stopping agents from cheating abstract when a principal hires two or more agents to work in a correlated environment each agent s reward will depend on the other s performance unfortunately with just the usual optimal incentive constrained contracts being offered the agents strictly prefer to play equilibrium strategies other than those desired by the principal they cheat however the principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop them from cheating at no extra cost this mechanism uses one agent to police the other and exploits certain properties of the optimal contracts

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

equity envy and efficiency under asymmetric information abstract varian s varian h 1974 equity envy and efficiency journal of economic theory 9 63 91 main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting 1 envy freeness and efficiency may be incompatible 2 there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another two weaker positive properties are formulated

almost budget balanced vcg mechanisms to assign multiple objects subsidy free vcg mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents the efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus over all profiles of non negative valuations the smallest efficiency loss l n p satisfies l n p l n n2 43n if pn is bounded away from 12 l n p converges to zero exponentially in n participation is voluntary in the optimal mechanism achieving l n p if p 1 but not if p 2 among voluntary mechanisms the optimal efficiency loss is not significantly larger than l n p if pn 12 but it does not converge to zero in n if pn 12

bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

supplier relations and the market context a theory of handshakes abstract this paper analyzes the degree of formality in industrial procurement contracts impose cost discipline on suppliers but stifle cooperative innovation noncontractual procurement provides cooperation but poor cost discipline however cost discipline comes naturally when there is not much vertical integration because the promise of finding an alternative buyer to use as a bargaining threat enhances the supplier s incentive to make efficiency enhancing investments thus highly integrated industries use contracts while less integrated industries do business on handshakes in the latter cooperative innovations flourish this may help explain some international comparisons and changes in business practices observed over time

simple strategy proof approximately walrasian mechanisms abstract this note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the walrasian mechanism it presents mechanisms under which truth telling is a dominant strategy in finite exchange economies in contrast to the walrasian mechanism and whose outcomes generically approximate walrasian ones for large economies these mechanisms provide new insights on the well know trade off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economies journal of economic literature classification numbers d50 d71 d78

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

united states export subsidies in wheat strategic trade policy or expensive beggar thy neighbor tactic this paper examines the domestic and international impacts of the u s export enhancement program eep for wheat eep uses targeted in kind subsidies to expand u s exports and was designed specifically to compete with subsidized exports from the european community ec we argue eep cannot be welfare improving for the u s even considering strategic trade theory we then model eep as an in kind constrained targeted export subsidy and determine its price quantity and budgetary effects empirical results show that no exporting country gains from eep and that the intended loser the ec is only slightly harmed we find the export subsidies generate only a small increase in u s wheat exports eep is an expensive program based on our estimates for 1988 government cost of additional wheat exports under eep reached 469 per metric ton

strategy proof exchange we consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences in such a setting standard allocation rules such as walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives we characterize the set of allocation rules which are incentive compatible or in other words the set of strategy proof social choice functions social choice functions which are strategy proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to a finite number of pre specified proportions the number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents such rules are necessarily inefficient even in the limit as the economy grows

approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies abstract we consider exchange economies where each consumer may report or act according to any demand function provided that there exist situations that the consumer finds plausible in which the reported demand performs at least as well as the true demand we identify conditions under which as the size of the economy increases all the market clearing prices and allocations of the reported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

worst case optimal redistribution of vcg payments in multi unit auctions abstract for allocation problems with one or more items the well known vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism aka clarke mechanism generalized vickrey auction is efficient strategy proof individually rational and does not incur a deficit however it is not strongly budget balanced generally the agents payments will sum to more than 0 we study mechanisms that redistribute some of the vcg payments back to the agents while maintaining the desirable properties of the vcg mechanism our objective is to come as close to budget balance as possible in the worst case for auctions with multiple indistinguishable units in which marginal values are nonincreasing we derive a mechanism that is optimal in this sense we also derive an optimal mechanism for the case where we drop the non deficit requirement finally we show that if marginal values are not required to be nonincreasing then the original vcg mechanism is worst case optimal

implementation in differential information economies abstract we consider the problem of implementation of social choice correspondences in differential information economies we provide necessary conditions for implementation and slightly stronger conditions which are sufficient to guarantee implementation

the dynamics of technological innovation the sector of antibacterial medicines abstract this is an empirical and historical study of the dynamics of technological innovation in antibacterial medicines a key sector of the pharmaceutical industry it is based on an analysis of all the innovations that were introduced over the period 1935 1987 from prontosil the first sulphonamide through penicillin and the semisynthetic antibiotics to the monobactams and the quinolones of the mid 1980s in the historical section we describe the influence that antibacterial medicines have had on the structure and research intensity of the innovating companies and through them on the pharmaceutical industry and its geography we also describe the catalytic role played by government agencies and universities in the empirical section the innovations are evaluated in terms of originality and market performance and are classified into four technological trajectories their distribution over time and among technological trajectories companies and countries the relation between originality and market performance of individual innovations the interplay between social needs market demand and technological innovation the role of market successful radical innovations in the launching of technological trajectories the orientation of subsequent academic and industrial research and the establishment of corporate technology traditions provide insights in both innovation theory and the dynamics of technological innovation

optimal contracts with public ex post information abstract we are concerned with the value of public ex post information about a seller s costs to an initially uninformed buyer we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal s s that is correlated with the risk neutral seller s costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer the first best outcome for the buyer is shown to be feasible if 1 the dimension of s is at least that of or 2 the conditional likelihood function of s given is for one of its realizations sj a strictly increasing function of and more concave in than is the seller s cost function

the type agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information abstract the type agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information it coincides with the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit the paper extends the work of perez castrillo cooperative outcomes through non cooperative games games econ behav 7 1994 428 440 to exchange economies with non transferable utility and asymmetric information the type agent core is a subset of wilson s coarse core wilson information efficiency and the core of an economy econometrica 46 1978 807 816 it is never empty even though it may be a strict subset of wilson s fine core in addition it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated

self fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations we introduce a class of communication equilibria which we call self fulfilling mechanisms and show that they provide a game theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria letebe an exchange economy with differential information we associate a strategic market game e withe we prove that the allocations achieved through a self fulfilling mechanism in e coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium allocations ine in order to understand how self fulfilment can be realized in a dynamic framework we investigate the relationship between self fulfilling mechanisms in e and nash equilibria of thet stage repeated game t e journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d82 c72

continuous and feasible implementation of rational expectations lindahl allocations abstract in this paper we consider bayesian implementation of rational expectations lindahl allocations for economic environments with public goods when agents are incompletely informed about environments we construct a continuous and feasible mechanism whose bayesian equilibrium allocations coincide with rational expectations lindahl allocations we not only allow the types of individuals to be unknown but also allow both the preferences and the initial endowments to be unknown to the designer in addition we allow some types of boundary equilibrium allocations and a continuous information structure journal of economic literatureclassification number c72 d71 d82 h41

managing innovation optimal incentive contracts for delegated r d with double moral hazard abstract managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates r d to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal incentive contract satisfies monotonicity conditions the analysis shows that the optimal incentive contract for delegated r d is an option delegated r d with simultaneous sampling results in shirking but delegated r d with sequential sampling attains the efficient outcome the analysis considers a combined problem with simultaneous and sequential search and gives sufficient conditions under which delegated r d attains the first best the discussion also considers delegated r d with stochastic innovation and with stochastic quality of inventions

implementation in economic environments with incomplete information the use of multi stage games abstract this paper shows that in economic environments with incomplete information incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d71 d82

an ordinal shapley value for economic environments abstract we propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it the problem is formulated in the preferences endowments space the solution is defined recursively incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the shapley value for transferable utility tu games we show a solution exists and call it the ordinal shapley value osv we characterize the osv using the notion of coalitional dividends and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous

self fulfilling mechanisms in bayesian games abstract amechanismfor a bayesian gamegis a mapping from the set of states of nature to the set of players actions isself fulfillingif players are truthful at the communication stage and given the information revealed by no player can gain in unilaterally deviating from the action prescribed by the mechanism we investigate the properties of self fulfilling mechanisms and we show in particular that they correspond to inert solutions of the infinitely repeated game generated byg we also discuss applications to market games regulation and r d games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d82 c72

protectionist responses and declining industries abstract this paper employs a three factor ricardo viner model of a small economy to analyse the effect of a falling world import price on the domestic price of the economy s importable good in the presence of an endogenously determined tariff the outcome is seen to depend on a the way in which the recycled tariff revenue is allocated to the three factor groups and b differences in relative risk aversion across those groups however under reasonable assumptions hillman s 1982 result that a declining industry will continue to decline is seen to hold in our general equilibrium framework

lobbying incentives and the pattern of protection in rich and poor countries in seeking to explain why poor countries tend to choose policies that tax agriculture relative to manufacturing while rich countries do the opposite archetypical parameters for a poor agrarian economy and a rich industrial one are inserted in a computable general equilibrium model to simulate the medium term effects on income distribution of policies that distort the relative prices of tradables the model includes a non tradables sector and intermediate inputs realistic features that ensure even greater skewness in the distributional effects of protection than simpler models suggest the magnitude of the results helps explain the tendency for countries to change gradually from taxing to subsidizing agriculture relative to manufacturing as their economies develop the paper draws out the implications of the analysis for agricultural and trade policy reform in the 1990s this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria abstract we investigate the implementability of the social choice correspondence induced by constrained rational expectations equilibria we construct an almost continuous mechanism that implements it provided that information held by each agent is non exclusive

the evolution of monetary equilibrium abstract the hahn problem is that even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists why should we expect the former over the latter here i consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness with unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the sum of agents fitnesses in a standard bewley townsend model this implies selection of the monetary over the nonmonetary equilibrium and also implies the survival of agents with money in the utility function trust in fiat money is only a recent development and even today such faith is hardly universal cass and shell 1980

incentives in university technology transfers there are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms licensing agreements and the creation of spin offs in this paper we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations the main incentive issues that appear in this process and the contractual solutions proposed to address them

the dynamics of technological innovation the case of the pharmaceutical industry abstract this paper examines the mechanisms and dynamics of the process of innovation in companies and sectors of the chemical industry it is based on analysis of science and technology output indicators namely patents and innovations evaluated in terms of originality and in the case of innovations in terms of market success as well radical innovation ri is identified as the kingpin for the evolution of technologies in both the micro and macro economic context not only because it provides a model for imitation but also because it turns out to be more profitable for the innovating companies than incremental innovation at the micro economic level this paper examines the significance of diverse driving forces which lead a company to the launching of projects aiming at ri measures the length of commitment to such projects and describes the dynamic effects generated by the introduction of a successful ri and how they affect the company s subsequent r d and market orientation at the macro economic level this paper identifies the stages of youth growth maturity and decline of the subsectors of the chemical industry examines the distribution of ri and market successful innovations over the development of a sector describes the influence of market demand and capital investment on technological advance and compares the development of national chemical industries the paper concludes with an account of the dynamics of technological innovation in the chemical industry over the period 1930 1985 which is based on the empirical findings of the previous sections

productivity growth in u s agriculture a postwar perspective there has been a long standing fascination with productivity trends in u s agriculture in part this stems from the historical importance of agriculture to the economy but it also reflects economists early and continued interest in quantifying the rate of return to society s sizable investment in agricultural r d the sum of government sponsored and private sector r d investment in agriculture is estimated to have been 268 million in 1953 in that year total r d investment in the economy from all sources amounted to 5 1 billion 2 excluding defense and space related r d which accounted for approximately half of the u s total in the early fifties 3 r d expenditures dedicated to agriculture equaled approximately 10 of total u s investment in r d from all sources

egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information abstract we propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends pazner and schmeidler s 1978 concept to environments with incomplete information if every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism as for instance in the case of non exclusive information then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible as they were under complete information when incentive constraints are more restrictive on the other hand the two criteria may become incompatible

welfare reducing licensing abstract in this paper we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two part tariff contracts a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty reduces social welfare we show that it occurs if i the firms compete in prices ii the innovation is large enough but not drastic and iii the goods are close enough substitutes moreover we show that regardless of the type of competition first the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and second even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous

primary commodity prices manufactured goods prices and the terms of trade of developing countries what the long run shows the authors revisit in this article the empirical foundation of the alleged secular decline in the prices of primary commodities relative to those of manufactures they use a newly constructed index of commodity prices and two modified indexes of manufactured good prices and find that from 1900 to 1986 the relative prices of all primary commodities fell on trend by 0 5 percent a year and those of nonfuel primary commodities by 0 6 percent a year they thus confirm the sign but not the magnitude of the trend implicit in the work of prebisch but even the more limited secular decline shown by their relative price indexes may be magnified by an incomplete account of quality improvements in manufactures they then show that the evolution of terms of trade of nonfuel primary commodities is not the same as that of the net barter terms of trade of non oil exporting developing countries finally they find that despite the decline that has probably occurred during the current century in the terms of trade of nonfuel primary commodities the purchasing power of total exports of these products has increased considerably similarly the fall that may have occurred after world war ii in the net barter terms of trade of developing countries seems to have been more than compensated for by the steady improvement in their income terms of trade

agricultural trade liberalization price changes and environmental effects many analyses of agricultural trade liberalization have been undertaken but few have considered the effects on the environment for the developed countries reducing the degree of protection would result in less intensive production therefore environmental stress would be reduced a reduction of trade barriers in industrial countries would result in higher world prices and in a somewhat lower world price variability assuming initially no policy changes for developing countries the question is how the liberalization would affect the environment higher prices in developing countries increase the level of production by intensifying production particularly in the commercial sector and by an area expansion both result in negative environmental effects these could be partly offset by an increase in hired labor in the commercial sector which might reduce pressure at the frontier and on marginal lands as well as by the income effect these off setting effects may be small however the direction of the overall environmental effects cannot be determined unambiguously without empirical examination at the global level the beneficial economic effects of agricultural trade liberalization probably outweigh the expected negative environmental effects in developing countries but this cannot be unambiguously established without valuation

multilateral trade negotiations european integration and farm policy reform trade negotiations and farm policy kym anderson why was it so hard to reach an agreement in the uruguay round to reduce agricultural protection after surveying the growth of agricultural protection in the 1980s i develop arguments based on political economy that imply a systematic tendency for governments to protect farmers increasingly at least up to some threshold as economic development proceeds agricultural protection growth in industrializing countries is therefore normal not exceptional liberalizing those policies before reaching that threshold is unattractive politically unless new influences e g from abroad upset the domestic political equilibrium the uruguay round provided such a force what made the early 1990s so significant a crossroads for farm policy reform was that coincidently there were other changes taking place in europe which lowered the domestic political cost of reforming the ec s common agricultural policy the paper argues that the reforms to farm policy during the rest of this decade as a result of the uruguay round agreement will at best be slow and messy but that is far preferable to the alternative of a failed uruguay round and continued growth of agricultural protection

the veil of public ignorance abstract a theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian standard of evaluation governing choices under complete information the task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information our first main result generalizes harsanyi s j polit econ 63 1955 309 classical result to situations of incomplete information assuming that group preferences satisfy bayesian coherence and interim pareto dominance these axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists we argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of bayesian preference aggregation under complete information

tariffs as insurance optimal commercial policy when domestic markets are incomplete free trade is not optimal for a small country that faces uncertain terms of trade if some factors are immobile ex post and markets for contingent claims are incomplete the government can improve social welfare by using commercial policy that serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets using a combination of analytical and simulation techniques we demonstrate that optimal policy for this purpose will often have an anti trade bias we also show that the usual preference by economists for factor or product taxes and subsidies over tariffs and export subsidies may not be justified in this context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on bayesian implementable allocations this paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are and are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment we show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social choice correspondences we also identify conditions under which the rational expectations equilibrium correspondence is implementable we extend the concepts of fair allocations and lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information and show that envy free allocations and lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not

per unit vs ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information we study an inside patent holder s optimal licensing policy when it has imperfect information about the value of the patent to its rival the patent holder can choose any two part licensing fee with either per unit or ad valorem royalties we demonstrate that the equilibrium will be either a fully separating contract with different per unit royalty rates or a contract with a single ad valorem royalty that excludes a high cost rival fixed fees will not be used the presence of asymmetric information uniquely drives the per unit royalties that otherwise would not be adopted per unit royalties always generate higher social welfare than ad valorem royalties

uncertainty duality and perversity an empirical test of the schultz baron hypothesis it has been suggested that supply curves may be negatively sloped under conditions of output price uncertainty and risk aversion if the effect of an increase in expected price is offset by the effect of an associated increase in uncertainty risk this hypothesis first articulated by schultz and given a more rigorous theoretical exposition by baron is tested using aggregate time series data to estimate a stochastic model of us agriculture based on a generalized leontief certainty equivalent profit function evidence of risk aversion and a positive correlation between mean output price and its variance are found however these factors are not strong enough to generate perversity thus the own price elasticity of supply of agricultural output is found to be positive with a value of 0 25 although no evidence of perversity is found the empirical results suggest that ignoring price uncertainty may bias estimates of aggregate supply response downwards by between 5 and 47 as well as testing the schultz

the road to uruguay context and to show how its agenda and procedures as well as its problems and possible outcomes have arisen from the conjunction of developments in patterns of world trade and the evolution of the gatt itself the uruguay round has some novel features but it also strongly reflects the continuation of the trends of the last forty years the gatt has fostered the evolution of the world trading system from a highly restrictive form with two major players the us and the uk towards a more liberal and evenly balanced form the practices appropriate to the former circumstances achieved many of their objectives but they proved gradually less able to cope with the strains of the new circumstances and problems thus the gatt s traditional bilateral mode of tariff negotiations has given way first to a more multilateral form of tariff talks and then to a preoccupation with constitutional issues such as trading rules and the sectoral coverage of the gatt its procedures have become progressively more multilateral but especially when one considers trade policy implemented between gatt rounds its outcomes appear recently to have become less so it is paradoxical that whereas initially the gatt harnessed the crude power of bilateralism to achieve multilateral outcomes it has more recently adopted multilateral procedures but with more bi and pluri lateral results

sources of technical innovation in the network of companies providing chemical process plant and equipment abstract the purpose of this paper is to explore issues concerning technological innovation in the network of firms linked to the chemical industry with particular reference to the process plant contracting industry while technological and economic maturity inhibit the research and development activities of plant contractors little evidence was found of contractors adopting novel strategies to capture special advantage from technology developed by equipment manufacturing firms it is suggested that the changing economic and technological environment is creating a climate where new or closer contractor equipment manufacturer relationships should receive greater attention appropriate alliances between contractors and equipment manufacturers can not only help to reduce plant design procurement and erection costs but also offer a means to counter the competitive threat from more specialist firms in particular the large equipment manufacturers that possess their own project contracting skills furthermore collaboration in niche and technology fusion type innovation offers a means of generating scope for technological competitive advantage whilst sharing cost and risk whilst contractor equipment manufacturer alliances are one option the nature of the market demands operating company involvement to facilitate commercialisation

growth of agricultural protection in east asia abstract japan is well known for its restrictions on food imports less well known is the fact that south korea and taiwan are also protective of their agricultural sectors this protectionism began early this century when all three countries were part of the japanese empire and it has increased rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s today food prices in east asia average two or three times higher than in international markets reflecting levels of protection that rival those in western europe

the political economy of the pharmaceutical industry e conomicsis a practical science since its inception as an independent discipline it has probed the major policy issues of the day the topics that aroused the interests of its practitioners have generally been those that presented government officials with critical choices the modern literature on the economics of the pharmaceutical industry is no exception this body of material originated with the investigations of the kefauver committee in late 1959 public interest was aroused by the spectacle of confrontation between committee and industry the record made by this committee and its successors grew to tens of thousands of pages as claims and counterclaims were offered regarding industry conduct and performance the primary line of attack concerned pharmaceutical prices and profits the committee demonstrated that prices generally exceeded direct costs of manufacturing for 22 major pharmaceutical firms in 1958 costs of goods sold were merely 32 percent of total sales u s senate report 1961 p 31 the committee argued that this fact alone demonstrated the presence of monopoly power while the substantial difference between revenues and production costs permitted high expenditures on research and development it also paid for even higher selling outlays moreover reported rates of return after taxes during this period on the order of 21 to 22 percent exceeded twice the average for all manufacturing the industry replied that on the contrary prices were low relative to the value afforded consumers and high returns on successful products were required to balance the losses from the large numbers of unsuccessful ones the relevant concept of marginal costs according to the industry position must include the costs of developing and marketing new products and therefore prices were not excessive at all although it admitted earning substantial profits the industry argued that without these returns research outlays would be limited and the number of new drugs reduced the committee countered that little of social value arose from industry research molecules were manipulated and the new drugs that resulted were therapeutically similar to those already on the market indeed it suggested that much