exchange rates and the fiscal theory of the price level abstract this paper addresses exchange rate determination under a nominal interest peg in a two country cash in advance model under two types of cash in advance constraints if both governments peg the nominal interest rate on domestic bonds there is a continuum of equilibria each consistent with different nominal exchange rates and real resource allocations the well known finding of equilibrium uniqueness under a nominal interest rate peg in a closed economy does not survive in a multi country multi currency setting

interactions between monetary and fiscal policy under flexible exchange rates we examine fiscal and monetary policy interactions by developing a two country open economy model under flexible exchange rates where overlapping generations of consumers supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms that change their prices infrequently we show in this context that the implications of lax fiscal policy in country a are significant for country b determinacy can be ensured by adopting a passive monetary policy in either country a or country b in both cases however lack of fiscal feedback in country a will imply that fiscal shocks have significant macroeconomic consequences for both countries we examine how the size of these spillovers is influenced by the degree of debt indexation we also show that the fiscal response required to support an active monetary policy is greater when consumers have finite lives and that the characterisation of active and passive regimes does not depend on whether or not debt is indexed

exchange rate crises and fiscal solvency this paper combines insights from generation one currency crisis models and the fiscal theory of the price level ftpl to create a dynamic ftpl model of currency crises the initial fixed exchange rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present value of expected future surpluses policy switching usually combined with currency depreciation restores fiscal solvency and lending this model can explain a wide variety of crises including those involving sovereign default we illustrate by explaining the crisis in argentina 2001

compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under emu the debate over the stability and growth pact sgp as a part of european monetary union has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre requisite for price stability within the union in this paper we develop a two country open economy model where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently we examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union but where the fiscal authorities remain independent we show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived in principle this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments but we show that the scope for compensation is limited the monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies finally in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the weak requirements of fiscal solvency however when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation

investing in skill to stay on or not to stay on there is now a large measure of consensus amongst economists that there is relatively little that governments can do to affect the underlying growth rate of the economy through macroeconomic policy changes the emphasis has changed to supply side measures and one of the most favoured both in the united states and the uk is improvement in education and training in the us the emphasis has been on securing improvements in basic schooling which is seen as the major deficiency chubb and moe 1990 in the uk the main focus has been on our low staying on rates whitfield and wilson 1991 micklewright et al 1989 limited training opportunities prats and wagner 1983 and poor access to higher education des 1991

an exploration in the theory of exchange rate regimes three exchange rate regimes a float a one sided peg and a cooperative peg are evaluated and compared in terms of efficiency and welfare levels the framework of analysis embodies country specific monies with the money of each country being used to transact in its commodity markets and its currency denominated bonds welfare levels depend only on consumption levels in the presence of perfect foresight all equilibrium allocations are pareto efficient in a floating exchange rate regime the perfect foresight equilibrium allocation coincides with an equilibrium of a costless barter economy the same result holds in a one sided peg if the pegging country s exchange rate stabilizing authority breaks even over time in a cooperative peg regime there is a different equilibrium allocation for each combination of exchange rate levels and monetary policies problems of policy coordination and conflicts in desired monetary policies are discussed

a game theoretic view of the fiscal theory of the price level the goal of this paper is to probe the validity of the fiscal theory of the price level by modelling explicitly the market structure in which households and the government make their decisions i describe the economy as a game and i am thus able to state precisely the consequences of actions that are out of the equilibrium path i show that there exist government strategies that lead to a version of the fiscal theory in which the price level is determined by fiscal variables alone these strategies are however more complex than the simple budgetary rules usually associated with the fiscal theory and the government budget constraint cannot be merely viewed as an equilibrium condition

fiscal discipline and exchange rate systems a new fiscal theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas we show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a ricardian regime that is the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a ricardian regime and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two or more of the countries in the union is non ricardian interestingly constraints written into the maastricht treaty are sufficient for a ricardian regime

infinite maturity public debt and the fiscal theory of the price level the fiscal theory of the price level asserts that the price level is determined by the ratio of outstanding public nominal debt into the present value of real primary budget surpluses of the government we here argue that price determinacy in general fails when at least part of the public debt takes the form of securities of infinite maturity indeed price determinacy requires non ricardian fiscal plans and a predetermined nominal debt of the government as no equilibrium restriction prevents the occurrence of a speculative bubble on infinite maturity public debt the initial nominal debt of the government is indeterminate and so is the price level under canonical specifications of non ricardian fiscal plans

fiscal solvency and price level determination in a monetary union abstract this paper applies the fiscal theory of price level determination to the case of a monetary union a fiscal perspective suggests first that the focus of past studies on seigniorage per se may be misplaced second a rise in the level of debt by one member government can raise the common price level throughout the union suggesting a role for fiscal rules third conditions are discussed under which fiscal solvency is not necessary for each member government in a monetary union

fiscal risk in a monetary union diverse fiscal policies which are subject to fiscal limits and stochastic shocks can threaten price stability in a monetary union the fiscal limits arise due to distortionary taxation and political will stochastic shocks are random and could push a fiscally sound policy towards its limit in equilibrium agents refuse to lend along a path which violates the fiscal limits creating a crisis the crisis requires a policy response to restore lending we focus on two responses default and policy switching both of which must be designed to restore fiscal solvency under the assumption that agents know the policy response we show that default poses no risk to price stability but that policy switching does we simulate the model to quantify fiscal risk in the european monetary union with fiscal variables at end of 2009 values we find that the probability of a fiscal crisis in greece and italy countries whose debt relative to gdp had strayed far above the 60 percent limit is positive but small however a small increase in debt can lead to a large increase in risk

on the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates in this paper we consider a particular international economic policy regime the laissez faire regime the distinguishing features of which are unrestricted portfolio choice and floating exchange rates and as we show this regime although favored by many economists is not economically feasible it does not have a determinate equilibrium that is an implication of an overlapping generations model more basically it is an implication of the notion that money is wanted only in order to accomplish trades

government finance in the wake of currency crises we address three questions i can classical models be reconciled with the fact that many crises are marked by high rates of depreciation and small increases in seignorage revenue ii what are the implications of different financing methods for post crisis rates of inflation and depreciation iii how do governments pay for the fiscal costs associated with currency crises to study these questions we use a general equilibrium model in which prospective government deficits trigger a currency crisis we then use our model in conjunction with fiscal data to interpret government financing in the wake of three recent currency crises korea 1997 mexico 1994 and turkey 2001

fiscal requirements for price stability maintaining price stability requires not only commitment to an appropriate monetary policy rule but an appropriate scal policy rule as well ricardian equivalence does not imply that scal policy is irrelevant except in the case of a certain class of policies ricardian policies the role of scal developments in inflation determination under a non ricardian regime is illustrated through an analysis of the bond price support regime of the 1940s a monetary scal regime with attractive properties would combine a taylor rule for monetary policy with nominal decit targeting as a scal policy commitment

a fiscal theory of currency crises an exchange rate crisis is caused when the fiscal authority lets the present value of primary surpluses inclusive of seigniorage deviate from the value of government debt at the pegged exchange rate in the absence of long term government bonds the exchange rate collapse must be instantaneous with long term government bonds the collapse can be delayed at the discretion of the monetary authority fiscal policy is responsible for the inevitability of a crisis while monetary policy determines its characteristics that is the timing of the crisis and the magnitude of exchange rate depreciation

currency crises and contingent liabilities a contingent liability is a future spending commitment that is realized with some probability international organizations emphasize the dangers of contingent liabilities when providing advice why one answer is obvious if significant contingent liabilities are realized they commit governments to substantial fiscal costs there is a further reason by taking on a contingent liability the government can increase the probability of the underlying shock taking place this paper describes how the issuance of government guarantees and the methods by which they are financed affect the probability of crises taking place it also discusses the determinants of post crisis inflation and depreciation

currency substitution risk premia and the taylor principle abstract this paper studies the equilibrium determinacy properties of a simple interest rate rule in a small open economy subject to currency substitution i e the use of a foreign currency for domestic transactions and risk premia on foreign borrowing it shows that if currencies are substitute in the provision of liquidity services the rule s response to inflation has to be sufficiently above unity for the equilibrium to be locally determinate this reinforced taylor principle requirement appears to be more binding in economies characterized by a larger elasticity of currency substitution more debt elastic country risk premia and intermediate degrees of dollarization in transactions

the fiscal theory of the price level a critique abstract this paper argues that the fiscal theory of the price level ftpl has feet of clay the source of the problem is a fundamental economic misspecification the ftplconfuses two key building blocks of a model of a market economy budgetconstraints which must be satisfied identically and market clearing or equilibriumconditions the ftpl asssumes that the government s intertemporal budgetconstraint needs to be satisfied only in equilibrium this economic misspecification has far reaching implications for the mathematicalproperties of the equilibria supported by models that impose the structure of theftpl it produces a rash of contradictions and anomalies jel classifications e31 e41 e51 e52 e62 e63 key words fiscal theory of the price level ricardian fiscal financial monetaryprogrammes government budget constraint price level indeterminacy author willem h buiter european bank for reconstruction and development oneexchange square london ec2a 2jn uktel 44 20 73386805fax 44 20 73386110 6111e mail buiterw ebrd comweb page http www nber org wbuiter index htm

regional rates of return to education and training in britain bennett r glennerster h and nevison d 1995 regional rates of return to education and training in britain reg studies 29 279 295 using a structural utility maximizing human capital model of the post 16 education and training decision the paper explores rates of return and lifetime earnings that might influence an individual s decision to participate in post compulsory education and training the paper presents ex ante regional rates of return to post 16 further and higher education using information from the general household survey in britain based on the empirical results implications for education and training policy are drawn the model demonstrates that there are important differences between expected rates of return to the same qualification in different regions these returns are influenced by the regional labour market and are likely to have important influences on the incentives of individuals to pursue education or to train the paper also demonstrates the generally low level of diff

spatial interaction model of spillovers from locally provided public services lundberg j 2006 spatial interaction model of spillovers from locally provided public services regional studies 40 631 644 this paper tests the hypotheses that recreational and cultural services provided at the local government level in sweden are associated with spillovers between municipalities a representative voter model is derived and the demand for recreational and cultural services is estimated using spatial sur techniques the result suggests a negative correlation between recreational and cultural services provided by neighbouring municipalities that indicate that these services are associated with spillovers in terms of strategic behaviour this result suggests that these services are strategic substitutes moreover the results provide week evidence that recreational and cultural services provided by local governments are complements lundberg j 2006 un modele d interaction geographique des retombees des services publics locaux regional studies 40 631 644 cet article cherche a test

on the theory of international currency portfolios abstract the paper develops a general equilibrium theory of the optimal currency composition of international bond portfolios like the partial equilibrium portfolio balance literature of the 1980s the theory emphasizes the critical roles of government debt and government balance sheet operations in the determination of portfolios prices and allocations consistent with empirical findings optimal foreign currency positions are found to be small with their size decreasing with exchange rate volatility while optimal domestic currency positions are large and increasing with domestic interest rates a large open market purchase of domestic currency bonds from private households lowers domestic interest rates

perils of unconventional monetary policy abstract unconventional monetary policy by relaxing restrictions on the composition of the balance sheet of the central bank compromises control over the stochastic path of inflation or in open economies over the stochastic path of exchange rates if the composition of the balance sheet is unrestricted then the path of inflation is indeterminate this is the case under pure quantitative easing where the target is the size of real money balances in contrast credit easing policies restrict the composition of the portfolio by targeting a specific expansion in the maturity profile of bonds bought and thus can implement a determinate path of inflation the composition of the portfolios traded by monetary fiscal authorities also determines premia in asset and currency markets

the fiscal myth of the price level i examine the fiscal theory of the price level according to which non ricardian policy and predetermined nominal government debt fiscally determine prices i argue that the non ricardian policy

the fiscal theory of the price level in an open economy abstract recent work loyo e going international with the fiscal theory of the price level manuscript john f kennedy school of government harvard university 1998 dupor b exchange rates and the fiscal theory of the price level journal of monetary economics 45 613 630 has shown that extension of the fiscal theory of the price level to an open economy yields indeterminate prices and exchange rates calling into question the usefulness of the theory this paper shows that by carefully tailoring policies in an independent fashion governments can eliminate price and exchange rate indeterminacy specifically governments are assumed to care about the welfare of their agents so that they never set policy to yield an intertemporal government budget surplus

the timing of exchange rate collapse abstract recent episodes of exchange rate collapse have renewed interest in models of speculative attacks these episodes have been considered by some observers to be inconsistent with fundamentals models of attack since there was no prolonged period of policy misalignment and declining reserves as required by such models this paper develops a fundamentals model in which collapse is instantaneous at the time of unexpected policy change and or a change in the expectations of future policy even for a reserve abundant country

prospective deficits and the asian currency crisis this paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems the expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in asia we articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises we present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis