price setting in online markets does it click using a unique dataset of daily u s and u k price listings and the associated number of clicks for precisely defined goods from a major shopping platform we shed new light on how prices are set in online markets which have a number of special properties such as low search costs low costs of monitoring competitors prices and low costs of nominal price adjustment we document that although online prices are more flexible than offline prices they nevertheless exhibit relatively long spells of fixed prices large size and low synchronization of price changes considerable crosssectional dispersion and low sensitivity to predictable or unanticipated changes in demand conditions qualitatively these patterns are similar to those observed for offline prices a finding that suggests a need for more research on the sources of price rigidities and dispersion

lobbying as legislative subsidy professional lobbyists are among the most experienced knowledgeable and strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice of politics nonetheless their behavioral patterns often appear anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories we revisit these anomalies in search of an alternative theory we model lobbying not as exchange vote buying or persuasion informative signaling but as a form of legislative subsidy a matching grant of policy information political intelligence and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators the proximate political objective of this strategy is not to change legislators minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own coincident objectives the theory is simple in form realistic in its principal assumptions and counterintuitive in its main implications empirically the model renders otherwise anomalous regularities comprehensible and predictable in a later section we briefly bring preferences back in examining the important but relatively uncommon conditions under which preference centered lobbying should occur

capture and the bureaucratic mafia does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity does the revolving door phenomenon erode bureaucratic integrity to answer this question we undertake a quantitative case study of a private university in south korea that recruited a former vice minister of education as its president specifically we investigate whether after employing this high ranking former public official the university received favorable treatment from the education ministry in terms of funding estimates from difference in difference triple difference and synthetic control methods all suggest that the high profile public official s recruitment is associated with financial benefits from the official s former employing agency no such advantage however was observed for benefits from other agencies this result offers suggestive but compelling evidence that the revolving door distorts the allocation of government resources the financial benefits the university received are due not to the recruited official s greater competence expertise or knowledge but rather to his implicit collusion with the government

repeated lobbying by commercial lobbyists and special interests developing a lobbying model of repeated agency we explain previously unexplained features of the real world lobbying industry lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called commercial lobbyists to lobby policymakers on their behalf our analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying for example using the observation that in the united states over the last 20 years policymakers have spent an increasing amount of their time fundraising as opposed to legislating we are able to explain why the share of commercial lobbyist activity in total lobbying has risen dramatically and now constitutes over 60 of the total the key scarce resource in our analysis is policymakers time policymakers allocate this resource via implicit repeated agency contracts that are used to incent special interests and commercial lobbyists to provide a mix of financial contributions and information on policy proposals these implicit agency contracts solve both an information problem in the presence of unverifiable policy information and a contracting problem in the absence of legal enforcement these repeated relationships that are often described using the pejorative term cronyism in the popular press may in certain circumstances be welfare improving jel d72 d82 h1 p16

booms busts and price dispersion using grocery store data we study the relationship between dispersion and the business cycle our findings reveal that overall there is no robust and significant relationship however these mask important heterogeneity in the cyclicality of dispersion at the category level

price dispersion over the business cycle evidence from the airline industry this study provides empirical evidence documenting how price dispersion moves with the business cycle in the airline industry performing a fixed effects panel analysis on seventeen years of data covering two business cycles we find that price dispersion is highly pro cyclical this effect is especially pronounced for legacy carriers relative to low cost carriers we show that our empirical result is consistent with firms implementing second degree price discrimination tactics

face to face communication in organizations communication is integral to organizations and yet field evidence on the relation between communication and worker productivity remains scarce we argue that a core role of communication is to transmit information that helps co workers do their job better we build a simple model in which workers choose the amount of communication by trading off this benefit against the time cost incurred by the sender and use it to derive a set of empirical predictions we then exploit a natural experiment in an organization where problems arrive and must be sequentially dealt with by two workers for exogenous reasons the first worker can sometimes communicate face to face with their colleague consistently with the predictions of our model we find that 1 the second worker works faster at the cost of the first worker having less time to deal with incoming problems when face to face communication is possible 2 this effect is stronger when the second worker is busier and for homogenous and closely located teams and 3 the career incentives of workers determine how much they communicate with their colleagues we also find that workers partially internalise social outcomes in their communication decisions our findings illustrate how workers in teams adjust the amount of mutual communication to its costs and benefits

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

gaining access by doing good the effect of sociopolitical reputation on firm participation in public policy making this paper examines the role of firms sociopolitical reputations as proxied by their perceived engagement in socially responsible practices in public policy makers decisions to grant access in the policy making process i argue that policy makers dependencies motivations and decision making processes lead them to evaluate firms by using sociopolitical reputation as a differentiating heuristic i hypothesize that firms that construct stronger sociopolitical reputations will be granted greater access and that firms existing political activity and policy makers partisanship will moderate this relationship i test these hypotheses using an 11 year panel on congressional testimony reputation and political and financial characteristics for the s p 500 and find support for all three these findings support the existence of a sociopolitical dimension to firms reputations that affects how public policy makers evaluate firms demonstrating that corporate social responsibility pays political benefits this paper was accepted by jesper sorensen organizations

how to avoid transferring a valuable asset many mechanisms such as auctions efficiently allocate an asset to the firm which values it most highly but sometimes the asset s owner may benefit from the transfer only if the asset is not too valuable to potential buyers in this setting we examine the efficiency of mechanisms when the potential buyers have private information about the asset s value we show that rent seeking and lobbying rather than merely wasting resources can lead to allocations which are close to efficient

policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector in this article i quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by firms affect policy enactment to achieve this end i construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th congress i then develop and estimate a game theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to affect the probability that a policy is enacted i find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy s equilibrium enactment probability to be statistically significant but very small nonetheless the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to be over 130

spatial models of legislative effectiveness spatial models of policymaking have evolved from the median voter theorem through the inclusion of institutional considerations such as political parties committees and various voting and amendment rules such models however implicitly assume that no policy is more effective than another at solving public policy problems and that all proposers are equally capable of advancing proposals we relax these assumptions by modeling proposal quality and the effort needed to make better proposals the resulting legislative effectiveness model lem offers three main benefits first it can better account for policy changes based on the effectiveness or popularity of the status quo changing our understanding of how to overcome gridlock in polarized legislatures second it generalizes canonical models of legislative politics such as median voter setter negative agenda setting and pivotal politics models all of which emerge as special cases within the lem third the lem offers significant new empirical predictions some of which we initially test and find support for within the u s congress

a simple model of the commercial lobbying industry in this paper we present a model of the behavior of commercial lobbying firms such as the so called k street lobbyists of washington d c in contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and are not directly affected by policy outcomes they are hired by citizens or groups of citizens to advocate on their behalf to policymakers in our analysis we address two basic questions why do commercial lobbying firms exist and what are the implications of their existence for social welfare we answer the first part of this question by proposing that commercial lobbying firms possess a verification technology that allows them to improve the quality of information concerning the social desirability of policy proposals this gives policymakers the incentive to allocate their scarce time to lobbying firms essentially it is this access to policymakers that lobbying firms sell to their clients to address the question of social welfare we construct a simple general equilibrium model that includes commercial lobbying firms and compare the equilibrium obtained under market provision of lobbying services to the first best optimum we find that the market level of lobbying services can be socially either too large or too small and characterize when each will be the case

dynamic competition and price adjustments the link between price rigidity and market structure has long been a topic of interest to researchers in both macroeconomics and industrial organization research on this subject with its antecedents in the widely debated topic of administered inflation has gone through several stages in recent years the focus of research has been on explaining the speed of price adjustment 8 7 11 4 2 3 a parallel line of research has been on the role of entry in disciplining the price behavior of incumbent firms 15 14 5 the current study extends previous work on price adjustment in several important ways most importantly we introduce dynamic elements of competition as measured by several disaggregated measures of domestic and import entry we are able to evaluate the extent to which price effects of entry into u s manufacturing are due to changes in desired prices or to changes in the speed of adjustment to desired prices we depart from previous studies in that we use pooled data to estimate by nonlinear regression methods both the desired target price change and the speed of adjustment across industries

the currency denomination of long term debt in the canadian corporate sector an empirical analysis abstract a portfolio model explaining the allocation of long term debt between canadian dollar and us dollar denominated bonds is proposed and implemented the role of anticipated exchange rate changes and the specification of the adjustment process is emphasized the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that corporations alter their pattern of debt outstanding to issue more liabilities with the lower expected service cost these results are consistent with imperfect substitutability between canadian and us dollar denominated long term bonds the results also indicate significant difficulties inherent in estimating portfolio models of the issue of corporate bonds

retail price fixity as a facilitating mechanism previous theoretical explanations for retail price fixity show that fixed retail prices can be consistent with either competitive or imperfectly competitive behavior we develop a conceptual model of retail pricing wherein fixed price points are facilitating mechanisms for tacit collusion a non cooperative equilibrium in fixed retail prices is supported through credible threats to revert to nash pricing if cheating is suspected we test the implications of this model using a two stage ordered probit approach in weekly supermarket pricing data the results show that price fixity does support collusive equilibria among retailers but other factors may also explain retail price behavior

pacs and the congressional supermarket the currency is complex although pacs attempt to influence the legislative process with contributions this research finds little evidence that the contributions of 120 pacs affiliated with 10 organizations affected the voting patterns of the house members who served continuously from 1975 to 1982 in the few cases in which a relationship between contributions and a member s votes is established the analysis indicates that contributions are a surrogate measure of a more important and larger package of support for the member from the interest groups two stage least squares regression models are used to test the relationship between pac contributions and a member s votes controlling for the incumbent s ideology and party and the political leaning of the district interviews with pac officials supplement the statistical analysis

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades

legal realism for economists abstract economists have made great progress in understanding the incentives and behavior of actors who operate outside of traditional economic markets including voters legislators and bureaucrats the incentives and behavior of judges however remain largely opaque do judges act as neutral third party enforcers of substantive decisions made by others are judges ordinary policymakers who advance whatever outcomes they favor without any special consideration for law as such emerging recent scholarship has started to explore more nuanced conceptions of how law facts and judicial preferences may interact to influence judicial decisions this work develops a perspective on judging that can usefully be understood as the modern manifestation of american legal realism a jurisprudential movement of lawyers judges and law professors that flourished in the early twentieth century the purpose of this essay is to introduce in simplified form the realist account of judicial decision making to contras

do changes in debt maturity composition affect the term structure some canadian evidence this paper examines the time series behaviour of the term structure of interest rates in the government of canada bond market to determine whether changes in the maturity composition of canada debt have had a significant effect on bond yields methodologically a reduced form model is estimated which incorporates exogenous information about both the level of domestic interest rates and the shape of the us term structure the empirical results indicate that the null hypothesis of no debt management effects in the government of canada bond market is rejected for monthly data

why do members of congress support agricultural protection it seems paradoxical that until recently developed countries have continued subsidizing agriculture even though their agricultural sectors had been declining in relative importance since the middle of the 20th century what drives support for agricultural protection the broad array of subsidies to farmers and taxes and quotas imposed on agricultural imports in developed countries we answer this question by testing three competing hypotheses about what drives support for agricultural protection in the us i legislator preferences ii electoral incentives or iii lobbying using data on the roll call votes of the members of the 106th through the 110th congresses 1999 2009 and the scores given to each legislator by the farm bureau our findings suggest that electoral incentives explain a great deal of the variation in support for agricultural protection but that legislator preferences and lobbying might play a role too moreover legislator preferences and electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one another why does congress support agricultural protection because many members have electoral incentives to and because many of those who do not still have other personal or strategic interests at stake

equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription drugs this study seeks to establish the empirical importance of price dispersion due to costly consumer search by examining retail prices for prescription drugs posted prices in two geographically distinct markets are shown to vary considerably across pharmacies within the same market even after one controls for variation due to pharmacy differences pharmacy heterogeneity accounts for at most one third of the observed price dispersion the empirical analysis hinges on the observation that consumers incentives to price shop depend on characteristics of the drug therapy cross sectional patterns in price distributions across drugs are consistent with the predictions of a search model prices for repeatedly purchased prescriptions for which the expected benefits of search are highest exhibit significant reductions in both dispersion and price cost margins

pay to play politics informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access abstract we develop a game theoretic model of informational lobbying between two interest groups and a politician in which the politician can require political contributions in exchange for access the analysis considers three claims 1 the rich have better access to politicians than less wealthy groups 2 this access advantage makes the rich better off and skews policy in their favor and 3 contribution limits can reduce the rich group advantage and result in less skewed policy we show that the rich do have better access with the politician always offering access to the rich groups and only sometimes offering access to the less wealthy group this does not however mean that the rich group is better off or that policy is biased in its favor the politician sets access fees to extract the greatest amount of rent from the political process when only the rich group has access its expected benefit from gaining access is fully offset by its payment to the politician in this case the less wealthy interest group who is not targeted by the politician is better off contribution limits decrease the politician s ability to extract rent which improves the payoffs of rich interests and decreases politician payoffs finally the paper presents a novel benefit of contribution limits they can encourage the formation of lobby groups or the search for evidence which results in more evidence disclosure and better policy

is trade policy for sale congressional voting on recent trade bills this paper examines voting by u s representatives onthe north american free trade agreement the uruguayround agreement and most favored nation status forchina using recent political economy models of tradepolicy to formulate an empirical specification ofcongressional voting behavior we find evidence thatcampaign contributions influenced legislators voteson the nafta and uruguay round bills labor groupcontributions were associated with votes against freertrade while business contributions were associatedwith votes in favor of freer trade economicconditions in each member s district as well as thebroad policy views of the legislators also affectedrepresentatives voting decisions

the party of lincoln and the politics of state fair employment practices legislation in the north 1945 1964 from 1945 to 1964 more than a score of northern states passed laws mandating nondiscrimination in employment why did some states pass such fair employment practice fep laws much more slowly than other states this article presents archival and statistical evidence that partisan control of policy making institutions namely republican control of veto points in the legislative process is associated with a substantial reduction in the likelihood that a state would pass fep legislation even when controlling for potentially confounding variables this finding casts doubt on the leading account of the electoral realignment that began in the mid 1960s and culminated in the reagan bush years well before the advent of affirmative action key numbers of gop officeholders allied with organized business and motivated by a free market antiregulatory ideology worked successfully to block the adoption of color blind laws mandating formal racial equality

economic actors lobbying influence on the prospects for war and peace political scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process in the past few years a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace all of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not i advance two contrary arguments at least among the advanced states i posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference all of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization in particular i show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras my second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace i posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders

interest parity cointegration and the term structure in canada and the united states in this paper the author uses a simple but powerful technique to examine two models of the term structure for an open economy cointegration tests using two data sets for canada and the united states support the open economy model based on uncovered interest parity as an explanation for the canadian term structure of interest rates support for the generalized present value model is at best mixed this lack of support may be attributable to low test power due to the author s smaller sample or to differences in the periods examined

why special economic zones using trade policy to discriminate across importers tariffs are generally assumed to depend on the product not the identity of the importer however special economic zones are a common economically important policy used worldwide to lower tariffs on selected goods for selected manufacturers i show this is motivated by policymakers desire to discriminate across buyers when a tax is intended to raise prices for sellers through a mechanism distinct from existing theories of optimal taxation using a new dataset compiled from public records and exogenous changes in imports of intermediate goods i find the form composition and size of us zones are consistent with the theory

price rigidities and market structure conventional wisdom has it that a large part of the explanation of keynesian unemployment is the observed rigidities of wages and prices what has been lacking however is a satisfactory theory or conjunction of theories which explains how wages and prices can be at non market clearing levels the objective of this paper is to sketch out several alternative theoretical explanations of this phenomenon each in contrast with keynesian theory is consistent with the observation that as the economy goes into a recession real product wages do not increase and may in fact decrease all of the theories assume rational profit maximizing firms and all entail some important departure from the standard competitive paradigm the first three explanations represent minor adaptations of standard models

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

ethics and lobbying the case of real estate brokerage members of licensed occupations benefit from legal standards that limit entry into their professions is it ethical for these professionals to give political support to these standards i examined the case of real estate brokers and found that their educational requirements raise average commissions by one quarter of a percentage point costing consumers 5 4 billion per year without improving the quality of brokerage services the case raises interesting ethical issues which are difficult to resolve

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

preemption contests between groups we consider a preemption game between competing groups firms lobbying individually for their groups interests provide an empirical example among symmetric groups the first firm to take action bears an unobserved cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group in equilibrium the firm with the lowest cost takes action but with delay more competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay firms in larger groups wait longer but group action can occur earlier as the probability of a low cost firm is higher asymmetries in group size or strength of externalities also matter

revolving door lobbyists we study how ex government ocials benet from the personal connections acquired during public service lobbyists with experience in the oce of a us senator suer a 24 drop in generated revenue when that senator leaves oce the eect is immediate discontinuous around the exit period and long lasting consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians the drop in revenue is increasing in the committee assignments power held by the exiting politician

who lobbies whom special interest politics under alternative electoral systems why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats we theorize lobbying venue choices and intensityasafunctionofcontractenforceabilitywithpolicymakers politicians orbureaucrats wearguethatorganizational structures of interest groups in particular whether they are centralized or decentralized substantially affect their lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy makers and punish them when they fail we further demonstrate that the effect of centralized versus decentralized structure on venue choices is conditional on the types of electoral system majoritarian semiproportional single nontransferable vote sntv or proportional representation systems we test this argument using longitudinal survey data on lobbying which span two decades and cover around 250 interest groups in various sectors and issue areas in japan the results lend strong support to our argument about contract enforceability under alternative electoral systems

an investigation into the power of insiders in wage determination abstract this paper is concerned with the role of insider forces in wage determination various union and non union models of wage behaviour are considered and they imply that wages are a convex combination of internal and external factors certain union models also imply a degree of hysteresis data on fourteen british production industries reveal that i insider forces are important ii their importance is directly related to both union power and the degree of monopoly in the product market iii the state of the aggregate labour market is also important and iv hysteresis effects arising from insider power are only significant in a small minority of sectors

price dispersion and inflation new facts and theoretical implications abstract in workhorse macroeconomic models price dispersion is a central determinant of welfare the cost of business cycles optimal inflation and the tradeoff between inflation and output stability while price dispersion increases with inflation in the models this relationship is negative in the data due to sales prices the comovement of price dispersion and inflation for regular prices is positive a model with sales can quantitatively match the comovement in the data whereas a range of similar models without sales cannot even for regular prices these findings have important implications for welfare calculations optimal inflation and the effects of monetary shocks