frictionless commerce a comparison of internet and conventional retailers there have been many claims that the internet represents a new nearly frictionless market our research empirically analyzes the characteristics of the internet as a channel for two categories of homogeneous products books and cds using a data set of over 8 500 price observations collected over a period of 15 months we compare pricing behavior at 41 internet and conventional retail outlets we find that prices on the internet are 9 16 lower than prices in conventional outlets depending on whether taxes shipping and shopping costs are included in the price additionally we find that internet retailers price adjustments over time are up to 100 times smaller than conventional retailers price adjustments presumably reflecting lower menu costs in internet channels we also find that levels of price dispersion depend importantly on the measures employed when we compare the prices posted by different internet retailers we find substantial dispersion internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33 for books and 25 for cds however when we weight these prices by proxies for market share we find dispersion is lower in internet channels than in conventional channels reflecting the dominance of certain heavily branded retailers we conclude that while there is lower friction in many dimensions of internet competition branding awareness and trust remain important sources of heterogeneity among internet retailers

rockets and feathers understanding asymmetric pricing prices rise like rockets but fall like feathers this stylized fact of most markets is con rmed by many empirical studies in this paper i develop a model with competitive rms and rational partially informed consumers where such asymmetric response to costs by rms emerges naturally in contrast to public opinion and past work collusion is not necessary to explain such result using a rich dataset of retail gasoline prices i nd the observed price dispersion pattern to be consistent with the model s prediction

the beauty of bigness on optimal design of multi winner contests abstract this paper examines the variation in total effort expended by participants when prizes are awarded in a grand contest as opposed to a number of subcontests when contestants are homogeneous under a mild and plausible condition regular contest technology a grand contest generates more effort than any set of subcontests when no restrictions are placed on the contest technology the results further demonstrate an increasing return to scale property such that each individual responds to a proportional increase in the number of contestants and the number of each prize by increasing individual effort therefore when a collection of identical subcontests forms a grand contest the total effort always increases and the grand contest leads to a higher rent dissipation rate our results apply to a wide variety of competitive activities such as high profile sports e g diving and gymnastics in the olympic games the internal labor market and the quota system for public resource allocation

asymmetric price adjustments a supply side approach using a model of dynamic price competition we provide an explanation from the supply side for the well established observation that output prices react faster in response to input cost increases than to decreases when costs decline the opportunity of profitable storing in anticipation of higher future costs allows competitive firms to coordinate on prices above current marginal costs the initial price response is only partial and profitable storing relaxes competition conversely when costs rise storing is not beneficial in anticipation of lower future costs and firms immediately adjust their prices to current marginal costs which entails the standard bertrand outcome our results shed new light on the empirical evidence about asymmetric pricing and can stimulate further empirical investigation on this puzzle

dynamic implementation in two agent economies abstract the dynamic mechanisms that implement pareto efficient and individually rational allocations in standard public good economies suppose that agents communicate by exchanging as messages their marginal rates of substitution in some familiar models such as economies with non monotonic preferences marginal rates of substitution are not well defined or do not characterize preferences and therefore cannot play the role of communication messages we define a dynamic mechanism that implements pareto efficient and individually rational allocations in a general two agent economy

the timing and magnitude of retail store markdowns evidence from weekends and holidays we examine daily prices of eight goods at seventeen retail stores collected in ann arbor michigan over a four month period from november 1 to february 28 we focus on weekly and seasonal price patterns and on the frequency of price markdowns or sales there were frequent markdowns in the intensive shopping period prior to christmas and a tendency for such sales to occur on weekends we interpret these findings as evidence that a significant number of markdowns are timed to occur when shopping intensity is exogenously high we complement the imperfect information based motives for sales in the literature by contributing an additional element based on the role of bulk shopping and increasing returns in the shopping technology

a multi winner nested rent seeking contest this paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent seeking contest in which there may be several winners we first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest in contrast to the previous work we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large

the optimal prize structure of symmetric tullock contests we show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n player tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists if such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner take all structure we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts if no such optimal equilibrium exists no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts

some results on rent seeking contests with shortlisting we show that rent seeking contests with shortlistinghave comparative static properties which depend on thestage of the contest by generalising the argument inamegashie 1997 we show that well known comparativestatic results in single stage rent seeking contestsdo not necessarily carry over to contests withshortlisting the analysis suggeststhat policy prescriptions for reducing rent seekingexpenditures in contests with shortlisting cannot begiven without taking into account the stage of thecontest we also extend the model in amegashie 1997 to the case of unequal class sizes finally theshortlisting method in amegashie 1997 is comparedwith that in clark and riis 1996

price dispersion in the small and in the large evidence from an internet price comparison site this paper examines four million daily price observations for more than 1 000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http shopper com we find little support for the notion that prices on the internet are converging to the law of one price in addition observed levels of price dispersion vary systematically with the number of firms listing prices the difference between the two lowest prices the gap averages 23 per cent when two firms list prices and falls to 3 5 per cent in markets where 17 firms list prices these empirical results are an implication of a general clearinghouse model of equilibrium price dispersion

market structure and the nature of price rigidity evidence from the market for consumer deposits panel data on consumer bank deposit interest rates reveal asymmetric impacts of market concentration on the dynamic adjustment of prices to shocks banks in concentrated markets are slower to raise interest rates on deposits in response to rising market interest rates but are faster to reduce them in response to declining market interest rates thus banks with market power skim off surplus on movements in both directions since deposit interest rates are inversely related to the price charged by banks for deposits the results suggest that downward price rigidity and upward price flexibility are a consequence of market concentration

prices rise faster than they fall output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases this tendency is found in more than two of every three markets examined it is found as frequently in producer goods markets as in consumer goods markets in both kinds of markets the asymmetric response to cost shocks is substantial and durable on average the immediate response to a positive cost shock is at least twice the response to a negative shock and that difference is sustained for at least five to eight months unlike past studies which documented similar asymmetries in selected markets gasoline agricultural products etc this one uses large samples of diverse products 77 consumer and 165 producer goods accordingly the results suggest a gap in an essential part of economic theory as a start on filling this gap the study finds no asymmetry in the resonse of an individual decision maker a supermarket chain to its costs but it finds above average asymmetry where a cost shock is filtered through a fragmented w

axiomatizing multi prize nested lottery contests a complete and strict ranking perspective abstract multiple prizes are usually awarded in contests e g internal promotions school admissions sports etc and players exert effort to increase their chances for winning a higher prize a multi prize contest model must provide each player s probabilities of winning each prize as functions of all players efforts we find that the key notion of hypothetical subcontests in the contest axiomatization literature initiated by skaperdas 1996 can be appropriately interpreted and precisely defined from a ranking perspective as well as the relevant axioms of subcontest consistency and independence of irrelevant contestants iic when there are less than four contestants exclusive a set of axioms properly adapted from those in skaperdas 1996 and clark and riis 1998a are sufficient and necessary for axiomatizing the widely adopted multi prize nested lottery contest of clark and riis 1996a when there are more than four contestants inclusive including a new axiom of independence of irrelevant ranks iir is necessary and sufficient

the relative rigidity of monopoly pricing this paper seeks to explain why monopolies keep their nominal prices constant for longer periods than do tight oligopolies the authors show that cost changes create a larger incentive for duopolists to change their prices while demand changes tend to have a greater effect on a monopolist when both costs and demand are affected by small changes in the overall price level the cost effect dominates in the presence of a small fixed cost of changing prices therefore duopolists change their prices in response to smaller perturbations in underlying conditions copyright 1987 by american economic association

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

sticky prices new evidence from retail catalogs this paper presents new results on the size frequency and synchronization of price changes for twelve selected retail goods over the past 35 years three basic facts about the data are uncovered first nominal prices are typically fixed for more than one year although the time between changes is very irregular second prices change more often during periods of high overall inflation third when prices do change the sizes of the changes are widely dispersed both large and small changes occur for the same item and the sizes of these changes do not closely depend on overall inflation

committees and rent seeking effort abstract this paper explores the extent to which administrative structures may influence the extent of rent seeking effort within the environments explored relatively smaller efforts tend to be invested to influence the deliberations of commitees than those of single administrators to the extent that these efforts may be considered unproductive rent seeking the widespread use of committees may reflect the fact that savings from reduced rent seeking more than offset the greater decision costs of committees

the relative rigidity of oligopoly pricing abstract evidence on canadian daily newspaper prices shows that unlike in rotemberg and saloner american economic review 1987 77 917 926 monopolies change prices more frequently than oligopolies

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

staggering and synchronization in price setting evidence from multiproduct firms theoretical work on price setting behavior focuses on the single product case while in reality a single price setter sells many products the authors use retail store level multiproduct pricing data to learn about price dynamics they find that while the timing of a product s price changes is staggered across stores selling the same product the timing of the price changes of different products sold within the same store is highly synchronized this finding validates the usual assumption that decisions are staggered across price setters and suggests that price rigidity is due mostly to mechanical reasons and not to informational asymmetries copyright 1996 by american economic association

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

the design of rent seeking competitions committees preliminary and final contests the paper examines the common practice in multi contest rent seeking competitions where finalists are selected based on rent seekers efforts in a preliminary contest we find that for any single contest design rent seeking expenditures could be reduced by introducing a preliminary contest if the marginal returns to rent seeking effort in the preliminary contest is sufficiently low in addition to other reasons the paper argues that this may explain why such multi contest designs are common we argue that rent seeking expenditure in the preliminary stage represents the cost of reducing the number of contestants we also find that the practice of setting a higher quality standard in the final contest than the quality standard in the preliminary contest reduces rent seeking waste we derive an expression for the optimal number of finalists under certain conditions we find that the optimal number of finalists is directly proportional or equal to the square root of the number of potential contestants finally we show that whether rent seeking expenditures rise or fall when the rent is awarded by a committee instead of a single administrator depends on the sensitivity of the committee relative to that of the single administrator

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

the rigidity of prices this paper uses evidence on individual transaction prices to analyze price behavior the evidence shows that for many transactions pricesremain rigid for periods exceeding one year the rigidity of price ispositively correlated with industry concentration for several productsthe correlation of price changes across buyers is low the paper alsoinvestigates the relationship between price rigidity price change andthe length of time a buyer and seller have been doing business together the author interprets the evidence as emphasizing the importance of nonprice rationing and the inadequacy of models in whichprice movements alone clear markets copyright 1986 by american economic association

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

in defense of lawyers moral hazard as an aid to cooperation abstract this paper studies strategic delegation in two player contests for an indivisible prize as in e g litigation where one party s probability of winning is determined by the relative investments of both even though neither player stands to gain anything from precommitment both players ex ante prefer compulsory representation by agents e g lawyers whose efforts are unobservable this delegation equilibrium is unaffected by secret renegotiation opportunities equivalently it does not matter whether contracts are observable or not hence the paper points out a role for delegation with moral hazard in facilitating cooperation an effect quite separate from precommitment journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72 d82 k41

contests with draws axiomatization and equilibrium we introduce and axiomatize a class of single winner contest success functions that embody the possibility of a draw we then analyze the game of contest that our success functions induce having different prizes delivered in the occurrence of a win and a draw we identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric interior nash equilibrium and show that equilibrium efforts and equilibrium rent dissipation can be larger than in a tullock contest with no possibility of a draw due to increased competition even if the draw prize is null these results suggest that a contest designer may profit from introducing the possibility of a draw finally we show that this approach naturally extends to multiprize contests with multiple draws across different subsets of the set of players jel c72 d72 d74

incentive compatibility without compensation abstract standard public good mechanisms rely on a transferable medium of compensation to overcome incentive compatibility constraints groves laffont if no such medium exists and information is incomplete the available rules with satisfactory welfare and incentice compatibility properties require a unidimensional set of alternatives we define a dynamic procedure for two dimensional economies that is pareto optimal and individually rational with incentives as those of rules exploiting compensatory transfers

a contest success function for networks abstract this paper models conflict as a contest within a network of friendships and enmities we assume that each player is either in a friendly or in an antagonistic relation with every other player and players compete for winning by exerting costly efforts we axiomatically characterize a success function which determines the win probability of each player given the efforts and the network of relations in an extension we allow for varying intensities of friendships and enmities this framework allows for the study of strategic incentives and friendship formation under conflict as well as the application of stability concepts of network theory to contests

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

are prices sticky online market structure effects and asymmetric responses to cost shocks in online mortgage markets abstract we analyze daily mortgage rates posted by online lenders at the price comparison site microsurf while cost shocks occurred almost daily in our sample quoted mortgage rates are surprisingly rigid only 16 of the posted rates represent changes however firms that adjusted rates in response to cost shocks did so quite rapidly about 98 of a cost shock was passed through within 2 days of the cost shock duration analysis reveals that the observed rigidity in rates systematically depends on market structure online mortgage rates are 30 to 40 more durable in concentrated markets than in markets where there are many competitors we also find that rates posted online tend to exhibit downward stickiness rate adjustments in response to cost increases are about twice the corresponding adjustments for cost decreases

do gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to crude oil price changes the authors test and confirm that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices among the possible sources of this asymmetry are production inventory adjustment lags and market power of some sellers by analyzing price transmission at different points in the distribution chain the authors attempt to shed light on these theories spot prices for generic gasoline show asymmetry in responding to crude oil price changes which may reflect inventory adjustment effects asymmetry also appears in the response of retail prices to wholesale price changes possibly indicating short run market power among retailers