the effects of entry regulation on oligopolistic interaction the uruguayan banking sector this article develops a methodology to test alternative oligopoly models and to analyze the effects of entry restrictions on conduct this methodology is applied to the uruguayan banking sector whose legal entry barriers were significantly relaxed during the late 1970s the results are consistent with a von stackelberg type of industry where the degree of oligopolistic interaction among the leading firms is reduced as a consequence of the relaxation of the legal entry barriers

economic profitability versus ecological entropy there is a long standing trade off in bioculture between concentrating on high yield varieties and maintaining sufficient diversity to lower the risks of catastrophic infection the paper uses a simple ecology based model of endogenous disease to indicate how a local decision to plant more of a widely grown crop creates negative externalities by increasing the probability that new pathogens will evolve to attack the crop globally society s basic issue concerns where to locate on an efficiency frontier between economic profitability and a standard formula for ecological entropy proved here to be a rigorous measure of generalized resistance to crop ecosystem failure

long term growth and short term economic instability when learning by doing is at the origin of growth the long run growth rate should be negatively related to the amplitude of the business cycle if human capital accumulation is increasing and concave in the cyclical component of production empirical evidence strongly supports this nding for industrialized countries and european regions using the standard control variables we nd that countries and regions that have a higher standard deviation of growth and of unemployment have lower growth rates the result does not come from an e ect of instability on investment the negative relation however does not hold for non industrialized countries for which learning by doing may not to be the main engine of growth 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation o40 e32

what type of process underlies options a simple robust test we develop a simple robust method to distinguish the presence of continuous and discontinuous components in the price of an asset underlying options our method examines the prices of at the money and out of the money options as the option s time to maturity approaches zero we show that these prices converge to zero at speeds that depend upon whether the underlying asset price process is purely continuous purely discontinuous or a combination of both we apply the method to s p 500 index options and nd the existence of both a continuous component and a jump component in the index to effectively price or hedge derivative securities or to understand the behavior of nancial asset prices in general it is important to know if they are best modeled using a purely continuous process pc a pure jump process pj or a combination of both cj we develop a method to distinguish between these possibilities using options written on the asset in question speci cally we examine the market prices of at the money atm and out of the money otm options as the option s maturity date approaches the valuation date while the prices of all atm and otm options converge to zero as the time to maturity approaches zero our theoretical work shows that the speed of convergence diiers across the three possibilities pc pj or cj we can thus identify the type of an asset price process by examining the convergence speeds of these option prices the simplest approach for determining the type of process governing an asset price is to examine the time series of asset prices directly however the discretely sampled paths from the three types of processes look very similar unless the sampling frequency is extremely high furthermore increasing the sampling frequency introduces market microstructure eiects since our method does not examine the sample path of the underlying asset directly it circumvents these di culties our method is able to distinguish the type of process governing the price of an asset because diierent types of processes have dramatically diierent implications

cartel unity over the business cycle in this paper cartel behavior in business cycles when some firms are vulnerable to bankruptcy in the downturns is investigated this vulnerability would restrict the set of collusive equilibria that are feasible in a repeated game and possibly result in a breakdown in recessions of all collusive agreements it is demonstrated however that the existence of a low cost producer in the cartel could prevent this breakdown by adjusting market shares across the business cycle and thereby eliminating the possibility of bankruptcy for its inefficient rivals this swing producer could enlarge the set of self enforcing collusive equilibria the results of this paper are seen to be consistent with a wide range of observations on the behavior of cartels over the business cycle

do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion an experimental analysis two behavioral concepts loss aversion and mental accounting have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle recent experimental evidence supports the theory as students behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion mla yet much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision making these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals using traders recruited from the cbot we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with mla to a greater extent than students

competitive advantage and collusive optima cost differences may often be important in real oligopolies if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective total industry profits lacks plausibility when costs differ this essay considers plausible alternatives four different technologies for effecting collusion which are essentially identical when costs are equal define sets of possible profits axiomatic bargaining models are used to select unconstrained optima from among these possibilities simple functional forms are employed low cost firms with large shares in cournot equilibrium may have little to gain from collusion if collusion is effective low cost firms will have relatively low estimated conjectural variations

how do value creation and competition determine whether a firm appropriates value how does competition among economic actors determine the value that each is able to appropriate we provide a formal general framework within which this question can be posed and answered and then provide several results chief among them is a condition that is both required for and guarantees value appropriation we apply our methodology to i assess the familiar notion that uniqueness inimitability and competition imply value appropriation and ii determine the value appropriation possibilities for an innovator whose unique discovery is of use to several others who can compete for the right to use it

endogenous mergers and collusion in asymmetric market structures recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion including an indivisible cost of cartelization we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion since they balance the small firms incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders indivisible cartelization cost using an endogenous merger model we also show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion current antisymmetry merger policy can thus be counterproductive

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

economic behavior in institutional environments the corporate merger wave of the 1980s over the last 100 years the united states has experienced four waves of corporate merger activity the first occurred at the turn of the century then again in the 1920s the 1960s and the 1980s most research on merger waves has focused on individual mergers within a wave our research focuses on the wave itself we develop a theoretical model that centers on the actors who promote the mergers and on those changes in the political and economic environments that provide the resources these actors need to act specifically we argue that a permissive state combined with increased access to capital market funds encourages fringe players to initiate the innovations that enable them to execute mergers merger waves occur when these actors become increasingly successful and their innovations are imitated throughout the business community we provide empirical support for the model using data from the 1980 s merger wave

optimal cartel trigger price strategies abstract a dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price in this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price the market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a downward demand shock

the economic costs to international labor restrictions revisiting the empirical discussion summary in a 1984 article hamilton and whalley calculated the annual efficiency gains from free international migration we update that study to compare developments over time with the aim of producing more reasonable and politically relevant scenarios our results suggest that the estimated gains from the liberalization of global immigration controls have increased substantially indeed we find that even a small liberalization of international migration restrictions can still yield substantial gains in particular we estimate that a 10 increase in international migration corresponds to an efficiency gain of about us 774 billion 1998 dollars

efficiency and distributional implications of global restrictions on labour mobility calculations and policy implications abstract in this paper a procedure for calculating the annual efficiency gains from various alternative changes in existing global immigration restrictions is presented along with an evaluation of impacts of wage rate changes on non migrating labour a simple methodology uses data on u s dollar gnp capita across countries to infer differences in the marginal productivity of labour both between countries and across major world trading areas two key assumptions used are that the worldwide labour supply is fixed and full employment occurs in all regions differences occuring in labour s marginal product across regions are assumed to arise because of barriers to inward mobility of labour in high wage countries when these are removed labour reallocates and efficiency gains occur while the calculations are based on contentious assumptions a striking feature is the size of the annual worldwide gains in some cases annual gains can easily exceed existing worldwide gnp generated in the presence of labour mobility restrictions while all gains do not accrue to ldc s the size of the gains nonetheless suggests that this issue may be much more important to these countries than other issues raised thus far in the north south debate the losses to labour already employed in high wage countries dramatize the incentives for labour unions in the developed world to oppose liberalization

on the workings of a cartel evidence from the norwegian cement industry using the institutional set up of the norwegian cement industry in particular its sharing rule we are able to identify the workings of a cartel in some detail given data on prices production and exports we are able to identify marginal costs as well as the effectiveness of the cartel we compare our marginal cost estimates which are derived from an equilibrium condition to detailed cost accounting data and find that our estimate of marginal cost is very much in line with the data we then show that the cement cartel has been ineffective in the sense that the sharing rule induces overproduction and exporting below marginal costs in this sense it is consumers not firms that benefi tf rom the sharing rule we find that the ineffectiveness of the cartel is becoming so large that domestic welfare of a merger to monopoly would in fact be positive at around 1968 which is exactly when the merger actually took place however we also show that competition would have resulted in even higher welfare gains over the entire sample

the population problem theory and evidence this study is concerned with the relationships among population growth poverty and environmental degradation with particular focus on the situation in developing countries the author rejects the concept of a general theory of fertility behavior in favor of an interpretation of these relationships which might be applicable to certain situations in the poorest parts of the indian subcontinent and sub saharan africa such situations include unacceptable risks of maternal death for poor illiterate women and a condemnation to extreme poverty in conditions of the deterioration of local resources and of the environment the author concludes that population growth rates are too high in certain specific areas and that an appropriate policy reaction to such conditions would be to try to change the options that men and women face so that their reasoned choice would be to lower their fertility

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

market structure and price cost margins in a paper that has become a standard reference in the structure conductperformance approach to industrial economics cowling and waterson 1976 developed a theoretical rationale for expecting industry profitability to be positively correlated with the level of concentration their model based on a simple algebraic description of oligopoly behaviour has been interpreted as providing a justification for the common empirical practice of cross industry regression analysis of price cost margins in terms of concentration levels in the present paper we show that on further examination this model implies a joint determination of margins and concentration this provides some interesting comparative static results of relevance to inter industry differences in concentration levels equally however it leads to various cautionary insights concerning the meaning of price cost margin versus concentration regressions

the interaction effect of rivalry restraint and competitive advantage on profit why the whole is less than the sum of the parts rivalry restraint based theoretical mechanisms predict that an industry s profits will increase when its firms engage in less price competition or less direct competition with each other competitive advantage based theoretical mechanisms predict that a firm s profits will increase when it creates superior economic value that direct and indirect competitors cannot fully compete away but what is the interaction effect on profit of simultaneously restraining rivalry and increasing competitive advantage do they positively amplify reinforce each other or negatively dampen undermine each other this paper s theoretical model predicts a negative interaction effect with potentially significant implications for theory practice and pedagogy

a bootstrap test for jumps in financial economics abstract an i i d bootstrap is applied for the ratio test of barndorff nielsen and shephard 2006 for jumps in jump diffusion processes asymptotic validity is established for the bootstrap test both under the null of no jump and under the alternative of jumps finite sample simulation shows that the bootstrap test has more stable size than the ratio test of barndorff nielsen and shephard 2006

profit sharing in a collusive industry abstract we study a model in which collusive duopolists divide up the monopoly profit according to their relative bargaining power we are particularly interested in how the negotiated profit shares depend on the sizes of the firms if each can produce at the same constant unit cost up to its capacity we show that the profit per unit of capacity of the small firm is higher than that of the large one we also study how the ratio of the negotiated profits depends on the size of demand relative to industry capacity and how this ratio changes with variations in demand

on the nature and significance of collusive price leadership abstract with the help of a simple analytical model we are able to analyze and to further clarify the conditions for collusive price leadership as they were originally devised by jesse markham within the confines of this model we show how collusion increases price cost margins but at the same time decreases concentration in the industry

design choices in privatized social security systems learning from the swedish experience in the 2000 u s presidential campaign george w bush advocated a partial privatization of the social security system according to his plan a portion of the payroll tax would be designated for individual savings accounts at the same time as this issue was being debated in the united states sweden was in the process of launching a system that is very similar to president bush s proposal although bush s plan did not get much attention in the early years of his administration the proposal may resurface either in the united states or in other countries if so important lessons can be learned from the swedish experience in particular the swedish plan adopted an interesting mix of design choices that can now be evaluated based on three years of post implementation experience although there is a large literature in economics on the design of social security systems most of that literature is concerned with macroeconomic considerations such as funding in contrast there has been much less attention devoted to the details of how plans might be designed in part because these details do not seem important from a standard economic perspective in this paper we reverse this usual pattern and focus our attention on the design aspects of the swedish plan we find that although most of the design choices are those that might be approved by most economists in some cases these choices produced undesirable consequences

being better vs being different differentiation competition and pricing strategies in the spanish hotel industry we study the effects of vertical and horizontal differentiation on pricing policy in a large sample of hotels in spain we show that hotels with more stars i e vertically differentiated offer smaller discounts over listed prices in addition to charging higher prices similarly hotels that belong to a branded chain i e horizontal differentiation also charge higher prices and provide smaller discounts we show how the degree of local competition moderates the effect of differentiation on pricing policy but only for vertical differentiation differentiation indeed protects hotels from the pressure to reduce prices as competition increases but being better seems to be more effective than just being different

how much equity does the government hold a central point in the recent debate about social security in the united states has been the extent to which the federal government should take significant positions in the equity market but as this paper shows the government already has a much more significant if implicit position in the u s equity market through its claim to future tax revenues using estimates of the sensitivity of federal tax revenues to stock market returns i calculate the implicit equity position of the federal government defined as the equity position that would be as sensitive to the stock market as the present value of federal revenues although standard errors are large point estimates indicate that the implicit federal equity position exceeds the size of the stock market itself a result that is consistent with the fact that revenues from all sources not just taxes on corporate source income are responsive to stock market returns this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

population technology and growth from malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond this paper develops a unied growth model that captures the historical evolution of population technology and output it encompasses theendogenous transitionbetween three regimes that have characterized economic development the economy evolves from amalthusianregime wheretechnologicalprogressis slow andpopulationgrowthprevents anysustainedriseinincomepercapita intoapost malthusianregime wheretechnological progress rises and population growth absorbs only part of output growth ultimately a demographic transition reverses the positive relationship between income and population growth andtheeconomyentersamoderngrowthregimewithreducedpopulationgrowth

strategic factor market intelligence an application of information economics to strategy formulation and competitor intelligence this paper develops a model of information acquisition decisions by firms that are competing in a strategic factor market barney 1986 to purchase a scarce resource whose value is unknown and differs across firms the model builds on the argument that more accurate expectations about the firm specific value of resources is other than luck the only way for firms to obtain the specific resources required for competitive advantage we address the more specific question of what types of information firms should gather to accomplish this goal the model generates a series of testable hypotheses about how a firm s optimal mix of different types of information is affected by a number of factors including the level of uncertainty about the value of the resource being acquired the rarity imitability and nonsubstitutability of that resource the level of inscrutability of firms pre existing stocks of resources and firms information gathering and information processing capacities

do markets differ much this essay reports the results of a crosssection study of differences in accounting profitability that sheds light on some basic controversies in industrial economics most previous cross section studies in this field have been concerned with testing hypotheses about structural coefficients in models meant to apply to essentially all markets as we have learned more about the difficulties of constructing such general models and of performing tests on their structural parameters properly structural cross section analysis has fallen out of fashion in contrast to most of the cross section literature the analysis reported here is fundamentally descriptive it does not attempt directly to estimate or to test hypotheses about structural parameters i hope to show by example that one can perform illuminating analysis of cross section data without a host of controversial maintained hypotheses cross section data can yield interesting stylized facts to guide both general theorizing and empirical analysis of specific industries even if they cannot easily support full blown structural estimation one can view the sort of search for stylized facts conducted here as either a replacement for or an input to interindustry structural estimation depending on one s feeling about the long run potential of that research approach this study also departs from much of the cross section literature by being fundamentally concerned with the importance of various effects not just with coefficient signs and t statistics in particular this essay provides estimates of the relative importance of firm market and market share differences in the determination of business unit divisional profitability in u s manufacturing using 1975 data from the line of business program of the u s federal trade commission ftc i find support neither for the existence of firm effects nor for the importance of market share effects moreover while industry effects apparently exist and are important they appear to be negatively correlated with seller concentration in these data section i relates firm market and share effects to current issues and controversies in industrial economics and thus supplies the motivation for our empirical analysis the remainder of the essay treats the data and

the statistical and economic role of jumps in continuous time interest rate models this paper analyzes the role of jumps in continuous time short rate models i first develop a test to detect jump induced misspecification and using treasury bill rates find evidence for the presence of jumps second i specify and estimate a nonparametric jump diffusion model results indicate that jumps play an important statistical role estimates of jump times and sizes indicate that unexpected news about the macroeconomy generates the jumps finally i investigate the pricing implications of jumps jumps generally have a minor impact on yields but they are important for pricing interest rate options