the phillips curve the persistence of inflation and the lucas critique evidence from exchange rate regimes comment we present evidence from the united states and the united kingdom that the persistence of price inflation is significantly higher under managed exchange rate regimes than under gold based fixed exchange rate regimes these differences are also reflected in expectations augmented phillips curves we use a two country macro model with forward looking price setters to demonstrate that higher monetary accommodation of inflation and exchange rate accommodation of inflation differentials increase inflation persistence the evidence does not contradict this hypothesis it supports the hypothesis of forward looking price setters and highlights the empirical significance of the lucas critique jel e31 e42 f33

bilateral trading with naive traders we introduce naive traders in bilateral trading these traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid ask their values costs in auctions we show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency in fact complete expropriation of naive traders is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency a significant implication is that in the presence of naive traders ex post individually rational mechanisms are not constrained efficient in contrast if the traders must use a given mechanism then the introduction of naive traders has an ambiguous effect on efficiency

real sources of european currency policy sectoral interests and european monetary integration in the thirty years before economic and monetary union was achieved european currency policies varied widely among countries and over time in this article i argue that the sectoral impact of regional exchange rate arrangements in particular their expected real effects on european trade and investment exerted a powerful influence on the course of european monetary integration the principal benefit of fixing european exchange rates was facilitation of cross border trade and investment within the european union eu the principal cost of fixed rates was the loss of national governments ability to use currency policy to improve their producers competitive position empirical results indeed indicate that a stronger and more stable currency was associated with greater importance of manufactured exports to the eu s hard currency core while depreciations were associated with an increase in the net import competition faced by the country s producers this suggests a powerful impact of real factors related to trade and investment and of private interests concerned about these factors in determining national currency policies

optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with home bias we analyze optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home bias in consumption peculiar to our framework is the application of a ramseytype analysis to a model of the recent open economy new keynesian literature we show that home bias in consumption is a su cient condition for inducing the monetary policy maker of an open economy to deviate from a strategy of strict markup stabilization and contemplate some optimal degree of exchange rate stabilization we focus on the optimal setting of policy both in the case of rms setting prices one period in advance and in a gradual fashion subject to adjustment costs while the rst setup allows us to analytically highlight home bias as an independent source of equilibrium

excessive volatility in capital flows a pigouvian taxation approach this paper analyzes prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets from the perspective of a pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle it presents a model in which restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during busts this mitigates the feedback effects of deleveraging episodes when tightening financial constraints on borrowers and collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing effects in our model capital controls reduce macroeconomic volatility and increase standard measures of consumer welfare

german dominance in the ems evidence from interest rates abstract the paper presents an empirical analysis of german dominance and asymmetries in the ems based on a dynamic system of equations explaining national money market interest rates the hypothesis of strict german dominance of the ems is rejected however there are some noticeable asymmetries in the ems germany is a relatively strong player and has been the least dependent country in the early phase of the system since 1983 german independence has diminished in contrast france throughout and italy in the early phase of the ems have been relatively weak players in the system

moral rules the moral sentiments and behavior toward a theory of an optimal moral system how should moral sanctions and moral rewards the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue be employed to govern individuals behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare in the model that we examine guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive sources of utility we also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their use we show that the moral sentiments should be used chiefly to control externalities and further that guilt is best to employ when most harmful acts can successfully be deterred whereas virtue is best when only a few individuals can be induced to behave well we also contrast the optimal use of guilt and virtue to optimal pigouvian taxation and discuss extensions of our analysis

conservative central banks and nominal growth exchange rate and inflation targets a framework is developed in which inflation biases with different target variables are compared a nominal growth target measured in consumer prices may yield less stabilization bias than a nominal income growth target exchange rate and inflation targets result in less stabilization bias than an income growth target the more important the terms of trade stabilization persistence in output causes excessive stabilization of productivity shocks and of shocks to the terms of trade under discretion an inflation weight conservative central bank is more likely under an inflation target than under an exchange rate target and less likely under a nominal income growth target

international monetary regimes and incidence and transmission of macroeconomic shocks evidence from the bretton woods and modern floating periods this paper investigates the relationship between international monetary regimes and incidence and transmission of macroeconomic shocks within the context of an open economy macro model empirical results confirm monetary interdependence and lower incidence of monetary discretion under fixed exchange rates the average magnitude and dispersion of supply shocks in bretton woods and the subsequent float is comparable however the average magnitude and dispersion of real demand shocks under bretton woods seems higher overall the international monetary regime may pose important constraints to policymakers in open economies economists have long recognized the role of a flexible exchange rate regime in insulating economies and allowing independent pursuit of monetary policy however experience with floating rates in the post bretton woods period led many to question the merits of flexible rates with increased volatility in nominal and real exchange rates and the implied effects of this volatility on international trade flows although fixed rates reduce uncertainty and transaction costs compared with flexible rates these benefits may be outweighed by increased output volatility due to sticky prices and increased international interdependence if countries face idiosyncratic shocks independent monetary policy is needed to stabilize the domestic economy theoretical work on the effects of international monetary regimes has been inconclusive helpman 1981 dornbusch 1983 turnovsky 1983 and others provide evidence that exchange rate arrangements cannot be ranked unambiguously in terms of their impact on macroeconomic stability or domestic welfare instead several studies have analyzed macroeconomic performance under different historical exchange rate arrangements using macroeconomic data from the bretton woods and the subsequent floating regime baxter and stockman 1988 found no clear relationship between exchange rate flexibility and output stability or synchronization of the business cycle using bivariate vector autoregressions vars bayoumi and eichengreen 1994 analyzed the standard

monetary union and the assignment problem proposals for the creation of an independent central bank in a european monetary union do not always take into account the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy this analysis describes a system of two similar economies forming either a joint fiscal and monetary union or a simple monetary union policy authorities aim to achieve target values for inflation and the budget balance if the monetary and fiscal authorities pursue their targets independently of each other there is a risk that unstable interactions will be set up the results indicate a hazard of the separation of monetary and fiscal management

pegged exchange rate regimes a trap this paper studies the empirical and theoretical association between the duration of a pegged exchange rate and the cost experienced upon exiting the regime we confirm empirically that exits from pegged exchange rate regimes during the past two decades have often been accompanied by crises the cost of which increases with the duration of the peg before the crisis we explain these observations in a framework in which the exchange rate peg is used as a commitment mechanism to achieve inflation stability but multiple equilibria are possible we show that there are ex ante large gains from choosing a more conservative not only in order to mitigate the inflation bias from the well known time inconsistency problem but also to steer the economy away from the high inflation equilibria these gains however come at a cost in the form of the monetary authority s lesser responsiveness to output shocks in these circumstances using a pegged exchange rate as an anti inflation commitment device can create a trap whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti inflation credibility but ultimately results in an exit occasioned by a big enough adverse real shock that creates large welfare losses to the economy we also show that the more conservative is the regime in place and the larger is the cost of regime change the longer will be the average spell of the fixed exchange rate regime and the greater the output contraction at the time of a regime change

exchange rate behaviour under the ems regime was there any systematic change abstract most empirical studies fail to detect any systematic effects of the ems regime on the economic performance of member countries this reveals the difficulty of constructing controlled experiments which can distinguish what is due to the ems from that due to common external pressures we argue that the crucial step is to examine the exchange rates distribution since no performance improvements will appear if exchange rate behaviour does not change within the ems we find that there are changes in the third and fourth moments which imply that ems currencies have become more fragile and susceptible to shocks particularly negative shocks relative to non ems currencies

monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy we lay out a small open economy version of the calvo sticky price model and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap we use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rulebased policy regimes for the small open economy domestic inflation and cpi based taylor rules and an exchange rate peg we show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail we also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules

fear of floating and the external effects of currency unions the introduction of the euro has considerably affected the de facto monetary policy autonomy defined as independence from monetary policy in the key currency areas in countries outside the european currency union ecu using a standard open economy framework we argue that de facto monetary policy autonomy has significantly declined for countries that dominantly trade with the ecu and slightly increased for countries that dominantly trade with the dollar zone the predictions of our model find support in the data we estimate the influence of the bundesbank s ecb s and the fed s monetary policies on various country groups the de facto monetary policy autonomy of both non euro eu members and efta countries declined with the introduction of the euro this effect was slightly stronger for the eu member countries than for efta countries as our theory predicts at the same time the de facto monetary policy autonomy of australia and new zealand vis a vis the us dollar has moderately increased

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

spurious welfare reversals in international business cycle models several papers have documented spurious welfare reversals incompletemarkets economy produces a higher level of welfare than the completemarkets economy this paper first demonstrates how conventional linearization can generate approximation errors that can result in welfare reversals using a two country production economy we argue that spurious welfare reversals are not only possible but also plausible under reasonable values for model parameters this paper then proposes an approximation method that modifies the conventional linearization by a bias correction this method can be easily implemented and approximates welfare as accurately as a second order perturbation method

monetary policy choices in emerging market economies the case of high productivity growth we develop a general equilibrium model of an emerging market economy where productivity growth differentials between tradable and non tradable sectors result in an equilibrium appreciation of the real exchange rate the so called balassa samuelson effect the paper explores the dynamic properties of this economy and the welfare implications of alternative policy rules we show that the real exchange rate appreciation limits the range of policy rules that with a given probability keep inflation and exchange rate within predetermined numerical targets we also find that the b s effect raises by an order of magnitude the welfare loss associated with policy rules that prescribe active exchange rate management

monetary fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation a tale of three countries abstract we study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross country data from 1965 to 1999 in a first step we contrast the monetary fiscal narrative for germany the u s and italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time varying var we find that the low frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities in a second step we use an estimated dsge model to interpret the low frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run the findings from the dsge model suggest that switches in the monetary fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation

screening when some agents are nonstrategic does a monopoly need to exclude we characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences we show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive there is no exclusion the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal cost of production our analysis is motivated by the evidence indicating that some individuals have limited ability to misrepresent themselves and imitate others

capital controls and balance of payments crises abstract the theory of balance of payments crises shows that under perfect foresight a system of fixed exchange rate is not sustainable in the presence of diverging economic policies in this paper it is shown how and why capital controls succeed in maintaining the principle of a fixed but adjustable parity both cases of a devaluation and a revaluation are considered and a condition for a parity change to be credible is presented

delegation in international monetary policy games abstract in this paper we show that delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in a multi country framework with monetary spillovers among countries even in the absence of time inconsistency credibility issues we also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to the case of coordination of monetary policies

capital controls monetary policy and balance sheets in a small open economy we develop a small open economy new keynesian model that incorporates a financial accelerator in combination with liability dollarization applying a ramsey type analysis we compare the welfare implications of an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates and an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates in an economy without the financial accelerator an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates is superior to an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates in contrast in an economy with the financial accelerator an optimal capital control under fixed exchange rates yields higher welfare than an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates jel e44 e52 f32 f38 f41

political and institutional factors in regime changes in the erm an application of duration analysis this paper analyses the functioning of the european exchange rate mechanism erm to that end we apply duration models to estimate an augmented target zone model explicitly incorporating political and institutional factors into the explanation of european exchange rate policies the estimations are based on quarterly data of eight currencies participating in the erm covering the complete history of the european monetary system our results suggest that both economic and political factors are important determinants of erm currency policies concerning economic factors the money supply the real exchange rate the interest rate in germany and the central parity deviation would have negatively affected the duration of a given central parity while credibility and the price level in germany would have positively influenced such duration regarding political variables elections central bank independence and left wing administrations would have increased the probability of maintaining the current regime while unstable governments would have been associated with more frequent regime changes moreover we show how the political augmented model outperforms the model which just incorporates pure economic determinants both in terms of explanatory power and goodness of fit

on becoming more flexible exchange rate regimes in latin america and the caribbean abstract this paper examines the shift from fixed to more flexible exchange rate regimes among countries in latin america and the caribbean in contrast to most traditional approaches the one followed here recognizes that fixed rates can be and often are adjusted but argues that policy makers incur a political cost from devaluation at the same time flexible exchange rates even managed ones may be very volatile with persistent misalignment a stylized model of regime choice is developed based on the perceived losses from exchange rate misalignment incurred under fixed versus more flexible regimes the model is estimated for a sample of 24 countries over the period 1978 1992 and empirical results are quite supportive misalignments proxied by current account deficits and moderate to high rates of inflation were associated with a move to more flexible rates during 1978 1986 misalignment indicators appear to have mattered less during 1987 1992 however there appears to have been a major reduction in the perceived difficulty of managing flexible rates during this period the paper then cautions against attributing differences in economic growth between groups of countries to their exchange regime the central point here is that the endogeneity of regime choice introduces selection biases into the samples of countries with fixed and with more flexible exchange regimes

are exchange rate bands better than fixed exchange rates the imported credibility approach this paper explicitly incorporates exchange rate bands into the barro gordon model of inflation this is a non trivial extension focusing on markov perfect equilibria we specify the properties of the optimal policy functions exchange rate dynamics and hence the arguments for and against target zones the attractiveness of alternative exchange rate regimes i e fixed flexible and target zones and the position of exchange rates inside the band depend on the inflationary performance of the center country

monetary policy and the exchange rate the british monetary authorities began the decade with a commitment to a policy of decelerating monetary growth as the centrepiece of their economic strategy a policy of outright benign neglect towards the exchange rate was a stated accompaniment by the end of 1990the centrepiece of policy was adherence to the exchange rate mechanism of the ems albeit initially within the wider band option although the commitment to counter inflationary policy objectives and to a nominal anchor as a means of achieving these remained the same the anchor had been changed at the intermediate target level there had been a revolution

credibility and disinflation in the european monetary system analysis of interest differentials in the european monetary system has suggested a widespread lack of credibility of the exchange rate mechanism in the sense that in most countries the implicit expected rate of devaluation was significant and not far short of inflation differentials vis a vis the deutschmark we present and test a model in which prices reflect expectations of exchange rate behaviour the results provide mixed evidence that price setting in countries which participated in the erm was influenced by the exchange rate discipline

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

who wants the euro and why economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single european currency the paper looks at whether public attitudes towards a single european currency held in the european union member states reflect a rational evaluation of the involved benefits and costs it finds that they do the looser monetary and fiscal policy was in the past and the more time a country spent in the ems the more citizens welcome the euro attitudes towards the euro do not seem consistent with attitudes towards a european central bank however upon closer scrutiny opponents of a single currency appear to be less consistent and less rational in their responses than proponents

delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions abstract a difference in the objectives of members of a customs union may be a unifying rather than a divisive force if countries outside the union behave strategically one union member may want to delegate to its partner the ability to set the common external tariff we demonstrate these results in the context of a pure exchange general equilibrium trade model we show that if tariffs are strategic substitutes the union country which is relatively less well endowed in the exported good may be willing to delegate to its partner which behaves more aggressively in setting the union s policy the delegation decision is reversed if tariffs are strategic complements the model extends the standard results on the appropriate level of the union policy by adding another dimension that of the optimal decision making agent

exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice the empirical distinction between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes raises a number of interesting questions which factors may induce a de facto peg why do countries enforce a peg but do not announce it why do countries break their promises we show that a stable socio political environment and an efficient political decision making process are a necessary prerequisite for choosing a peg and sticking to it challenging the view that sees the exchange rate as a commitment device policymakers seem rather concerned with regime sustainability in the face of adverse economic and socio political fundamentals

the effectiveness of monetary policy anchors firm level evidence analyses of monetary policy posit that exchange rate pegs inflation targets and central bank independence can help anchor private sector inflation expec tations yet there are few direct tests of this argument we offer cross national micro level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private sector inflation concerns using firm level data from eighty one countries approximately 10 000 firms we find evidence that international anchors exchange rate commit ments correlate significantly with a substantial reduction in private sector concerns about inflation while domestic anchors inflation targeting and central bank inde pendence do not our conjecture is that private sector inflation expectations are more responsive to exchange rate anchors because they are more transparent more con straining and more costly than domestic anchoring arrangements the literature on monetary policy highlights the role of monetary institutions in stabilizing private sector inflation expectations central bank independence cbi inflation targeting it and fixed exchange rates pegs are widely viewed as insti tutions that have the capacity to mitigate private sector concerns that policymak ers will exploit them after they have locked in their price wage and investment decisions while other empirical research explores the institutional correlates of inflation and its variability yielding mixed results we use firm level data in our study to directly assess the impact of monetary anchors on private sector inflation concerns we find evidence that pegs mitigate firm owners concerns with infla tion but that domestic anchors such as it and cbi are uncorrelated with our micro indicators of inflation expectations considerable research has investigated the use of it cbi and pegs as institu tions that establish monetary policy credibility whereas these anchors are expected

credibility and exchange rate management in developing countries abstract the paper discusses the role of credibility factors in the conduct of exchange rate policy in developing countries the analysis is based on a simple framework in which policymakers are concerned about inflation and external competitiveness price setters in the nontradable sector of the economy engage in a strategic game against the authorities the model generates a devaluation bias which undermines the credibility of a fixed exchange rate the role of reputational factors signaling considerations and joining a currency union as possible solutions to this bias is examined

business cycle convergence in emu a first look at the second moment we analyse the dynamics of the standard deviation of demand and supply shocks as well as of the demand component of gdp across countries in the european monetary union emu this analysis allows us to evaluate the patterns of cyclical comovement in emu and compare them the cyclical performance of the new members of the eu and other oecd countries we make use of sigma convergence methods to identify synchronization patterns in business cycles the eurozone has converged to a stable lower level of dispersion across business cycles during the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s the new eu members have also experienced a strong pattern of convergence from 1998 to 2005 when a strong divergence trend appears an enlargement of the emu to 22 members would not significantly decrease its optimality as a currency area there is evidence for some europe specific characteristics as compared to global comovements in business cycles authors abstract

importing credibility through exchange rate pegging this paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy making in an open economy since inflation is in part uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances the authority s actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective in contrast pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low inflation currency allows perfect monitoring because the exchange rate is in principle controllable for this reason exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly

distributional implications of joint tax evasion both buyers and sellers of goods and services may benefit from letting their economic transactions go unrecorded for tax purposes the supplier reduces his tax burden by underreporting income and sales whereas the consumer may gain from buying a non taxed lower priced product the distributional implications of such joint tax evasion depend on the amounts evaded on where the evaders on both sides of the market are found in the income distribution and on how the financial gain is split our empirical investigations show that the tax evasion controlled estimate of income inequality in norway exhibits more income dispersion than official estimates

seigniorage and the case for national money in countries with high rates of inflation there is typically movement away from the use of the local currency the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of using a local currency with emphasis on the seigniorage foregone by using a foreign money even if it should be desirable for a country to fix its exchange rate it still loses seigniorage if it does not use its own money the case for using a foreign money then turns largely on the superior discipline imposed on domestic policymakers by removing their control over the money supply alternative methods of imposing discipline are discussed estimates of the amount of seigniorage raised by different governments are presented seigniorage amounts in some cases to about 10 percent of government revenue estimates are also presented of both the annual flow and one time stock costs of giving up use of domestic currencies and instead using the dollar the flow cost is typically about 1 percent of gnp and the stock cost is around 10 percent of gnp

labour markets and monetary union a strategic analysis this paper shows that the effects of a monetary union depend on several labour market features in particular the switch from national monetary policies to a common monetary policy usually affects both inflation and unemployment even when all structural parameters of the economy and of unions and policymakers preferences remain the same the benchmark case of a monetary union between identical countries suggests that the switch to a monetary union is likely to make labour unions more aggressive increasing unemployment qualifications to this result are provided under alternative institutional scenarios like cross country asymmetries pre union erm membership and wage leadership

some evidence on policy makers motives macroeconomic preferences and output inflation trade offs this paper presents the results of an empirical study of the relationship between macroeconomic performance and policy makers preferences for real output growth and inflation based on quarterly data from 16 countries the empirical results indicate that a lower priority to inflation and a higher real output growth target lead to higher inflation and a less favourable real output inflation trade off without affecting real output growth

monetary policy in emerging markets can liability dollarization explain contractionary devaluations abstract in emerging markets external debt is denominated almost entirely in large developed country currencies such as the u s dollar this liability dollarization offers a channel through which exchange rate variation can lead to business cycle instability when firms assets are denominated in domestic currency and liabilities are denominated in foreign currency an exchange rate depreciation worsens firms balance sheets which leads to higher capital costs and contractions in capital spending to illustrate this i construct a quantitative sticky price small open economy model in which a monetary policy induced devaluation leads to a persistent contraction in output in this model fixed exchange rates offer greater stability than an interest rule that targets inflation

transmission effects of foreign exchange reserves on price level evidence from china abstract we investigate the transmission effects of foreign exchange reserves on price level in china by utilizing a nonparametric model first of all we employ var co integration analysis to obtain the number of lagged periods in every stage and then we estimate the elasticity of foreign exchange reserves to money supply and the elasticity of money supply to consumer price index respectively with nonparametric estimations finally we use the results from nonparametric estimations to calculate the cross elasticity of foreign exchange reserves to consumer price index we find that an increase in foreign exchange reserves will lead to an increase in money supply which in turn will result in an increase in price level

morality in the market abstract being honest can be a competitive disadvantage in markets with the opportunity to violate laws and regulations producers who are willing to cheat may crowd out more efficient producers who are honest and buyers who are willing to cheat may crowd out honest buyers with higher willingness to pay this mechanism makes morality honesty a bad substitute for sanctions in markets honesty reduces cheating but the output may be less efficiently produced and less efficiently allocated among buyers i also show that the effect of honesty depends crucially on the fraction of honest traders among both buyers and sellers while it does not matter whether a buyer or a seller pays the sanction it does matter who is honest

systemic conflict and regional monetary integration the case of europe existing explanations of european monetary integration emphasizing economic interdependence issue linkage institutions and domestic politics take a predominantly regional approach in the international monetary thesis developed here i argue that u s policy disturbances transmitted through the international monetary system created compelling incentives for european states to cooperate on exchange rate and monetary policy i develop a general theory of macroeconomic power based on open economy macroeconomics and show how the exercise of such influence can drive regional monetary integration this article then tests the international thesis with reference to monetary integration within the european union by examining four periods in which the united states acted to stabilize the international monetary system and seven episodes in which it disrupted the system european governments and central banks reduced regional monetary cooperation when the united states supported system stability and strengthened it after each episode of disruption the evidence thus strongly supports the inference that the link is causal

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

italy the real effects of inflation and disinflation over the past 15 years the italian economy has experienced rather uncommon developments by comparison with the rest of europe these developments have been described alternatively in terms of near collapses miracles or impending bankruptcy such dramatic characterizations are of little help in understanding what happened yet they somehow reflect a history of large and often unexpected changes and a sequence of policy turn arounds from a distance the italian experience still raises some issues of general interest regarding the means and the timing of an adjustment process in italy return to profitability was pursued before macroeconomic stabilization instead of resulting from it as happened elsewhere it is indeed our contention that this evolution is sometimes commendable adjustment in italy was quicker and less costly in terms of output investment and employment

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank abstract this paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions the analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation indexed debt if delegation of monetary policy is viable the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt this increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks evidence on central bank independence debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content

measuring lying aversion abstract we introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments in the game the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart s decision but potentially at a cost for the counterpart we identify at the individual level the decision to lie and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time our method allows us to classify people into types including those who never lie those who always lie and those who react to incentives to lie we suggest this method as a useful instrument for examining factors that influence the decision to lie

purchasing power parity under the european monetary system abstract using reduced rank cointegration analysis this study examines whether exchange rate realignments are effective in extenuating the deviations from purchasing power parity ppp under the european monetary system ems in contrast to previous studies more positive evidence for the ppp hypothesis is found the difference in findings can be attributed partly to the statistical technique used the correction of the finite sample bias and the adjustment for realignment effects in general the results of this study support that currency realignments of the ems have been effective in maintaining ppp among its member countries

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

the role of policymakers reputation in the ems disinflations abstract it is frequently argued that the ems itself in connection with the high anti inflation reputation of the german bundesbank is responsible for the inflation reduction and convergence which member countries have experienced based on the game theoretical model of backus and driffill 1985 american economic review 75 530 538 an empirical measure of the government s reputation for fighting inflation is derived by using a bayesian learning approach time varying estimates of these counterinflation reputation measures are computed for the original ems member countries and for a control group of major non ems countries the paper finds that only the smaller ems participants have gained anti inflation reputation during the ems period

credibility may require discretion not rules abstract we reexamine the common argument that rules produce greater credibility than discretion rules limit the actions of agents restricting observations of the agents preferences or types in a second best world where rules cannot be everlasting a regime of discretion in some periods may produce superior credibility and dominate a regime of rules

exchange rate regimes and inflation only hard pegs make a difference abstract using data from a large sample of developing countries from 1985 to 2001 we confirm that hard pegs currency boards or a shared currency reduce inflation and money growth there is no evidence that soft pegs confer any monetary discipline after other factors are controlled for inflation triggers regime switches under hard pegs monetary growth is unaffected by fiscal deficits or by inflation shocks under soft pegs as under floats increased fiscal deficits and positive inflation shocks are associated with higher monetary growth the apparently slower per capita output growth under hard pegs is explained by their geographical distribution jel classification f41

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

exchange rates and monetary policy in emerging market economies this paper investigates the effects of exchange rate regimes and alternative monetary policy rules for an emerging market economy that is subject to a volatile external environment in the form of shocks to world interest rates and the terms of trade in particular we highlight the impact of financial frictions and the degree of exchange rate pass through in determining the relative performance of alternative regimes in stabilizing the economy in the face of external shocks our results are quite sharp when exchange rate pass through is high a policy of non traded goods inflation targeting does best in stabilizing the economy and is better in welfare terms when exchange rate pass through is low however a policy of strict cpi inflation targeting is better in all cases a fixed exchange rate is undesirable in addition financial frictions have no implications for the ranking of alternative policy rules

partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital central bank independence and pegged exchange rates have each been viewed as solutions to the inflationary bias resulting from the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy while it is obvious that a benevolent social planner would opt for such an institutional solution it is less obvious that a real world incumbent facing short term partisan or electoral pressures would do so in this article i model the choice of monetary institutions from the standpoint of a survival maximizing incumbent it turns out that a wide range of survival maximizing incumbents do best by forfeiting control over monetary policy while political pressures do not in general discourage monetary commitments they can influence the choice between fixed exchange rates and central bank independence i highlight the importance of viewing fiscal policy and monetary policy as substitutes and identify the conditions under which survival maximizing incumbents will view fixed exchange rates and central bank independence as substitutes in so doing i provide a framework for integrating other contributions to this volume

to be or not to be in monetary union a synthesis article i nfo monetary union can benefit countries suffering from policy credibility problems if it eliminates the inflation bias and also allows for more efficient management of certain shocks but it also carries costs as some stabilization may be feasible even in the absence of credibility and this may be more than what an individual country can hope for in a monetary union in this paper we combine the stabilization and credibility branches of the currency union literature and construct a simple welfare criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative monetary arrangements we produce examples where monetary union may be welfare improving even for low modest levels of inflation bias 2 3 as long as business cycles are not too a synchronized across countries

transparency reputation and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates this paper shows that if the cost of importing foreign inflation and real exchange rate shocks are not too high then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate regime for a country with a credibility problem is a peg under which credibility is higher and inflation is lower than under a float this holds true although devaluations of the pegged rate are assumed to be costless the reason is that as realized inflation is not perfectly controllable planned inflation under a float is private information in contrast since the exchange rate can be perfectly controlled pegging resolves the private information problem is more transparent and makes reputation more effective

decentralization and inflation commitment collective action or continuity do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation political decentralization however does appear to reduce change in countries relative inflation rates over time by creating additional veto players federal structure may lock in existing patterns of monetary policy whether inflationary or strict among the mostly developed countries that started with low inflation inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states among the mostly developing countries that started with high inflation inflation tended to increase faster in the federations there is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country s degree of practical central bank independence whether high or low and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments

reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information abstract previous models of rules versus discretion are extended to include uncertainty about the policymaker s type when people observe low inflation they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to low inflation type 1 this enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted policymaker type 2 an incentive to masquerade as the committed type in the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delivers surprisingly low inflation with corresponding costs to the economy over an extended interval the type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile but shifts eventually to high inflation this high inflation is surprising initially but subsequently becomes anticipated

exchange rate regimes and independent central banks a correlated choice of imperfectly credible institutions theory and empirical evidence show that low inflation is a precondition for economic growth independent central banks and fixed exchange rates are institutional mechanisms that help keep inflation low by lending monetary policy credibility to governments however the two institutions are commonly analyzed as substitutes that tie the hands of inflation prone governments thus the literature has difficulties describing why governments would adopt both institutions and the interaction between them this paper presents a model that allows policymakers the simultaneous choice of monetary institutions and shows that imperfectly credible institutions will overlap when exchange rates are fixed but adjustable and central bank independence is not fully ascertainable governments choose both institutions more generally the paper generates hypotheses about the conditions that make fixed exchange rates and independent central banks complements or substitutes thus contributing to an explanation of the diversity of global monetary institutions in the post bretton woods period

can equilibrium models explain nominal exchange regime non neutrality evidence from the european monetary system abstract in a recent paper alan stockman argues that the finding that real exchange rate variability id higher under flexible nominal exchange rate systems than under fixed nominal exchange rate systems typically interpreted as evidencee of price stickiness is consistent with equilibriu models stockman s theory we argue predicts that the formation of the european monetary system should have had no effect on the real exchange rate variability of its members we test this prediction and interpret our findings as evidence in support of stockman s theory although not as evidence that equilibrium models can account for nominal exchange regime non neutrality jel f31

on the imperfect substitutability of policy regimes exchange rate targetting vs policy coordination abstract exchange rate targetting is always an imperfect substitute for explicit policy coordination but succeeds when economies are either structurally dissimilar with symmetric shocks or structurally symmetric with dissimilar shocks a joint commitment then generates economies of scale in interventions

does the euro dominate central and eastern european money markets the so called german dominance hypothesis gdh claimed that bundesbank policies were transmitted into other european monetary system ems interest rates during the pre euro era we reformulate this hypothesis for the central and eastern european cee countries that are on the verge of accessing the eurozone we test this euro dominance hypothesis edh in a novel way using a global vector autoregressive gvar approach that combines country specific error correction models in a global system we find that euro area monetary policies are transmitted into cee money market rates providing evidence for monetary integration between the eurozone and cee countries our framework also allows for introducing global monetary shocks to provide at least tentative empirical evidence regarding the effects of the recent financial crisis on monetary integration in europe

a long run view of the european monetary system abstract this papaer analyzes the exchange rates and consumer price indices of six countries participating in the european monetary system ems during the entire period of floating exchange rates the analysis shows that most of these real exchange rates have unit roots even when one allows for the possibility of a structural break at the time of the advent of the ems further proces and exchange rates are not co integrated during the ems period the data suggest that the 12 realignments of the ems have not served fully too offset the member countries inflation differentials

fixed versus flexible exchange rates which provides more fiscal discipline abstract conventional wisdom holds that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates in this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority the claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg hence under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well the difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate hence bad behavior today leads to punishment today if fiscal authorities are impatient flexible rates by forcing the costs to be paid up front provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent the recent experience of sub saharan countries supplies evidence that matches the predictions of the model

free riding convergence and two speed monetary unification in europe this paper shows that two speed monetary unification carries a danger low inflation countries in europe have an interest in delaying entry of the high inflation country because it would raise the average inflation rate however this country might refuse to join when the first group find it qualified to that is when convergence has taken place this is because the high inflation country can employ its monetary policy to stabilize against shocks given that the currency union members have optimally chosen a lower inflation rate hence a tradeoff exists between the necessity for convergence and the free rider problem

bubble thy neighbor portfolio effects and externalities from capital controls we use changes in brazil s tax on capital inflows from 2006 to 2013 to test for direct portfolio effects and externalities from capital controls on investor portfolios we find that an increase in brazil s tax on foreign investment in bonds causes fund managers to significantly decrease their portfolio allocations to brazil in both bonds and equities fund managers simultaneously increase allocations to other countries that have substantial exposure to china and decrease allocations to countries viewed as more likely to adjust their capital controls much of the effect of capital controls on portfolio allocation appears to occur through signalling i e changes in investor expectations about future policies rather than the direct cost of the controls this evidence of significant externalities from capital controls suggests that any assessment of controls should consider their effects on portfolio flows to other countries

a long run view of german dominance and the degree of policy convergence in the ems i introduction when the european monetary system ems was established in march 1979 the member countries agreed to gradually move to a european monetary union emu at the maastricht summit on december 9 10 1991 the member nations signed an agreement outlining the requirements and a timetable for monetary union building upon the framework specified in the 1989 delors report the maastricht agreement outlines a three stage transition to a common european monetary policy 1 the achievement of a high degree of monetary policy convergence among the member countries is crucial if a common monetary policy is to be initiated the ems already provides a framework in which monetary policy actions can be coordinated but have member nations actually coordinated their actions or have they conducted independent policies some have claimed that the bundesbank has dominated monetary policy in the ems one explanation is that by tying domestic monetary policy to that of germany other countries policymakers enhance their own credibility for instance giavazzi and pagano 1988 have argued that because the bundesbank is known to follow a consistent credible anti inflation policy tying policy to that of germany should enhance one s reputation a natural question to ask therefore is to what degree have monetary policies in the ems converged to that conducted by germany a finding of complete convergence among ems monetary policies would imply that the member countries have converged to one common monetary policy in studies examining the credibility hypothesis which clearly is linked to the notion of monetary policy convergence fratianni and von hagen 1990c and burdekin westbrook and willett 1993 rejected this hypothesis 2 to consider the prospects for the success of emu one must know whether and to what degree there has been a transmission of policy actions within the ems the question of whether germany has set the direction of monetary policy for the ems is a natural focus and has been the subject of recent study fratianni and von hagen 1990a 1990b 1990c von hagen and fratianni 1990 and kutan 1991 1992 all reject the hypothesis that german monetary policy actions dominate the monetary policy decisions of other ems countries 3 while germany is found to be an important player in setting monetary policy its actions are not independent of other members in contrast to this conclusion karfakis and moschos 1990 and macdonald and taylor 1991 argue that non german ems members policies are related closely to german policy changes and that german policy actions do not respond to those taken by the central banks of other ems countries this study tests for policy convergence among ems countries within a long run framework using cointegration procedures using both short term interest rates and the monetary base as measures of monetary policy our aim is to determine the number of shared common stochastic trends among ems monetary policies and test whether a complete convergence of policies has been achieved in the ems rejection of complete convergence a finding of two or more shared common trends indicates that some countries policies are set independently at least in the long run if this is true then the notion that the bundesbank dominates ems policy is rejected such a result also suggests that any credibility gain from tying policy to that of germany is probably outweighed by other considerations such as domestic growth or international competitiveness looking ahead our results indicate that ems monetary policies have not converged we also investigate the short run connection among policy measures using a longer sample than in previous work our results from this analysis indicate that while german policy actions influence monetary policy in other ems countries in the short run there is substantial policy interaction among ems members the format of the paper is as follows section ii discusses some methodological issues concerning the use of interest rates and the monetary base as indicators of policy actions

fiscal rules and government borrowing costs international evidence we find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985 2010 we apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets the results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the risk premium on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility jel e43 g12 h60

open economy macroeconomics developments in theory and policy this paper views developments in open economy macroeconomics through the lens of the debate over european monetary unification the empirical tendency for nominal exchange rate regimes to affect the variability of nominal and real exchange rates alike can be rationalized by sticky price theories or models of asset market liquidity effects but plausible liquidity models have difficulty generating enough persistence to match the data thus the macroeconomic stabilization costs of forgoing the exchange rate realignment option seem pertinent it is argued that our theories of efficiencies due to a common currency remain unsatisfactory despite recent advances the paper concludes by reviewing theories of currency crisis

fiscal discipline and the choice of exchange rate regime conventional wisdom claims that fixed exchange rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates but the recent experiences in europe the record of sub saharan countries in the 1980s and the history of stabilization attempts in latin america cast empirical doubts on this wisdom to explore this puzzle we present a standard intertemporal model with perfect capital mobility and price flexibility in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority

fewer monies better monies in the aftermath of emerging market crises from russia to asia and latin america there is a quest for better monetary arrangements that are more crisis proof fixed rates are out flexible rates are in with a policy focus on inflation targeting but there is of course the alternative of abolishing exchange rates all together this paper revisits the issue of dollarization or currency boards to review what arguments in the debate stand up the case for flexible exchange rates emphasizes the need for a tool to accomplish relative price adjustment this paper argues that in an intertemporal perspective most shocks require financing in the capital market rather than adjustment moreover countries frequently do not use their flexible rate to play a cyclical role and as a result only a pay a premium for the option to depreciate but do not take advantage of the flexibility on the contrary they engineer systematic overvaluation in the context of inflation targeting