the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy responses to twin crises we study how effective fiscal and monetary policy responses are during a twin crisis using the dataset provided by laeven and valencia 2008 we identify 57 episodes of twin crises following the methods proposed in baldacci et al 2009 and hutchison et al 2010 we construct the variables measuring the duration and output cost of a twin crisis we find that fiscal policy does not seem to be associated with the shortening of a twin crisis regarding monetary policy we find that monetary tightening is associated with the lengthening of a twin crisis duration consistent with the result in hutchison et al 2010 dealing with a sudden stop crisis in addition our results show that while a mild monetary expansion is effective in reducing a twin crisis duration over expansionary monetary policy loses its effectiveness

what do twins share a joint probit estimation of banking and currency crises we study the determinants of twin crises and investigate the direction of causality between banking and currency crises in emerging markets we model banking and currency crises as dynamic events correlated over time and jointly estimate their probability using panel data simulation techniques we show that banking and currency crises are closely intertwined and are driven by common fundamentals banking crises exhibit strong state dependence suggesting that countries that have experienced a banking crisis in the past are more prone to experience another crisis finally we find evidence of unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the error term structure

a model of financial crises in emerging markets recent events in mexico asia russia and brazil have underscored that a satisfactory explanation of financial crises in emerging markets remains elusive not too long ago the prevailing view was that crises were the inevitable outcome of ongoing fiscal imbalances coupled with fixed exchange rates but this first generation view pioneered by krugman 1979 has fallen out of fashion because in many crises the crucial fiscal disequilibria were absent and as obstfeld 1994 has argued currency crises have sometimes occurred even though central banks had more than enough resources to prevent them witness much of europe in the early 1990s obstfeld put forward a second generation view in which central banks may decide to abandon an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of defending it become too large this new perspective implied that crises could be driven by self fulfilling expectations since the costs of defending the peg may themselves depend on anticipations that the peg will be maintained but obstfeld s emphasis on mounting unemployment and domestic recession while appropriate for the erm 1992 crisis was at odds with the facts in mexico in 1994 and east asia in 1997 asian

a new approach to modeling early warning systems for currency crises can a machine learning fuzzy expert system predict the currency crises effectively abstract this paper presents a hybrid causal model for predicting the occurrence of currency crises by using the neuro fuzzy modeling approach the model integrates the learning ability of the neural network with the inference mechanism of fuzzy logic the empirical results show that the proposed neuro fuzzy model leads to a better prediction of crisis significantly the model can also construct a reliable causal relationship among the variables through the obtained knowledge base compared to neural network and the traditionally used techniques such as logit the proposed model can thus lead to a somewhat more prescriptive modeling approach based on determinate causal mechanisms towards finding ways to prevent currency crises

the minimal conditions for a financial crisis a multiregional intertemporal cge model of the asian crisis abstract the globalization of world capitalism constrains the ability of the developmental state to pursue an independent industrialization and foreign trade strategy we use an intertemporal multiregion cge model to study the fundamental reasons for a financial crisis we find that we can create a realistic crisis in the asia region when capital markets are open and there is an unexpected rise in the risk premium of the asia region when capital markets are closed and the state retains all its policy instruments the asia region not only avoids a crisis but increases its rate of growth

stabilization with liberalization an evaluation of ten years of chile s experience with free market policies 1973 1983 the recent post 1973 economic experience of chile has attracted considerable attention both from professional economists and from the media most observers have been particularly impressed by the sharp contrasts observed in chile in such a short period of time for example in 1973 chile had one of the highest rates of inflation in the world over 600 whereas in 1981 it experienced one of the lowest rates of inflation 9 5 also in 1975 real gnp declined by 12 9 but during 1977 80 real gnp grew at an average rate of 8 5 per annum in 1982 however the country faced a new recession with real gnp dropping by 14 5 in 1983 the gnp was reduced further by 2 3 the fact that these episodes developed while the military government was actively pursuing free market oriented policies that greatly liberalized the economy adds considerable interest to the chilean case 2 the year 1973 marked an important turning point in chile s economic and political history in september of that year the military took over the government from president salvador allende and a period of dramatic economic changes began chile was transformed from an economy isolated from the rest of the world with strong government intervention into a liberalized world integrated economy where market forces were left free to guide most of the economy s decisions the period 1973 81 was characterized by important achievements inflation was greatly reduced the government deficit was virtually eliminated the economy went through a dramatic liberalization of its foreign sector tariffs were reduced to a uniform 10 level and prices including interest rates were full liberalized probably one of the most interesting aspects of the chilean economy during this period is that major

balance of payments crises in a cash in advance economy the author shows that a flexible prices sidrauski type model with a cash in advance constraint is capable of depicting some of the phenomena associated with a balance of payments crisis like the onesrecently observed in argentina and mexico current accounts deficits and appreciation of the real exchange rat e it is also shown that these phenomena become exacerbated as the rate of devaluation before the crisis occurs becomes smaller copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

the role of expectations in stabilization policy abstract this paper develops and tests a theory of the process by which private agents in an economy form expectations about government policy agents form and update their beliefs about the true state of government policy in a bayesian fashion the credibility of a policy is defined to be the subjective probability that the government is pursuing a reform policy rule the credibility of a reform of monetary or exchange rate policies is a function of the parameters of both monetary and fiscal policies the theory is applied to the chilean and argentine exchange reforms of the late 1970 s

balance of payments crises and devaluation the collapse of a fixed exchange rate is typically marked by a sudden balance of payments crisis in which speculators fleeing from the domestic currency acquire a large portion of the central bank s foreign exchange holdings faced with such an attack the central bank often withdraws temporarily from the foreign exchange market allowing the exchange rate to float freely before devaluing and returning to a fixed rate regime this paper links the timing of the initial speculative attack to the magnitude of the expected devaluation and to the length of the transitional period off loating an implication of the analysis is that there exist devaluations so sharp and transition periods so short that acrisis must occur the moment the market first learns that the current exchange parity will eventually be altered for sufficiently long transition periods the floating exchange rate overshoots its new peg before appreciating back toward it for shorter periods the rate depreciates monotonically to its new fixed level accordingly the central bank s return tothe foreign exchange market can occasion a capital outflow or a capital inflow this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

domestic bank runs and speculative attacks on foreign currencies abstract the paper extends the international transmission of financial crisis literature by illustrating how a domestic bank run can cause a speculative attack on foreign currencies the idea is that when domestic banks invest abroad a domestic bank run will give way to a repatriation of foreign capital if the repatriation causes a depletion of the foreign central bank s foreign exchange reserves then the foreign currency will be devalued as such a devaluation will render domestic banks insolvent in the rational equilibrium domestic bank runs will 1 cause a speculative attack on the foreign currency and 2 be self justified

speculative currency attacks and balance of payments crises abstract this paper reviews the recent theoretical literature on collapsing exchange rate regimes using a combination of technique intuition and realworld observation we discuss the literature s main insights point out some unresolved questions and offer suggestions for future research the survey should be of interest to both specialists and non specialists in the field of international macroeconomics

financial crises and balance of payments crises a simple model of the southern cone experience abstract this paper starts from a simple model of the domestic banking sector and develops the potentially destabilizing macroeconomic consequences of its role in intermediating foreign capital inflows both financial and balance of payments crises may result reminiscent of the southern cone experience

good bye financial repression hello financial crash some unintended consequences of financial liberalization in latin america are analyzed in this paper intrinsic imperfectious in financial markets and the policy dilemmas they pose are reviewed first the stylized facts of southern cone experiments in financial liberization are then presented alternative ways of organlzing domestic capital markets under latin american conditions are discussed and an eclectic reform mongering program is proposed

monetarism in chile 1973 1983 some economic puzzles the most recent of these experiments began in 1973 after the military overthrew president salvador allende in the 10 years following the coup the military implemented deep reforms directed toward transforming chile from an economy semi isolated from the rest of the world with strong governmental intervention into a liberalized worldintegrated economy where market forces were freely left to guide most of the economy s decisions these liberalization reforms were carried out at the same time that a major stabilization program aimed at reducing a 600 rate of inflation was being implemented many of the policies undertaken roughly correspond to what a vast number of economists have been advocating for developing countries trade was liberalized the capital account was partially opened interest rates were freed and an active domestic capital market was developed the fiscal system was reformed with a value added tax replacing a cascading sales tax the social security system was reformed and the private sector began to play a more active role in the growth and development

why east european banks don t want equity abstract a number of observers have argued that banks should fill the corporate governance vacuum in eastern europe only in few cases this has happened in general banks have not shown great interest in control rights based on ownership this paper explains why based on interviews with bank managers in the czech republic hungary and poland

a model of the joint distribution of banking and currency crises abstract we develop a simple framework for studying the joint distribution of banking and currency crises we make two points first banking and currency crises are related but they are not the same thing viewing crises in isolation or as joint events biases estimates of the likelihood of crises second the proliferation of government promises such as adding a promise to bail out bank depositors to the promise of fixing the exchange rate reduces the likelihood of keeping any individual promise when the resources devoted to keeping the promises are fixed

population policy through tradable procreation entitlements one of the first tradable rights proposal is boulding s the meaning of the twentieth century london george allen and unwin ltd 1964 dealing with overpopulation we discuss both tradable procreation allowances and exemptions domestically and globally to address underpopulation as well we focus on three effects notably the rights tradability entails that whereas exemptions or expensive enough allowances benefit the poor cheap allowances benefit the rich a natalist policy also worsens the average education level of the next generation whereas population control enhances it also if procreation rights are grandfathered to countries the scheme redistributes further our analysis suggests that procreation entitlements may be efficient in controlling population without being necessarily anti redistributive

currency crises are they all the same abstract the plethora of currency crises around the world has fueled many theories on the causes of speculative attacks the first generation models focus on fiscal problems while the second generation models emphasize countercyclical policies and self fulfilling crises in the 1990s models pinpoint to financial excesses with the crisis of argentina in 2001 models of sovereign default have become popular again while the theoretical literature has emphasized variety the empirical literature has supported the one size fits all models this paper contributes to the empirical literature by assessing whether the crises of the last 30 years are of different varieties

the timing and size of bank financed speculative attacks abstract the recent epidemic of banking and currency crises has led researchers to consider the role that unhealthy banks may have in currency crises the present paper in contrast investigates the anatomy of a currency crisis when banks are healthy enough to finance it it is shown that when banks finance the crisis an anticipated collapse occurs sooner and an unanticipated collapse is worse than when banks do not increase credit during the crisis the findings imply that restrictions on bank loan activities and careful management of bank balance sheet risks may lessen the severity of or even prevent a currency crisis

strategic complementarities and the twin crises the economic literature has emphasized the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises motivated by evidence from recent financial crises we study a model where strategic complementarities exist not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators but also between the two groups the additional type of strategic complementarities generates a vicious cycle between banking crises and currency crises this vicious cycle magnifies the correlation between the two crises and destabilizes the economy we discuss some empirical implications and policy implications and in particular show that due to the interaction between the banking sector and the currency market a lender of last resort might not be able to prevent bank runs

exogenous shocks contagion and bank soundness a macroeconomic framework abstract in a model where all banks are initially solvent an exogenous shock affects confidence causing a flight from deposits into domestic and foreign currency real interest rates increase unexpectedly affecting firms and raising the share of the banks nonperforming assets this contagion causes a bank run simulations show that compensatory monetary policy mitigates the bank run but causes macroeconomic imbalances combining compensatory monetary policy with tight fiscal policies slows the bank run and mitigates insolvency a devaluation combined with compensatory monetary policy reduces insolvencies and increases the growth of real income but at the cost of increased inflation

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

the exact timing of the collapse of an exchange rate regime and its impact on the relative price of traded goods as of february 28 1983 ninety four countries are classified as having a fixed exchange rate regime 38 are pegged to the u s dollar 13 to the french franc 14 to the special drawing right and 24 to different baskets of currencies the choice of a fixed exchange rate peg implies a specific monetary discipline namely monetary growth equal to the growth rate of the currency or currencies to which a country is pegged monetary policy is thus subject to an exchange rate rule rather than to either a monetary growth rule or alternatively to discretionary policy a fixed exchange rate is a specific case of an active crawling peg where the preannounced rate of change in the exchange rate is zero active crawling peg rules whereby the exchange rate is adjusted downward by a preannounced amount over a specified period of time have been practiced in various places particularly in latin america recent experiments include argentina beginning december 1978 brazil during the 1980 calendar year chile from february 1978 to june 1979 jamaica from may 1978 to may 1979 portugal from august 1977 to june 1979 and uruguay beginning october 1978 1 at times the prean

does the ecb act as a lender of last resort during the subprime lending crisis evidence from monetary policy reaction models abstract we investigate whether the ecb aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in emu member countries we find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ecb has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable emu countries greece ireland italy portugal and spain increases while no significant effect is identified for the pre crisis period and relatively tranquil emu countries austria belgium france germany and the netherlands these findings suggest that the ecb acts as a lender of last resort for vulnerable emu countries

did established early warning signals predict the 2008 crises abstract over the past 60 years a voluminous literature has painstakingly developed crises theories and their associated early warning signals the hallmark of this literature is the consistency with which selected early warning signals such as the level of reserves and exchange rate appreciations are presumed to predict different types of crises across countries and time the diversity of crises theories that motivate early warning signals presents however a challenge to empirical implementations given that the true model of early warning signals is unknown omitted variable bias contaminates estimates and confidence levels when the uncertainty surrounding a particular theory has been ignored after addressing model uncertainty in early warning signal regressions using an extended version of frankel and saravelos 2012 j int econ 87 216 231 dataset we do not find a single early warning signal that alerts to all dimensions of the 2008 crisis instead distinct sets of early warning signals identify different dimensions of the crisis banking balance of payments exchange rate pressure and recession

rough sets and the role of the monetary policy in financial stability macroeconomic problem and the prediction of insolvency in insurance sector microeconomic problem abstract this paper faces two questions related with financial stability the first one is a macroeconomic problem in which we try to further investigate the role of monetary policy in explaining banking sector fragility and ultimately systemic banking crisis it analyses a large sample of countries in the period 1981 1999 we find that the degree of central bank independence is one of the key variables to explain financial crisis however the effects of the degree of independence are not linear surprisingly either a high degree of independence or a high degree of dependence are compatible with a situation of financial stability while intermediate levels of independence are more likely associated with financial crisis it seems that it is the uncertainty related with a non clear allocation of monetary policy responsibilities that contributes to financial crisis episodes the second one is a microeconomic problem the prediction of insolvency in insurance companies this question has been a concern of several parties stemmed from the perceived need to protect general public and to minimize the costs associated such as the effects on state insurance guaranty funds or the responsibilities for management and auditors we have developed a bankruptcy prediction model for spanish non life insurance companies and the results obtained are very encouraging in comparison with previous analysis this model could be used as an early warning system for supervisors in charge of the soundness of these entities and or in charge of the financial system stability most methods applied in the past to tackle these two problems are techniques of statistical nature and variables employed in these models do not usually satisfy statistical assumptions what complicates the analysis we propose an approach to undertake these questions based on rough set theory

prospective deficits and the asian currency crisis this paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems the expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in asia we articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises we present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis