consistent modeling of s p 500 and vix derivatives abstract this study introduces a model that identifies relationships between stylized features on s p 500 vix and derivatives on vix the paper considers a specification with discontinuous correlated jumps in stock prices and stock price volatility with state dependent arrival intensity and examines how these factors impact vix option pricing and hedging the paper finds strong evidence for jumps in volatility and jumps in returns implicit in vix option data

comment on cole the view that small rms face greater problems in obtaining credit thanlarge rms has a long history going back at least as far as the loan relationshipmodels of hodgeman 1961 and wood 1975 and the credit rationing work ofja ee and modigliani 1969 nevertheless there are few studies that provideor analyze direct evidence that credit is rationed with nonprice terms to rms at the macro level most empirical studies of business credit availability use in direct proxies ranging from early studies such as ja ee and modigliani 1969 who gauged availability by the share of small sized loans among all bank loans to more modern models that point to a role of cash ow as a determinant ofinvestment at the micro level empirical studies have indirectly tested forthe existence of credit rationing by assessing the behavior of loan pricing e g berger and udell 1992 1995 testing whether liquidity or cash owhas a greater impact on investment by smaller rms relative to larger rms e g fazzari et al 1988 or investigating whether smaller rms more heavilyuse expensive trade credit during periods of tight credit e g ja ee 1971 pe tersen and rajan 1994 cole 1998 lls a void in the literature on credit availability by testing how rm characteristics a ect a small rm s likelihood of experiencing a loan denialusing a unique cross section data set that provides direct evidence of nonpricecredit rationing this paper nds that preexisting nancial service relationshipswith a lender have a positive e ect on the probability of loan approvals con sistent with prior studies arguing that banks gain information about credit riskfrom monitoring borrower deposit activity e g black 1975 fama 1985 nakamura 1993 in addition results indicate that much of the e ect of

monetary transmission through bank loans or bank liabilities interest in the transmission of monetary fluctuations to real output has dominated macroeconomics since at least the eighteenth century since then many observers have noted the tendency of a monetary expansion to be followed initially by an expansion of real output and later by an increase in prices while the reason for the long run price change is well understood understanding the short run impact of money on nominal output remains an active unresolved research topic most theoretical models explain the transmission of monetary fluctuations to real output as a consequence of sticky prices or expectations the stickiness is either due to informational imperfections or to contractual rigidities while the policy implications of the two types of stickiness differ both types of model predict a transitory response of real output to a shock in nominal money balances neither the informational imperfection nor the contractual rigidity story is completely compelling and both rely on the central role played by movements in real balances and perceived real interest rates yet for thirty five years following world war ii neither significant movements in the anticipated real rate nor large interest elasticities of spending were apparent despite this the empirical correlation of money and output fluctuations has been found in most time periods and countries consequently the need for alternative explanations of monetary transmission or a credible reverse causation story remains strong

hedging the black swan conditional heteroskedasticity and tail dependence in s p500 and vix the recent financial crisis has accentuated the fact that extreme outcomes have been overlooked and not dealt with adequately while extreme value theories have existed for a long time the multivariate variant is difficult to handle in the financial markets due to the prevalent heteroskedasticity embedded in most financial time series and the complex extremal dependence that cannot be conveniently captured by a single structure moreover most of the existing approaches are based on a limiting argument in which all variables become large at the same rate in this paper we show how the conditional approach of heffernan and tawn 2004 can be implemented to model extremal dependence between financial time series we use a hedging example based on vix futures to demonstrate the flexibility and superiority of the conditional approach against the conventional ols regression approach

why is bank debt senior a theory of asymmetry and claim priority based on influence costs this theory can explain why bank debt is universally senior consistent with the presence of conflict lawyers and absolute priority violations in financial distress better organized banks would more strongly contest priority in financial distress if they were junior because deterrence can reduce creditors total expenses in a priority contest the ex post stronger lobbyist litigant should be senior ex ante for equivalent reasons the theory can advise when public debt should be senior to trade credit and or implicit contracts and can even suggest one rationale for the absolute priority rule apr this article further shows that chapter hi creditor reimbursement procedures can lower overall costs article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the finance growth nexus evidence from bank branch deregulation this paper provides evidence that financial markets can directly affect economic growth by studying the relaxation of bank branch restrictions in the united states we find that the rates of real per capita growth in income and output increase significantly following intrastate branch reform we also argue that the observed changes in growth are the result of changes in the banking system improvements in the quality of bank lending not increased volume of bank lending appear to be responsible for faster growth

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

pricing vxx option with default risk and positive volatility skew abstract this paper proposes and makes a comparative study of alternative models for vxx option pricing factors such as mean reversion jumps default risk and positive volatility skew are taken into consideration in particular default risk is characterized by jump to default framework and the positive volatility skew issue is addressed by stochastic volatility of volatility and jumps daily calibration is conducted and comparative study of the models is performed to check whether they properly fit market prices and generate reasonable positive volatility skews and deltas overall jump to default extended lrj model with positive correlated stochastic volatility called jdlrjsv in the paper serves as the best model in all the required aspects

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

the incidence of secured debt evidence from the small business community critics claim that theories of secured debt fail to explain the widespread use of collateral because they incorrectly predict when a loan will be secured this paper provides the first rigorous statistical test of the transaction cost models of secured debt data from two samples of over 1 000 small business loans generally support the common set of predictions of these theories the incidence of secured debt is positively related to probability of default loan size loan maturity and marketability of assets changes in the legal and economic environment also alter firms decisions regarding the pledging of collateral

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

an economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments abstract an economic rationale is provided for the competitive equilibrium deployment of commitment and usage fees in loan commitment pricing it is shown that under perfect information assessing both fees rather than just one permits optimal risk sharing when the borrower is privately informed about its probability of future commitment utilization commitment and usage fees can be used to induce borrowers to identify themselves by self selection through contract choice the equilibrium characterized here is dissipative and thus raises the usual existence questions which are addressed in the paper

commercial paper bank reserve requirements and the informational role of loan commitments abstract an explanation is provided of the often observed purchase of back up bank loan commitments by corporations immediately preceding their sale of dealer placed commercial paper since loan commitments are typically viewed as hedging instruments our paper explains why a risk neutral corporation would purchase this type of instrument and how it is priced it is assumed that while firms know their own credit risks neither banks nor the paper market can distinguish between some credit applicants we show that the purchase of a commitment can identify these firms to the market the equilibrium is partially revealing of the firms with unobservable quality those with higher quality identify themselves by purchasing commitments while those with lower quality sell unbacked paper and are pooled together unbacked paper is sold also by firms whose quality is observable unidentified firms in the lowest quality range do not sell commercial paper

equilibrium loan pricing under the bank client relationship abstract we determine the loan interest rate policy of a lender who is better informed about a client than other potential lenders the informational advantage possessed by the informed lender derives from the durability of information acquired as a result of an extant relationship given heterogeneous potential loan rate offers to the client by competitive lenders and client search costs the incumbent lender s policy of loan interest rate offers is examined we show that the optimal loan rate will exceed the incumbent lender s cost of funds and will exceed the average offer of competing lenders the potential lenders will offer loan rates that are exceeded by their cost of funds implying immediate losses in order to attract the client and to thereby earn expected profits in the future finally we show that the expected remaining duration of a lender client relationship is decreasing in the existing length of the relationship thus clients that have been with a particular lender longer will be more likely to leave and establish a relationship with another lender

implied volatility functions empirical tests derman and kani 1994 dupire 1994 and rubinstein 1994 hypothesize that asset return volatility is a deterministic function of asset price and time and develop a deterministic volatility function dvf option valuation model that has the potential of fitting the observed cross section of option prices exactly using s p 500 options from june 1988 through december 1993 we examine the predictive and hedging performance of the dvf option valuation model and find it is no better than an ad hoc procedure that merely smooths black scholes 1973 implied volatilities across exercise prices and times to expiration

comment on bergemann and hege dirk bergemann and ulrich hege examine in this paper the reasons why venture capitalists provide funds to entrepreneurs in successive financing rounds or stages this is an interesting analysis of one of the most important mechanisms that venture capitalists employ to control entrepreneurs an issue that surely deserves greater theoretical and empirical attention the authors approach to these issues is a creative and novel one at the same time some assumptions and predictions of the model seem quite at odds with the empirical evidence about venture capital investments in this discussion i will first briefly summarize the key features and predictions of the paper i will then highlight several of my concerns with the model the discussion concludes with some more general thoughts about the rationales for the staging of venture capital investments in young firms the paper depicts the interactions between a single entrepreneur and a venture investor the entrepreneur who has no financial resources must turn to a venture capitalist for funding it is assumed that the entrepreneur initially has the bargaining power in the negotiation the large number of potential venture investors are not diaerentiated dynamic interactions between several venture capitalists in diaerent financing rounds of the type analyzed by admati and pfleiderer 1994 are not considered in this model the project whose quality is initially uncertain can turn out to be one of two types good or bad the good projects are not revealed immediately rather in each period there is some probability that the project will be revealed to be good and generate a fixed return at which point the venture investor s involvement ends the probability of a successful outcome is increasing with

market structure and discrimination the case of small businesses this paper examines bank market structure to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small businesses the authors analyze credit application and denial rates loans outstanding and interest rates across demographic groups this set of variables in combination with information on local bank market structure helps them distinguish among borrower preferences lender tastes and inadequate lender information as likely causes of differences in credit market experiences of small business operators from distinct demographic groups the authors find that white men and women can expect similar treatment in credit markets with some benefits to female owned firms located in concentrated banking markets minorities by contrast fare worse than whites moreover by appealing to becker s 1957 classic theories we find some clear evidence to support the view that prejudicial discrimination is at least partly to blame

bargaining and strategic search abstract this paper specifies an alternative type of switching friction in a model of sequential bargaining to that suggested by shaked and sutton 1984 an imperfect and costly search technology gives the current insider a bargaining advantage over alternative partners for the firm where all potential partnerships generate the same rent search has a purely strategic value

trade credit and informational asymmetry commonly used trade credit terms implicitly define a high interest rate that operates as an efficient screening device where information about buyer default risk is asymmetrically held by offering trade credit a seller can identify prospective defaults more quickly than if financial institutions were the sole providers of short term financing the information is valuable in cases where the seller has made nonsalvageable investments in buyers since it enables the seller to take actions to protect such investments traditional explanations for the widespread use of trade credit fall into two categories the financing motive holds that capital market imperfections enable sellers to finance buyer purchases at lower cost than financial institutions ferris 4 argues that trade credit provides payment flexibility and thus reduces the overall need for buyers and sellers to maintain precautionary balances emery 3 contends that noncompetitive rents of financial institutions can be circumvented by sellers and buyers through provision of trade credit however the financing motive is not sufficient to explain why small suppliers offer trade credit the wide cross sectional variation in terms or why large buyers often take the prompt payment discount late a second set of explanations is best described as pricing motivations for trade credit provision nadiri 10 argues that availability of alternative payment terms can increase product demand but does not indicate why the offered terms could not be duplicated by financial institutions schwartz and whitcomb 14 argue that trade credit is used to circumvent robinson patman and similar prohibitions on price discrimination the correctness of this position depends on the charge to users of trade credit exceeding the cost of provision by the seller although the explanation is possible in principle an empirical question remains as to why variations in actual credit terms appear to be based on product market rather than buyer characteristics the literature also contains analyses of the impact of changing macroeconomic conditions on trade credit terms and aggregate credit flows schwartz 13 for example employs a financing motive for trade credit to conclude that restrictive monetary policy can be partly mitigated by liberalization of trade credit terms by firms with relatively easy access to capital markets however a microeconomic

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

bank credit commitments credit rationing and monetary policy when loan needs are uncertain and bankruptcy is costly contracts resembling bank credit commitments dominate ordinary debt contracts the fees charged on commitments reduce bankruptcy risk by smoothing out borrowers loan payments reduced bankruptcy risk entitles borrowers to larger loans thereby reducing the risk of quantity rationing even if commitments reduce rationing risk monetary policy is not necessarily weaker under commitment finance a rise in lenders cost of funds perhaps reflecting a monetary contraction can reduce the expected value of a project more under a commitment than under an ordinary debt contract copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

matching search and bargaining abstract first the paper incorporates search for alternative opportunities into a model of strategic bargaining second this search and bargaining model is embedded in a market matching model the solutions are presented in a manner that clarifies the role of the search abilities and the details of the bargaining procedure in the determination of the outcomes the predictions of the model are contrasted with the related literature the main accomplishment is the attainment of a manageable model which is still rich enough to grasp important differences between environments which are not captured by the standard matching models

endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives if banks have an informational monopoly about their clients borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders the fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks but provided banks retain an initial informational advantage their current profits are raised by the borrowers higher effort this trade off determines the banks willingness to share information their decision affects credit market competition interest rates volume of lending and social welfare article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

is relationship lending special evidence from credit file data in germany the german financial market is often characterized as a bank based system with strong bank customer relationships the corresponding notion of a housebank is closely related to the theoretical idea of relationship lending it is the objective of this paper to provide a direct comparison between housebanks and normal banks as to their credit policy therefore we analyze a new data set representing a random sample of borrowers drawn from the credit portfolios of five leading german banks over a period of five years we use credit file data rather than industry survey data and thus focus the analysis on information that is directly related to actual credit decisions in particular we use bank internal borrower rating data to evaluate borrower quality and the bank s own assessment of its housebank status to control for information intensive relationships the major results of our study support the view that housebanks are able to establish a distinct behavioral pattern consistent with the idea of long term commitment we find that housebanks do provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings with respect to loan pricing we find no evidence for intra or intertemporal price differentiation related to housebanking

bond covenants and delegated monitoring this paper examines alternative contracting arrangements available to a firm seeking to finance an investment project the authors consider the choice between loan contracts with covenants based on noisy indicators of the firm s financial health and loan contracts enforced by a monitoring specialist in one interpretation the specialist is a financial intermediary the firm s choice is shown to depend upon the firm s credit rating the accuracy of financial indicators of the firm s condition the loss from premature liquidation of the firm s project and the cost of monitoring

an analysis of compensation in the u s venture capital partnership abstract venture capital limited partnerships are an attractive arena to study cross sectional and time series variations in compensation schemes we empirically examine 419 partnerships the compensation of new and smaller funds displays considerably less sensitivity to performance and less variation than that of other funds the fixed base component of compensation is higher for younger and smaller firms we observe no relation between incentive compensation and performance our evidence is consistent with a learning model in which the pay of new venture capitalists is less sensitive to performance because reputational concerns induce them to work hard

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

the world stock markets under geopolitical risks dependence structure this paper reveals joint stochastic behaviours of the world s stock markets and geopolitical risk by a copula approach for the 37 world s stock markets over the period of june 1997 to december 2017 the various bivariate copulas show the different degrees of tail dependences and rank correlations the differences between overall geopolitical risk index and action related geopolitical risk index lie in the higher tail dependence with overall geopolitical risk index the dominancy of concordant movements of stock market indexes with overall geopolitical risk and that of discordant movements of stock market indexes with action related geopolitical risk index the results illustrate that action related geopolitical risk is more often adversely related to the world s stock market performances with less tail dependence

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

secured lending and default risk equilibrium analysis policy implications and empirical results the authors examine collateral in a competitive equilibrium in which borrowers can choose hidden actions and may additionally possess hidden knowledge apart from explaining the widespread use of collateral despite deadweight costs they show that an increase in the riskless interest rate causes equilibrium loan rates and collateral requirements to increase a decline in the deadweight costs of collateral reduces the equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard and an increase in the borrower s project size reduces equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard some of these predictions are tested and found to be supported by the data copyright 1991 by royal economic society

how important is the correlation between returns and volatility in a stochastic volatility model empirical evidence from pricing and hedging in the s p 500 index options market abstract this paper examines the importance of allowing for correlation between returns and volatility in a continuous time stochastic volatility option pricing model specifically it tests the closed form stochastic volatility model of heston review of financial studies 6 1993 327 343 that allows for non zero correlation in terms of pricing and hedging options on the s p 500 index it is found that non zero correlation in the stochastic volatility model leads to significant improvements in mispricing of out of the money options and overall pricing performance compared to if correlation is constrained to be zero in terms of hedging non zero correlation results in significantly lower hedging errors for out of the money options

trade credit and credit rationing asymmetric information between banks and firms can preclude financing of valuable projects trade credit alleviates this problem by incorporating in the lending relation the private information held by suppliers about their customers incentive compatibility conditions prevent collusion between two of the agents e g the buyer and the seller against the third e g the bank consistent with the empirical findings of petersen and rajan 1995 firms without relationships with banks resort more to trade credit and sellers with greater ability to generate cash lows provide more trade credit finally small firms react to monetary contractions by using trade credit consistent with the empirical results of nilsen 1994 article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

stabilization syndication and pricing of ipos we argue that in the after market trading of an ipo the underwriting syndicate by standing ready to buy back shares at the offer price price stabilization compensates uninformed investors ex post for the adverse selection cost they face in bidding for ipos this domi nates ex ante compensation by underpricing the reason is that stabilization exploits ex post information about investor demand whereas underpricing must be based on ex ante infor mation however liquidity and syndication costs constrain the use of stabilization which in equilibrium generates some underpricing as well we develop a model that formalizes this intuition and generates several empirical implications

venture capital contracting under asymmetric information abstract a model is developed wherein entrepreneurs and venture capitalists contract under symmetric information asymmetric information may arise following first contracting it is shown this can lead to debt infeasibility and preferred equity usage control is linked to choice between common and preferred results are robust to multiperiod extensions roles of convertible preferred retained equity and debt in ipos are considered an empirical survey of venture capital firms is presented demonstrating preferred dominates in early financing debt and common are used far less generally at later stages under lower probability of asymmetric information these results agree with the theory s implications

does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ evidence on specialization in private debt contracting this paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private market corporate lending adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information problematic firms however finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers particularly more leveraged borrowers evidence supports both regulatory and reputation based explanations for this specialization in passing we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies

a model of the commercial loan rate this paper explores the theoretical and empirical determinants of the commercial loan rate charged by commercial banks based on a model of financial intermediary behavior which assumes monopolistic competition in asset and liability markets the model incorporates the constraint that banks must maintain at least a minimum quantity of bonds in asset portfolios equations are estimated on a time series basis to explain the behavior of commercial loan rates over the period 1953 to 1980 the evidence appears consistent with the hypothesis that commercial banks operate in a market characterized by imperfect competition and that they explicitly set loan rates the development of large scale econometric models has focused attention on the operation of the commercial loan market because of the importance of commercial loan activity in the transmission of monetary policy moreover it is commonly accepted that the quantity of commercial loans or changes in these loans has an important influence on the holding of free reserves by commercial banks and this implies that the commercial loan market has an effect on the supply of money 2 nevertheless the determinants of commercial loan rates have drawn relatively little analytical attention previous work on the commercial loan market has generally focused on the question of whether this market is characterized by credit rationing 3 most studies assume that the commercial loan market is generally competitive but at times the commercial loan rate does not clear the market the quantity of loans transacted is constrained by the supply function and commercial banks engage in nonprice rationing of customers a corollary of this rationing hypothesis is that events in the deposit market have an important influence on the quantity of commercial loans 4 the purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of the commercial

the crash of ʼ87 was it expected the evidence from options markets transactions prices of s p 500 futures options over 1985 1987 are examined for evidence of expectations prior to october 1987 of an impending stock market crash first it is shown that out of the money puts became unusually expensive during the year preceding the crash second a model is derived for pricing american options on jump diffusion processes with systematic jump risk the jump diffusion parameters implicit in options prices indicate that a crash was expected and that implicit distributions were negatively skewed during october 1986 to august 1987 both approaches indicate no strong crash fears during the 2 months immediately preceding the crash attempts to explain what caused the stock market crashes around the world in october 1987 have suffered from the paucity of major economic developments occurring around that time that could have triggered the crashes shifting expectations regarding monetary policy foreign investors fears of a dollar decline increasing riskiness of assets none of these appeared major enough if present at all to explain the magnitude of the crashes and although portfolio insurance strategies could conceivably magnify the effects of a jump in fundamentals the initiating jump in fundamentals appears to be lacking

competition risk neutrality and loan commitments abstract we rationalize fixed rate loan commitments forward credit contracting with options in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutrality future interest rates are random but there are no transactions costs borrowers finance projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect project payoffs credit contract design by the bank is the outcome of a non cooperative nash game between the bank and the borrower the initial formal analysis is basically in two steps first we show that the only spot credit market nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result in welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank s informational handicap second we show that loan commitments because of their ability to weaken the link between the offering bank s expected profit and the loan interest rate enable the complete elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome that strictly pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium perhaps our most surprising result is that if the borrower has some initial liquidity it is better for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside equity in conjunction with spot borrowing

the jump component of s p 500 volatility and the vix index much research has investigated the differences between option implied volatilities and econometric model based forecasts implied volatility is a market determined forecast in contrast to model based forecasts that employ some degree of smoothing of past volatility to generate forecasts implied volatility has the potential to reflect information that a model based forecast could not this paper considers two issues relating to the informational content of the s p 500 vix implied volatility index first whether it subsumes information on how historical jump activity contributed to the price volatility followed by whether the vix reflects any incremental information pertaining to future jump activity relative to model based forecasts it is found that the vix index both subsumes information relating to past jump contributions to total volatility and reflects incremental information pertaining to future jump activity this issue has not been examined previously and expands our understanding of how option markets form their volatility forecasts

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements loan contracts with provision for collateral are of two general types in one the collateral may be an existing asset of the borrowing firm which is pledged to a lender in the event of default in this case collateral does not increase the assets that the borrower would lose if there is default since all the borrower s assets are attachable therefore the expected marginal cost to the borrower of providing an additional unit of collateral includes principally transactions costs associated with the collateral l this describes the usual type of commercial loan arrangement with the collateral being either equipment real estate accounts receivable or inventories in the other type of loan contract the collateral is an additional asset that is given up by the borrower if there is default that is in addition to the usual assets that are available to its lenders the borrower assigns as collateral to a creditor an asset that would normally not be legally attachable this arrangement is more common in small business loans that are secured by a personal asset e g a house of the entrepreneur likewise debt issued by a legally separate subsidiary may be secured by an asset of the parent firrn in these cases the expected marginal cost to the borrower the owner manager of the small firm or the parent corporation in the latter example of providing an additional unit of collateral

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy abstract much important work has informed us of rates of return earned by venture capitalists the importance of venture capitalists to the going public process and the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate deals this paper seeks to add to the literature by testing hypotheses based upon both the finance and strategic management literature regarding certain venture capitalist investment practices venture capitalists seek to control or manage risk driscoll 1974 macmillan siegel and subbanarasimha 1985 financing structure and investment strategy provide several means for venture capitalists to do this tools available to the venture capitalist include portfolio diversification to spread risk across different industries firms or hot cold ipo markets to minimize unsystematic or investment specific risk information sharing networking and specialization can also be used to control unsystematic risk several hypotheses are developed from these conflicting perspectives data used to test the hypotheses are derived from responses to a survey of venture capitalists three hundred surveys were mailed to venture capitalists 98 or 32 7 returned usable responses portfolio diversification is a well known means to control risk exposure by reducing unsystematic or specific risks however bygrave 1987 1988 as well as financial intermediation theorists argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization is useful for controlling risk as well as for gaining access to networks information and deal flow from other venture investors the analyses of this paper build upon bygrave s work we construct more rigorous tests to resolve the conflict between the diversification and information sharing hypotheses our hypothesis tests were usually resolved in favor of the information sharing view for example venture capitalists in the sample that were heavily involved in seed round financing were diversified across fewer numbers of firms and industries further evidence in favor of information sharing is seen in investment patterns across different financing stages diversification would imply maintaining a portfolio of investments across the different investment stages the information sharing specialization view would argue that it is best to stay focused on a single stage or several connected stages the empirical evidence from the sample once again favors the specialization perspective this research provides information of use to venture capitalists as they seek information on how best to control risk to entrepreneurs as they learn of the factors venture capitalists consider in determining their investment strategy and to academicians as such studies provide insight to general industry practice and thus help to form the basis of classroom discussion and future research endeavors

option prices implied price processes and stochastic volatility this paper characterizes all continuous price processes that are consistent with current option prices this extends derman and kani 1994 dupire 1994 1997 and rubinstein 1994 who only consider processes with deterministic volatility our characterization implies a volatility forecast that does not require a specific model only current option prices we show how arbitrary volatility processes can be adjusted to fit current option prices exactly just as interest rate processes can be adjusted to fit bond prices exactly the procedure works with many volatility models is fast to calibrate and can price exotic options efficiently using familiar lattice techniques

bank regulation and the credit crunch abstract this study investigates the direct link between regulatory enforcement actions and the shrinkage of bank loans to sectors likely to be bank dependent we partition the shrinkage due to loan supply into the component due to explicit regulatory enforcement actions and that due to a voluntary response by bank management to low capital to asset ratios we find that banks with formal actions shrink at a significantly faster rate than those without even after controlling for differences in capital to asset ratios furthermore much of the reduced lending has been in categories containing primarily loans to bank dependent borrowers

angel financing and public policy an overview abstract within the past few years public efforts have sought to encourage individual or angel investors this article provides an overview of the motivations for these efforts it assesses the underlying challenges that the financing of young growth firms pose the ways that specialized financial intermediaries address them and the rationales for public efforts to encourage angel investors the final section raises a set of questions about the practical implementation of these efforts

a transactions theory of trade credit use this paper derives a transactions theory of trade credit use from the motives of trading partners to economize on the joint costs of exchange in the formal analysis uncertain delivery time is used to generate a demand by firms to hold inventories of both goods and money trade credit is viewed as a mechanism that separates the exchange of money from the uncertainty present in the exchange of goods by forewarning both trading partners of the timing of money flows credit permits a reduction in precautionary money holdings and the more effective management of net money accumulations

the credit effects of monetary policy evidence using loan commitments in addition to the usual channels monetary policy may affect spending by changing the supply of bank loans and the creditworthiness of borrowers this paper tests for these credit effects using a contractual difference across commercial bank loans the author finds that bank loans not made under a commitment slow after tight policy while loans under commitment accelerate or are unchanged this divergence coincides with reports of tighter credit by lenders and by small firms suggesting the divergence reflects a reduction in the supply of credit to the firms without commitments rather than a reduction in their demand for loans

who benefits from secondary market price stabilization of iops abstract initial public offerings that receive secondary market price support from their underwriters are characterized by severely attenuated selling by small quantity presumably retail traders and more aggressive selling by large quantity presumably institutional traders the increase in institutional trading is concentrated in the first day of trading while the attenuation of retail trading persists this pattern exists in spite of the likelihood that retail investors receive relatively large initial allocations of fully priced stabilized offers thus the evidence is consistent with institutional investors being the primary beneficiaries of price stabilization efforts and with the use of penalty bids to constrain retail selling activity

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a model of venture capitalist investment activity the paper describes the activities of venture capitalists as an orderly process involving five sequential steps these are 1 deal origination the processes by which deals enter into consideration as investment prospects 2 deal screening a delineation of key policy variables which delimit investment prospects to a manageable few for in depth evaluation 3 deal evaluation the assessment of perceived risk and expected return on the basis of a weighting of several characteristics of the prospective venture and the decision whether or not to invest as determined by the relative levels of perceived risk and expected return 4 deal structuring the negotiation of the price of the deal namely the equity relinquished to the investor and the covenants which limit the risk of the investor 5 post investment activities the assistance to the venture in the areas of recruiting key executives strategic planning locating expansion financing and orchestrating a merger acquisition or public offering 41 venture capitalists provided data on a total of 90 deals which had received serious consideration in their firms the questionnaire measured the mechanism of initial contact between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the venture s industry the stage of financing and product development ratings of the venture on 23 characteristics an assessment of the potential return and perceived risk and the decision vis i vis whether to invest the modal venture represented in the database was a start up in the electronics industry with a production capability in place and seeking 1 million median in outside financing there is a high degree of cross referrals between venture capitalists particularly for the purposes of locating co investors factor analysis reduced the 23 characteristics of the deal to five underlying dimensions namely 1 market attractiveness size growth and access to customers 2 product differentiation uniqueness patents technical edge profit margin 3 managerial capabilities skills in marketing management finance and the references of the entrepreneur 4 environmental threat resistance technology life cycle barriers to competitive entry insensitivity to business cycles and down side risk protection 5 cash out potential future opportunities to realize capital gains by merger acquisition or public offering the results of regression analyses showed expected return to be determined by market attractiveness and product differentiation r2 0 22 perceived risk is determined by managerial capabilities and environmental threat resistance r2 0 33 finally a discriminant analysis correctly predicted in 89 4 of the cases whether or not a venture capitalist was willing to commit funds to the deal on the basis of the expected return and perceived risk the reactions of seven venture capitalists who reviewed the model s specification were used to test its validity

bank capital shocks dynamic effects on securities loans and capital abstract we used quarterly data for individual banks to estimate recent dynamic responses to bank capital shocks while it took bank capital and securities only one year to adjust to capital shocks liabilities and most loan categories took two to three years to complete their adjustments compared with those in the late 1980s capital shocks were twice as large and portfolio responses to capital shocks tended to be more rapid in the early 1990s larger banks adjusted each component of their portfolios faster than smaller banks capital shocks caused banks with capital shortfalls to contract more and more quickly in the 1990s than they had in the 1980s

an empirical comparison of continuous time models of implied volatility indices abstract we explore the ability of alternative popular continuous time diffusion and jump diffusion processes to capture the dynamics of implied volatility indices over time the performance of the various models is assessed under both econometric and financial metrics to this end data are employed from major european and american implied volatility indices and the rapidly growing cboe volatility futures market we find that the addition of jumps is necessary to capture the evolution of implied volatility indices under both metrics mean reversion is of second order importance though the results are consistent across the various metrics markets and construction methodologies

pure jump models for pricing and hedging vix derivatives abstract recent non parametric statistical analysis of high frequency vix data todorov and tauchen 2011 reveals that vix dynamics is a pure jump semimartingale with infinite jump activity and infinite variation to our best knowledge existing models in the literature for pricing and hedging vix derivatives do not have these features this paper fills this gap by developing a novel class of parsimonious pure jump models with such features for vix based on the additive time change technique proposed in li et al 2016a li et al 2016b we time change the 3 2 diffusion by a class of additive subordinators with infinite activity yielding pure jump markov semimartingales with infinite activity and infinite variation these processes have time and state dependent jumps that are mean reverting and are able to capture stylized features of vix our models take the initial term structure of vix futures as input and are analytically tractable for pricing vix futures and european options via eigenfunction expansions through calibration exercises we show that our model is able to achieve excellent fit for the vix implied volatility surface which typically exhibits very steep skews comparison to two other models in terms of calibration reveals that our model performs better both in sample and out of sample we explain the ability of our model to fit the volatility surface by evaluating the matching of moments implied from market vix option prices to hedge vix options we develop a dynamic strategy which minimizes instantaneous jump risk at each rebalancing time while controlling transaction cost its effectiveness is demonstrated through a simulation study on hedging bermudan style vix options

some hypotheses about risk in venture capital investing abstract venture capital investing differs in important respects from investment decisions involving the securities of fortune 500 companies or decisions to purchase established companies which are generally made in accord with widely recognized financial models investing in new ventures involves a high level of uncertainty as well as a high risk of failure venture capital investing is characterized by high variability in the outcomes of new ventures and in the performance of venture capital portfolios venture capital investing decisions are complicated by a general lack of quantifiable financial and market data for early stage ventures and investment decisions remain hostage to unanticipated competitors market shifts and financial cycles some observers have suggested that venture capital investment decisions are primarily subjective assessments while the question of risk in venture capital investing has been addressed on an ad hoc basis in several empirical studies there has been little effort to develop a theoretical framework of risk perceptions and risk reduction strategies despite differences in investor experience investment preferences and tolerance for risk venture capital managers share many common perceptions of the risks involved in investing in new ventures and the distribution of those risks over the venture capital funded phase of development venture capital managers also utilize many common behaviors and strategies in adapting to these risks these perceptions and reactions to risk in investing and strategies for controlling risk can in theory be used to construct a behavioral framework that can predict how venture capital managers will behave in choosing between various investment opportunities in order to minimize risk and to maximize potential returns in an attempt to begin to identify various elements of such a behavioral framework of venture capital reactions to risk the authors have drawn upon psychological risk theory of decision making under uncertainty including classic expected utility theory later modifications to that theory by kahneman and tversky 1979 and coombs and huang s 1970 portfolio approach to risk that are applicable to venture capital investing these expected behaviors to risk have been used in conjunction with empirical studies of venture capital investment and portfolio outcomes distributions of investments within portfolios and venture capitalist perceptions of risk to propose nine hypotheses about how venture capital managers behave in making investment decisions these hypotheses include differences in variation and magnitude of returns for early stage versus later stage ventures explanations of how risk distributions change over the stagewise development of new ventures differences in the behavior of aggressive versus conservative investors in screening investment prospects and strategies utilizing a lower ideal level of risk to reduce the chances of achieving negative or sub normal final portfolio returns

determinants of venture capital firms preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments abstract competition is intensifying in the venture capital industry in the u s the number of venture capital firms vcfs tripled from 1980 to 1989 supplier power in the form of institutional investors such as pension funds continues to grow foreign venture capital has grown to the extent that commitments to foreign vcfs exceeded domestic commitments in both 1988 and 1989 further alternative sources of financing for entrepreneurs such as individual investors angels corporations and strategic alliances are increasingly viable options vcfs face pressure to seek lower risk investments improve rates of return and provide value to new venture development surprisingly few scholarly studies have begun to investigate the strategies vcfs are aiming to implement in order to deal with this increasing pressure building on the premise that decisions regarding product market scope are a key component of firm strategy hofer and schendel 1978 this study examined 169 domestic vcfs in order to identify factors that might explain variations in preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments the sample drawn from california massachusetts and texas represented about 27 of all u s based vcfs in 1987 the year in which the data were gathered in terms of the total size of investment portfolio the average for these 169 vcfs was 69 8 million which is statistically indistinguishable from the u s average of 65 million results indicate that 1 vcfs specializing in early stage ventures prefer less industry diversity and narrower geographic scope relative to other vcfs 2 corporate vcfs i e those owned by non financial corporations prefer less industry diversity but broader geographic scope relative to non corporate vcfs 3 larger vcfs prefer greater industry diversity and broader geographic scope than do smaller vcfs and 4 provision of small business investment companies sbic financing by the vcf has no impact on preferences regarding industry diversity but is associated with a preference for narrower geographic scope one implication of these results is that vcfs in the u s are not homogeneous as regards the intended product market scope of their portfolios this in turn holds implications not only for vcfs but also for their suppliers limited partners buyers entrepreneurs and policy makers vcfs can no longer rely on haphazard investment schemes they need to attract investors by virtue of the benefits offered by their portfolio strategy and they need to attract superior investments via offering valueadded services and know how potential investors in venture capital will want to examine for example the impact on risk and return of investing smaller amounts in several vcfs at one extreme versus making one large investment in a very diversified vcf at the other extreme the results of this and other studies suggest that outcomes timing magnitude and riskiness of returns of choosing such alternatives will vary widely and will depend in great part on the strategies of the vcfs involved it will not be possible for investors to make wise choices without a full examination of their own objectives and of the profiles of vcfs entrepreneurs with the most attractive ventures have alternative sources of financing to consider and should weigh the benefits of being financed and supported by various vcfs as part of the vcfs portfolios knowing a vcf s preferences regarding product market scope improves their chances of approaching and selecting the right fit and for those entrepreneurs with a narrower set of options such knowledge may make the difference between receiving and not receiving financing in a timely manner finally policy makers may be able to make use of knowledge of the forces that influence the investment strategies of vcfs presently concerns for policy makers may include the gap in seed capital increased foreign presence in the u s market and the export of promising innovative technology via alliances with foreign firms all of these factors are influenced by the strategies pursued by vcfs as they jockey for position in the increasingly competitive venture capital market

did risk based capital allocate bank credit and cause a credit crunch in the united states this paper examines the reallocation of bank credit from loans to securities in the early 1990s using data on virtually all u s banks from 1979 to 1992 the authors investigate implementation of risk based capital and other regulatory and nonregulatory changes as possible causes of a supply driven credit crunch the main empirical implication of these credit crunch hypotheses that the reallocation of credit would be most associated with low capital high risk banks generally is not consistent with the data much of the reallocation is associated with demand side factors but it is difficult to differentiate cleanly among these factors copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

valuing futures and options on volatility abstract this paper presents simple closed form expressions for volatility futures and option prices and examines their implications for the characteristics of these securities we show that the properties of these volatility derivatives are fundamentally different from those of conventional option and futures contracts this analysis also provides insights into the role that volatility derivatives may play in managing and hedging volatility risk in financial markets

entrepreneurial ability venture investments and risk sharing a number of issues that relate to the desirability and implications of new venture financing are examined within a principal agent framework that captures the essence of the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists the model suggests 1 as long as the skill levels of entrepreneurs are common knowledge all will choose to involve venture capital investors since the risk sharing provided by outside participation dominates the agency relationship that is created 2 the less able entrepreneurs will choose to involve venture capitalists whereas the more profitable ventures will be developed without external participation because of the adverse selection problem associated with asymmetric information 3 if a costly signal is available that conveys the entrepreneur s ability some entrepreneurs will invest in such a signal and then sell to investors these entrepreneurs however need not be the more able ones the implications for new venture financing of these and other findings are discussed and illustrated by example

angel investors and the market for angel investments abstract the market for angel capital where individuals provide risk capital directly to small private often start up firms operates in almost total obscurity very little is known about the market s size scope the type of firms that raise angel capital and the types of individuals that provide it in this paper i present evidence on the angel market gathered from my field research which has involved interviews with more than a dozen angel investors in the dallas fort worth area the angel market appears to be a very heterogeneous and localized market with that qualification in mind i present some common characteristics of the angels i interviewed and how they select and monitor their investments i pay particular attention to how they address adverse selection and moral hazard problems i compare their behavior with venture capital limited partnerships in the more formal market for venture capital

a remark on lin and chang s paper consistent modeling of s p 500 and vix derivatives abstract lin and chang 2009 lin and chang 2010 establish a vix futures and option pricing theory when modeling s p 500 index by using a stochastic volatility process with asset return and volatility jumps in this note we prove that lin and chang s formula is not an exact solution of their pricing equation more generally we show that the characteristic function of their pricing equation cannot be exponentially affine as proposed by them furthermore their formula cannot serve as a reasonable approximation using the heston 1993 model as a special case we demonstrate that lin and chang formula misprices vix futures and options in general and the error can become substantially large

vix option pricing and cboe vix term structure a new methodology for volatility derivatives valuation abstract this study integrates cboe vix term structure and vix futures to simplify vix option pricing in multifactor models exponential and hump volatility functions with one to three factor models of the vix evolution are used to examine their pricing for vix options across strikes and maturities the results show that using exponential volatility functions presents an effective choice as pricing models for vix calls whereas hump volatility functions provide efficient out of sample valuation for most vix puts in particular with deep in the money and deep out of the money pricing errors for calls can be further reduced with a two factor model

point process models for extreme returns harnessing implied volatility forecasting the risk of extreme losses is an important issue in the management of financial risk there has been a great deal of research examining how option implied volatilities iv can be used to forecast asset return volatility however the role of iv in the context of predicting extreme risk has received relatively little attention the potential benefit of iv in forecasting extreme risk is considered within a range of models beginning with the traditional garch based approach along with a number of novel point process models univariate models where iv is included as an exogenous variable are considered along with a novel bivariate approach where extreme movements in iv are treated as another point process it is found that in the context of forecasting value at risk the bivariate models produce the most accurate forecasts across a wide range of scenarios

some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing this paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988 while commercial loan rates are sticky consistent with rationing this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory in addition the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing overall the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon

new resources and new ideas private equity for small businesses abstract private equity for rapidly growing small business is raised primarily from the organized venture capital market and the informal market comprised of high net worth individuals or angel investors we discuss commercially and publicly available data on private equity the research findings of studies that use these data and some of the more important questions that the available data have been unable to address

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing