monitoring changes in economy wide energy efficiency from energy gdp ratio to composite efficiency index since the 1973 world oil crisis monitoring trends in energy efficiency at the economy wide level has been an important component of energy strategy in many countries to support this effort various energy efficiency related indicators have been developed we examine some classical indicators which are often found in national and international energy studies in the 1970s and 1980s we then describe the recent developments in using the index decomposition analysis to give an economy wide composite energy efficiency index based on a bottom up approach this composite index is superior to the classical indicators as an economy wide energy efficiency measure and has lately been adopted by a growing number of countries for national energy efficiency trend monitoring

but who will monitor the monitor suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a monitor to detect their deviations what about the monitor s deviations to address this question i propose a contract that makes the monitor responsible for monitoring and thereby provides incentives even when the monitor s observations are not only private but costly too i also characterize exactly when such a contract can provide monitors with the right incentives to perform in doing so i emphasize virtual enforcement and suggest its implications for the theory of repeated games jel c78 d23 d82 d86

ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction abstract the private valuation assumption found in most trading mechanism design papers rules out markets whose valuation structure generates externalities between traders this paper characterizes the set of ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms for a large class of markets that do admit such externalities and for bilateral trade markets establishes the impossibility of a first best solution across a class of trading problems employing uniform priors and linear valuation structures this paper also compares levels of market efficiency for varying numbers of traders

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

robustly coalition proof incentive mechanisms for public good provision are voting mechanisms and vice versa we study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public good provision if incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of robust coalition proofness as well as robust incentive compatibility the participants contributions to public good provision can only depend on the level of the public good that is provided and that level can only depend on the population shares of people favouring one level over another for a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit the outcome depends on whether or not the share of votes in favour of provision exceeds a specified threshold with more provision levels for the public good more complicated mechanisms can be used but they still involve the counting of votes rather than any measurement of the participants willingness to pay the article thus provides a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms

separation of powers and development abstract we model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion proofness then we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries unfortunately the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this institution

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents abstract for an incomplete information model of public good provision with interim participation constraints we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated with approximately full surplus extraction when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small the result holds even if agents payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs the contrary result of neeman z neeman the relevance of private information in mechanism design j econ theory 117 2004 55 77 rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them

unequal treatment of identical agents in cournot equilibrium oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation environmental protection and international competition we discuss properties of such models when a cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal cost sum therefore unless the cost of inducing second stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs the private and social optima are asymmetric

balanced bayesian mechanisms in the transferable utility case a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers we present a new easy to interpret condition and we show that it is strictly more general than all the other conditions found in the literature we also study conditions guaranteeing the bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

comment on correlated information mechanism design and informational rents j econ theory 123 2 2005 210 217 abstract we amend an error in s parreiras correlated information mechanism design and informational rents j econ theory 123 2005 210 217 consequently it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of cremer and mclean j cremer r mclean full extraction of the surplus in bayesian dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1988 1247 1258 as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signals about other agents types instead such an interpretation is warranted only when the weights used to span an agent s set of beliefs stand in a singular relation with the prior type distribution that is known as an alternative characterization of blackwell dominance

measuring energy performance with sectoral heterogeneity a non parametric frontier approach abstract evaluating economy wide energy performance is an integral part of assessing the effectiveness of a country s energy efficiency policy non parametric frontier approach has been widely used by researchers for such a purpose this paper proposes an extended non parametric frontier approach to studying economy wide energy efficiency and productivity performances by accounting for sectoral heterogeneity relevant techniques in index number theory are incorporated to quantify the driving forces behind changes in the economy wide energy productivity index the proposed approach facilitates flexible modelling of different sectors production processes and helps to examine sectors impact on the aggregate energy performance a case study of china s economy wide energy efficiency and productivity performances in its 11th five year plan period 2006 2010 is presented it is found that sectoral heterogeneities in terms of energy performance are significant in china meanwhile china s economy wide energy productivity increased slightly during the study period mainly driven by the technical efficiency improvement a number of other findings have also been reported

surplus extraction and competition a competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have correlated private information about their valuations in contrast to the monopoly case where sellers charge entry fees and extract all buyers surplus it is shown that in the unique symmetric equilibrium with competition sellers hold second price auctions with reserve prices set equal to their cost most important it is a best reply for sellers not to charge entry fees of the kind normally used to extract surplus even though it is feasible for them to do so

dynamic yardstick mechanisms abstract this paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated this sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation the paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long term contracts we found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bound on transfers that an agent can be asked to pay in contrast short term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers second absent current yardstick the possibility of using correlated mechanisms in the future allows the principal to implement the first best with a renegotiation proof long term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short term contracting

a literature study for dea applied to energy and environment abstract this study systematically summarizes previous research efforts on data envelopment analysis dea applied to energy and environment in the past four decades including concepts and methodologies on dea environmental assessment industrial developments are very important for all nations in terms of their economic prosperities a problem is that the development produces various pollutions on air water and other types of contaminations all of which are usually associated with our health problems and climate changes thus it is necessary for us to consider how to make a balance between economic success and pollution mitigation to maintain a high level of social sustainability in the world it is widely considered that dea is one of the methodologies to examine the level of sustainability this study examines a recent research trend on dea applications from 1980s to 2010s nowadays many researchers have paid serious attention on how to combat various difficulties in the areas of energy and environment as a result the number of articles on dea applications on energy and environment has dramatically increased particularly after 2000s however it is true that dea has strengths and drawbacks in the applications therefore it is very important for us to carefully use dea for guiding large policy issues and business strategies such as the global warming and climate change an underlying premise of this study is that technology innovation in engineering and natural science may solve various problems by linking it with political and managerial efforts the use of dea provides a methodological linkage among them so enhancing the practicality in mitigating problems due to climate change and environmental pollutions this literature study along with a summary on conceptual and methodological developments provides us with guidelines for our future research works on dea on energy and environment issues

approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values abstract this paper studies the revenue maximization problem in environments wherein buyers have interdependent values and correlated types we show that 1 when the system of feasible sets is a matroid and buyer valuations satisfy a single crossing condition the generalized vickrey clarke groves mechanisms with lazy reserves vcg l are ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational 2 if in addition the valuation distribution satisfies a generalized monotone hazard rate condition the vcg l mechanism with conditional monopoly reserves is approximately optimal then we construct an ascending auction that implements the truth telling equilibrium of a vcg l mechanism in ex post equilibrium finally we discuss the connection between the vcg l mechanisms and greedy algorithms studied in lehmann et al 2002 and deferred acceptance auctions studied in milgrom and segal 2014 and the impact of competition by proving a bulow and klemperer 1996 type result

efficient energy saving targets for apec economies abstract energy saving target ratios estr for 17 apec economies during 1991 2000 are computed in a total factor framework all nominal variables are transformed into real variables by the purchasing power parity ppp at the 1995 price level the data envelopment analysis dea approach is used to find the energy saving target est for apec economies without reducing their maximum potential gross domestic productions gdps in each year energy labor and capital are the three inputs while gdp is the single output our major findings are as follows 1 china has the largest est up to almost half of its current usage 2 hong kong the philippines and the united states have the highest energy efficiency 3 the energy efficiency generally increases for apec economies except for canada and new zealand 4 chile mexico and taiwan have significantly improved their energy efficiency in the last 5 years 5 an inverted u shape relation exists between per capita est and per capita gdp 6 estr has a positive relation with the value added percentage of gdp of the industry sector and a negative relation with that of the service sector

energy efficiency and policy in swedish pulp and paper mills a data envelopment analysis approach the paper provides an empirical assessment of the electricity efficiency improvement potential in the swedish pulp and paper industry by employing data envelopment analysis dea and mill specific input and output data for the years 1995 2000 and 2005 the empirical results are discussed in relation to the reported outcomes of the swedish voluntary energy efficiency programme pfe the estimated electricity efficiency gap is relatively stable over the time period it equals roughly 1 twh per year for the sample mills and this is three times higher than the corresponding self reported electricity savings in pfe this result is largely a reflection of the fact that in the pulp and paper industry electricity efficiency improvements are typically embodied in the diffusion of new capital equipment and there is a risk that some of the reported measures in pfe simply constitute an inefficient speed up of capital turnover the above does not preclude though that many other measures in pfe may have addressed some relevant market failures and barriers in the energy efficiency market overall the analysis suggests that future energy efficiency programs could plausibly be better targeted at explicitly promoting technological progress as well as at addressing the most important information and behaviour related failures

energy intensity and its determinants in china s regional economies abstract this paper contributes to the existing literature as well as policy debates by examining energy intensity and its determinants in china s regional economies the analysis is based on a comprehensive database of china s regional energy balance constructed for this project through its focus on regional china this study extends the existing literature which mainly covers nationwide studies it is found in this paper that energy intensity declined substantially in china the main contributing factor is the improvement in energy efficiency changes in the economic structure have so far affected energy intensity modestly thus there is considerable scope to reduce energy intensity through the structural transformation of the chinese economy in the future

bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions abstract the generalized second price gsp auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use of the internet it is well known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise edelman et al 2007 11 and varian 2007 36 show that an efficient equilibrium always exists in the full information setting their results however do not extend to the case with uncertainty where efficient equilibria might not exist in this paper we study the space of equilibria in gsp and quantify the efficiency loss that can arise in equilibria under a wide range of sources of uncertainty as well as in the full information setting the traditional bayesian game models uncertainty in the valuations types of the participants the generalized second price gsp auction gives rise to a further form of uncertainty the selection of quality factors resulting in uncertainty about the behavior of the underlying ad allocation algorithm the bounds we obtain apply to both forms of uncertainty and are robust in the sense that they apply under various perturbations of the solution concept extending to models with information asymmetries and bounded rationality in the form of learning strategies we present a constant bound 2 927 on the factor of the efficiency loss price of anarchy of the corresponding game for the bayesian model of partial information about other participants and about ad quality factors for the full information setting we prove a surprisingly low upper bound of 1 282 on the price of anarchy over pure nash equilibria nearly matching a lower bound of 1 259 for the case of three advertisers further we do not require that the system reaches equilibrium and give similarly low bounds also on the quality degradation for any no regret learning outcome our conclusion is that the number of advertisers in the auction has almost no impact on the price of anarchy and that the efficiency of gsp is very robust with respect to the belief and rationality assumptions imposed on the participants

full implementation and belief restrictions we introduce a framework to study the problem of full implementation under general restrictions on agents beliefs which we call implementation first we provide a characterization of the properties of the mechanisms that achieve implementation these conditions relate the possibility of achieving full implementation to the strength of the strategic externalities induced by the mechanism we then study how to achieve full implementation via the design of simple transfer schemes in these context the general conditions for implementation suggest a simple design principle in which belief restrictions are used to weaken the strategic externalities induced by the baseline transfers of the belief free benchmark importantly our results require minimal information on agents beliefs which regard simple moments of the distribution of types these moment conditions arise naturally in applications and in practical problems of mechanism design

role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information we investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent we characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 that restricts the message spaces the principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss we show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes we also extend the results of the single agent model to the multi agent model

on the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation we consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent one dimensional private types we prove that for any bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus the short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to gutmann kemperman reeds and shepp 1991 we also show that the equivalence between bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations

collusion in organizations the principal agent theory developed in the 1980s has produced a large set of insights for understanding how contracts can be established within organizations this theory explains how a principal who offers a contract to an agent should structure this contract to overcome at least partially the asymmetries of information he faces by now optimal contracts with adverse selection or hidden knowledge with moral hazard or hidden action or with nonverifiability by a third party of some variables known ex post by both the principal and the agent are relatively well understood despite insightful extensions to multiagent or multiprincipal organizations this body of knowledge falls short of a comprehensive theory of organizations one major reason beyond the restrictive nature of the organizations studied lies in the noncooperative approach generally followed to model multiagent settings indeed in this standard paradigm the cooperation of agents desired by the principal can be induced by the contracts he offers to the agents each of them maximizing his own welfare given the behavior of the other agents what remains is that the principal has complete control of the game played by the agents unwanted communication or side contracting between agents can be prevented this is a rather unrealistic assumption contract theory teaches us that the principal structures the contracts so as to minimize the informational rents given up to the agents because of their informational advantages it is quite natural to expect a collective reaction on the part of the agents to protect their rents we need to understand how agents can react to the rules of an organization and beyond to understand how a principal who is aware of the incentives for collusion should design the organization modeling coalitional or collusive behavior and characterizing the regulatory responses to such behavior is a major task of organization theory the empirical relevance of this line of work is easy to establish a clear example is that of auctions for which the occurrence of cooperative behavior between bidders is a general and well documented phenomenon see porter and zona 1993

information sharing between vertical hierarchies abstract when do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain information we show that the incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities between principals and the correlation of agents information with small externalities principals share information when externalities and correlation have opposite signs and do not share information when externalities and correlation have the same sign in this second case principals face a prisoners dilemma since they obtain higher profits by sharing information

ex post renegotiation proof mechanism design we study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation proof eprp i e robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures and which social choice functions are eprp implementable in complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced groves allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents all ex post efficient allocations are in environments with independent private values essentially only the budget balanced groves in expectations allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents and correlated beliefs all ex post efficient allocations are

energy efficiency and the slump in labour productivity in the usa energy consumption is included in an aggregate cobb douglas production function for the usa the data suggest that energy conservation has not reduced the growth rate for real gnp by more than 0 3 percentage points and that less than one fifth of the overall slump in labour productivity since 1973 should be attributed to higher energy prices

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

dea radial measurement for environmental assessment and planning desirable procedures to evaluate fossil fuel power plants abstract energy policy depends on a proper use of methodology in guiding a large energy issue such as the global warming and climate change dea is one of such methodologies that are often used for preparing environmental policy which is closely linked to various energy issues unfortunately the use of dea applied to environmental policy is insufficient often misguiding policy makers and other individuals who are involved in energy issues this study provides three guidelines for a use of dea in preparing environmental assessment first it is important to prepare both primal and dual formulations to confirm whether information regarding all production factors i e inputs desirable and undesirable outputs is fully utilized in dea assessment second dea has model variations in radial and non radial measurements it is necessary for us to examine environmental issues by different models in order to avoid a methodological bias existing in those empirical studies finally dea environmental assessment needs to incorporate the concept of natural and managerial disposability the natural disposability indicates that a firm negatively adapts a regulation change on undesirable outputs in contrast the managerial disposability indicates that a firm positively adapts the regulation change because the firm considers the regulation change as a new business opportunity

privatisation and market structure in a transition economy abstract a model is developed in which an industry of n 1 firms is privatised the participation method of privatisation is used whereby firms are sold for cash but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership in each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment before output is produced this investment is unobservable by the state and therefore non contractible there is cournot competition in the product market the welfare maximising retained ownership share for the state is analysed taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance

privatization risk taking and the communist firm this paper studies alternative methods of privatizing a formerly communist firm in the presence of imperfect risk markets the methods include cash sales a give away scheme and a participation contract where the government retains a sleeping fractional ownership in the firm it is shown that with competitive bidding the participation contract dominates cash sales because it generates both more private restructuring investment and a higher expected present value of revenue for the government under weak conditions the participation contract will induce more investment than the give away scheme and it may even share the cash sales virtue of incentive compatibility

the effectiveness of english auctions abstract we study the performance of the english auction under different assumptions about the seller s degree of bayesian sophistication we define the effectiveness of an auction as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation total surplus we identify tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of the english auction for general private values environments and for private values environments where bidders valuations are non negatively correlated for example when the seller faces 12 bidders who the seller believes have non negatively correlated valuations whose expectations are at least as high as 60 of the maximal possible valuation an english auction with no reserve price generates an expected price that is more than 80 of the value of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation

total factor energy efficiency of regions in china abstract this paper analyzes energy efficiencies of 29 administrative regions in china for the period 1995 2002 with a newly introduced index most existing studies of regional productivity and efficiency neglect energy inputs we use the data envelopment analysis dea to find the target energy input of each region in china at each particular year the index of total factor energy efficiency tfee then divides the target energy input by the actual energy input in our dea model labor capital stock energy consumption and total sown area of farm crops used as a proxy of biomass energy are the four inputs and real gdp is the single output the conventional energy productivity ratio regarded as a partial factor energy efficiency index is computed for comparison in contrast to tfee our index is found fitting better to the real case according to the tfee index rankings the central area of china has the worst energy efficiency and its total adjustmentof energy consumption amount is over half of china s total regional tfee in china generally improved during the research period except for the western area a u shape relation between the area s tfee and per capita income in the areas of china is found confirming the scenario that energy efficiency eventually improves with economic growth

efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations this paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information under the assumption of independent types we construct an efficient incentive compatible mechanism that is also budget balanced in every period of the game our mechanism works in environments where in each period each agent observes her own realized outcome decision payoff from the previous period this extends the insight of mezzetti 2004 to the dynamic setting

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

optimal reservation prices in auctions the risk neutral independent private values ipv auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices no matter how many bidders the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value this is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice the authors relax the ipv assumption characterize optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions and show that when information is correlated the seller s optimal reservation price converges to his true value often monotonically and rapidly as the number of bidders grows copyright 1996 by royal economic society

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

on quitting rights in mechanism design quitting rights play a major role in many economic interactions whether in the precontractual phase or after contracts have been signed clearly no party can be forced to sign a contract if she is unwilling to thus implying that quitting rights can be exerted at the ex ante stage when no contract has been signed but quitting rights can also be exerted after explicit contracts have been signed in a number of instances for example most labor contracts allow employees to leave their job if they want to also quitting rights may be asymmetric across agents as labor contracts illustrate employers are generally constrained in their ability to replace their employees

czech privatisation 25 years later privatisation is still a hot political topic today and divides economists as well as politicians and the general public the paper aims to capture the czech privatisation in its historical economic and political contexts the first part explains the difference between transitional privatisation and standard privatisation the second part examines the interests in the privatisation process the third part discusses the privatisation methods used in the czech republic the fourth part offers an international comparison

the design and price of information abstract a data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty he can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller his willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information the data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments we establish the properties that any revenue maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy every experiment is a non dispersed stochastic matrix and every menu contains a fully informative experiment in the cases of binary states and actions or binary types we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments jel d42 d81 d82 d83

the organization of regulated production complementarities correlation and collusion we analyze the choice between vertical separation vs and vertical integration vi when two regulated firms produce complementary inputs with correlated costs and are protected by ex post break even constraints first in the absence of collusion the regulator prefers vi vs for negative and weak positive respectively strong positive correlation second if the firms can collude under vs and know all costs then vs is equivalent to vi however if firms collude under asymmetric information then collusion does not affect the choice between vs and vi since the regulator takes advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information

optimal redistributive taxation in a search equilibrium model this paper characterizes optimal non linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labour markets redistributive taxation distorts labour demand and wages compared to their efficient values gross wages unemployment and participation are lower average tax rates are increasing marginal tax rates are positive even at the top finally numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable mirrlees type setting

optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences abstract tax favored contributions for financing some public goods may be a useful part of optimal nonlinear income tax and expenditure policy there are two sides to the potential gain from subsidized donations first for a given level of public good provision higher private donations from high earners than low earners eases the incentive compatibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare this follows since considering a lower paid job includes a perception of a drop in public good provision second private donation reduces consumption easing the resource constraint this paper explores optimal policy using first a model with standard preferences and then a model with a warm glow of giving in addition to showing the conditions for the level of public goods the paper considers the pattern of optimal subsidization across earnings levels analysis of optimal taxation with warm glow preferences is sensitive to the choice of preferences that are relevant for a social welfare evaluation after considering optimal rules with formulations of social welfare which do and do not include warm glow utility the paper considers the choice of normative criterion like the earlier literature this paper assumes that organizing private donations is costless while tax collection has a deadweight burden since private charitable fundraising is very far from costless the paper is an exploration of economic mechanisms not a direct guide to policy

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

estimating the linkage between energy efficiency and productivity abstract many analyses have referred to industrial productivity benefits associated with energy efficiency that are at least as great or larger than the energy benefits if plants with higher energy intensity also tend to have lower productivity then energy policy needs to consider this this study examines this issue for two segments of the glass industry using plant level data from the census bureau productivity is defined by the difference in best practice production efficiency as measured by data envelopment analysis dea this study uses regression analysis to estimate how differences in plant level electricity and fossil fuel intensity i e energy use per unit of production are attributable to differences in plant level productivity and other economic variables like energy prices and cumulative production in every case productivity differences between plants are statistically significant in explaining differences in plant energy intensity the coefficient that links productivity to energy efficiency yields a less than proportional impact for only one industry and fuel type for others the relationship is implies that a 1 increase in productivity increase energy efficiency by more than 1 this effect is statistically significant for flat glass but not container glass the estimates of the price and learning by doing coefficients seem reasonable but without imposing the assumption that all plants in the industry are equally productive this lends further credence to a significant relationship between productivity and energy efficiency

correlated information mechanism design and informational rents abstract cremer and mclean econometrica 56 1988 1247 1258 obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for full surplus extraction in bayesian nash equilibrium the rank condition which mcafee and reny econometrica 60 2 1992 395 421 later generalize for continuous type spaces this paper shows that if the principal does not know how noisy is the agent s signal or equivalently when signals available to an agent can be ranked by blackwell s informativeness and an agent s informativeness is independent of others information the rank condition fails to hold conversely when rank condition fails and informational rents are left to an agent the model can be interpreted as if the principal were uncertain about the informativeness of the agent s signal

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

assigning resources to budget constrained agents this article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget constrained agents schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of utilitarian efficiency the socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount an in kind subsidy and a cash incentive to discourage low valuation individuals from claiming the good copyright oxford university press

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

decentralization externalities and efficiency in the competitive model externalities lead to inefficiencies and inefficiencies increase with the size of externalities however as argued by coase these problems may be mitigated in a decentralized system through voluntary coordination we show how coordination is limited by the combination of two factors respect for individual autonomy and the existence of private information together they imply that efficient outcomes can only be achieved through coordination when external effects are relatively large moreover there are instances in which coordination cannot yield any improvement at all despite common knowledge that social gains from agreement exist this occurs when external effects are relatively small and this may help to explain why coordination is so seldom observed in practice when improvements are possible we describe how simple subsidies can be used to implement second best solutions and explain why standard solutions such as pigovian taxes cannot be used possible extensions to issues arising in the structure of research joint ventures assumptions in the endogenous growth literature and the location of environmental hazards are also described

learning about the future and dynamic efficiency we analyze the conditions under which an efficient allocation of resources is achievable in a dynamic private values setting where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents values as an application consider the sequential allocation of scarce spectrum to emerg ing technologies whenever a new technology appears a benevolent designer is faced with a problem should he allocate a valuable chunk of spectrum right now while forfeiting for a long period of time the option of allocating it to a possibly superior future technology it makes sense to assume here that current firms have a better knowledge of their technological prow ess than the designer and that the designer s assessment of future technological possibilities is improved by observing the current technology if technology owners are strategic we show below that the learning process about the future disturbs the ability to extract the information necessary for efficient decision making another good example is hiring by an organization that fills positions at different hierarchy levels over time while all candidates prefer higher level positions some aspect of their ability to perform the needed tasks at each level is privately known to the candidates if contracts with current employees are difficult to adjust the designer must carefully compare the quality of present candidates which can serve as a signal about the market to the expected quality of candidates that may become available in the future finally consider a firm allocating franchises in a country where it did not operate before and where contractual clauses or other impediments prevent reallocation during a significant period of time local potential franchisees may have some superior information regarding future prof itability in the respective market and hence the elicitation of private information is crucial for a franchisor that is supposed to get a share of the future profits

optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible we study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent s transfers on the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agent s types cremer and mclean econometrica 53 1985 345 361 56 1988 1247 1257 mcafee and reny econometrica 60 2 1992 395 421 and riordan and sappington j econ theory 45 1988 189 199 studied situations where the signals are such that full surplus can be extracted from every agent type we study optimal utilization of the signals when there are fewer signals than types and the riordan and sappington conditions do not always hold for some special cases we show the level of surplus that can be extracted and identify the agent types who obtain rent

on public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget abstract consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible dsic ex post individually rational epir and ex post budget balanced epbb it is well known that if there are only two agents then any such mechanism must have a threshold or fixed cost sharing form providing the public good if and only if both agents have values that are at least their respective thresholds when there are more than two agents there are mechanisms that are dsic epir and epbb that are not of the threshold form any dsic epir and epbb mechanism that additionally satisfies that the lowest types expect zero net utility from participating are again of the threshold form this additional condition arises endogenously when maximizing expected welfare subject to dsic epir and epbb

identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values we introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions we exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard independent private values ipv model we also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest applying our methods to much studied u s forest service timber auctions we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates this correlation causes expected profit the profit maximizing reserve price and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional ipv analysis of the data would suggest

make trade not war this paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and trade we show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is economically beneficial military conflicts reduce trade and leaders are rational when war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains however countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict we test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950 2000 period using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues including instrumental variables we find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness for proximate countries we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military conflict

energy intensity in the iron and steel industry a comparison of physical and economic indicators abstract energy consumption of the iron and steel industry is examined in seven countries brazil china france germany japan poland and the united states for the period 1980 1991 using a decomposition analysis based on physical indicators for process type and product mix we decompose intra sectoral structural changes and efficiency improvements specific energy consumption decreased in all countries except poland efficiency improvement played a key role in brazil china germany and the us while structural changes were the main driver for energy savings in france and japan we also compare the use of various economic indicators to physical indicators and find that they do not track physical developments well in poland or the developing countries we studied in the industrialized countries value added based energy intensity indicators generally reflect the specific energy consumption better than other economic indicators although large differences occur in individual years we found a smaller correlation between other economic indicators gross output and value of shipments and specific energy consumption we conclude that use of physical energy intensity indicators improves comparability between countries provides greater information for policy makers regarding intra sectoral structural changes and provides detailed explanations for observed changes in energy intensity

optimal auction design in two sided markets a key feature of online markets for advertising e g sponsored links is that clicking rates depend on the searchers expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers this article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run where clicking rates are mechanism dependent in line with the practice of the major search engines the revenue maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of advertisers by trading off rent extraction and clicking volume this mechanism works as a cross subsidization device between searchers and advertisers

extraction of surplus under adverse selection the case of insurance markets abstract we consider a principal agent setting with two types of risk averse agents with different abilities to avoid losses abilities types are characterized by two distributions f and g which are agents private information all agents have the same increasing and strictly concave utility function u under which g has a higher certainty equivalent in this environment we derive a characterization of pairs of distributions under which a first best outcome can be achieved or approximated we prove that a first best outcome can be achieved if and only if the distribution f is not absolutely continuous with respect to the distribution g if this condition is not satisfied the first best outcome can be approximated arbitrarily close if and only if the likelihood ratio df dg is unbounded journal of economic literature classification number d82

optimal contracts with contingent allocation abstract we study the contractual design problem of a seller that observes an ex post signal correlated with the buyer s valuation and can make the allocation but not payments contingent on it we show that to maximize her profit the seller should offer a menu of contracts whereby the good is transferred to the buyer only if the signal is sufficiently low the welfare implications of these contracts are also discussed

implementing the efficient allocation of pollution we provide simple mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of pollution first assuming complete information across firms and then allowing for incomplete information both mechanisms operate by inducing firms to monitor one another using firms reports to determine pollution allotments and transfers the complete information mechanism determines a firm s transfer according to a linear pollution price set by other firms both mechanisms can be modified to be budget balanced in and out of equilibrium the complete information mechanism implements the efficient allocation even when firms are allowed to use mixed strategies under a single crossing condition the same holds for the incomplete information mechanism this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

experimentation and project selection screening and learning firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well known business models and the exploration of risky untested approaches in this paper we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm with private information about its returns from exploration and exploitation the investor optimal mechanism offers contracts with different tolerance for failures to screen returns from exploitation and with different exposure to the project s revenues to screen returns from exploration we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for private information about returns from exploration to have zero value to the firm when these conditions fail private information about exploration may even decrease the firm s payoff

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

environment adjusted total factor energy efficiency of taiwan s service sectors this study computes the pure technical efficiency pte and energy saving target of taiwan s service sectors during 2001 2008 by using the input oriented data envelopment analysis dea approach with the assumption of a variable returns to scale vrs situation this paper further investigates the effects of industry characteristics on the energy saving target by applying the four stage dea proposed by fried et al 1999 we also calculate the pre adjusted and environment adjusted total factor energy efficiency tfee scores in these service sectors there are three inputs labor capital stock and energy consumption and a single output real gdp in the dea model the most energy efficient service sector is finance insurance and real estate which has an average tfee of 0 994 and an environment adjusted tfee eatfee of 0 807 the study utilizes the panel data random effects tobit regression model with the energy saving target est as the dependent variable those service industries with a larger gdp output have greater excess use of energy the capital labor ratio has a significantly positive effect while the time trend variable has a significantly negative impact on the est suggesting that future new capital investment should also be accompanied with energy saving technology in the service sectors

coordination and externalities abstract we analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly we consider a general multi agent situation with externalities among agents incomplete information and type dependent reservation utilities when the regulator optimally leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents centralized coordination reduces global activity coordination induces more activity when the principal optimally leaves rents to the most inefficient agents last if we impose budget balance our mechanism can also be interpreted as the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d62 d82 l51

imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership this paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country the impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects the first is an output distortion effect which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption the second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input when the level of privatization increases a decrease in final good production lowers input demand causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase the third is a rent leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm the rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect with foreign ownership however complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent leaking effect we further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes e g selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm

designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro poor microfinance institutions abstract credit agents in microfinance institutions mfis must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the mfi s objectives we show that while giving incentives has no cost in for profit mfis it is costly in pro poor mfis when repayment and wealth are positively correlated a pro poor mfi cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment it then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives when audit costs are large pro poor mfis may have to forego selection on wealth and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations driven by donor concerns with mission drift away from the poor audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of mfis we show that introducing pro poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents

contractual design with correlated information under limited liability we examine contractual design in a principal agent model under two forms of limited liability nonnegative constraints on the transfer payments to and the profits of the agent we show that when limited liability is a binding constraint the principal cannot implement the first best solution and the agent earns rents from private information limited liability is a binding constraint in the nonnegative transfers model only when a signal is insufficiently responsible to type inelastic further as the production rule and profits are continuous in the type elasticity of the signal density function the level of the inefficiency is less than that which obtains with no signal if a signal is sufficiently responsive to type elastic in this environment then the principal can implement the first best allocation and the value of the agent s private information is zero we show that limited liability will always be a binding constraint in the nonnegative ex post profits model regardless of the information content of the signal the production rule and welfare are increasing in the informativeness of the signal

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

regional energy environmental performance and investment strategy for china s non ferrous metals industry a non radial dea based analysis globally china is the largest producer and consumer of common non ferrous metals china s non ferrous metals industry is energy intensive accounting for 24 of the total industrial energy consumption in 2011 in this study we adopted a non radial dea model to examine the energy environmental performance of the non ferrous metals industry from a regional perspective during the 2006 2011 period the energy environmental performance was evaluated by the eco efficiency under natural disposability en eco efficiency under managerial disposability em eco efficiency under natural and managerial disposability enm and enm with desirable congestion enm dc based on the en both the energy conservation and emission reduction potentials were calculated additionally the investment strategy was confirmed by regional types of damages to return dtr in the second stage study the factors influencing eco efficiency were measured using tobit regression and truncated regression models the results indicated that the efficiency scores of en em enm and enm dc were considerably different investment was effective in improving the energy environmental performance for twenty one regions during the whole study period henan had the highest energy conservation and emission reduction potentials the results obtained from the regression models were similar which displayed that the population density and energy price were responsible for the increase in eco efficiency while economic development level and industrial structure affected eco efficiency negatively based on these results policy recommendations for the non ferrous metals industry to improve their performance in a low carbon economy are suggested

strategic ex ante contracts rent extraction and opportunity costs this article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers the seller s optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant moreover this ex ante contract mitigates the seller s ex post rent seeking vis a vis the contracted buyer accordingly it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts depending upon the contracted buyer s financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed

manufacturing energy use in eight oecd countries decomposing the impacts of changes in output industry structure and energy intensity this paper examines trends in manufacturing energy use in eight oecd countries decomposing the changes that occured between 1973 and 1987 into the effects of changes in aggregate manufacturing activity industry structure and energy intensities measured at the industry group level while manufacturing production grew in every country except the uk the rate of growth was variable from nation to nation structural change led to modest reductions in energy use in most countries although in norway structural change led to substantial growth in energy use the reduction in energy intensities was strikingly uniform across all nations ranging from 20 norway to 36 japan over the period of the analysis while other studies have used divisia decomposition techniques we use an alternative method based on laspeyres indices a comparison of the two techniques shows that they yield closely similar empirical results although the laspeyres approach is more easily interpreted while the interactions between changes in structure and intensity are arbitrarily assigned to the two factors by the divisia approach the lapeyres method yields interaction terms that explicitly account for such effects

optimal prize allocation in contests the role of negative prizes abstract in this paper we analyze the role of negative prizes in contest design with a fixed budget risk neutral contestants and independent private abilities the effort maximizing prize allocation rule features a threshold when the highest effort is above the threshold all contestants with lower efforts receive negative prizes these negative prizes are used to augment the prize to the contestant with the highest effort which better incentivizes contestants with higher abilities when no contestant s effort exceeds the threshold all contestants equally split the initial budget or a portion of it to ensure their participation we find that allowing negative prizes can increase the expected total effort dramatically in particular if no bound is imposed on negative prizes the expected total effort can be arbitrarily close to the highest possible effort inducible when all contestants have the maximum ability with certainty the above contest is shown to be the optimal mechanism for a more general class of mechanisms

asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions abstract we study the revenue in auctions of a single object when the number of bidders becomes large we show that all sequences of auctions belonging to a class of mechanisms have limiting expected revenue equal to the expected best use value of the object an important special case that is covered is common value auctions but more generally not even affiliation of values is assumed this provides an asymptotic revenue equivalence result for settings beyond that of private values journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c72