useful fiction or miracle maker the competing epistemological foundations of rational choice theory rational choice theorists have not clearly articulated their epistemological positions and for this reason their arguments in favor of rational choice theory are inconsistent contradictory and unpersuasive to remedy this problem i describe how two of the main positions in the philosophy of science instrumentalist empiricism and scientific realism act as competing epistemological foundations for rational choice theory i illustrate how these philosophical perspectives help political scientists 1 understand what is at stake in the theoretical debates surrounding the rationality assumption self interest and methodological individualism 2 identify inconsistencies in the epistemological positions adopted by rational choice theorists and 3 assess the feasibility and desirability of a universal theory based on the rationality assumption

the microfinance promise in the past decade microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low income households while maintaining high repayment rates even without requiring collateral the programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services and millions of poor households are served globally a growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success particularly the use of group lending contracts with joint liability for the most part however high repayment rates have not translated into profits and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture in describing emerging tensions the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group lending contracts the measurement of financial sustainability the estimation of economic and social impacts the costs and benefits of subsidization and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit the promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion

group lending repayment incentives and social collateral abstract in this paper we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment this type of scheme especially in the guise of the grameen bank in bangladesh has received increasing attention we set up and analyze the repayment game which group lending gives rise to our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates the positive effect is that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile the negative effect arises when the whole group defaults even when some members would have repaid under individual lending we also show how group lending may harness social collateral which serves to mitigate its negative effect

rationality and deterrence this essay explores the relationship between deterrence theory and two distinct notions of rationality associated with it the author argues that the concept of procedural irrationality which is the basis of many critiques of contemporary deterrence theory is not necessarily inconsistent with the instrumental definition of rationality implicit in many models of deterrence he also argues that some recent rational choice models of deterrence are nonetheless deficient in their application of the rationality postulate finally he provides an outline of a possible resolution of the paradox of deterrence

introduction imperfect information and rural credit markets puzzles and policy perspectives rural credit markets have been at the center of policy intervention in developing countries over the past forty years many governments supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have devoted considerable resources to supplying cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings the results of many of these interventions have been disappointing and one explanation for this must be that they were based on an inadequate understanding of the workings of rural credit markets the articles in this symposium issue are devoted to empirical and theoretical investigations of rural credit markets in the framework of the imperfect information paradigm the authors show how this framework is useful not only in explaining puzzling features of these markets but also in providing a policy perspective to assess the successes and failures of specific interventions

wealth accumulation over the life cycle and precautionary savings this article constructs and simulates a life cycle model of wealth accumulation and estimates the parameters of the utility function the rate of time preference and the coefficient of risk aversion by matching the simulated median wealth profiles with those observed in the panel study of income dynamics and in the survey of consumer finances the estimates imply a low degree of patience and a high degree of risk aversion the results are used to study the importance of precautionary savings in explaining wealth accumulation they imply that wealth accumulation is driven mostly by precautionary motives at the beginning of the life cycle whereas savings for retirement purposes become significant only closer to retirement

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

social security unanticipated benefit increases and the timing of retirement between 1969 and 1972 real u s social security retirement benefits rose by 20 the rise was unanticipated and followed over 15 years of relatively constant real benefits this paper proposes a model of retirement behaviour in which workers respond differently although in a theoretically consistent manner to the anticipated and unanticipated components of the social security benefit they can receive upon retirement the retirement age decision in the presence of unanticipated benefit changes is shown to be a special case of utility maximization under a nonlinear budget constraint the model is estimated using the longitudinal retirement history survey between 1969 and 1973 real social security benefits for u s workers with fixed earnings histories were raised by more than 20 these increases were the first significant increases in social security since the early 1950 s at the same time that retirement benefits were rising the trend toward early retirement among older american men accelerated in the period from 1965 to 1970 the labour force participation rate of men aged 55 to 64 fell 1 6 percentage points from 84x6 to 83 0 but in the five years after 1970 the rate fell an additional 7 4 points to 75 6 the participation rate of men over 65 fell by 1 1 points in the five years after 1965 but by 5 2 points during the mid 1970 s 1 not surprisingly a large share of this labour force decline has been attributed to the effects of the social security increases enacted in 1969 and 1972 the purpose of this paper is to determine the precise effect of the unanticipated benefit increases on the timing of retirement the effect of social security on the age at retirement has been the subject of lively debate in recent years the literature has been reviewed in two recent papers by mitchell and fields 1982 and hurd 1983 who reach nearly opposite conclusions about the lessons that can be drawn from past empirical research mitchell and fields find that no definite judgment can be reached about the effects of social security on retirement while hurd argues that more careful studies have all found a significant and meaningful effect of social security on early retirement certainly the earlier studies by boskin 1977 and boskin and hurd 1978 found very large social security effects with boskin concluding that the social security system has been the major factor in the explosion in earlier retirement boskin 1977 p 1 very recent studies by burkhauser and quinn 1983 burtless and moffitt 1984 diamond and hausman 1984 fields and mitchell 1984 and hausman and wise 1985 have found smaller social security effects however none of them dealt explicitly with the rapid rise in real benefits during the early 1970 s the approach taken in this paper differs significantly from that in the earlier research just cited the proposed econometric model takes full account of the nonlinear relationship between goods consumption and the age at retirement introduced by social security

rural financial markets in low income countries recent controversies and lessons abstract recently some researchers have criticized traditional agricultural credit policies in low income countries this article identifies the major points of controversy between traditional views and these new views and also summarizes the primary lessons learned from these controversies savings mobilization more flexible interest rate policies less loan targeting and greater emphasis on improving the quality of financial services in rural areas are new views that are emphasized

informal credit markets in india informal financial markets those which are not regulated or monitored by the banking authorities account for much of business credit in developing countries these unregulated informal credit markets icm are important both in their own right as part of each country s financial system and because of their reciprocal relations with growing enterprises and the regulated financial sector in order to study the operations of some of these markets in detail in urban commercial settings we conducted an extended survey of some of the informal credit markets of india 2 based in some cases on centuries of operation these markets proved to be important in the functioning of the contemporary economy indigenous style bankers belonging to particular ethnic communities and castes formerly provided the full range of banking services to their clients 3 with the rise of modern western style banking the indigenous bankers either have transformed themselves to serve sectors such as wholesale trade not well served by the modern sector or provide services which the modern bankers cannot provide though any estimate is very approximate it seems that informal credit markets account for as much as 20 of commercial credit outstanding in the various markets surveyed we began by surveying the gujeratis some of whom still practice their traditional form of full service banking in their homeland of gujerat and adjoining bombay the shikarpuris or multanis originally full service bankers in sind who now provide commercial credit in various other centers the chettiars in south india the rastogis in uttar pradesh and the marwaris especially in eastern india 4 but our surveys revealed that a wide range of ethnic groups were now involved in informal credit markets and the more meaningful differentiations

wealth inequality and intergenerational links previous work has had difficulty generating household saving behaviour that makes the distribution of wealth much more concentrated than that of labour earnings and that makes the richest households hold onto large amounts of wealth even during very old age i construct a quantitative general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which parents and children are linked by accidental and voluntary bequests and by earnings ability i show that voluntary bequests can explain the emergence of large estates while accidental bequests alone cannot and that adding earnings persistence within families increases wealth concentration even more i also show that the introduction of a bequest motive generates lifetime savings profiles more consistent with the data

uncertain medical expenses and precautionary saving near the end of the life cycle this paper introduces a dynamic structural model of household consumption decisions in which elderly families consider the effects of uncertain future medical expenses when deciding current levels of consumption the model with uncertain medical expenses implies a potentially important role for precautionary saving incentives to explain slow rates of dissaving among elderly americans during retirement rather than just simulating the stochastic dynamic model preference parameters are estimated using panel data on health wealth and expenditures for retired families the health uncertainty model predicts consumption levels closer to observed expenditures than a life cycle model with uncertain longevity however elderly families typically dissave their financial assets more slowly than even the baseline health uncertainty model predicts is optimal

the use of village agents in rural credit delivery using a simple principal agent model this article examines the incentive problems that arise when a formal financial institution such as a rural bank utilises a member of the rural community to act as an agent in screening potential borrowers and collecting repayment optimal compensation schemes are derived for the agent and their implications are discussed in addition i show that the norms and rules that govern village life may aid the financial institution by helping to constrain possible strategic behaviour by the agent

moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment abstract this paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the presence of moral hazard and costly peer monitoring we compare peer monitoring treatments in which credit is provided to members of the group to individual lending treatments with lender monitoring we find that if the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the cost of lender monitoring peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring in the absence of monitoring cost differences however lending monitoring and repayment behavior is mostly similar across group and individual lending schemes within group lending contrary to theoretical predictions simultaneous and sequential lending rules provide equivalent empirical performance

interpreting aggregate wage growth the role of labor market participation a new and easily implementable framework for the empirical analysis of the relationship between aggregate and individual wages is developed aggregate real wages are shown to contain three important bias terms one associated with the dispersion of individual wages a second deriving from compositional changes in the selected sample of workers and a third reflecting the distribution of working hours their importance for interpreting the path of aggregate wages and of the returns to education for recent experience in britain is highlighted a close correspondence between the estimated biases and the patterns of differences shown by aggregate wages is established

a dynamic programming approach to model the retirement behaviour of blue collar workers in sweden this paper presents an empirical analysis of how sweden s public old age pension system affects the retirement decision we focus on male blue collar workers whose dominant income source as retired

the design of successful rural financial intermediaries evidence from indonesia abstract the success outreach and sustainability of eight rural financial intermediation systems in indonesia in profitably reaching large numbers of small individual clients is explained in terms of organizational design networks of semiautonomous units use local information and contract enforcement mechanisms to lower transaction costs reflecting basic concerns with institutional and financial viability elements of mechanism design have included compatible incentives such as performance based compensations profit sharing collection fees efficiency wages equivalent to quasi equity and system monitoring managerial discretion over transactions conducted at market terms policies to protect portfolio value and no dependency creating subsidies are important interventions have been appropriate for the problem at hand

what makes deterrence work cases from 1900 to 1980 the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives is an enduring feature of international politics force or the threat of force may be used either to change the status quo or to maintain it threatening the use of force to maintain the status quo often takes the form of deterrence defined by patrick morgan as the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else 1 deterrence sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails failures are attested to by numerous international wars of history in the nuclear age a failure could cost us our lives the conditions of successful deterrence thus require thorough logical and empirical analysis

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

the effect of social security on labor supply a cohort analysis of the notch generation this article uses aggregate birth year calendar year level data derived from the current population survey cps to estimate the effect of social security wealth on the labor supply of older men in the 1970s and 1980s the analysis focuses on measuring the impact of the 1977 amendments to the social security act which created a substantial unanticipated reduction in social security wealth for individuals born after 1916 this differential in benefits has become known as the benefit notch results indicate that labor supply continued to decline for the notch babies who received lower social security benefits than earlier cohorts

rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies several recent books have argued that comparative case studies of crises demonstrate the failure of rational deterrence theory they have offered certain empirical generalizations as substitutes this paper shows that such contentions are unwarranted first the empirical generalizations are impressive as historical insights but they do not meet the standards for theory set out by the most sophisticated case study analysts themselves second the tests of rational deterrence used in the case studies violate standard principles of inference and the ensuing procedures are so biased as to be useless rational deterrence then is a more successful theory than portrayed in this literature and it remains the only intellectually powerful alternative available case studies are essential to theory building more efficiently than any other methods they find suitable variables suggest middle range generalizations for theory to explain and provide the prior knowledge that statistical tests require their loose constraints on admissible propositions and suitable evidence are appropriate and even necessary for these tasks these same characteristics however inevitably undermine all attempts to construe case study generalizations as bodies of theory or tests of hypotheses

a little at a time the use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs abstract informal lenders appear to be thriving even in regions where microfinance institutions mfis such as the grameen bank have established lending programs we suggest that an explanation for this well documented observation lies in the ubiquitous use of regularly scheduled repayments by mfis borrowers are typically required to repay their loans in tightly structured installments beginning soon after loan disbursement this little remarked aspect of the repayment schedule is usually explained as inculcating fiscal discipline among borrowers we argue that an alternative rationale for this loan repayment structure lies in the difficulty of monitoring borrowers actions the potential for moral hazard leads mfis to use innovative mechanisms such as regularly scheduled repayments which indirectly coopt the better informed informal lenders conversely this installment repayment structure allows informal lenders to survive further we show that this linkage can not only expand the volume of informal lending but may also raise the interest rate in the informal sector

social security liquidity and early retirement abstract this paper investigates the effect of social security on retirement decisions it argues that it is important to take realistic account of how recipients evaluate potential benefit flows the paper presents a simple retirement model in which liquidity constraints prompt individuals to use higher than market discount rates in evaluating future pension benefits as a consequence even an apparently actuarially fair early retirement benefit could on average discourage continued work using data on individual retirement decisions i find support for the argument that this phenomenon contributes to some of the observed increase in early retirement

labor force dynamics of older men this paper describes and analyzes movements of older men among labor force states in the united states using quarterly observations derived from the retirement history survey rhs the results indicate substantial undercounts in the biannual data indicating that the prevalence of labor force movements at older ages has been underestimated previously the results show that labor force dynamics at older ages are important including duration and spell occurrence dependence and work experience effects these effects are robust to nonparametric controls for unobserved heterogeneity the estimates indicate that social security benefits have strong effects on the timing of labor force transitions at older ages but that changes in social security benefit levels over time have not contributed much to the trend toward earlier labor force exit excerpt

the effects of health insurance and self insurance on retirement behavior this paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of employer provided health insurance medicare and social security on retirement behavior using data from the health and retirement study we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses our results suggest that medicare is important for understanding retirement behavior and that uncertainty and saving are both important for understanding the labor supply responses to medicare half the value placed by a typical worker on his employer provided health insurance is the value of reduced medical expense risk raising the medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67 leads individuals to work an additional 0 074 years over ages 60 69 in comparison eliminating 2 years worth of social security benefits increases years of work by 0 076 years

confidence and the real value of money in an overlapping generations economy we demonstrate that stochastic bubbles which have a constant exogenous probability of collapsing may exist in general equilibrium on an intrinsically useless and unbacked asset money this may happen provided that the probability q that the bubble will persist next period is large enough and exceeds a threshold level q which we call the minimum rate of confidence this condition is always violated when the economy without bubble is dynamically efficient it is more likely to be satisfied in dynamically inefficient economies the larger the size of the inefficiency as measured by the excess of the growth rate over the no bubble interest rate we study both exchange and production economies

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

intertemporal substitution in labor supply evidence from micro data the sensitivity of the supply of labor to intertemporal variation in the wage is an important issue in macroeconomics the analysis of social security and pensions and the study of life cycle patterns of work this paper explores two approaches to the measurement of intertemporal substitution that have appeared in the literature the first approach is to use consumption to control for wealth and unobserved expectations about future wages in the labor supply equation the second approach is to estimate a first difference equation for hours in which labor supply from the previous period serves as a control for wealth and wage expectations the results indicate that intertemporal substitution elasticity for married men is positive but small

the effect of part time work on wages evidence from the social security rules this article identifies the part time wage effect using hours variation caused by the social security rules we show that work hours and wages drop sharply at ages 62 and 65 we argue that the hours decline causes the wage decline resulting in a 25 wage penalty for men who cut their work week from 40 to 20 hours however we find little evidence for such an effect among women we also show that models that fail to account for the joint determination of hours and wages will understate the labor supply response to a tax change by about 26

rising power on the mind a prominent explanation of war claims that international conflict can result when shifts in bargaining power induce the declining power to behave aggressively today because the rising power cannot credibly commit to not behave aggressively tomorrow this paper asks whether individuals respond to shifting power in ways assumed by these models rather than use abstract laboratory based bargaining games as in other work i use vignettes describing the united states in an international bargaining situation to explore the microfoundations of power transitions models empirically the vignettes vary whether the individual is a member of a declining or a rising power and whether there are previous public commitments to the status quo division of territory subjects propose a response the united states should make and then explain their decision in their own words i apply new methods for analyzing these open ended responses consistent with predictions from the behavioral literature i find important asymmetries in behavior across these conditions as well as substantial heterogeneities in individuals motivations for their decisions the results of the experiments suggest potential ways that power transition models should be refined to have a firmer behavioral basis

homo diplomaticus mixed method evidence of variation in strategic rationality psychology is traditionally used in political science to explain deviations from rationality lost in the debate between rationalists and their critics however is a sense of whether the kinds of strategic self interested behavior predicted by these models has psychological microfoundations what would homo economicus look like in the real world we argue that strategic rationality varies across individuals and is characterized by a pro self social value orientation and a high level of epistemic motivation testing our argument in the context of international relations we employ a laboratory bargaining game and integrate it with archival research on german foreign policy making in the 1920s we find in both contexts that even among those interested in maximizing only their own egoistic gains those with greater epistemic motivation are better able to adapt to the strategic situation particularly the distribution of power our results build a bridge between two approaches often considered to be antithetical to one another

the effects of health wealth and wages on labour supply and retirement behaviour this paper estimates a life cycle model of labour supply retirement and savings behaviour in which future health status and wages are uncertain individuals face a fixed cost of work and cannot borrow against future labour pension or social security income the method of simulated moments is used to match the life cycle profiles of labour force participation hours worked and assets that are estimated from the data to those that are generated by the model the model establishes that the tax structure of the social security system and pensions are key determinants of the high observed job exit rates at ages 62 and 65 removing the tax wedge embedded in the social security earnings test for individuals aged 65 and older would delay job exit by almost one year by contrast social security benefit levels health and borrowing constraints are less important determinants of job exit at older ages for example reducing social security benefits by 20 would cause workers to delay exit from the labour force by only three months

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

a dispositional theory of reputation costs politicians frequently turn to reputational arguments to bolster support for their proposed foreign policies yet despite the prevailing belief that domestic audiences care about reputation there is very little direct evidence that publics care about reputation costs and very little understanding of how we propose a dispositional theory of reputation costs in which citizens facing ill defined strategic situations turn to their core predispositions about foreign affairs in order to weigh competing reputational dimensions employing a diverse array of methodological tools from vignette based survey experiments to automated text analysis we show that the mass public has a taste for reputation but understands it in fundamentally different ways with hawks concerned about the negative reputational consequences of inconsistency and doves equally concerned with the negative reputational consequences of belligerence and interventionism in illustrating how reputation costs are in our heads our findings offer both good and bad news for theories of reputation in ir

moneylenders and bankers price increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market abstract in many areas of the world a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision we present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs motivated by studies of rural credit markets we show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition increasing prices or inducing exit higher prices interest rates result from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities among suppliers the models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that infusions of government subsidized formal credit have not improved the terms offered by moneylenders

contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice we contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues the results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory in particular our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains risk seeking in the domain of losses and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains this is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times the results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options contrary to the assumption of invariance finally we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting

the dynamic efficiency costs of common pool resource exploitation we conduct the first empirical investigation of common pool resource users dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real world data fishermen s strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players actions revealing the profit structure of the fishery we compare the fishermen s actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies jel d24 q21 q22

rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory this article presents evidence of the failure of government intervention in rural credit markets of ldcs in the past three decades it then shows how lessons for policy analysis can be drawn from modern theory particularly those theories focussing on credit rationing in competitive markets and interlinking of credit contracts with labor and land contracts the article outlines the policy implications of these theories and finds them insufficient to account for the empirical evidence it contends that a more systematic and rigorous analysis of institutions and institutional environments is essential for understanding and implementing effective policy reforms of rural credit markets it presents suggestions for undertaking such an analysis

designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro poor microfinance institutions abstract credit agents in microfinance institutions mfis must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the mfi s objectives we show that while giving incentives has no cost in for profit mfis it is costly in pro poor mfis when repayment and wealth are positively correlated a pro poor mfi cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment it then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives when audit costs are large pro poor mfis may have to forego selection on wealth and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations driven by donor concerns with mission drift away from the poor audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of mfis we show that introducing pro poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents

subjectivity in credit allocation to micro entrepreneurs evidence from brazil this paper estimates the impact of loan officer subjectivity on microcredit granting by exploiting an exceptionally detailed database from a brazilian microfinance institution the loan officers collect field data meet with applicants and make recommendations to the credit committee which has the final say on both loan approval and loan size ls the loan officer s subjectivity is captured through gender bias our estimations indeed show subjective gender gap in ls this gap is almost exclusively attributable to loan officers we interpret this finding as evidence that despite monitoring and wage incentivization microcredit officers let their subjective preferences interfere with loan granting we conclude by suggesting alternative means to curb subjectivity in credit allocation to micro entrepreneurs

the performance of village intermediaries in rural credit delivery under changing penalty regimes evidence from senegal this article concerns the use of village intermediaries to mitigate asymmetric information problems in rural credit delivery we consider an example from senegal and examine the intermediaries screening of loan applicants the results show that when the intermediaries expected to incur a substantial penalty in the event of borrower default they engaged in appropriate screening allocating credit to borrowers likely to repay their loans when the default penalty was lowered however the intermediaries engaged in opportunistic screening emphasising political affiliation and consanguinity in their lending decisions these results reveal both the potential efficacy of village intermediaries in allocating credit and their extreme sensitivy to penalty regimes

microenterprise clusters in rural indonesia industrial seedbed and policy target abstract this paper shows the importance of clustering at early stages of development when clustering is still largely a rural phenomenon and may serve as a survival strategy it argues first that dismally poor but clustered rural microenterprises may have a seedbed function for industrial development and second that clustering policy has brought about some success in indonesia data on more than 4 000 rural clusters provide insights in the various forces behind cluster gestation prosperity and dissolution it is argued that social capital is crucial for the achievement of transaction cost reductions which attract traders to the clustered enterprises ubiquitous search and reach advantages in marketing trigger clustering processes but these advantages diminish with overcrowding further external economies arise from specialization and technical indivisibilities but vary significantly by subsector consequently only specific clusters might benefit from public intervention in technology and organization

how social security and medicare affect retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets this paper provides an empirical analysis of how the u s social security and medicare insurance system affect the labor supply of older males in the presence of incomplete markets for loans annuities and health insurance we estimate a detailed dynamic programming dp model of the joint labor supply and social security acceptance decision focusing on a sample of males in the low to middle income brackets whose only pension is social security the dp model delivers a rich set of predictions about the dynamics of retirement behavior and comparisons of actual vs predicted behavior show that the dp model is able to account for wide variety of phenomena observed in the data including the pronounced peaks in the distribution of retirement ages at 62 and 65 the ages of early and normal eligibility for social security benefits respectively we identify a significant fraction of health insurance constrained individuals who have no form of retiree health insurance other than medicare and who can only obtain fairly priced private health insurance via their employer s group health plan the combination of significant individual risk aversion and a long tailed pareto distribution of health care expenditures implies that there is a significant security value for these individuals to remain employed until they are eligible for medicare coverage at age 65 overall our model suggests that a number of heretofore puzzling aspects of retirement behavior can be viewed as artifacts of particular details of the social security rules whose incentive effects are especially strong for lower income individuals and those who do not have access to fairly priced loans annuities and health insurance

a critique of traditional agricultural credit projects and policies abstract authors critique the results assumptions and policies commonly associated with agricultural credit projects in low income countries a summary of new views on these projects is present these views emphasize voluntary savings mobilization and positive real rates of interest several explanations are given for why few of these new views have been adopted by policymakers

interactions between institutional and informal credit agencies in rural india in an attempt to expand rural credit and displace the village moneylender india created a system of rural cooperatives in the 1950s and expanded branch banking into rural areas in the 1970s this article examines how these measures affected the rural market it begins with the question of how large the expansion of institutional credit has been and the extent to which it has dislodged the village and nonresident moneylenders a detailed comparison of three major surveys of the indian rural credit market suggests that in various guises the moneylender is still a major source of loans the article also examines the weak evidence on intermediation between the formal and informal sectors a formal model of the interaction between the informal moneylender and institutional lender is constructed under a variety of assumptions about the exclusivity of loan contracts and the competitive structure of the informal sector the conclusions are drawn together in the form of five proposals for public policy

is there a retirement savings puzzle in this paper we ask whether households are saving enough for their retirement we use data on income expenditure and expenditure components to analyse patterns of behaviour at and around the time of retirement for successive date of birth cohorts we compare periods of unemployment to periods of retirement and separate expenditures into categories reflecting work related expenditures basic necessities and other goods we find that income typically falls by more at unemployment than retirement but the reverse is true for expenditure we observe falls in expenditure at retirement for all expenditure categories using a stochastic life cycle model including mortality rates we assess the anticipated impact of retirement on consumption against that of unemployment the inter relationship between goods and leisure explains a large part of the persistent fall in expenditure at retirement we argue that the only way in which the life cycle hypothesis could be reconciled with the remaining unanticipated dip in consumption would be with the systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information at the time of retirement