multiregional oligopoly with capacity constraints we develop a model of cournot competition between capacity constrained firms that sell a single good to multiple regions we provide a novel characterization for the unique equilibrium allocation o

entry costs reduction and competition in the portuguese mobile telephony industry we study the eect of entry on costs and competition in the portuguese mobile telephony industry we construct and estimate a model that includes demand network and cost equations the latter accounts for ine ciency and cost reducing eort we show that failure to account for cost reducing eort leads to biased estimates of competition in the industry we also nd that our estimated price cost margins are similar to hypothetical nash margins if rms are patient and have optimistic beliefs about the industry growth finally our results suggest that the entry of a third operator in 1998 lead to signi cant cost reductions and fostered competition

the competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures abstract antitrust authorities should consider the trade off between enhanced efficiency and reduced competition in cases of partial ownership this paper examines the competitive effects side of that trade off in the context of a modified cournot model we show that in markets where entry is difficult partial ownership arrangements could result in less output and higher prices than otherwise even if the ownership shares are relatively small these effects arise solely because these arrangements link the fortunes of actual or potential competitors producing a positive correlation among their profits in this sense the effects are purely structural they arise not because of increased opportunities for collusion or changes in the concentration of control but because the linking of profits reduces each firm s incentive to compete since these links internalize free rider problems associated with policing collusion and investing in entry deterrence however they could also enhance cartel stability and profitability

fairness in uncertainty some limits and misinterpretations of actuarial fairness the recent proliferation of new data and technologies enables increasingly finer personalization of products and prices in every domain in insurance this revives and enlarges old debates around fairness that have never been completely settled we will argue that the commonly accepted actuarial fairness as based on the individual cost of risk derives in fact from a conflation while it indicates the average cost for a group of insureds from the perspective of an insurance company and is therefore sound from a business profitability viewpoint it is arguable whether it represents the fair price for the individual insured we first show in a historical perspective the intertwinement of conceptions of fairness with knowledge in order to point to the alternative to actuarial fairness for insurance we then describe the intrinsic difference between the insured and the insurer or portfolio manager when underwriting an insurance contract finally we build on this distinction to discuss the meaning of fairness in insurance prices we thus hope to re center the debate around insurance fairness on its underlying solidarity mechanisms rather than technical and actuarial considerations

does money matter in canada evidence from a vector error correction model this paper investigates the statistical properties of a set of canadian and u s economic time series and uses the data to address the question of the importance of monetary variables in canadian business cycle fluctuations the individual time series are found to contain unit roots but the data reveal the existence of several economically meaningful cointegrating vectors a multivariate vector error correction model is estimated and canadian velocity which appears as an error correction term is significant in the canadian output equation this supports the contention that monetary variables have predictive content for real output copyright 1989 by mit press

crime rates male youth unemployment and real income in australia evidence from granger causality tests this article applies granger causality tests to examine the relationship between seven different categories of property crime and violent crime against the person male youth unemployment and real male average weekly earnings in australia from 1964 to 2001 within a cointegration and vector error correction framework it is found that fraud homicide and motor vehicle theft are cointegrated with male youth unemployment and real male average weekly earnings however there is no evidence of a long run relationship between either break and enter robbery serious assault or stealing with male youth unemployment and real male average weekly earnings

the canadian u s exchange rate evidence from a vector autoregression a vector autoregression is used to elicit the empirical facts co ncerning exchange rate movements the author finds 1 the exchange rate relati ve price levels and trade balances are closely related 2 most other lagged v ariables have no perceptible influence in theexchange rate equation 3 exchan ge rate innovations are negativelycorrelated with innovations in output and pri ces positively with innovations in the balance of trade and almost not at all with innovations in money and 4 impulses in money trade balances and govern ment spending are followed by opposing future movements in theexchange rate and the price level taken as a whole the evidence suggests that exchange rate cha nges may be associated with real rather than monetary shocks copyright 1986 by mit press

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

the dynamics of multimarket competition in exploration and exploitation activities prior studies of multimarket contact have investigated exploitation rather than exploration activities we contrast effects of multimarket contact on entry and exit dynamics in these two settin

entry in monopoly market this paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game theoretic models of entry we construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants equilibrium strategies in simultaneous move and sequential move games and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles from estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer we also find that entry does not cause price cost margins to fall by much

unemployment and crime rates in the post world war ii united states a theoretical and empirical analysis using annual time series data for the united states 1946 1982 two hypotheses are tested 1 the level of the unemployment rate in any given year will have a negative partial contemporaneous effect on detrendedfluctuations increases or decreases in seven index crime rates homicide rape aggravated assault robbery burglary larceny theft and motor vehicle theft in that year 2 unemployment rate fluctuationsfrom one year to the next will have a positive partial effect on detrended crime rate fluctuations in the next year these hypotheses are developed from a theoretical model that identifies the former with a criminal opportunity effect and the latter with a criminal motivation effect of aggregate unemployment on crime for burglary robbery and larceny theft empirical support is found for the expected pattern of partial effects however the relative sizes of the effects are such that the total impacts of unemployment through both partial effects are negative in addition only the negative levels effect is exhibited for homicide and motor vehicle theft while rape and aggravated assault show no consistent association with either levels orfluctuations in the unemployment rate interpretations for these findings are discussed

efficiency analysis of cournot competition in service industries with congestion we consider cournot competition in the presence of congestion effects our model consists of several service providers with differentiated services each competing for users who are sensitive to both price and congestion we distinguish two types of congestion effects depending on whether spillover costs exist that is where one service provider s congestion cost increases with the other providers output level we quantify the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly with respect to the optimal social welfare with tight upper and lower bounds we show that when there is no spillover the welfare loss in an unregulated oligopoly is limited to 25 of the social optimum even in the presence of highly convex costs on the other hand when spillover cost is present there does not exist a constant lower bound on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly even with affine cost we show that the efficiency depends on the relative magnitude between the marginal spillover cost and the marginal benefit to consumers this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

the forms and limits of insurance solidarity what makes insurance special among risk technologies is the particular way in which it links solidarity and technical rationality on one hand within insurance practices risk is always defined in technical terms it is related to monetary measurement of value and to statistical probability calculated for a limited population on the other hand and at the same time insurance has an inherent connection to solidarity when taking out an insurance one participates in the risk pool within which each member is reciprocally responsible for others risks the combination of technical controllability and solidarity has made insurance a successful tool for governing welfare societies during the twentieth century from the point of view of business ethics it is interesting that as we argue in this article the connection between insurance and solidarity is not limited to social welfare assemblages but is evident in relation to private insurance as well at the same time however it is important to understand that insurance does not advance all forms of solidarity hence this theoretical article analyzes the specific conceptions of solidarity that the different forms of insurance practice produce particular emphasis is put on the distinction between chance solidarity and subsidizing solidarity the main questions of the article are what kinds of conceptions of solidarity are built in the insurance technology and how are the limits of solidarity defined and justified in different forms of insurance

cross shareholdings and competition in a rent seeking contest abstract we consider a tullock rent seeking contest with two firms and two investors each investor owns a majority share in one firm and a silent minority cross shareholding in the other firm we measure competition by either firms aggregate efforts or rent dissipation we show that aggregate efforts are smaller in our contest than in the benchmark case without cross shareholdings next we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions such that equilibrium rent dissipation in our contest is larger than in the benchmark case rent dissipation is larger under cross shareholdings if and only if one firm is much more efficient than the other firm and the cross shareholding in the more efficient firm is sufficiently smaller than the cross shareholding in the less efficient firm

time varying competition normative models typically suggest that prices rise in periods of high demand and cost however in many markets prices fall when demand or costs rise this inconsistency occurs because the normative models assume that competitive intensity does not change with demand and cost conditions over time we therefore introduce the notion of time varying competition by suggesting that it is important not only to account for the direct effect of demand and cost on prices e g higher demand means higher prices but also the indirect effect of demand and cost changes on competition e g higher demand could cause more competition and hence lower prices we develop a general unified framework to empirically model the direct and indirect effects of demand and cost shifts on pricing in differentiated product markets our approach allows us to measure the indirect effect of multiple demand and cost drivers on competitive intensity and test predictions from alternative theories of repeated games the empirical application is to the u s photographic film industry where there are two main players kodak and fuji we find that the indirect effects are highly significant and comparable in magnitude to the direct effects competitive intensity is greater in periods of high demand and lower cost and is moderated by whether demand or costs are expected to grow or decline interestingly we find asymmetries in the competitive responses of kodak and fuji while kodak is sensitive to demand factors fuji is sensitive to costs our results suggest that market characteristics such as observability of competitor prices can be an important determinant of how competitive intensity is affected by demand and cost conditions

atheoretical macroeconometrics a critique abstract the spurious nature of the restrictions used to identify many macroeconometric models has led some researchers to advocate a style of econometric inquiry that is less dependent on prior theoretical restrictions of the sort that were central to the approach of the cowles commission this development which we call atheoretical macroeconometrics is summarized and evaluated in the current paper it is contrasted with an updated version of the cowles commission approach we conclude that while some of the exercises of atheoretical macroeconometrics are valid those that have attracted the most attention and appear the most innovative exogeneity testing impulse response analysis and policy analysis using estimated vector autoregressions are based on incorrect analysis

how fair is actuarial fairness insurance is pervasive in many social settings as a cooperative device based on risk pooling it serves to attenuate the adverse consequences of various risks health unemployment natural catastrophes and so forth by offering policyholders coverage against the losses implied by adverse events in exchange for the payment of premiums in the insurance industry the concept of actuarial fairness serves to establish what could be adequate fair premiums accordingly premiums paid by policyholders should match as closely as possible their risk exposure i e their expected losses such premiums are the product of the probabilities of losses and the expected losses this article presents a discussion of the fairness of actuarial fairness through three steps 1 defining the concept based on its formulation within the insurance industry 2 determining in which sense it may be about fairness and 3 raising some objections to the actual fairness of actuarial fairness the necessity of a normative evaluation of actuarial fairness is justified by the influence of the concept on the current reforms of public insurance systems and the fact that it highlights the question of the repartition of the gains and burdens of social cooperation

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

on error correction models specification interpretation estimation abstract error correction models ecms have proved a popular organising principle in applied econometrics despite the lack of consensus as to exactly what constitutes their defining characteristic and the rather limited role that has been given to economic theory by their proponents this paper uses a historical survey of the evolution of ecms to explain the alternative specifications and interpretations and proceeds to examine their implications for estimation the various approaches are illustrated for wage equations by application to uk labour market data 1855 1987 we demonstrate that error correction models impose strong and testable non linear restrictions on dynamic econometric equations and that they do not obviate the need for modelling the process of expectations formation with the exception of a few special cases both the non linear restrictions and the modelling of expectations have been ignored by those who have treated ecms as merely reparameterisations of dynamic linear regression models or vector autoregressions

demand pricing and regulation evidence from the cable tv industry subsequent to the nationwide deregulation of the cable tv industry a number of questions have been raised concerning the conduct of cable firms answers to these questions turn upon a fundamental set of issues regarding the economic relationships of demand pricing and regulation in this article we empirically examine these relationships for the period prior to deregulation a number of basic findings emerge among these we find that the demand for basic cable service ranges from being generally inelastic in rural areas to elastic in large urban markets the elasticity of demand for pay cable services is typically well in excess of unity also while regulation did not lead to economically efficient marginal cost prices for basic cable service it did act to keep prices below monopoly levels moreover our examination reveals some significant differences in the effectiveness of the various types of regulation practiced in the pre deregulation period

the diffusion of mobile telecommunications services in the european union we study the technological and regulatory determinants of the diffusion of mobile telecommunications services in the european union using a logistic model of diffusion we find that the transition from the analogue to the digital technology during the early 1990s and the corresponding increase in spectrum capacity had a major impact on the diffusion of mobile telecommunications countries which granted first licenses at later points in time show a significant but slow catching up effect implying international convergence only by around 2006 the impact of introducing competition has also been significant during both the analogue and the digital period though the effect was smaller than the technology effect

common ownership market power and innovation abstract i examine the effects of overlapping ownership on market power when there are external effects across firms this is done in an oligopoly model with cost reducing innovation with technological spillovers where firms have an overlapping ownership structure based largely on lopez and vives 2019 the model allows for cournot competition with homogeneous product and for bertrand with differentiated products as well as for strategic effects of r d investment it derives positive testable implications and normative results to inform policy

the evolution of markets under entry and standards regulation the case of global mobile telecommunications abstract we analyze the effects of government policies on the evolution of an industry the global mobile telecommunications market i we find a relatively slow diffusion convergence between countries this follows partly from regulatory delay in issuing first licenses yet persisting initial cross country differences also contribute to a lack of convergence ii introducing competition has a strong immediate impact on diffusion but a weak impact afterwards sequential entry is preceded by pre emptive behavior by incumbents this is consistent with the presence of consumer switching costs iii setting a single technological standard accelerates the diffusion of analogue technologies considerably for digital technologies it is too early to draw reliable conclusions yet the available evidence suggests that setting single standards has similar beneficial effects

cointegration how short is the long run abstract when testing for cointegration and faced with short sample periods it is common for researchers to turn to more frequently sampled observations that is to move from annual to quarterly or monthly data in order to increase the number of observations we argue that such a gain in the degrees of freedom is more apparent than real essentially cointegration is a long run concept and hence requires long spans of data to give tests for cointegration much power rather than merely large numbers of observations using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate this for four popular tests for cointegration

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

collusive conduct in duopolies multimarket contact and cross ownership in the mobile telephone industry the deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in hopes of increasing competition one example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the united states where the fcc created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes we find that cross ownership and multimarket contact are important factors in explaining non competitive prices

adverse selection in insurance markets policyholder evidence from the u k annuity market in this paper we investigate the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets we use a unique data set consisting of all annuity policies sold by a large u k insurance company since the early 1980s to analyze mortality differences among individuals who purchased different types of policies we find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity policy characteristics such as whether the annuity will make payments to the estate in the event of an untimely death and whether the payments from the annuity rise over time these mortality patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information in the annuity market we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences however across annuities of different size even though models of insurance market equilibrium with asymmetric information would predict such differences we also find that the pricing of various features of annuity contracts is consistent with the self selection patterns we find in mortality rates our results therefore suggest that selection may occur across many specific features of insurance contracts and that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others this highlights the importance of considering the detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information

cointegration and unit roots this paper provides an updated survey of a burgeoning literature on testing estimation and model specification in the presence of integrated variables integrated variables are a specific class of non stationary variables which seem to characterise faithfully the properties of many macroeconomic time series the analysis of cointegration develops out of the existence of unit roots and offers a generic route to test the validity of the equilibrium predictions of economic theories special emphasis is put on the empirical researcher s point of view

market power and price increases for basic cable service since deregulation since the deregulation of rates for basic cable television service increases in price have outpaced the rate of inflation this article examines whether or not cable systems increased market power or their increased exercise of market power explains these price increases an estimated quasi supply function for cable systems before and after deregulation implies that real basic cable prices increased 18 since deregulation holding quality and other costs constant accounting for 43 of the total real price increase a demand equation is also estimated and the estimated demand elasticity of basic cable does not change after deregulation implying that this 18 real price increase is due to greater exercise of existing market power made possible by the elimination ofprice regulation rather than to an increase in market power caused by a change in the demand elasticity for cable

product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings abstract we investigate the incentives of a high quality firm to transfer for free its proprietary product innovation technology to its standard quality rival on which it has passive partial ownership holdings ppos we identify the conditions under which there exists an ownership threshold to make such a free transfer profitable for the high quality firm and show that these conditions are more stringent under bertrand than under cournot competition finally we show that technology transfer increases aggregate output industry wide profits consumers surplus and social welfare

conjectures firm characteristics and market structure abstract this paper makes use of a unique data set to investigate how firms in the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market view their rivals and how consumers in turn view these firms own and rival price elasticities of demand conjectural variations and lerner indices are estimated for thirteen service stations in a submarket of vancouver these variables are then related to firm characteristics such as type of ownership degree of horizontal and vertical integration and type of service in this way systematic patterns in seller behavior and in buyer attitudes are revealed

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

strategic pricing and detailing behavior in international markets we study three determinants of the levels of price and detailing effort across geographic markets the within market response to each variable the nature of interfirm strategic interactions both within that market and across markets we empirically examine the interactions of prozac zoloft and paxil across the united states the united kingdom germany france and italy our results indicate that all three factors driving marketing mix interactions are at play in this product category the u s market is less price sensitive than the european markets detailing elasticities are comparable across the united states germany and italy while the united kingdom and france show greater elasticity for the u s market we find that almost all deviations from nash pricing and detailing levels are due to within market interactions in the u k market deviations from nash prices come about due mostly to across market interactions both with the united states as well as the rest of europe whereas deviations from nash detailing levels are mainly due to across market interactions with the united states for italy we observe that both within and across market interactions affect price and detailing levels overall the pattern of interactions makes observed prices more similar across countries than prices implied by the estimated elasticities this underscores the importance of considering within and across market interactions in developing multimarket strategy

multimarket contact economies of scope and firm performance we integrate the efficiency and competitive effects of product market scope choice into a comprehensive model of economic performance and empirically test the model in the context of the u s airli

multimarket contact competition and pricing in banking abstract in this paper we assess the impact of multimarket contact of banks on their market power by means of a simultaneous equation model in which the divergence of price from marginal cost is a function of multimarket linkages the model is estimated using aggregate data from the italian regions for the years 1997 2009 our results show that multimarket contact is positively and significantly correlated to the market power index and is also connected to both home and non home market concentration the evidence is robust to changes in model specification and multimarket contact measures and supports the idea that firms which have a greater amount of contact are more likely to collude

silent financial interests and product innovation abstract we study quality enhancing r d price competition and welfare in markets with asymmetric passive partial ownership ppo holdings the asymmetries in ppos generate a positive re allocation effect which in some cases can increase consumer and total surplus in markets with no spillovers

temporal causality and the dynamics of different categories of crime and their socioeconomic determinants evidence from australia hale and sabbagh 1991 failed to find cointegration i e a long term equilibrium relationship between crime and unemployment in the case of england and wales the present study basedon multiple cointegrationtests preceded by various unit root or non stationarity tests is the first attempt at putting the analysis of crime in a temporal granger causal framework in the australian case 1963 90 by binding the relationship between different categories of crime and their socioeconomic determinants within a multivariate cointegrated system the results based on the most recent methodology broadly indicate that although the relative importance of the determinants of crime varied by type of crime of all the determinants it is dwelling commencements a proxy for wealth that appears to impact more or less on all the categories of crime significantly followed by urbanization

demand and innovation in services the case of mobile communications abstract this paper aims to analyse the pricing strategies of mobile communications operators and examine the role of demand characteristics in the development of new tariff plans in so doing we depart from a traditional industrial organization approach to price discrimination and interpret new tariff plans as innovations in the spirit of schumpeter we look at competition in this sector as depending upon this form of innovation and we argue that given the specific features of the industry the development of new tariff plans is strongly related to the users characteristics and behaviour our main point is that in a context of uncertainty demand affects firms innovative strategies in two ways first by providing information on user behaviour and by increasing the capability of market segmentation and second by providing the incentives to innovate this argument is supported by an empirical analysis carried out on the basis of an original dataset which includes all the tariff plans on offer in the history of the italian market between 1992 and 2005 we find that both a firm s installed customer base and the level of market saturation play a role in shaping firms innovative pricing strategies in terms of the number and characteristics of the new tariff plans

living by the golden rule multimarket contact in the u s airline industry this paper examines empirically the effects of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s airline industry the analysis of the time series and cross sectional variability of airline fares in the 1000 largest domestic city pair routes reveals the presence of statistically significant and quantitatively important multimarket effects fares are higher in city pair markets served by carriers with extensive interroute contacts these findings are consistent with the claims of industry experts that airlines live by the golden rule i e that they refrain from initiating aggressive pricing actions in a given route for fear of what their competitors might do in other jointly contested routes during his testimony mr steven b elkins senior director of marketing systems development for northwest airlines cited an example in which northwest lowered fares on night flights that were flying with empty seats in a number of routes from minneapolis and upper midwest cities to various west coast cities he said that continental airlines swiftly responded by cutting prices in important northwest markets mr elkins s memo advises northwest pricing analysts we will live by the golden rule in his testimony he explained that the golden rule in that context was that i did not want my pricing analyst initiating actions in another carrier s market like chicago for fear of what that other carrier might do to retaliate wall street journal october 9 1990 p b1

pricing patterns of cellular phones and phonecalls a segment level analysis one expectation of the u s federal communications commission fcc in the early stages of the cellular communications industry was that the presence of two licensees in each market would ensure competition and thereby result in declining prices over time for both cellular phones handsets and phonecalls however industry observers have noted recently that although the price of handsets has declined over time the price of the phonecalls has not we investigate this interesting pricing issue by modeling the market interaction between the providers of cellular services and also their interaction with customers using a game theoretic framework a critical assumption in the development of our model is that there exist segments of customers with different valuations usage levels and price sensitivities for cellular service empirically we provide support for the existence of two customer segments viz business professional and personal from both secondary data on industry usage and revenue and primary data collected from a conjoint analysis study of cellular service customers from the latter source we also establish that the business professional customers are more sensitive to prices of phonecalls than the personal segment from our analytical model we characterize the conditions under which penetration and skimming pricing strategies for the handsets are profit maximizing from the sellers standpoint and derive the corresponding price of phonecalls one of our main analytical results is that a competitive structure can result in lower prices over time for the handset but higher prices for the phonecalls depending on production costs of the handset we are thus able to provide a theoretical explanation for the observed price patterns for the handset and phonecalls

money growth volatility and the macroeconomy this study analyzes the effects of variability in money growth on the macroeconomy for the period 1961 1 1984 4 within the context of a vector autoregressive model that contains variables typically included in a small macro model variance decompositions and historical decompositions are used to assess the impact of money growth variability the variance decompositions suggest substantial effects of money growth variability on the long term interest rate output and the price level historical decompositions for 1979 4 1984 4 suggest substantial effects of money growth variability on the interest rate and output but smaller effects on the price level are found copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

overlapping ownership r d spillovers and antitrust policy this paper considers cost reducing r d investment with spillovers in a cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership we show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals profits b

market concentration and competition in oecd mobile telecommunications markets this study analyses the progress of market concentration in oecd member states mobile telecommunications markets and evaluates the relationship between market concentration and performance using annual panel data from 24 oecd member states for the 1998 2011 period the study estimates regression equations for market concentration mobile prices and profits the empirical results indicate that the more concentrated the mobile market the higher the prices and profits providing support for the market power hypothesis if this hypothesis holds then market concentration can be a useful indicator of market performance on the other hand the applicability of the hypothesis is unclear for the second half of the sample period the results provide evidence that regulatory policies influence the structure and performance of mobile markets