evaluating welfare reform in the united states this paper reviews the economic literature on welfare reform over the 1990s a brief summary of the policy changes is followed by a discussion of the methodological techniques that analyze the effects of these changes on outcomes the paper then critically reviews the econometric and experimental literature on caseload changes labor force changes poverty and income changes and family formation changes a growing body of evidence suggests that recent policy changes have influenced economic behavior and well being one particular set of new style welfare programs seems to show especially promising results with significantly increased work and earnings and reduced poverty

raising children to work hard altruism work norms and social insurance children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market moreover parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non credible to promote work

optimal welfare to work programs a welfare to work wtw program is a mix of government expenditures on various labour market policies targeted to the unemployed e g unemployment insurance m job search monitoring m social assistance sa wage subsidies this paper provides a dynamic principal agent framework suitable for analysing chief features of an optimal wtw program such as the sequence and duration of the different policies the dynamic pattern of payments along the unemployment spell and the emergence of taxes subsidies upon re employment the optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort social assistance characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal wtw program the typical sequence of policies is quite simple the program starts with standard ui then switches into monitored search and finally into sa the optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both jm and sa whereas taxes subsidies can be either increasing or decreasing with duration during ui they must decrease increase during a phase of jm in a calibration exercise we use our model to analyse quantitatively the features of the optimal program for the u s economy with respect to the existing u s system the optimal wtw scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains to unskilled workers because the incentives to search for a job can be retained even while delivering more insurance and using costly monitoring less intensively

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

productivity health and inequality in the intrahousehold distribution of food in low income countries a model is formulated incorporating linkages among nutrition labor market productivity health heterogeneity and the intrahousehold distribution of food and work activities in a subsistence economy empirical results based on a sample of households from bangladesh indicate that despite considerable intrahousehold disparities in calorie consumption households are averse to inequality furthermore consistent with the model the results also indicate that both the higher level and greater variance in the calories consumed by men relative to women reflect in part the greater participation by men in activities in which productivity is sensitive to health status copyright 1990 by american economic association

state corroding federalism competition among local governments in a decentralized political system is often thought to discipline lazy or corrupt officials improving public good provision and increasing welfare some scholars note possible distortions due to spillovers or a race to the bottom but suggest that central transfers or regulations can remedy these both arguments take for granted a framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect taxes allocate transfers and enforce regulations autonomously but what if it can t we show that if central enforcement capacity is endogenous interjurisdictional competition may itself erode the center s ability to channel competition in welfare enhancing directions regional governments may compete for capital by shielding firms from central tax collectors bankruptcy courts or regulators the equilibrium result is weaker central law enforcement and usually lower welfare interjurisdictional competition corrodes the state we illustrate with three examples from russia china and the us of cases in which such competition apparently encouraged subnational politicians to help firms evade central taxes or regulations

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

allocation under dictatorship research in stalin s archives we survey recent research on the soviet economy in the state party and military archives of the stalin era the archives have provided rich new evidence on the economic arrangements of a command system under a powerful dictator including stalin s role in the making of the economic system and economic policy stalin s accumulation objectives and the constraints that limited his power to achieve them the limits to administrative allocation the information flows and incentives that governed the behavior of economic managers the scope and significance of corruption and market oriented behavior and the prospects for economic reform

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

interest group politics in a federation the optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter state externalities of local policies we show that inter state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country interest groups who have multi state scope internalize inter state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state we use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter state externalities on firm performance using firm level panel data from a peripheralized federation russia in 1996 2003 we show that controlling for firm fixed effects the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter state externalities

understanding welfare stigma taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination abstract welfare stigma is widely regarded to be of central importance in understanding the impact of welfare programs in their goal of alleviating poverty it affects both the decision to take up benefits and the well being of those who actually do this paper develops alternative models of the determinants of welfare stigma we identify two views a statistical discrimination approach and a taxpayer resentment view we discuss how each may be formalized and derive their implications we then examine what they imply about the relationship between stigma and program design

analyzing the length of welfare spells abstract this paper studies the determinants of the length of individual spells of welfare focusing on how the length of a spell affects the probability of its termination the analysis utilizes six years of monthly data on time spent in the afdc program among female household heads a variety of duration dependence models are estimated monthly afdc participation does not show strong evidence of duration dependence two distinct groups appear to utilize welfare one with a very low and constant probability of leaving welfare and a second group which is more affected by time on the program

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

the m form hierarchy and china s economic reform for 13 years from 1979 to 1991 economic reforms in china have generated a significant growth its gnp grew at an average annual rate of 8 7 or at 7 37 for per capita gnp 1 the chinese economic performance is in contrast to that of eastern europe and the former ussr the average growth rate of gdp in hungary was 1 8 between 1981 and 1985 and almost zero in 1988 and 1989 in poland the average gdp growth rate was less than 2 between 1981 and 1989 from both theoretical and policy perspectives china s outstanding reform performances and associated differ ent reform strategies from those of eastern europe and the ussr are particularly interesting and puzzling there are two popular views in explaining the differences between china and eastern europe the first view states that china was at a much lower development stage than eastern europe and the ussr 3 the second view argues that china has followed a gradual and piecemeal approach as

optimal taxation prudence and risk sharing abstract this paper analyses optimal income taxation as a trade off between the incentive effects of increased uncertainty and the welfare benefits of social insurance greater prudence increases labour supply because of precautionary incentive effects which reduce the progressivity of the optimal income tax schedule increased uncertainty increases progressivity of the income tax schedule because of a greater value of social insurance optimal tax progressivity depends on the ratio of prudence to risk aversion when this ratio is high incentive effects dominate the social insurance effect leading to declining optimal income tax rates

educational choice families and young people s earnings this paper presents two optimizing models of educational choice discusses issues of identification estimates earnings equations in the context of these models and presents conditions under which we can test one against the other the estimates indicate that education is endogenous for young people s earnings creating a downward bias in estimated returns from education that assume exogeneity identification and estimation relies on family background information from a special sample from the british household panel study 1991 95 which matches mothers and their young adult children our estimates favor a family model over an individual model and they suggest that parents allocate resources to education to compensate for differences in their children s earnings endowments

the duration of welfare spells probability distributions for the duration of welfare spells are estimated the principle guiding the work is that a recipient will not exit from welfare if the expected utility on welfare exceeds the expected utility of welfare the analysis indicates that while the majority of welfare spells are of short duration a nontrivial minority of spells are quite long those recipients with long spells are found to differ in predictable ways from those experiencing brief spells this suggests that strategies to move women off welfare are unnecessary in many cases and should be targeted on those most likely to be long term recipients copyright 1987 by mit press

reconsidering the effect of welfare stigma on unemployment abstract stigma has been modeled in the literature as a cost of welfare participation providing a disincentive to welfare entry hence traditional models predict that stigma leads to higher search effort and higher employment we develop a more comprehensive model that accounts for the fact that welfare stigma may elicit psychological effects and foster negative attitudes towards welfare recipients affecting their employment prospects we find two contrasting effects the first reinforces the standard prediction rational individuals foreseeing the reduction in employability defer welfare entry deterrence effect the second goes in the opposite direction once assisted individuals experience less welfare to employment transitions both because of reduced search effectiveness and of reduced search effort entrapment effect when stigma is not too high the latter effect prevails more stigma yields to less employment and more welfare participation the result is stronger if individuals are not able to foresee their loss of employability

incentives information and organizational form we model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology here consisting of a collection of plants in our framework the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him we argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encouraging a good performance in particular we show that under certain assumptions the m form multi divisional form is likely to provide better incentives than the u form unitary form because it promotes yardstick competition i e relative performance evaluation more effectively we conclude by presenting evidence that the assumptions on which this comparison rests are satisfied for chinese data

m form hierarchy with poorly diversified divisions a case of khrushchev s reform in soviet russia we test the premise of the theoretical literature that m form political hierarchies are effective in creating yardstick competition between regional divisions only when those divisions have sufficiently diversified or similar industrial composition the reason for this is that the competition among poorly diversified inter related divisions creates incentives for regional leaders to pursue policies that inhibit industrial growth in neighboring regions in order to make their own region look better from the point of view of the center we use a unique episode in soviet history when a traditional soviet unitary form u form hierarchy was replaced by a multidivisional form m form organization namely khrushchev s sovnarkhoz reform first we demonstrate that during this reform regional leaders were subjected to relative performance evaluation which created incentives to generate industrial growth second we show that these career concerns resulted in higher growth in regions with sufficiently diversified and therefore self contained economies and lower growth in highly specialized regions

welfare benefits and the duration of welfare spells evidence from a natural experiment in canada abstract this paper uses a major reform of the welfare program implemented in the province of quebec canada in 1989 to analyze the impact of benefits on the length of welfare spells an important feature of this reform was the abolishment of discrimination based on age that applied to benefits as a result the monthly benefits of single individuals aged less than 30 increased from 173 to 425 1986 an increase of over 145 to assess the impact of the reform we estimate a series of semi parametric hazard models analogous to the regression approach to difference in differences estimation the estimated duration elasticities with respect to benefits for single men and women aged 22 29 are 0 25 and 0 28 respectively

when do women use aid to families with dependent children and food stamps the dynamics of eligibility versus participation this paper investigates dynamic patterns in the relationship between eligibility and participation in the aid to families with dependent children afdc and food stamp programs using monthly longitudinal data from the survey of income and program participation the results indicate that there are many relatively short eligibility spells that do not result in program participation and end with increases in income participation is most likely to occur among women with lower current and future earnings opportunities and is affected by locational and policy parameters those who elect to participate in these programs tend to start receiving benefits almost immediately upon becoming eligible a substantial number of women exit these programs before their eligibility ends among at least some of these women it is likely that unreported changes in income are occurring in 1989 if all eligible single parent families had participated in afdc and food stamps benefit payments in these programs would have been 13 5 billion higher