regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

cost based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly abstract this paper revisits the conventional doctrine that it is easier to collude among equals applied in the context of vertically related markets in a differentiated duopoly model we study how cost based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion

comparative institutional advantage in the european sovereign debt crisis excessive fiscal spending is commonly cited as a root of the current european debt crisis this article suggests like others that the rise of competitiveness imbalances contributing to national imbalances in total borrowing is a better explanation for systemic differences toward economic and monetary union emu countries exposure to market speculation we identify one driver of this divergence a country s capacity to limit sheltered sector wage growth relative to wage growth in the manufacturing sector corporatist institutions that linked sectoral wage developments together in the surplus countries provided those with a comparative wage advantage vis a vis emu s debtor nations which helps explain why the emu core has emerged relatively unscathed from market speculation during the crisis despite the poor fiscal performance of some of the core countries during emu s early years using a panel regression analysis we demonstrate that rising differentials between public and manufacturing sector wage growth and wage governance institutions that weakly coordinate exposed and sheltered sectors are significantly correlated with export decline we also find that weak governance institutions are significantly associated with more prominent export decline inside as opposed to outside a monetary union

private interest government beyond market and state market liberalism and state interventionism are both challenged as modes of democratic government by this book it suggests that the development of private interest governments might be a more viable policy alternative for the future it also questions whether the state could devolve certain public policy responsibilities to interest associations in specific economic sectors the book focuses specifically on interest associations in a disaggregated rather than global approach to economics and politics ten western industrialized countries are covered subjects ranging from advertising with self regulation private accountancy regulation and the british voluntary sector to four comparative papers on the corporatist arrangements in the governance of the dairy industry

centralized collective bargaining and the problem of compliance lessons from the italian experience according to the neo corporatist approach to the problem of compliance worker control over union policy is incompatible with centralized wage regulation because only associations in which national leaders are insulated from their members are capable of delivering rank and file acceptance of wage moderation this analysis of centralized collective bargaining agreements in italy in the 1980s and 1990s provides a critical re examination of the traditional neo corporatist approach the author drawing on archival research and interviews argues that centralization can be entirely compatible with decision making procedures in which rank and file workers have ultimate decision making power in fact the italian labor movement s adoption of more democratic decision making procedures he claims was instrumental in generating and sustaining centralized collective bargaining arrangements in italy in the early 1990s

the sources of business interest in social insurance sectoral versus national differences when and why have employers supported the development of institutions of social insurance that provide benefits to workers during various employment related risks the analysis developed in this article challenges the dominant explanations of welfare state development which are premised on the assumption that business opposes social insurance the article examines the conditions under which self interested profit maximizing firms support the introduction of a new social policy and it specifies the most significant variables explaining the variation in employers social policy preferences the model is tested in three political episodes of welfare state development in france and germany using policy documents submitted by various employers associations to bureaucratic and parliamentary commissions

when are concerted reforms feasible explaining the emergence of social pacts in western europe under what conditions do governments employers and unions enter formal policy agreements on incomes employment and social security such agreements widely known as social pacts became particularly prominent during the 1990s when european economies underwent major adjustment this article seeks to explain national variation in adjustment strategies and specifically why concerted agreements were struck in some countries but not in others a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis of 14 european countries is employed to assess main arguments about the emergence of pacts the analysis yields two key findings first although prevailing arguments emphasize economic and monetary unionrelated pressures or alternatively unemployment these factors were neither necessary nor in themselves sufficient for pacts to materialize rather a high economic problem load appears to be causally relevant only when combined with particular political and institutional conditions namely the prevalence of electorally weak governments and or an intermediate level of union centralization second the analysis refines existing multicausal explanations of pacts by demonstrating three distinct theoretically and empirically relevant causal pathways to concerted agreements

the economics of worldwide stagflation the last fifteen years have witnessed dramatic changes in economics not only in the manner in which the economics profession views economics but also in the manner in which the general public views economics and economists by the late 1960 s there had emerged more or less a consensus macroeconomic framework that is an agreed upon structure to be used to study economic problems at the aggregate level robert solow stated as quoted in leijonhufvud 1968

using bill and keep interconnect arrangements to soften network competition abstract this paper demonstrates that low below marginal cost interconnect or access charges can be used to sustain high subscription prices under network competition with two part tariffs and price discrimination this result stands in contrast to other results in the literature suggesting that high interconnect charges can play a collusive role

the fragmentation of the bargaining society wage setting in the nordic countries 1950 to 1992 it is commonly believed that corporatist bargaining institutions have been in general decline in the 1980s and 1990s the leading explanations of the purported universal trend toward greater decentralization of collective bargaining are the impact of technological change changes in the occupational structure and growing international economic integration decentralization should be particularly visible in the nordic countries because collective bargaining was more centralized in these countries in the 1960s and 1970s than in any others in western europe in this article the authors present data on the changes in the centralization of wage bargaining in the four nordic countries since 1950 they document that a significant decentralization of collective bargaining has occurred in sweden as is well known but not in the other three the article concludes with a review of possible explanations of swedish exceptionalism

employers and the welfare state the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies the authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and in turn affects social policy outcomes specifically the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision empirically the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy the authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort the authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs the authors conclude with a discussion of the findings implications for theories of social corporatism and the w

power resources and employer centered approaches in explanations of welfare states and varieties of capitalism protagonists consenters and antagonists the power resources approach underlining the relevance of socioeconomic class and partisan politics in distributive conflict within capitalist economies is challenged by employer centered approaches claiming employers and cross class alliances to have been crucial in advancing the development of welfare states and varieties of capitalism theoretically and empirically these claims are problematic in welfare state expansion employers have often been antagonists under specific conditions consenters but very rarely protagonists well developed welfare states and coordinated market economies have emerged in countries with strong left parties in long term cabinet participation or in countries with state corporatist institutional traditions and confessional parties in intensive competition with left parties

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

the rise and decline of general laws of capitalism economists have long been drawn to the ambitious quest of discovering the general laws of capitalism david ricardo for example predicted that capital accumulation would terminate in economic stagnation and inequality as a greater and greater share of national income accrued to landowners karl marx followed him by forecasting the inevitable immiseration of the proletariat thomas piketty s 2014 tome capital in the twenty first century emulates marx in his title his style of exposition and his critique of the capitalist system piketty is after general laws that will demystify our modern economy and elucidate the inherent problems of the system and point to solutions but the quest for general laws of capitalism is misguided because it ignores the key forces shaping how an economy functions the endogenous evolution of technology and of the institutions and the political equilibrium that influence not only technology but also how markets function and how the gains from various different economic arrangements are distributed despite his erudition ambition and creativity marx was led astray because of his disregard of these forces the same is true of piketty s sweeping account of inequality in capitalist economies in the next section we review marx s conceptualization of capitalism and some of his general laws we then turn to piketty s approach to capitalism and his general laws we will point to various problems in piketty s interpretation of the economic relationships underpinning inequality but the most important shortcoming is that

emerging varieties of capitalism in transition countries industrial relations and wage bargaining in estonia and slovenia this article analyzes patterns of economic coordination in estonia and slovenia two postsocialist countries in central and eastern europe by using the varieties of capitalism voc framework the

why are german employers associations declining arguments and evidence considerable progress has been made during the past two decades in conceptualizing dynamics within german employers associations in particular explanations for declines in density and the impact on the economy the verification has not kept pace with theorization however this article provides empirics the analysis confirms earlier conclusions that the interests of large and small employers have increasingly diverged since the mid 1980s in contrast to the conventional wisdom however the authors find that organized labor has not contributed to the cost pressures that have prompted many smalland medium sized enterprises to leave employers associations the article also explores employers associations response to a more challenging environment in light of the varieties of capitalism literature the decision of several german employers associations to offer different classes of membership has qualitatively expanded subnational variety within the german variety of capitalism

entry access pricing and welfare in the telecommunications industry abstract this paper investigates the effects of entry on welfare in the telecommunications industry equilibrium pricing parameters for monopoly and duopoly situations are determined where access charges are chosen non cooperatively welfare comparisons between alternative access pricing regimes are also performed

wage dispersion and productive efficiency evidence for sweden the swedish record of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized solidarity bargaining followed by substantial decompression of wages after central bargaining broke down supplies observations well suited to empirical evaluation of arguments about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution we obtain no results supporting fairness morale and cohesiveness theories implying that wage leveling within workplaces and industries may enhance productivity reduction of interindustry wage differentials evidently did however contribute positively to aggregate output and productivity growth most likely for the structural reasons first emphasized by swedish trade union economists almost a half century ago

bringing capital back in or social democracy reconsidered employer power cross class alliances and centralization of industrial relations in denmark and sweden the political domination of social democrats in denmark and sweden beginning in the 1930s was stabilized by the absence of intense opposition by capital to reformist programs aggressively opposed by business and the right elsewhere in the world this quiescence was not a symptom of weakness or dependency rather it was a product of a class intersecting cross class alliance behind institutions of centralized industrial relations that served mutual interests of sectoral groupings dominating both union and employer confederations well organized and militant and backed by social democrats employers in the two countries used offensive multi industry lockouts to force centralization on reluctant unions analysis of these cross class alliances and their pay distributional objectives is used to challenge a widely held view that centralization and social democratic electoral strength are sources of power against capital it also occasions a reassessment of conventional understandings of farmer labor coalitions and the decline of industrial conflict in scandinavia in the 1930s according to the alternative view presented here capital was included rather than excluded from these cross class alliances and industrial conflict subsided dramatically in part because employers achieved politically what they had previously tried to achieve with the lockout

still a coordinated model market liberalization and the transformation of employment relations in the german telecommunications industry this paper examines recent changes in collective bargaining and employer strategies in the german telecommunications industry following market liberalization in the late 1990s germany s distinctive co determination and vocational training institutions encouraged large firms to adopt employment systems in technician and call center workplaces that relied on high levels of worker skill and discretion however organizational restructuring is undermining these gains as firms use outsourcing and the creation of subsidiaries to escape or weaken company level collective agreements these trends have substantially weakened unions and contributed to the further disorganization of coordinated bargaining structures findings are based on interviews with union and works council representatives managers and employees at deutsche telekom and its major competitors conducted between 2003 and 2007 as well as secondary analysis of company documents and industry reports

distribution and redistribution the shadow of the nineteenth century the authors present an alternative to power resource theory as an approach to the study of distribution and redistribution while they agree that partisanship and union power are important they argue that both are endogenous to more fundamental differences in the organization of capitalist democracies specifically center left governments result from pr consensus political systems as opposed to majoritarian systems while strong unions have their origins in coordinated as opposed to liberal capitalism these differences in political representation and in the organization of production developed jointly in the early twentieth century and explain the cross national pattern of distribution and redistribution the clusters have their origins in two distinct political economic conditions in the second half of the nineteenth century one in which locally coordinated economies were coupled with strong guild traditions and heavy investment in cospecific assets and one in which market based economies were coupled with liberal states and more mobile assets

where to place the saving obligation energy end users or suppliers abstract obligations to save energy differentiate among other features by obliged parties these are obligations on energy suppliers and energy end users supplier obligations have been introduced in north america europe and australia under supplier obligations energy suppliers have to comply with mandatory energy saving targets and thus they implement directly or via third parties energy efficiency projects on their clients premises or they decide to trade certified project savings if this option is envisaged by their obligation scheme in several emerging schemes such as the uk carbon reduction commitment crc energy efficiency scheme the tokyo emission trading scheme or the perform achieve and trade pat scheme in india the obligation to reduce energy consumption is placed on large end users directly and end users are allowed to trade emissions allowances or energy saving certificates the paper starts with presenting these two conceptually different ways for introducing energy saving obligations then it analyses advantages and disadvantages of end users obligations compared to suppliers obligations the preliminary conclusion of the paper is that supplier obligations seem to be well suited for the residential sector but end user saving obligations may offer advantages when it comes to the industrial and commercial sectors

does the organization of capital matter employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention we argue however that the representational power of business coordination across business interest units and integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums or what we call the social corporatist organization of business should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation we test our arguments with models both of 1980 98 pooled time series data on withinand across country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm level survey data from denmark and the united kingdom we find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy we find moreover that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to de industrialization and increases in general unemployment at the firm level membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist denmark but not in the pluralist united kingdom

what you want depends on what you know firm preferences in an information age information has become a core input for many companies this article examines how this affects firm policy preferences in contrast to national typologies of capitalism or microeconomic expectation

business against markets employer resistance to collective bargaining liberalization during the eurozone crisis employer organizations have been presented as strong promoters of the liberalization of industrial relations in europe this article in contrast argues that the preferences of employers vis a vis

network competition with price discrimination bill and keep is not so bad after all abstract we study the impact of access charges on the incentives to invest in competing telecommunications networks of different quality high access charges soften competition in the investment stage and can be used to sustain higher profits under competition with two part tariffs and termination based price discrimination below cost charges such as bill and keep arrangements have a positive impact on investments

jevons paradox revisited the evidence for backfire from improved energy efficiency beginning with william stanley jevons in 1865 a number of authors have claimed that economically justified energy efficiency improvements will increase rather than reduce energy consumption jevons paradox is extremely difficult to test empirically but could have profound implications for energy and climate policy this paper summarises and critiques the arguments and evidence that have been cited in support of jevons paradox focusing in particular on the work of len brookes and harry saunders it identifies some empirical and theoretical weaknesses in these arguments highlights the questions they raise for economic orthodoxy and points to some interesting parallels between these arguments and those used by the biophysical school of ecological economics while the evidence in favour of jevons paradox is far from conclusive it does suggest that economy wide rebound effects are larger than is conventionally assumed and that energy plays a more important role in driving productivity improvements and economic growth than is conventionally assumed

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

organizational determinants of wage moderation this article contributes to the political economic literature regarding the effects of industrial relations institutions on national economic outcomes based on an econometric analysis of the determinants of wage moderation in sixteen industrialized countries between 1974 and 2000 it argues that the organizational characteristics of trade unions have a significant impact on wage dynamics controlling for a number of institutional and economic factors the countries in which trade union confederations directly involve workers in the process of collective bargaining ratification have on average lower wage growth relative to productivity than others the authors also find that collective bargaining coordination and contract ratification magnify each other s wage dampening effect through case studies of ireland and italy the article examines the causal mechanisms underlying the uncovered statistical regularities and concludes that particularly at a time in which classic political exchange is waning worker involvement in contract ratification allows confederation leaders to resolve conflicting claims inside their organizations at lower wage levels than are achieved by a less participatory governance process

globalization and taxation challenges to the swedish welfare state many have argued that the increased international mobility of both capital and labor witnessed in recent years will force advanced capitalist democracies to cut taxes and thus ultimately roll bac

public sector unions corporatism and macroeconomic performance what accounts for the apparent breakdown of the positive relationship between powerful trade union organizations and macroeconomic performance is corporatism a relic of a different age a luxury o

business and welfare state development why did employers accept social reforms in recent years employer centered explanations of welfare state development have begun to challenge conventional labor centered and state centered explanations these new explanations suggest that sector specific business interests and cross class alliances propelled the adoption and expansion of social programs the business interests thesis this article presents a novel explanation of differences in business support for welfare state expansion based on a diachronic analysis of the german case and shadow case studies of sweden and the united states the article suggests that when looking at changes in employers positions across time rather than across sectors political constraints turn out to be the central factor explaining variation in employers support for social reforms the political accommodation thesis the article identifies two goals of business intervention in welfare state development pacification and containment in the case of pacification business interests propel social policy expansion in the case of containment they constrain it business chooses pacification when revolutionary forces challenge capitalism and political stabilization thus becomes a priority business chooses containment when reformist forces appear likely to succeed in expanding social protection and no revolutionary challenge exists the article shows that changes over time in the type of political challenges that business interests confront best explain the variation in business support for labor friendly social reforms

strategy meets institutions the transformation of management labor relations at deutsche telekom and ntt this comparison of labor management relations at deutsche telekom dt and ntt group formerly nippon telephone and telegraph demonstrates the value of considering both institutions and strategic decision making to under stand the interaction between companies and unions as corporations diversify multi divisional or holding company structures emerge but the degree of diversity introduced in employment relations within the corporate group de pends on the interaction between corporate strategy and the strategy of orga nized labor the authors field research based on interviews with managers and labor leaders shows that despite a broadly similar corporate strategy of diversi fication by dt and ntt after the liberalization of telecommunication markets employment relations became more decentralized both for unions and for works councils within the dt group than within the ntt group this differ ence in outcomes is explained by the relative power and strategic choices of labor and management rather than by constraints and opportunities specific to the existing national institutions

network competition ii price discrimination our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing this article relaxes this assumption and allows networks to charge different prices for calls terminating on the subscriber s network and those terminating on a rivals network this creates a price differential between services that are identical for the consumer and generates network externalities despite network interconnection we show that in both the mature and entry phases of the industry the nature of competition is substantially affected by such price discrimination

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

energy performance certificates and investments in building energy efficiency a theoretical analysis abstract in the european union energy performance certificates epcs provide potential buyers or tenants with information on a property s energy performance by mitigating informational asymmetries on real estate markets the conventional wisdom is that they will reduce energy use increase energy efficiency investments and improve social welfare we develop a model that partly contradicts these predictions although epcs always improve social welfare in the absence of market failures other than asymmetric information their impact on energy use and investments is ambiguous and depends both on the time horizon considered and the distribution of energy needs in the population this implies that in a second best world where energy externalities are under priced epcs can damage social welfare

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

from factor endowments to class struggle pre world war i germany and rogowski s theory of trade and political cleavages ronald rogowski s recent and important work commerce and coalitions sets forth a farranging and parsimonious theory of trade and political cleavages this article closely investigates its validity in the case of pre world war i germany where trade has long been seen as a critical factor determining coalition formation and rogowski s argument appears at first glance to be especially compelling close investigation however reveals that the key variable in rogowski s theory relative factor endowments fails to account for the political alignment of capital and labor in germany following 1890 this article puts forward an alternative theory in which business labor coalition formation is determined not only by the alliance possibilities associated with trade but also by their intersection with the strength of worker organization and capital labor mobility this argument both addresses the anomalies that prewar germany poses for rogowski s account of trade and cleavages and provides a potential explanatio

the return of lockouts down under in comparative perspective globalization the state and employer militancy virtually unheard of since the great depression lockouts have reemerged strongly in australia and new zealand just as they have all but disappeared in germany the decline of lockouts in germany is convincingly attributed to the enhanced vulnerability of firms to stoppages in certain circumstances amid globalization but the small open economies of australia and new zealand are equally subject to these pressures using macro and micro level data this article illustrates that neoliberal legislative reforms and institutional change have reconfigured the risks costs and payoffs associated with lockouts amid globalization in doing so some flaws in the varieties of capitalism dual convergence literature are highlighted in particular the post hoc classification of the antipodes as liberal market economies bypasses the role of legislative reform in reconstituting employer interests and the differences in electoral party and state structures that impeded facilitated the rise of neoliberal reformers in

internationalization and the social democratic model crisis and future prospects this article examines the crisis of the social democratic model in the four countries austria norway finland and sweden in which social democracy was most successful in maintaining and even extending its two central achievements full employment and the institutional welfare state through the end of the 1980s four major conclusions emerge from the analysis first supply side measures more so than demand management were central to the employment and growth models pursued by social democracy prior to the early 1970s second the increasing trade openness contributed little to the recent problems of social democracy by contrast financial internationalization and deregulation and the multinationalization of capital undermined important features of the supply and demand sides of the models third changes in the international and domestic economies have weakened centralized bargaining fourth governments in the three nordic countries made serious mistakes in economic policy which greatly aggravated

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

interdependencies between transport fuel demand efficiency and quality an application to austria abstract this paper focuses on the interdependencies between technical efficiencies and energy demand which are often either treated in isolation or do not get the sufficient attention in the literature more precisely this paper uses technical efficiencies as one crucial determinant of energy demand in order to integrate at least two issues that are usually investigated separately from each other the rebound effect resulting from improved technical efficiencies and the asymmetry of energy demand in this regard our paper sets out a theoretical framework which has the following implications higher efficiency increases service demand first order rebound low fuel prices and higher efficiency increases the demand for quality second order which in turn increases service demand further third order ceteris paribus energy price shocks should increase scrapping rates fuel prices direct the rd those on engine efficiency are irreversible which has the consequence that energy price elasticities depend on the history of energy prices rather than being asymmetrical derived implications are subsequently tested on austrian data in particular the purchasing decision diesel versus gasoline powered cars allows to refute the myth that consumers apply high implicit rates for discounting the future benefit from efficient cars

the limit of equality projects public sector expansion sectoral conflicts and income inequality in postindustrial economies in this study we investigate how structural economic changes constrain an equality project the public sector expansion strategy first we describe a three stage process in which a growing produc

the crisis of german and japanese capitalism stalled on the road to the liberal market model german and japanese opinion leaders demand a decisive move toward the liberal market model yet their governments have been slow to act why can t germany and japan reform to unravel this puzzle we must understand how the german and japanese models of capitalism bind the potential winners from liberal reform such as competitive manufacturing exporters to the potential losers such as workers and protected service industries competitive exporters are reluctant to embrace reforms that might undermine valued relationships with workers financial institutions and other business partners moreover they cannot forge a strong reform coalition because they must work through industry associations and political parties that represent both competitive and protected sectors as a result germany and japan proceed cautiously with reform they package delicate compromises often compensating the potential losers they design reforms to preserve core institutions and they seek novel ways to build on the strengths

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

the decentralization of collective bargaining a literature review and comparative analysis the author reviews evidence that the bargaining structure is becoming more decentralized in sweden australia the former west germany italy the united kingdom and the united states although in

austrian and swedish social democrats in crisis party strategy and organization in corporatist regimes socialists and social democrats have probably nowhere been better entrenched than in austria and sweden yet in both countries they have suffered electoral defeats in the 1980s and early 1990s ju

the choices for scandinavian social democracy in comparative perspective scandinavian social democracy represents one of the most systematic attempts to shape economic institu tions and policies in pursuit of equality and full employment increasingly however these goals haveeluded governments and their institutional supports have eroded this paper seeks to understand this shiftthrough a comparative analysis that places particular emphasis on the interaction between macroeco nomic policies and wage bargaining institutions it is argued that the nature of this interaction and theassociated economic effects have been changed by new technology capital market integration andservice sector expansion as a result centralized wage bargaining institutions and accommodatingmacroeconomic policy regimes have been undermined and social democracy increasingly faces a choicebetween the promotion of equality and employment for all

endogenous timing with infinitely many firms abstract a model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit output dominant firm and the cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases at each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one both stackelberg and cournot like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however when the number of leaders is given production at subsequent periods is always prevented and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level

from comparative public policy to political economy putting political institutions in their place and taking interests seriously the historical institutionalist tradition in comparative politics commonly assigns analytical primacy to political institutions whereas this polity centeredness may be quite justifiable for purposes of comparative public policy students of comparative political economy should pay systematic attention not only to economic institutions but also to a range of economic structural variables that lie beyond the conventional confines of institutional analysis providing the basis for an analysis of collective actors and their interests such an approach is needed to account for institutional change and policy realignments within stable institutions

small states and skill specificity austria switzerland and interemployer cleavages in coordinated capitalism the varieties of capitalism literature has put skill systems at the center of comparative politics yet its claims about skill specificity are driven by two large coordinated economies germany and

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

white certificates energy efficiency programs under private information of consumers abstract energy efficiency is an objective of public interventions at least since the public utility regulatory policy act of 1978 purpa recently conservation has received considerable attention in the united states and in particular in the european union but this time in order to mitigate global warming policy measures include regulations at the technical level and the introduction of white certificates in order to force utilities and firms to invest into conservation in a way similar to the already existing renewable energy quota this paper derives the optimal mechanism if utilities must deal with white certificates facing consumers holding private information the optimal mechanism has some theoretically interesting features like restricted participation and a discontinuity

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

the costs of free entry an empirical study of real estate agents in greater boston this paper studies the consequences of xed commissions and low entry barriers in greater boston s real estate brokerage industry from 1998 2007 a period with substantial agent turnover we nd that entry is not associated with increased sales probabilities or reduced sales time instead it decreases the market share of experienced agents and reduces average service quality we develop a dynamic empirical model motivated by these patterns to study the extent of ineciency in the current system compared to alternatives to accommodate a large state space we approximate the value function using sieves and impose the bellman equation as an equilibrium constraint if commissions are cut in half there would be 40 fewer agents implying social savings of 23 of industry revenue and the average agent would facilitate 73 more transactions house price appreciation of 50 during our sample period accounts for a 24 increase in the number of agents and a 31 decline in average agent productivity finally improving information about past agent performance can increase productivity and generate signicant social savings

the politics of retrenchment in a social democratic welfare state reform of swedish pensions and unemployment insurance what explains the origins and pattern of retrenchment dynamics in swedish old age pensions and unemployment insurance during the 1990s although the economic crisis created pressure to scale back both programs the author argues that retrenchment only occurred when and where the social democratic party and some segments of the labor movement supported change this finding suggests that the political importance of organized labor in retrenchment politics depends on the relationship between welfare state programs and interest group structure when interest group structure is characterized by solidaristic centralized encompassing organizations the old class based power resource model has more explanatory bite than pierson s new politics of the welfare state approach

geography of savings in the german occupational pension system burger c geography of savings in the german occupational pension system regional studies the german pension reform of 2001 significantly decreased the level of public pensions for future generations and created instead voluntary supplementary plans this paper analyses the regional structure of savings amounts in the case of occupational pensions using a unique commercial dataset containing the records of 286 000 employees joining between the years 2002 and 2009 the analysis applies different location definitions in explaining financial behaviour the differences in the relationship between metropolitan and non metropolitan east and west and north and south are explained with the geographical nature of decision contexts implications are drawn on human behaviour and geography

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

from populism to neoliberalism labor unions and market reforms in latin america in the late 1980s populist labor parties which had advanced protectionism and state intervention in the postwar period implemented market oriented reforms in argentina mexico and venezuela in all three countries market reforms hurt their union allies the interaction between allied unions and governing labor parties however varied across countries and across sectors within the same country while some unions endorsed neoliberal reforms others rejected them despite their long term alliance with governing parties while some unions obtained concessions others failed to do so this article argues that the incentives created by partisan loyalties partisan competition and union competition explain these interactions partisan loyalty results from the long term affiliation of unions with a political party partisan competition takes place among union leaders affiliated with different political parties for the control of unions union competition occurs in diverse national and sectoral contexts among labor organizations for the representation of the same workers loyalty derived from a long term affiliation with the incumbent party facilitates collaboration between labor unions and the government yet if partisan competition makes loyal union leaders afraid of being replaced by activists affiliated with the opposition parties their incentives for militancy increase as a way of showing their responsiveness to the rank and file hurt by market reforms union competition for the representation of the same workers makes coordination more difficult thereby weakening unions and making them less likely to obtain concessions from the government despite their partisan loyalty the article presents empirical evidence from eighteen cases including national confederations and individual unions in five economic sectors in argentina mexico and venezuela to test this theory

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

uncertainty loss aversion and markets for energy efficiency increasing energy efficiency is critical to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel combustion reducing oil dependence and achieving a sustainable global energy system the tendency of markets to neglect apparently cost effective energy efficiency options has been called the efficiency gap or energy paradox the market for energy efficiency in new energy using durable goods however appears to have a bias that leads to undervaluation of future energy savings relative to their expected value this paper argues that the bias is chiefly produced by the combination of substantial uncertainty about the net value of future fuel savings and the loss aversion of typical consumers this framework relies on the theory of context dependent preferences the uncertainty loss aversion bias against energy efficiency is quantifiable making it potentially correctible by policy measures the welfare economics of such policies remains unresolved data on the costs of increased fuel economy of new passenger cars taken from a national research council study illustrate how an apparently cost effective increase in energy efficiency would be uninteresting to loss averse consumers

unions employers associations and wage setting institutions in northern and central europe 1950 1992 the eight countries examined in this study austria belgium denmark finland germany the netherlands norway and sweden have long been viewed as exemplifying corporatist industrial relations

the danish miracle luck pluck or stuck the 1980s and 1990s saw employment miracles in denmark australia and the netherlands this article analyzes the dynamics and substance of danish policy responses to poor export employment and fiscal performance to see whether remediation should be attributed to pluck intentional strategic remediation of dysfunctional institutions to make them conform with the external environment luck environmental change that makes formerly dysfunctional institutions suddenly functional or just being stuck endogenous not entirely strategic change that leaves institutions in conformity with the environment it addresses these issues to remedy biases in the literature toward sweden as model toward pessimism about the welfare state s survivability and toward privileging intentional action the analysis finds that stuck endogenous dynamics probably explains as much as pluck strategic choice suggesting only limited transferability for policy lessons from the miracles

the transformation of the swedish model economic ideas distributional conflict and institutional change this article examines the transformation of the swedish model of economic regulation from an ideational perspective while the majority of arguments about the decline of the swedish model have focused on the role of structural factors this article looks to illuminate the ideational factors that made possible both the emergence and the transformation of the swedish model the article details how during the 1930s and 1940s economic ideas provided the swedish state and its trade union allies with the means to construct the institutions of the swedish model by the 1970s however swedish business suffered diminishing returns to continued participation within these institutions and responded to labor s challenges by adopting a two pronged strategy of withdrawal from and ideological contestation of labor s supporting institutions the politics of ideas was key in this regard during the 1980s swedish business marshaled alternative economic ideas to contest and thus delegitimate existing institutions and the patterns of distribution they made possible swedish business thus began the process of overturning the swedish model long before capital mobility or domestic inflation was ever a problem by highlighting these factors the article offers an explanation of the transformation of the swedish model that stresses the centrality of ideational contestation for understanding institutional change in general

the paradox of globalization labor relations in germany and beyond what is the impact of globalization on labor in the advanced industrial countries one body of work holds that globalization pushes all countries toward neoliberalism another argues that the impact of globalization will vary according to prevailing institutional arrangements and predicts continued divergence between the so called liberal and coordinated market economies in an analysis of the german case that combines case study and formal modeling methods we refute the first neoliberal convergence theory showing that globalization in some ways empowers unions by rendering employers extremely vulnerable to industrial unrest furthermore we suggest some revisions to the second varieties of capitalism perspective we show that in germany employers increased vulnerability to conflict has shored up centralized bargaining arrangements in the short run but at the same time has also set in motion feedback effects that are deeply destabilizing to the system in the longer term

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

a tale of two market failures technology and environmental policy abstract market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies these combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives and can be cost effectively harnessed through the use of economic incentive based policy in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives while environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties a long term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success

labor markets production strategies and wage bargaining institutions the swedish employer offensive in comparative perspective transformed patterns of labor market governance occupy a central place in the study of contemporary west european political economies here detailed analysis of the dramatic decentralization of wa

incentives for conservation and quality improvement by public utilities the author examines the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service e g electricity supply local telephone service and service enhancements e g energy conservation services improved clarity and speed of voice communication the optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly depending upon the information available to the regulator the price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation 35 refs 2 figs

monetary union and wage bargaining institutions in the eu extrapolating from some member state experiences this article considers the question of how monetary union in the eu is likely to impact the preferences of governments employers and unions regarding the organization of wage bargaining european monetary union involves a decentralization of wage bargaining centered at the national level in relation to monetary policy centralized at the european level drawing on recent literature and on the experience of two member states italy and spain which prior to emu underwent periods of intense bargaining fragmentation the author argues that the imposition of restrictive monetary policy in a fragmented wage bargaining context in which workers nonetheless have substantial bargaining rights tends to have perverse effects these effects ultimately led governments and bargaining actors in italy and spain to seek a reorganization of bargaining that gave national actors greater control over wage setting the article considers to what extent a similar dynamic might play out in the euro zone