winner s curse without overbidding abstract we report the results of a series of second price auction experiments where each bidder s signal is given by a normally distributed value plus a normally distributed error while bidders values differ in one treatment they are the same in another which allows for a direct test of the winner s curse irrespective of confounding factors bidders may also fall prey to a news curse when they do not sufficiently take into account that signals and errors are correlated we find that the effects of the winner s curse are mitigated by a news curse and loss or risk aversion

asymmetric information and rational expectations when is it right to be wrong abstract in this paper we examine the effects of private agents being less than fully rational in their expectations we examine this in the context of monetary policy where the central bank may have uncertain preferences either by choice or by necessity the new feature is that we allow the public to react in two different ways they either form rational expectations and internalize the uncertainty about the central bank s preferences in full or alternatively and if this process of internalization is costly it forms a best guess regarding those preferences this implies a certainty equivalence strategy applied to the preference parameters as those parameters enter the decisions non linearly a systematic error emerges we examine the magnitude of the resulting error in inflation and output following the assumption of certainty equivalence under all reasonable levels of uncertainty this error turns out to be small but involves trading a deflation bias against the cost of gathering the information needed for the full information rational expectations solution

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

preference anomalies preference elicitation and the discovered preference hypothesis there is wide ranging evidence much of it deriving from economics experiments of anomalies in behaviour that challenge standard preference theories this paper explores the implications of these anomalies for preference elicitation methods because methods that are used to inform public policy such as contingent valuation are based on standard preference theories their validity may be called into question by the anomaly data however on a new interpretation these anomalies do not contradict standard theory but are errors in stated preference that can be expected to disappear as people become more experienced in relevant decision environments we explore the evidence for this interpretation and what implications follow for preference elicitation methodology

scale effects in multi unit auctions abstract we argue that auctions with multi unit demand can be used to experimentally conduct new and novel tests of auction theory the focus of the paper is on changes in bidding behavior as the auction is scaled up by adding more bidders and increasing both the demand per bidder and supply of the auctioned good we identify uniquely tractable environments and obtain clear cut theoretical comparative statics in these settings this leads to the construction of uniform price auctions of different scales where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale in our experiment bidders on average bid much more aggressively than predicted by theory there is also evidence of a scale effect with more aggressive bidding in the small scale treatment compared to the large scale treatment it is argued that these features are consistent with joy of winning and anticipated regret

fiat money as a medium of exchange this paper presents a completely explicit exchange environment in which agents wishing to exchange one type of good for another choose to trade for fiat money which is then traded for the desired goods this exchange pattern is chosen over barter because specified properties of fiat money make this pattern less expensive than the search for a double coincidence of wants although the transaction services of money affect agents utility the model s welfare implications are those of the basic overlapping generations models not those of models with money balances in the utility function copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction the answer to the question of how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous entry decisions into auctions the issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers attempting to attract bidders to their auctions there is a growing literature addressing issues in endogenous entry in auctions there are several papers such as engelbrecht wiggans 1993 pevnitskaya 2004 and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 that consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior there is a much larger group for example harstad 1990 engelbrecht wiggans 1993 levin and smith 1994 mcafee 1993 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 that considers competition between auctioneers in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price we consider the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction mechanism our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the entry decisions of potential bidders of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior in ivanova stenzel and salmon iss 2004a we introduced an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending a dynamic mechanism and sealed bid first price a static mechanism auctions it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them in a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid these differences might result in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret 1 the design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed bid first price auction versus a two bidder ascending auction each with different entry prices by varying the entry prices we could measure the subjects willingness to pay for either auction our main finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction at equal entry prices they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the two auctions to participate in an ascending auction thus they ended up entering the supposedly less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make a higher net surplus including the cost of the entry fee by entering into the ascending auction instead that paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle that involved assuming that bidders were risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice behavior this explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid first price auction just as we observed in the experiment for the most risk averse bidders this is because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in the event that they win they consequently end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders this is a trade off risk a verse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative though risky ascending auction

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

reservation price as a range an incentive compatible measurement approach abstract drawing from the literature on buyers uncertainty in preference and product knowledge the authors suggest and empirically test the proposition that a consumer s reservation price for a product is more meaningfully and accurately represented as a range than as a single point given this conceptualization they propose an approach for incentive compatible elicitation of a consumer s reservation price range icerange that builds on becker degroot and marschak s 1964 point of purchase method two empirical applications of the approach provide an assessment of its practicality and its predictive performance relative to current methodologies for reservation price elicitation the results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms the benchmark approaches in terms of predictive validity and yields valuable incremental information about uncertainty in product valuation

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

nonstandard bidder behavior in real world auctions empirical work on auctions has found that bidders deviate from standard behavior in important ways we investigate a range of these behaviors including nonrational herding auction fever quasi endowment effect and escalation of commitment our innovations are to more completely control for unobservables by using new data from a field experiment on ebay and by accounting for censoring of bids below the starting price consistent with standard auction theory and in contrast to the predictions of the nonstandard behaviors we find that auction starting price has no effect on bidder willingness to pay in a private values setting we conclude that there is little evidence that these nonstandard behaviors are important in the field

auctions in which losers set the price we study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values we show that the second price auction minimizes revenue among all efficient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays and the price only depends on the losers bids in particular we show that the k th price auction generates higher revenue than the second price auction for all k 2 if rationing is allowed with shares of the asset rationed among the t highest bidders then the t 1 st price auction yields the lowest revenue among all auctions with rationing in which only the winners pay and the unit price only depends on the losers bids finally we compute bidding functions and revenue of the k th price auction with and without rationing for an illustrative example much used in the experimental literature to study first price second price and english auctions

vertically differentiated simultaneous vickrey auctions theory and experimental evidence we study settings where a number of sellers simultaneously offer vertically differentiated vickrey auctions for imperfect substitute goods to unit demand buyers vertical differentiation can arise from differences in item quality item value certainty seller reliability or a combination of these factors we characterize the form of the bidding equilibria and derive expressions for the corresponding allocative efficiency and expected seller revenue when bidders are restricted to submit at most one bid our theory predicts the existence of a unique bayes nash equilibrium that resembles a form of probabilistic mating of likes allowing unit demand bidders to place an arbitrary number of bids induces complex strategy profiles where bidders place positive bids in all available auctions higher bidder types tend to follow more targeted strategies focusing their serious bids on fewer and generally higher quality auctions the nature of the bidding equilibria introduces allocative inefficiencies that arise from the lack of coordination in auction selection among bidders we test our theoretical propositions in a controlled laboratory experiment while also utilizing a domain specific risk score to help assess how the bidders risk type affects their bidding behavior in support of our theory we find evidence of a probabilistic assortative matching between bidder and auction types we also find that low risk type bidders tend to crowd on the highest auction and will pay a premium for the certainty it offers whereas high risk type bidders fail to appropriately adjust for risk associated with the lowest auction leading to overbidding these lead to an interesting focal anomaly whereby bids are concentrated on the highest and lowest auctions bypassing intermediate auctions

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

k price auctions abstract in this paper we analyze the equilibria structure of k price auctions k 3 under the independent private value assumption we discuss agents with an arbitrary attitude toward risk that is agents may be risk averse or risk seeking or they may have an alternating attitude toward risk we provide a characterization of a continuous symmetric equilibrium prove that there exists at most one such equilibrium and show that every such equilibrium is differentiable and increasing we also show some additional general properties of the equilibrium strategies in these auctions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d83

anticipated loser regret in third price auctions abstract losing the auction at an affordable price generates loser regret in third price auctions if bidders anticipate loser regret then in line with the experimental findings in a symmetric equilibrium the bids are more than the risk neutral nash equilibrium

fiat money in a pairwise trading multi good overlapping generations model abstract this paper studies a stationary pure exchange overlapping generations model with a particular kind of randomly generated pairwise trading pattern this model in contrast to the usual overlapping generations models has the following implications as regards existence it is shown that a standard boundary condition on preferences is sufficient to imply the existence of a stationary monetary equilbrium as regards properties of the equilibrium for some specifications my model has a stationary equilibrium in which claims bear a higher rate of return than fiat money it is also proved that this stationary equilibrium is conditionally pareto optimal

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions this paper considers a housing market with price restrictions on such markets the existence of a unique minimum rationing equilibrium price vector has been established for each preference profile on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles this vector can be used as a key ingredient in a direct and strategy proof allocation mechanism the main contribution of this paper is to provide two price sequences one with increasing prices and one with decreasing prices that both terminate to a minimal rationing equilibrium price vector in a finite number of steps these sequences are demonstrated to play key roles in an english auction and a dutch auction respectively for the considered housing market with price restrictions less

a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions a laboratory analysis laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects an ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are typically inexperienced in the types of decision making required of them in the lab this paper addresses this issue in the context of common value offer auctions as we compare the behaviour of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry experts with that of naive student subjects results of previous research of this sort have been equivocal in some cases experts make the same errors as novices in other cases they do not hogarth and reder i987 a series of sealed bid common value offer auctions in which bidders compete for the right to supply an item of unknown cost were conducted inherent to common value auctions cvas is an adverse selection problem which may result in below normal or negative profits the winner s curse experimental studies have documented the presence of the winner s curse with financially motivated student subjects in high price demand side auctions kagel et al i986 kagel and levin i986 the experiments reported here generalise these earlier studies from bid to offer auctions also in employing offer auctions we establish a setting with which our experts are familiar thus allowing their experience the best chance to manifest itself

experimental auction procedure impact on valuation of quality differentiated goods despite increased use of experimental auctions a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results this study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than english becker degroot marschak bdm and random nth price auctions especially in latter bidding rounds and that random nth price auction yields lower valuations than english and bdm auctions we find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations but the effect varies across auction mechanism

designed to fail the medicare auction for durable medical equipment we examine the theoretical properties of the auction for medicare durable medical equipment two unique features of the medicare auction are 1 winners are paid the median winning bid and 2 bids are nonbinding we show that median pricing results in allocation inefficiencies as some high cost firms potentially displace low cost firms as winners further the auction may leave demand unfulfilled as some winners refuse to supply because the price is set below their cost we also introduce a model of nonbinding bids that establishes the rationality of a lowball bid strategy employed by many bidders in the actual medicare auctions and recently replicated in caltech experiments we contrast the median price auction with the standard clearing price auction where each firm bids true costs as a dominant strategy resulting in competitive equilibrium prices and full efficiency jel d44 i11 h57

adaptive learning and the transition to fiat money this article explores some implications of adaptive learning for monetary evolution using a search theoretic framework that allows for media of exchange network effects adaptive learning precludes any voluntary transition to a fiat standard from a non monetary state of nature and can account for the historically observed tendency for fiat monetary standards to emerge only following the prior appearance of commodity money and the widespread employment of redeemable banknotes adaptive learning can also account for governments frequent resort to coercive measures to force a switch to fiat money and for their ability to affect such a switch even when doing so is not pareto optimal exchange media fall into the general category of products for which the utility that a user of the good derives from use of the good increases with the number of other agents using the good katz and shapiro 1985 p 424 there are two reasons for these positive network effects 1 indirect the more agents who employ a particular medium of exchange the more likely it is that prices will be quoted in terms of that medium of exchange i e that the medium of exchange will also serve as the economy s principle medium of account the costs of exchange are less for a medium of exchange that trades at par this indirect external effect is analogous to one encountered in computer hardware the more purchasers of a particular kind of hardware the more likely manufacturers of software are to supply compatible products 2 direct the more persons who use a particular exchange medium the better its quality or performance this direct network effect is analogous to one encountered in communications technologies such as telephones the analogy is especially close for fiat money which is useless to an isolated individual this article examines some ways in which media of exchange network effects influence the evolution of monetary standards and especially their role in determining both when and how a transition may occur from barter or commodity money to fiat money the approach taken here emphasises the role of adaptive learning where agents select exchange strategies that reflect static expectations concerning other agents preferred strategies although the exchange game agents play generally has multiple nash equilibria including one in which all agents accept fiat money adaptive learning precludes a spontaneous transition from barter to a fiat monetary standard even where a fiat standard would be welfare enhancing yet such learning does not rule out the spontaneous evolution of a commodity money standard or the eventual substitution of redeemable banknotes for commodity money readers familiar with the literature on network effects will recognise this

auction markets for evaluations when the value of a product or service is uncertain outcomes can be inefficient a market for evaluations can theoretically increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided this paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test the performance of four market mechanisms to provide product evaluations the mechanisms considered are derived from the oft studied uniform price sealed bid discriminatory price sealed bid english clock auction and dutch clock auction our results indicate for this nonrivalrous product that i each of these institutions improves social welfare and ii the performances of the four mechanisms are equivalent this second point is particularly noteworthy given that differing behavior is routinely observed in traditional private value auctions

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

a note on k price auctions with complete information abstract under complete information for k 3 a seller of a single unit k price auction obtains higher revenue than in a first or second price auction when the valuations and the bids are discrete and no bidder is using a weakly dominated strategy

an experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations abstract we study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single indivisible item valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder s own and other bidders signals theoretically the english auction yields efficient allocations while other standard auction formats fail to do so consistent with equilibrium predictions we find that an english auction yields significantly more efficiency than a second price sealed bid auction we also study the seller s expected revenue and the bidders expected profits and find that the experimental results are close to the theoretical predictions

auctions with anticipated emotions overbidding underbidding and optimal reserve prices the experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second price auctions regardless of the valuations of bidders in contrast in first price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations but underbidding for small valuations we show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model where bidders anticipate constant positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing even if the emotional dis utilities are very small the revenue maximizing reserve price r might be significantly different from the standard model moreover r decreases with the number of bidders

revenue equivalence revisited the conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient we re examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats consequently we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue they also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher

nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions the extent to which the behavior of people is consistent with game theoretic principles is investigated in a first price sealed bid auction environment three linear rules of thumb with increasing complexity are used as benchmarks to gauge the accuracy of the constant relative risk aversion model crram in addition the crram is tested against the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis existing competitive bidding experiments cannot clearly distinguish between game theoretic models and linear markdown rules on an individual level within the parametric environments studied and reported in the experimental literature game theoretic solutions are linear over the range of private values in which bid functions are estimated in this study agents drew values from non uniform distributions as a result the game theoretic bidding behavior is nonlinear due to the nonlinearity special econometric and numerical techniques are applied to solve the model and obtain the estimates the crram exhibits good fit of the data the pseudo r2 is greater than 0 8 in 90 percent of the subjects the crram is more accurate than the markdown model mm and the simple ad hoc model simam but not as accurate as the sophisticated ad hoc model sop am the data also supports the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis and suggests that substantial increases in the predictive power of game theoretic models can be gained from improvements in the theory of belief formation

price formation in a sequential selling mechanism abstract this paper studies a dynamic trade institution where an auction is combined with a buy it now option this option presents a take it or leave it price offered by the seller to a potential buyer before the auction if the buyer rejects this buyout price the object is auctioned off in equilibrium sales should take place only in the auction an experimental test reveals that average buyout prices and profits are well captured by the theoretical prediction however a substantial amount of sales takes place before the auction this is caused by offering too low or accepting too high buyout prices we discuss alternative explanations such as risk preferences and wrong formation of beliefs that might account for agents behavior

endogenous price expectations as reference points in auctions the paper models auctions with bidders who have reference dependent payos the reference point is endogenised as the expected price of the good in the auction the model predicts that in equilibrium bidders both overbid and underbid in comparison to the standard bidding function without reference dependent utility the model predicts that more bidders overbid than underbid and that bidders bid more aggressively as the number of bidders or the reserve price increases finally it is shown perhaps surprisingly that revenue equivalence continues to hold between rst and second price

auction fever rising revenue in second price auction formats the prevalent term auction fever visualizes that ascending auctions inconsistent with theory are likely to provoke higher bids than one shot auctions to explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally we design four different strategy proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo endowment effect arguments psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value a control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one shot auction with real endowments we conclude that when bidders are uncertain about their valuations auctions that foster pseudo endowment may raise bids and revenues

rationalizable bidding in first price auctions abstract we analyze the consequences of strategically sophisticated bidding without assuming equilibrium behavior in particular we characterize interim rationalizable bids in symmetric first price auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals we show that 1 every nonzero bid below the equilibrium is rationalizable 2 some bids above the equilibrium are rationalizable 3 the upper bound on rationalizable bids of a given player is a nondecreasing function of her signal in the special case of independent signals and quasi linear valuation functions i the least upper bound on rationalizable bids is concave hence ii rationalizability implies substantial proportional shading for high valuations but is consistent with negligible proportional shading for low valuations we argue that our theoretical analysis may shed some light on experimental findings about deviations from the risk neutral nash equilibrium

when does it pay to delay supplier qualification theory and experiments we study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening qualification screening is costly for the buyer involving product tests site visits and interviews in addition to a qualified incumbent supplier the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification the buyer wishes to run a price only open descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction we analytically study the buyer s optimal strategy accounting for the fact that under postauction qualification the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract in our analysis we derive the incumbent s optimal bidding strategy under postauction qualification and find that he follows a threshold structure in which high cost incumbents hold back on bidding or even boycott the auction to preserve their profit margin and only lower cost incumbents bid to win these results are strikingly different from the usual open descending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy we test our analytical results in the laboratory with human subjects we find that qualitatively our theoretical predictions hold up quite well although incumbent suppliers bid somewhat more aggressively than the theory predicts making buyers more inclined to use postauction qualification this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

the liquidity trap the real balance effect and the friedman rule this paper studies the behavior of the economy and the efficacy of monetary policy under zero nominal interest rates using a model with population growth that nests as a special case a more conventional specification in which there is a single infinitely lived representative agent the paper shows that with a growing population monetary policy has distributional effects that give rise to a real balance effect thereby eliminating the liquidity trap these same distributional effects however can also work to make many agents much worse off under zero nominal interest rates than they are when the nominal interest rate is positive

the effect of marketing messages and payment over time on willingness to pay for fuel efficient cookstoves abstract smoke from inefficient biomass cookstoves contributes to global climate change and kills approximately four million people per year cooking technologies such as manufactured fuel efficient cookstoves that mitigate the negative effects of traditional cookstoves exist but adoption rates are low the international development community debates whether this low adoption of fuel efficient cookstoves is due to a lack of adequate product information or due to household financial constraints we ran vickery second price auctions in rural uganda to elicit willingness to pay for fuel efficient cookstoves comparing the effect of informational marketing messages and time payments on willingness to pay a randomized trial tested the following marketing messages this stove can improve health this stove can save time and money and both messages combined none of the messages consistently increased willingness to pay in a second experiment we compared willingness to pay for two different contracts one with payment due within a week and one with equal installment payments over 4 weeks consistent with household financial constraints time payments raised willingness to pay by 40

incorporating biometric data in models of consumer choice the use of neuro physiological data in models of consumer choice is gaining popularity this article presents some of the benefits of using psycho physiological data in analyzing consumer valuation

should students be used as subjects in experimental auctions abstract we examine the bidding behavior of students and non students in experimental auctions by comparing their willingness to pay wtp values for a good our results suggest that there is no significant difference between the wtp bids of the two groups

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse