some macroeconomic implications of alternative compensation systems a basic theme of this paper is the idea that some structural reform of employee compensation arrangements is necessary to make reasonable price stability compatible with reasonably full employment in this view even the best designed macroeconomic policies are much too aggregative to get at the heart of the stagflation problem the ultimate solution involves going inside the workings of a modern capitalist economy and correcting the underlying structural flaw directly on the level of the individual firm stagflation represents an especially intractable policy dilemma for macroeconomics without a decisive tendency of the economic system to remain near full employment there is a strong prima facie case for fighting recessions by exogenously stimulating aggregate demand but the usual keynesian expansionary policies tend to impart an inflationary inertia that is difficult to choke off and of course the basic strategy for fighting inflation is to cool down the economy by restrictive monetary and fiscal policy thereby increasing unemployment and closing the viscous circle because the practical macroeconomic policies for dealing with unemployment and inflation are so diametrically opposed stagflation is a pervasive structural problem when for whatever reason there is basically an unfavourable short run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation economic policy tends to vacillate between expansion of demand to fight unemployment and restriction of demand to fight inflation polarising the electorate and distracting society from dealing effectively with its underlying real economic problems even the difficulty of attaining external balance in foreign accounts is largely a spillover into the international payments arena of an inability to achieve an acceptable internal balance between full employment and price stability this paper takes what might be called a comparative systems approach to the problem of stagflation at the heart of modern industrial capitalism is an incredibly complicated system of overlapping monopolistic competitors 2 a starting point for the paper is the realisation that the coordination difficulty which can cause some systems to suffer involuntary unemployment is not inherent in laissez faire private enterprise per se it is closely tied to one particular property of a conventional wage payment system namely compensation of each firm s employees is stuck to an outside numeraire whether money or a cost of

the consequences of minimum wage laws some new theoretical ideas economists generally agree that the effect of a binding minimum wage law is to move firms backward along the demand curve for low skill workers however this prediction of worker displacement depends critically on the assumption that the productivity of firms labor is not dependent on the wage in this paper we show that in a conventional efficiency wage model a minimum wage may increase the level of employment in low wage jobs the formal logic of our model is similar to the case of labor demand under monopsony but arises in a model with a large number of employers

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

efficiency wage models of unemployment one view h lorne carmichael persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies what could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models this paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments it concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment persistent involuntary unemployment of workers is a recurrent problem in labor markets all over the world unemployed workers seem unable to find work even though they are willing to accept lower wages than those being paid employed workers with similar skills what could be preventing wages from adjusting to clear these markets many recent papers known collectively as the efficiency wage literature now claim to have the answer this paper will survey the efficiency wage literature and critically evaluate some of its accomplishments efficiency wage models have already been examined by yellen 1984 katz 1986 and stiglitz 1987 and have received generally favorable reviews this paper is more critical its overall conclusion is that efficiency wage models provide some useful insights into the workings of the labor market but they do not provide a satisfactory account of wage rigidity or involuntary unemployment there are at least five separate versions of the efficiency wage model they share a common structure however and this is outlined in the first section of the paper this section also attempts to relate efficiency wage models to other recent models of unemployment section ii examines and criticizes the different approaches in detail section iii evaluates the achievements of this approach and suggests some directions for future work i a general efficiency wage model efficiency wage models as the name suggests are first of all models of wages they generate unemployment by showing that firms will sometimes want to set wages at non market clearing levels it is useful to begin therefore by reviewing how wages and employment are determined in some related models in a perfectly competitive labor market the wage for each type of labor is adjusted constantly to maintain equality of supply and demand overall employment fluctuates in response to demand changes as workers move up and down their labor supply curves unemployment is voluntary in that anyone who is not working prefers that state to employment at the going wage for people of his skills as well the value of a worker s marginal product is equal to the marginal value of his leisure so there are no unexploited wage bargains between unemployed workers and firms this model is successful in predicting the long term response of wages to shifts in demand and supply but it is clear that in the short run its depiction of voluntary unemployment and flexible wages is unrealistic a natural way to generate more realism is to assume that wages are inflexible in the short run in this case a reduction in demand away from a long run equilibrium will lead to rationing of jobs by employers as they attempt to stay on their labor demand curves the unemployment here is involuntary in that the unemployed would prefer to be working at the going wage and is inefficient in that there are lost gains from trade between these workers and firms the weakness of this model is that it is silent about the mechanism that keeps wages rigid unemployed workers who offer to work for less than the fixed wage ought to find work the early implicit contract models of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 provide one explanation for wage rigidity these models introduced the idea that wages can do more than just clear the market for labor wages in an implicit contract model are used to shift the risk generated by uncertain output market conditions from risk averse workers to the risk neutral firm

on the optimal income taxation and educational decisions abstract in this paper we consider three different ways of incorporating individuals educational choices into the design of optimal income tax policy in one variant of the model case 2 where an individual chooses his education before knowing his ability and after that education makes his labour supply decisions on the basis of known ability it is shown that qualitative features of the optimal income tax schedule are not similar to those of the standard optimal income tax model the marginal tax rate is generally not zero at the endpoints of distribution but is most likely negative using numerical methods some interesting features quite different from earlier numerical results are revealed especially in the second case for example the marginal tax rate is non decreasing in income for a substantial income range in addition our calculations support neither the traditional views on the egalitarian nature of equal education nor its disadvantageous consequences in the perfect utilitarian society

pay performance sensitivity and production uncertainty abstract the pay performance sensitivity of linear incentive contracts can increase with increasing production uncertainty depending upon the timing and nature of this uncertainty this provides a possible explanation for the failure of empirical tests to yield convincing support for a negative relationship

demand disturbances and aggregate fluctuations the implications of near rationality the paper investigates some properties of near rational models of the cycle examining two types of framework in the first an otherwise classical competitive economy is shown to respond to demand disturbances when some firms follow a near rational hiring policy in the second model a dynamic setting is addressed and a criterion termed stochastic near rationality is employed simulation results are consistent with recent empirical findings and suggest that further quantitative evaluation is merited copyright 1987 by royal economic society

labor discipline and aggregate demand a macroeconomic model university of california berkeley department o f economics berkeley c a l i f o r n i a working paper 8875 labor discipline and aggregate demand a macroeconomic model samuel bowles and robert boyer june 8 1988 key words jel aggregate demand d i s t r i b u t i o n classification o f income c l a s s force

the effect of taxes on labour in efficiency wage models abstract this paper analyses the effects of labour taxation on wage and employment in a moral hazard efficiency wage model where effort is a continuous variable and workers are risk averse in the model examined ad valorem and specific taxes on labour do not have the same consequences on the real wage both taxes have a negative effect on employment but the imposition of a specific tax causes an increase in the net real wage including firms to raise the quality of their workers these results are compared with those obtained in other versions of the shirking efficiency wage model

flexible labor compensation risk sharing and company leverage abstract in a traditional wage system the union and the firm bargain ex ante over a compensation level that does not depend on the state of the world under this regime both the wage and the interest earned by debt holders represent predetermined fixed claims on the value of the firm on the other hand in a profit sharing system the union and the firm bargain ex ante over a compensation schedule that does depend on the state of the world in this case the flexible compensation earned by workers becomes a residual claim on the value of the firm similar to the dividend earned by stock holders the implications of this correspondence between compensation structure and financial structure are explored the estimation of a model for the issuance of new long term debt supports the hypothesis of interdependence between financial and compensation decisions

profit sharing in a unionised economy with imperfect competition abstract this paper sets up a simple model of a unionised economy and shows that the introduction of profit sharing unambiguously reduces the unemployment rate the result arises because unions are assumed to care about the employment of their members but cannot bargain over employment directly profit sharing reduces the perceived cost in terms of worker income foregone of increasing employment in the firm in the economy as a whole the equilibrium unemployment rate falls

unemployment long term employment relations and productivity growth using an effort regulation type of efficiency wage model it is demonstrated that a firm may respond to slackening labor markets by acting to increase the intensity with which workers work the magnitude of this work intensity effect depends on the structure of employment relations where long term employment relations are prevalent the effect of labor market slack on work intensity may be diminished these propositions are tested empirically by estimating the effects unemployment and long term employment have on productivity growth in two digit manufacturing industries copyright 1987 by mit press

foreign direct investment with unemployment and endogenous taxes and tariffs it is well known that high tariffs can induce foreign direct investment or tariff jumping this paper analyzes tariff jumping in the context of a host government which can set specific tariffs and taxes subject to the credibility constraint that the chosen levels be optimal once capital is irreversibly in place the foreign multinational is assumed to choose its location and level of investment strategically taking into account the induced tax and tariff levels in the presence of unemployment the optimal tariff exceeds the optimal tax for any given level of capital investment leading to foreign direct investment

wage flexibility in the chinese labour market 1989 2009 abstractwage flexibility in the chinese labour market 1989 2009 regional studies china s bureaucratic wage determination system is gradually being replaced by a market based system leading to a novel version of a dual labour market this paper studies wage flexibility in this dual market its principal findings are as follows wages in both sectors have become less responsive to changes in official registered unemployment with an alternative market based measure of unemployment becoming more relevant there is evidence of convergence of flexibility between the two sectors the wages of women exhibit greater flexibility than those of men and there is evidence of differences in wage flexibility between workers who have urban residential rights and rural migrants

shirking unemployment and aggregate fluctuations empirically real wages exhibit relatively little cyclical variation and a weak cyclical pattern early real business cycle rbc models predict to the contrary large procyclical real wage movements incorporating efficiency wages into a rbc environment would seem promising since one prediction from the efficiency wage literature is real wage rigidity this paper evaluates a common microfoundation for efficiency wages the shirking model with respect to its predictions for real wages within a rbc style model simulations of the model reveal that it can generate dampened but still strongly procyclical real wage behavior

work norms and involuntary unemployment consider the organizational environment of labor management wherein the firm can measure the average performance i e group work norm of its employees but has difficulty in observing the individual worker s performance within the group accordingly the worker s remuneration is based on the observed group norm because of the way in which workers interact among themselves in setting work norms there results an undersupply of effort from a given workforce size furthermore the group work norm is shown to be negatively correlated with the size of the workforce consequently short run unemployment can arise with involuntary features the paper also explores the effectiveness of alternative remuneration schemes in mitigating the inefficiency associated with the group work norm setting

job matching and job competition are lower educated workers at the back of job queues abstract during the cyclical downturn of the 1980s unemployment in the netherlands increased substantially with unemployment rates of lower educated workers increasing more than those of higher educated workers a possible explanation of this phenomenon is job competition between workers with different levels of education another explanation of the diverging unemployment rates is that employers dismiss replaceable lower educated workers before irreplaceable higher educated workers in this paper we scrutinize the job competition explanation our results show that there only is job competition between unemployed workers with an academic and a higher vocational education there is no job competition at lower levels of education

the optimal public provision of private goods abstract this paper sets out conditions for the optimal public provision of in kind transfers rules are derived governing their marginal and optimal use in the presence of linear taxes because of the difficulty of using these conditions to examine what impact optimal transfers would have on optimal tax systems a simple two good simulation model is used to illustrate the problem

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

the economics of vocation or why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse abstract given the longstanding shortage of nurses in many jurisdictions why could not nursing wages be raised to attract more people into the profession we tell a story in which the status of nursing as a vocation implies that increasing wages reduces the average quality of applicants attracted the underlying mechanism accords with the notion that increasing wages might attract the wrong sort of people into the profession and highlights an in efficiency wage mechanism particular to vocations which makes wages sticky up wards the analysis has implications for job design in vocation based sectors such as nursing and teaching

an empirical investigation of ipo returns and subsequent equity offerings abstract several recent papers present signaling models in which firms underprice their initial public offerings of equity ipos so that they can subsequently issue seasoned equity at more favorable prices we test the implications of these models we find a positive relation between ipo underpricing and the probability and size of subsequent seasoned offerings although these results are consistent with the implications of the signaling hypotheses the economic significance appears weak we conduct additional tests to evaluate other explanations for these findings and find the alternatives more compelling

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

unemployment and the efficiency wage hypothesis there has been much recent discussion of the reasons why prices in certain markets and in particular in labour markets may not adjust to eliminate excess supply the absence of speedy adjustment of prices is an essential feature of the recent models of disequilibrium macroeconomics but for the most part no explanation for this absence is provided from within those models one explanation that has been around in the literature for some time and has been receiving increasing attention recently is the efficiency wage hypothesis initially applied to developing economies see leibenstein i957 it has more recently been adapted to developed economies by weiss i 980 and used in the context of a keynesian macroeconomic model by hart i 980 similar concepts have been applied to the credit market by stiglitz and weiss i98i the purpose of the present paper is to explore further the conditions under which the notion of an efficiency wage is applicable and can provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment the essential feature of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that the productivity of a firm s employees increases as their wage is increased at least over an economically relevant part of its range if the wage paid by the firm is denoted by w the number of employees by l and the productivity of each employee by p w where p w o then the effective labour force of the firm e can be represented by

profit related pay prose discovered this paper estimates that in 1984 43 percent of british private sector establishments had some form of profit related pay regression results do not show that these establishments had statistically significant better financial performance cross ta bulations do not suggest that the establishments with income sharing schemes had noticeably greater employment growth or better industrial relations copyright 1988 by royal economic society

financing education using optimal redistributive taxation abstract in this article the joint use of an income tax and public provision of education as instruments to achieve the government s distributional objectives is considered individuals differ in innate labour productivity and in aptitude to acquire skills through education actual labour productivity depends on both innate skill and the amount of education received using a generalized version of the mirrlees tax problem that incorporates these features qualitative properties of an optimal tax schedule are investigated

canadian jobs and firm size do smaller firms pay less even after controlling for observable workers characteristics and for occupation and industry specific effects a substantial wage differential remains between large and small firms what underlies the remaining wage differential is unclear direct evidence on pension plan coverage and on lay off rates by firm size is inconsistent with the bad working conditions hypothesis the union avoidance hypothesis does not seem to explain an important portion o f the wage differential as suggested by efficiency wage models part of the remaining wage differential may be due to firms heterogeneity similarly perhaps large firms pay higher wages simply partly beca use they employ workers with more unobserved abilities because differen t explanations of the wage differential may lead to different policy implications determining the source of the wage firm size effect is an important question for future research

primary versus secondary pricing of high yield bonds previous research has found systematic underpricing of newly floated securities vis a vis secondary market levels this conclusion is based on the observation that primary issues provide superior risk adjusted returns in the period immediately following issuance those returns however are not known at the time of pricing to gauge whether a new issue is offered at a premium or a concession to the secondary market investors must use standard valuation benchmarks in the case of high yield bonds an analysis based on agency ratings and yields to maturity indicates that new issues are priced richer than seasoned issues in some periods and cheaper in other periods using regression analysis the authors model the magnitude of the premium or concession prevailing in a given period the regressions explain 64 percent of the variance in the primary secondary yield spread through proxies for supply demand and liquidity of the high yield sector

anatomy of initial public offerings of common stock initial public offerings of common stocks ipos are typically underpriced in this paper the author develops and tests the hypothesis that underpricing serves as a form of insurance against legal liability and the associated damages to the reputations of investment bankers the empirical results based on samples of ipos that were brought to the market before and after the securities act of 1933 provide considerable support for the implicit insurance hypothesis specifically gross underpricing and market segmentation between prestigious and fringe investment bankers in originating unseasoned new issues appear to be peculiar to the post 1933 era a number of studies have documented that unseasoned common stocks typically garner large positive abnormal returns during a short period following the initial offering in his recent review of the empirical evidence on the initial returns of common stock offerings smith 36 concluded that the returns from offer price to after market price have exceeded fifteen percent his calculations did not include some of the earlier results obtained by mcdonald and fisher 23 and logue 20 when their samples are combined with those in smith s review the initial returns of unseasoned equity offerings appear even larger over seventeen percent these results imply that underwriters consistently offer the securities at substantial discounts from their values that are set in the after market in other words initial public offerings ipos appear to be underpriced what is even more puzzling is the fact that in some time periods underpricing appears to be systematically larger than in other periods ibbotson and jaffe 15 and ritter 29 have documented that during the postwar era there have been a number of periods in which the initial returns of common stocks have been extremely high ritter for example reported that the average return from the offer price to the first after market price was over forty eight percent for ipos in 1980 and 1981 1 similarly the initial returns of unseasoned issues of common stock brought to the market in 1950 1951 1961 and 1968 were unusually large these periods in which ipos were grossly underpriced are referred to as the hotissue markets why do investment bankers underprice ipos why do issuers

macroeconomic adjustment with segmented labor markets this paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal and labor market policies in a developing economy with an informal sector and a heterogeneous work force a permanent reduction in government spending on nontraded goods leads in the long run to a deprecia tion of the real exchange rate a fall in the market clearing wage for unskilled labor an increase in output of traded goods and a lower stock of net foreign assets a permanent reduction in the minimum wage improves competitiveness and expands the formal sector the effect of changes in unemployment benefits are also analyzed q 1999 elsevier science

education and taxation policies in the presence of countervailing incentives i examine income taxation and education policy when the government cannot observe individual productivity and there exist conflicting incentives for individuals to understate and overstate their productivity in this setting i identify four possible equilibria and discuss the corresponding taxation education policy mix i show that no general restrictions on optimal taxation and education policy emerge in this environment but each equilibrium and corresponding policy package can be associated with a country on the basis of its relative income and preference for redistribution

workers trust funds and the logic of wage profiles this paper defines a concept a worker s trust fund which is useful in analyzing optimal age earnings profiles the trust fund represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking in considering whether to work or shirk a worker weighs the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking against the benefits from reduced effort this concept is used to show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age earnings profiles is not a perfect substitute for an explicit up front performance bond or employment fee it is also shown that the second best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an up front employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing in a variety of stylized cases

imperfect information markets and public provision of education abstract it is shown that recent models of public provision of education overstate the argument against a free market in education with complete information income taxation can render a market irrelevant but the paper also considers examples where a free market in education is necessary even with public provision

signalling by underpricing in the ipo market abstract empirical evidence suggests the existence of hot issue markets for initial public offerings in certain periods and in certain industries new issues are underpriced and rationing occurs this paper develops a model consistent with this observation which assumes the firm itself best knows its prospects in certain circumstances firms with the most favorable prospects find it optimal to signal their type by underpricing their initial issue of shares and investors know that only the best can recoup the cost of this signal from subsequent issues

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

profit sharing and employee share ownership profit sharing and employee share ownership saul estrin paul grout and sushil wadhwani this paper evaluates the likely effects of linking a part of a worker s pay to the employer s profits it has been suggested by weitzman that this would raise employment by lowering the cost of taking on an extra worker however this can only happen if existing workers are willing to let their share of value added fall and experience of those firms in the uk who already operate profit sharing schemes suggests that the weitzman mechanism is not operative there is however some evidence that profit related pay does boost productivity but there are other ways of raising productivity such as performance related pay which may be more effective productivity enhancing effects are likely to be greatest when employees are involved in decision making as well but this is likely to undermine the weitzman case still further even if the argument that profit sharing raises employment is not compelling it is sometimes suggested that it can do little harm however there is evidence that it may well be inflationary in which case the government would be advised to proceed cautiously we argue that there is very little case for the introduction of a permanent subsidy to encourage increased profit sharing although there may be a case for a temporary one to overcome managerial inertia however there is a danger that a subsidy will promote cosmetic schemes designed to be eligible for the subsidy but which do not reflect any real change in behaviour

bond returns liquidity and missing data this paper examines holding period returns to constant duration portfolios of u s govern ment notes and bonds and measures the return premium generated by liquidity differences in bonds the approach compares constant duration portfolios constructed in two distinct ways one using only bonds issued in the most recent treasury auction one using all other bonds comparisons of the resulting series are made meaningful by choosing narrow du ration ranges in the portfolio formation procedure this in turn induces a missing data problem in the created time series parameters of return distributions are therefore estimated employing a maximum likelihood framework that explicitly accounts for the missing data it is estimated that recently issued bonds are priced to return a premium of around 55 basis points per annum over otherwise equivalent instruments

efficiency wages deferred payments and direct incentives in agriculture empirical evidence from agricultural labor markets is consistent with efficiency wage theory and inconsistent with several alternative explanations according to this theory the higher wage or deferred payment benefits that direct hire growers pay relative to that of farm labor contractors is an efficiency wage growers use this extra compensation to lower their monitoring expenses and reduce shirking by workers copyright 2002 oxford university press

incentive compatible long term contracts and job rationing this article presents a model in which markets for long term contractual employment coexist with spot markets for labor assuming the absence of third party enforcement wage contracts are required to be incentive compatible as a consequence contract wages yield higher expected utility to the worker than spot market wages so that in equilibrium contractual long term jobs are rationed

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

a simple test of baron s model of ipo underpricing abstract this paper tests baron s 1982 model of initial public offering ipo underpricing that model relies on information asymmetries between issuers and underwriters and predicts that offer prices will be lower than would prevail in the absence of asymmetric information we examine the initial public offerings of 38 investment banks that went public in the period 1970 1987 and participated in the distribution of their own securities we find that contrary to the implication of baron s model such self marketed offerings are characterized by statistically significant underpricing comparable to that of other ipos

wage interdependence through decentralized bargaining abstract the idea that sector specific unions are influenced by the wages obtained by other unions has mainly been used to support the empirical observation that wages are highly correlated among industries the sources of wage interdependence can mainly be found in unions preferences in the nature of technology and in price and demand determination the presence of externalities and of strategic complementarity among unions leads to suboptimal equilibria which generates non desired inflation unemployment and possibly also trade balance deficit this enforces the idea that part of current unemployment can be eliminated by improving the cooperation between social actors

multiple expectational equilibria under monopolistic competition this paper shows that a monopolistically competitive economy with real investment can have multiple rational expectations equilibria one is associated with entrepreneurs optimistic expectations about future demand another with entrepreneurs pessimism it also shows that an optimistic expectational equilibrium pareto dominates a pessimistic equilibrium an investment subsidy can be beneficial both by reducing the original underinvestment distortion and by changing firms expectations from pessimistic to optimistic the most important assumption is increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition makes increasing returns consistent with each producer s optimization

efficiency wage models of unemployment keynesian economists hold it to be self evident that business cycles are characterized by involuntary unemployment but construction of a model of the cycle with involuntary unemployment faces the obvious difficulty of explaining why the labor market does not clear involuntarily unemployed people by definition want to work at less than the going wage rate why don t firms cut wages thereby increasing profits

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

sequential sales learning and cascades when ipo shares are sold sequentially later potential investors can learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors this can lead rapidly to cascades in which subsequent investors optimally ignore their private information and imitate earlier investors although rationing in this situation gives rise to a winner s curse it is irrelevant the model predicts that 1 offerings succeed or fail rapidly 2 demand can be so elastic that even risk neutral issuers underprice to completely avoid failure 3 issuers with good inside information can price their shares so high that they sometimes fail 4 an underwriter may want to reduce the communication among investors by spreading the selling effort over a more segmented market consider a scenario in which an issuer is selling a new security of uncertain value for example an ipo initial public offering of stock or high yield debt through an underwriter the s e c has banned variable price sales while the value of this new security is highly uncertain to individual market participants investors hold perfectly accurate information when aggregated moreover there are many potential investors and a small number of these investors can jointly determine the value of the firm or its project with high precision it would seem that in this scenario underpriced offerings would succeed and overpriced offerings would fail nevertheless this paper shows that if the distribution channels of invest ment banks are limited underpriced offerings can fail and overpriced offer ings can succeed with limited distribution channels it takes the under writer time to approach interested investors therefore later investors can observe how well an offering has sold to date or at least how successful it has sold relative to offerings previously undertaken by this underwriter

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

an efficiency wage model with explicit monitoring abstract this paper develops an efficiency wage model of involuntary unemployment in a small open economy which uses two factors to produce three goods one of which is non traded monitoring aimed at reducing shirking by workers in all industries the analysis shows how a tariff on imports may lower employment but paradoxically raise social welfare at the same time as the paper also demonstrates the optimal policy combination includes not only taxes on capital and monitoring as well as a subsidy on employment but also despite the small country assumption a tax on consumption

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory

profit sharing risk sharing and firm size implications of efficiency wages by taking account of output fluctuations this paper constructs a synthesis of profit sharing and efficiency wage models to highlight the role of the risk attitudes of the firm and its employees we show contrary to the traditional efficiency wage theory that in a profit sharing economy unemployment is no longer a necessary device to induce work effort and consequently the labor market equilibrium may be characterized by full employment such a result is more likely to be true when the economy is characterized by small sized firms in addition we also provide a preliminary sketch of the situations in which the firm chooses a profit sharing program or a fixed wage one and discuss how a firm determines its pay parameters and employment in response to output fluctuations

the effects of profit sharing on employment wages stock returns and productivity evidence from uk micro data this paper provides evidence based on u k firm level data that 1 the authors cannot reject the view that profit sharing firms view the total level of remuneration as the marginal cost of labor which is contrary to much of weitzman s analysis 2 there is some support for the popular view that profit sharing raises total remuneration and can therefore be inflationary and 3 the introduction of profit sharing does lead to higher productivity but this combined with the employment reducing consequences of 2 leads the authors to conclude that the net employment effect is small and uncertain copyright 1990 by royal economic society

the pricing of initial public offerings a dynamic model with information production this paper presents an information theoretic model of ipo pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the ipo and the secondary market have private information about their firm s prospects and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm high value firms knowing they are going to pool with low value firms induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information the information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity giving a higher expected stock price for high value firms

commodity taxation in welfare states i introduction while the nature of unemployment is diverse a substantial part of unemployment in many developed countries it is argued stems from generous social welfare systems meyer 1990 nickell and layard 1999 and see figure 1 1 in fact the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd data show that countries with generous unemployment insurance ui face high unemployment rates and tend to have high commodity tax rates see figure 2 this paper attempts to account for these empirical patterns in the optimal taxation framework in a general equilibrium context the unemployment mentioned above can be viewed as a result of a a low work incentive induced by generous social insurance welfare benefits combined with b the subsequent employment adjustment by firms e g not renewing employment contracts or hiring a portion of temporary part time workers as regular workers to raise labor productivity to deal with this type of unemployment the government may need to seek reforms of social insurance welfare systems including a reduction in unemployment benefits but the public s redistributive motives often do not permit implementation of such reforms 2 under this socioeconomic constraint this paper raises a question can commodity taxation help reduce unemployment and improve efficiency perhaps a slightly different but equally interesting question that concerns many welfare states in recent decades may be suppose that a society agreed on the expansion of welfare programs in financing the increased welfare expenditure which tax increase consumption taxes or income taxes is more relevant figure 1 omitted figure 2 omitted to address these questions we examine the role of commodity taxation in a general equilibrium model where a taking into account wage unemployment benefits and taxes workers choose work effort that the firm can observe only through costly monitoring and b firms use both wage and monitoring as effort eliciting devices and they fire those caught shirking therefore the chosen level of a worker s effort affects the probabilities of employment and unemployment and thus involuntary unemployment arises from moral hazard 3 in this contractual setting with imperfect information we consider the government s problem of maximizing the representative worker s expected utility using income and commodity taxes we derive new results on commodity taxation and present supportive results using quantitative analysis our key results suggest that commodity taxation can be used to alleviate moral hazard and hence unemployment which can account for why countries with generous social welfare systems tend to adopt high commodity tax rates see figure 2 this main result is based on the following feature of the model given the aforementioned environment optimal commodity and income tax rates can be determined in contrast to the indeterminacy result of atkinson and stiglitz 1976 henceforth as 4 therefore our results provide an explanation for the widely observed coexistence of direct and indirect taxation to illustrate the intuition behind our results consider a situation where a a society provides liberal unemployment benefits for unemployed workers and b the government sets the levels of income and commodity tax rates so as to finance the expenditures for ui and public goods liberal unemployment benefits are equivalent to treating the consumption of unemployed workers favorably i e between states consumption choice distortion which creates moral hazard in the supply of effort under imperfect information about effort obviously drastic reforms in social insurance systems e g cutting benefits can correct moral hazard but the public s redistributive motives do not permit such reforms in this setting we show that strengthening commodity taxation while lessening income taxation penalizes moral hazard which lowers the between states consumption choice distortion leading to a greater supply of effort