competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

two stage equilibrium and product choice with elastic demand abstract this paper examines a two stage model of product choice with elastic demand duopolists choose locations and then prices consumers demand is linear in price transportation cost is quadratic and is a lump sum for each pair of locations there is a price equilibrium in the second stage the first stage equilibrium locations are unique symmetric and depend upon the ratio of the reservation price and the transportation cost parameter when this ratio exceeds a certain critical value the locations are at the extreme end points of the market as the ratio decreases the locations gradually move towards the center

the world market risk premium and u s macroeconomic announcements abstract conditional tests of the international capm in previous studies e g harvey 1991 help identify predictability but not causality in this paper we take an event study approach to examine if the world market risk premium is particularly higher on prescheduled us macroeconomic announcement days empirically we apply the savor and wilson 2014 methodology to daily us stocks as well as foreign stocks cross listed in the us our findings suggest that there is a causal relationship from the state of the global economy to the world market risk premium

competitive non linear pricing and bundling we examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly when consumers buy all their products from one firm the one stop shopping model nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare but often lower consumer surplus than linear pricing by contrast in a unit demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus in a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects compared with linear pricing nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when i demand is elastic ii there is substantial product differentiation iii there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand iv consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm and v a consumer s brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when i ii iv and v hold but iii does not

elasticity of demand and behaviour based price discrimination behaviour based price discrimination bbpd is typically analysed in a framework characterised by perfectly inelastic demand this paper provides a first assessment of the role of demand elasticity on the profit consumer and welfare effects of bbpd we show that the demand expansion effect that is obviously overlooked by the standard framework with unit demand plays a relevant role in comparison to uniform pricing we show that firms are worse off under bbpd however as demand elasticity increases the negative impact of bbpd on profits gets smaller despite a possible slight increase in the average prices charged over the two periods in comparison to uniform pricing we show that bbpd boosts consumer surplus and that this benefit is independent of elasticity in contrast to the welfare results derived under the unit demand assumption where bbpd is always bad for welfare the paper shows that bbpd can be welfare enhancing if demand elasticity is sufficiently high

spatial competition among multi store firms abstract the paper analyzes spatial cournot competition among multi store firms it demonstrates that the complex problem of determining equilibrium store locations for competing multi store firms can be approximated by a simple one in which each firm behaves as a multi store monopolist in choosing its store locations a firm s equilibrium store locations often coincide with its monopoly locations and in general converge to its monopoly locations as the demand grows larger when the firms have an equal number of stores the stores belonging to competing firms agglomerate at discrete points that coincide with each firm s monopoly store locations

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

international asset pricing and portfolio diversification with time varying risk we test the conditional capital asset pricing model capm for the world s eight largest equity markets using a parsimonious generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity garch parameterization our methodology can be applied simultaneously to many assets and at the same time accommodate general dynamics of the conditional moments the evidence supports most of the pricing restrictions of the model but some of the variation in risk adjusted excess returns remains predictable during periods of high interest rates our estimates indicate that although severe market declines are contagious the expected gains from international diversification for a u s investor average 2 11 percent per year and have not significantly declined over the last two decades

hotelling s competition with relative performance evaluation abstract this paper studies the impact of relative performance evaluation rpe on the equilibrium locations in a hotelling model with quadratic transportation cost it is shown that equilibrium location varies from maximum differentiation to minimum differentiation depending upon the relative strength of the rpe effect over the competition effect moreover social welfare is greater with than without rpe

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

quantity competition in a spatial model the authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then choose quantities in the second stage pure strategy quantity equilibria fail to exist for locations close together for low transport costs near agglomeration occurs and the firms choose locations where pure strategy quantity equilibria exist as transport costs rise firms become less direct competitors as they move away from the center of the market coauthors are james f klein eytan sheshinski and steven m slutsky we analyse a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then choose quantities in the second stage pure strategy quantity equilibria fail to exist for locations close together for low transport costs near agglomeration occurs and the firms choose locations where pure strategy quantity equilibria exist as transport costs rise firms become less direct competitors as they move away from the centre of the market coauthors are james f klein eytan sheshinski and stephen m slutsky

nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome abstract it is well known that in a duopoly model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost the firms locate at the extreme endpoints of the market jehiel 1992 int j ind organ 10 633 641 has examined this model in an infinite horizon setting where in the initial period the firms choose location and in subsequent periods charge the nash bargaining solution prices then in the unique equilibrium both firms locate at the center of the market this paper examines the case when the firms instead charge the prices determined by either the egalitarian bargaining solution or the kalai smorodinski bargaining solution it is shown that central agglomeration is an equilibrium furthermore there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in addition where the firms locate apart from each other so the products are not necessarily minimally differentiated thus different bargaining solutions provide quite different outcomes

on hotelling s competition with non uniform customer distributions abstract hotelling s competition in a two stage location price game is examined with increasing densities of consumers towards the centre it is shown that there is a range of rather even distributions for which firms locate at opposite ends of the market as the distribution becomes more concentrated duopolists will tend to move inside the market

dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers abstract we investigate in this paper whether dynamic targeted pricing based on consumer purchase history could benefit a practicing firm even when consumers are strategic in that they actively seek to avail themselves of a low price in the future such strategic behavior on the part of consumers has been shown in the literature to render such dynamic targeted pricing unprofitable even for a monopoly firm we show that dynamic targeted pricing can benefit competing firms when they actively pursue customer recognition based on consumer purchase history this is because in order to pursue customer recognition competing firms need to price high to screen out price sensitive consumers and hence price competition is moderated as a result all competing firms can become better off with targeted pricing than without even when consumers behave strategically interestingly because of this competition moderation effect the paradoxical outcome occurs where dynamic targeted pricing may not benefit a monopolist but it may benefit competing firms we also show that dynamic targeted pricing can expand the market such that social welfare unambiguously improves

do momentum based strategies still work in foreign currency markets this paper examines the performance of momentum trading strategies in foreign exchange markets we find the well documented profitability of momentum strategies during the 1970s and the 1980s has continued throughout the 1990s our approach and findings are insensitive to the specification of the trading rule and the base currency for analysis finally we show that the performance is not due to a time varying risk premium but rather depends on the underlying autocorrelation structure of the currency returns in sum the results lend further support to prior momentum studies on equities the profitability to momentum based strategies holds for currencies as well

linking price dispersion to product differentiation incorporating aspects of customer involvement the fact that product differentiation can cause price dispersion price differences between alternative brands of what are seemingly identical products is not surprising our contribution is to establish not whether but how it does so we explore the mechanisms involved using a variant of hotelling s market line model we make no explicit assumptions about the functional form of the consumer s utility function so that we derive a general relationship between price dispersion and product differentiation we then survey 16 product groups to identify the functional form of the consumer s utility function that allows our result to best fit real world circumstances we show that it is not product differentiation per se that causes price dispersion but rather the presence of a differential advantage of one product over another more importantly we show that the impact of a differential advantage in causing price dispersion is amplified or attenuated by an aspect of customer involvement in a purchase th

state budget stabilization fund adoption preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints the high rate of budget stabilization fund adoption during the 1980s is often attributed to the 1980 1982 recession in this view states adopted funds to prevent a recurrence of the fiscal crises experienced during that recession an alternative hypothesis is that some funds adopted during this period were intended to circumvent tax and expenditure limit laws we find that states with tels in place were significantly more likely to adopt statutory funds but were significantly less likely to adopt funds with stringent deposit and withdrawal rules suggesting that some funds were adopted to circumvent existing fiscal constraints

product selection by quantity setting firms abstract hotelling suggested that competition between oligopolistic sellers would result in consumers with inelastic demands being offered products with an excessive sameness smithies extended the hotelling result to the case of elastic demand while these results are intuitively appealing it has subsequently been shown that both the two stage and simultaneous price location games suffer from fundamental non existence problems when firms do not price discriminate in this paper we investigate the smithies analysis assuming that firms compete in quantities rather than prices we show that a tendency to agglomeration is characteristic of quantity location competition but when locations and quantities are chosen simultaneously problems of non existence of equilibrium do not arise and the principle of minimum differentiation does not hold by contrast when firms play a two stage game choosing locations in the first stage and quantities in the second stage the non existence problems that characterize price location games whether simultaneous or two stage extend to the two stage quantity location game for certain parameter values

an empirical investigation of international asset pricing we investigate several asset pricing models in an international setting we use data on a large number of assets traded in the united states japan the united kingdom and france the models together with the hypothesis of capital market integration imply testable restrictions on multivariate regressions relating asset returns to various benchmark portfolios we find that multifactor models tend to outperform single index models in both domestic and international forms especially in their ability to explain seasonality in asset returns we also find that the behavior of the models is affected by changes in the regulatory environment in international markets

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

testing the unbiased forward exchange rate hypothesis using a markov switching model and instrumental variables this paper develops a model for the forward and spot exchange rate which allows for the presence of a markov switching risk premium in the forward market and considers the issue of testing the unbiased forward exchange rate ufer hypothesis using us uk data it is shown that the ufer hypothesis cannot be rejected provided that instrumental variables are used to account for within regime correlation between explanatory variables and disturbances in the markov switching model on which the test is based copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

a location model with preference for variety we propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases i e one unit from each firm this model may fit many markets e g newspapers credit cards better than existing models a common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand while others consume more than one product our model yields predictions consistent with this observation if firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal thus under certain conditions we restore hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation

resolving the exposure puzzle the many facets of exchange rate exposure theory predicts sizeable exchange rate fx exposure for many firms however empirical research has not documented such exposures to examine this discrepancy we extend prior theoretical results to model a global firm s fx exposure and show empirically that firms pass through part of currency changes to customers and utilize both operational and financial hedges for a typical sample firm pass through and operational hedging each reduce exposure by 10 15 financial hedging with foreign debt and to a lesser extent fx derivatives decreases exposure by about 40 the combination of these factors reduces fx exposures to observed levels

spatial competition and price leadership in the stackelberg price leader price follower model each firm is typically better off as a follower than as a leader in this paper we show that introducing the spatial dimension provides a means of endogenising the role of price leadership furthermore the leader follower framework yields existence of a price and location equilibrium in the hotelling spatial model of competition where none exists under the original specification we first analyse the original hotelling model by determining reaction functions for firms this approach allows the model to be fully characterised and affords an intuitive explanation of the non existence of a price equilibrium for certain locations the reaction functions are then used to determine the solution when one firm adopts the stackelberg leadership role contrary to the existing predictions of the simple spatial duopoly model it is found that the outcome is asymmetric in terms of stackelberg equilibrium locations prices and profits with the first firm in the market enjoying higher profits than the subsequent entrant the equilibrium involves one firm locating at the mid point of the market this outcome is also appealing as it corresponds to the entry deterring and monopoly solutions

competition of newspapers and the location of political parties in this paper we suggest a model for an analysis of how newspapers and political parties determine their ideological orientation and how both decisions depend on each other quite naturally dissemination of information plays an important role the model is set up as a two stage game because elements of horizontal as well as vertical product differentiation are present in this model location patterns in ideology space exhibit in general neither maximal nor minimal differentiation although we keep quite close to the downs model with information as the most important distinguishing feature furthermore the model shows by way of example that economic theory can be a useful tool to investigate issues which are central to communication science

tests of international capm with time varying covariances we perform maximum likelihood estimation of a model of international asset pricing based on capm we test the restrictions imposed by capm against a more general asset pricing model the betas in our capm vary over time as the supplies of assets change and as the conditional covariances or returns on those assets change we let the covariances change over time as a function of macroeconomic data and an alternative model allows the covariances to follow a multivariate arch process we also can identify a modified capm model with measurement error we find that the estimated capm performs much better when variances are not constant over time nonetheless capm is rejected in favour of the lessrestricted model of asset pricing

reference pricing with elastic demand for pharmaceuticals in this paper we re examine the properties of two commonly adopted government reimbursement schemes for pharmaceuticals reference pricing and fixed percentage reimbursement we depart from the previous literature by assuming that the individual demand is price sensitive and depends on the copayment rate i e the part paid by each consumer we obtain two novel results under reference pricing first as the copayment rate increases so do pharmaceutical prices second this increase in pharmaceutical prices reduces social welfare whilst reference pricing does emerge as a preferable reimbursement scheme demand elasticities and the copayment rate interact in complex ways this leads unexpectedly to the possibility that a higher copayment rate lower reimbursement rate results in higher government expenditure

currency risk premia and uncovered interest parity in the international capm abstract zero investment uncovered interest parity uip portfolio positions provide perfect factor mimicking portfolios for currency risk in the international capm context their returns are the currency risk premia since the uip positions on average provide low returns the currency risk premia must be low so that currency risk appears not to be priced in an unconditional model however previous research has shown that uip returns are predictable and may be quite substantial conditionally we use this observation to generate a specific conditional version of the international capm a gmm approach shows that the conditional model performs well while the unconditional international capm is marginally rejected the paper thus argues that previous rejections of the international capm stem from the fact that currency risk premia are by nature low over extended periods of time and do not provide evidence against the international capm

transparency price dependent demand and product variety abstract this paper revisits the relationship between transparency on the consumer side and product variety we show that due to lower price cost margins more transparency is welfare improving this result is achieved even though product variety may be reduced

a theory of quality related differences in retail margins why there is a premium on premium gasoline this paper develops a theory of vertical and horizontal product differentiation to explain observed price cost margin differentials for goods that differ in quality the difference in price cost margins between the high and low quality goods is shown to depend positively on consumers average valuation for incremental increases in quality and positively on the distance to each competitor s closest rival these predictions are largely supported using an extensive station level data set of premium and regular unleaded gasoline prices from the los angeles basin area from 1992 1995

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with elastic demand abstract this paper revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models according to vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york and salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 while relaxing the assumption of inelastic demand using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity we show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the degree of demand elasticity we find that the excess entry theorem does only hold when the demand elasticity is sufficiently small otherwise there is insufficient entry in the limiting case of unit elastic demand the market is monopolized we broaden our results with a more general transportation cost function

positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market we study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion using a three stage hotelling type model we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research we find that firms charge higher prices in period 1 and lower prices in period 2 the lower price in period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching furthermore we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers finally we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers therefore the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market

intertemporal product choice and its effects on collusive firm behavior this study analyzes the collusive behavior of firms in markets characterized by horizontal product differentiation the special features are that product choice is endogenized and that firms may redesign their products intertemporally at a fixed cost the main objective is to examine the relationships between the extent of product differentiation the product redesigning cost and the degree of collusion supportable the findings indicate that flexible product design makes collusion more difficult to sustain since in the event collusion breaks down firms have an incentive to mitigate the severity of punishment by redesigning their products and thus reducing price competition copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

customer information sharing among rival firms abstract the recent rapid growth of the internet as a medium of communication and commerce combined with the development of sophisticated software tools are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information databases with detailed records about consumers preferences these databases have become part of a firm s assets and as such they can be sold to third parties this possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned regulated or left unchecked this paper investigates the incentives of rival firms to share their customer specific information and evaluates the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned in the context of a perfect price discrimination model

combining mean reversion and momentum trading strategies in foreign exchange markets abstract the literature on equity markets documents the existence of mean reversion and momentum phenomena researchers in foreign exchange markets find that foreign exchange rates also display behaviors akin to momentum and mean reversion this paper implements a trading strategy combining mean reversion and momentum in foreign exchange markets the strategy was originally designed for equity markets but it also generates abnormal returns when applied to uncovered interest parity deviations for five countries i find that the pattern for the positions thus created in the foreign exchange markets is qualitatively similar to that found in the equity markets quantitatively this strategy performs better in foreign exchange markets than in equity markets also it outperforms traditional foreign exchange trading strategies such as carry trades and moving average rules

price dispersion and accessibility a case study of fast food this study examines spatial variation in the price and accessibility of fast food across a major urban area we use novel data on the price of a representative fast food meal and the location of fast food restaurants belonging to one of three major chains in the district of columbia and its surrounding suburbs these data are used to test a structural model of spatial competition the results of this study are easily interpreted and compared with a past analysis we find that spatial differences in costs and demand conditions drive variation in the number of firms operating in a market which in turn affects prices

equilibrium in a simple price location model abstract in a spatial model with endpoints we show that when consumers have downward sloping rather than perfectly inelastic demand a price location equilibrium with price undercutting barred exists if the market is sufficiently long relative to the number of firms

a new approach to international arbitrage pricing this paper uses a nonlinear arbitrage pricing model a conditional linear model and an unconditional linear model to price international equities bonds and forward currency contracts unlike linear models the nonlinear arbitrage pricing model requires no restrictions on the payoff space allowing it to price payoffs of options forward contracts and other derivative securities only the nonlinear arbitragepricing model does an adequate job of explaining the time series behavior of a cross section of international returns the idea that a few relevant state variables explain expected returns is the main driving force of the seminal papers of merton 1973 and ross 1976 these seminal ideas have been extended to the pricing of international assets by ikeda 1991 ross and walsh 1983 solnik 1974 1983 and stulz 1981 among others the key implication of these arbitrage pricing models is that only risks related to these factors state variables are relevant in determining asset prices testable implications of these international asset pricing models have been derived either by placing restrictions on the payoff structure i e payoffs are linear in factors as in ikeda 1991 ross and walsh 1983 and solnik 1983 or on the joint distributions of the payoffs and state variables as in constantinides 1989 these restrictions lead to the testable implication that expected asset returns are linear in the conditional covariances with the factor payoffs in what follows we refer to these models as linear arbitrage models or linear models

the impact of brand selection on price competition a double edged sword brand selection the number of alternative brands of a particular product is a double edged sword in that on the one hand it increases rivalry and so stimulates price competition but on the other hand it causes consumers to be poorly informed and thus vulnerable to exploitation and so dampens price competition this phenomenon is demonstrated analytically and empirically with analytical work based on hotelling s unit market line using price dispersion as a measure of the state of price competition it is shown that a widening in price dispersion that is a lessening of price competition arises from an increase in brand selection any increase in the number of alternative brands on offer brand selection causes an increase in dif ness distortion in information function which in turn causes an increase in price dispersion a lessening of price competition the phenomenon is demonstrated empirically through a small survey of household beverages

dynamic pricing when to entice brand switching and when to reward consumer loyalty this article develops a theory of dynamic pricing in which firms may offer separate prices to different consumers based on their past purchases brand preferences over two periods are described by a copula admitting various degrees of positive dependence when commitment to future prices is infeasible each firm offers lower prices to its rival s customers when firms can commit to future prices consumer loyalty is rewarded if preference dependence is low but enticing brand switching occurs if preference dependence is high our theory provides a unified treatment of the two pricing policies and sheds light on observed practices across industries

testing the rationality of state revenue forecasts recent revenue shortfalls in several states focus attention on the question of whether states do a good job of forecasting revenues in modem economics forecasts are eval uated on the basis of whether or not they are rational do the forecasts optimally incorporate all available information this paper develops a method for testing the rationality of state revenue forecasts and applies it to the analysis of data from new jersey massachusetts and maryland one of our main findings is that in all three states the forecasts of own revenues are systematically biased downward tn 1985 the 50 states raised 349 billion in revenues from their own sources and received 84 billion in grants from the federal government u s bureau of the census 1987 p 266 state governments are clearly important players in the u s system of public finance and the efficiency with which they conduct their financial affairs has an important impact on consumer welfare one important determinant of a state s ability to con duct reasonable fiscal policies is the quality of its revenue forecasts sensible deliberations about ex penditures cannot be made in the absence of good forecasts indeed in the presence of con stitutional or statutory provisions for balanced budgets unanticipated changes in revenues can wreak havoc not only on proposals that are sched uled for funding but on plans that have already been put into effect as well in recent months two powerful governors michael dukakis of massachusetts and mario cuomo of new york have suffered major politi cal embarrassments because actual revenues fell substantially short of the predictions in their re spective states such episodes focus attention on the question of whether states do a good job of forecasting revenues in modem economics fore casts are evaluated on the basis of whether or not they are rational do the forecasts optimally incorporate all information that is available at the time they are made although there is a large literature on state revenue forecasting methods that literature focuses mostly on state budgetary institutions forecasts themselves are evaluated only in an informal fashion 1 although the theory and econometric methods of rational expectations have been used to evaluate forecasts made by households and businesses 2 these powerful tools have not been applied to state government fore casts this paper applies these methods to the problem of state revenue forecasting and as an example uses them to analyze data from new jersey massachusetts and maryland the results cast light not only on the question of rationality per se but on issues such as the impact of political factors on forecasts section ii presents the conceptual framework for testing rational expectations the relevant in stitutional issues and data are described in section iii the results are discussed in section iv we find that in all three states forecasts of own rev enues are systematically biased downward section v concludes with a summary

the economics of product variety a survey demand for variety may arise from a taste for diversity in individual consumption and or from diversity in tastes even when each consumer chooses a single variant the full degree of variety potentially demanded will not in general be supplied because scale economies even to a small degree mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater variety must be balanced against the lower unit production costs with fewer variants the economics of product variety consists essentially in analysing the effect of this balance in different situations and comparing the degree of product variety for different market structures with each other and with the optimum the survey commences with the work on market structures with single product firms generalized monopolistic competition tracing modern developments in both the chamberlinian and hotelling traditions the latter has been particularly fruitful due to the expansion of the original locational ideas into virtual spaces in product characteristics the emphasis in recent work on product variety has been on multiproduct firms in both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures including strategic market preemption although most work has been in a full information context there have been advances in product variety under imperfect information either by consumers to properties of the firms products or firms as to consumers demands

history based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs a welfare analysis abstract we analyze history based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry where an incumbent protected by switching costs faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers purchase histories we demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history based price discrimination we find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history based pricing or uniform pricing this implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history based price discrimination is exploitation not exclusion finally we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

price discrimination with private and imperfect information in this paper i investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer s brand preference i show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them then they charge more to these consumers and this price has an inverse u shaped relationship with the signal s accuracy in contrast the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal s accuracy rises while industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information the reverse happens to consumer surplus

competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms abstract conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus this result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric this paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite this inter temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications in particular if consumers are sufficiently myopic price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing overturning the conclusion of previous studies

can price competition dominate market segmentation this note analyses duopoly competition in a two stage location price game while allowing each firm to establish a couple of outlets both the circle and the line model of spatial competition are considered our main result is clear cut in equilibrium neither firm will take up the opportunity of opening two stores this is a warning that market segmentation i e competition from multiple outlets might not be attractive at all because it entails more intense price competition

spatial cournot competition among multi plant firms in a circular city we characterize equilibrium plant locations for a spatial multi plant cournot oligopoly in a circular city previous work demonstrates that for a two plant duopoly all four plants are equally spaced we establish that the equilibrium location pattern is unique if there are two firms with an equal number of plants in most other scenarios multiple equilibria arise next we endogenously determine both the number of plants per firm and plant locations for a duopoly it is shown that the subgame perfect nash equilibrium may not be unique and for identical set up costs the firms may choose different numbers of plants

countercyclical policy and the speed of recovery after recessions we consider the effect of some policies intended to shorten recessions and accelerate recoveries our innovation is to analyze the duration of the recoveries of various u s states which gives us a cross section of both state and national level policies because we study multiple recessions for the same state and multiple states for the same recession we can control for differences in the economic conditions preceding recessions and the causes of the recessions when evaluating various policies we find that expansionary monetary policy at the national level helps to stimulate the exit of individual states from recession we find that exogenous measures of decreases in taxes or targeted increases in federal spending reduce recovery times for state recessions we also find ambient economic conditions can extend expected recovery times other states in the same region suffering from recession around the same time the length of the preceding recession and increases in oil prices

uncovered interest parity it works but not for long abstract if an investor borrows in a low interest currency and invests in a high interest currency the interest differential accrues in a lumpy manner formally just like the dividend payments on a stock the investor will receive the interest differential discretely at the point when a position is rolled over from one day to the next a position that is not held open overnight receives no interest differential because intradaily interest rates are zero using a large data set of intradaily exchange rate data we run uncovered interest parity uip regressions over different short time intervals taking careful account of the settlement rules in the spot foreign exchange market we find results that are supportive of the uncovered interest parity hypothesis over very short windows of data that span the time of the discrete interest payment however adding even a few hours to the span of the window destroys the positive uncovered interest parity results

political control and public sector savings evidence from the states the right to access and ultimately spend public sector savings is determined by the party which can control the politicaloutcome this implies that anticipatedfuture changes in the state s controllingpolitical party may systematicallyadversely affect current savings extendingthe life cycle permanent income model ishow that a representative legislator willopt to forgo current saving in favor ofspending when his prospects for futurepolitical control diminish estimating apanel data model of 39 states from1973 1995 i find that an actual futurechange in the controlling party of astate s lower house significantly reducescurrent saving

the cost of capital in international financial markets local or global abstract this paper analyzes to what extent international and domestic asset pricing models lead to a different estimate of the cost of capital for an individual firm under the maintained assumption of perfect international financial integration we distinguish between i the multifactor solnik sercu icapm including both the global market portfolio and exchange rate risk premia and ii the single factor domestic capm we use a sample of 3 293 stocks from nine countries in the period 1980 1999 the domestic capm yields a significantly different estimate of the cost of capital from the multifactor icapm for only five percent of the firms in our sample we attribute the close correspondence between local and global pricing to strong country factors in individual stock returns which are probably due to lack of real integration our results reinforce the home bias puzzle

the political costs of tax increases and expenditure reductions evidence from state legislative turnover this paper estimates the political costs of increasing taxes and cutting expenditures for members of a legislature it is found that both costs are individually significant but that they are not significantly different this coincides with the first order condition for maximization of the probability of reelection republican legislatures have a higher political cost for taxes thus the party s relative bias toward smaller government is founded in stronger constituent preferences against taxes not for lower spending additionally by being ideologically conservative republicans lower the political costs of taxes while by being more liberal democrats lower the cost of cutting expenditures

from local to global competition abstract we introduce a framework that has known models of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products the circle the logit and the ces as limit cases this integrative approach incorporates both localized and global competition as well as price sensitive individual demands it is used to explain the impact of major changes over the last two centuries reductions in transport costs increased taste for variety population growth and use of technologies with greater returns to scale we work out the properties of an extended chamberlinian model with applications both in industrial organization and economic geography

does cournot competition yield spatial agglomeration abstract locations and quantities are chosen sequentially in spatial markets strikingly different location patterns emerge depending on the shape of the market in a circular city firms locate equidistant from each other in a linear city firms agglomerate at the center

product differentiation with consumer arbitrage abstract we determine the equilibrium to a game where two firms set delivered price schedules and consumers simultaneously declare where they want to take delivery of the product equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties but rather to purchase more standard varieties this behavior may decrease market diversity the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the market center we also show that it is efficient for the cost of adapting the product to consumers to be shared through arbitrage but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage

the effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing abstract using the spatial competition framework of hotelling 1929 this paper explores the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and the ability of firms to collude with respect to price we show that the minimum discount factor required to support the joint profit maximum as an equilibrium outcome monotonically increases as products become better substitutes when the joint profit maximum cannot be supported the optimal collusive price is shown to decline as products become more substitutable these findings suggest that firms producing stronger substitutes tend to find it tougher to collude in terms of their product price

partial agglomeration or dispersion in spatial cournot competition 1 introductionsince the seminal work of hotelling 1929 a rich and diverse literature on spatial competition has emerged location models can be classified into two types one type is shipping or spatial price discrimination model where sellers bear transport costs the other is shopping or mill pricing model where buyers pay for transport for each type one can have either bertrand type price setting or cournot type quantity setting 1most studies on location theory use shopping mill pricing models with bertrand competition although cournot and bertrand types of non spatial models are equally popular the body of literature on spatial competition that uses cournot type models is relatively small economists have recently considered shipping models with cournot competition hamilton thisse and weskamp 1989 and anderson and neven 1991 carry out pioneering works on location models 2 they use linear city models and show that all firms agglomerate at the central point pal 1998 shows that their result is crucially dependent on the assumption of a linear city he investigates a circular city duopoly model3 and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium that is locational dispersion appears 4 matsushima 2001a extends pal s model to an n firm oligopoly and shows another equilibrium where half of the firms locate at one point and the other half locate at the opposite point partial agglomeration these results indicate the multiplicity of equilibria in spatial cournot models with a circular city the multiplicity of equilibria restricts the applicability of the model because the model does not give us a distinct prediction in this article we take a close look at pal 1998 and matsushima 2001a we try to solve this problem by extending their linear transport cost model to one with nonlinear transport cost 5 we consider a simplified model the numbers of firms and markets and so possible locations are four four firms choose location a b c or d see if each of the four firms chooses a different location we call this outcome pal type if two firms locate at a and the other two locate at c we call this outcome matsushima type we find that the pal type equilibrium is much more robust because i pal type equilibrium always exists as long as transport cost is increasing in distance while matsushima type equilibrium fails to exist when the transport cost function is significantly convex or concave proposition 1 ii if firms choose their locations sequentially the unique equilibrium outcome is pal type under nonlinear transport cost functions proposition 2 and iii the profit of each firm in pal type is never smaller than that in matsushima type and the former is strictly larger if the transport cost function is nonlinear proposition 3 we also compare the welfare implications of pal type and matsushima type models if the transport cost function is linear the two outcomes yield exactly the same profits consumer surplus and total social surplus however this equivalence does not hold if the transport cost function is nonlinear either convex or concave in this case pal type yields greater total social surplus and profit of each firm while matsushima type yields greater consumer surplus these results indicate that the welfare implications are sensitive to whether or not the transport cost function is linear anderson and neven 1991 show that in the linear city model a strong concavity in transport cost changes the equilibrium outcome this result is related to our results but we emphasize that our results are different from theirs first we show that both concavity and convexity of the transport cost function affect the results while in anderson and neven 1991 only strong convexity changes the result second in our propositions 2 and 3 even a slight nonlinearity changes the results

two stage perfect equilibrium in hotelling s model hotelling i 929 suggests that his spatial competition model can be used to describe a wide range of differentiation problems he points to the selection of product variety within an industry as a potential application most of the subsequent work in his tradition has taken the equivalence of the two problems for granted in this note we look more closely at this equivalence we distinguish between two types of differentiated products according to the variety of preferences assumed with respect to those products building on this distinction we recognize that the demand faced by a firm locating on hotelling s line is analogous to the demand faced by a firm selecting a horizontally differentiated product it should be emphasized thus that the equivalence between the geographical and the product selection problem is by no means general and relies on specific assumptions about consumers preferences next we formulate a small model close to hotelling s one in which firms select a horizontally differentiated product within this model it will be shown that a pure strategy price equilibrium exists for every pair of products this statement is to be contrasted with the results of d aspremont et al i979 who have shown that in the original hotelling s setting an equilibrium fails to exist when firms are too close together 1 in addition we will examine the product selection problem faced by firms in a two stage game in the first stage each firm selects a product in the second stage the firm defines a price for its product we will seek the existence of a perfect equilibrium in this game a perfect equilibrium in this context can be viewed as a nash equilibrium in a game in which firms select a product aware of the non cooperative price equilibrium that will occur for each of their choices it will be shown that contrary to hotelling s principle the two firms will maximise their differentiation i e firms will locate at opposite ends of the market

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

on the interplay of informational spillovers and payoff externalities this thesis consists of four independent essays which consider different topics in information economics and political economy the first two papers are variants of the same idea an uninformed principal e g a government will make a decision in order to gain more information it may consult two experts however these experts have a private interest in certain policies being implemented the question is to gain as much information as possible should the principal consult experts who are biased in the same direction or experts who prefer different decisions the main result is that as long as collusion between experts can be prevented homogeneous panels are superior to heterogeneous ones and this advantage increases with the experts informational precision in the third paper two firms consider entry in a new product market and must decide when to enter the market and how to design their product firms do not know for certain what the best design is so both firms want to outwait the other s decision in order to gain more information the focus of the paper is on which firm will make the first decision the main result is that if products are strong strategic substitutes the worst informed firm makes the first decision in equilibrium the analysis should apply to a range of other contexts such as investors trading decisions or the policy choices of political candidates the final paper asks the following question could it be that parties in a two party system may benefit from using several candidates in the same election to promote the use of multiple candidates i assume that a party never runs the risk of having its votes split up among its candidates despite this it turns out that parties have a strong incentive to restrict their number of nominees paradoxically it seems that the more uncertain parties are about voter opinion the fewer candidates they want to use in particular with a uniform voter distribution the optimal number of candidates is one

pricing with customer recognition abstract this article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers preferences is discrete consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking in the static and first period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies when price discrimination is allowed forward looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition thus the probability that both will have positive first period sales decreases as they become more patient furthermore an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists yielding a 100 0 division of the first period sales as a whole price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social