minimax regret and strategic uncertainty this paper introduces a new solution concept a minimax regret equilibrium which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents we provide several applications of our concept in particular we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non degenerate distribution the induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations baye and morgan 2004

the optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer abstract this paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget constrained we consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function if the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint textbook monopoly pricing is optimal by contrast the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing to commit to a declining price sequence to require the buyer to disclose his budget or to offer financing journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d42 d45 d89 l12

recursive non expected utility connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity abstract i study how risk preferences and the level of ambiguity influence ambiguity attitudes in uzi segal s recursive second order non expected utility model it is shown that the negative certainty independence axiom for risk preferences is equivalent to a global form of ambiguity aversion that entails ambiguity averse behavior irrespective of the state space and the decision maker s second order belief thus the second order version of the cautious expected utility model is the only subclass of segal s theory that robustly predicts ambiguity aversion moreover a mean preserving spread operation over second order beliefs which corresponds to a particular way of increasing the level of ambiguity is equivalent to increasing the relative strength of ambiguity aversion for each possible specification of risk preferences within the cautious expected utility model an application of the latter result establishes a negative relation between participation rates in an asset market and the level of ambiguity concerning the distribution of returns

matching in the sourcing market a structural analysis of the upstream channel building on the structural two sided matching model we develop a framework to study the sourcing market in the context of marketing firms matching with manufacturers both sides prefer partners that could generate significant values with better sourcing process abilities moreover experienced manufacturers are preferred by the branded marketing firms who may even be willing to compensate the matching intermediary more for facilitating that preference empirical research measuring the values of such matching and the intermediary s pricing through commission on observed marketing firms characteristics and the low cost manufacturers and the deals that result is problematic when some of the characteristics are only partially observed and the matching is endogenous with the matching model we can control for endogenous matching we find evidence of positive assortative matching of pairs size on both sides of the market we also find that manufacturers location and tenure and whether the marketing firms are listed are important factors in identifying the preferred matching partners and the related ranking without controlling for endogenous matching the intermediary s pricing equation estimates are biased especially for the marketing firms that specialize in luxury products

the design of ambiguous mechanisms this paper considers a mechanism design framework that is standard except for the agents preferences which exhibit ambiguity aversion in the sense of gilboa and schmeidler 1989 we show that in this framework the optimal strategic form mechanism is an ambiguous mechanism an ambiguous mechanism specifies a message space and a set of outcome functions after showing that a version of the revelation principle holds in our environment we give an exact characterization of the smallest optimal ambiguous mechanism for the single agent case if the type set is composed of n finite elements then the smallest optimal ambiguous mechanism contains n 1 outcome functions we show how the extra revenue that the designer obtains by employing an ambiguous mechanism as opposed to a standard non ambiguous mechanism depends on the parameters of the model in particular we prove that the share of the surplus that the designer can extract from the agent increases as the type set becomes larger and the probability of each single type decreases in the limiting case where the agent s type is drawn from a nonatomic distribution on an interval the optimal ambiguous mechanism extracts all the rent from the agent

garp for kids on the development of rational choice behavior in this paper we examine the extent to which consumption choices by 7 and 11 year old children and college undergraduates satisfy the axioms of revealed preference we find that choices by even the 7 year olds are considerably more likely to obey revealed preference axioms than would be true if they were choosing randomly 11 year olds do better still while college students do no better than 11 year old children we also find that mathematical ability is not correlated with choosing rationally we argue that this evidence suggests that the ability to choose rationally is not innate but that it does develop quickly

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

a finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search abstract i study a model in which a finite number of men and women look for future spouses via random pairwise meetings the central question is whether equilibrium marriage outcomes are stable matchings when search frictions are small the answer is they can but need not be for any stable matching there is an equilibrium leading to it almost surely however there may also be equilibria leading to an unstable matching almost surely a restriction to simpler strategies or to markets with aligned preferences rules out such equilibria however unstable even pareto dominated matchings may still arise with positive probability under those two restrictions combined in addition inefficiency due to delay may remain significant despite vanishing search frictions finally a condition is identified under which all equilibria are outcome equivalent stable and efficient

why dowry payments declined with modernization in europe but are rising in india in contrast to most dowry oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization those in india have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades this paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste the theoretical model contrasts caste and non caste based societies in the former there exists an inherited component to status caste that is independent of wealth and in the latter wealth is the primary determinant of status modernization is assumed to involve two components increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status or caste groups the paper shows that in caste based societies the increases in wealth dispersion that accompany modernization necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments whereas in non caste based societies increased dispersion has no real effect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline

the determinants of earnings a behavioral approach we survey the determinants of earnings and propose a framework for understanding labor market success we suggest that the advantages of the children of successful parents go considerably beyond the benefits of superior education the inheritance of wealth or the genetic inheritance of cognitive ability we suggest that noncognitive personality variables such as attitudes towards risk ability to adapt to new economic conditions hard work and the rate of time preference affect both earning and the transmission of economic status across generations

final offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties abstract final offer arbitration foa is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers proposed by two disputing parties we build an equilibrium model of foa with players averse to arbitral uncertainty to study three important issues the role of foa in incentivizing negotiated settlements the convergence of final offers and the normative effect of diversity of arbitrator opinion we show that increase in arbitral uncertainty increases the likelihood of negotiated agreements and make the final offers converge to each other risk aversion is not necessary for convergence of offers precision and mean of arbitral uncertainty matter differently and can be controlled separately moreover as also argued by the industry practitioners carefully selected level of diversity of opinion in the arbitrator roster increases the welfare of negotiating parties

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

social status in economic theory social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour this paper provides a selective survey of recent advances in the economic analysis of the origins and consequences of social status concerns first a selection of empirical research from a variety of scientific disciplines is discussed to underpin the further theoretical analysis i then consider the origins and determinants of tastes for status discuss the endogenous derivation of such preferences for relative standing and assess the different formalizations of these preferences subsequently the consequences of preferences for status are studied for a variety of problems and settings the last section discusses a number of implications of status concerns for normative economics and public policy

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

ambiguity optimism and pessimism in adverse selection models we investigate the effect of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude on the shape and properties of the optimal contract in an adverse selection model with a continuum of types using the parametric model of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion called the neo additive model chateauneuf eichberger and grant 2007 we show that it necessarily features efficiency and a jump at the top and pooling at the bottom of the distribution conditional on the degree of ambiguity the pooling section may or may not be supplemented by a separating section as a result ambiguity adversely affects the principal s ability to solve the adverse selection problem and therefore the least efficient types benefit from ambiguity with respect to risk conversely ambiguity is detrimental to the most efficient types this is confirmed in the comparative statics section

direct evidence on risk attitudes and migration geographic mobility is important for the functioning of labor markets because it brings labor resources to where they can be most efficiently used it has long been hypothesized that individuals migration propensities depend on their attitudes towards risk but the empirical evidence to the extent that it exists has been indirect in this paper we use newly available data from the german socio economic panel to measure directly the relationship between migration propensities and attitudes towards risk we find that individuals who are more willing to take risks are more likely to migrate between labor markets in germany this result is robust to stratifying by age sex education national origin and a variety of other demographic characteristics as well as to the level of aggregation used to define geographic mobility the effect is substantial relative to the unconditional migration propensity and compared to the conventional determinants of migration we also find that being more willing to take risks is more important for the extensive than for the intensive margin of migration

optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity we consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity averse monopolist the monopolist s subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by contamination of an additive probability we find that under a maxmin utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract and the distortion at the bottom is reduced other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity but they get a greater discount

donations risk attitudes and time preferences a study on altruism in primary school children abstract we study in a sample of 1070 primary school children aged seven to eleven years how altruism in a donation experiment is related to children s risk attitudes and intertemporal choices examining such a relationship is motivated by theories of reciprocal altruism that provide a cornerstone for understanding human social behavior we find that higher risk tolerance and patience in intertemporal choice increase in general the level of donations albeit the effects are non linear we confirm earlier results that altruism increases with age during childhood and that girls are more altruistic than boys having older brothers makes subjects less altruistic

the effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions while most models of auctions and competitive bidding assume that each bidder s utility for an outcome depends only on his own profit we allow the utility to also depend on any regret that a bidder suffers after the fact and characterize when and how this affects bidding specifically a winner might regret money left on the table in federal offshore oil lease sales while a loser might regret seeing an object sell for less than his own value for it we show that for risk neutral bidders who after the fact know the winner s price for the object a bidder s optimal bidding strategy will not depend on the relative weight given to profit versus regret if both forms of regret weigh equally heavily however if bidders weight money left on the table regret more heavily then the bid taker suffers likewise if losers do not learn the winner s price then the bid taker also suffers thus the existing models exclusion of regret from risk neutral bidders utility functions affects the applicability of the

revenue implications of money creation under leviathan most governments possess a monopoly franchise in the creation of money economists provide an analytical justification for this institutional arrangement either in terms of the use of monetary aggregates for macro economic stabilization or in terms of the alleged inability of competitive markets to generate tolerably efficient monetary results any complete case for the government s monetary monopoly must however depend on a comparison of market and political arrangements a comparison that requires predictions about how governments are likely to behave once a monopoly franchise is assigned similarly such predictions are crucial in evaluating restrictions that might be imposed on the government s exercise of its money creation power in designing a monetary constitution in the analysis of political arrangements the revenue implications of the money creation power are probably more significant than considerations of either macro economic stability or optimality in the money supply although those revenue implications are incidental to demonstrating the nature of market failure in monetary arrangements they are fundamental in understanding how the government might exploit a monopoly in money creation once granted our interest in the revenue effects of money creation stems from a broader study of constitutional restrictions on the revenueraising authority of government see our book the power to create money is naturally encompassed in this restrictions on the revenue raising power must embody restrictions on the power to create money consequently the fiscal constitution has important implications for the monetary constitution in this paper we examine both the revenue implications of money creation and desirable consitutional restrictions on the money creation power within the context of a specific model of political processes

paralyzed by fear rigid and discrete pricing under demand uncertainty we propose a new theory of price rigidity based on firms knightian uncertainty about their competitive environment this uncertainty has two key implications first firms learn about the shape of their demand function from past observations of quantities sold this learning gives rise to kinks in the expected profit function at previously observed prices making those prices both sticky and more likely to reoccur second uncertainty about the relationship between aggregate and industry level inflation generates nominal rigidity we prove the main insights analytically and quantify the effects of our mechanism our estimated quantitative model is consistent with a wide range of micro level pricing facts that are typically challenging to match jointly it also implies significantly more persistent monetary non neutrality than in standard models allowing it to generate large real effects from nominal shocks

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

on the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem i e two sided one to one matching with non transferable utility for small economies this condition is also necessary this class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications

household consumption when the marriage is stable we develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption we de ne a revealed preference characterization of e cient household consumption when the marriage is stable stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs we characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold consumption transfers but without assuming transferable utility we show that our revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even with a single consumption observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households the characterization also allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure including the sharing rule under the same minimalistic assumptions an application to dutch household data demonstrates the usefulness of our theoretical results we nd that the female gets a higher income share when her relative wage increases which we can give a structural interpretation in terms of outside options from marriage that vary with individual wages

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

are risk aversion and impatience related to cognitive ability is the way that people make risky choices or tradeoffs over time related to cognitive ability this paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability risk aversion and impatience using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible measures we conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion and impatience over an annual time horizon for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1 000 german adults subjects also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability which correspond to sub modules of one of the most widely used iq tests interviews are conducted in subjects own homes we find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion and more pronounced impatience these relationships are significant and robust to controlling for personal characteristics educational attainment income and measures of credit constraints we perform a series of additional robustness checks which help rule out other possible confounds

exploring the diffusion of low energy houses an empirical study in the european union abstract diffusion of low energy houses is an important part of energy and climate policy in the european union eu and in individual eu countries key barriers to the adoption of low energy houses include additional construction costs and uncertainty surrounding actual energy and cost savings in this paper we econometrically analyze determinants of low energy house adoption including time and risk preferences we rely on original data from a large survey conducted among households in eight eu countries to our knowledge this is the first empirical study of low energy building adoption to rely on a demographically representative sample our set of covariates includes parameters of time and risk preferences that were elicited via state of the art incentivized multiple price list experiments and via self assessment scales we find mixed results for the effects of time discounting on low energy house adoption risk preferences do appear to matter as risk proneness increases so does the adoption of zero net or energy plus building but not passive houses consistent with the low cost hypothesis about environmental attitude and action we find no results for environmental attitudes and social norms

minimax regret strategies for bargaining over several variables for the sealed bid mechanism for bilateral bargaining we explore models in which each player bids so as to minimize his maximum regret here regret is defined as the difference between the profit the player could have made with the wisdom of hindsight and the profit he actually made we study bargaining over both price and quantity as well as over more general sets of bargaining alternatives with complete and incomplete information in each case there is a minimax regret strategy that is linear in the true value or cost and the minimax regret is not unacceptably large journal qf economic literature classification numbers 022 026

returns to schooling implicit discount rates and black white wage differentials a simple econometric model of investment in schooling is developed and estimated the measure of individual discount rates implicit in their educational investment decisions suggests no difference between individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds differences in individual speeds of educational attainment which do vary with background explain most of the variation in levels of attainment that is attributable to family background

a context dependent model of the gambling effect this paper presents a context dependent theory of decision under risk the relevant contextual factor is the presence of a riskless lottery in a preference comparison the theory only deviates from expected utility if the set of options contains both riskless and risky lotteries the main motivation for the theory is to explain the gambling effect contrary to previous theories of the gambling effect the present theory is consistent with stochastic dominance it can however violate transitivity the theory allows for a decomposition of the interaction between risk aversion and gambling aversion and thereby extends the classical arrow pratt measure of risk aversion

robust portfolio choice with learning in the framework of regret single period case in this paper we formulate a single period portfolio choice problem with parameter uncertainty in the framework of relative regret relative regret evaluates a portfolio by comparing its return to a family of benchmarks where the benchmarks are the wealths of fictitious investors who invest optimally given knowledge of the model parameters and is a natural objective when there is concern about parameter uncertainty or model ambiguity the optimal relative regret portfolio is the one that performs well in relation to all the benchmarks over the family of possible parameter values we analyze this problem using convex duality and show that it is equivalent to a bayesian problem where the lagrange multipliers play the role of the prior distribution and the learning model involves bayesian updating of these lagrange multipliers prior this bayesian problem is unusual in that the prior distribution is endogenously chosen by solving the dual optimization problem for the lagrange multipliers and the objective function involves the family of benchmarks from the relative regret problem these results show that regret is a natural means by which robust decision making and learning can be combined this paper was accepted by dimitris bertsimas optimization

marriage and class here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable we utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria the model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria even with constant returns to matching excerpt

robust monopoly pricing we consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information in the robust version the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution we characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors i maximin utility and ii minimax regret the equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty the concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

non reservation price equilibrium and search without priors we analyse a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search without priors consumers do not have prior beliefs about the distribution of prices charged by firms and thus try to use a robust search procedure we show that the optimal stopping rule is stochastic and that for any distribution of search costs there is a unique market equilibrium which is characterised by price dispersion although listed prices approach the monopoly price as the number of firms increases the effective price paid by consumers does not depend on the number of firms

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

a theory of the competitive saving motive abstract motivated by recent empirical work this paper formalizes a theory of competitive savings an arms race in household savings for mating competition that is made more fierce by an increase in the male to female ratio in the pre marital cohort relative to the empirical work the theory can clarify a number of important questions what determines the strength of the savings response by males or households with a son can women or households with a daughter dis save what are the conditions under which aggregate savings would go up in response to a higher sex ratio this theory can potentially help to understand the savings patterns in china india vietnam singapore hong kong and other economies that have experienced a dramatic increase in the pre marital sex ratio

core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market abstract flexible firms compete by means of wages in the assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the marriage market workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the marriage market respectively assignment market are not robust to the entrance of flexible respectively rigid firms to this market a new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid respectively flexible firms from this market meaningful comparative static results are derived

risk preferences in the psid individual imputations and family covariation unobserved heterogeneity greatly complicates empirical analysis in economics unobserved heterogeneity in preferences is particularly troublesome because there are so few theoretical restrictions on the distribution of preference parameters in the population therefore despite potential pitfalls we have developed direct survey measures of preference parameters based on hypothetical choices and appropriate econometric techniques for dealing with the inevitable measurement error in any such measures our work on survey measures of preference parameters focuses on risk tolerance robert b barsky f thomas juster kimball and shapiro 1997 bjks hereafter and kimball claudia r sahm and shapiro 2008 kss hereafter time preference and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution bjks and labor supply elasticities kimball and shapiro 2008

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

an exploration in school formation income vs ability we study stable school formation among four students that differ in ability and income in the presence of ability complementarities and school costs to be shared we identify the conditions under which a stable allocation is efficient inefficient nonexistent and tell who become peers

the today and tomorrow of kids time preferences and educational outcomes of children abstract we experimentally investigate the distribution of children s time preferences along gender and racial lines we find that boys are more impatient than girls and black children are more impatient than white children black boys have the highest discount rates of all groups most importantly we show that impatience has a direct correlation with behavior that is predictive of economic success an increase of one standard deviation in the discount rate is associated with an increase in the number of disciplinary referrals that a child has the following school year by 14 our results suggest that impatience might play an important role in determining the success of performance incentive programs for school children

children s rationality risk attitudes and field behavior abstract we investigate the relationship between risk attitudes choice consistency and field behavior of children by conducting economic experiments with 1275 8th graders choices are not completely consistent with any of the economic theories we consider however they are not random either we use our experimental data to structurally estimate risk preferences and correct for decision error using a measure constructed from the estimates and individual choices we find that risk preferences do predict future field behavior children who are more risk averse are less likely to receive disciplinary referrals one and two years after the experiment and are more likely to complete high school even controlling for economic rationality family background scholarly achievement and past misbehavior accounting for decision error turns out to be important as a simple aggregate measure of risk is not found to be correlated with field behavior

pricing without priors we consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer specifically the seller only knows the support of the possible valuations and has no further distributional information the seller is solving this choice problem under uncertainty by minimizing her regret the pricing policy hedges against uncertainty by randomizing over a range of prices the support of the pricing policy is bounded away from zero buyers with low valuations cannot generate substantial regret and are priced out of the market we generalize the pricing policy without priors to encompass many buyers and many qualities

regret aversion and opportunity dependence this paper provides an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty in which the decision maker is driven by anticipated ex post regrets our model allows both regret aversion and likelihood judgement over states to coexist also we characterize two special cases minimax regret with multiple priors that generalizes savage s minimax regret and a smooth model of regret aversion

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

sellers with misspecified models principals often operate on misspecified models of their agents preferences when preferences are such that non local incentive constraints may bind in the optimum even slight misspecification of the preferences can lead to large and non vanishing losses instead we propose a two step scheme whereby the principal 1 identifies the model optimal menu and 2 modifies prices by offering to share with the agent a fixed proportion of the profit she would receive if an item were sold at the model optimal price we show that her loss is bounded and vanishes smoothly as the model converges to the truth finally two step mechanisms without a sharing rule like 2 will not yield a valid approximation

gender competitiveness and career choices gender differences in competitiveness have been hypothesized as a potential explanation for gender differences in education and labor market outcomes we examine the predictive power of a standard laboratory experimental measure of competitiveness for the later important choice of academic track of secondary school students in the netherlands although boys and girls display similar levels of academic ability boys choose substantially more prestigious academic tracks where more prestigious tracks are more math and science intensive our experimental measure shows that boys are also substantially more competitive than girls we find that competitiveness is strongly positively correlated with choosing more prestigious academic tracks even conditional on academic ability most important we find that the gender difference in competitiveness accounts for a substantial portion about 20 of the gender difference in track choice

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

estimating individual discount rates in denmark a field experiment we estimate individual discount rates with respect to time streams of money using controlled laboratory experiments these discount rates are elicited by means of field experiments involving real monetary rewards the experiments were carried out across denmark using a representative sample of 268 people between 19 and 75 years of age individual discount rates are estimated for various households differentiated by socio demographic characteristics such as income and age our conclusions are that discount rates are constant over the 12 month to 3 year horizons used in these experiments and that discount rates vary substantially with respect to several socio demographic variables hence we conclude that it would be reasonable to assume constant discount rates for specific household types but not the same rates across all households

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

a mixed fan hypothesis and its implications for behavior toward risk in order to accommodate recent experimental evidence which questions the validity of the fanning out hypothesis a mixed fan hypothesis is proposed the hypothesis combines fanning out for the less preferred region of probability triangles with fanning in for the more preferred region and is defined over general probability spaces the relevance of fanning hypotheses for economic analysis is illustrated with an asset demand example and a new method for testing for fanning behavior is proposed

instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two sided matching with non transferable utility in this paper we apply the instrumental approach to social preferences in order to distinguish among various shapes of preferences for social status in particular we consider the shape of reduced preferences that emerge in the equilibrium of a twosided matching model with non transferable utility cole et al 1992 1995 show that under full observability of potential mates attributes instrumental concerns for social status are ordinal i e only one s own rank in the distribution of attributes matters we show that when we depart from full observability instrumental concerns for social status become cardinal i e also other features of the distribution of attributes matter we also show that the actual shape of cardinal concerns depends on how individuals can deal with the informational asymmetry alternatively leading to upward concerns i e making comparisons with higher rank people downward concerns i e making comparisons with lower rank people or bidirectional concerns i e being both upward and downward

stable marriages and search frictions stable matchings are the primary solution concept for two sided matching markets with nontransferable utility we investigate the strategic foundations of stability in a decentralized matching market towards this end we embed the standard marriage markets in a search model with random meetings we study the limit of steady state equilibria as exogenous frictions vanish the main result is that convergence of equilibrium matchings to stable matchings is guaranteed if and only if there is a unique stable matching in the underlying marriage market whenever there are multiple stable matchings sequences of equilibrium matchings converging to unstable inefficient matchings can be constructed thus vanishing frictions do not guarantee the stability and efficiency of decentralized marriage markets

three variants on the allais example three variants on the famous allais example were administered to student subjects two variants involved small changes in the example yet greatly diminished the qualitative behavior known as the allais paradox the third variant is almost a direct test of daniel kahneman and amos tversky s certainty effect against mark machina s fanning out hypothesis the results favor the certainty effect over the fanning out hypothesis for at least the case of straight line indifference curves copyright 1989 by american economic association

robust new product pricing we study the pricing decision for a monopolist launching a new innovation at the time of launch we assume that the monopolist has incomplete information about the true demand curve despite the lack of objective information the firm must set a retail price to maximize total profits to model this environment we develop a novel two period non bayesian framework where the monopolist sets the price in each period based only on a nonparametric set of all feasible demand curves optimal prices are dynamic as prices in any period allow the firm to learn about demand and improve future pricing decisions our main results show that the direction of dynamic introductory prices versus static prices depends on the type of heterogeneity in the market we find that 1 when consumers have homogeneous preferences introductory dynamic price is higher than the static price 2 when consumers have heterogeneous preferences and the monopolist has no ex ante information the introductory dynamic price is the same as

disclosure of information in matching markets with non transferable utility we present a model of two sided matching where utility is non transferable and information about individuals skills is private utilities are strictly increasing in the partner s skill and satisfy increasing differences skills can be either revealed or kept hidden but while agents on one side have verifiable skills agents on the other side have skills that are unverifiable unless certified and certification is costly agents who have revealed their skill enter a standard matching market while others are matched randomly we find that in equilibrium only agents with skills above a cutoff reveal and then they match assortatively we show that an equilibrium always exists and we discuss multiplicity increasing differences play an important role to shape equilibria and we remark that this is unusual in matching models with non transferable utility we close the paper with some comparative statics exercises where we show the existence of non trivial externalities and welfare implications