truthful bundle multiunit double auctions we address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers each buyer demands some bundle s of various commodities and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity to design truthful double auction mechanisms we propose a novel padding method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget to the best of our knowledge this padding method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy proof individually rational budget balanced and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment furthermore these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle single unit mechanisms with higher efficiency lower buying prices and higher selling prices

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

national industrial structure and the global system various forms of participation in the global system have been hypothesized to distort the structure of industrialization in developing countries influencing the relations between industrial capital labor and output we operationalize kuznets s 1965 theoretical definition of industrialization utilizing energy consumption per capita percent of the labor force employed in industry and percent of gdp accountedfor by industry to test several predictions about the effects of a country s involvement in the global system on the structure of its industrialization we first estimate a measurement model for 1970 that includes these three basic indicators as influenced by the latent variable of industrialization elaborations of the basic model allow us to measure the influence of the world system on the structure of industrialization types of goods imported and exported affect the structure of industrialization position in the world system and direct foreign investment have no net direct effects a marxist leninist regime has an independent influence on the structure of industrialization in some years we replicate the model using data from 196s 1980 and 1986

the predictability of interim earnings over alternative quarters this study examines the predictability of earnings per share for the first second third and fourth quarterly reporting periods forecasts of quarterly earnings per share both by security analysts and time series models are analyzed the next section of the paper deals with the question of whether there is a significant difference in the accuracy with which each quarter can be forecasted the data in this section strongly indicate that such a difference exists the third section explores explanations for the findings of section 2 these include the relationship between fourthquarter variability and the integral versus discrete reporting methods section 4 contains the summary and conclusions

ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction abstract the private valuation assumption found in most trading mechanism design papers rules out markets whose valuation structure generates externalities between traders this paper characterizes the set of ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms for a large class of markets that do admit such externalities and for bilateral trade markets establishes the impossibility of a first best solution across a class of trading problems employing uniform priors and linear valuation structures this paper also compares levels of market efficiency for varying numbers of traders

discretionary accounting choices and the predictive ability of accruals with respect to future cash flows using a sample of restatement firms and a meet or beat model to classify firms as making discretionary accounting choices for opportunistic meet or beat op mb reasons we show that originally reported earnings and accrual components are less predictive of future cash flows relative to the restated numbers we find the opposite is true for firms classified as making discretionary accounting choices for non op mb reasons we consider a number of competing explanations for these latter results our findings are most consistent with the informational hypothesis weakly consistent with conservative motivated efficient contracting hypotheses but inconsistent with opportunistic contracting and misapplication errors of gaap explanations

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

the changing landscape of accrual accounting a fundamental property of accrual accounting is to smooth temporary timing fluctuations in operating cash flows indicating an inherent negative correlation between accruals and cash flows we show that the overall correlation between accruals and cash flows has dramatically declined in magnitude over the past half century and has largely disappeared in more recent years the adjusted r 2 from regressing changes in accruals on changes in cash flows drops from about 70 90 in the 1960s to near zero under 20 in more recent years in exploring potential reasons for the observed attenuation we find that increases in non timing related accrual recognition as proxied by one time and nonoperating items and the frequency of loss firm years explain the majority of the overall decline on the other hand temporal changes in the matching between revenues and expenses and the growth of intangible intensive industries play only a limited role in explaining the observed attenuation finally the relative decline of the timing role of accruals does not appear to be associated with an increase in the asymmetrically timely loss recognition role

earnings management under price regulation empirical evidence from the spanish electricity industry abstract this paper analyses the effect of price regulation on the accounting policy of spanish electricity companies over the period 1991 2001 as predicted by the political costs hypothesis watts and zimmerman 1986 watts r l zimmerman j l 1986 positive accounting theory prentice hall englewood cliffs nj managers artificially reduce reported earnings when the government establishes tariff increases in this way companies attempt to diminish their political visibility and counteract social outcry arising from the government s decision several abnormal accruals models existent in the literature are used to obtain a proxy for managerial accounting discretion on earnings

performance shocks and misreporting we propose a parsimonious stochastic model of reported earnings that links misreporting to performance shocks our main analytical prediction is that misreporting leads to a negative second order autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression of current earnings on lagged earnings we also propose a stylized dynamic model of earnings manipulation and demonstrate that both earnings smoothing and target beating considerations result in the same predictions of negative second order autocorrelations empirically we find that the distribution of this measure is asymmetric around zero with 27 of the firms having significantly negative estimates using this measure we specify a methodology to estimate the intensity of misreporting and to create estimates of unmanipulated earnings our estimates of unmanipulated earnings are more correlated with contemporaneous returns and have higher volatility than reported earnings with respect to economic magnitude we find that in absolute terms median misreporting is 0 7 of total assets moreover firms in our sample subject to sec aaers have significantly higher estimates of manipulation intensity

accrual reversals earnings and stock returns we show that accruals consist of at least two distinct underlying processes one with positive serial correlation and the other with negative serial correlation we also find that the accrual reversals characterizing the negatively serially correlated process are predominantly good accruals that correctly anticipate fluctuations in working capital accrual estimation error is the least persistent component of earnings while accruals relating to firm growth are less persistent than cash flows finally the mispricing of accruals appears to be driven by a combination of accrual estimation error and firm growth

accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency abstract we argue that conservatism improves investment efficiency in particular we predict that it resolves debt equity conflicts facilitating a firm s access to debt financing and limiting underinvestment this permits the financing of prudent investments that otherwise might not be pursued our empirical results confirm these predictions we find that more conservative firms invest more and issue more debt in settings prone to underinvestment and that these effects are more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information asymmetries we also find that conservatism is associated with reduced overinvestment even for opaque investments such as research and development

perquisites risk and capital structure in a corporate agency problem perquisites and risk interact to produce novel complex comparative statics for example even if additional debt induces risk neutral insiders to increase risk they never seek to increase the market value of their stock instead insiders decrease the present value of their subsequent conditionally optimal perquisites also the firm s optimal capital structure includes a risky bond with an agreement to remove insiders whenever the bond defaults however the optimal sharing rule between corporate claimants cannot be supported solely by standard securities such as bonds stocks options and their hybrids

public and private sector discount rates in public private partnerships whether public sector projects should be discounted at a lower rate than private sector projects is highly contentious this paper assesses the appropriate private and public sector discount rates in the context of public private partnerships it shows that there are powerful arguments for using a higher rate to discount private projects than public sector projects and that failure to recognise this may lead to excessive reliance on public provision however the reason for the divergence is not related to the conventional incomplete market arguments in the literature the results may have far broader implications for private sector involvement in public services in the last 20 years there has been a major increase in the role of the private sector in the delivery of what were once considered public sector services outside transition economies probably the single most significant change has been the international wave of privatisation of utilities such privatisations typically involve the complete transfer of ownership to the private sector with the role of the state being reduced to policing prices and conduct more recently however there has been a rapid growth in more complex forms of private involvement in many cases the public sector or its agencies remain the immediate final purchaser of the services but no longer own or operate the assets necessary for the provision of the service such arrangements tend to be referred to as public private partnerships ppp in a typical ppp the government signs a long term contract with a private consortium to supply a service to the government and the private consortium designs builds owns and runs the physical assets required for the delivery of the service this contrasts with traditional public sector provision where the government builds or purchases physical assets retains ownership and uses public sector employees or a private contractor to deliver the required service a ppp can be characterised as a situation where the government becomes a purchaser of services not physical assets this type of arrangement is now common in the case of roads prisons hospitals and schools both in the uk and elsewhere 2 the economic justification for ppps is that they increase efficiency by aligning the incentives of the parties 3 as a result the government is able to provide the service at lower cost than would be possible with conventional public sector delivery indeed the standard test criterion for a ppp project is that the cost to the

signaling through obstruction obstruction is a time honored tradition in legislative politics in many cases obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful and in some of these cases purely costly even to the obstructor in this article i construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient the theory based on the legislators reelection motivations offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting including the legislator s value for reelection the appeal of the legislator s challenger the legislator s individual specific seniority competence and or valence and the visibility of the legislator s obstruction efforts to the voter finally the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing even in the absence of pandering

earnings quality in uk private firms comparative loss recognition timeliness abstract uk private and public companies face substantially equivalent regulation on auditing accounting standards and taxes we hypothesize that private company financial reporting nevertheless is of lower quality due to different market demand regulation notwithstanding a large uk sample supports this hypothesis quality is operationalized using basu s 1997 time series measure of timely loss recognition and a new accruals based method the result is not affected by controls for size leverage industry membership and auditor size or by allowing endogenous listing choice the result enhances understanding of private companies which are predominant in the economy it also provides insight into the economics of accounting standards

the effects of hedge fund interventions on strategic firm behavior we examine the impact of hedge fund interventions on target firms strategic behavior specifically their voluntary disclosure and earnings management strategies we find a decrease in both the likelihood and the frequency of management earnings forecasts conveying bad news and an increase in the level of real earnings management following interventions by hedge fund activists additional evidence suggests that managers substitute between voluntary disclosure and earnings management strategies in resisting hedge fund attacks we also find that withholding of bad news is more pronounced when hedge fund activists pose greater threats to the target firm s management and when the intervention lasts for a relatively short time period our results are consistent with firms behaving strategically in response to heightened career reputation concerns and endangered corporate control arising from hedge fund activism the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2816 this paper was accepted

the global rise of democracy a network account we examine the influence of an interstate network created by intergovernmental organizations igos on the global diffusion of democracy we propose that igos facilitate democracy s diffusion by transmitting information between member states and by interpreting that information according to prevailing norms in the world society where democracy is viewed as the legitimate form of government we employ a network autocorrelation model to track changes in democracy among all of the world s countries from 1815 to 2000 we find that democracy does diffuse through the igo network and that the influence of democratic countries is stronger than that of undemocratic countries evidence indicates that the igo network serves as a basis for normative diffusion this is an important contribution to sociological accounts of globalization which tend to emphasize diffusion divorced from network structure or diffusion dependent on the coercive influence of a small set of international organizations

a measurement approach to conservatism and earnings management this paper formalizes a two step representation of accounting measurement and uses it to formalize a general rationale for conservatism as a measurement principle a transaction s economic substance manifests itself in characteristics of the transaction and an accounting rule is a mapping from transaction characteristics to an accounting report managers who have stakes in the accounting report are able to influence transaction characteristics such earnings management is ex post rational for managers but ex ante inefficient to safeguard against such ex post opportunism the optimal ex ante accounting rule is conservative in the sense that it requires more verification of the transaction characteristics favorable to managers thus this rationale for conservatism is as general as the managers ability and incentive to inflate transaction characteristics by opening the black box of accounting measurement the two step representation also formalizes some classic accounting concepts such as relevance reliability verifiability verification and accounting motivated transactions

conservatism and cross sectional variation in the post earnings announcement drift accounting conservatism allows me to identify a previously undocumented source of predictable cross sectional variation in standardized unexpected earnings autocorrelations viz the sign of the most recent earnings realization and present evidence that the market ignores this variation loss effect it is possible to earn returns higher than from the bernard and thomas 1990 strategy by incorporating this feature additionally the paper shows that the loss effect is different from the cross quarter effect shown by rangan and sloan 1998 and it is possible to combine the two effects to earn returns higher than either strategy alone thus the paper corroborates the bernard and thomas finding that stock prices fail to reflect the extent to which quarterly earnings series differ from a seasonal random walk and extends it by showing that the market systematically underestimates time series properties resulting from accounting conservatism

simultaneous offers bargaining with a mediator abstract an arbitrator is often introduced into bargaining to avoid disagreement the arbitrator s role is to impose some agreement when negotiators cannot reach an agreement however in models with an arbitrator a fair agreement for negotiators is eliminated from equilibrium outcomes if the arbitrator is biased to avoid disagreement without eliminating the achievability of a fair agreement in equilibrium we consider introducing a mediator while an arbitrator imposes an agreement a mediator can only give advice we analyze a simultaneous offers bargaining model with a mediator and obtain the following desirable results first disagreement is not supported as an outcome of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium sspe second even if a mediator is biased the fair agreement in the sense of the nash bargaining solution nbs is always one of the sspe agreements finally if a mediator is fair negotiators always reach an agreement with the nbs in sspe

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

overbidding and inefficiencies in multi unit vickrey auctions for normal goods abstract i examine bid behavior in uniform price auctions and multi unit vickrey auctions without the standard quasilinearity restriction on bidder preferences instead of assuming quasilinearity i assume that bidders have weakly positive wealth effects i e the goods are normal goods my setting nests quasilinearity but also allows for budget constraints financial constraints and risk aversion i show that without the quasilinearity restriction truthful reporting is not a dominant strategy in the vickrey auction instead bidders truthfully demand for their first unit and weakly overreport their demand for later units the incentive to overreport demand means that the vickrey auction is generally inefficient this mirrors the well known demand reduction results in uniform price auctions moreover the efficiency ranking of the two auctions is ambiguous in fact there are cases where the uniform price auction is pareto efficient and the vickrey auction is pareto inefficient even if only one bidder has non quasilinear preferences

discussion of the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition the accrual process is central to financial accounting accruals adjust cash flows to reported earnings and form the building blocks for the balance sheet given the importance of accruals to financial accounting it is surprising how sparse the modeling of the overall accrual process has been within the literature until recently the state of the art empirical approach modeled total accruals as a function of the change in sales and property plant and equipment pp e jones 1991 recently working capital accruals have been more formally modeled as a function of firms selling activity and past present and future operating cash flows e g dechow kothari and watts 1998 dechow and dichev 2002 ball and shivakumar incorporate conditional conservatism an important feature of the earnings process into existing accruals models specifically they recognize that accruals are expected to be an asymmetric function of firm performance in which economic losses are captured by the accruals process in a more timely manner than gains their evidence documents a robust asymmetry in the relation between accruals and economic losses and gains and demonstrates that accruals models that incorporate this asymmetry have superior explanatory power the authors innovation advances

does religion mitigate earnings management evidence from china using a sample of 11 357 firm year observations from the chinese stock market for the period of 2001 2011 we investigate whether and how religion can mitigate earnings management specifically based on geographic proximity based religion variables we provide strong and robust evidence to show that religion is significantly negatively associated with the extent of earnings management suggesting that religion can serve as a set of social norms to mitigate corporate unethical behavior such as earnings management our findings also reveal that the negative association between religion and earnings management is less pronounced for firms with closer distance to the regulatory centers than for their counterparts implying the substitutive effects between religion and the distance to regulators the proxy for regulatory intensity on mitigating earnings management the above results are robust to different measures of earnings management various religion variables and a variety of sensitivity tests

the role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition we investigate the role of accrual accounting in the asymmetrically timely recognition incorporation in reported earnings of gains and losses timely recognition requires accruals when it precedes complete realization of the gains and losses in cash we show that nonlinear accruals models incorporating the asymmetry in gain and loss recognition timelier loss recognition or conditional conservatism offer a substantial specification improvement explaining substantially more variation in accruals than equivalent linear specifications conversely conventional linear accruals models by omitting the loss recognition asymmetry exhibit substantial attenuation bias and offer a comparatively poor specification of the accounting accrual process linear specifications also understate the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows these findings have implications for our understanding of accrual accounting and conservatism as well as for researchers estimating discretionary accruals earnings management and earnings quality

the efficiency of search under competition and monopsony this paper compares monopsonistic and competitive search equilibria while the competitive equilibrium is efficient the monopsonistic equilibrium is not there is too much search and the employment rate is too low

the reeded edge and the phillips curve money neutrality common knowledge and subjective beliefs abstract i present a simple two person auction model in which a seller and a buyer make bids in terms of money however the value of a unit of money is uncertain i show 1 a monetary revaluation has purely nominal effects if and only if it is common knowledge 2 if seller and buyer have identical beliefs making the value of money common knowledge maximizes total gains from trade 3 if seller and buyer are equally well informed and have identical beliefs then monetary revaluations have no net effect 4 when the seller knows the value of money but the buyer does not the expected utilities of both seller and buyer are proportional to 1 1 2 where is the standard deviation of the value of money expressed as a fraction of the mean and 5 when beliefs are subjective monetary policy can improve total gains from trade as in friedman s explanation of the phillips curve and an optimal level of inflation can be determined journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e52

optimal robust bilateral trade risk neutrality a risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item we prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non wasteful randomized posted prices

the macroeconomics of specificity specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences resources are underutilized factor markets are segmented production suffers from technological sclerosis job creation and destruction are unbalanced recessions are excessively sharp and expansions run into bottlenecks while depending on the shock expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization recessions should typically be softened in the long run institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation technology choice will also be affected with the appropriated factor partially excluding the other from production to reduce appropriation

is comprehensive income superior to net income as a measure of firm performance abstract with the exception of financial firms we find no evidence that comprehensive income is more strongly associated with returns market value or better predicts future cash flows income than net income moreover the only component of comprehensive income that improves the association between income and returns is the marketable securities adjustment our results do not support the claim that comprehensive income is a better measure of firm performance than net income our results also raise questions about the appropriateness of items included in sfas 130 comprehensive income as well as the need for mandating uniform comprehensive income disclosures for all industries

policy as myth and ceremony the global spread of stock exchanges 1980 2005 we examine the antecedents and consequences in developing countries of creating a national stock exchange a core technology of financial globalization we study local conditions and global institutional pressures in the rapid spread of exchanges since the 1980s and examine how conditions at the point of adoption affected exchanges subsequent vibrancy little prior research connects the process of diffusion with the operational performance of adopted policies we find that international coercion was associated with more ceremonial adoption but that contrary to expectations common in institutional research contagion processes via peer groups and normative emulation of prestigious actors enhanced vibrancy economic globalization provides a generative context in which to consider the policy implications of organizational theory and research globalization creates both opportunities and challenges for countries on the periphery of the world economy the central question for policy makers is what structures and institutions they should adopt to promote economic and social vibrancy notably waves of alternative theories and associated packages of reforms have swept over the globe in recent decades observing this process of global diffusion and often abandonment of policies and practices meyer boli thomas and raminrez 1997 extended analyses of myth and ceremony at the organization level to the nation state in their world society approach a core idea in this work is that coercion and mimicry of peers or competitors typically based in a substrate of network ties often

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

durable goods monopoly with incomplete information this article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist s marginal cost is private information we show that the coase conjecture implies the no trade theorem in any equilibrium in which the lowest cost seller s initial offer approaches her marginal cost the aggregate probability of trade must vanish however we also construct non coasean equilibria which approximate the unique outcome of the rental version of the same model these stationary equilibria are comparatively efficient the results are equally applicable to the mathematically equivalent problem of sequential bargaining with two sided incomplete information where one party makes all the offers what are the consequences of monopoly in a market for a durable good present day understanding of this question divides into two strands of thought first the monopolist may effectively lack any ability to credibly precommit on her future output under this scenario the price will drop almost instantaneously to marginal cost apparently yielding the efficient outcome normally associated with perfect competition 1 second the monopolist may possess an explicit e g leasing the good rather than selling2 or implicit e g the maintenance of reputation3 device enabling her to adhere to an output restriction under such circumstances price will be maintained at a non competitively high level suggesting an outcome fraught with all the inefficiency of classical monopoly the conclusions of the first paragraph rest on analysis of a standard model in which the monopolist s payoff function is taken to be common knowledge a single firm with known constant marginal cost sells an infinitely durable good to consumers with a known distribution of valuations for the good 4 the firm has the ability to revise its posted price

changes in accrual properties and operating environment implications for cash flow predictability abstract this paper reconciles conflicting evidence in prior literature on the relative ability of earnings and cash flows in predicting future cash flows further we investigate the implications of temporal shifts in accrual properties and operating environment for cash flow predictability three key insights emerge first cash flows consistently outperform earnings in predicting future cash flows second accruals and its components including those capturing non articulating events have incremental albeit small predictive ability over cash flows third earnings ability to predict future cash flows has increased over the period 1989 2015 due to changes in operating environment rather than accrual properties

the international diffusion of democracy the idea that democracy is contagious that democracy diffuses across the world map is now well established among policy makers and political scientists alike the few theoretical explanations of

autocorrelation structure of forecast errors from time series models alternative assessments of the causes of post earnings announcement drift abstract this paper demonstrates that the evidence supporting the hypothesis that post earnings announcement drift pead is caused by investors failure to incorporate the implications of current earnings for future earnings is also consistent with researchers over differencing an already stationary time series specifically we show the evidence is driven by a subset of firms where over differencing of quarterly earnings in estimating earnings surprises is most likely to have occurred given the persistence of the pead over time our alternative explanation suggests that the prior research investigating the causes for the pead overestimates investors naivete

when are local incentive constraints sufficient we study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings allowing for probabilistic mechanisms we give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces on many common preference domains including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences single peaked ordinal preferences and successive single crossing ordinal preferences local incentive compatibility suitably defined implies full incentive compatibility on domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition local incentive compatibility is not sufficient our sufficiency results hold for dominant strategy and bayesian nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences

the diffusion of regime contention in european democratization 1830 1940 this article goes beyond the established literature s focus on domestic conditions by examining the impact of external impulses on european democratization from 1830 to 1940 specifically it analyzes the diffusion of regime conflict that arose from the cross national spread of situational judgments about the feasibility of political change striking precedents of regime collapse such as the overthrow of french kings in 1830 and 1848 tended to produce dramatic waves of political contention across europe but because the actual distribution of power in polities that experienced such externally stimulated episodes of regime contention often differed from the front runner these conflicts produced various types of results the article distinguishes four outcomes of diffusion namely a successful replication b preemptive reform c abortive replication and d blockage of replication efforts the latter two outcomes help explain why in european history not only did political liberalism and democracy

why do accruals predict earnings abstract higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings we show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales profits and working capital respond to changes in a firm s product markets empirically high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long lasting drop in both profits and profitability accruals also predict an increase in future competition suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high and in equilibrium transitory true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry overall the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment

ex ante efficient ex post individually rational trade abstract consider a bilateral trade model with two sided incomplete information for a general set of independent beliefs an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient interim individually rational mechanism is constructed thus imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency

the economics of fraudulent accounting we argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences in a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous we show that in equilibrium low productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms this behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy we test the predictions of the model using firmlevel data we show that during periods of suspicious accounting firms hire and invest excessively while managers exercise options when the misreporting is detected firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves our firm level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000 in the aggregate our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment less growth

diffusion or confusion clustered shocks and the conditional diffusion of democracy scholars observing clustering in transitions to democracy argue that democratization diffuses across borders as citizens in autocracies demand the same reforms they witness in neighboring states we disagree this article demonstrates that diffusion plays only a highly conditional role in democratization we advance and test an alternative two step theory of clustered democratization 1 economic and international political shocks which are clustered spatially and temporally induce the breakdown of authoritarian regimes then 2 democratic diffusion in turn influences whether a fallen dictatorship will be replaced by a democracy or a new autocracy diffusion despite playing an important role is insufficient to explain the clustering of transitions using data on 125 autocracies from 1875 to 2004 we show that economic crises trigger authoritarian breakdowns while diffusion influences whether the new regime is democratic or authoritarian

the ability of earnings to predict future earnings and cash flow this paper examines the value relevance of earnings by testing their ability to predict two future benefits of equity investment earnings and cash flow from operations previous research discussed below has given an incomplete view of earnings predictive ability as it has typically focused on short horizons while ignoring the longer term benefits that are also valued as in ohlson 1990 i test earnings ability to predict future earnings and future cash flow from operations1 one through eight years ahead using annual data from

financial reporting quality and the cost of debt of smes this study explores a large and detailed dataset of financial statements of belgian small and medium sized enterprises smes over the 1997 2010 period using accruals quality as a proxy for the quality of smes financial reports we find that the quality of smes financial statements is negatively related to those companies effective interest cost this result is also highly economically significant the findings in this paper are consistent with the idea that earnings are important for creditors in predicting smes reimbursement capacity i e future cash flows and that less estimation error in accruals enhances earnings ability to predict future cash flows we deliver evidence of an important economic benefit of financial reporting for smes to wit the potential to reduce information asymmetry between smes and their creditors through higher quality financial reporting

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

a dominant strategy asset market mechanism abstract asset markets institutions that reallocate goods among agents with heterogeneous endowments demands and valuations abound in the real world but have received little attention in mechanism and market design assuming constant marginal private values and known endowments and maximum demands we provide a detail free dominant strategy asset market mechanism that allocates efficiently or close to efficiently respects traders individual rationality constraints ex post and never runs a deficit if it does not allocate efficiently it sacrifices the trades that under efficiency would involve the lowest value trader who efficiently would be allocated a positive amount the mechanism always allocates the quantity traded efficiently and permits clock implementation as the market becomes large the mechanism s efficiency loss converges to zero under natural conditions

accounting earnings and gross domestic product we document that aggregate accounting earnings growth is an incrementally significant leading indicator of growth in nominal gross domestic product gdp professional macro forecasters however do not fully incorporate the predictive content embedded in publicly available accounting earnings data as a result future nominal gdp growth forecast errors are predictable based on accounting earnings data that are available to professional macro forecasters in real time

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

asymmetric sensitivity of ceo cash compensation to stock returns abstract we document that ceo cash compensation is twice as sensitive to negative stock returns as it is to positive stock returns since stock returns include both unrealized gains and unrealized losses we expect cash compensation to be less sensitive to stock returns when returns contain unrealized gains positive returns than when returns contain unrealized losses negative returns this is consistent with boards of directors exercising discretion to reduce costly ex post settling up in cash compensation paid to ceos

diffusion development and democracy 1800 1999 while a trend of growth in democratization over the past two centuries has been generally observed it is the remarkable growth in the democratization of the world over the past 30 years that has truly captured the imagination of social scientists policymakers and the general public alike two major sets of factors have dominated studies attempting to predict democratization one set characterizes endogenous or internal features of countries and may be referred to as socioeconomic development the other set less often tested characterizes exogenous variables that influence democratization via forces at work globally and within the region in which a country resides this set may be referred to as diffusion processes this study provides the first systematic comparison of these two sets of variables when assessed alone development indicators are robust predictors of democracy but their predictive power fades with the inclusion of diffusion variables in particular diffusion predictors of spatial pr

on public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget abstract consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible dsic ex post individually rational epir and ex post budget balanced epbb it is well known that if there are only two agents then any such mechanism must have a threshold or fixed cost sharing form providing the public good if and only if both agents have values that are at least their respective thresholds when there are more than two agents there are mechanisms that are dsic epir and epbb that are not of the threshold form any dsic epir and epbb mechanism that additionally satisfies that the lowest types expect zero net utility from participating are again of the threshold form this additional condition arises endogenously when maximizing expected welfare subject to dsic epir and epbb

models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight color and terms of delivery in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods this paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special preferential independent additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs auction additive discrete provides a refined design for a price based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier in addition this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments the auction terminates with an outcome of a modified vickrey clarke groves mechanism this paper also develops auction nonlinear discrete for the more general nonlinear case a particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

the structure of firms abstract this paper studies different organizational forms within a single framework the u form is modelled as a two round communication game between a principal and agents with unobservable efforts and adverse selection problems the m form is modelled by considering a one round communication game with pure adverse selection feasible and optimal mechanisms are characterized the profit functions are derived and an extension of hotelling s lemma proved in the absence of the control loss problems flowing form the unobservability of agent effort levels the u form will be superior to the m form both forms will be superior to the corrupted m form

public goods with ambiguity in large economies abstract we consider a canonical problem in economics the financing and provision of a public good mailath and postlewaite 1990 show that under natural information and enforcement frictions the probability of providing the public good falls to zero as the population size goes to infinity even if provision of the public good is efficient in this paper we allow agents to have multiple prior beliefs about others valuations and to make choices that reflect their aversion to that ambiguity we show that as long as each agent s set of priors contains some distribution of valuations under which provision is inefficient it is possible to find a mechanism in large economies that finances provision of the public good

the comparative advantages of firms markets and contracts a unified theory the most efficient labour market mechanism depends on the advantages of specialization workers costs of switching between entrepreneurs and the frequency with which needs change multilateral mechanisms are more efficient when specialization is more advantageous when it is cheap for workers to switch between entrepreneurs and when individual entrepreneurs cannot occupy a worker on a full time basis given a bilateral mechanism employment a firm is more efficient than contracts when in process adjustments arise more frequently there exist three regions in which firms markets and sequences of bilateral contracts are weakly more efficient than all other mechanisms in a big class

mediation and peace this article applies mechanism design to the study of international conflict resolution standard mechanisms in which an arbitrator can enforce her decisions are usually not feasible because disputants are sovereign entities nevertheless we find that this limitation is inconsequential despite only being capable of making unenforceable recommendations mediators can be equally effective as arbitrators by using recommendation strategies that do not reveal that one player is weak to a strong opponent a mediator can effectively circumvent the unenforceability constraint this is because these strategies make the strong player agree to recommendations that yield the same payoff as arbitration in expectation this result relies on the capability of mediators to collect confidential information from the disputants before making their recommendations simple protocols of unmediated communication cannot achieve the same level of ex ante welfare as they preclude confidentiality

mechanisms for a spatially distributed market abstract we consider the problem of a spatially distributed market with strategic agents a single good is traded in a set of independent markets where shipment between markets is possible but costly the problem has previously been studied in the non strategic case in which it can be analyzed and solved as a min cost flow problem we consider the case where buyers and sellers are strategic our first result gives a double characterization of the vcg prices first as distances in a certain residue graph and second as the minimal for buyers and maximal for sellers equilibrium prices this provides a computationally efficient individually rational and incentive compatible welfare maximizing mechanism this mechanism is necessarily not budget balanced and we also provide a budget balanced mechanism which is also computationally efficient incentive compatible and individually rational that achieves high welfare finally we present results for some extensions of the model

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

anticipatory income smoothing a re examination abstract this paper reassesses evidence of anticipatory income smoothing reported in defond and park dp j accounting econom 23 1997 115 in light of knowledge about measurement error in discretionary accrual estimates we argue that the method dp use to measure un managed earnings mechanically biases the evidence in a manner consistent with anticipatory income smoothing using an approximate randomization approach we find that dp s results cannot be distinguished from those achieved when discretionary accruals are randomly assigned to firm years in our sample overall these results show that the backing out approach to measuring un managed earnings is ineffective in testing earnings management hypotheses

the relation between earnings and cash flows abstract a model of earnings cash flows and accruals is developed assuming a random walk sales process variable and fixed costs and that the only accruals are accounts receivable and payable and inventory the model implies earnings better predict future operating cash flows than current operating cash flows and the difference varies with the operating cash cycle also the model is used to predict serial and cross correlations of each firm s series the implications and predictions are tested on a 1337 firm sample over 1963 1992 both earnings and cash flow forecast implications and correlation predictions are generally consistent with the data

incentive contracting and value relevance of earnings and cash flows accounting performance measures such as earnings and cash flows are useful for both valuation and performance evaluation purposes however little evidence exists on whether there is any association between these two roles in this study we provide large sample empirical evidence that the value relevance of earnings explains a significant amount of the cross sectional variation in the pay sensitivity of earnings and the incremental value relevance of cash flows explains variation in the marginal pay sensitivity of cash flows we document that while both value relevance and compensation weight on earnings decline from the subperiod of 1993 to 1997 to the subperiod of 1998 to 2003 both value relevance and compensation weight on cash flows increase from the earlier subperiod to the later subperiod overall our results provide additional evidence that value relevance of a performance measure plays a significant role in its use for performance evaluation

have investors learned from the crisis an analysis of post crisis pricing errors and market corrections in us stock markets based on the reverse dcf model the traditional discounted cash flow dcf model is generally used to estimate the present value of an enterprise or its equity based on expected future parameters such as cash flows growth rate a

on delineating supply chain cash flow under collectionrisk abstract the credit terms for accounts receivable ar offered by sellers to buyers not only create a time lag between supply chain physical flow and cash flow but also increase the collection risk contributed by late collection and default previous studies describing the relationship between the two major supply chain flows did not consider the collection risk which poses a serious challenge to companies with limited cash resources when seeking growth opportunities in sales this study first delineates the relationship between the two flows during a growth period without imposing any constraints a stochastic optimization model is then developed to observe the managerial implications of cash flow risk under tight cash constraints

political rights and income inequality a cross national test among contemporary nations the relationship between income equality and national wealth exhibits an inverted u shape low among the richest and poorest nations and high for nations with intermediate wealth to examine the reasons for this relationship i hypothesize that both political democracy and educational enrollment are related in a similar way to income inequality two data sets are used in this analysis modified version of muller s set of 62 nations circa 1965 1975 and hoover s data set multiple regression reveals that measures of political democracy and the educational enrollment levels have an inverted u relationship with income inequality national wealth gnp had no consistent direct effect on income inequality a satisfactory specification of national levels of income inequality must include the polynomial functions of political democracy and education

how corruptible are you bribery under uncertainty abstract we model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials we investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one s potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in bribery and consequently the equilibrium level of corruption in the society we assume that the cost of engaging in corruption is subject to strategic complementarities which may lead to multiple corruption equilibria we find that corruption is lowest when potential bribers and potential bribees are uncertain regarding each other s corruptibility and have asymmetric bargaining powers our uncertainty result provides theoretical support in favor of anti corruption strategies such as staff rotation in public offices aimed at decreasing the social closeness of bribers and bribees our bargaining power result suggests that under uncertainty monopolistic public good provision has the same corruption reducing effect as competitive public good provision

industry competition earnings management and leader follower effects this article examines the impacts of industry competition on the leader follower effects in different earnings management activities the empirical results show that there are the leader follower e

initial evidence on the role of accounting earnings in the bond market we document that 1 the incidence of bond trade increases during the days surrounding earnings announcements 2 there is a bond price reaction to the announcement of earnings and 3 there is a positive association between annual bond returns and both annual changes in earnings and annual analysts forecast errors all of these effects are larger when earnings convey bad news or when the underlying bond is more risky taken together our results suggest that the nonlinear payoff structure of bond securities affects the role of accounting earnings in the bond market

the ability of earnings to predict future operating cash flows has been increasing not decreasing we investigate the relationship between earnings and one year ahead operating cash flows from 1973 to 2000 although the extant research indicates a weakening relationship between contemporaneous earnings and stock prices over time we find that the relationship between current earnings and future operating cash flows has increased over time this result holds for numerous divisions of our sample out of sample predictions of operating cash flows generally show increasing forecast accuracy over time increasing accounting conservatism appears to play a role in this phenomenon

legal inforcement short maturity debt and the incentive to manage earnings abstract prior research contends that weak legal regimes discourage lender enforcement of contracts by making it either costly or ineffective however diamond observes that this lender passivity can be overcome by structuring debt as a short term loan his argument is that an arrival of bad news in the presence of short term debt can result in externalities that will trigger a run on the firm and that this in turn creates ex ante incentives for lenders to enforce their contracts we examine whether short term debt creates an incentive for borrowers to delay the recognition of bad news through earnings management using a sample of firm level data from 33 countries over a 10 year period we find that short term debt induces greater earnings management this impact of short term debt is especially greater in countries with weak legal regimes this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that borrowers will manage earnings to circumvent lender enforcement

public good provision with many participants for a nonexcludable public good with benefit and cost functions independent of the number of participants this paper studies second best allocations under bayesian interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality as the number of participants becomes large second best provision levels converge in distribution to first best levels if the latter are bounded second best provision levels become large in absolute terms but small relative to first best levels if benefit and cost functions are isoelastic in contrast for an excludable public good the ratio of second best to first best levels is bounded away from zero