overconfidence and asymmetric information the case of insurance this paper contributes to the recent behavioral economics literature by showing that whether or not overconfidence changes qualitative predictions in asymmetric information markets may depend on the market structure itself we first show that overconfidence may overturn fundamental relations between observable variables in perfect competition asymmetric information insurance markets in monopolistic insurance markets in constrast we find that overconfidence may be observationally equivalent to variations in the risk composition of the economy our analysis provides a number of novel testable implications on i price heterogeneity within and across risk classes ii the relationship between ex post risk and insurance coverage iii the fact that a significant fraction of agents chooses to be uninsured and iv the relationship between underinsurance and age

economics as a moral science economists frequently make judgments about economic welfare but there is today little discussion of the foundations of welfare economics it is assumed either that there is unanimity of interests or that there is general acceptance of utilitarianism this means that economics cannot address many key policy issues and that important differences in ethical views cannot be recognized this paper argues that it is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to examine the consequences of different ethical positions taking case studies of employment as a macroeconomic objective and the role of capabilities in the measurement of economic performance

survival ambiguity and welfare abstract nearly all life cycle models adopt yaari s 1965 assumption that individuals know the survival probabilities that they face given that an individual s exact survival probabilities are likely unknown we explore the implications of relaxing this assumption if there is no annuity market then the welfare cost of survival ambiguity is large and regressive ambiguity neutral individuals would pay as much as 1 of total lifetime consumption for immediate resolution of ambiguity and the bottom income quintile is 4 times worse off than the top quintile alternatively with the availability of competitive annuity contracts survival ambiguity is welfare improving because it allows competitive insurance companies to pool risk across survival types even though social security and annuities share some properties social security does not help to hedge survival ambiguity

the credibility of a fixed exchange rate how reputation is gained or lost we examine the interest rate differential between each of the four largest nordic countries and the countries of their foreign currency baskets on monthly data for the period 1978 79 92 the interest rate differential is assumed to reflect devaluation expectations which partly depend on government reputation we investigate the formation of the reputation of the government assuming that reputation is updated using bayes s formula it is shown theoretically that when there is no devaluation the improvement in government reputation is larger the larger the prior devaluation expectations for norway the evidence gives support to this assertion

the welfare cost of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets we consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs we propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss after identifying some types which determine expected risk and insurance demand we derive the key factors defining the demand and cost functions in each market induced by these unobservable types these are used to quantify the efficiency costs of unpriced heterogeneity we apply our methods to the us long term care and medigap insurance markets where we find that unpriced heterogeneity causes substantial inefficiency

asymmetric information in insurance general testable implications several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard we show here that the positive correlationproperty can be extended to general setups competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public we test our results on a french dataset our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive they also suggest the presence of market power

gathering information before signing a contract after being offered a contract an agent has the possibility to observe the state of nature this enables him to refuse the contract in unfavorable states but burdens him with an observation cost the authors show that the principal offers a contract in which the agent has no incentive to observe the state of nature and they explore its terms later they show that the principal finds it profitable to organize competition between several agents even though he has monopoly power and can push a single agent down to his reservation utility copyright 1992 by american economic association

optimal annuitization with stochastic mortality and correlated medical costs the conventional wisdom since yaari 1965 is that households without a bequest motive should fully annuitize their investments numerous frictions do not break this sharp result we modify the yaari framework by allowing a household s mortality risk itself to be stochastic due to health shocks a lifetime annuity still helps to hedge longevity risk but the annuity s remaining present value is correlated with medical costs such as those for nursing home care thereby reducing annuity demand even without ad hoc liquidity constraints we find that most households should not hold a positive level of annuities and many should hold negative amounts jel d14 d82 g23 i12 j14 j26

uncertainty resolution and the timing of annuity purchases abstract this paper considers the question of why the annuity market is thin a model is presented in which consumers have the option of purchasing annuities before discovering their survival probability they can then recontract the initial choice after the resolution of this form of uncertainty it is shown that consumers purchase insurance against their own survival probability type at a very young age and do not undertake further transactions this characterization is then used to analze the effects of introducing future income uncertainty and to investigate the trade off between old age insurance motive and portfilio flexibility

an example of non existence of riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection abstract rothschild and stiglitz 1976 proposed a model of a competitive market with adverse selection and showed that a pure strategy nash equilibrium may not exist among the solutions proposed to deal with this problem a particularly influential one is the notion of riley or reactive equilibrium riley 1979 we give an example that shows that a riley equilibrium may not exist if consumers are not ordered

behavior based discrimination is it a winning play and if so when with advances in technology the collection of information from consumers at the time of purchase is common in many categories this information allows a firm to straightforwardly classify consumers as either new or past consumers this opens the door for firms to implement marketing that a discriminates between new and past consumers and b entails making offers to them that are significantly different our objective is to examine the competitive effects of marketing that tailors offers to consumers based on their past buying behavior in a two period model with two competing firms we assume that each firm is able to commit about whether or not to implement behavior based discrimination bbd i e to add benefits to its offer for past consumers in the second period when the firms are identical in their ability to add value to the second period offer bbd generally leads to lower profits for both firms past customers are so valuable in the second period that bbd leads to cutthroat competition in the first period as a result the payoffs associated with the implementation of bbd form a prisoner s dilemma interestingly when a firm has a significant advantage over its competitor one firm has the capability to add more benefits for its past customers than the other it can increase its profit versus the base case even when there is significant competition in the second period moreover the firm at a disadvantage sometimes finds that the best response to bbd by a strong competitor is to respond with a uniform price and avoid the practice completely

the role of commitment in dynamic contracts evidence from life insurance we use data on life insurance contracts to study the properties of long term contracts in a world where buyers cannot commit to a contract the data are especially suited to test a theory of dynamic contracting since they include information on the entire proele of future premiums all the patterns in the data et the theoretical predictions of a model with symmetric learning and one sided com

the social value of hidden information in adverse selection economies abstract when agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge at the time contracts are negotiated the social value of agents having access to additional hidden knowledge before contracts are implemented is positive to the extent that incentive constrained agents are sorted more finely but is negative to the extent that incentive constraining agents impose more stringent signalling requirements on others hence the intuition developed by hirshleifer 1971 marshall 1974 and milgrom and stokey 1982 that privately acquired information has neither positive nor negative social value when agents possess no prior hidden knowledge does not apply when agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge during contractual negotiations

adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets abstract models of adverse selection assume that risk type is known to the consumer but not to the insurer many analyses suggest that information has zero social value and negative prior value why then would consumers become informed what is the incentive to gather information and why does adverse selection arise we show that the private value of information is non negative only if insurers cannot observe consumers information status or if consumers can conceal their informational status we examine the existence and characterization of equilibria under different configurations of information costs and benefits finally we examine some welfare implications of the endogenous information model for public policy regarding genetic testing and for state regulations concerning hiv testing

on the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets abstract frictionless consumer choices and price competition are often associated with competitive markets and vanishing equilibrium profits we discuss vanishing profits in competitive screening markets like insurance we assume symmetric firms which exhibit constant returns to scale consumer heterogeneity creates the possibility of adverse selection firms can offer multiple contracts in equilibrium and importantly in any deviation nash equilibrium profits vanish if each consumer has a unique optimizing bundle at equilibrium prices or more generally if there exists a linear ordering of contracts that dictates the preferences of firms whenever consumers are indifferent between multiple optimal contracts of particular interest equilibrium profits vanish if for each agent indifference curves are steeper than iso profit curves the results extend to miyazaki wilson spence equilibria we provide examples of economies where there exists an equilibrium with strictly positive profit and show that these examples are robust hold for an open set of economies

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

adverse selection without single crossing monotone solutions abstract the single crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility if single crossing is violated global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account this paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one time violation of single crossing the results show that local and non local incentive constraints distort the solution in opposite directions therefore the optimal decision might involve distortions above as well as below the first best decision furthermore the well known no distortion at the top property does not necessarily hold the results show that the decision can even be distorted above first best for all types sufficient conditions for existence strict monotonicity and continuity of the solution are presented a new necessary condition satisfied by such solutions is found an algorithm based on this condition can calculate continuous and strictly monotone solutions

health insurance without single crossing why healthy people have high coverage standard insurance models predict that people with high risks have high insurance coverage it is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured we show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in an insurance model where people choose treatment intensity we analyse different market structures and show the following if insurers have market power the violation of single crossing caused by income differences and endogenous treatment choice can explain the empirically observed outcome our results do not rely on differences in risk aversion between types

income uncertainty bequests and annuities abstract life uncertainty and income uncertainty are modeled simultaneously in order to analyze the influence of perfecting income insurance in the size of bequests and the demand for annuities the main result shows that government intervention aimed at providing intergenerational risk sharing acts as a bequest substitute and if annuities are available reduces the demand for annuities

the value of information in efficient risk sharing arrangements suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets we show that better information makes everyone worse off if the economy has a representative agent that is the economy s demand for state contingent consumption equals the demand of a hypothetical agent who owns all the economy s wealth the representative agent moreover is normatively unrepresentative although each agent dislikes information the representative agent is indifferent although we emphasize pure exchange our results imply that a representative agent model might seriously misstate the welfare effects of improved information in an economy with production and risk sharing even if it performs well otherwise

competitive price discrimination strategies in a vertical channel using aggregate retail data we explore opportunities for targeted pricing for a retailer that only tracks weekly store level aggregate sales and marketing mix information we show that it is possible using these data to recover essential features of the underlying distribution of consumer willingness to pay knowledge of this distribution may enable the retailer to generate additional profits from targeting by using choice information at the checkout counter in estimating demand we incorporate a supply side model of the distribution channel that captures important features of competitive price setting behavior of firms this latter aspect helps us control for the potential endogeneity generated by unmeasured product characteristics in aggregate data the channel controls for competitive aspects both between manufacturers and between manufacturers and a retailer despite this competition we find that targeted pricing need not generate the prisoner s dilemma in our data this contrasts with the findings of theoretical models due to the flexibility of the empirical model of demand the demand system we estimate captures richer forms of product differentiation both vertical and horizontal as well as a more flexible distribution of consumer heterogeneity

optimum and risk class pricing of annuities when information on longevity survival functions is unknown early in life individuals have an interest in insuring themselves against moving into different risk classes as their life expectancy is revealed the first best allocation involves transfers across states of nature with symmetric information competitive equilibrium separates different risk classes and cannot provide such transfers because insurance firms are unable to precommit when utility is invariant to risk class realisation the optimum entails uniform consumption and optimum retirement age independent of risk class and an optimum social security scheme is superior to competitive equilibrium when preferences depend on risk class welfare ranking of systems becomes indeterminate much work has been undertaken by economists to understand and rationalise the annuity puzzle the fact that the markets for private voluntarily purchased annuities

genetic adverse selection evidence from long term care insurance and huntington disease abstract individual personalized genetic information is increasingly available leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time particularly in individual payer insurance markets we use data on individuals at risk for huntington disease hd a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity to estimate adverse selection in long term care insurance we find strong evidence of adverse selection individuals who carry the hd genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long term care insurance this finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for hd to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the hd risk population with and without the hd mutation

advantageous effects of regulatory adverse selection in the life insurance market we analyse the effects of regulations prohibiting the use of information to risk rate premiums in a life insurance market new information derived from genetic tests is likely to become increasingly relevant in the future many governments prohibit the use of this information thereby generatingregulatory adverse selection in our model individuals early in their lives know neither their desired level of life insurance later in life nor their mortality risk but learn both over time we obtain both positive and normative results that differ qualitatively from those in standard static models legislation prohibiting the use of genetic tests for ratemaking may increase welfare the effort to sequence the human genome completely is now effectively com pleted although a comprehensive understanding of the effects of most genes on health and mortality risks will still take substantial further effort it is likely that in the medium term future more and more information relevant to ratemaking in the life health and long term care insurance markets will become available in particular we will learn the effects of many genes on the likelihood of various illnesses and consequently individualslife expectancy 1 moreover new genetic tests for these genes will likely become much cheaper 2 allowing this information to be used by insurers raises the prospect of substantial changes in future pricing

adverse selection in insurance markets policyholder evidence from the u k annuity market in this paper we investigate the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets we use a unique data set consisting of all annuity policies sold by a large u k insurance company since the early 1980s to analyze mortality differences among individuals who purchased different types of policies we find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity policy characteristics such as whether the annuity will make payments to the estate in the event of an untimely death and whether the payments from the annuity rise over time these mortality patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information in the annuity market we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences however across annuities of different size even though models of insurance market equilibrium with asymmetric information would predict such differences we also find that the pricing of various features of annuity contracts is consistent with the self selection patterns we find in mortality rates our results therefore suggest that selection may occur across many specific features of insurance contracts and that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others this highlights the importance of considering the detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information

capital accumulation and uncertain lifetimes with adverse selection this paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects on constrption and bequest behavior with privately known heterogeneous mortality probabilities adverse selection causes the rate of return on private annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality however a fully funded social security system with compulsory participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality thus since social security offers a higher rate of return than private annuities consumers cannot completely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private annuity market using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social security reduces the steady state rate of return on annuities and raises the steady state levels of average bequests and average consumption of the young the steady state national capital stock rises or falls according to the strength of the bequest motive this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a test for speculative bubbles in the sterling dollar exchange rate 1981 84 the u s dollar price of the u k pound sterling is tested for a speculative bubble defined as a period with a nonzero median in excessreturns a nonparametric procedure is developed which controls for data mining over the period of flexible exchange rates and finds a negative bubble in the excess return to holding sterling rather than dollar assets during the period 1981 84 possible interpretations arebootstrap equilibria rational bubbles nonsym metric fundamentals and nonrational expectations copyright 1986 by american economic association

an empirical examination of information barriers to trade in insurance this paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world life insurance we report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information we conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market as in those for most other products

adverse selection in the annuities market and the impact of privatizing social security the observation that few americans purchase life annuities has often been attributed to adverse selection a still unanswered question is whether observable price increases caused by adverse selection can be generated endogenously in a life cycle model this paper calibrates a pure life cycle model for a characteristic us cohort and reproduces three stylized facts adverse selection increases annuity prices by 7 10 percent the cost of adverse selection rises with the age of the annuitant and the cost is smaller for females than for males social security privatization could reduce annuity prices by between 2 and 3 percent

interest rates in the nordic countries evidence based on devaluation expectations over the period 1979 92 investments in danish and norwegian kroner in the euromarket have had an annual excess return of about 2 and 1 1 per cent compared to investments in the euromarket in foreign currencies assuming risk neutrality the subjective probability of a devaluation within the next month is derived from the excess returns on the euromarket these derived probabilities are found to be inconsistent with the actual number of devaluations that have taken place over this period so that the probability of devaluation has been significantly overrated for denmark and norway

annuitization and asset allocation this paper examines the optimal annuitization investment and consumption strategies of a utility maximizing retiree facing a stochastic time of death under a variety of institutional restrictions we focus on the impact of aging on the optimal purchase of life annuities which form the basis of most defined benefit pension plans due to adverse selection acquiring a lifetime payout annuity is an irreversible transaction that creates an incentive to delay under the institutional all or nothing arrangement where annuitization must take place at one distinct point in time i e retirement we derive the optimal age at which to annuitize and develop a metric to capture the loss from annuitizing prematurely in contrast under an open market structure where individuals can annuitize any fraction of their wealth at anytime we locate a general optimal annuity purchasing policy in this case we find that an individual will initially annuitize a lump sum and then buy annuities to keep wealth to one side of a separating ray in wealth annuity space we believe our paper is the first to integrate life annuity products into the portfolio choice literature while taking into account realistic institutional restrictions which are unique to the market for mortality contingent claims

genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance a welfare analysis a central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information when offering insurance contracts we provide a welfare analysis of this issue within a model of an insurance market with asymmetric information having the following crucial feature in addition to a state contingent consumption profile a person s well being depends on her attitude towards resolution of future health uncertainty and this attitude varies across the population we present stylized facts that motivate this approach in the formal analysis we find that both tested high risks and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by insurers individuals who test for being low risks on the other hand are made worse off by not being able to verify this to insurers this implies that in terms of welfare a regulatory regime in which the use of genetic information by insurers is allowed is better than one in which it is not allowed

a note on the specification of inter firm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection abstract this paper reconsiders the proposition due to jaynes that the rothschild stiglitz wilson insurence market with adverse selection has a nash equilibrium once the sharing of information about customers is treated endogenously as part of the game among firms the proposition is shown to be correct if and only if each firm s communication behaviour is conditioned on the set of contracts that are offered by the other firms this type of conditioning introduces a reactive element which is akin to the alternative approach of wilson

competitive insurance markets with two unobservables i study a screening game in a competitive insurance market in which insurance customers differ with respect to both accident probability and degree of risk aversion it is shown that indifference curves of customers may cross twice thus the single crossing property does not hold when differences in risk aversion are sufficiently large firms cannot use policy deductibles to screen high risk customers types may be pooled in equilibrium or are separated by raising premiums above actuarially fair levels this leads to excessive entry of firms in equilibrium

on the link between exchange rate regimes capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in small european countries 1979 2000 we investigate international monetary policy transmission under different exchange rate and capital account regimes in eleven small open economies during the 1980s and 1990s we find no systematic link between ex post monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate regimes capital controls appear to have provided a degree of temporal insulation from foreign monetary policy shocks though not strict autonomy the results are consistent both with short term autonomy for small countries even under fixed exchange rates and an open capital account and with long term dependence under flexible exchange rates and an independent stability target results also indicate that euro area market interest rates are significantly more responsive to the development of the corresponding us rate than were the previous national rates

competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

noisy signals in target zone regimes theory and monte carlo experiments abstract previous empirical evidence indicates that uncovered interest parity uip does not hold for target zone exchange rates like those in the european monetary system and in the nordic countries we explore a target zone model where the market infers the probability of a realignment of the band on the basis of a noisy signal we show theoretically and through monte carlo simulations that if the market overrates the information content in the signal then this may explain the empirical results obtained from testing uip for target zone exchange rates

gold and silver health plans accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition abstract new regulation of health insurance markets creates multiple levels of health plans with designations like gold and silver the underlying rationale for the heavy metal approach to insurance regulation is that heterogeneity in demand for health care is not only due to health status sick demand more than the healthy but also to other taste related factors rich demand more than the poor this paper models managed competition with demand heterogeneity to consider plan payment and enrollee premium policies in relation to efficiency net consumer benefit and fairness the european concept of solidarity specifically this paper studies how to implement a silver and gold health plan efficiently and fairly in a managed competition context we show that there are sharp tradeoffs between efficiency and fairness when health plans cannot or may not because of regulation base premiums on any factors affecting demand enrollees do not choose the efficient plan when taste e g income can be used as a basis of payment a simple tax can achieve both efficiency and fairness when only health status and not taste can be used as a basis of payment health status based taxes and subsidies are required and efficiency can only be achieved with a modified version of fairness we refer to as weak solidarity an overriding conclusion is that the regulation of premiums for both the basic and the higher level plans is necessary for efficiency

a simple tax structure for competitive equilibrium and redistribution in insurance markets with asymmetric information in their influential paper rothschild and stiglitz 6 demonstrated that the existence of nash equilibrium is not a general property of insurance markets when buyers have private information about their riskiness and firms face free entry and exit conditions this paper presents a simple and implementable system of taxes and subsidies applied to firms which permits a nash equilibrium always to exist we also show that more than one nash equilibrium is open to the regulator in particular government can effect risk discriminating redistribution without a priori knowledge of any individual buyer s riskiness hence it is not the case that the inability to distinguish between types of buyers rules out compensation risk discriminating transfers even in principle as claimed by schmalensee 7 442 finally we show that even when a nash equilibrium exists without government intervention there are always alternative and under some circumstances pareto superior equilibria open to the regulator since these alternative equilibria entail cross subsidization from low risk to high risk buyers our results suggest that the well known cross subsidization enforced through current regulatory practices is consistent with economic efficiency we conclude that the informational asymmetry assumed by rothschild and stiglitz poses distinct efficiency and distribution problems as do more conventional non informational situations of market failure and that regulators can influence the allocation of insurance through conventional instruments of intervention without assuming dictatorial control of the market

modelling probabilities of devaluations i show why when the realized rates of depreciation within the exchange rate band are regressed on a given information set and conditioned on ex post actual no realignment a la drift adjustment a peso problem is still encountered the reason is that the frequency of realignments in the data need not be the same as the frequency of the even small subjective probabilities that a realignment may take place i suggest an alternative approach to solve the peso problem and provide consistent estimates my estimates of the expected realignment rates are greater than the ones obtained using the drift adjustment method

expected and predicted realignments the ff dm exchange rate during the ems an empirical model of time varying realignment risk in an exchange rate target zone is developed expected rates of devaluation are estimated as the difference between interest rate differentials and estimated expected rates of depreciation within the exchange rate band using french franc deutsche mark data during the european monetary system the behavior of estimated expected rates of depreciation accord well with the theoretical model of bertola svensson 1990 we are also able to predict actial realignments with some success

the poor are twice cursed wealth inequality and inefficient credit market abstract this paper investigates the role of unobservable wealth differences on credit market equilibrium given there is also asymmetric information concerning effort preferences and choices in equilibrium poor but able entrepreneurs may subsidise the rich and incompetent or be excluded as a result investment may exceed or fall short of the optimal level low inequality may deliver conditions for perfect screening and an efficient level of investment the equilibrium with cross subsidisation is consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical observations

redistribution by insurance market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities we illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation we calibrate and solve a model of the united kingdom s compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender based pricing restrictions we find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous social security like annuity contracts our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis

human capital risk contract enforcement and the macroeconomy we use data from the survey of consumer finance and survey of income program participation to show that young households with children are under insured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies we develop a tractable macroeconomic model with human capital risk age dependent returns to human capital investment and endogenous borrowing constraints due to the limited pledgeability of human capital limited contract enforcement we show analytically that consistent with the life insurance data in equilibrium young households are borrowing constrained and under insured against human capital risk a calibrated version of the model can quantitatively account for the life cycle variation of life insurance holdings financial wealth earnings and consumption inequality observed in the us data our analysis implies that a reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly like the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act of 2005 leads to a substantial increase in the volume of both credit and insurance

life cycle asset allocation with annuity markets abstract this paper derives the optimal consumption and portfolio choice pattern over the life cycle for households facing uninsurable labor income risk ruin risk stochastic capital markets and uncertain lifetime our model posits a dynamic utility maximizer with crra and epstein zin preferences who has access to liquid stocks bonds and illiquid life annuities we show that a considerable fraction of wealth is gradually annuitized until retirement and beyond to skim the mortality credit the remaining liquid wealth is mainly invested in stocks to compensate for riskless investment in life annuities the model allows us to assess the economic importance of common explanations for the empirically low annuity demand by analyzing participations rates annuitization fractions and welfare effects

endogenous information adverse selection and prevention implications for genetic testing policy we examine public policy toward the use of genetic information by insurers individuals engage in unobservable primary prevention and have access to different prevention technologies thus insurance markets are affected by moral hazard and adverse selection individuals can choose to take a genetic test to acquire information about their prevention technology information has positive decision making value that is individuals may adjust their behavior based on the result of the test however testing also exposes individuals to uncertainty over the available insurance contract so called classification risk which lowers the value of information in our analysis we distinguish between four different policy regimes determine the value of information under each regime and associated equilibrium outcomes on the insurance market we show that the policy regimes can be pareto ranked with a duty to disclose being the preferred regime and an information ban the least preferred one

the value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities abstract this paper investigates the welfare implications of symmetrical improvements in information and accompanying screening mechanisms which allow for improved matching of individuals to their respective risk classes unlike previous models used to investigate this phenomenon this paper allows for the possibility that individuals differ not simply according to exogenously specified unequal loss probabilities but rather that individuals possess different self protection technologies moreover various insurance contracting possibilities are also considered it is demonstrated that the structural form of the heterogeneity of technologies and the type of insurance contracts available in the market determine in an interactive way the value of information which improves the matching of individuals to risk class

false diagnoses pitfalls of testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets established tests for asymmetric information in insurance markets are examined the most commonly used that information is symmetric if high and low cover contracts have the same loss rate is inconsistent with standard assumptions that imply that under symmetric information all contracts o er full cover incomplete cover and symmetric information can be reconciled if there are claim processing costs but now existing tests fare badly partly due to the divergence between marginal and average selection effects ignoring the nature of loading factors may cause recent studies to mismeasure the welfare costs of asymmetric information but these problems are remedial

uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security this paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime share deathrelated risks when annuity markets operate a non discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources in the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities such a program will lead to a non optimal intragenerational allocation of resources however the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a pareto improving role for a mandatory non discriminatory social security program

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

product design in selection markets insurers choose plan characteristics to sort for profitable consumers in a model with multidimensional types this sorting incentive is proportional to the covariance among marginal consumers between marginal willingness to pay and cost to the insurer standard forms of cost sharing successfully repel costly consumers but reducing plan comprehensiveness instead alienates the risk averse in a perfectly competitive equilibrium the sorting incentive must vanish market power increases insurance quality and welfare nonetheless a competitive equilibrium with positive insurance is possible when insurance value is suciently negatively correlated with cost however in a calibration to handel hendel and whinston 2013 s data equilibrium still fails to exist

devaluation risk in target zones evidence from the nordic countries in this paper the authors estimate devaluation risk in denmark finland norway and sweden the target exchange ra te is modeled as a censored variable a shadow peg that is only observed when the equilibrium floating rate is too far from the prevailing peg using a two step procedure the authors are able to calculate time series of the probability and expected size of devaluations th e probability as well as the size of devaluations seem to be systematically related to a relation between the money stock industrial production foreign exchange reserves and the prevailing central parity copyright 1993 by royal economic society

incentive and selection effects of medigap insurance on inpatient care the medicare program which provides insurance coverage to the elderly in the united states does not protect them fully against high out of pocket costs for this reason private supplementary insurance named medigap has been available to cover medicare gaps this paper studies how medigap affects the utilization of inpatient care separating the incentive and selection effects of supplementary insurance for this purpose we use two alternative estimation methods a standard recursive bivariate probit and a discrete multivariate finite mixture model we find that estimated incentive effects are modest and quite similar across models there seems to be very significant selection with the presence of both adversely and advantageously selected individuals stemming from the multidimensional nature of residual heterogeneity

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

private pensions mortality risk and the decision to annuitize abstract this paper examines household decisions about whether or not to annuitize retirement resources a life cycle model of consumption implemented with the use of dynamic programming techniques is used to construct a utility based measure of annuity value for individuals and couples in the health and retirement survey variation in the calculated annuity equivalent wealth arises from differences in mortality risk marital status risk aversion and the presence of pre existing annuities such as social security i find that a one percentage point increase in the annuity equivalent wealth leads to nearly a one percentage point increase in the ex ante probability of annuitizing balances in defined contribution pension plans however because much of the variation in the expected annuity decision is left unexplained by the life cycle model other factors are also analyzed health status and an individual s time horizon for financial decision making are significant determinants of the decision there is no evidence that bequest motives are an important factor in making marginal annuity decisions

the impact of imperfectly categorizing risks on income inequality and social welfare the use of imperfect information to categorize risks is a pervasive and controversial phenomenon in the insurance industry although this activity reduces the average extent of vertical price discrimination it is shown in this paper that both highand low risk types may prefer ex ante to knowing the category to which they will be assigned that such information be suppressed furthermore for the lorenz criterion it is shown that under certain restrictive demand conditions the imperfect categorization of risks leads to an increase in inequality the paper employs the wilson e2 equilibrium concept l impact d une categorisation imparfaite des risques sur l inegalite du revenu et le bien etre social l utilisation de renseignements imparfaits pour categoriser les risques est un probleme important qui porte a controverses dans l industrie de i assurance meme si ce phenomene reduit le degre de discrimination verticale par les prix en moyenne i auteur montre que a la fois les personnes dont le coefficient de risques est faible et elev6 et ce avant de savoir a quelle categorie on va les assigner peuvent fort bien preferer que cette information soit supprimee de plus 1 auteur montre que sous certaines conditions de demande restrictives la categorisation imparfaite des risques conduit a un accroissement du degre d inegalite mesure par le critere de lorenz ce memoire utilise le concept d equilibre dit de wilson e2 if insurance firms are unable to distinguish between the risk types of their clients but consumers know their own probability of loss i e if asymmetric information persists then the complication of adverse selection may arise adverse selection occurs when the class of risks or set of classes that purchases insurance differs adversely from that anticipated by the firm for example if a firm offers a contract to low risk types at their actuarially fair rate then high risk types will also purchase it with the result that the firm will earn expected losses hence the problem of adverse selection restricts the ability of firms to offer efficient insurance contracts to low risk types it has been demonstrated by rothschild and stiglitz 1976 that provided the proportion of high risk types in the population is above some critical level a this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 of the author s phd thesis entitled the economics of risk classification in insurance london school of economics and political science 1982 i am indebted to my supervisor lucien foldes and an anonymous referee for useful comments the author alone is responsible for any errors herein canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xvil no 3 august aotlt 1984 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 84 557 568 1 50 c canadian economics association this content downloaded from 157 55 39 215 on wed 31 aug 2016 04 39 57 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

the foreign exchange risk premium in a target zone with devaluation risk abstract the foreign exchange risk premium in an exchange rate target zone is derived when the exchange rate is heteroskedastic within the band and there is a separate devaluation risk the risk premium is then the sum of two separate risk premia arising from uncertainty about exchange rate movements within the band and from uncertainty about devaluations both real and nominal risk premia are considered real and nominal risk premia from movements within the band are very small real and nominal risk premia from devaluations are larger but still relatively small proportions of the interest rate differential

time inconsistent preferences and the annuitization decision good news can involve difficult decisions for example winning a lottery jackpot can go along with the decision whether to have the jackpot paid out immediately as a lump sum or as periodic annual payments also when entering retirement most people face the decision whether they want their defined contribution account balance paid as a lump sum or to annuitize that amount the fact that people tend to choose the lump sum even if economic reasons suggest that they should choose the annuity is called the annuity paradox in a large online survey we find that people behave time inconsistent older people have a stronger tendency to choose the lump sum than younger people when they are asked to predict today what to choose when they retire this effect is considerably stronger for participants that answer simple time preference questions inconsistently our findings suggest to think about precommitment devices for the annuitization decision in the retirement case already at the time when the defined benefit plan is started

facilitating consumer learning in insurance markets what are the welfare effects we model a monopoly insurance market where consumers can learn their accident risks at a cost c we then ask what are the welfare effects of a policy that reduces c if c is sufficiently small c c marginally reducing c hurts the insurer and weakly benefits the consumer finally a reduction in c that is successful meaning that the consumer gathers information after the reduction but not before it can hurt both parties this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

competition and screening with motivated health professionals two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals who are privately informed about their ability and motivation hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue the non profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for motivated workers in equilibrium when both hospitals are active the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient and ability neutral allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when hospitals are similar the non profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower salaries than the for profit one

taxation insurance and precautionary labor we examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets in a previous literature it has been shown that with perfect insurance markets social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions this result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide additional justifications for social insurance we show however that adverse selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance it also causes welfare reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply and hence tax revenue in addition adverse selection may reduce the redistributive potential of social insurance we illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market notably we derive conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive objectives

input use decisions with greater information on crop conditions implications for insurance moral hazard and the environment emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater information on crop conditions this greater information occurs by providing improved predictions of crop yields using remote sensing and crop simulation models and by allowing farms to apply inputs within the growing season when some crop conditions are already realized we use a stylized model with uncertainty in yield and price to examine how greater information on crop conditions i e a forecast affects input use for insured and uninsured farms we show that moral hazard decreases farms apply more inputs as the forecast accuracy improves when the forecast indicates good yields and vice versa when the forecast indicates bad yields in the long run moral hazard decreases in response to an improvement in forecast accuracy even though moral hazard decreases in the long run indemnity payments are likely to increase in the long run driven by the increase in moral hazard when the forecast indicates bad crop conditions we use the results of our model to discuss the potential impact of different technologies and types of inputs on the federal crop insurance program and the environment

one pool to insure them all age risk and the price s of medical insurance asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection and market failure in a dynamic setting asymmetric information also limits reclassification risk this certainty offsets the costs of adverse selection using a dynamic model of endogenous insurance choice and price calibrated to the u s medical insurance market i find that asymmetric information is pareto improving when information is fully asymmetric however when insurers can discriminate by age group but not within age groups the young benefit by paying less for insurance the insurance market for the near elderly collapses because it is no longer implicitly subsidized by the participation of the young

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

modeling multiple sources of state dependence in random utility models a distributed lag approach we propose a utility theoretic brand choice model that accounts for four different sources of state dependence 1 effects of lagged choices structural state dependence 2 effects of serially correlated error terms in the random utility function habit persistence type 1 3 effects of serial correlations between utility maximizing alternatives on successive purchase occasions of a household habit persistence type 2 and 4 effects of lagged marketing variables carryover effects our proposed model also allows habit persistence to be a function of lagged marketing variables while accommodating the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in household choice parameters this model is more flexible than existing state dependence models in marketing and labor econometrics using scanner panel data we find structural state dependence to be the most important source of state dependence marketing mix elasticities are systematically understated if state dependence effects are incompletely accounted for the seetharaman and chintagunta 1998 model is shown to recover spurious variety seeking effects while overstating habit persistence effects ignoring habit persistence type 1 leads to an underestimation while ignoring habit persistence type 2 leads to an overestimation of structural state dependence effects we find lagged promotions to have carryover effects on habit persistence ignoring one or more sources of state dependence underestimates the total incremental impact of a sales promotion we draw implications for manufacturer pricing

anomalies foreign exchange most all behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable well defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those preferences in markets that eventually clear an empirical result qualifies as an anomaly if it is difficult to rationalize or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm this column will present a series of such anomalies readers are invited to suggest topics for future columns by sending a note with some reference to or better yet copies of the relevant research comments on anomalies printed here are also welcome the address

life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders abstract we analyze how the life settlement market the secondary market for life insurance may affect consumer welfare in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance with one sided commitment and overconfident policyholders in our model policyholders may lapse their life insurance policies when they lose their bequest motives however they are overconfident in the sense that they may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motives we show that in the competitive equilibrium without life settlement overconfident consumers will buy life insurance contracts with too much reclassification risk insurance for later periods the life settlement market can impose a limit on the extent to which primary insurers can exploit overconfident consumers we show that the life settlement market may increase the equilibrium consumer welfare of overconfident consumers when they are sufficiently vulnerable in the sense that they have a sufficiently large intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption our result is robust to alternative specifications where i insurers cannot observe the subjective or objective probability that policyholders will lose their bequest motives ii insurers can include health contingent cash surrender values csvs in the life insurance contract and iii policyholders underestimate their future mortality risk

on the status of the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium in economic theory in economic theory the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium is a widely used equilibrium concept nevertheless the concept is frequently misunderstood and misleading explanations and interpretations are often given this paper presents a sample of such frequently appearing misleading explanations and goes on to explain why they are misleading the case for using the nash noncooperative equilibrium concept is stronger than what is implied by the many misleading statements found in the literature a basic issue is whether it can be argued that decisions in accordance with the noncooperative equilibrium theory are individually rational decisions this issue is not covered by the classical rationality postulate in economic theory this problem is tackled by stating certain postulates which may be taken as defining individual rationality in situations of noncooperative interaction it is shown that nash behavior satisfies these postulates

behavioral price discrimination in the presence of switching costs we study the strategic impacts of behavioral price discrimination bpd on manufacturers and retailers in a distribution channel when there are switching costs in consumer demand unlike previous empirical studies of behavioral price discrimination which rely only on differences in price elasticity across customers our pricing model allows the firm strategies to additionally account for differences in price elasticity across time due to switching costs we estimate a dynamic pricing model using empirical data from the cola category and through a series of counterfactuals we find that the retailer should simply outsource the data analytics and customization of coupons to manufacturers and improve its profit beyond what it can achieve by proactively couponing on its own we further find that serving as an information broker to sell its customer database to manufacturers can be a vital source of profit to the retailer by contrast manufacturers end up worse off illustrating that customer information

optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods we examine the efficiency based arguments for second best optimal health insurance with multiple treatment goods and multiple time periods correlated shocks across health care goods and over time interact with complementarity and substitutability to affect optimal cost sharing health care goods that are substitutes or have positively correlated demand shocks should have lower optimal patient cost sharing positive serial correlations of demand shocks and uncompensated losses that are positively correlated with covered health services also reduce optimal cost sharing our results rationalize covering pharmaceuticals and outpatient spending more fully than is implied by static one good or one period models

stochastic devaluation risk and the empirical fit of target zone models in the model of this paper an exchange rate fluctuates between given boundaries for random lengths of time and jumps discretely when devaluation occur we provide explicit solutions for the stochastic processes followed by the exchange rate and by the expected rate of depreciation when the likelihood and the size of devaluations vary stochastically over time the model produces realistic patterns of covariation between exchange rates and interest rate differentials and provides interesting interpretations of available empirical evidence we also specify how to infer devaluation risk from target zone data

the efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex age or race in insurance and similar markets we consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency when categorization entails a nonnegligible resource cost however no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible when categorization is costless we demonstrate that government having no better information than market participants can effect redistribution without assuming dictatorial control of the market implying that a market equilibrium with costless categorization is potentially pareto superior to one without it when categorization is costly however the market may categorize when pareto improvements are not possible

the cost of annuities implications for saving behavior and bequests the fact that most elderly u s individuals maintain a flat age wealth profile rather than buy individual life annuities contradicts the standard life cycle consumption model average expected yields on individual life annuities in the united states during 1968 1983 were lower by 4 21 6 13 percent or 2 43 4 35 percent after allowing for adverse selection than yields on plausible alternative investments simulations of a model of saving and portfolio allocation show that during the early retirement years such yield differentials can account for the absence of annuity purchases even without a bequest motive at older ages the combination of such yield differentials and a bequest motive can do so it is common experience that as we grow older and nearer to eternity we become more not less anxious about money derek brewer chaucer and his world p 213

the value of genetic information in the life insurance market abstract this paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers in aggregate however the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium we describe the conditions under which from an ex ante standpoint all individuals gain all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the existence of the test

the value of purchase history data in target marketing an important aspect of marketing practice is the targeting of consumer segments for differential promotional activity the premise of this activity is that there exist distinct segments of homogeneous consumers who can be identified by readily available demographic information the increased availability of individual consumer panel data open the possibility of direct targeting of individual households the goal of this paper is to assess the information content of various information sets available for direct marketing purposes information on the consumer is obtained from the current and past purchase history as well as demographic characteristics we consider the situation in which the marketer may have access to a reasonably long purchase history which includes both the products purchased and information on the causal environment short of this complete purchase history we also consider more limited information sets which consist of only the current purchase occasion or only information on past product choice without causal variables proper evaluation of this information requires a flexible model of heterogeneity which can accommodate observable and unobservable heterogeneity as well as produce household level inferences for targeting purposes we develop new econometric methods to implement a random coefficient choice model in which the heterogeneity distribution is related to observable demographics we couple this approach to modeling heterogeneity with a target couponing problem in which coupons are customized to specific households on the basis of various information sets the couponing problem allows us to place a monetary value on the information sets our results indicate there exists a tremendous potential for improving the profitability of direct marketing efforts by more fully utilizing household purchase histories even rather short purchase histories can produce a net gain in revenue from target couponing which is 2 5 times the gain from blanket couponing the most popular current electronic couponing trigger strategy uses only one observation to customize the delivery of coupons surprisingly even the information contained in observing one purchase occasion boasts net couponing revenue by 50 more than that which would be gained by the blanket strategy this result coupled with increased competitive pressures will force targeted marketing strategies to become much more prevalent in the future than they are today

the balance between defined benefit defined contribution and state provision we examine the possible consequences of the increasing shift from defined benefit to defined contribution arrangements for private pensions whilst much analysis has focused on the possible distribution of investment and job tenure risk we point out the additional role for issues relating to adverse selection and to retirement incentives these issues are illustrated using empirical evidence from the united kingdom where the fact that private pensions are an alternative as opposed to a supplement to earnings related state pension provision makes the effects particularly salient jel i38 j32 d91

what are occupational pension plan entitlements worth in britain the acquisition of rights by workers in private pension plans underpins retirement behaviour recruitment policy and wage structure but there is controversy as to how these individual pension rights should be valued the paper combines four data sets to calculate pension entitlements for a sample of 3000 british workers in 1987 expected scheme tenure is a key variable in valuation younger workers and women face greater initial uncertainty as to their pension outcomes which is resolved as job tenure lengthens given the distribution of tenure durations many employees would obtain higher returns in defined contribution schemes than in a typical final salary defined benefit plan