guarding the guardians good government requires some restraints on the powerful but how can those be impose if there is no one above them this paper studies the equilibrium allocation of power and resources established by self interested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power commitment to uphold individuals rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be ex post power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo and thus want to defend it

long live the doge death as a term limit on venetian chief executives can an electorate use the projected life expectancy of a lifetime appointed chief executive to enforce binding informal term limits informal term limits based on the life expectancy of a chief executive candidate at election would enable an electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths to minimize expected turnover and tenure length costs while also providing a strictly binding term limit death we provide a detailed historical case study of venice from 1172 to 1797 when the ruling patricians utilized informal term limits on their chief executive the doge relying on the projected life expectancy of ducal candidates

transfers in a polarized country bridging the gap between efficiency and stability we consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession the country is efficient if its break up into smaller countries leads to aggregate utility loss we show that in an efficient country whose citizens preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without interregional transfers we also demonstrate that if majority voting is used to determine the redistribution schemes within the country then a high degree of polarization yields the full compensation scheme as the unique political equilibrium

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

are consumption taxes really better than income taxes abstract we use political equilibrium theory and the neoclassical growth model to compare consumption and income tax systems if government outlays are used for redistribution through transfers then steady state equilibria in societies that use income taxes are not necessarily worse in welfare terms and may even be better income taxes are attractive precisely because they are more distortionary since this implies low equilibrium transfer levels we also find that switching tax systems typically does not benefit the median voter moreover a change from income to consumption taxes may make everybody worse off

negativity in an almost ideal import demand system estimates of demand systems consistent with the underlying theory of a utility maximizing consumer are necessary if accurate welfare predictions are to be made in this paper we concentrate upon the negativity constraint and assess its validity using the almost ideal demand system subject to adding up homogeneity and symmetry applied to detailed trade and production data in the context of an import allocation model given the overwhelming rejection of negativity we consider a number of increasingly restrictive conditions which can be applied to the price parameters to try and achieve negativity over the sample data in general it is found that very tight constraints on substitution effects have to be imposed which remove the flexible nature of the model

regions of europe a feasible status to be discussed regions of europe jacques dreze a new concept is proposed that of regions of europe which do not have full statehood and belong not to any state but to the community directly without endorsing this possibility and limiting itself to its economic aspects this article discusses the various dimensions of its economic desirability it appears that in general autonomous regions will not find it advantageous to insure each other investigating how assets and liabilities should be apportioned at the time of secession it argues in favour of distributive neutrality net incomes are unchanged by the secession itself in both the seceding region and the rest of the nation how distributive neutrality could be implemented is explored through a number of suggestive examples in general a region receives a share of the public debt related to its share of the public primary deficit with corrections to account for growth unsustainability of the public debt and so on

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

oligarchy democracy inequality and growth abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of inequality democratization and economic development in a political economy model of growth where education is both the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation in a context with imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for an educated oligarchy to subsidize the poor s education and to initiate a democratic transition we characterize the equilibrium patterns of political institutions income distribution and growth as a function of the initial income and inequalities in particular we identify circumstances under which the elite promotes the endogenous emergence of a middle class for purely political economy reasons a simple linear infinite horizon framework is then presented in this setting we discuss the importance of historical dependence for long run social stratification and redistribution

life is unfair in latin america but does it matter for growth summary i analyze the effect of inequality on economic growth in latin america where inequality is measured as the area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of agricultural holdings using data from 18 latin american countries during 1960 2004 i find that inequality has a nonlinear effect on economic growth overall for the countries included in this analysis the share of family farms has a positive significant effect on economic growth these findings are robust to controlling for several factors using a different indicator of inequality land gini and addressing for endogeneity

financial liberalization and reversals political and economic determinants what accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms this paper identifies the political regime as one of the main factors focusing on democratization and financial reform it puts forward novel evidence for a u shaped relation across countries and over time for different reform measures and a wide range of estimators partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms and democratization when incomplete may lead to severe financial reform reversals nauro f campos and fabrizio coricelli

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

farewell to confucianism the modernizing effect of dismantling china s imperial examination system abstract this study uses 1899 1908 prefecture level panel data to assess how the likelihood of passing the civil service examination affected modernization before and after the examination system s abolition because higher quotas were assigned to prefectures with an agricultural tax of over 150 000 piculs we use a regression discontinuity design to generate an instrument that resolves potential endogeneity and ensures robust results we find that following abolition prefectures with higher quotas of successful candidates tended to establish more modern firms and send more students for overseas study in japan a subsequent analysis using an individual dataset further shows that the skill level of these overseas students increased after abolition especially in regions with higher per capita quotas this finding implies that the examination system led to substantial misallocation of talents

political economy of growth with a taste for status abstract this paper investigates the political economy of growth when individuals prefer high levels of relative consumption a pivotal voter determines the equilibrium tax on capital the revenues from which fund the provision of productive public goods the taste for status and the distributions of wealth and political power interact to generate stylized versions of oligarchies middle class democracies and populist democracies a rise in the taste for status increases the role of distributional concerns in policy preferences lowering growth in an oligarchy or populist democracy but increasing it in a middle class democracy in addition the egalitarian redistribution of wealth or political power causes growth to first rise and then fall as the equilibrium tax rate approaches and then exceeds its growth maximizing level generating inverse u shaped relationships between democracy and growth and inequality and growth

political selection and persistence of bad governments we study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions with a special focus on institutional flexibility a government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society the competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities e g by determining the amount and quality of public goods and each individual derives additional utility from being part of the government e g rents from holding office we characterize the dynamic evolution of governments and determine the structure of stable governments which arise and persist in equilibrium in our model perfect democracy where current members of the government do not have veto power over changes in governments always leads to the emergence of the most competent government however any deviation from perfect democracy to any regime with incumbency veto power destroys this result there is always at least one other less competent government that is also stable and can persist forever and even the least competent government can persist forever in office we also show that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the degree of incumbency veto power and the quality of government in contrast in the presence of stochastic shocks or changes in the environment a regime with less incumbency veto power has greater flexibility and greater probability that high competence governments will come to power this result suggests that a particular advantage of democratic regimes with a limited number of veto players may be their greater adaptability to changes rather than their performance under given conditions finally we show that royalty like dictatorships may be more successful than junta like dictatorships because in these regimes veto players are less afraid of change

inequality democracy and institutions a critical review of recent research this paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of economic and political inequality on institutions the current understanding suggests that unequal societies develop exploitative and inefficient institutions empirical research which is scant and has mainly concentrated at cross national level supports to some extent the existence of an inverse relationship between inequality and institutions but more analysis is needed future empirical research should undertake country state and micro level analysis which are a necessary complement to aggregate level studies the effect of inequality could also take place indirectly through the influence of inequality on democratization

the rise and decline of general laws of capitalism economists have long been drawn to the ambitious quest of discovering the general laws of capitalism david ricardo for example predicted that capital accumulation would terminate in economic stagnation and inequality as a greater and greater share of national income accrued to landowners karl marx followed him by forecasting the inevitable immiseration of the proletariat thomas piketty s 2014 tome capital in the twenty first century emulates marx in his title his style of exposition and his critique of the capitalist system piketty is after general laws that will demystify our modern economy and elucidate the inherent problems of the system and point to solutions but the quest for general laws of capitalism is misguided because it ignores the key forces shaping how an economy functions the endogenous evolution of technology and of the institutions and the political equilibrium that influence not only technology but also how markets function and how the gains from various different economic arrangements are distributed despite his erudition ambition and creativity marx was led astray because of his disregard of these forces the same is true of piketty s sweeping account of inequality in capitalist economies in the next section we review marx s conceptualization of capitalism and some of his general laws we then turn to piketty s approach to capitalism and his general laws we will point to various problems in piketty s interpretation of the economic relationships underpinning inequality but the most important shortcoming is that

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

the rise of europe atlantic trade institutional change and economic growth the rise of western europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the atlantic ocean and with substantial trade with the new world africa and asia via the atlantic this trade and the associatedcolonialism affected europe not only directly but also indirectly by inducing institutional change where initial political institutions those established before 1500 placed significant checks on the monarchy the growth of atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights these changes were central to subsequent economic growth

leviathan and competition among jurisdictions the case of benefit taxation abstract this paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and thus helps to tame leviathan governments however this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government in the case of benefit taxes e g user charges a leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum sum taxes

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

princes and merchants european city growth before the industrial revolution as measured by the pace of city growth in western europe from 1000 to 1800 absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government this might be explained by higher rates of taxation under revenue maximizing absolutist governments than under nonabsolutist governments which care more about general economic prosperity and less about state revenue

vintage human capital growth and the diffusion of new technology we develop a model of vintage human capital in which each technology requires vintage specific skills we examine the properties of a stationary equilibrium for our economy the stationary equilibrium is characterized by an endogenous distribution of skilled workers across vintages the distribution is shown to be single peaked under general conditions there is a lag between the appearance of a technology and its peak usage a phenomenon known as diffusion an increase in the rate of exogenous technological change shifts the distribution of human capital to more recent vintages thereby increasing the diffusion rate

if diversification is good why don t countries diversify more the political economy of diversification in resource rich countries abstract for resource rich countries diversification is claimed to represent a strategy for reducing resource curse problems this however depends on whether diversification has a positive effect on the country s institutions while there is a lot of evidence that exports of oil have a negative impact on institutions we know much less about the extent to which diversification leads to better institutions this article applies recent political economy theory to the phenomenon of diversification theoretical arguments suggest that it is the pattern of industrial activity rather than diversification per se which affects institutions like democracy in other words not all forms of diversification lead to better institutions furthermore where diversification has a positive impact on institutions diversification may be difficult to attain when it threatens the power base of the ruling elite a possible implication of these arguments is that policies for diversification should focus on international regulation affecting elite incentives rather than domestic industrial policy

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

democracy diversification and growth reversals there exists convincing evidence that democratic countries are less volatile this conclusion is usually reached with respect to volatility as measured by the standard deviation of annual growth rates of per capita gdp which includes both low and high frequency fluctuations however recently several studies have documented that significant changes in trend growth such as growth accelerations that last a decade or similar periods of negative growth are quite common in this paper we ask whether democracy also has a stabilizing effect on trend volatility i e whether more democratic countries experience fewer and milder swings of trend growth we find a common phenomenon medium term reversals of growth that is periods of exceptionally high growth are on average followed by periods of exceptionally low growth and vice versa the propensity to experience large swings of trend growth is not uniform across countries less democratic countries are more susceptible to it when compared with factors commonly associated with volatility such as measures of quality of institutions macroeconomic policies and financial development we find that democracy is the most robust predictor of a country s propensity for growth reversals we construct a model in which non democracies have high barriers of entry for new firms this leads to less sectoral diversification fewer sectors are operated but more resources are channeled to each in an uncertain environment this leads to infrequent but large growth accelerations when one of the few sectors operated is successful however these accelerations are followed by large declines when fortunes change in favor of the missing sectors we present empirical evidence that confirms the positive relationship between democracy and industrial diversification

the euro changeover and its effects on price transparency and inflation despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have no effect on prices european consumers perceived the opposite to shed some light on this puzzle we develop a model of imperfect information in which cheaper goods experience higher price growth after the changeover retailers aware of consumers difficulties in adopting the new currency use currency changeovers to increase profits by increasing prices the lower the price transparency after the changeover the higher the euro related inflation using data on inflation eurostat and price levels economist intelligence unit we show that although the euro changeover did not significantly increase inflation it nevertheless had a distortionary effect on prices after the changeover cheaper goods had higher inflation and this effect was stronger in countries in which people found dealing with the new currency problematic

large newsvendor games we consider a game called newsvendor game where several retailers who face a random demand can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers a game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit we consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors we prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game and we show that in a game with a continuum of players under a nonatomic condition on the demand the core is a singleton for a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases

political regimes and foreign intervention abstract we present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations we characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur we highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro investor bias and to be directed at destinations where fdi is highly profitable and where income inequality is high foreign sponsored coups d etat are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries in destinations where fdi is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships we relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world

voluntary export restraints and rationing u k leather footwear imports from eastern europe following the imposition of a quantitative import restriction someone somewhere must be quantity rationed concentrating on demand we develop methods to test and allow for the presence of rationing in the estimation of demand equations and in the calculation of the welfare effects of quantitative restrictions using a ces model we analyse the voluntary export restraints on u k imports of two types of leather footwear from comecon countries the results suggest that even if prices did not rise to clear the market u k consumers could have lost up to 60 million in 1986 from these restrictions

economic integration and political disintegration in a world of trade restrictions large countries enjoy economic benefits because political boundaries determine the size of the market under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural linguistic or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small homogeneous political jurisdictions this paper provides a formal model of the relationship between openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries and successfully tests two implications of the model firstly the economic benefits of country size are mediated by the degree of openness to trade secondly the history of nation state creations and secessions is influenced by the trade regime

multivariate test for forecast rationality under asymmetric loss functions recent evidence from mms survey of inflation output forecasts abstract we propose a multivariate test for forecast rationality under asymmetric loss functions and test jointly the rationality of inflation output forecasts of the mms survey for the us our results indicate that even though the rationality of the forecasts individually may be rejected under two popular univariate asymmetric loss functions linlin and linex there is evidence that rationality of the joint forecasts of inflation and output cannot be rejected we find that allowing for multivariate asymmetric loss functions does improve the evidence for rationality

oligarchic versus democratic societies this paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes an oligarchic society where political power is in the hands of major producers protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entry barriers against new entrepreneurs democracy where political power is more widely diffused imposes redistributive taxes on producers but tends to avoid entry barriers when taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency because comparative advantage in entrepreneurship shifts away from the incumbents the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time the typical pattern is one of rise and decline of oligarchic societies an oligarchic society may first become richer but later fall behind a similar democratic society i also discuss how democracies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies how within elite conflict in oligarchies might cause a transition to democracy and how the unequal distribution of income may keep inefficient oligarchic institutions in place jel p16 o10

factor mobility risk and redistribution in the welfare state economic integration reduces the costs of factor mobility producing efficiency gains and contributing to equalization of net factor returns this raises the cost of income redistribution policy thus threatening a basic function of the welfare state a simple model of costly factor mobility under uncertainty shows that greater factor mobility enables factor owners to pool industry specific region specific or occupation specific risks due to uncertain technology or terms of trade economic integration may thus reduce some of the potential social insurance benefits of redistributive policy

does natural resource abundance increase latin american income inequality abstract why is income inequality higher in latin america than in east asia is this phenomenon related to the region s natural resource abundance is it a contributor to latin america s slow and narrowly focused human capital accumulation if so can anything be done to reverse the latin american trends or should we think of the region s fate as unalterable to help answer these questions this paper draws upon standard trade theory and cross sectional empirical analysis to demonstrate that natural resource intensive sectors particularly permanent agriculture absorb capital that might otherwise flow to manufacturing this depresses workers incentive to accumulate skill and delays industrialization

adverse selection and entrepreneurship in a model of development this paper presents a theory in which talented entrepreneurs are identified as the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation entrepreneurial skills are private information which prevents full risk sharing development into a modern industrial economy might fail to take place since potentially talented entrepreneurs may refrain from taking on the entrepreneurial risks as a way to avoid income shocks an interesting feature of the model is the fact that the informational asymmetries are endogenous to the process of development as they are related to the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills required in the manufacturing activities

dictators and oligarchs a dynamic theory of contested property rights in an economy with weak economic and political institutions the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators the conventional wisdom presumes that as rent seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves institutions such as enforcement of the property rights will emerge eventually we explicitly model a dynamic game between oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent seeking the oligarchs choose either a weak dictator who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch or a strong dictator who can only be replaced via a consensus of oligarchs in equilibrium no dictator can commit to both i protecting the oligarchs property rights from the other oligarchs and ii not expropriating oligarchs himself we show that a weak dictator does not limit rent seeking a strong dictator does reduce rent seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs we show that even though eliminating rent seeking is pareto optimal weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent seeking continues this outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile

international trade and institutional change medieval venice s response to globalization international trade can have profound effects on domestic institutions we examine this proposition in the context of medieval venice circa 800 1600 early on the growth of long distance trade enriched a broad group of merchants who used their newfound economic muscle to push for constraints on the executive that is for the end of a de facto hereditary doge in 1032 and the establishment of a parliament in 1172 the merchants also pushed for remarkably modern innovations in contracting institutions that facilitated longdistance trade for example the colleganza however starting in 1297 a small group of particularly wealthy merchants blocked political and economic competition they made parliamentary participation hereditary and erected barriers to participation in the most lucrative aspects of long distance trade over the next two centuries this led to a fundamental societal shift away from political openness economic competition and social mobility and toward political closure extreme inequality and social stratification we document this oligarchization using a unique database on the names of 8 178 parliamentarians and their families use of the colleganza in the periods immediately before and after 1297 we then link these families to 6 959 marriages during 1400 1599 to document the use of marriage alliances to monopolize the galley trade monopolization led to the rise of extreme inequality with those who were powerful before 1297 emerging as the undisputed winners jel codes d02 f10 n43

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

debt sharing and secession a generational accounting approach cattoir p and docquier f 2004 debt sharing and secession a generational accounting approach reg studies38 293 303 this paper investigates one of the most important financial issues arising from a secession or a country partitioning namely the sharing of the national public debt extending dreze s distributive neutrality condition we use the generational accounting technique and propose a dynamic debt sharing criterion which takes into account both the true debt future generations inherit and their contributive capacity the equivalence with dreze s static rule is only obtained on the balanced growth path and in the absence of initial regional debt an application of our criterion to the belgian case offers striking results cattoir p et docquier f 2004 secession et partage de la dette publique une approche par la comptabilite generationnelle reg studies38 293 303 ce papier analyse l une des principales questions budgetaire posee en cas de secession ou de partage d un etat en plusieurs

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

labor supply effects of the recent social security benefit cuts empirical estimates using cohort discontinuities abstract in response to a crisis in social security financing two decades ago congress implemented an increase in the normal retirement age nra of 2 months per year for cohorts born in 1938 and after these cohorts began reaching retirement age in 2000 this paper studies the effects of these benefit cuts on recent retirement behavior the evidence suggests that the mean retirement age of the affected cohorts has increased by about half as much as the increase in the nra if older workers continue to increase their labor supply in the same way there might be important implications for the estimates of social security trust fund exhaustion that have played such a major role in recent discussions of social security reform

togetheror separately issues on the costs and benefits of political and fiscal unions abstract around the world one observes a tendency toward political separatism the economic literature generally but not always emphasizes several benefits of large fiscal and therefore political jurisdictions in this paper we discuss several politico economic arguments which reconcile this tension between normative economic models and empirical observations

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

estimating foreign trade functions a comment and a correction in this note a more flexible restricted error covariance matrix is applied than winters 1984 uses in order to estimate import demand functions we show that the alternative specification performs better in the sense of yielding a considerably larger value of the log likelihood function moreover some slight errors in winters tables 2 and 3 are corrected