transfers and the generalized theory of distortions and welfare recent theoretical attention devoted to the transfer paradox has included attempts to incorporate it into the body of commercial policy in this paper the existence of a family of always feasible corrective tax policies is proved which guarantees normal welfare response the set of pol icies is shown to contain the external trade fixing tariff and the op timal tariff the set of policies is then extended to include a capit al flow fixing profits tax to deal with the problems of foreign inves tment the results are then interpreted in terms of a general proposi tion in the theory of distortions and welfare copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

the collateral channel how real estate shocks affect corporate investment abstract what is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment in the presence of financing frictions firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects through this collateral channel shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment to compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral value we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate over the 1993 2007 period the representative us corporation invests 0 06 out of each 1 of collateral jel d22 g31 r30

foreign investment and economic growth characterization of a second best policy for welfare gains abstract this paper prescribes corrective taxes for immiserizing growth and customs union formation growth through removal of trade barriers when the home country and the rest of the world are financially linked through foreign investment and ownership of assets an always feasible policy which generates pareto welfare gains for home country residents and union countries residents is found with foreign ownership the policy generally requires a specific profits tax in addition to the usual taxes on traded goods and factors the policy does not harm residents in the rest of the world growth is pareto non inferior from the world point of view

foreign ownership and the theory of trade and welfare some standard topics in the theory of international trade are reconsidered in this paper by distinguishing between national and aggregate income when fixed supplies of foreign inputs are present within the home country under conditions that would ensure a national welfare gain if foreign ownership were absent international transfer economic growth or tariff policy might cause a national welfare loss in the presence of foreign ownership the techniques developed could be applied to other domestic distinctions such as those based on race sex age or ethnicity and to the theory of customs unions in a three country world

sense and surprise in competitive trade theory 2010 weai presidential address i introduction the competitive theory of international trade is well known for its abundance of paradoxes perhaps the most widely known is the leontief paradox associated with the rather startling results presented by leontief 1953 that the trade pattern of the united states suggested that its export sectors were more labor intensive than factor proportions found in its import competing sectors this result stimulated decades of research but is not the focus of the present paper other so called paradoxes include the metzler 1949 result wherein a country levying a tariff on an imported item may end up with a lowering of its domestic price that is a tariff may not be protective 1 lerner 1936 who earlier hinted at the metzler outcome emphasized the possibility that a tariff might instead worsen a country s terms of trade which is at the opposite extreme to the metzler result both of these paradoxes are attributed to possible income effects in demand more recently income effects stemming from asymmetry in demand patterns among countries were shown to open the door to paradoxical results if one country makes a transfer to another in a world in which other countries are also engaged in trade in the same commodities the surprising results the giver in the transfer might end up better off i e it may pay to give rather than to receive and or the recipient of the transfer may end up worse off 2 finally a classic result that does not depend on asymmetries in taste patterns but rather upon the degree of elasticity in demand and the nature of growth is the question of whether a country that unequivocally grows transformation schedule shifts out can be made worse off as a consequence of growth the so called immiserizing growth paradox 3 this is an issue familiar to particular sectors of the economy for example agriculture can a good harvest yield lower returns because of the subsequent price fall instead of revisiting these familiar paradoxes here i wish to concentrate on the production side of competitive models used in international trade and to focus on the question involving ways of judging economic models clearly the question of realism often comes up whether it is in terms of assumptions made or of outcomes expected here i suggest a different criterion does the model conform in many ways to common sense that is would one be tempted to suggest that the model is not necessary because common sense would lead to the same results and if it does do the outcomes in certain scenarios seem to be paradoxical or surprising if so can the model reveal in simple terms why these somewhat surprising results make sense 4 i shall restrict myself to a pair of basic models of production used in competitive trade theory the specific factors model on the one hand and the heckscher ohlin model on the other i shall argue that in many ways both conform to common sense but in addition provide the very tools that expose the underlying rationale for surprise ii a preliminary question consider any economy that is characterized by competitive markets and constant returns to scale technology suppose for such an economy there is an increase in the factor endowment bundle to fix on an example suppose there is an increase in the economy s labor force the very general question i wish to ask is how does such an economy absorb this increased endowment to maintain full employment of all factors note that if this economy is not engaged in international trade there will likely result a change in commodity prices as they adjust in order to equilibrate local supply and demand given the points i wish to make later let me assume that the country is engaged in free trade with the rest of the world if this economy were particularly small world prices could be taken as given even if world prices are disturbed it is legitimate to ask how the economy absorbs the extra supplies before any change in commodity prices takes place

foreign competition immigration and structural adjustment abstract the paper uses the ricardo viner r v model to investigate the relationship in a capital abundant economy between trade competition and immigration in doing so it derives new results for the r v model especially on the welfare implications of migration with and without an initial tariff

a result on the transfer problem in international trade theory abstract the purpose of this paper is to provide a result on the welfare effect of a transfer in a general equilibrium exchange model with no arbitrary restrictions on either the number of commodities traded or the number of countries our result can be stated as follows the donor country is worse off after a transfer if a all goods are net substitutes for the donor b all goods are gross substitutes for the other countries and c all goods are normal for all countries

finance and politics the wealth effects of special interest group influence during the nationalisation and privatisation of conrail conrail nationalised in 1976 and privatised in 1987 was the most significant nationalisation and privatisation by the us government in recent years it was created from six bankrupt railroads under the pressure of interest groups formed by customers existing claimants employees and related companies we document the gains and losses to these special interest groups at key points in the nationalised and privatised time periods over this period the us government had outlays of 6 59 billion and cash inflow of 6 15 billion and internal return of 6 4 the paper provides evidence that a state owned firm with good governance could deliver superior performance

an empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives abstract prior research on the factors influencing the use of debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing is extended by considering management incentives when alternative incentive variables are considered separately we find covenants have a significant negative relation to ceo cash compensation an insignificant relation to the value of ceo equity held and significant positive relations to both the ratio of the value of ceo equity holdings to cash compensation and the fraction of equity held by the ceo in two stage simultaneous equations models only the latter is significant when jointly considered with each of the other incentive variables

international migration non traded goods and economic welfare in the source country abstract this paper examines the economic effects of emigration in a source country producing both traded and non traded commodities it is shown that even if the economy faces fixed terms of trade emigration can still affect the welfare of the non migrants and the direction of the effect in this context will always be negative

the possibility of recipient harming donor benefiting transfers with more than two countries the possibility of a commodity transfer among nations which simultaneously benefits the donor and harms the recipient is examined an example of a three country exchange economy is presented where a transfer may be made which gives the counter intuitive result the result is then explained

the government as a shareholder a case from the united states we study a sample of u s corporations in which the federal government held 35 100 percent of the outstanding common stock for between 1 and 23 years during and following world war ii we find that although the firms experienced abnormally high turnover among corporate board members the tenure of senior management was relatively stable moreover the performance of the government owned companies was not significantly different than that of private sector firms in the same industry hence the interim government custodianship of the firms in our case does not have the effects normally attributed to government ownership

explaining top management turnover in private corporations the role of cross country legal institutions and capital market forces we investigate private firms ability to identify and replace poorly performing managers across countries we document three main findings first private firms are more likely to retain poorly performing managers in countries where legal institutions that protect minority investors are weak second private firms are more likely to retain poorly performing managers than public firms only in countries where governance mechanisms inherent in public equity markets limit managerial entrenchment in public firms third private firm managers are less likely to be replaced even when poor performance continues for relatively long horizons overall our findings provide new evidence on the potential vulnerability of minority shareholders in private firms

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

the regional economic consequences of tariffs and domestic transportation costs a small open economy is assumed to consist of two regions where interregional transport costs are higher than international transport costs cross hauling of identical commodities occurs and things such as terms of trade changes tariffs and domestic taxes have distinctly regional effects if tariffs generate interregional trade a welfare loss equal to the previous tariff collection occurs tariffs may also increase welfare for one region and may reverse the trade pattern for the economy tariffs and domestic taxes subsidies are not equivalent in this model tariffs also generate regional factor price differences which will not be eliminated by migration unless relative endowments are equalized les effets economiques regionaux des tarifs douaniers et des coats de transport domestique l auteur examine le cas d une petite 6conomie ouverte faite de deux regions entre lesquelles les couits de transport sont plus 6lev6s que les couits de transport internationaux on observe des mouvements de biens identiques entre pays dans les deux directions et des changements dans les termes d echange dans les tarifs douaniers et dans la fiscalit6 domestique ont des effets regionaux distincts si les tarifs douaniers engendrent un commerce interregional une perte de bien etre 6gale a la perte des droits de douane collect6s ant6rieurement se produit l introduction de tarifs douaniers peut accroftre le bien etre d une region et renverser le pattern de commerce international pour l 6conomie dans son ensemble dans ce modele tarifs douaniers et taxes subventions ne s 6quivalent pas les tarifs douaniers peuvent engendrer des diff6rences regionales dans le prix des facteurs qui ne s 6limineront pas par les mouvements migratoires a moins que les dotations relatives de facteurs ne soient 6galis6es

welfare taxes and foreign investment abstract r d based growth models imply a positive growth effect of foreign investment through the introduction of new technologies however it has been shown that in an economy without taxes national welfare may decrease due to the transfer of profits to foreigners this paper investigates whether the introduction of a tax on profits warrants a positive welfare effect of foreign investment it is shown that the welfare effect of foreign investment may be negative due to the existence of transfers of profits to foreigners even when the domestic economy is following the optimal tax policy

share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends abstract this study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price share allocation and other terms governments choose when they privatize state owned enterprises via a public share offering using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations sips with total proceeds of over 446 billion during the period 1977 1997 we find that governments consistently underprice sip offers tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors impose control restrictions on privatized firms and typically use fixed price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers all to further political and economic policy objectives

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

departures from multilateralism regionalism and aggressive unilateralism multilateralism can mean many things to many people for instance it may mean balancing trade multilaterally at whatever level of payments deficit or surplus one desires as distinct from insisting on bilateral balancing with specific countries the latter constituting a folly and a temptation that few politicians can resist but most economists will run from but the two characteristics of the gatt based multilateral trading system that spring to mind most readily to scholars of international trade and which therefore i focus on here are first the principle of non discrimination which implies the extension of mfn mostfavoured nation treatment to all gatt members and second the principle that balanced mutual reciprocal concessions and acceptance of new disciplines amounting to first difference reciprocity bhagwati i988 be the method for achieving progressive movement toward free trade this would rule out the aggressive use of power to extract either unrequited trade concessions or acceptance of new disciplines therefore shielding the weak against the strong who would otherwise in bilateral one on one confrontations have an advantage constrained only by altruism or conscience these principles are stated in idealised form in reality however the gatt permits departures from mfn for i countervailing duties against foreign subsidies cvd and as anti dumping ad measures aimed only at the offending parties article vi 2 developing countries part iv who get special and differential treatment such as preferentially lower tariffs in developed countries that are gatt members and 3 customs unions and free trade areas article xxiv 2

optimal tariffs and income taxes under imperfect and uncertain foreign investment international investment as well as international trade is now a wide phenomenon and optimal policies to be selected in the presence of both international trade and investment have been a great concern jones 7 and kemp 9 have done pioneering works in this area of study previous studies however have mostly postulated that international capital movements are perfect while perfect capital mobility is expected in the long run bhagwati and brecher 2 and brecher and bhagwati 3 emphasized short run sluggishness of foreign investment that is even in the presence of international differentials in rates of return to capital the amount of foreign capital existing in the host country is fixed in the short run a realistic case however will be between complete fixity and perfect mobility of foreign capital this is especially true in the medium run in such a case the amount of foreign capital existing in a country at a particular future point in time may be reasonably conceived as uncertain to that country uncertainty may arise for various reasons the case includes uncertainty about the level of the rate of return to capital in the world market and also uncertainty about production technology employed by foreign investors these cause amounts of foreign capital to be received by the host country uncertain to it even under perfect international capital mobility uncertainties in such a case are relevant when the host country government has a long run perspective and is concerned with the long run consequences of its policies this paper addresses the open question of levels of optimal policies to be chosen when foreign capital movements are uncertain as well as imperfect and examines whether they modify or make intact the optimal policies established traditionally policies considered here are import tariff and income tax by the host country since these are prevalent and have attracted much attention in the literature of international trade and investment

domestic taste differences transportation costs and international trade abstract the implications of taste differences among domestic consumers is investigated and transplantation cost assumptions are found to be crucial to the analysis in a frictionless world crosshauling occurs trade volume is indeterminant and tariffs need not have welfare significance with international transportation costs the traditional equivalence of tariffs and tax subsidy schemes breaks down and consumers are affected differentially by terms of trade changes when domestic transportation costs dominate cross hauling can occur and tariffs will have regional consequences tariffs can change the pattern of international trade and may internalize trade and result in the wasteful use of resources

trade theory distribution of income and immigration this paper examines the impact of mass immigration utilizing the analytical framework of so called trade theory as such its emphasis is on general equilibrium effects and on the constraints imposed by the openness of the economy on such effects the analysis will center on the distributional impact of unskilled labor immigration excerpt

creditor protection laws debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle we examine how legal creditor rights are related to debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle using firm level data from 40 countries we find that creditor rights are associated with greater debt financing and investment during economic downturns but creditor rights have a significantly smaller effect during expansions the beneficial effects of creditor rights during recessions are stronger for firms that are more likely to have severe shareholder bondholder agency problems we also find that during recessions relative to expansions strong creditor rights are associated with a smaller decline in net capital flows our findings are consistent with credit market frictions increasing during recessions and with stronger creditor rights decreasing the negative effects of these frictions overall the results suggest that better creditor protection laws help moderate the decline in debt financing and investment during recessions

international capital mobility shadow prices and the cost of protection this paper studies the welfare losses from tariff protection in a small open economy when some factors are internationally mobile our principal result is that international fictor mobility must raise the cost of protection more specifically the welfare loss resulting from a uniform increase in tariffs in a competitive small open economy is greater when tariff induced international factor movements take place than when factors are internationally immobile by contrast an exogen1ous inflow of factors in the presence of tariffs may increase or reduce the welfare loss associated with protection depending on whether or not the protected commodities use the foreign owned factors intensively relative to domestically owned factors these results are proven for a very general specification of the economy s technology in particular no restrictions are placed on the degree of vertical integration in production on the sectors into which factors are internationally mobile or on the number of goods and factors our main result holds whether or not an increase in tariff rates leads the economy to specialise in addition we show how our results relate to earlier work on immiserising capital inflows and on negative shadow prices for factors of production thus synthesizing a number of recent results within a common framework the paper is organised as follows in section 2 we explain our framework and derive expressions for the welfare effects of tariffs when all factors are domestically owned and when some factors are foreign owned but not internationally

tranching in the syndicated loan market around the world loan tranching allows banks to manage risk and facilitate firm financing which may be essential for firms that cannot access investors from stock markets we analyze the determinants and benefits of loan tranching by pooling the tranches of individual loans to create the largest cross country sample of syndicated loans covering more than 150 000 loans from multinational and domestic firms we find that in addition to market deal and borrower characteristics legal and institutional differences impact loan tranching strong creditor protection and efficient debt collection increase the probability of tranching and reduce tranche spreads ultimately promoting firms access to debt we also find evidence that tranching facilitates the financing of multinational firms abroad due to the transfer of legal and cultural institutions to foreign subsidiaries overall our results suggest that tranching plays an important role in reducing a country s financial development gap and promotes firms access to debt

international capital transfers and the choice of production technique a simple two country model abstract a two country two factor two good world with incomplete specialization is explored in the context of international capital transfers where the techniques of production of the same good differ across sectors of the world economy it is shown that the terms of trade for the south will worsen with a capital transfer to the south under a wide range of assumptions about the nature of the technology used in the north owned sector of the south the implied redistribution of world income as well as the implications of a change in the production technique of the foreign owned sector of the south are then examined

how legal environments affect the use of bond covenants we examine how country level legal and institutional investor protection shapes contractual creditor protection we examine debt covenant information from foreign corporate bonds issued in the us from more than 50 countries between 1991 and 2007 we find that bonds of firms incorporated in countries with stronger creditor rights use fewer covenants this finding suggests that creditor protection substitutes for covenants in reducing the agency cost of debt in contrast bonds of firms with stronger shareholder rights or firms with stronger firm level corporate governance use more covenants these findings support the notion that firms with stronger shareholder control may face an increase in the shareholder bondholder conflict and therefore prefer to use more covenants however greater shareholder rights are not associated with the use of more covenant restrictions on equity issuance as firms with greater minority shareholder protection are unlikely to suffer such equity dilution

optimal policy in the presence of licensed technology from abroad this paper extends the theory of international trade to analyze optimal commercial policy of a country importing technology for which royalties must be paid to foreigners as the analysis shows the country can maximize national welfare by combining a tax on international trade in commodities and a domestic commodity market tax or subsidy depending respectively on whether foreigners are net exporters or importers of the commodity whose technology is licensed internationally the analysis also demonstrates that the maximum level of national welfare might be lower with than without technological imports if the country s exportable commodity uses the foreign technology

the distributional impact of a resource boom abstract sizeable export growth led by a booming natural resource extraction sector has recently been experienced in a number of countries this form of growth holds potentially important implications for the distribution of income and in this paper a simple general equilibrium trade model is presented which is aimed at exposing the effects of a resource boom on factor owners real incomes the analysis highlights the critical role played by the real exchange rate and also explores the consequences of a resource boom in the presence of real international capital flows and endogenous protection wherein one group of factor owners uses commercial policy to maintain the group members real incomes

political party tenure and mne location choices we develop a theoretical framework to explain how political party tenure affects mne entries into an economy we leverage insights from the upper echelon and public administration literatures to argue that there is a curvilinear relationship between political party tenure and mne entries moreover we argue that political parties with an excessive tenure are less responsive to mnes and more corrupt therefore we further explain the mediating effects of government bureaucratic responsiveness and government corruption on that relationship we test our theory using a sample of manufacturing mnes entering into mexican cities the results support our theory

welfare aspects of the transfer problem using the standard trade model with three countries and allowing for substitutability in both production and consumption this paper demonstrates that a country may gain by giving a transfer that the receiver may lose and that these two phenomena may appear at the same time this result is an extension of gale s example in a fixed coefficient model where he shows both transferer and transferee may become better off harming the third country and it is contrasted with the traditional welfare proposition whereby a giver is immiserized and a recipient is enriched

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

deadweight costs and the size of government abstract we provide a model for analyzing effects of the tax system and spending programs on the determination of government spending and taxpayer welfare an improvement in the efficiency of either taxes or spending would reduce political pressure for suppressing the growth of government and thereby increase total tax revenue and spending we demonstrate the similarity of the political responses to revenue shocks spending shocks changes in tax efficiency and changes in spending program efficiency empirical analysis of oil shocks intergovernmental grants and other autonomous changes in taxes or spending indicates that cause and effect is not only from spending to tax structures

the possibility of an immiserizing transfer under uncertainty in a two country two commodity trade model with production uncertainty an international transfer can harm the recipient and benefit the donor this result holds even when equilibrium prices are stable moreover the form in which the transfer is paid can matter for the welfare consequences of the transfer

strategic trade policy and welfare foreign equity ownership is shown empirically to weaken significantly and occasionally reverse common strategic trade policy results existing levels of u s cross ownership for example reduce the average optimal export subsidy by 47 relative to the brander and spencer journal of international economics 1985 18 83 100 value in industries with particularly high cross ownership and relatively small imputed labor rents optimal subsidies fall to less than one seventh of their former level previous studies which overlook high rates of cross ownership overstate the effectiveness of strategic policies most sharply in sectors with above average expected profitability scope for strategic investments and barriers to rent dissipation

from a customs union to a common market the need for factor tax harmonization abstract wooton 1988 demonstrates that a movement of a small customs union towardsa common market may result in a welfare loss if the common external tariff rates are not zero the present paper building on wooton s model demonstrates that even if the common external tariff rates are zero the movement towards a common market may still result in a welfare loss if the tax rates on factor s rates of return are not equal among partners within two special models the analysis also demonstrates that when the tax rates on factors rates of return are equal among member countries then the movement towards a common market is optimal regardless of whether or not the common external tariff rates are zero

foreign ownership non traded goods and the effects of terms of trade changes on national welfare abstract this paper extends the theory of international trade in the presence of foreign ownership to incorporate non traded goods it is shown that with non traded goods national and aggregate welfare might move in opposite directions in response to a terms of trade deterioration even when national and aggregate trade specialization patterns coincide

tied aid and the paradoxes of donor enrichment and recipient impoverishment it is part of received doctrine that in a two country world without hindrance of commodity taxes or other distortions and with market stability assured international transfers necessarily harm the donor and benefit the recipient 2 however in the case of most non private international aid those conditions fail donors often require that aid be spent in a manner not closely related to private preferences in the recipient countries indeed not closely related to any well behaved preferences and they normally finance the aid by means of distorting taxation hence one cannot rule out by appeal to standard theorems the possibility that aid perversely leaves the donor better off and or the recipient worse off let us say that aid is tied in the recipient if it is spent inefficiently in terms of individual preferences and that aid is tied in the donor if it is financed inefficiently thus whether aid is tied is a question of how it is spent or financed it is not a question of the numeraire in terms of which aid is accounted nor of the form in which it is offered 3 evidently the definition of tying is uncommonly broad for example aid may be tied in the recipient not because the donor attaches strings but because the government of the recipient is incompetent or unrepresentative moreover the definition is relevant however the aid is applied whether to private or public goods whether to consumption or investment goods we follow the literature on the transfer problem in assuming that aid is spent on private consumption goods like hospital services and powdered milk this is a matter of convenience and continuity only 4 in the present note we seek to rework the economics of foreign aid under novel assumptions in particular allowance will be made for the possibility that aid is tied in whole or in part in the donor or in the recipient it will be verified that the donor may benefit and the recipient suffer and that these outcomes are com

import competition international factor mobility and lobbying responses the schumpeterian industry case abstract this paper analyzes the different responses of economic agents to import competition in seeking policy intervention economic agents are divided into three groups capitalists workers and the government the following output restoring policies are considered protection capital importation labour importation and technology importation the paper concentrates on capital intensive technologically progressive industries using both the heckscher ohlin samuelson and the jones neary factor specific models

aid and trade this paper surveys the recent theoretical and empirical literature that explores the relations between aid and trade and asks about the complementarity or substitution effects at work we distinguish between the effects of aid on trade flows and on trade policies of the donor as well as the recipient countries special focus is given on trade facilitation or aid for trade

imported technologies urban unemployment and the north south dialogue abstract this paper extends the harris todaro model with intersectoral capital mobility to include sector specific imported technologies technologies are assumed to be embodied in imported capital goods the small economy in the south for which the model is defined can import any amount of these technologies from the north at given royalty rates we find that if the north agrees to reduce the royalty rate on the industrial technology both the level and the rate of urban unemployment would rise and the income distribution change against the wage earners whereas such a reduction for the agricultural technology would have just the opposite effects a decrease in either royalty rate would increase the national income in the south although the magnitude of the increase in income would be larger with reduced royalty rate for agricultural rather than industrial technology the policy implication is that the south should emphasize the import of agricultural technology over the industrial technology

the economics of the to and fro migrant some welfare theoretical considerations the effects of international to and fro migration on the economic welfare of the migrants and the nonmigrants in the host and home countries are examined a to and fro migrant is defined as a worker who changes residence from origin to destination without any systematic tendency to remain in any of the two permanently the study is based on the theoretical framework developed by krauss the results indicate that to and fro emigration from a source country to a recipient country increases the economic welfare of the migrants and the nonmigrants residing in the host country but it tends to decrease the welfare of the nonmigrants residing in the source country in general the migration also tends to be pareto optimal from a world point of view excerpt

intermediate goods and the formation of duty free zones abstract if a country forms a duty free zone by lowering tariffs on intermediate goods and taxes on foreign capital used in the zone then resources are attracted from the surrounding domestic zone this can worsen the effects of the distortions due to the tariffs remaining in the domestic zone and can lower the host country s national income and welfare this tends to occur if 1 there is less substitutability between the intermediate and labor than between these factors and capital 2 there is currently a small foreign owned sector in which the share of labor in total costs is large relative to the share of the imported intermediate in the foreign sector and relative to the share of labor in total costs in the domestic zone ironically under the latter circumstances the host country is likely to regard a duty free zone as an attractive option

comovement information production and the business cycle abstract recent theoretical research suggests that information production is a positive externality of aggregate economic activity veldkamp 2005 both the quantity and quality of information increase during periods of economic expansion and decrease during periods of contraction based on this insight we hypothesize and confirm that time varying information production drives the comovement patterns observed in stock returns we examine stock return comovement in 36 countries from 1980 to 2007 and show that consistent with the theory comovement patterns are countercyclical that is when information production is high low comovement is low high we also find that the relation between comovement and the business cycle is stronger in countries that experience large intertemporal swings in information production finally we show that the relation between business cycle and comovement is stronger in poor countries countries with less developed financial markets and countries with weaker accounting and transparency standards these results suggest that financial development and transparency are conducive to a steady flow of financial information over the business cycle

foreign aid and public goods abstract most less developed countries ldcs use foreign economic aid to finance public consumption goods or public intermediate inputs this paper constructs a two country general equilibrium trade model where an income transfer that takes place between the two countries is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption good within this framework the paper identifies the conditions under which the income transfer improves or deteriorates the donor country s terms of trade and shows that the transfer can be welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient country the paper also demonstrates that the transfer can raise reduce world welfare in which case a welfare increase decrease in both the donor and the recipient country is possible

tariff reductions under foreign factor ownership in the presence of foreign factor ownership the traditional welfare effects of tariff reforms have to be reconsidered to include income redistribution between national and foreign owned factors jagdish n bhagwati and richard a brecher 1980 showed that when the relative amount of foreign owned factors in the host country is sufficiently large to induce a change in the direction of the trade pattern immiserizing tariff reductions may occur here it is shown that in the mirror case when foreign owned factors tend to promote the existing trade pattern i e trade promoting similar results can be obtained on the other hand when foreign factors are trade substituting tariff reductions cannot be immiserizing

foreign independent directors and the quality of legal institutions foreign directors can affect firm value through their advising and monitoring functions however the demand for these directors as well as their effect on firm performance is likely to be influenced by firm and country level characteristics in a large sample of non us firms we find that foreign directors are more likely to be associated with firms that have more foreign operations and an international shareholder base and firms that are located in countries with a limited supply of potentially qualified domestic directors countries with a smaller less well educated populace and lower levels of capital market development we also find that the association between foreign directors and firm performance is more positive in countries with lower quality legal institutions and when the director comes from a country with higher quality legal institutions than the firm s host country our study highlights the importance of considering national demographic factors and levels of capital market development when modeling the supply and demand for foreign directors and also underscores the importance of institutional quality in the foreign director s home and host country when assessing the effect of that director on firm performance

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

tariffs foreign capital and immiserizing growth with urban unemployment and specific factors of production abstract in this note we show that a recent observation of brecher alejandro as regards tariff induced capital inflows essentially extends to a setting with urban unemployment three factors of production and a variety of labor market conditions in the urban sector

creditor protection and credit response to shocks this article studies the relationship between creditor protection and credit responses to macroeconomic shocks using a data set on legal determinants of finance in a panel of data on aggregate credit growth for 79 countries during 1990 2004 it is shown that credit is more responsive to external shocks in countries with weak legal creditor protection and weak enforcement the results are statistically and economically significant and robust to alternative measures of creditor protection to the inclusion of variables that reflect different stages of economic development to the restriction of the sample to only developing economies to the controls for systemic crises to alternative shock measures and to vector autoregressive specifications

international trade and labor migration a theory of the relationship between international trade and labor mobility is developed that takes into account five characteristics of such migration including its temporary nature differences between migrant and native labor the acceptance of unpredictable conditions of employment by migrant labor the ready availability of further labor resources and international capital mobility particular attention is paid to the role of international labor migration in helping to insulate native populations from the rigors of industrial fluctuations and in helping to preserve import competing industries that would have succumbed without the availability of cheap imported labor

interpreting common stock returns around proxy statement disclosures and annual shareholder meetings numerous studies have analyzed the stock market reaction to information released in proxy statements two possible biases in proxy statement research are suggested frequently misspecification of the return benchmark and a sample selection bias from analyzing only clean events this paper presents evidence that most of the conclusions of existing studies are not affected by these potential biases a significantly positive abnormal return was found around a random sample of shareholder meeting dates the result indicates that interpreting event study results for announcements occurring around annual shareholder meetings must be conducted carefully the results are consistent with the findings of kalay and loewenstein 14 who argue that risk and expected return can increase around predictable information producing events alternatively the study can be viewed as being consistent with several recent studies that find anomalous results using daily return data and large samples

immiserizing transfer under variable returns to scale this paper examines the welfare consequences of a unilateral transfer for both the transfer paying and the transfer receiving country in which the production functions are subject to variable returns to scale we obtain the conditions for the strong paradox that is the welfare of the transfer paying country improves and that of the transfer receiving country declines in the standard two country framework the conditions for the weak paradox that is both the transferor and transferee gain or lose simultaneously and the normal results that is the transferor loses and the transferee gains are also derived transferts appauvrissants quand les rendements a l echelle sont variables ce memoire examine les effets de bien etre d un transfert unilateral a la fois pour le pays donateur et le pays recipiendaire quand les fonctions de production ont des rendements variables a l echelle les auteurs d6veloppent les conditions qui sous tendent le paradoxe fort i e le cas oii le bien r ils d6rivent aussi les conditions qui sous tendent le paradoxe faible i e le cas oui les deux pays gagnent ou

income effects and paradoxes in the theory of international trade every field in economics has its paradoxes phenomena which initially are thought to confound economic sense but ultimately come to be better understood the field of international trade can claim its fair share the examples of the metzler paradox wherein a tariff fails to provide protection or that of immerising growth wherein a country suffers a loss in welfare despite an improvement in production possibilities come easily to mind more recently a reexamination of the transfer problem in the context of many country trade or of tax distortions has revealed possibilities for donor countries to gain or transfer recipients to lose results which would be considered so paradoxical in standard treatments as to be ruled out by stability arguments behind each of the examples just cited lies a rational explanation in which income effects prove crucial in supporting a paradoxical outcome in some situations the potential for paradox rests on the possibility of income redistribution nationally or internationally when tastes differ among the various trading participants paradox becomes impossible if tastes at the margin are identical in other instances income redistribution is not the crucial mechanism and paradoxical outcomes may occur even if all traders possess the same taste patterns all cases share the property that paradoxes can arise only if the terms of trade are sufficiently disturbed substitution effects high values of which serve to dampen the required adjustment of prices to a market disturbance thus work to prevent paradoxical outcomes in the first section of this paper i focus on those issues for which income effects are associated with income redistribution especially the analysis of tariffs and transfers in markets that initially are free of taxes or other distortions in the second section i analyse an issue for which income redistribution is no longer the central ingredient the welfare consequences of growth a standard technique in game theory allows for a reinterpretation of the growth case to reveal the fundamental connection between a wide variety of standard two country results in the theory of international trade and the possibility of paradoxes in the three agent transfer problem i would therefore argue that the three agent transfer literature has wider applicability than is commonly perceived in the final section i analyse briefly the frequently encountered argument that some instances of paradoxical welfare loss can be avoided by optimal tariff policy i wish to thank isaias coelho for helpful conversations makoto yano for stimulating my interest in the transfer problem with many agents and j peter neary for comments on an earlier draft useful suggestions were also received at seminar presentations at the institute for international economic studies in stockholm and the london school of economics research support was provided by the national science foundation grants ses 78o6159 and ses 8309386 i the role of substitution effects in transfer paradoxes with more than two commodities and agents is discussed by de meza 1983

the multi country transfer problem abstract a general formula is derived for the welfare effects of a set of transfers among several countries in a two good model with production and substitution and compatible with walrasian stability the relation to recent work on transfer paradoxes is sketched

unemployment and the optimal export processing zone abstract in a country with harris todaro unemployment the formation of an urban export processing zone reduces national income unless it raises rural wages in that case increases in zone wages increase national income by less than dollar for dollar if foreign capital is taxed optimally then intermediate imports into the zone should be subsidized while the wage should be at the minimum feasible level for a given tax policy either the wage should be at the minimum or the ad valorem tariff on the intermediate should exceed the inverse of the elasticity of supply of labor from the countryside existing zone policies depart from these prescriptions

law finance and the international mobility of corporate governance we introduce the topic of this special issue on the role of financial and legal institutions in international governance with a particular emphasis on a notion of international mobility of corporate governance our discussion places the special issue at the intersection of law finance and international business with a focus on the contexts of foreign investors and directors country level legal and regulatory institutions facilitate foreign ownership foreign directors raising external financial capital and international m a activity the interplay between the impact of foreign ownership and foreign directors on firm governance and performance depends on international differences in formal regulatory institutions in addition to legal conditions informal institutions such as political connections also shape the economic value of foreign ownership and foreign directors we highlight key papers in the literature provide an overview of the new papers in this special issue and offer suggestions for future research

public offerings of state owned and privately owned enterprises an international comparison we compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies the evidence indicates that government officials in the united kingdom underprice ipos significantly more than their private company counterparts in canada and malaysia however the opposite is true there does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company ipos we provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

international capital mobility and commercial policy in an economic region abstract if two small countries are linked by capital movements then at low tariff levels any increase in capital flows induced by the commercial policy of either country will harm that country and benefit the other country while at low levels of international investment a tariff increase always harms the country levying the tariff nevertheless an increase in one country s tariff could benefit both countries by alleviating regional distortions in factor allocation if the countries liberalize factor movements within a customs union then conflicts must arise in choosing the level of the common external tariff

towards a common market factor mobility in a customs union this paper examines whether the member countries of a customs union would gain from moving towards the next stage of economi c integration the common market when the set of common external tar iffs is not chosen optimally increased factor mobility may reduce th e welfare of the customs union however common market formation is t he best policy when a customs union of any size sets its tariffs to t he appropriate levels

a simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate pac contributions the results presented in the previous section tend to confirm the hypothesis that committee assignments shape the pattern of corporate pac contributions this note corroborates existing research on corporate pacs at a significantly lower level of aggregation than the samples on which existing research has been conducted further because a nonparametric test was used rather than the more standard regressional analysis these results should increase our confidence that the essential institutions of government affect and engender responses by economic agents

investor protection optimal incentives and economic growth does investor protection foster economic growth to assess the widely held affirmative view we introduce investor protection into a standard overlapping generations model of capital accumulation better investor protection implies better risk sharing because of entrepreneurs risk aversion this results in a larger demand for capital this is the demand effect a second effect the supply effect follows from general equilibrium restrictions better protection i e higher demand increases the interest rate and lowers the income of entrepreneurs decreasing current savings and next period s supply of capital the supply effect is stronger the tighter are the restrictions on capital flows our model thus predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is stronger for countries with lower restrictions cross country data provide support for this prediction as does the detailed examination of the growth experiences of south korea and india

reevaluating the role of trade agreements does investment globalization make the wto obsolete abstract international ownership alters the role of multilateral trade institutions by redefining pecuniary externalities among countries regardless of the underlying cause whether foreign direct investment international portfolio diversification cross country mergers or multinational firms international ownership can mitigate incentives that lead large countries to set inefficiently high tariffs at the same time however foreign ownership introduces the potential for expropriation by investment host countries which can extract rent from foreign owners by manipulating local prices the basic principle of reciprocity continues to serve as an important guide to efficiency though its application must account for the pattern of international ownership in addition to traditional measures of market access

second best policy for international trade and investment abstract this paper investigates second best commercial policy for an open economy within the two commodity two factor model of a two country world where the first best strategy is known to require taxes subsidies on both international trade in commodities and foreign investment via capital movements as the analysis shows when either of these policy instruments is prohibited the other instrument generally must be complemented by a tax subsidy in consumption or production if a second best rather than third best equilibrium is desired the paper derives moreover precise conditions for determining the second best package of policies

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research