the dynamic in stability of backwards induction abstract the evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in finite extensive form games with perfect information is examined evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare perturbations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each strategy the criterion for our judgement is whether this dynamic stabilizes over time at the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome we find that the backwards induction solution is fully justified by this process only in very simple games examples of more complex games are given in which this process does not select between the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and alternative nash equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c79

why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes an evolutionary approach abstract two bargaining parties play the nash demand game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party s investment decision various investment levels are subgame perfect adding the investment decision to young s evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long run outcome efficient investment prevails and the investor s share of the pie approximates die maximum of i the smallest share that induces efficient investment even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment and ii half of the pie the result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold ups journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 l14

an empirical test of credit rationing in the mortgage market abstract recent theoretical models of credit rationing suggest that mortgages are rationed with nonprice terms on the basis of default risk despite the development of secondary mortgage markets and the deregulation of deposit rates we test this hypothesis using aggregate time series data on fha and conventional mortgage originations fha loans are more expensive for borrowers but provide federal guarantees which protect lenders against default losses for this reason fha loans should be subject to easier credit constraints than conventional mortgages and the fha share of mortgage originations should increase with aggregate default risk default risk is proxied by a bond rate quality spread consistent with previous studies our results imply that default risk induced mortgage rationing persists in the post disintermediation era but that fha programs help offset the overall impact of rationing on housing markets

credit rationing and the demand for owner occupied housing abstract this study applies cross sectional data to test whether default risk induced credit constraints affect the demand for owner occupied housing credit constrained households are argued to exhibit different elasticities of demand for housing than less constrained households housing demand elasticities are then estimated separately for households obtaining va insured and non va loans the government guarantee on va loans insures lenders against default enabling lenders to apply easier nonprice terms of credit results indicate that observed demand elasticities differ significantly across va and conventional mortgage holders that marginal changes in credit constraints affect housing demand and that fha financing mitigates the effect of mortgage constraints

loss aversion and the demand for index insurance abstract this work analyzes if reference dependence and loss aversion can explain the puzzling low adoption rates of rainfall index insurance we present a model that predicts the impact of loss aversion on index insurance demand to vary with different levels of insurance understanding index insurance demand of farmers who are unaware of the loss hedging benefit that insurance provides decreases with loss aversion in contrast insurance demand of farmers who are aware of the loss hedging benefit increases with loss aversion the model further predicts that farmers who are unaware of the loss hedging benefit will not demand an even highly subsidized index insurance using data from a randomized controlled trial involving a sample of indian farmers we provide empirical support for our core conjecture that insurance understanding mitigates the negative impact of loss aversion on index insurance adoption

tenure choice and the demand for housing this paper deals with the estimation by means of nonlinear methods of preference parameters from observation of behaviour in housing markets it differs from previous work on housing market behaviour in several important aspects first it treats the choice of tenure mode that is whether to rent or own and the housing consumption decision as a joint decision second it explicitly uses the same behavioural model in analysing these discrete and continuous elements of housing market behaviour third it allows for an analysis of the role of capital market imperfections and discriminatory practices in constraining housing market decisions

adoption of agricultural innovations in developing countries a survey this paper reviews various studies which have provided a description and possible explanation to patterns of innovation adoption in the agricultural sector the survey points out that the tendency of many studies to consider innovation adoption in dichotomous terms adoption nonadoption may not be appropriate in many cases where the actual decisions are defined over a more continuous range more attention needs to be given to the socio cultural and institutional environment in area studies so that their interrelation with economic factors affecting adoption can be inferred the presence of several interrelated innovations is another aspect that needs to be considered more carefully in future research since a number of simultaneous decisions may be involved furthermore the possibility of regular sequential patterns in adopting components of a new technological package should be specifically addressed in future studies finally the impact of differential adoption rates on land holding distribution merits attention in future research

income taxes and housing this paper presents new estimates of the distributional impact of special income tax provisions relating to housing it also discusses possible secondary effects of these tax factors resulting from adjustments in the returns to capital shifts in investment and changes in the housing stock the tax benefits to homeowners are shown to be

patterns of rainfall insurance participation in rural india take up of an innovative rainfall insurance policy offered to smallholder farmers in rural india decreases with basis risk between insurance payouts and income fluctuations increases with household wealth and decreases with binding credit constraints these results are consistent with the predictions of a simple neoclassical model with borrowing constraints other patterns are less consistent with the benchmark model for example participation in village networks and measures of familiarity with the insurance vendor are strongly correlated with insurance take up decisions and risk averse households are less not more likely to purchase insurance these results may reflect household uncertainty about the product given their limited experience with it

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

housing tenure choice evidence from time series abstract a model of tenure choice is specified and estimated a simple expression to represent the expected rate of return on equity for a homeowner is developed also the influence of the federal housing subsidy programs is analyzed both plus permanent income and the implicit rental price of owner occupied housing are important determinants of tenure choice other influences are the financing gap with the standard mortgage instrument in an inflationary environment the number of children less than 18 per family assets and liabilities and mortgage credit terms finally the changes in housing tenure choice over the estimation period are analyzed

voluntarily separable repeated prisoner s dilemma ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and run away from partners we formulate a model of endogenous relationships which one can unilaterally end and start with a randomly assigned new partner with no information flow focusing on two person two action prisoner s dilemma we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships gives rise to a significantly dierent evolutionary stability structure from the ordinary evolutionary games monomorphic equilibria require initial trust building while a polymorphic equilibrium includes early cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more ecient this

experimental evidence on the evolution of the meaning of messages in sender receiver games an experiment this paper experimentally investigates the evolution of message meanings when talk is cheap we consider communication between a privately informed sender and a receiver when the sender s message does not affect payoffs directly sender receiver games introduced by jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 and vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 provide the simplest stylized environment in which communication is essential communication is the only way to link the receiver s action to the sender s private information in addition sender receiver games have been widely used to study communication in accounting economics finance and political science intuition strongly suggests that effective communication will evolve when the players interests are closely aligned however there is always a nash equilibrium in which the sender randomizes uniformly across all messages such babbling equilibria are proper roger b myerson 1978 blume 1994 and even strategic stability elon kohlberg and jeanfrancois mertens 1986 does not rule out uninformative equilibria in general in response a literature developed that formulates equilibrium selection criteria by appealing to the existence of a commonly understood language matthew rabin 1990 steven a matthews et al 1991 joseph farrell 1993 that can be used to formulate credible deviations from equilibrium unfortunately the selection criteria from this literature are frequently strong enough to remove all equilibria from consideration in addition these arguments are vulnerable to stiglitz s observation in koo cho and david m kreps 1987 that successful deviations from equilibrium may induce further deviations which in turn may undermine the credibility of the original deviations both problems can be avoided by a dynamic approach as in rabin and sobel 1996 we also adopt a dynamic perspective but do not require messages to have a priori meanings instead distinct meanings may emerge endogenously this is important for communication across cultures and for language change 2 we are guided by recent results of blume department of economics university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 dejong department of accounting university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 kim department of economics sung kyun kwan university seoul 110 745 korea sprinkle department of accounting university of wisconsin madison wi 53706 we thank joyce berg vince crawford robert forsythe joel horowitz deirdre mccloskey forrest nelson larry samuelson gene savin joel sobel and especially two anonymous referees for their advice and suggestions we benefitted from comments and discussions resulting from presentations at the 1994 summer meetings of the econometric society the 1996 social learning workshop at suny stony brook the io me gt workshop at the university of iowa the university of bonn the university of bielefeld the center for economic research at tilburg university ohio state university seoul national university and texas a m university we are grateful for financial support from the college of business administration at the university of iowa the ira b mcgladrey institute and the national science foundation

tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria when people interact in familiar settings social conventions usually develop so that people tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention for rational players to usually restrict attention to a block of conventional strategies no player should prefer to deviate from the block when others are likely to act conventionally and rationally inside the block we explore two set valued concepts coarsely and finely tenable blocks that formalize this notion for finite normal form games we then identify settled equilibria which are nash equilibria with support in minimal tenable blocks for a generic class of normal form games our coarse and fine concepts are equivalent and yet they differ from standard solution concepts on open sets of games we demonstrate the nature and power of the solutions by way of examples settled equilibria are closely related to persistent equilibria but are strictly more selective on an open set of games with fine tenability we obtain invariance under the insertion of a subgame with a unique totally mixed payoff equivalent equilibrium a property that other related concepts have not satisfied

producer attitudes toward output price risk experimental evidence from the lab and from the field a number of agricultural and food policy instruments are predicated on the idea that producers dislike output price risk we test experimentally some theoretical predictions about the behavior of producers in the face of output price risk namely sandmo s 1971 prediction that price risk at the extensive margin causes risk averse producers to decrease how much they produce and batra and ullah s 1974 prediction that price risk at the intensive margin causes producers whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion to further decrease how much they produce we do so in labs with us college students as well as in the field with peruvian farmers first as regards price risk at the extensive margin we find no support for sandmo s prediction second consistent with batra and ullah s prediction we find that output decreases in response to price risk at the intensive margin when imposing a linear relationship between output and price risk when relaxing the assumption of linearity between output and price risk however we find a nonmonotonic relationship between output and price risk taken together these results are broadly inconsistent with expected utility theory alternative models of behavior in the face of risk such as prospect theory may explain the behavior we observe

estimating demand for owner occupied housing subject to the income tax the federal income tax code includes several provisions which benefit homeowners first the imputed rent from the ownership of a house is not incorporated into a household s taxable income second mortgage interest and property tax payments are tax deductible finally capital gains go untaxed if they are reinvested these provisions reduce the effective price of housing services by reducing the factor prices for land and structure but they do not reduce the price of operating inputs nor do they necessarily reduce the prices of land and structure proportionately thus they alter the optimum factor input combinations in the production of owner occupant housing services by influencing relative factor prices the homeowner tax provisions also increase effective income if the deductions and exclusions are large enough to shift the households into a lower tax bracket in this case the household receives an effective income transfer in the amount of income saved by not having to pay taxes at a higher rate few attempts at quantifying owner occupant demand behavior have systematically incorporated federal income tax provisions none have considered the effects of these provisions on housing service production behavior maisel et al 121 conducted a study in which income but not price was adjusted for taxes while straszheim 21 using household interview data made an adjustment to the gross price of housing without adjusting income in an analysis of the welfare effects of owner occupant tax benefits laidler l l acknowledges that taxes alter both price and income but uses an estimate of price elasticity which does not incorporate income tax provisions rosen 18 191 however has adjusted both price and income for taxes in a recent estimation of housing demand while rosen s work represents a

insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi this brief summarizes the insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi the farmers were offered loans for the november 2006 planting season does production risk suppress the demand for credit the author implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to adopt a new crop technology the study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in malawi where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall the author randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high yielding hybrid maize and groundnut seeds for planting in the november 2006 crop season the other half of farmers were offered a similar credit package but were also required to purchase at actuarially fair rates a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall surprisingly take up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan take up was 33 0 percent for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan there is suggestive evidence that reduced take up of the insured loan was due to farmers already having implicit insurance from the limited liability clause in the loan contract insured loan take up was positively correlated with farmer education income and wealth which may proxy for the individual s default costs by contrast take up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with these farmer characteristics

utility risk and demand for incomplete insurance lab experiments with guatemalan cooperatives we play a series of incentivized laboratory games with risk exposed cooperative based coffee farmers in guatemala to understand the demand for index based rainfall insurance we show that insurance demand goes up as increasingly severe risk makes insurance payouts more partial payouts are smaller than losses but demand is ad versely effected by more complex risk structures in which payouts are probabilistic it is possible that a shock occurs with no payout we use numerical techniques to esti mate a flexible utility function for each player and consequently can put exact dollar values on the magnitude of the behavioral response triggered by probabilistic insur ance exploiting the group structure of the cooperative we investigate the possibility of using group loss adjustment to smooth idiosyncratic risk our results suggest that consumers value probabilistic insurance using a prospect style utility function that is concave both in probabilities and in income and that group insurance mechanisms are unlikely to solve the issues of low demand that have bedeviled index insurance markets

how does risk management influence production decisions evidence from a field experiment weather is a key source of income risk especially in emerging market economies this paper uses a randomized controlled trial involving indian farmers to study how an innovative rainfall insurance product affects production decisions the authors find that insurance provision induces farmers to invest more in higher return but rainfall sensitive cash crops particularly among educated farmers this shift in behavior occurs ex ante when realized monsoon rainfall is still uncertain the results suggest that financial innovation can mitigate the real effects of uninsured production risk

evolutionary game theory game theory has been developed as a theory of rational behavior in interpersonal conflict situations with economics and the other social sciences being the intended fields of application since the theory is based on an idealized picture of human rationality it is by no means obvious that it can be applied to situations in which the players cannot be attributed any intellectual capabilities however in their seminal paper the logic of animal conflict maynard smith and price showed that animal contests can be modeled as games and that game theory can be applied successfully in biology the objective of this chapter is to review some of the developments in this biological branch of game theory and to point out the distinctions and similarities with the classical branch also see parker and hammerstein 1985 the main emphasis will be on the mathematics involved lack of space prevents an extensive discussion of the underlying biological assumptions as well as an analysis of specific examples for these the reader is referred to the very stimulating book evolution and the theory of games by john maynard smith

social stability and equilibrium in the field of noncooperative game theory nash equilibrium nash 1951 has played a central role as a solution concept in bold strokes one may discern two major interpretations of nash equilibrium in the context of rational players the first which is close to the eductive interpretation of binmore 1987 1988 and the complete information interpretation of kaneko 1987 assumes that the game is played exactly once if it is a repeated game the repetition occurs once and the players have sufficient knowledge and ability to analyze the game in a rational manner sometimes it is assumed that all players have consistent hierarchies of beliefs where the game and their priors are common knowledge bayesian interpretation such as proposed by aumann 1987 advanced this idea to the level that the players have a common prior from this point of view however nash equilibrium seems far from being satisfactory

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

leave and let leave a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation the option to leave your current partner in response to his behavior also known as conditional dissociation is a mechanism that has been shown to promote the emergence and stability of cooperation in many social interactions this mechanism nevertheless has always been studied in combination with other factors that are known to support cooperation by themselves in this paper we isolate the effect of conditional dissociation on the evolution of cooperation and show that this mechanism is enough to sustain a significant level of cooperation if the expected lifetime of individuals is sufficiently long 2014 elsevier b v all rights reserved

evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants abstract the strategy that upsets a potential evolutionarily stable strategy may in itself be very unstable or may differ from the candidate strategy only in irrelevant ways this paper develops a solution concept addressing these difficulties we lood for a set of nash equilibria such that small groups of entrants whose members are satisfied with their entry cannot take the population out of the set such a set is robust to the iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies depends only on the reduced normal form and has the never a weak best response property for generic two person extensive form games such sets generate payoffs consistent with proper equilibria

a residence time model of housing markets abstract this paper estimates a semi markov model of housing markets in which families move from one home to another spend a random amount of time in each home and choose whether to own or to rent at each move limiting conditions of the semi markov process are used to characterize the steady state frequency of owner occupied housing and to simulate the impact of changes in housing tax policy this approach differs markedly from previous studies of housing tax policy which focus on the entire population as opposed to the movers and ignore the effect of household residence times see king 1980 rosen 1979 white and white 1977 or laidler 1969 residence times further influence the analysis by affecting the relative cost of owning to renting in the tenure choice model homeowners pay legal and realtor fees at the time they move out of their homes which renters do not have to pay the discounted value of these fees declines with length of stay and provides a structural explanation of why families with longer residence times have a greater propensity to own results from the empirical analysis suggest that the semi markov model closely predicts conditions in the united states and provide important insights into the effects of housing tax policy residence times are also found to influence household tenure choice through their impact on the discounted legal and realtor fees paid by homeowners

nudging farmers to use fertilizer theory and experimental evidence from kenya we model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertil izer and assume some are stochastically present biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias such farmers may procrastinate post poning fertilizer purchases until later periods when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer consistent with the model many farmers in western kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profit able fertilizer investments but they do invest in response to small time limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer free deliv ery just after harvest calibration suggests that this policy can yield higher welfare than either laissez faire policies or heavy subsidies

an evolutionary approach to pre play communication we add a round of pre play communication to a finite two player game played by a population of players pre play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs the paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability when there is no conflict of interest between the players only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics for general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

risk aversion experimental evidence from south african fishing communities we estimate the risk attitudes of a large sample of individuals from various fishing communities along the west coast of south africa female fishers and rights holders are found to be more risk averse than their male counterparts while rights holders are found to be less risk averse relative to subjects without fishing rights risk attitudes are found to be correlated with compliance with fisheries regulations in particular a greater degree of risk aversion translates into a reduction in compliance furthermore in the case of gender female fishers and rights holders are more likely to comply with fisheries regulations

equilibrium selection in a merger game abstract a merger game is modeled as a non cooperative simultaneous moves exclusive membership game of coalition formation in the three player case in the equilibrium selected by refinements the merger is such that the participants prefer it to other mergers involving them

cross sectional estimation of a simultaneous model of tenure choice and housing services demand abstract in this paper we analyze the demand for housing services integrating into a single analysis a systematic treatment of several important conceptual and empirical issues our three major objectives are to 1 evaluate the empirical importance of the simultaneity between the tenure choice and consumption level decisions 2 analyze the relationship between household type and housing demand and 3 present new estimates of the parameters of housing demand which are based on detailed microdata in the process we derive and estimate overall income and price demand elasticities which incorporate the impacts of income and price on both the tenure choice and consumption level decisions

risk preferences technology adoption and insurance uptake a framed experiment abstract despite the yield improvements associated with the adoption of new farming technologies and modern inputs technology diffusion amongst small scale farmers in developing countries is slow in this context given the inherently risky environments in which farmers in the developing world operate poor households are thought to be caught in a risk induced poverty trap specifically poorer households that are unable to insulate themselves from consumption risk avoid these risks by opting for lower return lower risk agriculture and thus do not benefit from technological innovation using a series of laboratory experiments in a south african setting this paper examines whether the provision of a framed index insurance product induces individuals to opt into riskier but potentially more profitable activities to do so we use a simple gambling task with real monetary prizes to elicit subjects risk preferences elicited risk preferences are applied to the uptake of credit and insurance in a series of framed insurance simulation games experiment participants are small scale and subsistence urban food growers overall the results of the experiment lend empirical weight to the poverty trap argument firstly a high degree of risk aversion is evident among the sample secondly risk averse individuals are more likely to opt into traditional agriculture reflected as traditional seeds in the experiment and are less likely to use modern farming inputs that require financing high yield varieties despite the availability of insurance the results indicate that the provision of index insurance is not a panacea for the problem of promoting technology diffusion to small scale farmers in the developing world but that residual production risk and basis risk must be considered in the contract design

credit rationing reply john riley has made a further remark on section iv observationally distinguishable borrowers of our 1981 paper in this review in that paper we defined two types of rationing criterion a rationing occurs when among observationally identical borrowers some get loans and others do not and the rationed borrowers cannot get credit at any interest rate a second type of rationing criterion b rationing occurs when entire types cannot get credit at any interest rate although they would get credit if the supply of funds were sufficiently large this type of rationing is often termed redlining we showed that given the special simplifying assumptions of our model and disregarding the incentive effects of loan contracts if there are many types of observationally distinguishable borrowers only one type is subject to criterion a rationing riley goes on to conclude that rationing becomes of insignificant importance as the number of observationally distinct groups becomes large more specifically the conclusion that one might be tempted to draw from section iv of the 1981 paper is that given the special simplifying assumptions of the paper and ignoring the incentive effects of interest rates delineated in the paper as the number of observationally distinct groups increases the proportion of the population subject to criterion a rationing decreases while the proportion subject to criterion b rationing decreases or increases depending on how the population is partitioned we did not include this conclusion or even a less verbose version in that paper because we feared it might mislead readers in either of two ways first the reader might not have been aware that the conclusion is very sensitive to the special assumptions of the adverse selection sections of our 1981 paper by the time we published our 1981 paper our research extending that model for example to multiperiod settings and to situations where collateral and interest rates were both employed had made it amply clear that the conclusion that type a rationing disappeared in importance as the number of types in the economy increased was not in fact generally valid second even within the special context of those special simplifying assumptions the conclusions would mislead a reader who was not aware that criterion b rationing redlining has consequences for allocative efficiency and macroeconomic policy that are as important as the consequences of criterion a rationing we are not so presumptuous as to believe that the assumptions we made in our 1981 paper should be interpreted as a literal description of the economy those assumptions were made to provide the simplest model in which the market equilibrium would be characterized by credit rationing if one is interested as we are in understanding the importance of rationing in the economy as opposed to its importance within a specific model one should investigate the nature of rationing in more general models that are formulated to more closely resemble the actual economy this we have done in a series of papers which show that with many observationally distinguishable groups there may be rationing of several or even of all groups for

civil institutions and evolution concepts critique and models abstract the paper examines the relation between civil norms and evolution the survival of norms in the long run may depend on the evolutionary process and natural selection the sieve of natural selection may ensure that norms which persist must have minimal efficiency properties this paper begins with a general discussion of evolutionary processes and the survival of civil institutions it then presents an introductory account of the theory of evolutionary games it is argued that the model of evolutionary games is more suited to analyzing animal behaviour than the human one since it is the latter that is of interest to economists an attempt is made in this paper to develop some new solution concepts which are more apt for human games

the relationships between income and price elasticities in studies of housing demand tenure choice and household formation abstract three decisions pertaining to the demand for housing are 1 household formation 2 tenure choice and 3 how much housing to consume given the household formation and tenure choice decisions income and price elasticities can be estimated that include one two or all three of these decisions the relationships between these elasticities are developed

consumption risk technology adoption and poverty traps evidence from ethiopia much has been written on the determinants of input and technology adoption in agriculture with issues such as input availability knowledge and education risk preferences profitability and credit constraints receiving much attention this paper focuses on a factor that has been less well documented the differential ability of households to take on risky production technologies for fear of the welfare consequences if shocks result in poor harvests building on an explicit model this is explored in panel data for ethiopia historical rainfall distributions are used to identify the counterfactual consumption risk controlling for unobserved household and time varying village characteristics it emerges that not just ex ante credit constraints but also the possibly low consumption outcomes when harvests fail discourage the application of fertilizer the lack of insurance causes inefficiency in production choices