partial vertical integration risk shifting and product rejection in the high value export supply chain the ghana pineapple sector summary high value export supply chains hold potential to improve smallholders welfare but their relative production inefficiency and moral hazard problems can cause exporters to prefer vertically integrated plantation production however pineapple exporters in ghana produce both for their own account and purchase from smallholders we hypothesize that vertical integration is only partial because exporters face large market risks that smallholders surprisingly are better able to absorb we show empirically that exporters average rejection rate of export quality fruit is high and varies in response to unanticipated fluctuations in european demand these results support the hypothesis and are consistent with theories of partial vertical integration but not the standard principal agent paradigm

the hidden middle the quiet revolution in the midstream of agrifood value chains in developing countries the food security debate has focused largely on the farm sector and on trade relatively neglected or hidden from mainstream debate are the middle segments processing logistics wholesale of agrifood value chains in developing countries and yet this midstream forms 30 40 per cent of the value added and costs in food value chains the productivity of the midstream is as important as farm yields for food security in poor countries the article shows that over the past several decades the middle segments have transformed quickly and surprisingly with a huge volume expansion a proliferation of small and medium enterprises smes but also concentrating and multinationalizing in some places and products with technology change characterized by capital led intensification and with the incipient emergence of branding and labelling and packaging of new organizational arrangements in procurement and marketing interfaces with farmers and retailers and of private standards and contracts economic policies of market and foreign direct investment fdi liberalization commercial and business climate regulations hard and soft infrastructure investment and food safety laws have paved the path to the expansion and shaped the transformation of the important midstream segment of food value chains

large scale agricultural investments and smallholder welfare a comparison of wage labor and outgrower channels in tanzania summary this article evaluates household welfare effects of large scale agricultural investments in tanzania one of the main recipients of such investments in africa specifically the article compares households participating in sugar and rice investments through outgrower schemes or as agro industry workers with non participants in terms of household income and income poverty building on primary household data it is one of the first studies to empirically analyze ex post impacts of large scale agricultural investments in africa the analysis draws on cross section survey data of 516 households collected in kilombero district a priority cluster for the southern agricultural growth corridor of tanzania sagcot the results show overall positive household welfare differences between participants of the investments and the respective counterfactual however there are large differences between arrangements and subsectors estimated effects for outgrowers are largest yet for land rich outgrowers more so than for land poor effects for agro industry workers in the sugar investment are significantly larger than for those in the rice investment though in both investments land poor workers seem to benefit hence the study results suggest potential benefits of outgrower schemes and potentials of agro industry wage employment for the land poor to escape extreme poverty yet it also stresses particularly the need to address the constraints of land poor outgrowers qualitative interviews for example pointed to growing risks for land poor outgrowers in the context of rising elite capture by larger outgrowers

a new industrial strategy preparing europe for the turn of the century abstract this paper argues that the present significance of the forces of transnationalism centripetalism and short termism which relate back to an underlying concentration of power in modern economies provides strong grounds for developing a set of coherent industrial strategies within europe the paper goes on to argue that much can be learned from the japanese experience not so much in terms of the details of their strategy but more in terms of their general approach but such strategies have to be informed by a vision of the future europe the suggestion made on grounds of both democracy and efficiency is that we should not support national or european champions but rather aim for an economy in which relatively small dynamic enterprises can survive and prosper

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

federal reserve independence abstract the federal reserve is always called an independent agency the term independent is rarely defined the only attempt in the literature and internal records is based on chairman martin s statement that the federal reserve is independent with the government not independent of the government martin explained several times that independence within government meant that the federal reserve helped to finance government budget because they were approved by congress and signed by the president financing budget deficits is the very opposite of the principle adopted when congress approved the federal reserve act in 1913 in fact the federal reserve has supported treasury operations many times i conclude that it is far more important to have an enforceable policy rule such as the taylor rule but any rule must have a provision that permits the rule to be set aside

inflationary bias of the federal reserve system a bureaucratic perspective abstract the federal reserve system does not receive a budget from congress but instead finances its operation from interest payments on its government security portfolio this peculiar financing arrangement provides the foundation for a bureaucratic model of federal reserve official behavior the empirical section tests the bureaucratic model by analysing the fed s expenditure record since 1947 and its policy actions during periods of constitutional revision

reconciling the wage curve and the phillips curve the wage curve is the negative relationship that links wage levels to the unemployment rate it fits accurately with modern non competitive labour market models but goes against a phillips curve modelling because the latter ties wage growth to the unemployment rate in this article we present a comprehensive review of these non competitive models highlighting recent contributions that try to eliminate the possible gap that exists between the concepts of the wage curve on the one hand and the phillips curve on the other copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2005

first branch or root the congress the president and the federal reserve much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues from an empirical perspective that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy in this paper a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the congress the president and one agency we use the u s federal reserve as an extended example can dictate policy outcomes the results of the paper include the congressional dominance theorem if more than 2 3 of house members and more than 2 3 of senate members agree on something they get it the theorem is obvious the proof is in the u s constitution but often forgotten in the substantive literature more realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of congress are more diverse powers of the president to influence policy with and without appointments are also analyzed

an analysis of contract farming in east java bali and lombok indonesia this article examines the emergence and benefits of contract farming in east java bali and lombok indonesia after a general review of contract farming in these regions three contracts for seed corn in east java seed rice in bali and broilers in lombok are described and analyzed using key informant interviews and household survey data a review of the contracts suggest that there is a wide array of contract types and this is related to the technical requirements of production and the associated costs probit analysis is used to identify factors contributing to smallholder participation in farm contracts and a two stage estimation process used to measure the effects of farm contracts on gross margins and labor use results indicate participation in contracts is influenced by farm size and other factors such as smallholder s age education and participation in farm groups contracts increased returns to capital for the seed corn and broiler contracts but not for the seed rice contract all three contracts influenced the types of labor used however none of them influenced total farm employment

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

the transition to modern agriculture contract farming in developing economies recent years have seen considerable interest in the impact of contract farming on farmers in developing countries motivated out of belief that contract farming spurs transition to modern agriculture in this article we provide a thorough review of the empirical literature on contract farming in bo

employment entrepreneurship and 1992 microeconomic policy and european problems this essay has covered several areas which are not usually regarded as closely interrelated policy conclusions have been discussed briefly at various points and will now be developed more fully in this final section as evidence for the interrelatedness of such disparate fields as corporate finance and employment policy we start from the observation that many large firms are relatively inefficient particularly at product innovation and flexible organization and employment policies in part because top managerial compensation depends mainly on size this creates an incentive for excessive growth and empire building rather than payment to shareholders of the free cash flow which cannot be profitably invested internally more appropriate incentives for top management would increase dividend payments and hence the flow of funds into the capital market available for financing new start ups and small firms as venture capital even in the u s the cost of obtaining external capital often constrains small firms to invest only their internal cash flow fazzari et al 1988

contract farming in staple food chains the case of rice in benin abstract in this paper we analyze the impact of smallholder participation in a contract farming scheme in the rice sector in benin we use data from a cross sectional farm household survey and different propensity score matching estimations to reveal how participation in a contract farming scheme affects smallholder rice production we find that contract farming results in expansion of the rice area intensification of rice production increased commercialization of rice and higher farm gate prices and ultimately contributes to rice output growth and increased income our findings imply that contract farming can contribute to upgrading the rice supply chain and the development of the rice sector in benin promoting and supporting the spread of contract farming schemes in the sector might be an effective way to contribute to reaching the government goals of expanding rice production to become self sufficient and improving rice quality to compete with imported rice while there is a large empirical literature on contract farming in high value and commodity export sectors studies on contract farming in staple food sectors are very scarce our results document that contract farming for staple food crops can be sustainable and benefit smallholder farmers which is against theoretical expectations that contracting for staple food crops is not feasible because of contract enforcement problems that stem from a low value of produce low storage and transport costs and a larger number of buyers in the chain our study contributes to understanding the role that contract farming might play in the much needed upgrading of domestic and staple food crop sectors in developing countries

an introduction to the wage curve en conomists and policymakers are interested in understanding the forces that determine the level of unemployment and the level of wages this paper describes an empirical discovery made with the help of international microeconometric evidence covering more than a dozen nations about a link between these two variables the connection can be portrayed on a graph with the level of unemployment on the horizontal axis and the level of wages on the vertical axis then the wage curve as shown in figure 1 is a downwardsloping locus this relationship tells us that holding others things constant if a region has a rise in unemployment in a particular year those who live there will have a fall in their wages in that year what does this curve mean how in a field where fully controlled experiments are almost impossible could there be any convincing scientific basis for this wage curve what is the relationship between the wage curve and a phillips curve other than that the curve of figure 1 looks like a phillips curve with the vertical axis mislabeled how does the wage curve fit into existing economic knowledge and is the empirical finding consistent with competitive theory this paper sketches answers to these kinds of questions the discussion draws on our book the wage curve blanchflower and oswald 1994 where the points raised here are investigated more fully it also rests upon work done by other economists whose work is listed in the paper and the bibliography

politics and monetary policy abstract how and why do politicians preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks looking at the european central bank ecb this paper shows that politicians on average favor significantly lower interest rates three factors explain the different preferences first politicians put relatively less weight on inflation and more on output in their preferred monetary policy reaction function second their preferences are affected by political economy motives third different preferences are also and largely due to different constituencies as politicians primarily focus on national economic objectives rather than the euro area as a whole

shifts in us federal reserve goals and tactics for monetary policy a role for penitence during the fi rst period starting in the mid 1920s the federal reserve offi cial during the fi rst period starting in the mid 1920s the federal reserve offi cial policy was to support high quality bank lending but not speculative lending this policy was to support high quality bank lending but not speculative lending this goal was set aside once in 1927 in an episode that many observers then blamed for goal was set aside once in 1927 in an episode that many observers then blamed for the economic collapse that followed the fi nancial crash of 1929 the fed was then the economic collapse that followed the fi nancial crash of 1929 the fed was then reluctant to increase the funds available to banks through the early 1930s even as reluctant to increase the funds available to banks through the early 1930s even as the great depression ravaged the economy the fed s concern with the volume and the great depression ravaged the economy the fed s concern with the volume and quality of lending in the setting of monetary policy did eventually wither however quality of lending in the setting of monetary policy did eventually wither however this only seems to have happened after the publication of friedman and schwartz this only seems to have happened after the publication of friedman and schwartz 1963 a revisionist history of the great depression that blamed its depth on the 1963 a revisionist history of the great depression that blamed its depth on the fed s inappropriate focus on productive lending fed s inappropriate focus on productive lending in the second period after the experience of post world war ii infl ation the in the second period after the experience of post world war ii infl ation the federal reserve in the 1950s was highly concerned with infl ation and was willing to federal reserve in the 1950s was highly concerned with infl ation and was willing to raise interest rates and bring on recessions to nip even modest infl ation rates in the raise interest rates and bring on recessions to nip even modest infl ation rates in the bud this brought withering criticism for the federal reserve on the grounds that bud this brought withering criticism for the federal reserve on the grounds that the recessions of 1957 and 1960 had been unnecessary by the mid 1960s some fed the recessions of 1957 and 1960 had been unnecessary by the mid 1960s some fed offi cials seem to have developed an aversion to creating recessions as a method of offi cials seem to have developed an aversion to creating recessions as a method of

distributional effects of agricultural cooperatives in china exclusion of smallholders and potential gains on participation abstract this paper examines the treatment effects of the agricultural cooperative and publicly funded extension services on individual household economy using data collected by the author from watermelon producing farm households in rural nanjing the cooperative addressed in this study restricts the participation of small scale farmers implying that selection into the program must be taken into consideration for an accurate assessment of the treatment effect the econometric analysis revealed that government extension services have a modest effect on farm income in contrast the treatment effect of the agricultural cooperative is robust and substantially large accounting for nearly 70 of the pre matching difference this suggests that the agricultural cooperative system is an important avenue for farmers to improve their economic status the treatment effect of the agricultural cooperative is highly heterogeneous the economic benefits arising from the cooperative are significant only for small scale farms we can argue that a coexistence of smallholder exclusion and the treatment effect in favor of small scale farms poses serious challenges to pro poor agricultural growth in china

structural transformation and smallholder agriculture an information theoretic analysis of the nicaraguan case in light of continued debate regarding the capacity of small scale agricultural producers to compete amidst globalization and or liberalization we examine recent trends in the distribution and use of agricultural landholdings in developing nations via refined exploration of the nicaraguan case with nationally representative living standards measurement survey type data for the years 1998 2001 and 2005 we employ markov chain methods within an information theoretic framework in an attempt to advance the analysis of structural transformation in developing countries beyond the examination of trends in mean farm sizes or gini coefficients approaches ill suited to the detection of the apparent complexities of structural change further while markov chain analysis has witnessed relatively widespread application in the investigation of structural transformation in developed nations we offer a novel methodological extension by allowing for the simultaneous exploration of structural transformation across multiple dimensions namely structural change in both the distribution and use of agricultural landholdings as well as the incorporation of microlevel determinants of farm size and land use change the results of the inquiry above all suggest that nicaragua s agricultural and livestock sector is characterized by a definitive persistence of smallholders while a moderate tendency toward bifurcation in the distribution of landholdings would appear to obscure any immediate relationship between operational landholdings and land productivity we contend that such trends are in fact consistent with the often observed inverse farm size productivity relationship

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

impact of contract farming on income linking small farmers packers and supermarkets in china summary this study compares contract and non contract growers of apples and green onions in shandong province china in order to explore the constraints on participation and the impact of contract farming on income we find little evidence that firms prefer to work with larger farms though all farms in the area are quite small using a heckman selection correction model we find that contract farming raises income even after controlling for observable and unobservable household characteristics these results suggest that contract farming can help raise small farm income though questions remain regarding the number of farmers that can be brought into such schemes 2009 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

contract farming and food security contract farming has often been associated with an increase in the income of participating households it is unclear however whether contract farming increases other aspects of household welfare using data from six regions of madagascar and a selection on observables design in which we control for a household s marginal utility of participating in contract farming which we elicited via a contingent valuation experiment we show that participating in contract farming reduces the duration of a household s hungry season by about ten days on average and that it makes participating households about 20 percent more likely to see their hungry season end at any point in time further we find that these effects are more pronounced for households with a larger number of children and for households with a larger number of girls this is an important result as children especially girls often bear the burden of food insecurity

congressional influence on u s monetary policy abstract congressional influence is generally discounted or ignored in political models of federal reserve behavior here i show that changes in the leadership of the senate banking committee are significantly correlated with monetary base growth more liberal committee leaders are associated with significantly higher base growth other factors held constant the result is shown to hold across several econometric specifications and different definitions of the congressional preference variable

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

are institutional rigidities at the root of european unemployment the netherlands experienced employment growth higher than that in the us and achieved an unemployment rate of less than 3 but germany s unemployment rate remained at high levels a widely held view regards a distorted incentive structure in welfare states as the root of the european unemployment problem but welfare state institutions in the netherlands are more generous than the german ones therefore differences in the incentive structures between the two economies cannot explain the differences in employment success the reasons for this seem instead to be rooted in coordinated monetary wage and fiscal policies in the netherlands while these are incompatible policies in germany copyright 2003 oxford university press

explaining house voting on the north american free trade agreement this paper analyzes representatives voting patterns on nafta the public choice model posits that representatives vote to redistribute wealth to constituents evidence presented here indicates that the heckscher ohlin model is appropriate to represent the redistributional effects of nafta using a three factor variant of the heckscher ohlin model evidence is presented indicating that representatives voted to redistribute wealth to their geographical and electoral constituents the ability of geographically concentrated interests and of special interests to influence representatives votes helps to explain the weak party allegiance demonstrated on the nafta vote

limitations of contract farming as a pro poor strategy the case of maize outgrower schemes in upper west ghana summary contract farming cf arrangements have the potential to address market failures and improve technology adoption productivity and welfare in ghana government and donors use cf as a strategy for increasing adoption of new agricultural technologies and developing value chains yet to date there has not been a rigorous assessment of these cf schemes the focus in this paper is on different maize based cf schemes in the poorest and most remote region in ghana it assesses the profitability and potential impact of these cf schemes utilizing a unique plot level dataset that covers two periods of data and two maize plots scheme and non scheme per household and employing matching techniques and an instrumental variable approach to address selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity across farmers these are complemented by a community level survey in depth interviews with scheme operators and a series of key informant interviews results show that these schemes led to improved technology adoption and yield increases in addition a subset of maize farmers with high yield improvements due to cf participation have high profits maize cf schemes also enabled market coordination and consistent supply of quality maize to downstream industries however on average the impact of the cf schemes on profitability is negative even when input diversion is accounted for yield increases are not high enough to compensate for higher input requirements and the cost of capital under the schemes despite higher yields the costs to produce one metric tonne of maize under cf schemes are higher than on maize farms without cf schemes twice that of several countries in africa and more than seven times higher than that of major maize exporting countries the united states brazil and argentina sustainability of these cf schemes will largely depend on developing and promoting much improved varieties and technologies that boost yields in order to compensate for the high input and credit costs

on the existence of a political monetary cycle this paper examines electoral influence on monetary policy as measured by ml money growth i find a significant four year electoral cycle in money growth even when controlling for the influence of interest rates income and budget deficits further the residual electoral cycle produces the income and inflation movements associated with the political business cycle when it is used in simulations of simple reduced form macro models the paper concludes by discussing the difficulties in rationalizing cyclical monetary policy with rational expectations

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

contract farming smallholders and rural development in latin america the organization of agroprocessing firms and the scale of outgrower production abstract this paper demonstrates how contract farming functions as an economic institution and explores the causes of the observed variation in the scale of outgrower production in latin america we outline how market imperfections and transaction costs influence the decision of agroprocessing firms to contract out vertically integrate or use spot markets to obtain raw product the paper demonstrates how market conditions are likely to be associated with particular outgrower characteristics under contract farming an analysis of the mexican frozen vegetable industry illustrates determinants of successful and unsuccessful small scale contracting and suggests alternative policies to promote contract farming with smallholders

federal reserve transparency the more things change the more they stay the same the calculus of electoral politics and the central bank s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater federal reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue if incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the fed to become still more transparent and if the fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy then further changes in current practice are unlikely private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the fed s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process

presidential politics budget deficits and monetary policy in the united states 1960 1976 this paper has focused on the extent to which the traditional tools of macroeconomic management in the united states monetary and fiscal policy have contributed to a political business cycle regardless of whether politicians can successfully influence real economic variables to their own ends the evidence presented here suggests that they tried and that they enjoyed some at least indirect aid from their independent monetary authorities in doing so several major conclusions emerge

small farmers in high value chains binding or relaxing constraints to inclusive growth summary considerable empirical work relates participation in contract farming with farm profitability however causation is far from settled as few studies control for endogeneity of participation moreover the link between contract farming and equity is ambiguous as the association between contract farming and farmer endowments is mixed this case study of smallholders in the tobacco industry addresses these issues and seems to be the first such econometric application in the philippines based on a treatment effects regression contract farming increases profitability with participation biased toward smaller farm sizes supporting the positive role of contract farming toward inclusive growth in rural areas

political regime change and the real interest rate the effect of changes in policy regimes on real interest rates has important implications for financial and economic theory there is little current evidence that policy regime changes have any impact on the level of real interest rates we use large political changes as our measure of policy regime changes changes in presidential administration are more significantly correlated with real rate changes than are changes in the federal reserve chair or the mean shift points identified by garcia and perron 1996 using time series methods we also show that change of party control of congress is a significant factor explaining real rates we argue that theoretical models built on the assumptions of constant or policy invariant real interest rates are at variance with the empirical evidence

the determinants of tenure on the federal reserve board of governors should i stay or should i go this paper examines the quit behaviour of members of the federal reserve board of governors we find that the probability of a member continuing is lower when the member is an economist when the member comes to the board from the private sector and when their policy views differ from the board as a whole in addition we find evidence that the president can exert influence on the fed by the power of appointment and in contrast with what one might expect we find that salaries on the board relative to the private sector do not seem to be an important factor in determining the decision to continue service on the board

modern value chains and the organization of agrarian production empirical studies of agrarian production in developing countries often find that small farms possess a productivity advantage over larger farms eswaran and kotwal 1986 famously derive this inverse farm size productivity relationship from the structure of agrarian production the focal prediction of their model is that in otherwise equivalent economies a more egalitarian land distribution raises both output and producer welfare the traditional spot procurement system implicit in the eswaran and kotwal model however diverges fundamentally from modern contractual procurement practices we therefore develop a new model of agrarian production in order to determine whether the introduction of a modern value chain alters the welfare effects of land redistribution the inverse farm size productivity relationship persists in our model but we find that more egalitarian land distribution leads to nonmonotonic changes in producer welfare we also find that the introduction of a modern sector can harm the laboring classes

does the fed contribute to a political business cycle in contrast to findings of other studies evidence is presented to support the existence of a federal reserve induced political monetary cycle that corresponds to the u s presidential election cycle using various taylor rules we find support for the view that fed policy turns significantly more expansionary in the seven quarters prior to the election but only when the fed chair and incumbent presidential party have partisan affiliations

the political economy of american monetary policy preface 1 introduction thomas mayer 2 studying the fed towards a broader public choice perspective thomas willett 3 the federal reserve reaction function a specification search salwa khouri 4 corporate profitability as a determinant of restrictive monetary policy estimates for the post war united states gerald epstein and juliet schor 5 federal reserve behavior since 1980 a financial market perspective william melton and v vance roley 6 the federal reserve and its institutional environment a review michael munger and brian roberts 7 the political economy of monetary policy robert hetzel 8 political monetary cycles nathaniel beck 9 congress and the fed why the dog does not bark in the night nathaniel beck 10 the federal reserve as a political power james pierce 11 monetary policy and political economy the federal reserve and the bank of japan thomas cargill and michael hutchinson 12 a positive analysis of the policymaking process at the federal reserve raymond lombra and nicholas karamouzis 13 a theory of fomc dissent voting with evidence from the time series thomas havrilesky and robert schweitzer 14 explaining fomc members votes john gildea 15 fed behaviour and x efficiency theory toward a general framework harinder singh and roger frantz 16 minimizing regret cognitive dissonance as an explanation of fomc behavior thomas mayer 17 the discount window william poole 18 leaning against the wind the behavior of the money stock in recession and recovery 1953 8 elmus wicker 19 bureaucratic self interest as an obstacle to monetary reform edward kane index

the impact of monetary regime changes some exchange rate evidence abstract lucas has argued that coefficient changes can be explained by changing expectations caused by the policy regime shifts this paper provides evidence consistent with the lucas critique using an efficient markets news framework kalman filter results show that surprise relative u s monetary expansion is associated both with periods of u s depreciation and appreciation i show that variables representing changes in monetary policy regimes can explain a substantial fraction of the movements in the time varying parameter

serial correlation and the fixed effects model this paper generalizes the durbin watson type statistics to test the ols residuals from the fixed effects model for serial independence also generalized are the tests proposed by sargan and bhargava for the hypothesis that the residuals form a random walk a method for efficient estimation of the parameters is also developed finally an earnings function is estimated using the michigan survey of income dynamics in order to illustrate the uses of the tests and the estimation procedures developed in this paper

impact of contracts in high yielding varieties seed production on profits and yield the case of nepal abstract nepal s population continues to grow but the agricultural sector s performance remains almost stagnant this has led to a decline in the per capita availability of food increasing agricultural productivity is the key to agricultural growth and one strategy for increasing agricultural productivity is to use improved seeds this study investigates the impact of contract farming cf in high yielding varieties hyv of paddy seed production on costs yield and profits of smallholder farms in nepal using farm level data and a non parametric propensity score matching estimator the study finds a significant positive impact of contract hyv seed farming on revenues profits and yield and a significant negative impact on total costs of production additionally very small farms 0 43 ha with cf in hyv paddy seeds tend to gain the most when it comes to yield per hectare our estimates reveal that the average smallholder household in nepal engaged in cf with input conditions receives higher profits however farmers engaged in cf with output conditions tend to have higher yields but smaller profits finally farmers engaged in cf in hyv paddy seeds with both input and output conditions have the highest yield gains and significantly higher profits

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

the political economy of inflation labour market distortions and central bank independence using the citizen candidate model we study the government s choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment we derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence the post election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher consistent with evidence for oecd countries many democratic societies delegate key tasks to non elected and independent institutions a prominent example being independent central banks the belief in the advantage of central bank independence is nursed by the cross country evi

profits from participation in high value agriculture evidence of heterogeneous benefits in contract farming schemes in southern india abstract this paper assesses the variable impact of participation in high value agriculture through contract farming arrangements in southern india using survey data for 474 farmers in four commodity sectors gherkins papaya marigold and broiler an endogenous switching model is used to estimate net profits from participation findings suggest that average treatments effect vary widely across contract commodities papaya and broiler contracting offer clear net gains for participants whereas marigold contracting leaves participants worse off for gherkins while contracting holds net gains for participating farmers overall this is true of contracts with some firms but not others the standard deviations of point estimates of treatment effects are quite large indicating variability in profit gains even within the same commodity sectors thus notwithstanding the sign of average treatment effects contract farming arrangements have diverse impacts on income for individual farmers and these could have implications for sustained participation of farmers in high value agriculture

congressional oversight committee influence on u s monetary policy revisited abstract grier 1991 shows that monetary policy is influenced by congress in that increases in the liberality of the senate banking committee leadership are significantly positively correlated with monetary base growth chopin cole and ellis 1996 claim that the house leadership statistically dominates the senate leadership for predicting money growth but that the direction of the effect is perverse a more liberal house leadership is associated with a lower rate of base growth in this paper i show that chopin cole and ellis s claims are unfounded properly measured both house and senate leadership have a significant positive effect on base growth over grier s 1991 original sample in later periods money growth regressions are not sufficiently stable to support hypothesis tests

macroeconomic conditions and committee re election rates the traditional literature on the link between the macro economy and house elections follows kramer 1971 and assumes all members of the president s party are equally vulnerable to voter wrath caused by economic changes using presidential party return rates from 10 house committees over the time period 1916 1996 i find the impact of economic conditions at the polls varies by committee generally committees that manage money or provide a public good are the most sensitive to economic fluctuations contrastingly members of the public works committee and the rules committee are more insulated from electoral culpability due to economic fluctuations

agent heterogeneity and consensual decision making on the federal open market committee the consensual aspects of decision making are essential for understanding policy made by administrative organizations that take the form of a commision or board consensual decision making reflects the degree of policy cohesion exhibited by high level officials within administrative organizations it is proposed here that this type of behavior may differ between heterogeneous agents the federal open market committee fomc of the federal reserve system serves as a salient setting for testing these propositions in a time series context the empirical results indicate that major intra institutional differences exist between board of governor bog and regional bank president rbp members of the federal open market committee fomc regarding consensual behavior in terms of policy decision making the econometric evidence clearly demonstrates that the consensual behavior of these agents are fundamentally different from one another this in turn has important implications for the study of other commission and board policy making bodies that consist of agents who are not all homogeneous

slowing monetary growth since 1984 a public choice explanation until about 1984 the u s monetary base typically grew at an accelerating rate since then that acceleration has stopped modern evidence suggests that the federal reserve responds to political pressure we present empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that reduced monetary base growth reflects the fact that the political advantages of price inflation have been significantly reduced by the tax indexation provisions of the economic recovery tax act of 1981

federalism and central bank independence the politics of german monetary policy 1957 92 two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy first political threats to the status structure or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy second politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure that central bank appointees share their electoral and party political goals this paper derives the monetary policy outcomes obtained as a function of the degree of central bank independence zero partial or full and central bankers types partisans or technocrats based on a case study of the 1957 and 1992 institutional changes to the german central banking system and a regression analysis covering the period in between i argue that the formal independence of the system is protected by its embeddedness in the institutions of german federalism and by the federalist components of its decentralized organizational structure the behavioral independence of the german central bank fluctuates over time with the party control of federalist veto points the bundesbank is staffed with nonpartisan technocrats who are partially insulated from political pressures

congress and the federal reserve we examine legislative activity targeting the federal reserve to determine when congress takes an interest in the fed and whether this interest has an effect on monetary policy using a keyword search of the thomas catalogue for the period from january 1973 through december 2010 we identify 1575 bills in the house and 728 bills in the senate pertaining to the federal reserve we classify these bills into several categories including those that expand fed powers and those that threaten or usurp fed powers using the romer and romer 2004 series of monetary policy shocks we find that prior to the early 1980s the fed responded to bills credibly threatening fed powers by lowering the federal funds target below that prescribed by current and forecast economic conditions however this accommodation ceased following the end of the non borrowed reserves targeting period in october 1982 analyzing the determinants of bill sponsorship we find that high unemployment high inflation and high long term real borrowing costs failures of the fed along the three dimensions of its mandate all lead to a greater number of bills seeking to alter the fed s powers importantly we also find that the relative importance of these three dimensions has changed over time under chairmen burns and miller congress took greater interest when unemployment was high under chairman greenspan congress took greater interest when inflation was high we believe that these findings are consistent with the view that the lessons of the great inflation changed the public perception of the fed s macroeconomic responsibilities which in turn better aligned congressional views on policy with those of the fed and allowed the fed to better resist remaining congressional pressure to its independence

congressional policy preferences and u s monetary policy abstract this paper shows that the evidence of congressional impotence in influencing u s monetary policy presented in chopin et al 1996 is robust to inclusion of a dummy variable for the tenure of house banking committee chairman wright patman this result is in contrast to the assertion of grier 1996 further we show that specification problems of models of congressional influence over a sample period that extends beyond the mid 1980s can be the result of omitted variable bias when macroeconomic variables including oil price shocks are included in the model our results continue to hold contrasting our results with grier s indicates that the evidence concerning congressional influence is sensitive to the measure of congressional preferences

monetary policy signaling from the administration to the federal reserve this chapter employs the index of monetary policy signaling from the administration to the federal reserve safer that was developed in chapter two the safer index is a simple weekly sum of articles that appeared in the wall street journal in which administration officials expressed a desire for easier 1 or tighter 1 monetary policy a key assumption is that systematically over time the financial media capture the essence of communication that is going on between the executive branch and federal reserve officials 1 the signaling index is employed in ordinary least squares regressions for the period from january 1964 to november 1991 cumulative values of the safer index over a three week period as an explanatory variable are found to have a statistically significant effect on the average federal funds rate during the third week as the dependent variable further evidence suggests that the safer index is granger causal with respect to the federal funds rate after classifying the signals by sources within the administration oval office council of economic advisers treasury and other and unidentified sources it is shown that for the overall 1964 1991 period signals from the treasury department and from other and unidentified sources have a statistically significant effect on the federal funds rate while signals from the oval office and the council do not when the data are segmented according to who was the chairman of the federal reserve board at the time ordinary least squares results indicate that the federal reserve did not systematically respond to executive branch signaling in a statistically significant way when william mcchesney martin g william miller and alan greenspan were chairmen but did respond statistically significantly to administration signaling during portions of the periods during which arthur burns and paul volcker were chairmen

unemployment getting the questions right in my opinion the form and conception of this conference exemplifies the right instinct for modern macroeconomics there is a fact a big unmistakable unsubtle fact essentially everywhere in the modern industrial capitalist world unemployment rates are much higher than they used to be two or three decades ago why is that if macroeconomics is good for anything it ought to be able to understand and explain that fact we should be able to produce a fairly convincing analytical account of the occurrence and persistence of unusually high unemployment rates you might think that to be a mere commonplace to what other sort of end would anyone organize a conference my experience however is that most high powered academic conferences are stimulated by purely technical developments or less often by ideological or political promotion rather than by the need to deal with an outstanding fact i do not blame anyone for this state of affairs we may not be blessed with many significant observations too big to be quibbled over and technical innovations do need to be thrashed out by experts anyway it is good to be faced by a brute fact that needs explanation it is what macroeconomics ought to be about i compliment the organizers also on a second aspect of the agenda the country by country organization of the papers we can all hope to learn something from cross country comparisons one of the few good ways we have to test analytical ideas is to see whether they can make sense of international differences in outcomes by appealing to international differences in institutional structure and historical environment the right place to start is within each country separately studied by someone who knows the peculiarities of its history and its data you might think that this too ought to be obvious but in fact the usual approach is just the opposite more often than not we fail to take institutional differences seriously one model is supposed to apply everywhere and always each country is just a point on a cross section regression or one among several essentially identical regressions leaving only grumblers to worry about what is exogenous and what is endogenous and whether simple parametrizations do justice to real differences in the way the economic mechanism functions in one place or another i have no way of knowing whether this organized effort will get anywhere in explaining high unemployment but it seems to be set up to give itself the best chance for better or worse probably for the better theoretical and empirical work are closely intertwined in macroeconomics scratch a macro theorist and you find a casual econometrician scratch a macro econometrician and you find a casual theorist usually you do not have to scratch very hard thus the discussion of the issues central to the conference has already hardened into certain characteristic forms there are questions already lying on the table that the individual country papers will be trying to answer i suspect that some

a bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank abstract in this paper a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political system the major results of the paper are 1 the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy 2 changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president s term in office to the first period of the president s term will lead to more partisan monetary policy 3 in equilibrium nominations to the board are not rejected thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a rubber stamp process 4 lengthening the terms on the board relative to the electoral cycle will lead to more moderate appointments to the central bank and a reduction in partisan policymaking

higher growth through the blue ocean strategy implications for economic policy a b s t r a c t higher growth is a key goal of companies governments and societies economic policies often attempt to attain this goal by targeting companies of certain sizes that operate in specific industries and focus on a specific business activity this approach to policy making has considerable shortcomings and seems to be less than fully effective in increasing economic growth we suggest a new approach to policy making that stems directly from the entrepreneurial perspective this approach examines a successful business strategy framework the blue ocean strategy to discover conditions for high growth we test the propositions on empirical data for two cases of successful high growth business namely slovenian gazelles and amazon com the results reveal a gap between the macro level of economic policy making to achieve higher growth and the micro level of business growth the findings call for a change in the focus of economic policies on specific size companies industries and business activities to intraindus try cooperation collaboration between companies of different sizes value innovation and creation of uncontested markets

a political model of monetary policy with application to the real fed funds rate abstract we construct an empirical model of u s monetary policy assuming that the federal reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy we use the real federal funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive legislative and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996 we find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the senate banking committee leadership best represent legislative influence we argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy

federal antitrust enforcement a principal agent perspective this paper offers a critical examination of the appropriateness of the traditional principal agent model in describing the relationship between the antitrust division of the department of justice and its congressional oversight committees after studying the institutional reality of congressional oversight i extend the traditional principal agent model to incorporate both the antitrust division and the president as important players in the determination of federal antitrust policy my empirical analysis of antitrust division enforcement trends covers almost four decades from 1950 through the end of the reagan administration the results provide substantial evidence that the property rights of the congressional oversight committees are seriously attenuated leaving open the possibly for bureaucratic discretion

congressional influence on u s monetary policy a reconsideration of the evidence abstract one of the few works that finds strong evidence of congressional influence on u s monetary policy is grier 1991 which finds a direct relationship between the liberalism of the senate oversight committee leadership and monetary base growth we extend this analysis by considering a longer sample period and by considering the preferences of house oversight committee leaders in addition to senators grier s evidence is not robust to these extensions where we do find correlation between congressional preferences and monetary base growth increased liberalism of congressional oversight committees is associated with lower monetary base growth

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

supply chain differentiation contract agriculture and farmers marketing preferences the case of sweet pepper in thailand there is an emerging body of literature analyzing how smallholder farmers in developing countries can be linked to modern supply chains however most of the available studies concentrate on farm and farmer characteristics failing to capture details of institutional arrangements between farmers and traders moreover farmers preferences have rarely been considered here we address these gaps by analyzing different market channels for sweet pepper in thailand using data from a survey and choice experiment with farmers we find that there is a general preference for marketing options that do not involve a contract additional provision of inputs and credit can increase the attractiveness of contracts yet the most important factor for farmers is to personally know the buyer they deal with which may be related to issues of trust some policy implications are discussed

checks and balances and the supply of central bank independence abstract the paper analyzes the institutional conditions under which policymakers can credibly commit to an independent central bank and thereby mitigate the well known time consistency problem in monetary policy it is shown theoretically that granting independence via a statute is only credible for legislative systems with at least two heterogeneous decision making bodies which both have veto rights for example bicameral systems this thesis is supported by empirical evidence the legal independence of central banks is significantly higher in those oecd countries whose legislative processes are characterized by extensive checks and balances furthermore the negative relation between legal independence and inflation is larger in countries with checks and balances than in countries without checks and balances

politics and the fed in the standard economic model of policy choice choices are made by analyzing the social welfare implications to find welfare optimizing policy choices in this paper i argue that in a democratic government and perhaps elsewhere policy choices emerge from a political process people vote the voting process chooses elected representatives with their appointees the representatives make policy choices the appropriate model for policy analysis is a political economy model this conclusion is reinforced by my fifteen years of studying the history of the federal reserve 1 from the start that study reflected the influence of james buchanan and many others who followed him by analyzing policy choices made by individuals or committees motivated by considerations other than optimal welfare some of my prior work with alex cukierman and scott richard is fully in that tradition meltzer cukierman and richard 1991 consider recent federal reserve policy the federal reserve has more than doubled the size of its balance sheet it has more than 1 trillion of excess reserves and more than 1 trillion of long term relatively illiquid mortgage backed securities no central bank in a developed country ever had so much long term debt in 1932 a much less informed federal reserve board refused a request from congress to support the mortgage market congress responded by creating the home loan banks a fiscal solution the current board undertook the fiscal operations this is a political decision who would claim it is optimal policy in the late 1970s congress gave the federal reserve a dual mandate except for the years of moderation it has acted lexicographically from 1979 to 1982 it pursued disinflation letting unemployment rise to 10 8 percent before 1979 it concentrated on 1

elections and the fed is there a political monetary cycle to understand the political causes of macroeconomic policy it is necessary to examine the institutions that actually make such policy and the incentives those institutions face an explanation of the political causes of united states monetary policy must treat the various institutions that are influential in the monetary policy process which are at a minimum the federal reserve fed and the executive including the president the treasury department and other advisors in the executive office of the president the reelection motive has proven useful in modeling presidential incentives in this article i investigate whether electoral incentives associated with the theory of the political business cycle pbc can help to explain the behavior of the fed over the last quarter century the political business cycle has had a curious hold on modern political economy while the empirical evidence in favor of the cycle is far from overwhelming its theoretical importance leads to continuing empirical

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

contract farming and vulnerability to poverty among oil palm smallholders in indonesia abstractthis article addresses smallholder oil palm farming in indonesia and the risk of falling into poverty by comparing contract and non contract smallholders we use an asset based approach to define vulnerability and apply propensity score matching analysis to assess the impact of contract farming data were collected from a cross sectional survey conducted in 2010 of 245 oil palm smallholder households 126 of which were contract smallholders the study finds that approximately 40 per cent of oil palm smallholders can be classified as stochastic transient poor we also show that while contract participation reduces the negative impact of oil palm price shocks this is not the case for production shocks the study concludes that despite positive income effects contract smallholders also remain vulnerable to poverty

a partisanship theory of fiscal and monetary regimes this paper indicates that income redistribution motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort thi s suggests that newly elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income estimated reaction from function s support these predictions a measure of income redistribution the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to gnp has a positive significant effect on money growth in addition when the presidency changes from conservative to liberal there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth copyright 1987 by ohio state university press