planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

measuring welfare from ambulatory surgery centers a spatial analysis of demand for healthcare facilities this paper studies competition between healthcare facilities particularly between hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers asc s in the market for outpatient surgery the goal is to answer questions about the existence and magnitude of welfare gains earned from the use of asc s these questions are relevant to current policy debates about the usefulness of asc s i calculate welfare by specifying a multinomial logit model of consumer demand for healthcare facilities and estimating structural elements of demand functions total elimination of asc s results in between 10 2 and 28 1 minutes of welfare loss per patient surgery

optimal social insurance with linear income taxation we study optimal social insurance aimed at insuring disability risk in the presence of linear income taxation optimal disability insurance benefits rise with previous earnings optimal insurance is incomplete even though disability risks are exogenous and verifiable so that moral hazard in disability insurance is absent imperfect insurance is optimal because it encourages workers to insure themselves against disability by working and saving more thereby alleviating the distortionary impact of the redistributive income tax on labor supply and savings

the optimal linear income tax revisited abstract this paper shows that the mirrlees seade conditions of agent monotonicity and noninferiority of leisure imply the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax rate in sheshinski s model of linear income taxation as well as in the general model the optimal marginal tax rate is bounded above by the rawlsian rate which in turn is bounded by the revenue maximizing rate the optimal marginal tax rate may be arbitrarily close to the rawlsian rate however the optimal marginal tax rate is bounded away from the revenue maximizing rate whenever the individual with the lowest ability works

ex post redistribution in a federation implications for corrective policy abstract this paper analyzes whether changes in the timing of equalizing transfers to state governments necessitate an adjustment in federal corrective policy according to the existing literature assuming an ex ante choice of transfers the corrective grant is equal to the marginal damage benefit inflicted by externality generation when the federal government accommodates state finances ex post the grant differs in formula from existing prescription allocative federal policy corrects state policy incentives twofold it entails a correction for the distortion in the marginal benefit of state spending as in earlier literature and for the distortion in the marginal cost of public funds induced by the ex post provision of transfers the required grant rule is generically disproportionate to the equilibrium externality even with lump sum taxation furthermore the ex post provision of transfers is critical for the nature of the equilibrium inefficiency equalizing transfers at least partly internalize consumption spill overs but simultaneously establishes a new source of inefficiency as a final result the existing prescription for allocative federal policy continues to apply if the public good is pure

optimized quantity within distance models of spatial welfare heterogeneity abstract spatial welfare heterogeneity is frequently modeled within stated preference analysis as a function of discrete or continuous distance between households and affected resources a common example is distance decay analysis although distance based models such as these are easily estimated the ubiquity of this paradigm can lead to analyses that overlook other forms of analysis with equal or greater relevance this paper develops an alternative approach to spatial heterogeneity in stated preference willingness to pay wtp based on the quantity or area of an affected resource surrounding each respondent at an optimized distance band or radius with distance bands optimized using a grid search algorithm that maximizes model likelihood methods and results are illustrated using a choice experiment on riparian land restoration in maine usa the resulting quantity within distance model identifies systematic spatial patterns that are undetectable using distance based analysis and directly relevant for welfare analysis

competition and the ratchet effect in labor markets the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or by cutting pay we model this effect as a multiperiod principal agent problem with hidden information and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally consistent with our theoretical model we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition which are nearly eliminated when competition is introduced this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers

equity and the time consistent taxation of income in a theoretical model the share of intraindustry trade in an industry s bilateral trade flows is determined by relative factor prices in the trading countries factor intensity and the elasticity of substitution in demand between products in the industry the more similar the relative factor prices in different countries the less extreme the factor intensity while the lower the elasticity of substitution between the products in an industry the larger the intraindustry trade the empirical study confirms these implications furthermore tariffs and transport costs are shown to have a greater negative effect on intraindustry trade copyright 1991 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

privacy and time consistent optimal labor income taxation abstract incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems in the context of time consistent optimal labor income taxation privacy can lead to a pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy

an upper bound on optimal income taxes abstract the message of this paper is very simple a certain range of tax rates determined by supply and demand functions only can be disregarded in linear optimal taxation approaches before any interpersonal utility comparisons are made in particular no marginal tax rate above a certain level can be optimal with respect to pareto inclusive social orderings it is shown that is in general not larger than and sometimes strictly less than the minimal tax rate at which tax revenues are maximal conditions under which is the least upper bound are given and a comparison is made with tax rates obtained by the rawlsian maximin principle

dynamic optimal income taxation with government commitment abstract we analyze the optimal income tax problem when consumers work for many periods can information about abilities learned in one period be used later to attain more redistribution than is possible in a one period world when the government can commit to future policies and has the same discount rate as individuals intertemporal nonstationarity of tax schedules can lead to pareto improvements by relaxing lifetime self selection constraints analogous to randomization in a one period world more significant use of information is possible when the social discount rate is less than individuals rates the taxes converge over time to a nondistortionary schedule

the game form approach to redistribution this paper reviews the game form approach to redistributive policies this approach provides a justiucation for studying tax systems as good institutional arrangements for reallocating resources in a heterogeneous society after situating the problem of asymmetric information for public policy the paper provides a short overview of the main concepts and results in implementation theory next these tools are used to inquire about the possibility to decentralise the reallocation of resources in a production economy with the help of tax transfer systems finally the paper deals with some recent extensions of the theory a simple example is used throughout to illustrate the different results

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the us medical care market summary managed care health insurers in the usa restrict their enrollees choice of hospitals to within specific networks this paper considers the implications of these restrictions a three step econometric model is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer the results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing plans a welfare analysis assuming fixed prices implies that restricting consumers choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately 1 billion per year across the 43 us markets considered this figure may be outweighed by the price reductions generated by the restriction copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

union strategy and optimal direct taxation restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state we show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of mirrlees 1971 our results also apply to non welfarist states which have income redistribution but not in purely extortionary states

assessing competition in hospital care markets the importance of accounting for quality differentiation quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry where the choices of medicare patients are unaffected by prices unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market i estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both distance and quality are substantial the estimates suggest that patients do not substitute toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market shares implying that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital competitiveness

a comparison of tax bases for a personal tax tax bases for a personal tax are compared in this paper it is found that the potential welfare gains of moving from a linear affine tax on labor earnings to a linear affine tax on wage rates seem to be larger than the potential gains of moving from a head tax to an earnings tax it is also shown that for the common optimal taxation model utility levels and ability as measured by wage rates are inversely related at the first best optimum a development of the model so that a positive relationship between utility and ability results is suggested

hospital competition in hmo networks abstract we develop a framework for analyzing bargaining relationships between hospitals and hmos under selective contracting using a unique dataset on hospitals in the los angeles area from 1990 to 1993 we estimate the determinants of actual negotiated prices paid to hospitals by two major hmos we find that a hospital s bargaining power and thus its price decrease when the hmo can readily turn to alternative networks that exclude the hospital we simulate the effect of hypothetical hospital mergers on bargaining power and find that some hospital mergers even in urban areas with many nearby hospitals can lead to significant price increases

the target incentive system vs the price incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect abstract in a dynamic adverse selection type of principal agent relationship where the principal is committed over time to a particular incentive system with fixed structure but variable parameters but not to any intertemporal incentive scheme with both fixed structure and parameters the ratchet effect arises but varies with different incentive systems we show that compared with using prices as the sole planning mode the principal can attenuate the ratchet effect by stipulating targets as well as a result the target incentive system entails higher expected welfare than the price incentive system in a perfect bayesian equilibrium

the optimal linear income tax a diagrammatic analysis abstract this paper clarifies the role of the tax possibility frontier and the social indifference curve in the comparative statics analysis of the optimal linear income tax by a mostly diagrammatic derivation of the results we confirm the conventional conjecture that the optimal marginal tax rate increases with the government s inequality aversion on the other hand we cannot always confirm analytically the conventional conjecture that the optimal marginal tax rate increases with the government s budgetary needs

recreation demand models with taste differences over people we estimate random parameter logit models of anglers choice of fishing site the models generalize logit by allowing coefficients to vary randomly over anglers rather than being fixed the models do not exhibit the restrictive independence from irrelevant alternatives property of logit and can represent any substitution pattern estimation explicitly accounts for the fact that the variation in coefficients over anglers induces correlation in unobserved utility over trips by the same angler willingness to pay for improved fish stock and the value to anglers of specific sites are calculated from the models and compared with the estimates obtained from a standard logit model

dynamic income taxation redistribution and the ratchet effect abstract in this paper we extend the classic optimum linear income tax model to a twice repeated game a utilitarian policy maker decides on the second period tax system on the basis of observed first period behaviour we summarise our findings as follows first the static optimal linear tax results cannot be expected to hold in a dynamic setting second more productive households are likely to mimic the behaviour of less productive households third the optimal dynamic first period tax rate might be negative then income is redistributed from low to high income households fourth if the utility function is well behaved then the optimal dynamic first period tax rate is lower than the optimal static tax rate fifth if the optimal static tax rate separates then the dynamic and the static optimal tax rates coincide sixth if a zero tax rate separates then the optimal dynamic tax rate is positive

the dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect this paper provides a simple model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect as in shleifer and vishny 1993 we consider the sale of government property entry permit by government officials as the prototype of corruption activities in a dynamic version of the shleifer vishny model corrupt officials have ex post the incentive to price discriminate entrepreneurs based on the entry decisions made in an earlier period we show that the inability of government officials to commit to future money demands induces the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs have incentives to delay entry in order to receive a discount in the permit price later the ex post opportunism erodes the official s extortion power and reduces his revenues from selling permits even though the dynamic setting leaves the corrupt official with less extortion power we cannot rule out the possibility that the official s ability to apply dynamic discrimination decreases the intertemporal aggregate social welfare we also explore the effect of the official s tenure stability on the extent of corruption this allows us to identify circumstances under which the often observed practice of job rotation can help mitigate corruption