estimates of the returns to quality and coauthorship in economic academia salaries of academic economists are studied to determine if individuals receive differential returns to publishing articles of varying quality and to coauthored versus single authored articles estimates based on detailed data and a flexible nonlinear least squares procedure indicate that substantial returns to quality exist and that an individual s return from a coauthored paper with n authors is approximately 1 n times that of a single authored paper

durable goods and product obsolescence the issue of product obsolescence is addressed by examining the optimal sales strategy of a monopolist firm that may introduce an improved version of its current product consumers expectations of a forthcoming product lowers the price that they are willing to pay for the current product because of its loss in value due to obsolescence the new product is characterized by consumers increased willingness to pay and by its competitive interaction with the old product these characteristics affect the tradeoff that the firm makes between the cost of waiting for new product sales versus the cost of cannibalizing these sales we analyze the effect of these characteristics of the new product on the firm s optimal sales strategy we consider the various policy measures available to the firm including limiting initial sales in order to lower cannibalization of the new product buying back the earlier version of the product in order to generate greater demand for the new product and announcements of future product introductions we find that for modest levels of product improvement the firm s optimal policy is to phase out sales of the old product while for large improvements a buy back policy is more profitable lastly we find that the firm is better off if it informs consumers whether a new product is forthcoming

interrupted work careers depreciation and restoration of human capital the quantitative effects and even the existence of a human capital depreciation phenomenon have been a subject of controversy in the recent literature prior work however was largely cross sectional and the longitudinal dimension if any was retrospective using longitudinal panel data on married women in nls we have now established that real wages at reentry are indeed lower than at the point of labor force withdrawal and the decline in wages is greater the longer the interruption another striking finding is a relatively rapid growth in wages after the return to work this rapid growth appears to reflect the restoration or repair of previously eroded human capital the phenomenon of depreciation and restoration is also visible in data for immigrants to the united states however while immigrants eventually catch up with and often surpass natives returnees from the nonmarket do not fully restore their earnings potential

the demand for a risky asset in the presence of a background risk abstract we examine the demand for a risky asset in the presence of two risks a financial risk and a background risk which need not be financial first we compute the necessary and sufficient condition for a positive demand for a risky asset showing that it depends on two terms capturing respectively the direct effect of risk premium and the dependence between the two risks second we develop higher order expectation dependence concept and show that the more information about the sign of higher cross derivatives of the utility function we have the weaker dependence conditions on distribution we achieve

delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies this paper studies a simultaneous move infinite horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort the delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance we show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium the paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives we also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear quadratic payoffs

obsolescence of knowledge and career publication profiles some evidence of differences among fields in costs of interrupted careers in recent years women have received about 45 percent of all baccalaureate degrees but only approximately 20 percent of all ph d s does this imply that academic careers as compared with careers of the wider market for college graduates are less conducive to dual career family objectives evidence suggesting the relative tradeoff of these objectives is shown by the fact that over the last thirty years the zero order correlation between average cohort fertility and the proportion of ph d recipients who are women is 0 939 a female recipient of a doctorate is twice as likely as a male recipient to have specialized in the humanities and only one third as likely to have specialized in a physical science field furthermore of those who receive a doctorate in physical science a male is 60 percent more likely than a female to pursue research as a primary work activity in the humanities on the other hand a woman is at least as likely as a man to have research as an initial postdoctoral work activity obviously many factors affect opportunities and resultant decisions to enter particular careers and to select specific occupational specialties this study considers only onethe rate of obsolescence or depreciation of knowledge as reflected in the age profile of cited works this measure of the obsolescence of knowledge refers to the rate of decay in the relative frequency at which citations are made to a particular vintage of research communications as the communications age in other words the usefulness of older published research papers as an input to current research depreciates over time the rate at which this depreciation occurs is interpreted as measuring the durability of a professor s accumulated stock of knowledge evidence presented in section ii indicates that the durability of knowledge varies considerably from discipline to discipline this information raises a number of questions concerning how the durability of knowledge influences career decisions one influence considered here is that of a temporary career interruption for example if a woman experiences a break in her academic career such as for the purpose of raising children she will incur an opportunity cost in the sense that her research knowledge will to some extent become obsolete consequently her accumulated stock of knowledge will decline relative to those professors who have continuous careers the relative cost imposed on a woman who pursues dual family career objectives is higher the less durable the jobrelated knowledge this difference in relative costs is expected to alter career incentives the results presented here suggest that women who pursue academic careers have responded to these incentives before discussing the evidence on female careers i consider a more general model in which a professor is assumed to have a continuous career profile this model which is more appropriately viewed as a male model of investment behavior is used to analyze how the durability of a professor s knowledge affects his research productivity over a career interestingly the evidence suggests that a professor s response to less durable knowledge is not to compact all learning early in his career but rather to smooth learning over the career perhaps the most assistant professor arizona state university i would like to thank an anonymous referee and many friends for helpful comments on earlier drafts i am especially indebted to finis welch for valuable suggestions throughout the development of this paper the views expressed are my own and i am responsible for any possible errors

the role and growth of new car leasing theory and evidence abstractthere has been substantial growth in rates of new car leasing over the last few decades building on recent theoretical research we construct a model of the leasing decision in which leasing mitigates adverse selection and reduces transaction costs but moral hazard limits its use in our model the prevalence of leasing is related to new car reliability which suggests that the recent growth in leasing is at least partly due to improvements in new car reliability we use this model to derive testable implications and then conduct an empirical analysis to investigate whether the operation of the new and used car markets is consistent with the predictions of this theoretical approach our empirical results support the theoretical predictions of our model in particular we provide direct evidence that leasing mitigates adverse selection and that an important factor in the growth in new car leasing rates has indeed been the growth of new car reliability

trade ins and introductory offers in a monopoly we model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers trade ins or new buyers introductory offers of a quasi durable good we analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third degree price discrimination in our two period model the monopolist sets a first period price that segments the second period market optimally into holders and nonholders of the good in the second period different prices are quoted to the two market segments we present three versions of the model with varying assumptions on consumers rationality

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

commitment and monopoly pricing in durable goods models this article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist two models of the interaction between durability recycling and market power are compared the two differ according to the ability f the seller to credibly commit to a given salec qtrn egy this article takes the standard durable goods monopoly model extends it to allow for depreciation and compares the monopoly markup with swan s predicted markup for a recycled good the difference between the two models is shown to reduce to a single parameter in the markup equation

innovation and the durable goods monopolist the optimality of frequent new version releases when an improvable durable good such as packaged software saturates the market the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently hurting her profit a novel contractual device which i term as a free new version rights warranty free nvr warranty can help the seller overcome this temptation in a two period game theoretic model involving a monopolist firm facing heterogeneous consumers i derive conditions under which a rational monopolist can act suboptimally she could face a commitment problem and offer the new version even if doing so lowers her overall profit profit is hurt because when consumers expect a new version a fewer consumers buy the initial version and b the monopolist is forced to charge a lower price for the initial version i show how the free nvr warranty which requires the monopolist to offer consumers the right to receive the new version for free for a limited period can solve her commitment problem this is a new surprising finding by bundling new version rights with the initial version the monopolist at first appears to be denying herself future revenue i derive conditions under which this apparently unprofitable action is optimal which is my main contribution when free nvr is offered consumer surplus decreases and social surplus increases this work extends prior literature on durable goods and the coase conjecture to innovative durable goods with network externalities the findings have important practical implications for firms selling new versions of innovative durable goods subject to network effects as well as for their consumers

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

dual distribution channels the competition between rental agencies and dealers managerial decisions involving marketing channels are among the most critical that an organization must make part of the reason for this importance is that relationships between manufacturers and their intermediaries usually involve long term commitments that are difficult to change on the other hand in order to respond to the realities of the market place an organization must be ready to adapt its distribution practices sometimes under considerable uncertainty about the long term consequences such a problem faces the u s automobile industry which has led manufacturers to experiment with various channel structures when manufacturers first changed their distribution policies they were clear about the short term effect on sales but were unsure about its longer term impact on profitability in this article we develop a model to analyze the marketing of durable products through multiple channels our analysis suggests that even though it was not apparent at the time manufacturers were indeed behaving optimally when they changed their policies our model provides insights not only to automobile manufacturers but also to practitioners and academics who are interested in understanding the unique problems associated with marketing durable products through multiple channels we develop a two period model by assuming that a single manufacturer markets a durable product through two retailers a rental agency and a dealer the rental agency focuses mainly on renting the product in a daily rental market while the dealer focuses on selling the product to a different set of customers in the sales market to model the development of channels in the u s automobile industry we analyze three different channel structures the first structure a separate channel reflects the state of the industry through most of the 1980s when rental agencies were franchised solely to rent and dealers solely to sell the cars in response to a decrease in overall sales manufacturers encouraged rental agencies to sell their slightly used rental cars in the consumer market resulting in the second structure an overlapping channel dealers did not like this arrangement however and in the next experiment a buyback channel some manufacturers began buying back used rental cars and selling them through dealers in terms of the consumer side of the model we assume that consumers are heterogeneous and have product valuations that are distributed uniformly between a low and a high value in addition they recognize that as the durable depreciates with use its secondhand market value decreases while both sold and rented goods depreciate with use we assume based on an analysis of market prices that sold goods depreciate at a higher rate than rented goods given these different depreciation rates and consumers underlying utility functions we develop the market demand functions in the dealer s and rental agency s markets then for each of the channel structures we solve the intermediaries and manufacturer s problems the main contribution of this article is that it allows us to evaluate the profitability associated with various channel structures for all the players in our analysis the dealer the rental agency and the manufacturer in terms of the intermediaries we find that the overlapping channel is the most profitable structure for the rental agency on the other hand it is the least profitable for the dealer in terms of manufacturer profitability our model suggests that the separate channel is the least profitable and the overlapping channel is the most profitable it is interesting to note that the distribution structure in existence today is more akin to a buyback channel this strikes us as a compromise channel which alleviates dealer concerns with the overlapping channel and yet does not harm rental agencies as much as a separate channel these are surprising results because conventional wisdom has been that the overlapping channel was competing away profits for all players this suggests to us that automobile manufacturers were indeed on the right track when they began experimenting with the structure of their distribution channels

determinants of agricultural economics faculty salaries in the spring of 1980 500 randomly selected agricultural economists at land grant universities were asked to complete a pretested mailed questionnaire the questionnaire was designed to secure individual information and preserve respondent anonymity the 311 returned questionnaires represented a response rate of nearly 60 two hundred and forty one of the respondents held ph d degrees these individuals formed the sample for the following analysis 2

outside options and the failure of the coase conjecture a buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option abandoning their search or moving on to another seller we show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price contravening the coase conjecture we then embed the singleseller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual no haggling assumption jel c78 d42 d43 l12 l13 the coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory informing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of commitment the idea is that for any given price high value buyers are more likely to purchase than low value buyers leading to negative selection in the demand pool accordingly the seller cuts its price over time causing high value buyers to delay their purchases the seller s inability to commit thus leads its later selves to exert a negative externality on its former selves reducing its overall profit gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 this idea of negative selection is robust versions of it hold when costs are nonlinear kahn 1986 when goods depreciate over time bond and samuelson 1984 when there is entry of new buyers sobel 1991 and when the buyers face future competition fuchs and skrzypacz 2010 in this article we show that the coase conjecture fails in a natural environment where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise we consider a seller who faces a buyer or a continuum of buyers with unknown value for the good and unknown outside option each period the seller chooses price p t the buyer then chooses to buy wait or exercise his option and terminate the game the outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product for example when waiting for the price of the iphone to fall a customer could instead buy a comparable phone from a competitor similarly when bargaining over the price of a car a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer the outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation has terminated for example after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar a tourist could start seeing local attractions

why would a durable good monopolist also produce a cost inefficient nondurable good abstract we develop both commitment and time consistent stationary policies for a monopolist who produces a mixture of goods distinguished by production costs and degree of durability under commitment only the cost efficient durable good is produced and the monopoly output is realized each period for the time consistent stationary case there is an interval for the degree of durability where only the durable good is produced and a higher non overlapping interval where both the cost efficient durable and the cost inefficient nondurable good are produced for any period length when the degree of durability is such that both durable and nondurable goods are provided combined output is less than the competitive output and decreases in the degree of durability approaching the single period monopoly output when both goods are produced the coase conjecture does not hold

durable goods oligopoly abstract this paper models a durable goods oligopoly as a differential game two cases are treated sales where firms cannot lease but must sell the good in question and leasing where firms do not sell but only rent in the sales case firms face increasing marginal cost of production and the good in question depreciates for this case a rational expectations feedback nash equilibrium is constructed for which monopoly or oligopoly output is less than the efficient level this gap between oligopoly and competitive output diminishes as the number of firms increases when firms can only lease the good the good is assumed not to depreciate and the monopoly level of steady state output is compared with the level of steady state output for a feedback equilibrium duopoly for this case the duopoly equilibrium has steady state output that is less than the corresponding efficient level but greater than the monopoly level the leasing model is shown to be isomorphic to the adjustment cost duopoly model of driskill and mccafferty journal of economic theory 49 1989 324 338

the coase conjecture need not hold for durable good monopolies with depreciation abstract we consider the optimal sales policy for a monopoly seller of a durable good in a non stationary rational expectations equilibruim with replacement sales we show that coase s conjecture that the monopolist will sell the competitive stock as period length approaches zero may not hold under these assumptions

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

mixed risk aversion abstract we analyze the class of increasing utility functions exhibiting all derivatives of alternating sign this property that we call mixed risk aversion is satisfied by the utility functions most commonly used in financial economics the utility functions displaying mixed risk aversion can be expressed as mixtures of exponential functions we characterize stochastic dominance and we find conditions for both mutual aggravation and mutual amelioration of risks when agents are mixed risk averse finally the analysis of the distribution function describing a mixed utility allows one to characterize the behaviour of its indexes of risk aversion and to discuss its implications for portfolio selection journal of economic literature classification numbers d81 g11

why monopolists prefer to make their goods less durable this paper considers goods that depreciate in terms of quality over time and permits consumers to differ in their attitude concerning the usability of a durable good after it has depreciated given this it is shown that even if a monopoly can costlessly increase the durability of its product it may choose not to do so this does not happen in competition copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

optimal best price policy abstract a best price policy bp is a promise by a seller to give her customer a refund if she reduces her price after the customer has already purchased the product we characterize the optimal bp policy as when the seller can control both the policy length when the promise expires and the refund scale what portion of the price difference is refunded we explain why the policy length is finite and varies across industries in a setting where consumers valuations decline over time we show that a finite length bp allows the seller to commit to not lowering her price too soon while at the same time letting her capture some of the benefits of intertemporal price discrimination however because the decline in consumers valuations is uncertain a bp does not allow the monopolist to achieve the profit she could earn with a full commitment

negative returns to seniority new evidence in academic markets recent research has suggested that the long observed negative association between seniority and pay among college faculty largely reflects below average research productivity of senior faculty a possibility that most earlier studies did not examine overlooked in both waves of studies however is match quality because the higher quality of the faculty institutional match implied by higher seniority should all else equal result in higher salaries failure to account for match quality inflates the estimated returns to seniority indeed that positive bias the authors find is roughly equal in magnitude to the negative bias caused by failure to account for research quantity and quality when they account for both match quality and faculty research productivity in an analysis of data on economics faculty at five research universities over a 21 year period the authors estimate that holding experience and other factors constant the penalty for twenty years of seniority is 16 of salary

convex and decreasing absolute risk aversion is proper proper risk aversion a pivotal concept in the study of behavioral conditions on utility functions states that an undesirable risk can never be made desirable by the presence of an independent risk it is well known that standard risk aversion is sufficient for this concept we show in this short article that convex and decreasing absolute risk aversion is an alternative sufficient condition

network effects aftermarkets and the coase conjecture a dynamic markovian approach this paper investigates the expansion of the network of a monopolist firm that produces a durable good and is also involved in the corresponding aftermarket we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium of the continuous time dynamic game played by the monopolist and the forward looking consumers under the assumption that consumers benefit from the subsequent expansion of the network the paper contributes to the theoretical discussion on the validity of the coase conjecture analyzing whether coase s prediction that the monopolist serves the market in a twinkling of an eye remains valid in our setup we conclude that the equilibrium network development may actually be gradual contradicting coase s conjecture we find that a necessary condition for such a result is the existence of aftermarket network effects that accrue at least partly to the monopolist firm

putting risk in its proper place this paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs we show how such concepts as prudence and temperance can be fully characterized by a preference relation over these lotteries if preferences are defined in an expected utility framework with differentiable utility the direction of preference for a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the nth derivative of the utility function what makes our characterization appealing is its simplicity which seems particularly amenable to experimentation

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

scholarships citations and salaries economic rewards in economics while substantial attention has been paid to the determinants of academics earnings 5 7 8 14 15 this literature has by implication suggested that the mere fact of having spent more time in the profession and the publication of more scholarly articles and books are the major determinants of salary differences our purpose here is to introduce a new determinant the quality of one s scholarly research measured by the frequency of references to that work as an additional objective measure of productivity we expect that this proxy for the extent of a scholar s influence on the work of other researchers is rewarded by the market in addition to giving a more complete picture of the determination of salaries in academic labor markets our approach should be useful in establishing a better framework for the evaluation of issues of discrimination in such markets than has been presented before 2 9

monopoly with endogenous durability abstract a multi period formulation for a durable good monopoly is developed where production and durability are decision variables when commitment to production is possible neither the level nor the depreciation rate of initial stock has an effect on the selected efficient degree of durability with time consistent production policy the optimal degree of durability is less than the efficient rate and typically increasing in the initial stock and initial degree of durability when a monopolist can switch at any time from an inefficient non durable to an efficient durable there exists a cutoff durability above which only the non durable will be produced otherwise the efficient durable will be produced

urban congestion and developer precommitments unilateral solutions to dynamic inconsistency the sale of housing creates a dynamic inconsistency problem for residential developers who find it profit maximising to overdevelop an area once ownership of the existing housing stock has been transferred to local residents rational buyers lower the prices they are willing to pay in expectation of this future congestion it is therefore in the developers interest to attract higher prices by credibly precommitting themselves unilaterally to construction plans that are optimal for each housing tract if the externalities associated with congestion affect quality of life in neighbouring tracts however development will still exceed the efficient level the introduction of master planned communities where a single development company commits future developer builders to a plan for the construction of multiple contiguous housing tracts can create the expectation of future population densities that will be optimal on a city wide level

durable good monopoly with one hoss shay depreciation abstract this paper analyzes the effects of one hoss shay depreciation on the equilibrium stock path in a monopoly market for a durable good it is shown that the stock path oscillates converging to a stationary level lower than the competitive level

leasing lemons and moral hazard abstract a number of recent papers have analyzed leasing in the new car market as a response to the adverse selection problem in the used car market originally explored in the seminal 1970 paper by george akerlof in this paper we consider a model characterized by both adverse selection as in these earlier papers and moral hazard concerning the maintenance choices of new car drivers we show that this approach provides explanations for a number of empirical findings concerning real world new and used car markets including that leasing has become more popular over time very high income new car drivers lease more and used cars that were leased when new sell for more than used cars that were purchased when new we also compare and contrast our approach to new car leasing with alternative approaches

does raiding explain the negative returns to faculty seniority i introduction economists have studied various aspects of faculty mobility research shows that turnover is greater among nonunion faculty rees 1994 female faculty average slightly more employers than male faculty barbezat and hughes 2001 ginther and kahn 2004 1 the responsiveness of turnover to relative pay diminishes with rank ehrenberg kasper and rees 1991 and research productivity enhances prospects for upward mobility ault rutman and stevenson 1979 1982 coupe smeets and warzynski 2005 still questions remain unanswered where do faculty go when they leave a university how does faculty turnover vary with time at a university what percentage of faculty move upward and what percentage move downward because of tenure denials or the prospect of being turned down for tenure the present article contributes to our understanding of these issues but its primary objective was to use data on faculty mobility to provide insights on another issue returns to academic seniority the negative returns to seniority that many studies find are commonly attributed to one of two factors 2 the first view is that negative returns reflect monopsony power on the part of universities faculty with high mobility costs acquire high seniority and because they are unlikely to move they are paid less than equally productive faculty that employers view as more likely to leave a competing explanation is that highly productive faculty are raided according to this story returns to seniority are biased negatively because faculty with high seniority tend to have low unmeasured productivity the best faculty are bid away moving on to better jobs those who remain are the faculty without outside offers and the negative returns estimated for senior faculty actually reflect a penalty for low unmeasured productivity rather than a true penalty for seniority the raiding story has several implications first estimated returns to seniority should become less negative the more fully the productivity is measured second estimated returns should be less negative once we control for faculty who are bid away finally and of particular importance estimated returns to seniority should not be negative for faculty who are bid away the faculty for whom unmeasured productivity is presumably high with the right data set these hypotheses can be tested rejection of the raiding hypothesis would provide tacit evidence of monoposony in academic markets 3 this article contributes to the literature in several ways it is the first research to directly test the raiding hypothesis it provides a detailed look at faculty mobility in one segment of the academic labor market it extends and improves bratsberg ragan and warren 2003 in the following ways it expands the sample to cover three decades of faculty pay records it includes additional controls for productivity number and types of books recent and prospective articles and so forth resulting in the most complete specification of research productivity to date and it allows for heterogeneity in the seniority penalty via phd pedigree and direction of move finally it tests for the possibility that the academic job market does a better job of matching faculty and universities in recent years as might be expected because of the information revolution the sample consists of five public phd granting universities in the midwest we track all tenure track economics faculty employed in these universities over a 30 yr period we measure their productivity their pay and their mobility as such the study provides a rich and detailed investigation of one subset of economics programs it is possible that mobility may be greater in urban areas where faculty can more readily obtain alternative employment without relocating and prior research indicates that pay structures depend on the university s stature and its relative emphasis on research and teaching

monopoly extraction of a durable non renewable resource failure of the coase conjecture the author studies a perfect information rational expectations markov equilibrium for the situation where a monopolist extracts a nonrenewable resource that is converted to a durable good even if short run extraction costs are constant the coase conjectur e fails provided that the depreciation rate of the durable good is positive copyright 1993 by the london school of economics and political science

durable goods monopoly with limited choice of commitment strategy when should the monopolist precommit consider a firm a monopolist offering a unique product to a fixed number of potential customers suppose that no consumer desires more than one unit of the good within a given period or across periods that is there is no value to repeat purchases in addition suppose that customers vary with respect to their initial reservation prices which decline over time a natural interpretation is that the monopolist is selling a good that is durable alternatively the firm is providing an entertainment or fashion good consumers may place a premium on obtaining the product quickly before it becomes less useful less stylish or less novel coase 7 conjectured that this firm s ability to extract surplus is limited because the firm has to compete with itself across time periods high valuation customers would be unwilling to pay a high initial price because they would anticipate that over time the firm will be reducing the price in order to sell to lower valuation customers subsequent literature formalizes this as a time inconsistency problem faced by a monopolist unable to make intertemporal commitments a separate strand of the literature proceeds from the polar assumption that the monopolist can precommit to any multiperiod pricing strategy comparison to coase s monopolist is simple higher profits are obtainable under precommitment because more surplus is extracted from high valuation customers an important proposition due to stokey 22 is that it will be optimal for the monopolist to precommit to a declining intertemporal price schedule if consumers with higher initial valuations have a higher rate of time preference 2 otherwise the optimal strategy is to hold price constant at the static monopoly level and to sell no more than the static monopoly quantity 3

earnings profiles of department heads comparing cross section and panel models academics who become department heads suffer declining research skills because of time spent performing administrative tasks and this skill depreciation slows future wage growth this study examines kansas state university faculty who served as department heads during the period 1965 92 cross section estimates of the compensation for serving as department head are biased upward because of a correlation between unmeasured productivity characteristics and selection as department head to correct for this bias the authors reestimate earnings equations using a panel model that incorporates personal fixed effects although the average department head in the sample received a wage premium of 12 the premium for past administrative service had completely disappeared for the typical former head another finding is that skill depreciation was most severe and wage growth most adversely affected in the sciences as compensation department heads in the sciences received a larger initial administrative premium th

durable goods price cycles theory and evidence from the textbook market i introduction one of the features of the market for new textbooks is that the price of new textbooks is relatively inflexible over the life of an edition in the sense that it fails to decline as the end of an edition approaches this inflexibility seems surprising because the availability of used textbooks which are a close substitute for new textbooks rises as the textbook ages furthermore the willingness to pay of a purchaser of a new textbook who plans to resell the book should decline at the end of the edition as the introduction of a new edition will destroy the resale value of the previous edition both of these factors would be expected to put downward pressure on the price of the good as the edition ages our goal of this article is to develop a model of textbook pricing that is capable of explaining this price inflexibility over the life of an edition we model the textbook pricing decision as that of a monopoly seller of a durable good over the life of an edition of the good where the life of the edition is exogenously given at two periods and the introduction of a new edition kills off the used market for the previous edition we assume that the market for the good is made up of two types of consumers high valuation buyers who will keep the good and low valuation buyers who value the option of being able to resell the good in the used market after using the services of the good in the current period the willingness to pay of high valuation buyers will thus be constant over the life of an edition while that of the low valuation buyers will decline in the second period due to the elimination of the used market we show that this model may lead to an optimal price for the durable good that may either rise or fall over the life of an edition and identify two effects that influence the monopolist s pricing decision the first we refer to as the used goods supply effect which is the impact of the quantity of goods available in the used market on the optimal price of new goods in the second period we show that if the quantity of high valuation buyers is sufficiently low the price of new goods may be increasing in the quantity of used goods in the second period this results from the fact that the increased supply of used goods may reduce the elasticity of demand for new goods making it optimal for the monopolist to sell only to high valuation buyers in the second period the second effect is the potential for resale effect which is due to the fact that the ability to sell goods in the used market will raise the willingness to pay of low valuation buyers relative to that of high valuation buyers in the first period the combination of these two effects leads to the possibility that the monopolist will choose to sell to both types of buyers in the first period of the edition but to sell only to high valuation buyers in the second period our empirical analysis tests for the presence of used goods supply and potential for resale effects on the prices of new textbooks we utilize a panel dataset from college bookshops that contains price and quantity information for economics textbooks for each semester between 1997 and 2003 we estimate simple pricing equations with textbook fixed effects instrumental variables are also used to account for the potential endogeneity of a regressor we find that textbook prices increase as the share of used textbooks increases which is consistent with the presence of a used good supply effect in which the increased presence of used goods makes the demand curve for new goods less elastic we also find evidence that prices of the goods are higher in the last period of an edition controlling for the stock of used goods in the market this is consistent with the potential for resale effect our theoretical model can be distinguished from other work that has analyzed the optimal pricing problem for a monopoly seller of a durable good

depreciation erodes the coase conjecture if a durable good monopolist produces at constant marginal costs and the good depreciates there exists a family of strong markov perfect equilibrium smpe one member of this family entails instantaneous production of the level of stock produced in a competitive equilibrium this is consistent with the coase conjecture other smpe in the family entail steady state production at a stock level lower than in the competitive equilibrium there may be a jump to these steady states or they may be approached asymptotically monopoly profits are positive in these equilibria and the coase conjecture fails

durable goods market structure and the incentives to innovate a commonly cited finding in the innovation literature is that a monopoly tends to innovate too little this paper demonstrates that a monopoly may devote more resources to innovation than is socially optimal if it produces a durable good this possibility occurs because durability creates new innovation incentives once an initial stock of a durable good has been produced the monopoly faces a residual demand for the good innovation may allow the monopoly to more profitably exploit this residual demand and this ability may lead the monopoly to devote more resources to innovation than is socially optimal copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

replacement cycles income distribution and dynamic price discrimination this article analyses how income distribution intellectual property rights and other regulatory policies such as minimum quality standards determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context where a monopolist periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good discrimination through quality and screening in this article takes place in a context where consumers buy several versions of the durable good during their lifetime instead of a single version as in inderst s 2008 or koh s 2006 it also differs from glass 2001 in that an equilibrium may emerge in which different consumer types replace their durable generations with different frequencies our modelling is motivated by stylized facts from the last brazilian pof household budget survey

research note the role of production lead time and demand uncertainty in marketing durable goods firms often have to make their production decisions under conditions of demand uncertainty this is especially true for product categories such as automobiles and technology goods where the lead time needed for manufacturing forces firms to make production decisions well in advance of the selling season once the firm has produced the goods the available production volume affects the firm s subsequent marketing decisions in this paper we study the relationship between the firm s production and marketing decisions for a durable goods manufacturer we develop a dynamic model of a durable product market in which the demand functions are developed from a micromodeling of consumer utility functions and an equilibrium analysis of consumer strategies after taking into account the demand uncertainty as well as the potential for cannibalization of future sales the manufacturer makes its production and sales decisions we find that the firm s optimal inventory level is u shaped in the durability of the product and that the firm suffers a larger loss due to uncertainty when it is leases rather than sells its products furthermore unlike the case for nondurables for durable goods we find that the effect of uncertainty persists even after the uncertainty has been resolved

a theory of finitely durable goods monopoly with used goods market and transaction costs we construct a dynamic game to model a monopoly of finitely durable goods the solution concept is markov perfect equilibria with general equilibria embedded in every time period our model is flexible enough to simultaneously explain or accommodate many commonly observed phenomena or stylized facts such as concurrent leasing and selling active secondary markets for used goods heterogeneous consumers endogenous consumption patterns depreciation an infinite time horizon and nontrivial transaction costs within our model consumers have incentives to segment themselves into various consumption classes according to their willingness to pay and nontrivial transaction costs to sell used goods put strong constraints on consumers consumption sequences in time as a direct consequence of the finite durability the market power of the monopolist remains intact leasing manifests itself as a facilitator of price discrimination by debundling the durable good into new and used portions that are naturally bundled together under outright sales the concurrent leasing and selling reflects the degree of the comparative advantage the monopolist has over consumers in disposing used goods this comparative advantage which is partially exploited by the monopolist and partially shared by the consumers provides a sufficient mechanism to gain pareto improvement on the market

quality upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market abstract we examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth for a durable goods monopoly the seller may offer any bundle s of current and previous quality improvements upgrades subgame perfect equilibrium seller payoffs range from capturing the full social surplus down to only the initial flow value of each good as long as the value of all future quality growth exceeds the value of a single unit each of these payoffs is realized in a markov perfect equilibrium that follows the socially efficient path however inefficient delay equilibria with bundling exist for innovation rates above a threshold

durability and strategic trade are there rents to be captured abstract this paper analyzes strategic trade policy when home and foreign duopolists produce a durable good that is either sold or leased in a third country durability is important for two reasons it characterizes most of the products discussed in the strategic trade literature and it also calls for explicit dynamic modeling for duopolists who sell their product in a third country market this paper finds the optimal policy to be a tax on domestic output for duopolists who lease the good in a third country market though the optimal policy is a subsidy

when can expected utility handle first order risk aversion abstract expected utility functions are limited to second order conditional risk aversion while non expected utility functions can exhibit either first order or second order conditional risk aversion we extend the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional dependent risk aversion we show that first order conditional dependent risk aversion is consistent with the framework of the expected utility hypothesis our theoretical result proposes new insights into economic and financial applications such as the equity premium puzzle the cost of business cycles and stock market participation our model is compared to the rank dependent expected utility model

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

durable goods monopoly increasing marginal cost and depreciation this paper combines increasing marginal cost and depreciation in a continuous time model of a durable goods monopolist in contrast to the case of increasing marginal cost but no depreciation analysed by kahn and the case of depreciation with constant marginal cost analysed by bond and samuelson steady state output in this model is less than in the competitive case a turnpike result shows that choice of a long enough time horizon can make the equilibrium path of output in a finite horizon game arbitrarily close to the path of the infinite horizon game

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

does amd spur intel to innovate more we estimate an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with durable goods and endogenous innovation to examine the effect of competition on innovation in the personal computer microprocessor industry firms make dynamic pricing and investment decisions while consumers make dynamic upgrade decisions anticipating product improvements and price declines consistent with schumpeter we find that the rate of innovation in product quality would be 4 2 percent higher without amd present though higher prices would reduce consumer surplus by 12 billion per year comparative statics illustrate the role of product durability and provide implications of the model for other industries

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

imperfect durability and the coase conjecture this article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time we show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria a coase conjecture equilibrium a monopoly equilibrium and a reputational equilibrium when the depreciation rate is low the coase conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for intermediate values of the depreciation rate all three equilibrium types coexist when the depreciation rate is high the monopoly equilibrium is the unique equilibrium consequently when selling a good of sufficiently low durability the monopolist does not lose any of her monopoly power furthermore the steady state output in the reputational equilibrium falls below the monopoly quantity hence in durable goods markets welfare losses due to monopoly power may be larger than in markets for perishables

dynamic product diversity the goal of this paper is to study the frequency of new product introductions in monopoly markets where demand is subject to transitory saturation we focus on those types of goods for which consumers purchase at most one unit of each variety but repeat purchases in the same product category the model considers in nitely lived forward looking consumers and rms we show that the share of potential surplus that a monopolist is able to appropriate increases with the frequency of introduction of new products and the intensity of transitory saturation if the latter is su ciently strong then the rate of introduction of new products is higher than socially desirable excessive dynamic product diversity jel classi cation numbers l12 l13

on and off the hot seat an analysis of entry into and out of university administration the authors investigate economists decisions to enter and exit department chair positions in research intensive economics departments of elite universities during the postwar era 1948 1989 they use the american economic association survey of members as well as phone surveys to determine which and at what point in their careers faculty assume administrative positions the theoretical model predicts and empirical results confirm that a faster rate of knowledge depreciation in an economist s field of study reduces the entry and exit rates for the chair position moreover among those who have exited the position of chair longer terms of past chair service and faster knowledge depreciation accelerate the timing of movements into upper level administration the findings suggest that administrators are to some extent made and not born and that the growing specialization and technical nature of many professions could affect who chooses administrative careers and at what point in their careers they choose

selling and leasing strategies for durable goods with complementary products it has been recognized that when a durable goods manufacturer sells its output it has an incentive to produce at a rate that will drive down the market price of the product over time because anticipation of declining prices makes consumers less willing to invest in owning the durable good selling can be self defeating for the manufacturer if the manufacturer instead leases the product it can eliminate its own incentive to decrease the price over time which allows it to extract larger rents from consumers in this paper we investigate how a durable goods manufacturer s choice between leasing and selling is affected by a complementary product that is produced by an independent firm we show that a durable goods manufacturer that leases its product has an incentive to increase prices by limiting the availability of the product in response to the availability of a complement because this potential for opportunistic behavior discourages output of the complement leasing can also be problematic as a result the durable goods manufacturer faces a trade off between leasing which commits the manufacturer to not overproduce and selling which commits it to not underproduce our contribution is to identify this trade off and show how a durable goods manufacturer can use a combination of leasing and selling to balance its strategic commitment across both its own market as well as the complementary market

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a

risky choices and correlated background risk the analysis of a risky project should take into account not only uncertainties about the return from that project project risk but also uncertainties associated with other ongoing projects and with exogenous factors that can impact final wealth background risk the presence of background risk can change the optimal course of action with respect to a project and ignoring such risk might lead to a poor decision most work on background risk assumes that project risk and background risk are independent and are additive in their impact on wealth however independence is often unrealistic and background risk operates in a multiplicative manner in many situations we relax the independence assumption and consider a model with both additive and multiplicative background risk the optimal decisions in the correlated setting can be very different than those that would appear optimal if the correlation were ignored the impact of correlation differs in the additive and multiplicative cases with positive correlation being beneficial in some cases and negative correlation in others the analytical and numerical results indicate that in analyzing decision making problems it is very important to understand the direction and degree of dependence between project risk and background risks