competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

product and price competition in a duopoly this paper examines the role of consumer preferences costs and price competition in determining the competitive product strategy of a firm in the model studied here there are two identical firms competing on product quality and price they face consumers who prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product but differ in how much they are willing to pay for quality the consumers can also choose a substitute if they don t like the product price offerings of the two firms for the firms a higher quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product the paper shows that the equilibrium strategy for each firm should be to differentiate its product from its competitor with the firm choosing the higher quality choosing the higher margin as well this differentiation however is not efficient that is it is possible to choose two other products and offer them at prices that cover their marginal cost and still satisfy consumers needs better in the aggregate a monopolist by contrast would differentiate his product line efficiently this suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition the paper also shows that if one firm enters the market first then it can defend itself from later entrants and gain a first mover advantage by preempting the most desirable product position

competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination this paper investigates the eects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertis ing in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers preferences is discrete and where advertising plays two major roles it is used by rms as a way to transmit relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers and it is used as a price discrimination device we compare the rms optimal marketing mix advertising and pricing when they adopt mass advertising non discrimination strategies and targeted advertising price discrim ination strategies if rms are able to adopt targeted advertising strategies we nd that the symmetric price equilibrium is in mixed strategies while the advertising is chosen deter ministically our results also unveil that as long as we allow for imperfect substitutability between the goods rms do not necessarily target more ads to their own market in par ticular rms optimal marketing mix leads to higher advertising reach in the rival s market than in the rms own market provided that advertising costs are su ciently low in relation to the consumer s reservation value the comparison of the optimal marketing mix under mass advertising strategies and targeted advertising strategies reveals that targeted adver tising might constitute a tool to dampen price competition in particular if advertising costs are su ciently low in relation to the value of the goods we obtain that average prices with non discrimination mass advertising are below those with price discrimination and targeted advertising regardless of the market segment accordingly when i goods are imperfect substitutes ii advertising is not too expensive and iii targeted advertising constitutes an eective price discrimination tool price discrimination through targeted advertising may be detrimental to social welfare since it boosts industry pro ts at the expense of consumer surplus

the role of brand image and product characteristics on firms entry and oem decisions we investigate the optimal market entry and original equipment manufacturer oem decisions of a firm facing a market in which firms brands can be horizontally differentiated and products can be vertically differentiated the entrant might sell under its own brand and compete with an incumbent become a supplier to the incumbent or both findings reveal that when consumers perceive the firms are horizontally and vertically differentiated the entrant profits by simultaneously entering the market and establishing an oem arrangement with the incumbent in such competitive scenarios both buyer and seller increase profits by agreeing on wholesale prices that are not too low which softens both horizontal and vertical conflict between the firms findings also show that the incumbent may prefer to pay high wholesale prices to the entrant even if the incumbent had the option to source the product independently at a lower marginal cost when firms have the capability of producing each other s product lines su

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

tax policy and aggregate demand management under catching up with the joneses this paper examines the role for tax policies in productivity shock driven economies with catching up with the joneses utility functions the optimal tax policy is shown to affect the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes i e cooling down the economy with higher taxes when it is overheating in booms and stimulating the economy with lower taxes in recessions to keep consumption up thus models with catching up with the joneses utility functions call for traditional keynesian demand management policies but for rather unorthodox reasons

money and market incompleteness in overlapping generations models abstract this paper investigates the extent to which the character of equilibria in stochastic overlapping generations models stems from the model s generic market incompleteness in addition it addreses the question of whether money serves to complete markets in these models we show that money does not complete markets in the sense of expanding the set of state contingent commodities that an individual may trade the introduction of money effects state contingent transfers of wealth between individuals this is a generalization of a result obtained by marshall sonstelie and gilles 1987 numerical simulation of the model suggests that the risk sharing induced in the monetary economy leads to substantial increases in welfare levels relative to the nonmonetary economy

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

information time option pricing theory and empirical evidence abstract with a stochastic time change from calendar time to information time we derive a parsimonious option pricing formula with stochastic volatility as a risk neutral poisson sum of merton s 1973 prices over the option s information time maturity domain the formula contains two unobservable parameters information arrival intensity and information time asset volatility with stochastic volatility induced by random information arrival when the information arrival rate intensifies the option price increases and vice versa we test the formula in pricing hedging and excess profits capture empirically using currency and the s p 500 futures options transaction data

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

how to price discriminate when tariff size matters firms that serve a large market with many diverse consumer types use discriminatory or nonlinear pricing to extract higher revenue inducing consumers to separate by self selecting from a large number of tariff options but the extent of price discrimination must often be tempered by the high costs of devising and managing discriminatory tariffs including costs of supporting consumers in understanding and making selection from a complex menu of choices these tariff design trade offs occur in many industries where firms face many consumer types and each consumer picks the number of units to consume over time examples include wireless communication services other telecom and information technology products legal plans fitness clubs automobile clubs parking healthcare plans and many services and utilities this paper evaluates alternative ways to price discriminate while accounting for both revenues and tariff management costs the revenue maximizing menu of quantity price bundles can be very or infinitely large and hence not practical instead two part tariffs 2pts which charge a fixed entry fee and a per unit fee can extract a large fraction of the optimal revenue with a small menu of choices and they become more attractive once the costs of tariff management are factored in we show that three part tariffs 3pts which use an additional instrument the free allowance are an even more efficient way to price discriminate a relatively small menu of 3pts can be more profitable than a menu of 2pts of any size this 3pt menu can be designed with less information about consumer preferences relative to the menu of two part tariffs which in order to segment customers optimally needs fine grained information about preferences our analysis reveals a counterintuitive insight that more complex tariffs need not always be more profitable it matters whether the complexity is from many choices or more pricing instruments

research note consumer addressability and customized pricing the increasing availability of customer information is giving many firms the ability to reach and customize price and other marketing efforts to the tastes of the individual consumer this ability is labeled as consumer addressability consumer addressability through sophisticated databases is particularly important for direct marketing firms catalog retailers such as l l bean and land s end credit card issuing banks and firms in the long distance telephone market we examine the strategic implications of consumer addressability on competition between database direct marketing firms we address questions such as in a competitive environment how should firms invest in addressability will future improvements in the degree of addressability increase or mitigate the intensity of competition between the firms will greater addressability always be beneficial for firms we model competition between two firms in a market where consumers differ on a horizontal attribute of product differentiation the market comprises consumers located on a linear attribute space and firms located at the ends of the line we represent the degree of addressability or the reach of a firm s database as the proportion of consumers at each point in the market who are in the firm s database consequently the firm can offer these consumers customized prices consumer addressability creates two effects that govern the competition between firms a surplus extraction effect because a firm might address a consumer who is not reached by its competitor and a competitive effect that is created by the set of consumers who can be addressed by both firms the key results of the paper pertain to when the addressability decision is endogenous when the extent of market differentiation or consumer heterogeneity in preferences for a product brand attribute as well as the incremental cost of addressability are sufficiently large firms make symmetric investments in equilibrium given high costs firms choose sufficiently low levels of addressability low addressability and high levels of market differentiation both help reduce price competition which facilitates symmetric choice of addressability by the firms in equilibrium however when market differentiation and the cost of incremental addressability become small firms face the prospect of destructive competition as a result they strategically differentiate in their choice of addressability to mitigate this competition interestingly even in the extreme case when incremental addressability is costless not every firm chooses full addressability in equilibrium this has useful implications for direct marketing given that the advances in information technology should improve the ability of firms to address their consumers it might indeed not be desirable for all direct marketing firms to indefinitely pursue greater addressability as costs of doing so decline the analysis also shows an interesting effect of market differentiation in addressable markets equilibrium profits can decrease with an increase in market differentiation when the marginal cost of addressability is sufficiently high finally we discuss the competitive outcome that would result when firms compete with addressable as well as uniform posted prices

on the optimal product line selection problem with price discrimination product line design decisions are determinant for a firm s market success and simultaneously very costly to implement and change to evaluate the profitability of a design a number of mathematical programming approaches have been proposed in the last three decades typically nonlinear integer optimization problems that can only be tackled heuristically for real world instances recently chen and hausman 2000 efficiently exploited the fractional programming properties of a stylized model for product line and price selection with the objective to maximize contribution given homogeneous customer behavior by an aggregate multinomial logit choice model we extend the approach of chen and hausman chen k d w h hausman 2000 technical note mathematical properties of the optimal product line selection problem using choice based conjoint analysis management sci 46 2 327 332 to determine an optimal product line under a personalized or group pricing strategy in markets with multiple heterogeneous consumers such that total profit including fixed costs is maximized personalized group pricing is a growing discrimination strategy that more and more businesses are realizing is not only very profitable but also often implementable in the era of e business our problem formulation allows to incorporate commonly applied attraction choice models including the multinomial logit the bradley terry luce and approximately the first choice model though the problem is generally nonlinear we show that the fractional substructure resulting from attraction choice models can still be exploited to globally solve real world instances in reasonable time

quality and price personalization under customer recognition a dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria abstract we present a model of market hyper segmentation where a monopolist acquires within a short time all information about the preferences of consumers who purchase its vertically differentiated products the firm offers a new price quality schedule after each commitment period lower consumer types may have an incentive to delay their purchases until next period to obtain a better introductory offer the monopolist counters this incentive by offering higher informational rents considering the dynamic game played by the monopolist and its customers we find that there is always a markov perfect equilibrium mpe in which the firm immediately sells the good to all customers offering the mussa rosen static equilibrium schedule to first time customers and getting full commitment profits however if the commitment period between two offers is long enough there is another mpe with gradual market expansion contrary to the coasian result for a durable good monopoly we find that in both equilibria the profit of the monopolist increases and the aggregate consumers surplus decreases as the interval of commitment shrinks the model yields policy implications for regulations on collection and storage of customers information

bundling strategies when products are vertically differentiated and capacities are limited we consider a seller who owns two capacity constrained resources and markets two products components corresponding to these resources as well as a bundle comprising the two components in an environment where all customers agree that one of the two components is of higher quality than the other and that the bundle is of the highest quality we derive the seller s optimal bundling strategy we demonstrate that the optimal solution depends on the absolute and relative availabilities of the two resources as well as upon the extent of subadditivity of the quality of the products the possible strategies that can arise as equilibrium behavior include a pure components strategy a partial or full spectrum mixed bundling strategy and a pure bundling strategy where the latter strategy is optimal when capacities are unconstrained these conclusions are contrary to findings in the prior literature on bundling that demonstrated the unambiguous dominance of the full spectrum mixed bundling strategy thus our work expands the frontier of bundling to an environment with vertically differentiated components and limited resources we also explore how the bundling strategies change as we introduce an element of horizontal differentiation wherein different types of customers value the available components differently

behavior based pricing production efficiency and quality differentiation in a two period vertical duopoly we examine how behavior based price discrimination bpd affects the firms endogenous quality differentiation and profits the firms relative production efficiency defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference plays a crucial role with exogenous product qualities bpd always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor for the sufficiently less efficient firm its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss and its total profits increase with endogenous quality choices bpd does not alter the low end quality at the lower bound of the quality space but increases the high end quality enlarging quality differentiation this is because under bpd each firm s profit gain decreases or its profit loss increas

research note competitive bundling and counterbundling with generalist and specialist firms bundling which is the practice of selling two or more products or services in a package is a pervasive marketing practice and is often used as a strategic competitive tool however there has not been enough consideration of competitive bundling situations in which exit of a competitor is not a concern in this paper we address this issue by identifying conditions under which strategic competitors may or may not resort to bundling when competitor exit considerations are absent we study competition between a multiproduct generalist firm and two single product specialist firms in two product categories one of which has undifferentiated products and the other has differentiated products in our model the specialist firms can form an alliance to bundle their products in competing with the generalist firm in contrast to the previous literature we find that concurrent bundling by competitors if it occurs in equilibrium is profitable we also find that when one competitor bundles and the other does not the bundling firm gains a greater share of customers and makes a higher profit however when conditions favor counterbundling by a competitor such counterbundling helps the competitor retain its customers finally we note that under other market conditions concurrent bundling by competitors escalates price competition to the extent that retaining customers through bundling is not profitable in such a case we show that strategic competitors are better off having asymmetric product lines with one competitor bundling and the other selling unbundled

conspicuous consumption dynamics abstract we formalize veblen s idea of conspicuous consumption as two alternative forms of interdependent preferences dubbed envy and pride agents adjust consumption patterns gradually in the direction of increasing utility from an arbitrary initial state the distribution of consumption among agents with identical preferences converges to a unique equilibrium distribution when pride is stronger the equilibrium distribution has a right skewed density when envy is stronger the equilibrium is concentrated at a single point and the adjustment dynamics involve a shock wave that can be interpreted as a growing moving homogeneous middle class

occupational mobility and the distribution of occupational success among young men interpretation of the distribution of occupational success depends crucially on an understanding of the process of mobility if the holders of low paying jobs this year are just as likely as anyone else to hold good jobs next year then the lower tail of the earnings distribution is not a matter of great social concern further if the distribution of success is primarily determined by a random process the prospects for a significant reduction in the inequality of earnings are unfavorable on the other hand high mobility in the short run may conceal systematic stratification of the labor force it may be that the same individuals spend most of their time in the worst jobs if so luck and random events may play a small role in the distribution of well being inequality may be a major issue and the elimination of stratification may hold out the promise of an important reduction in inequality simple tabulation of distributions of success and of mobility among categories of success cannot answer the basic question of the role of stratification in this paper we develop a model and statistical method for studying mobility and relating it to characteristics upon which stratification may be based our study rests on annual interviews conducted from 1966 through 1969 with about 3 000 white males born between 1942 and 1952 1 we find that mobility is closely related to personal characteristics especially intelligence and education men with high iqs and extensive education are more likely to move to high paying jobs and are more likely to remain in them nevertheless random events dominate the distribution of occupational success in the short run our results strongly support the finding of christopher jencks and his collaborators that redistribution of the determinants of earnings would do almost nothing to reduce the observed inequality of annual earnings

the 2003 isms practice prize winner optimizing rhenania s direct marketing business through dynamic multilevel modeling dmlm in a multicatalog brand environment we introduce dynamic multilevel modeling dmlm to a multicatalog brand environment to determine the optimal frequency size and customer segmentation of direct marketing activities this optimization method leverages multicatalog brand effects including the utilization of prior customer ordering behavior maximization of customer value and customer share and economies of scale and scope in printing and mailing this enhancement of the original dmlm approach is called dynamic multidimensional marketing dmdm with dmlm alone rhenania a german direct mail order company turned its catalog mailing practices around and consequently rose from the number 5 to the number 2 market position the dmlm approach was so effective that two major competitors could be bought out improvements provided by dmdm were threefold more efficient resource allocation across all catalog brands more accurate customer microsegmentation and more effective reactivation presently the company s target is to transform single brand customer relationships into two or three brand relationships with higher revenue per customer as a consequence the rhenania group s performance was decoupled from the overall market trend

targeted advertising strategies on television the personal video recorder pvr facilitates the use of targeted advertising by allowing companies to monitor television viewing behavior and to build demographic profiles of viewers from the data that are collected our research explores the extent to which an advertiser should allocate resources to increase the quality of its targeting we present a game theoretic model that extends the conventional measurement of targeting quality by exploring the trade off between two measures accuracy and recognition accuracy measures the likelihood that any target segment prediction is correct while recognition conversely measures the likelihood that any member of the target segment is identified we find that the relative resources allocated to improving accuracy and recognition depend upon the size of the population of viewers the propensity of viewers to skip commercials the overall cost of airing commercials and the competitive environment furthermore the incentives to improve accuracy are markedly different from those to improve recognition although improving accuracy does not affect the extent of price competition improving recognition leads to intensified price competition and reduced profitability in the product market thus when facing a competitor that pursues a strategy to improve its recognition of potential customers an advertiser should choose to reduce its investment in recognition and increase its investment in accuracy

stock prices and volume the authors undertake a comprehensive investigation of price and volume co movement using daily new york stock exchange data from 1928 to 1987 they adjust the data to take into account well known calendar effects and long run trends to describe the process they use a seminonparametric estimate of the joint density of current price change and volume conditional on past price changes and volume four empirical regularities are found 1 positive correlation between conditional volatility and volume 2 large price movements are followed by high volume 3 conditioning on lagged volume substantially attenuates the leverage effect and 4 after conditioning on lagged volume there is a positive risk return relation article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

option pricing with stochastic volatility information time vs calendar time empirical evidence has shown that subordinated processes represent well the price changes of stocks and futures using either transaction counts or trading volume as a proxy for information arrival it supports the contention that volatility is stochastic in calendar time because of random information arrival and thus becomes stationary in information time this contention has also been supported later in theoretical models in this paper we investigate the implication of this contention to option pricing first we price the option in calendar time where the return of the underlying asset follows a jump subordinated process we extend rubinstein s rubinstein m 1976 the valuation of uncertain income streams and the valuation of options bell j econom management sci 7 407 425 and ross s ross s 1989a information and volatility the no arbitrage martingale approach to timing and resolution irrelevancy finance44 1 17 martingale valuation methodology to incorporate the pricing of volatility risk the resulting equilibrium formula requires estimating seven parameters upon implementation we then make a stochastic time change from calendar time to information time in order to obtain a stationary underlying asset return process to price the option we find that the isomorphic option has random maturity because the number of information arrivals prior to the option s calendar time expiration date is random we value the option using dynkin s dynkin e b 1965 markov processes vols i and ii springer verlag berlin and new york version of the feynman kac formula that allows for a random terminal date the resulting information time formula requires estimating only one additional parameter compared to the black scholes s in practical application in this regard the time change has reduced the computational complexity of the option pricing problem simulations show that the formula may outperform the black scholes black f m scholes 1973 the pricing of options and corporate liabilities political econom 81 637 659 and merton merton robert c 1976a option pricing when underlying stock returns are discontinuous financial econom 3 125 143 models in pricing currency options as a first attempt to derive valuation relationships in the information time economy this investigation may suggest that the information time approach is a functional alternative to the current calendar time norm it is especially suitable for deriving volatility free portfolio insurance strategies

financial innovation and asset price volatility we compare asset prices in an overlapping generations model for incomplete and complete markets individuals within a generational cohort have heterogeneous beliefs about future states of the economy and thus would like to make bets against each other in the incomplete markets economy agents cannot make such bets asset price volatility is very small the situation changes dramatically when markets are completed through financial innovations as the set of available securities now allows agents with different beliefs to place bets against each other wealth shifts across agents and generations such changes in the wealth distribution lead to substantial asset price volatility

behavior based discrimination is it a winning play and if so when with advances in technology the collection of information from consumers at the time of purchase is common in many categories this information allows a firm to straightforwardly classify consumers as either new or past consumers this opens the door for firms to implement marketing that a discriminates between new and past consumers and b entails making offers to them that are significantly different our objective is to examine the competitive effects of marketing that tailors offers to consumers based on their past buying behavior in a two period model with two competing firms we assume that each firm is able to commit about whether or not to implement behavior based discrimination bbd i e to add benefits to its offer for past consumers in the second period when the firms are identical in their ability to add value to the second period offer bbd generally leads to lower profits for both firms past customers are so valuable in the second period that bbd leads to cutthroat competition in the first period as a result the payoffs associated with the implementation of bbd form a prisoner s dilemma interestingly when a firm has a significant advantage over its competitor one firm has the capability to add more benefits for its past customers than the other it can increase its profit versus the base case even when there is significant competition in the second period moreover the firm at a disadvantage sometimes finds that the best response to bbd by a strong competitor is to respond with a uniform price and avoid the practice completely

bundling and competition for slots we consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots under independent pricing a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never efficient when bundling is allowed each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient technology renting equilibrium always exists furthermore in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned all equilibria are efficient comparing the mixed strategy equilibrium with the technology renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer s surplus finally we derive clear cut policy

commentaries and rejoinder to marketing of vice goods a strategic analysis of the package size decision by sanjay jain jain jain s 2012 marketing of vice goods a strategic analysis of the package size decision marketing sci 31 1 36 51 examines the impact of consumers self control problem on the equilibrium package sizes offered by firms marketing vice goods this series of discussions offers commentaries and a rejoinder that discuss competitive implications of firms offering small sizes and the impact of smaller sizes on the total consumer expenditure

customer poaching and advertising this paper is a first look at the dynamic effects of customer poaching in homogeneous product markets where firms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness when a firm is able to recognize customers with different purchasing histories it may send them targeted advertisements with different prices it is shown that only the firm which advertises the highest price in the first period will engage in price discrimination a practice that clearly benefits the discriminating firm this poaching gives rise to the race for discrimination effect through which price discrimination may act actually to soften price competition rather than intensify it as a result all firms may become better off even when only one of them can engage in price discrimination this paper offers a first attempt to evaluate the effects of price discrimination on the efficiency properties of advertising in markets with low or no advertising costs allowing firms to price discriminate leads them to provide too little advertising which is not good for consumers and overall welfare only in markets with high advertising costs might firms overadvertise regarding the welfare effects price discrimination is generally bad for welfare and consumer surplus though good for firms

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

pricing with cookies behavior based price discrimination and spatial competition we present a model of dynamic competition between two firms where firms gather customer information through first period purchase this creates asymmetric information in the second period whereby a

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

the equilibrium distribution of income and the market for status this paper explores the implications for risk taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption in contrast to previous analyses we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market we show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a status good and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good the main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income status and consumption is the same that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner

consumer privacy and marketing avoidance a static model we introduce the concept of marketing avoidance consumer efforts to conceal themselves and to deflect marketing the setting is one in which sellers market some item through solicitations to potential consumers who differ in their benefit from the item and suffer harm from receiving solicitations concealment by one consumer induces sellers to shift solicitations to other consumers whereas deflection does not solicitations cause two externalities direct harm on consumers and the indirect cost of consumer concealment and deflection we find that in markets where the marginal cost of solicitation is sufficiently low efforts by low benefit consumers to conceal themselves will increase the cost effectiveness of solicitations and lead sellers to market more however concealment by high benefit consumers leads sellers to market less furthermore concealment by low benefit consumers increases direct privacy harm and consumer welfare is higher with deflection than concealment finally it is optimal to impose a charge on solicitations

research note using basket composition data for intelligent supermarket pricing how can supermarkets use the vast data they have to design strategies to compete for large basket shoppers potentially their most profitable customers we say analyze the data to glean basket composition of heterogeneous consumers of theoretical and practical interest is the question will our suggestion improve supermarket profits and if so by what pricing strategies by answering this we can also answer the question do results of extant research on single product marketing that using such information intensifies competition and lowers profits generalize to multiproduct marketing by supermarkets that carry several products and whose patrons purchase multiple items we derive equilibrium data based intelligent pricing strategies that also produce increased supermarket profits what is more interesting is our result that data analysis is profitable whether or not a competitor undertakes data analysis if not too costly implementing data analysis is a dominant strategy moreover with comprehensive data analysis connecting basket information and household data stores can increase profits further by targeting rewards at individual households thereby segmenting the market more completely in contrast to past research findings we show that for supermarkets even under competition use of information on past purchases enables intelligent pricing better segmentation and higher profits

a model of competitive stock trading volume a model of competitive stock trading is developed in which investors are heterogeneous in their information and private investment opportunities and rationally trade for both informational and noninformational motives i examine the link between the nature of heterogeneity among investors and the behavior of trading volume and its relation to price dynamics it is found that volume is positively correlated with absolute changes in prices and dividends i show that informational trading and noninformational trading lead to different dynamic relations between trading volume and stock returns

differential information and dynamic behavior of stock trading volume this article develops a multiperiod rational expectations model of stock trading in which investors have differential information concerning the underlying value of the stock investors trade competitively in the stock market based on their private information and the information revealed by the market clearing prices as well as other public news we examine how trading volume is related to the information flow in the market and how investors trading reveals their private information article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the perils of behavior based personalization behavior based personalization has gained popularity in recent years whereby businesses offer personalized products based on consumers purchase histories this paper highlights two perils of behavior based personalization in competitive markets first although purchase histories reveal consumer preferences competitive exploitation of such information damages differentiation similar to the classic finding that behavior based price discrimination intensifies price competition with endogenous product design there is yet a second peril it emerges when forward looking firms try to avoid the first peril by suppressing the information value of purchase histories ideally if a market leader serves all consumers on day 1 purchase histories contain no information about consumer preferences however knowing that their rivals are willing to accommodate a market leader firms are more likely to offer a mainstream design at day 1 which jeopardizes differentiation based on this understanding i investigate how the perils of behavior based personalization change under alternative market conditions such as firms better knowledge about their own customers consumer loyalty and inertia consumer self selection and the need for classic designs

asset markets and equilibrium processes the failure of the asset market to be complete causes serial dependence in output and prices which is suboptimal we consider an economy with white noise shocks when the asset market is complete an optimal competitive allocation inherits this strong stationarity when the asset market is only sequentially complete prices and output necessarily display serial dependence at equilibrium the further incompleteness of a monetary economy explains co movements in real and nominal variables

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

personalized pricing and quality differentiation we develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing pp whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay we embed pp in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms choices over quality we show that firms optimal pricing strategies with pp may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations when the pp firm has high quality both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case conversely when the pp firm has low quality both firms lower their qualities although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with pp while it is optimal for the firm adopting pp to increase product differentiation the non pp firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space while pp results in a wider market coverage it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such pp policies despite the threat of first degree price discrimination we find that pp with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

intergenerational redistribution in the great recession in this paper we construct a stochastic overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households are subject to aggregate shocks that aect both wages and asset prices we use a calibrated version of the model to quantify how the welfare costs of severe recessions are distributed across dierent household age groups the model predicts that younger cohorts fare better than older cohorts when the equilibrium decline in asset prices is large relative to the decline in wages asset price declines hurt the old who rely on asset sales to nance consumption but benet the young who purchase assets at depressed prices in our preferred calibration asset prices decline more than twice as much as wages consistent with the experience of the us economy in the great recession a model recession is approximately welfare neutral for households in the 20 29 age group but translates into a large welfare loss of around 10 percent of lifetime consumption for households aged 70 and over

a dynamic equilibrium model of asset prices and transaction volume a dynamic general equilibrium model of capital asset pricing is constructed in which the volume of capital traded is determined endogenously the model also gives rise to a novel asset pricing formula it is shown that temporary shocks can give rise to serially correlated changes in the price of capital and transaction volume that persist long after the initial disturbance the frequency and amplitude of the resulting cycles are related to the length of the agent s planning horizon and the discount factor the model s implications for explaining asset price volatility are also explored

price competition in markets with consumer variety seeking we investigate price competition between firms in markets characterized by consumer variety seeking while previous research has addressed the effect of consumer inertia on prices there exists no research on the effects of variety seeking on price competition our study fills this gap in the literature using a two period duopoly framework as in klemperer s analysis of inertial markets we show that the noncooperative pricing equilibrium in a market with consumer variety seeking may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical market without variety seeking specifically our variety seeking model implies tacit collusion between firms in both periods unlike the inertia model of klemperer that implies tacit collusion between firms only in the second period but implies fierce price competition in the first period when consumers are assumed to have rational expectations about future prices the implied first period prices increase further which is consistent with what klemperer finds in an inertial market to summarize while our variety seeking analyses support two key results pertaining to second period prices and rational expectations previously derived for inertial markets by klemperer they depart from one key result pertaining to first period prices

segmentation advertising and prices this paper explores the implications of market segmentation on firm competitiveness in contrast to earlier work here market segmentation is minimal in the sense that it is based on consumer attributes that are completely unrelated to tastes we show that when the market is comprised by two consumer segments and when there is sufficient variation in the per consumer costs firms need to incur to access the different consumer populations then firms obtain positive profits in symmetric equilibrium otherwise the equilibrium is characterized by zero profits as a result a minimal form of market segmentation combined with advertising cost asymmetries across consumer segments give firms an opportunity to generate positive rents in an otherwise bertrand like environment

explaining bond returns in heterogeneous agent models the importance of higher order moments abstract this paper examines the higher order moments and nonlinear dynamic properties of discount bond returns in an equilibrium heterogeneous agent economy with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints we find that while it is possible for the economic model to match the mean and variance of the observed bond returns by choosing the parameters such that the borrowing constraint is binding sufficiently often the implied higher order moments are at odds with the data to match the higher order moments one needs a model in which the borrowing constraint is binding at times but not too often in this case one does not match the first two moments using the seminonparametric density estimation and the nonlinear impulse response analysis we find that our economic model can mimic the asymmetric effect of return shocks on conditional volatility as documented for the real bond returns however the economic model has difficulty replicating the dynamic properties observed in the data when the parameter values are chosen to match the first two moments of the observed bond returns

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

the price variability volume relationship on speculative markets this paper concerns the relationship between the variability of the daily price change and the daily volume of trading on the speculative markets our work extends the theory of speculative markets in two ways first we derive from economic theory the joint probability distribution of the price change and the trading volume over any interval of time within the trading day and second we determine how this joint distribution changes as more traders enter or exit from the market the model s parameters are estimated by fiml using daily data from the 90 day t bills futures market the results of the estimation can reconcile a conflict between the price variability volume relationship for this market and the relationship obtained by previous investigators for other speculative markets this paper concerns the relationship between the variability of the daily price change and the volume of trading on speculative markets previous empirical studies 2 3 6 12 14 16 of both futures and equity markets always find a positive association between price variability as measured by the squared price change ap2 and the trading volume 2 there are two explanations for the relationship clark s 2 explanation which is secondary to his effort to explain why the probability distribution of the daily price change is leptokurtic emphasizes randomness in the number of within day transactions in clark s model the daily price change is the sum of a random number of within day price changes the variance of the daily price change is thus a random variable with a mean proportional to the mean number of daily transactions clark argues that the trading volume is related positively to the number of within day transactions and so the trading volume is related positively to the variability of the price change the second explanation is due to epps and epps 6 their model examines the mechanics of within day trading the change in the market price on each within day transaction or market clearing is the average of the changes in all of the traders reservation prices epps and epps assume there is a positive relationship between the extent to which traders disagree when they revise their reservation prices and the absolute value of the change in the market price that is an increase in the extent to which traders disagree is associated with a larger absolute price change the price variability volume relationship arises then because the volume of trading is positively related to the extent to which traders disagree when they revise their reservation prices

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

technical note personalized dynamic pricing of limited inventories prior work has investigated time and inventory level dependent pricing of limited inventories with finite selling horizons we consider a third dimension in addition to time and inventory level that the firms can use in setting their prices the information that the firm has at the individual customer level an arriving customer provides a signal to the firm which is an imperfect indicator of the customer s willingness to pay and the firm makes a personalized price offer depending on the signal inventory level and time we consider two different models full personalization and partial personalization in the full personalization model the firm charges any price it wishes given the customer signal while in the partial personalization model the firm can charge one of two prices we find that a mere correlation between the signals and customers willingness to pay is not sufficient to ensure intuitive relationships between the signal and the optimal prices we determine a stronger condition which leads to several structural properties including the monotonicity of the optimal price with respect to the signal in the full personalization model for the partial personalization model we show that the optimal pricing policy is of threshold type and that the threshold is monotonic in the inventory level and time