consensus building how to persuade a group many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups the paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of group members to approve the proposal adopting a mechanism design approach to communication it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key members of the group and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others the paper unveils the factors such as the extent of congruence among group members and between them and the sponsor and the size and governance of the group that condition the sponsor s ability to maneuver and get his project approved

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

temperature shocks and establishment sales combining granular daily data on temperatures across the continental united states with detailed establishment data from 1990 to 2015 we study the causal impact of temperature shocks on establishment sales and productivity using a large sample yielding precise estimates we do not find evidence that temperature exposures significantly affect establishment level sales or productivity including among industries traditionally classified as heat sensitive at the firm level we find that temperature exposures aggregated across firm establishments are generally unrelated to sales productivity and profitability our results support existing findings of a tenuous relation between temperature and aggregate economic growth in rich countries

market entry waves and volatility outbursts in stock markets abstract we develop a simple agent based financial market model in which speculators market entry decisions are subject to herding behavior and market risk in addition speculators orders depend on price trends market misalignments and fundamental news using a mix of analytical and numerical tools we show that a herding induced market entry wave may amplify excess demand triggering lasting volatility outbursts eventually however higher stock market risk reduces stock market participation and volatility decreases again simulations furthermore reveal that our approach is also able to produce bubbles and crashes excess volatility fat tailed return distributions and serially uncorrelated price changes moreover trading volume is persistent and correlated with volatility

side effects of nonlinear profit taxes in an evolutionary market entry model abrupt changes coexisting attractors and hysteresis problems in order to demonstrate that nonlinear tax systems may have surprising and potentially undesirable side effects we develop an evolutionary market entry model in which firms decide on the basis of past profit opportunities whether or not to enter a competitive market our main focus is on the case of a proportional tax on positive profits such a piecewise linear tax scheme induces a kink in the firms profit functions and may lead to abrupt changes in a market s dynamics coexisting attractors and hysteresis problems since these phenomena can also be observed in more general models a proper understanding of their basic mechanism may be helpful to explain the intricate behavior of many economic systems

interactions between stock bond and housing markets abstract we develop a model in which investors can participate in stock bond and housing markets investors market entry decisions are subject to herding effects and depend on the markets price trends and on their mispricings the dynamics of our model is governed by a four dimensional nonlinear map and its unique inner steady state is characterized by standard present value relations between dividends rents and the bond rate amongst other things we show that endogenous stock and housing market dynamics emerge countercyclical to each other if investors react strongly to the markets price trends such a cross feedback reflects investors tendency to transfer their enthusiasm from one speculative market to another

inflexible rules in incentive problems in practice contracts involve standard terms or rules allowing for variations only under exceptional circumstances we develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature even in the absence of transactions costs rules arise when an agent has countervailing incentives to misrepresent private information these incentives are created by endowing the agent with a critical factor of production ex ante applications in regulatory labor and legal settings

quality competition with profit constraints abstract firms in markets such as health care and education are often profit constrained due to regulation or their non profit status and they are often viewed as being altruistic towards consumers we use a spatial competition framework to study incentives for cost containment and quality provision by altruistic firms facing profit constraints if prices are regulated profit constraints lead to lower cost containment efforts but higher quality if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic under price competition profit constraints reduce quality and cost containment efforts but lead to lower prices if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic profit constrained firms cost containment efforts are below the first best while their quality might be too high or too low if prices are regulated profit constraints can improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price depending on the degree of altruism

climate shocks and exports this paper uses international trade data to examine the effects of climate shocks on economic activity we examine panel models relating the annual growth rate of a country s exports in a particular product category to the country s weather in that year we find that a poor country being 1 degree celsius warmer in a given year reduces the growth rate of that country s exports by between 2 0 and 5 7 percentage points with no detectable effects in rich countries we find negative effects of temperature on exports of both agricultural products and light manufacturing products with little apparent effects on heavy industry or raw materials the results confirm large negative effects of temperature on poor countries economies and suggest that temperature affects a much wider range of economic activity than conventionally thought this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

individual firm and market dynamics of csr activities this paper investigates how firms should plan corporate social responsibility short csr this dynamic analysis starts with a firm s intertemporal optimization problem and proceeds to analyze interactions with other firms which are crucial if csr is profitable for firm a then it is most likely also profitable for competitors b and c and these simultaneous decisions affect the gain each would achieve from trying to advance its own position we find that multiple equilibria exist irrespective of whether interactions with other firms are taken into account interactions can eliminate or create additional steady states and can lead to a situation in which history is insufficient to determine the long run outcome among multiple steady states so that coordination is beneficial

a servant of two masters communication and the selection of international bureaucrats international bureaucrats must often serve multiple principals who collectively choose policy how does this affect bureaucrats incentives to truthfully reveal their private information i construct a cheap talk model in which a bureaucrat possesses private information about how policies translate into outcomes the bureaucrat can communicate publicly observable messages about this information to two policymakers who must then bargain over a set of policy choices i find that both the bureaucrat s willingness to communicate informatively and the choice of an optimal bureaucrat are highly contingent on the bargaining powers of the two policymakers when each policymaker is bound to adhere to the bargaining outcome moderate bureaucrats are most preferred in contrast when at least one policymaker can leave the bargaining table and exercise an outside option biased bureaucrats can be optimal i illustrate my findings by examining un weapons inspections in iraq from 1991 to 2003 i wish to thank bruce bueno de mesquita michael gilligan catherine hafer matias iaryczower dimitri landa adam meirowitz alastair smith and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback previous drafts of this article were presented in the new york university politics department research workshop and the 2006 annual conference of the midwest political science association

the economic impacts of climate change evidence from agricultural output and random fluctuations in weather fisher et al 2012 hereafter fhrs have uncovered coding and data errors in our paper deschenes and greenstone 2007 hereafter dg we acknowledge and are embarrassed by these mistakes we are grateful to fhrs for uncovering them we hope that this reply will also contribute to advancing the literature on the vital question of the impact of climate change on the us agricultural sector fhrs main critiques of dg are as follows i there are errors in the weather data and climate change projections used by dg ii the climate change projections are based on the hadley 2 model and scenarios rather than the more recent hadley 3 model and scenarios iii standard errors are biased due to spatial correlation iv the inclusion of state by year fixed effects does not leave enough weather variation to obtain meaningful estimates of the relationship between agriculture profits and weather v storage and inventory adjustment in response to yield shocks invalidate the use of annual profit data and vi fhrs argue that a better specified hedonic model produces robust estimates unlike the results reported in dg four of these critiques have little basis and we respond to them here in the introduction specifically with respect to ii the more recent daily climate predictions were not available when we wrote dg nevertheless the most important issue is providing the reliable estimates of climate change and in this note we report estimates based on the climate model we used in dg and a more recent one that we gained access to in the meantime iii in the primary table on agricultural profits dg reports two sets of standard errors with the first clustered at the county level and the second based on a variance covariance matrix that accounts for spatial correlation using the method proposed in conley 1999 thus the claim of fhrs 2012 seems overblown nevertheless to ease comparisons of papers in this literature this note will adopt the fhrs convention of reporting estimated standard errors clustered at the county and state levels we find that inference is largely unaffected by the choice between these different assumptions about the variance covariance matrix

the persistence of social strategies under increasing competitive pressure abstract in this paper we study the long run outcome if firms are repeatedly matched to play a n firm cournot oligopoly game and can select their type of business objective firms can either be profit maximizing or socially concerned also pursuing consumer welfare we use an indirect evolutionary approach to distinguish between the endogenous profit maximizing choice of the firms business objectives and their corresponding market behavior our main result is that the prospects of long run survival of firms pursuing social strategies strongly depends on the number of firms in the industry if a social strategy entails higher marginal production costs it is best suited if the number of firms in the industry is not too large in particular we demonstrate that the relation between long survival and the level of competitiveness of the industry is inverse u shaped we confirm this result by using the concept of coalition stability and further show that if a high number of firms adopt a social strategy welfare might be lower than with just profit maximizing firms

victims and shareholders the dilemmas of presenting corporate policy during a crisis corporate crises such as accidents scandals and product safety incidents exacerbate stakeholder demands in such a way that conflict can arise between the interests of shareholders and crisis vict

evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms abstract in this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities confronting remarks by milton friedman and gary becker we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non profit motives we find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit maximizing rivals one insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare but that the level of social concern should not be too high based on a strategy s profitability we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity here we observe that the consumers willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm if the firms propensity to switch between a social or a profit maximizing strategy is sufficiently large steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur

evolutionary efficacy of a pay for performance scheme with motivated agents the paper studies the short run and long run effects of the introduction of a team oriented pay for performance p4p payment scheme when agents may differ in their degree of intrinsic motivation toward the job suppose that new potential employees were able to assess the expected pay offs of current workers then they may modify their approach to work in order to follow the employee type that earned the highest expected pay off we show that the definition of the scheme needs to take into consideration the effects produced on the evolution of the motivation of new generations in particular the desirability and success of a p4p scheme strongly depend on the way incentives are allocated to the members of a team on the power of the quality related financial incentive and on the economic and social context in which the scheme is introduced the analysis is in part motivated by the introduction in uk in 2004 of a p4p scheme for family practitioners in the uk quality and outcomes framework qof and of a new system of assessing the quality of academic research completed in 2014 research excellence framework ref

the esteem theory of norms when esteem is costless to supply does it provide an effectivemeans of enforcing norms for public goods production i examine thebasic mechanics of an enforcement through esteem model whileesteem may enforce norms to considerable degree systematicunderenforcement remains the general result even in very basicsettings with a minimum of transactions costs i also examine whyesteem has positive value in equilibrium if it can be producedcostlessly i e why esteem remains scarce and what collectiveaction problems plague the supply of esteem

a note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies abstract in this note we show that the results developed in n singh and x vives 1984 rand j econ 15 546 554 are sensitive to the duopoly assumption if there are more than two firms prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition this will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements if goods are substitutes high quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition hence it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly we study a mixed duopoly model in which a state owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private foreign firm compete under general enough assumptions we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium cve applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly a particular case of a cve with constant influence conjecture coefficients is also examined

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

mixed oligopoly with differentiated products abstract the paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly with horizontal product differentiation firms choose their location and price in a model a la hotelling with quadratic transport costs and the solution concept is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium this enables one to determine how the presence of one or several public firms competing with private ones affects social welfare and how the results depend on the total number of firms n and their relative positions it is shown that is only for n 2 or n 6 that a mixed oligopoly with one public firm is socially preferable to the private oligopoly

what do we learn from the weather the new climate economy literature a rapidly growing body of research applies panel methods to examine how temperature precipitation and windstorms influence economic outcomes these studies focus on changes in weather realizations over time within a given spatial area and demonstrate impacts on agricultural output industrial output labor productivity energy demand health conflict and economic growth among other outcomes by harnessing exogenous variation over time within a given spatial unit these studies help credibly identify i the breadth of channels linking weather and the economy ii heterogeneous treatment effects across different types of locations and iii nonlinear effects of weather variables this paper reviews the new literature with two purposes first we summarize recent work providing a guide to its methodologies datasets and findings second we consider applications of the new literature including insights for the damage function within models that seek to assess the potential economic effects of future climate change jel c51 d72 o13 q51 q54

an evolutionary cournot model with limited market knowledge abstract in this paper we analyze a dynamic game of cournot competition with heterogeneous firms choosing between two different adaptive behavioral rules in deciding output strategies the underlying oligopoly structure is standard using a constant return to scale technology n firms produce homogeneous goods which are sold in a market characterized by constant price elasticity in this setup we assume that a fraction of firms employs a quite rough rule of thumb the so called local monopolistic approximation lma whereas the complementary fraction plays best reply br a more demanding strategy in terms of information and computation requirements the model is first considered with exogenously fixed fractions of firms in the two complementary groups then it is generalized by considering an endogenous evolutionary switching process between the two behavioral strategies based on profit driven replicator dynamics the role of the number of firms information costs and inertia or anchoring attitude in production decisions is analyzed as well as the influence in the evolutionary process of random noise in the demand function and memory of past profits global properties of the oligopoly with evolutionary pressure between behavioral rules are discussed with particular regard to cases in which the nash equilibrium is unstable

opec the seven sisters and oil market dominance an evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling approach abstract a methodological toolkit comprised of evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling is used to study opec and the seven sisters as they struggled for control over global petroleum markets during the 1960s and 1970s an evolutionary game theory model incorporates heterogeneous populations energy specific variables and behavioral considerations to capture the fundamentals of the applied problem an agent based model is used to provide detailed results and demonstrate the importance of the natural resource to the outcome of the model

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

temperature and income reconciling new cross sectional and panel estimates this paper presents novel evidence and analysis of the relationship between temperature and income first using sub national data from 12 countries in the americas we provide new evidence that the negative cross country relationship between temperature and income also exists within countries and even within states second we provide a theoretical framework for reconciling the substantial negative association between temperature and income in the cross section with the even stronger short run effects of temperature estimated by panel models the theoretical framework suggests that half of the negative short term effects of temperature may be offset in the long run through adaptation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

market distortions and government transparency in this paper we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions we first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information our key result is that distortions limit communication even if transparency is ex ante pareto superior to opaqueness it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high we next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions jel d82 e61

if you can t see the forest for the trees you might just cut down the forest the perils of forced choice on seemingly unethical decision making why do otherwise well intentioned managers make decisions that have negative social or environmental consequences to answer this question the authors combine the literature on construal level theory with the compromise effect to explore the circumstances that lead to seemingly unethical decision making the results of two studies suggest that the degree to which managers make high risk tradeoffs is highly influenced by how they mentally represent the decision context the authors find that managers are more likely to make seemingly unethical tradeoffs when psychological distance is high rather than low and when they are forced to choose between competing alternatives however when given the option not to choose managers better reflect on the consequences of each alternative and thus become more likely to choose options with less risk of negative consequences the results suggest that simply offering managers the option not to choose may reduce psychological distance and help organizations avoid seemingly unethical decision making

csr in an asymmetric duopoly with environmental externality we investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation a la ramsey and a negative environmental externality pollution in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility csr in its statute and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function if the market is sufficiently large the csr firm sells more accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit seeking rival

partial privatization in mixed duopoly abstract we investigate a quantity setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors the private firm maximizes profits while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration we consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm we find that neither full privatization the government does not hold any shares nor full nationalization the government holds all of the shares is optimal under moderate conditions

the strategy of manipulating conflict two decision makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a con ict game with incomplete information the decision making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheaptalk messages the power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying con ict game if actions are strategic complements a hawkish extremist provocateur can increase the likelihood of con ict by sending messages which trigger a fear spiral of hawkish actions this reduces the welfare of both decision makers if actions are strategic substitutes a dovish extremist paci st can send messages which cause one decision maker to back down and become more dovish this reduces his welfare but bene ts the other decision maker the hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision makers if actions are strategic substitutes and the paci st is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

money or friends social identity and deception in networks abstract strategic communication occurs in virtually all committee decision environments theory suggests that small differences in monetary incentives between committee members can leave deception a strategically optimal decision crawford and sobel 1982 galeotti et al 2013 at the same time in natural environments social incentives can also play an important role in determining the way people share or withhold truthful information unfortunately little is known about how monetary and social incentives interact to determine truth telling we investigate this issue by first building a novel model and then testing its equilibrium predictions using laboratory data in the absence of social identity the model s predictions are supported there is more truthful communication between those who share monetary incentives than those who do not we find that the effect of identity is asymmetric sharing the same identity does not promote truth telling but holding different identities reduces truthfulness overall as compared to environments lacking social identity committees with both monetary and social incentives exhibit truthful communication substantially less frequently

vaporware suddenware and trueware new product preannouncements under market uncertainty a firm may want to preannounce its plans to develop a new product in order to stimulate future demand but given that such communications can affect rivals incentives to develop the same new product a firm may decide to preannounce untruthfully in order to deter competitors we examine an incumbent s preannouncement strategy when there is uncertainty regarding the commercial viability of a new product opportunity and a threat of rival entry each firm has a private assessment of the market potential for the new product two competitive incentives arise for the incumbent in terms of discouraging rival entry it can use preemptive communication or it can remain silent and instill a pessimistic market potential outlook we find that an incumbent prefers to follow a vaporware strategy i e declares plans to pursue a new product opportunity even when it may have no development intentions when its market forecasting capabilities are weak and the demand side benefits from preannouncing are small by contrast when the incumbent has strong market forecasting capabilities and the demand side benefits are small the incumbent adopts a suddenware strategy i e remains silent about its new product plans even when it actually plans to develop the new product finally when its market forecasting capabilities are strong and the demand side benefits are large the incumbent prefers to engage in a trueware strategy i e truthfully preannounces development plans we show that an interplay between competition related and demand related considerations is what allows trueware to emerge as an equilibrium in the absence of any ex post cost to engaging in vaporware in an extension we let the incumbent s actual development plans leak out and allow the entrant to wait and learn those plans prior to setting a research and development level we identify conditions for the entrant to postpone development despite the risk of being late to market as well as conditions for the entrant to commence development immediately despite not knowing the incumbent s plans based on the observed preannouncement strategy

does competition destroy ethical behavior explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition as opposed to greed in assuring its spread using the examples of child labor corruption excessive executive pay corporate earnings manipulation and commercial activities by universities this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct when unethical behavior cuts costs competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs incomes and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct nonetheless i suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run because it promotes growth and raises incomes higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

language and government coordination an experimental study of communication in the announcement game one of the key roles of government is to coordinate the activities of citizens one reason why governments are efficient facilitators of coordinated action in addition to their ability to force compliance or tax is that they are typically endowed with more information than the individuals they govern this advantage creates a dilemma for them however since it forces them to decide on how they should distribute the information in their possession to the population this paper investigates this question we investigate the announcement game defined by the government and those it governs and focus on communication strategy that government uses to communicate private information to the citizens this communication strategy involves 1 partitioning the state space in an attempt to mask the true state of the world and 2 choosing what type of language to use in order to communicate elements of this partition we present evidence that the language used to execute a communication strategy does affect the efficiency of the equilibrium convergence process and also demonstrate that subjects playing the role of the government exhibit a great deal of sophistication in the communication strategies they employ and the language they use to execute them

are profit maximisers the best survivors a darwinian model of economic natural selection abstract this paper demonstrates that the friedman conjecture that profit maximisation summarises appropriately the conditions for firm survival is not generally true if firms have market power profit maximisers are not necessarily the best survivors because of the possibility of spiteful behaviour of the following kind say a firm forgoes profit maximisation and thus decreases its survival chances but its deviation from maximisation harms its profit maximising competitors more than itself though the firm will be less likely to survive than it would if it maximised its profits it will still be more likely to survive than its competitors

when does ethical code enforcement matter in the inter organizational context the moderating role of switching costs drawing on signaling theory we suggest that a supplier s enforcement of ethical codes sends signals about the supplier that affect a buyer s decision to continue their commitment to the supplier we then draw on side bet theory to hypothesize how switching costs influence the importance of a supplier s enforcement of ethical codes in predicting a buyer s continuance commitment to a supplier we empirically test our model with data from 158 purchasing managers across three manufacturing industries results confirm the connection between ethical code enforcement and continuance commitment but suggest that a supplier s enforcement of ethical codes matter less when switching suppliers is perceived as too costly

rivalry between strategic alliances abstract rivalry between strategic alliances is investigated in a model where each alliance member maximizes its own profit and some share of its partner s profit a complementary alliance confers a strategic advantage by allowing the partners to credibly commit to greater output owing to both within alliance complementarities and cross alliance substitutabilities although rivalry between different alliances can sometimes lead to a prisoners dilemma for firms it tends to improve economic welfare on the other hand an alliance that arises due purely to the threat of entry may reduce welfare

endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in cournot competition abstract an evolutionary game theoretic model of cournot competition is investigated individuals choose from a finite set of different behavioral rules each rule specifies the quantity to be produced in the current period as a function of past quantities using more sophisticated rules may require extra information costs based upon realized payoffs the fractions of the population choosing a certain behavioral rule are updated according to the replicator equation with noise the long run behavior of the evolutionary system consisting of the population dynamics coupled with the quantity dynamics of the cournot game may be complicated and endogenous fluctuations may arise we consider a typical example where firms can choose between two rules the nash rule and the best reply rule we show that a homoclinic tangency between the stable and unstable manifold of the equilibrium occurs as evolutionary pressure increases implying bifurcation routes to complicated dynamics and strange attractors

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

persuasive puffery sellers often make claims about product strengths without providing evidence even though such claims are mere puffery we show that they can be credible because talking up any one strength comes at the implicit trade off of not talking up another potential strength puffery pulls in some buyers who value product attributes that are talked up or emphasized while pushing away other buyers who infer that the attributes they value are relative weaknesses when the initial probability of making a sale is low there are more potential buyers to pull in than to push away so puffery is persuasive overall this persuasiveness requires that buyers have some privacy about their preferences so that the seller does not completely pander to them more generally the results show how comparative cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker can be credible and persuasive in standard discrete choice models used throughout marketing economics and other disciplines

can the government talk cheap communication announcements and cheap talk a great deal of attention has recently been focused on communication in economic contexts while some models of credible announcements have been based on reputational forces or penalties imposed by third parties as in sobel 21 and cothren 4 several recent papers have addressed the possibility of communication through cheap talk that is talk in situations with no explicit penalties for deception perhaps the most prominent application of cheap talk in the literature is the recent model of federal reserve announcements by stein 22 this paper will show that cheap talk equilibria of the sort modeled by stein and others often depend in a fundamental way on implausible discontinuities in public responses to government announcements that is cheap talk equilibria are frequently only possible if certain infinitesimally small changes in government announcements are capable of causing large discontinuous changes in public expectations and behavior intuitively if public expectations are a continuous function of government announcements then the government can fine tune these expectations the government will therefore often be tempted to deviate from the cheap talk equilibrium announcements in order to manipulate expectations this causes the equilibrium to unravel discontinuous public reactions sometimes prevent these equilibria from unraveling because they convert continuous choice problems which allow manipulative fine tuning into discrete choice problems where such fine tuning is impossible these discontinuities are implausible however and this may often rule out cheap talk as a realistic model of governmental policy announcements 2

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation