the cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking1 abstract we present evidence that insured deposit financing shields banks from the full costs of market discipline moody s downgrades indicators of increasing risk are associated with negative abnormal equity returns that are increasing in the bank s reliance on insured deposits moreover banks raise their use of insured deposits following increases in risk these findings cast doubt on the ability of capital market participants to effectively discipline bank behavior within the current regulatory environment more generally our findings highlight the potential for regulation to undermine market discipline in regulated industries

occupational self selection a human capital approach to sex differences in occupational structure a rich and diverse literature exists concerning the distribution of labor incomes one approach namely that of human capital concentrates on lifetime accumulation paths of earnings capacity units human capital individual variations in human capital imply differences in earnings power thereby yielding strong implications concerning earnings distribution within a population despite its explanatory power the human capital model has been widely criticized one criticism centers on its inability to obtain inferences concerning occupational distribution the purpose of this paper is to alleviate at least some such criticism by applying the hedonic price approach so as to embed occupational choice into the human capital framework the significance is that neoclassical economic theory can be used to obtain implications concerning the determinants of occupational structure excerpt

does the market for women s labor need fixing t he difference in pay between men and women workers in the american economy is currently averaging 30 to 35 percent depending on the measure used underlying these large pay differences are the continuing segregation of work by sex a sparsity of promotions for women and differences in the respect accorded men and women low wages for women workers mean a low standard of living for the large and growing fraction of women who do not share the income of a husband and for the children who live with them because of their lack of access to all jobs on an equal basis women have a disproportionately small share of the interesting jobs of the jobs that allow a person to grow and to advance gains for working women are occurring but even assuming the continuation of the current rate of change the substantial equality of women and men in the labor market is decades away this article concerns the appropriate policy response to this situation some economists imply that the appropriate response is none at all they view the inferior labor market position of women as something women have freely chosen as a normal and generally benign adaptation to their responsibilities for housework and child rearing low wage work is seen as appropriate for people who behave as they do the laws against discrimination and the apparatus designed to enforce them are in this view superfluous or of minor value after all the discipline of the competitive marketplace has kept things fair and always will there is however considerable evidence for the alternative view that widespread severe ongoing discrimination by employers and fellow workers continues to hamper women if this is true systematic government action to interfere in the marketplace can be justified on grounds of equity and efficiency the question then arises as to the

regulating banks through market discipline a survey of the issues abstract the interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed new capital accord this paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation we start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms next a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced we evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have finally we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism in this respect the basle committee has taken the right approach

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

environmental values and the frame of reference abstract wants may be distinguished by the extent to which they are positional positional wants are determined by one s frame of reference defined by comparison with peer group consumption and by one s own previous consumption the growth in positional wants is not uniquely related to environmental resource depletion but the two do strongly overlap several implications follow first social reductions in positional consumption may yield environmental benefits at little cost to consumers the costs are however spread over time and depend on the rate of adaptation the strength of the social reference effect determines whether individuals are subject to an isolation or an assurance problem and hence the degree to which cuts need to be centrally imposed if they are to succeed it is suggested that the negative consequences of international positioning could be ameliorated by the replacement of conventional income accounts by a welfare index that more fully incorporates environmental costs secondly the neoclassical utility function can be regarded as a special case of the reference based welfare function provided that it is restricted to positive explanations of how momentary choices are made reference based preferences have more in common with the findings of psychologists and hence open a way to consilience between economics and natural science finally the frame of reference also allows a dynamic perspective to the debate on the commensurability of wants

banking as the provision of liquidity this article represents a model economy in which demand deposits represent the optimal financial intermediation because these demand deposits are backed in part by an illiquid asset the in termediary bank is subject to panics in which each agent ration ally decides to withdraw his deposits making all worse off banks ca n prevent panics only through a distortion of the optimal contract t he government can prevent panics without this distortion by guarantee ing the return from deposits the moral hazard introduced by this dep osit insurance induces the government to regulate the intermediary s portfolio and returns copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

normality solvency and portfolio choice this paper examines whether investors with power utility functions choose mean vari ance mv efficient portfolios when returns are approximately normally distributed and there is borrowing or lending at a riskless interest rate the results show that the unlevered portfolios of power utility investors plot very closely to the mv efficient frontier how ever there are marked differences in the mix of risky assets regardless of whether the portfolios are highly concentrated or widely diversified such differences allow power investors to remain solvent even when they lever their optimal portfolios to a greater ex tent than less risk averse mv investors who risk bankruptcy it is concluded that the investment policies of power utility and mv investors with similar risk aversion measures are not as similar as is commonly believed this is particularly true for high power inves tors unless explicit solvency constraints are imposed on the mv problem and for low power investors when quadratic utility approximations are made to the power utility func tions these differences in the investment policies of power utility and mv investors lead us to question the widely accepted assertion that the assumptions of homogeneous beliefs normality a riskless asset and risk averse investors imply the simple mv capm where all investors including power utility investors hold combinations ofthe market portfolio and the riskless asset

size and performance of banking firms testing the predictions of theory abstract in recent years two important literatures on the theory of banking firms have developed one examines the economic functions of banks in environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed another considers the incentive effects moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance both theories make predictions about the relation between banking firm size and performance an empirical analysis of large bank holding companies investigates measures of market valuation and risk of failure limited support is provided for either set of theoretical predictions

does ecological economics have a future contradiction and reinvention in the age of climate change abstract this paper addresses the role of neoclassical methodologies in ecological economics and the contradictions these methodologies pose to the field s critical founding principles we first consider robert costanza s treatment of nicholas stern s global deal and then survey climate change related articles published in this journal over the past five years this survey reveals how mainstream neoclassical methodologies dominate discourse and do so by marginalizing more critical political economy analyses this situation imperils the field s founding vision of a no growth steady state it also fails to address the related growth dynamics of capitalism without such a critical treatment the field s formal embrace of methodological pluralism actually entails an ideological empiricism that renders ecological economics theoretically incoherent this situation undermines the field s historical promise as an alternative economic paradigm ecological economics now faces a problematic future its survival in a form faithful to its founding vision will require an explicit choice to address its internal contradictions and reinvent itself in ways relevant to our contemporary context without such a choice ecological economics will likely succumb to an implicit acceptance of the hegemony of mainstream economic methodologies and their pro growth imperatives

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

earnings functions beyond human capital taking a short run view of the labour market where individuals with given levels of education have to be matched with jobs differing in level of complexity and difficulty wages are related to education and job levels in a sample of some 13 000 observations controlling for age experience and sex a model emphasizing both sides of the allocation process is favoured over the simple human capital view that ignores allocation once education is taken care of it is claimed that the long run human capital model can fruitfully be expanded with this short run allocation structure the empirical results measure the differences in earnings for individuals with given education working at different job levels and shows them to be substantial the relevance of adding job levels to the explanatory variables is illustrated with the case of female earnings discrimination and with differences in age earnings profiles between general and vocational education

the disciplinary role of takeovers this paper presents a theory of the disciplinary role of takeovers based on an explicit model of managerial incentive problems stemming from asymmetric information it is argued that an informed raider can reduce incentive problems by making managerial compensation more sensitive to information unavailable to shareholders the paper also highlights the importance of specifying the source of contractual inefficiencies when analyzing the effect of takeovers on incentives

evidence of bank market discipline in subordinated debenture yields 1983 1991 we examine debenture yields over the period 1983 1991 to evaluate the market s sensitivity to bank specific risks and conclude that investors have rationally reflected changes in the government s policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major u s banking firms an increasingly important issue in the regulation of financial institutions concerns the extent to which market investors can will recognize and control the risks of banking firms although the banking act of 1933 replaced some private risk bearing with federal deposit insurance legislators were reluctant to displace market discipline very extensively flood 1992 by the early 1980s however u s regulators had come to protect virtually all bank liability holders from credit losses most visibly at large banks which were deemed too big to fail sprague 1986 o hara and shaw 1990 this extension of the government safety net largely reflects a skepticism on the part of regulators that normal market forces could adequately identify and control bank risks while u s regulators have recently shown an increased willingness to let some bank investors bear default losses an official suspicion of the efficacy of market discipline remains widespread by contrast some prominent academic economists argue that market investors in bank debentures could provide timely and effective control over banking firms risk exposures and that the social cost of supervising banks would be lower if regulators ceded greater

emerging problems with the basel capital accord regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues in recent years securitization and other financial innovations have provided unprecedented opportunities for banks to reduce substantially their regulatory capital requirements with little or no corresponding reduction in their overall economic risks a process termed regulatory capital arbitrage these methods are used routinely to lower the eaective risk based capital requirements against certain portfolios to levels well below the basel capital accord s nominal 8 total risk based capital standard this paper discusses the principal techniques used to undertake capital arbitrage and the diaculties faced by bank supervisors in attempting to deal with these activities under the current capital framework 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the use of loan sales and standby letters of credit by commercial banks abstract this paper examines the incentives banks have to engage in off balance sheet activities such as commercial loan sales and the issuance of standby letters of credit slcs i show that loan sales and loans backed by slcs have payoff characteristics similar to secured debt like secured debt off balance sheet activities permit banks to sell a portion of the cash flows associated with new investment oppurtunities this ability permits banks to invest in loans with positive net present values that they would pass up if restricted to deposit financing an examination of the risk premium on large certificates of deposit provides evidence consistent with the model

a selectivity model of employer size wage differentials this article investigates wage differentials for employees of different size firms utilizing an econometric methodology that allows the size of employer to be treated as endogenous in the context of discrete ordered employer size data as a result we are able to estimate i employer size wage gaps which are corrected for selectivity bias and ii the magnitude and direction of the selection bias decompositions of the resulting wage differentials are computed with comparisons of the conditional on sorting across employer size and unconditional wage gaps

looking through the dataquadrate characterizing the human environment relationship through economic hedonic ecological and demographic measures abstract this paper introduces the concept of plotting four dimensional data in two dimensions without loss of information namely the dataquadrate concept here objects are represented as quadrates instead of points in a practical 4 axis cartesian coordinate system this procedure helps us imagine and analyze complex relations where four different non negative variables influence processes this tool is of high utility for analyzing specific human environment issues here we analyze a monetary measure gross domestic product gdp a hedonic measure subjective wellbeing a limiting measure ecological footprint and a demographic measure human population our system adds new insights to the de growth debate discussed in a journal of cleaner production special issue vol 18 2010 and systematically illuminates lots of confusing paradoxes such as the downward sloping part of the environmental kuznets curve the jevons paradox and the easterlin paradox in this paper all these phenomena are analyzed for the usa and for china in 1990 and in 2007 by utilizing such methodology when mitigating environmental problems we are not limited to negative restrictive messages but are enabled to create new strategic ways of problem solving about how to optimize the human celestial footprint the ratio of human wellbeing to human environmental load

firm and guarantor risk risk contagion and the interfirm spread among insured deposits we develop a model of third party guaranteed debt and show that interest rate premiums are multiplicatively related to firm and guarantor risk we apply the model to thrifts issuing cds guaranteed by the fslic and then estimate firm probabilities of insolvency and guarantor risk across 20 observed months this time period spans the insolvency of the guarantor followed by two recapitalizations the relative stability in firm risk across time offers no evidence of generalized risk contagion among firms we attribute elevated cd premiums and rate spreads to increases in guarantor risk rather than changes in firm risk on third party guaranteed debt the risk of both the issuing firm and guarantor determines the interest rate we show that the interest premium above the riskless treasury rate for guaranteed debt is multiplicatively related to two factors the probability of firm insolvency and the expected cost of an incomplete guarantor payoff we demonstrate that the presence of the guarantor obscures firm risk despite this our model provides the basis for measuring firm risk as well as guarantor risk we explain how different rates can exist on different firms debt with the same guarantor and how spreads among the different firms rates widen when the guarantor becomes riskier only a riskless guarantor causes the spreads to disappear our model fits nicely the case where savings and loans issue certificates of deposit cds and the guarantor is the government s deposit insuring agency the federal savings and loan insurance corporation fslic in this case the debt instrument the guarantor and the guarantee are the same for all the firms we apply the model over a 20 month period beginning in january 1987 when fol lowing hundreds of thrift failures the fslic announced its own insolvency the

capital markets and corporate control a study of france germany and the uk this paper examines the relation between capital markets and corporate control in france germany and the uk it compares levels of takeover activity in the three countries and describes the degree to which takeovers are associated with changes in corporate control the paper examines the influence of regulation on forms of corporate ownership and control it compares regulation pertaining to the rights of employees managers and shareholders in the three countries and finds that regulatory rules are related to patterns of ownership and control changes the paper suggests that a fundamental objective of control changes is to correct managerial failure and that takeovers are suited to the correction of particular classes of managerial failure that cannot be readily rectified by contracts thus markets with low levels of takeovers may suffer from a low level of correction of managerial failure however by changing ownership takeovers may give rise to an inability of owners to commit themselves to the long term interests of managers and employees as a consequence financial systems with active takeover markets may be associated with inadequate investment in firm specific assets and an unduly short term investment horizon there is therefore a tradeoff between alternative methods of correcting managerial failure this is particularly important for european countries facing an extension of uk takeover activity to the continent the process is being encouraged by the european commission which aims to harmonize regulation on a uk style takeover code harmonization of regulation may have far reaching consequences for the structure of different countries capital markets and in view of the tradeoff is of uncertain merit

beyond homo economicus evidence from experimental economics environmental policies are generally based on a model of the human actor taken from neoclassical economic theory this paper reports on laboratory experiments suggesting weaknesses in this model and describes alternative models correcting these weaknesses one finding is that economic actors tend to be hyperbolic as opposed to exponential discounters who discount the immediate future at a higher rate than the more distant future another finding is that economic actors are not self regarding but rather in many circumstances are strong reciprocators who come to strategic interactions with a propensity to cooperate respond to cooperative behavior by maintaining or increasing cooperation and respond to free riders by retaliating against the offenders even at a personal cost and even when there is no reasonable expectation that future personal gains will flow from such retaliation we discuss some implications for policy analysis 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

heterogeneous creditors and the market value of bank ldc loan portfolios abstract a standard proposition used in many empirical studies is that the value of an ldc loan does not depend on the identity of the lender i test this proposition using bank securities prices and prices for ldc loans trading in the secondary market i find significant cross sectional differences in the sensitivity of bank stocks to changes in the price of ldc loans differences in sensitivity appear to be related to changes in bank exposure to ldcs i also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that cds are implicitly insured

market discipline and bank subordinated debt note a lengthy literature in banking has addressed the question of whether the market prices of liabilities respond to individual bank risk taking activity that is whether any market disciplines exists however despite the obvious importance of this question the current record has led to no consensus on the issue results have been contradictory in this journal alone hannan and hanweck 1988 conclude that the market does extract at least some price for risk taking while avery belton and goldberg 1988 find no such evidence in this study we argue that this line of inquiry has a serious f law in that it fails to use theoretical models of bank instrument valuation to determine the appropriate testing of market discipline therefore the empirical models have lacked the necessary exactness to isolate the appropriate null hypotheses to redress this shortcoming and advance the methodology of this area of the literature we use a pricing model which comes to the banking area from the options pricing literature to look at the yield spread on bank liabilities using this model it is clear that the value of large uninsured bank liabilities cannot be described as a linear monotonic function of risk moreover current bank regulation affects the assumed role risk measures play in the pricing of such debt instruments both of these complications mean that simple regressions are not likely to adequately address the relationship between the value of debt and underlying risk in the final section we empirically investigate the presence of market discipline using contingent claims pricing we find that accounting measures of bank risk still have little predictive value in explaining yield spreads and therefore offer little evidence of meaningful market discipline

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

market discipline by thrift depositors this paper tests for the presence of depositor discipline by examining the effect of depository institutions risk on the pricing and growth of uninsured deposits the study analyzes a large panel of thrifts that includes detailed information on interest rate schedules this information allows the authors to develop a time consistent risk profile for thrifts their empirical findings support the presence of market discipline riskier banks are found to pay higher interest rates but attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits the authors also find that qualitative results are similar for fully insured deposits although statistical significance is substantially lower

does the debt market assess large banks risk time series evidence from money center cds abstract uninsured bank liabilities should offer a promised yield that compensates depositors for their expected default losses however the conjectural guarantees available to large u s banking firms makes it questionable whether large depositors should or do feel themselves exposed to credit risk prior papers have evaluated the determinants of bank risk premia using cross sectional data with relatively inconclusive results this paper investigates the same issue in a methodologically independent fashion using time series data on specific banks daily offering rates during the period may 1982 through july 1988 we find that cd rates paid by large money center banks include significant default risk premia

building an incentive compatible safety net abstract bank safety nets originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems have become an important destabilizing influence government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net

allocation and wage structure differences between men and women in this article allocation to job level and wage rates within job level are analysed in two consecutive steps with special reference to the differences between men and women to correct for selectivity bias in the wage equation a correction term based on the multinomial logit model as proposed by lee 1983 is used in both steps factors derived from human capital theory and the segmented labour market theory are allowed to assert their influence in addition the relevance of crowding heterogeneous human capital and personal and familial background is tested finally a comparison is made with earlier similar research for the netherlands this comparison highlights the importance of the connection between age experience and exposure another significant finding is that during the eighties larger firms have become a more attractive option for career oriented women

contagion and bank failures during the great depression the june 1932 chicago banking panic the authors examine the social costs of asymmetric information induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance their case study is the chicago bank panic of june 1932 the authors compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks copyright 1997 by american economic association

climate change economics and buddhism part 2 new views and practices for sustainable world economies abstract the evidence of impending and serious climate and other consequences of an expanding world economy based on fossil carbon energy continues to accumulate this two part paper examines the potential contribution of the world view and insights of buddhism to this search it presents both a conceptual and practical case that buddhism can help shape and move towards an alternative and effective paradigmatic basis for sustainable economies one capable of bringing about and maintaining genuine high welfare levels across the world s societies the first paper outlined a comprehensive analytical framework to identify the fundamental nature of anthropogenic climate change based on the integration of two of the most influential environmental analysis tools of recent decades the dpsir model and ipat equation the framework was then broadened to facilitate ideas from the buddhist world view by injecting two key missing aspects the interrelated role of 1 beliefs and values on goals and behavior and 2 the nature of well being or human happiness finally the principal linkages between this climate change analysis framework and buddhism were explored in this concluding paper the systems framework is used to demonstrate how buddhist and related world views can feed into appropriate and effective responses to the impending challenges of climate change this is undertaken by systematically presenting a specific if indicative list of relevant strategies informed by the understanding of interconnectedness and other basic principles about the nature of reality and human well being as proposed in buddhism

optimal regulation of deposit taking financial intermediaries abstract this paper analyses the case for special restrictions on the commercial decisions of deposit taking financial intermediaries the existence of asymmetric information between managers of intermediaries and depositors is shown to generate unregulated outcomes where equity capital is underutilised and lending is suboptimally low a form of regulation to correct this market failure is designed the form of regulation is a capital adequacy scheme of the same kind as those used by bank regulators this is an important result because such schemes have lacked a theoretical underpinning even those who have viewed capital requirements as justifiable have assumed that they will reduce the level of intermediation this paper shows that this is not generally the case the ways in which optimal capital adequacy rules differ from the regulations currently used by banking supervisors is also analysed

an empirical test of the incentive effects of deposit insurance the case of junk bonds at savings and loan associations this paper analyzes how financial markets reacted to s l diversification into junk bonds the authors report that junk bond holdings are positively correlated with both the volatility of s l equity returns and the interest rates paid on large cds next they examine the impact of junk bonds on equity returns for poorly capitalized s ls greater risk taking increases the value of deposit insurance and should lead to higher stock returns however a well capitalized institution that increases junk bond holdings should not experience stock price gains the authors find that this is the case for the sample of s ls they studied copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

deposit insurance and wealth effects the value of being too big to fail this paper investigates the effect on bank equity values of the comptroller of the currency s announcement that some banks were too big to fail and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided using an event study methodology we find positive wealth effects accruing to tbtf banks with corresponding negative effects accruing to non included banks we demonstrate that the magnitude of these effects differed with bank solvency and size we also show that the policy to which the market reacted was that suggested by the wall street journal and not that actually intended by the comptroller the role of deposit insurance has become a topic of increasing debate advocates argue that by removing the incentive to run deposit insurance protects individual financial institutions from instability in the intermediation process thereby providing stability to the financial system as a whole 1 the recent rise in bank failures and the concomitant crises in the s l industry however demonstrate that this stability is not guaranteed moreover critics note that deposit insurance may introduce incentive problems and wealth effects into the financial system both of which can impede the effective functioning of any deposit insurance system these problems have prompted concern about the structure of the current deposit insurance system and have led to numerous proposals regarding its restructuring 2 this paper investigates one aspect of this debate by analyzing the effect on bank equity values of the policy decision to insure completely some banks but not others specifically in september 1984 the comptroller of the currency testified before congress that some banks were simply too big to fail tbtf and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided while not explicitly naming the banks the comptroller admitted that this policy would apply to the eleven largest banks using an event study methodology we analyze