community based tradable permits for localized pollution this paper considers the assignment of tradable permits representing property rights of an environmental good to community members who are harmed by pollution generated by firms these community members can in turn sell permits to polluters according to their personal preferences for a special case with a sole household market transactions between the household and polluters achieve an efficient pollution level however for a group of households the decentralized market solution fails to yield social efficiency because of competitive consumption of the environmental goods we design a revenue sharing mechanism akin to unitization under which market transactions also achieve efficient resource allocation importantly in some cases efficiency can be achieved even when regulators are ignorant of the private valuation of the environmental good

effluent regulation and long run optimality a regulator faced with free entry of firms is concerned not only with the implications of public policy for the discharges from a representative firm but also with the total pollution observed at the long run market equilibrium the regulator must take into account not only the effects of regulations upon the net marginal returns of the firm but must also consider the total profit of the firm and incentives for entry and exit this paper shows that effluent charges and tradeable effluent permits lead to long run optimality with entry of small firms the difference between firm payments and environmental damages is interpreted as the rent accruing to the environmental resource this result applies only to the competitive case with small polluters the analysis presented here allows a comparison and clarification of the literature on small and large polluters in a multi input framework with social damages dependent upon total effluents effluent charges are shown here to result in socially optimal entry confirming an assertion of baumol and oates 2 p 179 fn 161 and the important result of schulze and d arge 15 by taking average as well as marginal damages into account the effluent charge results in optimal firm scale levels and the correct input mix at the free entry market equilibrium the firm subject to an effluent tax will operate above or below the private minimum efficient scale depending upon whether average external costs exceed or are less than marginal external costs since public policy to reduce effluents is often directed at reducing the effluentgenerating activity some policy recommendations include a tax on the final output of the polluting firm in some theoretical analyses a relation between the output of the firm and the effluent level is identified and a pigouvian output tax is applied this approach should not be followed by policymakers since an output tax does not provide firms with the correct incentives for either input substitution or market entry it is shown that while a lump sum transfer is needed to provide correct entry incentives when a pigouvian output tax is applied no such transfer is needed if the tax is correctly applied to effluents contrary to 5 even if optimal firm scale and i thank the referees for helpful suggestions the support of the national science foundation under grant ses 82 19121 is gratefully acknowledged any errors are my responsibility 103

optimal producer behavior in the presence of area yield crop insurance optimal producer behaviour in the presence of area yield insurance is studied the producer s optimal production and insurance choices are characterized the effect of the provision of area yield insurance on production patterns is studied and sufficient conditions for the provision of area yield insurance to increase the riskiness of the individual producer s decisions are derived a separation result is derived for area yield insurance contracts and stochastic technologies

avoiding an ecological regime shift is sound economic policy we extend the shallow lake model by adding the capital stock of an industry a government can mitigate the effects of pollution arising from industrial activities by imposing the requirement to abate emissions within this framework two scenarios are examined in the social optimal benchmark the social planner optimally allocates investment in the competitive equilibrium market forces determine the investment in capital but the government can still abate emissions we find that irreversible environmental regime shifts are avoided in the competitive equilibrium by means of a static level of abatement when it is socially optimal to do so

degradation of environmental capital and national accounting procedures abstract the capital theoretic approach to the environment as a wastable stock a stock with a flow of abatement services is explored in a simple ricardo like model involving wheat production and pollution production as an essential by product we then turn to how the national accounts are implicit in growth or capital theory models and how formulae emerge for accounting for the wasting of environmental capital airsheds and watersheds from excessive use

designing economic instruments for the environment in a decentralized fiscal system designing economic instruments for the environment when external effects are important markets will be inefficient and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies however the standard economic analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of pollutants the enforcement authority of various levels of government and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels of government for example externalities generated in a particular local area may be confined to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions also local governments may be well informed about how best to regulate or enforce pollution control within their jurisdiction but they may not consider the effects of their actions on other jurisdictions finally the existence of locally generated waste emissions affects the appropriate assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of government the standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate or national perspective it typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems this paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies that is how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services as well as to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities

inter firm social dilemmas with agency risk abstract many social dilemmas involve decisions made by firms we design a laboratory experiment that represents firms principal agent problem and includes an inter firm social dilemma and stochastic agent performance agents unobservable effort affects the likelihood of a bad outcome occurring such as a regulatory violation this harms the agent s principal but can also damage others thus creating an inter firm social dilemma in our baseline treatment we omit the agency problem and principals make their firm s effort decision directly in the second treatment principals can only offer an unconditional wage contract to their agent although a non contractual ex post bonus can be paid in a third treatment principals can condition wages on the stochastic outcome and a fourth treatment combines the conditional wage with a non contractual bonus we find that principals use a combination of a conditional wage and the non contractual ex post bonus to help overcome the agency problem and incentivize agents to choose higher effort fixed wage unconditional contracts lead to significantly lower effort levels even when augmented with bonuses similarly conditional contracts on their own also perform poorly only the combination of conditional wage contracts and discretionary bonuses is effective in limiting agency risk to address the inter firm social dilemma problem

production risk in multi output industries estimates from norwegian dairy farms farmers who produce multiple outputs are portfolio managers in the sense that they use inputs to balance expected economic return and variance of return this article estimates the structure of the stochastic multioutput production technology in norwegian dairy farming allowing for a more flexible specification of the technology than previous studies we find that an increase in input levels leads primarily to higher output variability and that inputs also influence the covariance of shocks between outputs risk reducing effects of inputs on outputs are primarily present in the covariance functions technical change leads to shifts in the profit distribution over the data period but no welfare improvement for risk averse farmers

measuring technical and environmental efficiency in a state contingent technology most developed countries support farming activities through policies that are tailored to meet their specific social economic and environmental objectives economic and environmental efficiency have recently become relevant targets of most of these policies whose sound implementation can be enhanced by monitoring farm performance from a multidimensional perspective this paper proposes farm level technical and environmental efficiency measures that recognize the stochastic conditions in which production takes place a state contingent framework is used to model production uncertainty an implementable representation of the technology is developed using data envelopment analysis the application focuses on a sample of catalan arable crop farms results suggest that technical efficiency is slightly lower in bad than in good growing conditions nitrogen pollution can decrease substantially more under good than bad growing conditions

externalities a market model failure we focus here on a set of conceptual problems related to the accepted theory of externalities we are primarily concerned with difficulties that arise when a theoretical system is extended beyond its logical domain this is the practice in externality theory when the market model assuming independent agents is used to analyze physical interdependency the different kinds of dependencies obscure the standard use of the paretian analysis as the issues of rights and efficiency are mixed up the creation of emissions and the creation of externalities are further not held apart producing flows in the efficiency evaluations due to the interdependencies involved actions of both emitter and victim must be taken into account while searching for efficient policies finally we analyze the interrelationships between what is termed the internal structure of the market model and the annexed sphere of externalities we conclude that the accepted policy prescriptions both assume and demand no interrelationships between these two spheres we find the assumption unrealistic and inconsistent as concerns the basic foundations of the market model there are two main traditions addressing externalities the coasean and the pigovian this paper shows that both are vulnerable to the above critique thus the presumption that externality theory is now settled and coherent is seen to be without theoretical support

non point source pollution regulation as a multi task principal agent problem this paper considers a multi task principal agent problem where risk averse farmers possessing private information have two tasks pollution control and corn production but only direct incentive for corn production using a highly tractable reformulation of the standard uncertain production model a general method for solving the associated constrained paretian problem is developed and analyzed the optimal solution is shown to obey a generalized inverse elasticity rule and the optimal solution is characterized under a number of assumptions about the underlying technology and the role that pollution emission plays in reducing farmer risk

pigovian taxes which work in the small number case abstract an appropriately conceived pollution tax can achieve a pareto optimal equilibrium which is 1 stable in the presence of myopia 2 not subject to strategic manipulation even in the small number case and 3 resistant to inefficient cost shifting by the participants when transaction costs are low a considerable amount of confusion in the literature exists because different authors use different tax formulas often implicitly and different assumptions regarding conjectural behavior some of this confusion is cleared up by formally presenting various pigovian tax formulas explicitly considering whether there is cournot or stackleberg behavior and comparing the properties of the various configurations

evaluating the environmental efficiency of a two stage system with undesired outputs by a dea approach an interest preference perspective abstract in this study we propose a new dea model to evaluate the environmental efficiency of a two stage system with undesired outputs the two stage system consists of two parts a production subsystem and a pollution treatment subsystem different choices for allocating resources to each subsystem represent different interest preferences of decision makers with the production subsystem corresponding to short term interests and the pollution treatment subsystem corresponding to long term interests based on a proposed new dea model three theorems are established to show the relationships between the interest preference parameter and the change of efficiency scores an empirical analysis was conducted using the data of 30 provinces and municipalities eight regions of china the empirical results show the effectiveness of the proposed model and the usefulness of the theorems for the real world data optimal efficiency rankings of the eight regions are provided and the efficiency rankings truly reflect the current environmental situations of these eight regions to examine the economic impacts and facilitate sustainable development we also analyze the shadow prices for undesired outputs corresponding implications of the empirical analysis are also discussed

externalities pigouvian corrections and risk attitudes abstract we examine the influence of risk attitudes on the provision of an externality and on the proper size of pigouvian correction when the externality is a random variable whose distribution is affected by an observable externality generating activity an intervening technology relates changes in this observable activity to the probability distribution of the relevant externality unlike the now standard result in the theory of the firm involving the influence of risk attitudes on output levels we cannot conclude that increases in risk aversion will lead necessarily to a reduction in the level of the externality our results are applied to a wide range of market failures

fiscal federalism approach for controlling global environmental pollution this paper finds that optimal international carbon taxes are country specific and we can decompose a tax on a domestically produced carbon intensive commodity into a revenue tax a tax to control local atmospheric pollution and an international carbon tax it shows that an institutional arrangement for the world economy similar to the fiscal federalism in the federal countries can be useful to internalize the global externalities of atmospheric pollution

it s what you say not what you pay an experimental study of manager employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure we study manager employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak link game in the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure to overcome a history of coordination failure managers have two instruments at their disposal increasing employees financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees we find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps examining the content of managers communication the most effective messages specifically request a high effort point out the mutual benefits of high effort and imply that employees are being paid well

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

the approach to realizing the potential of emissions reduction in china an implication from data envelopment analysis abstract by proposing a three hierarchy meta frontier data envelopment analysis dea this paper first decomposes co 2 emissions efficiency and the potential for emissions reduction into the following three components structural technical and management based on these components we then conduct an empirical analysis of china s total factor co 2 emissions efficiency its potential for co 2 emissions reduction and its corresponding implementation path the results show that co 2 emissions efficiency in mainland china is relatively low because of structural inefficiency technical inefficiency and management inefficiency the chinese government is expected to realize a large quantity of co 2 emissions reduction potential nearly 40 of the current total co 2 emissions through adjusting the industrial structure narrowing the technology gap among regions promoting the reform of marketization and strengthening environmental regulation the causes of co 2 emissions inefficiency and the distribution of potential reductions in emissions show a distinct spatial difference characteristic therefore this paper also formulates emissions reduction strategies for china s 30 provinces according to their specific situations noting the direction of the industrial structure adjustment and the path to improving co 2 emissions efficiency

estimating state contingent production frontiers chambers and quiggin 2000 use state contingent representations of risky production technologies to establish important theoretical results concerning producer behavior under uncertainty unfortunately perceived problems in the estimation of state contingent models have limited the usefulness of the approach in policy formulation we show that fixed and random effects state contingent production frontiers can be conveniently estimated in a finite mixtures framework an empirical example is provided compared to conventional estimation approaches we find that estimating production frontiers in a state contingent framework produces significantly different estimates of elasticities firm technical efficiencies and other quantities of economic interest

sharing the cost of global warming due to meteorological factors the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions we argue in favor of osetting this discrepancy and propose a global insurance scheme to be ncanced according to countries respon sibility for climate change because ghg decay very slowly we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions raher than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a pigovian taxation scheme we characterize new versions of two well known cost sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of bossert and fleurbaey 1996 to a context with externalities j e l classi cation d62 d63 q54

effort and comparison income experimental and survey evidence the authors test the hypothesis that individual effort on the job depends both on one s own income and on the individual s position in the relevant income distribution combining experimental evidence from a gift exchange game with multi country issp survey data they analyze the extent to which relative income affects an individual s effort finding that an individual s rank in the income distribution more strongly determines effort than does others average income which suggests that comparisons are more ordinal than cardinal their experiment also reveals that comparisons over time affect effort individuals who received higher income offers or enjoyed higher income rank in the past exerted lower levels of effort for a given current income and rank

externalities in a regulated industry the aircraft noise problem airline noise is an externality in the traditional sense of being a byproduct of normal economic activity it affects the population around airports in single event bundles and cumulatively the transient nature of noise itself is unlike most other externalities as with the others however general improvements in technology and increases in population have made the situation more difficult to tolerate the combination of these things has led to a critical situation for the affected population since it involves its physical and mental health from among the various methods of dealing with externalities we choose the effluent charge scheme it generally allows each firm to incorporate the environmental standard into its marginal operating choices if each firm makes efficient decisions then the cost to society of achieving an environmental standard will be a minimum in this paper there are two modifications of the traditional charge scheme one is that because of the well known difficulties in specifying and estimating social costs we use the estimated direct noise abatement costs of achieving the environmental standard the second is that airlines cannot be necessarily thought of as cost minimizers the charges used for the control of airline noise are generated as shadow prices in a simple linear programming model solution to the problem involves choosing a mix of noise abating options that achieves proposed environmental standards at least cost additional bounds on the problem are limitations on service reductions and rate of return ror oni investment regulation the data sources used for the program were generally fragmentary and incomplete for our purposes after calculating a noise charge for a hypothetical airport we discuss the implementation and ramifications of the charge plan in the regulated airline industry included is a discussion of the link between noise abatement and fuel consumption

the effect of production versus consumption based emission tax under demand uncertainty abstract emission tax is an instrument widely adopted by countries and regions to incentivize emission abatement by emission intensive firms including manufacturers however policies differ in how they allocate emission responsibilities among stakeholders for example the chile emission tax directly penalizes manufacturers for the emissions they generate during their production production based emission tax whereas the sweden electricity emission tax penalizes the consumption of electricity rather than its production consumption based emission tax these two methods have potentially varying implications on manufacturers profits their emission abatement decisions as well as the resulting emission levels especially when demand uncertainty is involved in this paper we investigate the impact of the two distinct methods by studying a profit maximizing manufacturer facing stochastic demand under either production or consumption based emission tax the manufacturer s optimal decisions on its selling price production quantity and emission abatement investment are derived perhaps surprisingly we show that under either tax it is possible for an increase in the emission tax to discourage the manufacturer from investing in emission abatement the impact of tax rate abatement technology efficiency and demand uncertainty on the manufacturer s profitability and abatement decision are also studied interestingly higher demand uncertainty may motivate the manufacturer to invest more in emission abatement under production based emission tax using a numerical example of an electricity power generator we offer further insights into the comparison between the two taxes and find that there exist cases for either tax to dominate the other in terms of both profit and emissions

the economics of renewable energy support abstract this paper uses theoretical and numerical economic equilibrium models to examine optimal renewable energy re support policies for wind and solar resources in the presence of a carbon externality associated with the use of fossil fuels we emphasize three main issues for policy design the heterogeneity of intermittent natural resources budget neutral financing rules and incentives for carbon mitigation we find that differentiated subsidies for wind and solar while being optimal only yield negligible efficiency gains policies with smart financing of re subsidies which either relax budget neutrality or use polluter pays financing in the context of budget neutral schemes can however approximate socially optimal outcomes our analysis suggests that optimally designed re support policies do not necessarily have to be viewed as a costly second best option when carbon pricing is unavailable

production uncertainty and pollution there has been considerable interest in two sector models in which the production of one of the goods is subject to uncertainty the major papers in this area are by rothenberg and smith 13 batra 1 britto 3 diamond 5 mills 12 and harford and park 8 in the latest of these papers harford and park 8 41 build on a model in mills 12 to show that if constant relative risk aversion r which is mathematically analogous to the pratt arrow measure is less than exceeds or equal to unity the direction of efficient resource flow under uncertainty as compared to certainty is away from the risky sector toward the risky sector or unchanged respectively in their model as in mills 12 the preferences of consumers are represented by a community expected utility function in the present two sector model the risky sector is an industry that is adversely affected by air pollution which is a by product of production in the other industry although there is a deterministic relation between the output and emissions of the polluting stable sector the damage caused to the other sector as a result of any given level of emissions depends upon random variables such as mixing height and wind velocity and is therefore stochastic it is not intuitively obvious whether the results of harford and park 8 hold if the uncertainty in the risky sector is the consequence of production in the stable sector in fact there is substantial dissimilarity in the results if the measure of risk aversion r is less than unity the efficient direction of resource flow is generally though not always toward the risky polluted sector if r equals unity the results also differ with resources shifting under uncertainty in the direction of the risky polluted sector only if r exceeds unity are the results always the same in both models with resources flowing toward the risky sector this paper presents the marginal condition such that under uncertainty the optimal combination of outputs includes less of the stable polluting good and more of the risky pollution sensitive good than would be the case if pollution damage were anticipated with certainty if this marginal condition does not hold the risk averse community may prefer either more or less of the polluting good a narrowed interpretation of the marginal condition is then used to predict the special case in which the efficient flow of resources under uncertainty is toward the polluting sector

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

aggregate homothetic separability this paper develops necessary and sufficient conditions for an aggregate sector cost function derived from industry cost functions to exhibit homothetic separability

externality regulation and the monopoly firm abstract differences in strategic assumptions lead to predictable variations in the conclusions one may draw the formal theory of monopoly power and externalities reflects this variability in assumptions and conclusions this paper contains a unified model of monopoly power marketable product output and externality abatement

specification and estimation of production risk risk preferences and technical efficiency this article deals with specification and estimation of risk preferences production risk and technical inefficiency it makes contribution in three separate areas of production economics first we model producers attitude toward risk and derive risk preference functions without assuming any parametric form of the utility function and any distribution of the error term representing production risk when risk arises from production uncertainty and technical inefficiency second the standard production risk model is extended to accommodate technical inefficiency and producers attitude toward risk finally the technical efficiency model is generalized to accommodate production risk and producers attitude toward risk copyright 2002 oxford university press

coordination in the presence of asset markets markets aggregate widely dispersed information and direct resources to where they produce the greatest value friedrich a hayek 1945 adam smith 1776 these dual roles of informational and allocative efficiency help explain why asset markets are often used to guide economic activity such as production and investment many economic contexts involving production and investment are characterized by multiple equilibria john bryant 1983 jack hirshleifer 1983 russell w cooper 1999 colin camerer and marc knez 1997 jordi brandts and david j cooper 2006 when asset markets are linked to such contexts it is important to understand what role they play in aiding coordination and selecting equilibria if asset markets obtain both informational and allocative efficiency in a multiple equilibrium con text then they should coordinate the beliefs of economic agents and guide behavior to an efficient equilibrium indeed some evidence suggests that one sided auction markets may facilitate efficient coordination in an environment with multiple equi libria john b van huyck raymond c battalio and richard o beil 1993 vincent crawford and bruno broseta 1998 however the broader question of whether asset markets generally lead to efficient coordination in environments with multiple equi libria remains an open question in this paper we explore experimentally the influence of two sided futures asset markets on behavior and outcomes in an economic activity characterized by multi plicity of equilibria we use laboratory experiments where we can control impor tant features of both the market and the underlying activity and focus on situations where the outcome of the economic activity is sensitive to the behavior of small numbers of agents the economic activity in our setting consists of a coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria in which the payoff to each player is a function of her own choice or input and group output which is some order statistic such as the minimum of all players input choices see van huyck battalio and beil 1990 van huyck battalio and beil 1991 crawford 1995 players all do better if they coordinate on the highest output efficient equilibrium which is pareto optimal but they also prefer to select a lower input if they believe others will do so coordination games of this kind have been applied widely to model economic activity from the relationship between beliefs and output in macroeconomic models cooper 1999 to public good provision hirshleifer 1983 to firm production

heteroscedasticity or production risk a synthetic view two veins of literature namely production risk literature and stochastic frontier analysis are examined both fields are concerned of output variation the former due to exogenous shocks the latter due inefficiency by covering the literature from both the fields this review suggests that the concept of heteroscedasticity can be utilized to build a synthesis between these mainly separate branches of literature however the synthetic approach brings a challenge how to differentiate between different sources of output variation this challenge is identified as the main obstacle to meaningfully combine the two approaches

steering the climate system using inertia to lower the cost of policy common views hold that the efficient way to limit warming to a chosen level is to price carbon emissions at a rate that increases exponentially we show that this hotelling tax on carbon emissions is actually inefficient the least cost policy path takes advantage of the climate system s inertia to delay reducing emissions and allow greater cumulative emissions the efficient carbon tax follows an inverse u shaped path and grows more slowly than the hotelling tax economic models that assume exponentially increasing carbon taxes are overestimating the cost of limiting warming overestimating the efficient near term carbon tax and overvaluing technologies that mature sooner

spatial economic theory of pollution control reflections on a paradox abstract in their analyses of the impact of pollution taxation on the location of polluting decisions u k mathur j environ econom management 3 16 28 1976 and s s gokturk j reg sci 19 461 467 1979 obtained the result that a tax increase on urban pollution concentration may not succeed in pushing the polluting firm away from the urban center in this paper is shown that the sufficient condition for success in this case depends upon the specification of the production and pollution emissions technology and may be the opposite to the one posited by mathur and has more intuitive appeal

is expected utility theory applicable a revealed preference test we proffer a method to assess the adequacy of expected utility theory eut in empirical studies involving discrete and continuous choices the method calibrates a utility function to revealed choices and rejects eut for absurd degrees of implied concavity over the wealth at risk we find eut rejections in cases where risk averse choices are made between gambles with similar stakes regardless of their absolute sizes eut is shown to be applicable only when expected payoffs of gambles are similar or when more than half of wealth is at risk we illustrate our method with an application to agricultural production

providing adequate economic incentives for bioenergies with co2 capture and geological storage abstract knowing that carbon capture and storage ccs could play an important role in reducing emissions it is important to have a good understanding of this role and the importance of environmental policies to support carbon capture and geological storage from bioenergies beccs to date ccs technologies are not deployed on a commercial level and policy instruments should be used to provide incentives to firms to use these technologies to reduce pollution the aim of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of several incentive based instruments a fossil fuel tax an emissions tax a cap and trade system and a subsidy on captured emissions needed to spur the adoption of ccs and beccs using a dynamic general equilibrium model this type of model has become the standard for assessing economy wide impacts of environmental and technological policies the study shows that beccs will be deployed only if a specific subsidy per unit of biomass emissions captured with a ccs technology is available we show also that the two most cost efficient instruments for achieving a given emissions reduction target are a specific subsidy that rewards captured emissions and a carbon tax whose revenues are recycled to subsidize beccs

separation and hedging results with state contingent production a state contingent model of production under uncertainty is developed and compared with more traditional models of production under uncertainty producer behaviour with both production and price risk in the presence and in the absence of futures and forward markets is analysed in this state contingent framework conditions for the optimal hedge to be positive or negative are derived we also show that under plausible conditions a risk averse producer facing price uncertainty and the ability to hedge price risk will never willingly adopt a nonstochastic technology new separation results which hold in the presence of both price and production risk are then developed these separation results generalize townsend s spanning results by reducing the number of necessary forward markets by one

a cost approach to economic analysis under state contingent production uncertainty this article explores the economics of input decision under production uncertainty the article develops a methodology to specify and estimate cost minimizing input decisions under a state contingent technology the analysis is applied to time series data on u s agriculture it finds strong empirical evidence that expected output alone does not provide an appropriate representation of production uncertainty the results provide empirical support for an output cubical technology this indicates that an ex post analysis of stochastic technology appears appropriate the analysis also provides evidence that the cost of facing production risk has declined in u s agriculture over the last few decades copyright 2008 oxford university press

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

gift exchange in a multi worker firm one of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level in general 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher effort these results are observed for simple one employer one worker relationships in this paper we investigate whether they generalize to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers we compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers we find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce and intention based reciprocity rather than social preferences seems to be the main driving force behind gift exchange

pigou and coase a mathematical reconciliation abstract this paper provides a rigorous statement of the coase theorem and establishes a formal equivalence between abstract allocative mechanisms attributed to coase and pigou the model proceeds from output functions that reduce to production functions in special cases thereby capturing effects that are obscured by conventional production and cost functions the model also emphasizes fundamental differences in the characteristics of inputs particularly land that are implied in the construction of externality stories finally the model embodies a clear distinction between local e g nuisance and global e g pollution externalities the coase theorem as stated is valid only in the former case

valuing social sustainability in agriculture an approach based on social outputs shadow prices abstract interest in sustainability has gained ground among practitioners academics and policy makers due to growing stakeholders awareness of environmental and social concerns this is particularly true for agriculture however relatively little research has been conducted on the quantification of social sustainability and the contribution of social issues to the agricultural production efficiency this paper proposes a framework based on state contingent outputs to compute shadow prices of social outputs our methodological approach is based on the directional distance function and illustrated using a farm level dataset from a sample of catalan arable crop farms in 2015 our results indicate that in the sample of 180 farms included in the analysis efficiency scores are relatively high for the three alternative states of the nature considered in our state contingent analysis in addition our findings show that social outputs shadow prices are positive indicating that producing more social outputs is considered as great value to the farm for the efficient farms the social outputs shadow prices are contingent upon on the state of nature in a way that social outputs shadow prices increase with the improvement in crop growth conditions these results have implications in terms of eu farm payment redistribution

banning the bulb institutional evolution and the phased ban of incandescent lighting in germany much academic attention has been directed at analysing energy efficiency investments through the lens of behavioural failure these studies have challenged the neoclassical framing of regulation which emphasises the efficiency benefits of price based policy underpinned by the notion of rational individual self mastery the increasing use of a regulatory ban on electric lamps in many countries is one of the most recent and high profile flash points in this dialectic of freedom versus the state in the public policy discourse this paper interrogates this debate through a study of electric lamp diffusion in germany it is argued that neoclassical theory and equilibrium analysis is inadequate as a tool for policy analysis as it takes the formation of market institutions such as existing regulations for granted further still it may be prone to encourage idealistic debates around such grand narratives which may in practice simply serve those who benefit most from the status quo instead we argue for an evolutionary approach which we suggest offers a more pragmatic framing tool which focuses on the formation of market institutions in light of shifting social norms and political goals in our case progress towards energy efficiency and environmental goals

smallholder technical efficiency controlling for environmental production conditions abstract smallholder agricultural production depends heavily on environmental production conditions that are largely exogenously determined yet few data sets collect necessary detailed information on environmental production conditions this oversight raises the spectre of likely omitted variables bias because farmers input choices typically respond in part to environmental conditions moreover because environmental production conditions are rarely symmetrically distributed the omission also generally leads to upward bias in estimated technical inefficiency and to biased estimates of the correlates of estimated technical inefficiency as well using panel data from 464 traditional rice plots in cote d ivoire we show that controlling for heterogeneous environmental production conditions significantly changes inferences perhaps especially with respect to smallholder rice farmers estimated technical inefficiency

coasean bargaining in the presence of pigouvian taxation coasean arguments against the pigouvian perspective are well established a central tenet in this criticism argues that a pigouvian tax may be a source of inefficiency if parties were to bargain in the presence of a pigouvian tax allocative inefficiencies would occur the so called buchanan stubblebine turvey theorem by analyzing a coasean environment where the appropriation of property rights is costly we show coasean bargaining in the presence of a pre existing pigouvian tax may be superior this has implications for policy where dual regulatory environments exist such as regulation at the state and federal level as well as environmental liability and litigation

elements of an economic justification for municipal zoning abstract the possibility that externalities will produce a nonconvexity in the social production set limits the application of both the coase and pigou solutions for achieving an optimal allocation of land resources conditions on relative land prices are derived which indicate that external effects are strong enough to introduce a nonconvexity into the production set these conditions were not fulfilled in a sample of single family and multifamily dwellings in foster city california this does not preclude the possibility that they are fulfilled in cases of more severe external effects

natural resources national accounting and economic depreciation abstract the current value hamiltonian in an aggregate optimal growth problem with heterogeneous capital stocks including exhaustible renewable and environmental stocks is the nnp function routine substitutions reveal that the using up of natural resource stocks is representable as easy to interpret economic depreciation magnitudes we obtain true nnp inclusive of natural resource stock diminution implications for actual national accounting practices are also discussed

the state contingent properties of stochastic production functions this paper develops the state contingent properties of the most frequently used representations of stochastic production in the agricultural economics literature particular attention is paid to the cases of multiplicative and additive uncertainty and to the convolution of multiplicative and additive uncertainty embodied in the just pope stochastic production function state contingent technologies and their associated cost functions are reviewed and that theory is applied to the stochastic production function a generalisation of the just pope technology that has desirable state contingent characteristics is proposed cost functions based upon state contingent technologies are compared with cost functions based on a parametrised distribution representation of production uncertainty

wage secrecy as a social convention there is a time to keep silent and a time to speak out ecclesiastes 3 7 ask anyone who works for a living how much money he or she makes and you are likely to encounter a range of responses from evasion to outright hostility such responses however should not be surprising according to organizational etiquette it is considered gauche to ask others their salaries in a study at e i du pont de nemours all employees were asked if the company should disclose more payroll information so that everyone would know everyone else s pay only 18 voted for an open pay system dolan and schuler 1987 315 m any organizations have strict policies and norms about the secrecy of pay it is seen as inappropriate in most companies for employees to talk about what they earn and data are rarely given out even internally on salaries some organizations even fire individuals who release salary data this is one way to make it very clear that the organization means it when it says it believes in pay secrecy lawler 1990 239 t he issue of openness or secrecy in the communication of compensation information is one of the most important issues facing senior management henderson 1985 379 i introduction despite the general belief that a free flow of information enhances efficiency social convention appears to call for secrecy regarding individuals wages this paper provides an explanation for this convention we suggest that the role of wage secrecy is to reduce effective labor mobility and thereby enhance the feasibility of risk shifting contracts wage secrecy may yield a mix of mobility and risk shifting that is superior both to a spot market for labor and to a social convention that binds workers to their employers in promising to pay a worker a pre agreed wage rate labor contracts shift uncertainty from workers to employers and provide workers with insurance in particular if workers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral such contracts may enhance the welfare of workers without imposing a cost on firms since a risk shifting contract shields workers from the vicissitudes of the market wage rates need not equal the marginal product of labor in good outcomes workers pay the firm an insurance premium by accepting a wage rate that is lower than their marginal product in bad outcomes workers collect on their insurance policy earning a wage rate that exceeds their marginal product 1 if workers can move freely from one firm to another however risk shifting labor contracts may not be feasible given such freedom of movement workers will stay with their firm if the wage rate exceeds that offered elsewhere and move if they can obtain a higher wage rate in another firm hence without restrictions on labor mobility risk shifting contracts will not be offered and wage rates will vary with the marginal product of labor in this case the market in labor is a spot market the risk shifting role of labor contracts may be salvaged by a social convention that binds workers to their firms this would require that a worker who leaves his employer earlier than the accepted norm would be viewed as breaking a social convention and develop a damaging reputation we shall refer to this type of convention as a binding convention 2 it appears that a binding convention is assumed in most of the implicit contract literature binding however comes at a cost while facilitating risk shifting it may lead to inefficient resource allocation with a binding convention the tradeoff between the loss in output and the extent of workers exposure to risk depends on the nature of risks faced by the firm when the only risk that firms face is an aggregate shock defined as a shock that affects all firms in a sector in the same way binding does not reduce production efficiency if the marginal product of labor is the same in all firms the worker s place of employment does not affect output

social comparison and performance experimental evidence on the fair wage effort hypothesis we investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity we present three studies which all use three person gift exchange experiments consistent with akerlof and yellen s 1990 fair wage effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on average two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level we observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects we also find that reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather than to payoff consequences

the inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogenous market structure the paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution but where this effect can be partially off set by investing in adaptation as a private good the focus is not on external effects but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution the structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms the analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications the present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures i show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum i e to under adapation when pollution increases adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic otherwise welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution the total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies

controlling the monopolistic polluter nihilism or eclecticism abstract this paper is concerned with the consequences of pollution control when the polluter is a monopolist who can choose between abating pollution by reducing output and by adopting a less polluting technology it is suggested that the risk of welfare losses resulting from control policy is lower when technology is flexible than when it is rigid nevertheless some risk does remain so the paper concludes with a discussion of the possible use of selective control instruments to keep the risk to a minimum

a note on externalities and taxation the purpose of this paper is to explore the distributional aspects of a tax that is imposed in order to correct the detrimental effects of a production externality in the framework of a two sector general equilibrium model we show that harberger s classic results of tax incidence may change considerably because of the presence of the externality we also show that the tax is effective in reducing the detrimental effect of the externality although the return of the taxed factor may rise relative to the return of the untaxed factors

the hidden advantage of delegation pareto improvements in a gift exchange game this paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees our results how that such delegation significantly increases effort levels moreover we observe a pareto improvement as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not interestingly we also find that the employees performance under delegation is higher than under non delegation even for similar wages while there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations this result also holds for one shot interactions a possible non strategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility

the measurement and sources of technical inefficiency in the indonesian weaving industry production function models are estimated with a time series of cross section data on indonesian weaving establishments the sources of technical inefficiency are investigated three firm attributes are identified as being potentially related to firm efhciency tbey are firm ownership age and size the importance of these attributes as sources of inefficiency in the indonesian weaving industry is investigated and the implications of the find ings discussed

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts