why you can t find a taxi in the rain and other labor supply lessons from cab drivers i replicate and extend the seminal work of camerer et al labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time quarterly journal of economics 112 1997 407 441 who find that the wage elasticity of daily hours of work for new york city taxi drivers is negative and conclude that their labor supply behavior is consistent with reference dependence in contrast my analysis of the complete record of all trips taken in nyc taxi cabs from 2009 to 2013 shows that drivers tend to respond positively to unanticipated as well as anticipated increases in earnings opportunities additionally using a discrete choice stopping model the probability of a shift ending is strongly positively related to hours worked but at best weakly related to income earned i find substantial heterogeneity across drivers in their elasticities but the estimated elasticities are generally positive and rarely substantially negative i find that new drivers with smaller elasticities are more likely to exit the industry whereas drivers who remain quickly learn to be better optimizers have positive labor supply elasticities that grow with experience these results are consistent with the neoclassical optimizing model of labor supply and suggest that consideration of gain loss utility and income reference dependence is not an important factor in the daily labor supply decisions of taxi drivers jel codes d01 d03 j22

individual heterogeneity and cultural attitudes in credence goods provision abstract i study the heterogeneity of credence goods provision in taxi drivers taking detours in new york city first i document that there is significant detouring on average by drivers second there is significant heterogeneity in detouring across individuals yet each individual s propensity to take detours is stable drivers who detour almost always detour while those who do not detour almost never do drivers who take longer detours on each trip also take such trips more often third cultural attitudes plausibly explain some of this heterogeneity in behavior across individuals

one size fits all towards a differentiated regional innovation policy approach innovation has moved to the foreground in regional policy in the last decade concrete policies were shaped by best practice models derived from high tech areas and well performing regions these are often applied in a similar way across many types of regions here an attempt is made to show that there is no ideal model for innovation policy as innovation activities differ strongly between central peripheral and old industrial areas in this paper we analyse different types of regions with respect to their preconditions for innovation networking and innovation barriers based on this classification different policy options and strategies are developed

seller reputation from word of mouth to centralized feedback abstract reputation is one of the most important incentives for trade and cooperation using the complete selling history of 125 135 sellers on eachnet com an ebay equivalent in china we show that sellers with a longer successful selling record enjoyed more repeat business reached more buyer regions sold in more product categories and had a higher completion rate even before eachnet introduced a centralized feedback system since the centralized feedback system the difference between reputable and non reputable sellers has decreased in terms of repeat business but enlarged in terms of market expansion these findings suggest that while reputation can facilitate trade through buyer experience and word of mouth it is not as effective as centralized feedback our study also shows that although completion rate and transaction price are the two outcomes most often examined in the literature seller reputation is important for buyer clientele market reach business scope and market survival

tradeoffs from integrating diagnosis and treatment in markets for health care anyone who has consulted a doctor plumber or auto mechanic has experienced the tradeoffs in consulting a single expert to both diagnose and treat a problem in the presence of asymmetric information on one hand integrated diagnosticians those who also sell treatments may have the incentive to give advice that is not in the buyer s best interests as the theoretical models in curtis r taylor 1995 and asher wolinsky 1993 point out because the buyer has imperfect information on the scope of the problem if he did not he would not have needed to consult a diagnostician in the first place the diagnostician inevitably has the incentive to recommend treatments that are more profitable even if they are more costly of lower quality or less appropriate on the other hand joint production of diagnosis and treatment may be more efficient the diagnostician may have better information about how to treat the problem than he could or would provide to an independent third party or the diagnostician may be able to treat the problem himself less expensively or more effectively half the cost is opening the engine block we examine an important special case of this problem the costs and quality of care of a random sample of medicare beneficiaries with coronary artery disease we compare patients who were diagnosed by an integrated cardiologist one who also provides surgical treatment to patients who were diagnosed by a nonintegrated cardiologist we decompose the total effect of diagnosis by an integrated cardiologist into the parts due to the change in the type of treatment and the parts due to the relative efficiency of each type of treatment with this information we quantify the potential upsides and downsides to diagnosis by an integrated expert we identify these effects based on differences across geographic areas in the number of integrated cardiologists per capita our estimates are consistent under the assumption that unobserved patient characteristics and other determinants of spending are similar across areas with many versus few integrated cardiologists we explore the validity of this assumption below the paper proceeds in four sections section i reviews the previous empirical literature on the problems of obtaining diagnosis and treatment from a single expert when that expert has better information than the buyer on the source of the buyer s problem section ii discusses the details of the problem that we study and presents our models section iii describes our data section iv presents our results and section v concludes with the implications of our results for economic theory and health policy

reputation formation in economic transactions abstract we investigate patterns of information transmission and the evolution of behaviour in standard trust games where reputational information can be exchanged between individual agents within a population but does not become public we vary the nature of information that could be transmitted either a subjective rating or the objective details of a transaction as well as the cost of information transmission either zero or positive we find that information transmission is heavily used if it is costless but only moderately if it has positive cost objective information effectively increases the average amount sent in the trust game and thus efficiency and average profits as well as the return rate only if transmission is costless and therefore is heavily used subjective information a rating only increases transfer and return rates in a control treatment where it becomes publicly available but not for private communication a detailed analysis of the determinants of information transmission shows a positive influence of a the transfer made to a receiver b experience of exploitation and c points to reciprocity in information transmission

quality and accountability in health care delivery audit study evidence from primary care in india we present unique audit study evidence on health care quality in rural india and find that most private providers lacked medical qualifications but completed more checklist items than public providers and recommended correct treatments equally often among doctors with public and private practices all quality metrics were higher in their private clinics market prices are positively correlated with checklist completion and correct treatment but also with unnecessary treatments however public sector salaries are uncorrelated with quality a simple model helps interpret our findings where public sector effort is low the benefits of higher diagnostic effort among private providers may outweigh costs of potential overtreatment

institutional solutions to the asymmetric information problem in health and development services for the poor summary the world s poorest pay for professional services and thus are in a market whether the services are provided in the public or private sectors the associated problems of unequal information are particularly acute in undergoverned countries where state regulation is weak we systematically review the evidence on solutions to these problems in a variety of professions payments by clients are more likely to have a positive effect on quality if they are made through locally managed organizations rather than directly to individual practitioners particularly if those organizations have an institutionalized history of other regarding values and incorporate client participation

shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money burning options in a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumer s payoff expectations i an opportunity for the expert to make a non binding promise and ii an opportunity for the consumer to burn money in belief based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expert s behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer by contrast the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path experimental results confirm the behavioral relevance of i but fail to confirm ii

why don t people trust experts abstractcredence goods such as health care legal and financial services and auto repair create a conflict of interest by requiring experts to diagnose and provide services to uninformed consumers mistreatment of consumers appears widespread empirically but a simple explanation for mistreatment under realistic assumptions has proved elusive i generalize uwe dulleck and rudolf kerschbamer s credence good model to incorporate the highly realistic assumption that consumers do not observe experts cost functions the model guarantees equilibrium mistreatment in a wide range of price setting and market environments the model also yields testable implications regarding the nature of mistreating firms and the direction of mistreatment

legitimizing research technology and innovation policies for transformative change combining insights from innovation systems and multi level perspective in a comprehensive failures framework abstract the recent policy debates about orientating research technology and innovation policy towards societal challenges rather than economic growth objectives only call for new lines of argumentation to systematically legitimize policy interventions while the multi level perspective on long term transitions has attracted quite some interest over the past years as a framework for dealing with long term processes of transformative change but the innovation systems approach is still the dominant perspective for devising innovation policy innovation systems approaches stress the importance of improving innovation capabilities of firms and the institutional settings to support them but they are less suited for dealing with the strategic challenges of transforming systems of innovation production and consumption and thus with long term challenges such as climate change or resource depletion it is therefore suggested to consider insights from transition studies more prominently in a policy framework that is based on the innovation systems approach and the associated notion of failures we propose a comprehensive framework that allows legitimizing and devising policies for transformative change that draws on a combination of market failures structural system failures and transformational system failures

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

power in firm networks what it means for regional innovation systems christopherson s clark j 2007 power in firm networks what it means for regional innovation systems regional studies 41 1223 1236 the role of power within regional firm networks is noted in empirical studies but insufficiently theorized it is suggested that network functioning is conflictual and that more powerful network members particularly transnational corporations tncs leverage regional resources to advance their sustainable competitive advantage the agendas and power exercised by tncs within regionalized firm networks have significant implications for regional policy and the uneven allocation of resources and capacities within and among regions the findings indicate that transnational firm access to resources that are critical to innovation including university research and skilled labour negatively affects the potential for innovation by small and medium size firms christopherson s et clark j 2007 le pouvoir au sein des reseaux d entreprise son importance pour les systemes d

the economics of credence goods an experiment on the role of liability verifiability reputation and competition credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies such as under and overtreatment or market breakdown we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency we find that liability has a crucial but verifiability at best a minor allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence as predicted seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated jel d12 d82

institutional polycentrism entrepreneurs social networks and new venture growth what is the interrelationship among formal institutions social networks and new venture growth drawing on the theory of institutional polycentrism and social network theory we examine this question using data on 637 entrepreneurs from four different countries we find the confluence of weak and inefficient formal institutions to be associated with a larger number of structural holes in entrepreneurial social networks while the effect of this institutional order on the revenue growth of new ventures is negative a network s structural holes have a positive effect on revenue growth furthermore the positive effect of structural holes on revenue growth is stronger in an environment with a more adverse institutional order i e weaker and more inefficient institutions the contributions and implications of these findings are discussed abstract from author

second opinions and price competition inefficiency in the market for expert advice we consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer s need in our model experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions we explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort in particular the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum an intervention that limits price competition via price control increases welfare

following or breaking regional development paths on the role and capability of the innovative entrepreneur structural change economic diversification and new path development feature prominently in scientific and policy debates against the backdrop of increasing specialization in the economy this paper reinterprets schumpeterian innovative entrepreneurship as a fundamental process that creates new connections between distinct fields of specialization thereby induces path breaking innovations and structural change it is argued that the transformation capability of innovative entrepreneurs rests essentially on their position s and networks within evolving innovation systems by focusing on micro level processes and transformation capability the paper complements the large body of work on structural barriers unintended consequences supporting institutional arrangements and policy implications are discussed

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

on trust in honesty and volunteering among europeans cross country evidence on perceptions and behavior abstract we conduct an experimental study among european citizens regarding cross cultural perceptions related to trust in two dimensions volunteerism and honesty we use representative samples from five major economies of the euro area france germany italy the netherlands and spain we find that european citizens rely on nationality to infer behavior assessments of behavior show a north south pattern participants from northern countries are perceived to be more honest and to provide more effort in a volunteering game than participants from southern countries actual behavior is however not always in line with these assessments assessments of honesty show strong evidence of social projection participants expect other european citizens to be less honest if they are culturally closer to themselves assessments of volunteerism instead show that both northern and southern europeans expect higher performance in northern than in southern european countries

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

what drives taxi drivers a field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods credence goods are characterized by informational a symmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by seller s this paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in athens g reece set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers p resumed information and income on the extent of fraud results reveal that taxi drivers c heat passengers in systematic ways passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system l eads to manipulated bills higher income seems to lead to more fraud

signaling corporate social responsibility third party certification versus brands corporate social responsibility csr is a credence attribute of products which can be signaled either through a label certified by a third party or via unsubstantiated claims used as part of a brand building strategy we use an experimental posted offer market with sellers and buyers to compare the impact of these signaling strategies on market efficiency only third party certification gives rise to a separating equilibrium and an increase in csr investments unsubstantiated claims can generate a halo effect on consumers whereby the latter are nudged into paying more for the same level of csr investments by firms

rules of the game the place of institutions in regional economic change gertler m s rules of the game the place of institutions in regional economic change regional studies institutions exert a pervasive influence on the evolution and character of regional economies yet this role is poorly understood within recent debates on neoliberalism varieties of capitalism and other approaches to the study of economic change a reconstituted institutional economic geography must accommodate individual agency institutional evolution interscalar relations and comparative methodologies examining recent work on universities in local economies as well as on creativity based strategies and social inclusion polarization it is shown how locally distinctive institutional architectures shape evolutionary trajectories leading to differentiated social and economic outcomes the paper then enunciates some important principles of methodology and theory building in institutional analysis gertler m s les regles du jeu le role des institutions dans le developpement economique region

iylm a general theory compatible replacement for islm the islm model introduced in 1936 37 to provide interpretations of keynes s general theory subsequently emerged in its hicks hansen form as the workhorse and trained intuition of post war macroeconomists however islm is an essentially orthodox model based on neoclassical foundations and fails completely as an adequate representation of central elements of keynes s macroeconomic thought this article proposes iylm as a replacement for islm the new model being general theory compatible in that it is grounded only on key propositions in that work its purpose is to contribute within the constraints of a two market framework to the resuscitation of keynes s macroeconomics as an alternative to the inadequacies of much current macroeconomics the first part of the article derives the model and argues that those sympathetic to the general theory can accept the iylm framework whilst simultaneously rejecting islm the second part shows that hicks hansen islm is based on an income augmented form of orthodox loanable funds theory

transparency in markets for experience goods experimental evidence we propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good the market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy we compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality contrary to theoretical predictions firms do not differentiate quality under full information rather both tend to offer products of similar high quality entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory under no information we observe a lemons outcome where quality is low at the same time firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost in two intermediate treatments quality is significantly higher than the no information level and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect jel l15 c91 d82

when do experts cheat and whom do they target a credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer this information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed i propose two new theories of expert cheating suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers according to these theories cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination and experts cheat selectively for instance experts target high valuation and high cost customers finally selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services

gender effects in the credence goods market an experimental study abstract in this paper we offer further explanation for differences in earnings across genders we investigate difference in preferences in payment systems for credence goods we find that women were no less likely to select variable rate payment schemes as compensation for providing credence goods than men however overall earnings remained higher for men than for women disaggregating behavior by type of payment and gender reveals that women who chose fee for service provided significantly fewer units of services paid for than men who chose fee for service this difference accounts for the lower overall earnings for women in our experiments

globalisation of knowledge production and regional innovation policy supporting specialized hubs in the bangalore software industry abstract this paper is concerned with the changing role of regional innovation systems and regional policies in supporting the transition of indigenous firms in developing countries from competing on low costs towards becoming knowledge providers in global value chains special attention is paid to policies supporting the emergence and development of the regional innovation system in this transition process regional innovation systems in developing countries have very recently started to be conceptualised as specialized hubs in global innovation and production networks asheim b coenen l vang lauridsen j 2007 face to face buzz and knowledge bases socio spatial implications for learning innovation and innovation policy environment and planning c government and policy 25 5 655 670 chaminade c vang j 2006a innovation policy for small and medium size smes in asia an innovation systems perspective in yeung h ed handbook of research on asian business edward elgar cheltenham maggi c 2007 the salmon farming and processing cluster in southern chile in pietrobello c rabellotti r eds upgrading and governance in clusters and value chains in latin america harvard university press a specialized hub refers to a node in a global value chain that mainly undertakes one or a few of the activities required for the production and development of a given good or service or serves a particular segment of the global market in global value chains firms in developing countries have traditionally been responsible for the lowest added value activities however a few emerging regional innovation systems in developing countries are beginning to challenge this scenario by rapidly upgrading in the value chain there is however still only a poorly developed understanding of how the system of innovation emerges and evolves to support this transition process and what the role of regional innovation policy is in building the regional conditions that support indigenous small and medium size enterprises smes in this transition process this paper aims at reducing this omission by analyzing the co evolution of the strategies of indigenous smes and the regional innovation system of bangalore india

scientific labour markets networks and regional innovation systems lawton smith h and waters r scientific labour markets networks and regional innovation systems regional studies while quality of the labour force in a locality is the single most important component of local competitiveness the regional innovation systems literature has relatively neglected processes of labour force development this paper addresses two questions what is the role of labour markets in the making of regions as innovative systems and what is the role of labour markets in regional innovation systems the labour market and specifically the networks that exist between highly skilled workers are positioned at the centre of the analysis using evidence from the uk high technology economies of cambridgeshire and oxfordshire lawton smith h and waters r lawton smith h et wat

second degree moral hazard in a real world credence goods market in a field experiment in the market for taxi rides we investigate a phenomenon called second degree moral hazard the tendency of the supply side in a market to react to anticipated moral hazard on the demand side by increasing the extent or price of the service our moral hazard manipulation consists of some passengers explicitly stating that their expenses will be reimbursed this has a strong positive effect on the likelihood and the amount of overcharging and consequently increases consumer expenditure our results suggest that second degree moral hazard may have a severe impact on the provision of credence goods

challenges of transformation innovation re bundling and traditional manufacturing in canada s technology triangle bathelt h munro a k and spigel b challenges of transformation innovation re bundling and traditional manufacturing in canada s technology triangle regional studies this paper develops a perspective of regional re bundling in overcoming economic crises it does this by focusing on the effects of the recent global financial crisis on traditional manufacturing it analyses the structure of innovation processes and their development over time in canada s technology triangle a region known for university related spin off processes and successful modernization what is less well known is that this region has been strongly influenced by traditional manufacturing industries it is shown that these industries have been well prepared to deal with the effects of the crisis due to ongoing innovation and diversification stimulated by prior economic crises bathelt h munro a k and spigel b

credence goods efficient labelling policies and regulatory enforcement we analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of credence goods via alternative labelling procedures when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute producers can either self label their products or have them certified by a third party the government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the green or the brown producers our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information we extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers when corrupt producers can affix spurious labels the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities we find that mandatory self labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling unless the market share effect greatly exceeds the incentive to cheat effect

green public procurement of certified wood spatial leverage effect and welfare implications certified and conventional products are not traditional substitute goods green public procurement stimulates certification globally but not in each region public procurement of the cheaper unsustainable product does not maximise welfare increasing the price premium for certified wood creates a trade barrier the high costs of forest certification exclude vulnerable producers

experts vs discounters consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods this paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis the unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures this makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters we explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free riding on experts advice and we discuss policy options to solve the free riding consumers cheating experts problem

social preferences and strategic uncertainty an experiment on markets and contracts this paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market the experiment is designed as a sequence of three phases in the first two phases p1 and p2 agents face simple games which we use to estimate subjects social and reciprocity concerns together with their beliefs in the last phase p3 four principals who face four teams of two agents compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu then each agent selects one of the available contracts i e he chooses to work for a principal production is determined by the outcome of a simple effort game induced by the chosen contract we find that heterogeneous social preferences are significant determinants of choices in all phases of the experiment since the available contracts display a trade off between fairness and strategic uncertainty we observe that the latter is a much stronger determinant of choices for both principals and agents finally we also see that social preferences explain to a large extent matching between principals and agents since agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar social preferences

creating a cluster while building a firm entrepreneurs and the formation of industrial clusters feldman m p francis j and bercovitz j 2005 creating a cluster while building a firm entrepreneurs and the formation of industrial clusters regional studies39 129 141 the objective of the paper is to provide a theoretical model of cluster development that is informed by an appreciative interpretation of case studies it argues that entrepreneurs are a critical element in the formation of clusters entrepreneurs are important actors in the development of clusters as complex adaptive systems where the external resources associated with clusters are developed over time entrepreneurs who adapt to both constructive crises and new opportunities create the factors and conditions that facilitate their business interests and in turn contribute to the development of external resources the paper examines the initial factors that influence the decision to become an entrepreneur and examine how external factors influence the formation and location of high technology clusters feldman m p francis j

credence goods experts and risk aversion abstract the existing literature on credence goods and expert services has overlooked the importance of risk aversion in this paper we extend a standard expert model of credence goods with verifiable service quality by considering risk averse consumers our results show that the presence of risk aversion reduces the expert s incentive to invest in diagnosis and may thus lead to consumers mistreatment

editorial exploring regional varieties of capitalism the varieties of capitalism approach provides a most influential perspective in recent research on comparative capitalisms it takes the relationship between firms and their institutional environme

co evolution of firms industries and networks in space ter wal a l j and boschma r co evolution of firms industries and networks in space regional studies the cluster literature suffers from a number of shortcomings 1 it often neglects that cluster firms are heterogeneous in terms of capabilities 2 it tends to overemphasize the importance of geographical proximity and underestimates the role of networks and 3 it hardly addresses the origins and evolution of clusters the authors propose a theoretical framework that brings together the literature on clusters industrial dynamics the evolutionary theory of the firm and network theory it is described how clusters co evolve with 1 the industry with to they adhere 2 the capabilities of the firms they contain and 3 the industry wide knowledge network of which they are part ter wal a l j et boschma r la coevolution geographique des entreprises des industries et des reseaux regional studies la documentation sur les clusters souffre d un nombre de points faibles 1 elle ne tient c

sectoral systems of innovation and production the concept sectoral system of innovation and production provides a multidimensional integrated and dynamic view of sectors it is proposed that a sectoral system is a set of products and the set of agents carrying out market and non market interactions for the creation production and sale of those products a sectoral systems has a specific knowledge base technologies inputs and demand agents are individuals and organizations at various levels of aggregation they interact through processes of communication exchange co operation competition and command and these interactions are shaped by institutions a sectoral system undergoes change and transformation through the co evolution of its various elements 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

credence goods monopolists abstract with a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need therefore the seller acts as the expert determining the customers requirements this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services we analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behavior we consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller s incentives to be honest in three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services only in one scenario there is no trade

do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice an experimental deception game abstract the market for retail financial products e g investment funds or insurances is marred by information asymmetries clients are not well informed about the quality of these products they have to rely on the recommendations of advisors incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned when fees are used by financial institutions to steer advice we experimentally investigate whether voluntary contract components can reduce the conflict of interest and increase truth telling of advisors we compare a voluntary payment upfront an obligatory payment upfront a voluntary bonus afterwards and a three stage design with a voluntary payment upfront and a bonus after advisors are most truthful when mutual opportunities to reciprocate exist and when the voluntary payment is largest our analysis identifies the third stage bonus payment as the key feature for success as it allows for an interplay of reciprocal behavior between clients and advisors

relatedness as driver of regional diversification a research agenda relatedness as driver of regional diversification a research agenda regional studies the regional diversification literature claims that regions diversify in new activities related to their existing activities from which new activities draw on and combine local capabilities the paper offers a critical assessment and identifies a number of crucial issues for future research it calls for 1 a disentanglement of the various types of capabilities that make regions diversify 2 the inclusion of more geographical wisdom in the study of regional diversification like a focus on the effects of territory specific contexts such as institutions 3 a thorough investigation in the conditioning factors of related and unrelated diversification in regions and 4 a micro perspective on regional diversification that assesses the role of economic and institutional agents in a multi scalar perspective

corruption and culture an experimental analysis article i nfo article history why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions in 2005 we conducted a bribery experiment and found that among undergraduates we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country among graduate students we could not in 2007 we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the uk was associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe although this does not explain our inability to predict graduate behaviour we conclude that while corruption may in part be a cultural phenomenon individuals should not be prejudged with reference to their country of origin

how social preferences shape incentives in experimental markets for credence goods credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus maximising quality while standard theory predicts that equal mark up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received experimental evidence indicates the opposite we identify a lack of robustness with respect to heterogeneity in social preferences as a possible cause of this and conduct new experiments that allow for parsimonious identification of sellers social preference types our results confirm the assumed heterogeneity in social preferences and provide strong support for our explanation of the failure of verifiability to increase efficiency

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

the transition to flexible specialisation in the us film industry external economice the division of labour and the crossing of industrial divides there is increasing evidence that mass production methods are losing their dominance in the advanced industrial economies and that various forms of flexible production organization are on the rise the transition from mass production organization to flexible specialization is analyzed in detail through a case study of the film industry where it is shown that a system of production once based on product standardization high levels of vertical integration and stable oligopolistic market structures has after a period of vertical disintegration given way to a production system based on a deep division of labor between firms and high levels of flexibility in both product design and output levels the transition may be the result of increasing external economies of scale stemming from the development of the industry s social division of labor copyright 1989 by oxford university press

regional worlds from related variety in regional diversification to strategic coupling in global production networks this annual lecture paper bridges two influential but parallel literature strands on evolutionary economic geography eeg and global production networks gpn it argues that both strands are prem

the impact of social structure on economic outcomes s ocial structure especially in the form of social networks affects economic outcomes for three main reasons first social networks affect the flow and the quality of information much information is subtle nuanced and difficult to verify so actors do not believe impersonal sources and instead rely on people they know second social networks are an important source of reward and punishment since these are often magnified in their impact when coming from others personally known third trust by which i mean the confidence that others will do the right thing despite a clear balance of incentives to the contrary emerges if it does in the context of a social network economists have recently devoted considerable attention to the impact of social structure and networks on the economy for example see the economists chapters in rauch and casella 2001 and the illuminating review essay of this volume by zuckerman 2003 as well as dutta and jackson 2003 and calvoarmengol 2004 however i focus here on sociologists contributions sociologists have developed core principles about the interactions of social structure information ability to punish or reward and trust that frequently recur in their analyses of political economic and other institutions i begin by reviewing some of these principles building on these i then discuss how social structures and social networks can affect economic outcomes like hiring price productivity and innovation

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training