voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes increasing revenue or increasing incentives to evade many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed i model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade taxes they nevertheless increase tax revenues net of administrative costs i confirm the importance of administrative costs in a survey of german competent local tax authorities i then test the effects of voluntary disclosure on the tax evasion decision using the introduction of the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program in the u s for identification the analysis confirms that the introduction of voluntary disclosure increases tax evasion

taxation and international migration of superstars evidence from the european football market we analyze the effects of top tax rates on international migration of football players in 14 european countries since 1985 both country case studies and multinomial regressions show evidence of strong mobility responses to tax rates with an elasticity of the number of foreign domestic players to the net of tax rate around one around 0 15 we also find evidence of sorting effects low taxes attract highability players who displace low ability players and displacement effects low taxes on foreigners displace domestic players those results can be rationalized in a simple model of migration and taxation with rigid labor demand jel f22 h24 h31 j44 j61 l83

tax collection with agency costs private contracting or government bureaucrats historically governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes this paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors while bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs profit maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level generally the choice of collection methods depends on a comparison of the welfare loss associated with monitoring in the bureaucratic setting and the welfare loss associated with overdetection of evasion in the private setting copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

the political economics of redistribution inequality and tax avoidance a central result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality however empirical evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed this paper shows how the different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement by focusing on structure induced equilibrium in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of tax enforcement we show that more inequality may well reduce the extent of redistribution depending on two opposing effects the standard political effect and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue

fiscal paradise foreign tax havens and american business the tax haven affiliates of american corporations account for more than 20 percent of u s foreign direct investment and nearly a third of the foreign profits of u s firms american companies report extraordinarily high profit rates on their tax haven investments in 1982 this behavior implies that the revenue maximizing tax rate for a typical haven is around 5 8 percent american and foreign investment in tax havens has an uncertain effect on u s tax revenue but since low tax rates encourage american companies to shift profits out of high tax foreign countries it is possible that low foreign tax rates ultimately enhance u s tax collections

irs as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints the model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models in particular the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative also it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance the government can increase welfare by playing the role of loan shark to people whose borrowing is constrained on the private market

optimal taxation in the presence of tax evasion expected utility versus prospect theory abstract it is now well known that the predictions of expected utility theory eut applied to tax evasion are quantitatively and qualitatively at variance with the evidence while prospect theory pt makes the correct predictions in this literature the tax rate is exogenous we endogenize the tax rate and require that a successful theory should explain jointly the facts on the tax rate tax gap and the level of government expenditure we find that the data is best described by taxpayers using pt and the government using standard utility theory eut the results are robust to several possible alternative specifications we discuss how our results have a bearing on the debate between liberalism versus paternalism in behavioral economics we also propose an alternative explanation based on the notion of context dependent preferences

taxation with costly administration the concept of a tax technology is used here as providing a unified framework for analyzing both administrative activity by tax authorities and tax resisting activity by taxpayers this framework provides a simple formalization of adam smith s four components of tax costs administration substitution active noncompliance and passive compliance the model is used to derive policy implications concerning the proper measurement of the cost of public funds and concerning the criterion for optimal administration

the missing wealth of nations are europe and the u s net debtors or net creditors this paper shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens drawing on systematic anomalies in portfolio investment positions and a unique swiss dataset i find that 8 of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens 6 of which goes unrecorded on the basis of plausible assumptions accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone officially the world s second largest net debtor into a net creditor it also reduces the u s net debt significantly the results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that after a decade of poor to rich capital flows external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries i provide concrete proposals to improve international investment statistics

plea bargaining with the irs abstract the purpose of this paper is to propose a new evasion counteracting policy and to prove its welfare improving property the new fatota policy allows a target group of businesses to choose between the following two options paying a fixed amount of taxes thus exempting themselves from tax audits or paying only the amount they choose to pay and subject to possible tax audits it is shown that fatota is very similar to the plea bargaining system of the u s criminal proceedings and our results can be treated as an extension of the grossman katz analysis to the crime of tax evasion

the incidence of transaction taxes evidence from a stamp duty holiday this paper exploits the 2008 09 stamp duty holiday in the united kingdom to estimate the incidence of a transaction tax on housing the average reduction in the after tax sale price is found to be around 900 against the backdrop of an average tax reduction of about 1500 while we estimate an increase in transactions of properties affected by the tax holiday around 8 most of this effect appears to have reversed rapidly after the policy was withdrawn suggesting mostly a short term retiming of transactions the findings are calibrated to a simple bargaining model to show they imply that about sixty percent of the surplus generated by the holiday accrued to buyers

a quick refresher course in macroeconomics this paper presents a non technical discussion of some of the important developments in macroeconomics over the past twenty years it considers three broad categories of research first it discusses how the notion of rational expectations has affected economists views on the role of economic policy the debate over rules versus discretion and empirical work in macroeconomics second it discusses various new classical approaches to the business cycle including imperfect information theories real business cycle theories and sectoral shift theories third it discusses various new keynesian approaches to the business cycle includes theories based on general disequilibrium labor contracting and menu costs this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

settlement in tax evasion prosecution it is often argued that even if optimal ex post settlement dilutes deterrence ex ante we analyse the interest for the tax authority of committing ex ante to a settlement strategy we show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers true tax liability the more informative the signal the larger the additional expected revenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool

labour supply tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds an empirical investigation abstract in this paper we extend the concept of marginal cost of public funds itmcf to incorporate tax evasion in the labour market mcf values are also computed from various tax reforms applied to the province of quebec canada 1985 for this purpose a utility based labour supply model that allows for both regular and irregular work activities is used at the benchmark situation the mcf associated with an increase in marginal income tax rates ranges between 1 39 and 1 53 depending upon whether we consider rationing or not moreover the presence of the irregular sector accounts for between 0 02 and 0 05 of this mcf although small in magnitude the impact of the irregular sector increases rapidly with the level of marginal tax rates

evading auditing and taxing the equity compliance tradeoff tax evasion and auditing are analyzed in a model of linear income taxation taxpayers minimize expected tax payments including penalty for underreporting while the tax administration sets its audit policy to maximize expected net revenue under the restriction of only two audit rates per class of taxpayers given the reaction of taxpayers and tax administration we derive the optimal income tax that the government should adopt to maximize social welfare there are several classes of taxpayers each characterized by a given distribution of pretax income and specific audit policy parameters

research note prerelease demand forecasting for motion pictures using functional shape analysis of virtual stock markets prerelease demand forecasting is one of the most crucial yet difficult tasks facing marketers in the 60 billion motion picture industry we propose functional shape analysis fsa of virtual stock markets vsms to address this long standing challenge in vsms prices of a movie s stock reflect the dynamic demand expectations prior to the movie s release using fsa we identify a small number of distinguishing shapes e g the last moment velocity spurt that carry information about a movie s future demand and produce early and accurate prerelease forecasts we find that although forecasting errors from the existing methods e g those that rely on movie features can be as high as 90 87 our approach results in an error of only 4 73 because demand forecasting is especially useful for managerial decision making when provided longbefore a movie s release we further demonstrate how our method can be used for early forecasting and compare its power against alternative approaches we also discuss the theoretical implications of the discovered shapes that may help managers identify indicators of a potentially successful movie early and dynamically

tax evasion and the size of the underground economy abstract the theoretical literature on the relationship between the tax system and the underground economy is extended using a model similar to the one examined by watson journal of public economics 1985 27 231 246 in which tax evasion is possible in one sector of the economy but is impossible in the other we prove that a rise in the tax rate increases decreases the number of agents in the sector in which tax evasion is possible if preferences exhibit increasing decreasing relative risk aversion we also use our model to investigate the relationship between the tax rate and the total amount of tax evaded

the optimal size of a tax collection agency the condition that characterizes the optimal size of a tax collection agency is derived and then given a simple interpretation in terms of excess burden the paper clarifies an earlier finding of sandmo which suggests that the optimal degree of enforcement is higher than a simple cost benefit calculation would indicate the appropriate condition is that at the margin the resource cost of increasing enforcement should equal the saving of excess burden due to the decline in exposure to risk the increased revenue gained from stricter enforcement does not enter the expression because it merely represents a transfer among the economy s identical agents

timing decisions of new product preannouncement and launch with competition abstract we develop a game theoretic model to study the timing of new product preannouncement and launch under competition we derive firms optimal timing choices and conducted a numerical analysis to evaluate the role of various factors our analytical and numerical results showed that anticipated competitor s timing choices are the most significant factors a firm should not preannounce early unless the preannouncement is effective in creating pent up demands however the preannouncement and launch should be rushed if the quality or profit margin of the new product is high and postponed if the market share of the existing product is high the market leader should preannounce earlier in a simultaneous game than in a sequential game but the opposite for the market follower data collected from the microprocessor industry validated our model

economic man as a moral individual first there is the broadly ethical question how should one live to emphasize this connection is not the same as asserting that people will always act in ways they will themselves morally defend but only to recognize that ethical deliberations cannot be totally inconsequential to actual human behavior sen 1988 3 4 i introduction it is a plausible proposition that some people s behavior is affected significantly by moral considerations a growing literature in economics and related disciplines reviewed and analyzed in earlier work by two of the authors goldfarb and griffith 1991a griffith and goldfarb 1991b explores the possibility and desirability of incorporating these moral considerations into the economic analysis of individual behavior 1 a variety of approaches to introducing moral considerations into economic analysis have been put forward by contributors within economics including sen 1974 1977 1988 hirschman 1985 phelps 1975 vanberg 1988 brunner 1987 frank 1987 1988 hirshleifer 1985 mueller 1986 and schotter 1981 among others among related disciplines the philosophers gauthier 1986 and ulman margalit 1977 the sociologists coleman 1987 and etzioni 1986 1988 and the political scientist axelrod 1984 all present relevant analyses as our earlier review indicated these authors pursue three competing approaches introducing moral values as part of preference functions introducing moral norms or rules as constraints and introducing such norms as decision rules for coping with strategic interaction gaming situations we propose here a concrete method for including moral values in the economist s model of preferences our method maintains the standard economic framework of an agent maximizing his or her utility subject to constraints but modifies the utility function so that the enjoyment or utility from consuming a given set of goods varies in a lumpy or discontinuous way depending on the concurrent moral content of the individual s behavior moreover it offers an analytical representation of the linkage between preferring to act morally and the individual s being faced with possibly significant differences in constraints because of such moral considerations 2 the paper proceeds as follows section ii indicates where our approach fits in the existing literature incorporating moral values into preference functions section iii sets forth our approach to specifying these utility functions section iv suggests some extensions section v presents further discussion and conclusions ii relation to the literature while not directly inspired by the occupational choice literature our approach can be usefully viewed as an application of the economic model of occupational choice to modelling moral preferences 3 this approach helps fill an analytical gap between hochman and rodgers 1969 small modification of the standard microeconomic framework and the more extensive departures suggested by etzioni 1986 and sen 1974 1977 our model helps fill this gap by providing what we think is an intuitively appealing treatment of the discontinuous or lumpy content of important classes of moral decisions hochman and rodgers 1969 present an analysis of the possible relationship between moral and other values in the context of charitable transfers their analysis is now a standard ingredient in intermediate microeconomics textbooks 4 their interdependent utility approach puts impoverished individual y s income or utility into individual x s utility function one then analyzes the conditions under which individual x will either himself transfer resources to individual y or vote for a government program to make such a transfer this approach allows transfers that vary continuously from zero to very large amounts of money with decisions involving trade offs at the margin for our purposes this marginal trade off feature so useful for analyzing charitable transfers presents a very significant limitation when attempting to apply the model to a wider range of moral behavior

regional tax evasion and audit enforcement abstractregional tax evasion and audit enforcement regional studies using an original panel dataset on tax gap and audits this paper sheds light on the impact of audit and enforcement on the italian regional tax evasion over the period 2001 11 spatial econometric models were used to model regional tax gaps and to control for endogeneity issues and spatial patterns results provide evidence that greater enforcement increases tax compliance a higher probability of targeted audits and additional schemes to increase the disclosure of declared income decrease the tax gap the paper provides a general framework to study determinants of tax evasion at the regional level

labor market institutions taxation and the underground economy abstract the paper aims at qualifying the links between labor market institutions taxation tax monitoring and underground economic activity the proposed model is a continuous time matching model with one commodity roduced either overground or underground underground economic activity arises because of partial compliance with regulations and tax contributions imposed by the government vacancies and workers search are directed at a specific labor market workers are heterogenous in the subjective cost they face when operating in the irregular sector analytical and numerical investigations suggest that interactions between regular and irregular activities can affect standard results of policy interventions in that respect the paper supports the view that policies aiming at increasing individuals benefits of participating in the regular sector are more desirable than a deterrence policy

the occurrence of tax amnesties theory and evidence this paper presents a theoretical model and empirical evidence to explain the occurrence of tax amnesties we treat amnesties as endogenous resulting from a strategic game between many taxpayers discounting future payments from punishment and a government that balances costs and benefits of amnesty programs from the model we derive hypotheses about the factors that should influence the occurrence of tax amnesties to test these predictions empirically we rely on amnesty information from us states between 1981 and 2011 in line with the theoretical model our empirical findings suggest that the likelihood of amnesties is mainly driven by a government s fiscal requirements and the taxpayers expectations on future amnesties

honesty is sometimes the best policy this paper examines two central points in the economics of tax evasion if the taxation authorities have reason to believe that tax is being illegally evaded how far should they go in pursuit of the missing income and what roles should thoroughness of investigation and severity of penalties play in the pursuit of that income previous contributions have examined the positive economics of various control instruments on tax payers behaviouri the degree of threat or the level of policing required to enforce truthful reporting and the desirability of different types of policy in terms of tax payers expected utility some writers have investigated the design of sophisticated investigation schemes to maximise expected government receipts or to enforce truthful reporting at low resource cost the approach adopted here is to examine the desirability of various combinations of policy instruments in the context of an explicit model of social welfare it is not self evident that honesty is desirable from the point of view of the government if honesty is desirable it is not obvious that people should be forced to be completely honest and it is not obvious how they ought to be forced the desirability of an economic policy depends on two major issues which are sometimes left submerged the objectives of the government or its agents and the constraints under which such objectives must be pursued the objective is often assumed to be a simple form of ex ante expected utility this is surprising since value systems other than utilitarianism are frequently invoked in the design of tax systems and so it seems reasonable to

randomness in tax enforcement abstract when there is tax evasion increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess generally leads to higher reported income and more revenue when reducing randomness is costly optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable income even if reducing randomness is costless taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated so that the government s revenue stays fixed

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

keynes the keynesians and the classics a suggested interpretation mainstream interpretations of john maynard keynes s general theory are surveyed an alternative postclassical interpretation is proposed keynes is interpreted as treating classical theory as the valid theory of allocation but this type of theory is of limited relevance for macroanalysis the productive sector is characterized by the utilization mode of activity regulated by the nonallocative multiplier process however the financial sector is allocative and keynes proposed the allocative theory of liquidity preference it is argued that this dual conception of the macroeconomy is suggestive of the need for a more realistic method in macroeconomics copyright 1995 by royal economic society

optimal taxation capital mobility and tax evasion the problem of capital flight and tax evasion is of paramount concern to many countries the fear is that capital mobility may lead to capital flight from high to low tax countries in such large amounts that it deprives a nation of its tax base and as a consequence its welfare system today s international climate where bank secrecy laws protect foreign investors anonymity in addition to substantial differences in national tax rates makes this fear a reality capital flight and tax evasion are also of concern from an equity as well as an efficiency point of view to the extent that labor cannot evade taxation as easily as capital labor is subject to higher effective tax rates than capital the presence of capital flight therefore imposes a higher tax burden on immobile factors and creates inequality giovannini 1989 and razin and sadka 1991 have recently studied the welfare effects of capital flight both studies are undertaken from the extreme assumption that foreign savings cannot be taxed and hence that tax evasion is undetectable and costless although evidence suggests that governments have difficulties taxing foreign source income governments derive positive tax revenue from foreign source income this paper thus adopts a different perspective capital flight and tax evasion are viewed as problems of tax enforcement the purpose of the paper is to analyze the intertemporal savings decision of an individual who can allocate consumption between two periods by borrowing and lending abroad and domestically it is assumed that foreign savings can evade taxation with a certain probability depending on the amount of money the government allocates to tax enforcement within this setting we investigate how taxes on foreign and domestic savings should be set optimally and how much money if any the government should allocate to tax enforcement

optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between optimal taxation and optimal tax enforcement a central question concerns the extent to which revenue should be raised through higher tax rates which distort behavior or greater enforcement which distorts behavior and also entails direct resource costs in the models examined some expenditure on enforcement may be optimal despite its resource cost its distortionary effect and the availability of other revenue sources having no enforcement costs rules for optimal tax rates and enforcement expenditures are derived which also indicate the marginal cost of government funds and optimal enforcement priorities for a tax collection agency

explaining and forecasting online auction prices and their dynamics using functional data analysis online auctions have become increasingly popular in recent years and as a consequence there is a growing body of empirical research on this topic most of that research treats data from online auctions as cross sectional and consequently ignores the changing dynamics that occur during an auction in this article we take a different look at online auctions and propose to study an auction s price evolution and associated price dynamics specifically we develop a dynamic forecasting system to predict the price of an ongoing auction by dynamic we mean that the model can predict the price of an auction in progress and can update its prediction based on newly arriving information forecasting price in online auctions is challenging because traditional forecasting methods cannot adequately account for two features of online auction data 1 the unequal spacing of bids and 2 the changing dynamics of price and bidding throughout the auction our dynamic forecasting model accounts for these special featur

internet based virtual stock markets for business forecasting the application of internet based virtual stock markets vsms is an additional approach that can be used to predict short and medium term market developments the basic concept involves bringing a group of participants together via the internet and allowing them to trade shares of virtual stocks these stocks represent a bet on the outcome of future market situations and their value depends on the realization of these market situations in this process a vsm elicits and aggregates the assessments of its participants concerning future market developments the aim of this article is to evaluate the potential use and the different design possibilities as well as the forecast accuracy and performance of vsms compared to expert predictions for their application to business forecasting after introducing the basic idea of using vsms for business forecasting we discuss the different design possibilities for such vsms in three real world applications we analyze the feasibility and forecast accuracy of vsms compare the performance of vsms to expert predictions and propose a new validity test for vsm forecasts finally we draw conclusions and provide suggestions for future research

heard it through the grapevine the direct and network effects of a tax enforcement field experiment on firms abstract tax enforcement may have deterrent effects that extend beyond directly treated taxpayers but evidence of such deterrent effects for major sources of revenue is limited this paper studies the effects of a large scale field experiment on employer deposits that make up most u s tax collections in person visits by revenue officers have a large direct effect on visited firms tax deposits the other clients of visited firms tax preparers also deposit more tax a network effect that suggests preparers disseminate information aggregating over all links this network effect accounts for 1 2 times as much revenue as the direct effect letters conveying the same message are found to have much smaller direct effects and no measurable network effects

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

utilitarianism and horizontal equity the case for random taxation this paper establishes that far from being able to derive the principle of horizontal equity from utilitarianism the principle is actually in consistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances we derive conditions under which a it is optimal to impose random tax schedules ex post randomization and b it is optimal to randomize the tax schedules imposed on a set of otherwise identical individuals ex ante randomization the implications for optimal tax theory are discussed more generally it is shown that there are a number of potentially important economic situations with which the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent not only with utilitarianism but even with pareto optimality this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tax enforcement a public choice perspective federal income tax inforcement varies greatly across individual states while it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency anecdotal evidence suggests it does not in this paper we apply the weingast moran model to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the irs specifically we model irs audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations we find that the interstate differences in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the irs shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the irs

audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game abstract this paper uses a game theoretic model of the tax compliance game to estimate a model of audit selection and income tax underreporting in jamaica the empirical analysis make use of audited tax returns for individual taxpayers and a random sample of tax returns for the population from which the audited returns are selected the estimation results strongly indicate a nonrandom audit strategy and thus provide support for the game theoretic approach the results also indicate that the probability of underreporting and the level of underreporting are positively related to the marginal tax rate and to income and negatively related to marginal payroll tax benefits in general the underreporting elasticities are small

cross border tax evasion under a unilateral fatca regime abstract cross border tax evasion has emerged in recent years as a central issue in tax enforcement traditionally the legal regime governing cross border tax enforcement was based on information exchange upon request in 2010 the us congress enacted the foreign account tax compliance act fatca which seeks to induce foreign financial institutions ffis to participate in a global regime of automatic information reporting of the income of us residents to the us government this paper presents a simple theoretical model of cross border investment that analyzes the consequences of this unilateral fatca regime the model emphasizes cross border investors heterogeneous intrinsic motivation to comply with tax law as well as the impact of information reporting requirements on the cost of providing financial services in fatca compliant equilibria in which ffis report information to the us government ffis face a higher cost of providing financial services increasing the fees charged to their accountholders consequently tax compliant behavior such as investing via their domestic financial sector becomes more costly for foreign residents under certain conditions a unilateral fatca regime causes increased cross border tax evasion among residents of foreign countries this result is robust to various extensions

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

optimal taxation and optimal tax systems the theory of optimal taxation has for the pas two decades been the reigning normative approach of taxation this paper argues that in its current state optimal tax theory is incomplete as a guide to action concerning many critical issues in tax policy it is incomplete because it has not yet come to terms with taxation as a system of coercively collecting revenues from individuals who will tend to resist the coercive nature of collection taxes implies that the resource cost of implementing a tax system have been and will continue to be a critical determinant of appropriate tax policy the paper first presents the three cornerstone propositions of optimal tax theory and then it discusses the influence of these propositions on recent tax policy developments it concludes by sketching an alternative to optimal taxation called the theory of optimal tax systems which embraces the insights of optimal taxation but also considers the technology of raising taxes and the constraints placed upon tax policy by that technology the optimal tax systems perspective is shown to shed light on the choice of tax instruments the problem of tax evasion and the appropriate tax treatment of capital income this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the desirability of a permanent tax amnesty abstract there are two main concerns about tax amnesty first if it is anticipated it may increase cheating and reduce the efficiency of the tax system second amnesty may be inequitable by letting cheaters off the hook however several federal governments currently hold a policy of long term or permanent tax amnesty in apparent defiance of these concerns this paper examines fully anticipated tax amnesty and finds that it is possible for a permanent tax amnesty to actually increase rather than decrease the efficiency and equity of the tax system

avoiding tax avoidance a repeated game theoretic approach abstract we propose an optimal auditing scheme for the tax authorities who face a given tax and penalty functions and a given budget constraint under our proposed strategy individuals can be classified into one of three groups each group is characterized by two parameters i the probability of being audited in that group and ii into which group will an individual move if ii a he reported truthfully ii b he cheated it is then shown that there is a choice of these parameters so that in equilibrium i e when every individual maximizes his payoff given the auditing strategy the percentage of individuals that cheat is arbitrarily small

setting quality expectations when entering a market what should the promise be this paper examines optimal advertised quality actual quality and price for a firm entering a market it develops a two period model where advertised quality influences expectations and hence trial and the gap between actual quality and expectations determines satisfaction which in turn impacts second period sales in such situations a company makes a choice between advertising high quality and getting trial but little repeat and advertising low quality and getting low trial but high repeat results are derived by numerical methods as well as analytically for a special case of the model the model suggests it is optimal to overstate quality when i customers rely relatively less on advertising to form quality expectations and ii customers intrinsic satisfaction with a product is high these results are consistent with deceptive advertising cases at the ftc which showed more deception for unknown firms and for firms whose customers were more satisfied they are also consistent with the decisions made by future managers mbas except that the respondents would advertise higher versus lower quality when advertising was effective

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

whatever happened to keynes s monetary theory some see a return to keynes s ideas in response to the crisis that began in 2007 but we argue that the resurrected ideas belong to that betrayal of keynes s thought known as keynesian economics what happened is almost a reversal of the whig history view of economics in which past knowledge is embodied in later theory keynes has been made a pre keynesian we trace this transformation mainly through his monetary theory though we range more widely where necessary we state what we consider to be his monetary theory then identify and summarise the key contributions to its destruction then in a speculative section we suggest a variety of motivations for this subversion of his ideas we end by assessing what has been lost in particular his monetary policy and suggest social and political pressures that may have been partly responsible

the economics of tax amnesties abstract this paper examines some of the economic implications of tax amnesties we present a model where individuals are initially uncertain about the disutility from tax evasion when they file their tax returns if they later learn that they would like to be more honest than they have been an amnesty gives them an opportunity to report additional income we also show that as the probability of an amnesty rises people report less income as a consequence an optimal collection policy requires the government to balance the cost of lost tax revenue against the gains from an amnesty

tax evasion and the allocation of capital abstract the efficiency cost of capital misallocations between the corporate sector and the noncorporate sector is typically measured using statutory tax differences corporate source income tax compliance is high because of third party reporting however while noncorporate rental income tax compliance is low differential evasion thus exacerbates statutory differences and enlarges the efficiency cost to measure this effect we build a numerical general equilibrium model where households simultaneously choose portfolios of risky assets and fractions of income to report