factor use and productivity change in the alcoholic beverage industries 1 introductiondemands for wine beer and spirits are in view of their substitutable nature often studied in conjunction with one another heien and pompelli 1989 nelson 1999 yet the alcoholic beverage industries are connected by similarities in their production processes and inputs as well as by the demand substitutability of their products lea and piggott 1995 these industries are therefore usefully examined together when questions about technical change and productivity growth arise little recent attention has been given to the nature of technical adjustments in the beer sector and no such work seems ever to have been published on wine and spirits 1brewing and distilling and to a smaller extent winemaking have become increasingly mechanized during the past half century as they have in most other manufacturing sectors packaging rates are higher shelf lives longer and storage and transportation technology improved tremblay 1987 elzinga 1990 pp 216 219 iserentant 1995 piggott and conner 1995 gisser 1999 the fixed costs associated with these innovations have broadly speaking served as an incentive to build fewer and larger plants industry concentration in the beer sector rose dramatically from the mid 1930s through the mid 1980s plant numbers then expanded as microbreweries catered to the new demand for product variety and idiosyncrasy although four firm concentration continued to rise through the mid 1990s in the spirits sector domiciled largely in the south distillery numbers continue to decline spurred by declining aggregate demand as well as scale economies no such broad consolidation is taking place in the wine industry where several california and new york firms long have occupied a substantial market share instead wineries numbers have grown rapidly and uninterruptedly since 1970 proliferating in regions long thought inhospitable to wine grape production growing consumer interest in wine variety and microclimates a trend similar to that for microbrews has abetted this diversification goodhue et al 2000 prices in the alcoholic beverage industries have in real terms fallen substantially in the past 40 years net prices to brewers have dropped 37 to wineries 16 and to distillers 31 at the same time real wage rates generally have risen and except for brief instability during the 1970s so have capital rental prices real material prices in all three sectors rose from the 1950s through the 1960s fell through the 1970s then recovered by the mid 1990s to their early 1970s levels relative factor prices in the beer industry broadly representative of those in the other two sectors are shown in figure 1 wage rates rose relative to both capital and material prices until 1980 thereafter wages fell relative to capital but continued to rise relative to material prices u s bureau of the census various years expenditure shares illustrated in figure 2 suggest that the beer industry is the most capital intensive of the three sectors by the mid 1990s capital expenditures represented one third of beer production costs compared to only one fifth of wine and distilling costs on the other hand raw materials constituted little more than half of beer expenses but nearly 70 of wine and distilling costs labor accounted for only 10 12 of expenditures in any of these industries figure 2 seems to suggest that at least since the mid 1970s or early 1980s capital has substituted for labor and materials in all three sectors yet as figure 1 reveals much of these share changes are accounted for by the rising relative price of capital the substantial narrowing of output input price margins in the alcoholic beverage sector suggests that the sector has become more cost efficient through either technical change scale economies improved utilization rates or other means technical changes themselves can alter potential scale economies and productive capacities and hence prospects for future variations in industry structure

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

how does advertising depend on competition evidence from u s brewing the relationship between market structure and advertising has been extensively studied but has generated sharply opposing theoretical predictions as well as inconclusive empirical findings likely because of severe endogeneity concerns we exploit the 2008 merger of miller and coors in the u s brewing industry to examine how changes in local concentration affect firms advertising behavior well established regional preferences over beer brands and the sharp increase in concentration from the merger make this an excellent setting to analyze this question we find a significant positive effect of local market concentration on advertising expenditures a 100 point increase in the herfindahl hirschmann index measure of concentration increases advertising per capita by about 5 our findings shed light on how and when firms choose to deploy advertising the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2889 this paper was accepted by eric anderson marketing

ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction abstract the private valuation assumption found in most trading mechanism design papers rules out markets whose valuation structure generates externalities between traders this paper characterizes the set of ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms for a large class of markets that do admit such externalities and for bilateral trade markets establishes the impossibility of a first best solution across a class of trading problems employing uniform priors and linear valuation structures this paper also compares levels of market efficiency for varying numbers of traders

interpreting rising concentration the case of beer despite considerable long term progress in distinguishing conceptually between the fact of market power and the calculation of market concentration antitrust claimants the department of justice the federal trade commission ftc and private litigants continue to place substantial emphasis on defining a market computing market shares and calculating measures of concentration the operating supposition is virtually always that monopoly or market power is positively associated with concentration whether other offsetting characteristics are also associated with high concentration ordinarily receives less if any consideration the most often cited consideration weighing against an automatic condemnation of increased concentration say through horizontal merger is that costs market power and concentration may all be jointly related economic analysis suggests that if higher concentration brings with it is caused by or causes lower industry costs then it may also bring positive total benefits even if antitrust concern with industry concentration focuses on market power the ability of firms to restrict output and raise price the brewing industry among others has been a major target of this concern because of its high and rising concentration this paper sketches two alternative explanations for this change in industry structure competitive expansion by the more efficient brewers and anticompetitive exclusion of equally efficient but smaller brewers empirical analysis indicates that competition is the better hypothesis in explaining changes in the structure of the beer market

a reappraisal of interpreting rising concentration the case of beer there has been a tremendous amount of change in the structure and conduct of the post world war ii brewing industry most important concentration has risen scale economies have increased and advertising intensity especially television advertising has changed in a recent article in this journal william j lynk 1984 attempted to determine empirically how changes in concentration and technology affected brewing industry performance between 1974 and 1980 2 he found support for the competition hypothesis that cost reductions due to cost superiority or the exploitation of scale economies have dominated the possible market power effect of rising concentration and have caused output to increase and prices to fall thus the alternative or the exclusion hypothesis that large brewers have squeezed smaller rivals out of in contrast to the finding of william j lynk that rising concentration in the u s brewing industry caused industry output to expand and by his presumption prices to fall the results of this study show that concentration had no significant direct impact on post world war ii beer prices estimates from a reduced form price equation reveal that advertising and costs have had a significant positive effect on beer prices these results provide evidence that the rising concentration scale economies and advertising expenditures in the u s brewing industry generated higher beer prices between 1950 and 1971 i would like to thank william hallagan for bringing lynk s paper to my attention and james f ragan jr carol horton tremblay and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on earlier drafts any remaining errors are my responsibility 1 for example the number of firms declined from 386 to 37 and the five firm concentration ratio increased from 23 to 71 between 1950 and 1978 see elzinga 1973 1982 keithahn 1978 ornstein 1981 and greer 1971a 1981 for excellent industry studies 2 in this paper industry performance is evaluated from the consumer s point of view for a given level of product quality if structure and conduct changes are beneficial to consumers by causing the market price to fall then industry performance has improved

strategic liquidity supply and security design we study how securities and issuance mechanisms can be designed to mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity in our model asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling claims contingent on privately observed future cash flows liquidity suppliers can be competitive or strategic in the optimal trading mechanism associated to an arbitrary given security issuers with low cash flows sell their entire holdings of the security while issuers with high cash flows are typically excluded from trade by designing the security optimally issuers can avoid exclusion altogether we show that the optimal security is debt because of its low informational sensitivity debt mitigates the adverse selection problem furthermore by pooling all issuers with high cash flows debt also reduces the ability of a monopolistic liquidity supplier to exclude them from trade in order to better extract rents from issuers with lower cash flows

optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints abstract consider the optimal incentive compatible contract offered by a firm with private information to its risk averse employees if the firm is subject to a binding limited liability or bankruptcy constraint then the contract will yield underemployment in low productivity states relative to full information efficiency such contracts either yield underemployment in all states or excessively high variability in employment

ratifiable mechanisms learning from disagreement in a mechanism design problem participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo if equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players beliefs then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints we investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two stage process consisting of a ratification state followed by the actual play of the chosen game we develop and illustrate a new concept ratifiability that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

on the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information in interim economies with asymmetric information we show that the coarse core of wilson 1978 does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated this failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion of either interim core or price equilibrium

optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade a simple general equilibrium approach we investigate the design of domestic incentive regulations in a small economy opened to trade and its implications for international specialization and for trade openness to remain welfare improving more specifically we append to an otherwise standard 2 2 heckscher ohlin model of a small open economy a continuum of intermediate sectors producing nontradable goods used in tradable sectors those goods are produced by privately informed regulated firms asymmetric information induces distortions with general equilibrium impacts the small economy becomes relatively richer in the informationally sensitive factor so that asymmetric information might reverse trade patterns free trade is pareto dominated by autarky when it exacerbates agency distortions

efficiency and mechanisms with no regret can we always design a game form so that all its bayesian equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational efficient or interim envy free efficient in asymmetric information economies we show that the answer is no given that such games exist in complete information economies can this gap be filled by games that leak information endogenously without enlarging the equilibrium set we adopt two approaches first we introduce a theory of cheap play as a natural model of such games the second is an extreme approach that adopts an ex post viewpoint neither yields a possibility result information leakage does not recover efficiency this paper addresses the following question in any domain of asymmetric information economies is it always possible to design a game form so that all its equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational efficient or interim fair envy free efficient our first result is that with bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept we can never design such a game form in a wide domain of economies the impossibility result persists even if there were strong restrictions on the information structure guaranteeing incentive compatibility of all allocation rules from the nash implementation literature maskin 1977 hurwicz et al 1984 we know that such games exist in complete information economies our first result indicates the cost in terms of social welfare imposed on society by the presence of information asymmetry this raises a natural question can the gap between the positive results under complete information and the negative ones under incomplete information be bridged by devising game forms that leak information endogenously in an equilibrium of such a game the players optimality calculations are conditioned on the newly acquired information superficially it appears that such games may yield a solution to the problem of nonexistence of efficient mechanisms information leakage is a mixed blessing since typically it would require pre play communication which tends to enlarge the set of equilibria our negative findings using bayesian equilibrium were primarily due to the presence of too many equilibria in every conceivable game form clearly we need a game form that

a note on pareto optimality in differential information economies a mechanism is posterior efficient if the agents expected utilities given the outcomes of this mechanism can never be pareto improved a non revealing resp completely revealing mechanism is posterior efficient if and only if it is incentive interim resp ex post efficient

differential payments within a bidder coalition and the shapley value bidder coalitions at english auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction or knockout when coalition members are sufficiently heterogeneous nested coalition structures are observed in which a knockout is conducted at each level of nesting the nested knockout s characteristics are investigated within many settings we find that the expected payments to coalition members via the nested knockout equal the shapley value incentive compatibility problems of the nested knockout are also analyzed

aggregation determinacy and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information abstract we identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi complete for quasi complete economies we determine equilibrium trades show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria besides unifying some familiar settings such as those of grossman 1976 and milgrom and stokey 1982 the following new results are proved a the same restrictions that deliver gorman aggregation under symmetric information are sufficient for gorman aggregation under asymmetric information even under partially informative prices b the traditional assumptions of quadratic utilities and endowment spanning that result in the capm under symmetric information deliver a conditional capm under asymmetric information with prices that need not be fully informative c the linear equilibrium in grossman s 1976 model is the only equilibrium linear or not while minor changes in the normality assumptions result in indeterminacy and partially informative equilibria and d if there is no aggregate endowment risk asymmetrically informed agents with common priors sell the risky part of their endowment in every equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 g14 c62

the market for medical services and physicians an application of hedonic price theory without disputing the importance of the special characteristics found in the market for medical services it is argued in this paper that the standard economic model of maximizing behaviour rather than an idiosyncratic theoretical formulation unique to the medical profession is well suited to this market this conclusion is based on analysis in which the technique of equalizing differences is used to define a competitive equilibrium that provides the possibility of both price and non price competition the maximizing model developed provides an alternative theoretical explanation of the limit placed on supplier induced demand to that offered by the target income model of physician behaviour or that offered by the arguments based on medical ethics le marche des soins et des medecins une application de la theorie des prix hedoniques sans remettre en question l importance des caracteristiques particulieres du march6 des soins l auteur suggere que le modele traditionnel de comportement de maximisation est applicable a ce march6 et un substitut preferable aux formulations theoriques specifiquements dessinees pour la profession medicale l auteur derive cette conclusion d une analyse dans laquelle la technique des diff6rences egalisantes est utilisee pour definir un equilibre concurrentiel qui accommode la concurrence par les prix mais aussi par d autres moyens le modele de comportement de maximisation qui est developpe fournit une explication th6orique de rechange pour la limite placee sur la demande engendree par le producteur les autres explications ont ete fournies par des modeles de comportement du medecin tentant de se donner acces a un revenu cible ou encore par des explications fondees sur l ethique medicale the market for medical care is distinct from that for other commodities since medical services are often non transferable once purchased kessel 1958 pauly 1978 and consumers frequently find it difficult to evaluate medical services evans 1974 these characteristics of the medical market and the observation that physician density and both physician fees and services are positively associated have encouraged the assertion that physicians control demand sloan and feldman 1978 although research assistance by franca pastro and mary stafford is gratefully acknowledged financial assistance for this research was provided by the british columbia youth employment program the university of alberta s central research fund and the president s research grant from simon fraser university in addition i am grateful for the comments made by chris hall terry heaps david ryan seminar participants at the university of alberta and two anonymous referees canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xviii no 2 may 1985 printed in canada imprime au canada 0008 4085 85 377 94 1 50 c canadian economics association this content downloaded from 157 55 39 144 on mon 25 jul 2016 03 48 21 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

all stage strong correlated equilibrium abstract a strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations different notions of strong correlated equilibria were defined in the literature one major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation before ex ante or after ex post the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile in this paper we show that an ex ante strong correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages thus the set of ex ante strong correlated equilibria of moreno wooders games econ behav 17 1996 80 113 is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria

incentive schemes as a signaling device abstract this paper considers a model of moral hazard where the principal has private information for instance in an organizational setting the firm may be better informed about the profitability of a sales area for which it seeks to employ a new sales representative we show how this information asymmetry may lead to a game of signaling which can mute incentives

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

interim third party selection in bargaining abstract third party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information in this paper i consider the selection of a third party in a two person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness for a class of problems i find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary the selected third party s intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative this paper shows how the process of interim third party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third party intervention in bargaining

gifts as economic signals and social symbols gift giving has often puzzled economists especially because efficient gifts like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for seem crass or inappropriate it is shown in a formal game theoretic model that gifts serve as signals of a person s intentions about future investment in a relationship and inefficient gifts can be better signals other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced and some stylized facts about gift giving practices are described many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts

optimal robust bilateral trade risk neutrality a risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item we prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non wasteful randomized posted prices

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

efficiency enhancing signalling in the samaritan s dilemma suppose an altruistic person a is willing to transfer resources to a second person b if b comes upon hard times if b anticipates that a will act in this manner b will save too little from both agents point of view this is the samaritan s dilemma this paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information because if a is uncertain about how big b s need for support is b will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need by saving more than he otherwise would have done

incomplete information incentive compatibility and the core abstract we consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts while communication of private information is permitted the true information state is not verifiable the enforcement of contracts is therefore limited by incentive compatibility constraints we formalize a notion of the core for such an economy our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of r wilson 1978 econometrica46 807 816 or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the notion of incentive efficiency of b holmstrom and r myerson 1983 econometrica51 1799 1819 while there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non empty our main result shows that is not generally true journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c72 d51

ex ante efficient ex post individually rational trade abstract consider a bilateral trade model with two sided incomplete information for a general set of independent beliefs an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient interim individually rational mechanism is constructed thus imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency

the new york times and the market for local newspapers recent technological advances have dramatically lowered the cost of transmitting information over large distances in the late 1990s the new york times implemented a national distribution strategy expanding delivery in over 100 cities using cross sectional and longitudinal data on local newspaper circulation times penetration and local newspapers characteristics we find that as times circulation grows in a market local newspaper circulation declines among college educated readers local newspapers reposition toward local and away from national coverage raising circulation among individuals without a degree availability of national newspapers in local markets changes the relationship between local preferences and local products

the pass through of beer taxes to prices evidence from state and federal tax changes i introduction alcohol excise taxes are a common form of taxation used by the federal government and state governments alike serving the dual purpose of raising revenue and protecting the public health through reduced consumption 1 from a policy perspective it is crucial to understand how alcohol taxes are passed through to prices if higher taxes are to be levied standard economic theory predicts that taxes are at most fully passed through in a competitive market where firms are price takers however the market for beer in the united states can be best categorized as an oligopoly and beer stands out as the most prevalent type of alcohol consumed in the country 2 theories in imperfect competition suggest various possibilities of tax shifting including over and under shifting to prices in oligopolistic markets as fullerton and metcalf 2002 discuss an over shifting of tax can occur because of both the existence of market power and the strategic behavior of firms under shifting is also possible when the burden of higher taxes is shifted to labor in the form of lower wages or to other factors of production ultimately the amount of the tax pass through is an empirical question and therefore the main goal of this study is to provide new estimates of the magnitude of the beer tax pass through to prices in the united states when legislators consider changing beer taxes precise and recent estimates of the pass through rate are required to understand how the tax change will affect retail prices to our knowledge there are only a few existing studies that empirically estimate the pass through rate of alcohol taxes to prices in the united states using quarterly state level data from 1982 to 1997 young and kwapisz 2002 find that taxes on beer spirits and wine are over shifted to retail prices specifically the authors estimate that a 1 increase in the tax per barrel of beer increases the retail beer price by a range of 1 67 1 88 kenkel 2005 uses the 2002 tax hike in alaska to perform before after analyses and concludes that alcohol taxes are more than fully passed through to prices kenkel finds that the average pass through rate for off premise consumption is 2 14 2 03 and 1 57 for budweiser bud light and heineken respectively although a novel study in various ways the lack of a control group and the study s focus just on alaska raises questions regarding the external validity of the results stehr 2007 uses price data from the third quarter editions of the american chamber of commerce research association accra from 1990 to 2004 and finds that the magnitude of the pass through of beer taxes to prices is 0 94 this point estimate suggests that beer taxes are almost fully passed through to prices and a confidence interval around the estimate includes values greater than one however stehr s study only includes state and year fixed effects in the model as additional control variables and excludes other potential determinants of both alcohol prices and taxes also it is unclear as to why the study only uses the third quarter editions of accra when tax changes may occur any time during the year reflecting on the existing studies in the united states it must be emphasized that the most recent data used ends in 2004 since then the beer industry has experienced two major mergers of leading producers sabmiller and coors in 2007 followed by anheuser busch and inbev in 2008 given this restructuring within the industry new estimates of the tax pass through rate are warranted in terms of studies outside the united states bergman and hansen 2010 analyze the tax pass through rate in denmark using the liquor tax cut in 2003 the beer tax increase in 1997 and the beer tax cut in 2005 the authors find evidence of over shifting during the incidence of tax hikes and under shifting during the events of tax cuts carbonnier 2013 studies differences between the ad valorem taxes and per unit excise taxes in france and finds that the per unit excise taxes are over shifted whereas ad valorem taxes are under shifted to prices

forward shifting of the personal income tax by self employed canadian dentists in this paper two tests are conducted of the null hypothesis that self employed canadian dentists do not shift the burden of their personal income tax forward to their patients by charging higher real dental fees the first test using ordinary least squares estimation of a reduced form dental fee equation is based on an exogenous tax variable the second test uses two stage least squares estimation of a reduced form dental fee equation with an endogenous tax variable both tests reject the null hypothesis of no forward shifting and fail to reject the hypothesis that self employed canadian dentists shift forward 100 percent of their personal income tax burden

television and voter turnout i use variation across markets in the timing of television s introduction to identify its impact on voter turnout the estimated effect is significantly negative accounting for between a quarter and a half of the total decline in turnout since the 1950s i argue that substitution away from other media with more political coverage provides a plausible mechanism linking television to voting as evidence for this i show that the entry of television in a market coincided with sharp drops in consumption of newspapers and radio and in political knowledge as measured by election surveys i also show that both the information and turnout effects were largest in off year congressional elections which receive extensive coverage in newspapers but little or no coverage on television

noisy advertising and the predation rule in antitrust analysis can advertising by dominant firms pose a predatory threat theoretically the answer clearly is yes however empirical evidence indicating the importance of this theoretical finding is largely missing economists empirical studies of advertising which typically focus on the question of whether high levels of advertising are indicative of the presence of a barrier to entry or signal that advertising information can substitute for consumption experience usually employ average advertising levels that hide strategically focused price cuts or changes in short term advertising rates

bilateral trading in networks in many markets goods flow from initial producers to final customers travelling through many layers of intermediaries and information is asymmetric we study a dynamic model of bargaining in networks that captures these features we show that the equilibrium price demanded over time is non monotonic but the sequence of transaction prices declines over time with the possible exception of the last period the price dynamic is therefore reminiscent of fire sales and hot potato trading traders who intermediate the object arise endogenously and make a positive profit the profit earning intermediaries are not necessarily traders with many connections for the case of multilayer networks they belong to the path that reaches the maximum number of potential buyers using the minimal number of intermediaries this is not necessarily the path of the network that maximizes the probability of consumption by traders who value the most the object i e welfare

the equivalence of lending equilibria and signalling based insurance under asymmetric information i present a model in which a continuum of individuals have stochastic idiosyncratic income shocks complete insurance is physically feasible but unattainable due to an information asymmetry income shocks are observable only by the individuals receiving them any insurance institution must therefore rely on self reporting of income innovations two ways of achieving incentive compatible self reporting are presented the first is a debt market with an explicit lending restriction the second is an insurance contract that linearly filters a signal transmitted by individuals the two are then demonstrated to be identical equilibrium consumption fluctuates in a random walk which is inefficient given the physical potential for complete insurance but is efficient given the information constraints the results are complementary to those of green 1987 but permit more general stochastic processes of income to be analyzed serial correlation of income reduces the efficiency of the insurance

heterogeneous preferences and equilibrium trading volume abstract the representative agent lucas model stresses aggregate risk and hence does not allow us to study the impact of agents heterogeneity on the dynamics of equilibrium trading volume in this paper we investigate under what conditions non informational heterogeneity i e differences in preferences and endowments leads to nontrivial trading volume in equilibrium we present a non informational no trade theorem that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for zero equilibrium trading volume in a continuous time lucas market model with heterogeneous agents multiple goods and multiple securities we explain in detail how no trade equilibria are related to autarky equilibria portfolio autarky equilibria and peculiar financial market equilibria which play an important role in the literature on international risk sharing

unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information abstract the paper considers an exchange economy with incomplete information in which agents can retrade goods until all gains from trade are exhausted unimprovable allocations are defined to be those allocations from which agents would not wish to deviate either by retrading goods or by revealing further information the concept of unimprovability is then used to analyze a lemons market and an adverse selection insurance market in which agents can renegotiate after information has been revealed finally unimprovability is compared to different concepts of efficiency and to the concept of durability journal of economic literature classification number d82

efficient contracting with reliance and a damage measure this article reexamines the problem of breach of contract studied by shavell 1980 1984 and rogerson 1984 by considering explicitly the incentive problems that arise from asymmetric information and transaction specific investment we derive the optimal contract which consists of variable price and damage payment schedules each of which is set before any private information is observed we show that the optimal contract attains full classical efficiency

reputational comparative advantage and multinational enterprise 1 introduction when cultivating a new export market or attempting to expand its share of an existing market an exporter is likely to find that it has been preceded by its reputation minus a readily identifiable brand name quality reputation may solely reflect the country of origin for example when consumers are presented with a large amount of complex product information they may use the country of origin as a heuristic in forming product impressions without considering other product attributes 1 in this article i show that this heuristic decision making process can affect a firm s quality decision and can therefore become self fulfilling hence any bias that consumers have may be well founded however it is only correct because firms respond rationally to it colombia s garment industry provides an interesting example of a self fulfilling unfavorable quality reputation in international trade as described by morawetz 1981 a single colombian garment firm took a contract for 50 000 men s suits that was beyond its capability the poor quality result so tarnished the american importer s name that other high quality importers become wary of colombian sewn garments with the payoff to high quality production reduced colombian garment firms then concentrated on low quality markets and the newly found unfavorable reputation was justified in the model constructed here consumers see only a noisy signal of the product s quality at the time of purchase therefore their posterior beliefs are based on this noisy signal and the country of origin reputations as will be made clear higher quality firms benefit more from an increase in their country s reputation so that a better reputation generates an increase in the percentage of high quality firms in this way the reputation becomes self fulfilling and ex ante identical countries can be correctly perceived as differing in their percentage of high quality producers i next introduce an economy with two sectors one sector produces more complex goods where high quality is not easily verified and is more essential to the product s performance these may be technology intensive products or they may consist of the design and marketing of the goods produced in the other sector in particular high quality production costs and the consumer s value for high quality goods is greater in this sector i show that this sector becomes more profitable as the country of origin reputation increases hence if one country s equilibrium reputation is low and the other country s equilibrium reputation is high then the pattern of specialization and international trade can be determined solely by reputational comparative advantage 2 finally i show that reputational comparative advantage can overshadow a small technological comparative disadvantage in determining the pattern of international trade given this pattern of trade and specialization based on reputational comparative advantage a high reputation firm may expend resources to establish a multinational enterprise mne in the low reputation country for example many mne products require the differing specializations of both the high and low reputation countries although differing in motivation this result accords well with more traditional models of vertical mne 3 however this impetus for mne as well as its more traditional counterparts does not explain why the mne would choose foreign direct investment fdi over a less costly licensing arrangement 4 the quality uncertainty in this model along with the difference in equilibrium reputations allows us to address this question in particular appropriable reputational rents are generated by fdi when the high reputation parent firm procures and internalizes production with a low reputation host firm this fdi breaks the low reputation equilibrium of the host firm and generates reputational rents

strategy proof stochastic assignment abstract i study strategy proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects a stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments and mechanisms are compared according to first order stochastic dominance i show that non wasteful strategy proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy proof mechanisms however non wastefulness is highly restrictive when the mechanism involves randomization in fact the random priority mechanism i e the random serial dictatorship and a recently adopted school choice mechanism deferred acceptance with random tie breaking are wasteful i find that both these mechanisms are dominated by strategy proof mechanisms in general strategy proof improvement cannot be due to merely reshuffling objects and therefore must involve assigning more objects

national television and the market for local products the case of beer information technology lowers the cost of distributing information to dispersed consumers because national firms reap larger benefits from new media than firms serving only local consumers media innovations may reduce the market for local products this paper considers the effect of television on the market for local beer using market level data on television penetration local breweries and brewery production from 1945 1960 results show that increases in television penetration are associated with fewer local breweries and less local beer production the results indicate that the industrial organization of media markets can affect the structure of markets for local products

coalition proof equilibrium we characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can communicate prior to play but they cannot reach binding agreements a coalition proof equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no coalition has an improving and self enforcing deviation we show that any correlated strategy whose support is contained in the set of actions that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and weakly pareto dominates every other correlated strategy whose support is contained in that set is a coalition proof equilibrium consequently the unique equilibrium of a dominance solvable game is coalition proof journal of economic literature classification

asymmetric information information externalities and efficiency the case of oil exploration in this article we examine the efect of private information and information externalities on the ex post eficiency of investment in oil exploration we show that too much drilling tends to occur ifjirms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil and too little drilling occurs if the opposite is true bargaining with well defined property rights to the information externality can eliminate underinvestment but overinvestment remains a problem because firms have an incentive not to disclose their private information

stability with one sided incomplete information two notions of stability ex ante stability and bayesian stability are investigated in a matching model with non transferrable utility interdependent preferences and one sided incomplete information ex ante stable matching outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner s type while bayesian stable matching outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs ex ante stability is a minimal requirement bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties

the veil of public ignorance abstract a theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian standard of evaluation governing choices under complete information the task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information our first main result generalizes harsanyi s j polit econ 63 1955 309 classical result to situations of incomplete information assuming that group preferences satisfy bayesian coherence and interim pareto dominance these axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists we argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of bayesian preference aggregation under complete information

auction design and favoritism abstract the theory of auctions has ignored the fact that often auction designers not the principal design auctions in a multi attribute auction the auction designer may bias his subjective evaluation of quality or distort the relative weights of the various attributes to favor a specific bidder an ancient concern in the procurement of weapons in the auctioning of government contracts and in the purchase of electricity by regulated power companies the paper analyzes the steps to be taken to reduce the possibility of favoritism it is first shown that in the absence of favoritism quality differentials among firms are more likely to be ignored if the auction designer has imperfect information about the firm s costs second if the auction designer may collude with only one bidder the other bidders should be chosen if they are at least as efficient as the former bidder and no hard information about quality differentials is released by the auction designer that would justify fair discrimination in favor of the former bidder last if the auction designer can collude with any bidder the optimal auction tends to a symmetric auction in which quality differentials are ignored the possibility of favoritism reduces the auction designer s discretion and makes the selection process focus on non manipulable monetary dimensions of bids

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

decentralized trading with private information the paper studies how asset prices are determined in a decentralized market with asymmetric information about asset values we consider an economy in which a large number of agents trade two assets in bilateral meetings a fraction of the agents has private information about the asset values we show that over time uninformed agents can elicit information from their trading partners by making small offers this form of experimentation allows the uninformed agents to acquire information as long as there are potential gains from trade in the economy as a consequence the economy converges to a pareto efficient allocation

irreversibility and uncertainty cause an intergenerational equity efficiency trade off abstract two important policy goals in intergenerational problems are pareto efficiency and sustainability i e intergenerational equity we demonstrate that the pursuit of these goals is subject to an intergenerational equity efficiency trade off our analysis highlights two salient characteristics of intergenerational problems and policy i temporal irreversibility i e the inability to revise one s past actions and ii uncertainty of future consequences of present actions in human environment systems we employ a two non overlapping generations model that combines an intragenerational production decision on the use of circulating capital and a non renewable resource with a negative intergenerational externality as an unforeseen contingency if initially unknown problems become apparent and policy is enacted after irreversible actions were taken policy making faces a fundamental trade off between ex post pareto efficiency and sustainability that is one can achieve either one of these two goals but not both

virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information abstract the core is extended to games with incomplete information the feasible set is characterized by incentive compatible mechanisms blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive compatible mediation plan membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure independent types and sidepayments an offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual utility scales that generalize the weighted utility scales of the inner core mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable

markets beer in germany and the united states between 1950 and 2000 the four firm producer concentration ratio for beer increased from 22 to 95 in the united states and anheuser busch s share of domestic output ballooned from 6 to 54 percent in germany concentration has risen but it remains low in 2000 the four firm producer concentration ratio was just 29 and the eight firm ratio in germany was smaller than the one firm ratio in the united states in 2005 after five years of important mergers involving big brewers the german beer industry was still much less concentrated than its american counterpart in this article i discuss several candidate explanations for the failure of beer producer concentration to rise as much in germany as in the united states the relevance of the new technologies to german brewers the preferences of german consumers the rules for advertising on german television and other factors largely absent from the consensus interpretation of american experience i find that market structure depends on a remarkably broad range of factors extending well beyond technological opportunity and market size

the economics of medicare equilibrium within the medical community this paper partially fills a theoretical void by developing an integrated model of the various branches of the medical community a consistent and general framework is adopted to analyze equilibrium within the market for medical services under a stylized form of socialized medicine without invoking demand shifting the optimization problem faced by each agent is specified and the equilibrium is defined the effect of various parameter changes on the market for medical services is analyzed the predictions are not contradicted by the stylized facts

equilibrium rejection of a mechanism we study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game by refusing to participate in the mechanism a player can revert to playing the default game non cooperatively we show with an example that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms which will be rejected on the equilibrium path in our construction a refusal to participate conveys information about the types of the players this information causes the default game to be played under different beliefs and more importantly under different higher order beliefs than the interim ones we find a lower bound on all the implementable payoffs we use this bound to establish a condition on the default game under which all the implementable outcomes are truthfully implementable without the need to induce rejection of the mechanism