real rigidity nominal rigidity and the social value of information does welfare improve when firms are better informed about the state of the economy and can thus better coordinate their production and pricing decisions we address this question in an elementary business cycle model that highlights how the dispersion of information can impede both kinds of decisions and in this sense be the source of both real and nominal rigidity within this context we develop a taxonomy for how the social value of information depends on the two rigidities on the sources of the business cycle and on the conduct of monetary policy jel d21 d82 d83 e32 e52

the quantitative analytics of the basic neomonetarist model this paper constructs a dynamic macroeconomic model with less than perfect price flexibility which has a classical side consistent with real business cycle theory augmented by investment adjustment costs increasing returns to scale and a new flexible formalization of imperfect competition something akin to the classical dichotomy is justified by a mode of approximation appropriate for a model in which one state variable adjusts quickly while another state variable adjusts slowly even with investment adjustment costs monetary expansions are found to raise the real interest rate the determinants of real rigidity and the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment are investigated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

information and volatility in an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks we examine how the structure of private information in uences aggregate volatility the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks and display excess response to the aggregate shocks as in lucas 14 for any given variance of aggregate shocks the upper bound on aggregate volatility is linearly increasing in the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks our results hold in a setting of symmetric agents with linear best responses and normal uncertainty we establish our results by providing a characterization of the set of all joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure this tractable characterization extending results in bergemann and morris 8 can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the statistical moments of the economy

limited rationality and strategic interaction the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational forward looking decisions this raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive for aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results we examine this question in the context of a long standing and important economic problem the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated monetary shock our experiments suggest that two types of bounded rationality money illusion and anchoring are important behavioral forces behind nominal inertia however depending on the strategic environment bounded rationality has vastly different effects on aggregate price adjustment if agents actions are strategic substitutes adjustment to the new equilibrium is extremely quick whereas under strategic complementarity adjustment is both very slow and associated with relatively large real effects this adjustment difference is driven by price expectations which are very flexible and forward looking under substitutability but adaptive and sticky under complementarity moreover subjects expectations are also considerably more rational under substitutability

monetary and fiscal policy design at the zero lower bound evidence from the lab the global economic crisis of 2007 8 pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap a macroeconomic scenario characterised by nomial rates at the zero lower bound zlb low inflation and output below trend we design an experiment to generate empirical evidence on the effectiveness of policies aimed at managing expectations against liquidity traps in a controlled laboratory environment where expectations are elicied directly from human subjects our results suggest that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to insulate the economy form the risk of falling into a liquidity trap even if it preventively cuts the policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in avoiding and escapiing liquidity trap episodes we also measure larger than unity fiscal mulipliers when monetary policy is constrained by the zlb experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

optimal monetary policy with informational frictions we study optimal policy in a business cycle setting in which firms hold dispersed private information about or are rationally inattentive to the state of the economy the informational friction i

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

a single judge solution to beauty contests we show that the equilibrium policy rule in beauty contest models is equivalent to that of a single agent s forecast of the economic fundamental this forecast is conditional on a modified information process which simply discounts the precision of idiosyncratic shocks by the degree of strategic complementarity the result holds for any linear gaussian signal process static or persistent stationary or nonstationary exogenous or endogenous and also extends to network games theoretically this result provides a sharp characterization of the equilibrium and its properties under dynamic information practically it provides a straightforward method to solve models with complicated information structures

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

learning to deal with repeated shocks under strategic complementarity an experiment experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements under identical shocks however repetition allows adaptive learning so that inertia in adjustment should fade away with experience if this finding proves to be robust inertia in adjustment may be irrelevant among experienced agents the conjecture in the literature is that inertia would still persist perhaps indefinitely in the presence of real world complications such as nonidentical shocks herein we empirically test the conjecture that the inertia in adjustment is more persistent if the shocks are nonidentical for both identical and nonidentical shocks we find persistent inertia and similar patterns of adjustment that can be explained by backward looking expectation rules a reformulation of naive expectations with similarity based learning approach is found to have a higher predictive power than rational and trend following rules

business cycle dynamics under rational inattention we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with rational inattention and compare its predictions to data households and decision makers in firms have limited attention and optimally allocate their attention rational inattention is the only source of slow adjustment the model matches the empirical impulse responses to monetary policy shocks and aggregate technology shocks at the same time profit losses and utility losses from inattention are very small furthermore it matters whether one uses this model or a conventional dsge model for policy analysis

learning over the business cycle policy implications abstract this paper studies the policy implications of the endogeneity of information about the state of the economy the business cycle can be made less noisy and more efficient by incentivizing firms to vary their pricing and production decisions more with their beliefs about the state of the economy this calls for countercyclical taxes complemented by a monetary policy that leans against the wind the optimal policies trade off allocative efficiency for informational efficiency

information rigidity and the expectations formation process a simple framework and new facts we propose a new approach to test the full information rational expectations hypothesis which can identify whether rejections of the null arise from irrationality or limited information this approach quantifies the economic significance of departures from the null by quantifying the underlying degree of information rigidity applying this approach to u s and international data of professional forecasters and other agents yields pervasive evidence consistent with models of imperfect information furthermore the proposed approach sheds new light on policies such as inflation targeting and those leading to the great moderation affecting expectations finally we document evidence of state dependence in the expectations formation process

optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model this paper develops the quantitative implications of optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model in a stationary equilibrium the ex ante tax rate on capital income is approximately zero there is an equivalence class of ex post capital income tax rates and bond policies that support a given allocation within this class the optimal ex post capital tax rates can range from close to independently and identically distributed to close to a random walk the tax rate on labor income fluctuates very little and inherits the persistence properties of the exogenous shocks thus there is no presumption that optimal labor tax rates follow a random walk most of the welfare gains realized by switching from a tax system like that of the united states to the ramsey system come from an initial period of high taxation on capital income

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

optimal policy intervention and the social value of public information svensson 2006 argues that morris and shin s 2002 analysis is contrary to what is claimed actually pro transparency this paper re examines the issue but with an important modification to the original morris and shin framework recognizing that central banks impact on the economy not only indirectly via their public announcements but also directly through their policy actions we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention our results strengthen morris and shin s conclusions considerably in particular we find that public disclosure of the central bank s information is always undesirable

price setting under uncertainty about inflation abstract we analyze the manipulation of inflation statistics that occurred in argentina starting in 2007 to test the relevance of informational frictions in price setting we estimate that the manipulation of statistics was associated with a higher degree of price dispersion this effect is analyzed in the context of a quantitative general equilibrium model in which firms use information about the inflation rate to set prices reporting inaccurate measures of the cpi entails significant welfare losses especially in economies with volatile monetary policy

optimal monetary policy with uncertain fundamentals and dispersed information this paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate fluctuations are driven by the private sector s uncertainty about the economy s fundamentals information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents and there are two aggregate shocks a standard productivity shock and a noise shock affecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they are realized despite the lack of superior information monetary policy can affect the economy s relative response to the two shocks as time passes better information on past fundamentals becomes available the central bank can then adopt a backward looking policy rule based on more precise information about past shocks by announcing its response to future information the central bank can influence the expected real interest rate faced by forward looking consumers with different beliefs and thus affect the equilibrium allocation if the announced future response is sufficiently aggressive the central bank can completely eliminate the effect of noise shocks however this policy is typically suboptimal as it leads to an excessively compressed distribution of relative prices the optimal monetary policy balances the benefits of aggregate stabilization with the costs in terms of cross sectional efficiency copyright wiley blackwell

monetary policy obeying the taylor principle turns prices into strategic substitutes abstract monetary policy affects the degree of strategic complementarity in firms pricing decisions if it responds to the aggregate price level in normal times when monopolistic competitive firms increase their prices the central bank raises interest rates which lowers demand and creates an incentive for firms to reduce their prices thereby monetary policy reduces the degree of strategic complementarities among firms pricing decisions and even turns prices into strategic substitutes if the effect of interest rates on demand is sufficiently strong we show that this condition holds when monetary policy follows the taylor principle by contrast if the equilibrium is indeterminate because monetary policy violates the taylor principle or in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound pricing decisions are strategic complements we discuss the consequences for dynamic adjustment processes after shocks and some policy implications

monetary policy responses and strategic price setting abstract this paper shows that the systematic component of monetary policy is a potential determinant of the degree of strategic complementarity among its wider implications this result also points to an important interaction between the systematic and irregular components of monetary policy

monetary policy for inattentive economies we offer a contribution to the analysis of optimal monetary policy we begin with a critical assessment of the existing literature arguing that most work is based on implausible models of inflation output dynamics we then suggest that this problem may be solved with some recent behavioral models which assume that price setters are slow to incorporate macroeconomic information into the prices they set a specific such model is developed and used to derive optimal policy in response to shocks to productivity and aggregate demand optimal policy is price level targeting base drift in the price level which is implicit in the inflation targeting regimes currently used in many central banks is not desirable in this model when shocks to desired markups are added optimal policy is flexible targeting of the price level that is the central bank should allow the price level to deviate from its target for a while in response to these supply shocks but it should eventually return the price level to its target path optimal policy can also be described as an elastic price standard the central bank allows the price level to deviate from its target when output is expected to deviate from its natural rate

structural shifts in the manufacturing export performance of oecd economies summary this paper identifies structural shifts in manufacturing export performance of the major oecd economies the particular emphasis of this study is to see whether the longer run responses of a country s exports to the growth in world demand have undergone trend changes the econometric work focuses on the time variation in income elasticities from an export demand model over the period 1963 89 it thus covers a period in which there was a substantial slow down in world economic growth and in which the manufacturing sectors in advanced economies underwent substantial restructuring in the wake of the two oil price shocks and the competitive challenges of japan and the nics the exercise attempted to evaluate the relative successes and failures of the different oecd economies to maintain or improve their positions in the higher quality income elastic segments of world trade evidence was found for trend improvements in the income elasticity for uk exports from the early 1980s onwards and a trend decline for that of the us over the same period the effects of non tariff protection against japanese exports also showed up in our results and an attempt was made to separately identify its effects

policy with dispersed information information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society is only imperfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity and cannot be centralized by the government or any other institution in this paper we seek to identify policies that can improve the decentralized use of such dispersed information without requiring the government to observe this information we show that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of taxation on ex post public information regarding the realized fundamentals and aggregate activity when information is common as in the ramsey literature or when agents have private information only about idiosyncratic shocks as in the mirrlees literature the contingency on fundamentals alone suffices for efficiency when instead agents have private information about aggregate shocks the contingency on aggregate activity is crucial an appropriate combination of the two contingencies permits the government to i dampen the impact of noise and hence reduce non fundamental volatility without also dampening the impact of fundamentals ii induce agents to internalize informational externalities and hence improve the speed of social learning iii restore a certain form of constrained efficiency in the decentralized use of information and iv guarantee that welfare increases with the provision of any additional information jel c72 d62 d82

an informational rationale for action over disclosure abstract the past two decades have seen a considerable increase in the amount of public information provided by policymakers are such disclosures desirable or is it instead preferable to use such information to condition a policy instrument such a tax or an interest rate this paper studies the relative merits of each means to use a policymaker s information in a flexible class of economies that feature dispersed information and payoff and learning externalities i provide conditions for when the exclusive use of a policy instrument or disclosure is optimal i then relate these to differences in the equilibrium and socially optimal use of information i conclude with a series of applications that show how my results apply to common beauty contest models competitive economies and a broad class of macroeconomic models among others

r d and manufacturing production specialization in developed economies a study of the relation between technology and manufacturing production specialization in a series of developed economies is performed by means of models relating indicators of revealed symmetric comparative advantage of value added and exports to similar measures of comparative performance of r d expenditure capital intensity total factor productivity and wage costs the production and r d specialization are shown to be substantial and sticky this contrasts with the evidence of a substantial degree of convergence in the patterns of the other variables regression estimates show that although all variables play their part the impact of comparative r d efforts on production specialization is by far the strongest this impact is found to be stronger in the smaller economies and it is especially important in research intensive industries the influence of comparative wages is moreover found to be positive here suggesting the dominance of a labour skill and efficiency wage effect over a wage cost comp

exogenous information endogenous information and optimal monetary policy most of the analysis of optimal monetary policy is conducted with the calvo model this paper studies optimal monetary policy when the slow adjustment of the price level is due to imperfect information by decision makers in firms we consider two models a model with exogenous dispersed information and a rational inattention model in the model with exogenous dispersed information complete stabilization of the price level is optimal after aggregate productivity shocks but not after markup shocks by contrast in the rational inattention model complete stabilization of the price level is optimal both after aggregate productivity shocks and after markup shocks moreover in the model with exogenous dispersed information there is no value from commitment to a future monetary policy by contrast in the rational inattention model there is value from commitment to a future monetary policy because then the private sector can trust the central bank that not paying attention to certain variables is optimal

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

the role of technology in market shares dynamics the paper presents the estimation of an empirical model of market share dynamics for five industrialized countries and 18 industries the emphasis is put on the importance of non price factors of competitiveness whereas most traditional explanations rest on the influence of relative prices among the former type of factor the role of variables reflecting technological advantage is privileged in particular the role of innovations has received considerable attention in the literature on international trade as well as the literature on endogenous growth in this spirit the paper introduces patent counts and investment as explanatory variables for the export market share the results show that non price variables have an important impact on the determinations of long run competitiveness

information design bayesian persuasion and bayes correlated equilibrium abstract a set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes we consider the problem of an information designer who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends but has no ability to change the mechanism or force the players to make particular action choices we describe a unifying perspective for information design we consider a simple example of bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver we extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium

what can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidities a lot we derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers firms central bankers and professional forecasters we document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information the dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities the conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities

optimal fiscal and monetary policy equivalence results in this article we analyze the implications of price setting restrictions for the conduct of cyclical fiscal and monetary policy we consider standard monetary economies that differ in the price setting restrictions imposed on the firms we show that independently of the degree or type of price stickiness it is possible to implement the same efficient set of allocations and that each allocation in that set is implemented with policies that are also independent of the price stickiness in this sense environments with different price setting restrictions are equivalent

optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge we study optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy with monopolistic competition where firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy information imperfections emerge endogenously because firms are assumed to have finite shannon capacity to process information we then ask how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on firms processing capacity when price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements we find that policy should nominally accommodate white noise mark up shocks for a large range of capacity values this fi nding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms processing capacity when mark up shocks are persistent accommodation may even have to increase in the medium term but has to decrease in the long run thereby generating a hump shaped price response and a slow reduction in output instead when prices are strategic substitutes policy tends to react with nominal demand contractions to mark up shocks in addition there might exist discontinuities between common knowledge equilibria and equilibria with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge

technological competition and trade performance this paper estimates a demand system for oecd exports differentiated by country of origin for two isic industries non electrical machinery electrical machinery and for total manufacturing exports it develops a generalized form of the aids demand system in which research and development r d effort enters in a number of ways to affect a particular supplier s competitiveness r d activity relative to competitors affects on the one hand relative cost competitiveness and on the other hand the producer s position in the quality spectrum of products offered on international markets one of the interesting insights gained from the study is that effectiveness of r d effort can differ much across different economies it is conjectured that a country s position in an international catching up process may be partly responsible for such differences as well as labour market dynamics which link increased labour costs to cost and quality improvements

observing and shaping the market the dilemma of central banks while the central bank observes the market activity to assess economic fundamentals it shapes the market outcome through its policy interventions the more the central bank influences the market the more it spoils the informational content of economic aggregates how should the central bank act and communicate when it derives its information from observing the market this paper analyses the optimal central bank s action and disclosure under endogenous central bank s information for three operational frameworks pure communication action and communication and signaling action when the central bank takes an action it would be optimal for the central bank to be fully opaque to prevent its disclosure from deteriorating the information quality of market outcomes however in the realistic case where central bank s action is observable it may be optimal to refrain from implementing any action

endogenous public information and welfare in market games this paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition pricecontingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information a payoff pecuniary externality related to aggregate volatility and a learning externality the impact of the first depends on whether competition is of the strategic substitutes or complements variety and the second induces agents to put too little weight on private information we find that with strategic substitutes and when the learning externality is not very strong agents put too much weight on private information and prices are too informative this will happen in the normal case where the allocational role of price prevails over its informational role under strategic complementarity there is always under reliance on private information the welfare loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information the analysis provides insights into optimal business cycle policy and a rationale for a tobin like tax for speculators in financial markets

information acquisition and welfare we study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information first we relate the in efficiency in the acquisition of information to the in efficiency in the use of information and explain why efficiency in the use is no guarantee of efficiency in the acquisition next we show how the acquisition of private information affects the social value of public information i e the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the quality of public information finally we illustrate the implications of the results in a monetary economy with price rigidities and dispersed information about productivity shocks

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

unconventional fiscal policy at the zero bound when the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds monetary policy cannot provide appropriate stimulus we show that in the standard new keynesian model tax policy can deliver such stimulus at no cost and in a time consistent manner there is no need to use inecient policies such as

price dispersion private uncertainty and endogenous nominal rigidities this article shows that when agents learn from prices large private uncertainty may result from a small amount of heterogeneity as in a phelps lucas island model final producers look at the prices of their local inputs to infer aggregate conditions however market linkages between islands make the informativeness of local prices endogenous to general equilibrium relations in this context i show that a vanishingly small heterogeneity in local conditions is enough to generate an equilibrium in which prices are rigid to aggregate shocks and transmit only partial information i use this insight as a microfoundation for price rigidity in an otherwise frictionless monetary model and show that even a tiny amount of dispersion in fundamentals can lead to large non neutrality of money

economic fluctuations market power and returns to scale evidence from firm level data recent research on aggregate fluctuations coupled with ongoing work in industrial organization has renewed interest in the existence magnitude and cyclical pattern of market power and the extent of increasing returns to scale by exploiting restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets we present a framework for generating quantitative evidence on market power and returns to scale tailoring the econometric model to firm level panel data we calculate the percentage differential between price and marginal cost the lerner index in terms of the parameters from the econometric system results for firms in eleven industries indicate that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the extent of market power industries with significantly positive lerner indices tend to have substantial increasing returns in the production technology we find that there is only a modest relation between our estimated lerner indices and traditional measures of market power and that when market power varies temporally it is usually procyclical thus variations in the markup of price over marginal cost may help dampen aggregate economic fluctuations

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

intermediate goods and business cycles implications for productivity and welfare this paper presents an aggregate demand driven model of business cycles that provides a new explanation for the procyclicality of productivity and simultaneously predicts large welfare losses from monetary nonneutrality the key features of the model are an input output production structure imperfect competition countercyclical markups and for some results state dependent price rigidity true technical efficiency is procyclical even though production takes place with constant returns without technology shocks or technological externalities the paper has observable implications that distinguish it empirically from related work these implications are generally supported by data from u s manufacturing industries copyright 1995 by american economic association

the role of innovation in bilateral oecd trade performance this paper tests an empirical model of the determinants of bilateral oecd trade with particular emphasis on the role of innovation variation in the relationship across countries and sectors is analysed two innovation proxies and actual data on innovations are used a positive relationship is found between relative innovation and bilateral trade performance at an aggregate level and for a number of manufacturing sectors sectors are also categorized as either net users or producers of innovations differences in innovation appear to have more of an impact on trade performance for the net producers of innovations than the net users of innovations

limited rationality and strategic complements the implications for macroeconomics this paper considers the implications of heterogeneity in information processing abilities for macroeconomic models that exhibit strategic complements the latter is the same concept that has received much attention in the recent macro literature under the headings keynesian coordination problems and positive trading externalities we consider environments in which agents vary in terms of their ability to form expectations and ask whether it is the sophisticated agents or the naive agents who have a disproportionately large effect on macroeconomic equilibrium we find that if macroeconomic interaction exhibits strategic complementarity then it is the naive agents who have a disproportionate impact

business cycle anatomy we propose a new strategy for dissecting the macroeconomic time series provide a template for the business cycle propagation mechanism that best describes the data and use its properties to appraise models of both the parsimonious and the medium scale variety our findings support the existence of a main business cycle driver but rule out the following candidates for this role technology or other shocks that map to tfp movements news about future productivity and inflationary demand shocks of the textbook type models aimed at accommodating demand driven cycles without a strict reliance on nominal rigidity appear promising

the signaling role of policy actions abstract in an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank s assessment to firms because mark up shocks cannot be neutralized by monetary policy providing firms with more information about these shocks exacerbates their reaction and creates a larger distortion recognizing the signaling role of its instrument the central bank distorts its policy response in order to optimally shape firms beliefs while providing firms with more information is always detrimental to the output gap it has a more subtle effect on price dispersion depending on whether information is provided through the transparency channel or through the signaling channel although more transparency is always detrimental to welfare the information that is conveyed by the monetary instrument improves welfare when firms coordination is highly valuable

informationally robust trade and limits to contagion abstract two agents can each accept or reject a proposed deal whose value for each agent depends on an unknown state and may be positive or negative the deal takes place only if both accept each agent can be imperfectly informed in an arbitrary way about both her own value and the other agent s in such environments contagious adverse selection may prevent the deal from being reached even when it is mutually beneficial ex post we give an upper bound on the ex ante expected welfare loss in equilibrium due to such contagion valid for any information structure the welfare loss is small if negative values are unlikely ex ante and under an assumption of known aggregate gains from the deal our bound is sharp the bound has a succinct description even though the equilibrium itself in any given information structure may be hard to describe explicitly

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

individual expectations limited rationality and aggregate outcomes recent studies suggest that the type of strategic environment or expectation feedback can have a large impact on whether the market can learn the rational fundamental price we present an experiment where the fundamental price experiences large unexpected shocks markets with negative expectation feedback strategic substitutes quickly converge to the new fundamental while markets with positive expectation feedback strategic complements do not converge but show underreaction in the short run and overreaction in the long run a simple evolutionary selection model of individual learning explains these differences in aggregate outcomes

optimal monetary policy rules with labor market frictions abstract this paper studies optimal monetary policy rules in a framework with sticky prices matching frictions and real wage rigidities optimal policy is given by a constrained ramsey plan in which the monetary authority maximizes the agents welfare subject to the competitive economy relations and the assumed monetary policy rule i find that the optimal rule should respond to unemployment alongside with inflation this is so since models with matching frictions unlike standard new keynesian models feature a congestion externality that makes unemployment inefficiently high a strong response to inflation remains optimal while a response to output is always welfare detrimental

a theory of demand shocks this paper presents a model of business cycles driven by shocks to consumer expectations regarding aggregate productivity agents are hit by heterogeneous productivity shocks they observe their own productivity and a noisy public signal regarding aggregate productivity the public signal gives rise to noise shocks which have the features of aggregate demand shocks they increase output employment and inflation in the short run and have no effects in the long run numerical examples suggest that the model can generate sizable equilibrium dsge models of the business cycle include a large number of shocks to technol ogy monetary policy preferences etc but typically do not include expectational shocks as independent drivers of short run fluctuations 1 this paper explores the idea of expectation driven cycles looking at a model where technology determines equilibrium output in the long run and consumers receive noisy signals about technology in the short run the presence of noisy signals produces expectational errors this paper studies the role of these expectational errors in gener ating volatility at business cycle frequencies the model is based on two ingredients first consumers take time to recognize permanent changes in aggregate fundamentals although they may have good information on the current state of the individual firm or sector where they operate they have only limited information regarding the long run determinants of aggregate activity second consumers have access to public information that is relevant to estimate long run productivity this includes news about technological innovations publicly released macroeconomic and sectoral statistics financial market prices and public statements by policy makers however these signals provide only a noisy forecast of the long run effects of technological innovations this opens the door to noise shocks which induce consumers to temporarily overestimate or underestimate the productive capacity of the economy

setting the right prices for the wrong reasons we consider a model of nominal price adjustment with firm specific and aggregate shocks to economic fundamentals and incomplete dispersed information firms update their expectations about fundamentals based on their own cash flows revenues and wages we show that in a model with realistic levels of product level price dispersion the firms inference about aggregate shocks is very gradual yet in the aggregate prices adjust rapidly in response to aggregate nominal shocks when an aggregate shock occurs firms mistakenly attribute it to firm specific shocks but adjust prices nevertheless since the exact nature of the shock matters little for its optimal pricing decision

optimal monetary policy when information is market generated endogenous i e market generated signals observed by firms have crucial implications for monetary policy when information is endogenous firms gather a demand signal from their market that is both real and nominal as a result the traditional surprise channel of monetary policy is absent instead monetary policy works through a signaling channel as it affects firms information through the demand signal the optimal policy is then the signaling policy i e the policy that maximizes the information content of the demand signal in our setup the signaling policy targets a positive correlation between money supply and prices which emphasizes the natural response of prices to real shocks on the contrary in the more traditional case of exogenous information optimal monetary policy would stabilize prices as it acts through the surprise channel we show that the signaling policy is optimal regardless of the amount of attention that firms pay to central bank communication

the structure performance relationship for european banking abstract the relationship between market structure and performance has been studied extensively for american banking in contrast little work has been done to investigate this relationship for european banking two explanations of a positive correlation between profitability and concentration have been advanced the traditional structure performance hypothesis scp and the efficient structure hypothesis previous empirical tests of the alternative hypotheses have yielded mixed results but the tests were not robust because they did not incorporate measures of efficiency directly in the model this study applies a stochastic cost frontier as proposed by aigner et al 1977 to derive measures of x inefficiency and scale inefficiency under the assumption that the errors are distributed half normal we incorporate these measures of inefficiencies directly into the tests as proposed by berger and hannan 1993 we do not find a positive and significant relationship between concentration and profitability for a sample of banks across 11 european countries over a four year period 1988 1991 however we do find evidence to support one of the two versions of the efficient structure hypothesis for banks located in countries with low concentration of banks since little support is found for either of the scp hypotheses a simple policy of strict limitations on cross border acquisitions and growth is not warranted

endogenous information acquisition in coordination games in the context of a beauty contest coordination game in which payoffs 1 depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and 2 from the average action players choose how much costly attention to pay to vari 3 ous informative signals each signal has an underlying accuracy how precisely it 4 identifies the state and a clarity how easy it is to understand the unique linear 5 equilibrium has interesting properties the signals which receive attention are the 6 clearest available even if they have poor underlying accuracy the number of sig 7 nals observed falls as the complementarity of players actions rises and if actions 8 are more complementary the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium 9 is more public in nature the consequences of rational inattention constraints on 10

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

business expenditures on r d and trade performances in australia is there a link this article empirically examines the dynamic causal link between business research and development r d expenditures and trade performance in australia based on cointegration and error correction modelling granger causality tests variance decomposition and impulse response functions are used for this purpose the results show that a long run relationship exists between the trade variables and r d expenditure and a unidirectional causality run from r d expenditure to exports imports and net exports further the variance decomposition and impulse response functions confirm that a significant portion of fluctuations in the trade variables beyond the sample period is explained by r d expenditure therefore government policies that lift expenditures on business r d are shown to contribute to the narrowing of australia s chronic trade deficits

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information