is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping abstract given conditions of oligopolistic competition the coordinated ban of direct export promoting policies e g in the eu or by gatt increases the income of exporting countries however in the presence of environmental distortions free trade can lead to ecological dumping in exporting countries the question arises if free trade is still in the interest of exporting countries we show that welfare maximizing governments of exporting countries prefer free trade even if countries subsidize their local industries indirectly via ecological dumping the existence of further national policy instruments does not make free trade agreements obsolete

putting free riding to work a partnership solution to the common property problem the common property problem results in excessive mining hunting and extraction of oil and water the same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in r d and excessive outlays in rent seeking contests we propose a partnership solution to eliminate or at least mitigate these excesses each of n players joins a partnership in the first stage and chooses his effort in the second stage under the rules of a partnership each member must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of the partnership s revenue the incentive to free ride created by such partnerships turns out to be beneficial since it naturally offsets the excessive effort inherent in such problems in our two stage game this institutional arrangement can under specified circumstances induce the social optimum in a subgame perfect equilibrium no one has a unilateral incentive 1 to switch to another partnership or create a new partnership in the first stage or 2 to deviate from socially optimal actions in the second stage the game may have other subgame perfect equilibria but the one associated with the partnership solution is strictly preferred by every player we also propose a modification of the first stage which generates a unique subgame perfect equilibrium antitrust authorities should recognize that partnerships can have a less benign use by organizing as competing partnerships an industry can reduce the excessive output of cournot oligopoly to the monopoly level since no partner has any incentive to overproduce in the current period there is no need to deter cheating with threats of future punishments

market contagion evidence from the panics of 1854 and 1857 to test a model of contagion where individuals hear some bad news and communicate it to their acquaintances who then pass it on leading to a market panic requires a knowledge of the information networks of participants something hitherto unavailable for two panics in the 1850s this paper examines the behavior of irish depositors in a new york bank as recent immigrants their social network was determined largely by their place of origin in ireland and where they lived in new york during both panics this social network turns out to be the prime determinant of behavior

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

estimating the open market desk s daily reaction function this paper presents the results of an empirical investigation into the proximate determinants of the federal reserve s daily open market operations using information available each morning at the fed conference call the author models the open market desk s choice of both the quantity and the type of operation using a friction model for the former and a multinomial logit framework for the latter different types of operations are shown to send different signals to the market about the underlying thrust of fed policy and open market operations in recent years are shown to have become increasingly keyed to the federal funds rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

how robust are popular models of nominal frictions this paper analyzes three popular models of nominal price and wage frictions to determine which best ts post war u s data we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model and use maximum likelihood to estimate each model s parameters because previous research nds that the conduct of monetary policy and the behavior of in ation changed in the early 1980s we examine two distinct sample periods using a bayesian pseudo odds measure as a means for comparison a sticky price and wage model with dynamic indexation best ts the data in the early sample period whereas either a sticky price and wage model with static indexation or a sticky information model best ts the data in the late sample period our results suggest that price and wage setting behavior may be sensitive to changes in the monetary policy regime if true the evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules may be even more complicated than previously believed

agglomeration adjustment and state policies in the location of foreign direct investment in the united states abstract using u s state level data we show that agglomeration externalities influence the level of foreign invested capital in a location our empirical model allows the separation of agglomeration effects from the rate of capital stock adjustment two forces that previous research has conflated we estimate an agglomeration elasticity of investment of 0 11 to 0 15 with respect to same source country investment lower than previous estimates we also investigate the influence of state policies and find that although general investment incentives do not affect the location of fdi targeted policies such as unitary taxation and state foreign offices influence investment

the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games abstract we establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent seeking contests innovation tournaments and patent race games the results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities and to apply theorems and results intended for rent seeking games to other games and vice versa we conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results

geography industrial organization and agglomeration this paper makes two contributions to the empirical literature on agglomeration economies first the paper uses a unique and rich database in conjunction with mapping software to measure the geographic extent of agglomerative externalities previous papers have been forced to assume that agglomeration economies are club goods that operate at a metropolitan scale second the paper tests for the existence of organizational agglomeration economies of the kind studied qualitatively by saxenian 1994 this is a potentially important source of increasing returns that previous empirical work has not considered results indicate that localization economies attenuate rapidly and that industrial organization affects the benefits of agglomeration

technology shocks structural breaks and the effects on the business cycle abstract it is shown that time series of us productivity and hours are apparently affected by a structural break in the late 60s moreover the importance of technology shocks over the business cycle has sharply decreased after the break

permanent and transitory policy shocks in an empirical macro model with asymmetric information abstract an empirical model that allows for shifts in the inflation target and imperfect policy credibility is estimated imperfect credibility defined by differences between the perceived and actual inflation target obtains because private agents cannot correctly distinguish between permanent target shocks and transitory funds rate shocks learning affects responses to structural shocks important features include the absence of a price puzzle permanent nominal effects of aggregate supply shocks due to partial policy accommodation and the ability to examine responses to a permanent target change and expectations shocks perceptions of permanent target shocks explain sizable movements in bond yields and inflation

interdependence in multinational production networks the majority of multinational firms today operate a multilateral production network most existing empirical analyses have however focused on firms choice between producing at home and investing overseas and assumed that a firm s decision to invest in a foreign country is independent of its locations in third countries this paper examines the effect of existing production network on multinationals entry decision using detailed french multinational subsidiary level data the paper finds strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interdependence across multinationals foreign production locations there is however little evidence of horizontal interdependence between home country production and foreign investment when the third country effects are taken into account constituting a sharp contrast to the conventional emphasis this result is robust to the various specifications and sensitivity analyses undertaken in the paper and highlights the importance of investigating the causes and effects of foreign direct investment in the context of multinational production network

tightening environmental standards the benefit cost or the no cost paradigm ms ff ichael porter and claas van der linde have written a paper that is interesting and to us at least somewhat astonishing it is a defense of environmental regulation indeed an invitation to more stringent regulation that makes essentially no reference to the social benefits of such regulation this approach contrasts starkly with the methods that economists and other policy analysts have traditionally used when assessing environmental or other regulatory programs the traditional approach consists of comparing the beneficial effects of regulation with the costs that must be borne to secure these benefits for environmental regulation the social benefits include the reductions in morbidity or premature mortality that can accompany cleaner air the enhanced recreational opportunities that can result from water quality improvements the increased land values that might attend the cleanup of a hazardous waste site the enhanced vitality of aquatic ecosystems that might follow reductions in agricultural pesticide use or any of the other potentially significant benefits associated with tighter standards from this benefit cost approach emerges the standard tradeoff discussed in virtually every economics textbook porter and van der linde deny the validity of this approach to the analysis of environmental regulation claiming it to be an artifact of what they see as a static mindset in their view economists have failed to appreciate the capacity of

rent seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts the objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive tullock s standard rent seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts a positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest because a contender s private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent seeking model the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is a priori ambiguous it is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful excessive aggregate efforts

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

high and volatile real interest rates where does the fed fit in the federal reserve s new procedures for the conduct of monetary policy introduced on october 6 1979 have been the subject not only of considerable academic and political interest but also of intense debate b friedman 1982 roley 1982 walsh 1982 1984 mascaro and meltzer 1983 among others the fed s new operating procedures generally are perceived to have resulted in abnormally high and volatile real interest rates and thus to have contributed to if not been totally responsible for the deepest recession in postwar history in this paper we address the following question was the advent of the increased volatility and level of the real rate of interest concurrent with the fed s october 1979 change in operating procedures that is was the real rate of interest high and more volatile immediately after the october 1979 change in policy procedures in which case we might infer a connection between the fed s change in policy procedures and the increased volatility and level of the real rate or did the real rate become high and more volatile some time following the policy change which might lead us to conclude that the increased volatility and the increased level of the real rate was connected to some other event s occurring after the october 1979 policy change

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

tax incidence under imperfect competition comment abstract delipalla and o donnell 2001 contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem taxes in a conjectural variation oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms the formula is incorrect we derive the correct formula and provide a discussion of the error and its implications for empirical studies of pass through

the new econometrics of structural change dating breaks in u s labor productivity we have seen the emergence of three major innovations in the econometrics of structural change in the past fifteen years 1 tests for a structural break of unknown timing 2 estimation of the timing of a structural break and 3 tests to distinguish unit roots from broken time trends these three innovations have dramatically altered the face of applied time series econometrics in this paper we review these three innovations and illustrate their application through an empirical assessment of u s labor productivity in the manufacturing durables sector

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

monetary policy rules based on real time data this paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules using taylor s rule as an example i demonstrate that real time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data further estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the federal reserve in real time these results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules

policy regime changes judgment and taylor rules in the greenspan era this paper investigates policy deviations from linear taylor rules motivated by the risk management approach followed by the fed during the greenspan era we estimate a nonlinear monetary policy rule via a logistic smoothing transition regression model where policy makers judgment proxied by economically meaningful variables drives the transition across policy regimes we find that ignoring judgment induced nonlinearities while estimating taylor rules has remarkable costs in terms of fit above 250 bps in 10 quarters although linear taylor rules describe well the broad contours of monetary policy they fail to detect relevant policy decisions driven by policy makers judgment

understanding preferences for income redistribution abstract recent research suggests that income redistribution preferences vary across identity groups we employ statistical learning methods that emphasize pattern recognition classification and regression trees cart and random forests randomforests to uncover what these groups are using data from the general social survey we find that out of a large set of identity markers only race gender age and socioeconomic class are important classifiers for income redistribution preferences further the uncovered identity groupings are characterized by complex patterns of interaction amongst these salient classifiers we explore the extent to which existing theories of income redistribution can explain our results but conclude that current approaches do not fully explain the findings

export orientation and domestic merger policy theory and some empirical evidence abstract recent open economy industrial organization literature finds export orientation enhances the weight of post merger international competitive gains favouring lenient domestic merger policy however mergers seldom generate the significant synergies supportive of international competitive gains since a joint economies of production effect suggests domestic mergers tend to generate international competitive losses not gains export orientation favours strict not lenient domestic merger policy we show how non synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger reviews a panel data set of u s merger policy by manufacturing sector 1990 2001 empirically supports export orientation leading to strict merger policy jel classification l40 f10

bad luck bad policy and learning a markov switching approach to understanding postwar u s macroeconomic dynamics abstract this paper evaluates the role of monetary policy in understanding the u s post war macroeconomic fluctuations we construct a medium size dsge model in which the central bank through a real time learning process can make mistakes in estimating key elasticities between macroeconomic aggregates and the central banks objectives may change over time the model also features time varying volatilities of non policy shocks we find that misperceptions of the persistence of inflation and the slope of the phillips curve could affect optimal monetary policy decision making therefore their accurate prediction is key for achieving successful monetary policy outcomes in addition we argue that the monetary policy shift geared toward inflation stabilization in the late 1970s changed the composition of output making the marginal efficiency of investment shock that proxies for the functioning of the financial sector the most important contributor to the business cycle

a model for the federal funds rate target this paper is a statistical analysis of the manner in which the federal reserve determines the level of the federal funds rate target one of the most publicized and anticipated economic indicators in the financial world the paper introduces new statistical tools for forecasting a discrete valued time series such as the target and suggests that these methods in conjunction with a focus on the institutional details of how the target is determined can significantly improve on standard vector autoregression forecasts of the effective federal funds rate we further show that the news that the fed has changed the target has statistical content substantially different from the news that the fed failed to make an anticipated target change causing us to challenge some of the conclusions drawn from standard linear var impulse response functions

comparative economic performance of conventional and profit sharing firms abstract this paper compares the various economic properties of conventional firms and profit sharing firms the properties contrasted include wage level employment output price total economic rents and industry efficiency the firms operate in an oligopolistic industry with a labor union in general profit sharing firms outperform non sharing firms however there exist counterexamples in which non sharing firms can outperform sharing firms to test the robustness of the results the analysis is conducted for a variety of oligopolistic industries quantity setting pricesetting and joint collusion

the structure of a contract and the theory of a non exclusive resource the process of arriving at a useful concept of analysis is not only slow and painful but also may go astray and attain nothing useful someone begins with one example or observation followed by a theory which is intuitively plausible a theoretical term associated with a vague concept is coined examples of a seemingly different type emerge which call for another theory the process goes on as examples and theories continue to accumulate the different categories under the same heading of analysis serve only to confuse and each associated theory becomes ad hoc such has been the fate of the concept of externality a more useful approach i think is via contractual conditions the example chosen for illustration is marine fisheries where the fishing right is taken

multiple regimes in u s monetary policy a nonparametric approach we use two different nonparametric methods to determine whether there were multiple regimes in u s monetary policy over the period 1955 2003 we model monetary policy using two different versions of taylor s rule for the nominal interest rate target by contrast with parametric tests for regime changes the nonparametric methods we use allow the data to determine the dimensions on which to split the sample for purposes of estimating the coefficients of the taylor rule we find evidence for a few structural breaks and consistent agreement between our two nonparametric methods on the dating of those breaks

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia abstract numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate the conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks however such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than 3 months which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates the illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face

agreeing on efficient emissions reduction we propose a simple contest based mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infringing upon productive efficiency participation in the most stylized form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed the scheme balances its budget and requires no principal in a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version which could potentially inform policy decisions we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive that can serve as an effective rationale for the gradual formation of international environmental agreements

a free lunch in the commons we derive conditions under which raising costs through a regulatory constraint or a fully expropriated tax can increase the profits arising from a common pool resource the basic model assumes a fixed number of identical agents with linear costs selling in a single period at an exogenous price a necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to be profitable is that aggregate output from the resource be locally convex in aggregate effort we also show that cost increases can be profitable even if price is endogenous agents are heterogeneous entry is costless or agents are playing a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game we also discuss more general welfare implications of the result along with its relation to existing results for a cournot oligopoly

cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions we model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non linear stock dependent costs we propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase thereby supporting cooperation under the widest set of conditions we show under what set of parameter values for the discount rate resource growth rate harvest price and the number of resource users this strategy supports cooperation in the commons as a subgame perfect equilibrium the strategy profile that we propose which involves harsh punishment after a defection followed by forgiveness is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies

lechatelier samuelson principle in games and pass through of shocks abstract the lechatelier samuelson principle states that as a reaction to a shock an agent s short run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long run adjustment when the agent can also adjust other related actions we extend the principle to strategic environments where the long run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies we show that the principle holds for supermodular games strategic complements satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes heterogeneity we discuss the principle s implications for cost pass through of multiproduct firms

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure abstract emission taxes and abatement subsidies are considered to be efficient measures for environment protection the purpose of this paper is to quantify their effects on industry output firm output and on the number of firms in the industry three types of market structure are under discussion perfect competition oligopoly and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe it turns out that emission taxes and abatement subsidies affect the structure of the polluting industry in opposite ways while the effects on industry s emissions are similar in direction but different

when are nash equilibria independent of the distribution of agents characteristics author s bergstrom ted varian hal r abstract we present examples of nash equilibria that do not vary with the distribution of a parameter across agents and then offer a general theorem that characterizes this independence

strategic groups and rent dissipation we consider a rent seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays we examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation we show the following when just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking however when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking jel