the market for blood donating blood the gift of life is among the noblest activities and it is performed worldwide nearly 100 million times annually the economic perspective presented here shows how the gift of life albeit noble and often motivated by altruism is heavily influenced by standard economic forces including supply and demand economies of scale and moral hazard these forces shaped by technological advances have driven the evolution of blood donation markets from thin one to one marriage markets in which each recipient needed a personal blood donor to thick impersonalized diffuse markets today imbalances between aggregate supply and demand are a major challenge in blood markets including excess supply after disasters and insufficient supply at other times these imbalances are not unexpected given that the blood market operates without market prices and with limited storage length about six weeks for whole blood yet shifting to a system of paying blood donors seems a practical impossibility given attitudes toward paying blood donors and concerns that a paid system could compromise blood safety nonetheless we believe that an economic perspective offers promising directions to increase supply and improve the supply and demand balance even in the presence of volunteer supply and with the absence of market prices

china s grain and meat economy recent developments and implications for trade with the change in political leadership in the late 1970s china entered a period of substantial economic reform the effects of this reform have been particularly pronounced in agriculture where the demand for and supply of farm products have changed significantly in response to government policies to raise incomes and improve the availability of consumer goods the demand for farm products has shifted away from staple grains and toward meat dairy products eggs and other secondary foods production has been affected not only by the return to household farming under the responsibility system but also by the increased role of private economic activity and revisions in production targets commercial quotas and planned prices for a more detailed discussion of china s agricultural reforms see sicular the production of almost every important agricultural product has shown significant growth gains have been most rapid for commercial crops oilseeds and animal products the central objective of this paper is to clarify recent trends in china s grain and meat economy and to analyze their implications for china s grain trade between 1978 and 1982 china s net imports of grain expanded steadily although at a decreasing rate with bumper harvests in 1983 and 1984 net grain imports have declined somewhat however current levels remain considerably higher than at any time in the history of the people s republic prior to 1978 two key factors underlie this trade pattern first domestic grain demand has increased rapidly in large part from growth in the indirect demand for grain in the form of animal feed in the future feed demand and developments in the livestock sector probably will emerge as the dynamic force driving china s grain trade second china s agricultural trade continues to be greatly influenced by imbalances between domestic production and consumption despite rapid growth in production important imbalances persist especially in animal and aquatic products state statist bureau 1985 p ii reports of shortages of lean pork fish and dairy and poultry products appear regularly in the chinese press furthermore the seasonal and regional balance between supply and demand for these products is un

the optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents tournaments are widely used in organizations explicitly or implicitly to reward the best performing employees for example by promotion or bonuses and or to penalize the worst performing employees for example by demotion withholding bonuses or unfavorable job assignments these incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees relative performance while the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents we show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity under a wide range of conditions loser prize tournaments that is tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers are optimal for the firm the reason is that low ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments as compared to winner prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints jel m52 j33 j24

skill differentiation and wage disparity in a decentralized matching model of north south trade this paper develops a north south trade model in which the south produces food and the north produces both food and a high tech good food production is undertaken by unskilled workers while the high tech product is made only by horizontally differentiated skilled workers due to the possibility of a peergroup effect we allow the unskilled workers in the north to be equally or more productive than in the south horizontal matching of skilled workers is generally imperfect and the skilled wages are determined by a symmetric nash bargain we characterize two different types of equilibrium a closed economy equilibrium without trade and a free trade equilibrium without labor mobility we then extend the benchmark framework to consider the presence of transport costs in all cases with trade the equilibrium properties of goods pricing the volume of trade and wage disparities are examined

preferences and biases in educational choices and labour market expectations shrinking the black box of gender standard observed characteristics explain only part of the differences between men and women in education choices and labor market trajectories using an experiment to derive students levels of overconfidence and preferences for competitiveness and risk this paper investigates whether these behavioral biases and preferences explain gender differences in college major choices and expected future earnings in a sample of high ability undergraduates we find that competitiveness and overconfidence but not risk aversion is systematically related with expectations about future earnings individuals who are overconfident and overly competitive have significantly higher earnings expectations moreover gender differences in overconfidence and competitiveness explain about 18 of the gender gap in earnings expectations these experimental measures explain as much of the gender gap in earnings expectations as a rich set of control variables including test scores and family background and they are poorly proxied by these same control variables underscoring that they represent independent variation while expected earnings are related to college major choices the experimental measures are not related with college major choice

china s grain imports an empirical study abstract china is a major importer of grains primarily wheat however the relative importance of economic and policy factors underlying the increase in imports into this centrally planned but reforming economy is not that well understood an econometric model is developed to analyze chinese grain import behaviour over the past three decades and assess the relative importance of respective import determinants it is concluded that major factors influencing imports have been changes in state grain procurement policy and associated aspects of china s grain distribution system income related improvements in diet manifest primarily as a shift from inferior cereals and potatoes to wheat and rice rather than as feed grain based increases in meat consumption and shortfalls in domestic grain production

the impact of private and public feedback on worker performance evidence from the lab previous empirical studies have demonstrated the positive incentive effects of private performance feedback as well as public recognition on work performance in our laboratory experiments we directly compare these two feedback schemes moreover we compare their incentive effects across two real effort tasks that differ in regard to how interesting the subjects perceive working on them we find that both feedback schemes lead to performance increases compared to the tasks respective control treatments in particular subjects ability and a positive interim feedback enhance performance competitive preferences significantly affect performance only in the less enjoyable and challenging task jel c9 j3 m1

waiting to give stated and revealed preferences we estimate and compare the effect of increased time costs on consumer satisfaction and behavior we are able to move beyond the existing literature which focuses on satisfaction and intention and estimate the effect of waiting time on return behavior further we do so in a prosocial context and our measure of cost is the length of time a blood donor spends waiting we find that relying on satisfaction data masks important time cost sensitivities namely it is not how the donor feels about the wait time that matters for return behavior but rather the actual duration of the wait consistent with theory we develop our results indicate that waiting has a significant longer term social cost we estimate that a 38 increase equivalent to one standard deviation in the average wait would result in a 10 decrease in donations per year this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

production externalities and urban configuration abstract we formally explore jacobs idea that uncompensated knowledge spillovers are crucial for agglomeration by modeling location dependent interfirm production externalities in a general equilibrium linear city framework good and factor allocation firms and households locational choice and wages and land rents are all endogenously determined the unique equilibrium urban configuration may be concentrated with monocentric firm locations dispersed with completely mixed firm household locations or a combination depending on the population of firms transportation cost and firm interaction parameters due to distance dependent production externalities firms will be clustered together in any equilibrium thus ruling out the possibility of any multicentric urban configuration journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 r12

income redistribution in a common labor market when households are mobile among jurisdictions income redistribution by individual jurisdictions creates fiscal externalities a model of interjurisdictional migration is used to study the nature of this redistributive externality analysis of optimal redistribution and optimal corrective subsidies from higher level governments shows that benefit levels for the recipients of income transfers and tax rates on mobile taxpayers should be equalized across jurisdictions a system of jurisdictions with a common labor market can achieve welfare improvements through coordination of domestic redistributive policy or through the intervention of a higher level government copyright 1991 by american economic association

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

self selection and the efficiency of tournaments when exogenously imposed rank order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance bull schotter and weigelt 1987 however since the efficiency of performance related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees lazear 2000 it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments this paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments we show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament the average effort is higher and the between subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants we suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay

efficiency gains from organizational innovation comparing ordinal and cardinal tournament games in broiler contracts abstract we analyze the contract settlement data of a poultry company who contracts the production of broiler chickens with a group of independent growers the company originally used rank order ordinal tournaments to compensate their contract growers and later switched to cardinal tournaments based on the observed payment mechanism we construct an empirical model of a rank order tournament game and estimate structural parameters of the symmetric nash equilibrium and then simulate growers performance under the observed cardinal tournament contract we found that the model with risk averse agents fits the data better than the model with risk neutral agents and that switching from a rank order tournament to a cardinal tournament while keeping the growers ex ante expected utility constant improved efficiency the principal company gains from the switch whereas some of the agents growers gain and others lose depending on their realized productivity shocks

how to split the pie optimal rewards in dynamic multi battle competitions abstract multi battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life in this paper we examine the effort maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi battle competitions between two players the organizer has a fixed prize budget and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three battle contest a full spectrum of contest technologies in the tullock family is accommodated we find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology in particular when it is in the low range winner take all is optimal for the intermediate range as discriminatory power increases the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner take all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum discouragement effect for the high range a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum discouragement effect is essential for effort maximizing prize design in dynamic multi battle contests

blood donations and incentives evidence from a field experiment abstract there is a longstanding concern that material rewards might undermine pro social motivations thereby leading to a decrease in blood donations this paper provides an empirical test of how material rewards affect blood donations in a three month large scale field experiment and a fifteen month follow up period involving more than 10 000 previous donors we examine the efficacy of a lottery ticket as a reward vis a vis a standard invitation an appeal and a free cholesterol test the offer of a lottery ticket on average increases the probability to donate blood during the experiment by 5 6 percentage points over a baseline donation rate of 46 we find that this effect is driven by less motivated donors moreover no reduction in donations is observed after the experiment

a designer s choice between single prize and parallel tournaments in this article i theoretically and experimentally compare a designer s profits from two tournament designs the first design is a standard winner take all tournament with a single prize the second design features two winner take all parallel tournaments with different prizes where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing i develop a simple model that illustrates how the relative performances of these designs change as contestants abilities differ the theoretical model shows that the designer s profit is higher lower in the parallel tournament when contestants abilities differ greatly are similar i complement these findings with experimental evidence the experiments show that the parallel tournament is more profitable under high heterogeneity whereas under low heterogeneity the designer is better off with the single prize tournament furthermore high ability agents under participate and low ability agents over participate in the high prize tournament relative to the theoretical prediction jel c72 d82 j33 m51 m52

do competitive workplaces deter female workers a large scale natural field experiment on job entry decisions an important line of research using laboratory experiments has provided a new potential reason for gender imbalances in labour markets men are more competitively inclined than women whether and to what extent gender differences in attitudes toward competition lead to differences in naturally occurring labour markets remains an open question to examine this we run a natural field experiment on job entry decisions where we randomize almost 9000 job seekers into different compensation regimes by varying the role that individual competition plays in setting the wage and the gender composition we examine whether a competitive compensation regime by itself can cause differential job entry the data highlight the power of the compensation regime in that women disproportionately shy away from competitive work settings yet there are important factors that attenuate the gender differences including whether the job is performed in teams whether the position has overt gender associations and the age of the job seekers we also find that the effect is most pronounced in labour markets with attractive alternative employment options furthermore our results suggest that preferences over uncertainty can be just as important as preferences over competition per se in driving job entry choices

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

behavior in group contests a review of experimental research group contests are ubiquitous some examples include warfare between countries competition between political parties team incentives within firms group sports and rent seeking in order to succeed members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending individual efforts however since effort is costly each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members contest theory shows that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size sharing rule group impact function contest success function and heterogeneity of players we review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions almost all studies of behavior in group contests find significant over expenditure of effort relative to the theory we discuss potential explanations for such over expenditure including the utility of winning bounded rationality relative payoff maximization parochial altruism and social identity despite over expenditure most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory with the exception of the group size paradox finally studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de escalate and potentially eliminate between group conflict

excusing selfishness in charitable giving the role of risk decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk a common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact while this behaviour could be fully rationalized by standard economic models this article shows that an additional mechanism is relevant the use of risk as an excuse not to give in a laboratory study participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity when their decisions do not involve tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity they respond very similarly to self risk and charity risk by contrast when their decisions force tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity participants act more averse to charity risk and less averse to self risk these altered responses to risk bias participants towards choosing payoffs for themselves more often consistent with excuse driven responses to risk additional results support the existence of excuse driven types

on the size of the gender difference in competitiveness we design a new procedure for measuring competitiveness and use it to estimate the magnitude of the gender gap in competitiveness before working on a task participants choose what percentage of their payoffs will be based on a piece rate compensation scheme the rest of their payoff is allocated to a competitive compensation scheme this novel procedure allows us to distinguish between 101 levels of competitiveness as opposed to the binary measure used in the literature whereas the binary measure allows researchers to conclude that about twice as many men as women choose to compete typically two thirds versus one third the new procedure sheds light on the intensive margin we find that the intensity of the preference is more extreme than the binary measure could detect for example we find that only one fifth of the most competitive 25 of our participants are women and the most competitive 10 of our participants are all men the new procedure also allows us to study the correlation between comp

competitive blind spots and the cyclicality of investment experimental evidence we report laboratory experiments investigating the cyclicality of profit enhancing investment in a competitive environment in our setting optimal investment is counter cyclical when investment costs fall following market downturns however we do not observe counter cyclical investment instead we see much less strategic behavior than our rational investment model anticipates our participants exhibit what porter 1980 terms a competitive blind spot and heuristic investment models where individuals invest a fixed percentage of their liquidity or a fixed percentage of anticipated market demand better fit our data than does optimal investment we also report a control treatment without cost changes and a treatment with asymmetric investment liquidity both of these extensions support our main result

public facility location and urban spatial structure equilibrium and welfare analysis we consider a model in which the location of a single public facility is fixed somewhere in an urban area there are two firms that choose locations the locations of households competing for space in the land market are also endogenous the analysis examines the nature of the spatial equilibrium and shows that different kinds of equilibria can emerge depending on the parameters of the model the welfare implications of changes in transportation cost and the location of the public facility are studied and appear to be non standard for some equilibrium configurations

the importance of being confident gender career choice and willingness to compete abstract this study investigates the extent to which gender differences in choosing to enter competitive tournaments are due to women s lower taste for competition or differences in confidence we examine three types of confidence and find that confidence measured by expected ranking is the most important determinant of decisions to enter tournaments conditional on ability this measure eliminates gender differences in winner take all tournaments and when entered with risk measures eliminates differences in ranked compensation tournaments when the sample is split by career choice there are no gender differences for students in stem fields and in the humanities and the social sciences differences can be explained by confidence however for business school students gender differences in willingness to compete in winner take all tournaments persist even after accounting for risk aversion and confidence men in business set themselves apart from the rest of the population men and women alike with the highest levels of tournament entry and the most positive performance responses to competition

selective recognition how to recognize donors to increase charitable giving recognizing donors by revealing their identities is important for increasing charitable giving we conducted a field experiment to examine how different recognition methods impact giving and found that all forms of recognition that we examined had a positive impact on increasing donations whereby recognizing only highest donors positive recognition and recognizing only lowest donors negative recognition had the most pronounced effect we argue that selective recognition both positive and negative creates tournament like incentives recognizing the highest donors activates the desire to seek a positive prize of prestige thus increasing the proportion of donors who contribute large amounts recognizing the lowest donors activates the desire to avoid a negative prize of shame thus decreasing the proportion of donors who do not contribute or contribute very little therefore selective recognition is an effective tool that can be used in the field by charities to increase donations

social image concerns and prosocial behavior field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme abstract using longitudinal data on the entire population of blood donors in an italian town we examine how donors respond to a nonlinear award scheme that rewards them with symbolic prizes medals when they reach certain donation quotas our results indicate that donors significantly increase the frequency of their donations immediately before reaching the thresholds for which the rewards are given but only if the prizes are publicly announced in the local newspaper and awarded in a public ceremony the results are robust to several specifications sample definitions and controls for observable and unobservable heterogeneity our findings indicate that social image concerns are a primary motivator of prosocial behavior and that symbolic prizes are most effective as motivators when they are awarded publicly we discuss the implications of our findings for policies aimed at incentivizing prosocial behavior

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

learning matching and growth we examine an endogenous growth model in which market frictions are an integral part of the economic environment workers invest in education when young which raises their productivity onice employed the level of schooling also acts as a key determinant of the rate of economic growth by influencing workers ability to accumulate additional human capital on the job once schooling is completed workers search for employment the division of the surplus between vacancies and searching workers is characterized as is the optimal level of education the economy may display multiple steady state growth paths

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

how many winners are good to have on tournaments with sabotage abstract from an employer s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones we experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities

a policy analysis of china s wheat economy this paper examines the impacts of china s historical and anticipated future reforms on its domestic wheat economy and how it affects the import demand for wheat using a stochastic coefficient regression method the results strongly support the hypothesis that producers and consumers in the post reform era were responsive to a less controlled economy furthermore the higher import forecasts indicate that china will interact more with the world wheat market

overbidding and overspreading in rent seeking experiments cost structure and prize allocation rules we study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent seeking contests most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost and find both overbidding relative to the nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts which we term overspreading we investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally and of convex versus linear costs of effort while holding fixed the nash equilibrium prediction for effort we find the share rule results in average effort closer to the nash prediction and lower variation of effort combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results we can explain a significant amount of non equilibrium behavior by features of the experimental design these results contribute towards design guidelines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account implementation features of a contest

gender differences and the effect of facing harder competition gender differences in competition have been demonstrated in a variety of contexts yet it remains unclear how people respond to competitors they perceive to be hard or easy and whether gender differences exist in this response i run an experiment in eighteen public high school classrooms to study the effect of competing in a math task against different levels of competitors i exploit natural sorting within grade levels in malaysian public schools to randomly assign competitors of different perceived difficulty levels using a standard competition measure males are significantly more competitive than females however when students face harder competitors males respond by lowering performance while the performance of females does not vary significantly by level of competition

asymmetric tournaments equal opportunity laws and affirmative action some experimental results this paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents more precisely we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator usually the firm the effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group s cost disadvantage when the cost disadvantage is severe these programs significantly increase effort levels and hence profits the opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight

selection tournaments and dishonesty we conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner take all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition however after selection we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament this is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition

risk averse rent seeking with shared rents this paper presents a nash equilibrium model of rent seeking behavior in which risk averse players expend resources to obtain a share of a rent as for example in contests for import quota licences results are obtained relating the equilibrium level of lobbying effort by each player to the value of the rent in particular reduced individual lobbying effort is associated with higher rents contested if players are sufficiently risk averse the question of whether the value of rents is a good measure of the resource cost of rent seeking is also considered a simple approximation involving risk and risk aversion parameters is derived for the proportion of rents dissipated in long run equilibrium risk and risk aversion are seen to reduce the rent dissipation ratio below unity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

incentives and compensation schemes an experimental study when the performances of agents are correlated because of a common random component contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performances of agents theoretically outperform rank order tournaments and piece rate schemes although the theoretical advantage of such contracts has long been noticed in the literature the empirical papers that study this question have produced mixed results using a controlled laboratory experiment we shed light on the performance of these contracts we focus on the simplest version of such a contract the relative piece rate rpr and compare its performance with that of the tournament and piece rate schemes we find that when the rprs are imposed on the agents they exert higher effort levels and give the principal weakly higher profits than the tournament and piece rate contracts second we find that agents have little aversion to self select into the rpr scheme when other alternatives are available in our paper we fix the environment agents face and vary only their wage scheme our results support the theoretical predictions and suggest that principals can benefit from using rpr schemes in places where the piece rate and tournament contracts would otherwise be used

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

difference form contests and the robustness of all pay auctions abstract in much of the existing literature on rent seeking games the outcome of the contest is either infinitely sensitive or relatively insensitive to contestants efforts the current paper presents a family of contest games that permit characterization of equilibrium for all levels of sensitivity of the outcome to contestants efforts specifically the outcome of the contest depends on the difference between efforts which encompass the lottery and the all pay auction as polar cases the equilibrium converges to that of the all pay auction as the probability of winning the prize grows infinitely sensitive to one s effort and the main qualitative features of equilibrium persist over a large parameter region journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d72

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

alonso s discrete population model of land use efficient allocations and competitive equilibria in his 1964 book w alonso proposed several concepts of land use equilibrium in terms of discrete population however the so called new urban economics has been concerned exclusively with continuous population models it is the authors belief that in order to develop logical foundations for continuous population models it would be useful to go back to the original models of alonso in this paper they focus on the additive land price model of alonso and examine its solution characteristics in particular the authors demonstrate the existence and pareto efficiency of equilibria and the supportability of efficient allocations through additive land price systems copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

design innovation and fashion cycles a model of fashion cycles is developed in which designs are used as a signaling device in a dating game a monopolist periodically creates a new design over time the price of the design falls as it spreads across the population once sufficiently many consumers own the design it is profitable to create a new design and thereby render the old design obsolete this paper gives conditions under which all consumers would be better off by banning the use of fashion competition among designers may lead to less frequent changes in fashion and to higher prices than monopoly copyright 1995 by american economic association

optimal design of research contests procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations and if the buyer cannot extract up front payments from suppliers we study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment an auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one

selection bias demographic effects and ability effects in common value auction experiments inexperienced women along with economics and business majors are much more susceptible to the winner s curse as are subjects with lower sat act scores there are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects these selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning

agglomeration economies types and sizes of cities abstract the objective of this paper is to investigate why cities have different sizes traditionally this phenomenon has been explained by differences among cities in either the degree of internal scale economies or the elasticity of external economies this paper relates size differences between cities to differences in the dominant agglomeration force between cities we analyze this relationship via an equilibrium model of two cities that are embedded in a national economy one of the cities produces two traded goods with urbanization economies being the dominant agglomeration force the other city produces only one traded good with localization economies being the dominant force our first main result is that the two product city can be larger than the one product city in stable equilibrium if at least one of the two industries exhibits decreasing returns in production otherwise the one product city is larger second we obtain an existence result for the equilibrium of both cities we also analyze the relationship between optimum sizes of the two cities using an optimum city size model for each city finally we compare the equilibrium and optimum city sizes by doing so we identify the condition under which the stable equilibrium city size is smaller than the optimum city size

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

when less is more rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests this paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy we consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest where all bidders value the prize equally we show that whenever a tullock contest yields under dissipation the auctioneer s revenue can be increased by optimally fixing the number of tickets in particular in a stochastic contest with proportional probabilities it is possible to obtain almost full rent dissipation we test this hypothesis with a laboratory experiment the results indicate that as predicted revenue is significantly higher in a lottery with rationing than in a standard lottery on the other hand an alternative rationing mechanism that does not limit total expenditures fails to increase revenue relative to a standard lottery

the impact of advice on women s and men s selection into competition we conduct a laboratory experiment to study how advice by a more experienced and better informed person affects an individual s entry into a real effort tournament and the gender gap our experiment is motivated by the concerns raised by approaching the gender gap through affirmative action policies overall advice improves the entry decision of subjects in that forgone earnings due to wrong entry decisions go significantly down the improvements are mainly driven by increased entry of strong performing women who also become more confident and reduced entry of weak performing men we find that the overall gender gap persists even though it disappears among low and strong performers the persistence is due to an emerging gender gap among intermediate performers driven by women men following more the advice to stay out of enter the tournament in this performance group this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

urban economic theory land use and city size this book examines the economic reasons why people choose to live where they live and develops through analysis of the bid rent function a unified theory of urban land use and city size the first part of the book explicates the basic theory of urban land use and optimal city size residential location behavior of households is examined in a microeconomic framework and equilibrium and optimal patterns of residential land use are discussed the corresponding equilibrium and optimal city sizes are studied in a variety of contexts part two extends the classical theories of von thunen and alonso with the addition of externality factors such as local public goods crowding and congestion and racial prejudice the rigorous mathematical approach and theoretical treatment of the material make urban economic theory of interest to researchers in urban economics location theory urban geography and urban planning

social welfare and income inequality in a system of cities abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of a system of core periphery cities to examine the main determinants of intra and inter regional income disparities the economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous unskilled and heterogeneous skilled workers unskilled workers whose wages are determined competitively specialize in food production in local cities skilled workers whose wages are determined according to a nash bargain manufacture a high tech commodity in the metropolis we establish conditions under which this core periphery equilibrium spatial configuration emerges we show that both intra and inter regional income disparities are present the determinants of each type of disparity and the social welfare implications are fully investigated our results suggest that public policy programs that improve income equality may not be necessarily welfare enhancing

gender effects in private value auctions abstract in a two stage auction women are significantly more likely to go bankrupt than men bidding more aggressively than the men in both phases of the auction process

crowding out in the labor market a prosocial setting is necessary recent studies mostly from prosocial settings suggest that monetary rewards may crowd out effort exertion by economic agents we design a field experiment with data entry workers to investigate the extent of such crowding out effects in a labor market using simple variations in the job description of a task we induce a natural work setting under the work frame and emphasize social preference under the social frame we find that crowding out of labor participation critically depends on framing whereas small monetary rewards reduce the participation rate under the social frame the participation rate is nondecreasing in the wage rate under the work frame moreover among the workers who participate in the task those who receive a positive wage perform a considerably higher amount of work than those who are paid zero wage under either frame thus there is weak evidence of crowding out only when the task is explicitly given a prosocial flavor and not under a regular work setting furthermore emphasizing social preference in the labor market in such a way reduces the overall labor supply and seems to have an adverse effect on the quality of work data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1807 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

overconfidence and excess entry an experimental approach psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative abilities and unreasonably optimistic about their futures e g shelly e taylor and j d brown 1988 neil d weinstein 1980 when assessing their position in a distribution of peers on almost any positive trait like driving ability ola svenson 1981 income prospects or longevity a vast majority of people say they are above the average although of course only half can be if the trait is symmetrically distributed this paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence economic behavior in one particular setting entry into competitive games or markets many empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years for example using plant level data from the u s census of manufacturers spanning 1963 1982 timothy dunne et al 1988 estimated that 61 5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79 6 percent exited within 10 years most of these exits are failures see also dunne et al 1989a 1989b d shapiro and r s khemani 1987

on the continuum approach of spatial and some local public goods or product differentiation models some problems abstract models with a continuum of consumers and locations such that each consumer can purchase goods in only one location are examined such models are common in the literature of the new urban economics an approximation by economies with a finite number of consumers is shown to fail in the first two examples the continuum economy equilibrium exists and is unique but the finite economy has many equilibria example 1 or none at all example 2 in example 3 the continuum economy has no equilibrium but the finite economy has one these three examples employ location dependent utilities the fourth example illustrates the conceptual difficulties that arise in approximation when transportation cost is introduced even with location independent utilities the results are related to the literatures concerning product differentiation and spatial economies

do gender variant preferences for competition persist in the absence of performance the well established gender gap in preferences for competition has been attributed to gender variant feelings about performing in competitive environments using a novel task with agency in which subjects experience competition but cannot perform we find evidence that performing may be sufficient but not necessary to generate gender variant preferences for competition this suggests that the gender gap cannot be eliminated by correcting beliefs alone that eliminating performance for example routinizing tasks may not eliminate the gender gap and that there may be heretofore unidentified determinants of preferences for competition for example men may prefer payment schemes that are based on social comparison jel j16 c91 j24

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

local labor markets job matching and urban location we present a new way of modeling local labor markets by linking the space of workers skills and the physical space of cities the key lesson of our analysis is that firms exploit workers in these two spaces by setting wages that are below the competitive level the degree of monopsony power depends on the elasticity of the firm s labor pool which is inversely related to the costs workers incur in commuting and acquiring skills our analysis thus shows how socioeconomic ghettos emerge as workers with poor skill matches are also those who incur the highest commuting costs

saving power to conserve your reputation the effectiveness of private versus public information environmental damage is often an unseen byproduct of other activities disclosing environmental impact privately to consumers can reduce the costs and or increase the moral benefits of conservation behaviors while publicly disclosing such information can provide an additional motivation for conservation cultivating a green reputation in a unique field experiment in the residence halls at the university of california los angeles we test the efficacy of detailed private and public information on electricity conservation private information was given through real time appliance level feedback and social norms over usage and public information was given through a publicly visible conservation rating our analysis is based on 7 120 daily observations about energy use from heating and cooling lights and plug load for 66 rooms collected over an academic year our results suggest that while private information alone was ineffective public information combined with private information motivated a 20 percent reduction in electricity consumption achieved through lower use of heating and cooling public information was particularly effective for above median energy users

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

hedonic prices and cost benefit analysis abstract hedonic prices have been used to evaluate the willingness to pay for attributes we reformulate the notion of hedonic price from a composite price on housing to a unit price on traded quantities in conformity with long run competitive equilibrium theory this formulation was suggested but not developed by rosen j polit econ 82 no 1 1974 34 35 by first characterizing an efficient allocation of consumers to space we show that hedonic unit prices can be understood as a bid rent function which supports the efficient allocation this is despite the fact that the lots over which consumers bid are themselves endogenous we show that unit hedonic prices reveal preferences in a manner different from composite hedonic expenditures

gender differences in reactions to feedback and willingness to compete in western societies it is generally known that men have a greater taste for competition than women however the determinants of the decision to enter competitions are still not fully understood the aim of this paper is twofold we first evaluate how participants update their beliefs after receiving feedback informing them of whether their performance is below or above the median performance second we are interested in how men and women react to this information in terms of competitive entry our first result is that participants and women in particular react more strongly to the feedback they receive than would a bayesian agent as far as entry into competition is concerned below median participants adjust their entry decision according to the competition they expect to face while above median participants do not however the behaviour behind these results is quite different for men and women women mainly react to information on their own performance while men seem to respond more to their beliefs over the competition they will face moreover most of the effect of feedback and the information regarding the level of the competition on the decision to compete seems to operate via beliefs

personnel economics past lessons and future directions presidential address to the society of labor economists san francisco may 1 1998 in 1987 the journal of labor economics published an issue on the economics of personnel since then personnel economics defined as the application of labor economics principles to business issues has become a major part of labor economics now accounting for a substantial proportion of papers in this and other journals much of the work in personnel economics has been theoretical in large part because the data needed to test these theories have not been available in recent years a number of firm based data sets have surfaced that allow personnel economics to be tested using two such data sets i give support to the implications of theories that relate to life cycle incentives tournaments piecework incentives pay compression and peer pressure i conclude that personnel economics is real it is far more than a set of clever theories it has relevance to the real world additionally firm based data make asking and answering new kinds of questions feasible the value of research in this area is h

communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games costless pre play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with pareto ranked equilibria we report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest link contest by expending costly efforts allowing intra group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication on the other hand allowing inter group communication leads to less destructive competition as a result intra group communication decreases while inter group communication increases payoffs our experiment thus provides an example of an environment where communication can either enhance or damage efficiency this contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes

selection into self improvement and competition pay gender stereotypes and earnings volatility abstract we examine whether men and women differ in their willingness to select into a contract that pays upon improving one s past performance experiment participants choose to perform a task under either a regular piece rate or a larger piece rate provided they improve relative to a previous round women are less willing than men to select into self improvement pay and this gender gap is largely explained by higher risk aversion and to a smaller extent lower self confidence high earnings volatility widens the gender gap and makes self improvement pay less attractive than competition pay we find no effect of gender stereotypes in the willingness to sort into self improvement the results provide insight into the feasibility and potential of using self improvement contracts as gender neutral incentive mechanisms

loopholes undermine donation an experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in israel article i nfo giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting lists as has been implemented in israel and singapore pro vides an incentive for registration and has the potential to increase the pool of deceased donor organs however the implementation of a priority rule might allow for loopholes as is the case in israel in which an individual can reg ister to receive priority but avoid ever being in a position to donate organs we experimentally investigate how such a loophole affects donation and find that the majority of subjects use the loophole when available the existence of a loophole completely eliminates the increase in donation generated by the priority rule when information about loophole use is made public subjects respond to others use of the loophole by withholding donation such that the priority system with a loophole generates fewer do nations than an allocation system without priority 2013 published by elsevier b v