reciprocal relationships and mechanism design we study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves we model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players commitments we differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down we fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment we use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non participants the difference stems from the players ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts we discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal

creative destruction and productive preemptive acquisitions we develop a model of entrepreneurial innovation for entry and sale into oligopolies suitable for welfare analysis we show that the expected consumer welfare can be higher under commercialization by sale than under commercialization by entry despite increased market power in the product market the reason is that when the quality of the invention is sufficiently high preemptive bidding competition among incumbents drives the acquisition price above the entry value entrepreneurs who sell their inventions will then have a stronger incentive to develop high quality inventions than entrepreneurs who aim at entering the product market incumbents are hurt by this creative destruction process ignited by the entrepreneurs and thus have an incentive to undertake research to block entrepreneurs research activities we show that incumbents own research effort can reduce but not eliminate the entrepreneurs incentives to innovate for entry or sale

merger policy with merger choice we analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose which of several mutually exclusive mergers to propose in our model the optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus imposes a tougher standard on larger mergers i e those involving firms with a larger pre merger market share or equivalently leading to a larger naively computed post merger herfindahl index the optimal policy is a response to a bias in firms proposal incentives firms always propose a larger merger when it is better for consumers than a smaller one but sometimes will propose the larger one even when it is worse for consumers

equilibrium rejection of a mechanism we study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game by refusing to participate in the mechanism a player can revert to playing the default game non cooperatively we show with an example that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms which will be rejected on the equilibrium path in our construction a refusal to participate conveys information about the types of the players this information causes the default game to be played under different beliefs and more importantly under different higher order beliefs than the interim ones we find a lower bound on all the implementable payoffs we use this bound to establish a condition on the default game under which all the implementable outcomes are truthfully implementable without the need to induce rejection of the mechanism

on the optimality of not allocating we show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit

supply storage and service reliability decisions by gas distribution utilities a chance constrained approach this paper explores the trade offs among purchases storage and service reliability decisions faced by natural gas distribution utilities the short term demand for natural gas fluctuates because of the weather to encourage load leveling the pipeline transmission companies that supply the utilities use a demand contract that charges utilities based on their peak day needs and often charge for a minimum daily purchase requirement whether that purchase is made or not the policy variables available to the utility include increasing its storage capacity and providing interruptible service to some customers thereby lowering reliability of service there are also technological constraints on the maximum storage gas flows to explore these trade offs a chance constrained cost minimization problem is formulated two decision rules for gas purchases and storage operation are examined in these rules an initial decision is made at the beginning of each month about either the level of purchases or the level of

selling an asset to a competitor a seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers the seller and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if the other possesses the item we show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2 who does not interact ex post with the seller and in particular bidder 1 may not obtain the good even if his valuation is highest the auction is therefore subject to resale when resale is possible the seller must distort the original auction we show that the mechanism depends crucially on the way resale is organized ex post the seller may decide to always allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation when rents are fully extracted by an intermediary on the resale market however she may resort to a stochastic mechanism when the winner of the primary auction has full bargaining power in the resale stage

a large scale linear complementarity model of the north american natural gas market abstract the north american natural gas market has seen significant changes recently due to deregulation and restructuring for example third party marketers can contract for transportation and purchase of gas to sell to end users while the intent was a more competitive market the potential for market power exists we analyze this market using a linear complementarity equilibrium model including producers storage and peak gas operators third party marketers and four end use sectors the marketers are depicted as nash cournot players determining supply to meet end use consumption all other players are in perfect competition results based on national petroleum council scenarios are presented

externalities and asymmetric information a reconsideration of the pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information the presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum but when it has an impact it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels the model developed provides an appealing characterization of when such situations transpire they occur when the individuals who desire most to engage in some activity are the ones who society least wants to participate since such instances could potentially be regulated by the imposition of quantity controls this may explain authorities apparent predilection for quantity limits rather than tax cum subsidy schemes to manage many externalities

a comment on sequential elections and overlapping terms voting for us senate in a recent paper in this journal heckelman explains why senators from the same state often vote differently and still get re elected he argues that in a two party system primary elections lead to divergence of party platforms moreover he shows that the introduction of primary elections and overlapping terms into the median voter model leads to the prediction that extremist candidates win the general election in this comment i argue that when in primaries voters view office as a means to policy primary elections strengthens rather than weakens the prediction of the median voter model that policy platforms converge

dynamic processes of social and economic interactions on the persistence of inefficiencies an economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered an exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition at each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability and he chooses a coalition a feasible new state to move the economy to and side payments between the agents in the coalition the setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining coalition formation or exchange economies whenever agents are unable to write long term contracts but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude there can be long run inefficiencies with cycles or inefficient steady states however when agents are sufficiently patient the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run moreover when there exists an efficient state that is free of negat

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

sequential elections and overlapping terms voting for us senate abstract this paper presents a model in which voters attempt to balance the ideological positions of their senate representatives candidate positions are determined endogenously through a primary system the median voter theorem is applied in each election to determine winning platforms based on voter preferences which may differ from their individual bliss points contrary to the original median voter theorem the main implications of this model are that i convergence on platform positions is not achieved in the general election and ii extremist candidates defeat moderates in the stable long run equilibrium

auctions aftermarket competition and risk attitudes with the experience of the sequence of umts auctions held worldwide in mind we consider a situation where firms participate in license auctions to compete in an aftermarket it is known that when a monopoly right is auctioned auctions select the bidder that is least risk averse this firm will choose a higher value of the aftermarket strategic variable than any other firm will do thereby implying a higher market price under price setting behavior and a lower price due to higher quantity under quantity setting behavior this paper extends the analysis to oligopoly aftermarkets and analyzes whether the monopoly result carries over to oligopoly settings we argue that with multiple licenses and demand uncertainty auctions actually perform even worse from a welfare point of view than the monopoly case would suggest a strategic effect strengthens the monopoly result with respect to prices but weakens the result with respect to quantities

a marginal cost pricing model for gas distribution utilities we develop a natural gas distribution utility pricing model that includes optimization of supply mix and capacity expansion financial analysis of revenue requirements and design of either average cost or marginal cost based rates and apply it using data from the east ohio gas company the results clearly point to the superiority of marginal cost over average cost pricing policies in terms of lesser capital requirements better capacity utilization and higher end use economic efficiency

competitive effect of cross shareholdings in all pay auctions with complete information abstract this paper investigates the competitive effect of cross shareholdings in winner take all all pay auctions with two asymmetric bidders we show that cross shareholdings may paradoxically create a pro competitive effect and elicit more effort than a standard contest without cross ownership this observation runs in contrast to the anti competitive effect that cross shareholdings usually create in standard oligopolistic settings such as cournot or bertrand competitions both bidding costs and the sizes of cross shares affect the resultant total effort non monotonically neither a cross share nor a higher bidding cost necessarily decreases effort supply a complete account of equilibrium bidding behaviors is provided and the necessary and sufficient conditions under which cross shareholdings lead to higher or lower levels of overall effort are identified however the pro competitive effect comes at a loss of efficiency

repeated auctions with impatient bidders and externalities author affiliation ki eun rhee krhee kdischool ac kr acknowledgment i am grateful to kyle bagwell for providing invaluable advice and support throughout the research process i also thank michael riordan eiichi miyagawa and two anonymous referees for helpful comments 1 introductioncollusive bidding behavior has been conventionally studied in a static setup often relying on some unspecified repeated interaction story for the enforcement of a cartel 1 it is not clear however whether the results from static auctions immediately carry over to a repeated setup when bidders are impatient and the enforcement or the participation constraint is binding moreover many empirical analyses for detecting collusion rely on an explicitly repeated structure rendering a theoretical analysis of collusion in a repeated setup necessary 2 several recent theoretical developments in repeated auctions have been made by aoyagi 2003 2007 skrzypacz and hopenhayn 2004 and blume and heidhues 2006 taking standard auctions as stage games these articles present various collusive bidding schemes with asymmetric punishments that outperform the bid rotation scheme which is known to be optimal in static auctions mcafee and mcmillan 1992 this article studies collusive bidding behavior in repeated auctions among both patient and impatient bidders when the outside option of the participation constraint is endogenized because of externalities a stage game involves negative externalities among the bidders when any losing bidder is worse off if a rival wins the good than if no one wins it auctions with externalities have been introduced most notably by jehiel and moldovanu 1996 and jehiel moldovanu and stacchetti 1996 these auctions describe environments in which the outcomes of auctions affect the nature of ensuing market interactions among potential bidders a wide variety of situations in which bidders are a set of oligopoly firms competing in the same market apply to this setting for example procurement auctions for highway construction contracts studied empirically by porter and zona 1993 may qualify as repeated independent private value auctions with negative externalities except that the lowest bidder wins 3 consecutive highway lettings were distributed by the department of transportation dot to a set of oligopoly firms competing in the same industry negative externalities may arise because a firm that wins the auction may experience learning by doing which provides the winning firm with a comparative cost advantage or because the winning firm may gain a reputation that gives the firm an advantage in future private sector competition as jehiel and moldovanu 1996 and jehiel moldovanu and stacchetti 1996 discuss the issue of participation is nontrivial in auctions with externalities because the ex ante payoff a bidder expects by not participating is no longer zero as in standard auctions but is rather endogenously determined by the actions of the other bidders thus an analysis of collusive bidding behavior under both nonbinding and binding participation constraints seems especially worth studying for these auctions the main findings of this article are that i there are no bidding wars along the equilibrium path and bidders expect to receive the maximal continuation values when they are both patient and impatient when bidders are impatient the optimal collusive bidding scheme involves ii a lower threshold type above whom bidding starts when externalities are small or iii more frequent jumps i e more sorting of bidders types when externalities are large in both cases seller s ex ante profit is higher when bidders are impatient if we consider patient bidders to be the ones that are interacting in a stable market 4 results carry an empirical implication either less frequent sales or fewer bid levels in auctions that are let out in stable markets will be observed

choosing and sharing implementing a project like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic in practice revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements we address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to implement the efficient site the host with the lowest cost and share the exact cost while retaining total control over realized transfers our mechanism is simple and in the vein of the well known divide and choose procedure the unique nash equilibrium outcome of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling is budget balanced individually rational and immune to coalitional deviations more generally our mechanism can also handle the symmetric case of positive local externalities e g olympic games and even more complex situations where the usefulness of the project regardless of its location is not unanimous

primaries and the new hampshire effect candidates for u s presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single states the primaries we develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning the equilibrium replicates several stylized facts very well campaigning is very intensive in the first district the outcome of the first election then creates an asymmetry in the candidates incentives to campaign in the next district which endogenously increases the equilibrium probability that the first winner wins in further districts on the normative side our model oers a possible explanation for the sequential organization it leads in expectation to a lower level of advertising expenditures than simultaneous elections moreover if one of the candidates is the more eective campaigner sequential elections also perform better with regard to the selection of the best candidate

markets for ownership the prevailing economic theory of the firm based on a property rights perspective has demonstrated that ownership by dispensable outside parties is an inefficient outcome relative to ownership by productive agents in order to better understand observed patterns of ownership this paper considers the outcome of ma rkets for ownership that operate prior to production taking place the main result is that outside parties will often become the equilibrium asset owners this is precisely because but for ownership such parties would not earn rents in contrast productive agents earn rents even when they do not own assets given that their contribution is complementary with other productive agents their willingness to pay for ownership is less than that of an outside party this result is robust to the introduction of moderate levels of inefficiency arising from outside ownership and to a consideration of opportunities for re sale before production begins the main conclusion drawn is that the nature of the operation of markets for ownership stands alongside incentive effects as important predictors of firm boundaries journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 l22

when do auctions ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of scarce inputs we determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs a supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value because once the input is acquired it is unavailable to rivals an unfettered auction often ensures the welfare maximizing allocation of an input increment however it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies

bidding securities in projects with negative externalities abstract we analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security bid auction in which i the allocation of the project to one bidder causes a negative externality to his opponents ii the winner has to pay a fixed cost to implement the project and iii the winner s implementation decision is not contractible to study the effect of such features on the seller s expected revenue we focus on a second price auction based on one of four securities i cash ii equity iii a fixed equity hybrid and iv a fixed cash hybrid we show that the fixed equity hybrid generates the highest expected revenue whereas equity generates the lowest even though it is the instrument with the highest linkage absent negative externalities equity would generate the highest expected revenue among these four securities the revenue ranking of the instruments is robust to the information structure and the presence of insurance deposits and entry fees

tv wars exclusive content and platform competition in pay tv the article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television programming static analysis shows that a vertically integrated operator with premium programming always supplies this content to the rival distributor using per subscriber fees to soften competition in a dynamic setting with switching costs exclusivity confers a market share advantage benefiting the operator in the future under certain conditions this future benefit outweighs the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees making exclusivity the preferred choice alternative dynamic mechanisms are explored identifying essential features the analysis explains the observed incidence of content exclusivity in pay tv and provides guidance for policy makers

a mixed complementarity based equilibrium model of natural gas markets we present a new multiseasonal multiyear natural gas market equilibrium model based on the concept of a competitive equilibrium involving the market participants producers storage reservoir operators peak gas operators pipeline operators marketers and consumers the first three classes are depicted as price takers consistent with perfect competition the pipeline operations are described with regulated tariffs but also involve congestion pricing as a mechanism to allocate scarce pipeline capacity the marketers are price takers in all markets except in sales to consumers in which they compete as nash cournot players finally consumers are described by demand curves for each of the four sectors residential commercial industrial and electric power we show that the equilibrium model is an instance of a mixed nonlinear complementarity problem ncp and provide sufficient detail not generally seen in previous complementarity models of natural gas the ncp formulation is derived from considering the karush kuhn tucker optimality conditions of the optimization problems faced by these participants under mild conditions we show that this ncp has a solution and under additional reasonable conditions we show that the market prices are unique we also validate the model on a representative sample network with nine market participants and three seasons using four scenarios

hedging and competition abstract we consider firms that all else equal wish to minimize variability in their internal capital due to convex costs of raising external funds the firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project but not that of winning or losing the auction we characterize optimal hedging and bidding strategies in this competition framework we show that access to financial markets makes firms bid more aggressively possibly even above their valuation for the project in addition hedging increases the variance of bids and makes firm values more dispersed further with hedging the covariance of internal capital changes with the risk factor is negative and is more negative the higher the correlation of the hedging instrument with the risk factor

cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no deadline while with a deadline we identify delays both for positive and negative externalities without a deadline we find that 1 when externalities are positive there exists no spne in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay 2 when externalities are negative it may happen that all spne with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity this is the cyclical delay phenomenon

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

attracting skeptical buyers negotiating for intellectual property rights expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property ip in principle confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use in practice sellers often waive confidentiality rights we provide an incomplete information explanation for the waiver of confidentiality rights that are valuable in complete information settings waiving sacrifices the protective value of confidentiality to gain greater buyer participation buyer skepticism which reduces participation arises endogenously from three elements asymmetric information regarding seller ip rent dissipation from competition for ip and ex post costs from expropriation lawsuits

negotiating cultures in corporate procurement abstract in a repeated procurement problem the incumbent can undertake a relationship specific investment that generates opportunity costs of switching for the buyer we investigate the impact of the negotiating culture on investment incentives favoritism in the procurement contract allocation and buyer profit we compare a stylized competitive negotiating culture with a stylized protective culture the cultures differ in the way the buyer uses the entrance threat to exert pressure on the incumbent our main result is that the relative performance of the cultures depends non monotonically on the expensiveness of the investment

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

raising rivals cost in multi unit auctions abstract the objective many telecom regulators want to achieve when they decide to auction spectrum is that acquiring firms pay a market price based on the opportunity cost principle the simultaneous ascending auction may fail in this respect as it provides bidders with an opportunity to engage in strategic demand reduction this paper asks whether the combinatorial clock auction cca fares better in this respect we show that the answer to this question depends on the objectives bidders have if bidders have only the slightest preference to raise rivals cost they will use the opportunities the cca provides them to engage in strategic demand expansion this is even the case when the clock phase ends with excess demand

stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities this paper studies infinite horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present we extend the analysis in jehiel and moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria jehiel p moldovanu b 1995a cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities rev econ stud 62 619 637 a characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers

externalities and bargaining disagreement abstract we examine the possibility of disagreement in a one period bargaining model with positive externalities we find that when the externalities are relatively small no such disagreements can arise i e there are no ex post bargaining inefficiencies if however the externalities are large enough then disagreements occur with a positive probability

how not to raise money we show that standard winner pay auctions are inept fund raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another s high bid revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept this problem does not occur in lotteries and all pay auctions where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win we introduce a general class of all pay auctions rank their revenues and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner pay formats the optimal fund raising mechanism is an all pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price

managing dynamic competition in many important high technology markets including software development data processing communications aeronautics and defense suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost this paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer strategies for controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions the protection and allocation of intellectual property and the sharing of information among rival suppliers jel c73 d44 l10

selling licences for a process innovation the impact of the product market on the selling mechanism this article considers the sale by a research lab of licences for a cost reducing innovation the marginal cost of a firm that wins a licence is private information and the acquisition of a licence imposes a negative externality on the other firms the lab s optimal revenue is determined from a class of mechanisms in which the lab selects the number of licences and the reserve price before the sale the role of the downstream product market in the determination of the number of licences is analyzed furthermore it is also shown that the optimal reserve price may be zero jel classification d82 li3

resale markets and the assignment of property rights the consumption of an indivisible good causes identity dependent externalities to non consumers we analyse resale markets where the current owner designs the trading procedure but cannot commit to future actions we ask the following questions 1 doer the identity of the initial owner matter for the determination of the final consumer 2 is the outcome always efficient the major conclusion of our paper is that the irrelevance of the initial structure of property rights arises in resale processes even if there are transaction costs that hinder efficiency this result complements the coasian view where the irrelevance of the assignment of property rights is a consequence of efficiency

a mechanism design approach to the tiebout hypothesis we revisit the tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens it is shown in quasi linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed

mechanism design without revenue equivalence abstract we study mechanism design problems in quasi linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non convex and non differentiable valuations we obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility based on the mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule which pin down the range of possible payoffs as a function of the allocation rule to illustrate our approach we derive the optimal selling mechanism in a buyer seller situation where the buyer is loss averse we find a budget balanced efficient mechanism in a public goods location model and we consider a principal agent model with ex post non contractible actions available to the agent

subsidizing and taxing business procurement abstract this paper studies the effect of a subsidy or tax on a market where a downstream manufacturer uses a competitive tender to procure inputs from upstream suppliers subsidizing input production can result in input price decreases that are greater than the effective decrease in marginal costs that is overshifting occurs when the size of the subsidy is not too large the downstream firm can enjoy an increase in profits greater than the government expenditure on the subsidy a relatively weak sufficient condition for these results to hold is that suppliers earn a positive profit margin on the marginal unit sold before taking into account any subsidy payment stronger sufficient conditions tailored to each result are provided

optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities abstract this paper studies optimal auction design with asymmetric linear financial externalities among bidders when the matrix that relates bidders payoffs to their payments is nonsingular the payment related component in the design objective must equal a unique linear combination of its counterparts in bidder s payoffs if all multipliers of the linear combination are nonnegative a modified myerson procedure is discovered for deriving the optimal design if any multiplier is negative an arbitrarily high value can be achieved for design objective by setting proper fixed transfers to bidders when the matrix is singular the unbounded optimum result typically prevails we applied our method to auctions with cross shareholdings and charity auctions for revenue maximizing and efficient designs

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

the design of an efficient private industry government sponsored auctions for production rights e g license auctions privatizations etc shape the industry structure are there mechanisms that induce an efficient industry structure at least when there are no positive costs to public funds the answer is no whenever firms have private information about both fixed and marginal costs our analysis also suggests that the second best industry may either be more competitive or more monopolistic than the first best one these insights are in sharp contrast with the ones obtained for models where firms have one dimensional private information thus requiring more delicate policy recommendations jel d43 d45 d82 l1

collective decisions with interdependent valuations abstract many collective decision problems have in common that individuals desired outcomes are correlated but not identical this paper studies collective decisions with private information about desired policies each agent holds private information which mainly concerns his own bliss point but private information also affects all other agents we concentrate on two specific mechanism the median and mean mechanisms establish the existence of symmetric bayesian nash equilibria of the corresponding games and compare the performance of the mechanisms for different degrees of interdependencies applications of our framework include the provision of public goods and the design of decision processes in international organizations

auctions with quantity externalities and endogenous supply abstract this paper studies the design of license auctions when the number of licenses allocated in the auction determines structure of the post auction market i first show that a sequence of conditional reserve prices that specify minimum acceptable bid at each supply level can be used to determine supply endogenously then i construct a static auction called multi dimensional uniform price auction and a dynamic auction called walrasian clock auction that allow the auctioneer to condition reserve price on supply and allow bidders to condition bids on supply i show that both proposed auctions can implement the efficient market structure that maximizes total surplus in the post auction market in a dominant strategy equilibrium i next characterize the optimal auction and show that the two proposed auctions can yield the optimal revenue under a sequence of optimal reserve prices

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

no one likes to be second choice a decision maker is interested in appointing one individual from a group of candidates to a public position with an exogenous wage he must decide in what order to approach them candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available the candidates preferences have a social component each candidate finds the position more attractive if he is highly ranked by the decision maker relative to the other candidates however the decision maker s preferences are his private information as a result candidates infer the decision maker s evaluation of them based on the number of candidates who have previously turned him down the main result is that when the number of candidates is suficiently large all of the candidates reject the decision maker s offers including those whom he most values moreover the decision maker s payoff is not monotonic in the number of candidates

mechanism and network design with private negative externalities a revenue maximizing monopolist is selling a single indivisible good to buyers who face a loss if any of its rival buyers obtain it the rivalry is modeled through a network an arc between a pair of buyers indicates that a buyer considers another buyer its rival and the magnitude of the loss is the private information of each buyer this loss exposure due to competitive considerations can be viewed as a negative externality first using a myersonian approach we derive the monopolist s optimal mechanism for any given network second we show that revenues depend on the network structure thus in applications where it is possible the monopolist might consider designing not only the mechanism but also the network if not fully at least partially third we provide and fully describe the solution to the monopolist s market design problem that is the joint network and mechanism design problem specifically despite the nonmonotone impact of additional competition on the monopolist s revenues we deter

negative externalities may cause delay in negotiation we study the strategic equilibria of a negotiation game where potential buyers are affected by identity dependent negative externalities the unique equilibrium of long finitely repeated generic games can either display delay where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline or in spite of the random element in the game a well defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one

allocation decisions in network industries abstract in this paper i want to propagate a new analytical tool the usage of menu auctions for modelling complicated auctions negotiations rent seeking etc is advocated because contrary to normal auctions and bargaining models an arbitrary number of additional aspects can be taken into account after concentrating on truthful equilibria bernheim b d whinston m d 1986 menu auctions resource allocation and economic influence quarterly journal of economics 1 31 a certain broad class of menu auctions show unique and efficient allocations under an additional concavity condition even the equilibrium bids are unique two examples are discussed the privatisation of a state owned industry and the buying of wholesale electricity concluding contracts with a number of producers by a utility these examples also serve to trace the sources of non concavities which can prevent the uniqueness of bids and can provide the auctioneer with incentives to exclude bidders from the competition

robust strategies for natural gas procurement abstract in order to serve their customers natural gas local distribution companies ldcs can select from a variety of financial and non financial contracts the present paper is concerned with the choice of an appropriate portfolio of natural gas purchases that would allow a ldc to satisfy its demand with a minimum tradeoff between cost and risk while taking into account risk associated with modeling error we propose two types of strategies for natural gas procurement dynamic strategies model the procurement problem as a mean risk stochastic program with various risk measures naive strategies hedge a fixed fraction of winter demand the hedge is allocated equally between storage futures and options we propose a simulation framework to evaluate the proposed strategies and show that i when the appropriate model for spot prices and its derivatives is used dynamic strategies provide cheaper gas with low risk compared to naive strategies ii in the presence of a modeling error dynamic strategies are unable to control the variance of the procurement cost though they provide cheaper cost on average based on these results we define robust strategies as convex combinations of dynamic and naive strategies the weight of each strategy represents the fraction of demand to be satisfied following this strategy a mean variance problem is then solved to obtain optimal weights and construct an efficient frontier of robust strategies that take advantage of the diversification effect

standard auctions with identity dependent externalities i analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in the open ascending bid auction with identity dependent externalities with reciprocal externalities the allocation is determined by bidders consumption values alone with large nonreciprocal externalities the open auction generates higher expected revenue compared to standard sealed bid auctions the progress of the open auction reveals more information about the identity of the potential winner allowing active bidders greater opportunity to avoid incurring payoff reducing externalities the associated option value to staying active up until a relatively high price translates into higher expected revenue multiple bidders may sequentially quit at the same price and relative to sealed bid auctions bidders experience less ex post regret

auctions as coordination devices this paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market prices at the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game where the pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the auction i show that when there are two licenses for sale the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where firms bid an amount almost equal to the profits of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices with three or more licenses the auction format co determines whether or not the forward induction argument works

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities abstract we investigate a private value auction in which a single entrant on winning imposes a negative externality on two regular bidders in an english auction when all bidders are active regular bidders free ride exiting before price reaches their values in a first price sealed bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist limiting free riding compared to the english auction we find substantial though incomplete free riding in the clock auction in first price auctions regular bidders bid more aggressively than the entrant and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality predictions regarding revenue efficiency and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied

the role of optimal threats in auction design abstract this paper studies revenue maximizing auctions when buyers outside options depend on their private information and are endogenously chosen by the seller we show that the revenue maximizing assignment of the object can depend crucially on the outside options that the seller can choose as threats depending on the shape of outside options sometimes an optimal mechanism allocates the object in an ex post efficient way and other times buyers obtain the object more often than is efficient

privatization and foreign competition abstract this paper determines the equilibrium market structure in an international oligopoly where a state enterprise is sold at an auction the paper suggests that high greenfield costs and high trade costs do not necessarily induce foreign acquisitions in privatizations despite the fact that foreign firms would gain considerably from acquiring in such situations the reason is that domestic firms can then prevent foreign firms from becoming strong local competitors and thus their willingness to pay for the state assets is high

green auctions a biodiversity study of mechanism design with externalities abstract this paper uses a mechanism design approach to study the biodiversity improvement in a territory where the government is the principal and the landholders are the agents in particular i analyze an optimal mechanism that considers multidimensional bid which includes both the biodiversity improvement of the project and its cost additionally this mechanism incorporates the externality either positive or negative that a biodiversity project causes in the surrounding agents who decided not to participate specifically i assume that externalities enter in the cost function of the nonparticipating landholders i show that in the case of negative externalities the government will implement a transfer function which is decreasing in the landholder s efficiency level on the other hand in the case of a positive externality paradoxically the government may be interested in the nonparticipation of the most efficient landholders

monotone equilibrium in multi unit auctions in two sided multi unit auctions having a variety of payment rules including uniform price and discriminatory auctions a monotone pure strategy equilibrium mpse exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi dimensional types and interdependent values in fact all mixed strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to mpse thus for standard expected surplus revenue analysis there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies