measuring program impacts on earnings and employment do unemployment insurance wage reports from employers agree with surveys of individuals this article attempts to determine whether wage records reported by employers to state unemployment insurance ui agencies provide a valid alternative to more costly retrospective sample surveys o

do labor market policies have displacement effects evidence from a clustered randomized experiment this article reports the results from a randomized experiment designed to evaluate the direct and indirect displacement impacts of job placement assistance on the labor market outcomes of young educated job seekers in france we use a two step design in the first step the proportions of job seekers to be assigned to treatment 0 25 50 75 or 100 were randomly drawn for each of the 235 labor markets e g cities participating in the experiment then in each labor market eligible job seekers were randomly assigned to the treatment following this proportion after eight months eligible unemployed youths who were assigned to the program were significantly more likely to have found a stable job than those who were not but these gains are transitory and they appear to have come partly at the expense of eligible workers who did not benefit from the program particularly in labor markets where they compete mainly with other educated workers and in weak labor markets overall the program seems to have had very little net benefits

what have we learned from the illinois reemployment bonus experiment this article analyzes an experimental program that offered payments to unemployment insurance ui recipients who found a job quickly the experiment provided exogenous differences in individual incentives which i use to test labor supply and search theories of unemployment i examine predictions about the timing of exits from unemployment and the effect of the fixed amount bonus on different wage level groups i also argue that the experimental evidence does not show the desirability of a permanent program a permanent program would sharply increase the compensation for short ui spells likely increasing the claims rate and possibly increasing unemployment

the long run effects of unemployment monitoring and work search programs experimental evidence from the united kingdom this article examines the long run effects of the restart unemployment program in the united kingdom the program aimed at the long term unemployed involved a combination of tighter monitoring of benefit eligibility rules and increased job search assistance we compare the employment behavior of a treatment group who participated in the scheme with that of a randomly chosen control group for whom participation was delayed while there is little evidence of a long term benefit for women the unemployment rate among males in the treatment group was six percentage points lower than that of the control group 5 years after the initial experiment

labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions this paper examines the impact of labor unemployment risk on corporate financing decisions theory suggests that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of mitigating worker exposure to unemployment risk using changes in state unemployment insurance benefit laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells we explore the connection between unemployment risk and the corporate financing decisions of public firms in the united states we find that increases in legally mandated unemployment benefits lead to increases in corporate leverage the impact of reduced unemployment risk on financial policy is especially strong for firms that have greater layoff separation rates labor intensity and financing constraints the estimated premium required to compensate workers for unemployment risk due to financial distress is about 57 basis points of firm value for a bbb rated firm these findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions

assessing the effects of reemployment bonuses on job search a regression discontinuity approach abstract this study examines the impacts of reemployment bonuses that is the incentive payments to unemployment insurance ui recipients who find a job within a specified period using korean data a sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at age 55 identifies the effect of increased reemployment bonuses on unemployment duration and on subsequent job duration the results indicate that increases in the reemployment bonus boost the job finding hazards of ui claimants early in their unemployment spells during the bonus qualification period and significantly shorten the duration of ui spells by 0 16 to 0 42 months 0 68 to 1 82 weeks in addition employment stability is not significantly affected by an increased bonus which implies no negative influence of the bonus on subsequent job match quality the simulated estimates show that the increase in tax revenue and the decrease in ui benefit payment caused by the behavioral response of ui recipients are large enough to offset the increased cost of the reemployment bonus

does a minimum job search requirement reduce time on unemployment payments evidence from the jobseeker diary in australia this study examines the impact of thejobseeker diary jsd a program designed to increase the job search effort of unemployed persons in australia the jsd program is distinguished by combining a focus on work search verification with large scale imple mentation applying a quasi experimental matching method to data on unemployment spells occurring in 1997 98 the authors find that jsd participation was associated with an increased rate of exit from unemployment payment recipiency and a shorter total time spent on payments payment receipt duration is estimated to have fallen for about one half of jsd participants the largest effects of the jsd occurred for payment recipients for whom labor demand conditions were the most favorable cost benefit analysis suggests a fairly large net societal gain per program participant this study examines a large scale interven tion intended to increase job search ef fort of unemployed persons in australia the intervention the jobseeker diary jsd is a work search verification program that re quires unemployment payment recipients to complete a fortnightly biweekly diary in which details of a specified minimum number of job applications must be recorded the scale of the jsd program and its focus on work search verification make it unique in the international context

job search and hyperbolic discounting structural estimation and policy evaluation this paper estimates the structural parameters of a job search model with hyperbolic discounting and endogenous search effort it estimates quantitatively the degree of hyperbolic discounting and assesses its implications for the impact of various policy interventions aimed at reducing unemployment the model is estimated using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy the likelihood function explicitly incorporates all the restrictions implied by the optimal dynamic programming solution to the model both observed and unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for the results point to a substantial degree of hyperbolic discounting especially for low and medium wage workers the structural estimates are also used to evaluate alternative policy interventions for the unemployed estimates based on a model with exponential discounting may lead to biased inference on the economic impact of policies jel c6 c73 d90 j64 j68

punitive sanctions and the transition rate from welfare to work in the netherlands the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency if they do not then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed this article investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich register data on welfare recipients we find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work

lessons from the u s unemployment insurance experiments recent social experiments have evaluated two reforms of the unemployment insurance ui system reemployment bonuses and job search programs the bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the length of ui receipt and provide weak evidence that an earlier return to work does not decrease earnings the experiments do not show the favorability of a permanent bonus program as they ignore its effect on the number of the claimants the job search experiments test several more promising reforms nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce ui receipt and have favorable cost benefit analyses earnings often increase though the estimates are imprecise

carrot and stick how reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect exit rates from welfare summary to increase the exit from welfare benefit recipients in the municipality of rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives once their benefit spell exceeded one year welfare recipients were entitled to a re employment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least 6 months however they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction i e a temporary reduction of their benefits we find that the financial sticks in the form of benefit sanctions were effective in stimulating the exit from welfare while the financial carrots in the form of re employment bonuses were not copyright 2011 john wiley sons ltd

evaluating the worker profiling and reemployment services system using a regression discontinuity approach economists have long recognized the incentives the unemployment insurance ui system provides for workers the system motivates claimants to extend their unemployment spells by subsidizing both additional job search and leisure see bruce d meyer 1995 for a review of the empirical evidence at the same time the literature does not fully recognize that modest changes in the attractiveness of ui can lead to sizeable changes in worker behavior and as a result to substantively important changes in ui expenditures black et al 2003 provide experimental evidence of a large impact of the us worker profiling and reemployment services wprs system in the state of kentucky the wprs system imposes the requirement that claimants receive low intensity in terms of both the state s money and the claimant s time re employment services early in their spells in order to continue receiving benefits black et al 2003 find that imposing this requirement leads to a substantial increase in mean earnings as well as reductions in the mean amount and duration of ui benefits received as we describe in detail in the next section however the nature of the experimental design utilized in black et al 2003 limits the generalizability of their findings

experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior this paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions the experimental set up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed the ex post effect and the threat of getting a benefit sanction imposed the ex ante effect we find that both effects matter moreover the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect benefits sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment

optimal welfare to work programs a welfare to work wtw program is a mix of government expenditures on various labour market policies targeted to the unemployed e g unemployment insurance m job search monitoring m social assistance sa wage subsidies this paper provides a dynamic principal agent framework suitable for analysing chief features of an optimal wtw program such as the sequence and duration of the different policies the dynamic pattern of payments along the unemployment spell and the emergence of taxes subsidies upon re employment the optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort social assistance characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal wtw program the typical sequence of policies is quite simple the program starts with standard ui then switches into monitored search and finally into sa the optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both jm and sa whereas taxes subsidies can be either increasing or decreasing with duration during ui they must decrease increase during a phase of jm in a calibration exercise we use our model to analyse quantitatively the features of the optimal program for the u s economy with respect to the existing u s system the optimal wtw scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains to unskilled workers because the incentives to search for a job can be retained even while delivering more insurance and using costly monitoring less intensively

labor unemployment insurance and earnings management abstract we provide new evidence that firms appear to manage long run earnings upward in order to manage rank and file employees perceptions of employment security in particular we exploit exogenous state level changes in unemployment insurance benefits and test for partial unwinding of prior upward earnings management when benefits increase consistent with the hypothesis we find a significant reduction in abnormal accruals increased recognition of special items and write downs and greater likelihood of net income reducing restatements following an increase in state level unemployment benefits a number of cross sectional results are also consistent with the hypothesis

the long term effects of job search requirements evidence from the uk jsa reform this paper investigates long term returns from unemployment compensation exploiting variation from the uk jsa reform of 1996 which implied a major increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle search theory predicts that such changes should raise the proportion of non claimant nonemployed with consequences on search effort and labor market attachment and lower the reservation wage of the unemployed with negative effects on post unemployment wages i test these ideas on longitudinal data from social security records llmdb using a difference in differences approach i find that individuals who start an unemployment spell soon after jsa introduction as opposed to six months earlier are 2 5 3 more likely to move from unemployment into incapacity benefits spells and 4 5 less likely to have positive earnings in the following year this latter employment effect only vanishes four years after the initial unemployment shock also annual earnings for the treated individuals are lower than for the non treated these results suggest that while tighter search requirements were successful in moving individuals off unemployment benefits they were not successful in moving them onto long lasting or better jobs with fairly long lasting unintended consequences on a number of labor market outcomes

sequential testing of duration data the case of the pennsylvania reemployment bonus experiment cost considerations and the need to report the results promptly make it desirable to examine data as it accumulates and to terminate an experimental study as soon as definite statistical conclusions can be drawn these ideas are illustrated in a retrospective analysis of the pennsylvania reemployment bonus experiment recently developed large sample theory for a variety of sequentially computed score processes of time to event duration data with staggered entry enables one to construct stopping boundaries of a prescribed level of significance the gains from the use of sequential methodology appear to be worth while copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

a puzzling aspect of the effect of advance notice on unemployment displaced workers with generous periods of advance notice are more likely than their non notified counterparts to avoid post displacement unemployment altogether but once unemployed they tend to escape from unemployment much more slowly the authors using data from the five year retrospective 1988 and 1990 displaced worker surveys examine three potential explanations for this puzzle delaying behavior induced by the receipt of unemployment insurance nonrandom distribution of notice to workers and previous studies failure to appropriately incorporate the pre displacement search time of notified workers this analysis supports the third explanation after allowing for less intense search prior to displacement than following displacement the authors find that the pattern of escape rates for otherwise observationally equivalent workers does not differ by notification status

the effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment sanctions or punitive benefits reductions are increasingly used as a tool to enforce compliance of unemployment insurance claimants with search requirements this article analyses sanctions using a unique administrative data set of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the netherlands in 1992 after correction for selectivity in the imposition of sanctions we find that sanctions substantially raise individual re employment rates

job search requirements effort provision and labor market outcomes abstract how effective are effort targets this paper provides novel evidence on the effects of job search requirements on effort provision and labor market outcomes based on large scale register data we estimate the returns to required job search effort instrumenting individual requirements with caseworker stringency identification is ensured by the conditional random assignment of job seekers to caseworkers we find that the duration of un and non employment both decrease by 3 if the requirement increases by one monthly application when instrumenting actual applications with caseworker stringency an additionally provided monthly application decreases the length of spells by 4 in line with theory we further find that the effect of required effort decreases in the individual s voluntary effort finally the requirement level causes small negative effects on job stability reducing the duration of re employment spells by 0 3 per required application we find a zero effect on re employment wages

how do unemployment insurance and recall expectations affect on the job search among workers who receive advance notice of layoff this paper explores how advance notice of layoffs recall rehiring expectations and unemployment insurance ui benefits affected on the job search among a random sample of arizona ui recipients in 1975 76 the analysis which includes extensive controls for the characteristics of workers and their jobs indicates that pre unemployment search increased with length of notice and decreased with expected recall also among workers not expecting recall pre unemployment search decreased with the level of ui benefits available after layoff the authors argue that improved experience rating would encourage firms to give employees advance notice when layoffs are imminent and re employment bonuses for workers with zero or short unemployment spells would encourage early search

unemployment insurance recall expectations and unemployment outcomes this paper empirically examines the importance of explicitly accounting for the layoff rehire process in the analysis of unemployment outcomes in the united states we find that the spells of individuals who initially expect to be recalled account for much more of the unemployment of unemployment insurance ui recipients than do spells actually ending in recall our results indicate that the recall and new job escape rates from unemployment have quite different time patterns and are often affected in opposite ways by explanatory variables we also find that the probability of leaving unemployment both through recalls and new job finding increases greatly around the time that ui benefits lapse over the past fifteen years many studies have empirically analyzed the determinants of individual unemployment spell durations in the united states much of this literature has used a job search framework in which the unemployed are viewed as permanently displaced workers who are unattached to jobs the possibility of recall to a former job a process not requiring search has been omitted from explicit consideration in the majority of these studies 2 an explicit treatment of the layoff rehire process is necessary for a proper understanding of the determinants of unemployment durations and of the impacts of unemployment policies in the united states for at least three reasons first temporary layoffs in which workers are often rehired by their original employers are a quantitatively quite important feature of the u s labor market 3 second expectations concerning the likelihood of recall are likely to affect the responses of employers and unemployed workers to labor market interventions such as reemployment bonuses and subsidies

unemployment and urban labour markets two quite distinct views on how metropolitan labour markets work have co existed for over three decades both claim empirical support and after a brief period of confrontation they continue to co exist today giving quite conflicting signals to policy makers according to the first model the urban labour market consists of a number of spatially defined sub markets so that local unemployment exists primarily because of deficiencies in highly localised demand for labour by this argument unemployment rates remain high in the absence of a renewed supply of appropriate jobs within short commuting distances of the jobless the solution according to this model is to attract private and public sector production into such areas in contrast a second model views the city as a single market in which transactions between labour and capital take place regardless of the location of residence and employment sites according to this perspective the spatial incidence of unemployment simply reflects the residential

does reducing unemployment insurance generosity reduce job match quality abstract this paper analyzes how a change in slovenia s unemployment insurance law affected the quality of jobs workers found after periods of unemployment taking advantage the natural experiment we show through difference in differences estimation results that reducing the potential duration of unemployment benefits had no detectable effect on wages on the probability of securing a permanent rather than a temporary job or on the duration of the post unemployment job

does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes in this paper we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment for that purpose we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service especially for low educated and low skilled workers they also show that the search effort is more costly for low educated women and low skilled adult unemployed workers this last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear

does job search monitoring intensity affect unemployment evidence from northern ireland because unemployment benefit reforms typically package together a number of changes few existing evaluations have been able to isolate the effects of changes in job search monitoring intensity on benefit recipient stocks or flows those few studies that do so draw mixed conclusions this paper provides new estimates of monitoring impacts by exploiting plausibly exogenous periods where search monitoring has been temporarily withdrawn with the regime otherwise unchanged during a series of benefit office refurbishments in northern ireland as we would expect from search theory withdrawal of monitoring significantly increases the stock of unemployment benefit recipients via reduced outflows

the effect of unemployment benefits and nonemployment durations on wages abstract we estimate that unemployment insurance ui extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in ui eligibility in germany we show this effect combines two key policy parameters the effect of ui on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers our framework implies if ui extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration then reservation wages do not bind we derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects the effect of ui on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects jel j31 j64 j65

the internationalisation of public welfare policy with increasing globalisation of knowledge there are increased opportunities to learn from the experience of policy interventions elsewhere this paper presents evidence on the extent of international convergence in public policy with particular focus on labour welfare savings and retirement policy questions addressed in this framework include to what extent is policy diffusion or convergence a real and relevant phenomenon what role have economists played in the transfer of policy across national domains has policy transfer led to better public policy are there any practical limitations to policy convergence

fishing in different pools job search strategies and job finding success in canada in the early 1980s this article examines the job search methods of jobless workers and emphasizes sample selectivity in choice of job search strategies especially use of public employment agencies longitudinal data from the labour force survey of canada for 1981 1983 and 1986 indicate that job search methods change with the business cycle and that many people find jobs without any reported search the determinants of job search success also vary substantially over the business cycle implying a substantial social return to public employment agencies at the 1983 trough of the recession but no noticeable benefits when aggregate unemployment is relatively low

what works a meta analysis of recent active labor market program evaluations we summarize the estimates from over 200 recent studies of active labor market programs we classify the estimates by type of program and participant group and distinguish between three different post program time horizons using regression models for the estimated program effect for studies that model the probability of employment and for the sign and significance of the estimated effect for all the studies in our sample we conclude that 1 average impacts are close to zero in the short run but become more positive 2 3 years after completion of the program 2 the time profile of impacts varies by type of program with larger average gains for programs that emphasize human capital accumulation 3 there is systematic heterogeneity across participant groups with larger impacts for females and participants who enter from long term unemployment 4 active labor market programs are more likely to show positive impacts in a recession

experimental evidence on the effects of early meetings and activation we analyze the effects of four randomized social experiments involving early and intensive active labour market policy conducted in denmark in 2008 the experiments entailed different combinations of early and intensive treatment in terms of meetings and active labour market programmes we find that frequent meetings between newly unemployed workers and case workers can increase employment rates over the next two years by up to 10 weeks the effects continue to grow over the whole 4 year horizon studied for men we find evidence of a threat effect of having to participate in early active labour market programmes while no such effect is found for women we conduct a cost benefit analysis of each ofthe four experiments and find that meetings yield the largest net benefits

the effect of benefit sanctions on the duration of unemployment this paper investigates the effectiveness of unemployment benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration swiss data on benefit sanctions allow us to separate the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements from the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction moreover public employment services are given substantial leeway in setting the monitoring intensity results indicate that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment and that increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the duration of unemployment of the nonsanctioned jel j64 j65 j68

raiding opportunities and unemployment this article studies the impact of raiding opportunities in a labor market in which worker abilities differ recruiting firms can either raid an elsewhere employed worker of known ability by bidding up his wage or go through costly search to find a good worker among the unemployed in equilibrium all types of workers experience unemployment high ability workers involuntarily the raiding opportunities give rise to involuntary unemployment without changing the basic properties of the competitive model and thus suggest new implications of various institutional parameters on unemployment in particular unemployment compensation minimum wages wage taxation and search requirements

when financial work incentives pay for themselves evidence from a randomized social experiment for welfare recipients abstract this paper summarizes early findings from a social experiment that provided financial incentives for new welfare recipients to leave welfare and work full time the financial incentive was essentially a negative income tax with a requirement that people work at least 30 h week early results show that the financial incentive increased full time employment earnings and income and reduced poverty furthermore at the end of the period discussed in this paper the program was paying for itself through increased tax revenues

how to help unemployed find jobs quickly experimental evidence from a mandatory activation program abstract this paper investigates how a mandatory activation program in denmark affects the job finding rate of unemployed workers the activation program was introduced in an experimental setting where about half of the workers who became unemployed in the period from november 2005 to march 2006 were randomly assigned to the program while the other half was not it appears that the activation program is very effective the median unemployment duration of the control group is 14 weeks while it is 11 5 weeks for the treatment group the analysis shows that the job finding rate in the treatment group is 30 higher than in the control group this result is mainly driven by the more intensive contacts between the unemployed and the public employment service

recent trends in insured and uninsured unemployment is there an explanation this paper explores the recent decline in the fraction of unemployed workers who receive unemployment insurance benefits using march current population surveys we compare the fraction who are potentially eligible for benefits with the fraction who receive them the decline in insured unemployment is almost entirely due to a decline in the early 1980s in the takeup rate for benefits we analyze the determinants of the takeup rate using both aggregated state level data and micro data at least half the decline is due to an increasing share of unemployment in states with lower takeup rates

cost effectiveness of targeted reemployment bonuses targeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance ui claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments we show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state worker profiling and reemployment services systems can improve cost effectiveness since estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened we find that narrow targeting is not optimal the best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their ui benefit entitlement

unemployment insurance and employment this article examines the impact of unemployment insurance ui on the allocation of labor across industries an overlooked aspect of ui is the effect of imperfect experience rating on hiring firms in more stable industries generally pay more into the ui system than their workers ever receive in benefits thus subsidizing more volatile industries the results indicate that industry employment shares are significantly affected by ui and that there is a net shift of resources from the service industry to the construction industry the estimates also imply that layoff unemployment is increased by about 5 because of ui induced employment shifts

welfare states and the scar effects of unemployment a comparative analysis of the united states and west germany1 the article examines whether through supporting workers search for adequate reemployment the decommodification achieved by welfare state transfers reduces the longer run scar effects of unemployment drawing on employment history data from the survey of income and program participation and the german socio economic panel the analysis establishes positive effects of unemployment benefits on workers post unemployment jobs workers risks of incurring severe earnings losses of experiencing occupational mobility and of entering unstable job arrangements are considerably reduced in both the united states and west germany as workers face constrained choices in labor markets however this institutional protection of workers economic status comes at the economic cost of prolonged unemployment simulation analyses suggest that higher benefit coverage alone might account for up to 20 of the smaller cumulative disadvantages associated with unemployment for german workers

time varying effects of recall expectation a reemployment bonus and job counseling on unemployment durations a simple search model that includes the possibility of recall provides predictions as to the changing effects of recall expectations a bonus offer and job counseling on new job finding rates over time using data from the new jersey unemployment insurance reemployment demonstration project njuirdp i find evidence for an initial positive effect of the bonus offer which diminishes over time new job finding rates are found to be negatively affected by higher initial recall expectations this effect also diminishes over time and evidence suggests that job counseling is successful in speeding up this process

business cycles unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models this paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an rbc economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment the standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies but it cannot do both variable search and separation finite ui benefit duration efficiency wages and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle however either sticky wages or match specific productivity shocks can improve the model s performance by making the firm s flow of surplus more procyclical which makes hiring more procyclical too

optimal workfare with voluntary and involuntary unemployment this paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy we consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment job search behavior is unobservable which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance ui benefits intended for unemployed workers as a consequence pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment we show that requiring unproductive activities workfare in exchange for ui benefits may generate a pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers and we characterize the situations where this is the case

unemployment duration and economic incentives a quasi random assignment approach abstract we investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment we take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment but also in disability training programs or benefit sanctions our empirical basis is norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random assignment experiments we find that the employment and benefit sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio but that the effects vary considerably among individuals there is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard

vouchers as a way to finance unemployment benefits abstract instead of financing unemployment benefits through payroll taxes we propose to finance them through the sale of vouchers to firms unemployment benefits act as employment subsidies and dismissal penalties aggregate unemployment is lower and may remain constant and displacement effects are smaller than in alternative proposals

effects of unemployment insurance work search requirements the maryland experiment this paper describes findings from a 1994 experimental evaluation of alternative work search requirements in the unemployment insurance ui program requiring additional employer contacts or verification of contacts reduced ui receipt by one week and 115 per claimant because these additional requirements did not entail additional re employment services the ui spell reduction can be attributed to increased non monetary costs for remaining on ui a job search workshop requirement reduced ui receipt by half a week and 75 per claimant and additional results indicate that the effects were due to increased costs of continued ui receipt rather than to enhanced job search productivity these treatments did not affect employment or earnings implying that reduced ui duration led to more intensive job search rather than a reduction in the reservation wage in contrast elimination of the employer contact requirement increased ui receipt and post ui earnings suggesting that delayed exit from ui improved job matches he unemployment insurance ui program is designed to provide temporary income support to involuntarily unemployed individuals while they search for work although the ui program provides only temporary income support for the involuntarily unemployed it can reduce the incentive to seek employment because ui benefits reduce the cost of being unemployed resulting in an increase in the reservation wage and longer spells of unemployment to partially offset the negative impact ui benefits have onjob search state ui programs typically impose work search requirements for continued benefit receipt

the consumption effects associated with filing for personal bankruptcy this article examines the response of food consumption to filing for personal bankruptcy in the spirit of previous work on the benefits of other social insurance programs using the panel study of income dynamics psid we find that an increase in the financial benefit to filing for bankruptcy increases the growth in food consumption in addition we find that filing under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code provides consumption insurance while filing under chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code provides no significant consumption benefits personal bankruptcy in the united states is part of the social insurance structure provided by the federal and state governments other programs in this network include but are not limited to unemployment insurance ui temporary assistance to needy families tanf and food stamps while these latter three programs are targeted to specific groups the recently unemployed for ui and low income households for tanf and food stamps personal bankruptcy is not much like these other programs though bankruptcy reduces income uncertainty and reduces wealth uncertainty surprisingly little work has been done on the direct benefits to filing for bankruptcy this is in contrast with the growing literature on the costs of bankruptcy 1 fay hurst and white 2002 estimate the financial benefit to filing for bankruptcy which equals the debt forgiven minus any lost assets this measure is a good predictor of whether the household files for bankruptcy but it is not clear that the financial benefit is the true measure of the welfare gain from bankruptcy in fact the financial benefit is most likely an overestimate of the household s gain in the year it files for bankruptcy unlike ui or tanf bankruptcy provides no increase in money income for that period but rather increases net of debt income this change is felt over the household s lifetime and filers will most likely smooth this effect over multiple years because households cannot file for bankruptcy again for six years further using the financial benefit makes it difficult to compare results against the

do hiring subsidies reduce unemployment among older workers evidence from natural experiments we estimate the effects of hiring subsidies for older workers on transitions from unemployment to employment in germany using a natural experiment our first set of estimates is based on a legal change extending the group of eligible unemployed persons a subsequent legal change in the opposite direction is used to validate these results our data cover the population of unemployed jobseekers in germany and was specifically made available for our purposes from administrative data consistent support for an employment effect of hiring subsidies can only be found for women in east germany concerning other population groups firms hiring behavior is hardly influenced by the program and hiring subsidies mainly lead to deadweight effects jel j64 h24 c31

how effective are unemployment benefit sanctions looking beyond unemployment exit this paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions i e temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements in addition to the effects on unemployment durations we evaluate the effects on post unemployment employment stability on exits from the labor market and on earnings in our analysis we use a rich set of swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post unemployment earnings actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings the net effect of a benefit sanction on post unemployment income is negative over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect in addition to that stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect

social security and households saving this paper provides new evidence on the substitutability between private and pension wealth by exploiting the italian pension reform of 1992 we use a difference in difference estimator that exploits the differential effects of the reform on individuals belonging to several yea of birth cohorts and different occupational groups we find convincing evidence that saving rates increase as a result of a reduction in pension wealth by allowing for the possibility that substitutability changes with age we find that substitutability is particularly high and precisely estimated for workers between 35 and 45

evaluating the employment impact of a mandatory job search program this paper exploits area based piloting and age related eligibility rules to identify treatment effects of a labor market program the new deal for young people in the u k a central focus is on substitution displacement effects and on equilibrium wage effects the program includes extensive job assistance and wage subsidies to employers we find that the impact of the program significantly raised transitions to employment by about 5 percentage points the impact is robust to a wide variety of nonexperimental estimators however we present some evidence that this effect may not be as large in the longer run jel j18 j23 j38

providing advice to jobseekers at low cost an experimental study on online advice we develop and evaluate experimentally a novel tool that redesigns the job search process by providing tailored advice at low cost we invited jobseekers to our computer facilities for twelve consecutive weekly sessions to search for real jobs on our web interface for one half instead of relying on their own search criteria we use readily available labour market data to display relevant alternative occupations and associated jobs the data indicate that this broadens the set of jobs they consider and increases their job interviews especially for participants who otherwise search narrowly and have been unemployed for a few months

imperfect tagging in social insurance programs abstract this paper derives the optimal benefit structure of an earnings insurance program when a characteristic or tag imperfectly identifies those unable to work with a two sided classification error the optimal program is a dual work incentive system with a work non work consumption differential maintained for the tagged and untagged just sufficient to induce the able in each group to work and with more generous payments to tagged than to untagged individuals of the same work status it includes premiums to program eligible individuals who work a price missing in the u s social security disability system and in earlier attempts to characterize the optimal disability program

structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring to evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers it is important to take account of post unemployment wages and job to job mobility we structurally estimate a model with search channels using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized the data include registers and survey data on search behavior we find that the opportunity to move to better paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment job mobility compensates for adverse long run effects of monitoring on wages we examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path

land reform and agricultural productivity in india a review of the evidence in this paper we review as well as contribute to the empirical literature on the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity in india we find that overall for all states land reform legislation had a negative and significant effect on agricultural productivity however this hides considerable variation across types of land reform as well as variation across states decomposing by type of land reform the main driver for this negative effect seems to be land ceiling legislation in contrast the effect of tenancy reform averaged across all states is insignificant there seems to be a wide range of state specific effects which suggests that focusing on average treatment effects can hide a considerable amount of heterogeneity in particular allowing a separate slope for west bengal one of the few states that implemented tenancy laws rigorously we find that land reform had a marginal positive effect relative to the rest of india

the lot of the unemployed a time use perspective this paper provides new evidence on time use and subjective well being of employed and unemployed individuals in 14 countries we devote particular attention to characterizing and modeling job search intensity measured by the amount of time devoted to searching for a new job job search intensity varies considerably across countries and is higher in countries that have higher wage dispersion we also examine the relationship between unemployment benefits and job search

improving incentives in unemployment insurance a review of recent research abstract this paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance can be improved we are particularly concerned with three instruments i e the duration of benefit payments or more generally the time sequencing of benefits monitoring in conjunction with sanctions and workfare our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid a growing number of empirical studies including randomized experiments are in line with this conclusion