median voters or budget maximizers evidence from school expenditure referenda some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is related to the reversion the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model yet the failure of the certainty when base elections were optional their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model for those districts that did hold base elections the observations appear consistent with a setter model but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model finally both a the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections and b the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model a similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static full information models rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted

legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in american states in accordance with the median voter theorem the median legislator is decisive in representative democracy if the preferences of the median legislator differ from the preferences of the median voter in the polity fiscal policy choices will predictably diverge from those favored by the median voter this paper seeks to identify the median district and therein the preferences driving the median legislator in american state legislatures using economic characteristics of constituents we find substantial differences between the median district and the statewide median as the income of the median district rises above the median income of the polity government expenditures increase in addition the degree to which income is skewed across legislative districts affects spending for redistribution programs finally we find that direct democracy procedures which allow the statewide median voter to check legislative decisions limit the impact of differences between the district and polity medians

has the median voter found a ballot box that he can control this paper examines the appropriateness of the median voter hypothesis within an agenda control framework where the alternative to a proposed expenditure level is the existing level evidence from new york state school districts suggests that within this institutional setting the actual level of public service provision does not differ significantly from the median voter s preferred level the evidence also suggests that demand function parameter estimates for educational expenditures are not sensitive to the assumption that the public service output level corresponds to the median voter s private equilibrium

endogenizing the median voter public choice goes to school this paper investigates implications of the relationship between voter self selection and the behavior of politicians voter self selection arises in elections because only a portion of eligible voters actually vote it is likely to be more pronounced whenever the implied net benefits from a given electoral choice are disproportionately distributed across voters public choice theory predicts that incumbent officials will manipulate this self election pursuant to the maximization of their personal objective functions this paper provides evidence from school bond elections that politicians influence voter self selection via manipulation of election parameters

micro estimates of public spending demand functions and tests of the tiebout and median voter hypotheses responses to questions given to a random sample of michigan households are used to estimate public spending demand functions while income and price elasticities are similar to those obtained from aggregate data positive income elasticities appear to arise because public services are distributed in a prorich manner a relatively small variance in spending demands among urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas with substantial public service variety suggests that the tiebout mechanism works this interpretation is supported by the fact that actual spending conforms substantially to desired levels in urban areas but less so in rural areas with little public sector choice

moral hazard with several agents abstract we consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents cooperative behavior we find a close relationship between the agents commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract a greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes we also show that unless agents form a team the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium

an alternate test of the tiebout hypothesis this paper has presented an indirect test of the tiebout hypothesis that does not require explicit consideration of the interaction between the markets for housing and local public services the results suggest that at least in the case of elementary and secondary education when allowed to choose from a selection of jurisdictions individuals locate so as to minimize the allocative inefficiency that results from collective provision of local services

on trust in honesty and volunteering among europeans cross country evidence on perceptions and behavior abstract we conduct an experimental study among european citizens regarding cross cultural perceptions related to trust in two dimensions volunteerism and honesty we use representative samples from five major economies of the euro area france germany italy the netherlands and spain we find that european citizens rely on nationality to infer behavior assessments of behavior show a north south pattern participants from northern countries are perceived to be more honest and to provide more effort in a volunteering game than participants from southern countries actual behavior is however not always in line with these assessments assessments of honesty show strong evidence of social projection participants expect other european citizens to be less honest if they are culturally closer to themselves assessments of volunteerism instead show that both northern and southern europeans expect higher performance in northern than in southern european countries

political equilibrium and the provision of public goods this paper treats interest groups peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers asthe unit of account for representativevoting each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand at the margin the effort benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits

the organization and scope of agents regulating multiproduct industries abstract a mechanism design problem with two dimensional uncertainty is solved to derive the optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with private information about the marginal cost of producing two different goods the paper establishes that informational economies of scope or incentive complementarities arise when one firm produces both goods the regulator should weigh these economies against the benefits of relative performance incentives when choosing between integrated and decentralized organizations unless the marginal costs of the two products are sufficiently positively correlated the optimal ex ante policy gives control of both markets to a single firm journal of economic literature classification number s d82 l22 l51

does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more if school boards represent the preferences of the median voter referendums to approve school expenditures should not constrain school expenditures if school boards would choose expenditures larger than the median voter s preference referendums that restrict voters to approving or disapproving a school board s recommended expenditure level will result in expenditures larger than the median voter would prefer however florida used a unique referendum system which guaranteed the median voter s most preferred outcome using florida education expenditures as a benchmark the evidence suggests that spending was slightly higher in restricted choice referendum states than in florida

microdata estimation of school expenditure levels an alternative to the median voter approach the main purpose of this paper has been to present an alternative approach to estimating individual demand for a local public good in this case education most empirical studies of the private demand for public goods utilize the median voter framework for preference aggregation to justify the use of median values over geographical areas for the independent variables in the estimation however the median voter approach assumes that voter characteristics are well represented by population characteristics and that median or mean values on all independent variables can be used to describe accurately the fictional median voter we cannot know whether the crucial voter has the median income level or other median characteristics with the median framework we also have great difficulty in specification of a model containing household characteristics as an alternative this paper utilizes actual household observations from a large random sample data set for the independent variables in the estimation while we have no way of ascertaining whether the observations in our sample are in equilibrium or are for the crucial voters in their jurisdictions the same problems exist for the median voter representation we can however know that the results are statistically reasonable and that specification and simultaneity problems are greatly reduced relative to the median voter approach

the value of information and optimal organization the paper addresses the issue of optimal organization of production i compare three organizational forms centralization one agent produces difierent inputs decentralization each of the two agents produces a difierent input and contracts directly with the principal and delegation two agents produce difierent inputs the principal contracts with one of them only the optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity substitutability between the inputs in the flnal use the degree of complementarity substitutability also determines whether delegation is payofi equivalent to the two agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal in the context of delegation i consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor i also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists jel fields d2 d82 l23

asymmetric information and agenda control the bases of monopoly power in public spending abstract a pervasive empirical finding widely known as the flypaper effect is that lump sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction moreover such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process we posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid the empirical results are consistent with flypaper and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants

the median voter model in public choice theory the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter this claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector in the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether the model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is these latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model appropriately applied

optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents abstract a setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered with correlated productivities each agent s private information also provides a signal about the other agent s productivity in contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents it is only if the agents are risk averse that their private information may allow them to command rents moreover when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a nash equilibrium the pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth telling this leads to the consideration of truth telling equilibria that are not pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents among all such equilibria the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a nash response to truth

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

a note on the optimal structure of production abstract we analyze the advantages of centralization and decentralization in industries in which production takes place in several stages and the costs are privately observed by the agents in charge of production we demonstrate that informational diseconomies arise when uncorrelated information is concentrated in the hands of a single agent these diseconomies arise when the stages of production are different activities with different cost supports journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l22 l51

coalitions incentives and risk sharing abstract this paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting it is shown that the principal can implement given efforts via non individualistic incentive contracts at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result for there is no coalition proof revelation mechanism improving the principal s welfare journal of economic literature classification number d82