international economic structures government interests and international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment policies analysts have commonly argued that there has been a decline in international coordination of the kinds of policies that governments can use to manage the international payments imbalances that emerge when different governments pursue different macroeconomic policies the decline typically has been attributed to a posited decline in american hegemony in contrast this article argues that international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment policies trade and capital controls exchange rate policies balance of payments financing and monetary and fiscal policies was at least as extensive for much of the 1980s as it had been in the 1960s there was however a shift away from coordination of balance of payments financing and other policies that have limited direct consequences for domestic economic and political conditions and a concurrent shift toward coordination of monetary and fiscal policies that are critically important for domestic politics and economics this change is best explained as a consequence of changes in the structure of the international economy most important international capital market integration encouraged governments to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies because balance of payments financing and exchange rate coordination alone are insufficient to manage the enormous payments imbalances that emerge when capital is able to flow internationally in search of higher interest rates and appreciating currencies

irving fisher on the international transmission of booms and depressions through monetary standards the role of monetary standards in the international transmission of economic fluctuations particularly the role of the gold standard in the depression has attracted considerable recent attention for instance from choudhri and kochin 1980 hamilton 1988 temin 1989 1993 eichengreen 1992 and bernanke 1995 however this literature has overlooked a pioneering precursor irving fisher are booms and depressions transmitted internationally through monetary standards 1935 which has also been neglected in the literature on fisher i examine fisher s contribution in the context of later research on the topic and explore the place of fisher 1935 in fisher s work

rhetoric on the economy have european parties changed their economic messages abstractthis study analyses the determinants of dispersion of economic issue mentions in european party manifestos we examined three main economic domains governmental control of the economy free market capitalism and support for the welfare state as consequences of globalization forces economic conditions partisanship and electoral turnout employing aggregate level comparative manifesto project cmp data from legislative elections in 15 european countries from 1970 to 2010 we confirm that parties hold a common view of the salience of economic control of the state as a consequence of globalization pressure and economic growth levels partisanship of the cabinets regardless of the political orientation counteracted issue salience concentration in the welfare domain government size favoured dispersion in the free market realm our results do not indicate clear homogenization of parties economic messages in elections over the last 40 years

the second face of hegemony britain s repeal of the corn laws and the american walker tariff of 1846 one challenge facing hegemonic stability theory is to specify the processes by which hegemonic countries construct and maintain a liberal international economic order earlier studies have focused on direct coercion or ideological manipulation by the hegemon as a principal technique for manipulating the trade policies of other countries this article explores a different face of hegemony specifically we contend that by altering relative prices through the exercise of their international market power hegemonic leaders influence the trade policy preferences of their foreign trading partners we examine this argument in the case of the american walker tariff of 1846 american tariff liberalization was intimately related to britain s repeal of its corn laws in the antebellum united states northern protectionist and southern free trade proclivities were fixed western grain growers held the balance of power by allowing access to its lucrative grain market britain altered the economic and political incentives of western agriculturalists and facilitated the emergence of the free trade coalition essential to the passage of the walker tariff

the new theory of optimum currency areas highbrow opinion is like a hunted hare if you stand long enough it will come back to the place it started from dennis robertson

policy and the dynamics of political competition informed discussions of political competition by journalists pundits novelists country specialists or indeed practicing politicians usually describe a system in perpetual motion perpetual motion is seen as a normal state of affairs not a manifestation of chaotic instability and it is usually seen as having an endogenous dynamic what the actors do at cycle c of the political process feeds back to affect the entire process at cycle c 1 these informed discussions thus see politics as a complex dynamic system evolving under its own steam a system unlikely to reach steady state in stark contrast mainstream models of political competition are usually static with key model parameters and rules of interaction fixed exogenously although static models do not necessarily imply equilibrium almost invariably the core intellectual approach is to specify a model and solve for equilibrium authors of such models are typically driven by what cederman describes as a metaphysical conviction that equilibria are always out there waiting to be discovered a conviction that can blind the analyst to the possibility of adjustments never settling cederman 1997 34 35 but if common sense tells us party competition is a complex dynamic process then it also tells us party competition may never achieve equilibrium this paper addresses the striking disjuncture between the static nature of most formal models of party competition and the dynamic way in which informed observers who hardly ever talk about politics in terms of equilibrium think about the political process while many theorists would willingly concede in general terms that real political competition is a complex dynamic process the hard question concerns how to model this in a way that is both theoretically tractable and substantively plausible in what follows i set out

what moves parties the role of public opinion and global economic conditions in western europe do western european political parties adjust their ideological positions in response to shifts in public opinion and to changing global economic conditions based on a time series cross sectional analysis of parties ideological dynamics in eight western european democracies from 1976 1998 the authors conclude that both factors influence parties ideological positions but that this relationship is mediated by the type of party specifically they find that parties of the center and right react to both public opinion and the global economy whereas parties of the left display no discernible tendency to respond to public opinion and also appear less responsive to global economic conditions the findings on leftist parties distinctiveness support arguments about these parties long term policy orientations as well as about their organizational structures the authors also find little support for neoliberal convergence arguments

capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms abstract this paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms we show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package if instead profits can be fully taxed then source based investment taxes vanish if domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners then source based investment taxes can be used to shift income away from these to domestic citizens and they may even be used to finance lump sum transfers to domestic residents

international capital mobility amongst the major industrialised countries too little or too much this paper examines capital flows among the major industrialized countries with a view to assessing m feldstein and c horioka s 1980 claim that international capital mobility is limited it argues that saving investment correlation tests are inherently flawed and proposes an alternative methodology for testing the degree of international capital mobility it finds that capital flows have been excessive in the sense that they are driven by speculative forces rather than by economic fundamentals copyright 1995 by royal economic society

a downsian spatial model with party activism a unidimensional spatial model is proposed in this article although its formal structure parallels the spatial model of electoral competition this model examines the decisions of individuals as they choose whether or not to become activists in one of two political parties an individual calculus of participation is developed that is similar to the spatial interpretation of the calculus of voting this calculus is then generalized by examining conditions that may hold for aggregate activism probabilities and the relationship between the two forms is investigated some results are then presented which concern the distributions of activists in the two parties these results in general conform to the existence of party cleavages in which there are two stable equilibrium distributions of activists such that the two parties activists are relatively cohesive internally and relatively distinctive externally finally some suggestions are offered about how this model can be combined with the spatial model of candidate competition to provide a more complete model of elections

architecture of equity markets the abidjan regional bourse literature on financial market liberalization focuses heavily on state activity in allocating preferential credit i consider state activity in promoting nascent equity markets by asking why a state would create and promote a market in which the transaction costs are high the potential rate of return is low and firms are reluctant to list shares i examine the case of the west african regional stock exchange and propose that the central bank for the west african monetary union created it to mediate the relationship between this region and the world economy i propose that states and domestic markets act as complements rather than as rivals in some instances of bourse creation moreover bourses in developing economies present a different set of relationships among states public and private lending authorities and market participants than their counterparts in more developed financial environments this illuminates a need for further research in this area

the spectre of deflation a review of empirical evidence what explains the widespread fear of deflation this article reviews the history of thought economic history and empirical evidence on deflation with a view to answering this question it also outlines informally the main effects of deflation in applied monetary models the main finding is that for both historical and contemporary deflations there are many open empirical questions that could be answered using the tools economists use to study inflation and monetary policy more generally qu est ce qui explique la peur tres repandue de la deflation ce memoire fait un tour d horizon de l histoire de la pensee economique de l histoire economique et des resultats empiriques quant aux effets de la deflation en vue de repondre a cette question on fait aussi echo informellement aux effets principaux de la deflation dans les modeles monetaires appliques ce qui ressort principalement de ce travail est que tant pour les deflations dans l histoire que dans le monde contemporain il y a bien des questions empiriques encore irresolues auxquelles on pourrait donner une reponse en utilisant l outillage mental que les economistes utilisent pour etudier l inflation et la politique monetaire plus generalement sp c tre n thing that is thought to be seen but has no material existence haunting presentiment of ruin war madness etc

the politics of inequality voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted and why is it that in other countries where inequality has increased much less the left has become substantially more redistributive the answer the authors argue has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low income voters the authors make two points in this article first high levels of inequality move left parties to the left second although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of left parties to the left it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics the authors argue that left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low income voters are politically mobilized they explore these claims through a comparative analysis of left party programs in 10 organisation for economic cooperation and development countries over the period 1966 to 2002

public acceptance of energy technologies the effects of labeling time and heterogeneity in a discrete choice experiment public acceptance is crucial for successful implementation of energy technologies in society however studies that use the concept do so in diverse and often inconsistent ways they also often limit themselves to specific technologies and do not account for the effects of labeling time and the heterogeneity of the general public which may lead to a biased and incomplete understanding of public acceptance this study first conceptualizes three forms of public acceptance socio political acceptance market acceptance and community acceptance it then relates the concept of socio political acceptance to preference formation next it uses two discrete choice experiments that were conducted in 2010 and 2012 to investigate these concerns our results show that public preferences for energy technologies are temporally stable even in the face of exogenous shocks such as the fukushima incident using mixed logit models we further show that labeling has a profound influence on stated preferences when technology labels are revealed respondents favor renewable and natural gas technologies when labels remain unobserved nuclear energy and biomass take prominence however latent class models show that there are distinct classes of respondents tied to specific socio demographic characteristics that differ greatly in their sensitivity to labeling and in the temporal stability of their preferences it follows that changes in public acceptance are not population wide but remain limited to specific sub groups we discuss the theoretical and policy implications of our findings and conclude that future studies and policy initiatives may overlook important insights if they disregard the effects of labels time and heterogeneity

globalization party positions and the median voter the authors argue that the effects of economic globalization on social democratic parties in western europe are conditional on the position of the median voter if the median is far enough to the right such parties will adopt business friendly policies because they are required to win office only when the median is relatively far to the left will globalization constrain social democratic parties forcing them to adopt policies further to the right in order to retain credibility it is on this basis the authors argue that empirical studies are misspecified unless they include an interaction between measures of globalization and the position of the median in addition to presenting formal theoretical arguments the article reports empirical findings from fifteen countries in the period from 1973 to 2002 that support the conclusion that the effects of globalization are indeed contingent on the median the authors find that the effects of globalization are significant for social democratic parties only in circumstances in which the median is relatively far to the left

the effects of capital income taxation on international competitiveness and trade flows using an intertemporal equilibrium model this paper analyzes how lower source based taxes on capital income impact trade performance and international competitiveness it shows that depending on import shares and intertemporal and intratemporal substitution elasticities capital accumulation may induce changes in real interest rates and the terms of trade that stimulate domestic saving even if financial capital is perfectly mobile internationally import shares appear important determinants of exchange rate effects numerical simulations illustrate these results copyright 1989 by american economic association

phoenix risen the resurrection of global finance of all the many changes of the world economy since world war ii few have been nearly so dramatic as the resurrection of global finance a review of five recent books suggests considerable diversity of opinion concerning both the causes and the consequences of financial globalization leaving much room for further research competing historical interpretations stressing the contrasting roles of market forces and government policies need to be reexamined for dynamic linkages among the variables they identify likewise impacts on state policy at both the macro and micro levels should be explored more systematically to understand not just whether constraints may be imposed on governments but also how and under what conditions and what policymakers can do about them finally questions are also raised about implications for the underlying paradigm conventionally used for the study of international political economy and international relations more generally

the european monetary system list of figures list of tables preface 1 introduction niels thygesen part i the international environment 2 the european monetary system the dollar and the yen rudiger dornbusch discussion robert triffin discussion charles wyplosz part ii disinflation external adjustment and cooperation 3 monetary discipline and cooperation in the european monetary system a synthesis jacques melitz discussion jose vinals 4 the role of the exchange rate regime in a disinflation empirical evidence on the european monetary system francesco giavazzi and alberto giovannini discussion william branson 5 inflation and the european monetary system susan m collins discussion jean jacques rey 6 economic growth and exchange rates in the european monetary system their trade effects in a changing external environment stefano vona and lorenzo bini smaghi discussion david begg part iii exchange rates capital mobility and monetary coordination 7 exchange rates interest rates capital controls and the european monetary system assessing the track record michael j artis and mark p taylor discussion emil maria claassen and eric peree 8 the stability and sustainability of the european monetary system with perfect capital markets john driffill discussion daniel gros 9 competitiveness realignment and speculation the role of financial markets maurice obstfeld discussion marcus miller discussion herakles polemarchakis 10 interventions sterilisation and monetary policy in european monetary system countries 1979 87 cristina mastropasqua stefano micossi and roberto rinaldi discussion wolfgang rieke 11 monetary policy coordination within the european monetary system is there a rule massimo russo and giuseppe tullio discussion lucas papademos part iv the future of the european monetary system 12 the european monetary system a long term view tommaso padoa schioppa 13 a new phase in the european monetary system exchange rate constraint capital liberalisation and policy coordination a report of the conference panel discussion lamberto dini peter kenen rainer masera wolfgang rieke luigi spaventa and jacques waitzenegger index

random walk or planned excursion continuity and change in the left right positions of political parties implicit in theories of democratic elections is the idea of change or at least the potential for change elections provide the opportunity for citizens to change their party preferences and thus al

the optimal taxation of savings and investment in an open economy abstract while the taxation of savings and of investment are equivalent in a closed economy there is a real choice between the two in an open economy setting a tax authority can specifically tax the return to domestic capital following the source principle or it can tax the return to domestic savings following the residence principle this paper examines the optimal joint taxation of savings and investment for a country that has access to the international capital market conditions under which such a country should tax only savings or investment are identified generally however countries optimally tax both savings and investment most countries tax systems indeed are a mixture of the source and residence systems of taxation

how economic integration affects party issue emphases the economic dimension has typically been considered the primary dimension of political party competition however parties often rally voters on the basis of non economic issues in this article we argue that integration into global markets and into the european union eu constrains parties abilities to credibly differentiate themselves on economic issues given these constraints and voters awareness of them parties activate other non economic issues along which to compete using data across 49 countries between 1961 and 2010 this study shows that increased economic integration is associated with increased emphasis on non economic issues during election campaigns this effect persists over time and remains robust to a number of alternative explanations and modeling strategies we also explore the proposed causal mechanisms and show that integration is indeed associated with convergence of party positions on economic issues and that all types of parties not just new and niche parties respond to int

party policy diffusion do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems this research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating foreign successful incumbent parties spatial econometric analyses of parties election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed by showing that parties respond to these foreign incumbent parties this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition furthermore we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion as we suggest that political parties are important vehicles through which public policies diffuse

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

voters commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs when will a vote seeking government pursue unpopular welfare reforms that are likely to cost it votes using a game theoretical model we show that a government enacts reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times but not during good ones the key reason is that voters cannot commit to re elect a government that does not reform during bad times this voters commitment problem stems from economic voting i e voters tendency to punish the government for a poorly performing economy the voter commitment problem provides an explanation for the empirical puzzle that governments sometimes enact reforms that voters oppose

policy mis representation and the cost of ruling u s presidential elections in comparative perspective the cost of ruling effect on electoral support is well established that is governing parties tend to lose vote share the longer they are in power although we know this to be true we do not know why it happens this research examines whether the cost of ruling results at least in part from the tendency for governing parties to shift policy further away from the average voter it first considers differences in political institutions and how they might influence cost of ruling owing to policy drift and then tests the hypothesis focusing on u s presidential elections which is an unfavorable case to find such an effect results confirm a clear cost of ruling effect in these elections and demonstrate that policy misrepresentation is an important mechanism that is the policy liberalism of presidents from different parties diverges over time as their tenure in the white house increases and the degree to which it does matters for the presidential vote policy is not the only thing that matters and other

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

the effects of information voids on capital flows in emerging markets information voids reflect a lack of publicly available information about a country s investment climate and represent the information problems associated with institutional voids we argue that foreign investors differ in their sensitivity to information voids based on their own private information and their flexibility in responding rapidly to change we predict that foreign banks will be least hampered by information voids due to their privileged access to private information about local conditions and ability to adapt quickly to new information portfolio investors while impeded by information voids due to their severely limited access to local private information are able to quickly respond to new information foreign direct investors have moderate access to local private information yet their inability to adapt quickly creates problems dealing with information voids using time series cross sectional data on local public information and capital flows to the thirty largest emerging markets from 1994 to 2012 we find preliminary support for our hypotheses regarding the sensitivity of different investors to information voids we find that direct investors are most sensitive to information voids and banks are least sensitive while portfolio investors are moderately sensitive

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination