price discrimination copyright law and technological innovation evidence from the introduction of dvds u s copyright law effectively prevents direct price discrimination for copyright holders that sell to different markets in response these firms can engage in indirect price discrimination i derive theoretical predictions about the use of indirect price discrimination and i analyze how optimal pricing strategies differ for different products using data on vhs and dvd movie distribution i find that firms pricing choices are consistent with the predictions of theory and that firms use of indirect price discrimination benefits consumers but harms ancillary retailers finally i examine what optimal pricing strategies might look like in a legal environment that permits direct price discrimination

how video rental patterns change as consumers move online how will consumption patterns for popular and long tail products change when consumers move from brick and mortar to internet markets we address this question using customer level panel data obtained from a national video rental chain as it was closing many of its local stores these data allow us to use the closure of a consumer s local video store as an instrument breaking the inherent endogeneity between channel choice and product choice our results suggest that when consumers move from brick and mortar to online channels they are significantly more likely to rent niche titles relative to blockbusters this suggests that a significant amount of niche product consumption online is due to the direct influence of the channel on consumer behavior not just due to selection effects from the types of consumers who decide to use the internet channel or the types of products that consumers decide to purchase online this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

at the movies the economics of exhibition contracts i introduction the literature on profit sharing stresses asymmetric information profit sharing occurs when a party has private information that cannot be credibly revealed or when a party s actions cannot be observed economists avoid taste based explanations such as risk sharing stigler and becker 1977 and other factors that may lead to sharing such as measurement costs we describe a real world sharing contract that is widely used the movie exhibition contract and argue that asymmetric information is not the main cause of sharing two explanations based on difficulties with forecasting revenue fit the facts better the first is that movie distributors studios or independent distributors and exhibitors theater owners are both risk averse and exhibition contracts are designed to share risk the second is that the sharing rules accompanied by ex post adjustments economize on measurement costs transaction costs and long term relationships also affect contractual practices we use an original data set of 2 769 exhibition contracts to inform our models and test hypotheses the data includes all contracts involving 13 theaters owned by wehrenberg theatres a prominent st louis exhibitor over roughly two years our models explain the sharing that occurs and the conditions that lead to adjustments and our findings may be relevant for other contracting environments our explanations for the features of exhibition contracts complement those of de vany and eckert 1991 and de vany and walls 1996 who emphasize that difficulties with forecasting demand necessitate the use of short term contingency rich contracts some other work on nonexhibition aspects of the movie business also compares asymmetric information models to alternatives ravid 1999 tests and rejects a model of asymmetric information at the project selection stage ravid and basuroy 2004 consider risk aversion at the project selection stage chisholm 1993 1997 and weinstein 1998 compare principal agent models to alternatives in studies of contracts between studios and talent in the next subsection we describe the basic features of modern exhibition contracts after that we describe how the sharing rules evolved over time and argue that asymmetric information does not explain the sharing rules section ii contains our models section iii contains our empirical work and section iv concludes the modern movie exhibition contract the unit of analysis is a single movie in a single theater a theater is a building that may contain multiple auditoriums although there is typically a boilerplate contract between each distributor and exhibitor that specifies general conditions that apply to all individual contracts terms such as sharing rules and run lengths vary by movie and theater a typical run ends after four to eight weeks but the run may be adjusted after early revenues are observed and holdover clauses may be used to extend the run as long as revenue is sufficiently high de vany and eckert 1991 and de vany and walls 1996 attribute adjustable runs to imprecise forecasts we focus on explaining the peculiar revenue sharing rule that is common in modern contracts some contracts are aggregate deals in which each side s percentage share remains fixed throughout the run but most are sliding scale deals in a sliding scale deal each week the distributor gets the maximum of two possible payments 1 90 of the movie s weekly ticket revenue over the house nut which is a flat payment to the exhibitor 2 a floor payment some percentage of the weekly ticket revenue that typically declines according to a sliding scale as the weeks go by perhaps 70 in the first week 60 by the third week and as low as 30 at the end of the run if the parties anticipate that revenue might peak in the second or later weeks which can occur when the movie opens before a holiday weekend for example the contract includes a best weeks clause that ensures that the high floor payments are associated with the high demand weeks

bundling of substitutes or complements abstract the adams yellen two good bundling framework is generalized to allow the goods to be substitutes or complements general theorems on price change effects are given a monopolist may find it most profitable to offer the goods only as a bundle even if they are imperfect substitutes or to not bundle the goods even if they are complements if one good is competitively sold a monopoly producer of the other good can never increase profits by offering his good only as part of a bundle however such a monopolist might profitably offer his good in both bundled and unbundled form to price discriminate even if the two goods are substitutes

cultural and other barriers to motion pictures trade i introduction the u s motion picture industry has long dominated world markets but its recent expansion has been especially dramatic hollywood s current share of the world film market has doubled since just 1990 whereas the european film industry is about one ninth the size it was in 1945 in the 1960s foreign films constituted 10 of the u s market by 1986 they made up 7 and today only about three quarters of 1 remarkably the global dominance of american films has evolved despite extensive protectionist efforts by other countries and virtually no barriers to trade by the united states as to other countries we might expect to find much more active effective protectionism against a culturally sensitive product than against generic products and services the characteristics of the product would suggest that the fate of u s motion picture exports would have at least mirrored the decline in american textiles and steel to the contrary the u s motion picture industry has been winning the global ballgame despite three strikes against it protectionism rising real domestic costs and relatively stable real domestic ticket prices we address this quandary of why protectionism fails in a cultural industry where protectionism is expected to succeed we do so first by examining the structure of the u s domestic motion picture industry as it turns out this structure provides a special impetus for exports we next examine the nature of protectionism in a world of soaring demand for films in this setting the american movie is a world product in a different sense than say the automobile the american movie is a world product because its presence is dominant the automobile is a world product mostly because its parts are interchangeable by its nature the american movie appears to have few substitutes even though hollywood can use foreign locales for filming american movies encounter different protectionist strategies in different places the divides fall either side of highly industrialized nations versus less developed nations english speaking versus non english speaking people literate versus less literate people and so on some countries and regions combine fees with subsidies whereas others engage in piracy quantitative or service restrictions few countries have traditional tariffs once we have defined the characteristics of the u s movie industry and foreign strategies of protectionism we can better identify the relevant variables and appropriate models to explain not only industry exports but also the failure of protectionism we end up with a complex gravity iceberg model as a method of estimating u s motion picture exports because of the nature of the industry our approach shares some of the characteristics of earlier studies in which economies of scale and imperfect competition are present although early gravity models have focused on spatial distance some economists have interpreted the effects of distance as possibly nonphysical thus cultural distance applied to a culturally sensitive industry could be a reasonable interpretation for distance effects after using microdata to explore protectionist strategies we then aggregate these data for the formal model ii structure of the u s motion pictures industry why export what determines the structure and size of market for american films movie studios are both producers and distributors though movie studio revenues depend directly on net revenues gross revenues minus total costs the size and extent of the movies market remain tightly linked to gross revenue including domestic box office from the perspective of the studios aggregate market size s is 1 s n summation over i 1 r sub i x sub i where r sub i is gross domestic box office and x sub i is the u s dollar value of exports rentals video tapes of the ith of n movie studios

can price dispersion be persistent in the internet markets we investigate pricing behaviour and market dynamics for both online branches of multi channel retailers mcrs and online only retailers dotcoms based on a set of panel data collected for 2 years in the online dvd market we find that prices of mcrs and dotcoms both go down with time but prices of mcrs decrease in a significantly faster speed implying that difference in the average prices between the two types of retailers is getting smaller with time we also compare the price dispersion and its dynamics between mcrs and dotcoms we find that the price dispersion among mcrs is much bigger than that among dotcoms at the beginning but such a difference gets smaller with time as the price dispersion among dotcoms becomes bigger our results suggest that the two types of retailers will not only charge similar average prices in long term but also have similar price dispersions but our findings show that price dispersion among all retailers goes up with time indicating that prices do not converge in

bose einstein dynamics and adaptive contracting in the motion picture industry audiences discover what films they like and spread the word information feedback produces bose einstein dynamics in the motion picture box office revenue distribution information cascades generate box office hits and flops the revenue distribution evolves recursively over the run as a mixture of the opening and a stochastic competition among films the motion picture run is decentralized adaptive and self organizing semistationary admission prices local information and contingency rich contracts match the film rental price and the supply of theatrical engagements to demand copyright 1996 by royal economic society

revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental industry revenue sharing contracts in which retailers pay a royalty on sales to their suppliers are now widely used in the video rental industry we show that revenue sharing is valuable in vertically separated industries in which demand is either stochastic unpredictable or variable e g systematically declining downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized and downstream firms engage in intrabrand competition unlike two part tariffs revenue sharing achieves the first best outcome by softening retail price competition without distorting retailers inventory decisions our theories are also consistent with trends in prices and availability following retailers adoption of revenue sharing contracts

a reply to a comment on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters liu et al liu y d s putler c b weinberg 2004 is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters marketing sci 23 1 120 133 examine the television broadcast industry using a model in which profit maximizing broadcasters seek to gain viewers by choosing the type of program to offer and by spending money to set program quality allowing broadcasters to sell access to those viewers through inserted advertisements at a fixed rate per viewer wu and chou wu c s chou 2006 commentary on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters marketing sci 25 5 541 545 argue that the duopoly result for a certain range of the cost parameter in liu et al is not a pure strategy nash equilibrium they further propose some modifications to the original model to restore liu et al s results in this reply we demonstrate how a single strategy not included in the strategy space of the liu et al duopoly model leads to the difference between our analysis and that of wu and chou while we had intended to rule out this strategy the text was not entirely clear on this issue wu and chou s comment provides an opportunity to clarify the situation we provide both empirical and theoretical support for excluding this strategy which allows us to focus on the more plausible competitive situations in television broadcasting we also reply to wu and chou s other comments on several issues such as the relative importance of program type versus quality

the effect of local competition on admission prices in the u s motion picture exhibition market abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between local market structure and the prices charged to consumers in the u s motion picture exhibition market i find that there is a statistically significant relationship between the geographic distribution of movie theaters in a market and the admission prices that they are able to charge however the magnitude of the price reducing effect of local competition appears to be economically modest moreover i find no evidence that increases in geographic concentration lead to increased adult admission prices the findings are directly relevant to merger policy in the industry and pertinent because of the dramatic changes in industry structure resulting from mergers that occurred during 2002 i conclude that the available evidence suggests that popular and governmental concerns about horizontal mergers in the industry leading to dramatically increased admission prices are likely misplaced

moviemod an implementable decision support system for prerelease market evaluation of motion pictures in spite of the high financial stakes involved in marketing new motion pictures marketing science models have not been applied to the prerelease market evaluation of motion pictures the motion picture industry poses some unique challenges for example the consumer adoption process for movies is very sensitive to word of mouth interactions which are difficult to measure and predict before the movie has been released in this article we undertake the challenge to develop and implement moviemod a prerelease market evaluation model for the motion picture industry moviemod is designed to generate box office forecasts and to support marketing decisions for a new movie after the movie has been produced or when it is available in a rough cut but before it has been released unlike other forecasting models for motion pictures the calibration of moviemod does not require any actual sales data also the data collection time for a product with a limited lifetime such as a movie should not take too long for moviemod it takes only three hours in a consumer clinic to collect the data needed for the prediction of box office sales and the evaluation of alternative marketing plans the model is based on a behavioral representation of the consumer adoption process for movies as a macroflow process the heart of moviemod is an interactive markov chain model describing the macro flow process according to this model at any point in time with respect to the movie under study a consumer can be found in one of the following behavioral states undecided considerer rejecter positive spreader negative spreader and inactive the progression of consumers through the behavioral states depends on a set of movie specific factors that are related to the marketing mix as well as on a set of more general behavioral factors that characterize the movie going behavior in the population of interest this interactive markov chain model allows us to account for word of mouth interactions among potential adopters and several types of word of mouth spreaders in the population marketing variables that influence the transitions among the states are movie theme acceptability promotion strategy distribution strategy and the movie experience the model is calibrated in a consumer clinic experiment respondents fill out a questionnaire with general items related to their movie going and movie communication behavior they are exposed to different sets of information stimuli they are actually shown the movie and finally they fill outpostmovie evaluations including word of mouth intentions these measures are used to estimate the word of mouth parameters and other behavioral factors as well as the movie specific parameters of the model moviemod produces forecasts of the awareness adoption intention and cumulative penetration for a new movie within the population of interest for a given base marketing plan it also provides diagnostic information on the likely impact of alternative marketing plans on the commercial performance of a new movie we describe two applications of moviemod one is a pilot study conducted without studio cooperation in the united states and the other is a full fledged implementation conducted with cooperation of the movie s distributor and exhibitor in the netherlands the implementations suggest that moviemod produces reasonably accurate forecasts of box office performance more importantly the model offers the opportunity to simulate the effects of alternative marketing plans in the dutch application the effects of extra advertising extra magazine articles extra tv commercials and higher trailer intensity compared to the base marketing plan of the distributor were analyzed we demonstrate the value of these decision support capabilities of moviemod in assisting managers to identify a final plan that resulted in an almost 50 increase in the test movie s revenue performance compared to the marketing plan initially contemplated management implemented this recommended plan which resulted in box office sales that were within 5 of the moviemod prediction moviemod was also tested against several benchmark models and its prediction was better in all cases an evaluation of moviemod jointly by the dutch exhibitor and the distributor showed that both parties were positive about and appreciated its performance as a decision support tool in particular the distributor who has more stakes in the domestic performance of its movies showed a great interest in using moviemod for subsequent evaluations of new movies prior to their release based on such evaluations and the initial validation results moviemod can fruitfully and inexpensively be used to provide researchers and managers with a deeper understanding of the factors that drive audience response to new motion pictures and it can be instrumental in developing other decision support systems that can improve the odds of commercial success of new experiential products

timing of effort and reward three sided moral hazard in a continuous time model this paper studies a three sided moral hazard problem with one agent exerting up front effort and two agents exerting ongoing effort in a continuous time model the agents efforts jointly affect the probability of survival and thus the expected cash flow of the project in the optimal contract the timing of payments reflects the timing of effort payments for up front effort precede payments for ongoing effort several patterns are possible for the cash allocation between the two agents with ongoing effort in one case where the two agents face equally severe moral hazard they share the cash flow equally at each point of time in another case where the two agents have different severities of moral hazard their payments are sequential in a more general case the two agents with ongoing effort first receive the cash flow alternately with an increasing frequency of switches and then divide the cash flow at each point of time this study provides a framework for understanding a broad set of business contracting issues the characteristics suggested in the optimal contract help us analyze the causes of business failure such as the recent debacle of mortgage backed securities

estimating structural models of equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy thinking in the field the case of withheld movie critic reviews film studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release because the unreviewed movies tend to be below average in quality this practice provides a useful setting in which to test models of limited strategic thinking do moviegoers seem to realize that no review is a sign of low quality a companion paper showed that in a set of all widely released movies in 2000 2009 cold opening produces a significant 20 30 increase in domestic box office revenue which is consistent with moviegoers overestimating quality of unreviewed movies perhaps due to limited strategic thinking this paper reviews those findings and provides two models to analyze this data an equilibrium model and a behavioral cognitive hierarchy model that allows for differing levels of strategic thinking between moviegoers and movie studios the behavioral model fits the data better because moviegoer parameters are relatively close to those observed in experimental subjects these results suggests that limited strategic thinking rather than equilibrium reasoning may be a better explanation for naive moviegoer behavior this paper was accepted by brad barber behavioral economics

gaussian demand and commodity bundling in an important and widely cited essay adams and yellen 1976 examine the use of package selling as a price discrimination device they consider a monopolist producing two goods with constant unit costs and facing buyers with diverse tastes the marginal utility of a second unit of either good is assumed to be zero for all buyers the two goods are independent in demand for all buyers so that any buyer s reservation price for the first unit of either good is independent of the market price of the other thus the maximum amount any buyer would pay for a bundle consisting of one unit of each good is the sum of the two reservation prices and buyers are completely described by the values of those two prices 2 resale markets are assumed away in order to obtain comparative results for alternative pricing strategies the distribution of reservation prices in the adams yellen framework is assumed to be bivariate normal implications of gaussian demand are explored pure bundling is shown to operate by reducing buyer diversity thus facilitating the capture of consumers surplus it generally makes buyers worse off than unbundled sales it is more profitable if average reservation prices are high enough mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales and it is generally strictly more profitable than either bundling which treats goods symmetrically seems most attractive under symmetric reservation price distributions i am indebted to severin borenstein for superb research assistance to the ford motor company for research support through a grant to m i t and to the harvard economics department for housing me as a visiting scholar while most of this research was performed of course only i can be held responsible for this essay s shortcomings 1 the first clear recognition of this possibility seems to have been by stigler 1968 but also see burstein 1960 2 paroush and peles 1981 relax the assumption that consumers purchase at most one unit of each good but they consider only two types of buyers both with linear demand functions they retain the assumption that demands are independent for all buyers telser 1979 and phillips 1981 use different frameworks to analyze bundling policies spence 1980 explores the relation between bundling across commodities as here and bundling multiple units of the same

measuring the business stealing cannibalization and market expansion effects of entry in the u s motion picture exhibition market using a large and comprehensive theater level database covering over 18 billion in theater revenues over a five year period i document the extent and nature of business stealing revenue cannibalization and market expansion that occurred during the height of the 1990 s boom in movie theater construction

invited commentary making sense of these million dollar babies rationale behind superstar profit participation contracts the article by eliashberg et al 2006 provides a comprehensive review of current research on the motion picture industry with a special focus on managerially relevant issues on the supply side it walks the readers through the three distinct stages in the movie value chain of production distribution and theatrical exhibition and it points out promising avenues of future research the contractual issues between talents and the stu

when to exit a product evidence from the u s motion picture exhibition market when is it optimal for a multi product firm to exit a product we analyze strategic product exit using data on motion pictures exhibition choices in a major metropolitan first run market to estimate the survivor function for films at a given theatre this analysis indicates that a film s survival at a particular theatre is affected by intra firm relative performance and interfirm competitive pressures we find that theatres within chains avoid business stealing preliminary analysis further suggests that theatres compete for market share with neighboring theatres by increasing the time to exit when the competing theatre is owned by a different chain this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

internet based virtual stock markets for business forecasting the application of internet based virtual stock markets vsms is an additional approach that can be used to predict short and medium term market developments the basic concept involves bringing a group of participants together via the internet and allowing them to trade shares of virtual stocks these stocks represent a bet on the outcome of future market situations and their value depends on the realization of these market situations in this process a vsm elicits and aggregates the assessments of its participants concerning future market developments the aim of this article is to evaluate the potential use and the different design possibilities as well as the forecast accuracy and performance of vsms compared to expert predictions for their application to business forecasting after introducing the basic idea of using vsms for business forecasting we discuss the different design possibilities for such vsms in three real world applications we analyze the feasibility and forecast accuracy of vsms compare the performance of vsms to expert predictions and propose a new validity test for vsm forecasts finally we draw conclusions and provide suggestions for future research

structure and performance with profit measures based on stock market prices the theory that there is a causal relationship between industry structure conduct and performance is the fundamental premise in the field of industrial organization the most carefully researched component of that general theory is the hypothesis that increasing industrial concentration will give rise to increasing profits this traditional view is important not only because of its prominence in the academic analysis of industrial markets but also because of its implications for government policy especially antitrust policy the traditional view typically has been tested by treating an accounting based measure of industry profit as the dependent variable with concentration and other structural variables as independent variables within a cross section of manufacturing industries at a given point in time numerous papers have found that concentration has a positive impact on profits the methodology adopted in this paper is different the profit measures are based on stock market prices and are adjusted for risk this is an improvement because accounting methods are so poorly adapted to the measurement of economic profit and because risk may vary with concentration 2 39 another methodological innovation is the choice of time series over cross section analysis the question asked is whether the change over time in each industry s level of concentration had an impact on profits this minimizes the problem of omitted or inaccurately measured independent variables since there should be less change in basic structural characteristics over short time periods within an industry than between industries at a single point in time 2 a second important advantage is freedom from a basic assumption of crosssection studies the assumption that the relationship between concentration and profit is homogeneous across industries if the assumption is invalid empirical results are subject to bias two tests 7 26 have firmly rejected the homogeneity assumption 3

using revenue sharing to implement flexible prices evidence from movie exhibition contracts movie exhibition contracts entail revenue sharing terms that go down with weeks since release we develop a simple model to show how the form of these contracts can be explained by the distributors desire to set flexible prices we then use detailed data on theater movie contracts in spain where we exploit the information available at the time of contracting for movies previously released in the u s and other movie and theater characteristics to show how the implications of our flexible pricing argument are supported in the data and differentiate our explanation from prior more standard risk sharing and moral hazard explanations

the failures of privatization a comparative investigation of tuberculosis rates and the structure of healthcare in less developed nations 1995 2010 tuberculosis remains a persistent global health problem and key threat to development in poor countries while many nations pursue privatization of healthcare some accounts suggest that private health services are inadequate in addressing the tb burden we utilize panel regression to empirically investigate data from 99 less developed nations from 1995 to 2010 the results illustrate private health expenditures do not significantly impact tb rates while public health expenditures reduce tb rates in developing nations over time thus we caution against international development strategies which promote cuts in public spending and encourage privatization of healthcare as a means to stimulate growth or efficiency

network or pay per view a welfare analysis the welfare effects of pay per view television and advertising supported networks are compared it is shown that pay per view television admits third degree price discrimination and may involve a large loss of consumer surplus

waterfall versus sprinkler product launch strategy influencing the herd a seller decides the price and sequence in which a product of unknown value is introduced to consumers consumers inspect the product before consumption and observe past prices and sales consumption at a high price is informative for later consumers as it indicates that the product is likely to be of high value i show that on an average prices decrease over time however expected revenue on an average rises over time for a high enough discount factor i find that for extreme beliefs the firm introduces the product to all consumers but for intermediate values the product is introduced only to one consumer

assessing the profitability of growth by acquisition a premium recapture approach abstract this paper makes a case that because of the large premiums paid over the last 20 years by companies undertaking growth by acquisition this growth probably has been unprofitable the case has three parts the first develops a model designed to show for any premium paid for any acquiree the performance improvement required to recapture this premium and create value for the acquiring company the second part reports the distribution of premiums paid for a large sample of acquirees and uses this model to determine the specific performance improvements necessary to bring about value creation for the new parents of the acquirees the third part uses historical rate of return data to show that for typical acquirees these improvements call for levels of performance that are difficult to attain and sustain in u s industrial markets

platform competition with must have components in platform component systems with indirect network effects some must have components are so popular with consumers that they create large discrete indirect network effects when they become available on a platform for example espn is a must have component of cable tv platforms this paper examines how platform market structures determine exclusive versus non exclusive contracts between platforms and components it shows that a component provider is more likely to sign exclusive contracts with a single platform if its popularity is high the platform market share difference is large and cross platform indirect network effects are low

what s an oscar worth this article examines the impact of an academy award nomination and award for best picture best actor actress and best supporting actor actress on a film s i market share of theaters ii average revenue per screen and iii its probability of survival the model is estimated using weekly box office data for a matched sample of nominated and non nominated films the results indicate substantial financial benefits for a nomination and award for best picture and best actor actress the structure of rewards is consistent with that found in two stage single elimination tournaments

seasonality in the u s motion picture industry the observed seasonality of box office revenues reflects both seasonality in underlying demand for movies and seasonality in the number and quality of available movies i separately identify these aspects by estimating weekly demand for movies using movie fixed effects a long panel of movies weekly revenues and restrictions on their decay pattern i find that the estimated seasonality in underlying demand is much smaller and slightly different from the observed seasonality of sales the biggest movies are released at times when demand is highest amplifying the underlying seasonality price rigidities in the industry may facilitate this amplification effect

globalization and the decline of the welfare state in less developed countries why have trends in government welfare spending in developing countries diverged from those in developed countries i address this question by investigating the effects of capital and trade flows on government welfare spending in fifty three developing countries using an original measure of labor power in developing countries i test the links between international markets labor s political strength and the welfare state i argue that labor s collective action problems caused by large populations of low skilled and surplus workers offset labor s potential political gains from globalization i show that when the proportion of low skilled workers in a nation is high globalization will lead to a decline in welfare spending most significantly the results suggest that in nations where labor market institutions are not yet well developed government social welfare spending is constrained by international market forces

dynamic pricing for subscription services this paper investigates the use of pricing schemes in subscription services that consist of various combinations of activation subscription and cancellation fees when customers exclusively consider what is directly perceivable the activation fee starts low and increases as the network grows penetration strategy whereas the cancellation fee starts high and decreases as the network grows skimming strategy the activation and cancellation fees take various other forms otherwise the subscription fee remains low at the early stages and increases only when a reasonable number of subscribers is secured finally the authors discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of their findings

how complex do movie channel contracts need to be the motion picture industry is characterized by a dynamic market environment limited shelf space and product category management and consequently complex channel contracts specifying the split of box office revenue between distributors and exhibitors although such a contracting practice creates a considerable administrative effort and channel conflict it is not clear whether such complexity is necessary for superior channel performance this study investigates this question by analyzing the impact of movie contract structure on movie scheduling and channel member profitability we develop and analyze a game theoretic model using the genetic algorithm approach and a decision support system silverscreener to capture strategic behaviors of channel members in a complex market environment we find that simpler two part tariff or 50 50 split contracts perform as well as the current contracts thus the complexity of the market environment need not be reflected in the complexity of the channel contracts channel contract structure has significant impact on channel member profitability and the exhibitor s movie scheduling behavior in particular our results indicate that the flat rate contract structure represents an attractive alternative to the current practice for distributors

do oligopolists earn noncompetitive rates of return high in effect is defined in this proposition in either of two ways most commonly it has been taken to mean high enough to warrant remedial intervention of some sort by the state 4 recently however a growing minority of economists has urged that it be taken to mean instead high enough to warrant intervention provided the state can show that rates of return in excess of r1 reflect collusive behavior by the leading firms and not cost advantages which these firms have over their leading rivals both meanings in turn reflect a third high enough to imply a typical market price closer to pm in figure lb than to pc where pm is the price that would prevail if the leading firms maximized collective current period profits and pc is the price that would prevail if collective current period profits approximated zero 6 proposition 1 rests on a large body of empirical work proposition 2 however does not nor does it rest on any theoretical analysis industrial economists simply have intuited that there is a correspondence between the r1r2 segment in figure la and the pmp segment in figure lb are there substantive grounds for the intuition i argue that there are not the rates of return that lie along the r1r2 segment are competitive

analyzing the welfare impacts of full line forcing contracts theoretical investigations have examined both anti competitive and efficiency inducing rationales for vertical bundling making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications we use an extensive dataset on full line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare we identify and measure three primary effects of full line forcing contracts market coverage leverage and efficiency we find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency but has little impact on one distributor s gaining leverage over another as a result we estimate that full line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application

financing as a marketing strategy this paper investigates the issues concerning a film producer that finances production costs not only by the conventional funding from an institutional investor but also by internet funding financing through the internet from so called netizen investors in internet funding netizen investors engage in word of mouth activities assuming that information asymmetry exists between the producer and investors we investigate how the internet funding size varies with the word of mouth effect the monitoring effect of the institutional investor and the bargaining power of the producer over investors when the producer has no bargaining power the internet funding size is determined by balancing the word of mouth effect with the monitoring effect by the institutional investment if there is no word of mouth effect there may be no internet funding because netizen investors interpret internet funding as an indicator of a negative profit when the producer has high bargaining power full internet funding is possible if the information asymmetry of the film quality is resolved we discuss how information asymmetry can be resolved by the monitoring of the film quality the producer s reputation or the insurance on investment returns our model helps to capture several interesting aspects of internet funding in the korean film industry

vertical integration market foreclosure and consumer welfare in the cable television industry i examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry i assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings prices and subscriptions and i compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets the results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions first integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators second vertical integration does not harm and may actually benefit consumers because of the associated efficiency gains

electoral politics interest groups and the size of government electoral politics interest groups and the size of government i introduction interest groups have been considered main actors in the political drama for some time now by political scientists as in bentley 1908 schattschneider 1935 and truman 1951 and more recently by economist also such as olson 1965 and stigler 1975 despite the widespread consensus on their importance there have been few formal attempts to analyze their impact on public policies thus borooah and van der ploeg 1983 90 were moved to declare that theory based on the importance of different interest groups is badly needed in economics an important exception is becker s 1983 1985 analysis of interest group competition becker draws insights about the nature of the trade offs that occur when interest groups compete for political influence but becker consciously avoids incorporating into his model political institutions such as voting voting rules and candidates 1983 391 4 1985 330 rather he assumes that the political process operates as a veil through which the underlying strengths and demands of various interest groups are revealed this paper takes a different tack but one complementary to becker s approach the analysis is based on an explicit model of the political process that includes interest groups in the model interest group influence is a potential supply of votes for which parties or candidates compete each party seeks a winning coalition of voters and thus engages in implicit logrolling tullock 1959 572 an equilibrium exists in the competition for the support of interest groups and the nature of the equilibrium electoral platforms is identified below embodied in the characterization of the equilibria is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the strengths of the various interest groups and which enable one to identify how candidates change their policy positions in response to a change in the strength of an interest group it is therefore possible to analyze simultaneously the existence of an electoral equilibrium its nature including its normative properties and changes in equilibrium due to shifts in the balance of forces between competing groups 1 in contrast to becker 1983 1985 these analytical features are not assumed outright rather they are based on an underlying model of elections the theoretical underpinnings for this model are discussed in section ii interest groups are often alleged to be responsible in part for recent increases in the size of government in western democracies 2 therefore in sections iii and iv a model of the political process is used to study the impact of an increase in the influence of a particular interest group on government size in the simple models of the public sector considered here increasing group influence per se does not cause the size of the government to increase but an increase in the government s size does result when i there are constraints on the government s ability to change tax shares in response to a shift in group power or ii there is a publicly provided good which benefits one untaxed group and that group s sole concern with government policy is to maximize the amount of the good that it gets the paper concludes by considering some of the normative implications of the results ii interest groups in the electoral process there are two sets of actors in the model parties and interest groups and two sets of relationships which must be analyzed the relationships between interest groups and the parties and the relationship between the parties themselves with respect to the first question this paper investigates the determinants of each interest group s influence on the platforms proposed by the parties with respect to the second it explores whether the competition for votes between the parties produces an equilibrium and if so what its properties are

the paradox of state retrenchment in sub saharan africa the micro level experience of public social service provision summary over the past 30 years in africa neoliberal economic reform has meant a major retrenchment of the state provision of health and education with paradoxical local effects based on an analysis of 2005 afrobarometer data the study finds that the rural poor are more likely to use public schools and clinics than the urban better off the data suggest that a two tiered social service system now exists across many african countries where the rural poor may have little choice but to use public social services while the urban better off choose to pay for private alternatives the author argues that concerns about ensuring absolute levels of access have obscured attention to the micro experience and quality of social service delivery

the critical trade off identity assignment and box office success in the feature film industry researchers have begun to study markets that are structured in terms of an opposition between market identities in a manner akin to the role pairs analyzed in structural role theory in this paper we analyze the feature film market which came to have such a role structure by the mid 1990s by exploiting the contingency that pertains to the identity of newly released films and the intermediary function played by critics we assess the tendency for offerings to be assigned one or the other of the available market identitiesc independent or major an analysis of the box office success of 396 feature films released in 1997 shows that a film attracted a larger audience when critics who specialized in major releases reviewed the film and implicitly certified it as fit for the mass market such classification was particularly crucial for breaking out of the initial constraints set by theatrical exhibitors however while attaining a major identity was necessary for success in the mass market it was a handicap in penetrating the art house this trade off illustrates how market structures restrict identity in a manner akin that by which role structures place constraints on the identities available to individuals copyright 2003 oxford university press

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

a combined monopoly and optimal packaging this paper specifies the conditions under which a profit maximizing monopoly will market a package of two different commodities even when the demands for and the cost of production of each commodity are entirely independent of the other packaging is here a useful way of implicitly discriminating by price especially when explicit price discrimination is not possible some of the welfare applications are discussed

bundling subscription tv channels abstract i analyze a market such as a subscription tv market where multiple varieties of an excludable public good are traded in bundles here bundling is not due to a producer s desire to extract consumers surplus but due to economies of scope in distribution technology the paper studies the pricing and production decisions of a supplier as well as the impacts of certain regulations such as pure bundling or pure components pricing restrictions findings of interest are as follows a profit constrained welfare maximizer would use a pure bundling price system when costs are low and a mixed bundling price system when costs are high a private monopolist produces too few varieties a pure bundling restriction on a private monopolist may increase welfare and consumer surplus but a pure components restriction never increases them

state retrenchment and the exercise of citizenship in africa what explains the varied ways that africans practice citizenship on an everyday basis and how does the extent of state building or neoliberal unbuilding in a particular context affect the way in

why has africa grown slowly we distinguish between policy and destiny explanations of africa s slow growth during the past three decades policies were poor high export taxation and inefficient public service delivery and destiny was adverse landlocked tropical locations and terms of trade deterioration during the 1990s africa s economic policies improved although with considerable variation both between countries and between policies trade and exchange rate policies improved much more than service delivery thus the differing explanations of past slow growth imply different predictions for growth in the coming decade we argue that poor public economic services are likely to be the binding constraint

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

the market for motion pictures rank revenue and survival i introduction on any given day in every major city there may from 50 to 100 motion pictures playing on theater screens each is unique and its producer hopes it will catch that bit of magic that lights up the screen and the box office yet few achieve this feat and most lead brief unpredictable lives each film competes for screens and audiences during its brief life against a changing array of imperfect and equally unique substitutes how is one to understand this market is there any sense in which this market could be called competitive and how is it organized what institutions and contracts are adapted to this market environment and how do they shape the results we seek to answer some of these questions by examining the relationship between contractual practices and motion picture hazard and survival distributions our modeling is based on a large sample of motion picture revenues and theater bookings during their theatrical runs our detailed sample of motion picture lifetimes is a rare look at this fascinating industry whose unusual and complex features challenge economic theory in interesting ways as smith and smith 1986 506 observe given the interesting characteristics of movies as ideal examples of differentiated products and of the institutional arrangements governing their production and distribution such increased data availability would make this an exceptionally attractive area for applied micro economic research much of the empirical work on the motion picture industry has focused on the attributes of successful movies smith and smith 1986 examined the impact of oscar awards on the cumulative rentals of movies released from the 1950s through the 1970s in more recent work nelson et al undated have quantified the value of an oscar award on movie revenues using a large panel of data and an event study methodology in a somewhat broader empirical study prag and cassavant 1994 examined the determinants of movie revenues and marketing expenditures they found that marketing expenditures and quality are important determinants of a film s success and that production cost star actors and awards are positively related to marketing expenses in the present paper we attempt to account for the dynamic patterns in the data because each film is unique and plays in its own way its life as a commercial product in the theatrical market is hazardous indeed most motion pictures have short and unpredictable lives because audiences must discover what they like and films compete against an ever changing cast of competitors for these reasons it is productive to use evolutionary models of survival and death to model the data 1 we model competition among films in the theatrical market as an evolving rank tournament of survival 2 motion pictures live and die in the box office tournament as they are challenged during their run by a randomly evolving cast of new competitors the challengers come from films previously released and from newly released films the contending films are ranked by film goers and those with high rank survive and are carried over to the next week low ranked films fail and are replaced by new contenders these attributes of the motion picture market contribute to increasing returns and give the box office revenue distribution the distinctive convex shape of a tournament prize distribution 3 the leading products command a disproportionate share of the market and they have longer runs even then a film s rank in the tournament is ephemeral and its life unpredictable in fact of any 10 major theatrical films produced on the average 6 or 7 are unprofitable and 1 will break even vogel 1990 29 ii the motion picture exhibition market once a film is produced it is distributed to theaters who exhibit it for audiences the distributor chooses a release pattern the number and location of theaters in which the film is booked or licensed to play

research on the motion picture industry state of the art and new directions off the beaten track away from theatrical release the motion picture industry has been subject of extensive academic research over the last decades however most scholars focused on the u s theatrical motion picture market the number of research activities regarding even more profitable release windows such as home video or television has been substantially lower although international distribution is essential for a motion picture project to break even there has been little significant re search on most other markets this paper aims at summarizing the current state of research on the motion picture industry particularly from marketing and management perspective revealing research gaps and proposing recommendations for future research endeavors therefore a three pillar scheme is developed to systemize previous findings research on intraorganizational decision making contractual relationships between national stakeholders and international market competition are differentiated since these insights are mainly derived from u s theatrical exhibition they can hardly be applied to other markets and exhibition windows thus potential research areas are identified to expand knowledge of posttheatrical and international markets

please or squeeze brand performance implications of constrained and unconstrained multi item promotions existing research on price promotions typically investigates the effects of single product promotions however brand managers often promote multiple items simultaneously to bolster the performance of a complete brand line this paper investigates the brand performance implications of such multi item promotions we distinguish between two types of multi item promotions traditional unconstrained multi item promotions that grant a discount irrespective of the size or composition of the purchase set and constrained multi item promotions that require consumers to purchase specific quantities self bundling or even predetermined combinations fixed bundling of promoted items using a normative consumer decision model the authors analyze the relative effectiveness of these promotions in terms of unit sales and revenue impact and show that promotion performance is moderated by consumers preference for variety the authors find that unconstrained multi item promotions outperform single item promotions especially in markets without variety seeking in markets with variety seeking unconstrained multi item promotions are not as effective in stealing extra sales from competition because consumers prefer to spread their purchases across all items including competitive ones however in those markets self bundling promotions are particularly effective because they force consumers to adopt larger amounts of the promoted items at the expense of competitors finally in neither type of market does fixed bundling substantially improve promotion performance

vertical contracts in the video rental industry a large body of theoretical work has explored the channels through which vertical contracts can induce efficiency improvements however it is also important to study vertical contracts empirically in order to gain insight into the relative size of different types of efficiency gains in this paper i empirically analyse a contractual innovation in the vertically separated video rental industry prior to 1998 video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing contracts in 1998 revenuesharing contracts were widely adopted i investigate the effect of the introduction of revenue sharing contracts on firms profits and consumer welfare i analyse a new panel data set of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers contract and inventory choices as well as rentals and contract terms for 246 movie titles and 6137 retailers in the u s during each week of 1998 and 1999 and the first half of 2000 a structural econometric model of firms behaviour is developed that describes the nature of firms contract choices estimates from this model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase by 10 under the revenue sharing contract for popular titles for less popular titles the effects can be even larger i also estimate that consumers benefit when revenue sharing contracts are adopted

first party content and coordination in two sided markets the strategic use of first party content by two sided platforms is driven by two key factors the nature of buyer and seller expectations favorable versus unfavorable and the nature of the relationship between first party content and third party content complements or substitutes platforms facing unfavorable expectations face an additional constraint their prices and first party content investment need to be such that low zero participation equilibria are eliminated this additional constraint typically leads them to invest more less in first party content relative to platforms facing favorable expectations when first and third party content are substitutes complements these results hold with both simultaneous and sequential entry of the two sides with two competing platforms incumbent facing favorable expectations and entrant facing unfavorable expectations and multi homing on one side of the market the incumbent always invests weakly more in first party content relative to the case in which it is a monopolist this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

a bayesian model to forecast new product performance in domestic and international markets this paper attempts to shed light on the following research questions when a firm introduces a new product or service how can it effectively use the different information sources available to generate reliable new product performance forecasts how can the firm account for varying information availability at different stages of the new product launch and generate forecasts at each stage we address these questions in the context of the sequential launches of motion pictures in international markets players in the motion picture industry require forecasts at different stages of the movie launch process to aid decision making and the information sets available to generate such forecasts vary at different stages despite the importance of such forecasts the industry struggles to understand and predict sales of new movies in domestic and overseas markets we develop a bayesian modeling framework that predicts first week viewership for new movies in both domestic and several international markets we focus on the first week because industry players involved in international markets studios distributors and exhibitors are most interested in these predictions we draw on existing literature on forecasting performance of new movies to formulate our model specifically we model the number of viewers of a movie in a given week using a poisson count data model the number of screens distribution strategy movie attributes such as genre and presence absence of stars are among the factors modeled to influence viewership we employ a hierarchical bayes formulation of the poisson model that allows the determinants of viewership to vary across countries we adopt the bayesian approach for two reasons first it provides a convenient framework to model varying assumptions of information availability specifically it allows us to make forecasts by combining different sources of information such as domestic and international market specific data second this methodology provides us with the entire distribution of the new movie s performance forecast such a predictive distribution is more informative than a point estimate and provides a measure of the uncertainty in the forecasts we propose a bayesian prediction procedure that provides viewership forecasts at different stages of the new movie release process the methodology provides forecasts under a number of information availability scenarios thus forecasts can be obtained with just information from a historical database containing data on previous new product launches in several international markets as more information becomes available the forecasting methodology allows us to combine historical information with data on the performance of the new product in the domestic market and thereby to make forecasts with less uncertainty and greater accuracy our results indicate that for all the countries in the data set the number of screens on which a movie is released is the most important influence on viewership furthermore we find that local distribution improves movie sales internationally in contrast to the domestic market we also find evidence of similar genre preferences in geographically disparate countries we find that the proposed model provides accurate forecasts at the movie country level further the model outperforms all the extant models in the marketing literature that could potentially be used for making these forecasts a comparison of root mean square and mean absolute errors for movies in a hold out sample shows that the model that combines information available from the different sources generates the lowest errors a bayesian predictive model selection criterion corroborates the superior performance of this model we demonstrate that the bayesian model can be combined with industry rules of thumb to generate cumulative box office forecasts in summary this research demonstrates a bayesian modeling framework that allows the use of different information sources to make new product forecasts in domestic and international markets our results underscore the theme that each movie is unique as is each country and viewership results from an interaction of the product and the market hence the motion picture industry should use both product specific and market specific information to make new movie performance forecasts

oligopoly supergames some empirical evidence on prices and margins this paper is a panel data study on the behavior of prices and margins of oligopolies involved in repeated games the authors examine two supergame models which generate very different predictions about the cyclical behavior of prices and margins evidence on the levels of price cost margins indicates that oligopolies achieve equilibria that more closely resemble a one shot cournot nash outcome than monopoly the authors find however that industries with high price cost margins exhibit cyclical price behavior which is quite different from that of unconcentrated industries little evidence of price wars during either recessions or booms is found copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

auctions with constrained information blind bidding for motion pictures toward explaining why movie exhibitors have sought legislation requiring distributors to trade screen films before soliciting bids a simulation of a nash equilibrium in an auction suggests that without previews bidders may suffer losses i n expected utility this supports the hypothesis that risk aversion a nd competition render exhibitors unable to reduce their bids enough t o compensate fully for the dearth of information an error components model is used to analyze a unique industry dataset the results conf irm that a component of the bid is lower raising mean return while the variance of return is greater for blindly licensed films copyright 1988 by mit press

is the growth of small firms constrained by internal finance this paper examines the long standing theory that the growth of small firms is often constrained by the quantity of internal finance under plausible assumptions when financing constraints are binding an additional dollar of internal finance should generate slightly more than an additional dollar of growth in assets this quantitative prediction should not hold for the relatively small number of firms which access external equity we test these predictions with a panel of more than 1 600 small firms and find that the growth of most firms is constrained by internal finance our results have implications for several different research literatures including models of firm growth

a comment on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters this paper shows that the analysis of liu et al 2004 contains a substantive error the asserted pure strategy nash equilibrium leading to their theorems 1 and 2 is really not an equilibrium we show that in their model either pure strategy nash equilibria do not exist or unlike their asserted main result when a pure strategy equilibrium exists increasing the number of commercial television broadcasters does not result in lower quality programs possible modifications of liu et al s model that may help restore the desired result are discussed

the influence of expert reviews on consumer demand for experience goods a case study of movie critics an inherent problem in measuring the influence of expert reviews on the demand for experience goods is that a correlation between good reviews and high demand may be spurious induced by an underlying correlation with unobservable quality signals using the timing of the reviews by two popular movie critics siskel and ebert relative to opening weekend box office revenue we apply a difference in differences approach to circumvent the problem of spurious correlation after purging the spurious correlation the measured influence effect is smaller though still detectable positive reviews have a particularly large influence on the demand for dramas and narrowly released movies

forecasting marketing mix responsiveness for new products abstract before a new product launch marketers need to infer how demand will respond to various levels of marketing mix variables to set an appropriate marketing plan a critical challenge in estimating marketing mix responsiveness from historical data is that the observed decisions were affected by private information possessed by managers about the heterogeneous effects of marketing mix variables on sales the authors refer to this as the slope endogeneity problem such endogeneity differs from the intercept endogeneity problem which has been widely acknowledged in the literature to correct for the slope endogeneity bias the authors develop a conceptually simple control function approach that is amenable to multiple endogenous variables and marketing mix carryover effects the method is applied to forecasting advertising responsiveness in the u s dvd market the results suggest that advertising responsiveness varies substantially across dvd titles and that estimated marketing mix elasticities w

economic crisis and policy choice the politics of adjustment in the third world the acute economic pressures of the 1980s have forced virtually all of latin america and africa and some countries in asia into painful austerity programs and difficult economic reforms scholars have intensively analyzed the economics of this situation but they have given much less attention to the political forces involved in this volume a number of eminent contributors analyze the politics of adjustment in thirteen countries and nineteen governments drawing comparisons not only across the full set of cases but also within clusters selected to clarify specific issues why do some governments respond promptly to signs of economic trouble while others muddle indecisively for years why do some confine their response to temporary macroeconomic measures while others adopt broader even sweeping programs of reform what leads some countries to experiment with heterodox approaches while most however reluctantly pursue orthodox courses why confronted with intense political protest have some governments persisted while others have altered or abandoned course the answers to these questions are political not economic and they are examined here by thomas m callaghy stephan haggard miles kahler robert r kauman joan m nelson and barbara stallings

retailer entry conditions and wholesaler conduct the theatrical distribution of motion pictures abstract i add to the empirical literature on vertical contracting and wholesaler conduct by using retailer entry conditions to infer unobserved choice variables and equilibrium responses to prices and advertising after estimating the us demand for theatrical motion pictures from 1990 96 i apply these techniques to compare observed outcomes to predictions under various distributor conduct hypotheses while several caveats apply results indicate that the hypothesis of competition among distributors fails to describe advertising levels or aggregate payments of theaters to studios the hypothesis of some collusion among distributors however matches the data fairly well

the use of full line forcing contracts in the video rental industry bundling is at the forefront of many policy debates as new technologies allow firms to implement more complex bundling arrangements realistic analyses of bundling particularly between suppliers and retailers require detailed data on both supply arrangements and consumer demand we analyze firms use of bundling as a vertical restraint known as full line forcing using extensive supply and demand data from the video rental industry our model captures key details of the market that determine firms contractual choices and sheds light on the implications of these decisions the empirical approach provides a model for how to analyze bundling when detailed data are available jel d86 l14 l81 l82

a strategic motivation for commodity bundling the analytical literature on commodity bundling explains the practice of selling two or more differentiated products in a single package as a surrogate for direct price discrimination in contrast this paper shows that imperfect competition creates a strategic incentive to bundle the profitability of bundling whether it adversely affects rival producers and whether it yields an overall efficiency gain depends inter alia on the nature of product market competition the role of complementarity in explaining why firms bundle is also explored copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

silverscreener a modeling approach to movie screens management managing the allocation of shelf space for new products is a problem of significant importance for retailers the problem is particularly complex for exhibitors the retailers in the motion picture supply chain because they face dynamic challenges given the short life cycles of movies the changing level of demand over time the scarcity of shelf space and the complex revenue sharing contract between the exhibitor and the distributor in the face of this complexity the aim of current research is to provide a structure for analyzing management problems of exhibitors in the movie industry using a mathematical programming approach and a fast but readily accessible algorithm we propose a decision support model silverscreener whose aim is to help exhibitors make effective and timely decisions regarding theater screens management the major objective is to help select and schedule movies for a multiple screens theater over a fixed planning horizon in such a way that the exhibitor s cumulative profit is maximized by treating the multiple screens as parallel machines and the movies as jobs we provide an analogy of the current problem to the parallel machine scheduling problem we formulate the resulting problem as an integer program we depart from the typical parallel machine scheduling problems by introducing the time indexed formulation that is particularly useful for solving the current problem an important distinction between the current problem and typical machine scheduling problems is that the present approach allows for the choice of which movies to play typically in machine scheduling all jobs have to be scheduled we provide various analyses of normative versus actual decision making based on publicly available data the developed model is readily implementable and appears to lead to improved profitability in different comparative cases through sensitivity analysis we demonstrate that the above results are robust to variations in various parameters of the problem the main findings and insights from the normative policy suggest the following 1 based on silverscreener s recommendations the exhibitor can achieve substantially higher cumulative profit 2 the improvement over actual decisions in terms of profitability appears to result from a combination of better selection and scheduling of the movies 3 the general structure of the exhibitor s normative decision is choose fewer right movies and run them longer we propose a two tier integrated application of the model to show how the model can be applied to realistic decisionmaking the first tier involves development of a movie selection plan to help the manager plan an entire season and bid for movies before the start of that season an ex ante revenue prediction scheme is developed based intuitively on a matching of the forthcoming movies with similar movies played in this theater previously if the forthcoming season s scheduling plan can be visualized as a two dimensional week by screen matrix then that matrix contains only empty cells before the first tier after a bid plan is developed the exhibitor can fill some of those empty cells the remaining empty cells represent slots which can be decided during the season by either extending movies the exhibitor booked before the season or by scheduling other movies which may become available later in the season this motivates the second tier adaptive scheduling approach of the integrated approach the second tier helps the exhibitor in weekly decision making during the season this application involves rolling and updating data from one time window to another the approaches followed in the two tiers of the integrated application are quite general in that they can incorporate a sophisticated demand prediction model managerial judgments or a combination of both we also propose an alternative behavioral decision rule heuristic which exemplifies relationship dilemmas in the movie industry this heuristic shows that the exhibitors need to be selective in their choice of movies and may suffer a substantial loss in profitability if they place too much emphasis on accommodating distributors

pricing on the internet it is often claimed that e commerce has created a more competitive environment by encouraging the entry of new online firms and by enabling buyers to search easily for the lowest prices the limited evidence that exists paints a mixed picture many online markets are advertising and technology intensive creating a tendency towards growing concentration price search is imperfect and firms can dampen price competition by increasing product heterogeneity and switching costs in many sectors online firms may come to acquire some market power we look at the forms of pricing that are likely to emerge in such markets including the greater use of price discrimination and auction like trading arrangements copyright 2001 oxford university press

a blueprint for success in the us film industry this article analyses motion picture box office gross revenue using a cross section of films from 1997 to 2001 the dependent variable is total domestic box office revenue the independent variables investigated include production budget peak number of screens that the film was shown on in theaters consumer price index for movie tickets personal income season and year of the release in theaters a measure of pre existing audience aggregate critic rating mpaa rating genre word of mouth recommendation the presence of popular stars and the award nominations a distinction is made in the analysis between information available to the public prior to the release of the film in theaters ex ante and information available to the public after the film opens in theaters ex post results for the ex ante ordinary least squares ols regression reveal positive impacts of budget summer and holiday release dates critical reviews sequels and several genres on gross revenue significant positive determina

commodity bundling by single product monopolies consider two products that have independent demands in the sense that all individual buyers consider them neither substitutes nor complements then if the two products are priced separately the demand for either is independent of the price of the other in his classic analysis of block booking of feature films george stigler shows that it may be profitable for a monopoly seller of two such products to bundle them by requiring a buyer to take both in order to get either his work provides a rationale for tying arrangements that does not depend on technological or other dependencies among the products involved 2 adams and yellen extend the analysis of multiproduct monopoly with independent demands 3 they discuss two different bundling strategies pure bundling in which the seller only offers the products in fixed proportions and mixed bundling in which buyers may either buy the products separately or purchase a bundle with fixed proportions of each in this note i consider a single product monopoly and investigate the profit and welfare implications of bundling its product for some other

a parsimonious model for forecasting gross box office revenues of motion pictures the primary objective of this paper is to develop a parsimonious model for forecasting the gross box office revenues of new motion pictures based on early box office data the paper also seeks to provide insights into the impact of distribution policies on the adoption of new products the model is intended to assist motion picture exhibitor chains retailers in managing their exhibition capacity and in negotiating exhibition license agreements with distributors studios by allowing them to project the box office potential of the movies they plan to or currently exhibit based on early box office results it is also of interest to practitioners in other software industries e g music books cd roms where the distribution intensity is highly variable over the product life cycle and is an important determinant of new product adoption patterns the model and its extensions are of interest to academic researchers interested in modeling distribution effects in new product adoption as well as forecasters looking for ways to leverage historical data on related products to forecast the sales of new products we draw upon a queuing theory framework to conceptualize stochastically the consumer s movie adoption process in two steps the time to decide to see the new movie and the time to act on the adoption decision the parameter for the time to decide process captures the intensity of information intensity flowing from various information sources while the parameter for the time to act process is related to the delay created by limited distribution intensity and other factors our conceptualization extends existing new product forecasting models which assume that consumers act instantaneously on the motivating information they receive about the new product the resulting model is parsimonious yet it accommodates a wide range of adoption patterns in addition the stochastic formulation allows us to quantify the uncertainty surrounding the expected adoption pattern in the empirical testing we focus on the most parsimonious version of the modeling framework boxmod i a model that assumes stationarity with respect to the two shape parameters that characterize the adoption process the model produces fairly accurate early forecasts using at most the first three weeks of data for calibration and the predictive performance of the model compares favorably with benchmark models we propose extensions of the basic model that account for more realistic non stationary distribution intensity patterns including a wide release pattern that relies on intensive distribution and promotion and a platform release pattern that involves a gradual buildup of distribution intensity finally we present an adaptive weighing scheme that combines initial parameter estimates obtained from a meta analysis procedure with estimates obtained from early data to produce forecasts of box office revenues for a new movie when little or no box office data are available an important finding from the empirical testing is that motion picture box office revenue patterns display remarkable empirical regularity we find that there are only three classes of adoption patterns and these can all be represented within the basic model by using a two parameter exponential or erlang 2 probability distribution or a three parameter generalized gamma distribution we also find that cumulative box office revenues can be predicted with reasonable accuracy often within 10 of the actual using as little as two or three data points however our attempts to predict revenue patterns without any sales data meet with limited success while the scale parameter can be estimated reasonably well from a historical database of parameter values we find that it is considerably more difficult to predict the shape parameters using historical data the parsimony we seek in developing the model comes at the cost of several limiting assumptions we assume that the time to decide subprocess and the time to act subprocess are independent which may not be the case if decisions on continued exhibition by retailers are endogenously related to box office revenues over the life cycle in the basic model formulation we also assume that the time to act process can be represented by an exponential distribution which may not always be the case while we provide some empirical evidence to support these assumptions further research could relax these and other assumptions to enrich the basic model although this would entail some loss in parsimony

market provision of broadcasting a welfare analysis this paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry advertising levels may be too low or too high depending on the nuisance cost to viewers the substitutability of programs and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers market provision may allocate too few or too many resources to programming and these resources may be used to produce programs of the wrong type monopoly ownership may produce higher social surplus than competitive ownership and the ability to price programming may reduce social surplus

managerial objectives the r rating puzzle and the production of violent films we analyze project choice in the motion picture industry and find evidence consistent with revenue maximization and excessive hedging we find that movies that are very violent or feature sex and violence do not provide excess returns but they increase revenues particularly in the international market further they tend to lose money less often and their returns are more predictable even though there are never mega hits this evidence is consistent with studies of other industries and it partially explains the r rating puzzle that is the preponderance of r rated films although most studies find that g and pg rated films perform better

motion picture profit the stable paretian hypothesis and the curse of the superstar abstract this paper investigates the stable distribution as a model of profit in motion pictures the skew of this distribution and its paretian tails capture with great fidelity the statistics of the movies features of the business such as the nobody knows principle the curse of the superstar the angel s nightmare the instability of profit and the form of artist contracts follow from the properties of the stable distribution

does hollywood make too many r rated movies risk stochastic dominance and the illusion of expectation we estimate the probability distributions of budgets revenues returns and profits to g pg pg13 and r rated movies the distributions are non gaussian and show a self similar stable paretian form with nonfinite variance and nonstationary mean the profit distributions have asymmetric tails which means that hollywood could trim its downside risk while increasing its upside possibilities by shifting production dollars out of r rated movies into g pg and pg13 rated movies stars who are willing to appear in edgy counterculture r rated movies for their prestige value may induce an illusion of expectation leading studios to green light movies that have biased expectations

customized bundle pricing for information goods a nonlinear mixed integer programming approach this paper proposes using nonlinear mixed integer programming to solve the customized bundle pricing problem in which consumers are allowed to choose up to n goods out of a larger pool of j goods prior work has suggested that this mechanism has attractive features for the pricing of information and other low marginal cost goods although closed form solutions exist for this problem for certain cases of consumer preferences many interesting scenarios cannot be easily handled without a numerical solution procedure in this paper we investigate the efficiency gains created by customized bundling over the alternatives of pure bundling or individual sale under different assumptions about customer preferences and firm cost structure as well as the potential loss of efficiency caused by pricing with incomplete information about consumer reservation values our analysis suggests that customized bundling enhances sellers profits and enhances welfare when consumers do not place positive values on all goods and that this consumer characteristic is much more important than the shape of the valuation distribution in determining the optimal pricing scheme we also find that customized bundling outperforms both pure bundling and individual sale in the presence of incomplete information and that customized bundling still outperforms other simpler pricing schemes even when exact consumer valuations are not known ex ante

social learning and peer effects in consumption evidence from movie sales using box office data for all movies released between 1982 and 2000 i quantify how much the consumption decisions of individuals depend on information they receive from their peers when quality is ex ante uncertain in the presence of social learning we should see different box office sales dynamics depending on whether opening weekend demand is higher or lower than expected i use a unique feature of the movie industry to identify ex ante demand expectations the number of screens dedicated to a movie in its opening weekend reflects the sales expectations held by profit maximizing theatre owners several pieces of evidence are consistent with social learning first sales of movies with positive surprise and negative surprise in opening weekend demand diverge over time if a movie has better than expected appeal and therefore experiences larger than expected sales in week 1 consumers in week 2 update upward their expectations of quality further increasing week 2 sales second this divergence is small for movies for which consumers have strong priors and large for movies for which consumers have weak priors third the effect of a surprise is stronger for audiences with large social networks finally consumers do not respond to surprises in first week sales that are orthogonal to movie quality like weather shocks overall social learning appears to be an important determinant of sales in the movie industry accounting for 32 of sales for the typical movie with positive surprise this implies the existence of a large social multiplier such that the elasticity of aggregate demand to movie quality is larger than the elasticity of individual demand

multiple output production and pricing in electric utilities empirical studies of the electric utility industry have generally focused on one of several issues such as the presence or absence of regulation induced input mix distortions the rules used to select regulated prices whether electricity is one output or several or the naturalness of the electric utility monopoly this paper contributes a method which permits simultaneous estimation of demand elasticities pricing rule parameters and marginal rates of transformation within one econometric model since firms make input and output decisions given the demand and regulatory conditions facing them the marginal rates of substitution and transformation are dependent on the demand elasticities of each consumer class and the prices permitted by regulators its purposes are two first i examine the appropriateness of a multiple output model of production is electricity one output or are the products sold to different consumers distinct outputs most but not all previous studies treat electricity as a homogeneous product 2 while this assumption may be justified for studies which deal strictly with generation of electricity joskow and schmalensee 27 54 5 observe3 that

endogeneity in marketing decision models there are many critical concerns including the accounting for endogeneity when one is properly estimating response functions however it is sometimes certainly not always better to leave some variables exogenous when building mathematical models intended to help decision makers the exogenous variables allow the decision maker to better adapt the mathematical model to different situations and to incorporate myriad variables and constraints outside of the model

is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters competitive behavior in commercial television broadcasting is modeled to examine program choice and the effects of more channels being available on firm strategy specifically broadcasters compete by selecting both the type and quality level of a program to offer but do not compete on price we obtain five major results first a comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets indicates that broadcasters in an industry with a larger number of competitors may provide programs of lower quality compared to broadcasters in an industry with a smaller number second in terms of viewer welfare having more channels available is not necessarily better third broadcasters tend to choose an intermediate level of differentiation in terms of the types of programs they provide resulting in a counterprogramming strategy in other words avoidance of price competition is not required for competitors to differentiate themselves from each other fourth if one broadcaster starts the evening with a higher quality higher rated program than its competitor its second program should also be of higher quality finally a broadcaster s first program should be of equal or higher quality than its second program put another way it always behooves a broadcaster to lead with its best

modeling movie life cycles and market share we examine box office sales in the context of a market share model this is accomplished by developing a combination of a sliding window logit model and a gamma diffusion pattern in a hierarchical bayes framework we show that accounting for the full choice set available every week not only increases the fit of weekly movie sales but also leads to parameter estimates that depict a richer picture of the movie industry we show that movie studios appear to have a good understanding of the products they produce knowing when to support them and when not to we also show that the effect of the number of opening week screens is overestimated in traditional models our research indicates that actors have a direct and directors an indirect effect on consumers movie choice releasing a movie contemporaneously with other movies of the same genre adversely affects box office performance all around releasing a movie against movies of the same motion picture association of america mpaa rating hurts its sales in the beginning but there is a displacement effect which leads to a less severe sales loss in the long run

bundling with customer self selection a simple approach to bundling low marginal cost goods with declining costs of distributing digital products comes renewed interest in strategies for pricing goods with low marginal costs in this paper we evaluate customized bundling a pricing strategy that gives consumers the right to choose up to a quantity m of goods drawn from a larger pool of n different goods for a fixed price we show that the complex mixed bundle problem can be reduced to the customized bundle problem under some commonly used assumptions we also show that for a monopoly seller of low marginal cost goods this strategy outperforms individual selling m 1 and pure bundling m n when goods have a positive marginal cost or when customers have heterogeneous preferences over goods comparative statics results also show that the optimal bundle size for customized bundling decreases in both heterogeneity of consumer preferences over different goods and marginal costs of production we further explore how the customized bundle solution is affected by factors such as the nature of distribution functions in which valuations are drawn the correlations of values across goods and the complementarity or substitutability among products altogether our results suggest that customized bundling has a number of advantages both in theory and practice over other bundling strategies in many relevant settings

demand and supply dynamics for sequentially released products in international markets the case of motion pictures we develop an econometric model to study a setting in which a new product is launched first in its domestic market and only at a later stage in foreign markets and where the product s performance demand and availability supply are highly interdependent over time within and across markets integrating literature on international diffusion success breeds success trends and the theatrical motion picture industry the focus of the empirical analysis we develop a dynamic simultanenous equations model of the drivers and interrelationship of the behavior of consumers audiences and retailers exhibitors our findings emphasize the importance of considering the endogeneity and simultaneity of audience and exhibitor behavior and challenge conventional wisdom on the determinants of box office performance which is predominantly based on modeling frameworks that fail to account for the interdependence of performance and availability specifically we find that variables such as movie attributes and advertising expenditures which are usually assumed to influence audiences directly mostly influence revenuesindirectly namely through their impact on exhibitors screen allocations in addition consistent with the idea that the buzz for a movie is perishable we find that the longer is the time lag between releases the weaker is the relationship between domestic and foreign market performance an effect mostly driven by foreign exhibitors screen allocations

business models for media firms does competition matter for how they raise revenue the purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media firms like tv channels raise revenue a media firm can either be financed by advertising revenue by direct payment from the viewers or the readers if we consider newspapers or by both we show that the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained by other media firms offering close substitutes this implies that the less differentiated the media firms content the larger is the fraction of their revenue coming from advertising a media firm s scope for raising revenues from ads on the other hand is constrained by how many competitors it faces we should thus expect that direct payment from the media consumers becomes more important the larger the number of competing media products