competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

economies of traffic density in the deregulated airline industry this article estimates a structural model of competition among hub and spoke airlines in order to measure the strength of economies of traffic density on individual route segments we find that economies of density were strong during the sample period fourth quarter 1985 stronger than previous estimates by douglas caves laurits christensen and michael tretheway derived from traditional cost function methods we also find that the airlines competitive behavior was far from collusive in the markets under study markets requiring a connection at a hub airport our structural model also provides plausible estimates of demand elasticities we use our estimates to provide a cost based rationale for the major changes in the structure of the industry following deregulation for example the increase in airport and industry wide concentration and the increase in competition at the city pair market level and to simulate the effects of a merger of airlines that share a hub

are airports engines of economic development a dynamic panel data approach this paper applies the dynamic panel data generalized method of moments estimator to the data on commercial passenger air traffic at all primary airports in the united states to evaluate the impact of traffic volume and number of destinations served with non stop flights on the key indicators of regional economic development we find that number of destinations served with non stop flights has a much clearer and more robust impact on level of employment number of business establishments and average wage in the region passenger traffic volume affects employment and average wage but not number of establishments at the sample median connecting a metropolitan statistical area with an extra destination keeping everything else constant creates 98 jobs and facilitates the opening of four new business establishments that employ people the corresponding numbers for the sample mean are 223 jobs and 15 businesses the impact of air travel on regional economic development is influenced by competition on the

the limits of competition housing insurance in switzerland abstract in switzerland there are seven cantons where the housing insurance market is competitive while in the 19 others there are local state monopolies this paper compares the price performance relationship of these different market forms it is shown that for a very similar product the state monopolies charge 70 lower prices that they spend substantially more on fire prevention and that they have much lower damage rates one of the main reasons for the higher prices of the private insurance companies is the fact that they spend considerably more on sales and administrative costs the housing insurance market is thus a classic example of a situation where state monopoly outperforms private sector competition

incumbent response to entry by low cost carriers in the u s airline industry this article studies incumbent price response to entry by low cost carriers in the u s airline industry i find that legacy carrier incumbents decrease their mean airfare 10th percentile airfare and 90th percentile airfare following entry by a low cost carrier airfares decrease by a larger percentage at the right tail of the incumbents price distribution than at the left tail suggesting that increased competition from low cost carrier entrants leads to lower price dispersion

airport presence as product differentiation there is now widespread recognition that an airline s operation at a given airport greatly affects its competitive position on routes flown out of that airport see m levine 1987 s borenstein 1989 s morrison and c winston 1989 and myself 1989 among many others airlines typically defend any competitive advantage as stemming from the lower costs and better service that are said to be generated by hub and spoke route systems airline critics typically respond that airlines gain market power by dominating individual airports both views are at least plausible huband spoke transportation networks reduce the number of round trips necessary to carry a given number of passengers on a given set of itineraries while increasing the number of passenger miles flown if there are sufficient economies of scale in plane size then the advantages of hubbing can overcome the disadvantage in passenger miles resulting in lower total costs by pooling passengers with different ultimate destinations a hubbed system can also offer more frequent flights than would be economically feasible under a nonstop system it also appears however that airlines gain other advantages from a large presence at an airport incumbent airlines are the major source of financing for many airports and therefore gain a large degree of bureaucratic control over airport operations this control may enable them to block the entry or expansion of rivals airlines with a large presence in a given city also gain advantages from frequent flyer plans and nonlinear travel agent commission schedules see again levine and others if the bureaucratic and marketing advantages of airport presence are sufficient to prevent most attempts at entry then incumbents may gain the ability to exercise traditional market power by restricting output and driving up prices this paper argues that both simple costreducing and naive market power stories are inappropriate for the airline industry i present a model in which consumers are willing to pay a premium for the services of the dominant airline this premium may be related to a number of factors including flight frequency frequent flier miles and travel agent commission overrides this model has the advantage of treating oligopoly product differentiation in an explicit way of treating price as an endogenous variable and of allowing for airport presence to affect both costs and demand

price discrimination in the airline market the effect of market concentration we test the hypothesis that price discrimination increases with competition in the airline market using a large cross section of tickets offered by several carriers on various routes we approximate price discrimination with marginal implicit prices of ticket restrictions that carriers typically use to price discriminate saturday night stayover re quirements and advanced purchase discounts we find that the restrictions are associated with lower airfares but that the discounts are smaller on routes with higher market concentration the results suggest that price dispersion attributed to ticket restrictions increases as markets becomemore competitive

the groves scheme profit sharing and moral hazard considered in this paper is the problem of intrafirm resource allocation two incentive schemes the groves scheme and profit sharing have been presented in the literature as ways of dealing with this problem under conditions of asymmetric information in the absence of effort aversion by division managers it has been shown that truth telling forms a dominant strategy equilibrium using the groves scheme and a nash equilibrium using profit sharing the analysis in this paper allows for the problem of moral hazard effort aversion as well as the problem of asymmetric information it is shown that for a deterministic case in which the headquarters seeks to maximize a measure of total profits gross of divisional rewards a reinterpreted groves scheme will yield a dominant equilibrium at this equilibrium the headquarters implicitly considers the division managers effort levels as a cost to the firm it is also shown that in the presence of moral hazard profit sharing will not generally yield a nash equilibrium furthermore profit sharing may encourage the transmission of misinformation by a division manager so as to change the division s capital allocation and reduce the effort level subsequently selected by the manager

the economics of hubs the case of monopoly in this paper we study the optimization problem of an unregulated air carrier which is given the exclusive right to satisfy demand for air travel between any pair of cities it chooses a network of connections and a set of prices to maximize profits thus both network design and prices are endogenous we characterize the solution to this optimization problem when demands and costs are symmetric our main result is that if there are economies of density in the number of individuals travelling between two directly connected cities the optimal network is either a hub of size n 1 or one in which every pair of cities is connected directly

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

deregulating european airlines deregulating european airlines francis mcgowan and paul seabright one of the industries with the greatest potential to benefit from the single european market is civil aviation which has been highly regulated by european governments the deregulation of civil aviation in the us since the late 1970s has provided valuable evidence about the nature of the airline industry and its response to the liberalization of conditions of entry by new carriers we examine the us experience and look at the changing regulatory framework for the european industry we also consider the main sources of market failure in air transport the lessons of the us experience are threefold first deregulation can in principle produce major gains to consumers without damaging the long run profitability of carriers by reducing the high costs of operation of european airlines second congestion problems especially the availability of landing slots at airports need to be managed effectively to prevent incumbent carriers squeezing out new entrants we recommend a system of slot auctions to achieve this third in spite of relatively low sunk costs of entry to the industry there remain significant opportunities for the exercise of market power by incumbent carriers deregulation of entry needs therefore to be supplemented by a vigorous competition policy especially with regard to the approval of mergers

on the adoption of new technologies we investigate the incentives of private firms to adopt new technologies econometric investigation is performed on a pooled sample of individual us airline firms over the period 1971 to 1986 for which extensive information on available jet aircraft technology and fleet choice have been recorded given the incidence of successive commercial aircraft innovations and variation in production attributes across firms we are able to consider a wider array of time dependent and time independent adoption influences than in previous firm level studies to the extent that our study provides useful general insights into adoption decisions by firms the results have implications for us global competitiveness policy one key finding is that firms subject to increased product market competition exhibit a higher propensity to adopt technological innovations

localized market power in the u s airline industry this paper tests whether the observed dominance of most city pair markets and airports in the u s domestic airline industry by single carriers confers any pricing power on the dominan t firms the results of fixed effects estimation indicate that airport dominance by a carrier does confer upon it substantial pricing power whereas dominance at the route level seems to confer no such pricing power additionally the authors find a positive yet small correlation between both route concentration and price and airport concentration and price the quantitative importance of airport dominance reveals that the most promising direction for public polic y aimed at improving the industry s performance is to ensure equal acc ess to sunk airport facilities copyright 1993 by mit press

ontology and the study of social reality emergence organisation community power social relations corporations artefacts and money the conception of social reality i have previously defended and here extend positing features such as social relations positions and powers is thoroughly naturalistic and even consistent with modern interpretations of quantum field theory it also serves to ground a social science that can be scientific in the sense of natural science this is the thesis defended here central to the argument is an emphasis on a strong form of emergence and the category of organisation in process to bring out various salient features of the position defended i take the opportunity to compare aspects of it with relevant components of the contribution of john searle whose ontological conception appears at once to be both very similar yet also very different copyright the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

spatial multiproduct pricing empirical evidence on intra european duopoly airline markets this paper estimates a model of spatial multiproduct duopoly pricing when the location patterns differ across markets the theoretical model suggests that the neighbouring configuration yields less competitive nash prices than the interlaced configuration i apply this model to data for intra european duopoly airline markets the empirical results support the theoretical model since i find that fares are higher on intra european markets that exhibit neighbouring configurations in the time domain this result suggests that price competition is reduced when each airline operates on a specific segment of the timetable e g the first 12 hours of the day clearly this result has several implications for policy makers and or airport authorities in charge of awarding slots

a mutual insurance diffusion stochastic control problem abstract this paper determines the optimal loading factor policy of a mutual insurance firm insurance is viewed as a collective process of n persons paying fixed or variable contingent premiums and seeking protection against claims risk reduction for each person is then exercised through a distribution of risk by aggregating individual risks and by accumulating cash net of operating expenses to meet possible contingent claims by assuming an approximate claims diffusion process stochastic control problems for selecting the optimum loading factor policies are stated and resolved analytically in particular the implicit cost of bankruptcy is computed and an optimum variable feedback loading policy is established

ontology and the history of economic thought the case of anti reductionism in the work of friedrich hayek tony lawson has long advocated an ontological turn in the history of economic thought this essay aims to contribute towards that goal by considering how one aspect of the methodology adopted by a prominent heterodox economist was informed by ontological considerations the economist is friedrich hayek the aspect of his methodology concerns the possibility of reductionism while the ontological category that informs his anti reductionist methodology though not as we shall see in a wholly consistent way is that of emergence the account presented below suggests that the notion of emergence played an increasingly important and also increasingly explicit role in the arguments hayek mounts against reductionism in his postwar work on theoretical psychology and social theory in the case of his theoretical psychology notwithstanding the fact that he had access to a set of concepts that afforded him the opportunity to mount an emergentist case against reductionism hayek s most prominent argument against reductionism was and remained computational rather than emergentist in nature in the case of his mature post 1960 social theory however hayek explicitly advanced a consistently emergentist case against reductionism based on the importance of organising relations for the generation of higher level structural properties such as the coordinative powers of the liberal market economy the implications of this ontologically informed discussion of hayek s arguments against reductionism for existing interpretations of hayek s work are considered

spatial differentiation and price discrimination in the cement industry evidence from a structural model we estimate a structural model of the cement industry that incorporates spatial differentiation and price discrimination focusing on the us southwest over 1983 2003 we leverage the structure of the model to obtain consistent estimates of the underlying parameters using data on market outcomes that are substantially aggregated our results indicate that transportation costs around 0 46 per tonne mile rationalize the data this friction enables relatively isolated plants to obtain higher prices from nearby customers we further find that disallowing price discrimination would create 30 million in consumer surplus annually and show how the model can identify suitable divestitures in merger analysis

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

aviation policy past and present for 25 years airline deregulation has been a symbol of the trend toward less expansive government the move from economic regulation to deregulation has delivered on its efficiency promises and there have been significant benefits to consumers in terms of lower prices and more convenient schedules however airline competition especially at hub airports remains imperfect the nature of these imperfections is explained better by models of oligopolistic behavior than by the contestability theory paradoxically for this industry the terrorist attack of september 11 2001 has ushered in an expanded role of government in aviation policy this expanded role does not reinstate government intervention in airline economic decisions rather it provides financial stabilization of the industry in the short run and long term structural change in aviation security

product line rivalry and firm asymmetry we extend the brander and eaton 1984 model of product line rivalry to study the effects of asymmetry between firms on the equilibrium outcome our analysis shows that market interlacing can emerge as the equilibrium outcome even in situations where market segmentation would have been the only possible outcome had the firms been symmetric we identify two strategic factors that lead to such an outcome

the price effect of eliminating potential competition evidence from an airline merger this paper analyzes the gain in pricing power that a firm achieves by merging with a potential competitor in its market using pricing data for the merger of usair and piedmont empirical analysis finds that prices rose by 5 0 to 6 0 per cent on routes that one carrier served and the other was a potential entrant this was more than half the increase on routes where the two carriers had been direct competitors other important factors included carrier size market concentration incumbent s identity and the potential entrant s presence at one or both endpoints

shackle on time uncertainty and process this paper is intended both as a contribution to the conceptual work on process in economic thought and as an attempt to connect a non institutionalist non evolutionary thinker to it the paper has two principal objectives i to delineate a broad philosophically grounded conception of what an economic process theory ept is and ii to locate the contributions of george shackle within this broad conception of ept in pursuing these two objectives i hope to draw out the originality and significance of shackle s economics with a particular emphasis on what he adds to process conceptions developed within other heterodox traditions such as institutional and evolutionary economics i will also highlight some of the perceived limitations of shackle s approach and link them to the limitations of process philosophy

concentration potential entry and performance in the airline industry airline markets do not satisfy the theoretical conditions for perfect contestability and theory does not indicate which deviations from perfect contestibilty significantly affect performance thus the effect of potential entry on performance in airline markets is explored empirically the best model for explaining fares is found to be one in which the measure of market concentration takes into account not only the number and size distribution of incumbents but also the number of potential entrants not significantly disadvantaged due to economies of scale and scope the hypothesis that all city pair markets are perfectly contestable is rejected coauthors are richard l johnson andrew s joskow gregory j werden and michael a williams copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

uncertainty and imagination illusion and order shackleian connections shackle s work has many connections to economic scientific and philosophical ideas and also to the practicalities of economic organization and business management uncertainty is not only a pervasive problem but a necessary condition for human intelligence initiative and imagination unpredictability is essential to both scientific progress and entrepreneurship we create knowledge by making patterns that enable us to impose order and envisage new combinations in an evolutionary process driven by human purpose of competing and complementary conjectures many of which turn out to be false representations though academia was shackle s natural environment he was always concerned with applicability and testament to the practical relevance of his ideas is provided by two former senior managers with particular emphasis on the fundamental and domain specific issues of what to think about and how to think about it copyright the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

insurance premium allocation and loss prevention in a large firm a principal agent analysis abstract faced with increased insurance costs large firms are turning to a more systematic allocation of premium costs to subsidiaries an approach which capitalizes on economies of scale in a corporate wide management of aggregated risks risk pooled across divisions as well as subsidiaries such practice however raises a number of problems i what part of the aggregate risk should the firm self insure ii how should premium costs be allocated between subsidiaries iii how much effort should subsidiaries invest in loss prevention programs and how should they manage claims i e co insure themselves iv how can the parent firm induce managers of subsidiaries to control subsidiaries risk thereby reducing future premium payments and moral hazard or what premium incentive scheme can the firm devise to penalize or compensate subsidiaries investing less than an optimal effort in loss prevention to deal with these problems a conceptual framework based on a principal agents analysis and the definition of a liability account for each subsidiary is developed which is used to reduce the problems of moral hazard due to a less than perfect or indirect monitoring system specifically assumption regarding the premium allocation incentive scheme are made and explicit solutions are obtained for the control of subsidiaries loss prevention effort allocation

competition for scarce resources we model a downstream industry where firms compete to buy capacity in an upstream market which allocates capacity efficiently although downstream firms have symmetric production technologies we show that industry structure is symmetric only if capacity is sufficiently scarce otherwise it is asymmetric with one large fat capacity hoarding firm and a fringe of smaller lean capacity constrained firms as demand varies the industry switches between symmetric and asymmetric phases generating predictions for firm size and costs across the business cycle surprisingly increasing available capacity can cause a reduction in output and consumer surplus by resulting in such a switch

entry and competitive structure in deregulated airline markets an event study analysis of people express this paper proposes an alternative approach to the study of competitive structure in deregulated airline markets that avoids some of the weaknesses of previous studies this approach uses reactions of incumbent airlines stock prices to announcements of entry by people express to shed light on competitive structure these stock reactions reveal significant route specific profits or sunk costs and also provide evidence on the degree of competitive localization present in the industry the conclusions emerging from this analysis are corroborated by an examination of price sales quantity and schedule changes that followed people express entry

the equity and efficiency of runway pricing abstract this paper poses and answers the following question if an airport authority is assumed to choose landing fees that maximize a weighted sum of airline consumers surpluses subject to a revenue requirement what set of weights is implied by currently observed fees the model is loosely applied to san francisco international airport the main result is that commuter airlines are much more favored than others

domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare this article investigates the consumer welfare consequences of the recent code share agreement between continental airlines and northwest airlines we develop a discrete choice model based on individual flight characteristics this structural model recognizes that consumers i may have heterogeneous preferences for flight attributes and ii may face different prices for the same flight the empirical methodology also deals with the measurement error problem stemming from the absence of consumer level data on prices the estimation results suggest that whereas the code share agreement did not impact consumers significantly on average it increased the average surplus of connecting passengers but decreased the average surplus of nonstop passengers interestingly the magnitude of our welfare results may be attributed in large part to changes in product characteristics other than prices

the effect of air traffic delays on airline prices abstract a legislative change in takeoff and landing restrictions at laguardia airport provides an opportunity to study the effect of an exogenous shock to product quality on prices in the airline industry i test how the price response varies with the degree of competition in the market i find that prices fall by 1 42 on average for each additional minute of flight delay and that the price response is substantially larger in more competitive markets

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

firm size inequality and market power abstract in this paper we reexamine the relationship between firm size inequality fsi and market power in light of modern oligopoly theory using a model with capacity constraints and endogenous conduct we show that the market power fsi relationship is more complex than the positive link traditionally predicted we show that two separate effects are at work leading to a u shaped relationship between market power and fsi we also show that prices should be more unstable in markets where fsi is high we test these predictions on data for the u s airline industry and find results that support them

how do incumbents respond to the threat of entry evidence from the major airlines this paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors as distinguished from their response to competitors actual entry it uses a case study from the passenger airline industry specifically the evolution of southwest airlines route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly when southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future we examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events we find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by southwest s entry into their routes this is true even after controlling in several ways for airport specific operating costs the response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where southwest does not operate e g fares drop on routes from chicago midway but not chicago o hare the largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand incumbents do experience short run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts this is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor we examine evidence relating this demand building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion there is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

case based decision theory this paper suggests that decision making under uncertainty is at least partly case based we propose a model in which cases are primitive and provide a simple axiomatization of a decision rule that chooses a best act based on its past performance in similar cases each act is evaluated by the sum of the utility levels that resulted from using this act in past cases each weighted by the similarity of that past case to the problem at hand the formal model of case based decision theory naturally gives rise to the notions of satisficing decisions and aspiration levels

optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents abstract a setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered with correlated productivities each agent s private information also provides a signal about the other agent s productivity in contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents it is only if the agents are risk averse that their private information may allow them to command rents moreover when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a nash equilibrium the pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth telling this leads to the consideration of truth telling equilibria that are not pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents among all such equilibria the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a nash response to truth

an ex post welfare analysis of natural gas regulation in the industrial sector the current structure of the us natural gas industry is a result of the evolution of regulatory policy over the past three decades which began with the deregulation of natural gas prices at the wellhead ngpa of 1978 and culminated with the deregulation of interstate transportation of natural gas ferc order 636 focusing on the industrial sector this paper estimates the welfare and price effects associated with the changes in regulatory policy overtime actual prices converge towards estimated equilibrium prices consequently deadweight losses diminished an estimated 15 47 billion 2003 dollars of welfare loss had been incurred from 1977 to 2000

advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity optimal pricing by a monopoly airline that faces capacity constraints during the peak demand period is studied the existence of capacity constraints means that in order to expand output the airline must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak period a particular advance purchase discount policy is shown to be the profit maximizing method of selling tickets if the advance purchase requirement were infeasible output and total surplus would both be lower jel l12 substantial discounts for air travel are generally available to travelers who are willing to purchase tickets a week or more in advance of the departure date this paper demonstrates why the imposition of an advance purchase requirement may be a profit maximizing strategy for a monopoly airline facing capacity constraints during times of peak demand 1 the practice of imposing an advance purchase requirement on discount tickets is also placed in a favorable light in terms of its impact on social

pricing and performance in monopoly airline markets since the airline deregulation act of 1978 ada much has been learned about the performance characteristics of airline markets functioning free of governmental control contrary to the initial expectations of many airline markets do not appear to conform well to the contestable markets model numerous empirical studies of the industry have concluded that performance depends on the level of actual competition a result incompatible with perfect contestability 2 in a perfectly contestable

notions of order and process in hayek the significance of emergence this article explores the notions of order and process to which friedrich hayek subscribed it is argued that a satisfactory understanding of hayek s conceptions of order and process and in particular a clear understanding of those how the two concepts relate to each other in his scheme of thought requires an appreciation of the ontological categories of emergence and emergent properties ultimately for hayek the capacity of liberal market economies to co ordinate people s actions in the face of tacit and dispersed knowledge is an emergent property that arises only when people s interactions are governed by certain sets of rules this static analysis of the co ordinative powers of the market as an emergent property of a given system of rules must be supplemented by a dynamic account of the process through which the set of rules in question comes into being hayek provides such an account in his account of society as developing through a multi level evolutionary process key implications of hayek s accounts of order and process for debates about the co ordinative powers of free market economies are drawn out

airline mergers airport dominance and market power effects of northwestrepublic and twaozark mergers on fares at minneapolisst paul and st louis

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

hubs and high fares dominance and market power in the u s airline industry this article estimates the importance of route and airport dominance in determining the degree of market power exercised by an airline the results indicate that an airline s share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint airports significantly influences its ability to mark up price above cost the high markups of a dominant airline however do not create much of an umbrella effect from which carriers with smaller operations in the same markets can benefit the article suggests a number of possible explanations for this asymmetry

the anatomy of emergence with a focus upon capital formation abstract emergence is a unifying theme of both evolutionary economics and complex systems theory in spite of this centrality emergence in economics has not been subject to an extensive critical analysis this paper remedies this deficit we identify several conditions that economic patterns i e rule systems structures must satisfy to qualify as emergent 1 material realization emergent patterns are realized in physical structures and processes 2 coherence pattern is not a mere aggregate but a systemic whole 3 non distributivity pattern possesses global properties absent from its parts 4 structure dependence systemic properties depend upon connective structure these four core features are common to all forms of emergence in economics evolutionary economic systems also exhibit extra strength versions of emergence which require that patterns possess one or more additional features 5 genuine novelty 6 unpredictability in principle and 7 irreducibility we introduce three basic forms of emergence that occur in economic systems minimal diachronic and synchronic emergence and apply these ideas to capital formation at all levels of economic order the economy wide capital structure exhibits strongly emergent properties both diachronic and synchronic that depend on its structural and functional organization it is not a mere aggregate of capital goods within the realm of capital phenomena we also compare the distinguishing characteristics of emergent and spontaneous self organizing orders we provide a case study of the iphone as an emergent capital pattern to illustrate conditions 1 7 above and the different types of emergence

evidence of directional price discrimination in the u s airline industry abstract this paper explores possible determinants that may affect an airline s decision to charge passengers different roundtrip fares depending on trip origin a case of directional price discrimination such fare differences cannot be the result of differences in cost as the cost of flying a roundtrip passenger does not significantly differ depending on direction it is argued that directional fare differences result from airlines recognizing that passenger price elasticities differ between route endpoints a price discriminating airline will then charge a higher roundtrip fare at the endpoint where the passenger price elasticity of demand is comparatively lower evidence is found suggesting that airlines do use differences in income to price discriminate when setting roundtrip fares fares are found to be 0 18 0 43 higher on average for each 1000 difference in average per capita income between origin and destination metro areas this finding is sensible assuming that higher incomes reduce the price elasticity of demand for air travel with richer passengers being less sensitive to the cost of travel

deregulation ownership and productivity growth in the banking industry evidence from india this paper analyzes the relationship between deregulation and total factor productivity tfp growth in the indian banking industry using a generalized shadow cost function approach tfp growth is decomposed into a technological change a scale and a miscellaneous component a disaggregated panel data analysis using the population of public and private banks over 1985 96 that covers both pre and post deregulation periods indicates that a significant decline in regulatory distortions and the anticipated increase in tfp growth have not yet materialized following deregulation while private sector banks have improved their performance mainly due to the freedom to expand output public sector banks have not responded well to the deregulation measures

price dispersion and differentiation in online travel an empirical investigation previous research has examined whether price dispersion exists in theoretically highly efficient internet markets however much of the previous work has been focused on industries with low cost and undifferentiated products in this paper we examine the presence of price dispersion and product differentiation using data on the airline ticket offerings of online travel agents otas we find that different otas offer tickets with substantially different prices and characteristics when given the same customer request some of this variation appears to be due to product differentiation different otas specialize by systematically offering different trade offs between ticket price and ticket quality minimizing the number of connections matching requested departure and return time however even after accounting for differences in ticket quality ticket prices vary by as much as 18 across otas in addition otas return tickets that are strictly inferior to the ticket offered by another ota for the same request between 2 2 and 28 of the time overall this suggests the presence of both price dispersion and product differentiation in the online travel market

measuring consumer switching costs in the television industry in this article i develop and estimate a model of dynamic consumer behavior with switching costs in the market for paid television services i estimate the parameters of the structural model using data on cable and satellite systems across local us television markets over the period 1992 2006 the results suggest switching costs range from 159 to 242 for cable and from 212 to 276 for satellite providers in 1997 dollars using a simple dynamic model of cable providers i demonstrate that switching costs of these magnitudes can significantly affect the firms optimal strategies

non bayesian decision theory ahead of its time the case of g l s shackle this article deals with the reception of george l s shackle s volume expectation in economics introducing a unique attempt to discard the probability framework in the investigation of behaviour under uncertainty through a fresh reading of the textual evidence including correspondence held at cambridge university library the article assesses why decision theorists interest in shackle s theory substantial during the 1950s faded away in the early 1960s the article argues that apart from shackle s refusal to comprehend that his critics were under the influence of a new subjective probability perspective a major explanation of the dismissal of his work stays in shackle s stance not to establish a collaborative link with those critics who showed a positive attitude towards his theory the article shows though that the discussion between shackle and his critics hinged on a number of topics that are still crucial to the current developments of decision theory

network effects congestion externalities and air traffic delays or why not all delays are evil we examine two factors that explain air traffic congestion network benefits due to hubbing and congestion externalities while both factors impact congestion we find that the hubbing effect dominates empirically hub carriers incur most of the additional travel time from hubbing primarily because they cluster their flights in short time spans to provide passengers as many potential connections as possible with a minimum of waiting time non hub flights at the same hub airports operate with minimal additional travel time these results suggest that an optimal congestion tax might have a relatively small impact on flight patterns at hub airports jel l2 l5 l9 d6

appropriating value from computerized reservation system ownership in the airline industry it is difficult for the firm competing through information technology resources to gain a sustainable advantage because systems are easy to imitate and substitute resources are often available to competitors the innovator may be unable to appropriate all of the benefits from information technology investments airlines have installed computerized reservations systems in travel agencies to appropriate the returns from their investments in information technology the airlines expected to obtain a number of benefits from this strategy including increased efficiency possible bias in favor of the computerized reservations systems owner on the part of the travel agent and fees from other airlines for making reservations for them the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the appropriation of value by computerized reservations systems owners from deploying systems in travel agencies these benefits beyond fees from travel agents should be seen in the vendor airline s market share between cities and in the overall performance of the airline at an industry level this paper models airline performance as a function of computerized reservations systems ownership at two levels for selected city pairs and at the overall level of the firm the city pair analysis employs a multinomial logit market share model that analyzes five years of data on 72 city pair routes the industry model uses longitudinal data for a panel of 10 airlines for 12 years the results of both analyses support hypotheses that computerized reservations systems ownership is positively related to airline performance it appears that strong airlines have appropriated the benefits of their computerized reservations systems turning them into highly specialized assets for further travel related innovation this work offers useful theoretical extensions and methodological approaches for the study of similar kinds of network technology innovations that are currently being deployed in association with electronic commerce on the internet

the dominant firm advantage in multiproduct industries evidence from the u s airlines in many industries the largest firms are most successful in entering and competing in individual markets or submarkets while this success is often attributed to cost or quality differences it may also reflect reputation advantages or marketing strategies that benefit firms selling a wider variety of products in the industry i present an approach to estimating the advantages of a dominant firm in the airline industry that allows one to effectively control for cost and quality heterogeneity results using data from 1986 indicate that an airline with a dominant presence at an airport will have a significant advantage in attracting customers whose trips originate at that airport regardless of the specific route on which the customer is traveling

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

shackle on choice imagination and creativity hayekian foundations this paper develops a response to some of the criticisms that have been made of g l s shackle s analysis of human decision making because of its reliance on a cartesian account of the mind it is argued that the basis for a response can be found in the work on theoretical psychology developed by shackle s fellow subjectivist and one time phd supervisor f a hayek in particular the ideas advanced by hayek in his 1952 book the sensory order can be used to provide an account of the mind that avoids the shortcomings of shackle s cartesianism whilst still doing justice to his emphasis on genuine choice expectations and the role of creativity and the imagination in human decision making