contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

network models and financial stability abstract systemic risk is a key concern for central banks charged with safeguarding overall financial stability in this paper we investigate how systemic risk is affected by the structure of the financial system we construct banking systems that are composed of a number of banks that are connected by interbank linkages we then vary the key parameters that define the structure of the financial system including its level of capitalisation the degree to which banks are connected the size of interbank exposures and the degree of concentration of the system and analyse the influence of these parameters on the likelihood of knock on defaults first we find that the better capitalised banks are the more resilient is the banking system against contagious defaults and this effect is non linear second the effect of the degree of connectivity is non monotonic i e initially a small increase in connectivity increases the contagion effect but after a certain threshold value connectivity improves the ability of a banking system to absorb shocks third the size of interbank liabilities tends to increase the risk of knock on default even if banks hold capital against such exposures fourth more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic risk all else equal in an extension to the main analysis we study how liquidity effects interact with banking structure to produce a greater chance of systemic breakdown we finally consider how the risk of contagion might depend on the degree of asymmetry tiering inherent in the structure of the banking system a number of our results have important implications for public policy which this paper also draws out

interbank networks in prewar japan structure and implications forthcoming as interbank networks in prewar japan structure and implications with michiru sawada industrial and corporate change 2011

interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention we develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term safe asset when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility in such a situation a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate it can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

bank risk within and across equilibria abstract the global financial crisis highlighted that the financial system can be most vulnerable when it seems most stable this paper models non linear dynamics in banking small shocks can lead from an equilibrium with few bank defaults straight to a full freeze the mechanism is based on amplification between adverse selection on banks funding market and moral hazard in bank monitoring our results imply trade offs between regulators microprudential desire to shield individual weak banks and the macroprudential consequences of doing so moreover limiting bank reliance on wholesale funding always reduces systemic risk but limiting the correlation between bank portfolios does not

financial contagion through capital connections a model of the origin and spread of bank panics financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks the equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined we explore how the cross holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious eects conditional on the failure of a financial institution we show that contagion is possible in the unique equilibrium of the economy and characterize exactly when it may exist at the same time we identify a direction of flow for contagious eects which provides a rationale for localized financial panics simulations identify the optimal level of interbank deposit holdings in the presence of contagion risk our results suggest that when the probability of bank failure is low maximal levels of interbank holdings are optimal when cross holding of deposits is complete we demonstrate that the intensity of contagion is increasing in the size of regionally aggregate liquidity shocks

dynamic interbank network analysis using latent space models longitudinal network data are increasingly available allowing researchers to model how networks evolve over time and to make inference on their dependence structure in this paper a dynamic latent space approach is used to model directed networks of monthly interbank exposures in this model each node has an unobserved temporal trajectory in a low dimensional euclidean space model parameters and latent banks positions are estimated within a bayesian framework we apply this methodology to analyze two different datasets the unsecured and the secured repo interbank lending networks we show that the model that incorporates a latent space performs much better than the model in which the probability of a tie depends only on observed characteristics the latent space model is able to capture some features of the dyadic data such as transitivity that the model without a latent space is not able to

the effects of risk on self employment the effects of sectoral risk on the propensity to become self employed are analysed in contrast to previous studies which assume risk is concentrated only in the self employment sector a general equilibrium model is constructed in which uninsurable risk exists in both the paid and self employed sectors it is shown that when agents wish to mix self employment and employee participation the effects of sectoral risk on the optimal self employment decision is ambiguous this result disappears if agents choose instead to participate in one sector alone

contagion of self fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios abstract we look at two countries that have independent fundamentals but share the same group of investors each country might face a self fulfilling crisis agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will a crisis in one country reduces agents wealth this makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments consequently the probability of a crisis there increases this generates a positive correlation between the returns in the two countries since diversification affects returns in our model its welfare implications are non trivial

the distribution of unemployment spells canada 1978 82 this paper empirically examines entire distributions of unemployment spells according to a novel duration share approach based on decile shares and lorenz curves of unemployment the approach is applied to a canadian micro data source akin to the work experience surveys for the united states the major empirical findings are that long term unemployment accounts for a very substantial proportion of total weeks of unemployment despite the short duration of the average spell of unemployment the structure of unemployment spell distribution differs significantly by gender age education and region and significant cyclical effects on the distribution of unemployment spells are associated with the severe recession in 1982

the effects of interbank networks on efficiency and stability in a macroeconomic agent based model we develop a macroeconomic agent based model that consists of firms banks unions and households who interact on labour goods credit and interbank markets the model endogenises pricing decisions by firms wage setting by unions and interest rate setting by banks on both firm and interbank lending banks also set leverage targets and precautionary liquidity buffers on the basis of internal risk models our model produces endogenous fluctuations driven by the pricing behaviour of firms and the wage setting behaviour of unions fluctuations lead to loan defaults which are exacerbated as lenders reduce lending and charge higher interest rates inducing a credit crunch we also study how making the inter banking network more connected affects the key outcomes of the economy and find that while the flow of funds from surplus banks to firms can be increased the latter effect is soon dominated by increasing instability in the real sector as firms default at higher rates while the banking sector experiences fewer defaults as a whole losses on the interbank market increase as a source of bank defaults

contagion and risk sharing on the inter bank market abstract increasing inter bank lending has an ambiguous impact on financial stability using a computational model with endogenous bank behavior and interest rates we identify the conditions under which inter bank lending promotes stability through risk sharing or provides a channel through which failures may spread in response to large economy wide shocks more inter bank lending relationships worsen systemic events for smaller shocks the opposite effect is observed as such no inter bank market structure maximizes stability under all conditions in contrast deposit insurance costs are always reduced under greater numbers of inter bank lending relationships a range of regulations are considered to increase system stability

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

public information and coordination evidence from a credit registry expansion this paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing to isolate the coordination channel from lenders joint reaction to new information we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers we show that lenders while learning nothing new about the firm reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders reaction to the negative news about the firm the results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress

on the contagion effect in the us banking sector by using the spatial econometrics methodology this paper investigates the contagion of the risk taking by banks in the us banking sector during 2001 to 2012 in addition the contagion signals up to the subprime crisis in 2008 are analyzed and different channels of contagion are studied in order to identify fragile groups of banks our analysis reveals that there is no significant contagion transmitted to the whole banking system however we observe that the bank contagion is significantly spread locally and for the group of banks that share similar characteristics related to size and bank regulations

prices debt and market structure in an agent based model of the financial market we develop an agent based model in which heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents interact by trading a risky asset at an endogenously set price agents are endowed with balance sheets comprising the risky asset as well as cash on the asset side and equity capital as well as debt on the liabilities side a number of findings emerge when simulating the model we find that the empirically observable log normal distribution of bank balance sheet size naturally emerges and that higher levels of leverage lead to a greater inequality among agents furthermore greater leverage increases the frequency of bankruptcies and systemic events credit frictions which we define as the stickiness of debt adjustments are able to explain a key difference in the relation between leverage and assets observed for different bank types lowering credit frictions leads to an increasingly procyclical behavior of leverage which is typical for investment banks nevertheless the impact of credit frictions on the fragility of the model financial system is complex lower frictions do increase the stability of the system most of the time while systemic events become more probable in particular we observe an increasing frequency of severe liquidity crises that can lead to the collapse of the entire model financial system

financial fragility and distress propagation in a network of regions we investigate how the financial fragility in the real economy is affected by the average level of interdependence among agents across different regions of the economy to this end we develop a parsimonious agent based model of firms and banks organized in geographic regions the model is built on the framework of an existing class of models for business fluctuations the goal of our exercise is to clarify the effect on systemic failures of the interplay between network interconnectedness and financial acceleration in particular we investigate the probability of individual and systemic failures with varying levels of interconnectedness we find that in the absence of financial acceleration connectivity makes the system more resilient in contrast in the presence of financial acceleration the probability of both individual and systemic failures are minimized at intermediate level of diversification

production networks and economic policy in this paper we show how to combine data on input output tables and recent insights from the theory of production networks in order to inform policy we first describe the information contained in input output tables compiled by statistical agencies and show how to derive relevant statistics of production networks we then discuss the implications of production networks for policy intervention in a series of domains such as fiscal policy industrial policy or finance finally we present a quantitative exercise applied to french data in order to illustrate that production networks shape the overall impact of competition policy on the economy

asymmetric information occupational choice and government policy a model of credit markets under asymmetric information is proposed in which individuals differ in abilities that are valued in both entrepreneurship and paid employment unlike the heterogeneous ability model of de meza and webb 1987 over investment is not inevitable under investment and credit rationing can occur instead this result depends on the novel possibility of there being greater separation of types in paid employment than in entrepreneurship the model allows individuals to be monitored in both occupations and permits derivation of the conditions under which the novel possibility holds the role of corrective government policies is also discussed

estimating bilateral exposures in the german interbank market is there a danger of contagion abstract credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock recent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages we use balance sheet information to estimate a matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the german banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion we find that in the absence of a safety net there is considerable scope for contagion that could affect a large proportion of the banking system the financial safety net in this case institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks considerably reduces but does not eliminate the danger of contagion even so the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15 of the banking system in terms of assets

a model of a systemic bank run abstract this paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run focussing on six stylized key features in particular core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset backed securities rather than committed to long term projects in distress these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts i consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset backed securities uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection i shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective in the former the crisis deepens the larger the market share of distressed core banks while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version therefore the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities

habitual entrepreneurs in the making how labour market rigidity and employment affects entrepreneurial re entry we investigate the impact of country level labour market regulations on the re entry decision of experienced entrepreneurs whereby they become habitual entrepreneurs multilevel logit models on entry decisions among 15 709 individuals in 29 european countries show that labour market regulations have a positive influence on the decision to re enter into entrepreneurship this positive impact is stronger among individuals holding wage jobs at the time of re entry compared to those that do not our results indicate that novice and habitual entrepreneurs may respond very differently to labour market rigidity we discuss and provide tentative explanations for these differences and outline potential policy implications

informational contagion of bank runs in a third generation crisis model abstract this paper highlights the international spread of bank runs in a third generation model of financial crises through an informational channel banks short term liabilities include loans granted by foreign creditors who have imperfect information about the liquidation costs of banks assets a bank panic in a country induces lenders to downgrade early liquidation yields in other countries and thus to require higher interest rates to enable their banks to roll over their maturing debt those banks become therefore more prone to self fulfilling depositors runs the paper then studies the effect on contagion of increased transparency and bailouts

the fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage abstract during a financial crisis when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash the paper explains this phenomenon we argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds combined with low market liquidity creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds arbitrage capabilities we present a model of hedge funds optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors we show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions the model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

micro level transmission of monetary policy shocks the trading book channel abstract we open the black box of the monetary policy transmission mechanism with a granular model that considers the balance sheet composition and network relationships of each economic agent though there are several well documented channels through which monetary policy operates we focus on the overlooked trading book channel which arises because of adjustments in the accounting value of trading book exposures on banks balance sheets that have to be marked to market when interest rates change variations in banks net worth due these adjustments are used as input to a network model that incorporates the financial and corporate sectors the framework permits us to determine the effects of interest rate changes on every bank and firm in the economy and any second round contagion effects in the short run we apply the model to a comprehensive database of brazilian banks and firms from 2015 to 2020 we find that interest rate shocks affect more strongly financial stability in periods of monetary policy tightening we also find notable asymmetric effects of positive and negative interest rate shocks in the brazilian economy with positive interest rate shocks affecting more financial stability finally our results also suggest a non linear relationship between interest rate changes and financial stability reinforcing the need to mitigate monetary policy shocks through interest rate smoothing and adequate communication and transparency to society

local banking panics of the 1920s identification and determinants abstract using a newly discovered dataset of u s bank suspensions from 1921 to 1929 we discovered that banking panics were more common in the 1920s than had been believed besides identifying panics we investigate their determinants finding that local banking panics were more likely when fundamental economic conditions were generally weak and more likely in overbanked states they were less likely in states with deposit insurance or states where a relatively large share of banks belonged to chain banking organizations

a network analysis of the italian overnight money market the objective of this paper is to analyse the network topology of the italian segment of the european overnight money market through methods of statistical mechanics applied to complex networks we investigate differences in the activities of banks of different sizes and the evolution of their connectivity structure over the maintenance period the main purpose of the analysis is to establish the potential implications of the current institutional arrangements on the stability of the banking system and to assess the efficiency of the interbank market in terms of absence of speculative and preferential trading relationships

expectations and contagion in self fulfilling currency attacks this paper shows how expectations driven contagion of currency crises can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when viewed in isolation the model of morris and shin 1998 is extended to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market if speculators believe that a devaluation of this other currency will make a domestic devaluation more likely they will engage in trades that link the two markets a sharp devaluation of the other currency will then be propagated to the domestic market and will increase the likelihood of ac risis there fulfilling the original expectations even though this contagion is driven solely by expectations the model places restrictions on observable variables and these restrictions are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

the role of regulatory credibility in effective bank regulation this paper develops a model of regulated brownian motion with an endogenous profit term to analyze the role of regulatory credibility on the stability and productivity of the banking system we show that when regulatory intervention is perfect and costless the volatility of the system can be substantially reduced with no loss of productivity in fact perfect credibility can actually reduce the volatility of intrinsically risky banking systems below the volatility of intrinsically less risky systems as banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment behaviour accordingly however when the credibility of the regime is weakened because of increased uncertainty stemming from regulation such as random costs or imperfect timing of regulatory intervention both the stability and productivity of the financial system are impaired importantly we find that in the presence of regulatory costs and imperfect credibility there is no universal optimal intervention policy rule the optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator s level of absolute risk aversion

self employment in the eu quality work precarious work or both this paper estimates the differences in earnings between self employed and employees in the eu using the european union statistics on income and living conditions data and quantile regression methods it finds that in both eastern and western europe self employment pays more than regular employment only for workers at the top of the earnings distribution and considerably less than regular employment for those below the median these differences are smaller in eastern europe reflecting lower protection of regular employees this pattern is not driven by low skilled workers and it can be observed in both high skilled and low skilled occupations results are robust to accounting for differences in taxation hours worked and individual unobserved characteristics the evidence provided points to the lack of protective rights for the self employed and low earnings at the beginning of the self employment spells as the main explanations for lower earnings for the majority of self employed

banking panics the role of the first come first served rule and information externalities this paper proposes that both the first come first served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs the first come first served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors this payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks therefore failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks contagious runs may occur even if i depositors choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and ii the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare the feasibility of reforming the fdic to impose market discipline is also investigated

overlapping portfolios contagion and financial stability abstract we study the problem of interacting channels of contagion in financial networks the first channel of contagion is counterparty failure risk this is captured empirically using data for the austrian interbank network the second channel of contagion is overlapping portfolio exposures this is studied using a stylized model we perform stress tests according to different protocols for the parameters we study neither channel of contagion results in large effects on its own in contrast when both channels are active at once bankruptcies are much more common and have large systemic effects

rollover risk liquidity and macroprudential regulation i study rollover risk in wholesale funding markets when intermediaries hold liquidity ex ante and fire sales may occur ex post multiple equilibria exist in a global rollover game intermediate liquidity holdings support equilibria with both positive and zero expected liquidation a simple uniqueness refinement pins down the private liquidity choice which balances the forgone expected return on investment with reduced fragility and costly liquidation due to fire sales liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes intermediaries free ride on the holdings of other intermediaries causing excessive liquidation to internalize the systemic nature of liquidity a macroprudential authority imposes liquidity buffers

labor market transitions cyclic trend and seasonal effects for prime age men drawing on unpublished current population survey sources this article investigates the movements transitions of men aged 25 44 among three labor market categories employment unemployment and nonparticipation from june 1967 through december 1978 the estimating equation treats a transition probability as a function of an aggregate cyclical indicator a quadratic time trend and a set of monthly dummies of the three variables seasonality had the greatest effect on transition probabilities trend ran a close second and cyclical factors a distant third from the findings that the probability of moving from unemployment to employment declined sharply over the period and that trend factors were much more important than cyclical factors the author concludes that structural unemployment has been worsening

a model of financial fragility abstract this article presents a dynamic stochastic game theoretic model with two essential features first agents hold diversified portfolios that link their financial positions to those of other agents second shocks to fundamentals at the initial date cause some portfolio losses agents who incur losses reallocate their portfolios thereby breaking some linkages in the pareto efficient symmetric equilibrium studied two related types of financial crisis can occur in response one occurs gradually as losses spread breaking more links the other type occurs instantaneously when forward looking agents preemptively shift to safer portfolios to avoid future losses from contagion an economy is more fragile the earlier its last remaining link breaks from such a crisis journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 e00 e3 e44 g1

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

crisis and responses the federal reserve in the early stages of the financial crisis in summer 2007 u s and global financial markets found themselves facing a potential financial crisis and the u s federal reserve found itself in a difficult situation it was becoming clear that banks and other financial institutions would ultimately lose tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars from their exposure to subprime mortgage market loans bank lending is closely tied to bank capital or net worth specifically bank regulators require that loans not exceed a certain multiple of capital thus the federal reserve faced the danger of a sharp contraction in credit and bank lending in a way that threatened a deep recession or worse when this kind of event happens the job of the central bank is to assure that financial institutions have the necessary funds to conduct their daily business that they have the liquidity they need to make timely payments and transfers modern financial institutions need to replenish their funding every day in the united states alone literally trillions of dollars are transferred between banks each day to support the 50 trillion credit outstanding in the economy as a whole commercial banks require funds to initiate the mortgages auto loans and credit card debt they then sell into financial markets while investment banks finance much of their activity with daily borrowing in the early stages of the crisis the situation often arose in which a wellcapitalized bank was forced to make sudden large loans based on previously committed lines of credit in this circumstance central bank actions can ease

informational channels of financial contagion two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion one is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets using global games i present a two country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and i test its predictions experimentally the experimental results show that subjects do not extract information optimally which leads to two systematic biases that affect these channels directly base rate neglect leads subjects to underweight their prior and thus weakens the fundamental channel an overreaction bias strengthens the social learning channel since subjects rely on information about the behavior of others even when this information is irrelevant these results have significant welfare effects rooted in the specific way in which these biases alter behavior

stability analysis of financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios abstract common asset holdings are widely believed to have been the primary vector of contagion in the recent financial crisis we develop a network approach to the amplification of financial contagion due to the combination of overlapping portfolios and leverage and we show how it can be understood in terms of a generalized branching process this can be used to compute the stability for any particular configuration of portfolios by studying a stylized model we estimate the circumstances under which systemic instabilities are likely to occur as a function of parameters such as leverage market crowding diversification and market impact although diversification may be good for individual institutions it can create dangerous systemic effects and as a result financial contagion gets worse with too much diversification there is a critical threshold for leverage below it financial networks are always stable and above it the unstable region grows as leverage increases note that our model assumes passive portfolio management during a crisis however we show that dynamic deleveraging during a crisis can amplify instabilities the financial system exhibits robust yet fragile behavior with regions of the parameter space where contagion is rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs our model and methods of analysis can be calibrated to real data and provide simple yet powerful tools for macroprudential stress testing

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

the effect of the interbank network structure on contagion and common shocks abstract this paper proposes a dynamic multi agent model of a banking system with central bank banks optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserves according to their risk return and liquidity preferences they are linked via interbank loans and face stochastic deposit supply comparing different interbank network structures it is shown that money centre networks are more stable than random networks evidence is provided that the central bank stabilizes interbank markets in the short run only systemic risk via contagion is compared with common shocks and it is shown that both forms of systemic risk require different optimal policy responses

the institutions of economic freedom and entrepreneurship evidence from panel data this paper provides new evidence on the determinants of entrepreneurship across countries the paper investigates the relationship between the institutional setting in terms of economic freedom and entrepreneurship measured by self employment in a panel data setting covering 23 oecd countries for the period 1972 2002 the measure of economic freedom includes five aspects size of government legal structure and security of property rights access to sound money freedom to trade internationally and the regulation of credit labour and business the empirical findings show that a smaller government sector better legal structure and security of property rights as well as less regulation of credit labour and business tend to increase entrepreneurship

liaisons dangereuses increasing connectivity risk sharing and systemic risk the recent financial crisis poses the challenge to understand how systemic risk arises endogenously and what architecture can make the financial system more resilient to global crises this paper shows that a financial network can be most resilient for intermediate levels of risk diversification and not when this is maximal as generally thought so far this finding holds in the presence of the financial accelerator i e when negative variations in the financial robustness of an agent tend to persist in time because they have adverse effects on the agent s subsequent performance through the reaction of the agent s counterparties 2012 elsevier b v all rights reserved

uncertainty in an interconnected financial system contagion and market freezes this paper studies contagion and market freezes caused by uncertainty in financial network structures our model demonstrates that in a financial system where financial institutions are interconnected a negative shock to an individual financial institution could spread to other institutions causing market freezes because of creditors uncertainty about the financial network structure our model also reveals that when both a large creditor and a continuum of small creditors are present the size of the large creditor will affect the severity of market freezes substantially moreover our model is used to examine central bank policies to alleviate market freezes

explaining international variations in self employment evidence from a panel of oecd countries organisation for economic cooperation and development oecd data from 1972 to 1996 reveals substantial differences in the levels and trends of self employment rates across countries this article uses recently developed panel integration and cointegration techniques to explore the determinants of aggregate self employment rates we find that within the panel self employment rates are positively and significantly related to personal income tax rates and negatively and significantly related to the unemployment benefit replacement rate this accords a central role to government tax and transfer policies in contrast to nonrobust influences from macroeconomic variables which have been widely used in previous studies

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

asset commonality debt maturity and systemic risk we develop a model in which asset commonality and short term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk two asset structures arise in a clustered structure groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together in an unclustered structure defaults are more dispersed portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency when bank debt is short term creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are ine ciently liquidated this information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures in contrast when bank debt is long term welfare is the same under both asset structures

financial contagion and the role of the central bank abstract we investigate the role of a central bank cb in preventing and avoiding financial contagion the cb by imposing reserve requirements on the banking system trades off the cost of reducing the resources available for long term investment with the benefit of raising liquidity to face an adverse shock that could cause contagious crises we argue that contagion is not due to the structure of the interbank deposit market but to the impossibility to sign contracts contingent on unforeseen contingencies as long as incomplete contracts are present the cb may have a useful role in curbing contagion moreover the cb allows the banking system to reach first best allocation in all the states of the world when the notion of incentive efficiency is considered if the analysis is restricted to constrained efficiency the cb still avoids contagion without however reaching first best consumption allocation the model provides a rationale for reserve requirements without the presence of fiat money or asymmetric information

financial regulations and bank credit to the real economy we present a new agent based model focusing on the linkage between the interbank market and the real economy with a stylised central bank acting as lender of last resort using this model we address the tradeoff between stability and economic performance for different structures of the interbank market we also explore the efficacy of recent regulatory reforms using our richer model our results suggest that the effects of regulatory leverage ratios on the banking sector s performance can vary in a complex and non monotonic way with the state of the economy the degree of connectivity of the interbank market and the amount of information available to market participants on bank risks

banking crises and the lender of last resort how crucial is the role of information this article develops a model of bank runs and crises and analyses how the presence of a lender of last resort lolr affects the solvency of the banking system we obtain a one to one mapping from the depositors equilibrium strategy to an optimal contract prevailing in the economy the study finds that the difference between a perfectly informed and an imperfectly informed lolr can be crucial our results indicate that a perfectly informed lolr is a pareto improvement however if the supervisory process of the lolr is subject to noise then the gains from ex post efficiency may be outweighed by ex ante inefficiency induced by moral hazard which is conducive to lower lending rates in the economy

measuring network systemic risk contributions a leave one out approach abstract the aim of this paper is to propose a new network measure of systemic risk contributions that combines the pair wise granger causality approach with the leave one out concept this measure is based on a conditional granger causality test and consists of measuring how far the proportion of statistically significant connections in the system breaks down when a given financial institution is excluded we analyse the performance of our measure of systemic risk by considering a sample of the largest banks worldwide over the 2003 2018 period we obtain three important results first we show that our measure is able to identify a large number of banks classified as global systemically important banks g sibs by the financial stability board fsb second we find that our measure is a robust and statistically significant early warning indicator of downside returns during the last financial crisis finally we investigate the potential determinants of our measure of systemic risk and find similar results to the existing literature in particular our empirical results suggest that the size and the business model of banks are significant drivers of systemic risk

regionality revisited an examination of the direction of spread of currency crises abstract what determines the direction of spread of currency crises we examine data on waves of currency crises in 1992 1994 1997 and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion we simultaneously consider trade competition financial links and institutional similarity to the ground zero country as potential drivers of contagion to overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty we utilize bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion in particular we use the bayesian averaging of binary models that allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the appropriate set of regressors we find that institutional similarity to the ground zero country plays an important role in determining the direction of contagion in all the emerging market currency crises in our dataset we thus provide persuasive evidence in favour of the wake up call hypothesis for financial contagion trade and financial links may also play a role in determining the direction of contagion but their importance varies amongst the crisis periods

ageing and entrepreneurial preferences previous research on age and entrepreneurship assumed homogeneity and downplayed age related differences in the motives and aims underlying enterprising behaviour we argue that the heterogeneity of entrepreneurship influences how the level of entrepreneurial activity varies with age using a sample of 2 566 respondents from 27 european countries we show that entrepreneurial activity increases almost linearly with age for individuals who prefer to only employ themselves self employers whereas it increases up to a critical threshold age late 40s and decreases thereafter for those who aspire to hire workers owner managers age has a considerably smaller effect on entrepreneurial behaviour for those who do not prefer self employment but are pushed into it by lack of alternative employment opportunities reluctant entrepreneurs our results question the conventional wisdom that entrepreneurial activity declines with age and suggest that effective responses to demographic changes require policy makers to pay close attention to the heterogeneity of entrepreneurial preferences

interbank contagion an agent based model approach to endogenously formed networks abstract the potential impact of interconnected financial institutions on interbank financial systems is a financial stability concern for central banks and regulators in examining how financial shocks propagate through contagion effects we argue that endogenous individual bank choices are necessary to properly consider how losses develop as the interbank lending network evolves we present an agent based model to endogenously reconstruct interbank networks based on 6600 banks decision rules and behaviors reflected in quarterly balance sheets we compare the results of our model to the results of a traditional stationary network framework for contagion the model formulation reproduces dynamics similar to those of the 2007 09 financial crisis and shows how bank losses and failures arise from network contagion and lending market illiquidity when calibrated to post crisis data from 2011 to 2014 the model shows the u s banking system has reduced its likelihood of bank failures through network contagion and illiquidity given a similar stress scenario

macro networks an application to euro area financial accounts abstract this paper develops a financial network designated the macro network that depicts the connections between the main financial and non financial sectors of the economy in the various financial instruments of the euro area the macro network comprises of linkages across financial and non financial sectors in each country these country level sector networks are then connected by the cross border links between the individual banking sectors using the macro network to simulate financial shocks we find that the propagation effects depend on the underlying network structure which evolves over time after the financial crisis bilateral linkages contracted sharply reflecting the surge in counterparty risk and the de leveraging processes nonetheless our analysis suggests that even after this process vulnerabilities remained in the euro area financial system while a more diversified portfolio of cross border exposures might mitigate the shock effects we identify sectors which are most relevant for the propagation of financial shocks in the macro network

heterogeneity and stability bolster the strong not the weak we first study a stylized model of self fulfilling panic among agents with differing fragilities to strategic risk and show that depending on the severity of coordination problems the panic trigger threshold can depend only on one type s fragility we then present a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities to financial spillovers concerns about potential spillovers generate strategic interaction triggering a pre emption game in which one tries to exit the market before others to avoid spillovers although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions systemic risk can critically depend on financial health of stronger in the contagion chain in this case bolstering the strong rather than the weak more effectively enhances systemic stability

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

strategic complementarities and the twin crises the economic literature has emphasized the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises motivated by evidence from recent financial crises we study a model where strategic complementarities exist not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators but also between the two groups the additional type of strategic complementarities generates a vicious cycle between banking crises and currency crises this vicious cycle magnifies the correlation between the two crises and destabilizes the economy we discuss some empirical implications and policy implications and in particular show that due to the interaction between the banking sector and the currency market a lender of last resort might not be able to prevent bank runs

systemic risk in financial systems we consider default by firms that are part of a single clearing mechanism the obligations of all firms within the system are determined simultaneously in a fashion consistent with the priority of debt claims and the limited liability of equity we first show via a fixed point argument that there always exists a clearing payment vector that clears the obligations of the members of the clearing system under mild regularity conditions this clearing vector is unique next we develop an algorithm that both clears the financial system in a computationally efficient fashion and provides information on the systemic risk faced by the individual system firms finally we produce qualitative comparative statics for financial systems these comparative statics imply that in contrast to single firm results even unsystematic nondissipative shocks to the system will lower the total value of the system and may lower the value of the equity of some of the individual system firms

dependent self employment as a way to evade employment protection legislation this paper examines whether the strictness of employment protection legislation encourages employers to contract out work to their own paid employees by the formula of dependent self employment while making transitions to independent self employment less likely by altering the relative valuation of risk between salaried work and self employment in favour of the former in conducting this analysis discrete choice models are applied to data drawn from the european community household panel from 1994 to 2001 to test the hypotheses a tentative individual measure of the potential severance payment that a worker would receive in the case of dismissal is included as well as aggregated variables that try to capture differences in labour market institutions and macroeconomic conditions evidence for a positive impact of the strictness of employment protection legislation and the potential severance payment on transitions to dependent self employment is found the opposite effects however are detected for individuals becoming independent self employed

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

transparency in the financial system rollover risk and crises we present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk disclosing bank specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times thus the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises under this policy however information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information this commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis

heterogeneous beliefs in over the counter markets the behavior and stability of over the counter markets is of central concern to regulators little is known however about how the structure of these markets determine their properties in this paper we consider an over the counter market populated by boundedly rational heterogeneous traders in which the structure is represented by a network stability is found to decrease as the market becomes less well connected however the configuration of connections has a significant effect the presence of hubs such as those found in scale free networks increases stability and decreases volatility whilst small world short cut links have the opposite effect volatility in the fundamental value increases market volatility however volatility in the riskless asset returns has an ambiguous effect

contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms abstract this paper presents a model in which the contagion of a liquidity crisis between two nonfinancial institutions occurs because of learning activity within a common creditor pool after creditors observe what occurs in a rollover game for a firm they conjecture one another s type or attitude toward the risk associated with the firm s investment project creditors inference about one another s type then influences their decision to lend to the next firm by providing an analysis of the incidence of failure the threshold for a liquidity crisis for each firm this paper demonstrates that the risk of contagion increases sharply if it originates ex ante from a firm facing a low probability of failure in addition the paper proposes some policy measures for mitigating the severity of contagion during a liquidity crisis

the formation of a core periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks recent empirical evidence suggests that nancial networks exhibit a core periphery network structure this paper aims at giving an economic explanation for the emergence of such a structure using network formation theory focusing on intermediation benets we nd that a core periphery network cannot be unilaterally stable when agents are homogeneous the best response dynamics converge to a unique unilaterally stable outcome ranging from an empty to denser networks as the costs of linking decrease a core periphery network structure can form endogenously however if we allow for heterogeneity among agents in size we show that our model can reproduce the observed core periphery structure in the dutch interbank market for reasonable parameter values

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

networked relationships in the e mid interbank market a trading model with memory interbank markets are fundamental for bank liquidity management in this paper we introduce a model of interbank trading with memory our model reproduces features of preferential trading patterns in the e mid market recently empirically observed through the method of statistically validated networks the memory mechanism is used to introduce a proxy of trust in the model the key idea is that a lender having lent many times to a borrower in the past is more likely to lend to that borrower again in the future than to other borrowers with which the lender has never or has in frequently interacted the core of the model depends on only one parameter representing the initial attractiveness of all the banks as borrowers model outcomes and real data are compared through a variety of measures that describe the structure and properties of trading networks including number of statistically validated links bidirectional links and 3 motifs refinements of the pairing method are also proposed in order to capture finite memory and reciprocity in the model the model is implemented within the mason framework in java

the formation of financial networks modern banking systems are highly interconnected despite various benefits linkages between banks carry the risk of contagion in this article i investigate whether banks can commit ex ante to mutually insure each other when there is contagion risk in the financial system i model banks decisions to share this risk through bilateral agreements a financial network that allows losses to be shared among various counterparties arises endogenously i characterize the probability of systemic risk defined as the event that contagion occurs conditional on one bank failing in equilibrium interbank networks i show that there exist equilibria in which contagion does not occur

interbank loans collateral and modern monetary policy this study develops a novel agent based model of the interbank market with endogenous credit risk formation mechanisms we allow banks to exchange funds through unsecured and secured transactions which facilitates the flow of funds to the most profitable investment projects risk premiums result from banks forecasting rules and depend on past performance of the benchmark risk factors and interest rates our model confirms basic stylized facts of the interbank interest rates and volumes we also find that network structures within the secured market segment are characterized by the presence of dealer banks while we do not observe similar patterns in the unsecured market we perturb the model with exogenous shocks and policy scenarios which correspond to unconventional monetary policies