why are taxes so high in egalitarian societies in an analysis of the relative income or relative consumption hypothesis it is shown that if the ratio of agent i s consumption to agent j s consumption enters into the utility function a tax on labor income may increase welfare for all agents if pretax wage inequality is low all agents will unanimously be in favor of such a tax thus there will be a tendency for taxes to be high in societies where pretax wage inequality is low copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

comparing optima do simplifying assumptions affect conclusions consider a family of maximization models in which the optimum trades off beneficial and costly effects then comparative statics derived under many kinds of simplifying assumptions about the benefits technology are also true for general convex and nonconvex technologies for example any comparative statics conclusion about investment by a risk averse decision maker under uncertainty that holds when expected returns are described by a general linear function also holds for an arbitrary nonlinear expected return function

wars and state capacity the article builds a simple model to investigate how different types of armed conflict shape fiscal capacity the state s ability to raise revenue from taxes it starts from the simple observation

tax policy and aggregate demand management under catching up with the joneses this paper examines the role for tax policies in productivity shock driven economies with catching up with the joneses utility functions the optimal tax policy is shown to affect the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes i e cooling down the economy with higher taxes when it is overheating in booms and stimulating the economy with lower taxes in recessions to keep consumption up thus models with catching up with the joneses utility functions call for traditional keynesian demand management policies but for rather unorthodox reasons

an equilibrium model of wealth distribution i present an explicitly solved equilibrium model for the distribution of wealth and income in an incomplete markets economy i flrst propose a self insurance model with an inter temporally dependent preference uzawa 1968 lucas and stokey 1984 and obstfeld 1990 i then derive an analytical consumption rule which captures stochastic precautionary saving motive and generates stationary wealth accumulation finally i provide a complete characterization for the equilibrium cross sectional distribution of wealth and income in closed form by developing a recursive formulation for the moments of the distribution of wealth and income using this recursive formulation i show that income persistence and the degree of wealth mean reversion are the main determinants of wealth income correlation and relative dispersions of wealth to income such as skewness and kurtosis ratios between wealth and income

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

a resolution of the equity premium puzzle abstract the introduction of a simple non time additive utility function can explain the equity premium puzzle noted by mehra and prescott with a reasonable value for the relative risk aversion coefficient

political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments taxation in democracies and dictatorships recent political and economic transformations in latin america africa asia and eastern europe have brought about a renewed interest in the incentives and capabilities of different types of political regimes to implement policies that are deemed necessary for economic development in particular policies aimed at increasing tax revenue one central question is whether democracies can collect as much in taxes as dictatorships this article addresses this question by examining whether regime type classified as democracy or dictatorship has a causal impact on a government s capacity to mobilize resources through taxation on the basis of data gathered for 108 countries for the period between 1970 and 1990 the article concludes that observed differences across countries regarding the level of taxes collected by the government are not due to the fact that some are under a democracy and others under a dictatorship concerns about the inability of democratic regimes to collect taxes are therefore unfounded

labor market matching with precautionary savings and aggregate fluctuations we analyze a bewley huggett aiyagari incomplete markets model with labor market frictions consumers are subject to idiosyncratic employment shocks against which they cannot insure directly the labor market has a diamond mortensen pissarides structure firms enter by posting vacancies and match with workers bilaterally with match probabilities given by an aggregate matching function wages are determined through nash bargaining we also consider aggregate productivity shocks and a complete set of contingent claims conditional on this risk we use the model to evaluate a tax financed unemployment insurance scheme higher insurance is beneficial for consumption smoothing but because it raises workers outside option value it discourages firm entry we find that the latter effect is more potent for welfare outcomes we tabulate the effects quantitatively for different kinds of consumers we also demonstrate that productivity changes in the model in steady state as well as stochastic ones generate rather limited unemployment effects unless workers are close to indifferent between working and not working thus recent findings are corroborated in our more general setting

cities constitutions and sovereign borrowing in europe 1274 1785 this article investigates the politics of sovereign borrowing in europe over the very long run i consider three alternative hypotheses regarding the sources of borrower credibility according to the first european states with constitutional checks on executive authority found it easier to obtain credit at low interest rates than did states that lacked such constraints my second hypothesis focuses on state type city state versus territorial state and the way in which this may have influ enced the balance of political power between owners of land and owners of capital in a society this hypothesis suggests that after controlling for other factors one should observe that city states in europe found it easier to borrow than did larger territorial states and that these city states paid lower interest rates on their debt finally my third hypothesis suggests that borrower credibility depended on the simultaneous presence of both constitutional checks and balances and a city state when one con siders a broad sample of cases over a long time span there is strong support for the proposition involving city states and merchant power but less support for the argu ment that constitutional checks influenced credibility regardless of state type city state or territorial state there is however some empirical evidence of an interaction effect whereby constitutional constraints on rulers made city states particularly cred ible as borrowers my results are robust to a number of controls for alternative deter minants for sample selection bias and for the endogeneity of city state development one of the most frequently cited recent arguments about european state develop ment involves the effect of constitutional checks and balances on economic per formance in areas where political institutions placed constraints on rulers scholars have argued that property rights were more secure which helped stimulate invest ment innovation and growth authors have suggested that checks and balances also facilitated long term borrowing by governments since creditors found it less likely that constrained rulers would default on loans easier access to loans at low interest rates gave some states an advantage in international competition the con trasting cases of great britain and france provide a popular illustration of the

politics and economics in weak and strong states abstract while much research in political economy points out the benefits of limited government political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less developed nations by weak states which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non state actors i construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self interested ruler who tries to divert resources for his own consumption but who can also invest in socially productive public goods both weak and strong states create distortions when the state is excessively strong the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled when the state is excessively weak the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods i show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state i e its ability to raise taxes and its political power i e its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens i also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium which i refer to as consensually strong state equilibrium can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods the consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in oecd countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government

minimum wage legislation and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistribution the use of minimum wages and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistributing income is analyzed the government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two types of individuals who differ in ability the effect of introducing a minimum wage which induces involuntary unemployment will be to improve social welfare under weak conditions circumstances under which combining unemployment insurance with the minimum wage will be welfare improving are also considered

habit formation in consumption and its implications for monetary policy models this paper explores a monetary policy model with habit formation for consumers in which consumers utility depends in part on current consumption relative to past consumption the empirical tests developed in the paper show that one can reject the hypothesis of no habit formation with tremendous condence largely because the habit formation model captures the gradual hump shaped response of real spending to various shocks the paper then embeds the habit consumption specication in a monetary policy model and nds that the responses of both spending and inflation to monetary policy actions are signicantly improved by this modication jel d12 e52 e43

decentralized coercion and self restraint in provincial taxation the ottoman empire 15th 16th centuries abstract for technological reasons the central administration of a state may want to entrust to provincial delegates the dual tasks of extracting provincial resources and converting them into coercive force this article establishes that the coercive threat that the delegates pose may make the administration cap the amount they extract the cap will cause the state not to internalize the marginal benefits of provincial economic development it will also induce inefficient economic policies the identified institutional setup is consistent with the political regime economic policy and legislation of the ottoman empire during its classical age

war international finance and fiscal capacity in the long run in this article i revisit the relationship between war and state making in modern times by focusing on two prominent types of war finance taxes and foreign loans financing war with tax money enhances the capacity to assess wealth and monitor compliance namely fiscal capacity tax financed war facilitates the adoption of power sharing institutions which transform taxation into a non zero sum game carrying on the effect of war in the long run financing war with external capital does not contribute to long term fiscal capacity if borrowers interrupt debt service and as part of the default settlement war debt is condoned or exchanged for nontax revenue the empirical evidence draws from war around the world as early as 1816 results suggest that globalization of capital markets in the nineteenth century undermined the association between war state making and political reform

war making and state making governmental expenditures tax revenues and global wars addressing the disputed relationship between war and the expansion of governmental expenditures and revenues box tiao intervention models are applied to a number of british 1700 1980 united states 1792 1980 french 1815 1979 and japanese 1878 1980 spending and taxation series distinguishing between global and interstate wars the more intensive and extensive bouts of warfare global wars tend to bring about abrupt permanent impacts in contrast to the temporary changes associated with most interstate wars the observed displacements are reflected in both war related and nonwar related types of expenditure and are also observed before 1900 although our findings are not universally applicable and are subject to various other qualifications they may be interpreted in general as reinforcing the need for an appreciation of the persistent centrality of war especially global war in the discontinuous growth and expansion of the modern state

consumption versus expenditure previous authors have documented a dramatic decline in food expenditures at the time of retirement we show that this is matched by an equally dramatic rise in time spent shopping for and preparing meals using a novel data set that collects detailed food diaries for a large cross section of u s households we show that neither the quality nor the quantity of food intake deteriorates with retirement status we also show that unemployed households experience a decline in food expenditure and food consumption commensurate with the impact of job displacement on permanent income these results highlight how direct measures of consumption distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated shocks to income whereas measures of expenditures obscure the distinction

inventories and money holdings in a search economy the authors analyze a continuous time model with a walrasian labor market and a random search retail market with prices set on a take it or leave it basis the equilibrium distribution of money holdings is the asymptotic steady state of this stochastic process there is a unique uniform price steady state equilibrium the faster the search process the higher the absolute price wage and real wage the instantaneous effect of an equal per capita infusion of money is to raise the price wage real wage and transactions rate the immediate post infusion price and wage can overshoot their new asymptotic values copyright 1990 by the econometric society

different paths to the modern state in europe the interaction between warfare economic structure and political regime theoretical work on taxation and state building borrows heavily from early modern european experience while a number of european states increased centralized tax revenues during this period for others revenues stagnated or even declined and these variations have motivated alternative arguments for the determinants of fiscal and state capacity this study reviews the arguments concerning the three determinants that have received most attention namely warfare economic structure and political regime and tests them by making use of a new and comprehensive tax revenue dataset our main finding is that these three determinants worked in interaction with each other specifically when under pressure of war it was representative regimes in more urbanized commercial economies and authoritarian regimes in more rural agrarian economies that tended to better aggregate domestic interests towards state building

human capital and unemployment dynamics why more educated workers enjoy greater employment stability why do more educated workers experience lower unemployment rates and lower employment volatility empirically these workers have similar job finding rates but much lower and less volatile separation rates than their less educated peers we argue that on the job training being complementary to formal education is the reason for this pattern using a search and matching model with endogenous separations we show that investments in match specific human capital reduce incentives to separate but leave the job finding rate essentially unaffected the model generates unemployment dynamics quantitatively consistent with the data finally we provide novel empirical evidence supporting the mechanism studied in the paper this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

the role of unemployment insurance in an economy with liquidity constraints and moral hazard the potential welfare benefits of unemployment insurance along with the optimal replacement ratio are studied using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model to provide a role for unemployment insurance agents in our economy face exogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks and are unable to borrow or insure themselves through private markets in the absence of moral hazard replacement ratios as high as 65 are optimal and the welfare benefits of unemployment insurance are quite large however if there is moral hazard and the replacement ratio is not set optimally but is instead set to an empirically plausible value the economy can be much worse off than it would be without unemployment insurance

reservation wages and unemployment insurance this paper argues that a risk averse worker s after tax reservation wage encodes all the relevant information about her welfare this insight leads to a novel test for the optimality of unemployment insurance based on the responsiveness of reservation wages to unemployment benefits some existing estimates imply significant gains to raising the current level of unemployment benefits in the united states but highlight the need for more research on the determinants of reservation wages our approach complements those based on baily s 1978 test

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

liquidity and insurance for the unemployed we study the optimal design of unemployment insurance for workers sampling job opportunities over time we focus on the optimal timing of benefits and the desirability of allowing workers to freely access a riskless asset when workers have constant absolute risk aversion preferences it is optimal to use a very simple policy a constant benefit during unemployment a constant tax during employment that does not depend on the duration of the spell and free access to savings using a riskless asset away from this benchmark for constant relative risk aversion preferences the welfare gains of more elaborate policies are minuscule our results highlight two largely distinct roles for policy toward the unemployed a ensuring workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption and b providing unemployment benefits that serve as insurance against the uncertain duration of unemployment spells

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

state capacity and military conflict powerful centralized states controlling a large share of national income only begin to appear in europe after 1500 we build a model that explains their emergence in response to the increasing importance of money for military success when fiscal resources are not crucial for winning wars the threat of external conflict stifles state building as finance becomes critical internally cohesive states invest in state capacity while divided states rationally drop out of the competition causing divergence we emphasize the role of the military revolution a sequence of technological innovations that transformed armed conflict using data from 374 battles we investigate empirically both the importance of money for military success and patterns of state building in early modern europe the evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model

optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents the framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance ui scheme and preferences for unemployment policy reforms in a first step the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio ui systems are obtained in simulations then the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be approved by a majority of the population is explored finally the transitional dynamics following a policy change are analysed accounting for this transition has an important influence on the support for a policy change

state capacity and economic development causal mechanism or correlative filter abstract in this paper we explore why there are no examples of societies with low state capacity and high economic development we argue that such an outcome is unlikely because of the nature of investments in state capacity societies that become rich in the absence of a strong state invite predation by societies that develop such states thus societies invest in state capacity in part to plunder other societies wealth those investments are a form of rent seeking potentially preyed upon societies are forced to invest in state capacity in turn so as to deter potential attackers this entails that as soon as a rent seeker enters the game the likelihood of a low capacity high development society surviving falls this explains the historical lack of such societies we thus interpret state capacity not as a causal condition for widespread economic prosperity but a survivability condition for enjoying this prosperity

efficient unemployment insurance this paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion an increase in risk aversion reduces wages unemployment and investment unemployment insurance has the opposite effect insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk an economy with risk neutral workers achieves maximal output without any unemployment insurance but an economy with risk averse workers requires a positive level of unemployment insurance to maximize output therefore moderate unemployment insurance not only improves risk sharing but also increases output

the redistributive role of unemployment benefits abstract this paper evaluates the role of unemployment benefits as a tool for redistribution in a setting with worker heterogeneity the provision of unemployment benefits achieves two goals it provides insurance to workers in the event of job loss and it redistributes wealth from individuals with more to those with fewer economic opportunities our model features a frictional labour market and an incomplete financial market when calibrated to match stylised facts of the us economy the optimal level of unemployment benefits is broadly similar regardless of whether workers differ in economic opportunities this suggests that taking into consideration the redistributive nature of unemployment benefits has only a limited role in altering the optimal level of unemployment benefits

money and monetary stability in europe 1300 1914 abstract this paper investigates the determinants of monetary stability in europe from the late medieval era until world war i through this period the anchor for monetary policy was the silver or gold value of the monetary unit states however frequently abandoned this anchor some depreciating their monetary units against silver and gold less than 10 fold and others more than 10 000 fold between 1500 and 1914 to understand the determinants of these differences we compile a new and comprehensive monetary history dataset for all major states in europe and test alternative theories we find strong evidence that political factors and in particular fiscal capacity political regime and warfare explain patterns of monetary stability this finding is robust to addressing endogeneity controlling for the instability induced by the mechanics of the monetary system and accounting for the impacts of new monetary technologies and the advent of fiat standard

paying for war and building states the coalitional politics of debt servicing and tax institutions many scholars believe that intense warfare propelled state formation in early modern europe because rulers built tax institutions to pay for wars scholars likewise cite milder geopolitical pressures to explain the lackluster state building in the developing world the authors analyze episodes of ferocious warfare in and beyond europe and find that despite similar fiscal strains not all governments built strong tax institutions to service wartime debt when net creditors in a country s credit market were part of the ruling political coalition they pressed governments to diversify taxes and strengthen fiscal institutions to ensure debt service but when net debtors held political sway governments were indifferent to debt servicing and fiscal invigoration coalitional politics can help to explain why mounting debt service obligations led to fiscal institution building in some cases but not others the analysis highlights how the private economic interests of ruling coalition members can affect state building