tax structure and corruption cross country evidence one common feature of the current literature on corruption especially the empirical contributions to it is the emphasis on the exogenous determinants of corruption which are generally beyond the direct control of governments to date little is known about how the design of government policy potentially affects the level of corruption in a country even though there is growing recognition that the design and administration of tax and spending policies play important roles in promoting or discouraging corrupt practices using a large sample of countries over the 1995 2009 period this paper fills the gap by conducting the first analysis in the literature to examine the significance of the tax structure as measured by both tax mix and tax complexity in determining corruption our results suggest the following 1 countries relying more heavily on direct taxes tend to exhibit less corruption than countries that rely more heavily on indirect taxes and 2 countries with more complex tax systems tend to be more corrupt than countries with less complex tax systems these results are robust across alternative measures of corruption and tax structure and alternative estimations with and without correcting the potential endogeneity issue of the tax structure variables

shifts in the composition of government spending in response to external debt burden abstract this paper examines the effects of external public debt burden on the composition of public spending in a sample of 47 developing countries for 1972 2001 we specify a system of equations for the relative spending shares of six economic categories and estimate it using several estimation methods and samples we find support for the adverse effect of the debt burden on capital expenditure in the full sample and in the middle east north africa and sub saharan africa subsamples where the debt burden was relatively high among components of current expenditure increased debt burden shifted the shares against nonwage goods services and subsidy and transfers while leaving the share of politically sensitive category of wages and salaries unscathed in most cases

corruption and government size a disaggregated analysis using annual state level data over 1983 1987 this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices our objectives are twofold first we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state local sector in each state second we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office our results are generally supportive of becker s crime and punishment model regarding the primary focus of the paper our results show that government size in particular spending by state governments does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption

reducing bureaucratic corruption interdisciplinary perspectives on what works abstract this article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti corruption policies with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants drawing on the work of economists political scientists sociologists and anthropologists we examine seven policy categories 1 rewards and penalties 2 monitoring 3 restructuring bureaucracies 4 screening and recruiting 5 anti corruption agencies 6 educational campaigns and 7 international agreements notably rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti corruption policies nevertheless we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring including anti corruption audits and e governance in addition adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption an emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature we conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem it cannot be treated in the long term with individual level solutions

the role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires abstract we study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of buenos aires argentina during 1996 97 we find a well defined negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption prices paid by hospitals for basic homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown after this period prices increase but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown relative to the precrackdown period higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal during the first phase of the crackdown but have a negative and well defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels the last phase of the crackdown controlling for fixed effects we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20 these results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of gary becker and george stigler

time and punishment an intertemporal model of crime if an increase in the rate at which a criminal commits crimes lowers the expected time until detection the income from crime net of expected fines must be discounted at a rate that varies with the crime rate this paper models the criminal s choice of the optimal crime rate under such conditions it is shown that irrespective of the criminal s attitude toward risk an increase in the probability of detection is more likely to deter crime than a comparable increase in penalties other implications of the model for the optimal enforcement of laws are also explored

rent seeking in u s government budgets 1900 88 a measure of waste from the competitive rent seeking activity of special interest groups in federal state and local budgets was calculated over the period 1900 88 this period in u s fiscal history is characterized by constitutional changes that have made for more transparency in governmental fiscal activities and for greater diffusion of taxes the xvi amendment to the constitution created the progressive individual income tax the corporate income tax was judged to be an excise tax in 1909 and passed the test of constitutionality high marginal tax rates are a justification for a high average level of taxation the full employment act of 1946 insitutionalized government deficits as a means of meeting a political objective as a result opportunities for rent seeking through budgetary reallocations rose in the united states in the first two decades of the 20th century waste at all levels of government represented about 10 percent of incremental national output today waste is three times that amount the transparency and diffusion of taxes are highest at the federal level and least at the local level rent seeking through budgetary reallocation has followed the public purse one explanation for the observed centralization of government in the 20th century may be that opportunities to concentrate benefits and diffuse taxes are highest at the federal level finally the withdrawal of resources from the productive economy to pursue rent seeking in government budgets lowers the rate of real economic growth i find that rent seeking through budget reallocations has had a significant and large negative effect on the growth rate

transfers or public good provision a political allocation perspective abstract employing an extended rent seeking model this paper focuses on the problem faced by an optimizing politician of allocating a given budget among monetary transfers to individuals monetary transfers to groups and public good transfers to groups

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

corruption is bad for growth even in the united states we estimate the impact of corruption on growth of output per worker in u s states we improve on existing studies of the cost of corruption by using a better specified empirical model focusing on a study population that is less likely to be affected by parameter heterogeneity and controlling for endogeneity using political variables to instrument for corruption we find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment across the states

corruption product market competition and institutional quality empirical evidence from the u s states this article argues that the effect of corruption on competition is dependent on the institutional environment when institutions are relatively efficient observed corruption is likely to be associated with relatively less competition conversely in areas with low quality institutions e g excessively burdensome regulations corruption may lead to relatively more competition i employ unique data on competition corruption and institutional quality across u s states from 1997 to 2009 and report that a higher level of corruption is associated with relatively more competition in states with low levels of institutional quality however as institutional quality improves the effect of corruption worsens thus institutional quality is a fundamental determinant of the corruption competition relationship improving institutional quality while at the same time reducing corruption will increase competition and likely improve economic outcomes jel d73 o17 l26

corruption in russia abstractwe analyze the determinants of corruption in russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 russian regions for the period 2004 13 we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels corruption declines as relative salaries rise yet at strongly diminishing rates furthermore we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement education levels and unemployment rates

an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection this article presents an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection based on individual level data drawn from the internal revenue service 1982 and 1985 taxpayer compliance measurement programs i specify a model consisting of two equations the first measures the extent of evasion the second the fraction of evasion detected the empirical analysis explores the effects of income the marginal tax rate and various socioeconomic characteristics on filer evasion behavior and it assesses the variability in detection rates among irs examiners finally i use the empirical estimates to construct new estimates of the income tax gap the new estimates are very close to the previous irs estimates

transitions at different moments in time a spatial probit approach this paper adopts a spatial probit approach to explain interaction effects among cross sectional units when the dependent variable takes the form of a binary response variable and transitions from state 0 to 1 occur at different moments in time the model has two spatially lagged variables one for units that are still in state 0 and one for units that had already transferred to state 1 the parameters are estimated on observations for those units that are still in state 0 at the start of the different time periods whereas observations on units after they transferred to state 1 are discarded just as in the literature on duration modeling furthermore neighboring units that had not yet transferred may have a different impact from units that had already transferred we illustrate our approach with an empirical study of the adoption of inflation targeting for a sample of 58 countries over the period 1985 2008 copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd

do neoliberal policies deter political corruption this article probes the relationship between neoliberal economic poli cies and political corruption focusing in particular on the impact of trade and invest ment policies regulatory policy and the overall size of the public sector on corruption using a large cross national data set from the mid to late 1990s we test the neolib eral hypotheses that market oriented economic policies are associated with lower lev els of political corruption and state intervention in the economy with higher levels consistent with the neoliberal argument we find that open trade and investment pol icies and low effective regulatory burdens do correlate with lower levels of political corruption however we find no consistent relationship between the aggregate size of the public sector and political corruption while the neoliberal hypothesis on polit ical corruption has initial empirical support its lessons cannot be applied wholesale market oriented states may be less corrupt but interventionist states as measured by public spending are not necessarily more corrupt

notes on bribery and the control of corruption abstract existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem when an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested he has to take into account the fact that he may in turn be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain but from the other side the purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion having done so it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption these turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests

seeking rents by setting rents the political economy of rent seeking in recent years there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators regulators howeve r may also be expected and indeed have been shown to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are themselves rent se ekers in this paper the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators firms and consumers within a rent s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self motiva ted the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants policy implications are drawn where appropriate copyright 1987 by royal economic society

on the economic incentives for taking bribes this paper presents an empirical analysis of the factors affecting bribe taking by public officials factors influencing the acceptance of bribes include the probability of being convicted severity of punishment government salary relative to private sector income the demonstration effect and the unemployment rate our results indicate that higher probability of being convicted discourages the acceptance of bribes as does more severe punishment low relative earnings high unemployment and the demonstration effect of aggregate advertising all lead to increased bribe taking

central bank reform liberalization and inflation in transition economies an international perspective this paper develops extensive new data on the legal independence of new central banks in 26 former socialist economies fse this data is constructed using the codification system for measuring legal independence developed in cukierman webb and neyapti 1992 and in chapter 19 of cukierman 1992 this makes it comparable with earlier data on central bank independence cbi in the industrial democracies and in non fse developing countries and permits experimentation with alternative indices of cbi like those reviewed in eijffinger and van keulen 1995 the new indices of independence indicate that central bank cb reform in the fse during the nineties has been quite ambitious in spite of the large price shocks induced by the transformation from plan to market reformers in those countries chose to create central banks with levels of legal independence that are substantially higher on average than those of developed economies during the eighties based on data from 1989 through 1998 the evidence in the paper suggests that cbi is unrelated to inflation during the early stages of liberalization but for sufficiently high and sustained levels of liberalization and controlling for variables like price decontrols and wars legal cbi and inflation are significantly and negatively related these findings are consistent with the view that legal cbi no matter how high cannot contain the powerful inflationary impact of wide scale liberalization of formerly controlled prices but once the process of liberalization has gathered sufficient momentum legal independence becomes effective in slowing inflation down and the cumulative liberalization index developed by de melo et al 1996 becomes relatively less important the paper also presents evidence on factors that affect the level of cbi and examines the relation between inflation and cbi within a broader sample composed of the transition and of the developed economies

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

the globalization of liberalization policy diffusion in the international political economy one of the most important developments over the past three decades has been the spread of liberal economic ideas and policies throughout the world these policies have affected the lives of millions of people yet our most sophisticated political economy models do not adequately capture influences on these policy choices evidence suggests that the adoption of liberal economic practices is highly clustered both temporally and spatially we hypothesize that this clustering might be due to processes of policy diffusion we think of diffusion as resulting from one of two broad sets of forces one in which mounting adoptions of a policy alter the benefits of adopting for others and another in which adoptions provide policy relevant information about the benefits of adopting we develop arguments within these broad classes of mechanisms construct appropriate measures of the relevant concepts and test their effects on liberalization and restriction of the current account the capital account and the exchange rate regime our findings suggest that domestic models of foreign economic policy making are insufficient the evidence shows that policy transitions are influenced by international economic competition as well as the policies of a country s sociocultural peers we interpret the latter influence as a form of channeled learning reflecting governments search for appropriate models for economic policy

fiscal consequences of public corruption empirical evidence from state bond ratings empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention we empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the united states on state bond ratings which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt after controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

does inflation targeting make a difference in developing countries we evaluate the treatment effect of inflation targeting in thirteen developing countries that have adopted this policy by the end of 2004 using a variety of propensity score matching methods we show that on average inflation targeting has large and significant effects on lowering both inflation and inflation variability in these thirteen countries however the effectiveness of inflation targeting on lowering inflation is found to be quite heterogeneous the performance of a given inflation targeting regime can be affected by country characteristics such as government s fiscal position central bank s desire to limit the movements of exchange rate its willingness to meet the preconditions of policy adoption and the time length since the policy adoption

a stable international monetary system emerges inflation targeting is bretton woods reversed a stable international monetary system has emerged since the early 1990s a large number of industrial and a growing number of developing countries now have domestic inflation targets administered by independent and transparent central banks these countries place few restrictions on capital mobility and allow their exchange rates to float the domestic focus of monetary policy in these countries does not have any obvious international cost inflation targeters have lower exchange rate volatility and less frequent sudden stops of capital flows than similar countries that do not target inflation inflation targeting countries also do not have current accounts or international reserves that look different from other countries this system was not planned and does not rely on international coordination there is no role for a center country the imf or gold it is durable in contrast to other monetary regimes no country has been forced to abandon an inflation targeting regime succinctly it is the diametric opposite of the post war system bretton woods reversed

does too much government spending depress the economic development of transition economies evidences from dynamic panel threshold analysis abstractthis paper investigates the relationship between government size and economic growth and determines the optimal level of government spending to maximize economic growth the paper applies a

the economic effect of corruption in italy a regional panel analysis abstractthe economic effect of corruption in italy a regional panel analysis regional studies this paper provides a within country analysis of the impact of corruption on economic growth using a panel of italian regions from 1968 to 2011 through a robust measure of corruption this measure is averaged over five year periods to reduce short run fluctuations and probable delayed effects the results show a significant negative impact of corruption on long term growth in all specifications both on average and for each italian region as a consequence a zero level of corruption is growth maximizing this effect is non linear such that the negative impact of corruption on growth becomes less intense as corruption increases

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

semi structural models of advertising competition we propose a semi structural discrete choice model that can be used to estimate static or dynamic decision rules it is particularly useful in strategic contexts when games involve a rich set of choices when private information is correlated and when one wants to uncover the effect of historic behavior on for example prices sales and profits we apply our discrete choice estimator to study decision rules for a dynamic game of price and advertising competition and we evaluate the long run consequences of those rules

winning the local vote the effectiveness of constituency campaign spending in great britain 1983 1992 much recent analysis of british politics has assumed explicitly or implicitly that constituency campaigns have no impact upon an electorate that draws on an increasingly nationalized media for its information we employ data on constituency campaign spending to challenge this interpretation local party campaigners are rational in their use of funds spending most in seats where the competition is close and least where there is little hope of winning what is more campaign spending is clearly associated with voting increasing support for the spending party and decreasing support for its rivals contrary to the accepted wisdom local campaign spending can result in important shifts in the vote however local campaigning seems to be of much more value to challengers than to incumbents

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed

do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption cross country quantile regression estimates abstract we examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross sectional data for nearly one hundred countries while the causes of corruption have drawn economists interest in recent years our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries for instance we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature but also provide new conclusions in many cases quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from ols regressions among the most corrupt nations larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption but greater democracy seems to alleviate it our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations