sentiments and aggregate demand fluctuations we formalize the keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations when production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without persistent informational frictions externalities nonconvexities or strategic complementarities in production the models we consider are deliberately simple but could serve as benchmarks for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features

defending against speculative attacks the policy maker s reputation abstract this paper studies how speculative attacks and regime change arise from the interaction between a policy maker s reputation for defending against speculative attacks and speculators learning of the policy maker s type if speculators receive conditionally independent and identically distributed private signals about the policy maker s type in every period then no matter how precise their per period private signals are there can be no equilibrium with attacks if the speculators receive private signals whose precision increases as a power function of the time with the power strictly greater than two there exist infinitely many equilibria with attacks but this equilibrium multiplicity arises from the timing of the attacks only in such a case the set of status quos surviving in any equilibrium is strictly larger than in the case of a short lived policy maker

self fulfilling currency crises the role of interest rates abstract we develop a stylized currency crises model with heterogeneous information among investors andendogenous determination of interest rates in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium our modelcaptures three key features of interest rates the opportunity cost of attacking the currency respondsto the investors behavior the domestic interest rate may influence the central bank s preferences fora fixed exchange rate and the domestic interest rate serves as a public signal which aggregatesprivate information about fundamentals we explore the payoff and informational channels throughwhich interest rates determine devaluation outcomes and examine the implications for equilibriumselection by global games methods our main conclusion is that multiplicity is not an artifact ofcommon knowledge in particular we show that multiplicity emerges robustly either when adevaluation is triggered by the cost of high domestic interest rates as in obstfeld 1996 or when adevaluation is triggered by the central bank s loss of foreign reserves as in obstfeld 1986 providedthat the domestic asset supply is sufficiently elastic in the interest rate and shocks to the domesticbond supply are sufficiently small christian helliwigdepartment of economicsuniversity of california los angelesbox 951477los angeles ca 90095 1477arijit mukherjiuniversity of minnesotaaleh tsyvinskidepartment of economicsharvard universitylittauer centercambridge ma 02138 3001

large versus small players a closer look at the dynamics of speculative attacks what is the role of large players e g hedge funds in speculative attacks recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack however many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest rate differentials we propose a model in which large players can do both using data on currency trading by foreign large and local small players we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the norwegian krone during the 1990s during the attack on the swedish krona after the russian moratorium in 1998 foreign players moved early gains by delaying attack were small however because interest rates did not increase

linear adjustment costs and seasonal labor demand evidence from retail trade firms standard models of dynamic labor demand rely on the presence of adjustment costs to explain the observed smoothness in employment patterns although the costs are often difficult to quantify the experience rating feature of the u s unemployment insurance ui system provides a measurable linear cost of adjustment using a unique data set with administrative data on over 8000 firms i estimate the effect of a ui induced linear adjustment cost on seasonal labor demand in retail trade i find strong support for the large role of adjustment costs in reducing the employment response of firms to seasonal fluctuations in demand

coordinating regime switches the canonical model of strategic complementarities between individual actions which exhibits multiple equilibria under perfect information is extended with heterogeneous agents and imperfect information agents observe their own cost of action and the history of the levels of aggregate activity the distribution of individual characteristics evolves through a random process and individuals are rational bayesians under plausible conditions there is a unique equilibrium with phases of high and low activity and random switches applications may be found in macroeconomics and revolutions

ruling out multiplicity and indeterminacy the role of heterogeneity it is well known that economies of scale that are external to the individual decision makers can lead to self fulfilling prophecies and the multiplicity or even indeterminacy of equilibrium we argue that the importance of this source of multiplicity and indeterminacy is overstated in representative agent models as they ignore the potential stabilizing effect of heterogeneity we illustrate this in a version of matsuyama s 1991 two sector model with increasing returns to scale two main results are shown first sufficient homogeneity with respect to individual productivity leads to the instability and non uniqueness of a given stationary state and the indeterminacy of the corresponding stationary state equilibrium second sufficient heterogeneity leads to the global saddle path stability and the uniqueness of a given stationary state and the global uniqueness of equilibrium

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

natural resources aid and democratization a best case scenario natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power attempts are being made therefore to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization i analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly the best case scenario the models show that even with institutional safeguards these resources diminish chances for democratization in addition to their practical importance the results have an important theoretical implication the political resource curse may not be due to dictators use of these resources but simply to their existence in nondemocracies

aid and domestic resource mobilization with a focus on sub saharan africa increasing tax revenues in low income countries is essential to address future development finance requirements this is particularly important for aid recipients the focus of this paper theory shows that although there are many ways in which aid can have indirect effects on tax revenue the direct effects arise because aid and tax are alternative sources of revenue and political economy factors influence the choices made by government aid may discourage tax effort if viewed as a politically less costly source of revenue under different conditions the policies and reforms associated with aid may increase revenue through promoting growth encouraging more efficient tax structures or supporting reforms to tax administration while cross country evidence reveals no systematic pattern country studies show that aid can be associated with administrative and efficiency reforms to increase tax revenue the conclusion discusses how aid and donors can promote increasing domestic tax revenue

a panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid the donor community has been increasingly concerned that development assistance intended for crucial social and economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive military and other expenditures the link between foreign aid and public spending is not straightforward because some aid may be fungible this article empirically examines the impact of foreign aid on the recipient s public expenditures using cross country samples of annual observations for 1971 90 for the base sample of 14 developing countries it finds that aid is not fungible at the aggregate level and there is no associated tax relief increasing the number of countries however makes aid fungible moreover results based on the main sample indicate that aid is fungible in three out of five sectors examined developing country governments receiving earmarked concessionary loans for agriculture education and energy reduce their own resources going to these sectors and use them elsewhere only loans to the transport and communication sector are fully spent on the purposes intended by donors because most aid appears to be fungible the rate of return on a specific donor funded project tells little about the impact of that assistance a better approach may be to tie foreign aid to an overall public expenditure program that provides adequate resources to crucial sectors

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

foreign aid and market liberalizing reform market oriented economic policies reflected in limited economic activity by government protection of private property rights sound monetary policy outward orientation regarding trade and efficient tax and regulatory policy have been strongly linked to faster rates of economic growth foreign aid is often provided in the belief that it encourages liberalizing reforms in these areas this paper analyzes the impact of aid on market liberalizing policy reform correcting for the possible endogeneity of aid results indicate that higher aid slowed reform over the 1980 2000 period as measured by a broad index of policies disaggregating policy into five areas aid is significantly linked to slower reform in some policy areas but not in others disaggregating by decade aid s adverse impact on policy reform is much more pronounced for the 1980s than for the 1990s

do countries falsify economic data strategically some evidence that they might we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their economic data in a strategic manner among those suspected are countries with fixed exchange rate regimes high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model we also find that countries with bad institutional quality rankings and those in africa middle east eastern europe and latin america release economic data of questionable veracity our evidence calls for models with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for establishing independent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of high quality economic data

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

why there should be no political foreign aid curse summary this paper considers the causality underlying the so called political aid curse which proposes that foreign aid like oil should hinder democracy using a theoretical model which identifies repression and appeasement as the primary alternatives to democratization it argues that aid revenue should not produce a political curse because it is less fungible more conditional and less constant than state oil revenue making it difficult for recipient governments to use their aid to fund either repression or appeasement using several different measures associated with repression and appeasement the statistical results show that aid cannot be associated with any of these dependent variables

dueling policies why systemic risk taxation can fail abstract two policy instruments for the banking sector are investigated namely systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity about bailout policy bailout expectations can induce moral hazard in the form of excessive risk taking by banks systemic risk taxation induces banks to prefer uncorrelated investments leading to lower systemic risk formation constructive ambiguity generates uncertainty about bailout prospects however systemic risk taxation also may inform banks about the regulator s concern for financial stability and thereby its bailout policy this result leads to a trade off between systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity and highlights the need to consider interdependence across policies when evaluating their effectiveness

runs versus lemons information disclosure and fiscal capacity we study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs in our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons a fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests and paradoxically how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained

did regional economic diversity influence the effects of the great recession using data for u s counties from 2005 to 2012 we test whether higher levels of economic diversity mediated the effects of the great recession via four measures of stability spatial spillover effects are modeled by the use of the spatial durbin estimator with heteroscedastic errors the data generally support the central hypothesis that higher levels of diversity within a county are associated with enhanced employment stability across all counties as well as subsets of metro and nonmetro counties results for wage stability however appear to contradict our other findings we suggest that underlying labor elasticities can bridge these apparent contradictory results jel r11 r12 o47

do natural resources fuel authoritarianism a reappraisal of the resource curse a large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy extant cross country regressions however assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships numerous sources of bias may be driving the results the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country specific and time invariant heterogeneity to address these problems we develop unique historical datasets employ time series centric techniques and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals we test to see if there is a long run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time both on a country by country basis and across several different panels we find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism in fact in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing

foreign aid and statehood in africa has foreign aid destroyed state institutions in africa african states depend on development assistance to conduct basic government operations yet few of these states are well governed or effective at providing public goods the two trends mounting foreign aid and static or diminishing state performance raise an obvious question is aid dependency contributing to misrule and state failure in africa many critics argue the two phenomena are related i find they are not my analysis fails to show a negative association between aid receipts and two measures of democracy and economic freedom instead the evidence is consistent with a small positive relationship between aid and these indicators of state performance since the international community seems bent on reducing foreign aid an important issue is how african states can maintain and improve their performance with less foreign assistance

information choice and amplification of financial crises we propose an amplification mechanism of financial crises based on the information choices of investors information acquisition makes investors more likely to act against their prior deteriorating public news under an initially strong weak prior increases reduces the value of private information and induces more less information acquisition deteriorating public news increases the probability of a crisis since the initially strong weak prior induces no attacks attacks this effect is amplified with endogenous information choices to enhance financial stability a policy maker affects information acquisition via taxes and subsidies we derive and discuss testable implications for the magnitude of amplification

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

does foreign aid target the poorest to examine the extent to which foreign aid reaches people at different levels of wealth in africa i use household surveys to measure the subnational distribution of a country s population by wealth quintiles and match this information to data on the location of aid projects from two multilateral donors within countries aid disproportionately flows to regions with more of the richest people aid does not favor regions with more of the poorest people these findings violate the stated preferences of the multilateral donors under study suggesting that the donors either cannot or are not willing to exercise control over the location of aid projects within countries the results also suggest that aid is not being allocated effectively to alleviate extreme poverty

the perils of unearned foreign income aid remittances and government survival given their political incentives governments in more autocratic polities can strategically channel unearned government and household income in the form of foreign aid and remittances to finance patronage which extends their tenure in political office i substantiate this claim with duration models of government turnover for a sample of 97 countries between 1975 and 2004 unearned foreign income received in more autocratic countries reduces the likelihood of government turnover regime collapse and outbreaks of major political discontent to allay potential concerns with endogeneity i harness a natural experiment of oil price driven aid and remittance flows to poor non oil producing muslim autocracies the instrumental variables results confirm the baseline finding that authoritarian governments can harness unearned foreign income to prolong their rule finally i provide evidence of the underlying causal mechanisms that governments in autocracies use aid and remittances inflows to reduce their expenditures on welfare goods to fund patronage

public information private information and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games abstract i study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher order beliefs as the players signals become more and more precise the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals the same condition also determines the convergence of common p belief to common knowledge which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

local economic instability and business location the case of maine this paper investigates the effects of local economic instability on business location in maine instability is represented by the quarterly six month and annual persistence of employment in maine municipalities and seasonal spikes in local employment regression results suggest that businesses are attracted to areas with high short term and seasonal stability but that annual fluctuations in local employment are not a significant deterrent to new business activity services businesses are particularly sensitive to local employment fluctuations presumably because they are often highly integrated into the economy findings suggest that policymakers can jointly pursue the objectives of local economic growth and stability

uncertainty and currency crises evidence from survey data this paper studies empirically how uncertainty aects speculation in the foreign ex change markets we use the dispersion of survey forecasts of key macroeconomic variables to measure uncertainty about fundamentals we nd that uncertainty has a non monotone eect on exchange rate pressures namely uncertainty heightens speculative pressures when expected fundamentals are good and eases them when they are bad we prove that this prediction arises from a broad class of currency crisis theories ranging from rst generation to global game models we also show that the proposed empirical strategy remains valid in the presence of forecasters with strategic objectives and use a novel set of instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity bias

dynamic interventions and informational linkages abstract we model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and study how endogenous government interventions mitigate coordination failures we establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness and we show that one intervention can affect another through altering the public information structure a stronger initial intervention helps subsequent interventions through increasing the likelihood of positive news but also leads to negative conditional updates our results suggest optimal policy should emphasize initial interventions when coordination outcomes tend to correlate neglecting informational externalities of initial interventions results in over or under interventions moreover saving smaller funds disproportionally more can generate greater informational benefits at smaller costs

uncertainty co ordination and path dependence abstract our objective is to assess whether dynamics hinder or assist co ordination in a game with strategic complementarities we study two dynamic aspects different agents make decisions at different points in time and extra information about a payoff relevant state of nature becomes available over time we find that the dynamic resolution of information matters most for uniqueness of equilibrium this is demonstrated by showing that the condition for uniqueness is weaker when learning occurs we also analyse how successfully agents co ordinate when there is a unique equilibrium finally we show that path dependence occurs the order in which signals arrive matters as well as the total amount of information received

signaling in a global game coordination and policy traps this paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs while exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria the policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy this result does not rely on the freedom to choose out of equilibrium beliefs nor on the policy being a public signal it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise

taking time seriously dramatic world change has stimulated interest in research questions about the dynamics of politics we have seen increases in the number of time series data sets and the length of typical time series but three shortcomings are prevalent in published time series analysis first analysts often estimate models without testing restrictions implied by their specification second researchers link the theoretical concept of equilibrium with cointegration and error correction models third analysts often do a poor job of interpreting results the consequences include weak connections between theory and tests biased estimates and incorrect inferences we outline techniques for estimating linear dynamic regressions with stationary data and weakly exogenous regressors we recommend analysts 1 start with general dynamic models and test restrictions before adopting a particular specification and 2 use the wide array of information available from dynamic specifications we illustrate this strategy with data on congressional approval and tax rates across oecd countries

signalling effects of monetary policy we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the policy rate signals the central bank s view about macroeconomic developments to price setters the model is estimated with likelihood methods on a u s data set that includes the survey of professional forecasters as a measure of price setters inflation expectations this model improves upon existing perfect information models in explaining why in the data inflation expectations respond with delays to monetary impulses and remain disanchored for years in the 1970s u s monetary policy is found to signal persistent inflationary shocks explaining why inflation and inflation expectations were so persistently heightened the signalling effects of monetary policy also explain why inflation expectations adjusted more sluggishly than inflation after the robust monetary tightening of the 1980s

the signaling role of policy actions abstract in an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank s assessment to firms because mark up shocks cannot be neutralized by monetary policy providing firms with more information about these shocks exacerbates their reaction and creates a larger distortion recognizing the signaling role of its instrument the central bank distorts its policy response in order to optimally shape firms beliefs while providing firms with more information is always detrimental to the output gap it has a more subtle effect on price dispersion depending on whether information is provided through the transparency channel or through the signaling channel although more transparency is always detrimental to welfare the information that is conveyed by the monetary instrument improves welfare when firms coordination is highly valuable

volatility of development aid from the frying pan into the fire summary the paper building on the authors previous analysis examines the relative volatility of aid flows into developing countries and their domestic revenue using new data and three alternative measures of aid instability relative volatility vis a vis fiscal revenue unpredictability of aid disbursement relative to commitments and failure of aid to smooth fluctuations in aggregate income it finds that the volatility of aid flows is still much greater than that of domestic revenue and that this difference is not decreasing especially in very poor aid dependent countries this high volatility of inflows makes the macroeconomy hard to manage further the influence of aid has been procyclical and not countercyclical aid has failed to act either as a stabilizing force or as an insurance mechanism we argue that to counter these unwelcome trends donors need to be able to respond more speedily and effectively to large adverse shocks and their conditionalities need to become more flexible possibilities explicitly discussed elsewhere in this special section

rational and self fulfilling balance of payments crises speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes occur ifasset price paths are to be free of abnormal profit opportunities suchattacks are fully rational as they reflect the market s response to aregime breakdown that is inevitable the authors shows that under someexpectations about policy balance of payments crises can also be purely self fulfilling events in such cases even a permanently viableregime may collapse and the economy will possess multiple equilibriacorresponding to different subjective assessments of the probability ofa crisis the behavior of the domestic interest rate will naturally reflect the possibility of a speculative attack copyright 1986 by american economic association

does tourism promote cross border trade we estimate a simultaneous bivariate qualitative choice model of arizona agribusiness firms propensity to trade and visit as a tourist the cross border state of sonora mexico venture business visits quantified through the tourism equation were found to have the largest impact on a firm s propensity to trade tourist visits have a greater impact on trade when combined with other firm attributes such as age perceived need for geographic diversity foreign language fluency and firm size than if considered alone our results suggest that there is a role for government agencies to play in overcoming imperfect information related to trade opportunities through facilitating exploratory business venture and tourist visits

oil nontax revenue and the redistributional foundations of regime stability nontax revenues make up a substantial amount of government revenue around the world though scholars usually focus on individual sources of such revenue for example foreign aid and state owned oil companies using a theory of regime change that builds on recent models of the redistributional foundations of dictatorships and democracies i generate hypotheses regarding all nontax revenue and regime stability i argue that an increase in nontax revenue should be associated with less taxation of elites in democracies more social spending in dictatorships and more stability for both regime types i find support for all three of these hypotheses in a cross sectional time series analysis covering all countries and years for which the necessary data are available significantly i show that the particular source of nontax revenue does not make a difference they all act similarly with regard to regime stability and the causal mechanisms

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

rural population growth 1950 1990 the roles of human capital industry structure and government policy human capital raises rural incomes but this effect is swamped by higher returns to human capital in urban markets this leads to brain drain from rural areas populations grow more rapidly in rural counties that have a diversified employment base farm population grows faster or declines more slowly in counties with relatively high farm income and nonfarm populations grow faster in counties with relatively high nonfarm income however higher farm incomes lead to slower nonfarm population growth and vice versa rural county government services financed by local taxes or debt have neutral or negative effects on population growth rural population in the united states increased 53 between 1900 and 1990 this increase is concentrated in the nonfarm rural sector where population has grown to three times its turn of the century level nevertheless there exists a concern that rural areas are threatened by population declines that will gradually erode the ability of communities to provide public services necessary for their citizens eventually the fear is that these communities will become too small to be selfsustaining and will disappear one might ask why these concerns exist in the face of slowly rising rural populations one reason is that the overall rural population increase masks a huge migration of labor off the farm the rural farm population has fallen to one tenth its 1900 level if a strong farm economy is necessary to sustain rural communities then the farm population decline is a threat to the future viability of rural communities on the other hand off farm employment opportunities are increasingly important to the

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

sources of cyclical employment instability in rural counties cyclical employment instability at the county level is examined using monthly indiana employment data for 1970 80 and a single index portfolio model results show rural counties are more responsive to systematic or cyclical employment instability than urban counties at the state level a high percentage employed in manufacturing has been associated with greater employment instability over the business cycle this relationship does not hold at the county level where most manufacturing sectors seem to cyclically stabilize the counties in which they appear

employment stability and the role of sectoral dominance in rural economies rural development has received renewed attention particularly in the west where there are opportunities for enhancing tourism in communities once reliant on extractive resources the historical focus of rural development has been on economic growth with little concern about the sustainability or socioeconomic impacts of such growth this study analyzes and discusses the employment dynamics of rural economies with varying employment bases to illustrate some possible impacts of targeting specific employment sectors as part of a rural economic development strategy the empirical research focuses on the rural counties of utah where the trade and service sectors associated with increased tourism and retirement communities have been rapidly expanding throughout the past two decades

employment risk diversification and unemployment this paper studies determinants of the geographic distribution of unemployment in the united states since 1950 we argue that equilibrium differences in unemployment among markets are partially supported by corresponding differences in the covariance structure of sectoral demands for labor when workers are mobile greater diversification of sectoral demands reduces unemployment we confirm this point using pooled time series cross section data on state unemployment and employment by industry we also find evidence for nonneutrality of aggregate disturbances based on geographic differences in industrial composition and that permanent changes in the sectoral composition of employment lead to transitory fluctuations in unemployment

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally

is aid oil an analysis of whether africa can absorb more aid summary this paper considers whether africa can absorb a doubling of aid if oil revenues provide a natural experiment the results are disappointing far from being transformational they have been markedly less successful than aid one implication is that the delivery modalities of aid though heavily criticized have substantially added value the paper discusses which modalities may have been most useful unfortunately aid appears to be subject to diminishing returns so that doubling aid through conventional modalities would not double its impact the paper concludes by considering innovations in aid modalities which might offset diminishing returns