competition increases x efficiency a limited liability mechanism the main result of this study is that a financial constraint may serve as a disciplining device on the internal efficiency of a firm and the tougher the product market competition the higher the disciplining power this limited liability mechanism may in part account for the alleged disciplining power of product market competition on firm efficiency however even if policies that promote competition enhance x efficiency the gain may be outweighed by a less efficient allocation of risk moreover this adverse risk effect has repercussions implying that the effect of reduced entry barriers on competition and consumer s welfare is small

optimal investment in learning curve technologies we study optimal investment in technologies characterized by the learning curve there are two investment patterns depending on the shape of the learning curve if the learning process is slow firms invest relatively late and on a larger scale if the curve is steep firms invest earlier and on a smaller scale we further demonstrate that learning investment differs greatly from investment in technologies without learning effects learning investments generate substantial initial losses and are very sensitive to downside risk we show that the most susceptible to losses and risk are technologies with intermediate speed of learning

exclusive contracts and protection of investments we consider the effect of a renegotiable exclusive contract restricting a buyer to purchase from only one seller on the levels of noncontractible investments undertaken in their relationship contrary to some informal claims in the literature we find that exclusivity has no effect when all investments are fully specific to the relationship i e are purely internal exclusivity does matter when investments affect the value of the buyer s trade with other sellers i e have external effects we examine the effects of exclusivity on investments and aggregate welfare and the private incentives of the buyer seller coalition to use it

a note on endogenous firm efficiency in cournot models of incomplete information abstract martin models cournot firms with informational asymmetries on costs to investigate the relation betweenx inefficiency and the number of firms he argues that an increase in the number of competitors decreases firm efficiency we show that his results hold in a complete information model they are due to the implicit assumption of increasing returns to scale we further argue that a setting of adverse selection on cost and of ex post cost observability tends to isolate the intrafirm agency problem from what happens inside the product market leaving firm efficiency unaffected by the degree of competition journal of economic literatureclassification numbers l13 l22 d82

competition risk and managerial incentives this paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers a central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure the main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases as a result of greater product substitutability or greater market size principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs at the same time more intense competition also leads to more volatile firm level profits consequently managers incentives are positively correlated with firm level risk consistent with empirical evidence a decrease in the cost of entering the market has the opposite effect on incentives but still induces a positive correlation between risk and incentives

the learning curve and the yield factor the case of korea s semiconductor industry this article attempts to find out how the korean economy has grown so rapidly in a short time span of less than 30 years for that purpose it focuses on the development of the korean semiconductor industry more specifically the memory chip segment of the industry as a case in point to test the hypothesis that the learning curve effects have been significant in the memory chip industry yield factor the ratio of sellable chips to total chips in a wafer in semiconductor production is used as a measure of the learning progression that is by tracing how the yield factor for each generation of memory chips has increased one is able to see how well the korean chip makers have exploited the learning effects this article improves the learning by doing modelling by introducing a richer set of yield data and the unit of analysis employed throughout the article is at the firm level which is not common in the literature dealing with east asian development as well as the economics of technology thus enha

the yield factor and the learning curve in semiconductor production the role of the yield factor and the learning curve is estimated at the firm level the estimated learning curves for the different generations of semiconductor memory chips are clustered around the 72 per cent type the results are consistent with the persistence of leadership hypothesis an incumbent firm has an advantage over a new entrant in adopting a new technology because it can move quicker down the learning curve

technological leadership and persistence of monopoly under endogenous entry static versus dynamic analysis abstract we build a dynamic oligopoly model with endogenous entry in which a particular firm leader invests in an innovation process facing the subsequent entry of other firms followers we identify conditions that make it optimal for the leader in the initial oligopoly situation to undertake pre emptive r d investment strategic predation eventually resulting in the elimination of all followers compared to a static model the dynamic one provides new insights into the leader s intertemporal investment choice its optimal decision making and the dynamics of the market structure over time we also contrast the leader s investment decisions with those of the social planner

the role of exclusive territories in producers competition reprinted in cartels stephen salant ed the international library of critical writings in economics edward elgar reference collections

efficiency wages and x inefficiencies within most organizations agents may spend time on a variety of tasks productive and redistributive in this paper i derive an optimal multi task incentive scheme under the assumption that agents have limited liability the wage level is shown to increase with an agent s discretion and the organization s profits with multiple agents it is generally not optimal for the principal to fully eliminate distributional conflict within the organization the resulting influence costs constitute a measure of x inefficiency the analysis illuminates the relationship between competition and influence costs emphasizing the role of the organization s production technology

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

the economics of predation what drives pricing when there is learning by doing predatory pricing a deliberate strategy of pricing aggressively in order to eliminate competitors is one of the more contentious areas of antitrust policy and its existence and efficacy are widely debated the purpose of this paper is to formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure our framework encompasses important phenomena such as learning by doing network effects switching costs dynamic demand and certain types of adjustment costs due to its prominent role in legal cases involving alleged predation we examine learning by doing in more detail we first show that predation like behavior arises routinely in our learning by doing model equilibria involving predation like behavior typically coexist with equilibria involving much less aggressive pricing to disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we next decompose the equilibrium pricing condition and develop alternative characterizations of a firm s predatory pricing incentives we finally measure the impact of these incentives on industry structure conduct and performance we show that forcing a firm to ignore the predatory incentives in setting its price can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation like behavior along with the predation like behavior however a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated

how do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a market for inventions competition and intellectual property ip protections are complements in stimulating innovation when ip is appropriable a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate competition among producers the demand side of the market for inventions and competition among inventors the supply side of the market for inventions create incentives to innovate when ip is not fully appropriable markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate firms vertically integrate r d and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to ip this implies that antitrust policy and ip protections are complements

the unilateral incentives for technology transfers predation and deterrence by proxy abstract joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage we find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to deter entry or force exit we determine that with free entry such transfers are profitable and further it may be optimal to predate or deter every firm possible so that a market with many firms can become a duopoly while consumers are harmed by such action production efficiency normally increases sufficiently so that welfare increases

bundling as an entry barrier in this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment we show that bundling is a particularly effective entry deterrent strategy a company that has market power in two goods a and b can by bundling them together make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each the traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry deterrent effect i introduction in this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment we show that bundling is a particularly effective entry deterrent strategy a company that has market power in two goods a and b can by bundling them together make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market bundling allows an incumbent to defend both products without having to price low in each while it is still possible to compete by offering a rival bundle a monopolist can significantly lower the potential profits of a one product entrant without having to engage in limit pricing prior to entry we also show that bundling continues to be an effective pricing tool even if entry deterrence fails or if there is already an existing one product rival a company with a monopoly in product a and a duopoly in product b makes higher profits by selling an a b bundle than by selling a and b independently leveraging market power from a into b and accepting some one product competition against the bundle is better than using the monopoly power in good a all by itself since bundling mitigates the impact of competition on the incumbent an entrant can expect the bundling strategy to persist even without any commitment the traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist see stigler 1968 adams and yellen

anticompetitive financial contracting the design of financial claims this paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product market channels in standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets a firm s use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms we find that in order to deter entry the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky i e equity in contrast to the standard branderlewis 1986 result that debt deters entry the model sheds light on the policy debate on the separation of banking as to whether banks should be permitted to hold equity in firms it also provides an explanation for why venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start up firms

market structure and the efficiency of european insurance companies a stochastic frontier analysis abstract this paper is motivated by the progressive liberalisation of the european insurance market in recent years it uses stochastic frontier analysis to estimate flexible fourier cost functions for european insurance companies separate frontiers are estimated for life non life and composite companies we adopt a maximum likelihood approach to estimation in which the variance of both one sided and two sided error terms is modelled jointly with the frontiers this approach allows us to simultaneously control for the impact of heteroskedasticity on the estimation of scale economies as well as estimating the effect of firm size and market structure on x inefficiency the study draws on standard poor s eurothesys data set of financial reports for the period 1995 to 2001 this provides technical and non technical accounts at year end for life non life and composite insurance businesses in 14 major european countries our estimates suggest that over this period most european insurers were operating under conditions of decreasing costs increasing returns to scale and that company size and domestic market share were significant factors determining x inefficiency larger firms and those with high market shares tend to have higher levels of cost inefficiency

under pressure how the business environment affects productivity and efficiency of european life insurance companies deregulation and widespread economic changes have fundamentally affected the business environment of european life insurance companies over the last decades we apply multi stage data envelopment analysis to identify the impact of the changing environment on productivity and efficiency of european life insurance companies considering a sample of 970 life insurance companies from 14 european countries we show that general economic capital market and insurance market conditions are important drivers of efficiency although we find no technical change in the european life insurance sector we nonetheless observe an efficiency increase in 2002 2013 that leads to an increase in total factor productivity these trends can be explained by more challenging business conditions in the 2000s our results emphasize the need to control for the business environment in cross country efficiency studies

endogenous firm efficiency in a cournot principal agent model abstract in a market of cournot firms managed by agents the degree of firm efficiency is inversely related o the number of firms in the market journal of economic literature classification numbers l22 d23 d43

do managers work harder in competitive industries abstract we analyze the relationship between product market competition and managerial effort in a linear principal agent model firms compete in a differentiated cournot oligopoly we use two competition indexes the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms an increase in competition stemming from a lower degree of product differentiation reduces the optimal level of effort while an increase in competition from more firms has an ambiguous effect an increase in the number of firms reduces increases effort when the degree of product differentiation is low high

from a bundled energy capacity pricing model to an energy capacity ancillary services pricing model in this paper we extend the chilean power generation pricing mechanism with capacity and energy payments to one where ancillary services as as frequency regulation and voltage control are explicitly recognized adequacy and security attributes of the electric system and the public good characteristics of as are set within the payment structure to distribute the financing of as among those who benefit from their provision the contribution to finance the provision of as is determined assessing the value assigned to the system security by each agent following what s an efficient pricing mechanism in the presence of public goods

market power cost reduction and consumer search abstract this paper reconciles two opposing views in the r d and agency literatures about how market power influences incentives to reduce costs i develop a model where consumers search for prices firms set prices and technology is determined endogenously through stochastic investment to show that the relation between market power and cost reduction depends on the context i show that shifts in different parameters induce market power and investment to vary in different ways this view is supported by the ambiguity of the conclusions of the empirical literature on the determinants of r d and productivity growth

exclusive dealing and entry when buyers compete rasmusen et al 1991 and segal and whinston 2000 show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers we show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers is weak under fierce downstream competition if entry took place a free buyer would become more competitive and increase its output and profits at the expense of buyers that sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent anticipating that orders from a single buyer would trigger entry no buyer will sign the exclusive deal and entry will occur this result is robust across different specifications of the game jel k21 l12 l42

forecasting the semiconductor industry cycles by bootstrap prediction intervals in recent years there has been a recognition that point forecasts of the semiconductor industry sales may often be of limited value there is substantial interest for a policy maker or an individual investor in knowing the degree of uncertainty that attaches to the point forecast before deciding whether to increase production of semiconductors or purchase a particular share from the semiconductor stock market in this article i first obtain the bootstrap prediction intervals of the global semiconductor industry cycles by a vector autoregressive var model using monthly us data consisting of four macroeconomic and seven industry level variables with 92 observations the 24 step ahead out of sample forecasts from various var setups are used for comparison the empirical result shows that the proposed 11 variable var model with the appropriate lag length captures the cyclical behaviour of the industry and outperforms other var models in terms of both point forecast and prediction interval

learning by doing organizational forgetting and industry dynamics learning by doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings this paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of flrms pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting we show that forgetting does not simply negate learning rather learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces in particular a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior market dominance and multiple equilibria whereas a model with learning alone cannot

the determinants of firms performance can finance constraints improve technical efficiency this paper analyses the mechanisms through which binding finance constraints can induce debt constrained firms to improve technical efficiency to guarantee positive profits this hypothesis is tested on a sample of firms belonging to the italian manufacturing technical efficiency scores are computed by estimating parametric production frontiers using the one stage approach as in battese and coelli battese g coelli t 1995 a model for technical efficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function for panel data empirical economics 20 325 332 the results support the hypothesis that a restriction in the availability of financial resources can affect positively efficiency 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

managing learning resources for consecutive product generations abstract in this paper we study how a firm should allocate its learning resources when it is concurrently producing two consecutive generations of one product we define learning resources as scarce firm specific resources that a firm allocates towards the improvement of the cost quality or timeliness of its existing products and processes we use empirically tested models for demand substitution and learning curves to formulate this problem and we present our results as propositions with regard to the optimal time at which a firm should direct all its learning resources to the newer product generation depending on the substitution rate of the two product generations the learning rate and the level of cross learning results indicate that learning resources should be managed through a firm wide coordination process that will spread rather than concentrate learning resources not in static but in a dynamic way to ensure continued high returns from these learning resources

firm competition and incentive pay rent seeking at work empirical evidence shows that competition among firms generates steep incentives inside firms incentive pay stimulates productive investments but may generate inefficient rent seeking investments

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

exclusive dealing and entry when buyers compete comment in this paper fm s equilibrium analysis is shown to contain some errors fixing these errors changes their conclusions for some of the cases they consider exclusive deals written between an incumbent and competitive downstream buyers will still often arise in equilibrium thereby block ing efficient entry inefficient exclusion arises to protect industry profits from competition the issue centers on how competition works when upstream firms sell to consumers through two com peting downstream buyers in the case upstream firms can offer downstream buyers two part tariffs the analysis of competition in this setting turns out to be surprisingly subtle and the analysis here should be of more general interest to those modeling competition in vertical settings the particular model fm consider is based on the cost specification in segal and whinston 2000 sect iv in which the incumbent faces a potential entrant that has a lower cost of production but faces some fixed cost of entry two identical downstream buyers compete in prices for final consum ers exclusive deals involve the incumbent offering buyers a fixed compensation for agreeing not to purchase from the entrant fm derive their results under two different assumptions on wholesale pricing upstream firms are required to set linear wholesale prices section i and upstream firms are allowed to offer two part tariff contracts section ii since restricting upstream firms to charge linear wholesale prices to buyers seems inconsistent with assuming the incumbent can offer exclu sive contracts with a fixed compensation in the initial stage and since linear wholesale prices can lead to double marginalization problems the focus in this paper is on the less restrictive case consid ered by fm where upstream firms are allowed to offer downstream buyers two part tariffs 1 in this setting correcting fm s analysis shows that entry arises only when scale economies are not too important and the entrant s efficiency advantage is sufficiently large when either

exclusion via non exclusive contracts we establish that non linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent s contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival the optimal contract we describe is a three part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent s marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities the optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry l exclusion par le biais des contrats non exclusifs nous etablissons que des contrats verticaux non lineaires peuvent permettre a un titulaire d exclure un rival en amont dans un cadre qui ne de pend pas de l exclusivite des contrats du titulaire avec les entreprises en aval ou des limites sur les canaux de distribution disponibles pour le titulaire ou un rival le contrat optimal que nous decrivons est un contrat de rabais en trois parties base sur la quantite pre voyant le versement d une indemnite a un distributeur en aval et un prix de gros marginal inferieur au cout marginal de l operateur historique pour des quantites suffisamment importantes le contrat optimal est robuste si on permet aux parties de renegocier les contrats en cas d entree

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

persistence of leadership in product innovation in a firm model of vertical product differentiation three distinct patterns of market shares emerge as an equilibrium outcome reflecting three distinct strategies in respect of timing of the introduction of new products the main novelty relative to the existing literature on vertical product differentiation lies in the incorporation of learning by doing this assumption generates stability of market share patterns over a sequence of product innovations copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

competition long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms abstract internal reward structures in firms are often integral parts of their culture and are changed infrequently in comparison to decisions about e g prices this paper investigates how this feature of firm organization provides a mechanism through which product market competition affects firms internal efficiency the design of firms internal organization is modeled as a choice of an incentive structure between a principal and an agent with strategic implications for firm s competitive positions on the product market it is shown that contrary to popular beliefs there may be a negative relation between the competitiveness of the product market and effort incentives

testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction evidence from the semiconductor industry abstract the objective of this paper is to test whether firms in the dynamic random access memory dram industry take the intertemporal strategic effect of their contemporaneous output decision on their rivals future output decision into account or whether they precommit themselves to a production plan learning by doing and spillovers are present in this industry and introduce an intertemporal component to firms strategies a simplified version of jarmin s rand j econ 250 1994 441 dynamic oligopolistic model is applied to firm level data demand and pricing relations for five dram generations are estimated the empirical results show that firms behave strategically and price cost margins are likely overestimated in a precommitment specification

the learning curve in the production of semiconductor memory chips the relevance of the learning curve in the production of semiconductor memory chips is examined it is shown that the learning curve differs across quite similar products such as distinct types of memory chips on the other hand the learning curve does not show significant variation over successive generations of the same type of memory chip it is then shown thatthe interpretation given to the heterogeneity of learning by the effects across chip types and especially the importance of economies of scale is consistent with some stylized facts from the industry

endogenous market structures and contract theory delegation principal agent contracts screening franchising and tying abstract i study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous they concern 1 contracts of managerial delegation to non profit maximizers 2 incentive principal agent contracts in the presence of moral hazard on cost reducing activities 3 screening contracts in case of asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers 4 vertical contracts of franchising in case of hold up problems and 5 tying contracts by monopolists competing also in secondary markets firms use always these contracts to strengthen price competition and manage to obtain positive profits in spite of free entry

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

endogenous timing with infinitely many firms abstract a model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit output dominant firm and the cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases at each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one both stackelberg and cournot like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however when the number of leaders is given production at subsequent periods is always prevented and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level

endogenous market structures and strategic trade policy we characterize the optimal export promoting policies for international markets whose structure is endogenous contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for markets with a fixed number of firms it is always optimal to subsidize exports as long as entry is endogenous under both competition in quantities and in prices with homogenous goods the optimal export subsidy is a fraction 1 of the price where is the elasticity of demand the exact opposite of the optimal export tax in the neoclassical trade theory a similar argument can be applied to show the general optimality of r d subsidies and of competitive devaluations to promote exports in foreign markets where entry is endogenous

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

reactive power as an ancillary service this paper addresses the problem of reactive power procurement by an independent system operator iso in deregulated electricity markets a reactive bid structure is proposed in the context of a reactive power market based on the reactive power price offers and technical constraints involved in reactive power planning a two tier approach is developed to determine the most beneficial reactive power contracts for the iso the reactive capability of a generator and therefore the opportunity costs in providing reactive power is also included in the model uncertainty in reactive demand and in reactive bids of participating parties is incorporated through monte carlo simulations and the expected reactive power procurement plan for the iso is hence determined the cigre 32 bus network approximately representing the swedish system is used for the studies

privatisation and x inefficiency a bargaining approach the usual analysis of privatization and x inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort the authors model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers workers dislike effort because it lowers utility firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity public sector firms are assumed to be social welfare maximizers and therefore compared to private sector firms they bargain lower effort levels since they have the interests of consumers and workers at heart the authors model predicts that under certain conditions privatization should raise effort and so lower x inefficiency and that wages may increase or decrease copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

incorporating experience curves in appliance standards analysis the technical analyses in support of u s energy conservation standards for residential appliances and commercial equipment have typically assumed that manufacturing costs and retail prices remain constant during the projected 30 year analysis period there is however considerable evidence that this assumption does not reflect real market prices costs and prices generally fall in relation to cumulative production a phenomenon known as experience and modeled by a fairly robust empirical experience curve using price data from the bureau of labor statistics and shipment data obtained as part of the standards analysis process we present u s experience curves for room air conditioners clothes dryers central air conditioners furnaces and refrigerators and freezers these allow us to develop more representative appliance price projections than the assumption based approach of constant prices these experience curves were incorporated into recent energy conservation standards for these products the impact on the national modeling can be significant often increasing the net present value of potential standard levels in the analysis in some cases a previously cost negative potential standard level demonstrates a benefit when incorporating experience these results imply that past energy conservation standards analyses may have undervalued the economic benefits of potential standard levels

the learning curve and pricing in the chemical processing industries data on 37 chemical products are used to test a number of hypotheses about the learning curve and industrial price behavior the results document a strong and consistent learning effect learning is found to be a function of cumulated industry output and cumulated investment rather than calendar time standard economies of scale appear significant but small in magnitude relative to the learning effect variations in the slope of the learning curve are linked to differences in r d expenditures and capital intensity market concentration is found to be a strong influence on price flexibility and the timing of learningrelated price changes

a bargaining model of farrell inefficiency abstract an enormous number of empirical papers have estimated technical efficiency the distance of firms inside a frontier following the model of farrell farrell 1957 the measurement of productive efficiency journal of the royal statistical society series a 120 3 253 290 we propose a theory that explains the distance these empirical papers seek to measure the theory is based on the idea that workers can bargain low effort high crew sizes etc if they and the firm have some monopoly power we provide simple theoretical expressions for the empirical measures of technical and allocative efficiency and compare them to those in the statistical literature we also consider the relation between competition and efficiency

the impact of a public option in the u s health insurance market we develop a game theoretical framework to examine the implications of the introduction of a nonprofit public option in the u s health insurance market in this model heterogeneous consumers have to choose between two competing insurance plans one plan is offered by a profit maximizing private insurer the other by social welfare maximizing public option in equilibrium the distinct objectives of the two insurers induce adverse selection in consumer choice the public option covers the less healthy consumers yielding the more profitable segment of market to the private insurer however our empirical results suggest that both insurers will capture significant parts of the health insurance market jel i11 l10 l21 l32

an empirical analysis of strategic competition and firm values the case of r d competition abstract we operationalize a firm s competitive strategy through a new empirical measure and develop a framework for empirical analysis of the market value of strategic behavior using this framework we study announcement effects of r d spending the announcing firm s stock prices are positively influenced by a change in spending and negatively by our competitive strategy measure csm competitors stock prices are positively influenced by the interaction between the market s reaction to the announcing firm and the csm our results are consistent with positive effects of accommodating competition with strategic substitutes and nonpositive effects of tough competition with strategic complements

modifying customer expectations of price decreases for a durable product we study the introductory signalling strategy for a durable product that faces optimistic expectations among customers about price declines over time the firm introducing the product knows that experiential learning is low for the product however customers being uncertain about the extent of experiential learning assign a nonzero probability that the firm s new product will enjoy a high cost reduction with cumulative experience the optimistic expectations of customers reduce their willingness to pay a high price at the product s introduction while predisposing them to buying later the challenge facing the low experience firm is to choose an introductory strategy that will credibly convey the low experience curve effect to customers we use the sequential equilibrium concept in a game theoretic framework to identify the firm s signalling strategy we identify the unique separating equilibrium of the game after refining the set of separating equilibria we demonstrate that a high introductory price credibly signals the low experiential learning to customers we also show that signalling causes an artificial learning curve effect

stackelberg competition with endogenous entry i characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first mover advantage and entry is endogenous leaders are always more aggressive than the followers independently from strategic substitutability or complementarity under quantity competition leaders produce more than any follower and i determine the conditions for entry deterrence high substitutability and non increasing marginal costs under price competition leaders set lower prices than the followers the opposite than with an exogenous number of firms in contests leaders invest more than each follower in all these cases a leadership improves the allocation of resources compared to the nash equilibrium with endogenous entry this article studies endogenous market structures where a firm has a first mover advantage in the sense of stackelberg 1934 on the other firms and entry in the market is endogenous the article characterises the equilibrium of these endo genous market structures and provides welfare analysis for some of the applications these market structures emerge in many sectors which are substantially competitive a fringe of firms is ready to enter whenever there is a profitable opportunity but where some incumbent firms have a competitive advantage over the followers because of technological historical or legal reasons or just because entry was not possible at an earlier stage and choose their strategies before them 1 while symmetric models of strategic interactions have been widely studied in the presence of endogenous entry in a marshallian tradition 2 traditional models with incumbent firms facing a competitive fringe of entrants have been mostly limited to the analysis of markets with homogeneous goods and entry deterrence for instance in the theories of limit pricing and of contestable markets baumol et al 1982 more recently vives 1988 has analysed games with sequential entry of multiple firms but without endogenising the entry process see also anderson and engers 1992 1994

investment and financing decisions with learning curve technology abstract the learning curve has a significant impact on production cost hence corporate profit in a number of industries while the learning curve is well recognized in the economics literature and its effect on operating costs and production decisions widely studied its effect on corporate investment has been largely unexplored to our knowledge there is one paper that examines this issue but it is limited to unlevered firms we therefore examine a levered firm s optimal investment and financing choices when using learning curve technology the main findings are as follows the effect of leverage on the investment decision depends on the level of debt using the optimal debt level will result in earlier and larger investment thus leverage has a positive effect on investment overall and the difference between levered and unlevered firm is an increasing function of learning speed the optimal leverage ratio without a borrowing constraint is an increasing function of learning speed with a borrowing constraint the investment decision is similar to the unconstrained borrowing case but the leverage ratio is initially increasing and subsequently decreasing in learning speed moreover it is a decreasing function over a wider range for a more stringent borrowing constraint for decreasing returns to scale technology and for a less volatile product market

investigating the semiconductor industry cycles the aim of this article is to investigate the links between semiconductor sales and various macroeconomic financial industrial variables including inventories equipment orders or semiconductor sector stock index statistical properties of these variables are studied both short run and long run interactions are analysed on the short run our results indicate that relationships often imply feedbacks through the implementation of cointegration analysis we separately identify both sales value and investments in the semiconductor market an impulse response analysis confirms the relevance of our choice of data and stability tests demonstrate that the parameters remain constant during the entire sample the vector error correction models vecms offer a representation respecting cycle theories and market actor analyses

impact of the information asymmetry between managers and owners under oligopoly we show using a hotelling 1929 model with laffont and tirole 1986 firms that under duopoly the information asymmetry caused by the separation of ownership and control has two effects on owners incentives to induce effort information asymmetry raises the marginal cost of inducing effort which decreases efforts and increases prices since all firms prices increase this leads to a change in the expected demand of each firm and thus in the marginal benefit of inducing effort which may amplify or mitigate the initial impact as a consequence information asymmetry may induce some firms to increase efforts and lower prices more surprisingly it may increase both ex post and ex ante social welfare

product market competition and organizational slack under profit target contracts in a framework a la martin 1993 we introduce a common component in the managers private information in order to address three related questions what is the impact of contracts that reward managers on the basis of realized profits on firms productive and allocative efficiency relative to cost target contracts how do these contracts shape the relationship between competition and organizational slack can we then explain the existing evidence of an inverted u shaped relationship between competition and cost reducing activities as documented in aghion et al aghion p bloom n blundell r griffith r howitt p competition and innovation an inverted u relationship the quarterly journal of economics 120 pp 701 728 2005 we show that profit target contracts introduce a horizontal contractual externality between the competing firms that mitigates organizational slack and improves upon productive efficiency relative to cost plus mechanisms moreover when executive compensations are conditioned on profits an inverted u shaped relationship between product market competition and managerial effort obtains finally we also show that when contractual instruments are endogenous i e when shareholders can choose between profit and cost target rules the equilibrium with profit target contracts always exists and is the only one that survives to standard refinements