bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

bank runs and investment decisions revisited we examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the deposit contract offered and the investment decisions made by a competitive bank cooper and ross 1998 have shown that when the probability of a run is small the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank run equilibrium we show that in this case the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur in other words precautionary or excess liquidity will not be held this result allows us to determine how the possibility of a bank run affects the level of illiquid investment chosen by a bank we show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high the level of investment is decreasing in the probability of a run however when liquidation costs are moderate the level of investment is actually increasing in the probability of a run

optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria abstract we study optimal fiscal policy in an economy where i search frictions create a coordination problem and generate multiple pareto ranked equilibria and ii the government finances the provision of a public good by taxing market activity the government must choose the tax rate before it knows which equilibrium will obtain and therefore an important part of the problem is determining how the policy will affect the equilibrium selection process we show that when the equilibrium selection rule is based on the concept of risk dominance higher tax rates make coordination on the pareto superior outcome less likely as a result taking equilibrium selection effects into account leads to a lower optimal tax rate

on the existence of pareto optimal allocations when individual welfare depends on relative consumption abstract in this paper we analyze the existence of pareto optimal allocations of k goods among n agents when individual welfare depends on relative consumption under rather mild assumptions we show that for any predetermined vector of utility values we can find the amounts of goods and their corresponding distribution so that those target utility values are efficiently achieved then we prove that in the case where utility functions are interpersonally comparable in ordinal terms there exists a pareto optimal allocation of any given bundle of goods that equalizes all agents welfare levels what we call a welfare fair allocation

bank runs and institutions the perils of intervention we study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create we show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals instead once a run is underway benevolent government institutions would allow additional deposit withdrawals placing further strain on the banking system when depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals their incentive to participate in the run increases in fact ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self fulfilling run to occur jel g21 g8

dollarization bailouts and the stability of the banking system central bank policy suffers from time inconsistency when facing a banking crisis a bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate however a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization undesirable the results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the imf as international lolr we would never put ourselves in a position where we envisioned actions that we would take would be of assistance to the rest of the world but to the detriment of the united states alan greenspan to a congressional panel in 1999 iht january 19 2000

status effects and environmental externalities abstract this paper examines a static competitive economy where the production of a consumption good generates pollution that adversely affects human welfare preferences are defined over consumption leisure pollution and economic status each person s status increases with her own consumption but decreases with the average consumption of society the achievement of a pareto efficient resource allocation requires a consumption tax to offset the incentive to overconsume in the pursuit of enhanced status in contrast with standard prescriptions the efficient pollution tax generally exceeds the sum of individuals marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement these findings remain unaltered when preferences are modified to incorporate altruistic concern for others well being altruism however suggests a potential role for government intervention to achieve a desirable i e pareto efficient distribution of welfare between individuals

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

demand deposit contracts and bank runs with present biased preferences abstract this paper extends the diamond dybvig model of bank runs by incorporating hyperbolic discounting the main question is how consumers myopic decisions affect the possibility of a bank run and the bank s optimal contract under hyperbolic discounting consumers deposit preferences differ from their withdrawal preferences therefore the bank needs to consider two separate preferences when designing the optimal banking contract making it more difficult to design a run safe banking contract this difference in preferences could increase the possibility of a bank run in equilibrium although the bank can design a run proof contract the ex ante welfare through banking services will be lower under hyperbolic discounting due to its tighter incentive compatibility constraint

bailouts time inconsistency and optimal regulation a macroeconomic view a common view is that bailouts of firms by governments are needed to cure inefficiencies in private markets we propose an alternative view even when private markets are efficient costly bankruptcies will occur and benevolent governments without commitment will bail out firms to avoid bankruptcy costs bailouts then introduce inefficiencies where none had existed although granting the government orderly resolution powers which allow it to rewrite private contracts improves on bailout outcomes regulating leverage and taxing size is needed to achieve the relevant constrained efficient outcome the sustainably efficient outcome this outcome respects governments incentives to intervene when they lack commitment

regulating banks through market discipline a survey of the issues abstract the interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed new capital accord this paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation we start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms next a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced we evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have finally we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism in this respect the basle committee has taken the right approach

bank liquidity and stability in an overlapping generations model in an infinitely repeated version of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model intergenerational transfers enable a bank to achieve interest rate smoothing and to provide depositors with liquidity insurance without diamond and dybvig s assumption of no side trades the bank is subject to runs that may result from either excessive withdrawals or the lack of new deposits the latter cause which cannot occur in diamond and dybvig s one generation model implies that suspension of convertibility may not prevent bank runs government intervention may be necessary to maintain bank stability article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

models of banking instability a partial review of the literature abstract this paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed diamond and dybvig 1983 it explores the extent to which it a explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets and b justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry it suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real world banks in addition the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry it suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models

reconciling bagehot and the fed s response to september 11 bagehot 1873 states that to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity at a very high rate of interest in contrast most of the theoretical literature on liquidity provision suggests that central banks should lend at an interest rate of zero this is broadly consistent with the federal reserve s behavior in the days following september 11 2001 this paper shows that both policies can be reconciled with commodity money as in bagehot s time liquidity is scarce and a high price allows banks to self select in contrast the fed has a virtually unlimited ability to temporarily expand the money supply so self selection is unnecessary

banking as the provision of liquidity this article represents a model economy in which demand deposits represent the optimal financial intermediation because these demand deposits are backed in part by an illiquid asset the in termediary bank is subject to panics in which each agent ration ally decides to withdraw his deposits making all worse off banks ca n prevent panics only through a distortion of the optimal contract t he government can prevent panics without this distortion by guarantee ing the return from deposits the moral hazard introduced by this dep osit insurance induces the government to regulate the intermediary s portfolio and returns copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

the impact of bse on the demand for beef and other meats in great britain indices of media coverage of bse are incorporated in a dynamic aids model of meat demand the publicity which bse has received is found to have had significant effects on the allocation of consumer expenditure among the meats a short run impact has been identified which accounts in large part for the discernible drop in the market share of beef in the early 1990s and more important there also appears to be a significant long run impact of bse which by the end of 1993 has reduced the beef market share by 4 5

units of measurement and the stone index in demand system estimation the stone index typically used in estimating linear almost ideal demand systems is not invariant to changes in units of measurement which may seriously affect the approximation properties of the model a modification to the stone index or use of a regular price index instead are both desirable practices in estimating linear ai models

a structural time series approach to modelling multiple and resurgent meat scares in italy this paper exploits a structural time series approach to model the time pattern of multiple and resurgent food scares and their direct and cross product impacts on consumer response a structural time series almost ideal demand system sts aids is embedded in a vector error correction framework to allow for dynamic effects vec sts aids italian aggregate household data on meat demand is used to assess the time varying impact of a resurgent bse crisis 1996 and 2000 and the 1999 dioxin crisis the vec sts aids model monitors the short run impacts and performs satisfactorily in terms of residuals diagnostics overcoming the major problems encountered by the customary vector error correction approach

financial fragility and over the counter markets abstract this paper studies the interaction between financial fragility and over the counter otc markets i model the financial sector as a large number of investors divided into different groups which i interpret as financial institutions and a large number of dealers financial institutions and dealers trade assets in an otc market a la duffie et al 2005 and lagos and rocheteau 2009 investors receive privately observed preference shocks and financial institutions use the balanced team mechanism proposed by athey and segal 2013 to implement an efficient risk sharing arrangement among their investors when the market is liquid in the sense that search and bargaining are small frictions i show that the economy is likely to have a unique equilibrium and therefore is not fragile when these frictions are severe a run equilibrium exists investors announce low valuation of assets because they believe everyone else in their financial institution is doing the same conditional on bank runs existing the welfare impact of the search friction is ambiguous during runs trade is inefficient and as a result a friction that reduces trade during runs has the potential to improve welfare this result is in sharp contrast with the existing literature which suggests that search friction has a negative impact on welfare

seasonality in dynamic regression models this paper examines the implications of treating seasonality as an unobserved component which changes slowly over time this approach simplifies the specification of dynamic relationships by separating non seasonal from seasonal factors we illustrate this approach using the consumption model of davidson et al 1978 and estimate a stable error correction model between consumption income and prices over the period 1958 92 more generally we argue that autoregressive models are unlikely to successfully model slowly changing seasonality and may confound seasonal effects with the dynamic responses of prime interest our approach can be used in a wide range of cases and we show that there is little loss in efficiency even if seasonality is deterministic

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

demand estimation in the presence of stochastic trend and seasonality the case of meat demand in the united kingdom if budget shares have stochastic trend or seasonality or both then demand equations based on the assumption of deterministic trend and deterministic seasonality will be mis specified we test this proposition by estimating a linearized almost ideal lai demand system for meat demand in the united kingdom using harvey s structural time series methodology we demonstrate that the model specification allowing for stochastic trend and deterministic seasonality performs best in terms of diagnostic tests and goodness of fit measures it is also shown that the model with stochastic trend is better at out of sample forecasting

model selection and forecasting ability of theory constrained food demand systems out of sample forecasting of annual u s per capita food consumption applying data from 1923 to 1992 is used as a basis for model selection among the absolute price rotterdam model a first differenced linear approximate almost ideal demand system fdla alids model and a first differenced double log demand system conditional on price consumption forecasts derived from elasticities are determined to be superior to direct statistical model forecasts models with consumer theory imposed through parametric restrictions provide better forecasts than models with little theory imposition for these data a double log demand system is a superior forecaster to the rotterdam model which is superior to the fdla alids model

testing and incorporating seasonal structures into demand models for fruit it is widely recognized that purchases of perishable agricultural products are affected by the seasonal cycles of production when there are seasonal effects where seasonal buying is not explained by prices alone the seasonal component can be captured using appropriate dummy variables in a demand model however over time the introduction of different varieties and foreign sources of supply in the market may affect the seasonal structure in unknown ways and because of this it becomes important to identify and test for characteristics of seasonal structure in demand models in this article we set out to measure and test the various characteristics of the seasonal component of fruit demand we model seasonality in the context of an almost ideal demand system aids model where we consider several types of fruit demand in the united states

evolution coordination and banking panics abstract i study equilibrium selection by an evolutionary process in an environment with multiple equilibria one of which involves a banking panic the analysis is built on a repeated version of the diamond dybvig 1983 model the optimal equilibrium is uniquely selected if it is also risk dominant when there are multiple banks the probability of observing a panic increases as the size of the banks decreases local interaction generates contagion effects that allow a bank run to spread first among banks in the same geographic location and then throughout the population

banking panics and policy responses we study how banking panics unfold in av ersion of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model with limited commitment as is well known the banking authority could eliminate the possibility of a run on the banking system by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start once a run is under way however the banking authority will choose to reschedule rather than suspend payments we construct equilibria in which depositors run on the banking system with positive probability and we show that an equilibrium bank run in this setting is necessarily partial with only some depositors participating we also show that a run naturally occurs in waves with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further policy response from the banking authority the number of waves that occur in equilibrium is stochastic and can be arbitrarily large

pandemics of the poor and banking stability we first develop a theoretical model that shows that the likelihood of a collapse of the banking industry of a developing country increases as the joint prevalence of large pandemics such as aids and malaria increases we also show that the optimal bank reserves increase as the prevalence increases in the empirical part of the paper we consider a large dataset of developing countries and we exhibit a causality effect from combined prevalence to deposit turnover as well as causality effect from an increase of combined prevalence to an increase in bank reserves those empirical facts therefore support our theoretical findings

an incentive approach to banking regulation we examine the optimal design of a risk adjusted deposit insurance scheme when the regulator has less information than the bank about the inherent risk of the bank s assets adverse selection and when the regulator is unable to monitor the extent to which bank resources are being directed away from normal operations toward activities that lower asset quality moral hazard under a socially optimal insurance scheme 1 asset quality is below the first best level 2 higher quality banks have larger asset bases and face lower capital adequacy requirements than lower quality banks and 3 the probability of failure is equated across banks perihaps t he most troubling aspect of the current deposit insurance system is the distortions caused by the pervasive use of an insurance premium that is independent of risk the undesirable incentives that result when such a system is employed in a world with imperfect information have long been recognized in the literature of particular concern is the incentive banks have to increase the risk of their portfolio in order to maximize the value of the deposit insurance provided in some respects this problem is similar to the incentives generated by corporate debt however the solution to this problem may be different in a banking context because the creditors include the deposit insurer who has the power to regulate the banks conceivably regulation may be able to mitigate the informational problem at hand in this paper we examine some of the tradeoffs that arise in the design of a regulatory system for banks

no news is good news stochastic parameters versus media coverage indices in demand models after food scares we develop a stochastic parameter approach to model the time varying impacts of food scares on consumption as an alternative to the inclusion of news coverage indices in the demand function we empirically test the methodology on data from four food scares the 1982 heptachlor milk contamination in oahu hawaii and the bovine spongiform encephalopathy and two escherichia coli scares on u s meat demand over the period 1993 9 results show that the inclusion of time varying parameters in demand models enables the capturing of the impact of food safety information and provides better short term forecasts

the welfare costs of self fulfilling bank runs we study the welfare implications of self fulfilling bank runs and liquidity require ments in a neoclassical growth model where banks facing long lasting possible runs can choose in any period a run proof asset portfolio in this framework runs distort banks insurance provision against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and liquidity requirements re solve this distortion by forcing a credit tightening quantitatively the welfare costs of self fulfilling bank runs are equivalent to a constant consumption loss of up to 2 5 percent of u s gdp depending on fundamentals liquidity requirements might generate small welfare gains but also increase the welfare costs by up to 1 8 percent

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

wealth seeking reconsidered abstract if individuals are interested in their relative wealth position they engage in contests for wealth this leads to a steady state with overaccumulation in a simple growth model it is shown that if some individuals are engaged in wealth seeking activity but others are not the latter might benefit however wealth seeking is not welfare enhancing under usual assumptions concerning production technology the steady state equilibrium is characterized by a marginal productivity of capital that is below the steady state rate of time preference and by emergence of a class structure

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

bank fragility money under the mattress and long run growth us evidence from the perfect panic of 1893 abstract this paper examines how the us financial crisis of 1893 affected state output growth between 1900 and 1930 the results indicate that a 1 increase in bank instability reduced output growth by 2 5 a comparison of nebraska which had one of the highest bank failure rates with west virginia which did not experience a single bank failure reveals that disintermediation affected growth through a portfolio change among savers people simply stopped trusting banks time series evidence from newspapers indicates that articles containing the words money hidden significantly increase after banking crises then slowly die out

sunspot like effects of random endowments abstract random endowments can affect economic outcomes in two ways directly by affecting resources and indirectly by endogenously affecting expectations this second effect which we call a sunspot like effect allows prices to overreact to movements in fundamentals we prove that sunspot equilibria can be viewed as the limiting case of markets overreacting to small shocks to fundamentals two examples illustrate the theorem and show that sunspot like effects can be present even with significant shocks to fundamentals

financial intermediaries markets and growth we build a model in which financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks households can invest in financial markets directly if they pay a cost in equilibrium the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market from a growth perspective this can be beneficial because intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk sharing our model predicts that bank oriented economies can grow more slowly than more market oriented economies which is consistent with some recent empirical evidence

run equilibria in the green lin model of financial intermediation abstract we study the green lin model of financial intermediation e j green p lin implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation j econ theory 109 2003 1 23 under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents we derive the efficient allocation in closed form we show that in some cases the intermediary cannot uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism in these cases the mechanism also admits an equilibrium in which some but not all agents run on the intermediary and withdraw their funds regardless of their true liquidity needs in other words self fulfilling runs can arise in a generalized green lin model and these runs are necessarily partial with only some agents participating

modeling the demand for alcoholic beverages and advertising specifications in this paper the demand for beer wine spirits and soft drinks in ontario is modeled in two parts an equation is specified to endogenize group expenditures and a demand system is set up to allocate budgeted group expenditures across types of beverages advertising is allowed to influence both the level of group expenditures and its allocation three popular advertising specifications are compared using the j test and the likelihood dominance criterion even though all three specifications fitted well according to standard criteria the calculated expenditure price and advertising elasticities were sensitive to the manner with which advertising is specified this clearly highlights the need to rely on a sound criterion to identify a dominant specification from the identified dominant specification we found that advertising has very subtle effects on expenditures on alcoholic beverages group and individual beverages thus advertising is not effective in enlarging markets and this suggests that firms especially breweries use advertising to compete in zero sum market share games from a public policy perspective our results are comforting but future research should investigate whether the neutral effect of advertising on aggregated expenditures hide substantial offsetting changes in the drinking habits of individuals 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

economic growth liquidity and bank runs abstract we construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium in this setting a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output in addition the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks and thereby affects the long run growth rate these facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods a bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules in the first a run occurs with a fixed exogenous probability while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks portfolio choices we show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs

inter fuel substitution technical change and the demand for energy in the uk economy a model for energy demand based on a translog cost function is formulated unlike previous studies technical progress is modelled by means of stochastic as opposed to deterministic trend components the model is estimated using quarterly uk data for four economic sectors and forecasts of the future level of demand are made

benchmarking the expectations hypothesis of the interest rate term structure an analysis of cointegration vectors i test cointegration restrictions that are consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure by employing the full information maximum likelihood methods developed by johansen yield curves appear to be the result of cointegration among interest rates the cointegration vectors that best describe the long term impact of interest rate levels on interest rate changes can often be written as linear combinations of interest rate spreads there is however difficulty in keeping short term yields in such a restricted cointegrated system with other interest rates short term speculative returns from long term bonds do not conform to the expectations hypothesis

a note on egalitarian and efficient allocations with externalities in consumption abstract a pure distribution problem when individual utilities depend on relative consumption has been treated by villar 1988 in an earlier issue of this journal one of his main results is that for any bundle of goods to be divided there exists a pareto optimal egalitarian allocation in this note we show that there are such distribution problems for which only weak pareto optimal and egalitarian allocations can be ensured

the logic of testing structural change in meat demand a methodological analysis and appraisal in the past two decades the profession has expended valuable resources testing structural change in meat demand with mixed results overlooked to date is a fundamental methodological problem that transcends all methods of testing for structural change in this study a methodological framework is used to show that there is no valid test of structural change because of this result additional criteria from the methodology literature are used to evaluate the literature on structural change in meat demand and to provide suggestions for fertile areas of future research

playing fair with fairness a comment on arnsperger s envy freeness and distributive justice abstract the principle that no individual prefers another s allocation to his own is central in the analysis of economic justice mainly because of its identity with the basic case of equality of liberty rather than for its indirect relation with the sentiment of envy the various reproaches which have been addressed to this principle gathered by arnsperger either are misconceived or have been answered by rational justified extensions or specifications of the principle

food consumption dynamics a nonparametric approach using maximum entropy estimation we model dynamic consumer choice in a stochastic optimal control framework and show conditions under which observable market share data possess the markov property using 30 years of annual aggregate milk consumption data differentiated by fat content maximum entropy is used to estimate nonstationary transition probabilities showing how consumer tastes and preferences have changed over time the maximum entropy approach allows for the estimation of a 4 4 transition probability matrix for each year of the sample results suggest that skim milk was an absorbing state over most of the sample but that the trend toward skim milk has decelerated and possibly reversed itself since 1998 our approach provides a useful complement to existing parametric approaches to demand analysis when data are limited or the problem is ill posed

government policy and the probability of coordination failures this paper introduces an approach to the study of optimal government policy in economies characterized by a coordination problem and multiple equilibria such models are often criticized as not being useful for policy analysis because they fail to assign a unique prediction to each possible policy choice we employ a selection mechanism that assigns ex ante a probability to each equilibrium indicating how likely it is to obtain we show how such a mechanism can be derived as the natural result of an adaptive learning process this approach leads to a well defined optimal policy problem and has important implications for the conduct of government policy we illustrate these implications using a simple model of technology adoption under network externalities

financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs abstract we analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk we show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs in the absence of asset risk intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends and never sell assets if the economy is subject to transaction costs the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare we also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

equilibrium bank runs we analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts or mechanisms is broad the mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed consumers must be willing to deposit ex ante we show by examples that under the so called optimal contract the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability thus the diamond dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract

financial panics the seasonality of the nominal interest rate and the founding of the fed after the founding of the fed in 1914 the frequency of financial panics and the size of the seasonal movements in nominal interest ratesboth declined substantially this paper establishes that the fed by carrying out the seasonal open market policy that eliminated the seasonal in nominal interest rates caused the decrease in the frequency of panics since seasonal movements are anticipated and financial panics are probably real events the results show that an anticipated monetary policy had real effects on the economy copyright 1986 by american economic association

bank runs deposit insurance and capital requirements diamond and dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs we extend the diamond dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors we find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first best outcome depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects however an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first best allocation

an experimental exploration of self fulfilling banking panics their occurrence persistence and prevention this article tests the possibility and the degree of persistence of self fulfilling banking panics through an experimental protocol panics are proved to be persistent phenomena that are difficult to prevent however it seems possible to curb them through a learning effect caused by a temporary but sufficient suspension of the deposit availability combined with a narrow banking solution which makes banks more liquid additionally panic prevention requires a full deposit coverage to be effective this suggests that the moral hazard issue should not be tackled through a lower deposit coverage especially in emerging countries banking systems where depositors are likely to lose confidence

deposit insurance a reconsideration abstract this paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls in our economy the central issue in analyzing deposit insurance is how the government will make up any fdic losses deposit insurance premia matter only in so far as they affect the level of implied fdic revenue shortfalls moreover local variations in the magnitude of fdic losses will generically be irrelevant for the determination of any equilibrium quantities that affect agent welfare however large enough changes in these losses can matter there is no presumption that keeping these shortfalls low is a good idea finally we show that multiple pareto ranked equilibria can be observed the potential for multiplicity of equilibria may depend on components of fdic policy our analysis provides counterexamples to the following propositions 1 actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is always desirable 2 implicit fdic subsidization of banks through deposit insurance is always undesirable 3 large fdic losses are necessarily symptomatic of a poorly designed deposit insurance system 4 risk based deposit insurance premia can easily be used to reduce moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance provision

seasonality and unit roots the demand for fruits abstract we apply seasonal unit root tests to apple and pear price and quantity data we then develop a method for testing shifts in amplitude and or phase of the seasonal cycles the results have implications to econometric specifications of models which use short run data quarterly monthly

bailouts and financial fragility how does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system i study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment when a crisis occurs the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses the anticipation of such a bailout distorts ex ante incentives leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable however it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may in addition leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis a policy of taxing short term liabilities in contrast can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability

regional welfare weights for the uk england scotland wales and northern ireland evans d kula e and sezer h 2005 regional welfare weights for the uk england scotland wales and northern ireland regional studies 39 923 937 in relation to public spending and regional policy the importance of distributional issues is stressed and regional welfare weights are derived from an appropriate underlying social welfare function estimates of these weights are then provided for the four countries comprising the uk welfare weights now have a very high policy profile following the special emphasis placed by the uk treasury in its recently revised guidance on appraisal and evaluation in government on the assessment of the distributional impacts of social projects and policies from an empirical perspective the critical component of each welfare weight measure is the elasticity of marginal utility of income e alternative estimation approaches based on demand analysis and income tax data are used to determine e and a preferred measure of 1 60 emerges the resulting regional we

could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs abstract restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity based runs even when a run does not occur welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset