the democratic political economy of progressive income taxation why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two dimensionality of the issue space to give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two dimensional nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two party game whose players have complete preferences over a two dimensional policy space generically fails to exist i introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games based on the fact of factional conflict within parties each party is supposed to consist of reformists militants and opportunists each faction has a complete preference order on policy space but together they can only agree on a partial order nash equilibria of the two party game where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions and each party is represented by its partial order exist and it is shown that in such equilibria both parties propose progressive income taxation

agricultural price instability a survey of competing explanations and remedies there are two explanations for agricultural price dynamics one follows cobweb logic and models fluctuations driven by expectation errors but emphasises that these expectations create complex dynamics and possibly chaos the other stems from the rational expectations tradition of dynamics driven by real shocks the empirical evidence tends to support the latter but is not conclusive the rational expectations model generates an optimal dynamic path from which no improvement can be expected from public intervention however if we take account of all the potential market failures in agricultural markets and especially in developing countries this conclusion might require some qualifications although an appropriate policy design for stability has still to be achieved this paper surveys the positive and normative literature on agricultural prices highlighting empirical evidence and identifying remaining unresolved issues

representative democracy and marginal rate progressive income taxation abstract this paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income we present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules this set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear continuous function each party decides whether or not to present a candidate for election there is a fixed cost of running the elected candidate implements one of her preferred tax policies our main results provide conditions under which a strong nash equilibrium exists and a tax schedule with increasing marginal tax rates is implemented in some nash equilibria and in any strong nash equilibrium

fairness self interest and the politics of the progressive income tax all advanced democracies have adopted income taxes with considerable progression in marginal tax rates to explain this we examine the nature of individual and collective preferences over alternative tax schedules in the context of a simple two sector model we first consider the case of altruistic or sociotropic citizens who view the income tax as a means of achieving a fairer or more egalitarian distribution of income we show that greater marginal rate progressivity may well be less fair that a fairest tax however defined is always a linear or flat rate schedule in which all incomes are taxed at the same marginal rate and that with a purely sociotropic electorate there exists a flat rate schedule which is a majority equilibrium we then show that with self interested voters who seek to minimize their own tax burdens greater marginal rate progression may well be preferred by middle and upper income voters that for middle income citizens the optimal schedule is a sharply progressive one and that within the set of individually optimal schedules there exists a majority equilibrium which is a progressive schedule which minimizes the burden on median income or middle class citizens at the expense of lower and upper income taxpayers

is there a demand for income tax progressivity recently marhuenda and ortuno ortin economics letters 48 1995 319 have provided a popular support for progressivity theorem that says that a marginal progressive tax always defeats a marginal regressive tax as long as individuals vote for the tax scheme minimizing their tax liabilities and the median income is less than the mean income in this paper we provide under similar circumstances a popular support for regressivity theorem according to which for any existing tax scheme there is always a majority support for a regressive reform reducing marginal progressivity or increasing marginal regressivity this regressive reform is supported by both extremes of the income distribution combining this result with marhuenda and ortuno ortin s result implies that vote cycling between regressive and progressive tax reform is inevitable and thus that the demand for progressivity cannot be established in the standard downsian framework with self interested voters

order of entry as a moderator of the effect of the marketing mix on market share order of entry has been demonstrated to have a significant effect on market share a number of explanations for this effect have been suggested in the marketing and strategy literatures to date the market share advantage gained by pioneers has typically been treated as a main effect an automatic regularity treating order of entry as a main effect implies that there is no penalty on the effectiveness of a brand s marketing instruments for late entry and that a late entrant can compensate for being late by dedicating sufficient marketing resources to their product in this study we investigate the influence of order of entry into a market on the effectiveness of a firm s marketing mix decisions by asking the question can followers compensate for not being first by their marketing mix decisions also even if they can compensate for being late does this effort become increasingly more difficult with later entry that is are there asymmetries in the effectiveness of a brand s marketing mix variables that relate to its order of entry into the market or as has been typically assumed to date is order of entry strictly a main effect an asymmetry exists for example if the market response to advertising is different for the first entrant versus the second or third entrant an asymmetry also exists if the effects of say a price change by the first entrant on the second entrant are different than the effects on the third entrant we develop a market share attraction model where the parameters vary as a function of order of entry our main contribution is in modeling the sources of order of entry advantage as asymmetries in the effectiveness of a brand s marketing instruments hence distinct from previous research we explain why there are inherent order of entry effects this paper is potentially of interest to researchers developing market share models and studying the effectiveness of marketing mix variables the substantive implication of our results concern directly academics interested in marketing strategy as well as the practicing marketing strategists we model asymmetries in the market response of early entrants versus late entrants using data from two durables and three nondurables categories with one exception all data sets are established from the inception of the category and hence do not suffer from the possible bias of excluding pioneers who have failed results show that asymmetries in the effectiveness of a brand s marketing mix variables are an essential source of order of entry effects we find that the main effects of order of entry are minimal order of entry effects do not necessarily lead to lower shares but overcoming these effects is not without substantial cost to the late entrant our results support previous research that has demonstrated advantages to early entry in addition we provide guidelines for how late entrants should compete later entry tends to reduce a competitor s price sensitivity suggesting that they not instigate in a price war with earlier entrants in order to gain share order of entry tends to decrease response to quality and to promotion to achieve the same impact on market share later entrants need a bigger change in quality and need to spend more on promotion our data did not support an asymmetric effect on advertising

modeling asymmetric competition the effects of the marketing actions of one brand can be distributed among its competitors market shares in a complex manner this paper presents and illustrates methods for modeling brand competition and brand strategies in markets where competitive effects can be differentially and asymmetrically distributed we discuss the empirical specification parameter estimation and competitive strategy implications of the models proposed price and advertising competition among eleven brands of an australian household product is used to illustrate the application of these procedures

deconstructing the pioneer s advantage examining vintage effects and consumer valuations of quality and variety several studies have demonstrated an order of entry effect on market share suggesting that pioneers outperform later entrants however other research has pointed out the limitations of these studies and found evidence that many pioneers fail or have low market share given this background the purpose of this research is to understand the conditions under which pioneers are more likely and also less likely to have an advantage we propose a game theoretic model that includes important sources of pioneer advantages as well as disadvantages specifically we incorporate a pioneer advantage due to preemption in markets with heterogeneous tastes in addition we incorporate a potential pioneer disadvantage due to technology vintage effects where later entrants utilizing improved technology can have lower costs and higher quality the model allows us to evaluate the extent of vintage effects necessary to overcome a pioneer s advantage key relationships are found between the magnitude of the pioneer advantage or disadvantage and consumer valuations of product attributes e g variety and quality we empirically validate the model with vintage effect data in 36 product categories and measures of consumer valuations of product variety and quality for 12 of these 36 categories the results show that pioneers do better in product categories wherevariety is more important and worse in categories where productquality is more important pioneers in categories with high vintage effects are shown to have lower market shares and higher failure rates similar results appear when analyzing persistence of market leadership over time further validating our model s major implications we also present two case studies that illustrate key elements of the model

order of market entry established empirical generalizations emerging empirical generalizations and future research three established and four emerging empirical generalizations are identified below the first established generalization is that there is a negative relationship between order of market entry and market share second for consumer packaged goods and prescription anti ulcer drugs the entrant s market share divided by the first entrant s share roughly equals one divided by the square root of order of market entry third in mature markets market pioneer share advantages slowly decline over time while the emerging generalizations require additional research support the initial findings suggest 1 for consumer packaged goods order of market entry has a stronger negative relationship with trial penetration than with repeat purchase 2 market pioneers have broader product lines than late entrants 3 skill and resource profiles differ across market pioneers early followers and late entrants and 4 order of market entry is not related to long term survival rates future research topics are also dis

the impact of order and mode of market entry on profitability and market share market share performance and profitability of overseas business activities has long been an important issue in international business in this study we explore the impact of order and mode of market entry into an overseas market we find that early entrants have significantly higher market shares and profitability than late followers we also find that equity joint ventures have a higher profitability than either wholly owned operations or contractual joint ventures a significant interaction exists between order and mode of market entry as expected firm efficiency and size affect the performance of firms these results are based on the business activities of a sample of 14 466 foreign firms in china in 1995

the effects of commodity price stabilization programs in this paper the authors analyze the effects of commodity programs in which the government attempts to support and stabilize price through open market purchases and sales specifically they as sess the effects of such programs on the u s soybean market using a rational expectations model that allows for private storage expected price responsive production and arbitrary support and release price s a salient feature of the model is that private storage and product ion behavior adjusts to changes in government policy stochastic simu lations of the market model demonstrate that price stabilization prog rams can reduce long run market price and destabilize producer revenu e copyright 1988 by american economic association

the choice of techniques and the optimality of market equilibrium with rational expectations this paper shows that in the absence of a complete set of risk markets prices provide incorrect signals for guiding production decisions even if all individuals have rational expectations concerning the distribution of prices which will prevail on the market next period the market allocation is in general not a constrained pareto optimum essentially the only conditions under which for all technologies the market equilibrium is a constrained pareto optimum are those in which risk markets are redundant we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for redundancy of risk markets which turn out to be extremely restrictive

a new venture s optimal entry time abstract we formulate a model of the decision of when a new venture should enter the market based on the uncertain evolution over time of environmental volatility and market competition we characterize the performance maximizing time to enter the market and show how this entry time is affected by changes in the business environment by further focusing our modeling assumptions we are able to translate our time based criteria into environmental terms and propose that management set a target environment level that must be met before entering the market we also demonstrate that management should adjust this target over time to respond to changes in the business context this modeling feature is important because it allows for a better assessment of when to enter a market based on future performances we translate the model s theoretical insights into testable propositions and explore possible ways to operationalize these for empirical testing

on the optimal income taxation some further numerical results abstract using numerical calculations we show in the optimal income tax model that a realistic value for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 0 5 leads to conclusions different from some of those drawn by mirrlees 1971 and atkinson 1973 the marginal tax rates are not so low and the shape of the tax schedule is for a great majority of the population substantially nonlinear a new feature in our calculations is that both results come out without going to maximin as done by atkinson 1973 we study in special cases the locality of the zero limit of the marginal tax rate at the upper end of the ability distribution and we achieve a very definite conclusion this result is really very local we also present an interesting approximation result concerning the relationship between the level of the government revenue and the marginal tax rate for individuals with high ability an important methodological remark analogous to sen s critique on the ethical measures of inequality is made on the interpretation of optimal income tax calculations

an analysis of the stabilizing and welfare effects of intervention in spot and futures markets this paper analyzes the effects of three alternative rules on the long run distributions of both the spot and futures prices ina single commodity market in which the key behavioral relationships are derived from the optimizing behavior of producers and speculators the rules considered include i leaning against the wind in the spot market ii utility maximizing speculative behavior by the stabilization authority in the futures market iii leaning against the wind in the futures market since the underlying model is sufficiently complex to preclude analytical solutions the analysis makes extensive use of simulation methods as a general proposition we find that intervention in the futures market is not as effective in stabilizing either the spot price of the futures price as is intervention in the spot market indeed rule iii while stabilizing the futures price may actually destabilize the spot price furthermore the analogous type of rule undertaken in the spot market will always stabilize the futures price to a greater degree than it does the spot price the welfare implications of these rules are also discussed our analysis shows how these can generate rather different distributions of welfare gains including the overall benefits this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

cross sectional estimation in marketing direct versus reverse regression empirical results in marketing research are often derived from linear additive models estimated on cross sectional data an underlying assumption of these model specifications is that each exogenous variable contributes an additive effect to the endogenous variable measuring these additive effects is problematic if some components of the endogenous variable are not observable to the researcher reliance on observable correlates to capture those aspects of the endogenous variable might require reverse regression to ensure unbiasedness of the estimated effects in contrast to direct regression used exclusively in marketing research reverse regression first estimates the effect of the endogenous variable on those correlates and then derives unbiased estimates of the additive effect of other exogenous variables specified in the basic model this paper discusses the reverse regression approach relying on recently published analytic results a statistically powerful and analytically simple test is developed which allows the marketing researcher to assess a priori whether direct or reverse regression will provide unbiased parameter estimates an empirical illustration focuses on the measurement of potential market share rewards for pioneering businesses contained in the pims data base other areas in marketing where the issue of direct versus reverse regression is pertinent are mentioned

technological regimes and the persistence of first mover advantages this article investigates first mover and early entrant advantages in terms of market share and its growth by analyzing a unique panel data set of korean manufacturing firms specifically this article examines the existence and persistence of first mover and early entrant advantages across different technological regimes we find that these advantages are influenced by characteristics of the firms as well as of the technological regimes under which they operate in general early entry into a market benefits a firm in terms of the size and growth rate of its market share early entrants including first movers have higher market shares except in regimes with high technological opportunity and low r d appropriability however first movers are disadvantaged in terms of market share growth except in regimes with low technological opportunities and high r d appropriability we also find that firm specific competences in r d and advertising help to maintain attenuate first mover and early entrant advantages disadvantages copyright 2011 the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

is the first to market the first to fail empirical evidence for industrial goods businesses abstract when entering a new market the first entrant typically faces the greatest market and technological uncertainties memorable phrases reflect the associated survival risk such as the first to market is the first to fail and the pioneer is the one with the arrows in its back although research estimates the market pioneer s survival rate the typical pioneer survival rate has not been compared with that of early followers the authors study compares survival rates for 167 first entrant market pioneers versus 267 early followers for these industrial goods businesses 66 of the pioneers versus 48 of the early followers survived at least ten years the main conclusion is that the pioneer s temporary monopoly over the early followers plus its first mover advantages typically offset the survival risks associated with market and technological uncertainties these results are consistent with previous research in the sense that first mover advantages that increase a pioneer s market share also hel

majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences this paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when incomeis fixed and taxation non distortionary the set of feasibletaxes is compact and self interested voters have cornerpreferences we first show that if a majority winning taxpolicy exists it involves maximum progressivity we then givea necessary and sufficient condition on the incomedistribution for a majority winner to exist this conditionappears to be satisfied for a large class of distributionfunctions

risk aversion supply response and the optimality of random prices a diagrammatic analysis this paper analyzes the effect of commodity price stabilization on producers and consumers both in the short run and in the long run when producers have adjusted their production decisions to take account of the change in the price distribution we derive conditions under which a both producers and consumers may be better off and b both producers and consumers may be worse off moreover we show that the long run effects may differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively from the short run effects the anomalous results may occur even with reasonable assumptions concerning production functions and utility functions of producers and consumers

note the impact of leadtime and years of competitive rivalry on pioneer market share advantages research has established that for surviving brands market pioneers have a higher average market share than later entrants by moving first market pioneers often develop sustainable market share advantages longer leadtime which is the time between entries should increase these pioneer advantages using two leadtime measures this prediction is supported across 34 categories of frequently purchased consumer goods increasing the years of competitive rivalry should help a later entrant slowly reduct the pioneer s market share advantage after more than two decades in the market second entants have eliminated the pioneer s market share advantage but third and later entrants continue to trail the pioneer

popular support for progressive taxation and the relative income hypothesis abstract we show that a marginal rate progressive tax always defeats a marginal rate regressive tax under pairwise majority voting so long as the latter collects at least as much revenue as the former one irrespective of whether the voters care at all about their relative incomes or not

voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules abstract majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who have quasilinear in consumption preferences is considered roell 2012 has shown that individual preferences over these schedules are single peaked in this article a complete characterization of selfishly optimal schedules is provided each selfishly optimal schedule has a bunching region in a neighborhood of the proposer s skill type coincides with the maxi max schedule below this region and coincides with the maxi min schedule above it using techniques introduced by vincent and mason 1967 the bunching region is identified by solving an unconstrained optimization problem information about the optimal schedules is used to provide a relatively simple proof of single peakedness the condorcet winning tax schedule features marginal tax rates that are negative resp positive on the maxi max resp maxi min part of the schedule except at the endpoints of the skill distribution where they are zero

the politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects this paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome in our model with endogenous income there is no majority condorcet winning tax schedule we then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions we follow three strategies i reduction of the policy space to the tax functions that are ideal for some voter ii elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the use of mixed strategies in a standard downsian two party competition game iii assumption that political parties interact repeatedly and care about the size of their majority although each approach captures a different aspect of political behavior they point to the same simulation based conclusion that progressivity is more likely to emerge for most distributions of abilities and that it is actually the only possible voting outcome if the distribution is sufficiently concentrated at the middle

popular support for progressive taxation abstract the popular support obtained by two parties who propose two qualitatively different tax schemes is analyzed we show that if the median voter is below the mean then any progressive proposal wins over a regressive one

income taxation uncertainty and stability abstract this paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules it is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo a tax policy is stable if it is a condorcet winner it is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare we show however that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo it is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levels

judging agricultural policies a survey this survey provides a structured picture of 40 years of literature which uses welfare economic tools to judge agricultural policy challenges and developments of normative agricultural policy analysis are discussed in an easily accessible graphical framework it is shown how the literature has gone from examining a very small discrete set of simple policies to a much broader often continuous set of policies that combine policy instruments simultaneously the importance of the pareto criterion used to explore the limits of how government can affect welfare is revealed moreover given the importance of the objective of income redistribution in agricultural policy agricultural economists have often departed from the purely efficiency oriented tradition in economics it is shown that they have tried to incorporate equity considerations by either adding these criteria as constraints to the social welfare function or directly incorporating these criteria in the functional form of the social welfare function

dynamic effects of the order of entry on market share trial penetration and repeat purchases for frequently purchased consumer goods a time series cross sectional analysis of 18 successful later entrants in 8 categories of consumer packaged goods over the period from october 1983 to january 1988 confirms previous empirical findings that after correcting for differences in marketing effort later entrants suffer a long term market share disadvantage new evidence of the penalties associated with later entry are found in statistical estimation of models of cumulative trial first repeat and subsequent repeat purchasing significantly lower asymptotic levels are found in both trial and repeat behavior however based on this data the rate of approach of later entrants to their lower asymptotic performance measures is either equal to or faster than early entrants and provides evidence of a compensating partial effect accrued by later entrants

incomplete markets and government agriculture policy this paper investigates the welfare effects of several stereotypical agricultural policies in an economy with production risk and incomplete contingent claim markets the policies analyzed include target price deficiency payment programs the brannan plan production controls the cochrane plan and land set asides when there is no trading in contingent claims and when economic parameters take on values characteristic of staple food markets the paper finds that ajoint brannan plan production control program is often welfare increasing however production controls on their own tend to be welfare decreasing in addition land set asides are generally welfare reducing even in the presence of a brannan plan these results are derived analytically in a simple equilibrium model they are illustrated with a numerical example which demonstrates that welfare benefits from typical agricultural policy interventions can be large

government target price intervention in economies with incomplete markets the target price deficiency payment program is among economists favorite examples of costly government intervention in competitive markets dubbed the brannan plan after president truman s secretary of agriculture this program pays producers any positive difference between a given target price and the prevailing market price for their output in a world of certainty and perfect competition such an intervention benefits producers hurts consumers as taxpayers and causes a net harberger triangle welfare loss these implications are not only standard fare in economics lecture halls they have become conventional wisdom in contemporary policy discussions for example the 1986 economic report of the president states income support programs by inhibiting the efficient operation of agricultural markets can impose extra costs on consumers and taxpayers that exceed the amount of income transferred to farmers when such losses occur the programs are doing more than redistributing income they are wasting valuable economic resources that could be used to make everyone better off the object of this paper is to show that these conclusions do not extend to a stochastic production economy with incomplete contingent claim markets in the latter setting the distributional and welfare implications of a brannan plan can be reversed producers can be made worse off consumers can be made better off and with nonstochastic compensation all agents can be made better off the conditions under which these outcomes occur include producer risk aversion and low price and income elasticities of demand all well known characteristics of staple food markets in which target price programs are actually employed e g markets for wheat corn and rice like many other equilibrium analyses of resource allocation

when should entrepreneurs expedite or delay opportunity exploitation abstract we theorize on the performance implications of the timing at which entrepreneurs stop exploring their business opportunities and start exploiting them using an optimal stopping approach we characterize the time when exploitation should begin based primarily on when an entrepreneur s ignorance has been sufficiently reduced through knowledge accumulation this ignorance threshold captures a tradeoff between the time needed to increase legitimacy and the necessity to act now to minimize competition changes in legitimacy and competition are based on how entrepreneurs manage their knowledge tacit versus explicit under differing degrees of novelty for the business opportunity these changes in turn impact the performance and timing of opportunity exploitation

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

inequality the politics of redistribution and the tax mix political economy literature generally predicts a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution however there is no clear empirical evidence supporting such a relationship by incorporating an informal sector that evades income taxes we account for the tax base effect that along with the political channel determines the equilibrium redistribution and tax mix we find a non monotonic relationship between inequality and redistribution and explore under which conditions an unequal society relies more heavily on indirect taxes to finance redistribution ultimately this paper shows the limitations of the income tax to finance redistribution in developing countries even when taxes are democratically chosen

optimal price policy and the futures markets abstract because of the short term nature of existing commodity futures contracts optimally hedged producers remain subject to intertemporal income uncertainty but price stabilization may be detrimental because it negates the benefits of intertemporal production flexibility multiperiod futures would be preferred to price stabilization although they would not provide perfect hedging opportunities thus leaving scope for government intervention the optimal price policy requires the support price to be positively correlated to the futures price that prevails when production decisions are made

the advantages of entry in the growth stage of the product life cycle an empirical analysis in this article the authors examine how the stage of product life cycle in which a brand enters affects its sales through brand growth and market response after controlling for the order of entry

firm expansion size spillovers and market dominance in retail chain dynamics we develop and estimate a dynamic game of strategic firm expansion and contraction decisions to study the role of firm size in future profitability and market dominance modeling firm size is important because retail chain dynamics are more richly driven by expansion and contraction than de novo entry or permanent exit additionally anticipated size spillovers may influence the strategies of forward looking firms making it difficult to analyze the effects of size without explicitly accounting for these in the expectations and hence decisions of firms expansion may also be profitable for some firms while detrimental for others thus we explicitly model and allow for heterogeneity in the dynamic link between firm size and profits as well as potential for persistent brand effects through firm specific unobservable factors as a methodological contribution we surmount the hurdle of estimating the model by extending a two step procedure that circumvents solving the game the first stage combines semipar