on the equivalence of resale price maintenance and quantity restrictions abstract when demand is known with certainty there is a clear mapping between a monopolist s pricing and output decisions this suggests an equivalence between a monopolist manufacturer specifying a minimum maximum retail price and imposing a maximum minimum quantity on its retailers this paper shows that while the effect of maximum rpm can always be replicated by an appropriate quantity floor the minimum rpm outcome cannot always be replicated by an appropriately chosen quantity ceiling as such the analysis provides one reason that manufacturers will choose a price floor rather than quantity ceiling even though a quantity ceiling would appear to lead to lower monitoring costs

the replacement of payroll tax by a tax on revenues a study of sectorial impacts on the brazilian economy abstract a topic of current research in discussion about the brazilian economy is the exemption from payroll taxes which aims to stimulate competitiveness of the firms boosting economic growth this topic was introduced in brazil by new laws that proposed replacing the payroll tax with a new tax on revenues the payroll tax rate of 20 was replaced by a tax rate of 1 or 2 on revenue this change has been applied primarily in labor intensive economic sectors in this paper a neoclassical model was used to evaluate some sectoral impacts of these tax changes the results show positive effects of this reform among them the increase in aggregate consumption and capital stock employment also grows in the labor intensive sector however under a government revenue neutral scenario these effects are almost completely lost which shows some evidence about the low efficiency of these reforms

does the per se rule deter vertical price fixing i introduction beginning with the wide scale introduction of branded goods in the late nineteenth century manufacturers have often tried to dictate minimum resale prices to the retail outlets carrying their products and since roughly the same time antitrust experts have debated why they would do so 1 less attention has focused on what manufacturers do when they can not impose minimum prices even though legal obstacles have forced them to look for alternatives so what do manufacturers do when they cannot legally set the prices their outlets charge 2 many antitrust officials believe they go right on setting prices either flaunting the law or finding some means to circumvent it barrett 1991 quotes former new york state antitrust chief lloyd constantine as saying that the practice is ubiquitous but based upon winks and nods rather than written agreements that could be used in court new york attorney general robert abrams 1991 argues that vertical price fixing is endemic claiming that antitrust officers can recount scores of tales of retailers calling our offices too scared to give their names telling of coercion and intimidation by manufacturers representatives and rival dealers because their prices were too low former ftc commissioner terry calvani argues that a manufacturer practicing resale price maintenance would have to have an i q two points lower than a carrot to get caught 3 the prospects for wink and nod resale price maintenance are not hard to appreciate for example suppose a manufacturer wants to impose a 500 sanction on any discount outlet if it cannot do so overtly it may instead impose a lump sum charge of 500 on all outlets and ex post reward non discount outlets with a 500 rebate given this scheme s transparency courts legislators and antitrust officials should not be fooled yet the rebates could be indirect and discreet they could be spread over several periods and parceled out in small quantities as compensation for point of sale services to defray overhead to pay for advertising or training and so forth hence it may be hard for outsiders to prove a link between what the manufacturer pays each retailer and that retailer s price moreover in some instances antitrust officials may want an excuse to loosen the legal restrictions on resale price maintenance and may themselves wink and nod at these practices finally antitrust officials cannot always and perhaps not often distinguish legitimate cost sharing arrangements from maneuvers to influence resale prices as such they must proceed carefully manufacturers can employ two other legal means to fix resale prices first manufacturers can coordinate retailers meet the competition guarantees antitrust experts have long believed that on occasion retailers can independently offer meet the competition guarantees to their customers to discourage price competition 4 here a manufacturer coordinates retailers efforts by financing some or all of the meet the competition related rebates they make so in equilibrium all retailers adopt the suggested price while previous models of meet the competition guarantees focus on tacit horizontal price fixing this paper examines explicit vertical price fixing second the manufacturer can persuade retailers to charge its suggested price by guaranteeing the margins of those victimized by price cutting rivals in equilibrium no outlet wants to cut price first so discounting does not occur at all manufacturers have various other means to influence their dealers resale prices in addition to such well known instruments as consignment sales and exclusive territories manufacturers can agree to buy back dealers unsold inventories or parcel out merchandise only as demand for it materializes they can also use devices such as markdown allowances to influence when and by how much dealers discount if demand turns out low presumably this list does not exhaust the possibilities for innovative manufacturers seeking to subsidize dealers that cooperate and to discriminate against those that do not

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

the competitive implications of top of the market and related contract pricing clauses this article examines the competitive implications of contract pricing arrangements which link the contract price to the subsequent cash price we focus on so called top of the market pricing tomp in cattle procurement the tomp clause is shown to have anticompetitive consequences when the same buyers who purchase contract cattle with the tomp clause also compete to procure cattle in the subsequent spot market the tomp clause reduces packers incentives to compete aggressively in the spot market although tomp pricing is not in producers collective interest rational sellers may nonetheless sign these contracts with little or no financial inducement

guaranteed lowest prices do they facilitate collusion abstract the effects of a policy guaranteeing lowest price are analyzed in a two stage game where firms first decide whether to adopt such a policy and then choose prices symmetric and asymmetric games are solved to examine the extent to which prices can rise to collusive levels

the effects of market practices in oligopolistic markets an experimental examination of the ethyl case this study reports on the performance of experimental markets characterized by industrial structure and practices similar to those at issue in the ethyl case the central question is whether price competition is affected by the practices of advanced notification of price changes and most favored nation contracts or is determined by industrial organization and concentration alone

international risk cycles abstract recent work in international finance suggests that exchange rate puzzles can be accounted for if 1 aggregate uncertainty is time varying and 2 countries have heterogeneous exposures to a world aggregate shock we embed these features in a standard two country real business cycle framework and calibrate the model to equity risk premia in low and high interest rates countries unlike traditional real business cycle models our model generates volatile exchange rates a large currency forward premium excess comovement of asset prices relative to quantities and an imperfect correlation between relative consumption growth and exchange rates our model implies however that high interest rate countries have smoother quantities equity returns and interest rates than low interest rate countries contrary to the data

on the competitive effects of price matching policies abstract this paper challenges the conventional wisdom that price matching policies lead to supracompetitive prices by reducing firms incentives to undercut rivals i argue that price matching and price beating policies are more appropriately viewed as a means of price discrimination and develop a model that demonstrates their use as such analysis of this model shows that in contrast to the results of the existing literature price matching and price beating may raise or lower equilibrium prices relative to the equilibrium in which firms may not adopt such policies

did the airline tariff publishing case reduce collusion abstractin december 1992 the u s department of justice filed suit against eight major domestic airlines and the airline tariff publishing atp company in order to reduce opportunities for collusion in the industry the lawsuit ended with consent decrees limiting the ability of airlines to communicate surreptitiously through the shared fare database this paper measures the effects of the litigation and its settlement on industry performance comparing changes in outcomes between market segments that were more and less likely to be affected by the atp case prices fell in response to the investigation but increased following the settlement while the number of tickets sold in affected markets declined the importance of multimarket contact also declined and then recovered the atp case had at best a temporary effect on airline collusion

monetary policy and the exchange rate the british monetary authorities began the decade with a commitment to a policy of decelerating monetary growth as the centrepiece of their economic strategy a policy of outright benign neglect towards the exchange rate was a stated accompaniment by the end of 1990the centrepiece of policy was adherence to the exchange rate mechanism of the ems albeit initially within the wider band option although the commitment to counter inflationary policy objectives and to a nominal anchor as a means of achieving these remained the same the anchor had been changed at the intermediate target level there had been a revolution

measuring macroeconomic uncertainty a historical perspective abstract using 100 years of data we provide a new macroeconomic uncertainty proxy for the us and other 14 major industrial countries we show macroeconomic uncertainty experiences an overall declining pattern in the century and the influential political and economic events two world wars and major recessions are associated with a dramatic surge in macroeconomic uncertainty meanwhile a global common component plays an important role in driving uncertainty fluctuations across countries

dynamic duopoly with best price clauses this article investigates best price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game best price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase two different price clauses are distinguished most favored customer and meet or release i examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods in each period new consumers enter the market i show that in this context meet or release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most favored customer clauses

how low is a guaranteed lowest price a game based on the bertrand duopoly model is constructed to study the effects of price guarantee policies before it chooses a list price a firm can make a binding commitment to match or beat its competitor s price the effectiveness of these price guarantee policies in facilitating price collusion depends on the solution concept used furthermore there exists an equilibrium in which neither firm offers any price guarantees and each firm sets price equal to marginal cost

international business cycles world region and country specific factors the paper investigates the common dynamic properties of business cycle fluctuations across countries regions and the world we employ a bayesian dynamic latent factor model to estimate common components in macroeconomic aggregates output consumption and investment in a 60 country sample covering seven regions of the world the results indicate that a common world factor is an important source of volatility for aggregates in most countries providing evidence for a world business cycle we find that region specific factors play only a minor role in explaining fluctuations in economic activity we also document similarities and differences across regions countries and aggregates jel f41 e32 c11 c32

learning and noisy equilibrium behavior in an experimental study of imperfect price competition we consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique bertrand nash equilibrium the high price firm has a nonvanishing market share however and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share this relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy logit best responses to expected payoff differences the resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high price firm s market share varies the model accurately predicts the final period price averages a naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices

technical note a comparison of bertrand and cournot profits in oligopolies with differentiated products we compare equilibrium profits of bertrand price and cournot quantity competition in oligopolies with an arbitrary number of nonsymmetric firms offering differentiated substitutable products under an affine demand function we provide a precise characterization of the profit relationship in terms of 1 the number of firms 2 their relative quality and cost differences and 3 the competition intensity defined as the maxiumum absolute value of total change in competitors demand over change in own demand due to a unit change in own price we first examine the case where firms have the same demand sensitivity to own price and the same demand sensitivity to competitor prices but different cost and quality parameters for this case we prove that the total profit of the industry under cournot competition is at least as high as the total profit under bertrand competition if the number of firms is less than 28 or if the competition intensity is less than 0 909 or if the differences in quality and cost competitiveness between firms are small we also prove that for each firm the profit achieved under cournot competition is at least as high as the profit achieved under bertrand competition if the number of firms is less than eight or if the competition intensity is less than 0 739 we then provide numerical and analytical results that qualitatively support the same conclusions for general affine demand functions with variable demand sensitivities to prices

common and country specific economic uncertainty abstract we use a factor model with stochastic volatility to decompose the time varying variance of macroeconomic and financial variables into contributions from country specific uncertainty and uncertainty common to all countries we find that the common component plays an important role in driving the time varying volatility of nominal and financial variables the cross country co movement in volatility of real and financial variables has increased over time with the common component becoming more important over the last decade simulations from a two country dsge model featuring epstein zin preferences suggest that increased globalisation and trade openness may be the driving force behind the increased cross country correlation in volatility

linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty an overview we review different generic conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships their logical relationship is explored two kinds of conditions are considered however the property for an action profile to be compatible plays a crucial role in both kinds also two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition

cartel price announcements the vitamins industry abstract the primary manufacturers of vitamins admitted to participating in international market share agreement cartels for several years during the 1990s their announced price increases appeared in leading trade journals we show that price announcements during the cartel period and the lead times before these prices took effect were fundamentally different in character from price announcements when explicit collusion was less likely these differences are consistent with our model of price announcements where we account for the importance to the cartel of buyer acceptance of or resistance to a price increase acceptance avoids costly market share reallocations among members of an explicit cartel logit estimates show that after 1985 the likelihood of a price announcement is largely driven by the length of time between announcements rather than cost or demand factors suggesting that the price announcements after 1985 stem from cartel meetings

oligopolistic competition as a common agency game oligopolistic competition is analyzed in a complete information multi principal common agency framework where principals are firms supplying differentiated goods and the agent is a representative consumer we first propose a canonical formulation of common agency games and a parameterization of the set of equilibria based on the lagrange multipliers associated with the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints of each principal this is used to characterize the set of equilibria in the intrinsic and non intrinsic games the former includes the latter as well as the standard price and quantity equilibrium outcomes it may also include the collusive solution

common drifting volatility in large bayesian vars the general pattern of estimated volatilities of macroeconomic and financial variables is often broadly similar we propose two models in which conditional volatilities feature comovement and study them using u s macroeconomic data the first model specifies the conditional volatilities as driven by a single common unobserved factor plus an idiosyncratic component we label this model bvar with general factor stochastic volatility bvar gfsv and we show that the loss in terms of marginal likelihood from assuming a common factor for volatility is moderate the second model which we label bvar with common stochastic volatility bvar csv is a special case of the bvar gfsv in which the idiosyncratic component is eliminated and the loadings to the factor are set to 1 for all the conditional volatilities such restrictions permit a convenient kronecker structure for the posterior variance of the var coefficients which in turn permits estimating the model even with large datasets while perhaps misspecifi

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

the changing transmission of uncertainty shocks in the u s this article investigates if the impact of uncertainty shocks on the u s economy has changed over time to this end we develop an extended factor augmented vector autoregression var model that simultaneously allows the estimation of a measure of uncertainty and its time varying impact on a range of variables we find that the impact of uncertainty shocks on real activity and financial variables has declined systematically over time in contrast the response of inflation and the short term interest rate to this shock has remained fairly stable simulations from a nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model suggest that these empirical results are consistent with an increase in the monetary authorities antiinflation stance and a flattening of the phillips curve supplementary materials for this article are available online

list pricing and discounting in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly list or retail pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice we modify the standard bertrand edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount or not in a subsequent stage we show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome this is true for a general class of rationing rules further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader

competition advertising and meeting competition clauses abstract pricing according to meeting competition clauses mcc s is often argued to enforce collusive agreements our analysis incorporates uncertainty and advertising we show within a spatial model that mcc s permit price discrimination but at the expense of lower profits

general equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition a cournotian approach in a pure exchange economy we propose a general equilibrium concept under imperfect competition the cournotian monopolistic competition equilibrium and compare it to the cournot walras and the monopolistic competition concepts the advantage of the proposed concept is to require less computational ability from the agents the comparison is made first through a simple example then through a mon abstract concept the p equilibrium based on a general notion of price coordination c 1997 academic press

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

the most favored nation pricing policy and negotiated prices previous work has viewed the most favored nation mfn contract as a practice capable of facilitating collusion among sellers but this paper shows that even a monopoly seller may gain by including the mfn provision in sales contracts we consider a case in which the seller negotiates price separately with each of two buyers by including a mfn clause in her contract with the first buyer the seller raises her cost of granting price concessions to the second buyer this increases the seller s bargaining strength with respect to the second buyer thereby helping her negotiate a higher price

cooperative r d and vertical product differentiation abstract a partial equilibrium model with vertical product differentiation coumot competition and quality determined by r d expenses is analysed cooperative agreements on r d entail higher levels of r d quality output and welfare than at the non cooperative equilibrium under well denned conditions on spillover rates this confirms in a new setting a well known outcome of models with cost reducing r d further cooperation in r d allows a larger number of firms to operate in the industry than in the non cooperative case via a reduction in prices a new source of social gains from cooperative research is identified

does uncertainty affect real activity evidence from state level data abstract we use variation in the effect of us wide or global uncertainty on state level uncertainty to identify the impact of this shock on real activity we find that increases in uncertainty do have an adverse impact on real income employment and unemployment thus uncertainty shocks can be a source of economic fluctuations

equilibrium incentives for most favored customer clauses in an oligopolistic industry abstract this paper analyzes the economics of contemporaneous most favored customer clauses mfcc in a non cooperative n firm oligopoly in the first stage of a two stage game each firm independently decides whether to adopt mfcc in the second stage firms set prices non cooperatively given the first stage choices in contrast to work on retroactive mfcc by cooper the rand journal of economics 1986 17 377 388 our analysis shows that not adopting mfcc can be a dominant strategy the difference between our results and cooper s highlights important differences between retroactive and contemporaneous mfcc and suggests that mfcc are a less powerful facilitating practice than retroactive mfcc our analysis also sheds new light on grether and plott s economic inquiry 1984 22 497 507 experimental results regarding the effects of mfcc on average industry prices

the international transmission of volatility shocks an empirical analysis this paper proposes an empirical model which can be used to estimate the international transmission of volatility shocks using this model we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of the shock to us real gdp leads to a decline in uk gdp of 1 relative to trend and a 0 7 increase in uk cpi relative to trend at the two year horizon using a nonlinear open economy dsge model we find that these empirical estimates are consistent with the response to a perturbation to the volatility of foreign supply type shocks while an increase in the volatility of demand shocks has a negligible impact

fragility and the effect of international uncertainty shocks abstract when economic systems are fragile even modest shocks for example a shock to international capital movements can have strong negative effects on key macroeconomic fundamentals this paper proposes a large scale bayesian vector autoregression with factor stochastic volatility to investigate the macroeconomic consequences of international uncertainty shocks in g7 countries and shows that uncertainty increases fragility the factor structure enables us to identify an international uncertainty shock by assuming that it is the joint volatility process that determines the dynamics of the variance covariance matrix of the common factors to allow for first and second moment shocks we moreover assume that the uncertainty factor enters the var equation as an additional regressor our findings suggest that an international uncertainty shock has negative effects across all economies and variables under consideration leading to strong declines in output prices exports interest rates and equity prices the precise degree of fragility varies across countries a simple correlation exercise suggests that structural differences may be partially responsible for the observed differences

impact of global uncertainty on the global economy and large developed and developing economies global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline in global inflation growth and interest rate global uncertainty shocks have more protracted statistically significant and substantia

the effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local firms i present a game theoretic model of competition between a national firm and local firms in which the introduction of most favored customer clauses into the sales contracts of the national firm decreases all industry prices the reason is that the price restriction makes the national firm a weak price competitor in each local market this produces a prisoners dilemma situation in which each local firm has the unilateral incentive to be more aggressive in nonprice decisions this increase in nonprice competition by all local firms causes prices to fall across the industry

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production