the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

valuing inputs under supply uncertainty the bayesian shapley value we consider the problem of valuing inputs in a production environment in which input supply is uncertain inputs can be workers in a firm risk factors for a disease securities in a financial market or nodes in a networked economy each input takes its values from a finite set and uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over this set first we provide an axiomatic solution to our valuation problem defining three intuitive axioms which we use to uniquely characterize a valuation scheme that we call the a priori shapley value second we solve the problem of valuing inputs a posteriori that is after observing output this leads to the bayesian shapley value third we consider the problem of rationalizing uncertainty when the inputs are rational workers supplying labor in a non cooperative production game in which payoffs are given by the shapley wage function we find that probability distributions over labor supply that can be supported as mixed strategy nash equilibria always exist we also provide an intuitive condition under which we prove the existence of a pure strategy nash equilibrium we present several applications of our theory to real life situations

political cycles and economic performance in oecd countries empirical evidence from 1951 2006 this paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short term economic performance i employ data on annual gdp growth in 21 oecd countries over the 1951 2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests in countries with two party systems gdp growth is boosted before elections and under leftwing governments in the first two years of a legislative period these findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance my findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short term economic performance

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk for example a bank and a finance company or a good bank bad bank structure such bipartite structures may prevent risk shifting in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders by insulating safer loans from riskier loans a bipartite structure reduces risk shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary bipartite structures are more likely to dominate unitary structures as the downside from riskier loans is higher or as expected profits from the efficient loan mix are lower

when is fdi a capital flow in this paper we analyze the conditions under which a foreign direct investment fdi involves a net capital flow across countries for this purpose we investigate how multinational firms finance their foreign affiliates globally or locally we develop a contract theoretical model in which the financing structure is used to govern the incentives of managers we find that the investment tends to be financed locally if managerial incentive problems are large thus microeconomic governance problems may have macroeconomic implications for the net capital flow to host countries our results are consistent with survey data on german and austrian investment flows of firms to eastern europe

fidelity networks and long run trends in hiv aids gender gaps more than half of the hiv aids infected population today are women we study a dynamic model of in fidelity which explains the hiv aids gender gap by the configuration of sexual networks each individual desires sexual relationships with opposite sex individuals two markov matching processes are defined each corresponding to a different culture of gender relations the first process leads to egalitarian pairwise stable networks in the long run and hiv aids is equally prevalent among men and women the second process leads to anti egalitarian pairwise stable networks reflecting male domination and women bear a greater burden the results are consistent with empirical observations

ceo wage dynamics estimates from a learning model abstract the level of chief executive officer ceo pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the ceo s ability the average ceo captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news implying ceos and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power in contrast the average ceo bears none of the negative surplus from bad news implying ceos have downward rigid pay these estimates are consistent with the optimal contracting benchmark of harris and holmstrom 1982 and do not appear to be driven by weak governance risk averse ceos accept significantly lower compensation in return for the insurance provided by downward rigid pay

state investment tax incentives a zero sum game abstract over the past four decades state investment tax incentives have proliferated this emergence of state investment tax credits itc and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions 1 are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective to increase investment within the state 2 to the extent these incentives raise investment within the state how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states to begin to answer these questions we construct a detailed panel dataset for 48 states for 20 years the dataset contains series on output and capital their relative prices and establishment counts the effects of tax variables on capital formation and establishments are measured by the jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax variables cross jurisdictional differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives two models are estimated the capital demand model is motivated by the first order condition for a profit maximizing firm and relates at the state level the capital output ratio to the relative user cost of capital the twin counties model exploits both the spatial breaks discontinuities in tax policy at state borders and our panel dataset to relate at the county level the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing establishments using the capital demand model we find that own state capital formation is substantially increased by tax induced reductions in the own state price of capital and more interestingly substantially decreased by tax induced reductions in the price of capital in competitive states similarly using our twin counties model we find that county manufacturing establishment counts around state borders are higher on the side of the border with the lower price of capital but the difference is economically small suggesting that establishments are much less mobile than overall capital extensions of the capital demand model also reveal that state capital tax policy appears to be a zero sum game among the states in that an equiproportionate increase in own state and competitive states user costs tends to have no effect on own state capital formation

business groups and internal capital markets the recovery of the mexican economy in the aftermath of the 1995 crisis in the second half of the nineties the mexican economy experienced a severe financial crisis however as the initial panic subsided mexico started to show promising signals of macroeconomic recovery not only did the economy rebound within a year but also grew steadily afterward averaging an annual rate slightly above 5 during 1996 2000 in this article it is suggested that the business group structure helped in the recovery of the economy the collapse of the banking system and the interruption of financing flows through the domestic financial markets was overcome by a change in the firms capital structure firms when possible started to depend more on trade credit and the internal capital market of business groups created a financial cushion that kept the economy working in order to offer a rationale for the mexican experience a theoretical model is presented where it is shown that moral hazard problems are reduced within a business group as long as affiliated firms in the nontradable sector surrender control rights during periods of crisis copyright 2007 oxford university press

internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources this article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market unlike a bank headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in winner picking the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another by doing a good job in the winner picking dimension headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm wide credit constraints the model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects this article analyzes the process by which internal capital markets channel limited resources to different uses inside a company in so doing it seeks to address two related sets of questions first what is the fundamental economic rationale for creating an internal capital market that is under what circumstances can it make sense to combine several technologically distinct projects under one roof and have them seek funding from corporate headquarters as opposed to setting them up as stand alone companies that each raise external financing on their own second given this rationale what is the optimal size and scope of an internal capital market should headquarters be involved in funding a large number of projects or just a few and should these projects be unrelated to one another or in similar lines of business the answers to both sets of questions flow from the insight that in a credit constrained setting where not all positive npv projects can be financed headquarters can create value by actively reallocating scarce funds across projects for example the cash flow generated by one division s activities may be taken and spent on investment in another division where the returns are higher or alternatively one division s assets may be used as collateral to raise financing that is then diverted to the other division simply put individual projects must compete for the scarce funds and headquarters job is to pick the winners and losers in this competition

do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle this paper develops and tests the theory that fiscal rules limit politicians ability to manipulate the budget for electoral gain using panel data from the american states i find evidence suggesting that stringent balanced budget rules dampen the political business cycle that is while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year this pattern does not exist in states with strict no carry rules neither binding gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political business cycle

state and local fiscal policy and growth at the border abstract the paper studies the connection between state and local fiscal policy as measured by the share of government spending and revenues in personal income and the economic activity of counties that share a state border i construct a panel of pairs of us counties that share a state border from the 1970s to 2012 economic activity is measured by county employment wages and business establishments the state and local government spending and revenue shares are aggregates for the states on the respective sides of the border i estimate distributed lag regressions of changes in economic activity on changes in state and local government budgets in two ways the first double difference utilizes change in the difference between border counties this suggests a quite modest relocation of economic activity away from states with fiscal expansion i then look at activity on each side of the border separately and find more substantial and consistently negative effects of fiscal expansion on both sides of the border a border county shares the negative consequences for its neighbor of growth in the size of that neighbor s state and local governments this negative fiscal externality is roughly half the size of the direct negative effects from similar own state spending increases and the sum of the two is substantial economically

local political business cycles evidence from philippine municipalities abstract this paper establishes the existence of short term political business cycles in the philippines over the period 2003 2009 examining a balanced panel of 1143 municipalities shows that employment levels increase in the two pre electoral quarters and drop sharply in the two quarters following elections further results are consistent with the cycles being generated by incumbents attempts to increase their chances of re election cycles are stronger in sectors that incumbents are more able to influence and when they expect stronger electoral competition evidence suggests that these cycles are detrimental to development

phasing the operation mode of foreign subsidiaries reaping the benefits of multinationality through internal capital markets the lifetime of foreign equity partnerships is often limited research suggests that mncs abandon their local partners when the need for sharing ownership in foreign subsidiaries has diminished this study shows that mncs may abandon their local equity partners to reap the benefits of multinationality as mncs gain a competitive advantage from leveraging resources across borders they will initially benefit from sharing ownership with a local firm to embed their foreign subsidiaries in the local environment and access local resources more effectively later they will benefit from taking over the local partner s equity share to better embed their subsidiaries in the parent organization and transfer locally accessed resources to the mnc s other locations moderated mediation regressions provide evidence of such practice in the context of cross border transfers of capital resources this strategy seems to work as a corollary of our model panel regressions suggest that sharing ownership with local firms in a host country with a capital resource advantage is associated with appropriating more capital resources from the local debt market while abandoning these partner firms later is associated with transferring more capital resources from this host country via internal capital markets to other parts of the mnc

substituting the end for the whole why voters respond primarily to the election year economy according to numerous studies the election year economy influences presidential election results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term here we describe a series of surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for this pattern that runs contrary to standard political science explanations but one that accords with a large psychological literature voters we find actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative growth however since that characteristic is not readily available to them voters inadvertently substitute election year performance because it is more easily accessible this end heuristic explanation for voters election year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole the end heuristic explanation also suggests a remedy a way to align voters actions with their intentions providing people with the attribute they are seeking cumulative growth eliminates the election year emphasis

educational business cycles the political economy of teacher hiring across german states 1992 2004 strong institutional constraints and better informed voters may lead re election seeking incumbents to shift the use of political business cycle mechanisms away from monetary and fiscal policy towards other policy domains that are more easily manipulable targetable and timeable we investigate teacher employment patterns at the state level in germany and find strong evidence of cycling mechanisms in the form of electioneering and honeymooning against a backdrop of a continuously shrinking total teachers pool german state level incumbents accelerate the hiring of new teachers during election periods and partly reverse this during politically safer points in the electoral cycle cycles are mediated by issue salience heightened attention to german public schooling after the notorious pisa 2000 tests further strengthens the manipulation of new teacher hiring for electoral purposes

the effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers differences in differences estimates for spain abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper tier grantor governments i e controlled by the same party will receive more grants than those that are unaligned we use a rich spanish database which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993 2003 from three different upper tier governments i e central regional and upper local since three elections were held at each tier during this period we have enough within municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences in differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source moreover the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple differences estimator which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones the results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities for example with majority governments at the two layers aligned municipalities receive over 40 more grants than unaligned ones

using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime comment previous empirical studies have uncovered little evidence that police reduce crime possibly due to simultaneity problems this paper uses the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections as an instrumental variable to identify a causal effect of police on crime increases in the size of police forces are shown to be disproportionately concentrated in mayoral and gubernatorial election years increases in police are shown to substantially reduce violent crime but have a smaller impact on property crime the null hypothesis that the marginal social benefit of reduced crime equals the costs of hiring additional police cannot be rejected

electoral cycles in government employment evidence from us gubernatorial elections abstract incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards i investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment around us gubernatorial elections exploiting staggered gubernatorial election cycles across states i use both county fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference in gubernatorial election cycles consistent with manipulation state and local government employment per capita are higher leading up to elections afterwards employment abruptly returns to normal political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated including by election competitiveness term limits incumbent party affiliation and ideological alignment between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens differences across types of government employment and private sector employment are also explored

optimal dynamic capital budgeting i study optimal design of a dynamic capital allocation process in an organization in which the division manager with empire building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects and headquarters can audit projects at a cost under certain conditions a budgeting mechanism with threshold separation of financing is optimal headquarters 1 allocate a spending account to the manager and replenish it over time 2 set a threshold such that projects below it are financed from the account while projects above are financed fully by headquarters upon an audit further analysis studies when co financing of projects is optimal and how the size of the account depends on past performance of projects

capital markets and firm organization how financial development shapes european corporate groups we investigate the effect of financial development on the formation of european corporate groups because cross country regressions are hard to interpret in a causal sense we exploit exogenous industry measures to investigate a specific channel through which financial development may affect group affiliation internal capital markets using a comprehensive firm level data set on european corporate groups in 15 countries we find that countries with less developed financial markets have a higher percentage of group affiliates in more capital intensive industries this relationship is more pronounced for young and small firms and for affiliates of large and diversified groups our findings are consistent with the view that internal capital markets may under some conditions be more efficient than prevailing external markets and that this may drive group affiliation even in developed economies this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

the growth of public health expenditures in oecd countries do government ideology and electoral motives matter this paper empirically evaluates whether government ideology and electoral motives influenced the growth of public health expenditures in 18 oecd countries over the 1971 2004 period the results suggest that incumbents behaved opportunistically and increased the growth of public health expenditures in election years government ideology did not have an influence these findings indicate 1 the importance of public health in policy debates before elections and 2 the political pressure towards re organizing public health policy platforms especially in times of demographic change

financing a portfolio of projects this article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors bargaining positions and yet entrepreneurs incentives may be improved because projects funded by investors with shallow pockets must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised jel g24 g31 venture capital finance takes place in an environment of severe informational asymmetries and incentive problems venture capitalists not only must assess the quality of investment proposals submitted to them for funding but once the initial funding has taken place they must also give the right incentives to the entrepreneurs and monitor the performance of the portfolio companies on an ongoing basis this article departs from most of the existing literature by explicitly recognizing that venture capitalists manage a portfolio of projects the need for portfolio management arises if the amount of capital both financial and human available to a venture capital fund is limited implying that venture capitalists must carefully choose which projects to allocate their scarce financial and human resources to 1 by staging their investments venture capitalists retain the right to deny capital infusions to particular

is it inefficient investment that causes the diversification discount diversified conglomerates are valued less than matched portfolios of pure play firms recent studies find that this diversification discount results from conglomerates inefficient allocation of capital expenditures across divisions much of this work uses tobin s q as a proxy for investment opportunities therefore hypothesizing that q is a good proxy this paper treats measurement error in q using a measurement error consistent estimator on the sorts regressions in the literature i find no evidence of inefficient allocation of investment the results in the literature appear to be artifacts of measurement error and of the correlation between investment opportunities and liquidity diversif ied conglomerates appear to trade at a discount relative to matched portfolios of pure play firms studies documenting this stylized fact include lang and stulz 1994 berger and ofek 1995 comment and jarrell 1995 and servaes 1996 recent empirical work has sought to find the source of this diversification discount building on the theoretical work in milgrom and roberts 1990 stein 1997 and scharfstein and stein 2000 on the inefficiency of internal capital markets this literature has asked specifically whether diversified firms allocate their capital expenditures inefficiently across divisions the canonical answer has been yes and has been supported by two types of evidence first studies such as lamont 1997 shin and stulz 1998 shin and park 1998 and rajan servaes and zingales 2000 all find that internal capital markets in conglomerates transfer funds across divisions in a suboptimal manner second studies such as berger and ofek and scharfstein 1998 provide evidence suggesting that the divisions of conglomerates do not respond adequately to investment opportunities in comparison to single segment firms however these findings about divisional investment may be an artifact of measurement error most of these studies rely on tobin s q the market value of the capital stock divided by its replacement value as a proxy for investment opportunities and tobin s q is likely to be a poor proxy shin and stulz

do political parties matter evidence from u s cities are cities as politically polarized as states and countries no is the answer from our regression discontinuity design analysis which shows that whether the mayor is a democrat or a republican does not affect the size of city government the allocation of local public spending or crime rates however there is a substantial incumbent effect for mayors we investigate three mechanisms that could account for the striking lack of partisan impact at the local level and find the most support for tiebout competition among localities within metropolitan areas

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

resource allocation within firms and financial market dislocation evidence from diversified conglomerates we argue and demonstrate that resource allocation within firms internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing financial market dislocation we estimate a structural model of internal capital markets to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision and illustrate how these forces interact with external capital market stress the weaker stronger division obtains too much little capital as though it is 12 9 more less productive than it really is out of sample simulated data are consistent with the actual data showing that internal capital markets offset financial market stress during the recent financial crisis by 16 30

electoral cycles in active labor market policies we examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote short term job creation such policies reduce measures of unemployment using german state data for the period 1985 to 2004 we show that election motivated politicians pushed job promotion schemes before elections

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

capital reallocation and liquidity this paper studies the cyclical properties of capital reallocation and the frictions which inhibit such reallocation we show that the amount of capital reallocation and the benefits to reallocation vary at the business cycle frequency the amount of capital reallocation is procyclical in contrast the benefits to capital reallocation appear countercyclical we measure the amount of reallocation using data on flows of capital across firms and the benefits to capital reallocation using several measures of the cross sectional dispersion of the productivity of capital we then study a calibrated model of an economy where capital reallocation is costly and impute the cost of reallocation which is consistent with the amount of and benefits to reallocation in the data we find that the cost of reallocation needs to be substantially countercyclical to be consistent with the observed joint cyclical properties of reallocation and productivity dispersion the cyclical variation in this cost is interpreted as variation in the liquidity of capital broadly defined since physical costs are unlikely to vary countercyclically

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

pyramidal groups and debt abstract this paper suggests that debt should be raised by subsidiaries in order to exploit the limited liability of the holding company however when this behavior increases the cost of funds the holding might prefer to raise debt to a point where it would also default when subsidiaries are insolvent after accounting for standard controls we find that holding companies in italian pyramids have higher leverage than subsidiaries and that the cash flow share of the entrepreneur in the subsidiary does not play a significant role these findings are consistent with the implications of our model of group capital structure

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

product market competition and the financing of new ventures this paper examines the interaction between venture risk product market competition and the entrepreneur s choice between bank financing and venture capital vc financing under bank financing a debt type contract emerges as optimal which allows the entrepreneur to retain full control of the venture and thus yields strong effort incentives as long as the entrepreneur can service the debt repayment however this leads to liquidation in the case of default making the venture s success quite sensitive to exogenous even temporary shocks that may hinder debt repayment under vc financing an equity type contract emerges as optimal although it is not sensitive to exogenous shocks this contract requires the entrepreneur to share a fraction of the rents with the financier thus yielding lower effort incentives for the entrepreneur there exists a threshold level of venture risk such that bank financing is optimal if and only if venture risk is below that threshold product market competition increases the value of stronger entrepreneurial incentives and thus increases the maximum level of risk the entrepreneur is willing to take before switching from bank financing to vc financing this is a robust result that is shown to hold in various models of competition including the hotelling salop dixit stiglitz and cournot to bertrand switch this paper was accepted by lee fleming entrepreneurship and innovation

electoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities abstractelectoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities regional studies this paper provides evidence that there is an electoral cycle in public administration decisions using data from german local governments in the period 2001 10 specifically it finds that the number of building licences issued by the public administration significantly increases in election years this result is robust to various specification tests and to dealing with the potential endogeneity of the election timing

party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures this paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997 we find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support this is borne out in two ways i counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments ii when control of the state government changes the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party we find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts finally we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections this suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results and the mechanism through which this works is mobilization rather than conversion of voters in a fixed electorate

diversification and cash dynamics abstract why do diversified firms hold significantly less cash than focused firms we study this question using a dynamic model of corporate investment saving and diversification decisions we find that investment dynamics are more important in explaining the cash differences than financing frictions more efficient internal capital markets increase cash differences and are especially valuable when a firm diversifies or refocuses contrary to static models more diverse conglomerates have lower cash differences endogenous selection diversifying firms are larger and have better growth opportunities accounts for 68 of the cash difference and the diversification event itself reduces cash holdings by 32

global samaritans donor election cycles and the allocation of humanitarian aid abstract this paper finds a large causal donor election cycle effect in humanitarian aid allocations on average humanitarian aid increases by 19 in the year before elections our identification strategy consists of focusing on donors with fixed election dates making elections clearly exogenous furthermore we find large interaction effects with natural and human disasters this evidence is consistent with our theory that incumbent governments responding to humanitarian disasters can increase voter support for their party and insure against the political fall out of not being seen as representatives of a country with global interests and influence however it is important to stress that despite our findings human and natural disasters explain a substantially larger share of the overall variation in humanitarian aid observed in the data

why are ceos rarely fired evidence from structural estimation i evaluate the forced ceo turnover rate and quantify effects on shareholder value by estimating a dynamic model the model features learning about ceo ability and costly turnover to fit the observed forced turnover rate the model needs the average board of directors to behave as if replacing the ceo costs shareholders at least 200 million this cost mainly reflects ceo entrenchment rather than a real cost to shareholders the model predicts that shareholder value would rise 3 if we eliminated this perceived turnover cost all else equal the model also helps explain the relation between ceo firings tenure and profitability

internal vs external financing of r d the empirical evidence suggests that while small firms in united states united kingdom and canada rely on internal funds for financing r d similar firms in japan germany and france have access to bank loans in this paper we analyze the financial decisions of small firms willing to invest in r d we find that their high ratio of intangible assets along with the high risk nature of their investments can explain their inability to raise debt in external capital markets we also show that financing r d with bank loans might be feasible especially if banks are willing to monitor the investment activities of their clients

entrepreneurial spawning and firm characteristics we analyze the implications of the decision to spawn or to retain a new product for the nature and evolution of the firm in our model a new product is spawned if the fit between the product and its parent firm organization is not adequate we focus on the impact of the firm s history of spawning decisions on firm characteristics such as size focus profitability and innovativeness and analyze its role in shaping firm dynamics in accordance with the empirical literature our model predicts that older firms innovate less spawn less are more diversified and less profitable and that firms with more valuable general or specialized resources innovate and spawn more echoing seemingly contradictory empirical findings our model predicts that small focused firms large diversified firms innovate and spawn more and are more profitable when sample heterogeneity is driven by the importance of organizational fit the value of general resources this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

liaisons dangereuses increasing connectivity risk sharing and systemic risk the recent financial crisis poses the challenge to understand how systemic risk arises endogenously and what architecture can make the financial system more resilient to global crises this paper shows that a financial network can be most resilient for intermediate levels of risk diversification and not when this is maximal as generally thought so far this finding holds in the presence of the financial accelerator i e when negative variations in the financial robustness of an agent tend to persist in time because they have adverse effects on the agent s subsequent performance through the reaction of the agent s counterparties 2012 elsevier b v all rights reserved

reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets abstract diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts the literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles we show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post when managers derive utility from the funds under their purview moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives the ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds this effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

capital constraints asymmetric information and internal capital markets in banking new evidence a growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries in contrast we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur we find that internal capital markets are used by multibank holding companies to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries in addition we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital but also the movement of assets loans from less well capitalized to better capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries furthermore net loan sales are used to allow efficiency enhancing specialization among bank subsidiaries insofar as those subsidiaries with the best loan origination opportunities are able to focus on loan originations even if they do not have sufficient capital to hold the loans our evidence is consistent with banks affiliated with holding companies more actively participating in loan sales and purchases because by using their internal secondary loan market they are able to avoid the lemons problem faced by stand alone banks

fund families as delegated monitors of money managers because a money manager learns more about her skill from her management experience than outsiders can learn from her realized returns she expects inefficiency in future contracts that condition exclusively on realized returns a fund family that learns what the manager learns can reduce this inefficiency cost if the family is large enough the family s incentive is to retain any given manager regardless of her skill but when the family has enough managers it adds value by boosting the credibility of its retentions through the firing of others as the number of managers grows the efficiency loss goes to zero

evidence on the dark side of internal capital markets this article documents differences between the sensitivity of investment of stand alone firms and unrelated segments of conglomerate firms unrelated segments exhibit lower o sensitivity of investment than stand alone firms this fact is driven by unrelated segments of conglomerate firms that tend to invest less than stand alone firms in high s industries this finding is robust to matching on industry year size age and profitability the differences are more pronounced in conglomerates in which top management has small ownership stakes suggesting that agency problems explain the investment behavior

corporate liquidity and capital structure we solve for a firm s optimal cash holding policy within a continuous time contingent claims framework using dividends short term borrowing and equity issues as controls assuming mean reversion of earnings optimal cash is non monotone in business conditions and increasing in the level of long term debt the model matches closely a wide range of empirical benchmarks and predicts cash and leverage dynamics in line with the empirical literature firm value is quite insensitive to changes in the level of long term debt the model has interesting implications for asset substitution hedging and pecking order growth opportunities do not greatly affect cash holding policy

assessing the effects of local taxation using microgeographic data we study the impact of local taxation on the location and growth of firms our empirical methodology pairs establishments across jurisdictional boundaries to estimate the impact of taxation our approach improves on existing work as it corrects for unobserved establishment heterogeneity for unobserved time varying site specific effects and for the endogeneity of local taxation applied to data for english manufacturing establishments we find that local taxation has a negative impact on employment growth but no effect on entry

output fluctuations and fiscal policy u s state and local governments 1978 1994 abstract we study the cyclical properties of u s state and local government fiscal policy the budget surpluses of both are procyclical over short and medium term horizons procyclical surpluses are the result of strongly procyclical revenue and weakly procyclical expenditure these results hold whether aggregate u s wide fluctuations are controlled for or not federal grants to state and local governments are procyclical but this is due to aggregate output fluctuations with respect to state level output fluctuations federal grants are countercyclical the budget surpluses of trust funds and utilities are also procyclical but there is no evidence that this effect is stronger in states where balanced budget rules are tighter the cyclical patterns of state and local budget surpluses are affected by various political institutions for example budget surpluses are less procyclical in conservative states in an election year that occurs in good times state governments refrain from accumulating a larger surplus in bad times no such asymmetry between election and non election years is apparent

party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes although the nature of the differences between parties in democratic electoral politics is an enduring question in political science surprisingly little is understood about the subject but substantial progress has been made in recent years most notably in understanding party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes the first breakthrough was douglas hibbs s 1977 analysis of party related differences in the unemployment rate in his time series analysis for the united states hibbs modeled the path of unemployment as an autoregressive moving average process subject to a dummy variable intervention term indicating party of the president his analysis indicated that democratic administrations were associated with lower unemployment than republicans by 2 36 points after eight years in office and even larger differences in long run equilibrium a subsequent article by nathaniel beck 1982 addressed the same issue and found the party differences less sharp when administration specific policy differences are considered the techniques employed by hibbs and beck focus directly on an outcome unemployment rather than on the policy instruments that are presumably responsible for altering outcomes this approach can be misleading when there are long lags between implementation of policies and ultimate effects or when shocks occasionally intrude upon the regular connections between instruments and outcomes macroeconomic theories can provide information about constraints linking macroeconomic variables but hibbs and beck fail to incorporate theoretical constraints such constraints could help determine what kinds of outcomes are feasible and sustainable and to what extent outcomes are induced by policies as opposed to shocks our purpose here is to consider how one might go about estimating party differences in a framework that takes advantage of some insights offered by macroeconomic theories and to report some preliminary results a more complete description of the analysis is provided in our working paper available upon request

managerial incentives and internal capital markets capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm as well as on headquarters assessment of the divisions while corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who consequently are tempted to free ride as the number of divisions increases the free rider problem is aggravated and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives the analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm the industry and the capital market

the strategic impact of resource flexibility in business groups we show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets resources may be channelled to either more or less profitable units depending on the amount of internal resources a group may exit a market in response to increased competition or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market this has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash rich poor firm more less vulnerable to entry deterrence also resource flexibility within a group makes subsidiaries reaction functions flatter thus discouraging rivals strategic commitments when entry is accommodated

shapley value for multichoice cooperative games i abstract we extend cooperative games in characteristic function form to multichoice cooperative games in such multichoice games shapley value is extended the explicit formula is given to compute the value american mathematical society classification numbers 90d12 90d40 journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 d46 d61 d72

the corporate propensity to save why do corporations accumulate liquid assets we show theoretically that intertemporal trade offs between interest income taxation and the cost of external finance determine optimal savings intriguingly we find that controlling for tobin s q saving and cash flow are negatively related because firms lower cash reserves to invest after receiving positive cash flow shocks and vice versa consistent with theory we estimate negative propensities to save out of cash flow we also find that income uncertainty affects saving more than do external finance constraints therefore contrary to previous evidence saving propensities reflect too many forces to be used to measure external finance constraints

election results and opportunistic policies a new test of the rational political business cycle model the literature on the rational pbc suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre election distortions in fiscal policy we propose a new test that explores the two way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory the test is implemented using a large panel of portuguese municipalities the results show that opportunism leads to a larger win margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win margin is small these results are consistent with the theoretical model

the value allocation of an economy with differential information we analyze the shapley value allocation of an economy with differential information since the intent of the shapley value is to measure the sum of the expected marginal contributions made by an agent to any coalition that he she belongs to the value allocation of an economy with differential information provides an interesting way to measure the information advantage of an agent this feature of the shapley value allocation is not necessarily shared by the rational expectation equilibrium thus we analyze the informational structure of an economy with differential information from a different and new viewpoint

are internal capital markets efficient using segment information from compustat we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm s other segments but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow the investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single segment firms the sensitivity of a segment s investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better than those of the firm s other segments

internal versus external capital markets this paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation we focus pritnarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending while both represent centralized forms of financing in the former case the financing is owner provided while in the latter ceise it is not we argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences 1 it leads to more monitoring than bank lending 2 it reduces managers entrepreneurial incentives and 3 it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management

revisiting the minimum wage employment debate throwing out the baby with the bathwater we revisit the minimum wage employment debate which is as old as the department of labor in particular we assess new studies claiming that the standard panel data approach used in much of the new minimum wage research is flawed because it fails to account for spatial heterogeneity these new studies use research designs intended to control for this heterogeneity and conclude that minimum wages in the united states have not reduced employment we explore the ability of these research designs to isolate reliable identifying information and test the untested assumptions in this new research about the construction of better control groups our evidence points to serious problems with these research designs we conclude that the evidence still shows that minimum wages pose a tradeoff of higher wages for some against job losses for others and that policymakers need to bear this tradeoff in mind when making decisions about increasing the minimum wage

tax avoidance and business location in a state border model abstract previous studies have struggled to demonstrate that higher taxes deter business activity we revisit this issue by estimating the effect of changes over time in cross border differences in state tax conditions on the tendency for new establishments to favor one side of a state border over the other identification is enhanced by taking account of previously overlooked reciprocal agreements that require workers to pay income tax to their state of residence as opposed to their state of employment when reciprocal agreements are in force higher personal income tax rates lure companies from across the border while corporate income tax and sales tax rates have the opposite effect where reciprocal agreements are not in place the results are largely reversed these patterns are amplified in heavily developed locations and differ in anticipated ways by industry and corporate non corporate status of the establishment overall results strengthen the view that state level tax policies do affect the location decisions of entrepreneurs and new business activity but not in a way that lends itself to a one size fits all summary

debt shifting and ownership structure abstract previous theoretical studies on the debt shifting behavior of multinationals have assumed affiliates of multinationals to be wholly owned we develop a model that allows a multinational firm to determine both the leverage and ownership structure in affiliates endogenously a main finding is that affiliates with minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates and therefore a less tax efficient financing structure this is due to an externality that arises endogenously in our model where costs and benefits of debt shifting are shared asymmetrically between minority and majority owners our findings provide a theory framework for recent empirical findings

the capital budgeting process incentives and information we study the capital allocation process within firms observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems it is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low we also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer there is general agreement that investment decisions are the most important decisions made by corporations the choice of projects and the level of investment is critical not just for stakeholders of the firm but also for the economic well being of society as a whole it has been alleged that u s firms invest too little and tend to overemphasize short term results for example porter 1992 citing poterba and summers 1992 asserts that u s firms use hurdle rates to evaluate investment projects that are higher than their estimated costs of capital to understand the investment behavior of firms one must consider both the process by which external capital is made available to firms and the process by which internally and externally raised capital is allocated to investment projects within the firm considerable attention has been paid to how firms raise external capital the fundamental insight in this area is the celebrated result of modigliani and miller mm that capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of capital market frictions accordingly in the three decades since their contribution research on how external capital is raised has focused on market frictions including information and incentive problems relatively little research has focused on the internal allocation process and its relationship to the organization of the firm modern finance theory prescribes allocating capital according to the net present value npv rule just as the mm result itself provides no theory of the arrangements under which

parties politics and regulation evidence from clean air act enforcement does local federal regulation respond to the preferences of local congressional representatives for example do republican congressmen reduce local enforcement of clean air laws in their districts we use facility level panel data on clean air act inspections over 1989 2005 to study the causal effect of a congressman s party affiliation on local enforcement random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a regression discontinuity design we find that new republican vs democratic representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election jel d73 q52 q53

lloyd shapley s matching and game theory this is a survey of lloyd shapley s contributions to matching theory and game theory in general starting with the work that inspired the swedish academy to award the 2012 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences to lloyd shapley and alvin roth

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

bank and nonbank financial intermediation conglomerates trade credit arrangements and banks are all instances of financial intermediation however these institutions differ significantly in the extent to which the projects financed absorb aggregate intermediary risk in whether or not intermediation is carried out by a financial specialist in the type of projects they fund and in the type of claims they issue to investors the paper develops a simple unified model that both accounts for the continued coexistence of these different forms of intermediation and explains why they differ specific applications to conglomerate firms trade credit and banking are discussed conglomerates trade credit arrangements and banks are all instances of financial intermediation in each case the conglomerate headquarters supplier bank obtains funds by selling financial securities while in turn providing funds in exchange for a claim on project cash flows 1 however in spite of the fundamental similarity between these forms of financial intermediation important differences exist between them in particular

should business groups be dismantled the equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets abstract we analyze the relationship between conglomerates internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy wide capital allocation and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection conglomerates that engage in winner picking stein 1997 internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources journal of finance 52 111 133 find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects even when other firms in the economy have higher productivity projects that are in need of additional capital this bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital we also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development in such countries a high degree of conglomeration generated for example by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups could decrease the efficiency of the capital market our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates these predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms because of a lack of finance

a reexamination of the conglomerate merger wave in the 1960s an internal capital markets view one possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less developed capital markets examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s we find the highest bidder returns when financially unconstrained buyers acquire constrained targets this result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing we also find that bidders generally retain target management suggesting that management may have provided companyspecific operational information while the bidder provided capital budgeting expertise