the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

pro poor targeting and accountability of local governments in west bengal a commonly alleged pitfall of decentralization is that poverty socio economic inequality and lack of political competition allow local elites to capture local governments this hypothesis is empirically examined using a longitudinal sample of 89 west bengal villages concerning targeting of credit agricultural input kits employment programs and fiscal grants spanning the period 1978 98 higher poverty land inequality and low caste composition of the poor was associated with negligible adverse effects on targeting of private goods to the poor within villages but with lower employment generation out of allotted funds and significantly lower allocation of resources to the village as a whole political competition or literacy levels among the poor were not systematically related to targeting

buying votes vs supplying public services political incentives to under invest in pro poor policies this paper uses unique survey data to provide for the first time in the literature direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics ruling out alternate explanations such as for example poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes the data come from the philippines a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections the data reveal a significant robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services in places where households report more vote buying government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children and quite strikingly as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance a higher percentage of children are severely under weight

investigation of stated and revealed preferences for an elk hunting raffle the charter forest experiment at the valles caldera national preserve vcnp in new mexico provides land managers policymakers and researchers a unique opportunity to examine an alternative public land management institution the vcnp mature bull elk permit lottery has been the largest revenue generating recreation program at the preserve since the program s inception in 2002 this paper uses stated and revealed preference ticket purchase data collected through an online survey to estimate a set of ticket demand equations for the purpose of assessing revenue generation access and the willingness to donate to this program

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

policy evaluation with combined actual and contingent response data the city of marietta georgia experimentally switched from flat fee financing to volume based pricing for its trash services in january 1994 both before and during the experiment detailed data on individuals observed responses to the actual introduction and contingent behavioral responses to a hypothetical introduction of volume based pricing were collected this study applies these data and investigates the methodology of collecting contingent behavior data and their use in policy analysis in particular this study empirically evaluates the effect of experience with the policy on responses to contingent behavior questions and tests for potential bias in the contingent behavior data

the value of changes in deer hunting quality a travel cost approach 1988 the value of changes in deer hunting quality a travel cost approach applied economics vol 20 no 4 pp 533 539

enforcement for sale lobbying for water in pakistan s indus basin abstract surface irrigation is a common pool resource subject to over exploitation by upstream users we ask to what extent state enforcement of de jure water allocations designed to ensure adequate irrigation to downstream users is up for sale unique data on the land ownership of nearly a quarter million irrigators in pakistan s vast indus basin watershed provide a measure of political influence consistent with an influence driven model the decline in water availability and land values from head to tail is accentuated along channels having greater lobbying power at the head and attenuated along channels having greater lobbying power at the tail our paper shows how power disparities can be leveraged through the administrative state to capture valuable common resources

failure to launch the role of land inequality in transition delays recent work in the growth literature has provided various explanations for transition delays and the great divergence this paper provides empirical support for one theory of transition delays initial land inequality our analysis is designed to elucidate the channels via which land inequality can affect long run economic performance using a new historical data set for land inequality frankema 2009 we employ duration analysis to investigate whether higher levels of land inequality lead to longer delays in the extension of primary schooling we then investigate whether such delays affect long run economic performance via their effect on contemporaneous schooling our findings suggest that land inequality is a key determinant of delays in schooling and that such delays have a significant negative impact on long run output

decentralization and efficiency of subsidy targeting evidence from chiefs in rural malawi abstract lower income countries spend vast sums on subsidies beneficiaries are typically selected via either a proxy means test pmt or through a decentralized identification process led by local leaders a decentralized allocation may offer informational advantages but may be prone to elite capture we study this trade off in the context of two large scale subsidy programs in malawi for agricultural inputs and food decentralized to traditional leaders chiefs who are asked to target the needy using household panel data we find that nepotism exists but has only limited mistargeting consequences importantly we find that chiefs target households with higher returns to farm inputs generating an allocation that is more productively efficient than what could be achieved through strict poverty targeting this could be welfare improving since within village redistribution is common productive efficiency targeting is concentrated in villages with above median levels of redistribution

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

estimating economies of scope using profit function a dual approach of the normalized quadratic profit function abstract theoretical relationships between parameters of the normalized quadratic profit and cost functions are derived allowing for economies of scope to be calculated using profit function estimates an empirical example confirms that the cost function is recovered using the estimated profit function

the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa in a recent study nunn 2008 examines the long term impacts of africa s slave trade he finds that the slave trade which occurred over a period of more than 400 years had a significant negative effect on long term economic development although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced form relationship in this article we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within africa initially slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare but as the trade progressed the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others including friends and family members and to kidnap trick and sell each other into slavery sigismund wilhelm koelle 1854 p e h hair 1965 charles piot 1996 we hypothesize that in this environment a culture of mistrust may have evolved which may persist to this day we show that current differences in trust levels within africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and indian ocean slave trades combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal examining causal mechanisms we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual such as cultural norms beliefs and values jel j15 n57 z13

inherited trust and growth this paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation we show that inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants is sig nificantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears we thus use the inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants as a time varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin this strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects jel n11 n12 n31 n32 o47 z13

cash transfers clientelism and political enfranchisement evidence from brazil abstract this paper uses brazil s bolsa familia to show that redistributive policies that are shielded from the influence of political intermediaries can reduce incumbency advantage for mayors increase both electoral competition and candidate quality reduce support for clientelistic parties and lead incumbents to increase redistributive spending the paper exploits a nonparametric multivariate regression discontinuity design and employs a novel identification strategy for the variation in program coverage the theory proposes that cash transfers by reducing the vulnerability of poor voters make clientelism a less attractive strategy to incumbent mayors consequently incumbents reallocate effort away from the practice into public good distribution

institutions of higher education as multi product firms economies of scale and scope a multiple output cost function is estimated for institutions of higher education in the united states employing data for 1981 82 the authors flexible fixed cost quadratic function includes three outputs undergraduate teaching graduate teaching and research grants and one input price average faculty salaries results indicate the existence of scope economies at least up to a point for both public and private institutions of higher education ray economies of scale are more pronounced in the private sector and product specific economies of scale are observed only in the public sector for research and graduate teaching copyright 1989 by mit press

decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries we study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program while governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales but interregional targeting may deteriorate as central grants to high poverty regions shrink owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions

politician family networks and electoral outcomes evidence from the philippines we demonstrate the electoral importance of politician family networks and provide evidence of the mechanisms behind the relationship we use a 20 million person dataset allowing us to reconstruct intermarriage networks for over 15 000 villages in 709 municipalities in the philippines we show that politicians are disproportionately drawn from more central families and that controlling for candidate fixed e ects candidates receive a higher vote share in villages where their families are more central we present evidence that centrality confers organizational and logistical advantages that facilitate clientelistic transactions such as vote buying and do not operate through popularity name recognition or through the choice of policies more aligned with their constituents preferences

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

the political economy of the maoist conflict in india an empirical analysis we study the maoist naxalite conflict in india by constructing a comprehensive district level database combining conflict data from four different terrorism databases to socioeconomic and geography data from myriad sources using data on 360 districts for three time periods we find that land inequality and lower incomes are important factors behind the conflict exploiting the micro structure of the data we show that growth of incomes of scheduled tribes significantly decreases the intensity of the conflict finally we show that historical property rights institutions from colonial times that go back centuries affect present day conflict outcomes

the political economy of public goods some evidence from india we are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state we use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural india to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s national policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure we find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments among the historically disadvantaged social groups those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance

dynamic measures of scope and scale economies an application to german agriculture static concepts of multiproduct economies of scale and scope are extended into a dynamic setting within the cost of adjustment framework important properties of the dynamic measures are developed and the foundations of a dynamic theory of the firm generalizing static neoclassical theory are presented dynamic measures of scope and scale as well as shadow costs are estimated empirically for multiple output multiple input german dairy farms operating under a production quota causes of scope economies are explored and a conceptual model to predict the evolution of the production structure of german farms is formulated

land and power theory and evidence from chile many employment relationships concede rents to workers depending on the political institutions the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers political behavior such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot we examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in chile in 1958 on voting behavior before the reforms localities with more pervasive patron client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right wing parties traditionally associ ated with the landed oligarchy after the reform however this difference across localities completely disappeared jel d72 n46 o13 o15 o17

history institutions and economic performance the legacy of colonial land tenure systems in india we analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the british in india and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators these areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices

augmenting travel cost models with contingent behavior data this paper proposes contingent behavior survey questions as a valuable supplement to observed data in travel cost models of non market demand for recreational resources a set of observed and contingent behavior results for each survey respondent allows the researcher to control for individual heterogeneity by taking advantage of panel data methods when exploring the nature of respondent demands the contingent scenarios also provide opportunities to a test for differences between observed and contingent preferences and or b assess likely demands under conditionsbeyond the domain of observed variation in costs or resource attributes most importantly contingent scenarios allow the researcher to imposeexogenously varying travel costs exogenous imposition of travel costs together with panel methods reduces the omitted variables bias that plagues observed data travel cost models of recreational demand using a convenience sample of data for illustrative purposes we show how to estimate the demand for recreational angling by combining observed and contingent behavior data we begin with simple naive pooled poisson models and progress to more theoretically appropriate fixed effects panel poisson specifications

perceptions versus objective measures of environmental quality in combined revealed and stated preference models of environmental valuation abstract this study examines perceptions and objective attribute measures in discrete choice models of recreation site choice behavior these forms of attribute measurement are examined in individual and combined revealed preference stated preference models our results suggest that the model based on perceptions slightly outperforms the models based on objective attribute measures however issues such as the definition of the choice set and the measurement of welfare present significant challenges when using perceptions data

colonialism and modern income islands as natural experiments abstract using a new database of islands throughout the atlantic pacific and indian oceans we find a robust positive relationship between the number of years spent as a european colony and current gdp per capita we argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience we instrument for length of colonization using variation in prevailing wind patterns we argue that wind speed and direction had a significant effect on historical colonial rule but do not have a direct effect on gdp today the data also suggest that years as a colony after 1700 are more beneficial than earlier years we also find a discernable pecking order among the colonial powers with years under u s british french and dutch rule having more beneficial effects than spanish or portuguese rule our finding of a strong connection between modern income and years of colonization is conditional on being colonized at all since each of the islands in our da

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

reshaping institutions evidence on aid impacts using a pre analysis plan this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled reshaping institutions evidence on aid impacts using a pre analysis plan conducted between 2005 and 2009 in sierra leone the study observed the impact of pre analysis plan pap on local institutions by imposing participation requirements for marginalized groups including women and test for learning by doing effects in sierra leone on the individual and village level requiring women and young adults to take on leadership positions participate in project meetings and sign off on project finances does not have any persistent effect on their participation in local decision making or attitudes regarding leadership ability the project successfully established village organizations and tools to manage the project the distributions of the project s benefits were equitable and leakage was minimal there was a significant positive impact on the stock and quality of local public infrastructure however there are no detectible changes in the ability to raise funds for local public goods decision making process or social norms and attitudes funding for the study derived from the gobifo project the institutional reform and capacity building project ircbp the world bank development impact evaluation dime the horace w goldsmith foundation the international growth center 3ie and the national bureau of economic research nber african successes project

value for money vote buying and politician accountability abstract the prevalence of vote buying is widely identified as a cause of poor governance in the developing world potential mechanisms for this relationship include the selection of lower quality politicians and the reduced accountability experienced by politicians once elected in this paper we present the first experimental evidence in support of the second channel of reduced accountability using data from laboratory experiments conducted in the u s and kenya we find that vote payments reduce voters willingness to hold politicians accountable holding fixed politician identity voters who receive payments are less willing to punish the politician for rent seeking and this reduction in punishment is larger in magnitude when payments are widely targeted unsurprisingly the politician then engages in a higher level of rent seeking a simple model of multi faceted social preferences encompassing reciprocity and inequality aversion is consistent with these findings

estimating product specific and multiproduct economies of scale with data envelopment analysis nonparametric cost frontier estimation and subsequent analysis of the relative efficiency of firms has historically been conducted without critically examining the shape of the cost frontier the shape of the cost frontier has been examined using additional parametric estimation methods to recover potential cost savings from multiproduct and product specific economies of scale this paper presents and tests an approach to estimate multiproduct and product specific economies of scale using data envelopment analysis data for the study are simulated assuming an underlying production technology nonparametric estimates of efficiency multiproduct scale product specific scale and scope economies are compared to those of the assumed production technology results show that the nonparametric approach accurately estimates multiproduct economies of scale and product specific economies of scale under alternative inefficiency distributional assumptions

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

rural reforms and agricultural growth in china this paper employs province level panel data to assess the contributions of decollectivization price adjustments and other reforms to china s agricultural growth in the reform period decollectivization is found to improve total factor productivity and to account for about half of the output growth during 1978 84 the adjustment in state procurement prices also contributed positively to output growth its impact came mainly from the responses in input use the effect of other market related reforms on productivity and output growth was very small reasons for slowdown in agricultural growth after 1984 are also analyzed copyright 1992 by american economic association

measuring economies of scale and scope in agricultural banking generally empirical studies have used either duality theory with the estimation of cost functions or nonparametric estimation methods to assess efficiency in the financial services industry the purpose of the present study is to estimate economies of scope and scale in agricultural banking this will be accomplished through estimation of an indirect multi product cost function the uniqueness of this study when compared to previous studies of efficiency of the financial services industry is the disaggregation of the outputs so that agricultural lending can be evaluated in addition a normalized quadratic cost function is estimated with curvature properties imposed clark reviewed thirteen studies that measured economies of scope and scale for commercial banks credit unions and savings and loan associations he found that they offered four broad conclusions a overall economies of scale exist at low levels of input b no consistent evid nce of economies of scope exists c some evidence of cost complementarities exists and d the results seem to be robust among financial institutions

landownership concentration and the expansion of education we study the relationship between large landownership concentration and the expansion of mass education in nineteenth century prussia cross sectional estimates show a negative association between landownership concentration and enrollment rates fixed effects panel estimates indicate that regions with an initially stronger landownership concentration exhibit increasing enrollment rates this relationship is not driven by differences in the supply of schooling we argue that the implementation of agricultural reforms including the stepwise abolition of serfdom is an important driver of the change in enrollment the results are consistent with the interpretation that emancipation from labor coercion increased the private demand for education

markets in china and europe on the eve of the industrial revolution prevailing views suggest the industrial revolution began in europe because markets had gradually become more efficient and by the 18th century the scope of economic activity was far larger than in other parts of the world this paper compares the actual performance of markets in europe and china two regions of the world that were relatively advanced in the pre industrial period but would start to industrialize about 150 years apart the analysis covers economies that account for about two fifths of the world s population in the mid 18th century and it considers some three centuries of data our findings suggest that relative levels of market function in china and europe were similar prior to the industrial revolution higher efficiency in europe is seen only in the nineteenth century when industrialization was already underway moreover these improvements occurred in a dramatic and sudden fashion further casting doubt on an evolutionary view of market development rather than being a key condition for subsequent growth gains in efficiency appeared simultaneously with the turning point of modern growth we discuss the implications of these findings for a number of explanations for long run growth and the industrial revolution

inequality does cause underdevelopment insights from a new instrument consistent with the provocative hypothesis of engerman and sokoloff 1997 2000 this paper confirms with cross country data that agricultural endowments predict inequality and inequality predicts development the use of agricultural endowments specifically the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane as an instrument for inequality is this paper s approach to problems of measurement and endogeneity of inequality the paper finds inequality also affects other development outcomes institutions and schooling which the literature has emphasized as mechanisms by which higher inequality lowers per capita income it tests the inequality hypothesis for development institutional quality and schooling against other recent hypotheses in the literature while finding some evidence consistent with other development fundamentals the paper finds high inequality to independently be a large and statistically significant barrier to prosperity good quality institutions and high schooling

collectivization and china s agricultural crisis in 1959 1961 the agricultural crisis in china in 1959 61 after the initial success of the collectivization movement resulted in 30 million extra deaths in this paper a game theory hypothesis proposes the main cause of this catastrophe i argue that because of the difficulty in supervising agricultural work the success of an agricultural collective depends on a self enforcing contract in which each one promises to discipline oneself a self enforcing contract however can be sustained only in a repeated game in the fall of 1958 the right to withdraw from a collective was deprived the nature of the collectivization was thus changed from a repeated game to a one time game as a result the self enforcing contract could not be sustained and agricultural productivity collapsed the empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis

clientelism in indian villages abstract we study the operation of local governments panchayats in rural maharashtra india using a survey that we designed for this end elections are freely contested fairly tallied highly p

land distribution and international agricultural productivity the unequal distribution of agricultural land is often cited as a source of inefficiency in agriculture previous cross country studies of agricultural productivity differences though have not considered land inequality this article addresses this issue by using cross country data on inequality in operational holdings of agricultural land from deininger and squire 1998 in an estimation of an agricultural production function the gini coefficient for land holdings is found to have a significant negative relationship with productivity this is consistent with the existence of heterogeneity in productivity by farm size within countries a one standard deviation drop in the gini coefficient implies an increase in productivity of 8 5

allocation of goods by lottery i introduction many goods such as hunting permits oil drilling leases cellular telephone licenses and rights to fishing berths as well as some buds such as the military draft jury duty and who is to be thrown overboard on a sinking life raft are or have been allocated by lotteries in neo classical welfare economics the random distribution of property rights does not affect allocative efficiency as long as transferability is allowed and the transactions costs are non prohibitive lottery allocations however are generally not transferable thus lottery allocations are inefficient since the goods are not ultimately allocated to the users who value them the most a number of authors such as aubert 1959 fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 36 122 have argued that lotteries are chosen as the allocative instrument because it represents a fair or just means of allocating the goods rawls 1971 374 and eckhoff 1989 have noted that where it is impractical to divide the goods equally among those who desire them a lottery serves to satisfy both the requirement that the process be fair and that the allocation problem be resolved relatively costlessly elster 1989 113 however notes that lotteries are not the only fair allocation mechanism for example he points out that in jewish ethics the problem of allocating an indivisible good such as life saving resources is resolved by denying it to everyone even economists would probably prefer a lottery to this resolution the fairness hypothesis has a rich history in the old testament lotteries are deemed a fair way of allocating goods such as the inheritance of land numbers 33 54 lotteries are also used to allocate bads in perhaps the most famous biblical example of use of lots jonah was chosen by lot to be sacrificed to appease god who had brought a storm that threatened to wreck the ship the story goes that the lot selected jonah because he was shirking his duties elsewhere and should not have even been on the vessel jonah 1 6 1 notice that fair here is taken to mean just given this theological foundation it is not surprising that the lottery has seen frequent use in legal history as well one of the most interesting cases occurred in swedish and finnish trials in the 17th and 18th centuries in cases where a man was murdered by a mob lotteries were used to allocate punishment since the law required an eye for an eye no more and no less eckhoff says that if it was impossible to ascertain which of them had dealt the mortal blow the courts determined that one of the responsible parties be sentenced to death and that the person be selected by lottery 1989 19 a similar use of lotteries occurs in military history to deal with cases of mass desertion in roman armies every tenth man was executed decimated and the remainder pardoned in more modern times the lottery has been used in u s law 2 first of course is the use of a lottery to decide who shall sit on a jury a connection between fairness and lotteries however has also appeared in the common law in an 1842 case u s v holmes which has been discussed by fienberg 1971 eckhoff 1989 and elster 1989 a ship sank in a heavy storm and the lone surviving life raft was in grave danger of sinking the crew threw overboard fourteen male passengers in an effort to save the rest when back in port after being rescued a crewman named holmes the only crew member who had not disappeared upon arrival to port was brought to trial for the deaths of the passengers the court ruled that the non essential members of the crew should have been thrown overboard before any passengers and if that was not sufficient then passengers should have been selected by lot which is the fairest mode elster 1989 65 the fact that a human life presumably a large cost was at stake ex post did not affect the decision 3 the environmental economics literature contains a number of references to the social preferences for and benefits of lottery allocations

willingness to pay for quality improvements should revealed and stated preference data be combined abstract in this article we propose theoretically consistent welfare measurement of use and nonuse values for an improvement in environmental quality with revealed and stated preference data an analytical model based on the comparative static analysis of the variation function that describes the relationship between recreation demand and dichotomous choice contingent valuation models is estimated our results show that revealed and stated data should not be combined under the same assumed preference structure unless the two decisions imply the same change in behavior induced by the quality change in addition our results indicate scope effects in willingness to pay measures estimated with stated preference data

economic history and modern india redefining the link this paper argues that to restore the link between economic history and modern india a different narrative of indian economic history is needed an exclusive focus on colonialism as the driver of india s economic history misses those continuities that arise from economic structure or local conditions in fact market oriented british imperial policies did initiate a process of economic growth based on the production of goods intensive in labor and natural resources however productive capacity per worker was constrained by low rates of private and public investment in infrastructure excessively low rates of schooling social inequalities based on caste and gender and a delayed demographic transition to lower birthrates and the resultant heavy demographic burden placed on physical capital and natural resources

addressing aggregation bias in zonal recreation models abstract models of recreation demand are often based on zonal data results from such models are susceptible to aggregation bias we propose a zonal model of recreation that captures some of the underlying heterogeneity of individual visitors by incorporating distributional information on per capita income from census sources into the aggregate demand function this adjustment eliminates the unrealistic constraint of constant income across zonal residents and thus reduces the risk of aggregation bias in estimated parameters in addition the corrected aggregate specification reinstates the applicability of generalized maximum likelihood methods and increases model efficiency

the political class and redistributive policies we study the eect of the composition of the political class on the size of government first we use a citizen candidate model to show that the extension of surage may be inconsequential for government spending when there are pre existing stricter requirements for holding oce we then test this prediction empirically using data from the 13 u s original colonies we nd that the extension of the franchise did not aect government spending or the composition of the political class however the subsequent elimination of economic qualications to hold oce increased government spending and enriched the class heterogeneity

economies of scale and scope and the economic efficiency of china s agricultural research system this article investigates economies of scale and scope and other potential sources of improvements in the economic efficiency of china s crop breeding an industry at the heart of the nation s food economy using data covering 46 wheatand maize breeding institutes from 1981 to 2000 we estimate cost functions for the production of new varieties at china s wheat and maize breeding institutes our results indicate strong economies of scale along with small to moderate economies of scope related to the joint production of new wheat and maize varieties cost efficiency increases significantly with increases in the breeders educational status and with increases in access to genetic materials from outside the institute

behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture in this essay we develop a framework for analysing the major institutions governing the production and exchange of output and the primary factors of production in rural areas the analysis incorporates general considerations of risk and information constraints jointly with the principal material attributes of agriculture and of agricultural production factors the framework is used to analyse barriers to the existence of the major intertemporal and factor markets it is applied specifically to land scarce environments for which it provides an internally consistent explanation for many of the well documented institutional features of such settings in addition the analysis provides new implications for among other phenomena the inter relationships among ownership holdings operational scale family size and factor productivity for the scarcity of animal rental markets and use of animals as collateral for the renting out of land by small landowners and for the existence of plantations for certain crops

contracts hold up and exports textiles and opium in colonial india trade and export it is argued spur economic growth this paper studies the microeco nomics of exporting we build a heuristic model of transactions between exporters and producers and relate it to east india company operations in colonial bengal our model and the historical record stress two difficulties the exporter and its agents might not uphold payment agreements and producers might not honor sales contracts the model shows when procurement succeeds or fails highlighting the tension between these two hold up problems we analyze several cases including the east india company s cotton textile venture the famous opium monopoly and present day contract farming

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

clientelism and voting behavior evidence from a field experiment in benin the author conducted a field experiment in benin to investigate the impact of clientelism on voting behavior in collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters using the survey data collected after the elections the author estimated the effect of each type of message by comparing voting behavior in the villages exposed to clientelism or public policy messages treatment groups with voting behavior in the other villages control groups the author found that clientelist messages have positive and significant effect in all regions and for all types of candidates the author also found that public policy messages have a positive and significant effect in the south but a negative and significant effect in the north in addition public policy messages seem to hurt incumbents as well as regional candidates finally the evidence indicates that female voters tend to have stronger preference for public policy platforms than male voters

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

chiefs economic development and elite control of civil society in sierra leone we study the effect of constraints on chiefs power on economic outcomes citizens attitudes and social capital a paramount chief in sierra leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by british colonial authorities in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families chiefs face less political competition and development outcomes are significantly worse today variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism paradoxically with fewer ruling families the institutions of chiefs authority are more highly respected and measured social capital is higher we argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs

clientelism and vote buying lessons from field experiments in african elections electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development this is because they may limit the provision of public goods in this paper we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena we provide an overview discuss implementation and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in west african countries clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support the results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism in addition voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour we argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions as a way effectively to increase public good political accountability we also discuss directions for fruitful future research copyright 2009 oxford university press