transfers to sustain dynamic core theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control international environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement in a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co operative game by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved however the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required this paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context the possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

disclosure strategies for pollution control disclosure strategies which involve public and or private attempts to increase the availability of information on pollution form the basis for what some have called the third wave in pollution control policy after legal regulation the first wave and market based instruments the second wave while these strategies have become common in natural resource settings forest certification and organic farming for example they are less familiar in a pollution control context yet the number of applications in that context is now growing in both oecd and developing countries this survey will review what we know and don t know about the use of disclosure strategies to control pollution and conclude with the author s sense of where further research would be particularly helpful

stakeholder pressures as determinants of csr strategic choice why do firms choose symbolic versus substantive self regulatory codes of conduct to encourage corporations to contribute positively to the environment in which they operate voluntary self regulatory codes src have been enacted and refined over the past 15 years two of the most prominent are the united nations global compact and the global reporting initiative in this paper we explore the impact of different stakeholders pressures on the selection of strategic choices to join srcs our results show that corporations react differently to different sets of stakeholder pressures and that the src selection depends on the type and intensiveness of the stakeholder pressures as well as the resources at hand to respond to those pressures our contribution offers a more specific and finely variegated analysis of firm stakeholder interactions

optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management we analyze a dynamic auction in which a seller withc units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated intot time periods each group of buyers has independent private values for a single unit buyers compete directly against each other within a period as in a traditional auction and indirectly with buyers in other periods through the opportunity cost of capacity assessed by the seller the number of buyers in each period as well as the individual buyers valuations are random the model is a variation of the traditional single leg multiperiod revenue management problem in which consumers act strategically and bid for units of a fixed capacity over time for this setting we prove that dynamic variants of the first price and second price auction mechanisms maximize the seller s expected revenue we also show explicitly how to compute and implement these optimal auctions the optimal auctions are then compared to a traditional revenue management mechanism in which list prices are used in each period together with capacity controls and to a simple auction heuristic that consists of allocating units to each period and running a sequence of standard multiunit auctions with fixed reserve prices in each period the traditional revenue management mechanism is proven to be optimal in the limiting cases when there is at most one buyer per period when capacity is not constraining and asymptotically when the number of buyers and the capacity increases the optimal auction significantly outperforms both suboptimal mechanisms when there are a moderate number of periods capacity is constrained and the total volume of sales is not too large the benefit also increases when variability in the dispersion in buyers valuations or in the number of buyers per period increases

informal sector pollution control what policy options do we have abstract in developing countries urban clusters of informal firms such as brick kilns and leather tanneries can create severe pollution problems these firms are however quite difficult to regulate for a variety of technical and political reasons drawing on the literature this paper first develops a list of feasible environmental management policies it then examines how these policies have fared in four independent efforts to control emissions from informal brick kilns in northern mexico the case studies suggest that a conventional command and control process standards are generally only enforceable when buttressed by peer monitoring b surprisingly clean technologies can be successfully diffused even when they raise variable costs in part because early adopters have an economic incentive to promote further adoption c boycotts of dirty goods sold in informal markets are unenforceable d well organized informal firms can block implementation of costly abatement strategies such as relocation and e private sector led initiatives may be best suited for informal sector pollution control

mechanism design with interdependent valuations efficiency ggagents valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals or types of all agents under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome decision payoffs previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals efficient design is impossible this paper shows that an efficient mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome e g allocation of the goods is determined then the agents observe their own outcome decision payoffs and then final transfers are made

credence goods misleading labels and quality differentiation due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation we examine how consumers overestimation of the quality of intermediate quality products affects firms incentives to improve product quality the firms non cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity irrespective of the nature of second stage competition bertrand or cournot we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate quality firm and motivates it to raise its product s quality in response the high quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit overall average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves which raises consumer surplus social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities

analysis of the effectiveness of the first european pollutant emission register eper abstract the aim of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the first european pollution emissions register eper a regulatory instrument based on the publication of the environmental performance of firms exceeding specified pollution limits the multivariate regression model mvrm is applied to capture the disciplinary effect of the eper so we first perform an analysis to determine whether the publication of the eper has a negative effect on the market value of the listed firms secondly we consider the possibility of the publication of the eper affecting the market value of firms which could be included in the eper but are not because their emissions do not exceed the specified pollution limits finally we prepare an index to compare the environmental results of the firms and analyse whether the consequences of publishing the eper are worse for firms with high relative pollution records

does environmental information disclosure benefit waste discharge reduction evidence from china as a tool for regulating the environment in china does environmental information disclosure reduce pollutant discharge to answer this question we empirically analyzed the emission data of the three wastes i e waste gas wastewater and solid waste in unit industrial gdp in 31 provincial units as a measure to reduce institutional emission environmental information disclosure only slightly influenced waste discharge reduction in the implementation period of the eleventh five year plan of china instead command control and market based tools significantly affected waste discharge reduction representative measures included penalties and charges with the continuously enhanced pressure of control environmental information disclosure facilitates the effects of command control tools on waste discharge reduction content analysis of environmental information disclosed by sample listed companies in jiangsu province was conducted the disclosure of insufficient environmental information on emission reduction can be attributed to adverse selection in system performance i e the selective disclosure trend considering greenwashing in the listed companies and to the limited quality of overall environmental information disclosure this study provides empirical evidence for chinese policy makers to improve the system for environmental information disclosure of listed companies

monitoring and enforcement is two tier regulation robust a case study of ankleshwar india abstract the regulation of industrial pollution is difficult in a rapidly industrialising low income setting this study looks at the efforts to regulate chemical plants in ankleshwar the largest chemical estate in asia pollution comes from many sources the distribution of information is highly asymmetric and the authorities have meagre resources the location of plants in an industrial estate does however provide interesting preconditions for a form of two tier regulation in which industry association becomes an intermediary between regulator and firms the association is better informed and has an incentive to regulate its members to maintain a good reputation but doesn t possess much formal authority and its voluntary monitoring and abatement program is akin to managing a common property resource the analysis of four preconditions for the success of such management suitable design principles effective monitoring objective implementation of rules and enforcement indicates that they are satisfied at least partially in ankleshwar

behavioral environmental economics promises and challenges environmental issues provide a rich ground for identifying the existence and consequences of human limitations in this paper we present a growing literature lying at the interface between behavioral and environmental economics this literature identifies alternative solutions to traditional economic instruments in environmental domains that often work imperfectly but it also faces a set of challenges including the difficulty of computing welfare effects and the identification of a robust environmental policy based on context dependent socio psychological effects we illustrate our critical discussion with two behavioral schemes that have been widely implemented green nudges and corporate environmental responsibility

information as regulation the effect of community right to know laws on toxic emissions abstract there is growing academic and policy level interest in the use of information as quasi regulatory mechanisms such as toxic release inventory tri and green labels mandatory disclosure requirements have been touted as market based incentives that may affect firm behavior we provide new evidence on the effectiveness of disclosure requirements by examining firm behavior in response to disclosures of tri emissions we find that firms with the largest stock price decline on the day this information became public subsequently reduced emissions more than their industry peers this is consistent with the view that financial markets may provide strong incentives for firms to change their environmental behavior

how should food safety certification be financed an analytical framework where consumers are imperfectly informed about the safety of products is used to investigate the welfare effects of a public certification system several certification fees under alternative structures of certification cost are analyzed by maintaining competition among numerous sellers voluntary certification financed by a per unit fee is efficient and sufficient to signal product safety however mandatory certification linked with a fixed user fee may be necessary if a seller wields monopoly power further certification by a single private agency results in a distorted fee copyright 2001 oxford university press

ghg registries participation and performance under the canadian voluntary climate challenge program between 1994 and 2004 the voluntary challenge and registry vcr played an important role in canadian climate change policy in this paper we examine the decision of firms to participate in the vcr the extent of their involvement and then ask if greenhouse gas emissions are related to past vcr participation as an information provision program we find evidence that firms may participate in vcr to signal their environmental responsibility to regulators and to some extent investors but not to consumers we also find that past involvement in the vcr is a strong and significant determinant of current involvement in the registry greenhouse gas emissions reported to the mandatory greenhouse gas reporting program in 2004 however do not appear to be different between vcr reporters and non reporters ghg emissions are observed to be significantly lower among firms that are smaller emit fewer toxic releases use more renewable energy sources are intermediate good producers and are located in quebec ontario and manitoba

equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model abstract we examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model in contrast to salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint

the strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games abstract infinite time horizon stationary cooperative games are considered where at each date the instantaneous ntu game is determined by the state of nature the strong sequential core selects those utility streams that no coalition can improve upon by deviating at any moment in time the main result of the paper states that the strong sequential core is non empty provided that i the instantaneous ntu games in all states are additively b balanced ii at least one of these games is strongly additively b balanced and iii the discount factor is close enough to one

ecolabeling consumers preferences and taxation abstract ecolabeling is a means of reducing the information gap between consumers and producers we study the implication of ecolabeling a supposedly green good for a consumer s allocation of income between a dirty and the supposedly green good in the model the role of the ecolabel is to help product differentiation to give reliable information and to reduce informational asymmetries we show that a conscious consumer someone with a stronger green attitude or quality concerns demands more ecolabeled goods price oriented consumers demand fewer ecolabeled goods a subsidy resp tax on the price of the ecolabeled resp dirty good leads to a larger consumption of the ecolabeled resp dirty good whereas it may increase or decrease the demand for the dirty resp ecolabeled good depending on whether the consumer views both goods as gross substitutes or complements we then use a cross individual dataset of 22 568 consumers and show that the demand for ecolabeled goods increases strongly with the consciousness of the consumer but decreases for price oriented consumers ecolabel oriented consumers feel more informed more conscious consumers prefer a subsidy on green goods and a tax on dirty goods price oriented consumers do not care about the green subsidy but would vote against a tax on the dirty goods

economic prescriptions for environmental problems how the patient followed the doctor s orders o ne of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved and the range of potential solutions as one who frequently engages in this exercise i can attest to this fact in my view this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism in this paper i will argue that both normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management the particular set of policies examined here involves two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community marketable permits and emission charges pigou 1932 dales 1968 kneese and schultze 1975 both tools represent ways to induce businesses to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards they stand in stark contrast to the predominant command and control approach in which a regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations under highly restrictive conditions it can be shown that both of the economic approaches share the desirable feature that any gains in environmental quality will be obtained at the lowest possible cost baumol and oates 1975 until the 1960s these tools only existed on blackboards and in academic journals as products of the fertile imaginations of academics however some countries have recently begun to explore using these tools as part of a broader strategy for managing environmental problems

an integrated environmental and fairtrade labelling scheme for product supply chains environmental initiatives such as carbon labelling have been suggested as a driver for achieving sustainable production systems of product supply chains the paper therefore presents a systematic process of developing an environmental labelling framework as an extension of carbon labelling using the fairtrade certification as a platform to facilitate the process using the general theoretical constructs of lifecycle assessments the framework presented provides insight into the formulation of multi regional supply chains which has been specifically characterised in this paper for the uk india rest of the world supply chain the environmental labelling process presented in this paper is based on two key principles quantitative principle in eco labelling and the principle of whole lifecycle perspective and it is used to inform two key stakeholder groups in the supply chain consumers and supply chain partners for consumers a consistent way of presenting the environmental label information is presented highlighting the supply chain impacts across the indicators of co2 eq emissions water consumption and land use in addition to regional contributions to these impacts from a global supply chain perspective additionally communicating the environmental impacts to supply chain partners provides a decision support to take actions to reduce the overall impacts by identifying processes within the global supply chain that needed prioritisation given that fairtrade partnership is based on participatory development and a strict guidelines and standardisation process it is envisaged that synergies can be derived by integrating environmental labelling with the fairtrade scheme to enhance the environmental sustainability of product supply chains

the dynamic vickrey auction abstract we study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon buyers arrive randomly over time are long lived and have independent private values the valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way we construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which a there is a single financial transaction with the buyer b ex post participation constraints are fulfilled c there is no positive transfer to any agent and d payments are determined online we exploit that under the efficient allocation rule there is a unique potential winning period for each buyer this reduces the multidimensional type to one dimension and the payment of the winner can be defined as the lowest valuation for the potential winning period with which the buyer would have won the object in a static model this payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the vickrey auction

credence goods efficient labelling policies and regulatory enforcement we analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of credence goods via alternative labelling procedures when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute producers can either self label their products or have them certified by a third party the government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the green or the brown producers our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information we extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers when corrupt producers can affix spurious labels the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities we find that mandatory self labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling unless the market share effect greatly exceeds the incentive to cheat effect

transparency and value chain sustainability the rise of transparency on the public and political agendas is not an accident or fad soon to be replaced by another timely topic in sustainability politics and governance transparency will remain a key topic in global value chains and will further develop as it piggy backs on wider social developments such as globalization the information age and the shifting role of states in environmental governance transparency in value chains is bound up with positive connotations the more transparency the better it is for the sustainability of chains and for the empowerment of consumers and civil society but an overall positive past assessment of value chain transparency does not automatically extend into the future as new challenges lie ahead this paper investigates the new challenges for value chain transparency and their consequences due to the growing importance attached to transparency in value chains it becomes a central object of power struggles with uncertain outcomes markets and states seek to capture transparency arrangements for their own goals which may not be in line with the assumed normative linkages between value chain transparency and increased power for consumers and civil society in that sense transparency is losing its innocence more transparency is no longer always the best for citizen consumer empowerment and for the sustainability of value chains but value chain secrecy is not an attractive alternative this opens a new research agenda on how transparency should be organized and arranged in value chains to live up to the promises of democracy and sustainability

buy price english auction abstract consider an english auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller specified buy price b at any time we show that there exist v and v v such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation v is no less than v or v v v and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction if b v v he purchases at the buy price once the current bid reaches a strategically chosen threshold price a properly set buy price increases expected social welfare and the expected utility of each agent when either buyers or seller are risk averse

the economics of eco labeling standards costs and prices abstract the existing eco label landscape is fragmented because of the presence of numerous labels with different standards and is a pre competitive environment for firms to play in with many unanswered questions different standards eco labels are built around have different effects on credibility and legitimacy costs and benefits and ability to achieve sustainability goals of eco labeling focusing on eco label standards and using a hotelling type horizontal differentiation model we identify standards specific issues for and characterize primary barriers to eco labeling some of the major findings are as follows 1 more rigorous environmental standards enforced by higher integrity labels do not necessarily translate into higher selling prices 2 higher prices commanded by labeled products do not guarantee that a firm will derive higher profits from eco labeling 3 auditing fees paid per product unit being inspected for ensuring compliance with an eco label standard rather than participation fees paid up front is the primary de facto barrier to business involvement in eco labeling and 4 customers willingness to pay price premiums for eco labeled products is not a sufficient condition to generate a premium in the market

learning about the future and dynamic efficiency we analyze the conditions under which an efficient allocation of resources is achievable in a dynamic private values setting where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents values as an application consider the sequential allocation of scarce spectrum to emerg ing technologies whenever a new technology appears a benevolent designer is faced with a problem should he allocate a valuable chunk of spectrum right now while forfeiting for a long period of time the option of allocating it to a possibly superior future technology it makes sense to assume here that current firms have a better knowledge of their technological prow ess than the designer and that the designer s assessment of future technological possibilities is improved by observing the current technology if technology owners are strategic we show below that the learning process about the future disturbs the ability to extract the information necessary for efficient decision making another good example is hiring by an organization that fills positions at different hierarchy levels over time while all candidates prefer higher level positions some aspect of their ability to perform the needed tasks at each level is privately known to the candidates if contracts with current employees are difficult to adjust the designer must carefully compare the quality of present candidates which can serve as a signal about the market to the expected quality of candidates that may become available in the future finally consider a firm allocating franchises in a country where it did not operate before and where contractual clauses or other impediments prevent reallocation during a significant period of time local potential franchisees may have some superior information regarding future prof itability in the respective market and hence the elicitation of private information is crucial for a franchisor that is supposed to get a share of the future profits

public disclosure programs vs traditional approaches for environmental regulation green goodwill and the policies of the firm abstract a public disclosure program pdp is compared to a traditional environmental regulation exemplified by a tax subsidy in a simple dynamic framework a pdp aims at revealing the environmental record of firms to the public this information affects its image goodwill or brand equity and ultimately its profit a firm polluting less than its prescribed target would win consumer s sympathy and raise its goodwill whereas it is the other way around when the firm exceeds its emissions quota the evolution of this goodwill is assumed to depend also on green activities or advertising expenditures within this framework we analyze how a pdp affects the firm s optimal policies regarding emissions pricing and advertising as compared to a traditional regulation we show that advertising acts as a complementary device to pricing and that emissions are increasing in goodwill the role of a standard or target level for emissions turns out to be totally different under both policy regimes in the case of a tax subsidy approach this target level only acts as constant who increases or decreases profit by a fixed amount but it does not affect the policy of the firm on the contrary if a pdp is implemented the target value for emissions enters in an important way in the goodwill accumulation mechanism and determines how the firm reacts to the regulation and what is the time path for the economic and environmental variables moreover this value is also crucial to determine the possibility that a pdp is profit improving a policy implication of this fact is that regulators should be particularly careful in fixing the emission standard when a pdp is applied the theoretical results are complemented with a numerical illustration

functional mechanisms of mandatory corporate environmental disclosure an empirical study in china abstract this paper analyzes the functions of a government oriented disclosure program in china which rates company environmental performance into five colors and discloses the results to the public the rating results and their annual changes during 2005 2007 are statistically summarized by using the detailed database provided by municipal environmental protection bureau of the study area changshu city in jiangsu province the reflexive deterrent and enhancement mechanisms preliminarily identified for the disclosure program are qualitatively evaluated by using the information collected by onsite interviews to 32 program participating firms in overall the firms environmental performances have been improved the companies with worse rating records would be more likely to improve their environmental performances in the following years the disclosure program encourages the firms to be more reflexive to their internal environmental problems the deterrent and enhancement functions of the program are weak due to the marginal pressure from the classified stakeholders such as investors business partners and creditors the influence of the public such as neighboring communities and environmental ngos is weak too encouraging serious reactions of firm s stakeholders to the disclosed rating results should be addressed in order to enhance the effectiveness of the disclosure strategy

eco labeling and market equilibria with noisy certification tests an intriguing alternative to traditional methods for regulating externalities is the provision of information about firms environmental attributes an increasingly important example of this approach is eco labeling where a third party certifies firms products such schemes are currently used in a variety of countries this paper investigates the equilibria that may occur with eco labeling and the attendant welfare effects i model certification as a noisy test subject to both type i and type ii errors but where green firms more likely to pass than brown firms while it commonly leads to an increase in the fraction of green units in the market the introduction of an eco label can either increase or decrease welfare

environmental auditing in management systems and public policy abstract new international standards for environmental auditing are now being actively promoted by public authorities and adopted by private firms one important feature of these standards is their emphasis on managerial systems and incentives that support a wiser use of environmental resources this paper studies such a system in which incentive compensation may be based in part on the results of an environmental audit it is found that optimal wages after an environmental audit is performed should have a greater range than wages paid when no audit has occurred it is also shown that the decision to conduct an environmental audit and the size of the expected wage in this case depend crucially on whether the agent s prudence or precautionary motives dominates his aversion to risk it is finally found that the insertion of environmental audits within current management systems would certainly induce a manager to care more about the environment although this may come at the expense of less concern for other activities we find plausible circumstances in which properly designed environmental audits overcome such a tradeoff and increase the manager s attention tobothenvironmental and traditional tasks some implications of the analysis for environmental public policy are also discussed briefly

private enforcement of federal environmental law while the role of nongovernmental organizations in environmental policy is growing rapidly our analytical understanding of the causes and consequences of this emerging role has not kept pace in the 1970s congress authorized private organizations to seek injunctions and in some cases penalties against firms violating the terms of their environmental operating permits the economic models in this paper show how the varying remedies limitations and reimbursement procedures can affect both the level and patterns of litigation activity as well as the compliance consequences a database containing information on 1 205 cases is used to infuse empirical content into the analysis

informal regulation of pollution in a developing country evidence from india abstract recent policy discussions recognise the limitations of formal regulations to stem pollution in developing countries as a result there is a growing interest in the potential of informal regulations to achieve environmental goals in india many polluting industries fall under the rubric of the unorganised sector in such a context localised pollution may be influenced by discussions and reports on pollution in the vernacular press this study attempts to test the hypothesis that the press can act as an informal agent of pollution control this hypothesis is tested using monthly water pollution data from four hot spots in the state of gujarat india for the period 1996 to 2000 the results show that the press can function as an informal regulator if there is sustained interest in news about pollution however not all pollution agents are affected by pollution news press coverage appears to mainly influence industrial estates with a mix of small medium and large industries

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution abstract this note determines a rule to share a surplus gained when two countries or regions agree to coordinate their policies to reduce downstream pollution an intertemporal decomposition scheme for the total side payment is proposed this scheme has the following individual rationality property in each subgame that starts along the cooperative trajectory one country is guaranteed to receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution for this country another notion of individual rationality obtains this country will at any instant of time during the play of the game receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution

community pressure for green behavior the desire to avoid rousing community hostility may encourage firms to behave in an environmentally responsible manner firms may engage in corporate social responsibility csr to maintain community support and or to regain the support of a community where it has been lost it has been conjectured that such informal regulation could effectively replace formal intervention in some settings and usefully complement it in others we explore these conjectures with mixed results informal regulation is necessarily less efficient than a well designed formal alternative and the pattern of green behavior induced by the threat of community hostility may increase or decrease welfare the existence of community pressure may increase or decrease the optimal calibration of a formal intervention in this case an environmental tax and may complement or detract from the incentives generated by an optimally calibrated tax

strategic environmental disclosure evidence from the doe s voluntary greenhouse gas registry abstract although mandatory disclosure programs have been studied extensively strategic voluntary environmental disclosures by firms are not well understood we study the motivations for and impacts of firms strategic disclosure of greenhouse gas reductions to the us government we first model firms joint abatement and disclosure decisions incorporating both economic and political incentives we then use data from the department of energy s voluntary greenhouse gas registry to compare reported reductions to actual emissions we find that participants in the program engage in highly selective reporting in the aggregate they increase emissions over time but report reductions in contrast non participants decrease emissions over time participants tend to be large firms facing strong regulatory pressure pressure from environmental groups reduces the likelihood of participation suggesting such groups viewed the program as a form of greenwash participating in the 1605 b program had no significant effect on a firm s changes in carbon intensity over time

do voluntary biotechnology labels matter to the consumer evidence from the fluid milk market this article examines the effects on the demand of voluntary labeling for the use of genetically modified growth hormone for retail fluid milk using supermarket scanner data retail fluid milk tracks one of the first biotechnology products approved is fairly standardized and ubiquitous and allows for cross sectional differentiation between labeled and unlabeled products and between conventional and organic brands the results indicate that voluntary labeling increases the demand for recombinant bovine growth hormone free milk in addition the estimated effects of labeling appear to have increased over time innovations through biotechnology enable agricultural producers to reduce production costs and or enhance product quality for many livestock and crop commodities at the same time however these innovations may affect the demand for the products that utilize those commodities many individuals for example are concerned about potential risks to human health although by no means all consumers have such concerns burton metcalfe and smith heiman just and zilberman the use of the recombinant bovine growth hormone rbgh in milk production has been a particular concern for some consumers as approximately one third of the united states dairy herd about 3 million dairy cows currently receive rbgh supplements monsanto product labeling particularly with respect to the provision of health and environmental information is increasingly being used to provide information about product characteristics such as biotechnology content that

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

a dynamic game of waste management abstract the paper studies a differential game of waste management disposal each of three neighbouring regions is endowed with a stock of waste but no additional waste is generated in any region and waste does not decay from natural reasons a region s stock of waste can be reduced only by dumping on its neighbours the model features two externalities a strategic externality caused by the fact that the payoff of a coalition depends on the actions of players outside the coalition and a stock externality caused by the fixed overall amount of waste the game has a finite time horizon and it is shown that intertemporal core theoretic cooperation can be sustained under intuitive conditions

optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines a seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment with buyers that differ in their patience each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation first we derive the optimal mechanism neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline the deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer depending on the shape of the markup that the seller uses this can lead to a violation of the neglected incentive constraint we give sufficient conditions on the type distribution under which the neglected constraint is fulfilled or violated second for the case that the constraint cannot be neglected we consider a model with two periods and two buyers here the optimal mechanism is implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two the asymmetry which is introduced to prevent the patient type of the first buyer from buying in period one leads to pooling of deadlines at the top of the type space

buy prices in online auctions irrationality on the internet abstract buy prices are puzzling it makes sense for a seller at auction to set a minimum bidding level i e a reserve price surely but a maximum we explore the use of maximum bidding levels buy prices in online auctions and provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational auction mechanism we show that augmenting an english auction with a buy price can improve the seller s profits by partially insuring and therefore increasing the expected payment from some risk averse bidders perhaps more surprising is that the english auction augmented with a buy price can also be superior even to the first price sealed bid and dutch auctions when bidders are risk averse

dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations research overview current practices and future directions the benefits of dynamic pricing methods have long been known in industries such as airlines hotels and electric utilities where the capacity is fixed in the short term and perishable in recent years there has been an increasing adoption of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries where the sellers have the ability to store inventory three factors contributed to this phenomenon 1 the increased availability of demand data 2 the ease of changing prices due to new technologies and 3 the availability of decision support tools for analyzing demand data and for dynamic pricing this paper constitutes a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing given its applicability in most markets and its increasing adoption in practice our focus is on dynamic intertemporal pricing in the presence of inventory considerations

green markets eco certification and equilibrium fraud abstract consumers voluntarily pay significant price premiums to acquire unobservable environmental attributes in green markets this paper considers the performance of eco certification policy under circumstances where consumers cannot discern environmental attributes in goods but are able to form rational expectations regarding the extent of illicit activities in the green market the main results are i fraud is less prevalent in green markets when entry barriers limit the number of firms ii conventional environmental policies on polluting techniques increase the incidence of fraud and can even preclude the use of non polluting techniques which would otherwise emerge in green markets iii voluntary eco certification policies can decrease fraud increase output and raise profits per firm and iv in cases where the socially optimal resource allocation can be supported the optimal policy involves negative unit certification fees positive fixed certification fees and is revenue generating for the certifying agent

optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation a stochastic differential game approach abstract to account for previously ignored yet widely observed uncertainty in nature s capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation ec regimes this study constructs a stochastic differential game sdg model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region equilibrium strategies in the stochastic two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract a case based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights first accounting for various random disturbance factors the probabilistic pollutant stock in stackelberg non cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation second the ec mechanism provides long term effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region achieving a pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism third cross region cooperation reliably outperforms stackelberg non cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs this study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties interests within an ec agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex ante negotiations

non mandatory approaches to environmental protection the approach to environmental protection has been evolving from a regulation driven adversarial government push approach to a more proactive approach involving voluntary and often business led initiatives to self regulate their environmental performance this has been accompanied by increasing provision of environmental information about firms and products to enlist market forces and communities in creating a demand for corporate environmental self regulation by signaling their preferences for environmentally friendly firms this paper provides an overview of the non mandatory approaches being used for environmental protection and surveys the existing theoretical literature analyzing the economic efficiency of such approaches relative to mandatory approaches it also discusses empirical findings on the factors motivating self regulation by firms and its implications for their economic and environmental performance it examines the existing evidence on the extent to which information disclosure is effective in generating pressures from investors and communities on firms to improve their environmental performance