inflation taxation and welfare with externalities and leisure this paper examines how inflation taxation affects resource allocation and welfare in a neoclassical growth model with leisure a production externality and money in the utility function switching from consumption taxation to inflation taxation to finance government spending reduces real money balances relative to income but increases consumption labor capital and output the net welfare effect of this switch depends crucially on the strength of the externality and on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution while it is always negative without the externality it is likely to be positive with a strong externality and elastic intertemporal substitution

pareto improving campaign finance policy this paper argues that campaign finance policy in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing can be pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters the optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen the argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions

estimating the effect of campaign spending on senate election outcomes using instrumental variables o examine the traditional view that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent spending 7 i reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate s ability to raise campaign funds such as candidate wealth levels hhen the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal in contrast to previous research showing that because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending the incumbent s spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates this article shows that in an average senate election the incumbent s spending advantage yields a 6 increase in the incumbent s vote share that incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform my findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers in american congressional elections incumbents routinely win reelection even in the 1994 republican landslide change in the partisan makeup of congress occurred mainly through open seats switching from the democrats to the republicans a common explanation for high congressional reelection rates is the large campaign spending advantage enjoyed by incumbents it is widely believed that challenger spending is very important but there is surprisingly little evidence in the academic literature that incumbent campaign spending has an important effect on congressional election outcomes in light of the substantial effort incumbents devote to fundraising as well as some nagging methodological questions about existing academic studies the effect of incumbent spending on election outcomes remains an unresolved issue accurately measuring how incumbent spending leads to votes is of obvious importance politicians want to win elections and so if money matters then this will influence their behavior if campaign spending effects are trivial then concerns about politicians being

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

an end use analysis of global food requirements in examining the long term prospects for global food supply and demand the balance of research has favoured the examination of global food supply and not global food demand centre for agricultural and economic development 1967 chou et al 1977 council on environmental quality 1980 crosson and anderson 1992 fao 1993 mitchell and ingco 1993 bongaarts 1994 forecasting of global food demand has been limited to an exploration of alternative assumptions about the growth of incomes prices and population in particular the analysis and forecasting of global food demand has used income and price elasticities estimated from historical data which assume a fixed link between levels of income and levels of food demand for expository purposes this discussion presumes a particular pattern of prices with changing relative prices the link between incomes and food demand is more complicated but this does not change the fundamental argument being made here

money and the welfare cost of inflation in an r d growth model this study analyzes the effects of inflation on r d and innovation driven growth in the theoretical section we incorporate money demand into a quality ladder model with elastic labor supply and derive the following results if the elasticity of substitution between consumption and the real money balance is less greater than unity then r d and output growth are decreasing increasing in inflation if either labor supply is inelastic or the elasticity of substitution between consumption and the real money balance is unity then social welfare monotonically increases as the nominal interest rate approaches zero i e the friedman rule quantitatively decreasing inflation in the us to achieve price stability improves welfare equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of at least 0 5 in the empirical section we use cross country data to establish a negative and statistically significant relationship between inflation and r d

rent seeking and market structure comment if the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government two conditions must be met 1 there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile and 2 the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free rider problem in fund raising this argument though seemingly intuitively appealing has been under recent empirical attack this paper seeks to restore the parapets

electoral contributions and the cost of unpopularity when considering electoral campaigns candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding to offset this unpopularity effect politicians may either demand more money for campaign advertising from these industries in order to persuade less informed voters or shy away from unpopular contributors to avoid losing the support of the informed electorate our model predicts that the first effect dominates and electoral contributions are increasing in industry unpopularity by using u s house elections data and different identification strategies we provide robust evidence in favor of our predictions jel d72 p16

optimal monetary policy and economic growth abstract a question at the center of many analyses of optimal monetary policy is why do central banks never implement the friedman rule to the list of answers to this question we add neoclassical production specifically the tobin effect as one possible explanation to that end we study an overlapping generations economy with capital where limited communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for fiat money we assume a production function with a knowledge externality romer style that nests economies with endogenous growth ak form and those with no long run growth the diamond model the tobin effect is shown to be always operative under crra preferences a mild degree of social increasing returns is sufficient but not necessary for some positive inflation to dominate zero inflation and for the friedman rule to be sub optimal irrespective of the degree of risk aversion

media markets special interests and voters abstract this paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence i use the concentration of campaign contributions from political action committees to proxy for special interests capture of us senate candidates from 1980 to 2002 and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets in state media markets and out of state media markets unlike in state media markets out of state markets focus on neighboring states politics and elections thus if citizens punish political capture increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in state counties relative to the out of state counties where the candidate receives less coverage i find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0 5 to 1 5 percentage points in in state counties relative to the out of state counties robustness checks suggest that these results are not driven by omitted senator characteristics or by differences between in state and out of state counties along dimensions other than the media environment

food losses in food service institutions examples from sweden lowering food losses is a potential measure to overcome hunger and reduce the ecological side effects from the food system however few observations of food losses have been reported in the liter

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

food and life cycle energy inputs consequences of diet and ways to increase efficiency food consumption is one of the most polluting everyday activities when impacts during product life cycles are considered greenhouse gas emissions from the food sector are substantial and need to be lowered to stabilise climate change here we present an inventory of life cycle energy inputs for 150 food items available in sweden and discuss how energy efficient meals and diets can be composed energy inputs in food life cycles vary from 2 to 220 mj per kg due to a multitude of factors related to animal or vegetable origin degree of processing choice of processing and preparation technology and transportation distance daily total life cycle energy inputs for diets with a similar dietary energy consumed by one person can vary by a factor of four from 13 to 51 mj current swedish food consumption patterns result in life cycle energy inputs ranging from 6900 to 21 000 mj per person and year choice of ingredients and gender differences in food consumption patterns explain the differences up to a third of the total energy inputs is related to snacks sweets and drinks items with little nutritional value it is possible to compose a diet compatible with goals for energy efficiency and equal global partition of energy resources however such a diet is far from the swedish average and not in line with current trends

why did the incumbency advantage in u s house elections grow theory a simple rational entry argument suggests that the value of incumbency consists not just of a direct effect reflecting the value of resources such as staff attached to legislative office but also of an indirect effect reflecting the fact that stronger challengers are less likely to contest incumbent held seats the indirect effect is the product of a scare off effect the ability of incumbents to scare off high quality challengers and a quality effect reflecting how much electoral advantage a party accrues when it has an experienced rather than an inexperienced candidate hypothesis the growth of the overall incumbency advantage was driven principally by increases in the quality effect methods we use a simple two equation model estimated by ordinary least squares regression to analyze u s house election data from 1948 to 1990 results most of the increase in the incumbency advantage at least down to 1980 came through increases in the quality effect i e the advantage to the incumbent party of having a low quality challenger this suggests that the task for those wishing to explain the growth in the vote denominated incumbency advantage is to explain why the quality effect grew it also suggests that resource based explanations of the growth in the incumbency advantage cannot provide a full explanation

climate change and dietary choices how can emissions of greenhouse gases from food consumption be reduced abstract results from an analysis of greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption during the life cycle of carrots tomatoes potatoes pork rice and dry peas consumed in sweden are presented and discussed the life cycle is delineated to the part of the production chain prior to purchase by the consumer the study shows that emissions expressed in g co2 equivalents are highest for pork and rice and lowest for potatoes carrots and dry peas the most important stages of emissions in the life cycle are identified for each of the different food items crop farming is the most important stage for rice and tomatoes while rearing of animals is the most important stage for pork and storage is the most important stage for carrots comparison with an energy analysis shows that important stages in the life cycle of food may be under evaluated when energy only is accounted for this may lead to a sub optimisation of pollution control exemplified by the case of transportation also it is shown that the choice of functional unit has a decisive influence on the outcome of the study the recommendation is to compare whole meals or diets with the same nutritional qualities a comparison of four meals composed of the food items under analysis shows that a meal with tomatoes rice and pork has nine times higher emissions than a meal made from potatoes carrots and dry peas emissions of greenhouse gases from consumption patterns based on the food items analysed are compared with an assumed sustainable limit of greenhouse gas emissions the conclusion is that current food consumption patterns in the developed countries exceed the level of sustainability by at least a factor of 4 prospects for achieving sustainable food consumption patterns are questionable in view of current trends in food demand

market structure and campaign contributions does concentration matter a reply economic rents may be obtained through the process of market competition or be obtained by resorting to governmental protection rational firms choose the least costly alternative collusion to obtain governmental protection will be less costly the higher the concentration ceteris paribus however high concentration in itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to induce governmental protection

the sensitivity of an empirical model of married women s hours of work to economic and statistical assumptions this study undertakes a systematic analysis of several theoretic and statistical assumption s used in many empirical models of female labor supply using a singl e data set psid 1975 labor supply data the author is able to replic ate most of the range of estimated income and substitution effects fo und in previous studies in this field he undertakes extensive specif ication tests and finds that most of this range should be rejected du e to statistical and model misspecifications the two most important assumptions appear to be the tobit assumption used to control for sel f selection into the labor force and exogeneity assumptions on the wi fe s wage rate and her labor market experience copyright 1987 by the econometric society

women s liberation what s in it for men the nineteenth century witnessed dramatic improvements in the legal rights of married women given that these changes took place long before women gained the right to vote they amounted to a voluntary renouncement of power by men in this paper we investigate men s incentives for sharing power with women in our model women s legal rights set the marital bargaining power of husbands and wives we show that men face a tradeoff between the rights they want for their own wives namely none and the rights of other women in the economy men prefer other men s wives to have rights because men care about their own daughters and because an expansion of women s rights increases educational investments in children we show that men may agree to relinquish some of their power once technological change increases the importance of human capital we corroborate our argument with historical evidence on the expansion of women s rights in england and the united states

campaign finance and voter welfare with entrenched incumbents two candidates compete for elective office each candidate has information she would like to reveal to the voters but this requires costly advertising the candidates can solicit contributions from interest groups to finance such advertising these contributions are secured by promises to perform favors for the contributors should the candidate win the election voters understand this and elect the candidate they like best taking into account their expectations about promises to special interests there is an incumbency advantage in fundraising which is sometimes so great that the incumbent faces no serious opposition at all introducing partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system while it can reduce welfare in other districts the optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects

the jeffords effect abstract in may 2001 senator james jeffords left the republican party and tipped control of the u s senate to the democrats this paper uses the surprise event to demonstrate what i term the jeffords effect changes in the political landscape have large effects on the market value of firms i use a firm s soft money donations to the national parties as the measure of how the firm aligns itself politically in this event study a firm lost 8 percent of market capitalization the week of jeffords s switch for every 250 000 it gave to the republicans in the previous election cycle on the basis of the point estimates the stock price gain associated with democratic donations is smaller than the loss associated with republican donations but the estimates are consistent with the effects being equal and opposite the results withstand several robustness checks and the effects appear to persist over time

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

growing through cycles the neoclassical growth model focuses on factor accumulation as an engine of growth while the neo schumpetarian growth model stresses innovation this paper argues that these two views of growth may capture different phases of a single growth experience in the model presented below the balanced growth path is unstable and the economy achieves sustainable growth through cycles under an empirically plausible condition perpetually moving back and forth between two phases one phase is characterized by higher output growth higher investment no innovation and a competitive market structure the other phase is characterized by lower output growth lower investment high innovation and a more monopolistic market structure both investment and innovation are essential in sustaining growth indefinitely and yet they move in an asynchronized way only one of them appears to play a dominant role in each phase the economy grows faster along the cycles than along the unstable balanced growth path

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

votes or money theory and evidence from the us congress abstract this paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group s campaign contributions to politicians we uncover a robust hump shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator this pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician thereby increasing contributions but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds thereby decreasing contributions the model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and pac donations and local employment by sector this procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes we find that an additional vote costs a politician on average 145

signaling character in electoral competition we study a one dimensional hotelling downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform this is unobservable to voters character is desirable and a voter s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate s character this structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters since a policy platform affects voters utilities not only directly but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate s character the model generates a number of predictions starting with a failure of the median voter theorem jel d72 d82

growing through cycles in an infinitely lived agent economy abstract this paper extends the analysis of k matsuyama econometrica67 1999 335 347 to the case of an infinitely lived representative agent economy the economy grows endogenously through endogenous fluctuations perpetually moving back and forth between two phases in one phase there is no innovation the market structure is competitive and the economy grows solely by capital accumulation in the other phase new goods are introduced and the market structure is monopolistic in the long run both investment and innovation grow at the same rate but the economy alternates between the periods of high investment and the periods of higher innovation journal of economic literature classification numbers e32 o11

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

an empirical investigation of the strategic use of debt the paper examines the accumulation of debt by swedish local governments i find that right wing governments accumulate more debt when facing a higher probability of defeat whereas the opposite occurs for left wing governments these effects are sizable a right wing government increases its level of debt by 15 percent whereas a left wing government decreases its debt by 11 percent if they are both certain of being replaced as compared to when they are certain of remaining in office the results are consistent with the predictions from a strategic debt model developed by persson and svensson

the determinants of industry political activity 1978 1986 c ampaign contributions made by corporate political action committees pacs are increasingly important and controversial in u s elections influence purchasing is often alleged by pundits and campaign finance reform is continually debated in congress in the academy social scientists have analyzed the allocation of interest group monies and have looked for possible impacts on legislation few however have tried to explain the total contributions of economic interest groups we shall analyze variations in contributions across industries and over time with an empirical model based on organizationally constrained profit maximizing behavior we assume that corporate pac contributions in an industry are raised to enhance industry profits subject to the constraints of organization costs and freeriding incentives our empirical work covers 124 industries over five election cycles from 1978 through 1986 both the costs and benefits of political activity vary across industries we argue that the benefits of political action are determined by direct contact with the government as a regulator or purchaser of industry output by government s ability to ameliorate adverse market conditions and by the industry s ability to solve collective action problems without government assistance the costs of industry political action arise mainly from collective action problems because effective political activity often requires concerted action by the constituent firms in each industry we also make a methodological contribution previous studies use statistical techniques that suffer from sample selectivity bias or else force the probability of acting politically to be explained by the same set of coefficients as is the amount of action taken we explain and employ a technique that accounts for both problems the results are consistent with the theses that industries follow investment oriented goals in deciding the amount of political action to undertake and that collective action problems are important constraints on industry political activity we can explain between 60 and 80 of the variation in contributions in our sample first we review existing work on corporate political activity particularly papers examining patterns of aggregate pac spending by industry then we present an organization cost constrained industryprofit maximizing model based on a comparison between an idealized zero organization cost industry and the more realistic case where organizing collective action is difficult the independent variables used in the analysis are also discussed and defined next we discuss the dependent variable and total industry contributions and explain our statistical method then the results are presented followed by a discussion of industry structure and political activity to make clear how our results can explain different contribution patterns we give examples using five actual industries

campaign advertising and voter welfare this paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it an electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players many voters two candidates and one interest group the group has non verifiable insider information on the candidates quality and on the basis of this information offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position candidates spend the contributions they receive on non directly informative advertising this paper shows that 1 a separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive 2 although voters are fully rational a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare improving and 3 split contributions may arise in equilibrium and if they arise too often they are detrimental to voters

money and growth through innovation cycles with leisure we study monetary policy with growth through innovation cycles and leisure if consumption is cash constrained increasing money growth for lower income taxes increases labor output investment innovation and growth and amplifies fluctuations on a period two cycle path it induces convergence to the balanced growth path at sufficiently high money growth rates if investment for innovation and intermediate production is also cash constrained the effects of money on labor investment innovation and growth become negative at sufficiently high money growth rates

coherent arbitrariness stable demand curves without stable preferences economic theories of valuation generally assume that prices of commodities and assets are derived from underlying fundamental values for example in finance theory asset prices are believed to reflect the market estimate of the discounted present value of the asset s payoff stream in labor theory the supply of labor is established by the tradeoff between the desire for consumption and the displeasure of work finally and most importantly for this chapter consumer microeconomics assumes that the demand curves for consumer products chocolates cds movies vacations drugs and so forth can be ultimately traced to the valuation of pleasures that consumers anticipate receiving from these products because it is difficult as a rule to measure fundamental values directly empirical tests of economic theory typically examine whether the effects of changes in circumstances on valuations are consistent with theoretical prediction for example whether labor supply responds appropriately to a change in the wage rate whether compensated demand curves for commodities are downward sloping or whether stock prices respond in the predicted way to share repurchases however such comparative static relationships are a necessary but not sufficient condition for fundamental valuation e g summers 1986 becker 1962 was perhaps the first to make this point explicitly when he observed that consumers choosing commodity bundles randomly from their budget set would nevertheless produce downward sloping demand curves

the power of tv cable television and women s status in india cable and satellite television have grown rapidly throughout the developing world the availability of cable and satellite television exposes viewers to new information about the outside world which may affect individual attitudes and behaviors this paper explores the effect of the introduction of cable television on gender attitudes in rural india using a three year individual level panel dataset we find that the introduction of cable television is associated with improvements in womens status we find significant increases in reported autonomy decreases in the reported acceptability of beating and decreases in reported son preference we also find increases in female school enrollment and decreases in fertility primarily via increased birth spacing the effects are large equivalent in some cases to about five years of education in the cross section and move gender attitudes of individuals in rural areas much closer to those in urban areas we argue that the results are not driven by pre existing differential trends these results have important policy implications as india and other countries attempt to decrease bias against women authors

campaign spending with office seeking politicians rational voters and multiple lobbies abstract i introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office seeking politicians a continuum of voters and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians the model is used to i determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter s preferred policy ii show the informational value of lobbies contributions iii evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending and iv interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome although in equilibrium advertising provides voters with useful information under reasonable parameter values a ban on campaign contributions makes the median voter better off journal of economic literature classification numbers d72 d82 m37

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero