barriers to entry and competitive behavior evidence from reforms of cable franchising regulations between 2005 and 2008 19 of the 50 states of the u s reformed the franchising process for cable television significantly easing entry into local markets using a differencein differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms we find that prices for basic service declined systematically by about 5 5 to 6 8 percent following the reforms but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular expanded basic service we also find that the reforms led to increased actual entry in reformed states by about 11 6 relative to non reformed states our analysis shows that the decline in price for basic service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry consistent with limit pricing by incumbents to control for potential state level shocks correlated with the reforms we undertake a sample split test examining changes in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry because they were close to a prominent second entrant we find larger declines in prices for both basic and expanded basic services in these markets our results are consistent with limit pricing models that predict incumbents respond to increased threat of entry and suggest that the reforms facilitated entry and modestly benefitted consumers in reformed states

the impact of the 1992 cable act on household demand and welfare i measure the benefit to households of the 1992 cable act in light of strategic responses by cable systems to the regulations mandated by the act a discrete choice differentiatedproduct model of household demand for all offered cable television services forms the basis of the analysis aggregation over households and service combinations to the level of the data permits estimation on a cross section of cable markets from before and after the act the results indicate that while the regulations mandated price reductions of 10 17 for cable services observed system responses yielded no change in household welfare post act changes in cable prices are responsible for most of the difference

strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts this paper characterizes equilibrium exclusionary contracts between buyers an incumbent firm and a potential entrant when buyers can either vertically integrate or contract with the outside entrant in this setting exclusionary contracts are generally shown to be efficient and to deter inefficient entry that would otherwise occur with multiple unorganized buyers equilibrium contracts are shown to take a divide and conquer form and in some cases to deter some efficient entry in such cases efficient contracting can be restored by a policy that prohibits price discrimination and gives agents free reign to sign exclusionary agreements copyright 1994 by american economic association

market power of local cable television franchises evidence from the effects of deregulation the 1989 cable act eliminated most price regulation of cable television operators including the right of municipalities to enforce price terms in franchise agreements deregulation was justified at least partially by the contention that competition from other entertainment media eliminated any market power of cable franchises we examine the value at sale of existing cable systems before and after deregulation assuming that this value represents the expected present value of future profits deregulation had the predicted negligible effect on profits in cities with significant broadcast competition however profits appear to have increased in areas where the competition from broadcast television was less severe we explore several explanations for this increase and conclude that significant market power is the most plausible explanation

regulatory fog the role of information in regulatory persistence abstract regulation is very persistent even when inefficient we propose an explanation for regulatory persistence based on regulatory fog the phenomenon by which regulation obscures information regarding the value of counterfactual policies we construct a dynamic model of regulation in which the underlying need for regulation varies stochastically and regulation undermines the social planner s ability to observe the state of the world compared to a full information benchmark regulation is highly persistent often lasting indefinitely regulatory fog is robust to a broad range of partially informative policies and can be quite detrimental to social welfare regulatory experiments modeled as costly and imperfect signals of the underlying state do not eliminate the effects of regulatory fog we characterize their effects and provide a framework for choosing amongst a set of potential regulatory experiments

vertical integration market foreclosure and consumer welfare in the cable television industry i examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry i assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings prices and subscriptions and i compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets the results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions first integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators second vertical integration does not harm and may actually benefit consumers because of the associated efficiency gains

optimal contracts with lock in the authors analyze incomplete long term contracts when buyers incur relationship specific set up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties if set up costs are observable the first best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot enforceably specify quality this does not even require long term contracts if set up costs are unobservable however then long term price contracts can strictly outperform short term contracts equilibrium may involve either inefficiently low quality with no buyer switching or efficient quality with inefficient switching a policy of taxing switching or the availability of budget breaking third parties can improve welfare copyright 1989 by american economic association

on measuring competitive viability and monopoly power in cable an empirical cost approach this study provides empirical evidence concerning the economic feasibility of competition in the local market for video delivery services using responses from the fcc s 1995 cost survey we jointly estimate a translog cost function with factor share equations to evaluate subadditivity the fitted total cost of each firm is compared with the cost of two firms providing the same total output in eleven different market scenarios although costs were mildly superadditive in the vast majority of cases they were lower when one firm provided the output average cost savings with respect to a monopoly were fairly small ranging from 1 37 with a 10 market overlap to 5 05 with a complete overbuild we also calculated marginal cost from the fitted total cost equation and a price for cable services derived from the fcc survey data using these results and rubinovitz s price elasticity of 1 46 we estimated that reregulation had a regulatory effectiveness of 0 3251 and held prices to 40 5 of the monopoly level

concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry the future of television tv regulation concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry new technologies are deeply transforming the broadcasting industry what we have seen so far is only the beginning of a long story inevitably industry regulations must adapt which means that a wide ranging rethink of current practices is required in order to assess the likely evolution of the industry this article decomposes it into a number of components from conception of programmes to their broadcasting including distribution storage and licensing contrary to popular expectations the analysis suggests that the current high degree of concentration will if anything increase the policy implication is that regulation so far driven by now obsolete technological constraints should increasingly emphasize promoting competition massimo motta and michele polo

price competition and compatibility in the presence of positive demand externalities in many cases the benefit to a consumer of a product increases with the number of other users of the same product these demand interdependencies are referred to in the literature as positive demand externalities or network externalities this paper examines the dynamic pricing behaviors of an incumbent and a later entrant with special attention to the impacts of demand externalities compatibility and competition on prices and profits defining market power as the ability to price above a competitor without losing market share we show how demand externalities and installed base combine to confer market power we model optimal pricing as a differential game with the optimal price trajectory established as nash open loop controls for a duopoly durable goods market with strong demand externalities the results show an increasing price trajectory can be optimal as expected a new entrant is better off if its products are compatible with those of the incumbent especially when demand externalities are strong and the installed base of the incumbent is large less intuitively the incumbent as well may be better off agreeing on common standards the comparison of monopoly and duopoly shows that under strong demand externalities and a small installed base the incumbent profits from compatible entry

second sourcing as a commitment monopoly incentives to attract competition we show that a new product monopolist may benefit from delayed competition if consumers incur setup costs setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs we show that if customers anticipate this problem the monopolist s profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post adoption market if setup costs are large if setup costs are small the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with

the impact of the regulation of the cable television industry the effect on quality adjusted cable television prices between the mid 1980s and early 1990s cable television rates increased substantially simple price comparisons over the regulated and deregulated eras are difficult as the programming changed simultaneously using a modified hedonic framework to allow for the lack of competition on the supply side of the industry this paper imputes the price for regulation era cable packages using consumers estimated willingness to pay for individual satellite networks during the unregulated period then a quality adjusted price for the cable package offered in 1985 is estimated on average regulation benefited consumers by keeping prices below monopolist s profit maximizing price

cable franchise renewals do incumbent firms behave opportunistically systematic empirical evidence has heretofore been lacking on the extent to which supplier opportunism at the time of contract renewal is a fundamental problem associated with franchise bidding schemes at least for the case of local cable television distribution this article suggests several theoretical reasons why bad behavior by an incumbent supplier may be the exception rather than the rule and a simple test for supplier opportunism at the time of franchise renewal the simple test is employed to empirically analyze the terms of trade in a cross sectional sample of recent cable franchise renewal contracts

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

information and the hold up problem we examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input we study how the resulting hold up problem is affected by the seller s information about the investing party s likely returns from its investment our principal focus is on the effects of the investment s being observable by the non investing party contrary to popular intuition we find that an improvement in the seller s information e g the investment s being observable rather than not can benefit the buyer and harm the seller we also find that other popular intuitions about this problem are either false incomplete or require strong assumptions to be valid

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

nuclear power climate change and energy security exploring british public attitudes public attitudes towards nuclear power in the uk have historically been deeply divided but as concern about climate change and energy security has exerted an increasing influence on british energy policy nuclear power has been reframed as a low carbon technology previous research has suggested that a significant proportion of people may reluctantly accept nuclear power as a means of addressing the greater threat of climate change drawing on the results of a national british survey n 1822 the current study found that attitudes towards nuclear remain divided with only a minority expressing unconditional acceptance in general people who expressed greater concern about climate change and energy security and possessed higher environmental values were less likely to favour nuclear power however when nuclear power was given an explicit reluctant acceptance framing allowing people to express their dislike for nuclear power alongside their conditional support concerns about climate change and energy security became positive predictors of support for nuclear power these findings suggest that concern about climate change and energy security will only increase acceptance of nuclear power under limited circumstances specifically once other preferred options have been exhausted

growth incentives to invest in a network externality environment firms that operate in the telecommunications industry often have to make large and risky investments in digital infrastructure this paper examines how firm size affects the incentive to invest in infrastructure projects in industry environments that incur substantial network externalities we suggest that in the presence of network externalities a firm s rate of growth first declines and then increases with the size of its user base an implication of this result is that firms may benefit from making investments in emerging digital infrastructure early enough to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before other firms investments pre empt them the results mean that firms that undertake earlier successful investment may achieve preemption very quickly the sources of network externalities contribute to the incidence of strategic alliances in network industries particularly when coupled with the pressures of technical uncertainty copyright 1998 by oxford university press

collusive conduct in duopolies multimarket contact and cross ownership in the mobile telephone industry the deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in hopes of increasing competition one example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the united states where the fcc created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes we find that cross ownership and multimarket contact are important factors in explaining non competitive prices

the effects of market structure and ownership on prices and service offerings in the cable television industry this article provides empirical evidence on the effects of alternative market structures and ownership modes on prices and service offerings in the cable television industry we analyze the underlying characteristics and behavior of competing versus monopoly operators on the one hand and privately versus nonprivately owned operators on the other we find that competition and nonprivate ownership are associated with lower prices for basic cable television service we also find that cable television price and quality differentials vary with certain characteristics of competing operators and that market structure and ownership status influence changes in price and quality over time

market power and price increases for basic cable service since deregulation since the deregulation of rates for basic cable television service increases in price have outpaced the rate of inflation this article examines whether or not cable systems increased market power or their increased exercise of market power explains these price increases an estimated quasi supply function for cable systems before and after deregulation implies that real basic cable prices increased 18 since deregulation holding quality and other costs constant accounting for 43 of the total real price increase a demand equation is also estimated and the estimated demand elasticity of basic cable does not change after deregulation implying that this 18 real price increase is due to greater exercise of existing market power made possible by the elimination ofprice regulation rather than to an increase in market power caused by a change in the demand elasticity for cable

imperfect competition and reputational commitment abstract competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality these are self sustaining depending on future profits after maintaining or deviating from the commitment and on current costs of sustaining it competition can affect these three elements at different rates

fragmented duopoly a conceptual and empirical investigation where wireline distribution networks compete each network typically has some customers over which it competes and others for which it is the sole provider this paper conceptually and empirically assesses the effects of such competition on market prices demand and service quality for cable television service the results suggest that the effectiveness of competition in lowering prices is contingent on the degree of system overlap in particular in equilibrium an increase in overlap substantially reduces prices the conceptual model of fragmented duopoly developed in the paper may be useful in analyzing emerging competition in other network distribution industries

fighting city hall entry deterrence and technology upgrades in cable tv markets this article investigates how private firms respond to potential entry from public firms this paper uses a data set of over 3 000 u s cable tv systems to present evidence consistent with entry deterrence incumbent cable tv firms upgrade faster when located in markets with a potential municipal entrant however the same systems are then slower to offer new products enabled by the upgrade suggesting upgrades in these markets occur for strategic reasons incumbent cable systems also upgrade faster in response to municipal entry threats than to private entry threats understanding how private firms respond to potential entry from public firms is especially important in light of recent u s government entry into several industries this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

firm behavior in franchise monopoly markets this article presents empirical evidence concerning the value offranchise bidding competition as a means of controlling natural monopoly behavior the analysis focuses on the cable television industry using data collected in a survey of local government officials in cabled communities throughout the continental united states one important potential problem raised by critics offranchise bidding is the ability offranchise winners to engage in ex post opportunistic behavior by reneging on the promises that they made in order to win the franchise contract the results of my analysis suggest that although franchise competition does leadfirms to engage in some degree of opportunistic behavior the extent of opportunism is not severe furthermore reputation effects appear to play a role in constraining firm behavior while rate regulation actually seems to exacerbate ex post behavioral problems

intertemporal common agency and organizational design how much decentralization abstract in common agency where one agent contracts with several principals to what extent should the principals cooperate and centralize provision of incentives if the agency is over contract complements where an increase in activity for one principal increases the marginal value of contracting with other principals complete centralization seems optimal since this internalizes all externalities we show that this intuition is not generally valid for dynamic agency situations for although centralization provides more accurate incentives to the agent it also aggravates the ratchet effect and this negative effect may dominate the optimal degree of decentralization is discussed and partly characterized

an examination of market power in the intrastate long distance telephone service markets evidence from a natural experiment abstract during the preceding 2 decades state public utility commissions have experimented extensively with regulating telecommunications carriers more recently many states have more or less deregulated long distance service this paper employs a panel data set of states to examine whether the competitive conduct of long distance carriers was affected by these events a methodology is developed to estimate changes in the market conduct parameter following states decisions to price deregulate long distance service this effect is isolated by using a difference in difference estimator that compares the change in market conduct of the treatment group states deregulated during the study period to the change in market conduct of the control group states deregulated throughout the study period my hypothesis is that elimination of price regulation altered the carriers market conduct and that this change in conduct explains in part the price differences in regulated and deregulated markets the result

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

regulatory effects on electricity prices in hong kong abstract in hong kong electricity is supplied by two investor owned utilities china light and power company limited clp and the hongkong electric company limited hec these two utilities operate under a special regulatory arrangement known as the scheme of control which was proposed by the industry in 1964 the objective of this paper is to evaluate whether the scheme of control has fulfilled its original intention of protecting both the producer s right to serve and the consumer s right to be served our empirical results have indicated that the first scheme of control 1964 1978 had a greater effect on reducing electricity prices than the second one 1979 1992