learning to believe in sunspots a number of authors have shown that competitive economies may possess sunspot equilibria that is rational expectations equilibria in which purely extrinsic uncertainty affects equilibrium prices and allocations 2 such results demonstrate that it does not require a lack of faith in the rationality of market participants to believe that competitive markets may be subject to purely speculative fluctuations driven solely by expectations 3 the mere existence of sunspot equilibria as solutions to a system of marketclearing conditions however might not be judged sufficient to indicate that competitive markets with rational participants could ever be subject to speculative instability the sunspot equilibria represent states of affairs in which agents act differently in the case of different realizations of the sunspot variable and it is rational for each agent to do so but it might be thought unlikely that the beliefs of all the participants in the market could ever come to be coordinated so as to bring about an equilibrium of that kind it is rational to believe that sunspots convey information about future states of affairs once the economy is in a sunspot equilibrium but why would rational agents ever begin to believe in such a thing so as to create the conditions under which the belief is rational in order to address such a question one must go beyond the mere statement of the conditions for equilibrium and discussion of what states of affairs satisfy them one must specify an explicit dynamic process according to which the beliefs of agents adjust when out of equilibrium any exercise of this kind is necessarily unsatisfactory as there is no univocal meaning for the postulate of rational behavior outside of an equilibrium it may well be the case that

the policy preferences of the us federal reserve in this paper we model and explain us macroeconomic outcomes subject to the discipline that monetary policy is set optimally exploiting the restrictions that come from optimal policymaking we estimate the parameters in the federal reserve s policy objective function together with the parameters in its optimization constraints for the period following volcker s appointment as chairman we estimate the implicit inflation target to be around 1 4 and show that policymakers assigned a significant weight to interest rate smoothing we show that the estimated optimal policy provides a good description of us data for the 1980s and 1990s

optimal discretionary monetary policy in a model of asymmetric central bank preferences this paper considers optimal monetary policy in the context of the central bank adopting an asymmetric objective function our results show that under asymmetric preferences many of the extant results on the time consistency problem need no longer hold

on the indeterminacy of capital accumulation paths abstract in neoclassical optimal growth models the stability of the accumulation paths depends on the discount parameter we prove that for discount factors small enough the policy function which describes an optimal path can be of any type the result is achieved using the notion of concavity we adopt a constructive approach given any twice differentiable map we show how to construct an optimal growth problem which produces that map as the optimal policy function a consequence is that chaos can appear in these models we also provide bounds on the values of the discount parameter for which indeterminacy is possible

capital labor substitution and competitive nonlinear endogenous business cycles abstract we develop simple geometrical methods to study local indeterminacy bifurcations and stochastic sunspot equilibria near a steady state in nonlinear two dimensional economic models we present in particular a simple constructive geometrical characterization of the support of stochastic sunspot equilibria not only arbitrarily near a steady state but also along local bifurcations these methods are applied to a simple aggregative model to study in particular the influence of capital labor substitution and of the aggregate labor supply wage elasticity on the occurrence of competitive endogenous deterministic or stochastic fluctuations journal of economic literature classification numbers e32 c62

the monetary policy of the european central bank the first six years of ecb monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation output and the interest rate from their reference values the empirical analysis on synthetic euro area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric whereas the objectives of real activity and interest rate stabilizations are not output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high the hypothesis of m3 growth rate targeting is rejected

the two pillars of the european central bank i interpret the european central bank s two pillar strategy by proposing an empirical model for inflation that distinguishes between the short and long run components of inflation the latter component depends on an exponentially weighted moving average of past monetary growth and the former on the output gap estimates for the 1971 2003 period suggest that money can be combined with other indicators to form the broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments that constitutes the ecb s second pillar however the analysis does not suggest that money should be treated differently from other indicators while money is a useful policy indicator all relevant indicators should be assessed in an integrated manner and a separate pillar focused on monetary aggregates does not appear necessary stefan gerlach

are monetary policy reaction functions asymmetric the role of nonlinearity in the phillips curve abstract this paper investigates the implications of a nonlinear phillips curve for the derivation of optimal monetary policy rules combined with a quadratic loss function the optimal policy is also nonlinear with the policy maker increasing interest rates by a larger amount when inflation or output are above target than the amount it will reduce them when they are below target specifically the main prediction of our model is that such a source of nonlinearity leads to the inclusion of the interaction between expected inflation and the output gap in an otherwise linear taylor rule we find empirical support for this type of asymmetries in the interest rate setting behaviour of four european central banks but none for the us fed

stationary sunspot equilibria in a finance constrained economy abstract stationary sunspot equilibria are shown to exist in a production economy with infinite lived agents when it is not possible to borrow against future wage income equilibrium fluctuations exhibit persistence over time scales of the same order of magnitude as observed business cycles an active fiscal policy that stabilizes aggregate money expenditures can prevent such fluctuations

stability of cycles and expectations the actual dynamics of an economy depends on how agents forecast the future at every date as a function of their information on the past while possibly learning the structure of their environment we show in the case of a one dimensional state variable that under mild conditions on expectations functions a given cycle with perfect foresight that is stable in the actual dynamics is stable in a fictitious backward perfect foresight dynamics we exhibit a restricted class of expectations functions for which the converse is true

inflation targeting credibility and non linear taylor rules abstract in this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target we present a stylized new keynesian model in which agents inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target to re establish credibility monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past moreover the central bank responds non linearly to past inflation gaps this is reflected in an additional term in the central bank s instrument rule which we refer to as the credibility loss augmenting a standard taylor 1993 rule with the latter term we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting it economies we find first that past deviations from it feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful deterioration in credibility ceteris paribus forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps second we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses with the latter dominating the former

multiple steady states and endogenous fluctuations with increasing returns to scale in production abstract the purpose of this paper is to study the influence of the elasticity of capital labor substitution and of the labor supply elasticity on the existence of multiple pareto ranked stationary equilibria local indeterminacy bifurcations and expectations driven fluctuations in economies with external and internal increasing returns to scale in production this is done through general geometrical methods that do not depend upon particular specifications for preferences and technology for the sake of concreteness the analysis focuses on the model with heterogeneous agents and financial constraints presented in woodford j econ theory 40 1986 128 137 and extended by grandmont pintus and de vilder capital labor substitution and competitive nonlinear endogenous business cycles crest working paper 9728 1997 to account for capital labor substitution increasing returns to scale are incorporated in two different market structures an economy with aggregate production externalities and perfectly competitive markets an economy with increasing returns internal to the firm and imperfect competition in the product s market s only journal of economic literature classification numbers c61 e32

nominal price rigidity money supply endogeneity and business cycles abstract this paper investigates the ability of nominal price rigidity to explain the co movement of inflation with the cyclical component of output observed in the post war u s data a dynamic general equilibrium model is constructed with the introduction of monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity in a standard real business cycle model allowing for an endogenous money supply rule it is then demonstrated that sticky price models can explain the observed associations between movements in inflation and output much better than flexible price models this result depends little on whether money supply is assumed to be endogenous or not

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

does the barro gordon model explain the behavior of us inflation a reexamination of the empirical evidence abstract this paper tests the predictions of the barro gordon model using us data on inflation and unemployment to that end it constructs a general game theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the barro gordon model and a version of cukierman s model as special cases likelihood ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the barro gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of cukierman s model is not reduced form estimates are consistent with the view that the federal reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate

rent seeking and market structure comment if the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government two conditions must be met 1 there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile and 2 the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free rider problem in fund raising this argument though seemingly intuitively appealing has been under recent empirical attack this paper seeks to restore the parapets

inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule the purpose of the paper is to survey and discuss in ation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules the paper provides a general conceptual discussion of monetary policy rules attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of in ation targeting compares in ation targeting to other monetary policy rules and draws some conclusions for the monetary policy of the european system of central banks jel classi cation e42 e52

forward and backward dynamics in implicitly defined overlapping generations models in dynamic economic models derived from optimization principles the forward equilibrium dynamics may not be uniquely defined while the backward dynamics is well defined we derive properties of the global forward equilibrium paths based on properties of the backward dynamics we propose the framework of iterated function systems ifs to describe the set of forward equilibria and apply the ifs framework to a one and a two dimensional version of the overlapping generations olg model we show that if the backward dynamics is chaotic and has a homoclinic orbit a snap back repeller the set of forward equilibrium paths converges to a fractal attractor forward equilibria may be interpreted as sunspot equilibria where a random sunspot sequence determines equilibrium selection at each date

rent seeking in a market with morality solving a puzzle about corporate social responsibility rent seeking by lobbying for government favors is generally thought to be wasteful in view of this wastefulness it is puzzling that rent seeking by corporations has not been criticized as a failure to be socially responsible or even as an unethical business practice this article examines the compatibility of rent seeking with corporate social responsibility by utilizing thomas dunfee s idea of a marketplace with morality this idea is useful for solving this puzzle because in considering whether rent seeking is compatible with corporate social responsibility it is necessary first to define rent seeking which this article argues is a normative concept and second to find some principled way of identifying rent seeking behavior it also solves the puzzle about rent seeking by revealing that the concept of rent seeking itself is of little use in determining whether certain conduct is or is not socially responsible since rent seeking activity cannot be identified without first evaluating which activity is rent seeking

distributional coalitions state strength and economic growth toward a comprehensive theory of economic development high performing economies in the asia pacific region together with only mediocre economic development in latin america prompts the question of what explains differential economic growth rates among developing countries combining a statist perspective with olson s theory of interest group formation this research hypothesizes that nations with weak distributional coalitions will more likely experience high growth and state intervention will be effective using a longitudinal research design this secondary analysis involves a comparative and interactive examination of eight asian pacific and twelve latin american countries by considering the role of the state in interaction with distributional coalitions in society the results indicate that approximately two thirds of the variance in national economic growth is explained

modelling monetary policy inflation targeting in practice this paper estimates a simple structural model of monetary policy in the uk focusing on the policy of inflation targeting introduced in 1992 we find that i the adoption of inflation targeting led to significant changes in monetary policy ii post 1992 monetary policy is asymmetric as policy makers respond more to upward deviation of inflation away from the target iii post 1992 policy makers may be attempting to keep inflation within the 1 4 2 6 range rather than pursuing a point target of 2 5 and iv the response of monetary policy to inflation is nonlinear as interest rates respond more when inflation is further from the target

crucial issues concerning central bank independence abstract this paper argues first that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will in the absence of any tangible precommitment technology inevitably behave in a discretionary fashion that implies an inflationary bias furthermore there is no necessary tradeoff between flexibility and commitment second to the extent that the absence of any precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency they merely relocate it several implications are discussed

the industrial structure of the california assembly committee assignments economic interests and campaign contributions this paper examines the provision of campaign contributions made by economic interests to incumbents seeking reelection in the 1984 1986 and 1988 california assembly elections the study tests whether the distribution of campaign contributions by specific industrial sectors corresponds to legislator possession of the policy property rights associated with membership on relevant assembly standing committees a non parametric statistical model compares the distribution of campaign contributions from groups within a given industrial sector to members of relevant policy committees with the distribution of contributions from all other contributor classes the empirical analysis confirms that committee assignments significantly affect the allocation of special interest resources in assembly elections substantiating the importance of institutional considerations in influencing special interest activity

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

the past present and future of central banking the financial crisis on the one hand and the recourse to unconventional monetary policy on the other have given a sharp jolt to perceptions of the role and status of central banks in this paper we start with a brief contrarian history of central banks since the second world war which presents the great moderation and the restricted focus on inflation targeting as a temporary aberration from the norm we then discuss how recent developments in fiscal and monetary policy have affected the role and status of central banks notably their relationships with governments before considering the environment central banks will face in the near and middle future and how they will have to change to address it copyright 2012 oxford university press

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

complicated endogenous business cycles under gross substitutability abstract in this paper we investigate the global behaviour of the output equilibrium time paths in a two dimensional overlapping generations model with productive investment and capital accumulation where agents behave rationally and markets are competitive we show that equilibrium time paths can converge to complicated chaotic attractors as well as periodic attractors when the substitution effect dominates the income effect everywhere the occurrence of complicated equilibrium paths is guaranteed by homoclinic intersections of the stable and unstable manifolds of the autarkic steady state journal of economic literature classificiation number e32

participation in deterministic contests abstract this paper considers participation in deterministic contests for m 1 identical prizes which employ an auction like rule to determine the winners in most papers that investigate such models participation by precisely m 1 players is associated with players having complete information about their opponents characteristics and participation by more than m 1 players is associated with players having incomplete information about their opponents characteristics i show that incomplete information is in fact neither sufficient nor necessary for participation by more than m 1 players

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

chaos and sector specific externalities abstract benhabib and farmer 1996 indeterminacy and sector specific externalities journal of monetary economics 37 397 419 explore the possibility of local indeterminacy in a two sector model with sector specific externalities they find that very small sector specific externalities are sufficient for local indeterminacy in this case it is possible to construct sunspot equilibria where extrinsic uncertainty matters in this paper i provide a global analysis of their model revealing the existence of euler equation branching this branching allows for regime switching equilibria with cycles and chaotic behavior these equilibria occur whether the local dynamics are determinate or indeterminate

on endogenous competitive business cycles the belief that the long run equilibrium of a competitive monetary economy that does not experience any exogeneous shocks whether originating from the external environment or from policy should be modelled as a state that is stationary or perhaps growing at a constant rate seems to be deeply rooted in the mind of some economists

money and inflation in the euro area a case for monetary indicators abstract this paper examines inflation indicators for the euro area by studying the relationship between inflation output money and interest rates using data spanning 1980 2001 the central finding is that both the output gap and the real money gap the difference between the real money stock and the long run equilibrium real money stock contain considerable information regarding future inflation in contrast the eurosystem s money growth indicator the difference between nominal money growth and a reference value the prominent first pillar in its monetary strategy contains little information about future inflation and no information beyond that contained in the output and real money gaps the predictive performance of the output gap has improved compared to that in a previous version of this paper most likely because of better estimation methods

illegal markets and the social costs of rent seeking this paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent seeking the increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good consequently the social costs of rent seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent seeking competition and where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the tullock cost the social cost of rent seeking is greater than the sum of tullock and harberger costs

targeting inflation with a role for money this paper demonstrates how a target for money growth can be beneficial for an inflation targeting central bank acting under discretion because the growth rate of money is closely related to the change in the interest rate and the growth of real output delegating a money growth target to the central bank makes discretionary policy more inertial leading to better social outcomes this delegation scheme is also compared with other schemes suggested in the literature the results indicate that stabilizing money growth around a target can be a sensible strategy for monetary policy although other delegation schemes are often more efficient

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

macroeconomic stability and the preferences of the fed a formal analysis 1961 98 the rate of inflation in the u s has declined from an average of 4 5 in the period 1960 79 to an average of 3 6 in 1980 98 between those two periods the standard deviations of inflation and the output gap have also declined these facts can be attributed to the interaction of three possible factors a shift in central bank preferences a reduction in the variability of aggregate supply shocks and a more efficient conduct of monetary policy in this paper we identify the relative roles of these factors our framework is based on the estimation of a small structural macro model for the u s economy jointly with the first order conditions which solve the intertemporal optimization problem faced by the fed overall our results indicate that the policy preferences of the fed and in particular the implicit inflation target have changed drastically with the advent of the volcker greenspan era in addition we find that the variance of supply shocks has been lower and monetary policy has been conducted more efficiently during this period

the rise and decline of nations economic growth stagflation and social rigidities the years since world war ii have seen rapid shifts in the relative positions of different countries and regions leading political economist mancur olson offers a new and compelling theory to explain these shifts in fortune and then tests his theory against evidence from many periods of history and many parts of the world

on the transition from local regular to global irregular fluctuations abstract we present a general framework for understanding the transition from local regular to global irregular chaotic behaviour of nonlinear dynamical models in discrete time the fundamental mechanism is the unfolding of quadratic tangencies between the stable and the unstable manifolds of periodic saddle points to illustrate the relevance of the presented methods for analysing globally a class of dynamic economic models we apply them to the infinite horizon model of woodford 1988 j economic theory 40 128 137 amended by grandmont et al 1998 j economic theory 80 to account for capital labour substitution so as to explain the appearance of irregular fluctuations through homoclinic bifurcations when parameter values are far away from local bifurcation points

learning to believe in simple equilibria in a complex olg economy evidence from the lab abstract we set up a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate equilibrium selection in a complex economic environment we use the overlapping generation model of grandmont 1985 which displays multiple perfect foresight equilibria including periodic and chaotic dynamics the equilibrium selection problem is not solved under learning as each outcome is predicted by at least one existing learning theory we find that subjects in the lab systematically coordinate on an equilibrium despite the complexity of the environment coordination only happens on simple equilibria in this case the steady state or the period two cycle a result which is predicted only if the subjects follow simple learning rules this suggests that relevant perfect foresight equilibria should be robust to the use of simple rules

chaotic dynamics in a cash in advance economy abstract this paper introduces sufficient conditions for the existence of deterministic cycles and chaos in cash in advance models building on the earlier work of woodford 1994 chaotic equilibria are shown to be particularly likely in the cash in advance model because of a unique characteristic of such models a discontinuous derivative in the difference equation map at the satiation level of real balances the existence of a kink means that chaotic equilibria may exist without implausibly large curvatures in the utility function since a chaotic time series that makes use of the kink would sometimes exhibit zero nominal interest rates the paper also gives an example of chaos in which nominal interest rates remain strictly positive

chaos and capacity utilization under increasing returns to scale abstract it has been shown that adding variable capacity utilization of capital to a one sector model with a mild production externality can produce local indeterminacy in this paper i provide a global analysis of this model and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of euler equation branching i show that this branching allows for regime switching equilibria implying chaos and positive topological entropy two notions of chaotic behavior

the nonlinear phillips curve and inflation forecast targeting symmetric versus asymmetric monetary policy rules we study a simple small dynamic economy that a policymaker is attempting to control via use of a monetary policy rule the model features a convex phillips curve in that positive deviations of aggregate demand from potential are more inflationary than negative deviations are disinflationary using dynamic optimization techniques we find that the form of the optimal monetary policy reaction function is asymmetric we show that in the optimal rule the interest rate is a nonlinear function of the deviation of inflation from its target and of output from potential with asymmetry optimal monetary policy becomes more active as uncertainty about the impact of policy increases we thus provide an important and novel theoretical reason why increased uncertainty can lead to more aggressive rather than toward more cautious optimal policies

equilibrium cycles in an overlapping generations economy with production abstract perfect foresight equilibrium trajectories of an overlapping generations model with production may include stable or unstable invariant closed curves these orbits are detected using the hopf bifurcation theorem where the parameter of bifurcation is purely technological the paper also proves that there is a stabilization policy that completely eliminates the cycle finally using a c e s production function it is shown that the range of values of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor for which cycles may exist is bounded above

democracy political stability and economic growth in developing countries some evidence on olson s theory of distributional coalitions mancur olson has theorized recently that interest groups and distributional coalitions are a major factor in the rise and decline of nations he argues that the tendencies of these organizations to multiply and to support distributive policies lead to economic and political stalemate particularly in the most stable democratic societies in which pluralism has its greatest scope the bulk of evidence for olson s theory comes from the industrialized world in this article i test three of its propositions against the experience of seven stable liberal democracies in the developing world the theory predicts that with time such societies will reduce investment for the sake of consumption will expand their public sectors and will grow slowly in economic terms economic trends in the sample countries fail to confirm the first two propositions but offer tentative support for the third

on the complicated price dynamics of a simple one dimensional discontinuous financial market model with heterogeneous interacting traders abstract we develop a financial market model with heterogeneous interacting agents market makers adjust prices with respect to excess demand chartists believe in the persistence of bull and bear markets and fundamentalists bet on mean reversion moreover speculators trade asymmetrically in over and undervalued markets and while some of them determine the size of their orders via linear trading rules others always trade the same amount of assets the dynamics of our model is driven by a one dimensional discontinuous map despite the simplicity of our model analytical graphical and numerical analysis reveals a surprisingly rich set of interesting dynamical behaviors

european inflation dynamics abstract we provide evidence on the fit of the new phillips curve npc for the euro area over the period 1970 1998 and use it as a tool to compare the characteristics of european inflation dynamics with those observed in the u s we also analyze the factors underlying inflation inertia by examining the cyclical behavior of marginal costs as well as that of its two main components namely labor productivity and real wages some of the findings can be summarized as follows a the npc fits euro area data very well possibly better than u s data b the degree of price stickiness implied by the estimates is substantial but in line with survey evidence and u s estimates c inflation dynamics in the euro area appear to have a stronger forward looking component i e less inertia than in the u s d labor market frictions as manifested in the behavior of the wage markup appear to have played a key role in shaping the behavior of marginal costs and consequently inflation in europe

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

risk aversion heterogeneity and contests we introduce a novel method of modellingcontests that avoids the complexitiesencountered by the best response function approach we analyse contests in which i there are many risk averse players ii attitudes to risk may differ acrossindividuals and iii the technology thattransforms rent seeking effort intoprobability of winning may also differacross individuals we establish that ifevery player has a constant degree ofabsolute risk aversion a uniqueequilibrium exists we also establishcomparative static results and examine howthe level of rent dissipation is affectedby the heterogeneity of attitudes towardsrisk and the precise nature of the technology

forecast uncertainty and the taylor rule abstract in this paper we derive a modification of a forward looking taylor rule by integrating two variables that measure the uncertainty of inflation and gdp growth forecasts into an otherwise standard new keynesian model we show that certainty equivalence in new keynesian models is a consequence of log linearization and that a second order taylor approximation leads to a reaction function that includes the uncertainty of macroeconomic expectations to test the model empirically we use the standard deviation of individual forecasts around the median consensus forecast as a proxy for forecast uncertainty our sample covers the euro area the united kingdom and the united states for the period 1990q1 2016q4 we find that the bank of england and the european central bank have a significantly negative reaction to inflation forecast uncertainty our findings also reveal that the federal reserve bank of england lowers raises its interest rate in response to higher gdp growth forecast uncertainty we conclude by offering some implications for optimal monetary policy rules and central bank watchers

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

the fed s monetary policy rule and u s inflation the case of asymmetric preferences abstract this paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which the decision makers are allowed but not required to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values the estimates of the central bank s euler equation indicate that the preferences of the fed had been asymmetric only before 1979 with the interest rate response to output contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude we show that this asymmetry on output implied an average inflation bias around 1 5 while the implicit inflation target also declined the asymmetric preferences induced inflation bias appears to account for a sizable fraction of the historical decline in the inflation mean

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

gross substitutability in large square economies abstract this paper investigates the implications of gross substitutability of excess demand functions for the equilibria of exchange economies with countably many goods and arbitrarily many consumers we provide uniqueness theorems for general models we also show that the equilibrium trajectories of dynamic stationary overlapping generations economies satisfy strong turnpike properties in particular we are able to extend gale s characterization of the equilibrium dynamics of the model with one good per period one consumer per generation and two periods of life to models with many goods many consumers and many periods of life

testing asymmetries in central bank preferences in a small open economy a study for brazil abstract in this paper we extend surico s 2007a model to an open economy and test if the brazilian central bank s loss function is asymmetric with regard to positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the inflation rate from its target furthermore we use tests for structural breaks to investigate changes in the conduct of policy and monetary authority s preferences the results revealed that the central bank reacted more strongly to deviations of inflation from the target and the output gap after 2003 with regard to the monetary authority s preferences estimates indicate only an asymmetric preference over an above target inflation rate until mid 2003 after this period the evidence obtained by estimating the reaction function with inflation expectations showed that the central bank has been more averse to positive deviations of inflation from its target

distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in latin america for much of the discipline of economics a closed economy is seen as the result of efforts of distributional coalitions and rent seekers to maintain sector specific protections accordingly economic liberalization is explained by the policy consistency of uncompromising reform elites students of the politics of economic adjustment in the developing world in turn have argued that reform programs concentrate costs in the present and disperse benefits in the future hence losers are prepared to engage in collective action whereas prospective winners facing uncertainty about payoffs remain disorganized they thus posit the cohesiveness and insularity of policymakers as the main variable for explaining successful reform both economists and political scientists therefore adopt a collective action approach that overlooks how groups organize in support of liberalization in the recent latin american experience however these reforms have preserved market reserves for firms that provided vital political support to and often colluded with policymaking elites this setting has thus reproduced incentives for rent seeking behavior even in the presence of comprehensive liberalization this evidence supports two interrelated theoretical claims first distributional coalitions may proliferate when the state withdraws from the economy not only when it intervenes second interest based variables retain explanatory power in political economy which state autonomy arguments disregard irrespective of whether the economy is closed or open which neoclassical perspectives overlook to highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring marketization therefore the article suggests modifications to the dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the politics of economic adjustment

cultural institutions and value formation on the art market a rent seeking approach the formation of value in the artistic market can be specifically affected by the behavior of cultural institutions acting on it as monopolistic quality certifiers the rent maximizing strategy limits quantities to sub optimum levels and keeps prices and costs higher this can be worsened by institutional rent seeking the establishment s strategies cannot always be matched through public policies because this can result in an increase of monopoly social losses and of the establishment s lobbying efforts

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40