prizes and lemons procurement of innovation under imperfect commitment the literature on r d contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value this ignores a potential adverse selection problem the present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest we compare xed prize tournaments with and without entry fees and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement our main result is that the optimal xed prize tournament is more pro table than the optimal auction since preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction

contest design and optimal endogenous entry this paper derives the effort maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs the organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments he sets the value of the prize purse and arranges a monetary transfer entry subsidy or fee for each participating contestant in other words the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse the results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a positive fixed entry cost and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants the study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low

public procurement with unverifiable quality the case for discriminatory competitive procedures unverifiable quality may affect the enforcement of procurement contracts even when the award procedure is able to select the most efficient firm in the market in this paper we show that a discriminatory competitive mechanism which awards the contract on the basis of price and firms past performance yields an efficient allocation of the contract and allows the buyer to implement her desired quality quality enforcement arises out of relational contracting whereby the buyer handicaps a contractor in future competitive tendering processes if it fails to provide the required quality we study an infinitely repeated procurement model with two firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms cost in which in each period the buyer runs a discriminatory auction we restrict our analysis to the case of a buyer committed to her handicapping strategy a case which captures some of the features of a public buyer when players use either grim trigger or stick and carrot strategies we find that the buyer can induce the delivery of optimal unverifiable quality with a variety of handicap levels and when applicable durations of the punishment period for some values of the handicap and the length of the punishment period both firms remain active in the market even when punished

sealed bids sunk costs and the process of competition how do firms recover precontract costs for example suppose 10 firms compete in a sealed bid auction for the right to explore and develop an offshore oil field each spends 500 000 to estimate the value of the field and to prepare its bid suppose this investigation reveals that the tract is worth approximately 20 million if sunk costs do not matter competition dictates that the winner must bid 20 million but if the winner is to recover its prebid costs the maximum offer can be only 19 5 million furthermore long run industry equilibrium considerations suggest that the highest bid will be only 15 million 20 million minus the total bid preparation costs of 5 million if competition forces firms to charge marginal cost why do firms ever invest in resources which become sunk in some industries inframarginal rents can be used to recover these costs however the example above as well as many others involves an all or none deci

knowledge accumulation within an organization in this article we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization we show that knowledge accumulation is delayed the fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage falls gradually then rises again before falling finally toward zero we determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem or the specificity of knowledge we also discuss the form of the optimal life cycle wage profiles the role of the initial knowledge level and the role of discounting

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

investment and the nominal interest rate the variable velocity case investment and the nominal interest rate the variable velocity case evan f koenig models treating money either as a consumer good or as a producer good are encompassed by a model in which both households and firms use money as a buffer between receipts and expenditures a rise in nominal interest rates increases resources devoted to intermediation while discouraging purchases financed from accumulated cash if investment is financed from contemporaneous earnings there is a tendency to substitute out of consumption and into investment when interest rates are high greater resources devoted to intermediation generate a negative wealth effect the net impact on investment is ambiguous i introduction the relationship between investment and the nominal interest rate in an economy where the cash balances of households and firms are rigidly linked to their respective expenditures has been examined by koenig 1987b in such an economy the nominal interest rate acts like a tax on agents purchases as a result households are inclined to save rather than spend when the nominal interest rate is relatively high provided that at the margin firms are able to finance at least some of their capital spending out of contemporaneous earnings this increase in desired saving is only partially offset by a decrease in desired investment realized investment is thus greatest when the nominal interest rate is high in comparison to its own moving average a short run tobin effect this paper extends koenig s analysis to the case in which households and firms at a cost in terms of real resources are able to increase the velocity of money in this context it is shown that the short run tobin effect may be reversed intuitively when the nominal interest rate is high consumption of financial services by households and firms may rise to such an extent that any decline in the consumption of nonfinancial goods and services is overwhelmed reducing the resources available for investment as in the earlier paper i allow for the possibility that some fraction 1 u of firms investment expenditures can be financed from contemporaneous earnings unless u equals zero there is a stockman effect 1981 a tendency for investment to be depressed whenever the nominal interest rate is expected to be higher on average in the future than it has been in the past when u equals unity so all investment must be financed out of accumulated assets the money balances of the representative firm can be interpreted as an argument of its production function regardless of the value of u the money balances of households may be thought of as an argument along with gross household spending of an indirect utility function thus both of the most frequently used methods of modeling the role of money as an argument of the household utility function and as an argument of the production function are special cases of the model developed here this is a substantially less restrictive framework than that employed by fischer 1979 sweeney 1984 cohen 1985 and obstfeld 1985 each of whom has also examined the effects of anticipated policy in an economy where the velocity of money is variable 1 section ii discusses the utility and profit maximization problems facing households and firms respectively and shows how the behavior of economic agents is affected by the presence of real costs of financial management a dynamic analysis is undertaken in section iii and it is shown that the short run tobin effect may operate in reverse a summary concludes the paper throughout agents are assumed to possess perfect foresight ii the model preliminary analysis intuition imagine a world in which each household receives wage and dividend income at discrete intervals but desires to purchase and consume output continuously through time

optimal crowdsourcing contests abstract we study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up front to enter unlike all pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue in crowdsourcing contests the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality we give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution of contestant skills and the number of contestants we also compare crowdsourcing contests with more conventional means of procurement in this comparison crowdsourcing contests are relatively disadvantaged because the effort of losing contestants is wasted we show that the total wasted effort is at most the maximum effort which implies that crowdsourcing contests are a 2 approximation to an idealized model of conventional procurement

climate change industrial transformation and environmental growth traps this paper examines the potential interactions in the global economy between the impacts of climate change on productivity with existing technology and increasing returns in the development of less vulnerable and lower emission technology a simple specification is used in which the global economy can produce a single homogeneous consumption good with two different technologies the old technology has global diminishing returns to scale and depends on the use of fossil energy that gives rise to long lived damaging climate change the new technology has convex concave production due to set up cost and is not vulnerable to climate change through simulations we show that if output with the new technology does not grow fast enough to move through the phase of increasing returns then the economy could experience an environmental growth trap lingering at a low level of income indefinitely or achieving some progress but then getting driven back to a lower level of income by productivity reducing environmental degradation we discuss how the prospects of such a trap depend on the productivity and energy intensity of the old technology as well as the magnitude of the set up cost

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

lottery versus all pay auction contests a revenue dominance theorem abstract we allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way i e she can favor specific contestants by designing the contest rule in order to maximize total equilibrium effort resp revenue the two predominant contest regimes are considered all pay auctions and lottery contests for all pay auctions the optimal bias is derived in closed form it implies extreme competitive pressure among active contestants and low endogenous participation rates moreover the exclusion principle advanced by baye et al 1993 becomes obsolete in this case in contrast the optimally biased lottery induces a higher number of actively participating contestants due to softer competition our main result regarding total revenue comparison under the optimal biases reveals that the all pay auction revenue dominates the lottery contest for all levels of heterogeneity among contestants the incentive effect due to a strongly discriminating contest rule all pay auction dominates the participation effect due to a weakly discriminating contest rule lottery

shipwrecks and treasure hunters we examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore an island for a hidden prize of known value in every period until its discovery the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb if a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends players have a per period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search first as a benchmark for efficiency we solve the one player search problem second in the two player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over search a result akin to the tragedy of the commons however for players with intermediate levels of patience there is the possibility of inefficient under search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions finally with patient players several counterintuitive results can arise for example players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize

what money canʼt buy efficient mechanism design with costly signals i study the ex ante efficient allocation of a set of quality heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk neutral agents agents have independent private values which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality the designer faces a trade off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening because the cost sustained is wasted the optimal mechanism ranks agents based on their marginal contribution to social surplus and distributes objects to higher ranked agents the ranking is independent of the scarcity of objects or the extent of their heterogeneity if the hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing agents are ranked according to their expected values if hazard rates are decreasing and agents are symmetric the objects are allocated to the agents that sustain the highest costs in general optimal mechanisms combine both pooling and screening of values

efficient division of profits from complementary innovations abstract many products including microprocessors telecommunications devices computer software and on line auction services make use of multiple technologies each of which is essential to make or sell the product the owner of one technology benefits from the existence of complementary technologies we show that despite this externality the structure of payoffs that support efficient r d investment by duopolists racing to discover a single innovation generalizes to the structure that supports efficient investment for complementary innovations the paper also examines how alternative intellectual property regimes and legal institutions affect r d investment in complementary technologies the results have policy implications for the organization of r d the assessment of damages for patent infringement and allocations of value in patent pools

asymmetric contests with conditional investments rent seeking scenarios competitions for promotions and research and development r d races are examples of competitions in which participants expend resources regardless of whether they win or lose although similar in their all pay feature such competitions often differ in important dimensions these include the type of technologies employed in competition the type of asymmetries among competitors the degree to which expenditures are sunk and the number of prizes consider lobbying settings in which firms expend resources in order to influence a policymaker if expenditures take the form of monetary outlays and all firms have the same cost of capital then it is reasonable to think of firms marginal cost of influence as linear but if a firm has a reputational advantage and high costs of capital its lobbying technology may be more reasonably thought of as having convex costs relatively low marginal costs up to a moderate level of influence due to the reputational advantage and relatively high marginal costs at higher levels of influence due to the high costs of capital similarly the lobbying technology of a firm that is relatively unknown and has low costs of capital may be characterized by concave costs lobbying restrictions geographic location or preferential treatment by the policymaker further impact firms lobbying technologies inducing additional nonlinearities and asymmetries among firms in some lobbying settings firms also commit to expenditures conditional on a favorable outcome for example a firm may commit to building factories and creating new jobs if it is granted one of a limited number of manufacturing licenses thus the specification of firms lobbying technologies the type of asymmetries among firms the combination of unconditional and conditional investments and the number of eventual winners may change according to the lobbying setting studied the same is true for other competitions with an all pay feature in a competition for promotions workers often differ in their abilities experience and social skills more than one prize

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

the contractors game we develop a symmetric information auction model of multiproject contracting with costly bidding and increasing marginal performance costs when there are many potential contractors or only one job there is a zero expected profit symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies the winning bid at this equilibrium tends to rise perversely with the number of contractors when there are only two potential bidders and either two or three jobs multiple bids of a contractor at equilibrium are negatively correlated with each other the resulting equilibrium outcome tends to divide the market between the contractors in a manner that suggests anticompetitive behavior despite the absence of any collusion

a designer s choice between single prize and parallel tournaments in this article i theoretically and experimentally compare a designer s profits from two tournament designs the first design is a standard winner take all tournament with a single prize the second design features two winner take all parallel tournaments with different prizes where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing i develop a simple model that illustrates how the relative performances of these designs change as contestants abilities differ the theoretical model shows that the designer s profit is higher lower in the parallel tournament when contestants abilities differ greatly are similar i complement these findings with experimental evidence the experiments show that the parallel tournament is more profitable under high heterogeneity whereas under low heterogeneity the designer is better off with the single prize tournament furthermore high ability agents under participate and low ability agents over participate in the high prize tournament relative to the theoretical prediction jel c72 d82 j33 m51 m52

optimal auction design and r d abstract an indivisible object is to be procured through bidding from one of two prospective suppliers firms decide whether to invest in cost reduction before the bidding the procurer commits to a mechanism ahead of investment decisions by firms if the procurer can charge entry fees that may be discriminatory a sealed bid second price auction uniquely implements the first best outcome and is optimal for the buyer revenue equivalence holds when first best investments are symmetric however it breaks down when first best investments are asymmetric without entry fees the procurer may want to bid discriminate between ex ante identical firms to induce the favored firm to invest and become strong while the unfavored firm not to invest and stay weak this result runs counter to the earlier findings on discrimination in procurement auctions without pre contract r d the principal favors the weaker agent to induce stronger bid competition

contests for experimentation we study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation s feasibility and opponents outcomes we characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize sharing scheme and a disclosure policy a public winner takes all contest dominates public contests where any success is immediately disclosed with any other prize sharing scheme as well as winner takes all contests with any other disclosure policy yet jointly modifying prize sharing and disclosure can increase innovation in a broad class of mechanisms it is optimal to share the prize with disclosure following a certain number of successes under simple conditions a hidden equal sharing contest is optimal

the all pay auction with nonmonotonic payoff i model innovation contests as an all pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly r d investments and as a result there is no winner in such a case the winning payoff turns out to be nonmonotonic in own bid i derive the sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium in the mixed strategy equilibrium the support of the low value bidder is not continuous and both the high value and the low value bidders place an atom in the distinct lower bound of their respective support under symmetric valuation both bidders place an atom at zero these results can explain why one does not observe very low quality innovation in real life or why even symmetric firms may stay out of an innovation contest

contest with pre contest investment abstract in a standard noisy contest more competition more contestants leads to lower individual equilibrium effort we show that when contestants can make pre contest investment to enhance their competency neither equilibrium investment nor individual effort is monotonic in the number of contestants individual effort may increase with the level of participation

international transmission of anticipated inflation under alternative exchange rate regimes this paper studies the international transmission of anticipated inflation a two country two good two currency cash in advance model is used to examine analytically and numerically the consequences of changes in a country s inflation rate domestic monetary policy influences real activity at home through an inflation tax channel these real effects are transmitted to the foreign country via fluctuations in the real exchange rate under a flexible nominal exchange rate inflation is a beggar thy neighbor policy under a fixed nominal exchange rate each country suffers a welfare loss when one country inflates the quantitative results are fairly insensitive to variations in the cash credit mix used to finance investment expenditures 2001 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

attracting skeptical buyers negotiating for intellectual property rights expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property ip in principle confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use in practice sellers often waive confidentiality rights we provide an incomplete information explanation for the waiver of confidentiality rights that are valuable in complete information settings waiving sacrifices the protective value of confidentiality to gain greater buyer participation buyer skepticism which reduces participation arises endogenously from three elements asymmetric information regarding seller ip rent dissipation from competition for ip and ex post costs from expropriation lawsuits

auctions and information acquisition sealed bid or dynamic formats the value of an asset is generally not known a priori and it requires costly investments to be discovered in such contexts with endogenous information acquisition which selling procedure generates more revenues we show that dynamic formats such as ascending price or multistage auctions perform better than their static counterpart this is because dynamic formats allow bidders to observe the number of competitors left throughout the selling procedure thus even if competition appears strong ex ante it may turn out to be weak along the dynamic format thereby making the option to acquire information valuable this very possibility also induces the bidders to stay longer in the auction just to learn about the state of competition both effects boost revenues and our analysis provides a rationale for using dynamic formats rather than sealed bid ones

on the winner take all principle in innovation races what is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race should the winner take all or is it preferable that the original inventor shares the market with subsequent independent duplicators some recent papers in law and economics have argued that the latter more permissive solution is socially preferable under mild conditions we re examine that issue arguing that a permissive regime may turn the innovation race into a waiting game reducing the power of incentives and may invite socially wasteful duplicative r d expenditures in a model that accounts for these effects the winner take all system turns out to be preferable in a broad set of circumstances especially in highly innovative industries jel k11 l1 o34

incentivizing r d prize or subsidies abstract this paper studies the optimal design of r d contests a sponsor e g the us department of defense or the world health organization wants to improve the quality of the winning products to do so it partitions its budget between two schemes an inducement prize and efficiency enhancing subsidies to the firms competing in the contest prizes and subsidies have different functions and they provide complementary incentives in the optimally designed contest subsidies increase while the prize decreases if the innovation process is more challenging further sensible conditions are identified under which the optimal contest implements either a handicapping scheme by preferentially subsidizing the underdog or a national champion scheme by favoring the favorite our analysis yields a number of useful implications and sheds light on an array of r d incentive schemes such as the dod s design competitions and vaccine development incentives

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability we study contests with private information and identical contestants where contestants efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities the designer s revenue depends on the quality of the output and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality we characterize the equilibrium behavior outcomes and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory where the reward is contestant dependent contests we derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings where these conditions are satisfied

design competition through multidimensional auctions this article studies design competition in government procurement by developing a model of two dimensional auctions wherefirms bid on both price and quality and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer three auction schemes first score second score and second preferred offer are introduced and related to actual practices if the buyer can commit to a scoring rule in his best interest the resulting optimal scoring rule underrewards quality relative to the buyer s utility function and implements the optimal outcome for the buyer underfirst and second score auctions absent the commitment power the onlyfeasible scoring rule is the buyer s utility function under which 1 all three schemes yield the same expected utility to the buyer and 2 first and second score auctions induce the first best level of quality which turns out to be excessive from the buyer s point of view

motivating innovation the effect of loss aversion on the willingness to persist we investigate the willingness of individuals to persist at exploration when confronted by prolonged periods of negative feedback we design a two dimensional maze game and run a series of randomiz

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

dynamic behavior of capital accumulation in a cash in advance model abstract this paper analyzes the dynamic behavior of capital accumulation in stockman s cash in advance model if the cash in advance constraint applies only to consumption then money is superneutral along the transition path as well as in the long run alternatively if the cash in advance constraint applies to gross investment as well as consumption then a permanent increase in the rate of monetary growth reduces the steady state capital stock the effect on the speed of adjustment depends on the sign of a certain simple function of the parameters of preferences and technology

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

inefficiency as a strategic device in group contests against dominant opponents i introduction many strategic situations in economics and politics can be understood as contests rd nitzan and ueda 2009 a private good nitzan 1991a 1991b nitzan and ueda 2009 or a mixed good esteban and ray 2001 nitzan and ueda 2011 to a large extent the intensity of free riding or conversely the motivation for individuals to exert effort in a contest is shaped by the intra group incentive scheme or governance structure in standard contests incentives are inseparably linked to the sharing rule i e to the usually exogenous procedure by which the rents acquired in the contest are distributed within the group 1 in a number of economic applications however incentives to exert effort appear to be separate or are even willfully separated from the sharing rule phenomena such as team spirit akerlof and kranton 2005 identification with the group sherif 1966 bornstein and ben yossef 1994 peer pressure kandel and lazear 1992 or social norms to contribute to the social good elster 1989 are examples for this separation alternatively groups could apply selective incentive schemes based on relative performance lazear and rosen 1981 or marginally align individual and group incentives nitzan and ueda 2009 in all these scenarios individuals behave cooperatively i e in the interest of the entire group even if the final distribution of rents follows a standard sharing rule mechanisms to induce cooperation often are costly sanchez pages and straub 2010 may only work under restrictive conditions che and gale 2003 require strategic coordination among individuals hardin 1995 or cannot be ensured to be obeyed unanimously oliver 1980 this might explain why they do not emerge universally or automatically the point we make in this article is even stronger even if there existed perfect and costless solutions to within group free riding problems which will henceforth be called intra group efficient incentive schemes igeis they might not always be adopted why would a group for which an igeis is freely available not wish to utilize it but rather adopt an apparently inefficient governance structure by definition an igeis internalizes all within group externalities and seems to be a safe way to increase one s payoffs however this reasoning ignores repercussions that arise in strategic environments like contests suppose for example that the competing groups have sufficiently unequal strengths say due to unequal sizes or different comparative advantages then the weaker group may refrain from implementing a costless igeis to avoid the contest from heating up adoption of an igeis makes a group more efficient and consequently more aggressive in the contest on one hand higher efforts constitute a cost on the other they affect the share of the rent that this group can hope to acquire or the likelihood of succeeding in the contest 2 an igeis clearly enhances a group s prospects if the other group did not change its behavior however if members of the opponent group reply with a sufficiently strong increase in their contest efforts this diminishes and may potentially more than offset the gains from one s own increased efforts whether this happens depends on the direction of the strategic interaction between groups the detrimental firing back effect can only become relevant if the other group s efforts are sufficiently strong strategic complements to one s own efforts

procurement when price and quality matter a buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure xed cost and marginal cost of providing quality we characterize the buyer s optimal buying mechanism we then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining scoring auctions can extract a signifi cant proportion of the buyer s strategic surplus the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the e cient auction bargaining does less well and often does worse than the e cient auction

optimal design of research contests procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations and if the buyer cannot extract up front payments from suppliers we study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment an auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one

investment decisions under first and second price auctions a seller of an indivisible object faces multiple buyers whose valuations are a function of their unobservable prior investments a second price auction generates efficient investment but the seller prefers a first price sealed bid auction which induces inefficient investment

carrots and sticks prizes and punishments in contests i introduction contests are widely used to model political lobbying sports competitions job promotions and r d races in most cases the contest s organizer has some control over the structure of rewards and punishments teachers determine who passes and who fails the exam a company sets rules about promotions and layoffs and sport governing bodies choose the number of teams advancing to a higher league and the number of those relegated to a lower one in this paper we characterize the optimal prize structure in a contest where the designer can use both rewards carrots and punishments sticks in order to motivate participants to exert effort 1 although both rewards and punishments are part of many existing incentive contracts the literature on contests focused on the incentive role of rewards because a contest that uses some punishments can be replicated by one that uses only rewards and yields the same incentives but this equivalence breaks down if the contest designer faces a budget constraint and if both rewards and punishments are costly the main focus of the present paper is to study contest design when the designer is budget constrained and it is costly to punish or reward players costly punishments appear in many situations for example in labor tournaments a firm usually incurs costs when firing workers who perform poorly e g worker compensation production disruption loss of clients and usually face search and replacement costs e g think about a faculty denying tenure to some candidates in other instances punishments are less costly to implement e g relegation in sport tournaments and we also briefly deal with this set up we assume here that the designer has a limited budget which means that costly punishments cannot be arbitrarily high subject to her budget constraint the designer determines the number and size of prizes punishments in order to maximize the participants expected total effort in particular some prizes can be positive rewards or negative punishments given the prize structure players choose their effort levels in order to maximize their expected payoff it is important to note that in a contest with n participants the marginal effect of each of n prizes on the participants total effort is different and can be either positive or negative if the marginal effect of the k th prize is positive its value given a budget constraint should be positive reward or zero and if the marginal effect is negative its value should be negative punishment or zero thus given that the contest designer has a limited budget he will prefer to distribute the entire prize sum to the prize with the highest marginal effect on the participants total effort relative to its cost in this paper we show that the relative effectiveness of punishments compared to rewards crucially depends on the curvature of the distribution of player abilities exploiting results about normalized spacings among order statistics developed by barlow and prochan 1966 we first revisit one of the main results in moldovanu and sela 2001 if punishment is not feasible the optimal prize structure offers a single reward to the top performer if rewards are not feasible we then show that the designer should only punish the player with the lowest performance if the distribution of abilities has an increasing hazard or failure rate if this last condition is not satisfied more punishments may be optimal if the designer can punish as well as reward the optimal prize structure will depend on the relative marginal cost of punishments and on the distribution of the players abilities for example if the marginal cost of punishments is the same as the marginal cost of rewards it is optimal to punish the worst performing player if the distribution of abilities is convex if that player is punished even high types will work hard to avoid performing worst because they know that there is a relatively high probability that competitors also have high types

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

endogenous growth and the welfare costs of inflation a reconsideration abstract many economists share the view that the welfare costs of moderate rates of money growth cum inflation are generally modest or small this paper investigates the sensitivity of this result to alternative model specifications and behavioral assumptions we first construct a monetary endogenous growth model with romer s 1986 style of capital externality and find that the real growth rate effect is substantially large thus lending to much higher welfare costs than those in existing studies to investigate the robustness of the result we then conduct a series of experiments by exploring the romer model with an alternative specification of money demand and a class of other endogenous growth models it is demonstrated quite consistently that our finding is confirmed in these models

incentives and problem uncertainty in innovation contests an empirical analysis contests are a historically important and increasingly popular mechanism for encouraging innovation a central concern in designing innovation contests is how many competitors to admit using a unique data set of 9 661 software contests we provide evidence of two coexisting and opposing forces that operate when the number of competitors increases greater rivalry reduces the incentives of all competitors in a contest to exert effort and make investments at the same time adding competitors increases the likelihood that at least one competitor will find an extreme value solution we show that the effort reducing effect of greater rivalry dominates for less uncertain problems whereas the effect on the extreme value prevails for more uncertain problems adding competitors thus systematically increases overall contest performance for high uncertainty problems we also find that higher uncertainty reduces the negative effect of added competitors on incentives thus uncertainty and the nature of the problem should be explicitly considered in the design of innovation tournaments we explore the implications of our findings for the theory and practice of innovation contests this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

all pay auctions with a buy price option all pay auctions this paper studies all pay auctions in which there is a buy price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified price we analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first and second price all pay auctions with the buy price option while the optimal buy price in the second price is higher than are those in the first price all pay auction both formats maintain the same expected profit with an endogenous entry process all pay auctions with the buy price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted price selling mechanism jel d44 l11 l81

anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in advance economy abstract an economy is constructed in which the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the rate of inflation as a result that is directly opposite the usual conclusion

the impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic r d alliance this paper investigates the impact of royalty revision on incentives and profits in a two stage research and development r d stage and marketing stage alliance with a marketer and an innovator the marketer offers royalty contracts to the innovator we find that the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts offered by the marketer we show that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then revise the royalty rate up later otherwise she should do the opposite we identify two major effects of royalty revision first royalty revision provides the marketer with a flexibility to dynamically adjust royalty rates across the two stages of the alliance to better align the innovator s incentives this incentive realigning effect improves the marketer s profit second royalty revision makes it harder for the marketer to obtain private information from the innovator because the innovator worries that the marketer will take advantage of the information to revise the initial contract to a more favorable one to herself later this information revealing effect hurts the marketer s profit we characterize in what kind of alliances marketers would benefit the most from royalty revision so that managers should clearly establish the expectation for royalty revision and in what kind of alliances markerters would not benefit from royalty revision so that managers should commit not to revise the initial royalty contract with royalty contracts that are contingent on the r d outcome of the r d stage we find that contingent contract structure could be either substitutable by fully capturing the incentive re aligning effect or complementary by weakening the information revealing effect to royalty revision depending on whether the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage managers may need to use a contingent contract if possible either to replace or with royalty revision accordingly to improve profits this paper was accepted by kamalini ramdas entrepreneurship and innovation

entry and r d in procurement contracting abstract a model of competitive procurement and contracting is presented in this paper the key features of the model include precontract r d an endogenous number of homogeneous firms and sealed bid auction rules both diminishing and constant returns to scale drs and crs in r d expenditure technologies are considered i find that the sealed bid first price auction fpa is equivalent to the second price auction spa under drs technology the revenue equivalence theorems breaks down under crs because multiple equilibria arise in the r d stage when spa is used howerer spa yields a unique perfect equilibrium given sufficient heterogeneity among potential firms the free entry perfect equilibrium is also characterized the buyer prefers free entry through an appropriate selection of the reservation price

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

innovation market structure and the holdup problem investment incentives and coordination abstract i analyze the innovation incentives under monopoly and duopoly provision of horizontally differentiated products purchased via bilateral negotiations integrating the market structure and innovation literature with the holdup literature i show that competition can improve local incentives for non contractible investment because innovation levels are generally strategic substitutes however there can be multiple duopoly equilibria in some circumstances monopoly can provide a coordination device that can lead to greater expected welfare despite inferior local innovation incentives the conditions for this to be the case however are quite restrictive

markets for ideas prize structure entry limits and the design of ideation contests contests are a popular mechanism for the procurement of innovation in marketing design and other creative industries firms use freelance marketplaces to organize contests and obtain high quality ideas for ads new products and even business strategies from participants a central question faced by contest sponsors is how to appropriately structure prizes and entry regulations i develop an empirical model of idea generation ideation contests and investigate the impact of the number of prizes prize amount and submission limit on participation and quality outcomes using data from a popular marketing ideation platform the model explains participant submission decisions jury ratings and sponsor rankings of winning submissions counterfactuals reveal the impact of design parameters on outcomes and provide guidance for the optimal design of ideation contests and platforms

the short run tobin effect in a monetary optimizing model in an economy in which households face a cash in advance constraint the nominal interest rate acts like a tax on consumption to the extent that investment is financed from current earnings and so escapes the interest rate tax households will defer their consumption when the nominal interest rate is high a short run tobin effect results capital accumulates most rapidly when the interest rate is thought to be high relative to its past and future values

performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank order tournaments field evidence and implications for tournament design tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation we study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment the performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities precisely conforming to theoretical predictions most participants respond negatively whereas the highest skilled contestants respond positively in counterfactual simulations we interpret a number of tournament design policies number of competitors prize allocation and structure number of divisions open entry and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer

crowdsourcing city government using tournaments to improve inspection accuracy can open tournaments improve the quality of city services the proliferation of big data makes it possible to use predictive analytics to better target services like hygiene inspections but city governments rarely have the in house talent needed for developing prediction algorithms cities could hire consultants but a cheaper alternative is to crowdsource competence by making data public and offering a reward for the best algorithm this paper provides a simple model suggesting that open tournaments dominate consulting contracts when cities have a reasonable tolerance for risk and when there is enough labor with low opportunity costs of time we also illustrate how tournaments can be successful by reporting on a boston based restaurant hygiene prediction tournament that we helped coordinate the boston tournament yielded algorithms at low cost that proved reasonably accurate when tested out of sample on hygiene inspections occurring after the algorithms were submitted we draw upon our experience in working with boston to provide practical suggestions for governments and other organizations seeking to run prediction tournaments in the future

favoring the winner or loser in repeated contests should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player s effort by artificially boosting the underdog s chances we apply this type of handicapping to a two period repeated contest between employees in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first period in this setting employees are strategic and forward looking such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first period contest result on the second period contest and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly the manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy if employees abilities are sufficiently different favoring the first period loser in the second period increases the total effort over both periods however if abilities are sufficiently similar we find the opposite result occurs total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first period winner

incentive and sampling effects in procurement auctions with endogenous number of bidders abstract we study an auction contest for a procurement of innovation firms exert effort and the resulting quality of innovation is ex ante uncertain given this uncertainty there is a trade off regarding the number of participating firms in the contest increasing the number of firms reduces each firm s chance of winning the auction leading the firms to reduce effort level meanwhile the chance of obtaining a high quality of innovation increases with the number of firms due to the randomness of the quality thus the procurer faces a nontrivial problem of how many firms to invite we show that in the high level of randomness it is optimal for the procurer to invite many firms as the randomness vanishes however inviting only two firms is optimal we also show that a fixed prize tournament may outperform the auction when the randomness is large

a blotto game with incomplete information we consider a blotto game with incomplete information a pure strategy symmetric monotonic bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed

modeling the effects of mergers in procurement in procurement settings mergers among suppliers reduce buyers choice sets and can harm buyers by eliminating their preferred supplier or reducing their negotiating leverage i develop a stochastic economic model that predicts the effects of mergers based on information that commonly is available to antitrust authorities i derive general expressions for the ex ante expected changes in price buyer utility and supplier profit each becomes tractable under certain distributional assumptions the model predicts that average prices will increase by more than 40 due to the recently litigated acquisition of power reviews by bazaarvoice in the absence of an effective remedy

endogenous availability cartels and merger in an equilibrium price dispersion abstract in a generalization of the butters advertising model the equilibrium involves one firm that advertises at least twice as much as the others who all advertise equally a cartel formation game is considered and any equilibrium cartel involves at least two but generally not all firms in one equilibrium only the largest firms join the cartel a merger game is considered and in equilibrium the large firm buys the other firms in sequence with discounting equalizing the expected utility of the targets and prices rising over time journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l11 l13 l41

moral hazard in repeated procurement of services this paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a two period model with a potential repeated agency relationship in the first period there is an incumbent who provides a service in the second period there is a contest stage in which the principal selects the next service provider the agents effort is non contractible and the contest stage is the mechanism to mitigate potential moral hazard problems the principal takes account of the past service effort in the contest stage by choosing the weight of past effort and the degree of substitutability between past and current efforts the results show that when the principal does not value contest effort considering past effort as the relevant effort in the contest is optimal when the principal values contest effort and effort cost increases decreasing substitutability between efforts is optimal

competitive policy development we present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies yet agree on certain common objectives policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals these investments are specific to a given proposal which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power competition undermines this agenda power forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker this beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals jel d72 d73 d78 e61 during the early years of the new deal president franklin delano roosevelt faced an enormous challenge he believed that dramatic policy innovation was urgently needed on a wide range of issues including agriculture trade banking employment and social insurance however although roosevelt was well versed in policy crafting workable proposals for such a far reaching agenda was well beyond his capacity or that of his immediate advisors instead the president had to rely on a broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies although these individuals shared some common goals e g ending the great depression they also had deep seated ideological disagreements among themselves and with the president about what policies the federal government should pursue classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency weber 1991 famously argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a mere dilettante when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors more recently scholars

the tradeoff between performance and quitting in high power tournaments tournaments may be characterized by the performance they induce as well as by the rate of quitting and dropouts of participants although most of the attention in the literature is on the performance induced by high power incentives there are many daily situations in which dropouts and quitting are a major concern using a field experiment in schools and a model of dynamic tournament we examine the effect of different levels of rewards on the rate of quitting our experiment indicates that there is a possible tradeoff between performance and quitting strong incentives tournaments induced participants to exert more effort and exhibit a better performance but at the same time it induces a higher rate of quitting we present a multi stage tournament model that gives rise to a similar characterization jel c93 c73 d8 j30

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

debt and creative destruction why could subsidizing corporate debt be optimal the existing theoretical literature provides little justification for a corporate debt subsidy we illustrate the welfare benefit of this subsidy and study how the social costs and benefits change with the duration of industry distress in our model two firms engage in socially wasteful competition for survival in a declining industry firms differ on two dimensions exogenous productivity and endogenously chosen amount of debt financing resulting in a two dimensional war of attrition debt financing increases incentives to exit which although costly for the firm is socially beneficial these benefits decline as industry distress shortens our normative model sheds light on why the debt tax subsidy still persists around the world analogously the model can also rationalize a seemingly ad hoc feature of the u s tax system which subsidizes the conflict of interest between debt and equity regarding firm liquidation this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association