the optimal indexation of asymmetric information contracts the indexation of labour contracts is examined in a setting from which the hedging motive for partial indexation has been excluded since firms have better information than workers contracts must satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint the optimal degree of indexation depends on the incentives generated by the best fully indexed contract if firms would understate overstate the productivity of labour under this contract the optimal contract is partially more than fully indexed l indexation optimale des contrats quand l information est asymetrique l auteur examine l indexation de contrats de travail dans un monde dont on a elimine l indexation partielle dans le simple but de se couvrir comme les firmes ont une meilleure information que les travailleurs les contrats doivent satisfaire une contrainte de compatibilite le degre optimal d indexation depend des incitations engendrees par le meilleur contrat pleinement indexe si les firmes sous evaluent sur evaluent la productivte des travailleurs dans le contrat le contrat optimal est partiellement plus que pleinement indexe

involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts this paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist a model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal it is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment

underemployment with liquidity constrained multi period firms s grossman and o d hart amer econ rev 71 1981 301 307 have shown that underemployment can occur if firms are risk averse and have better information than workers c kahn and j scheinkman j econ theory 35 1985 343 365 replace the assumption of risk aversion with the more basic assumption of limited liability but they obtain risk averse behaviour only when the liquidity constraint is currently binding a t period model is developed here to show that firms will also display risk aversion if the liquidity constraint might become binding in the future

wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating in the presence of asymmetric information adding a public unemployment insurance ul to labor contracts is potentially pareto improving unfortunately most successful mechanisms are manipulable by coalitions this leads us to design coalition incentive compatible ui systems their welfare effect depends on which coalitions are feasible whenever firm ui coalitions may form one ends up with an impossibility result as contracts are made coalition proof they no longer pareto dominate firm worker contracts however if only firm worker coalitions are feasible the public ui is strictly pareto improving even though it cannot implement the welfare levels that would be reached if no coalition were feasible at all

information revelation and principal agent contracts in an environment in which effort is private information to the worker agreements between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent are likely to be risk sharing and information revealing mechanisms it is shown that principal agent contracts have significant implications for both compensation and employment rules in a simple work sharing model in general such contracts involve incomplete income insurance and involuntary or excessive underemployment this supports the view that models of worker specific information particularly with moral hazard provide a natural explanation of underemployment

optimal labour contracts when workers have a variety of privately observed reservation wages if a firm does not know the individual ex post outside opportunities of its contracted workforce then it can use hours wages and redundancy payments to screen them will a second best contract have underemployment inefficiency or overemployment and with a stochastic contract are those workers randomly selected for layoff worse off than their retained colleagues involuntary layoff or vice versa involuntary retention the answers depend on the nature of the workers preferences two polar cases are looked at corresponding to permanent and temporary layoff the former is characterized by overemployment and involuntary retention the latter by underemployment and involuntary layoff also examined are simple contracts where all retained workers are paid a common wage and all laid off workers receive a common redundancy payment handling asymmetric information in stochastic contracts has led to two technical innovations first a number of results are proved even though all the truth telling constraints are explicitly included second a new regularity condition is found under which the local constraints are sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility at an optimum

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

comment on how much bang for the buck applying a cross country growth regression approach the paper by ross levine and maria carkovic attempts to quantify the growth effects that might flow from providing a more stable nominal environment low and steady inflation and stable exchange rates thus the paper focuses on one potential benefit of dollarization and sets aside a vast range of costs and benefits that would have to be weighed in making the policy decision this topic is surely among the most important regarding dollarization growth benefits that flow from dollarization could easily dwarf benefits or costs due for example to reduced countercyclical policy the paper is another in a long line of outstanding contributions to cross country growth analysis by ross levine with many coauthors l these papers have documented the potential problems with cross country growth regressions have steadily improved the best practice in the area and have documented that various aspects of financial development may be central to growth this line of research has been very productive and very persuasive financial development seems to be an important contributor to growth my discussion will focus on three of the most important conclusions of the current paper

optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints abstract consider the optimal incentive compatible contract offered by a firm with private information to its risk averse employees if the firm is subject to a binding limited liability or bankruptcy constraint then the contract will yield underemployment in low productivity states relative to full information efficiency such contracts either yield underemployment in all states or excessively high variability in employment

asymmetric information multiperiod labor contracts and inefficient job separations economists have for some time been telling the world and each other that in a dynamic economy some labor turnover is to be expected and is in fact efficient however there is a pervasive feeling that not all of the observed turnover is efficient the dilemma of course is to provide satisfactory reasons why inefficient turnover should occur with optimizing rational economic agents in light of this problem recent developments in implicit contract theory 1 4 5 have begun to focus on the idea that in a world of uncertainty asymmetric information and moral hazard problems may prevent efficient fully enforceable contingent claims contracts from developing in particular the asymmetric information i e firms privately observe their profits and workers privately observe their alternatives and moral hazard problems make efficient turnover unlikely because parties making separation decisions have neither all available relevant information nor have an incentive to use this information to make an efficient decision while this investigation into the ramifications of asymmetric information has yielded new insights analysis in previous studies has been limited to models in which separations occur only in the final period of the model in this paper a simple multiperiod model is developed in which separations may occur in each of several successive periods the multiperiod specification enables us to distinguish between temporary and permanent separations and to focus attention on the potential for inefficient separations induced by asymmetric information problems in an intertemporal setting in an intertemporal model in which separations may occur in any one of several successive periods intertemporal allocation problems arise because compensation in a given period plays an allocative role not only in that particular period but also in all periods prior to that period that the terms of compensation may play a multiple intertemporal role in allocating labor has been recognized previously in other contexts for instance this argument has been used to explain the observed occurrence of rising wage profiles with tenure in the presence of such factors as worker shirking or firm specific skill acquisition 2 9 in this asymmetric information setting intertemporal allocation problems

liquidity constrained employment contracts abstract kahn and scheinkman 1985 have shown that optimal contracting between risk averse workers and risk neutral but liquidity constrained firms results in underemployment if firms have better information than workers this result is extended here by allowing the firm to divide its wealth between capital and liquid assets so that liquidity is a choice variable the firm generally chooses a portfolio under which it is optimal not to choose the risk neutral i e expected profit maximizing employment contract the underemployment result is thereby shown not to be strongly dependent on the choice of parameters

political instability and economic growth in developing economies some specification empirics abstract the paper empirically explores the specification of the relationship between political instability pi and economic growth using data on different events of coups d etat in sub saharan africa it finds that when a principal component of the various pi events is employed in an augmented production function basic specification tests are met however specifying pi using the separate events such as successful coups results in a potentially misspecified relationship reduced model fit and underestimation of the adverse pi effect

democracy and growth in africa implications of increasing electoral competitiveness abstract estimating a 1975 2004 decadal panel data in an augmented production function framework the paper finds that indexes of electoral competitiveness exhibit u shape relationships with gdp growth implying quite different intermediate and advanced level effects of reforms in africa

why u s wage and employment behavior differs from that in britain and japan if a poll were to be conducted among american academic economists to select the most mystifying economic phenomenon of our time surely the sticky nominal wage rate would emerge at or near the top of the list the slow and partial response of the nominal wage rate to changes in aggregate nominal spending has been a central postulate of macroeconomic theory for the past 45 years from keynes general theory down to the standard postwar textbook keynesian paradigm to the more modern fixed wage price models of robert barro and herschel grossman i976 and edmond malinvaud i977 unwilling passively to accept nominal wage rigidity as an unexplained assumption many labour market theorists have followed the lead of costas azariadis i975 and martin baily i974 in building models to explain rigid wages and layoff unemployment as the rational outcome of a profit maximising calculus as i pointed out in an early critique of the azariadis baily model i976a their assumptions cannot explain cycles in employment but rather why workers would want fixed incomes i e a fixed wage rate and fixed employment soon thereafter barro i977 went one step further and argued that contract theory is a facade which cannot explain why workers would choose a rigid wage and variable employment in preference to the classical equilibrium quantity of employment that equates the marginal product of labour with the marginal value of time now an examination of the evidence has led me to the realisation that rigid wages cannot provide the underpinnings for a universally valid theory of the business cycle simply because wages are not universally rigid i document below with postwar quarterly data that the share of fluctuations in the manufacturing wage bill taking the form of nominal wage changes as compared to changes in hours worked is five to ten times greater in britain and japan than in

endogenous unemployment insurance in a monopoly union model when job search matters abstract the aim of the paper is to derive an optimal unemployment insurance policy for a utilitarian trade union when job search matters it is shown that the well known result from the theory of insurance concerning the optimal risk sharing between risk averse agents changes essentially if the search behavior is allowed to affect the performance of the labor market we assume that labor market mismatch decreases with search effort which in turn decreases with the benefit the resulting equilibrium benefit is shown to be a decreasing function of the trade union s share of the costs of the insurance fund the model is also extended to the case where the benefit is made conditional on monitored search effort

mandatory retirement as a clause in an employment insurance contract this paper postulates the existence of an employment insurance contract in which firms insure the employment of workers at a predetermined wage against potential age related declines in productivity to limit its liability the firm establishes an age limit to its promise the mandatory retirement age it is demonstrated that pareto efficient contracts exist which involve mandatory retirement at a specific age the existence of these contracts including mandatory retirement increases workers life time utility and encourages the accumulation of human capital empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model

efficient labor contracts with employment risk this article analyzes efficient employment agreements where the demand for consumption insurance can be satisfied by noncontractual means we assume that workers can save and that consumption is determined by a strong form of the permanent income hypothesis under conditions of asymmetric information about exogenous shocks to labor demand we derive a unique compensation schedule that efficiently guides decisions by both workers and employers efficient employment outcomes are generated without a need for third party enforcement or monitoring and workers choose a consumption policy that leaves them indifferent among realizations of labor demand within this solution it is both costless and efficient for workers to delegate employment decisions to the firm within the context of the model we analyze implications for the equilibrium distribution of wages and for empirical studies of labor supply

trade unions and economic efficiency in this paper i shall investigate a role for trade unions in increasing economic efficiency this role is enabling an improvement in the allocation of riskbearing between a firm and its employees the essential idea is straightforward if employers and employees are both risk averse the optimal wage contract will not leave one party bearing all the risk if state contingent contracts are possible grossman and hart 1981 give several reasons for firms being risk averse that firms are indeed risk averse would seem to follow from the fact that employees bear substantial risks few firms offer a job for life at a guaranteed real wage employees bear the risks of layoff redundancy and changes in the real value of their earnings with transactions costs in finding and moving to another job which may be substantial in periods of high unemployment these are real risks yet the states of the world in which these eventualities are to occur are rarely specified in any legally enforceable form indeed it is hard to imagine that they ever could be both because of the problem of envisaging all the relevant states of the world the bounded rationality of simon 1979 and because of the problem of defining those states in such a way that the courts could in the event of a dispute decide which state had occurred in the absence of legal enforceability of state contingent contracts the analysis depends on whether or not decisions about production must be made before a firm knows which state has occurred if they do not have to be then it is not essential to negotiate any contract before the firm knows the state but it may still be desirable from a risk sharing point of view to have a long term contract covering different possible states for that case hall and lilien 1979 and grossman and hart 1981 have argued that some degree of state contingency may be achieved by negotiating a contract which allows the firm in the light of the state which occurs to choose between limited combinations of employment and wages the firm may for example be permitted to reduce wages under the contract but only at the expense of reducing employment so that it is only in its interest to do so if marginal productivity is low this can overcome some of the moral hazard problems arising when states are observed only by firms but as grossman and hart show only at the cost of pareto inefficiency in the employment contract at an empirical level it may explain provisions for compulsory overtime at premium rates this type of contract will work only in the case in which the firm observes the state of the world before making employment decisions but given that

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

a model of rationing and labour supply theory and estimation a number of authors most prominently clower 1965 and leijonhofvud 1968 have interpreted keynes s theory of unemployment as a disequilibrium model nominal price and wage rigidity prevent the labour market from clearing the actual level of employment is given by the minimum of the effective demand for labour and the effective supply general disequilibrium models of income and employment determination have been developed by barro and grossman 1976 and malinvaud 1977 the model has been extended to the open economy by dixit 1978 and to a two period rational expectations context by neary and stiglitz 1979 the econometric implications of the disequilibrium approach have been developed by goldfeld and quandt 1972 maddala and nelson 1974 and rosen and quandt 1978 among others in summary the disequilibrium approach has provided a fruitful context for analysing macroeconomic behaviour in a competitive walrasian system the notional supply of labour is defined as the amount of labour a worker wishes to provide when he can buy and sell as much as he would like in all markets subject only to his budget constraint and given prices and wages the notional supply of labour then is given by l where 1 c attains the indirect utility function

incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge abstract the pareto optimal contract between principal and risk neutral agent is analyzed for the case in which the agent s information is initially imperfect but better than that of the principal in contrast to the case where precontractual information is symmetric the final contract between principal and agent will not always guarantee an efficient outcome however in contrast to the case where the agent s information is initially perfect the agent may be unable to command rents from his superior information and the outcome will always be efficient the conditions under which efficient or inefficient outcomes are guaranteed differ qualitatively according to whether the random stete of nature follows a continuous or a discrete distribution journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026 611

credit rationing and implicit contract theory an empirical study abstract this paper investigate whether or not implicit contract relations predominate in the japanese bank loan market and produce equilibrium credit rationing the empirical evidence suggests that risks are shared between banks and firms through interest rate arrangements this implies that commercial banks in japan operate in a market dominated by implicit contract relations however the evidence does not support the view that japanese commercial banks execute credit rationing in the sense of fried and howitt 1980 furthermore the results show that large banks differ from small banks in the risk consideration of loan contracts these empirical results are completely consistent with the intermarket business group hypothesis such that the group formation aims to share risks and profits among members

employment with asymmetric information in an economy without informational and other distortions entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a pareto optimal allocation of resources this paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort in particular if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes employment will be less than fully pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature

the legal environment banks and long run economic growth this paper examines the relationship between the legal system and banlding development and traces this connection through to long run rates of per capita gdp growth capital stock growth and productivity growth the data indicate that countries where the legal system 1 emphasizes creditor rights and 2 rigorously enforces contracts have better developed banks than countries where laws do not give a high priority to creditors and where enforcement is lax furtherrnore the exogenous component of banking development the component defined by the legal environment is positively and robustly associated with per capita growth physical capital accumulation and productivity growth this paper addresses two questions first do crosscountry differences in the legal rights of creditors the efficiency of contract enforcement and the origin of the legal system explain cross country differences in the level of banking development second do better developed banks cause faster economic development that is is the component of banking development defined by the legal environment positively associated with long run rates of economic growth capital accumulation and productivity growth examining the relationship between the legal system and banking development is valuable irrespective of issues associated with long run growth first banks may influence the level of income per capita and the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations bernanke and gertler 1989 1990 second many economists stress that understanding the evolution of legal and financial systems is essential for understanding economic development north 1981 engerman and sokoloff 1996 consequently quantitative information on the relationship between the legal environment and banks will improve our understanding of business cycles and the process of economic development furthermore examining the causal links between banks and economic growth has both conceptual and policy implications on the conceptual front a long literature debates the importance of banks in economic development starting as early as bagehot 1873 economists have argued that better banks banks that are better at identifying creditworthy firms mobilizing savings pooling risks and facilitating transactions

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

insurance within the firm we evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers using matched employer employee panel data unlike previous contributions this paper focuses on idiosyncratic shocks to the firm which are the correct empirical counterpart of the theoretical notion of diversifiable risk we allow for both temporary and permanent shocks to output and find that firms absorb temporary fluctuations fully but insure workers against permanent shocks only partially risk sharing considerations can account for about 15 percent of overall earnings variability the remainder originating from idiosyncratic shocks to individual workers our welfare calculations indicate that firms are an important vehicle of insurance provision

internal bargaining labor contracts and a marshallian theory of the firm the theme of this paper is due to alfred marshall who states that nearly the whole income of a business may be regarded as a composite quasi rent divisible among different persons in the business by bargaining supplemented by custom and by notion of fairness and the division of quasi rents entails de facto some sort of profit loss sharing between almost every business and its employees principles of economics 8th ed book vi ch viii sec 10 pp 520 21 marshall emphasizes that a significant portion of composite quasi rent is derived from the organization of business and would be lost if employer employee connections were dissolved in this view bargaining can even be tacit insofar as there is an organizational basis which ensures agreement among the concerned parties consequently internal bargaining models of the firm may be applicable to the analysis of european style codetermination and japanese style labor management also as the relative bargaining strength between labor and management changes such a view of the firm admits as its extrema the organization of a labor managed firm lmf and the textbook case of a profit maximizing firm pmf masahiko aoki 1980 1982 and jan svejnar 1982 have recently explored models of an internal bargaining firm their analyses however consider the firm s long run behavior only under restricted circumstances without market uncertainty the relevance of the internal bargaining approach to profit sharing and labor management would be enhanced if we integrated the firm s short run wage employment policies with its long run plans for the rate of growth and capital labor substitutions this i do by underscoring the firm s organizational basis which is essentially a long term contractual association between workers and management i combine costas azariadis 1975 and martin baily s 1974 apparatus of labor contracting with efficient bargaining to investigate the effect of varying degrees of labor s bargaining power upon the firm s shortand long run policies under uncertainty these results are then contrasted with the empirical findings of collective bargaining for example richard freeman and james medoff 1981 conventional results of lmf models jaroslav vanek 1970 benjamin ward 1958 and the recent macroeconomic approaches to wage employment adjustments ian mcdonald and robert solow 1981

political business cycles democratization and economic reform the case of africa abstract this paper presents cross country evidence that political business cycles are alive and well in the nascent democracies of the developing world africa provides fertile ground for the study of political business cycles this paper uncovers systematic electorally timed interventions in five monetary and four fiscal policy variables in a panel of african countries these findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory if africa s increasingly frequent elections are associated with reversals of fiscal and monetary policy reform there is a potential conflict between political and economic reform

enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization in a world in which employment contracts are incomplete it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements by monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm s adherence to these implicit agreements thus the union provides a signaling mechanism that allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract this mechanism enhances the firm s credibility when forming employment contracts and facilitates increased employment levels

optimal labour contracts and involuntary unemployment under costly and imperfect monitoring this paper provides an explanation for the concurrence of rigid wages and involuntary unemployment we consider cases in which a firm monitors its workers but at some cost a key assumption in the model is that the firm cannot perfectly distinguish shirkers from nonshirkers thus the firm has to rely on negotiated compensation and work effort as well as monitoring to reduce the incentive to shirk we find that rigid wages and involuntary unemployment arise simultaneously when monitoring costs are large and the effectiveness of monitoring is low

labor contracts and the role of monetary policy in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper characterizes labor contracts in a dynamic economy subject to both real and nominal shocks in this environment we compare alternative means of trading labor services spot markets fixed nominal wage contracts and price contingent contracts the welfare ordering of these market structures is shown to depend on the relative variability of the real and nominal shocks and the costs of contingent contracts the paper also investigates the role of monetary policy and the neutrality of feedback rules finally we demonstrate that the optimal policy is nonstochastic

what is a liquidity crisis abstract this paper investigates the role of liquidity it is argued that the firm holds money as a guarantee of solvency to its contractual partners by holding liquid assets the firm is able to increase the efficiency of its contracts variations in the opportunity cost of holding money cause variations in the firm s demand for money and consequent variations in the frequency of contract failures this mechanism is suggested as an alternative explanation of the observed relationship between money income and interest rates

a characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information abstract employment distortions are characterized for different combinations of firm s risk aversion and the degree of normality of leisure in worker s preferences using a novel method all previously established results are derived and the previously unresolved cases are worked out

financial capacity and output fluctuations in an economy with multi period financial relationships this paper motivates a financial propagation mechanism in the context of an intertemporal production economy with asymmetric information and with borrowers and lenders who enter multi period financial relationships a key feature is that aggregate output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity which in turn may constrain current production especially in bad times a small but persistent shift in aggregate conditions may have a large impact on financial capacity making the framework capable of motivating large endogenous fluctuations in financial constraints understanding how small disturbances can induce large output fluctuations is an on going quest in macroeconomics this paper develops a simple framework in which shifts in aggregate economic fundamentals are amplified through their impact on financial conditions a distinguishing feature is that output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity and financial capacity may constrain current production especially in bad times a number of recent papers have resurrected the view that financial factors may play a part in propagating business fluctuations the underlying theories exploit the idea that with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders agency costs may drive the price of uncollateralized external funds above the price of internal funds in this kind of setting a borrower s financial position is a key determinant of the terms of credit she faces in the aggregate swings in borrower balance sheets over the cycle amplify fluctuations in investment and output essentially by inducing counter cyclical movements in the required premium for external finance this simple mechanism is broadly consistent with informal descriptions of how financial and real variables interacted in the great depression bernanke 1983 and in the postwar business cycles eckstein and sinai 1986 in addition numerous recent panel data studies beginning with fazzari hubbard and peterson 1988 support the notion of a financial investment accelerator mechanism

dynamic contractual enforcement a model of strikes this paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement a firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce if the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently then modulo discounting the first best is implementable but strikes are always off the equilibrium path if the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium the dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring the equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes

managerial incentives investment and aggregate implications scale effects we explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive problem arises because one input factor managerial effort is not publicly observed we show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first best in low states and that this phenomenon can account for greater cyclical variability in aggregate production and investment from the perspective of incentive scheme design a special feature of the model is that screening takes place over two variables investment and output rather than one as is customary

dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract this paper discusses the distortion of employment within a two period asymmetric information contracting model in which an exogenous demand shock is serially correlated and is known only to firms the obtained results show that serial correlations of the state of nature can cause not only underemployment but also overemployment even when overemployment never occurs in the context of a static asymmetric information contracting model

a note on overemployment underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment this paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral

democracy foreign direct investment and natural resources abstract empirical studies that examine the impact of democracy on foreign direct investment fdi assume that the relationship between democracy and fdi is the same for resource exporting and non resource exporting countries this paper examines whether natural resources in host countries alter this relationship we estimate a linear dynamic panel data model using data from 112 developing countries over the period 1982 2007 we find that democracy promotes fdi if and only if the value of the share of minerals and oil in total exports is less than some critical value we identify 90 countries where an expansion of democracy may enhance fdi and 22 countries where an increase in democratization may reduce fdi we also find that the effect of democracy on fdi depends on the size and not the type of natural resources

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

profit sharing and employee share ownership profit sharing and employee share ownership saul estrin paul grout and sushil wadhwani this paper evaluates the likely effects of linking a part of a worker s pay to the employer s profits it has been suggested by weitzman that this would raise employment by lowering the cost of taking on an extra worker however this can only happen if existing workers are willing to let their share of value added fall and experience of those firms in the uk who already operate profit sharing schemes suggests that the weitzman mechanism is not operative there is however some evidence that profit related pay does boost productivity but there are other ways of raising productivity such as performance related pay which may be more effective productivity enhancing effects are likely to be greatest when employees are involved in decision making as well but this is likely to undermine the weitzman case still further even if the argument that profit sharing raises employment is not compelling it is sometimes suggested that it can do little harm however there is evidence that it may well be inflationary in which case the government would be advised to proceed cautiously we argue that there is very little case for the introduction of a permanent subsidy to encourage increased profit sharing although there may be a case for a temporary one to overcome managerial inertia however there is a danger that a subsidy will promote cosmetic schemes designed to be eligible for the subsidy but which do not reflect any real change in behaviour

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

annual bonuses employment and productivity change in taiwan s manufacturing sector abstract taiwanese manufacturing firms have traditionally made annual bonus payments to employees concentrated around the lunar new year holiday this paper uses industry data to investigate the connection between compensation volatility and the volatility and growth rate of employment we observe a significant relationship between employment and seasonally predictable compensation volatility implying that industries in which firms commit themselves to paying regular new year bonuses employ more workers more stably we also investigate the relationship between compensation profits and productivity growth we find a significant role for productivity growth in the determination of profits and for profits in the determination of bonuses however it appears that productivity growth itself is mainly determined by exogenous factors and is only slightly responsive to the bonus system