repeated rounds with price feedback in experimental auction valuation an adversarial collaboration it is generally thought that market outcomes are improved with the provision of market information as a result the use of repeated rounds with price feedback has become standard practice in the applied experimental auction valuation literature we conducted two experiments to determine how rationally subjects behave with and without price feedback in a second price auction results from an auction for lotteries show that subjects exposed to price feedback are significantly more likely to commit preference reversals however this irrationality diminishes in later rounds results from an induced value auction indicate that price feedback caused greater deviations from the nash equilibrium bidding strategy our results suggest that while bidding on the same item repeatedly improves auction outcomes this improvement is not the result of price feedback

make to order or make to stock model and application some firms make all their products to order while others make them to stock there are a number of firms that maintain a middle ground where some items are made to stock and others are made to order this paper was motivated by a consumer product company faced with the decision about which items to make to stock and which ones to make to order and the inventory and production policy for the make to stock items the production environment is characterized by multiple items setup times between the production of consecutive items limited capacity and congestion effects in such an environment making an item to order reduces inventory costs for that item but might increase the lot size and inventory costs for the items made to stock also lead times increase because of congestion effects resulting in higher safety stocks for make to stock items and lower service levels for make to order items thus leading to a complex trade off we develop a nonlinear integer programming formulation of the problem we present an efficient heuristic to solve the problem which was motivated by key results for a special case of the problem without congestion effects that can be solved optimally we also develop a lower bound to evaluate the performance of the heuristic a computational study indicates that the heuristic performs well we discuss the application of the model in a large firm and the resulting insights we also provide insights into the impact of various problem parameters on the make to order versus make to stock decisions using a computational study in particular we find that the average number of setups of an item selected for make to stock production is always less than half the average number of setups of the item if it were to be made to order also factors other than an item s demand such as its setup time processing time and unit holding cost impact the make to order versus make to stock decision

labor mobility and the incidence of the residential property tax abstract this paper analyzes the incidence of the residential property tax in an economy with two communities workers are perfectly mobile so that their utility levels are equal in the two communities in equilibrium the property tax is modeled as an ad valorem tax on housing services

the winner s curse experiments with buyers and with sellers this paper explores the winner s curse phenomena as it was studied experimentally by kagel and levin experiments with the winner s curse are complicated by the fact that subjects can lose money and the experimenter has only a limited means of collecting it from them thus subjects enjoy only limited liability which has theoretical implications for behavior in the kagel and levin experiments subjects were removed from the bidders competition after losses reached a predetermined value this experimental procedure has unknown implications for the results so ambiguity exists about whether the winner s curse was actually observed in this study their results were replicated in an environment in which subjects were not removed the case in which competitors are sellers is also studied bankruptcy cannot be a problem in sellers competition in both cases the winner s curse is observed thus the limited liability cannot be an explanation for the phenomenon reported by kagel and levin in addition the paper examines the bidding behavior of all individuals and shows that this behavior does not fit any of the tested theories either on the aggregate or individual level the winner s curse did not disappear over time during the conduct of the research

inventory service level measures convexity and approximation we argue that standard approximations for two often used inventory service level measures may perform poorly in many situations then we confirm the long standing conjecture that the relatively exact formulas for these quantities are convex functions of the relevant control variables both results suggest the exact expressions should be seriously considered in practical work

product line competition customization vs proliferation we study a market with customers who have heterogeneous preferences for product attributes we consider two types of firms that compete on price and product variety a traditional firm which chooses a limited set of product configurations and a customizing firm which can produce any configuration to order the traditional firm carries product inventories and experiences a lead time delay the customizing firm does not carry inventory and its customers incur waiting costs until they receive their orders we assume that the customizing firm has limited capacity in the short run e g when it does not outsource production to high volume manufacturers we derive the equilibrium for a duopoly competition between the customizing firm and the traditional firm study its characteristics and compare it to a monopoly we characterize conditions that favor customization under competition we find that the customizing firm s profit is not monotone in the market size and its ease of customization similarly a

an experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations abstract we study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single indivisible item valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder s own and other bidders signals theoretically the english auction yields efficient allocations while other standard auction formats fail to do so consistent with equilibrium predictions we find that an english auction yields significantly more efficiency than a second price sealed bid auction we also study the seller s expected revenue and the bidders expected profits and find that the experimental results are close to the theoretical predictions

food choice health information and functional ingredients an experimental auction employing bread abstract in this paper we present the results of an experimental auction conducted to examine the influence of health and nutritional information on food choice and in particular estimate consumer willingness to pay wtp for bread that contains functional ingredients employing a sandwich we find that consumers are wtp more for a whole grain and whole grain granary bread sandwich than other bread types including white bread that contains a functional ingredient we also find that consumers react positively to the provision of nutritional and health benefit information but that this effect occurs regardless of whether we supply specific or non specific health benefit information we discuss information provision and health policy implications that emerge from our analysis for bread products in the sandwich market

a general equilibrium analysis of property tax incidence abstract mieszkowski s 1972 analysis of the new view of property tax incidence dealt with a model of an economy containing only one sector and three factors in which labor was immobile brueckner 1981 incorporated an equal utility condition into his general equilibrium analysis of property tax incidence to take worker mobility into account his model however did not have capital as an input factor and the benefits of public expenditure were ignored this paper extends previous research by using a general equilibrium model of an economy with two sectors three factors and multiple communities both capital and labor are assumed to be mobile and brueckner s labor mobility condition is modified to include public expenditure effects while the results of the analysis support the new view they qualify the original mieszkowski studies in many aspects the model also sheds light on tax incidence in no tax communities which was often ignored in earlier studies

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

posted prices and bid affiliation evidence from experimental auctions in most experimental auctions researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple po tentially binding rounds posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds if bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds this practice could result in biased value estimates in this article we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior we find that for familiar items high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions article advances the literature in several im portant ways first we report the design and results of the only study designed specifically to control for the effects of posted prices on bids in subsequent rounds we do this with the aid of confederate bidders who were instructed to bid within a certain narrow range thus we have multiple treatments that vary only by the presence or absence of confederate bidders al lowing for what we believe to be the cleanest possible test of the effect of posted prices on bidding behavior in later rounds while list and shogren 1999 model bids in round t as a function of the posted price in round t 1 through our use of confederate bidders to con trol posted prices we are able to test whether exposure to high posted prices has an effect that accumulates over the course of multiple rounds leading to a gradual increase in mean bids second our methods of analysis are more complete than previous work examining bid af filiation we not only compare summary statis tics from early and late rounds but we also use panel data analysis to understand how in dividual participants bids are affected by the presence of confederate bidders focusing on individuals rather than summary statistics al lows us to understand how individual specific characteristics influence affiliation and it also allows us to better understand the role of out liers

changes in beef packers market power after the livestock mandatory price reporting act an agent based auction controversy remains about the effectiveness of the 1999 livestock mandatory price reporting act mpra we determine the likely changes in beef packers market power after the mpra by using an agent based first price common value auction past research has employed cournot models but we use an auction model which more closely resembles the actual cattle procurement process we find that feeders benefit from the mpra regardless of whether price uncertainty decreases for packers and or feeders if the packers price uncertainty is reduced the feeder benefits from an increase in competition between the packers if the feeder s price uncertainty is reduced the feeder benefits from imposing more accurate reserve prices copyright 2013 oxford university press

should students be used as subjects in experimental auctions abstract we examine the bidding behavior of students and non students in experimental auctions by comparing their willingness to pay wtp values for a good our results suggest that there is no significant difference between the wtp bids of the two groups

the incidence of regional taxes in a general equilibrium framework abstract a six region general equilibrium model of the united states is presented and used to evaluate the incidence of state local business taxes because this formulation allows for labor and capital mobility the provision of public goods distinctions between household and business level taxes and the interaction of state local and federal tax systems numerical analysis is particularly appropriate simulations show that capital improvements generally bear the average economy wide burden of business taxes levied on them regardless of whether a multilateral or unilateral policy change is considered or whether the alternative tax is imposed on immobile resources or household income however for other factors of production both mobile andimmobile the effects vary across scenarios a demonstration that incidence should not be thought of as a single outcome or value

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

efficiency in auctions with private and common values an experimental study this discussion has resulted in a publication in the american economic review 2002 92 3 625 43 auctions are generally not efficient when the object s expected value depends on private and common value information we report a series of first price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders while some subjects fall prey to the winner s curse they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency the public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency although less than predicted

product customization and price competition on the internet the internet provides an unprecedented capability for sellers to learn about their customers and offer custom products at special prices in addition customization is more feasible today because of advances in manufacturing technologies that have improved sellers manufacturing flexibility we first develop a model of product customization and flexible pricing to incorporate the salient roles of the internet and flexible manufacturing technologies in reducing the costs of designing and producing tailored consumer goods we show how a monopoly seller may earn the highest profits by producing both standard and custom products and can raise prices for both types of products as customization and information collection technologies improve simultaneous adoption of customization in a duopoly reduces the differentiation between their standard products but does not intensify price competition compared with a two facility monopolist the duopoly may underinvest in customization consumer surplus improves after sellers adopt customization but does not monotonically increase as customization technologies advance when firms face a fixed entry cost and adopt customization sequentially the first entrant always achieves an advantage and may be able to deter subsequent entry by choosing its customization scope strategically