role individuals who declare themselves low risks to insurance companies face adverse contracturai terms if they subsequently have many accidents these adjustments are strongest in the case of a single insurance seller but are present in the competitive model as well

macroeconomic conditions at entry and injury risk in the workplace financial support from mineco feder eco2015 70540 p and the compagnia di san paolo to call3 20120119 the popart network is gratefully acknowledged

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders abstract this paper considers a first price common value auction with one sided private information among bidders an object is rented each period to the highest bidder without revealing the bids made in previous periods the paper extends single crossing arguments used in static games to show the existence of equilibrium in this repeated auction the model predicts that bidders bid more aggressively in a repeated auction than in a static auction because a higher bid increases the amount of information learned through bidding the aggressive bidding behavior also implies that the per period revenue of the repeated auction is higher than that of the one period counterpart this bidding behavior leads to a theoretical explanation for the winner s curse in repeated auctions in addition the model yields predictions like an increasing wage schedule over time and the institution of a signing bonus that are consistent with labor market observations

human capital bankruptcy and capital structure we derive a firm s optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk while equity holders can diversify this risk away in the presence of corporate taxes our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice it also makes a number of predictions for the cross sectional distribution of firm leverage consistent with existing empirical evidence it implies persistent idiosyncratic dierences in leverage across firms an important new empirical prediction of the model is that ceteris paribus firms with more leverage should pay higher wages

the great moderation in international capital flows a global phenomenon abstract this paper highlights a recent great moderation in global capital flows characterised by smaller volumes and lower volatility of cross border transactions however there are substantial differences across countries and regions which we analyse by comparing the level of international capital flows observed in 2005 06 immediately prior to the onset of the global financial crisis to the post crisis period of 2013 14 when global flows arguably settled at a new normal we find that since the pre crisis period gross capital inflows recovered more for economies with smaller pre crisis external and internal imbalances lower per capita income improving growth expectations a less severe impact of the global financial crisis and less stringent macroprudential policy on the asset side countries with a more accommodative monetary policy a milder impact of the crisis and oil exporters managed to increase gross capital outflows in the post crisis period

has the fed fallen behind the curve evidence from var models we evaluate the role of us monetary policy in shaping inflation and economic activity by means of a medium scale bayesian var model where the zlb and the unconventional measures are addressed by using a shadow interest rate the historical decomposition and a conditional forecast scenario show that the fed s stance is in line with gdp and inflation dynamics moreover core inflation will likely lie below its target in 2017

the origins of tax systems a french american comparison this article examines the origins of tax systems through a historical comparison of france and the united states and analysis of several shadow cases the article explains why the united states has relied more heavily on progressive income taxation than france which has favored regressive sales taxes this study traces the origins of these two tax systems to the early 20th century arguing that decisions about tax structure were shaped by resistance to the concentration of economic power in the united states and the centralization of state power in france in the united states the rapid concentration of economic power in the late 19th century spurred a political movement for a tax with clear redistributive purposes in france resistance to the centralization of state power and concomitant fears of fiscal inquisition weakened the drive for an effective income tax leaving the state to rely on consumption taxes to meet its revenue needs these 19th century movements of resistance to modernization shaped the foundations of contemporary political economy

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

incentives for information production and optimal job assignment with human capital considerations in this paper we examine the problem of inducing a manager to acquire information which is useful in determining his optimal job assignment but which might also adversely affect his market value we show that spot contracts are optimal and generate the first best effort level when the manager is risk neutral when the manager is risk averse the optimal contact consists either of a partial insurance contract against downward revisions in compensation or a competitive spot contract depending upon the nature of prior information

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

job search bargaining and wage dynamics this article constructs and estimates a model of wage bargaining with on the job search to explore three different components of wages general human capital match specific capital and outside options as the workers find better job opportunities the current employer has to compete with outside firms to retain them this between firm competition results in wage growth even when productivity remains the same the model is estimated by a simulated minimum distance estimator and data from the 1979 national longitudinal study of youth the results indicate that the improved value of the outside option raises wages by 14 16 in the first 5 years

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

repeated moral hazard with a time inconsistent agent abstract i consider a repeated principal agent model with moral hazard in which the agent has preferences which are widely used to capture time inconsistency i analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting i characterize the optimal wage scheme for such an agent and compare it to time consistent benchmarks the marginal cost of rewarding the agent for high output today exceeds the marginal benefit of delaying these rewards until tomorrow in this sense the principal does not smooth the agent s rewards over time when facing a sophisticated agent it is optimal for the principal to reward the good performance more and punish the bad performance more in the early period relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time consistent agent

career concerns contracts and effort distortions a two period career concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker s ability is analyzed contracts are unobservable but incomes are observable it is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover

optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous time model with limited commitment abstract we study a continuous time version of the optimal risk sharing problem with one sided commitment in the optimal contract the agent s consumption is a time invariant strictly increasing function of a single state variable the maximal level of the agent s income realized to date we characterize this function in terms of the agent s outside option value function and the discounted amount of time in which the agent s income process is expected to reach a new to date maximum under constant relative risk aversion we solve the model in closed form optimal consumption of the agent equals a constant fraction of his maximal income realized to date in the complete markets implementation of the optimal contract the alvarez jermann solvency constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint familiar from the bewley aiyagari incomplete markets models

what lies beneath a time varying favar model for the uk transmission mechanism we use a time varying factor augmented var to investigate changes in the transmission mechanism of economic shocks in the uk our estimates demonstrate the importance of time variation and suggest that monetary policy shocks had a bigger impact on inflation equity prices and the exchange rate during the inflation targeting period changes in the transmission of policy shocks to bond yields point to more efficient management of long run inflation expectations finally we investigate responses of disaggregated prices with the median becoming more negative and cross sectional patterns consistent with a decrease in the role of cost channels

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

managerial ability compensation and the closed end fund discount this paper shows that the existence of managerial ability combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry implies that the closed end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature we evaluate the model s ability to match the quantitative features of the data and find that it does well although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained the role of delegated portfolio managers in financial markets has puzzled

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

the insurance effect of groups many people belong to groups which partially identify their characteristics this paper argues that when agents are risk averse and where only group characteristics are visible rather than individual characteristics the pareto optimal construction of groups differs in systematic ways from standard notions of how groups should be formed two applications are considered the assignment of workers to jobs where it is shown the optimal contract does not involve maximizing output and accident insurance where the optimal contract does not involve complete insurance many people belong to groups which serve to partially identify otherwise hidden talents or characteristics for example it is possible to find out that certain authors have written an article but their individual contributions are much more difficult to ascertain similarly it may be easy to determine that a worker is a foreman but much more difficult to tell how much better he is than other foremen or that somebody is employed which tells us something about his talents but not whether he is more talented than the average employed person each of these examples illustrates cases where we can see the group to which an agent belongs author foreman employed rather than an individual s characteristics standard notions of efficiency tell us how these groups should be formed academics should write papers together only if their joint product is greater than if they operated separately a worker should be employer as a foreman only if his productivity is higher as a foreman than elsewhere in the organization and so on the principal result of this paper is that when agents are risk averse and where only groups of the type above are visible to some agents rather than individual characteristics these assignment rules may not be pareto optimal instead for example someone who is less competent as a foreman than as an operative may still be employed as a foreman and this yields higher welfare than employing that worker as an operative let me explain the intuition by a simple example assume that workers who join a firm are uncertain of their ability they are risk averse and seek insurance over that uncertainty untalented workers should be fired on standard efficiency grounds as they have higher productivity elsewhere assume that after a period of production information on ability becomes available to the employer and the employee but that other employers must infer this information from whether the

a comparative assessment of the spillovers of us monetary policy shocks and its mitigation abstract we conduct a comparative assessment of the spillovers of three types of fed s monetary policy surprises i e fed funds rate ffr forward guidance fg and large scale asset purchases lsap on monetary autonomy in the periphery economies pes we find these shocks to be significant in causing loss of monetary autonomy in the pes we also find that the macroprudential tools mitigate the degree of such impairment this holds for two types of macroprudential policies i e borrower targeted and financial institutions targeted we find both of them to be most effective against the ffr shocks comparing the macroprudential tools we find the financial institutions targeted tools to be more effective than the borrower targeted ones in mitigating the degree of impairment against all types of fed shocks

dynamic labor market competition and wage seniority abstract we design an overlapping generations model of the labor market experienced workers bear costs of switching employers whereas the segment for junior workers is horizontally differentiated the literature typically explains wage seniority premia with reference to productivity gains generated by the accumulation of worker experience or mechanisms associated with incomplete information in contrast this paper characterizes how the wage seniority premium depends on the relative intensities of competition in the markets for junior and senior workers in particular we show that a wage seniority premium may prevail even under circumstances where senior workers are less productive than junior workers

the evolution of tax structures certain themes recur throughout this paper the traditional account of the evolution of tax structures through the interaction of increasing efficiency and the claims of special interests plays a role but is not the whole story different taxes create tradeoffs between the costs of administration and compliance specification of these costs creates a framework in which long term trends like the growth and centralization of revenues and the increasing dependence on direct taxation can be understood this framework applies to observable collective decisions to alter tax structures uncertainty about ultimate incidence plays a major role in such decisions it also applies to the decentralized context of adjustment and resistance this framework can be used to investigate the extent of redistribution within tax systems and of the requirement of frequent reforms to sustain redistribution against resistance the simultaneous consideration of economic and political aspects of taxation can only improve future research

globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian democracies this article contributes to the growing literature on the role that domestic political institutions play in mediating globalization pressures by arguing that the capital tax constraints arising from international economic integration are the most severe for countries with majoritarian political institutions in doing so the author solves a tax puzzle that challenges conventional thinking about how institutions condition the relationship between economic globalization and domestic politics he presents a formal game theoretic model to sharpen the basic logic of his argument and then tests some of the model s predictions empirically using both quantitative and qualitative evidence

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

how progressive is the u s federal tax system a historical and international perspective this paper provides estimates of federal tax rates by income groups in the united states since 1960 with special emphasis on very top income groups we include individual and corporate income taxes payroll taxes and estate and gift taxes the progressivity of the u s federal tax system at the top of the income distribution has declined dramatically since the 1960s this dramatic drop in progressivity is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and in estate and gift taxes combined with a sharp change in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labor income the sharp drop in statutory top marginal individual income tax rates has contributed only moderately to the decline in tax progressivity international comparisons confirm that is it critical to take into account other taxes than the individual income tax to properly assess the extent of overall tax progressivity both for time trends and for cross country comparisons the pattern for the united kingdom is similar to the u s pattern france had less progressive taxes than the united states or the united kingdom in 1970 but has experienced an increase in tax progressivity and has now a more progressive tax system than the united states or the united kingdom

the role of comparative advantage and learning in wage dynamics and intrafirm mobility evidence from germany this article measures the importance of job level assignment based on comparative advantage and learning about workers ability in explaining intrafirm wage and mobility dynamics using survey data from the german socio economic panel the results reveal the importance of nonrandom selection of workers into the rungs of the firm s job ladder measured and unmeasured ability play important roles in workers rank assignment with unmeasured ability being more important at higher levels of the hierarchical job structure there is some evidence of learning effects for workers below age 35 generating mobility between upper and executive levels

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

human capital and self enforcing contracts this essay analyzes labor contracts as a device for rearranging factor incomes over time under conditions of extreme adverse selection in particular the lack of verifiable public information about future compensation prevents finitely lived workers from borrowing against their earnings specific human capital is used as an incentive to implement intertemporal self enforcing contracts between workers and firms after proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such contracts the resulting equilibrium earnings profiles are explored along with the effects of imperfections in the credit market on the way workers choose jobs and allocate time between current production and training copyright 1988 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

employer learning productivity and the earnings distribution evidence from performance measures two ubiquitous empirical regularities in pay distributions are that the variance of wages increases with experience and innovations in wage residuals have a large unpredictable component the leading explanations for these patterns are that over time either firms learn about worker productivity but productivity remains fixed or workers productivities themselves evolve heterogeneously in this paper we seek to disentangle these two models and place magnitudes on their relative importance we derive a dynamic model of learning and productivity that nests both models and allows them to coexist we estimate our model on a 20 year panel of pay and performance measures from a single large firm the baker gibbsholmstrom data incorporating performance measures yields two key innovations first the panel structure implies that we have repeat measures of correlates of productivity as opposed to the empirical evidence on employer learning which uses one fixed measure second we can separate productivity from pay whereas the previous literature on productivity evolution could not we find that both models are important in explaining the data however the predominant effect is that worker productivity evolves idiosyncratically over time implying firms must continuously learn about a moving target therefore while the majority of pay dispersion is driven by variation in individual productivity wages differ significantly from individual productivity at all experience levels due to imperfect information we believe this represents a significant reinterpretation of the empirical literature on employer learning

millionaire migration and taxation of the elite evidence from administrative data a growing number of u s states have adopted millionaire taxes on top income earners this increases the progressivity of state tax systems but it raises concerns about tax flight elites migrating from high tax to low tax states draining state revenues and undermining redistributive social policies are top income earners transitory millionaires searching for lower tax places to live or are they embedded elites who are reluctant to migrate away from places where they have been highly successful this question is central to understanding the social consequences of progressive taxation we draw on administrative tax returns for all million dollar income earners in the united states over 13 years tracking the states from which millionaires file their taxes our dataset contains 45 million tax records and provides census scale panel data on top income earners we advance two core analyses 1 state to state migration of millionaires over the long term and 2 a sharply focused discontinuity anal

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

outside opportunities and termination abstract we study a dynamic principal agent relationship where a stochastic outside opportunity offer arises each period for the risk averse agent termination is costly but it allows the agent to pursue the available outside opportunity and the principal to return to an external market to hire a new agent the principal acts strategically with respect to the agent s outside offers and we show that it is optimal to terminate the current relationship if and only if the agent s outside offer is above a cutoff level the optimal contract generates both voluntary and involuntary terminations severance compensation arises endogenously and we show that it may be paid only in involuntary terminations conditional on termination the size of the optimal severance compensation depends positively on the agent s current compensation but negatively on his outside offer the optimal contract dictates an inverted u relationship between compensation and the probability of termination

seniority and monopsony in the academic labor market workers with high seniority usually have higher wages than workers with low seniority and the same total labor marke t experience in contrast the results of this paper indicate that higher seniority is associated with lower salaries for university professors the author documents this finding for national surveys a nd individual institutions and explains it as due to monopsonistic discrimination by employers copyright 1993 by american economic association

managerial incentives for short term results a comment in managerial incentives for short term results narayanan 4 examines the manager s incentive to make a suboptimal decision in particular an incentive to choose projects that yield short term profits even when the manager is compensated with a long term contract this incentive to act myopically at the expense of shareholders welfare is attributed to the manager s very concern for the long term impact of current actions that is the desire to enhance reputation earlier to boost wages although this type of myopic behavior is a cause for great concern and narayanan s approach is interesting the particular model he develops has a serious drawback we discuss briefly in this note how the shareholders can easily anticipate and prevent the manager from making a suboptimal decision by providing proper incentive contracts using the model by harris and holmstrom 1 as a benchmark narayanan sets up a multiperiod principal agent relationship in which the manager s ability is unknown and project choice is unobservable by the shareholders since the manager s ability is unknown compensation depends upon the observable output not being able to observe the project choice the shareholders update their prior on the manager s ability according to their conjecture of the manager s project choice the manager in turn chooses a project so as to maximize expected future wage which depends upon the shareholders perception of the manager s ability by choosing a quicker return project the manager may induce the shareholders to attribute the extra dollars to higher ability resulting in greater wages in the future thus we have a game theoretic situation the illustrated game in the paper deals with two alternative projects yielding a 2 x 2 bimatrix nonconstant sum game with payoffs determined by the strategies and cash flows from the project given this game structure narayanan is able to obtain a unique nash equilibrium where both players use dominant strategies the choices of strategies for both players depend upon the value of 5k the difference between the manager s expected total wage from projects a and b regardless of the shareholders strategy conjecture on the project choice if 4k is positive negative both players choose a b as their dominant strategy this equilibrium can be summarized by a usual 2 x 2 matrix as follows

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

occupational specificity of human capital we find that returns to occupational tenure are substantial everything else being constant 5 years of occupational tenure are associated with an increase in wages of 12 20 moreover when occupational experience is taken into account tenure with an industry or employer has relatively little importance in accounting for the wage one receives this finding is consistent with human capital being occupation specific

tax innovation in the states capitalizing on political opportunity this paper assesses the factors that prompt states to adopt taxes during the twentieth century we test five explanations of state tax innovation derived from the literature economic development fiscal health election cycle party control and regional diffusion using event history analysis a pooled cross sectional time series technique while little support is found for the economic development and party control explanations our empirical results are highly consistent with a political opportunity explanation of state tax adoptions 1 the presence of a long time until the next election 2 the existence of a fiscal crisis and 3 the presence of neighboring states that have previously adopted a tax all create opportunities for politicians to shield themselves from the political costs of supporting a tax increase and are all shown by empirical analysis to increase the probability of a tax adoption this empirical evidence is consistent across different tax instruments and different periods of analysis throughout the twentieth century

changes in the effects of monetary policy on disaggregate price dynamics abstract based on a time varying factor augmented vector autoregression we demonstrate that the propagation mechanism of monetary policy disturbances differs across disaggregate components of personal consumption expenditures while many disaggregate prices rise temporarily in response to a monetary tightening in the early part of the sample there is no evidence of a price puzzle at the aggregate level the share of disaggregate prices that exhibit the price puzzle diminishes from the early 1980s onwards there also is evidence of a substantial decline in the dispersion of disaggregate price responses over time this gradual decrease in cross sectional heterogeneity of disaggregate price responses is associated with a dampening effect on aggregate real economic activity and a stronger effect on the aggregate price level we illustrate by means of a multi sector sticky price model augmented by a cost channel how key structural parameters would have had to change to match this evolution of sectoral price dynamics

which workers get insurance within the firm abstract industry level time series data suggest that low skilled workers get less insurance within the firm than high skilled workers in particular wages respond relatively more to productivity shocks in low skilled industries than high skilled industries our theory is that low skilled workers get relatively less insurance from their firms because they have relatively lower displacement costs under limited commitment lower displacement costs make the workers outside options more attractive and hence decrease the amount of risk sharing sustainable within the firm evidence on average displacement costs by industry support the theory s predictions

taxation and the political economy of the tariff traditional accounts of u s tariff policy emphasize trade strategies and interest group politics this article makes a departure it opens with an observation up until world war i the tariff was the largest single source of federal government revenues it then explores the significance of tariffs as taxes theoretically and empirically in its first part the article develops a theory of taxation politics and applies it to the tariff in its second part it submits the theory to an empirical test modeling changes in u s tariff rates from 1829 to 1940 the politics of tariff revision it argues followed from two characteristics of the tariff as tax from the extent of the treasury s dependence upon it and from the distributive pattern of its burdens and benefits taken together the article concludes revenue dependence and distributive incidence account for several diverse aspects of american tariff policy including the structure of its coalitions the shifts in its objectives and the timing of its innovations

competitive risk sharing contracts with one sided commitment this paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post in any given period after having observed her income the agent can walk away from the contract while the intermediary cannot i e there is one sided commitment we consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses we demonstrate that not only autarky but also partial and full insurance can obtain depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary we then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption savings economy with one period arrow securities and a short sale constraint similar to bulow and rogoff 1989 from this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

omitted ability bias and the increase in the return to schooling over the 1980s there were sharp increases in the return to schooling estimated with conventional wage regressions we explore whether the relationship between ability and schooling changed over this period in ways that would have increased the schooling coefficient in these regressions our empirical results reject the hypothesis that an increase in the bias of the schooling coefficient due to a change in the relationship between ability and schooling has contributed to observed increases in the return to schooling we also find that the increase in the schooling return has occurred for workers with relatively high levels of academic ability

long term wage fluctuations with industry specific human capital exploiting long term interindustry demand shifts this article provides evidence that 1 industry level wages do not respond to industry demand conditions 2 at the industry level the employment of young workers responds more to demand shifts than does the employment of experienced workers and 3 the postdisplacement wages of displaced workers are strongly affected by demand in their predisplacement industries these findings are consistent with a model in which worker s investments in industry specific skills pose a barrier to interindustry labor mobility and wages do not respond to spot labor market conditions

intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations this paper studies the role of a proposed seniority system in an organization the organization consists of at least three overlapping generations of short lived members and chooses either a shortsighted or a farsighted action in each period this results in intergenerational conflicts of interest the old generation desires to obtain an immediate profit while the middle and young generations have incentives to invest for future profits we use a model of infinitely repeated games and demonstrate that the seniority system solves these conflicts in the sense that the farsighted action profile is sustainable in equilibrium

a tie that binds revisiting the trilemma in emerging market economies this paper examines the claim that exchange rate regimes are of little salience in the transmission of global financial conditions to domestic financial and macroeconomic conditions by focusing on

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

some evidence on the relationship between performance related pay and the shape of the experience earnings profile we investigate the relationship between performance related pay prp and the shape of workers experience earnings profiles in particular we argue that the slope of the profile depends critically upon the degree of equity held by workers in their enterprise as measured by the extent of prp the implication is that the slope of the profile for prp workers falls between those of their zero equity fixed wage and one hundred per cent equity self employed counterparts our empirical analysis of three british data sets namely the british social attitudes survey the british household panel survey and the british family expenditure survey supports this prior in this paper we explore the shape of the experience earnings profile for individuals employed under different types of contracts fixed wage performance related pay prp and self employment contracts we follow lazear 1979 1981 and lazear and moore 1984 in hypothesizing that the slope of the experience earnings profile reflects agency costs and the reduction thereof with increased agency costs inducing steeper profiles if monitoring costs are high firms may implement compensation schemes designed to encourage employees to self select behavior in the firms interests one such scheme defers a substantial amount of compensation until the later years of tenure the resulting experience earnings profile provides a penalty for shirking lazear and moore 1984 we therefore presume that the profiles of workers employed under fixed wage contracts are steeper than those of self employees for whom the issue of agency does not arise because of the duality of principal and owner lazear and moore 1984 the interesting case is that of workers employed under prp if such contracts represent a hybrid between fixed wage and self employment then one would expect their experience earnings profiles to lie somewhere between these two extreme