capitalization of government support in agricultural land prices what do we know abstract the objective of this paper is to provide an overview of existing literature both theoretically and empirically on the extent to which agricultural subsidies do translate into higher land values and rents and finally benefit landowners instead of agricultural producers our review shows that agricultural support policy instruments contribute to increasing the rental price of farmland and that the extent of this increase closely depends on the level of the supply price elasticity of farmland relative to those of other factors inputs on the one hand and on the range of the possibilities of factor input substitution in agricultural production on the other hand the empirical literature shows that land prices and rents have in general a significant positive and inelastic response to government support such inelastic response is thought to reflect the uncertain future of the farm programmes and in general studies have indicated that land prices are more responsive to government based returns than to market based returns

evaluating social welfare and redistributive effects of spanish personal income tax reform spain has recently concluded a process of wide ranging reform of its personal income tax irpf in force since 1992 the new irpf is applicable from 1999 onward the aim of this article is to analyse the implications of this tax reform for the distribution of personal income and additionally to provide a comparative evaluation in terms of social welfare of both taxes empirical analysis is performed by a simulation exercise employing the microdata contained in the institute of fiscal studies irpf panel of taxpayers the analysis shows that the new irpf induces a redistributive effect slightly lower than the old irpf the greater redistributive potential of the progressive structure of the new tax proves to be insufficient to compensate for the contrary effect caused by reduction in the level of tax liability however this new tax unambigously permits in an inequality adverse society a higher level of social welfare than that attained by the old tax

prices employment and pro labor governments in this analysis of a game between a government and a union the welfare function of the union depends on the welfare of the workers and the welfare function of the government depends on the welfare of the workers and the owners a government is said to be more proworker if it gives more weight to the workers welfare in its utility function we study the effect on a more proworker government on the equilibrium of the economy a more proworker government is found to induce a lower wage lower unemployment lower prices higher welfare for the workers and typically lower welfare for the owners copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

nonpecuniary benefits to farming implications for supply response to decoupled payments we develop a household model wherein farmers allocate labor to maximize utility from leisure consumption and nonpecuniary benefits from farming the model shows that farmers with decreasing marginal utility of income respond to higher decoupled payments by decreasing off farm labor and increasing farm labor resulting in greater agricultural output we then estimate the difference between farm and off farm returns to labor using data from three nationally representative farm household surveys the finding of a large on farm off farm wage differential provides compelling evidence of substantial nonpecuniary benefits from farming

do decoupled payments affect investment financing constraints evidence from irish agriculture abstract this paper empirically tests whether decoupled subsidies decrease investment financing constraints faced by farms using a panel dataset from ireland over the period 2005 2010 we test whether the cap decoupled subsidy payments reduce credit constraints by altering the risk profile of farm earnings we test for financing constraints in a neoclassical q model using investment cash flow sensitivities our econometric methodology controls for censoring heterogeneity and endogeneity we find that decoupled subsidies do reduce credit constraints the effect is greater for farms that face higher constraints dairy farmers and younger farms this evidence suggests that over and above the effect on production indicated in previous research decoupling affects farm investment through financial channels

business political power the case of taxation we examine contending views about the forms and mechanisms of business power in u s politics by estimating time series models explaining taxation and redistribution taxation and redistribution constitute strong cases for theories about business and class power since all firms have an interest in reducing taxation we find that changes in corporate taxation and in redistribution between capital gains income and earned income and between corporate taxation and individual taxation are strongly influenced by political partisanship with democratic administrations increasing the tax burden on firms and their owners how far corporations engage in electoral financing measured through the establishment of corporate political action committees is also influential the models show some evidence consistent with the understanding of class power conceptualized by bowles gordon and weisskopf and the presence of election cycle effects but inconsistent with implications arising from the structural dependence of the state on capital and asset concentration in the largest corporations as a mechanism of class power

economic growth strategies the effects of ideological partisanship on interest rates and business taxation in the united states we reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it the reformulated version ideological partisanship is based upon the theory that similar rates of economic growth may follow from the different use of policy instruments owing to their role as determinants of investment and growth interest rates business taxation rates and the redistribution of the tax burden between capital gains and earned income are examined we advance models that take into account other views of politics beside the partisan one and test for political influences the united states is characterized by very pronounced partisan differences in national economic policy with democratic administrations seeking to promote growth through a consumption driven while republican administrations promote an investment driven strategy democratic administrations also seek to shift the tax burden toward corporations and owners of capital these findings are examined in light of the comparative political economy literature we conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries

power and the control of capital this essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial asia and latin america and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources the stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who or what supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

employers and the welfare state the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies the authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and in turn affects social policy outcomes specifically the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision empirically the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy the authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort the authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs the authors conclude with a discussion of the findings implications for theories of social corporatism and the w

limits on authoritarian imposition of policy failed ecuadoran military populism in comparative perspective does regime type affect policy outcomes do authoritarian regimes have greater policy discretion than democratic regimes the empirical evidence is ambiguous using two cases of failed military populism in ecuador the author argues that two authoritarian characteristics lack of participation in decision making and nonmobilization frustrated implementation of import substitution policies ironically groups expected to benefit most industrialists and urban workers provided the principal opposition although the regime needed their cooperation to implement policy neither group had assurance that its interests were protected thus political alliances require more than an exchange of policies for support regimes must make their commitments credible by permitting the participation in decision making and mobilization of groups whose cooperation is needed for policy implementation this conclusion is supported by a comparison to peru where a military regime encountered similar obstacles and argentina where

the capitalization of coupled and decoupled cap payments into land rental rates this article explores the extent to which payments under the common agricultural policy cap are capitalized into land rents in ireland with implications for the transfer efficiency of such payments since subsidies may not benefit targeted recipients if they are capitalized into input prices capitalization in the years preceding and following the decoupling of agricultural support payments from agricultural production is explored in the period prior to decoupling direct support pillar 1 payments were highly capitalized into irish agricultural rents 67 90 cents per euro of subsidies while in the post decoupling period capitalization appears to have declined somewhat

electoral business cycles in oecd countries studies of oecd countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre election period casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles we develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre election period specifically the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal the resulting declines referred to as reverse electoral business cycles are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties we test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten oecd countries between 1975 and 2006 the results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization moreover simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product gdp we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles

optimal tax treatment of the family married couples abstract this paper examines the appropriate tax treatment of the family in a series of analytical models and numerical examples for a population of taxpaying couples which differ in earning capacity we drive the optimal tax rates for each potential earner these rates depend crucially upon own and cross labor supply elasticities and the joint distribution of wage rates our results suggest that the current system of income splitting in the united states under which husbands and wives face equal marginal tax rates is nonoptimal using results from recent econometric studies and allowing for a sensitivity analysis the optimal tax rates on secondary workers in the family are much lower than those on primary earners indeed our best estimate is that the secondary earner would face tax rates only one half as high as primary earners

tax reform and the dutch labor market an applied general equilibrium approach abstract this paper develops an applied general equilibrium model to explore various tax cuts aimed at combating unemployment and raising labor supply the model calibrates modern labor market theories on wage setting job matching labor supply and labor demand on dutch data it represents the core of a larger applied general equilibrium model for the netherlands called mimic simulations reveal that targeting in work benefits at the low skilled is the most effective way to cut economy wide unemployment however targeting is likely to damage the quality and quantity of labor supply tax cuts in the higher tax brackets boost the quantity and quality of formal labor supply but are less effective in reducing unemployment and in raising unskilled employment and female labor supply

the impact of constitutions on economic performance constitutions matter for economic performance to the extent that they promote stability accountability and credibility this article considers the nature of political constituions and their impact on economic efficiny and economic security wnder three aspects the basic righs laid down in the constitution the structure of government and the stringency of amedment procedures while emphasizing that constitutions can be usefid by serving as precommitment devices the analysis also emphasizes the dangers of rigidity and the need for flexibility t he relation between political institutions and economic performance is not well understood the causal link goes in both directions well designed insttutions can improve economic performance but some institutions may be feasible or effective only at specific levels of economic development here i consider only one aspect of the relationship the impact of institutions on economic performance however a full treatment of the subject would consider both aspects and the following discussion must be read with this important proviso in mind i further limit myself to the subset of political institutions that are embodied in constitutions the smdy of the impact of constitutions on economic performance is part of what is usually referred to as constitutional political economy a field that can be traced back to the caklcdus of consent by buchanan and tullock 1962 buchanan was also the founder of the journal constitutional political economy the public choice approach to constitutions has focused somewhat narrowly on fiscal and monetary constitutions although actual constitutions rarely stipulate tax systems or monetary institutions in any detail the ban on paper money in the u s constituton for instance has few analogues in modem constitutions moreover even that document is concerned mostly with other matters such as the organization of the executive and the legislature separation of powers and the relations between the federal government and the states constituitional political economy

state revenue extraction from different income groups variations in tax progressivity in the united states 1916 to 1986 we examine the conditions that affected the progressivity of the individual income tax in the united states between 1916 and 1986 a multivariate time series analysis shows how macroeconomic conditions state imperatives the organizational capacities of social classes and political conditions have affected the progressivity and the symbolic component of the income tax progressivity is measured by the difference between the effective tax rates paid by moderate income and very high income families the symbolic component of this tax is measured by the difference between the nominal tax rate and effective income tax rate paid by very high income families the results reveal that changes in tax progressivity are due largely to macroeconomic and state fiscal conditions such as unemployment economic development and budget deficits although the organizational capacities of social classes and political conditions such as labor organization and political participation also have effects changes in progressivity are due primarily to adjustments in the rates paid by very high income families however the impacts of these conditions on tax progressivity changed somewhat when the federal income tax was transformed into a mass tax during world war il finally political conditions have a relatively greater effect on the symbolic component of the income tax than on progressivity overall this analysis supports a structural theory of the state in which the influences of politics and social classes on revenue extraction are circumscribed by macroeconomic and state fiscal conditions

does the organization of capital matter employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention we argue however that the representational power of business coordination across business interest units and integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums or what we call the social corporatist organization of business should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation we test our arguments with models both of 1980 98 pooled time series data on withinand across country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm level survey data from denmark and the united kingdom we find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy we find moreover that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to de industrialization and increases in general unemployment at the firm level membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist denmark but not in the pluralist united kingdom

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

central banks at war war is expensive troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured when the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns credibility problem more difficult central banks enhance a government s ability to borrow by being the sole direct purchaser of government debt the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender this increases lenders confidence that the government will be punished in case of default making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest the sovereign dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank has an incentive to retain the bank data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign s borrowing costs particularly during times of war

agricultural productivity revisited this paper describes production accounts for agriculture output is defined as gross production leaving the farm as opposed to real value added inputs are not limited to capital and labor but include intermediate inputs as well we derive index numbers of gross output capital labor and intermediate inputs these data are used to construct indexes of total factor productivity we then compare the contributions of input growth and productivity growth to economic growth the important role of productivity growth in agriculture becomes immediately apparent

flat rate taxes and inequality measurement abstract tax flattening exercises which include an increase in personal allowances have been pervasive over the past two decades such changes which typically benefit both the poor and the rich at the expense of the middle class have complex redistributive effects which are not obviously equalizing or disequalizing we develop a systematic approach to comparing the relative inequality of flat rate tax schemes to conventional graduated rate taxes we provide an illustrative example using 1993 u s taxfiler data

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

flat income taxation redistribution and labour market performance a flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in european countries this article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment we do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the netherlands the model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked labour force participation skill formation wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details the simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment this finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way

explaining capital account liberalization in latin america a transitional cost approach in the past three decades governments around the world have lowered barriers to international capital flows this movement is widely attributed to the forces of globalization as developed nations moved toward relative convergence on international financial openness yet developing nations with much to gain from openness to foreign investment moved only hesitantly and inconsistently in this direction analysis of two decades of capital account liberalization in latin america and the oecd reveals that nations in latin america with weaker domestic financial sectors face higher risks of transitional dislocations following liberalization and move less aggressively toward openness in the oecd by contrast financial weakness is associated with greater movements toward capital account opening as transitional costs are lower and governments are better equipped to ameliorate them examination of the transitional costs of liberalization thus helps to explain how market pressures may impede rather than promote market oriented reform in latin america

effects of crop insurance premium subsidies on crop acreage crop insurance premium subsidies affect patterns of crop acreage for two reasons first holding insurance coverage constant premium subsidies directly increase expected profit which encourages more acreage of insured crops direct profit effect second premium subsidies encourage farms to increase crop insurance coverage with more insurance coverage farms obtain more subsidies and farm revenue becomes less variable as indemnities offset revenue shortfalls so acreage of insured crops likely increases indirect coverage effect by exploiting exogenous policy changes and using approximately 180 000 county crop year observations we estimate the sum of these two effects of premium subsidies on the pattern of u s acreage across seven major field crops we estimate that a 10 increase in the premium subsidy causes a 0 43 increase in the acreage of a crop in a county holding the premium subsidy of its competing crop constant taking into account the small share of premium subsidies in expected crop revenue this subsidy impact is analogous to an own subsidy acreage elasticity of 1 24 which exceeds own price acreage elasticity estimates in the literature one explanation for the larger acreage response to premium subsidies is that insurance causes an indirect coverage effect in addition to a direct profit effect

average marginal tax rates in the uk economy using a known methodology this paper calculates the average tax rate atr and three different average marginal tax rate amtr measures for the uk the three different amtr measures are greater than the atr in the same year because of the progressive tax system in the uk barro s amtr measure weighted by total income is greater than barro s amtr measure weighted by number of returns because of the unequal distribution of income and barro s amtr measure weighted by total income exceeds seater s amtr measure because total income before tax in seater s amtr measure is greater than total income after tax in barro s amtr measure

room to move international financial markets and national welfare states a central research question in international political economy concerns the influence of financial markets on government policy outcomes to what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices i evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies evidence includes interviews with financial market participants and a cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of interest rates this evaluation suggests that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures financial market participants are concerned with a few macroeconomic policy indicators including inflation rates and government deficit gdp ratios but not with micropolicy indicators such as the distribution of government spending across functional categories in these areas governments retain policymaking autonomy i conclude by exploring the role of financial market influences within domestic politics and offering suggestions for further research

optimal income transfer programs intensive versus extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes optimal income transfers for low incomes labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin intensity of work on the job and along the extensive margin participation into the labor force when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer program is a classical negative income tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support and a large phasing out tax rate however when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer program is similar to the earned income tax credit with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income carefully calibrated numerical simulations are provided

the making of policy institutionalized or not this paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles their causes and their consequences in latin america finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies apts are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies the higher the potential damage they can cause the lower the wealth of the economy and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power moreover strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies for instance bribes by the rich and protests by the poor are likely to be countervailing forces and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions

bankers alliances and economic policy patterns evidence from mexico and brazil this article suggests an organizational or institutional explanation of economic policy patterns which differs significantly from state or society centered explanations and those based on international factors bankers alliances defined as interest coalitions of public and private financiers play an important role in shaping economic policy the stronger the bankers alliance the more likely that long run economic policy patterns will feature orthodox policies such as tight monetary policy and limited government intervention in financial or foreign exchange markets the historical organization of state economic agencies and of capital create national environments more or less conducive to formation of strong bankers alliances the three key variables center on a the timing and actors involved in central bank formation b the relationship between the central bank and other state economic policy making agencies and c the extent of conglomeration between industrial and financial enterprises a

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

campaign contributions as a commitment device we explore the idea that the influence of interest groups in elections may have positive economic effects since the investment decisions of firms determine economic growth and employment voters have a common interest in making their governments commit to policies that encourage private investments however governments may renege on promises for economic stability and choose excessively leftist policies campaign contributions by firms tend to restrain the scope for such opportunism and provide a commitment device this is achieved if firms after the policy is chosen contribute to the governing party or to its rivals

interest group success in the european union when and why does business lose business lobbying is widespread in the european union eu but because not all lobbying is successful the following question arises when does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policy making in the eu we argue that business actors are overall less successful than citizen groups in the european policy process however they can protect their interests if interest group conflict is low or the role of the european parliament is restricted a new data set on the positions of more than 1 000 non state actors with respect to 70 legislative acts proposed by the european commission between 2008 and 2010 allows us to evaluate this argument empirical support for our expectations is highly robust our findings have implications for the literature on legislative decision making in the eu and for research on non state actors in international organizations

the production effects of agricultural income support policies under uncertainty this analysis decomposes the production impacts of income support programs into wealth insurance and coupling effects under the usual assumptions about preferences the wealth and insurance effects of many support programs increase optimal input levels even for supposedly decoupled programs if the program is coupled in the usual sense then all three effects often act in the same direction it is concluded that studies of trade and domestic policy reform in stochastic environments should consider insurance and wealth effects the derivative conditions required to obtain results are also subjected to scrutiny simulations for an iowa corn producer confirm the comparative statics

the structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies the article presents a theory of class conflict between workers and capitalists who pursue their material interests under a form of societal organization that combines private ownership of instruments of production with representative political institutions there exist economic and political conditions under which both classes would simultaneously choose courses of action that constitute a class compromise workers consent to the institution of profit and capitalists to democratic institutions through which workers can effectively press claims for material gains when these conditions hold and a compromise is in force the role of the state consists in institutionalizing coordinating and enforcing the terms of a compromise that represents the preferences of workers as well as capitalists the combination of private ownership of the instruments of production with representative political institutions based on widespread suffrage constitutes a compromise between workers who consent to the private appropriation of profit by owners of capital and capitalists who accept the democratic institutions through which workers can make effective claims for an improvement of their material conditions this form of societal organization was con

taxation corporate financial policy and the cost of capital the cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system the purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest via the cost of capital taking full account of important issues that arise independently from the question of taxation included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

disentangling the consequences of direct payment schemes in agriculture on fixed costs exit decisions and output this paper goes beyond orthodox considerations of direct payment effects on agricultural output by highlighting the role of subsidies in affecting individual producers ability to cover fixed costs and in distorting the volume of aggregate production and net trade by implicitly discouraging exits the theoretical model considers both taxpayer and consumer financed decoupled direct payment schemes and compares them to a coupled production subsidy in terms of possible producer responses to direct payments the paper proposes an analytical framework of production decision making in the presence of a stochastic distribution of fixed costs across representative farms the paper shows that decoupled payments in theory can have a larger effect on output than coupled payments the model explicitly recognizes three consequences of domestic support a induce exit or entry b bias production incentives to domestic markets and c cross subsidize export in global markets an empirical model of the u s wheat sector is developed to illustrate the relative potential impacts of coupled versus decoupled payments on output through the effects on a farmer s ability to cover fixed costs and hence exit decisions

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the impact of decoupled payments on u s cropland values an extensive literature has shown that various farm programs may influence the value of farmland but other studies have not examined the cropland price effects of direct or decoupled payments separate from countercyclical payments this study uses nationally representative confidential field level panel data with farmer reported per acre land values we analyze the impact of decoupled and other farm program payments on farmland values using a fixed effects model and controlling for various factors that influence farmland values we find that an additional dollar of decoupled payments has a large and statistically significant impact on farmland values of about 18 per acre these results are comparable with similar studies undertaken in europe

how decoupled is the single farm payment and does it matter for international trade the extent to which decoupled agricultural support including the european union single farm payment sfp creates production incentives remains unclear we apply an extended version of the standard global trade analysis project model and generate a set of 21 databases that captures a comprehensive representation of domestic support by considering and modeling a range of different assumptions regarding the sfp s degree of decoupling we investigate the sfp s effect on the model s results the results of our analysis reveal substantially different effects that depend on the degree of decoupling and the findings can help validate trade analysis results particularly for developing countries

structural dependence of the state on capital a central claim of both marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society this is the theory of structural dependence of the state on capital using a formal model the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined we conclude that in a static sense the theory is false virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense policies that once in place redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented

public finance solutions to the european unemployment problem public finance solutions a tax shift away from low paid labour may fight unemployment unemployment in europe is heavily concentrated among low skilled workers it has therefore been suggested that structural unemployment could be reduced by shifting the tax burden away from low skilled labour and away from the production of consumer services which are intensive in the use of such labour this paper finds that a tax shift away from low paid labour may raise aggregate employment and welfare but only if wage formation is sufficiently responsive to changing tax incentives the analysis also suggests that non negligible employment and welfare gains could be reaped by offering tax concessions or subsidies to those parts of the consumer service sector which compete most directly with low productivity home production and with underground economic activity peter birch sorensen

redistribution and education subsidies are siamese twins abstract we develop models of optimal linear and non linear income taxation with endogenous human capital formation to explore optimal education subsidies optimal subsidies on education ensure efficiency in human capital accumulation and thus play an important role in alleviating the tax distortions on learning induced by redistributive policies if the government cannot verify all investments in human capital education policy offsets some but not all tax induced distortions on learning non pecuniary educational costs benefits may increase decrease subsidies on education especially if they are complementary to work effort

the political economy of high income taxation capital taxation path dependence and political institutions in denmark denmark s income tax burden as the percentage of gdp is larger than the total tax burden of the united states and it has increased further after 1980 how can this be explained given increasing tax competition and widespread views that strong reliance on regressive taxes was conducive to building and maintaining large tax and welfare states the article highlights three factors first large income taxes are feasible if the capital tax burden is moderated within the income tax second the effective capital income tax burden that had developed up to the early 1980s was extremely low so that subsequent tax reforms could cut marginal tax rates on mobile types of capital income while increasing tax revenue third drastic changes in the legal structure of the income tax and stability in aggregate tax policy outcomes were facilitated by proportional representation and legislative majority rule

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

the russian flat tax reform in 2001 russia dramatically reduced its higher rates of personal income tax pit establishing a single marginal rate at the low level of 13 in the following year real revenue from the pit increased by about 26 this flat tax experience has attracted much attention and emulation making it perhaps the most important tax reform of recent years but it has been little studied this paper asks whether the strong performance of pit revenue was itself a consequence of this reform using both macro evidence and in particular micro level data on the experiences of individuals and households affected by the reform to varying degrees it concludes that there is no evidence of a strong supply side effect of the reform compliance however does appear to have improved quite substantially by about one third according to our estimates though it remains unclear whether this was due to the parametric tax reform or to accompanying changes in enforcement anna ivanova michael keen and alexander klemm

globalization taxation and burden shifting in latin america most researchers interested in the relationship between global markets and public policy focus on advanced industrial democracies in contrast we examine competing hypotheses as to globalization s effect on governments by expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing nations more specifically we investigate the relationship between international market integration and the evolving burden of taxation on capital as well as the subsequent response of markets to shifts in tax policy in latin america since the late 1970s consistent with our theoretical expectations we find that global market forces are more constraining vis a vis tax policy in latin america than in the world s wealthiest nations despite these market based pressures however national politics continue to influence tax policy in latin america in a manner consistent with findings on advanced industrial democracies as such developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate policy though within the context of a more strictly neoliberal context than their counterparts in advanced industrial democracies

the origins of financial openness a study of current and capital account liberalization theory we assess the determinants of the national regulation of international finance or the comparative degree of national financial openness or closure hypotheses partisanship interacts with a nation s factor endowments to account in part for different international financial policies by governments of the same partisan hue methods we offer a quantitative measure of international financial openness or current and capital account regulation for 21 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development for 1950 88 we use regression analysis employing panel corrected standard errors to discover the determinants of financial openness results our main finding is that political partisanship substantially explains openness but does so in complex ways differences in both political institutional arrangements and types of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial regulation

leading the left to the right populist coalitions and economic reform abstract democratic political parties with a history of commitment to statist economic policies face internal stresses when they come to power and preside over programs of wholesale economic liberalization how do such parties and coalitions avoid splintering and manage to maintain electoral support examining the recent experiences of argentina and mexico edward gibson suggests that one can understand these achievements by treating each party as a combination of two separate components performing distinct functions a metropolitan policy component and a peripheral or rural electoral component his framework travels well beyond latin america and helps illuminate the different politics underlying three recent waves of economic liberalization in sri lanka

output and input bias effects of u s direct payments this study examines the national effect of u s direct payments on the extent and direction of biased technical change on u s agriculture we also assess the economic significance of the estimated bias effects for economic policy modeling endeavors involving a reduction of domestic support payments a two outputs livestock and crops and four inputs labor capital land and material translog cost function was estimated from national time series 1948 2011 data results indicate that payments do not induce output biased technical change we do find evidence of hicksian bias that is land using and material input saving attributable to support payments global computable general equilibrium simulations suggest that price and output effects of discontinuing direct payments are 1 4 to 1 3 the size once the bias effects are incorporated