market structure and buyer behaviour price adjustment in a multi object progressive oral auction abstract working within the framework of an english or progressive oral auction with multiple unit trading the study addresses the question of the effect on price behaviour of variations in market size in the sense of the number of equal sized market competitors prices are shown to converge to near competitive equilibrium levels upon replication whatever the market size however by extending the focus of the study beyond equilibrium to the market behaviour revealed during the adjustment or disequilibrium phase of the market it is possible to advance some conjectures on the nature of the equilibrating processes

gender wage gap across the wage distribution in different segments of the indian labour market 1983 2012 exploring the glass ceiling or sticky floor phenomenon abstractwomen s participation in the indian labour market is not only low but they are also engaged in low productivity and low paying jobs further the labour market is segmented by gender type of employment sector and location of residence this study makes an important contribution by examining gender wage gap in india across different segments of the labour market over the wage distribution using national level representative data spanning the period 1983 to 2012 the empirical results suggest that i the male female raw wage gap has declined over time across the wage distribution ii the gender wage gap attributable to differing returns to characteristics has increased over time and there is evidence of convergence of productive characteristics of men and women iii sticky floor rather than glass ceiling phenomenon is observed in all segments of the labour market and iv the adjusted wage gap suggests that women at the bottom of the distribution face higher discrimination than those at the t

glass ceilings or glass doors the role of firms in male female wage disparities i use canadian linked employer employee data to examine whether women face a glass ceiling in the labour market i also measure the extent to which the glass ceiling comes about because women are segregated into lower paying firms or because they are segregated into lower paying jobs within firms i find clear evidence that women experience a glass ceiling that is driven by their disproportionate sorting across firm types glass doors rather than within firms i find no evidence that these results are supply driven however my results are consistent with predictions of an efficiency wage model where high paying firms discriminate against females

bilateral bargaining with externalities this paper provides an analysis of a non cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network we establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents that is we provide a non cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non cooperative surplus the resulting division is related to the myerson shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications we demonstrate this by examining buyer seller networks and vertical foreclosure

robust trading mechanisms we consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information it is shown that posted price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy a posted price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade

is there a glass ceiling in sweden using 1998 data we show that the gender log wage gap in sweden increases throughout the wage distribution and accelerates in the upper tail we interpret this as a strong glass ceiling effect we use quantile regression decompositions to examine whether this pattern can be ascribed primarily to gender differences in labor market characteristics or in the rewards to those characteristics even after extensive controls for gender differences in age education both level and field sector industry and occupation we find that the glass ceiling effect we see in the raw data persists to a considerable extent

the walrasian tatonnement mechanism and information this article reports the results of experiments analyzing the walrasian t tonnement mechanism the t tonnement mechanism has the following characteristics there is only one price at any time there is an information mechanism notifying all traders of the price there is a mechanism for determining quantities offered for sale and purchase at the price and transactions at nonequilibrating prices are forbidden in addition the walrasian pricing rule is utilized by the auctioneer the change in price has the same sign as excess demand the treatment variable used in the experimental design is the degree of segregation of buyers and sellers complete segregation means sellers cannot discover the number of buyers and buyers cannot discover the number of sellers at an announced price the results show that the auction mechanism is stable it exhibits strong convergence properties and efficiency levels averaging better than 97 segregation of the buyers from the sellers leads to a significant difference in underrevelation of demand relative to supply

the effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets abstract we report the results of twelve double auction market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric induced supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path toward a competitive equilibrium the proposition convergence bias that prices tend to approach the competitive equilibrium from above below when consumer surplus is greater less than producer surplus cannot be rejected we do however reject the proposition convergence symmetry that these convergence biases are of equal absolute magnitude excesses of producer over consumer surplus are found to have a more pronounced effect on the sequence of contract prices

the use of quantile regressions in estimating gender wage differentials a case study of the philippines quantile regressions are used to analyse the size components and nature of the gender earnings differentials as well as the returns to education by gender in the philippines over the entire conditional distribution of earnings using data from the 1999 apis survey this approach allows more focused conclusions about the nature of gender earnings differentials incorporating the quantile regression approach to the oaxaca blinder decomposition allows the localization of gender discrimination to particular quantiles of the earnings distribution and permits more targeted policy intervention

buyer power with atomistic upstream entry can downstream consolidation increase production and welfare abstract this paper investigates the effects of buyer power on entry into an atomistic upstream market and economic welfare under reasonable market conditions we show that industries with a few buyers induce more upstream entry than industries with a larger number of firms in particular monopsony can be more conducive to entry and lead to higher social welfare than more fragmented industry structures this seeming paradox arises because a single buyer better internalizes the positive effects of entry on later periods supply conditions than a collection of firms this result is relevant in a number of market settings including markets for specialized labor and processing markets for agricultural products

an experimental investigation of the patterns of international trade this study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system the concept of multiple countries in which each country has its own technology preferences and resource endowments is introduced and operationalized the questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage factor price equalization terms of trade efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions the study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena

equilibrium selection in an experimental macroeconomy author affiliation vivian lei department of economics university of wisconsin milwaukee milwaukee wi 53201 usa vlei uwm edu corresponding authorcharles n noussair department of economics faculty of economics and business tilburg university p o box 90153 5000 le tilburg the netherlands c n noussair uvt nl acknowledgment we are grateful to the college of letters and science and center for research on international economics at the university of wisconsin milwaukee for financial support we thank colin camerer katarina kellar lutz hendricks nazrul islam tomomi tanaka filip vesely and two anonymous referees for helpful comments 1 introductionone of the most influential literatures in economics is the theory of growth for surveys see azariadis 1993 barro and sala i martin 1995 romer 1996 sala i martin 2002 the basis of much of the literature is the ramsey 1928 cass 1965 koopmans 1965 growth model in this model the economy is assumed to behave like a benevolent social planner who chooses capital stock and consumption levels over an infinite time horizon with the goal of maximizing the discounted utility of the consumption stream the principal result of the model is that consumption and capital stock converge to unique optimal steady state levels that are independent of the initial endowment and the utility function of the social planner an implication of the model therefore is that different countries would converge toward a common income level even if their initial endowment of capital differed provided that they have access to the same production technology relatively poor countries would exhibit higher growth rates than richer ones these two predictions are testable with field data however field studies have generally failed to support the hypothesis of convergence toward a common income level see durlauf and quah 1999 temple 1999 and islam 2003 for surveys rather the data are more consistent with the alternative hypothesis of club convergence baumol 1986 which postulates that a small number of steady states exist and that each country has a tendency to converge toward one of them 1 such a framework can explain the observed pattern over time of an increase in income differences between the organisation for economic cooperation and development countries and the developing world as well as a decrease in the differences within each of the two groups the empirical support for club convergence has encouraged the development of theoretical models with multiple equilibria while some countries may reach optimal equilibria unfortunate countries might find themselves in low income equilibria which are often labeled as poverty traps these countries are unable to reach a better equilibrium without coordination originally due to rosenstein rodan 1943 the insight that the existence of multiple equilibria might provide an explanation of international income differences has led to a literature that considers a variety of growth models with multiple equilibria for example azariadis and drazen 1990 construct an overlapping generations model with two stable pareto rankable equilibria in the inferior equilibrium no agent trades with members of other generations murphy shleifer and vishny 1989 build a model with synergies between industries each industry is profitable only if other industries are operating and there are equilibria where all of the industries operate and other pareto dominated equilibria where none operate galor and zeira 1993 and banerjee et al 2001 show that inequality and differential access to credit can keep an economy in a pareto dominated equilibrium recognizing whether or not an economy has multiple equilibria is important because policy prescriptions differ depending on whether an economy is in an inferior equilibrium or whether it is in an equilibrium that is unique

the effects of rent asymmetries in posted offer markets abstract we report the results of six posted offer market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path to competitive equilibrium the posted offer experiments are compared with twelve double auction experiments reported by smith and williams 1982 results differ markedly across trading institutions unlike trading under double auction rules we cannot reject the proposition that contract price convergence paths are unaffected by the distribution of consumer and producer surplus posted offer contract prices tend to converge to the competitive equilibrium from above regardless of the distribution of the exchange surplus

counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distributions using quantile regression we propose a method to decompose the changes in the wage distribution over a period of time in several factors contributing to those changes the method is based on the estimation of marginal wage distributions consistent with a conditional distribution estimated by quantile regression as well as with any hypothesized distribution for the covariates comparing the marginal distributions implied by different distributions for the covariates one is then able to perform counterfactual exercises the proposed methodology enables the identification of the sources of the increased wage inequality observed in most countries specifically it decomposes the changes in the wage distribution over a period of time into several factors contributing to those changes namely by discriminating between changes in the characteristics of the working population and changes in the returns to these characteristics we apply this methodology to portuguese data for the period 1986 1995 and find that the observed increase in educational levels contributed decisively towards greater wage inequality copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

forced information disclosure and the fallacy of transparency in markets a theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences for example wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility demand is disclosed to producers experimental markets studied here featured decentralized privately negotiated contracts typical of the wholesale electricity markets two conclusions emerge i such markets generally converge to the competitive equilibrium and ii forced disclosure works to the disadvantage of the disclosing side information disclosure would result in higher wholesale and thus higher retail electricity prices

gender wage differentials and discrimination in the new south africa research into discrimination within south africa sa has focused on racial issues with gender issues being largely ignored this study aims to estimate gender wage differentials and through decomposition analysis understand the different problems faced by white black coloured and indian asian in 1995 it is found that white and asian females suffer greater gender discrimination than their black and coloured counterparts which could be a signal to future problems black and coloured females may encounter the largest gender wage differential is faced by white females whilst the lowest is encountered by coloured and black females a possible explanation for this finding is the low subsistence wages that the black and coloured population groups command relative to other population groups

is there a glass ceiling over europe exploring the gender pay gap across the wages distribution using harmonised data from the european union household panel we analyse gender pay gaps by sector across the wages distribution for ten countries we find that the mean gender pay gap in the raw data typically hides large variations in the gap across the wages distribution we use quantile regression qr techniques to control for the effects of individual and job characteristics at different points of the distribution and calculate the part of the gap attributable to differing returns between men and women we find that first gender pay gaps are typically bigger at the top of the wage distribution a finding that is consistent with the existence of glass ceilings for some countries gender pay gaps are also bigger at the bottom of the wage distribution a finding that is consistent with sticky floors third the gender pay gap is typically higher at the top than the bottom end of the wage distribution suggesting that glass ceilings are more prevalent than sticky floors and that these prevail in the majority of our countries fourth the gender pay gap differs significantly across the public and the private sector wages distribution for each of our eu countries

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

evidence on new technologies and wage inequality in france using individual data from the french labour force survey and the complementary survey on working conditions for 1998 we analyse earnings inequalities along the wage distribution between workers using novel information and communication technologies ict at their job and those not using them we estimate quantile regressions with technological dummies and carry out a decomposition analysis both at the aggregate level and by occupations at the aggregate level most of the wage gap between both populations is explained by the divergence in their labour characteristics in jobs where ict are not very diffused the technological premium is larger than in jobs characterized by a large presence of novel technologies whereas in the former type of jobs the technological premium is mainly justified by a divergence in the labour market characteristics between ict users and nonusers in positions characterized by a wide presence of novel technologies the technological premium responds rather to a divergence in

cognitive ability and earnings performance evidence from double auction market experiments abstract our goal in this paper is to understand how heterogeneity in people s cognitive ability leads to different market behavior and thus different market performance to do this subjects with heterogeneous working memory capacity wmc were placed in a double auction environment to compete against artificial traders we considered two treatments which differ in the artificial traders the artificial traders are truth telling in the first treatment but demonstrate adaptive trading behavior in the second one our results show that working memory capacity has a significantly positive effect on subjects market performance and the performance gap caused by cognitive ability while narrowing over time remains significant by the end of experiment we find that differences in subjects performance resulted from their behavior high wmc subjects were better at exploiting extra profit opportunities and avoiding unprofitable transactions and they tended to underbid more than those with lower wmc among the five constituent abilities of wmc we find that it is distinctive abilities which contribute to the overall significance in these two treatments for the treatment involving truth telling traders the relevant factor is the ability of simultaneous processing and storing information whereas for the treatment involving adaptive traders the only one that matters is subjects ability to coordinate elements into structures

a framework to analyze the performance of thinly traded agricultural commodity markets thinly traded agricultural commodity markets are a concern for farmers and policy markers due to the belief that prices in these settings will be highly volatile subject to manipulation and incapable of efficiently allocating resources analysis of thin agricultural markets has to date been impeded by lack of an appropriate analytical framework from which to study their behavior in this paper we propose the modern agricultural markets mam framework as an appropriate paradigm through which to view and evaluate thin markets we argue that thinly traded markets that meet key conditions required for a mam will generate maximum economic surplus and enable farmers to earn at least a competitive return on their investments in the absence of these conditions however the concerns known as the thin market problem have validity we set forth the mam framework interpret it in a thin market context and conduct several brief case studies of thin markets to illustrate use of the approach and draw some key inferences about these markets behavior the analysis indicates that appropriate government policies directed to thin markets are those that facilitate their convergence to mam status but in reality key policies under recent consideration would have the opposite effect

vote trading with and without party leaders two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority individuals have different privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money we study theoretically and experimentally the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market the theory has strong predictions in both cases trading falls short of full efficiency but for opposite reasons with group leaders the minority wins too rarely with market trades the minority wins too often as a result with group leaders vote trading improves over no trade with market trades vote trading can be welfare reducing the theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data

labour market discrimination are there significant differences between the various decomposition procedures economists have usually called the proportion of the average wage gap between two groups which could not be explained by individual characteristics discrimination recently several theories have suggested that labour market discrimination on the one hand lowers the wages of the minority group and on the other leads to higher pay for the majority group in a recent survey of the various methods used to decompose the overall wage differential between two groups oaxaca and ransom compared five approaches in the contexts of race and gender discrimination this paper checks whether there are significant differences between the various decomposition procedures which have appeared in the literature the tests are based on bootstrap techniques

noncooperative bargaining hostages and optimal asset ownership this paper re examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels it obtains some results which contradict findings by sanford j grossman oliver d hart and john moore in particular it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser s investment incentive the difference between this paper and those authors papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining this paper also clarifies the role of relationship specific investments as a cause of integration copyright 1998 by american economic association

collusion exclusion and inclusion in random order bargaining this paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random order value e g the shapley value collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them say i this contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion which lets i exclude j s resource but not use it himself and inclusion which lets i use j s resource but not exclude j from it this representation yields a third difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion generalizing existing results for specific games namely collusion is profitable unprofitable when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced increased by other players

walrasian tâtonnement auctions on the tokyo grain exchange the tokyo grain exchange tge s itayose mechanism provides the opportunity to analyze functioning walrasian t tonnement auctions wta in 15 677 auctions conducted over 1997 1998 for corn and redbean futures contracts price formation is unexpectedly similar to that observed in continuous double auctions provisional prices and pledges are informative in contrast to behavior observed in experiments few pledges are deceptive because the traders participate repeatedly and because the auctioneer has flexibility when changing the provisional price and ending the auction both the risk of the auction ending and the more equitable dispersion of information increase depth and the speed at which information is embodied in price

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

papers in experimental economics competitive market institutions double auctions vs sealed bid offer auctions consider a market with the following characteristics 1 privacy that is each agent knows only his own valuation or cost conditions 2 exchange follows the rules of the oral double auction that is buyers freely announce bids or accept offers and sellers freely announce offers or accept bids 3 aggregate market supply and demand per trading period is stationary for at least two to three periods and 4 there are at least four buyers and as many sellers the literature reporting the results of a large number of experimental markets with these characteristics documents what appears to be a remarkably rapid convergence to a competitive equilibrium ce however any claim of double auction da convergence to the ce can only have meaning in one of three senses i the ce is attained immediately ii after t periods of trading some measure of the market s state such as mean price is nearer relative to experimental sampling variability to a ce than to some distinct alternative equilibrium such as a monopoly or nash equilibrium iii after t periods of trading this measure is nearer to a ce in da experimental markets than in markets organized under a different institution of contract for example a sealed bid auction since everything from electrons and the stars to rats and people yield state measures subject to error or random variation the deterministic criterion i can have no serious scientific standing by such criteria any hypothesis can be rejected and there could be no science of physics biology or economics 2 with the exception of certain very simple markets such as single object auctions or certain idealized markets such as the cournot quantity adjuster model economics has only two concepts of equilibrium monopoly and competitive the only formal model of da trading that has been proposed see david easley and john ledyard p 6 predicts stochastic convergence in finite time with probability one to a ce hence the only test alternative to the ce research hypothesis in da markets is a monopoly or monopsony equilibrium experimentalists have not reported statistical tests of the ce professor department of economics university of arizona assistant professor department of economics indiana university instructor department of economics university of arizona and sandia national laboratories albuquerque nm respectively we are indebted to the national science foundation for research support and to art denzau and mort kamien for helpful comments there is an early and recently growing body of experimental evidence for convergence to a competitive equilibrium under double auction rules the earliest evidence contained in experiments initiated in january 1956 is reported in smith 1962 1964 1965 1976 however these early experiments used between twenty and fifty or so participant buyers and sellers because in keeping with prevailing professional beliefs it was thought that a ce was unlikely to be approached unless numbers were quite large using large numbers was not unreasonable since it is a good beginning procedure to give a theory whatever is believed to be its best shot more recent evidence using six buyers six sellers and two traders in speculative da markets with cyclical demand is reported by r m miller charles plott and smith and williams 1979 for evidence from a comparison of oral and computerized da experiments with four buyers and four sellers see williams 1980 for further evidence in the context of the study of price controls see m isaac and plott 1981b and smith and williams 1981b in the context of a conspiracy study see isaac and plott 1981a in the context of comparisons between da and posted offer pricing see jon ketcham smith and williams in the context of a study of four variations on da rules see smith and williams 1980 all of these more recent papers report double auction experiments using no more than four buyers and four sellers 2as frederick mosteller once noted if you wanted to reject the inverse square law of attraction try tossing a sheet of paper out the window

uncertainty and partial adjustment in double auction markets abstract a model is presented of price determination in double auction markets the framework is contrasted with naive autoregressive models of price behavior implications of model choice are illustrated with the use of market experiments from several institutions

evidence on the glass ceiling effect in france using matched worker firm data in this article we investigate the relevance of the glass ceiling hypothesis in france according to which there exist larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution using a matched worker firm data set of about 1 30 000 employees and 14 000 employers we estimate quantile regressions and rely on a principal component analysis to summarize information specific to the firms our different results show that accounting for firm related characteristics reduces the gender earnings gap at the top of the distribution but the latter still remains much higher at the top than at the bottom furthermore a quantile decomposition shows that the gender wage gap is mainly due to differences in the returns to observed characteristics rather than in differences in characteristics between men and women

marshall and walras disequilibrium trades and the dynamics of equilibration in the continuous double auction market prices and quantities converge to the theoretical competitive equilibria in continuous double auction markets the double auction is not a tatonnement mechanism disequilibrium trades take place the absence of any influence of disequilibrium trades which have the capacity to change the theoretical equilibrium appears to be due to a property found in the marshallian model of single market adjustments the marshallian model incorporates a principle of self organizing coordination that mysteriously determines the sequence in which specific pairs of agents trade in an environment in which market identities and agent preferences are not public disequilibrium trades along the marshallian path of trades do not change the theoretical equilibrium the substance of this paper is to demonstrate that the marshallian principle captures a natural tendency of the adjustment in single continuous double auction markets and to suggest how it takes place the marshallian model of quantity adjustment and the walrasian model of market price adjustment can be seen as companion theories that explain the allocation and price processes of a market the marshallian model explains the evolution of the allocation who will meet and trade and the walrasian excess demand explains the evolution of prices when they do

vertical foreclosure versus downstream competition with capital precommitment abstract the recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level we allow the upstream firm to make an ex ante capital precommitment we show that if integration is outlawed the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device to restrict output we show that this alternative may be socially less efficient than vertical integration

marshallian vs walrasian stability in an experimental market the experiments discussed below are an attempt to examine concepts of stability as found in economic textbooks two concepts of stability which stem from two different concepts of market adjustment seem to have dominated thinking whilst these two concepts are typically called walras stability and marshall stability some controversy exists over the extent to which these two models represent their respective thinking no doubt the current formal statements of the theories reflect an evolution of the ideas through the work of many theorists the terminology is retained for convenience regardless of their origins these two concepts lead to competing hypotheses about the conditions under which market instability will be observed so the subject is a natural one for experimental investigation furthermore since this is the first experimental examination of the stability of equilibria the strategy is to inquire about stability in the context of these two classical models and to avoid the temptation to attempt to extend them or integrate them with more modern theory the old models have not been checked they seem to be an appropriate place to start

testing the boundaries of the double auction the effects of complete information and market power abstract we report boundary experiments testing the robustness of price convergence in double auction markets for non durable goods in which there is extreme earnings inequality at the competitive equilibrium ce following up on a conjecture by smith 1976a we test whether the well known equilibrating power of the double auction institution is robust to the presence of complete information about traders values and costs and the presence of symmetric market power we find that complete information is insufficient to impede convergence to ce prices however introducing market power consistently causes prices to deviate from the ce whether or not subjects possess complete information our design highlights the value of boundary experiments in understanding how market institutions shape behavior and our findings help delineate the limits of the double auction institution to generate competitive outcomes

new evidence on sex segregation and sex differences in wages from matched employee employer data we use new matched employer employee data to estimate the contributions of sex segregation and wage differences by sex within occupation industry establishment and occupation establishment cells to the overall sex gap in wages in contrast to earlier data used to study this question our data cover all industries and occupations across all regions of the united states we find that segregation of women into lower paying occupations industries establishments and occupations within establishments accounts for a sizable fraction of the sex gap in wages nonetheless approximately one half of the sex gap in wages remains attributable to the individual s sex

the hayek hypothesis in experimental auctions institutional effects and market power the hayek hypothesis in experimental auctions institutional effects and market power we report twelve market experiments utilizing a seller market power supply and demand structure where two of five sellers can unilaterally increase their profit by withholding supply the data indicate that both the double auction and posted offer institutions result in traders extracting the bulk of the potential gains from exchange in the market however prices generally occur above the competitive equilibrium prediction market power in the form of strategic supply withholding does not appear to be responsible for the supra competitive prices i introduction one important result arising from experimental market research is that the information flows and contracting rules which define the institutional structure of a market can exert a pronounced influence on market performance such institutional features may be more important than some traditional structural characteristics in determining whether market outcomes will correspond to the predictions of the competitive model in particular a large and growing body of experimental data suggests that markets can generate efficient outcomes even when there are a relatively small number of buyers and sellers with incomplete information on the underlying structure of the market based on evidence from a wide variety of experimental double auction markets vernon smith 1982 167 has expressed this more formally as the hayek hypothesis markets economize on information in the sense that strict privacy together with the public messages of the market are sufficient to produce efficient ce competitive equilibrium outcomes in this statement however the notion of an efficient ce outcome could be interpreted as 1 a simple efficiency claim that all exchange surplus will be extracted or 2 a price claim that all exchange surplus will be extracted via trades at the competitive equilibrium price a recent study by holt langan and villamil 1986 hereafter hlv examines the validity of the hayek hypothesis using the double auction institution and a market structure designed to provide a rather difficult test for the competitive model hlv s market power design provides a subset of sellers with an incentive to unilaterally generate a price increase via the strategic withholding of supply the resulting price deviation from the competitive equilibrium is substantial but results in a relatively small loss of market efficiency thus the price interpretation of the hayek hypothesis is violated in this design if holders of market power recognize their position and successfully affect prices to their advantage the efficiency interpretation however will still hold approximately even with the successful exercise of market power in fact the price interpretation of the hayek hypothesis tends to break down in hlv s markets but the efficiency interpretation tends to hold hlv report deviations from the competitive equilibrium price consistent with the exercise of market power in three of five seller market power experiments they also conjecture that deviations from the competitive equilibrium may increase as participants become more experienced with the trading institution this paper reports the results of twelve experiments that build on hlv s research our experiments compare market performance in hlv s seller market power smp design using both the double auction and posted offer trading institutions our purpose in conducting these experiments is twofold first we are interested in examining the effects of changes in trading institutions on deviations from the competitive equilibrium price in the smp design second to the extent that competitive equilibrium price deviations are observed we are interested in assessing whether the exercise of market power in the form of strategic withholding is the source of these deviations

extreme walrasian dynamics the gale example in the lab we study the classic gale 1963 economy using laboratory markets tatonnement theory predicts prices will diverge from an equitable interior equilibrium towards infinity or zero depending only on initial prices the inequitable equilibria determined by these dynamics give all gains from exchange to one side of the market our results show surprisingly strong support for these predictions in most sessions one side of the market eventually outgains the other by more than twenty times leaving the disadvantaged side to trade for mere pennies we also find preliminary evidence that these dynamics are sticky resisting exogenous interventions designed to reverse their trajectories

price formation in double auction markets abstract this paper reports 14 laboratory experiments that examine existing theories of the price formation process in the continuous double auction the experiments feature random values and costs and therefore a new price formation observation each period we find that efficiency is high and rises with experience in this environment we also find that trades with greater exchange surplus tend to occur earlier in the period that increased trader experience reduces an anomalous intertemporal arbitrage opportunity observed previously and that only when traders are very experienced does exchange surplus accrue disproportionately to the side of the market with a smaller number of traders

demand revelation and tâtonnement auctions abstract the t tonnement process is inherently a price taking process an auctioneer calls out a price and traders respond with a quantity signal this t tonnement groping process contrasts with a double auction continuous bid ask process that utilizes price signals do traders in this institution fully reveal quantity or do they underreveal affecting price quantity and efficiency in the experiments reported here traders playing against a fully revealing automaton systematically attempt to manipulate price by underrevealing quantity bid or offered

instability of equilibria in experimental markets upward sloping demands externalities and fad like incentives the objective of the paper is to study markets in which the value of the activity to any one person increases with the level with which the activity is undertaken by others the general interpretation could be fads mimicking behavior or some sort of belief formation process in which the beliefs or expectations of agents about some underlying state of nature are influenced by the buying behavior of other agents the result is to create a market that can be modeled as having an upward sloping market demand curve the questions posed are 1 in the fad like environment does the classical concept of equilibrium as an equating of market demand and market supply accurately predict market behavior ii can both stable and unstable equilibria be observed and iii which of the two classical concepts of stability best describes the conditions under which instability is obeserved under the conditions of a fad like demand side externality in a market organized by the multiple unit double auction muda market equilibration occurs at a point where demand equals supply the disequilibrium behavior follows the dynamics of the marshallian model of dynamics as opposed to the walrasian model these results confirm and extend the major findings of plott and george who studied a similar environment with a downward sloping supply

a sticky floors model of promotion pay and gender abstract according to raw data from the british household panel survey full time women are more likely than men to be promoted controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity we find that women are promoted at roughly the same rate as men but may receive smaller wage increases consequent upon promotion to help explain these phenomena we construct a new sticky floors model of pay and promotion in our model women are just as likely as men to be promoted but find themselves stuck at the bottom of the wage scale for the new grade

organizational change and skill accumulation we model the links between skills and changes in work organization as the proportion of skilled workers increases the economy travels through a sequence of organizational equilibria we show that as the relative supply of skills increases the organization of work becomes more decentralized both skilled and unskilled workers become more autonomous and perform a wider range of tasks decentralization spreads across firms at the expense of the old centralized organization based on a strict division of labor moreover as firms switch to decentralization their employment structure becomes more homogeneous and wage inequality stops decreasing these predictions are compared with empirical evidence based on french establishment level data and we find support for both of them this suggests that the long term increase in the skill level of the workforce may have been one important factor driving the recent introduction of new work practices by a large number of firms

advance production in experimental markets the effects of advance production in posted offer and double auction markets are investigated previously observed differences between these institutions in mean contract prices and in the distribution of producers and consumers surpluses under the production to demand condition disappear when sellers make output decisions and incur production costs prior to the start of trading the double auction institution remains more efficient under advance production the results suggest that the differential effects of alternative trading institutions on market outcomes may be partially offset by the production conditions characterizing a market

can supply and demand parameters be recovered from data generated by market institutions the relative accuracy of estimators in recovering supply and demand parameters can depend on the market institutions that generate the data the parameters of known supply and demand functions are estimated with data from laboratory market experiments with human buyers and sellers single equation estimators dominate simultaneous equations estimators in recovering supply and demand parameters from posted offer market data the inaccuracy of simultaneous equations estimators with posted offer data can be explained by the implications for error distributions of the inherent properties of this market institution simultaneous equations estimators perform better with closing price data from double auction markets

competitive equilibrium convergence in a posted offer market with extreme earnings inequities abstract we present the results of five laboratory posted offer experiments in which the competitive equilibrium model predicts that all exchange profits are received by one side of the market thus defining a boundary condition price converges to the prediction more slowly when buyers rather than sellers receive the exchange surplus apparently due to the increased market power of sellers in this trading mechanism a model of the seller s decision in this market is developed to explain this result we also observe costly signalling and tacit collusion in our experiments

tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories experimental evidence from competitive markets abstract a basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax by contrast policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence using competitive laboratory markets i test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies for sufficiently large markets the results show strong support for both theories there is little to no evidence even in the short run of the popular misperception that statutory incidence equals economic incidence in smaller markets in which competitive forces are weaker and relative bargaining strengths may play a role the evidence for tax incidence equivalence is weaker as minor price discrepancies may persist between markets

downstream mergers and producer s capacity choice why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice in this article the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer s capacity choice was studied contrary to conventional wisdom i find a nonmonotonic relationship horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high this result is explained by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects a change in holdup and a change in bargaining erosion

robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities the paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and n agents when each agent s utility depends on the principal s unobservable contracts with other agents we show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents beliefs this bound yields for example competitive convergence as n in environments in which an appropriately defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists we also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal

production trade prices exchange rates and equilibration in large experimental economies we study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are international in economic structure with multiple input output and foreign exchange markets in operation the economies have twenty one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fifty agents the economies are characterized by several hundred equations in spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market level variables empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described

global instability in experimental general equilibrium the scarf example scarf 1960 proposed a market environment and a model of dynamic adjustment in which the standard tatonnement price adjustment process orbits around rather than converges to the competitive equilibrium hirota 1981 characterized the price paths by the configuration of endowments we explore the predictions of scarf s model in a nontatonnement experimental double auction we find that the average transaction prices in each period do follow the path predicted by the scarf and hirota models when the model predicts prices will converge to the competitive equilibrium our data converge when the model predicts prices will orbit our data orbit the equilibrium and in the direction predicted by the model moreover we observe a weak tendency for prices within a period to follow the path predicted by the model

the effects of rent asymmetries in markets characterized by advance production abstract the results of 40 controlled market sessions are reported the effects of advance production and the distribution of the market surplus between buyers and sellers on the relative performance of posted offer and double auction markets are compared with the relative performance of posted offer and double auction institutions in markets with production to order performance differences between the two institutions across production conditions as the surplus distributions are varied are similar but not identical the distribution of surplus appears to have an effect on the performance measures in advance production markets

does asset ownership always motivate managers outside options and the property rights theory of the firm this paper studies the grossman hart moore ghm property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating offers bargaining when managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation the ghm results obtain if taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining outcomes are very different sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with sometimes independent assets should be owned together sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

strategic trading in a two sided foreign exchange auction abstract the market microstructure chosen for foreign exchange markets can influence trading volumes and equilibrium exchange rates with emerging markets and developing countries increasingly utilizing two sided auctions we show that the choice of the discrete t tonnement auction creates incentives for strategic behavior among market participants theoretical predictions on strategic under revelation of demand or supply positions are supported empirically using detailed data from a rare example of a t tonnement market the moscow interbank currency exchange our results suggest that market microstructures should be introduced alongside more traditional asset market fundamentals in studies of foreign exchange market activity especially in developing countries

price dynamics in general equilibrium experiments general equilibrium ge theory faces several related challenges classical theories of out of equilibrium adjustment are intuitive but implausibly centralized further standard restrictions on individual preferences place little structure on aggregate excess demand functions amongst other issues this fact implies that economies can be unstable under classical dynamics and thus instability appears to be an unavoidable feature of ge theory this paper recounts laboratory studies of ge environments which reveal that classical theories of dynamics do in fact organize market activity surprisingly well these experiments suggest that the walrasian auctioneer for example appears to be a constructive abstraction and that instability should be accommodated within theory rather than circumscribed laboratory applications of ge theory focused on issues beyond stability and dynamics are also briefly surveyed

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

introduction symposium on noncooperative bargaining this symposium includes 12 models of bargaining each of the following characteristics is shared by most of them 1 bargaining is noncooperative within a set of rules governing the process of negotiation the nash program 2 bargaining is bilateral 3 some or all of the traders are incompletely informed the authors explore the existence multiplicity and efficiency of equilibria and the plausibility of equilibria as descriptions of observed behavior in addition some authors discuss the effects of nonbinding preplay communication cheap talk the effects of increasing the number of players and alternatives to the nash equilibrium framework

the competitive market paradox abstract the competitive market model is paradoxical in perfect competition agents cannot influence price they only select an output quantity such passive behavior does not conform to the intuitive notion of competition this paper describes an experiment which demonstrates that near or even at a competitive equilibrium price competition is undiminished a substantial difference between the performance of sellers and buyers frequently results from this vigorous competition even with low price variability and approximate efficiency in double auction experiment sessions conducted with both automated and human agents exogenous variation of the pace of asks and bids of automated agents demonstrates that the performance difference between sellers and buyers results primarily from a difference between the pace of asks and bids if the buyers pace is slower than sellers pace buyers make price concessions less frequently than sellers so that prices move below the equilibrium price then more buyers become active and fewer sellers remain active prices stabilize when changes to the numbers of active buyers and sellers offset the superior bargaining capability of one side or the other in competitive equilibrium to a first approximation agents are price takers but that does not preclude vigorous competition competitive behavior moves to the dimension of bargaining pace

organisational change technology employment and skills an empirical study of french manufacturing this paper analyses the correlations between technological change organisational change and skill change using a survey on organisational change in manufacturing firms conducted in 1993 considerable diversity is allowed for in terms of the measure of technological and organisational change and the analysis shows a positive correlation between technological change and reorganisations whatever their types the paper then analyses the relationships between these changes and the employment behaviour of firms it shows that changes in the required skills and in the occupational structure of firms are more closely connected to organisational than to technological change although organisational change affects the work content and skill requirements of blue collar workers it is mainly indirect workers that are affected in terms of the number employed finally the analysis shows that technology tends to stabilise the workforce whereas the move towards the model of flexible enterprise favours its renewal copyright 2003 oxford university press

countervailing power and dynamic efficiency this paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency we consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier s incentives to invest in lower marginal cost we challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers incentives instead we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier more on his toes and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering in terms of both price and quality relative to buyers alternative options

the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade an experimental study a study is a limited exploration into the relationship between the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade and the resulting market performance laboratory experimental methods are applied to separate competing theories the competitive model predicts well relative to cartel models nevertheless when measurements are taken relative to the performance of markets where conspiracies are not possible the effects of attempted conspiracies can be determined

do traders strategically time their pledges during real world walrasian auctions abstract experimental research suggests the walrasian t tonnement auction encourages traders to under reveal preferences even encouraging initial pledges contrary to true desires because pledges are not binding we analyze the timing and characteristics of individual pledges and trades during 9604 auctions for redbeans conducted by the tokyo grain exchange we find no evidence of contrarian pledging and little evidence of under revelation as many traders over reveal as under reveal most traders pledge seriously from the beginning despite the considerable heterogeneity in pledging behavior across individual traders these differences appear to have no relationship with traders profits nor do they appear to affect the achievement of equilibrium

avoidable cost ride a double auction roller coaster the double auction trading institution has been highly efficient across diverse marginal cost market structures whether human subjects or zero intelligence robots populated those markets accordingly many researchers suspect that double auction performance transcends market structure and agent strategy but the authors show that large avoidable costs undermine the efficiency and stability of human subject double auctions and these low human efficiencies are simultaneously well above zero intelligence efficiencies their results dramatically illustrate the potential havoc wrought by highly competitive institutions when they must cope with nonconvex technologies copyright 1996 by american economic association

designing call auction institutions is double dutch the best this paper is an exercise in the institutional design of call markets schwartz i988 whitcomb i985 using the experimental laboratory as a test bed we evaluate the comparative performance1 of three new institutions for exchange when all trades are simultaneously executed at a uniform price call markets have been used on many european and israeli stock exchanges and for the daily opening on the new york american and tokyo stock exchanges in all outstanding listed issues in some versions the bids offers are verbal in others written in some cases the procedure is walrasian orders may be modified after a trial price is given whitcomb i985 also see jarecki i976 for the walrasian mechanism implemented with a unanimity stopping rule in the london bullion market in france new issues are offered in fixed quantity using modified uniform price sealed bid auction rules mcdonald and jaquillat i974 the rules of trading on all these exchanges are subject to incremental adjustment in the light of experience in recognition of this continuing adaptation the chicago mercantile exchange publishes its consolidated rules as a loose leaf three ring notebook these considerations motivate our interest in examining three potential new exchange mechanisms as their names suggest these institutions are generalisations of auctions which already exist in the field 2 double dutch dd is a generalisation of the dutch auction double english ee a generalisation of the english auction and dutch english de a special form of tatonnement using a single clock which is a dutch clock to buyers and an english clock to sellers our generalisations make the supply quantity endogenous thus broadening the scope of english and dutch auctions to markets in which both buyers and sellers are active in the exchange process two cited disadvantages of sealed bid offer call markets schwartz i988 pp 442 6 are corrected by

geographical indications and the competitive provision of quality in agricultural markets the economics of geographical indications gis is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture it is assumed that certification costs are needed for gis to serve as collective credible quality certification devices and production of high quality product is endogenously determined we find that gis can support a competitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains although they fall short of delivering the constrained first best the main beneficiaries are consumers producers may also accrue some benefit if production of the high quality products draws on scarce factors that they own copyright 2008 oxford university press

the principles of exchange rate determination in an international finance experiment this paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the behavior of economies with prominent features of international finance two countries each with its own currency were created international trade could take place only through the operation of markets for currency the law of one price and the flow of funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior of the economies prices of goods as well as the exchange rate evolve over time toward the predictions of the models however both the law of one price and purchasing power parity can be rejected for reasons that do not appear in the literature patterns of international trade were as predicted by the law of comparative advantage

employment vulnerability and earnings in urban west africa this article develops indicators of vulnerability in employment in seven economic capitals of west africa and studies their links with individual incomes quantitative distributional and qualitative analyses show that vulnerability compensating mechanism is mainly seen in the informal sector in the upper tail of the earnings distribution and particularly in the circumstance of visible underemployment employment vulnerability is not compensated for the poorest workers in the private sector long job queues and weak institutional protection of workers may have reduced bargaining power in the formal sector

market stability backward bending supply in a laboratory experimental market 1999 presidential address western economic association the paper investigates the stability properties of markets with backward bending supply curves parameters are chosen so that the two classic models of price dynamics the walrasian model and the marshallian model give opposite predictions the results are 1 market instability can be observed 2 in the backward bending case stability is captured by the walrasian model and the marshallian model of dynamics is rejected previous experiments have demonstrated that the marshallian model works in the forward falling case thus which theory of dynamics is appropriate for a market depends upon the underlying reasons for demand and supply shapes

papers in experimental economics on nonbinding price controls in a competitive market interest in the effect of nonbinding price controls on double auction markets stems from two primary considerations the double auction institution converges to a competitive allocation more rapidly and with fewer participating agents than any other institution with which it has been compared see smith et al one way to improve our understanding of this important property is to determine what conditions if any can interfere with or retard this convergence process nonbinding price controls represent a condition that may affect this convergence process hence if such effects can be documented they will provide a body of data that any future proposed model of the double auction process should be able to explain a second reason for studying the effect of nonbinding controls on the double auction is practical the organized commodity exchanges often set limits on price fluctuations during any single day when prices at any point during a day rise above qr fall below the closing prices of the preceding day by more than the amount of the limit no further trading for that day is permitted walter labys p 162 consequently commodity trading frequently occurs at prices near the level of nonbinding price floors or ceilings mark issac and charles plott report the results of twelve exploratory experiments in which various price control constraints are imposed on double auction markets their two principal conclusions can be summarized as follows 1 the hypothesis is rejected that nonbinding price controls that is price ceilings above or price floors below the competitive equilibrium ce will serve as a focal point or signalling price on which sellers and buyers will key their contracts 2 inconclusive evidence is presented in support of the hypothesis that nonbinding controls near the ce will bias prices below ce when there is a price ceiling and above ce when there is a price floor support for this second hypothesis is not conclusive because some experimental markets show a tendency to converge from below and others from above depending upon the relative bargaining strength of buyers as against sellers thus sampling variation among subjects can yield a group in which buyers sellers are able to make contracts at an average price below above ce for several periods of trading consequently in an experiment in which there is a price ceiling floor five cents above below ce and in which contract prices are observed to occur below above ce one cannot determine conclusively whether the observed effect was due to the nonbinding price control or to the bargaining characteristics of the market participants we report below an experimental design developed for the purpose of separating these confounding factors and allowing the effect of nonbinding controls to be isolated the results of sixteen experiments strongly support the hypothesis that markets with a nonbinding price ceiling floor near ce will converge from below above relative to any otherwise identifiable tendency to converge from below above an analysis of the effect of a nonbinding price ceiling floor on the distributions of bids and offers reveals the cause of this bias ceilings limit the bargaining strategies of sellers especially but also that of buyers while floors have the opposite effect thus in the absence of price controls double auction trading is characterized by a process in which sellers typically make concessions from offer prices well above ce while buyers most often concede from bid prices well below ce a price ceiling truncates seller offer prices at the ceiling requir university of arizona and indiana university respectively research support by the national science foundation is gratefully acknowledged

market power in oral double auctions this paper reports the results of a series of oral double auction experiments in which some traders possess market power a market is set up in which the configuration of the supply and demand curves leads to an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in their abilities to influence transactions prices this market structure does not always lead to convergence to the competitive equilibrium price despite the competitive nature of the oral double auction institution the nonconvergence occurs most frequently in the experiments involving experienced subjects