innovations improvements and the optimal adoption of new technologies abstract this paper extends the literature on technology adoption by introducing a distinction between technological breakthroughs innovations and the engineering refinements improvements that follow such a breakthrough firms do not necessarily wait for a future technological breakthrough but instead have an incentive to delay the adoption of a new technology until it is sufficiently advanced we characterize a firm s adoption decision as the solution to a continuous time infinite horizon dynamic programming problem which gives rise to an ordinary differential equation that is highly non linear and does not have a closed form solution we thus employ projection techniques and show how these techniques can be applied to the analysis of optimal stopping problems

on the policy ineffectiveness proposition and a keynesian alternative a rejoinder i the basis of rush and waldo s rw results is the introduction of a war dummy variable in the dg equation this is however difficult to justify in the context of a rational expectations model under incomplete learning wars by their very nature are unique events and it is not clear how the public are supposed to learn the quantitative effects that the ending of three totally different wars may have had upon the growth of real government expenditure the fact that in i946 the public knew that world war ii was over does not mean that they could also estimate its precise quantitative effect on government expenditure rw estimate their dg equation using data for the whole of the period i943 73 and i943 85 thus implicitly assuming that all these data were available to the public in i946 for the computation of the coefficient of the war dummy in the dg equation but in i946 the public could not possibly have known about the timing and the intensities of the korean or the vietnam wars the assumption of complete learning that underlies the rational expectations hypothesis in general and rw s version of the nc model in particular is especially troublesome when the model contains dummy variables that correspond to unique events

patent races and the persistence of monopoly patent races are important determinants of market structure for a new firm a patent can be an entry ticket into the market for an incumbent firm already in the market patents for related technologies can ensure that no new firm enters in this spirit recent work has explored the implications of patenting for the persistence of monopoly see for example dasgupta i982 gilbert i98i gilbert and newbery i982 much attention has been given to pre emptive patenting the strategic acquisition of patents by an incumbent firm solely to prevent potential rivals from entering the market in this context it is important to distinguish between two kinds of patent race a standard race is a competition in which a prize is awarded to the first player to reach the finishing line an asymmetrical race is a competition in which one player loses something of value if one of his rivals reaches the finishing line he is content if nobody wins but a prize is won by the first of the other players to reach the finishing line if any of them does so a patent race in which an incumbent firm s sole concern is to prevent potential rivals from entering his market is an asymmetrical race and not a standard race the distinction between the two kinds of race can be captured only in models with a sufficiently rich dynamic structure this and other advantages of a properly dynamic model are explained in section ii a model of an asymmetrical race with two firms is presented in section iii in this model the challenger wins a prize and the incumbent loses a prize if the challenger is first to reach the finishing line it is shown that the challenger is often automatically deterred from making any effort to win the race because the strategic interactions between the players are such that the incumbent would outdo any reasonable effort made by the challenger in order to stop the challenger being first to reach the finishing line then the incumbent has no need to make any effort in the race in order to maintain his existing monopoly the reason is that the incumbent unlike the challenger does not need to go all the way to the finishing line to achieve his objective on the other hand it may be truedepending on the parameters describing the firmsthat the challenger wins the patent proceeding to the finishing line just as if he were the only contender for the patent of particular interest is the case in which the firms are identical

on real and sticky price theories of the business cycle after presenting some facts about the growth of government in western industrialized countries possible causes of this development are analyzed from a public choice perspective next some empirically tested theories which seek to explain this growth are discussed finally possible consequences for efficiency and individual liberty are examined it is shown that both the number and size of interest groups age of democracy as stated by mancur olson 1982 and the increasing share of government expenditure in gdp seem to exert a negative influence on the growth rate of gdp copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

the nash bargaining solution is optimal abstract we consider the problem faced by players in a two person bargaining game who have different opinions about what is the appropriate solution concept to use a procedure is proposed to resolve such a conflict and it is shown that the nash bargaining solution constitutes the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the procedure as a by product we obtain that in the axiomatic characterization of the nash solution the controversial independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom can be replaced by a much weaker recursivity axiom which amounts to requiring independence of alternatives that cannot be obtained as an outcome of a risk sensitive solution

understanding rent dissipation on the use of game theory in industrial organization game theory has had a deep impact on the theory of industrial organization in a similar but less controversial way as the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics the reason it has been embraced by a majority of researchers in the field is that it imposes some discipline on theoretical thinking it forces economists to clearly specify the strategic variables their timing and the information structure faced by firms as is often the case in economics the researcher learns as much from constructing the model the extensive form as from

a critique of the proposed tests of the natural rate rational expectations hypothesis the failure of the governments of most industrialised countries over the past decade to deal successfully with the problems of rising unemployment and high and often accelerating rates of price and wage inflation has revived interest in the pre keynesian macro economics of sound money and has renewed the controversy of the 1930 s over what governments should or should not do if they wish to achieve full employment with reasonable price stability in democratic societies keynesian economics has come under attack both by those who primarily oppose interventionist policies on ideological grounds and by the so called new classical macro economists who adhere to the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis nrh advanced by phelps i967 and friedman i 968 and the hypothesis of rational formation of expectations reh originally due to muth i96i armed with this joint natural rate rational expectations nr re hypothesis the new classical macro economists have argued that in a world capable of being represented by linear or log linear relations with a unique and stable equilibrium and no information discrepancy between the government and the private sector no government macro economic policy whether monetary or fiscal no matter how ingeniously formulated and how effectively implemented can have any systematic or lasting impact upon the level of output or the rate of unemployment 2 clearly this fundamental policy

a dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion abstract we model capacity building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible while building their capacity over time firms compete a la cournot in the product market given their installed capacity there is no exogenous order of moves no commitment regarding future decisions and no finite horizon we investigate markov perfect equilibrium mpe paths of the investment game which may include episodes during which firms invest at different times a preemption pattern and episodes in which firms invest simultaneously a tacit collusion pattern these episodes may alternate and are typically several when firms have yet to invest in capacity the sole pattern that is mpe compatible is a preemption episode firms invest at different times but have equal value the first such investment may occur earlier and therefore be riskier than socially optimal when both firms hold capacity tacit collusion episodes may be mpe compatible firms invest simultaneously at a postponed time hence holding back production in the meantime thereby generating an investment wave in the industry such investment episodes are more likely with higher demand volatility faster market growth and lower cost of capital discount rate

fiscal decentralization and government size numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors this paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth fiscal decentralization the results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy

adjusted p and f tests and the keynesian classical debate the debate over the manner in which changes in money growth rates affect real economic activity and over the role that systematic monetary policy plays in this relationship has been a protracted one yet it remains unresolved this paper shows that a model proposed by fischer 13 in which multi period ahead expectational errors in money growth are crucial for the determination of real economic aggregates is empirically superior to two leading alternatives when the three are estimated on a sample of u s quarterly data spanning the 1970s in addition we show that the test used to demonstrate these results a version of davidson and mackinnon s 9 p test which we adjust experimentally to remove small sample biases in its size is in this application more powerful than the more commonly used f ratio form of the likelihood ratio test we use these results on relative power to explain and reconcile some conflicting decisions to which the two alternative tests lead

investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit abstract this paper investigates the interplay of investment irreversibility and endogenous exit in a duopoly with aggregate demand uncertainty endogenous exit and investment irreversibility produce predatory behavior in very competitive industries in which prices react strongly to changes in quantity and in which capacity increases are not too costly when the market is in decline firms increase capacity in order to subsequently monopolize this market upon a further decrease in demand predatory behavior is particularly likely to occur if fixed costs of operation are substantial large uncertainty has the opposite effect and makes predatory behavior less prevalent predation occurs as investment irreversibility gives commitment power to delay one s own exit and to promote the exit of a competitor this explains predatory behavior in a duopoly without invoking reputation network effects or learning effects

mathematical models of the u s military expenditure decision making process mathematical models of the u s military expenditure decision making process are constructed estimated and analyzed each model contains four interdependent policymaking groups each group is assumed to have different goals and objectives these objectives are formalized and are assumed to be a function of actions of other policymakirg groups relevant fiscal and economic constraints expectations of actions of other policymaking groups and the perceived external threat given posited objectives and a decision calculus by which expectations are formed adaptively and partial adjustments made by the groups to their goals decision rules describing behavior are derived and estimated results suggest that policymakers do employ expectations and do make partial adjustments to operational goals

economics of public good provision auditing outsourcing and bribery this study investigates a government s contracting decision to audit or outsource the provision of a public good given a potential hidden bribe and information asymmetries the key findings are the following first the bribe and price of the public good are increasing in the corruptibility of the department second the bribe is decreasing in the firm s bargaining power third a bribery equilibrium exists when the department s corruptibility is sufficiently high given the firm s bargaining power a bribe involves extortion or a compensatory payment depending on the department s corruptibility only a compensatory bribe affects the department s contracting decision ce memoire examine une decision contractuelle d un gouvernement de produire un bien public lui meme et de faire une verification ou d aller en sous traitance pour la fourniture d un bien public compte tenu de la possibilite de pot de vin cache et d asymetries informationnelles les principaux resultats s enoncent comme suit d abord le pot de vin et le prix du bien public s accroissent avec le degre de corruptibilite du ministere ensuite la taille du pot de vin decline a proportion que le pouvoir de marchandage de la firme s accroit enfin un equilibre de corruption existe quand la corruptibilite du ministere est suffisamment elevee compte tenu du pouvoir de marchandage de la firme un pot de vin implique une extorsion ou un paiement compensatoire selon la corruptibilite du ministere seul un paiement compensatoire affecte la decision contractuelle du ministere

regulatory errors optimal fines and the level of compliance abstract this paper shows that with a hierarchical structure of enforcement regulatory errors cause the optimal penalty to be non maximal even if offenders are risk neutral and fines are pure transfers and the private benefit from violation is strictly less than the social cost for all individuals in contrast with error free monitoring no finite fine is optimal within the same hierarchical structure also full compliance is an equilibrium outcome in the presence of errors whereas in the absence of errors the regulator can achieve only partial compliance

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

an empirical study of matching grants the cap on cap abstract funding mechanisms for social expenditures are currently being reformed in many countries while the theoretical implications of these changes are often easily identified their empirical magnitude is not always as clear for example in federal systems social expenditure is often funded by matching grants and estimates of the effect of varying matching rates on expenditures by sub national governments vary widely the ambiguity is due in part to inherent difficulties identifying price and income effects of federal grants given the structure of the funding mechanisms in most countries in this paper we examine a recent reform in canada in which federal grants for welfare expenditures were capped converted from an open ended to a closed ended matching grant importantly the cap applied to only three of 10 provincial governments our empirical strategy exploits the time series cross section variation in the funding mechanism provided by the differential application of the reform this approach potentially surmounts some of the difficulties which have beset earlier studies we find that the affected provinces did respond to the reform by reducing the growth rate of expenditures it was 8 to 9 percentage points lower than predicted in the absence of the cap over the medium term

the relevance of unanticipated money growth in explaining output variation this paper tests a reduced form equation in which real gnp for the united states is explained by deviations of multi period m1 growth rates from ex ante expectations of those rates formed from one to eight quarters earlier the theoretical model is suggested by stanley fischer s 1977 article and may be thought of as a new keynesian model the equations are tested in both level and first difference specifications to allow for possible unit roots empirical results strongly support this model in preference to new classical and keynesian alternatives ex ante expectations or m1 growth are formed from multi period forecasts made by chase econometrics inc between 1970 and 1979

an adaptive model of bureaucratic politics in this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics it departs from standard neoclassical approaches notably those of niskanen 1971 and peltzman 1976 in several important respects first our approach explicitly models a system of three way interaction among bureaus politicians and interest groups second it allows for institutional features of each type of participant third it is a model of dynamic process fourth participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing fifth participants are only minimally informed the result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior very much in the spirit of simon s 1947 behavioral tradition that offers a new perspective on political control bureaucratic power and the intelligence of democracy

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines should the penalty fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers these models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with lowfrequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected this article shows that if the judicial system is built on the reasonable doubt test then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent in particular as the penalty increases the probability of conviction falls as a result uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it this article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction that is the penalty should fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship generally treat both the probability and magnitude of fines as independent choice variables of the government this approach has led becker 1968 and others to conclude that it is optimal to set uniformly maximal penalties for all crimes and to set the probability of conviction at the minimum level necessary to enforce compliance with the law while this normative prescription is natural and intuitive there still remains a larger positive question of why in most nations of the world penalties are not uniformly high but rather rise with the severity of the crime one possible resolution of the positive and normative questions may lie in the fact that penalties and probabilities of conviction are not generally independent convictions are typically determined by judges or jurors who are instructed to convict only if the evidence convinces them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty psychologists however have found that a juror s willingness to convict may be influenced by more than just the evidence jurors are very sensitive to the potential penalties that defendants may pay

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

investment timing and learning externalities abstract we study a duopoly model of investment in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information and possibly the experience of his rival investment costs are private information and the background signal takes the form of a poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low the resulting attrition game has a unique symmetric equilibrium which depends on initial public beliefs we determine the impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing and how equilibrium is affected when a first mover advantage is introduced

privatization and government size a budget constraint view of government shows that privatization need not alter spending when it is implemented without a rule forbidding re use of the funding backing newly privatized programs only when these funds are eliminated from the budget process e g tax rebates or permanent deficit reduction can these funds not back new programs or expand existing programs this is an important caveat since privatization proposals do not contain such rules with such rules privatization can increase allocational efficiency and lead to smaller government size

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

keynesian and new classical models of unemployment revisited several keynesian and new classical models of unemployment for the united states are reevaluated the models are examined for adequacy by testing the cross equation restrictions where appropriate and using diagnostic and nonnested tests that explicitly recognize the problem introduced by generated regressors the best new classical model for the 1946 73 period is found to be adequate when it is estimated over the 1946 85 period whereas the keynesian model is not existing results of tests obtained at the single equation level ignoring generated regressors are not always supported when the test statistics are calculated using the correct covariance matrix or maximum likelihood copyright 1991 by royal economic society

rational rationing in stackelberg equilibria in the contect of duopoly theory with differentiated products economic theorists usually consider the price as the choice variable for the firms given the prices the respective quantities demanded and profits can be computed in this paper we consider strategy spaces consisting of both price and production variables two models are developped in one model the firm will choose its price and the number of consumers it will serve a serving capacity while in the other model it will choose the price and the total quantity it will produce a production capacity we are particularly concerned in this paper with the existence of endogenously determined rationing in a leader follower duopoly framework we show that rationing is always may be present in equilibrium when strategies are expressed in terms of the price and the production serving capacity moreover only the leader or first mover will or may engage in rationing rationing appears therefore as a strategic variable what may appear as a fixed price equilibrium or a disequilibrium turns out in this case to be a strategic equilibrium with completely flexible prices an example is worked out this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does contractual wage rigidity play a role in determining real activity interest in nominal wage ridigity as a source of macroeconomic fluctuations has waxed and waned over the past half century the most recent wave of interest was triggered by the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s which inspired an improved sticky wage paradigm the paradigm posits the existence of short term contractual arrangements that in their simplest form fix wage schedules in nominal terms for a predetermined period the life of the contract and leave employment at the discretion of the firm the most influential examples of the paradigm incorporate rational expectations and satisfy the natural rate hypothesis 9 14 thus meeting the new minimum standards for demand driven theories of the business cycle nominal wage contracting models have been vigorously criticized for both a lack of theoretical rigor and an absence of empirical support despite their critics however the models have remained a popular analytical tool and after almost a decade of inattention economists are showing a renewed interest in empirical tests of nominal contracting models the studies produced to date are small in number and offer conflicting conclusions they are perhaps as important for the objections they provoke as for the answers they provide while the work reported in this paper

on the policy ineffectiveness proposition and a keynesian alternative one of the most controversial macroeconomic developments of the last decade has been the rise of the so called new classical nc approach to macroeconomic theory and policy lucas i972 sargent and wallace i975 and barro i 976 have presented models which combine the friedman i968 phelps i970 natural rate theory with assumptions of market clearing and rational expectations as is well known these models deliver the striking result that the mean values of real variables cannot be affected by the government s monetary policy the publication of the theoretical work establishing the impotency result led to much empirical testing of the nc models one of the most successful approaches from the point of view of nc advocates is contained in a series of papers by barro i977 i978 i98i barro and rush i980 and rush i986 recently pesaran i982 has questioned barro s results and claimed that once an implausible assumption is discarded barro s work can be rejected in favour of a keynesian alternative because pesaran has put forth an explicit counter model to barro s work his results are potentially quite important this paper examines in detail pesaran s work and conclusions

nominal wage contracts and real activity evidence from the german economy the research on microfoundations of the phillips curve over the last two decades has produced two alternative new classical explanations of the short run output inflation trade off the nominalwage contracting variety explanation of fischer 4 and gray 7 and the equilibrium explanation of lucas 11 both explanations are similar in their prediction that real activity responds to aggregate demand disturbances through price surprises that they generate they are very different however in mechanisms that generate such response the contracting theory emphasizes the existence of long term contractual arrangements that in their simplest form fix wage schedules in nominal terms for a predetermined period the life of the contract and leave the level of employment at the discretion of the firm in this framework a positive aggregate demand shock that occurs after the contract negotiation date will cause an increase in the general price level a decrease in the real wage and an increase in employment and output by contrast the equilibrium theory makes imperfect information central to the non neutrality of nominal disturbances according to this theory agents lack full current information about aggregate variables and thus cannot dichotomize unanticipated price movements into their relative and absolute components in this framework unanticipated changes in aggregate demand lead to positive movements in output and employment because their price level effects are confused with relative price movements 2 differences between the contracting and equilibrium explanations of the response of real activity to aggregate demand shocks provide empirically testable hypotheses gray kandil and spencer 8 test for the proposition that while both theories predict a positive output response to aggregate demand shocks the size of the response is larger in the contracting model than in the

tests of equilibrium macroeconomics using contemporaneous monetary data abstract this paper uses contemporaneous monetary data to carry out econometric tests of the equilibrium approach to modelling the relation between monetary disturbances and macroeconomic fluctuations the theoretical analysis introduces into an equilibrium macroeconomic model the availability of preliminary data on current monetary aggregates and the process of accumulation of revised monetary data the econometric analysis tests two hypothesis derived from this extended model one hypothesis concerns the neutrality of perceived monetary policy the econometric results imply rejection of this hypothesis the other hypothesis concerns the non neutrality of errors in preliminary monetary data the econometric results fail to reject the contrary of this hypothesis these tests provide strong evidence against the reality of the equilibrium approach

some further evidence on the policy ineffectiveness proposition nonnested hypothesis tests are used to evaluate the keynesian and three variants of the new classical output equations the author s results based on the u s data show that the keynesian equation could not be rejected by the new classical equations for the periods 1946 85 and 1946 89 when the new classical equations are tested against the keynesian alternative with one minor exception the latter always rejected the former copyright 1992 by royal economic society

can centralized educational standards raise welfare abstract i examine conditions under which centralized educational standards raise welfare compared to decentralization in this model a uniform centralized standard only raises welfare when there is excessive cross district pooling of graduates by employers high cross district heterogeneity of students and high degrees of egalitarianism can surprisingly favor centralization in other cases centralization can lower standards in all districts including the weakest the cross district patterns of winners and losers among high and low achievers depend crucially on the degree of cross district pooling finally i show that centralized standards with a local option to set higher standards are always welfare improving

endogenous public sector budgeting to centralize or not in this paper the impact of budget size on a government s choice to centralize or decentralize the budgetary process is investigated using asymmetric information differing preferences and endogenous budgetary arrangements the central government chooses between a budgetary process that excludes the regional board centralization and one that includes the board decentralization in the determination of program budget levels it is predicted that the central government will decentralize the budgetary process at low and centralize at high overall budget levels switching from decentralization to centralization is predicted to

preemption and rent dissipation under price competition abstract we study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous price competition on a market of finite size driven by stochastic taste shocks different patterns of equilibria may arise depending on the importance of the real option effect if the average growth rate of the market is close to the risk free rate or if the volatility of demand shocks is high no dissipation of rents occurs in equilibrium despite instantaneous price competition if these conditions do not hold the equilibrium investment timing is suboptimal and the firms long run capacities may depend on the initial market conditions our conclusions contrast sharply with standard rent dissipation results

potential competition actual competition and economic welfare though the origins of anti trust legislation at least in the united states undoubtedly lie in late nineteenth century populist sentiments its current intellectual foundations rest on modern welfare economics these intellectual foundations provide more than just rhetoric as courts have increasingly relied on the testimony of economists to interpret and reinterpret the inevitably vague language of the legislation the reliance on modern welfare economics is somewhat paradoxical for the assumptions underlying the fundamental theorem of welfare economics are peculiarly ill suited to deal with competition in the central area to which anti trust is applied the industrial sectors of modern economies these sectors are characterized by important non convexities which admittedly present inherent problems for competition the competition that does take place is as likely to take the form of product and r d competition rather than price competition product competition plays no role in the conventional welfare paradigm which assumes a complete set of commodities and it is not that arrow and debreu simply forgot to include technical change in their formulations the natural assumptions underlying the analysis of the production marketing and utilization of knowledge are basically inconsistent with those underlying the arrow debreu model invited paper european economic association meetings copenhagen august 1987 financtal support from the national science foundation and the hoover institution is gratefully acknowledged the presence of non convexittes in production is central in explaining why only a ftnite subset of the set of possible commodities is in fact produced techmcal change is characterized by non convexities in its production radner and stiglitz 1984 if technology exhibits say constant returns to scale at a fixed technology when inputs devoted to r d are included it exhibits non convexities the value or information may increuse with the scale of production while conventional theory focuses on markets for homogeneous commodities each piece of new knowledge must be dinerent from previously produced knowledge knowledge has many of the properties of public goods it being both dificult and undesirable to exclude markets for knowledge are at best imperfect and as we have argued

local government grants and income tax revenue redistributive politics in norway 1900 1990 an important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods primarily education and health care in norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector the development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes the important revenue sources of the local and county governments grants and income tax revenue have been controlled nationally and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900 1990 the approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength the decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome the analysis shows how politics matter and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30 more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run

capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm size empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most industries we propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent with the observed facts the model highlights the mode of product market competition and the extent of investment reversibility as key determinants of the size distribution of firms in an industry in particular if firms compete in prices and the rate of depreciation is large then the industry moves toward an outcome with one dominant firm and one small firm industry dynamics in this case resemble a preemption race contrary to the usual intuition this preemption race becomes more brutal as investment becomes more reversible

centralization and the size of government in canada the determinants of the growth of government in canada over the period 1926 90 are examined of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector s share of gdp unlike other studies using time series data the effect of decentralization toward the provincial state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government