the effect of taxes on labor supply in the underground economy this paper uses micro data from a randomized survey carried out in the metropolitan area of quebec city canada to analyze the decision to evade taxes and work in the underground economy the results indicate that taxes distort labor market activities away from the regular sector to the underground sector but the distortion is small for the average worker the distortion is large however for particular groups of the population such as welfare claimants copyright 1994 by american economic association

consumer expectation and output growth the case of china abstract this study shows that china s consumer expectation index contains useful information about pure expectation shocks which are unrelated to economic fundamentals it turns out that such shocks are likely to be an important independent driver of industrial output growth

losses from effluent taxes and quotas under uncertainty recent theoretical papers by adar and griffin j environ econ manag 3 178 188 1976 fishelson j environ econ manag 3 189 197 1976 and weitzman rev econ studies41 477 491 1974 show that different expected social losses arise from using effluent taxes and quotas as alternative control instruments when marginal control costs are uncertain key assumptions in these analyses are linear marginal cost and benefit functions and an additive error for the marginal cost function to reflect uncertainty in this paper empirically derived nonlinear functions and more realistic multiplicative error terms are used to estimate expected control and damage costs and to identify empirically the mix of control instruments that minimizes expected losses

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

regulating stock externalities under uncertainty abstract using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock costs of adjusting the stock and uncertainty in costs we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price based policies e g taxes relative to quantity based policies e g tradable permits for controlling stock externalities as in weitzman rev econom stud 41 4 1974 477 the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical determinants of the efficiency of prices relative to quantities with flatter marginal benefits and steeper marginal costs favoring prices but some important adjustments for dynamic effects are necessary including correlation of cost shocks across time discounting stock decay and the rate of benefits growth applied to the problem of greenhouse gases and climate change we find that a price based instrument generates several times the expected net benefits of a quantity instrument

might fundamental tax reform increase criminal activity fundamental tax reform replacing the income tax with a sales tax is commonly thought to reduce levels of criminal and other underground economic activity by implicitly taxing their returns this paper finds instead that the impact of tax reform depends on the relative labour intensity of production in the legitimate and illegitimate sectors of the economy in the likely event that illegitimate output is produced by using more labour intensive techniques than is legitimate output then replacing an income tax with a sales tax reduces the cost of criminal and other underground activity thereby stimulating its growth

ethical influences on the evolution of the us tradable permit approach to air pollution control abstract in 1975 a novel approach to air pollution control was implemented in the usa from this rather humble beginning this approach has now been expanded rather dramatically in several different directions this paper describes this evolution shows how the design of the system has been adapted to accommodate ethical concerns and describes how the latest versions of this approach have transformed the regulatory process which spawned the approach in the first place

designing testing and implementing a trial dryland salinity credit trade scheme this article describes implementation and outcomes of a credit trading trial focussed on dryland salinity in victoria australia in lieu of extant specified property rights participants were invited to agree to obligations to provide groundwater recharge credits in exchange for pecuniary compensation participants were able to meet their obligations to supply groundwater recharge credits through land management actions resulting in monitored outcomes consistent with contractual obligations to reduce recharge alternatively those in deficit were provided the option to obtain sufficient credits through market exchange surplus transferable recharge credits were produced by those participants who exceeded their own contractual obligations through improved land management the paper describes the process of contract design and implementation the trial involved a design and testing phase and an on ground implementation phase we describe composite methodologies deployed in the design and testing of alternative policy instruments and institutional arrangements conducted prior to implementation these involved community consultation an attitudinal and behavioural survey experimental economics and the development of a transparent and credible monitoring protocol the conclusions drawn as a result of this analysis provided an empirical basis to implement the on ground trial phase results of on ground implementation are described finally the methods and results of a benefit cost analysis bca of the on ground trial implementation are outlined the bca accounted for salinity damage reduction forgone river flow carbon sequestration production benefits and costs the result of bca was an estimated net benefit

emission trading vs rigid regulations in the control of vehicle emissions this paper presents the results of an empirical study of the cost savings associated with a marketable permit system for light duty vehicles relative to the current system of uniform standards the sensitivity of cost savings estimates to model specification are examined including estimation approaches for obtaining cost functions issues of the functional form of emission control cost functions and choice of pollution variables included in the estimated cost functions additionally the precision of point estimates of cost savings are explored using a simulation method for obtaining estimates of the standard errors of cost savings

the underground economies tax evasion and information distortion list of contributors preface introduction edgar l feige part i the meaning measurement and policy implications of the underground economies 1 the meaning and measurement of the underground economy edgar l feige 2 information distortions in social systems the underground economy and other observer subject policymaker feedbacks robert r alford and edgar l feige 3 policy illusion macroeconomic instability and the unrecorded economy robert t mcgee and edgar l feige 4 how large or small should the underground economy be bruno frey part ii the underground economy in western developed nations measurement in different laboratories 5 monetary perspective on underground economic activity in the united states richard d porter and amanda s bayer 6 the unrecorded economy and the national income accounts in the netherlands a sensitivity analysis g a a m broesterhuizen 7 assessing the underground economy in the united kingdom michael o higgins 8 the underground economy in the federal republic of germany a preliminary assessment enno langfeldt 9 the underground economy in sweden ingemar hansson 10 the irregular economy of italy a survey of contributions bruno contini 11 the hidden economy in norway with special emphasis on the hidden labor market arne jon isachsen and steiner strom 12 canada s underground economy rolf mirus and roger s smith 13 the underground economy in france philippe barthelemy part iii the underground economy under central planning 14 the soviet second economy in a political and legal perspective f j m feldbrugge 15 second economy and socialism the hungarian experience istvan r gabor bibliography

on the informational superiority of quantities over prices in the presence of an externality in this study we investigate the convexity of the profit function of a regulated firm with respect to the random shocks in the marginal costs and the demand intercept and its implications regarding information disclosure when these shocks are revealed to the firm at a future stage we illustrate that information disclosure is attained when the firm is regulated through the use of a quantity rather than a price instrument to do so we argue that increased convexity obtained under complete information is a sufficient condition as a policy implication we suggest a new argument which favors the use of quantities over prices these implications are more pronounced once we allow for multiple firms

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

cap and trade policy challenges a tale of three markets cap and trade policy instruments have been applied to a number of environmental problems with varying success this article examines cap and trade programs for so2 allowances fishery quotas and water rights design and implementation of cap and trade mechanisms involves challenging policy tradeoffs accommodating equity concerns balancing use levels with resource conditions facilitating transactions accounting for externalities assuring adequate monitoring and documenting welfare gains efficient trading mechanisms are more readily implemented when there is a strong political or legal mandate to cap resource use and trades are perceived as a means to ease adjustment to use limits

incentives for environmental protection this book explores the extent to which pricing incentives such as charges on emissions in contrast to regulatory standards can be shaped into a practical policy that is technically effective politically enactable administratively enforceable and equitable it also compares he advantages and disadvantages of this approach to those that characterize the policy of compliance to regulatory standards and it identifies the criteria on which either pricing mechanisms or regulatory standards should be based three case studies comprise the heart of the book one investigates carcinogenic chemical emissions another audits the tradeoffs in controlling aircraft noise near major airports and the third treats the protection of air quality from pollution by primarily stationary sources the case studies are introduced by a chapter that gives numerous examples of possible pricing approaches and identifies common lessons that the three diverse studies reinforce the studies are followed by a chapter which is based on interviews with congressional staff environmentalists and industrial lobbyists and other interest groups in washington revealing their assessments of pricing mechanisms in environmental protection thomas c schelling and his co authors david harrison jr albert l nichols robert repetto and steven j kelman are all affiliated with the kennedy school of government harvard university the book is fifth in the series regulation of economic activity

prices versus quantities in a second best setting the choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions the first proceeds from weitzman s partial equilibrium sto chastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve the second utilises deter ministic general equilibrium models with pre existing distortionary taxes it concludes that non revenue raising instruments e g grandfathered tradable permits are costlier than rev enue raising ones e g a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits to build a bridge between these two traditions we introduce in weitzman s model a positive cost of public funds due to pre existing distortionary taxes the tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits as compared to weitzman s classical result then we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden this may require a transfer to firms in the form of freely allocated permits or lump sum tax rebate it turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced quantitatively even if the marginal benefit function is 50 more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function the price instrument should be preferred we also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum the superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first best

the control of externalities abatement vs damage prevention both public policy discussions and the theoretical literature on externalities have focused on abatement by emitters as the chief means of mitigating the harmful effects of pollution the purpose of this paper is to broaden that focus by illuminating the role of damage reduction activities undertaken by victims and by showing how the efficient solution is affected when these preventive actions are incorporated into the standard theory of externalities finding the efficient solution requires a comparison of emitters abatement costs and the damages sustained by victims as browning 5 has shown the correct short run measure of damage is the loss in the victims profits given that they have acted optimally to minimize the harmful effects of the pollution if victims have no options other than passive acceptance of ambient pollution levels this loss in profits simply equals the profit level in the absence of the externality less the harm inflicted directly by exposure to it however if victims have available to them some cost effective means of reducing the harmful effects of untreated pollution the loss in profits will be smaller since a victim sees damage from pollution as a cost it will attempt to minimize this cost at each level of its output just as it endeavors to minimize other private costs of production such as labor or fuel costs the victim will maximize its profits only if it takes into account both the cost of pollution damages and the cost of damage reduction measures surprisingly the theoretical literature on externalities includes very little explicit discussion of victims defensive actions browning for example displayed a victim s set of marginal cost curves corresponding to different pollution levels each curve was drawn under the assumption that the victim had undertaken the efficient amount of damage prevention given the quantity of pollution it had received the mechanism by which it chose this amount of prevention was not discussed a different approach was taken by bohm 2 3

correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice abstract for two decades environmental economists have generally maintained that benefit uncertainty is irrelevant for choosing between price and quantity instruments but that cost uncertainty matters with the identity of the efficient instrument depending upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions but in the presence of simultaneous correlated uncertainty such policy instrument recommendations may be inappropriate with plausible values of relevant parameters the conventional identification of a price instrument will be reversed to favor instead a quantity instrument the opposite reversal from the choice of a quantity instrument to a price instrument seems less likely to occur

confidence and the real economy the japanese case this paper empirically analyses whether consumer confidence has an effect on the real economy in japan this paper uses vector autoregressions including variables which represent consumer confidence it is shown that in the cases of quarterly and monthly data consumer confidence has a significant effect on gdp fluctuations whereas in the case of semiannual data it has no effect in other words consumer confidence has an effect on only short term economic fluctuations

consumer confidence and rational expectations are agents beliefs consistent with the theory consumer confidence is found to have predictive content for a wide range of macroeconomic variables including consumption growth contrary to standard repih we find that on uk data the repih is rejected due to the predictive content of consumer confidence and not labour income we explain this finding in terms of precautionary behaviour extending the hansen and singleton consumption capm model to allow a conditional variance we find a high level of confidence is associated with both greater optimism about the level of consumption and greater uncertainty about the forecaster variance once allowance is made for time aggregation the over identifying restrictions implied by this model are accepted we estimate a small but statistically significant intertemporal elasticity of substitution

new directions in emissions trading the potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract once an arcane topic even among environmental economists emissions trading systems have substantially increased during this past decade in the usa moreover the implementation of these systems has necessitated increased involvement of professionals in many fields besides economics this paper reviews the practical experience of the six major types of emissions trading systems focusing on credit market development participation and results including transaction costs five more recent applications of emissions trading also are considered as well as the possibility of inter pollutant trading while inter pollutant trading has been successfully used for chlorofluorocarbons cfcs the applicability of this experience is probably very limited additionally it would be highly premature to attempt an evaluation of these newer emissions trading systems some of which have yet to be even partially implemented in order to improve these latter and future programs the paper considers the potential contribution of the new institutional economics nie to emissions trading the nie is used to develop theoretical insights and a series of predictions about the performance of a range of emissions trading systems

an emission saved is an emission earned an empirical study of emission banking for light duty vehicle manufacturers abstract this paper presents results of an empirical study of emission banking for light duty vehicle manufacturers an intertemporal model of manufacturers choices is combined with econometrically estimated abatement cost functions to simulate the cost savings and emission effects of an averaging trading and banking marketable permit system relative to command and control regulations while the cost savings of such a system are estimated to be modest the intertemporal emission effects may be sizable the sensitivity of the results to discount rates abatement cost functions and model specifications is also explored

stochastic pollution costly sanctions and optimality of emission permit banking abstract this paper identifies a new economic motive for pollution regulations that allow polluting firms to bank and borrow emission permits over time when aggregate pollution is stochastic an intertemporal permit trading regime can provide firms with efficient incentives for pollution abatement without the need for costly government enforcement actions that would otherwise be required

tradeable emission permits and the control of greenhouse gases this article reiterates the case for tradeable permits as a global policy option for limiting greenhouse gas emissions and considers the detailed design of a global tradeable permit regime emphasising the importance of the initial assignment of property rights and arguing that the relevant property rights in this case are the rights of every member of the world community to share in a sustainable global atmosphere and climate the allocation of permits should therefore be done on a per capita basis across the world community with the result that rents generated by the process of reducing carbon emissions would accrue to non polluters most of whom live in the south the international transfers of income and wealth implied by the proposed scheme are large but feasible there is therefore a real prospect that an international convention on carbon dioxide emissions could end the debt crisis and finance sustainable development in the south

the control of externalities in a growing urban economy the received theory of externality control which implicitly assumes that both the social marginal damage and marginal treatment cost schedules will remain fixed during the time any policy is operative concludes that an effluent tax and an auction of rights to emit pollutants in the amount of a given emissions standard will be equally efficient in meeting that standard we show that urban growth causes shifts in both schedules these shifts in turn substantially increase the welfare loss from a fixed effluent tax relative to that from an auction market with a fixed number of licenses

seller incentive properties of epa s emission trading auction abstract the new clean air act amendments instruct the environmental protection agency epa to conduct annual sealed bid offer auctions of emission allowances the auction pricing rules are discriminative and sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper assesses the seller incentives of this auction and demonstrates that the auction rules cause sellers to choose asking prices that under reveal their cost of emission control furthermore increasing the number of sellers intensifies this misrepresentation if the number of buyers remains fixed the epa s rules can therefore generate significantly biased price signals and reduce the efficiency of the allowance trading market

assessing the relative merits of development charges and transferable development rights in an uncertain world traditionally regulatory instruments have been used to achieve planning objectives however emerging market based policy instruments such as transferable development rights a quantity based app

designing climate mitigation policy this us paper provides an exhaustive review of critical issues in the design of climate mitigation policy by pulling together key findings and controversies from diverse literatures on mitigation costs damage valuation policy instrument choice technological innovation and international climate policy the authors begin with the broadest issue of how high assessments suggest the near and medium term price on greenhouse gases would need to be both under cost effective stabilization of global climate and under net benefit maximization or pigouvian emissions pricing the remainder of the paper focuses on the appropriate scope of regulation issues in policy instrument choice complementary technology policy and international policy architectures

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

economic prescriptions for environmental problems how the patient followed the doctor s orders o ne of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved and the range of potential solutions as one who frequently engages in this exercise i can attest to this fact in my view this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism in this paper i will argue that both normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management the particular set of policies examined here involves two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community marketable permits and emission charges pigou 1932 dales 1968 kneese and schultze 1975 both tools represent ways to induce businesses to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards they stand in stark contrast to the predominant command and control approach in which a regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations under highly restrictive conditions it can be shown that both of the economic approaches share the desirable feature that any gains in environmental quality will be obtained at the lowest possible cost baumol and oates 1975 until the 1960s these tools only existed on blackboards and in academic journals as products of the fertile imaginations of academics however some countries have recently begun to explore using these tools as part of a broader strategy for managing environmental problems

consumption pollution tradeoffs in an environment vulnerable to pollution related catastrophic collapse abstract this paper considers the consequences of an avoidable risk of irreversible environmental catastrophe for society s optimal long run consumption pollution tradeoffs the risk is assumed to be a nondecreasing function of pollution concentration which evolves as a dynamic environmental renewal process the main objective of the paper is to derive qualitative insights regarding the effects of such risk on optimal management

auctions and alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights this paper considers two different types of auctions which the government could use to sell discharge rights 1 an auction where rights are sold for a single clearing price and 2 a special type of discriminating auction that discourages strategic manipulation of bids by individual dischargers based on both theoretical and practical considerations there appears to be a fundamental trade off between reducing the financial burden of rights purchases and eliminating the incentives for strategic behavior very few discharges in either case study would have lower expenses under government sales of rights than under uniform treatment the simulations also suggest that there may be opportunities for strategic behavior under nonincentive compatible procedures because of small numbers of dischargers despite its problems with respect to incentive compatibility the right allocation approach of free distribution followed by exchange may offer the most desirable package of features this approach can yield dischargers savings over the expenses of present uniform regulations as well as provide incentives for efficient allocation of treatment efforts 25 references 1 figure 5 tables

tax evasion with labour income allingham and sandmo s 1972 classic paper on tax evasion set out a simple framework for looking at the effects of regular tax parameters and of the structure of penalties on the amount of tax dodging carried out by a tax evader subsequent papers have enriched the basic model of individual behaviour and have attempted to adduce some empirical evidence 2 but with few exceptions the essential nature of the assumed underlying problem has remained the same how much income shall i reveal to the authorities in the face of the known penalties and the known possibility of getting caught whilst this approach is useful for some types of tax evasion by individuals it is clearly inappropriate for others such as the phenomenon of working off the books rather than concealing a portion of a uniform lump of income that is undistinguished as to its source the person cheats the government by taking one or more different jobs either in addition to or as a replacement for his regular employment the income from which is administratively difficult to tax this paper examines the implications of the possible diversity of form of the tax evasion problem for the analysis of the fundamental questions which allingham and sandmo addressed the effect of government instruments on the incentives to participate in legal and illegal work activities to do this we must concentrate on one major development of the original model namely that where income is endogenous in effect we construct a particular version of the analysis of labour supply under uncertainty within which to

consumer confidence and economic fluctuations if consumers become pessimistic about the state of the economy can there be a slowdown in output even if their pessimism is not based on economic fundamentals recent macroeconomic models show the answer is yes if there are strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria we investigate the link between consumer confidence and economic fluctuations using vector autoregressions in all models after controlling for economic fundamentals the hypothesis that consumer sentiment does not cause gnp in the granger sense can be rejected variance decompositions suggest that consumer sentiment accounts for between 13 and 26 percent of the innovation variance of gnp

costs of alternative policies for the control of nitrogen dioxide in baltimore abstract the costs of meeting alternative one hour nitrogen dioxide standards in baltimore are simulated for alternative pollution control policies applied to the 200 point sources with the largest emissions and compared to a similar study for the chicago area the least cost spatially differentiated policy is found to be quite closely approximated by an effluent fee varying only by source type and a policy that combines features of a regulatory and an economic incentive policy the uniform fee or its market permit analogue results in relatively high costs because of severe overcontrol

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control a bargaining solution abstract one of the primary justifications for using transferable permits for pollution control is that they achieve a given level of emission reduction at the lowest cost although the initial allocation of pollution permits may have no impact in terms of efficiency it does have a significant impact on equity in this paper we examine a variety of permit allocation rules for a small catchment in south west england an asymmetric nash bargaining framework is employed to characterise agents co operative behaviour and to explain their likely preferences over permit allocation rules the results indicate that the preferred allocation scheme depends upon the relative bargaining power of the agents furthermore some potential links between ex ante and ex post equity criteria were also discussed

the empirical properties of two classes of designs for transferable discharge permit markets abstract previous work by atkinson and lewis j environ econ manag 1 237 250 1974 and anderson et al an analysis of alternative policies for attaining and maintaining a short term no2 standard mathtech inc princeton n j 1979 has indicated the tremendous cost advantages to be achieved by moving from a policy based on emission standards to one based on marketable emission permits as tietenberg land econ 56 391 416 1980 points out however neither of the major permit designs treated in the literature are optimal from all points of view this has triggered a search for alternative permit designs which while they may not minimize compliance costs have sufficient other virtues as to make them attractive on other grounds the purpose of this paper is to examine within the context of an empirical mathematical programming model the air quality emission and cost consequences of two classes of the permit designs which can be implemented in the absence of information on control costs this case study involves particulate control in st louis

pollution standards vs charges under uncertainty conventional analysis of pollution control policy under uncertainty does not properly account for the potential cost effectiveness difference between standards and charges thus drawing misleading conclusions for the case of inefficient standards correcting for this anomaly the following conclusions can be drawn when uncertainty involves the position of the marginal damage cost schedule rather than policy indifference a charge is always superior to an inefficient standard when uncertainty is about the position of the marginal control cost schedule policy indifference may occur but if it does it must be the case that the slope of marginal damage cost exceeds that of marginal control cost

prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement abstract i study whether incomplete enforcement of a regulation has any impact on the choice between price e g taxes and quantity e g tradeable quotas instruments results indicate that a second best design accounting for incomplete enforcement can be implemented equally well with either instrument as long as the benefit and cost curves are known with certainty if these curves are uncertain to the regulator however the quantity instrument performs relatively better than the price instrument the reason is that the effective amount of control under the quantity instrument is no longer fixed which makes this instrument come closer to a non linear instrument

marketable permits market power and cheating abstract in this paper we present a model of a noncompliant firm operating in a marketable pollution permit market in the main result of the paper we show how compliance is related to the initial distribution of permits a firm with market power will cheat less the larger its endowment of permits is from a fixed stock of permits the competitive fringe however will cheat more as its endowment of permits is reduced generating an ambiguous global impact on cheating

taxes and quotas for a stock pollutant with multiplicative uncertainty we compare taxes and quotas when firms and the regulator have asymmetric information about the slope of firms abatement costs damages are caused by a stock pollutant we calibrate the model using cost and damage estimates of greenhouse gasses taxes dominate quotas as with additive uncertainty this model with multiplicative uncertainty allows us to compare expected stock levels under the two policies and to investigate the importance of stock size and the magnitude of uncertainty on the policy ranking

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure comment abstract conrad and wang 1993 international journal of industrial organization 11 499 518 determine that a tax on emissions decreases the total output of a polluting industry but if demand is sufficiently inelastic can increase the number of firms in that industry this follows from their proposition that the tax reduces the scale of the polluting firm in contrast the scale of the polluting firm in the present model increases when there are increasing returns to scale in abatement whereas conrad and wang extend their results to cases of monopolistic competition the present paper is confined to perfect competition but extends the analysis to the pollution damaged industry

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

environmental regulation of households an empirical review of economic and psychological factors abstract the literature on sustainable consumption and environmental regulation of household behavior is dominated by conceptual and normative approaches as a result many suggestions lack a firm empirical basis to overcome this deficiency econometric studies in three areas of environmentally relevant activities of households are reviewed residential use of energy generation of solid waste and recycling and residential use of water next to price and income elasticities attention is devoted to individual socio economic features and psychological factors such as attitudes knowledge perceptions and values potential psychological determinants and related insights are further examined by discussing a range of representative and illustrative statistical psychological studies of environmental behavior one important general finding is that there are very few empirical studies that systematically combine socio economic and psychological determinants a range of insights for environmental policy is derived and research recommendations are offered

indirect methods for regulating externalities under uncertainty it is sometimes necessary or appropriate to correct an externality by intervening in the market for a privately traded commodity with which the externality is linked in these situations ad valorem taxation is a viable policy option it is argued that some combination of specific and ad valorem taxes will always outperform regulations which fix price administratively but that quantity standards may outperform taxes the analysis is applied to a problem in international trade

on the efficiency of environmental instruments in a spatial economy this paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy we call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms

differential environmental regulation effects on electric utility capital turnover and emissions this paper tests the hypothesis that differential regulations reduced the rate of capital turnover in the electric utility industry resulting in increased emissions of sulfur dioxide based on a sample of forty four privately owned electric utilities operating over the period 1969 83 the authors results indicate that 1 regulation increased the age of capital by an average of 3 29 years 24 6 percent 2 increases in the age of capital have no statistically significant impact on emissions and 3 in the absence of regulation emissions would have increased by 3 79 tons per million kwhs 34 6 percent copyright 1993 by mit press

a comparison of emission taxes and permit markets for controlling correlated externalities this paper provides an answer to the question are emission taxes an efficient and self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated externalities we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions this mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection we find that unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self enforcing

charging the earth the promotion of price based measures for pollution control abstract this paper seeks to consider the ways in which the theory and application of economic instruments in particular price based instruments is shaped by the interests values and ideologies of those who are promoting and implementing them although economists have been advocating the use of economic instruments for pollution control for decades it is only in recent years that they have been embraced by business groups and governments looking for a way to avoid stricter and more costly regulations that might inhibit economic growth and as a way of correcting and therefore preserving the free market system this paper examines the rationale for price based instruments and explains how economists have managed to enroll the support of other interest groups even those that have conflicting interests

the inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogenous market structure the paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution but where this effect can be partially off set by investing in adaptation as a private good the focus is not on external effects but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution the structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms the analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications the present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures i show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum i e to under adapation when pollution increases adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic otherwise welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution the total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies

economic instruments for environmental regulation our knowledge about economic incentive approaches to pollution control has grown rapidly in the two decades in which they have received serious analytical attention not only have the theoretical models become more focused and the empirical work more detailed but we have now had over a decade of experience with emissions trading in the u s and emission charges in europe as the world community becomes increasingly conscious of both the need to tighten environmental controls and the local economic perils associated with tighter controls in a highly competitive global marketplace it seems a propitious time to stand back and to organize what we have learned about this practical and promising approach to pollution control that may be especially relevant to current circumstances this paper draws upon economic theory empirical studies and actual experience with implementation to provide a brief overview of some of the major lessons we have learned about two economic incentive approaches emissions tradi copyright 1990 by oxford university press

tradeable permits for pollution control when emission location matters what have we learned our knowledge about tradeable permit approaches to pollution control has grown rapidly in the two decades in which they have received serious analytical attention not only have the theoretical models become more focused and the empirical work more detailed but we have now had over a decade of experience with them in the u s this article draws upon economic theory empirical studies and actual experience with implementation to summarize what we have learned about applying tradeable permits to air pollution control in the special circumstance where the spatial aspects of the problem are a prime consideration

controlling stock externalities in a common property fishery subject to uncertainty abstract two methods are examined for regulating stock externalities under uncertainty quotas and taxes dynamic programming is used to characterize the externalities precisely the accuracy with which the current size of the resource stock can be monitored is found to be of crucial importance in the choice between tax and quota regulation if the current stock is observed without error taxes are capable of outperforming any quota

the economic case for limits to government in june of 1978 the voters of california approved proposition 13 restricting the rate of local property taxation to no more than 1 percent of 1975 market values in november 1978 the voters of michigan approved the headlee amendment which limited state revenues from own sources to a fixed share of state personal income in november of 1980 massachusetts voters followed the lead of california and required all cities and towns to limit their taxation to a rate of 22 percent of full and fair cash value numerous hypotheses have been advanced and analyzed to explain the emergence of these new restrictions on fiscal choice the results point to two explanations voters feel governments are too big providing more services than what they prefer or governments spend too much on redistributive activities to help the poor and through higher wages to help public employees themselves the response to this perceived failure of government has been to propose and in california michigan and massachusetts to approve absolute limits to government expenditures the question i wish to address here is whether a compelling economic argument can be advanced for such a policy response politics and personalities aside the answer i think is yes but particular preconditions must apply first and perhaps most importantly is the inability of citizens to directly control the provision of public services responsibility for providing public goods is delegated to agents of the voter and these agents be they bureaucrats or elected representatives have their own objectives and an ability to act upon them to the possible disadvantage of the voters second without direct control over public outputs voters must use indirect controls through the manipulation of their appointed agents these indirect controls take two general forms price incentives or quantity restrictions third the choice of either of these indirect controls must take place before the agent acts to provide public goods further voters must often make their choice of a price or quantity control before the benefits or costs of the public service are known to them with certainty agents however can wait to observe true benefits and coststhat is why we use agents and then provide a level of public services in response to costs benefits and the voters chosen control voter uncertainty over benefits and costs can be interpreted as placing the voter within a constitutional perspective where a voter s precise position in society that is his or her benefits and costs are unknown when choosing a control geoffrey brennan and james buchanan ch 1 were the first to really stress this important point fourth if benefit and cost uncertainty is predominantly over the position rather than slope of the marginal benefit and marginal cost schedules and if the marginal benefit schedule is relatively steep loosely an inelastic demand curve while the marginal cost schedule is relatively flat an elastic supply curve then quantity controls on agents behavior through tax or spending limitations will be the preferred control these four preconditions strike me as quite plausible rather than just an emotional reaction to a peculiar configuration of political and economic circumstances proposition 13 the headlee amendment and proposition 24 may be perfectly reasoned responses to a failure in the politi professor university of pennsylvania and research associate the national bureau of economic research inc an alternative hypothesis which has been tested and generally rejected attributes voter approval to a desire to alter the tax mix away from property taxation and towards other taxes what approving voters really want it seems is increased government efficiency and less redistribution see the recent studies by jack citrin paul courant edward gramlich and daniel rubinfeld and helen ladd and julie wilson

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

marketable pollution permits and acid rain externalities a comment and some further evidence in a recent paper scott atkinson 1983 has provided some important insights into the design of systems of marketable permits for the control of air pollution atkinson reaches two major conclusions 1 a system of marketable permits that minimizes the control costs for the attainment of local ambient air quality standards for so2 is likely to increase significantly the extent of long range sulfate depositions acid rain as compared to a traditional command and control cac strategy 2 solely from the perspective of local air quality the cost minimizing system of marketable permits must imply higher levels of local pollution relative to an alternative system of emissions permits or to a prototype cac system we have no quibbles with the first point moreover atkinson s simulation results suggest that the trade off between local air pollution and the long range transport of sulfur is a serious issue this is largely a matter of stack height higher chimneys allow sulfur emissions to escape the local environment only to result in increased sulfate pollution at more distant locations this suggests that stack height must be treated as a critical variable in the design of systems to control jointly local and global pollution our concern in this note is with atkinson s second point we shall show first that the atkinson theorem is formally incorrect the cost minimizing permit system need not result in increased local pollution however as a practical matter atkinson may well be right we shall supplement his simulation results with some findings from another set of simulations for a different air pollutant particulate matter in the baltimore air quality control