male and female marriage returns to schooling a collective marriage matching model is estimated and calibrated to quantify the share of returns to schooling that is realized through marriage the predictions of the model are matched with detailed danish household data on the relationship between schooling and wage rates the division of time and goods within the household and the extent to which men and women sort positively on several traits in marriage counterfactual analysis conducted with the model suggests that danish men and women are earning on the order of half of their returns to schooling through improved marital outcomes

the demographic transition and the position of women a marriage market perspective we present international evidence on the marriage market implications of cohort size growth and set out a theoretical model of how marriage markets adjust to imbalances since men marry younger women secular growth in cohort size in the second phase of the demographic transition worsens the position of women this e ect has been substantial in many asian countries earlier and continues to be true in sub saharan africa with fertility decline cohort are now shrinking in east asia improves the position of women these demographic trends can explain the increase and spread in dowries in south asia and the persistence of polygyny in sub saharan africa we show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances even though it accommodates transitory shocks jel categories j12 j13 j16

marriage market divorce legislation and household labor supply this paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply in our approach the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of distribution factors these factors are defined as variables that affect the household members bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set we extend the collective labor supply model developed by chiappori to allow for distribution factors we show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process the model is estimated using psid data for the year 1988 our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model also the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects

bidimensional matching with heterogeneous preferences education and smoking in the marriage market we develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait and a binary attribute the model incorporates attributes for which there are heterogeneous preferences in the population regarding their desirability that is the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one dimensional attractiveness index we present a general resolution strategy based on optimal control theory and characterize the stable matching we then consider education and smoking status further specify the model by observing that there are more male than female smokers above each education level and derive additional predictions about equilibrium matching patterns and how individuals with different smoking habits marry down or marry up by education using the cps march and tobacco use supplements for the period 1996 to 2003 we find that the hypotheses based on our model predictions are borne out in the data

beauty premium and marriage premium in search equilibrium theory and empirical test we propose a theoretical explanation for the so called beauty premium our approach relies entirely on search frictions and the fact that physical appearance plays an important role in attracting a marriage partner we analyze the interaction between frictional labor and marriage markets making use of what we label constrained job search the optimal strategy entails different reservation wages for different men and we establish the existence of a search equilibrium characterized by a beauty premium and or marriage premium predicted profiles of premia allow for potential falsification tests and point to relevant empirical evidence in support of our theory

taxation in matching markets what is the impact of taxation in matching markets in matching markets because agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners welfare depends on which agents are matched to each other in equilibrium taxes in matching markets can generate inefficiency by changing who is matched to whom even if the number of workers at each firm is unaffected for markets in which workers refuse to match without a positive wage higher taxes decrease match efficiency however in more balanced matching markets where transfers may flow in either direction such as the student college market lowering taxes may decrease match efficiency because an agent can transfer enough to buy an inefficient partner only to be bought back when taxes are lowered further simulations show that in matching markets traditional deadweight loss estimates based on the change in taxable income can be substantially biased in either direction jel classification h20 j24 c78 d13

modeling determinants of poverty in mauritania abstract this paper presents a brief descriptive summary of poverty in mauritania as revealed by household survey data for 1990 and then uses regression analysis to study the determinants of living standards and hence poverty the latter is conducted at the level of broadly defined socioeconomic groups using an econometric technique which also models the selection of households into socioeconomic groups household characteristics are used as explanatory variables including demographic education and sector specific variables by controlling for many factors multivariate analysis enables a clearer understanding of the nature and determinants of poverty than can be obtained from examination of summary poverty indices

how do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets evidence from america s second generation sex ratios i e relative numbers of men and women can affect marriage prospects labor force participation and other social and economic variables but the observed association between sex ratios and social and economic conditions may be confounded by omitted variables and reverse causality this paper uses variation in immigrant flows as a natural experiment to study the effect of sex ratios on the children and grandchildren of immigrants the flow of immigrants affected the second generation marriage market because second generation marriages were mostly endogamous i e to members of the same ethnic group the empirical results suggest that high sex ratios had a large positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage and a large negative effect on female labor force participation perhaps surprisingly the marriage rates of second generation men appear to be a slightly increasing function of immigrant sex ratios higher sex ratios also appear to have raised male earnings and the incomes of parents with young children the empirical results are broadly consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase female bargaining power in the marriage market

location and housing demand abstract william alonso s model of the demand for housing and location in the monocentric city is one of two pre eminent models of its type the purpose of this article is to provide the detailed analysis and the comparative statics of the alonso model the complexity of the analysis is seen to derive from the nature of the constraint which is nonlinear and has slopes which vary with income a new result is that housing and closeness can be inferior even when they are taste normal the empirical direct variation of income with distance is explained consistent with the finding that income increase has indeterminate effects on location and housing demand the alonso specification is shown to be superior to others

agricultural household models extensions applications and policy this book presents the basic model of an agricultural household that underlies most of the case studies undertaken so far the model assumes that households are price takers and is therefore recursive the decisions modeled include those affecting production and the demand for inputs and those affecting consumption and the supply of labor comparative results on selected elasticities are presented for a number of economies the empirical significance of the approach is demonstrated in a comparison of models that treat production and consumption decisions separately and those in which the decisionmaking process is recursive the book summarizes the implications of agricultural pricing policy for the welfare of farm households marketed surplus the demand for nonagricultural goods and services the rural labor market budget revenues and foreign exchange earnings in addition it is shown that the basic model can be extended in order to explore the effects of government policy on crop composition nutritional status health saving and investment and to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the effects on budget revenues and foreign exchange earnings methodological topics primarily the data requirements of the basic model and its extensions along with aggregation market interaction uncertainty and market imperfections are discussed the most important methodological issues the question of the recursive property of these models is also discussed

policy analysis in matching markets abstract price and quantity interventions intended to affect assignments are common in many labor and education markets e g financial aid quotas this article discusses an empirical framework based on the theory of stable matching that is suitable for policy analysis while accounting for the presence of equilibrium sorting it then compares financial incentives and supply interventions for encouraging the training of family medicine residents in rural america due to equilibrium effects the primary effect of financial incentives is to increase the quality not numbers of residents in rural programs while quantity regulations directly affect numbers without adversely affecting quality

the marriage squeeze interpretation of dowry inflation a comment in a recent paper rao 1993 advanced a marriage squeeze explanation to the secular rise in real dowries so called dowry inflation witnessed in india arguing that the relevant ages with respect to marriage are 10 19 for women and 20 29 for men rao found that the ratio of women to men in those age groups had increased over time moreover this sex ratio was found to have a positive and significant impact on dowry when one controls for differences in traits of brides and grooms the empirical results presented here suggest that rao s findings are not robust using the same data i fail to replicate his main result that is that the sex ratio women 10 19 men 20 29 has a positive impact on dowries moreover rao s specification regressing dowries on differences in spouses traits bride s minus groom s imposes the restriction that attributes influence dowries in a symmetrical fashion ignoring compelling evidence against that assumption i find that regressing dowry on individual traits instead of differences improves the model fit considerably

accounting for the timing of first marriage among first marriages in the united states grooms are on average 1 7 years older than their brides traditionally this fact is explained by sex differences in income we use a general equilibrium overlapping generations search model economy to show instead that sex differences in fecundity are essential to account for the age gap at first marriage whereas sex differences in income play a secondary role our model economy also accounts for other facts on the timing of first marriages that the literature has overlooked

the econometrics and some properties of separable matching models we present a class of one to one matching models with perfectly transferable utility we discuss identification and inference in these separable models and we show how their comparative statics are readily analyzed

a foundation of location theory consumer preferences and demand abstract location models with a continuum of consumers have severe conceptual shortcomings this article considers an alternative foundation for location economics the commodity space of each of a finite number of consumers is the collection of measurable subsets of land this space is so large that a solution to the consumer maximization problem does not always exist the main result is the definition and use of a topology on land parcels to show that a solution will always exist for utilities continuous with respect to the topology the underlying preferences are exposed

regional differences pose challenges for food security policy a case study of india mahadevan r and suardi s regional differences pose challenges for food security policy a case study of india regional studies this paper examines factors affecting the calorie gap by considering the risk of calorie inadequacy or excess at the tails of food intakes non linear estimations accounting for rural urban differences in more and less developed states allow for policy making on two levels first the calorie gap was found to respond differently depending on the calorie status of the individual to various socio economic characteristics social assistance programmes as well as caste and religion second these impacts depended on rural urban differences and at other times on the development of the states these findings pose significant challenges towards achieving a balanced regional food security policy

marketplaces markets and market design marketplaces are often small parts of large markets and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must accomplish to enable different kinds of markets marketplaces can have varying degrees of success and there can be marketplace failures i ll discuss labor markets like the market for new economists and also markets for new lawyers and doctors that have suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates to well before employment begins markets work best if they enjoy social support but some markets are repugnant in the sense that some people think they should be banned even though others want to participate in them laws banning such markets often contribute to the design of illegal black markets and this raises new issues for market designers i ll briefly discuss markets and black markets for narcotics marijuana sex and surrogacy and the design of markets for kidney transplants in the face of widespread laws against and broader repugnance for compensating organ donors i conclude with open questions and engineering challenges

partner choice investment in children and the marital college premium abstract we construct a model of household decision making in which agents consume a private and a public good interpreted as children s welfare children s utility depends on their human capital

fertility shocks and equilibrium marriage rate dynamics why did the marriage probability of single females in france after world war 1 rise 50 above its pre war average despite a 33 drop in the male female singles ratio we conjecture that war time disruption of the marriage market generated an abnormal abundance of men with relatively high marriage propensities our model of matching over the lifecycle when calibrated to pre war data and two war time shocks succeeds in matching the french time path under the additional assumption of a pro natalist post war preference shock we conclude that endogeneity issues make the sex ratio a potentially unreliable indicator of female marriage prospects

accounting for racial differences in marriage and employment what can account for the differences in marriage and employment decisions across blacks and whites to answer this question i develop a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage two explanations for the racial differences in behavior are considered differences in population supplies and wages black white differences in population supplies explain one fifth of the difference in marriage rates and between one fifth and one third of the differences in employment rates across race removing the racial gap in wages eliminates the differences in employment but increases the differences in marriage rates

food aid impacts in rural kenya assessing the potential role of food aid in economic development requires that analytical attention be given to both household production and consumption consequences of food aid projects effects of a food for work ffw project in rural kenya are assessed using a peasant household firm model which incorporates a linear programming model and an almost ideal demand system the results indicate that program participants have net returns 52 percent higher than nonparticipants most of which is due to induced effects of capital formation on own farm production greater capital formation increases the opportunity cost of participants time encouraging a transition over time from ffw activities to greater own farm production ffw increases food demand employment and marketable surplus

the rising price of husbands a hedonic analysis of dowry increases in rural india dowries in south asia have steadily risen over the last 40 years and now often amount to over 50 percent of a household s assets this paper attempts to investigate the reasons behind this increase it adapts rosen s implicit market model to the indian marriage market and tests predictions from the model with data from six villages in south central india and from the indian census it is found that a marriage squeeze caused by population growth resulting in larger younger cohorts and hence a surplus of women in the marriage market has played a significant role in the rise in dowries

the impact of conditional cash transfers on marriage and divorce abstracta growing number of less developed countries have introduced conditional cash transfer programs in which funds are targeted to women economic models of the family suggest that these transfer programs may lead to marital turnover among program beneficiaries data from the experimental evaluation of the progresa program in mexico is used to provide new evidence on the short run impacts of targeted transfers on couples union dissolution and individuals new union formation decisions we find that although the overall share of women in union does not change as a result of the program marital turnover increases intact families eligible for the transfers experienced a modest 0 32 percentage points increase in separation rates with most of the effect concentrated among young and relatively educated women households in contrast young single women with low educational attainment levels experienced a substantial increase in new union formation rates the marital transition patterns are consistent

large matching markets as two sided demand systems this paper studies two sided matching markets with non transferable utility when the number of market participants grows large we consider a model in which each agent has a random preference ordering over individual potential matching partners and agents types are only partially observed by the econometrician we show that in a large market the inclusive value is a sufficient statistic for an agent s endogenous choice set with respect to the probability of being matched to a spouse of a given observable type furthermore while the number of pairwise stable matchings for a typical realization of random utilities grows at a fast rate as the number of market participants increases the inclusive values resulting from any stable matching converge to a unique deterministic limit we can therefore characterize the limiting distribution of the matching market as the unique solution to a fixed point condition on the inclusive values finally we analyze identification and estimation of payoff parameters from the asymptotic distribution of observable characteristics at the level of pairs resulting from a stable matching

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

non parametric tests of consumer behaviour the neoclassical model of consumer behaviour postulates that a consumer s choice behaviour can be described as deriving from utility maximization subject to a budget constraint one is then naturally led to ask what this model implies about observed behaviour this question has been addressed from two quite distinct approaches the first approach originating in the work of slutsky 1915 and antonelli 1886 derives necessary and sufficient conditions involving the derivatives of the demand functions the second approach originating in the work of samuelson 1938 1947 1948 derives algebraic conditions on the demand functions implied by maximizing behaviour

can t buy me love a field experiment exploring the trade off between income and caste status in an indian matrimonial market i introduction the relationship between economic motive and observance of discriminatory social customs is hardly new to economists this is implicit in the writings of becker 1957 1973 1974 on discrimination and other social customs and explicit in arrow s essay 1972 on discrimination and akerlof s work 1980 on the interactive relationship between economic incentives and discriminatory social customs as scholars like becker arrow and akerlof have investigated the relationship between economic incentives and the prevalence of custom based discrimination of which status based discrimination is an example it is natural to consult the related empirical evidence on the impact of economic incentives on the extent of status based discrimination surprisingly the extant empirical literature is mostly silent on how economic incentives may directly interact with status based discrimination 1 this is atypical as one would be hard pressed to find an issue as weighty as status based discrimination yet our knowledge in this aspect remains oddly limited our study aspires to rectify this gap this study investigates whether and what magnitude of economic incentive can diminish the incidence of status based discrimination by designing a controlled field experiment in an actual marketplace a reputable arranged marriage market that is conducted via newspaper advertisements the existing literature suggests that this market might be especially prone to strong discriminatory mate selection behavior based on the social identity status of an individual where caste identity of an individual is an easily measured indicator of social status the genesis of this discrimination can be attributed to a high status female s concern for a decline in her social status if she engages in a marital relationship with a low status male against this backdrop we ask whether a low status male could attempt to weaken this enduring form of discrimination by providing systematic economic incentive in the form of high monthly groom incomes to a high status female so that the former s marriage proposal receives preliminary consideration by the latter conditional on both individuals participation in this market the marketplace that we utilize is a well functioning arranged marriage market conducted via matrimonial advertisements in a widely circulated bengali language newspaper marriageable males in this market typically advertise their caste and income information among other attributes after these advertisements appear in the newspaper interested families contact the advertiser mostly in form of detailed letters expressing their interest in that advertisement this provides a confidential and reliable measure of first intent of the interested party in this case females therefore the conjunction of an exceptionally strong status based mate selection behavior a reputed market for arranged marriages and an exclusive correspondence process furnish us with a unique opportunity to investigate the main research hypothesis of our study to the best of our knowledge this is the first field experiment that exclusively focuses on how economic incentives can influence status based discrimination in an actual market 2 to operationalize the experiment we create nine unique matrimonial advertisements each representing a fictitious groom type 3 these potential grooms belong to one of the three blocks where each block contains three grooms from a given caste group we vary the caste status across these blocks we consider three different caste groups high middle and low strictly ranked so in the study region we vary the income features of grooms within a block we consider three different monthly income levels i e high medium and low that are considered feasible for each caste group in the study region furthermore we randomly assign other characteristics relevant for this market to all the potential grooms so that these features on average do not affect the behavior of responders

lowering standards to wed spouse quality marriage and labor market responses to the gender wage gap this paper examines the effect of the female to male wage ratio relative wage on women s spouse quality marriage and labor supply over three decades exploiting task based demand shifts as a

matching value and market design in online advertising networks an empirical analysis advertising networks have recently played an increasingly important role in the online advertising market critical to the success of an advertising network are two mechanisms an allocation mechanism that efficiently matches advertisers with publishers and a pricing scheme that maximally extracts surplus from the matches in this paper we quantify the value and investigate the determinants of a successful advertiser publisher match using data from taobao s advertising network a counterfactual experiment reveals that the platform s profit under a decentralized allocation mechanism is close to the profit level when the platform centrally assigns the matching under perfect platform knowledge of matching values in another counterfactual experiment we explore the effect of platform technology and revenue model on the strategic choice of the pricing schemes of list price versus generalized second price gsp auction pricing we find that platforms that profit from the advertiser side may have less incenti

still waiting for mister right asymmetric information abortion laws and the timing of marriage previous studies have suggested that more liberal abortion laws should lead to a decrease in marriage rates among young women as shotgun weddings are no longer necessary empirical evidence from the united states lends support to that hypothesis this article presents an alternative theory of abortion access and marriage based on the cost of search which suggests that more liberal abortion laws may actually promote young marriage an empirical examination of marriage data from eastern europe shows that countries that liberalized their abortion laws saw an increase in marriage rates among nonteenage women

household consumption when the marriage is stable we develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption we de ne a revealed preference characterization of e cient household consumption when the marriage is stable stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs we characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold consumption transfers but without assuming transferable utility we show that our revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even with a single consumption observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households the characterization also allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure including the sharing rule under the same minimalistic assumptions an application to dutch household data demonstrates the usefulness of our theoretical results we nd that the female gets a higher income share when her relative wage increases which we can give a structural interpretation in terms of outside options from marriage that vary with individual wages

a field study on matching with network externalities we study the effects of network externalities within a protocol for matching faculty to offices in a new building using web and survey data on faculty s attributes and choices we identify the different layers of the social network institutional affiliation coauthorships and friendships we quantify the effects of network externalities on choices and outcomes disentangle the layers of the networks and quantify their relative influence finally we assess the protocol used from a welfare perspective our study suggests the importance and feasibility of accounting for network externalities in assignment problems and evaluates techniques that can be employed to this end jel c78 c93 d62 d85 z13

household behavior and the marriage market abstract there is some controversy in the field of household economics regarding the efficiency of household decisions we make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and the household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household time allocations to determine the manner in which spouses interact efficiently or inefficiently under strong but standard assumptions regarding marriage market equilibria marital sorting patterns can be used essentially as out of sample information that allows us to assess whether household behavior is efficient or not we develop a new likelihood based metric to compare marriage market fits under the two alternative behavioral assumptions we use a sample of households drawn from a recent wave of the panel study of income dynamics and find strong evidence supporting the view that household behavior is constrained efficient

testable implications of transferable utility although the transferable utility tu assumption is widely used in micro theory little is known about its testable consequences and in particular how one can from the observation of a group s demand test whether the tu assumption is satisfied within this group we derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on demand that characterize the tu context the conditions are of two types first tu requires the group to behave as a single decision maker secondly within the unitary setting the representative utility generated by a tu framework must be of the generalized quasi linear gql form we derive testable properties of the demand function that fully characterize gql utilities these additional restrictions only involve specifi cp rices namely those of the goods that are publicly consumed within the household

nutrition labour productivity and labour supply of men and women in ghana ghana s population is expected to increase from 14 1 million in 1990 to 18 7 million in 2000 bumb et al 1994 this growth in population along with growth in per capita income and urbanisation will create increased demand for food before the launching of the economic reform programme in 1983 ghana s food production had fallen to an abysmally low level in response to the general deterioration in the economy output of food and cash crops declined at a rate of 0 3 percent per year between 1970 and 1980 cereal production which exceeded domestic demand by some 200 000 tonnes in 1971 73 registered a deficit of over 300 000 tonnes in 1981 83 production of starchy staples fell from 7 9 million tonnes to 4 1 million tonnes between 1974 and 1981 as a result of declining food output combined with a rising population per capita food availability in 1981 83 was 30 percent lower than it was in 1975 efforts made under the economic recovery programme have improved the food supply situation in the country although food production levels still remain low output levels of cocoyam and plantain have not reached their average levels in the early 1970 s table 9 1

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

the dynamics of marriage and divorce we formulate and estimate a dynamic model of marriage divorce and remarriage using panel data on two cohorts of danish men and women the marital surplus is identified from the probability of divorce and the surplus shares of husbands and wives from their willingness to enter marriage we find that the educations of husbands and wives are complements education raises the share of the marital surplus for men but not for women as men and women get older husbands receive a larger share of the marital surplus the estimated costs of divorce are high both early and late in marriage

common ownership market power and innovation abstract i examine the effects of overlapping ownership on market power when there are external effects across firms this is done in an oligopoly model with cost reducing innovation with technological spillovers where firms have an overlapping ownership structure based largely on lopez and vives 2019 the model allows for cournot competition with homogeneous product and for bertrand with differentiated products as well as for strategic effects of r d investment it derives positive testable implications and normative results to inform policy

sorting multidimensional types theory and application this article studies multidimensional matching between workers and jobs workers differ in manual and cognitive skills and sort into jobs that demand different combinations of these two skills to study this multidimensional sorting problem i develop a theoretical framework that generalizes the unidimensional notion of assortative matching and sufficient conditions on the technology under which sorting obtains i derive the equilibrium in closed form and use this explicit solution to study biased technological change the main finding is that an increase in worker job complementarities in cognitive relative to manual inputs leads to more pronounced sorting and wage inequality across cognitive relative to manual skills this can trigger wage polarization and boost aggregate wage inequality i then estimate the model for the u s and identify sizable technology shifts during the last two decades worker job complementarities in cognitive inputs strongly increased whereas complementarities in manual inputs decreased in addition to this bias in complementarities there has been a cognitive skill bias in production counterfactual exercises suggest that these technology shifts as opposed to changes in skill supply and demand can account for observed changes in worker job sorting wage polarization and a significant part of the increase in u s wage dispersion

who marries whom and why this paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market the model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects it rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations the model was used to estimate u s marital behavior in 1971 72 and 1981 82 the marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women

alonso s discrete population model of land use efficient allocations and competitive equilibria in his 1964 book w alonso proposed several concepts of land use equilibrium in terms of discrete population however the so called new urban economics has been concerned exclusively with continuous population models it is the authors belief that in order to develop logical foundations for continuous population models it would be useful to go back to the original models of alonso in this paper they focus on the additive land price model of alonso and examine its solution characteristics in particular the authors demonstrate the existence and pareto efficiency of equilibria and the supportability of efficient allocations through additive land price systems copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the logical foundations of urban economics are consistent the logical foundations of models in urban economics with continua of agents distributed over continuous spaces have recently been questioned it was argued among other things that these models cannot represent properly models with discrete numbers of households each occupying a parcel of land in this paper we propose a mapping based on the continuous model utility and defined over discrete parcels of land which determines the discrete model utility so that the equilibrium solutions of the two models coincide hence the continuous model of urban economics can be used as a tool for studying equilibria and comparative statics of a discrete model which appears to have sound logical foundations journal qf economic literature classification numbers 022 930 1990 academic press inc

a direct test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis this paper takes gary becker s theory of marriage seriously in his seminal paper becker 1973 proposes an invisible hand theorem for the marriage market he argues that the competition for spouse leads men and women to be matched in such a way that maximizes the sum total of marital output applications of the economic approach to marriage are now commonplace becker et al 1977 study the effect of imperfect information on divorce benham 1974 scully 1979 and wong 1986 estimate the effect of wife s education on husband s earnings grossbard shechtman 1993 and rao 1993 focus on the effect of sex ratio on implicit or explicit bride prices or dowries the literature however has virtually ignored becker s hypothesis that marriage markets maximize total marital output i e that marriage markets are efficient mistakes are no doubt made in marriage decisions the marriage market is not a text book example of perfect competition because of elaborate social norms substantial search costs and room for bargaining and opportunistic behavior nevertheless we intend to push becker s efficient marriage market model at face value and directly confront it with data the hypothesis that the marriage market maximizes marital output provides a framework that allows estimating a model of spouse selection which recovers some of the parameters of the production function for marital output using the estimated parameters we can use programming techniques to find the optimal male female pairing that maximizes the sum of marital output the degree to which the actual pairing of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness of fit test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis our method is applied to census data in hong kong a model of spouse selection and other matching models differs from a discrete choice model e g mcfadden 1984 in two important ways first the choice of a spouse is mutual not only does each man choose a woman that yields him the highest net utility but each woman also picks a man that gives her the highest net utility second in a discrete choice model several individuals can choose the same alternative in marriage markets this is prohibited under monogamy thus new methods have to be developed to analyze choice in marriage markets although marital output and the shadow price of husbands and wives are not observable the theory of optimal matching allows us to write down the likelihood function for the observed choice of marital partners it turns out that this model of spouse selection reduces to a version of the tobit model under the assumption that error terms are independently and identically normal in multinomial logit models the interpretation of parameters is cumbersome especially when the number of alternatives is large in our model of spouse selection the estimated parameters are directly related to the production function of marital output the signs of these parameters can be used to address the issue of positive versus negative assortative mating the model can also be used to test marginal product pricing in the marriage market with the estimated production function from the model of spouse selection we can impute the marital output for all possible male female pairs using these imputed output figures the optimal pairing between men and women that maximizes the sum of marital output can be found using an algorithm that solves the assignment problem the degree to which this optimal pairing corresponds to the observed pairing then provides a natural way of assessing marriage market efficiency given the limited range of information contained in the census we find that our model of spouse selection fits the observed choices better than other models such as one based on ranking method following varian s 1990 proposal for goodness of fit tests for optimizing models we derive a measure of efficiency which is based on the distance between total imputed marital output under observed matching and that under optimal matching

factors affecting food poverty in ghana household production theory is applied to the ghana household budget survey data to 1 identify the main determinants of food poverty and 2 determine the net contribution of children to household food availability results suggest income fertility and maturity indices age sex and education significantly explain household calorie gaps hypothesis test results at one per cent and five per cent suggest the contribution of children to household food availability is less than their caloric intake estimated non linear equations permit the prediction and monitoring of the calorie gap for a given household or set of households with given household income and demographic features in a given location

food poverty profile and decomposition applied to ghana abstract a new procedure for deriving a food poverty line and estimating a decomposable poverty measure is applied to the 1974 1975 ghana household budget survey a food poverty profile is constructed which estimates the relative contributions of regional and socioeconomic variables to overall food poverty the incidence of food poverty is found to be more prevalent in 1 rural areas and locations close to the sahel and 2 households with many members and illiterate female or self employed heads comparisons of least cost diets and observed diets incorporating tastes suggest that households exercise food preferences which have relatively high costs

an analysis of out of wedlock childbearing in the united states this paper relates the erosion of the custom of shotgun marriage to the legalization of abortion and the increased availability of contraception to unmarried women in the united states the decline in shotgun marriage accounts for a significant fraction of the increase in out of wedlock first births several models illustrate the analogy between women who do not adopt either birth control or abortion and the hand loom weavers both victims of changing technology mechanisms causing female immiseration are modeled and historically described this technology shock hypothesis is an alternative to welfare and job shortage theories of the feminization of poverty excerpt

a quantitative review of marriage markets how inequality is remaking the american family by carbone and cahn june carbone and naomi cahn argue that growing earnings inequality and the increased educational attainment of women relative to men have led to declining marriage rates for less educated women and an increase in positive assortative matching since the 1970s these trends have negatively affected the welfare of children as they increase the proportion of poor single female headed households using data on marriage markets defined by state race and time and the choo siow marriage matching function this review provides a quantitative assessment of these claims we show that changes in earnings inequality had a qualitatively consistent but modest quantitative impact on marriage rates and positive assortative matching neither changes in the wage distributions nor educational attainments can explain the large decline in marriage rates over this period

aggregation in matching markets this article develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demanders under particular assumptions about the distribution of preferences and the matching game asymptotic aggregate relations for the number of realized matches of different types in the presence of flexible contracts such as a price are derived simulation experiments demonstrate that the model also provides excellent predictions in small populations the potential for applications within demographic labor market and welfare analyses is discussed

specifying a structural matching game of trading networks with transferable utility structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility including matching games of trading networks and many to many matching is increasingly popular in empirical work i explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game one decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model i discuss pairwise stability competitive equilibrium and noncooperative games such as auctions another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents i explore other issues as well

does better nutrition raise farm productivity household level data from sierra leone are used to test whether higher caloric intake enhances family farm labor productivity this is the notion behind the efficiency wages hypothesis which has found only weak empirical support a farm production function is estimated accounting for the simultaneity in input and calorie choice instruments include prices household demographic characteristics and farm assets the latter two sets of instruments are later dropped to explore the robustness of the results to different specifications of exogeneity the exercise shows a highly significant effect of caloric intake on labor productivity providing solid support for the nutrition productivity hypothesis the marginal effect on productivity falls drastically as calorie consumption rises but remains positive at moderately high levels of intake one result is a fall in the effective price of food a decline that is larger for households that consumer fewer calories

revealed preference and location choice abstract the assumption that population and structural densities are defined over parcels of land with zero area is problematic when interpreting the standard residential land use model as approximating a large finite economy this paper extends revealed preference theory to depict a spatial economy with land parcels of finite area the model generalizes the standard utility function approach allowing for many consumer types with different tastes and incomes and labor leisure choice to show that the most important predictions of the standard theory hold in the general finite framework studied here

personality traits and the marriage market which and how many attributes are relevant for the sorting of agents in a matching market this paper addresses these questions by constructing indices of mutual attractiveness that aggregate information about agents attributes the first k indices for agents on each side of the market provide the best approximation of the matching surplus by a k dimensional model the methodology is applied on a unique dutch household survey containing information about education height body mass index health attitude toward risk and personality traits of spouses

birth control and female empowerment an equilibrium analysis we analyze from a theoretical perspective the impact of innovations in birth control technology on intrahousehold allocation of resources we consider a model of frictionless matching on the marriage market in which men as well as women differ in their preferences for children moreover men unlike women must marry to enjoy fatherhood we show that more efficient birth control technologies generally increase the power hence the welfare of all women including those who do not use them this empowerment effect requires that the new technology be available to single women an innovation reserved to married women may result in a disempowerment effect

structural estimation of marriage models a structural approach is used to examine who matches with whom a two sided matching model that allows for marital sorting in response to marriage market flexibility and agents preferences is utilized estimation is based on imbedding the numerical solution of a matching model within a maximum likelihood procedure results indicate that wage is more desirable than education in predicting marriageability for white men education is more desirable for black men the marriage market for white men is more flexible both marriage market flexibility and the chance of being classified correctly using agents wage and education decrease with age for white men

canadian contributions to family economics canadian scholars have made substantial contributions to the relatively new field of family economics these include new models of how men and women match in marriage markets and of how decisions are made in multi person households several were early contributors to the literature on married women s labour supply and labour supply in a family context and helped to develop empirical methods in this area a particular focus has been on the impacts of policy relevant parameters such childcare costs on family labour supply and child well being new work on child development the impact of early life conditions and the processes of intergenerational transmission also highlight the importance of family context in determining economic well being

cross border marriage costs and marriage behavior theory and evidence this article analyzes cross border marriages between mainland china and hong kong hk we examine the effects of a reduction in cross border marriage costs following an increase in marriage migration quotas and the handover of hk to china we find that cross border marriages mainly involve men from the low tail of the hk attribute distribution we also find that hk women s position in the marriage market and within households deteriorated following the reduction in cross border marriage costs and that their disadvantaged position exerts an incentive effect on their labor market behavior these outcomes are consistent with our matching model

marital matching economies of scale and intrahousehold allocations we propose a novel nonparametric method to empirically identify economies of scale in multiperson household consumption we assume consumption technologies that define the public and private nature

matching and sorting in online dating using data on user attributes and interactions from an online dating site we estimate mate preferences and use the gale shapley algorithm to predict sta ble matches the predicted matches are similar to the actual matches achieved by the dating site and the actual matches are approximately efficient outof sample predictions of offline matches i e marriages exhibit assortative mating patterns similar to those observed in actual marriages thus mate pref erences without resort to search frictions can generate sorting in marriages however we underpredict some of the correlation patterns search frictions may play a role in explaining the discrepancy

how does the marriage market clear an empirical framework the paper surveys the choo and siow 2006a cs marriage matching model and its extensions cs derives a behavioural marriage matching function the collective model of intra household allocations can be integrated into this framework spousal labour supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions marriage market tightness the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals the hypothesis that spousal labour supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions the framework extends to a dynamic marriage matching environment empirically this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in sichuan affected the marital behaviour of famine born cohorts marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the united states marriage market conditions in the contemporary united states primarily affect spousal labour force participation rather than hours of work ce texte examine le modele de choo et siow et ses extensions ce modele derive une fonction comportemental d arrimage sur le marche du mariage le modele d allocation intra menage des t ches peut s integrer a ce cadre d analyse les offres de travail des epoux repondent aux conditions changeantes du marche du mariage un marche du mariage serre un ratio d hommes celibataires de type i par rapport a un nombre de femmes celibataires de type j constitue une statistique suffisante pour etablir les conditions de marche de ces types d individus l hypothese que les offres de travail des epoux varient pour equilibrer le marche du mariage engendre des restrictions de sur identification le cadre d analyse couvre le cas d un environnement dynamique d arrimage empiriquement ce memoire montre comment la famine causee par le grand saut en avant de sichuan a affecte le comportement de mariage des cohortes qui en sort sorties on montre aussi que le caractere serre du marche du mariage aux etats unis fournit une statistique utile pour prendre le pouls des conditions du marche du mariage ces conditions dans le monde contemporain aux etats unis ont un impact sur la participation des epoux au marche du travail plutot que sur les heures travaillees

marriage labor supply and home production we extend the search matching model of the marriage market of shimer and smith 2000 to allow for labor supply home production match specific shocks and endogenous divorce we study nonparametric identification using panel data on marital status education family values wages and market and non market hours and we develop a semiparametric estimator we estimate how much sorting results from time use specialization or homophilic preferences we estimate how equilibrium marriage formation affects the wage elasticities of market and non market hours we estimate individuals willingness to pay for marriage and quantify the redistributive effect of intra household resource sharing

accounting for changes in tastes health concerns are thought by many to have shifted consumption away from red meats though econometric evidence is mixed testing for structural change is difficult especially when one time series is used for both estimating demand equations and testing their stability specification errors may suggest a shift where none has occurred using nonparametric demand analysis we find that meat consumption patterns in the united states and australia can be explained using only relative prices and expenditures only imposing particular functional forms can reverse the conclusion suggesting that specification errors in econometric demand studies can account for findings of taste changes

demand analysis using strategic reports an application to a school choice mechanism several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences we find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in cambridge such strategizing can complicate preference analysis this paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms we show that preferences are non parametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shifter we then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to cambridge estimates suggest that while 82 of students are assigned to their stated first choice only 72 are assigned to their true first choice because students avoid ranking competitive schools assuming that students behave optimally the immediate acceptance mechanism is preferred by the average student to the deferred acceptance mechanism by an equivalent of 0 08 miles the estimated difference is smaller if beliefs are biased and reversed if students report truthfully

improving the numerical performance of static and dynamic aggregate discrete choice random coefficients demand estimation the widely used estimator of berry levinsohn and pakes 1995 p roduces estimates of consumer preferences from a discrete choice demand model with random coefficients market level demand shocks and endogenous prices we derive numerical theory results characterizing the properties of the nested fixed point algorithm used to evaluate the objective function of blp s estimator we discuss problems with typical implementations including cases that can lead to incorrect parameter estimates as a solution we recast estimation as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints which can be faster and which avoids the numerical issues associated with nested inner loops the advantages are even more pronounced for forward looking demand models where the bellman equation must also be solved repeatedly several monte carlo and real data experiments support our numerical concerns about the nested fixed point approach and the advantages of constrained optimization for static blp the constrained optimization approach can be as much as ten to forty times faster for large dimensional problems with many markets

marriage as a rat race noisy premarital investments with assortative matching we study the efficiency of premarital investments when parents care about their child s marriage prospects in a large frictionless marriage market with nontransferable utility stochastic returns to investment ensure that equilibrium is unique we find that generically investments exceed the pareto efficient level unless the sexes are symmetric in all respects girls will invest more than boys if their quality shocks are less variable than shocks for boys or if they are the abundant sex the unique equilibrium in our continuum agent model is the limit of the equilibria of finite models as the number of agents tends to infinity

on the state of the union an overlapping generations model of marriage and divorce is constructed to analyze family structure and intergenerational mobility agents differ by sex marital status and human capital single agents meet in a marriage market and decide whether to accept or reject proposals to wed married couples must decide whether to separate or not parents invest in their children depending on their wherewithal a simulated version of the theoretical prototype can generate an equilibrium with a significant number of female headed families and a high degree of persistence in income across generations to illustrate the model s mechanics the effects of two antipoverty policies namely child support and welfare are investigated

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

large demographic shocks and small changes in the marriage market between 1958 and 1961 china experienced one of the worse famines in her history birth rates fell during these years and recovered immediately afterwards the famine also adversely affected the health of these cohorts this paper provides non parametric estimates of the total effects of the famine on the marital behaviour of famine affected cohorts in the rural areas of sichuan and anhui these reduced from estimates incorporate general equilibrium and heterogeneous treatment effects two important components of equilibrium marital behaviour next the paper uses a structural model of the marriage market the choo siow model to decompose observed marital outcomes into quantity and quality effects of the famine the structural estimates show that the famine substantially reduced the marital attractiveness of the famine born cohort the conclusion is that the small observed changes in marriage rates of the famine born cohorts are due to a substantial decline in their marital attractiveness controlling for changes in educational attainment does not change the conclusion

two sex demographic models classical stable population theory the standard model of population age structure and growth is ill suited to addressing many issues that concern economists and demographers because it is a one sex theory this paper investigates the existence uniqueness and dynamic stability of equilibrium in the birth matrix mating rule bmmr model a new model of age structure and growth for two sex monogamously mating populations the paper shows by means of examples that the bmmr model can have multiple nontrivial equilibria and establishes sufficient conditions for uniqueness it generalizes a theorem of w brian arthur to nonlinear systems and uses it to establish sufficient conditions for local dynamic stability

location housing and leisure demand muth s model of cbd employed household behavior has been successfully extended to include labor leisure choice in order to deal with the original version s deficient treatment of commuting time the extension demonstrates how all the basic results of the simpler formulation remain valid this paper provides a similar extension for the locally employed household variant of muth s model the analysis demonstrates a surprising difference between the demand gradient and comparative static results for the locally employed household without leisure choice and the locally employed household with leisure choice not observed for the cbd employed household model

urban commuting journeys are not wasteful do urban workers commute too much bruce hamilton 1982 was the first to raise the question whether urban workers commuting journeys are too long or in his terms wasteful he argued that the monocentric urban model predicts that workers commuting journeys will be minimized to test the model he calculated the minimum commuting journey length for the average worker in a group of u s cities and compared the results to the actual average commuting journey length for those workers he assumed that any difference between the two figures was wasteful commuting he found that the average minimum commuting distance was only 1 1 miles but the average distance actually commuted by workers in those cities was 8 7 miles or nearly eight times as great hamilton therefore concluded that the monocentric urban model has little predictive value concerning commuting behavior and that actual commuting behavior could be predicted just as well using an assumption that commuting is random commuting behavior is a central feature of any model that purports to explain urban residential and job location choice hamilton s assertion that the monocentric urban model has little predictive value concerning commuting behavior therefore strikes at the heart of

exclusive nightclubs and lonely hearts columns non monotone participation in optional intermediation in many decentralised markets the traders who benefi tm ost from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them at the same time employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade together these decisions amount to non monotone participation choices in intermediation only traders of middle type employ intermediaries while the rest the high and the low types prefer to search for a trading partner directly we provide a theoretical foundation for this hitherto unexplained phenomenon we build a dynamic matching model where a trader s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type we also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non monotone equilibria

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

dynamic marriage matching an empirical framework the paper proposes a dynamic version of the frictionless becker shapley shubik marriage matching model with transferable utility its primary objective is to develop a tractable model that rationalizes the marriage distribution of who marries whom by age this behavioral dynamic model rationalizes a new marriage matching function an empirical methodology that relies on the equilibrium outcomes of the model identies the marital preferences over spouses this framework also allows the inverse problem of computing the vector of aggregate marriages given a new distribution of available single individuals and estimated preferences to be solved the solution to this inverse problem has been shown to exist under mild conditions this paper also develops a simple test of the model s empirical validity using aggregate data of new marriages and available single men and women in the us in 1970 1980 and 1990 i investigate the changes in the gains to marriage over this period

gender based price discrimination in matching markets this paper develops a new model to analyze price discrimination in matching markets where agents have private information about their respective qualities on the basis of signals car clothing club membership etc purchased from profit maximizing firms men and women form beliefs about each other s qualities the matching must then be stable in the following sense there cannot be a man and woman who are unmatched and who both believe they would be better off if they were matched with one another the model enables an analysis of the impact of third degree or gender based price discrimination on welfare when third degree price discrimination is not feasible the cost of eliciting private information is higher but a monopoly intermediary may have stronger incentives to implement an efficient allocation i show that gender based price discrimination is more likely to have a positive impact the more symmetric the matching environment is

for better or for worse the long term effects of postwar reconstruction on family formation abstractthis article estimates the long term legacies of female labour force mobilization on women s family formation outcomes such as marriage age at first marriage and divorce we identify the long term marriage effects of female labour force mobilization by exploring postwar mandatory employment in germany using difference in differences analysis we find that participation in postwar reconstruction efforts increased women s probability of being currently married ever married and marrying at younger ages we also find that postwar employment had no differential effect on divorce rates of the affected cohorts of women these results persist after accounting for the potential changes in the composition of the population demand for female labour war relief payments and postwar state specific policies

an empirical model of the medical match abstract this paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many to one matching market using only observed matches i use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression due to residents willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain on average at least 23 000 below the marginal product of labor therefore the match is not the likely cause of low salaries jel c78 i11 j31 j44 k21 l44