capital market development in china abstract this paper examines why and how capital markets have developed in a low income socialist country it shows that the development is the response of economic agents operating under a more market oriented economic environment with a highly regulated and inefficient banking system this development has presented new policy challenges and opportunities the paper argues that the developmental effects of the emergence of capital markets in china can be as important as its impact on improving allocative efficiency and resource mobilization

decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem in markets with adverse selection only low quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low we show that under decentralized trade however both high and low quality units trade although with delay moreover when frictions are small the surplus realized is greater than the static competitive surplus thus decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem remarkably payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish even though both high and low quality units continue to trade and there is trade at several prices markets differ in the degree to which trade is centralized call markets used to set opening prices on the nyse are highly centralized and all trade takes place at a single price the market clearing price in contrast in housing labor or used car markets trade is highly decentralized and prices are determined by bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers and may differ between trades the competitive model abstracts away from these institutional aspects thus providing a model suitable in principle for the study of both centralized and decentralized markets our results suggest that decentralized markets with adverse selection may perform better than anticipated by the static competitive model and therefore that these institutional features cannot be ignored it is known that in markets for homogenous goods decentralized trade tends to yield competitive outcomes when trading frictions are small because competitive equilibrium is efficient in these markets this implies that decentralized trade generates nearly efficient outcomes in markets with adverse selection however competitive equilibria ce need not be efficient which raises the possibility that alternative market structures perform better in this article we study a version of akerlof s 1970 market for lemons in which trade is decentralized each period an equal measure of buyers and sellers enters the market every seller is endowed with a unit of either high or low quality at each period every agent in the market has a positive probability of meeting an agent of the opposite type once matched a buyer without observing the quality of the seller s unit makes a take it or leave it price offer if the seller accepts then they trade at the offered price and both agents exit the market if the seller rejects the offer then both agents remain in the market at the next period discounting of future gains and the possible delay in matching with a trading partner constitute trading frictions when the average quality of the good held by entering sellers is low the market has a unique competitive equilibrium ce in which the price equals the buyers value of a low quality unit

efficiency in decentralised markets with aggregate uncertainty we study efficiency in decentralized markets with aggregate uncertainty and one sided private information there is a continuum of mass one of uninformed buyers and a continuum of mass one of informed sellers buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs over time and buyers make the offers we show that all equilibria become efficient as trading frictions vanish

vietnam assessing the achievements of doi moi following a decade of reform and the 1988 89 stabilisation programme vietnam appears well positioned to become a new east asian dragon below the main macroeconomic dimensions of the reform process are examined in particular improved terms of trade for food agriculture is seen as a key determinant of stabilisation more generally it is argued that the authorities have rightly given broad priority to macro stability over micro efficiency while the process of institutional change is necessarily a lengthy one rising domestic and foreign savings will help sustain rapid growth mitigating any adverse distributional consequences of reform the vietnamese experience clearly contains lessons for other market transition economies

why the quantity theory of money is not applicable to china together with a tested theory that is using data for the period 1952 88 this paper argues that any statistical relationship between money and prices is not evidence of causation running from money to prices but is due to the consistent nature of planners reactions to purchasing power imbalances this is not an econometric study historical institutional and simple statistical analysis is used an outline descriptive picture of money development for this period in china is offered in the light of the simple theory applied here parallels with post keynesian monetary theory are suggested two appendixes explain the narrow money supply process and present all the data used copyright 1992 by oxford university press

information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts we consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions boom or bust from the information disclosed after a trading round the disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry in particular when only winning bids are publicly disclosed learning is more rapid in a bust

the dilemmas of market socialism capital market reform in china part i bonds this two part article analyses the attempts to reform the socialist financial system in china by diversifying financial assets and introducing capital markets the approach used is that of political economy in the sense of elucidating the interplay between political and economic interests actors and issues in the reform process part i discusses the issue of bonds by governments and enterprises although the reform era has seen gradual progress towards something resembling a bond market in terms of a diversification of bond types and growing competition between bond issues there is no evidence that this has improved allocative efficiency in the economy rather bonds have functioned as one instrument in a complex struggle for resources between political institutional and economic actors in the context of a continuing shortage economy this competitive system falls far short of a true market rather it embodies powerful systemic factors reflecting the basic structural and institutional features o

the relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation we calculate learning rates when agents are informed through public and private observation of other agents actions we characterize the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs if the private learning channel is present convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the perfect information limit is exponential at a rate equal to the sum of the mean arrival rate of public information and the mean rate at which individual agents are randomly matched with other agents if however there is no private information sharing then convergence is exponential at a rate strictly lower than the mean arrival rate of public information c 2009 elsevier inc all rights reserved

reforming china s financial system and monetary policies a sovereign remedy for locally initiated investment expansion abstract this paper studies the efficacy of china s financial reforms in helping the central monetary authority to achieve its goals of macroeconomic stabilization a local local monetary game is presented which examines the investment competition between local governments in different hypothetical financial settings it is shown that direct means of credit control and indirect instruments of monetary policy have both strengths and weaknesses suggesting that their combination would be desirable in macroeconomic management under the new financial arrangement

learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions we study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others actions every period each agent observes a public and private noisy signal centered around the aggregate action taken by the population the public signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a price or a quantity the private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and local interactions we identify conditions such that the average learning curve is s shaped learning is slow initially intensifies rapidly and finally converges slowly to the truth we show that increasing public information always slows down learning in the long run and under some conditions reduces welfare lastly optimal diffusion of information requires that agents strive to be different agents need to be rewarded for choosing actions away from the population average

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

information learning and the stability of fiat money abstract we analyze the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government information about its value is imperfect and learning is decentralized we show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money it also provides an explanation of the fact that despite its obvious advantages the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development

rural urban disparity and sectoral labour allocation in china this study examines china s rural urban segmentation and its causes in the context of economic reforms household survey and aggregate data indicate a v shaped process in which rural urban consumption and income differentials decreased between 1978 and 1985 but then have continually increased to historically high levels this sectoral division is consistent with production function estimates based on provincial data that reveal higher labour productivity in urban state owned industries than in rural industries and agriculture to explain the v shaped change we argue that the precedent of successful rural reforms raised farmers relative earnings but the remaining obstacles to an efficient sectoral allocation of labour have prevented china from eliminating dualism recent financial policies consisting of urban price subsidies and increased investment credits have also had influential distribution effects that are biased against the rural sector

long run price competition we generalize the standard repeated games model of dynamic oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long lived and forward looking each period leaves some residual demand to future periods and pricing in one period affects consumers expectations about future prices we analyze this setting for an indivisible durable good with price setting firms and overlapping cohorts of consumers the model nests the repeated game model and the coasian durable goods model as its two extreme cases the analysis is mostly focused on constant price collusion but conditions for collusive recurrent sales are also identified

screening in a matching market contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting if the informed party s reservation value does not depend on its private information its type it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers low types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to high types we challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment we consider a market where players meet pairwise and where in each match either side may be chosen to make a take it or leave it offer as frictions become sufficiently low we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information in particular all contracts are free of distortions

resale and collusion in a dynamic market for semidurable goods the paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second hand markets it will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity the main contribution of the paper shows that an active second hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude as do policies that affect the functioning of the second hand market e g leasing policy and buy back it will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits

bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers abstract we analyze bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network players can make repeated alternating public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders linked to each specific proposer our purpose is to find the conditions of the network which drive the price distribution in equilibrium this paper uses graph theory tools to provide necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the architecture of networks for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the walrasian outcome

cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist in the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination a new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay within each cohort consumers vary in their tastes for the good under broad conditions the seller will vary the price over time in most periods he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay periodically however he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay

a theory of shortage in socialist economies based on the soft budget constraint this paper attributes shortages of goods in socialist economies to the soft financial constraints that firms in such economies face a soft budget constraint problem arises when the state bank is unable to make a credible commitment not to refinance bad projects once some investment costs are sunk in such a situation if a consumer good is also demanded by firms as an input and the seller cannot separate firms from households the high market clearing price would lead to welfare losses because too many bad projects would start and crowd out household consumption copyright 1994 by american economic association

dynamic matching and bargaining games a general approach this paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies this result is informed by the analysis of non cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions a central objective of this literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions in particular does the trading outcome become walrasian when frictions become small existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers the characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific search and bargaining games

financial deregulation and economic performance an attempt to relate european financial history to current ldc issues abstract the mckinnon model of repressed capital and money markets is tested against concise accounts of the development of such markets in england france germany and italy differences of a national and institutional character are observed it is concluded that the question is more complex than one of repressed vs unrepressed capital markets and that the explosive reactions in latin america from recent deregulation may have originated not in inconsistencies in policies wrong order of reform steps or other current explanations so much as precipitousness which failed to give markets sufficient time to settle down between deregulation measures getting asset prices right rather than underpriced and overtraded and permitting expectations time to settle in stable fashion

market power and information revelation in dynamic trading we study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty there is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers all buyers are uninformed while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the world when n 1 full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period with n 1 the outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers information and even more importantly on the intensity of competition allowed by the existing trading rules when there is intense competition absence of clienteles information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough regardless of the number of informed sellers on the other hand for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of competition presence of clienteles for any n we always have equilibria where information is never fully revealed moreover in that case when only one seller is informed for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation even for large n jel c72 c78 d82 d83

the rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms abstract we study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information a friction parameter is the length of the time period until the next meeting we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms the condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power the bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power nbp mechanisms simple random proposer take it or leave it protocols are nbp while k double auctions k da are not we find that k das have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all

stagflationary effect of government bond financing in the transforming chinese economy a general equilibrium analysis abstract this paper studies how the method of government debt financing affects the macroeconomic performance of the transforming chinese economy the investigation is conducted within the context of an endogenous growth model that incorporates the major institutional features of the chinese economy using this framework we evaluate the effects on the growth rate of output and inflation if the chinese government relies more on bonds and less on money creation for budget deficit and debt repayment financing it is shown that although this policy change can reduce the growth rate of the money supply it can generate a stagflationary effect reducing the rate of output growth while raising the rate of inflation if the initial fraction of government deficit and debt repayment financed by bonds is sufficiently small and the tax rate on labor income is sufficiently low

price dispersion information and learning abstract we consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money agents learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning we show that multiple equilibria arise and equilibria with price dispersion entail more learning than equilibria with one price price dispersion increases communication about private histories which in turn increases the overall amount of information in the economy we also compare ex ante welfare under price dispersion and one price our results show that despite the existence of some meetings where no trade takes place ex ante welfare under price dispersion may be higher than under one price

sequential moves and tacit collusion reaction function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly abstract this paper analyzes a finite horizon sequential move pricing duopoly restricting attention to markov strategies the solution yields stationary patterns independent of initial conditions where the reaction functions follow cycles of three periods the market price never settles down and is at all times strictly above marginal cost long run average industry profits are approximately 5 6 of the monopoly level these results demonstrate that neither a long horizon nor non markovian strategies are required for persistent profits in dynamic price competition games journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 l13

an equilibrium search model of synchronized sales we demonstrate the existence of periodic nonstationary equilibria with self generating cycles in a simple model of random search our results provide a theory of synchronized sales based on product market search by heterogeneous consumers that is our model explains how it can be optimal for all sellers to follow a repeated pattern of posting a high price for several periods and then posting a low price for one period

search adverse selection and market clearing we examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing a seller who has private information about product quality and a buyer are matched to bargain over price they form a long term relationship if they reach agreement they return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved the market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold

reprint of information percolation in segmented markets we study equilibria of dynamic over the counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information over time agents are privately informed by bids and offers investors differ with respect to information quality including initial information precision and also in terms of market connectivity the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities we characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives more liquid markets lead to higher equilibrium information acquisition when the gains from trade and market duration are sufficiently large on the other hand for a small market duration the opposite may occur if agents vary sufficiently in terms of their market connectivity c 2014 published by elsevier inc

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty abstract we introduce aggregate uncertainty into a rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 type dynamic matching and bilateral bargaining model the market can be either in a high state where there are more buyers than sellers or in a low state where there are more sellers than buyers traders do not know the state they randomly meet each other and bargain by making take it or leave it offers the only information transmitted in a meeting is the time a trader spent on the market there are two kinds of search frictions time discounting and exogenous exit we find that as the search frictions vanish the market discovers the competitive price quickly the prices offered in equilibrium converge in expectation to the true state walrasian price at the rate linear in the total search friction this rate is the same as it would be if the state were commonly known

screening peers softly inferring the quality of small borrowers this paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers creditworthiness we find that these peer lenders predict an individual s likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45 greater accuracy than the borrower s exact credit score unobserved by the lenders who only see a credit category moreover peer lenders achieve 87 of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borrowers screening through soft or nonstandard information is relatively more important when evaluating lower quality borrowers our results highlight how aggregating over the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance lending efficiency this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

socialist economics the disequilibrium school and the shortage economy the economics literature about behavior and policy in the stylized socialist economy has passed through three main phases the first phase emanated essentially from the barone lange von mises debate before world war ii its main focus was on how a socialist economy could operate efficiently in the absence of markets and private property the second phase occurring mostly since world war ii has been concerned primarily with coming to grips with the organization institutions and planning process of economies that profess to have realized some form of the ideal socialist economy several writers have sought to generalize on the basis of these empirical features without really aiming at a rigorous formal theory of the various agents in a centrally planned economy the third phase has occurred since the mid 1970s when some began to work out propositions on and formalize models of micro and macroeconomic behavior in stylized centrally planned economies and sought to buttress their theoretical approach with macroeconometric measurements that have since been used as a platform for formulating policy recommendations there have been three main strands in this third type of inquiry ickes 1984

contradication in china s financial reforms the relationship between blanks and enterprises this paper investigates the effects of the reforms in china s financial sector on enterprise performance particular attention is paid to the effect of the increased role played by banks as a result of the major reorganization of the banking system which occurred in 1984 it is argued that although china s banks now possess considerable power to discriminate between enterprises in the allocation of credit in practice this power is seldom used and enterprises have not been subjected to significantly increased financial discipline as a result of the reforms the reasons for this are discussed and the prospects for further reform assessed copyright 1989 by oxford university press

prices delay and the dynamics of trade we characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral finding a trading partner is costly prices are determined by bargaining and preferences are private information we show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values as frictions vanish transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists journal of economic literature classification numbers d40 d50

convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate abstract consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers values for the traded good are private and independently drawn time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate we show that in all steady state perfect bayesian equilibria as approaches zero equilibrium prices converge to the walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation

bargaining and reputation in search markets in a two sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus the matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus the frequency of behavioral types is determined in equilibrium even if the frequency of behavioral types is negligible they aect the terms of trade and eciency in an unbalanced market where the entering

information percolation in segmented markets we study equilibria of dynamic over the counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information over time agents are privately informed by bids and offers investors differ with respect to information quality including initial information precision and also in terms of market connectivity the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities we characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information gathering incentives more liquid markets lead to higher equilibrium information acquisition when the gains from trade and market duration are sufficiently large on the other hand for a small market duration the opposite may occur if agents vary sufficiently in terms of their market connectivity c 2014 published by elsevier inc

learning and price discovery in a search market we introduce learning into an otherwise standard two sided search and bargaining market there is uncertainty about the price distribution due to uncertainty about an underlying exogenous state of relative demand in the high state buyers are on the long side otherwise they are on the short side in equilibrium prices are on average higher in the high state individual agents learn about the distribution while searching agents typically start out by experimenting with a tough bargaining position buyers may initially insist on a low price and sellers on a high price after successive failures to trade agents become increasingly pessimistic about the market conditions and soften their bargaining stance when frictions are small equilibrium transaction prices are approximately market clearing despite aggregate demand being unknown thus the search and bargaining procedure enables price discovery in a decentralized market

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

search with adverse selection this paper analyzes a sequential search model with adverse selection we study information aggregation by the price how close the equilibrium prices are to the full information prices when search frictions are small we identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when search frictions are small we trace this to a strong form of the winner s curse that is present in the sequential search model the failure of information aggregation may result in inefficient allocations

the decomposition of disturbances to national output of china the evidence of sectoral and regional shocks the chinese government has established policies to promote its industrial sectors and to develop coastal provinces since the late 1978 to investigate the extent and reason the output growth in china has been influenced by these policies an error component model is employed to decompose the importance of sectoral and regional shocks to variations in national output the results show that both sectoral specific shocks common across regions and regional specific shocks common across sectors are important in explaining the disturbance of national output in china specifically sectoral specific shocks consistently explain relatively more disturbance of chinese output than regional specific shocks do our empirical results are somewhat different from stockman 1988 and costello 1993 since they show almost equal explanatory power of sectoral and national shocks in accounting for national outputs in oecd countries

models of financially repressed developing economies abstract the past decade has witnessed an explosion of research on financial sector models of financially repressed developing economies for the most part financial repression is interpreted to be the technique of holding interest rates particularly deposit rates of interest below their free market equilibrium levels the recent spate of activity in this field was produced by the simultaneous publication in 1973 of books by mckinnon and shaw both authors demonstrate how economic theory can be applied to the analysis of the effects of financial conditions on investment and the real rate of economic growth since 1973 models of financially repressed developing economies have been formalized mathematically extended to open economies in order to analyse exchange rate policies and tested empirically this paper presents a critical survey of the major contributions to the literature in this field since 1973

financial deregulation and segmented capital markets the case of korea abstract this paper deals with the relation between the official and the unregulated or curb segments of the capital market in korea the paper focuses on the behavior of officially controlled interest rates paid on time deposits and on freely determined curb market interest rates the effects of financial deregulation on interest rates investment and growth are investigated it is argued that under some plausible circumstances financial deregulation can generate significant crowding out in the curb market reducing the total degree of financial intermediation the empirical results provide some support to the crowding out hypothesis and indicate that changes in the officially controlled time deposit rate have been positively related to changes in the freely determined curb market interest rate an aggregate investment function is also estimated for korea it is found that an increase decrease in the curb rate discourages encourages investment on the other hand increases in the real volume of credit intermediate in the official segment have a positive effect on real aggregate investment

should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market to answer the question in the title this article characterizes the socially efficient organization of the market with search frictions the efficient organization depends on the relative elasticity in the supply between the two sides of the market the costs of participating in the market and organizing trade and the a symmetry in matching we also show that the social optimum can be implemented by a realistic market equilibrium where the organizers set up trading sites to direct the other side s search the results provide a unified explanation for why trade has often been organized by sellers in the goods market by buyers firms in the labor market and by both sides in the asset market the analysis also sheds light on how the efficient market organization can change with innovations such as e commerce and just in time production

the timing of sales this paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination a fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase the sellers typically vary their prices over time charging a high price in most periods but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price in some equilibria all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level

vertical control and price cycles in gasoline retailing we examine norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station specific observations from 2003 to 2006 the four big gasoline companies use a vertical restraint that is adopted industry wide labeled price support this moves price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern where we observe de facto simultaneous decision making by the headquarters without knowledge of their rivals prices when every monday around noon they decide to increase pump prices to the same level the price level on mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the headquarters of the gasoline companies

on the informational content of wage offers this article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single play matching model with two sided unobservable characteristics it generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes i good jobs offer premia if high quality worker population is large ii bad jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of good jobs to low quality workers is large iii all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by high quality workers and firms or iv gresham s law prevails good types withdraw if bad types dominate the population the screening signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns

decentralized markets and endogenous institutions this paper is concerned with decentralized models of market equilibrium in which the primary interest lies in the nature of the institutions that govern trade there are two separate branches in this literature in the first the institutions that govern trade are taken to be given exogenously the primary motivation for models in this class is essentially the study of comparative institutions in particular the papers are interested in whether there are specific institutions that will generate walrasian prices and allocations approximately when transactions costs are small in the second branch of the literature the institutions that govern trade themselves are made endogenous these models characterize the nature of these endogenously generated institutions and examine their efficiency in environments where transactions costs are small

a decentralized market with common values uncertainty non steady states we analyse a market where i trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining ii agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good and iii no new entrants are allowed once the market is open we show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium even as discounting is removed this holds whether the asymmetry is two sided or one sided in some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded this contrasts with the earlier literature which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period

strategic firms and endogenous consumer emulation better informed consumers may be treated preferentially by firms since their consumption serves as a quality signal for other customers for normal goods this results in wealthy individuals being treated better than poor individuals we investigate this phenomenon in an equilibrium model of social learning with heterogeneous consumers and firms that act strategically consumers search for high quality firms and condition their choices on observed actions of other consumers when they observe consumers who are more likely to have identified a high quality firm uninformed individuals will optimally emulate those consumers one group of consumers arises endogenously as leaders whose consumption behavior is emulated follow on sales induce firms to give preferential treatment to these lead consumers which reinforces their learning

a battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium abstract potential manipulation of prices and convergence to rational expectations equilibrium is studied in a game without noise traders informed players with initially long and short positions bulls and bears seek to manipulate consumer expectations in opposite directions in equilibrium period 1 prices reveal the state so manipulation is unsuccessful bears and uninformed consumers sell up to their short sale limits in period 1 bulls buy in period 1 but receive arbitrage losses when the number of bulls and bears approaches infinity the equilibrium converges to the ree without short sale constraints there is a non revealing equilibrium but no revealing equilibrium

inefficiencies from financial liberalization in the absence of well functioning equity markets since the seminal works by mckinnon 1973 and shaw 1973 there has been active research into the working of financially repressed economies and the beneficial effects of elnancial liberalization see fry 1982 for a survey of literature they claim that liberalization of the elnancial sector from interest rate ceilings and other restrictions facilitates economic development and growth because higher interest rates lead to both increased savings and greater efficiency of capital allocation today the idea that financial activity should not be repressed has become the new orthodoxy in academia as well as in the major international institutions that provide policy guidelines for developing countries the elnancial liberalization argument however is incomplete the literature on emancial liberalization has emphasized eliminating interest rate ceilings and fostering free competition among banks it has largely overlooked the possibility that endogenous constraints in the credit market such as imperfect information could be signielcant barriers to efelcient credit allocation even when banks are freed from interest rate ceilings nor has the literature dealt with market structure e g the oligopolistic and cartelized banking systems found in most locs the literature has emphasized the role of the banking sector which is correctly perceived as the only organized capital market in most developing countries it has neglected the potential

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings the paper presents a simple pairwise meetings model of trade the new feature is that agents have asymmetric information about the true state of the world the focus is on the transmission of the information through the process of trade the qualitative question is to what extent is the information revealed to uninformed agents through the trading process when the market is in some sense frictionless in particular does the decentralized process give rise to full revelation results as derived by the literature on rational expectations for centralized and competitive environments in the context of the model of this paper it turns out that the information is not fully revealed to uninformed agents even when the market is in some sense approximately frictionless

presidential address asset price dynamics with slow moving capital i describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries i discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions which subsided afterward after presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings i offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors i address the implications for asset price dynamics of the apparent slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the arrival of new capital to an investment opportunity can be delayed by fractions of a second in some markets for example an electronic limit order book market for equities or by months in other markets such as that for catastrophe risk insurance accordingly prices respond to supply or demand shocks with a sharp reaction because of the relatively small subset of capital and thus risk bearing capacity that is immediately available to absorb a shock on short notice such a price impact is substantially reversed over time as additional capital becomes available the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect many sorts of attention costs to trade as well as institutional impediments to capital movement such as search costs for trading

decentralized trading with private information the paper studies how asset prices are determined in a decentralized market with asymmetric information about asset values we consider an economy in which a large number of agents trade two assets in bilateral meetings a fraction of the agents has private information about the asset values we show that over time uninformed agents can elicit information from their trading partners by making small offers this form of experimentation allows the uninformed agents to acquire information as long as there are potential gains from trade in the economy as a consequence the economy converges to a pareto efficient allocation

information percolation in large markets we introduce a simple model of the percolation of information of common interest through a large market as agents encounter each other over time and reveal information to each other some of which they may have received earlier from other agents we are particularly interested in the evolution over time of the cross sectional distribution in the population of the posterior probability assignments of the various agents we provide a market example based on privately held auctions and obtain a relatively explicit solution for the cross sectional distribution of posterior beliefs at each time our results contribute to the literature on information transmission in markets hayek 1945 argues that markets allow information that is dispersed in a population to be revealed through prices grossman s 1981 notion of a rational expectations equilibrium formalizes this idea in a setting with price taking agents milgrom 1981 pesendorfer and swinkels 1997 and reny and perry 2006 provide strategic foundations for the rational expectations equilibrium concept in centralized markets a number of important markets however are decentralized these include over the counter markets and private auction markets wolinsky 1990 and blouin and serrano 2002 study information transmission in decentralized markets in contrast to these two papers equilibrium behavior in our market example leads to full revelation of information we happily acknowledge conversations with manuel amador frank kelly jeremy stein and pierre olivier weill and research assistance from sergey lobanov rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 and gale 1986a 1986b study decentralized markets without asymmetric information satterthwaite and shneyerov 2003 study decentralized market with private value asymmetric information amador and weill 2006 study a more abstract setting regarding transmission of common and private i nformation

liquidity misallocation in an over the counter market abstract to understand the illiquidity of the over the counter market when dealers and traders are in long term relationships i develop a framework to study the endogenous liquidity distortions resulting from the profit maximizing screening behavior of dealers the dealer offers the trading mechanism contingent on the aggregate history of his customers summarized by the asset allocation the equilibrium distortion is type dependent trade with small surplus breaks down trade with intermediate surplus may be delayed trade with large surplus is carried out with a large bid ask spread but without delay because of dealers limited commitment the distortions become more severe when the valuation shock is frequent the valuation dispersion is large or the matching friction to form new relationships is large calibrating the model and running a horse race between matching efficiency trading speed and relationship stability i found that the liquidity disruption in the market during the recent financial crisis is more consistent with declining matching efficiency of forming trading relationships the optimal mechanism can be implemented by random quote posting

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

disagreement in markets with matching and bargaining this paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations in disagreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued negotiation the key to the analysis is a model which embeds bargaining activity within a market agents are continually faced with the choice between continuing to bargain with an existing partner or searching for a new partner bargainers may then terminate negotiations without an agreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued bargaining because seeking a new bargaining partner promises a higher return

follies subdued informational efficiency under adaptive expectations and confirmatory bias abstract we study the informational efficiency of a market with a single traded asset the price initially differs from the fundamental value about which the agents have noisy private information which is on average correct a fraction of traders revise their price expectations in each period the price at which the asset is traded is public information the agents expectations have an adaptive component and a social interactions component with confirmatory bias we show that taken separately each of the deviations from rationality worsens the informational efficiency of the market however when the two biases are combined the degree of informational inefficiency of the market measured as the deviation of the long run market price from the fundamental value of the asset can be non monotonic both in the weight of the adaptive component and in the degree of confirmatory bias for some ranges of parameters two biases tend to mitigate each other s effect thus increasing informational efficiency

institutional investment mergers and the market for corporate control the increasing importance of institutional investors as shareholders in individual companies has led to an important debate on their impact on corporate performance in this paper we focus on their role in the market for corporate control this has so far been the subject of very little systematic investigation despite its theoretical and practical significance we consider the impact of financial institutions using two u k merger samples and employing both univariate and multivariate techniques of analysis in the first sample drawn from the low merger period 1981 1983 pre and post merger differences are found between merging companies with and without a significant institutional presence however in the takeover boom year of 1986 from which the second sample is drawn all such distinctions become blurred

experiments on percolation of information in dark markets in dark markets order submissions are bilateral and transaction prices are known only to the trading counterparties here we study to what extent the information aggregation theory proposed by duffie and collaborators predicts outcomes in a laboratory version of such markets we find that prices aggregate the available information but not in the strict sense of the theory where prices converge exponentially fast to average private signals prices instead fluctuate within bands around this average the band widths reflect in the best case the precision of the average signal and otherwise the precision of a single private signal

information percolation with equilibrium search dynamics we solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information when two agents meet they share their information the information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings and so on equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision and then search minimally a tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can in some cases increase welfare on the other hand endowing agents with public signals reduces information sharing and can in some cases decrease welfare

learning from trades i study stationary cut off strategy equilibria of a dynamic market model where buyers sample sellers sequentially from an unknown distribution buyers learn about the distribution from the sampled sellers and a trade signal the trade signal reveals whether a randomly chosen seller traded yesterday observing a trade as opposed to no trade is good news about the distribution buyers who observe a trade use a higher cut off than buyers who observe no trade despite buyers learning from sampled sellers that puts a countervailing pressure on the cut offs the trade signal may reduce market efficiency while an appropriate exogenous signal increases efficiency

effective demand enterprise reforms and public finance in china economic reform in china athar hussain and nicholas stern this paper examines some problems of transition from a command to a market economy through an analysis of the most important example to date the reforms in the chinese economy since the late 1970s our focus is on the links between enterprise reforms effective demand and public finance the reforms have created a curious and problematic hybrid of market and command economies with serious problems of coordination they have concentrated almost exclusively on the delegation of decision making to enterprises from the higher to lower tiers of the government without taking into account its implications for investment consumption and public finance an understanding of future policy and lessons for other countries requires a careful examination of the effects of these past policies granting discretion to enterprises over investment and wages has resulted in both an investment and consumption boom but paradoxically a fall in profits there are strong reasons to suppose that the investment ratio has been too high in recent years fuelling inflation and slowing additions to supply by prolonging the gestation period of investment there has been a large increase in liquid assets in the hands of households which makes their expectations increasingly important for macroeconomic policy there is need for concerted financial innovation to diversify household wealth away from liquid assets finally the changes in the composition of government revenue and expenditure are disturbing there is an urgent need for a flexible and broad based tax system and for reducing price subsidies and subsidies to loss making enterprises