corrective taxes under oligopoly with inter firm externalities pollution externalities between polluters should be taken into account in the design of corrective taxes when the externalities are substantial and or the number of polluters is large the effluent levies on these firms do not necessarily result in a deadweight loss consequently the second best tax exceeds the marginal social cost of pollution a more general rule is that the tax rate should be greater than the marginal social cost of pollution if and only if a marginal increase in the tax rate results in opposite effects on the changes of equilibrium emission level and output

an analysis of feed in tariff remuneration models implications for renewable energy investment recent experience from around the world suggests that feed in tariffs fits are the most effective policy to encourage the rapid and sustained deployment of renewable energy there are several different ways to structure a fit policy each with its own strengths and weaknesses this paper presents an overview of seven different ways to structure the remuneration of a fit policy divided into two broad categories those in which remuneration is dependent on the electricity price and those that remain independent from it this paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of these different fit models and concludes with an analysis of these design options with a focus on their implications both for investors and for society

pigouvian taxes under imperfect competition if consumption depends on emissions the paper considers environmental regulation of a consumption good and an externality which influence demand and costs in a nonseparable way under monopoly two instruments are always required for first best the pigouvian tax is more complicated than anticipated

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

a note on discount rate policy and the variability of discount window borrowing abstract the purpose of this note is to evaluate the appropriate discount rate policy rules consistent with minimization of the variability of borrowing at the federal reserve discount window in the context of goodfriend s 1983 model of the bank borrowing decision it is demonstrated that either a penalty rate or a subsidy rate policy will produce minimized variability of borrowing so long as the subsidy rate adjusts point for point to changes in the value of the federal funds rate these policy rules are compatible with a policy procedure designed to target borrowed or non borrowed reserves if the fed does not adhere to one of these specific rules minimization of borrowing variability requires an open market procedure in which the fed pegs the federal funds rate

environmental policy under oligopoly with endogenous market structure emission taxes under both fixed number oligopoly and endogenous market structure which are the most relevant market structures for policy issues are examined in the latter case and contrary to what is expected under imperfect competition the optimal tax could exceed marginal external damages which implies that externalities generated by oligopolistic firms could be optimally controlled by overinternalizing environmental damages under endogenous market structure a scheme consisting of a license fee and a second best underinternalizing emission tax can increase social welfare as compared to the use of a single emission tax exceeding marginal damages copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

asymmetric information signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly abstract this paper examines the effects of signaling on environmental taxation in a two period oligopoly model in which each firm privately knows whether its technology is clean or dirty while third parties the rival firms and the regulator have only a subjective perception about this fact consequently there are both horizontal and vertical asymmetric information and each firm can strategically manipulate both the competitor s and the regulator s priors in this context we find that each firm wishes to be perceived as a technologically clean firm in period 2 whenever the regulator s ecological conscience is sufficiently high we also show that taxes under symmetric information are always positive but under asymmetric information and signaling they may be negative subsidies and lower or greater than in the symmetric information case depending on the ecological conscience of the regulator and the probability of firms being dirty finally taxes are below environmental marginal damage both under symmetric and asymmetric information and signaling reinforces such under taxation

long run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation we investigate the long run effect of energy conservation regulation which forces firms to raise energy saving investment above the cost minimizing level if pigovian tax is imposed additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition while it can improve welfare under imperfect competition our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

taxation within cournot oligopoly abstract when the production of output causes pollution we often consider taxation as a means to reduce it this paper examines various forms of taxation to control pollution within cournot oligopoly it shows that two commonly used forms can actually increase pollution in contrast both of these forms unambiguously reduce pollution within the competitive model the paper provides conditions in terms of demand and technology that make taxation effective in the cournot oligopoly case another implication of the analysis is that outside the price taking framework asymmetry of cost functions is particularly important and deserves careful attention when we examine the effect of taxation

federal reserve operating procedures a survey and evaluation of the historical record since october 1979 comment william poole has produced another thoughtful and thought provoking paper two major conclusions emerge from his work first the instability of growth in m1b since october 1979 can be attributed largely to a reluctance by the federal reserve to permit wide enough swings in the federal funds rate second to correct this problem and to promote greater stability in financial markets and the economy the fed ought to replace lagged with contemporaneous reserve accounting and reform the discount window they should then begin to hit a nonborrowed base or reserves target that grows at a steady rate i will organize my comments around these two conclusions i will not comment directly on the other excellent paper in this session by ralph c bryant i will refer to some of bryant s empirical work though in my discussion of the poole paper poole attributes the continued extensive volatility of m1b growth since october 1979 to efforts by the federal reserve to smooth interest rates he concedes that the fed really has let go the federal funds rate to a very considerable extent but he believes that variability in m1b growth over tonger periods is due primarily to the important role accorded interest rates in federal reserve policy making italics mine he cites four reasons for believing that the post october 1979 targeting procedures qualitatively are not very different from the federal funds targeting procedure followed earlier of the four the most interesting and empirically verifiable is that in nearly one third of the weeks since october 1979 the federal funds rate has averaged within 100 basis points of either the bottom or the top of the widened target range during these weeks the constraint on the funds rate might have prevented the fed from hitting its nonborrowed reserves target poole in fact accepts this view uncritically

border adjustments supplementing nationally determined carbon pricing as agreed on in the paris agreement each country determines its own contribution to combat climate change on a voluntary basis there is no mechanism to force a country to comply with its own nationally determined contributions this bottom up approach builds on unilateral actions and yields a kind of carbon pricing which is not necessarily identical across countries as a consequence these nationally determined climate policies have drawbacks in terms of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness for firms producing in high carbon price countries to reduce these negative effects border adjustments bas may be appropriate subsequent to more stringent environmental regulation we model a three stage game involving carbon price competition in the first stage the introduction of bas in the second stage and oligopolistic competition between firms in the third stage strategic trade theory suggests that the qualitative results about the optimal ba policy may vary with the underlying type of competition namely bertrand and cournot competition however our results are similar for both types of competition we conclude that bas are suitable for supporting a more stringent environmental policy moreover we find that anticipation of the implementation of bas in the second stage yields higher average carbon prices in the first stage since high carbon price countries increase their carbon prices whereas the other countries partially offset

pollution control through price incentives the role of rent seeking costs in monopoly markets abstract we consider the effect of rent seeking costs on the design of an efficient pollution tax earlier work has concluded that a pollution tax levied on an otherwise unregulated monopoly should always be less than the pigouvian rate this study demonstrates that if rent seeking costs are present the appropriate discharge tax for a monopoly firm can equal or exceed the marginal damage from its pollution calculations reveal that under a wide range of conditions the ideal corrective tax for a monopoly firm is very close to the fully internalizing pigouvian tax

environmental tax in a green market we examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices the unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed we show that the emission tax improves welfare thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation the higher the marginal environmental damage is the higher the optimal tax will be the optimal tax however becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large finally when marginal environmental damage is not too low the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly

modeling decision making as a support tool for policy making on renewable energy development abstract this paper presents the findings of a study on decision making models for the analysis of capital risk investors preferences on biomass power plants projects the aim of the work is to improve the support tools for policy makers in the field of renewable energy development analytic network process anp helps to better understand capital risk investors preferences towards different kinds of biomass fueled power plants the results of the research allow public administration to better foresee the investors reaction to the incentive system or to modify the incentive system to better drive investors decisions changing the incentive system is seen as major risk by investors therefore public administration must design better and longer term incentive systems forecasting market reactions for that two scenarios have been designed one showing a typical decision making process and another proposing an improved decision making scenario a case study conducted in italy has revealed that anp allows understanding how capital risk investors interpret the situation and make decisions when investing on biomass power plants the differences between the interests of public administrations s and promoters how decision making could be influenced by adding new decision criteria and which case would be ranked best according to the decision models

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

optimal pollution taxation in a cournot duopoly it is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution it has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage in this paper i derive the optimal pollution tax for a cournot duopoly if firms have different production costs the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage this is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm it is also shown that if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level

discount window borrowing monetary policy and the post october 6 1979 federal reserve operating procedure abstract a demand schedule for discount window borrowing based on profit maximizing bank behavior is derived a feature of non price rationing at the discount window making longer duration borrowing more costly is shown to make lagged borrowing and expected future spreads between the federal funds rate and the discount rate relevant to the current borrowing decision consequently both the size of the coefficients in the borrowing functions as well as the form of the function itself depend on expected fed policy toward the spread the demand function for discount window borrowing provides the critical link by which non borrowed reserve control affects short term interest rates and ultimately the money supply under post october 6 1979 reserve targeting the analysis suggests some reasons why the fed has experienced difficulty in specifying estimating and utilizing a discount window borrowing function in the non borrowed reserve operating procedure

is the conventional view of discount window borrowing consistent with the behavior of weekly reporting banks discount window borrowing by weekly reporting banks disaggregated by federal reserve district is used to estimate marvin goodfriend s 1983 model of borrowed reserves little evidence is found to support the argument that a bank s borrowing decision is determined by the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate and by prior bank borrowing a weekly reporting bank has only a 2 7 percent chance of visiting the discount window during any given maintenance period this result is consistent with the presence of considerable harassment costs imposed by the discount window officer copyright 1994 by mit press

clustering analysis of environmental emissions a study on kyoto protocol s impact on member countries abstract this paper aims to start the study of the effects of the kyoto protocol on the agricultural and forestry sector the emission levels of greenhouse gases are greatly changed from a geographical point of view over the years after kyoto accord except for technical innovation the design and timing of policy interventions is crucial for reducing innovation barriers and improving production efficiency the proper use of available databases linked to the identification and application of tools by decision makers for grooming emissions are one of the main drivers for improving the efficient use of resources and global warming reduction in this paper we propose a first proposal of methodologies to analyse the effects of the kyoto protocol policies on the agricultural and forestry sector

distribution of environmental costs and benefits additional distortions and the porter hypothesis the porter hypothesis argues that environmental regulations benefit firms by fostering innovation we discuss four examples consistent with this idea highlighting either the distribution of benefits or costs or the presence of some additional distortion other than pollution examples are organized according to the list of market failures adding any one market failure creates the possibility that firms benefit from regulations while each example can be fully consistent with the porter hypothesis it is also possible that regulations benefit firms even without fostering innovation a result that would be empirically difficult to distinguish from the porter hypothesis

carbon taxation and market structure a cge analysis for russia abstract russia is one of the world s major sources of carbon based energy as well as one its most intensive users introducing carbon taxes can lead to a reduction in emissions and encourage investment in energy efficiency we investigate the economic effects of carbon taxes on the russian economy under perfect competition and a cournot oligopoly in output markets the main findings are i substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes can yield a strong double dividend in russia however welfare gains strongly depend on the labour supply elasticity and elasticities of substitution between capital labour and energy ii under the assumption of a cournot oligopoly with homogenous products and symmetric firms in the markets for natural gas petroleum and chemical products metals and minerals welfare costs of the environmental tax reform can be higher than under perfect competition this is because introducing carbon taxes leads to a reduction in already sub optimal output thereby exacerbating pre existing distortions arising from imperfect competition iii furthermore increases in energy costs can result in higher mark ups in some markets because of less competition resulting from firms exit

controlling monetary aggregates the discount window this paper argues that current discount window policy coupled with non borrowed reserve targeting of the federal reserve makes the quantity of high powered money endogenous examination of the advisability of this procedure in a stochastic environment is conducted using a general equilibrium financial model it is concluded that the current policy reduces the destabilizing effects of shifts between various depository financial assets but increases the effect of other asset portfolio shifts and aggregate supply disturbances these results are consistent with the work of poole inasmuch as the current debate over discount policy is a repackaging of the debate over interest rate or aggregates control for monetary policy

taxing incumbent monopoly to foster entry abstract this paper investigates whether it is welfare enhancing to tax the output of a monopoly in order to foster cost inefficient entry this question is of particular concern in the energy markets dominated by cartel like affiliations opec and oil russia s gas exports to europe and the interest and practice to stimulate the development of alternative fuels making the realistic assumption that none of the players can commit to future policies subsidies are not a viable strategy for the government a tax cannot be first best but can be second best if the government cannot force the incumbent monopoly to sell its output at no profit and if the incumbent s profit is discounted however stimulating supply by improving the conditions for entry is not the prime concern of taxation after all it lowers aggregate supplies and may even lower the entrant s supply but to accrue parts of the monopoly rent

competition under industry stock driven prevailing market price environmental consequences and the effect of uncertainty abstract we address competition between several firms that cause pollution when producing fully substitutable products these firms comprise the industry and each individual firm charges for its products the market price determined by the difference between cumulative market supply and demand i e by the industry s stock we find that although the greater the number of firms competing for the same primary market the lower the market price and the higher the industry inventory surplus the reduction in price at market equilibrium is insufficient to stimulate greater aggregate sales that is greater competition does not necessarily induce higher industry output and pollution furthermore we show that commitment production pollution strategies compared to contingent strategies do not necessarily result in lower pollution especially when the number of competing firms is not high market uncertainty is low and proportional pollution taxation is high

feed in subsidies taxation and inefficient entry we study energy markets with dirty production and lumpy entry costs of clean production renewables for intermediate entry costs markets yield inefficient production and inefficient entry a mix of three popular regulatory instruments polluter taxation feed in subsidies for renewables and consumption taxation cannot correct these market failures for larger entry costs the instruments are imperfect because they affect marginal incentives whereas entry is a lumpy fixed cost problem whenever the first best is implementable feed in subsidies and consumption taxes are redundant the second best requires feed in subsidies or consumption taxes in addition to a pollution tax and overshoots first best levels given production levels the instruments do not affect the regulator s budget

biogas and eu s 2020 targets evidence from a regional case study in italy abstract the provision of renewable energy by agriculture so called agroenergy is a key element of the europe 2020 strategy and has sparked public and research debates on the bio based economy hot topics involve direct and indirect land use change and the ability of agroenergy to foster or hinder food and energy security worldwide research has dealt with these and other issues associated with the sustainability of the diffusion of agroenergy generation systems but the subject is still open this paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the sustainability of agroenergy we propose an empirical model to simulate the diffusion of farm biogas installations and estimate a set of indicators covering the economic environmental and social dimensions of sustainability at the regional level model results show that the current incentive mechanism does not allow to meet eu s energy targets at the local level to do so the policy mix needs an improved design accounting for regional peculiarities across the eu model results show that agroenergy production can help farmers stabilise their income and keep viable rural areas despite some trade offs among socioeconomic and environmental indicators major drawbacks are environmental risks associated with farming intensification

the economics of attribute based regulation theory and evidence from fuel economy standards in many countries fuel economy standards mandate that vehicles meet a certain fuel economy but heavier or larger vehicles are allowed to meet a lower standard this has the perverse implication of allowing automakers to meet standards either by improving fuel economy or by increasing weight which lowers fuel economy and increases externalities related to accidents this is but one example of an attribute based regulation in which the regulation imposed on a product depends on both the externality it creates and some other attribute attribute basing potentially motivates rms and individuals to strategically alter the attribute thereby endogenously altering the stringency of the regulation this paper develops a theory of attribute basing to demonstrate the costs and benets of its use the paper then empirically examines the consequences of attribute based fuel economy standards in japan where fuel economy standards are a notched attribute based function of vehicle weight we use cross sectional and panel techniques to demonstrate that attribute based regulation has signicantly altered the distribution of vehicle weight in japan where 10 of vehicles bunch at weight notches for cars whose weight is altered in response to the policy we estimate that the alteration generates a welfare loss from the exacerbation of weight related externalities of 1 500 per unit sold which translates into a 700 million annual loss across the japanese auto market