infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries should governments in developing countries promote private ownership and deregulated prices in noncompetitive sectors or should they run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expense of rents to insiders a theoretical model is used to answer these normative questions the analysis focuses on the tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus during privatization of noncompetitive sectors privatization transfers control rights to private interests and eliminates public subsidies yielding benefits to taxpayers at the cost of increased prices for consumers in developing countries where budget constraints are tight privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for low profitability industries but suboptimal for more profitable industries and once a market has room for more than one firm governments may prefer to regulate the industry without a credible regulatory agency regulation is achieved through public ownership

a carbon tax to reduce co2 emissions in europe abstract this paper examines the effects of introducing a tax on carbon dioxide emissions produced by combustion processes in oecd european countries a sectoral model of energy consumption is constructed to examine energy saving and inter fuel substitution effects induced by the introduction of various carbon taxes the simulation period is 1989 1994 our results provide a mild support to the environmental role of a carbon tax energy saving or inter fuel substitution processes that result from the introduction of environmental taxation stabilize emissions at the 1988 level only in the electricity generation sector and only if high tax rates are assumed 100 ton c by contrast total emissions all sectors and all fuels keep growing and the implementation of a tax of 100 ton c can only reduce the emission growth rate these results would recommend the introduction of several coordinated environmental instruments the last part of the paper compares results concerning oecd europe with those obtained when examining a single country italy the comparison does not seem to be in favour of a uniform carbon tax it rather indicates that environmental policy should be designed taking into account the specific economic situation and technological choices of each single country country specific coordinated environmental policies are to be recommended where international coordination ought to concern environmental targets rather than instruments

the social and environmental influences of population growth rate and demographic pressure deserve greater attention in ecological economics abstract ecological economists accept that the global population cannot grow forever but papers discussing the relevance of population growth and the prospects for minimising it are rare in the literature on ecological economics even these papers treat population almost exclusively as an issue relating to the scale of human activity the many ways in which population growth rate and local demographic pressures drive negative social and environmental trends remain largely unarticulated the mistaken belief that action to reduce population growth requires involuntary control of people s reproduction has fostered a taboo on the topic and deterred analysis of demographic influences on issues such as inequality unemployment debt social cohesion and conflict this paper discusses how some of these influences relate to ecological economics discourses on natural resources labour capital and governance it argues that population stabilisation is not only ultimately required for a steady state economy but can be a powerful lever in a virtuous cycle of effects diminishing resource consumption and environmental impacts reversing income inequality and undermining the leverage enjoyed by capital over labour a richer more integrated treatment of population dynamics would greatly enhance the ecological economics research agenda in the coming decades

sulfur allowance trading and the regional clean air incentives market a comparative design analysis of two major cap and trade permit programs this paper investigates in detail the design parameters of the two mostprominent us cap and trade permit program the us epa sulfur allowancetrading program and the south californian regional clean air incentivesmarket reclaim in contrast to expectations the two programs turn out to be rather different in several important design parameter choices common elements emerge primarily in the existence of an ambitious quantifiedenvironmental target mandatory use of stringent emission monitoring methodsand stiff penalties for non compliance coexisting command and controlregulations the creation of a competitive permit market structure andsome distributional concessions in the initial permit allocation generalizing from these common features we find that provisions to assurepolitical acceptance functional interdependencies and overlapping regulation are the most important influences on the design of applied cap and trade permit programs

threshold effects and incentives for the conservation of biodiversity biological diversity is a central component of the stock of natural capital on which all economic development is based other things being equal loss of biologically diversity implies loss of development potential and its conservation through sustainable use or outright protection implies the protection of that potential one characteristics of biodiversity loss of especial importance is that biodiversity loss more than any other current environmental problem is associated with ecological threshold effects the paper explores the implication of this characteristics for the properties of a biodiversity conservation strategy

infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns the roots of public discontent abstract this paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers we show that there are cases in which privatization even though it fosters investments in infrastructure also opens the door to more corruption the public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in latin america where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency enhancing and have fostered investments and at the same time popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high especially among the middle class we show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region

how to make a carbon tax reform progressive the role of subsistence consumption this letter analyzes the distributional effects of a carbon tax reform when households must consume carbon intensive goods above a subsistence level the reform is progressive if revenues are recycled as uniform lump sum transfers in other cases it is regressive

economic instruments for emission abatement under appreciable technological indivisibilities the paper explores the performance of decentralized incentives when abatement involves technological indivisibilities technologically pollution abatement is often carried out as a discrete process if pollution reduction involves relatively large scale investments in emission abatement equipment consequently the firm s response to decentralized economic incentives for pollution abatement is affected by the indivisible property of the technology it can be shown that in such cases efficiency may not be realized installing an abatement device may entail too much or too little investment compared with the eficient solution

costs of alternative environmental policy instruments in the presence of industry compensation requirements abstract this paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation we apply a numerically solved general equilibrium model to compare the incidence and costs of emissions taxes fuel intermediate input taxes performance standards and mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation requirement compensation is provided either through industry tax credits or industry specific cuts in capital tax rates we analyze the added costs from the compensation requirement in terms of 1 an increase in intrinsic abatement cost reflecting a lowered efficiency of pollution abatement and 2 a lump sum compensation cost that captures the efficiency costs of financing the compensation the compensation requirement affects these components differently depending on the policy instrument involved and the required extent of pollution abatement as a result it can change the cost rankings of the different instruments in particular when compensation is provided through lump sum tax credits the lump sum compensation cost is higher under the emissions tax than under the command and control policies performance standards and mandated technologies a reflection of the higher compensation requirements under the emissions tax when the required pollution reduction is modest imposing the compensation requirement causes the emissions tax to lose its status as the least costly instrument and to become more costly than command and control policies in contrast when required abatement is extensive the emissions tax again becomes the most cost effective instrument because of its advantages in terms of lower intrinsic abatement cost

privatization and efficiency from principals and agents to political economy ad i pavia abstract we survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy the former extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues comparing state owned enterprises with private regulated firms the benefits of privatization may derive either from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or from the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions they either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyse the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency the theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain

economic instruments for environmental regulation our knowledge about economic incentive approaches to pollution control has grown rapidly in the two decades in which they have received serious analytical attention not only have the theoretical models become more focused and the empirical work more detailed but we have now had over a decade of experience with emissions trading in the u s and emission charges in europe as the world community becomes increasingly conscious of both the need to tighten environmental controls and the local economic perils associated with tighter controls in a highly competitive global marketplace it seems a propitious time to stand back and to organize what we have learned about this practical and promising approach to pollution control that may be especially relevant to current circumstances this paper draws upon economic theory empirical studies and actual experience with implementation to provide a brief overview of some of the major lessons we have learned about two economic incentive approaches emissions tradi copyright 1990 by oxford university press

on the virtues of privatization when government is benevolent abstract this paper shows that privatizing a public firm can be welfare improving even if the government is a welfare maximizer we consider a setup where the firm s owner a profit maximizing entrepreneur or a benevolent government employs a manager who can invent and implement an innovative production technology wage arrangements are optimal given the verifiable information all parties behave rationally and the information structure is the same in both governance modes nevertheless privatization turns out to be preferable in a wide variety of situations government ownership yields the first best if producing under the old technology is not viable

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

emission trading in europe with an exchange rate this paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate the exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition it is shown that generally this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated although total abatement costs are always reduced a routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral sequential process subject to an exchange rate in the example used results for so2 emissions in europe show that starting from a uniform reduction exchange rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one to one trading without achieving the cost minimum sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets at many places the results are sensitive to pre trade emission levels the transaction costs the availability of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners

impacts of market based climate change policies on the us pulp and paper industry abstract much of the policy debates on climate issues have centered on the optimal level and timing of policy interventions that cost effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions we briefly review the range of policy issues in our paper and assess the impact that climate change policies may have on energy use and carbon emissions in the us pulp and paper industry we then present results from time series based analyses of changes in technologies and fuel mix and compare the results with engineering based technology analyses of us pulp and paper production for a copy of the model and software send e mail to mruth bu edu projections based on information for eight paper and paperboard categories are presented for the years 1995 2020 the findings indicate that under a wide range of specifications and policy assumptions carbon emissions from fossil fuel use per ton of product are likely to decline when combined with investment incentives an additional cost effective reduction in carbon emissions per ton of product will be realized however expected increases in output from the industry are likely to be higher than the reductions in energy and carbon intensities the policy implications of these findings are discussed

community based tradable permits for localized pollution this paper considers the assignment of tradable permits representing property rights of an environmental good to community members who are harmed by pollution generated by firms these community members can in turn sell permits to polluters according to their personal preferences for a special case with a sole household market transactions between the household and polluters achieve an efficient pollution level however for a group of households the decentralized market solution fails to yield social efficiency because of competitive consumption of the environmental goods we design a revenue sharing mechanism akin to unitization under which market transactions also achieve efficient resource allocation importantly in some cases efficiency can be achieved even when regulators are ignorant of the private valuation of the environmental good

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

allocating tradable permits on the basis of market price to achieve cost effectiveness it is a well known result that distributional constraints can lead to an imperfectly competitive permit market where the emission target is no longer met at least cost in this paper we suggest an allocation rule for tradable permits which can handle this problem if the permit allocation is dependent on the market price for permits this allocation rule can achieve both cost effectiveness and meet specific requirements for cost distribution across agents

market failure in incentive based regulation the case of emissions trading abstract among the existing evaluations of the us epa s emissions trading program a consensus has emerged while the program has resulted in significant cost savings it has not even approximately achieved a cost effective allocation of the control responsibility the cost savings have been smaller and the trades fewer than might have been expected at the outset of the program in this article we explore one hypothesis which purports to explain the divergence between the cost minimizing and the observed pattern of trades for nonuniformly mixed pollutants the trading process hypothesis attributes some significant proportion of this divergence to the nature of the process by which emission reduction credits are traded under the bubble policy an examination of actual bubble trades reveals that the actual trading process is sequential and bilateral and hence differs considerably from the implicit process modeled in the existing empirical studies simulations of this more realistic trading process suggest that the resulting equilibria deviate considerably from cost effective allocations of the control responsibility

energy and climate policy in china s twelfth five year plan a paradigm shift the twelfth five year plan fyp endorsed by the people s national congress in march 2011 plays a crucial role in shaping china s development trajectory over the next decades and especially for the fulfillment of the 40 45 carbon intensity reduction target by 2020 the plan will condition both the medium and long term perspectives of economic restructuring rebalance between the inclusive economic growth and environmental objectives which are compounded by multiple constraints faced by china such as aging population natural resources depletion energy supply security and environmental deterioration this article investigates the major energy and climate targets and actions specified in the 12th fyp to gain insights into the nature and magnitude of challenges and difficulties with regard to the medium and long run economic and environmental policies it points out that china should articulate sectoral policies with the global climate mitigation targets to avoid long term carbon lock in based on an in depth analysis of the objectives in the plan it is argued that the implementation should include mainstreaming developments of appropriate instruments to support cost effective energy efficiency improvements and carbon intensity reduction in the next five years

new directions in emissions trading the potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract once an arcane topic even among environmental economists emissions trading systems have substantially increased during this past decade in the usa moreover the implementation of these systems has necessitated increased involvement of professionals in many fields besides economics this paper reviews the practical experience of the six major types of emissions trading systems focusing on credit market development participation and results including transaction costs five more recent applications of emissions trading also are considered as well as the possibility of inter pollutant trading while inter pollutant trading has been successfully used for chlorofluorocarbons cfcs the applicability of this experience is probably very limited additionally it would be highly premature to attempt an evaluation of these newer emissions trading systems some of which have yet to be even partially implemented in order to improve these latter and future programs the paper considers the potential contribution of the new institutional economics nie to emissions trading the nie is used to develop theoretical insights and a series of predictions about the performance of a range of emissions trading systems

external costs of aquaculture production in west virginia temperate hill lands of the u s a such as those in west virginia are areas from which increasing output of farm raised fish may be possible however the downstream economic impacts of current and projected future effluent as a result of aquaculture production have not been extensively studied using an externality framework and a combination of primary and secondary data this study determines pollution prevention costs ppc and downstream pollution damage costs resulting from fish farm wastewater effluent measured as willingness to pay wtp for restoring water quality ppc is estimated at 0 11 per kg of trout produced which would add 6 to private production cost and wtp is estimated at 0 49 per kg of trout produced representing 25 of private production cost at current production and price levels this study shows that installation of filtration units is a low cost less than 6 of total cost and an effective technology for controlling pollution at the source internalizing external costs adding this 6 to private production costs is one strategy that could contribute to sustainable growth of the aquaculture industry

how can china reach its co2 intensity reduction targets by 2020 a regional allocation based on equity and development in late 2009 the chinese government committed to cut its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product gdp by 40 to 45 of 2005 levels by 2020 this has raised the issue of how to allocate the co2 reduction target regionally to meet the national reduction target to meet this objective the following aspects may be taken into consideration equity principles common but differentiated responsibilities intensity reduction target fulfillment and economic difference and reduction potential among provinces this paper selects per capita gdp accumulated fossil fuel related co2 emissions and energy consumption per unit of industrial added value as indicators for emission reduction capacity responsibility and potential respectively based on these three indicators a comprehensive index is developed and an intensity allocation model constructed as decision makers may have different preferences when allocating the reduction burden we allocate different weights to the indicators analyzing the results using cluster analysis the following aspects may also be considered together with the national regional development strategy to determine how to share the burden the reduction potential of various regions implementation potential of the plans and promotion of a highly efficient low carbon economic development model

auctions and alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights this paper considers two different types of auctions which the government could use to sell discharge rights 1 an auction where rights are sold for a single clearing price and 2 a special type of discriminating auction that discourages strategic manipulation of bids by individual dischargers based on both theoretical and practical considerations there appears to be a fundamental trade off between reducing the financial burden of rights purchases and eliminating the incentives for strategic behavior very few discharges in either case study would have lower expenses under government sales of rights than under uniform treatment the simulations also suggest that there may be opportunities for strategic behavior under nonincentive compatible procedures because of small numbers of dischargers despite its problems with respect to incentive compatibility the right allocation approach of free distribution followed by exchange may offer the most desirable package of features this approach can yield dischargers savings over the expenses of present uniform regulations as well as provide incentives for efficient allocation of treatment efforts 25 references 1 figure 5 tables

the tradable permits approach to protecting the commons lessons for climate change tradable permit approaches for rationing access to the commons have been applied to many different types of resources in many different countries this essay reviews the experience with three main applications of tradable permit systems air pollution control water supply and fisheries management as well as some unique related programmes the purpose of the review is to draw together what we have learned about tradable permits in practice that might offer some useful insights for the implementation of the three tradable permit mechanisms that are part of the kyoto protocol copyright 2003 oxford university press

efficiency productivity and environmental policy a case study of power generation in the eu this study uses the eu public power generating sector as a case study to investigate the environmental efficiency and productivity enhancing performance of the european union s co2 emissions trading scheme eu ets in its first phase using data envelopment analysis methods we measure the environmental efficiency and the productivity growth registered in public power generation across the eu over the 1996 2007 period in the second stage of our analysis we attempt to explain changes in productivity and efficiency over time using econometric techniques our analysis suggests two conclusions carbon pricing led to an increase in environmental efficiency and to a shift outwards of the technological frontier and the overly generous allocation of emission permits had a negative impact on both measures these results are shown to be robust to changes in controls and specifications

finding common ground between ecological economics and post keynesian economics abstract post keynesian economics and ecological economics have in common that they are considered to be heterodox schools of thought aside from that there has not been a strong connection between them previous books on post keynesian economics contain no chapter on environmental or ecological issues this neglect has led leading ecological economists to criticize post keynesians for succumbing to the same growth paradigm as the neoclassical school this paper argues that the two approaches are complementary in the sense that they each have different strong points ecological economics has correctly pointed out that the growth of the global economy may not be welfare improving anymore whereas post keynesians have gained valuable insights into the functioning of the capitalist growth process to determine the feasibility of a synthesis between the two schools the paper compares their approaches to the problems of production consumption and economic dynamics as well as the associated policy recommendations it shows that on a theoretical level the two schools have much in common but their policy conclusions differ with regard to the desirability of further growth the paper concludes that a synthesis of both approaches may lead to a better understanding of how a capitalist economy operates in a natural environment with limits to growth and to better informed policy advice

allocation of carbon permits within a country a general equilibrium analysis of the united kingdom abstract the kyoto agreement includes international trade in carbon permits from 2008 we have used a cge model to evaluate methods of allocating permits within the uk auctioning is broadly similar to a carbon tax with revenues recycled to reduce other distortions grandfathering some permits free to large firms would mean a loss of recycling and possibly give windfall profits to foreigners alternatively regularly revised allocation using best practice estimates would be similar to recycling revenue as an output subsidy such a system could allow much of the potential double dividend to be realised though an auction system might still be preferable

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control comment following on from an analysis by milliman and prince this article considers further the relative incentives for technical change provided by different pollution control instruments the comments involve the recognition that emission targets are typically chosen fairly arbitrarily because of regulators lack of knowledge of abatement cost schedules there is also a more detailed discussion of the practicability of auctioning emissions permits as these have been less thoroughly covered in the literature than the other instruments

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

tradable emission rights and strategic interaction the use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy this paper presents an analysis of how and under what conditions emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes

emission taxes versus other environmental policies in the environmental policy of most countries various forms of quotas and direct regulation are more important than environmental taxes this paper addresses four arguments which are often given against the use of emission taxes the three arguments related to information asymmetries and non convexities are valid in the sense that they point to complications in the use of environmental taxes the fourth argument is related to the employment effects of different types of environmental policies in economies with unemployment although this argument is frequently used by politicians the analysis provides no justification for it on the contrary in the model used employment is higher with environmental taxes than with nonrevenue raising environmental policies

the neoclassical production function as a relic of anti george politics implications for ecological economics abstract widespread support for henry george s land tax proposal prompted a backlash from wealthy landowners who focused their political efforts on tax policy the backlash corresponded chronologically with the development of neoclassical economics and land barons became active in the establishment of academic economics institutions in the united states whereas the classical economists frequently referred to the factors of production as land labor and capital neoclassical textbooks appearing in the 20th century increasingly ignored land and provided a production function y f k l in which capital and labor were the only factors explicitly identified neoclassical authors had several possible reasons for using a two factor production function but the political influence on neoclassical economics during its formative stages was conducive to avoiding reference to land when discussing factors of production an emphasis on land would have invited scrutiny of land rents for tax purposes ecological economics has evolved as a response to the shortcomings of neoclassical economics in dealing with the environmental perils of economic growth one of those shortcomings is the capital labor production function which hides the importance of land and natural resources ecological economists have developed production functions that are more ecologically oriented and one of them is explained herein

a tale of two market failures technology and environmental policy abstract market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies these combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives and can be cost effectively harnessed through the use of economic incentive based policy in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives while environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties a long term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success

socio ecological regime transitions in austria and the united kingdom we employ the concepts of socio ecological regime and regime transition to better understand the biophysical causes and consequences of industrialization for two case studies the united kingdom and austria we describe two steps in a major transition from an agrarian to an industrial socio ecological regime and the resulting consequences for energy use land use and labour organization in a first step the coal based industrial regime co existed with an agricultural sector remaining within the bounds of the old regime in a second step the oil electricity based industrial regime agriculture was integrated into the new pattern and the socio ecological transition had been completed industrialization offers an answer to the input and growth related sustainability problems of the agrarian regime but creates new sustainability problems of a larger scale while today s industrial societies are stabilizing their resource use albeit at an unsustainable level large parts of the global society are in midst of the old industrial transition this poses severe problems for global sustainability

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

the early history of modern ecological economics abstract this paper provides a historical perspective for the discussion on ecological economics as a special field of research by studying the historical background of ecological economics the present discussions and tensions inside the field might become easier to understand and to relate to the study is inspired by other studies of the emergence of new research areas done by sociologists and historians of science and includes both cognitive and social aspects macro trends and the role of individuals the basis for the paper is a combination of literature studies and interviews with key researchers from the field the story opens with the emergence of the new environmental agenda in the 1960s which was influenced by the scientific development in biology and ecology then it is outlined how the environmental challenge was met by economics in the 1960s around 1970 the basic ideas of ecological economics were given modern formulations but it took a long gestation period from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s before ecological economics took shape during this gestation period the personal relationships between the actors were formed and the meetings that were decisive for the formal establishment of ecological economics took place

tradeable permits missing markets and technology this paper examines the effects of missing markets heterogeneous pollutants and the pollution technology of firms on the efficacy of transferable pollution permits under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets we show that if firms can substitute among pollutants then setting the optimal number of permits for only one pollutant will not in general lead to an efficient outcome the degree of the inefficiency will depend on the information set available to the regulator and the substitutability among pollutants by firms when establishing transferable pollution rights regulators should therefore consider the technology of firms if firms discharge pollutants in the same fixed proportions then the regulator need only set a market for one of the pollutants to ensure an efficient outcome where firms can substitute among pollutants however establishing a market for only one pollutant provides an incentive for firms to substitute to unregulated ones this is an important policy issue as substitutability among pollutants within and across production processes may dampen the dynamic advantages of a tradeable permit policy

batneec the economics of technology based environmental standards with a uk case illustration all environmental standards however implement ed impose costs on the regulated party this is true of emission or ambient quality standards environ mental taxes tradable emission permits and stand ards basedon the best available technology bat not surprisingly therefore all environmental reg ulation is to a greater or lesser degree the outcome of some political balancing of costs and benefits part at least of the initial cost is passed on to final consumers the extent depends on the price elastic ity of demand which is consistent with thepollut er pays principle oecd 1975 the costs of regulation are therefore borne by society as a whole the benefits of regulation are also shared by society as a whole although some groups in society may be efit more than others and where trans boundary pollution is involved different countries will re ceive variable benefits

ethical influences on the evolution of the us tradable permit approach to air pollution control abstract in 1975 a novel approach to air pollution control was implemented in the usa from this rather humble beginning this approach has now been expanded rather dramatically in several different directions this paper describes this evolution shows how the design of the system has been adapted to accommodate ethical concerns and describes how the latest versions of this approach have transformed the regulatory process which spawned the approach in the first place

sulphur abatement policy this paper compares the cost of meeting pollution targets by the imposition of a uniform charge rate and by differentiated charge rates these costs are then compared with a simple standards setting in the form of critical loads in order to see in an empirical way if economic instruments work better than regulations empirical results are provided with associated conclusions and policy implications

market based systems for reducing chemical use in agriculture in the united states this study uses a computable general equilibrium cge model of the u s economy to estimate the economic effects of agricultural fertilizer and pesticide input reductions on individual farm sectors and on the economy as a whole the costs of reducing agricultural chemicals using a market based approach and a command and control approach are compared the real cost to society of restrictng fertilizer and pesticide use by 20 percent across all uses is estimated to be 2 3 billion a market based approach that would provide incentives to reduce chemical use in the most cost efficient manner would be about 10 percent less costly

spatial heterogeneity contract design and the efficiency of carbon sequestration policies for agriculture abstract in this paper we develop methods to investigate the efficiency of alternative contracts for carbon c sequestration in cropland soils taking into account the spatial heterogeneity of agricultural production systems and the costs of implementing more efficient contracts we describe contracts being proposed for implementation in the united states and other countries that would pay farmers for adoption of specified practices per hectare contracts we also describe more efficient contracts that would pay farmers per tonne of soil c sequestered and we show how to estimate the costs of implementing these more efficient contracts in a case study of a major agricultural region in the united states we confirm that the relative inefficiency of per hectare contracts varies spatially and increases with the degree of spatial heterogeneity the results also show that per hectare contracts are as much as five times more costly than per tonne contracts a degree of inefficiency similar to that found in assessments of command and control industrial emissions regulations measurement costs to implement the per tonne contracts are found to be positively related to spatial heterogeneity but are estimated to be at least an order of magnitude smaller than the efficiency losses of the per hectare contract for reasonable error levels this finding implies that contracting parties could afford to bear a significant cost to implement per tonne contracts and achieve a lower total cost than would be possible with the less efficient per hectare contracts

monopoly and soft budget constraint a benevolent government may decide to subsidize an unprofitable monopoly whose profits do not capture all the social surplus from its production anticipating this the firm may underinvest in order to become unprofitable and extract state subsidies the resulting welfare loss may exceed by many times the deadweight cost of monopoly pricing committing the firm to a price ceiling may soften its budget constraint and thus reduce welfare competition can harden budget constraints in industries in which free entry is socially excessive

pareto improvement through a reallocation of carbon emission quotas abstract this article presents a methodology that discusses a reallocation of carbon emission quotas based on the zsg dea model also introduces the process of solving the zsg dea model in extensive detail and derives theorems 1 and 2 theorem 1 shows the equivalence in competition and the cooperation case while theorem 2 indicates the correlation between quota adjustment and efficiency change through this zsg dea model the determination of carbon emission quotas is no longer subjective and reasonable carbon emission quotas among countries can be obtained the reallocation of carbon emission quotas can not only ensure that all countries have 100 efficiencies but also help all countries gain through pareto improvement the conclusions of this paper are that most developed countries should increase their carbon emission quotas and that most less developed countries need to reduce theirs including the two most populous countries of china and india the reallocation process should be paid by selling the quotas of low efficient countries so that they can obtain funds to support their development while at the same time high efficient countries can produce more due to relaxation of environmental constraints thus achieving global pareto improvement

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

the net benefits of incentive based regulation a case study of environmental standard setting economists interested in environmental safety and health regulation have long argued that decentralized incentive based or ib policies are more efficient than centralized command and control or cac approaches see charles schultze 1977 for instance these arguments generally have been based on the assumption that ib policies will accomplish the same goals as their cac counterparts but at less cost to society however some of those touting ib policies have overlooked an important point environmental workplace or even productsafety standards typically take the form of maximum permissible concentrations of harmful substances so that compliance only requires that all monitoring points or samples register readings below these critical levels for this reason ib policies typically assign a shadow price of zero to improvements that exceed the standard s while more crude cac policies generally result in overcontrol beyond the standards if there is no value to this overcontrol cac policies will not improve at all on ib approaches and will indeed be more expensive if however reduced concentrations below the level of the standards bring with them further improvements in health or the environment cac approaches will produce greater benefits than ib approaches thus a fair comparison between the two necessitates that any additional benefits associated with cac policies be offset against the cost advantages enjoyed by their ib counterparts although this possibility has been recognized by others scott atkinson and t h tietenberg 1982 for instance it is little appreciated and its empirical significance has never been ascertained that is our purpose here we do so by developing data on the costs and benefits of controlling a common air pollutant total suspended particulates or tsp in baltimore by comparing the tsp levels likely under both ib and cac approaches we are able to estimate the marginal costs and benefits associated with a variety of alternative air quality standards which take the form of maximum permissible concentrations this in turn allows us to determine the net benefits arising from the two kinds of regimes in the next section we present a simple conceptual framework for our analysis section ii describes the estimation of the costs and benefits of our hypothesized air pollution controls in baltimore section iii presents our somewhat surprising findings and section iv discusses those findings and their potential significance for regulation in the real world

understanding the soft budget constraint we propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist transitional and market economies our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena and provides a classification of their causes and consequences in light of this interpretation we then review the theoretical literature on the subject and compare it with those on other dynamic commitment problems in economics

integrating agronomic principles into production function specification a dichotomy of growth inputs and facilitating inputs this article presents a general conceptual framework for integrating agronomic principles into economic production analysis we categorize inputs in crop production into growth inputs and facilitating inputs based on this dichotomy we specify an asymmetric production function the robustness of the asymmetric framework is tested using crop level panel data on potato production in the netherlands the test results do not reject the proposed framework and the asymmetric specification better represents the underlying production technology

costs of alternative policies for the control of nitrogen dioxide in baltimore abstract the costs of meeting alternative one hour nitrogen dioxide standards in baltimore are simulated for alternative pollution control policies applied to the 200 point sources with the largest emissions and compared to a similar study for the chicago area the least cost spatially differentiated policy is found to be quite closely approximated by an effluent fee varying only by source type and a policy that combines features of a regulatory and an economic incentive policy the uniform fee or its market permit analogue results in relatively high costs because of severe overcontrol

government outsourcing public contracting with private monopoly the article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts the government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds a la laffont and tirole 1993 government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels however government can contract ex post with the private firms this ex post contracting set up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash flows this is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties

federalism and the soft budget constraint the government s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade off between political benefits and economic costs the latter depending on the decentralization of government two effects of federalism are derived first fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and thus serves as a commitment device the competition effect second monetary centralization together with fiscal decentralization induces a conflict of interests and thus may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation the checks and balance effect the authors analysis is used to interpret china s recent experience of transition to a market economy copyright 1998 by american economic association

endogenous timing with infinitely many firms abstract a model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit output dominant firm and the cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases at each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one both stackelberg and cournot like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however when the number of leaders is given production at subsequent periods is always prevented and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

sustainability guided promotion of renewable electricity generation in recent years the threat of global climate change high fuel import dependence and rapidly rising electricity demand levels have intensified the quest for more sustainable energy systems this in turn has increased the need for policy makers to promote electricity generation from renewable energy sources guaranteed prices coupled with a buy back obligation for electricity fed into the grid is a popular renewables promotion instrument especially in europe more recently driven mainly by electricity market liberalisation efforts quota targets for the share of renewables in combination with tradable green certificates tgc have received considerable attention tgc offer a greater theoretical potential for economic efficiency gains due to price competition and the greater flexibility assigned to the obliged parties while guaranteed prices and tgc schemes support the operation of renewable energy technology systems bidding schemes for renewable energy generation capacity are used to raise economic efficiency on the plant construction side all of these policy instruments suffer from the shortcoming that they do not explicitly account for the often widely varying environmental social and economic impacts of the technologies concerned in this paper we propose a methodology for the design of renewable energy policy instruments that is based on integrated assessment in particular we argue that using participatory multicriteria evaluation as part of the design of renewable energy promotion policies would make it possible 1 to differentiate the level of promotion in a systematic and transparent manner according to their socio ecological economic impact and 2 to explicitly account for the preferences of stakeholders a further problem of existing tgc and bidding schemes is that diversity of supply could be severely diminished if few low cost technologies were allowed to dominate the renewable energy market to ensure a certain diversity of technologies our scheme suggests the use of different technology bands for technologies that are relatively homogeneous with respect to their maturity

hardening the budget constraint the experience of the post socialist countries abstract the study surveys the typical manifestations of the softness of the budget constraint such as state subsidies soft taxation non performing loans the accumulation of trade arrears between firms and the build up of wage arrears in the various post socialist countries it was widely maintained at the outset of the post socialist transition that the holy trinity of liberalization privatization and stabilization would suffice to produce an efficient market economy since then it has become clear that hardening the budget constraint needs to be given equal priority with these unless this occurs the effects of privatization will fall short of expectations as they have in russia

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

scope and limits of the market mechanism in environmental management abstract this paper tries to evaluate the role of the market mechanism in environmental management and warns against reductionist views on the causes and remedies of environmental damages according to some of these views proper pricing of the environment and extensive use of market mechanisms in environmental management would solve environmental problems but various conditions tell against such simplifications namely the complex causality behind environmental damages the complexity of the functions and values of nature as well as limitations of the market mechanism in coping with the functions and services of nature several of those limitations the difficulties of defining and enforcing property rights to nature s functions and services the pervasiveness of externalities conditioned by the public goods characteristics of many environmental functions and values the difficulties in enticing processing and using information about environmental goods and the high transaction costs caused by all these circumstances often rule out contracts and trading of environmental services it is less known that the basic cause of market existence and extension namely specialization and division of labour have negative environmental effects with respect to environmental policy conceptual problems are analyzed while all kinds of environmental management mechanisms have a regulatory function only quantity mechanisms as a subset of incentive mechanisms are market mechanisms the choice of relevant environmental policy instrument is conditioned by many considerations the issue of the superior efficiency properties of market mechanisms in environmental management is not yet settled satisfactorily extensive empirical tests are still lacking

the impact of economics on environmental policy abstract environmental economists have seen their ideas translated into the rough and tumble policy world for over two decades they have witnessed the application of economic instruments to several environmental issues including preserving wetlands lowering lead levels and curbing acid rain this essay examines the impact of the rise of economics in the policy world on the making of environmental policy i focus on two related but distinct phenomena the increasing interest in the use of incentive based mechanisms such as tradable permits to achieve environmental goals and the increasing interest in the use of analytical tools such as benefit cost analysis in regulatory decision making i argue that economists and economic instruments have had a modest impact on shaping environmental health and safety regulation but that economists will play an increasingly important role in the future although the role of economics is becoming more prominent it does not follow that environmental policy will become more efficient this apparent inconsistency can be explained by the political economy of environmental policy

industrial output restriction and the kyoto protocol an input output approach with application to canada the objective of this paper is to assess the economic impacts of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by decreasing industrial output in canada to a level that will meet the target set out in the kyoto protocol the study uses an ecological economic input output model combining economic components valued in monetary terms with ecologic components ghg emissions expressed in physical terms economic and greenhouse gas emissions data for canada are computed in the same sectoral disaggregation three policy scenarios are considered the first one uses the direct emission coefficients to allocate the reduction in industrial output while the other two use the direct plus indirect emission coefficients in the first two scenarios the reduction in industrial sector output is allocated uniformly across sectors while it is allocated to the 12 largest emitting industries in the last one the estimated impacts indicate that the results vary with the different allocation methods the third policy scenario allocation to the 12 largest emitting sectors is the most cost effective of the three as the impacts of the kyoto protocol reduces gross domestic product by 3 1 compared to 24 and 8 1 in the first two scenarios computed economic costs should be considered as upper bounds because the model assumes immediate adjustment to the kyoto protocol and because flexibility mechanisms are not incorporated the resulting upper bound impact of the third scenario may seem to contradict those who claim that the kyoto protocol would place an unbearable burden on the canadian economy c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

energy saving in energy market reform the feed in tariffs option abstract the use of feed in tariffs fits is now widespread for renewable energy and under discussion for other low carbon electricity generation but not for energy efficiency there is a small literature on fits for electricity demand reduction but not energy efficiency more generally this paper considers the general application of fits on the demand side and sets out the economic arguments in the context of changing energy markets it then discusses the implications of some practical issues including the definitional problems arising from the difference between energy efficiency and demand reduction using experience from historical energy efficiency programmes it considers the public benefits payment methods and policy scope that need to be considered and how these might affect policy design it makes some provisional estimates of economically justified payments in the context of the proposed uk energy market reform it concludes that fits for energy saving might be a powerful tool for incentivising energy efficiency

the economics of the greenhouse effect the recognition that economic activity is contributing to climatic change with attendant costs that may be of large magnitudes has set in motion a substantial research effort this paper seeks to review the contribution of economics to analysis of the greenhouse effect and to the policies and instruments suggested as means of mitigating its damage a brief overview of the causes and consequences of global warming is given and a number of energy economy forecasting models are examined as the costs of global warming depend upon the extent to which preventative and adaptive measures are undertaken the techniques available to evaluate these costs are surveyed we examine extant targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction and explore the frameworks within which optimal policy targets can be designed the paper also considers the narrower question of minimized abatement costs and surveys the types of models used to estimate them the merits of alternative policy instruments are examined paying particular attention to the role that risk and uncertainty and the costs of monitoring and implementation of policy under conditions of imperfect information may play in the choice of instruments problems of international co operation in the development of abatement policy are examined and we consider the compensations across both nations and generations that are likely to be necessary conditions for effective action

the assessment reforming environmental regulation in the uk quired in the light of new but highly uncertain scientific evidence research was initiated and as a result a series of largely ad hoc objectives and targets were adopted through a process of political negotiation thus the ukis now committed through a variety of international agreements to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide by 60 per cent of their 1980 levels by the year 2003 to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000 and more vaguely to maintain biodiversity and sustainable development european directives on bathing beaches on drinking water and on urban waste water treatment required a major investment programme in water and sewage treat ment with the further commitment to end sewage dumping at sea by 1998 added to this programme substantial and sustained real increases in the price of water services to customers became necessary

efficiency of second generation biofuel crop subsidy schemes spatial heterogeneity and policy design policy schemes that aim to stimulate the cultivation of biofuel crops typically ignore the spatial heterogeneity in costs and benefits associated with their production because of spatial heterogeneity in biophysical and current agricultural production factors potential gains from stimulating biofuel crops are non uniformly distributed across space this paper explores implications of this type of heterogeneity for the net benefits associated with different subsidy schemes we present a simple framework based on discounted cash flows to assess potential gains from introducing the notion of heterogeneity into stimulation schemes we show that agricultural subsidy spending can be reduced in a pareto efficient way and simultaneously improve the total stimulation potential of biofuel policies when schemes 1 are production based instead of land based 2 accommodate differences in opportunity costs and 3 target sites where subsidies for conventional agricultural land use types are high these results are robust for a range of different bioenergy prices and the relative gains of addressing these key elements in policy compared to conventional stimulation schemes increase with lower bioenergy prices and are largest when low prices coincide with high emission reduction ambitions

a synthetic analysis of market efficiency and constant resource stock for sustainability and its policy implications abstract economic efficiency and ecological sustainability reflect different understandings and requirements for natural and environmental resource management these two approaches can conflict in principle but at the same time they can be complementary a synthesis is suggested so that ecological sustainability could be realised with economic efficiency with the introduction of a resource enhancement function an optimal control model is constructed to investigate the efficient implementation of sustainability criteria further discussions are made on the policy implications arising from the synthesis and the transformation between physical capital natural resources in situ and capital gains economic surplus in a market control process

creating markets for air pollution control in europe and the usa this paper surveys recent efforts to relax the rigid regulatory frameworks for air pollution control in europe and the usa european policies have mainly taken the form of bubbles and compensation or offset schemes emission trading has been limited to intra firm solutions for various reasons industry structure absence of real scarcity and too restrictive trading rules bubbles have been granted to homogenous sectors only and can be characterized as direct regulation for a group rather than tradable permit systems by contrast the sulphur allowance program in the usa has laid down the foundation for a pollution permit market with few formal restrictions problems that arise are mainly related to local environmental and public utility controls europe can learn from the usa that regular national permit markets could be installed preferably for homogenous sectors in designing the permit system the differences between the usa and europe in terms of ecosystem sensitivity stringency of regulation and differentiation of regional environmental policy have to be taken into account

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

credible carbon policy the paper sets out the credibility problem in carbon policy provides a number of examples of non credibility in recent energy policy and identifies the costs of failing to address it the time inconsistency of carbon policy arising because of multiple objectives the irreversibility of energy investments and the scope for ex post reneging on ex ante commitments to set policy instruments such as carbon taxes or emission permits at appropriate levels is set in a conceptual framework analogies with monetary policy are drawn and a solution to the time inconsistency problem is proposed through the establishment of an energy carbon agency

optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock externalities abstract underlying some of the most pressing environmental problems are the interlinked resource and environmental stock externalities with threshold effects using a simple dynamic model it is shown how in the face of such externalities the static market based policy instruments such as pigouvian taxes should be modified it is shown that even if for an initial period there is going to be no pollution stock damage the optimal policy still requires that abatement begins immediately and at increasing rates simulation of the model for the case of fossil fuel burning and the consequent global warming shows that the optimal carbon tax and therefore the optimal control strategy is particularly sensitive to changes in the marginal abatement cost and the level of fossil fuel demand policy simulations contrast the optimal control policy with and estimate the welfare losses from alternative policies deriving from arbitrary tax paths the latter include i a no tax policy ii a constant carbon tax rate iii the european community s proposed carbon tax path and iv a delayed optimal tax path

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

enemies or allies henry george and francis amasa walker one century later an evaluation and commemoration of two pioneering american economists one century after their deaths in 1897 biographical sketches are followed by expositions and assessments of their contributions to economics areas covered include distribution theory the explanation of poverty george s single tax proposal the business cycle and money and statistics a novel interpretation of george s treatment of rent is provided also covered are the parallels and antagonisms between george and walker and the uneasy relationship between george and the academic economists of the era an appendix provides a brief guide to the literature

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

environmental regulation a value theoretic and class based analysis following a value theoretic and class based approach it is argued in this paper that ecological problems are inseparably linked to the process of extracting surplus value in capitalism and owing to their adverse impacts instigate struggles over the appropriation of nature these struggles fought within and outside the state by competing agents shape environmental regulation in particular taxes permits command and control measures and subsidies affect prices profits and rents and have class and other social implications evidence of current environmental regulation shows that it takes places under the great influence of capitalist concerns

when can carbon abatement policies increase welfare the fundamental role of distorted factor markets abstract this paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue neutral carbon tax and nonauctioned carbon emissions permits taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets the presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies this cost increase is much greater under emissions permits since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about 18 per ton of carbon in contrast an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare improving so long as environmental damages are positive

decentralized economic incentives under technological indivisibilities a cooperative game approach abstract abatement technology is often characterized by indivisibility in those instances it is usually more efficient to operate the installed abatement device at full capacity in order to capture economies of scale in these situations efficiency may not necessarily be achieved by market incentive schemes such as taxes or tradeable permits installing a device may entail too much or too little investment in relation to the target level a tax could entail higher cost than a command and control approach while equilibrium in a permits market may not even exist the paper proposes an alternative incentive scheme the fine incentive scheme fis which imposes a fine penalty if the given area wide not firm specific emission or ambient standard is violated the performance of the fis is evaluated in a game theoretic framework specifically a cooperative game analysis since a measure of interdependence is introduced via the fis the model is illustrated with data from the haifa area in israel these empirical results are contrasted with a non cooperative framework as well as with command and control cac and the two traditional economic incentive schemes taxes and permits it is shown that taxes are the least desired mechanism while tradeable permits often don t work furthermore the efficacy of command and control relative to the fis varies with the circumstances the latter does not necessarily dominate the former under a rather wide range of circumstances

the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues the concept of the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues is developed it is defined as the reduction in excess burden resulting from the substitution of these revenues for current or future resource distorting tax revenues such as those raised from federal corporate and personal income taxes the annual efficiency value of revenues raised by national effluent taxes on two major air pollutants is estimated to range from 0 63 to 3 05 billion if substituted for federal personal income tax revenue and from 1 to 4 87 billion if substituted for corporate income tax revenue expressed in 1982 dollars thus previous estimates of the efficiency gain from substitution of an effluent tax scheme for current pollution regulation policy have been too low because the efficiency value of the tax revenues has been excluded

do transaction costs influence firm trading behaviour in the european emissions trading system this study is one of the first to empirically investigate firm trading behaviour and the importance of permit trading transaction costs such as information costs and search costs in the first phase of the european union s emissions trading system eu ets the signs and significance of our constructed transaction costs proxy variables indicate for a presence of these costs in the initial years of the eu ets in particular this paper shows that ets firms with the smaller number of installations and with less trading experience were less likely to participate in the european emissions trading market and traded the lower quantities of permits furthermore these firms chose to trade permits indirectly via third parties this study also supports the concerns that transaction costs could be excessive for smaller participants and firms operating in the new eu member states

the environment as a factor of production the authors develop a model of environmental resource use in production with an empirical analysis of how electric power companies consume and bank sulfur dioxide pollution permits the model considers emissions fuels and labor as variable inputs with quasi fixed inputs of permits and capital incorporating information from permit markets allows the authors to distinguish between user costs and asset shadow values their findings indicate that firms are holding stocks of pollution permits for reasons other than short term cost savings the results also reveal substantial substitution possibilities between emissions permits stocks and other factors of production the authors speculate that anticipated secondary markets for carbon offset inventories related to the flexibility mechanisms of the kyoto protocol will have similar effects for greenhouse gas emitting firms

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors