educational mismatch work outcomes and entry into entrepreneurship a growing body of research explores how employees organizational context shapes their entrepreneurial activity we add to this work by examining how educational mismatch when a job does not utilize the skills an employee has acquired during education relates to subsequent transitions into entrepreneurship while prior research has focused on mismatch due to labor market frictions workers may also enter mismatches for other reasons such as family obligations or a change in career interests different reasons in turn may relate in distinct ways to wages and job satisfaction and thus to the opportunity costs of entering entrepreneurship moreover mismatch may also affect human capital development including the formation of a broader range of skills that is beneficial in entrepreneurship using longitudinal data from over 25 000 scientists and engineers we document a broad range of reasons for educational mismatch and show that the relationships between educational mismatch and wages job satisfacti

the empirical content of the roy model this paper clarifies and extends the classical roy model of self selection and earnings inequality the original roy model based on the assumption that log skills are normally distributed is shown to imply that pursuit of comparative advantage in a free market reduces earnings inequality compared to the earnings distribution that would result if workers were randomly assigned to sectors aggregate log earnings are right skewed even if one sectoral distribution is left skewed most major implications of the log normal roy model survive if differences in skills are log concave however few implications of the model survive if skills are generated from more general distributions we consider the identifiability of the roy model from data on earnings distributions the normal theory version is identifiable without regressors or exclusion restrictions sectoral distributions can be identified knowing only the aggregate earnings distribution for general skill distributions the model is not identified and has no empirical content with sufficient price variation the model can be identified from multimarket data cross sectional variation in regressors can substitute for price variation in restoring empirical content to the roy model

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

allocation of individuals to job levels under rationing summary we augment an ordered response model for the job level at which individuals desire to work with allowance for individual reporting of a discrepancy between actual and desired job level and we also investigate possible biases from restricting the observations to the employed and omitting the unemployed we find that the latter bias can be ignored and interpret this as evidence that the unemployed are not choosier than the employed people claiming inadequate capability utilization are not markedly differently allocated than those claiming a proper match women s lower job levels cannot be explained from rationing by capability utilization

job choice in academia the asymmetric international mobility of talented scientists is well documented yet there is little evidence about the reasons why scientists choose particular jobs building on an extended human capital model of science we unify a dispersed literature relevant for job choice to formulate hypotheses which we test in a unique international quasi experiment among more than 10 000 researchers we find that attractive jobs satisfy researchers taste for science and increase their expected scientific productivity responding to both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in particular while salaries research funding and working with stimulating peers matter we provide unique estimates of the importance of organisational and institutional factors early stage researchers are willing to trade off a substantial amount of salary for early independence and tenure perspectives later stage researchers favour jobs which make it easy to take up new lines of research research only positions are considered as less attractive than jobs with a moderate amount of teaching our findings have important implications for the organisational design of research universities and the competitiveness of european science in light of the brain drain of highly talented scientists towards the u s

self selection bias in longitudinal estimation of wage gaps cross sectional regression analyses of wage gaps may be biased by omission of unobserved worker characteristics recent studies therefore have used longitudinal data to difference out the effects of such variables this paper however shows that self selection of job changers may cause longitudinal estimation of wage gaps to be inconsistent

ability and power over production in the distribution of earnings t he aggregate distribution of earnings in all western countries is approximately lognormal over most of its range but the earnings of the top 10 or 20 of individuals follow the pareto form which generates a great excess of very high earnings compared with the tail of a lognormal distribution individuals at the top appear to be paid according to the job they perform rather than their ability this paper explains these features in terms of profit maximising behaviour from time to time a single new manager or management team improves a company s profit by millions of dollars per year this shows that a senior manager can influence the company s total output far more than a junior employee his greater influence over output derives from having much more control over the company s resources profit maximising companies offer high salaries for senior management jobs because even a small improvement in their performance leads to a worthwhile increase in output and competitive bidding for the best managers then drives their salaries up to high levels this in outline is the explanation for high earnings developed formally in the rest of this paper

how the market solves an assignment problem the matching of lawyers with legal claims in the market for lawyers observable data on promotion and turnover can be explained by reference to the idea that there is positive assortative mating of lawyers and legal claims there is a scale of resources effect under which it is optimal to assign larger claims to lawyers of higher quality in a law firm the institution of tenure performs a sorting function lawyers found to be of high quality are given tenured positions and the rest leave the value of legal claims handled by a firm determines its sorting problem which in turn determines its promotion ladder and turnover

learning about the nature of production from equilibrium assignment patterns this paper exploits empirically a key insight from lucas 1978 and rosen 1982 that the organization of production and the distribution of earnings across individuals are jointly determined by the equilibrium assignment of individuals to firms and hierarchical positions we study how different classes of production functions generate alternative equilibrium assignments we then use confidential census data on u s law offices to investigate the form that the production function should take to rationalize earnings patterns in legal services we argue that earnings patterns in this industry are consistent with a production function that is characterized by asymmetric sensitivity to the skill of agents in different organizational positions complementarity between managers and workers skill and scale effects in individual skill

does salaried status affect human capital accumulation human capital studies do not usually consider whether an individual is paid an hourly wage or a salary the authors of this paper develop a conceptual framework that explains why some workers are p

on the optimal realignment of a contest the case of college football this article examines the relationship between demand and scheduling in college football we first derive two different metrics for team quality and then use those metrics to see how they impact attendance we find that there is a positive interaction between the quality of the teams then various simulations are run to see how attendance would change under different scheduling scenarios if teams are put into conferences based on the team quality measures the average per game attendance only rises 1 2 this is true if 1 year or 10 year quality measures are used however our simulation suggests that this effect would be more than offset mainly because schools with larger capacity would play fewer home games and so aggregate attendance would fall we discuss whether this effect would be mitigated by capacity adjustments in the longer term jel l83 z20 c78

academic freedom private sector focus and the process of innovation we develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private sector research rather than relying on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research we emphasize control rights considerations and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus by serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests academia can be indispensable for early stage research at the same time the private sector s ability to direct scientists toward higher payoff activities makes it more attractive for later stage research

endogenous matching in university industry collaboration theory and empirical evidence from the united kingdom we use a two sided matching framework to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms we consider both horizontal and vertical characteristics those related to affinity e g preferences for a type of scientific research and those related to ability e g capacity to produce high quality scientific output we build a unique data set based on the teams of academics and firms that proposed research projects to the uk s engineering and physical sciences research council our results are suggestive of positive assortative matching in terms of ability and type while the matching is negative assortative in terms of their interactions the most able and the most applied academics are the ones that are more likely to propose collaborative as opposed to noncollaborative projects data are available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2016 2680 this paper was accepted by david hsu entrepreneurship and innovation

research productivity over the life cycle evidence for academic scientists the relationship between age and the publishing productivity of ph d scientists is analyzed using data from the survey of doctorate recipients national research council and the science citation index the longitudinal nature of the data allows for the identification of pure aging effects in five of the six areas studied life cycle aging effects are present only in particle physics where scientists often speak of being on a religious quest is the indication that scientific productivity is not investment motivated vintage effects are also considered the expectation that the latest educated are the most productive is not generally supported by the data copyright 1991 by american economic association

worker allocation hierarchies and the wage distribution economists have traditionally viewed the allocation of workers among jobs through the concept of comparative advantage this paper investigates hierarchical production models which display an absence of comparative advantage in order to demonstrate that for hierarchical production there is a second allocating factor which plays an important role two results are found first the allocation of workers among jobs tends to match high ability workers with positions which value ability highly second despite the fact that the models display an absence of comparative advantage i e the standard theoretical explanation for why wage distributions might be skewed the models wage distributions are skewed to the right relative to the underlying ability distributions

social responsibility messages and worker wage requirements field experimental evidence from online labor marketplaces this paper examines the effects of employer social responsibility on the wages workers demand through randomized field experiments in two online labor marketplaces workers were recruited for short term jobs and i manipulated whether or not they received information about the employer s social responsibility i then observed the payment workers were willing to accept for the job in the first experiment information about the employer s social responsibility marginally reduced prospective workers wage requirements on average and had a significant effect on the highest performers who were willing to give up the wage differential they would otherwise demand in the second prospective workers submitted 44 lower wage bids for the same job after learning about the employer s social responsibility this paper provides causal empirical evidence of a revealed preference for social responsibility in the workplace and of a greater preference among the highest performers more broadly it provides evidence that

industry or academia basic or applied career choices and earnings trajectories of scientists we extend life cycle models of human capital investments by incorporating matching theory to examine the sorting pattern of heterogeneous scientists into different career trajectories we link differences in physical capital investments and complementarities between basic and applied scientists across industry and academic settings to individual differences in scientist ability and preferences to predict an equilibrium matching of scientists to careers and to their earnings evolution our empirical analysis using the national science foundation s scientists and engineers statistical data system database is consistent with theoretical predictions of i sorting by ability into basic versus applied science among academic scientists but not among industry scientists and ii sorting by higher taste for nonmonetary returns into academia over industry the evolution of an earnings profile is consistent with these sorting patterns the earnings trajectories of basic and applied scientists are distinct from each other in academia but are similar in industry this paper was accepted by lee fleming entrepreneurship and innovation

when is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods abstract using the homogeneous of degree zero inverse congestion quality function employed most frequently in the literature we characterise completely the families of utility functions which are then necessary and sufficient for break even utilitarian welfare maximising provision of club goods with self selection to be separable from distribution two types of separation involving alternatively a the price and quality b the price quality facility size and total utilisation are considered when separation is possible utility functions and optimal decisions take simple intuitive forms our results extend the scope of separation results previously obtained only for pure public goods journal of economic literature classification numbers d62 h23 h40

time salary and incentive payoffs in labor contracts time hourly payoffs and salary the payoff does not vary with hours account for the bulk of the payoffs on labor contracts this article argues that the choice between time and salary centers on the presence time or absence salary of information about flows of effort or output per unit time without information about the flow of hourly effort or output payoffs for time give the worker an incentive to supply hours without effort time can then become uninformative about output in this situation if the contract includes a fixed payoff it is likely to be a salary rather than a payoff for time

the importance of bundling in a gorman lancaster model of earnings the idea that the labor market of individuals can be decomposed into payments to separate productive attributes has an enduring appeal in economics assuming that demographic groups differ only in their endowments of productive characteristics it is possible to rationalize observed demographic earnings differentials without invoking the arguments that characteristics specific to a particular demographic group are direct objects of employer demand by aggregating skills over all demographic groups it is possible to produce a theory of the market determination of the prices of skills held in different amounts by different demographic groups this paper considers conditions under which characteristics are uniformly priced across sectors of a multisector economy the paper presents empirical evidence that rejects uniform pricing of characteristics as a description of the us labor market bundling may account for this evudence but other hypotheses do as well authors

frictional assignment i efficiency abstract this paper examines the two sided matching problem where the agents on each side of the market are heterogeneous and the matching process is time consuming this is cast in a labor market setting where workers of different skills match with different machine qualities i characterize the efficient allocation and then show that it can be decentralized by a market mechanism the efficient assignment is not always positively assortative despite the fact that machine qualities and skills are complementary in production to decentralize the efficient allocation the market mechanism requires the firms to post wages and commit each machine quality to a particular skill implications on wage inequality are briefly examined journal of economic literature classification numbers j31 e24 j64

pay technology and the cost of worker absence i introduction the complexity of patterns of worker absence is well known but is yielding reluctantly to studies that use highly detailed information about individual workers and their work environments to date these studies have focussed on how specific contractual details affect worker absenteeism rates 1 in this paper we instead take an equilibrium perspective where we assume heterogeneous firms and heterogeneous workers participate in a competitive labor market by understanding why firms with different technologies may have different policies toward absenteeism we can begin to explain observed differences in absenteeism rates across workers and firms the empirical framework is based on coles and treble 1996 which considers an equilibrium assignment model with heterogeneous firms and workers the standard assignment framework 2 assumes that each filled job is characterized by one machine of quality q and one employee with skill level s a competitive equilibrium yields a wage schedule w and an assignment rule q where a worker of skill s is hired at wage w w s by a firm holding machine q q s coles and treble 1996 do not assume that workers are differently skilled instead workers have different propensities to go absent also instead of a one worker one machine production process firms utilize different production technologies some use an assembly line technology where output requires that a sufficient number of workers show up for work and others use a linear production technology in which there are constant marginal returns to labor for reasons that will become clear a competitive equilibrium yields a wage schedule and an assignment rule that depend on worker propensities to go absent specifically workers with a lower propensity to go absent earn a higher wage and are employed in firms using assembly line technologies the key insight is that firms who operate assembly line technologies have a different shadow cost of absenteeism from those which operate a linear technology as in weiss 1985 and coles and treble 1993 in the latter technology an absence by one particular worker does not affect the marginal productivity of other workers at the firm this is not true in an assembly line firm or in production functions where labor inputs are strict complements as in kremer 1993 coles and treble 1996 consider a market equilibrium in which workers are also heterogeneous say workers have different family responsibilities in this case a competitive labor market implies equilibrium sorting by firms and workers assembly line firms require a low level of absenteeism and pay a relatively high wage to compensate workers for attending work reliably we refer to this as the shadow cost of absenteeism workers who have a comparative advantage in attending work reliably say those who do not have to look after children when the children are sick take employment in assembly line firms and enjoy the wage premium attached to employment there we refer to this as the shadow price of absenteeism conversely those who appreciate greater flexibility in work attendance take employment in the linear technology firms and in equilibrium earn a lower average wage rate although absenteeism may be costly to firms observed absenteeism rates are not necessarily inefficient the worker who misses a day at work to look after sick children or enjoy a sports event is expressing a trade off between workplace production and home production where home productivity is perhaps subject to idiosyncratic shocks efficient contracting implies that firms and workers agree to an acceptable absenteeism rate and a compensating wage differential efficient sorting implies that those workers who can commit to attending work reliably accept employment in assembly line occupations and so earn a wage premium reflecting the shadow price of absenteeism our goal is to identify and measure this shadow price using a unique data set from france

why do firms do basic research with their own money abstractthe question to be addressed is why do private firms perform basic research with their own money interest in this question derives from both analytical and utilitarian considerations there is empirical evidence in the united states which provides the main context for this paper supporting the view that basic research makes a significant contribution to the productivity growth of the economy 4 7 it is widely held that social returns from basic research are significant and higher than private returns and it is for this reason that most such activities continue to be financed by the taxpayer this also implies that measures aimed at increasing basic research by the private sector will be welfare improving in the united states the federal government in the years since the second world war has provided the vast majority of all funds devoted to basic research although the federal share has been declining in recent years and although that share is at its lowest level in about 20 years it still constitutes about two thirds of the total 10 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

firms choice of method of pay using data from the bls industry wage survey the author tests the theory that firms choose their methods of pay by balancing the gains from more precise links between performance and pay against m

12 million salaried workers are missing evidence from current population surveys various cohorts of the national longitudinal surveys and the panel study of income dynamics suggests that the fraction of american employees who were paid salaries held constant from the late 1960s through the late 1970s and continued to hold constant or perhaps fell slightly thereafter through the late 1990s an analysis that accounts for the changing industrial occupational demographic and economic structure of the work force shows that this fraction was 9 percentage points below what would have been expected in the late 1970s this shortfall is not explained by growth in the temporary help industry declining unionization institutional changes in overtime or wage payment regulation the increasing openness of american labor and product markets or convergence of nonwage aspects of hourly and salaried employment the author suggests several alternative explanations

seniority wages and productivity a turbulent decade why does a worker s wage tend to grow with seniority in the firm and what does this have to do with productivity two decades ago neoclassical labor economists thought that the theory of human capital provided a good answer to this question the last decade has however been one of puzzles and doubt at this point few would give an unambiguous answer and much hinges on the answer an attractive feature of human capital theory is that it yields a consistent and coherent explanation for several aspects of the employer employee relationship for example seniority systems layoff policies that vary with skill and the relationship between tenure and turnover can be explained in terms of human capital the fact that these explanations are connected leads however to something like a domino effect doubts about one cast doubt on the others if the human capital explanation for the wage seniority relationship is flawed then human capital explanations for other phenomena may require reevaluation in addition an important body of empirical research is built around the assumption that at any point in time a person s wage indicates the person s productivity included here is the extensive literature on the human capital earnings function as well as work on labor demand market discrimination and compensating differentials that assumption has become controversial in recent years in part because implicit contract theories predict that compensation will be redistributed over the period of the contract if a person s spot wage has little to do with spot productivity but rather is an instrument of a complex insurance or deferred compensation scheme then a reassessment of the empirical research may be necessary

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

who makes who breaks which scientists stay in academe we examine the survival of young scientists in academe the propensity to leave follows an inverse u shape publishing increases and patenting decreases the chance of survival scientists with strong preferences for business are less likely to stay in academe

what is benefit taxation abstract benefit taxation is a system in which individuals are taxed according to the benefits they receive from public expenditures this paper describes an alternative to the standard lindahl method of determining the distribution of individual benefits from government provided public goods and uses this alternative to calculate benefit taxes this alternative avoids some of the paradoxial features of lindahl pricing and generates outcomes in which all consumers benefit from reduced costs of providing public goods an illustrative calculation shows that benefit taxes defined in this way may be quite regressive

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

self selection and the distribution of hourly wages this article formulates and estimates alternative equilibrium models of industrial wage determination and self selection in explaining industrial wage differentials we find that it is important to account for heterogeneous sector specific skills and self selection decisions by agents concerning their sector of employment the classical roy model is rejected so is an efficiency units model of the labor market a revised roy model that accounts for comparative advantage in the choice of industrial sectors and choice between market and nonmarket work is much more successful in explaining cross section wage distributions and their evolution over time

education matching and the allocative value of romance societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non market goods such as marital partnerships we explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labour supply decisions of partnered couples we consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt these generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy while marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market the analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross country differences in educational investments and labour force participation based on matching regimes

marriage markets and assortative mating with household public goods theoretical results and empirical implications this paper analyzes marriage market equilibria when the gains from marriage result from joint consumption of household public goods assuming transferable utility within marriage the paper proves that marriage markets will be characterized by positive assortative mating on wealth when spouses differ only in endowments and the gains to marriage result only from public goods when spouses differ in wages and household public goods are produced at home the results imply offsetting effects with public good economies creating an incentive for positive assortative mating on wages and gains from specialization creating an incentive for negative assortative mating on wages the results help explain the persistent lack of empirical support for becker s prediction of negative assortative mating on wages and have implications for empirical analysis of all joint living arrangement decisions

market provision of price excludable public goods a general analysis the demand distribution is employed as a novel and powerful basis for analyzing monopoly provision of price excludable public goods and could be used to analyze other market structures or in some circumstances private goods provision for uniform per unit all or none two part and multipart pricing we identify characteristics of revenue functions relative profitability and operational procedures for selecting price output levels under all these strategies rationing of some consumers by output is required and a positive price output relationship may arise in general the revenue ranking of pricing strategies is sensitive to the distribution of demand and though multipart pricing can be expected to be revenue dominant uniform per unit pricing emerges as a surprisingly robust strategy even before operational complexity is fully taken into account

a note on aggregation of skills and labor quality we use a unique new data set that combines data on individual workers and their employers to estimate marginal productivity differentials among different types of workers we then compare these to estimated relative wages leading to new evidence on

empirical analysis of occupational hierarchies using data on u s engineers and the position of engineering jobs within firms this paper estimates a model of hierarchies within firms the model extends rosen s 1982 model of recursive production to two skills and multiple hierarchy levels the model generates an empirical model that is nested within a general roy 1951 model of self selection maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the production technology and the skill experience profiles are estimated the results suggest that approximately two thirds of changes in employment shares across hierarchy levels across time are explained by demographic shifts in the stock of engineering skills most of the returns to experience and to assignment to higher hierarchy levels within firms are caused by skill accumulation and self selection rather than technological dierences across hierarchy levels

competition for talent country and organizational level effects in the internationalization of european higher education institutions this paper analyzes the competition for skilled human resources between european higher education institutions hei through a multi level model predicting their ability to attract foreign researchers predictions of the model are tested on a dataset on internationalization of 601 heis in 8 european countries we show that 1 the model is able to explain a large proportion of the variance in the levels of internationalization of academic staff between heis 2 country factors are more important than heis characteristics in driving internationalization 3 research oriented heis in attractive countries have a larger share of international staff whereas this happens only to a limited extent with similar heis in low attractive countries 4 the association of research orientation with internationalization is mediated by the hei s international network these results have relevant implications for hei s hiring strategies as well as for national policies concerning careers and the mobility of researchers we suggest that policies should be tailored to structural conditions of heis and countries whereas imitating the approaches of highly attractive places might be damaging less attractive countries should rather focus on training and career opportunities for young national researchers as well as on instruments to keep linkages with national expatriates

heterogeneous firms and the organization of production firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm this input must be allocated to two activities coordinating production and monitoring workers able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring a dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities the design of products and the organization of production the monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

hourly versus salaried payment and decisions about trading time and money over time using longitudinal data from the british household panel survey the authors examine how individuals employment compensation salaried or hourly affects their decisions to trade time for money res

privatizing the intellectual commons universities and the commercialization of biotechnology abstract this paper analyzes universities recent attempts to adapt their policies and organizational arrangements in order to accommodate the commercialization of university biotechnology research we argue that these attempts have been severely hampered because internal and external parties have sought to enforce universities adherence to their historic commitment to create and sustain an intellectual commons for the benefit of society at large the standardized organizational arrangements universities maintain to administer this intellectual commons have also served to impede adaptive efforts we conclude that social contractual commitments and organizational standards can significantly affect the shape and outcome of negotiations over property rights and can place important limits on the scope of organizations potentially leading to the generation of new organizational forms

field of study earnings and self selection why do individuals choose different types of post secondary education and what are the labor market consequences of those choices we show that answering these questions is difficult because individuals choose between several unordered alternatives even with a valid instrument for every type of education instrumental variables estimation of the payoffs require information about individuals ranking of education types or strong additional assumptions like constant effects or restrictive preferences these identification results motivate and guide our empirical analysis of the choice of and payoff to field of study our context is norway s post secondary education system where a centralized admission process covers almost all universities and colleges this process creates credible instruments from discontinuities which effectively randomize applicants near unpredictable admission cutoffs into different fields of study at the same time it provides us with strategy proof measures of individuals ranking of fields taken together this allows us to estimate the payoffs to different fields while correcting for selection bias and keeping the next best alternatives as measured at the time of application fixed we find that different fields have widely different payoffs even after accounting for institutional differences and quality of peer groups for many fields the payoffs rival the college wage premiums suggesting the choice of field is potentially as important as the decision to enroll in college the estimated payoffs are consistent with individuals choosing fields in which they have comparative advantage we also test and reject assumptions of constant effects or restrictive preferences suggesting that information on next best alternatives is essential to identify payoffs to field of study