duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources this article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market unlike a bank headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in winner picking the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another by doing a good job in the winner picking dimension headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm wide credit constraints the model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects this article analyzes the process by which internal capital markets channel limited resources to different uses inside a company in so doing it seeks to address two related sets of questions first what is the fundamental economic rationale for creating an internal capital market that is under what circumstances can it make sense to combine several technologically distinct projects under one roof and have them seek funding from corporate headquarters as opposed to setting them up as stand alone companies that each raise external financing on their own second given this rationale what is the optimal size and scope of an internal capital market should headquarters be involved in funding a large number of projects or just a few and should these projects be unrelated to one another or in similar lines of business the answers to both sets of questions flow from the insight that in a credit constrained setting where not all positive npv projects can be financed headquarters can create value by actively reallocating scarce funds across projects for example the cash flow generated by one division s activities may be taken and spent on investment in another division where the returns are higher or alternatively one division s assets may be used as collateral to raise financing that is then diverted to the other division simply put individual projects must compete for the scarce funds and headquarters job is to pick the winners and losers in this competition

the taxation of diesel cars in belgium revisited this paper compares the current taxation of diesel and gasoline cars in belgium with the guidelines for optimal taxation we find that diesel cars are still taxed much less than gasoline cars resulting in a dominant market share for diesel cars in the car stock if the fuel tax is the main instrument to control for externalities and generate revenues the diesel excise should be much higher than the excise on gasoline for two reasons diesel is more polluting than gasoline and more importantly through the better fuel efficiency diesel cars contribute less fiscal revenues per mile

are there environmental benefits from driving electric vehicles the importance of local factors we combine a theoretical discrete choice model of vehicle purchases an econometric analysis of electricity emissions and the ap2 air pollution model to estimate the geographic variation in the environmental benefits from driving electric vehicles the second best electric vehicle purchase subsidy ranges from 2 785 in california to 4 964 in north dakota with a mean of 1 095 ninety percent of local environmental externalities from driving electric vehicles in one state are exported to others implying they may be subsidized locally even when the environmental benefits are negative overall geographically differentiated subsidies can reduce deadweight loss but only modestly

the bright side of internal capital markets we examine capital expenditure decisions of discount firms in response to wal mart s entry into their markets before wal mart s entry focused incumbents and discount divisions of diversified incumbents are similar in size geographic dispersion and firm debt levels however discount divisions of diversified firms are significantly more productive after wal mart s entry diversified firms are quicker to either exit the discount business or stay and fight also their capital expenditures are more sensitive to the productivity of their discount business internal capital markets function well as transfers are away from the worsening discount divisions it appears diversified firms make better investment decisions

the flip side of financial synergies coinsurance versus risk contamination this paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs contrary to conventional wisdom separate financing dominates joint financing when risk contamination losses that are associated with the contagious default of a well performing project that is dragged down by the other project s poor performance outweigh standard coinsurance gains separate financing becomes more attractive than joint financing when the fraction of returns lost under default increases and when projects have lower mean returns higher variability more positive correlation and more negative skewness these predictions are broadly consistent with evidence on conglomerate mergers spinoffs project finance and securitization

optimal taxation of car ownership car use and public transport insights derived from a discrete choice numerical optimization model in this paper we study the taxation of car ownership car use and public transport in the presence of externalities within the framework of a discrete continuous choice model we first derive optimal taxes in a simplified setting emphasizing the specific role of fixed car ownership taxes and the relevance of public transport demand by non car owners for the optimal tax structure a numerical optimisation model is then constructed to study welfareoptimal public transport fares and two part tariffs on ownership and use of gasoline and diesel cars in belgium results are as follows first we find that the current differences in tax treatment between diesel and gasoline car ownership and use cannot be justified on the basis of external cost and budgetary considerations efficient pricing requires substantial increases in the relative user tax on diesel cars as compared to gasoline cars optimal fixed taxes are substantially below current levels and only marginally differ between car fuel types second if for political or technical reasons variable car taxes cannot be optimally adjusted large differences in fixed car taxes do result the same holds if the government uses kilometre taxes as the main variable tax instrument third the results of a series of marginal tax reform exercises suggest that a shift form gasoline towards diesel taxation is welfare improving both for fixed and variable taxes somewhat surprisingly a shift from fixed towards variable taxes is not necessarily welfare improving it is for diesel but not for gasoline cars

corporate diversification and credit constraints real effects across the business cycle we study whether differences in access to credit cause focused firms to perform differently from diversified firms in the product market prior work has identified binding credit constraints for bank dependent firms during recessions we assess whether corporate diversification alleviates these constraints we find that during recessions sales growth rates drop more for bank dependent focused firms than for rival segments of bank dependent diversified firms we also find that during recessions inventory growth rates drop more for bank dependent focused firms than for bank dependent diversified firms even after we control for contemporaneous sales growth consistent with a credit constraint explanation we find no difference in the sensitivities to recessions of bank independent focused and bank independent diversified firms jel g30 g31 g32 copyright 2006 oxford university press

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does britain or the united states have the right gasoline tax this paper develops an analytical framework to assess the second best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution congestion and accident externalities as well as interactions with the broader fiscal system we provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the us and the uk under a variety of parameter scenarios under our central parameter values the second best optimal gasoline tax is 1 01 gal for the us and 1 34 gal for the uk current tax rates are much lower than this in the us and higher in the uk the calculations are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions the congestion externality is the largest component in both nations revenue raising needs also play a significant role as do accident externalities and local air pollution potential welfare gains from reducing the current uk tax rate are estimated at nearly one fourth the production cost of all gasoline used in the uk even larger gains could be achieved by switching to a tax on vehicle miles with equal revenue yield for the us the welfare gains from optimizing the gasoline tax are smaller but those from switching to an optimal tax on vehicle miles are very large

optimal tax and public investment rules for congestion type of externalities optimal government policy is considered in a second best framework where consumers and producers cause an externality of the congestion type and income distribution issues are taken into account the theoretical results of the optimal tax literature are adapted using the concept of the net social pigouvian tax an illustrative age model uncovers the relative importance of its components the model demonstrates that the level of the externality tax does not depend strongly on distribution concerns as reoptimization of the other taxes ensures that the income distribution objective is reached the model also allows us to study the interaction between externality taxes and public abatement

intertemporal product choice and its effects on collusive firm behavior this study analyzes the collusive behavior of firms in markets characterized by horizontal product differentiation the special features are that product choice is endogenized and that firms may redesign their products intertemporally at a fixed cost the main objective is to examine the relationships between the extent of product differentiation the product redesigning cost and the degree of collusion supportable the findings indicate that flexible product design makes collusion more difficult to sustain since in the event collusion breaks down firms have an incentive to mitigate the severity of punishment by redesigning their products and thus reducing price competition copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

externalities and optimal taxation this paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem income and commodities in the presence of externalities the nature of the second best and the choice of the tax instruments are motivated by the informational structure in the economy the main results are i environmental levies linear or nonlinear differ in formula from pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods ii externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas linear and nonlinear for private goods iii externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear and iv a general income tax plus strictly pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution at any given consumption bundle

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

an indirect utility model of car ownership and private car use abstract in this paper a model is developed for the simultaneous determination of private car ownership and private car use measured as the annual number of kilometers this model is a micro economic utility model in which the fixed and variable car costs enter through the budget restriction this allows us to do micro simulations of increasing those costs which is a policy issue in the netherlands it turns out that in this model both fixed and variable car costs are effective measures for reducing traffic growth the former working primarily through decreasing car ownership levels the latter having a more direct effect on car use

price vs quantity competition in oligopoly supergames abstract in a repeated oligopoly with differentiated products and firms following trigger strategies quantity competition leads to a less efficient outcome than price competition this result contrasts with the repeated duopoly result where price competition is less efficient under certain conditions

endogenous product design in an infinitely repeated game abstract this paper examines the incentives to differentiate products horizontally in a repeated game when redesigning costs are negligible the main findings are the following if firms are patient with respect to future profits i e the discount factor is high they will choose an intermediate degree of differentiation the lower the discount factor the more firms are forced to increase differentiation in order to keep collusion from breaking down unless the discount factor is extremely low prices will be unconstrained monopoly prices

collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products abstract this paper examines the relationship between product differentiation and the sustainability of collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products the main finding is that collusion is more easily sustained the more similar the products are exactly the opposite result may be obtained in models of horizontal differentiation consequently when products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically theory provides no clearcut prediction

financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information in an earlier paper we presented an entry game with a monopolist and a potential entrant facing financial constraints in which the unique perfect equilibrium involved no entry here we consider a one sided incomplete information variant of the game in which the monopolist allows for the possibility that the entrant is committed to endure a price war to the limit of his capability we find a unique sequentially perfect equilibrium in which entry sometimes occurs when it does predatory price wars may result with the incumbent sometimes driving out the entrant but other times eventually abandoning the fight

conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting we provide a formal analysis of the notion that conglomerates are more entrenched as they have deeper pockets using the financial contracting model of bolton and scharfstein 1990 we can isolate two effects that confirm this conjecture the pooling of cash flows which allows to smooth out repayments and the ability to obtain better credit terms for less profitable business segments the internal capital market operated in a conglomerate may however work in the opposite direction increasing the sensitivity of operations to own cash flows and increasing the likelihood of exit

the devolution of declining industries in declining industries capacity must be reduced in order to restore profitability who bears this burden where production is all or nothing there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium the largest firms exit first ghemawat and nalebuff 1985 in this paper firms continuously adjust capacity again there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium all else equal large firms reduce capacity first and continue to do so until they shrink to the size of their formerly smaller rivals intuitively bigger firms have lower marginal revenue and correspondingly greater incentives to reduce capacity this prediction is supported by empirical findings

market structure internal capital markets and the boundaries of the firm we study how the creation of an internal capital market an icm can invite strategic responses in product markets that in turn shape firm boundaries icms provide ex post resource flexibility but come with ex ante commitment costs alternatively stand alones possess commitment ability but lack flexibility by creating flexibility integration can sometimes deter a rival s entry but commitment problems can also invite predatory capital raising these forces drive different organizational equilibria depending on the integrator s relation to the product market hybrid organizational forms like strategic alliances can sometimes dominate integration by offering some of its benefits with fewer strategic costs this paper develops a theory of the firm in which internal capital markets affect the ability to compete in product markets in our model a firm s decision to operate an internal capital market affects the fund raising behavior of its product market rivals an internal capital market can either scare away rival firms or else induce them to compete more aggressively raising more capital than they otherwise would in equilibrium these strategic interactions determine the boundaries of the firm

guarantees leverage and taxes this paper considers the optimal joint decision on firm organization and capital structure under a tax bankruptcy trade off stressing the role of guarantees against default conditional guarantees which are embedded in parent subsidiary structures increase joint value and joint debt relative to unguaranteed stand alone firms such guarantees that are unilateral rather than mutual for moderate default costs may dominate the unconditional mutual guarantees built in mergers we study the optimal characteristics of both guarantors and beneficiaries as well as their impact on the self enforcement potential of conditional guarantees

revenue recycling and the welfare effects of road pricing the authors explore the interaction between taxes on work related traffic congestion and preexisting distortionary taxes in the labor market a congestion tax raises the overall costs of commuting to work and discourages labor force participation at the margin when revenues are returned in lump sum transfers the resulting efficiency loss in the labor market can be larger that the pigouvian efficiency gains from internalizing the congestion externality by contrast if congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes the net impact on the labor supply is positive and the efficiency gain in the labor market can raise the overall welfare gains of the congestion tax by as much as 100 percent recycling congestion tax revenues in public transit subsidies produces a positive but smaller impact on the labor supply in short the authors results indicate that the presence of preexisting tax distortions and the form of revenue recycling can crucially affect the size and possibly even the sign of the welfare effect of road pricing schemes the efficiency gains from recycling congestion tax revenues in other tax reductions can amount to several times the pigouvian welfare gains from congestion reduction

a note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities abstract i consider the problem of optimal taxation with externalities in a general setup encompassing most of optimal taxation models found in the literature it is demonstrated that when direct taxation of externalities is possible optimal taxes can be expressed as the sum of the optimal pigouvian taxes and the optimal taxes in a related problem without externalities regardless of what other tax instruments are available this result generalizes the so called principle of targeting

the effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing abstract using the spatial competition framework of hotelling 1929 this paper explores the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and the ability of firms to collude with respect to price we show that the minimum discount factor required to support the joint profit maximum as an equilibrium outcome monotonically increases as products become better substitutes when the joint profit maximum cannot be supported the optimal collusive price is shown to decline as products become more substitutable these findings suggest that firms producing stronger substitutes tend to find it tougher to collude in terms of their product price

the welfare gains from pricing road congestion using automatic vehicle identification and on vehicle meters it is a widely accepted proposition that there is a general underpricing of auto travel in u s cities auto travel imposes a congestion externality with an efficient peak period level estimated at lo 23t per mile on urban freeways small 1121 2 3 but for most urban auto travel tolls consist almost entirely of the gasoline excise tax at a fuel economy of 15 miles per gallon the auto toll implied by the current high gas tax in the united states of 25e per gallon is only 1 7e per mile this is much too low for most peak period travel and even underprices some off peak travel the purpose of this study is to estimate the welfare gains which are possible under different regimes for imposing higher auto tolls in urban areas the three regimes studied are associated with a higher gas tax and systems called automatic vehicle identification and on vehicle metering the framework for the study is a model of a city whose shape is that of a wedge or pie slice of a circle the model s features include

transport taxes with multiple trip purposes a congestible urban transport system is considered in which cars and buses are used for commuting and non commuting trips commuting is a strict complement to taxable labour supply the optimal tax structure for raising a given amount of government revenue is examined for the cases where differentiation of transport tolls between trip purposes is and is not possible an application to belgian urban environments shows that optimal toll differentiation produces significant efficiency improvements without differentiation reforming transport taxes generates substantial gains only when the labour tax can be reduced

the marginal efficiency effects of taxes and subsidies in the presence of externalities a computational general equilibrium approach abstract using 1983 data we develop a 19 sector computational general equilibrium model incorporating producer producer externalities and producer consumer externalities simulation results indicate that when additional government expenditure is financed by pigouvian taxes the marginal cost of public funds is substantially below one labor sales and output taxes also affect the output of the polluting industries and thus have indirect pigouvian effects which tend to reduce the associated marginal costs of public funds pigouvian taxes are usually more efficient than pigouvian subsidies since the tax revenue can be used to reduce other taxes

cartel stability and product differentiation abstract this paper employs a supergame theoretic model of collusion to analyze the effects of different levels of product differentiation on cartel stability in contrast to earlier work the ability of the parties to reach an agreement is assumed here the focus is on how greater product homogeneity increases both the gain to cheating on a collusive agreement and the magnitude of the punishments that follow a defection the total effect on the likelihood a cartel is stable is therefore unclear two particular differentiated products models are then used to demonstrate that contrary to the conventional view greater homogeneity can reduce cartel stability