bank acquisitions and ownership structure theory and evidence abstract in this paper we both theoretically and empirically consider the joint nature of two ownermanager conflict resolution mechanisms insider shareholdings and shareholder concentration we find evidence of a significant entrenchment effect for high low firms moreover bidder returns are found to be positive for high high firms only we utilize a switching of regression regimes model to solve for critical values of and that subdivide the universe of acquiring firms into separate and distinct ownership structure regimes i e that define high vs low levels of or

marketable pollution permits in oligopolistic markets with transaction costs in this paper we present a variational inequality framework for the modeling qualitative analysis and computation of equilibrium patterns in multiproduct multipollutant oligopolistic markets with marketable pollution permits in the presence of transaction costs the model deals explicitly with spatial differentiation and also guarantees that the imposed environmental quality standards are met through the initial allocation of licenses an algorithm is proposed with convergence results to compute the profit maximized quantities of the oligopolistic firms products and the quantities of emissions along with the equilibrium allocation of licenses and their prices numerical examples are included to illustrate this approach

competition for advertisers and for viewers in media markets standard models of advertising financed media assume consumers patronise a single media platform precluding effective competition for advertisers such competition ensues if consumers multi home the principle of incremental pricing implies that multi homing consumers are less valuable to platforms then entry of new platforms decreases advertisement prices while a merger increases them and advertisement financed platforms may suffer if a public broadcaster carries advertisements platforms may bias content against multi homing consumers especially if consumers highly value overlapping content and or second impressions have low value

determinants of bank growth choice abstract we study the determinants of bank growth in a two stage logistic regression model we first compare banks that branch bank acquire or product expand with banks that do not grow externally banks that are federally chartered in states with higher income growth and with higher labor prices are less likely to grow externally larger banks are more likely to grow externally in the second stage we study determinants of growth activity for banks that expand products branch or acquire other banks depending on the time period bank structure regulatory environment performance and balance sheet characteristics determine bank growth choices

content vs advertising the impact of competition on media firm strategy media firms compete in two connected markets they face rivalry for the sale of content to consumers and at the same time they compete for advertisers seeking access to the attention of these consumers we explore the implications of such two sided competition on the actions and source of profits of media firms one main conclusion we reach is that media firms may charge higher content prices in a duopoly than in a monopoly this happens because competition for advertisers can reduce the return per customer impression from the ad market making each firm less willing to underprice content to increase demand greater competitive intensity may thus increase content profits and decrease ad profits these findings are in sharp contrast to those in a regular one sided product market in which competition typically lowers product prices and profits we extend the framework to examine competition across different media e g between magazines and cable tv and show that firms in a duopolistic medium may benefit from more intense competition from a monopolist in another medium we characterize the conditions for each firm in the duopoly medium to bundle more ads and earn greater total profits than the rival firm in the monopoly medium

concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry the future of television tv regulation concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry new technologies are deeply transforming the broadcasting industry what we have seen so far is only the beginning of a long story inevitably industry regulations must adapt which means that a wide ranging rethink of current practices is required in order to assess the likely evolution of the industry this article decomposes it into a number of components from conception of programmes to their broadcasting including distribution storage and licensing contrary to popular expectations the analysis suggests that the current high degree of concentration will if anything increase the policy implication is that regulation so far driven by now obsolete technological constraints should increasingly emphasize promoting competition massimo motta and michele polo

mutual holding companies evidence of conflicts of interest through disparate dividends abstract the mutual holding company mhc structure establishes a dual class stock that creates a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor owners to new minority shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends we show that mhcs are priced higher than comparable non mhcs and dividend policy is a significant component of this valuation we also show that mhc thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non mhc thrifts and that an office of thrift supervision ots ruling reducing the potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in lower dividends these results have policy implications of special significance given that the ots reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use of the mhc structure in the financial service industry

two sided markets with pecuniary and participation externalities the existing literature on two sided markets addresses participation externalities but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms in this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities in our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising and offer consumers a service free of charge such as a tv program that is financed through advertising we show that advertising can exhibit the properties of a strategic substitute or complement surprisingly there exist cases in which platforms benefit from market entry moreover we show that from a welfare point of view perfect competition is not always desirable

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

market provision of broadcasting a welfare analysis this paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry advertising levels may be too low or too high depending on the nuisance cost to viewers the substitutability of programs and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers market provision may allocate too few or too many resources to programming and these resources may be used to produce programs of the wrong type monopoly ownership may produce higher social surplus than competitive ownership and the ability to price programming may reduce social surplus

spatial market policy modeling with goal targets in this paper we show how the theory of variational inequalities can be applied to the formulation qualitative analysis and computation of a new competitive spatial market model in the presence of goal targets the model allows the decision maker to impose supply goals at production locations demand goals at consumption locations and transportation goals between supply and demand locations along with associated penalties for failure to comply this work may be viewed as a contribution to the growing literature on the development of mathematical methodologies for policy modeling

motivations for bank mergers and acquisitions enhancing the deposit insurance put option versus earnings diversification this paper examines the prices bid for target banks in the early to mid 1980s two hypotheses are examined 1 the earnings diversification hypothesis which holds that banks would bid more for merger partners that offered risk reduction opportunities and 2 the deposit insurance put option hypothesis which holds that acquirers would bid more for targets that offered opportunities to increase risk and or become too big to fail an empirical analysis of a sample of 302 mergers produces results that are consistent with the earnings diversification hypothesis and inconsistent with the deposit insurance put option hypothesis copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

sequential location games we study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval we show that for certain classes of densities including monotone and under some additional restrictions hump shaped and u shaped ones equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets winner take all competition trade offs between profits in the short and the long run and firms operating multiple outlets

a continuous approach to oligopolistic market equilibrium we provide an algorithm for computing cournot nash equilibria in a market that involves finitely many producers the algorithm amounts to following a certain dynamical system all the way to its steady state which happens to be a noncooperative equilibrium the dynamics arise quite naturally as follows let each producer continuously adjust the planned production if desired as a response to the current aggregate supply in doing so the producer is completely guided by myopic profit considerations we show under broad hypothesis that this adjustment process is globally asymptotically convergent to a nash equilibrium

corporate governance of banks a survey this paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance of banks we start by highlighting the main differences between banks and nonfinancial firms and focus on three characteristics that make banks special i regulation ii the capital structure of banks and iii the complexity and opacity of their business and structure next we discuss the characteristics of corporate governance in banks and how they differ from the governance of nonfinancial firms we then review the evidence on three governance mechanisms i boards ii ownership structures and iii executive compensation our review suggests that some of the empirical regularities found in the literature on corporate governance of nonfinancial institutions such as the positive negative association between board independence size and performance do not hold for banks also existing work provides no conclusive results regarding the relationship between different governance mechanisms and various measures for banks performance we discuss potential explanations for these mixed results

tv wars exclusive content and platform competition in pay tv the article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television programming static analysis shows that a vertically integrated operator with premium programming always supplies this content to the rival distributor using per subscriber fees to soften competition in a dynamic setting with switching costs exclusivity confers a market share advantage benefiting the operator in the future under certain conditions this future benefit outweighs the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees making exclusivity the preferred choice alternative dynamic mechanisms are explored identifying essential features the analysis explains the observed incidence of content exclusivity in pay tv and provides guidance for policy makers

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

quantity restrictions on advertising commercial media bias and welfare abstract we study the welfare effect of a quantity restriction on advertising in free to air television and other advertising financed media in the presence of commercial media bias broadcasters face a trade off between increasing the number of viewers by sending content that is highly valued by viewers and increasing the price of advertising by choosing advertiser friendly content a cap on advertising drives the per viewer price of ads up thus content improves for viewers therefore the cap can be welfare enhancing even when viewers are not ad averse competition among broadcasters makes it more likely that a cap on advertising improves welfare thus there is a complementarity between regulation and competition on this market we also show that a tax on advertising revenues has quite different effects than a cap on advertising quantity

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

time scarcity and the market for news abstract we develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance time constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets they choose which outlets to access and which stories to read or skip thus indirectly deciding how much time to spend on a given outlet firms decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits we show that even when readers or television viewers and firms are rational and unbiased they spend more time on the news than they would like and not necessarily on the topics they prefer in particular relevant news items may be crowded out we then study how reader efficient standards can be restored and derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditional media these include tabloidization and polarization of the news and other aspects relevant for the political economy of the media including political knowledge gaps and voter turnout

the role of insider influence in mutual to stock conversions using a sample of 347 demutualizing thrifts from 1991 to 2004 we show that the level of inside participation is not a traditional signal of firm performance we conclude that unanticipated inside participation reflects the incentives of insiders to reduce the size of the offer to influence the level of expected initial public offer ipo returns we find unanticipated inside participation is related to lower offer size and higher initial returns but we do not find a relationship between inside participation and post ipo performance

television in a digital age what role for public service broadcasting public service broadcasting the television broadcasting industry is subject to an exceptionally high level of public intervention but one of the reasons for this the absence of competition is fast disappearing as households become multi channel this paper is concerned with whether a case for public service broadcasting remains and if so what form it should take there are several other potential sources of market failure but a lack of evidence often makes judging their practical significance difficult to help overcome this problem and provide the basis for improved public accountability the paper proposes several measures of public service broadcasting performance the paper also considers when the appropriate remedy for these failures might take the form of dedicated public service broadcasters like the bbc rai ard france 2 etc it suggests that in general targeted supply side interventions of this sort only make sense when they address a supply side failure and that dedicated public service broadcasters are to be preferred to alternative types of targeted intervention like an arts council of the air on contractual grounds shaun p hargreaves heap

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

press advertising and the ascent of the pensee unique the press industry depends in a crucial way on the possibility of financing an important fraction of its activities by advertising receipts we show that this induces the editors of newspapers to moderate in several cases the political message they display to their readers compared with the political opinions they would have expressed otherwise to this end we consider a three stage game in which editors select sequentially their political image the price of their newspaper and the advertising tariff they oppose to the advertisers the intuition of the result lies in the fact that editors have to sell tasteless political messages to their readers in order to sell a larger audience to the advertisers

a simple theory of advertising as a good or bad our analysis treats advertisements and the goods advertised as complements in stable metautility functions and generates new results for advertising by building on and extending the general analysis of complements by assimilating the theory of advertising into the theory of complements we avoid the special approaches to advertising found in many studies that place obstacles in the way of understanding the effects of advertising we also use this approach to evaluate advertising from a welfare perspective whether there is excessive or too little advertising depends on several variables the effects on consumer utility the degree of competition in the market for advertised goods the induced changes in prices and outputs of advertised goods and whether advertising is sold to consumers

sensitivity analysis for the general spatial economic equilibrium problem we consider the general spatial economic equilibrium problem where the supplies and demands at each market for each commodity may depend on the price on this as well as other prices of other commodities at other markets and the transportation cost on each link for each commodity may depend on the flow on this as well as other flows of other commodities on other links in the network for this model we perform stability and sensitivity analysis assuming that the supply demand and transportation cost functions are monotone we first show that the multicommodity equilibrium price pattern depends continuously upon the market supply and demand functions and the multicommodity equilibrium shipment pattern depends continuously upon the transportation cost functions we then focus on the delicate question of predicting the direction of the change in the price and shipment pattern and the incurred supplies demands and transportation costs resulting from changes in the supply demand and transportation cost fu

retraining in an interdependent system of labor markets a network analysis abstract the study of a system of markets for labor of different categories heterogeneous labor must be based on the recognition that individual workers may move from one category to another through schooling and retraining here such transitions are viewed as a flow through a retraining network the nodes of the network represent various stages of education and acquired abilities the directed links represent avenues of possible schooling and retraining if wages are rigid downwards failing to fall in the face of a weakening demand for labor there may be unemployment at one or several nodes of the retraining network an optimizing principle inspired by developments in the analysis of spatial networks is presented which solves for the supply of labor of each category the number of workers enrolled in the various retraining activities and the possible unemployment at each node of the network the lagrange multiplier of each market balance is the market wage rate whether the labor market is in equilibrium or not

competition between networks a study of the market for yellow pages this paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for yellow pages i estimate three simultaneous equations consumer demand for usage of a directory advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher s first order condition derived from profit maximizing behaviour estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising implying a network effect i find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus as an application i consider whether the market benefits from monopoly which takes advantage of network effects or oligopoly which reduces market power i find that a more competitive market is preferable copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

efficiency enhancing taxation in two sided markets this paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad valorem taxes we show that i a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum ii output may be reduced by imposing negative value added taxes subsidy or positive specific taxes

the role of online platforms for media markets two dimensional spatial competition in a two sided market abstract we analyze the market for online and offline media in a model of two dimensional spatial competition where media outlets sell content and advertising space consumer preferences are distributed along the style and type of news coverage where the distance costs may vary across dimensions for integrated provision of online and offline platforms we show that entering the online market reduces average profits and may even constitute a prisoner s dilemma specialized provision may yield polarization in the style and type dimensions this is in contrast to the maximum minimum differentiation result previously established in the literature on multidimensional horizontal competition we show that maximal differentiation in both dimensions occurs due to the discrete nature of the type dimension and asymmetric advertising markets

the political economy of government responsiveness theory and evidence from india the determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive this suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy the ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from india we show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater controlling for shocks where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

the managerial regulatory and financial determinants of bank merger premiums this paper analyzes the managerial regulatory and financial determinants of us bank merger premiums we use both individual acquirer and target bank characteristics we also examine state regulation of acquirer and target banks from a geographically dispersed population allowing us specifically to test the effect of a varied state regulatory menu the study finds merger premiums to be related to the characteristics of both acquirer and target banks and the regulatory environments in both acquirer and target bank states we also find evidence that the separation of ownership and control in acquirer and target banks has a significant effect on merger premiums in the last decade the pace of mergers in the us banking industry has been impressive this growth in the number of bank mergers has largely been due to the changing economic and regulatory environment with the reduction in the severity of enforcing strict antitrust guidelines by the reagan administration and more importantly the gradual removal of geographical restrictions by individual states on bank expansion the environment for bank mergers has never been so conducive since the regulatory restrictions are likely to be further relaxed with an increasing number of states permitting interstate banking in the early 1990s the number and dollar value of bank mergers is certain to accelerate accordingly it is important to improve our understanding of bank mergers this paper examines the financial regulatory and managerial determinants of bank merger premiums in examining the financial determinants of the merger premiums we include the financial characteristics of the target banks and the franchise value of its banking market because bank mergers are carefully regulated by state laws we also analyze the regulation in the banks states we examine the state regulation of acquirer and target banks

tariffs and quotas in world trade a unified variational inequality framework abstract in this paper we develop a unified variational inequality framework in the context of spatial price network equilibrium problems that captures world trade policies in the form of tariff rate quotas which are two tiered tariffs and that have been applied in practice to numerous commodities the spatial price network equilibrium model allows for multiple supply markets and multiple demand markets in different countries as well as multiple transportation routes the model is qualitatively analyzed and also related to models with trade policies such as ad valorem tariffs and strict quotas a case study on the dairy industry focusing on the united states and france is presented to illustrate the modeling and computational framework with impacts of stricter quotas higher over quota tariffs as well as additional transportation routes assessed the numerical examples reveal that although domestic producers can gain under tariff rate quotas consumers may experience higher prices given the relevance of tariffs to global trade in the world today and discussions concerning the impacts the framework constructed in this paper is especially timely

financial determinants of bank takeovers note in recent years more takeovers have occurred in banking than in any other industry mergers acquisitions 1987 this activity resulted partly from liberalized laws affecting branch and interstate banking and partly from the number of failed banks t as more states liberalize their laws regarding banking structure and regional pacts takeovers of bank and nonbank financial institutions are expected to increase 2 thus understanding the determinants of the prices paid in bank takeovers is important to the large portion of the banking industry that is either a potential target or potential bidder or both greater knowledge of the determinants of purchase prices can also help shed light on commercial bank operations 3 several recent studies examine the determinants of bank merger pricing these studies tend to focus on the characteristics of the target and to downplay the characteristics of the acquiror these studies also tend to use a single proxy for each theoretical effect for example one measure of the target s earnings the individual studies are reviewed below but in general they find a positive relationship between purchase price and some measure of the target s potential growth and a negative relationship between purchase price and some measure of the ratio of the target s total assets to the acquiror s total assets other variables including those for the target s profitability are sometimes but not always statistically significant one difference between this study and prior studies is that this study places greater emphasis on acquiror related characteristics acquirors tend to pay a premium for a controlling interest in banks this premium suggests that the firm

state passage of interstate banking legislation an analysis of firm legislative and economic characteristics abstract forty nine states and the district of columbia enacted legislation reducing interstate banking restrictions between july 1982 and april 1993 for these 50 banking bills deregulation increased the average price of bank stocks returns vary cross sectionally by firm characteristics regulatory features and economic conditions returns are positively related to the characteristics of acquisition targets furthermore returns are positively related to legislative features that increase the bargaining power of potential targets and economic conditions that are likely to encourage bank acquisition these findings are consistent with the relaxation of geographic restrictions increasing activity in the corporate control market

network or pay per view a welfare analysis the welfare effects of pay per view television and advertising supported networks are compared it is shown that pay per view television admits third degree price discrimination and may involve a large loss of consumer surplus

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

optimal auction design in two sided markets a key feature of online markets for advertising e g sponsored links is that clicking rates depend on the searchers expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers this article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run where clicking rates are mechanism dependent in line with the practice of the major search engines the revenue maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of advertisers by trading off rent extraction and clicking volume this mechanism works as a cross subsidization device between searchers and advertisers

selective reporting of factual content by commercial media the authors study the market for factual content and examine whether competition increases or decreases its provision factual content is supplied by commercial media firms which observe a set of facts depicting the state of the world and selectively decide how to report them consumers value content that matches their opinion which incentivizes media firms to slant their reports by omitting certain facts novel features in the authors model include consumers ability to anticipate the media s incentives for slant and the requirement that all media stances must be supported by facts furthermore consumers find reports with more facts to be more convincing despite consumers ability to detect slant and their demand for factual support the research shows that competition results in consumers reading fewer facts and being unable to update their prior beliefs about the state of the world the authors also find that a monopoly medium may be more polarizing than competitive media and that polarized report

search diversion and platform competition abstract platforms use search diversion in order to trade off total consumer traffic for higher revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products e g advertising we show that competition between platforms leads to lower equilibrium levels of search diversion relative to a monopoly platform when the intensity of competition is high on the other hand if there is only mild competition then competing platforms induce more search diversion relative to a platform monopolist when platforms charge consumers fixed access fees all equilibrium levels of search diversion under platform competition are equal to the monopoly level irrespective of the nature of competition furthermore relative to platforms that cannot charge such fees platforms that charge positive negative access fees to consumers have weaker stronger incentives to divert search

a semi parametric analysis of two sided markets an application to the local daily newspapers in the usa summary this paper considers an empirical semiparametric model for two sided markets contrary to existing empirical literature on two sided markets we specify network effects and probability distribution functions of net benefits of the two sides nonparametrically we then estimate the model by nonparametric instrumental variables regression for local daily newspapers from the usa we show that semiparametric specification is supported by the data and the network effects are neither linear nor monotonic with a numerical illustration we demonstrate that the mark up of the newspaper on each side changes drastically with the nonlinearly specified network effects from the case with linear network effects copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

computing market equilibria with price regulations using mathematical programming one approach to modeling and solving for economic equilibria relies on mathematical programming these models solve for competitive equilibria however policy analysis often requires measuring the impacts of government price regulations that differ from the competitive equilibrium in this paper we provide a unified framework for computing market equilibrium in mathematical programming models in the presence of government price regulations the iterative procedure that we use is essentially a gauss seidel algorithmic strategy the paper concludes by showing how to represent tax rebate programs average cost pricing and price ceilings

who owns the media the authors examine patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world they find that almost universally the largest media firms are controlled by the government or by private families government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media government ownership is generally associated with less press freedom fewer political and economic rights inferior governance and most conspicuously inferior social outcomes in education and health the adverse effects of government ownership on political and economic freedom are stronger for newspapers than for television the adverse effects of government ownership of the media do not appear to be restricted solely to instances of government monopoly the authors present a range of evidence on the adverse consequences of state ownership of the media state ownership of the media is often argued to be justified on behalf of the social needs of the disadvantaged but if their findings are correct increasing private ownership of the media through privatization or by encouraging the entry of privately owned media can advance a variety of political and economic goals especially those of meeting the social needs of the poor

higher taxes more evasion evidence from border differentials in tv license fees this paper studies the evasion of tv license fees in austria we exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion comparing municipalities at the low and high fee side of state borders reveals that higher fees trigger significantly more evasion our preferred estimator indicates that a one percent increase in fees raises the evasion rate by 0 3 percentage points the positive effect of fees on evasion is confirmed in different parametric and non parametric approaches and survives several robustness checks