the politics of conflict and consent abstract transaction cost economics claims to model the labor contract in terms of the opportunism practised by workers a recent alternative has seen custom as the main means by which workers impose their control of the contract both fail to explore workers co operative behavior in the workplace pay insufficient attention to managerial behavior and misunderstand the social organization of conflict and consent materials from industrial sociology and labor history are used to illustrate these limitations to show how the labor contract is in fact negotiated and to suggest how an alternative approach might be constructed

contracting structures for custom software development the impacts of informational rents and uncertainty on internal development and outsourcing custom software development projects have special informational attributes that have challenged managers for many years they are associated with information asymmetries regarding user valuation and developer costs relationship specific investments and a resulting likelihood of positive externalities for the user or the developer from the other party s investment furthermore in a custom project market prices for software are not helpful in solving either the valuation or the cost problems in this paper we analyze the unique nature of the software development agreements that can be reached between the user and the developer in such a setting we compare the value of using internal and external developers with the goal of better understanding the factors relevant to the outsourcing decision for internal development we derive a new mechanism that achieves the first best system whenever the project has positive expected net value while achieving ex ante budget balance in contrast the optimal mechanism for an external developer will not in general yield the first best system this implies that when internal and external developers have identical cost functions internal development definitely yields the larger net value more generally this implies that an external developer must have considerable cost advantages over an internal developer in order to have the larger net value numerical results indicate that this difference in net values can be very large as much as a 100 increase for internal development over external development this is consistent with the strong bias in favor of internal custom development found in recent empirical studies we also explain why the efficient levels of investment can be achieved only when there are no externalities and we show that the presence of positive externalities results in underinvestment since using an external developer will typically yield a system that is not first best inefficient investments result with or without externalities we present examples showing that uncertainty about system value is not a significant factor in choosing between internal and external development however uncertainty about the development costs is highly significant with greater uncertainty making outsourcing less attractive

internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm abstract the transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form simultaneously several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game these complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place through unilateral modifications in production technology because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi rent component of fifirm income this process may persist in equilibrium asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis

the organization of work a historical dimension abstract an evaluation of the organizational efficiencies of various modes of production by o e williamson has led him to conclude that given identical technologies the factory was more efficient than the putting out system the superior organizational efficiency of the former he maintains was one reason for the transition to factory production during the nineteenth century this paper challenges that view it is argued that the way in which williamson evaluates efficiency is open to methodological and other objections and that there is limited empirical support for his hypothesis given an identical technology the evidence suggests that the putting out system was usually able to compete with the factory

interest rates and the fisher effect in india an empirical study abstract this study throws light on the importance of adjustment lags variability of inflation changes in real income etc in the empirical estimation of fisher hypothesis variability of inflation has a significant negative impact on both short and long term interest rates in a developing economy like india the philips curve effect has not been operative in a developing country

can money matter in a developing economy abstract this study demonstrates that the productivity of real money balances is small in two developing countries india and pakistan using a methodology due to startz 1984

on some recent explanations of why capital hires labor conventional microeconomics contains no explanation of why capital hires labor and not the reverse in view of some surprisingly positive results in the theoretical analysis of worker run enterprise systems recent contributions to the theory of the firm have attempted to explain the dominance of capitalist production relations in efficiency terms the present paper critically reviews works in this area by alchian and demsetz 1972 williamson 1975 1980 and jensen and meckling 1979 and contends that a convincing efficiency argument for the general superiority of capital owners over workers control of enterprises still is lacking

tying the manager s hands constraining opportunistic managerial intervention we discuss and examine empirically a firm level equivalent of the ancient problem of tying the king s hands namely how to avoid managerial intervention that is undertaken to reap private benefits but is harmful to overall value creation that is managerial opportunism the link from managerial intervention to firm level value creation is moderated by employee motivation thus intervention in the form of managers overruling employees or reneging on delegation may demotivate employees particularly when the intervention is perceived as being unfair undertaken for personal gain etc we argue that a number of mechanisms such as managers staking their personal reputation employees controlling important assets strong trade unions etc may function as constraints on managerial proclivities to intervene thus reducing the problem of managerial opportunism we derive four hypotheses from these ideas and test them using path analysis on a rich dataset based on 329 firms in the spanish food and electric electronic industries

the function of authority in transaction cost economics abstract this paper questions the transaction cost characterization of observed authority relations as efficient governance structures various inadequacies in the transaction cost account of work organization and the limits of firm size are traced to its neglect of the possibility that authority may be abused opportunistically this exemplifies a more general propensity in the transaction cost literature that of explaining economic organization in functionalist terms with little attention to the causal mechanisms through which efficient governance structures might actually arise three such mechanisms are considered but none is found to provide an adequate rationale for the imputation of efficiency to observed structures

employee ownership and internal governance abstract this paper is designed to counter oliver williamson s hypothetical peer group model of organization with a discussion of three prosperous populations of employee owned firms worked owned scavenger companies taxi cooperatives and professional partnerships such as the large law firm it will be shown here that these firms are formed endure and prevail over their competition for reasons that williamson more than anyone else has taught us to appreciate in particular this paper will argue that the metering problems and human asset considerations that are so prominently featured in williamson s work are crucial for understanding the success of these firms

transaction cost economics the comparative contracting perspective abstract gregory dow s assessment of transaction cost economics is both thoughtful and provocative although we agree on many matters these remarks focus on our differences i begin with a brief sketch of the framework out of which transaction cost economics operates i then examine the purported bias of transaction cost economics in favor of capital managed as against labor managed firms and my alleged failure to deal with downward opportunism dow s claim that transaction cost economics is given to functionalist excesses is considered next concluding remarks follow

an empirical investigation of oliver williamson s organization of work oliver williamson argues that the attributes of the employment contract like intermediate transactions in general are essentially driven by the specificity of assets in the case of the organization of work it is the particular attributes of labour that determines the transaction costs of any given governance structure the paper presents a stylized account of the transaction cost model of the efficient organization of work stressing an underlying tension and ambiguity in the transaction cost framework the paper exploits a unique dataset to test for the first time with british data williamson s transaction cost predictions concerning the nature of employment contracts williamson tacitly assumes that asset specificity is exogenous in general however there is evidence in the literature that labour specificity is endogenous to employment contracts the paper endeavours to demonstrate that there is empirical evidence to suggest that specialized labour is indeed endogenous in the transaction cost mode

national culture and corporate debt maturity abstract we investigate the influence of national culture on corporate debt maturity choice based on the framework of williamson we argue that culture located in social embeddedness level can shape contracting environments by serving as an informal constraint that affects human actors incentives and choices in market exchange we therefore expect national culture to be related to debt maturity structure after controlling for legal political financial and economic institutions using hofstede s four cultural dimensions uncertainty avoidance collectivism power distance and masculinity as proxies for culture and using a sample of 114 723 firm years from 40 countries over the 1991 2006 period we find robust evidence that firms located in countries with high uncertainty avoidance high collectivism high power distance and high masculinity tend to use more short term debt we interpret our results as consistent with the view that national culture helps explain cross country variations in the maturity structure of corporate debt

inflation and unemployment the world economy today is vastly different from the 1930s when seymour harris the chairman of this meeting infected me with his boundless enthusiasm for economics and his steadfast confidence in its capacity for good works economics is very different too both the science and its subject have changed and for the better since world war ii but there are some notable constants unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists statesmen journalists housewives and everyone else the connection between them is the principal domestic economic burden of presidents and prime ministers and the major area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics i have chosen to review economic thought on this topic on this occasion partly because of its inevitable timeliness partly because of a personal interest reaching back to my first published work in 1941

a transaction costs analysis of innovations in the organization of pharmaceutical r d abstract this paper uses transaction costs economics to analyze the increasing importance of vertical disintegration of r d by large pharmaceutical and chemical firms first it discusses three characteristics of the research based pharmaceutical industry then it shows that market failures related to long term joint venture r d contracts between firms and university laboratories are less significant than appears at first and may account for their striking increase over the past fifteen years

governance strategies and transaction costs in a renovated electricity market abstract this study applies a transaction cost economics tce framework to examine how economic agents adopt governance strategies in brazil s recently renovated electricity market in light of a well established tce model four attributes of transactions i e asset specificity uncertainty complexity and frequency are examined for three unregulated transactions between generating firms and final consumers the qualitative analysis of attributes unfolds into a comparative analysis of theory predicted governance strategies versus strategies observed in the marketplace it is argued that williamson s model continues to effectively predict the most efficient governance strategy in the sense of minimizing transaction costs and safeguarding idiosyncratic assets misalignment between theory predictions and observations however suggests that two additional concepts implementability and reputation must be examined alongside with williamson s four attributes of transactions in order to better explain strategic decisions in brazil s electricity market capital availability existence of compatible partners and reputation play crucial roles in explaining those decisions

long term relationships governed by short term contracts this paper studies the effects of contract duration on the incentive to invest in a relationship when its parties are rational and have perfect information and contracts are complete ex cept that short term contracts specify only current period actions t hen short term contracting distorts investment decisions only when t he efficient plan involves mainly sunk cost investment and the relati onship plays a consumption smoothing role there is a general but no t universal tendency to underinvest copyright 1988 by american economic association

fisher phillips friedman and the measured impact of inflation on interest a reply the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that empirical findings which persistently appear to contradict the fisher hypothesis that the nominal rate of interest should rise by the full amount of an increase in anticipated inflation are due basically to a failure to control for changes in the real rate of interest that are associated with changes in anticipated inflation we are guided in our search for proper specification of a fisher equation by a simple general equilibrium model which is employed to derive the impact of a change in anticipated inflation upon nominal interest given the requirement that commodity money and labor markets remain in equilibrium in effect we depart from the empirical tradition which has grown up around testing of the fisher hypothesis that takes the real interest rate to be independent of anticipated inflation and argues that for anticipated inflation properly measured the data ought to support the fisher hypothesis 1

the emergence of cooperation among egoists this article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority this problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political philosophy international politics and economic and social exchange the problem is formalized as an iterated prisoner s dilemma with pairwise interaction among a population of individuals results from three approaches are reported the tournament approach the ecological approach and the evolutionary approach the evolutionary approach is the most general since all possible strategies can be taken into account a series of theorems is presented which show 1 the conditions under which no strategy can do any better than the population average if the others are using the reciprocal cooperation strategy of tit for tat 2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be collectively stable and 3 how cooperation can emerge from a small cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of unconditional defection

anarchy hierarchy and the variety of international relations security relations between states vary along a continuum from anarchic alliances to hierarchic empires this continuum in turn is defined by the parties rights of residual control the state s choice between alternatives is explained in a theory of relational contracting as a function of the expected costs of opportunism which decline with relational hierarchy and governance costs which rise with relational hierarchy a comparison of early postwar relations between the united states and western europe and the soviet union and eastern europe illustrates the theory

does hierarchical governance facilitate adaptation to changed circumstances abstract the transaction cost theory of economic organization maintains that by merging and adopting a hierarchical governance structure two firms can circumvent the bargaining problem which would impede adaptation to changing circumstances if they remained independent i analyze this claim in a simple model which allows the costs of hierarchical organization imperfect selective intervention to be evaluated alongside the costs due to the bargaining problem delays and disagreement both costs are due to informational asymmetries which are assumed to be unaffected by the choice of governance structure examples are presented which support the fundamental transaction cost proposition that hierarchical governance is preferred when parties are highly interspecific and there are significant gaps in the contract the intuition is that rational bargainers make less attractive offers in precisely those circumstances where adaptation is likely to be extremely valuable integration effectively separates the decision to adapt from the division of the resulting surplus and so is relatively efficient when substantial quasi rents are at stake

evolution and organisational choice in nineteenth century britain this paper offers an explanation for the dearth of labor managed firms in western economies it argues that the historical evolution of labor managed firms put them at a disadvantage relative to their classical capitalist counterparts in britain the government played an instrumental role in creating the initial disadvantage specifically it took too long for the british government to remove the legal burden of unlimited liability and other company laws that were especially costly of labor managed firms early financial instruments were also ill suited to the establishment and continuation of producers cooperatives of the day since organizational forms and their supporting institutions must coevolve a path dependent process has continued to impede the development of labor managed firms c 1993 academic press inc copyright 1993 by oxford university press

a resource based theory of the firm knowledge versus opportunism this paper develops a resource based knowledge based theory of the firm its thesis is that the organizational mode through which individuals cooperate affects the knowledge they apply to business activity we focus on the polar cases of organization within a firm as compared to market contracting there will be a difference in the knowledge that is brought to bear and hence in joint productivity under the two options thus as compared to opportunism based transaction cost theory we advance a separate yet complementary answer to the question why do firms exist our aim is to develop an empirically relevant and complementary theory of why firms are formed a theory based on irreducible knowledge differences between individuals rather than the threat of purposeful cheating or withholding of information we assume limited cognitive abilities on the part of individuals bounded rationality and assume that opportunistic behavior will not occur the latter allows us to determine whether resource based

an investigation of oliver williamson s analysis of the division of labour in 2009 oliver williamson was jointly awarded the nobel prize in economics for his analysis of economic governance williamson was central to the emergence of the transaction cost framework as an important aspect of social scientific analysis part of this approach makes important efficiency predictions and prescriptions regarding the division of labour within firms in contemporary capitalist economies this discounts issues of power and privileges firm specific human assets as the key organisational driver indeed williamson s approach intentionally conflates the employment relation with exchanges for intermediate goods this article seeks to investigate williamson s explanatory claims through a uk based panel dataset using a dynamic logit modelling approach the findings question williamson s central argument the results instead are more consistent with the idea of the industry specificity of labour and highlight the importance of firm size

deleveraging and monetary policy japan since the 1990s and the united states since 2007 japan s deleveraging became serious because the negative feedback loop was japan s deleveraging became serious because the negative feedback loop was not contained in its early stage of development the japanese government did not not contained in its early stage of development the japanese government did not act promptly to recapitalize banks that were suffering from the erosion of their act promptly to recapitalize banks that were suffering from the erosion of their capital buffer due to their large holdings of stocks as a result japan s banks only capital buffer due to their large holdings of stocks as a result japan s banks only slowly recognized bad loans while stopping lending to promising new projects slow slowly recognized bad loans while stopping lending to promising new projects slow but protracted asset sales resulted in a long period of asset price declines nonfi nanbut protracted asset sales resulted in a long period of asset price declines nonfi nancial companies perceived the deterioration of their balance sheets as permanent cial companies perceived the deterioration of their balance sheets as permanent and cut spending drastically as japan s economy stagnated the total amount of bad and cut spending drastically as japan s economy stagnated the total amount of bad loans turned out to be much larger than initially estimated loans turned out to be much larger than initially estimated

regulation of the employment relationship the old institutional perspective abstract this review article examines the rationale developed by the old institutional economists particularly john r commons and associates of the wisconsin school for the regulation of the employment relationship factors emphasized by the old institutionalists include the promotion of noneconomic social goals the deleterious effects of unrestrained self interest and competition the highly imperfect nature of labor markets the skewed distribution of property rights and labor s inequality of bargaining power the paper then describes the policy strategy and regulatory program advocated by the old institutionalists to improve the efficiency and equity of the market system implications of the old institutional perspective for current debates over the extent and form of employment regulation are then assessed

works councils and employment growth in german establishments using data from german manufacturing establishments this article examines the relationship between works councils and employment growth taking the endogeneity of councils into account the estimates show a positive growth effect of works councils this suggests that the performance enhancing voice role of german works councils dominates their monopoly role moreover the findings of this study support the hypothesis that workers are more likely to implement a council to protect their quasi rents when the establishment is facing a long term crisis copyright the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

on the political origin of corporate governance species although economies business practices and living standards have converged since wwii corporate structures continue to differ among the advanced economies of the world looking at the diversity of corporate structures of large sized firms around the world and over time would fascinate charles darwin this work develops a critical review of the literature on political determinants of corporate governance through the darwinian theory including some lamarckian aspects as darwin in his work on the origin of species explicates the diversity of species of tortoises finches and iguanas of the galapagos islands so darwinism may contribute in understanding the origin and the persistence of corporate diversity in particular this article takes into account politics driven variations their inheritances and the subsequent selection of advantageous corporate attributes

can the survivor principle survive diversification the survivor principle holds that the competitive process weeds out inefficient firms so that hypotheses about efficient behavior can be tested by observing what firms actually do this principle underlies a large body of empirical work in strategy economics and management but do competitive markets really select for efficient behavior is the survivor principle reliable we evaluate the survivor principle in the context of corporate diversification asking if survivor based measures of interindustry relatedness are good predictors of firms decisions to exit particular lines of business controlling for other firm and industry characteristics that affect firms portfolio choices we find strong robust evidence that survivor based relatedness is an important determinant of exit this empirical regularity is consistent with an efficiency rationale for firm level diversification though we cannot rule out alternative explanations based on firms desire for legitimacy by imitation and attempts to temper

capabilities transaction costs and firm boundaries although the literature on firm boundaries has been greatly influenced by transaction cost economics strategy scholars often emphasize the importance of capabilities considerations in these decisions this has led to a debate that we suggest has generated more heat than light we argue that the two sets of considerations are in fact so intertwined dynamically that treating them as independent competitive explanations is fundamentally misleading we offer a theoretical synthesis of transaction cost and capabilities approaches to firm boundaries that seeks to overcome each approach s limitations and provides a unified and logically consistent understanding of boundary decisions

towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm this paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation market imperfections and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge including its fungible and taut character a framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient

division of labor organizational coordination and market mechanisms in collective problem solving abstract this paper builds upon a view of economic organizations as problem solving arrangements and presents a simple model of adaptive problem solving driven by trial and error learning and collective selection institutional structures and in particular their degree of decentralization determine which solutions are tried out and undergo selection it is shown that if the design problem at hand is complex in terms of interdependencies between the elements of the system then a decentralized institutional structure is unlikely ever to generate optimal solutions and therefore no selection process can ever select them we also show that nearly decomposable structures have in general a selective advantage in terms of speed in reaching good locally optimal solutions

radical political economy and the economics of labor markets this essay is the result of a long process involving many drafts and revisions i am grateful to duncan foley for the careful and constructive criticisms offered throughout the project the following people read the manuscript at different stages and although they often disagreed with me they generously provided helpful comments two anonymous referees for this journal samuel bowles william dickens greg dow robert drago richard edwards kathleen engel richard freeman james galbraith herbert gintis jody hoffer gittel sandfordjacoby tom kochan david levine lisa lynch paul osterman michael piore bob rebitzer gil skilman dan slesnick robert thomas and tsuyoshi tsuru comments from participants in seminars at the massachusetts institute of technology university of massachusetts at amherst and hitotsubashi university are also gratefully acknowledged

theoretical isolation and explanatory progress transaction cost economics and the dynamics of dispute two related goals are pursued first the development of and debates around oliver williamson s version of transaction cost economics are organised in terms of an emerging metatheoretical framework it proposes looking at economic theorising and its changes in terms of rival theoretical isolations which are often responses to challenging explanatory questions as a side product williamson s strategy of theorising is portrayed second using transaction cost economics as an illustration and as a source of inspiration the paper amends and refines the earlier framework of theoretical isolation by incorporating notions of explaining and explained items notions of progress in questions as well as increased causal penetration and increased degree of unification and the notion of the dynamics of dispute copyright 2004 oxford university press