the impact of endowment framing on market prices an experimental analysis framing effects are well known in individual decision making using experimental markets we investigated whether similar effects could be found in a market environment two series of experiments showed that negative framing can give different market prices than a positively framed endowment we also found that volume may be affected by the framing of the endowment 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a review of wta wtp studies abstract willingness to accept wta is usually substantially higher than willingness to pay wtp these constructs have been studied for roughly 30 years and with a wide variety of goods this paper reviews those studies we find that the less the good is like an ordinary market good the higher is the ratio the ratio is highest for non market goods next highest for ordinary private goods and lowest for experiments involving forms of money a generalization of this pattern holds even when we account for differences in survey design ordinary goods have lower ratios than non ordinary ones we also find that ratios in real experiments are not significantly different from hypothetical experiments and that incentive compatible elicitation yields higher ratios

consumer search incomplete exchange rate pass through and optimal interest rate policy this paper studies utility maximizing monetary policy in a two country economy with consumer search frictions search frictions provide a microfoundation for incomplete exchange rate pass through and international deviations from the law of one price lop i show that optimal interest rate policy targets deviations from the lop and acts to mitigate the effect of search frictions in a quantitative setting with internationally correlated technology and preference shocks optimal policy generates positive cross country correlation of nominal interest rates

wage rigidities and jobless recoveries abstract real wage rigidities cause jobless recoveries suppose that a one time shock reduces the capital stock below trend if wages are flexible they decline and employment increases at the moment of the shock before both revert back to normal levels as the economy grows back to trend if wages are completely rigid and the labor market is otherwise frictionless the shock causes a proportional and permanent decline in employment capital output consumption and investment relative to trend in a search model with rigid wages the shock causes a persistent but not permanent decline in these economic outcomes a jobless recovery

the origins and development of the northeast asian political economy industrial sectors product cycles and political consequences theories of the product cycle hegemony and the world system are used to analyze the creation and development of the northeast asian political economy in this century japan south korea and taiwan have each developed in a particular relationship with the others the three taken together form a hierarchical constantly interacting political economic unit during the period of colonial rule japan was unique in building an imperial economic unit marked by a strong role for the state whether in tokyo or taipei by a tight integral unking of all three nations into a communications and transport network running toward the metropole and by a strategy of both using the colonies for agricultural surpluses and then locating industries there after 1945 a diffuse american hegemony replaced japan s unilateral system but elements of the prewar model have survived strong states direct economic development in south korea and taiwan here termed bureaucratic authoritarian industrializing regimes both countries are receptacles for japan s declining industries and both countries develop in tandem if in competition with each other the most recent export led competition has seen taiwan succeed where south korea has temporarily failed leaving seoul in an export led trap burdened with rapidly increasing external debt taiwan furthermore has industrialized relatively free of social disruption whereas korean society resisted its transformation at japanese hands and remains more rebellious today there can be one japan and one taiwan but not two or many of either in the world economy

resolving differences in willingness to pay and willingness to accept reply gwendolyn c morrison 1997 raises a logical point regarding our experimental test of the divergence between willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta measures of economic value shogren et al 1994 she argues that our design does not provide a true test of the existence of a fundamental endowment effect since we did not control for the potential of a pivoting indifference map daniel kahneman et al 1990 she concludes that even though our ev idence shows that the mean wtp and wta bids for market goods with close substitutes e g candy bars and coffee mugs converge after market experience the endowment effect might still be alive and well albeit at statisti cally insignificant levels

modeling exchange rate passthrough after large devaluations large devaluations are generally associated with large declines in real exchange rates burstein eichenbaum and rebelo 2005 argue that the primary force causing these declines is often the slow adjustment in the price of nontradable goods and services we develop a model which embodies two complementary forces that account for the large declines in the real exchange rate that occur in the aftermath of large devaluations the first force is sticky nontradable goods prices instead of simply assuming that nontradable goods prices are sticky we develop conditions under which this phenomenon can emerge as an equilibrium outcome the second force is the impact of real shocks that often accompany large devaluations these real shocks lead to a decline in the price of nontradable goods relative to traded goods we argue that sticky nontradable goods prices generally play an important role in explaining post devaluation movements in real exchange rates however there are cases in which sticky nontradable goods prices are not sustainable as an equilibrium phenomenon in these cases real shocks are the primary driver of real exchange rate movements j e l classification f31

optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with home bias we analyze optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home bias in consumption peculiar to our framework is the application of a ramseytype analysis to a model of the recent open economy new keynesian literature we show that home bias in consumption is a su cient condition for inducing the monetary policy maker of an open economy to deviate from a strategy of strict markup stabilization and contemplate some optimal degree of exchange rate stabilization we focus on the optimal setting of policy both in the case of rms setting prices one period in advance and in a gradual fashion subject to adjustment costs while the rst setup allows us to analytically highlight home bias as an independent source of equilibrium

the mirage of floating exchange rates this note summarizes some of the highlights of my longer paper with guillermo calvo fear of floating many emerging market countries have suffered financial crises one view blames soft pegs for these crises adherents to that view suggest that countries move to corner solutions hard pegs or floating exchange rates we analyze the behavior of exchange rates reserves and interest rates to assess whether there is evidence that country practice is moving toward corner solutions we focus on whether countries that claim they are floating are indeed doing so we find that countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not there seems to be an epidemic case of fear of floating

the disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value psychologists have long argued that people are much more averse to a loss than attracted to an equivalent gain this behavior termed loss aversion has been formalized by kahneman and tversky 1979 in their reformulation of expected utility theory prospect theory in prospect theory the utility function is replaced by a value function that evaluates changes in income from the current level increases in income are weighted by a relatively small marginal utility decreases in income are weighted by a much larger marginal utility in effect the value function implies that a kink in the relationship between utility and income occurs at the initial income or reference point and that the slope of the utility function for losses in income is steeper than it is for gains in a recent paper knetsch and sinden 1984 report a series of experiments that demonstrate the existence of a large disparity between willingness to accept wta and willingness to pay wtp measures of value they argue that the psychological theory of loss aversion explains this difference economic theory would suggest that individuals who exhibit a large disparity between wta and wtp are perhaps underperceiving the value of gains or overperceiving the value of losses are behaving in an irrational manner and will consequently achieve a lower level of well being than if they behaved in a true utility maximizing manner this would in contrast to loss aversion usually imply near equal values for wta and wtp see willig 1976 further documentation of a larger than expected disparity between wta and wtp has been obtained in surveys asking for the value of a variety of public goods for example cummings brookshire and schulze 1986 document six

valuation in the lab experimental methods have proven useful to explore the power and limits to nonmarket valuation through stated preference methods we now understand better how people learn about and react to the incentives institutions and information created by surveys this paper briefly reviews topics in experimental valuation including ex ante bias corrections ex post bias calibration and examining the circumstances that strengthen or weaken the economist s presumption of rational valuation

pecuniary externalities in economies with downward wage rigidity abstract a pecuniary externality in economies with downward nominal wage rigidity leads firms to hire too many workers in expansions which leads to too much unemployment in recessions when firms hire more workers firms fail to internalize that competition for workers between firms pushes up the aggregate wage which imposes a negative externality over other firms the externality can be resolved by a macroprudential tax on labor in expansions in the calibrated model the tax reduces the welfare cost of downward nominal wage rigidity by up to 90 as it makes the economy significantly less exposed to unemployment crises

loss aversion without the endowment effect and other explanations for the wta wtp disparity abstract to learn why wta regularly exceeds wtp in economic experiments involving inexpensive market goods with ample substitutes the verbal protocol technique was used in a real cash experiment employing a random price auction results suggest that the primary reason for the disparity was subjects reluctance to suffer a net loss from any transaction whether purchase or sale and tendency to consider sale much below assumed market price as a loss this interpretation indicates a kind of loss aversion but not the kind envisioned in the endowment effect which maintains that selling creates a loss and buying creates a gain

how trading institutions affect financial market performance some laboratory evidence i introduction trading institutions vary considerably across contemporary financial markets 1 but most can be classified into one of two basic types the continuous double auction da allows traders to submit public offers to buy or to sell and to accept other traders offers at any moment in time the double auction institution offers immediacy but non uniform transaction prices the other basic trading institution the clearinghouse ch gathers offers and clears them at a unified price at a pre specified time it sacrifices immediacy for uniform transaction prices 2 the two types of institutions have co existed and evolved for centuries but now are emerging in new electronic versions market participants and policy makers would like to know which institution or variant or combination is most efficient but theoretical and empirical work to date provides little guidance this paper reports on a series of laboratory asset markets experiments designed to compare variants of the double auction and clearinghouse trading institutions the markets are small usually with eight or nine traders but the traders are profit motivated and experienced with the trading institutions the traded asset has uncertain market value and traders receive useful but inconclusive private information they can only learn the asset s true value during the course of trade laboratory markets offer several advantages for empirical study of financial market institutions first private information is observable even controllable in the laboratory and therefore the investigator can directly measure market efficiency 3 second the complexity of the environment can be varied systematically in the laboratory and its effects on market performance can be separated from the effects of the market institution and other forces finally the market institution itself is controllable in the laboratory so it is possible to make valid causal inferences on how the market institution shapes market performance i begin with a survey of relevant literature and other preliminaries in the rest of this section section ii outlines the laboratory procedures the creation of trading environments of varying complexity the electronic implementation of the clearinghouse and double auction trading institutions the computation of theoretical benchmark prices and allocations and the measurement of market performance section iii collects the results following an illustrative account of a double auction trading period and a clearinghouse trading period i use descriptive statistics to summarize market performance in each of the thirty nine experiments the main conclusions are based on statistical comparisons of market performance across alternative market institutions the clearinghouse institution does surprisingly well it delivers greater market depth than the double auction discovers prices at least as efficiently and produces final allocations almost as efficient as the double auction the main institutional variants examined in this paper concern the amount of information made public regarding order placement orderflow the data suggest that public display of the orderflow enhances double auction efficiency but may impair clearinghouse efficiency a study of trading volume shows higher volume in the double auction in both institutions volume increases when important private news arrives and when the trading period is about to end the paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the results a companion paper friedman 1991 considers the effects of awarding various privileges to some but not all traders copeland and friedman 1987 1991 provide useful background information on laboratory procedures and computerized double auction markets instructions for the current experiments are available on request the need for empirical work a skeptic might argue that empirical work is unnecessary the mere fact that the double auction and clearinghouse institutions both persist in major financial markets implies that both are highly efficient because a more efficient institution would displace less efficient institutions

public sector expenditures and financial crisis in chile abstract working with official government statistics this paper shows that imf stabilization guidelines which blame inflation and balance of payments disequilibrium on fiscal deficits are incorrect in the case of chile there government spending has for the most part been held in check during the military government however there are leading and lagging expenditure areas within the government military spending has steadily increased while social expenditures have been cut the latter point directly contradicts the official government position

privatization and democracy the effects of regime type in the developing world what is the effect of regime type on privatization of state owned enterprises the authors investigate the relationship between regime type and privatization through a panel data set for 76 developing countries from 1987 to 1994 the results show that contrary to most studies that claim that authoritarian regimes are better able to ignore societal interests opposed to economic measures that impose austerity democracies privatize more than authoritarian regimes moreover challenging conventional interpretations that claim that economic difficulties contribute to state sell offs the authors find that privatization is most likely in wealthier developing democracies whose budgets operate with current account surpluses hence authoritarian regimes provide neither the right nor the correct model for countries wishing to pursue unpopular economic policies

monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy we lay out a small open economy version of the calvo sticky price model and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap we use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rulebased policy regimes for the small open economy domestic inflation and cpi based taylor rules and an exchange rate peg we show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail we also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules

fees and the efficiency of tradable permit systems an experimental approach the paper presents the results of an economic experiment in which the effects of fees on allocative efficiency of tradable utilization permits e g pollution permits are explored laboratory subjects university students play the roles of firms whose generic product requires a specific input or permits scarcity is exogenously introduced by a fixed supply of tradable production permits three treatments are compared no fee imposed n a fixed tax per permit t and partial retraction of permits and subsequent redistribution by auction a treatments t and a represent two different ways of imposing fees which are designed to be revenue equivalent our results indicate that after controlling for deviation of permit prices from a prediction based on fundamentals fees have an impact on distribution of permits interestingly a fixed tax enhances efficiency compared to the case of no fees while retraction and reallocation by auction tends to reduce efficiency apparently subjects decision making is affected by the imposition of fees but how and to what extent depends on the method used

are micro and macro labor supply elasticities consistent a review of evidence on the intensive and extensive margins we evaluate whether state of the art macro models featuring indivisible labor are consistent with modern quasi experimental micro evidence by synthesizing evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins we find that micro estimates are consistent with macro estimates of the steady state hicksian elasticities relevant for cross country comparisons on both the extensive and intensive margins however micro estimates of intertemporal substitution frisch elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in aggregate hours by preferences the key puzzle to be resolved is why micro and macro estimates of the frisch extensive margin elasticity are so different

real wage rigidities and the new keynesian model most central banks perceive a trade off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output however the standard new keynesian framework implies no such trade off in that framework stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare relevant output gap in this paper we argue that this property of the new keynesian framework which we call the divine coincidence is due to a special feature of the model the absence of nontrivial real imperfections we focus on one such real imperfection namely real wage rigidities when the baseline new keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities the divine coincidence disappears and central banks indeed face a trade off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare relevant output gap we show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications but it also has appealing positive properties in particular it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation unemployment relation found in the data

papers in experimental economics competitive market institutions double auctions vs sealed bid offer auctions consider a market with the following characteristics 1 privacy that is each agent knows only his own valuation or cost conditions 2 exchange follows the rules of the oral double auction that is buyers freely announce bids or accept offers and sellers freely announce offers or accept bids 3 aggregate market supply and demand per trading period is stationary for at least two to three periods and 4 there are at least four buyers and as many sellers the literature reporting the results of a large number of experimental markets with these characteristics documents what appears to be a remarkably rapid convergence to a competitive equilibrium ce however any claim of double auction da convergence to the ce can only have meaning in one of three senses i the ce is attained immediately ii after t periods of trading some measure of the market s state such as mean price is nearer relative to experimental sampling variability to a ce than to some distinct alternative equilibrium such as a monopoly or nash equilibrium iii after t periods of trading this measure is nearer to a ce in da experimental markets than in markets organized under a different institution of contract for example a sealed bid auction since everything from electrons and the stars to rats and people yield state measures subject to error or random variation the deterministic criterion i can have no serious scientific standing by such criteria any hypothesis can be rejected and there could be no science of physics biology or economics 2 with the exception of certain very simple markets such as single object auctions or certain idealized markets such as the cournot quantity adjuster model economics has only two concepts of equilibrium monopoly and competitive the only formal model of da trading that has been proposed see david easley and john ledyard p 6 predicts stochastic convergence in finite time with probability one to a ce hence the only test alternative to the ce research hypothesis in da markets is a monopoly or monopsony equilibrium experimentalists have not reported statistical tests of the ce professor department of economics university of arizona assistant professor department of economics indiana university instructor department of economics university of arizona and sandia national laboratories albuquerque nm respectively we are indebted to the national science foundation for research support and to art denzau and mort kamien for helpful comments there is an early and recently growing body of experimental evidence for convergence to a competitive equilibrium under double auction rules the earliest evidence contained in experiments initiated in january 1956 is reported in smith 1962 1964 1965 1976 however these early experiments used between twenty and fifty or so participant buyers and sellers because in keeping with prevailing professional beliefs it was thought that a ce was unlikely to be approached unless numbers were quite large using large numbers was not unreasonable since it is a good beginning procedure to give a theory whatever is believed to be its best shot more recent evidence using six buyers six sellers and two traders in speculative da markets with cyclical demand is reported by r m miller charles plott and smith and williams 1979 for evidence from a comparison of oral and computerized da experiments with four buyers and four sellers see williams 1980 for further evidence in the context of the study of price controls see m isaac and plott 1981b and smith and williams 1981b in the context of a conspiracy study see isaac and plott 1981a in the context of comparisons between da and posted offer pricing see jon ketcham smith and williams in the context of a study of four variations on da rules see smith and williams 1980 all of these more recent papers report double auction experiments using no more than four buyers and four sellers 2as frederick mosteller once noted if you wanted to reject the inverse square law of attraction try tossing a sheet of paper out the window

global effective lower bound and unconventional monetary policy abstract in a standard open economy new keynesian model the effective lower bound causes anomalies output and terms of trade respond to a supply shock in the opposite direction compared to normal times we introduce a tractable framework to accommodate for unconventional monetary policy in our model these anomalies disappear we allow unconventional policy to be partially active and asymmetric between countries empirically we find the us euro area and uk have implemented a considerable amount of unconventional monetary policy the us follows the historical taylor rule whereas the others have done less compared to normal times

structural reforms in a debt overhang we assess the eects of reforms in product and labor markets in an econ omy where credit restrictions and long term debt combine to produce a persis tent recession with slow deleveraging following a negative nancial shock we show that reforms that reduce markups in product markets stimulate output and employment even in the short run despite their de ationary eects by favouring a faster recovery of investment and collateral values product mar ket reforms bring forward the end of the deleveraging phase this last eect is missing in the case of labor market reforms the short run eects of which are sensitive to the response of trade ows and to debt maturity

legal institutions environmental protection and the willingness to accept measure of value abstract this paper looks at the us legal system and negative environmental externalities i provide a positive explanation for the role of courts in environmental disputes using the willingness to accept wa measure of value i further suggest that environmental law has aided courts in attaining a new welfare standard wa efficiency the explanation offered here contrasts with those found in law and economics because i propose that courts are not substitutes for markets and as such one of their important roles may be to efficiently redistribute entitlements the analysis is formalized with a model in which the court allows a victim of pollution to exert a credible threat against a polluter which results in increased social welfare even beyond what would exist in a zero transaction cost world i also investigate when legal policy based on wa efficiency is appropriate and suggest that the answer may hinge on rawl s notion of primary goods

monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy this paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities it shows that the utility based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation output gap and real exchange rate the presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility when domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime the reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low

the political economy of privatization in developing countries abstract privatization in ldcs refers here to the sale or leasing of assets in which the state has a majority interest and the contracting out of publicly provided services privatization is in part a response to the need for fiscal austerity its pace and scope will be determined importantly by the way in which the public sector was built privatization is easier to implement than has been supposed because its austerity and equity costs are relatively small compared to those of broader structural adjustment processes in which it is commonly situated however the payoffs from privatization are relatively small too there is high opportunity cost in time and management for the complicated task of preparing public assets for sale capital market thinness characterizes ldcs and popular capitalism does not appear to be a realistic option in ldcs privatization is likely to be entangled in regional and ethnic conflicts these may be as consequential for formulating and implementing programs as are the critical coalitions that form between economic sectors such as capital and labor or importers and exporters we believe that privatization is not a linear or ineluctable process indeed many privatizations may be implemented in the absence of a commitment to market forces but where the state seeks to redefine the instruments and scope of its interventionism

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

understanding the gains from wage flexibility the exchange rate connection we study the gains from increased wage exibility and their dependence on exchange rate policy using a small open economy model with staggered price and wage setting two results stand out i the impact of wage adjustments on employment is smaller the more the central bank seeks to stabilize the exchange rate and ii an increase in wage exibility often reduces welfare and more likely so in economies under an exchange rate peg or an exchange rate focused monetary policy our ndings call into question the common view that wage exibility is particularly desirable in a currency union

sticky prices in the euro area a summary of new micro evidence this paper summarises the vast evidence on micro price setting recently obtained for euro area countries we consider studies with micro data on consumer and producer prices as well as survey information the main findings are 1 prices in the euro area are sticky and stickier than in the us 2 downward price rigidity is only slightly more marked than upward price rigidity 3 heterogeneity and asymmetries are observed in price setting and 4 the relevance of theories that explain price stickiness such as implicit or explicit contracts marginal costs and coordination failure is confirmed whereas menu costs pricing thresholds and costly information explanations are judged much less relevant by firms jel c25 d40 e31

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

is increased price flexibility stabilizing redux abstract what are the implications of increased price flexibility on output volatility in a simple dsge model we show analytically that more flexible prices always amplify output volatility for supply shocks and also amplify output volatility for demand shocks if monetary policy does not respond strongly to inflation more flexible prices often reduce welfare even under optimal monetary policy if full efficiency cannot be attained our results extend to a model with both sticky information and wages we estimate a quantitative dsge model using bayesian methods and using counterfactual experiments show that our results from the simple model continue to apply

the effects of a money financed fiscal stimulus abstract i analyze the effects of a money financed fiscal stimulus and compare them with those resulting from a conventional debt financed stimulus i study the effects of both a tax cut and an increase in government purchases with and without a binding zero lower bound zlb on the nominal interest rate when the zlb is not binding a money financed fiscal stimulus is shown to have much larger multipliers than a debt financed fiscal stimulus that difference in effectiveness persists but is much smaller under a binding zlb nominal rigidities are shown to play a major role in shaping those effects

economic stabilization conditionality and political stability imf conditionality is seldom so important that it dominates all other considerations for political stability imf stabilization programs often shift benefits from one group to another they expose elites to charges of selling the sovereignty of their countries the imposition of imf conditions particularly subsidy cuts may lead to sharp outbreaks of civil disorder nonetheless the imf provides resources that make adjustment easier and thus may lessen the chances of political instability for a country imf programs are seldom implemented fully as negotiated and the penalties for partial compliance are not great debtor countries have more flexibility in imposing austerity measures and the economic constraints are less binding than often assumed the very availability of alternatives to imf programs results in internal divisions because some favor debt repudiation and others oppose it groups now contend over solutions to the debt problems of their countries

experimental tests of the endowment effect abstract the endowment effect which predicts undertrading and a willingness to accept greater than willingness to pay is studied using responses that remove all reference to buying or selling and focuses only on choice tasks the results significantly lower the willingness to pay willingness to accept discrepancy but the latter is still significant a high efficiency open display uniform price auction is used to exchange mugs for money since mugs are randomly assigned to half of 2n subjects n 2 mugs are predicted to trade less than n 2 mugs trade on average but more than previously reported the phenomenon exists but is less prominent than reported previously

international debt deleveraging i provide a framework for understanding debt deleveraging in a group of nancially integrated countries during an episode of international deleveraging world consumption demand is depressed and the world interest rate is low reecting a high propensity to save if exchange rates are allowed to oat deleveraging countries can depreciate their nominal exchange rate to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associated with debt reduction the key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union this channel of adjustment is shut o and therefore the falls in consumption demand and in the world interest rate are amplied hence monetary unions are especially prone to hit the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and enter a liquidity trap during deleveraging in a liquidity trap deleveraging gives rise to a union wide recession which is particularly severe in high debt countries the model suggests several policy interventions that mitigate the negative impact of deleveraging on output in monetary unions

european inflation dynamics abstract we provide evidence on the fit of the new phillips curve npc for the euro area over the period 1970 1998 and use it as a tool to compare the characteristics of european inflation dynamics with those observed in the u s we also analyze the factors underlying inflation inertia by examining the cyclical behavior of marginal costs as well as that of its two main components namely labor productivity and real wages some of the findings can be summarized as follows a the npc fits euro area data very well possibly better than u s data b the degree of price stickiness implied by the estimates is substantial but in line with survey evidence and u s estimates c inflation dynamics in the euro area appear to have a stronger forward looking component i e less inertia than in the u s d labor market frictions as manifested in the behavior of the wage markup appear to have played a key role in shaping the behavior of marginal costs and consequently inflation in europe

risk preference differentials of small groups and individuals the risk prefer ences of thr ee person group s a nd individuals are compar ed using a non sequential repeated measures lottery exp eriment w ith 20 per player win pe rcentages varying from 10 to 90 analysis based on independent samples of certainty equivalent ratios certainty equivalent expected value elicited using a maximum willingness to pay mechanism for fifty two individuals and sixteen groups reveals that 1 certainty equi valent ratios cers va ry significantly a cross lottery win percentages 2 cer dispersion tends to decline as the lottery win percentage increases and is significantly smaller for groups than individuals in seven of the nine lotteries 3 for the highest risk lotteries the average cers submitted by groups are significantly smaller more risk averse than the average cers submitted by individuals 4 for the lowest risk lotteries the average cers submitted by groups are approximately risk neutral cer 1 and somewhat larger than the average cers submitted by individuals

valuing the non use benefits of marine conservation zones an application to the uk marine bill abstract this paper presents the results of a stated preference choice experiment designed to estimate the non market benefits derived by uk residents from the conservation of ecosystem goods and services resulting from implementation of proposed marine conservation zones under the uk marine and coastal access bill 2008 the results inform an impact assessment that compares benefits to projected policy costs as demonstrated in a paper by hussain et al 2010 ex ante benefit estimation is complicated by the scientific uncertainty and data gaps that hinder the development of a bottom up valuation of the ecosystem goods and services provisioned by the policy a choice experiment approach provides an alternative top down valuation by approximating policy outcomes which are spatially remote from beneficiaries and therefore arguably only appreciated passively or in terms of non use or existence value for broadly defined attributes of the policy the choice experiment shows preferences for both halting the loss of or increasing marine biodiversity and the provision of other environmental services relative to current trajectories of decline survey respondents were indifferent to the levels of restrictions on activities needed to achieve these outcomes as a top down estimate of policy benefits the study suggests that welfare improvements from the marine bill significantly outweigh projected regulatory costs

privatization and the logic of coalition building a comparative analysis of state divestiture in turkey and the united kingdom privatization has emerged as a global phenomenon during the 1980s rather paradoxically however the extent of privatization both in terms of the scale of divestitures as well as the pace of implementation has with notable exceptions remained quite restricted this article seeks to develop a framework for explaining the pattern of limited privatization the central argument is that the possibilities for utilizing privatization as an instrument for mobilizing an electoral coalition and establishing a form of popular capitalism are rather remote in the context of most developing countries alternative forms of privatization involving direct sale to domestic or foreign corporations are either not feasible or politically unattractive the u k experiment is in many ways unique the conditions that facilitated extensive privatization in the united kingdom are not likely to be reproduced in other national contexts in the third world the author attempts to demonstrate the validity of this argument via

learning to like what you have explaining the endowment effect the endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it the existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments we attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect the reason is that an endowment effect improves one s bargaining position in bilateral trades we show that for a general class of evolutionary processes strictly positive endowment effects will survive in the long run

resistance redistribution and investor friendliness abstract poor communities sometimes resist private investment and destroy economic surplus even if the government has the willingness and ability to redistribute we interpret such acts of resistance as demands for redistribution destruction contains credible information about how the affected group values surplus and such information is used by the government in implementing the optimal redistribution policy the extent of destruction is increasing in the extent of political marginalization of the affected group resistance not only destroys economic surplus it also mutes the investor s incentives to create surplus the government uses a tax subsidy on the investor to maximize weighted social surplus and we show that the possibility of destruction may force the government to be too soft in its negotiations with the investor we discuss several policy instruments that have the potential to improve welfare these include compensation floor for the affected group legal or financial protection for the investor and licensing fees for the investor

monetary policy in a low pass through environment in a dynamic new keynesian optimizing model we introduce incomplete exchange rate pass through on import prices three results stand out first unlike canonical models with perfect pass through which emphasize a type of isomorphism incomplete pass through renders the analysis of monetary policy of an open economy fundamentally different from the one of a closed economy second productivity driven deviations from the law of one price assume the interpretation of endogenous cost push shocks third the optimal commitment policy relative to discretion entails a smoothing of the deviations from the law of one price and requires more stable nominal and real exchange rates

politics of economic liberalization in india abstract attempts at liberalizing india s import substitution model of development have had a mixed record some success in changing the policy regime highlights the role of a new technocratic leadership that has received support from both indian business groups and from external aid agencies conversely popular sectors within india including the rank and file of the ruling party the organized workers in the public sector and the numerically significant middle and lower peasantry have registered their opposition while the government remains committed to liberalizing the economy the momentum has slowed down and given the pressures of electoral politics a populist economic program has been simultaneously readopted it appears that the marriage of political and economic liberalism may not be an easy one in countries like india

is increased price flexibility stabilizing this paper uses john taylor s model of overlapping contracts to show that increased wage and price flexibility can easily be destabilizing because of the mundell effect while lower prices increase output the expectation of falling prices decreases output simulations based on realistic parameter values suggest that increases in price flexibility might well increase the cyclical variability of output in the united states copyright 1986 by american economic association

the political economy of economic liberalization two of the major policy problems facing governments of developing countries in the 1 980s have been unsustainable external and internal disequilibria and implementation of politically feasible stabilization cum liberalization programs which become necessary to correct these imbalances this article discusses these crises and subsequent policy reform the analysis suggests that balance of payments and fiscal deficits are frequently the result of use of an incorrect accounting system in a fixed exchange rate economy and of public sector expansion beyond its economically feasible size that governments usually seek to liberalize their economies during a crisis to regain control when the growth of the transfer state has led to generalized tax resistance avoidance or evasion that reduction of the government role will be required to alleviate these crises that sharp departures from past policies rather than gradual reform may be politically necessary and that contrary to the current technocratic opinion on this matter the sequencing of a consistent and credible package of reforms which will most effectively reduce the costs of adjustment is initial liberalization of domestic capital markets simultaneous with cuts in the fiscal deficit followed by floating the exchange rate and then commodity market liberalization with the growing importance of internal monetary fund imf stabilization and world bank structural adjustment programs there has been concern about the proper sequencing of the standard stabilization cum liberalization measures contained in these packages in particular there is grave concern at the very mixed and in some cases disastrous effects of liberalization attempts on incomes and employment in the southern cone of latin america in the late 1970s and early 1 980s much of the existing discussion of the order of liberalization is conducted within the traditional technocratic framework which seeks to determine the welfare cost minimizing deployment of policies in the standard stabilization and 1 this assumes a benevolent and well informed government maximizing a social welfare function

risk uncertainty and entrepreneurship evidence from a lab in the field experiment theory predicts that entrepreneurs have distinct attitudes toward risk and uncertainty but empirical evidence is mixed to better understand the unique behavioral characteristics of entrepreneurs and the causes of these mixed results we perform a large lab in the field experiment comparing entrepreneurs to managers a suitable comparison group and employees n 2 288 the results indicate that entrepreneurs perceive themselves as less risk averse than managers and employees in line with common wisdom however when using experimental incentivized measures the differences are subtler entrepreneurs are only found to be unique in their lower degree of loss aversion and not in their risk or ambiguity aversion this combination of results might be explained by our finding that perceived risk attitude is not only correlated to risk aversion but also to loss aversion overall we therefore suggest using a broader definition of risk that captures this unique feature of entrepreneurs their willingness to risk losses this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

the inherent benefit of monetary unions abstract if the monetary authority lacks commitment a monetary union can dominate flexible exchange rates with forward looking staggered pricing inertia in the terms of trade induced by a fixed exchange rate is a benefit under discretion since it acts like a commitment device by trading off flexibility in the adjustment of the terms of trade the monetary authority improves on its ability to manage private sector s expectations the higher the incidence of asymmetric inefficient shocks and or the higher the degree of nominal price rigidity the greater the inherent benefit of monetary unions in stark contrast to the traditional optimum currency area theory

a new meta analysis on the wtp wta disparity abstract this study reports a new meta analysis of papers that elicit willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept compensation wta measures of value for the same good we investigate the effects of type of good and several survey design features on the wtp wta disparity measured as the logarithm of the ratio of mean wta to mean wtp confirming horowitz and mcconnell s 2002 pioneering meta analysis we find the disparity is smaller for ordinary private goods than for public and non market goods that it is not solely an artifact of using hypothetical transactions or other weak experimental or survey methods and that it is smaller for studies using student subjects in addition we find that the disparity is smaller when subjects have experience valuing the good in real markets or through repeated experimental trials in contrast to horowitz and mcconnell we find the disparity is significantly smaller in studies using incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms the disparity is smaller in more recent studies an effect that is attributable only in part to changes in study characteristics

the political economy of chinese style privatization motives and constraints summary the paper examines how the privatization of chinese state owned enterprises soes can be successfully triggered and completed by identifying the motives of local government leaders and the constraints that face them during transition we conclude that first whether local governments are motivated to privatize their soes depends on if the ownership transfer is expected to stimulate sufficiently high growth of local tax revenues without sacrificing the bureaucrats private control benefits second a specific privatization program can succeed only if it manages to satisfy the managerial cooperation constraint the workers compensation constraint and the bank debt servicing constraint the motives cum constraints political economy approach offers an important explanation for the pace and scope of the ongoing chinese style privatization

notes for a new guide to keynes i wages aggregate demand and employment i revisit the general theory s discussion of the role of wages in employment determination through the lens of the new keynesian model the analysis points to the key role played by the monetary policy rule in shaping the link between wages and employment and in determining the welfare impact of enhanced wage exibility i show that the latter is not always welfare improving