the rotten kid theorem meets the samaritan s dilemma a familiar result in the economic theory of the family is becker s rotten kid theorem this theorem states that altruism by a family member will lead other selfish members to act efficiently from the family viewpoint we extend becker s one period model to two periods and show that parental altruism can result in an inefficiency known in other contexts as the samaritan s dilemma implications of this for transfer arrangements within the family and for the ricardian equivalence theorem are drawn

competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

women work and divorce in this paper the author presents evidence that adds support to the economic approach to divorce and shows that the divorce rate is significantly and substantially affected by the earning ability of women in market work data are drawn from the u s farm sector after a brief overview of the economic theory of divorce and its relevance to the farm sector data sources and regression specifications are discussed excerpt

bequests gifts and social security this paper analyses the very long run or stationary state impact of an unfunded social security system we use an overlapping generations model framework a key feature is that while parents care about their children and can leave non negative bequests to them children also care about their parents and can make non negative gifts to them we show that the possibility of negative net bequests may make social security less harmful to private wealth accumulation than would otherwise be the case a subsidiary finding is that risk loving behaviour may emerge for some households due to the nature of intergenerational transfers within family lines

gross versus net equalization scheme in a federation with decentralized leadership this paper compares the impact of two equalization transfer schemes on regional budgetary choices a gross equalization scheme where ex post transfers to regions are financed from federal tax revenues and a net equalization scheme where region to region ex post transfers allocated by the federal government are self financed the net equalization scheme reduces ex post federal intervention and should therefore be favored over the gross equalization scheme in order to reduce opportunistic regional behaviour in addition the two equalization schemes differently affect the composition of public expenditures the gross equalization scheme generates an upward distortion of the amount of capital public expenditures whereas the net equalization scheme generates a downward distortion of the amount of current public expenditures compared to the optimum a welfare analysis reveals that incentives to use a net equalization scheme are strengthened for a sufficiently high number of regions

altruism and time consistency the economics of fait accompli this paper analyzes the strategic and intertemporal interaction between two economic agents who have overlapping concerns such as altruistic concerns for each other s welfare the agents may be two individuals a social bureau and a client or two units in an organization we show how the presence of such common concerns may lead to socially inefficient outcomes in which one economic agent free rides on the other s concern we also briefly how this inefficiency and free riding in the context of interaction between individuals might be mitigated by compulsory social security systems as another example we interpret the inefficiency in terms of kornai s soft budget constraints within organizations

the role of brand image and product characteristics on firms entry and oem decisions we investigate the optimal market entry and original equipment manufacturer oem decisions of a firm facing a market in which firms brands can be horizontally differentiated and products can be vertically differentiated the entrant might sell under its own brand and compete with an incumbent become a supplier to the incumbent or both findings reveal that when consumers perceive the firms are horizontally and vertically differentiated the entrant profits by simultaneously entering the market and establishing an oem arrangement with the incumbent in such competitive scenarios both buyer and seller increase profits by agreeing on wholesale prices that are not too low which softens both horizontal and vertical conflict between the firms findings also show that the incumbent may prefer to pay high wholesale prices to the entrant even if the incumbent had the option to source the product independently at a lower marginal cost when firms have the capability of producing each other s product lines su

theory and evidence on pricing by asymmetric oligopolies we present an analysis of markets with many asymmetrically positioned retailers that compete for the business of both informed and uninformed customers for a homogenous good such as software music book or a brand name appliance we show that two forms of asymmetry one related to loyal segment sizes of retailers and one related to the positioning of firms completely explain the observed price dispersion in such markets and the multitude of asymmetrical strategies adopted by retailers the stochastic dominance of empirical mixed strategy measures is used to test the theory with data on 968 books from 10 online retailers

an economic model of cohabitation and divorce abstract the positive correlation between the rates of cohabitation and divorce has long been established this paper seeks to determine the direction of causation between these two variables a simultaneous equations model is specified with cohabitation and divorce rates as endogenous variables and using data aggregated to the state level for 1990 this procedure suggests that the divorce rate is a significant factor in explaining variations across states in the cohabitation rate and that the divorce rate is itself influenced by cohabitation behavior this finding strengthens the results put forth by various economic and sociological single equation studies this synthesis of information and data provided by sociologists with economic theory and methodology suggests further research in modelling demographic variables as joint outcomes of the same process

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

customized advertising via a common media distributor we show that when a single media content distributor such as a television cable company or an internet provider delivers advertising messages on behalf of multiple competing brands it can sometimes utilize customized advertising to implement monopoly pricing even though such monopolistic pricing can be implemented with varying degrees of customization of commercials product revenues and consumer surplus are highest when the distributor chooses the highest level of customization feasible consumers would obviously prefer aggressive price competition in product markets however given that collusion on prices is facilitated anyway when the distributor acts as a common agent the welfare of consumers is enhanced when commercials are better aligned with their preferences

dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers abstract we investigate in this paper whether dynamic targeted pricing based on consumer purchase history could benefit a practicing firm even when consumers are strategic in that they actively seek to avail themselves of a low price in the future such strategic behavior on the part of consumers has been shown in the literature to render such dynamic targeted pricing unprofitable even for a monopoly firm we show that dynamic targeted pricing can benefit competing firms when they actively pursue customer recognition based on consumer purchase history this is because in order to pursue customer recognition competing firms need to price high to screen out price sensitive consumers and hence price competition is moderated as a result all competing firms can become better off with targeted pricing than without even when consumers behave strategically interestingly because of this competition moderation effect the paradoxical outcome occurs where dynamic targeted pricing may not benefit a monopolist but it may benefit competing firms we also show that dynamic targeted pricing can expand the market such that social welfare unambiguously improves

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

economic policy precommitment and social welfare abstract the claim that economic policy precommitment is advantageous is investigated in a context in which the welfare basis of the government s objectives is explicit three results are demonstrated each one defining a class of welfare functions and a class of models such that precommitment would not raise welfare in models of that class it is concluded that if a purely welfare economic argument for precommitment is to be found attention will have to be paid either to conflicts asymmetries and differences within the private sector or to multiple equilibria

rotten kids purity and perfection bergstrom has shown that becker s rotten kid theorem holds in a world of two commodities if their utilities are transferable the present paper identifies a further circumstance in which the theorem is valid we show that it also holds in the absence of transferable utility if the externalities are assumed to take the form of a single pure public good

altruism within the family reconsidered do nice guys finish last this paper criticizes the view that altruism either increases the benefits of group interactions or improves the allocation of resources within families the authors identify a variety of circumstances in which members of a group would prefer to interact with less altruistic individuals and in which the efficiency of resource allocation is inversely related to the prevailing degree of altruism reasons that altruism might be a counter productive social force include 1 it can alter the social utility possibility frontier in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways 2 it can entail exploitability causing family members to behave in ways that leave all parties worse off 3 altruists may take inefficient actions to preempt exploitation and 4 family members may establish efficient resource allocation by punishing selfish behavior a rise in the level of altruism may lead to the exclusion of certain punishment strategies on the grounds of credibility 1 general positive result is that sufficiently high levels of altruism almost always lead to efficient resource allocation one should not necessarily expect to find strong altruistic linkages between spouses nor should altruism necessarily contributed to marital stability in addition to the connections between this work and the literature on family behavior this analysis has broader implications concerning the role of altruism in society and the evolution of social conscience

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

mixed pricing in oligopoly with limited monopoly we analyze price competition between two brands buyers consist of switchers and two segments of customers with limited brand loyalty we identify a unique symmetric mixed strategy price equilibrium and find that competition is most relaxed when there exists some switchers

research note consumer addressability and customized pricing the increasing availability of customer information is giving many firms the ability to reach and customize price and other marketing efforts to the tastes of the individual consumer this ability is labeled as consumer addressability consumer addressability through sophisticated databases is particularly important for direct marketing firms catalog retailers such as l l bean and land s end credit card issuing banks and firms in the long distance telephone market we examine the strategic implications of consumer addressability on competition between database direct marketing firms we address questions such as in a competitive environment how should firms invest in addressability will future improvements in the degree of addressability increase or mitigate the intensity of competition between the firms will greater addressability always be beneficial for firms we model competition between two firms in a market where consumers differ on a horizontal attribute of product differentiation the market comprises consumers located on a linear attribute space and firms located at the ends of the line we represent the degree of addressability or the reach of a firm s database as the proportion of consumers at each point in the market who are in the firm s database consequently the firm can offer these consumers customized prices consumer addressability creates two effects that govern the competition between firms a surplus extraction effect because a firm might address a consumer who is not reached by its competitor and a competitive effect that is created by the set of consumers who can be addressed by both firms the key results of the paper pertain to when the addressability decision is endogenous when the extent of market differentiation or consumer heterogeneity in preferences for a product brand attribute as well as the incremental cost of addressability are sufficiently large firms make symmetric investments in equilibrium given high costs firms choose sufficiently low levels of addressability low addressability and high levels of market differentiation both help reduce price competition which facilitates symmetric choice of addressability by the firms in equilibrium however when market differentiation and the cost of incremental addressability become small firms face the prospect of destructive competition as a result they strategically differentiate in their choice of addressability to mitigate this competition interestingly even in the extreme case when incremental addressability is costless not every firm chooses full addressability in equilibrium this has useful implications for direct marketing given that the advances in information technology should improve the ability of firms to address their consumers it might indeed not be desirable for all direct marketing firms to indefinitely pursue greater addressability as costs of doing so decline the analysis also shows an interesting effect of market differentiation in addressable markets equilibrium profits can decrease with an increase in market differentiation when the marginal cost of addressability is sufficiently high finally we discuss the competitive outcome that would result when firms compete with addressable as well as uniform posted prices

marriage and divorce reply in the popular press and among policymakers the effect of no fault divorce laws on divorce rates remains an issue see e g new york times 23 july 1991 in my 1986 article in this review i show that the adoption of one form of no fault divorceunilateral divorce does not lead to a significant increase in divorce rates the theoretical model that is consistent with this empirical evidence would imply that the new law does not decrease the costs of divorce it merely redefines which party has the right to terminate the marriage

government transfers and the samaritan s dilemma in the family this paper examines the effectiveness of government transfersin overcoming the samaritan s dilemma in a family in which thechild saves an insufficient amount in order to induce largerbequests from the parent the results are as follows first exogenous government transfers do not affect intergenerationalconsumption allocation if bequests are operative second assuming that government transfers are chosen strategically the government precommits to such a level of transfers fromthe parent to the child that bequests become inoperative andthus rids the child of the incentive for undersaving thisengenders an efficient intertemporal allocation ofconsumption

mail versus mall a strategic analysis of competition between direct marketers and conventional retailers consumers now purchase several offerings from direct sellers including catalog and internet marketers these direct channels exist in parallel with the conventional retail stores the availability of multiple channels has significant implications for the performance of consumer markets the literature in marketing and economics has however been dominated by a focus on the conventional retail sector this paper is an effort toward modeling competition in the multiple channel environment from a strategic viewpoint at the outset a parsimonious model that accommodates the following consumer and market characteristics is introduced first the relative attractiveness of retail shopping varies across consumers second the fit with the direct channel varies across product categories third the strength of existing retail presence in local markets moderates competition fourth in contrast with the fixed location of the retail store that anchors its localized market power the location of the direct marketer is irrelevant to the competitive outcome the model is first applied in a setting where consumers have complete knowledge of product availability and prices in all channels in the resulting equilibrium the direct marketer acts as a competitive wedge between retail stores the direct presence is so strong that each retailer competes against the remotely located direct marketer rather than against neighboring retailers this outcome has implications for the marketing mix of retailers which has traditionally been tuned to attract consumers choosing between retail stores in the context of market entry conditions under which a direct channel can access a local market in retail entry equilibrium are derived our analysis suggests that the traditional focus on retail entry equilibria may not yield informative or relevant findings when direct channels are a strong presence next the role of information in multiple channel markets is modeled this issue is particularly relevant in the context of direct marketing where the seller can typically control the level of information in the marketplace sometimes on a customer by customer basis e g by deciding on the mailing list for a catalog campaign when a certain fraction of consumers does not receive information from the direct marketer the retailers compete with each other for that fraction of the market the retailer s marketing mix has to be tuned in this case to jointly address direct and neighboring retail competition the level of information disseminated by the direct marketer is shown to have strategic implications and the use of market coverage as a lever to control competition is described even with zero information costs providing information to all consumers may not be optimal under some circumstances in particular when the product is not well adapted to the direct channel the level of market information about the direct option should ideally be lowered the only way to compete with retailers on a larger scale with a poorly adapted product is by lowering direct prices which lowers profits lowering market information levels and allowing retailers to compete more with each other facilitates a higher equilibrium retail price in turn this allows a higher direct price to be charged and improves overall direct profit on the other hand when the product is well adapted increasing direct market presence and engaging in greater competition with the retail sector yields higher returns the finding that high market coverage may depress profits raises some issues for further exploration first implementing the optimal coverage is straightforward when the seller controls the information mechanism as in the case of catalog marketing the internet in contrast is an efficient mechanism to transmit information but does not provide the sellers with such control over the level of market information a key reason is that the initiative to gather information on the internet lies largely with consumers the design and implementation of mechanisms to control aggregate information levels in electronic markets can therefore be an important theme for research and managerial interest second direct marketers have traditionally relied on the statistical analysis of customer records to decide on contact policies the analysis in this paper reveals that these policies can have significant strategic implications as well research that integrates the statistical and strategic aspects could make a valuable contribution the paper concludes with a discussion of issues for future research in multiple channel markets including avenues to model competition in settings with multiple direct marketers

competitive price discrimination strategies in a vertical channel using aggregate retail data we explore opportunities for targeted pricing for a retailer that only tracks weekly store level aggregate sales and marketing mix information we show that it is possible using these data to recover essential features of the underlying distribution of consumer willingness to pay knowledge of this distribution may enable the retailer to generate additional profits from targeting by using choice information at the checkout counter in estimating demand we incorporate a supply side model of the distribution channel that captures important features of competitive price setting behavior of firms this latter aspect helps us control for the potential endogeneity generated by unmeasured product characteristics in aggregate data the channel controls for competitive aspects both between manufacturers and between manufacturers and a retailer despite this competition we find that targeted pricing need not generate the prisoner s dilemma in our data this contrasts with the findings of theoretical models due to the flexibility of the empirical model of demand the demand system we estimate captures richer forms of product differentiation both vertical and horizontal as well as a more flexible distribution of consumer heterogeneity

the condorcet jury theorem free speech and correlated votes one of the more optimistic if obscure propositions about democracy is condorcet s jury theorem cjt the theorem establishes that under certain conditions a majority of a group with limited information about a pair of alternatives is more likely to choose the better alternative than any one member of the group the theorem thus provides a mathematical basis for majority rule voting and potentially gives an important clue to our understanding of the strength of democratic government yet cjt makes two overly restrictive assumptions it assumes that individuals vote independently and that they share a common goal clearly the assumptions preclude any application of the theorem to democratic politics not surprisingly black 1963 163 ruled that the theorem offers truly an unpromising start recently interest in the theorem was revived by miller 1986 who permits voters to have conflicting goals and by grofman and feld 1988 who link it with rousseau s general will miller 1986 and grofman and feld 1988 however retain the assumption of independence in this paper i generalize cjt for correlated votes and offer an analytical basis for free speech moreover i apply the generalized theorem to organization theory who should a chief executive choose as advisers the main results of the paper are summarized for large groups condorcet s result would hold under fairly general conditions for small groups the conditions are severe finally under reasonable assumptions p the probability that a majority selects the

the effect of economic opportunity and family background on adolescent cohabitation on adolescent cohabitation and childbearing among low income blacks this article uses a hazards model permitting continuous covariates and fixed effects to estimate the effect of local employment opportunity and family background on the cohabitation and childbearing of black youths from low income households support is found for w j wilson s hypothesis that employment opportunity encourages the formation of cohabitational unions as well as for the opportunity cost hypothesis that employment opportunity discourages childbearing outside such unions however the latter effect appears to be larger suggesting that the opportunity cost hypothesis is the primary channel through which higher employment rates result in lower rates of illegitimacy among underclass youths

economic choice political decision and the problem of limits assesses the arguments for the use of market or political processes for making collective choices the border between what is mine and what is ours is contested but it is unguarded where should it lie how would we know when it should be adjusted i uncover an old paradox a society can never use political means to guard against incursions across the border for political ends some other mechanism such as constitutional or other extra statutory rules are required

customer information sharing among rival firms abstract the recent rapid growth of the internet as a medium of communication and commerce combined with the development of sophisticated software tools are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information databases with detailed records about consumers preferences these databases have become part of a firm s assets and as such they can be sold to third parties this possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned regulated or left unchecked this paper investigates the incentives of rival firms to share their customer specific information and evaluates the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned in the context of a perfect price discrimination model

when and how is the internet likely to decrease price competition conventional wisdom seems to claim that by lowering the cost of distribution and by making search easier for consumer the introduction of the internet is likely to intensify price competition this paper intends to challenge this view by asking when and how is the internet likely to decrease the level of price competition between firms to answer this question we develop an analytic model with the following characteristics on the demand side consumers need to gather information on two types of product attributes digital attributes which can be communicated on the web at very low cost and nondigital attributes for which physical inspection of the product is necessary consumers choose between two brands but are familiar with the nondigital attributes of only the brand purchased on the last purchase occasion on the supply side firms use traditional stores and the internet to inform consumers about their products attributes and to sell their products in this setup we show that the impact of the internet on competition will be radically different depending on the relative importance of parameters describing the relevant shopping and distribution context specifically we find that the introduction of the internet might lead to monopoly pricing when 1 the proportion of internet users is high enough 2 when nondigital attributes are relevant but not overwhelming 3 when consumers have a more favorable prior about the brand they currently own and 4 when the purchase situation can be characterized by destination shopping more surprising we also show that in such cases the use of the internet not only leads to higher prices but can also discourage consumers from engaging in search as such an important message of the paper is that under some conditions the internet might represent an opportunity for firms to leverage their brand loyalty and increase their profits the intuition behind our results is the following the internet allows consumers to evaluate digital attributes easily i e without visiting the stores however nondigital attributes can only be evaluated through physical presence as such for goods where both types of attributes are important the introduction of the net changes the effective cost of search for consumers without the internet the cost of search is the cost of visiting more than one store with the introduction of the net however nonsearching consumers do not have to undertake the shopping trip at all because they can order products on the net thus in the presence of the internet the cost of search is related to the cost of undertaking the entire shopping trip in the case of destination shopping i e when the fixed cost of undertaking the shopping trip is higher than the cost of visiting an additional store the presence of the internet creates higher effective search costs for consumers given this shift of paradigm in search costs due to the internet consumers may not take the risk of searching for products with better nondigital attributes but instead remain with the product they are familiar with this results in increased consumer loyalty which induces firms to increase their prices our results have important managerial implications first they provide guidelines for firms on when i e for which product categories they should consider expanding their distribution network to the internet in this respect an important additional insight of the paper is that the internet can lower price competition and lead to reduced consumer search even if it is more expensive than the traditional distribution channel this can easily be the case if distribution through the internet represents additional costs such as the costs associated with shipping and handling and return policies second the paper also provides guidelines on how to plan the firm s internet strategy interestingly the results suggest that with the general availability of the internet the role of stores might actually become more important while we do not explicitly model a dynamic market our findings together with klemperer s 1987 results suggest that stores might have a key role in consumer acquisition while the internet can help leverage the acquired customer base through demand fulfillment this might imply that for certain product categories firms should actually allocate additional resources to improve their in store environment when considering the internet as a complementary distribution channel

private income transfers and market incentives the paper introduces labour supply considerations and labour earnings uncertainty into a parent child framework in the presence of merit goods i investigate the implications of various parental bequest rules on the effort decisions of the offspring where the parent cannot perfectly observe her child s market activities the asymmetry in information and preferences gives rise to a moral hazard problem and as a result the parent may not fully insure her child because the source of risk is not entirely exogenous in this case optimal parental transfers are shown to be state contingent moreover the child s effort is higher in the case with a merit good and parental transfers than in the case without a merit good goods are not only economic commodities but vehicles and instruments for realities of another order influence power sympathy status emotion and the skillful game of exchange consists of a complex totality of maneuvers conscious or unconscious in order to gain security and to fortify one s self against risks incurred through alliances and rivalry levi strauss the principle of reciprocity

efficiency enhancing signalling in the samaritan s dilemma suppose an altruistic person a is willing to transfer resources to a second person b if b comes upon hard times if b anticipates that a will act in this manner b will save too little from both agents point of view this is the samaritan s dilemma this paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information because if a is uncertain about how big b s need for support is b will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need by saving more than he otherwise would have done

creating micro marketing pricing strategies using supermarket scanner data micro marketing refers to the customization of marketing mix variables to the store level this paper shows how prices can be profitably customized at the store level rather than adopting a uniform pricing policy across all stores historically there has been a trend by retailers to consolidate independent stores into large national and regional chains this move toward consolidation has been driven by the economies of scale associated with these larger operations however some of these large chains have lost the adaptability of independent neighborhood stores micro marketing represents an interest on the part of managers to combine the advantages of these large operations with the flexibility of independent neighborhood stores a basis for these customized pricing strategies is the result of differences in interbrand competition across stores these changes in interbrand competition are measured using weekly store level scanner data at the product level obviously this presents a huge estimation problem since we wish to measure substitution between each product at a store level for a chain with 100 stores and 10 products in a category we would need to estimate over 100 000 parameters to reliably estimate these individual store differences we phrase our problem in a hierarchical bayesian framework essentially each store level parameter can be thought of as a combination of chain level and random store specific effects the improvement in estimating this model comes from exploiting the common chain level component in addition we relate these store specific changes to demographic and competitive characteristics of the store s trading area which helps explain why these differences are present these estimated differences in price response are in turn used to set store level prices to simplify and focus the problem we limit our attention to everyday price changes i e the prices of products that are not advertised there are many marketing variables that can be adjusted at a storelevel e g promotions and product assortments the reason we concentrate upon everyday pricing is driven by its importance in the marketing mix that most profits are earned on products sold at their everyday price and the amenability of everyday prices to store level customizations a limitation of this approach is that it yields only a partial solution to the retailer s global optimization problem a challenge for the retailer in implementing micro marketing pricing strategies is to retain a consistent image while altering prices that adapt to neighborhood differences in demand our approach is to search for price changes that leave image unchanged we argue that a sufficient condition for holding the input to store image constant from everyday pricing is to hold average price and revenues at their current levels we implement this condition by introducing constraints into the profit maximization problem future research into store choice may yield more efficient conditions a benefit of holding the retailer s image constant is that it does not require costly new information about competitors and promotional activity instead retailers are able to derive these store level customizations based largely upon scanner data this is very advantageous since this information is already being collected and is readily available our results indicate that micro marketing pricing strategies would be profitable and could increase gross profit margins by 4 percent to 10 percent when these gross profit gains are considered after administrative and operating costs are taken into account they could increase operating profit margins by 33 percent to 83 percent these gains come from encouraging consumers through everyday price changes to switch to more profitable bundles of products and not through overall price changes at the chain level these results show that the information contained in the retailer s store level scanner data is an under utilized resource by exploiting this information using newer and more powerful computational techniques managers can better appreciate its value the implication is that profits could be increased and gains can be made by using this information as the basis for micro marketing

trick or treat development opportunities and challenges in the wto negotiations on industrial tariffs negotiations on industrial tariffs in the current wto work programme have turned out to be surprisingly difficult on the one hand developing countries particularly in africa are concerned about the potential negative effect on their industrial development of developed country efforts to push them into deep cuts in applied tariffs after the disillusion of the uruguay round promises of welfare gains seem unconvincing on the other hand a number of the more complex formula proposals for tariff cutting make it difficult for participants to evaluate what they have to do compared with what they hope to receive the developing countries may achieve greater exports and welfare gains from the more ambitious proposals but computations show that these also imply greater imports lower tariff revenues some labour market adjustments and reduced output in some politically sensitive sectors some way of assisting the developing countries in coping with these adjustments is required to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the negotiations

samaritan versus rotten kid another look abstract we set up a two stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents the samaritan s dilemma rotten kid theorem states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after before the altruist we find that in general the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent s action marginally affects only his own payoff the altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff

targeted advertising strategies on television the personal video recorder pvr facilitates the use of targeted advertising by allowing companies to monitor television viewing behavior and to build demographic profiles of viewers from the data that are collected our research explores the extent to which an advertiser should allocate resources to increase the quality of its targeting we present a game theoretic model that extends the conventional measurement of targeting quality by exploring the trade off between two measures accuracy and recognition accuracy measures the likelihood that any target segment prediction is correct while recognition conversely measures the likelihood that any member of the target segment is identified we find that the relative resources allocated to improving accuracy and recognition depend upon the size of the population of viewers the propensity of viewers to skip commercials the overall cost of airing commercials and the competitive environment furthermore the incentives to improve accuracy are markedly different from those to improve recognition although improving accuracy does not affect the extent of price competition improving recognition leads to intensified price competition and reduced profitability in the product market thus when facing a competitor that pursues a strategy to improve its recognition of potential customers an advertiser should choose to reduce its investment in recognition and increase its investment in accuracy

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

profitable pricing when market segments overlap in this paper we analyze profitable pricing strategies when market segments overlap overlapping markets are segments that are not perfectly sealed and leakage between them can occur different consumers are assumed to incur possibly different transaction costs if they choose to purchase in the low price market a monopolist seller knows the distribution of transaction costs across consumers and must choose an optimal pricing strategy in particular the monopolist must decide whether to charge a single price or to price differentiate conditions are derived under which price differentiation will be the most profitable strategy when price differentiation is optimal the equilibrium amount of leakage is determined endogenously unlike the standard economics textbook model of price discrimination in which zero leakage is determined exogenously and is usually given as a necessary condition for price discrimination we show that zero leakage is not necessary for differential pricing to be optimal and that

cross market network effect with asymmetric customer loyalty implications for competitive advantage a cross market network effect exists in many industries e g newspaper publishing media software in which a seller sells both a primary and a secondary product e g a newspaper publisher sells newspapers to readers and advertising space to advertisers and the value of the secondary product depends on the size of the user base of the primary product this paper examines the competitive implications of asymmetric customer loyalty in such markets in traditional markets an advantage in customer loyalty generates a profit advantage we show here however that in the presence of a cross market network effect a midlevel of loyalty advantage in the primary product market can lead to an overall profit disadvantage this surprising result is derived from the interdependence of the two markets whereby a profit in one market may be gained at the cost of the other and by the positive relationship between a larger loyalty segment and a higher opportunity cost of price competition in the product of the primary market extending our model to a two period entry game also shows that under certain conditions the entrant with disadvantage in customer loyalty can outperform the incumbent in profit and market share this result suggests that asymmetry in customer loyalty can be a source of first mover advantage or disadvantage

commentaries and rejoinder to marketing of vice goods a strategic analysis of the package size decision by sanjay jain jain jain s 2012 marketing of vice goods a strategic analysis of the package size decision marketing sci 31 1 36 51 examines the impact of consumers self control problem on the equilibrium package sizes offered by firms marketing vice goods this series of discussions offers commentaries and a rejoinder that discuss competitive implications of firms offering small sizes and the impact of smaller sizes on the total consumer expenditure

behavior based pricing in vertically differentiated industries we study behavior based pricing bbp in a vertically differentiated model vertical differentiation is innately asymmetric because all customers prefer the higher quality product when prices are equal this asymmetry causes bbp to have different properties than symmetric horizontally differentiated models we highlight two dimensions that affect the analysis the role of quality adjusted cost differences between the firms and the role of consumer discounting relative to firm discounting in the second period consistent with the prior literature we find that there are conditions based on market shares and quality adjusted costs under which either the low quality firm or the high quality firm but not both will reward its current customers with lower prices than it charges to new customers we then consider whether these conditions can arise in a two period equilibrium we find that if consumers sufficiently discount the future periods then firms at enough of a competitive disadvantage will reward their customers i e the low quality firm will reward its current customers if the quality adjusted cost differential between the two firms is small while the high quality firm will reward its current customers if this cost differential is large conversely we find that if consumers do not discount the future very much then the firm at a competitive disadvantage i e a low quality firm competing against a low cost high quality firm or a high quality firm that has very high costs can earn greater profits with bbp than without bbp although there are cases where both firms may benefit from bbp this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

optimal selection for direct mail direct marketing mail is a growing area of marketing practice yet the academic journals contain very little research on this topic the most important issue for direct marketers is how to sample targets from a population for a direct mail campaign although some selection methods are described in the literature there seems to be not a single paper discussing the analytical and statistical aspects involved the objective of this paper is to introduce a comprehensive methodology for the selection of targets from a mailing list for direct mail at least theoretically this methodology leads to more efficient selection procedures than the existing ones the latter are not based on an optimal selection strategy whereas we explicitly take the profit function into account by equating marginal costs and marginal returns we determine which households should receive a mailing in order to maximize expected profit in the empirical part we show that our methodology has great predictive accuracy and generates higher net returns than traditional approaches

price discrimination with private and imperfect information in this paper i investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer s brand preference i show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them then they charge more to these consumers and this price has an inverse u shaped relationship with the signal s accuracy in contrast the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal s accuracy rises while industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information the reverse happens to consumer surplus

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

product diversion to a direct competitor a manufacturer will often limit competition among downstream partners by authorizing only a select group of retailers to carry its product however it is not uncommon for authorized retailers to create an additional competitor by diverting units to an unauthorized seller this paper presents an analytical model that demonstrates how diversion from authorized retailers to an unauthorized direct competitor can occur under circumstances not considered by the prior literature in fact diversion can represent a prisoner s dilemma whereby retailers diminish their own profit by selling to the unauthorized direct seller the authorized retailer s profit loss actually increases as the per unit diversion costs incurred by the authorized retailer decrease the model also shows that the unauthorized direct seller earns greater profit by strategically procuring a unilaterally constraining quantity even though this procurement strategy results in an equivalent increase in the quantity sold by the retailers combined the results identify a new reason for diversion and its consequences for retailers and the unauthorized direct seller

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

behavioral price discrimination in the presence of switching costs we study the strategic impacts of behavioral price discrimination bpd on manufacturers and retailers in a distribution channel when there are switching costs in consumer demand unlike previous empirical studies of behavioral price discrimination which rely only on differences in price elasticity across customers our pricing model allows the firm strategies to additionally account for differences in price elasticity across time due to switching costs we estimate a dynamic pricing model using empirical data from the cola category and through a series of counterfactuals we find that the retailer should simply outsource the data analytics and customization of coupons to manufacturers and improve its profit beyond what it can achieve by proactively couponing on its own we further find that serving as an information broker to sell its customer database to manufacturers can be a vital source of profit to the retailer by contrast manufacturers end up worse off illustrating that customer information

altruism the samaritan s dilemma and government transfer policy this paper shows that altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor the framework is one in which there are rich altruists and risk averse poor who face some possibility of loss the government represents the rich and makes transfers on their behalf with unconditional transfers the poor may forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss this reliance on private charity has adverse efficiency effects these may be avoided if the government makes in kind transfers of insurance copyright 1995 by american economic association

international charity under asymmetric information abstract international charity is often subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems we show that the burden of informational asymmetries are borne by the most needy countries even when charities design incentive contracts which limit the rents that some countries can extract

does the samaritan s dilemma matter evidence from u s agriculture the samaritan s dilemma posits a downside to charity recipients may rely on free aid instead of their own efforts anecdotally the expectation of free assistance is thought to be important for decisions about insurance and risky behavior in numerous settings but reliable empirical evidence is scarce we estimate whether the samaritan s dilemma exists in u s agriculture where both private crop insurance and frequent federal disaster assistance are present we find that bailout expectations are qualitatively and quantitatively important for the insurance decision furthermore aid expectations reduce both expenditure on farm inputs and subsequent crop revenue jel d72 h84 q18

sleeping with the enemy should competitors share the same advertising agency the possibility of account conflicts is generally regarded as a very serious problem in the advertising industry the problem is that once an advertising agency works for a firm it learns private information which it can use strategically i e make available to the firm s competitors but in oligopolistic situations knowing more about a competitor may not necessarily be beneficial because the competitor may react to this knowledge similarly allowing the competitor to have more information may not necessarily be detrimental in fact the decision of whether to share the same agency depends on three effects which are identified here 1 the decision making framework effect 2 the strategic effect and 3 the uncertainty effect the first effect always favors sharing the same gency the direction of the latter two effects is ambiguous this ambiguity is resolved against the sharing of agencies when 1 the competitor s reaction to the firm s situation is especially harmful in that particular situation strategic effect and 2 the competitor s actions are increasingly harmful uncertainty effect

consumer privacy and marketing avoidance a static model we introduce the concept of marketing avoidance consumer efforts to conceal themselves and to deflect marketing the setting is one in which sellers market some item through solicitations to potential consumers who differ in their benefit from the item and suffer harm from receiving solicitations concealment by one consumer induces sellers to shift solicitations to other consumers whereas deflection does not solicitations cause two externalities direct harm on consumers and the indirect cost of consumer concealment and deflection we find that in markets where the marginal cost of solicitation is sufficiently low efforts by low benefit consumers to conceal themselves will increase the cost effectiveness of solicitations and lead sellers to market more however concealment by high benefit consumers leads sellers to market less furthermore concealment by low benefit consumers increases direct privacy harm and consumer welfare is higher with deflection than concealment finally it is optimal to impose a charge on solicitations

research note using basket composition data for intelligent supermarket pricing how can supermarkets use the vast data they have to design strategies to compete for large basket shoppers potentially their most profitable customers we say analyze the data to glean basket composition of heterogeneous consumers of theoretical and practical interest is the question will our suggestion improve supermarket profits and if so by what pricing strategies by answering this we can also answer the question do results of extant research on single product marketing that using such information intensifies competition and lowers profits generalize to multiproduct marketing by supermarkets that carry several products and whose patrons purchase multiple items we derive equilibrium data based intelligent pricing strategies that also produce increased supermarket profits what is more interesting is our result that data analysis is profitable whether or not a competitor undertakes data analysis if not too costly implementing data analysis is a dominant strategy moreover with comprehensive data analysis connecting basket information and household data stores can increase profits further by targeting rewards at individual households thereby segmenting the market more completely in contrast to past research findings we show that for supermarkets even under competition use of information on past purchases enables intelligent pricing better segmentation and higher profits

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

five questions an integrated research agenda for public choice all societies political or academic must choose among alternatives these choices can be good or bad the worst choice may be looking for answers before there is consensus or at least a debate on what the real questions should be five real questions are offered here in an integrated research agenda for public choice my premis is that there is a single fundamental human problem construct or preserve institutions that make self interested individual action not inconsistent with group welfare all social science research is either a distraction or a step toward understanding at least one of five questions 1 what are preferences 2 what are feasible alternatives 3 how much does the form of implementation affect the way alternatives are valued 4 how do alternatives chosen today affect the menu of alternatives available in the future 5 what is good how would we know if some outcomes are better than others

public pensions as optimal social contracts abstract a simple overlapping generations model is modified to allow for an externality experienced by the young from consumption by the elderly this sets up a game between generations in which one generation s strategy may be to save too little and rely on gifts from the young e g public assistance for retirement income social security can therefore be viewed as a pareto optimal contract to restore efficient intertemporal allocation a funded public pension plan corresponds to forced saving but is vulnerable in that the next young generation may stop contributing rely on its children for retirement assistance and meanwhile reap the consumption externality from the current elderly s social security benefits this suggests a forced giving or pay as you go type of compulsory pension plan such as exists in most nations which also has the advantage of aiding the initial old generation and therefore generating an immediate consumption externality for the initial young the approach can also be used to explain other aspects of existing social security

marriage and divorce informational constraints and private contracting the relationship between divorce rates in the united states and laws regulating divorce are analyzed using data from a special current population survey undertaken in 1979 with particular reference to the adoption by many states of no fault divorce laws the author utilizes a contract theoretic framework to examine the impact of both legal and informational constraints on several aspects of the marriage relationship 1 the probability of divorce 2 compensation at divorce i e the terms of the divorce settlement 3 the probability of entering marriage and 4 incentives for investment in marriage specific capital two different models are developed the first assumes that ex post information about the value of each spouses opportunites at divorce is symmetric and that since divorce would only occur if the joint benefits outweigh the joint costs the law has no effect on the divorce rate the second model asserts that the existence of asymmetric information results in a fixed wage marriage contract and that divorce would be higher in states that allow unilateral divorce the evidence supports the first of these hypotheses excerpt

preference modification vs incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment the role of culture terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics this weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free riding or defection from the weaker side there are two nonexclusive answers 1 atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation even if it results in the recruit s own death 2 create a set of incentives that reward loyalty by giving access to excludable near public club goods culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions culture is defined here as the set of inherited beliefs attitudes and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders to understand themselves and to communicate with each other the primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation the difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism if terrorists are selected for having unusual cooperative from the perspective of the terror group preferences then recruitment must be disrupted somehow if on the other hand terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods

female earnings and the divorce rate a simultaneous equations model economists have contributed a great deal of research both theoretical and empirical to the study of marital formation and dissolution many empirical examinations of marriage and divorce rates exist based on becker s seminal contributions to the literature all of these divorce studies are single equation models with female earnings assumed exogenous as discussed by becker 1981 however causality may run in the opposite direction as well the divorce rate may influence female earnings this paper estimates a simultaneous equations model in which divorce rates and female earnings are the jointly endogenous variables data are by state for 1960 1970 1980 and 1990 the state wide divorce rate equation is an extension of waters and ressler 1999 and the specification of a state wide earnings equation follows standard human capital theory the specification of joint endogeneity between female earnings and the divorce rate allows valid inferences to be made regarding the effect of female earnings on

the perils of behavior based personalization behavior based personalization has gained popularity in recent years whereby businesses offer personalized products based on consumers purchase histories this paper highlights two perils of behavior based personalization in competitive markets first although purchase histories reveal consumer preferences competitive exploitation of such information damages differentiation similar to the classic finding that behavior based price discrimination intensifies price competition with endogenous product design there is yet a second peril it emerges when forward looking firms try to avoid the first peril by suppressing the information value of purchase histories ideally if a market leader serves all consumers on day 1 purchase histories contain no information about consumer preferences however knowing that their rivals are willing to accommodate a market leader firms are more likely to offer a mainstream design at day 1 which jeopardizes differentiation based on this understanding i investigate how the perils of behavior based personalization change under alternative market conditions such as firms better knowledge about their own customers consumer loyalty and inertia consumer self selection and the need for classic designs

targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals it is increasingly observable that competitors in different industries share customer data which can be used for targeted pricing we propose a modified hotelling model with two dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such sharing and its ensuing welfare effects we show that these incentives depend on the type of customer data and on consumer heterogeneity in the strength of brand preferences only data on consumer transportation cost parameters is shared the incentives to do so are stronger if consumers are relatively homogeneous customer data sharing is most likely to be detrimental to consumer surplus while the effect on social welfare can be positive

the value of purchase history data in target marketing an important aspect of marketing practice is the targeting of consumer segments for differential promotional activity the premise of this activity is that there exist distinct segments of homogeneous consumers who can be identified by readily available demographic information the increased availability of individual consumer panel data open the possibility of direct targeting of individual households the goal of this paper is to assess the information content of various information sets available for direct marketing purposes information on the consumer is obtained from the current and past purchase history as well as demographic characteristics we consider the situation in which the marketer may have access to a reasonably long purchase history which includes both the products purchased and information on the causal environment short of this complete purchase history we also consider more limited information sets which consist of only the current purchase occasion or only information on past product choice without causal variables proper evaluation of this information requires a flexible model of heterogeneity which can accommodate observable and unobservable heterogeneity as well as produce household level inferences for targeting purposes we develop new econometric methods to implement a random coefficient choice model in which the heterogeneity distribution is related to observable demographics we couple this approach to modeling heterogeneity with a target couponing problem in which coupons are customized to specific households on the basis of various information sets the couponing problem allows us to place a monetary value on the information sets our results indicate there exists a tremendous potential for improving the profitability of direct marketing efforts by more fully utilizing household purchase histories even rather short purchase histories can produce a net gain in revenue from target couponing which is 2 5 times the gain from blanket couponing the most popular current electronic couponing trigger strategy uses only one observation to customize the delivery of coupons surprisingly even the information contained in observing one purchase occasion boasts net couponing revenue by 50 more than that which would be gained by the blanket strategy this result coupled with increased competitive pressures will force targeted marketing strategies to become much more prevalent in the future than they are today

add on pricing by asymmetric firms this paper uses an analytical model to examine the consequences of add on pricing when firms are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and there is a segment of boundedly rational consumers who are unaware of the add on fees at the time of initial purchase we find that consumers who know the add on fees can be penalized and increasingly so by the existence of boundedly rational consumers our consideration of quality asymmetries on base goods and add ons plus the inclusion of boundedly rational consumers leads to several novel findings regarding firm profits when quality asymmetry is on base goods only and with boundedly rational consumers add on pricing can diminish profit for a qualitatively superior firm and increase profit for an inferior firm i e a lose win result compared to when add on pricing is prohibited or infeasible when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and without boundedly rational consumers the opposite win lose result prevails when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and with boundedly rational consumers the result can be win win win lose or lose win depending on the magnitude of quality differentiation on add ons this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

personalized pricing and quality differentiation we develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing pp whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay we embed pp in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms choices over quality we show that firms optimal pricing strategies with pp may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations when the pp firm has high quality both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case conversely when the pp firm has low quality both firms lower their qualities although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with pp while it is optimal for the firm adopting pp to increase product differentiation the non pp firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space while pp results in a wider market coverage it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such pp policies despite the threat of first degree price discrimination we find that pp with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare

labor supply and marital separation panel data are used to estimate the effect of marital separation on labor supply female labor supply increases substantially and male labor supply declines marginally lending support to the theory of specialization within the household the most interesting finding is that women began to increase their labor supply well before the actualsplit occurs suggesting either that shocks to labor supply change divorce probabilities or that women with a higher likelihood of divorcework more this argument is pursued by constructing and estimating a simultaneous model of labor supply and divorce risk copyright 1986 by american economic association

should mobile marketers collect data other than geo location we take today s mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality we show that depending on consumer heterogeneity higher quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns in equilibrium both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality while only one acquires data if the data quality is low firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and or when data are precise although social welfare weakly improves consumers can be harmed

segmentation advertising and prices this paper explores the implications of market segmentation on firm competitiveness in contrast to earlier work here market segmentation is minimal in the sense that it is based on consumer attributes that are completely unrelated to tastes we show that when the market is comprised by two consumer segments and when there is sufficient variation in the per consumer costs firms need to incur to access the different consumer populations then firms obtain positive profits in symmetric equilibrium otherwise the equilibrium is characterized by zero profits as a result a minimal form of market segmentation combined with advertising cost asymmetries across consumer segments give firms an opportunity to generate positive rents in an otherwise bertrand like environment

king lear s dilemma precommitment versus the last word abstract we relax the prevalent assumption in the literature on intergenerational transfers that an altruistic parent can perfectly observe her child s activities and market opportunities we find that when private information and market risks are present precommitment by the parent to a transfer dominates having the last word

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

technical note personalized dynamic pricing of limited inventories prior work has investigated time and inventory level dependent pricing of limited inventories with finite selling horizons we consider a third dimension in addition to time and inventory level that the firms can use in setting their prices the information that the firm has at the individual customer level an arriving customer provides a signal to the firm which is an imperfect indicator of the customer s willingness to pay and the firm makes a personalized price offer depending on the signal inventory level and time we consider two different models full personalization and partial personalization in the full personalization model the firm charges any price it wishes given the customer signal while in the partial personalization model the firm can charge one of two prices we find that a mere correlation between the signals and customers willingness to pay is not sufficient to ensure intuitive relationships between the signal and the optimal prices we determine a stronger condition which leads to several structural properties including the monotonicity of the optimal price with respect to the signal in the full personalization model for the partial personalization model we show that the optimal pricing policy is of threshold type and that the threshold is monotonic in the inventory level and time

pricing with customer recognition abstract this article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers preferences is discrete consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking in the static and first period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies when price discrimination is allowed forward looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition thus the probability that both will have positive first period sales decreases as they become more patient furthermore an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists yielding a 100 0 division of the first period sales as a whole price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare