does one soros make a difference a theory of currency crises with large and small traders do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets to address this issue we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals even abstracting from signaling the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling relative to the case in which there is no large investors small investors attach the currency when fundamentals are stronger yet the difference can be small or null depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors adding signaling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders behaviour much stronger

herding with and without payoff externalities an internet experiment most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities yet the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities in this paper we experimentally investigate the effects of several different forms of payoff externalities e g network effects first mover advantage etc in a standard information based herding model our results are based on an internet experiment with more than 6000 subjects of which more than 2400 participated in the treatments reported here including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international consulting firm we also replicate and review earlier cascade experiments finally we study reputation effects i e the influence of success models in the context of herding

one two three infinity newspaper and lab beauty contest experiments beauty contest is a game in which participants have to choose typically a number in 0 100 the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers we describe and analyze beauty contest experiments run in newspapers in uk spain and germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them despite the uncontrollability of these experiments these results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried we claim that all observed behavior across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools can be interpretedas iterative reasoning level 1 reasoning level 2 reasoning and level 3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples while the equilibrium choice level maximum reasoning is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists the results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject pools and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines

the wisdom of the minority we consider a simple variant of the canonical model of social learning and show that in many situations it is optimal for an agent to abandon her own information and follow the minority rather than the majority this possibility depends on two economically meaningful requirements agents are differentially informed and observe only the number of agents having chosen each option such as consumers observing only market shares we show that minority wisdom arises when information is sufficiently heterogeneous and the well informed are not overly abundant yet the conditions necessary are not overly restrictive in fact it is possible for the minority to be wise even when the minority consists of a lone dissenter and a majority of citizens are well informed

herd behavior the penguin effect and the suppression of informational diffusion an analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency this article analyzes a technology adoption process in which the effect of informational spillover interacts with network externalities the interplay of informational externalities and payoff interdependency induces risk averse and clustering behavior in the technology adoption process the analysis differs from the herd behavior literature in focusing on how the herd behavior of subsequent users influences the initial adoption decision moreover herd behavior in this article stems from each agent s desire to inhibit the revelation of new information that can be used in a way detrimental to her rather than from each agent s effort to free ride on information contained in the decisions made by predecessors

the evolution of managerial expertise how corporate culture can run amok this paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital investments and hiring individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can evaluate dynamically when workers become managers managerial expertise can become increasingly skewed over time raising investment distortions and reducing output if firms select managerial expertise strategically efficient investments can be retrieved when a identifying whether workers skills matter more than distinguishing among skilled workers and b initial investment distortions are small otherwise such strategic design worsens long run outcomes finally we determine when short run affirmative action policies are effective

ex ante versus ex post optimal promotion rules the case of internal promotion i introduction the literature on promotion practices within the firm identifies two distinct roles for a firm s promotion policies promotions serve both as a way for the firm to efficiently assign workers to tasks and as a way for the firm to reward prior performance 1 in this article i explore the time inconsistency problem that arises as a result of the dual nature of the promotion decision in particular i show that the common practice of favoring internal candidates for promotion can be understood as a response by firms to the problem of time inconsistency 2 consider a firm in which promotions serve as a reward for prior expenditures of effort and or prior investments in human capital the optimal promotion policy for this firm depends on the time frame from which we view the problem the ex ante optimal promotion rule is the optimal rule when the problem is viewed from a date prior to young workers deciding to work at this firm this rule takes into account both the assignment aspects of the promotion decision and that promotions serve as a reward for prior performance there is a second relevant rule however because at the date of the promotion decision the effects of promotion serving as a reward for prior performance are in the past for example in a world where the possibility of future promotion serves to increase the effort levels of young workers by the time of the promotion decision those effort choices have already been made hence the ex post optimal rule only takes into account the assignment aspects of the promotion decision the time inconsistency problem that arises is now clear total profits are maximized when the firm follows the ex ante optimal promotion rule but in the absence of commitment this is not how the firm behaves at the time of the promotion decision the firm has an incentive to ignore the effects of promotion serving as a reward for prior performance and instead follow the ex post optimal rule in other words the profits of the firm are decreased because at the time of the promotion decision the firm maximizes current profits and the anticipation of this behavior by workers has deleterious effects on behavior in prior periods in this article i explore a specific example of this time inconsistency problem consider a firm s decision concerning whether to fill a managerial position by promotion from within or by hiring an outsider i show that when confronted with this decision the firm faces the exact situation described that is the ex post optimal rule shows no preference for promotion from within over hiring from the outside whereas the ex ante optimal rule exhibits a preference for promoting from within the logic here is that the possibility of receiving the higher managerial wage in the future reduces the wage required to attract young workers into the firm but only the ex ante optimal rule takes this into account the result is that in the absence of commitment the firm hires from the outside too often the conclusion is that the establishment of an internal labor market in which the firm favors promotion from within can be understood as a way that the firm avoids this time inconsistency problem this result extends a finding in malcomson 1984 that article also shows that an internal labor market in which hiring from the outside is restricted can arise in a world where promotion serves as a reward for prior performance in that work however there is no time inconsistency problem the reason is that malcomson assumes workers are homogeneous and thus at the time of the promotion decision it is weakly optimal for the firm to have all promotions be from within in contrast i assume that workers are heterogeneous and find that if the firm maximizes ex post profits it lowers total profits the result is an internal labor market that not only limits hiring from the outside but also constrains the firm to behave in a manner different from that which maximizes profits at the time the promotion decision is made

network effects software provision and standardization in this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms the provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies we show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium we show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market

publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent evidence from the us federal reserve transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers we consider one potential cost the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions we construct a model that compares incentives for members with career concerns to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private we test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee asking whether the fomc s 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent we find evidence that this is indeed the case there has been much recent discussion of the advantages of transparency in agency relationships both in and outside of government while research has attempted to model this issue theoretically there has been less progress with empirical tests a problem due no doubt in large part to the fact that it is difficult to make before and after comparisons of a shift in transparency often no data are available on an agent s actions prior to the establishment of transparency in this article we focus on one specific type of transparency publishing verbatim transcripts of committee meetings and one specific reason why this type of transparency might not be desirable the possibility that the quality of deliberation on a committee will suffer if the deliberations take place in public we develop a theoretical model that helps to identify the potential costs of this type of transparency and we then test the model empirically using an original dataset on deliberations of the federal reserve s federal open market committee fomc our dataset is unique in that it records views expressed by policymakers at fomc meetings and not just their official votes our empirical tests focus in particular on the observed effect of the institutional change that occurred in 1993 when the fomc decided to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings after a delay of five years transparency is a particularly relevant issue in monetary policy because it is commonly argued that when central banks take actions such as publishing macroeconomic forecasts revealing individual votes on monetary policy committees or releasing minutes of meetings this will lead to improved economic outcomes while simultaneously facilitating democratic accountability 1

hiv status and labor market participation in south africa abstract we use econometric methods based on the propensity score to estimate the causal effect of hiv status on employment outcomes in south africa relying on rich data from a national survey which included hiv testing we control for systematic differences between hiv positive and hiv negative individuals we provide the first nationally representative estimates of the impact of hiv status on employment outcomes for southern africa being hiv positive is associated with an increase of 6 to 7 percentage points in the likelihood of unemployment overall and 10 to 11 percentage points for those who are less educated this disadvantage reinforces existing inequalities in south africa

predicting catastrophe risk evidence from catastrophe bond markets abstract compared to the past literature on prediction markets that uses small scale observational field data or experiments this present research examines the efficiency of such markets by studying catastrophe cat bonds we collect actual catastrophe loss data match them with the defined trigger events of each cat bond contract and then employ an empirical pricing framework to obtain the excess cat premiums in order to represent the market based forecasts our results indeed show that market based forecasts have more significant predictive content for future cat losses than professional forecasts that use natural catastrophe risk models although the predictive information for cat events is specialized and complex our evidence supports that cat bond markets are successful prediction markets that efficiently aggregate information about future cat losses our resultsalso highlight that actual cat losses in future periods can explain the excess cat bond spreads in the primary market and provide support for market efficiency when pricing cat risk

well informed intermediaries in strategic communication this paper studies how a sender with private information can influence the decisionmaker through well informed intermediaries both the sender and the intermediary may be independently objective or biased with the objective type assumed to pass on the most accurate information while the biased type wanting to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective although using one s own information is a sign of objectivity the biased intermediary selectively incorporates the sender s information to push his agenda and his truth telling incentives always decrease in those of the biased sender s hence measures raising the sender s reputation cost worsen the intermediary s distortion and may make the decisionmaker strictly worse off in contrast the biased sender s and the intermediary s truth telling incentives are strategic complements if they report simultaneously

ingratiation experimental evidence we investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion conformity both individuals performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover in some treatments first movers can change their opinion after learning that held by the second mover we find evidence of high ingratiation indices as opinion conformity is rewarded however second movers reward conformity less when it is common knowledge that opinions can be manipulated strategically introducing a monetary cost for changing opinion reduces ingratiation introducing performance related pay for the second mover makes ingratiation less rewarding but does not eliminate it completely reducing the noise in the measurement of ability has little effect

the contribution of female health to economic development we analyze the economic consequences for less developed countries of investing in female health we do this through developing and calibrating a novel micro founded dynamic general equilibrium model in which parents trade off the number of children against investments in their education and in which we allow for health related gender differences in productivity we show that better female health speeds up the demographic transition and thereby the take off toward sustained economic growth by contrast male health improvements delay the transition and take off because ceteris paribus they raise fertility investing in female health is therefore a potent lever for promoting development

the long run economic costs of aids a model with an application to south africa primarily a disease of young adults acquired immuno deficiency syndrome aids imposes economic costs that could be devastatingly high in the long run by undermining the transmission of human capital the main driver of long run economic growth across generations aids makes it harder for victims children to obtain an education and deprives them of the love nurturing and life skills that parents provide these children will in turn find it difficult to educate their children and so on an overlapping generations model is used to show that an otherwise growing economy could decline to a low level subsistence equilibrium if hit with an aids type increase in premature adult mortality calibrating the model for south africa where the hiv prevalence rate is over 20 percent simulations reveal that the economy could shrink to half its current size in about four generations in the absence of intervention programs to combat the disease and to support needy families could avert such a collapse but they imply a fiscal burden of about 4 percent of gross domestic product gdp

outcome manipulation in corporate prediction markets this paper presents a framework for applying prediction markets to corporate decision making the analysis is motivated by the recent surge of interest in markets as information aggregation devices and their potential use within firms we characterize the amount of outcome manipulation that results in equilibrium and the impact of this manipulation on market prices jel d71 d82 d83 d84

political accountability and sequential policymaking abstract we develop a model of political accountability with sequential policymaking when a bureaucrat s actions are transparent his overseer faces a political time inconsistency problem she is tempted to revise her retention rule in the middle of the policymaking process as a result the bureaucrat s equilibrium behavior overemphasizes later tasks if the overseer knows the technology by which policies translate into outcomes then she can eliminate these distortions using task specific budget caps however if the overseer is uncertain about this technology such budget caps introduce ex post inefficiency when uncertainty is sufficiently large and consequential the overseer prefers an institutional environment with a fungible budget and no transparency such an environment allows the overseer to exploit the bureaucrat s expertise though at the cost of weaker overall incentives

transparency in agency the constant elasticity case and extensions this paper considers a hidden action agency problem where the principal has a single source of hidden information concerning the agent s utility the agent s effort productivity or the agent s cost of effort we examine whether the principal should precommit to disclosing these different single sources of information to the agent if the optimal contract is invariant over the hidden information and thus the disclosure rules constant elasticity case such disclosure increases the agent s utility it can raise or lower profit and total surplus depending on the source of hidden information and non disclosure can be optimal if disclosure affects the agent s motivation if the contract varies with the hidden information and thus disclosure rule disclosure or non disclosure can be optimal depending on whether the party s payoff is convex or concave in the information variable respectively

the informational content of prices when policy makers react to financial markets abstract when can policy makers use policy relevant information from financial market prices and how does policy affect price informativeness i analyze a novel setting with noise where a policy maker tries to infer information about a state variable from prices to improve policy decisions and policy in turn affects asset values i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of information revelation in equilibrium which might not be possible if the policy reaction to prices punishes traders for revealing their information if the policy maker is uninformed then policy objectives do not change price informativeness but they do if the policy maker has independent information about the state i also analyze policy maker transparency and find that policy makers with objectives having a large impact on asset values should publish their information before trading to make prices more informative in other cases intransparency can be optimal

the gift of the dying the tragedy of aids and the welfare of future african generations this paper simulates the impact of the aids epidemic on future living standards in south africa i emphasize two competing effects on the one hand the epidemic is likely to have a detrimental impact on the human capital accumulation of orphaned children on the other hand widespread community infection lowers fertility both directly through a reduction in the willingness to engage in unprotected sexual activity and indirectly by increasing the scarcity of labor and the value of a woman s time i find that even with the most pessimistic assumptions concerning reductions in educational attainment the fertility effect dominates the aids epidemic on net enhances the future per capita consumption possibilities of the south african economy

careerist experts and political incorrectness abstract while political correctness is a dominant norm in many public situations we also observe behaviors that are apparently politically incorrect often from professionals and experts this paper examines the flip side of political correctness as analyzed in morris 2001 to shed some light on the elusive notion of political incorrectness and elucidate its equilibrium and welfare properties we show that there are circumstances in which unbiased experts deliberately take a politically incorrect stance out of reputational concerns and identify key elements which give rise to this perverse reputational incentive the results suggest that political incorrectness cannot necessarily be viewed as a sign of blunt honesty when informed experts have long term reputational concerns we also examine the welfare consequences of political incorrectness and argue that this form of information manipulation can be beneficial under some conditions

payoff effects in information cascade experiments lisa r anderson i introduction this article examines payoff effects in information cascade experiments 1 cascade experiments provide a unique environment to study errors because decisions are made publicly and in sequence allowing people to learn from the decisions of others however there are no payoff interdependencies so subjects are only concerned with maximizing their own expected payoffs which cannot be directly affected by the actions of others this feature simplifies the analysis of the decision making process and makes it possible to focus more clearly on how subjects draw inferences from public decisions furthermore errors are recursive in the sense that mistakes made by initial decision makers influence the decisions of those that come later in the sequence this study focuses on learning and errors by analyzing data econometrically in a logistic error model econometric methods have gained popularity as a way to examine errors in experimental data harless and camerer 1994 present a maximum likelihood estimation method to test the predictive power of various utility theories using data from 23 different experiments mckelvey and palfrey 1995 and 1998 use the logistic structure to estimate error rates with data from a variety of games palfrey and prisbrey 1997 use a similar structure with a probit model to estimate error rates in a public goods experiment the analysis presented here differs from these previous econometric studies of experimental data in the following way in this model errors are analyzed in a sequential structure so the errors of others must be taken into account but there is no strategic element in the decision making process this study expands on the error analysis presented in anderson and holt 1997 by examining error rates under different payoff conditions smith and walker 1993a present a model of decision making in which the effort of contemplating a decision is balanced against potential gains in payoffs in addition they survey the experimental literature in economics and psychology addressing the issue of payoff effects and they find mixed results some studies report a decrease in error rates as payoffs increase others show little difference in results under payoff and no payoff treatments however there is a consensus that higher payoffs reduce the variance of decisions from the predicted outcome testing their own theory in the context of a first price auction experiment smith and walker 1993b report that the amount and severity of error decreases as payoffs increase interestingly behavior is not random even when there is no monetary reward for a correct decision using data from lottery choice experiments wilcox 1993 finds that higher monetary payoffs affect behavior in complex situations but not in relatively simple decision making environments harless and camerer 1994 use econometric methods to compare error rates in experiments with real losses to those with hypothetical losses they find that error rates are lower and variances are reduced in data with real losses this article adds to the literature on the saliency of rewards by analyzing behavior in a different experimental framework and by using the logistic model to generate econometric estimates of error rates under no payoff payoff and double payoff conditions the underlying behavioral model is an extension of the cascade model presented in bikhchandani hirshleifer and welch 1992 experimental procedures are discussed in section ii section iii discusses econometric details section iv reports results and section v concludes ii procedures 2 for each session of this experiment seven subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics courses at the university of virginia one subject was randomly chosen to be a monitor and the remaining six subjects were decision markers at the beginning of each period the monitor threw a six sided die to determine which of two urns was to be used for that period

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

learning from the behavior of others conformity fads and informational cascades learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior for example why do people tend to converge on similar behavior why is mass behavior prone to error and fads the authors argue that the theory of observational learning and particularly of informational cascades has much to offer economics business strategy political science and the study of criminal behavior

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

overconfidence ceo selection and corporate governance we develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager who sometimes makes value destroying investments has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to ceo under value maximizing corporate governance moreover a risk averse ceo s overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion overconfident ceos also underinvest in information production the board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident ceos finally sarbanes oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors but to reduce project investment

a theory of self fulfilling political expectations abstract in their pursuit of being re elected politicians might not choose high quality policies but just conform to popular wisdom the larger are the office spoils and the more precise is an incumbent s knowledge of voter opinion the more likely that she will resort to such populism my main result is that the public s trust or distrust in politicians behavior may be self fulfilling when voters assess the quality of an incumbent politician they will compare her policy choices with their own prior opinion if voters think that the incumbent was just trying to conform a failure to do so will be even more damaging for the incumbent s election chances however this only increases the incumbent s incentives to conform which indeed confirm voters skepticism loosely put a skeptic voter attitude tends to generate conformist politicians while a trusting attitude tends to generate confident ones

who follows the crowd groups or individuals abstract in games of social learning individuals tend to give too much weight to their own private information relative to the information that is conveyed by the choices of others weizsacker 2010 in this paper we investigate differences between individuals and small groups as decision makers in information cascade situations in line with results from social psychology as well as results on bayesian decision making charness et al 2006 we find that groups behave more rationally than individuals groups in particular are able to abandon their own private signals more often than individuals when it is rational to do so our results indicate that the intellective part of the decision task contributes slightly more to the superior performance of groups than the judgmental part our findings have potential implications for the design of decision making processes in organisations finance and other economic settings

information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market prediction markets are increasingly being considered as methods for gathering summarizing and aggregating diffuse information by governments and businesses alike critics worry that these markets are susceptible to price manipulation by agents who wish to distort decision making we study the effect of manipulators on an experimental market we find that manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy subjects without manipulation incentives compensate for the bias in offers from manipulators by setting a different threshold at which they are willing to accept trades

a political theory of populism when voters fear that politicians may have a right wing bias or that they may be in uenced or corrupted by the rich elite signals of true left wing conviction are valuable as a consequence even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses populist policies i e policies to the left of the median voter as a way of signaling that he is not from the right truly right wing politicians respond by choosing more moderate or even left of center policies this populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in o ce is higher for the politician when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right wing politicians when politicians are indeed more likely to have a hidden right wing agenda when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive when politicians are more forward looking and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent we show that similar results apply when some politicians can be corrupted or in uenced through other non electoral means by the rich elite we also show that soft term limits may exacerbate rather than reduce the populist bias of policies

local discouragement and global collapse a theory of coordination avalanches abstract we study a dynamic game in which all players initially possess the same information and coordinate on a high level of activity eventually players with a long string of bad experiences become inactive this prospect can cause a coordination avalanche in which all activity in the population stops coordination avalanches are part of pareto efficient equilibria they can occur at any point in the game their occurrence does not depend on the true state of nature and allowing players to exchange information may merely hasten their onset we present applications to search markets organizational meltdown and inefficient computer upgrades jel d83

aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets effects of trading mechanism and information distribution we conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets under different information distribution patterns to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders we find that markets structured to have a fixed sequence of trades exhibit greater accuracy of information aggregation than the typical form that has unstructured trade in comparing two commonly used mechanisms we find no significant difference between the performance of the direct probability report form and the indirect security trading form of the market scoring rule in the case of the markets with a structured order we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that information aggregation is slower when information is complementary in structured markets the theoretical prediction that there will be more delayed trading in complementary markets is supported but we find no support for the prediction that there will be more bluffing in complementary markets however the theoretical predictions are not borne out in the unstructured markets this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

a theory of yes men this paper illustrates an incentive for workers to conform to the opinion of their supervisors when firms use subjective performance evaluation this desire to conform arises endogenously from the firm s need to induce the worker to exert effort the author shows that firms may optimally eschew the use of incentive contracts to retain workers incentives for honesty the author illustrates that the incentive to conform implies inefficiencies even when workers are risk neutral and is likely to lead to more centralized decision making than in the absence of the desire to conform copyright 1993 by american economic association

observational learning under imperfect information abstract we explore bayes rational sequential decision making in a game with pure information externalities where each decision maker observes only her predecessor s binary action under perfect information the martingale property of the stochastic learning process is used to establish convergence of beliefs and actions under imperfect information in contrast beliefs and actions cycle forever however despite the stochastic instability over time the private information is ignored and decision makers become increasingly likely to imitate their predecessors consequently we observe longer and longer periods of uniform behavior punctuated by increasingly rare switches

information cascades in the laboratory when a series of individuals with private information announce public predictions initial conformity can create an information cascade in which later predictions match the early announcements this paper reports an experiment in which private signals are draws from an unobserved urn subjects make predictions in sequence and are paid if they correctly guess which of two urns was used for the draws if initial decisions coincide then it is rational for subsequent decisionmakers to follow the established pattern regardless of their private information rational cascades formed in most periods in which such an imbalance occurred copyright 1997 by american economic association

rational herding toward the poor evidence from location decisions of microfinance institutions within pakistan analyzing the geographical location of almost all the microfinance institutions mfis within pakistan this paper gives further evidence that microfinance activities do not reach the poorest rural areas especially we explore how this result is driven by the uncertainty faced by mfis in their location decision i e they can hardly predict accurately whether or not they will perform financially furthermore we find that mfis are spatially clustered and identify three main reasons for this common attraction factors i e the characteristics of one area fits to the preferences of all mfis so that they are all located in the same areas payoff externalities to be collocated and herd behavior i e mfis follow one another most importantly we find that a significant part of this herding process is rational i e early locations of mfis convey information used by later ones such that it reverses or neutralizes the negative impact of uncertainty resulting then in more locations in needier areas since it allows them to be located in poorer areas mfis improve the achievement of their social goal this latter result is rather good news for those who reckon that a better access to financial services enhances economic growth and fosters poverty alleviation indeed rational herding constitutes an endogenous moderator effect to the big issue that financial services penetration is too weak in the poorest rural areas

assessing the impact of aids on the growth path of the malawian economy abstract a modified solow growth model is used to simulate the impact of the aids epidemic on output capacity and other key macroeconomic aggregates in malawi comparing a counterfactual no aids scenario to medium and extreme aids projections suggests that average real gdp growth over the 1985 2010 period will be 0 2 0 3 1 2 1 5 percentage points lower in the medium extreme case relative to the no aids case as a result the size of the economy by the year 2010 will be reduced from a real gdp of 5 03 billion constant 1985 kwacha without aids to 4 81 4 77 3 80 3 46 billion kwacha in the medium extreme scenario

wishes expectations and actions a survey on price formation in election stock markets abstract with error prone and biased individual traders can markets aggregate trader information and produce efficient outcomes we review election stock market evidence that suggests this does happen individual traders appear biased and error prone consistently yet these markets prove quite efficient in predicting election outcomes we also review work which documents comparable but substantially different phenomena in related laboratory markets in addition we report the results from a new laboratory session which shows how we can create particular biases that mirror those in election stock markets finally we discuss how combined laboratory and field experiments can help us understand trader market interactions

the roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts we analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts the information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo we show that it is optimal to publicly disclose both the expert s contribution and his identity surprisingly revealing the intensity of the expert s bias doesn t always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium the presence of a second expert raises the first expert s incentives to report truthfully when reports are public but reduces them when they are secret in particular having an option to call another expert may be detrimental in terms of information production if reports are not public finally sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are public but raises it when they are secret

hiding information in electoral competition abstract we model a two candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy relevant state of the world the candidates receive private signals about the true state which are imperfectly correlated we study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their information to voters through their choice of policy platforms our results show that the fact that private information is dispersed between the candidates creates a strong incentive for them to bias their messages toward the electorate s prior information transmission becomes more difficult the less correlated are the candidates signals the lower is the signals quality and the stronger is the electorate s prior indeed for weak priors welfare decreases as the prior becomes stronger and welfare always decreases as the signals become less correlated

how much information is incorporated in financial asset prices experimental evidence we propose a new estimation method and use experimental data from multiple double auction experiments in the literature to directly estimate how much information is incorporated in financial market prices we find that public information is almost completely reflected in prices but that surprisingly little private information less than 50 is incorporated in prices our estimates therefore suggest that while semi strong informational efficiency is consistent with the data financial market prices may be very far from strong form efficiency we compare our estimates with beliefs of economists surveyed at the econometric society meetings and find that economists and finance researchers alike expect market prices to reflect considerably more private information than what we estimated

health nutrition and economic development the relationship between health and economic development is explored focusing on nutrition based health indicators the spotlight is placed on the inter related feedbacks between the influence of health on productivity on one hand and the influence of income on health status on the other disentangling causality in these relationships has preoccupied much of the literature we evaluate different empirical strategies that have been adopted and assess the results there is now a body of evidence based on careful empirical studies that demonstrates a causal relationship between health and labor productivity there is also evidence that at least among the very poor additional income is spent on improved nutrition there are two issues that have received little attention although we argue they are likely to be very important first measurement of health is discussed in detail evidence is presented on how taking into account differences in the extent of measurement error is critical for interpreting the impact of health on wages the same theme emerges in studies of the effect of income on health specifically calorie intake the key role of non linearities in these relationships is highlighted and we demonstrate that a good deal of the variation in estimates of income elasticities of demand for calories can be ascribed to the role of measurement and functional form authors

stock price manipulation it is generally agreed that speculators can make profits from insider trading or from the release of false information both forms of stock price manipulation have now been made illegal in this article the authors ask whether it is possible to make profits from a different kind of manipulation in which an uninformed speculator simply buys and sells shares they show that in a rational expectations framework where all agents maximize expected utility it is possible for an uninformed manipulator to make a profit provided investors attach a positive probability to the manipulator being an informed trader article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

do formal salary systems really matter drawing on a single large u s corporation s personnel records for the years 1989 93 the authors analyze an example of the kind of formal salary system used by most large firms they find that this firm s practices were consistent with most of the important conclusions of prior empirical research on internal labor markets the system was highly centralized covering salary levels salary ranges raises and bonuses supervisors had little discretion over pay other than through subjective performance ratings the firm held fairly strictly to the salary rules leading to observable constraints on pay for employees near the top of the salary range these constraints however apparently did not impose important costs on the firm in the form of increased turnover although the system operated without any apparent connection to external factors the authors conclude that it transmitted external labor market forces with little distortion

pandering to persuade a principal chooses one of multiple projects or an outside option an agent is privately informed about the projects benets and shares the principal s preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option we show that for moderate outside option values strategic communication is characterized by pandering the agent biases his recommendation toward conditionally better looking projects even when both parties would be better o with some other project a project that has lower expected value can be conditionally better looking we develop some comparative statics of pandering pandering is also induced by an optimal mechanism without transfers

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

partisan impacts on the economy evidence from prediction markets and close elections analyses of the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered by the problem that economic outcomes also influence elections we sidestep these problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes in expectations about the likely winner during election day analyzing high frequency financial fluctuations following the release of flawed exit poll data on election day 2004 and then during the vote count we find that markets anticipated higher equity prices interest rates and oil prices and a stronger dollar under a george w bush presidency than under john kerry a similar republican democrat differential was also observed for the 2000 bush gore contest prediction market based analyses of all presidential elections since 1880 also reveal a similar pattern of partisan impacts suggesting that electing a republican president raises equity valuations by 2 3 percent and that since ronald reagan republican presidents have tended to raise bond yields

historical presidential betting markets this paper analyzes the large and often well organized markets for betting on u s presidential elections that operated between 1868 and 1940 four main points are addressed first we show that the market did a remarkable job forecasting elections in an era before scientific polling second the market was fairly efficient despite the limited information of participants and active attempts to manipulate the odds third we argue political betting markets disappeared largely because of the rise of scientific polls and the increasing availability of other forms of gambling finally we discuss lessons this experience provides for the present

averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias we study the behavior of experimental subjects who have to make a sequence of risky investment decisions in the presence of network externalities subjects follow a simple heuristic investing after positive experiences and reducing their propensity to invest after a failure this result contrasts with the theoretical findings of jeitschko and taylor jeitschko t d taylor c 2001 local discouragement and global collapse a theory of coordination avalanches amer econ rev 91 1 208 224 in which even agents who have only good experiences eventually stop investing because they account for the fact that others with worse experiences will quit this can trigger sudden economic collapse a coordination avalanche even in the most efficient bayesian equilibrium in the experiment subjects follow their own experiences and disregard the possible bad experiences of others thus exhibiting behavior that we term solipsism bias solipsism results in sustained investment activity and thus averts complete collapse

from extreme to mainstream the erosion of social norms social norms usually persistent can change quickly when new public information arrives such as a surprising election outcome people may become more inclined to express views or take actions previously perceived as stigmatized and may judge others less negatively for doing so we examine this possibility using two experiments we first show via revealed preference experiments that donald trump s rise in popularity and eventual victory increased individuals willingness to publicly express xenophobic views we then show that individuals are sanctioned less negatively if they publicly expressed a xenophobic view in an environment where that view is more popular

manipulation and the allocational role of prices it is commonly believed that prices in secondary financial markets play an important allocational role because they contain information that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources this paper identifies a limitation inherent in this role of prices it shows that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the firm s stock when this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreases and the beneficial allocational role of the financial market weakens the trader profits from this trading strategy partly because his trading distorts the firm s investment we therefore refer to this strategy as manipulation we show that trading without information is profitable only with sell orders driving a wedge between the allocational implications of buyer and seller initiated speculation and providing justification for restrictions on short sales

sequential sales learning and cascades when ipo shares are sold sequentially later potential investors can learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors this can lead rapidly to cascades in which subsequent investors optimally ignore their private information and imitate earlier investors although rationing in this situation gives rise to a winner s curse it is irrelevant the model predicts that 1 offerings succeed or fail rapidly 2 demand can be so elastic that even risk neutral issuers underprice to completely avoid failure 3 issuers with good inside information can price their shares so high that they sometimes fail 4 an underwriter may want to reduce the communication among investors by spreading the selling effort over a more segmented market consider a scenario in which an issuer is selling a new security of uncertain value for example an ipo initial public offering of stock or high yield debt through an underwriter the s e c has banned variable price sales while the value of this new security is highly uncertain to individual market participants investors hold perfectly accurate information when aggregated moreover there are many potential investors and a small number of these investors can jointly determine the value of the firm or its project with high precision it would seem that in this scenario underpriced offerings would succeed and overpriced offerings would fail nevertheless this paper shows that if the distribution channels of invest ment banks are limited underpriced offerings can fail and overpriced offer ings can succeed with limited distribution channels it takes the under writer time to approach interested investors therefore later investors can observe how well an offering has sold to date or at least how successful it has sold relative to offerings previously undertaken by this underwriter

persistent norms and tipping points the case of female genital cutting abstract more than 200 million women alive today have undergone female genital cutting fgc despite the associated negative health outcomes the practice has persisted for generations the prevailing theory of fgc persistence is that fgc is a social coordination norm which implies that if a sufficient number of community members agree to abandon fgc a tipping point is reached and the rate of fgc will fall to zero recent empirical evidence is inconsistent with this theory this paper formalizes an alternative theoretical explanation in which households have heterogeneous thresholds i e the rate of fgc in their community at which the household switches from practicing to not practicing fgc this threshold heterogeneity removes the certainty that a tipping point exists and introduces the possibility of a stable internal equilibrium in the rate of fgc in a community using a dataset of more than 27 000 women born across 4 5 decades in burkina faso i use a novel technique to construct community level distributions of household thresholds these distributions show that some communities in burkina faso have tipping points while some have a stable internal equilibrium i find suggestive but statistically insignificant evidence that communities with a larger share of educated women higher poverty rates and lower population density are more likely to have a tipping point additionally the empirical method developed in this paper has applications to the evolution of other social phenomena such as technology adoption voting behavior and racial segregation

optimal dissent in organizations we model an organization as a two agent hierarchy an informed decision maker in charge of selecting projects and a possibly uninformed implementer in charge of their execution both have intrinsic preferences over projects this paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their preferences that is dissent within the organization dissent is useful to 1 foster the use of objective and sometimes private information in decision making and 2 give credibility to the decision maker s choices however dissent comes at the cost of hurting the implementer s intrinsic motivation thereby impairing organizational efficiency we show that dissent can be optimal in particular when information is useful and uncertainty is high moreover dissent remains an optimal organizational form even when implementers can choose their employer or when decision makers have real authority over hiring decisions

corporate prediction markets evidence from google ford and firm x despite the popularity of prediction markets among economists businesses and policymakers have been slow to adopt them in decision making most studies of prediction markets outside the lab are from public markets with large trading populations corporate prediction markets face additional issues such as thinness weak incentives limited entry and the potential for traders with biases or ulterior motives raising questions about how well these markets will perform we examine data from prediction markets run by google ford motor company and an anonymous basic materials conglomerate firm x despite theoretically adverse conditions we find these markets are relatively efficient and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25 reduction in mean squared error the most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at google the inefficiencies that do exist generally become smaller over time more experienced traders and those with higher past performance trade against the identified inefficiencies suggesting that the markets efficiency improves because traders gain experience and less skilled traders exit the market

confidence enhanced performance there is ample evidence that emotions affect performance positive emotions can improve performance while negative ones may diminish it for example the fears induced by the possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences shaking loss of concentration that may impair performance in sports on stage or at school there is also ample evidence that individuals have distorted recollection of past events and distorted attributions of the causes of successes of failures recollection of good events or successes is typically easier than recollection of bad ones or failures successes tend to be attributed to intrinsic aptitudes or own effort while failures are attributed to bad luck in addition these attributions are often reversed when judging the performance of others the objective of this paper is to incorporate the first phenomenon above into an otherwise standard decision theoretic model and show that in a world where performance depends on emotions biases in information processing enhance welfare

information cascades replication and an extension to majority rule and conformity rewarding institutions in a randomly determined order each agent was given an independent private signal about which of two states was selected by a random draw after receiving the private signal each agent made a publicly announced decision about the state thus at the time of personal decision each agent had a private signal and also knew the decisions of all preceding agents the experiments focused on three different types of organization 1 agents were rewarded according to whether their announced decision was right or wrong this individualistic institution is the one studied by anderson and holt aer 1997 their discovery of information cascades is replicated 2 agents were rewarded according to whether a majority of announced decisions were right or wrong under this majority rule institution the instance of information cascades is sharply reduced 3 agents are rewarded more according to whether their personal announced decision was the same as the majority decision than they were rewarded if their decision was correct this conformity rewarding institution is motivated by proceedings in which there is incentive to produce reports that conform to the reports of others substantial information cascades are observed

incentives for subjects in internet experiments abstract providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky one simple method is a high score as in computer games we test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives we find significant differences

sunflower management and capital budgeting in organizations ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals however those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas this commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior s prior belief we refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

an experiment on behavior in social learning games with collective preferences abstract many environments with social learning involve payoff interdependencies until recently few studies have examined sequentially observational social learning environments with externalities this paper presents the results of an experiment that examines the theoretical predictions of a simple model of observational learning where individuals care about their own actions and the actions of others ali and kartik 2012 consistent with theory i find that behavior does not change with this class of payoff interdependencies however behavior deviates from equilibrium predictions in the same manner both with and without these interdependencies

the informational content of ex ante forecasts the informational content of different forecasts can be compared by regressing the actual change in a variable to be forecasted on forecasts of the change we use the procedure in fair and shiller 1987 to examine the informational content of three sets of ex ant forecasts the american statistical association and national bureau of economic research survey asa data resources incorporated dri and wharton economic forecasting associates uefa we compare these forecasts to each other and to quasi ex ante forecasts generated from a vector autoregressive model an autoregressive components model and a large scale structural model the fair model

on the interplay of informational spillovers and payoff externalities this thesis consists of four independent essays which consider different topics in information economics and political economy the first two papers are variants of the same idea an uninformed principal e g a government will make a decision in order to gain more information it may consult two experts however these experts have a private interest in certain policies being implemented the question is to gain as much information as possible should the principal consult experts who are biased in the same direction or experts who prefer different decisions the main result is that as long as collusion between experts can be prevented homogeneous panels are superior to heterogeneous ones and this advantage increases with the experts informational precision in the third paper two firms consider entry in a new product market and must decide when to enter the market and how to design their product firms do not know for certain what the best design is so both firms want to outwait the other s decision in order to gain more information the focus of the paper is on which firm will make the first decision the main result is that if products are strong strategic substitutes the worst informed firm makes the first decision in equilibrium the analysis should apply to a range of other contexts such as investors trading decisions or the policy choices of political candidates the final paper asks the following question could it be that parties in a two party system may benefit from using several candidates in the same election to promote the use of multiple candidates i assume that a party never runs the risk of having its votes split up among its candidates despite this it turns out that parties have a strong incentive to restrict their number of nominees paradoxically it seems that the more uncertain parties are about voter opinion the fewer candidates they want to use in particular with a uniform voter distribution the optimal number of candidates is one

a manipulator can aid prediction market accuracy prediction markets are low volume speculative markets whose prices offer informative forecasts on particular policy topics observers worry that traders may attempt to mislead decision makers by manipulating prices we adapt a kyle style market microstructure model to this case adding a manipulator with an additional quadratic preference regarding the price in this model when other traders are uncertain about the manipulator s target price the mean target price has no effect on prices and raising the variance of the target price can increase average price accuracy by boosting the returns to informed trading and thereby incentives for traders to become informed