pocketbook voting social preferences and expressive motives in referenda we develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self interest social preferences and expressive motives our model implies that if pocketbook benefits are relevant voters either perceive their impact on the outcome to be non negligible or expressive motivations do not play a role in the decision on how to vote conversely if own pocketbook benefits do not explain voting then voting is expressive if the perceived probability of being pivotal is non negligible social preferences and expressive concerns are observationally equivalent our empirical analysis studies collective choices which are analogous to decisions on local public goods we consider referenda among university students on whether to collectively purchase deeply discounted flat rate tickets for public transportation and cultural amenities individual usage data allow quantifying the monetary benefits associated with each ticket as voters had precise information on the individual costs and benefits our setting comprises a real world laboratory of direct democracy we find that monetary benefits strongly influence participation and voting however social or expressive motives such as stated altruism environmental concerns and paternalism are decisive for a significant minority our results rule out purely expressive voting and imply that a substantial share of the electorate perceived their impact on the outcome to be non negligible

how words and money cultivate a personal vote the effect of legislator credit claiming on constituent credit allocation the district affect how constituents allocate credit legislators use credit claiming messages to influence the expenditures they receive credit for and to affect how closely they are associated with spending in the district constituents are responsive to credit claiming messages they build more support than other nonpartisan messages but contrary to expectations from other studies constituents are more responsive to the total number of messages sent rather than the amount claimed our results have broad implications for political representation the personal vote and the study of u s congressional elections p articularistic spending a large literature argues cultivates a personal vote for incumbents cain ferejohn and fiorina 1987 ferejohn 1974 lazarusandreiley2010 levittandsnyder1997 mayhew 1974 to build this support legislators are assumed to direct projects and programs to their districts constituents in turn are thought to reward their legislator for the level of federal spending in the district levitt and snyder 1997 str omberg 2004 or the

surge and decline negative voting and the midterm loss phenomenon a simultaneous choice analysis campbell s surge and decline and kernell s negative voting theories have been employed most frequently by researchers who seek to explain the invariable pattern of administration party vote loss in midterm house elections despite the original emphasis placed on voting as the act of selecting jointly from among the three options of abstention democratic choice or republican choice all efforts to corroborate the theories have inappropriately treated the decisions of whether and how to vote as independent questions for investigation applying the more suitable technique of nested multinomial logit analysis i find little support for negative voting s two key contentions that negative presidential evaluations hurt white house party candidates more than positive appraisals help or that the president s backers have disproportionately low turnout however a rational basis for abstention emerges that differs from the one postulated by negative voting in contrast on year defections to presidential party candidates by regular voters who normally favor the opposition do seem a cause of the biennial electoral cycle as surge and decline indeed would have us to believe

bridging the gaps credits adoption and inequality we examine here the role of credits on technology adoption and inequality from the perspective of developing countries utilizing a model of exogenous growth with heterogeneous labor and technical progress embodied in physical capital we find that credits can contribute to a faster adoption and to reducing income inequality thus a virtuous cycle of credits a shorter technological gap less inequality and economic growth is feasible to be created when there is full liquidity in the market when credits are constrained the cycle loses virtuosity where the economy can lose up to two points in growth due to credit constraints

equal votes equal money court ordered redistricting and the distribution ofpublic expenditures in the american states a study of the effects of legislative re districting in the states during the 1960 s also contains data file

coordination moderation and institutional balancing in american presidential and house elections outcome in the theoretical equilibrium the proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the house with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes moderation has usually been based on voters expectations that the president will be at least an equal of the house in determining postelection policy d o americans coordinate their votes for president and for congress suppose a voter knows that policy outcomes are compromises between the positions taken by the president and congress and believes the two political parties push for distinct policy alternatives then the voter believes that different combinations of party control of the presidency and congress will produce different policy outcomes if the voter cares about the policy outcomes then the voter s choices among candidates should depend on the combination of party control the choices will help bring

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

growth accounting with investment specific technological progress a discussion of two approaches two approaches taken to the embodiment question are compared and discussed quantitative theory and traditional growth accounting the two approaches give very different estimates for the contribution of investment specific technological advance to economic growth therefore the approach taken matters it is argued that the measures used in traditional growth accounting to gauge the importance of investment specific technological progress have little economic content unlike the measure obtained from quantitative theory

academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying abstract in this paper we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities to motivate our empirical work we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a house appropriations committee hac or senate appropriations committee sac member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented in addition using instrumental variables estimations we show that universities without hac or sac representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero however for universities with hac or sac representation a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2 8 percent or 3 5 percent increase in earmarks respectively this suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the hac or sac but little or no return if not

buying negative agenda control in the u s house we explore the foundations of the legislative party cartel as theorized by cox and mccubbins 1993 2005 to determine how majority party moderates who suffer net policy losses from the majority leadership s use of negative agenda control are kept from defecting from the cartel arrangement first we identify formally the group of majority party members who are net policy losers we find that those members occupying the initial 30 of the space within the majority party blockout zone that space closest to the floor median are hurt on a pure policy basis by the cartel arrangement second we find that members in this 30 zone are rewarded disproportionately by majority party leaders relative to members in other intervals on the same side of the floor median via side payments in the form of campaign contributions in addition majority party members within the 30 zone receive side payments commensurate with their particular policy loss

coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game we examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions and legislators preferences are separable over the two dimensions in equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately the equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator as defined over the ideological dimension in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made moreover in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved we show that legislators can gain from forming political parties and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties we discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome

government subsidies and presidential election outcomes evidence for a developing country summary we explore the effects of government subsidies on presidential elections in chile in 1989 99 we use a panel with three periods the elections of 1989 1993 and 1999 and 229 counties we correct for the potential simultaneity problem deriving from the fact that an incumbent facing a difficult political scenario might react by increasing subsidies to improve his her electoral performance our results indicate that the greater the coverage of these types of programs i e the percentage of people receiving subsidies the higher the votes for the incumbent

granting votes exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within between specification for panel data instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors political goals this study uses a unique panel dataset on more than 500 croatian municipalities over a 12 year period to uncover the extent to which grant distribution is biased owing to grantors electoral concerns instead of the default fixed effects approach to modelling panel data we apply a novel within between specification aimed at uncovering the contextual source of variation focusing on the effects of electoral concerns on grant allocation within and between municipalities we find evidence of a substantial political bias in grant allocations both within and between municipalities particularly when it comes to local level electoral concerns the paper offers researchers a new perspective when tackling the issue of politically biased grant allocation using panel data particularly when they wish to uncover the simultaneous impact of time variant and time invariant factors or when they cannot apply a quasi experimental approach because of specific institutional contexts

senate representation and coalition building in distributive politics p7 vhe senate s equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics the great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal fttnds than others but all senators have equal voting weight as a result even though all senators votes are of equal value to the coalition builder they are not of equal prwice coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states building on formal models of coalition building two hypotheses are developed and tested first coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently second the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small state senators than large state senators the hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997 98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs the findings support both hypotheses

comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies the role of legislative committee structure abstract this paper analyzes the impact of legislative committee structure on policy outcomes comparing a tax committee enacting tax expenditures and a decentralized system of specialized committees undertaking direct spending an endogenous commodity taxation framework is combined with models of legislative bargaining and committee voting the main conclusion is that the tax committee structure gives rise to lower subsidy levels under a wide range of circumstances however it is only under a more restrictive set of assumptions that social welfare is higher in the tax committee regime this theoretical analysis is illustrated by two examples of institutional change in congress

parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects abstract local public goods financed from a national tax base provide concentrated benefits to recipient jurisdictions but disperse costs creating incentives for legislators to increase own district spending but to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax costs while these common pool incentives underpin a variety of theoretical analyses which tend to predict inefficiencies in the allocation of public goods there is little direct evidence that individual legislators respond to such incentives to test for reactions to such incentives this paper analyzes 1998 congressional votes over transportation project funding the empirical results provide evidence that legislators respond to common pool incentives the probability of supporting the projects is increasing in own district spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending having found that legislators do respond to such incentives i use the parameter estimates to calculate the efficient level of public goods which suggest over spending in aggregate especially in politically powerful districts and large associated deadweight loss

a note on renegotiation in repeated bertrand duopolies weak renegotiation proofness ww singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated bertrand duopoly we show that with a discrete strategy space wrp does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome c 2006 elsevier b v all rights reserved

on the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments a couple of months before the swedish election in 1998 the incumbent government distributed 2 3 billion sek to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities this was the first wave of a four year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development this temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government in this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants we find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes in particular we find strong support for the lindbeck weibull dixit londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters this result is statistically as well as economically significant we do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters

inequality leverage and crises the paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution empirically the periods 1920 1929 and 1983 2007 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich a large increase in leverage for the remainder and an eventual financial and real crisis the paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes a financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction but restoration of the lower income group s bargaining power is more effective

the marginals never vanished incumbency and competition in elections to the u s house of representatives 1952 82 the average vote margin enjoyed by incumbent candidates for the u s house of representatives increased sharply during the 1 960s despite this and contrary to assumptions common in the literature on recent congressional elections electoral data show that house incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s the marginals properly defined have not vanished the swing ratio has diminished little if at all and competition for house seats held by incumbents has not declined vote margins increased without adding to incumbent security diminishing competition or dampening swings because the heterogeneity of interelection vote swings increased at the same time

price and investment dynamics theory and plant level data we construct a model of a firm competing for market share in a customer market and making investments in physical capital the firm is financially constrained and there are implementation lags in investment our model predicts that product prices should depend on costs and competitors prices but respond weakly to demand shocks also prices should be strongly related to investment we estimate price and investment equations on panel data for swedish manufacturing plants and find results that are qualitatively in line with these predictions though the relation between investment and prices is stronger than predicted by our model

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

party government and the cohesive power of public plunder we argue that party government in the u s house of representatives rests on two pillars the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the house is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor in the process it creates policy losers among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes we posit that the majority party creates an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer we evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of roll rates in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983 96 we find that within the majority party policy losers are favored in the distribution of pork barrel spending throughout this period

building majority coalitions for sub majority benefit distributions this paper poses a deceptively simple question it asks how can a program or group of programs that provides distributive benefits to recipients in a minority of legislative districts be passed by a majority of a legislative body the answer in the existing body of work on distributive policymaking would suggest that supporters of narrowly focused programs are able to ensure passage of their pet projects by logrolling with other legislators we argue that logrolling is not always necessary to produce majority support for narrowly focused programs the paper considers three institutional mechanisms for building majority support for sub majority benefit distributions political parties interest groups and administrative agencies the conditions that would be required for each mechanism to be employed are outlined descriptive data from the 100th congress are employed to reflect on the relative plausibility of each of the mechanisms with respect to the question of how a program that provides distributive benefits to recipients in a minority of legislative districts can be passed by a majority of a legislative body we reject the first mechanism the party based explanation on the grounds that it is empirically implausible at least in the american case the other two we argue are empirically plausible under certain conditions

do voters demand responsive governments evidence from indian disaster relief abstract using rainfall public relief and election data from india we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses the data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control however fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters we also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election in accordance with these electoral incentives governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years these results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes

do conditional cash transfers affect electoral behavior evidence from a randomized experiment in mexico this article reexamines the argument that targeted programs increase pro incumbent voting by persuading beneficiaries to cast ballots against their first partisan choice the evidence comes from the randomized component of progresa the pioneering mexican conditional cash transfer cct program experimental data show that early enrollment in the program led to substantive increases in voter turnout and in the incumbent s vote share in the 2000 presidential election the experiment also reveals that opposition parties vote shares were unaffected by the program thus the electoral bonus generated by ccts may be best explained by a mobilizing rather than persuasive mechanism these findings are difficult to reconcile with the notion that the electoral effects of ccts are a result of prospective concerns triggered by threats of program discontinuation or endogenous program enrollment instead the evidence in this article suggests that ccts mobilizing effects are compatible with programmatic politics

media markets special interests and voters abstract this paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence i use the concentration of campaign contributions from political action committees to proxy for special interests capture of us senate candidates from 1980 to 2002 and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets in state media markets and out of state media markets unlike in state media markets out of state markets focus on neighboring states politics and elections thus if citizens punish political capture increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in state counties relative to the out of state counties where the candidate receives less coverage i find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0 5 to 1 5 percentage points in in state counties relative to the out of state counties robustness checks suggest that these results are not driven by omitted senator characteristics or by differences between in state and out of state counties along dimensions other than the media environment

legislative budget cycles recent literature suggests that electoral budget cycles are a phenomenon of new rather than established democracies what part of the democratization process explains the amelioration of the political budget cycle we argue the answer lies in part in the development of a strong party system we extend the classic rogoff siebert model to show that political budget cycles are possible in a legislative context with rational voters we then demonstrate that the development of a strong party system can restrain political budget cycles in a majoritarian electoral system finally we follow prior work in using vote share volatility as a measure of the institutionalization of the party system using newly collected vote share data for 433 elections for 90 democracies from 1980 2007 we calculate a measure of party institutionalization we then use this data to demonstrate that institutionalized party systems are associated with mitigated political budget cycles especially in majoritarian electoral systems

why should majority voting be unfair the common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling in theory it inequitably favors the proposer and paradoxically it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse in practice however outcomes are equitable the present paper analyzes data from a novel experimental design to identify the underlying social preferences our experiment compares one shot and indefinite horizon versions of random proposer majority bargaining the baron ferejohn game which allow us to disentangle behaviors compatible with altruism inequity aversion and reference dependent altruism most subjects are classified as reference dependent altruists around 10 are inequity averse subjects are egoistic when their payoff is below their reference point they become efficiency concerned when satisfied and the reference point is either the ex ante expectation or the opponent s payoff finally we successfully test rda out of sample on a number of distribution and bargaining games from three seminal social preference experiments

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

household debt and income inequality 1963 2003 i construct an economy with heterogeneous agents that mimics the time series behavior of the earnings distribution in the united states from 1963 to 2003 agents face aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and accumulate real and financial assets i estimate the shocks that drive the model using data on income inequality aggregate income and measures of financial liberalization i show how the model economy can replicate two empirical facts the trend and cyclical behavior of household debt and the diverging patterns in consumption and wealth inequality over time while business cycle fluctuations can account for the short run changes in household debt its prolonged rise of the 1980s and the 1990s can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in income inequality

the effects of congressional appropriation committee membership on the distribution of federal research funding to universities i introduction in 1994 members of the republican party pledged to seek legislation to impose term limits on members of congress this pledge stemmed from the popular belief that senior members of congress tend to promote personal interests or are more influenced by lobbying efforts that may not be representative of their constituents today term limits continue to be discussed but have not been enacted instead many members have focused their energies toward minimizing the time spent on any particular committee of congress believing that tenure on a committee is a more serious concern than simple tenure in congress implicit in these concerns is the issue whether as incumbent politicians plan to retire they will behave differently and if so whether tenure on a congressional committee exacerbates this behavior this article explores the role of membership on the appropriations committee on the distribution of federal research funding to universities specifically it explores whether funding is diverted to these universities because politicians use their position on a committee to promote personal or constituent interests previous research on shirking compares the voting records of politicians on certain issues with demographic and economic characteristics of the politicians constituents this article explores the issue of shirking differently i explore how membership on congressional appropriations committees affects the distribution of federal research funding to universities i look at two types of relationships between the members and the universities first i consider the relationship between members and the universities that are located in the members districts states in the case of senators second i examine the relationship between members and their undergraduate alma mater i use district representa tion to proxy favoritism that reflects a politician s constituents given that in most instances an alma mater affiliation is not the same as district representation i use alma mater affiliation to proxy favoritism that reflects the politician s personal interests federal research funding accounts for more than 60 of research funding received by research universities previous research has shown a positive impact of federal funding on research outcomes see adams and griliches 1998 arora and gambardella 1997 connolly 1997 payne and siow 2002 and payne 2001 except for payne and siow 2002 however these articles do not consider that political diversion of funds may promote or detract from research productivity as with any other federal program this article concentrates on the impact of membership on the house and senate appropriations committees because they wield the greatest power in the allocation of funding 1 using a panel data set spanning 26 years i explore how changes in the composition of the appropriations committees affects the distribution of research funding after controlling for the heterogeneity that exists across different universities the results suggest that both district representation and alma mater affiliation matter thus there is evidence of shirking for personal interests and evidence of members representing their constituents with respect to the representation of one s constituents the strongest results suggest that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities however only benefit from representation in the senate with respect to alma mater affiliations the results suggest again that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities also benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees the results also suggest that the tenure of the member on the committee matters as does whether the member is a part of the majority party in power in the congressional chamber

estimation of the depreciation rate of physical and r d capital in the u s total manufacturing sector i introduction numerous studies on production and cost the sources of productivity and endogenous growth have recognized the pivotal role of the physical capital stock studies at various levels of aggregation over assets and industries have emphasized the crucial role of investment in plant and equipment in the growth of demand and productive capacity it is clearly recognized by economists and policymakers that knowledge capital approximated by rd 1986 to measure the depreciation rates of the stock of rd 1980 in the literature on dynamic demand models such an approach was first adopted by epstein and denny 1980 and more recently by kollintzas and choi 1985 for a single capital good and on a theoretical level in bernstein and nadiri 1987a 1987b the paper is organized as follows the specification of the model is presented in section ii section iii is devoted to a discussion of the data and to the presentation of the parameter estimates of the model in section iv we present the empirical results for the depreciation rates for physical and r d capital and compare them with those reported in the literature we compare the physical capital stock estimates generated by our model with the official capital stock estimates produced by u s department of commerce bureau of economic analysis in this section we also present our estimates of the decomposition of gross investment into replacement and expansion investment for both physical and r d capital these decompositions are important from the vantage point of public policy analysis

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

how lasting is voter gratitude an analysis of the short and long term electoral returns to beneficial policy dominant theories of electoral behavior emphasize that voters myopically evaluate policy performance and that this shortsightednessmayobstructthewelfare improvingeffectofdemocraticaccountability however weknowlittleabouthow long governments receive electoral credit for beneficial policies we exploit the massive policy response to a major natural disaster the 2002 elbe flooding in germany to provide an upper bound for the short and long term electoral returns to targeted policy benefits we estimate that the flood response increased vote shares for the incumbent party by 7 percentage points in affected areas in the 2002 election twenty five percent of this short term reward carried over to the 2005 election before the gains vanished in the 2009 election we conclude that given favorable circumstances policy makers can generate voter gratitude that persists longer than scholarship has acknowledged so far and elaborate on the implications for theories of electoral behavior democratic accountability and public policy

coattail voting in recent presidential elections this article presents a method for analyzing the extent and strength of coattail voting in presidential elections this method allows the authors to estimate the magnitude of coattail voting and then to decompose this estimate into more basic elements estimates are given for presidential elections beginning with 1956 the determination of the coattail vote and its decomposition depend on the theory of the voting decision that is assumed in this article we present a model of vote determination that is similar in most respects to the traditional src model the vote for congressional representation in a presidential election year is determined jointly by partisan affiliation attitudes toward the presidential candidates and local forces unique to the congressional race such as may be captured by an incumbency variable this model permits the separate estimation of the strength of short term forces and of the efficiency of the presidential coattails application of the model to survey data since 1956 indicates that efficiency of presidential coattails has declined during this period furthermore the 1980 election does not appear to be an exception to this trend on the other hand there has not been any particular trend in the strength of short term forces during this period instead events peculiar to the context of a specific election generate short term forces at the level of the presidential election but the degree to which these forces are carried over to local races seems to have declined

politicians bureaucrats and targeted redistribution abstract the paper argues that for political reasons elected politicians are more likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution than appointed bureaucrats it uses the example of patronage jobs in the u s local governments to provide empirical support for this claim it shows that the number of public employees is higher for elected chief executives this difference is stronger in public services with bigger private public wage differential and it increases during election years it also finds that the number of public employees increases with the age of bureaucrats while there is no such relationship in the case of politicians which is consistent with younger bureaucrats having stronger career concerns

a theory of divided government this paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature s impact on policy depends upon relative plurality to analyze equilibrium in this game between voters we apply coalition proof type refinements the model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the united states for instance the model predicts a split tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress b for some parameter values a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature and c the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections

the president and the distribution of federal spending scholarship on distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on the internal operations of congress paying particular attention to committees and majority parties this article highlights the president who has extensive opportunities both ex ante and ex post to influence the distribution of federal outlays we analyze two databases that track the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 24 year period the largest and most comprehensive panels of federal spending patterns ever assembled using district and county fixed effects estimation strategies we find no evidence of committee influence and mixed evidence that majority party members receive larger shares of federal outlays we find that districts and counties receive systematically more federal outlays when legislators in the president s party represent them

party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures this paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997 we find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support this is borne out in two ways i counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments ii when control of the state government changes the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party we find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts finally we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections this suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results and the mechanism through which this works is mobilization rather than conversion of voters in a fixed electorate

bringing home the bacon an empirical analysis of the extent and effects of pork barreling in australian politics which electorates receive targeted funding and does targeted funding swing votes to answer these questions i analyze four discretionary programs funded by the australian federal government during the 2001 2004 election cycle controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding and a larger number of program grants among government seats funding does not appear to have been directed towards those that were more marginal more discretionary funding particularly on road building was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election

finance inequality nexus the long and the short of it financial development affects income inequality differently in the short and in the long term investigating oecd countries from 1870 2011 we find in the short run an improvement in financial development tends to reduce inequality while in the long run more finance contributes to more inequality the short run effect concurs with theories advocating financial development increases the availability of financial services primarily for the poor however this effect becomes nil within a few years results thus imply that policies aimed at reducing inequality through improving access of the poor to finance need to be carefully designed to ensure longevity of impact

seniority political experience and support for government spending in the us house a culture of spending payne 1991a postulates that there is a culture of spending in the us congress whereby members of congress are socialized to increase their roll call support for more spending as a function of length of service and exposure to the washington culture in this article we develop and test an expanded model of roll call voting on spending matters focusing on two potential sources of socialization effects 1 exposure to the washington culture of spending primarily through seniority and proximity to washington dc and 2 previous political experiences developed before members are elected to congress using data for us house members from the 93rd through the 107th congresses we estimate a series of models in which we explain national taxpayer union scores as a function of seniority previous political experience personal attributes and a range of constituency variables we find strong and consistent seniority and political experience effects with senior members and those with extensive political experience more likely to support greater spending than other members these findings withstand a range of robustness tests

fiscal consistency and federal district spending in congressional elections theory conventional wisdom holds that legislators win votes by acquiring federal spending for constituents scholars have struggled however to support this belief empirically this paper links federal district spending and pork with an explanation based on consistency electoral performance hinges on legislators fiscal consistency i e whether their votes on federal spending are consistent with their credit claiming for pork flowing to their districts hypotheses in districts receiving substantial pork fiscally liberal incumbents perform better electorally than fiscal conservatives in low pork districts fiscal conservatives perform better methods these hypotheses are tested using aggregate level data from the 198490 united states house elections and individual level data from the 1988 senate election study results the hypotheses are supported on the aggregate and individual levels fiscally consistent legislators receive more votes than fiscally inconsistent legislators

does the size of the legislature affect the size of government evidence from two natural experiments this paper makes use of regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of the number of legislators on the size of government the results indicate a negative effect i e the larger the size of the legislature the smaller is the size of government this runs counter to conventional wisdom one potential explanation is that more legislators can better control a budget maximizing bureaucracy i present evidence that is consistent with the proposed mechanism

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

voting retrospectively critical junctures and party identification abstract this paper provides evidence for retrospective voting in the very long term by exploiting a unique quasi natural experiment of history we trace the origins of party identification to a critical juncture in the local history of sasun a mountainous region of the ottoman empire located in eastern turkey sasun received vital support from the armenian revolutionary federation arf both during the great massacres against armenians at the end of the 19th century and during the armenian genocide 1915 1917 with the help of the arf some of the survivors from sasun were resettled in various villages in modern day armenia although the party was not active in armenia during seven decades of soviet rule we find that villages with sasun ancestry display substantially higher electoral support for the arf than other villages evidence from first names of current residents and our field work suggest that this differential support can at least in part be explained by historical gratitude and sympathy for the party we offer suggestive evidence to explain why this sympathy might have endured over generations

divided government versus incumbency externality effect quasi experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions abstract this paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections we ask 1 does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter s decision in subsequent town council elections 2 do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election the analysis mainprod type flply relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for germany we find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election moreover voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections throughout the paper we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government

dynamic estimation of ideal points for the us congress theories of candidate positioning suggest that candidates will respond dynamically to their electoral environment because of the difficulty of obtaining bridge votes most existing approaches for estimating the ideal points of members of congress generate static ideal points or ideal points that move linearly over time we propose an approach for dynamic ideal point estimation using project vote smart s national political awareness test to construct bridge votes we use our dynamic estimates to measure aggregate change to measure individual level change and to study the institutional and structural factors that explain the changing positions of house candidates and members of congress we demonstrate that while the republican party has been selecting increasingly extreme candidates democratic incumbents have become more extreme while in office we also find that the congruence between elected members of congress and their constituents is mostly explained by the selection as opposed to the responsiveness of the candidate nonetheless we find evidence of dynamic responsiveness of incumbents in specific circumstances we find that competitiveness midterm elections and sharing the president s party affiliation are associated with greater responsiveness conversely retirement is not associated with a change in responsiveness we find no evidence of responsiveness of challengers finally we find that close elections draw challengers who are more in line with the district s ideology

volatility and growth credit constraints and the composition of investment abstract how does uncertainty and credit constraints affect the cyclical composition of investment and thereby volatility and growth this paper addresses this question within a model where firms engage in two types of investment a short term one and a long term one which contributes more to productivity growth because it takes longer to complete long term investment has a relatively less cyclical return but it also has a higher liquidity risk the first effect ensures that the share of long term investment to total investment is countercyclical when financial markets are perfect the second implies that this share may turn procyclical when firms face tight credit constraints a novel propagation mechanism thus emerges through its effect on the cyclical composition of investment tighter credit can lead to both higher volatility and lower mean growth evidence from a panel of countries provides support for the model s key predictions

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

economic impacts of east coast fever immunization on smallholder farms kenya a simulation analysis abstract a whole farm simulation model technology impact evaluation system ties was used to assess ex ante financial and economic impacts of immunization of dairy cattle against east coast fever ecf by the infection and treatment method itm on smallholder farms from two sites in kenya four alternative strategies of immunization in combination with different levels of acaricide use were compared with the current acaricide based method of control the economic impacts were estimated using simulated net present values present values of ending net worth internal rates of return benefit cost ratios annual cash farm incomes cash expenses and net farm incomes the results from the analysis indicate that ecf immunization strategies are financially and economically viable on smallholder farms based on the risk preference for risk averse producers the most preferred strategy was to adopt itm in combination with a 75 reduction in acaricide use the results obtained provide a good indication of the relative orders of magnitude of the farm level financial and economic effects of ecf immunization by itm the whole farm simulation model used for the analysis has the advantage of incorporating the risks involved in farm production whole farm simulation offers a flexible method for assessing the financial and economic impacts of alternative disease control methods on smallholder farms

turnout and presidential coattails in congressional elections estimating the impact of turnout on house election results is problematic because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias the following study proposes an instrumental approach to correct for these problems by using a series of fixed effects two stage least squares panel data regression models covering three congressional apportionment cycles 1972 1980 1982 1990 1992 2000 the analysis tests whether voter participation decreases the house incumbent s electoral support regardless of the level of competition in the district the study also aims to determine if an increase in participation benefits democratic candidates and whether this effect is constant across apportionment cycles the results show that the influence of turnout on incumbency vote share is conditional on the level of presidential support in the district this finding is explained by the surge and decline thesis of campbell 1960

majority rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods abstract despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon we build on baron and ferejohn s american political science review 83 4 1989 1181 1206 bargaining model to describe public investments in a setting of budgetary politics specifically we show that underinvestment inherently arises from distributive politics within a majoritarian institution the inability of current majorities to contract with future ones drives a wedge between spending on consumption today and investing for future consumption extensions to the model demonstrate that earmarking future returns to specific players and or detaching consumption from investment decisions yields more efficient levels of public investment

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

energy polarization and popular representation evidence from the russian duma in this article we introduce the term energy polarization to explain the politics of energy market reform in the russian duma our model tests the impact of regional energy production party cohesion and ideology and electoral mandate on the energy policy decisions of the duma deputies oil gas and electricity bills and resolution proposals between 1994 and 2003 we find a strong divide between single member district smd and proportional representation pr deputies high statistical significance of gas production is demonstrated throughout the three duma terms and shows gazprom s key position in the post soviet russian economy oil production is variably significant in the two first dumas when the main legislative debates on oil privatization occur there is no constant left right continuum which is consistent with the deputies proclaimed party ideology the pro and anti reform poles observed in our poole based single dimensional scale are not necessarily connected with liberal and state oriented regulatory policies respectively party switching is a solid indicator of russia s polarized legislative dynamics when it comes to energy sector reform

intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument empirical evidence from swedish municipalities are grants to swedish municipalities tactical in this essay i derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 swedish municipalities 1981 1995 in order to decide which regions that are politically powerful both election results and survey data from the swedish election studies are used the results although somewhat ambiguous support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes

electoral goals and center state transfers a theoretical model and empirical evidence from india we construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations these considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not a testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers we test this prediction using indian data for 14 states from 1974 75 to 1996 97 we find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16 higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non swing

strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources how do government agencies allocate program resources some authors presume that agencies seek to maximize program objectives others suggest agencies favor the districts important to the president s election in addition agencies may distribute larger program resources to those districts whose congressional representatives are best positioned to help the agency we examined how federal government agencies responded both to the 2006 election when control of congress shifted from the republican to the democratic party and to the 2010 election when the house switched from democratic to republican control we used a difference in difference analysis to evaluate the impact of each election on the agencies allocations of contracts agencies generally responded to the elections by allocating more contract resources to districts represented by the winning party however federal agencies reacted differently to changing political environments depending on the characteristics of the agency for example after the 2006 election those agencies with programs favored by republican members of congress allocated more resources to democratic districts these republican agencies presumably are the most vulnerable to the risk of losing future appropriations democratic agencies and neutral agencies facing no significant threats to their appropriations did not respond to the election as strongly finally more vulnerable districts received the most support especially by the republican agencies we reaffirmed these results by using the 2010 congressional elections in which the political orientations of the districts favored with more contract distributions was reversed

electoral misgovernance cycles evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in greece we present detailed empirical evidence from greece that around elections misgovernance results in significant increases in wildfires and tax evasion and has important economic implications these effects have led to the destruction of property or loss of government revenue estimated at 8 of gdp there are two plausible reasons why misgovernance might intensify around elections i attention and effort of elected officials is directed to campaigning instead of governing and ii the misgovernance may benefit special interests and serve as a pork barrel transfer that is hard to monitor or control empirically we find that redistributive politics are likely a dominant cause of electoral misgovernance in the case of wildfires we also find evidence that political competition tends to increase electoral misgovernance furthermore electoral misgovernance helps incumbents get reelected while misgovernance may manifest differently among countries our analysis suggests that electoral cycles everywhere may be much more multifaceted and harmful than previous literature suggests

congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays the literature on the organization of the united states congress has been dominated by distributive and informational theory one important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork barrel activities here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork barrel is alive and well in the contemporary united states congress we focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts finding strong and systematic evidence of pork barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization

voter influence and big policy change the positive political economy of the new deal what conditions cause major policy changes under representative government this article addresses that question by providing a theoretically grounded analysis of a massive policy change the new deal it explains how the economic problems of the early 1930s initiated changes on several dimensions of policy federal spending labor market regulation and civil rights the article concludes by considering the broader lessons learned from the political economy of the new deal

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

a political agency model of coattail voting abstract this paper provides a theoretical model for the coattail effect where a popular candidate for one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government i assume a political agency framework with moral hazard in order to analyze the coattail effect in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections i show that coattail voting is the outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians efforts in a retrospective voting environment i assume that an office motivated politician executive or member of congress prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party this correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or to different parties two sided coattail effects then arise on the one hand an executive s success props up while failure drags down her partisan ally in the congressional election which implies a presidential coattail effect on the other hand the executive s reelection itself is affected by a congress member s performance which results in a reverse coattail effect

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

on measuring partisanship in roll call voting the u s house of representatives 1877 1999 on measuring partisanship in roll call voting the u s house of representatives 1877 1999 we propose a method of assessing party influence based on a spatial model our method provides the first test of whether observed values of the widely used rice index of party dissimilarity are consistent with a partyless null model it also avoids problems that beset previous estimators substantively we find evidence of party influence in all but one congress since 1877 moreover our indicator of party pressure is systematically higher for the sorts of roll calls that party theorists believe are more pressured procedural organizational and label defining votes our results refute the widespread notion that parties in the house have typically had negligible influence on roll call voting behavior they also document important changes in party influence associated with the packing of the rules committee in 1961 and the procedural reforms of 1973

the price of pork the seniority trap in the u s house abstract using data on federal outlays and u s house elections i estimate the effect of the pork barrel on the quality of officeholders taking into account the fact that seniority creates a dynamic linkage across periods after estimating the parameters governing the influence of seniority on federal outlays and the parameters governing the distributions of candidate quality i conduct several policy experiments to uncover the size of the welfare loss created by the seniority system i find that the seniority system negatively impacts the quality of representatives but has little effect on the outcomes of elections furthermore the most commonly proposed solution to the distortion term limits may have a significant negative effect on the quality of sitting representatives instead of a quantity constraint term limits i propose a change in the relative price of seniority by way of a pigouvian tax on seniority such a policy achieves the first best outcome

do formula based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting evidence from ghana abstract various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation in this paper we investigate a formula based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation specifically we study the sharing of resources of the district assemblies common fund dacf in ghana amongst the country s district governments over the period 1994 to 2005 we find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants per capita dacf grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower suggesting that swing districts were targeted we find evidence that dacf formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers

the effects of discretionary federal spending on parliamentary election results i introduction three compelling reasons to expect that discretionary federal spending will have a different impact on incumbent majority and opposition candidates in the canadian parliamentary system of government are only the prime minister and his appointed cabinet may propose spending or taxing initiatives the electorate only votes directly for their local member of parliament mp and if the prime minister declares a vote of confidence all majority party mps must vote with the prime minister or leave the party these three characteristics combined with the fact that the opposition does not have enough votes to successfully prevent passage of legislation make it very difficult for opposition mps to influence discretionary spending if the electorate is aware of this situation majority party candidates regardless of incumbency stand to reap the electoral benefits of additional federal discretionary spending furthermore opposition incumbents will lose votes as a consequence if majority candidates receive additional votes to some extent this must be at the expense of votes for opposition incumbents the purpose of this paper is to empirically test these two hypothesis the idea that discretionary spending can be used to influence election outcomes verges on the trite mass media discussions are rife with accusations of pork barrel politics this idea is implicitly contained the entire interest group theory of political decision making and it is formally modeled in papers such as weingast shepsle and johnsen 1981 despite the general agreement on the electoral motivations of discretionary spending empirical findings have been relatively unsuccessful in documenting either important or significant effects of discretionary spending or various other district level explanatory variables typical of this literature jacobson 1978 finds a negative and small effect of incumbent campaign spending and johannes and mcadams 1981 find no effect of case work on election outcomes as explained by fiorina 1981 rivers and fiorina 1989 and stein and bickers 1994 the presence of a simultaneous equation system has biased the empirical estimates since politicians are apt to shift resources towards those electoral districts where the election is expected to be closest ordinary least squares will underestimate the true effect stein and bickers demonstrate a negative correlation between the closeness of elections and the amount of pork barrel spending in congressional races in a more recent article case 2001 finds that federal block grants are negatively influenced by the expected closeness of the election in albania despite the recognition of a simultaneity bias attempts to overcome the problem have generally been unsuccessful a notable exception is that of levitt and snyder 1997 who uses spending outside of a district but inside a state as an instrument for spending in the district levitt and snyder find a positive and significant impact of discretionary spending on the share of the vote for incumbents in u s house elections this paper contributes to the discretionary spending and election literature in two ways using a newly created data set of canadian federal spending at the electoral district level the analysis of discretionary spending can be extended beyond the u s border and presidential system of government to a parliamentary system additionally the results contained herein provide a robustness check of levitt and snyder s methodology using instruments similar to those proposed by nagler and leighley 1992 and levitt and snyder 1997 consistent estimates indicate that increases in federal government spending and national gross domestic product gdp per capita have positive and significant effects on the share of the vote received by majority incumbents yet insignificant effects on opposition incumbents the sign of the point estimates are negative

political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems evidence from germany combining local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in a german state we study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a quasi experimental framework we hypothesize that state governments pursue two distinct goals when allocating grants to local governments 1 helping aligned local parties win the next election and 2 buying off unaligned municipalities that may obstruct the state government s policy agenda we argue furthermore that the relative importance of these two goals depends on local political conditions in line with this argument we show empirically that the effect of political alignment on grant receipts varies depending on the degree of local support for the state government while previous contributions find that aligned local governments always tend to receive larger transfers our results imply that the political economy of intergovernmental transfers is more intricate

pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents despite the attention of scholars to that question the empirical results are mixed thus far the present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections i study the consequences of pork barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in slovakia between 2006 and 2018 finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection the same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years the effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are however moderated by municipal population more specifically a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas

the impact of federal spending on house election outcomes while it is widely believed by academics politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak one explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias we address this estimation problem using instrumental variables for each house district we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district federal spending is affected by a large number of actors e g governors senators mayors and other house members in the state delegation

developments in biophysical and bioeconomic simulation of agricultural systems a review this paper reviews the features and uses of some recent biophysical and bioeconomic simulation models in agricultural economics research problems associated with earlier models are discussed and the extent to which recent simulators have addressed these concerns is appraised some salient factors that will enhance the continued relevance of simulators as research and decision support tools are indicated