re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

institutional competition versus centralization quo vadis europe lots of steep and sometimes blind bends with harsh speed limits and frequent detours but still it has been one that has attracted more and more traffic after a successful period of shaping a customs union and a free trade area following the treaty of rome 1957 europe became infected with euro sclerosis in the seventies owing to an increased intensity of national regulation especially in the labour market the constructionist approach to harmonization from above slowed down the speed of integration almost to a halt only the change of two fundamental rules revitalized the european integration process namely the introduction of majority voting in the ec council and the mutual recognition of national regulations brought about by the 1979 ruling of the european court with the single european act and the launch of the internal market programme europhoria blossomed finally leading to the maastricht treaty which aimed to be the masterpiece of european integration only very recently the danish no and the unconvincing approval by the french voters cooled off hopes for a united states of europe signalling that european integration is at the crossroads once again

measuring the deadweight loss from taxation in a small open economy a general method with an application to sweden the paper develops a simple general equilibrium framework for calculating the marginal deadweight loss from taxation in a small open economy the framework allows a decomposition of the deadweight loss from each tax instrument into the losses stemming from the contraction of the different tax bases the paper describes a method of calibrating the model which exploits the links between the various factor supply elasticities implied by the standard life cycle model it also develops a method of estimating effective tax rates that is consistent with optimising household and firm behaviour to illustrate how the model works it is calibrated to a data set for sweden the quantitative results highlight the importance of accounting for the interaction between the major tax bases when estimating deadweight loss

the new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the american political science association september 1 5 atlanta ga and the 2000 annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 27 30 chicago il the authors thank steffen ganghof philip genschel mark hallerberg alex hicks william keech dennis quinn and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and dennis quinn for generously sharing data duane swank thanks the german marshal fund of the united states and marquette university for support of work incorporated in this paper data utilized in this paper are available from duane swank marquette edu

capital taxation and production efficiency in an open economy we attempt to clarify the role of the production efficiency theorem in international capital taxation it is shown that a direct open economy analogue to the production efficiency theorem arises not in the small country case but in the more general setting of tax competition between a finite number of identical jurisdictions

corporate tax policy under the labour government 1997 2010 this paper reviews and evaluates corporate tax policy under the 1997 2010 labour government during this period the government implemented a classical rate cut cum base broadening tax policy for large companies tax policy for small and medium sized enterprises smes is more difficult to characterize in the first two terms rates were cut more frequently than for large businesses and the base was narrowed but in the government s third term statutory rates for smes were increased extensive reforms of dividends and capital gains tax at the individual and corporate level have also been implemented in 1998 the imputation system was abolished and in 2009 foreign dividends became exempt for corporate income tax purposes a comparison of the statutory and effective rates shows that the uk has lost some ground to the oecd since 2003 4 fundamental reforms of dividends and capital gains taxation have aligned the uk to its competitors and to eu law we find that the overall effect of the labour s tax policy on aggregate investment may have been small for three reasons increases in real investment between 1997 and 2007 are largely explained by the economic cycle while the reduction in the tax component of the user cost of capital was small moreover the increase in aggregate investment was led by an exceptional surge in investment in structures driven by a real estate boom finally we note that most investment was undertaken by large companies and therefore it was not affected by the large set of tax reforms focusing on smes

income convergence within an economic union the role of factor mobility and coordination abstract in the context of a human capital based growth model we show the essential role of labor mobility in equalizing income levels for countries that start off from different initial income positions human capital externalities cum labor mobility are the driving forces behind the income level equalization process in a non cooperative equilibrium labor mobility will be limited and income level equality will not be achieved coordination will allow free mobility of labor within an economic union leading to income convergence coordination of educational policies will also help internalize the inter regional human capital externalities to ensure efficient growth for members of the union

simple rules for the optimal taxation of international capital income in this paper we reconcile and extend previous results on the collectively optimal taxation of international investment income the weighted average rule of horst 1980 for example is shown to rest on unattractive assumptions on the set of instruments available ruling out any need for distorting taxes the principal contribution is to establish a new and strikingly simple weighted average rule encompassing the other key result in this area for the general case in which lump sum taxes are unavailable the ability to tax pure profits is perhaps restricted and distorting taxes on both domestic and border crossing capital income are optimally deployed

international competition in corporate taxation evidence from the oecd time series despite numerous studies controversy remains about the impact of economic globalization on corporate taxation theoretical models of tax competition generate different predictions about trends in the level of tax burdens and the degree of convergence in tax burdens across countries in this paper we present a purely empirical analysis of the evolution of tax burdens across oecd countries since the 1950s issues of measurement and methodology have contributed to the inconclusive character of studies to date so we begin with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden problems with some commonly used measures of the tax burden are considered and the most plausible measures identified descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive race to the bottom in corporate taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden many inferential studies of corporate taxation base their conclusions on cross sectional analysis in contrast we adopt an explicitly time series method to what are essentially time series questions cointegration methodology originally developed to study issues of convergence of living standards is applied and fails to reveal evidence of convergence of tax burdens for the oecd and europe as a whole it does however indicate that there has been some harmonization within smaller groups of countries mainly in northern europe important questions remain about the effectiveness and impact of corporate taxation in an increasingly open and integrated global economy but we find little evidence to support fears that the burden of taxation is being lifted from corporations kenneth stewart and michael webb

the taxing task of taxing transnationals financial and real investment flexibility tax competition and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation while these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies such as deferral double taxation apportionment and trade rules very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models in this paper i show how the integration of investment flexibility tax competition and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies

regional tax coordination and foreign direct investment this paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries one of which is not part of the union and a globally mobile firm we show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain first for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union second by internalising all of the union s benefits from foreign direct investment a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation depending on which motive dominates tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination

public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation the paper considers the welfare effect of the harmonisation of indirect taxes in two open economies the revenue from taxation is used for the production of a non tradeable public good the welfare levels are affected via two channels i changes in the levels of public good provision and ii changes in deadweight loss associated with the taxes we develop a number of rules of harmonisation and derive conditions under which they lead to potential pareto improvement

tax incidence majority voting and capital market integration we re examine from a political economy perspective the standard view that higher capital mobility results in lower capital taxes a view in fact that is not confirmed by the available empirical evidence we show that when a small economy is opened to capital mobility the change of incidence of a tax on capital from capital owners to owners of the immobile factor may interact in such a way with political decision making so as to cause a rise in the equilibrium tax this can happen whether or not the immobile factor labour can be taxed and whether or not savings can be subsided under capital mobility d 2005 published by elsevier b v

residence and source based capital taxation in open economies with infinitely lived consumers abstract in this paper we investigate tax competition in a neoclassical growth model where each country may use both residence and source based capital taxes we show that both types of capital taxes are zero at any interior steady state just as in a closed economy for symmetric countries and even for countries that differ only with respect to size and productivity we prove analytically and verify numerically that the open economy policies coincide exactly with the closed economy policies in all time periods for countries that are asymmetric in other dimensions we find that source based taxes are used to manipulate the intertemporal terms of trade in the short run either way the fiscal externalities of source based taxes vanish once residence based taxes are allowed

tax structure and government expenditures with tax equity concerns abstract we augment a standard tax model by concerns about tax equity people get upset when labour is taxed more heavily than capital even the slightest concern for tax equity invalidates the common tenet that capital remains tax exempt in small open economies this holds for exogenous as well as for endogenous government expenditures and irrespective of whether concerns with tax equity only cause emotional discomfort or also impact on work incentives if concerns with tax equity get more intense the economy may choose higher taxes on labour and move to the downward sloped part of its laffer curve for endogenous government spending stronger concerns with tax equity may lead to a larger size of the public sector

must losing taxes on saving be harmful abstract internationalization offers enhanced opportunities for individuals to place savings abroad and evade domestic saving taxation this paper asks whether the concomitant loss of saving taxation necessarily is harmful to this end we construct a model of many symmetric countries in which public goods are financed by taxes on saving and investment there is international cross ownership of firms and countries are assumed to be unable to tax away pure profits countries then face an incentive to impose a rather high investment tax also borne by foreigners in this setting the loss of the saving tax instrument on account of international tax evasion may prevent the overall saving investment tax wedge from becoming too high and hence may be beneficial for moderate preferences for public goods

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

tax evasion in an open economy abstract ignoring tax evasion possibilities a value added and a cash flow income tax have similar behavioral and distributional consequences yet the available means of tax evasion under each can be very different under a vat avoidance occurs through cross border shopping whereas under an income tax it can occur through shifting taxable income abroad given evasion we show that a country would make use of both taxes in order to minimize the efficiency costs of evasion activity relying relatively more on whichever tax is harder to evade we then make use of aggregate danish tax and accounting data from 1992 to measure the amount of evasion that occurred under the two taxes while the estimates of evasion activity are small the figures imply that denmark could reduce the real costs of evasion activity by relying more on value added taxes

tax evasion tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination the case of interest taxation in europe this paper uses a game tlieoredc approach to analyse the taxadon of interest income in europe in the presence of tax evasion the model allows tis to assess the success of various reform proposals we argue tbat the tax treatment of nonresidents interest income plays a crucial role when decisions on discriminatio n and on withholding tax rates are made noncooperadvely the outcome is similar to a prisoners dilemma all countries discriminate but in equilihrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades taxation successfully in contrast if all governments did not discriminate tax competition leads to less tax evasion the integration of capital markets in europe has hrought various benefits at the same time however governments struggle to contain tax evasion international capital flight as an attempt to evade taxes is particularly relevant in the area of taxation of interest income banking secrecy laws in some eu countries and low tax rates in small countries like luxembourg which hoost its role as financial centre have led to the effective elimination ofthe taxation of interest income for some investors the economist speaks not surprisingly about the disappearing taxpayer may 31 1997 several proposals have been made in order to overcome this situation the european commission supports the introduction of a minimum tax rate and or the status of a community resident under the concept of a community resident a country s tax on interest income is independent of the residence of the investor practically realising the source principle by contrast a proposal of the oecd 1977 argues in favour of a maximum withholding tax rate on interest income none of these proposals has been unanimously accepted since gains and losses from non coordinated policies differ greatly across member states the main beneficiary of the present situation is luxembourg which attracts large amounts of foreign capital in particular from germany the united kingdom opposes any coordination for political reasons and because tax coordination may also threaten london s role as the leading financial centre in europe in contrast germany sticks to its traditional bank secrecy law which enables resident investors to evade german taxation by investing abroad

crisis and risk dependencies abstract the knowledge of the multivariate stochastic dependence between the returns of asset classes is of importance for many finance applications such as asset allocation or risk management by means of goodness of fit tests we analyze for a multitude of portfolios consisting of different asset classes whether the stochastic dependence between the portfolios constituents can be adequately described by multivariate versions of some standard parametric copula functions furthermore we test whether the stochastic dependence between the returns of different asset classes has changed during the recent financial crisis the main findings are first whether a specific copula assumption can be rejected or not crucially depends on the asset class and the time period considered second different goodness of fit tests for copulas can yield very different results and these differences can vary for different asset classes and for different tested copulas third even when using various goodness of fit tests for copulas it is not always possible to differentiate between various copula assumptions fourth during the financial crisis copula assumptions are more frequently rejected however the results also raise some concerns over the suitability of goodness of fit tests for copulas as a diagnostic tool for identifying stressed risk dependencies

tax evasion tax competition and gains from nondiscrimination with equilibrium mixed strategies abstract this note extends janeba and peters econ j 109 1999 93 paper on tax evasion and tax competition by allowing for equilibrium mixed strategies it shows that discrimination is still the weakly dominant strategy for both countries

on capital income tax policies under uncertainty this paper investigates corporate income and dividend taxation in a multi country world where production is subject to country specific productivity shocks singlecountry non cooperative tax policy is shown to imply a tax on foreign source dividends and a subsidy to domestic source dividends the optimal corporate tax may be negative if international portfolios are little diversified at the outset finally each country in a coordinating region should subsidize rather than tax domestic citizen s investment in equity in partner countries 1998 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

european tax harmonisation and production efficiency this paper analyses the impact on production efficiency of potential harmonisation of the taxation of income from capital in the european union it develops and applies a methodology for computing the cost of capital for transnational investments to assess the degree to which production efficiency holds in the eu it considers the impact of potential forms of corporation tax harmonisation the results indicate that some commonly advocated reforms e g harmonising tax rates or tax bases would not significantly move the tax system towards production efficiency but that other reforms which affect the taxation of cross border flows would have more impact

international tax competition and gains from tax harmonization abstract in a world economy there are two types of distortions which can be caused by capital income taxation in addition to the standard closed economy wedge between the consumer saver marginal intertemporal rate of substitution and the producer investor marginal productivity of capital i international differences in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution implying an inefficient allocation of world savings across countries and ii international differences in the marginal productivity of capital implying an inefficient allocation of world investment across countries the paper focuses on the structure of taxation for countries which are engaged in tax competition and on potential gains from a tax harmonization we show that if the competing countries are sufficiently coordinated with the rest of the world then tax competition leads each country to apply the residence principle of taxation and there are no gains from tax harmonization if however there is not sufficient coordination then tax competition leads to low capital income taxes and the tax burden falls on the internationally immobile factors the outcome is nevertheless still efficient relative to the available constrained set of tax instruments

the taxation of financial capital under asymmetric information and the tax competition paradox information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal taxation framework we introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange the model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under provision of publicly provided goods however in contrast to previous results in the literature under provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations we show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies evidence from oecd countries with implications for the european union tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy such as local governments should not and will not rely on non benefit taxes such as the income tax yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries and such reliance changes over time evidence from a panel data set of 13 oecd countries over the period 1975 1984 suggests that competition between levels of government resulting in a vertical fiscal externality and between levels of government at the same level resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality provide some economic rationale for these changes moreover the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact these results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the european union particulary as the eu continues to evolve one implication for the eu is that enlargement that increases tax base disparities within the eu and is not accompanied by an eu level income tax will tend to lower national income tax rates although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population a second implication is that fiscal expansion of the eu to include an eu levelincome tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality

internal external attitudes sense of efficacy and labor market experience a reply to duncan and morgan the paper studies direct evidence on reservation wages reported in great britain in 1982 to assess 1 whether such asking prices are high and 2 whether variations in these reservation wages are related to differences in measures of the subjective

taxation of investment and savings in a world economy the equilibrium of capital and equilibrium market prices are derived for a world economy with a unified securities market mobile capital no uncertainty and varying tax rates on different sources of income in each country the paper then characterizes optimal tax rates for a small country in this setting focusing on the peculiar incentives created when the before tax rate of return differs among securities due to differences in their typical tax treatment copyright 1986 by american economic association

the impact of corporate and personal income taxes on the location of firms and on employment some panel evidence for the swiss cantons abstract the impact of corporate income taxes on location decisions of firms is widely debated in the tax competition literature tax rate differences across jurisdictions may lead to distortions of firms investment decisions empirical evidence on tax induced relocation and subsequent economic development in the us and europe is still inconclusive much the same applies to switzerland while there is some evidence on personal income tax competition between swiss cantons evidence on the impact of intercantonal corporate income tax differences on the location of business within switzerland is missing in this paper we present econometric evidence on the influence of corporate and personal income taxes on the regional distribution of firms in 1981 and 1991 and on cantonal employment using a panel data set of the 26 swiss cantons from 1985 to 1997 the results show that corporate and personal income taxes deter firms to locate in a canton and subsequently reduce cantonal employment

yardstick competition and partial coordination exploring the empirical distribution of local business tax rates abstract this paper explores a striking form of tax policy interdependence that can be observed in the german federation though municipalities enjoy discretion in setting the local business tax rate large fractions of municipalities in some states even the majority set identical tax rates our analysis shows that this tax rate bunching is not the result of federal or state level institutions possible explanations rest on partial coordination and yardstick competition the role of the former is exemplified by the finding that small jurisdictions and jurisdictions sharing the same county are more likely to engage in bunching yardstick competition seems also relevant since jurisdictions for which strategic tax setting should be associated with larger gains and lower cost are in fact more likely to set identical tax rates

the international ramifications of tax reforms supply side economics in a global economy this paper studies tax reforms in a dynamic model of a global economy calibrated to current u s and european tax policies world capital markets add consumption smoothing and income redistribution effects that alter closed economy predictions in the absence of taxes on foreign interest welfare gains of eliminating u s income taxes are enlarged by up to 34 percent at the expense of european losses caused by transitional declines in consumption and leisure and a permanent capital outflow in contrast if foreign interest is taxed the same tax reform reduces u s welfare 0 7 percent and increases european welfare 1 8 percent copyright 1998 by american economic association