guarding the guardians good government requires some restraints on the powerful but how can those be impose if there is no one above them this paper studies the equilibrium allocation of power and resources established by self interested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power commitment to uphold individuals rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be ex post power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo and thus want to defend it

optimal self employment income tax enforcement abstract most models of optimal income tax enforcement assume that income is either random or solely remunerates labor neglecting that auditing strategies may depend on observable inputs this paper outlines a model to optimally monitor self employed entrepreneurs when in addition to reported profits the tax collection agency also observes the number of workers employed or any other input variable at each firm we show that by conditioning the monitoring strategy only on labor input it is optimal for the irs to audit firms in a way that generates some empirical regularities like the missing middle we also show that the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by an indirect monitoring strategy that is consistent with actual irs practices in particular the irs calculates inputted income as function of labor whenever an entrepreneur reports profits that are lower than inputted income she is randomly monitored finally we formalize a model of optimal presumption taxation in which inputted income is the tax base to compare revenue collection across tax systems

national institutions and subnational development in africa we investigate the role of national institutions on subnational african development in a novel framework that accounts both for local geography and cultural genetic traits we exploit the fact that the political boundaries in the eve of african independence partitioned more than two hundred ethnic groups across adjacent countries subjecting similar cultures residing in homogeneous geographic areas to different formal institutions using both a matching type and a spatial regression discontinuity approach we show that differences in countrywide institutional structures across the national border do not explain within ethnicity differences in economic performance as captured by satellite images of light density the average non effect of national institutions on ethnic development masks considerable heterogeneity partially driven by the diminishing role of national institutions in areas further from the capital cities

natural resources curse or blessing are natural resources a curse or a blessing the empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible this paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources these include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate deindustrialization and bad growth prospects and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law corruption presidential democracies and underdeveloped financial systems another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries and keeps in place bad policies finally resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets the survey also offers some welfare based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies

wars and state capacity the article builds a simple model to investigate how different types of armed conflict shape fiscal capacity the state s ability to raise revenue from taxes it starts from the simple observation

the political economy of state failure rapid decolonization created many arbitrary countries in contrast to those states which had emerged through a quasi darwinian process of selection some of these new countries had structural characteristics which gravely impeded the provision of public goods their lack of a unifying sense of shared identity made cooperation difficult and their tiny economic size left them unable to reap scale economies two public goods security and accountability are particularly important for development and so where they could not be provided states failed the cause of a problem is not necessarily a guide to its solution darwinian struggle among failing states is not something to be encouraged solutions lie partly in a phase of international provision of the key public goods partly in enhanced regional pooling of sovereignty and partly in institutional innovation to make the domestic provision of public goods less demanding of the state copyright 2009 oxford university press

are modern financial systems shaped by state antiquity we demonstrate that existing differences in financial development between countries can be explained by the cumulative variations in their levels of state experience since 1 ad this dimension of early historical development has not been considered so far in studies that analyze the determinants of financial development the estimation allows for all major theories established in the literature as possible explanations for the disparity of financial development across the globe significance of state antiquity is robust to the use of alternative indicators of financial development the consideration of different lengths and periods of statehood and controlling for a range of variables or country characteristics our results highlight the important role of statehood in propelling financial system development and thus provide some support to the view that historically determined differences in the early start developmental advantage provide the basis for explaining the fundamental sources of variations in financial development between countries today

the institutional causes of china s great famine 1959 1961 this paper studies the causes of china s great famine during which 16 5 to 45 million individuals perished in rural areas we document that average rural food retention during the famine was too high to generate a severe famine without rural inequality in food availability that there was significant variance in famine mortality rates across rural regions and that rural mortality rates were positively correlated with per capita food production a surprising pattern that is unique to the famine years we provide evidence that an inflexible and progressive government procurement policy where procurement could not adjust to contemporaneous production and larger shares of expected production were procured from more productive regions was necessary for generating this pattern and that this policy was a quantitatively important contributor to overall famine mortality

the logic of insurgent electoral violence competitive elections are essential to establishing the political legitimacy of democratizing regimes we argue that insurgents undermine the state s mandate through electoral violence we study insurgent violence during elections using newly declassified microdata on the conflict in afghanistan our data track insurgent activity by hour to within meters of attack locations our results suggest that insurgents carefully calibrate their production of violence during elections to avoid harming civilians leveraging a novel instrumental variables approach we find that violence depresses voting collectively the results suggest insurgents try to depress turnout while avoiding backlash from harming civilians counterfactual exercises provide potentially actionable insights for safeguarding at risk elections and enhancing electoral legitimacy in emerging democracies

macroeconomic features of the french revolution this paper describes aspects of the french revolution from the perspective of theories about money and government budget constraints we describe how unpleasant fiscal arithmetic gripped the old regime how the estates general responded to reorganize france s fiscal affairs and how fiscal exigencies impelled the revolution into a procession of monetary experiments ending in hyper inflation

government impartiality and sustained growth in sub saharan africa many studies suggest that one of the main reasons for africa s dismal growth performance over most of the 20th century is its degree of ethnic fragmentation yet there is still insufficient knowledge about whether ethnic diversity necessarily entails large economic costs or whether the implications of diversity depend inter alia on the government s approach toward the ethnic question we note that economic growth tends to increase average incomes but it also affects the income distribution then if growth is accompanied by growing economic inequality the perception of the impartiality of the government toward different ethnic groups is likely to be important for whether growth can be sustained or whether sparks of growth will evaporate because of rising political divisions and internal conflicts in this paper we study whether the degree of ethnic impartiality in the government s policies is related to the emergence of sustained growth in sub saharan africa irrespective of the actual content of the policies we measure perceptions about the impartiality of the government with survey data from the afrobarometer covering 20 countries starting in the late 1990 s our main definition of sustained growth is when there is a gdp per capita growth rate of at least 2 for at least five consecutive years our empirical results suggest that countries whose governments are perceived as impartial are more likely to experience sustained growth we conclude that in order to ensure economic development it is not only important to choose the right policies but also to implement these policies in a fair manner

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

state capacity and long run economic performance we present new evidence about the long run relationship between state capacity the fiscal and administrative power of states and economic performance our database is novel and spans 11 european countries and 4 centuries from the old regime to world war i we argue that national governments undertook two political transformations over this period fiscal centralization and limited government we find a significant direct relationship between fiscal centralization and economic growth furthermore we find that an increase in the state s capacity to extract greater tax revenues was one mechanism through which both political transformations improved economic performance our analysis shows systematic evidence that state capacity is an important determinant of long run economic growth

politics and economics in weak and strong states abstract while much research in political economy points out the benefits of limited government political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less developed nations by weak states which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non state actors i construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self interested ruler who tries to divert resources for his own consumption but who can also invest in socially productive public goods both weak and strong states create distortions when the state is excessively strong the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled when the state is excessively weak the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods i show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state i e its ability to raise taxes and its political power i e its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens i also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium which i refer to as consensually strong state equilibrium can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods the consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in oecd countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

what drives the historical formation and persistent development of territorial states the importance of the length of state history for understanding variations in income levels and growth rates across countries has received a lot of attention in the recent literature on long run comparative development the literature however is silent about its origins this paper explores the determinants of statehood by considering the potential roles of an early transition to fully fledged agricultural production the adoption of state of the art military innovations and the opportunity for economic interaction with the regional economic leader the results demonstrate that only the association between economic interaction and the rise and development of the state is statistically robust

population technology and fragmentation the european miracle revisited abstract the effects of political fragmentation on long run development seem to have changed over the course of human history technological leaders used to be empires but the industrial revolution started in the fragmented europe this paper sets up a model to help us think about this puzzle there are two sets of mechanisms at play a standard scale effect which benefits unified regions since technology is a non rivalrous good and several competition effects both negative like wasteful armies and positive incentives to invest in new technologies we apply the model to analyze the preindustrial divergence between china and europe

medieval universities legal institutions and the commercial revolution we present new data documenting medieval europe s commercial revolution using information on the establishment of markets in germany we use these data to test whether medieval universities played a causal role in expanding economic activity examining the foundation of germany s first universities after 1386 following the papal schism we find that the trend rate of market establishment breaks upward in 1386 and that this break is greatest where the distance to a university shrank most there is no differential pre 1386 trend associated with the reduction in distance to a university and there is no break in trend in 1386 where university proximity did not change these results are robust to estimating a variety of specifications that address concerns about the endogeneity of university location universities provided training in newly rediscovered roman and canon law students with legal training served in positions that reduced the uncertainty of trade in the middle ages we argue that training in the law and the consequent development of legal and administrative institutions was an important channel linking universities and greater economic activity in medieval germany

the political consequences of income shocks explaining the consolidation of democracy in france abstract this study analyzes the circumstances that enabled france to become in the late nineteenth century the first stable parliamentary democracy with universal male suffrage in europe it establishes a causal relationship between short term variations in local income and the electoral support for the coalition of republican parties that represented the newly established regime the results suggest the republican coalition won the parliamentary elections because most french regions did not suffer from transitory negative income shocks stemming from heavy precipitations they thus raise questions about the rationality of voters and ultimately the actual causes of the consolidation of democracy in france

the democratic advantage institutional foundations of financial power in international competition despite their presumed liabilities institutions associated with democracy serve as a source of power in prolonged international competition by increasing the financial resources that states can bring to bear the theory of sovereign debt suggests that a state s ability to raise money through public borrowing is enhanced when debtholders have mechanisms for sanctioning state leaders in the event of default institutions associated with liberal government provide such mechanisms all other things being equal states that possess these institutions enjoy superior access to credit and lower interest rates than do states in which the sovereign has more discretion to default unilaterally liberal states can not only raise more money from a given economic base but can also pursue tax smoothing policies that minimize economic distortions the ability to finance competition in a manner that is consistent with long term economic growth generates a significant advantage in prolonged rivalries these claims are explored by analyzing the anglo french rivalry 1688 1815 and the cold war

constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes we investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies we rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference due to non random selection of these constitutional rules the findings are consistent with our theoretical priors presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections

elite competition and state capacity development theory and evidence from post revolutionary mexico international wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity this article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict under conditions of intra elite conflict political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals expropriate their assets and consolidate authority because this political consolidation increases rulers chances of surviving an economic elite s challenge it enhances their incentives to develop state capacity these ideas are evaluated in post revolutionary mexico where commodity price shocks induced by the great depression affected the local economic elite differentially negative shocks lead to increased asset expropriation and substantially higher investments in state capacity which persist to the present

fragile states and development policy it is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under development in many parts of the world such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace as of yet mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance this paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states

inequality and personal income taxation the origins and effects of legislative malapportionment why does personal income taxation pit remain relatively low in many developing countries despite a period of democratic advancement and rapid economic growth this stylized fact is hard to reconcile with standard political economy models of taxation that expect democratic regimes to bring about redistribution in countries that suffer from high inequality this article argues that the details of political institutions are key to understand why pit remains low in many developing and unequal countries in particular we show how legislative malapportionment may prevent the use of personal income taxes as a major revenue source by skewing the distribution of political power across groups malapportionment is usually not exogenous but the result of design by those with political power at the transition or reform moment as such it depends on the structure of political and economic power in society based on a sample of more than 50 countries between 1990 and 2007 this article finds that a countries with

why can modern governments tax so much an agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries we develop an agency model explaining why third party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful while third party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion we embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development showing that the tax take evolves as an s shape driven by changes in third party information we show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development

civil service and the growth of government abstract i study a model of elections which links the scale of government activity to civil service rules without tenure protections bureaucrats career prospects are tied to the electoral prospects of the party that hires them to avoid wasteful partisan spending voters only consent to minimal taxation if bureaucrats are protected by tenure they have no incentive to favour one party over another and governments only produce public goods in turn voters consent to high taxes however because higher tax revenues increase the ability of governing parties to co opt the bureaucracy through favourable compensation large scale government activity is accompanied by inefficiently high public sector wages

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

public economics and history a review of fiscal regimes and the political economy of premodern states edited by andrew monson and walter scheidel fiscal regimes and the political economy of premodern states greatly expands our knowledge of the history of premodern fiscal systems and raises important questions about the political economy of premodern states answering those questions can help explain how states developed the capacity to tax why tax levels and government spending patterns varied greatly in the past even though per capita incomes were similar how government debt and representative institutions arose and last but not least why some premodern states expanded and others collapsed but firm answers to those questions will have to combine the history outlined in fiscal regimes and the political economy of premodern states with systematic data and formal models of political economy

a theory of constitutional standards and civil liberty why would potentially intolerant majorities in a democracy protect the rights of unpopular groups this paper models the formation of legal standards that determine the extent of civil liberty in a society it is shown that tolerant legal standards emerge over time despite all individuals having intolerant preferences each period citizens choose activities that have social consequences a majority vote determines which of these activities are legally protected because of errors in interpreting the symbolic content of these activities voters from the majority will not impose excessively intolerant standards otherwise they may end up severely punishing members of their own group by mistake extending this framework to a dynamic model we examine markovian equilibria of the game when government improves with time in its ability to correctly interpret citizens activities these improvements allow an unchanging majority to impose increasingly intolerant standards over time it is shown that societies with high political turnover due to population changes are apt to choose tolerant legal standards societies with low turnover are more apt to choose more intolerant and unstable ones each group seeks to prevent auditing capabilities of government from improving too much over time in order to prevent future majorities from successfully enforcing more intolerant standards

what does it take for a roving bandit settle down theory and an illustrative history of the visigoths a roving bandit provides exclusive rivalrous collective goods to members of its in group a stationary bandit further provides inclusive non rivalrous public collective goods to the out group the inclusive goods are an input to the production of the exclusive goods enjoyed by the in group as such the transition from roving to stationary bandit is likely to involve the redefinition of the in group its collective interest and the type of goods that it provides to illustrate these points i employ a case study of the roving visigothic confederacy as it evolved during the fourth and fifth centuries towards the stationary visigothic kingdom the illustration provides insights into why competition amongst roving bandits does not always or often lead to the emergence of a non predatory state

political determinants of state capacity in latin america summary in this article we argue that both democracy and governments partisanship have a bearing on state capacity in latin america we also maintain that state capacity is a condition rooted in history and society it can be built or purposefully undermined in particular in latin america parties of the left have frequently operated to reallocate social and political clout in favor of underprivileged groups the inclusion of the latter in the political process helped states to thwart pressures from dominant elites opposing redistribution and tax increases these mobilized groups have also pushed for universal public services as high quality education health care or public housing which required well functioning administrations and an adequate institutional capacity thus contributing to consolidate stateness in the area whereas previous qualitative studies analyzed the mechanisms that relate democracy and political partisanship to state capacity we test this hypothesis quantitatively to this end we estimate the effect over time of democracy political parties and other socio demographic factors on a composite measure of stateness obtaining supportive evidence in particular we find that higher democracy levels and left leaning governments favored the growth of state strength in the area during 1975 2009 and discuss these findings with reference to the political experience of latin america

the costs of patronage evidence from the british empire i combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the british colonial administration for the period 1854 1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage once allocated they provide more tax exemptions raise less revenue and invest less the promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

law regulation and the business climate the nature and influence of the world bank doing business project the importance of a well functioning legal and regulatory system in creating an effective market economy is now widely accepted one flagship project that tries to measure the environment in which businesses operate in countries across the world is the world bank s doing business project which was launched in 2002 this project gathers quantitative data to compare regulations faced by small and medium size enterprises across economies and over time the centerpiece of the project is the annual doing business report it was first published in 2003 with five sets of indicators for 133 economies and currently includes 11 sets of indicators for 189 economies the report includes a table that ranks each country in the world according to its scores across the indicators the doing business project has become a major resource for academics journalists and policymakers the project also enjoys a high public profile with close to ten million hits on its website each year with such interest it s no surprise that the doing business report has come under intense scrutiny in 2012 following discussions by its board the world bank commissioned an independent review panel to evaluate the project on which i served as a member in this paper i first describe how the doing business project works and illustrate with some of the key findings of the 2015 report next i address what is valuable about the project the criticisms of it and some wider political economy issues illustrated by the report

disagreement and learning about reforms when it comes to economic reforms in developing countries many economists agree on broad objectives broad objectives however can be pursued in different ways and policy experimentation is often indispensable for learning which alternative works locally we propose a theoretical model to study this societal learning process the model explores the role of disagreeing beliefs about what works it suggests that such disagreement can stall the societal learning process and cause economic stagnation although everyone knows that growth promoting reforms do exist our analysis is motivated by the observation of a negative relationship between disagreement and economic growth among poorer countries

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

monopolizing violence and consolidating power governments in weak states often face an armed opposition and have to decide whether to try to accommodate and contain that adversary or to try to consolidate power and monopolize violence by disarming it when and why do governments choose to consolidate power and monopolize violence how fast do they try to consolidate power when does this lead to costly fighting rather than to efforts to eliminate the opposition by buying it off we study an infinite horizon model in which the government in each period decides how much to offer the opposition and the rate at which it tries to consolidate its power the opposition can accept the offer and thereby acquiesce to the government s efforts to consolidate or it can fight in an attempt to disrupt those efforts in equilibrium the government always tries to monopolize violence when it has coercive power against the opposition where roughly coercive power is the ability to weaken the opposition by lowering its payoff to fighting whether the government consolidates peacefully or through costly fighting depends on the size of any contingent spoils which are benefits that begin to accrue from an increase in economic activity resulting from the monopolization of violence and the higher level of security that comes with it when contingent spoils are small the government buys the opposition off and eliminates it as fast as is peacefully possible when contingent spoils are large the government tries to monopolize violence by defeating the opposition militarily jel codes d02 d74 h1 copyright 2013 oxford university press

democracy war and wealth lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation in this article we use an original data set to provide the first empirical analysis of the political economy of inherited wealth taxation that covers a significant number of countries and a long time frame 1816 2000 our goal is to understand why if inheritance taxes are often very old taxes the implementation of inheritance tax rates significant enough to affect wealth inequality is a much more recent phenomenon we hypothesize alternatively that significant taxation of inherited wealth depended on 1 the extension of the suffrage and 2 political conditions created by mass mobilization for war using a difference in differences framework for identification we find little evidence for the suffrage hypothesis but very strong evidence for the mass mobilization hypothesis our study has implications for understanding the evolution of wealth inequality and the political conditions under which countries are likely to implement policies that significantly redistribute wealth and income

state capacity in latin america state capacity is exceptionally low in latin america even when compared to other former colonies this paper analyzes four possible factors that could potentially explain this troubling feature political inequality economic inequality interstate conflict and civil war with the exception of external war these variables have a negative effect on state building in models where the accumulation of state capacity is analogous to investment under uncertainty these analytical predictions are then tested with cross country data paying special attention to latin america democracy s impact on state capacity is quite positive as is the effect of the frequency of external wars when data for the last century is used however in the data for the last half century external wars have little effect but the negative effects of internal wars and income inequality become highly significant the model explains why latin america has failed to develop its state despite the improvement in the various measures of democracy in fact both the theoretical model and the empirical evidence suggest that the effects of democracy are undermined in the presence of high economic inequality

the monopoly of violence evidence from colombia many states in latin america africa and asia lack the monopoly of violence even though this was identified by max weber as the foundation of the state and thus the capacity to govern effectively in this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence we build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors paramilitaries in a democracy the model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections since paramilitaries have preferences over policies this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them we then investigate these ideas using data from colombia between 1991 and 2006 we first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive next we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well finally we use roll call votes to illustrate a possible quid pro quo between the executive and paramilitaries in colombia language en

statehood experience legal traditions and climate change policies this study investigates how the implementation of modern climate change policies is related to former colonies length of state history and their legal heritage we argue that countries with longer statehood experience around the time of colonization were better equipped to implement the legal philosophies transplanted by their colonial powers therefore the implications of receiving british common law versus french civil law should be particularly important in countries with a greater accumulated history of statehood using a cross section of up to 78 former colonies our results provide support for this hypothesis in particular our estimates demonstrate that common law countries have weaker modern climate change policies than civil law countries and the difference is inflated by a longer statehood experience measured by the length of state history from 1 to 1800 ad legal origin has no effect in areas which by the time of colonization had no statehood experience finally we report similar results for the pattern of labor market regulations jel k15 k31 k32 o44 q54 q58

the making of policy institutionalized or not this paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles their causes and their consequences in latin america finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies apts are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies the higher the potential damage they can cause the lower the wealth of the economy and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power moreover strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies for instance bribes by the rich and protests by the poor are likely to be countervailing forces and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions

can cultural norms reduce conflicts confucianism and peasant rebellions in qing china abstract can culture mitigate conflicts triggered by economic shocks in light of the extraordinary emphasis that confucianism places on subordination and pacifism we examine its role in possibly attenuating peasant rebellion within the historical context of china circa 1651 1910 our analysis finds that while crop failure triggers peasant rebellion its effect is significantly smaller in counties characterized by stronger confucian norms as proxied by confucian temples and chaste women this result remains robust after controlling for a long list of covariates and instrumenting confucian norms using ancient confucian sages 500 b c a d 550 to address concerns of measurement error and reverse causality

dictators and oligarchs a dynamic theory of contested property rights in an economy with weak economic and political institutions the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators the conventional wisdom presumes that as rent seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves institutions such as enforcement of the property rights will emerge eventually we explicitly model a dynamic game between oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent seeking the oligarchs choose either a weak dictator who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch or a strong dictator who can only be replaced via a consensus of oligarchs in equilibrium no dictator can commit to both i protecting the oligarchs property rights from the other oligarchs and ii not expropriating oligarchs himself we show that a weak dictator does not limit rent seeking a strong dictator does reduce rent seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs we show that even though eliminating rent seeking is pareto optimal weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent seeking continues this outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile

tax evasion and financial development under asymmetric information in credit markets abstract recent empirical studies have documented that after controlling for variables related to state capacity the incidence of firms tax evasion on their sales is negatively correlated with the level of a country s financial development motivated by this stylized fact our paper takes state capacity as given and provides an alternative theory that is built upon asymmetric information in credit markets particularly within developing economies we analytically show that with a more developed financial sector that exhibits smaller agency costs the government of a rich small open economy country will raise its optimal tax auditing probability which in turn leads to more tax compliance our baseline model also yields an empirically realistic positive correlation between financial development and the ratio of tax revenue over gdp in an extended setting which allows for size dependent probabilities of tax detection we find that consistent with the empirical evidence large firms comply with taxes whereas small firms evade taxes

state capacity and military conflict powerful centralized states controlling a large share of national income only begin to appear in europe after 1500 we build a model that explains their emergence in response to the increasing importance of money for military success when fiscal resources are not crucial for winning wars the threat of external conflict stifles state building as finance becomes critical internally cohesive states invest in state capacity while divided states rationally drop out of the competition causing divergence we emphasize the role of the military revolution a sequence of technological innovations that transformed armed conflict using data from 374 battles we investigate empirically both the importance of money for military success and patterns of state building in early modern europe the evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model

strengthening state capabilities the role of financial incentives in the call to public service we study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in mexico different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites and job offers were subsequently randomized screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants intellectual ability personality and motivation this allows the first experimental estimates of i the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants ii the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer and iii the role of job attributes distance attractiveness of the municipal environment in helping fill vacancies as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities a theoretical model guides each stage of the empirical inquiry we find that higher wages attract more able applicants as measured by their iq personality and proclivity towards public sector work i e we find no evidence of adverse selection effects on motivation higher wage offers also increased acceptance rates implying a labor supply elasticity of around 2 and some degree of monopsony power distance and worse municipal characteristics strongly decrease acceptance rates but higher wages help bridge the recruitment gap in worse municipalities

the glittering prizes career incentives and bureaucrat performance bureaucracies are configured differently to private sector and political organizations across a wide range of civil services entry is competitive promotion is constrained by seniority jobs are for life and retirement occurs at a fixed age this implies that older entering officers who are less likely to attain the glittering prize of reaching the top of the bureaucracy before they retire may be less motivated to exert effort using a nationwide stakeholder survey and rich administrative data on elite civil servants in india we provide evidence that i officers who cannot reach the senior most positions before they retire are perceived to be less effective and are more likely to be suspended and ii this effect is weakened by a reform that extends the retirement age together these results suggest that the career incentive of reaching the top of a public organization is a powerful determinant of bureaucrat performance

fiscal policy institutions and history this paper shows that historical variables can explain a significant part of discretionary government spending across countries we argue that these results provide evidence in favor of besley and persson s 2009 hypothesis that institutional quality or state capacity is historically determined and further that institutional quality determines in part economic policy

tax revenue and or trade liberalization abstract with the public finances of many developing and emerging market countries still heavily dependent on trade tax revenues further trade liberalization may be hindered unless they are able to develop alternative sources of revenue against a background of and to inform heightened theoretical controversy as to the appropriate balance between trade and other taxes not least the vat this paper uses panel data for 117 countries over 32 years cleaned for a variety of problems in standard data sources to address a central question of fact have countries recovered from domestic taxes the revenues they have lost from past episodes of trade liberalization for high income countries the answer is clearly yes for middle income countries there are robust signs of strong replacement both concurrently with the revenue loss and essentially dollar for dollar in the long run signs of significant recovery by low income countries are flimsier however and their experiences appear to have varied widely the picture that emerges for low income countries is thus that replacement has been and become higher than previous studies have suggested but sufficiently incomplete in many cases to give cause for concern

state capacity and repression a model of colonial rule abstract state capacity in colonial regimes can have spillover effects on the welfare of citizens if the colonizer is removed this work shows that when spillovers are positive investments in state capacity and repression by the colonizer are strategic complements the colonizer needs a larger repression when state capacity is high because the latter increases the incentives of the colonized to rebel therefore determinants of investment in repression such as geographic factors or idiosyncratic features of the colonizer can affect state capacity this work contributes to explain the heterogeneous levels of state capacity in non settler colonies and has policy implications for present autocratic regimes

elites and corruption a theory of endogenous reform and a test using british data eighteenth century britain displayed patterns of corruption similar to those of developing countries today reforms enacted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries eliminated many of these patterns this article develops a theoretical argument that seeks to explain why the british elite enacted anticorruption reforms and provides evidence using a new data set of members of the house of commons the author argues that the shock that pushed the british elite from preferring the old corrupt regime to preferring the reformed one was an increase in government spending and a corresponding increase in the costs of tolerating corruption features unique to britain allowed the reformist outcome to emerge and illuminate why such an outcome is difficult to achieve in general

fiscal capacity and the quality of government in sub saharan africa summary historical evidence from the industrialized world suggests that the expansion of the modern state s capacity to tax eventually led to more democratic and less corrupt governments using a dataset that covers 31 sub saharan african countries over the 1990 2005 period we study whether the positive effect of fiscal capacity on the quality of government prevails in contemporaneous sub saharan africa as well the results provide consistent evidence that within sub saharan africa fiscal capacity decreases corruption and increases democracy

on the origins of the state stationary bandits and taxation in eastern congo a positive demand shock for coltan a mineral whose bulky output cannot be concealed leads armed actors to create illicit customs and provide protection at coltan mines where they settle as stat

the conscription of wealth mass warfare and the demand for progressive taxation the dominant narrative of the politics of redistribution in political sci ence and economics highlights the signature role of the rise of electoral democracy and the development of political parties that mobilize working class groups we argue in this article that this narrative ignores the critical role played by mass warfare in the development of redistributive public policies focusing attention on the determi nants of progressive taxation we argue that mobilization for mass warfare led to demands for increased taxation of the wealthy to more fairly distribute the burden for the war effort we then show empirically that during the past century mass mobi lization for war has been associated with a notable increase in tax progressivity in the absence of war neither the establishment of universal suffrage nor the arrival of political control by parties of the left is systematically associated with large increases in tax progressivity in making these arguments we devote particular attention to a difference in differences comparison of participants and nonparticipants in world war i those who have made fortunes out of the war must pay for the war and labour will insist upon heavily graduated direct taxation with a raising of the exemption limit that is what labour means by the conscription of wealth

why do developing countries tax so little the power to tax is taken for granted in a great deal of mainstream public finance in considering limits to taxation traditional research in the field focuses on limits imposed by incentive constraints which are tied to asymmetric information or to politics and political institutions the limits to taxation are rarely tied to the administrative capacity of the state but incentive constraints alone cannot explain the vast differences in the levels of taxation that we see across the world and across time low income countries typically collect taxes of between 10 to 20 percent of gdp while the average for high income countries is more like 40 percent in essence our view on these patterns is similar to that taken by joseph schumpeter 1918 almost a century ago when he noted the fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history an enormous influence on the fate of nations emanates from the economic bleeding which the needs of the state necessitates and from the use to which the results are put in order to understand taxation economic development and the relationships between them we need to think about the forces that drive the development process poor countries

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

a theory of political entrenchment can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency this paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon which we label political entrenchment we use a two party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting political entrenchment by the left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high low skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies we discuss the possibility of entrenchment by the right the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies and the effect of state capacity income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment we illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples

government size and growth a survey and interpretation of the evidence the literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings this conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied an alternative approach of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to gdp and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time reveals a more consistent picture the most recent studies find a significant negative correlation an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0 5 to 1 percent lower annual growth rate we discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation against this background we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth one hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market friendly policies in other areas both explanations are supported by ongoing research

presidential address institutions and culture how and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions this paper argues that individual values and convictions about the scope of application of norms of good conduct provide the missing link evidence from a variety of sources points to two main findings first individual values consistent with generalized as opposed to limited morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non despotic political institutions in the distant past second well functioning institutions are often observed in countries or regions where individual values are consistent with generalized morality and under different identifying assumptions this suggests a causal effect from values to institutional outcomes the paper ends with a discussion of the implications for future research jel a10 d7 e00

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

uncovered interest parity forward guidance and the exchange rate under uncovered interest parity uip the size of the effect on the real exchange rate of an anticipated change in real interest rate differentials is invariant to the horizon at which the change is expected empirical evidence using us euro area and uk data points to a substantial deviation from that invariance prediction expectations of interest rate differentials in the near distant future are shown to have much larger smaller effects on the real exchange rate than is implied by uip some possible explanations are discussed

miracle on sixth avenue information externalities and search after a long dormant period lower sixth avenue in new york has undergone a rapid revitalisation we show that a simple search theoretic model with information spillovers can explain both the period of underuse and the rapid turnaround the model reduces to a simple equation which allows us to do comparative statics on the duration of vacancies we show how the solution reacts to changes in market structure and changes in search technology the model is suggestive of difficulties that may occur in many markets in which there are changes over time in the optimal use of resources at one time lower sixth avenue was one of the most fashionable retail centres in manhattan but the area collapsed as a retail centre when the affluent moved further uptown and to the suburbs today sixth avenue is in the midst of a rapid turnaround as reported in the sunday new york times by claudia