spurious volatility in historical unemployment data this paper shows that the stabilization of the unemployment rate between the pre 1930 and post 1948 eras is an artifact of improvements in data collection procedures prewar methods are used to construct postwar unemployment data that are consistent with the historical data the constructed postwar series is nearly as volatile as the pre 1930 unemployment data the constructed postwar data are systematically more volatile than the actual postwar data because the cyclical behavior of the labor force and productivity are misspecified in the construction procedures the relationship between the actual and constructed postwar unemployment series is used to construct new historical data

informational asymmetries strategic behavior and industrial organization one of the most active and exciting areas of economic research over the last several years has been the use of noncooperative games of incomplete information to model industrial competition this work has yielded not only a remarkable number of papers but also several new insights on and explanations of fundamentally important issues the purpose of this paper is to attempt an appreciation and evaluation of this work because most of our individual and joint work since about 1979 has been in this mode it will come as no surprise that we are proponents of this line of research however there are several questions and potential problems that we see as arising in connection with this methodology and we will attempt to address these first a disclaimer we are not attempting a survey of the applications of asymmetric information games aig to industrial organization although we will refer in a highly selective fashion to a number of prominent strands in this literature in particular where any references are provided at all they are typically only to the earliest contributions to a subject even more we do not deal with work in which informational asymmetries are important but the analysis is not game theoretic for example search and price dispersion or the early work on the lemons problem and on moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets or with game theoretic treatments that assume complete information i aig methods and applications

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

ideas interests and oil prices the political economy of trade reform during soeharto s indonesia indonesia since the late 1960s constitutes an excellent case study in the political economy of trade protection there have been major changes in the overall policy regime from liberalism to significant intervention and back towards liberalism there have been large though declining inter industry variations in effective protection there has been a lively domestic debate much of it dominated by non economists many actors at home and abroad have a stake in that debate and since the 1980s at least trade policy interventions have been reasonably well documented and quantified in this paper we show how quantitative analysis may be employed to shed light on changes in the trade policy regime over time we also examine the principal actors with an interest in and influence over trade policy delineating where possible how their influence translated into the policy arena finally we speculate on whether the framework developed in this paper is applicable to the very different circumstances prevailing in the post soeharto era

tariff endogeneity evidence from 19th century europe abstract this paper tests an endogenous tariff model for six european countries from around the mid 19th century until the eve of world war 1 ww1 the tariff rate was generally cointegrated with real gnp real wages the price level and the external trade balance results from granger causality tests suggest that real gnp and the price level may be important endogenous determinants of tariff levels

black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory political economy in general equilibrium preface acknowledgments list of results 1 a preview of the results 2 endogenous policy theory a diagrammatic approach part i endogenous policy theory with specific factors the theory of industry tariffs in partial equilibrium 3 the probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians 4 endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem 5 endogenous tariff theory 6 the power function model of endogenous industry lobbying 7 three simple tests of the stolper samuelson theorem 8 the invisible foot and the waste of nations lawyers as negative externalities part ii endogenous policy theory in general equilibrium a long run theory of national tariff levels 9 the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory 10 a prisoner s dilemma theory of endogenous protection the leontief model 11 the compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap 12 increasing returns to politics and factor endowments economic development and brazilian vitality versus the indian disease 13 endogenous protection in the united states 1900 88 14 a cobb douglas model 15 black hole tariffs 16 the endowment effect cross national evidence on endogenous tariffs part ii postscript 17 the senile industry argument for protection 18 optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst the politically efficient policy mathematical appendices references author index subject index

employment and wage strategies of the firm over a business cycle abstract by using control theory we analyze the behaviour of a firm which expects a demand cycle and occupies a monopsonistic position on the labour market consequently the relative wage rate is used as a tool for regulating the flow of applicants and the rate of quits of employees the dynamic wage policy is governed by the demand trend but the marginal propensity of workers to quit and the level of hiring costs are also relevant factors in setting the wage rate the recession period is characterized by a relative wage decrease associated with voluntary quits rather than firing however the wage rate starts increasing when demand is still declining and labour hoarded

asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage given incomplete factor markets appropriate time paths of flow variables must be chosen to build required stocks of assets that is critical resources are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor markets barney barney j 1986 strategic factor markets expectations luck and business strategy management sci october 1231 1241 sustainability of a firm s asset position hinges on how easily assets can be substituted or imitated imitability is linked to the characteristics of the asset accumulation process time compression diseconomies asset mass efficiencies inter connectedness asset erosion and causal ambiguity

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

adaptive strategies of the firm through a business cycle abstract the paper examines the behaviour of a profit maximizing firm which forecasts a recession and which has at its disposal to regulate its level of equipment and its level of employment three control variables investment recruitment firing the selling price being held constant it shows that i the expectation of a recession by a firm is enough to launch a real recession in the demand for production factors equipment and recruitment ii by comparison with a situation in which the firm may manipulate the selling price price rigidities imply the occurrence of excess capacity in addition they do not allow the firm to delay firing and induce a stronger irregularity in recruitment and firing and iii depending on the characteristics of the firm and of the environment a unique model is compatible with a whole variety of behavioural patterns

testing the endogeneity of tariff policy in the u s abstract endogenous tariff theory suggests tariffs are created in response to self interested political pressure using a varma model covering the period 1890 1970 in the u s we show that macroeconomic variables which proxy political pressure granger cause the tariff

a resource based perspective on corporate environmental performance and profitability drawing on the resource based view of the firm we posited that environmental performance and economic performance are positively linked and that industry growth moderates the relationship with the returns to environmental performance higher in high growth industries we tested these hypotheses with an analysis of 243 finns over two years using independently developed environmental ratings results indicate that it pays to be green and that this relationship strengthens with industry growth we conclude by highlighting the study s academic and managerial implications making special reference to the social issues in management literature

testing tariff endogeneity in japan a comparison of pre and post war periods abstract this paper tests an endogenous tariff model for japan 1890 1970 using a vector autoregression var i find that tariff changes are endogenous in the post war period rather than being designed to promote economic activity this suggests that tariffs respond to macroeconomic disturbances

delegation ratification and u s trade policy why divided government causes lower tariffs recent research on executive legislative relations concludes that divided government causes higher tariffs and inhibits international cooperation i find that divided government leads to lower u s

the emergence of cooperation among egoists this article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority this problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political philosophy international politics and economic and social exchange the problem is formalized as an iterated prisoner s dilemma with pairwise interaction among a population of individuals results from three approaches are reported the tournament approach the ecological approach and the evolutionary approach the evolutionary approach is the most general since all possible strategies can be taken into account a series of theorems is presented which show 1 the conditions under which no strategy can do any better than the population average if the others are using the reciprocal cooperation strategy of tit for tat 2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be collectively stable and 3 how cooperation can emerge from a small cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of unconditional defection

quantitative assessment of tariff endogeneity abstract the paper provides a quantitative assessment of the tariff endogeneity hypothesis in the macro context for the interwar and postwar u s economy there is an almost unidirectional causality running from unemployment and trade deficit to the average tariff rate during the interwar period while more interactive relationships hold in the postwar period compared with the interwar era there is a decline in the dependence of tariff on unemployment and trade deficit but the individual effect of unemployment on tariff has increased and that of trade deficit has decreased furthermore unanticipated shocks exert smaller and less persistent effects of tariff

environmental ethics and information asymmetry among organizational stakeholders this paper addresses the conflicting environmental interests of a firm and the community an important stakeholder the short term profit maximization objective of a firm may stand in contrast with what the community wants a safe and clean environment this paper argues that the information regarding the environmental impact of a firm s products processes and waste may be asymmetrically distributed between the firm and the community the resultant information asymmetry may influence the probability of a firm acting opportunistically and ultimately a firm s ethical behavior the paper identifies information asymmetry between a firm and community as well as that within the community the perceived information asymmetry across various community segments may perhaps be a determinant of environmental discrimination the paper further contends that information asymmetry may diminish in the long run finally it examines the implications of information asymmetry for firms and government policy

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

import prices and the political economy of tariffs evidence from germany japan and the united states 1954 1994 abstract endogenous protection theory suggests that macroeconomic conditions affect tariffs through policy responses to political pressure however import prices affect average tariffs even in the absence of policy changes i examine the effects of import prices and macroeconomic conditions in postwar germany japan and the united states finding strong evidence for the effect of import prices but little evidence consistent with endogenous protection theory

on recalls layoffs variable hours and labor adjustment costs abstract the paper analyzes the employment policy of a firm that can vary both hours and the level of employment the analysis differs from previous work in the adjustment cost literature in that the firm is able to change its employment not only through hires layoffs and quits but also by recalls of employees who were previously laid off thus we introduce the possibility of the firm inventorying the labor input it is shown that this labor inventory potential is necessary if the firm is to ever lay off workers further it is demonstrated that linear rather than strictly convex adjustment costs are then required if the firm is to always recall employees who were previously laid off prior to hiring new workers