behavioral contract theory abstract this review provides a critical survey of psychology and economics behavioral economics research in contract theory first i introduce the theories of individual decision making most

product and price competition in a duopoly this paper examines the role of consumer preferences costs and price competition in determining the competitive product strategy of a firm in the model studied here there are two identical firms competing on product quality and price they face consumers who prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product but differ in how much they are willing to pay for quality the consumers can also choose a substitute if they don t like the product price offerings of the two firms for the firms a higher quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product the paper shows that the equilibrium strategy for each firm should be to differentiate its product from its competitor with the firm choosing the higher quality choosing the higher margin as well this differentiation however is not efficient that is it is possible to choose two other products and offer them at prices that cover their marginal cost and still satisfy consumers needs better in the aggregate a monopolist by contrast would differentiate his product line efficiently this suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition the paper also shows that if one firm enters the market first then it can defend itself from later entrants and gain a first mover advantage by preempting the most desirable product position

persuasive advertising and product differentiation in a hotelling type differentiated products duopoly model we distinguish between three alternative ways that persuasive advertising may affect consumer perferences we illustrate the implications of our theory an contrast with results from models of informative advertising by analysing the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and equilibrium levels of advertising the analysis suggests that an positive relationship between equilibrium levels of advertising and inherent product substitutability is consistent only with advertising that increases perceived product differences

make to order or make to stock model and application some firms make all their products to order while others make them to stock there are a number of firms that maintain a middle ground where some items are made to stock and others are made to order this paper was motivated by a consumer product company faced with the decision about which items to make to stock and which ones to make to order and the inventory and production policy for the make to stock items the production environment is characterized by multiple items setup times between the production of consecutive items limited capacity and congestion effects in such an environment making an item to order reduces inventory costs for that item but might increase the lot size and inventory costs for the items made to stock also lead times increase because of congestion effects resulting in higher safety stocks for make to stock items and lower service levels for make to order items thus leading to a complex trade off we develop a nonlinear integer programming formulation of the problem we present an efficient heuristic to solve the problem which was motivated by key results for a special case of the problem without congestion effects that can be solved optimally we also develop a lower bound to evaluate the performance of the heuristic a computational study indicates that the heuristic performs well we discuss the application of the model in a large firm and the resulting insights we also provide insights into the impact of various problem parameters on the make to order versus make to stock decisions using a computational study in particular we find that the average number of setups of an item selected for make to stock production is always less than half the average number of setups of the item if it were to be made to order also factors other than an item s demand such as its setup time processing time and unit holding cost impact the make to order versus make to stock decision

the role of brand image and product characteristics on firms entry and oem decisions we investigate the optimal market entry and original equipment manufacturer oem decisions of a firm facing a market in which firms brands can be horizontally differentiated and products can be vertically differentiated the entrant might sell under its own brand and compete with an incumbent become a supplier to the incumbent or both findings reveal that when consumers perceive the firms are horizontally and vertically differentiated the entrant profits by simultaneously entering the market and establishing an oem arrangement with the incumbent in such competitive scenarios both buyer and seller increase profits by agreeing on wholesale prices that are not too low which softens both horizontal and vertical conflict between the firms findings also show that the incumbent may prefer to pay high wholesale prices to the entrant even if the incumbent had the option to source the product independently at a lower marginal cost when firms have the capability of producing each other s product lines su

a common agency with incomplete information in the present article i demonstrate that forming a common agency by oligopolistic firms may not be to their advantage if agents have access to private information about their costs bernheim and whinston 1985 1986 pointed out that a common agency allows the firms to sustain the collusive outcome by giving them a vehicle to internalize the externality generated by their pricing or output decisions if agents have access to private information the advantage pointed out by bernheim and whinston may be more than outweighed by the possible existence of an informational disadvantage specifically if the unit costs of different potential agents are correlated the firm may be more successful in extracting the informational rents of its agent if it contracts with an independent agent and not with the same agent as its rival firm when oligopolistic firms contract with independent agents the revenues of one firm reveal implicit information about the unit costs of agents serving competing firms in the same industry however if the unit costs of different agents are correlated revenues also reflect information about the unit cost of the firm s own agent this additional information transmitted by revenues cannot be controlled by the agent s reporting behavior as a result if the firm conditions its agent s payoff upon revenues it can limit the informational rents that this agent can secure due to the existence of private information this possibility of limiting its agent s informational rents is eliminated if the firm contracts with the same agent as its rivals with a common agency the agent can manipulate the reports delivered to all the firms thus reducing the options available to each of them various patterns of agency relationship exist in markets where oligopolistic producers

how to set price and quality in a supply chain of virtual products under bi criteria and risk consideration abstract virtual products are characterized by ample production capacity zero lead time and no holding costs we consider a two echelon supply chain of a virtual product consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer who face random demand demand depends on both price and quality of the product and its stochastic nature exposes the supply chain members to financial risk each party adopts profit criteria that reflect his or her attitude toward this risk including the use of bi criteria by formulating a model that follows a stackelberg game and using the stochastic dominance property we show that one can analytically obtain equilibrium by assuming certain common structures of the demand function and of the risk attitudes the contribution of this study is fourfold i analyzing multiplicative and additive demand forms and comparing the properties of the decisions under the two forms ii showing that under the multiplicative demand form the pricing strategies are not affected by the parties attitudes toward risk whereas the manufacturer s decision on quality investment is affected by his risk attitude iii showing that under the additive demand form the manufacturer s utility function and the demand uncertainty affect pricing and investment strategies and iv suggesting a method to construct the efficient set of decisions and the non dominated set of profit criterion values

overconfidence and asymmetric information the case of insurance this paper contributes to the recent behavioral economics literature by showing that whether or not overconfidence changes qualitative predictions in asymmetric information markets may depend on the market structure itself we first show that overconfidence may overturn fundamental relations between observable variables in perfect competition asymmetric information insurance markets in monopolistic insurance markets in constrast we find that overconfidence may be observationally equivalent to variations in the risk composition of the economy our analysis provides a number of novel testable implications on i price heterogeneity within and across risk classes ii the relationship between ex post risk and insurance coverage iii the fact that a significant fraction of agents chooses to be uninsured and iv the relationship between underinsurance and age

quality and competition in recent years the practitioner literature in operations management has seen a dramatic surge in articles on quality management it reflects the increased emphasis on quality by u s firms which has been attributed largely to increased competition faced by them the question of how quality is influenced by competitive intensity however has not received much attention either in the practitioner or the academic research literatures the notion of competitive intensity itself has not been defined precisely in this paper we develop formal models of oligopolistic competition to investigate whether equilibrium levels of quality increase as competition intensifies we consider three different competitive settings i asymmetric duopolistic competition where the dominant firm s intrinsic demand potential decreases ii a symmetric duopoly where the firms are precluded from cooperating in setting quality levels and iii symmetric oligopolistic competition where the number of firms increases we find that the relation between equilibrium quality and competitive intensity depends on what is understood by increased competition and in addition the relation is contingent on the values of parameters describing the cost and demand structure for the industry

research on the motion picture industry state of the art and new directions off the beaten track away from theatrical release the motion picture industry has been subject of extensive academic research over the last decades however most scholars focused on the u s theatrical motion picture market the number of research activities regarding even more profitable release windows such as home video or television has been substantially lower although international distribution is essential for a motion picture project to break even there has been little significant re search on most other markets this paper aims at summarizing the current state of research on the motion picture industry particularly from marketing and management perspective revealing research gaps and proposing recommendations for future research endeavors therefore a three pillar scheme is developed to systemize previous findings research on intraorganizational decision making contractual relationships between national stakeholders and international market competition are differentiated since these insights are mainly derived from u s theatrical exhibition they can hardly be applied to other markets and exhibition windows thus potential research areas are identified to expand knowledge of posttheatrical and international markets

working over time dynamic inconsistency in real effort tasks experimental tests of dynamically inconsistent time preferences have largely relied on choices over time dated monetary rewards several recent studies have failed to nd the standard patterns of present bias however such monetary studies contain oftendiscussed confounds in this paper we sidestep these confounds and investigate choices over consumption real eort in a longitudinal experiment we pair this eort study with a companion monetary discounting study we conrm very limited time inconsistency in monetary choices however subjects show considerably more present bias in eort furthermore present bias in the allocation of work has predictive power for demand of a meaningfully binding commitment device therefore our ndings validate a key implication of models of dynamic inconsistency with corresponding policy implications

closed loop advertising strategies in a duopoly using the lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market where two firms compete for customers by advertising we solve the problem of determining an optimal advertising strategy for maximum discounted profits we develop both open and closed loop strategies and explain the relationship between them using a new mathematical approach we prove that our closed loop solution is a global nash equilibrium the closed loop strategy is time variant and depends linearly on the actual market share the time variant coefficient incorporates the discount factor its computation requires the solution of a backward differential equation and a set of two nonlinear differential equations for an initial value problem the closed loop advertising expenditures are proportional to the open loop advertising expenditures and to the square of the competitor s actual market share this provides a very practical adaptive control rule that allows the manager to adjust the actual advertising expenditure and to deviate f

content vs advertising the impact of competition on media firm strategy media firms compete in two connected markets they face rivalry for the sale of content to consumers and at the same time they compete for advertisers seeking access to the attention of these consumers we explore the implications of such two sided competition on the actions and source of profits of media firms one main conclusion we reach is that media firms may charge higher content prices in a duopoly than in a monopoly this happens because competition for advertisers can reduce the return per customer impression from the ad market making each firm less willing to underprice content to increase demand greater competitive intensity may thus increase content profits and decrease ad profits these findings are in sharp contrast to those in a regular one sided product market in which competition typically lowers product prices and profits we extend the framework to examine competition across different media e g between magazines and cable tv and show that firms in a duopolistic medium may benefit from more intense competition from a monopolist in another medium we characterize the conditions for each firm in the duopoly medium to bundle more ads and earn greater total profits than the rival firm in the monopoly medium

job search and hyperbolic discounting structural estimation and policy evaluation this paper estimates the structural parameters of a job search model with hyperbolic discounting and endogenous search effort it estimates quantitatively the degree of hyperbolic discounting and assesses its implications for the impact of various policy interventions aimed at reducing unemployment the model is estimated using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy the likelihood function explicitly incorporates all the restrictions implied by the optimal dynamic programming solution to the model both observed and unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for the results point to a substantial degree of hyperbolic discounting especially for low and medium wage workers the structural estimates are also used to evaluate alternative policy interventions for the unemployed estimates based on a model with exponential discounting may lead to biased inference on the economic impact of policies jel c6 c73 d90 j64 j68

tourists spending and adherence to shopping plans the case of the christmas market in merano italy abstract the present paper investigates the determinants of tourists expenditure by categorizing tourists based on their mental budgets individuals can be divided into three categories based on the difference between their mental budget and actual expenditure underspenders on budget spenders and overspenders estimation of the empirical model is performed based on data collected through a survey of visitors to the christmas market in merano italy during advent in 2011 the estimation is performed with the heckman estimator ordered probit selection rule and linear regression we find that the spending patterns of visitors belonging to the three identified categories differ significantly analyzing visitors expenditure based on the proposed categorization allows us to identify category specific factors and develop management strategies for each category the managerial and theoretical implications of the results are discussed

mergers and acquisitions between risk averse parties abstract this paper evaluates mergers and acquisitions ma however it may yield a higher price for the consumer moreover we show that a decentralized supply chain can be more beneficial for the parties than a centralized supply chain formed by acquisition

analysis of protection and pricing strategies for digital products under uncertain demand abstract we analyze pricing and protection digital rights management strategies in a two echelon supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer of digital products the demand for the legal non pirated product which depends on both price and monetary investment in protection is assumed to be uncertain three different supply chain models are analyzed manufacturer stackelberg retailer stackelberg and vertical integration we show that the retailer s utility function has no effect on the equilibrium strategies and suggest schemes to find these strategies for any utility function of the manufacturer further results are obtained under assumptions of either a multiplicative or an additive demand model we study the players strategies under different profit criteria reflecting different attitudes toward risk specifically the expectation criterion and the target criterion and for each criterion we obtain the dependence between the pricing and the protection investment we show that there are situations in which the manufacturer can increase his profit by giving up his leadership to the retailer even if the power balance is in his favor

advertising competition under consumer inertia we construct a multistage game theoretic model of advertising and price competition in a differentiated products duopoly in which proportions of consumers exhibit latent inertia in favor of repeat purchase advertising simultaneously plays the dual role in reducing such inertia through awareness and enhancing perceived brand value persuasion we derive the advertising price cross effects and provide a theoretical reconciliation of the longstanding debate in the marketing literature regarding the impact of advertising on price sensitivity we characterize the nature of equilibria under symmetry and show that when a large proportion of consumers exhibit inertial tendencies then a multiplicity of equilibria exists marketing implications and comparative statics are discussed numerical simulations for asymmetric firms are presented wherein we show that advertising is not a useful competitive tool for small firms however advertising spending by the large firm provides a halo effect for the average prices in the category which has a positive externality on the small firm s profits in the absence of the small brand advertising larger brand shares encourage firms to allocate higher expenditures on advertising to enhance the perceived value of their brand which in turn shore up the average prices in the industry from which all firms benefit

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

common marketing agency as a device for facilitating collusion in a variety of markets firms voluntarily and independently delegate control over certain aspects of marketing to common agents in this article we present an explicit model of agency delegation where firms noncooperatively select agents name output prices and choose compensation schemes we exhibit an equilibrium in which all strategic variables not merely the marketing choices delegated to agents but prices as well are selected perfectly cooperatively this cooperative equilibrium is very simple and attractive each firm sets the collusive output price and employs a commission scheme to compensate the agent although each

is addiction rational theory and evidence this paper makes two contributions to the modeling of addiction first we provide new and convincing evidence that smokers are forward looking in their smoking decisions using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective and monthly data on consumption second we recognize the strong evidence that preferences with respect to smoking are time inconsistent with individuals both not recognizing the true dife culty of quitting and searching for self control devices to help them quit we develop a new model of addictive behavior that takes as its starting point the standard rational addiction model but incorporates time inconsistent preferences this model also exhibits forward looking behavior but it has strikingly different normative implications in this case optimal government policy should depend not only on the externalities that smokers impose on others but also on the internalities imposed by smokers on themselves we estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case

customized advertising via a common media distributor we show that when a single media content distributor such as a television cable company or an internet provider delivers advertising messages on behalf of multiple competing brands it can sometimes utilize customized advertising to implement monopoly pricing even though such monopolistic pricing can be implemented with varying degrees of customization of commercials product revenues and consumer surplus are highest when the distributor chooses the highest level of customization feasible consumers would obviously prefer aggressive price competition in product markets however given that collusion on prices is facilitated anyway when the distributor acts as a common agent the welfare of consumers is enhanced when commercials are better aligned with their preferences

health insurance without single crossing why healthy people have high coverage standard insurance models predict that people with high risks have high insurance coverage it is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured we show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in an insurance model where people choose treatment intensity we analyse different market structures and show the following if insurers have market power the violation of single crossing caused by income differences and endogenous treatment choice can explain the empirically observed outcome our results do not rely on differences in risk aversion between types

on sales effort and pricing decisions under alternative risk criteria abstract in the literature different risk criteria are proposed for risk averse decision making but it is often unclear which risk criteria should be used and what their differences may be this study investigates this problem when a risk averse make to order firm decides its pricing and sales effort two factors affecting demand we consider alternative risk criteria commonly used in the literature namely expected utility theory eut mean variance mv mean semideviation ms value at risk var conditional value at risk cvar and loss aversion la we find that all of these criteria lead to similar qualitative behaviors regarding how risk loss averse decisions deviate from risk neutral ones a particularly interesting result is that the form of demand randomness i e additive or multiplicative can completely reverse the effect of risk loss aversion in certain cases we also find that the risk aversion models i e eut mv ms var and cvar are essentially equivalent in inducing the same set of optimal solutions under adverse market states however loss aversion is a mild version of risk aversion in that the la model can only lead to a subset of the solutions generated by other models these results may not be valid for other applications such as the newsvendor pricing problem so we can conclude that the relationship between alternative risk criteria is case sensitive and should be evaluated more carefully

time inconsistency and welfare program participation evidence from the nlsy we empirically implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation for agents with potentially time inconsistent preferences using panel data on the choices of single women with children from the nlsy 1979 we provide estimates of the degree of time inconsistency and of its influence on the welfare take up decision with these estimates we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the utility loss stemming from the inability to commit to future decisions and the potential utility gains from commitment mechanisms such as welfare time limits and work requirements

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

quality investment and price decision in a risk averse supply chain abstract in this paper we investigate quality investment and price decision of a make to order mto supply chain with uncertain demand in international trade due to volatility of orders from buyers the supplier and the manufacturer in the supply chain are subject to financial risk in contrast to the general assumption that players in a supply chain are risk neutral in quality investment and price decision we consider the risk averse behavior of the players in three different supply chain strategies vertical integration vi manufacturer s stackelberg ms and supplier s stackelberg ss the study shows that both supply chain strategy and risk averse behavior have significant impacts on quality investment and pricing compared to a risk neutral supply chain a risk averse supply chain has lower same and higher quality of products in vi ms and ss respectively also we derive the conditions under which the supply chain strategy is implemented in a decentralized setting a numerical study is used to illustrate some related issues

the delivery and control of quality in supplier producer contracts we model the effect of contract parameters such as price rebates and after sales warranty costs on the choice of quality by a supplier the inspection policy of a producer and the resulting end product quality both noncooperative and cooperative settings are explored the paper s contribution is to highlight the importance of strategic and contractual issues in quality management

spatial price equilibrium with information asymmetry in quality and minimum quality standards abstract a spatial price equilibrium model with information asymmetry in quality is developed in both static and dynamic versions producers at the supply markets are aware of the quality of their products whereas consumers located at the demand markets are aware only of the average quality of the products that are shipped to their demand markets minimum quality standards are also captured in order to assess the impacts of such policy interventions we establish qualitative results in the form of existence uniqueness and stability analysis an algorithm is proposed along with a convergence proof it is then utilized to compute solutions to a spectrum of spatial price equilibrium numerical examples in order to explore the impacts of information asymmetry under different scenarios the numerical examples which are of quite general functional forms reveal that as the number of supply markets increases the anonymizing effect leads to a decrease in the average quality on the other hand as the number of demand markets increases the pressure to improve quality increases and the average quality increases finally we demonstrate that after the imposition of minimum quality standards the average quality at the demand markets increases and the prices also increase

negotiations and exclusivity contracts for advertising exclusive advertising on a given media outlet is usually profitable for an advertiser because consumers are less aware of competing products however for such arrangements to exist media must benefit as well we examine conditions under which such exclusive advertising contracts benefit both advertisers and media outlets referred to as stations by illustrating that exclusive equilibria arise in a theoretical model of the media advertisers and consumers who participate in both the product and media markets in the model stations sell advertising space to advertisers and broadcast advertising messages to consumers conditions leading to higher equilibrium levels of advertising can be unprofitable for advertisers because high levels of advertising make consumers better informed and thus lead to fiercer product price competition as a result media stations may be less profitable as well because their payoff is determined as a fraction of the advertiser surplus generated in the product market stations mitigate this effect by offering advertisers exclusive advertising contracts with such contracts consumers are less informed about competing products yielding higher producer surplus it is profitable for stations to offer exclusivity when commercial advertising is an important means for advertisers to inform consumers about their products

a reply to a comment on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters liu et al liu y d s putler c b weinberg 2004 is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters marketing sci 23 1 120 133 examine the television broadcast industry using a model in which profit maximizing broadcasters seek to gain viewers by choosing the type of program to offer and by spending money to set program quality allowing broadcasters to sell access to those viewers through inserted advertisements at a fixed rate per viewer wu and chou wu c s chou 2006 commentary on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters marketing sci 25 5 541 545 argue that the duopoly result for a certain range of the cost parameter in liu et al is not a pure strategy nash equilibrium they further propose some modifications to the original model to restore liu et al s results in this reply we demonstrate how a single strategy not included in the strategy space of the liu et al duopoly model leads to the difference between our analysis and that of wu and chou while we had intended to rule out this strategy the text was not entirely clear on this issue wu and chou s comment provides an opportunity to clarify the situation we provide both empirical and theoretical support for excluding this strategy which allows us to focus on the more plausible competitive situations in television broadcasting we also reply to wu and chou s other comments on several issues such as the relative importance of program type versus quality

optimal price and product quality decisions in a distribution channel this paper studies a joint pricing and product quality decision problem in a distribution channel in which a manufacturer sells a product through a retailer the manufacturer jointly determines the wholesale price and quality of the product and the retailer determines the retail price we find that if the marginal revenue function is strictly concave then the manufacturer chooses a lower product quality level than if selling the product directly to customers if the marginal revenue function is affine then the manufacturer s optimal product quality decision is independent of the distribution channel structure if the marginal revenue function is strictly convex then the manufacturer chooses a higher product quality level than if selling the product directly to customers

a comment on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters this paper shows that the analysis of liu et al 2004 contains a substantive error the asserted pure strategy nash equilibrium leading to their theorems 1 and 2 is really not an equilibrium we show that in their model either pure strategy nash equilibria do not exist or unlike their asserted main result when a pure strategy equilibrium exists increasing the number of commercial television broadcasters does not result in lower quality programs possible modifications of liu et al s model that may help restore the desired result are discussed

the shape of advertising response functions revisited a model of dynamic probabilistic thresholds prior work in marketing has suggested that advertising threshold effects levels beneath which there is essentially no sales response are rarely encountered in practice because advertising policies settle into effective ranges through early trial and error thresholds cannot be observed directly and arguments for their existence must be based primarily on a statistical footprint that is on relative fits of a range of model types to detect possible threshold effects we formulate a switching regression model with two regimes in only one of which advertising is effective mediating the switch between the two regimes is a logistic function of category specific dynamic variables e g order of entry time in market number of competitors and advertising levels nesting a variety of alternative formulations among them both standard concave and s shaped responses a sequence of comparisons among parametrically related models strongly suggests that threshold effects exist that market share response to advertising is not necessarily globally concave that superior fit cannot be attributed to model flexibility alone and that dynamic environmental competitive and brand specific factors can influence advertising effectiveness these effects are evident in two evolving durables categories suvs and minivans although not in the one mature nondurable category liquid detergent studied

advertising in a distribution channel conventional wisdom suggests that one of the goals of manufacturer advertising is to reduce the cross price elasticity between products make one s own and rivals products appear to be less substitutable in the eyes of consumers conventional wisdom also suggests that all else being equal retailers will be able to obtain better terms of trade from manufacturers the more substitutable are the manufacturers products it follows that retailers should be opposed to advertising that has the effect of reducing cross price elasticities and thus that manufacturer advertising can be a source of channel conflict we show that these conventional wisdoms need not hold when only some consumers are exposed to the advertising messages using a hotelling model of demand we show that 1 manufacturers can be worse off from advertising that reduces the cross price elasticities between their products 2 channel conflict need not arise even when the sole purpose of advertising is to affect cross price elasticities and 3 depending on its bargaining power a retailer can be better off when the manufacturers products are perceived to be less substitutable

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection equilibria with adverse selection we construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection in particular it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and that in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that exist both when withdrawal costs are zero and when they are arbitrarily small but strictly positive we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome of our game this outcome is always constrained efficient and involves cross subsidization from low to high risk agents that is increasing in the share of low risks in the population under weak conditions on risk preferences

sinking swimming or learning to swim in medicare part d under medicare part d senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance offered by numerous private insurers we examine nonpoor enrollees actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data our sample reduced overspending by 298 on average with gains by 81 percent of them the greatest improvements were by those who overspent most in 2006 and by those who switched plans decisions to switch depended on individuals overspending in 2006 and on individualspecific effects of changes in their current plans the oldest consumers and those initiating medications for alzheimer s disease improved by more than average suggesting that real world institutions help overcome cognitive limitations

creating micro marketing pricing strategies using supermarket scanner data micro marketing refers to the customization of marketing mix variables to the store level this paper shows how prices can be profitably customized at the store level rather than adopting a uniform pricing policy across all stores historically there has been a trend by retailers to consolidate independent stores into large national and regional chains this move toward consolidation has been driven by the economies of scale associated with these larger operations however some of these large chains have lost the adaptability of independent neighborhood stores micro marketing represents an interest on the part of managers to combine the advantages of these large operations with the flexibility of independent neighborhood stores a basis for these customized pricing strategies is the result of differences in interbrand competition across stores these changes in interbrand competition are measured using weekly store level scanner data at the product level obviously this presents a huge estimation problem since we wish to measure substitution between each product at a store level for a chain with 100 stores and 10 products in a category we would need to estimate over 100 000 parameters to reliably estimate these individual store differences we phrase our problem in a hierarchical bayesian framework essentially each store level parameter can be thought of as a combination of chain level and random store specific effects the improvement in estimating this model comes from exploiting the common chain level component in addition we relate these store specific changes to demographic and competitive characteristics of the store s trading area which helps explain why these differences are present these estimated differences in price response are in turn used to set store level prices to simplify and focus the problem we limit our attention to everyday price changes i e the prices of products that are not advertised there are many marketing variables that can be adjusted at a storelevel e g promotions and product assortments the reason we concentrate upon everyday pricing is driven by its importance in the marketing mix that most profits are earned on products sold at their everyday price and the amenability of everyday prices to store level customizations a limitation of this approach is that it yields only a partial solution to the retailer s global optimization problem a challenge for the retailer in implementing micro marketing pricing strategies is to retain a consistent image while altering prices that adapt to neighborhood differences in demand our approach is to search for price changes that leave image unchanged we argue that a sufficient condition for holding the input to store image constant from everyday pricing is to hold average price and revenues at their current levels we implement this condition by introducing constraints into the profit maximization problem future research into store choice may yield more efficient conditions a benefit of holding the retailer s image constant is that it does not require costly new information about competitors and promotional activity instead retailers are able to derive these store level customizations based largely upon scanner data this is very advantageous since this information is already being collected and is readily available our results indicate that micro marketing pricing strategies would be profitable and could increase gross profit margins by 4 percent to 10 percent when these gross profit gains are considered after administrative and operating costs are taken into account they could increase operating profit margins by 33 percent to 83 percent these gains come from encouraging consumers through everyday price changes to switch to more profitable bundles of products and not through overall price changes at the chain level these results show that the information contained in the retailer s store level scanner data is an under utilized resource by exploiting this information using newer and more powerful computational techniques managers can better appreciate its value the implication is that profits could be increased and gains can be made by using this information as the basis for micro marketing

the effect of risk sensitivity on a supply chain of mobile applications under a consignment contract with revenue sharing and quality investment abstract the paper provides a thorough investigation of the revenue sharing contract format typically used in the mobile applications apps industry the platform provider sets the level of revenue sharing and the app developer determines the investment in quality and the selling price of the app the demand for an app which depends on both price and quality investment is assumed to be uncertain so the risk attitude of the supply chain members has to be considered specifically we focus on how risk sensitive behavior of supply chain members affects chain performance the members equilibrium strategies are analyzed under different attitudes toward risk averse neutral and seeking we show that the retailer s utility function has no effect on the equilibrium strategies and suggest schemes to identify these strategies for any utility function of the developer we find that i the revenue sharing contract circumvents the double marginalization effect associated with vertical competition and therefore yields the best selling price for the customer ii a decentralized supply chain sometimes performs better than a centralized one and iii a risk seeking developer may obtain a higher expected profit than does a risk neutral developer

life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders abstract we analyze how the life settlement market the secondary market for life insurance may affect consumer welfare in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance with one sided commitment and overconfident policyholders in our model policyholders may lapse their life insurance policies when they lose their bequest motives however they are overconfident in the sense that they may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motives we show that in the competitive equilibrium without life settlement overconfident consumers will buy life insurance contracts with too much reclassification risk insurance for later periods the life settlement market can impose a limit on the extent to which primary insurers can exploit overconfident consumers we show that the life settlement market may increase the equilibrium consumer welfare of overconfident consumers when they are sufficiently vulnerable in the sense that they have a sufficiently large intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption our result is robust to alternative specifications where i insurers cannot observe the subjective or objective probability that policyholders will lose their bequest motives ii insurers can include health contingent cash surrender values csvs in the life insurance contract and iii policyholders underestimate their future mortality risk

pricing and product line strategy in a supply chain with risk averse players abstract we study the pricing and product line strategy of a risk averse manufacturer who sells her products through a risk averse retailer we identify the conditions under which the manufacturer extends her product line or replaces the old product with a new product and find that i a higher retailer s risk aversion decreases the retail price but increases the unit wholesale price ii the manufacturer extends the product line if the price caps for both products are sufficiently high both her risk aversion and product substitutability are sufficiently low iii the manufacturer discontinues the old product if the relative price cap of the new product to the old product is sufficiently high her risk aversion is medium and product substitutability are sufficiently high further we find that i the decentralization of supply chain may increase product line length if the retailer s risk aversion and product substitutability are sufficiently high otherwise it may decrease product line length ii the endogenization of quality design increases the motivation to introduce a new product and iii the manufacturer extends or replaces the product line if quality cost is not too high

optimal selection for direct mail direct marketing mail is a growing area of marketing practice yet the academic journals contain very little research on this topic the most important issue for direct marketers is how to sample targets from a population for a direct mail campaign although some selection methods are described in the literature there seems to be not a single paper discussing the analytical and statistical aspects involved the objective of this paper is to introduce a comprehensive methodology for the selection of targets from a mailing list for direct mail at least theoretically this methodology leads to more efficient selection procedures than the existing ones the latter are not based on an optimal selection strategy whereas we explicitly take the profit function into account by equating marginal costs and marginal returns we determine which households should receive a mailing in order to maximize expected profit in the empirical part we show that our methodology has great predictive accuracy and generates higher net returns than traditional approaches

insurance self control and contract flexibility we study a competitive insurance market in which some consumers have too optimistic expectations regarding their future use of preventive measures when contracts are long term and inflexible such naive consumers would increase the costs of insurance for low risk consumers the competitive insurance market therefore offers flexible contracts that allow for switching between different tariffs sophisticated consumers choose a partial insurance tariff and remain low risks naive consumers choose the same tariff but later switch to full insurance and become high risks if there are sufficiently many naive consumers they pay a transfer to sophisticated consumers so that high risks subsidize low risks in contrast there are no such transfers when contracts are short term the model generates novel implications for the time frame of insurance contracts and insurance requirements

is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters competitive behavior in commercial television broadcasting is modeled to examine program choice and the effects of more channels being available on firm strategy specifically broadcasters compete by selecting both the type and quality level of a program to offer but do not compete on price we obtain five major results first a comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets indicates that broadcasters in an industry with a larger number of competitors may provide programs of lower quality compared to broadcasters in an industry with a smaller number second in terms of viewer welfare having more channels available is not necessarily better third broadcasters tend to choose an intermediate level of differentiation in terms of the types of programs they provide resulting in a counterprogramming strategy in other words avoidance of price competition is not required for competitors to differentiate themselves from each other fourth if one broadcaster starts the evening with a higher quality higher rated program than its competitor its second program should also be of higher quality finally a broadcaster s first program should be of equal or higher quality than its second program put another way it always behooves a broadcaster to lead with its best

futile attempts at self control we investigate costly yet futile attempts at self control when consumption of a harmful product has a binary breakdown no breakdown nature and individuals tend to underestimate their need for self control considering time inconsistent preferences as well as temptation disutility we show that becoming more sophisticated can decrease welfare and investigate what kind of mistaken beliefs lead to low welfare with time inconsistent preferences being close to perfectly understanding one s preferences but assigning zero probability to true preferences induces the worst outcome jel d03 d11 d91

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

competitive reactions to advertising and promotion attacks how do competitors react to each other s price promotion and advertising attacks what are the reasons for the observed reaction behavior we answer these questions by performing a large scale empirical study on the short run and long run reactions to promotion and advertising shocks in over 400 consumer product categories over a four year time span our results clearly show that the most predominant form of competitive response is passive in nature when a reaction does occur it is usually retaliatory in the same instrument i e promotion attacks are countered with promotions and advertising attacks are countered with advertising there are very few long run consequences of any type of reaction behavior by linking reaction behavior to both cross and own effectiveness we further demonstrate that passive behavior is often a sound strategy while firms that do opt to retaliate often use ineffective instruments resulting in spoiled arms accommodating behavior is observed in only a minority of cases and often results in a missed sales opportunity when promotional support is reduced the ultimate impact of most promotion and advertising campaigns depends primarily on the nature of consumer response not the vigilance of competitors

overconfidence insurance and paternalism it is well known that when agents are fully rational compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of insurance markets we find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks compulsory insurance makes low risk agents worse off hence behavioral biases may weaken some of the well established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information

sleeping with the enemy should competitors share the same advertising agency the possibility of account conflicts is generally regarded as a very serious problem in the advertising industry the problem is that once an advertising agency works for a firm it learns private information which it can use strategically i e make available to the firm s competitors but in oligopolistic situations knowing more about a competitor may not necessarily be beneficial because the competitor may react to this knowledge similarly allowing the competitor to have more information may not necessarily be detrimental in fact the decision of whether to share the same agency depends on three effects which are identified here 1 the decision making framework effect 2 the strategic effect and 3 the uncertainty effect the first effect always favors sharing the same gency the direction of the latter two effects is ambiguous this ambiguity is resolved against the sharing of agencies when 1 the competitor s reaction to the firm s situation is especially harmful in that particular situation strategic effect and 2 the competitor s actions are increasingly harmful uncertainty effect

the many player advertising game this study extends the time variant closed loop strategy of fruchter and kalish 1997 to the n player advertising game we demonstrate that solving an n player game using 2 players results in overadvertising

goals and bracketing under mental accounting abstract behavioral economics struggles to explain why people sometimes evaluate outcomes separately narrow bracketing of mental accounts and sometimes jointly broad bracketing we develop a theory of endogenous bracketing where people set goals to tackle self control problems goals induce reference points that make substandard performance painful evaluating goals in a broadly bracketed mental account insulates an individual from exogenous risk of failure but because decisions or risks in different tasks become substitutes there are incentives to deviate from goals that are absent under narrow bracketing extensions include goal revision naivete about self control income targeting and firms bundling strategies

a game theoretic fundation of competitive quilibria with adverse selection we construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome

modeling the impact of product quality on dynamic pricing and advertising policies abstract the marketing mix of price quality and advertising quality relationship is well studied less understood is the price advertising quality relationship this article fills the gap investigating the interplay between price advertising and quality in an optimal control model our results generalize the condition of dorfman steiner in a dynamic context also they point to the impact of greater product quality on the dynamic policies of pricing and advertising furthermore a phase diagram analysis shows that quality develops monotonically in time and converges to a unique steady state we also show that quality investment could either decrease or increase over time but this depends on its effectiveness our results spot the profitable opportunities of a firm managing a more complex marketing mix

demand forecast sharing in a dual channel supply chain abstract we assess the benefits of sharing demand forecast information in a manufacturer retailer supply chain consisting of a traditional retail channel and a direct channel the demand is a linear function of price with a gaussian primary demand i e zero price market potential both the manufacturer and the retailer set their price based on their forecast of the primary demand in this setting we investigate the value of sharing demand forecasts we analyze the make to order scenario in which prices are set before and production takes place after the primary demand is known and the make to stock scenario in which production takes place and prices are set before the primary demand is known we also compare the supply chain performance with and without the direct channel under some assumptions production cost is zero and each demand function has the same slope of price we find that the direct channel has a negative impact on the retailer s performance and under some conditions the manufacturer and the whole supply chain are better off our research extends and complements prior research that has investigated only the inventory and replenishment related benefits of information sharing

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

a game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection we construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts so that cross subsidization is not ruled out moreover firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists in fact when withdrawal is costless the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts we then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs we show that the miyazaki wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

contracting with diversely naive agents in standard contract theoretic models the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters and the principal s objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type we study a contract theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a cognitive nature in our model the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences agent types differ only in their degree of sophistication that is their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes we fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent s sophistication the menu does not exclude any type it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types and exploitative contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types more naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal our results allow us to interpret real life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries

business models for media firms does competition matter for how they raise revenue the purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media firms like tv channels raise revenue a media firm can either be financed by advertising revenue by direct payment from the viewers or the readers if we consider newspapers or by both we show that the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained by other media firms offering close substitutes this implies that the less differentiated the media firms content the larger is the fraction of their revenue coming from advertising a media firm s scope for raising revenues from ads on the other hand is constrained by how many competitors it faces we should thus expect that direct payment from the media consumers becomes more important the larger the number of competing media products