the impact of divided government on legislative production it seems obvious that divided governments should produce less legislation than unified governments yet studies have consistently failed to find such an effect because almost all existing studies focus on the experience of the u s national government the data have limited analysis to a consideration of executive legislative division and ignore the impact of division between bicameral chambers the state level data set employed in this study is not so limited the results show that divided legislatures decrease the production of laws by almost 30 nonetheless consistent with previous studies using national level data executive legislative divisions have no impact of legislative production the reason for this asymmetry is theoretically motivated additional hypotheses of interest are also tested including whether republican controlled legislative chambers are more conservative than democratic chambers in the sense of producing fewer laws than their democratic counterparts

the china model withering institutional roots of china s local developmentalism china s new development wave since the mid 1990s is distinguishable by its strong urbanism urban governments particularly at municipal and county levels rushed to build industrial parks urban l

explaining metropolitan housing price differences abstract housing prices differ substantially among metropolitan areas the rent and house price indexes used here measure this variation among 54 metropolitan areas a model of metropolitan housing price determination is presented and used to identify the sources of intermetropolitan price variation reduced form equations explain close to 90 of the variation in rental prices and close to 60 of the variation in house prices

evaluating restrictive measures containing housing prices in china a data envelopment analysis approach this paper establishes and evaluates the efficiency of three restrictive measures adopted by the government to contain housing prices restricted bank loan xiandai restricted sale price xianjia and restricted housing purchase xiangou based on the data envelopment analysis non controllable variable model the efficiency of the three measures to mediating housing prices among 35 major cities are examined it is found that xiangou is more efficient than xianjia and xiandai to achieve stabilising goals in the housing market the findings of this research could provide the government with a benchmark to estimate the possible outcome of different restrictive measures containing property prices in the context of the global overflow of liquidity over the past decade

residential construction using the urban growth model to estimate housing supply abstract this article presents an empirical model of housing supply derived from urban growth theory this approach describes new housing construction as a function of changes in house prices and costs rather than as a function of the levels of those variables which previous studies have used empirical tests support this specification over the leading alternative models our estimates show that a 10 rise in real prices leads to an 0 8 increase in the housing stock which is accomplished by a temporary 60 increase in the annual number of starts spread over four quarters

the impact of land use planning and tax subsidies on the supply and price of housing in britain this article presents new empirical estimates of the impact of two types of policy intervention tax subsidies and land use planning on the housing market in britain the estimates are derived from a set of models representing the demand and supply sides of the market for the new private housebuilding which include an explicit land supply element the models are fitted to cross sectional data at the inter urban local authority level and then employed in medium period simulations of alternative policies modelling at this level enables estimates to be made of the extent of variation between local markets in the elasticity of supply and also in the impacts of policy measures including the capitalisation of tax subsidies

convergence and spillover of house prices in chinese cities abstractthe issue of house price convergence in 34 chinese cities is investigated we augmented the convergence model with contemporaneous spatial dependence in house prices and found that price convergence and positive spatial spillover are both present we explicitly addressed the endogeneity problem by introducing a bayesian instrumental variable setup which was estimated with particle filtering techniques from a growth poles perspective the empirical evidence indicates that the spread effect in regional house prices outweighs the backwash effect the identified positive spatial spillover has two effects on the growth of house prices in chinese cities first the spillover elevates the trajectories of the steady state growth paths of house prices second the spillover narrows the gaps between the growth paths of house prices in neighbouring cities shocks to the socio economic variables of a city generate their own effects on domestic house prices that dominate the effects arising from cross city p

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

home or overseas an analysis of sourcing strategies under competition motivated by the recent backshoring trend this paper studies a sourcing game where competing firms may choose between efficient sourcing e g sourcing from overseas and responsive sourcing e g sourcing from a home country efficient sourcing usually provides a cost advantage whereas responsive sourcing allows a firm to obtain more accurate demand information when making procurement decisions by characterizing the equilibrium outcome we find some interesting results driven by the strategic interaction between the firms first a firm may still use efficient sourcing in equilibrium even when the cost advantage associated with efficient sourcing does not exist this is because the firm can dampen competition by reducing the correlation between its own demand information and the competitor s second a cost hike in efficient sourcing e g the rising labor cost in asia may benefit all the firms in the industry the reason is that the cost hike may alleviate competition by inducing a new equilibrium sourcing structure this paper also sheds some light on the recent backshoring trend first our analysis indicates that more firms will shift from efficient sourcing to responsive sourcing in equilibrium i e backshore if the market size shrinks the demand becomes more volatile or the sourcing costs rise simultaneously second a firm s backshoring behavior reduces the competition on the cost dimension but it also has an ambiguous informational impact on the other firms in the market in particular some firms may benefit from increased correlation of their demand information under cournot competition with substitutable products overall the backshoring behavior can be beneficial to all the firms sticking to their original sourcing strategies under certain conditions this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain the importance of material flow management for a profit maximizing firm has been well articulated in the supply chain literature we demonstrate in our analytical model that a firm must also actively manage information flows within the supply chain which translates to controlling what it knows as well as what its competitors and suppliers know in our model of horizontal competition between an informed and an uninformed firm with a common upstream supplier material and information flows intersect through leakage of demand order information to unintended recipients as a result the informed firm s drive to control information flows within the supply chain can trigger operational losses through material flow distortion these losses can be so severe that the firm may prefer not to acquire information even when it is costless to do so our results underscore the importance of strategic information management actively managing the supply chain s information flows and making trade offs with material flows where appropriate to maximize profits

when fiscal recentralisation meets urban reforms prefectural land finance and its association with access to housing in urban china by retrieving household level information from 127 938 household heads and fiscal data from 177 prefectures located in eastern and central china this research quantifies the net association between land finance and urban housing tenure while the results demonstrate that in 2005 china s urban housing market remained stratified and simultaneously favoured individuals possessing economic political and human capital the key finding is that net of other household and prefecture level effects land finance is significantly and negatively associated with local homeownership moreover both the demand and supply sides of the urban housing market contribute to such net association by demonstrating the internal links between urban housing and local finance this research not only provides a more holistic view of housing stratification during institutional changes but also lends empirical support to conceptual frameworks that explain a territory based coalition between local governments and selective enterprises

being a leader or a follower this paper deals with the analysis of conflicts in duopoly situations in particular with the distribution of roles in the von stackelberg framework which firm will be the leader which firm the follower under what circumstances will firms find a mutually advantageous distribution of roles will they fight for leadership or followship in von stackelberg s analysis of duopoly either firms do not choose their respective roles or they fight for leadership this situation is due to the particular strategy space namely the quantity to produce of an homogeneous good we extend here the strategy space to price quantity pairs we show that if costs are identical or similar then both firms will prefer the role of follower if there is a significant cost differential between the firms then the non cooperative equilibrium can only be of two types either the less efficient firm will act as the leader selling a limited quantity at a low price and the more efficient firm as the follower selling to the residual demand at a higher price or the more efficient firm acting as leader will drive the less efficient firm out of the market by adopting a limit pricing strategy but in so doing that firm makes less profits than if it acts as follower we suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect that firms in a duopoly framework will tend to coordinate on their mutually advantageous role distribution even if they compete in a non cooperative strategic way in terms of both prices and quantities

simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution abstract under the decision rule specified by kandori mailath and rob 1993 kandori m mailath g j rob r 1993 learning mutation and long run equilibria in games econometrica 61 29 56 myopic adjustment can lead to surprising results including coordination on strictly dominated strategies we show that under an alternative decision rule convergence to nash equilibrium is guaranteed moreover if rare mutations are introduced risk dominant equilibria always correspond to long run equilibria

endogenous price leadership and the strategic acquisition of information we model a differentiated bertrand duopoly in which a firm s earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading in such a setting with second mover advantage we then study the firms incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game both i neither firm acquiring information and ii one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome even if information is free information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition

more neighbors more efficiency abstract this paper considers a finite population of agents located within an arbitrary fixed network every agent plays a coordination game with his neighbors if one neighbor s payoff from a specific interaction exceeds his average payoff per interaction the neighbor is perceived as better performing over time agents imitate the strategies of their better performing neighbors occasionally they make mistakes sufficient conditions for emergence of pareto efficient and risk dominant conventions are provided the paper also illustrates the main results through relevant examples

urban land and housing markets in the punjab pakistan well functioning urban land and housing markets are critical success factors for achieving robust economic growth this paper provides an overview of urban land and housing market performance in punjab province of pakistan it describes the characteristics of well functioning markets and argues that the punjab s present markets are not performing adequately in fact there exists a range of impediments to efficient urban land and housing market performance excessive public land ownership inadequate infrastructure services weak property rights pervasive public and private sector rent seeking counter productive urban planning policies and regulations costly sub division and construction regulations limited financing for property development and acquisition rent controls and inadequate property tax based revenue generating mechanisms the paper concludes by suggesting that a prioritised comprehensive reform agenda is needed to improve urban land and housing market performance in punjab province the

a two stage model of research and development with endogenous second mover advantages this paper describes a simple two stage model of research and development in which the winner of the research stage has the option of moving first in the development stage some unexpected results emerge in equilibrium the leader in the development stage invests less than each follower and is consequently least likely to collect the patent moreover the leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers thus there are endogenous second mover advantages using a game of timing in which the identity of the stackelberg leader is determined to link the two stages i find that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage although the leader invests less than each follower in the research stage as well the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the complete two stage game than does each follower the equilibrium is inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research is completed and the time at which development is begun and because aggregate investment is inefficiently asymmetrically distributed across firms

barometric price leadership abstract barometric price leadership refers to situations in which a price leader acts as a barometer of prevailing market conditions for other firms in the industry in this paper a model of price setting with costly information acquisition is analyzed it is shown that the unique equilibrium outcome is for one firm to acquire information and become a price leader while the other firm does not purchase information and becomes a follower in contrast to most previous work leadership in this model is due to the informational setting not the price setting mechanism as with symmetric information the unique outcome is the symmetric bertrand equilibrium

reforming china s institutional environment for urban infrastructure provision summary rapid urbanisation in the reform period has resulted in a very high demand for basic urban infrastructure in china improving its provision by the public sector is a challenge as problems persist in the form of unmet demand de ciencies in cost recovery and inadequate maintenance institutional hurdles particularly the lack of organisational and nancial autonomy for the providers of urban infrastructure are in part to blame urban construction authorities have yet to rid themselves of political interference and overlapping responsibilities but measures have been taken to reform the institutional environment speci cally increasingly decentralised central local scal relations are allowing municipalities an unprecedented degree of freedom for resource mobilisation through a wide range of mechanisms that greatly expand extra budgetary revenue a case study of shanghai s reform efforts shows that results can be immediate and promising

second mover advantage and price leadership in bertrand duopoly we consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated product bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs we generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and or complements dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions we show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first mover advantage for the linear version of the model we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance the analysis yields as the unique equilibrium outcome sequential play with the low cost firm as leader

the effects of congressional appropriation committee membership on the distribution of federal research funding to universities i introduction in 1994 members of the republican party pledged to seek legislation to impose term limits on members of congress this pledge stemmed from the popular belief that senior members of congress tend to promote personal interests or are more influenced by lobbying efforts that may not be representative of their constituents today term limits continue to be discussed but have not been enacted instead many members have focused their energies toward minimizing the time spent on any particular committee of congress believing that tenure on a committee is a more serious concern than simple tenure in congress implicit in these concerns is the issue whether as incumbent politicians plan to retire they will behave differently and if so whether tenure on a congressional committee exacerbates this behavior this article explores the role of membership on the appropriations committee on the distribution of federal research funding to universities specifically it explores whether funding is diverted to these universities because politicians use their position on a committee to promote personal or constituent interests previous research on shirking compares the voting records of politicians on certain issues with demographic and economic characteristics of the politicians constituents this article explores the issue of shirking differently i explore how membership on congressional appropriations committees affects the distribution of federal research funding to universities i look at two types of relationships between the members and the universities first i consider the relationship between members and the universities that are located in the members districts states in the case of senators second i examine the relationship between members and their undergraduate alma mater i use district representa tion to proxy favoritism that reflects a politician s constituents given that in most instances an alma mater affiliation is not the same as district representation i use alma mater affiliation to proxy favoritism that reflects the politician s personal interests federal research funding accounts for more than 60 of research funding received by research universities previous research has shown a positive impact of federal funding on research outcomes see adams and griliches 1998 arora and gambardella 1997 connolly 1997 payne and siow 2002 and payne 2001 except for payne and siow 2002 however these articles do not consider that political diversion of funds may promote or detract from research productivity as with any other federal program this article concentrates on the impact of membership on the house and senate appropriations committees because they wield the greatest power in the allocation of funding 1 using a panel data set spanning 26 years i explore how changes in the composition of the appropriations committees affects the distribution of research funding after controlling for the heterogeneity that exists across different universities the results suggest that both district representation and alma mater affiliation matter thus there is evidence of shirking for personal interests and evidence of members representing their constituents with respect to the representation of one s constituents the strongest results suggest that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities however only benefit from representation in the senate with respect to alma mater affiliations the results suggest again that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities also benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees the results also suggest that the tenure of the member on the committee matters as does whether the member is a part of the majority party in power in the congressional chamber

endogenous sequencing of firm decisions abstract when firms are symmetrically informed a stackelberg leader prefers to be leader rather than a cournot duopolist however when the leader has superior information about demand the leader may earn lower ex ante profits than it would earn if it was choosing quantities simultaneously with the follower in this paper i give the firm with superior information the option of delaying its quantity decision until the decision period of the less informed firm so that decisions are made simultaneously surprisingly in the unique stable outcome the informed firm moves first regardless of its private information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82 l10

von stackelberg and cournot duopoly choosing roles under what circumstances will firms agree on the choice of roles of leader and follower in the von stackelberg duopoly model a key determinant is the slope of the firms reaction function in either price or quantity space the duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles if they have downward sloping reaction functions each will prefer to be the leader they will also disagree if they have upward sloping reaction functions and similar profit functions each will prefer that the other be the leader preferences between von stackelberg and cournot outcomes are also considered

imitation local interactions and efficiency abstract we consider a circular city model as in ellison ellison g 1993 learning local interaction and coordination econometrica 61 1047 1071 where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best response if interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors payoff efficient equilibria and not risk dominant ones can be uniquely selected

cournot competition imitation and information networks abstract we develop a stochastic learning model of cournot competition on arbitrary networks where firms can only observe local information and imitate the locally best the walrasian equilibrium is uniquely selected for any connected information network

distance to work in beijing institutional reform and bargaining power in this study we use a large sample from the beijing household travel survey to build husband wife dyads construct variables to measure bargaining power between spouses and place intra household

information value under demand uncertainty and endogenous market leadership in an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods we identify the circumstance under which a firm s having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership high demand volatility leads to stackelberg competition with the information advantaged firm leading in the n firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously in a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither one or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm s obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium but only when firms have different costs of information our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first mover advantage such as certain public good provision games jel c72 d82 l13

asymmetric information acquisition and behavior in role choice models an endogenously generated signaling game the authors employ a static homogeneous good duopoly model wherein firms can choose to produce in one of two periods the model allows agents to acquire information and then traces the impact of the information pattern on subsequent production behavior asymmetric information acquisition leads to a unique production role choice pattern the informed uninformed firm chooses to assume the leader s follower s role moreover if information is costly the typical equilibrium involves only one firm acquiring information thus identical firms with identical opportunities choose to become asymmetrically informed and produce sequentially this is the unique refined equilibrium outcome copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

housing tenure choice in transitional urban china a multilevel analysis summary using a 1996 national survey of housing in china and a multilevel modelling technique we examine housing tenure choice in transitional urban china where households have been granted limited freedom of choice in the housing market since the housing reforms of 1988 we e nd that both market mechanisms and institutional forces affect households tenure choice in urban china while some socioeconomic factors such as age household size household income and housing price have similar effects on tenure choice as in the west others such as the number of workers and marital status have rather different effects in addition factors characterising institutional relationships among the state work units and households such as hukou job rank and work unit rank still play important roles in tenure choice

bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium recent papers have established that bicameralism can support a non empty core in majority voting games in two dimensional policy spaces we generalise this result to the n dimensional case and provide a discussion of multi cameralism bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria by institutionalising opposition between mutually oriented median voters this provides a clear link with the standard median voter model and with more traditional analyses of bicameralism

china s changing urban governance in the transition towards a more market oriented economy china s changing urban development processes and urban landscapes in the transition towards a more market oriented economy have received extensive research attention in recent years relatively the governing of chinese cities is still underresearched this article aims to analyse the forces released both inside and outside the formal socialist state system and the impacts on phenomenal restructuring of urban governance especially at local levels marketisation has created new elements beyond the reach of state work units that represent the state s hierarchical control the pillars of the socialist governing structure the party state the work units system and household registration are shaken by these forces the changes in the organisation of people capital production materials infrastructure and space fundamentally demand new urban governance territorial organisations such as the municipality urban districts street office and residents committees are reinvented and consolidated to restore a governable society the devolution towards the base level and the reinvention of local communities reflect the state s attempt to reconsolidate its power to create a governable society as well as to cope with practical pressures such as the provision of social assistance to poor and aged residents re employment of laid off workers and the management of floating immigrants the combination of new market elements and decentralised state apparatus has given rise to the entrepreneurial endeavour of china s governance this research highlights the micro foundation of the new urban governance in addition to the globalisation capital mobility city competitiveness thesis

bicameral sequence theory and state legislative evidence theory voting sequence is a strategic variable between bicameral chambers decisions by chambers to acquire costly information affect the payoffs chambers receive from sequencing choices thus it is also a strategic variable between bicameral chambers hypotheses 1 because of incentives to take advantage of one chamber s informational expertise when chambers share relatively homogeneous policy preferences house chambers in legislatures dominated by a single party will initiate adopted legislation in greater proportion relative to legislatures that are not dominated by a single party 2 a cost advantage in acquiring information grows with an increasing disparity in the number of legislators between bicameral chambers lower information acquisition costs in the larger bicameral chamber account for a persistent first mover advantage for that chamber methods hypotheses are derived from a game theoretic model in which informational endowments are endogenously chosen by bicameral chambers and in which voting sequence is endogenously determined implications of the model are tested with an original data set developed from the session laws of thirty three state legislatures results under specified conditions bicameral chambers sequence themselves to take advantage of one chamber s informational expertise under other conditions bicameral chambers will not take advantage of a chamber s informational expertise the main theoretical results conclude 1 that one party legislatures take greater advantage of informational expertise relative to divided party legislatures 2 that senators have an incentive to specialize in more risky policy environments relative to house members and 3 that there is an informational basis for house chambers to initiate more adopted legislation than senate chambers the empirical results are consistent with hypothesis 1 the results are consistent with hypothesis 2 although an alternative noncontradictory theory might also account for the result

the process of commercialisation of urban housing in china the role of the state in housing has been the subject of controversial debate recently in china more and more decision makers consider that the supply of housing should be left to market forces of demand and supply various new policies have been introduced from as early as 1979 designed to commercialise and reform the public sector dominated housing system this paper provides a review of housing reforms and a systematic account of the key features of the commercialisation process it focuses principally on the attempts to privatise public sector housing in urban areas in the context of the major characteristics and problems of the urban housing system the development of reform policies and legislation and current reform practice

altruists egoists and hooligans in a local interaction model the authors study a population of agents each of whom can be an altruist or an egoist altruism is a strictly dominated strategy agents choose their actions by imitating others who earn high payoffs interactions between agents are local so that each agent affects and is affected by only his neighbors altruists can survive in such a world if they are grouped together so that the benefits of altruism are enjoyed primarily by other altruists who then earn relatively high payoffs and are imitated altruists continue to survive in the presence of mutations that continually introduce egoists into the population copyright 1998 by american economic association

british planning policy and access to housing some empirical estimates there is evidence that the implementation of the planning system creates scarcity rents for land in different uses by acting as a constraint on land supply this paper provides for 1984 estimat

region specific estimates of the determinants of real estate investment in china this paper utilises a reduced form equilibrium model to investigate the possible sources of real estate investment differentials among 22 provinces five autonomous regions and four municipalities of the people s republic of china the model is estimated using panel data from 2001 to 2006 yielding a total of 186 observations specifically empirical results suggest that demographic economic and planning factors are the major determinants to cause real estate investment to vary among chinese regions the relatively small coefficient estimate of real interest rates indicates that it has a significant but modest impact based on the coefficient estimates this paper finally suggests that the chinese government should focus and work on several policy parameters in order to achieve a more balanced state of real estate investment across chinese regions

the impact of information provision on agglomeration bonus performance an experimental study on local networks the agglomeration bonus is an incentive mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland this paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the agglomeration bonus in achieving the socially optimal land management configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies and the strategic setting is unfavorable for efficient coordination the experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct and indirect neighbors actions they are more likely to produce the socially optimal configuration thus effectiveness of the policy can be improved by implementing information dissemination exercises among landowners however given the adverse strategic setting increased game experience leads to coordination failure and optimal land choices only at the localized level independent of the information available to subjects thus success of the agglomeration bonus scheme on real landscapes will have to take account of the roles of both information and experience on participant behavior

the persistence of power despite the changing meaning of homeownership an age period cohort analysis of urban housing tenure in china 1989 2011 using nine successive waves of the china health and nutrition survey chns data set this study employs hierarchical age period cohort logistic models hapc to analyse temporal patterns of urban homeownership from 1989 to 2011 with the changing meaning of homeownership due to housing reforms the strong period increases in homeownership track policy changes and the most dramatic increase occurs mainly in the era of housing privatisation rather than housing commodification the temporal analyses also offer insights into housing stratification from redistribution to markets the positive effect of education on homeownership is explained by period increases in homeownership whereas working in state sectors has persistently attached to preferred housing tenure choice before and after the housing reforms moreover the significant cohort effect lends support to strengthened temporal inequalities in the reform era these findings not only provide a dynamic understanding of housing stratification in post so

the effect of foreign investment on the real estate industry in china this paper discusses the development of real estate industry in china in recent years it argues that hayek s theory of economic fluctuations can help to explain the contraction of the real estate market in 1994 in china as a whole however as a theory of the closed economy hayek s theory is found to be no longer robust when applied to cities where there is heavy foreign direct investment such as shanghai we believe that it is the foreign direct investment that is making the real estate industry in shanghai perform well despite the government s tight monetary policy and the contraction of the industry in other parts of the country over the same period the paper also argues that while most foreign investment in real estate is classified as direct investment it is very different from typical foreign direct investment except in form and in fact shares most of the characteristics of portfolio investment foreign direct investment in real estate reflects the imperfections of china s capital markets

the evolution of the housing market and its socioeconomic impacts in the post reform people s republic of china a survey of the literature the development of the housing market in the people s republic of china is not only a major component of chinese economic growth but also has wide ranging influential impacts on chinese society a burgeoning number of papers have examined the housing market in the postreform people s republic of china from various perspectives this paper aims to provide a thorough survey of the key literature in the field and then supply a complete picture of the dynamics of the housing market in the people s republic of china to assess the functional efficiency of this nascent market we pay particular attention to the literature that is related to the academic debate over the chinese housing bubble issue the structure and operation of the housing market is another major concern in this paper finally we summarize the key insights of the literature that we surveyed note research gaps in the literature and discuss further research directions in this field

on the price of land and the value of amenities a house represents not only a bundle of structural characteristics but also a set of location specific characteristics adding locational coordinates and site area to other house characteristics makes it possible to estimate a land rent surface as well as thle hedonic prices attached to local patterns of land use and other neighbourhood characteristics one can then estimate how the value of such location specific characteristics are capitalized into land prices this analysis illustrated with estimates based on data from two british towns has a number of wider implications it generates a more parsimonious method of estimating amenity values it also reveals likely systematic biases produced by conventional hedonic studies which exclude land and location finally it clarifies the conceptual definition of land and suggests that monocentric models can perform well despite recent criticism

foreign liquidity to real estate market ripple effect and housing price dynamics globalisation enables foreign liquidity to access local property markets this paper depicts a strong connection between foreigners property acquisitions and regional housing price movements in singapore testing structure breaks also illustrates a ripple effect of prices from the central city to suburbs a structural vector autoregression incorporates these two observations impulse response function and forecast error variance decomposition show that central region s foreign liquidity shocks can greatly impact housing price growth in not only the central region but also the non central region where foreign buyers are inactive the ripple effect of prices plays an important role non central region s foreign liquidity shocks in contrast have small effects on both regions impacts of foreign liquidity shocks can reach the public housing market where foreigners participation is prohibited the findings are useful to policy makers who consider regulations of foreign home buyers as an instrument to stabilise housing markets

the interjurisdictional effects of growth controls on housing prices institute of university of i 39 business and california at i economic research berkeley fisher center for real estate and urban economics working paper series working paper no 84 83 the interjurisdictional effects of growth controls on housing prices l by these papers are preliminary in nature their purpose is to stimulate discussion and lawrence katz comment therefore they kenneth t rosen are not to be cited or quoted in any publication without the ex press permission of the author walter a haas school of business