investment and coordination in oligopolistic industries we examine investment by firms in 24 chemical product industries to determine whether firms invest preemptively to achieve persistent increases in market share or whether there is evidence of behavior to maintain market share the data indicate that investment reduces the probability that rival firms will expand capacity but the effect is temporary large firms tend to maintain market share while smaller firms tend to invest simultaneously with rivals the role of preemptive investment is limited to that of permitting a firm to invest with a lower probability of redundant investment by rivals preemption does not allow a persistent increase in market share but instead acts as a means by which firms may coordinate capacity investment to help avoid episodes of industry overcapacity

an empirical model of capacity expansion and pricing in an oligopoly with barometric price leadership a case study of the newsprint industry in north america the weak form of oligopolistic coordination in pricing and capacity expansion of the north american newsprint industry is examined a dynamic model consisting of demand price and regional capacity equations is estimated for the years 1965 to 1986 the reference price in the industry is hypothesized to be based on either adjusted full cost pricing or mark up over marginal cost pricing neither hypothesis was rejected confirming that either pricing rule better describes industry practices than marginal cost pricing the determinant of mark up levels was the industry operating rate the model also showed that capacity expansion was negatively related to the concentration ratio

how aid targets votes the impact of electoral incentives on foreign aid distribution despite allegations that foreign aid promotes corruption and patronage little is known about how recipient governments electoral incentives influence aid spending this article proposes a distributional politics model of aid spending in which governments use their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate a disproportionate share of aid to electorally strategic supporters allowing governments to translate aid into votes to evaluate this argument the author codes data on the spatial distribution of multilateral donor projects in kenya from 1992 to 2010 and shows that kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favor of copartisan and coethnic voters a bias that holds for each of kenya s last three regimes he confirms that aid distribution increases incumbent vote share this evidence suggests that electoral motivations play a significant role in aid allocation and that distributional politics may help explain the gap between donor intentions and outcomes

on the role of demand and strategic uncertainty in capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics abstract even mature industries seldom settle down into a long run steady state fluctuations in demand disrupt the status quo and call for firms to adjust their capacities on an ongoing basis we construct a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment disinvestment decisions in addition to uncertainty about the evolution of demand a firm faces strategic uncertainty concerning the decisions of its rivals we numerically solve the model for its markov perfect equilibria for one set of parameter values three equilibria exist and while all of them have simple intuitive structures they exhibit widely varying patterns of response to demand shocks at one extreme one firm dominates the industry almost as a monopolist and changes its capacity to accommodate demand at the other extreme the larger firm keeps its capacity nearly constant while the smaller firm acts as the swing producer

exports foreign market structure and profitability in japanese and u s manufacturing this paper examines the influence of price d ecisions by foreign firms on export price decisions by domestic firms the theor etical analysis develops a general model which hypothesizes a positive relation between export price and foreign price assuming international product differenti ation this model further suggests that export price depends on foreign structur al traits as they determine foreign price the empirical analysis based on a cr oss section of sixty nine four digit manufacturing industries matched between th e united states and japan provided support for the hypothesis that foreign mark et structure and foreign pricing affect export pricing and thus the observed pri ce cost margin copyright 1986 by mit press

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

aid policy and growth in post conflict societies countries emerging from civil war attract both aid and policy advice this paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post conflict growth process it is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars and covers 27 countries that were in their first decade of post conflict economic recovery during the 1990s the authors first investigate whether the absorptive capacity for aid is systematically different in post conflict countries they find that during the first three post conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level so ideally aid should phase in during the decade historically aid has not on average been higher in post conflict societies and it has tended to taper out over the course of the decade the authors then investigate whether the contribution of policy to growth is systematically different in post conflict countries and in particular whether particular components of policy are differentially important for this they use the world bank policy rating database the authors find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post conflict societies comparing the efficacy of different policies they find that social policies are differentially important relative to macroeconomic policies however historically this does not appear to have been how policy reform has been prioritized in post conflict societies

an analysis of preemptive behavior in the titanium dioxide industry abstract much of the recent theoretical work on oligopoly theory focuses on preemptive capital expansion this paper continues this work by testing whether dupont s behavior in the titanium dioxide industry was consistent with the capital commitment model between 1972 and 1977 this is different from previous empirical papers analyzing preemptive capital expansion because it focuses on strategic behavior in a specific industry and because the hypothesis tests in this paper are based on a formal model of firms optimizing behavior the results lend support to the conclusion that dupont committed capital to preempt the smallest five firms in the industry between 1972 and 1977

investment interdependence and the coordination of lumpy investments evidence from the british brick industry the brick industry is characterized by regional markets lumpy capacity increments and high fixed costs in such an industry the coordination of rival expansions in capacity can be crucial to the profitability of those expansions evidence from the british brick industry suggests that excess investments are generally avoided but there is little support for existing theories to explain how this is achieved the explanation for how coordination failures are avoided is based on firm heterogeneity the regional dimension to the investment decision and the prospects for and consequences of growth by acquisition

tax aversion in labor supply abstract in a real effort laboratory experiment labor supply decreases more with the introduction of a tax than with a financially equivalent drop in wages this tax aversion is large in magnitude when we decompose the productivity decrease that arises from taxation we estimate that 40 is due to the lower net wage and the remaining 60 to tax aversion this tax aversion affects labor supply more on the extensive margin working less than on the intensive margin being less productive while working the aversion is equally strong whether tax revenue goes to the u s government or back to the experimenter a laboratory tax we discuss the implications of our results for the relationship between labor supply and taxation

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

a comparative analysis of intertemporal behavior of profits japan and the united states this paper first asks whether the working of market forces in japanese manufacturing industries is unique to them or similar to u s counterparts it is found that autoregressive profit equations for 376 japanese firms over 1964 82 are on average similar to those for 413 u s firms over 1964 80 the paper next asks whether the interindustry pattern of profit adjustments in japan is related to industry traits in a manner analogous to the united states in this case specific national differences between the two countries in the effects of imports industry growth and capital intensity on the profit adjustment process are found copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

price reactions to new competition a study of us luxury car market 1986 1997 abstract this paper examines the questions of whether the incumbent responds to entry and which firms respond to entry in an industry by using a data sample of the us luxury car market during the period of 1986 and 1997 the statistical analysis finds that the incumbent s response varies across firms but some group of firms responds to entry similarly in particular this paper finds that the german exporters of luxury cars respond significantly to the entry of a japanese rival in the us market similarly by reducing their prices and mark ups the extent to which they respond to entry become greater as the japanese firm s market share increases the statistical test accepts the hypothesis of the equality of coefficients among the german firms but rejects the hypothesis when both the german and british firms are included in the sample

market growth economies of scale and plant size in the chemical processing industries what factors determine the size of new industrial plants this study uses data on twenty tw o chemical products to test alternative models of capacity expansion including the manne model and a scale frontier model the empiri cal results strongly support the scale frontier model the size of n ew plants increased along a time trend that was unrelated to market c oncentration market growth or the magnitude of investment scale eco nomies entrants typically built smaller plants than incumbents but all firms built plants closer to the technological frontier when smal l plants carried a higher relative cost penalty copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

in pursuit of monopoly power recent quantitative work in industrial economics this paper reviews empirical work in industrial organization devoted to the question of inferring the existence of monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes like profits and prices the discussion covers inter industry work long conventional in the area newer developments in intra industry analysis and case studies and concludes with some remarks on a small but growing body of work assessing market dynamics the wide range of studies reviewed all generally reveal that market power exists in many industries

market structure capacity expansion and pricing a model applied to the japanese iron and steel industry abstract the main objective of this paper is to study empirically the simultaneous and recursive relations between short run pricing capacity decision and fluctuations in the elements of market structure for this purpose a time series industry model was constructed and applied to the japanese iron and steel industry for 1957 1975 the statistical results imply that over time industry market structure especially seller concentration might change endogenously in the system the model also indicated that seller concentration as an element of market structure was a significant determinant of short run domestic and export prices and also had a significant effect on the capacity decisions these findings support the proposition that market structure affects market conduct at any moment in time while it is some degree shaped by past market conduct or behavior and structure

cartel price announcements the vitamins industry abstract the primary manufacturers of vitamins admitted to participating in international market share agreement cartels for several years during the 1990s their announced price increases appeared in leading trade journals we show that price announcements during the cartel period and the lead times before these prices took effect were fundamentally different in character from price announcements when explicit collusion was less likely these differences are consistent with our model of price announcements where we account for the importance to the cartel of buyer acceptance of or resistance to a price increase acceptance avoids costly market share reallocations among members of an explicit cartel logit estimates show that after 1985 the likelihood of a price announcement is largely driven by the length of time between announcements rather than cost or demand factors suggesting that the price announcements after 1985 stem from cartel meetings

international trade and industrial organization this survey reviews recent contributions to the interface between international trade and industrial organization import competition places a substantial limit on domestic market power in the short run competitive conditions can influence the speed and efficiency of a domestic market s adjustment to international disturbances exports effects on competition among national sellers are unclear and depend on the scope for price discrimination models of trade with monopolistic competition explain intra industry trade and also the widely observed sensitivity of firm size to market size exposure to trade also increases the technical efficiency of production diverse policy issues turn on the distinction between national and global welfare and the scope for commitment

firm market share price flexibility and imperfect information this paper argues that firms with larger market shares will be relatively better informed about demand conditions the main implications are 1 more rapid price adjustments in concentrated industries 2 price leadership in industries with dominant firms and 3 price setting behavior by the concentrated side of the market

large company capital formation and effects of market share turbulence micro data evidence from the pims database the possible effect of demand uncertainty on company investment decisions is investigated at the micro level a standard investment function is employed and modified to incorporate demand uncertainty the data comes from the pims data base on business units of large firms in concentrated markets in dynamic panel data estimation significance was found for a variable representing market share turbulence in a number of industries this variable causes a depressing effect on capital investment either on its own or in combination with indicators of vertical integration which indicate insulation from demand uncertainty the results constitute some of the best available evidence that demand uncertainty constraints capital investment

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

import share under international oligopoly with differentiated products japanese imports in u s manufacturing this paper seeks to identify the determinants of the japanese impor t share in the u s market from the assumptions of international oligopoly and internationally differentiated products a theoretical model is developed where import share is considered as a cournot nash equilibrium the relative position of the reaction functions is determined by the previous commitments of both domestic and foreign firms on advertising r d and tangible investment as well as by artificial and natural trade barriers using a sample of twenty four three digit import competing u s industries matched to japanese industries the empirical analysis provides evidence supporting the model s predictions that the relative strategic expenditures and market structures of both partners explain the japanese import share in u s markets copyright 1988 by mit press

lumpy capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries in this paper we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment disinvestment we use our model to suggest answers to two questions first what economic factors facilitate preemption races second what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination with a series of examples we show that low product differentiation low investment sunkness and high depreciation tend to promote preemption races the same examples also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness tend to promote capacity coordination although depreciation removes capacity it might impede capacity coordination finally our examples show that multiple equilibria arise over at least some range of parameter values the distinct structures of these equilibria suggest that firms expectations play a key role in determining whether or not industry dynamics are characterized by preemption races and capacity coordination taken together our results suggest that preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand in hand with capacity coordination in the long run

the roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror this paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries as does the recipient country s level of education due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results they suggest that western democracies which are the main targets of terrorist attacks should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education

progressive taxation in a tournament economy abstract not enough is known about the responsiveness of individuals in particular those who work under different incentives to changes in marginal tax rates we ask whether changes in tax rates are less distortionary for workers engaged in a contest to examine this potential rationale for a more progressive tax code we first model the effort decisions of workers faced with progressive taxation under tournaments and piece rates because of the difficulty identifying any distortion that may be induced by the tax code in naturally occurring data we then report on the results of a real effort experiment based on this model consistent with a behavioral approach to public finance we find that competitive tournament workers are less sensitive and hint in our discussion at the possible welfare benefits of progressive taxation in tournament economies

optimal management of fringe entry over time abstract in this paper we investigate the problem of a dominant company facing entry of a competitive fringe smaller competitor or fringe of smaller competitors we seek to identify pricing and advertising or other promotional strategies that maximize long term profits for the dominant firm under possible reactions of the competitive fringe two main situations are considered the firms in the fringe are price takers but they advertise the firms in the fringe are not price takers and advertise the possibility of a passive reaction in the case of a very small fringe is considered as a particular case we assume that the rate of change of fringe sales is dynamically related to the current sales price and advertising efforts of both the dominant firm and the fringe the higher the dominant firm price the faster fringe entry the higher dominant firm advertising effort the slower fringe entry fringe advertising and pricing may counterbalance these effects formulating a dynamic game with the dominant firm as a leader and the fringe as a follower we present a new methodology for providing time invariant feedback stackelberg equilibrium the methodology relies on finding the relationship between the co state variables and the state variable the equilibrium solution is obtained in an implicit form by solving a set of two backward differential equations to show the applicability of our solution to real situations we use data from the u s long distance market and find optimal decision rules for at t facing the entry of mci and sprint during the 1980 1990 period the feedback equilibrium indicates that while at t s price is decreasing when fringe mci and sprint sales increase the fringe price is increasing at t s advertising is increasing with fringe sales while the fringe s advertising increases and then decreases the comparison with actual behavior indicates that at t has adhered closer to the optimal solution in both price and advertising than the fringe

resolving the commitment versus flexibility trade off the role of resource accumulation lags we examine how time consuming resource accumulation influences the classic strategy trade off between commitment and flexibility in particular using 1975 95 data from the worldwide petrochemical

excess capacity and limit pricing an empirical test entry may be inhibited by expectations that incumbents have lower marginal costs incumbents may be able to use limit pricing or excess capacity to further this expectation we construct an empirical model of oligopoly capacity and pricing decisions and of entrant responses the results support the hypothesis that both lower prices and greater excess capacity inhibit entry they further support limit pricing but provide no evidence that oligopolies deliberately install excess capacity to deter entry the results suggest however that limit pricing firms may exploit the entry inhibiting effects of unintended excess capacity by raising their limit prices

an experimental evaluation of strategic preemption abstract this paper reports the results of a series of two stage two person noncooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other in one of our designs the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption in the other it entails partial preemption the data show that players tend to completely preempt when it is privately optimal however when partial preemption is privately optimal a non trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non preemptive structure this may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively

the investment behaviour of firms in an oligopolistic setting industrial organization theory has identified strategic investment in capacity as an important element in competition in oligopolistic markets in the paper we specify a model of oligopolistic investment behaviour and test it with panel data for 114 firms in 15 narrowly defined uk manufacturing industries in the 1970s and 1980s the industries are distinguished according to their market characteristics as fragmented dominant firm and dominant group sectors the results indicate behaviour which is noncooperative in fragmented sectors cooperative in dominant group sectors and competitive in dominant firm sectors

locating foreign aid commitments in response to political violence following a recent trend towards disaggregation in studies of foreign aid and political violence we evaluate the determinants of foreign aid sub nationally we focus our attention upon political violence as a key subnational determinant of aid commitments and argue that donors commit aid to areas with recent political violence in the hope of ameliorating need and bolstering stability this being the case however we contend not all areas experiencing violence are equally likely to receive aid commitments this is because potential donors are faced with a dilemma balancing risk and reward that leads them to question whether they can effectively deliver aid to areas under conditions of extreme violence we test these two hypotheses and provide confirmation for them in the context of bilateral aid commitments to local areas within sub saharan african states experiencing civil war between 1990 and 2007

when to adopt a service innovation nash equilibria in a competitive diffusion framework abstract we study the optimal timing of adoption of a service innovation that a new entrant firm brings to a market populated by two incumbent firms our analysis is based on a model of competitive diffusion dynamics that extends the monopolistic bass model to include customer churn processes as well as a potential market expansion driven by the innovation we obtain expressions for the time trajectories of the customer bases i e the numbers of customers that use old and new service processes for the competing firms as well as sharper closed form characterizations for the setting with a stable market and homogeneous imitation process in modeling competitive dynamics we consider settings where incumbents anticipate a potential failure of the innovation we use the trajectories for the customer bases to model an optimal adoption response problem faced by one of the incumbent firms when the adoption time for the other incumbent can be anticipated or is pre announced and analyze this problem in the absence of market expansion or intra generational customer churn using the optimal response results we provide the nash equilibrium analysis of the adoption decisions by competing incumbent firms and derive sufficient conditions for the now now now never and never never adoption equilibria we use the trading volume data from the foreign exchange markets to estimate the parameters of the competitive diffusion dynamics for our model and to conduct a numerical investigation of the impact of the uncertainty associated with the success of the innovation on the incumbents nash equilibrium adoption times

multilateral aid and domestic economic interests existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries economic groups such as exporters should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests however economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support international organizations generating the benefits i test my argument using data on aid allocated to the multilateral fund for the implementation of the montreal protocol and the global environment facility and international trade by commodity i find robust empirical support for the argument that when donors domestic economic groups are likely to gain from opportunities created by international environmental organizations programs donor governments increase aid allocations to these organizations

foreign subsidization and excess capacity abstract the u s steel industry has long held that foreign subsidization and excess capacity has led to its long run demise yet no one has formally examined this hypothesis in this paper we incorporate foreign subsidization considerations into a model based on staiger and wolak s 1992 cyclical dumping framework and illustrate testable implications of both cyclical excess capacity and structural excess capacity stemming from foreign subsidization we then use detailed product and foreign country level data on steel exports to the u s market to estimate these excess capacity effects while the full sample results provide evidence of both cyclical and structural excess capacity effects for exports to the u s market these effects are confined to such a narrow range of country product combinations that it is unlikely that such effects were a significant factor in the fortunes of u s steel firms over the past decades

dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs abstract the literature on strategic investment emphasized the case of completely irreversible investment this paper considers an oligopoly model in which investment is reversible and capacity is subject to adjustment costs an n player linear quadratic differential game is analyzed existence and characterization results for perfect equilibrium feedback strategies are provided feedback strategies provide incentives for each player to invest strategically so as to preempt subsequent expansion by rivals a larger set of perfect equilibria is constructed by using memory dependent trigger strategies equilibria of this type are shown to support joint value maximization for some initial states and asymmetric steady states

us food aid and civil conflict we study the effect of us food aid on conflict in recipient countries our analysis exploits time variation in food aid shipments due to changes in us wheat production and cross sectional variation in a country s tendency to receive any us food aid according to our estimates an increase in us food aid increases the incidence and duration of civil conflicts but has no robust effect on interstate conflicts or the onset of civil conflicts we also provide suggestive evidence that the effects are most pronounced in countries with a recent history of civil conflict jel d74 f35 o17 o19 q11 q18 we are unable to determine whether our aid helps or hinders one or more parties to the conflict it is clear that the losses particularly looted assets constitutes a serious barrier to the efficient and effective provision of assistance and can contribute to the war economy this raises a serious challenge for the humanitarian community can humanitarians be accused of fueling or prolonging the conflict in these two countries medecins sans frontieres amsterdam 1

net wage illusion in a real effort experiment in a controlled laboratory experiment subjects had to fold letters in order to earn money while the net income per letter was the same in the three treatments the gross income varied and the tax rate was 0 25 and 50 percent although work incentives should be the same in all treatments subjects worked harder and longer when they were taxed we conclude that this is because of a net wage illusion effect the existence of this effect demonstrates that not only are the tax rate and the tax base of importance for work incentives but the perception of a tax is also important

can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war evidence from a field experiment in post conflict liberia civil war is very common in the develop ing world with harmful welfare effects when it occurs many fear that the devastation wrought by violent conflict destroys social capital impedes economic development and leads to the recur rence of violence paul collier et al 2003 in response donors are injecting large amounts of aid into post conflict countries a significant share of this assistance is spent on community driven reconstruction cdr programs which support the establishment of new local institu tions in order to promote social reconciliation whether this assistance has this effect is how ever largely unknown can brief foreign funded efforts to build local institutions in fact have posi tive effects on local patterns of cooperation we address this question using a randomized field experiment to evaluate the impact of a cdr project in northern liberia the project was funded by the united kingdom s department for international development dfid and imple mented by the international rescue committee irc the project attempted to build demo cratic community level institutions for making and implementing decisions about local public goods this model of support for participatory processes to enhance local public goods provi

group characteristics evolution arising from asymmetric information in asymmetric information problems agents with less information principals or contractors usually take as given the preferences of agents with more information agents or contractees moreover the distribution of characteristics of contractees is supposed to be invariant in this article we consider a mixed framework of asymmetric information adverse selection followed by moral hazard where those two assumptions are excluded specifically the contractor only knows the current distribution of characteristics and the contractees may change them after signing the contract if this improves their welfare thus we find that the asymmetric information problem leads to a group eect changes of characteristics this feedback defines a sequence of temporary equilibria we provide conditions for the convergence of that sequence to a stationary long run equilibrium we also prove that both temporary equilibrium and long run equilibrium coincide with the equilibrium in classical models of adverse selection and the moral hazard problem vanishes in the long run

robust capacity planning under uncertainty the existence of uncertainty influences the investment production and pricing decision of firms therefore capacity expansion models need to take into account uncertainty this uncertainty may arise because of errors in the specification statistical estimation of relationships and in the assumptions of exogenous variables one such example is demand uncertainty in this paper a cautious capacity planning approach is described for solving problems in which robustness to likely errors is needed the aim is to cast the problem in a deterministic framework and thereby avoid the complexities inherent in nonlinear stochastic formulations we adopt a robust approach and minimize an augmented objective function that penalises the sensitivity of the objective function to various types of uncertainty the robust or sensitivity approach is compared with friedenfelds equivalent deterministic demand method using numerical results from a large nonlinear programming capacity planning model it is shown that as ca

investment sequencing in the brick industry an application of grounded theory since the work of george richardson on the problem of investment co ordination the literature has focused on explaining equilibrium in investment games and neglected the problem of how investments are coordinated this paper reports the findings of a case study of the brick industry which used grounded theory techniques to develop a new analysis of investment co ordination our main findings indicate that despite the high cost of excess capacity and the very clear signalling of investment intentions brick firms are reluctant to stand back and delay their own investments when a rival firm is expanding the fact that for the most part excess investment is avoided is explained by reference to firms heterogeneity and constraints to investment

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

aiding violence or peace the impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub saharan africa abstract this paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict we improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using gdp levels of donor countries as instruments a more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing the literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models thereby forcing unlikely i i d structures on the error terms implicitly 1 as a consequence malfunctioning institutions deep rooted political grievances or any other obvious yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away we find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue the continuation probability such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration we do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start the onset probability

more dollars than sense refining our knowledge of development finance using aiddata summary in this introductory essay to the special issue we introduce a new dataset of foreign assistance aiddata that covers more bilateral and multilateral donors and more types of aid than existing datasets while also improving project level information about the purposes and activities funded by aid we utilize that data to provide a brief overview of important trends in foreign aid contributors to this special issue draw on aiddata as well as other sources to analyze aid transparency new donors not previously described or analyzed aid allocation and aid effectiveness our recurring theme in this introductory essay is that aiddata and these initial academic projects refine rather than revolutionize our understanding of aid the database has added significant numbers of new projects dollar amounts donors and details about those projects though there is much more yet to add we worry that aid debates have been driven by too little information and that many claims are based on limited or very poor evidence rectifying these problems will not be instantaneous refining knowledge takes a lot of time and hard work the common feature of the papers in this special issue is their careful attention to nuance and detail in spite of what some recent authors have claimed aid is neither a simple solution nor a sufficient cause of most problems in developing countries its motivations distribution and effects are complex and shifting capturing this complexity requires detailed data careful thought and sophisticated methods that allow scholars to make conditional causal and descriptive inferences 2011 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

how work effort responds to wage taxation a non linear versus a linear tax experiment abstract this is one of a series of experiments by the author testing predictions of the labor supply model that comes from the theory of single period single person utility maximization where utility is a quasi concave function of consumption and leisure and where consumption is assumed a normal good this paper studies how people adjust their work effort in response to a gross wage rate change under a non linear tax system in comparison to a linear tax system the linear tax system is chosen as the hausman equivalent of the non linear system at the starting wage rate the prediction is that work effort will be higher under the linear tax system after the gross wage rate change this experiment supports the theorem the implication is that tax flattening will yield more labor and possibly more tax revenues as wage rates rise