strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

rent seeking and the provision of public goods in this short paper i adopt the public choice school paradigm of modeling a government in order to compare its performance with that of the market in the standard model of the provision of public goods private provision is represented by the cournot nash equilibrium in individual contributions public provision incorporates rent seeking whereby some of the aspects of the allocation are determined indirectly by influence activities of the interested parties thus both allocation procedures yield inefficiency and the question is which procedure results in a greater amount of inefficiency private provision with its free riding incentives or public provision with its rent seeking incentives the results indicate that public provision may well be preferred to private provision of public goods thus superiority of private provision is not guaranteed even in the case of a non benevolent government copyright 1993 by royal economic society

a general model of rent seeking for public goods this paper generalizes the model of collective rent seeking over a public good expanding the rent seeker s consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good our results suggest collective rent seeking is positively related to group size although free riding exists within a group there is not a one for one tradeoff in addition rent seeking increases with wealth finally total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest the key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

the use of flow analysis in foreign exchange exploratory evidence abstract this paper provides questionnaire evidence on the role of flow analysis for professional traders and fund managers this evidence suggests that besides fundamental information and technical analysis the analysis of flows provides an independent third type of information for professionals the view that flows can be used to learn about fundamentals is not consistent with the data instead evidence indicates that flows more likely provide insight into semi fundamental private information

assessing systemic risk due to fire sales spillover through maximum entropy network reconstruction abstract monitoring and assessing systemic risk in financial markets is of great importance but it often requires data that are unavailable or available at a very low frequency for this reason systemic risk assessment with partial information is potentially very useful for regulators and other stakeholders in this paper we consider systemic risk due to fire sales spillovers and portfolio rebalancing by using the risk metrics defined by greenwood et al 2015 by using a method based on the constrained minimization of the cross entropy we show that it is possible to assess aggregated and single bank s systemicness and vulnerability using only the information on the size of each bank and the capitalization of each investment asset we also compare our approach with an alternative widespread application of the maximum entropy principle allowing to derive graph probability distributions and generating scenarios and we use it to propose a statistical test for a change in banks vulnerability to systemic events

the allocation of resources by voting a general theory of voting which explains under what conditions voting will be chosen as a means for allocating resources and how the constitution that governs the voting will be structured is presented it is hypothesized that developers of voting organizations will structure their organizations in order to maximize the value of shares sold by minimizing the expected costs of wealth transfer and decision making in the voting organization implications regarding the allocation of votes and assessments within the organization the domain of voting decisions and the optimal voting rule are tested with data on the constitutional structure of condominium homeowner associations

leverage induced systemic risk under basle ii and other credit risk policies abstract we use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies the first is the unregulated case which only imposes limits on maximum leverage the second is basle ii and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage induced risk with options when compared to the unregulated case both basle ii and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high this is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging which can destabilize the market none of these policies are optimal for everyone risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage banks prefer the perfect hedge policy and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage no one prefers basle ii

the foreign exchange market a random walk with a dragging anchor this paper explores some anomalies in the foreign exchange market it is hard to find evidence of either short term overshooting or of longer term reversion to an equilibrium the forward exchange rate contains virtually no information on future spot rates discussions with practitioners indicate that longer term speculation based on fundamentals is strictly limited and survey data and other evidence suggest that expectations and speculation are based on a variety of models the interplay between speculation based on fundamentals and on a random walk or chartist approach influences the outcome this endorses the prior model of j a frankel and k a froot copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

insider trading without normality in this paper we analyse the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a particular class of monopolistic rational expectations models we show the equivalence between the kyle 1985 model of insider trading where the insider observes the amount of noise trading and the kyle 1989 model of informed speculation when there is one risk neutral insider and many risk neutral market makers we show that in these two equivalent models i there exists a unique equilibrium independently of the distribution of uncertainty ii this equilibrium minimizes the expected gains of the informed agent under incentive compatibility constraints we extend our results to a class of signalling games

when micro prudence increases macro risk the destabilizing effects of financial innovation leverage and diversification by exploiting basic common practice accounting and risk management rules we propose a simple analytical dynamical model to investigate the effects of microprudential changes on macroprudential outcomes specifically we study the consequence of the introduction of a financial innovation that allows reducing the cost of portfolio diversification in a financial system populated by financial institutions having capital requirements in the form of value at risk var constraint and following standard mark to market and risk management rules we provide a full analytical quantification of the multivariate feedback effects between investment prices and bank behavior induced by portfolio rebalancing in presence of asset illiquidity and show how changes in the constraints of the bank portfolio optimization endogenously drive the dynamics of the balance sheet aggregate of financial institutions and thereby the availability of bank liquidity to the economic system and systemic risk the model shows that when fin

an econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns the returns to hedge funds and other alternative investments are often highly serially correlated in sharp contrast to the returns of more traditional investment vehicles such as long only equity portfolios and mutual funds in this paper we explore several sources of such serial correlation and show that the most likely explanation is illiquidity exposure i e investments in securities that are not actively traded and for which market prices are not always readily available for portfolios of illiquid securities reported returns will tend to be smoother than true economic returns which will understate volatility and increase risk adjusted performance measures such as the sharpe ratio we propose an econometric model of illiquidity exposure and develop estimators for the smoothing prole as well as a smoothing adjusted sharpe ratio for a sample of 908 hedge funds drawn from the tass database we show that our estimated smoothing coecien ts vary considerably across hedge fund style categories and may be a useful proxy for quantifying illiquidity exposure

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

charts noise and fundamentals in the london foreign exchange market this paper presents some empirical evidence on the prevalence perceived importance and nature of chartist or technical analysis in the london foreign exchange market if noise traders see e g de long et al i987 are defined as those speculators who do not base their trading strategies on a consideration of market fundamentals then it clearly encompasses those traders who employ chart analysis i e those who base their strategies on the analysis and extrapolation of past price movements alone

reconstructing and stress testing credit networks abstract financial networks are an important source of systemic risk but often only partial network information is available in this paper we use data on bank firm credit relationships in japan and conduct a horse race between different network reconstruction methods in terms of their ability to reproduce the actual credit networks we then compare the different reconstruction methods in terms of their implied levels of systemic risk based on a standard model of price mediated contagion we find that the observed credit network displays relatively high levels of systemic risk compared with most reconstruction methods lastly we explore whether different policies can improve the robustness of the system

stability analysis of financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios abstract common asset holdings are widely believed to have been the primary vector of contagion in the recent financial crisis we develop a network approach to the amplification of financial contagion due to the combination of overlapping portfolios and leverage and we show how it can be understood in terms of a generalized branching process this can be used to compute the stability for any particular configuration of portfolios by studying a stylized model we estimate the circumstances under which systemic instabilities are likely to occur as a function of parameters such as leverage market crowding diversification and market impact although diversification may be good for individual institutions it can create dangerous systemic effects and as a result financial contagion gets worse with too much diversification there is a critical threshold for leverage below it financial networks are always stable and above it the unstable region grows as leverage increases note that our model assumes passive portfolio management during a crisis however we show that dynamic deleveraging during a crisis can amplify instabilities the financial system exhibits robust yet fragile behavior with regions of the parameter space where contagion is rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs our model and methods of analysis can be calibrated to real data and provide simple yet powerful tools for macroprudential stress testing

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

the use of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market abstract technica or chartist analysis of financial markets involves providing forecasts or trading advice on the basis of largely visual inspection of past prices without regard to any underlying economic or fundamental analysis this paper reports the results of a questionnaire survey conducted on behalf of the bank of england among chief foreign exchange dealers based in london in november 1988 amongst other findings it is revealed that at least 90 per cent of respondents place some weight on this form of non fundamental analysis when forming views at one or more time horizons there is also a skew towards reliance on technical as opposed to fundamentalist analysis at shorter horizons which becomes steadily reversed as the length of horizon considered is increased a very high proportion of chief dealers view technical and fundamental analysis as complementary forms of analysis and a substantial proportion suggest that technical advice may be self fulfilling jel f31

the impact of systemic and illiquidity risk on financing with risky collateral abstract repurchase agreements repos are one of the most important sources of funding liquidity for many financial investors and intermediaries in a repo some assets are given by a borrower as collateral in exchange of funding the capital given to the borrower is the market value of the collateral reduced by an amount termed as haircut or margin the haircut protects the capital lender from loss of value of the collateral contingent on the borrower s default for this reason the haircut is typically calculated with a simple value at risk estimation of the collateral for the purpose of preventing the risk associated to volatility however other risk factors should be included in the haircut and a severe undervaluation of them could result in a significant loss of value of the collateral if the borrower defaults in this paper we present a stylized model of the financial system which allows us to compute the haircut incorporating the liquidity risk of the collateral and most important possible systemic effects these are mainly due to the similarity of bank portfolios excessive leverage of financial institutions and illiquidity of assets the model is analytically solvable under some simplifying assumptions and robust to the relaxation of these assumptions as shown through monte carlo simulations we also show which are the most critical model parameters for the determination of haircuts

insider trading in a rational expectations economy it is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading in this article an opposing efficiency argument is formalized the model incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage if outsiders expect insiders to take advantage of them in trading outsiders will reduce their investment the insiders loss from this diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains consequently a prohibition on insider trading may effect a pareto improvement insiders are made better off if they can precommit not to trade on their privileged information govemment regulation accomplishes exactly this jel 022 026 313 the traditional rationale articulated for insider trading regulation and other securities law is that such rules promote confidence in markets indeed president franklin d roosevelt justified the first major u s securities legislation by saying it should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence similar language is still invoked half a century later in connection with enforcement efforts against insider trading and in proposals for tightened stock

asymmetry and corrective public policy in contests the proposal of an inefficient policyusually stimulates a political strugglebetween the affected interest groups theresulting wasteful lobbying activities mayreduce welfare even if the proposed policyis not approved in this paper weshow that sufficient asymmetry in payoffsnot only tends to reduce lobbying effortsin standard rent seeking contests as iswell known but it is in fact a necessarycondition for the implementation of asuccessful effective correctivetax transfer policy that complements theproposal of the inefficient policy such apolicy induces an efficient equilibriumoutcome which is in addition optimal fromthe viewpoint of the players that take partin the public policy game

rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained in the original tullock 1975 1980 game an individual bidder s probability of winning with a bid b is proportional to br where the exponent reflects economies of scale in rent seeking different interpretations can be given to these probabilities first one may view r as a reflection of the political culture alternatively one may view r as a choice variable for a politician intuition suggests that a society with a high tolerance for the selling of political favors and politicians who are receptive to rent seeking would both induce greater rent seeking expenditures than other societies all else equal this paper shows that a lower value of r can actually lead to more rent dissipation than a higher value this paper also reinforces two points concerning rent seeking first the analysis confirms the robustness of under dissipation of rents even in the face of entry second it points out the importance of distinguishing between rent seeking expenditures and rent dissipation when bidders must borrow for example total expenditure may understate rent dissipation

multimarket trading and market liquidity when a security trades at multiple locations simultaneously an informed trader has several avenues in which to exploit his private information the greater the proportion of liquidity trading by large traders who can split their trades across markets the larger is the correlation between volume in different markets and the smaller is the informativeness of prices we show that one of the markets emerges as the dominant location for trading in that security when informed traders can use their information for more than one trading period the timely release of price information by market makers at one location adversely affects the profits informed traders expect to make subsequently at other locations market makers competing to offer the lowest cost of trading at their location consequently deter informed trading be voluntarily making the price information public and by cracking down on insider trading article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the use of fundamental and technical analyses by foreign exchange dealers hong kong evidence abstract this article reports the results of a questionnaire survey conducted in february 1995 on the use by foreign exchange dealers in hong kong of fundamental and technical analyses to form their forecasts of exchange rate movements our findings reveal that 85 of respondents rely on both fundamental and technical analyses for predicting future rate movements at different time horizons at shorter horizons there exists a skew towards reliance on technical analysis as opposed to fundamental analysis but the skew becomes steadily reversed as the length of horizon considered is extended technical analysis is considered slightly more useful in forecasting trends than fundamental analysis but significantly more useful in predicting turning points interest rate related news is found to be a relatively important fundamental factor in exchange rate forecasting while moving average and or other trend following systems are the most useful technical technique