wealth effects in the principal agent model abstract this paper addresses the question of how the principal s surplus and agency costs depend on the agent s wealth our main results are that if the agent has an additively separable utility function in income and effort and his degree of absolute prudence is smaller than three times the agent s degree of absolute risk aversion then the principal s expected pay off is smaller the richer the agent for general utility functions this result also holds if the first order approach is applicable and one further technical assumption is satisfied if however the participation constraint does not bind then richer agents are cheaper journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 g3 j33

introduction imperfect information and rural credit markets puzzles and policy perspectives rural credit markets have been at the center of policy intervention in developing countries over the past forty years many governments supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have devoted considerable resources to supplying cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings the results of many of these interventions have been disappointing and one explanation for this must be that they were based on an inadequate understanding of the workings of rural credit markets the articles in this symposium issue are devoted to empirical and theoretical investigations of rural credit markets in the framework of the imperfect information paradigm the authors show how this framework is useful not only in explaining puzzling features of these markets but also in providing a policy perspective to assess the successes and failures of specific interventions

rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper analyzes the structure of loan contracts comprising interest rate loan size and collateral requirements in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information when debtors are risk averse using a similar but more general framework than former papers on this topic it is argued that results obtained in the literature so far are largely driven by assuming technological indivisibilities or universal risk neutrality or both whatever market structure is assumed to prevail the generalized model implies that some borrowers always receive a smaller loan and invest at a smaller scale than with perfect information in the competitive case loan size rationing and self selection of risks are shown to co exist in equilibrium even though full funding of all investment projects is feasible and socially desirable

an empirical investigation of rationing constraints in rural credit markets in india abstract the literature on rural credit markets has generally assumed that households are rationed in their access to subsidized formal credit the validity of this assumption depends on the level of effective demand for formal credit in turn a function of the demand for credit and its availability from informal sources this paper estimates the demand and the sector specific costs of credit and hence the extent of formal sector rationing through an analysis of household participation in both the formal and the informal credit sectors the results show that the extent of rationing is considerably less than what is conventionally assumed

the role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information abstract the paper analyzes the structure of credit market equilibrium under imperfect information collateralization and credit rationing are compared as alternative means to cope with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard it is shown that lenders may use collateral as a self selection and incentive mechanism rationing occurs only if the borrowers collaterizable wealth is too small to allow perfect sorting or to create sufficiently strong incentives whenever there is rationing in an equilibrium some borrowers are charged the maximum amount of collateral

how open system intermediaries address institutional failures the case of business incubators in emerging market countries in emerging market countries commercial institutions do not always develop sufficiently quickly or effectively to support ambitious entrepreneurs how might intermediaries remedy these problems w

credit markets in northern nigeria credit as insurance in a rural economy this article addresses the issues of imcomplete markets and imperfect information in the context of credit markets in rural northern nigeria in much recent theoretical literature the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are assumed to be decisive for the organization of agrarian institutions in contrast it is found that in the four villages surveyed credit transactions take advantage of the free flow of information within rural communities information asymmetries between borrower and lender are unimportant and their institutional consequences the use of collateral and interlinked contracts are absent credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between households through the use of contracts in which the repayment owed by the borrower depends on the realization of random production shocks by both the borrower and the lender

informal sector pollution control what policy options do we have abstract in developing countries urban clusters of informal firms such as brick kilns and leather tanneries can create severe pollution problems these firms are however quite difficult to regulate for a variety of technical and political reasons drawing on the literature this paper first develops a list of feasible environmental management policies it then examines how these policies have fared in four independent efforts to control emissions from informal brick kilns in northern mexico the case studies suggest that a conventional command and control process standards are generally only enforceable when buttressed by peer monitoring b surprisingly clean technologies can be successfully diffused even when they raise variable costs in part because early adopters have an economic incentive to promote further adoption c boycotts of dirty goods sold in informal markets are unenforceable d well organized informal firms can block implementation of costly abatement strategies such as relocation and e private sector led initiatives may be best suited for informal sector pollution control

credit constraints credit unions and small scale producers in guatemala abstract efficient and equitable development outcomes may depend in part on whether formal financial institutions leave low wealth producers tightly constrained in their access to credit if so can cooperative institutions efficiently relax these constraints these issues are explored using survey data gathered from 950 small scale producer households in areas of guatemala with market oriented credit unions that mobilize savings and make unsubsidized loans nonprice rationing by banks is found to be common among lower wealth households while credit unions relax credit constraints for a significant portion of those rationed by banks but not the poorest of the study households

real exchange rate and international reserves in an era of growing financial and trade integration abstract this paper evaluates the impact of international reserves terms of trade shocks and capital flows on the real exchange rate reer we observe that international reserves cushion the impact of terms of trade shocks on reer and that this effect is important for developing but not for industrial countries this buffer effect is especially significant for asian countries and for countries exporting natural resources financial depth reduces the buffer role of international reserves in developing countries developing countries reers seem to be more sensitive to changes in reserve assets whereas industrial countries display a significant relationship between hot money and reer

credit constraints and productivity in peruvian agriculture this article evaluates the performance of a rural credit market in peru we develop a model that shows that collateral requirements imposed by lenders in response to asymmetric information can lead not just to quantity rationing but also to transaction cost rationing and risk rationing just like quantity rationing these two additional forms of nonprice rationing adversely affect farm resource allocation and productivity we test the insights of the model using a panel data set from northern peru we estimate the returns to productive endowments for constrained and unconstrained households using a switching regression model we find that consistent with the theory productivity is independent of endowments for unconstrained households but is tightly linked to endowments for constrained households we estimate that credit constraints lower the value of agricultural output in the study region by 26

an analysis of offer functions of banks and credit unions in guatemala economists have sought to identify institutions which might fill the gap in household access to credit arising from rationing by formal lenders credit unions have been identified as institutions which might use informational and monitoring advantages to fill that gap using information on household perceptions of their access to credit this article analyses the impact of certain credit unions on the access to credit of households in guatemala regression results indicate that credit unions serve markets unserved by formal lenders and that information on household perceptions of their access to credit is important in making inferences about lender lending activities

the impact of market friendly reforms on credit and land markets in honduras and nicaragua summary this article explores the impacts on credit access and agrarian structure of land market liberalization policies undertaken in honduras and nicaragua during the 1990s like liberalization efforts pursued in many latin american countries these market friendly reforms were designed to activate land transfers and enhance agricultural efficiency in large part by improving the access of the rural poor to both credit and land markets panel data sets gathered in honduras and nicaragua are used to compare title credit and land access patterns before and after the reforms descriptive nonparametric regression analyses show that despite major gains in titling across the land size spectrum and some increase in land market activity the other hoped for improvements in credit and land access did not occur and appear unlikely to occur without further policy attention to credit markets

risk wealth and sectoral choice in rural credit markets we model the role of the informal credit sector in developing countries the informational advantage of informal lenders is portrayed as the ability to monitor borrowers monitoring reduces the incentive problem and allows for contracts with lower collateral this enables informal lenders to serve both individuals who cannot post the collateral required by the formal sector and those who are able but do not want to post collateral the model is consistent with the conventional view of the informal sector as recipient of spillover demand from the formal sector it also shows that the informal sector may provide partial insurance as the lower collateral requirement implies greater consumption smoothing for borrowers

transitioning entrepreneurs from informal to formal markets abstract informal markets encompass economic activity that occurs outside of formal regulations and is rather guided by informal norms values and understandings a growing stream of research explores the transition of entrepreneurs from informal to formal markets past research appears to portray the transition to formality as a strategic choice made by entrepreneurs and to center on regulatory concerns such as acquiring licenses registering the business and paying taxes such an approach to studying formalization however may not adequately account for the influence of informal institutions on such a transition and ignores the facilitating role often played by institutional intermediaries a type of institutional entrepreneur thus the purpose of this study is to explore a more comprehensive view of formalization in which an institutional intermediary seeks to help small producers transition from selling their goods in informal markets where formal regulations and infrastructures do not exist or are severely underdeveloped to formal markets where developed formal regulations and infrastructures have engendered stronger competition and heightened quality and efficiency standards more specifically we examined the process by which an ngo attempted to transition approximately 1 800 dairy farmers in rural nicaragua from informal to formal markets our results suggest that the success of formalization efforts by institutional intermediaries hinges on a series of inter related tactics aimed at providing institutional scaffolding to encourage and facilitate informal entrepreneurs participation in formal markets

the thick description and comparison of societal systems of capitalism critiques of international business theory have recently pointed to weaknesses in the handling of context of culture and of policy implications it is contended that the origins of such failings lie in the discipline s commonly accepted methodologies and in turn that they have epistemological roots as a route out of the dilemmas faced a proposal is made to adopt more complete ways of handling determinacy including the influences of history culture and the societal emergence of institutions business systems theory is drawn upon and a model proposed developed from the work of whitley in this culture is seen as underpinning formal institutions which in turn underpin societal business systems the use of the model relies on the ideas of geertz on thick description and of ragin on holistic analysis it is illustrated with a comparison of the american and french socio economic systems seen historically findings in strategy research about the geographically defined nature of firm supremacy in many industries are brought into the account using the business systems literature consistent patterns of determinacy as well as distinct and contrasting trajectories of business system evolution are noted a more complete and multidisciplinary form of explanation grounded in socio economics is advocated as a means of meeting the challenges both of understanding and of policymaking at several levels

outreach sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer monitored lending abstract i study the contract design problem facing microfinance lending organizations mfos that want to maximize the impact and outreach of their lending activities to a target population of poor borrowers while remaining financially sustainable tradeoffs between outreach sustainability and financial leverage are shaped by the endogenous monitoring and delegation costs that arise within a chain of agency relationships subject to moral hazard between borrowers loan staff mfo equity owners and outside investors all else equal sustainable mfos that target poorer borrowers must charge higher interest rates have higher staff costs per dollar loaned and are less leveraged analysis of data for 72 mfos tends to support the findings

agricultural workers credit rationing and family networks in rural mexico abstractwe use mixed methods and first hand household data in mexico to investigate credit practices by households engaged in agricultural wage employment quantitative analysis shows evidence of rationing in the formal sector but also suggests the existence of mitigating mechanisms qualitative analysis provides additional insights first income patterns associated with agricultural wage generate income smoothing needs that are sometimes better met by the informal sector second family networks can perform key functions as gateways to the formal sector through specific informal arrangements that inject flexibility into formal rules and procedures

an institutional logics approach to liability of foreignness the case of mining mnes in sub saharan africa prior research on firms liability of foreignness lof has emphasized the role of isomorphic behavior in overcoming lof however the literature has not adequately considered how firms can overcome lof under conditions of institutional complexity when fundamental differences in firms home and host country values beliefs and rules may make isomorphic behaviors impossible or undesirable in this article we use the emerging research on institutional logics and institutional entrepreneurship to address this important issue by examining case studies of eight foreign mining mnes experiencing lof in sub saharan africa based upon our qualitative analysis we find that mnes can overcome lof by co creating new institutional logics rather than conforming to existing ones yet our data show that this is a difficult process one that may not be capable of being done unilaterally by the mne instead we find that local employees embedded in both sets of competing institutional logics acted as key intermediaries who facilitated institutional entrepreneurship moreover we found that firms implementation strategy matters as well in some cases institutional entrepreneurship mitigated lof in others friction returned to varying degrees

some stronger measures of risk aversion in the small and the large with applications the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion for von neumann morgenstern utility functions have become workhorses for analyzing problems in the microeconomics of uncertainty they have been used to characterize the qualitative properties of demand in insurance and asset markets to examine the properties of risk taking in taxation models and to study the interaction between risk and life cycle savings problems to name just a few applications equally importantly they have generated the linear risk tolerance class of utility functions which has provided canonical examples in such diverse areas as portfolio theory and the theory of teams despite these successes there have been a number of areas for which the results have been weaker than hoped it is natural to use the risk aversion measures to compare the behavior of individuals in risky choice situations for example consider the individual portfolio choice problem in a two asset world with a riskless asset and a risky asset if individual a has a uniformly higher arrow pratt coefficient of risk aversion than individual b then b will always choose a portfolio combination with more wealth invested in the risky asset but suppose that both assets are risky now there is no obvious sense in which the more risk averse individual can be said to hold a less risky portfolio but it seems strange that such a simple alteration should destroy the analytics which support the basic intuition similarly consider the basic insurance problem if one individual a is more risk averse than another b in the arrow pratt sense it follows that a will pay a larger premium to insure against a random loss than will b typically though an individual evaluates partial rather than total insurance that is only some gambles can be insured against and others must be retained in this case even when the gambles which are retained are independent from those which are insured it is no longer true that the individual whose arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is higher will pay a larger insurance premium the situation is no better when we consider comparative statics exercises for a single individual decreasing absolute risk aversion in the sense of arrow and

the double edged sword of legitimacy in base of the pyramid markets as compared to developed countries a much higher proportion of entrepreneurs within base of the pyramid bop markets operate unregistered businesses prior research has suggested that the primary cause of such informal activity in these settings is the general failure of weak institutions to provide sufficient resources to warrant formalization we attempt to extend such thinking by deconstructing the discrete and inter related effects of formal business registration on the level of resources obtained by entrepreneurs from financial labor and legal institutions within bop markets using a multi method approach involving 299 entrepreneurs within guatemala city our results suggest that being seen as a legitimate registered business can actually lead to both increased resource provision and resource appropriation more specifically adhering to the norms and rules prescribed by regulatory institutions within weak legal environments can convey positive signals of stability and profitability that both attract the desired attention from formal institutional actors as well as unwanted attention from criminals

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

equilibrium credit rationing of small farm agriculture it is often argued that externally imposed contractual restrictions lead to inequitable credit rationing this paper argues that unrestricted laissez faire markets may also inequitably ration credit a formal model which grants borrowers autonomy in credit application and use demonstrates that adverse incentive and selection effects may cause banks to endogenously impose interest rate restrictions and ration small farms out of the credit market consequently liberalization of financial markets may be insufficient to guarantee small farms access to credit

small and medium size enterprises access to finance as a growth constraint abstract this paper presents recent research on access to finance by small and medium size enterprises smes smes form a large part of private sector in many developed and developing countries while cross country research sheds doubt on a causal link between smes and economic development there is substantial evidence that small firms face larger growth constraints and have less access to formal sources of external finance potentially explaining the lack of smes contribution to growth financial and institutional development helps alleviate smes growth constraints and increase their access to external finance and thus levels the playing field between firms of different sizes specific financing tools such as leasing and factoring can be useful in facilitating greater access to finance even in the absence of well developed institutions as can systems of credit information sharing and a more competitive banking structure

poverty and the varieties of entrepreneurship in the pursuit of prosperity abstract in this paper we revisit the entrepreneurship and poverty relationship under a eudaimonic perspective that brings together conversion factors and future prosperity expectations based on an fsqca of changes in life circumstances of 166 farm households in rural kenya we explore how different combinations of conversion factors enable distinct forms of entrepreneuring in the pursuit of prosperity results show that strong entrepreneurship enabled future prosperity expectations result from three combinations of enabling conversion factors shaping up three varieties of entrepreneurial endeavors family frugal individual market and family inwards which show a much more diverse and counterintuitive reality our research contributes to literature by revealing and theorizing on a split picture portraying the many ways in which farmers acting as everyday entrepreneurs exploit real opportunities in seemingly identical impoverished communities it also reveals a central disconnect between entrepreneurship life satisfaction and financial improvements when assessed against expectations of future prosperity in doing so this paper responds to calls for a better understanding of the processes whereby entrepreneurship can distinctively improve current and future life circumstances and the many ways in which this may happen