markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant the problem of noncompliance and enforcement in transferable discharge permit tdp markets has not received much attention this paper examines the consequences of noncompliance for a tdp market given fairly general assumptions about the characteristics of the enforcement policy in place the analysis reveals that when firms are noncompliant tdp markets retain their efficiency property only under some fairly stringent conditions the effect of noncompliance on the equilibrium permit price raises some important questions about the ability of a tdp market to achieve and remain in equilibrium when firms are noncompliant

the choice of regulatory instrument when there is uncertainty about compliance with fisheries regulations noncompliance is an important problem for fisheries regulators and a number of studies have considered optimal enforcement issues within fisheries regulation our article extends this literature by studying the implications of noncompliance for the choice between tax and quota regulation we first develop a general stock recruitment model of a search fishery with illegal landings and show that compliance uncertainty where the regulator is uncertain about the extent of noncompliance generates an efficiency advantage for taxes over individual transferable quotas we also provide evidence that uncertainty about compliance is an important source of uncertainty for regulators copyright 2008 oxford university press

lender penalty for environmental damage and the equilibrium cost of capital in a model of the lending relationship incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard we show that increasing the liability of lenders for environmental damage done by their borrowers has a qualitatively ambiguous impact upon interest rates this calls into question the assertion of financial community representatives that such reform will necessarily driveup interest rates and have adverse macroeconomic consequences if it is this fear which is preventing reform then that reluctance may in the case of many classes of pollutant be misplaced the implications of such reform for credit rationing are also explored

losses from effluent taxes and quotas under uncertainty recent theoretical papers by adar and griffin j environ econ manag 3 178 188 1976 fishelson j environ econ manag 3 189 197 1976 and weitzman rev econ studies41 477 491 1974 show that different expected social losses arise from using effluent taxes and quotas as alternative control instruments when marginal control costs are uncertain key assumptions in these analyses are linear marginal cost and benefit functions and an additive error for the marginal cost function to reflect uncertainty in this paper empirically derived nonlinear functions and more realistic multiplicative error terms are used to estimate expected control and damage costs and to identify empirically the mix of control instruments that minimizes expected losses

on optimal audit mechanisms for environmental taxes abstract we consider the auditing problem of an environmental enforcement agency with fixed audit resources how to decide which firms to audit after having observed the firms taxable emissions reports the goal of the agency is to implement the socially efficient emissions level the audit mechanism is the agency s sole choice variable while other variables such as the tax rate on emissions and the fine for non compliance are determined by other governmental actors the fines and budget of the agency are constrained in such a way that the common random audit mechanism fails to implement socially efficient emissions assuming perfect information among the firms we derive an optimal audit mechanism capable of implementing the socially efficient emissions level the optimal audit mechanism creates a contest exploiting the strategic interdependencies between the firms where the probability of winning not being audited for each firm depends on costly efforts their taxable emissions reports

the economics of enforcing pollution taxation abstract the efficient structure of pollution tax policy is examined when it is recognized that enforcing compliance will be costly there are two components of this cost 1 the direct cost of enforcement and 2 the cost polluters incur avoiding enforcement considering only the first cost the efficient pollution policy calls for a tax in excess of that conventionally recommended as efficient t but with little enforcement once avoidance cost is recognized the efficient policy can be substantially altered requiring a tax lower than t but with greater enforcement even when direct enforcement cost is zero it is shown that there is no unique advantage to t in the absence of avoidance cost

profits from violating controls on the use of a polluting input profits from violating the quota charge and permit market systems are compared the results indicate that for a given permit price the violation profits of the charge and permit market systems are the same and exceed the profits from violating a quota system if the optimal use of inputs in a compliant market is lower than the quota it is also shown that under a permit market system the occurrence of violation decreases the equilibrium price of permits this implies that the profits from violating a permit market are lower than violation profits of a charge system

quota enforcement in resource industries self reporting and differentiated inspections quotas are frequently used in the management of renewable resources and emissions however in many industries there is concern about their basic effectiveness due to non compliance we develop an enforcement model of a quota regulated resource and focus on a situation with significant non compliance and exogenous constraints on fines and enforcement budget we propose a new enforcement system based on self reporting of excess extraction and explicit differentiation of inspection rates depending on compliance history we use differentiated inspections to induce firms to self report excess extraction this system increases the effectiveness of the quota by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under traditional enforcement while ensuring an efficient allocation of extraction in addition inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in welfare

regulation and evolution of compliance in common pool resources the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a cpr stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics this evolutionary approach suggests that in long run equilibrium coexistence of both cooperative and non cooperative rules is possible under regulation stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels as an equilibrium outcome it might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities

enforcement of pollution levies in china abstract this paper investigates how industrial plants react to inspections conducted by environmental authorities under the pollution levy taxation regulation in china contrary to studies in the united states and canada magat and viscusi 1990 laplante and rilstone 1996 and previous studies in china dasgupta et al 2001 we find that inspections increase plants self reported pollution by 3 45 we provide a model to analyze plants strategic reactions to the pollution levy regulation in china the model concludes that under the specific regulation plants actual pollution might increase with inspections our study provides a key policy implication that inspections by environmental authorities in china are effective for verifying plants self reported pollution but not for reducing their pollution

inducing environmental disclosures a dynamic mechanism design approach this paper studies the design of voluntary disclosure regulations for a firm that faces a stochastic environmental hazard the occurrence of such a hazard is known only to the firm the regulator if finding a hazard collects a fine and mandates the firm to perform costly remediation that reduces the environmental damage the regulator may inspect the firm at any time to uncover the hazard however because inspections are costly the regulator also offers a reward to the firm for voluntarily disclosing the hazard the reward corresponds to either a subsidy or a reduced fine depending on whether it is positive or negative thus the regulator needs to dynamically determine the reward and inspection policy that minimizes expected societal cost in the long run we model this problem as a dynamic adverse selection problem with costly state verification in continuous time despite the complexity and generality of this setup we show that the optimal regulation policy follows a very simple cyclic structure which we fully characterize in closed form specifically the regulator runs scheduled inspections periodically after each inspection the reward level decreases over time until a subsequent inspection takes place if a hazard is not revealed the reward level is reset to a high level restarting the cycle in contrast to the reward level the mandated remediation level is constant over time nonetheless when subsidies are not allowed in the industry we show that the regulator should dynamically adjust this remediation level which then acts as a substitute for a subsidy our analysis further reveals that optimal inspection frequency increases not only when the inspection accuracy decreases but also when the penalty for not disclosing the hazard increases

pooling of uncertainty enforcing tradable permits regulation when emissions are stochastic an under appreciated advantage of tradable permits regulation is its ability to create better decision making when emissions are stochastic in general the distribution of stochastic actual emissions around intended emissions results in over or under compliance permit tradability reduces the extent to which actual aggregate emissions deviate from regulatory targets by giving firms an additional mechanism for responding to uncertainty we construct a two period model of permit regulation with ex post enforcement to demonstrate how the permit market distributes uncertainty and to illustrate the importance of expectations toward permit market outcomes

the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs this paper addresses the following question to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost effectively should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target the total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs monitoring costs and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms under common assumptions i show that allowing noncompliance is cost effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty however one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs this last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty in fact the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty and can actually be lower finally tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms abatement costs

remediation and self reporting in optimal law enforcement abstract many environmental laws encourage firms to self report their violations to government regulators rather than subject themselves to probabilistic enforcement this paper studies self reporting enforcement regimes when there are ex post benefits of remediation or clean up remediation benefits are shown to impart two advantages to the use of self reporting beyond those identified elsewhere firstly whereas non reporting firms only engage in costly clean up when they are caught by an enforcement authority self reporting firms always engage in efficient remediation secondly with self reporting the government can costlessly impose stiffer non reporter penalties that reduce the government enforcement effort required to achieve a given level of violation deterrence

a re examination of real interest rate parity empirical investigation based on consumer price index based real interest rates is used to conclude that real interest rate parity is not supported in this paper the authors employ three panel based unit root tests provided by andrew levin and chien fu lin 1992 kyung so im hashem m pesaran and yongcheol shin 1995 and g s maddala and shaowen wu 1996 to examine the stationarity of real interest differentials using monthly observations on euro market rates they support the mean reverting property of real interest differentials and hence the real interest rate parity this finding is consistent with the observation that international integration of financial markets has increased dramatically since 1979

measurement error and state dependent pollution control enforcement abstract a two group model of state dependent enforcement is applied to identical firms which minimize the expected present value of costs and fines measurement error affects the probabilities of transitions between groups and the receipt of fines it is shown that state dependent enforcement can reduce social cost below the level attainable with static enforcement and that differentiation in both monitoring probabilities and standards may be optimal however setting fines for both groups at the maximum is likely to be optimal comparisons between models and alternative model interpretations are offered

cost efficient pesticide reductions a study of sweden the minimum cost for reducing the farmers use of pesticides is calculated the measures include are i a decrease in use of inputs ii an improvement of the insurance system and iii application of an ecotechnology where 5 10 meters along the borders of the fields are left untreated with pesticides the cost of reducing the use of pesticides is measured by means of pesticide demand functions and the cost for improving an insurance system is measured as the risk premium the empirical results indicate that the minimum cost for reducing the use of pesticides by 50 in sweden corresponds to about 6 per cent of farmers incomes from crop production a simple comparison of policy instruments shows that the cost of a quota system is about 40 per cent higher than the costs of the charge and permit market systems the farmers decreases in incomes under a charge system are twice as high as under the other two policy instruments the results are however sensitive to the levels of the pesticide price elasticities

is there a connection between monetary unification and real economic integration evidence from regime switching stationarity tests abstract we investigate the extent of real convergence among g7 economies in terms of long run real interest parity a novel approach is applied where unit root tests of real interest differentials are embedded within a markov regime switching framework whereas standard univariate unit root tests provide little support for parity we find real convergence is present after allowing for regime switches in real interest misalignments however differentials across members of the euro zone are likely to exhibit greater persistence despite nominal convergence it is non sequitur to infer from monetary unification that nominal convergence is necessarily conducive to real interest realignments or preventive of misalignments

efficient environmental policy with imperfect compliance discussions of efficient environmental policytend to recommend taxes rather than quotas ongrounds of efficiency a uniform tax willequalize marginal abatement cost betweenpolluters when polluters actions are imperfectly observable the distinction betweentaxes and quotas becomes less clear taxes maybe evaded by underreporting of emissions whilequota violations will not always be discovered this paper explores the conditions under whichthe efficiency properties of taxes continue tohold even when evasion is possible and theextent to which the fine for quota violationsplays the same role as a tax on emissions withsimilar efficiency properties

guilty until proven innocent regulation with costly and limited enforcement abstract we consider optimal regulations for a polluting firm when regulators cannot observe emission control costs and can only observe emissions via costly monitoring fines or subsidies for enforcing compliance are also limited the optimal regulations resemble a deposit refund system the firm reports its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report if the firm is monitored it receives a rebate when actual and reported emissions coincide the enforcement constraints and the firm s rights determine whether the incentives to reduce emissions are optimally provided by varying the rebate for compliance the monitoring probability or the initial tax

the choice between emission taxes and output taxes under imperfect monitoring we consider a regulator s choice between environmentally motivated emissions taxes and output taxes we investigate how the optimal instrument depends on the monitoring cost function the firm s technology and on social preferences regarding output and environmental quality pure emissions taxes are usually not optimal with monitoring costs pure output taxes are optimal under sufficiently high monitoring costs sufficiently limited options for emission reduction by means other than output reduction and sufficiently high substitutability of the output finally conditions for the optimality of mixed taxes are given

network externality an uncommon tragedy economists have defined network externality and have examined putative inframarginal market failures associated with it this paper distinguishes between network effects and network externalities where the latter are market failures the authors argue that while network effects are important network externalities are theoretically fragile and empirically undocumented some network externalities are merely pecuniary network ownership or transactions among network participants can internalize some network effects the type of market failure that has been associated with these externalities is a transition problem that has little to do with externality

tortoises and hares choice among technologies of unknown merit recent work in the area of competing technologies and increasing returns has largely been concerned with the effectiveness of the market in delivering optimal outcomes the existence of inefficient market outcomes suggests that there might be a place for intervention in the technology choice process this paper develops a model of sequential choice in which the choice process is subject to centralized control the model is used to show that intervention can increase the expected present value of the technology adoption process it remains however that one technology and not necessarily the best will come to dominate the market copyright 1991 by royal economic society

more powerful panel data unit root tests with an application to mean reversion in real exchange rates unit root tests seeking mean or trend reversion are frequently applied to panel data we show that more powerful variants of commonly applied tests are readily available moreover power gains persist when the modifications are applied to bootstrap procedures that may be employed when cross correlation of a rather general sort among individual panel members is suspected copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

an experimental analysis of the effectiveness of an environmental assurance bonding system on player behavior in a simulated firm it has long been recognized that the present command and control methods for pollution abatement are inefficient using market mechanisms for environmental management is a promising alternative to the direct regulatory approach market mechanisms are just beginning to appear in u s environmental policy for example tradable permit schemes are being developed and implemented for some air pollutants under the amended clean air act various other forms of taxes and tradable permits have been proposed however these systems do not address the large uncertainty inherent in most environmental problems one mechanism currently being studied to address uncertainty more effectively is a flexible environmental assurance bonding system designed to incorporate environmental criteria and uncertainty into market incentives this study uses an experimental approach employing an interactive computer game simulation model with human players to examine the effectiveness of the assurance bonding system under varying degrees of uncertainty an environmental cost efficiency index ecei or profit per unit waste is used to measure player performance preliminary results indicate that players are more successful under the assurance bonding system in terms of ecei than under the simulated current system

the dynamo and the computer an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox the dynamo and the computer an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox author s paul a david source the american economic review vol 80 no 2 papers and proceedings of the hundred and second annual meeting of the american economic association may 1990 pp 355 361 published by american economic association stable url http www jstor org stable 2006600 accessed 08 12 2010 01 40

why are real interest rates not equalized internationally 1 introductioninternational financial economists are intensely concerned with several parity conditions that relate goods prices and asset returns across countries these include purchasing power parity ppp interest rate parity irp and variations of these two such as relative ppp ex ante ppp and real interest rate parity rip each of these parity conditions measures a degree of integration between the economies of the world the greater the economic integration across countries the greater the likelihood that the more restrictive of these parity conditions will have empirical support for example the strict ppp hypothesis implies that aggregate price levels will be equal in terms of a common currency this condition is very stringent because it does not allow for even temporary deviations from the equilibrium condition 1 a less restrictive version is long run ppp where price levels measured in a common currency across countries converge over some period of time may be a very long period of time recognizing all of the impediments that keep strict ppp from holding economists have put their efforts in studying the long run version of this equilibrium condition there is a relatively large literature examining the equality of real interest rates internationally 2 in all of these studies the real interest rate is defined by the fisher equation these studies then go on to estimate and test for the simultaneous existence of uncovered interest parity uip which is also called the open economy fisher relation and ex ante ppp eappp the other conditions sufficient for rip the problem in this strategy is that the fisher equation may not hold many studies have been devoted to examining the validity of the fisher relationship for both the u s and other economies 3 the results of this line of inquiry have been decidedly mixed even if the fisher relation does hold it is unlikely that the fisher effect will be one for one as implied by defining the real interest rate from the simple fisher equation both mundell tobin and tax effects can drive a wedge between inflation expectations and the effect on nominal interest rates 4 it would seem more appropriate to treat the fisher relation as another testable parity condition than as an assumption in this study we examine the underlying parity conditions sufficient for rip treating them as hypotheses to be tested the four parity conditions or equilibrium relationships upon which rip is predicated uncovered interest parity uip ex ante ppp eappp the fisher relation in each country i e the fisher relation in country a and the fisher relation in country b imply time series implications for the observable variables specifically if any of the nominal interest rates or inflation rates can be characterized as integrated variables evidence of which we will provide then the four parity conditions imply one common stochastic trend between them therefore an initial examination of the sufficient conditions for rip should include a test for a unit root in the observable variables and then a test for the number of common stochastic trends in a given rip system because the power of univariate unit root and stationarity tests is notoriously low many exploit the power gains available by using panel tests however there are serious drawbacks to some of these panel unit root tests for example o connell 1998 taylor and sarno 1998 and breuer mcnown and wallace 2001 we overcome these drawbacks by taking advantage of recent innovations in univariate and multivariate unit root tests that have substantially greater power to reject a false null but are not subject to the size distortions associated with some popular panel based tests our use of these methods leads us to conclude that each rip system analyzed can be characterized to some degree as a system of integrated variables that share more than one common trend

enforcement costs and regulatory reform the agency and firm response influenced by models of optimal law enforcement several authors have recently revised the work on efficient levels of regulatory control to accommodate the realities of underenforcement and imperfect compliance however most of these efforts have centered on either the enforcement agency or the firm and have largely ignored the decentralized nature of the enforcement process this paper extends these results by modelling both the firm and the local agency and by incorporating detection uncertainty and concealment activity each model is then evaluated with respect to the alternative regulatory regimes of direct controls and emission taxes

enforcement and price controls in emissions trading this paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms abatement costs the analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits when this occurs accommodating the effect of abatement cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second best optimal values however it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices this enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs and the policy produces the second best optimal outcome

self reporting of pollution and the firm s behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations abstract motivated by the nature of u s laws a model is developed for a firm that maximizes expected profit and faces imperfectly enforceable pollution standards with imperfectly enforceable reporting requirements some previous models of imperfectly enforceable standards and taxes are special cases of this general mode when the fine for violating the pollution standard is linear in excess pollution the form will equate the marginal cost of control to the marginal fine rate and thus actual pollution will be insensitive to enforcement parameters related to under reporting the more complex comparative statics that exist when the fine is non linear are analyzed and comparisons with other models are made

on indirect tax evasion abstract this paper examines some aspects of the decision to evade indirect taxes in the context of a monopolistic firm in particular the degree of interdependence between the tax shifting and the tax evasion decisions is analyzed both in the case of a fixed and of a variable probability of being detected it is shown that in the first case the shifting and evasion decisions are separable while in the second case this is no longer true in this latter case a rule according to which the probability decreases with larger declarations can be said to be an efficient one the conditions for a firm s becoming a completely submerged one are derived and finally direct and indirect tax evasion are compared it is shown that for decreasing risk aversion an indirect tax is evaded as a percentage less than a profit tax of equal yield

self reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution abstract existing environmental regulations frequently require firms to self report their compliance status to regulatory agencies using a principal agent framework i derive and compare incentive compatible regulatory policies with and without self reporting i find the firm needs to be audited less often when self reporting is required but punished more often the sign and magnitude of the gains from self reporting depend on the relative size of audit and sanction costs the accuracy of the regulator s monitoring technology and the desired level of abatement effort

leniency policies and illegal transactions abstract we study the consequences of leniency reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self report to law enforcers on sequential bilateral illegal transactions such as corruption manager auditor collusion or drug deals it is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction here we find that when not properly designed leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence

environmental policy instruments technology adoption incentives with imperfect compliance we study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance interestingly incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario however under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms incentives to invest whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non compliance induces a reduction in the permit price our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both theoretical and empirical applications

emission taxes versus other environmental policies in the environmental policy of most countries various forms of quotas and direct regulation are more important than environmental taxes this paper addresses four arguments which are often given against the use of emission taxes the three arguments related to information asymmetries and non convexities are valid in the sense that they point to complications in the use of environmental taxes the fourth argument is related to the employment effects of different types of environmental policies in economies with unemployment although this argument is frequently used by politicians the analysis provides no justification for it on the contrary in the model used employment is higher with environmental taxes than with nonrevenue raising environmental policies

truth or consequences enforcing pollution standards with self reporting abstract evidence suggests that a surprisingly large fraction of firms comply with pollution emission standards even though expected penalties for noncompliance are low we offer an explanation of this puzzle by extending the standard model of enforcement to include a self reporting requirement and enforcement power these extensions are enough to challenge the conventional result that higher fines lead to higher compliance rates we find that under plausible conditions higher compliance rates are achieved with lower fines for noncompliance and the cost of enforcing a given level of aggregate pollution is minimized by setting the fine for noncompliance equal to zero

unit roots and persistence in the nominal interest rate a confirmatory analysis applied to the oecd this paper investigates the stochastic properties of long term and short term nominal interest rates for the oecd over the post war era for that purpose we employ univariate unit root tests as well as panel unit root and stationarity tests that explicitly allow for cross sectional dependence overall we find overwhelming evidence that the nominal interest rate contains a unit root which may be driven by a stochastic common factor the computation of half lives through impulse response functions also points to a high degree of persistence this has important implications for the cointegration analysis of the fisher equation the uncovered interest parity and the term structure jel classification

comparing environmental policy instruments in the presence of imperfect compliance a case study in this paper we aim to include rule making implementation monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments we use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry the model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement the case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms we compare combinations of regulatory instruments emission taxes emission standards and technology standards and enforcement instruments criminal fines civil fines and transaction offers we show that the inclusion of information monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments

financial integration in the pacific basin region rip by panic attack abstract we exploit advances in panel data econometrics to test whether real interest parity holds in the pacific basin region we test for a unit root in the difference between either the us japanese or euro area real interest rate and the real interest rates from a panel of eleven pacific basin economies unlike extant studies that test for rip using panel data we use bai and ng s 2004 panic test which allows for a very general model of cross section dependence including the possibility of cross unit cointegration ignoring the possibility of cross unit cointegration can lead to severe size distortions and to an over rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root we overturn earlier findings based on first generation panel tests and demonstrate that cross unit cointegration leads to incorrect conclusions we find that rip holds in the pacific region real interest rates converge to the us rate we find no support for the hypothesis that pacific basin real interest rates converge to either the japanese or euro area rates

self reporting investigation and evidentiary standards abstractself reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement this paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort i show that this leads to a negative relationship between self reporting incentives and investigation effort three main conclusions arise first violators self report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered second self reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high finally authorities can increase the incentives to self report when they convict without hard evidence however a hard evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior

non compliance and the quota price in an itq fishery this paper examines the effects of non compliance on quota demands and the equilibrium quota price in an itq fishery i show that whereas lower quota prices are implied unambiguously by expected penalties which are a function of the absolute violation size the expectation of penalties based upon relative violations of quota demands can under certain conditions produce higher quota prices than in a compliant quota market if there are both compliant and non compliant firms in the fishery the result would then be a shift in quota demand from compliant to non compliant firms rather than the reverse the findings are generally applicable to quota markets in other industries including pollution permit markets

path dependence and the korean keyboard abstract this paper recounts the evolution of the korean keyboard as a case in which the disadvantages of the inherited standard turn into a nonissue with the advancement of auxiliary technologies the persistence of an inherited standard when a superior alternative is available is usually regarded as market failure however if the transition costs to the new standard are such that the net gains from the transition are insufficient the situation is unfortunate but not market failure the situation may change over time if the net gain from the alternative standard increases or transition costs to new alternative decrease or both the situation turns into one in which entrepreneurs can profit by making the transition where appropriate an institutional reform may lower transition costs substantially this paper suggests an additional possibility of technological changes that make the transition unnecessary in the case of the korean keyboard changes in auxiliary technologies have rendered the disadvantages of the inherited standard innocuous the case provides a cautionary tale against the temptation to drastically alter a seemingly hopelessly inferior inherited standard the lesson of the korean keyboard applies to japanese and chinese keyboards with even greater force

environmental enforcement when inspectability is endogenous a model with overshooting properties if a firm can influence its monitorability vis a vis an environmental regulator it is shown that increasing the thoroughness of inspections induces the firm to substitute towards more transparent technologies whilst increasing their frequency may cause substitution the other way perversely when the effect of such substitution is taken into account an increase in the frequency of inspections or equally the stringency of penalties may worsen the firm s environmental performance the agency should favour more thorough inspections than existing theory suggests particularly in sectors where the scope for such substitution is great moreover when monitorability adjusts only sluggishly to policy shocks because it is an embodied characteristic of capital for example the environmental impacts of increased frequency and increased thoroughness well over and under shoot their respective long run impacts in assessing regulatory reform therefore it is important to leave sufficient time for the class of adjustments identified to occur the possibility of overshooting can be used as an alternative to existing regulatory capture theories to explain why the efficacy of some classes of regulatory reform may fade through time

enforcing transferable permit systems in the presence of market power we derive an enforcement strategy for a transferable permit system in the presence of market power that achieves complete compliance in a cost effective manner we show that the presence of a firm with market influence makes designing an enforcement strategy more difficult than enforcing a perfectly competitive system we also re consider hahn s 1984 suggestion that a firm with market influence should be allocated permits so that it chooses to not participate in the permit market when enforcement and its costs are taken into account hahn s suggestion does not hold except in a very special case the presence of market power will limit the extent to which transferable emissions permit systems can fulfill their theoretical promises hahn 1984 was the first to show that permit trading in the presence of market power cannot be expected to result in a distribution of emissions that minimizes aggregate abatement costs furthermore the distribution of emissions will never be completely independent of the initial allocation of permits modeling a transferable permit system in which one firm has market power while the rest are perfect competitors a dominant firm competitive fringe model hahn demonstrated that aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when the dominant firm is allocated exactly the number of permits it will choose to hold in equilibrium simply aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when a firm that can manipulate the permit price does not because it chooses to not trade permits like most of the theoretical literature on transferable permit systems hahn ignored the fact that compliance in a permit system must be enforced recognizing this important omission van egteren and weber 1996 extended hahn s work to

atmospheric externalities and environmental taxation abstract the paper reviews the theory of environmental taxation under first best and second best conditions it argues that negative environmental externalities lead to reductions of the provision of public goods while investment in abatement increases the supply of public goods together with optimal tax rules the paper therefore also derives conditions for the optimal use of resources on abatement after brief discussions of the dimensions of time and uncertainty tax reform and the double dividend and taxes vs quotas the optimal tax model is applied to the problem of global warming with a discussion of the particular incentive problems that arise in designing and implementing global climate policy

financial integration of east asian economies evidence from real interest parity in this article we investigate the financial linkages between the east asian economies with japan and the united states we test for long run real interest rate parity rip using an array of panel data techniques including recent techniques developed by breuer et al 2002 and carrion i silvestre et al 2005 this study offers two important results first the failure to account for structural breaks in the industrialized countries and asian emerging economies is likely to provide evidence of nonstationary series that are stationary second we found strong evidence that the parity condition holds in all the asian countries the failure of earlier studies to confirm mean reversion of real interest rate differential rid may reflect the choice of estimation testing procedure rather than any inherent deficiency in the rip

prosecution and leniency programs the role of bluffing in opening investigations this paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the competition authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case i show that the competition authority can then exploit firms uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even when the case is weak more generally i show that offering full leniency allows the competition authority to open more successful investigations what i refer to as the activism effect of leniency which overall raises both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence finally i discuss the policy implications of the model