a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the baron ferejohn model abstract we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs for games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs with this characterization we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs for the case where the players have the same discount factor we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer for the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d70

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

the allocation of credit and financial collapse this paper examines the allocation of credit in a market in which borrowers have greater information concerning their own riskiness than do lenders it illustrates that 1 the allocation of credit is inefficient and at times can be improved by government intervention and 2 small changes in the exogenous risk free interest rate can cause large discontinuous changes in the allocation of credit and the efficiency of the market equilibrium these conclusions suggests a role for government as the lender of last resort

models of banking instability a partial review of the literature abstract this paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed diamond and dybvig 1983 it explores the extent to which it a explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets and b justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry it suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real world banks in addition the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry it suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models

in which context is the option clause desirable the option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels it has been used within the diamond and dybvig j pol econ 91 401 419 1983 framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance this literature has however been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts it will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes bankrupt because of a bank run as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt it will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in a free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt related agency problems and b under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self fulfilling prophecies it will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt makes the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

banking as the provision of liquidity this article represents a model economy in which demand deposits represent the optimal financial intermediation because these demand deposits are backed in part by an illiquid asset the in termediary bank is subject to panics in which each agent ration ally decides to withdraw his deposits making all worse off banks ca n prevent panics only through a distortion of the optimal contract t he government can prevent panics without this distortion by guarantee ing the return from deposits the moral hazard introduced by this dep osit insurance induces the government to regulate the intermediary s portfolio and returns copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

information institutions and constitutional arrangements this paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered term overlapping generations organizations such as legislative bodies our model is a simple stochastic game of multi principal multi agent dynamic relationships our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the constitutional moment first they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows imperfectly informed legislators with information about the history of play second we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures

ces production functions and economic growth we examine inconsistencies and controversies related to the use of ces production functions in growth models first we show that not all variants of ces functions commonly used are consistently specified second using a simple growth model we find that a higher elasticity of substitution leads to a higher steady state and makes the emergence of permanent growth more probable it is also pointed out that the effect of a higher elasticity of substitution on the speed of convergence depends on the relative scarcity of the factors of production finally we discuss possible explanations of variations in the elasticity of substitution jel classification o41 o11

dynamic legislative policy making abstract we prove existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in an infinite horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next we allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks we prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere we establish upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence and we provide weak conditions under which each equilibrium of our model determines an aperiodic transition probability over policies we establish a convergence theorem giving conditions under which the invariant distributions generated by stationary equilibria must be close to the core in a canonical spatial model finally we extend the analysis to sequential move stochastic games and to a version of the model in which the proposer and voting rule are determined by play of a finite perfect information game

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

in quest of the slutsky diamond the slutsky equation can be constructed as a parallelogram a diamond the area of which is proportional to the elasticity of substitution this construction permits to show immediately that demand functions become concave on an interval if the elasticity of substitution increases sufficiently also the diamond sheds light on the fact that the production level increases with the elasticity of substitution as an application the author shows that the elasticity of substitution has a direct bearing not only on the rate of growth of an economy but also on the very existence of sustained growth copyright 1989 by american economic association

on the faustian dynamics of policy and political power this paper examines the faustian dynamics of policy and power we posit a general class of dy namic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power resulting in the following faustian trade off if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy he then sacrifices future political power yet if he wants to preserve his future power he must sacrifice his present policy objec tives the trade off comes from the fact that the current political ruler pivotal voter cannot uncouple the direct effect of his policy from its indirect effect on future power a policy endogenous pe equilibrium describes this endogenous transfer of power and the resulting evolution of policy and political power over time we show that the faustian trade off in a pe equilibrium is decomposed into two basic rationales the political preservation effect induces more tempered policy choices than if one s policy choice did not affect one s political fortunes however the reformation effect induces more aggressive policies in order to exploit the productivity gains from policies chosen by even more aggressive successors we distinguish between political systems that give rise to monotone faustian dynamics political power that progressively evolves towards more fiscally liberal types of leaders and cyclical faustian dynamics political power that oscillates between liberal and conservative types of leaders in each case we show that the faustian trade off moderates the choices of each type of leader

the long term success of the neoclassical growth model in this paper we seek to re establish the link between the constant elasticity of substitution ces production function and neoclassical solow growth theory we do so in three dimensions first we review the increasing importance of the ces technology in modern dynamic macroeconomics in expanding not only theory but also in addressing important policy questions second we aue that the importance of the ces function in growth theory is intimately linked to normalization finally we examine the data congruence between ces functions and recent growth patterns in the usa and the euro area economies where we apply a supply side system incorporating a ces function with factor augmenting and time varying technical progress

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

the optimum quantity of money rule in the theory of public finance this paper examines optimal tax policy in a monetary economy in which money serves as an intermediate good that helps facilitate the conversion of scarce resources into tinal consumption goods by enabling consumers to economize on the costs of transacting it is shown that in such an environment even though distorting taxes must be levied for revenue purposes the optimal tax structure calls for abstaining from inflationary finance and adopting the optimum quantity of money rule

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

inefficiency in legislative policymaking a dynamic analysis this paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining the policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation the productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens e g national defense and the distributive spending is district specific transfers e g pork barrel spending investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods the analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

endogenous institutions and political extremism abstract the election of extreme political leaders is often associated with changes in political institutions this paper studies these phenomena through a model in which the median voter elects a leader anticipating that he will impose institutional constraints such as constitutional amendments judicial appointments or the implicit threat of a coup that influence the behavior of future political challengers it is typically optimal for the median voter to elect an extreme incumbent when democracy is less fully consolidated when the costs of imposing institutional constraints are intermediate and when the distribution of potential challengers is asymmetric the median voter typically elects a more right wing incumbent when the distribution of potential challengers shifts to the left implications of the model for the consolidation of democracy and institutional constraints are discussed as are several related mechanisms through which politicians ability to affect institutions may lead voters to optimally elect extremists

economic growth and the elasticity of substitution two theorems and some suggestions at the beginning of the twentieth century the work of the swedish economist knut wicksell 1901 marked an important advance in our understanding of the relationship between the structure of production functions and income distribution wicksell had asked the following question among many others suppose that the marginal productivities are equal to the remuneration rates of each factor what then should be the form of the corresponding production function he pointed out p 125 that the general integral of the partial differential equation implied by this relationship was of the form y lf kil which meant in turn that the product y was necessarily a homogeneous of degree one function of capital k and labor l as an example he gave a function where the shares of k and l in y were constant and wrote down the function which would be rediscovered decades later by charles w cobb and paul h douglas 1928 however it is only half a century later in robert m solow s nobel prize winning 1956 essay that implications between the structure of the production function and long run equilibrium or disequilibrium of the economy were drawn in his classic article a contribution to the theory of economic growth solow had considered three cases analytically other cases were also discussed geometrically using a phase diagram he had labeled the two first cases 1hlarrod domar and cobb douglas respectively and he referred to the third type of production function as offering a bit of variety it was y ak 2 l 2 2 a particular case of y akp lp 1p in those early days solow had not pointed out to the reader that his cases could have been numbered 0 1 and 2 following the elasticity of substitution of the corresponding production function it would be only five years later in 1961 that with his coauthors kenneth j arrow et al he would find the general form of the two factor constant elasticity of substitution ces production function by integrating the differential equation corresponding to the observed relationship between output per capita and the wage rate solow s third case was indeed highly interesting since it allowed the possibility of everincreasing income per head even without any technical progress indeed solow showed that due to the efficiency of the system entailed by the particular production function he had chosen there existed a threshold for the savings rates s to generate investment per head large enough for income per head to grow forever that threshold was s nla2 where n is the growth rate of the population it was then natural to ask whether one could express that threshold in terms of the elasticity of substitution a the value of that threshold was determined by de la grandville 1989 to be equal to s no3 or where a is k s coefficient in a normalized ces function equal to a in solow s third case where u 2 for any s and n values this relationship gives also the threshold value in implicit form by the solution of ao1 1 log 3q or ilog nls by totally differentiating the last relationship one could observe that the threshold for the elasticity of substitution to entail ever sustained growth was an in klump faculty of mathematics and economics university of ulm helmholtzstrasse 20 d 89081 ulm germany de la grandville department of economics university of geneva 102 boulevard carl vogt ch 1211 geneva 4 switzerland we gratefully acknowledge the comments of seminar participants at stanford university and at the universities of stuttgart hohenheim and munich where parts of the paper were presented also we would like to thank without implicating in any way robert solow for his insightful remarks and an anonymous referee for very helnfuil supgestions wicksell cobb and douglas would no doubt burst with pride if they knew that one of our first year students wrote in a paper of his of course we recognize here a kirk douglas production function

firm heterogeneity internal finance and credit rationing this paper assesses the role of internal net worth holding constant investment opportunities in the allocation of credit in the presence of asymmetric information in the capital market the authors consider an economy in which both symmetric information and information intensive entrepreneurs seek funds from the capital market and they develop a simple general equilibrium model of credit allocation their emphasis is on shocks to borrower net worth depending on levels of net worth the symmetric information allocation a credit collapse or intermediate allocations are possible the model yields predictions corresponding to accelerator effects on investment and output as well as real effects of collateral redistributions copyright 1990 by royal economic society

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

bank runs the deposit currency ratio and the interest rate abstract this paper provides a model of an economy with a banking system which is subject to bank runs the model is then used to explain the rise in short term interest rates during bank runs and the fall in the deposit currency ratio in anticipation of possible runs

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

a theory of constitutional standards and civil liberty why would potentially intolerant majorities in a democracy protect the rights of unpopular groups this paper models the formation of legal standards that determine the extent of civil liberty in a society it is shown that tolerant legal standards emerge over time despite all individuals having intolerant preferences each period citizens choose activities that have social consequences a majority vote determines which of these activities are legally protected because of errors in interpreting the symbolic content of these activities voters from the majority will not impose excessively intolerant standards otherwise they may end up severely punishing members of their own group by mistake extending this framework to a dynamic model we examine markovian equilibria of the game when government improves with time in its ability to correctly interpret citizens activities these improvements allow an unchanging majority to impose increasingly intolerant standards over time it is shown that societies with high political turnover due to population changes are apt to choose tolerant legal standards societies with low turnover are more apt to choose more intolerant and unstable ones each group seeks to prevent auditing capabilities of government from improving too much over time in order to prevent future majorities from successfully enforcing more intolerant standards

static and dynamic underinvestment an experimental investigation in this paper we design a stylized version of an environment with public goods dynamic linkages and legislative bargaining our theoretical framework studies the provision of a durable public good as a modified version of battaglini et al 2012 we develop an experimental design that allows us to disentangle inefficiencies that would result in a one shot world static inefficiencies from extra inefficiencies that emerge in an environment in which decisions in the present affect the future dynamic inefficiencies we solve for efficiency and also characterize the bargaining equilibrium a symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium which is the most common concept used in applied work the experimental results indicate that subjects do react to dynamic linkages and as such we find evidence of both static and dynamic inefficiencies in fact the quantitative predictions of the model with respect to the share of dynamic inefficiencies are closest to the data when dynamic linkages are high to the extent that behavior is different from what is predicted by the model a systematic pattern emerges namely the use of strategic cooperation whereby subjects increase the efficiency of period one proposals by selectively punishing in period two subjects who did not propose efficient allocations

choosing how to choose self stable majority rules and constitutions constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society we study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society constitutions are stylized here to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly a different voting rule for making changes to the constitution we define an equilibrium notion for constitutions called self stability whereby under the rules of a self stable constitution the society would not vote to change the constitution we argue that only self stable constitutions will endure we prove that self stable constitutions always exist but that most constitutions even very prominent ones may not be self stable for some societies we show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic and there are many societies for which no such constitution is self stable we conclude with a characterization of the set of self stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

costs of taxation and the size of government existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system this paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation a main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government than the presidential system the proposed mechanism appears consistent with several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

a model of farsighted voting i present a new method of interpreting voter preferences in settings where policy remains in effect until replaced by new legislation in such settings voters consider not only the utility they receive from a given policy today but also the utility they will receive from policies likely to replace that policy in the future the model can be used to characterize both long term preferences and distributions over policy outcomes in situations where policy is ongoing and voters are farsighted

liquidity banking and bank failures a multiperiod model with risk neutral agents is constructed in which a liquidity problem arises in an equilibrium with decentralized tradin g in capital which banking institutions are able to alleviate depos it contracts provide for early withdrawal banks hold debt and agent s who borrow from banks hold compensating balances institutional col lapse or a state of the world when bank failures are experienced is associated with a high demand for liquidity low output and a lower than average level of welfare bank failure is symptomatic of a part icular state of endowments preferences and technology and governme nt intervention is undesirable copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting in light of the extensive theoretical evidence suggesting absence of equilibrium in voting models tullock 1981 asks why so much stability our results suggest the following answer political agents engaged in long term relationships can sustain highly stable allocations if there are strongly held norms for punishment of defectors 1

majority rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods abstract despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon we build on baron and ferejohn s american political science review 83 4 1989 1181 1206 bargaining model to describe public investments in a setting of budgetary politics specifically we show that underinvestment inherently arises from distributive politics within a majoritarian institution the inability of current majorities to contract with future ones drives a wedge between spending on consumption today and investing for future consumption extensions to the model demonstrate that earmarking future returns to specific players and or detaching consumption from investment decisions yields more efficient levels of public investment

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

procedural choice in majoritarian organizations a puzzling feature of self governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive seemingly nonmajoritarian procedures e g chairs and committees this article provides a theory of self enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures we ask 1 why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place 2 why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter and 3 with what policy consequences in the model a risk averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency i e reduce the procedural uncertainty of free for all bargaining an equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive generating nonmajoritarian policy bias still a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty

the political economy of fiscal policy we describe a theory of the collective choice of fiscal policy in dynamic economies that are subject to aggregate shocks the theory incorporates realistically complex policy spaces rational forward looking agents and a rich political decision process we argue that it provides a tractable framework to study a variety of important questions in macroeconomics and public finance jel e62 h63 d79

economic growth technical change biases and the elasticity of substitution a test of the de la grandville hypothesis a recent development in microeconomic theory suggests that the size of the elasticity of substitution between factors is relevant to economic growth this study undertakes an empirical investigation of this proposition comparing two economies the united states and south korea the authors test results support the de la grandville hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution is a potent explanatory variable of economic growth this inquiry also provides a clue to the puzzle that the u s elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is well below unity whereas that of south korea is close to unity nonetheless the u s factor shares have tended to remain fairly stable whereas the distributive shares of south korea seem to have changed in favor of capital their findings indicate that a high elasticity of substitution is a bad signal for the distribution of income under the paradigm of modern technology copyright 1991 by mit press

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

why do voters dismantle checks and balances voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive if such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents why do voters support their removal we argue that by reducing politician rents checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or inauence politicians through non electoral means in weakly institutionalized polities where such non electoral inauences particularly by the better organized elite are a major concern voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these inauences when they do so they are e ectively accepting a certain amount of politician presidential rents in return for redistribution we show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when equilibrium politician rents are low when the elite are better organized and are more likely to be able to inauence or bribe politicians and when inequality and potential taxes are high which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority we show that the main intuition that checks and balances by making politicians icheaper to bribe i are potentially costly to the majority is valid under di erent ways of modeling the form of checks and balances

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

institutional constraints and the inefficiency in public investments abstract this paper studies limits on executive authority by identifying a dynamic channel through which they interact with policy making the model features two agents one of which becomes the incumbent in each of the two periods and unilaterally decides on investment in a common interest public good targeted pork spending and the future executive constraint while a weak constraint permits an incumbent to enact his desired policies in case of re election the same applies to his opponent in the opposite scenario however this trade off changes with the level of the public good because the agents shared investment interest dominates their conflict over pork spending to a lesser extent as the efficiency gains from investing get exhausted in equilibrium more efficient states of the public good are associated with tighter executive constraints despite the fact that agents share the same preferences over public good consumption equilibrium public good provision is inefficient moreover this inefficiency worsens as the incumbent s re election chances deteriorate these findings shed light on why incumbents facing similar electoral environments make different institutional choices

democratic public good provision this paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under repeated voting expenditures are financed through age dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations we focus on politico economic markov equilibria and contrast these with the ramsey allocation under commitment the model features indeterminate equilibria with a key role of forward looking strategic voting due to the lack of commitment to future policies the tax burden may be on the wrong side of the dynamic laffer curve moreover restrictions on government policies can in some cases be welfare improving

demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining i propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play the equilibrium majorities and the policy outcome the ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is however invariant to fundamental institutional differences and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power the bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office the order of play is endogenous and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker the role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

the soviet economic decline soviet growth from 1960 to 1989 was the worst in the world after we control for investment and human capital the relative performance worsens over time there is some evidence that the burden of defense spending modestly contributed to the soviet debacle the declining soviet growth rate from 1950 to 1987 can be accounted for by a declining marginal product of capital with a constant rate of growth of total factor productivity the soviet reliance on extensive growth rising capital to output ratios was no greater than that of market economies such as japan and the republic of korea but a low elasticity of substitution between capital and labor implied especially acute diminishing returns to capital compared with the case in market economies copyright 1995 by oxford university press

the road to power partisan loyalty and the centralized provision of local infrastructure this paper sets out a simple dynamic probabilistic voting model in which a government allocates a fixed budget across electoral districts that differ in their loyalties to the ruling party the model predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long run machine politics considerations and the more immediate concern to win over swing voters empirical results obtained from a panel of electoral districts in quebec provide robust evidence that districts which display loyalty to the incumbent government receive disproportionately more spending especially close to an election at odds with the standard swing voter view

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

the dynamics of government abstract we model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations we find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment the difference is larger the lower is the political influence of young agents the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations and the lower is risk aversion furthermore there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium finally smooth preference aggregation as under probabilistic voting produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria which occur under majority voting aggregation

what determines the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor a literature review this paper provides the first comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the determinants of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor our focus is on the two input constant elasticity of substitution ces production function we start by presenting four concise observations that summarize the empirical literature on the estimation of motivated by these observations the main part of this survey then focuses on potential determinants of capital labor substitution we first review several approaches to the microfoundation of production functions where the elasticity of substitution eos is treated as a purely technological parameter second we outline the construction of an aggregate elasticity of substitution aes in a multi sectoral framework and investigate its dependence on underlying intra and inter sectoral substitution third we discuss the influence of the institutional framework on the extent of factor substitution overall this survey highlights that the effective elasticity of substitution ees which is typically estimated in empirical studies is generally not an immutable deep parameter but depends on a multitude of technological non technological and institutional determinants based on these insights the final section identifies a number of potential empirical and theoretical avenues for future research

mandatory versus discretionary spending the status quo eect do mandatory spending programs such as medicare improve eciency we analyze a model with two parties allocating a xed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an innite horizon we compare two institutions that dier in whether public good spending is discretionary or mandatory we model mandatory spending as an endogenous status quo since it is enacted by law and remains in eect until changed mandatory programs result in higher public good spending furthermore they ex ante pareto dominate discretionary programs when parties are patient persistence of power is low and polarization is low

banking and insurance abstract this paper studies the economic role of financial institutions in economies where agents incomes are subject to privately observable idiosyncratic random events the information structure precludes conventional insurance arrangements however a financial institution perhaps best viewed as a savings bank can provide partial insurance by generating a time pattern of deposit returns that redistributes wealth from agents with high incomes to those with low incomes resulting in a level of expected utility higher than that achievable in simple security markets insurance is incomplete because the bank faces a tradeoff between provision of insurance and maintenance of private incentives

debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking abstract this paper develops a political economic model of fiscal policy one in which government resources are a common property out of which interest groups can finance expenditures on their preferred items this setup has striking macroeconomic implications transfers are higher than a benevolent planner would choose them to be fiscal deficits emerge even when there are no reasons for intertemporal smoothing and in the long run government debt tends to be excessively high peculiar time profiles for transfers can emerge with high net transfers early on giving rise to high taxes later on

productivity versus elasticity a normalized constant elasticity of substitution production function applied to historical soviet data this study tests the extensive growth hypothesis which would attribute the soviet economic slowdown to low elasticity of substitution and over investment rather than deteriorating productivity growth to circumvent the low availability of data widely applicable new methods for estimating productivity and elasticity of substitution were developed based on the normalized constant elasticity of substitution ces production function one is an extended version of the solow residual calculation and the other is a direct estimation of the time varying parameter normalized ces production function the application of the methods to the soviet data showed a decreasing trend in productivity growth and a low elasticity of substitution of approximately 0 25 the results neither reject nor support the extensive growth hypothesis because of uncertainty in the interpretation of the low elasticity of substitution the results suggest that it is reasonable to assert that both deteriorating productivity growth and low

seniority in legislatures we construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system we model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional issues modeled as a divide the dollar game however each session begins with a vote in which the legislators decide by majority rule whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the baron ferejohn rule an agenda setter is selected by a random recognition rule which in our model is a function of the seniority system selected the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues and the legislature then votes whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal if the legislature rejects the proposal another agenda setter is randomly selected and the process is repeated if the legislature accepts the proposal the legislative session ends and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their legislator or throw it out of office the voters verdict determines the seniority structure of the next period legislature we find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority system and that legislators are always reelected