regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

mergers and business model assimilation evidence from low cost airline takeovers this paper examines mergers that lead to an almost immediate replacement of the target firm s business model in favour of that of the acquiring firm we examine the post merger behaviour of the two leading european dedicated low cost airlines easyjet and ryanair each acquiring another low cost airline respectively go fly and buzz we find that both takeovers had an immediate and sustained impact on both the pricing structures and the extent of inter temporal price discrimination used on the acquired routes with early booking fares noticeably reduced and only very late booking fares increased overall the analysis points to a pro competitive effect of both takeovers as a consequence of the introduction of the acquiring firms business models and associated yield management pricing systems

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

deviations from purchasing power parity in the long run this paper demonstrates that deviations from purchasing power parity reveal a remarkable and possibly startling consistency with martingale behavior during both fixed and flexible rate periods for a wide variety of countries and in both monthly and annual data since this pattern appears to be much more general than one would expect on the basis of models founded on international commodity arbitrage the paper proposes an alternative explanation which instead relies on financial arbitrage in bonds as the underlying mechanism this paper will demonstrate that deviations from purchasing power parity ppp reveal a remarkable and possibly startling consistency with martingale behavior during both fixed and flexible exchange rate periods for a wide variety of countries and in both monthly and annual data this pattern appears to be much more general than one would expect on the basis of models founded on international commodity arbitrage the paper therefore proposes an alternative explanation which does not presuppose free trade in goods but which instead relies on financial arbitrage in bonds as the underlying mechanism the major implication of the theory and the results is that ppp is as likely to be violated in the long as in the short run as an empirical matter deviations from ppp can be observed for most currencies at any instant see kravis et al 21 stockman 37 and genberg 15 among others these deviations are typically both cumulative and persistent the real exchange rate can remain on either side of parity for lengthy but variable time intervals of a year or more as a consequence the current consensus shared

long run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation we investigate the long run effect of energy conservation regulation which forces firms to raise energy saving investment above the cost minimizing level if pigovian tax is imposed additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition while it can improve welfare under imperfect competition our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

endogenous quality differentiation in congested markets firms selling a product with congestion externalities to a heterogeneous population of customers have an incentive to offer differentiated levels of quality in a price competitive market differentiation arises endogenously through the prices chosen by firms in equilibrium firms offer a range of prices which induce an efficiency improving range of quality levels and allow customers to self select their preferred price quality combinations additional results suggest that with many firms in the market the choice of prices dominates the choice of service capacities in determining congestion levels copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

technological leadership and persistence of monopoly under endogenous entry static versus dynamic analysis abstract we build a dynamic oligopoly model with endogenous entry in which a particular firm leader invests in an innovation process facing the subsequent entry of other firms followers we identify conditions that make it optimal for the leader in the initial oligopoly situation to undertake pre emptive r d investment strategic predation eventually resulting in the elimination of all followers compared to a static model the dynamic one provides new insights into the leader s intertemporal investment choice its optimal decision making and the dynamics of the market structure over time we also contrast the leader s investment decisions with those of the social planner

the collapse of purchasing power parities during the 1970 s one of the striking facts concerning the relationship beiveen prices and exchange rates during the 1970 s has been the dismal performance of the predictions of the simple versions of the purchasing power parity doctrine ppp that doctrine in its absolute version states that the equilibrium exchange rate between domestic and foreign currencies equals the ratio of domestic to foreign price levels the relative version of the doctrine relates equilibrium changes in exchange rates to changes in the ratio of domestic to foreign prices during the 1970 s short run changes in exchange rates bore little relationship to short run differentials in national inflation rates and frequently divergences from purchasing power parities have been cumulative this paper reviews and analyzes the empirical record of exchange rates and prices during the 1970 s and the analysis is based on the experience of the dollar pound the dollar frecch franc and the dollar dm exchange rates section 2 presents the evidence on ppp during the 1970 s and contrasts it with the evidence from the 1920 s a period during which the doctrine held up reasonably well this analysis is relevant for assessing whether the flexible exchange rate system was successful in providing national economies with an added degree of insulation from foreign shocks and whether it provided policymakers with an added instrument for the conduct of macroeconomic policy the evidence regarding devia tions from purchasing power parities is also relevant for determining whether there is a case for managed float section 3 attempts to explain what went wrong with

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

the impact of mergers on fares structure evidence from european low cost airlines this paper examines mergers that lead to an almost immediate replacement of the target firm s business model in favor of that of the acquiring firm we examine the post merger behavior of the two leading european dedicated low cost airlines easyjet and ryanair each acquiring another low cost airline go fly and buzz respectively we find that both takeovers had an immediate and sustained impact on both the pricing structures and the extent of intertemporal price schedules used on the acquired routes with early booking fares noticeably reduced and only very late booking fares increased the analysis suggests that the takeovers had a net beneficial effect for consumers at least in price terms as a consequence of the introduction of the acquiring firms business models and associated yield management pricing systems

markets vs management what drives profitability this study addresses the issue of the relative degree of variance in roa accounted for by industry corporate and sbu effects while controlling for the business cycle and the interaction between the business cycle and industry two key articles schmalensee 1985 and rumelt 1991 are discussed in detail research results on a recent data base compustat using variance components analysis varcomp are presented that not only confirm most of the rumelt 1991 findings but also suggest the existence of a corporate effect heretofore undetected

what does a small corporate effect mean a variance components simulation of corporate and business effects in a widely cited paper rumelt 1991 presents estimates of the relative influence of corporate business unit and other influences on business unit profitability and finds the corporation explains almost none of the variability in business unit profitability using a monte carlo simulation we examine the relation of variance component magnitudes to other indicators of the importance of a particular effect our results demonstrate that variance components can be an extremely nonlinear indicator of importance we also question whether rumelt s corporate effect represents the possible contributions of corporate strategy to business unit performance this addresses a puzzle raised by rumelt 1991 concerning the small effect of corporations in explaining performance and suggests that rumelt s findings should not be seen as demonstrating the insignificance of corporate strategy 1997 john wiley sons ltd

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

monopoly and soft budget constraint a benevolent government may decide to subsidize an unprofitable monopoly whose profits do not capture all the social surplus from its production anticipating this the firm may underinvest in order to become unprofitable and extract state subsidies the resulting welfare loss may exceed by many times the deadweight cost of monopoly pricing committing the firm to a price ceiling may soften its budget constraint and thus reduce welfare competition can harden budget constraints in industries in which free entry is socially excessive

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

competing with the new york stock exchange research on information economics and securities markets dating back to stigler journal of political economy 69 1961 213 225 journal of business 37 1964 117 142 argues that trading will tend to centralize in major market centers such as the new york stock exchange nyse the nyse s recent mergers with archipelago and euronext bring questions about the viability and effects of competition between stock exchanges to the policy forefront we examine the largely forgotten but unparalleled episode of competition between the nyse and the consolidated stock exchange of new york consolidated from 1885 to 1926 the consolidated averaged 23 of nyse volume for approximately forty years by operating a second market for the most liquid securities that traded on the big board our results suggest that nyse bid ask spreads fell by more than 10 when the consolidated began to trade nyse stocks and subsequently increased when the consolidated ceased operations the empirical analysis suggests that this historical episode of stock market competition improved consumer welfare by an amount equivalent to us 9 6 billion today

welfare losses under cournot competition abstract in a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical compete in quantities and produce with constant returns the percentage of welfare losses pwl is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases we study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms we provide exact formulae of pwl and robust constructions of markets were pwl is close to one in these two cases we show that the market structure that maximizes pwl is either monopoly or dominant firm depending on demand finally we prove that pwl is minimized when all firms are identical a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of pwl downwards

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

entry and competitive structure in deregulated airline markets an event study analysis of people express this paper proposes an alternative approach to the study of competitive structure in deregulated airline markets that avoids some of the weaknesses of previous studies this approach uses reactions of incumbent airlines stock prices to announcements of entry by people express to shed light on competitive structure these stock reactions reveal significant route specific profits or sunk costs and also provide evidence on the degree of competitive localization present in the industry the conclusions emerging from this analysis are corroborated by an examination of price sales quantity and schedule changes that followed people express entry

privacy and personal data collection with information externalities abstract we provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent nonetheless excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss of privacy compared to the social optimum the main mechanism for this result is information externalities and users coordination failure in which some users decision to share their personal information may allow the data controller to infer more information about non users we also show that the emergence of data brokerage industry can facilitate the collection and monetization of users personal data even in a fragmented market where no individual website has incentives to do so independently due to scale economies in data analytics we discuss policy implications of our analysis in light of the recent eu general data protection regulation gdpr

tobin s q and the importance of focus in firm performance using tobin s q as a measure of performance we seek to estimate the relative importance of industry focus and share effects in determining firm performance our methods are analogous to those of richard schmalensee and like him we find that industry effects account for the majority of the explained variance however we also find that firm effects exist in the form of focus effects that is narrowly diversified firms do better than widely diversified firms we interpret this finding as consistent with profit maximization by firms with different factor endowments

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

consumption co integration and varying coefficients the australian evidence an aggregate consumption function incorporating random coefficient approach is estimated to investigate the changing pattern of consumer response in austrialia using quarterly data from 1959 iv to 1990 iv the methdology applied is that of hidreth and houck 1968 singh et al 1976 and hoque 1991 the largenge multiplier test as suggested by breush and pagan 1979 supports the hypothesis of randomness in the response coefficients our study indicates strong dependence on the first difference of income and that consumers respond quite slowly to short run fluctuations this is because consumption and income have been found to be integrated of order one and co integrated thus as error correction model has been estimated following engle and granger 1987

tax incidence under oligopoly a comparison of policy approaches abstract this paper presents a methodological approach for the analysis of tax incidence that encompasses familiar forms of taxation in a general and analytically convenient model in oligopolistic industries the performance of a tax depends on the sensitivity of the unit tax rate to changes in industry output output elastic tax schedules are less likely to be over shifted and have superior welfare properties relative to regulatory instruments that are less responsive to the equilibrium market quantity for revenue neutral tax reforms the finding of delipalla and keen 1992 that ad valorem taxes welfare dominate specific taxes under oligopoly is derived as a special case of this general result

the relative influence of industry and corporation on business segment performance an alternative estimate rumelt s 1991 widely cited paper presents estimates of the relative influence of industry corporate business unit and other influences on business unit profitability he finds corporations explain almost none of the variability in business unit profitability using a simultaneous equation model we provide alternative estimates of the influence of industry and corporation on business unit performance we find that both corporations and industries influence business unit profitability but corporations have the larger influence copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

dynamic oligopoly behaviour in the airline industry abstract this paper examines the dynamic interaction between united airlines and american airlines on a set of duopoly routes we estimate quarterly conduct parameters or conjectural variations and test constant behaviour bertrand cournot and collusive models we also test two regimeswitching models derived from the green porter price war model one based on reversion to bertrand behaviour during price wars the other on reversion to cournot behaviour the three constant behaviour models are all rejected the regime switching models can both describe the data but the cournot based version is preferred

estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry this paper considers the effect of an airline s scale of operation at an airport on the profitability of routes flown out of that airport the empirical methodology uses the entry decisions of airlines as indicators of underlying profitability the results extend the empirical literature on airport presence by providing a new set of estimates of the determinants of city pair profitability these estimates imply that city pair profits increase in airport presence and decrease rapidly in the number of entering firms the literature on empirical models of oligopoly entry is also extended via a focus on the role of differences between firms

measuring and analysing the effects of short term volatility in real exchange rates this paper examines short term volatility in the real effective exchange rates of industrial countries and its impact on their imports it yields three conclusions first volatility has not diminished as markets have gained experience with floating exchange rates the trend appears to be in the opposite direction for some countries second exposure to short term volatility has differed among countries japan and sweden have experienced much more than most other industrial countries third volatility appears to depress the volume of international trade this third finding is consistent with results reported by cushman and by akhtar and hilton and challenges earlier findings by hooper and kohlhagen

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

flexible exchange rates prices and the role of news lessons from the 1970s recent experience with flexible exchange rate systems has led to renewed interest in the operation of foreign exchange markets as reflected in many recent studies of the principal determinants of exchange rates the 1970s witnessed the dramatic alteration of the international monetary system from a regime of pegged exchange rates which prevailed for about a quarter of a century since the bretton woods conference into a regime of flexible though managed rates as a consequence of the emergence of the new legal and economic system traders national governments and international organisations were confronted with new economic problems choices and instruments during the 1970s ex change rates fluctuated widely and inflation rates accelerated the international monetary system had to accommodate extraordinarily large oil related shocks which affected trade flows in goods and assets huge oil payments had to be recycled uncertainties concerning future developments in international politics reached new heights and the prospects for the world economy got gloomier these developments placed unprecedented pressures on the markets for foreign exchange as well as on other asset markets they were associated with a large slide in the value of the us dollar and resulted in speeding up the creation of new institutions like the european monetary system which provided the formal framework for the management of exchange rates among members

an econometric model of kuwait s non oil gdp a model covering the production part of the non oil gdp in kuwait is specified and estimated for the period 1972 93 the estimated model has passed the test of validation quite well therefore the model has been used to experiment with a number of possible scenarios to depict a future path of all the endogenous variables of the model the postulated scenarios are adopted from the various policy options of kuwait s ministry of planning the results have indicated that a quick reform policy will cause a substantial decline in non oil production and consumption a better policy option would be to choose a policy between minor and gradual reform

how do incumbents respond to the threat of entry evidence from the major airlines this paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors as distinguished from their response to competitors actual entry it uses a case study from the passenger airline industry specifically the evolution of southwest airlines route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly when southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future we examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events we find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by southwest s entry into their routes this is true even after controlling in several ways for airport specific operating costs the response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where southwest does not operate e g fares drop on routes from chicago midway but not chicago o hare the largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand incumbents do experience short run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts this is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor we examine evidence relating this demand building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion there is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes

arima and cointegration tests of ppp under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes real exchange rates between the united states and its major trading partners were calculated for the bretton woods and flexible exchange rate periods unit root tests indicate that purchasing power parity performed poorly in both periods tests for cointegration reveal limited instances in which it is possible to estimate the deviations from ppp as an error correcting model the estimated error correcting models indicate that foreign but not u s prices responded to deviations from ppp frenkel s 1981b finding that purchasing power parity ppp worked better during the 1920s than the 1970s caused considerable controversy for example davutyan and pippenger 1985 contend that the socalled collapse of ppp is a result of an increase in the relative importance of real versus monetary shocks they argue that the 1970s as opposed to the 1920s was characterized by real supply shocks and the international coordination of monetary policies the argument is that ppp did not fail rather there was an increase in the volatility of those factors giving rise to deviations from ppp hakkio 1984 reestimated ppp over the 1920s and 1970s using cross country tests i e sure estimates to improve the efficiency of his estimates he was able to support the hypothesis that ppp worked better in the 1970s than in the 1920s on the other hand papers by adler and lehman 1983 dornbusch 1980 frenkel 1981a junge 1985 and krugman 1978 report findings contrary to the ppp hypothesis moreover kenen and rodrik 1986 find that the volatility of real exchange rates has increased throughout the flexible rate period this paper tries to shed some light on the importance and persistence of the observed deviations from purchasing power parity under alternative exchange rate systems while it is interesting to compare ppp in the 1920s versus the 1970s it is equally useful to compare the 1960s versus the 1970s and 1980s if real supply shocks and lack of monetary coordination are characteristic of the latter period ppp should perform better in the 1960s to illustrate the issues involved consider the following econometric model of relative purchasing power

endogenous timing with infinitely many firms abstract a model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit output dominant firm and the cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases at each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one both stackelberg and cournot like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however when the number of leaders is given production at subsequent periods is always prevented and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level

producer opportunism in retailing contracts this paper analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints it considers vertical contracts as starting points of ex post renegotiation it shows that the alleged room for franchisor opportunism that seems quite important in franchising contracts can be seen as an insurance device when part of the goal of the contract is to provide a stable payoff to the franchisee this conclusion holds for various opportunistic strategies direct eviction of initial retailers excessive entry of new retailers on the market or resale price maintenance used to encourage voluntary exit of initial retailers

cost reductions cost padding and stock market prices the chilean experience with price cap regulation we study the chilean electricity distribution industry and find that costs the ratio of reported costs to revenues have fallen since price caps were introduced cost reductions are u shaped since 1989 strong initial cost reductions reverse every four years coinciding with regulatory reviews a possible explanation is that firms are behaving strategically we then use stock market data to complement our study we construct a measure of cumulative abnormal returns for regulated firms around their quarterly announcements and a measure of naive cost expectations which excludes any indication of the occurrence of review periods in general cost reports in excess of naive cost expectations have a negative effect on returns even after we control for company fixed effects the exception is cost surprises that happen during review periods which increase abnormal returns the estimated effects fall over time this is consistent with the hypothesis of strategic firms and that the regulatory regime translates these games into higher rates in a way that is not completely anticipated by the market more generally the results suggest there may be value in complementing regulatory procedures with stock market information

speculative profits innovation and growth when technological change affects the prices of tradeable assets innovators can obtain speculative profits by exploiting their inside information as to the occurrence of innovations we propose a tractable model of endogenous growth that formalizes this argument originally due to hirshleifer 1971 we then use the model to assess two claims advanced by hirshleifer namely that speculative profits can generate excessive investment in r d when they add to monopoly rents guaranteed by patent protection or else even in a perfectly competitive economy the analysis confirms the first claim but casts doubts on the second one jel o30 o40

competition and relational contracts in the rwanda coffee chain how does competition affect market outcomes when formal contracts are not enforceable and parties resort to relational contracts difficulties with measuring relational contracts and dealing with the endogeneity of competition have frustrated attempts to answer this question we make progress by studying relational contracts between upstream farmers and downstream mills in rwanda s coffee industry first we identify salient dimensions of their relational contracts and measure them through an original survey of mills and farmers second we take advantage of an engineering model for the optimal placement of mills to construct an instrument that isolates geographically determined variation in competition conditional on the suitability for mills placement within the catchment area we find that mills surrounded by more suitable areas i face more competition from other mills ii use fewer relational contracts with farmers and iii exhibit worse performance an additional competing mill also iv reduces the aggregate quantity of coffee supplied to mills by farmers and v makes farmers worse off competition hampers relational contracts directly by increasing farmers temptation to default on the relational contract and indirectly by reducing mill s profits

public monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions we estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government controlled retailing on entry patterns in the absence of the pennsylvania liquor control board the state would have roughly 2 5 times the current number of stores higher consumer surplus and lower payments to liquor store employees with just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing government operation mitigates but does not eliminate free entry s bias against rural consumers we find only limited evidence of political influence on entry jel d42 d72 l11 l12 l43 l81

the regulation of electricity results from an event study in this paper event study methods are used to compare the stock market returns for the recs with general stock market returns to test the hypothesis that the regulatory package shows symptoms of capture by special interest groups over the 1991 95 period the results show that some capture by the recs may have occurred as they have earned abnormal market returns however regulatory events are heterogeneous in nature and actions taken over prices by the director general of electricity supply dges in 1995 appear to have reduced abnormal returns as part of the study we examine the impact on shareholders returns of the dges s controversial announcement in march 1995 of plans to tighten price controls on the recs the regulatory package appears to work reasonably well on balance

dynamic capabilities what are they this paper focuses on dynamic capabilities and more generally the resource based view of the firm we argue that dynamic capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable processes such as product development strategic decision making and alliancing they are neither vague nor tautological although dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path dependent in their emergence they have significant commonalities across firms popularly termed best practice this suggests that they are more homogeneous fungible equifinal and substitutable than is usually assumed in moderately dynamic markets dynamic capabilities resemble the traditional conception of routines they are detailed analytic stable processes with predictable outcomes in contrast in high velocity markets they are simple highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes finally well known learning mechanisms guide the evolution of dynamic capabilities in moderately dynamic markets the evolutionary emphasis is on variation in high velocity markets it is on selection at the level of rbv we conclude that traditional rbv misidentifies the locus of long term competitive advantage in dynamic markets overemphasizes the strategic logic of leverage and reaches a boundary condition in high velocity markets copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

a capability based view of competitive heterogeneity the question of how firms differ is paramount to strategy scholars this question has motivated empirical research on the factors influencing performance differences among close competitors it also has motivated work on factors that increase or decrease the mean performance of firms in an industry theories about resources and capabilities tend to dominate discussions of heterogeneity in performance and superior performance yet the strategy field lacks a cumulative body of empirical work showing how firms differ this article derives conclusions and questions from empirical work on capabilities we then discuss work that complements but lies beyond the boundaries of traditional capabilities research we conclude by suggesting approaches to and areas of future work

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

the costs of free entry an empirical study of real estate agents in greater boston this paper studies the consequences of xed commissions and low entry barriers in greater boston s real estate brokerage industry from 1998 2007 a period with substantial agent turnover we nd that entry is not associated with increased sales probabilities or reduced sales time instead it decreases the market share of experienced agents and reduces average service quality we develop a dynamic empirical model motivated by these patterns to study the extent of ineciency in the current system compared to alternatives to accommodate a large state space we approximate the value function using sieves and impose the bellman equation as an equilibrium constraint if commissions are cut in half there would be 40 fewer agents implying social savings of 23 of industry revenue and the average agent would facilitate 73 more transactions house price appreciation of 50 during our sample period accounts for a 24 increase in the number of agents and a 31 decline in average agent productivity finally improving information about past agent performance can increase productivity and generate signicant social savings

equilibrium product bundling this article offers an equilibrium theory of product bundling by rival firms in several models where a primary good is produced in a duopoly market and one or more other goods is produced under perfectly competitive conditions bundling is shown to emerge as an equilibrium strategy of one or both of the duopolists for its role as a product differentiation device when the rival firms can commit to bundling sales their profits are higher but social welfare is reduced copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry we provide a new perspective to the literature on social desirability of entry by showing that if the input supplier has market power social desirability of entry of the final goods producers depends on returns to scale entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to scale technology but it can be socially excessive under decreasing returns to scale technologies if the cost of entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently competitive hence the anti competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable if the final goods market is characterised by decreasing returns to scale technologies

market r d allocations when research paths are product specific a compared to the social optimum individual firms undertook too little rd b too many firms entered the competition to undertake rd2 c if the elasticity of demand were sufficiently low aggregate rd

firm entry excess capacity and endogenous productivity abstract we show that sluggish firm entry causes productivity to vary endogenously in response to technology shocks the endogenous productivity effect is caused by incumbent firms utilizing excess capacity as entry adjusts we develop a nonparametric model of endogenous sunk costs and monopolistic competition to show that imperfect competition and dynamic entry are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for endogenous productivity fluctuations quantitatively we show the endogenous productivity effect is as large as that from a traditional capital utilization effect

the inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogenous market structure the paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution but where this effect can be partially off set by investing in adaptation as a private good the focus is not on external effects but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution the structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms the analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications the present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures i show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum i e to under adapation when pollution increases adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic otherwise welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution the total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies

product differentiation search costs and competition in the mutual fund industry a case study of s p 500 index funds we investigate the role that non portfolio fund differentiation and information search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry the large number of funds and the sizeable dispersion in fund fees in a case study we find that despite the financial homogeneity of s p 500 index funds this sector exhibits the fund proliferation and fee dispersion observed in the broader industry we show how extra portfolio mechanisms explain these features these mechanisms also suggest an explanation for the puzzling late 1990s shift in sector assets to more expensive and often newly entered funds an influx of highinformation cost novice investors

price fixing policy abstract the prohibition against price fixing is competition law s most important and least controversial provision yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing and prevalent understandings cannot be reconciled with principles of oligopoly theory this article 1 presents a fundamental reconceptualization of our understanding of horizontal agreements 2 develops a systematic analysis of price fixing policy that focuses on its deterrence benefits and chilling costs and 3 compares this direct approach to commentators favored formulations that typically involve some sort of formalistic communications based prohibition by targeting a subset of means rather than the illicit ends conventional formulations tend to impose liability in cases with lower deterrence benefits and greater chilling costs than those reached under a direct approach and to incur greater administrative costs as well

endogenous costs and price cost margins an application to the european airline industry this paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins in particular we estimate price cost margins when firms bargain over wages we extent the standard two equation set up demand and first order condition in the product market to include a third equation which is derived from bargaining over wages in this way price cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa we implement the model using data for eight european airlines from 1976 1994 and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price cost margins and the assessment of market power our main result is that observed prices in europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices even though observed margins are consistent with nash behavior apparently costs had been inflated to the point that the european consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices

do markets differ much this essay reports the results of a crosssection study of differences in accounting profitability that sheds light on some basic controversies in industrial economics most previous cross section studies in this field have been concerned with testing hypotheses about structural coefficients in models meant to apply to essentially all markets as we have learned more about the difficulties of constructing such general models and of performing tests on their structural parameters properly structural cross section analysis has fallen out of fashion in contrast to most of the cross section literature the analysis reported here is fundamentally descriptive it does not attempt directly to estimate or to test hypotheses about structural parameters i hope to show by example that one can perform illuminating analysis of cross section data without a host of controversial maintained hypotheses cross section data can yield interesting stylized facts to guide both general theorizing and empirical analysis of specific industries even if they cannot easily support full blown structural estimation one can view the sort of search for stylized facts conducted here as either a replacement for or an input to interindustry structural estimation depending on one s feeling about the long run potential of that research approach this study also departs from much of the cross section literature by being fundamentally concerned with the importance of various effects not just with coefficient signs and t statistics in particular this essay provides estimates of the relative importance of firm market and market share differences in the determination of business unit divisional profitability in u s manufacturing using 1975 data from the line of business program of the u s federal trade commission ftc i find support neither for the existence of firm effects nor for the importance of market share effects moreover while industry effects apparently exist and are important they appear to be negatively correlated with seller concentration in these data section i relates firm market and share effects to current issues and controversies in industrial economics and thus supplies the motivation for our empirical analysis the remainder of the essay treats the data and

the incidence of regulatory rents in the motor carrier industry this article focuses on two questions in the debate over motor carrier regulation first did regulation create eliminate or have no effect on monopoly rents in the trucking industry second ifthere were rents what was their incidence were they received by owners oftrucking firms dissipated through higher costs or captured by the teamsters union data on share price responses to deregulation announcements reveal declines in expected profits of 8 19 of totalfirm value this suggests that regulation created monopoly profits and indicates that at least some of these rents accrued to owners of trucking firms firms responses to regulatory change are modelled as functions of company s operating characteristics and measures of unionization operating efficiency and service characteristics are shown to affect the impact of deregulation on share values

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

capacity and product market competition measuring market power in a puppy dog industry abstract in this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for competition in two variables capacity and prices the model has a two stage setup in the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a product differentiated price setting game in the second stage since costs are endogenized through the first stage this has important implications for the measurement of market power in the product market in particular simpler one stage specifications would result in a bias in the measurement of market power which can be linked to the taxonomy for two stage games given in fudenberg and tirole 1984 fudenberg d tirole j 1984 the fat cat effect the puppy dog ploy and the lean and hungry look american economic review paper and proceedings 74 361 366 we then estimate this model demand cost short and long run and conduct for the european airline industry using data for the period of 1976 1990 we perform a number of specification tests and reject a simple one stage specification in favor of our two stage set up in particular we find that some degree of market power in the product market exists however market conduct in the two stage set up is significantly less collusive than in the more widely employed one stage specification which is consistent with the direction of bias in puppy dog games this illustrates that collusiveness of firms market conduct in the product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity competition is not accounted for

forecasting exchange rate for the australian dollar via a vis the us dollar using multivariate time series models the purpose of the paper is to forecast exchange rates by using restricted and unresticted vector autoregressive var models also introduced is an econometric model for the purpose of comparison a comparison of forecast stastistics shows that the restricted model bvar has better forecasting ability compared with the unrestricted var model however the econometric model outperforms both the study also indicates that the exchange rate relative price and three month forward rate are cointegrated thus an error correction model also is considered for the structural one and the forecasting performance improved further for this model

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

a tale of two market failures technology and environmental policy abstract market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies these combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives and can be cost effectively harnessed through the use of economic incentive based policy in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives while environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties a long term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success

unemployment insurance and market structure abstract this paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance ui on employment and unemployment in an industry in which the prices can vary due to some market power some non conventional results are obtained it is shown that if there is free entry and exit average industrial employment may be a decreasing function of the experience rating because the number of firms in the industry is itself a decreasing function of this parameter this contradicts the conventional view which was arrived at using models of a perfectly competitive industry with no entry and according to which employment should be an increasing function of the experience rating the general conclusion is that for industries with different degrees of market power the same ui scheme has different impacts on employment and unemployment

a test of the purchasing power parity hypothesis the purchasing power parity ppp hypothesis is examined in the case of less developed countries although the issue has been debated extensively in the context of the developed countries there has hardly been any study using the experience of the less developed countries quarterly data from four countries is used for the period 1961 1 1990 4 and hardly any evidence is found of the hypothesis a special test namely a cointegration test designed for the hypothesis has been implemented

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

raising the returns to venture finance abstract investors in ventures that threaten to disrupt the markets of incumbents can use the options markets to add value to their investments by purchasing put options on the stock of the disrupted rivals on the basis of their asymmetric knowledge by making a profit on these derivative trades in the stock of the disrupted firms the investor innovator is able to recapture from the market extra and immediate profits equivalent to the value of the consumer surplus generated by the innovation these additional profits increase the incentive of investors to invest in disruptive ventures and so correct biases that have been observed against investing disruptive innovation our paper provides guidance as to how these effects arise and their value it also explores the ethical regulatory and practical constraints on undertaking the trades pointing out that it is effective and the legality seems to be robust provided certain conditions are met

testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance the determinants of organizational risk taking and its impact on economic performance are critical issues in strategic management using a model that included risk performance performance expecta