learning and wage dynamics we develop a dynamic model of learning about worker ability in a competitive labor market the model produces three testable implications regarding wage dynamics 1 although the role of schooling in the labor market s inference process declines as performance observations accumulate the estimated effect of schooling on the level of wages is independent of labor market experience 2 timeinvariant variables correlated with ability but unobserved by employers such as certain test scores are increasingly correlated with wages as experience increases and 3 wage residuals are a martingale we present evidence from the nlsy that is broadly consistent with the model s predictions

bonus culture competitive pay screening and multitasking to analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation we embed multitasking and screening within a hotelling framework competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay shifting effort away from long term investments risk management and cooperation efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal who dulls incentives to extract rents as competition intensifies monopsonistic underincentivization of low skill agents first decreases and then gives way to growing overincentivization of high skill ones aggregate welfare is thus hill shaped while inequality tends to rise monotonically bonus caps can help restore balance in incentives but may generate other distortions

rent seeking and the transformation of employment relationships the effect of corporate restructuring on wage patterns determinants and inequality a key debate in research on corporate restructuring is whether this widespread and extensive transformation process made contemporary employment relationships more open with firms relying largely o

the transition to the knowledge economy labor market institutions and income inequality in advanced democracies the transition from fordism to the knowledge economy in the world s advanced democracies was underpinned by the revolution in information and communications technology ict the introduction and rapid diffusion of ict pushed up wages for college educated workers with complementary skills and allowed top managers and ceos to reap greater rewards for their own talents despite these common pressures income inequality did not rise to the same extent everywhere income in the anglo saxon countries remains particularly unequally distributed to shed new light on this puzzle the authors carry out a panel data analysis of eighteen oecd countries between 1970 and 2007 their analysis stands apart from the existing empirical literature by taking a comparative perspective the article examines the extent to which the relationship between the knowledge economy and income inequality is influenced by national labor market institutions the authors find that the expansion of knowledge employment is positively associated with both the 90 10 wage ratio and the income share of the top 1 percent but that these effects are mitigated by the presence of strong labor market institutions such as coordinated wage bargaining strict employment protection legislation high union density and high collective bargaining coverage the authors provide robust evidence against the argument that industrial relations systems are no longer important safeguards of wage solidarity in the knowledge economy

methods of pay and earnings a longitudinal analysis using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth 1988 90 the author investigates the relationship between methods of pay including piece rates and bonuses and the level and variance of wages among men piece rate workers earned a premium compared to other workers but the evidence on bonuses is mixed the author finds evidence that female piece rate workers earned more than other female workers once a control variable for the presence of dependents is interacted with the piece rate variable with controls for the wage effects of schooling and experience unobserved worker productivity is found to have accounted for most of the wage variance among both male and female piece rate workers wage variance among workers not having explicit pay for performance schemes in contrast was predominantly due to other factors

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

the effect of unions on the structure of wages a longitudinal analysis this paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity the econometric model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a large panel data set formed from the u s current population survey the results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills in addition the patterns of selection bias differ by skill group among workers with lower levels of observed skill unionized workers are positively selected whereas union workers are negatively selected from among those with higher levels of observed skill despite a large and sophisticated literature there is still substantial disagreement over the extent to which differences in the structure of wages between union and nonunion workers represent an effect of trade unions rather than a consequence of the nonrandom selection of unionized workers over the past decade several alternative approaches have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers 2 one method that has been successfully applied in other areas of applied microeconometrics is the use of longitudinal data to measure the wage gains or losses of workers who change union status unfortunately longitudinal estimators are highly sensitive to measurement error even a small fraction of misclassified union status changes can lead to significant biases if the true rate of mobility between union and nonunion jobs is low this sensitivity led lewis 1986 to essentially dismiss the longitudinal evidence in his landmark survey of union wage effects in this paper i present some new evidence on the union wage effect based on a longitudinal estimator that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status the estimator uses external information on union status misclassification rates along with the reduced form coefficients from a multi variate regression of wages on the observed sequence of union status indicators to isolate the causal effect of unions from any selection biases introduced by a correlation between union status and the permanent component of unobserved wage heterogeneity recognizing that unions may raise wages more or less for

inequality fairness and social capital we study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness and its separate effect on the economically successful and the unsuccessful in a controlled economic experiment we find evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on social interactions probing the boundaries of this effect we document that this erosion of social capital critically depends on the context if a well off person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the worse off person then we observe no negative effects on trust and trustworthiness in the aggregate moreover our data do not support the view that higher status or wealth leads to an erosion of pro social attitudes the successful are always more generous groups of unsuccessful persons are least efficient and least generous in the trust game

bonuses and promotion tournaments theory and evidence standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses we combine classic and market based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles we use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the finnish economy our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature

comparative advantage learning and sectoral wage determination we develop a model in which a worker s skills determine the worker s current wage and sector the market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker s skills endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor market participants learn about these unobserved skills we show how the model can be estimated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques we apply our methodology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations and industries using individual level panel data from the national longitudinal survey of youth we find that high wage sectors employ high skill workers and offer high returns to workers skills

inequality leverage and crises the paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution empirically the periods 1920 1929 and 1983 2007 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich a large increase in leverage for the remainder and an eventual financial and real crisis the paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes a financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction but restoration of the lower income group s bargaining power is more effective

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

the polarization of the u s labor market this paper analyzes a marked change in the evolution of the u s wage structure over the past fifteen years divergent trends in upper tail 90 50 and lower tail 50 10 wage inequality we document that wage inequality in the top half of distribution has displayed an unchecked and rather smooth secular rise for the last 25 years since 1980 wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution also grew rapidly from 1979 to 1987 but it has ceased growing and for some measures actually narrowed since the late 1980s furthermore we find that occupational employment growth shifted from monotonically increasing in wages education in the 1980s to a pattern of more rapid growth in jobs at the top and bottom relative to the middles of the wage education distribution in the 1990s we characterize these patterns as the u201cpolarization u201d of the u s labor market with employment polarizing into high wage and low wage jobs at the expense of middle wage work we show how a model of computerization in which computers most strongly complement the non routine abstract cognitive tasks of high wage jobs directly substitute for the routine tasks found in many traditional middle wage jobs and may have little direct impact on non routine manual tasks in relatively low wage jobs can help explain the observed polarization of the u s labor market this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a spillover based theory of credentialism i propose a model in which credentials such as diplomas are instrumentally valuable to workers the model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker s wage to their output a worker s productivity is influenced by the skills of their co workers where such skills arise from an ability augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co workers credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market thereby allowing them to match with high skill co workers in equilibrium despite the positive externality associated with a worker s investment i show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium

the effect of implicit contracts on the movement of wages over the business cycle evidence from micro data in this paper we address the question of whether wages are affected by labor market conditions in a manner more consistent with a contract approach than with a standard spot market model from a simple implicit contract model we derive implications about the links between wages and past labor market conditions using individual data from the current population survey and the panel study of income dynamics we find that an implicit contract model with costless mobility describes these links better than either a simple spot market model or an implicit contract model with costly mobility

portfolio choices firm shocks and uninsurable wage risk assessing the importance of uninsurable wage risk for individual financial choices faces two challenges first the identification of the marginal effect requires a measure of at least one component of risk that cannot be diversified or avoided moreover measures of uninsurable wage risk must vary over time to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity secondly evaluating the economic significance of risk requires knowledge of the size of all the wage risk actually faced existing estimates are problematic because measures of wage risk fail to satisfy the non avoidability requirement this creates a downward bias which is at the root of the small estimated effect of wage risk on portfolio choices to tackle this problem we match panel data of workers and firms and use the variability in the profitability of the firm that is passed over to workers to obtain a measure of uninsurable risk using this measure to instrument total variability in individual earnings we find that the marginal effect of uninsurable wage risk is much larger than estimates that ignore endogeneity we bound the economic impact of risk and find that its overall effect is contained not because its marginal effect is small but because its size is small and the size of uninsurable wage risk is small because firms provide substantial wage insurance

salaries or piece rates on the endogenous matching of harvest workers and crops the objective of this paper is to determine whether the choice of payment schemes hourly vs piece rates is systematically related to the workers risk aversion and ability we derive the equilibrium relationship between agents risk aversion and ability and the power of incentives payment scheme in a market where many heterogeneous principals and agents are endogenously matched the equilibrium matching between principals and agents depends on the traits and is critical in determining the contract choice using confidential data from the national agricultural workers survey naws we find evidence of matching between agricultural workers and the riskiness of their jobs crops they harvest based on workers risk aversion and no matching based on ability when controlling for matching we find strong evidence that high risk averse workers choose hourly rates and low risk averse workers choose piece rates we also found that high ability types choose piece rates and low ability types choose hourly rates but the evidence is weaker jel j33 d82 q12

estimating the effects of unions on wage inequality in a panel data model with comparative advantage and nonrandom selection this article considers the estimation of the structure of wages in union and nonunion sectors it proposes an estimator that extends standard panel data techniques to the case in which the return to the permanent component of the error term is differently rewarded in the two sectors the econometric model is used to estimate the effect of unions on both the level and the variance of wages in canada the findings indicate that unions increase the average wage of workers and compress the returns to observable measures of skill and to a time invariant unobservable measure of skill

interpreting panel data on job tenure tenure responses in the panel study of income dynamics psid and the national longitudinal surveys are often inconsistent with calendar time these inconsistencies pose special problems in the psid because job changes cannot be identified directly so researchers must infer them from error ridden tenure data we use alternative rules for partitioning psid data into jobs and then estimate several wage and mobility models to assess the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the partitioning method we also assess the importance of replacing raw tenure data with imputed measures that are internally consistent

job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard abstract we consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth constrained workers suffer from moral hazard specifically effort on the job is non contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract higher unemployment benefits affect the workers outside option the latter is improved for low skilled workers hence they receive a larger share of the surplus which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity effects are reversed for high skilled workers moreover raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase

inefficient sorting under output sharing abstract i study sorting in a frictional market asset owners post their terms then workers direct their search when the owners switch from prices to shares the competition between workers is handicapped the unique equilibrium features inefficient positive assortative matching the queue lengths are distorted even though the hosios efficiency condition holds for every pair of types for any distribution of types all workers pair up with better assets the best workers suffer while the weakest workers gain the opposite occurs on the asset side competition drives the asset owners to post flatter contracts it leads to constrained efficiency whenever prices are feasible otherwise handicapped competition results in inefficient sorting

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

performance pay and wage inequality an increasing fraction of jobs in the u s labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonus pay commissions or piece rate contracts using data from the panel study of income dynamics we show that compensation in performance pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed and unobserved productive characteristics of workers than compensation in non performance pay jobs we also find that the return to these productive characteristics increased faster over time in performance pay than in non performance pay jobs we show that this finding is consistent with the view that underlying changes in returns to skill due for instance to technological change induce more firms to offer performance pay contracts and result in more wage inequality among workers who are paid for performance thus performance pay provides a channel through which underlying changes in returns to skill get translated into higher wage inequality we conclude that this channel accounts for 21 of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and for most of the increase in wage inequality above the eightieth percentile over the same period

returns to talent and the finance wage premium to study the role of talent in finance workers pay we exploit a special feature of the french higher education system wage returns to talent have been significantly higher and have risen faster since the 1980s in finance than in other sectors both wage returns to project size and the elasticity of project size to talent are also higher in this industry last the share of performance pay varies more for talent in finance these findings are supportive of finance wages reflecting the competitive assignment of talent in an industry that exhibits a high complementarity between talent and scale received october 11 2017 editorial decision september 4 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

the timing of discretionary bonuses effort signals and reciprocity abstract in a real effort experiment we investigate the relationship between reciprocity and the timing of discretionary bonuses in a two period principal agent manager worker setting we vary the timing of the manager s bonus decision in order to examine two main channels reward and trust through which discretionary bonuses may operate average worker performance improves when bonus decisions are made between the two periods since both channels are simultaneously active first period output significantly increases as workers attempt to signal their trustworthiness to managers when the bonus decision is made upfront or at the end average output is no different than in a baseline setting without the bonus mechanism furthermore output after a bonus is not paid decreases substantially consistent with negative reciprocity our main findings are reinforced by using time spent on the available real leisure activity as an alternative measure of subjects effort

regulation of road accident externalities when insurance companies have market power abstract accident externalities that individual drivers impose on one another via their presence on the road are among the most important external costs of road transport we study the regulation of these externalities when insurance companies have market power some of the results we derive have close resemblance to the earlier literature on externality regulation with market power in aviation and private roads but there are important differences too using analytical models we compare the first best public welfare maximizing outcome with a private profit maximizing monopoly and oligopoly we find that insurance companies will internalize some of the externalities depending on their degree of market power we derive optimal insurance premiums and regular parametric taxes as well as manipulable ones that make the companies set socially optimal premiums the latter take into account that the firm tries to exploit knowledge of the tax rule applied by the government finally we also study the taxation of road users rather than that of firms

understanding the gender pay gap what s competition got to do with it a number of researchers have argued that men and women have different attitudes toward and behavioral responses to competition that is women are more likely to opt out of jobs in which performance pay is the norm and to under perform in some competitive situations laboratory experiments suggest that these gender differences are rather large to check these hypotheses and findings against differences in the field the authors use performance pay as an indicator of competition in the workplace and compare the gender gap not only in incidence of performance pay but also in earnings and work effort under these contracts they find that although women are less likely than men to work under performance pay contracts the gender gap is small furthermore the effect of performance pay on earnings is modest and does not differ markedly by gender consequently the authors argue the ability of these competition hypotheses to explain the gender pay gap seems very limited