grading minimum quality standards and the labeling of genetically modified products we relate the labeling of genetically modified gm products to the theory of grading and minimum quality standards the model represents three stages in the supply chain assumes a vertical product differentiation framework allows for the accidental commingling of non gm products and treats regulation as a purity threshold for non gm products we find that a non gm purity level that is too strict leads to the disappearance of the non gm product and that some quality standard benefits farmers indeed the standard that is optimal from the perspective of producers is stricter than what is optimal for consumers and for societal welfare

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

least cost subsidization alternatives this paper addresses the problem of designing least cost subsidy schemes for agriculture thus it departs somewhat from the mainstream of the literature on agricultural policy analysis which following wallace s pioneering work focuses on evaluating alternative policies in a welfare theoretic context the approach taken here is more closely related to that taken in the optimal taxation literature e g mirrlees it involves the specification of a goal of farm policy and an examination of appropriate policy instruments to achieve that goal the only policy instruments considered are linear subsidies i e subsidies all individuals receive while the criterion for choosing among alternative subsidy schemes is the minimization of government expenditure hence we are interested in isolating the cheapest way of attaining a stated policy objective and we do not consider the welfare consequences of such policy action no use is made of traditional welfare measures like deadweight loss and consumer surplus the approach is purely positive and therefore ignores issues like those raised in gardner s recent paper on efficient redistribution of eco

weak complementarity and production abstract this paper describes how weak complementarity a common assumption to characterize consumer preferences for recovering measures of willingness to pay for nonmarketed environmental resources can be used to evaluate the effects of pollution that may affect profits or costs in such cases pollution serves as an externality imposed by third parties on production activities

measuring welfare effects of product contamination with consumer uncertainty abstract a methodology is developed for measuring consumer welfare loss from market demand due to contamination when information is imperfect comparison of behavior before and after awareness permits calculation of the cost of ignorance which occurs when news of contamination is withheld or undiscovered for a time as well as when excessive reporting and exaggeration cause overreaction avoidance costs are also calculated for consumers who consume less than they would with perfect information due to risk aversion the methodology is applied to analyzing the heptachlor crisis which reduced milk consumption in hawaii by over 80

analysis of a small open economy the case of energy prices in canada the analysis suggests that land rental price decrease in the long run as a consequence of higher energy prices energy demand from agriculture decreases if land and energy are substitute inputs the necessary and sufficient conditions for expecting increasing average farm size decreasing agricultural output and number of farms also have been provided the analysis considers a competitive equilibrium environment with specific proviso that land prices adjust in response to higher domestic energy prices simple expressions for calculating long run agricultural responses to higher domestic energy prices were derived and used in estimating such responses for canadian agriculture

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

the theory of the firm in long run equilibrium in a recent series of articles economists have investigated the comparative statics of the neoclassical firm in a competitive environment with the specific proviso that output price adjusts in response to changes in factor prices the older theory of the firm such as is found for example in paul samuelson 1947 is deficient in this regard metaphors such as short run have been used to gloss over the inconsistency of holding output price constant in the face of changing costs through changing factor prices in this paper a simple yet thorough analysis of a firm in a competitive industry i e a firm facing zero entry and adjustment cost conditions is given new results pertaining to restrictions on the behavior of such firms are offered also the length and complexity of established results is substantially reduced

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

marshallian vs walrasian stability in an experimental market the experiments discussed below are an attempt to examine concepts of stability as found in economic textbooks two concepts of stability which stem from two different concepts of market adjustment seem to have dominated thinking whilst these two concepts are typically called walras stability and marshall stability some controversy exists over the extent to which these two models represent their respective thinking no doubt the current formal statements of the theories reflect an evolution of the ideas through the work of many theorists the terminology is retained for convenience regardless of their origins these two concepts lead to competing hypotheses about the conditions under which market instability will be observed so the subject is a natural one for experimental investigation furthermore since this is the first experimental examination of the stability of equilibria the strategy is to inquire about stability in the context of these two classical models and to avoid the temptation to attempt to extend them or integrate them with more modern theory the old models have not been checked they seem to be an appropriate place to start

differential human capital and structural evolution in agriculture abstract the growth of market capitalism and the technological advances of the last two centuries underlie the relentless process of structural change in agriculture substantial occupational migration out of farming and geographical migration from rural to urban areas is a characteristic of most if not all economies in the 20th century the process of rural urban migration and the resulting urban problems have received considerable attention the fate of the residual farm population has received less scrutiny and is less well understood in the united states we observe considerable farm poverty increasing farm size inequality and a disturbing decay of rural communities for the last half century the problem of low farm incomes has been perceived as a farm problem amenable to solutio by appropriate farm policy in this paper a model is proposed which suggests that farm poverty and inequality are inevitable consequences of a rural urban migration process in which two types of human capital play a fundamental role general human capital determines a person s expected nonfarm income while farming specific human capital determines his her productivity in farming it is argued that inadequate human capital combined with positive rural urban migration cost positive farm technology adoption costs and inelastic demand for farm output can explain persistently high levels of farm poverty and increasing farm size inequality the model suggests that traditional farm policies are inappropriate programs that directly address the problems of inadequate human capital are advocated

geographical indications public goods and sustainable development the roles of actors strategies and public policies summary the protection of geographical indications gis is being explored more and more worldwide as a tool for supporting local sustainable development focusing on wine and coffee value chains this paper will set out in what way gi protection schemes can contribute to the provision of public goods and illustrate how this contribution is being threatened by different failures that may occur within both valorization strategies and legal protection policies by examining how private collective and public interventions front these failures this paper will put forward economic arguments supporting a more comprehensive policy approach to ensure gis contribution to sustainable development

informative advertising in differentiated oligopoly markets abstract this paper examines the welfare implications of informative advertising in differentiated product oligopoly markets the analysis reconciles the conflicting results in previous studies that find advertising to be undersupplied in homogeneous product markets but oversupplied in differentiated product markets when the degree of differentiation is small in equilibrium purely informative advertising is undersupplied when brands are sufficiently close substitutes and oversupplied when brands are more differentiated product differentiation also has welfare implications for the effect of technological change in the advertising sector in response to an advertising cost innovation equilibrium prices fall and the market converges to the socially optimal resource allocation for brands that are sufficiently close substitutes whereas equilibrium prices rise and divergence occurs when brands are more differentiated

the nature of the farm abstract using a model based on a trade off between moral hazard incentives and gains from specialization this paper explains why farming has generally not converted from small family based firms into large factory style corporate firms nature is both seasonal and random and the interplay of these qualities generates moral hazard limits the gains from specialization and causes timing problems between stages of production by identifying conditions in which these forces vary we derive testable predictions about the choice of organization and the extent of farm integration to test these predictions we study the historical development of several agricultural industries and analyze data from a sample of over 1 000 farms in british columbia and louisiana in general seasonality and randomness so limit the benefits of specialization that family farms are optimal but when farmers are successful in mitigating the effects of seasonality and random shocks to output farm organizations gravitate toward fa

critical import supply elasticities and the imports as market discipline hypothesis abstract this paper formally examines the factors underlying how responsive imports must be to domestic prices the import supply elasticity in order to thwart an anticompetitive domestic price increase stemming from a merger an issue that frequently arises in many antitrust reviews domestic firms face a fringe comprised of foreign firms who import their products into the domestic market in the eyes of domestic consumers these imports are viewed as imperfect substitutes in demand to the output produced by the domestic firms the model is solved in terms of the critical import supply elasticity that can then be used evaluate the ability of imports to constrain an anticompetitive price increase post merger numerical simulations are conducted to consider the magnitude of perturbations in the model s exogenous parameters potential empirical extensions of the model are also considered

the discipline of imports the case of sweden in examining the constraints that imports competition imposes on the price cost margins in swedish manufacturing industries the paper addresses two questions whether the free trade agreement between the ec and efta has reinforced the disciplinary effect of imports and whether there are differences between imports of different origins my findings support intensified competition from the free trade agreement even though the disciplinary effect of imports originating from ldcs japan and the asian nics is larger than the effect of imports from other developed countries

market structure and price cost margins in a paper that has become a standard reference in the structure conductperformance approach to industrial economics cowling and waterson 1976 developed a theoretical rationale for expecting industry profitability to be positively correlated with the level of concentration their model based on a simple algebraic description of oligopoly behaviour has been interpreted as providing a justification for the common empirical practice of cross industry regression analysis of price cost margins in terms of concentration levels in the present paper we show that on further examination this model implies a joint determination of margins and concentration this provides some interesting comparative static results of relevance to inter industry differences in concentration levels equally however it leads to various cautionary insights concerning the meaning of price cost margin versus concentration regressions

on the comparative statics of a competitive industry with inframarginal firms recently economists have begun to develop a theory of the perfectly competitive firm and industry in long run equilibrium in contrast to the traditional model2 in which all prices are parametric this new theory takes explicit recognition of the fact that output price must adjust to exogenous changes in input prices before the industry can be said to be in long run competitive equilibrium the focus of this analysis has been to derive implications of competitive theory which can be tested using data generated by observing individual firms in

strength of protection for geographical indications promotion incentives and welfare effects we address the question of how the strength of protection for geographical indications gis affects the gi industry s promotion incentives equilibrium market outcomes and the distribution of welfare geographical indication producers engage in informative advertising by associating their true quality premium relative to a substitute product with a specific label emphasizing the gi s geographic origin the extent to which the names words of the gi label can be used and or imitated by competing products which depends on the strength of gi protection determines how informative the gi promotion messages can be consumers heterogeneous preferences vis a vis the gi quality premium are modeled in a vertically differentiated framework both the gi industry and the substitute product industry are assumed to be competitive with free entry the model is calibrated and solved for alternative parameter values results show that producers of the gi and of the lower quality substitute good have divergent interests gi producers are better off with full protection whereas the substitute good s producers prefer intermediate levels of protection but they never prefer zero protection because they benefit indirectly if the gi producers incentives to promote are preserved for consumers and aggregate welfare the preferred level of protection depends on the model s parameters with an intermediate level of protection being optimal in many circumstances

the economics of nested names name specificity reputations and price premia a good can be identified by its region or country of origin the firm that produces it and its product name in other words names can nest within each other to categorize goods with increasing specificity this article develops a conceptual framework for jointly analyzing the effect of product firm and collective reputations on market price the model is estimated via quantile regression with california wine market data the results portray how the structure and relative importance of reputations change as product prices vary specifically reputation premia migrate from collective to specific names as prices increase

generic product advertising spillovers and market concentration we examine the decision to advertise a homogenous good we show that the likelihood of inefficiently low advertising rests heavily on how one models the mechanism by which advertising affects demand regardless of this mechanism however there is always a lower bound of concentration below which no advertising occurs even when welfare enhancing in such cases mandatory programs will raise welfare if they induce entry although producer surplus may decline our model also provides an explanation for the stylized fact that advertising intensity first rises and then falls as concentration increases copyright 2008 oxford university press

serial correlation and the fixed effects model this paper generalizes the durbin watson type statistics to test the ols residuals from the fixed effects model for serial independence also generalized are the tests proposed by sargan and bhargava for the hypothesis that the residuals form a random walk a method for efficient estimation of the parameters is also developed finally an earnings function is estimated using the michigan survey of income dynamics in order to illustrate the uses of the tests and the estimation procedures developed in this paper

the long side of the market and the short end of the stick bargaining power and price formation in buyers sellers and balanced markets the determinants of bargaining power and price formation in a dynamic exchange market where new traders enter randomly over time are studied when agents on the long side of the market possess the option to wait for the arrival of future partners the terms of trade in the spot market must honor the value of this option the equilibrium terms of trade are expressed in intuitive closed form equations that highlight the distinct influences of short run spot market conditions and long run market demographics i introduction few concepts in economics are as intuitive as the idea that traders on the long side of a market wind up holding the short end of the stick that is they receive little or none of the gains from trade consider for instance the classic setting in which b identical buyers each with unit demands for an indivisible homogeneous good face s identical sellers each with one unit of the good for sale it is well known that in a broad class of one shot trading games all of the surplus in this setting goes to the short side of the market in equilibrium that is if b s buyers bid the price up to their reservation value often it is only when b s that market institutions the rules of the game have any bearing on the equilibrium division of surplus this classic result is somewhat brittle because of the discontinuity in the terms of trade when moving from positive to negative levels of excess demand its logic is familiar however from bertrand competition and it is very compelling the option value to an agent frozen out of a trade in a one shot market game is his reservation payoff of zero any outcome that confers nonzero surplus to a long side agent cannot be sustained in equilibrium because all of the long side agents who would otherwise be frozen out possess a strict incentive to undercut

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

intellectual property rights and the world trade organization retrospect and prospects this paper analyzes the main economic issues of intellectual property rights iprs protection in the context of the world trade organization wto a retrospective view on the establishment of the trips trade related aspects of intellectual property rights agreement a still controversial accomplishment of the uruguay round of trade liberalization is provided the paper reviews the economic rationale for the harmonization of iprs drawing both on economic theory considerations as well as emerging empirical evidence the logic of linking ipr protection and trade in the context of the wto is also re examined some specific attention is devoted to the implications of trips for agricultural and biotechnology innovations the impact that ipr protection can have in promoting growth and development and the relation of iprs with other economic policies is discussed the paper concludes with an analysis of the prospects for more or less iprs related consensus in the current round of wto negotiations

modelling competitive behavior a single seller of an indivisible object wishes to sell the good to one of many buyers the seller has zero value for the good the buyers have a commonly known identical value of one this article attempts to determine strategic environments that ensure the seller s ability to exploit the competitive behavior of the buyers to extract all the surplus in the game i show that in many simple dynamic games there are subgame perfect equilibria that involve the seller s giving up the good for free even if the seller has an informational advantage that allows him to keep bidders from learning the bidding behavior of their opponents there still exist perfect bayesian equilibria that involve a sale at the price of zero however in this case a simple refinement in the spirit of sequential equilibria can be used to rule out such collusive behavior and to show that the unique equilibrium outcome satisfying this refinement yields the seller a price of one

on market equilibrium analysis in this paper we develop the implications of competitive market equilibrium for production and household behavior when some prices are endogenously determined the properties of market equilibrium functions are explored including the effects of pricing policy a slutsky type equation relating compensated and uncompensated market equilibrium functions is derived implications for multimarket welfare analysis are presented focusing on the effects of pricing policy and technical change

the generalized composite commodity theorem and food demand estimation this article reports tests of aggregation over consumer food products and estimates of aggregate food demand elasticities evidence that food demand variables follow unit root processes leads us to build on and simplify existing tests of the generalized composite commodity theorem we compute food demand elasticities using a method of cointegration that is shown to apply to a convenient but nonlinear functional form estimates are based on consumer reported expenditure data rather than commercial disappearance data appropriately specified models of consumer demand are central to market analysis it has been established that a valid equilibrium for markets characterized by diverse firms or diverse consumer products depends on downward sloping composite demand curves heiner braulke wohlgenant or on valid indirect utility functions chavas and cox given the large number of consumer food products food demand and price analysis must be implemented at some level of product aggregation improper aggregation can lead to biased estimates of welfare loss associated with public policies biased estimates of consumer and derived demand elasticities and misleading tests of market power testing for consistent aggregation over food products and estimating aggregate consumer food demand elasticities are the subjects of this article by far the most common justification for aggregation has been separable preferences one reason for its popularity has been the lack of a viable alternative tests of the composite commodity theorem hicks leontief lewbel are always rejected because it restricts relative prices within a group to remain fixed over time on the other hand aggregation based on weak separability is often rejected diewert and wales eales and unnevehr

incomplete adoption of a superior innovation we consider a model in which an innovating monopolist of a technologically superior intermediate input must sell this product to final output producers prior research shows that with complete information the monopolist s optimal strategy will lead to complete adoption of this technologically superior innovation in this article we show that when the price of some competitively supplied input used in the final product market is endogenous and is altered by adoption of the innovation then the optimal pricing strategy of the monopolist may lead to incomplete innovation thus the standard result of complete adoption of the superior technology is partly attributable to the partial equilibrium nature of prior models

geographical indications and the competitive provision of quality in agricultural markets the economics of geographical indications gis is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture it is assumed that certification costs are needed for gis to serve as collective credible quality certification devices and production of high quality product is endogenously determined we find that gis can support a competitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains although they fall short of delivering the constrained first best the main beneficiaries are consumers producers may also accrue some benefit if production of the high quality products draws on scarce factors that they own copyright 2008 oxford university press

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

collective marketing arrangements for geographically differentiated agricultural products welfare impacts and policy implications this paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products we develop a model that allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real world producer organizations using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which these organizations will evolve and describing implications of the results obtained in the context of an ongoing debate between the european union and united states as the anticipated fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order to ensure the coverage of fixed costs whenever a collective organization allows a market with a new product to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal welfare counterintuitively stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed the reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large technological distortions