efficient methods of measuring welfare change and compensated income in terms of ordinary demand functions a utility maximizing consumer with a completely known system of ordinary demand functions q h p c is considered let p qo and p q be two arbitrary equilibrium situations the problem is to evaluate in which of the situations the utility is higher without knowing the utility function revealed preference theory tells that the ordinary demand functions which are in principle observable contain enough information to solve the problem remaining difficulties are therefore mainly computational we present how the compensated income c i c p qo and the compensated demand h p cl1 are calculated with arbitrary accuracy using only the ordinary demand system our two efficient algorithms also have interesting interpretations in terms of index numbers and consumer surplus measures

a hedonic travel cost analysis for valuation of multiple components of site quality the recreation value of forest management abstract one benefit of managing forests is that one can alter the qualities of sites the value of changing site qualities however is generally not known this paper develops a formal hedonic travel cost model which can be used to estimate the value of both marginal and non marginal changes to sites the approach accommodates multiple simultaneous changes in site characteristics estimating this model using a set of permits from wilderness areas leads to revealed preference estimates of the recreational value of clear cuts old growth and nine other wilderness attributes

the dual structure of incomplete demand systems integrability of incomplete demand systems is discussed the concepts of weak integrability quasi expenditure function quasi indirect utility function and quasi utility function are defined their relationships to the expenditure function indirect utility function and utility function are developed the dual structure of the quasi functions permits exact welfare analysis and reveals the conditional preference structure for the commodities of interest new results relating the uniqueness and exactness of consumer s surplus to the structure of the expenditure and indirect utility functions are obtained

self confirming price prediction strategies for simultaneous one shot auctions abstract bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent s value for a good in one auction may depend on the outcome of other auctions that is bidders face an exposure problem previous works have tackled the exposure problem with heuristic strategies that employ probabilistic price predictions so called price prediction strategies we introduce a concept of self confirming prices and show that within an independent private value model bayes nash equilibrium can be fully characterized as a profile of optimal price prediction strategies with self confirming prices we operationalize this observation by exhibiting a practical procedure to compute near self confirming price predictions given a price prediction strategy an extensive empirical game theoretic analysis demonstrates that bidding strategies that use such predictions are effective in simultaneous auctions with both complementary and substitutable preference structures in particular we produce one such strategy that finds near optimal bids thereby outperforming all previously studied bidding heuristics in these environments

a utility consistent combined discrete choice and count data model assessing recreational use losses due to natural resource damage abstract a two stage budgeting approach can often be taken when analyzing consumer choice situations in this paper we examine the particular situation where a consumer makes purchases of a discrete commodity of which there are a number of brands in the first stage the consumer decides how many purchases to make in the second stage the consumer decides how to allocate these purchases across brands our econometric approach to this type of situation uses a utility consistent combined discrete choice and count data model the second stage which is specified as a multinomial choice model produces a price index for the commodity which is used to estimate the first stage which is specified as a count data model we apply the model to recreational demand behavior in alaska in order to estimate the welfare losses suffered by recreational users due to the exxon valdez oil spill these results may provide useful input to government agencies attempting to estimate the appropriate level of taxes fines or regulations for deterring damage to the environment

separability partial demand systems and consumer s surplus measures abstract in practice complete demand systems are not estimated rather either an incomplete demand system is estimated or separability is invoked and a partial demand system is estimated this paper considers the relationship between the conventional compensating variation equivalent variation and the corresponding welfare measure that can be derived from a partial demand system and the current budget allocation to the separable group even assuming the separability assumption invoked is appropriate these partial measures provide in general only a limited amount of information about the compensating variation and no information about the equivalent variation great care is therefore needed when using partial welfare measures to evaluate policy

revealed preference with a subset of goods abstract suppose that you observe n choices of k goods and prices when the consumer is actually choosing from a set of k 1 goods then revealed preference theory puts essentially no restrictions on the behavior of the data this is true even if you also observe the quantity demanded of good k 1 or its price the proofs of these statements are not difficult

technical note mathematical pitfalls in the one machine multiproduct economic lot scheduling problem we consider a group of products sharing the same piece of production equipment and show that two mathematical problem formulations in the literature are ill posed in both cases the infimum of the cost function occurs at a boundary point that is not feasible

capacitated two stage multi item production inventory model with joint setup costs we analyze a continuous time two stage production inventory system in the first stage a common intermediate product is produced in batches and possibly stored in the second phase the intermediate product is fabricated into n distinct finished products several finished products may be included in a single production batch of limited capacity to exploit economies of scale we propose a planning methodology to address the combined problem of joint setup costs and capacity limits per setup we restrict ourselves to a class of replenishment strategies with the following properties a replenishment strategy specifies a collection of families subsets of items covering all end items if an item belongs to several families a specific fraction of its sales is assigned to each family each time the inventory of one item in a family is replenished the inventories of all other items in the family are replenished as well we derive a simple roughly 0n log n algorithm that results in a strategy whose long run average cost comes within a few percentage points of a lower bound for the minimum achievable cost within the above class of strategies

a repeated nested logit model of atlantic salmon fishing participation and site choice for atlantic salmon fishing are modeled in the context of a repeated three level nested logit model consumer s surplus measures are derived for different levels of species availability in the penobscot river the most important salmon river in new england for comparison six other travel cost models are estimated these include restrictive cases of the nested logit model a partial demand model and two single site demand models comparisons across these models indicate the importance of modeling the participation decision including income effects and of adopting a nested logit structure rather than a single level logit structure

contests with limited resources abstract many interesting phenomena electoral competition r d races lobbying are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources specifically the following game is analyzed two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests the players have limited resources budgets and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests in each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize mixed strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical blotto game are analyzed

combining contingent valuation and travel cost data for the valuation of non market goods the travel cost method tcm has long been used to infer the economic value of nonmarket resources and public goods more recently contingent valuation cvm survey methods have gained popularity for eliciting these values here cvm survey responses are combined with tcm data on actual market behavior to estimate jointly both the parameters of the underlying utility function and its corresponding ordinary demand function this is a prototypical empirical example of a new modeling strategy variants of which should prove useful in many applications especially where reliance on a single valuation method is undesirable

how to split the pie optimal rewards in dynamic multi battle competitions abstract multi battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life in this paper we examine the effort maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi battle competitions between two players the organizer has a fixed prize budget and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three battle contest a full spectrum of contest technologies in the tullock family is accommodated we find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology in particular when it is in the low range winner take all is optimal for the intermediate range as discriminatory power increases the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner take all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum discouragement effect for the high range a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum discouragement effect is essential for effort maximizing prize design in dynamic multi battle contests

primaries and the new hampshire effect candidates for u s presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single states the primaries we develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning the equilibrium replicates several stylized facts very well campaigning is very intensive in the first district the outcome of the first election then creates an asymmetry in the candidates incentives to campaign in the next district which endogenously increases the equilibrium probability that the first winner wins in further districts on the normative side our model oers a possible explanation for the sequential organization it leads in expectation to a lower level of advertising expenditures than simultaneous elections moreover if one of the candidates is the more eective campaigner sequential elections also perform better with regard to the selection of the best candidate

annual fees and recreation choice models of recreation behavior have typically ignored the role of fixed annual fees such as the fee for a recreational license in determining choice and welfare we demonstrate how techniques from the literature on discrete continuous choice and two part tariffs can address a situation where fixed annual fees are essential to determining the choice of a recreation site we explore how accounting for value captured by fixed fees can influence the way resource changes are assessed

modeling recreation demand in a poisson system of equations an analysis of the impact of international exchange rates we extend count data travel cost modeling by developing a utility theoretic system of semilogarithmic recreation demand equations the restrictions required to make the system utility theoretic are applied during estimation the model is applied to individual wilderness recreation trips in a system of four canadian wilderness parks the resulting demand system is used to examine the impacts of changing u s canadian currency exchange rates on participation and welfare of u s recreationists

welfare losses due to livestock grazing on public lands a count data systemwide treatment backcountry hikers willingness to pay for removing grazing from trails in the hoover wilderness is analyzed using a multinomial dirichlet negative binomial distribution this multivariate discrete distribution allows the direct calculation of seasonal welfare measures that are derived from an incomplete demand specification the welfare maximizing choice of activities is examined on a trail by trail basis using the results of the analysis our findings suggest that a mix of hiking and grazing activities provide the greatest social welfare

do prediction markets aid defenders in a weak link contest abstract laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states moves of nature however in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival this is particularly important in aggressor defender contests this paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor s action the results of the experiments indicate that the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender s win rate prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors decisions that is not being exploited by defenders and the existence of a prediction market does not alter the behavior of the aggressor whose behavior is being forecast

evaluation of nonmarket goods recovering unconditional preferences a new approach is proposed for the evaluation of nonmarket goods starting from a complete or incomplete conditional demand system for market goods which is observable and depends on nonmarket goods this information is not sufficient to recover the underlying preference ordering of the representative consumer the central idea is to employ additional marginal willingness to pay functions for the nonmarket goods since they can be estimated either together with the demand system or in a separate step they are less arbitrary than the assumptions or hypotheses usually made if the entire system is weakly integrable the underlying ordering and appropriate welfare measures can be derived in this article i investigate the relationship between conditional and unconditional demand systems present sufficient conditions for weak integrability and demonstrate the practicability of the procedure proposed by means of three examples

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

determinants of demand for recreational walking trails in ireland abstract the purpose of this work is to explore how recreational walkers marginal willingness to pay for or travel to irish trails is affected by trail attributes we use principal components data reduction z score data normalization and ols regression analyses on two stated preference datasets covering 302 irish and foreign visitors and recreational experts across 15 sites in ireland between 2005 and 2010 findings reveal that endowment and infrastructure attributes emerge as primary influences affecting demand in particular flat or valley endowed trails and infrastructure including signage amenities and maps or leaflets positively affect demand additionally robustness checks suggest farmer access agreements may also be important on the other hand we find that mountain or hill forest and coastal or lake trails as well as income seem to be negatively associated with demand finally we are able to use these in sample results to extrapolate demand for a set of new relatively unimproved trails in an out of sample demand prediction exercise

vertically differentiated simultaneous vickrey auctions theory and experimental evidence we study settings where a number of sellers simultaneously offer vertically differentiated vickrey auctions for imperfect substitute goods to unit demand buyers vertical differentiation can arise from differences in item quality item value certainty seller reliability or a combination of these factors we characterize the form of the bidding equilibria and derive expressions for the corresponding allocative efficiency and expected seller revenue when bidders are restricted to submit at most one bid our theory predicts the existence of a unique bayes nash equilibrium that resembles a form of probabilistic mating of likes allowing unit demand bidders to place an arbitrary number of bids induces complex strategy profiles where bidders place positive bids in all available auctions higher bidder types tend to follow more targeted strategies focusing their serious bids on fewer and generally higher quality auctions the nature of the bidding equilibria introduces allocative inefficiencies that arise from the lack of coordination in auction selection among bidders we test our theoretical propositions in a controlled laboratory experiment while also utilizing a domain specific risk score to help assess how the bidders risk type affects their bidding behavior in support of our theory we find evidence of a probabilistic assortative matching between bidder and auction types we also find that low risk type bidders tend to crowd on the highest auction and will pay a premium for the certainty it offers whereas high risk type bidders fail to appropriately adjust for risk associated with the lowest auction leading to overbidding these lead to an interesting focal anomaly whereby bids are concentrated on the highest and lowest auctions bypassing intermediate auctions

another theorem on using market demands to determine willingness to pay for non traded goods abstract this paper contains a proof of the following theorem let e1 and e1 denote an agent s expenditures on two groups of goods which are substitutes and complements to a non traded good suppose that both the agent s income and the quantity of the non traded good provided him have a positive effect on these two amounts then these effects can be used to place upper and lower bounds on the agent s marginal willingness to pay for the non traded good

coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems supply chain management scm has become an important management paradigm as supply chain members are often separate and independent economic entities a key issue in scm is to develop mechanisms that can align their objectives and coordinate their activities so as to optimize system performance in this paper we provide a review of coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems in a framework that is based on supply chain decision structure and nature of demand this framework highlights the behavioral aspects and information need in the coordination of a supply chain the identification of these issues points out several directions of future research in this area

specification tests for mixed demand systems with an emphasis on combining contingent valuation and revealed data abstract in a world characterized by r unrationed goods i e market goods and n r rationed goods such as most environmental goods necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an underlying rational preference structure are derived based on a system of mixed demand functions with complete information with incomplete information the case of a partial demand system is addressed and a test for separability is proposed the implications for testing rationality in a world characterized by combined rp and sp individual data are examined for data consistency testable conditions are derived

recreation nonparticipation as choice behavior rather than statistical outcome in recreation demand models nonparticipation is usually estimated as the probability mass on zero demand given a positive level of expected demand and a discrete distribution of demand outcomes researchers have attempted to improve predictions of nonparticipation by modifying the parameters of the demand distribution this study departs from previous approaches by explicitly incorporating nonparticipation into the behavioral model the choice to participate is described by a distribution of preferences combined with a choke price on individual demands to distinguish participants from nonparticipants the model is found to accurately predict nonparticipation and the size of the user group copyright 2008 oxford university press

multi item one warehouse multi retailer distribution systems in this paper we study the problem of coordinating the purchase and shipment of i items in a one warehouse n retailer inventory system the model includes positive echelon holding costs fixed costs for ordering and shipping each item and a fixed joint item order cost at each retailer demand for each item at each retailer is assumed to occur at a constant and continuous rate a mathematical model is developed based on these assumptions and the assumption that a stationary nested policy is followed an efficient algorithm is presented based on the problem s structure that involves only sorting and runs in oni log ni time the cost of the policy computed is proven to be within 6 of the cost of an optimal nested policy an example is presented to illustrate the problem structure and the proposed algorithm

98 effective integer ratio lot sizing for one warehouse multi retailer systems a warehouse supplies n retailers constant external demand occurs at each retailer and shortages are not allowed there are linear holding costs and fixed costs for ordering at the warehouse and at each retailer the goal is to minimize the long run average cost over an infinite time horizon we define a new class of policies for this problem whose simple structure facilitates both computation and implementation the cost of a policy that is optimal within this class is shown to be within 2 of the cost of an optimal policy for the original problem in the worst case such a policy can be computed in on log n time

approximations of dynamic multilocation production and inventory problems consider a central depot or plant which supplies several locations experiencing random demands orders are placed or production is initiated periodically by the depot the order arrives after a fixed lead time and is then allocated among the several locations the depot itself does not hold inventory the allocations are finally received at the demand points after another lag unfilled demand at each location is backordered linear costs are incurred at each location for holding inventory and for backorders also costs are assessed for orders placed by the depot the object is to minimize the expected total cost of the system over a finite number of time periods this system gives rise to a dynamic program with a state space of very large dimension we show that this model can be systematically approximated by a single location inventory problem all the qualitative and quantitative results for such problems can then be applied

multi battle contests an experimental study this study examines behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi battle contests in simultaneous contests subjects make positive bids in each battle 80 of the time and bids fall within the predicted boundaries however 35 of the time subjects make positive bids in only two instead of all three battles and they significantly overuse moderately high bids in sequential contests theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles contrary to this prediction subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles consequently instead of always ending in the second battle contest proceeds to the third battle 38 of the time finally in both simultaneous and sequential settings subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted resulting in negative expected payoffs

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

an equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction we provide a bayes nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction saa when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items we first assume that each local bidder values only a specific item e g the license for the region where it has monopoly power and that global bidders valuation functions are convex for this environment we show that a global bidder faces an exposure problem with adverse consequences for revenue and efficiency in the limit when the number of items grows large the saa is revenue and efficiency equivalent to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism we extend our analysis to include the case where items are substitutes for local bidders so that price arbitrage will occur as observed in many spectrum auctions this environment which combines substitutes and complements results in an aggravated exposure problem consequently the saa is no longer efficient and may yield dramatically lower revenues than the vcg mechanism finally we relax the assumption that global bidders valuation functions are convex by considering an environment with medium sized global bidders who demand fewer than all items we show that global bidders divide the market at low prices when market sharing is feasible while they engage in mutually destructive bidding when there is a fitting problem in both cases the saa again underperforms relative to the vcg mechanism

using count data models in travel cost analysis with aggregate data estimators of recreational demand models frequently use continuous functional forms such as ordinary least squares ols on log transformed variables e g ziemer musser and hill however the nature of trip demand introduces complicating factors first trips occur in nonnegative quantities failure to control for this censoring will lead to biased estimation second because trips are available only in integer quantities the usual demand models which correlate marginal quantity with marginal price may be inapplicable in light of these factors a natural alternative is to use statistical models that explicitly recognize the count nature of trip demand several recent papers e g shaw smith grogger and carson creel and loomis have applied count models to the travel cost model these works largely have focused on truncated data sets based on choice based samples in this study the focus is on the older problem where zero demanders are included in particular the application of several robust estimators of count models to aggregated data will be considered the poisson distribution forms the foundation for the count models examined in this study although the poisson is a convenient distribution to work with it imposes some stringent constraints on the demand distribution in particular the poisson distribution assumes the variance of trip demand is equal to the expected value of trip demand to loosen these constraints a generalization of the poisson the negative binomial is discussed robust estimation procedures that permit further loosening of a priori assumptions are then reviewed permit data from the boundary waters canoe area are used to examine the effects of these count models on consumer surplus estimates and on coefficient variability

equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem i develop a method that transforms an equilibrium strategy profile from one auction to another the method is constructive and does not require complicated computation this provides a new approach to revenue equivalence and extends the theorem to domains where it had not previously been known in particular to simultaneous multiple object auctions with complete information and to auction environments having correlated private values and common values

a discrete count model of recreational demand abstract discrete choice models generate welfare measures resulting from environmental quality changes on a per trip basis instead of over a longer more policy relevant time period seasonal or annual welfare measures resulting from a quality change are often computed by multiplying each individual s per trip welfare measure by the number of trips the individual is forecasted to take at the new quality level these models are typically formulated so that increases in the quality of any site causes every individual to increase his or her participation this paper presents an alternative method of linking the discrete choice model to a demand model enabling welfare changes to be estimated in a conventional manner

further results on willingness to pay for nonmarket goods abstract some implications of substitution relationships between private and public goods for measuring the value of changes in nonmarket goods such as environmental quality are explored if a market good is hicks neutral to quality for some price vector the total value of discrete changes in quality consisting of both use and nonuse value can be measured from empirical demand coefficients a plausible motivation for neutrality is developed in the contexts of specifying incomplete demand systems for weak complements to quality and measuring nonuse value when the consumption of weak complements is held at zero previous results on bounding marginal willingness to pay for nonmarket goods are also strengthened

revealed preference tests of nonmarket goods valuation methods abstract revealed preference theory is used to test the theoretical consistency of nonmarket goods valuation methods choices of recreational travel in a sample of hunters are tested for consistency with the axioms of rational choice where prices of travel are computed using travel costs and different values of travel time contingent valuation is used to derive an implicit price for recreation this price is included in the consumption budget data to see if respondents could pay the stated value and maintain consistency with the axioms of revealed preference theory few violations of rationality are noted and when they do exist they are not far from rational choices

a new approach to random utility modeling using the dirichlet multinomial distribution in this paper we introduce a new econometricapproach to analyzing recreational site choicedata the dirichlet multinomial model thismodel which nests the standard conditionalmultinomial logit model can accommodateover dispersed data and may provide moreefficient estimators of coefficients andconsequent welfare measures than the standardconditional logit model which is so widelyused in the random utility model approach torecreation demand we illustrate thisdirichlet approach using a data set of rockclimbers in scotland and study the impacts onper trip consumers surplus of alternativemanagement strategies for popular rock climbingsites results show that the dirichletmultinomial approach produces coefficient andwelfare estimates having smaller samplingvariability in this case we also compareclassical welfare measures with their posteriorequivalents which allow for welfare changes tobe dis aggregated

three object two bidder simultaneous auctions chopsticks and tetrahedra symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games the games all have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first price sealed bid auctions for identical objects information is complete and the bidders marginal valuations increase for the second object and then decrease for the third in all cases the support of the mixture that generates the equilibrium is two dimensional and it surrounds a three dimensional set of best responses this appears to be a previously unknown structure

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

beyond chopsticks symmetric equilibria in majority auction games majority auction games are simultaneous sealed bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction more than a half of the objects each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it symmetric equilibria having simple intuitive forms are shown to exist in first price second price and all pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large this contrasts with earlier results for the two bidder pure chopstick majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated

brand choice and purchase frequency revisited an application to recreation behavior the role that total purchases play in determining the choice among brands has been considered in microeconomic theory for quite some time but for traditional goods only consumption of outdoor recreation is an unusual good most often measured using an individual s recreational trip adding the trips made on a number of choice occasions seems the obvious way to aggregate this good but doing so leads to several problems in defining a meaningful price index the hicks leontief conditions for aggregation suggest that trips to destinations may be thought of as brand choices on consumption occasions andthe continuous analogue to total purchases may in fact be the individual s total travel an empirical example of the model is used to estimate welfare impacts for a group of anglers

a blotto game with incomplete information we consider a blotto game with incomplete information a pure strategy symmetric monotonic bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed

regulatory policy design for agroecosystem management on public rangelands this paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public rangelands we present an informational and institutional environment where three of the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands input regulation cost sharing taxation and performance regulation can be de ned and compared the paper examines how the optimal regulation is shaped by the informational and institutional constraints faced by federal land management agencies flmas such as the bureau of land management and the u s forest service these constraints include informational asymmetries between ranchers and flmas limitations on flmas ability to monitor ranch level ecological conditions and constraints on flmas actions due to budget limitations and restrictions on the level of penalties they can assess the theoretical model extends the previous work of baker 1992 prendergast 2002 and hueth and melkonyan 2009 by considering optimal regulation by a budget constrained regulator in an environment of asymmetric information and moral hazard

simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values abstract in this paper we study a simultaneous auction model with synergies common values and overlapping interests we construct strategies in which bidders of different types randomize over different bid intervals and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for such strategies to form symmetric equilibria questions about seller s revenue and efficiency are addressed journal of economic literature classification number d44