duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

carbon dioxide emissions and governance a nonparametric analysis for the g 20 this paper applies nonparametric estimators to examine countries carbon dioxide co2 emissions and governance relationship by using data for the time period 1996 2010 of the twenty largest economies group of twenty g 20 the dynamics of the considered relationship are analyzed six governance measures are included in our analysis voice and accountability political stability and absence of violence government effectiveness regulatory quality rule of law and control of corruption as have been defined in world governance indicators from the world bank the empirical findings reveal a nonmonotonic relationship between countries co2 emissions and the examined governance measures in addition and with respect to the environmental policy makers a significant difference on the number of governance measures influencing countries carbon dioxide emissions which is subject to countries specific regional and development variations is recorded finally the carbon dioxide emissions governance relationship is highly nonlinear and appears that countries higher governance quality does not always result to lower carbon dioxide emission levels

price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly abstract we revisit the classic discussion of the endogenous choice of a price or a quantity contract but in a mixed duopoly we find that choosing the price contract is a dominant strategy for both firms whether the goods are substitutes or complements

effects of packers inventory and market power on price adjustments in the u s beef industry this study examines effects of packers inventory and market power on their price adjustment behaviour in the u s beef industry econometric model used in the study allows inventory and market pow

a conjectural variations model of reduced japanese milk price supports conjectural variations are estimated to determine the degree of imperfection in the japanese milk market estimated conjectural variations indicate that the japanese milk market is imperfectly competitive but is becoming more competitive our comparative static analysis indicates that when the milk support price is reduced the fluid milk price will decline less under the current imperfectly competitive structure than it would under a competitive structure

approaches and methods for the econometric analysis of market power a survey and empirical comparison this study discusses two widely used approaches in the new empirical industrial organization neio literature and examines the strengths and weaknesses of the production theoretic approach pta and the general identification method gim for the econometric analysis of market power in agricultural and food markets we provide a framework that may help researchers to evaluate and improve structural models of market power starting with the specification of the approaches in question we compare published empirical studies of market power with respect to the choice of the applied approach functional forms estimation methods and derived estimates of the degree of market power thereafter we use our framework to evaluate several structural models based on pta and gim to measure oligopsony power in the ukrainian dairy industry the pta based results suggest that the estimated parameters of oligopsony power are significantly different from zero while gim based results do not indicate any evidence of oligopsony market power in the ukrainian dairy industry moreover estimations results vary substantially due to the employed estimation procedure

environment market share and market power in this paper we develop a process model relating market share to firm profits in particular we specify average price and average cost equations as a function of previous year market share position changes in market share environmental conditions and interactions of environmental conditions with the lagged market position and market share change variables we estimate these equations using pims data after controlling for unobservable factors our results suggest that firms with high market shares derive no extra market power benefits except if they operate in environments with little buyer power instead environmental factors and changes in market share most strongly influence price and cost an analysis of the market share associated with maximal firm profits indicates that for the majority of firms in our sample steadily increasing market share does not always associate with increasing profits giving credence to the proposition that more market share is not always better

effects of horizontal consolidation under bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers this article considers bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers to estimate the trade off between market power and cost efficiency the model is based on pricing rules from a firm s profit maximization and nests both oligopoly and oligopsony models an empirical analysis for us beef processors and retailers suggests that processors tend to exercise oligopsony market power in procuring cattle but they are unlikely to exercise market power on retailers when retailers and processors are considered as one integrated sector efficiency effects from the increased concentration in the us beef packing industry are slightly larger than market power effects when processors market power is considered separately from retailers market power the difference between cost saving and market power effects becomes greater the cost elasticity estimate 0 99 indicates that a further merger would result in little economies of scale in the future therefore although we find that efficiency effect

information technology effects on firm performance as measured by tobin s q despite increasing anecdotal evidence that information technology it assets contribute to firm performance and future growth potential of firms the empirical results relating it investments to firm performance measures have been equivocal however the bulk of the studies have relied exclusively on accounting based measures of firm performance which largely tend to ignore it s contribution to performance dimensions such as strategic flexibility and intangible value in this paper we use tobin s q a financial market based measure of firm performance and examine the association between it investments and firm q values after controlling for a variety of industry factors and firm specific variables the results based on data from 1988 1993 indicate that in all of the five years the inclusion of the it expenditure variable in the model increased the variance explained in q significantly the results also showed that for all five years it investments had a significantly positive association with tobin s q value our results are consistent with the notion that it contributes to a firm s future performance potential which a forward looking measure such as the q is better able to capture

marketing margins and price uncertainty the case of the u s wheat market this paper seeks to determine the effect of changes in output price risk on marketing margins a theoretical model of price determination in a marketing channel with risk averse firms is developed this model shows that if marketing firms are competitive and decreasingly absolute risk averse then an increase in output price risk should result in higher expected marketing margins empirical evidence from the wheat marketing channel supports the theoretical model increased price variability significantly increases wheat marketing margins for both the farm mill margin and the mill retail margin these results suggest a potential benefit from price stabilization programs

modeling the effects of restricting packer owned livestock in the u s swine industry an imperfectly competitive model of processor packer behavior is formulated to estimate welfare effects from restricting alternative marketing arrangements of livestock procured by packers pork was aggregated into a composite good and hog supply was partitioned into negotiated spot contract and packer owned the model was estimated with the dynamic sur method using weekly mandatory price reporting mpr hog and pork data from 2001 to 2005 the model incorporates production uncertainty by modeling expected pork output as expected output in the input demand functions the welfare effects from banning packer owned hogs indicate that independent producers consumers and packers all would lose

the cournot bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation abstract we consider a duopoly model with a cournot type firm and a bertrand type firm both survive and the equilibrium is stable when there is sufficient product differentiation with no differentiation only the cournot type firm survives and the outcome is perfectly competitive

key elements related to the emissions trading for the kyoto protocol the emissions trading first proposed by the us as a concrete idea is a promising policy framework to tackle the global climate change issue it not only has its high cost efficiency flexibility but also has big potential as an instrument which is profitable for both buyers and sellers and must enforce s the compliance with the emission limitations in principle it can be the incentives for economy in transition parties to choose energy saving economic development path and also for the developing country parties to join the regime in the following phases this paper focuses on its pragmatic aspects and clarifies its merits and problems to be solved in order to probe into its possibilities to be installed some related trading scheme on environmental issues are discussed to have implications for the climate change case for climate change trading scheme concrete proposals are suggested for the emissions budget approach and borrowing in addition an idea packaging carbon taxation and emissions trading is proposed for the establishment of the domestic emissions market which guarantees the compliance of the protocol automatically these elements and proposals are expected to be useful information to clarify the points for the international negotiations with some concrete images not general ideas

an equilibrium displacement approach to oligopoly market analysis an application to trade in the korean infant formula market this article uses an equilibrium displacement model edm to assess the impact of a change in trade policy in the korean infant formula market that is assumed to be oligopolistic domestic oligopolists compete in a market for a homogenous good with importing firms who enjoy the same level of market power as the domestic producers within an edm framework we investigate how the market adjusts to a new equilibrium in response to an external policy shock that improves access to foreign goods our empirical work consists of two steps we first econometrically estimate the market demand elasticity and market power parameter then using these estimates we simulate our edm model to assess the distributional effects of tariff cuts and other changes in marginal cost simulation results show that with a lower market price and increased consumption the change in consumer surplus resulting from tariff reduction is unambiguously positive but that the change in social welfare can be in either direction depending on who receives market rents associated with imports when importing firms are domestic the domestic welfare change is definitely positive however in the case of foreign importing firms the direction of the welfare change crucially depends on the demand elasticity

industrialization and consolidation in the u s food sector implications for competition and welfare good sources for information on recent developments in food market structure include barkema drabenstott and welch u s department of agriculture 1996b and rogers my objective is not to add to this literature but rather to consider what we have learned as a profession about the rapid consolidation in food processing and distribution what are its implications for market power economic efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare among producers consumers and marketers

the price of anarchy in supply chains quantifying the efficiency of price only contracts in this paper we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price only contracts with a price only contract a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price without specifying the amount that will be transferred it is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory capacity decisions we measure efficiency with the price of anarchy poa defined as the largest ratio of profits between the integrated supply chain that is fully coordinated and the decentralized supply chain we characterize the efficiency of various supply chain configurations push or pull inventory positioning two or more stages serial or assembly systems single or multiple competing suppliers and single or multiple competing retailers

measuring market power in multi product oligopolies the us meat industry this paper develops and estimates an economic model for measuring market power in a quantity setting oligopoly engaged in the joint production of demand related goods the model which allows for firms conjectures about both same and cross market responses to own output variation is applied to the us meat beef and pork industry he hypothesis that the industry s equilibrium reflects price taking behaviour is rejected the hypothesis of no cross effects cannot be rejected roughly half of the farm to retail price spreads for beef and pork appear to be attributable to market power

markdown pricing and cattle supply in the beef packing industry we determine the effect of anticipated and unanticipated cattle supply on the departure of fed cattle price from cattle s marginal value product results indicate fed cattle were priced significantly below their marginal value during 31 of the 59 quarters between 1972ii and 1986iv when unanticipated supply shocks are small markdown behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that packers follow an average processing cost apc pricing rule one implication of our results is that reducing industry concentration is not likely to lead to changes in cattle prices predicted by scp based studies of the industry

reward programs and tacit collusion reward programs a promotional tool to develop customer loyalty offer incentives to consumers on the basis of cumulative purchases of a given product or service from a firm reward programs have become increasingly common in many industries the best known examples include frequent flier programs offered by airlines frequent guest programs offered by hotels and frequent shopper programs offered by supermarkets despite the widespread business practice of reward programs research efforts on reward programs particularly in marketing have been scarce our paper takes an important step towards understanding the design of reward programs and its implications on pricing strategies we study a market that consists of two segments heavy and light user segments the key distinction between the two segments is that the heavy user segment purchases in each period and thus is a candidate for the reward programs in contrast the light user segment exits the market after one purchase and is not in a position to exploit reward programs an important feature of our model is that we allow for different price sensitivity between heavy user and light user segments our model closely examines the type of rewards a reward worth a dollar to the consumer might have different cost implications for the offering firm depending on the type of reward for example cash rewards have higher unit reward cost inefficient reward for the firm than a free product of the firm such as an airline ticket or long distance minutes efficient reward specifically we examine an interesting puzzle observed in the marketplace several firms offer a cash reward or a product not made by the firm such as jackets electronic items etc these firms could offer their own product as rewards and significantly lower their cost we examine whether there is any reason for such a seemingly suboptimal practice our analysis shows that reward programs weaken price competition by offering the incentives for repeat purchases reward programs increase a firm s cost to attract competing firms current customers because firms gain less from undercutting their prices equilibrium prices go up moreover as consumers become unwilling to switch because of potential rewards the firm with a larger market share in the heavy user segment charges higher prices therefore a low price in the first period which leads to a larger market share in the heavy user segment will always be followed by a high price in the second period in our model consumers are rational and can correctly anticipate firms incentive to offer lower prices initially to enroll them into the reward programs our paper offers an explanation as to why the type and amount of reward may vary across the programs we identify two determining factors for the selection of rewards size and relative price sensitivity of the heavy user segment we find that in a market with a small heavy user segment that is also much more price sensitive than the light user segment it is optimal for firms to offer the most inefficient rewards the intuition is based on the firms incentive to exploit the price insensitive light user segment by offering inefficient rewards firms are able to commit to weaker competition and therefore higher prices when the heavy user segment is large or not very price sensitive when compared to the light user segment competing firms should adopt the most efficient rewards to maximize their profit this may well be the case in a number of real world situations in which efficient rewards are quite prevalent we also find that optimal reward amount has a negative relationship with unit reward cost because both firms use rewards to attract the heavy users they tend to offer more when they adopt the more efficient rewards finally our paper identifies the relationship between market characteristics and theimpact of reward programs on firms profits and consumers benefits we find that firms gain from the adoption of reward programs as long as light users are not too price sensitive when light users are very price sensitive firms engage in intense price competition thus benefiting little from the loyalty of heavy users created through rewards because reward programs increase market prices light users who do not get the reward earn strictly lower benefit in contrast heavy users often stand to gain more from the reward program in most cases firms and the heavy users are better off at the expense of light users

a century of research on agricultural markets this article provides a perspective on major innovations in research on agricultural markets over the past century we review research on market structure and performance vertical coordination arrangements and institutions for producer collective action contributions to empirical modeling of agricultural price determination and marketing margins are also evaluated as are innovations in research on spatial market relationships and the role of storage finally we discuss contributions to understanding market information systems and the functioning of market based mechanisms for agri

modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly abstractthis article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets respectively monte carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition monopoly monopsony bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor retailer bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets then new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated true and with models that reflect alternative market structures alternative the general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption monte carlo simulation results indicate that the gen

risk response in the beef marketing channel a multivariate generalized arch m approach a model of the farm retail price spread for beef is specified under rational expectations in which systematic risk response on the part of marketing intermediaries is allowed the three equation structural model contains potentially time varying risk terms in margin and supply equations which i approximate and estimate using a multivariate garch in mean approach the estimated model is used to infer relative risk premia in beef margins and to simulate short run equilibrium risk effects results indicate that price risk has at times had substantial impacts on farm and retail beef prices and production

exclusive territories and manufacturers collusion this paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains we show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers incentives to sustain tacit collusion first granting local monopolies to retailers softens competition in a one shot game hence punishment profits are larger thereby rendering deviation more profitable second exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands adjust their prices to the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer whereas intrabrand competition prevents such instantaneous reaction we show that the latter effect tends to dominate thereby making exclusive territories a more suitable organizational mode to cooperate these insights are robust to endogenous communication between manufacturers we also consider retailers service investments here a novel effect emerges that softens the procollusive value of exclusive territories retailers of a deviant manufacturer increase investments which renders deviation more profitable this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

new directions in emissions trading the potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract once an arcane topic even among environmental economists emissions trading systems have substantially increased during this past decade in the usa moreover the implementation of these systems has necessitated increased involvement of professionals in many fields besides economics this paper reviews the practical experience of the six major types of emissions trading systems focusing on credit market development participation and results including transaction costs five more recent applications of emissions trading also are considered as well as the possibility of inter pollutant trading while inter pollutant trading has been successfully used for chlorofluorocarbons cfcs the applicability of this experience is probably very limited additionally it would be highly premature to attempt an evaluation of these newer emissions trading systems some of which have yet to be even partially implemented in order to improve these latter and future programs the paper considers the potential contribution of the new institutional economics nie to emissions trading the nie is used to develop theoretical insights and a series of predictions about the performance of a range of emissions trading systems

bertrand vs cournot competition in distribution channels with upstream collusion abstract this paper applies repeated game theory to tacit collusion in dynamic distribution channels based on the grim trigger strategy we examine competitors choice of the strategic instruments in distribution channels comprised of two manufacturers distributing through two independent retailers respectively first the paper discusses the upstream manufacturers collusion incentives under different competition modes for downstream retailers and shows that the manufacturers collusion incentives critically depend on the retailers competition modes and the discount factor we then identify the endogenous competition modes in equilibrium we find that upstream collusion is easier to sustain under cournot competition than bertrand competition and it is least likely to be sustained under mixed bertrand cournot competition furthermore in equilibrium retailers can engage in bertrand cournot or mixed bertrand cournot competition depending on the discount factor and the degree of product differentiation this study provides the rationale behind the emergence of various modes of competition in practical dynamic distribution channels especially the recent mixed bertrand cournot competition mode finally the manufacturers collusion incentives and retailers competition modes jointly affect the manufacturers profitability and social welfare we also discuss how the manufacturers profitability and social welfare vary under different competition modes taking upstream collusion into consideration we find that upstream collusion increases decreases social welfare for complements substitutes

cooperation among competitors a comparison of cost sharing mechanisms abstract in this paper we investigate the consequences of using outcome based versus ex ante based cost sharing mechanisms in terms of competing firms profitability and total welfare we consider two firms making a joint expenditure which can positively affect firms demand and or unit operating costs while competing in the final market by setting either price or quantity we compare two outcome based cost sharing mechanisms i e quantity proportional qp and total margin proportional tm with the more competitive fixed share fs mechanism where cost sharing is set up on an ex ante basis we show that outcome based mechanisms and even a fully collusive behavior induced by the optimal cost sharing mechanism might actually enhance total welfare as compared with the more competitive fs mechanism we also find that although the fs mechanism is never more preferable than the tm mechanism it can lead to higher profits than the qp mechanism when competition is mild these results can support firms cooperating with competitors in the choice of the cost sharing mechanism as well as provide important implications to policy makers

why has poland avoided the price liberalization trap the case of the hog pork sector price liberalization in the agri food economy in the transition economies is likely to slip into a trap food prices rocket up consumption declines but food supply does not catch up and even contracts however during the transition period following the 1989 price liberalization the polish hog pork sector succeeded in avoiding this trap by conducting market structure and econometric analysis this article looks for the reasons for this success in the polish hog pork sector the restructuring of state owned enterprises and the emergence of private firms introduced an effective price transmission mechanism between the processing retailing and farm levels this mechanism allowed farm supply to respond to changed demand and to take advantage of increased retail prices such a relatively efficient marketing system was made possible by a relatively stable macroeconomic environment and limited government intervention

technological change and economies of scale in u s poultry processing this article uses a unique data set provided by the census bureau and a translog cost function to empirically examine technological change in the u s poultry industry results reveal substantial scale economies that show no evidence of diminishing with plant size and that are much greater than those realized in cattle and hog slaughter findings suggest that consolidation is likely to continue particularly if demand growth diminishes and that controlling for plant product mix is critical to accurate cost estimates

risk behavior and rational expectations in the u s broiler market this study examines the empirical implications of extending the rational expectations hypothesis reh to include price uncertainty a general estimation framework that incorporates both the restrictions on structural parameters and the variance covariance terms is developed garch time series processes are used to generate time varying expectations of both the means and the variances of exogenous variables the empirical application is with a quarterly model of the u s broiler industry the results indicate that the rational expectation of price variance is an important determinant of broiler supply a formal test indicates that the restrictions implied by the reh cannot be rejected

measuring oligopsony power with shadow prices u s markets for pulpwood and sawlogs empirical estimation of input market power hindered by problems in measuring an input s value of marginal product vmp by estimating a variable profit function system however one can infer a factor s vmp through its shadow price this technique is used here to specify a structural equation system which is estimated using time series data for the u s sawmilling and paper industries to empirically measure the degree of oligopsony power for sawlog and pulpwood inputs respectively results evaluated at sample means indicate that pulpwood markets are more oligopsonistic than sawlog markets though both perform closer to perfect competition than monopsony time trends for market power differ for each product and perfect competition cannot be rejected for sawlogs in later years copyright 1995 by mit press

determinants of oligopsony power the haitian coffee case abstract this paper investigates the determinants of oligopsony power exerted by coffee exporters in haiti it develops and estimates a two equation model with cross parameter restrictions one equation for the lerner index of oligopsony and the other for the residual supply function facing exporters empirical results indicate that both institutional arrangements and domestic market conditions have significantly shaped oligopsony power

product differentiation and collusion sustainability when collusion is costly a widely debated question in recent years by both strategy theorists and antitrust practitioners is what role product differentiation between firms plays in their ability to sustain a collusive agreement in order to reduce the strength of competition and gain higher profits this paper addresses the following question what happens to the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship when setting up and maintaining an agreement is costly we show that introducing collusion costs into the discussion has relevant implications indeed sufficiently high collusion costs modify the underlying market structure thus altering the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship with respect to the case where collusion costs are absent or low in particular if the gains from collusion are increasing decreasing with the degree of product differentiation the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability is always positive negative whereas if the gains from collusion are inverted u shaped the relationship is inverted u shaped too these results stress the importance of considering those markets where the coordination between firms is sufficiently costly as structurally different from those markets where coordination has no costs for firms

a note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies abstract in this note we show that the results developed in n singh and x vives 1984 rand j econ 15 546 554 are sensitive to the duopoly assumption if there are more than two firms prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition this will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements if goods are substitutes high quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition hence it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

price behavior in a dynamic oligopsony washington processing potatoes punishment strategies are necessary to sustain a collusive oligopsony in a repeated game context when demand is uncertain and only market variables are observable this article proposes a test for tacit collusion among potato processors in washington state using a dynamic regime switching model estimated with a finite mixture method the results support the existence of punishment and collusive regimes and show the welfare losses due to anti competitive behavior on the part of processors to be significant processors oligopsony power is enhanced by higher domestic production imports and existing stocks but it is ameliorated by high capacity utilization rates and exports copyright 2001 oxford university press

the effect of farm supply shifts on concentration and market power in the food processing sector in this paper we examine the marginal impact of changing farm supply on the market structure of the downstream food processing sector we develop a theoretical model that allows for cost differences among processors and endogenizes downstream entry and exit comparative statics results are consistent with several well established trends in the food processing sector in particular the analysis demonstrates that increasing concentration in the food processing sector is consistent with decreasing market power indeed we find that when the farm supply curve shifts outward an increase in concentration can only occur when there is a decrease in market power

outsourcing vertical integration and price vs quantity competition abstract we show that standard conclusions about duopoly competition can be reversed when the production of key inputs is outsourced to a vertically integrated retail competitor with upstream market power under such outsourcing bertrand competition can produce higher prices higher industry profit lower consumer surplus and lower total surplus than cournot competition in addition to limiting the intensity of retail competition bertrand competition can limit the extent of wholesale competition by reducing the incentive of retail providers to produce key inputs themselves

measuring market power in food processing industries discussion focuses on the measurement of market power in the beef processing industry in the united states causal linkage between concentrated industrial structure and antisocial economic performance structure conduct performance paradigm basic model for fed cattle studies

the effects of imperfect competition on the size and distribution of research benefits studies of agricultural research benefits usually assume perfectly competitive markets studies that have allowed for market power of agribusiness firms have generally assumed unrealistic pure monopsony or monopoly behavior this paper allows for processing firms to exhibit a range of degrees of oligopsony power in buying raw farm products and oligopoly power in selling processed farm products the results indicate that different types of research induced technical change can exacerbate or ameliorate distortions from the exercise of market power by agribusiness firms which affects the size and especially the distribution of research benefits

vertical integration raising rivals costs and upstream collusion abstract this paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear as a first step the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated it turns out this is the joint profit maximum of the colluding firms the discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry while the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising rivals costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

effects of forward sales on spot markets pre commitment sales and prices for fresh strawberries increasingly agricultural markets are vertically coordinated often a thinning spot market coexists with coordinated transactions raising the question of how private coordination affects the market as a whole one of the greatest challenges when analyzing such market level effects is obtaining information on private transactions we utilize publicly available data to evaluate how informal contracts in the fresh strawberry market affect spot market prices using a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic in mean garch m model we find that these informal contracts increased spot prices as argued by some industry members while the effect on spot price volatility varied by production region

market transparency and market structure the livestock mandatory reporting act of 1999 the premise of the livestock mandatory reporting act of 1999 is that enhanced transparency promotes competition this article provides a theoretical study of the consequences of such transparency for the structure conduct and performance of the livestock industry i conclude that the usefulness of the act to the livestock industry may not be in the value of reported information to feeders as the supporters of the act claim rather by forcing packers to pool information at negligible marginal cost the act may foster more competitive conduct in the procurement of livestock copyright 2003 oxford university press

estimation of price cost margins and union bargaining power for belgian manufacturing abstract this paper extends hall s 1988 hall r e 1988 the relationship between price and marginal cost in us industry journal of political economy 96 921 947 methodology to analyze imperfections in both the product and the labor market for firms in the belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988 1995 we investigate the heterogeneity in price cost mark up and workers bargaining power parameters among 18 sectors within the manufacturing industry as well as the relationship between both parameters using a sample of more than 7000 firms our gmm results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labor market leads to an underestimation of the price cost margin evaluated at perfect competition in the labor market these findings are confirmed in the sectoral analysis sectors with higher workers bargaining power typically show higher price cost margins

antitrust economic analysis in food marketing channels a global perspective antitrust enforcement concerning monopolies mergers and cartels is converging across all market oriented economies in the world this convergence is based upon neoclassical economic analysis of industrial organization the role of empirical economic analysis however has not converged as rapidly as the conceptual model because different countries have different enforcement institutions and strategies this article explains how antitrust enforcement has evolved over time from public agencies to a market for enforcement that admits private parties private party law suits and especially class action law suits on behalf of groups such as farmers and consumers is a mechanism for redressing the often superior legal and economic resources that defendant corporations have and public agencies do not have enforcement and the role of empirical analysis are compared in the united states and other countries examples of enforcement from different countries illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches finally some insights explain how economists function in enforcement and the attributes required for success

analysis of a supply control program under uncertainty and imperfect competition chinese cabbage in taiwan researchers have often attributed the farm wholesale price spread after adjusting for marketing costs as compensation for marketing firms risk bearing however price spreads in excess of marketing costs can also be due to marketing firms exercise of market power in settings where both imperfect competition and marketer risk aversion are plausible a modeling framework must be sufficiently general to accommodate both types of behavior this article develops and estimates such a model in the context of fresh produce marketing and develops the implications for analysis of supply control programs the model is applied to the production and marketing of chinese cabbage in taiwan and specifically to the analysis of supply control programs implemented in this industry by the taiwanese government the empirical results provide little support for the hypothesis that marketing firms exhibit risk averse behavior but they do show that marketing firms exercise oligopsony power in procurement of the product from farmers and that this power is positively related to the quantity supplied in each market period this provides a heretofore unexplored impetus for supply controls intended to raise producer incomes however such controls are also rendered less effective by imperfect competition because marketing firms capture part of the benefits from supply reduction

the seed and agricultural biotechnology industries in india an analysis of industry structure competition and policy options since the late 1980s technological advances and policy reforms have created new opportunities for private sector investment in india s seed and agricultural biotechnology industries these changes have had a significant impact on cotton yields and output in india but less so for rice and wheat the country s main cereal staples for which yield growth rates are tending toward stagnation this analysis examines the structures of these industries their potential effects on competition and innovation and the policies that may improve both industry performance and the delivery of new productivity enhancing technologies to india s cereal production systems our findings suggest that more substantive policy reforms are needed to encourage further innovation reduce regulatory uncertainty and encourage firm and industry level growth while continued public spending on agricultural research is needed to support technological change

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

measurement of technological and market structure alternative methodological perspectives discussion all three of the papers in this session lived up to the promise of delivering alternative methodological perspectives but only that of paul and muth and wohlgenant came close to providing a framework for measurement of technological and market structure perhaps a more fitting and inclusive title of the session in light of goodwin and holt s contribution would be technology market structure and price adjustment in the beef marketing channel beef is added because it is on the menu of each of the papers taken together the three papers are timely and important in view of the ongoing changes in market structures and organization of the livestock sector taken individually the degree to which each paper furthers our understanding of those changes varies with the type of issues raised and methodological perspective offered

market power and the cattle cycle the relationship between the dynamic cattle cycle and the potential for market power in cattle purchases has rarely been studied this paper provides a conceptual framework showing how the cattle cycle and buyer market power are related not only does a larger cattle stock lead to a lower fed cattle price but the cattle stock s negative effect on price is magnified by the degree of buyer market power in cattle procurement empirical findings support the posited theoretical relationships and help explain why previous researchers reached different conclusions regarding the extent of market power in the industry copyright 2010 oxford university press

measuring market power and cost efficiency effects of industrial concentration in this paper i show how appelbaum s framework for testing price taking behavior in a single industry can be formally extended to consider concentration explicitly in so doing i separate the market power effect of concentration from its cost efficiency effect data from the us beef packing industry are used to illustrate an empirical application of the model the findings support oligopsonistic market power and slaughter cost efficiency in the industry however the cost efficiency effect outweighs the market power effect

market and welfare effects of the u s livestock mandatory reporting act author affiliation kenneth njoroge department of accounting the fuqua school of business duke university box 90120 durham nc 27708 0120 usa kn14 duke eduamalia yiannaka department of agricultural economics 314d filley hall university of nebraska lincoln lincoln ne 68583 0922 usa yiannaka unl edukonstantinos giannakas department of agricultural economics 216 filley hall university of nebraska lincoln lincoln ne 68583 0922 usa kgiannakas unl eduazzeddine m azzam department of agricultural economics 103b filley hall university of nebraska lincoln lincoln ne 68583 0922 usa aazzam1 unl edu corresponding author acknowledgment senior authorship is shared authors names appear in reverse seniority order 1 introductionthe livestock mandatory reporting act the act was enacted in 2001 to provide market participants with information on all cash and noncash transactions reported by packers to the agricultural marketing service ams on a daily basis the information is aggregated under specific confidentiality guidelines1 to preserve the anonymity of the source2 and published in the mandatory livestock and meat market news reports reports 3 ams is responsible for setting the confidentiality guidelines as well as for enforcing the act as stated in the act federal register 2000 the reports intend to provide information that can be readily understood by producers packers and other market participants improve the price and supply reporting services of the department of agriculture and encourage competition in the marketplace for livestock and livestock products the rationale is that as more animals have been purchased under marketing arrangements neither the arrangements nor the final purchase prices are publicly disclosed 4about two years after the act went into effect schroeder grunwald and ward 2002 reviewed the early literature on livestock mandatory reporting lmr a consensus appeared to be forming that while lmr could be beneficial by reducing uncertainty and increasing competition in cattle markets revealing too much information about rival pricing could facilitate collusion and reduce competition among packers schroeder grunwald and ward 2002 p 11 the uncertainty reducing effect of lmr was deduced from two experimental studies by anderson et al 1998 and bastian koontz and menkhaus 2001 in the first experiment price and quantity information in the fed cattle market simulated through the fed cattle market simulator fcms 5 was varied and market outcomes were observed uncertainty measured by price dispersion was found to increase with the amount and type of information withheld in the second experiment also using the fcms market participants were provided with price and quantity information on cattle sold through the spot markets as well as through forward contracts the authors observed a substantial reduction in the variance of forward contract prices the effect of the forward market information on the variance of spot prices was negative but not statistically significant maintaining the hypothesis that mandatory reporting reduces uncertainty through the provision of more information azzam 2003 studied the effects of the reduction in uncertainty on the structure conduct and performance of livestock markets azzam s theoretical findings suggest that in a setting where cattle feeders and packers are risk averse and packers hold consistent conjectures increased transparency due to mandatory reporting promotes competition and results in higher livestock prices however since increased transparency can make it easier for packers to collude wachenheim and devuyst 2001 azzam s assumption of consistent conjectures is restrictive because it rules out the possibility of collusion njoroge 2003 provides a formal model of collusion that is in line with the arguments in wachenheim and devuyst 2001

nonparametric tests of profit maximization in oligopoly with application to the beef packing industry in this paper we develop new nonparametric methods of testing for static profit maximization given noncompetitive behavior repeated application of the test yields maximum likelihood estimates of the degree of noncompetitive behavior using plant level data these newly developed nonparametric methods are employed to test the hypothesis that beef packers are profit maximizers and to measure the extent to which packers influence prices in fed cattle markets

liberalization and food price distributions arch m evidence from madagascar abstract there is no well articulated theory of how stochastic food prices respond to economic liberalization measures a surprising oversight in the vast literature on market oriented reforms this paper presents reduced form estimates of the effects of liberalization measures on food commodity prices in madagascar using autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic in mean arch m methods the data indicate that the short term effects of liberalization on the mean and variance of food prices vary substantially by commodity region and season in the long term liberalization increases both the mean and the variance of food prices the abandonment of a quantity rationed state marketing system with administrative pricing also leads to smaller inter regional and interseasonal differences in mean food prices and a sharp increase in price autocorrelation real exchange rates have pronounced positive effects on mean food prices but these effects emerge indirectly rather than directly through induced changes to border parity prices

testing the monopsony inefficiency incentive for backward integration in theory monopsony at one stage in a vertically related market provides an incentive for backward integration into the adjacent competitive stages by integrating backward a monopsonist internalizes the monopsony inefficiency due to underemployment of the factor produced upstream however little is known about the importance of such incentive in practice in this paper i provide an empirically implementable model to test the monopsony inefficiency incentive for vertical integration for illustration the model is applied to the u s beef slaughter industry findings seem to support the monopsony inefficiency incentive for backward integration by the industry into the live cattle market

estimating the degree of market power in the beef packing industry a technique for assessing the degree of monopoly power developed by appelbaum 1979 1982 is extended here to permit measurement of monopsony power as well data from the u s beef packing industry are examined the results reveal small but statistically significant monopoly monopsony price distortions in slaughter cattle and wholesale beef markets but in spite of a recent trend toward heightened concentration in the industry give no indication that performance has become appreciably less competitive of late this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products abstract this paper examines the relationship between product differentiation and the sustainability of collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products the main finding is that collusion is more easily sustained the more similar the products are exactly the opposite result may be obtained in models of horizontal differentiation consequently when products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically theory provides no clearcut prediction

efficiency of the multiplant multiproduct firm a general framework is provided for assessing the technology cost and efficient scale of a multiplant multiproduct firm we show sufficient conditions for the existence of a plant cost function and necessary and sufficient conditions for using plant level data to draw exact firm level cost inferences we also distinguish between plant and input nonjointness and show the optimal relation between plant level and firm level cost elasticity in a multiproduct setting the framework is applied to a vegetable processing cooperative which is found to operate below its efficient scale

imperfect competition in multiproduct food industries with application to pear processing agricultural product markets often involve relatively few firms processing a farm product into multiple processed products this market structure prompts concern that processing firms may exercise both oligopsony and oligopoly power the present paper develops and applies a methodology to test simultaneously for market power in both the raw input market and multiple processed output markets application of the methodology to california pear processing indicates the industry has exerted power in both its farm input market and the markets for canned pears and fruit cocktail

correcting for measurement error in food demand estimation use of disappearance data as proxies for actual consumption causes inconsistent estimates of own price retail demand elasticities a system of equations describing consumer processor and producer behavior is used to consistently estimate the retail demand elasticity for beef using available data while avoiding the restrictive assumption of fixed input proportions implicit in disappearance data this approach yields an estimate of the own price retail demand elasticity for beef of 0 45 which is more inelastic than the estimate 0 66 obtained using a traditional approach the methodology is applicable to other food commodities for which disappearance data serve as proxies for actual consumption copyright 1993 by mit press

the effect of barge and ocean freight price volatility in international grain markets this paper looks at the potential role of time varying volatility of mississippi river barge and ocean freight prices on commodity prices in illinois at the us gulf and in rotterdam using a vector error correction garch in mean model the model is used to infer the extent to which transportation price risk affects price dynamics in international grain markets results from a simulation exercise indicate that both barge and ocean price volatility influence grain prices but barge price volatility tends to have a greater impact on grain prices and marketing margins than that arising from ocean price volatility consistent with most studies that evaluate the role of risk in marketing channels results here suggest that a reduction in barge rate risk would reduce marketing margins between illinois and the us gulf and between the us gulf and rotterdam the existence of an ocean freight futures contract coupled with the lack of a futures contract for barge rates may be partially responsible for the finding that barge rates have a significant influence on grain prices and contribute most to wide marketing margins found throughout the international grain marketing system

marketing margins market power and price uncertainty this paper provides a conceptual and empirical framework for analyzing marketing margins in a noncompetitive food processing industry facing output price uncertainty the framework allows the decomposition of observed margins into components reflecting the marginal cost of the processing industry oligopoly oligopsony price distortions and an output price risk component the empirical procedure is applied to a time series of spreads between wholesale pork prices and farm prices of market hogs the principal finding is that while farm wholesale margins are more consistent with competitive performance now than they were fifteen years ago the output price risk component persisted throughout the sample period

u s trade policy on lamb meat who gets fleeced the u s lamb meat industry received protection from import competition in 1999 with a tariff rate quota this paper analyzes proposed and adopted policies using a partial equilibrium model of lamb meat and lambs incorporating imperfect competition in the packing industry under a tariff policy packers can only exercise oligopsony power in the lamb market and both packers and lamb growers benefit from protection if a quota or tariff rate quota policy is used packers can assert oligopoly power packers benefit from protection but lamb growers may not under the tariff rate quota adopted lamb growers suffer a welfare loss copyright 2001 oxford university press

competition in the us meatpacking industry is it history the us meatpacking industry has become concentrated to a degree not experienced since the days of the beef trust a century ago a number of mainstream studies have investigated if such concentration has been detrimental to competition just as earlier studies may have helped shape competition policy towards meatpacking a century ago contemporary studies have made their way into current discussions and may shape competition policy at the turn of this century this paper asks whether or not contemporary studies are useful in informing competition policy after comparing how competition looks from the econometric vantage point with how it looks from the vantage point of the industry s 300 yr history this article concludes that mainstream studies are more useful for a competition policy targeting conduct rather than structure

do alternative marketing arrangements increase pork packers market power in this article we use structural econometrics to formally test whether the use of the alternative marketing arrangements amas by pork packers is the source of their market power on the spot cash market for live hogs we specify the pork packers conjectures of the change in the industry total market procurement of live hogs through the spot market with respect to their amas stocks the test is carried out using the mandatory price reporting data our results show that pork packers have statistically significant market power on the spot market for live hogs but the source of that market power cannot be narrowed down to the existence of amas stocks copyright 2009 oxford university press

regime switching and oligopsony power the case of u s beef processing in this article we estimate a model of oligopsony behavior under imperfect monitoring of rival actions to analyze weekly marketing margin data for the u s beef packing industry oligopsonists are hypothesized to follow a discontinuous pricing strategy in equilibrium and we focus on shocks in the normal throughput of supply as a potential catalyst for regime switching between cooperative and noncooperative phases we adopt an algorithm developed by bellone 2005 that relies on hamilton s 1989 multivariate first order markov process to test for the cooperative noncooperative switching behavior we find strong evidence that links switching conduct by packers to disruptions in coordinating the derived demands for processed beef with the supply of live cattle once switched cooperative regimes lasted an average of 21 weeks while noncooperative regimes averaged 33 weeks the average marketing margin for processed beef was 68 lower in the noncooperative regimes compared to the cooperative regimes this led to an annual average increase in profits of 408 million dollars to the beef packing industry and about an 8 9 reduction in live cattle prices

asymmetric farm retail price transmission and market power a new test a finite mixture model is used to estimate farm retail price transmission in the us fresh strawberry market results suggest two distinct pricing regimes associated with off and peak harvesting seasons the market power parameter is significant in the peak harvest regime but not in the off peak regime moreover price changes are transmitted completely throughout the marketing channel in the off peak regime when the market power parameter is zero but not in the peak harvest regime when the market power parameter is positive this suggests that produce buyers are more apt to exercise market power when farm supplies are abundant than when they are scarce and that the exercise of such power causes the farm retail price linkage to become asymmetric

supply analysis in an oligopsony model primary agricultural markets are often characterized by oligopsony this paper investigates the effect of an agricultural product supply shift on the equilibrium prices and quantities of farm products purchased by food processors and on profits of food processors the principal comparative static result indicates that under oligopsony qualitative implications of a disturbance in the supply of raw input differ from that under perfect competition and monopsony effects of other disturbances are identical in sign to the perfectly competitive case although magnitudes may differ implications for supply estimation and agricultural policy analysis are briefly discussed

a critical assessment of supply demand models of agricultural trade we offer a critical assessment of static deterministic reduced form supply demand sd models of agricultural trade a commonly used and well documented model has significant limitations no explicit treatment of factor mobility between farm and nonfarm sectors nonzero profits in some sectors no substitutability among feedstuffs in livestock sectors violation of the law of one price small marketing margins for some commodities and incomplete coverage of the agricultural sector such limitations have significant impacts on the magnitude and direction of projected world price and welfare changes we believe agricultural policy analysis should first focus on the remediation of these limitations before proceeding to more complex issues like dynamics and uncertainty

cartel stability and product differentiation abstract this paper employs a supergame theoretic model of collusion to analyze the effects of different levels of product differentiation on cartel stability in contrast to earlier work the ability of the parties to reach an agreement is assumed here the focus is on how greater product homogeneity increases both the gain to cheating on a collusive agreement and the magnitude of the punishments that follow a defection the total effect on the likelihood a cartel is stable is therefore unclear two particular differentiated products models are then used to demonstrate that contrary to the conventional view greater homogeneity can reduce cartel stability