rent controls and rental housing quality a note on the effects of new york city s old controls rent controls are used in many cities throughout the united states and many other countries there is a lengthy literature on the conceptual effects of rent controls this is not surprising given the size of housing in the u s asset base and the political importance attached to homeownership and quality housing it is surprising how little evidence there is on many of the supposed effects of rent controls the evidence on these impacts is relatively slim for a variety of reasons first the data needed to document some of the predicted impacts are not good for example it is difficult to measure effective maintenance inputs and it is costly to obtain any such data on a wide variety of buildings convincing ceteris paribus experiments are difficult to perform because there typically are many other factors for which it is hard to control additionally the negative theoretical implications appear to be so clear that many economists may not have felt much need to quantify the extent of the damage nevertheless there is some evidence on the influences of rent controls from studies estimating the price elasticity of the supply of structures economists have estimated the likely effect of rent controls on the supply of new structures in a city rydell et al lo and fallis and smith 3 have

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

rent control and prices of owner occupied housing we examine the relation between rent control and prices of owner occupied housing in th e presence of different qualities of housing while a rent ceiling and the price of condominiums are substitutes if housing is undifferentiated it is shown that this is not necessarily the case when housing differs in quality a complete dismantling of rent control may in fact increase the price of condominiums

empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking abstract we examine whether executive stock options esos provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects for a sample of oil and gas producers we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity our proxy for exploration risk increases with the sensitivity of the value of the ceo s options to stock return volatility eso risk incentives both eso risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach we find evidence that eso risk incentives has a positive relation with future exploration risk taking additional tests indicate that eso risk incentives exhibits a negative relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations where eso risk incentives and hedging are allowed to be endogenously determined overall our results are consistent with esos providing managers with incentives to mitigate risk related incentive problems

exercise behavior valuation and the incentive effects of employee stock options abstract we use a large database on eso exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior are manifested in option values and incentives option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations are compared to those computed from models used to value tradable options our analysis provides guidance to both academics and practitioners about how differences in exercise behavior and model choice affect measures of eso values and incentives and underscores the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying economic forces that affect the behavior of eso holders

the multitask theory of state enterprise reform empirical evidence from china the degree of state ownership remains significant in the chinese economy despite more than two decades of economic reform since 1979 most of the remaining state owned enterprises soes are money losing and the few exceptional ones tend to be sheltered by government protection in selected industries yet china has been enjoying one of the most spectacular growth experiences in world history and much of the growth is driven by non state owned enterprises non soes given the poor financial performance of soes the co existence of state ownership and non state ownership in china is a puzzling phenomenon does state ownership exist solely for the benefit of politicians or has state ownership played any role in china s spectacular growth is there any rationale behind china s gradual and selective approach towards privatizing its soes what types of soes does the chinese government choose to privatize what are the consequences of privatization in this paper we offer a multitask theory of soe reform in the context of china which has predictions about the types of soes to be chosen for privatization and the results of privatization we then present empirical evidence supporting the basic premise of the theory and its predictions

rent control and misallocation rent control is still an important type of government regulation of housing markets in many countries and numerous researchers have studied its implications for allocation welfare and investments in housing the present paper aims to improve our understanding of the effect of second generation rent control when it is applied only to one sector of the rental market it is diagrammatically shown that the welfare effects are very different between a universal and a limited application of rent control studying the danish case of second generation rent control lower rents are found in controlled sectors and a minor increase of the rent in the uncontrolled sector using the area of living space in the dwelling as a measure for housing consumption evidence is also produced of both overallocation and underallocation of housing in the rent controlled sectors as envisaged by economic theory

the invisible hand and the grabbing hand evidence from a survey of 105 shop owners in moscow and warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection as well as the burden of regulation and corruption are much greater in moscow the evidence suggests that the invisible hand model of government better fits the warsaw local government and the grabbing hand model is more appropriate for moscow the evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced and that the quality of government may be as essential this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

households willingness to pay for public housing in the presence of price controls nonmarket housing allocation mechanisms such as queueing prevent households from revealing their marginal willingness to pay for housing through market prices we derive the households marginal willingness to pay using the intuitive idea that the length of the queue for a specific house reflects the households willingness to pay for housing characteristics we apply our methodology to public housing in the amsterdam metropolitan area and show that on average the households marginal willingness to pay for a unit of public housing is close to its marginal costs this suggests that the welfare loss of public housing through distortions in housing supply is rather limited and is mainly through distortions in housing demand we provide indirect evidence of the latter by showing that queueing induces inefficient matching of households and housing

the impact of rent control on rents in the free sector in most cases rent control covers only a part of the housing stock this note provides a simple analysis of the impact which rent control and non price rationing exert on the rent in the free sector it is shown that depending on the rationing mechanism rents in the free sector can be higher or lower than in the absence of rent controls

valuing executive stock options with endogenous departure abstract executive stock options differ from exchange traded options because of vesting and portability restrictions executive departure from the firm forces early exercise reducing the value of executive options current methodology calculates the option value by multiplying the black scholes option price by the departure probability this ignores the possibility that executive departure is less likely when stock price is high and thus is correlated with the stock price we show that this correlation implies a substantial increase in option values a similar situation occurs in performance based option packages where the actual number of options granted depends on stock performance

state ownership and market liberalization evidence from china s domestic m a market abstract we study how state ownership affects the post merger performance of chinese acquirers and find that state owned acquirers soes experience a significantly larger long term performance improvement following mergers compared to their non state owned nsoe counterparts when partitioning the sample period into acquisitions made prior to and following china s split share reform of 2005 we find that the post merger performance improvement of soe acquirers is largely attributed to the post reform period in which controlling shareholders converted their non tradable shares into tradable status our results are consistent with the interpretation that state intervention in the form of capital market liberalization and alleviation of governance problems combined with political connections and privileged access to financing may have a positive effect on m a performance that outweighs the inefficiency cost of state ownership in china

merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle abstract the substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares a toehold in the market prior to launching a bid moreover auction theory suggests that toehold bidding may yield a competitive advantage over rival bidders nevertheless with a sample exceeding 10 000 initial control bids for us public targets we show that toehold bidding has declined steadily since the early 1980s and is now surprisingly rare at the same time the average toehold is large when it occurs 20 and toeholds are the norm in hostile bids to explain these puzzling observations we develop and test a two stage takeover model where attempted merger negotiations are followed by open auction with optimal bidding a toehold imposes a cost on target management causing some targets to rationally reject merger negotiations optimal toeholds are therefore either zero to avoid rejection costs or greater than a threshold so that toehold benefits offset rejection costs the toehold threshold estimate averages 9 across initial bidders reflecting in part the bidder s opportunity loss of a merger termination agreement in the presence of market liquidity costs a threshold of this size may well induce a broad range of bidders to select zero toehold as predicted the probability of toehold bidding decreases and the toehold size increases with the threshold estimate the model also predicts a relatively high frequency of toehold bidding in hostile bids as observed overall our test results are consistent with rational bidder behavior with respect to the toehold decision

waiting line auctions if prizes are to be awarded simultaneously at a specified time on a first come first served basis then individuals who queue for them will choose different waiting times through their arrivals at the queue this choice of arrival time at a queue is similar to the choice of a sealed tender in an auction an equilibrium for this waiting line auction is obtained here using methods for analyzing sealed tender auctions when individuals are risk neutral it is shown that several alternative waiting line allocation procedures result in the same transactions cost associated with waiting in line

the relation between equity incentives and misreporting the role of risk taking incentives abstract prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport however if the manager is risk averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk the sensitivity of the manager s wealth to changes in stock price portfolio delta will have two countervailing incentive effects a positive reward effect and a negative risk effect in contrast the sensitivity of the manager s wealth to changes in risk portfolio vega will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect we show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature using both regression and matching designs and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals restatements and enforcement actions we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta collectively our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk

stock splits to profit insider trading lessons from an emerging market abstract stock splits have long presented financial puzzles why are they undertaken why are they associated with abnormal returns abnormal returns particularly those coming shortly before a split s announcement date should raise strong suspicions of insider trading particularly in nations with weak regulatory structures we examined the 718 split events in the emerging stock market of vietnam from 2007 through 2011 we found evidence consistent with illegal insider trading particularly in firms that were vulnerable to insider manipulation and therefore more likely to split their stocks when vulnerable firms stocks did split they provided significant excess short term returns tellingly the abnormal returns on those stocks prior to the split announcements were also extremely high indeed higher than their abnormal post announcement returns moreover trading volume increased prior to the split announcement date this suspicious pattern is what we would expect if insiders were trading on their knowledge we propose that illegal insider trading in contexts where it is possible to escape serious penalty provides a previously undiscussed and cogent explanation for both stock splits and abnormal short term returns

the sensitivity of ceo wealth to equity risk an analysis of the magnitude and determinants abstract to control risk related incentive problems equity holders are expected to manage both the convexity and slope of the relation between firm performance and managers wealth i find stock options but not common stockholdings significantly increase the sensitivity of ceos wealth to equity risk cross sectionally this sensitivity is positively related to firms investment opportunities this result is consistent with managers receiving incentives to invest in risky projects when the potential loss from underinvestment in valuable risk increasing projects is greatest firms stock return volatility is positively related to the convexity provided to managers suggesting convex incentive schemes influence investing and financing decisions

profiting from government stakes in a command economy evidence from chinese asset sales abstract we examine the market response to an unexpected announcement of the sale of government owned shares in china in contrast to earlier work we find a negative effect of government ownership on returns at the announcement date and a symmetric positive effect from the policy s cancellation we suggest that this results from the absence of a chinese political transition to accompany economic reforms so that the benefits of political ties outweigh the efficiency costs of government shareholdings companies managed by former government officials have positive abnormal returns suggesting that personal ties can substitute for government ownership as a source of connections

disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings this article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership using data for 1 301 publicly traded corporations in eight east asian economies we find that firm value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder consistent with a positive incentive effect but firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow ownership consistent with an entrenchment effect given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world

heterogeneity and intertemporal trade finding support for international credit contracts abstract this paper examines the role heterogeneity plays in supporting intertemporal trades between countries when no legal contracts bind sovereign debtors in a dynamic general equilibrium model countries smooth consumption over time by choosing optimal investment and bond sales or purchases countries which follow efficient investment plans and borrow with the intention of repaying debts may nevertheless find default to be in their best interest credit ceilings which eliminate default eliminate some if not all intertemporal trades positive credit ceilings arise only when there is sufficient intertemporal heterogeneity to insure that a country s future includes foreign and domestic investment jel f10 f30

rent control and housing maintenance controls on the conditions of renting housing can take many different forms with different consequences for the market this paper contains analyses of the effects of different regulatory forms on in particular the maintenance decision we review and extend previous approaches and find that not all of the familiar predictions of the basic neoclassical model can be generated by a more sophisticated model others have extended the basic model focusing on the maintenance aspect but we cannot agree entirely with their conclusions a careful specification of the relationship between costs and quality is necessary to derive useful predictions about the effects of rent and eviction controls

ipo mechanisms monitoring and ownership structure1 this paper analyzes the e ect of di erent ipo mechanisms on the structure of share ownership and explores the role of underpricing and rationing in determining investors shareholdings we focus on the agency problem that results when large institutions are the only investors capable of monitoring the firm whereas small shareholders free ride on these activities the major conclusion is that some well known aspects of ipos may be explained as rational responses by the issuer to the existence of regulatory constraints in public capital markets there is a two stage o ering mechanism in which the investment banker acting in the interests of the issuer optimally rations the allotment of shares to small investors in order to capture the benefits associated with better monitoring by institutions importantly in our model the existence of underpricing and oversubscription is an indication that the issuer has received a higher ex ante price than would have been obtained through a competitive walrasian type o ering process 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved jel classification g24 g32 g38

partial privatization and firm performance most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact this perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner using data on indian state owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability productivity and investment widespread privatization in recent decades has generated a large empirical literature concerning the effect of ownership on firm performance most studies find that privatization has a positive impact on the profitability and efficiency of firms see megginson and netter 2001 for a recent survey 1 the firms in these studies have had a majority of their assets privatized and control rights have been transferred from the government to private owners surprisingly little is known about the effect of partial privatization where the government remains the controlling owner this paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by investigating whether the performance of state owned enterprises in india is affected by the sale of non controlling equity stakes on the stock market

firm specific information and the efficiency of investment abstract in the three year period following stock market liberalizations the growth rate of the typical firm s capital stock exceeds its pre liberalization mean by an average of 4 1 percentage points cross sectional changes in investment are significantly correlated with the signals about fundamentals embedded in the stock price changes that occur upon liberalization panel data estimations show that a 10 percentage point increase in a firm s expected future sales growth predicts a 2 9 to 3 5 percentage point increase in the growth rate of its capital stock country specific changes in the cost of capital drive changes in investment but firm specific changes in the cost of capital do not

estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility the costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives accounting choice financing decisions and the valuation of equity we present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year s proxy statement or annual report this method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm wide option plans in broad samples of actual and simulated ceo option portfolios we show that these proxies capture more than 99 of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics and is most severe in samples of ceos with a large proportion of out of the money options however the proxies explanatory power remains above 95 in all subsamples

political connections and the process of going public evidence from china abstract we examine how political connections impact the process of going public specifically we test how political connections impact the pricing of the newly offered shares the magnitude of underpricing and the fixed cost of going public based on the experience of the newly public firms from chinese security markets and using multiple measures of political connections we find robust evidence that the issuing firms with political connections reap significant preferential benefits in the process of going public to be specific we find that firms irrespective of their ownership status with greater political connections have relatively higher offering price lower underpricing and lower fixed costs during the going public process

resolving the agency problems of external capital through options this paper investigates the role of stock options in resolving the agency problems of external capital as originally identified by jensen and meckling 1976 these problems are precipitated by managerial incentives a to consume excessive non pecuniary benefits or perquisites beyond the optimal level for sole ownership and b to engage in risk shifting in productive decisions so as to transfer wealth from external capital contributors these incentive problems can be resolved through a strategy that judiciously combines call and put options retained by the owner manager and external financiers respectively the resolution of the agency problems through this mechanism provides an economic rationale for the existence of managerial stock options and convertible debt the work by jensen and meckling 7 has brought more realism to the theory of the firm in their paper jm address agency problems in the context of a firm which is viewed as a nexus of contracts among various factors of production the contractual relationships involve incentive conflicts arising from the pursuit of self interest by limiting themselves to an entrepreneur or owner manager who retains complete control of the firm jm have demonstrated that financing through the issuance of common stock or debt to outsiders engenders costs these costs are precipitated in part by the manager s propensity to consume nonpecuniary benefits or perquisites perks by employing certain resources in excess of their optimal usage 1 and by his propensity to engage in high risk investment projects so as to transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders 2

a theory of price control price or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place to delimit the scope of my analysis i shall use the term price control to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions first the control must fix the price or income terms of private contracts this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis 2 second the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government taxation and subsidization are thus excluded finally the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales purchases or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price 3 by this stipulation price support is also excluded even on such terms legal regulations to control price are still many and varied to evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts by this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications 4 an alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here

irreversible investment with price ceilings a model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed in the absence of restrictions investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long run average cost by an option value factor when a lower ceiling is imposed investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher shadow price as the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long run average cost this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely because investment is depressed a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long run average price

sovereign debt as intertemporal barter author s kletzer kenneth m wright brian d abstract borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modeled as intertemporal barter that smoothes the consumption of a risk averse party subject to endowment shocks the surplus anticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties including any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign the sole punishments consist of renegotiation proof changes in the path of future payments we show that intertemporal trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relationships whatsoever that is borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy and are supported by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater long term implicit relationships may be fulfilled as the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short term loans the analysis suggests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and the parties involved

markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions this paper studies the relation between the premiums in takeover bids involving exchange listed target firms from 1975 91 and the pre announcement stock price runups the evidence shows that the pre bid runup and the postannouncement increase in the target s stock price the markup are generally uncorrelated with little substitution between the runup and the markup the runup is an added cost to the bidder this finding has important implications for assessing the costs of insider trading it also raises interesting questions about the role of information from public capital markets in private takeover negotiations

the welfare costs of rationing by waiting with price controls and rationing by waiting rational consumers increase the quantity boughtperpurchase this individually rational response is socially wasteful and the cost of making it is a deadweight loss this cost plus the value of time spent in queues may exceed the total rent transferred from suppliers to consumers by price controls i e the value of resources spent competing for the rent may exceed the rent itself this point is illustrated by an empirical application to gasoline price controls rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent trangerred the efficiency of the price system is often illustrated lby pointing to the obvious wastes associated with alternative allocation mechanisms for example the queues that accompany price controls and first come first served allocations although rationing by waiting wastes resources in a dramatically visible fashion the magnitude of the waste and the factors that determine it seldom have been examined empirically moreover existing theory on the subject is incomplete unless the first come first served rule is precisely specified consumers will compete for available supplies in ways other than waiting in the model developed below queues cause consumers to compete by increasing amounts bought per trip to the market the analysis demonstrates that such individually rational adjustments only increase the welfare cost of rationing by waiting and thus are socially self defeating the theoretical model is illustrated empirically by estimating the welfare costs of a market wide ceiling on gasoline prices this application was motivated by the availability of two key pieces of information the value of time spent in gasoline queues and the effect of waiting lines on amounts bought per purchase this information was obtained from a survey of motorists conducted during the era of federal gasoline price regulations to focus on competition among consumers one of the inefficiencies that results from price controls is ignored the supply reduction leading to the