what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

cooperation and competition in climate change policies mitigation and climate engineering when countries are asymmetric we study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management srm involving two heterogeneous countries or group of countries countries emit greenhouse gasses ghgs and can block incoming radiation by unilateral srm activities thus reducing global temperature heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of srm the environmental damages due to global warming the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits the rate of impatience and the private cost of geoengineering we determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and srm activities concentration of ghgs and global temperature and we examine whether a tradeoff actually emerges between mitigation and srm our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and srm methods to control climate change especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions

information and legislative bargaining the political economy of u s tariff suspensions this paper studies the political influence of individual firms on congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on u s imports of intermediate goods we develop a legislative bargaining model in which firms influence legislators by transmitting information about the value of protection using verbal messages and lobbying expenditures model estimation using firm level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures reveals that the probability a suspension is granted decreases with each additional firm that expresses opposition this effect is significantly larger than that of either opponent or proponent lobbying due to the greater information content of verbal opposition and legislative bargaining costs jel f13 d7

a money demand equation for brazil abstract the estimates for the money demand equation reported below are based on quarterly time series for brazil for the 1966 i 1979 iv period they show that the long run income elasticity of the demand for money is roughly unitary and the rate of interest does affect the demand for money exclusion of the latter variable therefore leads to biased estimates of the coefficients of the money demand equation the empirical evidence also points out that the rate of inflation affects the demand for money only to the extent that it is necessary to change nominal cash balances to adjust cash holdings to their desired level either nominal interest rates capture the expected inflation rates or goods inventories are not an important alternative to holding money in brazil

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying abstract in this paper we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities to motivate our empirical work we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a house appropriations committee hac or senate appropriations committee sac member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented in addition using instrumental variables estimations we show that universities without hac or sac representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero however for universities with hac or sac representation a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2 8 percent or 3 5 percent increase in earmarks respectively this suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the hac or sac but little or no return if not

nonmarket performance evidence from u s electric utilities building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of political markets where firms transact over public policies with government policy makers we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms nonmarket strategies we propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians the firm s recent experience with policy makers and the opportunity to learn from other firms recent experiences and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of u s privately owned electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our arguments

energy balance climate models and general equilibrium optimal mitigation policies in a general equilibrium model of the world economy we develop a two dimensional energy balance climate model featuring heat diffusion and anthropogenic forcing driven by global fossil fuel use across the sphere of the earth this introduces an endogenous location dependent temperature function driving spatial characteristics in terms of location dependent damages resulting from local temperature anomalies into the standard climate economy framework we solve the social planner s problem and characterize the competitive equilibrium for two polar cases differentiated by the degree of market integration we define optimal taxes on fossil fuel use and how they may implement the planning solution our results suggest that if the implementation of international transfers across latitudes is not possible then optimal taxes are in general spatially non homogeneous and may be lower at poorer latitudes the degree of spatial differentiation of optimal taxes depends on heat transportation by employing the properties of the spatial model we show by numerical simulations how the impact of thermal transport across latitudes on welfare can be studied

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

cointegration and tests of a classical model of inflation in argentina bolivia brazil mexico and peru abstract we develop a classical model of inflation with rational expectations that carries a number of testable implications first money growth and inflation are cointegrated second the changes in real money demand the equilibrium error anticipate future monetary policy third cointegration between money growth and inflation implies as campbell and shiller journal of political economy 1987 95 1062 1088 and journal of economic dynamics and control 1988 12 505 522 show cross equation restrictions readily generated from an error correction representation of the variables our results show that the allegedly different inflationary experiences of argentina bolivia brazil mexico and peru are consistent with this classical model of inflation in all countries the data fail to reject these three conditions in all but one of the periods studied

commercial policy with altruistic voters in public discussions of policy evidence that import competing sectors earn low or falling incomes is often used to argue for protection this paper rationalizes the apparent effectiveness of this argument in both direct and indirect democracies in direct democracies a small degree of voter altruism leads to protection in the specific factors model when the import competing sector earns little similarly voter altruism creates an incentive in representative democracies for self interested parties to present evidence to legislators on the income of import competing factors this leads to a theory in which campaign contributions buy access to legislators rather than buy votes

policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector in this article i quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by firms affect policy enactment to achieve this end i construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th congress i then develop and estimate a game theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to affect the probability that a policy is enacted i find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy s equilibrium enactment probability to be statistically significant but very small nonetheless the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to be over 130

do interest groups affect us immigration policy while anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue in this paper we construct an industry level dataset for the united states by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration we find robust evidence that both pro and anti immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration policy across sectors barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobbying expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important

political quid pro quo agreements an experimental study we experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence in the game one special interest i e a corporate firm has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates the success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections in the experiment successful political influence never materializes when the firm and candidates interact just once by contrast it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40 of societies with finitely repeated encounters however investments are not always profitable and profit sharing between the firm and candidates depends on prominent equity norms our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few firms do actually attempt to influence policymaking

a money demand equation for brazil comments and additional evidence abstract in an article in this journal cardoso 1983 presents evidence on money demand in brazil during the period 1966 1979 re estimating cardoso s equations using the data provided in her paper we find evidence that her estimates are subject to serious statistical problems we suggest an alternative estimating strategy our results support several of cardoso s estimates the main difference concerns the relative importance of the nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation in contradiction to cardoso s our results indicate that the inflation rate is statistically much more significant than the nominal interest rate

nonmarket strategy performance evidence from u s electric utilities this paper develops and tests a theory of the performance determinants of a firm s nonmarket strategy in shaping public policy outcomes building on the concept of political market attractiveness we argue that nonmarket performance is influenced by both the characteristics of a firm s regulatory and political environment especially rivalry among interest groups or politicians and by internal capabilities that enable a firm to mitigate political transaction costs using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by u s electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our approach

the effects of congressional appropriation committee membership on the distribution of federal research funding to universities i introduction in 1994 members of the republican party pledged to seek legislation to impose term limits on members of congress this pledge stemmed from the popular belief that senior members of congress tend to promote personal interests or are more influenced by lobbying efforts that may not be representative of their constituents today term limits continue to be discussed but have not been enacted instead many members have focused their energies toward minimizing the time spent on any particular committee of congress believing that tenure on a committee is a more serious concern than simple tenure in congress implicit in these concerns is the issue whether as incumbent politicians plan to retire they will behave differently and if so whether tenure on a congressional committee exacerbates this behavior this article explores the role of membership on the appropriations committee on the distribution of federal research funding to universities specifically it explores whether funding is diverted to these universities because politicians use their position on a committee to promote personal or constituent interests previous research on shirking compares the voting records of politicians on certain issues with demographic and economic characteristics of the politicians constituents this article explores the issue of shirking differently i explore how membership on congressional appropriations committees affects the distribution of federal research funding to universities i look at two types of relationships between the members and the universities first i consider the relationship between members and the universities that are located in the members districts states in the case of senators second i examine the relationship between members and their undergraduate alma mater i use district representa tion to proxy favoritism that reflects a politician s constituents given that in most instances an alma mater affiliation is not the same as district representation i use alma mater affiliation to proxy favoritism that reflects the politician s personal interests federal research funding accounts for more than 60 of research funding received by research universities previous research has shown a positive impact of federal funding on research outcomes see adams and griliches 1998 arora and gambardella 1997 connolly 1997 payne and siow 2002 and payne 2001 except for payne and siow 2002 however these articles do not consider that political diversion of funds may promote or detract from research productivity as with any other federal program this article concentrates on the impact of membership on the house and senate appropriations committees because they wield the greatest power in the allocation of funding 1 using a panel data set spanning 26 years i explore how changes in the composition of the appropriations committees affects the distribution of research funding after controlling for the heterogeneity that exists across different universities the results suggest that both district representation and alma mater affiliation matter thus there is evidence of shirking for personal interests and evidence of members representing their constituents with respect to the representation of one s constituents the strongest results suggest that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities however only benefit from representation in the senate with respect to alma mater affiliations the results suggest again that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities also benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees the results also suggest that the tenure of the member on the committee matters as does whether the member is a part of the majority party in power in the congressional chamber

strategic interaction among governments in the provision of a global public good abstract how do governments respond to other governments when providing a global public good using data from 2007 to 2014 on medical research funding for infectious and parasitic diseases we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries respond to funding changes by the us government which accounts for half of funding for these diseases because funding across governments might be positively correlated due to unobserved drivers they have in common we use variation in the representation of research intensive universities on us congressional appropriations committees as an instrument for us funding we find that a 10 increase in us government funding for a disease is associated with a 2 to 3 reduction in funding for that disease by another government in the following year

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

campaign contributions and access an important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given in this story access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy relevant information under complete information regarding donors policy preferences i argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups and the recipient legislators preferences are similar however one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive relaxing the informational assumption on donors preferences i reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the informational value of access to any agent is endogenous

pollution control with uncertain stock dynamics when and how to be precautious abstract the precautionary principle pp applied to environmental policy stipulates that in the presence of uncertainty society must take robust preventive action to guard against worst case outcomes it follows that the higher the degree of uncertainty the more aggressive this preventive action should be this normative maxim is explored in the case of a stylized dynamic model of pollution control with uncertain in the knightian sense stock dynamics using the robust control framework of hansen and sargent 12 optimal investment in damage control is found to be increasing in the degree of uncertainty thus confirming the conventional pp wisdom optimal mitigation decisions however need not always comport with the pp in particular when damage control investment is both sufficiently cheap and sensitive to changes in uncertainty damage control investment and mitigation may act as substitutes and a pp with respect to the latter can be unambiguously irrational the theoretical results are applied to a calibrated linear quadratic model of climate change the analysis suggests that a reversal of the pp with respect to mitigation while theoretically possible is very unlikely

spatial climate economic models in the design of optimal climate policies across locations we couple a one dimensional energy balance climate model with heat transportation across latitudes with an economic growth model we derive temperature and damage distributions across locations and optimal taxes on fossil fuels which in contrast to zero dimensional integrated assessment models account for cross latitude externalities we analyze the impact of welfare weights on the spatial structure of optimal carbon taxes and identify conditions under which these taxes are spatially nonhomogeneous and are lower in latitudes with relatively lower per capita income populations we show the way that heat transportation affects local economic variables and taxes and locate sufficient conditions for optimal mitigation policies to have rapid ramp up initially and then decrease over time

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the demand for money in brazil what happened in the 1980s abstract some of cardoso s 1983 money demand specifications are used here the estimates are based on quarterly data for the period 1966 1985 it is shown that due to financial innovation the money demand function shifted downwards in the 1980 s also a comparison is made between the actual demand for money and that predicted by the model during the period in which the economic reforms of the cruzado plan were in force

strategic implications of counter geoengineering clash or cooperation abstract solar geoengineering has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily stabilize global temperatures a key concern is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment costs may allow the country with the strongest incentive for cooling the so called free driver to impose a substantial externality on the rest of the world we analyze whether the threat of counter geoengineering technologies capable of negating the climatic effects of solar geoengineering can overcome the free driver problem and tilt the game in favour of international cooperation our game theoretical model of countries with asymmetric preferences allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic interaction surrounding solar geoengineering and counter geoengineering we find that counter geoengineering prevents the free driver outcome but not always with benign effects the presence of counter geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage in a non cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions negative welfare effect a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type of climate intervention indeterminate welfare effect or cooperative deployment of solar geoengineering positive welfare effect we show that the outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries

climate engineering under deep uncertainty abstract climate engineering and in particular solar radiation management srm is attracting increasing attention as a climate policy option however its potentially strategic nature and unforeseen side effects provide major policy and scientific challenges we study the role of srm in a two country model with the notable feature of deep uncertainty modeled as model misspecification of srm side effects we find that deep uncertainty leads to a reduction in srm deployment under both global cooperation and strategic nash behavior and that the effect is larger if countries act strategically furthermore we demonstrate that if countries have different model confidence about srm impacts then the more confident country will engage more strongly in using srm leading this country to free drive

perspective explaining influence rents the case for an institutions based view of strategy research in strategy has identified and tried to explain four types of rents monopolistic rents efficiency rents quasi rents and schumpeterian rents building on previous work on political and institutional strategies we add a fifth type of rent influence rents influence rents are the extra profits earned by a firm because the rules of the game laws regulations and informal rules are designed or changed to suit it to aid the analysis of the relationship between institutional context and firm performance and to provide a structure to guide research we develop a framework with five key components a an identification of the five fundamental problems of a market economy b a typology that describes the five different types of institutions that emerge to solve these problems c the market ordering mechanisms used by institutions to solve these problems d the common causes of weak institutional performance and e generic strategies used by firms to exploit these weaknesses of an institutional context to enhance firm performance we highlight potential applications of the framework as well as an illustrative research agenda that can advance the development of theory to explain the emergence and persistence of influence rents

giving the people what they want the distribution of earmarks in the u s house of representatives the common wisdom in journalistic accounts of earmarking is that congress distributes earmarks on a purely political basis without any consideration for the demand for federal spending academic accounts similarly argue that factors internal to congress are preeminent in determining where earmarks go even more than for other types of pork barrel spending using earmarks appearing in the fiscal year 2008 appropriations bills i search for both chamber based and demand side determinants of the distribution of earmarks i find that both types of factors are significantly related to the number of earmarks that a house member receives this result indicates that even while earmarking members of congress are at least minimally responsive to voter preferences and calls into question whether earmarks should be treated as an outlier within the universe of spending allocation mechanisms

the committee assignment process and the conditional nature of committee bias the view that congressional committees tend to be biased subsets of their parent chambers provides the foundations for a substantial body of theoretical literature on distributive politics and legislative structure more recent revisionist work suggests that committees composed of preference outliers are in fact rare we reject the categorical account of preference outliers a priori and elaborate conditions under which committees should be unrepresentative of their parent chambers we argue that the most widely available and frequently used data floor roll call votes are inappropriate to the task of assessing outlier predictions in any form finally we conduct a differentiated set of hypothesis tests within one policy jurisdiction to illustrate the characteristics of evidence and analysis necessary to evaluate alternative theoretical accounts of legislative organization the appearance of policy relevant biases in congressional work groups we conclude is not so much rare as it is conditional and we suggest several conditions on which future models of legislative organization should build

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second best world evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players abstract this paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question in a second best world should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally we find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small this result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution i e it uses uniform standards whereas local authorities use different shadow prices and therefore different standards

tax exempt lobbying corporate philanthropy as a tool for political influence we explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence a channel that has been heretofore unexplored in the political economy literature for philanthropic foundations associated with fortune 500 and s p500 corporations we show that grants given to charitable organizations located in a congressional district increase when its representative obtains seats on committees that are of policy relevance to the firm associated with the foundation this pattern parallels that of publicly disclosed political action committee pac spending as further evidence on firms political motivations for charitable giving we show that a member of congress s departure leads to a short term decline in charitable giving to his district and we again observe similar patterns in pac spending charities directly linked to politicians through personal financial disclosure forms filed in accordance to ethics in government act requirements exhibit similar patterns of political dependence our analysis suggests that firms deploy their charitable foundations as a form of tax exempt influence seeking based on a straightforward model of political influence our estimates imply that 7 1 percent of total u s corporate charitable giving is politically motivated an amount that is economically significant it is 280 percent larger than annual pac contributions and about 40 percent of total federal lobbying expenditures given the lack of formal electoral or regulatory disclosure requirements charitable giving may be a form of political influence that goes mostly undetected by voters and shareholders and which is directly subsidized by taxpayers

is it whom you know or what you know an empirical assessment of the lobbying process abstract do lobbyists provide issue specific information to members of congress or do they provide special interests access to politicians we present evidence to assess the role of issue expertis

the determinants of industry political activity 1978 1986 c ampaign contributions made by corporate political action committees pacs are increasingly important and controversial in u s elections influence purchasing is often alleged by pundits and campaign finance reform is continually debated in congress in the academy social scientists have analyzed the allocation of interest group monies and have looked for possible impacts on legislation few however have tried to explain the total contributions of economic interest groups we shall analyze variations in contributions across industries and over time with an empirical model based on organizationally constrained profit maximizing behavior we assume that corporate pac contributions in an industry are raised to enhance industry profits subject to the constraints of organization costs and freeriding incentives our empirical work covers 124 industries over five election cycles from 1978 through 1986 both the costs and benefits of political activity vary across industries we argue that the benefits of political action are determined by direct contact with the government as a regulator or purchaser of industry output by government s ability to ameliorate adverse market conditions and by the industry s ability to solve collective action problems without government assistance the costs of industry political action arise mainly from collective action problems because effective political activity often requires concerted action by the constituent firms in each industry we also make a methodological contribution previous studies use statistical techniques that suffer from sample selectivity bias or else force the probability of acting politically to be explained by the same set of coefficients as is the amount of action taken we explain and employ a technique that accounts for both problems the results are consistent with the theses that industries follow investment oriented goals in deciding the amount of political action to undertake and that collective action problems are important constraints on industry political activity we can explain between 60 and 80 of the variation in contributions in our sample first we review existing work on corporate political activity particularly papers examining patterns of aggregate pac spending by industry then we present an organization cost constrained industryprofit maximizing model based on a comparison between an idealized zero organization cost industry and the more realistic case where organizing collective action is difficult the independent variables used in the analysis are also discussed and defined next we discuss the dependent variable and total industry contributions and explain our statistical method then the results are presented followed by a discussion of industry structure and political activity to make clear how our results can explain different contribution patterns we give examples using five actual industries

a comparison of alternative models for the demand for medical care we have tested alternative models of the demand for medical care using experimental data the estimated response of demand to insurance plan is sensitive to the model used we therefore use a split sample analysis and find that a model that more closely approximates distributional assumptions and uses a nonparametric retransformation factor performs better in terms of mean squared forecast error simpler models are inferior either because they are not robust to outliers e g anova anocova or because they are inconsistent when strong distributional assumptions are violated e g a two parameter box cox transformation

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

identification and estimation of money demand in most natural sciences physics chemistry biology theories are validated by controlled experiment however in other natural sciences astronomy meteorology and in most social sciences including economics the data are characteristically generated not by experiment but by measurement of uncontrolled systems in economics theories take the form of restrictions on the models assumed to generate the data and statistical methods replace experimental controls in testing these restrictions and here is the difficulty in economics particularly macroeconomics the theory used to derive tests ordinarily does not generate a complete specification of which variables are to be held constant when statistical tests are performed on the relation between the dependent variable and the independent variables of primary interest accordingly in such cases there will be a set of often very different candidate regression based tests each of which has equal status with the others since each is based on a different projection of the same underlying multivariate model except in the unlikely event that the explanatory variables are mutually orthogonal the conditional regression coefficients which generally form the basis for the test statistic will depend on the conditioning set we conclude from this that if a theory which does not generate a complete specification of the regression test is nonetheless to have testable implications these implications must be robust over the permissible alternative specifications if the restrictions indicated by the theory are satisfied in some projections but not in others that have an equal claim to represent implications of the theory one cannot conclude that the theory has been confirmed the fact that the observable implications of valid theories must obtain over a broad but usually incompletely specified set of regressions rather than for a single regression introduces a large and unavoidable element of imprecision into hypothesis testing in macroeconomics generally it appears to be appropriate to weaken the statistical criterion for rejecting theories consider for example the theory of money demand which will engage our attention in this paper the tobin baumol square root formula implies that the elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate is exactly one half but which interest rate should wealth be held constant inflation in view of such uncertainties it would be inappropriate to insist in a literal minded fashion on rejecting the tobin baumol model if in some regression the measured interest elasticity differed from one half by more than two standard deviations and only then obviously a more flexible approach is called for the practice has been to conclude that the statistical evidence is consistent with the tobin baumol model as long as the interest rate coefficient is negative if it is negative and significant or negative and insignificantly different from minus one half that would provide somewhat stronger confirmation but a positive coefficient particularly a significantly positive coefficient would be viewed as raising questions about the validity of the theory in macroeconomics generally as in the money demand application the typical response to specification uncertainty has been to regard a theory as supported if the signs of the estimated coefficients agree with those expected from theory and as disconfirmed otherwise there is no theoretical justification for this procedure but it seems to be a reasonable course to follow the point that economic theory ordinarily generates incompletely specified statistical university of california santa barbara we have received helpful comments from andrew abel robert clower michael darby robert engle stephen goldfeld david laidler edward leamer robert lucas frederic mishkin and edward prescott thomas hall provided able research assistance

the incredible economics of geoengineering the focus of climate policy so far has been on reducing the accumulation of greenhouse gases that approach however requires broad international cooperation and being expensive has been hindered by free riding so far little action has been taken an alternative approach is to counteract climate change by reducing the amount of solar radiation that strikes the earth geoengineering in contrast to emission reductions this approach is inexpensive and can be undertaken by a single country unilaterally but geoengineering also has worrying consequences it may harm some countries it would not address ocean acidification it would pose new risks the fundamental challenge posed by this new technology is not free riding but governance who should decide if and under what circumstances geoengineering should be used

the impact of federal spending on house election outcomes while it is widely believed by academics politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak one explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias we address this estimation problem using instrumental variables for each house district we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district federal spending is affected by a large number of actors e g governors senators mayors and other house members in the state delegation