knowledge accumulation within an organization in this article we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization we show that knowledge accumulation is delayed the fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage falls gradually then rises again before falling finally toward zero we determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem or the specificity of knowledge we also discuss the form of the optimal life cycle wage profiles the role of the initial knowledge level and the role of discounting

unemployment with observable aggregate shocks a general equilibrium model of optimal employment contracts is developed where firms have better information about labor s marginal product than workers it is optimal for the wage to be tied to the level of employment to prevent the firm from falsely stating that the marginal product is low and cutting the wage it is shown that an observed aggregate shock that leads to an interindustry shift in labor demand and that would have no effect on total employment under symmetric information leads to a reduction in employment when firms and workers have asymmetric information

open access and academic journal quality ing from complicated signaling behavior by informed authors lerner and tirole show that adding upstream private information does not alter their basic analysis their proposition 4 454 aea papers and proceedings may 2005

adjustment costs durables and aggregate consumption abstract previous tests of the permanent income hypothesis pih have focused on either non durables or durables expenditures in isolation this paper studies consumer purchases of non durables and durables as the outcome of a single optimization problem it is shown that with non separability in utility the presence of adjustment costs of changing durables stocks may affect the time series properties of both components of expenditure an econometric test of the pih based on the model developed in the paper is both more efficient and less prone to bias than those in some previous studies however this test confirms earlier rejections of the pih in aggregate quarterly data

the review process in economics is it too fast rewards for publications in good economics journals are very high and submission fees and other monetary costs associated with submitting an existing manuscript are low consequently the editorial delay especially the first response time the time until the first editorial decision by postponing monetary rewards to publication constitutes the major submission cost from the author s perspective reducing the delay will induce many additional submissions of low quality papers to good journals increasing significantly the workload of editors and referees moreover the rejection rate will increase and cause papers to be rejected more times before publication offsetting at least some of the shorter first response times as a result the efforts of many editors to reduce the editorial delay although attracting more submissions to their journals may have adverse effects from a social perspective and the optimal delay might be longer than the current average of four months

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

estimating market power in a two sided market the case of newspapers the newspaper industry is a two sided market the readers market and the advertising market are closely linked by inter market network externalities we estimate market power in the italian newspaper industry by building a structural model which encompasses a demand estimation

a new theory of aggregate supply macroeconomic theory contains two competing explanations of business cycle fluctuations according to the intertemporal substitution mechanism its observed variations in employment represent the optimal response of labor supply to misperceived variations in the expected real rate of interest a competing theory is offered by the literature on overlapping contracts that attributes employment variations to contracted nominal wage rigidities such rigidities prevent prices from adjusting in a way that would allow quantities to mimic the theoretical predictions of the walrasian marketclearing model both of these theories incorporate the property that employment converges in the long run to a natural rate of employment this paper develops an alternative theory it presents a model of an economy in which agents are rational utility maximizers with perfect foresight of future prices nevertheless the competitive equilibrium is pareto inefficient this situation arises because the economy does not contain a complete set of markets perfect capital markets do not exist because of asymmetric information ai a complete set of futures markets does not exist because agents have finite lives and trades cannot be negotiated with the unborn these two sources of market failure are modeled by embedding a theory of ai contracts into an overlapping generations model olg in which a critical role is played by the additional assumption that in some states of nature bankruptcy may be a binding constraint the nonexistence of futures markets generates a model with the property that government debt is real wealth which implies that fiscal policy can have a permanent effect on the real rate of interest the bankruptcy constraint translates changes in the rate of interest into changes in the frequency of contract default simply stated a high interest rate increases the probability that a firm will go bankrupt or that it will layoff workers in sharp contrast to either the new classical or the sticky price contract explanations of business cycle fluctuations this theory is not a natural rate theory even in the long run it predicts that the steady state employment level is an endogenous variable which varies systematically with fiscal policy

the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption a cross sectional analysis this paper examines the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption expenditures using a single year cross section data set a reduced form equation for consumption is estimated on high saving households by the tobit procedure to account for the selectivity bias since high saving households are not likely to be liquidity constrained the estimated equation is an appropriate description of how desired consumption that would be forthcoming without liquidity constraints is related to the variables available in the cross section data when the reduced form equation is used to predict desired consumption the gap between desired consumption and measured consumption is most evident for young households

competition between networks a study of the market for yellow pages this paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for yellow pages i estimate three simultaneous equations consumer demand for usage of a directory advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher s first order condition derived from profit maximizing behaviour estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising implying a network effect i find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus as an application i consider whether the market benefits from monopoly which takes advantage of network effects or oligopoly which reduces market power i find that a more competitive market is preferable copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

are delays in academic publishing necessary researchers perpetually complain about long decision lags glenn ellison 2002a b confirms that delays are being longer he suggests an evolving social norm as a possible explanation with more demands made on authors for their work to be published time delays have the additional effect however of limiting the flow of submissions in the absence of time delays and other significant submission costs the best strategy is to start at the most prestigious journal and work down until the article is accepted better journals are unlikely to welcome this the major submission cost is the long and unpredictable length of time spent waiting for a decision ellison notes that time lags are longer for the top five economics journals at around six to eleven months longer than the rest despite the increasing prestige of top journals the number of submissions remains fairly static

submission fees and response times in academic publishing both submission fees and response times enable editors to maintain an acceptable refereeing burden by discouraging the submission of articles with low probability of acceptance when authors differ in their ability or willingness to pay submission fees and deal with delays journal quality is maximized under a combination of moderate fees and moderate delays

free labor for costly journals there is a remarkable difference between the prices that commercial publishers charge to libraries for economics journals and the prices charged by professional societies and university presses this price difference does not reflect a difference in quality the six most cited economics journals listed in the social science citation index are all nonprofit journals and their library subscription prices average about 180 per year only five of the 20 most cited journals are owned by commercial publishers and the average price of these five journals is about 1660 per year tables 1 and 2 compare library costs and measures of cost effectiveness for the ten most cited nonprofit journals and the ten most cited journals owned by commercial presses the average price per page of the commercial journals is about six times as high and the average price per citation is about 16 times as high as for the nonprofit journals in tables 1 and 2 the first column shows the year 2001 library subscription price and the second column shows the price per page calculated by dividing year 2001 price by the number of pages published in the year 2000 the third column reports the price per citation this is the library subscription price divided by the number of times that articles in this journal were cited in 1998 as recorded by the social science citation index the fourth column price per recent citation is the library subscription price divided by the number of times that the 1996 and 1997 volumes of the journal were cited in 1998 the citation rank is found by ranking journals according to the number of times that this journal was cited in 1998 the differences in prices and cost effectiveness between nonprofit and commercial journals are similar for less prestigious journals i have assembled a data

submission demand in core economics journals a panel study i introduction academic economics journals have proliferated to around 1 500 providing economists a large number of outlets for publishing manuscripts econlit n d ideas n d although researchers have examined how the demand for submission for academic economics journals responded to nonprice variables such as an editorial policy change on page limit card and dellavigna 2012 surprisingly the price elasticity of demand for submission remains unknown and becomes the focus of this study the objective of this study was to examine empirically what factors influence authors decisions on which economics journal to submit to focusing on three sets of demand factors manuscript submission fee observed journal quality such as impact factor and ranking and journal usage such as abstract views and library subscriptions similar to most of the literature on economics journals we focused on the economics journals indexed in journal citation reports jcr compiled by the institute for scientific information because jcr journals tend to be viewed as the core or leading academic journals two challenges arose in estimating the demand for journal submission first submission fee may be endogenous if supply and demand are simultaneously determined or if economics journals set the fee based on demand variations that the econometrician does not observe and hence cannot explicitly specify in the demand model to reduce the potential endogeneity bias we surveyed journal editors to obtain and use as an instrument the fee paid to a journal referee for reviewing the reviewer fee might serve as a good instrument in this case because the reviewer fee which is a supply side variable generally is paid by the submission fee there is little evidence to support that paying referees is correlated with unobserved journal quality such as journal reputation indeed a recent study by chetty saez and sandor 2014 found that reviewer fees have little or no effects on quality of the reviewer reports based on an experiment with referees at the journal of public economics casting doubt on the relationship between reviewer fee and referee report the second challenge is that journal quality such as journal reputation or editor reputation is not observed by the econometrician our strategy to address this issue was to use panel data to control for unobserved individual journal effect by supplementing the jcr citation data with other publicly available data and our two rounds of surveys of journal editors we constructed a unique panel dataset that contains various journal characteristics such as submission fee fee paid to a journal referee for reviewing and the number of new submissions for the years of 2008 and 2013 thompson scientific institute for scientific information 2008 and 2013 many researchers have analyzed theoretically the role of submission fee and or response times in academic publishing e g azar 2006 cotton 2013 heintzelman and nocetti 2009 leslie 2005 for a recent example cotton 2013 showed that journal quality could be maximized through a combination of both moderate fees and moderate delays when authors have heterogeneous preferences such a result is obviously based on the assumption that authors respond negatively to a submission fee from an empirical perspective submission fees raise the cost of submitting an article and therefore discourage the submission of papers especially those of marginal quality i e a self selection process regarding the quality of authors own manuscripts however several factors can alleviate the negative impact of submission fees on submissions first azar 2005 pointed out that the rewards for publications in good economics journals are very high compared with the relatively low submission fees second submission fees are sometimes paid by department funds and faculty s grants research contracts

job search unemployment and savings abstract this paper examines optimal search policies on the basis of two alternative assumptions first that individuals consume income as it is received and second that individuals can save and subsequently draw from their savings in this model workers search for heterogeneousjobs which are characterized by fixed wages and random duration of employment spells workers choose jobs which will maximize the total expected lifetime utility of consumption the optimal steady state job acceptance policy in both cases takes the form of a fixed partition of the set of all job offers into acceptable and unacceptable ones in the absence of a capital market employment duration appears to be irrelevant for the marginal job offer and all jobs offering wages which exceed the marginal one are also acceptable independent of the distribution functions of employment duration nevertheless the dispersion of employment duration at inframarginal acceptable jobs affects job choice it is shown that when individuals can save and if current utility and probability density functions are exponential then steady state rates of saving during periods of employment and of dissaving during periods of unemployment are independent of wealth and constant the model developed is then used to examine the determinants of unemployment and the properties of optimal savings rates and to obtain a number of testable hypotheses about savings behavior and job security

human capital and self enforcing contracts this essay analyzes labor contracts as a device for rearranging factor incomes over time under conditions of extreme adverse selection in particular the lack of verifiable public information about future compensation prevents finitely lived workers from borrowing against their earnings specific human capital is used as an incentive to implement intertemporal self enforcing contracts between workers and firms after proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such contracts the resulting equilibrium earnings profiles are explored along with the effects of imperfections in the credit market on the way workers choose jobs and allocate time between current production and training copyright 1988 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

which journal rankings best explain academic salaries evidence from the university of california the ranking of an academic journal is important to authors universities journal publishers and research funders rankings are gaining prominence as countries adopt regular research assessment exercises that especially reward publication in high impact journals yet even within a rankings oriented discipline like economics there is no agreement on how aggressively lower ranked journals are down weighted and in how wide is the universe of journals considered moreover since it is typically less costly for authors to cite superfluous references whether of their own volition or prompted by editors than it is to ignore relevant ones rankings based on citations may be easily manipulated in contrast when the merits of publication in one journal or another are debated during hiring promotion and salary decisions the evaluators are choosing over actions with costly consequences we therefore look to the academic labor market using data on economists in the university of california system to relate their lifetime publications in 700 different academic journals to salary we test amongst various sets of journal rankings and publication discount rates to see which are most congruent with the returns implied by the academic labor market jel a14 i23 j44

implicit contracts a survey 7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets otherwise contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction there is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory contracts smooth consumption but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks this result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis however the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different contracts embody a nonlinear two part pricing scheme the lump sum part allocates the income consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization this implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects flexible though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity furthermore the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work sharing and layoffs contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

investment and monetary policy learning and determinacy of equilibrium we explore determinacy and expectational stability learnability of rational expectations equilibrium ree in new keynesian nk models that include capital using a consistent calibration across three different models labor only firm specific capital or an economy wide rental market for capital we provide a clear picture of when ree is determinate and learnable and when it is not under a variety of monetary policy rules our findings make a case for greater optimism concerning the use of such rules in nk models with capital while bullard and mitra s 2002 2007 findings for the labor only nk model do not always extend to models with capital we show that determinate and learnable ree can be achieved in nk models with capital if there is i plausible capital adjustment costs ii some weight given to output in the policy rule and or iii a policy of interest rate smoothing

quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ach banking industry we seek to estimate the causes and magnitudes of network externalities for the automated clearinghouse ach electronic payments system using a panel data set on individual bank usage of ach we construct an equilibrium model of consumer and bank adoption of ach in the presence of a network the model identifies network externalities from correlations of changes in usage levels for banks within a network from changes in usage following changes in market concentration or sizes of competitors and from adoption decisions of banks outside the network with small branches in the network and can separately identify consumer and bank network effects we structurally estimate the parameters of the model by matching equilibrium behavior to the data using simulated maximum likelihood and a data set of localized networks and use a bootstrap to recover confidence intervals the parameters are estimated with high precision and fit various moments of the data reasonably well we find that most of the impediment to ach adoption is due to large consumer fixed costs of adoption the deadweight loss from the network externality is moderate the optimal number of ach transactions is about 16 higher than the equilibrium level

pricing of scientific journals and market power we analyze the empirical relationship between journal prices their quality measured by their citation counts their age as well as conduct of publishers the database covers 22 scientific fields and over 2600 among the most highly reputed and cited journals in 2003 we show that a for profit journals charge roughly 3 times more than journals run by scientific societies b the number of citations has a positive impact on prices c there are large differences in prices across fields that vary from 1 and 6 these are highly and positively correlated with the degree of concentration in the industry

price structure in two sided markets evidence from the magazine industry we present and estimate a model of competition in a two sided market the market for magazine readership and advertising using data on magazines in germany we find evidence that magazines have properties of two sided markets the results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are subsidized and that magazines make all their money from advertisers consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements our results imply that higher demand on the reader side increases ad rates but that higher demand on the advertising side decreases cover prices