individual taxpayer response to tax cuts 1982 1984 with implications for the revenue maximizing tax rate abstract this paper measures the response of taxpayers to the u s personal rate reductions from 1982 to 1984 a baseline income distribution is created to describe what level and distribution could be expected in the absence of tax changes comparison of this baseline with actual tax return data shows that at least one sixth and probably one quarter of the revenue ascribable to the rate reductions was recouped by changes in taxpayer behavior the data also show that federal income tax revenue would have been maximized at a tax rate of about 35 percent and total income tax revenue maximized at a total tax rate of about 40 percent

regressive sin taxes with an application to the optimal soda tax a common objection to sin taxes corrective taxes on goods that are thought to be overconsumed such as cigarettes alcohol and sugary drinks is that they often fall disproportionately on low income consumers this paper studies the interaction between corrective and redistributive motives in a general optimal taxation framework and delivers empirically implementable formulas for sufficient statistics for the optimal commodity tax the optimal sin tax is increasing in the price elasticity of demand increasing in the degree to which lower income consumers are more biased or more elastic to the tax decreasing in the extent to which consumption is concentrated among the poor and decreasing in income effects because income effects imply that commodity taxes create labor supply distortions contrary to common intuitions stronger preferences for redistribution can increase the optimal sin tax if lower income consumers are more responsive to taxes or are more biased as an application we estimate the optimal nationwide tax on sugar sweetened beverages using nielsen homescan data and a specially designed survey measuring nutrition knowledge and self control holding federal income tax rates constant our estimates imply an optimal federal sugar sweetened beverage tax of 1 to 2 1 cents per ounce although optimal city level taxes could be as much as 60 lower due to cross border shopping

de gustibus non est taxandum heterogeneity in preferences and optimal redistribution abstract the prominent but unproven intuition that preference heterogeneity reduces redistribution in a standard optimal tax model is shown to hold under the plausible condition that the distribution of preferences for consumption relative to leisure rises in terms of first order stochastic dominance with income given familiar functional form assumptions on utility and the distributions of ability and preferences a simple statistic for the effect of preference heterogeneity on marginal tax rates is derived numerical simulations and suggestive empirical evidence demonstrate the link between this potentially measurable statistic and the quantitative implications of preference heterogeneity for policy

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

revealed social preferences of dutch political parties we measure the redistributive preferences of dutch political parties using unique detailed information from their election proposals by employing the inverse optimal tax method we calculate the political weights across the income distribution for each political party we find that all dutch political parties give a higher political weight to middle incomes than to the poor moreover the political weights of the rich are close to zero furthermore we detect a strong political status quo bias as the political weights of all political parties hardly deviate from the weights implied by the pre existing tax system we argue that political economy considerations are key in understanding these results

moral hazard in risk averse teams holmstrom 1982 has shown that a non budget balancing contract induces a team of risk neutral agents to choose the first best effort levels this is not generally true when agents are risk averse furthermore a massacre contract which punishes all but one agent when the outcome is low can attain the first best over a wider range of parameters than any other budget balancing contract

switching regression models with imperfect sample separation information with an application on cartel stability an exogenous switching regression model with imperfect reginme classificationi information is specified and applied to a study of cartel stability an efficient estimation method is proposed which takes this imperfect information into account the consequences of misclassification are analyzed the direction of the least squares bias is derived an optimal regime classification rule is obtained and compared theoretically and empirically with other classification rules we then examine the joint executive committee a railroad cartel in the 1880 s the econometric evidence indicates that reversions to noncooperative behavior did occur for the firms in our sample and these reversions involve a significant decrease in market price this article is concerned with the possibility of estimating a switching regression model and its application to a study on cartel stability the switching regression model is the exogenous switching model proposed by quandt 24 which generalized a problem of mixture distributions day 4 the sample in this model is generated from distinct regression equations or regimes for each time period if the investigator has a priori information on how the sample is partitioned into the underlying regimes it is a switching regression model with known sample separation otherwise it is a model with unknown sample separation estimation of these latter models has been considered by quandt 24 goldfeld and quandt 8 and kiefer 14 16 among others a switching regression model is appropriate for the study of cartel behavior when there are price wars as firms will revert from cooperative to noncooperative behavior and so the industry supply function shifts occasionally this model will allow us to exploit the fact that there will be periodic stochastic switches or reversions between cooperative and noncooperative conduct in order to identify collusive episodes

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

a model of the crude oil market in which market conduct varies this paper describes a model which first identifies in an estimatable manner parameters which describe the conduct each decision maker in an oligopoly expects from it s rivals and then allows them to vary in a systematic fashion across rivals and over time the model is applied to ten producing countries in the crude oil market 1966i to 1981iii a fully dynamic demand system is estimated together with equations describing price choice and variations in conduct and the null hypothesis of constant conduct is rejected against the more general alternative proposed here copyright 1987 by royal economic society

incentives and loss of control in an optimal hierarchy this paper studies incentives and loss of control in a hierarchy model which combines and generalizes the models of williamson calvo wellisz and keren levhari in our model of the hierarchy the levels of effort from managers and workers the wage scales the span of control and in particular the total number of tiers are all endogenous using optimal control techniques we show that in the optimal hierarchy the wage scales and effort levels decrease as one moves down the hierarchy as the hierarchy expands with no technological progress workers exert less effort and are paid less top managers work harder and are paid more and the wage distribution becomes increasingly skewed

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

revisiting the classical view of benefit based taxation this paper explores how the persistently popular classical logic of bene t based taxation in which an individual s bene t from public goods is tied to his or her income earning ability can be incorporated into modern optimal tax theory if lindahl s methods are applied to that view of bene ts rst best optimal policy can be characterized analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics in particular the coe cient of complementarity between public goods and innate talent constrained optimal policy with a pareto e cient objective that strikes a balance controlled by a single parameter between this principle and the familiar utilitarian criterion can be simulated using conventional constraints and methods a wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result including those that match well several features of existing policies to the extent that such an objective re ects the mixed normative reasoning behind prevailing

bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply how can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs or inattention i derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed effect of a price change on demand the size of the price change and the degree of frictions the degree of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum the bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin elasticities i apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1 of earnings as a result small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities extensive and intensive margin elasticities and other disparate findings pooling estimates from existing studies i estimate a hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0 33 on the intensive margin and 0 25 on the extensive margin after accounting for frictions

measuring attitudes towards inequality individuals attitudes to inequality aversion are measured using survey data based on the leaky bucket experiment for several groups of students in australia and israel three forms of social welfare function are estimated it is found that measures of inequality aversion can be obtained with some precision and that these estimates are substantially lower than the values typically used by those measuring inequality and examining optimal tax structures furthermore a welfare function based on the gini inequality measure is generally found to give a better fit than forms based on constant relative or constant absolute inequality aversion jel classification c91 d63

the surprising power of age dependent taxes this paper provides a new empirically driven application of the dynamic mirrleesian framework by studying a feasible and potentially powerful tax reform age dependent labour income taxation i show analytically how age dependence improves policy on both the intratemporal and intertemporal margins i use detailed numerical simulations calibrated with data from the u s panel study of income dynamics to generate robust policy implications age dependence 1 lowers marginal taxes on average and especially on high income young workers and 2 lowers average taxes on all young workers relative to older workers when private saving and borrowing are restricted finally i calculate and characterize the welfare gains from age dependence despite its simplicity age dependence generates a welfare gain equal to between 0 6 and 1 5 of aggregate annual consumption and it captures more than 60 of the gain from reform to the dynamic optimal policy the gains are due to substantial increases in both efficiency and equity when age dependence is restricted to be pareto improving the welfare gain is nearly as large

measuring economic efficiency using inverse optimum weights abstract this paper provides a method to measure the traditional kaldor hicks notion of economic efficiency when taxes affect behavior in contrast to traditional unweighted surplus measuring efficiency requires weighting individual benefits or surplus by the marginal cost to the government of providing a 1 transfer at each income level these weights correspond to the solution to the inverse optimum program in the optimal tax literature they are the social planning weights that would rationalize the status quo tax schedule as optimal i estimate the weights using the universe of us income tax returns from 2012 the results suggest that measuring economic efficiency requires weighting surplus accruing to the poor roughly 1 5 2 times more than surplus accruing to the rich this is because 1 of surplus to the poor can be turned into roughly 1 5 2 of surplus to the rich by reducing the progressivity of the tax schedule following kaldor and hicks original applications i compare income distributions over time in the us and across countries the results suggest us economic growth is 15 20 lower due to increased inequality than is suggested by changes in gdp because of its higher inequality the u s is unable to replicate the income distribution of countries like austria and the netherlands despite having higher national income per capita

how should capital be taxed this survey discusses how capital should be taxed in advanced economies we review the theoretical optimal tax literature survey empirical studies on the distribution of capital and the distortion

globalization and its challenges rudi was born and grew up in krefeld germany he was an undergraduate at the university of geneva and completed his ph d at the university of chicago in 1971 which is where we met he was a student of robert mundell and both the subject matter the development of the mundell fleming model and the elegance and insights of his early work reflected mundell s influence he taught at the university of rochester and at the university of chicago before accepting an offer from mit in 1975

on quota violations of opec members abstract over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for opec countries however the academic literature on opec focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns this paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain opec members incentives for abiding or violating quotas we first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice the model highlights the trade off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007 we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and opec s quota system disciplining its members in bad times

the architecture of economic systems hierarchies and polyarchies the authors present new ways of looking at economic organizations andsystems individuals judgments entail errors they sometimes reject good projects and accept bad projects the architecture of an economicsystem specifying how the decision making units are organized togetherwithin a system who gathers what information and who communicates what with whom affects its performance both because it influences thenature of errors that individuals make within the system and becauseit has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals errors theperformance of two polar architectures decentralized polyarchical versus centralized hierarchical decision making authorities are analyzed and compared copyright 1986 by american economic association

the firm as a dedicated hierarchy a theory of the origins and growth of firms in the formative stages of their businesses entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect rather than steal the source of organizational rents we study how the entrepreneur s response to this problem determines the organization s internal structure growth and its eventual size large steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries and will have seniority based promotion policies by contrast e at hierarchies will prevail in human capital intensive industries and will have up or out promotion systems furthermore e at hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies the model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets at the root of most enterprises generating economic surplus is an entrepreneur with a unique critical resource such as an idea good customer relationships a new tool or superior management technique a fundamental problem of entrepreneurship is how to enlist the cooperation of the many agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of the surplus generated by the enterprise the risk of being expropriated however is always inherent in production in particular the entrepreneur has to give her employees whom we call managers close proximity or access to the critical resource for them to learn to produce effectively for example a manager has to understand the idea be in contact with the key customers and suppliers or even learn the entrepreneur s unique managerial techniques in order to work effectively but access also gives the manager the opportunity to expropriate this critical resource and compete against the entrepreneur managers may steal the idea walk away with clients or mimic the entrepreneur s management style and start up a rival concern the greater the access a manager has the more he can appropriate and the more effectively he can compete this paper explores the role of organizational design in

changes in the labor supply behavior of married women 1980 2000 using march current population survey data we investigate married women s labor supply from 1980 to 2000 we find a large rightward shift in their labor supply function for annual hours in the 1980s with little shift in the 1990s these shifts account for most of the slowdown in the growth of labor supply during this period a major development was the dramatic decrease in the responsiveness of married women s labor supply to their own and husbands wages their own wage elasticity fell by 50 56 while their cross wage elasticity fell by 38 47 in absolute value

how elastic are preferences for redistribution evidence from randomized survey experiments we analyze randomized online survey experiments providing interactive customized information on us income inequality the link between top income tax rates and economic growth and the estate tax the treatment has large effects on views about inequality but only slightly moves tax and transfer policy preferences an exception is the estate tax informing respondents of the small share of decedents who pay it doubles support for it the small effects for all other policies can be partially explained by respondents low trust in government and a disconnect between concerns about social issues and the public policies meant to address them jel d31 d72 h23 h24

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

efficient and nearly efficient partnerships this paper shows in two ways that the degree to which free riding diminishes the performance of deterministic partnerships may be less than has been generally thought first a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for a partnership to sustain full efficiency it implies that many non trivial partnerships sustain efficiency such as generic ones with finite action spaces and neoclassical ones with leontief technologies second approximate efficiency is shown to be achievable in a large class of partnerships including ones with smooth and monotonic production and disutility functions approximate efficiency is achieved by mixed strategy equilibria one partner takes with small probability an inefficient action the degree to which efficiency is approximated is restricted only by the amount of liability the partners can bear nonetheless their equilibrium payments are not arbitrarily large

fair income tax fairness is a key concept in redistribution issues in this paper we study how particular requirements of fairness can shed light on the design of the optimal income tax schedule we consider a population of heterogeneous individuals or households who differ in two respects first they have unequal skills and therefore unequal earning abilities second they differ in terms of their preferences about consumption and leisure and as a consequence typically make different labour time choices both kinds of differences generate income inequalities we study how to justify and compute a redistribution income tax in this context redistribution through an income tax usually entails distortions of incentives but the resulting efficiency loss has to be weighed against potential improvements in the fairness of the distribution of resources we address this efficiency equity trade off here by constructing social preferences which obey the standard pareto principle in addition to fairness conditions

labor supply and taxes a survey i survey the male and female labor supply literatures focusing on implications for effects of wages and taxes for males i describe and contrast results from three basic types of model static models especially those that account for nonlinear taxes life cycle models with savings and life cycle models with both savings and human capital for women more important distinctions are whether models include fixed costs of work and whether they treat demographics like fertility and marriage and human capital as exogenous or endogenous the literature is characterized by considerable controversy over the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in wages and taxes at least for males it is fair to say that most economists believe labor supply elasticities are small but a sizeable minority of studies that i examine obtain large values hence there is no clear consensus on this point in fact a simple average of hicks elasticities across all the studies i examine is 0 30 several simulation studies have shown that such a value is large enough to generate large welfare costs of income taxation for males i conclude that two factors drive many of the differences in results across studies one factor is use of direct vs ratio wage measures with studies that use the former tending to find larger elasticties another factor is the failure of most studies to account for human capital returns to work experience i argue that this may lead to downward bias in elasticity estimates in a model that includes human capital i show how even modest elasticities as conventionally measured can be consistent with large welfare costs of taxation

comment on positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions by benjamin lockwood and matthew weinzierl

how should tax progressivity respond to rising income inequality we address this question in a heterogeneous agent incomplete markets model featuring exogenous idiosyncratic risk endogenous skill investment and flexible labor supply the tax and transfer schedule is restricted to be log linear in income a good description of the us system rising inequality is modeled as a combination of skill biased technical change and growth in residual wage dispersion when facing shifts in the income distribution like those observed in the us a utilitarian planner chooses higher progressivity in response to larger residual inequality but lower progressivity in response to widening skill price dispersion reflecting technical change overall optimal progressivity is approximately unchanged between 1980 and 2016 we document that the progressivity of the actual us tax and transfer system has similarly changed little since 1980 in line with the model prescription

in pursuit of monopoly power recent quantitative work in industrial economics this paper reviews empirical work in industrial organization devoted to the question of inferring the existence of monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes like profits and prices the discussion covers inter industry work long conventional in the area newer developments in intra industry analysis and case studies and concludes with some remarks on a small but growing body of work assessing market dynamics the wide range of studies reviewed all generally reveal that market power exists in many industries

the limitations of decentralized world redistribution an optimal taxation approach abstract a centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border neutral social welfare function subject to the disincentive effects it would create generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality dropping the gini coefficient from 0 69 to 0 25 in contrast an optimal decentralized i e with no cross country transfers redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality thus the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax suggesting that voluntary world transfers subject to a free rider problem produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the united states either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross border transfers is wasted the product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the united states assigns to foreigners we calculate that value to be as low as 1 2000 of the value put on the welfare of an american suggesting that u s policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted

the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates a critical review this paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data first we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis we discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic second we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the united states to illustrate those issues third we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out finally we discuss avenues for future research jel h24 h31 j22

generalized social marginal welfare weights for optimal tax theory this paper proposes to evaluate tax reforms by aggregating money metric losses and gains of different individuals using generalized social marginal welfare weights optimum tax formulas take the same form as standard welfarist tax formulas by simply substitut ing standard marginal social welfare weights with those generalized weights weights directly capture society s concerns for fairness without being necessarily tied to individual utilities suitable weights can help reconcile discrepancies between the welfarist approach and actual tax practice as well as unify in an operational way the most prominent alternatives to utilitarianism such as libertarianism equality of opportunity or poverty alleviation jel d60 d63 h21 h23 i38

the effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income a panel study of the 1986 tax reform act this paper uses a treasury department panel of more than 4 000 taxpayers to estimate the sensitivity of taxable income to changes in tax rates on the basis of a comparison of the tax returns of the same individual taxpayers before and after the 1986 tax reform the analysis emphasizes that the response of taxable income involves much more than a change in the traditional measures of labor supply the evidence shows an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal net of tax rate that is at least one and could be substantially higher the implications for recent tax rate changes are discussed

the desirability of commodity taxation under non linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes abstract this paper revisits the atkinson stiglitz result on uselessness of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal non linear income taxation in a more general setup namely when tastes are heterogeneous this general analysis displays the key economic assumptions under which the atkinson stiglitz result is robust a small tax on a given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure an application to the case of savings suggests that even in the presence of optimal non linear earnings taxation there is a role for a supplemental capital income tax in the standard overlapping generation model

optimal contracts for teams in a team subject to both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed optimal contracts are under certain conditions linear in the team s output the outcome is the same whether the principal observes just the total output or each individual s contribution thus monitoring is not needed to prevent shirking by team members instead the role of monitoring is to discipline the monitor production is a collective enterprise by workers in a firm or firms in a joint venture the synergy that is the reason for the team s existence may mean that an individual s contribution to the team s output is not distinguishable so that it is impossible to pay him according to his own productivity how should the principal remunerate the team members so as to maximize his own profit in this paper we analyze incentives in teams with asymmetric information both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed directly holmstrom 1982 showed that in a team model with moral hazard the principal can ensure an outcome arbitrarily close to the full information ideal by using a contract that punishes each team member arbitrarily severely whenever team output falls below some target however this seems to be an unrealistically drastic way of solving the moral hazard problem in our model we in effect prevent the principal from using such a contract by introducing adverse selection in addition to moral hazard and by assuming that ability and effort interact in such a way that the principal is unable to disentangle an agent s effort from his ability under the assumption that the principal and the team members are risk neutral we shall show that the principal can implement his information constrained optimum simply by offering each agent a payment linear in the team s output although the essential feature of our analysis is the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard this result can be understood by first considering the special case in which the agents abilities are common knowledge in this case the moral hazard problem can be completely solved the principal can do as well as he

clustering in crude oil prices and the target pricing zone hypothesis abstract this paper studies the target pricing zone tpz hypothesis for crude oil by examining price clustering in the dollar digit it is hypothesized that price clustering occurs within an established tpz if opec is able to defend the upper and lower bounds through output changes the results show that prices strongly cluster around the dollar digit value of 9 within the tpz sub periods but not outside the sub periods furthermore the degree of clustering declines when production capacity utilization is high and when production significantly exceeds quotas consistent with opec s inability to defend the zone nine centered clustering also results in lower contemporaneous and next day volatility these results support the target pricing zone hypothesis of crude oil

redistributive taxation in the roy model we consider optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector we show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens the constrained pareto frontier can be implemented with a single non linear income tax we derive formulas for this optimal tax schedule if sectoral inputs are complements a many sector model with self selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single sector model under natural conditions however they are more progressive than in a multi sector model without occupational choice or without overlapping wage distributions as in stiglitz 1982

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

the firm as a communication network this paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of information when these returns to specialization outweigh costs of communication it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm it is shown that efficient networks involve centralization that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items

the promise of positive optimal taxation normative diversity and a role for equal sacrifice abstract a prominent assumption in modern optimal tax research is that the objective of taxation is utilitarian i present new survey evidence that most people reject this assumption s implications for several prominent features of tax policy instead preferring tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective the principle of equal sacrifice i generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective proposing a method by which to make disparate criteria commensurable while respecting pareto efficiency then i show that optimal policy in this generalized model calibrated to the survey evidence and u s microdata is capable of quantitatively matching several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional model but widely endorsed in the survey and reality including the coexistence of substantial redistribution and limited tagging together these findings demonstrate the potential of a positive theory of optimal taxation

what happens when you tax the rich evidence from executive compensation this paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995 the data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income indeed this small group of executives may account for as much as 20 percent of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for approximately the one million richest taxpayers over this time period one person alone can account for more than 2 percent the decline however is almost entirely a short run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income the short run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share exceeds one in this sample but the elasticity after one year is at most 0 4 and probably closer to zero breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows that the large short run responses come almost entirely from a large inc

the case for a progressive tax from basic research to policy recommendations the fair distribution of the tax burden has long been a central issue in policyhe fair distribution of the tax burden has long been a central issue in policymaking a large academic literature has developed models of optimal tax making a large academic literature has developed models of optimal tax theory to cast light on the problem of optimal tax progressivity in this theory to cast light on the problem of optimal tax progressivity in this paper we explore the path from basic research results in optimal tax theory to paper we explore the path from basic research results in optimal tax theory to formulating policy recommendations formulating policy recommendations models in optimal tax theory typically posit that the tax system should maximize a models in optimal tax theory typically posit that the tax system should maximize a social welfare function subject to a government budget constraint taking into account social welfare function subject to a government budget constraint taking into account that individuals respond to taxes and transfers social welfare is larger when resources that individuals respond to taxes and transfers social welfare is larger when resources are more equally distributed but redistributive taxes and transfers can negatively are more equally distributed but redistributive taxes and transfers can negatively affect incentives to work save and earn income in the fi rst place this creates the clasaffect incentives to work save and earn income in the fi rst place this creates the classical trade off between equity and effi ciency which is at the core of the optimal income sical trade off between equity and effi ciency which is at the core of the optimal income tax problem in general optimal tax analyses maximize social welfare as a function of tax problem in general optimal tax analyses maximize social welfare as a function of individual utilities the sum of utilities in the utilitarian case the marginal weight for individual utilities the sum of utilities in the utilitarian case the marginal weight for a given person in the social welfare function measures the value of an additional dollar a given person in the social welfare function measures the value of an additional dollar of consumption expressed in terms of public funds such welfare weights depend on of consumption expressed in terms of public funds such welfare weights depend on the level of redistribution and are decreasing with income whenever society values the level of redistribution and are decreasing with income whenever society values more equality of income therefore optimal income tax theory is fi rst a normative more equality of income therefore optimal income tax theory is fi rst a normative theory that shows how a social welfare objective combines with constraints arising from theory that shows how a social welfare objective combines with constraints arising from limits on resources and behavioral responses to taxation in order to derive specifi c limits on resources and behavioral responses to taxation in order to derive specifi c

optimal taxation and human capital policies over the life cycle this paper derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a life cycle model with risky human capital the government faces asymmetric information regarding agents ability its evolution and labor supply when the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base and falls with age income contingent loans or a deferred deductibility scheme can implement the optimum numerical results suggest that full deductibility of expenses is close to optimal and that simple linear age dependent policies perform very well

the incredible shrinking elasticities married female labor supply 1978 2002 this paper demonstrates the extent to which married women s labor supply elasticities have changed over the past quarter century estimates from march current population survey data suggest that these elasticities have decreased substantially by 60 percent for the hours wage elasticity from 0 36 to 0 14 70 percent for the hours income elasticity from 0 053 to 0 015 95 percent for the participation wage elasticity from 0 66 to 0 03 and 60 percent for the participation income elasticity from 0 13 to 0 05 changing demographic characteristics explain little of the drop in these elasticities suggesting that preferences toward work have changed across birth cohorts

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

incentives information and organizational form we model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology here consisting of a collection of plants in our framework the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him we argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encouraging a good performance in particular we show that under certain assumptions the m form multi divisional form is likely to provide better incentives than the u form unitary form because it promotes yardstick competition i e relative performance evaluation more effectively we conclude by presenting evidence that the assumptions on which this comparison rests are satisfied for chinese data

project characteristics incentives and team production we develop a model to show how agency conflicts free rider effects and monitoring costs interact to affect optimal team size and workers incentive contracts team size increases with project risk decreases with profitability and decreases with monitoring costs as a proportion of output our predictions are consistent with empirical evidence that firm specific risk has increased over time average corporate earnings have declined and firms organizational structures have also flattened the predicted effects of monitoring costs on team size are supported by evidence that improvements in information technology likely to lower monitoring costs lead to larger teams further firms with relatively more intangible assets where monitoring costs are likely to be higher are smaller optimal incentive intensities decrease with risk and increase with profitability the endogenous determination of team size accentuates the positive effects of a decline in risk and an increase in profitability on incentives

recent trends in top income shares in the usa reconciling estimates from march cps and irs tax return data although the majority of research on us income inequality trends is based on public use march cps data a new wave of research using irs tax return data reports substantially higher levels of inequality and faster growing trends we show that these apparently inconsistent estimates are largely reconciled if the inequality measure and the income distribution are defined in the same way using internal cps data for 1967 2006 we closely match irs data based estimates of top income shares reported by piketty and saez 2003 our results imply that any inequality increases since 1993 are concentrated among the top 1 percent of the distribution

inequality and social discounting we explore steady state inequality in an intergenerational model with altruistically linked individuals who experience privately observed taste shocks when the welfare function depends only on the initial generation efficiency requires immiseration inequality grows without bound and everyone s consumption converges to zero we study other efficient allocations in which the welfare function values future generations directly placing a positive but vanishing weight on their welfare the social discount factor is then higher than the private one and for any such difference we find that consumption exhibits mean reversion and that a steady state cross sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists with no one trapped at misery

a leaky bucket in the real world estimating inequality aversion using survey data existing evidence of inequality aversion relies on data from class room experiments where subjects face hypothetical questions this paper estimates the magnitude of inequality aversion using representative survey data with questions related to the real economy situations the respondents face the results reveal that inequality aversion can be measured in a meaningful way using survey data but the magnitudes of the estimates depend dramatically on how inequality aversion is measured no matter how measured the revealed inequality aversion predicts opinions on a wide range of questions related to the welfare state such as the level of taxation tax progressivity and the structure of unemployment benefits

the elasticity of taxable income evidence and implications abstract a central tax policy parameter that has recently received much attention but about which there is substantial uncertainty is the overall elasticity of taxable income we provide new estimates of this elasticity which address identification problems with previous work by exploiting a long panel of tax returns to study a series of tax reforms throughout the 1980s this identification strategy also allows us to provide new evidence on both the income effects of tax changes on taxable income and on variation in the elasticity of taxable income by income group we find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is approximately 0 4 the elasticity of real income not including tax preferences is much lower we estimate small income effects of tax changes on reported income implying that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of taxable income are very similar we estimate that this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above 100 000 per year who have an elasticity of 0 57 while for those with incomes below 100 000 per year the elasticity is less than one third as large moreover high income taxpayers who itemize are particularly responsive to taxation our estimates suggest that optimal tax structures may feature tightly targeted transfers to lower income taxpayers and a flat or even declining marginal rate structure for middle and high income taxpayers

the effect of risk on the ceo market this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives under risk aversion and moral hazard each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed form equation in the presence of moral hazard assignment is distorted from positive assortative matching on firm size as firms with higher risk or disutility choose less talented ceos such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross section but economywide increases in risk or the disutility of being a ceo do not affect pay the strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion if the ceo can affect firm risk incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion we calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in ceo assignment jel g34 j33 this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives risk averse managers of different talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous firms which vary in their size risk and level of effort required the level of pay drives the assignment of talent to firms the strength of incentives induces the efficient effort level and is determined by an optimal contracting approach our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a ceo market equilibrium in a tractable manner a large empirical literature has shown that risk is a firstorder determinant of compensation contracts demsetz and lehn 1985 garen 1994 core and guay 1999 oyer and schaefer 2004 peters 2009 peters and wagner 2009 but most theories assume risk neutrality this assumption is

worker heterogeneity job screening and firm size a model of job screening is developed in which firms make wage offers to workers based on an imperfect evaluation of their abilities if large firms have higher costs of acquiring information about workers they screen workers with less accuracy and choose a wage compensation scheme different from the one small firms choose this generates the often observed positive correlation between firm size and wages the model also predicts that wage structure and perhaps wage dispersion will differ by firm size and that individuals who acquire more schooling will also choose to work in a larger firm these hypotheses are tested and supported using data from the national longitudinal survey

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic