political economic markets perts and pests in food and agriculture j i lyniversity of california berkeley jjept of agricultural and resource economic l working paper al cljdare i lorking paper 0 231 politic eco lic l rxets a d pests i j food l ti achiculture by per ts cordon c rausser ja nlnl tt junot tlon a riii ent st ticn giannini fou 1cl itiol1of ar ricultllrnj econo ll i cs july 11 w

distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure the classic statement of the problem was given by paul samuelson 1954 an optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good mrs mrt however samuelson s formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump sum taxes since this is not generally possible the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system an appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds mcf in the case of samuelson s formula where government is entirely financed with lump sum taxes the mcf would be exactly 1 0 in the traditional view of economists distortionary taxes cause the mcf to be greater than one thus raising the cost of providing public goods in this paper we discuss some cases where the mcf may be less than one we will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes

the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent a theoretical model of deterrence is studied in which the imposition of nonmonetary as opposed to monetary sanctions is socially costly it is therefore desirable that the system of sanctions be designed so that sanctions are imposed infrequently if courts possess perfect information the optimal system is such that sanctions are never imposed all who can be deterred will be but realistically courts information will be imperfect and sanctions will be imposed copyright 1987 by american economic association

promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in austria in most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted two different viewsare presented to explain why the chicagoan view efficient redistribution hypothesis and the virginian view inefficient outcome of political bargaining a vertically structuredempirical model of the austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented

irs as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints the model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models in particular the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative also it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance the government can increase welfare by playing the role of loan shark to people whose borrowing is constrained on the private market

free to trade democracies autocracies and international trade trade relations we address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy in a formal model of commercial policy we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country pairs composed of an autocracy and a democracy we test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990 the results of this analysis accord with our argument democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs t he effects of domestic political institutions on trade policy have long been a source of controversy among social scientists despite the widespread interest that this debate has prompted however remarkably few studies have addressed the links between political regime type and commercial policy 1 most work on the political economy of trade policy that examines institutional factors focuses only on variations in policy among democracies and avoids comparing democracies with other types of regimes moreover many analyses of trade barriers especially those by economists ignore the effects of domestic political

redistributing income back to european community consumers and taxpayers through the common agricultural policy a multiple policy instrument generalization of gardner s surplus transformation curve analysis is applied to an empirical model of the ec wheat sector to compare welfare effects of policy change proposals a production quota support price combination is estimated as the most efficient means of making relatively small transfers from ec agriculture to consumers taxpayers a coresponsibility levy support price combination is estimated as the most efficient means of making larger transfers the importance of accounting for income transfer size distortions in related markets and the structure of markets when comparing welfare effects of policy change proposals is demonstrated

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

the effects of comparable worth in the public sector on public private occupational relative wages if as appears likely comparable worth programs are confined to the public sector the level of publiclprivate relative pay may change and the structure of publiclprivate relative wages within occupations will almost certainly change the nature of these changes will determine the degree to which public wages conform more or less closely to the prevailing wage standard which requires that wages for public jobs be equivalent to wages for similar private sector jobs thus there will be implications for economic efficiency this study analyzes alternative scenarios involving comparable worth in the state and local government slg sector the results suggest that when comparable worth is implemented through special wage increases public sector wages are moved further from compliance with the prevailing wage standard this is because public wages are on average already on a par with privatesector wages however comparable worth tends to provide larger wage increases to those occupations where publiclprivate wages are relatively low and when the payroll budget under comparable worth is fixed at the same size as the payroll budget before comparable worth public wages could be moved closer to compliance with the prevailing wage norm

some neglected social costs of government spending in farm programs economic welfare analyses of farm programs typically assume that the direct social opportunity cost of subsidy payments is one dollar per dollar of government spending recent literature suggests that the marginal opportunity cost of a dollar of u s federal government spending is more likely to be in the range of 1 20 to 1 50 this implies that the net social costs of farm programs that involve government spending are significantly greater than the typical estimates in addition the normative efficiency ranking of alternative policies is sensitive to the marginal opportunity cost of government spending

the economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement this study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient the analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers the socially optimal income redistribution and the social welfare from intervention

efficient income redistribution for a small country using optimal combined instruments abstract in this paper i improve gardner s surplus transformation curve framework by assuming that governments are able to vary many policy instruments simultaneously instead of only one i use my framework to find the combination of the currently used instruments which provides the most efficient income redistribution for the austrian bread grains market comparing the most efficient policy with the actual policy reveals that 464 10 6 austrian shillings were wasted i theoretically compare for a small country the transfer efficiency of every possible pair of the four major agricultural policy instruments floor price production quota co responsibility levy and deficiency payments without considering the marginal cost of public funds mcf deficiency payments cum quota equal to a fully decoupled direct income support is the most efficient policy succeeded by floor price cum quota and floor price cum deficiency payments if the mcf is taken into account the ranking crucially depends on the market parameters the transfer level and the value of the mcf for the austrian bread grains market i empirically demonstrate that given the present support level a fully decoupled direct income support redistributes income most efficiently as long as the mcf is lower than 1 17 beyond this value a floor price cum quota policy becomes more efficient a floor price cum deficiency payments policy is never superior to the floor price cum quota

who learns from what in policy diffusion processes the idea that policy makers in different states or countries may learn from one another has fascinated scholars for a long time but little systematic evidence has been produced so far this article improves our understanding of this elusive argument by distinguishing between the policy and political consequences of reforms and by emphasizing the conditional nature of learning processes using a directed dyadic approach and multilevel methods the analysis of unemployment benefits retrenchment in oecd countries demonstrates that policy makers learn selectively from the experience of others right governments tend to be more sensitive to information on the electoral consequences of reforms while left governments are more likely to be influenced by their policy effects

organized crime corruption and punishment we analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment when bribing costs are low that is badly paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates indeed beyond a threshold further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime

stop and go agricultural policies with a land market this article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers productivity a government objective to insure farmers a minimum parity income an endogenous land rent and diminishing returns on alternative nonprogram crop land uses in this setting acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy although compensated acreage limits are when there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation or buyout program in which high cost producers participate and low cost producers do not copyright 2003 oxford university press

institutional change in the common agricultural policy of the european community the common agricultural policy cap of the european community ec is a complex institutional structure with major effects on world agriculture this study analyzes the cap from a public choice perspective as a case of induced institutional innovation the demand for change is analyzed as a function of a newly enlarged community time consuming decisions unequal distribution of net benefits increasing budget expenditures and rising pressures to renationalize farm subsidies drive the demand for change alternative institutional arrangements respond to these demands which reflect preferences for fairness and equity as well as improved efficiency in the cap

implementing comparable worth a survey of recent job evaluation studies during the 1980 s equal pay for comparable worth has emerged as a major legislative issue especially at the state and local level in the wake of increasing implementation of comparable worth in the public sector efforts have been made to estimate the probable effect of nationwide implementation of comparable worth type legislation on the earnings gap between women and men see for example george johnson and gary solon 1984 these analyses have generally concluded that a comprehensive comparable worth policy would have very little effect on the sex based earnings gap this paper offers alternative estimates of the effect of comparable worth on the male female earnings gap based upon examination of four statelevel comparable worth studies iowa michigan minnesota and washington

the political determinants of international trade the major powers 1907 1990 we test three arguments about the effect of international politics on trade flows the first argument states that trade flows are greater between states with similar interests than those with dissimilar interests the second that trade flows are greater in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads and the third that trade flows are greater between allies we examine trade flows between the major powers from 1907 to 1990 this period provides variation on all three independent variables of interest and allows us to separate the three arguments empirically we estimate a gravity model of trade with the above political variables added our results demonstrate that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad but alliances generally do not even when controlling for polarity of the system

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

federalism opportunism and multilateral trade negotiations in agriculture when federalist nations are signatories to international economic agreements potential problems arise because of the inherent conflicts between federal law and legitimate state interests this paper presents a conceptual framework for analyzing problems surrounding negotiation ratification and implementation of international agreements when federations are signatories the economic model isolates three factors the variance of state net benefits under an agreement individual states opportunity costs associated with the agreement and state supported opportunism as cost increasing impediments to the successful institution of international economic agreements and highlights opportunism containment as fundamental to credible commitments in international agreements

a roll call analysis of the endangered species act amendments public choice economics view legislative process as a transaction in the political market interest groups demand regulation in their favor and lobby lawmakers the lawmakers analyze an assortment of factors and supply legislation to the winning group thereby maximizing their rent from the political market this article examines endangered species act esa amendments from a public choice perspective congressional voting on the esa amendments are assessed using a model based on political incentive and ideology the results show that the lawmakers voting behavior is correlated with their party affiliation ideology and several characteristics of their home state such as number of endangered species proportion of urban population contribution of the natural resources and construction sectors in gross state product and geographical location copyright 2001 oxford university press

honesty is sometimes the best policy this paper examines two central points in the economics of tax evasion if the taxation authorities have reason to believe that tax is being illegally evaded how far should they go in pursuit of the missing income and what roles should thoroughness of investigation and severity of penalties play in the pursuit of that income previous contributions have examined the positive economics of various control instruments on tax payers behaviouri the degree of threat or the level of policing required to enforce truthful reporting and the desirability of different types of policy in terms of tax payers expected utility some writers have investigated the design of sophisticated investigation schemes to maximise expected government receipts or to enforce truthful reporting at low resource cost the approach adopted here is to examine the desirability of various combinations of policy instruments in the context of an explicit model of social welfare it is not self evident that honesty is desirable from the point of view of the government if honesty is desirable it is not obvious that people should be forced to be completely honest and it is not obvious how they ought to be forced the desirability of an economic policy depends on two major issues which are sometimes left submerged the objectives of the government or its agents and the constraints under which such objectives must be pursued the objective is often assumed to be a simple form of ex ante expected utility this is surprising since value systems other than utilitarianism are frequently invoked in the design of tax systems and so it seems reasonable to

why higher punishment may reduce deterrence abstract assuming that the willingness to find a potentially innocent defendant guilty is decreasing in punishments we derive two results deterrence is decreasing when punishments are too high and deterrence maximizing punishments tend to increase in the quality of legal systems

comparative democracy the economic development thesis in comparative politics an established finding that economic development fosters democratic performance has recently come under challenge we counter this challenge with a dynamic pooled time series analysis of a major but neglected data set from 131 nations the final generalized least squares autoregressive moving averages estimates n 2 096 appear robust and indicate strong economic development effects dependent in part on the nation s position in the world system for the first time rather hard evidence is offered on the causal relationship between economics and democracy according to granger tests economic development causes democracy but democracy does not cause economic development overall the various tests would seem to advance sharply the modeling of democratic performance

intervention bias in agricultural policy abstract this paper re examines the motivation for government intervention in agriculture to support farm prices and incomes a model is outlined in which the government has a preference for higher farm incomes but fails to provide farmers with the socially optimal level of price support even when one accepts the government s income redistribution goals as a valid reflection of social preference it is shown that agricultural policy has an intervention bias government price supports generally are higher than would be socially optimal the source of the intervention bias is a time inconsistency in optimal agricultural policy formation caused by the government s inability to precommit to a rule for setting future price support levels simulation results indicate that in some circumstances the intervention bias in agricultural policy can be substantial

infringement of intellectual property rights causes and consequences parallel revolutions in molecular biology and the legal framework that assigns intellectual property rights iprs to plant genetic resources have resultedin the emergence of agricultural biotechnology andthe introd uction of genetically modified gm products into the foodsystem iprs create economic incentives for research andd evelopment by making the innovator the residual claimant of the benefits associatedwith the new technology whereas iprs purport to protect intellectual property full appropriation of the benefits from the innovation is not a given when infringement of iprs i e piracy is profitable rational economic agents compliance with ipr provisions is by no means assured costly monitoring and enforcement are requiredto d eter unauthorized illegal use of the new technology experience from various countries aroundthe worldind icates that ipr enforcement is far from being perfect andmany successful innovations are

social science knowledge and institutional change over the last several decades agricultural economists have made major contributions to our understanding of the impact of advances in natural science knowledge on technical change and of the impact of technical change on economic growth we have also significantly advanced our understanding of the sources of demand for and supply of technical change work carried out within the framework of the induced technical change paradigm has demonstrated that technical change can be treated as largely endogenous to the development process hayami and ruttan 1971 binswanger and ruttan we have made less progress in our attempts to understand the contributions of advances in social science knowledge to institutional innovation or of the contribution of institutional innovation to economic political or social change and our knowledge of the sources of demand for and supply of institutional change remains rudimentary in this paper i suggest an approach to thinking about the sources of demand and supply for institutional change i then proceed to explore the use of social science knowledge and the role of social scientists in the design and evolution of institutional innovations finally i examine the contribution of agricultural economics research and of agricultural economists to the design and evolution of the direct payment approach to farm price and income policy i follow the lead of commons and knight and define institution to include both the behavioral rules that govern patterns of relationships and action as well as decision making units such as government bureaus firms and families the term institutional change will at times be used to refer to both institutional innovation and to changes in institutional performance i

efficient redistribution using quotas and subsidies in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating this paper introduces misrepresentation and cheating into the policy analysis of output quotas and subsidies analytical results show that when cheating occurs output quotas are a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed as well cheating increases the transfer efficiency of output subsidies the result is that an all or nothing choice between quotas and subsidies will generally favor the use of subsidies a combination of quotas and subsidies however usually remains the most efficient means of income redistribution through market intervention a key assumption in agricultural policy analysis is that farmers follow the provisions of the policy instruments in the manner desired by the policy maker or alternatively that it is costless to ensure that farmers do so in reality however farmers may be expected to act opportunistically when faced with an agricultural policy when a production quota is in effect farmers may cheat by overproducing and selling the above quota amount through alternative channels under an output subsidy scheme farmers may report and collect on a greater quantity of production than they actually produced the possibility of misrepresentation and cheating arises because it is costly to determine farmers actions because of this cost farmers are in a position to misrepresent their quantity of production and or to cheat very few studies have incorporated misrepresentation or cheating in theoretical agricultural policy analysis one exception is alston and smith who raise the question of cheating and black market activity in an examination of rationing in an industry with an effective minimum price policy in place studies that deal with farmer opportunism can also konstantinos giannakas is an assistant professor in the department of agricultural economics university of nebraska lincoln murray fulton is director centre for the study of co

the eec s wheat trade policies and international trade in differentiated products comment in a recent issue of the journal de gorter and meilke dgm make an important contribution to our understanding of the impact of the european community s ec wheat policy on world wheat trade they consider the often overlooked fact that the ec has simultaneously imported and exported large quantities of wheat they also distinguish between threshold and intervention prices and incorporate the differing national prices within the ec caused by the green currency system furthermore unlike most other studies dgm consider the fact that wheat is not a perfectly homogenous commodity the heterogeneity of wheat is crucial because ec wheat imports are primarily composed of high quality wheat from north america while ec exports are largely soft or low quality wheat varieties

least cost cheap food policies some implications of international food aid abstract many low income countries pursue cheap food policies in which consumers pay subsidized prices for bread rice and other staples this paper addresses the issue of why different governments select different food subsidy policies using multiple instruments rather than a simple across the board subsidy to provide consumers with access to cheap food it examines the optimal structure of cheap food policies in the context of a partial equilibrium model in which the country may be large in trade and is able to combine import subsidies or tariffs and output taxes or subsidies to transfer income to consumers through the market the model allows for a marginal opportunity cost of government revenues greater than one dollar in addition in the model food aid from overseas may be either given away to the consumer or given to the government for subsequent sale in the domestic market the results indicate that only by happenstance will a country choose to use a pure consumption subsidy or a pure import subsidy to transfer income to consumers in addition an increase in international food aid does not necessarily lead the government to reduce producer and consumer prices for a commodity

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

the grain sector of the european community policy formation price determination and implications for trade a coresponsibility levy was added to high domestic prices and export subsidies in the ec levels for policy instruments could result from negotiations which favor producers but are acceptable to the public higher domestic prices and levies but lower export subsidies would occur if levy exemptions cover domestic marketings if exemptions are excluded low domestic prices producer subsidies and export taxes would occur with exemptions improved farm income and treasury surpluses would be achieved without injury to the public exemptions might be excluded because producers are better off and public cost is about the same with either program but producer subsidies require expanded public financing export reductions would occur under either program given prevailing market conditions

endogenous supranational policy decisions the common agricultural policy of the european community the analysis of the supranational ec decisions on the cap indicates that they are endogenous and could largely be explained by past income growth and the development of budgetary expenditures prevailing at the time of the price decisions the empirical results corroborate the hypothesis that monetary compensatory amounts are integral part of common price decisions agricultural income growth could be explained by past price policy decisions whereas budget expenses are determined by u s world market prices and the exchange rate of the ecu against the u s

national interests and the cap abstract development of the cap is heavily circumscribed by differing national interests reflecting the usual agricultural policy conflicts between different regional and sectoral interests but as a supranational policy with principles of community preference and common financing the cap also redistributes the burdens and benefits of agricultural support between member states the implications of these features of the cap with reference to specified alternative policies are explored and conclusions drawn the conflict between national and supranational interests is inadequately reflected to decision makers the single instrument of price support at a common level is inadequate to meet a mix of differing national objectives and the assumption that the common policy serves unification and integration of the community may be incorrect

partial market liberalization and the efficiency of policy reform the case of the european dairy sector this article analyzes the efficiency of partial market liberalization and policy reform with an application to the european dairy sector in a second best world partial moves toward market liberalization are not always efficiency improving we develop a general equilibrium model to investigate the efficiency implications of discrete changes in government policy the analysis covers price and quantity instruments used in both domestic and trade policy we derive simple conditions under which partial market liberalization is efficiency improving we apply the approach to agricultural policy reform in the european dairy sector and identify market liberalization scenarios that are not efficiency improving

judging agricultural policies a survey this survey provides a structured picture of 40 years of literature which uses welfare economic tools to judge agricultural policy challenges and developments of normative agricultural policy analysis are discussed in an easily accessible graphical framework it is shown how the literature has gone from examining a very small discrete set of simple policies to a much broader often continuous set of policies that combine policy instruments simultaneously the importance of the pareto criterion used to explore the limits of how government can affect welfare is revealed moreover given the importance of the objective of income redistribution in agricultural policy agricultural economists have often departed from the purely efficiency oriented tradition in economics it is shown that they have tried to incorporate equity considerations by either adding these criteria as constraints to the social welfare function or directly incorporating these criteria in the functional form of the social welfare function

efficient redistribution through commodity markets efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention the implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs the results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient given the political power of interest groups

collateral damage trade disruption and the economic impact of war abstract conventional wisdom in economic history suggests that conflict between countries can be enormously disruptive of economic activity especially international trade we study the effects of war on bilateral trade with available data extending back to 1870 using the gravity model we estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of wars on the trade of belligerent nations and neutrals controlling for other determinants of trade as well as the possible effects of reverse causality we find large and persistent impacts of wars on trade national income and global economic welfare we also conduct a general equilibrium comparative statics exercise that indicates costs associated with lost trade might be at least as large as the conventionally measured direct costs of war such as lost human capital as illustrated by case studies of world wars i and ii

gender wage discrimination methodological issues and empirical results for a canadian public sector employer a methodology for testing the statistical significance of wage discrimination is presented from two perspectives first the question of whether or not wage discrimination is present and second the question of whether or not wage discrimination is of sufficient magnitude to make a statistically significant contribution to the earnings advantage of the majority group using this methodology the total effect of within occupation wage discrimination against females at a large canadian public sector employer is estimated to be statistically insignificiant at the same time occupational femaleness has a negative effect on female earnings so that a pay equity programme is estimated to reduce the earnings advantage of males at this employer by 27 37

the kantian peace the pacific benefits of democracy interdependence and international organizations 1885 1992 the authors test kantian and realist theories of interstate conflict using data extending over more than a century treating those theories as complementary rather than competing as the classical liberals believed democracy economic interdependence and international organizations have strong and statistically significant effects on reducing the probability that states will be involved in militarized disputes moreover the benefits are not limited to the cold war era some realist influences notably distance and power predominance also reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict the character of the international system too affects the probability of dyadic disputes the consequences of having a strong hegemonic power vary but high levels of democracy and interdependence in the international system reduce the probability of conflict for all dyads not just for those that are democratic or dependent on trade

rationalizing agricultural export subsidies export subsidies are an important form of agricultural policy especially for large traders such as the united states and the european community a number of small countries also use export subsidies in effect e g saudi arabian wheat or canadian dairy products in that the domestic price is set well above world levels and surplus production is dumped onto the world market a number of recent contributions to trade theory have argued that export subsidies can be welfare enhancing for the subsidizing country and by implication that the policy choice is consistent with the hypothesis that a benevolent government is pursuing pareto efficiency in the present paper we examine these arguments and present an alternative explanation of export subsidies utilizing the concept of efficient redistribution becker gardner 1983 in standard trade models arguments in favor of global export subsidies arise from failure to exploit market power in another good itoh and kiyono feenstra itoh and kiyono use a threegood model to show that subsidies on marginal goods defined as goods not exported at all or exported in small quantities can increase welfare in the subsidizing country a subsidy on marginal goods causes their production to increase and the supply of nonmarginal goods to decrease thereby raising the price of the nonmarginal goods and increasing the exporter s terms of trade feenstra also employs a threegood model and demonstrates that it is possible for the pattern of substitutability and complementarity across goods to allow subsidies to increase welfare the necessary condition is that the subsidized export be a stronger substitute for another exported good or a stronger complement for an imported good in the subsidizing country than abroad the export subsidy increases welfare by improving the terms of trade in the other imported or exported good the distortion in feenstra s model is the failure to exploit market power in the second or third market as an alternative to global export subsidies abbott paarlberg and sharples aps have examined targeted export subsidies and found that in some circumstances they can be welfare improving dutton later showed the aps result arises because they first constrain the export tax to the rest of the world to be zero so that it becomes theoretically possible for the best export tax to the targeted country to be negative the aps result hinges on differences in import demand elasticities and the exporting country s use of market power in order to price discrim

clear and clean the fixed effects of the liberal peace in their article in this issue donald p green soo yeon kim and david h yoon claim contrary to liberal theory and extensive evidence that neither joint democracy nor economic interdependence significantly reduces the frequency of militarized interstate disputes in pooled time series analyses when dyadic fixed effects are taken into account similarly their fixed effects analyses contradict theory and previous evidence that democracies have higher levels of trade with one another than do other types of states our reexamination however refutes both claims and reinforces previous findings their fixed effects analyses of disputes produces distorted results because they consider a relatively short time period 1951 92 in which variation in the binary dependent variable and the key independent variables democracy and trade is limited when we analyze a longer period 1886 1992 the results confirm liberal theory the differences between our analyses of bilateral trade and those of green kim and yoon primarily arise from a seemingly minor methodological decision a more reasonable method confirms that democracies do have higher levels of trade than expected on purely economic grounds though we do not advocate a fixed effects model for analyzing these data and have serious reservations about its general usefulness our findings provide additional confirmation of liberal theories of international relations

the impact of leadership turnover on trading relations between states we test how domestic political institutions moderate the effect of lead ership turnover on relations between states deriving hypotheses from recent theo retical work bueno de mesquita et al and mcgillivray and smith we examine how leader change affects trading relations between states using dyadic trade data con sistent with hypotheses we find that large winning coalition systems such as democ racies are relatively immune from the vagaries of leadership change in such systems trade remains relatively constant whether leader change occurs or not in contrast when winning coalition size is small as in autocratic states leadership change pro foundly alters relations causing a decline in trade finally we examine instances of poor relations measured by a significant decline in trade compared to historical lev els as predicted instances of poor relations are less common between pairs of democ racies than other dyadic pairings further leadership turnover in autocratic systems restores trading relations between states the effect of leadership change in democ racies is much less pronounced since first drafting this article the united states has invaded iraq and deposed its leader saddam hussein for more than a decade iraq experienced harsh economic sanctions with hussein s removal these sanctions have been lifted and iraq is in the processes of being reinstated into the international community although it was the iraqi people who bore the costs of the sanctions the sanctions were aimed at hussein s regime with hussein removed the prospects for improved relations between iraq and western states look strong while iraq offers an extreme example this article assesses how the turnover of leaders affects relations between states as measured by trade flows in partic ular drawing on recent theoretical developments we examine how domestic insti tutions and leadership turnover affect dyadic trade flows consistent with the theoretical arguments we find that trade flows between states depend on the inter action of institutions and leader turnover

from senators to the president solve the lumber problem or else we use key events associated in the two decade long u s canada softwood lumber trade dispute to present the dynamic relationship between u s congress and the administration in the formation of international trade policy we find that the executive branch of the u s government responded quickly to several letters from a group of u s senators demanding a solution to the lumber problem a roll call analysis is used to identify factors influencing senators willingness to sign these letters and pressure the president on behalf of the u s lumber industry the results show that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a senator s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a senator less likely to sign these letters

agricultural policies in the presence of distorting taxes this article analyzes how distortionary factor taxes affect the welfare impacts of production subsidies production quotas acreage controls subsidies for acreage reductions and cash transfers to farmers pre existing taxes substantially raise the costs of all these policies these additional costs reflect the welfare losses from financing certain policies by distortionary taxes they also reflect interactions with factor markets caused by changes in the costs of producing agricultural output previous studies ignore the latter types of effect consequently they significantly overstate the costs of production subsidies and understate the costs of production quotas acreage controls and subsidies for acreage reductions

a general equilibrium model of crime and punishment abstract a model of crime and punishment is developed where individuals who differ in their earnings abilities choose between work and crime taking the probability and consequences of punishment into account an aggregate relationship between the probability of punishment and the level of crime is derived there is also a relationship between enforcement spending the number of criminals and the number punished in such an economy the possibility of multiple equilibria and the effects of changes in enforcement spending and in inequality on the levels of crime and punishment are discussed there is also discussion of social welfare and voting behavior

policy design and conservation compliance on highly erodible lands we develop a game theoretic model of heterogeneous producers in order to identify the economic determinants of producer noncompliance with the conservation provisions of the united states department of agriculture usda policy on highly erodible lands we evaluate the policy effectiveness in inducing compliance and adoption of conservation practices the current policy design creates economic incentives for all noncompliant producers to masquerade as adopters and to claim government payments for which they are not entitled both theoretical and empirical results indicate that the increased income transfers to agriculture enacted under the latest farm bill will increase producer compliance and conservation activity on highly erodible lands

the intergovernmental network of world trade igo connectedness governance and embeddedness membership in certain intergovernmental organizations igos such as the world trade organization has long been argued to stimulate trade yet evidence linking igos to trade is mixed the authors argue that identifying the influence of igos requires attention not only to the institutions igos enact but also to the network through which they enact them this approach allows them to demonstrate that trade between two countries increases by an average of 58 with every doubling of the strength of igo connection between the countries they also contribute to debates regarding the mechanisms through which structural relationships influence economic behavior by showing that substantial trade benefits occur not only through economic igos but also through igos that were formed for social and cultural purposes and that connections through igos that are organizationally strong have more impact than those through minimalist igos

the eec s wheat price policies and international trade in differentiated products several features of the ec wheat market are analyzed including the imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic supplies the simultaneous import and export of wheat and the distinct impact of threshold versus intervention policy prices in theory the impact of ec price policies on wheat consumption and net trade are found to be indeterminate a priori empirical results show that intervention prices have a positive impact on ec net exports while increases in threshold import prices have decreased ec net wheat exports competing wheat exporters would prefer the ec to lower the intervention price to world levels but maintain threshold prices

the optimal use of fines and imprisonment abstract this paper examines the use of fines and imprisonment to deter individuals from engaging in harmful activities these sanctions are analyzed separately as well as together first for identical risk neutral individuals and then for two groups of risk neutral individuals who differ by wealth when fines are used alone and individuals are identical the optimal fine and probability of apprehension are such that there is some underdeterrence if individuals differ by wealth then the optimal fine for the high wealth group exceeds the fine for the low wealth group when imprisonment is used alone and individuals are identical the optimal imprisonment term and probability may be such that there is either underdeterrence or overdeterrence if individuals differ by wealth the optimal imprisonment term for the high wealth group may be longer or shorter than the term for the low wealth group when fines and imprisonment are used together it is desirable to use the fine to its maximum feasible extent before possibly supplementing it with an imprisonment term the effects of risk aversion of these results are also discussed

non point source regulation a self reporting mechanism abstract information feasible regulatory mechanisms that do not require the regulator to acquire firm level information have been proposed long ago for stochastic non point emission problems these mechanisms do not take polluter cooperation and firm entry exit incentives simultaneously into account nor are these issues addressed in an informationally efficient way in this paper we propose an informationally feasible self reporting mechanism that is robust to cooperation among polluters while giving participating firms correct abatement incentives as well as giving entry exit incentives that are correct to a first order approximation

eu agri environmental programs and the restaurant table effect the share of agricultural area enrolled in eu agri environmental programs varies significantly between eu member states these national differences are explained based on a model that reflects both that these programs internalize externalities and the political economy we identify six factors that affect the extent to which agri environmental programs are implemented environmental benefits opportunity costs of participation budgetary pressure the share of program expenditures financed by the eu the political weight attributed to farmers at the national and the political influence of each country at the eu level in addition we demonstrate that if the policy decision making process is noncooperative at the eu level countries that contribute less to the eu budget will ceteris paribus implement more programs using data of four years and feasible generalized least square methods we are able to confirm our theoretical results including a noncooperative behavior of eu member states

maginot line of european farm policies as the european community has increased it s level of self sufficiency in agriculture it has moved from being an importer of many agricultural commodities to being an exporter as a consequence countries that were formerly exporters to the community now find themselves competing in third markets with subsidised exports from the community they may well conclude as have numerous west european scholars that the common agricultural policy cap no longer serves the interests of community agriculture or its political relations with the rest of the world it is expensive and cumbersome to operate protection is too high and unbalanced commodity expenditures are poorly allocated and their redistributive effects aggravate inequalities in the final analysis rather than being a unifying institution within the community the cap in its present form threatens the political equilibrium of the community and endangers the international trading system

germany and the cap a bargaining model of ec agricultural policy formation a bargaining model of ec agricultural policy formation is formulated the model allows for more explicit consideration of political factors than is possible in standard political economy models it shows how the political system in germany has increased the power of german farm interests relative to farm interests elsewhere in the ec the paper recognizes cap negotiations are an on going process results of the previous bargaining round form the basis for the current round and give momentum to price changes understanding this momentum provides insight into the fluctuating price supports that have characterized the cap