endogenous entry and self selection in private value auctions an experimental study this paper presents the results of an experimental study of endogenous entry in first price independent private value auctions n potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in an auction or receive a known outside option in the second stage entrants submit bids after learning their own private values and the number of entrants an equilibrium model of heterogeneous risk averse bidders implies a self selection effect where bidding in the auction is lower with endogenous entry because only less risk averse bidders enter this effect is confirmed by the experiment we also observe excessive entry relative to the theoretical model

bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction auctions have become a pervasive method of exchange in the online world as each day thousands of auctions take place online and this trade volume totals to billions of dollars worth of goods per year 1 this large volume of auction transactions implies the existence of a large number of sellers competing for buyers the obvious implication is that the competition among the sellers for the pool of potential buyers can be fierce and any competitive edge a seller can find could be important one such competitive edge a seller might exploit is using an auction design that attracts bidders away from their competitors when designing a real auction or modeling a theoretical one the entry decision of prospective bidders is rarely considered most auction analysis is performed assuming that a certain number of bidders will participate for certain or perhaps that the number of bidders is unknown and randomly determined it should be clear however that the most crucial part of a successful auction is encouraging as many bidders as possible to participate in general this should be expected to have a positive effect on revenue at least in noncommon value environments and in certain types of auctions it may help combat the possibility of bidder collusion because there are typically competing auctions available for similar goods or even outside options that bidders can pursue when auctions are for unique goods it is important to understand how the aspects of an auction format can effect the entry decision of a bidder consider a bidder who is faced with the choice of entering one of two auctions for similar or even identical objects how does this bidder make the decision of which auction to enter the obvious answer is that the bidder will enter into the auction that maximizes his or her expected utility so long as that expected utility is greater than some reservation value the real question then is how are these expected utilities constructed profit from participating in the auction is an obvious argument there are also a number of environmental considerations that might effect this decision that would be difficult to account for precisely such as the reputation and trustworthiness of the auctioneer quality of the advertisement for the auction and things of this nature it is also possible that the format of the auction itself can have an impact on the preferences of the bidder this latter point will be the issue of this study the particular focus will be looking at bidder preferences between the two most common standard auction formats used in the field the sealed bid first price will be abbreviated as just the sealed bid auction and the ascending or english auction the other reason we are interested in comparing these two auction formats rather than the ascending and second price or first price and descending is that it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between the two due to the strategic differences between them such differences lead to substantial differences in terms of the difficulty of deciding how to bid and also in the possibility that an outcome leads to a bidder experiencing some form of regret regret may occur in a first price auction when a bidder loses to a bid that is below his value as he may think that if only he had bid higher he could have won although such feelings of regret may be considered irrational that does not preclude their existence such a scenario should not reasonably occur in an ascending auction if one considers the situation of a bidder choosing between two auctions that differ only in regard to whether the auction is being conducted according to an ascending or sealed bid format it is not immediately obvious which would be the most preferred even assuming a standard symmetric independent private values environment were all bidders risk neutral then of course revenue equivalence would hold and the bidders would be indifferent

on favoritism in auctions with entry abstract we examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single unit auction when the seller s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders we show that unless the seller values those bidders welfare more than her own private utility a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

the impact of bse on the demand for beef and other meats in great britain indices of media coverage of bse are incorporated in a dynamic aids model of meat demand the publicity which bse has received is found to have had significant effects on the allocation of consumer expenditure among the meats a short run impact has been identified which accounts in large part for the discernible drop in the market share of beef in the early 1990s and more important there also appears to be a significant long run impact of bse which by the end of 1993 has reduced the beef market share by 4 5

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support prequalifications and penalties abstract auctions are a promising tool to accomplish renewable energy support res however they involve diverse risks for the auctioneer and the bidders the major risk for the auctioneer with respect to the expansion target and the acceptance of auctions for res in general is the risk of non realization awarded bidders do not realize their projects the main reasons are bidders uncertainties concerning their project costs the auctioneer can reduce the non realization risk by taking various measures the most discussed and implemented measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties an evaluation of these measures has relevant implications for an appropriate auctions design for res the non realization option induces lower bids a suitable combination of financial and physical prequalifications can reduce the non realization risk significantly however involves sunk costs counterintuitively first price auction and second price auction lead to different expected award prices and different realization probabilities penalties bear a high risk of inefficient auction outcomes the appropriate parametrization and combination of the measures is challenging under consideration of all implications we recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications to achieve a sufficiently high realization rate while maintaining efficiency

units of measurement and the stone index in demand system estimation the stone index typically used in estimating linear almost ideal demand systems is not invariant to changes in units of measurement which may seriously affect the approximation properties of the model a modification to the stone index or use of a regular price index instead are both desirable practices in estimating linear ai models

a structural time series approach to modelling multiple and resurgent meat scares in italy this paper exploits a structural time series approach to model the time pattern of multiple and resurgent food scares and their direct and cross product impacts on consumer response a structural time series almost ideal demand system sts aids is embedded in a vector error correction framework to allow for dynamic effects vec sts aids italian aggregate household data on meat demand is used to assess the time varying impact of a resurgent bse crisis 1996 and 2000 and the 1999 dioxin crisis the vec sts aids model monitors the short run impacts and performs satisfactorily in terms of residuals diagnostics overcoming the major problems encountered by the customary vector error correction approach

optimal auctions revisited in symmetric privately known values oral auctions with costly entry for bidders the seller can do no better than by committing ex ante to a reservation price and entry fees or subsidies which result in no fewer and at most one more bidders than a reservation price equal to the seller s value would in the absence of entry fees or subsidies journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c72

seasonality in dynamic regression models this paper examines the implications of treating seasonality as an unobserved component which changes slowly over time this approach simplifies the specification of dynamic relationships by separating non seasonal from seasonal factors we illustrate this approach using the consumption model of davidson et al 1978 and estimate a stable error correction model between consumption income and prices over the period 1958 92 more generally we argue that autoregressive models are unlikely to successfully model slowly changing seasonality and may confound seasonal effects with the dynamic responses of prime interest our approach can be used in a wide range of cases and we show that there is little loss in efficiency even if seasonality is deterministic

ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs this paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation and shows that when bidders valuation distribution is concave there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of those auctions it also investigates how the results are related to stochastic ordering of bidders valuation distributions and provides some illustrative examples

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction the answer to the question of how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous entry decisions into auctions the issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers attempting to attract bidders to their auctions there is a growing literature addressing issues in endogenous entry in auctions there are several papers such as engelbrecht wiggans 1993 pevnitskaya 2004 and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 that consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior there is a much larger group for example harstad 1990 engelbrecht wiggans 1993 levin and smith 1994 mcafee 1993 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 that considers competition between auctioneers in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price we consider the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction mechanism our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the entry decisions of potential bidders of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior in ivanova stenzel and salmon iss 2004a we introduced an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending a dynamic mechanism and sealed bid first price a static mechanism auctions it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them in a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid these differences might result in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret 1 the design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed bid first price auction versus a two bidder ascending auction each with different entry prices by varying the entry prices we could measure the subjects willingness to pay for either auction our main finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction at equal entry prices they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the two auctions to participate in an ascending auction thus they ended up entering the supposedly less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make a higher net surplus including the cost of the entry fee by entering into the ascending auction instead that paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle that involved assuming that bidders were risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice behavior this explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid first price auction just as we observed in the experiment for the most risk averse bidders this is because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in the event that they win they consequently end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders this is a trade off risk a verse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative though risky ascending auction

multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design abstract incentive compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents types are multidimensional two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed first we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves and second we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist

public employment decline in developing countries in the 21st century the role of globalization abstract does globalization increases or decreases the size of government compensation versus efficiency hypothesis the debate is re visited with innovative bureaucracy and globalization indicators using panel data for the unexplored period 2000 2016 robust evidence suggests that global competition reduces public employment

demand estimation in the presence of stochastic trend and seasonality the case of meat demand in the united kingdom if budget shares have stochastic trend or seasonality or both then demand equations based on the assumption of deterministic trend and deterministic seasonality will be mis specified we test this proposition by estimating a linearized almost ideal lai demand system for meat demand in the united kingdom using harvey s structural time series methodology we demonstrate that the model specification allowing for stochastic trend and deterministic seasonality performs best in terms of diagnostic tests and goodness of fit measures it is also shown that the model with stochastic trend is better at out of sample forecasting

model selection and forecasting ability of theory constrained food demand systems out of sample forecasting of annual u s per capita food consumption applying data from 1923 to 1992 is used as a basis for model selection among the absolute price rotterdam model a first differenced linear approximate almost ideal demand system fdla alids model and a first differenced double log demand system conditional on price consumption forecasts derived from elasticities are determined to be superior to direct statistical model forecasts models with consumer theory imposed through parametric restrictions provide better forecasts than models with little theory imposition for these data a double log demand system is a superior forecaster to the rotterdam model which is superior to the fdla alids model

does globalization affect growth evidence from a new index of globalization the study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions economic integration social integration and political integration using panel data for 123 countries in 1970 2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth as the results show globalization indeed promotes growth the dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries although less robustly information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect

testing and incorporating seasonal structures into demand models for fruit it is widely recognized that purchases of perishable agricultural products are affected by the seasonal cycles of production when there are seasonal effects where seasonal buying is not explained by prices alone the seasonal component can be captured using appropriate dummy variables in a demand model however over time the introduction of different varieties and foreign sources of supply in the market may affect the seasonal structure in unknown ways and because of this it becomes important to identify and test for characteristics of seasonal structure in demand models in this article we set out to measure and test the various characteristics of the seasonal component of fruit demand we model seasonality in the context of an almost ideal demand system aids model where we consider several types of fruit demand in the united states

equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders abstract the number of rivals may be unknown when a bidding strategy is formulated in an auction in a symmetric model with risk neutral bidders holding independent information we obtain explicit equilibrium bidding functions for first price and second price auctions with uncertainty about the number of rivals five auctions are revenue equivalent first price and second price auctions each with the number of bidders known or uncertain and english auctions

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

no news is good news stochastic parameters versus media coverage indices in demand models after food scares we develop a stochastic parameter approach to model the time varying impacts of food scares on consumption as an alternative to the inclusion of news coverage indices in the demand function we empirically test the methodology on data from four food scares the 1982 heptachlor milk contamination in oahu hawaii and the bovine spongiform encephalopathy and two escherichia coli scares on u s meat demand over the period 1993 9 results show that the inclusion of time varying parameters in demand models enables the capturing of the impact of food safety information and provides better short term forecasts

detecting collusion on highway procurement this paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first price procurement the main objective is twofold first to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction in california i identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within each type bidders are symmetric i find evidence supporting the collusive scheme for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of competition and a model of collusion

optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types abstract we study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders values are correlated although full surplus extraction is in general impossible we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability

alternative common value auction procedures revenue comparisons with free entry the logic of revenue comparisons for different types of common value auctions is substantially altered if the number of participants rather than being fixed responds endogenously to the expected profitability from participating in a thoroughly symmetric model a seller may prefer that competition be indirect an auction procedure in which fewer participants are needed to drive the expected profitability from participating down to the level obtainable in other auctions in the economy can attain higher expected revenue if a sale is sufficiently likely this insight allows a complete revenue ranking of standard auction procedures with endogenous entry

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

auctions with an inexpert bidder abstract we consider an auction in which the behavior of one potential bidder departs mildly from full rationality we show that the presence of such an inexpert bidder can be enough to discourage all of an infinitely large population of fully rational potential bidders from entering an auction furthermore this departure from full rationality does not reduce the inexpert bidder s payoff

on optimal reservation prices in auctions the theory of auction design examines how various factors affect the outcome of an auction most of the existing literature focuses on how varying the amount of information available to each bidder affects the bid taker s expected revenue when all other factors remain constant this paper studies how the bid taker s expected revenue varies with changes in the auction format when such changes affect the number of bidders and in turn the bidders maximum value for the object being sold specifically we examine how varying the reservation price or screening level affects the bid taker s expected revenue though its effect on the number of bidders for two simple examples the losses associated with a reduced number of bidders outweighs any benefits that nontrivial reservation prices might have had in models with an exogonously set number of bidders

disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry abstract this paper models research contests as an all pay auction with stochastic entry and analyzes the effect of disclosing the actual number of participants on the expected winning bid i find that the classic disclosure irrelevance principle on expected revenue does not extend to the ranking on expected winning bid the ranking on expected winning bid crucially depends on the number of potential bidders participation probabilities and the distribution of bidders valuations when there are more than two potential bidders fully concealing the actual number of participants elicits a higher expected winning bid if potential bidders have low participation probabilities whereas the rank reverses if bidders have high participation probabilities and high chances of being high types

an empirical study of auction revenue rankings the case of municipal bonds using a novel dataset of 386 rst price municipal bond auctions held in california i perform counterfactual revenue comparisons based on the theoretical result of milgrom and weber 1982 i show that the revenue in the second price auction is non parametrically identi ed and the counterfactual revenue in the english auction can be bounded in an informative way these results form a

optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs abstract a buyer repeatedly purchases some good suppliers privately learn their cost only upon producing at least once efficiency would imply sampling sellers until one is found with cost lower than a increasing with time reservation value then the good would be permanently purchased from the seller with lowest cost a sequence of second price auctions with participation premia and entry fees is shown to be both efficient and optimal for the buyer an alternative calls for price offers by informed sellers with compensations that increase in the offer in both cases the buyer subsidizes competition through participation premia or compensations journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d83 l14

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

optimal reservation prices in auctions the risk neutral independent private values ipv auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices no matter how many bidders the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value this is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice the authors relax the ipv assumption characterize optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions and show that when information is correlated the seller s optimal reservation price converges to his true value often monotonically and rapidly as the number of bidders grows copyright 1996 by royal economic society

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

modeling the demand for alcoholic beverages and advertising specifications in this paper the demand for beer wine spirits and soft drinks in ontario is modeled in two parts an equation is specified to endogenize group expenditures and a demand system is set up to allocate budgeted group expenditures across types of beverages advertising is allowed to influence both the level of group expenditures and its allocation three popular advertising specifications are compared using the j test and the likelihood dominance criterion even though all three specifications fitted well according to standard criteria the calculated expenditure price and advertising elasticities were sensitive to the manner with which advertising is specified this clearly highlights the need to rely on a sound criterion to identify a dominant specification from the identified dominant specification we found that advertising has very subtle effects on expenditures on alcoholic beverages group and individual beverages thus advertising is not effective in enlarging markets and this suggests that firms especially breweries use advertising to compete in zero sum market share games from a public policy perspective our results are comforting but future research should investigate whether the neutral effect of advertising on aggregated expenditures hide substantial offsetting changes in the drinking habits of individuals 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the evidence on globalisation globalisation is blamed for many socioeconomic shortcomings i discuss the consequences of globalisation by surveying the empirical globalisation literature my focus is on the kof indices of globalisation that have been used in more than 100 studies early studies using the kof index reported correlations between globalisation and several outcome variables studies published more recently identify causal effects the evidence shows that globalisation has spurred economic growth promoted gender equality and improved human rights moreover globalisation did not erode welfare state activities did not have any significant effect on labour market interaction and hardly influenced market deregulation it increased however within country income inequality the consequences of globalisation thus turn out to be overall much more favourable than often conjectured in the public discourse

incumbency and entry in license auctions the anglo dutch auction meets another simple alternative the existence of ex ante strong incumbents may constitute a barrier to entry in auctions for goods such as licenses favoring the allocation to entrants is a way to induce entry and thus create competition designs such as the anglo dutch auction have been proposed with this goal in mind we first show that the anglo dutch auction does indeed foster entry and increases the revenues of the seller however we argue that a more effective way could be to stage the allocation of the good so that each stage reveals information about the participants we show that a sequence of english auctions with high reserve prices in early rounds fulfils this property and is more efficient than any one stage entry auction moreover it also outperforms the anglo dutch auction in terms of seller s revenues

inter fuel substitution technical change and the demand for energy in the uk economy a model for energy demand based on a translog cost function is formulated unlike previous studies technical progress is modelled by means of stochastic as opposed to deterministic trend components the model is estimated using quarterly uk data for four economic sectors and forecasts of the future level of demand are made

entry coordination and auction design with private costs of information acquisition i introduction in most auction literature bidders are passively endowed with private information about their valuations the analysis then focuses on optimal elicitation of private information on many occasions bidders may instead have to incur costs to collect this information 1 auction design in these cases has to balance between information acquisition and information elicitation which are interdependent the performance of an auction depends not only on the bidding equilibrium but also crucially on the information acquisition equilibrium 2 as a salient feature auction design with information acquisition costs has been complicated by entry coordination among bidders due to multiple entry equilibria issue in a symmetric independent private value ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 with fixed information acquisition cost levin and smith 1994 note that the ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auction a second price auction with no entry fee and no reserve induces many asymmetric entry equilibria other than the targeted symmetric one the existence of asymmetric entry equilibria in this setup fundamentally lies in bidders constant marginal cost of entry 3 information acquisition costs could be private information of bidders just as with their private information about values for example in the cases of construction procurements or u s timber auctions many aspects of prebid information acquisition and analyzation are private knowledge of bidders 4 clearly when information acquisition costs are private information of bidders auction design has to additionally take into account information elicitation at the information acquisition stage this aspect of analysis has yet to be reflected in the literature while the case with fixed information acquisition costs has been thoroughly studied by milgrom 1981 mcafee and mcmillan 1987 engelbrecht wiggans 1987 1993 harstad 1990 levin and smith 1994 mcafee quan and vincent 2002 ye 2004 2007 and cremer spiegel and zheng 2009 among others a widely recognized insight of these studies is that ex ante efficiency can be achieved through a second price auction while setting the reserve at the seller s valuation if ex ante entry fees can be used to extract all the expected surplus of bidders then there is a congruence between the revenue and total surplus 5 this article advances this line of research by studying the implications of private acquisition costs on auction design with an emphasis on bidders coordination at the information acquisition stage specifically we consider the ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 and levin and smith 1994 while allowing the information acquisition costs to be bidders private information which follow a continuous distribution in light of our previous discussion this article attempts to answer the following questions 1 how are ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auctions affected by this additional dimension of private information in other words how does information rent extraction at the entry stage affect the auction designs 2 can this private information alleviate rather than aggravate the problem of entry coordination with the dispersion in private information acquisition costs the multiplicity of entry equilibria arising from the constant marginal cost in levin and smith 1994 might be avoidable the types with higher information acquisition costs must have less incentive to enter which could reduce the number of entry equilibria the questions are will sufficient dispersion coordinate bidders and induce a unique entry if yes how much dispersion is enough due to the potential multiplicity of entry equilibria for any given mechanism it is rather difficult to compare performances across varieties of mechanisms to overcome this difficulty we come up with an alternative approach our analysis begins with characterizing efficient and revenue maximizing auctions for any given feasible entry pattern which can be described through a vector of bidders entry thresholds of acquisition costs

benchmarking the expectations hypothesis of the interest rate term structure an analysis of cointegration vectors i test cointegration restrictions that are consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure by employing the full information maximum likelihood methods developed by johansen yield curves appear to be the result of cointegration among interest rates the cointegration vectors that best describe the long term impact of interest rate levels on interest rate changes can often be written as linear combinations of interest rate spreads there is however difficulty in keeping short term yields in such a restricted cointegrated system with other interest rates short term speculative returns from long term bonds do not conform to the expectations hypothesis

optimal search auctions abstract we study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction with independent bidders types and possibly interdependent valuations the seller s problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs compared to the socially efficient mechanism the optimal mechanism features fewer participants longer search conditional on the same set of participants and inefficient sequence of entry

the logic of testing structural change in meat demand a methodological analysis and appraisal in the past two decades the profession has expended valuable resources testing structural change in meat demand with mixed results overlooked to date is a fundamental methodological problem that transcends all methods of testing for structural change in this study a methodological framework is used to show that there is no valid test of structural change because of this result additional criteria from the methodology literature are used to evaluate the literature on structural change in meat demand and to provide suggestions for fertile areas of future research

sicken thy neighbour the initial trade policy response to covid 19 since the onset of the covid 19 pandemic many governments have limited exports of medical supplies and medicines pre pandemic barriers to imports of medical supplies and soap remain largely in place having characterised trade policy stance towards covid 19 related goods this study critically assesses the resort to export curbs and import taxes elements of an alternative positive trade policy contribution to surmount this pandemic are presented

food consumption dynamics a nonparametric approach using maximum entropy estimation we model dynamic consumer choice in a stochastic optimal control framework and show conditions under which observable market share data possess the markov property using 30 years of annual aggregate milk consumption data differentiated by fat content maximum entropy is used to estimate nonstationary transition probabilities showing how consumer tastes and preferences have changed over time the maximum entropy approach allows for the estimation of a 4 4 transition probability matrix for each year of the sample results suggest that skim milk was an absorbing state over most of the sample but that the trend toward skim milk has decelerated and possibly reversed itself since 1998 our approach provides a useful complement to existing parametric approaches to demand analysis when data are limited or the problem is ill posed

strategic ignorance in a second price auction abstract suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second price auction with costly bidding all equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price

on absolute auctions and secret reserve prices from a theory viewpoint the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices also called absolute auctions or of auctions with secret reserve prices is somewhat puzzling despite being common by allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge we also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats thereby offering a range of testable predictions alternative approaches are reviewed

auctions with heterogeneous entry costs it is well known that if bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs a rst or second price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller s value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue and leaves bidders with no surplus further in mixed strategy entry equilibria social surplus and seller revenue decrease with the number of bidders we show that when entry costs are heterogeneous and private information the revenue maximizing reserve price is above the seller s value a positive inspection fee and a reserve price equal to the seller s value generates even more revenue and in either case bidders capture informational rents further seller revenue and social surplus may either increase or decrease with the number of bidders nevertheless seller revenue is asymptotically the same whether entry costs are homogeneous or heterogeneous our results are framed in terms of screening values rather than reserve prices and apply to any standard auction

economic activity and the spread of viral diseases evidence from high frequency data viruses are a major threat to human health and given that they spread through social interactions represent a costly externality this article addresses three main questions i what are the unintended consequences of economic activity on the spread of infections ii how efficient are measures that limit interpersonal contacts iii how do we allocate our scarce resources to limit the spread of infections to answer these questions we use novel high frequency data from france on the incidence of a number of viral diseases across space for different age groups over a quarter of a century we use quasi experimental variation to evaluate the importance of policies reducing interpersonal contacts such as school closures or the closure of public transportation networks while these policies significantly reduce disease prevalence we find that they are not cost effective we find that expansions of transportation networks have significant health costs in increasing the spread of viruses and that propagation rates are pro cyclically sensitive to economic conditions and increase with inter regional trade jel codes i12 i15 i18 h51 c23

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

participation in auctions participation preparing offers in auction and procurement games e g bidding for spectrum rights or for control of corporations is very costly which calls for analyzing participation no less than how to play the games as part of equilibrium the result is a model with bi dimensional distribution of types as in jackson m o 1999 nonexistence of equilibria in auctions with both private and common values mimeo http www stanford edu jacksonm nonexist pdf and endogenous distribution of participants players with low production but high participation costs may decide not to participate forcing the auctioneer to pay higher than necessary prices to mitigate this phenomenon auctioneers may consider partially reimbursing participants for the costs they incur in preparing offers restricting attention to symmetric games we prove that the game we consider has a unique symmetric equilibrium with and without the reimbursement mechanism

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

seasonality and unit roots the demand for fruits abstract we apply seasonal unit root tests to apple and pear price and quantity data we then develop a method for testing shifts in amplitude and or phase of the seasonal cycles the results have implications to econometric specifications of models which use short run data quarterly monthly

regional welfare weights for the uk england scotland wales and northern ireland evans d kula e and sezer h 2005 regional welfare weights for the uk england scotland wales and northern ireland regional studies 39 923 937 in relation to public spending and regional policy the importance of distributional issues is stressed and regional welfare weights are derived from an appropriate underlying social welfare function estimates of these weights are then provided for the four countries comprising the uk welfare weights now have a very high policy profile following the special emphasis placed by the uk treasury in its recently revised guidance on appraisal and evaluation in government on the assessment of the distributional impacts of social projects and policies from an empirical perspective the critical component of each welfare weight measure is the elasticity of marginal utility of income e alternative estimation approaches based on demand analysis and income tax data are used to determine e and a preferred measure of 1 60 emerges the resulting regional we

behavioral models for first price sealed bid auctions with the one shot decision theory abstract we build an auction model with the one shot decision theory which describes the process of a bidder deciding his her bidding price in first price sealed bid auctions the decision making procedure involves two steps first for each of his her possible bidding prices the bidder examines every possible highest bidding price provided by the other bidders and chooses one as a focus point of this bidding price of him her then the bidder determines such a bidding price as the optimal one that generates the best outcome when its focus point occurs the optimal bidding price can be obtained and two common phenomena in auction markets throwing away and overbidding are well explained

inter country distancing globalisation and the coronavirus pandemic originating in china the coronavirus has reached the world at different speeds and levels of strength this paper provides an initial understanding of some driving factors and their consequences since transmission requires people the human factor behind globalization is essential globalization a major force behind global wellbeing and equality is highly associated with this factor the analysis investigates the impact globalization has on the speed of initial transmission to a country and on the scale of initial infections in the context of other driving factors our cross country analysis finds that measures of globalization are positively related to the spread of the virus both in speed and scale however the study also finds that globalized countries are better equipped to keep fatality rates low the conclusion is not to reduce globalization to avoid pandemics but to better monitor the human factor at the outbreak and mobilize collaboration forces to curtail diseases

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices