long term competition in a dynamic game the cold fish war this article presents a model of credible voluntary collective agreements in a dynamic game these agreements are implicit in collections of history dependent threat strategies i consider the strategies in a game of resource exploitation credibility is represented by perfect equilibrium voluntarism requires at least that all behavior be supported by the threat of collapse of the agreement which would return the players to the memoryless equilibrium collective rationality requires that the agreement be robust to the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation i analyze the set of agreements meeting each of these restrictions

tipping points and business as usual in a global commons abstract this paper analyzes a dynamic strategic model of resource extraction from a global commons countries derive benefits from both direct extraction and aggregate conservation of an open access resource each period a country s output depends both on its resource usage and on the global stock of the resource stored within the ecosystem leading examples are ocean fisheries habitat preservation forestry and land carbon biomass the production coefficients on these inputs vary across countries and evolve stochastically over time a business as usual bau equilibrium characterizes each country s resource usage in the absence of an effective international agreement under non concave resource dynamics depletion of the resource in a bau equilibrium may reach a tipping point below which the stock spirals downward toward a steady state of marginal sustainability under the assumptions of the model the tipping points emerge endogenously if the number of extractors exceeds some fixed finite bound the commons always tips regardless of the initial stock we find that countries will accelerate their rates of extraction the closer they are to reaching the low end steady state by contrast in the socially efficient plan the commons never tips if the initial stock is large

climate treaties and approaching catastrophes abstract if the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs treaties can easily coordinate countries behavior so as to avoid the threshold where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower treaties typically fail to help countries cooperate to avoid catastrophe sustaining only modest cuts in emissions these results are unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of catastrophe by contrast uncertainty about the catastrophic threshold normally causes coordination to collapse whether the probability density function has thin or fat tails makes little difference

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

disappointment in decision making under uncertainty decision analysis requires that two equally desirable consequences should have the same utility and vice versa most analyses of financial decision making presume that two consequences with the same dollar outcome will be equally preferred however winning the top prize of 10 000 in a lottery may leave one much happier than receiving 10 000 as the lowest prize in a lottery this paper explores the implications of disappointment a psychological reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a lottery to one s prior expectations for decision making under uncertainty explicit recognition that decision makers may be paying a premium to avoid potential disappointment provides an interpretation for some known behavioral paradoxes and suggests that decision makers may be sensitive to the manner in which a lottery is resolved the concept of disappointment is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive model

the new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the american political science association september 1 5 atlanta ga and the 2000 annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 27 30 chicago il the authors thank steffen ganghof philip genschel mark hallerberg alex hicks william keech dennis quinn and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and dennis quinn for generously sharing data duane swank thanks the german marshal fund of the united states and marquette university for support of work incorporated in this paper data utilized in this paper are available from duane swank marquette edu

feedback nash equilibria for non linear differential games in pollution control abstract dynamic problems of pollution and resource management with stock externalities often require a differential games framework of analysis in addition they are represented realistically by non linear transition equations however feedback nash equilibrium fbne solutions which are the desired ones in this case are difficult to obtain in problems with non linear quadratic structure we develop a method to obtain numerically non linear fbne for a class of such problems with a specific example for shallow lake pollution control we compare fbne solutions by considering the entire equilibrium trajectories with optimal management and open loop solutions and we show that the value of the best fbne is in general worse than the open loop and optimal management solutions

strategic dynamic interaction abstract the motivation for this paper is fishing legislation that divides a fishery into regions each of which is exploited by a single firm as the regions have common borders an analysis based on models with one firm and one region would lead to erroneous results an alternative motivation is the problem of a fishery with several interacting species each exploited by a single firm in this paper we assume that fish move between regions therefore the stock in one region depends not only on previous stock and catch in the region but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions in the multiple species interpretation these movements correspond to the interactions between species we use a multisectoral differential duopoly model in order to capture the strategic interactions of the firms over time the model is solved for an example in which varying levels of dependence between regions can be compared

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

after kyoto alternative mechanisms to control global warming after more than a decade of negotiations and planning under the framework convention on climate change fccc the first binding international agreement to control the emissions of greenhouse gases has come into effect in the kyoto protocol the first budget period of 2008 2012 is at hand moreover the scientific evidence on greenhouse warming strengthens steadily as observational evidence of warming accumulates the institutional framework of the protocol has taken hold solidly in the european union s emissions trading scheme ets which covers almost half of europe s carbon dioxide emissions notwithstanding this apparent success the kyoto protocol is widely seen as somewhere between troubled and terminal early troubles came with the failure to include the major developing countries along with lack of an agreedupon mechanism to include new countries and extend the agreement to new periods the major blow came when the united states withdrew from the treaty in 2001 by 2002 the protocol covered only 30 percent of global emissions while the hard enforcement mechanism in the ets accounts for about 8 percent of global emissions even if the current protocol is extended models indicate that it will have little impact on global temperature change unless there is a dramatic breakthrough or a new design the protocol threatens to be seen as a monument to institutional overreach nations are now beginning to consider the structure of climate change policies for the period after 2008 to 2012 some countries states cities companies and even universities are adopting their own climate change policies are there in fact alternatives to the scheme of tradable emissions permits embodied in the protocol the fact is that alternative approaches have not had a serious hearing among natural scientists or among policymakers what are some alternatives for global public goods there are three potential approaches command and control regulation quantity oriented market approaches and taxor price based regimes of these only the tradable quantity and the price like regimes have any hope of being reasonably efficient under a tradable quantity approach an agreement proceeds by setting limits on emissions by different countries the limits are partially or wholly transferable among countries this is the approach taken under the kyoto protocol this approach has very limited international experience under existing protocols such as the cfc chlorofluorocarbon mechanisms and somewhat broader experience under national trading regimes such as the u s sulfur dioxide regime a radically different approach is to use harmonized prices fees or taxes as a method of coordinating policies among countries this approach has no international experience in the environmental area although it has modest experience nationally in such areas as the u s tax on ozone depleting chemicals on the other hand the use of harmonized price type measures has extensive international experience in fiscal and trade policies such as with the harmonization of taxes in the european union and harmonized tariffs in international trade these thoughts on the structure of international agreements to control global warming should not be regarded as negotiating strategies

estimating the structure of industrial water demands the case of canadian manufacturing this study considers water use by canadian manufacturing firms the estimation of water demands is based on a detailed cross sectional survey of establishment level observations on water prices quantities and expenditures industrial water use is modeled as having four components intake treatment prior to use recirculation and discharge average values for the estimated own price elasticity for water intake range from 0 1534 to 0 5885 water recirculation is found to be a substitute for both water intake and water discharge this confirms that expanding the use of economic incentives e g effluent fees may be effective in encouraging firms to reduce their water use while increasing in plant recirculation

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings we extend expected utility theory to situations in which agents experience feelings of anticipation prior to the resolution of uncertainty we show how these anticipatory feelings may result in time inconsistency we provide an example from portfolio theory to illustrate the potential impact of anticipation on asset prices

preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities this paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects in addition to estimating the impact of individuals socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility we employ panel data to construct dobjectivet measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals we find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than dgeneral mobilityt indexes we also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one s position in the social ladder ceteris paribus people who believe that the american society offers equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution d 2004 published by elsevier b v

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

the compleat fish wars biological and dynamic interactions abstract in this article we study an example of a fishery in which there are two agents each harvesting two species of fish there are two externalities in the model the dynamic externality studied in levhari and mirman 1980 and the biological externality examined in fischer and mirman 1992 this model allows us to study the interactions between agents in a model in which the species of fish interact we find the unique closed loop nash equilibrium in the context of a differential game and we compare the resulting catch ratios to the results of the earlier papers which allow for only one externality we also study the efficiency of the solution

endogenous beliefs in models of politics in the standard rational choice model actors have exogenously given beliefs that perfectly match objective probabilities as such these beliefs cannot be optimistic or motivated by preferences even though substantial empirical evidence indicates that human beliefs routinely satisfy neither of these criteria i present a tractable endogenous beliefs model and apply it to three different political environments from across the subfields of political science in the model players form beliefs that maximize a utility function that represents preferences over outcomes and the anticipatory experience of uncertainty applications include voter turnout taxation and collective choice and crisis bargaining the model captures the empirical evidence about belief formation much better than the standard model moreover these applications show how rigidly insisting on the standard rational choice model rejects otherwise reasonable explanations by fiat precisely because of its implausible assumptions about beliefs

does egalitarianism have a future the fall of communism the reassessment of nordic social democracy belt tightening in other advanced welfare states and the worldwide privatization wave have led many to conclude that egalitarianism is a merely utopian ideal the possibility of whose realization is laid to rest by the failure of a series of twentieth century social experiments we survey the evidence both empirical and theoretical and conclude that obituaries are premature key theoretical errors in the design of egalitarian experiments and in some critiques of pro egalitarian policies concern the role of information asymmetries and we argue that their proper understanding re opens possibilities for increasing equality without unacceptable sacrifices in efficiency