the effect of using consumption taxes on foods to promote climate friendly diets the case of denmark abstract agriculture is responsible for 17 35 of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions with livestock production contributing by approximately 18 22 of global emissions due to high monitoring costs and low technical potential for emission reductions a tax on consumption may be a more efficient policy instrument to decrease emissions from agriculture than a tax based directly on emissions from production in this study we look at the effect of internalising the social costs of greenhouse gas emissions through a tax based on co 2 equivalents for 23 different foods furthermore we compare the loss in consumer surplus and the changed dietary composition for different taxation scenarios in the most efficient scenario we find a decrease in the carbon footprint from foods for an average household of 2 3 8 8 at a cost of 0 15 1 73 dkk per kg co 2 equivalent whereas the most effective scenario led to a decrease in the carbon footprint of 10 4 19 4 but at a cost of 3 53 6 90 dkk per kg co 2 equivalent the derived consequences for health show that scenarios where consumers are not compensated for the increase in taxation level lead to a decrease in the total daily amount of kj consumed whereas scenarios where the consumers are compensated lead to an increase most scenarios lead to a decrease in the consumption of saturated fat compensated scenarios leads to an increase in the consumption of added sugar whereas uncompensated scenarios lead to almost no change or a decrease generally the results show a low cost potential for using consumption taxes to promote climate friendly diets

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

design of a climate tax on food consumption examples of tomatoes and beef in sweden abstract this study examined appropriate design of efficient climate taxes on consumption of food by constructing a simple theoretical model and exemplifying the results using the examples of tomatoes and beef in sweden the theoretical results showed that for the tax to be efficient i existing taxes on greenhouse gases ghgs should be considered when calculating the climate impact in order to avoid double taxation and ii taxes should be differentiated between ghg here carbon dioxide co2 methane ch4 and nitrous oxide n2o because of their differing climate impacts the calculations of climate taxes on tomatoes and beef in sweden indicated considerable differences in the tax level depending on whether conditions i and ii were considered or not the commonly applied approach in the literature on climate taxes on food i e taxing carbon dioxide equivalents co2e using global warming potential over 100 years gwp100 and neglecting existing taxes on ghg emissions results in a tax that is 1 4 2 8 times higher than the efficient tax for tomatoes and a tax that is between 30 lower and 20 higher than the efficient tax for beef despite the relatively low variations in the climate tax on beef estimated reduction in emissions from beef ranged between 23 and 35 depending on choice of tax the price increases on food due to a climate tax and associated effects on emissions can thus show large variation depending on the tax calculation method

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

ideas interests and oil prices the political economy of trade reform during soeharto s indonesia indonesia since the late 1960s constitutes an excellent case study in the political economy of trade protection there have been major changes in the overall policy regime from liberalism to significant intervention and back towards liberalism there have been large though declining inter industry variations in effective protection there has been a lively domestic debate much of it dominated by non economists many actors at home and abroad have a stake in that debate and since the 1980s at least trade policy interventions have been reasonably well documented and quantified in this paper we show how quantitative analysis may be employed to shed light on changes in the trade policy regime over time we also examine the principal actors with an interest in and influence over trade policy delineating where possible how their influence translated into the policy arena finally we speculate on whether the framework developed in this paper is applicable to the very different circumstances prevailing in the post soeharto era

making economic policy in weak democratic post crisis states an indonesian case study summary economic crises in developing countries differ in their causes severity and recovery trajectories the literature on the causes and immediate management of these crises is well developed however it is more difficult to develop an a priori framework which facilitates an analytical interpretation of how crises affect economic policy and hence recovery this is especially so in the commonly occurring twin crises in which an economic crisis interacts with regime collapse country studies are needed to contribute to the development of such a framework this paper addresses these issues with reference to indonesia s deep economic and political crisis of 1997 98

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

auctioning incentive contracts this paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory it considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms the firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion the authors show that 1 the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid and the second bid 2 the winner faces a linear incenti ve contract 3 the fixed transfer to the winner decreases with his announced expected cost and increases with the second lowest announce d expected cost and 4 the share of cost overruns borne by the winn er decreases with the winner s announced expected cost copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

the impact of alternative forms of state regulation of at t on direct dial long distance telephone rates federal and state regulatory agencies have traditionally used rate of return regulation to set profit and rate levels for utilities a price cap framework in which the regulatory agency sets a maximum rate below which the regulated utility has pricing flexibility is possibly a more efficient alternative to rate of return regulation this article presents an econometric analysis that compares at t s prices of intrastate long distance telephone service in states that allow at t pricing flexibility with those in states that do not the results of this analysis suggest that at t s daytime evening nighttime and weekend rates are significantly lower in states that allow pricing flexibility than in states that use rate of return regulation

menus of price quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation abstract many authors have proposed mechanisms to induce regulated polluting firms to truthfully reveal their private information this paper proposes an alternative scheme in which the regulator offers each firm a menu of linear price quantity contracts faced with this menu each firm s dominant strategy is to truthfully report its private information and self select the contract that is ex post efficient the proposed menu schedule that is more elastic than the firm s residual marginal damage function engenders a positive quantity effect thereby counterbalancing the firm s incentive to misreport prompted by the linearity of price due to its built in price quantity structure the scheme performs as designed regardless of the elasticities of marginal damage and demand functions

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

empirical contract theory the case of insurance data abstract while contract theory has reached a high degree of sophistication econometric applications remain scarse one often invoked reason is that adequate data is hard to find we argue that insurance data fit especially well the requirements of econometric testing then we propose some insights on how insurance data can be used to test the predictions of contract theory as an illustration we present some preliminary empirical results relative to the existence of adverse selection of the rothschild and stiglitz type in automobile insurance

privatization liberalization wages and employment theory and evidence for the uk most agency based privatization models are of the owner manager relation and ignore the labour market yet in the 1980s there were profound changes in public sector and privatized firms to wages and employment we develop a bargaining model of the manager workforce relation that explains employment and wages when firms are privatized government objectives become more commercial and markets are liberalised using data on 14 uk companies 1972 1988 that were publicly owned in 1972 we find a employment fell following the change to more commercial objectives b wages were only slightly affected by this but fell if the firm lost market power

effects of an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in sweden this study evaluated the environmental impacts of introducing an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in sweden three meat products beef pork and chicken four dairy products milk fermented products cream and cheese and four pollutants generating environmental damage greenhouse gases ghg nitrogen ammonia and phosphorus were included in the analysis the unit tax applied corresponded to between 8 9 and 33 3 of the respective price per kg product in 2009 consumer response to the tax was calculated by econometric estimates of the almost ideal demand system aids for meat and dairy products using per capita consumption data and prices the results indicated relatively inelastic own price elasticities and high income elasticities for all meat products and slightly lower for dairy products simultaneous introduction of a tax on all seven products decreased emissions of ghg nitrogen ammonia and phosphorus from the livestock sector by up to 12

monopoly regulation under asymmetric information prices versus quantities we compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs fixing either the price or quantity for each instrument we consider sophisticated screening and simple bunching mechanisms we characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance with unknown demand and increasing marginal costs the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease the simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase with unknown costs both instruments are equivalent

making trade policy in a new democracy after a deep crisis indonesia this paper examines the recent political economy of trade policy in indonesia against the backdrop of two major events the deep economic crisis of 1997 98 and the transition from three decades of rapid growth under an authoritarian regime to a weaker but democratic state we investigate both international and domestic trade policy the international trade policy regime has remained largely open perhaps surprisingly in view of the unpopularity of liberal economic policies in the wake of the crisis and the forces advocating more protectionist policies however this openness is precarious and lacks both institutional and community opinion support in contrast while remaining largely open at the international border domestic barriers to trade have increased this conjunction of economic crisis and weak democratic states is a common phenomenon in the developing world and the lessons for trade policy from the indonesian experience over this decade are therefore relevant to many other countries

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

intertemporal non linear pricing this paper examines the impact of variations in temporal parameters in a non linear pricing model the two period model being analysed allows a rather general characterization of the price functions and of the impact of changes in temporal parameters such as the social rate of time discount the marginal costs in the two periods the interest rate and the growth rates in demand comparative statics results are derived under the assumption that price functions satisfy a strong optimality condition examples are given tarification non lineaire dans un cadre intertemporel dans cet article l auteur analyse l impact des variations dans les parametres temporels d un modele de tarification non lineaire on considere un modele i deux penodes qui permet une caracterisation assez generale des fonctions de prix et des impacts de variations dans les parametres temporels tels que le taux social de preference temporelle les cofuts marginaux dans les deux periodes le taux d interet et les taux de croissance de la demande l auteur derive des resultats de statique comparative en posant comme hypothese que les fonctions de prix satisfont une condition d optimalite forte des exemples sont donnes the present paper deals with the problem of designing price functions that would maximize social welfare under the constraint that firms operating under increasing returns and or large fixed costs break even there is an abundant literature on this general problem it is not my intention here to survey this literature but only to mention a few seminal papers namely ramsey 1927 coase 1946 boiteux 1956 baumol and bradford 1970 guesnerie 1980 and laffont and tirole 1984 the specific purpose of the present i am grateful to maurice marchand to the participants in the economic theory workshop queen s university the ceremade seminar universite de paris ix and the mathematical economics seminar at core universit6 de louvain for their comments the current version was written in the spring of 1985 during my visit to the universite de toulouse and was subsequently revised to meet the very helpful comments of two anonymous referees financial support from sshrc is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xix no 3 august aofit 1986 printed in canada imprim6 au canada 0008 4085 86 539 555 1 50 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 57 on sat 10 sep 2016 05 43 49 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

effect of eating seasonal on the carbon footprint of swedish vegetable consumption abstract the advice on climate smart food consumption given by authorities and ngos includes the recommendation to eat seasonal foods however no clear definition of seasonality is given in the literature this study investigated how the carbon footprint of yearly per capita consumption of tomatoes and carrots in sweden was affected by seasonal consumption according to interpretations of seasonality found in communications from swedish ngos and authorities the results showed that the carbon footprint of carrot and tomato consumption was strongly affected by consuming according to either a strict definition of seasonality which excluded both production in heated greenhouses and long distance transport or a definition which only allowed swedish produce the reduction potential was approximately 60 but the consumption pattern was also highly restrictive with e g tomatoes only being consumed during three months according to the strictest definition the reduction from eating only swedish products was not due primarily to characteristics commonly associated with seasonal production shorter transport or low energy demand in cultivation but to the use of renewable fuel instead of fossil energy the methodology chosen in this study resulted in carrots having a more distinct season than tomatoes since the energy use for heating greenhouses which are needed all year round in cold climates was evenly allocated across all tomatoes harvested during one year while the carbon footprint of carrots was assumed to increase with time due to increased energy demand for storage and storage losses hence modern production techniques challenge the traditional concepts of seasonality on an absolute scale including the whole food sector the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from eating seasonal is limited as emissions from vegetable production make up a minor proportion of the total emissions from food consumption

procurement policy and contracting efficiency the contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments such as multiple cost observations full commitment self selection and competition a two period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment self selection and multiple cost observations are small while the benefits of competition are larger to obtain some evidence on contracting costs defense contracting is reviewed it indicates that using these instruments is very costly thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

existence of optimal mechanisms in principal agent problems we provide general conditions under which principal agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection we allow multidimensional types actions and signals as well as both financial and non financial rewards our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent s contract beyond measurability we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms it is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it should be and is permitted randomization also plays an essential role in our proof we also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

efficient investments in the implementation problem abstract this paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency to do so we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments in our problem the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitment proofness is sufficient and necessary for an efficient social choice rule to be implementable in subgame perfect equilibria the availability of ex post investments is crucial in our model there is no social choice rule that is efficient and implementable in subgame perfect equilibria without ex post investments we also show that our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting

indonesia trade policy review 2007 this paper examines the 2007 wto review of indonesian trade policy indonesia undertook a major policy liberalisation in the late 1960s serious protectionist pressures emerged in the 1970s but for most of this period and especially since the mid 1980s the economy has remained broadly open we summarise the wto report update some of its analysis highlight its key findings and point to some trade policy issues that in our opinion warranted greater attention the main theme of the paper is that indonesia is a largely open economy but that this openness on occasion remains precarious there are both political economy rent seeking forces opposed to the current openness and perhaps more importantly much of the country s influential public opinion is sceptical of the merits of an open economy and deeper global commercial integration nor is there a deeply institutionalised support for openness in the country s bureaucracy and polity seen from this perspective a key question to answer is why the country has remained open particularly since the deep economic and political crises of 1997 98

dea based auctions we discuss the design of a multi dimensional procurement mechanism that combines data envelopment analysis dea and auction theory the mechanism selects an agent to provide a project characterized by multiple attributes the optimal configuration of the multiple attributes is settled endogenously by trading off the costs to the provider with the benefits to the acquirer this is done within a context of asymmetric information and strategic behavior as well as possibly correlated costs the mechanism makes it individually rational and incentive compatible to participate and reveal costs and the outcome is socially optimal allocatively efficient

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

simple cost sharing contracts we extend rogerson s 2003 intriguing analysis of the performance of simple procurement contracts to consider settings where the supplier s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly although the simple contract that rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely we show that in all settings under consideration though a fairly simple pair of contracts one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement can always secure more than 73 of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract

a risk averse buyer s contract design abstract this research focuses on the design of optimal procurement contracts for competitive bidding involving risk neutral contractors and a risk averse buyer individuals or small businesses need to contract services from larger more efficient firms examples of such services include moving expertise or the building of computing facilities a customized office or home in these situations fixed price contracts are typically used we find that the fixed price contract should not always be employed the buyer can more efficiently account for the bidding strategies of the contractors if he absorbs some risk of cost overruns

departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity abstract when activities within the organization are confronted with different types of stochastic environments the owner of the firm has to evaluate the benefits and the costs involved in establishing multiple specialized divisions the benefit from departmentalization is the ability to better match incentives to the extent of uncertainty confronting different activities the cost of departmentalization is the increase in the number of required managerial positions which implies that the owner has to deal with a bigger number of individuals that can assume only limited risk only when the extent of stochastic dissimilarity among activities is significant can the benefit more than outweigh the cost

industrialisation after a deep economic crisis indonesia abstract indonesia experienced a deep economic contraction as a result of the 1997 1998 asian crisis this paper develops an analytical framework that facilitates an examination of trends and patterns in the country s industrial sector in the wake of the crisis and explains why it appears to be on a lower growth trajectory we particularly focus on why industrialisation has become less employment elastic why industrial exports have performed indifferently and why the process of small firms graduating to larger units has slowed and most of the output growth is now coming from existing firms rather than new entrants

nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard specifically we consider the false moral hazard model developed by laffont and tirole 1986 we first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions we establish the nonparametric identification of the demand cost deterministic transfer and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model which are the firm s type and the demand cost and transfer shocks the cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument testable restrictions of the model are characterized

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

optimal contracting of separable production technologies abstract we analyze the class of agency problems with a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent in which hidden actions and hidden information on the agent s efficiency are jointly present technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule we show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent s inputs together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent s actions and indirect utility

on the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection abstract this paper characterizes a class of optimal incentive schemes in a simple principal agent model which allows for moral hazard and adverse selection we show that incentive compatible allocation can always be approximately implemented through a menu of quadratic incentive schemes it is also proved that the set of incentive compatible allocations is independent of the distribution of the additive uncertainty which affects the outcome informational requirements and economic interpretation of quadratic and linear schemes are discussed

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

implementing second best environmental policy under adverse selection abstract a key obstacle to practical application of mechanism design theory to regulation is the difficulty of obtaining consistent beliefs regarding information that theoretical models assume to be commonly held this article presents a solution to this problem by developing an easily implemented empirical methodology with which the government can use available data to develop beliefs regarding the technology and distribution of types in a regulated sector characterized by hidden information results are used to calibrate a second best land conservation mechanism and evaluate its cost relative to simpler alternatives

x efficiency and technical efficiency efficiency measurement has become a very popular field in applied economics in recent years and with this interest there has been a large intellectual investment in refining the empirical methods available to researchers in the area in this paper we relate these developments to harvey leibenstein s original 1966 insight into the psychological ideas underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and behaviour of course it is always possible to argue that apparent inefficiency only arises from a failure of the observer to realise what it is that is being maximized however we evade this easy escape route into non falsifiable hypothesizing and instead take at face value the fact that too many empirical studies have come up with substantial measures of inefficiency for us to ignore its importance for normative economics

good regulatory regimes assuming simple functional forms numerical methods are used to analyze linear regulatory rules that include cost plus and price cap regimes regulators are assumed to observe actual cost but not the disutility of cost reduction and are assumed unable to impose taxes or make transfers best linear regimes depend importantly on the level and form of uncertainty the regulatory objective function and the firm profitability constraint under uncertainty regimes in which price depends in part on actual cost generally substantially outperform pure price caps particularly in terms of consumers surplus

estimating cost functions in regulated industries characterized by asymmetric information abstract in this paper a structural model is developed to estimate a cost function that includes both an adverse selection and a moral hazard variable it is shown how traditional cost function estimates may produced biased results if moral hazard is present this gives an alternative reason to feinstein and wolak the econometric implications of incentive compatible regulation in g f rhodes ed advances in econometrics vol 9 159 204 jai press greenwich ct 1991 of why scale economics may be overestimated in regulated industries parameter estimates from our model can be used to design an optimal contract or any other regulatory mechanism we illustrate our approach using data from the norwegian bus transport industry

targets for global climate policy an overview a survey of the economic impact of climate change and the marginal damage costs shows that carbon dioxide emissions are a negative externality the estimated pigou tax and its growth rate are too low to justify the climate policy targets set by political leaders a lower discount rate or greater concern for the global distribution of income would justify more stringent climate policy but would imply an overhaul of other public policies catastrophic risk justifies more stringent climate policy but only to a limited extent

optimal regulation of multinationals under collusion this paper analyses the optimal collusion proof mechanism for the regulation of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects there is a host country with a profitable investment opportunity either a multinational firm mnf or a local firm lf can undertake this project nonetheless due to its firm specific advantage and the mnf has the potential to create a larger surplus the host government faces an informational constraint such that it cannot observe the extra surplus the mnf can generate using this set up karabay 2010 shows that employing foreign ownership restrictions to force a joint venture jv can help the host government to partially overcome its information disadvantage in this paper we extend karabay 2010 by studying the host government s optimal regulatory policy when the mnf and the lf can collude it turns out collusion imposes no cost on the host government and the expected welfare attained in the absence of collusion can still be secured under collusion

using food taxes and subsidies to achieve emission reduction targets in norway food production contributes considerably to global greenhouse gas ghg emissions animal products particularly meat from ruminants generally have higher ghg emissions than plant products over the last few decades the global per capita consumption of animal products has increased this has a negative impact on climate change land and water availability and human health we are faced with the two fold challenge of reducing ghg emissions while still producing enough food for our growing population part of the solution could be for consumers to change towards a more sustainable diet in this paper we take norway as a case study for estimating optimal taxes and subsidies on different food items which can change consumption patterns in order to reduce the ghg emissions derived from the average norwegian diet in the estimate we ensure that the average calorie intake with the new diet remains the same as with the current diet and factor in other health considerations our findings suggest that limited but useful emission reduction targets can be set with only a few changes in diets the methodology presented in this paper may be used to estimate optimal climate taxes and subsidies under different emission quantities taxes subsidies and health constraints

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

regulating pollution under asymmetric information the case of industrial wastewater treatment abstract we present in this paper an empirical evaluation of a contract based environmental regulation under asymmetric information an imperfect pollution tax results in the necessity of regulating industrials by a contract based policy in order to promote a higher level of pollution removal the local regulatory agency has imperfect information on costs of abatement and must design a feasible mechanism providing incentives for industrials to extend their wastewater treatment plant capacity the optimal policy consists in regulating only the most efficient industrials in the abatement activity empirical evidence reveals that the pollution tax should be more than twice its present level to attain the fully internalizing pigouvian tax level

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

cost structure and technological change of local public transport the kaohsiung city bus case this study has developed a translog cost function for the kaohsiung city bus kcb to analyse its cost structure and economic characteristics based on monthly data over the time period from january 1996 to december 2000 the empirical results reveal that economies of density in the provision of bus services in kaohsiung do prevail the estimated marginal cost which is less than the average cost but greater than the current bus fare indicates that the subsidy is necessary due to the existence of returns to density rtd the kcb could obtain cost saving benefits by extending its output scale the kcb production technology is also not neutral the effects of technological change on the kcb costs suggest that over the period 1996 2000 technological progress did lead to cost saving the pure productivity growth rate increased from 0 45 in 1998 to 3 in 2000

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had