surplus from publicness in consumption and its equitable distribution abstract the application of distributive equity has been confined to the allocation of private goods this paper extends this application to economies with public goods after the surplus accruing from publicness in consumption of public goods is defined and quantified we show 1 there exists an efficient allocation such that the surplus from publicness as well as all of the resources available are equitably distributed 2 the surplus from publicness fails to be equitably distributed in lindahl equilibria and in the core even if the economy starts from an equal distribution of endowments 3 a certain income redistribution policy should be undertaken to equitably distribute the surplus from publicness

technical change land quality and income distribution a general equilibrium analysis this paper investigates the distributional effects of technical progress in agriculture a small computable general equilibrium model is developed in which agricultural production occurs in two environments with fixed land resources of different quality the analytical structure permits not only the rate but also the factor biases of technical change to differ between environments distributional results are generated for several classes of households distinguished both by their ownership of factors and by their consumption patterns the results demonstrate that technical change produces distributional outcomes which are highly sensitive to its factor biases and to prior differences in land quality

efficient egalitarian equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects abstract we prove the existence of efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations in an economy with a finite number of private goods and one abstract public project that can be executed by certain coalitions of economic agents efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations however may not be in the core

poverty productivity and production environment a review of the evidence abstract this paper reviews the state of knowledge about the key issues needing to be understood to satisfactorily resolve a long standing debate within the consultative group for international agricultural research cgiar system the debate revolves around the effects on various populations particularly the poor of different allocations of research effort between marginal and favoured production environments this paper specifically focuses on what is known about the geographical distribution of the rural poor across agro ecological zones and over time variations in the income generating activities including non agricultural activities engaged in by the poor are examined and the ways in which specific technology packages affect the economic well being of different types of households both directly and indirectly

differential technology adoption and income distribution in pakistan implications for research resource allocation a multi market model of technological change in food production is used to simulate the long run income distributional implications of differential diffusion of currently available wheat technologies in pakistan the results indicate that a research agenda emphasizing technologies suited to pakistan s favored production environments would enhance overall production without compromising inter group equity it is found that when commodity prices are market determined net consuming households are the major beneficiaries of technological change however in the more common situation of government intervention in markets for staple foods net producing households are the principal beneficiaries of technological change

the incidence and allocation effects of a tax on corporate distributions abstract to study the effects of double taxation first at the corporation level then at the shareholder level this paper analyzes a model with a tax on all corporate distributions to equity owners and no other taxes contrary to the common view the tax is shown to have no subtitution effect and in particular no effect on the corporate choice between debt and equity via retained earnings finance the analysis opens to question certain arguments commonly used to support integration of corporation and individual income taxes via dividend relief

rural infrastructure transactions costs and market participation in kenya abstract we develop a conceptual framework for quantifying fixed transactions costs facing semisubsistence households using household survey data from a sample of 324 kenyan maize farmers we jointly estimate household supply and demand schedules and transactions costs econometric results indicate that on average the ad valorem tax equivalent of fixed transactions costs for households in our sample is 15 additional analysis indicates that economic isolation is positively associated with the size of transactions costs to the best of our knowledge ours are the first empirical estimates of the magnitude of fixed transactions costs for agricultural households in developing countries

game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale abstract this paper surveys the analysis by means of cooperative game theory of economies in which there are increasing returns to scale in the first section necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a core of a general equilibrium economy are considered in the second section the partial equilibrium approach to increasing returns production which developed along with the natural monopoly literature is surveyed the close relationship between the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium approaches is emphasized

aggregate consumer behaviour and the measurement of inequality this paper presents an approach to inequality measurement based on an econometric model of aggregate consumer behaviour the novel feature of this model is that systems of individual demand functions can be recovered uniquely from the system of aggregate demand functions we present methods for evaluating social welfare based on an explicit social welfare function this social welfare function incorporates measures of individual welfare based on indirect utility functions for all consumer units we develop indexes of inequality based on actual and potential levels of social welfare

revisiting the classical view of benefit based taxation this paper explores how the persistently popular classical logic of bene t based taxation in which an individual s bene t from public goods is tied to his or her income earning ability can be incorporated into modern optimal tax theory if lindahl s methods are applied to that view of bene ts rst best optimal policy can be characterized analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics in particular the coe cient of complementarity between public goods and innate talent constrained optimal policy with a pareto e cient objective that strikes a balance controlled by a single parameter between this principle and the familiar utilitarian criterion can be simulated using conventional constraints and methods a wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result including those that match well several features of existing policies to the extent that such an objective re ects the mixed normative reasoning behind prevailing

the vanishing harberger triangle this paper shows that the double taxation of corporate dividends or profit repatriations implies a nucleus theory of the corporation after the firm is set up with a small stock of original capital it enters a phase of purely internal growth during which no dividends are paid and no shares are issued the phase terminates when an efficient stock of capital has been accumulated and dividends are paid during the growth phases the tax distortion is inversely related to the tax burden and it is larger than conventional formulae for the cost of internal and external equity finance suggest

welfare egalitarianism in non rival environments we study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non rival good from their private contributions a social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations we build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences

measuring the inefficiences of tax systems abstract the properties of the procedure for measuring inefficiency developed by debreu 1951 1954 are summarised and the advantages of such an input based approach in analysing taxation discussed exact expressions for the debreu measure of deadweight loss are derived and the measure proposed by kay 1980 shown to be a special case the approach is pursued to construct and interpret a measure of the overall welfare loss from taxation which decomposes conveniently into efficiency and distributional components in one special case the corresponding index of total effectiveness is the product of debreu s coefficient of resource utilisation and an atkinson equality index

share repurchases the new view and the cost of capital this paper counters the view that the possibility of share repurchases invalidates the predictions of the new or trapped equity view of corporate taxation it is shown that the new view s basic cost of capital expression which distinguishes it from the old view remains valid regardless of the proportions in which corporate distributions of earnings split into share repurchases and ordinary dividend payments it is widely held that the new view of corporate taxation put forward by auerbach 1979 1983 l3radford 1981 king 1977 fullerton and king 1984 and others is incompatible with the phenomenon of share repurchases share repurchases it is maintained undermine this view s basic premise that the corporate firm is an equity trap and thus invalidate its predictions of the firm s investment behavior in my letter i argue that this verdict may be premature while i certainly do not want to claim to have isolated the forces that determine the firm s choice between dividend payments and share repurchases i hesitate to accept the argument that the invalidity of one of a theory s assumptions will necessarily render its predictions incorrect to be precise i will show that the new view s basic cost of capital expression that distinguishes it from the old view stays valid regardless of the proportions in which corporate distributions of earnings split into share repurchases and ordinary dividend payments consider a stylized class of capital income tax systems that resembles the class operative in the 0ecd countries let 7r be the rate of corporate tax on retained earnings rd the rate of corporate tax on dividends which equals rr in the us rc the effective rate of tax on accrued capital gains rdp the rate of personal tax on dividend income and 7 the rate of personal tax on interest income where

new markets and technological change for the traditional cereals in semiarid sub saharan africa the malian case during the last three decades in sub saharan africa development and research resources have concentrated on the higher rainfall and irrigated regions especially on export crops and the principal food crops grown there there has been much less concern and investment in semiarid regions without irrigation another negative factor has been the lack of public policy concern with the profitability of the basic food crops with good weather prices collapse with bad weather governments and ngos dispense food crops as food aid or at subsidized prices this article documents the importance of the demand side to facilitate diffusion of new technologies for the basic food commodities of semiarid regions the traditional cereals with farm programming models aggregated into a sector model the combination of technological change and demand shifts for sorghum are evaluated in one semiarid region where the traditional cereals are concentrated it focuses on combining policies to increase the prices farmers receive after introduction of technologies that use higher input levels it also compares benefits of a strategy that focuses on yield and demand increases for a traditional cereal of the semiarid region sorghum with two alternative strategies for the higher rainfall zone

a game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects this paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan if the project is expedited a reward arises analogously a penalty arises if the project is delayed this paper considers the case of arbitrary nondecreasing reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay respectively attention is focused on how to divide the total reward penalty among the activities the core of a corresponding cooperative project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward penalty in the definition of project games surplus cost sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the specific characteristics of the reward penalty function at hand it turns out that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games this relation allows us to establish nonemptiness of the core of project games

a core selection for regulating a single output monopoly we consider a single output production economy in which all coalitions of agents have access to the technology under increasing returns to scale the corresponding cooperative game without side payments is convex and hence has a large core we propose a core selection that is obtained by considering the lowest price of output relative to input such that the corresponding vector of indirect utilities is feasible the constant returns equivalent allocation is feasible and achieves this utility vector it satisfied the property of technological monotonicity when the production possibility set expands no agent faces a utility loss technological monotonicity and the core property together characterize the constant returns equivalent solution

uniform externalities two axioms for fair allocation abstract positive resp negative preference externalities say that an agent always prefers his actual welfare to his virtual welfare should other agents share his preferences resp prefers his virtual to his actual welfare negative group externalities say that an agent never prefers his actual welfare to his virtual welfare should he be the sole user of the resources these two axioms unify several familiar fairness properties and yield some new ideas as well in the division of unproduced commodities and the cooperative production of a private or a public good we also discuss their compatibility with no envy and resource monotonicity

economic models of nato abstract the seminal work of olson and zeckhauser 1966 on the economic theory of alliances in particular nato provides the theoretical background for this paper after restating their results on alliance allocation behavior in a formal framework we show that these results may fail in a context with decentralized production of the public defense commodity finally we introduce a simple mechanism which allows the implementation of an efficient allocation characterized by proportional burden sharing and cost monotonicity these results can also be applied to other public goods problems

modern varieties productivity and sustainability recent experience and emerging challenges abstract the contribution of modern varieties of cereal crops to increased productivity in the postgreen revolution period is reviewed and the future role of hybrids and biotechnology discussed particular emphasis is given to the ways in which modern varieties may contribute to input efficiency and sustainability finally economic and institutional issues in restructuring plant breeding programs for the most efficient use of resources in both the public and private sectors and at the national and international levels are analyzed

fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good we study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good a social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations we propose the following free lunch aversion condition if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs reducing that gap improves social welfare this condition combined with the more standard requirements of unanimous indifference and responsiveness delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent s welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that consumed at no cost would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned

the social cost of living index abstract household cost of living indexes reflect household preferences analogous indexes for groups of households require a corresponding concept of group preferences in this paper i investigate the social cost of living index a group index based on the bergson samuelson social welfare function i first define the index and examine its properties under the assumption that the investigator constructing it expresses his distributional judgments in an explicit bergson samuelson social welfare function i then examine the maximizing society and the independent society two cases in which the index can be constructed from the information contained in the market demand functions in these two cases a laspeyres index i e the fixed weight index based on the reference consumption pattern is an upper bound on the exact social cost of living index in general however the assumptions required to place bounds on the social cost of living index are much more likely to be satisfied than those required to place analogous bounds on a household s cost of living index

the impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goods abstract we investigate how burden sharing rules impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents we compare different rule based contribution schemes where agents can first suggest a minimum provision level of the public good before the smallest common denominator is implemented we find that rule based contribution schemes significantly increase payoff levels relative to the vcm while significant differences exist between the rules importantly the equal payoff rule maximizes payoffs for all player types this also holds relative to a scheme where different types of players separately can determine their minimum contribution levels our results lend insights into the efficient institutional design for voluntary private provision of public goods and how burden sharing rules interact with efficiency when agents are heterogeneous

estimating the benefits of plant breeding research methodological issues and practical challenges impact assessment studies consistently show that the benefits generated by plant breeding are large positive and widely distributed numerous case studies have concluded that investment in plant breeding research generates attractive rates of return compared to alternative investment opportunities that welfare gains resulting from the adoption of modern varieties mvs reach both favoured and marginal environments and that benefits are broadly shared by producers and consumers but just how reliable are the results of studies that estimate the benefits of plant breeding research this article reviews methods used to estimate the benefits of plant breeding research and discusses theoretical and empirical issues that often receive inadequate attention in applied impact assessment work our objective is not to question the validity of the theoretical frameworks commonly used to estimate the benefits of plant breeding research but rather to examine problems that can arise when the widely accepted theoretical frameworks are used for empirical analysis most of these problems can be grouped into three basic categories 1 problems associated with measuring adoption and diffusion of mvs 2 problems associated with estimating benefits attributable to adoption of mvs and 3 problems associated with assigning credit among the various plant breeding programmes that participated in developing the mvs

peanut research and poverty reduction impacts of variety improvement to control peanut viruses in uganda a procedure is developed and applied for predicting ex ante impacts of agricultural research on aggregate poverty using as an example the poverty reducing impact of peanut research in uganda market level information on economic surplus changes is combined with a procedure for allocating income changes to individual households characteristics of farmers that affect their likelihood of technology adoption are used to create a technology adoption profile associated changes in poverty resulting from adoption are computed using poverty indices predicted income changes at the household level are aggregated to the market level and reconciled with calculations of economic surplus changes

modeling the impact of agricultural growth and government policy on income distribution in india this article uses a limited general equilibrium model to investigate the growth and equity effects of a variety of economic and technical changes and selected agricultural policies in india it explores how changes in food prices rural wages and farm profits associated with the green revolution period affected income distribution between net buyers and sellers of food the model shows that income gains from the green revolution initially accrued to the wealthier rural groups but that after 1972 73 they were transferred to urban consumers and that by 1980 81 the per capita incomes of poor and wealthier rural groups alike were barely above their respective 1960 61 levels the model is also used in counterfactual analysis of the impact of changes in technological demographic investment taxation and income redistribution variables its findings indicate the importance of trade policies for the nature of the equity outcomes from agricultural growth and suggest that a reduction in population growth and an increase in nonagricultural employment and income are required to convert agricultural growth into reduced rural poverty

justifying the lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation the motivation for the lindahl equilibrium is mostly a rather artificial price mechanism even though the analogy to a competitive market was emphasised by lindahl himself his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas behind his concept in the present paper we therefore show how the lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from some simple equity axioms these normative assumptions are the benefit principle on the one hand and the equal sacrifice principle or equivalently a non envy condition as a postulate for distributional equity on the other fairness among agents with different preferences and incomes is taken into account by considering their marginal willingness to pay as shadow prices in this way the reason why the lindahl solution can be perceived as an outcome of fair cooperation might become more understandable

public goods and the distribution of income abstract this article addresses conceptual issues concerning the distributive incidence of public goods solutions depend on the specific purposes for asking the question of distributive incidence notably assessing the extent to which various public goods should be provided determining how the provision of public goods affects the desirability of income redistribution and providing a meaningful description of the distribution of well being in the course of the analysis a simple and intuitive version of the benefit principle of taxation qualitatively different from those commonly advanced in pertinent literatures is presented and some of the problems confronting empirical attempts to measure the distributive incidence of public goods are resolved

population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility abstract an allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to allocate the worth of every coalition it is population monotonic if each player s payoff increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger we show that essentially a game has a population monotonic allocation scheme pmas if and only if it is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple games with veto control a dual characterization is also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a pmas include convexity and increasing average marginal contributions if the game is convex its extended shapley value is a pmas classification number 026

reward patterns of fair solutions abstract the solutions proposed in the literature on fair allocations are sensitive to the preference profiles of the agents as a consequence each of them displays a specific distribution pattern which may be interpreted as rewarding certain kinds of preferences at the expense of others in the basic models with private goods and decreasing returns the equal income competitive equilibrium tends to favor the eccentric preferences whereas most egalitarian equivalent solutions tend to reward the agents who like particular resources the identification of the rewarding pattern of each mechanism sheds light on its ethical content and may help select the adequate solution in concrete applications in this analysis a preference monotonicity property turns out to be satisfied by many solutions

welfare effects of maize technologies in marginal and high potential regions of kenya this paper describes the findings of a study that used a multi market model to assess the potential impact of improved maize technologies on the welfare of various types of rural and urban households in kenya the modelling results indicate that technologies developed for high potential regions are likely to have more profound aggregate impacts on maize production and lead to greater reductions in import demand if prices are controlled or maize prices if maize prices are flexible technology adoption in high potential regions is likely to have substantially greater positive impacts on aggregate real incomes but inferior income distributional outcomes compared to technology adoption in marginal regions

joint ownership of a convex technology comparison of three solutions a given set of agents jointly own and operate a decreasing returns to scale technology with a single input and a single output they all contribute some input and receive some of the output what first best allocation is equitable we discuss three allocation mechanisms the equal benefits solution gives every agent the same benefit computed at the supporting price the equal returns solution equalizes returns output shares input contributions across agents the constant returns equivalent solution gives every agent his indirect utility level at some common price of output relative to input a lower and an upper bound on individual welfares play a key role in these axiomatic characterisation results

equity as a prerequisite for stability of cooperation on global public good provision analysing cooperative provision of a global public good such as climate protection we explore the relationship between equitable burden sharing on the one hand and core stability on the other to assess the size of the burden which a public good contribution entails for a country we make use of a specific measure based on moulin econometrica 55 963 977 1987 in particular we show that a pareto optimal allocation which is not in the core can always be blocked by a group of countries with the highest moulin sacrifices in this sense it is the overburdening and thus unfair treatment of some countries that provides the reason for core instability by contrast a pareto optimal allocation is in the core if the public good contributions are fairly equally distributed according to their moulin sacrifices the potential implications of our theoretical analysis for global climate policy are also discussed

dynamic procedures and incentives in public good economies in this paper we consider economies involving one public good one private good and convex technology and propose an informationally decentralized dynamic nontatonnement procedure that converges in general from the initial endowments to an allocation in the core of the economy we then consider a general class of procedures and show that there exists none in the class that is locally incentive compatible and individually rational these results show that there exists a trade off between the requirements of local incentive compatibility and equitable cost sharing

the replacement principle in economies with single peaked preferences abstract our objective is to investigate the implications of the replacement principle for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single peaked preferences the principle says that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved changes all of the relevant agents should be affected in the same direction they all gain or they all lose we apply it to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may change under the name ofwelfare domination under preference replacement we show that there is no selection from the no envy and pareto solution satisfying it then we weaken it by limiting its application to situations in which the change is not so disruptive that it turns the economy from one in which there is too little of the commodity to one in which there is too much or conversely we show that there is only one selection from the no envy and pareto solution satisfying this property andreplication invariance it is the uniform rule a solution that has played a central role in previous analyses of the problem journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 d63 d70

sharing the cost of a public good an incentive constrained axiomatic approach we study the problem of provision and cost sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion complete or partial is possible we search for incentive constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good in the sense of a first order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged under suitable domain restrictions we give an explicit characterization of all incentive constrained efficient allocation rules we then show that there exists a unique incentive constrained efficient and demand monotonic allocation rule the so called serial rule in the binary public good case the serial rule is also the only incentive constrained efficient and population monotonic rule

role of agricultural research in poverty reduction lessons from the asian experience abstract the poor spend much of their income on food depend primarily on labour earnings and tend to reside in marginal agricultural areas to reduce poverty agricultural research should aim to ensure adequate food supplies by developing yield increasing technologies to increase labour demand by developing labour using technologies and to develop technologies suitable for marginal areas this article seeks to identify appropriate technologies that agricultural research should generate for poverty reduction the identification is based on a review of the experience of the green revolution in rice production in asia and an assessment of the changing structure of income sources among rural households in the philippines

equality of resources implies equality of welfare if one is an egalitarian should one try to equalize resources available to agents or to equalize their welfares with a suitably general conception of what resources are these two conceptions cannot be distinguished an allocation mechanism is defined on a space of economies and is required to satisfy various axioms that are necessary conditions for equalizing resources among a population the unique mechanism satisfying these axioms on a large domain of economies is the one that allocates commodities so as to equalize utilities of the agents methodologically the theorem is a generalization of bargaining theory because the mechanisms are defined on commodity space

what is benefit taxation abstract benefit taxation is a system in which individuals are taxed according to the benefits they receive from public expenditures this paper describes an alternative to the standard lindahl method of determining the distribution of individual benefits from government provided public goods and uses this alternative to calculate benefit taxes this alternative avoids some of the paradoxial features of lindahl pricing and generates outcomes in which all consumers benefit from reduced costs of providing public goods an illustrative calculation shows that benefit taxes defined in this way may be quite regressive

egalitarian equivalent cost sharing of a public good in an economy with one public and one private good egalitarian equivalent cost sharing consists of finding the highest public good level x such that consuming x for free yields a feasible utility distribution the corresponding feasible allocation typically unique called egalitarian equivalent is in the core of the economy conversely any cost sharing method satisfying pareto optimality cost monotonicity nobody suffers a utility loss if the production technology improves upon ceteris paribus and individual rationality no single agent coalition objects or no private transfers no agent receives a positive amount of private good must select an egalitarian equivalent allocation in every economy copyright 1987 by the econometric society

taxation corporate financial policy and the cost of capital the cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system the purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest via the cost of capital taking full account of important issues that arise independently from the question of taxation included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

all sorry to disagree a general principle for the provision of non rival goods a group of agents with identical rights but different preferences share the cost of a public good in a situation where each agent is held responsible for his own preferences the principle says that nobody can benefit from the difference between his and other agents preferences all are sorry to disagree this axiom is incompatible with the pay according to benefits approach and in particular with lindahl pricing methods however it is compatible with foley s stand alone core constraints the author s axiom unlike the stand alone properties applies to any number of public goods or bads and to arbitrary public decisions copyright 1992 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

technology production environment and household income assessing the regional impacts of technological change abstract this paper clarifies the factors determining the welfare effects of improved agricultural technologies when technology diffusion is unevenly distributed across production environments household level income effects are shown to depend primarily on a whether the economy is open or closed with respect to world markets b whether households are net consumers or net producers of the commodity for which technological change occurs c whether households are adopters or non adopters of the new technology d the degree to which labor is mobile across agricultural regions and e government intervention in commodity and or factor markets a review of recent empirical work indicates considerable variation in the relative strength of these various factors across countries and that assumptions regarding the mechanism by which commodity prices are determined endogenously as in a closed economy or exogenously as in an open economy is especially critical

an alternative approach to aggregate surplus analysis abstract this paper suggests a dual to the many person applied welfare economics problem with constraints on lymp sum redistribution the dual has the property of minimizing an aggregator function over individual income transfers the properties of the aggregator are dependent upon the resource costs of redistribution and not upon the distributional preferences embodied in the social welfare function an interpretation of the dual problem in terms of consumer surplus is offered

reasonable expectations on the prospects for documenting the impact of agricultural research on poverty in ex post case studies abstract the increasing emphasis on poverty alleviation as a motivation for investing in public sector international agricultural research is discussed from the perspective of practitioners engaged in ex post impact evaluation context is largely provided from the experience of the international potato center cip in impact assessment of improved potato and sweet potato technologies the poverty content of 10 cip related success stories of technological change was qualitatively assessed with a checklist of key questions with this admittedly crude method the size of project net present value npv appears to be an informative guide to the magnitude of poverty effects hence projects that generate widespread benefits to many people particularly to net consumers of food crops remain likely to be the most effective vehicles to contribute to poverty alleviation from public sector investments in the improvement of food crops in developing countries

equity fairness and lindahl equilibria abstract the purpose of this paper is to establish a criterion of justice called l fairness for an economy with public goods the concept of l fairness is set up in such a way as to extract the ethical judgement from lindahl s equilibrium concept then it is shown that the lindahl equilibria are qualified as l fair that is any lindahl equilibrium net trade is strongly l fair and conversely any strongly l fair net trade must be a lindahl equilibrium net trade as a corollary to this proposition it is also shown that any lindahl equilibrium allocation with equal wealth is strongly l fair and conversely that any strongly l fair allocation has to be that of lindahl equilibrium with equal wealth