a model of trade credit in a capital constrained distribution channel abstract in a product market with uncertain demand we examine a distribution channel consisting of one manufacturer and one capital constrained retailer the retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer provided it is also to the latter s benefit to extend trade credit under bank credit financing we show that the channel behaves as if the retailer is not constrained by capital in a wholesale price contract we find that trade credit makes both channel members better off and is the unique financing equilibrium trade credit better integrates the channel than bank credit by centralizing the financing of distribution at the manufacturer we further compare bank versus trade credit under a classical channel contract revenue sharing contract in addition we present a set of numerical experiments to show how product cost internal capital and demand variability impact on the market equilibrium under both bank and trade credits

product risk asymmetric information and trade credit the purpose of this paper is to explain cross sectional variations in trade credit terms across firms and industries this study shows that there is a separating equilibrium in which the size of the cash discount conveys information about product quality the driving forces of this equilibrium outcome are the risk sharing motives of the producer and buyer as well as asymmetric information about product quality the empirical implications of the model are derived and discussed in relation to industry practices

does trade credit play a signalling role some evidence from smes microdata using micro data on small and medium sized enterprises this paper empirically investigates the signalling hypothesis formulated on the role of trade credit biais and gollier in rev financ stud 10 903 937 1997 burkart and ellingsen in am econ rev 94 569 590 2004 the research method adopted allows evaluation of the impact of suppliers credit on bank debt accounting for the strength duration of bank firm relationships our main finding is that trade credit seems to have an information content for banks especially when the latter do not dispose of adequate soft information on firms which is likely the case at the beginning stages of bank firm relationships an implication of our results is that the availability of suppliers credit might be crucial to foster access to institutional funding for new firms entering the market our evidence also suggests that banks seem to consider suppliers a reliable source of information on firms financial conditions even after several years of lending relationships

fiscal paradise foreign tax havens and american business the tax haven affiliates of american corporations account for more than 20 percent of u s foreign direct investment and nearly a third of the foreign profits of u s firms american companies report extraordinarily high profit rates on their tax haven investments in 1982 this behavior implies that the revenue maximizing tax rate for a typical haven is around 5 8 percent american and foreign investment in tax havens has an uncertain effect on u s tax revenue but since low tax rates encourage american companies to shift profits out of high tax foreign countries it is possible that low foreign tax rates ultimately enhance u s tax collections

dynamic limit pricing and internal finance abstract this paper examines a model of dynamic limit pricing with a profit maximizing fringe constrained to finance new investment from internal finance in a differential game the dominant firm controls price thereby determining the current earnings of the fringe while the fringe chooses its optimal retention ratio if market growth is less than the discount rate an important feature of the solution is that price must eventually drop to the fringe long run cost of production if market growth is initially rapid the dominant firm is much more aggressive in limiting fringe growth

rotating savings and credit associations credit markets and efficiency this paper examines the allocative performance of rotating savings and credit associations roscas a financial institution which is observed world wide we develop a model in which individuals save for an indivisible good and study roscas which distribute funds using random allocation and bidding the allocations achieved by the two types of rosca are compared with that achieved by a credit market and with efficient allocations more generally we find that neither type of rosca is efficient and that individuals are better off with a credit market than a bidding rosca nonetheless a random rosca may sometimes yield a higher level of ex ante expected utility to prospective participants than would a credit market i introduction rotating savings and credit associations roscas are a widely observed institution for financial intermediation they are found all over the world particularly in developing countries and have heretofore received scant attention from economists this paper and its companion piece besley coate and loury 1993 constitute a first attempt to analyse their economic role and performance roscas come in two main forms the first type allocates funds randomly in a random rosca members commit to putting a fixed sum of money into a pot for each period of the rosca s life lots are drawn and the pot is randomly allocated to one of the members in the next period the process repeats itself with each previous winner excluded from the draw the process continues until each rosca member has received the pot once at this point the rosca is either disbanded or begins over again individuals may also form a bidding rosca in which the pot is allocated via a bidding procedure the individual who

accounts receivable management policy theory and evidence this paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain the choice of accounts receivable management policies the tests focus on both cross sectional explanations of policy choice determinants as well as incentives to establish captives we find size concentration and credit standing of the firm s traded debt and commercial paper are each important in explaining the use of factoring accounts receivable secured debt captive finance subsidiaries and general corporate credit we also offer evidence that captive formation allows more flexible financial contracting however we find no evidence that captive formation expropriates bondholder wealth firms typically sell merchandise on credit rather than requiring immediate cash payment such credit sales generate accounts receivable although credit terms and credit collection procedures have been studied see smith 1980 there has been little systematic analysis of the organizational and financial structures employed to manage the firm s accounts receivable these decisions merit more careful attention for two reasons first receivables are a substantial fraction of corporate assets for example 1986 compustat data indicate that accounts receivable are 21 0 of u s manufacturing corporations total assets second we observe substantial diversity in firms use of specialized contracts and intermediaries in their accounts receivable management policies firms can 1 establish a captive finance subsidiary 2 issue accounts receivable secured debt 3 factor 4 employ a credit reporting firm 5 retain a credit collection agency or 6 purchase a credit insurance policy 1 in this paper we demonstrate that accounts receivable management policy offers opportunities for both the development of a robust theory as well as empirical testing of the theory s implications although the data necessary to

evidence on the determinants of credit terms used in interfirm trade trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment in this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries we examine empirically the firm s basic credit policy choices whether to extend credit or to require cash payment and if credit is extended whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment we also examine determinants of variations in two part terms results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness trade credit has important economic significance from both micro and macroeconomic perspectives during the 1990s vendor financing has accounted for an average 1 5 trillion of the book value of all assets of u s corporations and has represented approximately 2 5 times the combined value of all new public debt and primary equity issues during a given year as a component of the money supply trade credit in the form of accounts payable exceeds the primary money supply mi by a factor of 1 5 on average 1 clearly efforts to control economic growth through monetary policy can be confounded by aggregate decisions of businesses to increase or decrease reliance on trade credit financing several recent empirical studies examine determinants of firm reliance on trade credit 2 these studies model supply and demand for trade credit using financial statement data accounts receivable and payable 3 however many aspects of trade credit practice are unexplored most notably little is known about the types of credit terms e g net 30 2 10 net 30 and credit policies that are observed across firms and industries the only comprehensive doc

trade credit and taxes abstract this paper analyzes the extent to which tax differences affect the use of trade credit u s owned affiliates in low tax countries use trade credit to lend whereas those in high tax countries use trade credit to borrow 10 lower local tax rates are associated with net trade credit positions that are 1 4 higher as a fraction of sales the use of trade credit to get capital out of low tax low return environments is also illustrated by the temporary repatriation tax holiday in 2005 which was used most intensively by affiliates with positive net trade credit positions

the exploitation of relationships in financial distress the case of trade credit this paper develops optimal pricing lending and renegotiation strategies for companies in relationships where one firm is highly dependent on the other long term trade creditor firm relationships induce dependent trade creditors to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations than nondependent creditors anticipating these larger renegotiation concessions not only do less financially stable firms prefer trade credit but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate for trade credit the model also explains the existence of teaser interest rates and convenience classes findings are consistent with those of the relationship lending literature

taxes and the theory of trade debt in this paper we show that taxes motivate the flow of trade credit without involving the assumption of credit market imperfections the direction of trade credit flow depends on the distribution of marginal tax rates among buyers and sellers in equilibrium the trade credit decision follows a tax induced clientele on both the supply and demand side a glance at the balance sheet of a typical corporation reveals the sizeable investment firms make in accounts receivable 1 in spite of its quantitative importance the analysis of trade credit policy figures far less prominently than other corporate policies in the finance literature although there exists a body of literature on the subject its focus is on the monetary policy implications of trade credit flow and therefore holds only indirect relevance to micro aspects such as the trade credit decision as part of corporate policy in this paper we examine the trade credit decision as a short term financing decision the decision to either grant or issue trade debt is analyzed in the familiar framework of miller 12 this approach establishes the link between existing paradigms on the financing of firms and the formulation of trade credit policies the existing literature provides three possible motives for trade credit they are respectively the transaction motive the price motive and the financial motive the first two motives have been discussed extensively elsewhere see for example smith 18 for a summary it is at the third motive the financial motive that the present paper is directed 2 past studies on the financial motive such as brechling and lipsey 3 jaffee and modigliani 7 laffer 10 schwartz 15 and schwartz and whitcomb 16

credit and deferral as international investment incentives abstract many governments tax the foreign income of their firms using a system that grants credits for foreign taxes paid and permits tax deferral for unrepatriated income this paper shows that such tax systems encourage firms to restrict their equity stakes in new foreign investments and to finance their new investments with considerable debt these incentives exist even when transfer price regulation effectively limits the profit rates foreign subsidiaries can earn the behavior of the foreign subsidiaries of us multinationals in 1984 appears to be consistent with these incentives

how responsive is business capital formation to its user cost an exploration with micro data abstract the response of business capital formation to its user cost is critical to evaluating tax reform deficit reduction and monetary policy evidence for a substantial user cost elasticity however is sparse most evidence has been based on aggregate data although several recent studies with firm level data report substantial effects with a particularly rich micro dataset containing over 26 000 observations this paper explores what can be learned about the user cost elasticity while the results depend to some extent on the specification and econometric technique various diagnostics lead us to prefer a precisely estimated but small elasticity of approximately 0 25 this paper is dedicated to the memory of robert eisner who labored early and ably on uncovering the determinants of investment spending and highlighting the importance of the question found in the title of this paper

taking stock a critical assessment of recent research on inventories empirical and theoretical aspects of inventory behavior became hot topics in the 1950s and early 1960s no one seemed to notice the tension that was developing between the emerging macroeconomic and microeconomic views of inventories macroeconomists routinely thought of inventories as a destabilizing factor yet the prevailing micro theory viewed inventories as a stabilizing factor it was a fascinating question that was barely explored instead somewhat inexplicably interest in inventories dried up as if inventories were of minor economic significance and little intrinsic interest by the early 1980s then economists once again knew something they had known in the 1950s that inventory investment is of first order importance in business cycles but they were also beginning to realize that the standard production smoothing buffer stock model of inventories was in deep trouble this paper focuses on developments since that realization

trade credit and informational asymmetry commonly used trade credit terms implicitly define a high interest rate that operates as an efficient screening device where information about buyer default risk is asymmetrically held by offering trade credit a seller can identify prospective defaults more quickly than if financial institutions were the sole providers of short term financing the information is valuable in cases where the seller has made nonsalvageable investments in buyers since it enables the seller to take actions to protect such investments traditional explanations for the widespread use of trade credit fall into two categories the financing motive holds that capital market imperfections enable sellers to finance buyer purchases at lower cost than financial institutions ferris 4 argues that trade credit provides payment flexibility and thus reduces the overall need for buyers and sellers to maintain precautionary balances emery 3 contends that noncompetitive rents of financial institutions can be circumvented by sellers and buyers through provision of trade credit however the financing motive is not sufficient to explain why small suppliers offer trade credit the wide cross sectional variation in terms or why large buyers often take the prompt payment discount late a second set of explanations is best described as pricing motivations for trade credit provision nadiri 10 argues that availability of alternative payment terms can increase product demand but does not indicate why the offered terms could not be duplicated by financial institutions schwartz and whitcomb 14 argue that trade credit is used to circumvent robinson patman and similar prohibitions on price discrimination the correctness of this position depends on the charge to users of trade credit exceeding the cost of provision by the seller although the explanation is possible in principle an empirical question remains as to why variations in actual credit terms appear to be based on product market rather than buyer characteristics the literature also contains analyses of the impact of changing macroeconomic conditions on trade credit terms and aggregate credit flows schwartz 13 for example employs a financing motive for trade credit to conclude that restrictive monetary policy can be partly mitigated by liberalization of trade credit terms by firms with relatively easy access to capital markets however a microeconomic

the implicit costs of trade credit borrowing by large firms we examine a novel but economically important characterization of trade credit relationships in which large investment grade buyers borrow from their smaller suppliers using a matched sample of large retail buyers and their much smaller suppliers we find that slower payment terms by large retailers are associated with lower investment at the supplier level the effects are sharpest during periods of tight bank credit and for firms which we might otherwise characterize as financially constrained the opportunity cost of extending credit to large buyers appears to be positive and sharply increasing in the financial frictions facing a firm

bank credit and trade credit evidence from natural experiments abstract prior studies find mixed evidence about the substitution relation between bank credit and trade credit in this paper using two bank interest rate deregulations in china we revisit the substitution hypothesis by examining how exogenous increases in the availability of bank credit affect trade credit we find that firms with higher credit risk increased their use of bank credit and reduced their use of trade credit after the 2004 bank interest rate ceiling deregulation whereas firms with lower credit risk increased their use of bank credit and reduced their use of trade credit after the 2013 bank interest rate floor deregulation our results provide supportive evidence for the substitution hypothesis that firms reduce their use of trade credit after the relaxation of bank credit and suggest that bank credit is more favorable short term financing than trade credit

trade credit and bank relationships evidence from pre world war i belgium we investigate the determinants of trade credit granted by suppliers in a historical environment which was characterized by high information asymmetries and strong banks focusing on the role of bank firm relationships our results which are based on a unique sample of 535 firm year observations for 125 listed belgian firms in four dominant industries in the period 1905 to 1909 are generally consistent with the financing role of trade credit they suggest that trade credit was a tool for channelling funds from firms with close bank ties to other firms which is consistent with findings for contemporary developing countries

trade credit and the effect of macro financial shocks evidence from u s panel data using disaggregated panel data we examine how firms change trade credit in response to a monetary tightening we find that both accounts payable and accounts receivable increase with tighter monetary policy implying that trade credit helps firms absorb the effect of a credit contraction further both s p 500 firms and a comparison group of smaller firms increase net trade credit accounts receivable minus payable making up for the reduced liquidity associated with tighter policy however we find no evidence that large firms play this role more actively than smaller firms

la crema a case study of mutual fire insurance we analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in andorra which is called la crema in the local language this mechanism relies on households announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other households the only pareto efficient allocation reachable through the mechanism requires that all households honestly report the true value of their property however such honest reporting is not an equilibrium except in the extreme case in which the property values are identical for all households nevertheless as the size of the society becomes large the benefits from deviating from truthful reporting vanish and all the nondegenerate equilibria of the mechanism are nearly truthful and approximately pareto efficient

debt and the marginal tax rate abstract do taxes affect corporate debt policy this paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax the simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code tax regime shifts business cycle effects and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule using annual data from more than 10 000 firms for the years 1980 1992 i provide evidence which indicates that high tax rate firms issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

in kind finance a theory of trade credit it is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash therefore suppliers may lend more liberally than banks this simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets the model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes among other things the model explains why trade credit has short maturity why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit markets and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical than those of small firms

inventories as factors of production and economic fluctuations this paper presents a theory of inventory investment by stage of processing and uses it to examine the role of inventory investment in economic fluctuations the model in which inventories are treated as factors of production is estimated for four durable goods industries three conclusions emerge from the estimation first the estimates generally satisfy the theoretical restrictions second the elasticity of inventory demand with respect to output is high indicating an important accelerator effect finally the estimates suggest that shifts in the demand for inventories are an important source of economic fluctuations copyright 1989 by american economic association

competition and inter firm credit theory and evidence from firm level data in indonesia abstract using firm level data we investigate the relationship between trade credit and suppliers market structure and find a shaped relationship between competition and trade credit with a discontinuous increase in credit provision between monopoly and duopoly this big jump arises because monopolists are more likely to not offer any trade credit than firms in competitive environments our model exploits the fundamentally different nature between cash and trade credit sales arguing that firms are unable to commit ex ante to a trade credit price we show that monopolists will often sell only on cash while credit is always provided in competitive environments

the relation between the return interval and betas abstract the size effect is sensitive to the length of the return interval used in estimating betas beta changes with the return interval because an asset s covariance with the market and the market s variance do not change proportionately as the return interval is changed we document beta sensitivity to the return interval evidence from cross sectional regressions of returns on monthly and annual betas is inconsistent with beta changes stemming only from the higher standard errors of the longer interval betas we provide evidence that the size effect becomes statistically insignificant when risk is measured by betas estimated using annual returns

are small stock returns achievable returns of the small company universe an examination of actual small company passive portfolios sheds some light on this issue these small stock portfolios deliver the returns of their targets within statistically acceptable bounds there are however significant differences across their returns and these differences appear to be related to management style pure indexers try to maintain perfect index like portfolio compositions minimizing trading cost is of secondary importance to them these portfolios have the lowest returns at the other extreme some portfolios emphasize minimizing trading costs at the expense of perfect portfolio composition these portfolios have the highest returns

efficiency with costly information a reinterpretation of evidence from managed portfolios we investigate the informational efficiency of mutual fund performance for the period 1965 84 results are shown to be sensitive to the measurement of performance chosen we find that returns on s p stocks returns on non s p stocks and returns on bonds are significant factors in performance assessment once we correct for the impact of non s p assets on mutual fund returns we find that mutual funds do not earn returns that justify their information acquisition costs this is consistent with results for prior periods coauthors are martin j gruber sanjiv das and matthew hlavka article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

trade credit collateral liquidation and borrowing constraints assuming that firms suppliers are better able to extract value from the liquidation of assets in default and have an information advantage over other creditors the paper derives six predictions on the use of trade credit 1 financially unconstrained firms with unused bank credit lines take trade credit to exploit the supplier s liquidation advantage 2 if inputs purchased on account are sufficiently liquid the reliance on trade credit does not depend on credit rationing 3 firms buying goods make more purchases on account than those buying services while suppliers of services offer more trade credit than those of standardized goods 4 suppliers lend inputs to their customers but not cash 5 greater reliance on trade credit is associated with more intensive use of tangible inputs 6 better creditor protection decreases both the use of trade credit and input tangibility

credit contagion from counterparty risk standard credit risk models cannot explain the observed clustering of default some times described as credit contagion this paper provides the first empirical analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects we find that bankruptcy announce ments cause negative abnormal equity returns and increases in cds spreads for credi tors in addition creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer from financial distress later this suggests that counterparty risk is a potential additional channel of credit contagion indeed the fear of counterparty defaults among financial institu tions explains the sudden worsening of the credit crisis after the lehman bankruptcy in september 2008

the economics of rotating savings and credit associations supported by the center for energy policy studies m i t and the japanese corporate associates program at the kennedy school of government

miller s equilibrium shareholder leverage clienteles and optimal capital structure the purpose of this paper is twofold first we examine the individual portfolio decisions when income from stocks and bonds is taxed at different rates second a rationale for the existence of risky debt in the presence of leverage related costs and differential personal income taxation is provided previous studies on capital structure with differential personal income taxation have ignored either the portfolio risk consideration and or the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields due to insufficient taxable earnings e g 8 2 3 14 13 6 7 1 9 19 20 21 23 in section i of this paper both the portfolio risk consideration and the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields are explicitly introduced this enables us to provide a rationale for the shareholder leverage clientele phenomenon within a mean variance framework we also demonstrate a non corner solution for the optimal corporate capital structure in a tax environment similar to that of miller s debt and taxes 14 in sections ii and iii of this paper miller s world is further modified to include risky debt and the attendant costs we re examine and synthesize recent studies on the theory of optimal capital structure which have appeared since the publication of debt and taxes e g 4 6 7 13 19 20

individual risk and mutual insurance this paper examines how in the presence of individual risk economic efficiency can be achieved without an unrealistically large number of contingent claims market uncertainty is specified in such a way that general types of individual risk and collective risk are properly accounted for and so that specifically market clearing is always satisfied ex post as well as ex ante we show that consistency of beliefs and optimality of allocation can be guaranteed with an appropriate array of pure arrow securities to spread collective risk and mutual insurance policies to pool individual risk when there is individual risk common to like groups of individuals pooling risk by means of mutual insurance permits substantial economizing on market transactions as compared to those required if dealing instead with the full complement of pure arrow securities we show that if there are n households consisting of h types each facing the possibility of being in s individual states together with t collective states then ensuring pareto optimality requires only h s 1 t independent mutual insurance policies plus t pure arrow securities our results also help to clarify the question of which missing markets may affect allocational efficiency

credit chains and bankruptcy propagation in production networks abstract we present a simple model of a production network in which firms are linked by supplier customer relationships involving extension of trade credit our aim is to identify the minimal set of mechanisms which reproduce qualitatively the main stylized facts of industrial demography such as firms size distribution and at the same time the correlation over time and across firms of output growth and bankruptcies the behavior of aggregate variables can be traced back to the direct firm firm interdependence in this paper we assume that the number of firms is constant and the network has a periodic static structure but the framework allows further extensions to investigate which network structures are more robust against domino effects and if the network is let to evolve in time which structures emerge spontaneously depending on the individual strategies for orders and delivery

working capital and fixed investment new evidence on financing constraints this article presents new tests for finance constraints on investment by emphasizing the often neglected role of working capital as both a use and a source of funds the coefficient of endogenous working capital investment is negative in a fixed investment regression as expected if working capital competes with fixed investment for a limited pool of finance this finding addresses a criticism of previous research on finance constraints that cash flows may simply proxy shifts in investment demand in addition previous studies may have underestimated the impact of finance constraints on growth and investment because firms smooth fixed investment in the short run with working capital

financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information in an earlier paper we presented an entry game with a monopolist and a potential entrant facing financial constraints in which the unique perfect equilibrium involved no entry here we consider a one sided incomplete information variant of the game in which the monopolist allows for the possibility that the entrant is committed to endure a price war to the limit of his capability we find a unique sequentially perfect equilibrium in which entry sometimes occurs when it does predatory price wars may result with the incumbent sometimes driving out the entrant but other times eventually abandoning the fight

the source of fluctuations in money evidence from trade credit abstract this paper tests the relative importance of technology shocks and financial shocks as sources of fluctuations in money the model extends the theory of king and plosser 1984 by recognizing that both money and trade credit provide transactions services under certain conditions the co movements between money and trade credit can reveal the nature of the underlying shocks the empirical results strongly suggest that shocks to the financial system account for most of the fluctuations in money in the long run and at business cycle frequencies on the other hand technology shocks appear to be more important at seasonal frequencies

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

trade credit and supplier competition abstract this paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers leading to a free rider problem a supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and as a result extends less trade credit relative to its sales in consequence retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated the free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free riding suppliers are its product market competitors leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter we test the model using both simulated and real data the estimated relations are consistent with the model s predictions and are statistically and economically significant

the cost of institutional equity trades presented are an overview of the findings from the recent literature on the cost of u s equity trades for institutional investors and new evidence on trading costs from a large sample of institutional trades the findings discussed have important implications for policymakers and investors implicit trading costs are economically significant equity trading costs vary considerably and vary systematically with trade difficulty and order placement strategy and whether a trade price represents best execution depends on detailed data for the trade s entire order submission process especially information on pretrade decision variables such as the trading horizon

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

trade credit in small and medium size firms an application of the system estimator with panel data financing through suppliers is a subject that has been little studied in the economic literature in general and in corporate finance in particular although several hypotheses have been put forward to explain the different reasons behind this phenomenon trade credit is not based on a general theory

an agency model to explain trade credit policy and empirical evidence this article explains trade credit policy based on the agency theory according to this theory we have developed an agency model based on the adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena arising from the relation between sellers and buyers this model has been estimated by using panel data methodology applied to uk companies our findings strongly support the model proposed we find that smaller firms those with a smaller proportion of fixed assets and those that are less profitable extend more trade credit whereas firms with a high proportion of variable costs and high percentage of bad debts extend less

corporate trade credit and inventories new evidence of a trade off from accounts payable and receivable abstract trade credit is an important source of finance for firms and has been well researched but the focus has been on financial trade offs in this paper we consider the trade offs with inventories and develop a simple model that recognizes the incentives a firm faces to offer and receive trade credit our model identifies the response of accounts payable and accounts receivable to changes in the cost of inventories profitability risk and liquidity and importantly this influence operates through a production channel our results support the model and complement many existing studies focused on explaining the financial terms of trade credit