toward a reconstruction of keynesian economics expectations and constrained equilibria a two period model of temporary equilibrium with rationing is presented paying particular attention to agents expectations of future constraints it is shown that with arbitrary constraint expectations many different types of current equilibrium may be consistent with the same set of current and expected future wages and prices and that constraint expectations exhibit bootstraps properties e g a higher expectation of keynesian unemployment tomorrow increases the probability that it will prevail today in addition the concept of rational constraint expectations i e perfect foresight of future constraints is introduced and shown to enhance rather than reduce the effectiveness of government policy

competition and the number of firms in a market are duopolies more competitive than atomistic markets this paper uses a variant of the standard search model to examine market equilibrium and the consequences for market equilibrium of an increase in the number of firms if marginal search costs increase with the number of searches then the demand curve facing any firm will be kinked with the elasticity of demand with respect to price decreases being less than with respect to price increases prices may not change in response to changes in marginal costs as the number of firms increases the maximum price that is consistent with equilibrium increases to the monopoly price but the minimum price decreases on the other hand if marginal search costs decrease with the number of searches equilibrium if it exists is characterized by a

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

evolutionary theorizing in economics modern economic analysis oriented toward understanding the workings of economies that make extensive use of markets came into existence with three guiding questions all central in adam smith s 1776 1937 the wealth of nations one question concerned order without any central authority guiding and commanding action how is economic activity coordinated the second question was the challenge of explaining the prevailing constellation of prices inputs and outputs what explains the price of labor and the rent of land the third question addressed the processes of economic progress or development smith and other early economists clearly were impressed by the inventiveness the energy and the growing productivity generated by the evolving market economy how to understand its dynamics the first two questions have defined continuing central concerns of the discipline of economics since they first were posed over two centuries ago when not posed in the context of an economy that is understood as in the process of developing they seem to pull the focus of theorizing toward equilibrium conditions the third question concerned with the processes driving economic progress pulls the theorizing toward an evolutionary orientation the question of economic development has waxed and waned in centrality to the discipline as has the importance of evolutionary theorizing during the first several decades of the twentieth century evolutionary thinking and language was widespread in economics but as one contrasts the economic

excessive volatility in capital flows a pigouvian taxation approach this paper analyzes prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets from the perspective of a pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle it presents a model in which restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during busts this mitigates the feedback effects of deleveraging episodes when tightening financial constraints on borrowers and collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing effects in our model capital controls reduce macroeconomic volatility and increase standard measures of consumer welfare

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

macroeconomics after the crisis time to deal with the pretense of knowledge syndrome the recent financial crisis has damaged the reputation of macroeconomics largely for its inability to predict the impending financial and economic crisis to be honest this inability to predict does not concern me much it is almost tautological that severe crises are essentially unpredictable for otherwise they would not cause such a high degree of distress what does concern me about my discipline is that its current core by which i mainly mean the so called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach has become so mesmerized with its own internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world with the precision that it has about the real one this is dangerous for both methodological and policy reasons to be fair to our field an enormous amount of work at the intersection of macroeconomics and corporate finance has been chasing many of the issues that played a central role during the current crisis including liquidity evaporation collateral shortages bubbles crises panics fire sales risk shifting contagion and the like however much of this literature belongs to the periphery of macroeconomics rather than to its core i will discuss the distinction between the core and the periphery of macroeconomics as well as the futile nature of the integrationist movement that is the process of gradually bringing the insights of the periphery into the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium structure i argue that the complexity of macroeconomic interactions limits the knowledge we can ever attain and that we need to place this fact at the center of our analysis we should consider what this complexity does to the actions and reactions of the economic agent and seek analytical tools and macroeconomic policies that are robust to the enormous uncertainty to which we are confined

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

rentierism energy and economic growth the case of algeria and egypt 1965 2010 abstract the algerian economy is an example of a high level of rentierism while the egyptian economy shows a low moderate level of rentierism the ardl bounds test approach was used upon annual time series data from 1965 to 2010 the results suggest cointegration for both countries bi causality between energy consumption and growth in the long run was found for algeria there is a reversed negative energy growth nexus adding a new relationship to the traditional four causal hypotheses on the energy growth nexus for egypt we found positive elasticity both of oil price and energy which is in line with the mainstream

mission improbable does petroleum related aid address the resource curse petroleum related aid programmes and projects are a key part of donor activities in oil rich developing countries this paper critically assesses petroleum related aid activities using the norwegian oil for development programme as a main case recent research suggests that institutions or governance are essential in averting a resource curse while governance issues are beginning to receive more attention in these types of programmes they still form a minor part of programme activities the narrow sector focus that characterizes petroleum related aid makes it unlikely that it will produce the higher order institutional changes needed to lift the resource curse petroleum related aid activities address the issue of corruption only to a limited extent given the commercial and political interests of donor countries questions about the integrity and credibility of these types of programmes can be raised

resource curse an analysis of causes experiences and possible ways forward abstract higher prices for oil gas and mineral resources have again raised questions about how exporting countries can counter the challenges of resource curse international experience managing the risks of resource curse has varied summarising the continuing discussion on meeting the challenges of the resource curse this paper addresses four questions what are the positive and negative effects of high oil gas and mineral prices on exporters what have been the experiences with managing natural resource revenues can good institutions ensure that natural resource revenues have a positive impact on development and what is the direction for the way forward we argue that the current emphasis on institutions as a potential solution has largely ignored under what conditions institutions are formed and changed

rethinking macroeconomics what failed and how to repair it the standard macroeconomic models have failed by all the most important tests of scientific theory they did not predict that the financial crisis would happen and when it did they understated its effects monetary authorities allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low partly because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for efficiency and growth after the crisis broke policymakers relying on the models floundered notwithstanding the diversity of macroeconomics the sum of these failures points to the need for a fundamental re examination of the models and a reassertion of the lessons of modern general equilibrium theory that were seemingly forgotten in the years leading up to the crisis this paper first describes the failures of the standard models in broad terms and then develops the economics of deep downturns and shows that such downturns are endogenous further the paper argues that there have been systemic changes to the structure of the economy that made the economy more vulnerable to crisis contrary to what the standard models argued finally the paper contrasts the policy implications of our framework with those of the standard models

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

toward a general theory of wage and price rigidities and economic fluctuations this paper begins with the hypothesis that large economic fluctuations the marked changes in the unemployment that characterize market economies are a consequence of problems of adjustment to disturbances especially adjustments of wages and prices two strands of work have addressed these problems of adjustment one focuses on rigidities downward rigidities in wages are at the center of traditional keynesian models the other focuses on the consequences of rapid changes particularly in asset prices in the context of markets with incomplete contracting imperfect indexing and imperfect capital markets while the second tradition traces its origins at least back to irving fisher s debt deflation theories it has been revived in the newkeynesian work of bruce greenwald and stiglitz 1988 1989 1990b 1993 1995 and others the fact that wages and prices did fall dramatically in the great depression by more than a third in the united states provided some of the impetus to the latter theory the major economic downturn this year in east asia with unemployment in indonesia soaring from 4 7 percent to 14 3 percent and output falling by at least 16 percent was accompanied by huge changes in prices over the first year of the crisis the current best estimate is that indonesian real wages fell by 40 60 percent world bank 1998 p 105 this result i would argue is better interpreted through the second strand of thought

if diversification is good why don t countries diversify more the political economy of diversification in resource rich countries abstract for resource rich countries diversification is claimed to represent a strategy for reducing resource curse problems this however depends on whether diversification has a positive effect on the country s institutions while there is a lot of evidence that exports of oil have a negative impact on institutions we know much less about the extent to which diversification leads to better institutions this article applies recent political economy theory to the phenomenon of diversification theoretical arguments suggest that it is the pattern of industrial activity rather than diversification per se which affects institutions like democracy in other words not all forms of diversification lead to better institutions furthermore where diversification has a positive impact on institutions diversification may be difficult to attain when it threatens the power base of the ruling elite a possible implication of these arguments is that policies for diversification should focus on international regulation affecting elite incentives rather than domestic industrial policy

the effects of governance modes on the energy matrix of andean countries this article addresses the consequences of different modes of energy governance on the energy matrix energy governance is understood as a regulation system of the energy related interplays between the state the society and the economy the energy matrix is a useful instrument for comparative policy analysis since it informs us about production and consumption trends by sources and sectors our central argument is that energy governance follows two different patterns one hierarchical and the other cooperative that are not necessarily determined by the initial factors allocation and produce different effects on the energy matrix hierarchical governance is based on centralized decision making and state centered development while co governance is based on decentralized decision making and market oriented development to develop this argument we compare the energy matrix from the five andean countries venezuela colombia ecuador peru and bolivia

cultural and institutional bifurcation china and europe compared how to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external formal and informal enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large how do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations do contemporary attitudes institutions and behavior reflect distinct pre modern trajectories this paper addresses these questions by examining the bifurcation in the societal organizations of pre modern china and europe it focuses on their distinct epitomizing social structures the clan and the city that sustain cooperation through different mixes of enforcement and intrinsic motivation the chinese clan is a kinship based hierarchical organization in which strong moral ties and reputation among clan members are particularly important in sustaining cooperation in medieval europe by contrast the main example of a cooperative organization is the city here cooperation is across kinship lines and external enforcement plays a bigger role but morality and reputation

financial intermediation and macroeconomic analysis a macroeconomic framework in which fi nancial intermediation matters for the allocation of resources allocation of resources in this paper i fi rst discuss why neither standard macroeconomic models that in this paper i fi rst discuss why neither standard macroeconomic models that abstract from fi nancial intermediation nor traditional models of the bank lending abstract from fi nancial intermediation nor traditional models of the bank lending channel are adequate as a basis for understanding the recent crisis i argue that channel are adequate as a basis for understanding the recent crisis i argue that instead we need models in which intermediation plays a crucial role but in which instead we need models in which intermediation plays a crucial role but in which intermediation is modeled in a way that better conforms to current institutional intermediation is modeled in a way that better conforms to current institutional realities in particular we need models that recognize that a market based fi nan realities in particular we need models that recognize that a market based fi nan cial system one in which intermediaries fund themselves by selling securities in cial system one in which intermediaries fund themselves by selling securities in competitive markets rather than collecting deposits subject to reserve require competitive markets rather than collecting deposits subject to reserve require ments is not the same as a frictionless system ments is not the same as a frictionless system i then sketch the basic elements of an approach that allows fi nancial inter i then sketch the basic elements of an approach that allows fi nancial inter mediation and credit frictions to be integrated into macroeconomic analysis in a mediation and credit frictions to be integrated into macroeconomic analysis in a straightforward way i show how the model can be used to analyze the macroeco straightforward way i show how the model can be used to analyze the macroeco nomic consequences of the recent fi nancial crisis and conclude with a discussion of nomic consequences of the recent fi nancial crisis and conclude with a discussion of some implications of the model for the conduct of monetary policy some implications of the model for the conduct of monetary policy

chaos sunspots and automatic stabilizers abstract we consider a real business cycle model with an externality in production depending on parameter values the model has sunspot equilibria cyclical and chaotic equilibria and equilibria with deterministic or stochastic regime switching we study the implications of this model environment for automatic stabilizer tax systems stabilization is desirable because the efficient allocations are characterized by constant employment and output growth we identify an automatic stabilizer income tax subsidy schedule with two properties i it specifies the tax rate to be an increasing function of aggregate employment and ii earnings are subsidized when aggregate employment is at its efficient level the first feature eliminates inefficient fluctuating equilibria while the second induces agents to internalize the externality

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

risk and global economic architecture why full financial integration may be undesirable integration of global financial markets was supposed to lead to greater financial stability as risks were spread around the world the finan cial crisis has thrown doubt on this conclusion a failure in one part of the global economic system caused a global meltdown the recent crisis has shown that in the absence of appro priate government intervention privately profit able transactions may lead to systemic risk this paper provides a general analytic framework within which we can analyze the optimal degree and form of financial integration within this general framework full integration is not in general optimal indeed faced with a choice between two polar regimes full integration or autarky in the simplified model autarky may be superior

should central banks respond to movements in asset prices in recent decades asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries in light of this experience how if at all should central bankers respond to asset price volatility we have addressed this issue in previous work bernanke and gertler 1999 the context of our earlier study was the relatively new but increasingly popular monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting see e g bernanke and frederic mishkin 1997 in an inflation targeting framework publicly announced medium term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run the inflation targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank s forecast of inflation to a first approximation once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations in use now for about a decade inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice however so far this approach has not often been stress tested by large swings in asset prices our earlier research employed simulations of a small calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation targeting policy defined as one in which the central bank s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation might fare in the face of a boom and bust cycle in asset prices we found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule in our simulations one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2 0 substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices intuitively inflation targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices in our view there are good reasons outside of our formal model to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices including the fact that as history has shown the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable hence we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast in the spirit of recent work on robust control the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst case discussants robert shiller yale university glenn rudebusch federal reserve bank of san francisco kenneth rogoff harvard university

savings growth and the resource curse hypothesis an important connection between recent attempts to understand the determinants of economic growth and the measurement of sustainability is the finding of a negative and significant relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth this is the so called resource curse hypothesis using cross country regressions we offer evidence that the curse may itself be a manifestation of the inability of governments to manage large resource revenues sustainably in particular these results offer another perspective on the resource curse hypothesis the countries where growth has lagged are those where the combination of natural resource macroeconomic and public expenditure policies have led to a low rate of genuine saving net saving adjusted for resource depletion

capital market liberalization globalization and the imf one of the most controversial aspects of globalization is capital market liberalization not so much the liberalization of rules governing foreign direct investment but those affecting short term capital flows speculative hot capital that can come into and out of a country in the 1980s and 1990s the imf and the us treasury tried to push capital market liberalization around the world encountering enormous opposition not only from developing countries but from economists who were less enamoured of the doctrines of free and unfettered markets of market fundamentalism that were at that time being preached by the international economic institutions the economic crises of the late 1990s and early years of the new millennium which were partly or even largely attributable to capital market liberalization reinforced those reservations this paper takes as its point of departure a recent imf paper to provide insights both into how the imf could have gone so wrong in its advocacy of capital market liberalization and into why capital market liberalization has so often led to increased economic instability not to economic growth copyright 2004 oxford university press

credit markets and the control of capital traditional discussions of the role of capital markets have identified a number of distinct functions which they perforrn they allocate scarce capital among competing users and uses l and they provide signals to guide managers in making their investment decisions 2 in this lecture i wish to focus on a rather different function of the capital market what i shall refer to as the control of capital 3 conventional theory treats the typical firrn in an anthropomorphic manner it acts as a single rational individual doing what it is supposed to be doing maximizing stock market value that may have been well and good in those nostalgic bygone days of small firrns each run tightly by their owners who were single mindedly pursuing their lust for wealth but today a majority of production occurs in large corporations in which no shareholder owns more than a small fraction of the shares in which the separation of ownership and control that frank knight was so concerned with in his writings some sixty five years ago has become a reality those

money credit constraints and economic activity when government expenditures exceed current tax revenues the resulting deficit must be financed either by issuing bonds which imply obligations to levy future taxes or by creating high powered money the choice between money and bonds is often thought to be of great moment for both real and nominal variables that is monetary policy matters there is by now a wide empirical consensus that monetary policy has effects on real variables like output and employment but there is far less agreement about why this is so the purpose of this paper is to take issue with some currently fashionable views of why money has real effects and to suggest a new theory or rather resurrect an old one the loanable funds theory and give it new improved microfoundations this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

labor market adjustments and the persistence of unemployment persistent unemployment like that plaguing europe since the early 1980 s has been a persistent problem for economic theory competitive equilibrium theory assumes that all markets clear including the labor market all theories of unemployment thus must reflect significant departures from that paradigm the last 20 years have generated a plethora of such theories the challenge is to construct models that generate unemployment and are broadly consistent with a host of other labor and macroeconomic phenomena including patterns of real wages and hours the traditional approach is to focus on a simple static equilibrium in which wages are kept above their market clearing level for a variety of reasons in the older versions of this story minimum wages union power and normative traditions in its more recent incarnations efficiency wage considerations within the united states the older variants of these models have received decreasing credence as union power has eroded the real value of the minimum wage has declined and empirical evidence has buttressed a broader set of theoretical arguments based on imperfect competition within the labor market and efficiency wage considerations suggesting at most negligible effects from these government interventions efficiency wage variants are more broadly consistent with observed labormarket behavior and help explain both natural rates of unemployment and certain cyclical phenomena e g the use of layoffs rather than job sharing see carl shapiro and stiglitz 1984 lawrence summers 1990 moreover to the extent that unemployment compensation and protection against separations for cause have improved recently in europe these models can explain the secular rise in european unemployment see edmund phelps 1994 2 on the other hand as conventionally formulated they leave many aspects of the labor market unexplained 3 more recent theories analyze unemployment as the result of imbalances between flows into and out of the job market 4 in these models in steady state on average the flow supply into unemployment must balance the flow out the equilibrium level of unemployment is thus determined through relations between these flows and the level of unemployment most noted within this genre are the labor turnover theories in which labor costs are affected by wages and the unemployment rate and the job search models in which unemployment arises from the need for job matches which by assumption can only occur among the

discouraging rivals managerial rent seeking and economic inefficiencies we argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers decisions in general managerial rent seeking affects not only the level of investment but also the form our basic hypothesis is simple given the now well established scope for managerial discretion managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation and a manager s pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management the board of directors and rival management teams or takeover artists this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

toward a theory of rigidities this paper presents a theory of rigidity or more properly inertia in the responses of economic variables to changing environments the theory rests on three fundamental assumptions 1 that firms are risk averse 2 that firms are uncertain of the impacts of changing decision variables and 3 that this uncertainty increases with the size of deviations in decision variables from appropriately defined past level under these circumstances an optimal portfolio of incremental decision variable adjustments exists which a takes variance minimizing adoptions to environmental change as a point of departure and then b is weighted in favor of changes in variables whose effects are less uncertain in considering price and quantity adjustments this implies that price and wage adjustments should largely incorporate expected inflation and from that point should be small relative to quantity adjustments since in most situations the uncertainties associated with the consequences of quantity adjustment should be smaller than those associated with price adjustments this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

macroeconomic modeling for monetary policy evaluation we describe some of the main features of the recent vintage macroeconomic models used for monetary policy evaluation we point to some of the key differences with respect to the earlier generation of macro models and highlight the insights for policy that these new frameworks have to offer our discussion emphasizes two key aspects of the new models the significant role of expectations of future policy actions in the monetary transmission mechanism and the importance for the central bank of tracking of the flexible price equilibrium values of the natural levels of output and the real interest rate we argue that both features have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy

exploratory assessment of the economic gains of a pre salt oil field in brazil abstract in recent years brazil has made public several oil discoveries located in deep waters below the salt layer discoveries are steadily enhancing national reserves and have brought the country into a new role in the global oil industry this paper aims at investigating the economic gains that could be expected from a brazilian oil field in the pre salt region analyses were conducted based on the libra field the largest oil discovery in brazil until now with approximately 10 billion barrels the results were calculated for different scenarios of oil prices companies arrangements and regulatory regimes the findings suggest that economic gains could be higher for the brazilian government if the oil production were conducted under a service contract scheme however considering the current production sharing regime in force for pre salt areas economic gains could be higher if a bidding process was conducted ensuring for the brazilian government a higher participation in the oil to be produced additionally the results demonstrate that under the current rules applied for the production sharing regime the government quota of oil has decreased over time putting at risk economic results

institutional assets for negotiating the terms of development indigenous collective action and oil in ecuador and alaska abstract case studies of two oil fields with superficial similarities same company same time period similar anticipated scale of production similar remote field design similarly situated in indigenous territory show radically different benefits for the adjacent indigenous communities this analysis finds that the major differences driving these results are institutional primarily differences in property rights regimes and secondarily in local institutional development in the alaska context the community was able to negotiate a direct share of the royalties while the ecuadorian community was entitled only to an indirect revenue share from the national government both communities also negotiated for various community assistance projects from the company the ecuadorian communities likely would have succeeded in instituting their sustainable development proposal if they had stronger local organization comparative analysis of the factors for local institutional development fit well in the conceptual

institutional analysis and the resource curse in developing countries abstract the present article examines the recent advances reported in the literature regarding the mechanisms underlying the resource curse in developing countries by analyzing the rule of law index we investigated how the institutions responsible for allocating hydrocarbon royalties can help minimize the effects of the resource curse we used a qualitative methodology based on case studies the results show that evidence of legal violations on the part of these institutions and the lack of tools in resource rich developing countries to uphold basic social and economic rights are associated with the resource curse our findings suggest that strengthening the institutions closer monitoring of oil revenue allocations and public participation can help to alleviate the resource curse

credit chains and bankruptcy propagation in production networks abstract we present a simple model of a production network in which firms are linked by supplier customer relationships involving extension of trade credit our aim is to identify the minimal set of mechanisms which reproduce qualitatively the main stylized facts of industrial demography such as firms size distribution and at the same time the correlation over time and across firms of output growth and bankruptcies the behavior of aggregate variables can be traced back to the direct firm firm interdependence in this paper we assume that the number of firms is constant and the network has a periodic static structure but the framework allows further extensions to investigate which network structures are more robust against domino effects and if the network is let to evolve in time which structures emerge spontaneously depending on the individual strategies for orders and delivery

what should government do problems of social cost externalities and all that public choice as a field introduced the framework for a methodical economic analysis of political markets the output of these markets of course is reflected by the role that government plays that is specifically true with respect to the organization of economic activity gordon tullock has studied a myriad of aspects of this topic for more than half a century we examine his answers to the question of what should government do and how they have influenced and are still impacting the discussion on the proper role of government in the economy

cross scalar dynamics of the resource curse constraints on local participation in the bolivian gas sector abstractcontributing to debate on the contextual underpinnings and varieties of the resource curse this article points to how political and economic dynamics of resource endowments operate in interrelated but potentially contradictory ways across spatial scales resource endowments insert a complex set of incentives and interests into the political arena in ways that both enable and constrain actors at different scales using a case study of gas governance in bolivia the article illustrates the interrelation of these dynamics across local national and international scales and in particular how they circumscribe the space for local participation

information and the coase theorem abstract some economists think the coase theorem implies a lot about the proper scope of government intervention in the economy and about the welfare consequences of laissez faire others see it as a mere tautology that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be efficient the coase theorem is important only if we believe that efficient negotiation is likely of course we can attribute inefficiencies to bargaining imperfection but it may not be useful to do so such attitudes sometimes seem to depend more on ideology than on reason this article gives one economist s reasoned view it discusses the coase theorem as a decentralization result and why decentralization results are interesting it considers mechanism design for revealing private information and describes the problems of centralization should the coase theorem should be viewed as a second best result property rights are more efficient than some reasonable alternative does the coase theorem recommend an institution or make

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

finite bubbles with short sale constraints and asymmetric information abstract we present a finite period general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information we say that a rational expectations equilibrium exhibits a strong bubble if the price is higher than the dividend with probability one we show that necessary conditions for a strong bubble to occur are that 1 each agent must have private information in the period and state in which the bubble occurs 2 each agent must be short sale constrained at some period in the future with positive probability and 3 agents trades are not common knowledge we present examples of bubbles when the necessary conditions are satisfied journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d52 d82 d84 g12 g14

evidence on the role of cash flow for investment abstract recent work in macroeconomics argues that imperfections in capital markets may lead to business cycle fluctuations by propagating relatively modest shocks evidence for such a mechanism also known as the financial accelerator consists largely of firm level studies showing that cash flow is an important predictor of investment but this evidence is often viewed with skepticism because cash flow is also a good indicator of investment opportunities in this paper we develop a framework for estimating the extent to which the predictive power of cash flow can be attributed to its role as a fundamental versus its role in alleviating credit frictions for firms with access to commercial paper and bond markets we find that the perfect capital markets model of investment can fully account for the role of cash flow for firms with only limited access to capital markets as indicated by lack of participation in public debt markets however investment appears to be excessively sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow these results thus clarify the role of cash flow in investment equations and provide support for the existence of a financial accelerator

optimal monetary policy in a model with agency costs this paper integrates a fully explicit model of agency costs into an otherwise standard dynamic new keynesian model in a particularly transparent way a principal result is the characterization of agency costs as endogenous markup shocks in an output gap version of the phillips curve the model s utility based welfare criterion is derived explicitly and includes a measure of credit market tightness that we interpret as a risk premium the paper also fully characterizes optimal monetary policy and provides conditions under which zero inflation is the optimal policy finally optimal policy can be expressed as an inflation targeting criterion that depending upon parameter values can be either forward or backward looking

balance sheet contagion japan has been in a slump for the past decade after gdp had been growing by on average 4 percent during the 1980 s the growth rate dropped to 1 percent in the 1990 s asset prices also fluctuated significantly capital gains on stocks and real estate in the 1980 s followed by capital losses in the 1990 s were both on the order of a few years worth of gdp even after taking inflation into account together with production and asset prices the fraction of nonperforming loans fluctuated substantially these are by no means all bank loans for the nonfinancial corporate sector in japan the ratio of financial assets to total assets is about 40 percent much higher than in the united states such financial assets include loans to and securities of other private agents that is nonfinancial institutions simultaneously borrow from and lend to each other on a significant scale many nonperforming loans are interlocked paralyzing the financial system it is important to recognize that these swings have been experienced by almost all sectors of the japanese economy yet in other countries comparable movements in asset prices have had less widespread consequences for example the recent fluctuations in the nasdaq index in the united states have been no smaller than those of asset prices in japan but the damage appears to be contained to closely related sectors although u s equity holders particularly pension funds have lost value the level of nonperforming loans is relatively limited up to now the question is why does there appear to be more contagion in some countries than in others has contagion anything to do with the nature of financing or the extent to which there are inter locking loans in this theoretical paper we examine two different mechanisms by which contagion may occur in both cases propagation is through balancesheet effects first through the indirect effects that fluctuations in asset prices have on collateral values second through the direct effects that default on or postponement of debt repayments have when there are chains of credit

asymmetric information and the new theory of the firm financial constraints and risk behavior this paper summarizes recent developments in the theory of the firm that have arisen in examining the implications of imperfect information it shows that a wide range of these models have similar implications for the likely reaction of firms to external environmental and policy changes two significant implications are 1 that firms behave as if they are risk averse individuals maximizing a utility function of terminal wealth profitability even when the risks involved are unsystematic and 2 in many circumstances because this utility function is likely to be characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion firms are likely to respond significantly and positively to changes in cash flow and profitability together these two phenomena are able to account for a wide range of firm behaviors that have been empirically observed both formally and informally and that are difficult to explain in terms of the traditional theory of the firm furthermore the responses of such firms to policy interventions are likely to differ significantly from those of neoclassical firms this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

pareto inefficiency of market economies search and efficiency wage models this paper shows that market economies with search and in which wages are affected by efficiency wage considerations are not constrained pareto efficient wages are not set at pareto efficient levels nor is the level of employment unemployment pareto efficient we identify the nature of the biases and the welfare improving government interventions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

reforming the global economic architecture lessons from recent crises economic theory and empirical research agree that capital market liberalization can result in greater vulnerability to crisis opening a country s capital account encourages short term capital flows and increases potential instability in east asia huge short term capital inflows after the opening of capital accounts were followed by even more rapid outflows other forms of financial liberalization can lead to an increase in risky lending by banks in thailand investments in speculative real estate grew dramatically after liberalization

leverage and asset bubbles averting armageddon with chapter 11 an iconic model with high leverage and overvalued collateral assets is used to illustrate the amplification mechanism driving asset prices to overshoot equilibrium when an asset bubble bursts threatening widespread insolvency and what richard koo calls a balance sheet recession besides interest rates cuts asset purchases and capital restructuring are key to crisis resolution the usual bankruptcy procedures for doing this fail to internalise the price effects of asset fire sales to pay down debts however we discuss how official intervention in the form of super chapter 11 actions can help prevent asset price correction causing widespread economic disruption

equilibrium wage distributions the observation that different firms charge different prices for what appears to be the same commodity or pay different wages for what appears to be equivalent labour has long been explained in economics by a reference to imperfect information this paper is concerned with characterising market equilibrium with imperfect information we do not present a general theory rather we develop in some detail an example of importance in its own right imperfect information in the labour market several properties of our example in particular the existence of equilibria with price wage dispersion unemployment excess supply of labour positive profits multiple equilibria and the nonoptimality or some of all of the equilibria are of more general validity other results may not be this paper is concerned with two kinds of imperfect information a individuals may not know the wage paid in any particular firm or whether there is a vacancy in any particular firm until they apply for a job 1 b there are several characteristics besides the wage rate associated with a job which are important to the individual some like the normal length of a work week become known when the individual applies for the job information about other characteristics e g personalities of colleagues is acquired only gradually there is one important difference between the two kinds of imperfect in