nonparametric estimation of sample selection models sample selection models provide an important way of accounting for economic decisions that combine discrete and continuous choices and of correcting for nonrandom sampling nonparametric estimators for these models are developed in this paper these can be used for estimating shapes and important economic quantities as in standard nonparametnc regression endogeneity of regressors of interest is allowed for series estimators for these models are developed which are useful for imposing additivity restnctions that arise from selection corrections convergence rates and asymptotic normality results are derived an application to returns to schooling among australian young females is given

borrowing constraints and credit demand in a developing economy summary this paper investigates the determinants of credit demand in the presence of borrowing constraints in a developing economy we model the determinants of observed debt for chilean households while accounting for selection bias and the endogeneity of their income and specific household assets using a novel chilean dataset we estimate the relationship between household characteristics and consumer and mortgage debt we find substantial differences in the nature of these relationships across the types of debt for example we find that the income elasticity for consumer debt is greater than 1 whereas for mortgage debt it is not the results suggest the increased availability of credit combined with the aging of the chilean population is likely to drastically change the distribution and level of chilean debt these findings are particularly relevant for other developing economies currently experiencing rapid income and debt growth copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

media competition and electoral politics we build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout while information pushes up independent turnout partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate and on average they vote less when informed

media bias and influence evidence from newspaper endorsements this paper investigates the relationship between media bias and the inuence of the media on voting in the context of newspaper endorsements werst develop a simple econometric model in which voters choose candidates under uncertainty and rely on endorsements from better informed sources newspapers are potentially biased in favor of one of the candidates and voters thus rationally ac count for the credibility of any endorsements our primary empiricalnding is that endorsements are inuential in the sense that voters are more likely to support the recommended candidate after publication of the endorsement the degree of this inuence however depends upon the credibility of the endorsement in this way endorsements for the democratic candidate from left leaning news papers are less inuential than are endorsements from neutral or right leaning or newspapers and likewise for endorsements for the republican thesendings suggest that voters do rely on the media for information during campaigns but that the extent of this reliance depends upon the degree and direction of any bias

learning from coarse information biased contests and career profiles an organization s promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly rational learning about ability the decision maker can bias noisy rank order contests sequentially thereby changing the information they convey the optimal final period bias favours the leader reinforcing his likely ability advantage when optimally biased rank order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information the leader is favoured in every period in other environments bias in early periods may i favour the early loser ii be optimal even when the workers are equally rated and iii reduce the favoured worker s promotion chances this paper presents a model of boundedly rational learning by an organization the aims are to represent in a simple form the costs of gathering processing or transmitting information and to analyse their implications for the procedures selected to handle information as well as for the decisions actually made like other recent work on the internal organization of firms this work explores to what extent organizational structure and behaviour as well as organizational performance can be explained by adaptation to the costs associated with information in the learning model we formulate the decision maker not only selects a rule specifying what action to take as a function of his observations but also chooses sequentially the information partitions generating those observations this general problem is interpreted in the context of an organization which needs to make an important promotion decision and which attempts to maximize the value of the information generated during the observation periods that precede the decision one of the motivations for this analysis was the finding by organizational sociologists that earnings and promotions in the later stages of a worker s career are strongly correlated with earnings and promotions in the early stages kanter 1977 rosenbaum 1984 later success is positively associated with early success even when one controls for the effect of observable characteristics likely to affect performance such as education one obvious source of this correlation is differences in ability that persist over time and that are not captured by the observable covariates in this paper we focus on differences in ability which are initially unobservable by organizations and their workers as well as by researchers we present a simple model of an organization trying to learn about differences in ability and show

a comparison of autoregressive univariate forecasting procedures for macroeconomic time series the actual performance of several automated univariate autoregressive forecasting procedures applied to 150 macroeconomic time series are compared the procedures are the random walk model as a basis for comparison long autoregressions with three alternative rules for lag length selection and a long autoregression estimated by minimizing the sum of absolute deviations the sensitivity of each procedure to preliminary transformations data periodicity forecast horizon loss function employed in parameter estimation and seasonal adjustment procedures is examined the more important conclusions are that akaike s lag length selection criterion works well in a wide variety of situations the modeling of long memory components becomes important for forecast horizons of three or more periods and linear combinations of forecasts do not improve forecast quality appreciably

accountability with large electorates we show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability in our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance a sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter s signal and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner public information or ideological preferences can impair the beneficial impact of the sampling effect on accountability overconfidence of voters can restore the full benefit of the sampling effect

an unobserved components model that yields business and medium run cycles we generalize the unobserved components uc model to allow the permanent component to have different dynamics than the transitory components when decomposing u s economic activity using a multivariate uc model of log output consumption and investment we find that these proposed dynamics in the permanent component are statistically significant and distinct from those of the transitory components our approach provides an alternative explanation for the growth cycles identified by comin and gertler 2006 that is related to the cyclical movements in technology in a framework consistent with the beveridge and nelson 1981 decomposition

testing for liquidity constraints in euler equations with complementary data sources previous tests for liquidity constraints using consumption euler equations have frequently split the sample on the basis of wealth arguing that low wealth consumers are more likely to be constrained we propose alternative tests using different and more direct information on borrowing constraints obtained from the 1983 survey of consumer finances in a first stage we estimate probabilities of being constrained which are then utilized in a second sample the panel study of income dynamics to estimate switching regression models of the euler equation our estimates indicate stronger excess sensitivity associated with the possibility of liquidity constraints than the sample splitting approach

ideological segregation online and offline we use individual and aggregate data to ask how the internet is changing the ideological segregation of the american electorate focusing on online news consumption offline news consumption and face to face social interactions we define ideological segregation in each domain using standard indices from the literature on racial segregation we find that ideological segregation of online news consumption is low in absolute terms higher than the segregation of most offline news consumption and significan tly lower than the segregation of face to face interactions with neighbors co workers or family members we find no evidence that the internet is becoming more segregated over time

how partisan voters fuel the influence of public information abstract i study sincere voting equilibria in elections with public information in a large poisson game in addition to rational voters the electorate is characterized by the presence of partisan voters who vote according to their ideological position i show that the set of public signals compatible with sincere voting becomes smaller as the number of partisan voters vanishes which suggests that when the number of partisan voters is small public information hardly manipulates voting decisions

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

persistent media bias abstract the news media plays an essential role in society but surveys indicate that the public views the media as biased this paper presents a theory of media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists through their investigations and persists despite profit maximizing news organizations and rivalry from other news organizations bias has two effects on the demand for news first rational individuals are more skeptical of potentially biased news and thus rely less on it in their decision making this skepticism reduces demand and leads the news organization to set a lower price for its publication the greater is the bias it tolerates lower quality news thus commands a lower price second bias makes certain stories more likely than others given their private information journalists may bias their stories if their career prospects can be advanced by being published on the front page news organizations can control bias by restricting the discretion allowed to journalists but granting discretion and tolerating bias can increase profits if it allows journalists to be hired at a lower wage bias is not driven from the market by a rival news organization nor by a news organization with an opposing bias and the profits of a high bias news organization can be higher than the profits of a low bias one moreover bias can be greater with competition than with a monopoly news organization if individuals collectively choose regulation in place of their individual decision making bias increases the expected stringency of regulation

personal bankruptcy and credit supply and demand this paper examines how personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply and demand for credit while generous state level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most policy makers as benefiting less well off borrowers our results using data from the 1983 survey of consumer finances suggest that they increase the amount of credit held by high asset households and reduce the availability and amount of credit to low asset households conditioning on observable characteristics thus bankruptcy exemptions redistribute credit toward borrowers with high assets interest rates on automobile loans for low asset households also appear to be higher in high exemption states

multivariate estimates of the permanent components of gnp and stock prices the economic assumption that a present value relation holds between consumption and income and between stock prices and dividends or the statistical assumption that the consumption income ratio and the dividend price ratio are stationary imply that the permanent or random walk component in each series of a pair must be the same as the permanent component in the other series of a pair either assumption then allows us to estimate the variance of the permanent component of one series gnp stock prices from the variance of the permanent component of the other consumption dividends or from the covariance of the two series permanent components this paper presents such estimates and finds that the permanent components are about half those estimated by similar univariate methods a series of recent papers has examined the importance of a potential unit root to the behavior of real gnp campbell and mankiw 1986 1987 cochrane 1986 clark 1987 and stock prices fama and french 1986 lo and mai if by 0 the series is stationary the response can be any real number which is the innovation in these estimates instead of forcing us to ask the dichotomous question is there a unit root or not they allow us to continuously measure the importance of a potential unit root the actual estimating technique used in these papers varied somewhat cochrane poterba and summers and lo and mai if a series is stationary the variance of k differences will tend to a precursor to this paper appeared under the title spectral density estimates of unit roots we thank masanao aoki lam hansen masao ogaki and chris sims for helpful suggestions the computer programs and data used in this paper are available on request from the authors

correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality if it is common knowledge that the players in a game are bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players actions like any other uncertainty then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium random strategies appear as an expression of each player s uncertainty about what the others will do not as the result of willful randomization use is made of the common prior assumption according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have where information may be interpreted broadly to include experience upbringing and genetic makeup copyright 1987 by the econometric society

who is credit constrained in the u s economy an important assumption of the life cycle model of consumption is the postulate of perfect capital markets this hypothesis has recently been challenged by substantial empirical evidence hall and mishkin 1982 using the panel study of income dynamics estimate that 20 percent of united states families are liquidity constrained mariger 1986 derives a life cycle model with endogenous liquidity constraints and using a cross section estimates this fraction to be 19 4 percent hubbard and judd 1986 simulate a model with a constraint on net worth which shows that with reasonable assumptions about preferences 19 0 percent of united states consumers are liquidity constrained the emerging consensus points therefore to a fraction of approximately 20 percent of the population behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with the pure life cycle model in addition hayashi 1985 and zeldes 1989 investigate the correlation among consumption wealth and income for various population groups and infer that liquidity constraints are more important for younger families with low levels of wealth and saving the main limitation of these studies is that in their data sets constrained consumers are not observable and have to be identified via indirect evidence thus there is as yet little firm evidence about the characteristics of the consumers who are likely to be credit constrained this paper adopts an approach that differs from previous tests for liquidity constraints because it makes use of data where constrained consumers are observable and explicitly links their existence to credit market imperfections and personal characteristics the data drawn from the 1983 survey of consumer finances scf and described in section ii provide information on individuals whose request for credit has been rejected by financial intermediaries in section iii a model is developed in which consumers and lenders behavior jointly determines the probability that a consumer is rationed in the credit market this probability is then

extremist platforms political consequences of profit seeking media we analyze how information about candidate quality affects the choice of electoral platforms made by an office motivated political challenger the incumbent is of known quality and located at the ideal policy of the voter the voter cares for both policy and the candidates quality and can learn about the challenger s quality by buying information a high quality challenger then has an incentive to signal her quality by choosing a policy that induces the voter to buy information we first study the benchmark case in which the information is supplied exogenously and its quality is independent of the challenger s platform this yields multiple equilibria and indeterminacy of equilibrium platforms by contrast when the information is supplied by a profit maximizing media outlet its quality depends on the challenger s platform and we obtain a unique equilibrium platform in particular when the incumbent s quality is relatively low the media coverage rises and the challenger s platform diverges further from the voter s ideal policy as the voter s preference for quality increases

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

a spatial theory of media slant and voter choice we develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one dimensional space perceived by voters economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory expected electoral results influence economic choices and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour in a two candidate election we show that media favouring the front runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection we characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances balanced media giving each issue equal coverage may be worse for voters than partisan media

trends and cycles in macroeconomic time series two structural time series models for annual observations are constructed in terms of trend cycle and irregular components the models are then estimated via the kalman filter using data on five u s macroeconomic time series the results provide some interesting insights into the dynamic structure of the series particularly with respect to cyclical behavior at the same time they illustrate the development of a model selection strategy for structural time series models

are output fluctuations transitory according to the conventional view of the business cycle fluctuations in output represent temporary deviations from trend the purpose of this paper is to question this conventional view if fluctuations in output are dominated by temporary deviations from the natural rate of output then an unexpected change in output today should not substantially change one s forecast of output in say five or ten years our examination of quarterly postwar united states data leads us to be skeptical about this implication the data suggest that an unexpected change in real gnp of 1 percent should change one s forecast by over 1 percent over a long horizon

media and political persuasion evidence from russia this paper compares electoral outcomes of 1999 parliamentary elections in russia among geographical areas with differential access to the only national tv channel independent from the government it was available to three quarters of russia s population and its signal availability was idiosyncratic conditional on observables independent tv decreased aggregate vote for the government party by 8 9 percentage points increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 6 3 percentage points and decreased turnout by 3 8 percentage points the probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals who watched independent tv even controlling for voting intentions measured one month before elections jel d72 l82 p26

political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias abstract we develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings and maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information that the partisan audience does not like hearing while voters are rational understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately important information is lost through bias and can lead to electoral mistakes we characterize those conditions that give rise to electoral mistakes showing that heightened political polarization and asymmetric distributions of voter ideologies make electoral mistakes more likely even if the median ideology is a centrist and centrist voters gain access to unbiased news media bias can generate excessive cross over voting which in turn can lead to the election of the wrong candidate

abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences we analyze a model of a two candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences we demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that nevertheless elections effectively aggregate voters private information using examples we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed however may lead to higher levels of abstention we conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes

do liquidity constraints and interest rates matter for consumer behavior evidence from credit card data this paper utilizes a unique new dataset of credit card accounts to analyze how people respond to changes in credit supply the data consist of a panel of thousands of individual credit card accounts from several different card issuers with associated credit bureau data we estimate both marginal propensities to consume mpcs out of liquidity and interest rate elasticities we also evaluate the ability of different models of consumption to rationalize our results distinguishing the permanent income hypothesis pih liquidity constraints precautionary saving and behavioral models we find that increases in credit limits generate an immediate and significant rise in debt counter to the pih the average mpc out of liquidity ddebt dlimit ranges between 10 14 the mpc is much larger for people starting near their limits consistent with binding liquidity constraints however the mpc is significant even for people starting well below their limit we show this response is consistent with buffer stock models of precautionary saving nonetheless there are other results that conventional models cannot easily explain e g why so many people are borrowing on their credit cards and simultaneously holding low yielding assets unlike most other studies we also find strong effects from changes in account specific interest rates the long run elasticity of debt to the interest rate is approximately 1 3 less than half of this elasticity represents balance shifting across cards with most reflecting net changes in total borrowing the elasticity is larger for decreases in interest rates than for increases which can explain the widespread use of temporary promotional rates the elasticity is smaller for people starting near their credit limits again consistent with liquidity constraints

would rational voters acquire costly information abstract we analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is better for them voters can acquire some costly information about the alternatives in agreement with downs s rational ignorance hypothesis individual investment in political information declines to zero as the number of voters increases however if the marginal cost of information is near zero for nearly irrelevant information there is a sequence of equilibria such that the election outcome is likely to correspond to the interests of the majority for arbitrarily large numbers of voters thus rationally ignorant voters are consistent with a well informed electorate

the market for news we investigate the market for news under two assumptions that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs we show that on the topics where readers share common beliefs one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media competition results in lower prices but common slanting toward reader biases on topics where reader beliefs diverge such as politically divisive issues however newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions yet in the aggregate a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective generally speaking reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se

demand for slant how abstention shapes voters choice of news media political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into information cocoons and segregate along ideological lines we show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates cross over in news consumption voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist this non monotonicity in the demand for slant makes voters ideologies non recoverable from their choice of news media and generates disproportionate demand for media outlets that are centrist or only moderately biased it also implies that polarisation of the electorate may lead to an ideological moderation in news consumption

how risky is consumption in the long run benchmark estimates from a robust estimator the long run standard deviation lrsd of consumption growth is a key moment in determining risk premiums under epstein zin preferences standard estimators of the lrsd are biased downward and have poor confidence interval coverage making them overreject the long run risk model this paper studies a new estimator with smaller bias and accurate confidence intervals standard long run risk calibrations are still rejected in the data the lrsd of consumption growth in the postwar sample is estimated to be 2 5 per year with an upper bound to the 95 confidence interval of 4 9 these values can be taken as benchmarks for future calibrations received october 29 2014 accepted february 18 2016 by editor leonid kogan

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

the cyclical component of u s economic activity quarterly data on industrial production and deflated gross national product in the united states from 1947 through 1985 are decomposed into independent nonstationary trend and stationary cycle components using kalman filtering and smoothing techniques estimates of the model parameters imply that at least half of the quarterly innovation in u s economic activity can be attributed to a stationary cyclical component that persists over periods of time as long as five years this finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that most of the apparent variation in u s economic activity can be attributed to a nonstationary trend component

social connectivity media bias and correlation neglect we propose a model of political persuasion in which a biased newspaper aims to convince voters to vote for the government each voter receives the newspaper s report as well as an independent private signal voters then exchange this information on social media and form posterior beliefs neglecting correlation among signals an increase in connectivity increases the newspaper s bias if voters are ex ante predisposed to vote against the government and reduces the bias if they are predisposed in favour of the government while more precise independent signals reduce the newspaper s optimal bias the bias remains positive even when connectivity becomes large thus even with a large number of social connections the election produces an inefficient outcome with positive probability implying a failure of the condorcet jury theorem

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

the effect of borrowing constraints on consumer liabilities this paper explores the effects of liquidity constraints on consumer liabilities while much empirical evidence attests to the importance of liquidity constraints in the u s economy evidence about the effects of borrowing constraints on consumer balance sheets is scarce using the 1983 survey of consumer finances data we estimate desired borrowing for unconstrained households we then evaluate the gap between predicted and observed debt for the sample of liquidity constrained consumers predicted debt is 75 percent higher than actual debt in the liquidity constrained sample thus the effect of removing borrowing constraints has quantitatively important implications for the allocation of debt in the household portfolio the removal of borrowing constraints would raise aggregate household liabilities by 9 percent copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

abstention ideology and information acquisition we consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity in contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities we show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are we also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity

downs meets d aspremont and company convergence versus differentiation in politics and the media abstract media firms have incentives to differentiate their news products to soften price competition when consumers value cognitive consistency between the news they read and the policies they support politicians are induced to propose more polarized policies to conform to a polarized media landscape a stronger commercial motive or a weaker preference for editorial neutrality in the media exacerbates this effect and causes party policies to become more extreme we find that prices for news products are higher when consumers have a demand for cognitive consistency despite the fact that maximal product differentiation does not hold for media firms

the self perpetuation of biased beliefs to overcome strong prior beliefs strong evidence to the contrary is needed if a person is predisposed to choosing a certain action the advice from an advisor who sets a low threshold for recommending the alternative action is not of much use the preference for like minded advisors who supply coarse information implies that the advice a person receives is likely to reinforce his existing priors this effect can lead to polarisation of opinion and the emergence of self serving beliefs the learning process is prolonged and the induced short run bias can become perpetual if information is costly

a spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition we characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news when there are two media outlets each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones but voter welfare is not always higher copyright 2008 wiley blackwell