consensus building how to persuade a group many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups the paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of group members to approve the proposal adopting a mechanism design approach to communication it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key members of the group and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others the paper unveils the factors such as the extent of congruence among group members and between them and the sponsor and the size and governance of the group that condition the sponsor s ability to maneuver and get his project approved

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

credit market constraints consumption smoothing and the accumulation of durable production assets in low income countries investments in bullocks in india in this paper we formulate and estimate a finite horizon structural dynamic model of agricultural investment behavior that incorporates the major features of low income agricultural environments income uncertainty constraints on borrowing and rental markets and the use of investment assets to generate income and smooth consumption the model is fit to longitudinal indian household data on farm profits bullock stocks and pump sets the estimated structural parameters are used to assess the effects on the life cycle accumulation of bullocks agricultural profits and welfare associated with complete markets and bullock liquidity and with second best policies that provide assured sources of income to farmers and weather insurance

marketed surplus under risk do peasants agree with sandmo using a newly defined notion of aversion to income risk the behavior of the marketed surplus producer under price risk is characterized unlike the familiar case first examined by sandmo output depends on both ordinal preferences for goods and on risk attitudes conditions are found that yield an output level under risk that is smaller than under certainty if these conditions do not hold both risk and risk aversion may have a positive effect on output implications for econometric studies of risk attitudes are considered and illustrated with an example finally we examine the effect of uncertainty on the peasant s long run equilibrium

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

a simple model of endogenous agricultural commodity price fluctuations with storage a debate has been raging for centuries regarding the effects of interannual storage on commodity prices most analysts consider storage to function as a price stabilizer while others place it at the core of an explanation of intriguing features of commodity price series such as skewed distributions most studies have been developed in the context of the theory of competitive storage where random shocks affect supply or demand recently the endogenous chaotic behavior of markets has become another possible hypothesis regarding the origin of commodity price fluctuations we develop a nonlinear cobweb model with intra and interannual storage risk averse agents and adaptive expectations like the theory of competitive storage this nonlinear cobweb model with storage can reproduce some of the stylized facts of agricultural commodity prices autocorrelation of first rank low kurtosis and skewness in addition the effects of storage on price variation are mixed in the presence of interannual storage chaotic price series show less variation compared to a situation without interannual storage but we find that storage contributes to the endogenous volatility of prices by making chaotic dynamics more likely

how far down the path to free trade the importance of rice price stabilization in developing asia abstract international trade agreements are pushing the world in the direction of free trade but price stabilization which is inconsistent with completely free trade remains important in developing asia because of the large share of rice in economic output a policy of pure price stabilization for rice without consistent protection either subsidization or taxation can help to create the macroeconomic stability that is essential for sustained rapid economic growth by increasing the quantity and efficiency of investment throughout the economy pure price stabilization can also generate significant equity gains by protecting poor consumers and farmers from sharp fluctuations in prices while domestic commodity price stabilization schemes have a checkered history around the world the experience of asian countries in stabilizing rice prices offers more scope for optimism asian governments have been generally successful in stabilizing rice prices and there are several instances where this has been accomplished without sustained protection of either consumers or farmers however there is room for improved stabilization mechanisms that would lower the costs of intervention

inflexible rules in incentive problems in practice contracts involve standard terms or rules allowing for variations only under exceptional circumstances we develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature even in the absence of transactions costs rules arise when an agent has countervailing incentives to misrepresent private information these incentives are created by endowing the agent with a critical factor of production ex ante applications in regulatory labor and legal settings

the value of ideal contingency markets in agriculture an incomplete markets equilibrium in which no contingency markets are available is compared to a complete markets equilibrium formed by introducing a futures market and a crop insurance market the two regimes are compared using comparative static and welfare analyses numerical examples highlight important characteristics of the model and illustrate how the effects of introducing contingency markets can be quantified the main conclusions are that contingency markets in agriculture increase economic efficiency but there is no guarantee that farmers and consumers both benefit it is found that futures and crop insurance markets may reduce farmer welfare when the demand for farm products is price inelastic

flexible production systems and local machine tool subcontracting electronics components transnationals in malaysia this paper examines the influence of flexible production systems on the development of local sourcing using information gathered on production relationships between firms it shows that the introduction of flexible production systems in electronics components transnationals in malaysia stimulated the growth of local machine tool firms a combination of market forces and cooperation strengthened subcontracting links between electronics components transnationals and local machine tool firms such that the latter experienced considerable technological broadening and deepening thereby transforming them from simple parts to high precision tooling and automation systems manufacturers copyright 1994 by oxford university press

the financialization of food commodity equity and cross commodity return co movements rose dramatically after the 2008 financial crisis this development took place following what has been dubbed the financialization of commodity markets

grain price stabilization in india evaluation of policy alternatives abstract stabilization of prices is an important element of food policy in india as in most other countries both developing and developed however since the magnitude of grain stocks held for this purpose as well as the costs of physical storage have become prohibitively high there is now a need for finding cost effective alternatives including non interventionist and market oriented methods for price stabilization in this paper we consider the case of rice and wheat which are staple foodgrains in india we make a comparison between alternative price stabilization policies including that of holding buffer stocks in terms of their impact on domestic price stability producer and consumer welfare and government costs a multi market equilibrium framework is used where private storage consumption supply and prices of rice and wheat are determined simultaneously indian exports and imports are assumed to affect world prices the alternative price stabilizing mechanisms are ranked according to both the criteria welfare and price stability achieved the main findings are as follows the ranking of alternatives varies with the criterion used greater price stability need not necessarily imply greater welfare the option of variable levies on private external trade turns out to be the most inexpensive and that of domestic buffer stocks the costliest in achieving price stability further the efficacy of buffer stocks and subsidy to private storage in stabilizing prices is lower under free trade as compared to the case where the economy is closed to private external trade

a servant of two masters communication and the selection of international bureaucrats international bureaucrats must often serve multiple principals who collectively choose policy how does this affect bureaucrats incentives to truthfully reveal their private information i construct a cheap talk model in which a bureaucrat possesses private information about how policies translate into outcomes the bureaucrat can communicate publicly observable messages about this information to two policymakers who must then bargain over a set of policy choices i find that both the bureaucrat s willingness to communicate informatively and the choice of an optimal bureaucrat are highly contingent on the bargaining powers of the two policymakers when each policymaker is bound to adhere to the bargaining outcome moderate bureaucrats are most preferred in contrast when at least one policymaker can leave the bargaining table and exercise an outside option biased bureaucrats can be optimal i illustrate my findings by examining un weapons inspections in iraq from 1991 to 2003 i wish to thank bruce bueno de mesquita michael gilligan catherine hafer matias iaryczower dimitri landa adam meirowitz alastair smith and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback previous drafts of this article were presented in the new york university politics department research workshop and the 2006 annual conference of the midwest political science association

optimal intertemporal consumption decisions under the threat of starvation abstract this paper studies consumption and saving decisions over time in a life cycle model in which survival from one period to the next is endogenous survival probabilities depend on health which is a capital stock subject to depreciation and which can be augmented by consumption nutrition borrowing is ruled out in our model and we investigate optimal consumption decisions when income fluctuates at seasonal frequencies and when income follows a stochastic process among other results we show that understanding the pattern of income is necessary for understanding consumption decisions when survival is probabilistic and endogenous

prices credit markets and child growth in low income rural areas in this paper it is argued that fluctuations in child growth in rural areas of bangladesh during and after severe floods in i988 can provide insight into the structure of credit markets a model of intertemporal resource allocation is developed and euler equations relating growth patterns of children to the cost of borrowing by household are then derived from the model the evidence indicates that although some of the variation in growth patterns over the relevant period may be attributed to variation in illness and the price of rice growth patterns for children in landless households were influenced by credit market imperfections this paper links two prominent strands of research in economic development the first strand examines the extent to which households in poor rural economies are able to protect themselves from the adverse weather and other shocks that importantly influence earnings in underdeveloped areas while it has long been thought that credit market imperfections and other forms of market failure make it difficult for poor individuals in these economies to smooth consumption both within and across years there remains some question about the magnitude and pervasiveness of these imperfections while there is evidence that fluctuations in economic conditions result in inefficient allocation of resources e g morduch 1990 rosenzweig and wolpin i993 some recent papers have emphasised the fact that consumption patterns of households in the same village comove in a manner consistent with the idea that a substantial fraction of idiosyncratic variation in income is effectively

the esteem theory of norms when esteem is costless to supply does it provide an effectivemeans of enforcing norms for public goods production i examine thebasic mechanics of an enforcement through esteem model whileesteem may enforce norms to considerable degree systematicunderenforcement remains the general result even in very basicsettings with a minimum of transactions costs i also examine whyesteem has positive value in equilibrium if it can be producedcostlessly i e why esteem remains scarce and what collectiveaction problems plague the supply of esteem

the effects of a large discrete maize price increase on the distribution of household welfare and poverty in rural kenya1 this study estimates the effects of a large discrete maize price increase on the welfare of a sample of rural kenyan households the usual first order welfare approximation formula is extended to a second order formula that allows for supply and demand responses to the price change results show that many rural households are not affected greatly by the price change and there are about as many gainers as losers however these full sample results mask important differences across regions welfare gains generally take place in major production areas while losses are in areas where most households are net buyers of maize semiparametric methods are used to investigate the relationship between income and the size of the welfare effect and poverty dominance techniques are applied to study the impacts of the maize price increase on rural poverty

the macro dimensions of food security economic growth equitable distribution and food price stability abstract rather than asking how to cope with hunger and famine the question might be how to escape their threat altogether important in this regard is recognizing that agriculture and the rural economy are greatly influenced by policies and outcomes in the rest of the economy strategies include economic growth with unchanging income distribution and growth with redistribution the latter encourages balanced growth to create non farm employment opportunities while investing in rural infrastructure

asset smoothing consumption smoothing and the reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints abstract a growing literature asks whether low wealth agents can accumulate assets over time or whether they are trapped in poverty this paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model with endogenous asset price risk to explore savings and portfolio decisions in a resource poor environment characterized by risk and subsistence constraints optimal portfolio strategies are found to bifurcate despite divisible assets and fully rational agents wealthier agents acquire a higher yielding portfolio and pursue conventional consumption smoothing poorer agents acquire a less remunerative portfolio and pursue asset smoothing rather than consumption smoothing asset based risk coping thus results in positive correlation between initial wealth and portfolio rate of return

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

consumption insurance an evaluation of risk bearing systems in low income economies the hypothesis of full risk sharing can be taken to data from low income countries and evaluate formal and informal financial systems in many contexts idiosyncratic risks are high so credit insurance arrangements could be beneficial statistical tests reveal that households in southern india take advantage of these possibilities villages in cote d ivoire and countries in thailand do not do as well the paper includes an empirical description of the devices used to smooth consumption and a theoretical discussion of private information and incentives on ideal operating systems the full information and mechanism design frameworks provide benchmarks for policy analysis

producer attitudes toward output price risk experimental evidence from the lab and from the field a number of agricultural and food policy instruments are predicated on the idea that producers dislike output price risk we test experimentally some theoretical predictions about the behavior of producers in the face of output price risk namely sandmo s 1971 prediction that price risk at the extensive margin causes risk averse producers to decrease how much they produce and batra and ullah s 1974 prediction that price risk at the intensive margin causes producers whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion to further decrease how much they produce we do so in labs with us college students as well as in the field with peruvian farmers first as regards price risk at the extensive margin we find no support for sandmo s prediction second consistent with batra and ullah s prediction we find that output decreases in response to price risk at the intensive margin when imposing a linear relationship between output and price risk when relaxing the assumption of linearity between output and price risk however we find a nonmonotonic relationship between output and price risk taken together these results are broadly inconsistent with expected utility theory alternative models of behavior in the face of risk such as prospect theory may explain the behavior we observe

the effects of the food reserve agency on maize market prices in zambia over the last decade governments throughout eastern and southern africa have increasingly used strategic reserves and or marketing boards to influence grain market outcomes yet little is known about how these activities are affecting grain markets this article estimates the effects of the food reserve agency fra on maize market prices in production and consumption regions in zambia using a vector autoregression model and monthly data from july 1996 through december 2008 in recent years fra has become the dominant buyer of smallholder maize in zambia simulations show that fra activities stabilized market prices throughout the july 1996 december 2008 study period and raised mean prices between july 2003 and december 2008 by 17 19 the price raising effects of fra policies have assisted surplus maize producers but adversely affected net buyers of maize in zambia namely urban consumers and the majority of the rural poor the increase in maize price stability is unlikely to have had substantial welfare effects on poor households in contrast relatively wealthy producers are likely to have benefited from the higher average and more stable maize prices resulting from fra policies

the microeconomics of the developmental paradox on the political economy of food price policy abstract a longstanding puzzle in comparative economics is the developmental paradox the tendency for government support for agriculture to increase with national income and to decrease with the proportion of economic activity and of the population in agriculture this paper offers a microeconomic explanation for that puzzle it establishes analytically the microeconomic basis for coalition alignments with respect to food price policy then numerically simulates the comparative static effects of alternative food policies on coalition structure a parsimonious household model applied to a heterogeneously endowed society demonstrates how variation in individual welfare effects might beget distinct coalitions in the debate over food price policy and how those policies are inextricably linked to land population and technology policies in food agriculture moreover coalition alignments on particular policy debates are path dependent in particular food price policy creates its own political support

on the costs of food price fluctuations in low income countries abstract conventional welfare measures of the costs of food price fluctuations in low income countries are extended to allow for both economic growth and food security effects the analysis reveals that growth and food security effects may dominate more conventional welfare costs of food price fluctuations although estimating the empirical magnitude of the effects is hampered by the lack of consensus on the extent to which food price fluctuations actually reduce economic growth and food security even if the welfare costs of food price fluctuations are high there are many challenges to the design and successful implementation of price stabilization schemes

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

market distortions and government transparency in this paper we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions we first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information our key result is that distortions limit communication even if transparency is ex ante pareto superior to opaqueness it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high we next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions jel d82 e61

on price risk and the inverse farm size productivity relationship abstract the oft observed inverse relationship between farm size and productivity has elicited several explanations having important policy and theoretical implications using advances in the analysis of price risk effects on producer behavior and a simple two period model of an agricultural household that both produces and consumes under price uncertainty at the time labor allocation decisions are made this paper demonstrates analytically that a non degenerate land distribution and price risk can together produce an inverse relationship even absent any of the more common explanations empirical evidence from madagascar confirms the plausibility of this intuitive explanation for the phenomenon

consumer s surplus and welfare change in a simple dynamic model la somme escomptee d equivalents instantanes ou les variations compensees n est jamais un indicateur du bien etre economique exact pour un consommateur dont les preferences sont representees par une fonction utilite inter temporelle croissant

rice price stabilization and food security in bangladesh abstract the paper reviews the rationale of price stabilization establishes the importance of price stabilization for food security examines the nature and extent of fluctuations in rice prices and develops an approach to stabilize rice prices in bangladesh it shows that the extent of annual price variability has increased somewhat in the post technology 1976 1984 period compared to pre technology period 1960 1970 seasonal pattern of prices has also changed with sharper troughs in september and peak in may in the 1976 1984 period the paper argues that the theoretical positions against price stabilization are not valid in the context of rice price in bangladesh a framework for stabilization of rice prices that integrates public procurement import rationing and open market operations is developed in order to contain annual and seasonal prices within desired price bands

towards greater food security for india s poor balancing government intervention and private competition to achieve its strategic objective of food security the government of india goi maintains an elaborate set of food grain policies which include public procurement and price support operations price stabilisation through buffer stocks public food grain distribution and extensive controls on private trade we use aggregate and household level evidence to show that this system is costly generates inefficiencies in the food grain marketing system for both the public and the private sector and often offers few if any benefits to its intended beneficiaries the poor on this basis we propose an integrated reform agenda involving improvements in the targeting of the public distribution system creation of an enabling environment for increased private participation in food grain markets and greater incentives for efficiency by the food corporation of india fci

a new look at the effects of export instability on investment and growth abstract this paper is concerned with the effects of export instability on investment and growth it is shown that past cross sectional empirical studies on the effects of export instability either in prices or in value terms used an incorrect measure of instability that does not properly take account of the share of exports in gdp using a new instability index and a broad set of conditioning variables it is shown that export instability was positively associated with investment but negatively associated with growth in a large sample of countries during the period from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s

the strategy of manipulating conflict two decision makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a con ict game with incomplete information the decision making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheaptalk messages the power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying con ict game if actions are strategic complements a hawkish extremist provocateur can increase the likelihood of con ict by sending messages which trigger a fear spiral of hawkish actions this reduces the welfare of both decision makers if actions are strategic substitutes a dovish extremist paci st can send messages which cause one decision maker to back down and become more dovish this reduces his welfare but bene ts the other decision maker the hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision makers if actions are strategic substitutes and the paci st is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

money or friends social identity and deception in networks abstract strategic communication occurs in virtually all committee decision environments theory suggests that small differences in monetary incentives between committee members can leave deception a strategically optimal decision crawford and sobel 1982 galeotti et al 2013 at the same time in natural environments social incentives can also play an important role in determining the way people share or withhold truthful information unfortunately little is known about how monetary and social incentives interact to determine truth telling we investigate this issue by first building a novel model and then testing its equilibrium predictions using laboratory data in the absence of social identity the model s predictions are supported there is more truthful communication between those who share monetary incentives than those who do not we find that the effect of identity is asymmetric sharing the same identity does not promote truth telling but holding different identities reduces truthfulness overall as compared to environments lacking social identity committees with both monetary and social incentives exhibit truthful communication substantially less frequently

vaporware suddenware and trueware new product preannouncements under market uncertainty a firm may want to preannounce its plans to develop a new product in order to stimulate future demand but given that such communications can affect rivals incentives to develop the same new product a firm may decide to preannounce untruthfully in order to deter competitors we examine an incumbent s preannouncement strategy when there is uncertainty regarding the commercial viability of a new product opportunity and a threat of rival entry each firm has a private assessment of the market potential for the new product two competitive incentives arise for the incumbent in terms of discouraging rival entry it can use preemptive communication or it can remain silent and instill a pessimistic market potential outlook we find that an incumbent prefers to follow a vaporware strategy i e declares plans to pursue a new product opportunity even when it may have no development intentions when its market forecasting capabilities are weak and the demand side benefits from preannouncing are small by contrast when the incumbent has strong market forecasting capabilities and the demand side benefits are small the incumbent adopts a suddenware strategy i e remains silent about its new product plans even when it actually plans to develop the new product finally when its market forecasting capabilities are strong and the demand side benefits are large the incumbent prefers to engage in a trueware strategy i e truthfully preannounces development plans we show that an interplay between competition related and demand related considerations is what allows trueware to emerge as an equilibrium in the absence of any ex post cost to engaging in vaporware in an extension we let the incumbent s actual development plans leak out and allow the entrant to wait and learn those plans prior to setting a research and development level we identify conditions for the entrant to postpone development despite the risk of being late to market as well as conditions for the entrant to commence development immediately despite not knowing the incumbent s plans based on the observed preannouncement strategy

language and government coordination an experimental study of communication in the announcement game one of the key roles of government is to coordinate the activities of citizens one reason why governments are efficient facilitators of coordinated action in addition to their ability to force compliance or tax is that they are typically endowed with more information than the individuals they govern this advantage creates a dilemma for them however since it forces them to decide on how they should distribute the information in their possession to the population this paper investigates this question we investigate the announcement game defined by the government and those it governs and focus on communication strategy that government uses to communicate private information to the citizens this communication strategy involves 1 partitioning the state space in an attempt to mask the true state of the world and 2 choosing what type of language to use in order to communicate elements of this partition we present evidence that the language used to execute a communication strategy does affect the efficiency of the equilibrium convergence process and also demonstrate that subjects playing the role of the government exhibit a great deal of sophistication in the communication strategies they employ and the language they use to execute them

survival versus consumption we develop an indirect method to estimate utility and willingness to pay wtp for reductions in the risk of death at various ages using a life cycle model of consumption we assume that an individual sets his consumption level each year so as to maximize his expected lifetime utility alternative assumptions about opportunities for borrowing and annuities characterize two polar types of societies in our robinson crusoe case an individual must be entirely self sufficient and annuities are not available in our perfect markets case an individual can borrow against future earnings and purchase actuarially fair annuities we show that under these assumptions wtp is the sum of livelihood discounted expected future earnings and consumer surplus to illustrate our methods we derive wtp for an average financially independent american man under plausible assumptions the model is calibrated to 1978 earnings e g 18 000 per year for men aged 45 54 with at least some income in the robinson crusoe case wtp increases from 500 000 at age 20 to a peak of 1 250 000 at age 40 and declines to 630 000 at age 60 in the perfect markets case age variations are less pronounced wtp is 1 050 000 at age 20 peaks at 1 070 000 at age 25 and declines to 600 000 at age 60 these results suggest that individuals value risks to their lives at several times the pro rata share of their future earnings

seasonal food crises and policy responses a narrative account of three food security crises in malawi summary this paper examines seasonal food price crises in malawi in the 2000s malawi experienced three episodes in which seasonal maize prices rose in 2001 02 2004 05 and 2007 09 by 354 218 and 395 respectively these extreme price spikes resulted from a sequential interaction of economic and political events a repeated pattern of cause inapt response and adverse outcome is identified the relative neglect in vulnerability analysis of staple food price movements as lead indicators of impending food crises is emphasized and implications are drawn for price stabilisation public private coordination and social protection policies

commodity price stabilisation macroeconomic impacts and policy options a macroeconometric simulation study is undertaken to evaluate the impact of commodity price stabilisation cps schemes for the export tree crop industry in papua new guinea the findings suggest that there is a negligible level of favourable macroeconomic impacts of cps contrary to the expectation cps adversely affects the stability of monetary and external sectors bop cps policy has failed to stabilise the macroeconomy the price stabilisation policies are no longer appropriate from the macroeconomic point of view technical change futures market and rural savings are the possible alternative policy options to manage the price risk

is food financialized yes but only when liquidity is abundant abstract in this paper we investigate whether commodity index trader cit positions help to explain the increase in the correlations between agricultural commodities and equities starting around 2008 some argue institutional investors who invest both in stock and commodity markets demolish the borders between these two seemingly unrelated markets and increase correlations a recent phenomenon known as financialization yet some others argue recently correlations have decreased back to historical levels and the increase between 2008 and 2012 was merely due to a business cycle effect our results do not support one side at the expense of the other but rather shows that both factors are important in explaining the correlations between agricultural commodities and stocks furthermore we find that cits prefer to go back to their circle of competence under scarce liquidity and thus correlations decrease back to levels absent institutions hence low liquidity is a significant obstacle inhibiting financialization to occur

cost of business cycles with indivisibilities and liquidity constraints it is almost universally agreed that individuals face incomplete insurance markets and cannot perfectly insure against the idiosyncratic risk in this paper simple general equilibrium models with incomplete insurance markets are examined in order to assess the impact of imperfect insurance on the magnitude of the welfare costs of business cycles two versions of incomplete insurance markets are considered and certain statistical properties of the equilibrium stochastic processes in these environments are compared with those of a perfect insurance economy

price stabilization liberalization and food security conflicts and resolutions abstract an important stimulus for cereal sector reform has been the massive fiscal costs of many state procurement and intervention agencies this has led to policies to minimize their role in the future through rapid market liberalization and a substantially increased role for the private sector this approach may pay insufficient attention to price stabilization and food security issues there are several instances in which even with a well developed private sector government intervention will be required to achieve adequate stability moreover where the private sector is not fully developed public sector agencies can potentially play an important but hopefully declining role in either performing or financing stabilization services international assistance could be invaluable in supporting well run intervention agencies through temporary liquidity crises cereal sector reform is a difficult process even with strong government commitment this is frequently weakened because donor agencies are unwilling to appreciate and accommodate the real fears of governments concerning their loss of control over food security as a consequence of rapid liberalization the hope is expressed that with a more measured pace and explicit concern for this issue a stronger commitment to reform might emerge

persuasive puffery sellers often make claims about product strengths without providing evidence even though such claims are mere puffery we show that they can be credible because talking up any one strength comes at the implicit trade off of not talking up another potential strength puffery pulls in some buyers who value product attributes that are talked up or emphasized while pushing away other buyers who infer that the attributes they value are relative weaknesses when the initial probability of making a sale is low there are more potential buyers to pull in than to push away so puffery is persuasive overall this persuasiveness requires that buyers have some privacy about their preferences so that the seller does not completely pander to them more generally the results show how comparative cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker can be credible and persuasive in standard discrete choice models used throughout marketing economics and other disciplines

trading off volatility and distortions food policy during price spikes this paper analyses the trade off between price distortions and reduced volatility when governments intervened in agricultural and food markets during the recent food price spikes we develop a model to derive how much distortions a government would introduce when it cares about price stability in a situation with limited policy options we show that there is a trade off and identify the optimal combination of distortions and stability for given international price shocks and interest groups preferences for stability we compare these theoretical findings with empirical indicators on actual government interventions in staple food markets we find that several countries have been able to reduce short run price volatility in the domestic markets while at the same time allowing structural medium and long term price changes to pass through to producers and consumers however this is not the general case for many countries even when explicitly taking into account the trade off and the benefits of reducing volatility government policies appear far removed from the optimal trade off and there appears to be much room for policy improvement

can the government talk cheap communication announcements and cheap talk a great deal of attention has recently been focused on communication in economic contexts while some models of credible announcements have been based on reputational forces or penalties imposed by third parties as in sobel 21 and cothren 4 several recent papers have addressed the possibility of communication through cheap talk that is talk in situations with no explicit penalties for deception perhaps the most prominent application of cheap talk in the literature is the recent model of federal reserve announcements by stein 22 this paper will show that cheap talk equilibria of the sort modeled by stein and others often depend in a fundamental way on implausible discontinuities in public responses to government announcements that is cheap talk equilibria are frequently only possible if certain infinitesimally small changes in government announcements are capable of causing large discontinuous changes in public expectations and behavior intuitively if public expectations are a continuous function of government announcements then the government can fine tune these expectations the government will therefore often be tempted to deviate from the cheap talk equilibrium announcements in order to manipulate expectations this causes the equilibrium to unravel discontinuous public reactions sometimes prevent these equilibria from unraveling because they convert continuous choice problems which allow manipulative fine tuning into discrete choice problems where such fine tuning is impossible these discontinuities are implausible however and this may often rule out cheap talk as a realistic model of governmental policy announcements 2

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation