what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

deposit insurance and external finance i introduction capital markets serve an essential purpose in the growth and development of modern economies they provide for the efficient channeling of funds from savers to investors there are two basic methods for financing capital investment primary issuance of equity or bonds and securing of bank loans looking around the world we see that countries differ substantially in the relative importance of banks and capital markets in providing investment financing equity market capitalization currently ranges from close to zero in countries like austria argentina and greece to nearly two times gross domestic product gdp in the united kingdom south africa and malaysia the importance of bank loan financing is essentially the mirror image of this what accounts for the cross country differences in the importance of banks and capital market financing of investment the purpose of this article is to address this question directly we contend that much of the variation across countries in the depth and breadth of capital markets can be explained by a combination of the existence of deposit insurance and the extent to which a country s banking system is state owned because of the importance of financial intermediation and the difficulties associated with potential bank failures governments in most countries have established a set of institutional structures to ensure the stability of their banking systems primary among these is the creation of deposit insurance by insuring deposits banks liability holders are significantly less likely to request the return of callable deposits reducing the chances of bank runs but at the same time deposit insurance subsidizes bank risk taking activities and allows the payment of lower interest rates to depositors 1 this channels money through banks and away from financial markets direct state bank ownership has a similar impact see barth et al 2001 la porta et al 2000 we present a simple three sector model in which the economy is composed of firms banks and households the firms require operating capital and can obtain it either through equity issuance or from bank loans banks take deposits from households and make loans to firms while households both allocate their wealth and purchase the firms output the model allows us to show how increases in deposit insurance or the percentage of the banking system that is state owned both reduces the size of the capital market and shrinks the amount of bank credit to the private sector and may decrease the number of firms seeking equity financing to examine the predictions of the model we study a data set composed of 49 countries of these 33 currently have explicit deposit insurance and 42 have some state ownership of banks ranging from less than 2 to almost 90 the data confirm the predictions of the model an increase in either state bank ownership or presence of deposit insurance both decreases the size of capital markets and the extent of bank lending for example we would predict that decreasing the percentage of the banking system that is state owned from 36 as it is in italy to zero would increase in the size of the capital market from less than 10 to over 30 of gdp and a raise in the level of bank lending from 57 to close to 90 of gdp our conclusions are in contrast with those in la porta et al 1997 who study the relationship between law and finance la porta et al note the importance of the countries legal system in determining the structure of the financial system in particular they point out that investors provide capital to firms only if they believe they will get their money back for equity holders this means that they must be able to vote out directors and managers who do not pay them for creditors and holders of bonds this means that they must have authority to repossess collateral furthermore these nominal legal rights must be accompanied by confidence that the laws will be enforced

energy disruptions interfirm price effects and the aggregate economy in an economy with many imperfect competitors monopolistic competition firms that pass through higher oil prices during a disruption will affect the demand for firms in other industries firms that charge higher prices for their final product will include the effect on their own final product in their private decisions but will exclude the effect on the final products of other firms although a pecuniary externality these actions will reduce society s welfare unlike the case of a perfectly competitive market this situation creates a societal risk that is much wider than an externality in any single market policy interest shifts from one of punishing persian gulf oil producers to one of cushioning an industrialized economy from sudden disruptions caused by political and military conflicts although the value of reducing oil use depends upon a number of unknown parameters with wide distributions a representative numerical example suggests that it may approach 5 per barrel

proper risk aversion on introduit et on etudie une condition comportementale significative sur les fonctions d utilite pour les richesses qui signifie qu une loterie indesirable ne peut jamais etre rendue desirable par la presence d une loterie indesirable independante

wage bargaining central bank independence and the real effects of money the effects of financial capital mobility on monetary policy autonomy are relatively well understood but the importance of particular monetary regimes in distinct national institutional settings is not this article is a theoretical and empirical exploration of the effects of monetary policy regimes on unemployment in different national wage bargaining settings based on a rational expectations two stage game of the interaction between the wage behavior of labor unions and the monetary policies of governments i argue that monetary policies have real employment effects in all but the most decentralized bargaining systems specifically in intermediately centralized bargaining systems a credible government commitment to a nonaccommodating monetary policy rule will deter militant wage behavior with salutary effects on unemployment in highly centralized systems by contrast restrictive monetary policies will clash with unions pursuit of wage distributive goals and produce inferior employment performance only in highly fragmented bargaining systems is money neutral in the sense that employment performance is unaffected by monetary regimes the model has clear consequences for the optimal design of central banks and collective bargaining arrangements and suggests new ways to study institutional change hereunder the causal effect of increasingly globalized capital markets the argument is supported by pooled time series data for fifteen oecd countries over a twenty one year period

imperfect competition multiple equilibria and unemployment policy this paper takes a simple imperfectly competitive macro model with increasing returns and shows how it can lead to nonexistence or multiplicity of equilibria the consequences for government policy toward unemployment are explored and shown to be very different from the traditional model it is argued that a multiple equilibrium model is an attractive possible explanation of the behavior of u k unemployment in the 1980s copyright 1990 by royal economic society

the inexorable and mysterious tradeoff between inflation and unemployment this paper discusses the short run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment although this tradeoff remains a necessary building block of business cycle theory economists have yet to provide a completely satisfactory explanation for it according to the consensus view among central bankers and monetary economists a contractionary monetary shock raises unemployment at least temporarily and leads to a delayed and gradual fall in inflation standard dynamic models of price adjustment however cannot explain this pattern of responses reconciling the consensus view about the effects of monetary policy with models of price adjustment remains an outstanding puzzle for business cycle theorists several years ago i gave myself a peculiar assignment i decided to try to summarise all of economics in ten simply stated principles the purpose of this task was to introduce students to the economic way of thinking in the first chapter of my textbook principles of economics i figured if god could boil all of moral philosophy down to ten commandments i should be able to do much the same with economic science most of the ten principles i chose were microeconomic and hard to argue with they involved the importance of tradeoffs marginal analysis the benefits of trade market efficiency market failure and so on i allocated the last three principles to macroeconomics the first of these was a country s standard of living depends on its ability to produce goods and services which i viewed as the foundation of all growth theory the second was prices rise when the government prints too much money which i took to be the essence of classical monetary theory the last of my ten principles is the subject of today s lecture society faces a short run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment perhaps not surprisingly this statement turned out to be controversial when my publisher sent out the manuscript for review a few readers objected

adjustment costs inventories and output this paper analyzes the optimal adjustment strategy of an inventory holding firm facing price and quantity adjustment costs in an inflationary environment the model nests both the original menu cost model that allows production to be costlessly adjusted and the later model that includes price and quantity adjustment costs but rules out inventory holdings it is shown that the firm s optimal adjustment strategy may involve stockouts at low inflation rates output is inversely related to the inflation rate and the length of time demand is satisfied increases with the demand elasticity but decreases with the storage cost and the real interest rate

stabilising properties of discretionary monetary policies in a small open economy this article sets out a simple new keynesian open economy model and shows that the conduct of discretionary monetary policy in an open economy differs substantially from the closedeconomy framework the article shows analytically that the existence of the direct exchange rate channel in the open economy phillips curve impairs the perfect stabilising property of monetary policy in the face of demand side disturbances under domestic inflation targeting if cpi inflation is instead the target then the perfect stabilising property of monetary policy breaks down even in the absence of the direct exchange rate channel in the phillips curve

organized labor and the political economy of product market distortions why are economic reforms reversed through strikes and demonstrations in some countries but backed by the labor movement in other countries why do product and labor market distortions differ so much across countries this article addresses these questions by means of a simple heuristic model of the economy that replicates in an integrated manner several independent results from the recent political economy literature unlike most of this literature however the model focuses on the role played by organized labor rather than by rent seeking firms and guilds a two stage game between the government and organized labor determines the level of product market distortions for example import tariffs in the first stage the players may undertake costly actions such as redistributing income or striking in order to increase their bargaining power in the second stage they negotiate over product market distortions and wages under very general assumptions several policy regimes exist changes in the key parameters of the economy may trigger a switch in the strategy of trade unions from confrontation to cooperation and hence change the policy regime cross country data highlight that in spite of its simplicity the model reproduces some observed empirical regularities

exchange rate policy wage formation and credibility abstract since the collapse of the bretton woods system some european countries have pursued discretionary exchange rate policies in order to maintain or enhance the international competitiveness of the traded goods sector these countries which typically feature centralized wage setting have also tended to experience high nominal wage increases the overall outcome may be described as a devaluation wage spiral this paper applies two models of repeated games to analyze the strategic interaction between an exchange rate setting policy maker and a wage setting trade union it is shown how a devaluation wage spiral may result from a conflict of interest over the real wage it is also shown how reputational forces may provide a way out of the devaluation wage spiral

how will emu affect inflation and unemployment in europe this paper explores how european monetary union will change the wage setting behavior of national labor unions we derive the impact of national inflation aversion and labor militancy on the performance of national labor markets under different monetary arrangements a common central bank raises inflation and unemployment if it acts as conservatively as national central banks however unemployment falls in countries that previously tied their monetary policy to the bundesbank we also examine the composition of emu and the influence of national labor market legislation jel classification e24 f02 f33

low inflation pass through and the pricing power of firms abstract recently there has been a significant decline in the degree to which firms pass through changes in costs to prices a decline that is frequently characterized as a reduction in the pricing power of firms the decline appears to be associated with the decline in inflation in many countries the decline has important implications for monetary policy because it affects both forecasts of inflation and the effects of changes in monetary policy on inflation some have argued that the decline in pricing power helped to keep inflation low in the face of apparently strong demand pressures in the united states in the late 1990s this paper puts forth the view that the decline in pass through or pricing power is due to the low inflation environment that has recently been achieved in many countries first a microeconomic model of price setting is used to show that lower pass through is caused by lower perceived persistence of cost changes evidence is then presented showing that inflation is positively correlated with persistence of inflation suggesting that the low inflation itself has caused the low pass through an economy wide model consistent with the micromodel is then presented to illustrate how such changes in pricing power affect output and inflation dynamics in favorable ways but can disappear quickly if monetary policy and expectations change

macroeconomic policy with a floating exchange rate and a unionized nontraded sector this paper considers the effect of a unionized nontraded sector on welfare and policy in an open economy in equilibrium there are endogenous wage and price setting there may be unemployment and non walrasian policy effects nominal wages and prices become pegged to the price of tradables with direct government employment the multiplier is unity irrespective of financing with direct government expenditure on nontradables the multiplier is less than unity in both cases an increase in government expenditure reduces welfare

tariffs employment and the current account real wage resistance and the macroeconomics of protectionism using a standard complete specialization model of a small open economy within a rigorous intertemporal optimization framework and with contract based wage rigidity we show that permanent tariffs lead to a current account deterioration and a fall in employment contradicting most of the literature on macroeconomic effects of import tariffs the crucial factor in this complete reversal of standard results is the impact of tariffs on domestic real product wages via wage indexation temporary tariffs will have less of a negative impact on the ca or potentially even a positive impact because they increase the consumption rate of interest the terms at which future consumption can be traded for current consumption and so increase private savings extensions towards incorporating a more general production structure investment and the use of tariff revenues to provide wage subsidies are presented this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

portfolio turnpike theorems risk aversion and regularly varying utility functions models which incorporate both uncertainty and the dynamic behavior of economic agents are difficult to analyze 2 moreover even when a solution is obtained it can seldom be simply stated and rarely lends itself to straightforward interpretations an example of an appealingly understood result is a turnpike theorem which states that if the planning horizon is distant then the optimal policy can be approximated by a wealth independent policy our paper develops an analogous result in a stochastic intertemporal model of portfolio selection in fact we obtain necessary and some sufficient conditions for a turnpike the problem considered in this essay is that of an investor a von neumannmorgenstern expected utility maximizer who invests for a finite horizon and consumes only his terminal wealth at the beginning of the first period the investor allocates his wealth w among various assets and at the end of the first

sticky prices as coordination failure this paper links the coordination failure and menu cost approaches to the microeconomic foundations of keynesian macroeconomics if a firm s desired price is increasing in others prices then the gain from price adjustment after a nominal shock is greater if others adjust this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity thus nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes jel e12 e30 keynesian macroeconomics waned in the 1970 s because economists grew disenchanted with its weak microeconomic foundations the central difficulty was that keynesian models were based on ad hoc rigidities in nominal wages and prices the 1980 s produced two approaches to reviving keynesian theory the menu cost literature n gregory mankiw 1985 george akerlof and janet yellen 1985 seeks to provide rigorous explanations for nominal rigidities these papers argue that small frictions in price setting are enough to produce large nominal rigidities in contrast the coordination failure literature russell cooper and andrew john 1988 abandons nominal rigidities and seeks alternative foundations for keynesian models the central idea is that many economic activities such as production e g john bryant 1983 trade e g peter diamond 1982 and investment e g nobuhiro kiyotaki 1988 exhibit synergism or strategic complementarity one agent s optimal level of activity depends positively on others activity strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria with high activity equilibria superior to low activity equilibria thus an economy may be stuck in an underemployment equilibrium even though a superior equilibrium exists models with nominal rigidities and models with coordination failures are often presented as competing paradigms 1 this paper shows that this view is incorrect we take a step toward unifying the foundations of keynesian economics by showing that the two sets of ideas are highly complementary nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes this failure has the essential features of coordination failures in previous models flexibility in one firm s price increases the incentives for other firms to make their prices flexible this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity equilibria with less rigidity more active price adjustment are often pareto superior to equilibria with more rigidity these results contribute to our understanding both of coordination failure and of nominal rigidity the range of keynesian phenomena explained by coordination failures is greatly expanded previous coordination failure models contain only real variables and thus ascribe no role to monetary policy or other determinants of nominal spending our results suggest that coordination failure is at the root of inefficient nonneutralities of money theories of nominal rigidities gain new empirical and policy im

competition or manipulation an empirical evidence of determinants of the earnings persistence of the u s banks we examine the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence by exploiting a natural experiment following interstate banking deregulation that increased bank competition we find that bank earnings adjustment speed increases after their states implement the deregulation this relationship is weakened however with the increase of bank s abilities to sustain earnings as reflected in size diversification managerial efficiency and safety we further find that the impact of compeititon on bank earnings adjustment speed is direct but not indirectly through the channel of earnings management

is it harmful to allow partial cooperation in economics politics and society examples abound in economics politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes i e they can collude with a subset of agents several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the no cooperation situation our paper assesses this view by highlighting the forces that lead to such results we find that the nature of strategic spillovers is central to determining whether partial cooperation is bad our propositions are then applied to various examples as industry wage bargaining or local public goods

stabilisation policy targets and unemployment in imperfectly competitive economies this paper argues that the rate of equilibrium unemployment depends on the objectives of the central bank in a model where the central bank uses monetary policy to stabilise the economy we show that unemployment and inflation will be lower with an inflation target than with targets for output money or nominal gdp the intuition for this is that the elasticities of demand in both the product and the labour markets are greater when there is an inflation target we show that this leads to a lower mark up of price over marginal cost and makes wages more sensitive to unemployment

european monetary union adjustment and exchange rate variability abstract this paper uses a three country three good factor specific model of trade with wage rigidities to investigate how european monetary union is likely to affect exchange rate variability focusing on international macroeconomic adjustment under both exogenous and optimizing monetary policies it shows that the relative variability against external currencies of the euro and a basket of predecessor currencies depends on the relative sizes and specialization patterns of countries and the relative importance of different shocks monetary union is likely to decrease increase aggregate european exchange rate variability for shocks to industries in which large small euro area countries specialize

a quantized approach to rational inattention abstract in this paper i propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables and still only a finite amount of information is being used this holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous that is the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece wise constant thus limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior rather than a source of noise the approach is applied to a simple static model of price setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks the effect of aggregate money shocks on output and prices is studied it is shown that as the variance of idiosyncratic shocks become large the aggregate log price level converges to a linear function of the aggregate money shock with a coefficient which is strictly between 0 and 1 consequently unanticipated aggregate money shocks have real effects on output in contrast to the sticky price model of caplin and spulber 1987 but these effects are smaller than in standard rational inattention models or in the lucas 1972 misperception model

inflation and productive activity in a multiple matching model of money abstract this paper investigates the relationship between money growth inflation and productive activity in a dynamic general equilibrium multiple matching framework where trade frictions are manifested by limited consumption variety productive activity and matching in the goods market are endogenized by a time allocation decision of work and search effort we find that a high degree of complementarity between participation in the labor and goods markets creates a channel by which inflation can positively influence production and output this feature arises when household preferences for consumption variety is sufficiently large and it can also lead to the multiplicity of monetary equilibria

bargaining structure and economic performance in the open economy abstract it seems nowadays accepted that both centralized wage bargaining and negotiation at the firm level perform better than sectoral wage bargaining this is because sectoral unions have enough market power to raise wages but do not internalize all the effects of their actions however the ranking may be different in an open economy facing a less than infinitely elastic foreign demand because raising wages improves the country s terms of trade as in the optimal tariff argument as a result welfare is higher in the centralized setting while sectoral bargaining is better than full decentralization when imported goods represent a large share of total consumption

living in an imaginary world that looks real abstract in the paper we show using standard approaches general equilibrium modeling and the assumption of complete rationality that the macroeconomic environment is endogenous and is indeterminate specifically it is argued without resorting to sunspot type arguments that microeconomic fundamentals do not suffice to characterize the economy at the macro level in particular we show how perceptions of rational agents of the workings of the economy a shape the environment b affect the environment sufficiently to ensure that rational economic agents find the observed environment consistent with their beliefs even though it is not as a by product we illustrate that endogenous macro uncertainty can arise as an outcome if rational economic agents whose expectations are anchored on endogenous variables expect them to arise finally we show that systematic errors can persist indefinitely under rationality

interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal policies we consider monetary scal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the scal with both policies discretionary 1 nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities 2 of the two leadership possibilities scal leadership is generally better with scal discretion monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks but scal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion second best outcomes require either joint commitment or identical targets for both authorities output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative or complete separation of tasks jel e61 e63

relative prices in monetary union and floating we analyse a small open economy with a tradable and a sheltered sector if the unions that operate in each sector coordinate their wage demands sectorwise the choice of monetary regime floating cum inflation target vs emu may affect the relative wages and prices of the economy we show that emu results in lower prices for tradable goods and lower real wages in the traded sector while opposite results hold for sheltered sector prices and wages thus if large unions behave strategically the choice of monetary regime has far reaching structural implications

bank earnings management and tail risk during the financial crisis we show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis banks demonstrating more aggressive earnings management prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher stock market risk once the financial crisis begins as measured by the incidence of large weekly stock price crashes as well as by the pattern of full year returns stock price crashes also predict future deterioration in operating performance bank regulators may therefore interpret them as early warning signs of impending problems

theoretical developments in the light of macroeconomic policy and empirical research macroeconomics is surveyed with emphasis on the implications of the new classical and rational expectations critiques for the keynesian paradigm and the role of macro policies at the background are the main macro developments of the 1 970s and 1 980s as well as the specific lessons of recent high chronic inflation processes a synthesis is emerging in which the basic keynesian view of the existence of market and price coordination failures as well as room for pareto improving policy intervention are maintained at the same time the theoretical underpinnings are undergoing substantial change mainly due to a rational expectations reformulation

macroeconomic performance and wage setting level in symmetric non cooperative games abstract this paper shows that the relationship between the wage and the extent of centralisation of the wage setting is necessarily monotonic in symmetric non cooperative games between monopoly trade unions if the game for each wage setting level has only one equilibrium moreover when the conditions of stability of nash equilibria are fulfilled the trade unions welfare rises with the degree of centralisation

asymmetric effects of money supply shocks and trend inflation in recent years a number of empirical studies have presented evidence that money supply shocks have asymmetric effects that is unexpected negative changes in the money supply slow the economy more than unexpected positive changes accelerate the economy evidence of asymmetry was documented by cover 1992 for the postwar u s economy and his finding was confirmed by de long and summers 1988 morgan 1993 rhee and rich 1995 and karras 1996a b stimulated by these empirical works several attempts have been made to provide microeconomic foundations for the asymmetric effects of money supply shocks 1 among those theories this paper examines the one that focuses on asymmetric price adjustment and let us call it a sticky price theory money supply shocks will have asymmetric effects on real output if prices are less flexible downward than upward this sticky price theory was proposed by tsiddon 1993 ball and mankiw 1994 and caballero and engel 1992 by employing a menu cost model the above researchers show that positive trend inflation can produce the asymmetric effects of money supply shocks the logic of their theory is the following along with price adjustment costs positive trend infla

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

nominal disturbances wage flexibility and shifting resources in a two sector economy the recent behaviour of european unemployment rates has sparked considerable interest in the connection between wage flexibility and unemployment see for example bruno and sachs i985 and the papers in the i986 supplement to economica much of the empirical work finds that economies adjust more rapidly and with less inflation when wages and prices are very responsive to unemployment this finding supports the belief that greater wage and price flexibility leads to greater macroeconomic stability in fact one can view martin weitzman s i 983 i 984 and i 985 share system as an institutional change aimed at providing sufficient wage and price flexibility to avoid unemployment it is hard to imagine how wage and price flexibility could increase in all sectors of the economy simultaneously instead greater aggregate wage and price flexibility is likely to result from increased wage and price flexibility at particular firms in particular sectors as a result realistic proposals for share systems involve some time perhaps forever when share firms and wage firms would coexist during this period an increase in aggregate flexibility will be associated with an increase in the difference in wage and price flexibility between sectors this paper analyses allocational issues raised by such an uneven increase in aggregate wage and price flexibility the analysis is done explicitly in terms of a short run two sector model where the first sector is a fixed wage sector and the second sector is a share sector the model is short run because both the number of firms in each sector and the pay parameters at all firms are fixed while the explicit analysis is done in terms of share firms in the second sector the model is more general the second sector can be thought of as the flexible sector where wage and price flexibility maintain full employment an important new phenomenon occurs in the mixed system relative prices change in response to nominal disturbances in particular the relative price of the flexible sector falls in response to a decrease in nominal aggregate demand as a result of the change in relative prices both the utilisation of labour and the mix of consumption shift to the more flexible sector in addition the opposite shifting of resources and consumption occurs in response to an increase

some evolutionary foundations for price level rigidity this paper shows that price rigidity evolves in an economy populated by imperfectly rational agents who experiment with alternative rules of thumb in the model firms must set their prices in face of aggregate demand shocks their payoff depends on the level of aggregate demand as well as on their own price and their neighbor s price the latter assumption captures local interactions despite the fact that the rational expectations equilibrium ree is characterized by a simple pricing rule that firms can easily adopt the economy does not converge to the ree for all parameter values when the volatility of monetary innovations is low and interactions among firms are high the aggregate price level exhibits rigidity in that it does not fully react to contemporaneous aggregate demand shocks we discuss the role of the nature of experimentation and of path dependence driven by interactions in explaining these results

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

real exchange rates and the pattern of trade comparative dynamics for north and south abstract using a two country model of imperfect competition this paper examines cross sectional implications for the time series behavior of real exchange rates across different patterns of trade under intersectoral trade price setters display less interaction in their pricing decisions across national boundaries allowing for greater deviation and weaker mean reversion in relative prices conversely with intra industry trade greater price linkages between similar countries trading in similar goods generate lower pass through and less real exchange rate persistence the pattern of trade is shown to essentially alter the degree of domestic price stickiness which in turn affects the self correcting mechanism of an open economy

do central banks act asymmetrically empirical evidence from the ecb and the bank of england the paper attempts to exploit whether monetary authorities have a different behaviour during recession and expansion to this end a multivariate extension of hamilton markov switching model is adopted first regime dependent taylor type rules are estimated for the euro area and the united kingdom in order to capture the systematic behaviour of central banks then impulse response functions that account for the different phases of the business cycle are analysed in addition a comparative analysis concerning the estimated rules as well as the different reaction of real economy to monetary shocks is implemented the study strongly suggests that central banks cannot neglect the regime where the monetary action takes place it follows that the phase of business cycle is an important matter in monetary policy decision process

earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses this paper provides evidence that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses specifically in cross sectional distributions of earnings changes and earnings we lind unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losscs and unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income we find evidence that two components of earnings cash flow from operations and changes in working capital are used to achieve increases in earnings we present two theories based on stakeholder use of information processing heuristics and prospect theory about the motivation for avoidance of earnings decreases and losses

aggregation and optimization with state dependent pricing the literature on the aggregation of s s policies has ignored the impact of aggregate behavior on the individual s optimization problem in the case of pricing the feedback effects are clear not only do pricing strategies determine the evolution of the price level but the evolution of the price level also influences the optimal pricing strategies in this paper we provide a consistent treatment of aggregation and optimization we use this model to analyze three issues in the menu cost pricing literature the relationship between strategic complementarity and the real effects of money the relationship between the variance of the money supply and the correlation between money and output and the relationship between the cost of price adjustment and the size of price adjustment questions concerning the dynamics of aggregate variables such as prices employment investment and consumption represent the core of business cycle analysis one striking feature of these variables is the radical difference between properties of these aggregates and the nature of the individual behavior that underlies them the behavior of a firm s prices investment and employment and the behavior of an individual s consumption all involve frictional elements that lead to discrete adjustment at the microeconomic level heterogeneity among individuals however tends to smooth the behavior of the corresponding aggregates in recent years a large body of research has developed to examine the manner in which microeconomic frictions influence aggregate dynamics one of the centerpieces of this research has been the s s model developed by arrow harris and marschak 1951 the key element of this model is the state dependence of individual decisions agents act when a state variable crosses some critical threshold which balances the cost and benefits of adjustment the aggregate implications of this form of microeconomic behavior have been analyzed by blinder 1981 caplin 1985 and mosser 1991 in the context of inventory dynamics by caplin and spulber 1987 caballero and engel 1991 1993 and caplin and leahy 1991 in the context of prices and by bertola and caballero 1990 caballero 1993 and eberly 1994 in the context of con sumer durables one of the most limiting aspects of these models is that they focus exclusively on the impact that microeconomic inertia has on aggregate dynamics they 1we would like to thank michael harrison loannis karatzas john leahy sr andreu mas colell a co editor and four anonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments and the national science foundation and the sloan foundation for financial support

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

does competition destroy ethical behavior explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition as opposed to greed in assuring its spread using the examples of child labor corruption excessive executive pay corporate earnings manipulation and commercial activities by universities this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct when unethical behavior cuts costs competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs incomes and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct nonetheless i suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run because it promotes growth and raises incomes higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

attractive compounds of unattractive investments and gambles a compound of many independent replicas of an investment or gamble may be attractive to some risk averters who do not accept the individual investment or gamble this can happen if there is a chance that the compound leads to a wealth level where the degree of risk aversion is lower than at the initial wealth level it can also happen if the investor has some sort of limited liability the von neumann morgenstern utility functions with the property that sufficiently long sequences of repetitions of any fair gamble are preferred to all finite wealth levels are characterized in this paper

the new open economy macroeconomics a survey since the 1995 publication of obsteld and rogoff s redux model there has been an outpouring of research on open economy dynamic general equilibrium models that incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this paper offers an interim survey of this recent literature 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

imperfect common knowledge staggered price setting and the effects of monetary policy this paper studies the consequences of a lack of common knowledge in the transmission of monetary policy by integrating the woodford 2003a imperfect common knowledge model with taylor calvo staggered price setting models the average price set by monopolistically competitive firms depends on their higher order expectations about not only the current state of the economy but also about the states in the future periods in which prices are to be fixed this integrated model provides a plausible explanation for the observed effects of monetary policy it shows analytically how price adjustments are delayed and how the response of output to monetary disturbances is amplified

what determines aggregate returns to scale abstract this paper develops a unified framework that incorporates four features important in existing models with increasing returns fixed costs decreasing marginal costs product variety and market power when fixed costs are not allowed to vary and profits are imposed to be zero in every period only the degree of returns to variety determines the degree of aggregate increasing returns to scale when fixed costs respond to changes in aggregate activity or the zero profit condition does not hold in the short run aggregate returns depend not only on product variety but also on diminishing marginal costs or market power the degree of market power however does not affect input prices which are critical to determine the uniqueness of equilibrium

price rigidities and market structure conventional wisdom has it that a large part of the explanation of keynesian unemployment is the observed rigidities of wages and prices what has been lacking however is a satisfactory theory or conjunction of theories which explains how wages and prices can be at non market clearing levels the objective of this paper is to sketch out several alternative theoretical explanations of this phenomenon each in contrast with keynesian theory is consistent with the observation that as the economy goes into a recession real product wages do not increase and may in fact decrease all of the theories assume rational profit maximizing firms and all entail some important departure from the standard competitive paradigm the first three explanations represent minor adaptations of standard models

on the persistence and pricing of industry wide and firm specific earnings cash flows and accruals economic theory suggests that the industry wide component of firm performance is more persistent than the firm specific component this paper tests whether investors fail to fully appreciate the relatively higher lower persistence of industry wide firm specific earnings consistent with predictions we find that the industry wide component of earnings is a significant predictor of future stock returns we show that this form of mispricing is distinct from the accrual anomaly sloan 1996 a hedge portfolio trading strategy that exploits signals from both industry fundamentals and accounting accruals generates abnormal returns in excess of either strategy alone additional evidence suggests that the market underreacts overreacts to industry wide cash flows firm specific accruals but correctly prices both industry wide accruals and firm specific cash flows

enjoying the quiet life corporate governance and managerial preferences much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers when they are not closely monitored will pursue goals that are not in shareholders interests but what goals would managers pursue this paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences we use plant level data and exploit a unique feature of corporate law that allows us to deal with possible biases associated with the timing of the laws we find that when managers are insulated from takeovers worker wages especially those of white collar workers rise the destruction of old plants falls but the creation of new plants also falls finally overall productivity and profitability decline in response to these laws our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life

increasing returns and the foundations of unemployment theory current approaches to macroeconomic theory divide roughly into two basic schools of thought one approach typically associated with rational expectations views the economy as basically at or near walrasian market clearing equilibrium in which case it becomes very difficult to explain away convincingly the undeniable persistence at times of involuntary unemployment another approach views the underemployed economy as being in a state of temporary fixed price disequilibrium in which case aside from having to repress suspicions that the essence of effective demand failure might not have to do with prices fixed at wrong values there is a lot of rationalising to be done about why profitable adjustments are so slow this paper argues that something like an internally consistent theory of steady state involuntary unemployment is possible and even plausible the cornerstone of this third approach is increasing returns to scale which blocks unemployed agents from breaking out of a low level equilibrium trap unless there is overall coordination or stimulation a simple model is presented which contains the basic ideas

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

excess capacity in a fixed cost economy abstract this paper proposes a new mechanism that can explain persistent economic slack the theory shows that when producers face negligible marginal costs and desired spending is below the economy s capacity the economy features slack in equilibrium even when prices are flexible and there are no other frictions a heterogeneous household version of the model demonstrates how an economy can enter a capacity trap in response to a temporary negative demand shock when demand by some consumers falls temporarily other consumers permanent income and hence their desired consumption also falls since output is determined by demand the permanent fall in desired consumption causes a permanent state of excess capacity

state dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output economists have long suggested that nominal product prices are changed infrequently because of fixed costs in such a setting optimal price adjustment should depend on the state of the economy yet while widely discussed statedependent pricing has proved difficult to incorporate into macroeconomic models this paper develops a new tractable theoretical state dependent pricing framework we use it to study how optimal pricing depends on the persistence of monetary shocks the elasticities of labor supply and goods demand and the interest sensitivity of money demand

magazine prices revisited this paper examines price adjustment behaviour in the magazine industry in a frequently cited study cecchetti 1986 constructs a reduced form s s model for firms cecchetti assumes that a firm s pricing rules are fixed for non overlapping three year intervals and estimates the model using a conditional logit specification from chamberlain 1980 the estimates are inconsistent however due to the duration dependent specification of the model two alternative specifications are used to obtain consistent estimation the consistent estimates continue to provide strong evidence in favour of state dependent pricing models but only weak evidence on the behaviour of price adjustment costs copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the united kingdom abstract this paper analyses the effects of a non linear tax system on wage bargaining the main conclusions are an increase in the marginal income or payroll tax rate reduces the pre tax wage in the isoelastic case an increase in the average tax rate increases the pre tax wage by more than the tax increase and a measure of the progressivity of the tax system residual income progression is a sufficient measure of the effect of the tax system on wage pressure empirical evidence is presented to support these propositions and the predictions of the model regarding the effect of recent changes to the u k tax system on the distribution of earnings discussed

optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation abstract in the monetary policy literature it is common to assume that trend inflation is zero despite overwhelming evidence that zero inflation is neither empirically relevant nor a practical objective for central bank policy we therefore extend the standard new keynesian model to allow for positive trend inflation showing that even low trend inflation has strong effects on optimal monetary policy and the dynamics of inflation output and interest rates under discretion the efficient policy deteriorates and there is no guarantee of determinacy even with commitment targeting non zero trend inflation leads to substantial welfare losses our results serve as a warning against indiscriminate use of models assuming zero trend inflation

taxation unemployment and growth dynamic welfare effects of green policies abstract this paper analyzes the effects of environmental tax reforms on a small open economy the labor market is characterized by union wage setting the carbon tax acts as an implicit tariff which gives rise to terms of trade gains the terms of trade effect together with the union wage setting leads to a positive relationship between the capital labor ratio and net foreign wealth in the short run the disinvestments in real and financial capital give temporary room for higher consumption and instantaneous utility the long run effect on instantaneous utility is more uncertain a strong double dividend may exist

central bank independence centralization of wage bargaining inflation and unemployment theory and some evidence abstract this paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of central bank independence of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the interaction between those institutional variables on real wages unemployment and inflation in a framework in which unions are averse to inflation this aversion moderates union s wage demands as they attempt to induce the central bank to inflate at a lower rate an increase in the degree of centralization of wage bargaining a decrease in the number of unions triggers two opposite effects on real wages unemployment and inflation it reduces the substitutability between the labor of different unions and therefore the degree of effective competition between them this reduced competition effect raises real wages unemployment and inflation but the decrease in the number of unions also strengthens the moderating effect of inflationary fears on the real wage demands of each union this strategic effect lowers real wages unemployment and inflation for sufficiently inflation averse unions the interaction between those two effects produces a calmfors driffill type relation between real wages and centralization the paper analyzes the effects of central bank independence on the position and the shape of this relation as well as on inflation and unemployment the paper features two mechanisms one of which is novel through which monetary institutions have real effects the model implies that if there is a single union social welfare is maximized when the central bank attaches a zero weight to inflation but when the number of unions is larger than one this result is no longer true in general empirical evaluation of some of the theoretical implications using data from 19 developed economies is for the most part supportive of those implications

all roads lead to risk preference a turnpike theorem for conditionally independent returns an individual is repeatedly offered the opportunity to invest in a risky asset whose retum distribution is unknown because the return distribution is constant over time however he is able to learn about that distribution by observing investment outcomes results are presented regarding the asymptotically optimal investment behavior of a risk averse indi vidual under these circumstances when his aim is to maximize the expected utility of his end of horizon wealth for the class of isoelastic utility functions with constant relative risk averson less than one the optimal investment approaches a constant proportion of wealth the limiting proportion is the same as the proportion put up by the most optimistic individual when the investment opportunity is offered only once these results are then extended by generalizing the class of utility functions under consideration and at the same time restricting the class of possible investment schemes this paper is distinguished from the previous literature by the assumption of conditional independence of returns across periods