fighting with one hand tied behind the back political budget cycles in the west german states theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre election period only if fiscal transparency is low i argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal electioneering governments may increase spending on highly visible policies the composition of the budget serves as a second best strategy it increases political support without straining the budget balance an empirical analysis of the west german states reveals alternative electoral budget strategies and ultimately point to the importance of analyzing how governments choose between alternative fiscal instruments

political cycles and economic performance in oecd countries empirical evidence from 1951 2006 this paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short term economic performance i employ data on annual gdp growth in 21 oecd countries over the 1951 2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests in countries with two party systems gdp growth is boosted before elections and under leftwing governments in the first two years of a legislative period these findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance my findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short term economic performance

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

strategic pricing with customer rationing the case of primary metals firms in primary metal industries often charge subcompetitive prices and in periods of high demand they may ration their customers a model is developed to ex plain these empirical regularities in the model firms with market power are aware that the price they charge today affects their demand tomorrow in addition the strategic interaction among firms reinforces this intertemporal effect in the equilibrium of the two stage game oligopolists can price below marginal cost and when capacity constraints are introduced the equilibrium can involve rationing model predictions are assessed using market structure and technology data for several primary metal industries

international and domestic constraints on political business cycles in oecd economies a comment we attempt to assess the effect of monetary policy in a panel model for 16 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd to answer the question of whether central banks actively create political business cycles we focus on the short term interest rate as a proxy for the use of monetary instruments our results indicate that central banks do not create political business cycles this conclusion holds whether or not central banks are independent and whether or not they are constrained by the exchange rate system in force

long term contracting and multiple price systems this article examines product markets in which long term contracts and spot transactions coexist such markets are characterized by multiple price systems wherein adjustment to supply and demand shocks occurs through spot prices while contract prices are fixed or adjust slowly the authors derive the existence of contracts as well as the equilibrium fraction of spot trade in the framework of an optimizing model and analyze the effects of shocks on market equilibrium when some buyers and sellers locked in contractually the model is employed to interpret the change in the copper market from a multiple price system to one characterized solely by spot trade copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

the politics of digits evidence of odd taxation from the concept of odd pricing i e setting rightmost price digits below a whole number this paper advances the political counterpart of odd taxation using a panel of danish municipal taxes first the distribution of tax decimals is non uniform and resembles the distribution of price endings data second nine ending and other higher end decimals are found to be over represented which echoes odd pricing research it suggests that incumbents take voters biases into account and apply odd taxes to minimize the political costs of taxation while maximizing revenue attention should be given to how policy digits are arranged to exploit voters cognitive biases

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

fiscal policy deficits and politics of subnational governments the case of the german laender the first part of the paper briefly describesinstitutional aspects of the german federal system andexamines the economic and fiscal performance of thegerman laender since 1970 taking into account theinstitutional settings especially the fact that thegerman laender cannot set tax rates individually wedevelop a highly stylized model of subnationalgovernments that do not have access to the tax rateinstrument and thus have to use expenditures as apolicy variable the model implies an expendituresmoothing policy of subnational governments andcomplements the famous tax smoothing model theempirical section examines whether governments ofvarious ideology show significant differences infiscal stabilization policy our results indicatethat regional differences in public debt accumulationand public expenditure policy in general is largelydetermined by interregional differences in economicperformance whereas we do not find any significantimpact on the ideological composition of the laendergovernments

unemployment and inflation consequences of unexpected election results the empirical evidence toward rational partisan theory of business cycles is mixed and thus inconclusive this is due to the enormous heterogeneity of the existing empirical studies only a few of these test explicitly for the central theoretical innovation that post electoral blips in economic activity depend on the degree of the electoral surprise using polling data we present empirical evidence in favor of rational partisan theory for a panel of oecd countries

educational business cycles the political economy of teacher hiring across german states 1992 2004 strong institutional constraints and better informed voters may lead re election seeking incumbents to shift the use of political business cycle mechanisms away from monetary and fiscal policy towards other policy domains that are more easily manipulable targetable and timeable we investigate teacher employment patterns at the state level in germany and find strong evidence of cycling mechanisms in the form of electioneering and honeymooning against a backdrop of a continuously shrinking total teachers pool german state level incumbents accelerate the hiring of new teachers during election periods and partly reverse this during politically safer points in the electoral cycle cycles are mediated by issue salience heightened attention to german public schooling after the notorious pisa 2000 tests further strengthens the manipulation of new teacher hiring for electoral purposes

electoral cycles in government employment evidence from us gubernatorial elections abstract incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards i investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment around us gubernatorial elections exploiting staggered gubernatorial election cycles across states i use both county fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference in gubernatorial election cycles consistent with manipulation state and local government employment per capita are higher leading up to elections afterwards employment abruptly returns to normal political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated including by election competitiveness term limits incumbent party affiliation and ideological alignment between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens differences across types of government employment and private sector employment are also explored

noncooperative behavior by a cartel as an entry deterring signal recent work has investigated the effect of a potential entrant s uncertainty about postentry profits on the likelihood of his entering the market it has always been assumed that the potential entrant knows the type of postentry solution but lacks information on cost or as to whether the postentry solution will be cooperative or noncooperative we find that entry is more likely the greater is the preentry profit rate in equilibrium the threat of entry then forces the incumbent firms to act more competitively to deter entry

what does an oligopoly maximize a monopolist maximizes a well defined objective function monetary profit in a competitive industry although each individual pursues selfish objectives the market behaves as if an agent was maximizing an objective function social welfare can we say the same for an oligopoly do firms pursuing selfish objectives and behaving strategically act as if an agent was maximizing a fictitious objective function necessary and sufficient conditions for nash equilibria of static and state space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems are derived nash equilibria of the game that are not maxima of the function are shown to be generically unstable copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

the bundesbank s path to independence evidence from the 1950s the german bundesbank is frequently called the world s most independent and conservative central bank taking account of the path dependency of this reputation both quantitative data and qualitative data on german central bank law and political conflicts are used to determine the factors that contributed to this reputation in the 1950s it is shown that quantitative analysis has its limits and that law might be a misleading indicator in this respect it is rather the analysis of policy conflicts between the bundesbank and the government that yields information on the bank s path to independence

opportunistic and partisan election cycles in brazil new evidence at the municipal level this article tests the hypothesis of opportunistic and partisan cycle models using a new large data set of brazilian municipalities over the 1989 2005 period the results show an increase in total and current expenditures and a decrease in municipal investments local tax revenues and budget surplus in election years they also show that partisan ideology exerts a relative influence on the performance of the local public accounts these results confirm that both opportunistic and partisan cycles have occurred in the management of the budgets of brazilian municipalities after the end of the military government

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

searching for political business cycles in germany one reslt of the revitalised literature on political business cycles is that there are signs in german data that elections and ideology have an impact however using monthly data for the period 1950 1989 and standard methods of time series analysis we reject both the nordhaus hypothesis of opportunistic cycles and the partisan approaches by hibbs ans alesina we show that some results are sensitive to the assumption of stationarity there are signs of policy cycles in m1 it is hard though to bring this in line with the rogoff hypothesis of rational opportunistic cycles because of the german institutional setting

market structure marketing method and price instability data for metals sold on commodity exchanges and at prices set by producers are used to test the relationship between the organization of markets and the behavior of prices on the production side the question is whether prices are more stable in concentrated industries and on the sales side the question is whether markets where buyers are consumers have more stable prices than those with consumers and speculators the recent increase in metal price instability is explained by changes in the market structure and organization variables foremost is increased reliance on commodity exchanges declines in concentration are of less importance

political parties world demand and unemployment domestic and international sources of economic activity this article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects namely that unemployment falls under left wing governments and rises under right wing governments however the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies that is economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity and that in addition to politicians strategic incentives political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained transitory or absent with respect to the latter on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office where one party or dominant partner coalitions form the effect on unemployment is transitory whereas where broad coalitions form it is sustained or absent finally ceteris paribus any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities

electoral cycles in active labor market policies we examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote short term job creation such policies reduce measures of unemployment using german state data for the period 1985 to 2004 we show that election motivated politicians pushed job promotion schemes before elections

economic freedom and government ideology across the german states potrafke n economic freedom and government ideology across the german states regional studies this paper examines whether government ideology influenced economic freedom across the german states the results show that in former west germany rightwing governments promoted economic freedom whereas leftwing governments confined it in the former east germany however rightwing governments were not associated with propagating economic freedom this finding appears to conflict with the common notion of policy convergence at the federal level in fact the observed variation in political preferences across states may indicate that politicians gratify the local electorate and in return offer moderate policies at the federal level potrafke n potrafke n la liberte economique et l ideologie du gou

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

political budget cycles the case of the western german lander this paper focuses on the issue of the electoral andideological cycles in state government budget for the elevenwestern german lander we verify this hypothesis over theperiod 1974 1994 for the following budgetary variables totalexpenditures surplus deficit administration health care education roads and social security benefits while overallour results seem to show that generally the party variabledoes not play a systematic role in spending decisions theyprovide some support to the opportunistic cycle theory showingthat the only relevant phenomenon is the effect of theupcoming election on the government spending inclinations

child benefits maternal employment and children s health evidence from canadian child benefit expansions industrial countries typically provide income transfers to families with young children traditionally these family benefit programs were motivated by distributional concerns families with children faced higher expenditure needs than other families and a concern for horizontal equity led to transfers throughout the 1990s however many countries introduced benefits aimed at improving labor market incentives for mothers with young children in the united states the earned income tax credit eitc has played this role but similar programs exist in europe canada and elsewhere much effort has been expended on evaluating the labor market impact of child benefits however less work has examined the impact of these programs on broader outcomes such as the mental and physical health of both the children and the parents outcomes that follow from the traditional equity motivation for child benefits in this paper we review and extend some recent results studying the expansion of family benefits in canada in particular we exploit a change that occurred in the province of manitoba to highlight the effects of child benefits on both labor supply and family outcomes

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

the failure of input based schooling policies in an effort to improve the quality of schools governments around the world have dramatically increased the resources devoted to them by concentrating on inputs and ignoring the incentives within schools the resources have yielded little in the way of general improvement in student achievement this paper provides a review of the us and international evidence on the effectiveness of such input policies it then contrasts the impact of resources with that of variations in teacher quality that are not systematically related to school resources finally alternative performance incentive policies are described

electoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities abstractelectoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities regional studies this paper provides evidence that there is an electoral cycle in public administration decisions using data from german local governments in the period 2001 10 specifically it finds that the number of building licences issued by the public administration significantly increases in election years this result is robust to various specification tests and to dealing with the potential endogeneity of the election timing

welfare reform in european countries a microsimulation analysis this article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in work benefits in the 15 pre enlargement countries of the european union we use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins and the euromod microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates we quantify the equity efficiency trade off for a range of elasticity parameters in most countries because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase out rates increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme in contrast the in work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases

when the money runs out do cash transfers have sustained effects on human capital accumulation this study examines the medium term effects of a two year cash transfer program targeted to adolescent girls and young women significant declines in hiv prevalence teen pregnancy and early marriage among recipients of unconditional cash transfers ucts during the program evaporated quickly two years after the cessation of transfers however children born to uct beneficiaries during the program had significantly higher height for age z scores at follow up on the other hand conditional cash transfers ccts offered to out of school females at baseline produced a large increase in educational attainment and a sustained reduction in the total number of births but caused no gains in health labor market outcomes or empowerment the findings point to both the promise and the limitations of cash transfer programs for sustained gains in welfare among young women

fiscal policy and reelection in brazilian municipalities this paper uses a new panel of more than 2 000 brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors reelec tion we examine brazilian municipal elections from 1988 to 2000 using a logit fixed effects model the results suggest that mayors who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party in par ticular higher capital spending over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are beneficial to brazilian incumbent mayors

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

rationality and the political business cycle the case of local government the empirical results which have been reported support the hypotheses implied by the model of rational political behavior set out in section 2 in pre election periods local government development expenditures deviate significantly from their normal levels the extent of deviation is approximately 20

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

rhetoric and action what are central banks doing before elections central bank rhetoric need not always be followed bycorresponding measures in a number of regressions coveringgermany japan and the u s we examine differences in rhetoricand actual behavior before elections using a standard pbcmodel our results indicate that these three central bankshave not been influenced by electoral consideration in thepolicies they implement but the case of the german bundesbankindicates that it may be helpful to distinguish betweenrhetoric and action

transparency political polarization and political budget cycles in oecd countries we investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance while some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies in contrast we show conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies using a sample of 19 oecd countries in the 1990s we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low er transparency countries while no such cycles can be observed in high er transparency countries furthermore we find in accordance with recent theory that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries

federalism and central bank independence the politics of german monetary policy 1957 92 two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy first political threats to the status structure or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy second politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure that central bank appointees share their electoral and party political goals this paper derives the monetary policy outcomes obtained as a function of the degree of central bank independence zero partial or full and central bankers types partisans or technocrats based on a case study of the 1957 and 1992 institutional changes to the german central banking system and a regression analysis covering the period in between i argue that the formal independence of the system is protected by its embeddedness in the institutions of german federalism and by the federalist components of its decentralized organizational structure the behavioral independence of the german central bank fluctuates over time with the party control of federalist veto points the bundesbank is staffed with nonpartisan technocrats who are partially insulated from political pressures

child cash benefits and family expenditures evidence from the national child benefit income may improve child outcomes through two mechanisms as a direct input into health and education or indirectly by reducing household financial stress we exploit policy induced changes in refundable tax benefit income in canada to study these two potential mechanisms our findings suggest that additional income may improve outcomes through both mechanisms some benefit income is spent on direct education inputs while some is spent on everyday items likely to improve the general conditions children face additionally some families reduce spending on risky behaviour items spending responses to benefit generosity appear to vary by income and by child age prestations pour enfants en especes et depenses des familles ce que revele la prestation nationale pour enfants le revenu permet d ameliorer le developpement d un enfant gr ce a deux mecanismes en contribuant directement a l education et a la sante et en reduisant indirectement les difficultes financieres au sein du foyer afin d etudier ces deux mecanismes nous nous appuyons sur les modifications politiques apportees au credit d impot remboursable de type prestation fiscale pour revenu de travail au canada nos resultats suggerent que par l entremise de ces deux mecanismes la situation peut s ameliorer gr ce a un revenu additionnel une partie de ces prestations est depensee directement pour l education tandis qu une autre est utilisee pour les biens quotidiens susceptibles d ameliorer les conditions de vie generales de l enfant de plus certaines familles reduisent les depenses d articles pouvant induire des comportements a risque les types de depenses lies aux prestations sociales semblent varier en fonction des revenus et de l ge des enfants

is german domestic social policy politically controversial this paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using german data examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951 2007 period leftwing governments however spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after german reunification in 1990 since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon

political parties and the supply side of the economy the provision of physical and human capital in advanced economies 1960 90 theory partisan tenure of government in contrast to institutionalist and structural approaches is used to explain the nature of governmental strategies to affect the supply side of the economy the provision of the input factors capital and labor hypotheses supply side economic strategies are a function of the party in office left wing governments spend heavily in physical and human capital formation to raise the productivity of factors and the competitiveness of the economy rightwing governments rely instead on private agents to maximize economic growth the organization of the domestic political economy and the international economy which place heavy limits on the capacity of parties to affect the conduct of macroeconomic policies hardly constrain the choice of supply side economic strategies methods regression analysis of data for levels of public spending on gross fixed capital formation and on education in oecd nations from 1960 to 1990 results supply side policies conform to partisan preferences throughout the period examined the institutional configuration of the economy affected policies jointly with government partisanship until the oil shock but not afterwards economic openness does not constrain the choice of supply side policies

are expectations on inflation and election outcomes connected an empirical analysis abstract in this paper we study whether inflation expectations react on variations of election outcome expectations using data from 6 countries we show that such a link in fact exists and thus provides empirical evidence supportive to rational partisan theory of business cycles

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

shortages segmentation and self selection this paper considers the rationality and implications of using shortages as a self selection device shortages lead to uncertain access and enable sellers to offer ensured access either to the good or to a preferred variety of the good at a higher price or as part of a bundle it is shown that such activities allow firms to span nonconcavities in their revenue function firms respond to changes in demand and costs through changes in quantity and or the premium for ensured access but not through changes in the base price

rational rationing in stackelberg equilibria in the contect of duopoly theory with differentiated products economic theorists usually consider the price as the choice variable for the firms given the prices the respective quantities demanded and profits can be computed in this paper we consider strategy spaces consisting of both price and production variables two models are developped in one model the firm will choose its price and the number of consumers it will serve a serving capacity while in the other model it will choose the price and the total quantity it will produce a production capacity we are particularly concerned in this paper with the existence of endogenously determined rationing in a leader follower duopoly framework we show that rationing is always may be present in equilibrium when strategies are expressed in terms of the price and the production serving capacity moreover only the leader or first mover will or may engage in rationing rationing appears therefore as a strategic variable what may appear as a fixed price equilibrium or a disequilibrium turns out in this case to be a strategic equilibrium with completely flexible prices an example is worked out this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

partisan political business cycles in the german labour market empirical tests in the light of the lucas critique this paper focuses on alternative specifications ofpartisan political business cycles partisan theory rational partisan theory and hysteresis augmentedrpt it elaborates on analogies of the natural ratehypothesis underlying all specifications and thecointegration concept accordingly problems of thespecification of hypotheses estimation and inferencein a cointegrating framework with politicalinterventions are treated super exogeneity tests areshown to be equivalent to tests of the lucas critiqueand the rpt therefore the concept ofsuper exogeneity is transferred to empirical tests ofpartisan cycles by this a new testing framework ofpartisan cycles is developed and applied to germanlabour market data

the integration of child tax credits and welfare evidence from the national child benefit program abstract in 1998 the canadian government introduced a new child tax credit the innovation in the program was its integration with social assistance welfare some provinces agreed to subtract the new federally paid benefits from provincially paid social assistance partially lowering the welfare wall other provinces did not integrate benefits providing a quasi experimental framework for estimation we find large changes in social assistance take up and employment in provinces that provided the labour market incentives to do so in our sample the integration of benefits can account for between 19 and 27 of the decline in social assistance receipt between 1997 and 2000

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

political biases despite external expert participation an empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in germany this paper explores whether and how political biases arise in an institutional setting where revenue forecasting is delegated to a body that includes experts from institutions neither part of nor controlled by the government the empirical analysis focuses on the performance of german federal tax revenue forecasts in the preparation of which the advice of external experts has a long tradition as an institutional safeguard while on average revenue forecasts turn out to be unbiased the results show that the government exerts an influence in particular optimism pessimism in the government s gdp forecast helps to explain why the revenue forecast turns out too optimistic pessimistic in addition governmental estimates of the revenue effects of tax law changes are found to contribute to forecast errors

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

the effect of universal child benefits on labour supply using a difference in differences estimator i find the canadian universal child care benefit has significant negative income effects on the labour supply of married individuals the likelihood of lower educated mothers to participate in the labour force is reduced 3 2 percentage points when receiving the benefit median hours worked per week among lower educated mothers is reduced by 1 9 hours the effects on higher educated mothers are substantial with median hours worked among higher educated mothers reduced by nearly one hour per week for men the evidence suggests small but significant income effects on labour supply consistent with the literature on labour supply elasticities

introductory price as a signal of cost in a model of repeat business a two period game between firms and consumers is considered firms are privately informed about their individual costs and consumers must pay a search cost in order to learn a firm s current price consumers thus have incentive to use introductory price as a signal of cost and hence second period price recent refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are employed and the resulting equilibria involve low introductory prices introductory sales