why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

the illusion of fiscal illusion unsticking the flypaper effect recognizing that it is difficult to prove a negative this paper marshals evidence in support of the hypothesis that the widely documented flypaper effect of federal grants to state and local governments is purely a statistical artifact a review of previous studies and a monte carlo investigation suggest that the use of an inappropriate functional form may generate an illusory flypaper effect a local expenditure equation is then estimated in alternative specifications with ten years of state level data empirical results confirm the sensitivity of the flypaper effect to specification and tests of fit unambiguously favor one functional form that specification yields no statistical evidence of a flypaper effect

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

the flypaper effect and the deadweight loss from taxation abstract the difference in the effects on public expenditure by local governments of consumer s incomes and intergovernmental grants is shown to be consistent with the maximization of a representative consumer s utility by a local government increasing marginal deadweight loss of taxation accounts for the result explanations of the flypaper effect do not therefore require models of strategic bureaucratic behavior or voter misperceptions

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

cops and crime abstract the violent crime control and law enforcement act of 1994 established the community oriented policing services cops program that provided grants to states and localities to pay up to 75 of the cost for new police hires for 3 years to date the cops program has awarded almost 5 billion in hiring grants paying for 64 000 new police officers we use annual data from 1990 through 2001 from 2074 cities with populations in excess of 10 000 to show that for each officer paid for by grant funds the size of the force expands by 0 70 officers the size of cops grants are correlated with population and crime rates but not the pre cops time trends in crime rates or the size of the police force this allows us to use the size of cops grants as an instrument for the size of the police force in regressions where crime is the outcome of interest these models indicate that police added to the force by cops generated statistically significant reductions in auto thefts burglaries robberies and aggravated assaults

unsticking the flypaper effect in an uncertain world abstract we provide a novel explanation for the flypaper effect based on insurance arguments in our model the flypaper effect arises due to the differential response of precautionary savings to private income or fiscal transfers shocks in an uncertain world with incomplete markets the model generates two testable implications i the flypaper effect is a decreasing function of the correlation between fiscal transfers and private income and ii such relationship is stronger the higher is the volatility of fiscal transfers and or private income an empirical analysis of argentinean provinces for the period 1963 2006 finds strong support for the model s implications

the flypaper effect what happens to a state s spending when it receives an unconditional grant from the federal government the standard theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in spending will be the same as that generated by an equivalent increase in local incomes or roughly 5 10 percent for most states in contrast numerous empirical analyses have found that spending increases by much more with some estimates near 100 percent this result is known as the flypaper effect since the money appears to stick where it hits the authors review this evidence as well as other studies that find similar behavior in firms

capital grants and regional public investment in spain fungibility of aid or crowding in effect the aim of capital grants to subcentral governments is to increase their investment however recipients may try to allocate additional resources to cut saving or deficit generating a crowding out effect on self financed investment using data from the spanish autonomous communities during the period 1984 to 1999 the effect of capital transfers on regional public investment saving and deficit are estimated econometric results demonstrate that capital grants have no relevance when explaining the dynamics of saving however in deficit regressions they are shown to be both significant and negative both results lead us to a partial long run crowding out effect of grants on self financed investment

the politics of public good provision evidence from indian local governments this paper uses village and household survey data from south india to examine how political geography and politician identity impacts on public good provision we provide evidence that the nature of this relationship varies by type of public good for high spillover public goods residential proximity to elected representative matters in contrast for low spillover public goods sharing the politician s group identity is what matters jel d78 h40

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

general revenue sharing and public sector unions abstract in this paper i find that in the context of a large intergovernmental general revenue sharing program implemented from 1972 to 1986 cities increased expenditures one for one with federal grants which is suggestive of a large flypaper effect furthermore i find that cities in states with pro union collective bargaining laws spent more than half of the transfers on increased wages while cities in states without such laws spent a greater fraction on increased government services these latter findings suggest that public sector unions play an important role in determining the usage and impact of intergovernmental grants

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

local property and state income taxes the role of interjurisdictional competition and collusion this paper addresses two long standing positive questions in public finance i why is the property tax despite widespread popular complaints against its fairness the almost exclusive tax instrument used by local governments and ii why do we consistently observe higher levels of governments states undermining local property tax systems through income tax funded grants and state imposed caps on local property tax rates a new intuitive argument to explain question is presented and tested in simulations using a computable general equilibrium model with parameters set to be consistent with new jersey data both the intuitive argument and the simulation results indicate that setting local income tax rates to zero is a dominant strategy for community planners when faced with popular sentiment against the property tax community planners can collude and introduce local income taxes simultaneously to prevent adverse general equilibrium migration and price changes since zero income tax rates are dominan

asymmetric information and agenda control the bases of monopoly power in public spending abstract a pervasive empirical finding widely known as the flypaper effect is that lump sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction moreover such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process we posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid the empirical results are consistent with flypaper and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants

the flypaper effect identifying areas for further research the flypaper effect literature dates back three decades it is overwhelmingly neo classical in approach attempting to improve the median voter demand model and or temper it with public choice supply side perspectives whilst this approach provided valuable early substantial analytical insights more recent papers seem to have contributed only marginally to an understanding of the flypaper effect if indeed it exists at all hence as well as providing a long overdue comprehensive review of the literature on the flypaper effect this paper identifies more productive avenues for further research

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

raising taxes through equalization a simple theory suggests that a common form of federal horizontal equalization grants should cause subnational governments to levy higher tax rates distorting local tax bases and so increasing federal transfers to test this i examine canadian provincial tax policies in the 1972 2002 period consistent with the theory provinces respond to expansions of equalization transfers by increasing their own tax rates i estimate that on average tax rates in grant receiving provinces were substantially and significantly higher as a consequence of the transfer formula jel classification h21 une theorie simple suggere qu une forme usuelle d octrois federaux de perequation horizontale devrait entrainer les gouvernements sub nationaux a imposer de plus hauts taux d imposition modifiant ainsi les bases de fiscalite locale et ce faisant accroissant les transferts federaux pour mettre au test cette hypothese on examine les politiques fiscales des provinces canadiennes pour la periode entre 1972 et 2002 d une maniere qui semble supporter l hypothese les provinces ont repondu a un accroissement des transferts de perequation en accroissant leur propre taux d imposition on estime que les taux moyens d imposition dans les provinces qui recoivent des transferts sont plus eleves de maniere substantielle et significative en raison de la formule de transferts

the flypaper effect and other anomalies abstract i develop a model in which income both in its own right and as a proxy for other socioeconomic characteristics is an input in the production function for local public services the most obvious example is education though there are other applications as well the comparative statics results from this model yield the following results 1 the observed flypaper effect the tendency for local government to spend a higher fraction of unrestricted grants than income of residents may be due at least in part to the fact that own income but not grants is a substitute for purchased inputs in the technology hence the propensity to spend on purchased inputs out of own income is lower than out of grants 2 the income elasticity of demand for public sector output may be higher than the observed income elasticity of demand for purchased inputs 3 equalization of educational opportunity via wealth neutrality as suggested by feldstein requires major changes in education finance once we recognice the distinction between purchased inputs and output

do federal grants boost school spending evidence from title i abstract one of the federal government s main elementary and secondary education programs is title i which allocates money for compensatory education to school districts based on child poverty i use sharp changes in per pupil grant amounts surrounding the release of decennial census data to identify effects of title i on state and local education revenue and how much the program ultimately increases spending by recipient school districts i find that state and local revenue efforts initially are unaffected by title i changes but that local governments substantially and significantly crowd out changes in title i within in a 3 year period

air pollution as a cause of sleeplessness social media evidence from a panel of chinese cities abstract we provide first evidence of a link from daily air pollution exposure to sleep loss in a panel of chinese cities we develop a social media based city level metric for sleeplessness and bolster causal claims by instrumenting for pollution with plausibly exogenous variations in wind patterns estimates of effect sizes are substantial and robust in our preferred specification a one standard deviation increase in aqi causes an 11 6 increase in sleeplessness and for pm2 5 is 12 8 the results sustain qualitatively under ols estimation but are attenuated the analysis provides a previously unaccounted for benefit of more stringent air quality regulation it also offers a candidate mechanism in support of recent research that links daily air quality to diminished workplace productivity cognitive performance school absence traffic accidents and other detrimental outcomes

congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays the literature on the organization of the united states congress has been dominated by distributive and informational theory one important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork barrel activities here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork barrel is alive and well in the contemporary united states congress we focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts finding strong and systematic evidence of pork barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization

the effects of grants in aid on state and local expenditures abstract this paper develops econometric methods to estimate the effect of the piecewise linear budget constraints created by grant formulas in which the subsidy rate is not constant over expenditures e g closed end grants the methods are applied to the afdc program the results show that because of the kinked nature of the grant formula 1 the present federal formula actually increases cross state inequality in afdc benefits 2 several subsidy rates in the formula actually reduce benefits and 3 the so called flypaper effect disappears

an examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in oecd countries perhaps the best way to summarize the empirical results is to classify the hypotheses into three groups those which can be readily accepted because they are supported in all tests those which can be readily rejected because no test results support them and those upon which one should remain agnostic because the test results are not consistent in the first group are population pop decentralization of government dcnt and length of time of modernization date one can state quite confidently that these three variables are determinants of interest group activity in the second group are the variables measuring characteristics of the political system poly dem1 dem2 pfrc one can with ease reject the hypotheses to which these variables are relevant there is a large group of variables which stand in the middle group however for these variables there are gradations of success in the tests the variables on socioeconomic development inc agri news and number of industries and political subdivisions nind regp are only significant in the one variable tests especially important is their failure to obtain the correct signs in the tests reported in table 3 the variables on ethnic fractionalization efrc and olson s hypothesis on destruction of groups ndfo have the correct signs in table 3 and are significant in table 1 thus it is more difficult to reject efrc and ndfo as determinants of interest group activity than inc nind and regp finally it should be mentioned that once appropriate simultaneous equations techniques are applied government size is no longer supported as a significant variable this paper will conclude with comments of a more conjectural nature on the implications of the results in the case of three specific variables first the results on hypothesis 3 suggest that population affects the number of interest groups independently of indirect effects through other variables this direct effect occurs because groups become proportionately smaller and more homogeneous as population increases hence one can expect the political economy of larger countries to be significantly different from that of smaller countries the results suggest that larger countries will have a denser array of interest groups and that these groups because of their homogeneity will find it easier to decide on and pursue policies in the narrow interests of their members secondly the results support olson s claim that there will be a gradual accumulation of interest groups in developed democracies given that olson attributes to interest groups a large role in determining the economic fortunes of a country the fact that his accumulation hypothesis is supported is a result of some significance finally if one accepts the two stage least squares results it has been shown that changes in government size do not induce changes in interest group activity an important conclusion can be reached when this result is taken in combination with the results of other studies which show that interest groups induce changes in the size of government mccormick and tollison 1981 and mueller and murrell 1983 these results do not support the capture theory of government that governmental institutions are created perhaps in the public interest and then dominated by interest groups rather the results support the theory that the institutions themselves are the creatures of interest group activity