policy relevant treatment effects accounting for individual level heterogeneity in the response to treatment is a major development in the econometric literature on program evaluation a substantial body of empirical evidence demonstrates that econometric models fit on individual level data manifest heterogeneity in treatment effects that is present even after conditioning on observables an important distinction is the one between evaluation models where participation in the program being evaluated is based at least in part on unobserved idiosyncratic responses to treatment and models where participation is not based on unobserved idiosyncratic responses this is the distinction between selection on unobservables and selection on observables the validity of entire classes of evaluation estimators hinges on whether or not they allow agents to act on unobserved idiosyncratic responses in a wide variety of applications the available evidence suggests that not only are ex post postenrollment responses heterogeneous but that ex ante decisions to participate in programs are based in part on these heterogeneous responses heckman and vytlacil 2000b 2001

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

competition and social influence the diffusion of the sixth generation processor in the global computer industry1 when is a social actor most strongly influenced by its peers this article addresses this question by clarifying when computer firms were most strongly affected by the choices of their structurally equivalent rivals to adopt a well known technology intel s sixth generation processor the core hypothesis is that the effect of adoptions by structurally equivalent firms increases with the competitive pressure that a focal firm faces in its market position the results show that a chosen firm is most strongly influenced by comparable others when it faces scale based competition and is diversified the implications of this study are twofold a social actor s sensitivity to the conduct of others may depend not only on its place in a hierarchy but also on the nature of its ties to an external audience and a contingent theory of social influence may be necessary to characterize diffusion processes correctly particularly when external and time varying nonnetwork factors have significant effects

tipping and concentration in markets with indirect network effects this paper develops a framework for measuring tipping the increase in a firm s market share dominance caused by indirect network effects our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects in practice this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects we build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware software paradigm to demonstrate its applicability we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32 64 bit generation of video game consoles a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects in our example we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong economically significant increase in market concentration we also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war and on the supply side as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks

do r d tax credits work evidence from a panel of countries 1979 1997 this paper examines the impact of fiscal incentives on the level of r d investment an econometric model of r d investment is estimated using a new panel of data on tax changes and r d spending in nine oecd countries over a 19 year period 1979 1997 we find evidence that tax incentives are effective in increasing r d intensity this is true even after allowing for permanent country specific characteristics world macro shocks and other policy influences we estimate that a 10 fall in the cost of r d stimulates just over a 1 rise in the level of r d in the short run and just under a 10 rise in r d in the long run

regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

network externalities technological progress and the competition of market contracts abstract network externalities are used to describe the fact that many modern products become more valuable the more users adopt products of the same technology where network externalities and technological progress exist the various kinds of inefficiencies discussed in the recent literature can be explained by different types of contracts the main categories analysed are simple market contracts update contracts and service contracts it is shown that these types of contract emerge endogenously from the incentive structure of profit maximizing firms competition between these contracts may substantially reduce inefficient allocations caused by network externalities

tying and innovation a dynamic analysis of tying arrangements this paper analyses the effects of tying arrangements on r d incentives it shows that tying is a means through which a firm can commit to more aggressive r d investment in the tied goods market tying also has the strategic effect of reducing rivals incentives to invest in r d the strategy of tying is a profitable one if the gains via an increased share of dynamic rents in the tied goods market exceed the losses that result from intensified price competition in the market the welfare implications of tying and consequently the appropriate antitrust policy are discussed

promoting network competition by regulating termination charges abstract this paper contributes to the policy debate about the optimal termination charge when penetration rates are explicitly taken into account although lowering termination charges towards cost leads to more efficient usage its impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous since it induces an increase in fixed subscription fee through the so called waterbed effect we show that a reduction in termination charge below cost has two opposing effects on consumer surplus it softens competition but also helps to internalize network externalities hence it can decrease or increase penetration depending on whether or not the first effect dominates the second we show that the first effect dominates the second when networks are weak substitutes or the penetration rate is high

build or buy strategies in the local loop we provide a dynamic model to study how the presence of the option to buy the incumbent local exchange carrier s ilec facilities via local loop unbundling affects the competitive local exchange carriers clecs incentives to build alternative infrastructures we show that an unregulated incumbent sets a rental path for its local loop which delays technology adoption compared to the case in which there is no unbundling we also characterize the equilibrium rental path set by the unregulated incumbent it is prohibitively high at the initial phases when there is no effective threat of entry with alternative technologies and it is decreasing over time in later phases the decrease in the rental price follows the rise of the entrant s opportunity cost of leasing lines we also argue that neither allowing higher prices for unbundled elements over time nor setting a sunset clause would suffice to induce facility based competition by studying the unregulated ilecs decision regarding unbundling we challenge the implicit assumption behind the sunset clauses which is that the ilec would either deny unbundling or charge too high a price for its network elements in the absence of regulation we claim that the ilecs that initially resist unbundling requirements would tend to charge attractive access prices relative to the entrants alternatives for their infrastructure which become less essential over time this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the impact of r d subsidies on r d employment composition in this paper we examine the impact of subsidies granted at national and regional levels on a set of r d employment variables and specifically we seek to identify the existence of the behavioural additionality effects of these public subsidies on firms r d human resources we begin by assessing the effects of public funds on r d private expenditures and on the number of r d employees and then focus on their impact on the composition of human resources engaged in r d as classified by occupation and level of education the data used correspond to the spanish technological innovation panel for the period 2006 2011 to control for selection bias and endogeneity a combination of non parametric matching techniques are implemented after ruling out the existence of crowding out effects our results show that r d subsidies increase the number of r d employees however no increase is found in the average level of qualification of r d staff members in subsidized firms all in all the effects of public support are heterogeneous being dependent on the source of the subsidy and the firms characteristics

public subsidies and the employment growth of high tech start ups assessing the impact of selective and automatic support schemes the aim of this article is to assess the impact of public subsidies on the employment growth of new technology based firms ntbfs contingent on i the type of policy scheme either selective or automatic and ii the age of the firms at the time of receipt of the subsidy for this purpose we analyze a sample composed of 536 italian independent ntbfs observed during a 10 year period 1994 2003 we estimate augmented gibrat law type dynamic panel data models using different techniques aimed at controlling for the potentially endogenous nature of public financing namely the generalized method of moments system fixed effect instrumental variable and inverse probability treatment weights estimators the results of the estimates show that selective support schemes had a larger impact on employment growth than automatic ones but only if they were awarded in the very early period of the recipient firms lives however selective subsidies awarded to young ntbfs are rare in italy calling into question the capability of the italian industrial policy to sustain the growth of the high tech entrepreneurial sector

policies and international trade agreements on technical compatibility for industries with network externalities abstract the paper considers a country home in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over ex ante incompatible domestic and imported products and benefit from a network externality we analyze the cases with trade under perfect competition and the international duopoly in which both governments strategically use policies toward compatibility but cannot use conventional trade policies in both cases the equilibrium outcome of the non cooperative game depends upon the strength of the network externality effect and involves either an excessively high equilibrium level of compatibility in combination with either too much or too little trade or very low equilibrium levels of both compatibility and trade the paper concludes with the analysis of the international agreements on policies toward compatibility and evaluates the existing provisions in the wto legal system aimed at minimizing the trade inhibiting impact of standards and regulations in the area of technical compatibility

ceo characteristics and firm r d spending over the past fifteen years a number of studies have examined the determinants of firm r d spending these studies however almost invariably focus on the role of firm or external ownership characteristics in predicting r d spending while overlooking the attributes of the top managers involved in allocating corporate resources in this study we change that focus by empirically examining how r d spending as compared to industry competitors varies at firms based on the characteristics of their ceos using a sample of publicly traded firms we find that ceo characteristics explain a significant proportion of the sample variance in firm r d spending even when corporate strategy ownership structure and other firm level attributes are controlled in terms of individual ceo characteristics we find that r d spending is greater at firms where ceos are younger have greater wealth invested in firm stock and signifacant career experience in marketing and or engineering r d in contrast to existing theory we find that the amount of a ceo s formal education had no significant association with r d spending once a ceo has attained a college degree however significant r d spending increases are found at firms where ceos have advanced science related degrees from subgroup analyses we further find that ceo effects on relative r d spending increase with longer ceo tenure implying that ceos over time may mold r d spending to suit their own preferences from these results we make implications for both research on determinants of r d spending and managerial practice

arms races and negotiations two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game each player s type determines his propensity to arm types are private information and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution with probability close to one the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will there is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons we find conditions under which the unique bayesian nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one however if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small then there is an equilibrium of the cheap talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

optimal bundling of technological products with network externality for many high tech and internet related products utility to consumers depends in part on the size of the user base a phenomenon called network externality a firm with a portfolio of these and other products that are often asymmetric in their degree of network externality or marginal cost may have to look beyond the traditional strategies of pure components pure bundling and mixed bundling one such strategic alternative in a two product case would be a so called mixed bundling 1 under which the bundle and product 1 are offered but the other product can only be purchased in a bundled form the purpose of this study is to compare and contrast the impact of such asymmetry or symmetry in direct network externality and cost on the choice of bundling strategies we model a monopolist firm that has a product in each of two categories and faces heterogeneous consumers results suggest that pure bundling is more profitable when both products have low marginal costs or high network externality whereas pure components or mixed bundling 1 is more profitable when the products diverge in their costs and network externality e g only one product has network externality traditional mixed bundling is optimal in other instances

attack defence and contagion in networks sanjeev goyal acknowledges support from a keynes fellowship cambridge inet institute and european research area complexity net resilience and interaction of networks in ecology and economics adrien vigier acknowledges support from a gates cambridge fellowship as well as a core fellowship from universite catholique de louvain

how effective are fiscal incentives for r d a review of the evidence this paper surveys the econometric evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal incentives for r d we describe the effects of tax systems in oecd countries on the user cost of r d the current position changes over time and across different firms in different countries we describe and criticize the methodologies used to evaluate the effect of the tax system on

foreign direct investment as a way to guide the innovative process towards sustainability abstract in 1972 for the first time the term sustainable development was coined at the stockholm conference and in 1987 the brundtland report established the sustainability innovation binomial since then extensive research into sustainability oriented innovation has been conducted focused during the last decade on smes and recognizing these as the main actor of sustainable development for which foreign direct investment fdi is considered from a research and institutional point of view as a vital source although academic literature presents conflicting conclusions in this context this paper aims to perform a microeconomic analysis of how fdi influences the innovative process of smes and how this can lead to a process oriented towards sustainability to this end a panel of 4667 smes has been analyzed spanning a sample period between 2004 and 2013 through a binary logit model which compares and contrasts smes with fdi and equivalent smes without fdi over time and therefore exposed to a changing economy the most significant results are that fdi is attracted mainly by factors associated with technological supply which when coupled with being of medium size and located in a manufacturing sector of medium high technology generates positive spillovers these depend to a large extent on public funding which allows these companies to be more innovative and makes it more likely they focus their innovative process on sustainability

the effects of federal research and development subsidies on firm commercialization behavior abstract this paper assesses the longer term up to 14 years causal impact of federal research and development r d subsidies on firms commercialization behavior the data are for small firms which applied to the 1998 2000 advanced technology program atp competitions a variant of the research design pioneered by heckman 1979 allows for selection bias to be controlled for commercialization behavior is operationalized as the number of new product announcements related to the technology a firm mentions in its atp proposal s the major finding is that receiving an atp award has a positive and significant causal impact on a firm s commercialization behavior

r d support programs in developing countries the turkish experience in this study the determinants of private r d investment are examined at the level of firms in the turkish manufacturing industry we focus our attention on the effect of public r d support programs our findings indicate that public r d support significantly and positively affects private r d investment there seems to be even an acceleration effect on firm financed r d expenditures smaller r d performers benefit more from r d support and perform more r d in addition technology transfer from abroad and domestic r d activity show up as complementary processes given the scarcity of studies on r d support in technologically weaker economies our hope is that the less developed countries can exploit these findings in constructing socially beneficial technology policies

diffusion of a new product under network effects the us dvd market we formulate a model that captures the inter dependence between hardware demand and software supply indirect network effect in the dvd industry the identification of the network effect comes from the difference in software availability across two different formats vhs and dvd we find that a 1 increase in the number of dvd titles raises the demand for dvd players by 0 87 simultaneously a 1 increase in video player ownership leads to a 0 14 increase in the variety of video titles our simulations show that hardware manufacturers might be able to internalize the network externality to increase total industry revenues

business to business bargaining in two sided markets abstract bargaining regularly takes place on the business to business side of two sided markets however little is known about the consequences of these negotiations in this paper we allow the platform or a policy maker to choose between a standard design offering posted prices to both sides or a design with bargaining offering a posted price to consumers and negotiating with at least some firms we find that the platform pursues negotiations when it has a strong bargaining position and does so by targeting firms with the largest network effects while this behavior may appear exploitive we show that profits and welfare often align across platform designs this alignment stems from how bargaining incentivizes the platform greater platform bargaining power allows the platform to extract more of the network surpluses since it can convert more of the firm surplus into profits and this incentivizes the platform to draw in greater participation generating greater welfare these results suggest that platform and policy maker preferences often align in this setting

communication in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper studies communication in a static cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs we investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk and show that when these conditions are violated it may be possible to construct informative cheap talk equilibria if the firms can communicate through a third party communication can be informative even when informative cheap talk is impossible we exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium for the firms

reputation in long run relationships we model a long run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents in each period the agents play an extensive form stage game of perfect information with either locally non conflicting interests or strictly conflicting interests there is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2 s type is commonly known we show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2 s uncertainty about his type to secure his highest pay off compatible with player 2 s individual rationality in any perfect bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game copyright 2012 oxford university press

grabber holder dynamics and network effects in technology innovation abstract economists and marketing researchers have examined how network effects can have an impact on the adoption of technology and products and how an intrinsic inferior product or technology may dominate the market however their studies have not explained how a producer could create network effect for a new product and how after successfully creating the network effect for this product the producer could lose it in a short period of time while these studies provide insight into technology innovation after it happened they fail to shed light on understanding many of the surprises that we experience in the process the objective of this paper is to present a fundamental framework that helps us understand most of the surprising outcomes that we have seen in technology innovation processes especially the winners and losers in an innovation process the framework is built on a grabber holder dynamic model that captures how all the intelligent agents involved in an innovation shape the forces that either induce a strong network effect or destroy a network effect that is already in place the model can be used to explain many surprising events that have happened in technology innovation in this paper i apply the model to the personal computer innovation

effective protection redux abstract this paper rehabilitates effective protection for use in political economy in general equilibrium the usual definition corresponds to no economically interesting magnitude the effective rate of protection for sector j is redefined here as the uniform tariff which is equivalent to the actual differentiated tariff structure in its effect on rents to residual claimants in sector j it permits political economic ranking of how much protection is given across sectors since higher uniform tariffs imply higher losses of welfare sacrificed to the interest groups demonstrating operationality the numerical results for the us economy for the old and new concepts are not significantly correlated

network effects software provision and standardization in this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms the provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies we show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium we show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market

entry in monopoly market this paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game theoretic models of entry we construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants equilibrium strategies in simultaneous move and sequential move games and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles from estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer we also find that entry does not cause price cost margins to fall by much

the effects of public r d subsidies on firms innovation activities the case of eastern germany this study analyzes the effects of public r d policy schemes on the innovation activities of firms in eastern germany the main question in this context is whether public funds stimulate r d activities or simply crowd out privately financed r d empirically we investigate the average causal effects of all public r d schemes in eastern germany using a nonparametric matching approach compared to the case in which no public financial means are provided it turns out that firms increase their innovation activities by about four percentage points

competing by restricting choice the case of search platforms we show that a two sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice we develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other starting from these microfoundations we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side agents resolve the trade off between these competing effects differently depending on their outside options for agents with high outside options the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect leading them to prefer an unrestricted choice platform the opposite is the case for agents with low outside options who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice as

waves in consumption with interdependence among consumers this paper presents a model to analyze the development of consumption patterns when there are social interactions among consumers in particular a consumer in this model recognizes three reference groups a peer group of similar consumers with whom the consumer wishes to share consumption activities a distinction group from which the consumer wishes to distinguish him or herself and an aspiration group to which the consumer does not belong but wishes that he she did and with whom the consumer would like to share consumption activities the interplay of aspiration and distinction can lead to waves in consumption these can happen when for example the avant garde consumption of up market pioneers is copied by other types of consumer as the latter aspire to emulate the former the former in turn seek to distinguish themselves from these unwelcome companions by varying their consumption in consequence a particular consumption activity may start up market an then gradually proceed down the social spectrum more complex patterns with continuing cycles in consumption can also be found the paper argues that this model is not only applicable to the consumption behaviour of an elite or would be elite but is relevant in a wide range of consumption settings

social capital for hire mobility of technical professionals and firm influence in wireless standards committees the movement of personnel between firms has been shown to have important implications for firms yet there has been little direct investigation of the underlying mechanisms we propose that in addition to their human capital mobile individuals carry social capital affecting the outcomes of the firms they join and leave by altering the patterns of interaction between firms in this study we examine how job mobility affects firm influence in a technical standards setting committee for u s wireless telecommunications we hypothesize and find that hiring individuals who are richer in social capital increases firm influence in technical standards setting committees by increasing the hiring firm s social capital we also find the benefits of hiring social capital are attenuated when an interfirm relationship is maintained by multiple individuals in contrast we find that the loss of personnel does not affect a firm s social capital or influence over standards directly but that it does have an effect on firm social capital and influence contingent on changes in the firm s business strategy in advancing these arguments we address the broader question of individuals as carriers of social capital and the conditions under which interpersonal connections are appropriable by firms

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

the use and abuse of export subsidies evidence from colombia 12033 christian helmers and natalia trofimenko we evaluate the impact of firm specific export subsidies on exports in colombia using a two step selection model we predict firm specific subsidy amounts that can be explained by the characteristics that determine firms eligibility for government support and its amount drawing on the accounts of the discretionary allocation of subsidies in developing countries we interpret the discrepancy between the predicted and the observed subsidy amounts as a proxy for a firm s ties to government officials controlling for observable and unobservable firm characteristics as well as persistence in exporting we find that although in general subsidies exhibit a positive impact on export volumes this impact is diminishing in subsidy size and in the degree of a firm s connectedness

competing technologies the learning curve and rational expectations abstract the problem of choice between several variants of a technology subject to dynamic learning economies is examined in a rational expectations model with overlapping adopters it is shown that even with rational expectations the long term market outcome depends sensitively on the pattern of early chance events and that only one variant of the technology will come to dominate the market in the long run this variant need not be the one which is socially optimal or most promising technically

globalizing carbon lock in this paper extends the arguments surrounding carbon lock in elaborated in unruh energy policy 28 2000 817 30 2002 317 to countries currently undergoing industrialization it argues that for numerous reasons industrializing countries are unlikely to leapfrog carbon intensive energy development on the contrary carbon lock in may be globalizing and could further constrain climate change mitigation options it is then argued that many policy recommendations ignore carbon lock in possibly limiting their potential for successful implementation the paper then discusses four policy approaches that appear to have advantages given lock in conditions it is recognized however that relative ease of implementation does not necessarily equate with superiority instead it is merely a path dependent outcome of past development decisions pursuing policies on the basis of relative implementation ease may help address the issue of climate change but could also result in sub optimal outcomes along other dimensions of sustainable development

a battle of the sexes game with incomplete information a battle of the sexes game with incomplete information presents two different efficiency problems coordination and maximizing ex ante expected utility by favoring a player facing high stakes communication and mediation can allow an optimal tradeoff between the two problems this paper gives 1 necessary conditions for and specification of an incentive efficient mediation mechanism and 2 necessary and sufficient conditions for mediation to be required for efficiency these conditions yield additional results concerning the necessity of privacy in communications and the superfluity of enforcement contrary to some recent studies our results demonstrate that unmediated communication is insufficient to achieve incentive efficiency an application to the theory of regulation is suggested

from exogenous to endogenous economic networks internet applications economic agents behaviour is affected by their position in a network either exogenous or endogenous in which they interact with a sub set of neighbours only the network s links which may be generated by vertical and or horizontal relations or by more complex morphologies may explain the transition between dynamic equilibria and the instability of economic aggregates moreover networks shape strategic interaction among agents by determining their strategies the problem of access and interconnection particularly relevant in the internet is perhaps the best example a two way feedback between strategies and network structures arises instead when links are endogenous those features are clearly shown in the mechanism underlying the formation of peering links an dr d networks

a global game with strategic substitutes and complements abstract we study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region an agent s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents if the degree of congestion is sufficiently large agents strategies are non monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental in this case a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action because of the risk of overcrowding

social learning and dynamic pricing of durable goods we analyze the impacts of social learning sl on the dynamic pricing and consumer adoption of durable goods in a two period monopoly consumers can make either early uninformed purchases or late but potentially informed purchases as a result of social learning several results are derived first we identify the market conditions under which ex ante homogeneous consumers may choose to purchase at different times second equilibrium adoption may demonstrate inertia where all adopt late or frenzy where all adopt early in particular adoption inertia appears when sl intensity is reasonably high but may vanish when sl intensity exceeds a certain threshold third firm profits and social welfare first weakly decrease in sl intensity and may then jump up by a lump sum amount at the threshold sl intensity level mentioned above last we show that the firm potentially benefits from informative advertising or investing to cultivate more social learning

growth incentives to invest in a network externality environment firms that operate in the telecommunications industry often have to make large and risky investments in digital infrastructure this paper examines how firm size affects the incentive to invest in infrastructure projects in industry environments that incur substantial network externalities we suggest that in the presence of network externalities a firm s rate of growth first declines and then increases with the size of its user base an implication of this result is that firms may benefit from making investments in emerging digital infrastructure early enough to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before other firms investments pre empt them the results mean that firms that undertake earlier successful investment may achieve preemption very quickly the sources of network externalities contribute to the incidence of strategic alliances in network industries particularly when coupled with the pressures of technical uncertainty copyright 1998 by oxford university press

on the sources and significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities abstract the set of technological opportunities in a given industry is one of the fundamental determinants of technical advance in that line of business we examine the concept of technological opportunity and discuss three categories of sources of those opportunities advances in scientific understanding and technique technological advances originating in other industries and in other private and governmental institutions and feedbacks from an industry s own technological advances data from the yale survey on industrial research and development are used to measure the strength of various sources of technological opportunity and to discern interindustry differences in the importance of these sources we find that interindustry differences in the strength and sources of technological opportunities contribute importantly to explanations of cross industry variation in r d intensity and technological advance

speeding up the internet regulation and investment in european fiber optic infrastructure in this paper we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy copper and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure to this end we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous entrants and test its main predictions using panel data from 27 eu member states over the last decade our theoretical model extends the existing literature by among other things allowing for heterogeneous entrants in internet access markets as we consider both other telecom and cable tv operators as entrants in the empirical part we use a novel data set including information on physical fiber network investments legacy network access regulation and recently imposed fiber access regulations our main finding is that more stringent access regulations for both the legacy and the fiber networks harm investments by incumbent telecom operators but in line with our theoretical model do not affect cable tv operators

income distribution and labor market effects of austrian pre and post tokyo round tariff protection abstract this paper argues that focusing on short run income distribution effects of tariffs within a specific factors model provides a much better rationale for the calculation of effective rates of protection than does the traditional focus on long run resource reallocation it shows how factor price and labor market effects can be calculated from effective rates of protection if factor specificity is introduced along these lines the paper also presents some empirical results for austrian pre and post tokyo round tariff protection

participation inertia in r d tax incentive and subsidy programs we examine how persistent firms participation is in rd the use of tax credits in contrast is unrelated to a firm s productivity our results suggest that r d tax incentives and r d subsidies are not substitutes and that any unintended misallocation of support is likely to persist

coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information abstract a monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types the seller coordinates the buyers adoption decisions based on their reported types and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions we study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion proof and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions and the number of adoptions is maximized subject to the participation constraints

rational incompatibility with international product standards abstract international product standardization enables traditional price based competition but the existence of redesign costs or network effects creates market frictions that diminish the incentive to standardize if there already exists a different technology in an established market this leads to multi attribute competition between products and will generally reduce trade flows not only do incumbent firms using a different technology have an incentive to deviate from an international standard but a host country government concerned for its consumers welfare has no incentive to enforce the international standard and may even value deviation from the international standard through technical barriers to trade

the diffusion of clean technologies a review with suggestions for future diffusion analysis abstract this article gives an overview of the literature on clean technology diffusion followed by suggestions for future analysis findings from diffusion analysis are presented in the form of 10 stylised facts helping the reader to see the forest for the trees the overall conclusion is that the diffusion of clean technology same as the diffusion of normal innovations is governed by endogenous mechanism epidemic learning and learning economies and by exogenous mechanisms policy is important for clean technology diffusion but other factors are important too the characteristics of the clean technology absorptive capacities of potential adopters and the age structure of capital it is often overlooked that companies have a choice they can choose between an end of pipe solution a process change adaptation and a change of process substitution this means that the diffusion and evolution of one clean technology will be at the expense of the diffusion of another clean technology something overlooked in studies on clean technology diffusion further research is needed on the influence of public policy on clean technology choice expectations about learning economies and prices adjustment costs network externalities and complementary innovations on clean technology adoption choices

the market value of rarity abstract most theories of demand assume that consumers value the characteristics of products but are unconcerned with how many other consumers also consume the product however several theories of demand argue that consumers can value the exclusivity of possessing a rare object we test this implication on a particular collectible rare coins our paper examines the case of coins of a given type and identical quality that have mintages in different quantities this allows us to exclude the common case in which rarity or price itself is an indicator of quality for our sample rarer coins command higher prices rarity in the form of original mintage more strongly influences the market price than does collectibility as represented by the rarest coins of each mint mark or year we also point out that here may be other goods such as automobiles for which rarity may influence market demand

egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games abstract we analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria the battle of the sexes or the hawk dove game are key examples if one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria efficient equilibria must be egalitarian for finitely repeated games and generic discount factors there is a unique outcome path which ensures efficiency within the class of symmetric equilibria this is also true for the infinitely repeated games if the players are sufficiently impatient journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

local network externalities and market segmentation this paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction it departs from the standard katz shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents it shows that even if rival firms engage in bertrand competition this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits the analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation while for others there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

public selection and financing of r d cooperative projects credit versus subsidy funding abstract in this article we develop an analytical model of the selection process for r d cooperative projects to study the factors that motivate public project selection and corresponding funding using two different financial instruments subsidies and credits for this purpose we propose a three stage empirical strategy to analyse the differential individual effects of several factors on the decisions taken by the public agency this analysis is based on project level data from cooperative r d project calls under the spanish profit initiative for the period 2000 2003 the main results show that the public agency uses the two financial instruments to address different objectives first some projects close to the market are well supported through credits while basic research projects receive only selective support in the form of subsidies second there is significant diversity in the selection and funding of technological areas third regarding the explicit goal of fostering cooperation the public agency selectively favours partnerships with universities and technology institutes through the award of subsidies however there seems to be less incentive for large consortia fourth there are significant regional differences among financed projects and also our data show sharp yearly fluctuations

configuring value for competitive advantage on chains shops and networks building on thompson s 1967 typology of long linked intensive and mediating technologies this paper explores the idea that the value chain the value shop and the value network are three distinct generic value configuration models required to understand and analyze firm level value creation logic across a broad range of industries and firms while the long linked technology delivers value by transforming inputs into products the intensive technology delivers value by resolving unique customer problems and the mediating technology delivers value by enabling direct and indirect exchanges between customers with the identification of alternative value creation technologies value chain analysis is both sharpened and generalized into what we propose as a value configuration analysis approach to the diagnosis of competitive advantage with the long linked technology and the corresponding value chain configuration model as benchmark the paper reviews the distinctive logic and develops models of the value shop and the value network in terms of primary activity categories drivers of cost and value and strategic positioning options 1998 john wiley sons ltd

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

mediation and peace this article applies mechanism design to the study of international conflict resolution standard mechanisms in which an arbitrator can enforce her decisions are usually not feasible because disputants are sovereign entities nevertheless we find that this limitation is inconsequential despite only being capable of making unenforceable recommendations mediators can be equally effective as arbitrators by using recommendation strategies that do not reveal that one player is weak to a strong opponent a mediator can effectively circumvent the unenforceability constraint this is because these strategies make the strong player agree to recommendations that yield the same payoff as arbitration in expectation this result relies on the capability of mediators to collect confidential information from the disputants before making their recommendations simple protocols of unmediated communication cannot achieve the same level of ex ante welfare as they preclude confidentiality

the city network paradigm measuring urban network externalities in recent years network behaviour has been analysed extensively as the emerging model for economic growth by network behaviour a metaphor for co operative behaviour among individuals corporate

cheap talk coordination and entry we show how costless nonbinding nonverifiable communication cheap talk can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural monopoly industry where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes the analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs for example bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards while cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict

theorizing path dependence a review of positive feedback mechanisms in technology markets regional clusters and organizations the concept of path dependence has often been criticized as vague and only narrowly applicable although we can find some very refined definitions of the concept we also find a wide range of empirical phenomena being described as path dependent we argue that more detailed accounts of the positive feedback mechanisms that form paths can take path dependence beyond this state of being overdetermined but under specified reviewing three well described cases of path dependent dynamics in technology markets regional clustering and organizations we define a core set of positive feedback mechanisms that constitute path dependence at different analysis levels and clarify the relationship between positive feedback and increasing returns we show that path dependent processes that is processes driven by positive feedback that veer toward rigidity or lock in can be but do not have to be found under many labels including structural inertia coevolution or institutional persistence we conclude that a precise definition of path dependence does not need to be at odds with the concept s widespread use in understanding organizational and industrial development processes copyright 2013 the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

trade policy and resource allocation in the presence of product differentiation traditionally the empirical analysis of the effects of trade policy on resource allocation has relied both on a partial equilibrium framework using effective rates of protection and on a multisector general equilibrium framework this paper responds to the growing dissatisfaction with the concept of perfect substitutability that has been assumed in these models it discusses the theorectical properties and implications of one practical specification of product differentation and explores quantitatively the impact of trade policy on relative prices and resource pulls with a general equilibrium model that incorporates product differentiation an analysis of the implications of product differentation for the autonomy of the domestic price system is extended to include intermediate products the specification of imperfect substitutability provides a practical way of capturing product differentation both in a partial equilibrium and in a general equilibrium model however partial equilibrium based estimates are not likely to be robust when there are substantial policy changes that affect a number of sectors simultaneously

assessing the effect of public subsidies on firm r d investment a survey this survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public r d subsidies and private r d investment over the past five decades the survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues we aim to provide further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity in particular we emphasise a set of issues that in our view are critical to understanding the potential effect of public r d subsidies on private r d spending special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm r d the constraints faced by the firm such as financial constraints and the amount and source of public subsidies none of these issues have been investigated in depth we formulate a set of research assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field

who participates in r d subsidy programs the case of spanish manufacturing firms abstract empirical evidence on the effectiveness of r d subsidies to firms has produced mixed results so far one possible explanation is that firms and project selection rules may be quite heterogeneous both across agencies and across industries leading to different outcomes in terms of the induced additional private effort here we focus on the participation stage using a sample of spanish firms we test for differences across agencies and industries our results suggest that firms in the same industry face different hurdles to participate in different agencies programs that participation patterns may reflect a combination of agency goals and that patterns differ across high tech and low tech industries

issues and perspectives on evaluating manufacturing modernization programs abstract the establishment of a national system of federal state manufacturing modernization centers to serve small and medium sized manufacturing systems is a major experiment in the us the system s rapid expansion has made it impossible to begin with an experimental design that would systematically permit tests of the variables and relationships likely to effect the long term economic effectiveness of these centers or their political and financial stability relatedly many existing evaluation studies and journalistic narratives are marred by serious analytical and empirical flaws it is not too late to attempt to improve practice in future evaluations several areas of expanded evaluation are described including theories of industrial restructuring regional technology infrastructure public management financing evaluation design evaluability assessment firm learning and measurement of benefits and costs in each case evaluation is presented as a means of simultaneously yielding information relevant to formative and summative program level decisions and to hypothesis testing

network effects market structure and industry performance abstract this paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods we prove existence of non trivial fulfilled expectations equilibrium we formalize the concept of industry viability investigate its determinants and show that it improves with more firms in the market and or by technological progress these results enlighten some well known conclusions from case studies in the management strategy literature we also characterize the effects of market structure on industry performance which depart substantially from ordinary markets the approach relies on lattice theoretic methods supplemented with basic insights from nonsmooth analysis

absorptive capacity coauthoring behavior and the organization of research in drug discovery we examine the interface between for profit and publicly funded research in pharmaceuticals firms access upstream basic research through investments in absorptive capacity in the form of in house basic research and pro publication internal incentives some firms also maintain extensive connections to the wider scientific community which we measure using data on coauthorship of scientific papers between pharmaceutical company scientists and publicly funded researchers connectedness is significantly correlated with firms internal organization as well as their performance in drug discovery the estimated impact of connectedness on private research productivity implies a substantial return to public investments in basic research

a positive theory of flexibility in accounting standards abstract we develop a positive theory of accounting standards when standards generate network externalities and differ in the amount of reporting discretion or flexibility they provide firms we evaluate expected value maximizing firms preferences between two standards regimes rigid and flexible as the number of firms subject to each standard varies as the organization of the securities market varies and as the mapping from the underlying economics of the firms transactions to the accounting reports produced under the two standards vary we also compare firms preferences between the two regimes to the preferences of profit maximizing traders in the firms securities

estimating the benefits of targeted r d subsidies we study the expected welfare effects of targeted r d subsi dies using project level data from finland we model the application and r d investment decisions of firms and the subsidy granting decision of the public agency in charge of the program our model and institutional environment allow us to identify different benefits and costs of the r d subsidy program we find that expected effects of subsidies are very het erogeneous and estimated application costs low on average the social rate of return on targeted subsidies is 30 to 50 but spillover effects of subsidies are smaller than effects on firm profits

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

internal r d expenditures and external technology sourcing abstract the paper examines the two way relationship between external r d activities and internal r d expenditures on a cross section of flemish r d active companies the analysis extends the classical explanatory variables like size diversification ownership structure and technological opportunities to include the impact of various external sourcing strategies r d cooperation and to a lesser extent r d contracted out are found to have a significant positive effect on internal r d but only if the companies have absorptive capacity in the form of a full time staffed r d department at the same time firms are found to be more frequently engaged in r d cooperation the more they spend on internal r d

demand side vs supply side technology policies hidden treatment and new empirical evidence on the policy mix this paper provides new empirical evidence about the impact of various technological policies upon firms innovative behaviour we take into consideration the role of policies for innovative activities and we focus on their interaction while supply side policies such as r d subsidies and tax credits have been both extensively discussed in the literature and empirically investigated the analysis of innovative public procurement is a growing trend in the literature which still lacks robust empirical evidence in this paper we replicate the existing results on supply side policies surmise fresh empirical evidence on the outcome of innovative public procurement and address the issue of possible interaction among the various tools when controlling for the interaction with other policies supply side subsidies cease to be as effective as reported in previous studies and innovative public procurement seems to be more effective than other tools the preliminary evidence suggests that technology policies exert the highest impact when different policies interact

product compatibility as a signal of quality in a market with network externalities abstract in this paper i consider the compatibility decision as a signaling device of the quality of a newly introduced technology of which users are not informed provided that firms are located sufficiently far apart in hotelling s 0 1 interval i find separating equilibria where low compatibility signals high quality this possible separation is due to the fact that low compatibility is more advantageous to the high quality entrant than to the low quality entrant since it can prevent users of the established technology from enjoying network benefits from the new technology very much

modeling the forms of international cooperation distribution versus information the problems of distribution and information impede international cooperation they arise when actors select how they will cooperate an exploration of the interaction between these problems using a limited information model of cooperation leads to six conclusions first leadership solutions to coordination problems always exist but leadership here is very different from hegemonic provision of public goods second actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy even without a shadow of the future third diffuse reciprocal strategies arise naturally in coordination problems fourth norms and institutions are intertwined within successful cooperation fifth the form of cooperation on an issue varies with the relative importance of distribution and information finally and most important distributional and informational problems interfere with each other arrangements to cooperate can successfully address one but not both of these problems

co ordination spillovers and cheap talk abstract we analyze the role of cheap talk in two player games with one sided incomplete information we identify conditions under which 1 players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game and 2 players cannot communicate so cheap talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the bayesian game we present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two sided incomplete information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities we examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology the relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality the clash between the foreign firm s choice and the local government s ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm ce texte examine les preferences d une firme etrangere et d un gouvernement du pays hote quant a deux modes d investissement direct de l etranger entree de novo de la firme etrangere versus acquisition d une firme domestique en place deux facteurs pris en compte sont la presence d externalites de reseau et d incompatibilite partielle entre la technologie locale et celle introduite par la firme etrangere l impact relatif des modes d entree sur le mieux etre local depend du degre de concurrence sur le marche et de l importance des externalites de reseau le conflit entre les preferences de l entreprise etrangere et les preferences du gouvernement local peuvent etre a la source de politiques qui limitent le degre de proprieteetrangere permis

the role of sunk costs in the decision to invest in r d we present a dynamic empirical model of a firm s r d decisions that is consistent with the existence of sunk r d costs taking into account that these costs may differ between small and large firms and among different technological regimes we estimate a multivariate dynamic discrete choice model using firm level data of spanish manufacturing for 1990 2000 conditional on firm heterogeneity and serially correlated unobservable factors we find that r d history matters this true state dependence allows inferring the existence of sunk r d costs associated with performing r d sunk r d costs are found to be higher for large high tech firms

exclusionary pricing in markets with interdependent demands in this paper i use a simple model to study the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing involving two markets related by a positive demand externality it is shown that below cost pricing on one of these markets can allow an incumbent firm to exclude from both markets a more efficient rival which does not have a customer base yet however when exclusion occurs it is always socially optimal in addition under some circumstances there is inefficient entry the entrant wins both markets while the social optimum would require the incumbent to win them