balancing skilled with unskilled migration in an urbanizing agricultural economy summary in the early stages of economic development the migration of unskilled workers contributes to labor intensive manufacturing production in middle income countries however the migration of skilled workers becomes the more important factor in economic progress evaluating the skill content of migration patterns therefore is essential to understanding migration s economic implications for this purpose we investigate the determinants of skilled and unskilled migration decisions in vietnam rural higher education is shown to promote knowledge intensive production by encouraging skilled individuals to migrate to cities in complementary fashion commercial farm development helps alleviate urban overcrowding by encouraging unskilled individuals to remain at home

bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions use of computerized nash competitors abstract results are reported from a series of first price sealed bid auctions where bidders face computerized nash equilibrium competitors the results provide strong support for employing this newly developed methodology as a testing procedure for nash equilibrium bidding models

dynamic learning in a two person experimental game abstract we analyze learning in a two person simultaneous choice repeated game agents form beliefs about their rival s strategies which they revise as the game progresses we test this model using data from a series of experiments we obtain data on subjects expectations by asking them to predict their rival s choice in each period of the game subjects are paid for each correct prediction we analyze the data using the kalman filtering technique and find that learning is broadly consistent with bayesian updating the predicted equilibrium based on this learning process is indistinguishable from observed behavior for most subjects in later periods

who formulates renewable energy policy a swedish example a broad participation by stakeholders and an extensive reliance on expert advice are often seen as preconditions for a legitimate and successfully implemented renewable energy policy however we have lacked systematic data for testing this argument this article s contribution is to examine the actors who take part in the making of swedish energy policy with the help of data on the composition of various committees of inquiry over the last twenty years 1988 2009 swedish renewable energy policy is often characterised with words like pioneering and forerunner suggesting that the policy making process in this area engages many different experts and stakeholders our data give only some support to this argument results point to a noteworthy predominance of politicians civil servants and representatives of state agencies within the policy process producers of uranium and fossils based energy have been engaged more often than producers of renewable energy experts have played a prominent role but this is mostly due to the participation of expert bureaucrats rather than of scientists the study suggests that a better understanding of the making of energy policy both in sweden and elsewhere requires greater attention to the networks and role of various state employees

reprint of crop prices and the individual decision to migrate abstract this paper investigates the effect of commodity prices in particular rice and coffee on the decision of migrating at the individual level as most coffee production is sold by households for exports we would expect that coffee price shocks would have a direct effect on the probability to migrate on the other hand we would anticipate that fluctuations in rice prices have little or no effect on migration decisions given that rice is mainly produced for household consumption we test these hypotheses drawing evidence from migration in viet nam we show that the lower the price of coffee the higher the likelihood of migrating this evidence seems to suggest that migration acts as a shock coping strategy we find that rice prices have no effect on the probability of migrating we further explore the extent of migrants self selection and show that lower coffee prices increase the migration probability of individuals with lower education

understanding overbidding in second price auctions an experimental study we present results from second price private value auction spa experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponentsvalue such signals change biddersperception about the strengthof their opponent and the relationship between biddersperception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in spa we found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values supporting a modifiedjoy of winninghypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values consistent with thespite hypothesis second price private value auctions spas are the most easily understood auction format from a theoretical point of view 1 in standard private value auction models of fully rational bidders with standard preferences bidding one s own value is a weakly dominant strategy this theoretical prediction holds irrespective of biddersrisk atti tudes the number of rival bidders symmetry in the value distributions and so on in laboratory experiments however subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding kagel et al 1987 found that the actual bids are on average 11 above the dominant strategy bids kagel and levin 1993 found that about 62 of all bids in their five bidder spa sessions exceed the bidder s value while only 8 of all bids were below it both kagel and levin 1993 and harstad 2000 further reported that experience has only a small effect in reducing overbidding in spa an important related finding is that overbidding in english auctions a mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the spa in the case of private values is known to be a short term phenomenon that subjects quickly learn not to undertake kagel and levin 1993 thus any explanation for the prevalence and persistence of overbidding in the spa must also explain its rarity in the english auction given the robustness of the findings of overbidding in spa it is surprising that economists have little understanding of why it happens kagel et al 1987 conjectured that bidding above one s own value in a spa is based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second highest bid 2 moreover they argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive profits and because the negative feedback from overbidding is a weak mechanism in the spa for example if a bidder overbids in a spa by 10 above her value it is quite possible that she does not win at all and thus does not experience

does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first price auctions abstract overbidding with respect to risk neutral nash predictions in first price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature one possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments do not have a clear perception of probabilities which causes them to bid aggressively we test whether displaying probabilities of winning produces systematic differences in bidding in our design previous auction outcomes are not revealed across treatments no significant differences in behavior across treatments are obtained our results are in contrast to previous experiments which suggest that displaying probabilities could reduce the extent of overbidding

traders expectations in asset markets experimental evidence we elicit traders predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15 period lived asset we find that individuals beliefs about prices are adaptive and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market and when experienced they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur when prices deviate from fundamental values belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

are carbon taxes good for the poor a general equilibrium analysis for vietnam summary we evaluate effects of an environmental tax using a general equilibrium model linked to a household database the burden of the tax applied mainly to energy is passed forward by non tradable industries and backward by tradable industries facing fixed world prices the tax is thus equivalent to a real exchange rate appreciation and since export industries are labor intensive reduces employment and increases poverty especially when labor supply is responsive to wages the use of revenues to increase transfers to households can offset poverty increases but does not create jobs thus the tax will likely conflict with other development policy objectives

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

risk aversion and overbidding in first price sealed bid auctions new experimental evidence bidding above the risk neutral nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion later studies however offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role in a novel experimental design we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets we find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding jel d44 c91

measuring poverty in a growing world or measuring growth in a poor world the extent to which growth reduces global poverty has been disputed for 30 years although there are better data than ever before controversies are not resolved a major problem is that consumption measured from household surveys which is used to measure poverty grows less rapidly than consumption measured in national accounts in the world as a whole and in large countries particularly india china and the united states in consequence measured poverty has fallen less rapidly than appears warranted by measured growth in poor countries one plausible cause is that richer households are less likely to participate in surveys but growth in the national accounts is also upward biased and consumption in the national accounts contains large and rapidly growing items that are not consumed by the poor and not included in surveys so it is possible for consumption of the poor to grow less rapidly than national consumption without any increase in measured inequality current statistical procedures in poor

convergence an experimental study of teaching and learning in repeated games nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a steady state where players hold correct beliefs about the other players behavior and act rationally we experimentally examine the process that leads to this steady state our results indicate that some players emerge as teachers those subjects who by their actions try to influence the beliefs of their opponent and lead the way to a more favorable outcome and that the presence of teachers appears to facilitate convergence to nash equilibrium in addition to our experiments we examine games with different properties from other experiments and show that teaching plays an important role in these games we also report results from treatments in which teaching is made more difficult in these treatments convergence rates go down and any convergence that does occur is delayed jel c70 c91 d83 d84

learning to bid an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games we examine learning behaviour in auction and fair division experiments with independent private values under two different price rules first and second price participants play all four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids this allows us to study how institutional changes are anticipated and whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games we find that learning does not drive bidding towards the benchmark solution bid functions are adjusted globally rather than locally directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid changes the data support a cognitive approach to learning

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

out migration wealth constraints and the quality of local amenities the relation between income and migration intentions can be monotonically decreasing increasing or inverse u shaped dependent on the level of migration cost relative to wealth and if individuals are credit constrained using unique individual level data covering countries in three geographic regions sub saharan africa asia and latin america we show that migration intentions respond to individual wealth and that the pattern differs across the country groups studied in a manner compatible with the predictions of our simple model we also show that contentment with various dimensions of local amenities such as public services and security are key determinants of migration intentions

global market shocks and poverty in vietnam the case of rice world food prices have experienced dramatic increases in recent years these shocks affect food importers and exporters alike vietnam is a major exporter of rice and rice is also a key item in domestic production employment and consumption accordingly rice price shocks from the world market have general equilibrium impacts and as such their implications for household welfare are not known ex ante in this paper we first present a simple framework for understanding the direct and indirect welfare effects of a global market shock of this kind second we quantify the transmission of the price shock from global indicator prices to domestic markets third we then we use an applied general equilibrium age model to simulate the effects of domestic price changes in more detail fourth a recursive mapping to a large nationally representative living standards survey permits us to identify in detail the ceteris paribus effects of the shock on household incomes and welfare in this analysis interregional and intersectoral adjustments in the labor market emerge as key channels transmitting the effects of global price shocks across sectors and among households

subjective probabilities in games an application to the overbidding puzzle this article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games we conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first price auctions the experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction and indeed overbid when provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions subjects learn to make better predictions and to curb significantly overbidding the structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

labor market consequences of internal migration in turkey abstractduring the past 30 years turkey has undergone profound economic and social transformations including fundamental shifts from a state oriented economy to a market oriented economy large scale modernization investments in telecommunication and transportation services and low intensity ongoing armed conflict concentrated in the country s southeastern region for such a period using the 1990 and 2000 turkish censuses i evaluated the labor market consequences of internal migration that might have been sparked by such significant economic and social changes overall the results suggest that provinces with a higher share of recent migrants may observe decreases in their native population s labor market opportunities while this adverse impact of the recent migrant inflows remains robust it exhibits heterogeneity with respect to the skill level of natives as well as for the labor market outcomes of different native and migrant groups

nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions the extent to which the behavior of people is consistent with game theoretic principles is investigated in a first price sealed bid auction environment three linear rules of thumb with increasing complexity are used as benchmarks to gauge the accuracy of the constant relative risk aversion model crram in addition the crram is tested against the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis existing competitive bidding experiments cannot clearly distinguish between game theoretic models and linear markdown rules on an individual level within the parametric environments studied and reported in the experimental literature game theoretic solutions are linear over the range of private values in which bid functions are estimated in this study agents drew values from non uniform distributions as a result the game theoretic bidding behavior is nonlinear due to the nonlinearity special econometric and numerical techniques are applied to solve the model and obtain the estimates the crram exhibits good fit of the data the pseudo r2 is greater than 0 8 in 90 percent of the subjects the crram is more accurate than the markdown model mm and the simple ad hoc model simam but not as accurate as the sophisticated ad hoc model sop am the data also supports the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis and suggests that substantial increases in the predictive power of game theoretic models can be gained from improvements in the theory of belief formation

a test of dual labor market theory despite substantial differences in their views of the appropriate policy response to the existence of poverty neither the proponents of dual market theory nor its critics have proposed potentially conclusive tests of the dual market hypothesis this paper presents a test of the two central propositions of dual market theory 1 the existence of two distinct labor markets with different wage setting mechanisms and 2 the existence of barriers to mobility between the labor markets we find considerable support for both hypothesis estimation of a switching model of wage determination with unknown regimes yields two distinct wage equations the one which most workers are associated with closely resembles the standard human capital regression with significant returns to education and experience the other equation is flat with no returns to human capital these two equations resemble the predictions of dual market theory for the primary and secondary markets respectively further we present evidence that at least some non white workers are involuntarily confined to the secondary market this crowding of minority workers into the low wage labor market accounts for a substantial portion of white non white wage differences we interpret these results as providing empirical support for the dual market hypothesis and for recent theoretical work on efficiency wagemodels in addition combining the efficiency wage argument with the observation that much of the white non white wage difference is explained by the exclusion of non whites from the primary sector suggests an explanation for the persistance of wage differences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

individual behavior of first price auctions the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets abstract this article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the nash equilibrium predictions of the first price sealed bid auction a subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer simulated bids the design used between subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral nash equilibrium our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments which after each auction reveals the winning bid only by means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior

intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation experimental evidence abstract in this paper we contribute to the discussion on whether intellectual property rights foster or hinder innovation by means of a laboratory experiment we introduce a novel scrabble like word creation task that captures most essentialities of a sequential innovation process we use this task to investigate the effects of intellectual property allowing subjects to impose license fees on their innovations we find intellectual property to have an adverse effect on welfare as innovations become less frequent and less sophisticated introducing communication among innovators does not reduce this detrimental effect introducing intellectual property results in more basic innovations with subjects failing to exploit the most valuable sequential innovation paths subjects act more self reliant and non optimally in order to avoid paying license fees our results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders innovation especially for sectors characterized by a strong sequentiality in innovation processes

determinants of rural urban inequality in vietnam detailed decomposition analyses based on unconditional quantile regressions abstractthis study examines determinants of the rural urban gap of household welfare in vietnam during 2008 2012 using national household data we have used unconditional quantile regressions uqr

indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world experimental evidence the authors design and study an olg experimental economy where the government finances a fixed real deficit through seigniorage the economy has continua of nonstationary rational expectations equilibria and two stationary rational expectations equilibria the authors do not observe nonstationary rational expectations paths observed paths tend to converge close to or somewhat below the low inflation stationary state the adaptive learning hypothesis is consistent with the data in selecting the low inflation stationary state rational expectations equilibrium as a long run stationary equilibrium nevertheless simple adaptive learning models do not capture the market uncertainty or the biases observed in the data copyright 1993 by the econometric society

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions an experimental study abstract we review an asymmetric auction experiment based on plum int j game theory 20 1992 393 private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions one of which first order stochastically dominates the other we test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders preference for first vs second price auctions

crop prices and the individual decision to migrate abstract this paper investigates the effect of commodity prices in particular rice and coffee on the decision of migrating at the individual level as most coffee production is sold by households for exports we would expect that coffee price shocks would have a direct effect on the probability to migrate on the other hand we would anticipate that fluctuations in rice prices have little or no effect on migration decisions given that rice is mainly produced for household consumption we test these hypotheses drawing evidence from migration in viet nam we show that the lower the price of coffee the higher the likelihood of migrating this evidence seems to suggest that migration acts as a shock coping strategy we find that rice prices have no effect on the probability of migrating we further explore the extent of migrants self selection and show that lower coffee prices increase the migration probability of individuals with lower education

inter provincial migration and inequality during vietnam s transition abstract vietnam s economic boom during the transition to a market economy has centered on very rapid growth in some sectors and provinces yet poverty has diminished across the entire country with capital investments highly concentrated by province and sector geographic labor mobility may be critical in spreading the gains from growth conversely rising income inequality may be attributable in part to impediments to migration we first use census data to investigate migration patterns and determinants we then examine the role of migration as an influence on income ratios between pairs of provinces the former analysis robustly confirms economic motives for migration but also suggests the existence of poverty related labor immobility at the provincial level examination of income ratios between pairs of provinces reveals that the impact of migration on inequality can be either negative or positive a robust inequality reducing impact of migration is found for migration flows into provinces where most of vietnam s trade oriented industrial investments are located

asymmetric information about rivals types in standard auctions an experiment this paper studies experimentally how information about rivals types affects bidding behavior in firstand second price auctions the comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions of the auction theory by providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral motives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments our experimental evidence provides strong support for the theory and sheds light on the roles of risk aversion and the spite motive in first and second price auctions respectively

commodity prices and intra household labor allocation volatility in commodity markets poses a distinct risk to farmers in developing countries who rely on cash crop agriculture we combine a time series of international coffee prices with a long running panel on coffee growing households in vietnam to investigate coping mechanisms employed by farmers in a transitioning economy we find that households cope with lower coffee prices by increasing wage labor of adults with children and adolescents substituting for adults on the farm heterogeneity analysis indicates a stronger substitution pattern among women ethnic minorities and households with fewer assets a variety of robustness checks corroborate these findings account of this finding should be taken in formulating and implementing social protection and inclusive growth policies

outside options another reason to choose the first price auction abstract in this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding behaviour in first price and second price auctions with outside options we find that bidders do respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors outside options however overbidding in first price auctions is significantly higher with outside options than without first price auctions yield more revenue than second price auctions this revenue premium is significantly higher with outside options in second price auctions the introduction of outside options has only a small effect