where strategy and ethics converge pharmaceutical industry pricing policy for medicare part d beneficiaries on january 1 2006 medicare part d prescription drug coverage was initiated concern was immediately voiced by the american association of retired persons aarp and families usa that in response to this program the pharmaceutical industry may raise prices for drugs most often used by the elderly this article examines the ethical implications of a revenue maximizing pricing strategy in an industry in which third party financing mitigates an end product s true cost to the user the perspectives of three stakeholder groups are examined the elderly as consumers of prescription drugs the pharmaceutical industry as product manufacturer and beneficiary of derived profits and the total u s population as the ultimate payer for the program via tax revenues key questions explored include the relationships among price strategy and access to drugs at both the micro medicare cohort and macro total population levels and on drug development or enhancement the role of profit in a capitalism based health care system is also examined hospital industry impact on these same stakeholder groups in response to the original 1965 medicare law is used to compare and contrast possible outcomes of the new drug program it is predicted that pharmaceutical firms will mimic the hospital industry adopting a price maximizing strategy for drugs covered by the program in the process a utilitarian effect occurs the benefits of increased access and diffusion of drugs counterbalance inequities in financing medicare part d

aggregation and pairwise aggregation of demand when the distribution of income is fixed abstract this paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise aggregation of the demand functions of a group of consumers conditions under which the mean demand for each pair of consumers satisfies the slutsky restrictions when the distribution of income is fixed the sufficient conditions imply existence of a representative competitive consumer whose demand is the mean demand of the group the necessary conditions imply that such a representative consumer exists for every fixed income distribution only if the consumers have homothetic preferences or alternatively if for each price vector all the consumers income expansion paths lie in the same plane

monopolistic competition in the spirit of chamberlin a general model this paper develops a model of large group chamberlinian monopolistic competition in which 1 there are many firms producing differentiated commodities 2 each firm is negligible in that it can ignore its impact on and hence reactions from other firms 3 free entry leads to zero profit of operating firms but 4 each firm faces a downward sloping demand curve the existence of a monopolistically competitive equilibrium is established in a companion paper more particular questions such as whether the market provides too many or too few products are addressed for a special case of the model

price effects on compound commodities we examine the effect of simultaneous price changes on the total demand for a group of goods which we call a compound commodity specifically we consider unit and proportional cost components e g taxes transportation costs imposed on compound commodities if the unit cost is positive then the proportional cost raises the relative price of the more expensive good and thus induces substitution towards the less expensive good within this group then the substitution effect of the proportional cost for a compound commodity is non negative if and only if the compound commodity and the other goods are on average not strongly substitutable

consumption externalities and monetary policy with limited asset market participation this article explores the interaction between consumption externalities and limited asset market participation lamp in the standard new keynesian model we assess the performance of simple taylor type interest rate rules with respect to a equilibrium determinacy b the model s ability to simultaneously generate output and inflation volatility similar to the pre volcker era and c the model s response to a technology shock we find that when individual preferences are affected by average household consumption aggregate consumption externality stronger externalities increase the range of lamp for which multiple equilibria arise even if the policy rule satisfies the taylor principle the interaction of lamp and externalities can generate vast inflation output relative volatility in line with the one observed in the data in the 1970s according to our analysis consumption externalities also affect the responses of endogenous variables to total factor productivity shocks jel e4 e5

long run welfare under externalities in consumption leisure and production a case for happy degrowth vs unhappy growth in this paper we contribute to the debate on the relationship between growth and well being by examining an endogenous growth model where we allow for externalities in consumption leisure and production we analyze three regimes a decentralized economy where each household makes isolated choices without considering their external effects a planned economy where a myopic planner fails to recognize both leisure and consumption externalities but recognizes production externalities and a planned economy with a fully informed planner we first compare the balanced growth paths under the three regimes and then we numerically investigate the transition to the optimal balanced growth path we provide a number of findings first in a decentralized economy growth or labor or both are greater than in the regime with a fully informed planner and hence are sub optimal from a welfare standpoint second a myopic intervention which overlooks consumption and leisure externalities leads to more growth and labor than in both the decentralized and the fully informed regime third we provide a case for happy degrowth a transition to the optimal balanced growth path that is associated with downscaling of production a reduction in private consumption and an ongoing increase in leisure and well being

tax policy and aggregate demand management under catching up with the joneses this paper examines the role for tax policies in productivity shock driven economies with catching up with the joneses utility functions the optimal tax policy is shown to affect the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes i e cooling down the economy with higher taxes when it is overheating in booms and stimulating the economy with lower taxes in recessions to keep consumption up thus models with catching up with the joneses utility functions call for traditional keynesian demand management policies but for rather unorthodox reasons

welfare implications of the interaction between habits and consumption externalities we analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an infficient dynamic equilibrium in particular we show that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes

on the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products abstract this paper provides a thorough exploration of the microeconomic foundations for the multi variate linear demand function for differentiated products which is widely used in industrial organization the setting is the standard representative consumer with a quasi linear utility function a key finding is that strict concavity of the quadratic utility function is critical for the demand system to be well defined otherwise the true demand function may be quite complex multi valued non linear and income dependent we uncover failures of duality relationships between substitute products and complementary products as well as the incompatibility between high levels of complementarity and concavity the two good case emerges as a special case with strong but non robust properties a key implication is that all conclusions derived in applied economic models via the use of linear demand that does not satisfy the law of demand ought to be regarded with some suspicion

optimal emissions tax rates under habit formation and social comparisons abstract the existing climate models ignore the behavioral anomalies of households and conclude that the optimal environmental tax rate should comove with business cycles however this assumption has received extensive criticism recently to this end this paper studies the optimal emissions tax rate when households are bounded rational in particular we calculate the optimal climate policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model that features households with habit formation internal habits and social comparisons external habits compared to the benchmark model without consumption externality the social comparisons model amplifies consumption volatility but produces a similar response of pollutant emissions in the presence of the three types of economic shocks considered in contrast the habit formation model decreases the volatility of both consumption and pollutant emissions in contrast to the previous result that the optimal emissions tax rate should be procyclical we find that the social comparisons model largely mitigates the procyclicality of optimal emissions tax rates and the optimal emissions tax rates under the habit formation model remain constant in response to all the economic shocks considered

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption i examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer s utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted average of consumption by others the benchmark level of consumption as well as on the level of the consumer s own consumption the socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the modi ed golden rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each period a competitive economy can be induced to attain the social optimum by a lump sum pay as you go social security system and a tax on capital income

monetary policy stock prices and consumption externalities abstract we study interest rate rules responding to stock prices in a sticky price sticky wage new keynesian framework subject to consumption externalities for given wage rigidity such rules are beneficial to equilibrium determinacy if households preferences feature sufficiently strong keeping up with the joneses externalities

exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss consumer s surplus is a widely used tool in applied welfare economics both economic theorists and cost benefit analysis often use consumer s surplus despite its somewhat dubious reputation the basic idea is to evaluate the value to a consumer or his willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say pricep to pricep because price changes affect consumer welfare an evaluation of this effect is often a key input to public policy decisions yet consumer s surplus is probably the most controversial of widely used economic concepts both paul samuelson and ian little conclude that the economics profession would be better off without it it is my feeling of the situation that substantial agreement exists on the correct quantities to be measured the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price change as he was before the price change the quantities correspond to john hicks compensating variation measures an alternative measure which takes ex post price change utility as the basis of comparison is hicks equivalent variation the controversy arises in the measurement of these quantities the usual measurement procedure is to use the area to the left of the marshallian market demand curve between two price levels jules dupuit originated this measure of welfare change and alfred marshall and hicks derived appropriate conditions for its use the primary condition for the area to the left of the demand curve to correspond to the compensating variation is to have constant marginal utility of income marshall gave this condition and if it holds the same quantity will be derived as the area to the left of the compensated hicksian demand curve this area to the left of the compensated demand curve is exactly what the compensating variation and equivalent variation measure thus the constant marginal utility of income is a sufficient condition for marshallian consumer s surplus to be equal to hicks consumer s surplus in this case arnold harberger s plea to use the welfare triangle as one half times the product of the price change times the quantity change to measure deadweight loss corresponds to the correct theoretical amount of welfare change in a recent paper robert willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the marshallian measure derived form the market demand curve his bounds which depend on the income elasticity of demand for the single good in the region of price change being considered as well as the proportion of the consumer s income spent on the good demonstrate that the marshallian consumer s surplus is often a good approximation to hicks consumer s surplus the fact that the proportion of the consumer s income spent matters as well as the income elasticity was first pointed out by harold hotelling willig contends that the approximation error will be less than the errors involved in estimating the demand curve thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using marshallian consumer s surplus to measure welfare change however in this paper i show that for the case primarily considered by willig of a single price change which is also the situation in which consumer s surplus is often used in applied work no approximation is necessary professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research associate national bureau of economic research i would like to thank peter diamond erwin diewert daniel mcfadden robert merton robert solow hal varian joel yellin and the referees for help and comments research support from the national science foundation is acknowledged the reason that we still have two rather than one of samuelson s six measures of consumer s surplus arises from an index number problem of the correct basis for the welfare comparison i will give both measures but plan to concentrate on the compensating variation

a note on small income effects this note provides an alternative sufficient condition for the small income effect result that is first shown by vives small income effects a marshallian theory of consumer surplus and downward sloping demand rev econ stud 54 1 1987 87 103 the condition is stated by ordinal terms only whereas vives assumes cardinal properties of utility representation second as its application we provide a sufficient condition for the preference being asymptotically quasi linear in a two good economy where the second good is a composition of a large number of goods

conformism and structural change using a simple multisector model of endogenous growth we show that commodity specific consumption externalities can be a source of structural change when the degrees of consumption externalities are different between goods each sector grows at a different rate however the aggregate economy exhibits balanced growth in that capital stock and expenditure grow at the same constant rate a three sector version of our model may reconcile kaldor s stylized facts with empirically plausible profiles of industrial structure transformation

the strategic marshallian cross we prove existence and uniqueness of non autarkic equilibria in bilateral oligopoly assuming only that preferences are binormal and satisfy a weakened version of gross substitutes we permit complete heterogeneity of preferences and our analysis exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on own strategy and two universal aggregates this allows us to define strategic versions of supply and demand curves such that non autarkic nash equilibria are in 1 1 correspondence with intersections of these curves the same approach can be used to establish comparative statics under the assumptions above as examples we focus on adding players and changing endowments this competitive approach also allows us to conclude that much of conventional marshallian analysis is robust to strategic manipulation strategic marshallian cross strategic manipulation imperfect competition

engel curves leading to the weak axiom in the aggregate for every range of admissible incomes the authors characterize the class of engel curves with the property that if an economy has first a price independent distribution of income and second preferences which are identical across consumers and generate engel curves in the class then the corresponding aggregate demand function satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference this class is defined by two simple conditions the no torsion condition says that in the relevant range of income the engel curve is contained in a plane through the origin the uniform curvature condition says that in addition the engel curve is either convex or concave to the origin copyright 1987 by the econometric society

is more always better a survey on positional concerns abstract we use survey data to provide some empirical information about concerns regarding relative standing respondents chose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one where everyone s endowment of the good is higher but the respondent has less than others questions asked about education attractiveness and intelligence for one s child and oneself income vacation time approval and disapproval from a supervisor and papers to write half of the respondents preferred to have 50 less real income but high relative income concerns about position were strongest for attractiveness and supervisor s praise and weakest for vacation time

nosy preferences benevolence and efficiency author affiliation chetan dave cdave nyu edustefan dodds sdodds uwinnipeg ca acknowledgment we would like to thank ingela alger sheryl ball nathan berg tarek coury rachel croson frances woolley participants at the 2008 canadian economics association meetings seminar participants at queen s university and two anonymous referees for valuable comments all errors are those of the authors 1 introductionthe pareto principle declares that if everyone in a society prefers some social state of the world x to another state y then the aggregated social ranking should reflect this as well minimal liberalism requires that no individual s preference relation between social states say z and w be violated in the social choice provided that the position of other individuals is unaffected across states z and w both of these principles can be appealing to economists as they evaluate the normative features of various policies however the liberal paradox of sen 1970 demonstrates that the pareto principle and minimal liberalism are potentially at odds with one another the paradox shows that if individuals possess nosy preferences that is they hold opinions about what others should do even though their own material well being is unaffected by others actions then it is in general impossible to arrive at a unique social choice that jointly satisfies these two axioms 1 as an elegant proof by contradiction the paradox adds to the list of social choice impossibilities 2sen s paradox highlights the tension between freedom of choice and efficiency with nosiness as the key ingredient in this article we re examine this tension by using recent insights from behavioral economics the idea that individuals may have concern for others namely altruism is well established in the behavioral economics literature becker 1974 however the concept of nosy preferences and what they imply for collective choice environments has not been extensively studied from a behavioral perspective here we provide such a study to do so we recast nosiness as a new form of social preference in a strategic setting this insight stems from the analysis of segal and sobel 2007 who consider a model where players in a game possess preferences over both outcomes and strategies employed by all players we embed our version of nosiness into a more general model of social preferences individuals in the model derive utility from three sources intrinsic payoffs from the outcomes of strategic choice nosy payoffs based on specific actions taken by other individuals to generate such outcomes and unconditionally altruistic or benevolent payoffs positively related to the extended utilities of other individuals this framework allows us to analyze strategic environments in which there exist interdependent preferences over utilities and actions or just one of these features we apply this particular model of preferences to two environments the first was suggested by aldrich 1977 who sought to provide a game theoretic interpretation of sen s paradox for this environment we are interested in the efficiency of equilibria and to what extent inefficiency depends on particular forms of social preferences we thus offer a new behavioral interpretation of sen s paradox following the behavioral theme we show that when individuals exhibit loss aversion over their own actions the paradox may be robust to schemes that attempt to generate efficiency by restricting action sets ex ante the second environment we consider is that of relative consumption concerns we show that applying our particular model of interdependent preferences to this environment allows us to find cases where individuals will voluntarily restrict consumption to mitigate the negative externality arising from nosy concerns about what others consume

ethics pricing and the pharmaceutical industry this paper explores the ethical obligations of pharmaceutical companies to charge fair prices for essential medicines the moral issue at stake here is distributive justice rawls framework is especially germane since it underlines the material benefits everyone deserves as kantian persons and the need for an egalitarian approach for the distribution of society s essential commodities such as health care this concern for distributive justice should be a critical factor in the equation of variables used to set prices for pharmaceuticals

jealousy and equilibrium overconsumption the idea that the happiness of an individual depends upon the consumption of others is widely viewed as an important feature of our shared social existence recent research in finance has used this idea through consumption externalities to explore asset pricing anomalies consumption externalities potentially break the link between pareto optimality and competitive equilibria and open the door for beneficial government intervention e g lars ljungqvist and harald uhlig 2000 in this paper we delineate two effects that a consumption externality may have an increase in aggregate consumption may a raise the marginal utility of individual consumption relative to leisure and or b lower an individual s utility level we refer to a as keeping up with the joneses henceforth kuj following jordi gali 1994 and we refer to b as jealousy jealousy is a distinct concept from kuj under kuj an individual derives greater utility from additional own consumption relative to leisure when others consume more at the same time higher per capita consumption holding fixed individual consumption can trigger either jealousy so that individual utility falls or admiration so that individual utility rises in section i of this paper we show that jealousy implies that the laissez faire equilibrium consumption level is greater than the optimal level whether preferences exhibit kuj is not necessary for this main result intuitively in the presence of jealousy consumption is similar to pollution overpollution exists because individuals do not take into account the cost of polluting on others not because an increase in economywide pollution makes the return to individual polluting higher similarly overconsumption exists because individuals do not take into account the negative effect of own consumption on jealous others things go in the opposite direction when individuals are admiring in section ii we consider a functional form that encompasses several existing models we show that jealousy determines the optimal tax to correct overconsumption and that kuj is mainly important for asset pricing

we are what we eat obesity income and social comparisons abstract the empirical evidence of a non monotone relation between income and obesity is not well explained we build a theoretical model combining income inequality and social comparisons to explain the link between income and obesity and study tax policy implications for fighting obesity we assume that differences in food consumption patterns between poor and wealthy households partly reflect positionality which is the concern for social status our key assumption is that positionality for low calorie food consumption is positively related to a country s wealth in this framework body weight outcomes reflect competing income and positionality effects yielding the following results we explain the link between average obesity rates and standards of living and suggest the existence of a kuznets curve for obesity in accordance with empirical evidence for cross sections of the population we explain the observed correlation between income and obesity which is positive in poor countries and negative in rich countries we find that increasing the relative cost of high calorie food is less effective at decreasing the relative weight of poor individuals in rich countries than in poor countries

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

relative consumption and tax evasion abstract relative consumption effects or status concerns that feature jealousy in the sense of dupor and liu 2003 boost consumption expenditure if consumption is financed by labour income such status considerations increase labour supply and hence the tax base a higher taxable income in turn can make tax evasion more attractive we show for various specifications of preferences that the tax base effect generally dominates consequently relative consumption effects tend to reduce tax evasion this is true irrespective of whether tax parameters are exogenous guarantee a balanced budget or are set optimally

a new look at the classical bertrand duopoly abstract the paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure strategy nash equilibrium in the standard bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product the main condition is elementary easy to interpret and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature

price competition in pharmaceuticals the case of anti infectives a fundamental question in industrial organization regards the relationship between price and the number of sellers this relationship has been particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry where legislative changes were specifically designed to foster competition previous research on the pharmaceutical industry has shown generic entry has a mixed impact generic prices fall rapidly with generic entry whereas branded prices tend to increase or decrease only slightly using more complete data focused on one segment of the pharmaceutical industry anti infectives we find that the relationship between pharmaceutical prices and the number of sellers is more like that found in other industries jel l11 l65 d4

impatience and equilibrium indeterminacy abstract this paper extends the neoclassical one sector optimal growth model by postulating that individual agents time preference impatience depends on the economy wide average consumption and average income which are social factors taken as external by individual agents the paper shows that with the socially determined individual time preference local equilibrium indeterminacy can arise moreover local indeterminacy can also be associated with global indeterminacy in many cases the results hold in models with bounded and unbounded growth

small income effects a marshallian theory of consumer surplus and downward sloping demand we formalize the marshallian idea that when the proportion of income spent on any commodity is small then the income effects are small if n is the number of goods we show under certain assumptions on preferences and prices that the order of magnitude of the norm of the income derivative of demand is 1 n as a corollary we get that for the case of a single price change the percentage error in approximating the hicksian deadweight loss by its marshallian counterpart goes to zero at least at the rate 1 n and that demand is downward sloping for n large enough

smallness of a commodity and partial equilibrium analysis partial equilibrium analysis has a conceptual dilemma that its object should be negligibly small in order to be free from income effect but then the consumer does not care for it and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense in the setting of a continuum of commodities we propose a limiting procedure which transforms the general many commodity framework into a partial single commodity framework in the limit willingness to pay for a commodity is established as a density notion and it is shown to be free from income effect this pins down an exact relationship between general equilibrium analysis and partial equilibrium analysis

getting ahead of the joneses when equality increases conspicuous consumption among bottom tier consumers it is widely believed that increasing the equality of material possessions or income in a social group should lead people at the bottom of the distribution to consume less and save more however this prediction and its causal mechanism have never been studied experimentally five studies show that greater equality increases the satisfaction of those in the lowest tier of the distribution because it reduces the possession gap between what they have and what others have however greater equality also increases the position gains derived from status enhancing consumption since it allows low tier consumers to get ahead of the higher proportion of consumers clustered in the middle tiers as a result greater equality reduces consumption when consumers focus on the narrower possession gap but it increases consumption when they focus on the greater position gains i e when consumption is conspicuous social competition goals are primed and the environment is competitive

individual well being in a dynamic perspective this paper explores the determinants of individual well being as measured by self reported levels of satisfaction with income making full use of the panel data nature of the german socio economic panel we provide empirical evidence for well being depending on absolute and on relative levels of income in a dynamic framework this finding holds after controlling for other influential factors in a multivariate setting the main novelty of the paper is the consideration of dynamic aspects individual s own history as well as the relative income performance with respect to the others living in the society under analysis do play a major role in the assessment of well being