signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets abstract this article studies a two period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain the central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable money growth and its goal variable inflation prior to setting its instrument the central bank receives private noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank s type in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting this advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank s perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control if the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer

nonlinearities in economic dynamics two reasons that led to the dominance of the linear stochastic difference equations approach the first one was the fact that the nonlinear systems seemed incapable of reproducing the statistical aspects of actual economic time series at best such models were able to produce periodic motion1 and an examination of the spectra of economic time series showed the absence of the spikes that characterise periodic data the emphasis on the equilibrium approach to aggregate economic behaviour cf lucas i 986 would make things even more difficult the plethora of stability results for models of infinitely lived agents with perfect foresight turnpike theorems suggested that even the regular fluctuations that had been derived in the literature on endogenous business cycles were incompatible with a theory that had solid microeconomic foundations further this indicated that while nonlinearities could be present the explanations of the fluctuations had to rest solely on the presence of exogenous shocks that working through the equilibrating mechanism would create the observed randomness if such shocks were absent the system would tend to a stationary state the second reason was the empirical success of the models based on linear stochastic difference equations low order autoregressive processes captured some of the features of aggregate time series in turn these processes can in principle result from an economy with complete markets where production is subject to exogenous shocks though the task of confronting these equilibrium models with actual data has not yielded uncontroversial results see the discussion and references in section i there was no obvious gain in the

on the indeterminacy of capital accumulation paths abstract in neoclassical optimal growth models the stability of the accumulation paths depends on the discount parameter we prove that for discount factors small enough the policy function which describes an optimal path can be of any type the result is achieved using the notion of concavity we adopt a constructive approach given any twice differentiable map we show how to construct an optimal growth problem which produces that map as the optimal policy function a consequence is that chaos can appear in these models we also provide bounds on the values of the discount parameter for which indeterminacy is possible

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary the paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint ver upon an importing firm a ver set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry the result follows as the imposition of a ver upon a free trade nash price competition forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader the ver raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare pourquoi les restrictions volontaires d 1 exportation sont volontaires ce memoire presente une analyse des effets de l introduction de restrictions volontaires a l exportation rve sur une entreprise qui importe dans un monde en equilibre oligopolistique on montre que l introduction de rve approximant le niveau des importations en regime de libre echange devrait augmenter les profits de toutes les entreprises dans l industrie cela decoule du fait que l imposition de rve sur un univers de concurrence par les prix a la nash en regime de libre echange force l entreprise domestique a devenir le leader en prix l introduction de rve augmente le niveau des prix de l industrie en facilitant la collusion et de ce fait reduit le niveau de bien etre des consomrnateurs

international trade policy benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians the claim that sophisticated non operational efficiency based arguments for intervention facilitate obfuscatory policy induced income transfers will meet in some quarters the counterclaim that this is an overly cynical interpretation of politicians policy motives rent seeking can likewise be argued to be an overly cynical conception the theory of rent seeking would impute self interest motives to the offer of payment for a cup of coffee

price and quantity controls as facilitating devices abstract this letter examines three cases in which a regulation imposed on one of two duopolists can increase the profit levels of both firms the regulations examined include a price floor an output quota and a sales tax

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

a complete characterization of optimal growth paths in an aggregated model with a non concave production function the convexity of technology has played a crucial role in economic analyses of optimal one sector growth problems for example two of the key results on the traditional model of ramsey 1928 that have relied on the convexity of the technology are that optimal intertemporal growth involves moving monotonically towards a unique steady state as in cass 1965 koopmans 1965 and that the value function is a concave differentiable function of the initial capital stock as in benveniste and scheinkman 1979

equilibrium models displaying endogenous fluctuations and chaos abstract this paper surveys current developments in dynamic general equilibrium theory concerned with conditions under which endogenous fluctuations are possible existing contributions are divided into two classes the larger one consists of models with a unique perfect foresight equilibrium while the second includes models where equilibrium is indeterminate and the set of equilibria involving endogenous fluctuations includes sunspots equilibria while the two classes of models involve oscillations of different natures and with different policy implications we show that both are consistent with optimizing behavior and competitive equilibrium

protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry the political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import competing producers the regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving or instigating international collusion hence voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import competing producers and a de emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement similarly trigger price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti dumping measures to preserve fair competition likewise the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated but as demonstrated by kalt s econometric analysis contentious complaint of unfair foreign competition voluntary export restraints trigger price mechanisms and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors

importing credibility through exchange rate pegging this paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy making in an open economy since inflation is in part uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances the authority s actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective in contrast pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low inflation currency allows perfect monitoring because the exchange rate is in principle controllable for this reason exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly

trade and insurance with imperfectly observed outcomes abstractthe following sections are included introductionthe modelunobserved outcomescostly observationconcluding remarksreferences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

irregular growth cycles this paper uses the familiar neoclassical theory of capital accumulation to show how complex behavior can emerge from quite simple economic structures indeed when sufficient nonlinearities and a production lag are present the interaction alone of the propensity to save and the productivity of capital can lead to growth cycles that exhibit a wandering sawtooth pattern not unlike those observed in reality these fluctuations need not converge to a cycle of any regular periodicity so they are not quasi periodic because such chaotic trajectories are unstable errors of estimation in parameters or initial conditions however tiny will accumulate rapidly into substantial errors of forecast moreover periods of erratic cycling can be interspersed with periods of more or less stable growth evidently the future behavior of a model solution cannot be anticipated from its patterns in the past a situation that seems to mimic experience apparent structural change and unpredictability is explained in the present theory by a deterministic single equation model random shocks play no role so the reader can visualize just what it is we are are talking about a noteworthy simulation is presented in figure 1 for gnp in a growth model that is described below in section iii a period of relatively rapid growth is followed by a period of cycles then remarkably for a considerable time about twenty periods apparently steady state growth occurs wandering cycles however emerge another brief period close to the steady state appears again toward the end of the series i establish conditions of savings and productivity that lead to results of this kind this analysis makes use of the mathematical theory of chaos which in the form exploited here originated in the work of edward lorenz a formal definition of chaos and sufficient conditions for chaotic trajectories were provided in a seminal paper by t y li and james yorke a survey of these related contributions is found in yorke and evelyn yorke this theory was introduced into economics by jess benhabib and myself 1981 where we showed that sequences of rational choices can be erratic when preferences depend on experience in a certain way by michael stutzer who provides a detailed analysis of trygve haavelmo s growth model by benhabib and myself 1980 in an application of the overlapping generations model and in my forthcoming study of the classical growth model

dealing with time inconsistency inflation targeting versus exchange rate targeting adopting a single instead of multiple targets can be an effective way to overcome the classic time inconsistency problem the choice of a single mandate depends on the trade openness and the credibility reduced form empirical results show as central banks become less credible they are more likely to adopt a pegged exchange rate and the tendency to peg depends on trade openness in a model with loose commitment as credibility falls either an inflation target or a pegged exchange rate is more likely to be adopted arelatively closed highly open economywould adopt an inflation target exchange rate peg

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

perfectly competitive models of endogenous business fluctuations the endogenous hypothesis is not new at a pre analytic level it is based on the simple intuition that market mechanisms are inherently dynamically unstable at least around their stationary positions in this note i want to stress the theoretical point that there is nothing in the working of a perfectly competitive market system that prevents it from displaying persistent and endogenous fluctuations and that moreover such fluctuations may have their origins in market fundamentals such as factor intensities factor substitutability degree of impatience and so forth nevertheless macroeconomic models of endogenous fluctuations still have to prove that apart from being very beautiful they can also be useful to understand the so called heal world hit sunt leones this article is not intended to be a survey of all that has been written in this area in the last decade i have no title whatsoever to talk about empirical studies chera sayers contribution in this same volume addresses that guestion scheinkman 1990 is a readily available survey of nonlinear statistical methods that are relevant to this debate as for the theory incompetence recommends that i avoid touching on sunspot equilibria olg models and more generally expectations driven cycles they are instead discussed in jean michel grandmont s article finally marketing awareness implies recommending boldrin and woodford 1990 as a reasonably complete survey of what the endogenous cycle research program has recently produced at a theoretical level

trade and insurance with moral hazard abstract previous literature on the use of trade policy for insurance has relied implicitly on moral hazard and adverse selection as the reasons for the failure of private markets for risk bearing this paper begins with the observation that such forces should be incorporated explicitly into the models to ensure a fair comparison between markets and governments for the case of moral hazard it is found that market equilibrium given exclusive insurance is an informationally constrained pareto optimum in one case of non exclusive insurance a systematic role for government insurance is found but the scope of trade policy is ambiguous

trade and insurance with adverse selection this paper considers a small open economy with a safe sector and a risky sector the probability of success in the risky activity differs across individuals and is private information it is shown that policies that sustain informationally constrained pareto optima should not include tariffs a laissez faire competitive equilibrium if it exists is pareto optimal these results contrast with previous literature on the role of tariffs as insurance where private risk markets are assumed away in an ad hoc manner

benefits from mutual restraint in a multilateral monetary union summary we show that monetary union can enhance price stability for its member countries even if none of them has a long history of stable prices and independent monetary policy as is the case in a number of monetary union initiatives among developing countries the positive effect obtains because the opportunistic objectives of one country s policy makers are kept in check at the union level by other members with disparate objectives we calibrate the model to evaluate the proposed monetary union in the east african community the empirical results show that the mutual restraint on monetary policy is an important determinant of the expected benefit from an eac monetary union

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

transparency reputation and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates this paper shows that if the cost of importing foreign inflation and real exchange rate shocks are not too high then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate regime for a country with a credibility problem is a peg under which credibility is higher and inflation is lower than under a float this holds true although devaluations of the pegged rate are assumed to be costless the reason is that as realized inflation is not perfectly controllable planned inflation under a float is private information in contrast since the exchange rate can be perfectly controlled pegging resolves the private information problem is more transparent and makes reputation more effective

on the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes abstract most anti inflation plans have used a nominal exchange rate anchor even though many other variables can serve this role the conventional wisdom is that an exchange rate anchor imposes more macroeconomic discipline than other anchors though theory does not yet provide any clear reason why this is so we explain the link between an exchange rate anchor and discipline with a model that assumes that the public can monitor the nominal exchange rate more easily that it can the other variables in our model a barro gordon game of incomplete information with imperfect monitoring we show that serious stabilizers prefer more visible anchors such as the nominal exchange rate we also show that in some circumstances serious stabilizers will choose to fix the exchange rate even when fixed exchange rates have some costs such as diminished capabilities to respond to external shocks

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility abstract a fundamental problem for government is how to combine commitment to certain policies with the flexibility required to adjust them when needed rogoff 1985 rogoff k 1985 the optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target q j econ 100 4 1169 1189 showed that a way to strike the right balance is to appoint an optimally conservative policy maker in real life however policy makers also have power over decisions where optimal plans are time consistent so delegating to a conservative person could be undesirable a flexible delegation device can be found in a large committee of randomly appointed members voting over policy after observing a shock when facing dynamic inconsistency under a single crossing property there exists a supermajority rule that implements the population median s optimally conservative policy maker with certainty another single crossing property guarantees that if simple majority voting is used to select the voting rule that will govern policy choice the supermajority preferred by the median is chosen for problems where dynamic inconsistency vanishes the committee will choose to make decisions by simple majority implementing median outcomes an application to monetary policy is developed we show that the optimal supermajority is higher when dynamic inconsistency is more severe when preferences are more homogeneous and when the economy is less volatile

fiscal policies and the choice of exchange rate regime a common argument against either a monetary union or a regime or a fixed exchange rates is that they preclude flexible use of the inflation tax the authors address this point of view by comparing three alternative exchange rate regimes a pure float an ems regime in which the exchange rate is fixed but can be realigned and a monetary union the authors model the three regimes as alternative commitments on future seigniorage policies this approac h suggests that it is not possible to pareto rank the three regimes o n the other hand the authors provide intuitive conditions under which each of the systems is superior to the others copyright 1993 by royal economic society

sources of complex dynamics in two sector growth models this paper develops a tractable multisectoral dynamic equilibrium model and provides a fairly complete analysis of the dynamics that may arise along the intertemporal competitive equilibrium path despite the fact that the environment displays neither random nor deterministic variability the model may produce oscillations in aggregate variables such as output consumption and investment we show that these oscillations can be exactly periodic of any finite period i and even totally aperiodic chaotic we characterize the parameter values for which each of these cases occur but also provide some strong global asymptotic stability results

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms