dynamic oligopolies without full information and with continuously distributed time lags abstract dynamic oligopolies are examined without full information on the price function with each firm using a perceived price function that usually differs from the actual inverse demand function of the market it is assumed that firms experience time lags in obtaining and implementing information on the price and also on output under realistic assumptions we show that without time lags the steady state is always locally asymptotically stable whereas in the presence of time lags situations of local instability may occur the possibility of limit cycles is examined and some special cases are considered

the evolution of federal reserve credibility 1978 1984 a random coefficients kalman filter model of the response of commodity prices to weekly m1 announcements indicates a gradual evolution in the credibility of the federal reserve as an inflation fighter the october 1979 announcement of a change in monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation did not result in an immediate increase in credibility and the october 1982 announcement of a policy reversal did not diminish credibility credibility does vary with the underlying rate of inflation which shows that markets pay attention to policy results not simply policy announcements copyright 1989 by mit press

unequal treatment of identical agents in cournot equilibrium oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation environmental protection and international competition we discuss properties of such models when a cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal cost sum therefore unless the cost of inducing second stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs the private and social optima are asymmetric

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

an equilibrium selection theory of monopolization we develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market e g investing in process innovation or product development as well as in the market e g setting quantities or prices competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms investment levels relative size and profitability we show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market in particular it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm while not generating new equilibria this result complicates the task of determining whether a firm s dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization we discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation and illustrate these by means of two well known antitrust cases

dynamic analysis of discontinuous best response with innovation abstract starting from the static analysis in eckert et al 2017 we study a cournot duopoly where firms can decide to incur fixed costs in activities that improve their competitiveness i e product development or process innovation innovation costs generate discontinuities in the firms quantity best response functions and in turn a variety of equilibrium configurations including multiple equilibria we provide a dynamic global analysis of the equilibria and show the way in which firms initial expectations regarding the rivals level of output are crucial in defining the configuration of the long run equilibrium

recovering preferences from preferences over nominal gambles abstract the main result in revealed preference theory is that under fairly weak assumptions strict concavity and monotonicity of the utility function an agent s preferences can be recovered from the entire demand function this paper addresses the possibility of recovering preferences from less extensive information given additional maintained restrictions on preferences specifically we explore whether an agent s utility function can be recovered from preferences over nominal gambles when money is risky in real terms or from demand for assets whose nominal returns contain common inflation or other risk the recovery is constructive to the extent that there is a good numerical technique for doing fourier transforms and inversions and other numerical computations can be done

recovering cardinal utility individual choice under uncertainty depends on an agent s attitudes towards risk typically represented by his von neumann morgenstern cardinal utility function u this function is of course an unobservable characteristic what is at least in principal observable is the agent s demand for alternative assets problems of prediction and welfare often require conclusions to be drawn concerning the unobservable characteristics based on observable behaviour to predict the response to a change in the stochastic production plan of a firm or to determine the compensation necessary so as to avoid a loss in welfare due to a change in the capital tax structure knowledge of an agent s attitude towards risk is required it is the purpose of the present paper to demonstrate that as long as the joint distribution of returns of the available assets is known the cardinal utility function can be recovered without ambiguity from asset demands provided that the set of available assets contains a riskless asset the distinguishing characteristic of the recoverability problem as posed here is the possible incompleteness of markets in a framework of complete markets if nominal income and prices vary independently the range of the demand correspondence can be assumed to cover an open subset of the consumption set the utility function can then be immediately recovered up to a monotone transformation over this range given mild regularity conditions on demand behaviour given incomplete markets however this argument fails since the choice set is a lower dimensional subspace of state space we learn only about the agent s preferences within this subspace we show that the existence of a riskless asset and some risky asset implies recoverability of von neumannmorgenstern preferences even if markets are incomplete in the presence of a riskless asset any positive riskless level a of wealth is demanded for some asset prices using arguments from pratt 1964 the ratio u a u a can be recovered without ambiguity for all positive resp non negative values of a and hence an integration argument can be used to recover the cardinal utility function u up to a positive affine transformation beyond the argument based on knowledge of the asset demand correspondence we explore an alternative approach to recoverability we demonstrate that knowledge of the portfolio indifference surfaces permits recovery of the cardinal utility function provided there is a riskless asset the intuition here is that the agent s risk aversion is directly related to the curvature of the indifference curve around the riskless point and the variance of the risky asset s that this approach is in general equivalent to the demand correspondence approach is well known we give a brief proof for twice continuously differentiable and strictly monotone utility functions we point out two results concerning the informational requirements of the argument for recoverability specifically the argument does not require complete knowledge of the distribution of returns independently of the asset demands instead it suffices to know the mean and variance of the returns to just one asset other than the riskless and the return of the riskless asset furthermore if the demand for assets is known only on a subset of the

a note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies abstract in this note we show that the results developed in n singh and x vives 1984 rand j econ 15 546 554 are sensitive to the duopoly assumption if there are more than two firms prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition this will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements if goods are substitutes high quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition hence it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

macroeconomic sources of risk in the term structure we develop a new way of modeling time variation in term premia based on the stochastic discount factor model of asset pricing the joint distribution of excess u s bond returns of different maturity and the observable fundamental macroeconomic factors is modeled using multivariate garch with conditional covariances in the mean to capture the term premia by testing the assumption of no arbitrage we derive a specification test of our model we estimate the contribution made to the term premia at different maturities through real and nominal sources of risk from the estimated term premia we recover the term structure of interest rates and examine how it varies through time finally we examine whether the reported failures of the rational expectations hypothesis can be attributed to an omitted time varying term premium

the term structure spread and future changes in long and short rates in the g7 countries abstract according to the expectations hypothesis when the spread between long and short rates widens next quarter s long rate should rise in the united states however long rates decline instead of rising this anomaly is also present in canada the uk germany and japan four of the additional six g7 countries nevertheless in contrast to the us where long rates appear to overreact to expected future developments the anomalous short run movement of long rates in these other g7 countries is caused by an additive white noise error on long rates that does not materially affect the information in their term structure

federal reserve interest rate targeting rational expectations and the term structure abstract the amount of information in the yield curve for forecasting future changes in short rates varies with the maturity of the rates involved indeed spreads between certain long and short rates appear unrelated to future changes in the short rate contrary to the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure this paper estimates a daily model of federal reserve interest rate targeting behavior which accompanied by the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations explains the varying predictive ability of the yield curve and elucidates the link between fed policy and the term structure

do stationary risk premia explain it all evidence from the term structure abstract predictable variations in excess returns have often been attributed to the presence of time varying risk premia in this paper we use an insight based upon new techniques from time series analysis to test whether stationary risk premia can alone explain the behavior of excess returns to long bonds relative to rolling over short rates surprisingly we reject this hypothesis using u s t bill returns we then show that either permanent shocks to the risk premia and or rationally anticipated shifts in the interest rate process could produce anomalous results

non welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions in these situations the government might want to intervene indeed individuals might want the government to intervene to induce behavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing the analysis of such corrective interventions through taxes and subsidies might be called behavioral public economics however such analysis where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals is not new in public economics in these cases the government is said to be non welfarist in its objectives and there is a long tradition of nonwelfarist welfare economics especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes the object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non welfarist optimal taxation literature and secondly to present behavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

cournot duopoly when the competitors operate multiple production plants this article considers a cournot duopoly under an isoelastic demand function and cost functions with built in capacity limits the special feature is that each firm is assumed to operate multiple plants which can be run alone or in combination each firm has two plants with different capacity limits so each has three cost options the third being to run both plants dividing the load according to the principle of equal marginal costs as a consequence the marginal cost functions come in three disjoint pieces so the reaction functions derived on basis of global profit maximization may also consist of disjoint pieces this is reflected in a particular bifurcation structure due to border collision bifurcations and to particular basin boundaries related to the discontinuities it is shown that stable cycles may coexist and the non existence of unstable cycles constitutes a new property we also compare the coexistent short periodic solutions in terms of the resulting real profits

macro factors and the term structure of interest rates this paper presents an essentially affine model of the term structure of interest rates making use of macroeconomic factors and their long run expectations the model extends the approach pioneered by kozicki and tinsley 2001 by modeling consistently long run inflation expectations simultaneously with the term structure application to the u s economy shows the importance of long run inflation expectations in the modeling of long term bond yields the paper also provides a macroeconomic interpretation for the latent factors found in standard finance models of the yield curve the level factor represents the long run inflation expectation of agents the slope factor captures business cycle conditions and the curvature factor expresses a clear independent monetary policy factor

expected consumer s surplus and the welfare effects of price stabilization suppose a consumer faces a price which is uncertain ex ante a question which often arises is whether the consumer would benefit from a stabilization policy under which the price would then be fixed and known with certainty many authors have addressed this question by calculating the expected compensating variation of the price change others have used expected marshallian consumer s surplus often with the explanation that it is a good approximation to expected compensating variation 2 an important unresolved issue however is whether expected compensating variation does in fact provide a valid ranking of stochastic prices against stabilized prices i e a ranking in agreement with that given by expected utility in section 2 we demonstrate that expected compensating variation is not in general a valid utility indicator in essence while utility comparisons under uncertainty require the use of the cardinal properties of von neumannmorgenstern utility functions the expected surplus measures depend only on ordinal preference rankings expected compensating variation then is completely insensitive to and cannot reflect the precise factor of interest in suchstudies the consumer s attitudes toward risk we then derive a set of restrictions on the utility function which are necessary in order for expected compensating variation to be a valid measure we see that price stabilization policies can only be evaluated with compensating variation if consumer preferences are assumed to satisfy quite stringent requirements this is in constrast to the familiar certainty case in which compensating variation always provides correct rankings

exploiting the conditional density in estimating the term structure an application to the cox ingersoll and ross model we propose an empirical method that utilizes the conditional density of the state variables to estimate and test a term structure model with known price formulae using data on both discount and coupon bonds the method is applied to an extension of a two factor model due to cox ingersoll and ross 1985 cir our results show that estimates based on only bills imply unreasonably large price errors for longer maturities we reject the original cir model using a likelihood ratio test and conclude that the extended cir model also fails to provide a good description of the treasury market

the revival of the expectations hypothesis of the us term structure of interest rates abstract us interest rate data from 1987 to 1995 show a substantial predictive power of the spread for the short rate in line with the expectations hypothesis the estimation of a mccallum policy reaction model supports our conjecture that this striking result can be attributed to the adoption of the spread as an indicator for us monetary policy since the late eighties 1997 elsevier science s a

n firm oligopolies with production adjustment costs best responses and equilibrium abstract n firm single product oligopolies will be examined without product differentiation and with production adjustment costs the best response functions of the firms will be first determined in terms of the outputs of the rest of the industry and the firm s own outputs of the previous time period this function is always decreasing not necessarily continuous and might have two different values then the best response will be determined when the output of the rest of the industry is replaced by the output of the entire industry we will show that this function might have infinitely many values leading to infinitely many equilibria a complete description of the equilibrium set will also be given the theoretical findings will be illustrated with the case of linear price and linear cost functions

new hope for the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates survey data on interest rate expectations permit separate testing of the two alternative hypotheses in traditional term structure tests that the expectations hypothesis fails and that expected future interest rates are ex post inefficient forecasts we find that the source of the spread s poor predictions of future interest rates varies with maturity at short maturities the expectations hypothesis fails at long maturities however changes in the yield curve reflect changes in expected future rates one for one an implication of the expectations hypothesis this result confirms earlier findings that long rates underreact to short rates but now it cannot be attributed to term premia if the attractiveness of an economic hypothesis is measured by the number of papers which statistically reject it the expectations theory of the term structure is a knockout most tests beginning with macaulay 1938 find no evidence supporting the expectations hypothesis 1 many cannot even reject statistically the alternative hypothesis that the spread between long and short rates contains no information about future interest rate changes 2 to make matters worse in u s postwar data future long rates tend to rise when short rates are above long rates since the expectations hypothesis would predict that long rates tend to fall the theory often does worse than even the naive model that future interest

explaining the failures of the term spread models of the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure contrary to the predictions of the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates empirical evidence suggests that the term spread between long and short rates fails to forecast future movements of long term rates although its forecasts of future short term rates are in the correct direction in this paper the authors show that this puzzling behavior of the term spread alone can be explained by a time varying term premium that is correlated with the term spread once this is accounted for neither expression of the expectations hypothesis is against the predictions of the theory copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world experimental evidence the authors design and study an olg experimental economy where the government finances a fixed real deficit through seigniorage the economy has continua of nonstationary rational expectations equilibria and two stationary rational expectations equilibria the authors do not observe nonstationary rational expectations paths observed paths tend to converge close to or somewhat below the low inflation stationary state the adaptive learning hypothesis is consistent with the data in selecting the low inflation stationary state rational expectations equilibrium as a long run stationary equilibrium nevertheless simple adaptive learning models do not capture the market uncertainty or the biases observed in the data copyright 1993 by the econometric society

the monotonicity of the term premium abstract fama s evidence that the term premium on treasury securities is not monotonically increasing is found to depend entirely on the behavior of bid asked mean returns on 9 and 10 month bills and only during the subperiod 8 64 12 72 when transactions costs as reflected in the bid asked spread are taken into account there is found to be no way to exploit this non monotonicity the anomalous behavior of the quotations is attributed to the treasury s auctions of 9 month bills during the period 9 66 10 72 the hypothesis that the term premium is a monotonically increasing function of maturity remains unrefuted

new product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents effects of size on strategy we analyze a duopoly where capacity constrained firms offer an established product and have the option to offer an additional new and differentiated product we show that the firm with the smaller capacity on the established market has a higher incentive to innovate and reaches a larger market share on the market for the new product an increase in capacity of the larger firm can prevent its competitor from innovating whereas an increase in capacity of the smaller firm cannot prevent innovation of its larger competitor in equilibrium the firm with smaller capacity on the established market might outperform the larger firm with respect to total payoffs

recovery of preferences from observed wealth in a single realization von neumann morgenstern preferences over terminal consumption can be inferred from wealth on a single sample path when markets are complete and returns follow a known law in a neoclassical investment problem in either a discrete time i i d binomial model or a continuous time diffusion model with a gaussian state variable numerical results suggest that useful information about preferences can be obtained from even a single noisy sample of monthly observations of a portfolio over 5 years article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

explorations into factors explaining money market returns in this article we measure and interpret the common factors that describe money market returns results are presented for both three and four factor models we find that the three factor model explains on average 86 percent of the total variation in most money market returns while the four factor model explains on average 90 percent of this variation using mimicking portfolios we provide an interpretation of the systematic risks represented by these factors in this article we attempt to measure and interpret the common factors that describe money market returns the factor approach we employ assumes that the covariance matrix of a set of random variables in this case excess returns can be decomposed into common or systematic components and idiosyncratic or nonsystematic components this decomposition into systematic and nonsystematic components is based on an assumption of a linear relationship between the returns of each security and a set of common factors this is the assumption of linear return generating models which form an integral part of the structure of many asset pricing theories for example arbitrage pricing theory apt as developed by ross 1976 the interpretation is that the common factors represent sources of systematic or nondiversifiable risk and the idiosyncratic component of returns represents diversifiable risks our focus here is not on testing a particular asset pricing model per se but on developing empirical evidence for the existence of stylized facts regarding money market returns the stylized facts take the form of the existence measurement and interpretation of the common factors that are found in money markets our attempt to measure and interpret these sources of systematic risk may eventually lead to the construction of observable eco

equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations abstract we analyze a nonlinear discrete time cournot duopoly game where players have adaptive expectations the evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two dimensional map the long run behavior is characterized by multistability that is the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs which correspond to nash equilibria in the quantity space hence a problem of equilibrium selection arises and the long run outcome strongly depends on the choice of the players initial beliefs we analyze the basins of attraction and their qualitative changes as the model parameters vary we illustrate that the basins might be nonconnected sets and reveal the mechanism which is responsible for this often neglected kind of complexity the analysis of the global bifurcations which cause qualitative changes in the topological structure of the basins is carried out by the method of critical curves

on the consistency of backward looking expectations the case of the cobweb in dynamic models of economic fluctuations backward looking expectations with systematic forecasting errors are inconsistent with rational behaviour in non linear dynamic models exhibiting seemingly unpredictable chaotic fluctuations however simple habitual rule of thumb backward looking expectation rules may yield non zero but nevertheless non systematic forecasting errors in a chaotic model expectational forecasting errors may have zero autocorrelations at all lags even for rational agents patterns in these forecasting errors may be very difficult to detect especially in the presence of small noise backward looking expectations are then not necessarily inconsistent with rational behaviour we investigate whether simple expectation schemes such as naive or adaptive expectations can be consistent with rational behaviour in the simplest of all non linear dynamic economic models the non linear cobweb model

a re evaluation of adaptive expectations in light of global nonlinear dynamic analysis we undertake an analysis of the dynamic behaviour of a discrete time nonlinear monetary dynamics model with adaptive expectation that is a basic mechanism in a broad class of descriptive macrodynamic models we consider in particular a variety of ways in which the adaptive expectations mechanism may be formulated these differ in the degree of rationality of the economic agents that inhabit the model we study in detail the local and global properties of the maps determining the price dynamics