incentive effects of benevolent intervention the case of government loan guarantees abstract there has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the united states this paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice using the simplest available two period model it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage these perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan guarantees related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm s assets and its leverage

renewable energy partnerships in development cooperation towards a relational understanding of technical assistance abstract recent decades have witnessed a surge in international programmes established to assist the adoption of renewable energy technologies rets in low and lower middle income countries so far such programmes have yielded mixed success while partnerships between international national and local organisations have become the pre eminent model for ret programmes we know relatively little about their contribution this article traces the role of renewable energy partnerships in development cooperation shifting the analytical emphasis from barriers and drivers to key actors and their relationships it presents a relational approach for the analysis of development assistance for renewable energy drawing on theories concerning the role of strong and weak ties in inter organisational networks through an analysis of seven empirical cases from central america the article provides insights into how different forms of inter organisational relationships can facilitate implementation of ret programmes but do not necessarily enhance the capacities of local organisations in a way to support a more sustainable adoption of rets on the basis of this analysis theoretical and policy implications are given concerning the potential of relational approaches for researching technology diffusion processes and the role of strong and weak ties for the success or failure of renewable energy partnerships

strategic considerations the pecking order hypothesis and market reactions to equity financing myers and majluf 1984 showed that in a world of asymmetric information managers of overvalued firms issue equity while managers of undervalued firms use cash if available this paper shows that in a multiperiod world managers of undervalued firms may find it optimal to issue stock even though cash is available consequently the market does not interpret all announcements of equity issues as signals of firm overvaluation the paper also generates predictions regarding the effect of information asymmetry and investment oppor tunities on i dividend policy and ii the cross sectional distribution of market reactions when an equity issue is announced

asymmetric information signaling and optimal corporate financial decisions as is shown in the financial literature the assumption of perfect and costless information often leads to the conclusion that corporate financial decisions are inconsequential to the value of the firm e g stiglitz 20 and fama 6 this conclusion seems to be in direct contradiction with the observed behavior of corporations that allocate real resources to implement financial policies the gap between theory and observed behavior is bridged by introducing various frictions and market imperfections a growing number of studies examine the optiraality of financial decisions when the assumption of perfect and costless information is replaced by allowing for informational asymmetry the asymmetry is assumed to exist between corporate insiders who possess superior information about the firm s future earnings prospects and outside investors the emphasis in this literature is on the ability of financial instruments to serve as signaling devices through which the true value of the firm can be revealed to the market without moral hazard or disclosure of confidential information although the signaling process is typically considered to be costly it is advocated that firms may be better off if they employ this mechanism rather than reveal reliable but confidential information or not disclose at all

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

screening market signalling and capital structure theory this paper develops an equilibrium model in which informational asymmetries about the qualities of products offered for sale are resolved through a mechanism which combines the signalling and costly screening approaches the model is developed in the context of a capital market setting in which bondholders produce costly information about a firm s a priori imperfectly known earnings distribution and use this information in specifying a bond valuation schedule to the firm given this schedule the firm s optimal choices of debt equity ratio and debt maturity structure subsequently signal to prospective shareholders the relevant parameters of the firm s earnings distribution our objectives in this paper are threefold first we discuss an alternative equilibrium mechanism for resolving the informational asymmetry problem in a lemons type market in which some agents are a priori better informed than others this mechanism recently proposed by thakor 19 is distinct from and yet integrates the salient features of the screening see stiglitz 17 and viscusi 21 and signalling bhattacharya 41 paradigms second we demonstrate that the equilibrium notion developed is relevant to the determination of an interior optimal capital structure for a firm in a world of imperfect information this application of our model involves firms with intertemporally distributed cashflows which vary cross sectionally and are not necessarily independent and identically distributed i i d through time we use this multiperiod setting to address our third objective which is to explain a firm s debt maturity decision essentially our argument is that when both the size and timing of a firm s future earnings are indistinguishable ex ante from other firms in the economy the firm s capital structure and debt maturity choices could simultaneously function as signals of these a priori unknown parameters of its earnings the market structure we consider is similar to that in thakor 19 there are sellers each of whom offers a variety of products with qualities dependent upon a common set of exogenous attributes unique to the seller and buyers who are unaware of these attributes buyers interested in one of the products offered

conglomerate merger wealth redistribution and debt a note i the set of relationships between merging firms cash flows that determines the size and direction of wealth redistribution ii the necessary and sufficient conditions for wealth redistribution neutrality in conglomerate merger which requires more than perfectly correlated cash flows and iii the determinants of wealth redistribution among debt claimants in merger in addition to those between debt and equity

determinants of corporate leasing policy the existing finance literature assumes the real operating cash flows from leasing or owning are invariant to the ownership of the asset and focuses on tax related incentives for corporate leasing policy our analysis suggests that taxes are important in identifying potential lessees and lessors but are less important in identifying the specific assets leased we provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease versuspurchase decision we then show how these incentives explain the use of contractual provisions such as maintenance clauses deposits options to purchase the asset and metering when a firm buys an asset it obtains both the right to the services of that asset over the period it is owned plus the right to sell the asset at any future date with a lease the firm acquires only the right to the asset s services for a period specified in the contract the existing finance literature analyzing corporate leasing policy concentrates on the tax related incentives to lease or buy e g see miller and upton 19 myers et al 21 lewellen et al 13 franks and hodges 11 and brealey and young 4 we believe that taxes play an important role in explaining certain dimensions of leasing policy for example the choice between manufacturer and third party leasing however taxes provide only a limited explanation of why specific assets are leased rather than owned and for the choice of provisions in lease contracts in this paper we want to accomplish two things 1 to provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease versus buy decision and 2 to employ that analysis to explain observed variation in corporate leasing policy in deriving testable hypotheses about the characteristics of lessees lessors the assets leased and provisions in lease contracts we extend the standard leaseversus buy analysis found in corporate finance textbooks e g brealey and myers

debt overhang global growth opportunities and investment abstract using a pan european data set of 8 5 million firms we find that firms with high debt financing invest relatively more than otherwise similar firms if they are operating in sectors facing good global growth opportunities the positive impact of a marginal increase in debt on investment in good global growth opportunities sectors disappears if firm debt is already excessive if it is dominated by short maturities and during systemic banking crises our results are consistent with theories of the disciplining role of debt as well as with models highlighting the negative link between firm and bank related agency problems and corporate investment

a theoretical model for valuing preferred stock this paper develops a model of preferred stock value which includes the possibility of dividends on the preferred stock being omitted the analytical framework used is based on the option hedging methodology of black and scholes precise valuation formulae are obtained for cumulative and noncumulative preferred stock in a variety of contexts the values obtained are quite different from those for either riskless or risky perpetual bonds which have previously been proposed as being similar to preferred stock since 1970 an average of 3 billion dollars worth of capital has been raised annually by corporations in the united states in the form of preferred stock in spite of this impressive figure there has been very little theoretical analysis of preferred stock valuation while previous analysis e g merton 9 and ingersoll 7 has treated preferred stock as a corporate consol bond this view is not taken here for an essential feature of preferred stock is that omission of the dividend is permissible and does not precipitate bankruptcy whereas this would happen if a bond coupon payment were missed corporations can and do fail to pay preferred dividends from time to time particularly in times of severe economic depression herein is developed a theory of preferred stock valuation the return generating process for the firm is assumed to be a continuous time diffusion and the option hedging arguments of black and scholes 2 cox and ross 4 and other authors can be used to derive a functional form of preferred stock value in terms of firm value and dividend arrearage the key to the valuation theory lies in a particular assumption about the conditions under which preferred stock dividends are omitted this assumption is that all dividends are omitted whenever firm value falls below some critical amount all the theory is developed subject to this assumption section i of this paper discusses whether such an assumption is reasonable this section carefully examines conditions under which rational management seeking to maximize common shareholder wealth would pay dividends as suggested in section ii the basic model is described and solved some generalization is obtained in section iii where allowance is made for the possible coexistence of other claims such as bonds illustrative solutions to the model are provided

interest rate uncertainty and the optimal debt maturity structure as demonstrated by boyce and kalotay 1979 and brick and ravid 1985 the use of long term debt may be preferred because of tax related advantages brick and ravid show that if there exists a tax advantage to debt and nonstochastic interest rates long term debt will increase the present value of the tax benefits of debt if the term structure of interest rates adjusted for risk of default is increasing a decreasing term structure on the other hand calls for short term debt the present paper extends the tax induced argument of brick and ravid to allow for the presence of stochastic interest rates once interest rates are uncertain pricing even under risk neutrality becomes a complex issue we analyze the debt maturity decision under two competing pricing equations the return to maturity expectations hypothesis and the local expectations hypothesis this terminology is used in cox ingersoll and ross 1981 and campbell 1986 under uncertainty a debt capacity factor will create an additional incentive to issue long term debt our other results may be interpreted to indicate that if the term premium the difference between the implied forward interest rate and the future expected spot rate is positive sufficiently negative then long term short term debt maturity strategy is optimal

auctions with contingent payments there now exists a host of results concerning the revenue performance of various auction methods this note delves deeper into auction markets by examining the effects on sellers revenue of certain noncash means of payment the basic result that bidding mediums which include some contingent pricing feature generally yield the seller more revenue than do cash bids is intriguing by itself and also points out the limitations of received theory since what follows builds on the independent preferences framework it is useful to first note the assumptions of that model and the major results pertaining to it to model an auction in the independent preferences tradition one assumes that bidders have reservation values vi that are known only privately and that can be depicted as being drawn independently from some distribution f v the most important result for this model is the revenue equivalence theorem as given in john riley and william samuelson 1981 any auction involving risk neutral bidders for which the following four conditions hold a a buyer can make any bid above some minimum reserve price b the buyer making the highest bid is awarded the object c the auction rules are anonymous and d there is a common equilibrium bidding strategy in which each buyer makes a bid bi which is a strictly increasing function of his reservation value vi yields an expected revenue of

how to achieve full electrification lessons from latin america electricity coverage in latin america has increased substantially in recent decades rising from 50 of the population in 1970 to more than 95 in 2015 growth however slowed in the 1990s as many countries experienced difficulties in extending their networks further in particular to serve those living in isolated and rural areas in spite of this the process of electrification was not interrupted and at the beginning of the 2010s decade most countries in the region were able to provide access to electricity to almost all of their populations in this paper we examine the main strategies used in latin america to increase coverage and argue that only a combination of policy efforts has made it possible to achieve the current situation we also examine the remaining obstacles at policy and institutional levels to achieving full coverage

the prospects of renewable energy technologies for rural electrification a review from nepal abstract utilization of renewable energy technologies remains one of the major energy policies throughout the world these technologies are proven to be successful for electrifying rural communities especially in developing countries realizing the benefits of renewable energy sources the government of nepal has initiated the production and distribution of renewable energy technologies in recent years mainly to electrify rural communities although these technologies are suitable for providing electricity in isolated and remote rural areas their implementation programs have not been successful as expected this review provides broad spectrum view about the energy situation in nepal and highlights the current policies and subsidies for the optimal utilization of renewable energy resources in isolated and poor rural communities in addition major promotional barriers for their implementation in nepal have been discussed

a theory of mandatory convertibles abstract the objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical analysis of mandatory convertibles which are securities that automatically mandatorily convert to common stock on a pre specified date we consider a firm facing a financial market characterized by asymmetric information and significant costs in the event of financial distress the firm can raise capital either by issuing mandatory convertibles or by issuing more conventional securities like straight debt ordinary convertibles or equity we show that in equilibrium the firm issues straight debt or ordinary convertibles if the extent of asymmetric information facing it is large but the probability of being in financial distress is relatively small it issues mandatory convertibles if it faces a smaller extent of asymmetric information but a greater probability of financial distress our model provides a rationale for the three commonly observed features of mandatory convertibles mandatory conversion capped or limited capital appreciation and a higher dividend yield compared to common stock we also characterize the equilibrium design of mandatory convertibles

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

bidding securities in projects with negative externalities abstract we analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security bid auction in which i the allocation of the project to one bidder causes a negative externality to his opponents ii the winner has to pay a fixed cost to implement the project and iii the winner s implementation decision is not contractible to study the effect of such features on the seller s expected revenue we focus on a second price auction based on one of four securities i cash ii equity iii a fixed equity hybrid and iv a fixed cash hybrid we show that the fixed equity hybrid generates the highest expected revenue whereas equity generates the lowest even though it is the instrument with the highest linkage absent negative externalities equity would generate the highest expected revenue among these four securities the revenue ranking of the instruments is robust to the information structure and the presence of insurance deposits and entry fees

the role of debt and perferred stock as a solution to adverse investment incentives we analyze the optimal mix of debt common equity and preferred equity in a model with an investment opportunity and asymmetric information about its quality and show that an all equity financed firm will overinvest issuing the appropriate amount of debt before the project becomes available resolves this overinvestment problem introducing a second motive for debt such as taxes leads to a role for preferred stock as a means of enhancing the firm s debt capacity by creating additional incentives to invest we derive an opti mal capital structure involving debt preferred stock and common stock this paper examines the ifnpact of a firm s capital structure on its subsequent investment decisions we assume that a firm s equityholders receive private information about the quality of a project that must be funded externally before the project becomes available and before the information asymmetry exists however the equityholders can choose a capital structure from among debt preferred stock and common stock we show that a subsequent informational asymmetry about project quality induces fully equity financed firms to overin vest that is to accept some negative net present value investments this overin vestment will be reflected in security values prior to the investment we then demonstrate that an appropriate initial debt issue eliminates this suboptimal in vestment behavior and results in an optimal initial debt equity ratio not based upon taxes bankruptcy costs or other exogenous factors we then allow for a corporate tax advantage to debt that leads the firm to issue additional debt however the additional debt creates an underinvestment problem we demonstrate that preferred stock has features that generate incen tives for equityholders to invest and so preferred stock enhances the firm s debt capacity i e the firm can issue more debt in conjunction with preferred stock without creating an underinvestment problem

timing of investment and financing decisions in imperfectly competitive financial markets the authors present a model in which firms can time their projects they show that financing and investment decisions are interrelated if financial markets are not perfectly competitive resulting in apparent timing of financing decisions the authors obtain the result that the proportion of equity financing relative to debt is higher when economic conditions are improving they also show that the type of financing depends both on current and past economic conditions finally the authors show that there will be relatively more equity financing in industries in which obsolescence is more likely copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

debt versus equity under asymmetric information in a world of asymmetric information in which only the insiders know the quality of the firm it is claimed that debt even if it is risky is more advantageous than outside equity because issuance of debt is less attractive to inferior firms the advantage to debt arises from the fact that it can keep unprofitable firms out of the market thus improving the average quality of firms in the market this advantage exists even if the firms cannot be perfectly sorted in the signaling equilibrium

an exploration of competitive signalling equilibria with third party information production the case of debt insurance in markets in which sellers know more about product quality than buyers but cannot convey their superior information either by directly issuing costly signals of the spence type or by successfully funding the production of information i suggest another way in which the informational asymmetry problem can be resolved a third party can produce the necessary information at a cost and use it to price a service consumed by the sellers buyers can then observe a seller s choice of service consumption level and be well informed in equilibrium in this framework i construct a model in which a borrower s choice of insurance coverage signals its default probability to lenders and explore the properties of the resulting signalling equilibrium in a variety of cases subsequent to akerlof s provocative paper 1 the analysis of equilibria in markets with asymmetrically informed agents has been the subject of considerable enquiry akerlof s novel insight was the observation that such markets can fail in the sense that the demand at any price is zero this market failure can be prevented however if a priori imperfectly informed buyers of a given product can somehow revise their initial conditional estimates of product quality so that prices are consistent with quality in an equilibrium bhattacharya 2 3 ross 9 and spence 12 13 14 have suggested that one way of achieving this is to allow sellers of the product or service to issue costly signals of the quality offered for sale in a rational equilibrium prospective buyers could use these signals to discriminate accurately between products of differing quality campbell and kracaw 4 have recently suggested another possibility that sellers can make side payments to information producers to acquire the necessary information at a cost and convey it to the market this paper explores yet another distinct way of resolving the information asymmetry problem the market structure considered here involves three parties a group of sellers each aware of the quality of its own product a set of buyers who perhaps satisfy the rational expectations assumption that they are aware of the average quality of the products in the market but are unable to distinguish one seller from the other on the basis of product quality and third party information producers who expend resources to produce information about the quality of each product offered for sale these information producers recover the cost of information acquisition by using their knowledge to structure and price some fixed quality service that they provide to

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

the economics of large scale infrastructure fdi the case of project finance in this paper a theoretical framework is developed to explain why multinational enterprises invest in infrastructure through the mode of project finance pf instead of using corporate finance infrastructure assets are susceptible to creeping expropriation from host governments and to hold up from concentrated suppliers buyers corporate finance based foreign direct investment fdi cannot fully mitigate these threats however pf based fdi through strategic use of capital structure chiefly high leverage and syndicate structure of debt improves the bargaining position of firms in ex post recontracting negotiations high leverage precommits cash flows serves as a monitoring and early warning mechanism that reveals creeping expropriation induces lenders to join renegotiations and reduces reported net profits the syndicate structure of debt creates a reputation effect for host countries high debt shields wealth from concentrated suppliers buyers while separate incorporation in pf allows suppliers buyers to hold equity stakes this theoretical framework is tested by assembling a database of 200 investments worth 159 97 billion by 167 firms in 128 countries over 17 years sample selection bias is controlled for through heckman probit specification the hypothesis that pf based fdi helps mitigate hold up from concentrated suppliers buyers finds strong support while the hypothesis that pf mitigates country risk finds limited support

bidding with securities comment to feasible securities 1 their main finding concerns the role of the steepness of securities in determining the seller s revenue they show that the steeper the payment to the seller as a func tion of the realized value the higher is the seller s expected revenue a shift from a security say a debt to a steeper one say equity or call option flattens the surplus accruing to a bidder as a function of his future realized value and this levels the competitive gaps between bidders hence the competition becomes intensified 2 in this comment we wish to add to dks analysis a caveat that the adverse selection prob lem should be an important part of security and auction design consideration unlike cash bids security bids are difficult to evaluate when the seller does not know the buyer s exact type for instance a 40 percent share of an asset managed by a buyer may be less valuable than a 30 per cent share of the same asset managed by a different buyer if the latter is much more competent lacking such information a seller may fall victim to adverse selection choosing a wrong bidder this problem has been noted by several authors such as william samuelson 1987 simon board 2007 and charles zheng 2001 in the context of a fixed security design our concern here is its relevance for security design we show that the adverse selection problem may lead to rankings of alternative security designs that are quite different from and in fact opposite to those found in dks in particular under a reasonable circumstance a steeper security is more vulnerable to adverse selection and could result in a poorer revenue performance than a flatter security to illustrate suppose there are two buyers 1 and 2 buyer 1 2 has a project which gener ates a gross return of v and requires initial investment cost of x r suppose that vx v2 0 and xx x2 and also that vx xx v2 x2 that is buyer 1 s project generates a higher net return so is efficient to select but requires a higher investment than buyer 2 s project this assumption is reasonable a financially distressed or bankrupt firm will more likely turn profitable again under management willing to infuse more cash for instance or a firm that can generate a greater value from an underperforming target is more likely to have a higher opportunity cost e g of pursuing other target or standalone values the assumption is equally compelling in other contexts such as the government sale of oil leases

the socio technical barriers to solar home systems shs in papua new guinea choosing pigs prostitutes and poker chips over panels this study explores the socio technical barriers to solar home systems shs in papua new guinea the authors collected primary data through semi structured research interviews conducted over the course of february 2010 april 2010 respondents included government officials financiers planners commercial distributors and companies teachers and rural villagers in addition to members of civil society academics consultants and trainers these interviews were supplemented with site visits to port moresby goroka and madang and field research in the villages of akameku asaroka lufa kundiawa okifa simbu and talidig the study draws from these interviews and visits to discuss four types of barriers technical barriers relate to substandard equipment and logistical problems economic barriers include high rates of poverty misconceptions about the role of currency and lack of financing political barriers include poor institutional capacity and a government commitment to fossil fueled grid electrification social barriers encompass unrealistic expectations about what shs can provide along with jealousy theft vandalism and unfamiliarity with solar technology

on bidding with securities risk aversion and positive dependence abstract demarzo et al 2005 consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned the paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family provides greater expected revenue to the seller two assumptions are the buyers are risk neutral the random variables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated we show that this revenue ranking holds for the second price auction in the case of risk aversion however it does not hold if affiliation is relaxed to a less restrictive form of positive dependence namely first order stochastic dominance fosd we define the relative strong steepness of families of securities and show that it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for comparing two families in the fosd case all results extend to the english auction

liquidity maturity and the yields on u s treasury securities the efrect8 of aaaet liquidity on expected retuma for ts with infinite maturities toc ka are eumined for bonda treuury notes and bills with matched maturities of lellll than 6 months the yield to maturity ill higher on notes which have lower liquidity the yield di1ferential between notes and billa is a decreuing and convex function of the time to maturity the results provide a robult confirmation of the liquidity effect in auet pricing this paper studies empirically the effects of the liquidity of capital assets on their prices amihud and mendelson 1986 1989 proposed that liquidity affects asset prices because investors require a compensation for bearing transaction costs transaction costs paid whenever the asset is traded form a sequence of cash outflows the discounted value of this cost stream proxies for the value 1088 due to illiquidity which lowers the asset s value for any given cash flow that the asset generates 1 as a result the return on assets should be an increasing function of their illiquidity other things equal for stocks the illiquidity effect is expected to be strong because their transaction cost sequence is infinite amihud and mendelson 1986 1989 demonstrated that common stocks with lower liquidity yielded significantly higher average returns after controlling for risk and for other factors these results on the importance of liquidity in the pricing of stocks raise additional questions i does the liquidity effect depend on the specific controls used by amihud and mendelson 1986 1989 1 ii does illiquidity have a similarly strong effect on the pricing of bonds whose maturities are finite and iii if liquidity affects bond yields how is this effect related to the bond s time to maturity

endogenous entry to security bid auctions we endogenize entry to a security bid auction where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate we first consider any minimum reserve security bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset s value when retained by the seller demarzo kremer and skrzypacz 2005 establish that with a fixed number of bidders auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues counterintuitively we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry further enhancing the revenues from such auctions we then establish that with optimal reserve securities auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

the role for low carbon electrification technologies in poverty reduction and climate change strategies a focus on renewable energy mini grids with case studies in nepal peru and kenya abstract as a potential poverty reduction and climate change strategy this paper considers the advantages and disadvantages of using renewable energy technologies for rural electrification in developing countries although each case must be considered independently given a reliable fuel source renewable energy mini grids powered by biomass gasifiers or micro hydro plants appear to be the favoured option due to their lower levelised costs provision of ac power potential to provide a 24 h service and ability to host larger capacity systems that can power a wide range of electricity uses sustainability indicators are applied to three case studies in order to explore the extent to which sustainable welfare benefits can be created by renewable energy mini grids policy work should focus on raising awareness about renewable energy mini grids improving institutional technical and regulatory frameworks and developing innovative financing mechanisms to encourage private sector investments establishing joint technology and community engagement training centres should also be encouraged

capital structure and signaling game equilibria in this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game we prove that when insiders have perfect information regarding the firm s future case flows the application of refinements to the set of admissible equilibria leads to the dominance of debt over equity financing however we show that when insiders observe the firm s cash flows imperfectly there may exist sequential equilibria in which this pecking order breaks down and some firms strictly prefer equity to debt financing we also prove that despite the breakdown of the pecking order the announcement effect of equity financing will be negative relative to debt financing

conflicts in bankruptcy and the sequence of debt issues this paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule apr when we introduce explicit costs of class conflict the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt the implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues we test several other implications of our model as well

on the existence of an optimal capital structure theory and evidence one of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital structure the geneses of this controversy were the seminal contributions by modigliani and miller 18 19 the general academic view by the mid 1970s although not a consensus was that the optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present value of bankruptcy costs no sooner did this general view become prevalent in the profession than miller 16 presented a new challenge by showing that under certain conditions the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level since then there has developed a burgeoning theoretical literature attempting to reconcile miller s model with the balancing theory of optimal capital structure e g deangelo and masulis 5 kim 12 and modigliani 17 the general result of this work is that if there are significant leverage related costs such as bankruptcy costs agency costs of debt and loss of non debt tax shields and if the income from equity is untaxed then the marginal bondholder s tax rate will be less than the corporate rate and there will be a positive net tax advantage to corporate debt financing the firm s optimal capital structure will involve the trade off between the tax advantage of debt and various leverage related costs the upshot of these extensions of miller s model is the recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is essentially an empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage related costs are economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing the miller model and its theoretical extensions have inspired several timeseries studies which provide evidence on the existence of leverage related costs trczinka 28 reports that from examining differences in average yields between taxable corporate bonds and tax exempt municipal bonds one cannot reject the miller hypothesis that the marginal bondholder s tax rate is not different from the corporate tax rate however trczinka is careful to point out that this finding does not necessarily imply that there is no tax advantage of corporate debt if the personal tax rate on equity is positive indeed buser and hess 1 using a longer time series of data and more sophisticated econometric techniques estimate that the average effective personal tax rate on equity is statistically positive and is not of a trivial magnitude more importantly they document evidence that is consistent with the existence of significant leverage related costs in the economy

financing led solar home systems in developing countries abstract about 1 4 billion people around the world still do not have access to the regular electricity it is estimated that roughly 85 of the people without electricity live in rural semi urban or remote rural areas of the sub saharan africa and south asia although grid expansion is a vital objective of several developing countries and could be a long term solution the remoteness isolation low electricity demand of many rural communities high investment cost of grid expansion make them very unlikely to be reached by the extension of the power grid consequently the off grid generation systems seem to be the most suited alternative to provide the electricity services to these isolated rural communities solar home systems shss with light emitting diode led lamps are considered to be cost effective and robust decentralized option for rural electrification two financing schemes fee for service and micro credit system ownership are primarily important for acquiring the shss by the rural population however high upfront cost of shss and absence of payment flexibility is deterring the penetration into larger market of lower income group rural population non availability of facile finance to rural population at the grass root level is the major barrier inhibiting the widespread adoption of solar powered lighting systems micro finance institutions mfis can be useful to address the gap between the high initial upfront cost of shs and low paying capacity of rural households by providing flexible and affordable credit the one stop shop model based on a single micro energy provider who provides the services of finances supply of standardized shss and after sale energy services is crucial the success of the shs program depends on the satisfactory technical performance an adequate financing infrastructure responsive after sales support and the extent to which it can fulfill the needs of the end users of having grid quality energy

what is challenging renewable energy entrepreneurs in developing countries this paper cumulates the findings from a review of the challenges faced by renewable energy entrepreneurs in developing countries to date research that could facilitate the success of renewable energy entrepreneurs in the world s developing regions has been fragmented across two main bodies of literature management specifically entrepreneurship and renewable energy by conducting a qualitative review of the extant literature i propose that the findings from both bodies of research may be distilled to six 6 key challenges inadequate access to institutional finance the price of renewable energy technologies rets the lack of skilled labour underdeveloped physical infrastructure and logistics power dominance of incumbents inadequate government or policy support through this research i not only advance a unified conceptualisation of the challenges faced by renewable energy entrepreneurs in developing countries but also highlight a number of the revealed opportunities for future research

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

positive information from equity issue announcements abstract the myers and majluf 1984 model predicts a nonpositive price reaction to an announcement of a new issue of equity this paper shows that the myers and majluf result is a direct outcome of their assumption that all potential projects facing the firm have a nonnegative net present value refining the myers and majluf model by allowing for the realistic possibility of potential projects having negative net present values leads to different predictions the refined model predicts positive as well as negative stock price responses consistent with recent empirical evidence concerning the stock price effects of new stock issues

optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders abstract i analyze the effects of heterogeneity in terms of bidders valuation distributions and standalone values in equity auctions auctions in which bidders offer equities rather than cash heterogeneity misaligns equity bids face values monetary values and bidder types making the seller s revenues sensitive to the auction design given heterogeneity i identify the mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue among all incentive compatible mechanisms of equity auctions i show how different sources of heterogeneity alter the optimal design revenues and allocational efficiency unlike optimal cash auctions myerson 1981 where bidders standalone values are irrelevant the allocation of optimal equity auctions favors bidders with lower standalone values because the seller can extract a larger proportion of their rents by contrast when bidders differ only in valuation distributions optimal equity auctions feature more efficient allocations than optimal cash auctions

auctions with contingent payments an overview i survey a literature on auctions with contingent payments that is auctions in which payments are allowed to depend on an ex post verifiable variable such as revenues in oil lease auctions based on demarzo et al 2005 i describe a partial ranking of auction revenues for auctions that differ in terms of contract forms pricing rules and seller commitment and why the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply even in an independent private values setup i discuss models that incorporate adverse selection moral hazard competition between auctioneers common values and the sale of multiple units

corporate earnings and financings an empirical analysis this article examines the long term behavior of corporate earnings around three corporate financing events sales of common stock convertible bonds and straight bonds the article shows that earnings declined for all issuers and that more capital is raised the larger the earnings decline these findings indicate that external financings are motivated by earnings declines no evidence is found of a relationship between the size of the subsequent earnings downturn or the amount of capital raised and stock price reactions to the financing announcements these findings suggest that security sales did not systematically provide new information about either the magnitude of subsequent earnings downturn or the amount of financing copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

enabling private sector investment in microgrid based rural electrification in developing countries a review access to electricity is widely recognized as an important factor for economic and social development low rates of access particularly in remote rural areas in regions such as sub saharan africa south asia and southeast asia have led developing nations and international organizations to set ambitious goals to expand the reach of electricity decentralized solutions such as microgrids have been proposed as cost effective solutions to reaching communities located far from central grid infrastructure lack of capital from public and donor sources has severely impeded achieving access goals leading to calls for greater private sector participation in electrification activities however due to the high level of risk associated with decentralized electrification projects in low income areas marginal expected returns on investment and a lack of clear and effective public policy the private sector has not shown significant interest in participating in such projects the purpose of this paper is to review barriers to private sector participation in decentralized electrification projects and to identify solutions that have been implemented and proposed to overcome these barriers the barriers discussed include unsecure revenue streams inability to finance projects and long term project risks such as grid encroachment the range of interventions and business models reviewed include methods to secure reliable demand subsidy models risk guarantees and different revenue models this paper does not include an analysis of the effectiveness of the different interventions described future research should evaluate the relative costs and benefits of these interventions in order to provide robust policy guidance to decision makers in developing countries

addressing the renewable energy financing gap in africa to promote universal energy access integrated renewable energy financing in malawi abstract the sustainable energy for all initiative is a global initiative launched by the united nations secretary general in 2012 with a goal of providing universal access to modern energy services by 2030 to achieve this goal substantial financial and technological investments will be required at a rate far exceeding historical levels sub saharan africa has a 30 5 electrification rate and policy reform issues to improve electrification have been poorly implemented thereby sprinkling doubt as to whether the region would be able to achieve 100 access to electricity for all by the year 2030 sub saharan africa faces a tough challenge in order to achieve universal access to modern energy services since the region fails to attract energy sector investments there is also a general perception that the region contributes very little to global greenhouse gas emissions hence offers few opportunities to reduce these emissions consequently missing out on attracting climate finance projects a guarantee of power purchase has been shown to attract energy sector investments however guarantees of power purchases such as feed in tariffs are experiencing slow market growth in developing countries because of a range of technical regulatory and financial barriers using malawi as a case study of a developing country this review provides a perspective from a sub saharan africa least developed country as to the various electrification renewable energy deployment and climate change management challenges that still require urgent attention this study shows that despite the perceived regulatory and financial challenges malawi can integrate and use a combination of adapted price guarantee schemes cross subsidies and environmental taxes in order to support initiatives aimed at supporting the country s development of renewable energy sources and hence indirectly support the sustainable energy for all initiative

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing

telecommunications infrastructure and economic development a simultaneous approach in diesem beitrag wird untersucht welchen einflus die telekommunikations infrastruktur auf die wirtschaftliche entwicklung ausubt diese wichtige frage hat im zusammenhang mit der diskussion um informationsautobahnen aktualitat erlangt in der vorliegenden studie wird der einflus der telekommunikations infrastruktur fur 21 oecdlander fur die vergangenen 20 jahre analysiert es wird ein strukturgleichungsmodell geschatzt in dem investitionen in die telekommunikations infrastruktur als endogene variable erfast werden und in einem mikromodell angebot und nachfrage nach telekommunikations investitionen spezifiziert werden das mikromodell wird dann zusammen mit der makro wachstumsgleichung geschatzt als ergebnis stellen die autoren dann eine positive kausalbeziehung zwischen telekommunikations investitionen und wirtschaftlicher entwicklung fest wenn eine kritische masse an telekommunikations infrastruktur existiert

is there a pecking order evidence from a panel of ipo firms abstract we test the pecking order model of capital structure by examining the financing of firms that went public in 1983 we estimate a logit to predict external financing and a multinomial logit to predict the type of financing using data on the ipo firms security offerings during 1984 1992 our results indicate that the probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in internally generated funds although firms with cash surpluses avoid external financing firms that access the capital markets do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer

optimal priority structure capital structure and investment we study the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a dynamic model where the firm has multiple debt issues and equityholders choose the timing of investment jointly optimal capital and priority structures can virtually eliminate investment distortions because debt priority serves as a dynamically optimal contract examining the relative efficiency of priority rules observed in practice we develop several predictions about how firms adjust their priority structure in response to changes in leverage credit conditions and firm fundamentals notably financially unconstrained firms with few growth opportunities prefer senior debt while financially constrained firms with or without growth opportunities prefer junior debt moreover lower rated firms are predicted to spread priority across debt classes finally our analysis has a number of important implications for empirical capital structure research including the relations between market leverage book leverage and credit spreads and tobin s q the influence of firm fundamentals on the agency cost of debt and the conservative debt policy puzzle the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

inefficient sorting under output sharing abstract i study sorting in a frictional market asset owners post their terms then workers direct their search when the owners switch from prices to shares the competition between workers is handicapped the unique equilibrium features inefficient positive assortative matching the queue lengths are distorted even though the hosios efficiency condition holds for every pair of types for any distribution of types all workers pair up with better assets the best workers suffer while the weakest workers gain the opposite occurs on the asset side competition drives the asset owners to post flatter contracts it leads to constrained efficiency whenever prices are feasible otherwise handicapped competition results in inefficient sorting

capital market access and corporate loan structure in this article we use a sample of 14 075 loan packages issued between 1993 and 2007 to examine if borrower access to external capital markets influences corporate loan structure we classify firms into three access categories private unrated public and rated public private firms have the lowest access and to date no large sample investigation of their loans has been done in the literature rated public firms access the capital markets the most we find the level of access influences loan structure in ways that are consistent with having greater or fewer financing alternatives as well as theories on information asymmetry agency and monitoring in particular loans to firms with higher levels of access have shorter maturities fewer loan facilities per package and a lower probability of being secured we also find that a higher level of access results in a higher incidence of single lender loans but among multiple lender loans it leads to a larger number of lenders furthermore we find evidence

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

liquidation under moral hazard optimal debt maturity and loan commitments abstract this paper examines the benefits and limitations of loan commitment financing commitments enable firms to adopt more efficient liquidation policies we demonstrate however that the limitations of commitment financing depend on a number of firm characteristics in some circumstances firms find long term debt to be a superior alternative to commitment financing this provides a possible explanation for why loan commitments are not universally utilized by considering both the benefits as well as the limitations of loan commitment financing we are also able to integrate loan commitment contracts into a model of optimal debt maturity

financing off grid sustainable energy access for the poor this paper examines the role of public instruments in promoting private finance to achieve off grid sustainable energy access renewable energy technologies are increasingly becoming the cheapest solutions for off grid energy access the dramatic uptake of mobile phones in developing countries shows how quickly decentralized services can develop on a commercial basis under the right conditions and raises the prospect that private finance could also drive decentralized energy access for the poor indeed there are already a number of instances of clean energy solutions such as solar portable lights household biogas units or solar home systems that have managed to scale up through leveraging private finance however the experience gained from first generation market development projects show that in almost all cases significant public resources have been necessary to increase the affordability of clean energy technologies provide access to financing for the poor and remove non economic barriers such public interventions may be funded by international public finance domestic budgets and carbon finance despite mounting fiscal constraints facing governments worldwide the emergence of new sources of climate finance and the political momentum in support of energy subsidy reforms as well as new programming modalities offer opportunities to leverage additional resources to achieve universal energy access by 2030

noncooperative equilibrium and market signalling among many recent developments in the economics of information none has generated more controversy than the concept of market signalling introduced by a michael spence if buyers are less well informed about product quality than sellers and no additional information is available market clearing prices must reflect some weighted average of product quality then if potential sellers of the highest quality products have the greatest opportunity costs and these costs exceed price they will not enter the market this adverse selection phenomenon is however offset if sellers of higher quality products can adopt activities that operate as a signal to potential buyers intuitively an activity is a potential signal if entering into it has a lower marginal cost for sellers of higher quality products for example the fly bynight operator faces a higher advertising cost per unit of sales than the new entrant who plans to build and then maintain his reputation or in the labor market productivity on the job is positively correlated with performance in school therefore the higher productivity worker has on average a lower personal cost of obtaining a given set of educational credentials similarly in purchasing insurance the marginal cost of accepting a higher coinsurance rate for a specific loss is lower for those with a lower probability of loss but on closer inspection it turns out that informational equilibria that is equilibria in which signalling is needed to distinguish product quality do not have the stability properties of classical walrasian equilibria in papers by michael rothschild and joseph stiglitz and the author 1975 1977 it has been shown that unless the difference between quality levels is sufficiently large there is for every set of signal price pairs s some alternative s 4 s which if offered by a single seller would improve his lot that is there is no cournot nash signalling equilibrium one possible inference that might be drawn from this result is that signalling could not be an important phenomenon in a competitive economy after all if any attempt at signalling were to result in interference in the form of competitive responses there would be no opportunity for individuals to identify the correlation between the level of the signal and the underlying quality of the product however this is too simplistic since the interference cannot take place until after signalling has been established it is therefore more appropriate to suppose that an economy is initially in a state of informational equilibrium with signals reflecting product quality and to ask whether the potential instability is likely to lead to a general collapse of the equilibrium following the approach adopted by charles wilson there have been several related attempts to introduce quasi dynamic considerations in which every agent takes into account the reaction by other agents when contemplating a defection from the initial set of signal price pairs s it is then argued that the set s forms a stable equilibrium if for every alternative s that would make a single defector better off this same signalprice pair would make the defector worse off after the reaction by other agents where these attempts differ is in the university of california los angeles this research was supported by national science foundation grant soc 76 13443 to the rand corporation

costly auction entry royalty payments and the optimality of asymmetric designs abstract we analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash with sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different ex ante probabilities when bidders are ex ante identical higher royalty rates which tie payments more closely to bidder valuations increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auction design further raising revenues when bidders differ ex ante in entry costs the seller favors the low cost entrant whereas when bidders have different valuation distributions the seller favors the weaker bidder if entry costs are low but not if they are high higher royalty rates cause the seller to favor the weaker bidder by less and the strong bidder by more

optimal capital structure and project financing abstract we examine the financing and incorporation modes for new projects there are two objectives the first is to provide a theory of optimal capital structure that links risk leverage and value and is particularly applicable to large firms counter to conventional wisdom we show riskier firms acquire more debt pay higher interest rates and have higher values in equilibrium second we provide an economic rationale for project financing which entails organizing a new project legally distinct from the firm s other assets we explain why project financing involves higher leverage than conventional financing and why highly risky assets are project financed

firm specific human capital amd optimal capital structure the authors consider the moral hazard in managers undersupplying imperfectly marketable firm specific human capital firms may cope by granting long term wage contracts that protect managers against employment termination although ex ante efficient these contracts may be ex post inefficient when managerial ability is discovered to be low precommitted firms must honor these contracts unless there is ownership transfer that permits their legal invalidation bankruptcy is one such transfer mechanism since managers anticipate the contractual consequence of bankruptcy leverage worsens moral hazard this cost provides a counterbalance to the debt tax shield and leads to an optimal capital structure copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

financing energy access and off grid electrification a review of status options and challenges abstract this paper provides a review of funding needs and financing mechanisms for energy access in general and off grid electrification in particular to find whether the funding for these activities has been adequate whether sufficient funding is likely to be available to meet the needs of universal energy access whether innovative approaches can be used in funding it finds that in all successful cases the state has played an important role in funding infrastructure investments but many developing countries have neglected the energy access issue for a long time international donor agencies have provided selective and limited support while the innovative mechanisms are also unfriendly towards small scale projects weak governance limited organisational capacity and unfavourable policy environment militate against large scale mobilisation of financial resources in the poorest countries of the world where energy access is a chronic problem the challenge of mobilising finance and ensuring its appropriate delivery and use remains a major issue and would require a co ordinated effort of all relevant stakeholders

on the relevance of debt maturity structure in this paper we present a tax induced framework to analyze debt maturity problems we show that under some modifications of the existing u s tax code debt maturity is irrelevant even in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs that yield an optimal capital structure if this restrictive structure is relaxed and assuming the miller 15 equilibrium does not prevail tax reasons would usually imply the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure if there exists a gain from leverage then an increasing term structure of interest rates adjusted for default risk results in long term debt being optimal a decreasing term structure under similar circumstances renders short term debt optimal in the absence of agency costs a miller 15 type result emerges at equilibrium and irrelevance prevails we also argue that agency costs could again reverse the irrelevance and imply a firm specific optimal debt maturity structure there has been extensive discussion in the literature concerning the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure kraus 13 states without proof that efficient capital markets preclude the existence of an optimal debt maturity stiglitz 20 demonstrates the irrelevance of debt maturity but in an economic environment in which the entire financing decision is irrelevant due to the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs in contrast morris 16 argues that the issuance of short term debt can reduce the risk to stockholders and thereby increase equity value if the covariance between the net operating income and future interest rates is positive this result by morris is obtained even in the absence of taxes and when there is no probability of default the discrepancy between morris and stiglitz arises because morris uses the bogue and roll 31 multiperiod capital asset pricing model to incorporate uncertain future interest rates which implicitly assumes that investors cannot diversify away intertem

financial contracting and leverage induced over and under investment incentives this paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over and under investment incentives associated with risky debt we show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under investment but increases over investment and vice versa under symmetric information the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets i e project financing under asymmetric information the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project s cash flow in the same rate if this is not possible the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large with regard to dividend convenants we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments when they are unconditioned allowing more dividends increases the under investment incentive in contrast conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over investment incentive

on the good news in equity carve outs the announcement of the sale of equity in a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation is received by the market as good news about the value of the existing equity in the parent corporation this is in stark contrast to announcements of other forms of public equity financing we show that the apparent inconsistency between the market response to equity carve out announcements and other forms of equity financing can be easily understood in the myers and majluf 1984 framework it is shown that firms that resort to an equity carve out will be firms that on average are being undervalued by the market the announcement of the sale of equity in a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation known as an equity carve out 1 appears to be received by investors as good news about the value of the existing equity in the parent corporation for a sample of announcement of equity carve outs by corporations schipper and smith 1986 2 document that such announcements are associated with an average market adjusted positive return to the stock of the parent corporation of about 2 as schipper and smith point out this positive market reaction is in stark contrast to the well documented3 evidence that announcements of issues of seasoned equity are treated by the market as unfavorable news about the value of a company s stock price masulis and korwar 1986 and others have documented that announcements of equity issues by u s industrial firms are associated with an average negative abnormal return of around 3 not only are sales of seasoned equity viewed unfavorably by the market but the empirical evidence indicates that even sales of convertible debt are associated

financial contracting under risk neutrality limited liability and ex ante asymmetric information this paper derives equilibrium financial contract forms in a risk neutral capital market with asymmetrically informed borrowers entrepeneurs and investors in doing so the analysis generalizes the work of demeza and webb 1987 by allowing for arbitrary profit distributions arbitrary contract forms and variable investment choices the main result of this inquiry is as follows when higher quality entrepreneurs have better ex post profit distributions in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property equilibrium contracts take a standard debt form so long as admissible investor payoff functions are monotone non decreasing in firm profit without the monotonicity constraint contracts often take a different live or die form

a direct test of agency theories of debt evidence from residential mortgage backed securities when a firm is facing default equity holders have incentives to engage in asset substitution underinvest or directly transfer wealth few papers document investment distortions on account of debt equity agency conflicts only that the threat of distortions influence ex ante financing costs a nonagency residential mortgage backed security deal represents an entity that is highly leveraged where ex ante equity holders know they will face default this provides an ideal laboratory for testing whether the threat of default creates any of the distortions predicted in theory we estimate a lower bound on agency costs associated with direct wealth transfers to be in the range of 018 per dollar the internet appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2853 this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

the economics of renewable energy expansion in rural sub saharan africa accelerating development in sub saharan africa will require massive expansion of access to electricity currently reaching only about one third of households this paper explores how essential economic development might be reconciled with the need to keep carbon emissions in check the authors develop a geographically explicit framework and use spatial modeling and cost estimates from recent engineering studies to determine where stand alone renewable energy generation is a cost effective alternative to centralized grid supply the results suggest that decentralized renewable energy will likely play an important role in expanding rural energy access but it will be the lowest cost option for a minority of households in africa even when likely cost reductions over the next 20 years are considered decentralized renewables are competitive mostly in remote and rural areas while grid connected supply dominates denser areas where the majority of households reside these findings underscore the need to de carbonize the fuel mix for centralized power generation as it expands in africa

the determinants of contract terms in bank revolving credit agreements the paper examines the determinants of contract terms on bank revolving credit agree ments revolvers of medium large publicly traded companies we model the duration maturity secured status and pricing decisions within a simultaneous decision frame work thereby overcoming the biased and inconsistent estimates in prior single equation studies of debt contract terms we find strong interrelationships between contract terms with significant bi directional relationships between duration and secured status and be tween the all in spread and commitment fees and a unidirectional relationship from both duration and secured status to all in spread we also illustrate how several single equa tion studies of contract terms draw incorrect conclusions because of their inappropriate assumption that other contract terms and leverage were exogenous finally our results sup port the hypothesis that the setting of contract terms plays an important role in alleviating contracting problems

competition among sellers in securities auctions we study simultaneous security bid second price auctions with com petition among sellers for potential bidders the sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets upon observing auction designs potential bidders decide which auctions to enter we characterize all symmet ric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations in large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash we extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options jel d44 d82 g10 in economic and financial markets rights to control and exploit assets with the potential to generate cash flows are often sold through auctions while in some auc tions the winner s future profits from the asset cannot be used as a basis for payment so only cash bids are possible in many cases it is possible to observe and verify the ex post cash flows this means that bidders can submit their bids in the form of securities the values of which are contingent on future cash flows from the asset securities auctions are common in the real world examples include government sales of oil leases lead plaintiff wireless spectrum and highway building auctions many other transactions though not formally auctions are similar to securities auc tions in nature examples include corporate takeovers intercorporate asset sales book publishing advertising and venture capital markets 1 in this paper we analyze equilibrium auction mechanisms when sellers compete for potential bidders by altering security designs of their auctions rather than reserve prices as in the prior literature specifically we consider an environment in which

pricing options in an extended black scholes economy with illiquidity theory and empirical evidence this article studies the pricing of options in an extended black scholes economy in which the underlying asset is not perfectly liquid the resulting liquidity risk is modeled as a stochastic supply curve with the transaction price being a function of the trade size consistent with the market microstructure literature the supply curve is upward sloping with purchases executed at higher prices and sales at lower prices optimal discrete time hedging strategies are then derived empirical evidence reveals a significant liquidity cost intrinsic to every option copyright 2006 oxford university press

bidding with securities auctions and security design we study security bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities that is they offer payments that are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold the value depends on investment by the winner thus creating the possibility of moral hazard such auctions are commonly used both formally and informally in formal auctions the seller generally restricts bids to an ordered set such as an equity share or royalty rate by restricting the bids standard auction formats such as first and second price auctions can be used in informal settings with competing buyers the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront rather bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid based on his beliefs ex post we characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies in this setting and show that an informal mechanism yields the lowest possible revenues across all mechanisms we also determine the optimal formal mechanism and show that the security design is more important than the auction format we show that the revenue equivalence principle that expected revenues are independent of the auction format holds if the set of permissible securities is ordered and convex such as equity otherwise it need not hold for example when bidders offer standard debt securities a second price auction is superior on the other hand if bidders compete on the conversion ratio of convertible debt a first price auction yields higher revenues finally we examine how different forms of moral hazard impact our results

investment incentives debt and warrants abstract this paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing the decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized the paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives these claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm s earnings and this mitigates the incentive to take risk it is shown that under certain conditions such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm

the price of options illiquidity the purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of illiquidity on the value of currency options we use a unique dataset that allows us to explore this issue in special circumstances where options are issued by a central bank and are not traded prior to maturity the value of these options is compared to similar options traded on the exchange we find that the nontradable options are priced about 21 percent less than the exchange traded options this gap cannot be arbitraged away due to transactions costs and the risk that the exchange rate will change during the bidding process

optimal equity auctions with two dimensional types abstract we analyze the design and performance of equity auctions when bidder s valuations and opportunity costs are private information distributed according to an arbitrary joint density that can differ across bidders we identify for any incentive compatible mechanism an equivalent single dimensional representation for uncertainty we then characterize the revenue maximizing and surplus maximizing equity mechanisms and compare revenues in optimal equity and cash auctions unlike in cash auctions the adverse selection arising from bidders two dimensional types in equity auctions can lead to a global violation of the regularity condition which represents a maximal mismatch between incentive compatibility and maximization of revenue or surplus such mismatch can lead a seller to exclude bidders and demand a bidder specific stake from a non excluded bidder providing insights into when a firm should employ an auction and when it should just negotiate with a single bidder

alternative framework for renewable energy planning in the philippines abstract like many countries striving to be responsible consumers of energy and conscious of the need to mitigate the impact of climate change the philippines has in both policy and practice shown a bias towards renewable energy re sources the country s proportion of re production in primary energy and distribution in electricity is significantly higher than those of many asian and european countries however the philippine national re program has adopted a strategy of aggressively amassing re capacity to the extent of tripling the capacity over the period 2011 to 2030 the preoccupation with more megawatts rather than the value of re beyond clean energy has erected a bias against off grid re applications off grid re applications can displace more expensive diesel generation and can enhance the livelihood opportunities for communities the insistence on focusing on megawatts is threatening to bloat the current feed in tariff structure by causing large grid connected applications to be seriously oversubscribed this paper reviews the current re status in the philippines and presents a simple alternative planning paradigm in which the ability of re technology to affect the livelihood of the residents and the effectiveness of its energy delivery are used to distinguish the utility of different re technologies in off grid and grid connected areas the authors also describe an actual kw scale off grid application that addresses both energy and economic poverty

influence of economic factors on the valuation effects of debt offerings the obejective of this paper is to determine whether the share price responses to debt offerings are influenced cross sectially by economic factors we develop hypotheses that share price responses are inversely related to nominal interest rates and to the issuing firm s stock price level relative to the market and positively related to economic growth after controlling for firm specific characteristics used in previous studies we find that the share price responses to straight debt offerings are not significantly related to the nominal interest rates or to the issuing firm s relative stock price level but are positively related to the economic growth we also find that share price responses to convertible debt offerings are significantly related to the nominal interest rates the issuing firm s relative stock price level and economic growth in the manner hypothesized these results imply that the signal emitted by a firm s debt offering can be influecnced not only by firm specific characteristics

information production dilution costs and optimal security design abstract we investigate the problem of a firm wishing to finance a project by issuing securities under asymmetric information we find that when outside investors can produce noisy information on the firm s quality the degree of information asymmetry resulting in equilibrium is endogenous and depends on the information sensitivity of the security issued thus in contrast to the prediction of the pecking order theory see e g myers and majluf j financial econom 13 1984 187 a security with low sensitivity to private information such as debt does not always dominate one with high information sensitivity such as equity a firm s preference for equity rather than debt depends on the costs of information production the precision of the information production technology and the extent of the information asymmetry we also study the optimal security design problem and find that depending on the cost and precision of the information production technology risky debt or a composite security with a convex payoff emerges as optimal securities

debt equity choice under asymmetric information and taxes abstract under asymmetric information regarding the quality of investment opportunities and a tax advantage to debt it is demonstrated that a separating equilibrium in which higher quality firms issue equity and lower quality firms issue debt may exist thus the pecking order theory may break down when debt financing enjoys a tax advantage

why are derivative warrants more expensive than options an empirical study derivative warrants typically have higher prices than do otherwise identical options using data from the hong kong market during 2002 2007 we show that the price difference reflects the liquidity premium of derivative warrants over options newly issued derivative warrants are much more liquid than options with similar terms as a result long term derivative warrants are preferred by traders who trade frequently in spite of their higher prices short term returns on long term derivative warrants are in fact higher than the hypothetical short term returns on options the differences in price and liquidity measures decline as the contracts get closer to maturity