photovoltaic investment roadmaps and sustainable development abstract this paper analyzes the potential contributions of photovoltaic energy to sustainable development in its three dimensions environmental economic and social for that purpose the capacity deployments proposed by the main international institutions in the field are considered mainly the international energy agency the paper focuses on the monetary valuation of avoided co2 emissions and the assessment of the required financial funds the risk implied by the uncertain photovoltaic prices are dealt with and methods to manage it are suggested it is shown that valuing emission at a conservative price and properly discounted would be enough to finance on average the required investments thus a low carbon tax is all that would be required to finance the investments

auctions with resale when private values are uncertain evidence from the lab and field abstract auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first price auctions remains under researched this study begins by examining field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3000 auctions over 10 000 individual bids for cutting rights of standing timber in british columbia from 1996 to 2000 in comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not we find evidence that is consistent with theory critical evaluation of the reduced form bidding model however reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types we therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect we find that while it does have the predicted effect a theoretical model based on risk averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk neutral bidders beyond testing theory the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data

how do learning externalities influence the evaluation of ontario s renewables support policies abstract support programs for renewable electricity generation in ontario have been in place since 2005 including feed in tariffs and a competitive procurement process these programs have been criticized on a number of fronts in particular critics claim the level of support was excessive and creating surplus supply however prior studies have ignored one potential benefit of renewable energy support that it can help to promote cost reductions in new technologies through learning by doing this paper uses a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium cge model featuring learning by doing effects to assess the renewable support programs provided in ontario our results in line with previous studies do not justify the high support rates paid in ontario given our core range of assumptions but our modeling approach allows us to identify the combination of key parameter values relating to learning effects and environmental damages that justify the observed rates these parameters are hard to measure empirically and our modeling approach introduces a new tool for examining the impact of variations in these parameters on policy analysis

optimal auction with resale this paper investigates the design of seller optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good in that case the optimal allocation characterized by myerson 1981 cannot be achieved without resale i find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale in two bidder cases i prove that the myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions with three or more bidders achieving the myerson allocation is more difficult i prove that it can be implemented in special cases in those cases the myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions each optimally chosen by a reseller

emissions trading and technology deployment in an energy systems bottom up model with technology learning abstract an important criterion in the analysis of climate policy instruments is their ability to stimulate the technological change necessary to enable the long term shift towards a low carbon global energy system in this paper some effects of emissions trading on technology deployment when technology learning is endogenized are examined with a multi regional bottom up energy systems optimization markal model of the global energy system in this framework due to the action of spillovers of learning imposing emission constraints on a given region may affect the technology choice and emissions profiles of other unconstrained regions the effects depend on the geographical scale of the learning process but also on the presence of emissions trading the regions that join the trade system and their timing for doing so incorporating endogenous technology learning and allowing for spillovers across regions appears as an important mechanism for capturing the possibility of induced technological change due to environmental constraints in bottom up models

can technology specific deployment policies be cost effective the case of renewable energy support schemes can technology specific deployment policies be cost effective the case of renewable energy support schemes

first price auctions with resale abstract we present a simple model of first price auction with two bidders whose valuations are not identically distributed and where resale is possible between the bidders and given an explicit expression for the equilibrium strategies

collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects with and without complementarities collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects even with large complementarities in the buyers utility functions the bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves while keeping the prices low in the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized the scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases

understanding overbidding in second price auctions an experimental study we present results from second price private value auction spa experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponentsvalue such signals change biddersperception about the strengthof their opponent and the relationship between biddersperception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in spa we found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values supporting a modifiedjoy of winninghypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values consistent with thespite hypothesis second price private value auctions spas are the most easily understood auction format from a theoretical point of view 1 in standard private value auction models of fully rational bidders with standard preferences bidding one s own value is a weakly dominant strategy this theoretical prediction holds irrespective of biddersrisk atti tudes the number of rival bidders symmetry in the value distributions and so on in laboratory experiments however subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding kagel et al 1987 found that the actual bids are on average 11 above the dominant strategy bids kagel and levin 1993 found that about 62 of all bids in their five bidder spa sessions exceed the bidder s value while only 8 of all bids were below it both kagel and levin 1993 and harstad 2000 further reported that experience has only a small effect in reducing overbidding in spa an important related finding is that overbidding in english auctions a mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the spa in the case of private values is known to be a short term phenomenon that subjects quickly learn not to undertake kagel and levin 1993 thus any explanation for the prevalence and persistence of overbidding in the spa must also explain its rarity in the english auction given the robustness of the findings of overbidding in spa it is surprising that economists have little understanding of why it happens kagel et al 1987 conjectured that bidding above one s own value in a spa is based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second highest bid 2 moreover they argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive profits and because the negative feedback from overbidding is a weak mechanism in the spa for example if a bidder overbids in a spa by 10 above her value it is quite possible that she does not win at all and thus does not experience

picking winners modelling the costs of technology specific climate policy in the u s passenger vehicle sector abstract researchers debate the cost effectiveness of technology specific versus technology neutral climate policies but few quantify the differences using the case of low carbon vehicle technologies in the us passenger vehicle sector ethanol plug in electric and hydrogen we develop a technology adoption simulation model that represents increasing returns to adoption in both financial costs and consumer preferences representing uncertainty through monte carlo analysis we compare the policy costs tonne co2 out to 2050 of i a technology neutral carbon tax ii a somewhat neutral vehicle standard requiring low carbon vehicle sales but allowing competition among technologies and iii technology specific vehicle standards requiring sales of just one technology on average across simulations the carbon tax is twice as cost effective as the best vehicle standard in part because the tax more substantially affects vehicle use rates among the vehicle standards a technology specific standard that selects the right winner plug in electric vehicles is more cost effective than the neutral standard as it more quickly stimulates technology improvement however there is risk in a technology specific approach mistakenly forcing a loser technology hydrogen results in policy costs that are 2 to 5 times higher than other policies results can help policymakers trade off the costs and risks of different climate policy options

firm size and the nature of innovation within industries the case of process and product r d the effect of firm size on the allocation of r d effort between process and product innovation is examined it is hypothesized that relative to product innovations process innovations are less saleable in disembodied form and spawn less growth this implies that the returns to process r d will depend more on the firm s output at the time it conducts its r d than the returns to product r d incorporating this distinction in a simple model the authors derive and test predictions about how the fraction of r d devoted to process innovation varies with firm size within industries

understanding the reductions in us corn ethanol production costs an experience curve approach the us is currently the world s largest ethanol producer an increasing percentage is used as transportation fuel but debates continue on its costs competitiveness and energy balance in this study technological development of ethanol production and resulting cost reductions are investigated by using the experience curve approach scrutinizing costs of dry grind ethanol production over the timeframe 1980 2005 cost reductions are differentiated between feedstock corn production and industrial ethanol processing corn production costs in the us have declined by 62 over 30 years down to 100 2005 tonne in 2005 while corn production volumes almost doubled since 1975 a progress ratio pr of 0 55 is calculated indicating a 45 cost decline over each doubling in cumulative production higher corn yields and increasing farm sizes are the most important drivers behind this cost decline industrial processing costs of ethanol have declined by 45 since 1983 to below 130 2005 m3 in 2005 excluding costs for corn and capital equivalent to a pr of 0 87 total ethanol production costs including capital and net corn costs have declined approximately 60 from 800 2005 m3 in the early 1980s to 300 2005 m3 in 2005 higher ethanol yields lower energy use and the replacement of beverage alcohol based production technologies have mostly contributed to this substantial cost decline in addition the average size of dry grind ethanol plants increased by 235 since 1990 for the future it is estimated that solely due to technological learning production costs of ethanol may decline 28 44 though this excludes effects of the current rising corn and fossil fuel costs it is also concluded that experience curves are a valuable tool to describe both past and potential future cost reductions in us corn based ethanol production

economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon a reexamination in a recent issue of this review david grether and charles plott 1979 hereinafter referred to as g p presented a series of experiments that show that individual decisions are made in a manner inconsistent with standard preference theory this inconsistency can be illustrated by the following example individuals under suitable laboratory conditions first have a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a small sum of money the p bet probability bet and a lottery with a high stake but low probability of winning the m bet money bet after indicating a preference for one of the lotteries in the pair the same subjects are then asked to place a monetary value on each of the individual lotteries grether and plott found that a large number of participants stated a preference for the p bet in the first round but placed a higher value on the other lottery the m bet in the second round this behavior a preference reversal is inconsistent with the traditional statements of preference theory

preference anomalies preference elicitation and the discovered preference hypothesis there is wide ranging evidence much of it deriving from economics experiments of anomalies in behaviour that challenge standard preference theories this paper explores the implications of these anomalies for preference elicitation methods because methods that are used to inform public policy such as contingent valuation are based on standard preference theories their validity may be called into question by the anomaly data however on a new interpretation these anomalies do not contradict standard theory but are errors in stated preference that can be expected to disappear as people become more experienced in relevant decision environments we explore the evidence for this interpretation and what implications follow for preference elicitation methodology

collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders abstract we show that efficient collusion by any subset of bidders in second price private value auctions is possible even when the bidders are heterogeneous an important property of efficient collusion is that a bidder s net payoff from participating in collusion is independent of her valuation we show that the cooperative game whose characteristic function evaluated at a coalition is the ex ante collusive surplus of that coalition has a nonempty core a feature of more technical interest is the mechanism characterization when the private information of agents does not enter in a linear or even piecewise linear manner

up scaling formative phases and learning in the historical diffusion of energy technologies the 20th century has witnessed wholesale transformation in the energy system marked by the pervasive diffusion of both energy supply and end use technologies just as whole industries have grown so too have unit sizes or capacities analysed in combination these unit level and industry level growth patterns reveal some consistencies across very different energy technologies first the up scaling or increase in unit size of an energy technology comes after an often prolonged period of experimentation with many smaller scale units second the peak growth phase of an industry can lag these increases in unit size by up to 20 years third the rate and timing of up scaling at the unit level is subject to countervailing influences of scale economies and heterogeneous market demand these observed patterns have important implications for experience curve analyses based on time series data covering the up scaling phases of energy technologies as these are likely to conflate industry level learning effects with unit level scale effects the historical diffusion of energy technologies also suggests that low carbon technology policies pushing for significant jumps in unit size before a formative phase of experimentation with smaller scale units are risky

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

all equilibria of the multi unit vickrey auction abstract this paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non increasing marginal valuations and there are at least three potential buyers there are two types of equilibria in the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum valuation in this class above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all units one of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold the other bidders bid zero in this range in the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units the allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders all the remaining bids equal zero with any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

quantifying the long term economic benefits of european electricity system integration abstract this paper aims to quantify the long term economic benefits that arise from an increasing integration of the pan european electricity system by means of comparing model based decarbonization scenarios developed with the model limes eu it explicitly accounts for the interplay between transmission infrastructure and renewable generation capacity expansion we confirm earlier findings that on aggregate pan european transmission capacity expansion constitutes a no regret option for integrating increasing shares of variable renewables it leads to positive social returns on investment in all mitigation scenarios under analysis however the reduction in total discounted system costs stemming from transmission capacity expansion is modest in magnitude over the period 2010 2050 it reaches a maximum of 3 5 for a case with massive expansion compared to one in which the status quo remains in technical terms this means that the optimum is rather flat and taking into account regional and local benefits and distributional aspects could alter the evaluation of the economic benefits a crucial finding is that the configuration of pan european transmission infrastructure and the importance of specific country connections i e a southern versus a northern solution hinges on the relative development of specific investment costs for solar and wind technologies over the next decades

a review of uncertainties in technology experience curves abstract the use of log linear experience curves or learning curves relating reductions in the unit cost of technologies to their cumulative production or installed capacity has become a common method of representing endogenous technical change in energy economic models used for policy analysis yet there are significant uncertainties in such formulations whose impact on key model results have been insufficiently examined or considered this paper reviews the major types of uncertainty in log linear experience curves and their effect on projected rates of cost reduction uncertainties are found not only in the learning rate parameter of a log linear model but also in the functional form that determines the shape of an experience curve evidence for alternative forms such as an s shaped curve is reviewed along with case studies that demonstrate the uncertainties associated with cost increases during early commercialization of a technology a phenomena that is widely recognized but rarely quantified or incorporated in learning models additional factors discussed include the effects of learning discontinuities institutional forgetting and the influence of social economic and political factors we then review other models of causality which aim to improve modelers ability to explain and predict the influence of other underlying processes that contribute to technology cost reductions in addition to learning ignoring other types of underlying mechanisms can create a false sense of precision and overestimate the true contribution of learning currently however uncertainties in such multi factor models remain large due to the difficulties of estimating key parameters such as private sector r d investments and extending models of a specific technology to a broader suite of technologies and cost projections pending the development and validation of more robust models of technological change we suggest ways to significantly improve the characterization and reporting of current learning model uncertainties and their impacts on the results of energy economic models to help reduce the potential for drawing inappropriate or erroneous policy conclusions

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

market experience eliminates some anomalies and creates new ones we report two experiments which investigate whether experience of decision making in repeated markets purges behaviour of preference reversals we investigate two behavioural mechanisms that may be shaping bids in repeated auctions a tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed market prices and a tendency to reduce bids following bad market outcomes we find little support for the former but strong support for the latter also whilst just enough market exposure eliminates the typical preference reversal phenomenon continued exposure fosters the mirror image anomaly therefore although market experience shapes behaviour in our experiments it does not generally promote consistency with standard preference theory

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

an economic perspective on experience curves and dynamic economies in renewable energy technologies this paper analyzes dynamic economies in renewable energy technologies the paper has two contributions the first is to test the robustness of experience in solar photovoltaic solar thermal and wind energy to the addition of an explicit time trend which has been done in experience studies for other industries but not for renewable energy technologies estimation is carried out on the assumption that cumulative capacity industry production average firm production and electricity generation affect experience and thus the fall in price the second contribution is to test the impact of r d on price reduction in general cumulative experience is found to be highly statistically significant when estimated alone and highly statistically insignificant when time is added to the model the effect of r d is small and statistically significant in solar photovoltaic technology and statistically insignificant in solar thermal and wind technologies

all equilibria of the vickrey auction abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in the second price sealed bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders in addition we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness

long term payoffs of near term low carbon deployment policies abstract recent climate change negotiations indicate that near term policies to address climate change are likely to vary across countries with countries employing a range of different policy options one option frequently mooted at the national level is to promote via policy the deployment of low carbon technologies promoting the deployment of low carbon technologies can involve a near term cost if such technologies are more expensive overall or require more upfront capital than emitting alternatives however it lowers future costs of emissions abatement by reducing emissions in the near term and potentially accelerating rates of improvement in targeted low carbon technologies we derive a globally cost effective near term international technology investment strategy to achieve a long term climate goal and show that it employs a diversified international technology investment portfolio across countries we also explore the degree to which independent national technology deployment policies align with collaboratively determined regimes we show that conditions exist under which there are substantial gains to international cooperation in the deployment of diverse low carbon technologies and also circumstances in which domestic outcomes align with the global outcome

asymmetric auctions with resale an experimental study we study auctions with resale based on hafalir and krishna s 2008 6 model as predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without so that average auction prices tend to increase when the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do but not nearly as much as the theory predicts in other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral nash model s predictions bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without in line with the theory

partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities abstract two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary markets for the goods being sold even in simple symmetric settings the combination of these features can preclude existence of an equilibrium in symmetric separating bidding strategies with a reserve price sufficiently far below the maximum endogenous valuation a symmetric equilibrium still exists but with some types pooling at the reserve the optimal reserve price depends not only on the joint distribution of bidders information before and after the auction but also on how surplus is divided in the secondary market journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c7 l1 d82

imprecision as an account of the preference reversal phenomenon many individuals choices and valuations involve a degree of uncertainty imprecision this paper reports an experiment designed to obtain some measure of imprecision and to examine the extent to which it can explain preference reversals of two opposite forms one of which appears not to have been reported previously the model of imprecision we examine not only predicts both patterns but also provides an account of earlier results that are otherwise not well explained the results suggest that any successful descriptive theory of choice and valuation will need to allow in some way for the imprecision surrounding people s decisions

on the economics of renewable energy sources abstract with the global expansion of renewable energy re technologies the provision of optimal re policy packages becomes an important task we review pivotal aspects regarding the economics of renewables that are relevant to the design of an optimal re policy many of which are to date unresolved we do so from three interrelated perspectives that a meaningful public policy framework for inquiry must take into account first we explore different social objectives justifying the deployment of re technologies and review model based estimates of the economic potential of re technologies i e their socially optimal deployment level second we address pivotal market failures that arise in the course of implementing the economic potential of re sources in decentralized markets third we discuss multiple policy instruments curing these market failures our framework reveals the requirements for an assessment of the relevant options for real world decision makers in the field of re policies this review makes it clear that there are remaining white areas on the knowledge map concerning consistent and socially optimal re policies

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

on the sources of technological change assessing the evidence this paper uses a selective review of the economic literature on technological change to support four points that are important for interpreting and incorporating technological change into formal models of energy and the environment the review 1 supports the notion that no single source dominates the process of technological change it supports roles for rd 3 indicates that these spillovers are often indirect requiring own industry activities to utilize and 4 indicates that simple experience curve calibrations often used in formal models likely include a range of sources of technological change in addition to learning by doing some of which might not be induced by the sorts of policies typically considered in the climate context

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

a review of learning rates for electricity supply technologies a variety of mathematical models have been proposed to characterize and quantify the dependency of electricity supply technology costs on various drivers of technological change the most prevalent model form called a learning curve or experience curve is a log linear equation relating the unit cost of a technology to its cumulative installed capacity or electricity generated this one factor model is also the most common method used to represent endogenous technical change in large scale energy economic models that inform energy planning and policy analysis a characteristic parameter is the learning rate defined as the fractional reduction in cost for each doubling of cumulative production or capacity in this paper a literature review of the learning rates reported for 11 power generation technologies employing an array of fossil fuels nuclear and renewable energy sources is presented the review also includes multi factor models proposed for some energy technologies especially two factor models relating cost to cumulative expenditures for research and development r d as well as the cumulative installed capacity or electricity production of a technology for all technologies studied we found substantial variability as much as an order of magnitude in reported learning rates across different studies such variability is not readily explained by systematic differences in the time intervals geographic regions choice of independent variable or other parameters of each study this uncertainty in learning rates together with other limitations of current learning curve formulations suggests the need for much more careful and systematic examination of the influence of how different factors and assumptions affect policy relevant outcomes related to the future choice and cost of electricity supply and other energy technologies

horizontal mergers with synergies cash vs profit share auctions we consider takeover bidding in a cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target and bidders can influence rivals beliefs through their bids we compare cash and profit share auctions first and second price supplemented by entry fees since non merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low bidders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability nevertheless pooling does not occur unlike cash auctions profit share auctions are not revenue equivalent and the second price profit share auction is more profitable than the other auctions

what s experience got to do with it sources of cost reduction in a large specialty chemicals producer conventional learning curves relating unit cost to measures of production experience are estimated for 221 specialty chemicals produced by a fortune 500 company detailed records on cost and r d coupled with insights from company personnel are used to explain the variation across products in the rate of cost reduction products that exhibited the strongest relationship between unit cost and measures of production experience were subject to specific initiatives particularly process r d the r d was not however generally motivated or informed by production experience however cumulative past output the most commonly used measure of production experience was related to expected future output which conditioned the expected future returns from r d and the choice of r d projects thus cumulative output was connected to unit costs through its role in conditioning incentives to undertake process r d rather than as a proxy for production experience this suggests that the strong relationship commonly found between unit cost and measures of production experience may reflect incentives to reduce cost as much as learning from production experience

the impact of r d on innovation for wind energy in denmark germany and the united kingdom this paper examines the impact of public research and development r d support on cost reducing innovation for wind turbine farms in denmark germany and the united kingdom uk first we survey the literature in this field the literature indicates that in denmark r d policy has been more successful than in germany or the uk in promoting innovation of wind turbines furthermore such studies point out that subsidy induced capacity expansions were more effective in the uk and denmark in promoting cost reducing innovation than in germany the second part of the paper describes the quantitative analysis of the impact of r d and capacity expansion on innovation this is calculated using the two factor learning curve 2flc model in which investment cost reductions are explained by cumulative capacity and the r d based knowledge stock time series data were collected for the three countries and organized as a panel data set the parameters of the 2flc model were estimated focusing on the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the parameters across countries we arrived at robust estimations of a learning by doing rate of 5 4 and a learning by searching rate of 12 6 the analysis underlines the homogeneity of the learning parameters enhancing the validity of the 2flc formulation

the making of an oligopoly firm survival and technological change in the evolution of the u s tire industry the number of producers in the u s tire industry grew for 25 years and then declined sharply and the industry evolved to be an oligopoly the role of technological change in shaping the industry s market structure is explored a model of industry evolution featuring technological change is used to derive predictions that are tested using a novel data set on firm entry exit size location distribution networks and technological choices prior to the shakeout of producers consistent with the model earlier entering and larger firms survived longer principally because of the influence of age and size on technological change

multi object auctions with resale theory and experiment abstract we study multi object auctions in the presence of post auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either single or multi object demand we focus on two formats vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second price auctions we show that under complementarities the vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not the simultaneous second price on the other hand leads to inefficiency with or without resale possibility our experimental findings show that the possibility of resale in second price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to the no resale case however after resale the efficiency rate in second price is as high as that of vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the experiment preventing resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second price format

revisiting the techno economic analysis process for building mounted grid connected solar photovoltaic systems part two application part one in this two part paper identified monte carlo analysis as an improved approach over traditional deterministic techno economic methods for solar pv prosumers in deregulated markets in this

production costs of global conventional and unconventional petroleum abstract concerns about the costs of developing oil and gas from conventional and unconventional formations have led many commentators to assume that increasing prices are in the offing and may be a limiting factor for economic growth historically production costs have fluctuated as influenced by the cost increasing effects of depletion versus the cost reducing effects of technological progress this paper aims to review several methods for assessing current and long term costs despite the uncertainty of such estimation evidence shows that production costs in the foreseeable future might not increase dramatically and actually could decrease as petroleum development methods improve and additional supplies come online recent examples include the commercially viable production of unconventional oil and gas resources that has kept energy prices contained

asymmetric auctions with resale we study first and second price auctions with resale in a model with indepen dent private values with asymmetric bidders the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post auction trade which in our model takes place via monopoly pricing the winner makes a take it or leave it offer to the loser we show a a first price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium and b with resale the expected revenue from a first price auction exceeds that from a second price auction the inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a gen eral revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded jel d44

an equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction we provide a bayes nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction saa when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items we first assume that each local bidder values only a specific item e g the license for the region where it has monopoly power and that global bidders valuation functions are convex for this environment we show that a global bidder faces an exposure problem with adverse consequences for revenue and efficiency in the limit when the number of items grows large the saa is revenue and efficiency equivalent to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism we extend our analysis to include the case where items are substitutes for local bidders so that price arbitrage will occur as observed in many spectrum auctions this environment which combines substitutes and complements results in an aggravated exposure problem consequently the saa is no longer efficient and may yield dramatically lower revenues than the vcg mechanism finally we relax the assumption that global bidders valuation functions are convex by considering an environment with medium sized global bidders who demand fewer than all items we show that global bidders divide the market at low prices when market sharing is feasible while they engage in mutually destructive bidding when there is a fitting problem in both cases the saa again underperforms relative to the vcg mechanism

experience curve for natural gas production by hydraulic fracturing abstract from 2007 to 2012 shale gas production in the us expanded at an astounding average growth rate of over 50 yr and thereby increased nearly tenfold over this short time period alone hydraulic fracturing technology or fracking as well as new directional drilling techniques played key roles in this shale gas revolution by allowing for extraction of natural gas from previously unviable shale resources although hydraulic fracturing technology had been around for decades it only recently became commercially attractive for large scale implementation as the production of shale gas rapidly increased in the us over the past decade the wellhead price of natural gas dropped substantially in this paper we express the relationship between wellhead price and cumulative natural gas output in terms of an experience curve and obtain a learning rate of 13 for the industry using hydraulic fracturing technology this learning rate represents a measure for the know how and skills accumulated thus far by the us shale gas industry the use of experience curves for renewable energy options such as solar and wind power has allowed analysts practitioners and policy makers to assess potential price reductions and underlying cost decreases for these technologies in the future the reasons for price reductions of hydraulic fracturing are fundamentally different from those behind renewable energy technologies hence they cannot be directly compared and hydraulic fracturing may soon reach or maybe has already attained a lower bound for further price reductions for instance as a result of its water requirements or environmental footprint yet understanding learning by doing phenomena as expressed by an industry wide experience curve for shale gas production can be useful for strategic planning in the gas sector as well as assist environmental policy design and serve more broadly as input for projections of energy system developments

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

the evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure several empirical regularities concerning firm growth rates and industry firm size distributions have been developed by studying primarily mature industries the primary purpose of this article is to bring together and extend empirical regularities on the evolution of new industries and to use these regularities to gain further insight into the forces governing industry evolution to explain these regularities a model is constructed which emphasizes how factors governing the early evolution of industries may shape their market structure at maturity it stresses how chance events and exogenous factors that influence the number of potential entrants to the industry the growth rate of incumbents and the ease of imitation of industry leaders will influence the ultimate number and size distribution of firms in the industry

multi object auctions with package bidding an experimental comparison of vickrey and ibea abstract the use of package auctions for complex resource allocation has been rapidly increasing in recent years in this paper we study two package auction mechanisms in a laboratory setting a sealed bid vickrey auction and an ascending version of vickrey the i bea auction unlike the single unit vickrey auction where bidders tend to overbid in the laboratory most of our bidders either underbid or bid their true values furthermore at the aggregate level while the vickrey auction generates significantly higher revenue than does i bea the i bea auction generates significantly higher bidder profit and efficiency additionally a significantly larger proportion of i bea auctions achieves 100 efficiency than does the vickrey auction we also find that human bidders learn from their robot opponents when the robot strategies are myopic best responses

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

resale in second price auctions with costly participation abstract we study sealed bid second price auctions with costly participation and resale each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff if resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function the symmetric equilibrium where all bidders use the same cutoff is less efficient than a class of two cutoff asymmetric equilibria existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two cutoff equilibria with resale moreover the equilibria with resale are more asymmetric and under a sufficient condition more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale

first price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two bidder first price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed nevertheless we construct a behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure that is equivalent to the pure separating equilibrium under no disclosure thus if the bidders follow this equilibrium the choice of the disclosure regime does not affect the final allocation of the item nor the expected payoffs

optimality and the english and second price auctions with resale abstract in the presence of resale and under more general assumptions than zheng s 2002 implementation of myerson s 1981 optimal allocation with two bidders is achieved through the second price auction in a special class of asymmetric n bidder models it is achieved through the english auction

bidding to lose auctions with resale a losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction we show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price so it can be common knowledge that in equilibrium a weak bidder will win the auction and even without uncertainty about relative valuations resale will take place the possibility of reselling to a strong bidder attracts weak bidders to participate in the auction and raises the seller s revenue

collusion via resale the english auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post auction interbidder resale is allowed we show this by constructing equilibria where with positive probability one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders these equilibria interim pareto dominate among bidders the standard value bidding equilibrium without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or postbidding spoil division

speculation in standard auctions with resale in standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale we study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private value bidders for second price and english auctions the efficient value bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits first price and dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders the value distribution and the discount factor speculators do not make profits in first price or dutch auctions

understanding cost reduction of china s biomass direct combustion power generation a study based on learning curve model abstract during the critical transition towards cleaner production cp the developing and transition countries should pay extra attention to displace traditional biomass utilization with cp concepts such as biomass direct combustion power bio dcp china has witnessed impressive growth in its bio dcp sector from 2006 to 2014 the further industrial expansion and policy making of bio dcp in china and other countries in transition call for a deeper understanding of cost reduction mechanisms in this study the learning curve models i e electricity production cost as a function of multiple factors including cumulative installed capacity operation maintenance costs feed in tariff and cogeneration were developed to i empirically estimate the learning rates of china s bio dcp and ii investigate the impacts of past technological developments and policies on the cost development main findings include i the overall learning rate of china s bio dcp is 4 54 over the period 2006 2014 ii the raised feed in tariff in 2010 shows a positive effect on the learning of bio dcp iii the circulating fluidized bed projects show a higher learning rate compared to that of the grate boiler projects based on the above results suggestions regarding the bio dcp s future development are offered including discriminative subsidies biomass waste supply chains cogeneration and multi industry parks

pre play learning and the preference reversal phenomenon elicited preference rankings for two lotteries are typically inconsistent across choice and pricing tasks we test whether pre play learning makes preference rankings consistent pre play learning denotes ex ante lottery learning where subjects observe playing lotteries before making decisions we find that pre play learning makes the average selling prices for the p bet of subjects who choose the p bet higher than their average selling prices for the bet however pre play learning is not strong enough to equalize the rates of standard and non standard reversals although pre play learning reduces the rate of standard reversals

efficiency in auctions with failed resale abstract the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi object uniform price auctions with asymmetric bidders we theoretically show that when the exogenous probability of a resale market is sufficiently low final efficiency is lower than in an auction without resale our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the probability that bidders participate in a resale market resale always increases efficiency compared to the auction allocation but it also induces demand reduction by high value bidders which reduces auction efficiency consistent with theory and in contrast to what is usually argued the possibility of resale may reduce final efficiency and changes in the probability of resale have a non monotonic effect on efficiency we also analyze bargaining chat data to provide insights into the functioning of resale markets

low revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending bid auctions low revenue equilibria allow participants in an auction to obtain goods at prices lower than would prevail in a competitive market these outcomes are generated as perfect equilibria of ascending bid multiunit auctions we show that these equilibria are possible under mild conditions conditions that are likely to prevail in many situations where auction formats have recently been adopted we argue that these equilibria could explain the low revenues of some recent auctions and discuss potential remedies to eliminate low revenue equilibria

endogenous technological change in climate change modelling this article investigates the impact on optimal co2 abatement and carbon tax levels of introducing endogenous technological change in a macroeconomic model of climate change we analyse technological change as a function of cumulative capacity as incorporated recently in energy systems models our calculations confirm that including endogenous innovation implies earlier emission reduction to meet atmospheric carbon concentration constraints however the effect is stronger than suggested in the literature moreover the development of non fossil energy technologies constitutes the most important opportunity for emission reductions optimal carbon tax levels reducing fossil energy use are lower than usually advocated