learning and wage dynamics we develop a dynamic model of learning about worker ability in a competitive labor market the model produces three testable implications regarding wage dynamics 1 although the role of schooling in the labor market s inference process declines as performance observations accumulate the estimated effect of schooling on the level of wages is independent of labor market experience 2 timeinvariant variables correlated with ability but unobserved by employers such as certain test scores are increasingly correlated with wages as experience increases and 3 wage residuals are a martingale we present evidence from the nlsy that is broadly consistent with the model s predictions

political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies abstract law and politics affect the financial structure of the public corporation perhaps as much as economics law restricts financial institutions from holding large equity blocks and from networking the small blocks they do own impetus for these restrictions came from several sources a public spirited belief that financial stability would be fostered by financial fragmentation american federalism each state created its own insular set of financial institutions rivalries between groups of financial institutions and popular mistrust of powerful private financial institutions the stability of many of these rules also derives from the political resistance that one would expect corporate managers and benefited financial institutions to offer to any change

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

wages experience and seniority in this paper we study the sources of wage growth we identify the contribution to such growth of general sector specific and firm specific human capital our results are interpretable within the context of a model where the returns to human capital may be heterogeneous and where firms may offer different combinations of entry level wages and firm specific human capital development we allow for the possibility that wages are match specific and that workers move jobs as a result of identifying a better match to estimate the average returns to experience sector tenure and firm specific tenure within this context we develop an identification strategy which relies on the use of firm closures our data source is a new and unique administrative data set for germany that includes complete work histories as well as individual characteristics we find positive returns to experience and firm tenure for skilled workers the returns to experience for unskilled workers are small and insignificant after 2 years of experience their returns to sector tenure are also zero however their returns to firm tenure are substantial in this paper we study the growth of wages of young workers in germany knowing the extent and reasons for individual wage growth over the life cycle is important for a number of areas in economics just to mention two examples first it is a key element to understanding and designing active labour market programmes many such programmes offer temporary and often subsidized work opportunities examples are the new deal in the u k and the swedish programmes as well as a number of programmes in germany these programmes are based on the assumption that general skills are sufficiently enhanced while working so as to render the workers employable without a wage subsidy thus the success of these programmes depends on how skills improve on the job for the target population and whether this skill enhancement is transferable across jobs second it is a key to understanding the benefits and costs of job mobility this in turn matters for a number of policy issues including the design of pension policies relating for example to final salary schemes as a result of this widespread interest a large body of empirical research has focused on obtaining estimates for the returns of experience and seniority 1 our study uses a new and unique administrative data set with a number of features that are important for our analysis and allow us to avoid many problems encountered in earlier work in this field in our model wages grow due to learning by doing which may be heterogeneous across individuals moreover since firms offer different career profiles and because we allow for match specific effects on wages investments take the form of searching for the firm with the most desirable learning by doing characteristics career structure 2

business ethics and the decision to adopt golden parachute contracts empirical evidence of concern for all stakeholders golden parachutes are often viewed as a form of excessive compensation because they provide senior management with substantial payouts following an acquisition while other stakeholders are subjected to layoffs disrupted business relationships and other negative externalities using a sample of s p 500 firms an economic and ethical justification for this type of contract is given golden parachutes ensure effective corporate governance that in turn preserve the firm s value for all stakeholders boards of directors enter into parachute agreements to protect recently hired ceos human capital during periods of financial uncertainty and thus potential takeover activity from an ethics viewpoint golden parachutes are valuable to all stakeholders because they encourage merger or acquisition in lieu of bankruptcy

management turnover and product market competition empirical evidence from the u s newspaper industry we examine the relationship between management turnover and market structure for newspapers in 50 large cities from 1950 to 1993 we find that competitive markets display greater turnover rates than monopolistic markets and that turnover rates are increasing in the degree to which a newspaper trails its competition in market share we find no evidence that the turnover performance relationship varies with market structure we discuss the implications of these findings for theories concerning competition and managerial employment contracting the results appear most consistent with the hypothesis that the greater likelihood of liquidation in competitive markets leads to elevated turnover rates copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

corporate governance under proportional electoral systems this paper provides a political explanation for the form of corporate governance captured by the degree of minority shareholder protection msp using a multi stage game model of three party competition under proportional electoral systems i demonstrate that the electoral threshold the minimum percentage of votes a party must receive to get at least one seat in parliamentary pr systems is inversely related to the degree of msp this finding represents an important modification to formal models in the political economic literature that tends to omit the political process

the price effects of increased competition in auction markets bidding theory predicts low er selling winning bids higher buying winning bids as numbers of bidders incre ase alternative versions predict that winning bids fall rise with the second order statistic the maximum order statistic or 1 n the authors test these pre dictions using data on underwriters spreads on tax exempt bonds offshore oil t racts and national forest timber they estimate winning bids using general vari ables for the product and dummies for 1 2 11 bidders in all cases mor e bidders meansignificantly lower selling winning bids the expected maximum order statistic fits better than either the second order statistic or1 n in te n out of twelve cases copyright 1987 by mit press

managerial turnover in a changing world we develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world in which the quality of the match between a firm and its managers changes stochastically over time shocks to managerial productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers our key positive result shows that the firm s optimal retention decisions become more permissive with time our key normative result shows that compared to what is efficient the firm s contract induces either excessive retention at all tenure levels or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure

financial factors in the great depression eginning with irving fisher 1933 and john maynard keynes 1931 b 1963 macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the great depression turning points during the depression often coincided with or were preceded by dramatic events in financial markets stock market collapse waves of bankruptcy and bank failure and contractions in the money stock but the mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the depression has been a source of controversy as has been the relative importance of financial factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the depression this essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the depression and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the depression and for macroeconomics i argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial real links in the depression followed a paradigm shift in economics a central neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity also the increasing emphasis on learning and path dependence in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy makers failed to prevent the depression

job displacement relative wage changes and duration of unemployment using special cps data on displaced workers this article investigates the wage consequences of job displacement in a framework that emphasizes the effects of past job duration s and unemployment duration s on postdisplacement wages our model also attempts to take account of the simultaneity between unemployment duration and the postdisplacement wage it is found that duration strongly reduces subsequent earnings and that considerable overstatement of the loss in firm specific training investments is implied by conventional routes to measuring wage losses

industry specific capital and the wage profile evidence from the national longitudinal survey of youth and the panel study of income dynamics using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth 1979 96 and the panel study of income dynamics 1981 91 i seek to determine whether there is any net positive return to tenure with the current employer once we control for industry specific capital including total experience in the industry as an additional explanatory variable i show that the return to seniority is markedly reduced using gls while it virtually disappears using iv gls at both the one digit and three digit levels therefore it seems that what matters most for the wage profile in terms of human capital is industry specificity not firm specificity

the link between ability and specialization an explanation for observed correlations between wages and mobility rates wage levels and turnover rates are negatively correlated across types of employment and this fact is often interpreted as evidence that high wage jobs are rationed a simple training model illustrates however that this correlation may arise because able workers have an incentive to choose highly specialized jobs in any job the most able workers possess the most valuable stocks of specific skills and therefore face the highest mobility costs thus able workers may have a comparative advantage in specialized employments data from the national longitudinal survey of youth provide an opportunity to evaluate the merits of the training model developed here data on worker training and mobility provide support for several implications of the model the model also provides new ways to interpret existing results in the literature on interindustry wage differentials

empirical testing of auction theory given the state of affairs in auction theory there is at least one model for instance to support any position one would care to take concerning the revenue of sealed bid vs open auctions it should not come as a surprise that a fair amount of empirical work in auctions is underway this paper reports the results of some recently completed research i first discuss papers in which the predictions being tested derive directly from the pure theory of auctions and then papers in which the predictions arise out of an application of auction theory to a related institution

wage growth due to human capital accumulation and job search a comparison between the united states and germany this paper compares the sources of wage growth of young male workers in two countries with very different labor market institutions the united states and germany the author first develops a simple method for decomposing wage growth into components due to general human capital accumulation firm specific human capital accumulation and job search the empirical analysis uses data from administrative records germany and the national longitudinal survey of youth united states for cohorts entering the labor market in the late 1970s and early 1980s although the two countries differed substantially in mobility rates they were similar in the sources of wage growth with general human capital accumulation being the most important single source and job search accounting for an additional 25 or more of total wage growth there is no evidence that returns to firm specific human capital accumulation were higher for german apprentices than for u s high school dropouts or graduates

top executive rewards and firm performance a comparison of japan and the united states this paper studies top executive turnover and compensation and their relation to firm performance in the largest japanese and u s companies japanese executive turnover and compensation are related to earnings stock returns and to a lesser extent sales performance measures the fortunes of japanese top executives therefore are positively correlated with stock performance and current cash flows or with factors contributing to such performance the relations for the japanese executives are generally economically and statistically similar to those for their u s counterparts there is some evidence however that the fortunes of japanese executives are more sensitive to low income but less sensitive to stock returns than those of u s executives

job search bargaining and wage dynamics this article constructs and estimates a model of wage bargaining with on the job search to explore three different components of wages general human capital match specific capital and outside options as the workers find better job opportunities the current employer has to compete with outside firms to retain them this between firm competition results in wage growth even when productivity remains the same the model is estimated by a simulated minimum distance estimator and data from the 1979 national longitudinal study of youth the results indicate that the improved value of the outside option raises wages by 14 16 in the first 5 years

compensation turnover and top management incentives historical evidence the authors find that the rate of top management turnover and the sensitivity of turnover to stock returns for a sample of large industrial firms from 1933 to 1941 was significantly smaller than estimates reported for modern panels they present evidence that management compensation has become more sensitive to firm performance since the 1930s in contrast to the conclusions of michael c jensen and kevin j murphy 1990 and others the authors findings indicate that management incentives under control of the board have become stronger rather than weaker over the past half century these findings are consistent with internal and external control mechanisms functioning as complements copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

organization form residual claimants and corporate control eugene fama and michael jensen s treatment of the separation of ownership and control is both insightful and informative it deepens our understanding of corporate control and the analysis of residual claimants usefully extends the economics of internal organization to include partnerships mutuals nonprofits and the like the basic argument is this specialized governance structures arise in response to the efficiency needs of each type of organization this is an important argument and one with which i broadly concur they couple this however with a strong suggestion that these structures have reached a high degree of refinement on which account there is not now if indeed there ever has been an organization control problem with which scholars and others are legitimately concerned on this point i have grave doubts my discussion of the paper addresses three issues what is the relation if any of the hierarchical organization of the firm to economic performance what relation if any does residual claimant status have to the composition and character of the board of directors and is there now or has there ever been a corporate control problem i deal with each of these issues in order

administrative creation of property rights to radio spectrum abstract despite the 1934 communication act s ban on private ownership of radio spectrum the law leaves open to the federal communications commission a range of licensing regimes under which the commission may in its discretion grant spectrum users relatively strong or weak property rights to allotted frequencies this article examines numerous administrative decisions by the fcc to demonstrate how regulatory changes have affected the property interests conferred by spectrum licenses focusing on licensees rights to use divide and broker spectrum flexibly and to prevent unauthorized reception of their signals the article discusses the economic and legal significance of those changes and identifies areas for further reform the authors conclude that although important changes remain to be made the fcc has strengthened property interests on both the transmission and receiving ends of licensed frequencies and through the administrative process has eroded the importance of the statutory distinction

job duration seniority and earnings an important stylized fact about labor markets is that workers with longer seniority with their current employer have higher earnings than other workers with the same total labor market experience this study shows that workers in longer jobs earn more throughout than workers in a series of shorter jobs and that the measured positive cross sectional return seniority is largely a statistical artifact due to the correlation of seniority with an omitted variable representing the quality of the worker the job or the worker employer match the implication is tha t earnings do not in fact rise very much with seniority copyright 1987 by american economic association

the relative effects of employed and unemployed job search a lthough many early models of job search assumed that job seekers were unemployed economists have come to recognize the importance of on the job search mattila 1974 for example found that roughly 60 of quitters experienced no unemployment between jobs implying that the majority of voluntary job changers engaged in on the job search the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search has been modelled in the theoretical search literature barron and mccafferty 1977 burdett 1978 however there have been no attempts to estimate empirically the determinants of this choice 2 some researchers have however examined the resulting wages associated with these two types of search and found a greater wage return to employed than to unemployed search mattila 1969 black 1980 however because voluntarily unemployed search involves forgoing income burdett 1978 while employed search does not abstracting from voluntary reductions in hours incomemaximizing job seekers would never quit to search unless the expected net return to unemployed search exceeded that for employed search thus the previously mentioned empirical findings at first glance might appear to contradict the assumption of income maximization by job seekers because some workers do quit into unemployment 3 in this paper it is argued that previous attempts to compare the returns of employed and unemployed job search suffer from a selectivity problem specifically searchers who accept offers without experiencing any unemployment are likely to have unobservable variables such as informal job contacts and ability which will raise the relative return to employed search compared to that of voluntarily unemployed job seekers 4 providing an explanation for higher wages for on the job searchers than for unemployed searchers this paper estimates the relative wage effects of employed and unemployed search and the determinants of the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search unlike earlier work mattila 1969 black 1980 the previously mentioned selectivity problems are accounted for this is the first attempt to estimate the determinants of choice of search mode 5 without adjusting for selectivity bias as regards employed vs unemployed search it is found that employed search is associated with greater expected wage offers than unemployed search controlling for measurable personal characteristics however accounting for selectivity the expected wage offer given unemployed search is greater than that given employed search finally the greater is the difference between the expected offer given unemployed and that given employed search the more likely one is to choose unemployed search these findings suggest that quitting to search unemployed may be a wealth maximizing decision received for publication november 5 1980 revision accepted for publication august 17 1981 university of illinois at urbana champaign and arizona state university respectively professor low is partially supported by a faculty grant from the graduate college at arizona state university the authors thank francine blau wallace hendricks and two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions i for a summary of this literature see lippman and mccall 1976 2 barron and mccafferty 1977 do estimate an aggregate time series model of the log of the proportion of quits entering unemployment as a function of the vacancy rate proxied by the help wanted advertising index however such a model ignores search that does not lead to quits and does not include variables beyond the vacancy rate that influence an individual s choice of search mode i it is also possible that the forgone earnings due to unemployed search could in principle be less than the possible savings in direct search costs due to unemployed search relative to employed search see burdett 1978 in this case a lower wage return to unemployed search could imply that quitting was based on income considerations further individuals may have quit for nonwage reasons 4 black 1980 found that other things equal those who planned to seek new employment but did not quit had significantly lower wage growth than those who did not plan to search and did not quit this finding strongly suggests the likelihood of a selectivity bias black 1980 p 227 black s 1976 1980 data the michigan panel study of income dynamics psid for his work on employed search did not allow him to distinguish employed and unemployed search

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

optimal contracting with moral hazard and cascading in this article i identify optimal incentive contracts for managers of firms competing in the product market such firms often confront similar decisions and uncertainties managers can improve decision quality by generating private signals through costly effort however since signals are likely to be correlated firms that decide later get additional information from the actions of earlier firms this impacts effort choice decision quality is also affected if later managers disregard their own signals and blindly imitate preceding decisions in a competitive environment such cascading hurts profits contracts that solve both moral hazard and cascading problems typically put more weight on firm profits making them expensive contacts with more weight on decision quality are less expensive but result in cascades shareholders choose contracts that maximize their net surplus this results in testable implications about which industries may have more convergence in investment choices greater pay for profit sensitivity larger differences in observed contracts more innovation larger size firms and potential for overcompensation article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

subordination of american capital abstract to economists agency problems present challenges that can be resolved through optimal contracting or incentive mechanisms to politicians agency problems represent entitlements to be allocated among favored constituencies corporate management constitutes a powerful constituency independent of the interests of workers local communities and other corporate stakeholders the political process has for politically rational but economically dabatable reasons systematically subordinated investors desire to resolve agency problems to managers desire to be protected from capital market discipline politically explicit modes of analysis thus complement traditional tools of finance theory and improve our ability to explain capital market structure and behavior

the rationality of u s regulation of the broadcast spectrum in his classic 1983 technologies of freedom ithiel de sola pool so elucidated the prevailing wisdom concerning broadcast licensure in the united states while the key legal questions surrounding this institution involve important first amendment questions hence pool s scarcity analogy to paper ink and presses economists and other policy analysts have often remarked on the more general incongruity in federal licensing while spectrum is regulated on the physical scarcity premise it is awarded to private users on a no fee basis thus conferring significant economic rents on private parties at substantial opportunity cost to the fisc moreover federal communications commission fcc 2 policies have openly sought virtually throughout the agency s entire life span to restrict broadcast licenses and competition for broadcasters particularly cable television to far below the quantity technically available 3 the

wages separations and job tenure on the job specific training or matching a general stochastic model of optimal job separation behavior is developed in the paper the model nests both the job training and the job matching hypotheses of the wage tenure relationship as special cases the purpose of the paper is to compare the implications of the two hypotheses for job turnover that expected wealth maximizing separation strategies are qualitatively identical under the two hypotheses is the principal theoretical result although the empirical implications of the two hypotheses for observations on the distribution of completed job spell lengths are similar as a consequence they are not quite identical

in the right place at the wrong time the role of firms and luck in young workers careers we examine administrative data on young german workers and their employers to study the long term effects of an early career job loss to account for nonrandom sorting of workers into firms with different turnover rates and for selective job mobility we use changes over time in firm and age specific labor demand as an instrument for displacement we find that wage losses of young job losers are initially 15 percent but drop to zero within five years only workers leaving very large establishments suffer persistent losses a comparison of estimators implies that initial sorting negative selection and voluntary job mobility biases ordinary least squares estimates toward finding permanent negative effects of early displacements

6 revenue effects and information processing in english common value auctions an experiment analyzing behavior in english common value auctions is reported english auctions raise more revenue than first price auctions only when bidders do not suffer from a strong winner s curse agents employ other bidders dropout prices along with their private information as nash bidding theory predicts however a simple and natural signal averaging rule which does not require recognizing the adverse selection effect of winning the auction better characterizes the data than the nash rule monte carlo simulations using fiml estimates of the signal averaging rule predict a number of data characteristics not directly employed in the estimation procedure copyright 1996 by american economic association

the determinants of prices in the fcc s 700 mhz spectrum auction this article examines the prices paid for 700mhz licenses in recent federal communications commission auctions econometric modelling confirms the presence of economies of scale and scope in wireless spectrum valuations that is higher prices are recorded for areas with large populations whilst lower prices are realized for geographically large areas also smaller geographic license areas appear to meet bidders demand more effectively and licenses in areas with high incomes are sold at higher prices not surprisingly more strict deployment requirements and the presence of harmful technical interference reduce prices also paired spectrum receives higher prices than unpaired spectrum interestingly high minimum opening bids and upfront deposits are associated with higher prices finally competitive bidding places upward pressure on prices

is job stability in the us falling reconciling trends in the current population survey and panel study of income dynamics this article considers whether two commonly used sources of information on employer tenure the panel study of income dynamics and the current population survey yield systematically different trends in employer tenure little evidence of a discrepancy between the data sets in the 1980s or 1990s is found when comparable samples variable definitions and time frames are used neither data set shows a significant trend in the share of workers with 1 year or less of tenure while both data sets show an increase in the fraction of men with less than 10 years of tenure starting in the late 1980s

has job stability declined yet new evidence for the 1990 s we update the evidence on changes in job stability through the mid 1990s using recently released current population survey data for 1995 that parallel earlier job tenure supplements in the aggregate job stability declined modestly in the first half of the 1990s moreover the relatively small aggregate changes mask rather sharp declines in stability for workers with more than a few years of tenure nonetheless the data available to this point do not support the conclusion that the downward shift in job stability for more tenured workers and the more modest decline in aggregate job stability reflect long term trends

do wages rise with job seniority many previous studies have found a strong positive effect of job seniority tenure on wages this paper re examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables scheme to deal with the fact that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics that affect the wage we use the variation of tenure over a given job match as the principal instrumental variable for tenure the variation in tenure over the job is uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual and job match specific components of the error term of the wage equation our main finding is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small and that general labour market experience and job shopping account for most wage growth over a career the strong cross section relationship between tenure and wages is due primarily to heterogeneity bias prior researchers see mincer and jovanovic 1981 bartel and borjas 1981 borjas 1981 cline 1979 and mellow 1981 and many others have established that job seniority has a strong positive relationship with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section time series of individuals in this paper we re evaluate the evidence concerning the partial effects on wages of job seniority tenure and total labour market experience the extent to which wages rise with tenure is important for several reasons first and foremost the wage tenure profile is a fundamental question about the structure of earnings over careers second the wage tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is tied to specific jobs and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by displaced workers hamermesh 1984 third evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline in quits with tenure since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that the worker will locate a superior alternative a growing theoretical literature surveyed in parsons 1984 has taken the evidence of a strong wage tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for the relationship the most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human capital oi 1962 becker 1962 mincer 1974 parsons 1972 kuratani 1973 and hashimoto 1980 in which the growth of wages with tenure holding experience constant is attributed to the worker s share of investments in firm specific skills more recently lazear 1981 has presented a supervision model of wage growth in which firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to shirk freeman 1977 and harris and holmstrom 1982 provide an explanation for wage growth based on an insurance motive salop and salop 1976 nickell 1976 and guasch and weiss 1982 present adverse selection models of wage growth in which firms use a wage tenure profile as a

ceo replacement under private information this article examines the optimal ceo compensation and replacement policy when the ceo is privately informed about the firm s continuation value under his leadership ex ante moral hazard implies that the ceo must receive ex post quasi rents which endogenously biases him toward continuation our model shows that to induce bad ceos to quit it may be best to make continuation costly through steep incentive pay rather than simply rewarding quitting through severance pay incentive pay makes continuation attractive for good ceos who can expect high future on the job pay but unattractive for bad ceos who may instead prefer to take their outside option payoff our model generates novel empirical implications that jointly relate ceo compensation and turnover to corporate governance firm size cash flow risk and the informativeness of performance measurement jel g34

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

the contributions of search and human capital to earnings growth over the life cycle abstract this paper presents and estimates a unified model where both human capital investment and job search are endogenized this unification enables us to quantify the relative contributions of each mechanism to life cycle earnings growth while investigating potential interactions between human capital investment and job search within the unified framework the expectation of rising rental rates of human capital through job search gives workers more incentive to invest in human capital in addition unemployed workers reduce their reservation rental rates and increase their search effort to leave unemployment quickly to take advantage of human capital accumulation on the job the results show both forces are important for earnings growth and the interactions are substantial human capital accumulation accounts for 50 of total earnings growth job search accounts for 20 and the remaining 30 is due to the interactions of the two

the impact of corruption on consumer markets evidence from the allocation of second generation wireless spectrum in india abstracttheoretical predictions of the impact of corruption on economic efficiency are ambiguous with models allowing for positive negative or neutral effects while much evidence exists on levels of corruption less is available on its impact particularly its impacts on consumer markets this paper investigates empirically the effect of the corrupt sale of spectrum licenses to ineligible firms on the wireless telecommunications market in india i find that the corrupt allocation had at worst no impact on the number of subscribers prices usage revenues competition and measures of quality i argue that the market based transfer of licenses to competent firms other than the original awardees combined with fierce competition in the telecommunications sector may have mitigated potential deleterious impacts of corruption on consumers these results suggest that the original corrupt allocation did not matter which provides support for the coase theorem

on the efficiency of competitive markets for operating licenses some economists and policy makers have suggested that market allocation of scarce operating licenses broadcasting licenses and airport slots for instance would lead to their efficient use this paper demonstrates that a competitive market allocation of operating licenses whether attained through auctioning selling or allowing resale of the rights does not in general assure efficiency the profit criterion that would guide the allocation of licenses in a competitive market would not necessarily lead to the uses that maximize social benefits the paper shows that the difference between private and social incentives in the allocation process can be quite large the theory is then applied to discussions of allocating airport takeoff and landing slots and broadcasting licenses

matching turnover and unemployment this paper develops the view that workers move into and out of the labor market because of changes in the perceived value of their market opportunities a search model is combined with a matching model to yield movement of workers from job to job and into and out of employment

consequences of seniority wages on the employment structure the author examines seniority wage profiles in german establishments to discern hiring patterns with respect to age and sex using the country s linked employer employee dataset liab over the per

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

new zealand spectrum policy a model for the united states abstract in 1989 the new zealand government began to auction management rights to the electromagnetic spectrum using sealed bid second price vickrey auctions subsequently the united states began to auction spectrum through ascending bid multiple round auctions although students of auction processes find the latter type of auction to be the more efficient form i find that the prices realized in the new zealand cellular auctions are very similar to those realized in the u s personal communications services auctions after adjusting for differences in demographics the flexibility of the new zealand management rights should theoretically allow the winning bidders to find the highest valued use for the spectrum but many of the auctioned rights remain unused several years later a country as small as new zealand simply cannot be as innovative in finding new uses for the spectrum because of the large initial costs of developing the requisite equipment for using it

managerial incentives and collusive behavior abstract i characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long run oligopolistic competition when managers have a preference for smooth time paths of profits as revealed by the empirical literature on income smoothing manager led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor independent of contracts duration when managers have these preferences incentives and demand fluctuates price wars during booms need not occur the most collusive price may then be pro cyclical

property rights and wireless license values abstract while extending the scope of spectrum property rights promotes efficiency such reforms are often deterred by equity concerns theoretically however the windfalls may be negative relaxing license restrictions may increase profits by allowing enhanced productivity yet liberalization across a class of licensees can reduce the expected profits by increasing competitiveness this article examines license value changes for regimes that decisively shift toward private property rights in radio spectrum by analyzing the average prices paid in international cellular phone license auctions during 1995 2001 this unique data set encompasses 1 365 licenses assigned by competitive bidding in 38 auctions held in 24 countries licenses awarded by regimes with more expansive spectrum property rights generated winning bids that were 61 percent lower adjusting for other factors this evidence reverses the equity argument against liberalization over the policy margin studied and is consistent with coase s view

occupational specificity of human capital we find that returns to occupational tenure are substantial everything else being constant 5 years of occupational tenure are associated with an increase in wages of 12 20 moreover when occupational experience is taken into account tenure with an industry or employer has relatively little importance in accounting for the wage one receives this finding is consistent with human capital being occupation specific

duration to first job and the return to schooling estimates from a search matching model this paper investigates the properties of the joint distribution of the duration to the first post schooling full time job and of the accepted wage for that job within a search matchingbargaining theoretic model the model provides an interpretation of the observations on duration to first job and accepted wages that differentiates between behavioural influences and market fundamentals in determining the accepted wage schooling relationship the return to schooling is appropriately measured by differences in the wage offer distribution which depends only on market fundamentals we use data from the 1979 youth cohort of the national longitudinal surveys of labor market experience to follow several school leaving cohorts of young males a model which allows for five types of heterogeneous workers within schooling race groups fits the duration and wage data well for all such groups offer probabilities for all groups are estimated to be close to one mean offered wages are about 1000 less than mean accepted wages and the internal annual rate of return for attending college relative to graduating from high school is 32 for blacks and 17 for whites this paper investigates the properties of the joint distribution of the duration to the first post schooling full time job and of the accepted wage for that job within a search matching bargaining model it is a well established empirical regularity that hazard rates are decreasing with the duration of search unemployment it is also true for the data we use that the sample mean of the accepted wage associated with the first job is not increasing with duration these findings hold for both black and white male youth at all levels of schooling conditional on schooling however the time between leaving school and working at the first full time job is longer for blacks and their accepted mean wage is lower conditional on race the time between leaving school and working at the first full time job is shorter for those with higher levels of schooling and their accepted mean wage is higher interestingly blacks display a similar pattern of duration and accepted wages to whites who are one level of schooling below e g black high school graduates and white high school dropouts

ceo compensation and bank risk is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking abstract this paper examines whether executive compensation in banking is structured to promote risk taking we find that on average bank ceos receive less cash compensation are less likely to participate in a stock option plan hold fewer stock options and receive a smaller percentage of their total compensation in the form of options and stock than do ceos in other industries cross sectional differences in the structure of compensation contracts within banking are also examined we find a positive and significant relation between the importance of equity based incentives and the value of the bank s charter this result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that compensation policies promote risk taking in banking

assigning property rights to radio spectrum users why did fcc license auctions take 67 years abstract while leo herzel 1951 and ronald coase 1959 persuasively argued for auctioning licenses issued by the federal communications commission fcc not until 1993 did the u s congress grant the fcc authority to assign wireless operating permits via competitive bidding why were auctions with obvious efficiency and equity advantages so long in coming why were comparative hearings in the public interest first abandoned as assignment tools in 1981 not for auctions but for lotteries and why were radio and tv licenses pointedly excluded from auctions four factors the special interest of regulators in influencing broadcasting content the limits placed on explicit program regulation by the u s constitution the recent increase in the relative economic importance of nonbroadcast wireless services and the agency problem embedded in central planning are used to explain both the political stability of economically inefficient licensing methods and recent reforms

equilibrium wage tenure contracts in this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage tenure contracts and workers both employed and unemployed search for new job opportunities given workers are risk averse we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium all post a wage tenure contract that implies a worker s wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm as firms make different offers there is job turnover as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises this implies the increase in a worker s wage can be due to job to job movements as well as wage tenure effects further there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage we also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters

the determinants of price in 3g spectrum auctions this article examined the empirical relationship between prices paid for national 3g wireless licenses when spectrums were sold by auction the reduced form modelling approach was based on the prem

proxy voting and the sec abstract this paper analyzes the sec s proxy regulations and assesses their effects on corporate governance the proxy rules began in 1935 as a minimal series of disclosure requirements and a prohibition against fraud by 1956 they imposed extensive and wide ranging disclosure requirements on anyone wishing to communicate about voting issues and required that all such communications be cleared in advance in essence censored by the sec i present evidence that since that time the rules have significantly increased the costs of communication and coordinated action among shareholders they have thus deterred shareholder initiatives and inhibited the development of a private market for information about voting issues

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

income variance dynamics and heterogeneity recent theoretical work has shown the importance of measuring microeconomic uncertainty for models of both general and partial equilibrium under imperfect insurance in this paper the assumption of i i d income innovations used in previous empirical studies is removed and the focus of the analysis is placed on models for the conditional variance of income shocks which is related to the measure of risk emphasized by the theory we first discriminate amongst various models of earnings determination that separate income shocks into idiosyncratic transitory and permanent components we allow for education and time specific differences in the stochastic process for earnings and for measurement error the conditional variance of the income shocks is modelled as a parsimonious arch process with both observable and unobserved heterogeneity the empirical analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 1967 1992 panel study of income dynamics we find strong evidence of sizeable arch effects as well as evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the variances

optimal abolition of fcc spectrum allocation ronald coase based his 1959 call for spectrum markets on theoretical conjecture today abundant evidence supports his case targeted liberalization in cellular markets as contrasted with regulatory planning of the digital tv transition and other traditional policies suggest enormous efficiency gains are available from wider use of the price system with exclusive frequency rights assigned to owners markets widely reconfigure spectrum use coordinating complex spectrum sharing resulting social gains include increased consumer surplus from enhanced technological innovation and wireless service competition a social bonus arrives in the benefits associated with wider scope for free speech yet the administrative allocation system continues to distribute rents and garner political support liberal reforms in contrast produce large but broadly dispersed efficiency gains and are undersupplied this paper proposes an incremental extension of property rights in spectrum to move beyond the current rent seeking equilibrium eliminating the federal communications commission s centralized spectrum allocation process and with it an attractive nuisance generating anticonsumer outcomes

are workers permanently scarred by job displacements this paper investigates whether workers suffer lasting scars following job displacements using david t ellwood s 1982 terminology scars represent persistent effects whereas blemishes are transitory adjustments which dissipate over time more precisely dislocated individuals are defined as scarred if they continue to earn less or to be unemployed more than their nondisplaced counterparts even after the conclusion of a several year adjustment period