do firms engage in risk shifting empirical evidence i empirically test whether firms engage in risk shifting contrary to what risk shifting theory predicts i find that firms reduce investment risk when they approach financial distress to identify the effect of distress on risk taking i use a natural experiment with exogenous changes to leverage risk reduction is most prevalent among firms that have shorter maturity debt bank debt and tighter bank loan financial covenants these findings suggest that debt composition and financial covenants serve as important mechanisms to mitigate debt equity agency conflicts such as risk shifting that are not explicitly contracted on received january 8 2015 accepted may 27 2016 by editor david denis

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

idiosyncratic variation of treasury bill yields i document a dramatic increase in the importance of two types of variation in treasury bill yields beginning in the early 1980s the first is idiosyncratic variation in individual short maturity less than three months bill yields the second is a common component in treasury bill yields that is not shared by yields on other instruments such as short maturity privately issued instruments or longer maturity treasury notes and bonds some evidence suggests the first type reflects increased market segmentation these results have important implications for the calibration and testing of no arbitrage term structure models and interpreting tests of the expectations hypothesis united states treasury bill yields play a central role in economists efforts to understand the behavior of financial markets the focus on treasury bills is driven by the belief that bill yields can be viewed as benchmarks from which yields on other debt instruments are derived for example in no arbitrage models of the default free term structure the stochastic properties of the hypothetical instantaneous interest rate determine bond prices researchers often construct and evaluate these models using short maturity bill yields as proxies for instantaneous interest rates similarly bill yields are frequently used to test the expectations hypothesis of the term structure 2 economists standard pricing models for default risky securities also view treasury yields as building blocks in such models yields on default risky securities depend at least in part on the yields of default free securities and the underlying stochastic default process therefore yields on treasury bills have been used in studies of the effects of monetary policy on the business cycle not because bills are intrinsically critical to the economy but because

evaluating interval forecasts a complete theory for evaluating interval forecasts has not been worked out to date most of the literature implicitly assumes homoskedastic errors even when this is clearly violated and proceed by merely testing for correct unconditional coverage consequently i set out to build a consistent framework for conditional interval forecast evaluation which is crucial when higher order moment dynamics are present the new methodology is demonstrated in an application to the exchange rate forecasting procedures advocated in risk management

status intertemporal choice and risk taking this paper takes the position that an individual s concern for relative status is expressed in her preferences we embed this hypothesis in an otherwise conventional model of economic growth and examine its consequences the model generates two kinds of equilibrium in the first all individuals always follow a deterministic consumption and investment strategy such a strategy must be linear in output is independent of payo s and technology and only depends on the discount factor this sort of equilibrium exists when the individual cares only about status and the individual production function is convex in investment in contrast the other kind of equilibrium involves convergence to a steady state in which there is persistent and endogenously generated gambling this kind of equilibrium exists in more plausible circumstances the individual has a utility function that may depend on consumption per se as well as implied status and individual production functions are concave we characterize the unique steady state in such a situation and prove that any dynamic equilibrium path must converge to it risk taking arises not from the presumption of a utility function with strictly convex segments as in friedman savage but naturally from a view of utility as depending on relative status our steady state is broadly consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and to gamble over upside risk and generates similar patterns of risk taking and avoidance across environments with quite di erent overall wealth levels finally in contrast to friedman 1953 endogenous risk taking here is generally pareto ine cient

macroeconomics and the term structure this paper provides an overview of the analysis of the term structure of interest rates with a special emphasis on recent developments at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance the topic is important to investors and also to policymakers who wish to extract macroeconomic expectations from longer term interest rates and take actions to influence those rates the simplest model of the term structure is the expectations hypothesis which posits that long term interest rates are expectations of future aver age short term rates in this paper we show that many features of the configuration of interest rates are puzzling from the perspective of the expectations hypothesis we review models that explain these anomalies using time varying risk premia although the quest for the fundamental macroeconomic explanations of these risk premia is ongoing inflation uncertainty seems to play a large role finally while modern finance theory prices bonds and other assets in a single unified framework we also consider an earlier approach based on segmented markets market segmentation seems important to understand the term structure of interest rates during the recent financial crisis jel e31 e43 e52 e58

human capital bankruptcy and capital structure we derive a firm s optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk while equity holders can diversify this risk away in the presence of corporate taxes our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice it also makes a number of predictions for the cross sectional distribution of firm leverage consistent with existing empirical evidence it implies persistent idiosyncratic dierences in leverage across firms an important new empirical prediction of the model is that ceteris paribus firms with more leverage should pay higher wages

managerial incentives on the near linearity of optimal compensation contracts are examined when outcomes depend on managers choices as well as efforts as the cost of effort shrinks relative to payoffs the optimal contract converges to a linear payoff if the control space of the agent has full dimensionality but not otherwise thus when the agent can trade expected return for greater correlation with other returns it is better to ignore relative performance when the cost of effort is small when the choices include all fair gambles and hedges the linear schedule is no more expensive than any other schedule that induces effort unfair gambles are examined as well

optimal contracts with shirking i explicitly derive the optimal dynamic incentive contract in a standard continuoustime agency setting where the agent has a shirking action my solution generates two dynamic contracts new to the literature both contracts include phases when the agent frequently shirks in one contract the shirking phases are relaxation periods rewarding the agent for good performance in the other the shirking phases are suspension type arrangements punishing the agent for poor performance in addition i also explore the relationships between optimal contracting and taxes bargaining and renegotiation

the great moderation of the term structure of uk interest rates abstract the conduct of monetary policy the term structure of interest rates and the structure of the economy in the uk have changed over the post wwii period we model the interaction between the macroeconomy and financial markets using a time varying var augmented with the factors from the yield curve there is evidence of a great moderation in the dynamics of the yield curve with the factors being persistent and volatile before the introduction of inflation targeting in 1992 but becoming stable afterwards the introduction of time variation in the factor augmented var improves the fit of the model and results in expectation hypothesis consistent yields that are close to actual yields even at long maturities monetary policy shocks had a significant impact on the volatility of inflation output and the policy rate over the pre inflation targeting era but their contribution has been negligible under the current regime shocks to the level of the yield curve accounted for a large fraction of inflation variability only before 1992

the effects of macroeconomic announcements on commodity prices this article analyzes the immediate reaction of a representative sample of commodity prices and two t bill yields to the unanticipated components of thirteen macroeconomic announcements surprises in the monetary variables cause the majority of the significant commodity price responses while these plus other cyclical surprises such as the unemployment rate cause significant lumber and t bill reactions the results provide strong support for the policy anticipations hypothesis and against the inflationary expectations hypothesis i e that monetary surprises cause changes in real interest rates rather than in nominal rates only as the inflationary expectations hypothesis contends

empirical evidence of risk shifting in financially distressed firms this paper provides evidence of risk shifting behavior in the investment decisions of financially distressed firms using a real options framework i show that shareholders risk shifting incentives can reverse the expected negative relation between volatility and investment i test two hypotheses that are consistent with risk shifting behavior i volatility has a positive effect on distressed firms investment ii investments of distressed firms generate less value during times of high uncertainty empirical evidence using 40 years of data supports both hypotheses i further evaluate the effect of various firm characteristics on risk shifting and estimate the costs of the investment distortion

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

dynamic security design convergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications an entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project an agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers we first study the optimal contract in discrete time this contract can be implemented by cash reserves debt and equity the latter is split between the financiers and the entrepreneur and pays dividends when retained earnings reach a threshold to provide appropriate incentives to the entrepreneur the firm is downsized when it runs short of cash we then study the continuous time limit of the model we prove the convergence of the discrete time value functions and optimal contracts our analysis yields rich implications for the dynamics of security prices stock prices follow a diusion reflected at the dividend barrier and absorbed at zero their volatility as well as the leverage ratio of the firm increase after bad performance stock prices and book tomarket ratios are in a non monotonic relationship a more severe agency problem entails lower price earning ratios and firm liquidity and higher default risk

a monetary analysis of food price determination erratic food price movements during the 1970s have received much attention in recent literature salathe and boehm found that movements in retail food prices since 1970 have been substantially more volatile than in earlier periods and that the food component of the consumer price index cpi has often displayed an annual rate of change different from that of the total cpi such changes in agricultural prices reflect low price elasticities for food products and the difficulty of predicting weather patterns and their effects on farm output research interest stems from relatively larger recent price changes caused by persistent general inflation and unexpected supply disruptions several recent studies of retail food prices are based on cost push theories these models posit that as input costs faced by food manufacturers rise the increases are passed through to consumers in the form of higher product prices to model cost push behavior changes in components of the marketing bill such as processing packaging and transportation costs are measured and related to subsequent changes in retail product prices examples of such empirical studies are those by lamm heien and lamm and westcott however these models represent only one perspective of the pricing process this paper suggests the use of a family of alternative models in particular by making a clear distinction between changes in nominal and real values a different set of variables is selected to measure each component of overall price change it is argued that not all models can explain behavior of both real and nominal price changes

optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous time agency model we derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous time principal agent setting and implement it with a capital structure credit line long term debt and equity over which the agent controls the payout policy while the project s volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm s total debt capacity they increase the use of credit versus debt leverage is nonstationary and declines with past profitability the firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing at a higher rate through the credit line surprisingly the usual conflicts between debt and equity asset substitution strategic default need not arise in this paper we consider a dynamic contracting environment in which a riskneutral agent or entrepreneur with limited resources manages an investment activity while the investment is profitable it is also risky and in the short run it can generate arbitrarily large operating losses the agent will need outside financial support to cover such losses and continue the project the difficulty is that while the probability distribution of the cash flows is publicly known the agent may distort these cash flows by taking a hidden action that leads to a private benefit specifically the agent may i conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption and or ii stop providing costly effort which would reduce the mean of the cash flows therefore from the perspective of the principal or investors that fund the project there is the concern that a low cash flow realization may be a result of the agent s actions rather than the project s fundamentals to provide the agent with appropriate incentives investors control the agent s wage and may also withdraw their financial support for the project and force its early termination we seek to characterize an optimal contract in this framework and relate it to the firm s choice of capital structure we develop a method to solve for the optimal contract given the incentive constraints in a continuous time setting and study the properties of the credit line debt and equity that implement the contract as in the discrete time model of demarzo and fishman 2003 the continuous time setting offers several peter m demarzo is from stanford university and yuliy sannikov is from u c berkeley we

optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous time model with limited commitment abstract we study a continuous time version of the optimal risk sharing problem with one sided commitment in the optimal contract the agent s consumption is a time invariant strictly increasing function of a single state variable the maximal level of the agent s income realized to date we characterize this function in terms of the agent s outside option value function and the discounted amount of time in which the agent s income process is expected to reach a new to date maximum under constant relative risk aversion we solve the model in closed form optimal consumption of the agent equals a constant fraction of his maximal income realized to date in the complete markets implementation of the optimal contract the alvarez jermann solvency constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint familiar from the bewley aiyagari incomplete markets models

dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility abstract we study a firm s internal resource allocation using a dynamic principal agent model with endogenous cash flow volatility the principal supplies the agent with resources for productive use but the agent has private control over both project volatility and resource intensity and may misallocate resources to obtain private benefits the optimal contract can yield either overly risky or overly prudent project selection it can be implemented with a constant pricing schedule i e a static decentralized linear mechanism giving the agent control over the resource quantities project risk and agent s equity share the implementation rationalizes the use of hurdle rates above a firm s cost of capital and transfer prices above marginal cost while showing that hurdle rates or transfer prices may not vary with the agent s risk choice

optimal mortgage design this article studies optimal mortgage design in a continuous time setting with volatile and privately observable income costly foreclosure and a stochastic market interest rate we show that the features of the optimal mortgage are consistent with an option adjustable rate mortgage option arm under the optimal contract the borrower is given discretion of how much to repay until his balance reaches a certain limit the default rates and interest rate payment on the mortgage correlate positively with the market interest rate gains from using the optimal contract relative to simpler mortgages are the biggest for those who face more income variability buy pricey houses given their income level or make little or no down payment our model thus may help to explain a high concentration of option arms among riskier borrowers jel g20 g21 g33

impatience versus incentives this paper studies the dynamics of long term contracts in repeated principal agent relationships with an impatient agent despite the absence of exogenous uncertainty pareto optimal dynamic contracts generically oscillate between favoring the principal and favoring the agent

analyzing extension s role in macroeconomic policy education monetary and fiscal policies both here and abroad have more influence on the markets of u s farmers and on the prices they receive than do the domestic conditions of agricultural demand and supply schuh 1991 the agricultural economics profession has given very little emphasis to macropolicy principles research and extension education in my view a big weakness in the profession and the ajae 1991 survey of state extension specialists

implications of the macroeconomic outlook for agriculture this paper analyzes the implications for agriculture of the macroeconomic scenarios put forth by bosworth and lawrence a substantial body of work in recent years has developed both the theoretical framework and empirical evidence on the channels of influence between the macroeconomy and agriculture the aaea sponsored preconference workshop this year entitled value of large scale aggregate models for economic policy analysis manifests the profession s interest in quantifying the effects that macroeconomic factors have upon the economic performance and financial health of agriculture this paper draws upon the findings of previous work in general terms but more specifically we present the agricultural implications of two alternative macroeconomic environments implied by an existing macroeconomic model which emphasizes agriculture s interface with the macroeconomy the second section of this paper reviews the major findings of the literature on transmission mechanisms linking agriculture with the general economy the third section provides key details of how agriculture fares under bosworth and lawrence s outlook for the general economy through 1990 including the implications for farm prices cash receipts wealth and financial stress the fourth section discusses the consequences of one potential deviation from bosworth and lawrence s out

intermediary asset pricing abstract we model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary intermediaries face an equity capital constraint risk premia r

relative agricultural prices and monetary policy an imperfect information rational expectations model of relative price determination is presented this model provides an econometric specification for testing for a causal relationship between money and the relative prices of agricultural commodities test results indicate that variations in the growth rate of the nominal money supply whether anticipated or unanticipated have not been an important influence on the average level of prices received by farmers relative to other prices in the economy over the period 1951 85

the impact of inflation on the real income of u s farmers according to conventional economic theory an unanticipated increase in the rate of general price inflation benefits those whose money incomes are flexible at the expense of those whose money incomes are fixed farmers have flexible money incomes hence theory suggests that farmers should benefit from an unanticipated increase in the rate of inflation yet at least for recent time periods empirical studies have not found that farmers gain real income as a result of an increase in the rate of general price inflation for example tweeten concluded that the terms of trade for farmers deteriorates improves as the rate of inflation rises falls this conclusion was based on his empirical finding that as inflation increases prices paid by farmers increase faster than the prices they receive on the other hand studies by gardner prentice and schertz and chambers found no significant effects of inflation on farmers terms of trade in this paper we examine various measures of relative prices over different time periods to test the hypothesis suggested by economic theory that farmers are benefitted by an acceleration in the rate of general price inflation and conversely are harmed by a deceleration in the inflation rate the real income of farmers is equal to the sum of the physical quantities which they produce multiplied by the money prices they receive all then divided by the general price level here we ignore changes in the physical production of farmers and concentrate on the behavior of the prices they receive for this physical production relative to the behavior of other prices we assume that if the prices farmers receive for their physical production rise fall relative to other prices the economic well being of farmers is enhanced diminished

rewarding trading skills without inducing gambling this paper develops a model of active portfolio management in which fund managers may secretly gamble in order to manipulate their reputation and attract more funds we show that such trading strategies may expose investors to severe losses and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient their trading skills are scalable and generate higher prot per unit of risk we study investment management contracts that deter this behavior if investors are short lived then the manager must leave rents to investors in order to credibly commit not to gamble if investors are long lived contracts that increase but defer expected bonuses after an outstanding performance implement the rstbest our model can explain a number of observed dierences

agricultural and financial market interdependence in the short run a theoretical model capable of examining the effects of various monetary policies on agriculture is developed results from comparative static experiments with the model show that a restrictive monetary policy may adversely affect agriculture results from the theoretical model are compared with earlier studies and are empirically investigated using vector autoregression techniques in general empirical analysis supports the theoretical developments

optimal leverage and aggregate investment we analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and can also switch to less profitable riskier ventures optimal financial contracts can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk shifting problem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort problem is the most severe worsening of the moral hazard problems leads to decreases in investment and output at the macroeconomic level moreover aggregate leverage decreases with the risk shifting problem and increases with the effort problem

price pressure in the government bond market what determines the term structure of interest rates standard economic theory links the interest rate for maturity t to the willingness of a representative agent to substitute consumption between times 0 and t the standard model contrasts sharply with a more informal view based on investors preferred habitat proposed by john culbertson 1957 and franco modigliani and richard sutch 1966 according to the preferred habitat view there are investor clienteles with preferences for specific maturities and the interest rate for a given maturity is influenced by the demand of the corresponding clientele and the supply of bonds with that maturity for example the typical clientele for long term bonds are pension funds an increase in their demand would be expected to raise prices of long term bonds and thus lower long term interest rates in short preferred habitat implies that there is price pressure in the bond market while the preferred habitat view has intuitive appeal it has not entered into the academic mainstream typically being relegated to a paragraph in mba level textbooks one reason for this is the mixed findings in early empirical studies of the term structure specifically between 1962 and 1964 the us treasury and federal reserve raised the supply of short term government debt while simultaneously lowering the supply of long term debt this program known as operation twist aimed to raise shortterm interest rates and so improve the balance of payments while also lowering long term rates to stimulate private investment a number of papers evaluated operation twist and while they reached different conclusions none found strong evidence that the operation was effective in flattening the term structure e g modigliani price pressure in the government bond market

a hybrid spline based parametric model for the yield curve empirical evidence indicates that both nominal and real yield curves in important markets have segmentation between their short end and their longer maturity segments this segmentation might affect term structure estimation introducing distortions in longer maturity yields especially in parametric models in order to deal with such segmentation we propose a new model that combines the flexibility of spline functions with the parsimoniousness of a parametric four factor exponential model the short end of the yield curve is fitted using a b spline function while longer segments are captured by the parametric model we illustrate the benefits of the proposed model for pricing and risk management purposes using two examples the real yield curve in the brazilian government index linked bond market and the us treasury nominal yield curve we show that in both markets our model is simultaneously able to fit the yield curve well and to provide unbiased value at risk estimates for all tested portfolios of bonds outperforming an important parametric benchmark model frequently adopted by central banks

a continuous time version of the principal agent problem this paper describes a new continuous time principal agent model in which the output is a diffusion process with drift determined by the agent s unobserved effort the risk averse agent receives consumption continuously the optimal contract based on the agent s continuation value as a state variable is computed by a new method using a differential equation during employment the output path stochastically drives the agent s continuation value until it reaches a point that triggers retirement quitting replacement or promotion the paper explores how the dynamics of the agent s wages and effort as well as the optimal mix of short term and long term incentives depend on the contractual environment the understanding of dynamic incentives is central in economics how do companies motivate their workers through piece rates bonuses and promotions how is income inequality connected with productivity investment and economic growth how do financial contracts and capital structure give incentives to the managers of a corporation the methods and results of this paper provide important insights to many such questions this paper introduces a continuous time principal agent model that focuses on the dynamic properties of optimal incentive provision we identify factors that make the agent s wages increase or decrease over time we examine the degree to which current and future outcomes motivate the agent we provide conditions under which the agent eventually reaches retirement in the optimal contract we also investigate how the costs of creating incentives and the dynamic properties of the optimal contract depend on the contractual environment the agent s outside options the difficulty of replacing the agent and the opportunities for promotion our new dynamic insights are possible due to the technical advantages of continuous time methods over the traditional discrete time ones continuous time leads to a much simpler computational procedure to find the optimal contract by solving an ordinary differential equation this equation highlights the factors that determine optimal consumption and effort the dynamics of the agent s career path are naturally described by the drift and volatility of the agent s pay offs the geometry of solutions to the differential equation allows for easy comparisons to see how the agent s wages effort and incentives depend on the contractual environment finally continuous time highlights many essential features of the optimal contract including the agent s eventual retirement in our benchmark model a risk averse agent is tied to a risk neutral principal forever after employment starts the agent influences output by his continuous unobservable effort input the principal sees only the output a brownian motion with a drift that depends on the agent s effort the agent dislikes effort and enjoys consumption we assume that the agent s utility function has the income effect that is as the agent s income increases it becomes costlier to compensate him for the effort also we assume that the agent s utility of consumption is bounded from below

corporate policies with permanent and transitory shocks we model the financing cash holdings and hedging policies of a firm facing financing frictions and subject to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks the permanent and transitory shocks generate distinct sometimes opposite effects on corporate policies we use the model to develop a rich set of empirical predictions in our model correlated permanent and transitory shocks imply less risk lower cash savings and a drop in the value of credit lines the composition of cash flow shocks affects the cash flow sensitivity of cash which can be positive or negative optimal hedging of permanent and transitory shocks may involve opposite positions

bond yields and the federal reserve bond yields respond to policy decisions by the federal reserve and vice versa to learn about these responses i model a high frequency policy rule based on yield curve information and an arbitrage free bond market in continuous time the fed s target is a pure jump process jump intensities depend on the state of the economy and the meeting calendar of the federal open market committee the model has closed form solutions for yields as functions of a few state variables introducing monetary policy helps to match the whole yield curve because the target is an observable state variable that pins down its short end and introduces important seasonalities around fomc meetings the volatility of yields is snake shaped which the model explains with policy inertia the policy rule crucially depends on the two year yield and describes fed policy better than taylor rules

uncertainty shocks and balance sheet recessions this paper investigates the origin and propagation of balance sheet recessions i first show that in standard models driven by tfp shocks the balance sheet channel disappears when agents can write contracts on the aggregate state of the economy optimal contracts sever the link between leverage and aggregate risk sharing eliminating the concentration of aggregate risk that drives balance sheet recessions i then show that uncertainty shocks can help explain this concentration of aggregate risk and drive balance sheet recessions even with contracts on aggregate shocks the mechanism is quantitatively important and i explore implications for financial regulation

neutrality of inflation in the agricultural sector abstract the paper considers the effect of inflation on the relative prices of products traded in auction markets prices of us agricultural products are used for the period 1951 1981 since agricultural products are widely traded the real forces of supply and demand specific to agriculture are represented by foreign agricultural prices the exchange rate is entered as a separate variable influencing domestic agricultural prices trade between the usa and the ten countries included in the federal reserve board s trade weighted dollar is considered the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that inflation did not alter relative agricultural prices when the real forces of supply and demand and the exchange rate are held constant

relative prices and money further results for the united states empirical results support the hypothesis that agricultural prices respond faster than manufactured product prices to a change in money supply in the united states sims vector autoregression var technique was applied in examining this hypothesis the monte carlo integration method was used to test the significance of the impulse responses generated by the var technique

explorations into factors explaining money market returns in this article we measure and interpret the common factors that describe money market returns results are presented for both three and four factor models we find that the three factor model explains on average 86 percent of the total variation in most money market returns while the four factor model explains on average 90 percent of this variation using mimicking portfolios we provide an interpretation of the systematic risks represented by these factors in this article we attempt to measure and interpret the common factors that describe money market returns the factor approach we employ assumes that the covariance matrix of a set of random variables in this case excess returns can be decomposed into common or systematic components and idiosyncratic or nonsystematic components this decomposition into systematic and nonsystematic components is based on an assumption of a linear relationship between the returns of each security and a set of common factors this is the assumption of linear return generating models which form an integral part of the structure of many asset pricing theories for example arbitrage pricing theory apt as developed by ross 1976 the interpretation is that the common factors represent sources of systematic or nondiversifiable risk and the idiosyncratic component of returns represents diversifiable risks our focus here is not on testing a particular asset pricing model per se but on developing empirical evidence for the existence of stylized facts regarding money market returns the stylized facts take the form of the existence measurement and interpretation of the common factors that are found in money markets our attempt to measure and interpret these sources of systematic risk may eventually lead to the construction of observable eco

reward for luck in a dynamic agency model this paper studies a continuous time principal agent problem of a rm whose cash ows are determined by the manager s unobserved eort the rm s cash ows are further subject to persistent and publicly observable shocks that are beyond the manager s control while standard contracting models predict that compensation should optimally lter out these shocks empirical evidence suggests otherwise in line with this evidence our model predicts that the manager is rewarded for luck

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

caviar conditional autoregressive value at risk by regression quantiles value at risk var has become the standard measure of market risk employed by financial institutions for both internal and regulatory purposes var is defined as the value that a portfolio will lose with a given probability over a certain time horizon usually one or ten days despite its conceptual simplicity its measurement is a very challenging statistical problem and none of the methodologies developed so far give satisfactory solutions interpreting the var as the quantile of future portfolio values conditional on current information we propose a new approach to quantile estimation which does not require any of the extreme assumptions invoked by existing methodologies such as normality or i i d returns the conditional autoregressive value at risk or caviar model moves the focus of attention from the distribution of returns directly to the behavior of the quantile we specify the evolution of the quantile over time using a special type of autoregressive process and use the regression quantile framework introduced by koenker and bassett to determine the unknown parameters since the objective function is not differentiable we use a differential evolutionary genetic algorithm for the numerical optimization utilizing the criterion that each period the probability of exceeding the var must be independent of all the past information we introduce a new test of model adequacy the dynamic quantile test applications to simulated and real data provide empirical support to this methodology and illustrate the ability of these algorithms to adapt to new risk environments

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research