crowding in of complementary contributions to public goods firm investment into open source software abstract we present a fairly general model in which firms are competitors in a commercial market segment and can invest into a complementary public good like open source software we show that contrary to standard predictions additional contribution to the public good by the government or a new market entrant can lead to higher investments of all incumbent firms that is a crowding in effect this result occurs if the investment cost function is superadditive we find that government contribution leads to larger crowding in effects than subsidizing market entry if the price elasticity of demand with respect to the private good is large relative to the one with respect to the public good our results are robust to extensions in the timing and the mode of competition

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

the nature of costs and the number of firms at cournot equilibrium abstract the paper analyzes the perfect equilibria of a two stage entry production game in a simple model with constant marginal costs a fixed cost per firm and cournot behaviour at the production stage if fixed costs are not sunk the range of equilibrium values for n the number of firms can be quite large that range becomes smaller with the lower values of n being eliminated the more that fixed costs are sunk thus there is a sense in which sunk costs can rule out some less competitive equilibria to the benefit of consumers and potential entrants by enhancing the credibility of entry

free entry and regulatory competition in a global economy abstract this paper examines the optimal entry policy toward oligopoly in a global economy we show that free entry results in too much competition for the world but each country s corrective tax policy unless internationally coordinated proves suboptimal because of international policy spillovers thus globalization prevents countries from pursuing the optimal entry policy however globalization also generates the gains from trade when countries are small the gains from trade dominate the losses from a suboptimal entry policy but as markets grow the result is reversed making trade inferior to autarky therefore the need for tax harmonization grows as the world economy grows this paper also contributes to the international tax competition literature through the discovery of the reverse home market effect

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

regional innovation systems in hungary the failing synergy at the national level lengyel b and leydesdorff l regional innovation systems in hungary the failing synergy at the national level regional studies entropy statistics are used in this paper to measure the synergies of knowledge exploration knowledge exploitation and organizational control in the hungarian innovation system the data consist of high and medium technology firms and knowledge intensive services categorized by subregions proxy for geography industrial sectors proxy for technology and firm size proxy for organization configurational information along these three dimensions is used as an indicator of a reduction of uncertainty or in other words the synergy across the knowledge functions the results indicate that three regimes have been created during the hungarian transition with very different dynamics 1 budapest and its agglomeration emerge as a knowledge based innovation system on every indicator 2 the north western part of the country where foreign owned companies have induced a shift

existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents in this paper we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric we show the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game the proof is a constructive one and therefore we provide a method to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium within a reasonable time

the role of non economic endowments introduction to the special section on what we know and what we should know about international knowledge sourcing recent developments in the pattern of international knowledge sourcing have highlighted a new international division of labor in knowledge production which now is affecting emerging as well as advanced countries the source of this division of labor has been identified as residing in the changing economic endowments of these countries we extend this by suggesting that the new international allocation of knowledge related activities is related strongly to a country s non economic endowments our arguments provide context to the papers in this special section

the innovative performance of german multinationals abroad evidence from the european community innovation survey this article analyzes cross country differences in innovation behavior of subsidiaries of german multinational enterprises the analysis is based on data from community innovation survey cis4 and covers 16 european countries we find considerable differences in innovation input intensity and innovation output intensity between german subsidiaries located in different european countries multivariate analysis reveals that these differences are largely related to firm characteristics a significant relationship between firm level innovation and host country characteristics can only be found for innovation output copyright 2011 the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

long run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation we investigate the long run effect of energy conservation regulation which forces firms to raise energy saving investment above the cost minimizing level if pigovian tax is imposed additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition while it can improve welfare under imperfect competition our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

foreign research and development in swedish multinationals abstract in 1987 sweden s 20 largest multinationals together operated some 170 foreign rd 2 market proximity i e adaptation of centrally developed products and processes to local market conditions 32 3 exploitation of foreign rd 4 political factors i e environmental factors more or less directly influenced by government action 34 the remaining 20 of employment seemed to be motivated by a combination of factors the primary aim of the first three types of foreign r d units is to enhance a company s competitive position in ways not possible from a domestic location hence they should be little cause of concern for swedish policy makers

the rising instability of u s earnings the inequality of earnings and of family incomes in the united states has increased since the late 1970s autor katz and kearney 2008 this increase in cross sectional inequality has largely been interpreted as a growing disparity in permanent incomes between those with high incomes and those with low incomes however growing inequality could equally well be a result of growing income instability if workers experience increasingly large fluctuations in earnings from year to year this would also increase the measured inequality of earnings from year to year for example if everyone maintained the same level of permanent income but some experienced a 500 increase in their income in the first year and then a reversal to 500 below their permanent incomes in the following year while an equal number experienced the opposite a drop in income followed by an offsetting rise measured inequality would rise though nothing would have happened to the dispersion of permanent incomes while this example is an extreme one it points to the fact that the large rise in earnings inequality between the 1970s and the 1990s could reflect either a rise in disparity of permanent incomes a rise in earnings instability or some portion of both without longitudinal data it is impossible to distinguish between these two very different explanations for increased cross sectional measures of inequality in this paper we provide longitudinal measures that separate changes in income inequality into changes that permanently change income to new levels and those that only reflect transitory change we refer to the latter as changes in income instability and discuss how the instability of individual earnings and family income in the united states has evolved over the last quarter century

industrial organization and public policy competition policy has been dominated by politics industrial organization can expect to exert an influence only insofar as it commands superior knowledge that is true with respect to the long run since economies of scale are limited to the short run competition is feasible in the long run therefore a trade off approach seeking to identify optimal market structures is misleading competition policy should instead be directed at prohibiting protective strategies of incumbents to deter entry competition being a process of creative destruction political viability of a competitive order requires competition policy to be supplemented by a social welfare policy

the role of free entry in an oligopolistic heckscher ohlin model retaining the basic properties of the heckscher ohlin trade model namely free entry and exit fully integrated international commodity markets and the same number of sectors with that of factors the authors develop a two country model with cournot oligopoly in this economy factor price equalization and the standard heckscher ohlin theorem on comparative advantage hold between two countries which are identical except for size however autarkic prices are different even though the level of trade is zero under the free trade regime nevertheless free trade reduces the oligopoly price and increases welfare copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

multi market competition r d and welfare in oligopoly we investigate a multi market cournot model with strategic process research and development r d investments wherein a multi market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets we show that entry can enhance the total r d expenditures of the multi market firm moreover the incumbent s profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases depending on the fixed entry costs and r d technologies both insufficient and excess entry can appear our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

how do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a market for inventions competition and intellectual property ip protections are complements in stimulating innovation when ip is appropriable a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate competition among producers the demand side of the market for inventions and competition among inventors the supply side of the market for inventions create incentives to innovate when ip is not fully appropriable markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate firms vertically integrate r d and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to ip this implies that antitrust policy and ip protections are complements

inefficiency of subgame optimal entry regulation the literature on excess entry shows that the free entry equilibrium number of firms may be greater than is socially optimal and proposes government entry regulation as a remedy this article tries to show that such a policy recommendation is misleading a two period three person entry game model which explicitly includes second best government shows that entry regulation aimed at preventing excess entry actually induces the incumbent to behave strategically against the government and makes the final outcome socially suboptimal compared to cases in which there is no government intervention entry regulation is subgame optimal however it is globally suboptimal

how does state owned shares affect double externalities and industrial performance evidence from china s exhaustible resources industry abstract excessive entries of business into resource industries can cause allocation inefficiency and externality problems such as resource depletion and environmental pollution these problems have been existed in china s resources industry for many years after opening up to the world china has even begun to lose some critical strategic resources theoretical studies suggest that state owned shares as an indirect form of entry regulation could help the government reduce costs and control risk this paper first empirically analyzed the co integration relationship between double externalities and state owned shares using a seemingly unrelated regression based on china s coal ferrous metal and non ferrous metal resources panel data for 1999 to 2015 the results showed that state owned shares significantly reduced the intergenerational 0 760 and environmental externalities 0 265 however higher state owned shares might reduce industrial effectiveness thus this paper further tested the effect of state owned shares under different threshold degrees of externality the results showed that the effect of indirect regulation was the best when it was associated with a medium degree of intergenerational externality and high degree of environmental externality

socially excessive dissemination of patent licences compared with the social optimum a monopolist usually sells too little this result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation katz and shapiro 1986 find conditions under which the lab will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences however i find instead that its incentives can be socially too high the monopoly seller may sell too much for example it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences while it is socially optimal that none is sold en comparaison avec l optimum social un monopoleur habituellement vend trop peu voila qui semble tenir pour le cas d un laboratoire qui vend des licences pour une innovation brevetee qui reduit les couts katz shapiro 1986 ont montre dans quelles conditions le laboratoire va emettre moins que le nombre optimal de licences cependant l auteur decouvre que les incitations peuvent plutot l amener a en emettre trop plus que l optimum social par exemple il se peut que la maximisation du profit amene a vendre plusieurs licences alors qu il serait socialement optimal de n en vendre aucune

r d offshoring and the productivity growth of european regions the recent increase in r d offshoring has raised fears that knowledge and competitiveness in advanced countries may be at risk of hollowing out at the same time economic research has stressed that this process is also likely to allow some reverse technology transfer and foster growth at home this paper addresses this issue by investigating the extent to which r d offshoring is associated with productivity dynamics of european regions we find that offshoring regions have higher productivity growth but this positive effect fades with the number of investment projects carried out abroad a large and positive correlation emerges between the extent of r d offshoring and the home region productivity growth supporting the idea that carrying out r d abroad strengthens european competitiveness

firm capabilities technological dynamism and the internationalisation of innovation a behavioural approach we develop a behavioural framework of bounded rational decision making under uncertainty to analyse the role of technological dynamism in the firm s environment for its decision to internationalise innovation applying prospect theory we argue that technological uncertainty in the firm s environment affects its risk preferences differently depending on its technological capabilities a key prediction is that firms with low capabilities will internationalise innovation when faced by technological uncertainty while firms with high capabilities will concentrate their innovation at the home base we also argue that our behavioural approach based on prospect theory is not a stand alone programme but benefits from the integration with traditional concepts in ib in particular we make a case that organisational measures fostering absorptive capacity such as intensive personnel exchange between headquarters and subsidiaries can help to attenuate the high capability firms tendency to concentrate innovation at the home base when faced by high uncertainty we corroborate the predictions of our framework based on data from the german part of the community innovation survey

safe nests in global nets internationalization and appropriability of r d in wireless telecom this paper documents the case of the wireless telecom industry to bring new empirical evidence to the debate on the internationalization of research and development r d activities us patent statistics on the four industry leaders ericsson motorola nokia and qualcomm illustrate the growing trend of the internationalization of r d over the 1990s yet we show that the most critical r d projects related to the development of wireless standards remain homebound the paper then leverages qualitative data collected through interviews with informed managers to provide a fresh interpretation for the homeboundedness of critical industrial r d the stickiness of core r d projects to domestic locations is related not only to organizational inertia and the unripe maturation of subsidiaries as suggested by prior literature but particularly to the headquarters centralization of intellectual property ip management which offers a high level of appropriability of r d results the unequal distribution of appropriability across corporate r d networks is at the base of the formation of safe nests domestic r d centers that are sheltered from the forces of globalization because they offer a desirable setting for the exploitation of technologies deriving from a stronger coordination of inventive activities with the management of ip

optimal policy and network effects for the deployment of zero emission vehicles abstract we analyze the impact of indirect network effects in the deployment of zero emission vehicles in a static partial equilibrium model in most theoretical analyses direct and indirect effects are conflated and relatively few authors have explicitly considered indirect network effects we also introduce the market power of vehicle producers and scale effects in the production function the model exhibits a multiplicity of local social critical points and market equilibria suggesting a possibility of lock in the optimal two subsidies for vehicles and stations are derived so that the pareto dominating market equilibrium would coincide with the social optimum configurations associated with different values of the parameters are explored to revisit the policy issues at various stages of deployment of hydrogen and battery electric vehicles

sectoral patterns of technical change towards a taxonomy and a theory abstract the purpose of the paper is to describe and explain sectoral patterns of technical change as revealed by data on about 2000 significant innovations in britain since 1945 most technological knowledge turns out not to be information that is generally applicable and easily reproducible but specific to firms and applications cumulative in development and varied amongst sectors in source and direction innovating firms principally in electronics and chemicals are relatively big and they develop innovations over a wide range of specific product groups within their principal sector but relatively few outside firms principally in mechanical and instrument engineering are relatively small and specialised and they exist in symbiosis with large firms in scale intensive sectors like metal manufacture and vehicles who make a significant contribution to their own process technology in textile firms on the other hand most process innovations come from suppliers these characteristics and variations can be classified in a three part taxonomy based on firms 1 supplier dominated 2 production intensive 3 science based they can be explained by sources of technology requirements of users and possibilities for appropriation this explanation has implications for our understanding of the sources and directions of technical change firms diversification behaviour the dynamic relationship between technology and industrial structure and the formation of technological skills and advantages at the level of the firm the region and the country

free entry and social efficiency under vertical oligopoly we analyze a successive vertical oligopoly model that incorporates vertical relationships between industries and demonstrate that free entry in an industry that produces a homogeneous product can lead to a socially insufficient number of firms this is in contrast with the proevious findings that under cournot oligopoloy with fixed set up costs level of entry in the free entry equilibrium is socially excessive it has often been argued that this result can provide a justification for apparently anticompetitive entry regulations our finding yields an important policy implication that such a justification is not necessarily valid when vertical relationships ar taken into account

simultaneous entry and welfare abstract i examine the welfare properties of free entry under conditions of simultaneous entry specifically i consider the second best problem of influencing the number of entrants while taking as given firm behavior upon entry i consider two alternative models of simultaneous entry grab the dollar entry and war of attrition entry i show that if entry costs are low then the results from previous models of sequential entry are fairly robust to the possibility of simultaneous entry if however entry costs are high then the welfare effects of free entry depend delicately on the nature of the entry game being played

offshoring administrative and technical work new fields for understanding the global enterprise in this paper we introduce the journal of international business studies special issue on offshoring administrative and technical services ats in doing so we have attempted to locate the topic within the international business research tradition as well as suggest challenges and opportunities that the phenomenon offers to theoretical and empirical research in the field we examine the interplay of costs knowledge and innovation in the evolution of ats offshoring from modest beginnings to its current stature as an accepted business practice we suggest that understanding the continuing evolution of ats offshoring requires researchers to take into account not only the business imperative of cost saving but also a more complex set of underlying factors and potential outcomes we argue that the rapid growth of ats offshoring has brought about an accumulation of resources including financial flows knowledge infrastructure and human capital to create new platforms for knowledge creation and innovation low costs may characterize the initial conditions for offshoring but they also provide the basis for up market moves as firms increasingly pursue innovation based strategies we introduce the papers in the special issue as integral elements in our discussion contributing new ideas that stimulated our thinking and hopefully will do the same for others seeking to understand this emerging area of globalization and international managerial practice journal of international business studies 2009 40 887 900 doi 10 1057 jibs 2009 22

market versus technology drive in r d internationalization four different patterns of managing research and development research and development are subject to different location drivers the analysis of 1021 r d units each distinguished by its main orientation towards either research or development work reveals that research is concentrated in only five regions worldwide while development is more globally dispersed our research is based on 290 research interviews and database research in 81 technology intensive multinational companies we identify two principal location rationales access to markets and access to science as the principal determinants for four trends that lead to four archetypes of r d internationalization national treasure market driven technology driven and global their organizational evolution is characterized by four trends the model is illustrated with short cases of international r d organization at kubota schindler xerox and glaxo wellcome differences in rd separation seems to contradict this trend we argue that this need not be the case for there are good reasons to maintain some independence between research and development

equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model abstract we examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model in contrast to salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint

r d internationalization r d collaboration and public knowledge institutions in small economies evidence from finland and the netherlands this paper investigates domestic and foreign innovating firms determinants of r d collaboration with domestic universities and public knowledge institutes in finland and the netherlands we put particular emphasis on the impact of incoming academic spillovers on the probability to co operate with these public r d institutes based on data from community innovation surveys we find that foreign firms in the netherlands are less likely to co operate with domestic public knowledge institutions than domestic firms while in finland no significant difference can be detected another result is that incoming knowledge spillovers are an important determinant for r d collaboration with domestic public knowledge institutions in both countries in case of foreign firms in finland incoming knowledge spillovers affect the probability to co operate with public knowledge institutions more positively as compared with domestic firms for the netherlands no substantial difference could be found in this respect further innovating firms in finland that require academic or basic knowledge do not co operate significantly more with public knowledge institutions than those that need applied knowledge at the same time they are willing to share knowledge with public r d partners in the netherlands innovating firms that require relatively more basic than applied knowledge increase the probability of co operation with dutch universities and public knowledge institutions but there is reluctance to share proprietary knowledge with public r d partners for both countries no significant difference between foreign and domestic firms with regard to academic knowledge requirements could be found this raises the issue whether finnish innovation policies with a strong focus on r d co operation provide incentives for strategic behaviour by domestic public partners to put more emphasis on applied research

welfare losses under cournot competition abstract in a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical compete in quantities and produce with constant returns the percentage of welfare losses pwl is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases we study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms we provide exact formulae of pwl and robust constructions of markets were pwl is close to one in these two cases we show that the market structure that maximizes pwl is either monopoly or dominant firm depending on demand finally we prove that pwl is minimized when all firms are identical a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of pwl downwards

taxation and welfare in an oligopoly with strategic commitment this paper establishes comparative statics results for an oligopoly model with strategic commitment firms compete in two stages in the first stage firms decide on strategic cost reducing r d investment whereas they choose output in the second stage taking an excise tax subsidy as a shift parameter in the second stage game the short run as well as long run effects on output cost reducing r d investment and second best welfare will be examined the crucial role played by the strategic substitutability of outputs as well as cost reducing r d investments is clarified and a variant of the le chatelier samuelson principle in the authors game theoretic model is obtained copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the globalisation of technology what remains of the product cycle model this paper reexamines two hypotheses associated with earlier versions of the product cycle model the first hypothesis that innovations are almost always located in the home country of the parent company is rejected on the basis of evidence drawn from one hundred years of u s patent office data the second hypothesis that the international dispersion of activity is led by technology leaders is historically valid however over the last twenty years technology leaders have been ahead instead in the globalization of technology that is in developing internal international networks to exploit the locationally differentiated potential of foreign centers of excellence c 1995 academic press inc copyright 1995 by oxford university press

indirect taxation in vertical oligopoly this paper analyzes the effects of specific and ad valorem taxation in an industry with downstream and upstream oligopoly we find that in the short run i e when the number of firms in both markets is exogenous the results concerning tax incidence tend to be qualitatively similar to models where the upstream market is perfectly competitive however both over and undershifting are more pronounced potentially to a very large extent instead in the long run under endogenous entry and exit overshifting of both taxes is more likely to occur and is more pronounced under upstream oligopoly as a result of this a tax increase is more likely to be welfare reducing we also demonstrate that downstream and upstream taxation are equivalent in the short run while this is not true for the ad valorem tax in the long run we show that it is normally more efficient to tax downstream

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

global technology development by colocating r d and manufacturing the case of swedish manufacturing mnes in this study we analyze the role of colocation between research and development r d and manufacturing for global technology development by multinational enterprises mnes the extant literature suggests that the main strategic role of colocated r d units is to locally adapt existing products and processes however data from 146 foreign r d units of sweden s 17 largest manufacturing mnes in 2013 show that they instead mainly develop new technology not only for the local and regional markets but to a large extent for the global market a likely explanation is that colocation positively contributes to joint problem solving and transfer of tacit knowledge between production and r d personnel all of which is necessary in new product development especially in industries characterized by complex products and systems and rapid technological change a theoretical implication is that depending on industry characteristics internal cross functional linkages between r d and manufacturing can be more critical than external supply and demand side factors when it comes to influence where r d units are located globally

new concepts and trends in international r d organization abstract the globalization of markets the regionalization of technical and scientific expertise and the rapid change in technologies are forcing technology based companies to continuously adjust their r d organization our study of 33 companies reveals five different types of r d organization in multinational companies mnc we classified r d organizations according to the dispersion of r d activities and the degree of cooperation between individual r d units and identified the ethnocentric centralized the geocentric centralized the polycentric decentralized the r d hub and the integrated r d network organization five trends of organizational change among these forms of international r d organization were identified 1 stronger orientation of r d activities towards international markets and knowledge centers 2 establishment of tightly coordinated listening posts 3 strengthening and reinforcement of foreign r d sites 4 increased integration of decentralized r d units and 5 tighter coordination and recentralization of r d activities at fewer know how centers the search for the optimal balance between coordination and control is reflected by hybrid structures and intermediary configurations detected in some of the investigated companies since effective changes in behavioral orientation require considerable time successful quantum leaps in multinational r d organization are next to impossible

contestable markets an uprising in the theory of industry structure presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th meeting of the american economic association on december 29 1981 discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry ebsco

the market selects the wrong firms in the long run we consider the effects of free entry on the market structure and social welfare of an asymmetric cournot oligopoly even if we allow for the existence of different types of firms initially only one type in almost all cases can survive in the long run free entry leads an economy to a symmetric equilibrium in which the excess entry theorem holds further we consider the socially optimal policy for this economy in cases of either i a concave demand which implies strategic substitutability or ii strategic complementarity which implies a convex demand the type of firms that should remain in the market to achieve social optimality does not necessarily coincide with the type of firms that will survive in the long run the market may select not only the wrong number of firms but also the wrong type of firms in the long run

consumer benefited cartels under strategic capital investment competition abstract the purpose of this paper is to refute the genrally accepted idea that a cartel raises producers surplus at the expense of consumers surplus if firms in an industry expect that a cartel in which the output is allocated on the bases of the capital equipment will be formed then each firm tries to make a larger capital investment than before which may lead to larger consumers surplus through this argument i shall present one of the reasons why heavy industries had excess capacity in postwar japan

choosing an appropriate alliance governance mode the role of institutional cultural and geographical distance in international research development r d collaborations we identify a variety of r d alliance modes in a knowledge intensive industry e g pharmaceuticals and classify them into four ordered categories which go beyond the traditional binary equity vs non equity alliance classification this enriches our understanding of alliance governance structures and broadens the application of alliance modes in what is today a more complicated international r d collaboration setting we then explore national industry and firm factors that determine the selection of an appropriate r d alliance governance mode using a sample of 237 international alliance deals the likelihood of using a more integrated alliance governance mode decreases as the difference or distance between nations of the partner firms increases in terms of human capital and cultural distance on the other hand a greater geographic and institutional difference is positively associated with the selection of more integrated alliance governance modes furthermore firms in the research stage are more likely to use a more integrated governance mode as opposed to firms in the development stage these findings advance research on alliance governance structure they reveal the factors affecting the r d alliance governance mode choice

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial markets abstract vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york shows that the number of firms entering is excessive in his circle model of product differentiation we broaden his result to a large class of transport and production cost functions in particular convex transport and production costs always entail excessive entry as long as a price equilibrium exists we also provide an example of insufficient entry in equilibrium

strategic entry deterrence recent developments in the economics of industry this paper reviews the recent developments in the economics of industry with respect to strategic entry deterrence starting from bain s 1956 classical analysis a simple two stage game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant is used to present the general structure of the entry deterrence problem commitments credible threat and sub game perfection are illustrated in this context the various strategic variables that an incumbent firm can use to bar entry are discussed the issue of whether a group of incumbents can noncooperatively deter entry is taken up and some empirical evidence is reviewed copyright 1989 by blackwell publishers ltd

corruption and socially optimal entry abstract the paper investigates the effects of corruption in the entry certifying process on market structure and social welfare for a cournot industry with linear demand and costs to gain entry a firm must pay a bribe maximizing official a fixed percentage of anticipated profit in addition to the usual set up cost this would lead to a monopoly but only in markets without pre existing or shadow economy firms a benevolent social planner may preempt the harmful effects of corruption by either manipulating the number of pre existing firms in the market or by setting up two independent corrupt licensing authorities a socially optimal number of firms in the market may be reached by choosing the right number of pre existing firms or by having exactly two licensing authorities these mechanisms may be seen as restoring second best efficiency in settings characterized by two major sources of distortion imperfect competition and corruption we also show in an extension that the basic insights carry over in a qualitative sense to a model with quadratic costs and first best entry regulation

geographical amplitude in the international generation of technology present situation and business determinants abstract building on a rich dataset with information on 65 000 firms and 465 000 european patent applications from 1978 to 2000 this paper addresses the geographical amplitude of international technology generation first we show that the number of countries hosting international technological activities is increasing the usa and some developing nations benefit from this internationalisation conversely although europe as a whole still plays a leading role in the encouragement of foreign technological activities some european countries such as germany and the uk appear to be losing their technological appeal second we verify that multinational corporations mncs have increased the geographical amplitude of their technological activities in fact the mean number of countries in which mncs internationalised technology generation has doubled during the 23 years we have analyzed third we address the business characteristics that explain this phenomenon a negative binomial regression suggests that internationalisation is higher in mncs showing a greater technological diversification a higher volume of technological activity a wider presence in international markets and more experience in the international generation of technology finally american corporations and regardless of the home country those firms whose main technological fields are in chemistry pharmaceuticals or electronics present the highest geographical dispersion of their international technological activities

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

price and entry regulations with large fixed costs consider an industry with many potential firms each firm characterized by a cost structure with large fixed costs in determining the socially optimal resource allocation the number of firms is a crucial variable in this paper a relationship is established between pure profits with a fixed number of firms and the desirability of increasing or diminishing the number of firms in the industry both first best and nonnegative profit constrained second best cases are considered the results are related to price and entry regulation in such an industry

offshoring of r d looking abroad to improve innovation performance the offshoring of knowledge services has become a phenomenon of increasing importance for firms but many of its implications are yet to be discussed thoroughly this paper analyzes whether r d offshoring contributes to enhancing firms innovation capabilities specifically the study distinguishes between two governance models of offshoring captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing and two types of innovation outcomes product and process innovations we suggest that r d offshoring has different impacts depending on the innovation results and governance models considered the study empirically tests these relationships using the spanish technological innovation panel this survey contains information on a large sample of firms from diverse sectors for the period 2004 2007 the empirical findings allow us confirm our hypotheses and highlight the strategic importance of r d offshoring the empirical evidence reveals a positive relation between offshoring and innovation performance with a greater effect on product than on process innovations the results for different governance models show that captive offshoring has a greater effect on innovation outcomes than offshore outsourcing these findings lead us to conclude that firms that look overseas can benefit from location specific and specialization advantages to improve innovation performance

social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry we provide a new perspective to the literature on social desirability of entry by showing that if the input supplier has market power social desirability of entry of the final goods producers depends on returns to scale entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to scale technology but it can be socially excessive under decreasing returns to scale technologies if the cost of entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently competitive hence the anti competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable if the final goods market is characterised by decreasing returns to scale technologies

foreign direct investment and the relative wage in a developing economy abstract this paper examines the issue of the effect of foreign direct investment on the relative wage in the context of a developing economy recognizing that competing domestic entrepreneurs are potentially skilled workers foreign investment in skilled labor intensive sectors is shown to lower the relative wage moreover a general lump sum subsidy to foreign and domestic firms is shown to lower aggregate welfare whereas a discriminatory subsidy only to foreign firms may raise welfare

selective attention and the initiation of the global knowledge sourcing process in multinational corporations multinational corporations mncs frequently use their foreign subsidiaries to identify new opportunities to access external knowledge this article builds on the attention based view to examine how selective attention the focus on certain issues or answers at the exclusion of others works in the global knowledge sourcing process in mncs the results reveal an intriguing paradox while mncs may establish foreign subsidiaries far from headquarters to identify diverse novel knowledge and overcome local search headquarters decision makers tend to favor opportunities that are market proven and simply confirm what the mnc already knows subsidiary managers pre selling and selling efforts however can play a pivotal role in overcoming that bias this study combines detailed qualitative data with access to a proprietary database on 137 external knowledge sourcing opportunities in one of the world s largest mncs in the telecommunications sector

social desirability of free entry a bilateral oligopoly analysis abstract this paper explores the social desirability of free entry by analyzing a bilateral oligopoly model with bargaining that incorporates the entry process of firms we demonstrate that free entry in an industry producing a homogeneous final product leads to a socially insufficient number of firms when the suppliers of the intermediate products have sufficiently strong bargaining power this is in contrast to previous findings in the theoretical industrial organization literature which demonstrate that in homogeneous final product markets with cournot oligopoly and fixed set up costs level of entry in the free entry equilibrium is always socially excessive our analysis yields an important policy implication given that the standard excess entry result has often been used as a justification for apparently anti competitive entry regulations

what determines the location choice of r d activities by multinational firms abstract we analyse 446 location decisions of r d activities by multinational firms incorporated in the european union over 1999 2006 our results suggest that on average the location probability of a representative r d foreign affiliate increased with agglomeration economies from foreign r d activities human capital proximity to centres of research excellence and the research and innovation capacity of the region further our evidence suggests that in comparison to european multinational firms the effects of patents intensity and proximity to centres of research excellence were stronger in the case of north american multinational firms while government r d expenditure intensity increased the probability of location of r d activities by european multinational firms in the region it did not have a significant effect on the probability of location of r d activities by north american multinational firms

commodity taxation and imperfect competition a note on the effects of entry abstract this paper looks at the effects of allowing the number of firms to vary in seade s model of oligopoly and taxation we show that the normative and positive consequences of a specific commodity tax are affected by entry in significant ways

how firms innovate through r d internationalization an s curve hypothesis abstract this article examines the effects of r d internationalization and organizational slack on innovation performance we suggest that there is an s shaped relationship between r d internationalization and innovation performance innovation performance increases in the decentralization stage decreases in the transition stage and increases again in the recentralization stage in addition organizational slack is hypothesized to have a negative moderating effect on the s shaped relationship longitudinal data on 210 taiwanese firms in the information technology sector during a 10 year period is collected to test the hypotheses the findings support our prediction managerial implications and future research directions are discussed

innovation market structure and welfare many writers subscribe to joseph schumpeter s view that while perfectly competitive firms allocate resources efficiently in a static sense they perform poorly when it comes to innovation from this point of view the optimal form of market structure is unlikely to be perfect competition but some other type of dynamic competition which includes significant elements of monopoly recently considerable effort has been focused on modelling schumpeter s notion of competition perhaps best exemplified by the 1980 work of partha dasgupta and joseph stiglitz hereafter d s 2 this approach views free entry to the rd see nelson and winter 1977 3readers will recognize a similarity of this approach with the notion of contestable markets discussed most recently by william baumol 1982 and by baumnol john panzar and robert willig 1982 for an interesting comparison of the schumpeterian with the marxian notion of competition see john elliott 1980 4this was noted for example by robert wilson 1975 5in such industries the long term gains from dynamically efficient innovation become of paramount importance consequently the optimal market structure would consist of a small number of firms the driving force behind such a result is what scherer 1972 has called the lebensraum effect firms performing r d must at least break even they derive their profits from

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

consumer benefiting exclusive territories i investigate the effect of exclusive territories which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms using shipping spatial models i consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets an upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories i find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity setting competition in price setting competition they raise prices in half the local markets reduce them in other markets and also reduce the total consumer surplus jel classification l42 r32 a propos de territoires exclusifs qui profitent aux consommateurs l auteur analyse les effets de la regle des territoires exclusifs qui est souvent imposee comme controle vertical par les entreprises en amont a l aide de modeles spatiaux de livraison on considere le cas d une industrie composee de plusieurs marches locaux independants un monopoleur en amont reduit la concurrence entre entreprises en aval en imposant la regle des territoires exclusifs on decouvre que cette regle reduit les prix du produit final dans tous les marches locaux s il y a concurrence par les quantites s il y a concurrence par les prix la regle accroit les prix dans la moitie des marches locaux les reduit dans les autres et reduit aussi le surplus au consommateur

social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry revisited abstract we revisit the social desirability of entry in a vertical structure by showing that if the input supplier has market power social desirability of entry of downstream producers depends on the asymmetric marginal costs among competing firms under constant returns to scale entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient when entrants are inefficient but it can be socially excessive if the cost of entrants is sufficiently low compared to the incumbents

large firms in the production of the world s technology an important case of non globalisation us patenting by 686 of the world s largest manufacturing firms shows that their share of the world s production of technology is less than their share of r d activities and varies greatly amongst sectors in most cases the technological activities of these large firms are concentrated in their home country the characteristics of which influence the volume and trends in their technological activities much more strongly then the international component of these activities at the same time these large firms are major elements in the volume and the pattern of sectoral specializations in their home countries technological activities

accessing vs sourcing knowledge a comparative study of r d internationalization between emerging and advanced economy firms research and development r d internationalization is on the rise for advanced economy multinationals amnes as well as emerging economy multinationals emnes we study emne r d internationalization by comparing it to that by amnes in the context of an emerging knowledge intensive industry we find that these two are fundamentally different processes while the internationalization of amnes r d activities can largely be explained in terms of the twin strategies of competence exploitation and competence creation emne r d internationalization is rooted in the firms overall catch up strategy to get on par with industry leaders an in depth comparison of knowledge flows reveals that within amnes headquarters often serves the primary source of knowledge for r d subsidiaries in contrast within emnes headquarters accesses knowledge from r d subsidiaries in advanced economies for innovation catch up within this dichotomy the innovative capabilities of emne headquarters develop more slowly and with greater difficulty than those of amne subsidiaries

r d determinants accounting for the differences between research and development the determinants of r d are an important topic of innovation studies the classical schumpeterian hypotheses about the influence of size and market power have been complemented with the role played by industry determinants such as demand pull technological opportunity and appropriability in determining r d investments however r d has always been considered as a whole even though research and development activities differ in many aspects we take advantage of a new panel database of innovative spanish firms pitec to distinguish between research and development efforts of firms we analyze the differentiated role played by traditional r d determinants in driving research and development results show that demand pull and appropriability have a higher effect on development while technological opportunity is more influential for research differences are statistically significant important in magnitude and robust to the use of different indicators for demand pull technological opportunity and appropriability and to several robustness checks

helping minor firms reduces welfare the effect on national welfare of uneven technical progress and eli mination of a firm is analyzed under the existence of a cournot oligopolistic sector an increase in the share of an inefficient firm owing to its innovations results in a shift of production from more efficient firms to the inefficient firm causing a less efficie nt allocation of production it may decrease welfare even though the innovation itself is beneficial conversely policies keeping ineffic ient firms from innovations or eliminating them may increase welfare though they make the market structure more oligopolistic copyright 1988 by royal economic society

how many firms should be leaders beneficial concentration revisited we investigate how the number of stackelberg leaders and followers aects economic welfare first we discuss the model with m leaders and n m followers compete in a homogeneous good market daughety 1990 nds that under constant marginal costs the stackelberg model m2 0 n yield a higher welfare than the cournot model m 0 or

free entry versus socially optimal entry abstract this paper reconsiders the well known comparison of equilibrium entry levels into a cournot industry under free entry second best control of entry but not production and first best control of entry and production allowing for the possibility of limited increasing returns to scale in production this paper generalizes the conclusion of mankiw and whinston 1986 10 that under business stealing competition free entry yields more firms than the second best solution we also show that under entry always holds under business enhancing competition this confirms the general intuition given by mankiw and whinston which does not rely on the convexity of the cost function the same result is shown to extend at a similar level of generality to the comparison between free entry and the first best socially optimal solution irrespective of business stealing three illustrative examples are provided one showing that the second best and free entry solutions may actually coincide

firm location decisions regional grants and agglomeration externalities we examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments we find that a region s existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas but importantly we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry this suggests that these subsidies are less effective in influencing firms location decisions in the face of countervailing co location benefits