agenda restrictions in multi issue bargaining abstract we study a bilateral multi issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous agenda in the procedure proposals must be made on only one issue at a time although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table when bargaining frictions are small there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements including ones with delay however equilibrium payoffs cannot be made arbitrarily small perpetual disagreement cannot be supported in equilibrium this multiplicity contrasts with the uniqueness found in the literature for a procedure where offers can be made in any subset of remaining issues

do side payments help collective decisions and strategic delegation i investigate when side payments facilitate cooperation in a context with strategic delegation on the one hand allowing side payments may be necessary when one party s participation con straint otherwise would be violated on the other with side payments each principal appoints a delegate that values the project less because this increases her bargaining power reluctant agents in turn implement too few projects i show that side payments are bad if the hetero geneity is small while the uncertainty and the typical value of the project are large with a larger number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments but delegation becomes more strategic as well and cooperation decreases in either case jel c78 d78 f53 h77

issue by issue negotiations the role of information and time preference abstract the alternating offers bargaining game with two pies and incomplete information has a bargaining sequential equilibrium where the strong type of the informed player restricts his offer to one pie leaving it to the other player to make an offer on the second pie an offer on both pies comes only from the weak type of informed player hence an issue by issue negotiation agenda may arise from signaling considerations journal of economic literatureclassification number c78

firm dynamics and financial development abstract using comprehensive firm level datasets this paper studies the impact of cross country variation in financial market development on firms financing choices and growth in less financially developed economies small firms grow faster and have lower leverage than large firms as financial development improves the growth difference between small and large firms shrinks while the leverage difference rises the paper then develops a quantitative model where financial frictions drive firm growth and debt financing through the availability of credit and default risk the model explains the observed cross country variations in firm size leverage and growth in response to changes in financial frictions

why doesn t technology flow from rich to poor countries what determines the technology that a country adopts while there could be many factors the e ciency of the country s nancial system may play a signi cant role to address this question a dynamic contract model is embedded into a general equilibrium setting with competitive intermediation the ability of an intermediary to monitor and control the cash ows of a rm plays an important role in a rm s decision to adopt a technology can such a theory help to explain the

relational contracts limited liability and employment dynamics this paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liability constraint the agent s effort is his private information and affects output stochastically we characterize the optimal relational contract and compare the dynamics of the relationship with that under the optimal long term contract under the optimal relational contract the relationship is less likely to survive and the surviving relationship is less efficient in addition relationships always converge to a steady state under the optimal long term contract but they can cycle among different phases under the optimal relational contract

on the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations abstract the preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined it is shown that the buyer weakly prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history with substitute goods such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short deadlines that prevent a head to head competition with complementary goods strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for sellers which is likely to be the case when sellers possess high bargaining powers their price offers have short deadlines and or goods are weak complements sellers strategic deadline choices as well as their incentives to disclose information about negotiations are also investigated

dynamic financial constraints distinguishing mechanism design from exogenously incomplete regimes we formulate and solve a range of dynamic models of constrained credit insurance that allow for moral hazard and limited commitment we compare them to full insurance and exogenously incomplete financial regimes autarky saving only borrowing and lending in a single asset we develop computational methods based on mechanism design linear programming and maximum likelihood to estimate compare and statistically test these alternative dynamic models with financial information constraints our methods can use both cross sectional and panel data and allow for measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity we estimate the models using data on thai households running small businesses from two separate samples we find that in the rural sample the exogenously incomplete saving only and borrowing regimes provide the best fit using data on consumption business assets investment and income family and other networks help consumption smoothing there as in a moral hazard constrained regime in contrast in urban areas we find mechanism design financial information regimes that are decidedly less constrained with the moral hazard model fitting best combined business and consumption data we perform numerous robustness checks in both the thai data and in monte carlo simulations and compare our maximum likelihood criterion with results from other metrics and data not used in the estimation a prototypical counterfactual policy evaluation exercise using the estimation results is also featured

breakthroughs deadlines and self reported progress contracting for multistage projects we study the optimal incentive schemes for multistage projects staged financing pervasive in both venture capital and research grants arises as a feature of the optimal contract the nature of progress plays an important role when progress is tangible incentives are provided through a series of deadlines and a reward scheme that decreases over time early progress in one stage gives the agent more time and funding to complete the next one when progress is intangible unverifiable progress reports are used despite the fact that the information in the report has no social value the optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date if the agent reports progress at that date then the principal gives him a relatively short deadline to complete the project if not then a probationary phase begins in which the project is terminated at a constant rate until progress is reported we explore the implications for welfare and optimal project design

managerial turnover in a changing world we develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world in which the quality of the match between a firm and its managers changes stochastically over time shocks to managerial productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers our key positive result shows that the firm s optimal retention decisions become more permissive with time our key normative result shows that compared to what is efficient the firm s contract induces either excessive retention at all tenure levels or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure

demand learning and firm dynamics evidence from exporters abstract this paper provides direct evidence that learning about demand is an important driver of firms dynamics we present a model of bayesian learning in which firms are uncertain about idiosyncratic demand in each market and update their beliefs as noisy information arrives firms update their beliefs to a given demand shock more the younger they are we test and empirically confirm this prediction using the structure of the model together with exporter level data to identify demand shocks and the firms beliefs about future demand consistent with theory we also find the learning process to be weakened in more uncertain environments

money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining abstract this paper synthesizes recent work on delay and multiple equilibria in complete information rubinstein bargaining we identify a general principle money burning underlying prior results and develop a general model of the phenomena money burning is a threat by one player to destroy surplus which can serve to enhance that player s bargaining power if it is credible our results show that the uniqueness and efficiency properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium of rubinstein bargaining are vulnerable to players ability to burn money journal of economic literature classification number 026

optimal dynamic capital budgeting i study optimal design of a dynamic capital allocation process in an organization in which the division manager with empire building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects and headquarters can audit projects at a cost under certain conditions a budgeting mechanism with threshold separation of financing is optimal headquarters 1 allocate a spending account to the manager and replenish it over time 2 set a threshold such that projects below it are financed from the account while projects above are financed fully by headquarters upon an audit further analysis studies when co financing of projects is optimal and how the size of the account depends on past performance of projects

large firm dynamics and the business cycle do large firm dynamics drive the business cycle we answer this question by developing a quantitative theory of aggregate fluctuations caused by firm level disturbances alone we show that a standard heterogeneous firm dynamics setup already contains in it a theory of the business cycle without appealing to aggregate shocks we offer an analytical characterization of the law of motion of the aggregate state in this class of models the firm size distribution and show that aggregate output and productivity dynamics display i persistence ii volatility and iii time varying second moments we explore the key role of moments of the firm size distribution and in particular the role of large firm dynamics in shaping aggregate fluctuations theoretically quantitatively and in the data

bargaining piecemeal or all at once perfect information rubinstein style bargaining models are used to explore questions about multiple issue bargaining is it ever sensible to offer on only a subset of the issues being bargained what is the effect of limiting offers so that they must cover all issues we conclude that in realistic settings the answer to the first question is yes and that restricting offers to those covering all issues may be harmful to one or both parties

alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit abstract in a seminal paper ariel rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the two person bargaining problem in this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum if the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways for example because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small we also show that for a fixed discount rate all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the discrete game converge to the solution obtained by rubinstein if the smallest money unit tends to zero

the relationship between firm growth size and age estimates for 100 manufacturing industries this study uses a sample of all firms operating in 100 manufacturing industries to examine some aspects of firm dynamics it finds that firm growth the variability of firm growth and the probability that a firm will fail decrease with firm age it also finds that firm growth decreases at a diminishing rate with firm size even after controlling for the exit of slow growing firms from the sample gibrat s law therefore fails although the severity of the failure decreases with firm size copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

specialization productivity and financing constraints we analyze optimal financial contracts when the specificity of investments is endogenous specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets but improves the asset s long term productivity while the former is known to make financing more difficult we show that the latter can ease financing constraints and increase financing capacity by improving an entrepreneur s incentive to repay the overall impact of specialization on the terms of financing depends on which effect is more important specialization decisions interact with the nature of investments their timing the need for outside financing and an entrepreneur s ability to commit to a level of specialization the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

decomposition of new venture growth into firm age survey period and vintage effects firm data are accumulated on a yearly basis in view of the linear relationship of firm age foundation year survey year the fluctuations of firm data classified by age and period cannot be decomposed into age period and cohort foundation year effects three decomposition methods are briefly reviewed and applied to japanese data on new ventures founded since 1995 regarding sales and employment growth the age effect is the largest with a downward trend and the cohort effect is negligible regarding labour productivity the age effect indicates upward movements and the cohort effect is negligible the reason of the negligible cohort effect is discussed

cross sectoral variation in the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks we estimate the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks in u s manufacturing we measure the variation in revenue total factor productivity not explained by either industry or economy wide factors or by establishments characteristics we find that idiosyncratic shocks are much larger than aggregate shocks accounting for about 80 of the overall uncertainty faced by plants plants in the most volatile sector are subject to about six times as much idiosyncratic uncertainty as plants in the least volatile we provide evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is higher in industries where the extent of creative destruction is likely to be greater

multi issue bargaining with endogenous agenda abstract the first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues the agenda matters even if players become arbitrarily patient this result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues it is found that simultaneous bargaining over packages should be a prevailing phenomenon but we also point to the possibility of multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay journal of economic literature classification number c78

the importance of the agenda in bargaining abstract this paper discusses a multi issue bargaining game in which the players set up an agenda and negotiate on the issues sequentially according to this agenda we demonstrate that the agenda might play an important role in the bargaining and discuss the relationship between the agenda and the final outcome of the bargaining game assuming that players have conflicting evaluations regarding the importance of the issues under negotiation we identify the type of agenda each player prefers we also show that in such cases the outcome of the bargaining game need not to be efficient by demonstrating the strategic use of the agenda the paper explains the phenomenon of bargaining on the agenda

rent shifting and the order of negotiations abstract when two sellers negotiate terms of trade with a common buyer the order in which the negotiations occur can affect the buyer s payoff this suggests that the buyer may have preferences over which seller to negotiate with first we find that when the efficient outcome calls for the buyer to purchase from only one seller the buyer weakly prefers to negotiate first with the inefficient seller and when the efficient outcome calls for the buyer to purchase from both sellers the buyer prefers to negotiate first with the seller that has less bargaining power or offers a smaller stand alone surplus all else being equal these conclusions hold whether or not penalty clauses are feasible

capital flows under moral hazard abstract i analyze a model with moral hazard and limited enforcement in a small open economy i find that when state contingent contracting is allowed adding the moral hazard friction improves the model s predictions along several dimensions first it justifies why non contingent debt is an optimal way to finance an emerging economy second it explains the limited consumption risk sharing and high volatile and counter cyclical interest rates third it generates realistic crisis like dynamics in which capital inflows are brought to a halt and interest rates sky rocket the model also has a strong internal propagation mechanism limited enforcement friction alone or together with moral hazard has nearly no effect on the model s performance i also construct a simple empirical test to distinguish between the two frictions and it favors moral hazard over limited enforcement friction

interest rates and credit risk this paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default we develop a dynamic model in which the relationship between firms and their outside financiers is affected by a moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs initial wealth is scarce the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival the need to finance new investment with outside funding pushes firms leverage ratio above some state contingent target towards which they gradually adjust through earnings retention the dynamic response of leverage and default to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms both rises and cuts increase the aggregate default rate in the short run however a higher interest rate reduces firms target leverage and hence produces lower default rates in the longer run this helps rationalize some evidence regarding the risk taking channel of monetary policy

delays and partial agreements in multi issue bargaining abstract we model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically one player values the existing pie more than the future one while the other player has the opposite valuation we show that players may consume only a fraction of the existing pie in the first period and then consume the remainder of it along with the second pie at the date at which the second pie becomes available thus our model features a special form of bargaining delay in which agreements take place in multiple stages such partial agreements arise when players are patient enough when they expect the second pie to become available soon and when the asymmetry in their valuations is large enough

stochastic house appreciation and optimal mortgage lending w e characterize the optimal mortgage contract in a continuous time setting with stochastic growth in house price and income costly foreclosure and a risky borrower who requires incentives to repay his debt we show that many features of subprime loans can be consistent with properties of the optimal contract and that when house prices decline mortgage modification can create value for borrowers and lenders our model provides a number of empirical predictions that relate the features of mortgage contracts originated in a housing boom and the extent of their modification in a slump to location and borrowers characteristics jel g20 g21 g33

financial credibility ownership and financing constraints in private firms as shown in the international business literature the ability of controlling owners to extract private benefits is greater in countries with weaker legal institutions in these countries providing credible financial information could play an especially important role in reducing information asymmetry between private firms and external providers of finance for our sample of firms across 68 countries we find that firms with greater financial reporting credibility i e annual financial statements reviewed by an external auditor experience significantly lower perceived problems in gaining access to external finance further the impact of financial credibility in reducing financing constraints in the presence of a controlling owner is more pronounced in countries with weaker creditor rights given the predominance of private firms around the world their economic significance and the fact that an increasing number of private firms now operate in multinational environments with different institutional features we contribute to the literature on the role of financial information firm characteristics and country level institutions for an important and interesting group of firms

dynamic security design convergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications an entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project an agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers we first study the optimal contract in discrete time this contract can be implemented by cash reserves debt and equity the latter is split between the financiers and the entrepreneur and pays dividends when retained earnings reach a threshold to provide appropriate incentives to the entrepreneur the firm is downsized when it runs short of cash we then study the continuous time limit of the model we prove the convergence of the discrete time value functions and optimal contracts our analysis yields rich implications for the dynamics of security prices stock prices follow a diusion reflected at the dividend barrier and absorbed at zero their volatility as well as the leverage ratio of the firm increase after bad performance stock prices and book tomarket ratios are in a non monotonic relationship a more severe agency problem entails lower price earning ratios and firm liquidity and higher default risk

optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous time agency model we derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous time principal agent setting and implement it with a capital structure credit line long term debt and equity over which the agent controls the payout policy while the project s volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm s total debt capacity they increase the use of credit versus debt leverage is nonstationary and declines with past profitability the firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing at a higher rate through the credit line surprisingly the usual conflicts between debt and equity asset substitution strategic default need not arise in this paper we consider a dynamic contracting environment in which a riskneutral agent or entrepreneur with limited resources manages an investment activity while the investment is profitable it is also risky and in the short run it can generate arbitrarily large operating losses the agent will need outside financial support to cover such losses and continue the project the difficulty is that while the probability distribution of the cash flows is publicly known the agent may distort these cash flows by taking a hidden action that leads to a private benefit specifically the agent may i conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption and or ii stop providing costly effort which would reduce the mean of the cash flows therefore from the perspective of the principal or investors that fund the project there is the concern that a low cash flow realization may be a result of the agent s actions rather than the project s fundamentals to provide the agent with appropriate incentives investors control the agent s wage and may also withdraw their financial support for the project and force its early termination we seek to characterize an optimal contract in this framework and relate it to the firm s choice of capital structure we develop a method to solve for the optimal contract given the incentive constraints in a continuous time setting and study the properties of the credit line debt and equity that implement the contract as in the discrete time model of demarzo and fishman 2003 the continuous time setting offers several peter m demarzo is from stanford university and yuliy sannikov is from u c berkeley we

a macroeconomic approach to corporate capital structure abstract the cross sectional distribution of corporate capital structure and its macroeconomic implications are underexplored research areas this paper embeds a dynamic trade off theory of firm financing into a general equilibrium model with firm dynamics i find that the stationary equilibrium replicates fairly well the distribution of leverage as well as the relationship between leverage size and profitability the counterfactual experiment points out relatively small effects of tax benefits on corporate capital structure it also implies that the effects of the default cost on macroeconomic variables are almost negligible under endogenous capital structure choice

multilateral bargaining and downstream competition we examine multilateral bargaining in vertical supply relationships that involve an upstream manufacturer who sells through two competing retailers in these relationships the negotiations are interdependent and bargaining externality may arise across the retailers in addition the timing by which the manufacturer negotiates with the retailers becomes important in simultaneous bargaining the retailers negotiate without knowing if an agreement has been reached in the other retail channel whereas in sequential bargaining the retailer in the second negotiation is able to observe whether an agreement was reached in the first negotiation we show that simultaneous bargaining is optimal for the manufacturer when the retail prices and profitability are similar and sequential bargaining is preferred when the dispersion in the retail prices is sufficiently large as a result of ex post renegotiations the manufacturer may strategically stock out the less profitable retailer who charged a relatively low retail price and exclusively supply only the retailer who charged a relatively high retail price and maintained high channel profitability moreover ex post multilateral bargaining can buffer downstream competition and thus lead to positive retail profits even in markets that are close to perfect competition

agenda restrictions in multi issue bargaining ii unrestricted agendas we study a bilateral multi issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous unrestricted agenda in which offers can be made in any subset of outstanding issues we find necessary and sufficient conditions for this procedure to have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium agreement

financing development the role of information costs to address how technological progress in nancial intermediation aects the economy a costly state veri cation framework is embedded into the standard growth model the framework has two novel ingredients first rms dier in the risk return combinations that they oer second the e cacy of monitoring depends upon the amount of resources invested in the activity a nancial theory of rm size results undeserving rms are over nanced deserving ones under funded technological advance in intermediation leads to more capital accumulation and a redirection of funds away from unproductive rms toward productive ones quantitative analysis suggests that nance is important for growth

efficient sovereign default in this article i show that the key aspects of sovereign debt crises can be rationalized as part of the efficient risk sharing arrangement between a sovereign borrower and foreign lenders in a production economy with informational and commitment frictions the constrained efficient allocation involves ex post inefficient outcomes that resemble sovereign default episodes in the data and can be implemented with non contingent defaultable bonds and active maturity management defaults and periods of temporary exclusion from international credit markets happen along the equilibrium path and are essential to supporting the efficient allocation furthermore during debt crises the maturity composition of debt shifts towards short term debt and the term premium inverts as in the data

optimal mortgage design this article studies optimal mortgage design in a continuous time setting with volatile and privately observable income costly foreclosure and a stochastic market interest rate we show that the features of the optimal mortgage are consistent with an option adjustable rate mortgage option arm under the optimal contract the borrower is given discretion of how much to repay until his balance reaches a certain limit the default rates and interest rate payment on the mortgage correlate positively with the market interest rate gains from using the optimal contract relative to simpler mortgages are the biggest for those who face more income variability buy pricey houses given their income level or make little or no down payment our model thus may help to explain a high concentration of option arms among riskier borrowers jel g20 g21 g33

impatience versus incentives this paper studies the dynamics of long term contracts in repeated principal agent relationships with an impatient agent despite the absence of exogenous uncertainty pareto optimal dynamic contracts generically oscillate between favoring the principal and favoring the agent

optimal annuitization with stochastic mortality and correlated medical costs the conventional wisdom since yaari 1965 is that households without a bequest motive should fully annuitize their investments numerous frictions do not break this sharp result we modify the yaari framework by allowing a household s mortality risk itself to be stochastic due to health shocks a lifetime annuity still helps to hedge longevity risk but the annuity s remaining present value is correlated with medical costs such as those for nursing home care thereby reducing annuity demand even without ad hoc liquidity constraints we find that most households should not hold a positive level of annuities and many should hold negative amounts jel d14 d82 g23 i12 j14 j26

dynamic risk sharing with two sided moral hazard abstract a group of risk averse agents repeatedly produce a perishable consumption good individual outputs are observable but efforts are not the contracting problem admits a recursive formulation and the optimal value function is the fixed point of a contraction mapping when the agents can be punished to the full extent in a single period every continuation contract of an optimal contract is itself optimal the marginal utility ratio between one agent and another is a submartingale the results imply that it is in general important to restrict an agent whose moral hazard constraint is binding from saving through another agent within the risk sharing group limited commitment and long run implications of optimal contracting are also examined

first things first the agenda formation problem for multi issue committees abstract the paper focuses on sequential bargaining procedures in which parties are allowed to differ in several respects we first highlight the strategic effects in the bargaining game and the often conflicting incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas we then show that there is a pareto superior agenda among the issue by issue procedures this consists in setting the most important issue first unless this is difficult urgent in the sense that there is probability of game breakdown after a rejection in the negotiations over this issue in this case parties prefer to negotiate over the easy issue first

financial frictions investment and tobin s q we develop a model of investment with financial constraints and use it to investigate the relation between investment and tobin s a firm is financed partly by insiders who control its assets and partly by outside investors when their wealth is scarce insiders earn a rate of return higher than the market rate of return i e they receive a quasi rent on invested capital this rent is priced into the value of the firm so tobin s is driven by two forces changes in the value of invested capital and changes in the value of the insiders future rents per unit of capital this weakens the correlation between and investment relative to the frictionless benchmark we present a calibrated version of the model which due to this effect generates realistic correlations between investment a nd cashflow

liquidity default liquidity management and smooth dividends policy abstractour article models liquidity financing constraints with the real options framework by conducting a comprehensive investigation of the effects of shocks to liquidity constraints on the firm s optimal investment financing and dividend policies our model highlights the importance of liquidity management and extends the liquidity management approach to hedge liquidity default risk we find that being concerned about liquidity default risk will significantly change a firm s behaviours including those related to investment and the optimal capital structure a firm that is concerned about its liquidity default risk will become more cautious it will choose to delay investment and have higher leverage when internal liquidity is very low but choose earlier investment and lower leverage when liquidity is high enough the dividends policy can alleviate risks from both the external market and internal project volatility and provides an alternative explanation for the smooth dividends policy puzzle comm

fragmented property rights and royalty bargaining abstract we consider production by a firm that relies on the patent rights that are held by other actors before production can take place bargains have to be struck with each patent holder over the royalty per unit produced in the negotiations a patent holder must be mindful of the fact that a large royalty will increase the product price and lower demand for the final product hence each patent holder would prefer to gain a large royalty at the expense of rivals when the producer makes the first offer in an alternating offer framework we analyze whether it should conduct negotiations sequentially with some grouping of patent holders or simultaneously we demonstrate that the producer will prefer simultaneous negotiation an individual patent holder would prefer to negotiate early with the producer and then to see remaining rights holders negotiate simultaneously a firm that holds several patents would want to negotiate royalties on each one sequentially and then have simultaneous negotiation of payments to other rights holders

selection and firm survival evidence from the shipbuilding industry 1825 1914 several theories of firm performance can explain the well known observation that survival is positively related to age however a more mundane explanation selection bias driven by variations in firm quality may also underlie the phenomenon this paper employs a 90 year plant level panel data set on the u s iron and steel shipbuilding industry of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to discriminate between the explanations the shipbuilding industry exhibits the usual joint dependence of survival on age and size but this dependence is eliminated after controlling for heterogeneity by using preentry experience as a proxy for firm quality the evidence points to a dominant role for selection bias in creating the age dependence of survival at the same time preentry experience is found to have a large and extremely persistent effect on survival and this finding is inconsistent with standard explanations for the role of preentry experience on firm performance

bargaining and international environmental agreements this article surveys game theoretic papers focused on the negotiation process that leads to an international environmental agreement most of the papers considered apply bargaining theory although other approaches have been considered as well among other issues the papers considered analyze the burden sharing rule that will result from a negotiation over a global public good the role of information asymmetries the impact of unilateral commitments delegation and ratification whether or not countries are going to form groups during the negotiation process and the influence of the expectation of a future bargaining process on investment decisions the basic bargaining model is optimistic as it predicts that countries will reach an efficient agreement immediately however all the developments of this model surveyed afterwards are rather pessimistic and even the basic model has perverse incentives for pre negotiation signals

adverse selection endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth abstract if banks face asymmetric information about loan quality endogenous borrowing constraints which restrict the size of new firms may emerge in equilibrium high quality firms reduce financing costs by starting off small and increasing their size over time

the game of negotiations ordering issues and implementing agreements abstract we use a two issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining we uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium how the order in which issues are bargained over matters and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have if agreements are implemented as they are reached easy issues are negotiated first and hard issues later if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled then it is size that matters with large issues settled first all parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter

large risks limited liability and dynamic moral hazard we study a continuous time principal agent model in which a risk neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses firm size can be decreased at no cost or increased subject to adjustment costs in the optimal contract investment takes place only if a long enough period of time elapses with no losses occurring then if good performance continues the agent is paid as soon as a loss occurs payments to the agent are suspended and so is investment if further losses occur accumulated bad performance leads to downsizing we derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its asymptotic growth rate and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually goes to zero or grows without bounds

the importance of legal form of organization on small corporation external financing this article quantitatively evaluates the impact of legal form of organization lfo choices c versus s corporation on small business external financing a treatment effect model is formulated and estimated to examine the relationship between corporate types and chances of obtaining external financing the estimation takes into account self selection bias associated with lfo choices this article finds that lfo choices mainly affect small corporations access to external equity capital but have no significant impact on loan financing specifically when a small corporation selects the c corporate legal form the probability of obtaining new external equity is eight times higher compared to when it selects the s corporate legal form furthermore the results suggest that better access to external equity investments loosening business capital constraints leads to better growth prospects for small c corporations these empirical results have important macro economic implications on corporate financial and fiscal policies jel g32 g38

finance and growth for microenterprises evidence from rural china using a survey dataset of chinese rural households we find that access to external finance is positively associated with the decision to become entrepreneur and the initial investment for microenterprises also we find that use of informal finance especially financing from friends and family is positively associated with sales growth of microenterprises with employees but not of self employed we do not find any significant relationship between the use of formal finance and firm growth our findings underline the importance of finance for entrepreneurship and microenterprise growth and the role of informal finance in the absence of efficient formal financial institutions

a theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics there is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival in this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing lending relationship with asymmetric information we show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long term lending contract and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower s claim to future cash flows increases we also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics in agreement with the empirical evidence as age and size increase mean and variance of growth decrease and firm survival increases

bite me abc s shark tank as a path to entrepreneurship business pitch competitions provide early stage finance and mentoring for entrepreneurs in this paper we analyze data from the most public high stakes pitch competition in the usa abc s shark tank we construct a dataset comprising all entrepreneurs firms that have aired between august 2009 and may 2016 our findings 1 funding on the show seems to relax an internal financial constraint rather than signal the quality of the venture to potential outside investors 2 to the extent that the latter is occurring there is plausible evidence that the signaling effect works in an unexpected direction for women entrepreneurs it may crowd out attention from potential investors 3 while it is fairly clear that this pitch competition is associated with longer run existence of firms it has no significant impacts on innovation 4 there are no consistent differential impacts on racial ethnic minorities these findings complement the literature on the impact of pitch competitions and early access to finance

striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents this paper models the wage contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide in each period whether or not to strike for the duration of that period we show that there exist subgame perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement although both parties are completely rational and fully informed this has implications for other inefficient phenomena such as tariff wars debt negotiations and wars in general we characterize the set of equilibria show that strikes can occur in real time and discuss extensions of the model such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities copyright 1991 by american economic association

the price effects of monetary shocks in a network economy abstract empirical evidence shows monetary shocks have two temporary effects on the distribution of prices one the dispersion of cross section of prices increases in response to monetary shocks two some prices change in the wrong direction some prices decrease in response to positive monetary shocks and increase in response to negative monetary shocks we present a model that generates the two effects of monetary shocks on the distribution of prices as an out of equilibrium phenomena firms are related to each other through a production network monetary shocks change the working capital of a subset of firms and percolate to other firms through buyer seller linkages price dispersion increases because the percolation of a monetary shock through the production network causes prices to differentially deviate from their steady state values some prices change in the wrong direction because a shift in one firm s demand causes a shift in another firm s supply and vice versa thereby generating complicated chains of bi directional price changes monetary shocks can significantly disturb relative prices even when all prices are fully flexible

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

financial capacity and output fluctuations in an economy with multi period financial relationships this paper motivates a financial propagation mechanism in the context of an intertemporal production economy with asymmetric information and with borrowers and lenders who enter multi period financial relationships a key feature is that aggregate output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity which in turn may constrain current production especially in bad times a small but persistent shift in aggregate conditions may have a large impact on financial capacity making the framework capable of motivating large endogenous fluctuations in financial constraints understanding how small disturbances can induce large output fluctuations is an on going quest in macroeconomics this paper develops a simple framework in which shifts in aggregate economic fundamentals are amplified through their impact on financial conditions a distinguishing feature is that output and borrowers financial capacity the maximum overhang of past debt they may feasibly carry are determined jointly much in the spirit of gurley and shaw 1955 expectations of future economic conditions govern financial capacity and financial capacity may constrain current production especially in bad times a number of recent papers have resurrected the view that financial factors may play a part in propagating business fluctuations the underlying theories exploit the idea that with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders agency costs may drive the price of uncollateralized external funds above the price of internal funds in this kind of setting a borrower s financial position is a key determinant of the terms of credit she faces in the aggregate swings in borrower balance sheets over the cycle amplify fluctuations in investment and output essentially by inducing counter cyclical movements in the required premium for external finance this simple mechanism is broadly consistent with informal descriptions of how financial and real variables interacted in the great depression bernanke 1983 and in the postwar business cycles eckstein and sinai 1986 in addition numerous recent panel data studies beginning with fazzari hubbard and peterson 1988 support the notion of a financial investment accelerator mechanism

r d and credit rationing in smes we study the effects of credit rationing on research and development r d investment using survey and accounting data on a large representative sample of manufacturing small and medium sized enterprises smes our econometric model accounts for the endogeneity of our credit rationing indicator and employs an innovative theory based identification strategy we find that credit rationing has a significantly negative effect on both the probability to set up r d activities and on the level of r d spending conditioned on the r d decision but the overall estimated reduction in r d spending is largely to be associated with the first effect jel g21 d82 032 c35 i introduction long run economic growth and welfare resides on the production of new knowledge and its implementation into new or improved products or processes for this reason identification evaluation and correction of the detrimental effects of potential underinvestment in research and development r d activities have a prominent place in the policy agendas of all industrialized countries this is particularly the case in europe where since the start of the recent economic crisis the policy debate has been focused on the role of capital market imperfections as they increase the cost of r d when firms do not have sufficient internal funds to finance it the credit crunch that is the lack of availability or reduction in supply of credit to businesses from traditional financial institutions is said to reduce firms investment in innovative activities and growth prospects however despite its theoretical appeal and in contrast with the proven sensitivity of fixed capital investment to financing constraints evidence on the susceptibility of r d investment to financial frictions and in particular to credit rationing is still mixed and inconclusive three explanations have been put forward for the lack of robust evidence first it is claimed that the variety in the results reflects the contrast between theoretical explanations based on asymmetric information arguments suggesting a sensitivity of r d to financing constraints potentially higher than that of ordinary investment and the characteristics of r d as a long term investment with high adjustment costs suggesting rather the opposite 1 second existing evidence is based almost exclusively on the sensitivity of firm level r d spending to the availability of internal finance typically measured through cash flow which is however known to be problematic in its ability to proxy for financing constraints kaplan and zingales 1997 2000 third recent contributions have stressed the difficulty in identifying the role of financing constraint using standard investment models when firms have access to multiple channels for raising external financial resources and managing buffer stocks of liquidity brown martinsson and petersen 2011 in this study we use firm level data on r d investment and credit constraints to measure the detrimental effect of credit rationing on r d investment dealing with all the above specified issues first we claim that the ambiguity originated by information problems versus the nature of r d as a long term investment might be resolved if we distinguish between the probability of r d investment the r d participation decision and the size of r d investment once the decision to invest has been taken the amount of r d spending decision we therefore study the effect of credit rationing on the decision to do r d and on the amount of r d investment our hypothesis is that credit rationing displays a stronger effect on the first decision compared with the latter while this expectation might seem obvious to our knowledge econometric analyses on the topic have not yet addressed or proven the differential impact of credit rationing on the participation and amount decisions respectively

a theory of multiperiod debt structure we develop a theory of multiperiod debt structure a simple trade off between the termination threat required to make debt repayments incentive compatible and the desire to avoid early liquidation determines the number of repayments their timing and amounts as firms increase their borrowing they add periodic risky repayments from the back of the maturity structure with the time between repayments increasing in cash flow risk cash flow growth or a significant risk free cash flow component limits the number of risky repayments firms with a significant risk free cash flow component choose dispersed maturity profiles with smaller relatively safe repayments every period rather than riskier periodic repayments

optimal long term financial contracting we develop an agency model of financial contracting we derive long term debt a line of credit and equity as optimal securities capturing the debt coupon and maturity the interest rate and limits on the credit line inside versus outside equity dividend policy and capital structure dynamics the optimal debt equity ratio is history dependent but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and in some cases the severity of the agency problem in our model the agent can divert cash flows we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort or can control cash flow risk

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

the perils of behavior based personalization behavior based personalization has gained popularity in recent years whereby businesses offer personalized products based on consumers purchase histories this paper highlights two perils of behavior based personalization in competitive markets first although purchase histories reveal consumer preferences competitive exploitation of such information damages differentiation similar to the classic finding that behavior based price discrimination intensifies price competition with endogenous product design there is yet a second peril it emerges when forward looking firms try to avoid the first peril by suppressing the information value of purchase histories ideally if a market leader serves all consumers on day 1 purchase histories contain no information about consumer preferences however knowing that their rivals are willing to accommodate a market leader firms are more likely to offer a mainstream design at day 1 which jeopardizes differentiation based on this understanding i investigate how the perils of behavior based personalization change under alternative market conditions such as firms better knowledge about their own customers consumer loyalty and inertia consumer self selection and the need for classic designs

outside opportunities and termination abstract we study a dynamic principal agent relationship where a stochastic outside opportunity offer arises each period for the risk averse agent termination is costly but it allows the agent to pursue the available outside opportunity and the principal to return to an external market to hire a new agent the principal acts strategically with respect to the agent s outside offers and we show that it is optimal to terminate the current relationship if and only if the agent s outside offer is above a cutoff level the optimal contract generates both voluntary and involuntary terminations severance compensation arises endogenously and we show that it may be paid only in involuntary terminations conditional on termination the size of the optimal severance compensation depends positively on the agent s current compensation but negatively on his outside offer the optimal contract dictates an inverted u relationship between compensation and the probability of termination

financial determinants of firm dynamics evidence from a european panel i use a panel of large european firms for the period 1999 2007 to study scale dependence in firm dynamics i find that scale dependence is much more pronounced when focusing on within firm rather than between firm variation and that scale dependence is a decreasing function of financial development

a theory of political and economic cycles abstract we develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined these cycles are driven by three political economy frictions policymakers are non benevolent they cannot commit to policies and they have private information about the tightness of the government budget and rents our first main result is that in the most favorable equilibrium to the households distortions to production emerge and never disappear even in the long run this result is driven by the interaction of limited commitment and private information on the side of the policymaker since in the absence of either friction there are no long run distortions to production our second result is that if the variance of private information is sufficiently large there is equilibrium turnover in the long run so that political cycles never disappear finally our model produces a long run distribution of taxes distortions and turnover where these all respond persistently to temporary economic shocks

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

liquidity innovation and endogenous growth abstract we build a model of endogenous innovation driven growth in which innovative firms have costly access to outside financing and hoard cash reserves to maintain financial flexibility we show that financing frictions slow down schumpeterian creative destruction by discouraging entry as a result financing frictions importantly affect the composition of growth by reducing the contribution of entrants but spurring the contribution of incumbents we investigate the net impact of these countervailing effects on the equilibrium growth rate and welfare

commitment in organizations and the competition for talent we show that a change in organizational structure from partnerships to public companies which weakens contractual commitment can lead to higher investment in high return and risk activities higher productivity value added per employee and greater income dispersion inequality these predictions are consistent with the observed evolution of the financial sector where the switch from partnerships to public companies has been especially important in the decades that preceded the 21st century financial crisis

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

bargaining frictions bargaining procedures and implied costs in multiple issue bargaining the paper explores how bargaining frictions and bargaining procedures interact to determine players bargaining costs in multiple issue bargaining settings when bargaining frictions take the form of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached issue by issue negotiation can generate bargaining costs different from those that occur if all issues are bargained simultaneously these cost differences result in differences in allocations across bargaining procedures such that players disagree on the desired method of bargaining similar results hold for certain fixed cost bargaining friction specifications this analysis provides a potential explanation of both agenda bargaining and incomplete contracts

budget constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information i study a budget constrained private valuation sealed bid sequential auction with two incompletely informed risk neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non monotonic functions of a bidder s type multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation efficiency and revenue the sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders the sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods if a particular good say is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale then auction revenue and the price of good are higher when good is sold first

cross sectoral variation in the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks we estimate the volatility of plant level idiosyncratic shocks in u s manufacturing we measure the variation in revenue total factor productivity not explained by either industry or economy wide factors or by establishments characteristics we find that idiosyncratic shocks are much larger than aggregate shocks accounting for about 80 of the overall uncertainty faced by plants plants in the most volatile sector are subject to about six times as much idiosyncratic uncertainty as plants in the least volatile we provide evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is higher in industries where the extent of creative destruction is likely to be greater

entrants reputation and industry dynamics this article analyzes entry exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge within a rational expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations the analysis focuses on the class of name switching reputational equilibria in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants reputation the main technical result is the existence of a unique steady state equilibrium within this class in which the entrants reputation is endogenous the resulting industry dynamics is largely on agreement with the findings in the empirical literature

us based ngos in international development financial and economic determinants of survival summary the accountability of non governmental organizations ngos has various dimensions from an economic perspective official financiers private donors as well as aid recipients could expect more charitable output from ngos if less efficient organizations were squeezed out of international development activities we consider administrative overheads as an important aspect of ngo efficiency our empirical analysis focuses on the effects of administrative overheads public funding and the interrelations between these two factors on the probability of market exit for almost 900 us based ngos with overseas aid activities since the mid 1980s we find that larger administrative overheads increase the probability of exit for ngos receiving any public funding however this effect weakens with increasing shares of public funding of ngos

financial constraints and firm dynamics this study analyzes the effect of financial constraints fcs on firm dynamics we measure fcs with an official credit rating which captures availability and cost of external resources we find that fcs undermine average firm growth induce anti correlation in growth patterns and reduce the dependence of growth volatility on size fcs are also associated with higher volatility and asymmetries in growth shock distributions preventing young fast growing firms especially from seizing attractive growth opportunities and further deteriorating the growth prospects of already slow growing firms particularly if old the sub diffusive nature of the growth process of constrained firms is compatible with the distinctive properties of their size distribution

bank concentration and financial constraints on firm level investment in europe abstract this study examines the effect of bank concentration on financing constraints of non financial firms in 14 european countries between 1992 and 2005 using firm level data we analyze financial constraints with the euler equation derived from the dynamic investment model we find that with a highly concentrated banking sector firms are less financially constrained this result is robust to consideration of firm opacity firm size and business cycle relaxation of financial constraint while greater for firms in less opaque industries also accrues for firms in more opaque industries greater bank concentration is associated with less tight financial constraint during both expansions and recessions results overall are consistent with an information based hypothesis that more market power increases banks incentives to produce information on potential borrowers findings are robust to consideration of country specific institutional factors

how sensitive is investment to cash flow when financing is frictionless i analyze the sensitivity of a rm s investment to its own cash ow in the benchmarkcase where nancing is frictionless this sensitivity has been proposed as a measure of nancing constraints in earlier studies i nd that the investment cash ow sensitivities that obtain in the frictionless benchmarkare very similar both in magnitude and in patterns they exhibit to those observed in the data in particular the sensitivity is higher for rms with high growth rates and low dividend payout ratios tobin s q is shown to be a more noisy measure of near term investment plans for these rms does a high sensitivityof a rm s investment to its own cash ow indicate that the rm is nancially constrained a large body of research starting with fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 hereafter fhp suggests that rms facing nancing constraints should exhibit high investment cash ow sensitivities re ecting the wedge between the costs of external and internal funds empirical ndings seem to give support to this hypothesis since rms classi ed as constrained on a priori criteria such as size dividend payout or leverage do have higher cash ow sensitivities even after controlling for their investment opportunities by conditioning on tobin s q however the reliability of these results critically depends on whether q is a proper control for the investment opportunity set if q performs worse for certain classes of rms higher sensitivities may obtain for these rms simply because cash ow re ects information about investment opportunities this critique is not new in his discussion of fhp poterba 1988 was the rst to point out that measurement error in q may cloud the empirical results similar concerns have been raised in subsequent studies as well while the qualitative point is well known its quantitative impact on the investment cash ow sensitivity has not been analyzed can the linkbetween cash ow and the investment opportunity set account for the observed magnitudes of the sensitivity or are these magnitudes too large to be explained without nancing frictions