what do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation this study empirically evaluates the certification and value added roles of reputable venture capitalists vcs using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start ups with multiple financing offers i analyze financing offers made by competing vcs at the first professional round of start up funding holding characteristics of the start up fixed offers made by vcs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted and high reputation vcs acquire start up equity at a 10 14 discount the evidence suggests that vcs extra financial value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital these extra financial services can have financial consequences a central issue for early stage high tech entrepreneurs is obtaining external resources when the assets of their start up are intangible and knowledge based particularly for entrepreneurs without an established reputation convincing external resource providers such as venture capitalists vcs to provide financial capital may be challenging the literature contains two main lines of research for overcoming this problem one research stream has concentrated on designing institutional structures to permit financing early stage ventures this contractual and monitoring based approach is aimed at solving potential agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs e g admati and pfleiderer 1994 lerner 1995 hellmann 1998 and kaplan and str omberg 2001 2002 2003 a second research stream has suggested that when the quality of a start up cannot be directly observed external actors rely on the quality of the start up s affiliates as a signal of the start up s own quality

foreign venture capitalists and the internationalization of entrepreneurial companies evidence from china we use a comprehensive database of venture capital backed companies from china to test whether and how foreign venture capitalists vcs can facilitate international initial public offerings of entrepreneurial companies foreign vcs increase the likelihood that a portfolio company will list on a foreign exchange and use a top lawyer banker or accountant when doing so the propensity to list overseas is moderated by the number of venture backers the fund s size and governance in the domestic market foreign vcs encourage foreign listings in domestic backed companies we take steps to address sample selection and endogeneity concerns overall we show that foreign vcs encourage internationalization in entrepreneurial companies

representative evidence on lying costs abstract a central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally these models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation to provide an empirically validated microfoundation for these models it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives we measure the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the german population by calling them at home in our setup participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport misreporting cannot be detected reputational concerns are negligible and altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role yet we find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs are large and widespread further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of communication

subjective and objective measures of governmental regulations in oecd nations abstract since government regulations may have an important impact on the macroeconomic performance of market economies it is necessary to devise quantitative indicators of the regulatory regime which raises some difficult methodological issues after reviewing some of these problems we compare the results of several recent quantitative studies of regulation in oecd nations some based on an extensive review and quantification of laws and regulations others based on observational data of those familiar with these regulations despite their very different methodologies and coverage of particular types of governmental regulation the results of the three studies are significantly correlated which suggests that they all capture the same underlying reality

studying optimal paternalism illustrated by a model of sin taxes the classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices a great deal of evidence suggests however that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave in their own best interests economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational and in particular it may be fruitful for economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better choices we propose an approach for studying optimal paternalism that follows naturally from standard assumptions and methods of economic theory write down assumptions about the distribution of rational and irrational types of agents about the available policy instruments and about the government s information about agents and then investigate which policies achieve the most efficient outcomes in other words economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a mechanism design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational this approach has many advantages first and foremost by explicitly addressing when and how people do and don t pursue their own best interests economists will be better able to contribute to policy debates to contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions we must study whether financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and whether self control problems lead people to borrow too heavily to contribute to debates over teenage smoking we must study whether teenagers become smokers against their long run best interest economists will and should be ignored if we continue to insist that it is axiomatic that constantly trading stocks or accumulating consumer debt or becoming a heroin addict must be optimal for the people doing these things merely because they have chosen to do it a second advantage of our approach is that it forces us to look for the best feasible policy our

do international investors enhance private firm value evidence from venture capital we examine the impact of international venture capital investors on private firm success spanning 81 countries over the years 1995 2010 the data examined indicate that relative to deals in which the investor base is purely domestic private firms that have an international investor base have a higher probability of exiting via an initial public offering ipo and higher ipo proceeds the evidence is consistent with the view that while the benefits of internationalization may be difficult and costly to manage for those firms that succeed in managing cross border coordination costs there is potential value for an ipo firm the benefits relative to the costs of internationalizing the investor base for private firms sold in acquisitions by contrast are much less pronounced the most important source of this benefit appears to be access to capital

model misspecification and underdiversification in this paper we study intertemporal portfolio choice when an investor accounts explicitly for model misspecification we develop a framework that allows for ambiguity about not just the joint distribution of returns for all stocks in the portfolio but also for different levels of ambiguity for the marginal distribution of returns for any subset of these stocks we find that when the overall ambiguity about the joint distribution of returns is high then small differences in ambiguity for the marginal return distribution will result in a portfolio that is significantly underdiversified relative to the standard mean variance portfolio

a theory of the syndicate form follows function we relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi rents this improves incentives for individual bankers to cultivate investor relationships that translate into greater expected proceeds reputational concerns of lead bankers amplify the effect we derive conditions under which restricted entry and designation of a lead banker strictly pareto dominate in which case it is also strictly pareto dominant for the syndicate s fee to be greater than members cost of participation copyright the american finance association 2001

lying to level the playing field why people may dishonestly help or hurt others to create equity unethical and dishonest behavior has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines recent work has begun to focus on a previous overlooked factor predicting dishonest behavior the beneficiary or victim of dishonest acts in two laboratory experiments we manipulate the level of resources allocated to our participants their wealth and investigate whether perceived inequity from wealth that is randomly or subjectively assigned leads individuals to cross ethical boundaries through helping or hurting others the results show that dishonest behavior is influenced by positive and negative inequity that motivates helping and hurting acts furthermore a third experiment shows that people tend to discount the wrongness of crossing ethical boundaries to hurt or help others when the action restores equity

contracts and exits in venture capital finance using a sample of european venture capital vc investments i study the relation between vc contracts and exits the data indicate that ex ante stronger vc control rights increase the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will exit by an acquisition rather than through a write off or an ipo my findings are robust to controls for a variety of factors including endogeneity and cases in which the vc preplans the exit at the time of contract choice my findings are consistent with control based theories of financial contracting such as aghion and bolton 1992

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

honesty on the streets a field study on newspaper purchasing many publishers use an honor system for selling newspapers in the street we conducted a field experiment to study honesty in this market finding that a moral reminder increases the level of honesty in payments whereas the same message has no effect on whether one is honest reminding customers of the legal norm has no effect we argue that these results are consistent with a preference for honesty based on an internalized social norm auxiliary evidence suggests that the moral message remains effective when it is posted for longer periods and even when it is removed again authors abstract

loss aversion and lying behavior abstract we theoretically show that loss averse agents are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a low payoff after a random draw the lower the ex ante probability of this bad outcome the ex ante expected payoff increases as the bad outcome becomes less likely and hence the greater is the loss avoided by lying we demonstrate robust support for this theory by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature and with a new experiment that varies the outcome probabilities and is run double anonymous

the influence of regulations on innovation a quantitative assessment for oecd countries abstract regulatory framework conditions have been identified as important factors influencing the innovation activities of companies industries and whole economies however in the empirical literature the impacts of regulation have been assessed as rather ambivalent for innovation different types of regulations generate various impacts and even a single type of regulation can influence innovation in various ways depending on how the regulation is implemented the endogenous growth approach developed by carlin and soskice 2006 and empirically applied by crafts 2006 which determines endogenously the rate of technological progress and therefore innovation allows a conceptual analysis of the influence of different types of regulation on innovation in general the negative effect of compliance costs should be compared with the more dynamic effect of regulations generating additional incentives for innovative activities based on this approach we derive hypotheses on the impact of different specific regulations on innovation we differentiate between economic social and institutional regulations following the oecd taxonomy on regulations existing economic analyses are surveyed which are characterised by rather heterogeneous approaches data bases and results the paper aims to apply a comprehensive and comparative approach to investigate quantitatively the innovation impacts in 21 oecd countries using panel data for the period between 1998 and 2004 in summary the empirical results confirm the hypotheses derived from the conceptual theoretical framework determining technical progress and innovation endogenously and allowing a distinction between short term and long term effects consequently the theoretical approach is an appropriate starting point for the empirical analysis of the influence of different regulations on innovation

the economics of private equity funds this article analyzes the economics of the private equity industry using a novel model and dataset we obtain data from a large investor in private equity funds with detailed records on 238 funds raised between 1993 and 2006 we build a model to estimate the expected revenue to managers as a function of their investor contracts and we test how this estimated revenue varies across the characteristics of our sample funds among our sample funds about two thirds of expected revenue comes from fixed revenue components that are not sensitive to performance we find sharp differences between venture capital vc and buyout bo funds bo managers build on their prior experience by increasing the size of their funds faster than vc managers do this leads to significantly higher revenue per partner and per professional in later bo funds the results suggest that the bo business is more scalable than the vc business and that past success has a differential impact on the terms of their future funds jel g10 g20 g24

what lures cross border venture capital inflows the change in the business model of venture capitalists from investing locally towards investing across borders started to intensify in the late 1990s according to a dataset of european and north american countries we find that countries with higher expected growth and higher lagged stock market returns receive larger net cross border venture capital inflows thus portfolio companies located in high growth and high return countries receive more venture capital from foreign venture capitalists than these countries venture capitalists invest in foreign portfolio companies also countries with lower stock market capitalizations as well as those with poor tax and legal environments for venture capital intermediation exhibit larger net cross border inflows these findings offer important insights for policy makers since cross border venture capital inflows partly compensate for potential limits in the domestic venture capital supply

tax me if you can an artifactual field experiment on dishonesty in this paper we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die under cup paradigm participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and thus have an incentive to over report we find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act in addition we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty we find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes these results warn policy makers about the non trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty

legal framework quality and success of different types of venture capital investments abstract drawing on an analysis of 8 270 companies from 41 countries i explore the relationship between success of venture capital investments and legal frameworks in the investment countries legal framework quality is related to success but the effect varies with the deal type first the significant and positive relationship between legal framework quality and success is more pronounced for domestic deals than for international deals further investigations suggest that international venture capitalists often exit their portfolio companies abroad particularly when these companies are located in countries with inefficient legal frameworks in addition the results lend support to the view that international venture capitalists have a greater experience and reputation second legal framework quality seems to be more important for success in syndicated than in standalone deals this finding supports the view that a sound legal framework may improve the benefit cost balance of syndication while an inefficient legal framework may tend to increase costs in syndicated deals

does legal enforcement affect financial transactions the contractual channel in private equity analyzing 210 developing country private equity investments we find that transactions vary with nations legal enforcement whether measured directly or through legal origin investments in high enforcement and common law nations often use convertible preferred stock with covenants in low enforcement and civil law nations private equity groups tend to use common stock and debt and rely on equity and board control transactions in high enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns while relying on ownership rather than contractual provisions may help to alleviate legal enforcement problems these results suggest that private solutions are only a partial remedy

do you not like pigou or do you not understand him tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab tax aversion reduces the likelihood that price rationing can be a politically viable tool for environmental protection we examine the case of the classic pigouvian tax to control a negative externality and consider how recycling the revenues labeling of the tax and information about its purpose affects the support for taxation we test the support for taxation within a single price market experiment in which purchases by some buyers impose external costs on others observing behavior consistent with tax aversion we also find that recycling the revenues to more narrowly targeted groups seems to increase support for taxation in the absence of narrow revenue recycling labeling a pigouvian instrument as a tax may significantly lower the likelihood of voter support

why do we lie a practical guide to the dishonesty literature over the last decade a massive body of research has been devoted to uncovering human dishonesty in the present paper we review more than a hundred papers from this literature and provide a comprehensive overview by first listing the existing theoretical frameworks and then covering the common empirical approaches synthesizing the demographic and personal characteristics of those who cheat identifying the behavioural mechanisms found that affect dishonesty and finally we finish by discussing how the empirical evidence fit theory overall the review concludes that many people behave dishonestly but also that it is a highly malleable behavior sensitive to elements such as decision contexts behaviour of others state of mind and depletion the review can be used as an overview of the dishonesty literature or as a guide or work of reference for selected topics of interest

entrepreneurs and new ideas we study how early stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension such as technical feasibility correspondence to market demand legality or patentability to screen good ideas the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise sharing the idea however creates the risk that the expert would steal it yet the idea thief cannot contact any other expert lest he should in turn steal the idea thus stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary in such cases the entrepreneur can form a partnership with the experts thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other s information yet very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them

private equity returns and disclosure around the world to obtain more funds from the institutional investors private equity pe fund managers may report inflated valuations of private investee companies that are not yet sold however such overvaluations may result in a reputational cost when those investments are realized using evidence from 39 countries we show that there are significant systematic biases in managers reporting of fund performance we find that these biases depend on the accounting and legal environment in a country and on proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between institutional investors and pe fund managers

ipos trade sales and liquidations modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis using a detailed sample made up of more than 20 000 investment rounds we analyze the time to ipo trade sale and liquidation for about 6 000 venture backed firms we model these exit times using competing risks models biotech and internet firms have the fastest ipo exits internet firms are also the fastest to liquidate while biotech firms are however the slowest the conditional probability for ipos are clearly non monotonous with respect to time as time flows venture capital backed firms first exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an ipo however after having reached a plateau investments that have not yet exited have fewer and fewer possibilities of ipo exits as time increases the bubble period from 1998 to 2000 was an easy money period where venture capitalists gave much more money to firms many of which did not offer outstanding growth potential as they tended to liquidate much faster than in normal times