cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

on the estimation of hospital cost functions abstract data from 166 general hospitals in new york state 1981 is used to estimate a quadratic and logarithmic long run cost function both equations fit the data very well but give very different results the quadratic appears to confirm the commonly held view of a shallow u shaped average cost curve whereas the log function indicates significant economies of scale a total and average cost elasticity of 0 9 and 0 10 respectively using beds or patient days to measure output ramsey s reset test is used to discriminate between the two models and the quadratic is clearly rejected as a misspecification scale economies thus exist even where the usual quadratic suggests otherwise

r d policies trade and process innovation we set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each the firms invest in cost reducing r d and each government may grant r d subsidies to the domestic firm we show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher r d subsidies the lower the level of trade costs even if the firms are independent monopolies if firms produce imperfect substitutes policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives international policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome however it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing the optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with r d subsidies to only one of the firms

breaking up a research consortium inter firm r d collaborations through contractual arrangements have become increasingly popular but in many cases they are broken up without any joint discovery we provide a rationale for the breakup date in r d collaboration agreements more specifically we consider a research consortium initiated by a firm a with a firm b b has private information about whether it is committed to the project or a free rider we show that under fairly general conditions a breakup date in the contract is a second best optimal screening device for firm a to screen out free riders with the additional constraint of renegotiation proofness a can only partially screen out free riders entry by some free riders makes sure that a does not have an incentive to renegotiate the contract ex post we also propose empirical strategies for identifying the three likely causes of a breakup date adverse selection moral hazard and project non viability

the one sector growth model with idiosyncratic shocks steady states and dynamics abstract this paper investigates the one sector growth model where agents receive idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks and face a borrowing constraint it is shown that any steady state capital stock lies strictly above the steady state in the model without idiosyncratic shocks in addition the capital stock increases monotonically when it is sufficiently far below a steady state however near a steady state there can be non monotonic economic dynamics

networks of collaboration in oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly prior to competing in the market firms have an opportunity to form pair wise collaborative links with other firms these pair wise links involve a commitment of resources and lead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms we study the incentives of firms to form links and the architecture of the resulting collaboration network we find that incentives to form links are intimately related to the nature of market competition our analysis also suggests that collaborations are used by firms to generate competitive advantage and that strategically stable networks are often asymmetric with some firms having many links while others have few links or are isolated specifically we show that networks with the dominant group architecture stars and inter linked stars are stable we also present some results on the architecture of socially efficient networks

road accident external effects an empirical assessment the relationship between the number of road accidents and the volume of traffic is econometrically estimated in this paper a stratified random sample of 399 road segments covering urban and rural roads in new york state usa in 1985 is analysed no significant externality is detected on ver high volume urban roads the marginal to average accident rate ratio is 1 06 on all other roads a ratio of 0 98 is estimated these findings contrast sharply with those of vickrey who estimated a ratio of 1 5 for california freeways in 1962 the results are however consistent with the official view of both the us and uk highway authorities that no significant accident externality exists

existence of stationary equilibrium in an incomplete market model with endogenous labor supply in this article i first study an income fluctuation problem with endogenous labor supply let be the agent s time discount factor and r 0 be the constant gross rate of return on assets for r 1 i show that the agent s wealth either approaches infinity almost surely or converges to a finite level almost surely for r

r d cooperation in smes the direct effect and the moderating role of human capital abstractwe analyse the determinants of r d cooperation for smes in italy we introduce in the literature human capital as one of the main determinants of r d cooperation concentrating on its moder

abuse of eu emissions trading for tacit collusion in this paper we show that loopholes in eu emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets the abuses originate from the covert misuse of eu emissions trading institutions such as pooling or project based mechanisms we analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions even if those firms are price takers on the permit market which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the eu the identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms profits decreases the consumers surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges consequently public authorities should not allow emissions trading s overall good reputation based upon its efficient abatement of pollution to blind them to options in european emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition

extending the sectoral coverage of an international emission trading scheme in a model inspired by the eu emissions trading scheme non cooperative countries allocate their emissions to internationally trading and non trading sectors each country is better off with trading than without and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading scheme we analyze the effects of extending the sectoral coverage of the trading scheme in a two country model with quadratic abatement costs if only the original trading sector is asymmetric between countries the welfare change is always positive and the same in both countries if the original and additional trading sectors are asymmetric one country might lose but there is an aggregate welfare gain if the original trading sector and the non trading sector are asymmetric both countries always gain

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

on the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium in bewley economies with production abstract i prove existence of stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in bewley economies with production under specifications in which i the utility function is allowed to be unbounded and ii the underlying discrete idiosyncratic productivity process can take any form aside from mild restrictions some of the intermediate results provide theoretical basis for assumptions often made in the quantitative macroeconomics literature by providing an example i illustrate that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique even under typical specifications of the model and discuss the underlying reasons for multiplicity

optimal pollution taxation in a cournot duopoly it is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution it has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage in this paper i derive the optimal pollution tax for a cournot duopoly if firms have different production costs the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage this is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm it is also shown that if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level

persistence of innovation in dutch manufacturing is it spurious this paper studies the persistence of innovation and the dynamics of innovation output in dutch manufacturing using firm data from three waves of the community innovation surveys cis pertaining to the periods 1994 1996 1996 1998 and 1998 2000 we estimate by maximum likelihood a dynamic panel data type 2 tobit model accounting for individual effects and handling the initial conditions problem we find that there is no evidence of true persistence in achieving technological product or process innovations while past shares of innovative sales condition albeit to a small extent current shares of innovative sales

the impact of classes of innovators on technology financial fragility and economic growth in this article we study innovation processes and technological change in an agent based model by including a behavioral switching among heterogeneous innovative firms the model is able to replicate via simulations well known industrial dynamic and growth type stylized facts the main original element of the model is that firms are allowed to endogenously change among three different classes namely single innovators collaborative innovators and imitators moreover our analysis focuses on the impact of these three innovation categories on micro meso and macro aggregates we find that collaborative companies are those having the highest positive impact on the economic system furthermore we have paid particular attention to the role of credit market in promoting smart growth for this purpose we analyze the role of banks as sources of external funds for innovative entrepreneurs our results suggest a trade off between short term profit maximization and long term efficiency which prevents banks to foster investment in r d and technological progress the model is then used to study the effect that different innovation policies have on macroeconomic performance

equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers this paper analyzes a simple oligopoly model with information spillovers firms spend on r d to affect their costs of production the main finding is that depending on the magnitude of the spillover the market may not provide enough incentives for the optimum degree of cooperation to take place it is shown that the equilibrium size of a research joint venture is usually less than the optimum size which requires all firms to participate in the research joint venture the policy implications of this result are that there should be encouragement for firms competing in high technology industries to form industry wide cooperative agreements copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

stochastic pollution permits and merger incentives pollution permit regulations introduce nonlinearities into the objective function of a polluting firm we develop a microeconomic model to show the effects these nonlinearities might have upon firm decisions when emissions are stochastic under perfect competition the fraction of planned pollution covered by permits is shown to be separable from planned production we also demonstrate that permit management incentives may motivate a merger of otherwise independent firms incentives to petition for bubble coverage are also considered the model is studied under risk neutrality and risk aversion imperfectly competitive situations in the output and permit markets are also analyzed

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

on income fluctuations and capital gains abstract we consider the infinite time horizon problem of asymptotically maximizing the expected accumulated discounted utility in a one good production economy the available capital in a given period is given by the production of the previous period plus a random variable the product of the discount and interest factors is either 1 greater than or 2 equal to one under 1 the optimal policy exists under certain conditions and always under 2 the optimal capital sequence almost surely goes to infinity under 1 with conditions on the utility one almost surely reaches a capital level above which the sequence is increasing

does environmental regulation create merger incentives this paper studies merger incentives for polluting cournot firms under a competitive tradable emission permits market we find that when firms are symmetric and marginal costs are constant an horizontal merger is welfare enhancing if efficiency gains are high enough for the merger to take place the presence of a competitive or monopolistic outside market that also trades in the permits market makes profitable a merger that would not happen otherwise when firms are vertically related in an input output chain an horizontal merger in one of the markets increases profits in the other market due to the permits price decrease finally we consider an oligopoly fringe model in which firms differ in their marginal production costs a merger between the dominant oligopolistic firms decreases the permits price and is always profitable such setting is relevant to assess the observed mergers between power generators in several market for permits like the regional greenhouse gas initiative rggi allowing us to derive some policy recommendations

innovative strategic groups in multinational industries abstract differences in innovative strategies between groups of domestic and multinational enterprises are analyzed within a two stage game model that incorporates the asymmetries in transaction costs between the two species of enterprises nash and cooperative behaviour is shown to result in different equilibrium r d strategies with the multinational companies doing typically more r d for larger markets and domestic companies focusing on specific market segments survey data from companies operating in eleven high tech multinational industries in belgium provide support for these strategic differences and show how they are related to company performance

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

tradable emission rights and strategic interaction the use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy this paper presents an analysis of how and under what conditions emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

collusion and dynamic under investment in quality in a dynamic game of investment in product quality i investigate whether collusive underinvestment equilibria can be supported by the threat of escalation in investment outlays when there are no spillovers underinvestment equilibria exist even though by deviating a firm can gain a persistent strategic advantage when there are strong spillovers underinvestment equilibria fail to exist a weakening of patent protection can thus lead to more investment in equilibrium a nonfragmentation result is shown to hold in all free entry equilibria industry concentration is bounded away from zero no matter how large the market and despite the existence of underinvestment equilibria

monitoring of workers and product market competition the role of works councils i introduction technological advancement allows firms to closely monitor their workers actions more than ever before for instance firms can acquire worker monitoring software to monitor activities on computers or cell phones such software enables firms to assess whether workers play games on their computers or surf the internet instead of working productively and even to track workers exact locations similarly firms scan emails or use video surveillance to monitor their workers behavior unsurprisingly the growing use of monitoring technologies has led to a debate on how closely firms should be allowed to monitor their workers actions and on whether government intervention is needed to protect workers privacy at first sight it appears that this debate centers around two different kinds of arguments economic arguments e g higher worker productivity in favor of extensive worker monitoring against ethical issues according to which workers privacy must be protected schmitz 2005 however demonstrates that this is not necessarily true in a contract theoretical model he finds that firms employ monitoring technologies not to increase efficiency but rather to reduce rents that must be paid to the workers in the case of imperfect monitoring he concludes that monitoring technologies may lead to inefficiencies and thus calls for laws protecting workers privacy whereas worker protection in the united states is rather weak in this respect it is typically stronger within the european union in germany for instance works councils are important institutions that provide workers with power on the firm level particularly with respect to working conditions within the system of co determination works councils have legally guaranteed influence on management decisions concerning working conditions within a firm for instance the law prescribes that worker representatives must consent to any introduction of technologies that monitor the workers effort and output 1 given these rights of works councils it may be puzzling that firm owners do not more strongly oppose this limitation of their control rights in this paper we offer an explanation to resolve this puzzle by analyzing the interaction between internal organization and market conduct we argue that works councils and their right to block monitoring of workers can act as a commitment device of firms to mitigate product market competition as relaxed competition increases profits and because workers receive an information rent from their co determination rights workers and firms have aligned interests in establishing works councils at the expense of consumers we derive these results in a simple model of two competing firms where each firm faces a moral hazard problem with its workforce that could be solved by installing a monitoring technology without monitoring inducing high effort by workers is more costly as a result effort levels will be lower and so will be output this may serve a similar purpose as quantity reduction in a cartel and it may thereby increase firm profits 2 however similar to quantity reduction in a cartel also with respect to monitoring there is a danger that a single firm deviates and installs the monitoring technology consequently the deviator can produce higher output more cheaply and free rides on the lower output of its competitor thus firms would like to ex ante commit not to use a monitoring technology usually no such commitment is possible however works councils may serve this unintended purpose because they must give their consent to monitoring technologies this provides them with a property right on the information rent arising in case of nonmonitoring to receive their consent the firm must offer the workers compensation for the foregone rent this additional cost of monitoring makes deviation from a nonmonitoring situation less attractive implying that works councils may serve as the desired commitment device

optimal r d levels when firm j benefits from firm i s inventive activity abstract we amend the static model of industry structure in dasgupta and stiglitz to include external benefits from a firm s r d now the market can be seen to underinvest in r d relative to the social optimum the work of mansfield suggests that such external benefits are pervasive

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage we consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that unlike in environments without unobservable storage the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade riskfree bonds among themselves in this paper we consider an environment in which individuals have random income and can accumulate assets through a storage technology their income realizations and their asset position are private information given these informational frictions we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk free bonds among themselves there is a large prior literature which examines the characteristics of efficient risksharing in dynamic settings in the presence of private information unlike our paper this literature generally finds that efficient allocations do not coincide with the equilibrium allocations of any economy with a competitive bond market see atkeson and lucas 1992 in particular the key difference between our paper and these preceding ones is that the earlier literature assumes either that agents cannot accumulate resources over time or that if they can this accumulation is observable in contrast we assume that both agents incomes and their stored resources are private information it is this combination of assumptions that leads to our result our findings are reminiscent of allen s 1985 he considers a dynamic principalagent relationship in which the agent is risk averse and has hidden stochastic income the

economies of scale in school operation a reply in addition to pointing out that kumar 1983 omits hough 1981 and knight 1983 from its list of reference hough 1983 raises two issues of largely statistical nature 1 these are 1 the use of an average ac rather than a total tc cost curve as the correct statistical device for examining economies of scale and 2 estimation problems arising from possible heteroscedasticity of the error term in the estimating relation exactly the same issues are also raised in hough 1981 notwithstanding our earlier disclaimer p 324 that no new grounds are broken on the methodological front as well as a clear mention of both problems footnotes 1 and 2 hough is quite correct that the implications of these issues for our results were not spelled out we take this opportunity to offer some clarifications with respect to the results in kumar 1983

aggregate precautionary savings when is the third derivative irrelevant abstract when are aggregate precautionary savings positive we address this question in the context of a general equilibrium model where infinitely lived agents receive idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks hold a risk free asset to smooth consumption and face a liquidity constraint we prove that 1 the steady state capital stock is always larger in any equilibrium with idiosyncratic shocks and a liquidity constraint than without idiosyncratic shocks i e aggregate precautionary savings are positive as long as consumers are risk averse and 2 aggregate precautionary savings occurs if and only if the liquidity constraint binds for some agents

the risk free rate in heterogeneous agent incomplete insurance economies abstract why has the average real risk free interest rate been less than one percent the question is motivated by the failure of a class of calibrated representative agent economies to explain the average return to equity and risk free debt i construct an economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks and smooth consumption by holding a risk free asset i calibrate the economy and characterize equilibria computationally with a borrowing constraint of one year s income the resulting risk free rate is more than one percent below the rate in the comparable representative agent economy

auctioning vs grandfathering in cap and trade systems with market power and incomplete information we compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies based on real life cases such as the eu ets we consider a multi unit multi bid uniform auction at the auction each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market either as a leader or a follower this role affects each firms valuation of the permits which are not common across firms as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost effective allocation of permits as it occurs in simpler auction models auctioning tends to be more cost effective than grandfathering when the firms abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough

on income fluctuations and capital gains with a convex production function abstract this work considers a one good economy the production function is random and not necessarily concave the interest factor is variable and the consumer must maximize asymptotically the expected accumulated and discounted utility one proves that the value function is concave and the limit policy is optimal and is the unique one furthermore if the production function is convex there exist two levels of capital with the property that for initial capitals below the first level the optimal sequence of capitals stays bounded with probability one for initial capitals above the second level the optimal sequence of capitals tends monotonically to infinity for initial capitals between the two levels the optimal sequence of capitals leaves the interval with probability one

economic of scale in school operation evidence from canada 1983 economic of scale in school operation evidence from canada applied economics vol 15 no 3 pp 323 340