technology and transaction cost economics a reply abstract i argue here as i have previously that technology is neither fully determinative of nor irrelevant to economic organization transaction cost economizing occupies a prominent position in any effort to assess the efficacy of alternative forms of economic organization

learning by doing vs learning from others in a principal agent model abstract we introduce learning in a principal agent model of output sharing under moral hazard we use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement experience weighted attraction ewa and individual evolutionary learning iel to represent individual learning learning in the principal agent model is difficult due to the stochastic environment the discontinuity in payoffs at the optimal contract and the incorrect evaluation of foregone payoffs for iel and ewa social learning is much more successful in adapting to the optimal contract than standard individual learning algorithms a modified iel using realized payoffs evaluation performs better but still falls short of social learning

organizational governance and ethical systems a covenantal approach to building trust american businesses and corporate executives are faced with a serious problem the loss of public confidence public criticism increased government controls and growing expectations for improved financial performance and accountability have accompanied this decline in trust traditional approaches to corporate governance typified by agency theory and stakeholder theory have been expensive to direct and have focused on short term profits and organizational systems that fail to achieve desired results we explain why the organizational governance theories are fundamentally inadequate to build trust we advance a conceptual framework based on stewardship theory characterized by covenantal relationships and argue that design of governance mechanisms using a covenantal approach is more effective in building trust in organizations a covenantal relationship is a specialized form of a relational contract between an employee and his or her organization we argue that regardless of incentives and control mechanisms carefully designed through contractual mechanisms in the absence of covenantal relationships it is extremely difficult to build trust within organizations we propose that organizations are more likely to build trust both at the organizational level and at the interpersonal level when they create reinforcing and integrated systems that honor implied duties of covenantal relationships

cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection abstract we study cooperation dynamics in repeated games with markovian private information after any history signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions but also makes the problem of coordinating current actions harder in equilibrium players may play aggressive or uncooperative actions that signal private information and partners tolerate a certain number of such actions we discuss several applications of our results we explain the cycles of cooperation and conflict observed in trench warfare during world war i show that price leadership and unilateral price cuts can be part of an optimal signaling equilibrium in a repeated bertrand game with incomplete information and show that communication between cartel members may be socially efficient in a repeated cournot game finally we show that the welfare losses disappear as the persistence of the process of types increases and the interest rate goes to zero

communication networks knowledge and decisions that communication pervades the everyday life of organizations is a statement of the obvious how this widespread communication affects organization s performance is less clear another truism about organizations is that their members are seldom fully knowledgeable of the exact state of the world in which they operate to overcome this information uncertainty burden organizations tend to devote a substantial amount of resources to retrieve information about their environment individual experimentation is a natural way to obtain superior information when the nature and the consequences of the prevailing uncertainty is common to all organization members a natural substitute for replications of individual experiments is to have agents communicate their private information among themselves communication is then a means to save on experimentation costs when they display diminishing returns in another vein shared information fosters coordination between individual agents which is beneficial to the organization as a whole when coordinated actions lead to higher benefits for everyone altogether when each organization member individually ascertains that both uncertainty and coordination are the main driving networked interactions

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high tech manufacturing organizations htmos abstract this paper uses economic mechanisms to coordinate supply chains within high tech manufacturing organizations htmos it models the one shot initial production and allocation decisions involved in the production and marketing of new technologies these decisions are driven by the economic objectives of the firm and of the employees with private information the experts it analyzes and compares the efficiency of three coordination policies centralized command and control centralized revelation and decentralized revelation it shows that decentralized policies introduce an additional cost and it proposes rules of thumb for coordinating supply chains within firms that use many experts

asset specificity and economic organization abstract this paper examines the optimization problem of firm and market organization in which both production cost and transaction cost differences are expressed as a function of asset specificity in general markets enjoy advantages by aggregating the demands of many buyers thereby realizing economies of scale or scope such production cost savings need to be assessed in relation to the transaction cost advantages that internal organization sometimes enjoys over markets in adapting to changed circumstances as it turns out both production cost economies and the transaction cost differences between firm and market organization vary systematically with the characteristics of the investments this paper employs a unified framework to assess the choice of organization form the condition of asset specificity is featured

labor income responds differently to income tax and payroll tax reforms we estimate the responses of gross labor income with respect to marginal and average net of tax rates in france over the period 2003 2006 we exploit a series of reforms to the income tax and payroll tax schedules affecting individuals who earn less than twice the minimum wage our estimate for the elasticity of gross labor income with respect to the marginal net of income tax rate is around 0 2 while we find no response to the marginal net of payroll tax rate the elasticity with respect to the average net of tax rate is not significant for the income tax schedule while it is close to 1 for the payroll tax schedule a plausible explanation is the existence of significant labor supply responses to the income tax schedule combined with sticky posted wages i e the gross labor income minus payroll taxes divided by hours worked finally the effect of the net of income tax rate seems to be driven by participation decisions in particular those of married women

marginal tax rates and income new time series evidence this paper estimates the dynamic effects of marginal tax rate changes on income reported on tax returns in the united states over the 1950 2010 period after isolating exogenous variation in average marginal tax rates in structural vector autoregressions using a narrative identification approach i find large positive effects of tax cuts in the top 1 of the income distribution in contrast to earlier findings based on tax return data i also find large effects in other income percentile brackets a hypothetical tax reform cutting marginal rates only for the top 1 leads to sizeable increases in top 1 incomes and has a positive effect on real gdp there are also spillover effects to incomes outside of the top 1 but top marginal rate cuts lead to greater inequality in pre tax incomes

on the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and government revenues abstract when arthur laffer and other supply side advocates plot total tax revenue as a function of a particular tax rate they draw an upward sloping segment called the normal range followed by a downward sloping segment called the prohibitive range a brief literature review indicates that tax rates on the prohibitive range in theoretical and empirical models have been the result of particularly high tax rates high elasticity parameters or both the labor tax rate which maximizes total revenue for example will depend on the assumed labor supply elasticity this paper introduces a new curve which summarizes the tax rate and elasticity combinations that result in maximum revenues separating the normal area from the prohibitive area a general purpose empirical u s general equilibrium model is used to plot the laffer curve for several elasticities and to plot the newly introduced curve using the labor tax example results indicate that the u s could conceivably be operating in the prohibitive area but that the tax wedge or labor supply elasticity would have to be much higher than most estimates would suggest

another look at the radner stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information abstract this paper revisits the well known result of r radner and j stiglitz 1984 in bayesian models of economic theory elsevier amsterdam which shows that under certain conditions the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realizations are finite assumptions which preclude most analyses of optimal information acquisition we provide sufficient conditions that yield this nonconcavity in the value of information in a general framework the role that these conditions play is clarified and illustrated with several examples we also discuss the robustness of the nonconcavity result and the difficulties involved in getting the value of information to be globally concave journal of economic literature classification number d83

the design of direct taxation and family benefits abstract the subject of this paper is the design of the personal income tax and social security benefits that vary with the size of the family it is concerned with the analytical problems of policy design that arise from constraints on the instruments which may be used from differences in social judgements about the desirability of redistribution and from differences of view about the disincentive effects of taxation the paper considers these issues in the context of the french tax benefit system and the implications of the french system being harmonised towards certain features of the british system

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates a critical review this paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data first we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis we discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic second we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the united states to illustrate those issues third we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out finally we discuss avenues for future research jel h24 h31 j22

entrepreneurial universities and overt opportunism entrepreneurial universities are a catalyst for regional economic development and growth yet the entrepreneurial university may not always capture the full gains made by the broader economy due to opportunistic behavior by its faculty scientists we expand agency theory to address conditions when opportunistic behavior persists in the face of substantial information symmetry and where principals appear to tolerate opportunism despite the authority to sanction their agents using a sample of 105 us research universities and 73 603 scientists we demonstrate that some scientists privately leak discoveries invented while working for their universities counter to prior prediction we find that universities acting as principals often do not retaliate even when having knowledge of such opportunistic behavior and the capability to punish non complying agents to extend theory we examined contexts that exacerbate and alleviate such overt opportunism high value discoveries and sizable entrepreneurial activity are associated with greater opportunistic behavior whereas efforts to empower those who have close professional ties with scientists their departments and technology commercialization offices are related to reduced opportunism to complement our empirical analyses we provide a stylized mathematical model that shows how agency theory can improve its predictive power once it formally recognizes certain conditions under which agents wield substantial bargaining power over their principals who in turn seem to tolerate agents overt opportunistic behavior

the effect of income taxes on household income research on the distribution of income during the 1980s has identified a trend towards increasing inequality which may be the continuation and acceleration of trends spanning several decades this paper explores to what extent behavioral responses to the tax changes during the 1980s may also explain the rising inequality the 1986 tax reform act is used as a natural experiment to explore the roles played by both taxes and a variety of nontax factors our principal finding is that both tax rates and nontax factors appear to have had significant effects on relative income growth during the late 1980s

what happens when you tax the rich evidence from executive compensation this paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995 the data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income indeed this small group of executives may account for as much as 20 percent of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for approximately the one million richest taxpayers over this time period one person alone can account for more than 2 percent the decline however is almost entirely a short run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income the short run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share exceeds one in this sample but the elasticity after one year is at most 0 4 and probably closer to zero breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows that the large short run responses come almost entirely from a large inc

capital account liberalization and dynamic price discovery evidence from chinese cross listed stocks abstractwe analyse the effects of a recent financial reform shanghai hong kong stock connect that enables cross market investment between hong kong and shanghai stock exchanges using a vecm we find that the reform announcement considerably narrows the equilibrium level of price disparity and strengthens the price comovement of shares that are cross listed in both markets the estimated equilibrium relationship is in support of the relative law of one price we find that both markets adjust in response to a disequilibrium in price disparity leading to a sizeable error correction activity the shanghai market contributes to approximately two thirds of the price discovery process competition and informativeness of trading affect the relative role of price discovery in each market finally the reform implementation reinforces the long run cointegration relationship and strengthens the short run price comovements of cross listed stocks despite the widening price disparity during the period

the elasticity of taxable income during the 1990s new estimates and sensitivity analyses author affiliation seth h giertz sgiertz2 unl edu acknowledgment the author wishes to thank david weiner ed harris bob dennis doug hamilton tom woodward emmanuel saez chris bollinger and three anonymous referees for their comments and assistance 1 introductioneconomists have long recognized that taxation creates economic inefficiency by distorting relative prices often between leisure and all other goods in the economy even a broad based income tax can have substantial efficiency costs so long as leisure remains untaxed harberger 1964 uses this as motivation for comparing the efficiency implications of direct versus indirect taxation in so doing he shows how labor supply elasticities can be used to measure the efficiency implications of income taxation 1 harberger s analysis had a profound influence on public and labor economists spurring increased research into labor supply elasticities which were seen as proxies for the efficiency costs from taxation more than two decades after harberger economists began to emphasize the variety of other margins over which taxes can distort behavior in addition to hours worked these economists noted that these other behavioral responses may too have important implications for efficiency an important building block in the evolution of this literature was set forth by slemrod 1990 who presented a hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation slemrod divided behavior into three categories based on their responsiveness to taxes his least responsive category real responses includes individuals changing consumption and work patterns and businesses altering investment and production decisions second in order of responsiveness is circumvention which includes both illegally evasion and legally avoidance bypassing the tax system 2 in the case of evasion income is concealed from tax authorities or factors that offset tax liabilities such as expenses and deductions are inflated beyond what is legally permitted in the case of avoidance income is shifted in order to receive more favorable tax treatment diverting income into a tax deferred retirement account is an example of avoidance 3 included in circumvention is the expenditure of time and money necessary to avoid or evade taxation third on the hierarchy and the most responsive is the timing of income receipt which includes pulling the receipt of income into the previous year or pushing it into the next in order to take advantage of more favorable tax treatment while not altering real behavior 4 slemrod further recognizes that the type of behavioral response could have implications for both tax revenue and tax incidence and in some cases efficiency predating slemrod s insights lindsey 1987 produced elasticity estimates for taxable income although what lindsey termed taxable income more closely approximates adjusted gross income agi instead of labor supply 5 lindsey s estimated elasticities were much larger than the labor supply literature would have suggested lindsey emphasized the revenue implications of the elasticity of taxable income eti but not its efficiency implications building on slemrod and lindsey feldstein 1995 produced eti estimates but went much further than lindsey in describing the behaviors that could affect taxable income he argued that many of these behaviors were not captured by labor supply elasticities furthermore feldstein posited that income taxation creates economic inefficiency not only by distorting the relative price between labor and leisure but more broadly by distorting the relative price between goods or activities that are taxed and those that are not taxed since leisure is not the only untaxed activity for example in response to taxes not only work hours but also work effort might change

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

estimating taxable income responses with elasticity heterogeneity abstract we explore elasticity heterogeneity in the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income eti and propose potentially valid instruments we show that previously used instruments are not valid and yield weighted averages of etis of different taxpayers plus a bias using the nber tax panel for 1979 1990 we find a weighted average eti of 0 57 when using all available variation in budget set changes provided by the tax reforms in the data our results also demonstrate that elasticity heterogeneity is an important explanation for the remarkable divergence of estimates in the previous literature

reported gross income and marginal tax rates estimation of the behavioural reactions of spanish taxpayers this article estimates for the spanish personal income tax the elasticity of reported gross income to marginal tax rates the identification of this elasticity has been performed using the reform approved by law 35 2006 which came into force in january 2007 the elasticities obtained suggest the existence of important efficiency costs with significant regional differences the average elasticity estimated for spain as a whole is 0 676 however this elasticity is highly dispersed throughout the spanish administrative regions which indicates the unequal power of distortion of the tax thus households whose principal source of income is salary display an elasticity of 0 337 compared to 0 682 for households whose main income source comes from business or savings lastly a positive correlation is also detected between elasticity and income level an elasticity of 3 6 is reached for taxpayers with an annual gross income exceeding 100 000

evidence on the insurance effect of redistributive taxation copyright 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

does tax policy affect executive compensation evidence from postwar tax reforms abstract the trends in executive pay and labor income tax rates since the 1940s suggest a high elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax policy by contrast the level and structure of executive compensation have been largely unresponsive to tax incentives since the 1980s however the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay was small during this period using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005 we also find a small short run response of salaries qualified stock options and bonuses paid after retirement to changes in tax rates on labor income even though tax rates were significantly higher and more heterogeneous across individuals in the first several decades following wwii we explore several potential explanations for the conflicting impressions given by the long run and short run correlations between taxes and pay including changes in social norms and concerns about pay equality

the effect of age targeted tax credits on labor force participation of older workers abstract i analyze the effect of income tax policy changes on labor force participation of older workers i exploit two age targeted policy initiatives to promote work at older ages simultaneously implemented in sweden in 2007 an earned income tax credit and a payroll tax credit for workers above age 65 using an age based discontinuity in eligibility criteria i conduct a difference in differences analysis with the reform as an instrument for the net of tax rate i find a participation elasticity with respect to the net of participation tax rate of about 0 22 in the year following the 65th birthday for individuals who were working four years earlier

the elasticity of taxable income evidence and implications abstract a central tax policy parameter that has recently received much attention but about which there is substantial uncertainty is the overall elasticity of taxable income we provide new estimates of this elasticity which address identification problems with previous work by exploiting a long panel of tax returns to study a series of tax reforms throughout the 1980s this identification strategy also allows us to provide new evidence on both the income effects of tax changes on taxable income and on variation in the elasticity of taxable income by income group we find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is approximately 0 4 the elasticity of real income not including tax preferences is much lower we estimate small income effects of tax changes on reported income implying that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of taxable income are very similar we estimate that this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above 100 000 per year who have an elasticity of 0 57 while for those with incomes below 100 000 per year the elasticity is less than one third as large moreover high income taxpayers who itemize are particularly responsive to taxation our estimates suggest that optimal tax structures may feature tightly targeted transfers to lower income taxpayers and a flat or even declining marginal rate structure for middle and high income taxpayers

optimal market intelligence strategy when management attention is scarce this paper extends the theoretical literature on firms optimal information strategies to the situation when a firm s management attention capacity to process available data is scarce in this case a firm s optimal market intelligence strategy must trade off learning a little about a broad range of markets a broad strategy with gaining a very deep understanding of one or a few markets a focused strategy this trade off is not present when data are scarce an assumption made in most of the existing literature on optimal information search strategies however in data rich environments which are of increasing relevance given technology changes we show a focused market intelligence strategy is always best when managers need to process a substantial amount of data before beginning to gain insights i e there are increasing returns to attention interestingly this focused strategy can also be best with decreasing returns to attention when a managers are sufficiently efficient in processing the available data and b managers have sufficiently strong initial priors on the unknown market parameters we show a broad market intelligence strategy is only optimal when new data points are sufficiently redundant i e when the learning rate is sufficiently decreasing with the allocation of more attention our results also indicate that advances in information technology can account for the pressure on firms to become more focused and that competition increases the likelihood of a focused strategy competition can lead to asymmetric outcomes where firms focus on different markets finally we note that a focused market intelligence strategy and thus an asymmetric allocation of attention does not require a priori differences between firms markets or market specific core capabilities consequently a focused market intelligence strategy can result in market specific core competencies and produce firm differences from equivalent starting conditions