associations between alternative accounting profitability measures and security returns the importance of accounting information on security price determination is of interest to both security analysts and accountants beaver 3 downes and dyckman 6 gonedes 12 beaver and manegold 4 and others have investigated the possible relationships between accounting information and market information rosenberg 26 has shown the existence of extra market components of covariance in security returns while simkowitz and logue s l 28 have derived the interdependent structure of security returns however none of this research has explicitly investigated how the empirical results can be affected by alternative accounting profitability measures within an industry simultaneously

social norms and csr performance some institutional investors e g pensions universities and religious charitable and not for profit institutions are exposed to social norms and public scrutiny prior research indicates that these norm constrained institutions engage in negative screening and invest less in firms operating in sin industries we examine whether social norms also motivate these institutions to engage in positive screening where they invest more in firms with better corporate social responsibility csr performance and csr related activism where they promote improvements in the csr of existing investees we find that firms with superior csr performance have greater ownership by norm constrained institutions consistent with positive screening and we use a natural experiment to establish causality we also find that increases in the shareholdings of norm constrained institutions are associated with subsequent improvements in csr consistent with activism further we rule out an alternative explanation for our results where the positive screening and activism are profit driven rather than driven by social pressure thus our results suggest that the influence of social norms on stock markets is more pervasive than documented in the prior literature

an antitakeover amendment for stakeholders the non financial effects nfe antitakeover amendment addresses the duties of company directors and management when faced with a possible takeover bid the nfe amendment either permits or requires managers to consider the interests of the company s stakeholders during takeover bids other types of antitakeover devices have been viewed as protecting either stockholder or management interests the nfe amendment would appear to protect a broad spectrum of interests including those of company employees creditors and the community in which the company operates positive market returns to the adoption of nfe amendments provide some evidence that investors approve the percent of both management and institutional ownership are positively related to the market reaction to the nfe amendment adoption to the extent that institutional ownership proxies for the broad spectrum of stakeholder interest nfe devices unlike some other amendments that have been studied appear to be in the interests of more than a single interest group

attitudes toward risk and the risk return paradox prospect theory explanations this study attempted to explain bowman s risk return paradox in terms of recent research in behavioral decision theory and prospect theory the research emphasized the role of reference or target

antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth abstract many large corporations have recently adopted antitakeover charter amendments which make the transfer of corporate control more difficult this paper develops and tests competing theoretical explanations for the passage of these amendments in one view antitakeover provisions are adopted because incumbent management seeks job protection at stockholders expense the alternative hypothesis is that antitakeover provisions benefit stockholders perhaps by extracting greater payment in exchange for corporate control although inconclusive the evidence provides weak preliminary support for the hypothesis that antitakeover amendments are best explained as a device for managerial entrenchment

studying optimal paternalism illustrated by a model of sin taxes the classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices a great deal of evidence suggests however that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave in their own best interests economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational and in particular it may be fruitful for economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better choices we propose an approach for studying optimal paternalism that follows naturally from standard assumptions and methods of economic theory write down assumptions about the distribution of rational and irrational types of agents about the available policy instruments and about the government s information about agents and then investigate which policies achieve the most efficient outcomes in other words economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a mechanism design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational this approach has many advantages first and foremost by explicitly addressing when and how people do and don t pursue their own best interests economists will be better able to contribute to policy debates to contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions we must study whether financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and whether self control problems lead people to borrow too heavily to contribute to debates over teenage smoking we must study whether teenagers become smokers against their long run best interest economists will and should be ignored if we continue to insist that it is axiomatic that constantly trading stocks or accumulating consumer debt or becoming a heroin addict must be optimal for the people doing these things merely because they have chosen to do it a second advantage of our approach is that it forces us to look for the best feasible policy our

corporate financial policy and corporate control abstract this paper presents evidence that stockholder wealth declines on average when managers respond to attempted hostile takeovers with defensive changes in asset and ownership structure the data also indicate that these corporate restructurings are typically quite large and that many are attempts by managers to create barriers specific to the hostile bidder and or to consolidate a block of voting securities in the hands of management allies the evidence suggests that defensive motives whether beneficial or harmful influence corporate asset and ownership structure

too risky to hold the effect of downside risk accumulated equity wealth and firm performance on ceo equity reduction although the alignment effect of equity ownership is often studied with emphasis on changes in firm strategy the exposure of ceos firm specific wealth to firm risk is more easily controlled by changing their level of equity holdings than by changing firm strategic risk we rely on prospect theory and the behavioral theory of the firm to examine the antecedents of ceo equity reduction and investigate whether it serves to decouple ceo wealth from firm risk given its central role in loss avoidance we underline the effect of the firm s downside risk and distinguish the total loss potential on equity holdings from the loss potential due to firm specific factors allowing for own performance referents we also consider firm performance and the value of a ceo s equity holdings in the analysis based on a sample of 208 u s ceos for the years 1997 1999 we find empirical support for the role of downside risk and firm performance in ceo equity reductions implications on incentive alignment through equity ownership are presented

standstill agreements privately negotiated stock repurchases and the market for corporate control abstract standstill agreements are voluntary contracts which limit a substantial stockholder s ownership interest in a corporation for a specified number of years they are often accompanied by repurchase of the substantial stockholder s shares at a premium above the market price standstills and premium buybacks reduce competition for corporate control and provide differential treatment of large block stockholders the analysis indicates a statistically significant negative average effect on non participating stockholder wealth associated with standstill agreements negotiated premium repurchases are also associated with negative but less significant stockholder returns the evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that these management actions are in the best interests of non participating stockholders

tax incidence when individuals are time inconsistent the case of cigarette excise taxes abstract one of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups we argue that traditional quantity based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive time consistent model of consumption of sin goods a model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot this self control function benefits lower income groups more since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking calibrations show that as a result cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values

the impact of institutional investors on mergers and acquisitions in the united kingdom abstract in this paper we investigate the impact of institutional ownership on uk mergers and acquisitions we employ a comprehensive sample of m as conducted by uk acquirers from 2000 to 2010 thus including a full cycle of peak and trough in m a waves we find that institutional investors increase the likelihood of an m a to be a large cross border deal opting for full control moreover institutional ownership concentration and foreign institutional ownership increase the likelihood of cross border m as in addition we assess the influence of institutional shareholders investment horizon and find that while investment horizon have a negative influence in encouraging cross border m as the presence of long term investors encourages larger m as finally even after controlling for the 2007 08 financial crisis the market reacts negatively to the announcement of cross border m as

prospect theory and the risk return association an empirical examination in 85 industries a new sample of 85 industries about 3 300 firms defined in terms of homogenous products provides strong evidence that prospect theory can explain the tradeoff between two of the most researched parameters in evaluating organizations namely risk and return in particular organizations below their target level are found to be risk takers hl while organizations above their target level are risk averters h2 moreover the below target tradeofl was generally steeper than the above target with a median below to above slope ratio of about 3 l h3 risk and return are probably the two single parameters most researched by the various and related disciplines of economics finance and management although each one of them has looked at these two parameters from different aspects and for different purposes they have provided a wide understanding of these two factors in the contest of the theory of the firm the purpose of this study is to look closely at the relationship between these two important parameters in order to understand firm s competitive behavior using the recent development in behavioral decision theory namely prospect theory kahneman and tversky 1979 although march 1988 has criticized the discipline of management for its later adaptation in considering risk elements for evaluating organization performance and decision making processes recent studies e g bettis 1981 rumelt 1974 singh 1986 jemison 1987 and baird and thomas 1986 have paid considerable attention to risk aspects in evaluating the performance of firms in general these studies have concluded that the characteristics of the firms environment strategy and implementation processes have significant and important influence on the firm s risk level and its associated rate of return bowman 1980 has looked closely at 85 u s industries and explored the

institutional investor stability and crash risk monitoring versus short termism this study tests two opposing views of institutional investors monitoring versus short termism we present evidence that institutional investor stability is negatively associated with 1 year ahead stock price crash risk consistent with the monitoring theory of institutional investors but not the short termism theory our findings are shown to be robust to alternative empirical specifications estimation methods and endogeneity concerns in addition we find that institutional ownership by public pension funds bank trusts investment companies and independent investment advisors is significantly negatively positively associated with future crash risk consistent with findings that pension funds more actively monitor management than other types of institutions

strategic reference point theory how can executives achieve a match between expected external environmental conditions and internal organizational capabilities that facilitates improved performance this paper argues that a firm s choice of reference points can help achieve strategic alignment capable of yielding improved performance and potentially even a sustainable competitive advantage building upon prospect theory and other relevant theoretical perspectives the strategic reference point srp matrix is developed a firm s srp consists of three dimensions internal capability external conditions and time a theory is developed which posits an optimal srp structure and propositions are offered which articulate the expected relationships between the srp strategic choice behavior and firm performance the paper closes with some suggestions for using strategic reference points in both research and practice

non welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions in these situations the government might want to intervene indeed individuals might want the government to intervene to induce behavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing the analysis of such corrective interventions through taxes and subsidies might be called behavioral public economics however such analysis where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals is not new in public economics in these cases the government is said to be non welfarist in its objectives and there is a long tradition of nonwelfarist welfare economics especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes the object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non welfarist optimal taxation literature and secondly to present behavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework

framing controversial actions regulatory focus source credibility and stock market reaction to poison pill adoption we contribute to the research on organizational accounts by examining the role of different framing languages and the credibility of the frame articulator on justifying controversial organizational actions drawing on regulatory focus theory and the literature on source credibility we develop novel arguments as to how a gains versus nonlosses framing and the perceived credibility of the speaker influence stakeholder responses as well as how the effectiveness of these aspects is influenced by context we test our arguments using data on the framing of the adoption of poison pills by u s firms between 1983 and 2008 using content analysis and an event study we find that a gains framing aligned with the dominant institutional logic leads to a positive stock market reaction while statements emanating from speakers with potentially self serving interests negatively affect the stock market reaction our findings further show that the effectiveness of framing and source credibility are dependent on contextual attributes such as speaker visibility prior performance and practice prevalence

voting power in the proxy process abstract the likelihood that a firm will enact a management sponsored antitakeover charter amendment depends on ownership structure this implies that the adoption of antitakeover amendments may be anticipated then announcement returns provide a biased estimate of wealth effects an estimator that corrects for the bias induced by anticipation indicates that the enactment of an antitakeover amendment is associated with a statistically significant decrease in shareholder wealth the voting power of employee stock ownership plans and the chief executive officer plays a prominent role in determining whether a firm will adopt this type of takeover defense

the effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth abstract this paper examines empirical evidence about the effect of poison pill takeover defenses on shareholder wealth i find evidence that announcements of the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with stock price declines also the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with abnormally high rates of defeat of unsolicited tender offers although this evidence is consistent with managerial entrenchment the evidence implies that on average poison pill defenses have seemingly had only a modest effect on firm valuation

the association between outside directors institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts we investigate the relation of the board of directors and institutional ownership with the properties of management earnings forecasts we find that firms with more outside directors and greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue a forecast and are inclined to forecast more frequently in addition these forecasts tend to be more specific accurate and less optimistically biased these results are robust to changes specification granger causality tests and simultaneous equation analyses the results are similar in the pre and post regulation fair disclosure reg fd eras additional analysis suggests that concentrated institutional ownership is negatively associated with forecast properties this association is less negative in the post reg fd environment which is consistent with reg fd reducing the ability of firms to privately communicate information to select audiences

moral hazard income taxation and prospect theory the standard theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty has been developed under the assumption that individuals maximise expected utility however prospect theory has now been established as an alternative model of individual behaviour with empirical support this paper explores the theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty when individuals behave according to the tenets of prospect theory it is seen that many of the standard results are modified in interesting ways the first order approach for solving the optimisation prob lem is not valid over the domain of losses and the marginal tax schedule offers full insurance around the reference consumption level the implications of non welfarist objectives under income uncertainty are also examined

fixed versus variable reference points in the risk return relationship abstract researchers using prospect theory in explaining bowman s risk return paradox have typically assumed a single fixed reference point normally the industry median in defining two decision contexts gain and loss our findings suggest this reference point is elevated above industry median performance and varies over time and across industries independent of industry performance consistent with the prospect theory firms above this reference point were risk averse and those below it were risk seeking we found no evidence of a second survival reference point for firms in trouble

choice and procrastination author s o donoghue ted rabin matthew abstract recent models of procrastination due to self control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self control problems we develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self control problems this menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones a person might forego completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never to be completed option hence providing a non procrastinator additional options can induce procrastination and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

large shareholders and the monitoring of managers the case of antitakeover charter amendments this paper examines the role of large shareholders in monitoring managers when they propose antitakeover charter amendments we attempt to distinguish between two competing hypotheses the active monitoring hypothesis and the passive voting hypothesis we find a statistically significant positive relation between institutional ownership and the stockholder wealth effects of various types of amendments after controlling for ownership concentration among institutions managerial ownership and firm size our empirical evidence lends support to the active monitoring hypothesis proposed by demsetz 1983 and shleifer and vishny 1986 that the existence of large shareholders leads to better monitoring of managers

takeover defenses ownership structure and stock returns in the netherlands an empirical analysis this study empirically examines the relationships between a firm s takeover defenses and its ownership structure and stock returns analyzing data of dutch listed companies we find that multiple antitakeover defenses are increasingly adopted when firms are characterized by relatively lower ownership concentration the evidence supports the hypothesis that more concentrated ownership of shares provides more effective monitoring of managers as defense by issuing preferred share has recently been the most widely adopted mechanism in the netherlands its impact on shareholders wealth is also analyzed we observe the presence of two opposing effects of this antitakeover measure

an empirical analysis of the reincorporation decision the literature suggests two competing explanations for reincorporations efforts at managerial entrenchment and attempts to improve contractual efficiency the empirical evidence to date is inconclusive to seek further evidence we examine a large sample of firms that changed their state of incorporation over the period 1980 1992 we find that shareholder wealth is decreased by reincorporations that erect takeover defenses but is increased by reincorporations that establish limits on director liability firms that claim they reincorporate to limit the personal liability of their board members and thereby attract better qualified outside directors do in fact expand the outside representation on their boards whereas firms citing other motives do not

institutional investors political connections and the incidence of regulatory enforcement against corporate fraud we investigate two under explored factors in mitigating the risk of corporate fraud and regulatory enforcement against fraud namely institutional investors and political connections the role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of a firm s management is well established in the literature we further observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by institutional investors have a lower incidence of enforcement actions against corporate fraud the importance of political connections for enterprises whether in a developed market such as the united states or an emerging market such as china has been established by previous studies however we find evidence of another positive effect of political connections they may reduce the incidence of enforcement action against corporate fraud we also find that political connections play a more significant role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against non state owned enterprises and firms in weaker legal environments whereas institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against state owned enterprises

the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may and often do diverge and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear in creating these new relationships the quasi public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution it has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit seeking enterprise 1

insider ownership and financial flexibility this study examines the cash flow sensitivity of external financing financial flexibility ff of firms from the perspective of the agency by focusing on whether and how insider ownership has a modifying effect on the ff of firms given the documented relationship between corporate governance and cost of external financing insider ownership an important proxy of corporate governance should affect ff via the agency cost channel a review of the us nonfinancial firms from 1992 to 2009 indicates that insider ownership aids in determining the ff of firms more specifically results indicate the existence of optimal insider ownership and any deviation from it causes ff to decrease in addition ff is higher when ceo ownership is lower 0 08 and this phenomenon is more pronounced for financially unconstrained firms furthermore ff is higher when non ceo insider ownership is in the middle range 0 12 0 43 for financially constrained firms whereas non ceo insider ownership has minimal impact on ff fo

an empirical investigation of the impact of antitakeover amendments on common stock prices abstract antitakeover amendments are amendments to a corporation s charter that impede the ability of an outsider to gain control of the firm a number of individuals and institutions have onjected to such amendments on the grounds that they are not in the best interests of the shareholders of the firms that adopt them this paper employs event time methodology to investigate the impact of antitakeover amendments on the common stock prices of firms that adopt them the results indicate that the announcement of such amendments is associated with a positive revaluation of stock price contrary to the concerns of their critics we conclude that antitakeover amendments are proposed by managers who seek to increase the value of the firm and are approved by stockholders who share that objective