product differentiation in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly abstract in a bertrand edgeworth model with homogeneous goods an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist non existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not solely due to the homogeneous goods assumption in this paper i consider a bertrand edgeworth model with product differentiation and i parametrize when an equilibrium exists journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d4 l1

delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies this paper studies a simultaneous move infinite horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort the delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance we show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium the paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives we also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear quadratic payoffs

expenditure taxes income taxes and time inconsistency abstract traditional welfare based comparisons of different tax structures implicitly assume that the government can precommit to its future optimal policy when optimal tax rates are time inconsistent however such comparisons may be misleading this paper uses a two period representative consumer optimal taxation model to study the implications of time consistency for the welfare rankings of expenditure and income taxation i show that the welfare rankings of optimal policies may not be preserved by time consistent ones

judo economics in markets with asymmetric firms abstract i study a market entry game with price competition and perfectly substitutable products limiting the initial capacity judo economics is a plausible entry strategy i show that under asymmetry in production cost or product quality capacity limitation can become obsolete

cautious risk takers investor preferences and demand for active management actively managed mutual funds have distinct return distributions from their passive benchmarks and our theoretical analysis using tail sensitive risk preferences suggests that active value and growth funds may serve to reduce downside risk and capture upside potential respectively furthermore tail sensitivity measures estimated from the empirical pricing kernel have significant explanatory power for active fund flows even after controlling for business cycles and market wide sentiment finally active funds unlike their passive counterparts have exposures to option strategies hedging downside risk or capturing upside potential

portfolio rebalancing and the turn of the year effect this paper finds that for the 1935 1986 period the market s risk return relation does not have a january seasonal the findings differ from those of other studies due to the use of value weighted rather than equally weighted portfolios inferences are sensitive to the weighting procedure because of the small firm return patterns in january in particular even in those januaries for which the market return is negative small firm returns are positive and they are more positive the higher is beta this is consistent with the portfolio rebalancing explanation of the turn of the year effect since at least 1926 the average return on small firms in january has been unusually high a phenomenon known as the turn of the year effect in this paper we present new evidence regarding the risk return characteristics of small firms in january we find that for small firms there is a positively sloped riskreturn relation in both up and down markets this pattern is difficult to reconcile with the belief that the high return on small firms in january is equilibrium compensation for risk bearing we show how these patterns in small firms returns have led others to conclude that the market s risk return relation has a january seasonal in particular rozeff and kinney 21 and tinic and west 22 23 among others using equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of historical betas have found a steeper slope for the capm s risk return relation in january than in other months we demonstrate that this pattern exists only for small firms consequently statistical inferences about the risk return relation are heavily dependent upon whether equally weighted or value weighted portfolio returns are used in the estimation we show that for 1935 86 when monthly cross sectional regressions are estimated using value weighted portfolio returns there is no more of a statistically significant difference in the estimated return to risk bearing in january than in the other eleven months of the year the notion that there is a january seasonal in the capm s risk return relation for the us has rapidly become accepted knowledge for example corhay hawawini and michel 6 accept this conclusion and investigate whether other

prices and price dispersion on the web evidence from the online book industry using data collected between august 1999 and january 2000 covering 399 books we examine pricing by thirty two online united states based bookstores at the aggregate level we find that both advertising and competitive structure had the predicted effects more competition led to lower prices and to lower price dispersion holding competitive structure constant more widely advertised items also had lower prices at the firm level we observe considerable heterogeneity in behavior firms had differentiated or attempted to differentiate on dimensions such as brand price and selection

retail strategies on the web price and non price competition in the online book industry two conflicting predictions have emerged regarding the effect of low cost information on price the first states that all internet retailers will charge the same low price for mass produced goods the second states that internet retailers will differentiate to avoid intense price competition using data collected in april 1999 on the prices of 107 books in thirteen online and two physical bookstores we find similar average prices online and in physical stores and substantial price dispersion online analysis of product differentiation yields no clear results the substantial premium charged by amazon provides indirect evidence of product differentiation

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

cross sectional alpha dispersion and performance evaluation abstract our paper explores the link between cross sectional fund return dispersion and performance evaluation the foundation of our model is the simple intuition that in periods of high return dispersion which is associated with high levels of idiosyncratic risk for zero alpha funds unskilled managers can more easily disguise themselves as skilled rational investors should be more skeptical and apply larger discounts to reported performance in high dispersion environments our empirical results are consistent with this prediction using fund flow data we show that a one standard deviation increase in cross sectional return dispersion is associated with an 11 to 17 decline in flow performance sensitivity the effect is stronger for recent data and among outperforming funds

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

scale and skill in active management abstract we empirically analyze the nature of returns to scale in active mutual fund management we find strong evidence of decreasing returns at the industry level as the size of the active mutual fund industry increases a fund s ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines at the fund level all methods considered indicate decreasing returns though estimates that avoid econometric biases are insignificant we also find that the active management industry has become more skilled over time this upward trend in skill coincides with industry growth which precludes the skill improvement from boosting fund performance finally we find that performance deteriorates over a typical fund s lifetime this result can also be explained by industry level decreasing returns to scale

public goods and dynamic efficiency abstract it is well known that the use of distorting taxes to finance a public good in a static economy may indirectly raise the social cost of the public good because of the deadweight loss associated with the tax system however the tax system may also affect the dynamic efficiency of the economy we provide an example where the use of distorting taxes lowers the social cost of a public good in a steady state relative to the first best case due to the effect of the government s tax policy on the dynamic efficiency of the economy

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

how are derivatives used evidence from the mutual fund industry we investigate investment managers use of derivatives by comparing return distributions for equity mutual funds that use and do not use derivatives in contrast to public perception derivative users have risk exposure and return performance that are similar to nonusers we also analyze changes in fund risk in response to prior fund performance changes in risk are substantially less severe for funds using derivatives consistent with the explanation that managers use derivatives to reduce the impact of performance on risk we provide new evidence regarding the implications of cash flows and managerial gaming for the relation between performance and risk

do tournaments have incentive effects much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses we focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure prize distribution and measures of individual output players scores are both available we find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance

on the size of the active management industry we argue that active management s popularity is not puzzling despite the industry s poor track record our explanation features decreasing returns to scale as the industry s size increases every manager s ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines the poor track record occurred before the growth of indexing modestly reduced the share of active management to its current size at this size better performance is expected by investors who believe in decreasing returns to scale such beliefs persist because persistence in industry size causes learning about returns to scale to be slow the industry should shrink only moderately if its underperformance continues

commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing abstract this paper investigates which equilibria of a game are still viable when players have the opportunity to commit themselves to that end we study a model of endogenous timing in which players face the trade off between committing early and moving late it is shown that mixed resp pure equilibria of the original game are subgame perfect resp persistent in the timing game only when no player has an incentive to move first consequently mixed equilibria are viable only if no player has an incentive to move first one needs strong evolutionary solution concepts to draw that conclusion for pure equilibria journal of economic literature classification number c72

religious beliefs gambling attitudes and financial market outcomes this study investigates whether geographic variation in religion induced gambling norms affects aggregate market outcomes we conjecture that gambling propensity would be stronger in regions with higher concentrations of catholics relative to protestants consistent with our conjecture we show that in regions with higher catholic protestant ratios investors exhibit a stronger propensity to hold lottery type stocks broad based employee stock option plans are more popular the initial day return following an initial public offering is higher and the magnitude of the negative lottery stock premium is larger collectively these results indicate that religion induced gambling attitudes impact investors portfolio choices corporate decisions and stock returns

price setting firms and the oligopolistic foundations of perfect competition theory fails to explain how prices are formed these observations lead us to study the theory of monopolistically competitive markets in which firms choose prices rather than quantities and then to ask whether such large markets approximate perfect competition price setting oligopolies can provide economists with a price formation story prices arise from the profit maximizing decisions of individual firms thus we are able to obtain a theory in which prices are picked by those economic actors who do so in reality although this is a matter of taste we believe that the use of prices instead of quantities as the strategic variables of firms can yield a better simple descriptive model of oligopoly that captures the essential features of many markets this motivation then leads to the question of which price setting model should be used for the study of the oligopolistic foundations of perfect competition in the original model formulated by joseph bertrand 1883 firms have constant marginal and average costs so that any one firm can supply the whole market this assumption leads to the conclusion that the presence of two or more price setting firms suffices to yield perfectly competitive outcomes be

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

ranking games and gambling when to quit when you re ahead it is common for rewards to be given on the basis of a rank ordering so that relative performance amongst a cohort is the criterion in this paper we formulate an equilibrium model in which an agent makes successive decisions on whether or not to gamble and is rewarded on the basis of a rank ordering of the final position amongst competing players one application of this model is to the behavior of mutual fund managers who are paid depending on funds under management which in turn are greatly influenced by annual or quarterly rank orderings our model deals with a situation in which fund managers can elect either to pick stocks or to use a market tracking strategy in equilibrium the distribution of the final position will have a negative skew we explore how this distribution depends on the number of players the probability of success when gambling the structure of the rewards and on information regarding the performance of other players

price dispersion in the lab and on the internet theory and evidence price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook bertrand competition we show that only a little bounded rationality among sellers is needed to rationalize such dispersion a variety of statistical tests based on datasets from two independent laboratory experiments and structural estimates of the parameters of our models suggest that bounded rationality based theories of price dispersion organize the data remarkably well evidence is also presented to suggest that the models are consistent with data from a leading internet price comparison site

incentive fees who wins who loses 1987 incentive fees who wins who loses financial analysts journal vol 43 no 1 pp 27 38

rationing rules and bertrand edgeworth equilibria in large markets abstract in a market with concave downward sloping demand and symmetric firms which compete in prices with constant marginal costs and capacity limits it is shown that the supports of the symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibria converge to the unique competitive price provided that unsatisfied demand is allocated according to the surplus maximizing rationing rule

tournament incentives and asset price bubbles evidence from a field experiment abstract in this note we show at the example of an experimental stock market conducted on the occasion of the world soccer championship 2010 in south africa how tournament incentives might contribute to the formation of asset price bubbles

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

a few bad apples scandalous behavior of mutual fund managers recent scandals in the business world have intensified the demand for an explanation of the causes of corporate wrongdoing this study empirically tests the effects of mutual fund management fees and control structures on the likelihood of illegal activity within mutual fund organizations specific attention is given to the presence of agency duality issues in the mutual fund industry and how this influences the motivations and decisions of fund managers findings provide support for the hypothesized relationship that higher levels of management fees decrease the likelihood of illegal behavior additionally control of the mutual fund by external management is found to have a negative impact on the likelihood of illegal activity while also acting as a moderator of the management fee illegal behavior relationship

brothers from different mothers how distribution fees change investment behavior abstract we ask whether loads affect investment flows in the us mutual fund industry we argue that sales fees make the investment decision partially irreversible under these circumstances investors await for a stronger signal of managerial ability before committing to a new fund this stronger signal can take the form of a particularly strong performance or a particularly long series of positive performance realizations looking at pairs of fund shares with the same portfolio but different sales fee arrangements we show that investment flows in share classes with front loads react disproportionally to good performances higher convexity in the flow performance relationship and react to performance realizations further back in time longer memory a counterfactual example of fund shares with back end loads allows us to rule out the hypothesis that this behavior is due to the incentive structure of brokers finally we show that these behavioral modifications induced by front loads have a negative and significant effect on investors timing ability

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

window dressing by pension fund managers this paper takes a first look at investment strategies of managers of 769 pension funds with total assets of 129 billion at the end of 1989 the data show that managers of these funds tend to oversell stocks that have performed poorly relative sales of losers accelerate in the fourth quarter when funds portfolios are closely examined by the sponsors this result supports the view that fund managers window dress their portfolios to impress sponsors and suggests that managers are evaluated on their individual stock selections and not just aggregate portfolio performance this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

portfolio performance evaluation old issues and new insights this article presents a model that provides insights about various measures of portfolio performance the model explores several criticisms of these measures these include the problem of identifying an appropriate benchmark portfolio the possibility of overestimating risk because of market timing ability and the failure of informed investors to earn positive risk adjusted returns because of increasing risk aversion the article argues that these need not be serious impediments to performance evaluation

difference in interim performance and risk taking with short sale constraints abstract absent much theory empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament if there is a tournament interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead while interim losers are expected to increase their volatility so as to catch up with winners we consider a rational model of a mutual fund tournament in the presence of short sale constraints and find the opposite interim winners choose more volatile portfolios in equilibrium than interim losers several empirical works present evidence consistent with our model however based on the above informal argument they appear to conclude against the tournament behavior we argue that this conclusion is unwarranted we also demonstrate that tournament incentives lead to differences in interim performance for otherwise identical managers and that mid year trading volume is inversely related to mid year stock return

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

can tax evasion tame leviathan governments this paper asks to what extent institutional features that facilitate tax evasion may keep leviathan governments at bay the specific feature we look at is banking secrecy abroad the analysis draws on a 16 generation olg model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent seeking leviathan government key insights are 1 effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born 2 there is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonic as we move from young to old combined these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex

approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry this paper considers the existence and properties of approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry price setting firms produce a homogeneous product with weakly convex costs the main results are that a given e 0 an e equilibrium exists if the industry is large enough b if the e is small enough and the industry large enough any e equilibrium is approximately competitive these results depend on how contingent demand is specified

management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints abstract this paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation in particular in the presence of portfolio constraints allowing for benchmarking can be beneficial benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement mechanism vis a vis relaxing portfolio constraints numerically we solve jointly for the manager s linear incentive fee and the optimal benchmark the size of the incentive fee and the risk adjustment in the benchmark composition are increasing in the investor s risk tolerance and the manager s ability to acquire and process private information

risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks i introduction when individuals compete for promotions bonuses or other rewards tied to their relative performance ranking vis a vis other contestants competition is likely to drive not just work effort but where imperfect monitoring permits other choices at the contestants discretion in this article we ask how rank dependent compensation influences attitudes toward risk or the choice of variance of output when contestants have opportunities to influence this aspect of their output distribution unlike previous literature we assume that it is costly for contestants to alter the variance of output and that identical contestants simultaneously choose both the mean of their output distribution i e work effort and its variance our analysis emphasizes the importance of the number of players and symmetry or lack thereof of payoffs on contestants incentives we find that contestants will engage in risk seeking increasing the variance of their output distribution in contests among three or more players when the payoff structure offers a greater prize for ranking first than the penalty for ranking last as happens in winner take all contests if the tournament organizer or sponsor values the aggregate output of the contestants as is typically assumed in labor market tournaments this risk seeking behavior is inefficient because it is costly but does not increase the expected output however we argue that many contests such as the research and development tournaments first modeled by taylor 1995 may be characterized by an organizer who cares only or primarily about the highest output achieved by a single contestant e g the best submission received in such cases the organizer may benefit from costly risk taking among contestants we show that three payoff levels a prize to the contestant ranked first a penalty to the contestant ranked last and a common intermediate payoff to all others are sufficient to achieve any combination of effort and variance of output that the organizer wishes to induce among contestants so long as the desired output variance does not exceed that which results from a winner take all prize structure therefore the sponsor s problem can be characterized as choosing the optimal mean and variance of the output distribution given the contestants costs of influencing the mean and variance of output in this way our model provides an explanation for the importance of both carrots prizes and sticks penalties in competitive settings only through the combined use of both can a contest organizer determine the effort and the variance of output chosen by contestants and doing so is necessary to achieve optimal performance from contests since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others rank order tournaments or contests have been used to model incentives in a variety of economic settings in particular executive compensation has frequently been modeled as a tournament in which low level executives are motivated by the prospect of climbing the corporate ladder and obtaining the large salaries attendant to top ranking executives as in rosen 1986 and bognanno 2001 similarly the behavior of investment fund managers who compete for top fund rankings has been modeled as a tournament by brown harlow and starks 1996 taylor 1995 developed a model of research tournaments in which contestants search for an innovation and the best innovation submitted to the sponsor wins a prize the distinguishing feature of a tournament or contest is that contestants are paid based on the rank of their output relative to others rather than the level of output prize levels are set in advance and competition to win generates the incentive to exert effort to increase output lazear and rosen 1981 showed that rank order tournaments can provide an efficient incentive framework in a labor market setting when workers are risk neutral

adverse risk incentives and the design of performance bases contracts this paper uses option pricing theory to value and analyze many performance based fee contracts that are currently in use a potential problem with some of these contracts is that they may induce portfolio managers to adversely alter the risk of the portfolios they manage the paper is prescriptive in that it presents conditions for contract parameters that provide proper risk incentives for classes of investment strategies for buy and hold and rebalancing strategies adverse risk incentives are avoided when the penalties for poor performance outweigh the rewards for good performance

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management abstract this paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio the contract parameters the extent of delegation and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider symmetric fulcrum performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the sharpe ratios asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and sharpe ratios with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds excess performance

on the strategic importance of prices versus quantities in this article i investigate three single shot models of differentiated products oligopoly in each model firms choose both output and price the demand cost and spillover demand specifications are quite general and there are three main results first with simultaneous choice there is no pure strategy noncooperative equilibrium second with output chosen first and announced to all firms before the choice of price equilibrium sometimes exists and when it does it is the same as in a quantity only model third with price chosen and announced first equilibrium always exists and is the same as in a price only model

performance incentive fees an agency theoretic approach this paper employs recent developments in agency theory to study the impact that com pensation contracts have on portfolio management investment decisions in a restricted mean variance world two types of incentive contracts for mutual fund managers are ana lyzed and compared the results show that the symmetric contract while not necessar ily eliminating agency costs dominates the bonus contract in aligning the manager s interests with those ofthe investor investment companies and by extension their managers control a large and increasing percentage ofthe aggregate wealth of their clients more investors are putting their money under the control of these advisers than ever before con sequently potential conflicts of interest arise between investment company own ers and their financial management advisers the securities and exchange com mission sec has been concerned with this issue for a number of years the agency has commissioned several studies to investigate the issue and has set forth certain rulings concerning the behavior of investment company advisers of par ticular importance has been the compensation arrangement between mutual fund management and the fund owners in fact the sec has issued specific guidelines regarding allowable fee schedules for managers these guidelines have ied to a policy debate concerning whether the sec has been too stringent or not stringent enough in regulating compensation for investment managers the present study takes a new approach to this problem in an attempt to resolve this debate the fiduciary relationship between mutual fund management and the inves tors they represent may be viewed as a principal agent relationship conse quently the methodology from the agency literature can be applied to study the impact of various compensation arrangements on the potential conflict of interest between these two groups

do hedge funds deliver alpha a bayesian and bootstrap analysis abstract using a robust bootstrap procedure we find that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck and hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons moreover we show that bayesian measures which help overcome the short sample problem inherent in hedge fund returns lead to superior performance predictability sorting on bayesian alphas relative to ols alphas yields a 5 5 per year increase in the alpha of the spread between the top and bottom hedge fund deciles our results are robust and relevant to investors as they are neither confined to small funds nor driven by incubation bias backfill bias or serial correlation

the performance of us equity mutual funds the paper examines the performance of us no load equity mutual funds fund performance is derived using stochastic frontier analysis for a flexible functional form this analysis allows us to derive parametric estimates of efficiency scores for each fund in our sample for the first time in the literature our results indicate that us no load equity funds display varying levels of efficiency over time but also depending on size and on investment style robustness analysis reaffirm the efficiency scores remain consistent across different selections of inputs and outputs as well as the underlying distribution of the return having estimated each fund s efficiency in the sample we unveil their underlying dynamics also with respect to risk and operational characteristics such as flows assets and morningstar star ratings panel var estimations reveal that the response of funds efficiency to a shock in risk is positive and substantial some evidence of reverse causality is also observed finally we extend our analysis to investigate the relationship between funds performance and key covariates across subgroups defined by size

iterated elimination of dominated strategies in a bertrand edgeworth model we consider a bertrand edgeworth model of price competition firms have identical and constant marginal costs and finite exogeneous capacities firms choose prices our interest is in the set of those prices which are left over after the iterated elimination of dominated strategies we show that in two circumstances this set will be close to the set containing only the marketclearing walrasian price i if any n 1 out of n firms assumed to be in the market have sufficient capacity to cover demand at marginal costs ii if any given total capacity is owned by a very large number of very small firms

a simple model of endogenous tax reform abstract this paper presents a model of optimal taxation that is useful for understanding governments incentives to switch from wage to consumption taxation the key ingredient is the fact that governments cannot precommit policy although under precommitment governments would tax only wages there is an ex post incentive to switch to the consumption tax as savings grow numerical examples for a nested ces utility function find that for reasonable parameter values equilibrium features a switch to consumption taxation in particular the model produces this tax reform when parameterized as in auerbach and kotlikoff s 1987 study

is partial tax harmonization desirable we consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions on one hand governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates on the other hand they are unable to commit to future policies and once capital has been installed have incentives to increase taxes in this setting there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions we compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios no tax harmonization all countries set taxes unilaterally global tax harmonization all countries coordinate their capital taxes and partial tax harmonization only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes we show that if capital is sufficiently mobile partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization

the effect of distributive goals on the time inconsistency of optimal taxes abstract in the context of a two period n consumer model of optimal wage and interest taxation this paper asks whether the government s distributive goals can inhibit its incentives to renege on its announced policies inconsistent interest tax increases may be moderated by distributed goals if they create an unacceptable utility distribution in the economy this result is developed for a general case its implications for welfare and savings are illustrated with numerical examples

tournament rewards and risk taking this article considers a lazear rosen tournament model where agents can influence both the spread of their output distribution risk taking and its mean the unique equilibrium induces excessive risk taking and a low level of effort by modifying the tournament to give the highest prize to the agent with the most moderate output a low level of risk taking and high level of effort can be sustained as an equilibrium the first result can be useful to understand the relative performance evaluation puzzle of executive compensation and the second result can be useful to understand puzzling workplace norms promoting mediocrity

estimation risk and incentive contracts for portfolio managers the fiduciary relationship between portfolio managers and the investors they represent may be viewed as a principal agent relationship and therefore we have used the methodology from the agency literature in economics and finance to study the impact of existing compensation arrangements on the conflicts of interest between these two groups in this paper we employ the assumptions of the capital asset pricing model and of estimation risk concerning beta to develop a model in which portfolio managers can through effort choose the parameters of the beta distribution our model entails moral hazard because the investor cannot observe the manager s action given certain utility functions we show that the presence of estimation risk leads the manager to choose a lower beta portfolio than otherwise and that no first best optimal contract exists we also show that managerial divergent behavior is related to the divergence in risk preferences between the manager and the investor by making slightly more stringent assumptions about preferences we show that there exist some conditions under which the manager will provide more effort but also a riskier portfolio than the investor prefers finally we show that the investor will prefer a manager who is less risk averse than the investor

the dynamics of short term mutual fund flows and returns a time series and cross sectional investigation abstract this study analyzes the dynamics of daily mutual fund flows a vector auto regression var of flows and returns shows that the behavior of fund investors is more consistent with contrarian rather than momentum characteristics past fund flows have a positive impact on future fund returns with the long term information effect dominating the transient price pressure effect seasonality in daily flows such as day of week and day of month patterns are present and daily flows are generally mean reverting probit regressions indicate that fund investment objective marketing policy and level of active management explain cross sectional variation in the behavioral patterns displayed in daily flows our results are robust to the different methods of calculating daily flows based on whether or not the day end tna figures include the current day s flow throughout the analysis we contrast the dynamics of daily flows with established results for monthly fund flows and find important differences between the two

men women and competition an experimental test of behavior this study reports a series of experiments that examine outcomes when agents are able to choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance i e piece rate and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance i e a tournament we test for the presence and persistence of gender differences in performance and the rate of entry into the tournament option and whether these differences are sensitive to the structure of the tournament rewards in the winner take all wta condition only the best performer in the tournament for each round received a payment 4 50 in the graduated tournament condition the same payment 4 50 was divided among the first second and third finishers in the tournament in the wta condition men showed significantly lower forecast errors than women in addition a clear sorting effect occurs in the wta condition in early rounds of the wta condition male entrants into the tournament show significantly lower forecast errors than female tournament entrants however the difference disappears over time after controlling for forecasting skill gender did not predict entry into the tournament for the wta condition however lower forecasting skill reduced the probability of entry in the graduated tournament the situation was reversed men entered the tournament at significantly higher rates even after controlling for skill forecasting skill had no impact on the decision to enter the tournament while the average male entrant to the tournament had lower forecast errors than the average female entrant the men entered at much higher rates as a consequence men were much more likely than women to enter the tournament too frequently

optimal contracts in a continuous time delegated portfolio management problem this article studies the contracting problem between an individual investor and a professional portfolio manager in a continuous time principal agent framework optimal contracts are obtained in closed form these contracts are of a symmetric form and suggest that a portfolio manager should receive a fixed fee a fraction of the total assets under management plus a bonus or a penalty depending upon the portfolio s excess return relative to a benchmark portfolio the appropriate benchmark portfolio is an active index that contains risky assets where the number of shares invested in each asset can vary over time rather than a passive index in which the number of shares invested in each asset remains constant over time fund managers compensation schemes in a delegated portfolio management setting have been of special interest to both academics and practitioners academic interest stems in part from the rapid growth of managed funds over the last two decades gompers and metrick 1998 report that by december 1996 mutual funds pension funds and other financial intermediaries held discretional control over more than half of the u s equity market it is thus of importance to study the impact of institutional trading on asset prices and to integrate into one model both asset pricing and delegated portfolio management compensation as advocated by brennan 1993 allen and santomero 1997 and allen 2001 it is also important to understand the relationship between a manager s trading strategies and his implicit incentives or career concerns see e g brown harlow and starks 1996 brown goetzmann and park 1997 chevalier and ellison 1999 and chen and pennacchi 2000 these concerns include internal promotion from a small to a large fund higher outside offers and the flow of money through the fund under management 1 the importance of fund manager compensation is also underscored by congressional passage in 1970 of the amendment to

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

incentive fees some problems and some solutions 1987 incentive fees some problems and some solutions financial analysts journal vol 43 no 1 pp 21 26

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite this paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls under the manager s optimal policy the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money as the asset value goes to zero volatility goes to infinity however the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking sometimes the manager s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account furthermore giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility managers with convex compensation schemes play an important role in financial markets this paper solves for the optimal dynamic investment policy for a risk averse manager paid with a call option on the assets he controls the paper focuses on how the option compensation impacts the manager s appetite for risk when he cannot hedge the option position on one hand the convexity of the option makes the manager shun payoffs that are likely to be near the money under the optimal policy the manager either significantly outperforms his benchmark or else incurs severe losses furthermore in examples of optimal trading strategies asset volatility goes to infinity as asset value goes to zero yet option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking as asset value grows large or if the evaluation date is far away the manager moderates asset risk for example if the manager has constant relative risk aversion crra asset volatility converges to the merton constant as asset value goes to infinity in some situations the manager actually chooses a lower asset volatility than he would if he were investing on his own because the leverage inherent in his option magnifies his exposure to the asset volatility in addition with all constant or decreasing absolute risk averse utility functions from the hyperbolic absolute risk averse hara class giving the manager more options causes him to reduce asset volatility in the crra case for example the manager targets a fixed volatility for his personal

list pricing and discounting in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly list or retail pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice we modify the standard bertrand edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount or not in a subsequent stage we show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome this is true for a general class of rationing rules further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader