decision maker preferences for international legal cooperation why do some decision makers prefer big multilateral agreements while others prefer cooperation in small clubs does enforcement encourage or deter institutional cooperation we use experiments drawn from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology along with a substantive survey focused on international trade to illustrate how two behavioral traits patience and strategic reasoning of individuals who play key roles in negotiating and ratifying an international treaty shape their preferences for how treaties are designed and whether they are ratified patient subjects were more likely to prefer treaties with larger numbers of countries and larger long term benefits as were subjects with the skill to anticipate how others will respond over multiple iterations of strategic games the presence of an enforcement mechanism increased subjects willingness to ratify treaties however strategic reasoning had double the effect of adding enforcement to a trade agreement more strategic subjects were particularly likely to favor ratifying the agreement we report these results for a sample of 509 university students and also show how similar patterns are revealed in a unique sample of ninety two actual us policy elites under some conditions certain types of university student convenience samples can be useful for revealing elite dominated policy preferences different types of people in the same situation may prefer to approach decision making tasks and reason through trade offs in materially different ways

testing the unbiasedness hypothesis in the forward foreign exchange market a specification analysis abstract this paper evaluates two popular regression methods of testing the unbiasedness hypothesis in the forward foreign exchange market for the 30 day canada united states forward foreign exchange market the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that it is inappropriate to treat the structure of the systematic and stochastic components of the test relations as constant over time hence conclusions inferred from parameter significance testing based upon full sample estimation can be very misleading accordingly we argue for a specification analysis of the test relations and more explicit modelling of market fundamentals

are interest rate options important for the assessment of interest rate risk abstract fixed income options contain substantial information on the price of interest rate volatility risk in this paper we ask if those options will also provide information related to other moments of the objective distribution of interest rates based on dynamic term structure models within the class of affine models we find that interest rate options are useful for the identification of interest rate quantiles two three factor models are adopted and their adequacy to estimate value at risk of zero coupon bonds is tested we find significant difference on the quantitative assessment of risk when options are or not included in the estimation process of each of these dynamic models statistical backtests indicate that bond estimated risk is clearly more adequate when options are adopted although not yet completely satisfactory

on the accuracy of the mean variance approximation for futures markets abstract simple approximate fomulae for the volume and gains from futures trading are derived using the mean variance model the errors involved are exactly quantified and shown to be negligible for the futures price and welfare gains though potentially larger for volumes

spot and futures prices of nonstorable commodities under rational expectations the paper examines the effect of the presence of a commodity futures market upon the price formation process in a stochastic rational expectations framework an optimizing model with price uncertainty and risk aversion is used in order to solve equilibrium distributions of prices for nonstorable commodities the existence of futures trading does not affect the degree of short term spot price fluctuations however if the commodity market disturbance that originates from stochastic consumption demand is serially dependent then the long term price variation is smaller with a futures market than without it futures prices fluctuate less variably over time than spot and expected prices finally there exists a futures intervention rule whereby the authority can stabilize spot prices and raise the overall welfare of society

less filling tastes great the realist neoliberal debate this essay examines and reformulates the realist neoliberal debate focusing initially on the issue of the attribution of goals to states we argue that not only are goals merely the epiphenomena of other things but also that their specification constitutes but a re description of strategic environments that is although an attribution of goals may contribute to our characterization of outcomes a discussion of them is not central to the development of a theory that explains and predicts the outbreak of conflict and the patterns of cooperation instead we argue that the realist neoliberal debate should be recast so that our central research agenda is the development of substantively specific models that allow us to ascertain how the equilibrium to a game in which states structure international affairs influences the types of issue specific subgames states play how countries coordinate to equilibria of different types how we can characterize the coordination problems associated with different equilibria how states can enhance the attractiveness of an equilibrium and how states can signal commitments to the strategies that are part of that equilibrium

bond pricing and the term structure of interest rates a new methodology for contingent claims valuation this paper presents a unifying theory for valuing contingent claims under a stochastic term structure of interest rates the methodology based on the equivalent martingale measure technique takes as given an initial forward rate curve and a family of potential stochastic processee for its subsequent movements a no arbitrage condition restricts this family of processes yielding valuation formulae for interest rate sensitive contingent claims which do not explicitly depend on the market prices of risk examples are provided to illustrate the key results in relation to the term structure of interest rates arbitrage pricing theory has two purposes the first is to price all zero coupon default free bonds of varying maturities from a finite number of economic fundamentals called state variables the second is to price all interest rate sensitive contingent claims taking as given the prices of the zero coupon bonds this paper presents a general theory and a unifying framework for understanding arbitrage pricing theory in this context of which all existing arbitrage pricing models are special cases in particular vasicek 1977 brennan and schwartz 1979 langetieg 1980 ball and torous 1983 ho and lee 1986 schaefer and schwartz 1987 and artzner and delbaen 1988 the primary contribution of this paper however is a new methodology for solving the second problem i e the pricing of interest rate sensitive contingent claims given the prices of all zero coupon bonds the methodology is new because i it imposes its stochastic structure directly on the evolution of the forward rate curve ii it does not require an inversion of the term structure to eliminate the market prices of risk from contingent claim values and iii it has a stochastic spot rate process with multiple stochastic factors influencing the term structure the model can be used to consistently price and hedge all contingent claims american or european on the term structure and it is derived from necessary and more importantly sufficient conditions for the absence of arbitrage the arbitrage pricing models of vasicek 1977 brennan and schwartz 1979 langetieg 1980 and artzner and delbaen 1988 all require an iformerly titled bond pricing and the term structure of interest rates a new methodology

methods for selecting the optimal dynamic hedge when production is stochastic a dynamic hedging problem with stochastic production is solved the optimal feedback rules recognize that future hedges will be chosen optimally based on the most current information the resulting distribution of revenue is analyzed numerically this analysis enables the hedger to select his appropriate level of risk aversion

the gains debate framing state choice the theoretical bifurcation of international relations theory into neo realist and neo liberal camps has resulted in a gains debate that says little about an empirical world in which states exhibit both relative and absolute gains pursuit this article deploys prospect theory in an attempt to move beyond the gains debate the intent here is synthetic by bringing the predictions of both perspectives under a single theoretical umbrella we can model a broader set of state behavior the thesis developed demonstrates that states in a gains frame pursue absolute gains and are risk averse while states in a losses frame pursue relative gains and are risk acceptant this hypothesis is assessed against the behavior of the european community in the formation of the montreal protocol a regime intended to protect the earth s protective ozone shield the new model accurately predicts the timing and content of shifts in ec preferences suggesting that a synthesis of realist and liberal approaches is possible

optimal hedging and equilibrium in a dynamic futures market abstract this paper considers an agent maximizing the expected utility of the sum of the terminal value of a fixed portfolio of spot market assets and the terminal value of a margin account on a futures trading position closed form solutions for the optimal hedging strategy are provided in several special cases

testing theories of regime change hegemonic decline or surplus capacity two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors a theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector the history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes however a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change surplus capacity in the absence of a hegemon creates the conditions necessary for change

analytic valuation formulas for range notes and an affine term structure model with jump risks abstract we derive analytic valuation formulas for range accrual notes and spread range accrual notes under an affine term structure model with jump risks we show that the value of a range accrual note can be significantly affected by the choice of interest rate model and the arrival intensity of jump risks we also show that misuse of the correlation between reference rates of a spread range accrual note may lead traders and risk managers to mispricing of the note

risk aversion liquidity and endogenous short horizons we analyze a competitive model in which different information signals get reflected in value at different points in time if investors are sufficiently risk averse we obtain an equilibrium in which all investors focus exclusively on the short term in addition we show that increasing the variance of informationless trading increases market depth but causes a greater proportion of investors to focus on the short term signal which decreases the informativeness of prices about the long run finally we also explore parameter spaces under which long term informed agents wish to voluntarily disclose their information article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

adverse selection and security design this paper studies the problem of optimal security design by a privately informed entrepreneur in the context of a simple parametric model it is shown that the entrepreneur does not find it profitable to float an asset that affords her an informational advantage the reason is that with rational uninformed outside investors the entrepreneur faces adverse selection in the security market which prevents her from exploiting her position as an insider this is true whether or not she has market power in trading the asset consider a risk averse entrepreneur who is contemplating what security to issue the entrepreneur anticipates that during subsequent trading in the secondary market she will have private information on the payoff of her investment as well as on other risks in the economy the design of the asset is therefore influenced not only by a desire to share risk but also by informational considerations involving the potential for insider trading profits this paper studies the problem of optimal security design in the context of a simple parametric model with gaussian risks and cara utility trading in the secondary market is modelled via the static reduced form concept of rational expectations equilibrium in which uninformed outside investors use market prices to try to infer the private information of the entrepreneur or insider as she will sometimes be called it is shown that the entrepreneur does not find it profitable to float an asset that affords her an informational advantage an optimal asset entails a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium and is perfectly correlated with the issuer s endowment risk the reason is that with rational outside investors the entrepreneur faces adverse selection in the security market which prevents her from exploiting her position as an insider she is better off foregoing her informational advantage and concentrating on her hedging motive alone in the particular setting described in the paper equity2 is an optimal asset since the entrepreneur has no privileged information regarding its payoff and it allows efficient risk sharing the issue of security design when prices have an informational role to play is just beginning to be researched closely related to this paper is the work of demange and laroque 1995 who use a competitive rational expectations model with noise traders to analyse the problem posed above except for some special cases however they are able to get only numerical results in comparison the present paper obtains partially revealing equilibria in a model in which all agents are rational furthermore demange and laroque

rethinking macroeconomics what failed and how to repair it the standard macroeconomic models have failed by all the most important tests of scientific theory they did not predict that the financial crisis would happen and when it did they understated its effects monetary authorities allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low partly because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for efficiency and growth after the crisis broke policymakers relying on the models floundered notwithstanding the diversity of macroeconomics the sum of these failures points to the need for a fundamental re examination of the models and a reassertion of the lessons of modern general equilibrium theory that were seemingly forgotten in the years leading up to the crisis this paper first describes the failures of the standard models in broad terms and then develops the economics of deep downturns and shows that such downturns are endogenous further the paper argues that there have been systemic changes to the structure of the economy that made the economy more vulnerable to crisis contrary to what the standard models argued finally the paper contrasts the policy implications of our framework with those of the standard models

when misperception matters this essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor s preferences in international relations the author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy although it can affect that actor s expectations as long as both actors are self interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences an actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other s misperception of its preferences and thus to avoid conflict not to create it three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable in a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war

international human rights a regime analysis after laying out a typology of international regimes eight international and regional human rights regimes are analyzed in order to 1 examine the utility of regime analysis in noneconomic issue areas and 2 assess the nature extent and evolution of international cooperation on human rights there has been a remarkable growth of international action since 1945 when human rights were not even widely accepted as a legitimate issue area this growth can be explained largely by expanding perceptions of moral interdependence and community increased national commitment the growing ideological appeal of human rights and changes in the distributions of international power these same factors however suggest only limited future growth on a broader theoretical plane the case of human rights suggests a significant if limited and principally heuristic utility for regime analysis especially to the extent that international relations is becoming increasingly concerned with specific issues

coordination and collaboration regimes in an anarchic world the study of regimes can contribute to our understanding of international politics only if regimes represent more than international organizations and less than all international relations the conceptualization of regimes developed here accepts the realist image of international politics in which autonomous self interested states interact in an anarchic environment yet there are situations in which rational actors have an incentive to eschew unconstrained independent decision making situations in which individualistic self interested calculation leads them to prefer joint decision making regimes because independent self interested behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes these situations are labeled dilemmas of common interests and dilemmas of common aversions to deal with these states must collaborate with one another or coordinate their behavior respectively thus there are different bases for regimes which give rise to regimes with different characteristics coordination is self enforcing and can be reached through the use of conventions collaboration is more formalized and requires mechanisms both to monitor potential cheating and to insure compliance with the regime the article elucidates the assumptions of such an interest based approach to regimes assimilates alternative explanations into this framework and develops the implications for regime maintenance and change

an analysis of the stabilizing and welfare effects of intervention in spot and futures markets this paper analyzes the effects of three alternative rules on the long run distributions of both the spot and futures prices ina single commodity market in which the key behavioral relationships are derived from the optimizing behavior of producers and speculators the rules considered include i leaning against the wind in the spot market ii utility maximizing speculative behavior by the stabilization authority in the futures market iii leaning against the wind in the futures market since the underlying model is sufficiently complex to preclude analytical solutions the analysis makes extensive use of simulation methods as a general proposition we find that intervention in the futures market is not as effective in stabilizing either the spot price of the futures price as is intervention in the spot market indeed rule iii while stabilizing the futures price may actually destabilize the spot price furthermore the analogous type of rule undertaken in the spot market will always stabilize the futures price to a greater degree than it does the spot price the welfare implications of these rules are also discussed our analysis shows how these can generate rather different distributions of welfare gains including the overall benefits this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

design in context existing international agreements and new cooperation this research note highlights an important element missing from rational design theories of international agreements institutional context the presence or absence of existing and prior agreements between prospective partners in new cooperation if as rational design theorists argue agreement design is deliberate strategic and directed toward enhancing contracting parties ability to credibly commit to future cooperation then prior design successes should influence the terms of additional cooperation we test for this omitted variable problem in three agreement design outcomes ex ante limitations on agreement duration exit clauses and dispute settlement provisions through an augmentation and reanalysis of data from a key study in the rational design literature barbara koremenos s contracting around international uncertainty we show institutional context is positively correlated with inclusion of ex ante time limitations in negotiated agreements and negatively correlated with the inclusion of exit clauses and third party dispute settlement provisions institutional context also mediates and conditions the effects of the explanatory variable at the heart of existing rational design theories uncertainty about the future distribution of gains from cooperation our findings show that the collective appeal of particular design features varies not only with the nature of underlying strategic problems but also with degrees of shared institutional context

informational frictions and commodity markets this paper develops a model with a tractable log linear equilibrium to analyze the effects of informational frictions in commodity markets by aggregating dispersed information about the strength of the global economy among goods producers whose production has complementarity commodity prices serve as price signals to guide producers production decisions and commodity demand our model highlights important feedback effects of informational noise originating from supply shocks and futures market trading on commodity demand and spot prices our analysis illustrates the weakness common in empirical studies on commodity markets of assuming that different types of shocks are publicly observable to market participants

can position limits restrain rogue trading this paper studies the imposition of position limits on commodity futures from the perspective of curbing excessive speculation and thus manipulation we present a simple general equilibrium model in a static rational expectations framework and agent heterogeneity to illustrate that excessive speculation serves to enrich other agents at the expense of the speculator position limits on the contrary are not only superfluous but also counter productive as they exacerbate market power and lead to a deterioration in efficiency position limits not only reduce social welfare but also cannot restrain market manipulation

rational expectations in stationary linear models linear time series models have come to dominate the macroeconomic literature on rational expectations and equilibrium business cycle theory but the explicit solution of such models has generally required strong restrictions upon the exogenous process of stochastic shocks e g temporal independence as well as upon the values of various demand and supply elasticities this paper exhibits a solution technique the method of z transforms which does not require one to impose such restrictions the value of this method is illustrated by applying it to completely characterize the symmetric stationary rational expectations equilibria of a naive linear model of land speculation this approach also permits systematic study of the informationally asymmetric equilibria of the model this paper develops a method for analyzing rational expectations re equilibria in linear economic models the methods i shall discuss usually enable one to determine whether or not a given model has a re equilibrium and if one exists to exhibit an explicit expression for the stochastic process of equilibrium prices the techniques apply to linear models driven by stationary processes of exogenous random shocks

a privately revealing rational expectations equilibrium for the futures market abstract this paper develops a model of the futures market with two types of participants farmers and speculators farmers undertake production decisions and face both output and spot price risk as opposed to speculators who face only spot price risk agents have constant absolute risk aversion von neumann morgenstern utility functions and form rational expectations about the future output shock and spot price we assume that traders specialize in information collection in our model the futures price is not a sufficient statistic for the market information we show that the rational expectations equilibrium ree futures price is privately revealing to traders who purchase costly information this ree is efficient in the sense that in equilibrium traders are in possession of all market information we demonstrate that traders a have an incentive to collect costly information and b are better off by specializing in collecting the information in which they have a comparative advantage in terms of the quality of the information that they can obtain finally we show that the futures market stabilizes the spot price

potential contributions of political science to environmental economics while political science has much to offer at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models nevertheless we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing combining or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science we develop our argument by examining three core components of political science analysis ideas power and institutions for each component we review political science approaches and propositions with a view to determining what s in it for environmental economics

the emergence of cooperation among egoists this article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority this problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political philosophy international politics and economic and social exchange the problem is formalized as an iterated prisoner s dilemma with pairwise interaction among a population of individuals results from three approaches are reported the tournament approach the ecological approach and the evolutionary approach the evolutionary approach is the most general since all possible strategies can be taken into account a series of theorems is presented which show 1 the conditions under which no strategy can do any better than the population average if the others are using the reciprocal cooperation strategy of tit for tat 2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be collectively stable and 3 how cooperation can emerge from a small cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of unconditional defection

rewarding impatience a bargaining and enforcement model of opec in this article i make two primary contributions to the literature on international cooperation first i present a simple version of fearon s bargaining and enforcement model and show that impatience as captured in the discount factor can be a source of bargaining strength when the outcome of the bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners dilemma second i illustrate how to apply this model to the question of the division of cartel profits within the organization of petroleum exporting countries opec particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons i find that for some critical threshold level states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better oil production offers than those that do not i examine empirical evidence that suggests that countries in opec fall into the range where this proposition holds in other words relatively poor populous countries and relatively unstable ones are allowed by opec to overproduce i am grateful to christino arroyo jim denardo joe gochal james honaker shuhei kurizaki drew linzer barry o neill art stein hiroki takeuchi george tsebelis jana von stein and two anonymous referees for helpful comments i am especially indebted to ken schultz for his advice and to randy calvert for a helpful discussion during the 2003 eitm summer institute at washington university in st louis

on intraday risk premia this article presents a framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of anticipated large demand pressures on asset risk premia we show that large institutions who can time their entry into the market will trade either at the open or during periods of unusual demand pressures we show that if these institutions do enter later in the day they trade in the same direction as institutions which provide liquidity continuously institutions therefore appear to exhibit herding behavior we also explore how changing the uncertainty of demand pressures late in the day affects trading costs throughout the day most financial market investors do not continuously monitor intraday fluctuations in stock prices other activities e g outside employment often take precedence over following the stock market and there are limitations to processing information for example a reader of this page is likely to be unaware of current financial market prices in fact for many investors entry into financial markets occurs once a day or even less frequently given these institutional realities it is of interest to explore how asset markets react when it is known that a set of very large predictable demands will arrive during the afternoon does their arrival affect prices only when they arrive or throughout the day if the price impact is spread out then how do trading costs behave during the day if some traders have the flexibility to time their entry into the market when will they arrive during the day and how will their entry decisions affect asset risk premia if market participants anticipate that demands in the afternoon will be unusually volatile how does this affect the intertemporal behavior of prices and expected returns earlier in the day the primary focus of this article is the development of tractable methodologies that can address these issues

exploiting the conditional density in estimating the term structure an application to the cox ingersoll and ross model we propose an empirical method that utilizes the conditional density of the state variables to estimate and test a term structure model with known price formulae using data on both discount and coupon bonds the method is applied to an extension of a two factor model due to cox ingersoll and ross 1985 cir our results show that estimates based on only bills imply unreasonably large price errors for longer maturities we reject the original cir model using a likelihood ratio test and conclude that the extended cir model also fails to provide a good description of the treasury market

a test of the cox ingersoll and ross model of the term structure we test the theory of the term structure of indexed bond prices due to cox ingersoll and ross cir the econometric method uses hansen s generalized method of moments and exploits the probability distribution of the single state variable in cir s model thus avoiding the use of aggregate consumption data it enables us to estimate a continuous time model based on discretely sampled data the tests indicate that cir s model for index bonds performs reasonably well when confronted with short term treasury bill returns the estimates indicate that term premiums are positive and that yield curves can take several shapes however the fitted model does poorly in explaining the serial correlation in real treasury bill returns article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

bargaining uncertainty and property rights in fisheries garrett hardin s tragedy of the commons metaphor is commonly invoked to account for the unfortunate state of world fisheries but the world s oceans are no longer a global commons and have not been so for the past two decades open access regimes have persisted within many exclusive economic zones eezs during this time but coastal states authority to regulate domestic fisheries has existed for more than a generation faced with the prospect of hardin s tragedy coastal states have had more than twenty years to devise institutional constraints that would prevent it this article asserts that the dismal experience with eezs is in large part attributable to distributive bargaining problems that arose within coastal states in the wake of eez extension moreover the article argues that high levels of uncertainty that characterize the early stages of institutional development have exacerbated these problems finally the article demonstrates how the variety of institutional designs and paths of institutional development that are observed in the cases of iceland norway and atlantic canada result from the different configurations of political power and political structure within each case while the empirical discussion is focused upon property rights and fisheries the theoretical discussion of bargaining and uncertainty has widespread application across comparative and international politics

the international politics of harmonization the case of capital market regulation the internationalization and globalization of capital markets greatly complicates the tasks of national financial regulators it is becoming increasingly difficult if not impossible to regulate the activities of banking and securities firms and the broad range of transactions in which they engage on a national level in this article i explore the process of international regulatory harmonization in capital markets focusing especially on the mechanisms political pressure market pressure and institutional arrangements that facilitate this process i argue that the united states and the united kingdom are dominant players in the capital market and that the factors most relevant for understanding harmonization processes are 1 whether other jurisdictions have incentives to emulate the regulatory innovations of the dominant financial centers and 2 whether the dominant centers experience negative externalities in the process these two factors shed considerable light on whether harmonization will be spurred primarily by market forces or by politics they also suggest the likely role of international institutions in the process of regulatory harmonization the argument is illustrated using four issue areas capital adequacy requirements for banks anti money laundering rules accounting standards and information sharing among securities regulators

making rules for global finance transatlantic regulatory cooperation at the turn of the millennium this article explains a shift in the way transatlantic authorities managed conflicts over the cross border regulation of securities markets from cooperation skewed heavily toward the preferences of u s officials and accepted grudgingly by european counterparts to a euro american regulatory condominium characterized by close interactions among decision makers and mutual accommodation in the final decades of the twentieth century the asymmetric influence wielded by u s securities market authorities had few parallels in other regulatory areas why then did u s officials become more accommodating and european authorities more influential and why did the turning point occur in 2002 and 2003 an unlikely moment for intensified transatlantic sovereignty sharing my study shows that institutional change inside the eu recast the north atlantic balance of regulatory leverage and thereby was the primary factor behind the reshaping of transatlantic cooperation internal eu regulatory centralization changed the expectations of u s and european firms and authorities and generated new incentives in washington d c for accommodation and closer transatlantic coordination my explanation differs from models that accepting u s financial pre eminence as a given attribute variance in cross border regulatory cooperation to factors such as incentives derived from the particularities of issue areas or preferences rooted in domestic politics while resonating with a well established theme from the realist branch of ipe my findings have broad theoretical significance and open new avenues for dialogue between realists and constructivists about the social political and institutional foundations of power in global economic affairs the transatlantic political process set off by financial transformation in europe reveals contemporary sources of systemic change and raises questions about what the eu s ascendance as a global financial regulator will mean in the aftermath of the late 2000s crisis

efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information an application of rational expectations models the study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one priced security returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature some agents insiders whose identity was unknown to other agents knew the state before the markets opened with replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational expectations model are relatively accurate prices adjusted immediately to near rational expectations prices profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from non insiders and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent

a model of returns and trading in futures markets this paper develops an equilibrium model of a competitive futures market in which investors trade to hedge positions and to speculate on their private information equilibrium return and trading patterns are examined 1 in markets where the information asymmetry among investors is small the return volatility of a futures contract decreases with time to maturity i e the samuelson effect holds 2 however in markets where the information asymmetry among investors is large the samuelson effect need not hold 3 additionally the model generates rich time tomaturity patterns in open interest and spot price volatility that are consistent with empirical findings an issue central to the analysis of futures markets is the relationship between speculation and futures price volatility a long line of models see e g grossman 1977 bray 1981 have tried to understand the effects of speculation on futures price volatility this line of research is economically relevant as speculative trades appear to be an important determinant of volatility in futures markets for instance roll 1984 finds that public information accounts for only a fraction of the movement in orange juice futures prices which suggests that investors bring their own private information into the market through their trades unfortunately existing models of speculation in futures are essentially static ones and cannot speak to a number of interesting aspects of returns and trading in futures markets an example is the relationship between the price volatility and the timeto maturity of a futures contract the analysis of this issue is an important one and has a long history assuming the existence of a representative investor and an exogenous spot price process samuelson 1965 shows that when there is a mean reverting component in the spot price process and no

the limits of international organization systematic failure in the management of international relations contributors to the literature on international organization io have traditionally been overly optimistic about the ability of multilateral management to stabilize in ternational relations and have tended to ignore the destabilizing effects of io while recent revisionist scholarship has acknowledged both the potential for organizational failure and the conditionality of management it has tended to focus on how io fails within specific issue areas and institutions this article offers a typology of the inherent systematic failures of io across issue areas and institutions and thereby seeks to bridge the gaps in our understanding of why many different institutions and managerial schemes have adverse effects it argues that io is prone to failure 1 when it attempts to manage complex tightly coupled systems of relations and issues 2 when it serves as a substitute either for more substantive and long term resolutions to international problems or for responsible domestic or foreign policy 3 when it intensifies international disputes and 4 when it generates moral hazard in offering a general theoretical approach to understanding the destabilizing effects of io the analysis is intended to serve both as a focal point for understanding critical approaches to the study of io and as an alternative rationale for eliminating the excesses of multilateral management

market response to financial reports abstract a two date rational expectations model is analyzed at the first date traders can privately acquire a costly signal that provides imperfect information about a public report that will be issued at the second date equilibrium characterizations are provided for the fraction of traders that become informed and the informativeness of the first date price as well as the price change variance and the expected trading volume at the second date comparative statics identify how the above variables are influenced by changes in the information content of the public report and in particular how market phenomena at the public release date are influenced by endogenous prior information acquisition and trading in response to the forthcoming public release

explaining the non proliferation regime anomalies for contemporary international relations theory this article reconciles common policy usage with scholarly definition the system of cooperation on non proliferation has often been termed an international regime but there has not been any systematic effort to determine if this is actually true the discussion also attempts to reconcile the formation and maintenance of this system of cooperation with contemporary international relations theory the central argument is that the system of international cooperation on non proliferation does constitute a regime but that such a regime presents a serious anomaly for contemporary theory the article concludes that power and egoistic self interest are inadequate to account for the regime s formation and maintenance the inadequacies of both the hegemonic stability and functional theories point towards another independent variable that needs central consideration in regime analysis knowledge and learning

hegemons ios and markets the case of the substitution account for eighteen months between 1978 and 1980 the international monetary fund and imf members attempted to reform the international monetary system by establishing a substitution account designed to enhance the stability of the monetary system the proposed substitution account would have accepted dollar deposits from foreign central banks in return issuing certificates denominated in special drawing rights the collapse of negotiations about the account in early 1980 confirms the hypothesis of hegemonic stability theorists that the distribution of systemic costs is problematic in the absence of a hegemonic power the case thereby qualifies recent assertions that a small group of nations can supply stability to the international economy however two factors outside the realm of hegemonic theory also helped produce the outcome of the negotiations the division of power within the united states between congress and the executive and changes in international market conditions during 1979 and early 1980

coordination versus prisoners dilemma implications for international cooperation and regimes the study of political institutions in general and international cooperation in particular has been beneficially influenced by the prisoners dilemma pd game model but there is a mistaken tendency to treat pd as representing the singular problem of collective action and cooperation by relaxing the assumptions of 2 2 games and developing an alternate model of the coordination game i show how some cooperation problems have very different properties from those found in pd the analytical results of the two games are compared across several important dimensions number of strategies available number of iterations of the game numbers of players and the distribution of power among them the discussion is illustrated with specific problems of international cooperation and the implications of alternative cooperation problems for the formation and performance of international regimes are explored the basic solutions for pd and coordination have divergent ramifications for the institutionalization stability and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international system however the coordination model does not replace the pd model but complements and supplements it as a way to understand the diversity of political institutions these results are widely applicable to areas of politics beyond international relations

an exact bond option formula this paper derives a closed form solution for european options on pure discount bonds assuming a mean reverting gaussian interest rate model as in vasicek 8 the formula is extended to european options on discount bond portfolios

herding in delegated portfolio management when is comparative performance information desirable abstract we address the issue of investors asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative doing so allows investors to write an efficiency improving relative performance contract on the other hand herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium we show that herding occurs when the cost of information is high information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse moreover when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager s performance they will not do so

toward a positive theory of international institutions regulating international aviation markets the regulation of postwar international aviation markets suggests that existing approaches to international institutions cannot adequately account for important elements of international institution building in particular scholars have neglected how domestic politics shapes the incentives of national governments to create and maintain international institutions and the impact of domestic politics on the scope and functions of international institutions drawing on positive theories of regulation and the literature on property rights i argue that national politicians use international institutions to increase the wealth available for domestic redistribution in short national politicians create and maintain international institutions to maximize domestic political support i present a domestic political model that explains how when and why national politicians create international institutions the model is applied to the creation of institutions governing international aviation markets in the late 1940s and the reformulation of these institutions over the past two decades

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

production uncertainty and the input decision of the competitive firm facing the futures market abstract production uncertainty is introduced into the model of the competitive firm facing the futures market the firm s input decision is shown to be highly sensitive to the nature of the production uncertainty

market efficiency and natural selection in a commodity futures market while the literature usually justifies informational efficiency in the context of rationality this article shows informational efficiency by applying the evolutionary idea of natural selection in a dynamic futures market speculators are assumed to merely act upon their predetermined trading types buyer or seller their predetermined fractions of wealth allocated for speculation and their inherent abilities to predict the spot price reflected in their distributions of prediction errors with respect to the spot price this article shows that the proportion of time that the futures price equals the spot price converges to one with probability 1 article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the relative gains problem for international cooperation modern realism claims that the fear that others will enjoy relatively greater benefits frequently impedes international cooperation recent articles in this review by duncan snidal and robert powell modeled conditions under which the impact of relative gains varied joseph grieco criticizes snidal s model as based on assumptions that allow him to avoid rather than confront the realist arguments he also argues that powell s model while constructive ignores important additional sources of sensitivity to relative gains in response powell discusses the value of alternative assumptions about preferences and constraints in international relations snidal defends his analysis and presents an additional proof to support the independence of his central result the diminishing impact of relative gains with increasing numbers of states from assumptions of concern to grieco both responders emphasize their work as contributing to a contextually rich theory of international politics that builds on elements of both realism and neo liberalism

the limits of rational design the rational design of international institutions special issue of io autumn 2001 makes a significant contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions it is important however to recognize the limits of both the rational design project in its current form and the conclusions that can be drawn from the special issue about the project s usefulness and validity this article evaluates the project on its own terms as a rationalist attempt to explain variation in international institutions i identify three significant sets of limitations those of the scope of the project those of the analytical framework and those of the efforts that are made to evaluate the framework through empirical analysis although the first set of limitations is largely a matter of choice the last two raise questions about how much of an advance the special issue in fact represents nevertheless these shortcomings are not absolute they can be remedied through further theoretical and empirical research

pricing home mortgages and bank collateral a rational expectations approach the efficiency of the housing finance system is of interest to homeowners financial intermediaries and policy makers we study the design of optimal mortgage contracts for risk averse economic agents with access to symmetric information on the payoffs of a risky home our non linear framework helps demonstrate the pareto efficiency of a risk free loan over its risky counterpart it also allows us to evaluate the unique equilibrium interest rate loan amount and home price in contrast to the capital structure theorems finally we conduct numerical simulations in lieu of comparative statics to shed some light on the complex causal relationship between mortgage pricing parameters and the underlying collateral i e home value

hedge disclosures future prices and production distortions in this paper we identify social benefits to hedge accounting disclosures that have not previously been examined we show that from the perspective of price efficiency in the futures market the key information that is provided by hedge accounting is information about firms underlying risk exposures without this information the futures price confounds information regarding firms hedge motivated trades with their speculative trades making the futures price inefficient our model shows that an inefficient futures price causes significant externalities by distorting the production choices of an entire industry in the presence of hedge disclosures the futures price appropriately informs production decisions in the whole industry in addition to distortion in production choices we also investigate the effect of an inefficient futures price on the risk sharing role of the futures market we find that arijit mukherji passed away in october 2000 he was our colleague mentor advisor and friend we dedicate this paper to his memory and his contributions to the field of accounting he will be missed university of minnesota tuniversity of minnesota and federal reserve bank of minneapolis university of chicago we thank workshop participants at the 1998 accounting mini conference at minnesota the 2000 journal of accounting research conference berkeley columbia chicago the lse financial markets group northwestern ohio state penn state stanford ucla and the european and american accounting association annual meetings in particular we have benefited from the comments of regina anctil stan baiman mary barth margaret bray robert bushman ron dye frank gigler dan gode charles goodhart rachel hayes thomas hemmer jack hughes jim jordan bjorn jorgensen young kwon richard leftwich nobu kiyotaki rick lambert maureen mcnichols nahum melumad john o brien jim patell jim peck madhav rajan abbie smith phil stocken brett trueman igor vaysman robert verrecchia amir ziv and an anonymous referee the views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system

relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well in international politics this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy after discussing why states might seek relative gains i demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed relative gains do impede cooperation in the two actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner s dilemma problem but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner s dilemma relative gains seeking is much less consequential its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors

modeling the forms of international cooperation distribution versus information the problems of distribution and information impede international cooperation they arise when actors select how they will cooperate an exploration of the interaction between these problems using a limited information model of cooperation leads to six conclusions first leadership solutions to coordination problems always exist but leadership here is very different from hegemonic provision of public goods second actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy even without a shadow of the future third diffuse reciprocal strategies arise naturally in coordination problems fourth norms and institutions are intertwined within successful cooperation fifth the form of cooperation on an issue varies with the relative importance of distribution and information finally and most important distributional and informational problems interfere with each other arrangements to cooperate can successfully address one but not both of these problems

the statistical and economic role of jumps in continuous time interest rate models this paper analyzes the role of jumps in continuous time short rate models i first develop a test to detect jump induced misspecification and using treasury bill rates find evidence for the presence of jumps second i specify and estimate a nonparametric jump diffusion model results indicate that jumps play an important statistical role estimates of jump times and sizes indicate that unexpected news about the macroeconomy generates the jumps finally i investigate the pricing implications of jumps jumps generally have a minor impact on yields but they are important for pricing interest rate options

abiding by the vote between groups conflict in international collective action we analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when actors have heterogeneous preferences over the desirability of the action and split into supporters and opponents all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome we study how actors can communicate their preferences through voting when they are not bound either by their own vote or the outcome of the collective vote we identify two organizational types with endogenous coercive enforcement and find that neither is unambiguously preferable like the solutions to the traditional prisoners dilemma these forms require long shadows of the future to sustain we then show that cooperation can be sustained through a noncoercive organization where actors delegate execution to an agent even though this institution is costlier it does not require any expertise by the agent and is independent of the shadow of the future and thus is implementable when the others are not