equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers abstract firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous product market where uninformed consumers search for price information some uninformed consumers are local searchers who visit only one seller whereas others search sequentially with an optimal reservation price equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zero density gap when the exogenous reservation price of local searchers depart from that of the optimizing sequential searchers by a relatively small amount the presence of local searchers either has no effect on market outcomes or benefits all consumers a reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher equilibrium prices

competition under consumer loss aversion we address the effect of expectation based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase however some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution whereas others are perfectly informed all the time we show that if firms have symmetric costs a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more competitive outcome the reverse holds if cost asymmetry in duopoly is sufficiently large

the informational role of prices we consider a dominant firm with a competitive fringe in order to address the informational role of prices the fringe is necessary for the existence of a unique fully revealing equilibrium in which the price reveals the quality of the good to uninformed buyers a higher price triggers more sales on the part of the competitive fringe reducing both residual demand and profits we find that a larger share of uninformed buyers increases the price reduces the quantity sold by the dominant firm but increases the quantity sold by the competitive fringe this in turn reduces consumer surplus and welfare this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

the effect of uncertainty on the demand for medical care health capital and wealth we analyze the effect of the uncertainty of the incidence of illness on the demand for medical care and on the accumulation of health capital and wealth over the retirement years we use a simplified version of a dynamic grossman household production model to characterize patterns of an individual s precautionary behavior elderly individuals respond to uncertainty by smoothing their expected utility over time by making specific patterns of purchases of medical care and consumption we examine these patterns for individuals with different degrees of risk aversion

the market for quacks a group of n quacks plays a price competition game facing a continuum of patients who recover with probability whether or not they acquire a quack s treatment if patients chose rationally the market would be inactive i assume however that patients choose according to a boundedly rational procedure which re ects anecdotal reasoning this element of bounded rationality has signi cant

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

a latent structure approach to measuring reputation the present study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation specifically this study seeks to i quantify the reputation of washington apples over time ii study the dynamic nature of reputation and iii analyze the effect of the label washington apple the model adopted in this study is the dynamic multiple indicator multiple cause dymimic modeling approach which is a special case of the general latent variable modeling scheme called state space models both dymimic and hedonic approaches are applied to the data on washington apples and results from the two approaches are compared reputation plays an important role in assuring product quality in markets where consumers can only imperfectly judge the product quality until after consumption if reputation effects are absent in these types of markets there is an incentive for producers to reduce quality and take short run gains before buyers catch on in order to avoid such quality cutting products with good reputations will sell for premium prices shapiro 1983 showed theoretically that price premiums are necessary for producers to invest in quality and reputation there is an extensive theoretical literature on reputation but empirical studies are limited empirical studies on the impact of firm reputation on shareholder wealth or product demand include jarrell and peltzman 1985 borenstein and zimmerman 1988 and karpoff and lott 1993 caves and green 1996 showed that factors that may affect a firm s reputation influence the relationship between price and quality gorton 1996 analyzed how a bank s reputation for default affects the discount rate on its debt the measurement of the value of reputation to producers in terms of price premiums and how a reputation can be built up and destroyed are important issues that have not been empirically analyzed the current study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation steenkamp 1990 points out that consumers observe at the moment of purchase the intrinsic and extrinsic product quality cues but not the quality attributes intrinsic cues are characteristics of the product such as color freshness texture and flavor while extrinsic

price advertising and the deterioration of product quality arguments in favour of self enforced bans on advertising by professionals often rely on the stylized fact that advertising can communicate information about price but not about quality this being the case it is argued that allowing professionals to advertise runs the risk that firms will compete vigorously over price at the expense of the quality of their product this paper shows that even if price can communicate no information directly about quality it can do so indirectly because price will be a signal of quality because of this allowing advertising is shown to improve consumer welfare

prominence complexity and pricing this paper analyzes prominence in a homogeneous product market where two firms simultaneously choose both prices and price complexity levels complexity limits competing offers comparability and results in consumer confusion confused consumers are more likely to buy from the prominent firm in equilibrium there is dispersion in both prices and price complexity the nature of equilibrium depends on prominence compared to its rival the prominent firm makes higher profit associates a smaller price range with lowest complexity puts lower probability on lowest complexity and sets a higher average price however higher prominence may benefit consumers and conditional on choosing lowest complexity the prominent firm s average price is lower which is consistent with confused consumers bias

competitive price and quality under asymmetric information we present an analysis of equilibrium in markets with asymmetrically informed consumers some consumers know both price and quality of all sellers whereas others know neither but may search among sellers the equilibrium correlation between price and quality generally increases with the level of information in the market and can be negative when this level is sufficiently small a meta analysis of the available empirical studies strongly supports the model s predictions

certification under oligopolistic competition in a symmetric duopolistic market where each firm s choice regarding certain quality attributes such as the environmental friendliness of its product is its own private information the extent of horizontal differentiation between firms plays a crucial role in a certifier s optimal certification policy under a non profit certifier it is always the case that both firms produce the highest quality and opt for certification this is also the case under a for profit certifier but only when the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently high when horizontal differentiation is low the for profit certifier by charging a very high certification fee creates maximum vertical differentiation between firms as a result only one firm produces the highest quality and opts for certification whereas the other firm produces the lowest quality and does not opt for certification this asymmetry under a for profit certifier makes the market inefficient which provides one possible explanation for the existence of mostly non profit certifiers in such markets

oligopolistic competition in price and quality abstract we consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered some know only the prices and some know neither we show that if there are sufficiently many uninformed consumers then there exists a unique equilibrium where price is a perfect indicator of quality this equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and pareto inefficiency of the price quality offers where better price quality combinations are associated with lower prices

uncertainty and health care spending by the poor the health capital model revisited this short theoretical paper examines health care utilization by the poor in the context of grossman s 1972 health capital model earlier work has shown that uncertainty can reduce the attractiveness to the poor of health capital investments this paper demonstrates that uncertainty can also have precisely the opposite effect that is while there may be cases in which it is excessively risky for the poor to invest in their health there may also be cases in which the poor can ill afford the risks that arise from not making timely investments in their health

does demand for product quality increase worker training abstract we uniquely examine the relationship between firm organized training and the sensitivity of consumer demand to product quality cross section panel fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates confirm that british workplaces provide more intensive training when their product demand is more sensitive to product quality robustness checks including using alternative key variable definitions and a counterfactual analysis examining the importance of competing on price support this confirmation

causes and consequences of price premiums existing literature that argues for the prevalence of price premiums is examined an evaluation of an extant model identifies several possible boundary conditions that limit the applicability of the model a set of propositions is developed based on these boundary conditions linking buyer seller and market factors to the magnitude of price premiums that should be available alternative means for empirical testing of the propositions are offered and some implications and applications of this line of thinking for pricing and brand management are described copyright 1996 by university of chicago press

quality uncertainty and informative advertising we present a price signalling model with informative advertising a costly advertisement informs of the good s quality directly and therefore the seller determines the fraction of informed buyers endogenously we show that informative advertising only occurs in pooling equilibria for an advertising pooling equilibrium to exist consumer valuation for high quality advertising cost prior probability that quality is high and inaccuracy of the buyers pre purchase information must be sufficiently high for some parameters there is a unique undefeated advertising pooling equilibrium if advertising is used in equilibrium the adverse selection problem is mitigated

consumer search with observational learning this article studies observational learning in a consumer search environment consumers observe the purchasing decision of a predecessor with similar preferences consumers rationally emulate by initiating their search at the firm from which their predecessor purchased free riding on search effort and reacting less to price changes prices are nonmonotone in search costs and may be as low as marginal costs we discuss several extensions and show that the effect of emulation on prices is stronger when i the number of firms increases ii consumers first visits are more elastic with respect to market shares and iii prices are adjusted more frequently

a theoretical rationale for an inelastic demand for health care abstract this paper provides a theoretical rationale for the empirical finding that the demand for health care is inelastic using wagstaff bull econ res 38 1986 93 version of grossman j polit econ 80 1972 223 human capital model of the demand for health the paper develops a criterion to identify restrictions on the basics of the model i e on the utility and health production functions for the purpose of realizing an inelastic demand for health care

reliability pricing and quality control abstract the purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical framework which allows a manufacturer to examine the tradeoffs between pricing reliability design and quality control issues in particular the paper investigates effects of risk aversion on the relative prominence of one or the other policy instruments in addition the results of extensive numerical analyses are presented relating basic managerial guidelines with price reliability and quality control

health and mortality delta assessing the welfare cost of household insurance choice we develop a pair of risk measures health and mortality delta for the universe of life and health insurance products a life cycle model of insurance choice simplifies to replicating the optimal health and mortality delta through a portfolio of insurance products we estimate the model to explain the observed variation in health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of life insurance annuities including private pensions and long term care insurance in the health and retirement study for the median household aged 51 to 57 the lifetime welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal choice is 3 2 of total wealth

the insurance value of medical innovation abstract economists think of medical innovation as a valuable but risky good producing health benefits but increasing financial risk for consumers and healthcare payers this perspective overlooks how innovation can lower physical risks borne by healthy patients facing the prospect of future disease we present an alternative framework that accounts for all these sources of value and links them to the value of healthcare insurance we show that any innovation worth buying reduces overall risk and generates positive insurance value on its own we conduct a stylized numerical exercise to assess the potential empirical significance of our insights our calculations suggest that conventional methods meaningfully understate the value of historical health gains and disproportionately undervalue treatments for the most severe illnesses where physical risk to consumers is the costliest these calculations also suggest that the value of physical insurance from new technologies may exceed the financial spending risk that they pose

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

certification and market transparency we provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency in a market with opaque product quality sellers use certification as a signaling device while buyers use it as an inspection device this difference alone implies that seller certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare under buyer certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency but because seller certification yields larger profits active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed these findings are robust and widely applicable to for instance patents automotive parts and financial products

price competition with consumer confusion this paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogenous product compete in both prices and price frames i e ways to present price information we model price framing by assuming that firms frame choices affect the comparability of their price offers consumers may fail to compare prices due to frame differentiation and due to frame complexity in the symmetric equilibrium the firms randomize over both price frames and prices and make positive profits this result is consistent with the observed coexistence of price and price frame dispersion in the market we also show that i the nature of equilibrium depends on which source of consumer confusion dominates and ii an increase in the number of firms can increase industry profits and harm consumers

eliciting and utilizing willingness to pay evidence from field trials in northern ghana we utilize the becker degroot marschak 1964 mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern ghana the bdm mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research allowing us to directly estimate demand compute heterogeneous treatment effects and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting we demonstrate the implementation of bdm along these three dimensions compare it to the standard take it or leave it method for eliciting willingness to pay and discuss practical issues for implementing the mechanism in true field settings jel classifications c93 d12 d82 l11 l31

fractionalization entrepreneurship and the institutional environment for entrepreneurship the vast majority of the literature on ethnicity and entrepreneurship focuses on the construct of ethnic entrepreneurship however very little is known about how ethnic heterogeneity affects entrepreneurship and the institutional arrangements affecting entrepreneurship this study attempts to fill the gap and thus examines the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on various outcomes associated with entrepreneurship and the institutional environment for entrepreneurship using indices of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization we show that ethnic heterogeneity negatively influences entrepreneurship we argue that potential channels that can explain the negative effect of fractionalization on entrepreneurship include trust social network and innovation among others this study provides a new perspective on the existing debate that seeks to understand why the levels of entrepreneurial success vary across countries

competition for attention we present a model of market competition in which consumers attention is drawn to the products most salient attributes firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived with this attention externality depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit commoditized price salient equilibria while others exhibit de commoditized quality salient equilibria when the costs of quality change innovation can lead to radical shifts in markets as in the case of decommoditization of the coffee market by starbucks in the context of financial innovation the model generates the phenomenon of reaching for yield

price quality and reputation evidence from an online field experiment we examine the link between price quality seller claims and seller reputation in internet auctions after purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality they pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often online seller reputation is effective for identifying good faith sellers but conditional on completed auctions reputable sellers do not provide better quality evidence also suggests that high claim sellers target less experienced buyers we attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the ebay rating system we benefited from the comments of austan goolsbee raphael thomadsen john shea dan vincent david reiley larry ausubel peter cramton v joseph hotz jeff smith jimmy chan vincent crawford mark duggan and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences we are particularly grateful to seth sanders and john list for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research to timothy bresnahan rachel kranton and thomas hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions and to editor ariel pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry excellent research assistance from randy alexander moore and krzysztof fizyta is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are ours

experience dependent information diffusion and product quality in a monopoly market for an experience good the diffusion of product quality information may depend on whether or not the information is favorable to capture this asymmetry our model uses as its information source a quality survey which suffers from response bias consumers may attempt to adjust for bias but are not required to do so correctly as a result quality under perfect information need not be and usually will not be higher than quality under imperfect information in addition the externality exerted by informed consumers on uninformed consumers may not be the traditional beneficial externality jel l15

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

uncertainty and the demand for medical care abstract this paper provides an analysis of the effects of uncertainty on the demand for medical care using a simplified version of grossman s human capital model of the demand for health two types of uncertainty are analysed the uncertainty surrounding the incidence of illness and the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of medical care in the first the consumer s basic level of health is assumed to be a random variable in the second the effectiveness of medical care is assumed to be random comparative static results are reported indicating the effects on the demand for medical care of both increases in the means of these distributions and mean preserving spreads of the distributions

self employment and the earnings of immigrants we examine the question of the economic returns to immigrants engaged in self employment based on samples of four entrepreneurial immigrants plus control samples of blacks and whites from the 1980 u s public use microdata sample we find large differences in the net effect of self employment depending on the use of a linear absolute dollar values or loglinear relative returns form we examine various explanations for the discrepancy and identify the role of outliers as significant the loglinear form fits the data better but at the cost of obliterating substantively important information namely the preponderance of the self employed among positive outliers effects of excluding the latter from the linear form and the theoretical and policy implications of alternative specifications of the earnings equation are examined excerpt

the timing of choice enhancing policies abstract recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers we analyze the optimal timing of such choice enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them in the model a firm provides a contract with automatic renewal we show that a policy intending to enhance consumers choices when they choose a contract can be detrimental to welfare by contrast a choice enhancing policy at the time of contract renewal increases welfare more robustly our results highlight that policies should be targeted in timing to the actual choice inefficiency

non monotonic health behaviours implications for individual health related behaviour in a demand for health framework a number of behaviours influence health in a non monotonic way physical activity and alcohol consumption for instance may be beneficial to one s health in moderate but detrimental in large quantities we develop a demand for health framework that incorporates the feature of a physiologically optimal level an individual may still choose a physiologically non optimal level because of the trade off in his or her preferences for health versus other utility affecting commodities however any deviation above or below the physiologically optimal level will be punished with respect to health distinguishing between two individual types we study a the qualitative properties of optimal time paths of health capital and health related behaviour b the perturbations of the optimal time paths that result from changes in exogenous parameters and c steady state properties predictions of the model and the implications for empirical analysis are discussed at length some comments on potential future extensions conclude the paper

competing for consumer inattention consumers purchase multiple types of goods but may be able to examine only a limited number of markets for the best price we propose a simple model that captures these features conveying new insights a firm s price can deflect or draw attention to its market and consequently limited attention introduces a new dimension of cross market competition we characterize the equilibrium and show that having partially attentive consumers improves consumer welfare with less attention consumers are more likely to miss the best offers but enhanced cross market competition decreases average price paid as leading firms try to stay under the consumers radar

incentives through consumer learning about tastes we consider a long lived firm that faces an infinite sequence of finitely lived consumers in each period the firm can exert either high or low effort which is the firm s private information when consumers learn about the firm s talent from the outcomes of previous transactions there exists no equilibrium in which the firm always exerts high effort however when consumers learn about their own tastes such an equilibrium can exist consumer learning about tastes therefore is an alternative to reputational concerns that produces stable incentives we discuss the implications of this mechanism for advertising advertising content and consumer education

inattentive consumers and product quality this paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone without attention to potential differences in product quality a firm may offer a low quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model firms choose prices with mixed strategies similarly to varian 1980 in which some consumers purchase from a random seller without attention to market prices in our model though firms also choose quality stochastically and there is both price and quality dispersion two stylized policy interventions are considered competition policy which acts to increase the number of sellers and market transparency reforms which act to increase the fraction of attentive consumers with fewer inattentive consumers firms are less likely to cheat i e cut quality which therefore improves welfare but profit and consumer surplus can either increase or decrease when there is a large number of sellers approximately half the sellers cheat regardless of the fraction of inattentive consumers and introducing more sellers boosts consumers surplus and reduces profit while the impact on welfare is ambiguous

the impact of consumer attentiveness and search costs on firm quality disclosure a competitive analysis firms can invest to disclose quality information about their products to consumers but consumers are not always perfectly attentive to these disclosures indeed technologies such as digital video recorders have increased the ease with which disclosures can be avoided by consumers although such inattention may result in a consumer missing information from one or more competing firms consumers who have missed disclosures might decide to search for quality information to become fully informed before making a purchase decision in this paper we incorporate consumer attentiveness as well as the related endogenous search decision into a model of quality disclosure our results suggest that firms should disclose less quality information as the share of partially informed consumers informed about one firm but not the other increases or as consumer search costs increase we also provide insights into the potential impact of consumer trends toward lower attentiveness and lower search costs this paper was

health and other asset holdings despite clear evidence of correlations between financial and medical statuses and decisions most models treat financial and health related choices separately this article bridges this gap by proposing a tractable dynamic framework for the joint determination of optimal consumption portfolio holdings health investment and health insurance we solve for the optimal rules in closed form and capitalize on this tractability to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which separation between financial and health related decisions is sensible and of the pathways through which wealth and health determine allocations welfare and other variables of interest such as expected longevity or the value of health furthermore we show that the model is consistent with the observed patterns of individual allocations and provide realistic estimates of the parameters that confirm the relevance of all the main characteristics of the model

employer investments in employee health implications for the family as health producer the model presented in this paper further extends the demand for health model in which the family is the producer of health investments to consider the case in which an employer has incentives for investing in the health of a family member the household and the employer are assumed to interact strategically in the production of health the general insight provided is that the conditions which determine the nature of the relationship between the employer and the employee for instance market conditions production technologies taxes and government regulation will also affect the allocation of health investments and health capital within the family

response to competitive entry a rationale for delayed defensive reaction empirical studies examining responses to new product entries come to the puzzling conclusion that in general an incumbent reacts to a new entrant after a significant delay even easy to implement price cuts are observed after significant lag following entry these findings seem to contradict the existing literature that either implicitly assumes or strongly advocates immediate defensive responses to limit competitive encroachment when a competing firm enters the market consumers may be uncertain about the entering firm s product quality the incumbent firm through rigorous tests may fully know the entrant s quality suppose the incumbent aggressively lowers price this may cause the consumers to wonder if indeed the entrant s quality is high in other words an incumbent s reaction may cause the consumers to make inferences about the entrant s quality such strategic implications of the incumbent s reactions have to be carefully analyzed before determining the optimal response by the incumbent in this paper we propose a conceptual framework for understanding differences in the magnitude and timing of incumbents responses to competitive entries we consider a model in which a monopolist incumbent firm faces competitive entry the incumbent firm knows the true quality of the entrant with certainty although consumers are aware of the incumbent s product quality through their prior experience they are initially uncertain of the entrant s product quality in such a situation a high quality entrant has the incentive to signal her true quality through her strategic price choice however the uncertainty about the entrant s quality is favorable to the incumbent in the sense that consumers believe with a high probability that the entrant s quality is low as a result the strategic incentives facing the incumbent and the entrant oppose each other while the entrant wants to signal her high quality the incumbent wants to prevent her from doing so we demonstrate that one way the incumbent can prevent the quality signaling is to select a higher than his optimal competitive duopoly price in other words the incumbent can prevent or jam the entrant s quality signaling by choosing a price higher than his optimal competitive price when consumers are fully informed about the entrant s true quality though the signal jamming price is lower than the monopoly price the price is substantially higher than the competitive price this marginal reduction in the incumbent s price from the pre entry monopolistic price represents a muted or lack of response by the incumbent to the competitive entry however once the entrant s quality gets revealed in subsequent periods through consumer usage and word of mouth the entrant has no incentive to engage in quality signaling and the incumbent has no incentive to jam it therefore the market reverts to the complete information competitive prices and the incumbent lowers his price considerably this temporal pattern of muted price reduction in the first period followed by a sharp price reduction in the second period corresponds to a delayed defensive reaction in our model although the empirical studies suggest that the delayed reaction may arise due to factors such as managerial inertia or indecision we demonstrate that such a behavior is indeed an optimal strategy for a profit maximizing firm thus our model reconciles empirical results with the equilibrium outcome of a strategic analytical framework furthermore in an experimental setting we test the predictive power of our framework and establish that consumers indeed form conjectures about the entrant s quality based on the incumbent s reactions in the first experimental study we find strong support for the notion that the incumbent s price reaction may indicate entrant s quality in a follow up study we observe that whenever the incumbent lowers prices respondents judge the quality of the entrant to be higher as compared to the case when prices are the same or increased the managerial implication of this paper is that well established incumbent firms should be cautious in the implementation of their defensive responses to product introductions of uncertain quality by competitors of particular concern are situations where the reactions are easily observable by consumers a strong reaction may suggest that the incumbent takes the competitive threat seriously leading consumers to believe in the quality of the competitor s product

health status and health dynamics in an empirical model of expected longevity expected longevity is an important factor influencing older individuals decisions such as consumption savings purchase of life insurance and annuities claiming of social security benefits and labor supply it has also been shown to be a good predictor of actual longevity which in turn is highly correlated with health status a relatively new literature on health investments under uncertainty which builds upon the seminal work by grossman grossman m 1972 on the concept of health capital and demand for health journal of political economy 80 223 255 has directly linked longevity with characteristics behaviors and decisions by utility maximizing agents our empirical model can be understood within that theoretical framework as estimating a production function of longevity using longitudinal data from the health and retirement study we directly incorporate health dynamics in explaining the variation in expected longevities and compare two alternative measures of health dynamics the self reported health change and the computed health change based on self reports of health status in 38 of the reports in our sample computed health changes are inconsistent with the direct report on health changes over time and another 15 of the sample can suffer from information losses if computed changes are used to assess changes in actual health these potentially serious problems raise doubts regarding the use and interpretation of the computed health changes and even the lagged measures of self reported health as controls for health dynamics in a variety of empirical settings our empirical results controlling for both subjective and objective measures of health status and unobserved heterogeneity in reporting suggest that self reported health changes are a preferred measure of health dynamics

prices product qualities and asymmetric information the competitive case recent developments in the economics of information emphasize the informational content of prices we examine the degree to which prices convey information on product quality to uninformed agents under perfect competition we show that a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist when an equilibrium does exist the information on quality conveyed by prices depends on the shape of the average cost curves and the relative numbers of informed and uniformed agents

selective reporting of factual content by commercial media the authors study the market for factual content and examine whether competition increases or decreases its provision factual content is supplied by commercial media firms which observe a set of facts depicting the state of the world and selectively decide how to report them consumers value content that matches their opinion which incentivizes media firms to slant their reports by omitting certain facts novel features in the authors model include consumers ability to anticipate the media s incentives for slant and the requirement that all media stances must be supported by facts furthermore consumers find reports with more facts to be more convincing despite consumers ability to detect slant and their demand for factual support the research shows that competition results in consumers reading fewer facts and being unable to update their prior beliefs about the state of the world the authors also find that a monopoly medium may be more polarizing than competitive media and that polarized report

optimal choices under uncertainty the case of two argument utility functions this paper presents a unified treatment for the analysis of two argument utility functions with a random budget constraint the way in which changes in both additive and multiplicative risk affect optimal choices has been analyzed prov iding intuitive economic explanations to third order magnitudes which usually appear in this kind of analysis two examples are given in t erms of optimal savings and labor supply under uncertainty finally an application to taxation under uncertainty is given where both the effects of increased tax progressivity and the rules for efficient t axation are analyzed copyright 1988 by royal economic society

portfolio choice in retirement health risk and the demand for annuities housing and risky assets in a life cycle model a retiree faces stochastic health depreciation and chooses consumption health expenditure and the allocation of wealth between bonds stocks and housing the model explains key facts about asset allocation and health expenditure across health status and age the portfolio share in stocks is low overall and is positively related to health especially for younger retirees the portfolio share in housing is negatively related to health for younger retirees and falls significantly in age finally out of pocket health expenditure as a share of income is negatively related to health and rises in age

precautionary motive for saving and medical expenses under health uncertainty evidence from korea abstract this paper considers a model of precautionary behavior under health uncertainty and derives testable equations to be used in empirical analysis our empirical findings based on data from korea provide evidence of precautionary motive for saving and medical expenses that arises from health uncertainty

does competition destroy ethical behavior explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition as opposed to greed in assuring its spread using the examples of child labor corruption excessive executive pay corporate earnings manipulation and commercial activities by universities this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct when unethical behavior cuts costs competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs incomes and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct nonetheless i suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run because it promotes growth and raises incomes higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

sweet lemons illusory quality self deceivers advertising and price the author s study suggests that competition can lead to low quality advertisers competing against and gaining market shares from lower priced high quality non advertisers evidence in support of

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

market regulation of voluntary add on contracts abstract this paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add on insurance for their products we develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale under retail competition the consumers option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss leadership inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard which can even reduce consumer surplus the results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by uk legislators

the public finance of healthy behavior lifestyle can often affect the likelihood an individual will have a future illness subsidies often mitigate the consequences of poor lifestyle choices in this paper we explore tax subsidy policies that lower the consequences of incurring ill health we find that a funding mechanism consistent with current us policy lowers the investment in healthy lifestyles by both the wealthy who pay taxes and the poor who receive subsidies we also explore alternative policy interventions such as investing in research to lessen the impact or probability of the disease

uncertainty inequalities in health and the demand for health abstract as it has become increasingly recognized that inequalities in health stem more from inequalities in wealth rather than from inequalities in access to medical care economists have begun to suggest that michael grossman s model of the demand for health may be a useful analytical framework for investigating the issue ironically the more popular of grossman s two sub models the pure investment model provides little by way of insights into the relationship between inequalities in wealth and inequalities in health in common with other pure investment models of human capital formation grossman s model predicts that an individual s health investment decisions at each stage in the lifecycle will be independent of his initial wealth this paper shows that if uncertainty is introduced into the model this result no longer holds it also shows that if individuals display decreasing absolute risk aversion wealthier individuals will invest more in health capital than individuals who start life with relatively small stocks of financial capital

the family as producer of health an extended grossman model deriving a model where each family member is the producer of his own and other family members health shows that the family will not try to equalise marginal benefits and marginal costs of health capital for each family member they will rather invest in health until the rate of marginal consumption benefits equals the rate of marginal net effective costs of health capital the level of compensation in the social insurance system the effective price of care health related information and transfer payments will all affect the production possibility set and therefore the optimal level and distribution of family health

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

modeling competitive marketing strategies the impact of marketing mix relationships and industry structure this paper empirically analyzes the formulation of competitive marketing strategies consisting of product quality levels promotional expenditures and prices using a simultaneous equation model we examine the use of prices and promotional spending as signals or indications of product quality the impact of promotional spending on prices and the impact of industry structure on the formulation of the complete marketing mix the structural equations are developed using a theoretical model of optimal competitive marketing mix and are estimated using business level pims data which consists largely of industrial durable goods producers for a cross section of 1 100 of these businesses three results of the estimation are especially interesting price cost margins are high for high quality products suggesting that high prices indicate or signal high quality promotional intensity is unrelated to product quality suggesting that promotional effort provides no reliable signals of quality intensely promoted products earn low price cost margins however indicating that promotional spending is associated with high price sensitivity quality levels promotional intensity and price cost margins vary significantly with competitive and market conditions such as the concentration of competitors and the stability of market shares although these relationships are generally weaker than relationships between quality promotion and price cost margins quality levels are high and margins low in markets with unstable shares or unconcentrated competitors

ethnic enclaves and the earnings of self employed latinos in the investigation reported here i have tested the ethnic enclave hypothesis focusing on self employed cuban and mexican immigrants specifically i have compared the economic returns for self employed cuban immigrants in florida with those of mexican immigrants in california and texas the analysis shows that self employed mexican immigrants who remain within mexican enclaves earn substantially lower earnings than those in non enclave environments in contrast the earnings of cuban immigrants self employed within cuban enclaves are comparable to those earned by cubans employed within the general labor market overall my findings are contrary to the ethnic enclave hypothesis which suggests that there are economic advantages associated with owning firms in ethnic enclaves

consumption and investment demand when health evolves stochastically abstract the health capital model of grossman 1972 is extended to account for uncertainty in the rate at which a stock of health depreciates two general versions of the model are contemplated one with a fully functioning financial market and the other in its absence the comparative dynamics of the feedback form of the consumption and health investment demand functions are studied in these general settings where it is shown that the key to deriving refutable results is to determine how a parameter or state variable affects the expected lifetime marginal utilities of health and wealth to add further reach to the results a simplified stochastic control problem is explicitly solved yielding estimable structural feedback demand functions

pricing and signaling with frictions abstract we study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites observing sellers choices of prices and sites but not quality buyers choose which site to visit a seller s choices of prices can direct buyers search and signal quality a unique equilibrium exists and is separating when the quality differential is large the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information otherwise the quality of goods and or the number of sites created is inefficient due to a conflict between the search directing and signaling roles of prices