balancing terrorism and natural disasters defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort in this paper we apply game theory to identify equilibrium strategies for both attacker and defender in a fully endogenous model of resource allocation for countering terrorism and natural disasters the key features of our model include balancing protection from terrorism and natural disasters and describing the attacker choice by a continuous level of effort rather than a discrete choice i e attack or not interestingly in a sequential game increased defensive investment can lead an attacker to either increase his level of effort to help compensate for the reduced probability of damage from an attack or decrease his level of effort because attacking has become less profitable this can either reduce or increase the effectiveness of investments in protection from intentional attack and can therefore affect the relative desirability of investing in protection from natural disasters

moral hazard discipline and the management of terrorist organizations terrorist groups repeatedly include operatives of varying commitment and often rely on a common set of security reducing bureaucratic tools to manage these individuals this is puzzling in that covert organizations are commonly thought to screen their operatives very carefully and pay a particularly heavy price for record keeping the authors use terrorist memoirs and the internal correspondence of one particularly prominent group to highlight the organizational challenges terrorist groups face and use a game theoretic model of moral hazard in a finitely sized organization to explain why record keeping and bureaucracy emerge in these groups the model provides two novel results first in small heterogeneous organizations longer institutional memory can enhance organizational efficiency second such organizations will use worse agents in equilibrium under certain conditions the core logic is that in small organizations the punishment strategies that allow leaders to extract greater effort are credible only when operatives can identify and react to deviations from the leaders equilibrium strategy this dynamic creates incentives for record keeping and means that small organizations will periodically use problematic agents in equilibrium as part of a strategy that optimally motivates their best operatives

voter turnout in the industrial democracies during the 1980s there are two contending accounts of cross national variation in voter turnout rates one emphasizes the role of institutions and electoral attributes whereas the other stresses cultural and historical factors the authors evaluate the merits of these two arguments they first apply the model developed by r w jackman to turnout rates during the 1980s expanding the sample of industrial states to include three newer democracies with recent authoritarian histories greece portugal and spain they then examine the potential impact of cultural variables on voter turnout rates the authors conclude that the institutional argument outperforms the cultural account of conventional political participation

crime and poverty a search theoretic approach numerous studies document that criminal activity is positively related to unemployment and negatively related to educational attainment levels within given communities we study this phenomenon in the context of a search equilibrium model in which agents choose between formal employment and pursuing crimerelated activities theft prior to their occupational choices agents undertake costly schooling raising their productivity crime acts in essence as a tax on human capital by affecting the probability that a worker s earnings possessions are subsequently appropriated there are multiple equilibria high crime low levels of educational attainment long spells of unemployment and poverty are correlated across them

markets hierarchies and information on a paradox in the economics of organization abstract the literature on the economics of organization presents the following paradox on the one hand firms are said to be repositories of superior information about input characteristics on the other hand markets are said to be superior to hierarchies in coordinating resource allocation because hierarchies are forced to aggregate heterogeneous inputs into homogeneous categories this paper suggests reasons for the association of firms with refined input information and argues that it is not their hierarchical features but their provision of an appropriate framework for rent sharing that is responsible for this association

irs as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints the model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models in particular the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative also it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance the government can increase welfare by playing the role of loan shark to people whose borrowing is constrained on the private market

value creation management competencies and global corporate citizenship an ordonomic approach to business ethics in the age of globalization this article develops an ordonomic approach to business ethics in the age of globalization through the use of a three tiered conceptual framework that distinguishes between the basic game of antagonistic social cooperation the meta game of rule setting and the meta meta game of rule finding discourse we address three questions the answers to which we believe are crucial to fostering effective business leadership and corporate social responsibility first the purpose of business in society is value creation companies have a social mandate to organize mutually advantageous cooperation second business ethics should teach the management competencies necessary to fulfill business s societal mandate these competencies are optimization competence in the basic game of value creation governance competence in the meta game of political rule setting and the three discourse related skills of orientation competence reception competence and communication competence necessary for engaging in the meta meta game third companies can help solve global problems through global corporate citizenship if they participate as political and moral actors in rule setting processes and rule finding discourse aimed at laying the foundation for value creation on a global scale

income distribution police expenditures and crime a political economy perspective in this paper i present a structural approach to investigate empirically the relation between income distribution police expenditures and crime the approach is based on the estimation of an equilibrium model where heterogeneous individuals choose whether to engage in criminal activities and expenditures on police to apprehend criminals are determined endogenously through majority voting i discuss the identification and estimation of the parameters of the structural model using data for the united states jel d72 d78 k42

the logic of insurgent electoral violence competitive elections are essential to establishing the political legitimacy of democratizing regimes we argue that insurgents undermine the state s mandate through electoral violence we study insurgent violence during elections using newly declassified microdata on the conflict in afghanistan our data track insurgent activity by hour to within meters of attack locations our results suggest that insurgents carefully calibrate their production of violence during elections to avoid harming civilians leveraging a novel instrumental variables approach we find that violence depresses voting collectively the results suggest insurgents try to depress turnout while avoiding backlash from harming civilians counterfactual exercises provide potentially actionable insights for safeguarding at risk elections and enhancing electoral legitimacy in emerging democracies

provoking preferences unionization trade policy and the ilwu puzzle if any group of american blue collar workers has benefited from the growth of trade it is the unionized dockworkers along the us west coast nevertheless the international longshore and warehouse union ilwu representing these workers is vocally opposed to trade liberalization we examine several competing explanations for this puzzle and evaluate them by tracing the union s stance on trade over several decades we also use an original survey to compare ilwu affiliates attitudes on trade with those of nonmembers with otherwise similar characteristics consistent with a model of organizational socialization the data support the hypothesis that ilwu membership affects the members revealed political opinions the data are difficult to reconcile with standard theories of international trade our findings indicate that the political support for trade depends not just on voters structural positions in the economy but also on the organizations and networks in which they are embedded

bad loans to good friends money politics and the developmental state in south korea why has the literature on asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in south korea how can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in south korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999 politics is central to the answer in this study i make two arguments first money politics was extensive in south korea both during and after the high growth era second political not economic considerations dominated policymaking this study explains both past and present and compares the patterns of money politics in the early post independence era with those that arose after the democratic transition in 1987 while during the park era a balance of power between businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control the transition to democracy altered the basic business state relationship allowing business to exert greater influence over policy decisions the political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state

the breakdown of hierarchies in the soviet union and china a neoinstitutional perspective why did modest attempts to decentralize the centrally administered soviet system lead to its collapse while more far reaching decentralization in china left central political and administrative hierarchies intact this article analyzes the disintegration of centrally planned organizations in the context of a neoinstitutional model of the breakdown of authority within hierarchies an agency model of hierarchy is presented that incorporates the ambiguous property rights authority relations and risk sharing conditions that prevailed under central planning and then persist during postcommunist transitions this model suggests that decentralizing reforms could trigger an organizational bank run prompting local agents to seize organizational assets under their control the article also considers reputation preserving strategies that central authorities might use to avert disintegration as an application of this model the collapse of soviet political industrial and state fiscal hierarchies are considered and compared with the experience of analogous sectors in china reforms in both states transferred significant autonomy from the center to local field agents in the soviet case these agents appropriated organizational assets with little interference from the center in china by contrast the center preserved both its capacity for monitoring and its reputation for disciplining transgressions and the rise of hybrid ownership forms made expropriation of state and party assets far less attractive

the fate of easter island the limits of resource management institutions abstract malthus malthus thomas 1798 1970 an essay on the principle of population penguin new york believed that population growth will eventually lead to natural resource depletion economic and social collapse and population decline brander and taylor brander james a taylor m scott 1998 the simple economics of easter island a ricardo malthus model of renewable resource use american economic review 88 119 138 use a predator prey model with an assumption of an open access resource they show that the collapse of easter island could be explained by a malthusian trap combined with technical characteristics of the resources they suggest that institutional change such as assignment of property rights could potentially have averted the collapse of easter island in this paper we show that even if the islanders had complete assignment of property rights and implemented optimal resource management with infinite horizon or equivalently had a social planner that implemented such an optimal plan as in neoclassical welfare economics a similar boom bust cycle would have occurred

team theory garbage cans and real organizations some history and prospects of economic research on decision making in organizations this essay attempts to articulate and advance a long term agenda for organizational economics the essay begins with a general discussion of four specific items on this agenda and then moves to a more specific discussion of decision making in organizations beginning with two polar opposite conceptions team theory and garbage cans and then describing several recent economic models part of the rationale for writing this essay is that this agenda has both substantive and methodological commonalities with the work of james march copyright 2003 oxford university press

strategic entry deterrence and terrorism theory and experimental evidence using a two stage rent seeking framework we present a simple model of strategic entry terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers the theory illustrates that relative to a cooperative outcome negative externalities lead to over spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under spending on deterrence our experimental results are broadly consistent subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures in contrast to theoretical predictions participation decisions while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest were influenced by a subject s ability to participate in multiple contests

progress in behavioral game theory i s game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not it is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question the seminal book by von neumann and morgenstern the theory of games and economic behavior was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational in more recent work game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise at one extreme highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions at the other extreme adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple modelsmostly developed to describe nonhuman animals in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all when game theory does aim to describe behavior it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing this paper describes an approach called behavioral game theory which aims to describe actual behavior is driven by empirical observation mostly experiments and charts a middle course between over rational equilibrium analyses and under rational adaptive analyses the recipe for behavioral game theory i will describe has three steps start with a game or naturally occurring situation in which standard game theory makes a bold prediction based on one or two crucial principles if behavior differs from interested readers familiar with game theory should read crawford 1997 whose approach is more eclectic than mine he concludes p 236 that most strategic behavior can be understood via a synthesis that combines elements from each of the leading theoretical frameworks traditional game theory evolutionary game theory and adaptive learning with a modicum of empirical information about behavior behavioral game theory adds psychological interpretations to this synthesis

conciliation counterterrorism and patterns of terrorist violence what causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows gov ernment concessions given this pattern why do governments ever conciliate terror ists i propose a model in which terrorist organizations become more militant following concessions because only moderate terrorists accept them leaving extremists in con trol governments nonetheless are willing to make concessions because their coun terterror capabilities improve because of the collusion of former terrorists former terrorists undertake this collusion to insure the credibility of government promises the model also yields hypotheses regarding the level of government investment in counterterror when moderates accept concessions the terms of negotiated settle ments the duration of terrorist conflicts incentives for moderate terrorists to radical ize their followers and incentives for governments to encourage extremist challenges to moderate terrorist leaders the model is illustrated with an application to the israeli0 palestinian conflict

burglary and income inequality abstract in a model where risk neutral agents have differing legal incomes which may be supplemented by burglary we study the effects of income distribution on the level of burglary assuming that a detected burglar is incarcerated for a fixed term and assuming that burglars choose target houses using the signal of house quality we show how increases in income inequality may increase the level of crime in particular increases in relative differential inequality unambiguously increase burglary crime corollaries are that a more regressive income tax increases the level of crime and that richer neighborhoods may have lower crime rates

mixed signals central bank independence coordinated wage bargaining and european monetary union plans for the european monetary union emu are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects however the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank when signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective greater central bank independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated but it can bring higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is less coordinated thus currency unions like the emu may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage they will have costs as well as benefits and these will be unevenly distributed among and within the member nations depending on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination

irrational workers the moral economy of labor protest in egypt after comparing the predictions of marxist moral economy and rational choice theories concerning collective actions by workers in egypt in the period since the 1952 free officers coup this article concludes that a moral economy perspective is best able to explain the nature and frequency of these protests the supporting evidence is the correlation between labor protest and violations of workers feelings of entitlement as manifest in declining real wages or disruptions to established patterns of wage differentials the targeting of state institutions combined with the fact that workers have eschewed actual production stoppages in favor of symbolic protests indicates a view of reciprocal rights and obligations between themselves and the state the latter reinforces the moral economy by combining significant concessions with its repressive response to labor protests marxism proves unable to explain the largely defensive and reactive nature of labor protest while rational choice theory is reduced to efforts to quantify workers reactions to this repression

what accounts for the decline in crime in this article we analyze recent trends in aggregate property crime rates in the united states we propose a dynamic equilibrium model that guides our quantitative investigation of the major determinants of observed patterns of crime our main findings can be summarized as follows first the model is capable of reproducing the drop in crime between 1980 and 1996 second the most important factors that account for the observed decline in property crime are the higher apprehension probability the stronger economy and the aging of the population third the effect of unemployment on crime is negligible fourth the increased inequality prevented an even larger decline in crime overall our analysis can account for the behavior of the time series of property crime rates over the past quarter century

an empirical investigation into the international real interest rate linkages linear dynamic stochastic processes are derived for the ex ante real interest rates from those followed by the ex post real rates under the identifying assumption of rational expectations the technique is used to study instantaneous and lagged effects of u s ex ante real rates on a number of oecd ex ante real rates the author finds significant contemporaneous correlations between ex ante real rates in the long run however real rates seem to be insulated

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

explicating political hazards and safeguards a transaction cost politics approach we apply the logical of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government we consider two strategies that investors may follow lobbying for the creation of a specialized political governance structure or the reliance on more general political mechanisms to influence policy in that sector on an ongoing basis we identify political hazards as crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards finally we highlight shift parameters in a nation s institutional environment that influence the choice between specialized and generalized political governance mechanisms

non commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions abstract auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment the manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker s output taking into account all interim information he has obtained the worker will work just hard enough and show it to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult this usually raises the costs of setting work incentives so incentives are softened sometimes drastically moreover when a worker s on the job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information

forecasting inflation using interest rate and time series models some international evidence it has been suggested that inflation forecasts derived from short term interest rates are as accurate as time series forecasts previous analyses of this notion have focused on u s data providing mixed results in this article the authors extend previous work by testing the hypothesis using data taken from the united states and five other countries using monthly eurocurrency rates and the consumer price index for the period 1967 86 their results indicate that time series forecasts of inflation have equal or lower forecast errors and have unbiased predictions more often than the interest rate based forecasts copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

resource curse an analysis of causes experiences and possible ways forward abstract higher prices for oil gas and mineral resources have again raised questions about how exporting countries can counter the challenges of resource curse international experience managing the risks of resource curse has varied summarising the continuing discussion on meeting the challenges of the resource curse this paper addresses four questions what are the positive and negative effects of high oil gas and mineral prices on exporters what have been the experiences with managing natural resource revenues can good institutions ensure that natural resource revenues have a positive impact on development and what is the direction for the way forward we argue that the current emphasis on institutions as a potential solution has largely ignored under what conditions institutions are formed and changed

on the political economy of income redistribution and crime this article analyzes a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to specialize in either legitimate or criminal activities expenditures on police to apprehend criminals as well as income redistribution are determined endogenously through majority voting we investigate how crime redistribution and police expenditures depend on characteristics of the underlying distribution of income earning abilities and on the apprehension technology our model accounts for the positive correlation between inequality and crime the positive correlation between expenditures on police and redistribution and the lack of correlation between crime and redistribution observed in u s data

international interest rates and inflationary expectations abstract fama s hypothesis that short term interest rates are efficient predictors of inflation has been criticized on the grounds that his test depends critically on the constancy of the short term expected real rate of interest this paper uses an international framework where the time invariance assumption of the real rate is replaced by the assumption that short term expected real rates are identical at a point in time across countries with well developed capital markets results support fama s contention that short term nominal rates of interest reflect inflationary expectations

incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime an intertemporal general equilibrium model of criminal behavior is used to analyze the effect on crime of changing policy parameters the policy parameters are the length of the prison term the severity of punishment and the amount of police resources the number of crimes in society can be decomposed into an incentive part an incarceration part and a crime competition part the magnitudes of these three components are studied by means of empirical data from england and the us

a strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism abstract we study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power their military effectiveness the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to damage only a subset of countries that emerges endogenously takes proactive measures to fight the terrorist while all countries incur defensive expenditures to protect their soil we characterize analytically the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and show how the equilibrium strategies depend on the key model parameters we provide an algorithm to find the endogenous set of cooperating countries based on their benefit from cooperation and their political economic power

religion terrorism and public goods testing the club model abstract can rational models once theological explanations are discredited explain why certain radical religious rebels are so successful in perpetrating suicide attacks the fundamental barrier to success turns out not to be recruiting suicide attackers there is a rational basis for volunteering rather the barrier is the danger of other operatives defecting a club model portraying voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods explains how they weed out potential defectors by requiring sacrifices as signals of commitment they are thereby able to succeed in risky terrorist attacks the model has testable implications for tactic choice and damage achieved by clubs and other rebel organizations data spanning a half century on both terrorists and civil war insurgents much from middle east sources and israel palestine reveal that a missions organized by radical religious clubs that provide benign local public goods are both more lethal and are more likely to be suicide attacks than missions organized by other terrorist groups with similar aims and theologies and b suicide attacks are chosen when targets are hard i e difficult to destroy our results suggest benign tactics to counter radical religious terrorism and insurgency

income tax evasion an intersectoral analysis abstract this paper develops an intersectoral model of income tax evasion with general equilibrium effects key elements of the model are imperfectly substitutable outputs from the compliant and evading sectors and workers with heterogeneous evasion costs the model allows for biased public expenditures a wide range of behavioural responses and both legitimate and criminal activities evading tax as well as tax avoidance activities qualitative and quantitative assessments are undertaken for the effects of tax rate changes on evasion activity relative output prices and real tax revenues this approach offers useful findings for taxation policy and is amenable to further analytical extensions

does terrorism work this paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool for achieving political goals by exploiting geographic variation in terror attacks in israel from 1988 to 2006 we show that local terror attacks cause israelis to be more willing to grant territorial concessions to the palestinians these effects are stronger for demographic groups that are traditionally right wing in their political views however terror attacks beyond a certain threshold cause israelis to adopt a less accommodating position in addition terror induces israelis to vote increasingly for right wing parties as the right wing parties move to the left in response to terror hence terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of shifting the entire political landscape to the left although we do not assess whether it is more effective than non violent means

dominant firms price leadership and the measurement of monopoly welfare losses abstract the possible welfare losses associated with monopoly power have been the subject of numerous studies over a number of decades recent estimates seem to confirm the earliest estimates which suggested that such losses were relatively trivial this paper suggests that the basis of such estimates is questionable in particular it is argued that the familiar dominant firm price leadership model is not well suited to the task of estimating monopoly welfare losses more appropriate assumptions are identified and their implications for assessing the magnitude of potential welfare losses are illustrated

firm competition and incentive pay rent seeking at work empirical evidence shows that competition among firms generates steep incentives inside firms incentive pay stimulates productive investments but may generate inefficient rent seeking investments

tests of the fisher hypothesis with international data theory and evidence the fisher hypothesis 7 8 states that nominal interest rates adjust fully to expected inflation for years tests of this hypothesis followed fisher 8 in regressing nominal rates on a distributed lag of past inflation which was used as a proxy for the expected rate of inflation see roll 15 for references fisher eventually concluded that nominal rates do not fully reflect expected inflation saying that when the cost of living is not stable the rate of interest takes the appreciation and depreciation into account to some extent but only slightly and in general indirectly 1 fisher attributed this to money illusion in more recent years other researchers have explained the non neutrality of inflation on grounds of general equilibrium sargent 16 and taxes darby 3 and feldstein 6 a new method of testing the fisher hypothesis was introduced by fama 4 he concluded that interest rates set in u s financial markets are informationally efficient fama s work highlighted the two separate although not always distinguishable elements in the fisher hypothesis 1 the effect of expected inflation on the expected real rate and 2 the question of whether or not the nominal rate reflects a rational forecast of expected inflation to test the informational efficiency of nominal rates fama 4 assumed a constant expected real rate arguing in the later paper that the efficiency test is robust with respect to the assumption of the constancy of the expected real rate this assumption has come under severe criticism carlson 2 nelson and schwert 14 on the grounds that the efficiency results are not verifiable given the actual behavior of realized real rates summers 17 extended the study of interest rates to the period 1860 to 1979 using both fisher s and fama s methods and found that the results are less favorable for the fisher hypothesis in a more recent study fama and gibbons 5 tested the fisher hypothesis using a procedure developed by ansley 1 which assumes that the expected real rate follows a random walk they concluded that nominal rates fully reflect expected inflation at the same time that the expected real rate adjusts to it this paper examines the question of whether international interest rates reflect expected inflation in their respective countries in doing so we expand on the previous work of kane and rosenthal 11 we show that although fama 4 introduced a bias into his tests his general approach was correct we then present simple time series tests and show that they fail for eurocurrency rates

electoral terms and terrorism many terror attacks occur at the beginning of electoral terms we present a game theoretical model with incomplete information to account for this empirical pattern both terrorists and governments can be of weak or strong types we find that the risk of terror attacks is highest at the beginning of electoral terms because striking early allows the terrorists to collect valuable information about the government s type and also because terrorists know that even initially weak governments sometimes retaliate to show toughness closer to an upcoming election the model s predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence

extremism in revolutionary movements abstract a revolutionary entrepreneur strategically chooses the revolutionary agenda to maximize the likelihood of revolution citizens have different preferences and can contribute varying degrees of support we show 1 extremists exert a disproportionate influence over the revolutionary agenda 2 depending on the structure of repression more severe repression can moderate or radicalize the revolutionary agenda specifically increases in the minimum punishment marginal cost of revolutionary effort at its minimum radicalize the revolutionary agenda this presents the elite with a tradeoff between extreme but unlikely revolutions and moderate but likely ones 3 competition between revolutionary entrepreneurs can radicalize the revolutionary agenda

reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines should the penalty fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers these models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with lowfrequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected this article shows that if the judicial system is built on the reasonable doubt test then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent in particular as the penalty increases the probability of conviction falls as a result uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it this article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction that is the penalty should fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship generally treat both the probability and magnitude of fines as independent choice variables of the government this approach has led becker 1968 and others to conclude that it is optimal to set uniformly maximal penalties for all crimes and to set the probability of conviction at the minimum level necessary to enforce compliance with the law while this normative prescription is natural and intuitive there still remains a larger positive question of why in most nations of the world penalties are not uniformly high but rather rise with the severity of the crime one possible resolution of the positive and normative questions may lie in the fact that penalties and probabilities of conviction are not generally independent convictions are typically determined by judges or jurors who are instructed to convict only if the evidence convinces them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty psychologists however have found that a juror s willingness to convict may be influenced by more than just the evidence jurors are very sensitive to the potential penalties that defendants may pay

getting to know you a theory of strategic group identity this paper develops a theory of strategic group identity that explains how strategic groups emerge in an industry and how they can affect firm behaviors and outcomes in so doing it provides a theoretical basis for the existence of strategic groups we argue that managers cognitively partition their industry environment to reduce uncertainty and to cope with bounded rationality social learning theory and social identification theory are used to describe how cognitive groups coalesce into meaningful substructures and how a group level identity emerges we describe the ways in which macro level factors condition the development of groups and their identities we introduce the notion of a strong identity which characterizes any group sufficiently recognized and attended to by members to affect individual action groups with weak identities are no more than transient agglomerations of firms and do not exist in any meaningful sense these ideas are developed into propositions that describe the conditions under which groups with strong identities are likely to emerge a second set of propositions describes their transformation over time identity strength is linked to both positive and negative outcomes in a final set of propositions we show how strategic groups with strong identities can affect firm performance resolving a longstanding problem which has plagued strategic groups research and conclude by suggesting some approaches for measurement and future research 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitment japan and the united states the domestic politics of great powers significantly influence the fate of such multilateral regimes at the general agreement on tariffs and trade and the north atlantic treaty organization unless great powers can make credible commitments to support those regimes few countries will offer more than token support domestic political constraints may bind national leaders to good faith adherence to multilateral regimes even if international circumstances do not compel adherence domestic politics also influence the ability of other countries to monitor national adherence to agreements case studies of u s and japanese responses to multilateral regimes show how the nature of the national electoral system the division of powers in the government and the transparency of the national political system influence credibility and lead to special features of multilateral economic and security regimes

crime punishment and background risks abstract we show that if the punishment for a property crime effectively eliminates an individual s initial wealth as with a very long prison sentence then such criminal activities become less desirable for a risk averse and prudent individual if his initial wealth distribution undergoes a second order stochastic dominant improvement similar results obtain under additional restrictions if the punishment reduces an individual s initial wealth by some factor less than 1 in a general equilibrium model where the endogenous victimization risk is part of individuals background risks we also show that the availability of insurance for the victimization risk lowers economy wide crime rates

myopic deterrence policies and the instability of equilibria we develop a general equilibrium model of crime in which honest workers face an effective tax rate on earnings consisting of an exogenous income tax used to pay for policing and an endogenous crime tax given by the proportion of their disposable income that is stolen when there are two stable equilibria the low crime equilibrium is welfare dominant and furthermore welfare is a decreasing function of the income tax rate however as the income tax rate is reduced the degree of stability of the low crime equilibrium diminishes until for sufficiently low tax rates the low crime equilibrium is unstable with respect to any small positive perturbation in the crime rate thus myopic maximization of social welfare exposes the economy to random shocks in the crime rate that can destroy the preferred low crime equilibrium we argue that this dilemma between economizing on resources used for deterrence and ensuring the stability of the most desirable equilibrium is a fundamental trade off in the design of many institutions intended to control antisocial behavior including rent seeking corruption and theft

the role of installment payments in contracts for services this article studies the role of installment payments in relationships characterized by moral hazard and sunk costs we rule out vertical integration and payments contingent on the product of the contractor instead each payment is negotiated as and when made in such circumstances an initial down payment serves to redress the weakness of the contractor in ex post renegotiations if higher effort by the contractor in thefirst stage increases the marginal product of effort in the second stage a second installment payment induces the contractor to invest greater effort initially

on the strength of corporate cultures abstract we model corporate culture s as production technologies for which employees have to undertake culture specific investments that improve their effectiveness at a later date the organization can adopt cultural changes that make this investment partially redundant this leads to under investment however as agents invest more the organization s opportunity cost of a change increases which in turn increases each agents incentives to invest this externality among agents leads to multiple equilibria otherwise similar organizations can thus exhibit either high investment levels and low probability of changes strong culture or low investment levels and high probability of changes weak culture we also explore some implications for the nature and management of corporate culture

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

retrieving and transferring embodied data implications for the management of interdependence within organizations this research helps to link theories of sticky information with organizational design and governance it suggests that information embodied in process material can allow downstream tasks to uncover information about upstream tasks it shows that downstream operators can use this information to negotiate interdependence problems with upstream operators data presented in this article begin to uncover when such information retrieval and exchange occurs and how managers can encourage it finally the article discusses implications for theories of operational design and governance

information processing moderators of the effectiveness of trust based governance in interfirm r d collaboration it is generally assumed that improved outcomes accompany the use of trust as a governance mechanism in an interfirm relationship briefly trust is a social lubricant that reduces the friction costs of existing trade and or serves to increase the scope of trade in contrast to this universalistic view we posit that the performance of trust based governance is contingent on the ability of trading partners to read each other and learn about counterpart behavior these information processing abilities allow firms to assess partner trustworthiness better which reduces the risk of misplaced trust the increased efficacy of communication and learning from one another also enables them to better capitalize from the adaptation and revision possibilities uncovered through trust based governance during the task execution phase given the central role of these cognitive requirements we assess these contingent effects with data from a knowledge intensive task setting using a sample of 129 firms that have engaged outside contractors on client sponsored r d projects we find strong support for our thesis specifically we find that trust based governance has a larger positive impact on task performance when the client is more skilled at understanding the outsourced tasks at hand the task itself requires skills that are relatively more readily taught less tacit and the task itself is organized in parallel with work being done at the contractor as well as the client as a corollary we also find that firms adopt trust based governance to a greater extent as these information processing abilities increase as well as with the colocation of the contractor and client suggestions for engineering trust based governance are offered

preference modification vs incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment the role of culture terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics this weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free riding or defection from the weaker side there are two nonexclusive answers 1 atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation even if it results in the recruit s own death 2 create a set of incentives that reward loyalty by giving access to excludable near public club goods culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions culture is defined here as the set of inherited beliefs attitudes and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders to understand themselves and to communicate with each other the primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation the difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism if terrorists are selected for having unusual cooperative from the perspective of the terror group preferences then recruitment must be disrupted somehow if on the other hand terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods

what makes rational peasants revolutionary dilemma paradox and irony in peasant collective action peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to olson s collective action problem this article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles everyday forms of peasant resistance unorganized rural movements and organized peasant rebellions that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined first what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals the level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations peasants demand selective incentives the suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations the authorities and the allies of both a political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market second what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry s collective cause selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective selective incentives alone are counterproductive these questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self interest it is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action the dilemma peasants face or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self interest of none the paradox peasants face or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma for example with selective incentives and participate in collective action and the irony peasants face or that self interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

the market for street crime an economic analysis of victim offender interaction abstract this paper views the economic explanation of crime rates from a new perspective by explicitly deriving an economic model of the behavior of potential victims and considering the interaction of the behavior of potential victims with the behavior of offenders crime is produced through offenders supplying time in search of victims and victims demanding to expose themselves to the environment a model is set up in which the crime rate the probability of being a victim per unit of exposure time and the probability of finding a victim per unit of offenders search time are simultaneously determined the model leads us to distinguish the real crime rate the probability of being a victim per unit of exposure time from the nominal crime rate the number of crimes per capita the nominal crime rate can be inversely related to the real crime rate

the race between deterrence and displacement theory and evidence from bank robberies security measures that deter crime may unwittingly displace it to neighboring areas but evidence of displacement is scarce we exploit precise information on the timing and locations of all italia

a general equilibrium model of crime commission and prevention abstract the model developed in this paper features a general equilibrium specification of the relationships among criminals victims of crime and a law enforcement agency these relationships are employed to endogenously derive an explicit intuitively appealing technology of crime commission and prevention the solution to the present model is therefore obtained with a set of more elementary assumptions than the previous literature where arbitrary curvature assumptions are invoked

the measurability of budget related rent seeking it has been suggested that the extent of rent seeking expenditures arising from attempts to influence budget allocations should be estimated by the absolute magnitude of the observed changes in allocation instead we argue that it is the extent of theex ante prospective changes that determine the level of rent seeking and that in the presence of countervailing activity these may be quite unrelated to the ex post observed values we further argue that the traditional rent seeking model of competition for a pre specified rent is inappropriate in this context

the optimal use of fines and imprisonment abstract this paper examines the use of fines and imprisonment to deter individuals from engaging in harmful activities these sanctions are analyzed separately as well as together first for identical risk neutral individuals and then for two groups of risk neutral individuals who differ by wealth when fines are used alone and individuals are identical the optimal fine and probability of apprehension are such that there is some underdeterrence if individuals differ by wealth then the optimal fine for the high wealth group exceeds the fine for the low wealth group when imprisonment is used alone and individuals are identical the optimal imprisonment term and probability may be such that there is either underdeterrence or overdeterrence if individuals differ by wealth the optimal imprisonment term for the high wealth group may be longer or shorter than the term for the low wealth group when fines and imprisonment are used together it is desirable to use the fine to its maximum feasible extent before possibly supplementing it with an imprisonment term the effects of risk aversion of these results are also discussed

dynamic deterrence theory economic theories of deterrence have primarily been built on static models a common and serious shortcoming of the existing dynamic deterrence models is the assumption of a twoperiod structure that ignores recidivism the aims of this paper are to formulate and solve a general dynamic deterrence model that incorporates recidivistic behaviour to explore its implications and to derive some testable predictions the analysis shows how the value and the intensity of engaging in illegal activity change over time highlights the weaknesses of twoperiod deterrence models and compares the deterrent effectiveness of increasing the likelihood of punishment versus the severity of punishment finally the recidivistic model provides a structural foundation for the widely used stochastic process models of crime in operations research and criminology

insurgent compensation evidence from iraq participating in insurgency is physically risky why do people do so using new data on 3 799 payments to insurgent fighters by al qa ida iraq we find that i wages were extremely low relative to outside options even compared to unskilled labor ii the estimated risk premium is negative and iii the wage schedule favors equalization and provides additional compensation for larger families these results challenge the notion that fighters are paid their marginal product or the opportunity cost of their time they may be consistent with a lemons model in which fighters signal commitment by accepting low wages

logical deficiencies in spatial models a constructive critique a fundamental property of any good theoryis logical consistency however two commonassumptions in the rational choice approach topolitical analysis that induced preferences overpolicy are separable and that such preferences areindependent of changes in exogenous factors are notconsistent with the archetypal assumptions ofindividual utility maximization these particularpathologies of spatial models of politics have notbeen well recognized in the political scienceliterature

bundling governance mechanisms to efficiently organize small firm loans abstract bank loans are a common source of financing for small firms while scholars have examined specific conditions that affect small firm loan approval and interest rates practical questions remain about how these loans are structured to address characteristically acute challenges from asymmetric information this paper suggests collateral reputation and relationship banking each perform unique exchange organizing tasks and that small firms systematically use them in predictable combinations a multiple discriminant analysis of 796 small firm loans suggests four governance bundles are commonly employed in this setting the implications for managers focus on how loan governance mechanisms are most efficiently bundled together

formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms evidence from technology development projects formal contracting addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via explicit terms designed to achieve incentive alignment alternatively when firms expect to interact repeatedly relational mechanisms may achieve similar results without the associated costs however as we now know from a growing body of theoretical and empirical work the resulting intuition that relational mechanisms will be substituted for formal ones whenever possible does not generally hold the extent to which firms substitute relational mechanisms for formal ones in the presence of repeated interaction is an empirical question that forms the basis of this paper we study a sample of 52 joint technology development contracts in the telecommunications and microelectronics industries and devise a coding scheme to allow empirical comparison of contract terms counter to the above intuition but consistent with recent research we find that a firm s contracts are more detailed and more likely to include penalties when it engages in frequent deals whether with the same or different partners our results suggest complementarity between formal and relational contracts and have implications for optimal contracting particularly in high technology sectors

short term interest rates as predictors of inflation on testing the hypothesis that the real rate of interest is constant in an innovative and provocative paper in this review eugene fama presents evidence which appears to be consistent with the joint hypothesis that the real rate of interest ignoring taxes is a constant and that the market for u s treasury bills is efficient in the sense of embodying rational expectations those findings are strikingly at variance with a long list of previous studies which seemed to support the view that the real rate of interest varies over time and can be related to economic variables such as real output monetary policy and so forth 2 the methodologies which lead to these contradictory conclusions are quite different previous studies had followed the lead of irving fisher by relating nominal interest rates to distributed lags on past rates of inflation 3 these distributed lags are generally interpreted as approximations to the market s expected rate of inflation and thus any remaining variation is attributed to variation in the real rate 4 fama s methodology on the other hand draws on the fact that the difference between the market interest rate and the subsequently observed rate of inflation the ex post real interest rate consists by definition of the ex ante real interest rate plus a pure forecasting error 5 the hypothesis of market efficiency implies that these forecasting errors must be serially random thus observing ex post real rates is equivalent to observing ex ante real rates with random measurement error these errors of course confound the problem of identifying variation in the ex ante real rate in this paper we will argue that the relative magnitude of these measurement errors is such that the tests carried out by fama were not powerful enough to reject the joint hypothesis that the ex ante real rate is a constant and expectations are rational more powerful tests which are presented in this paper using the same data do lead to rejection of that hypothesis of course rejection