the inflation tax in a real business cycle model money is incorporated into a real business cycle model using a cash in advance constraint the model economy is used to analyze whether the business cycle is different in high inflation and low inflation economies and to analyze the impact of variability in the growth rate of money in addition the welfare cost of the inflation tax is measured and the steady state properties of high and low inflation economies are compared

how delegation improves commitment abstract mccallum 1995 american economic review papers and proceedings 85 2 207 211 conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it this holds if optimal ex ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available however with a flexibility credibility trade off delegation improves credibility

measuring the time inconsistency of us monetary policy this paper offers an alternative explanation for the great inflation of the 1970s by measuring a novel source of monetary policy time inconsistency in the presence of asymmetric preferences the monetary authorities generate a systematic inflation bias through the private sector expectations of a larger policy response in recessions than in booms the estimated fed s implicit target for inflation has declined from the pre to the post volcker regime the average inflation bias was about 1 before 1979 but this has disappeared over the last two decades because the preferences on output stabilization were large and asymmetric only in the former period

the eurosystem the u s federal reserve and the bank of japan similarities and differences the paper provides a systematic comparison of the eurosystem the u s federal reserve and the bank of japan these monetary authorities exhibit somewhat different status and tasks which reflect different historical conditions and national characteristics however widespread changes in central banking practices in the direction of greater independence and increased transparency as well as changes in the economic and financial environment over the past 15 20 years have contributed to reduce the differences among these three world s principal monetary authorities a comparison based on simple over the counter policy reaction functions shows no striking differences in terms of monetary policy implementation

the demand for education with power equalizing aid abstract state grants in aid modify the full fiscal income and tax price for education services faced by voters in local school districts if aid is non linear in the local property tax rate as occurs with district power equalization coupled with an aid floor then individual budget constraints are non linear and least squares estimation is inappropriate we develop and estimate a model that incorporates these effects derive and extensively illustrate the comparative statics present global and local elasticities and simulate the impact of parameter changes on the variance of spending and the cost of the program

the inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment abstract this paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more or less severely than negative deviations in the central banker s loss function the bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment the time series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from g7 countries econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related

rules and discretion with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions thus the issue of how to improve upon the time consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy we present a model with three players the central bark the fiscal authority and wage setters in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled we show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated we also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank

inflation contracts and inflation targets under uncertainty why we might need conservative central bankers this paper compares the relative effectiveness of inflation contracts and inflation targets in the presence of uncertainty regarding the central bank s preferences and the underlying output target the model explains why discretion may be superior to a delegation solution we also show that there might be the need to combine inflation targets and contracts with the appointment of a rogoff type conservative central banker if contracts and targets cannot be made state contingent and that less flexible inflation targets may be appropriate with uncertain central bank preferences

when do long run identifying restrictions give reliable results many recent articles have identified behavioral disturbances in vector autoregressions by imposing restrictions on the long run effects of shocks this article demonstrates that this approach will be unreliable unless the underlying economy satisfies three types of strong restrictions although many aspects of these issues have been raised before this article draws out and illustrates the implications for inferences under the long run scheme furthermore it provides strategies for dealing with the problems

the monetary policy of the european central bank the first six years of ecb monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation output and the interest rate from their reference values the empirical analysis on synthetic euro area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric whereas the objectives of real activity and interest rate stabilizations are not output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high the hypothesis of m3 growth rate targeting is rejected

a computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental aid abstract this paper introduces a theoretical and a calibrated computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental relations in which heterogeneous agents i are endowed with income and houses ii are fully mobile between multiple jurisdictions and iii vote in both local and state elections to determine local property and state income tax rates three different types of intergovernmental programs are analyzed i redistributive revenue sharing ii district power equalization and iii deductibility of local taxes the approach facilitates a heretofore difficult comparative analysis in that it provides for integrated investigation of these programs in a single general equilibrium model

issues in new political economy an overview a brief overview of the historical background nature and rapid growth in volume and scope of new political economy since the early 1980s is provided the paper continues with some general reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the new political economy approach illustrated by the other contributions to this special issue of the journal of economic surveys the final section summarises these contributions

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

the structuralist theory of imported inflation an application to south africa this study emphasizes the importance of identifying the origin of inflation in the present context of inflation targeting by many emerging market and transition economies the analysis shows based on south african data how structural supply and demand inflation can be distinguished the results indicate that south africa s inflation experience between 1973q1 and 1998q4 is characterized by two monetary regimes during the first regime 1973q1 1984q4 the long run cause of inflation is demand pull the second regime 1987q1 1998q4 represents major changes to structural imported and cost push inflation the two year period 1985 1986 signifies structural change from the first to the second regime moreover the results in the second regime remain robust when the inflation model is subjected to new out of sample data until 2001q2 evidence of structural imported inflation in the second regime suggests that inflation should not entirely be squeezed out of the system nor should it necessarily be k

price level targeting vs inflation targeting a free lunch price level targeting without base drift and inflation targeting with base drift are compared under commitment and discretion with persistence in unemployment price level targeting is often said to imply more short run inflation variability and thereby more employment variability than inflation targeting counter to this conventional wisdom under discretion a price level target results in lower inflation variability than an inflation target if unemployment is at least moderately persistent a price level target also eliminates the inflation bias under discretion and as is well known reduces long term price variability society may be better off assigning a price level target to the central bank even if its preferences correspond to inflation targeting a price level target thus appears to have more advantages than commonly acknowledged

inflation targeting under asymmetric preferences this paper develops and estimates a game theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker s preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate specifically positive deviations from the target can be weighted more or less severely than negative ones in the central banker s loss function it is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences estimates of the central banker s preference parameters for canada sweden and the uk are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function

how important is precommitment for monetary policy we quantify the welfare differential between precommitment and discretionary monetary policy in three estimated models of the u s economy by calculating the permanent deviation of inflation from target that in welfare terms is equivalent to moving from discretion to precommitment using a range of reasonable central bank preference parameters this inflation equivalent ranges from 0 05 to 3 6 percentage points with a mid point of either 0 15 or 1 1 5 percentage points depending on the model in addition to the degree of forward looking behavior we show that the existence of transmission lags and or information lags is crucial for determining the welfare gain from precommitment

does the barro gordon model explain the behavior of us inflation a reexamination of the empirical evidence abstract this paper tests the predictions of the barro gordon model using us data on inflation and unemployment to that end it constructs a general game theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the barro gordon model and a version of cukierman s model as special cases likelihood ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the barro gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of cukierman s model is not reduced form estimates are consistent with the view that the federal reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

time inconsistency of monetary policy empirical evidence from polls while the basic model of time inconsistency put forward by barro and gordon barro r j gordon d b 1983 journal of political economy 91 589 610 is widely accepted now several authors have expressed serious doubts about the empirical relevance of the model in explaining inflation interestingly enough few attempts have been made so far to test for the existence of inflationary biases empirically theory predicts a positive correlation between a monetary authority s relative preference for the high employment goal and inflation using polling data from six countries as a proxy for public preferences we provide empirical evidence in favor of the barro gordon model

economic incentives and political institutions spending and voting in school budget referenda abstract allocation of resources in the local public sector involves economic and political forces in many u s states the bulk of spending on public education is subject to referendum we link spending proposals to referendum outcomes our model makes use of voting data to shed light on the extent to which referenda constrain spending we use data from school budget referenda in 544 new york school districts for the 1975 1976 school year our econometric results and simulations based on them reveal considerable sensitivity of spending to the form of the state grants in aid structure as well as to the referendum requirement in addition large school districts appear to behave more like budget maximizers than do small districts where proposals appear more in line with median voter demands

production and innovation when techniques are tacit the case of education abstract the central theme of this paper is that the conventional economic theory of production does not hold even approximately in a field like education after examining the result of input output studies in education and the effect of government attempts to enhance education effectiveness we provide a sketch of a new production theory for sectors where techniques are poorly articulated and idiosyncratic

modeling multiple outputs in educational production functions for some time now economists have conceptualized learning as a production process most educational production functions specify only one output usually a measure of cognitive achievement some recent studies have recognized the multidimensional aspects of schooling specifying outputs in both the cognitive and affective domains introducing multiple outputs into the production function raises interesting theoretical and empirical issues one issue is the manner in which various outputs are interrelated how one models output interactions in educational production functions may be important are the outputs multiple products if so are they independently or simultaneously produced or are the outputs joint products answers to these questions may affect empirical estimates of the educational production function s this paper briefly describes how one might approach this problem we argue on conceptual grounds that modeling outputs in the cognitive and affective domains as joint products is preferable in addition we compare the three approaches empirically to evaluate the sensitivity of educational production function parameter estimates to output specification

monetary policy analysis and inflation targeting in a small open economy a var approach empirical monetary policy research has increased in the last decade possibly because deregulation and explicit monetary targets have made monetary policy issues more interesting in particular within the inflation targeting framework it has been argued that inflation forecasts can be used as optimal intermediate targets for monetary policy and the development of empirical models that have good forecasting properties is therefore important this paper shows that a var model with long run restrictions justified by economic theory is useful for both forecasting inflation and for analysing other issues that are central to the conduct of monetary policy copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

delegation time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium this paper analyzes the effectiveness of delegation in solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy using a microfounded general equilibrium model where delegation and reappointment are explicitly included into the government s strategy the method of chari and kehoe 1990 sustainable plans journal of political economy 98 4 783 802 is applied to characterize the entire set of sustainable outcomes countering mccallum s 1995 two fallacies concerning central bank independence american economic review 85 2 207 211 second fallacy delegation is able to eliminate the time inconsistency problem with the commitment policy being sustained under discretion for any intertemporal discount rate

schooling and economic well being the role of nonmarket effects standard estimates of the economic value of additional schooling based on earnings differences associated with differences in the level of schooling attained cover only a portion of the total effects of education that are valued by citizens we first identify a catalog of nonmarketed effects many of which have been recently studied by economists and then propose a procedure for estimating a willingness to pay value for these effects using empirical estimates of the magnitude of a selection of these effects found in the literature we calculate willingness to pay values using our proposed procedure these illustrative calculations suggest that standard estimates of the benefit of incremental schooling substantially understate the full value of such investments

crucial issues concerning central bank independence abstract this paper argues first that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will in the absence of any tangible precommitment technology inevitably behave in a discretionary fashion that implies an inflationary bias furthermore there is no necessary tradeoff between flexibility and commitment second to the extent that the absence of any precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency they merely relocate it several implications are discussed

optimal sustainable monetary policy in recent monetary policy literature optimal commitment policy or its variant from a timeless perspective has been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment regardless of its time consistency problem called a stabilization bias with an optimizing model used in the literature we examine sustainable equilibrium of chari and kehoe 1990 and study optimal sustainable policy the policymaker s strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium in the absence of commitment technologies calibrated versions of the model show that the ramsey equilibrium generated by optimal commitment policy is not achievable suggesting that optimal sustainable policy is the desirable policy benchmark from the viewpoint of policy operationality the latter policy involves some issues due to its dependence on the entire history of lagrange multipliers on a sustainability constraint as a guidepost for actual policy conduct that contains no such issues and attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does we propose a sustainable policy conducted by following a policy rule that achieves the best markov equilibrium

inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule the purpose of the paper is to survey and discuss in ation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules the paper provides a general conceptual discussion of monetary policy rules attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of in ation targeting compares in ation targeting to other monetary policy rules and draws some conclusions for the monetary policy of the european system of central banks jel classi cation e42 e52

an endogenous model of public school expenditures and private school enrollment abstract this paper examines the link between private school enrollment rates and public school expenditures using a panel of new york state school districts models are estimated in which public school spending and private school enrollment rates are endogenously determined the results indicate the presence of endogeneity increases in private school enrollment are not shown to cause decreases in public school per pupil expenditure private school enrollment rates are found to respond to changes in public school expenditure and are sensitive to changes in tuition

expectations of future income and real exchange rate movements abstract we show that changes in expectations of future income driven by exogenous factors such as the discovery of oil and an increase in global demand for natural resources can cause movements in the real exchange rate rer in excess of and sometimes even in the opposite direction to what one would expect given the changes in current income we provide both a theoretical model and empirical evidence of this in particular we show that the signing of numerous production sharing agreements psas between the government of azerbaijan and foreign oil companies in 1994 1998 fueled expectations of higher future incomes resulting in a considerable appreciation of the rer some of these psas subsequently failed or ran into difficulties which led to a downward revision of expected future income and a depreciation of the rer in 1999 2003 even though the current income started to rise due to an increase in the current oil revenue

are real wages and unemployment related in this paper we propose an alternative method for investigating the sources behind the behaviour of real wages and unemployment the model we study is a certain cointegrated var a so called common trends model which has become increasingly popular in the empirical growth business cycle literature this model leads us to emphasize the distinction between long run and short run relations using quarterly swedish data 1965 90 we find only weak evidence of a short run relation between real wages and unemployment as reported in traditional single equation error correction models there is even less evidence of a long run relation

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

supplanting the minnesota prior forecasting macroeconomic time series using real business cycle model priors abstract although general equilibrium models are in wide use in the theoretical macroeconomic literature their empirical relevance is uncertain we develop procedures for using dynamic general equilibrium models to aid in analyzing the observed time series relationships among macroeconomic variables our strategy is based on that developed by doan litterman and sims 1984 who constructed a procedure for improving time series forecasts by shrinking vector autoregression coefficient estimates toward a prior view that vector time series are well described as collections of independent random walks in our case the prior is derived from a fully specified general equilibrium model we demonstrate that like the atheoretical random walk priors real business cycle model priors can aid in forecasting

estimating the value of an in kind transfer the case of food stamps the value of one in kind transfer food stamps is estimated by evaluating the experience of an actual conversion from stamps to cash in puerto rico in 1982 the evidence indicates that the cashout of the stamps had no detectable influence on food expenditures the explanation partly lies in the distribution of expenditures for the stamps were inframarginal for most recipients however some evidence indicates that trafficking in stamps was widespread as well including indirect evidence from estimation of the piecewise linear constraint model copyright 1989 by the econometric society

a structural bayesian var for model based fan charts inflation forecast uncertainty is of importance for a wide range of agents in the economy central banks in particular ways to describe and account for this uncertainty in a consistent manner have received increasing attention of late in part due to the growing number of inflation targeting central banks this article develops a large structural var for the swedish economy and estimates it in a bayesian framework the methodology permits not only structural interpretation and analysis but offers a natural way to formalize forecast uncertainty as the posterior predictive density from the model has the interpretation of a fan chart

school decentralization helping the good get better but leaving the poor behind abstract the decentralization of public services is a major feature of institutional innovation the main argument in support of decentralization is that it brings decisions closer to the people thereby alleviating information asymmetries and improving accountability however decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences in this paper we analyze the average and distributional effects of school decentralization on educational quality in argentina we find that decentralization had an overall positive impact on student test scores the decentralization gains however did not reach the poor thus although bringing decisions closer to the people may help the good get better the already disadvantaged may not receive these benefits

optimal policy intervention and the social value of public information svensson 2006 argues that morris and shin s 2002 analysis is contrary to what is claimed actually pro transparency this paper re examines the issue but with an important modification to the original morris and shin framework recognizing that central banks impact on the economy not only indirectly via their public announcements but also directly through their policy actions we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention our results strengthen morris and shin s conclusions considerably in particular we find that public disclosure of the central bank s information is always undesirable

the econometrics of piecewise linear budget constraints a survey and exposition of the maximum likelihood method in this article maximum likelihood techniques for estimating consumer demand functions when budget constraints are piecewise linear are exposited and surveyed consumer demand functions are formally derived under such constraints and it is shown that the functions are themselves nonlinear as a result the econometric problems in estimating such functions are exposited and the importance of the stochastic specification is stressed in particular the specification of both unobserved heterogeneity of preferences and measurement error econometric issues in estimation and testing are discussed and the results of the studies that have been conducted to date are surveyed

the dynamic impacts of monetary policy an exercise in tentative identification it is currently popular to identify monetary policy shocks with innovations in some measure of reserves or in the federal funds rate these assumptions about the interest elasticity of the supply of or demand for reserves imply monetary policy shocks that produce dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables that are anomalous relative to traditional monetary analyses this paper tentatively identifies supply and demand shocks in the markets for reserves and m2 for the 1980s and contrasts them with results for the 1970s in the later period identified monetary policy shocks have dynamic impacts that are fully consistent with traditional analyses

do markets care who chairs the central bank this paper assesses the effects of central bank governor appointments on financial market expectations of monetary policy to measure these effects we assemble a new dataset of appointment announcements from 15 countries and conduct an event study analysis on exchange rates bond yields and stock prices our main findings are threefold first exchange rates and bond yields display a statistically significant response to the announcement of a new governor especially when the appointee s identity was not anticipated in advance second the reactions are especially pronounced for central banks lacking either independence or a clear nominal anchor third new governors are not generally perceived to lack credibility there is no tendency for announcements to be associated with jumps in inflation expectations

credibility of optimal monetary delegation comment in his recent paper in the american economic review jensen 1997 argues that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank which acts as an agent for the government does not mitigate the problem of time inconsistency but merely relocates it

targeting inflation with a role for money this paper demonstrates how a target for money growth can be beneficial for an inflation targeting central bank acting under discretion because the growth rate of money is closely related to the change in the interest rate and the growth of real output delegating a money growth target to the central bank makes discretionary policy more inertial leading to better social outcomes this delegation scheme is also compared with other schemes suggested in the literature the results indicate that stabilizing money growth around a target can be a sensible strategy for monetary policy although other delegation schemes are often more efficient

hybrid inflation and price level targeting in this paper we investigate the properties of monetary regimes that combine price level and inflation targeting we look both at an optimal control and at a simple rule characterisation of these regimes we derive numerical results by modelling the economy as a small scale open economy re model calibrated on uk data we conclude that 1 the relative merits of price level and inflation targeting as well as of mixes of these two depend on particular modelling and policy assumptions and 2 these merits do not always change gradually and or monotonically as we move from one regime to another

optimal central banker contracts and common agency this paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model we suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency we develop amodel with two principals society government and ageneric interest group whose objective conflicts withsociety s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias we determine when the government offered orinterest group offered contract dominates the central banker sdecision the results largely depend on whether theinterest group offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation

monetary stabilisation with nominal asymmetries optimal monetary stabilisation in the standard new keynesian framework usually assumes a policy loss function from outside the model in this paper in contrast the objective arises directly from the model credit constraints and sticky nominal debt contracts imply that monetary stabilisation has asymmetric impacts depending on whether consumers are credit constrained the policy problem is to maximise some weighting of the expected utility of the different types of consumer features of optimal stabilisation are derived that do not appear to be far out of line with empirical evidence for many countries but that clearly conflict with standard loss function results

cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game abstract this paper presents a simple repeated game model of interaction between an optimizing government and the private sector two polar cases are considered a the private sector is represented by a single agent and b there is a continuum of heterogenous atomistic private agents in both cases the government starts each repetition by making a non binding announcement about its future actions the players have complete and perfect information with one exception the private agents do not know whether or not the government will act as announced thus each private agent i either behaves with probability i as if it trusted the announcement or plays with probability 1 i as a stackelberg leader after observing the reaction of the private sector the government implements the actual policy measures finally the private agent s update i as a function of the payoffs received we show that although the government s announcements are never respected acting as if they were true leads to an outcome that simultaneously improves the situation of the government and of those players that trust it compared to the standard equilibrium solutions an overwhelming majority of private agents very rapidly learns to behave as if the announcements were true the other agents also experience higher payoffs due to an herding effect the fact that the announcements are always reneged is crucial for the solution to be pareto improving these results are in stark contrast to the conclusions usually presented in the related economic literature

identifying monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible exchange rates abstract previous empirical study on the effects of monetary policy shocks in small open economies has generated puzzling dynamic responses in various macroeconomic variables this paper argues that these puzzles derive from an identification of monetary policy that is inappropriate for such economies to remedy this it is proposed that a structural model be estimated to explicitly account for the features of the small open economy such a model is applied to canada with tightly estimated results overall the dynamic responses to the identified monetary policy shock are consistent with standard theory and highlight the exchange rate as a transmission mechanism

inflation targeting a new framework for monetary policy he world s central bankers and their staffs meet regularly in venues from basle to washington to share ideas and discuss common problems perhaps these frequent meetings help explain why changes in the tactics and strategy of monetary policymaking such as the adoption of money growth targets in the 1970s the intensification of efforts to reduce inflation in the 1980s and the recent push for increased institutional independence for central banks tend to occur in many countries more or less simultaneously whatever their source major changes in the theory and practice of central banking are of great importance for both individual countries and the international economy in this article we discuss a new strategy for monetary policy known as inflation targeting which has sparked much interest and debate among central bankers and monetary economists in recent years this approach is characterized as the name suggests by the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at one or more horizons and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy other important features of inflation targeting include increased communication with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary policymakers and in many cases increased accountability of the central bank

the econometrics of nonlinear budget sets traditional empirical analysis of consumer demand has usually made the assumption of linear budget sets that is the consumer is assumed to purchase any desired quantity at a constant price subject to a budget constraint the major exception to this framework is the analysis of demand when some goods are rationed 2 in the rationed case the price is constant up to a quantity limit in contrast to the rationed case here i consider the situation where the price varies with the amount of the good purchased empirical situations with nonconstant prices come readily to mind and of course they have received much recent attention from theorists since mirrlees 44 paper on optimal nonlinear taxation the following examples are meant to give a partial listing of cases when nonlinear budget sets occur i electricity prices many electric utilities engage in declining block pricing that is the marginal price of successive kwh s of electricity decrease at a given number of points determined by total demand thus the budget set is piecewise linear houthakker 36 was the first to propose an approach to this problem taylor 51 analyzes the problem at length and hausman kinnucin and mcfadden 31 use an instrumental variables estimator to provide consistent estimates of the demand function

the effect on black white wage differences of differences in the quantity and quality of education using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth for the years 1979 88 the author examines the extent to which black white differences in educational attainment educational quality and unmeasured individual ability can explain black white wage differences an analysis that corrects for both selectivity and ability biases inherent in estimating the education wage relationship shows that the main source of the black white wage differential is the racial difference in the quality rather than quantity of schooling in fact the author concludes closing the racial gap in the basic skills learned in school could reduce the wage differential by two thirds

applied cointegration analysis in the mirror of macroeconomic theory summary cointegration analyses of macroeconomic time series are often not based on fully specified theoretical models we use a theoretical model to scrutinize common procedures in applied cointegration analysis monte carlo experiments show that 1 some tests of the cointegration vectors do not work well on series generated by an equilibrium business cycle model 2 cointegration restrictions add little to forecasting 3 structural var models based on weak long run restrictions seem to work well the main disadvantages of cointegration analysis without strong links to economic theory are that it makes it hard to estimate and interpret the cointegration vectors

learning the preferences of governments and voters from proposed spending and aggregated votes abstract remarkably little is known about how to analyze the proposals and voting results from spending referenda when the votes are aggregated by jurisdiction and the proposals are different across jurisdictions this paper presents a framework in which we can derive the voting equation comparative statics and links between reduced form and structural parameters that are implied by different models of the proposal maker it is then possible to use interjurisdictional proposal and voting information to test hypotheses about the proposal maker and the voters our empirical work finds support for a modified budget maximization model over simpler maximization models and various non maximization models

identification long run relations and fundamental innovations in a simple cointegrated system this paper examines the roles played by innovations identified from a simple four variable var characterized by cointegration using knowledge of cointegration rank and textbook relations that link macroeconomic aggregates we identify distinct real and nominal innovations that dictate the long run behavior of the model we also examine the explanatory power of transitory innovations that are orthogonal to these permanent shocks one of the permanent shocks displays all the characteristics of a technology or supply innovation while one of the transitory innovations identified by imposing short run price rigid ity is interpretable as a demand side impulse the permanent nominal shock bears the imprint of an innovation in aggregate inflation expectations historical decomposition and comparison with variables that are external to the model reveals the relative importance of the shocks at various episodes

legal constraints and the choice of educational grant structures recent empirical work suggests that legalconstraints are significant in choosingstate educational grant structures unfortunately the literature has not takensuch constraints into account thus callinginto question particular grant structurerecommendations this paper studies theconditions under which a legislature underorder to reform its educational grantstructure prefers foundation grants overdistrict power equalization grants atheoretical model is presented in which thechoice is shown to depend on the legalbasis of the court s decision and theempirical validity of this conclusion isdemonstrated using connecticut data and aseparate model of school districtexpenditure choice

schools and housing values this study combines historical and quantitative methods to determine the market response to a major nineteenth century american urban architectural form the speculatively built row house the paper estimates a hedonic price index which decomposes the

political influence and the dynamic consistency of policy garfinkel department of economics university of fornia 3151 social science plaza irvine ca 92697 lee artment of economics university of california 3151 soscience plaza irvine ca 92697 and international monfund 700 19th street nw washington dc 20431 we k without implicating avinash dixit amihai glazer chel grossman luisa lambertini stergios skaperdas an ymous referee and seminar participants at the university alifornia los angeles california state universityerton and the 1998 winter meetings of the econometociety for helpful comments on previous drafts of this r which had been circulated under the title political ipline and the dynamic consistency of policy the s expressed in this paper are those of the authors and ld not be attributed to the international monetary fund see torsten persson and guido tabellini 1990 for a ul survey of this literature

current account and macroeconomic fluctuations the primary purpose of this study is to establish some stylized facts about current account and macroeconomic fluctuations in sweden another purpose is to propose a multivariate detrending technique which is based on a time series model with common stochastic trends this technique should be useful for establishing stylized facts about macroeconomic fluctuations in general the descriptive statistics in this analysis are thus confined to the transitory components of the time series in contrast with results obtained for other countries we find e g that the current account is procyclical

the credibility of monetary reform new evidence the history of monetary policy is characterised by crisis and reform the paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful a cross sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem it is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility as the dependent variable we calculate a post reform inflation rate the exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment the constraining influence of institutions and a new variable for ex ante credibility of the reform the paper allows for the conclusion that monetary commitment the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform

an economic model of teaching effectiveness the literature on the determinants of good teaching performance has been largely devoted to empirical measurement a complete review of the publications in this area would require at least an entire issue the size of this journal yet it is virtually impossible to discover attempts to derive hypotheses about the determinants of good teaching from explicit models of behavior this has led researchers into the trap of exploring only the empirical determinants of good teaching performance typically the results of student evaluations are correlated with affective personality traits of the teachers with peer evaluations of psychological compositions or even with the results of various psychological tests examples are the works of robert isaacson et al frank costin et al and wilbert mckeachie et al in most of these studies no substantive conclusions are reached regarding the determinants of effective teaching in the few studies which do contain significant findings the independent variable in question is difficult to explain as a direct determinant of teaching effectiveness for example isaacson et al find that virtually the only statistically significant determinant of effective teaching is the personality characteristic which they label culture this may imply that simply wearing a tweed jacket and taking up pipesmoking is sufficient to improve teaching this paper takes a somewhat different approach to the analysis of teaching assume that the individual in question wishes to maximize teaching effectiveness clearly there are constraints on this maximization process one must necessarily be the time budget constraint a second constraint however adds a good deal of interest to the model this constraint is best described as the bundle of characteristics available to the individual these characteristics could be termed the components of the individual s personality such attributes include physical appearance psychological makeup speaking ability and a myriad of other variables thus this model bears a resemblance to the standard economic models of monopolistic competition see a michael spence before proceeding to a formal statement of the problem a philosophical issue must be addressed what is meant by teaching effectiveness generally this is interpreted as maximizing student evaluations of teachers however this is clearly not always equivalent to maximizing student learning unfortunately the latter variable is difficult but not impossible to measure preand posttesting with standardized tests is becoming increasingly accepted for example the meaning of teaching effectiveness in this paper must unfortunately remain ambiguous some teachers concerned perhaps with obtaining tenure will interpret good teaching as obtaining good evaluations the criterion by which they are judged others may take a more eclectic viewpoint since the problem below is an individual maximization problem the precise definition of effective teaching may simply vary from individual to individual see w r allen formally this problem is exactly analogous to one first addressed by kelvin lancaster he assumes that the consumer attempts to maximize satisfaction through purchase of bundles of attributes each commodity is possessed of certain of these characteristics by consuming various combinations of these commodities the consumer is assistant professor department of economics and director center for economic education california state university hayward i would like to thank alex cassuto nancy sanders and an anonymous referee for helpful discussion in a previously unreported experiment in the department of economics california state universitybakersfield faculty members were required to wear coats and ties in classes it was subsequently observed that teaching evaluations improved unfortunately no detailed statistical results of this experiment are available for analysis

the effects of grants in aid on state and local expenditures abstract this paper develops econometric methods to estimate the effect of the piecewise linear budget constraints created by grant formulas in which the subsidy rate is not constant over expenditures e g closed end grants the methods are applied to the afdc program the results show that because of the kinked nature of the grant formula 1 the present federal formula actually increases cross state inequality in afdc benefits 2 several subsidy rates in the formula actually reduce benefits and 3 the so called flypaper effect disappears

on the contract curve a test of alternative models of collective bargaining the traditional model of collective bargaining confines unions to settlements constrained by the employer s labor demand curve but an alternative model places wage employment outcomes on a contract curve that extends beyond the labor demand curve this paper derives a multidimensional hedonic contract curve model in which employment security provisions are used to maintain efficient bargains outside the employer s demand curve and distinguishes empirically between the contract curve and demand constraint models using data for public school teachers in new york state estimates clearly support the contract curve model over the demand constraint model by linking the gap between compensation and the value of the marginal product to the strength of employment security provisions

what is wrong with taylor rules using judgment in monetary policy through targeting rules it is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule e ither ageneral targeting rule explicit objectives for monetary policy or a specific targeting rule a criterion for the forecasts of the target variables to be fulfilled essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extramodel information are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium

on the impossibility of central bank independence four decades of time and intellectual inconsistency the intellectual justification for modern central banking time inconsistency celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the cambridge journal of economics however the key progeny of the time inconsistency literature central bank independence has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research in the first instance the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country second central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence i conclude that independence fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context with central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy

central banker contracts incomplete information and monetary policy surprises in search of a selfish central banker approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problemprovides a useful framework for interpreting alternativedelegation schemes in this paper we consider theeffectiveness of central banker incentive schemes when theprincipal delegates monetary policy through contracts butremains uncertain about the central banker s responsiveness tosuch schemes we adopt a simple principal agent model andassume that the central banker s trade off between socialwelfare and the incentive scheme is private information weconsider two types of central bankers one who responds to theincentive scheme selfish and one who does not and onlycares about social welfare benevolent we demonstratethat when a benevolent central banker accepts a contractdesigned for a selfish central banker positive inflationsurprises occur and output exceeds its natural rate wefurther show that a benevolent central banker with aninflation bias has an incentive to masquerade as selfish mechanisms exist that solve that problem by achievingpreference revelation we consider a simple mechanism indominant strategies that induces the benevolent type eithernot to breach or not to accept the appointment contract inthe first place this multi period mechanism works with eitherinflation targets or the appointment of a conservativecentral banker our results suggest that more complicatedincentive schemes embedded within broader constitutionalarrangements are required in the presence of privateinformation for them to work effectively

recession aversion output and the kydland prescott barro gordon model abstract this paper explores the relationship between the kydland prescott barro gordon model and models with asymmetric policy preferences while both yield an inflation bias recession aversion dampens the output effects of contractionary supply shocks some inflation may therefore reflect policy preferences

estimating permanent and transitory income elasticities of education spending from panel data abstract we use a twenty one year panel of data to examine the role of past income and aid and expectations of future income in regressions explaining state and local education spending we show that simple estimates of the elasticity of spending with respect to financial resources are not robust to specification changes because the variables are non stationary over time causing inconsistent estimation of model parameters estimation in first differences or equivalently in growth rates solves the time series problems and produces robust estimates of the model s parameters we then show that current spending by states responds to changes in expected future income this explains why using fixed effects in simpler models reduces estimated income elasticities fixed effects partially capture permanent income effects on spending estimates of lagged income are significant when used in models that do not explicitly model the expectations process but present and past aid both have no effect on education spending models with structural assumptions about expected income produce estimates very similar to simpler models which include lagged information on income as a control variable we conclude with recommendations for estimating models when only cross section data or only short panels are available

a model of local demand for education abstract a careful modeling of the spending behavior of local school districts in new jersey is presented the theoretical model relies on the common hypothesis of political competition leading to a median outcome as well as the assumption that school superintendents act as budget maximizers the model is estimated for a sample of 177 school districts under three different aid formulas pooling of the cross sections suggests that the response of school expenditures to changes in variables other than those associated with school aid parameters has remained constant over time the results are discussed in the context of recent theories regarding the effect of intergovernmental aid on the level of public expenditure

the quality of schooling quantity alone is misleading although much research discusses the quantity of schooling as an effective impact on productivity and earnings most such research leaves out the idea of the quality of schooling which may cause biases in the estimated returns to schooling this paper consequently attempts to extend the standard mincerian approach to incorporate school quality as well as quantity it demonstrates how exclusion of quality in the standard procedure may cause biases in the estimated returns to years of schooling probably in the upward direction the paper explores the implications of this extension of the standard model for the case of young brazilian males it shows that the estimate of the private return to years of schooling using the preferred quality inclusive specification is only one half the estimate using the standard procedure indicating substantial upward bias in the standard estimates it further outlines a method for estimating a social return to quality and finds that it exceeds substantially the social return to quantity the paper then shows why this in turn suggests there may be an equity productivity trade off in schooling investments

public education expenditures and private school enrollment in this paper i investigate whether increases in public education expenditures lead to reductions in private school enrollment in order to deal with the endogeneity of public expenditures i use as a natural experiment the 1998 fundef reform in brazil that caused exogenous variations in local public school funding using data from brazilian school and population censuses i show that public education expenditures increases are associated with reductions in the share of private school enrollment for grade 1 however the effect is smaller for grades 2 to 4 which is consistent with the existence of costs associated with switching schools resume depenses pour l instruction publique et inscriptions dans les ecoles privees dans ce memoire on fait enquete pour etablir si des accroissements dans les depenses pour l instruction publique menent a des reductions dans les inscriptions dans les ecoles privees conscient de l endogeneite des depenses publiques l auteur utilise la reforme fundef de 1998 au brazil qui a entraine des variations exogenes dans le financement des ecoles publiques locales a partir des donnees des recensements bresiliens des ecoles et de la population on montre que les accroissements de depenses pour l instruction publique sont associes a des reductions dans la part des ecoles privees dans les inscriptions en premiere annee cependant l effet est plus faible pour les inscriptions dans les annees 2 a 4 qui suivent ce qui est coherent avec l existence de couts associes aux changements d ecole