repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

the education and development of managers for future decades a major report managers for the xxi century their education and development emanated from a landmark international conference in paris in june 1980 sponsored jointly by the american assembly of collegiate schools of business aacsb and the european foundation for management development efmd 1 the report was published in the fall of 1981 but thus far has received little notice from academicians although it culminated a 3 year effort management and management education in a world of changing expectations by the aacsb and the efmd to establish a frame work to prepare managers better for the forthcoming decades 2 in this article we present a personal interpretation of the ideas on management education that emerged from the paris meeting the various ideas on changes in the direction of management education are certainly worthy of widespread analysis discussion and consideration on the part of teachers researchers and educators in management a response that has not occurred up to this time

are consumption taxes really better than income taxes abstract we use political equilibrium theory and the neoclassical growth model to compare consumption and income tax systems if government outlays are used for redistribution through transfers then steady state equilibria in societies that use income taxes are not necessarily worse in welfare terms and may even be better income taxes are attractive precisely because they are more distortionary since this implies low equilibrium transfer levels we also find that switching tax systems typically does not benefit the median voter moreover a change from income to consumption taxes may make everybody worse off

tournaments with midterm reviews in many tournaments investments are made over time the question whether to conduct a review once at the end or additionally at points midway through the tournament is a strategic decision if the latter course is chosen then the designer must establish both a rule for aggregating the results of the different reviews and a rule for determining compensations we first study the case of a fixed exogenously given prize and then extend the analysis to the case where the prize is not fixed but may vary with the tournament s outcome it is shown that 1 it is always optimal to assign a higher weight to the final review 2 this weight increases with the dominance of the first stage effort in determining the final review s outcome when the prize is not fixed the optimal design generates an asymmetric tournament in the second stage that favors the winner of the midterm review

a global survey of international business education in the 1990s this article presents the major findings of the fifth global curriculum survey of the academy of international business aib an examination of the status and trends in international business education around the world as of the early 1990s the survey s findings based on responses from more than 500 business schools encompass different goals and methods of internationalization international linkages and experiential activities organizational issues amounts of internationalization progress achieved and degrees of administrative satisfaction with progress achieved the overall conclusion is that considerable progress has been made but much more remains to be accomplished

transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities how do public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare in economies with investment complementarities and what is the optimal transparency in the information conveyed for example by economic statistics policy announcements or news in the media we first consider an environment where the complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique no matter the structure of information an increase in the precision of public information may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate volatility nevertheless as long as there is no value to lotteries welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute precision of public information hence full transparency is optimal this is because more transparency facilitates more effective coordination which is valuable from a social perspective on the other hand when complementarities are strong enough that multiple equilibria are possible more transparency permits the market to coordinate more effectively on either the bad or the good equilibrium in this case constructive ambiguity becomes optimal if there is a high risk that more transparency will lead to coordination failures this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

transparency and economic policy we provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability transfers are partly financed through government debt and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems the model provides an explanation of fiscal churning it also predicts that groups whose transfers are less visible to others receive higher transfers and that imperfect transparency of transfers may lead to underprovision of public goods from the policy perspective the main novelty of our analysis is a separate evaluation of the transparency of spending and the transparency of revenues we show that the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency transparency of spending is beneficial but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive because it endogenously leads to increased wasteful spending

experiential knowledge and cost in the internationalization process using a behavioral approach this study identifies and delineates components of experiential knowledge in the internationalization process three hypotheses are developed and tested they center ar

learning from coarse information biased contests and career profiles an organization s promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly rational learning about ability the decision maker can bias noisy rank order contests sequentially thereby changing the information they convey the optimal final period bias favours the leader reinforcing his likely ability advantage when optimally biased rank order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information the leader is favoured in every period in other environments bias in early periods may i favour the early loser ii be optimal even when the workers are equally rated and iii reduce the favoured worker s promotion chances this paper presents a model of boundedly rational learning by an organization the aims are to represent in a simple form the costs of gathering processing or transmitting information and to analyse their implications for the procedures selected to handle information as well as for the decisions actually made like other recent work on the internal organization of firms this work explores to what extent organizational structure and behaviour as well as organizational performance can be explained by adaptation to the costs associated with information in the learning model we formulate the decision maker not only selects a rule specifying what action to take as a function of his observations but also chooses sequentially the information partitions generating those observations this general problem is interpreted in the context of an organization which needs to make an important promotion decision and which attempts to maximize the value of the information generated during the observation periods that precede the decision one of the motivations for this analysis was the finding by organizational sociologists that earnings and promotions in the later stages of a worker s career are strongly correlated with earnings and promotions in the early stages kanter 1977 rosenbaum 1984 later success is positively associated with early success even when one controls for the effect of observable characteristics likely to affect performance such as education one obvious source of this correlation is differences in ability that persist over time and that are not captured by the observable covariates in this paper we focus on differences in ability which are initially unobservable by organizations and their workers as well as by researchers we present a simple model of an organization trying to learn about differences in ability and show

the optimal prize structure of symmetric tullock contests we show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n player tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists if such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner take all structure we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts if no such optimal equilibrium exists no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts

the internationalization of the curriculum this note reviews the results of four surveys related to the efforts of the aacsb to internationalize the curriculum of the business schools the first a survey of the 1071 participants in the 30 workshop seminars which have been organized by the aacsb showed that the workshops have been very beneficial for the participants and affected the courses they teach the second survey of all aacsb member schools showed that most of them plan to internationalize their curriculums by introducing an international dimension into the core courses but this raises the question of whether the faculty members are trained or prepared to do this the third survey found that only 64 out of 564 aacsb member schools have one or more exchange programs with foreign business schools and that only about 125 professors go overseas each year under the aegis of these programs finally a fourth survey of the 53 largest doctoral programs indicated that only 17 of the graduates of our doctoral programs study any international courses during their graduate masters and doctoral studies thus the next generation of faculty members will have difficulty in introducing any international content into the courses they teach

is there a relationship between a geocentric mind set and multinational strategy this paper operationalizes and tests relationships between a geocentric managerial mind set geographic scope and the structural and strategic characteristics of firms and industries relationships are tested using data from a survey of senior corporate international hrm managers of large u s based manufacturing multinationals an index of a geocentric mind set is found to correlate with geographic scope and various aspects of ihrm policy and practice however no relationship is found with measures of multinational strategy or organizational structure the paper concludes with a speculative hypothesis development of a geocentric mind set may relate to the information or knowledge intensity of the firm rather than its position on the strategic continuum

the liability insurance market t his paper offers an overview of the u s liability insurance market and the link between its performance and developments in tort law over the last few decades the dominant feature of the insurance market has been the intermittent periods of rapidly rising premiums and cutbacks on the availability of coverage the insurance cycle appears to be increasing in amplitude and since the 1960s has been concentrated increasingly in liability lines an episode of rising premiums in the late 1960s was followed by a six year period of declining and eventually negative growth rates in total liability insurance premiums over the 1975 1977 period the annual growth rate jumped to 30 percent then followed another period of declining real premiums until premiums nearly tripled in 1984 1986 accompanied by cancellations of policies and massive withdrawal of insurers from some lines this crisis had an economic impact beyond the insurance market leading to the withdrawal of many goods and services from u s markets in mid 1987 the market began to turn again with premiums falling by as much as 40 percent for some commercial policies since then aggregate revenue from premiums has been relatively stable the liability insurance market is intertwined with the tort system in addition to providing incentives to avoid accidents the tort system allocates the risks of accident costs in providing compensation for accident victims the modern expansion of liability in tort law as described by priest in this issue represents a shift in the burden of supplying insurance from first party insurance markets to liability or third party insurance markets clearly this shift will

the perils of transparency in bureaucracies many countries have recently enacted or proposed reforms aimed at increasing citizens information on the quality of some public sector services disclosure of schools and teachers quality is the case that has generated the biggest public debate in the us the no child left behind act nclb requires learning progress to be measured for every child and results from students tests be made available in annual report cards so that parents can evaluate schools performances similar reforms have also been proposed for many other public services in the uk legislation introduced in the year 2000 now requires that the performance of each local government is reviewed and made public with regards to provision of services such as re police housing social services and education but also like the condition of roads the

decision making in committees transparency reputation and voting rules in this paper i analyze the effect of the transparency of the decision making process in committees on the decisions that are eventually taken i focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns so that each member tries to enhance his own reputation when the decision making process is secretive the individual votes of the committee members are not exposed to the public but only the final decision thus individuals are evaluated according to the group s decision i find that in such a case group members are induced to comply with preexisting biases for example if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform individuals vote more often against reforms and exacerbate the conservatism of the voting rule when the decision making process becomes transparent and individual votes are observed this effect disappears and such committees are then more likely to accept reforms i also find that coupled with the right voting rule a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one

rewarding improvements optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation we study a t period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private we find that the principal should punish the agent for performing poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past at the same time the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor evaluations in the past with better performance in the future optimal incentives are thus asymmetric conditional on the same number of good evaluations an agent whose performance improves over time should be better rewarded than one whose performance deteriorates

optimal incentives for sequential production processes i study optimal incentive schemes in organizations where agents perform their tasks sequentially i consider a model in which agents effort decisions are mapped into the probability of the project s success an optimal investment inducing mechanism allocates rewards to agents so as to induce all of them to exert effort in equilibrium at minimal cost to the principal i characterize the unique optimal mechanism in several versions of my benchmark model i also address the problem of allocating individuals with diverse qualifications to different slots of the production process as well as allocating tasks of different importance across different agents copyright 2006 rand

the importance of international business to the strategic agenda of u s ceos the growth of international business ib and concerns about the relevance of ib research indicate the need for managerial input on the topic a survey of 108 u s ceos reveals that ib issues are an important part of their strategic agenda four types of ib issues are identified which reveal that american ceos appear to be taking a proactive stance regarding the international arena the ceos were also found to hold diverse perceptions of ib issues the implications of these findings are discussed

interim performance feedback in multistage tournaments the optimality of partial disclosure workers competing in a tournament for a prize e g a promotion often perform sequentially in multiple stages when the firm is privately informed about the workers performance it can sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results but the policies that enhance final stage effort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage in our model the optimal disclosure policy has a simple form disclose only if all workers perform poorly this result offers a novel justification for partial disclosure in performance feedback also it contrasts with the existing literature that focuses on the extreme policies of full disclosure and no disclosure

rethinking macroeconomics what failed and how to repair it the standard macroeconomic models have failed by all the most important tests of scientific theory they did not predict that the financial crisis would happen and when it did they understated its effects monetary authorities allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low partly because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for efficiency and growth after the crisis broke policymakers relying on the models floundered notwithstanding the diversity of macroeconomics the sum of these failures points to the need for a fundamental re examination of the models and a reassertion of the lessons of modern general equilibrium theory that were seemingly forgotten in the years leading up to the crisis this paper first describes the failures of the standard models in broad terms and then develops the economics of deep downturns and shows that such downturns are endogenous further the paper argues that there have been systemic changes to the structure of the economy that made the economy more vulnerable to crisis contrary to what the standard models argued finally the paper contrasts the policy implications of our framework with those of the standard models

incentives and discrimination optimal incentive mechanisms may require that agents are rewarded differentially even when they are completely identical and are induced to act the same we demonstrate this point by means of a simple incentive model where agents decisions about effort exertion is mapped into a probability that the project will succeed we give necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal incentive mechanisms to be discriminatory we also show that full discrimination across all agents is required if and only if the technology has increasing return to scale in the non symmetric framework we show that negligible differences in agents attributes may result in major differences in rewards in the unique optimal mechanism this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

uncertainty and the employment dynamics of small and large businesses we examine the impact of uncertainty on employment dynamics alternative measures of uncertainty are constructed based on the survey of professional forecasters and regression based forecasting models for gdp growth inflation sp the impact on large businesses are generally non existent or weaker our results suggest that to truly understand the effects of uncertainty on employment dynamics we need to focus on the relatively smaller and entrepreneurial businesses we discuss implications for the framing of economic policy

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

team contests with multiple pairwise battles abstract we consider a multi battle team contest in which players from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight in distinct component battles which are carried out sequentially or partially

political competition and state government size do tighter elections produce looser budgets we test implications of politicalcompetition theory concerning government size usingdata from u s states we find that greaterpolitical competition in the race for governor actsas a check against bigger government evidence onthe effectiveness of legal limits on expendituresand or revenues growth is mixed the democraticparty is associated with bigger government but onlywhen party representation in both the governor shouse and the legislature is strong the flypapereffect of grants is found to be strong our resultshave implications for models of fiscal illusion

where modern macroeconomics went wrong this paper provides a critique of the dsge models that have come to dominate macroeconomics during the past quarter century it argues that at the heart of the failure were the wrong microfoundations which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour e g incorporating insights from information economics and behavioural economics inadequate modelling of the financial sector meant they were ill suited for predicting or responding to a financial crisis and a reliance on representative agent models meant they were ill suited for analysing either the role of distribution in fluctuations and crises or the consequences of fluctuations on inequality the paper proposes alternative benchmark models that may be more useful both in understanding deep downturns and responding to them

on equilibrium player ordering in dynamic team contests we study equilibrium player ordering in a dynamic all pay contest between two teams the contest lasts two periods and each team consists of two players who perform in different periods on behalf of their teams the team with the higher aggregate output wins the prize which is a public good to its players each team has one stronger player and one weaker player and the two teams can differ in their values of the prize the teams maximize their winning odds by strategically assigning their players to different periods we find that when the intrateam heterogeneity in player ability is not excessive the teams would allocate their stronger players to the late positions as the anchormen when both the intrateam ability gap and interteam heterogeneity in teams values become excessively large the team with high value always places its stronger player in the early position who will place a large bid to preempt late competition jel c7 d7 d8

a drawback of electoral competition in most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters we provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties in our model the larger the number of parties the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition the reason is that when the number of parties increases electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits the analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition thresholds of exclusion runoff electoral systems and majoritarian two party political systems jel d82 l15

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

information policy in tournaments with sabotage sabotage is one of the main problems of tournament like reward schemes workers who are leading in a tournament are more dangerous rivals and are therefore sabotaged more heavily this implies that there is an extra cost to becoming a leader and hence to choosing high productive effort in the early stages of a tournament the incentives to exert productive effort are thereby reduced we show that this problem can be solved by concealing intermediate information on the performances of workers i e by clever information management moreover we offer experimental evidence indicating that such information management does increase productive efforts

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

clean evidence on peer effects we study subjects who were asked to fill letters into envelopes with a remuneration independent of output in the pair treatment two subjects worked at the same time in the same room and peer effects were possible in the single treatment subjects worked alone and peer effects were ruled out we find evidence of peer effects in the pair treatment because the standard deviations of output are smaller within pairs than between pairs moreover average output is higher in the pair treatment thus peer effects raise productivity finally low productivity workers are the most sensitive to the behavior of peers

do polls create momentum in political competition abstract we explore how public opinion polls affect candidates campaign spending in political competition generally polls lead to more asymmetric behavior under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby increases her lead in expectation polls create momentum when campaigning is very effective and the race is very close a second type of equilibrium may exist the trailing candidate outspends and overtakes his opponent regardless of the type of equilibrium polls have a tendency to decrease expected total campaigning expenditures by amplifying ex ante asymmetries between candidates and thus defusing competition when candidates care also for their vote share in addition to having the majority candidates incentives crucially depend on the distribution of voters candidate preferences

transparency inequity aversion and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams theory and evidence we provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion analyzing a two period model with two agents we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure when contributions are unobservable agents act as though they were purely selfish however when contributions are made transparent at an interim stage agents exert higher efforts in the first period and adjust their efforts according to the interim information in the second period this form of peer pressure reduces free riding and thus more efficient outcomes are attained the results are confirmed in a real effort experiment

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

intermediate information loss aversion and effort empirical evidence the present article empirically explores the impact of intermediate information on contestants effort data involving substituted soccer players of the german bundesliga indicate only weak evidence of a negative effect of ex ante heterogeneity on effort in contrast intermediate information measured by goal difference at the time of substitution significantly affects effort players exert the greatest effort when their team is leading by one goal and reduce their effort when it is trailing when intermediate information suggests the contest is already decided players from both teams reduce effort this behavior is in line with loss aversion such that players weight potential losses more than potential gains and adjust their effort accordingly jel z22 j41 m54

the views of american multinational ceos on internationalized business education for prospective employees for some time a number of industry leaders have been exhorting american business schools to train their students in the aspects of international business as late as 1987 a group of prominent leaders from business labor academia and government issued a report that stated that business schools must internationalize the entire course of study and should include comparative business practices foreign languages and analyses of other countries and cultures

double edged transparency in teams abstract in a team project with significant complementarities between various players individual tasks news of early success by some encourages others to push ahead with their own tasks while lack of success has the opposite effect this ex post disparity in incentives created gives rise to two differing implications ex ante for an ideal team transparency sometimes it is better to commit to complete secrecy within the team of the various participants interim progress as it mitigates the negative effect of failures in some other situations commitment to full disclosure is better as players are then encouraged to be proactive by exerting efforts in the early rounds and motivate other team members into continued activities by way of interim progress transparency of outcomes has thus double edges it can boost incentives or dampen incentives

the importance of relative performance feedback information evidence from a natural experiment using high school students we study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information on performance under piece rate incentives a natural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusual opportunity to test this effect in a real effort setting for one year only students received information that allowed them to know whether they were above below the class average as well as the distance from this average we exploit a rich panel data set and find that the provision of this information led to an increase of 5 in students grades moreover the effect was significant for the whole distribution however once the information was removed the effect disappeared to rule out the concern that the effect may be driven by teachers within the school we verify our results using national level exams externally graded for the same students and the effect remains

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

an analysis of twenty five years of research in the journal of international business studies the article analyzes the twenty five years of research published in the journal of international business studies jibs since its inception in 1970 the article reviews the authors their institutional affiliations and the discipline content of the published articles

profiling managers to improve export promotion targeting one of the major criticisms of government export promotion schemes in many countries is that they tend to be poorly targeted awareness levels about export schemes among managers of companies at exporting or pre exporting stages of internationalization are often quite low and the perceived usefulness of schemes may decline as companies internationalize and their needs become more specific one solution may be to develop a better understanding of the needs of managers who make export market development decisions and to target segments of managers rather than companies who share similar strengths and weaknesses this study attempts to address these concerns by devising a typology of senior international marketing managers the most senior marketing decisionmakers in a broad multi industry sample of new zealand exporting firms were surveyed the results of the cluster analysis suggest that groups of managers who share similar characteristics can be identified and profiled based on shared international business attitudes and similar levels of knowledge and skills this appears to be a useful method of segmenting international marketing managers to determine what sort of educational and export assistance particular groups may require

incentives versus competitive balance abstract when players compete repeatedly prizes won in earlier contests may improve the players abilities in later contests this paper determines the allocation of prizes within and across contests that maximizes the weighted sum of aggregate efforts

international business education a corporate view as a preliminary step in the internationalization of business school curricula 122 major canadian corporations were surveyed for their views on the importance of various management skills and international courses as well as their opinion on the mechanisms institutions and academics for delivering them this article reports on the responses obtained and suggests methods for improving the overall effectiveness of international business education

small firms finance in france the data concerning interest rates paid by small and medium sized firms on credit and financial markets as well as the available balance sheets confirm the idea that firms have difficulties to get financial resources this paper tries to put in light the financial disparities among firms when a discrimination resting on size characterises the functioning of credit market the first section presents the main financial characteristics of french smes the low level of equities the heaviness of short term debts and the over use of payment delays section 2 shows how french and european authorities reacted in order to improve the financial situation of sme s and to reduce their liquidity constraint changing tax policy and promoting the creation of new means of financing

international business and trade in the next decade report from a delphi study the globalization of business causes major changes in the business environment and in business practices forecasting such changes is crucial for the preparation of responses to them this article reports on a delphi study conducted with a global set of experts drawn from the policy business and academic communities over three rounds of mailings these experts analyzed and debated the likelihood of changes in the international business environment over the next decade and the impact of these changes on corporate practices the findings identify key geographic areas of business growth major sectoral transformations shifts in the trade framework and its institution and strategies for corporate adjustment

vertical multinationals and host country characteristics abstract we inquire into the question of what country characteristics particularly market size and labor force composition attract inward investment this approach is motivated by the empirical observation that the poorest countries attract a far smaller share of world direct investment than their share of income small markets receive less investment per capita than larger ones we develop a model that generates both stylized facts in equilibrium suggesting the existence of a development trap for small skilled labor scarce countries

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives