the optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents tournaments are widely used in organizations explicitly or implicitly to reward the best performing employees for example by promotion or bonuses and or to penalize the worst performing employees for example by demotion withholding bonuses or unfavorable job assignments these incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees relative performance while the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents we show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity under a wide range of conditions loser prize tournaments that is tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers are optimal for the firm the reason is that low ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments as compared to winner prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints jel m52 j33 j24

rational household labor supply traditionally household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function in this paper we propose an alternative approach in which the household is modeled as a two member collectivity taking pareto efficient decisions the consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three good model in which only total consumption and each member s labor supply are observable if the agents are assumed egoistic i e they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint if alternatively agents are altruistic restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private good economy

children as collective goods and divorce settlements the failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female headed households this paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children s welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce the point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother within marriage proximity and altruism serve to overcome the free rider problem associated with the provision of public goods however on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a pareto optimal allocation of their joint resources a model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event

external market condition and tournaments theory and evidence abstract this paper adds in a new assumption product price into the tournament model and shows the convexity of pay structure should become stronger when the produce price increases empirical results from a taiwanese textile company are consistent with the implication

an approximation of the distribution of learning estimates in macroeconomic models abstract adaptive learning under constant gain allows persistent deviations of beliefs from equilibrium so as to more realistically reflect agents attempt of tracking the continuous evolution of the economy a characterization of these beliefs is therefore paramount to a proper understanding of the role of expectations in the determination of macroeconomic outcomes in this paper we propose a simple approximation of the first two moments mean and variance of the asymptotic distribution of learning estimates for a general class of dynamic macroeconomic models under constant gain learning our approximation provides renewed convergence conditions that depend on the learning gain and the model s structural parameters we validate the accuracy of our approximation with numerical simulations of a cobweb model a standard new keynesian model and a model including a lagged endogenous variable the relevance of our results is further evidenced by an analysis of learning stability and the effects of alternative specifications of interest rate policy rules on the distribution of agents beliefs

learning and coordination with dispersed information abstract we analyse adaptive learning in a model of incomplete and dispersed information with externalities and strategic interactions we build on the framework proposed by angeletos and pavan 2007a and extend it to a dynamic multi period setting where agents need to learn to coordinate we derive conditions under which adaptive learning obtains in such setting and show that when actions are strategic substitutes the information structure affects the speed of convergence while more precise private information is beneficial better public information has negative effects we also show that adaptive learning dynamics converge to the bayesian nash equilibrium which means that agents can learn to act strategically by relying only on observable exogenous information

gift giving and the evolution of cooperation gift giving is a practice common to many societies in an evolutionary model the social custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation the evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can be used as gifts for example gift goods may have little use value even at low levels of consumption although the gifts themselves are useless the institution is not

escape dynamics in learning models this article illustrates and characterizes how adaptive learning can lead to recurrent large fluctuations learning models have typically focused on the convergence of beliefs towards an equilibrium however in stochastic environments there may be rare but recurrent episodes where shocks cause beliefs to escape from the equilibrium generating large movements in observed outcomes i characterize the escape dynamics by drawing on the theory of large deviations developing new results which make this theory directly applicable in a class of learning models the likelihood frequency and most likely direction of escapes are all characterized by a deterministic control problem i illustrate my results with two simple examples

the economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation this paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations roscas detailed evidence from roscas in a kenyan slum nairobi suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income to explain this phenomenon we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption the empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in kenya

portfolio manager behavior and global financial crises abstract i develop a two market agent based model to study how global portfolio managers affect global financial crises and stability first i create an agent based model where fund managers make their allocation decisions between two markets and a risk free asset based on the mean variance framework simulation results reveal that global managers do not create global financial crises second i extend the base model by incorporating insights from behavioral finance where risk is instead determined by fund manager losses simulation results reveal that slight global manager losses can trigger a widening of both markets risk premium accelerating the decline in asset prices worldwide statistical analysis reveals that global managers are a stabilizing force in smaller numbers however they become destabilizing in larger numbers the ability to reduce risk by diversifying across markets results in excessive risk taking if global managers exist in larger numbers systematic over leverage may result such that a deleveraging process can lead to the spreading of financial crises

do tournaments have incentive effects much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses we focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure prize distribution and measures of individual output players scores are both available we find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance

learning by disinflating disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy in this paper we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating the approach differs from the existing literature which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation we build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilisation in this case our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long run level the potential for inflation to undershoot its long run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker s mandate jel classification d83 e52 e58 keywords disinflation escape dynamics learning monetary policy

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

asymmetric information about migrant earnings and remittance flows this paper examine asymmetric information about migrant earnings and its implications for remittance behavior using a sample of indian households with husbands working overseas in qatar on average wives underreport their husbands income and underreporting is more prevalent in households with higher earning migrants the discrepancy in earning reports is strongly correlated with variation in remittances greater underreporting by wives is associated with lower remittances an exchange model of remittances is developed with asymmetric information and costly state verification the optimal remittance contract prescribes a threshold for remittances that invites verification only if unmet the model s predictions closely match our empirical findings

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

the impact of managerial change on performance the role of team heterogeneity when a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents as a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change but only when the team is suciently homogenous otherwise a new manager quickly makes similar choices as the old one did we investigate this hypothesis using a large data set on coach dismissals in the german football league where the selection of players is indeed a key task of the coach indeed we nd substantial evidence that coach replacements enhance team performance only in homogenous teams moreover from a methodological point of view we argue that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession eects which might reconcile previous ndings of no or even negative eects with the vast number of dismissals

the long term impact of international migration on economic decision making evidence from a migration lottery and lab in the field experiments this paper studies how migration from a poor to a rich country affects key economic beliefs preference parameters and transnational household decision making efficiency the setting is the migration of tongans to new zealand through a migration lottery program in a 10 year follow up survey of individuals applying for this program the study elicited risk and time preferences and pro market beliefs it also linked migrants and potential migrants to a partner household consisting of family members who would stay behind if the migrants moved survey participants played lab in the field games designed to measure the degree of intra family trust and the efficiency of intra family decision making migration provides a large and permanent positive shock to income a large change in economic institutions and a reduction in interactions with partner household members despite these changes the study finds no significant impacts of migration on risk and time preferences pro market beliefs or the decision making efficiency of transnational households this stability in the face of such a large and life changing event lends credence to economic models of migration that treat these determinants of decision making as time invariant and contrasts with recent evidence on preference changes after negative shocks

unstable inflation targets this paper studies long run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment when central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares inflation targets can lead agents beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels first implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting second there can be nearly self fulfilling inflation disinflation or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed

a new look at incentive effects and golf tournaments abstract this paper uses data from the 1992 professional golf association tour to analyze the incentive effects offered by tournaments the results suggest that the level of the total prize money has an insignificant effect on the total score output of the players workers this conclusion contradicts the findings of an earlier paper by ehrenberg and bognanno journal of political economy 1990 98 1307 1324

testing the theory of tournaments an empirical analysis of broiler production broiler chickens are raised by contract growers whose rewards depend explicitly upon relative performance we use data on the performance of broiler producers facing both tournament and linear performance evaluation compensation structures to test three predictions from the theory of tournaments that changes in the level of prizes that leave prize differentials unchanged will not affect performance that in mixed tournaments more able players will choose less risky strategies and that tournament organizers will attempt to handicap players of unequal ability or reduce mixing to avoid the disincentive effects of mixed tournaments our evidence is consistent with each prediction

the incentive effects of tournaments revisited evidence from the european pga tour this analysis of data from the 1987 european men s professional golf association pga tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance specifically players performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks the authors suggest that these results together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 u s men s pga tour may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers such as corporate executives college professors and salespeople

intrinsic heterogeneity in expectation formation we introduce the concept of misspecification equilibrium to dynamic macroeconomics agents choose between a list of misspecified econometric models and base their selection on relative forecast performance a misspecification equilibrium is a stochastic process in which agents forecast optimally given their choices with forecast model parameters and predictor proportions endogenously determined under appropriate conditions the misspecification equilibrium will exhibit intrinsic heterogeneity in which all predictors are used at all times even in the neoclassical limit in which only the most successful predictors are used this equilibrium is attainable under least squares learning and dynamic predictor selection based on average profits

relative pay and its effects on firm efficiency in a transitional economy abstract in this study we examine the impact of relative pay manager pay divided by average worker pay on a firm s productivity using data from a major transitional economy china we find that relative pay is negatively associated with high productivity our results provide support for the view that workers are alienated when their incomes are far lower than that of top management and this leads to lower productivity this effect is most pronounced in labor intensive firms

gifts as economic signals and social symbols gift giving has often puzzled economists especially because efficient gifts like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for seem crass or inappropriate it is shown in a formal game theoretic model that gifts serve as signals of a person s intentions about future investment in a relationship and inefficient gifts can be better signals other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced and some stylized facts about gift giving practices are described many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts

optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers abstract we consider a rank order tournament between workers with different abilities under malcomson s self commitment property the employer optimally uses individual tournament prizes to extract rents from the workers without the self commitment property individual prizes are used to make the asymmetric competition less uneven by discriminating against the more able worker i e he is offered a lower winner prize than the less able worker in this spirit individual prizes serve as a substitute for handicaps

escapist policy rules abstract we study a simple microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority employs a taylor type policy rule we analyze situations in which the self confirming equilibrium is unique and learnable and explore the prospects for the use of large deviation theory we show that the system can sometimes depart from the self confirming equilibrium towards a non equilibrium outcome characterized by persistently low nominal interest rates and persistently low inflation these events that have some of the properties of liquidity traps observed in the data even though the policymaker remains committed to a taylor type policy rule which otherwise has desirable stabilization properties

escaping nash inflation an ordinary differential equation ode gives the mean dynamics that govern the convergence to self confirming equilibria of self referential systems under discounted least squares learning another ode governs escape dynamics that recurrently propel away from a self confirming equilibrium in a model with a unique self confirming equilibrium the escape dynamics make the government discover too strong a version of the natural rate hypothesis the escape route dynamics cause recurrent outcomes close to the ramsey commitment inflation rate in a model with an adaptive government

learning and price volatility in duopoly models of resource depletion the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical model that can account for price fluctuations in depletable resource markets we do so by introducing learning into a hotelling style duopoly model of optimal resource depletion before the depletable resource becomes scarce the self confirming equilibrium of the model mirrors noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium in that supply is high and price is low although learning does induce occasional upward price spikes that are followed by a long period of falling price once the depletable resource becomes scarce the dynamics of the market change significantly with the self confirming equilibrium mirroring the cooperative rather than noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium supply is low and price is high price spikes still occur but against a background of increasing prices when scarcity is sufficient then the market is permanently in a self confirming equilibrium that is equivalent to cooperative rational expectations equilibrium

learning large deviations and recurrent currency crises this article studies a version of obstfeld s journal of international economics 43 1997 61 77 escape clause model the model is calibrated to produce three rational expectations equilibria two of these equilibria are e stable and one is unstable dynamics are introduced by assuming that agents must learn about the government s decision rule it is assumed they do this using a stochastic approximation algorithm it turns out that as a certain parameter describing the sensitivity of beliefs to new information gets small the algorithm converges to a small noise diffusion process the dynamics of exchange rate changes are then characterized using large deviation techniques from freidlin and wentzell random perturbations of dynamical systems second edition berlin springer verlag 1998 these methods describe the sense in which the limiting distribution of exchange rate changes is approximated by a two state markov switching process where the two states correspond to the two e stable equilibria the model is calibrated to the exchange rate histories of argentina brazil and mexico currency crises in these countries resemble the predicted escape routes of the model a key feature of these escape routes is that expectations of a devaluation erupt suddenly without large contemporaneous shocks this is consistent with evidence showing that crises are often poorly anticipated by financial markets

convergence of least squares learning in environments with hidden state variables and private information we study the convergence of recursive least squares learning schemes in economic environments in which there is private information the presence of private information leads to the presence of hidden state variables from the viewpoint of particular agents by applying theorems of ljung we extend some of our earlier results to characterize conditions under which a system governed by leastsquares learning will eventually converge to a rational expectations equilibrium we apply insights from the learning results to formulate and compute the equilibrium of a version of townsend s model

strategic choices in polygamous households theory and evidence from senegal this paper proposes a strategic framework to account for fertility choices in polygamous households a theoretical model specifies the main drivers of fertility in the african context and describes how the fertility of one wife might impact the behavior of her co wives it generates predictions to test for strategic interactions exploiting original data from a household survey and the demographic and health surveys in senegal empirical tests show that children are strategic complements one wife raises her fertility in response to an increase by the other wife because children are the best claim to resources controlled by the husband this result is the first quantitative evidence of a reproductive rivalry between co wives it suggests that the sustained high level of fertility in africa does not merely reect women s lack of control over births as is often argued but also their incentives to have many children this paper also contributes to the literature on household behavior as one of the few attempts to open the black box of non nuclear families

the conquest of south american inflation we infer determinants of latin american hyperinflations and stabilizations by using the method of maximum likelihood to estimate a hidden markov model that assigns roles both to fundamentals in the form of government deficits that are financed by money creation and to destabilizing expectations dynamics that can occasionally divorce inflation from fundamentals levels and conditional volatilities of monetized deficits drove most hyperinflations and stabilizations with a notable exception in peru where a cosmetic reform of the type emphasized by marcet and nicolini occurred

household allocations and endogenous information the case of split migrants in kenya abstract one of the main elements separating different models of intrahousehold allocations is the household information set this paper tests for the endogeneity of the household information set in a context where household members cannot observe each other easily spousal information in the context of split urban migration in kenya based on unique data it finds that split migrant couples in the nairobi slums invest considerable resources into information acquisition substituting visits monitoring by siblings and budget submissions before remitting comparisons of pre marital search characteristics between current split and joint migrants are consistent with the hypothesis that those anticipating split migration change their marital search behavior to mitigate the consequences of pending imperfect information

escaping volatile inflation why has inflation been so stable in developed economies since the early 1990s in this paper we answer that the united states and other countries may have escaped from a volatile inflation equilibrium our argument builds on the story proposed by tom sargent in the conquest of american inflation where the fall in inflation in the 1980s was attributed to changing government beliefs to explain the escape in inflation volatility we unwind one of sargent s simplifications and allow the government to react to some of the shocks in the economy in this case when government beliefs turned against the phillips curve in the 1980s they not only led to an escape from high inflation but also stopped government using changes in inflation to offset shocks inflation and inflation volatility therefore escaped in tandem our analysis also sheds some light on why the escape in inflation occurred at the time it did

directing remittances to education with soft and hard commitments evidence from a lab in the field experiment and new product take up among filipino migrants in rome this paper tests how migrants willingness to remit changes when given the ability to direct remittances to educational purposes using different forms of commitment variants of a dictator game in a lab in the field experiment with filipino migrants in rome are used to examine remitting behavior under varying degrees of commitment these range from the soft commitment of simply labeling remittances as being for education to the hard commitment of having funds directly paid to a school and the student s educational performance monitored the analysis finds that the introduction of simple labeling for education raises remittances by more than 15 percent adding the ability to directly send this funding to the school adds only a further 2 2 percent the information asymmetry between migrants and their most closely connected household is randomly varied but no significant change is found in the remittance response to these forms of commitment as information varies behavior in these games is shown to be predictive of take up of a new financial product called edupay designed to allow migrants to pay remittances directly to schools in the philippines this take up seems largely driven by a response to the ability to label remittances for education rather than to the hard commitment feature of directly paying schools

gender agricultural production and the theory of the household virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources is pareto efficient within many african households agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by different members of the household pareto efficiency implies that factors should be allocated efficiently across these plots i find in contrast that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men the estimates imply that about 6 percent of output is lost because of inefficient factor allocation within the household the paper suggests a new approach to modeling intrahousehold allocation consistent with the empirical results

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

incentives performance and choking in darts this paper examines how within match variation in incentives affects the performance of darts players the game of darts offers an attractive naturally occurring research setting because performance can be observed at the individual level and without obscuring effects of risk considerations and behavior of others we analyze four data sets covering a total of 29 381 darts matches of professional amateur and youth players we find that amateur and youth players display a sizable performance decrease at decisive moments professional players appear less susceptible of such choking under pressure our results speak to a growing literature on the limits of increasing incentives as a recipe for better performance

adaptive learning endogenous uncertainty and asymmetric dynamics abstract i present a simple model where forecasting confidence affects aggregate demand it is shown that this model has similar stability properties under statistical and evolutionary learning as a model without a confidence affect from this setup i introduce expectational business cycles where output fluctuates due to learning heterogeneous forecasting models and random changes in the efficient forecasting model agents use one of two forecasting models to forecast future variables while heterogeneity is dictated via an evolutionary process increased uncertainty due to a shock to the structure of the economy may result in a sudden decrease in output as agents learn the equilibrium output slowly increases to its equilibrium value expectational business cycles tend to arrive faster last longer and are more severe as agents possess less information

the effort effects of prizes in the second half of tournaments abstract the theory of tournaments predicts that a worker s effort depends on the difference between the winning and losing prizes as well as the degree that increases in effort affect the probability of winning this paper tests these predictions using a data set from arabian horse racing jockeys increase their efforts lower their times in the second half of races when the amount of prize money lost by dropping a place is greater and when there is less distance between them and their closest competitors these findings are consistent with the theory

spousal control and intra household decision making an experimental study in the philippines i elicit causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the philippines when choices are private men put money into their personal accounts when choices are observable men commit money to consumption for their own benefit when required to communicate men put money into their wives account these strong treatment effects on men but not women appear related more to control than to gender men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treat ment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender specific outcomes

intermediate information loss aversion and effort empirical evidence the present article empirically explores the impact of intermediate information on contestants effort data involving substituted soccer players of the german bundesliga indicate only weak evidence of a negative effect of ex ante heterogeneity on effort in contrast intermediate information measured by goal difference at the time of substitution significantly affects effort players exert the greatest effort when their team is leading by one goal and reduce their effort when it is trailing when intermediate information suggests the contest is already decided players from both teams reduce effort this behavior is in line with loss aversion such that players weight potential losses more than potential gains and adjust their effort accordingly jel z22 j41 m54

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

don t tell on me experimental evidence of asymmetric information in transnational households although most theoretical models of household decision making assume perfect information empirical studies suggest that information asymmetries can have large impacts on resource allocation i demonstrate the importance of these asymmetries in transnational households where physical distance between family members can make information barriers especially acute i implement an experiment among migrants in washington dc and their families in el salvador that examines how information asymmetries can have strategic and inadvertent impacts on remittance decisions migrants make an incentivized decision over how much of a cash windfall to remit and recipients decide how they will spend a remittance migrants strategically send home less when their choice is not revealed to recipients recipients make spending choices closer to migrants preferences when the migrants preferences are shared regardless of whether or not the spending choices are revealed to the migrants suggesting that recipients choices are inadvertently affected by imperfect information

recurrent hyperinflations and learning we use a model of boundedly rational learning to account for the observations of recurrent hyperinflations in the 1980 s in a standard monetary model we replace the assumption of full rational expectations by a formal definition of quasi rational learning the model under learning matches some crucial stylized facts observed during the recurrent hyperinflations experienced by several countries in the 1980 s remarkably well we argue that despite being a small departure from rational expectations quasi rational learning does not preclude falsifiability of the model it does not violate reasonable rationality requirements and it can be used for policy evaluation

a simple recursive forecasting model abstract we compare the performance of alternative recursive forecasting models a simple constant gain algorithm used widely in the learning literature both forecasts well out of sample and also provides the best fit to the survey of professional forecasters

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

why inflation rose and fell policy makers beliefs and u s postwar stabilization policy this paper provides an explanation for the run up of u s inflation in the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinflation in the early 1980s which standard macroeconomic models have difficulties in addressing i present a model in which rational policymakers learn about the behavior of the economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally conditional on their current beliefs the steady state associated with the self confirming equilibrium of the model is characterized by low inflation however prolonged episodes of high inflation ending with rapid disinflations can occur when policymakers underestimate both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inflation in the phillips curve i estimate the model using likelihood methods the estimation results show that the model accounts remarkably well for the evolution of policymakers beliefs stabilization policy and the postwar behavior of inflation and unemployment in the united states

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

bubbles and crashes gradient dynamics in financial markets abstract fund managers respond to the payoff gradient by continuously adjusting leverage in our analytic and simulation models the base model has a stable equilibrium with classic properties however bubbles and crashes occur in extended models incorporating an endogenous market risk premium based on investors historical losses and constant gain learning when losses have been small for a long time asset prices inflate as fund managers increase leverage then slight losses can trigger a crash as a widening risk premium accelerates deleveraging and asset price declines

shocks and government beliefs the rise and fall of american inflation working paper 2004 22 september 2004 abstract the authors use a bayesian markov chain monte carlo algorithm to estimate a model that allows temporary gaps between a true expectational phillips curve and the monetary authority s approximating nonexpectational phillips curve a dynamic programming problem implies that the monetary authority s inflation target evolves as its estimated phillips curve moves the authors estimates attribute the rise and fall of post world war ii inflation in the united states to an intricate interaction between the monetary authority s beliefs and economic shocks shocks in the 1970s altered the monetary authority s estimates and made it misperceive the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment that misperception caused sharp rise in inflation in the 1970s the authors estimates indicate that policy makers updated their beliefs continuously by the 1980s policy makers beliefs about the phillips curve had changed enough to account for fed chairman paul volcker s conquest of u s inflation in the early 1980s jel classification e3 e5 key words updating beliefs policy evaluation self confirming equilibrium nash inflation ramsey outcomes i introduction today many statesmen and macroeconomists believe that inflation can largely be determined by a government monetary authority then why did the federal reserve board preside over high us inflation during the late 1960s and the 1970s and why under paul volcker did it rapidly bring inflation down during the early 1980s this paper answers these questions by estimating a model that features a particular process that makes a procession of economic shocks induce the monetary authority to alter its model of inflation unemployment dynamics the phillips curve at each date t the monetary authority updates its beliefs about the phillips curve and then recomputes a first period action recommended by a phelps problem a discounted dynamic programming problem that minimizes the expected value of a discounted quadratic loss function of inflation and unemployment 1 the monetary authority pursues the same objectives at each date using the same structural model with only its estimates of that model changing over time 2 this model of the systematic part of inflation puts the monetary authority s beliefs about the phillips curve front and center 3 we assume that the monetary authority s model of the phillips curve deviates in two subtle but important ways from what it would be in a rational expectations model e g kydland and prescott 1977 the first deviation is that while the true phillips curve is like kydland and prescott s we assume that the monetary authority omits the public s expected rate of inflation from its phillips curve by itself this omission need not prevent the outcomes of our model from coinciding with those of kydland and prescott s nor need it imply that the government s model is wrong in a way that could be detected from even an infinite sample whether the monetary authority s model is wrong in a statistically detectable way depends on how we allow the monetary authority to reestimate the parameters of its model in particular if the monetary authority were to believe that the coefficients of its phillips curve are constant over time then its estimates would converge to ones that support a self confirming equilibrium sce after convergence its estimated phillips curve would correctly describe occurrences along the sce path for inflation and unemployment such an after convergence version of our model has little hope of explaining the rise and fall of us inflation that model would have inflation fluctuating randomly around a constant sce level that coincides with kydland and prescott s time consistent suboptimal i e excessive level 4 this outcome motivates our second subtle deviation from a rational expectations equilibrium

asymmetry of information within family networks this paper studies asymmetry of information and transfers within a unique data set of 712 extended family networks from tanzania using cross reports on asset holdings we construct measures of misperception of income among all pairs of households belonging to the same network we show that there is significant asymmetry of information and no evidence of major systematic over evaluation or under evaluation of income in our data although there is a slight over evaluation on the part of migrants regarding non migrants we develop a static model of asymmetric information that contrasts altruism pressure and exchange as motives to transfer the model makes predictions about the correlations between misperceptions and transfers under these competing explanations testing these predictions in the data uncovers the active role played by the recipient our findings suggest that the recipient sets the terms of the transfers either by exerting pressure to give on the donor or by holding the bargaining power during the exchange of services with the donor