a market to implement the core abstract i present a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core of an underlying convex tu game the mechanism resembles an asset market in which one of the players is randomly selected as a broker who centralizes trade in addition the rules of the mechanism are independent of the coalitional function therefore the mechanism is useful for an incompletely informed designer who wishes to implement the core of these games the mechanism is inspired by the reduced games relevant for the consistency of the core journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 and c72

transfers to sustain dynamic core theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control international environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement in a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co operative game by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved however the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required this paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context the possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed

buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game abstract we consider a two player asymmetric differential game of pollution control one player is non vulnerable to pollution or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non cooperative game we characterize the feedback nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution we establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non vulnerable player to control her emissions we further use the nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff

trade s dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution abstract this study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the u s mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs public health damages and trade benefits noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages results show trade liberalization leads mexico to curtail pollution in both games cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the united states from mexico s pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game

cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games abstract this paper shows the equivalence between the stable solution set of any cooperative game in characteristic form g1 and the subgame perfect nash equilibria in pure strategies of a certain noncooperative game g2 players of g1 are named agents g2 is played by different players principals who compete in wages to attract agents the equivalence result holds when there are enough principals if the game is superadditive two principals suffice finally another related cooperative game g3 is constructed with both principals and agents as players for g2 and g3 the same result is then proven for any number of principals journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 and c72

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

the acid rain differential game this paper considers an acid rain differential game countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil countries face a trade off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not this paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open loop and markov perfect nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game it will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady state levels of the buffer stocks differ the theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between great britain and ireland finally some results are given for the whole of europe

the type agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information abstract the type agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information it coincides with the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit the paper extends the work of perez castrillo cooperative outcomes through non cooperative games games econ behav 7 1994 428 440 to exchange economies with non transferable utility and asymmetric information the type agent core is a subset of wilson s coarse core wilson information efficiency and the core of an economy econometrica 46 1978 807 816 it is never empty even though it may be a strict subset of wilson s fine core in addition it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated

on the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information in interim economies with asymmetric information we show that the coarse core of wilson 1978 does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated this failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion of either interim core or price equilibrium

transboundary pollution in the black sea comparison of institutional arrangements this paper analyses the transboundary pollution between romania and ukraine coastal states along the black sea and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem to achieve this goal we use a dynamic and strategic framework we compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first best case with three different institutional arrangements the non cooperative game of countries the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the black sea commission our findings indicate that the non cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

subgame perfect cooperative agreements in a dynamic game of climate change abstract we model climate change as a dynamic game and prove existence of a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne that is also markov perfect we interpret this unique spne as the business as usual bau equilibrium and show that if the countries are not sufficiently symmetric then the familiar trigger strategy equilibria may not be pareto improvements over the bau equilibrium and may even lack efficiency properties we then motivate and introduce a subgame perfect cooperative agreement as an improvement over the bau equilibrium in the sense that every country or coalition of countries is better off in every subgame irrespective of the extent of heterogeneity of the countries we characterize subgame perfect cooperative agreements and identify sufficient conditions for their existence we show that direct or indirect transfers between countries to balance the costs and benefits of controlling climate change are a necessity and not a matter of approach

nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices abstract we discuss nonlinear strategies in an infinite horizon duopoly game with sticky prices where firms maximize their discounted sum of profit we construct a stationary feedback equilibrium without guessing value functions and feedback strategies that solve the hamilton jacobi equation for this purpose we study the auxiliary equation that is derived from the hamilton jacobi equation we show that the domain of the state space plays an crucial role in characterizing feedback equilibria and discuss several implications of this observation in particular we find that when the upper bound of the state space is not very high previously unknown feedback equilibria emerge

non cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core abstract in an exchange economy with incomplete information the signaling core is defined by the set of state contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents an objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential equilibrium of an ultimatum bargaining game with an informed proposer we prove that a stationary sequential equilibrium allocation in a rubinstein type sequential bargaining game with a restart rule belongs to the signaling core if the belief of players satisfies a self selection property

trade transboundary pollution and foreign lobbying in this paper we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution we show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream polluted country but if the upstream polluting country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country s social welfare and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country thus the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments susceptibility to foreign political influence

renegotiation proof equilibria in repeated prisoners dilemma abstract in this note it is shown that the requirement of weak renegatiation proofness does not eliminate any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated prisoner s dilemma specifically it is demonstrated that when players are sufficiently patient any feasible and individually rational outcome can be sustained by means of an equilibrium in which the punishing player always profits by carrying out the punishment

private eradication of mobile public bads we consider analytically the non cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad such as an invasive weed species infectious disease fire or agricultural pest the stock of the public bad can grow and disperse across a spatial domain of arbitrary size in this setting we characterize the conditions under which private property owners will control or eradicate and determine how this decision depends on property specific environmental features and on the behavior of other landowners we show that high mobility or lower control by others result in lower private control but when the marginal dynamic cost of the bad is sufficiently large we find that complete eradication may be privately optimal despite the lack of consideration of others welfare in these cases eradication arises in the non cooperative game and is also socially optimal so there is in effect no externality finally when property harboring the bad is not owned or is owned in common we derive the side payments required to efficiently control the mobile public bad

the effect on income distribution of development the growth rate and economic strategy abstract an analysis of cross section and time series data for 83 countries confirms some and contradicts other work on income distribution new findings include a dualistic socio political system is highly unfavorable for equality neither the extent of government intervention in the economy nor the rate of manufactured exports are systematically related to income distribution the analysis confirms that there is no systematic relationship between equality and the rate of economic growth educational participation and a reduction in the share of primary exports in gdp are both favorable for equality there is some support for the kuznets hypothesis that inequality increases as per capita income rises to about 400 and then declines with further income increase but the empirical support is not strong and may be weakening over time these findings lead to more optimistic conclusions then other work that rapid growth in a mixed economy is quite consistent with unchanged or even improved income distribution even at early stages of development

economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions abstract recent empirical research has examined the relationship between certain indicators of environmental degradation and income concluding that in some cases an inverted u shaped relationship which has been called an environmental kuznets curve ekc exists between these variables unfortunately this inverted u shaped relationship does not hold for greenhouse gas emissions one explanation of the absence of ekc like behavior in greenhouse gas emissions is that greenhouse gases are special pollutants that create global not local disutility but the international nature of global warming is not the only reason that prevents de linking greenhouse gas emissions from economic growth the intergenerational nature of the negative impact of greenhouse gas emissions may have also been an important factor preventing the implementation of greenhouse gas abatement measures in the past in this paper we explore the effect that the presence of intergenerational spillovers has on the emissions income relationship we use a numerically calibrated overlapping generations model of climate economy interactions we conclude that 1 the intertemporal responsibility of the regulatory agency 2 the institutional capacity to make intergenerational transfers and 3 the presence of intergenerationally lagged impact of emissions constitute important determinants of the relationship between economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions

market participation and sunspot equilibria we investigate the structure of competitive equilibria in an exchange economy parametrized by i endowments and ii restrictions on market participation for arbitrary regular endowments if few consumers are restricted there are no sunspot equilibria if endowments are allowed to vary while restrictions on market participation are fixed there is a generic set of preferences such that sunspot equilibria exist for a non empty subset of endowments our analysis extends to the general case of an arbitrary number of restricted consumers the results of cass and shell for the polar cases in which either i no consumers are restricted or ii all consumers are restricted

biosecurity incentives network effects and entry of a rapidly spreading pest abstract protection against pest invasion is a public good yet the nature of private incentives to avoid entry is poorly understood this work shows that due to increasing returns or network effects private actions to avoid entry are strategic complements this means that compulsory action at least by a subset of parties can be an effective policy both heterogeneity in biosecurity costs and the effect of private actions on the extent of the invasion threat are shown to have ambiguous effects on the magnitude of welfare loss due to strategic behavior communicated leadership by some party is preferred to simultaneous moves and it may be best if the party with highest biosecurity costs assumes a leadership role

a two level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between russia china and annex b countries this paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between russia and developing countries dcs mainly represented by china on the international market of emission permits created by the kyoto protocol the model uses a formulation of i a demand function for permits from annex b countries and ii marginal abatement costs mac in russia and china provided by two detailed models gemini e3 is a computable general equilibrium model that provides the data to estimate annex b demand for permits and macs in russia poles is a partial equilibrium model that is used to obtain mac curves for china the competitive scenario is compared with a monopoly situation where only russia is allowed to play strategically the impact of allowing dcs to intervene on the international emission trading market is thus assessed

egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information abstract we propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends pazner and schmeidler s 1978 concept to environments with incomplete information if every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism as for instance in the case of non exclusive information then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible as they were under complete information when incentive constraints are more restrictive on the other hand the two criteria may become incompatible

the consequences of a one sided externality in a dynamic two agent framework abstract we develop a dynamic model where all agents contribute to a global externality but only those in a specific region suffer from it we model this in a dynamic setting via a two agent non cooperative overlapping generations model and analyze the consequences for economic growth and intertemporal choices we find that multiple steady states may result from this asymmetry in particular if the agent who is affected by the externality has to spend a large share of his income to offset it then he may be stuck in an environmental poverty trap we provide conditions for the existence of and local convergence to the equilibria as well as a condition for the global convergence to the poverty trap while in addition to maintenance expenditures externalities tend to be addressed via studying taxes investment in r d or alike we focus on capital market integration specifically agents in the affected region can open up their capital market to enable capital inflows we investigate whether an open capital market improves or worsens their welfare while we do find that capital market integration eliminates the environmental poverty trap we show that capital market integration is not always in both agents interest in particular we provide conditions under which the agents prefer autarkic or integrated capital markets

the oslo protocol on sulfur reduction the great leap forward the increasing number of international environmental agreements ieas and the fact that under some agreements emissions have been reduced beyond agreed targets are frequently viewed as success stories of international cooperation we argue that success can only be measured if abatement targets under an iea are compared with estimated abatement levels in the absence of a treaty and are evaluated in terms of costs and benefits we analyze the oslo protocol on sulfur reduction showing that this iea is not the great leap forward when compared with the calculated nash equilibrium and the social optimum however we also demonstrate that under the oslo protocol more ambitious targets could not have been realized due to strong free rider incentives

explaining african economic performance africa has had slow growth and a massive exodus of capital in many respects it has been the most capital hostile region we review and interpret the aggregate level and microeconomic literatures to identify the key explanations for this performance there is a reasonable correspondence of the two sets of evidence pointing to four factors as being important these are a lack of openness to international trade a high risk environment a low level of social capital and poor infrastructure these problems are to a substantial extent attributable to government behaviour and the paper includes a review of the political economy literature which addresses that behaviour

pigouvian taxation in tourism the paper studies the characteristics and the effects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists accommodations first a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered in each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit linear perfect markov strategies are derived for both the non cooperative and the public monopoly case in equilibrium a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly furthermore the more the monopolist discounts the future the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced second the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure the tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use however its combined effect with another policy instrument such as a quota induces the optimal level of resource use

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

core convergence with asymmetric information we analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies we show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately walrasian for the associated arrow debreu economy

regulation via the polluter pays principle we consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution we examine the distributional impact of the polluter pays pp principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her pollution emissions with constant marginal damages we show that regulation via the pp principle leads to the unique welfare distribution that induces non negative individual welfare change and renders each agent responsible for his or her pollution impact we extend both the pp principle and this result to increasing marginal damages due to pollution we also compare the pp principle with the vickrey clark groves scheme

the role of human and social capital in growth extending our understanding human capital institutions and social capital are now all recognised as significant factors of growth they have largely been studied separately and although they present sufficient common characteristics to be conceptualised as one main category distinct from physical capital it may still be more important to focus on the links between their specific sub categories direct links with income may be spurious as there appears to be a web of associations between the sub categories which would benefit from further empirical investigation this paper reviews the literature on human capital institutions and social capital extracting three sub categories of human capital human skills capital stock of knowledge and entrepreneurship and two of social capital low and high rationalisation specific areas are then suggested for further empirical study

optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation a stochastic differential game approach abstract to account for previously ignored yet widely observed uncertainty in nature s capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation ec regimes this study constructs a stochastic differential game sdg model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region equilibrium strategies in the stochastic two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract a case based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights first accounting for various random disturbance factors the probabilistic pollutant stock in stackelberg non cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation second the ec mechanism provides long term effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region achieving a pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism third cross region cooperation reliably outperforms stackelberg non cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs this study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties interests within an ec agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex ante negotiations

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way