optimal shared savings contracts in supply chains linear contracts and double moral hazard in many supply chains consumption of indirect materials sold by a supplier to a customer for use in her production process can be reduced by efforts exerted by either party since traditional supply contracts provide no incentive for the supplier to exert such effort shared savings contracts have been proposed as a way to improve incentives in the channel leading to more efficient effort choices by the two parties such shared savings contracts typically combine a fixed service fee with a variable component based on consumption volume we formalize this situation using the double moral hazard framework in which both parties decide how much effort to exert by trading off the cost of their effort against the benefits that they will obtain from reduced consumption we also extend the double moral hazard framework to analyze a broader class of cost of effort functions than considered so far including the linear cost of effort functions commonly found in practice we show that the supplier can still always induce the optimal second best equilibrium with a linear shared savings contract under this broader class of functions however the behavior of the optimal contract as a function of the problem parameters becomes more complex we illustrate how small changes in the problem parameters can turn profits from being a well behaved to a poorly behaved function of the contract and provide some theoretical characterization of this phenomenon the practical significance of this is that simple linear contracts are sufficient in many double moral hazard contexts even for the broader class of functions we consider but care must be taken in selecting the optimal contract parameters

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

satisfaction guaranteed or money partially refunded efficient refunds under asymmetric information refunds are modelled as a competitive market response to asymmetric information firms have private information on their choice of product quality and compete by offering price and refund contracts consumers who care about quality draw inferences about the quality offered by the various firms from observed contracts conditions under which a revealing market equilibrium emerges are specified and the equilibrium quality and contract s characterized the model predicts that when product risk is not insurable consumers with higher incomes will pay higher prices for higher quality goods with higher refunds if the product fails

delegation and incentives this article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives it extends the standard principal agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority the agent s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project we find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent in fact if the agent is protected by limited liability delegation is never optimal

east west joint ventures and buyback contracts abstract contractual joint ventures cjvs and the buyback form of countertrade are popular methods that socialist countries use to attract foreign investment in this paper we explore some reasons why this is so and also explain two predominant characteristics of these contracts the existence of sharing rules and minimum standard requirements on inputs the model stresses the incentive problems involved when a socialist host country which does not allow foreign direct investment uses a cjv to obtain the fruits of some knowledge based production process from a multinational enterprise

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

the value of technology improvements in games with externalities a fresh look at offsetting behavior abstract we model the effect of safety technology improvements in a symmetric game in which each player s payoff depends on his own precaution and the other players average precaution we derive conditions under which an improved technology increases or decreases players equilibrium utilities for mandatory safety technologies the direction of the welfare effect depends on whether the externality between players is positive or negative and on whether the technology improvement is a complement or substitute for individual precaution for safety technologies that individuals can choose whether or not to purchase individuals expend too much on reducing the loss size but may spend either too much or too little on features that reduce an individual s loss probability

findings biased but efficient an investigation of coordination facilitated by asymmetric dominance in several marketing contexts strategic complementarity between the actions of individual players demands that players coordinate their decisions to reach efficient outcomes yet coordination failure is a common occurrence we show that the well established psychological phenomenon of asymmetric dominance can facilitate coordination in two experiments thus we demonstrate a counterintuitive result a common bias in individual decision making can help players to coordinate their decisions to obtain efficient outcomes further limited steps of thinking alone cannot account for the observed asymmetric dominance effect the effect appears to be due to increased psychological attractiveness of the dominating strategy with our estimates of the incremental attractiveness ranging from 3 6 a learning analysis further clarifies that asymmetric dominance and adaptive learning can guide players to an efficient outcome

efficient relocation of spectrum incumbents changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient to address this problem the fcc has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders often it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency in particular giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values but good public information about the cost of relocating the incumbent we examine the experience of broadband pcs entrants in relocating microwave incumbents we conclude with some remarks on how these ideas might be applied to digital television spectrum

quality indicators in theory and in fact abstract in recent literature it has been suggested that consumers need have no knowledge of product quality as a number of quality indicators or signals may be used as substitutes very little attention has been paid to the empirical verification of these studies the present paper is devoted to the issue of how well these indicators perform using market data provided by consumer magazines from 3 countries the results strongly indicate that price is a poor quality indicator the paper also presents some evidence which suggests that seller reputation and easily observable characteristics are also poor indicators

moral hazard asset specificity implicit bonding and compensation the case of franchising i introduction there is a large and growing interest in the structuring of compensation to deal with the moral hazard problem much of this literature treats various forms of income sharing such as piece rates and sharecropping as a means for a principal to provide incentives to an agent this literature has been extended to the case of two sided moral hazard where both parties to an exchange may shirk another mechanism to induce effort discussed in the literature is bonding where workers post a bond that is forgone if effort is inadequate klein 1980 and klein and leffler 1981 treat the possibility of specific assets as constituting an implicit bond where poor performance by a firm is penalized by bankruptcy and sale of assets at a loss this paper studies a situation where these issues coalesce the case of compensation arrangements in franchising the typical franchise contract calls for the sharing of franchise income between franchisee and franchisor additionally franchisees may be terminated for poor performance if franchise assets have a degree of specificity the ensuing sale of assets at a loss provides a penalty for poor performance we examine the determinants of franchise royalty rates and fees in this setting while there is a literature on two sided moral hazard and some empirical work on franchising based on this idea none incorporates the potential influence of asset specificity we explicitly consider the role of implicit bonding and asset specificity in conjunction with moral hazard on the part of both trading parties we go beyond previous work in franchising by estimating the effects of asset specificity and other influences on the royalty rate further part of our empirical work utilizes improved micro data on actual franchise contracts our approach and its implications are discussed in section ii consistent with previous work we expect the royalty rate to decrease increase as the importance of the franchisee s franchisor s input increases however more specific capital with the threat of termination acts as an implicit bond and substitutes for a reduced royalty rate in inducing franchisee effort thus we expect royalty rates to increase with asset specificity also unlike other approaches we do not necessarily expect an inverse relationship between the royalty rate and the franchise fee for example the greater the importance of franchisor effort the higher the royalty rate but the franchise fee may also increase if franchise revenue rises by enough our hypotheses are tested using two different data sets an original firm level data set is taken from federal trade commission ftc required uniform franchise offering circulars ufoc 1 in addition data are obtained from bond s 1989 the source book of franchise opportunities the data are discussed and the results presented in section iii we find substantial support for our approach for example factors that increase the importance of the franchisee s effort such as the number of employees supervised lower the royalty rate and increase the franchise fee also a reduction in the specificity of the franchisee s investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee 2 section iv summarizes our findings and concludes the paper ii the approach and the hypotheses the typical franchising contract consists of a two part payment by the franchisee to the franchisor the franchisee pays an up front nonrefundable franchisee fee and a continuing royalty payment usually a percentage of sales in return the franchisee receives the right to use the franchisor s brand name capital and a method of operation in addition the franchisor provides on going support to the franchisee however the franchisor maintains the right to unilaterally terminate the contract if the franchisor determines that the franchisee is not delivering a product consistent with the quality guaranteed by the brand name

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

a dynamic model of the choice of mode for exploiting complementary capabilities this paper examines the choice of mode for a multinational enterprise and a local firm to exploit their complementary capabilities we develop a combined real options and game theoretic model of modal choice by incorporating a range of factors drawn from the dynamic capabilities theory and transaction cost or organizational economics the factors scrutinized in the model include the parties absorptive capacities frictions in knowledge and asset markets and associated incentive problems cost of switching from one mode to another and cost associated with power jockeying the model uses simulation to examine how these factors interact to influence the choice of mode the results identify a number of conditions for one factor to dominate another and help to reconcile different theories that have made contradicting predictions with regard to the effects of such factors as uncertainty and capability divergence on the optimal choice of mode

incentive contracts in two sided moral hazards with multiple agents abstract the paper studies a contracting problem in which a principal enters in two sided moral hazards withnindependent agents there are no technological or informational linkages among thenagency problems despite this independence optimal incentive schemes essentially eliminate the principal s incentive problem when team size is large enough reputation like effects appear in a static setting through an improved aggregation of information about the actions of the principal one implication of this result is that it is generally suboptimal to require an agent s compensation to depend only on his own outcome another implication is the existence of purely informational economies of scale to increasing team size thus the concentration of otherwise unrelated transactions in a single firm creates wealth through a more efficient use of information about the principal s actions the paper also shows that extremely simple statistical contracts are approximately optimal in large teams the outcome of such contracts is observationally indistinguishable from standard principal agent contracts this provides a theoretical justification for using standard principal agent contracts in environments that involve two sided hazard in a fundamental way journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 d23

performance verifiability and output sharing in collaborative ventures this paper studies the problem of contracting between two firms when they try to exploit their complementary resources in a collaborative venture cv but their performance in the cv cannot be precisely verified by the other party or by a third party arbiter using a mathematical model that treats performance verifiability as a continuous variable the paper first establishes that a party whose performance cannot be perfectly verified has an incentive to shirk if it is paid only a flat fee and that this shirking problem is more severe as its performance is less verifiable then the paper shows in a general setting that a contract under which each party shares a fraction of the output is superior to a contract under which one of them is paid only a flat fee when performance verifiability is sufficiently low in addition with some specific assumptions about the forms of the revenue and cost functions the paper also shows that a party s share of the venture s residual output in the equilibrium is an increasing function of its productivity and a decreasing function of its opportunity cost finally the numerical examples constructed in the paper suggest that a contract which combines the self enforcing mechanism of output sharing with the third party enforcement mechanism of arbitration generally performs better than a contract that utilizes only one of these mechanisms

promotions and product pricing parsimony versus veblenesque demand the veracity of the parsimonious law of demand has long been challenged by analyses of the veblen effect and prestige pricing backward bending demand curves often attend discussions of conspicuous consumption probing the sociological and psychological intricacies of potential consumer interdependencies scholars in economics and marketing have overlooked mundane product promotions for a monopolistic firm we formalize the relationship between the optimal price quantity combination and the thoroughness of product promotions iterating toward the profit maximizing thoroughness of product promotion gives rise to a backward bending price quantity locus challenges to the law of demand that ignore product promotions are thereby undercut

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

risk preferences and demand drivers of extended warranties we disentangle and study the relative importance of different risk preferences in explaining extended warranty purchases and the high premia paid for them empirical and behavioral research on insurance is at odds with whether diminishing returns curvature of the utility function or loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting lead to observed consumer behavior this lack of consensus is primarily due to the inability of standard choice data to separate different risk preferences and the consequent need to rely on strong parametric assumptions we design two conjoint studies consistent with simultaneous and sequential decision making with choices about washing machines and extended warranties where subjects are given failure probabilities and repair costs using stated choice data from the surveys we can nonparametrically identify product and risk preferences we find that loss aversion is significantly more important than curvature and probability weights in explaining extended warranty choices importantly failure to decompose risk averse behavior into that arising from curvature loss aversion and probability weighting leads to lower washer prices and profits these findings are robust to alternate reference point assumptions we rationalize the premia paid for warranties by exploring retailer incentives to price discriminate and test the theory on complementary goods pricing finally based on counterfactual analysis forcing separate retailers to sell washers and extended warranties is not necessarily welfare enhancing as cited in the media and previous literature

tariffs terms of trade unemployment and the real exchange rate the less developed countries ldcs have been subjected to major exogenous shocks and drastic domestic policy changes in recent years these shocks include changes in the terms of trade and or a policy shift away from the pervasive protectionism of the previous decades the implementation of trade liberalization programs is likely to follow in many more developing countries a large body of theoretical and empirical literature has developed which attempts to analyze the consequences of these changes utilizing models which explicitly incorporate the main structural and institutional characteristics of the ldc economies the behavior of the real exchange rate defined in various ways but most commonly as the relative price of tradeables to non tradeables has been identified as being of central analytical and policy importance while the literature on this subject recognizes the key link between the real exchange rate and domestic wages the analytical models used generally suffer from serious limitations in terms of their characterization of the labor markets the models used in the literature can be categorized into two groups a flex price models that give rise to full employment and b models that assume full or partial wage rigidity thereby generating some form of unemployment conventional wisdom suggests that a rise in import tariffs or an improvement in the terms of trade would always lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate however it is shown by clague 3 and edwards and van wijnbergen 11 that the above result does not necessarily hold in more general models however these analyses were restricted to models with flexible wages wage rigidity is often ascribed to the existence of some form of wage indexation or other forms of government inter

product risk sharing by warranties in a monopoly market with risk averse consumers abstract this paper analyzes the implications of three different warranty rules in a monopoly setting with risk averse consumers the necessary condition for the existence of the market is independent of the risk sharing arrangement although the quantity consumed is the highest if the consumer receives no warranty even if the monopolist is constrained to marginal cost pricing the replacement warranty is most efficient from a risk allocation point of view however the situation with no warranty is pareto superior to a money back warranty additionally the producer and the consumers agree on the ranking of the warranty rules

on manufacturing marketing incentives stereotypically marketing is mainly concerned about satisfying customers and manufacturing is mainly interested in factory efficiency using the principal agent agency paradigm which assumes that the marketing and manufacturing managers of the firm will act in their self interest we seek incentive plans that will induce those managers to act so that the owner of the firm can attain as much as possible of the residual returns one optimal incentive plan can be interpreted as follows the owner subcontracts to pay the manufacturing manager a fixed rate for all capacity he delivers each marketing manager receives all of the returns from his product in turn all managers pay a fixed fee to the owner under this plan the marketing managers will often complain about the stock level decisions even though these levels are announced in advance under a revised plan the owner can eliminate such complaints by delegating the stocking decisions to the respective marketing managers without any loss this plan is interpreted as requiring the owner to make a futures market for manufacturing capacity paying the manufacturing manager the expected marginal value for each unit of capacity delivered receiving the realized marginal value from the marketing managers and losing money on average in the process

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard this article examines the use of prices and warranties as signals of product quality to consumers who choose how to maintain their purchases the seller s incentives are strongly affected by the interaction of quality and maintenance in determining product reliability two different assumptions about this interaction are made a separating equilibrium in which high quality is signalled with a low warranty and low price is shown to be possible in both cases

all units discounts and double moral hazard abstract an all units discount is a price reduction applied to all units purchased if the customer s total purchases equal or exceed a given quantity threshold since the discount is paid on all units rather than marginal units the tariff is discontinuous and exhibits a negative marginal price cliff at the threshold that triggers the discount this paper shows that all units discounts arise in optimal agency contracts between upstream and downstream firms that face double moral hazard i present conditions under which all units discounts dominate two part tariffs and other continuous tariffs i also examine these tariffs when the upstream market faces a threat of entry in the case considered all units discounts deter entry by less efficient rivals without distorting price and investment whereas continuous tariffs either accommodate such entry or deter it by distorting price and investment

calculating the reserve for a time and usage indexed warranty many products carry a warranty that offers protection for the consumer against low quality these warranties are often two dimensional such as an automobile warranty that guarantees repair up to a certain time and mileage after sale this paper considers the problem of assessing the size of a reserve needed by the manufacturer to meet future claims for such a two dimensional warranty to do this a class of failure models that describe failure by two scales time and mileage for example must be developed the first half of the paper is devoted to this development then the warranty reserve problem is considered in more detail the problem is described and a decision theoretic solution making use of the newly developed reliability model is proposed

voluntary product safety certification this paper describes the incentives for firms to seek voluntary product safety certifications we consider a firm that makes the decision of whether or not to seek certification prior to selling the product we show that even when the firm and the consumers have the same beliefs about the product s safety there are incentives for the firm to seek safety certification the main analysis investigates the role of consumer moral hazard and shows that it can lead to greater incentives for voluntary certification when inherent product safety and effort are substitutes but smaller incentives when they are complements the analysis of consumer moral hazard provides a nuanced perspective on the so called risk compensation or the peltzman effect phenomenon which postulates higher levels of accidents for safer products in our paper products that are successfully certified can end up with a higher incidence of accidents we also uncover an interesting nonmonotonic relationship between effectiveness of consumer

optimal second stage outsourcing manufacturers have recently begun outsourcing product assembly and completion tasks to their suppliers such outsourcing solves several contracting problems but generates new incentive frictions between manufacturers and their suppliers in this paper we analyze a manufacturer s decision to outsource an assembly second stage task to a preestablished supplier we find that outsourcing second stage tasks becomes more attractive as the cost of either the first or second stage activity rises outsourcing becomes less attractive when the supplier is unable to accept large levels of liability the manufacturer is shown to prefer more testing when she outsources assembly to her supplier as opposed to when she assembles products in house last we find that the contracting frictions identified persist when the supplier s work can be tested individually albeit imperfectly

aid conditionality and military expenditure reduction in developing countries models of asymmetric information this paper analyzes problems of implementing noneconomic conditionality such as military expenditure reduction in the granting of foreign aid given the presence of asymmetric information the authors present two conceptually separate principal agent models to capture the stylized facts of multilateral and bilateral aid negotiations respectively the first model is an application of the problem of adverse selection when there is more than one type of principal donor with varying objectives the second model extends moral hazard to double moral hazard where neither principal nor agent recipient can fully observe or verify each other s strategies copyright 1995 by royal economic society

monotone equilibria in signaling games abstract we examine the monotonicity of the sender s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signaling games we show that when the sender s return from the receiver s action depends on her type the spence mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which a higher type sender chooses a strictly lower action than a lower type we provide sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone which require that the sender s payoff is decreasing in her action is increasing in the receiver s action and has strictly increasing differences between her type and the action profile we apply our sufficient conditions to education signaling advertising and warranty provision

a simple model of buybacks abstract buybacks are a type of contractual joint venture used in countertrade where the good produced is allocated in fixed proportions to the parties involved we show that buybacks can act as commitment devices when the quality of inputs cannot be contracted over