contract enforcement and trade liberalization in mexico s footwear industry abstract the wave of formal legal system reforms sweeping developing countries provides only a partial solution to the problem of enforcing agreements between firms informal institutions govern the majority of interfirm transactions economic reform also necessitates changes in these institutions this paper examines the evolution of contract enforcement in the mexican footwear industry as trade barriers were removed in the closed economy geographic agglomeration of manufacturing allowed the manufacturers trade associations to maintain information about the behavior of retailers and gave retailers strong incentives to maintain reputations by providing an alternative source for procurement trade liberalization weakened the power of manufacturers

prices employment and pro labor governments in this analysis of a game between a government and a union the welfare function of the union depends on the welfare of the workers and the welfare function of the government depends on the welfare of the workers and the owners a government is said to be more proworker if it gives more weight to the workers welfare in its utility function we study the effect on a more proworker government on the equilibrium of the economy a more proworker government is found to induce a lower wage lower unemployment lower prices higher welfare for the workers and typically lower welfare for the owners copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

structural gaiatsu international finance and political change in japan argues that the principal contributor to changes in japan s political economy is the decline of japanese governmental control over capital flows and foreign exchange rates brought about by structural gaiatsu or direct foreign pressure differs from previous analysis of gaiatsu by arguing that international capital and market forces generate gaiatsu not foreign governments and that its influence has been worldwide as well as deeper and more ongoing than bilateral negotiating sessions and joint communiques related to trade discusses how the change has catalyzed a major increase in foreign direct investment by japanese owned corporations a reduction in government s ability to control corporate behavior a diminution of intra corporate linkages conflict within national economic policies and the increased penetration of the japanese economy by foreign financial institutions describes how the change has resulted in an emerging socio economic gap in japan between individuals groups and organizations demonstrates how the japanese experience suggests the transformative power of global capital markets on national political economies particularly those that have been interventionist in nature

business political power the case of taxation we examine contending views about the forms and mechanisms of business power in u s politics by estimating time series models explaining taxation and redistribution taxation and redistribution constitute strong cases for theories about business and class power since all firms have an interest in reducing taxation we find that changes in corporate taxation and in redistribution between capital gains income and earned income and between corporate taxation and individual taxation are strongly influenced by political partisanship with democratic administrations increasing the tax burden on firms and their owners how far corporations engage in electoral financing measured through the establishment of corporate political action committees is also influential the models show some evidence consistent with the understanding of class power conceptualized by bowles gordon and weisskopf and the presence of election cycle effects but inconsistent with implications arising from the structural dependence of the state on capital and asset concentration in the largest corporations as a mechanism of class power

economic growth strategies the effects of ideological partisanship on interest rates and business taxation in the united states we reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it the reformulated version ideological partisanship is based upon the theory that similar rates of economic growth may follow from the different use of policy instruments owing to their role as determinants of investment and growth interest rates business taxation rates and the redistribution of the tax burden between capital gains and earned income are examined we advance models that take into account other views of politics beside the partisan one and test for political influences the united states is characterized by very pronounced partisan differences in national economic policy with democratic administrations seeking to promote growth through a consumption driven while republican administrations promote an investment driven strategy democratic administrations also seek to shift the tax burden toward corporations and owners of capital these findings are examined in light of the comparative political economy literature we conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries

third world indebted industrialization international finance and state capitalism in mexico brazil algeria and south korea the past fifteen years have seen two important developments in the international economic system the rapid industrialization of many less developed countries ldcs and their increasing indebtedness to private financial institutions massive bank loans have been used to fund industrial growth in many ldcs international financial markets have replaced multinational corporations as the third world s most important source of private foreign capital in four major borrowing countries mexico brazil algeria and south korea the process of indebted industrialization has its roots in the internationalization of finance the increasing role of the state and the use of funds raised on the international capital markets to finance industrial development the results include rapid expansions of ldc industrial production and ldc exports of manufactured products as well as the formation of an implicit partnership between private financial institutions and state capitalist elites in the third world

partisan governments the international economy and macroeconomic policies in advanced nations 1960 93 this article examines the impact of parties domestic institutions and the international economy on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies using time series cross section data from nineteen oecd countries for the years between 1960 and the mid 1990s the results are as follows partisan governments have affected alone and in interaction with the organization of labor markets the pattern of macroeconomic management still their impact has varied over time partly as a function of economic conditions but fundamentally as a function of the degree of financial liberalization and the exchange rate system in place after following broadly similar macroeconomic policies in the 1960s oecd governments pursued divergent monetary and fiscal policies in response to the economic slowdown of the 1970s even when they initially adopted countercyclical measures conservative governments quickly favored tight monetary policies and strove to achieve fiscal discipline by contrast taking advantage of generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates socialist cabinets embraced demand management policies in a systematic fashion mostly through budget deficits in corporatist countries and through both loose monetary and loose fiscal measures in noncorporatist settings as financial liberalization progressed in the early 1980s partisan and institution led differences in macroeconomic policies waned across countries

the effects of regional sizing on growth in this paper a micro founded model dealing with the effects of regional sizing on economic growth is developed departing from bigger sizes reduction involves more efficient public choices because of proximity to individual preferences and needs but also creates the risk of underestimation of the real profitability of public expenditure by local governments due to cross border spillovers and predator behaviors hence the optimal size depends on the relative strength of both effects moreover we show that different institutional arrangements between fiscal tiers involve different results for each possible size using data from the spanish regions during the period 1984 1996 the relationship between productive spending and jurisdiction size is then analyzed

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

power and the control of capital this essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial asia and latin america and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources the stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who or what supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow

employers and the welfare state the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies the authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and in turn affects social policy outcomes specifically the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision empirically the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy the authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort the authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs the authors conclude with a discussion of the findings implications for theories of social corporatism and the w

limits on authoritarian imposition of policy failed ecuadoran military populism in comparative perspective does regime type affect policy outcomes do authoritarian regimes have greater policy discretion than democratic regimes the empirical evidence is ambiguous using two cases of failed military populism in ecuador the author argues that two authoritarian characteristics lack of participation in decision making and nonmobilization frustrated implementation of import substitution policies ironically groups expected to benefit most industrialists and urban workers provided the principal opposition although the regime needed their cooperation to implement policy neither group had assurance that its interests were protected thus political alliances require more than an exchange of policies for support regimes must make their commitments credible by permitting the participation in decision making and mobilization of groups whose cooperation is needed for policy implementation this conclusion is supported by a comparison to peru where a military regime encountered similar obstacles and argentina where

for better or forever formal versus informal enforcement this article contrasts supporting partnerships through relational contracting and supporting partnerships through formal legal institutions a large population of players interact in bilateral relationships efficiency requires cooperation but cheating yields a higher short term payoff there is a positive probability that the maximum feasible payoff available to a partnership decreases opportunistic behavior makes it impossible to realize the efficient outcome a legal system can lead to efficient contracting without such a system productive relationships arise in equilibrium if it is costly to initiate new relationships this type of relational contracting tends to make partnerships last longer than is efficient

mixed signals central bank independence coordinated wage bargaining and european monetary union plans for the european monetary union emu are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects however the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank when signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective greater central bank independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated but it can bring higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is less coordinated thus currency unions like the emu may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage they will have costs as well as benefits and these will be unevenly distributed among and within the member nations depending on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination

electoral business cycles in oecd countries studies of oecd countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre election period casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles we develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre election period specifically the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal the resulting declines referred to as reverse electoral business cycles are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties we test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten oecd countries between 1975 and 2006 the results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization moreover simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product gdp we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

the impact of constitutions on economic performance constitutions matter for economic performance to the extent that they promote stability accountability and credibility this article considers the nature of political constituions and their impact on economic efficiny and economic security wnder three aspects the basic righs laid down in the constitution the structure of government and the stringency of amedment procedures while emphasizing that constitutions can be usefid by serving as precommitment devices the analysis also emphasizes the dangers of rigidity and the need for flexibility t he relation between political institutions and economic performance is not well understood the causal link goes in both directions well designed insttutions can improve economic performance but some institutions may be feasible or effective only at specific levels of economic development here i consider only one aspect of the relationship the impact of institutions on economic performance however a full treatment of the subject would consider both aspects and the following discussion must be read with this important proviso in mind i further limit myself to the subset of political institutions that are embodied in constitutions the smdy of the impact of constitutions on economic performance is part of what is usually referred to as constitutional political economy a field that can be traced back to the caklcdus of consent by buchanan and tullock 1962 buchanan was also the founder of the journal constitutional political economy the public choice approach to constitutions has focused somewhat narrowly on fiscal and monetary constitutions although actual constitutions rarely stipulate tax systems or monetary institutions in any detail the ban on paper money in the u s constituton for instance has few analogues in modem constitutions moreover even that document is concerned mostly with other matters such as the organization of the executive and the legislature separation of powers and the relations between the federal government and the states constituitional political economy

increasing returns to scale in financial intermediation and the non neutrality of government policy a general equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries is constructed and used to study the effects of some standard policy experiments one time increases in the growth rate and in the level of the stock of money have non neutral and sometimes surprising effects on interest rates the quantity of intermediated borrowing and lending the number of intermediary firms inflation and the price level optimal government macroeconomic policy is shown to reflect a tradeoff between public sector frictions and the capital market distortion created by increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition in private intermediation

state revenue extraction from different income groups variations in tax progressivity in the united states 1916 to 1986 we examine the conditions that affected the progressivity of the individual income tax in the united states between 1916 and 1986 a multivariate time series analysis shows how macroeconomic conditions state imperatives the organizational capacities of social classes and political conditions have affected the progressivity and the symbolic component of the income tax progressivity is measured by the difference between the effective tax rates paid by moderate income and very high income families the symbolic component of this tax is measured by the difference between the nominal tax rate and effective income tax rate paid by very high income families the results reveal that changes in tax progressivity are due largely to macroeconomic and state fiscal conditions such as unemployment economic development and budget deficits although the organizational capacities of social classes and political conditions such as labor organization and political participation also have effects changes in progressivity are due primarily to adjustments in the rates paid by very high income families however the impacts of these conditions on tax progressivity changed somewhat when the federal income tax was transformed into a mass tax during world war il finally political conditions have a relatively greater effect on the symbolic component of the income tax than on progressivity overall this analysis supports a structural theory of the state in which the influences of politics and social classes on revenue extraction are circumscribed by macroeconomic and state fiscal conditions

the politics of finance how capital sways african central banks abstractwhile there is a large literature on the politics of central banking its insights are difficult to translate to sub saharan africa this article addresses gaps in this literature by considering how the interests of those who control financial resources sway african central banks case studies of kenya nigeria and uganda demonstrate that variation in the sources of capital on which countries rely to finance investment helps to account for the pattern of variation in central bank policy stances the analysis further develops and probes arguments about power derived from the control of capital in the context of developing countries

does the organization of capital matter employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention we argue however that the representational power of business coordination across business interest units and integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums or what we call the social corporatist organization of business should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation we test our arguments with models both of 1980 98 pooled time series data on withinand across country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm level survey data from denmark and the united kingdom we find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy we find moreover that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to de industrialization and increases in general unemployment at the firm level membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist denmark but not in the pluralist united kingdom

revisiting the single european act and the common wisdom on globalization the european program of liberalization launched by the single european act sea of 1987 is commonly seen as a powerful instance of globalization trends of economic integration liberalization and international institution building this article revisits the origins of the sea to argue that the extent and success of its liberalizing program depended on a causally distinct push for european institutional reform a retracing of concrete political patterns behind the sea greatly strengthens broader statistical and theoretical challenges to the notion of strong universal trends of globalization

capital grants and regional public investment in spain fungibility of aid or crowding in effect the aim of capital grants to subcentral governments is to increase their investment however recipients may try to allocate additional resources to cut saving or deficit generating a crowding out effect on self financed investment using data from the spanish autonomous communities during the period 1984 to 1999 the effect of capital transfers on regional public investment saving and deficit are estimated econometric results demonstrate that capital grants have no relevance when explaining the dynamics of saving however in deficit regressions they are shown to be both significant and negative both results lead us to a partial long run crowding out effect of grants on self financed investment

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

ostracism and forgiveness many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation if an individual shirks in one relationship her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her while continuing to cooperate among themselves however a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk rather than report her victimization truthfully if guilty players are to be permanently ostracized then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners could obtain through bilateral enforcement ostracism can improve upon bilateral enforcement if tempered by forgiveness through which guilty players are eventually readmitted to cooperative society

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

central banks at war war is expensive troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured when the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns credibility problem more difficult central banks enhance a government s ability to borrow by being the sole direct purchaser of government debt the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender this increases lenders confidence that the government will be punished in case of default making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest the sovereign dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank has an incentive to retain the bank data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign s borrowing costs particularly during times of war

an economic approach to social capital a standard optimal investment model can be used to analyse an individual s decision to accumulate social capital we analyse six facts that support the predictions of this individual based approach 1 social capital first rises and then falls with age 2 social capital declines with expected mobility 3 social capital rises in occupations with greater returns to social skills 4 social capital is higher among homeowners 5 social connections fall sharply with physical distance 6 people who invest in human capital also invest in social capital we fail to find robust evidence that social capital investments fall with the value of time or that geographic religious groups generate social capital complementarities

bayesian inference for comparative research rv egression analysis in comparative research suffers from two distinct problems of statistical inference first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of a repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second the small and collinear data sets of comparative research yield imprecise estimates of the effects of explanatory variables we describe a bayesian approach to statistical inference that provides a unified solution to these two problems this approach is illustrated in a comparative analysis of unionization a widely used tool in quantitative comparative politics is the linear regression model estimating relationships between institutional and economic variables observed for a set of countries constituting some population of interest a brief survey of recent comparative research finds no shortage of work of this type for instance remmer 1991 identifies economic crisis as a source of electoral volatility in latin american countries in the 1980s robertson 1990 presents evidence that institutions moderating the transaction costs of negotiations between capital and labor reduce industrial conflict and golden 1993 finds that union wage moderation in industrialized democracies results from coordinated collective bargaining although the methodological advantages are well documented jackman 1985 we identify two distinct problems of statistical inference endemic to this type of quantitative comparative research first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of some repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second because data sets tend to be small and collinear the effects of explanatory variables are estimated imprecisely in most applications the first problem is generally ignored and the second is solved by imposing restrictions on the regression model to obtain sensible results the bayesian model of statistical inference provides a unified solution to these two distinct problems of quantitative comparative research two features of bayesian inference are important in this context first probability is conceived subjectively as characterizing a researcher s uncertainty about the parameters of a statistical model this subjective probability concept seems particularly useful in comparative settings where the data are typically convenience samples not generated by a known probability mechanism such as random sampling second bayesian inference allows the inclusion of other information in addition to the quantitative sample information again this seems useful in the comparative context where rich historical material is commonly available sparking ideas for researchers but formally discarded in the final analysis in the bayesian approach this historical material can be formally incorporated into the analysis we begin by detailing why the nonstochastic and weak data typical of comparative research are problematic for conventional linear regression analysis we next introduce some ideas about bayesian inference and describe bayesian regression analysis these ideas are applied to a comparative analysis of unionization the subject of a recent exchange in the american political science review between michael wallerstein and john stephens stephens and wallerstein 1991 wallerstein 1989 the bayesian regressions we present are supplemented with a sensitivity analysis that investigates how our conclusions depend upon the sample data and our prior beliefs although we survey some ideas in bayesian statistics a full introduction to the bayesian approach to statistical inference is beyond our scope here good book length treatments are pollard 1986 lee 1989 and at a slightly higher level press 1989 our intention here is to spotlight problematic but ignored issues of statistical inference in a common area of application the bayesian alternative that we present represents just one way forward to address these inferential problems

an arrgh chy the law and economics of pirate organization this article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law economics and organization of pirates to effectively organize their banditry pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation minimize crew conflict and maximize piratical profit pirates devised two institutions for this purpose first i analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation second i examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history

cooperation in community interaction without information flows we study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other s past actions they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship there is incomplete information regarding player types a subset of the population is myopic while the remainder have discount factors that permit cooperation in principle we define social equilibrium in such communities such equilibria are characterized by an initial testing phase followed by cooperation if the test is successful it is precisely the presence of myopic types that permit cooperation by raising barriers to entry into new relationships we examine the implications of increased patience which takes two forms an increase in the number of non myopic types and an increase in the discount factor of non myopic types these two notions turn out to have strikingly different implications for the degree of cooperation that can be sustained

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

de globalization theories predictions and opportunities for international business research de globalization now a distinct possibility would induce a significant qualitative shift in strategies structures and behaviors observable in international business ib coming to terms with this qualitative shift would require ib research to develop a much deeper integration of politics the key driver of de globalization to support such integration this paper introduces two relevant theories of de globalization from political science liberalism and realism both predict de globalization under current conditions but lead to different expectations about the future world economy liberalism suggests a patchwork of economic linkages while realism predicts the emergence of economic blocs around major countries this paper discusses the resulting opportunities in three areas of ib research political strategies and roles of multinational enterprises mnes global value chains and the role of the national context for political strategies and roles there is a need to explore how regular business activities and deliberate political agency of mnes affect the political sustainability of globalization for value chains questions include their future reach and specialization changes in organizational forms and the impact of political considerations on location decisions research opportunities on national contexts relate to their ability to sustain globalization and their connection with economic and military power

the political economy of financial internationalization in the developing world in the last decade a growing number of developing countries have opened their financial systems by liberalizing capital flows and the rules governing the international operations of financial intermediaries one explanation of this rush toward greater financial internationalization is that increasing interdependence generates domestic and foreign political pressures for capital account liberalization while we find evidence for that hypothesis we find that the proximate cause in developing countries more frequently is found in balance of payments crises politicians perceive that financial openness in the face of crisis can increase capital inflows by indicating to foreign investors that they will be able to liquidate their investments and by signaling government intentions to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline the argument is explored through case studies of chile indonesia mexico and south korea

trust social capital and economic development many argue that elements of a society s norms culture or social capital are central to understanding its development however these notions have been difficult to capture in economic models here we explore ap ossible role for trustworthiness as corresponding to social capital individuals are trustworthy when they perform in accordance with promises even if this does not maximize their payoffs the usual focus on incentive structures in motivating behaviour plays no role here instead we emphasize more deep seated modes of behaviour and consider trustworthy agents being socialized to act as they do to model this socialization we borrow from a process of preference evolution pioneered by bisin and verdier 2001 the model developed endogenously accounts for social capital and explores its role in the process of economic development it captures in a simple formal way the interaction between social capital and the economy s productive processes the results obtained caution against rapid reform and provide an explanation for why late developing countries may not easily be able to transplant the modes of production that have proved useful in the west

explaining capital account liberalization in latin america a transitional cost approach in the past three decades governments around the world have lowered barriers to international capital flows this movement is widely attributed to the forces of globalization as developed nations moved toward relative convergence on international financial openness yet developing nations with much to gain from openness to foreign investment moved only hesitantly and inconsistently in this direction analysis of two decades of capital account liberalization in latin america and the oecd reveals that nations in latin america with weaker domestic financial sectors face higher risks of transitional dislocations following liberalization and move less aggressively toward openness in the oecd by contrast financial weakness is associated with greater movements toward capital account opening as transitional costs are lower and governments are better equipped to ameliorate them examination of the transitional costs of liberalization thus helps to explain how market pressures may impede rather than promote market oriented reform in latin america

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance a corrigendum alvarez garrett and lange 1991 used cross national data panel data on the organization for economic coordination and development nations to show that countries with left governments and encompassing labor movements enjoyed superior economic performance here we show that the standard errors reported in that article are incorrect reestimation of the model using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors upholds the major finding of alvarez garrett and lange regarding the political and institutional causes of economic growth but leaves the findings for unemployment and inflation open to question we show that the model used by alvarez garrett and lange feasible generalized least squares cannot produce standard errors when the number of countries analyzed exceeds the length of the time period under analysis also we argue that ordinary least squares with robust standard errors is superior to feasible generalized least square for typical cross national panel studies

unions wages and the common interest three models have dominated recent research on the relationship between labor unions wage behavior and national economic performance a simple linear model a parabolic model and a political model this article argues that an unemployment mediated linear model is theoretically preferable in a context of low unemployment encompassing labor movements can be expected to restrain wage demands whereas localized unions have much less incentive to do so in a context of high unemployment localized unions should exhibit wage moderation and the pressure on encompassing unions to restrain wage demands is further accentuated these four models are assessed as predictors of wage changes inflation and misery index levels for 15 industrialized nations over the periods 1960 1973 1974 1979 and 1980 1990 the linear models outperform the parabolic and political models in each of the latter two time periods for the mid to late 1970s the simple linear model performs best but for the 1980s the unemployment medi

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

trust in large organizations several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social institutions we argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations in a cross section of countries evidence on government performance participation in civic and professional societies importance of large firms and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis moreover trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross section of countries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

endogenous institutional selection building trust and economic growth abstract private order market institutions founded on trust based relational contracts suffer adverse selection and moral hazard problems while public order market institutions have a limited capacity to enforce contracts i model agent selection between contract enforcement institutions and demonstrate that the state s contract enforcement capacity is complementary to private order contract enforcement institutions for low to moderate levels of public order enforcement capacity this suggests that initial improvements to public order institutions cause the accumulation of trust and result in economic growth in both institutions however i show that the private order institution must collapse once the public order contract enforcement capacity is too great

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

exchange rate theory and practice this volume grew out of a national bureau of economic research conference on exchange rates held in bellagio italy in 1982 in it the world s most respected international monetary economists discuss three significant new views on the economics of exchange rates rudiger dornbusch s overshooting model jacob frenkel s and michael mussa s asset market variants and pentti kouri s current account portfolio approach their papers test these views with evidence from empirical studies and analyze a number of exchange rate policies in use today including those of the european monetary system

room to move international financial markets and national welfare states a central research question in international political economy concerns the influence of financial markets on government policy outcomes to what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices i evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies evidence includes interviews with financial market participants and a cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of interest rates this evaluation suggests that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures financial market participants are concerned with a few macroeconomic policy indicators including inflation rates and government deficit gdp ratios but not with micropolicy indicators such as the distribution of government spending across functional categories in these areas governments retain policymaking autonomy i conclude by exploring the role of financial market influences within domestic politics and offering suggestions for further research

trade expansion and contract enforcement consider a world of traders separated in geographic economic or social space honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders but frequencies of meetings and information flows about cheating have local bias honesty is self enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world the extent of self enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self governing small community intermediate size worlds fare worst

the making of policy institutionalized or not this paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles their causes and their consequences in latin america finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies apts are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies the higher the potential damage they can cause the lower the wealth of the economy and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power moreover strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies for instance bribes by the rich and protests by the poor are likely to be countervailing forces and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions

bankers alliances and economic policy patterns evidence from mexico and brazil this article suggests an organizational or institutional explanation of economic policy patterns which differs significantly from state or society centered explanations and those based on international factors bankers alliances defined as interest coalitions of public and private financiers play an important role in shaping economic policy the stronger the bankers alliance the more likely that long run economic policy patterns will feature orthodox policies such as tight monetary policy and limited government intervention in financial or foreign exchange markets the historical organization of state economic agencies and of capital create national environments more or less conducive to formation of strong bankers alliances the three key variables center on a the timing and actors involved in central bank formation b the relationship between the central bank and other state economic policy making agencies and c the extent of conglomeration between industrial and financial enterprises a

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

interest group success in the european union when and why does business lose business lobbying is widespread in the european union eu but because not all lobbying is successful the following question arises when does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policy making in the eu we argue that business actors are overall less successful than citizen groups in the european policy process however they can protect their interests if interest group conflict is low or the role of the european parliament is restricted a new data set on the positions of more than 1 000 non state actors with respect to 70 legislative acts proposed by the european commission between 2008 and 2010 allows us to evaluate this argument empirical support for our expectations is highly robust our findings have implications for the literature on legislative decision making in the eu and for research on non state actors in international organizations

capital mobility and coalitional politics authoritarian regimes and economic adjustment in southeast asia this article investigates the coalitional bases of authoritarian rule to explain striking variation in adjustment policy to the asian financial crisis in indonesia and malaysia given currency depreciation with financial sector fragility holders of mobile assets prefer to maintain an open capital account while owners of fixed assets and labor favor restrictions of capital mobility to facilitate expansionary macroeconomic policies differences in adjustment policy across the two countries reflect differences in the political coalitions supporting the authoritarian regimes these findings illuminate the nature of political conflict during financial crises and show how a nuanced view of the coalitions supporting authoritarian rule can yield powerful insights into the political economy of authoritarianism and economic adjustment in a global economy

campaign contributions as a commitment device we explore the idea that the influence of interest groups in elections may have positive economic effects since the investment decisions of firms determine economic growth and employment voters have a common interest in making their governments commit to policies that encourage private investments however governments may renege on promises for economic stability and choose excessively leftist policies campaign contributions by firms tend to restrain the scope for such opportunism and provide a commitment device this is achieved if firms after the policy is chosen contribute to the governing party or to its rivals

using the law to change the custom the custom often acts as a powerful hindrance to equity increasing changes in this paper we present a simple model of legal dualism in which a progressive legal reform can under certain conditions shift the conflicting custom in the direction intended by the legislator formal law then acts as an outside anchor that exerts a magnet effect on the custom we also characterize the conditions under which a moderate reform performs better than a radical one in improving the welfare of the disadvantaged sections of the population we illustrate our insights using examples on inheritance marriage and divorce in sub saharan africa and india

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

the structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies the article presents a theory of class conflict between workers and capitalists who pursue their material interests under a form of societal organization that combines private ownership of instruments of production with representative political institutions there exist economic and political conditions under which both classes would simultaneously choose courses of action that constitute a class compromise workers consent to the institution of profit and capitalists to democratic institutions through which workers can effectively press claims for material gains when these conditions hold and a compromise is in force the role of the state consists in institutionalizing coordinating and enforcing the terms of a compromise that represents the preferences of workers as well as capitalists the combination of private ownership of the instruments of production with representative political institutions based on widespread suffrage constitutes a compromise between workers who consent to the private appropriation of profit by owners of capital and capitalists who accept the democratic institutions through which workers can make effective claims for an improvement of their material conditions this form of societal organization was con

taxation corporate financial policy and the cost of capital the cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system the purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest via the cost of capital taking full account of important issues that arise independently from the question of taxation included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

international institutions and domestic compensation the imf and the politics of capital account liberalization certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross border movement of capital how can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s we argue that imf stabilizationprogramsprovideawindowofopportunityforgovernmentstoinitiatefinancialreforms butthatpolicymakers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high large loans from the imf shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government s ex ante promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms we test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002 we employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in imf programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion the results provide strong support for the interactive effect of imf programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

structural dependence of the state on capital a central claim of both marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society this is the theory of structural dependence of the state on capital using a formal model the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined we conclude that in a static sense the theory is false virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense policies that once in place redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented

international macroeconomic policy coordination when policymakers do not agree on the true model the authors relax the assumption of the literature on international coordination that policymakers know the true model t wo countries will still be able to agree on a cooperative policy pack age that each believes will improve the objective function relative t o the nash noncooperative solution however the bargaining solution may move the target variables in the wrong direction these points ar e illustrated with monetary and fiscal multipliers taken from simulat ions of ten leading econometric models out of 1 000 possible combina tions of models that could represent u s beliefs non u s beliefs and the true model monetary coordination improves u s welfare in on ly 546 cases copyright 1988 by american economic association

the political economy of high income taxation capital taxation path dependence and political institutions in denmark denmark s income tax burden as the percentage of gdp is larger than the total tax burden of the united states and it has increased further after 1980 how can this be explained given increasing tax competition and widespread views that strong reliance on regressive taxes was conducive to building and maintaining large tax and welfare states the article highlights three factors first large income taxes are feasible if the capital tax burden is moderated within the income tax second the effective capital income tax burden that had developed up to the early 1980s was extremely low so that subsequent tax reforms could cut marginal tax rates on mobile types of capital income while increasing tax revenue third drastic changes in the legal structure of the income tax and stability in aggregate tax policy outcomes were facilitated by proportional representation and legislative majority rule

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

globalization taxation and burden shifting in latin america most researchers interested in the relationship between global markets and public policy focus on advanced industrial democracies in contrast we examine competing hypotheses as to globalization s effect on governments by expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing nations more specifically we investigate the relationship between international market integration and the evolving burden of taxation on capital as well as the subsequent response of markets to shifts in tax policy in latin america since the late 1970s consistent with our theoretical expectations we find that global market forces are more constraining vis a vis tax policy in latin america than in the world s wealthiest nations despite these market based pressures however national politics continue to influence tax policy in latin america in a manner consistent with findings on advanced industrial democracies as such developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate policy though within the context of a more strictly neoliberal context than their counterparts in advanced industrial democracies

the origins of financial openness a study of current and capital account liberalization theory we assess the determinants of the national regulation of international finance or the comparative degree of national financial openness or closure hypotheses partisanship interacts with a nation s factor endowments to account in part for different international financial policies by governments of the same partisan hue methods we offer a quantitative measure of international financial openness or current and capital account regulation for 21 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development for 1950 88 we use regression analysis employing panel corrected standard errors to discover the determinants of financial openness results our main finding is that political partisanship substantially explains openness but does so in complex ways differences in both political institutional arrangements and types of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial regulation

leading the left to the right populist coalitions and economic reform abstract democratic political parties with a history of commitment to statist economic policies face internal stresses when they come to power and preside over programs of wholesale economic liberalization how do such parties and coalitions avoid splintering and manage to maintain electoral support examining the recent experiences of argentina and mexico edward gibson suggests that one can understand these achievements by treating each party as a combination of two separate components performing distinct functions a metropolitan policy component and a peripheral or rural electoral component his framework travels well beyond latin america and helps illuminate the different politics underlying three recent waves of economic liberalization in sri lanka

national tax systems versus the european capital market capital taxation alberto giovannini the current structure of taxes on capital income across ec countries can be exploited by corporations to reduce tax burdens skilled individuals can indulge in tax avoidance too the liberalization of capital movements stands to turn tax avoidance into a cottage industry this article provides a primer on capital income taxes and describes strategies which reduce the tax burden from a policy perspective the question is how to avoid massive tax evasion after 1992 there is no need to harmonize if the right taxation principle is adopted two principles are contrasted the territorial principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic investment irrespective of the country of residence of the beneficiary and the worldwide principle according to which taxes are levied on domestic savings irrespective of where they are invested it is shown that the worldwide principle involves much fewer distortions than the territorial principle a strict application of this principle would effectively solve the problem of tat evasion in europe without requiring full harmonization of the tax systems its full implementation would require the abolition of withholding taxes the elimination of tax deferrals which are quite pervasive throughout europe and an in depth review of blocking and secrecy laws

democracy and markets the case of exchange rates the relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied severa competing propositions about how political re equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested the results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency market equilibria additionally opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and or the contents of public policies electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency market equilibria political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority plurality systems there is less evidence that central bank independence consensual corporatist systems or political coherency reduces the effect of politics on currency markets he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field the size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases substantively with globalization currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments reducing their room to maneuver analytically in comparison to most goods markets currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria today s exchange rate is determined by currency traders fully informed expectations about tomorrow s exchange rate the sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration 1 this article demonstrates there are informationally relevant political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency market equilibria moreover these factors vary in important ways across democracies some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination