innovation and imitation in a duopoly in a duopoly where one firm has the idea for a non patentable innovation the expected profits from the innovation will not be a monotonic function of the cost of innovating furthermore a costly innovation may be undertaken where an inexpensive one would not have been all other things being equal

the case against intellectual property according to a common argument the presence of strong intellectualproperty rights spurs innovation which leads to higher economic growthand increasing benefits for all the argument seems coherent theestablishment of secure property rights is a fundamental pillar of a wellfunctioning market economy no economic agent exercises productiveeffort without the certainty of controlling its fruits what is true forphysical effort must be true for the intellectual one if strong propertyrights provide good incentives for the production of potatoes they mustalso provide good incentives for the production of ideas why then do we argue a case against intellectual property are wearguing that while stealing potatoes is bad stealing ideas is good weare not economic efficiency and common sense argue that ideasshould be protected and available for sale just like any other commodity but intellectual property has come to mean not only the right to ownand sell ideas but also the right to regulate their use this creates asocially inefficient monopoly and what is commonly called intellectualproperty might be better called intellectual monopoly when you buy apotato you can eat it throw it away plant it or make it into a sculpture current law allows producers of a cds and books to take this freedomaway from you when you buy a potato you can use the idea of a potatoembodied in it to make better potatoes or to invent french fries currentlaw allows producers of computer software or medical drugs to take thisfreedom away from you it is against this distorted extension ofintellectual property rights that we argue it is a long jump from the assertion that inventors deserve the fruits oftheir efforts to the conclusion that current patent and copyrightprotection are the best way of providing such reward statements such

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

the great intervention and massive money injection the japanese experience 2003 2004 abstract from the beginning of 2003 to the spring of 2004 japan s monetary authorities conducted large scale yen selling dollar buying operations in what taylor 2006 has labeled the great intervention this paper examines the relationship between this great intervention and the quantitative easing policy the bank of japan was pursuing at that time first we find that about 40 percent of the yen funds supplied to the market by yen selling interventions were not offset by the boj s monetary operations and remained in the market for a while this is in contrast with the preceding period when almost 100 percent were immediately offset second comparing interventions and other government payments the extent to which the funds were offset was much smaller in the case of interventions suggesting that the boj differentiated between and responded differently to interventions and other government payments these two findings indicate that it is likely that the boj intentionally did not sterilize yen selling interventions to achieve its policy target of maintaining the current account balances of commercial banks at the boj at a high level finally we find that an unsterilized intervention had a greater impact on the yen dollar rate than a sterilized one suggesting that it matters whether an intervention is sterilized or not even when the economy is in a liquidity trap

majoritarian management of the commons yong j yoon this article analyzes usage of a common property resource the commons under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements particular emphasis is on majority decision rules when separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common resource total value is dissipated but the interdependencies introduced by possible membership in differing coalitions to an extent reduce the incentives for exploitation the formal analysis is analogous to that familiar in cournot nash duopoly oligopoly models but with differing efficiency implications the argument has relevance for differential benefit public spending from general tax sources as well as other applications jel d7 h00 02 i introduction the operation and management of common property resources the commons have been exhaustively examined in economics and political science both in formal analyses and in practical application 1 however the full range of institutional alternatives has not been covered even at a level of stylized interaction models our purpose in this article is to fill in at least some of the gaps here and specifically to examine the predicted results that emerge when usage decisions are collectivized under majoritarian voting rules to our knowledge this analysis has not been undertaken we shall in section ii first summarize the classic analysis along with the familiar institutional reform suggested as a solution to the tragedy this solution privatization is analyzed under several institutional variants in section iii we then shift attention in section iv to arrangements under which usage of the commonly shared resource or facility is chosen by some predesignated collective decision rule specifically we concentrate analysis on the predicted results in several majority rule environments we analyze thoroughly the case in which different majority coalitions make usage decisions separately and simultaneously the analysis incorporates recognition on the part of any member of a specific majority of the prospect for membership in alternative majority coalitions we demonstrate that instead of full dissipation the level of usage that emerges in the limit is structurally analogous to the outcome in the cournot nash duopoly model even if the efficiency implications differ in the two settings ii the classic model summarized the familiar tragedy of the commons lends itself to stylized illustration an immobile but renewable resource exists a common pasture aquifer fishing ground and has economic value if used effectively through the application of units of complementary mobile resources that are themselves valued in their alternative market opportunities there are no assigned ownership rights to the immobile resource or facility free and open access may dissipate most or even all of the potential value consider figure 1 the productivity of mobile complementary resource units as applied elsewhere in the economy e g steers grazed on the open range beyond the commons is set at w a value assumed constant the quantity of such inputs applied on the commonly used facility is measured along the abscissa in figure 1 the marginal and average productivity curves for the units of applied complementary resource are shown as mp and ap total value is maximized when q sub m units are applied at which point marginal product values are equalized as between this usage and other opportunities the maximal value of the commonly used resource is the area under the mp curve above w if entry to usage is open and if the institutional structure is such as to allow for decentralized decisions on the part of many potential users rational choices made separately will generate a full behavioral equilibrium at q sup where average product per unit of the complementary resource is equalized as between the commons and other uses

the war of attrition in continuous time with complete information this paper provides a complete characterization of the nash equilibrium outcomes for the war of attrition when time is continuous and information is complete it allows for asymmetric payoffs and an arbitrary time horizon in addition to certain asymme tric pure strategy equilibria that always exist the authors establi sh the conditions under which there is also a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria these are most likely to exist when either the horizon is infinite or the game is symmetric copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the case for open market purchases in a liquidity trap prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short term nominal interest rate renders open market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals we show that even were this the case there remains a powerful argument for large scale open market operations as a fiscal policy tool as we also demonstrate however this same reasoning implies that open market operations will be beneficial for stabilization as well even when the economy is expected to remain mired in a liquidity trap for some time thus the microeconomic fiscal benefits of open market operations in a liquidity trap go hand in hand with standard macroeconomic objectives motivated by japan s recent economic experience we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the welfare impact of open market operations for an economy in japan s predicament we argue japan can achieve a substantial welfare improvement through large open market purchases of domestic government debt

reprint of central bank collateral frameworks abstract this paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely overlooked yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems namely central bank collateral frameworks their importance can be understood by the observation that the money at the core of these systems central bank money is injected into the economy on terms not defined in a market but by the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks using the collateral framework of the eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study the paper brings to light the functioning reach and impact of collateral frameworks a theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy they can for example bias the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability evidence is presented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid collateral and more generally impairs market forces and discipline the paper also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the eurosystem s collateral framework

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates abstract ignoring the existence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates one considerably understates the value of monetary commitment in new keynesian models a stochastic forward looking model with an occasionally binding lower bound calibrated to the u s economy suggests that low values for the natural rate of interest lead to sizeable output losses and deflation under discretionary monetary policy the fall in output and deflation are much larger than in the case with policy commitment and do not show up at all if the model abstracts from the existence of the lower bound the welfare losses of discretionary policy increase even further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the phillips curve these results emerge because private sector expectations and the discretionary policy response to these expectations reinforce each other and cause the lower bound to be reached much earlier than under commitment

managing local commons theoretical issues in incentive design local commons encompass a wide range of resources whose shared feature is the need for some form of collective management in what follows we shall be concerned mainly with the problems of implementing a collective management plan whatever the mechanisms invoked many recent contributions to the literature have stressed that relatively informal collective management of common property resources can in the right circumstances avoid the severe resource degradation predicted by the tragedy of the commons nevertheless both empirical and theoretical arguments suggest that cooperative behavior may be only partial and the incentives of short term self interest only partially held in check under what circumstances then can more formal implementation mechanisms make good the deficiency and given that formal incentives are typically stronger than informal ones are there any reasons why informal incentives might nevertheless sometimes be preferred

an equilibrium search matching model of discrimination abstract a model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical groups which are discriminated against e g blacks women earn lower wages and endure longer unemployment spells

buying and selling attacks on fixed exchange rate systems abstract in this paper we show how rational expectations models of speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate systems can be extended to take into account the possibility that the central bank could be forced to either devalue or revalue essential to the analysis are the concepts of buying attack and selling attack by means of which we were able to describe how expectations about the future exchange rate are formed we also provide a discussion on the problem of uniqueness of the equilibrium that may arise in this kind of speculative attack models

great expectations and the end of the depression what ended the great depression in the united states this paper suggests that the recovery was driven by a shift in expectations this shift was triggered by president franklin delano roosevelt s fdr policy actions on the monetary policy side roosevelt abolished the gold standard and announced an explicit policy objective of inflating the price level to pre depression levels on the fiscal policy side roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending which helped make his policy objective credible the key to the recovery was the successful management of expecta tions about future policy roosevelt s rise to power is modeled as a policy regime change as in thomas sargent 1983 and peter temin and barry wigmore 1990 this paper formalizes temin and wigmore s argu ment in a repeated game setting using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model and argues that the regime change can account for the recovery in the model a regime change means the elimination of certain policy dogmas that constrain the actions of the government the regime change generates an endogenous shift in expectations due to a coordination of mon etary and fiscal policy this coordination ended the great depression by engineering a shift in expectations from contractionary i e the private sector expected future economic contrac tion and deflation to expansionary i e the public expected future economic expansion and inflation the expectation of higher future inflation lowered real interest rates thus stimulating demand while the expectation of higher future income stimulated demand by raising permanent income

the fiscal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap we consider the fiscal multiplier and spillover in an environment in which two countries are caught simultaneously in a liquidity trap using an optimizing two country sticky price model we show that the fiscal multiplier and spillover are contrary to those predicted in textbook economics for the country with government expenditure the fiscal multiplier exceeds one the currency depreciates and the terms of trade worsen the fiscal spillover is negative if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one and positive if the parameter is greater than one incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is a crucial factor in understanding the effects of fiscal policy in open economies

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

decentralization duplication and delay we argue that although decentralization has advantages in finding low cost solutions these advantages are accompanied by coordination problems which lead to delay or duplication of effort or both consequently decentralization is desirable when there is little urgency or a great deal of private information but it is strictly undesirable in urgent problems when private information is less important we also examine the effect of large numbers and find that coordination problems disappear in the limit if distributions are common knowledge

the relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation abstract changes in patent law global competition and the rise of several new technologies suggest that patents could be of greater value than secrecy for many innovative firms particularly small firms that are unable to use market power or other factors to appropriate their investments in innovation data from the 1993 european community innovation survey cis for up to 2849 r d performing firms is analysed to determine the relative importance of secrecy vs patents this particular combination of appropriation methods is interesting because secrecy can act as a mutually exclusive alternative to patents the results show that a higher percentage of firms in all size classes rate secrecy as more valuable than patents however ordered logit regressions show that the probability that a firm rates secrecy as more valuable than patents declines with an increase in firm size for product innovations while there is no relationship for process innovations the firm s r d intensity has no effect on the relative value of secrecy vs patents there is weak evidence to show that participation in cooperative r d increases the value of patents over secrecy for product innovations the results are relevant to ongoing debates over changes to the patent system and the need for policies to encourage small firms to patent more

appropriation and efficiency a revision of the first theorem of welfare economics the first theorem of welfare economics rests on the assumption that individuals have neither price making nor market making capacities we offer a revision in which individuals have such capacities the revision emphasizes two keys for market efficiency i the need to align private rewards with social contributions called full appropriation and ii the need for an assumption to counter the possibility of coordination failures in the choice of produced commodities called noncomplementarity we also emphasize that information about prices of unmarketed commodities involves decentralized knowledge available only to product innovators and that pecuniary extemalities are important potential sources of market failure jel d51 d60 d62

an information good market with symmetrical externalities in 3 the author investigated how an information good is supplied from its owner to users through trades in a case where all the traders are located at geographically separated points and thus a transmission of the good implies certain costs and moreover its external effects are negligibly small in general however information goods possess negative external effects as seen from the following suppose a firm possessing a new technology gains a profit by monopolistically utilizing it once this technology is known to and used by other firms the firm can no longer enjoy its monopolistic position and might incur a significant loss of profit the aim of this paper is to analyze how a concealable information good with external effects is diffused from its monopolistic owner to demanders through trades generally information goods have their own peculiar properties among them we suppose in this paper the following typical ones the first one is a possibility of free replication namely each trader can replicate the good as many times as he wants without any cost immediately after he obtains it each replica is supposed to be exactly the same as the original good the second one is an indivisibility which implies that each trader gains a benefit just from one unit of the good the third one is an irreversibility in trading the good in the case of trading ordinary goods it would be possible for a buyer to return the good to a seller by cancelling the trade for information goods however this would not be possible since a buyer may replicate it immediately after he purchases because of free replication namely a seller must refuse a buyer s proposal to return it since a buyer might already have its replica the fourth one is a negative external effect mentioned above namely a benefit brought by the good is affected by how the good is possessed among other traders and if some trader newly gets it then the benefit for each possessor is decreased throughout this paper we further assume that costs for transmitting the good are negligibly small a new process for producing chemical products a new computer program and so on are information goods which we have in mind for further description of information goods refer to 1 2 and 5 here we remark that in the case of trading such an information good it might occur from free replication that once each demander owns the good he will

global policy at the zero lower bound in a large scale dsge model abstract this paper analyses whether fiscal policies can alleviate the effects of a global recession that drives interest rates to the zero lower bound additionally we study the benefits of international coordination the analysis is carried out using a dynamic general equilibrium model of the global economy eagle model we consider that the fiscal shocks are temporary and that fiscal policy retains full credibility at all times in this setup we find significant non linearities in a zero lower bound situation that amplify the effects of fiscal shocks compared to the non zero lower bound case international coordination is helpful but does not play a major role in the results

endogenous provision and appropriation in the commons munity creating the potential of avoiding the tragedy of the commons that characterizes resource use under open access bromley serious difficulties remain however in managing the resource in a way that is socially optimal because of the rival nature of appropriation by individual members achieving the social optimum requires either inducing a noncooperative behavior by individual members that mimics what co

common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation abstract in addition to the usual fixed costs we introduce variable costs in a community s effort to cooperate in extracting from a common pool resource using a standard supervision mechanism these variable costs are shown to be an increasing function of individual members incentives to default the model explains why we frequently observe communities that all cooperate and have relatively similar resource endowments and yet achieve very different levels of extraction

a dynamic model of open source vs proprietary r d abstract we propose a dynamic model in which firms compete to produce sequential and cumulative innovations and in which the more firms do research in one sector the more likely it is that one of them innovates firms choose research effort and whether to patent innovations or to use an open source license like the general public license we show that i patents generate a larger stationary reward but foreclose research within a sector and that ii open source generates a smaller stationary reward but allows everyone to use the technology and therefore by attracting firms to the sector it induces a faster pace of innovation we characterize all the equilibria of the model and show that in equilibrium an open source sector appears only after a proprietary sector we also find conditions under which the model has a unique equilibrium in which a proprietary and an open source sector coexist and compete in the short run but the open source sector dominates the industry in the long run we use our model to study whether patents are inefficient and to explain firms behavior in the software and the biomedical industry

currency crises and monetary policy in an economy with credit constraints this paper presents a simple model of currency crises which is driven by the interplay between the credit constraints of private domestic firms and the existence of nominal price rigidities the possibility of multiple equilibria including a currency crisis equilibrium with low output and a depreciated domestic currency results from the following mechanism if nominal prices are sticky a currency depreciation leads to an increase in the foreign currency debt repayment obligations of firms and thus to a fall in their profits this reduces firms borrowing capacity and therefore investment and output in a credit constrained economy which in turn reduces the demand for the domestic currency and leads to a depreciation we examine the impact of various shocks including productivity fiscal or expectational shocks we then analyze the optimal monetary policy to prevent or solve currency crises we also argue that currency crises can occur both under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes as the primary source of crises is the deteriorating balance sheet of private firms

waiting to imitate on the dynamic pricing of knowledge we study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally imitated imitators may enter the market by imitating the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention the possibility of contracting dramatically affects the need for patent protection our results show that i imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist ii the inventor sells knowledge through contracts that allow resale by the imitators and iii under certain conditions the inventor s payoff increases with the number of imitators

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

coping with the tragedy of the commons game structure and design of rules the paper provides an assessment of some recent results of the large amount of new institutional economics analyses investigating a common pool resource setting with a specific focus on game theory models most of the studies have used a non cooperative approach in order to explain how under provision for the resource or its over use the so called tragedy of the commons can be avoided within given management rules they show how the characteristics of the game payoff matrix repetition or of the users group size wealth heterogeneity and moral norms may give incentives for the latter to play in a way that benefits all users by contrast much fewer articles have used a formalized approach to assess the possibility for players to design new rules to overcome the initial tragedy of the commons the article ends with some proposals of directions for future research

locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal abstract illegal water diversions and lax rule enforcement are common on irrigation canals we present a mathematical programming model of a watercourse calibrated to a canal in maharashtra on which farmers voted to cooperate to control water theft the model solution computes the crop choices and profits of individually optimizing farmers who differ in their location it reveals the spatial distribution of gains and losses from cooperation it illuminates why voluntary bargaining will rarely achieve an efficient water allocation it also shows that landless laborers might well be against local cooperation if the expropriated water nurtures labor intensive crops

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

analyzing collective action collective action problems pervade all societies as well as ecological systems used by humans substantial evidence has accrued during the last several decades that human actors are able to solve some but definitely not all collective action problems on their own without external rules and enforcement imposed from the outside in this article i review some of the structural variables that have been found to affect the likelihood of collective action then i address the need to base future work on collective action on a more general theory of human behavior than has been used to model collective action over the last five decades in the last section i discuss how structural variables affect the core relationships of reputation trust and reciprocity as these affect levels of cooperation

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames abstract it is well known that cooperative outcomes can be supported by noncooperative equilibrium strategy combinations in games that are infinitely repeated however the example of the repeated prisoner s dilemma has led people to conclude that such cooperative outcomes cannot be sustained if the game is repeated finitely often in this paper it is proved that the belief about finitely repeated games is false conditions are given that allow the existence of cooperative outcomes in finitely repeated games that are supported by subgame perfect noncooperative equilibrium strategies

population growth and agriculture in poor countries a review of theoretical issues and empirical evidence abstract the paper contributes a critical survey of the very extensive literature dealing with various aspects of the economic and institutional responses of agriculture to population growth in poor countries encompassing a discussion of the main underlying theoretical issues such responses are evaluated in the framework of the general population development debate the main conclusion is that although population growth induces adjustments in agriculture in terms of technical progress intensification and definition of property rights optimism may not be justified in the context of very fast population growth and or already high densities especially when the environmental resource base is taken into account

investing to cooperate theory and experiment we study theoretically and in a lab experiment investment decisions in environments where property rights are absent in our setting a player chooses an investment level before interacting repeatedly with a given set of agents the investment stochastically affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period we show that more volatile returns make investment more difficult in the absence of legal protection and might force the investor to invest more to guarantee cooperation experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings

sustaining quality in tourism destinations an economic model with an application sustaining quality in tourism destinations can be described as seeking to maintain a destination s reputation this is a strategy that has a dynamic dimension in the sense that the benefits from such a strategy are likely to accrue in the future the task of building reputation will necessitate some investment which implies that in equilibrium a high quality tourism experience will sell for a premium above its cost of production this premium can be seen as the return on the initial investment in reputation or as an important incentive in inducing a destination to maintain its reputation as a particular kind of quality destination without such a premium a destination may find that a fly by night strategy of quality reduction would be profit maximizing this is the type of moral hazard problem that is present when say a tourism destination faces the question of how to react to increases in tourist numbers with large numbers reputation may not be seen as important and the various providers have a str

central bank collateral frameworks abstract this paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely overlooked yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems namely central bank collateral frameworks their importance can be understood by the observation that the money at the core of these systems central bank money is injected into the economy on terms not defined in a market but by the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks using the collateral framework of the eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study the paper brings to light the functioning reach and impact of collateral frameworks a theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy they can for example bias the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability evidence is presented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid collateral and more generally impairs market forces and discipline the paper also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the eurosystem s collateral framework

quality ladders and product cycles we develop a two country model of endogenous innovation and imitation in order to study the interactions between these two processes firms in the north race to bring out the next generation of a set of technology intensive products each product potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times but quality improvements require the investment of resources and entail uncertain prospects of success in the south entrepreneurs invest resources in order to learn the production processes that have been developed in the north all r d investment decisions are made by forward looking profit maximizing entrepreneurs the steady state equilibrium is characterized by constant aggregate rates of innovation and imitation we study how these rates respond to changes in the sizes of the two regions and to policies in each region to promote learning

regulating endangered species endangered species timothy swanson one important issue at the earth summit in rio de janeiro was the preservation of diverse biological resources or biodiversity to date the regulation of endangered species has been based on the premise that over exploitation is the principal problem this diagnosis has led to a wide range of attempts to destroy demand for wildlife by means of bans on trade and consumption of the products of endangered species this approach misses the fundamental cause of the problem terrestrial species compete for land land use primarily reflects human decisions about its allocation even over exploitation is the result of human allocation decisions species that are overexploited are those for which society chooses not to invest in their management species that survive are thus those in which humans chose to invest whilst extinction should be interpreted as disinvestment in species or their ancillary resources habitat management trade bans do not address this fundamental cause of extinction the paper sets out how demand should be constructively managed to encourage continuing investment in endangered species

the effects of foreign shocks when interest rates are at zero in a two country dsge model the effects of foreign demand shocks on the home country are greatly amplified if the home economy is constrained by the zero lower bound on policy interest rates this result applies even to countries that are relatively closed to trade such as the united states departing from many of the existing closed economy models the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously adverse foreign shocks can extend the duration of the trap implying more contractionary effects for the home country the home economy is more vulnerable to adverse foreign shocks if the neutral rate is low consistent with secular stagnation and trade openness is high

strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor during the evolution of most industries however a sequence of firms enters or attempts to enter at distinct points in time consideration of issues arising from sequential entry fundamentally alters the qualitative nature of the deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms within a sequential setting counterintuitive behavior may be observed specifically numerous government policies designed to decrease industrial concentration penalties for anticompetitive practices subsidization of entry consent decrees restructuring industries may have the opposite effect

collusive equilibria in oligopolies with finite lives abstract it is generally accepted that collusive agreements cannot be sustained in oligopolies with finite lives in this paper it is shown that provided the number of competitors is neither too small nor too large the most restrictive output i e the monopoly output can be sustained as a perfect nash equilibrium if the number of firms is too small only sequences of the nash equilibria of the constituent market game can appear as perfect nash equilibria if the number of firms is too large the power of the cartel falls sharply

common property and collective action in economic development abstract a fundamental issue in many ldcs is the degree to which natural resource mismanagement is caused by common property arrangements this view has led to widespread attempts to privatize forests rangelands and water resources many of these efforts have failed to stop overuse and have contributed to inequality in resource distribution this paper seriously questions this approach and describes a number of reasons why common property may continue to be both efficient and equitable complementing and combining with private rights in a way consistent with the resource endowments of village economies a theoretical approach is outlined showing that the tragedy of the commons is an unsatisfactory model of common property an alternative model is presented together with a call for research into institutional alternatives in resource management

licensing the market for technology abstract in technology based industries incumbent firms often license their technology to potential competitors such a strategy is difficult to explain within traditional models of licensing this paper extends the literature on licensing by relaxing the assumption of a monopolist technology holder competition in the market for technology induces licensing of innovations and incumbent firms may find it privately profitable to license although their joint profits may well be higher in the absence of any licensing a strong testable implication of our model is that the number of licenses per patent holder decreases with the degree of product differentiation

the sale of ideas strategic disclosure property rights and contracting ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea s value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea these problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale an expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining undisclosed know how we examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size

risk coping land tenure and land markets an overview of the literature over the last decades a significant amount of literature has been published on informal risk coping in developing countries in this paper we review how informal risk coping has been addressed in the land tenure literature from two main perspectives a first stream of research looks at how customary tenure and communal property perform key informal risk coping functions a second subset of this literature analyses how informal risk coping creates land market imperfections through sharecropping or distress sales the segmentation of the literature results from the demsetzian property rights framework further research on risk coping and land tenure would benefit from examining recent work on property regimes

escaping from a liquidity trap and deflation the foolproof way and others existing proposals to escape from a liquidity trap and deflation including my foolproof way are discussed in the light of the optimal way to escape the optimal way involves three elements 1 an explicit central bank commitment to a higher future price level 2 a concrete action that demonstrates the central bank s commitment induces expectations of a higher future price level and jump starts the economy and 3 an exit strategy that specifies when and how to get back to normal a currency depreciation is a direct consequence of expectations of a higher future price level and hence an excellent indicator of those expectations furthermore an intentional currency depreciation and a crawling peg as in the foolproof way can implement the optimal way and in particular induce the desired expectations of a higher future price level i conclude that the foolproof way is likely to work well for japan which is in a liquidity trap now as well as for the euro area and the united states in case either would fall into a liquidity trap in the future

a framework for evaluating collective action and informal institutional dynamics under a resource management policy of decentralization the decentralization of resource property rights has become an increasingly popular policy in many natural resource dependent communities of the developing world however the success of this policy approach depends on both collective action and institutionalization it is therefore important to evaluate collective action and institutionalization where the process of property rights decentralization is in progress this paper presents a modified version of the institutional analysis and development iad framework designed to analyze the decentralization of property rights and the collective action of community members to obtain these rights it describes a three phased framework for analyzing i the government property right decentralization policy ii the stock of capital assets in the community required to achieve property rights by initiating collective action and iii the development of an informal institution for effective property right distribution in the community finally to demonstrate its utility to collective action research we present a case study application of our modified framework to the fisheries property right decentralization policy of the bangladesh government and the subsequent collective action of a wetland dependent community

determinants of collective action on the local commons a model with evidence from mexico i develop a model of cooperation in small irrigation systems i give conditions under which an equalizing redistribution of wealth increases the level of equilibrium cooperation but also show that some redistributions that increase inequality can also increase cooperation the distributive rule a combination of arrangements for maintenance cost sharing and water allocation also affects the cooperation level i estimate statistical models of cooperation for three maintenance indicators using field data from a study of mexican irrigation societies social heterogeneity and landholding inequality are significantly associated with lower maintenance distributive rules that allocate water proportionally to landholding size likewise reduce maintenance

credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank we start from two empirical facts 1 central banks target cpi inflation 2 independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital the first fact makes it difficult for a central bank to implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap because it makes a commitment to overshoot the inflation target not credible we show that the second fact helps to solve this credibility problem the optimal policy can take the form of a currency depreciation combined with a crawling peg a policy advocated by svensson as the foolproof way to escape from a liquidity trap jel e52 f31 f41 this paper starts from two empirical facts 1 central banks target infl ation measured by the consumer price index cpi 2 independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital we provide evidence for these facts below the first fact adds to the well known credibility problem of the optimal escape from a liquidity trap the second fact provides a mechanism through which the credibility problem can be solved and the optimal escape

the deflation bias and committing to being irresponsible i model deflation at zero nominal interest rate in a microfounded general equilibrium model i show that one can analyze deflation as a credibility problem if three conditions are satisfied first the government s only policy instrument is increasing the money supply by open market operations in short term bonds second the economy is subject to large negative demand shocks third the government cannot commit to future policy i call the credibility problem that arises under these conditions the deflation bias i propose several policies to solve it they all involve printing money or issuing nominal debt in addition they require cutting taxes buying real assets such as stocks or purchasing foreign exchange the government credibly commits to being irresponsible by pursuing these policies it commits to higher money supply in the future so that the private sector expects inflation instead of deflation this is optimal since it curbs deflation and increases output by lowering the real rate of return

team approaches in reducing nonpoint source pollution abstract it is technically difficult and costly to monitor nonpoint source pollution consequently most economic instruments directed towards reducing this type of pollution have focused on circumventing the monitoring problem by focusing on readily observable factors such instruments include taxes or tradable permits on inputs or other incentives to induce changes in farming practices one difficulty with such approaches is that the incentives may not be consistent with the primary objectives of the policies to reduce nutrient runoffs this paper seeks to identify under what conditions it would be beneficial to apply more direct incentives for reduced nutrient runoffs monitoring and enforcement are core issues in this connection it is still difficult to monitor individual farm field runoffs hence the incentive problems associated with multiple agents emitting to the same recipient need to be resolved

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

the signaling effect of raising inflation abstract this paper argues that central bankers should temporarily raise inflation when anticipating liquidity traps to ensure the credibility of otherwise time inconsistent forward guidance policies as stable inflation in normal times either stems from central bankers desire to maintain credibility or from aversion to inflation the private sector is unable to infer the central banker s willingness to follow through on promises from observing stable inflation jeopardizing the efficiency of forward guidance policy we show that this signaling motive can justify temporary deviations of inflation from target well above 2 but also that the low inflation volatility during the great moderation was insufficient to ensure fully efficient forward guidance when needed

trade tragedy and the commons we develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which coun tries escape the tragedy of the commons and hence the de facto property rights regime is endogenously determined three forces determine success or failure in resource management the regulator s enforcement power the extent of har vesting capacity and the ability of the resource to generate competitive returns without being extinguished the model can explain heterogeneity across coun tries and resources in the effectiveness of resource management and it predicts that changes in prices population and technology can cause transitions to better or worse management regimes jel p14 q21 q22 q23 q32 many of the world s major renewable resource stocks are in a state of decline this is true for capture fisheries for forests in developing countries and for many measures of the biosphere s health other renewable resources including many species of wildlife marine mammals and coral reefs are also under threat while poverty and government corruption are surely respon sible for some of this record particular emphasis is often placed on the potentially damaging role played by international trade this emphasis is not surprising given that natural resource products are a key export for much of the developing world and property rights over renewable resources are both difficult to define and poorly enforced but property rights are not an immutable country characteristic such as weather mineral deposits or topography they are instead market institutions developed to facilitate transactions and protect scarce resources consequently changes in prices technology and other effects of market integration may alter the de facto property rights regime and lead to impacts quite dif ferent from those predicted by existing analyses the purpose of this paper is to examine renew able resource use within a framework where the enforcement of property rights and hence the efficacy of resource management is endogenously determined we develop a theory where an existing government regulates the use of a renewable resource by a set of agents who have a right to harvest the resource could be a fishery forest stock aquifer etc and we assume it is local and therefore contained within one country the govern ment sets rules limiting harvests but agents may cheat on these allocations and risk punishment property rights are endogenous in this framework because the government must account for agents incentive to cheat as a result the effective protection for the resource or what we refer to as the de facto property rights regime may be far from perfect even though property rights would be perfectly enforced if there was no monitoring problem

the differential impact of user heterogeneity in resource management a case study from india abstract this paper analyses the heterogeneous users decision to participate in co management which is an institutional alternative proposed in the wake of state s failure in managing the cochin estuarine fisheries in kerala india since a collective action under co management require not only user s active participation in terms of their labor but also involve various types of organizational and managerial costs the users were given the following choices on co operation firstly the users had the choice to contribute their labor in conservation activities which would ensure sustainability of the fisheries secondly they could make a voluntary contribution towards meeting the organizational costs of collective action thirdly they could contribute in terms of labor as well as in monetary terms finally they had the choice not to participate at all keeping in view the problems of free rider and the chances for adoption of strategic behavior by users some incentives were given for each of the above ways of co operation a multinomial logit analysis of the decision of about 369 sample fishermen to participate in co management as defined above shows the differential impact of user heterogeneity in resource management while heterogeneity in terms of the present legal status of the users motivate them for contributing their labor even in the absence of any additional economic incentives heterogeneity in economic status and membership in formal organizations matters when it comes to making monetary payments in addition to these the overall optimism of the users motivates them to both physically engage in conservation activities as well as make monetary payments adoption of strategic behaviors by at least some users cannot however be ruled out on the whole it is seen that the heterogeneous fishermen s decision to participate depends upon their anticipation of the distribution of benefits from co operation however one must be cautious that those who anticipate disproportionate benefit from co operation are likely to take a lead role therefore care must be taken to prevent them from deciding the rules of the game in such a manner that they are disproportionately in their favor

payments for environmental services in watersheds insights from a comparative study of three cases in central america we have compared three cases of payments for water related environmental services pes in central america in terms of socioeconomic background opportunity costs of forest conservation and stakeholders perceptions of the conditions of water resources and other issues we found that in general the opportunity costs are larger than the amounts paid which apparently contradicts the economic foundation of pes schemes and suggests that the role of intangibles is important in inducing participation the results also show that trade offs between different environmental and social goals are likely to emerge in pes schemes posing some doubts as to their ability to be multipurpose instruments for environmental improvement and rural development we also found that pes schemes may work as a conflict resolution instrument facilitating downstream upstream problem solving though at the same time they might introduce changes in social perceptions of property rights

patent litigation as an information transmission mechanism patent litigation reveals important information about the validity of the contested patent to other potential entrants this paper explores the implications of such informational externalities for entry dynamics in the presence of multiple potential entrants the nature of the entry game can be one of either waiting or preemption depending on the degree of patent protection therefore the payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are discontinuous in the degree of patent protection furthermore strengthening intellectual property rights is not necessarily desirable for the patentee the analysis may also help explain the apparently puzzling practice of delaying patent suits copyright 1998 by american economic association