limited commitment and the demand for money understanding money demand is important for our comprehension of macroeconomics and monetary policy its instability has made this a challenge common explications for the instability are financial regulations and financial innovations that shift the money demand function we provide a complementary view by showing that a model where borrowers have limited commitment can significantly improve the fit between the theoretical money demand function and the data limited commitment can also explain why the ratio of credit to m1 is currently so low despite that nominal interest rates are at their lowest recorded levels this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts this paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist a model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal it is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment

wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

optimal labour contracts when workers have a variety of privately observed reservation wages if a firm does not know the individual ex post outside opportunities of its contracted workforce then it can use hours wages and redundancy payments to screen them will a second best contract have underemployment inefficiency or overemployment and with a stochastic contract are those workers randomly selected for layoff worse off than their retained colleagues involuntary layoff or vice versa involuntary retention the answers depend on the nature of the workers preferences two polar cases are looked at corresponding to permanent and temporary layoff the former is characterized by overemployment and involuntary retention the latter by underemployment and involuntary layoff also examined are simple contracts where all retained workers are paid a common wage and all laid off workers receive a common redundancy payment handling asymmetric information in stochastic contracts has led to two technical innovations first a number of results are proved even though all the truth telling constraints are explicitly included second a new regularity condition is found under which the local constraints are sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility at an optimum

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

financial technology shocks and the case of the missing m2 m2 growth was unusually weak in the early 1990s when its velocity soared although m2 growth subsequently recovered its velocity plateaued at a high level giving rise to a case of missing money these swings in m2 growth have accompanied opposite swings in bond mutual fund inflows m2 growth is better tracked and the missing m2 problem is resolved when money models are modified to account for shifts in bond mutual fund costs this approach avoids the capital gains and portfolio substitution problems posed by adding bond or equity funds to m2 while capturing the substitution effects relevant to money demand

inflation and welfare in a monetary economy it is in everyone s private interest to try to get someone else to hold non interest bearing cash and reserves but someone has to hold it all so these efforts must simply cancel out all of us spend several hours per year in this effort and employ thousands of talented and highly trained people to help us these person hours are simply thrown away wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all

the demand for money a structural econometric investigation this study empirically investigates dynamic microfoundations for the conventional static money demand equation an intertemporal substitution model with the addilog utility function yields a money demand relationship that closely approximates the double log specification results from previous empirical studies largely support the derived equation estimations with quarterly u s data support cointegration among real per capita m1 and consumption and an after tax long term interest rate for the post 1980 period estimated short run intertemporal interest rate elasticities of consumption vary from 0 26 to 0 93 estimated long run elasticities of substitution between consumption and money range from 0 26 to 0 41

involuntary employment in contracts with risky job search involuntary employment in contracts with risky job search the implications of partially insurable job search risk for incentive compatibility in a standard contracting framework are explored when unemployment spells provoke job search workers face risk in spell duration and reemployment wages when search effort is not variable contracts including unemployment insurance will yield involuntary employment when search effort is diminished by ui benefits firms shift some compensation back to wages increasing the relative attractiveness of employment the analysis begins with a theorem on incomplete insurance by imai geanakoplos and ito 1981 for which a simple proof and economic intuition are provided i introduction in seminal models of contingent labor contracts azariadis 1975 and baily 1974 sought to explain the behavior of wages and employment over the business cycle much of the subsequent literature for example grossman and hart 1983 and hart 1983 has been devoted to exploring the impact of asymmetric information on such properties of contracting equilibria as over or underemployment wage flexibility and whether or not utility falls when a worker is fired this paper looks at the effects on contingent labor contracts of the asymmetry in risk faced on the one hand by workers who being laid off when the contract is implemented experience job search risk which is partially uninsured due to asymmetric information and on the other hand by workers who retaining their jobs return to a known status quo for the rest of the period in most contingent contracting models all relevant information about the prevailing state of nature is revealed at once and wage and employment levels are then determined once the contract is implemented there is no residual uncertainty this sequence of events agreement upon a contingent contract resolution of uncertainty determination of wages and employment is a reasonable approximation to the experience of workers who retain their jobs since they know their wages and their working conditions workers who are laid off however often face considerable risk over the effectiveness of job search and the terms of future employment this creates an asymmetry in the riskiness of the ex post outcomes of the contract job retention means no more uncertainty within the period while layoff entails further within period risk associated with job search and reemployment while severance pay or unemployment benefits can reduce some of the uncertainty associated with job loss they will not generally provide complete insurance this is because the intensity of job search and the arrival of job offers are private information since the firm cannot verify for example the intensity of job search it will insist that the worker bear some of the risk associated with the search s outcome this is a standard principal agent problem see for example shavell 1979 equilibrium labor contracts will therefore offer workers a gamble between job retention with no residual risk and layoff with some uninsured job search risk 1 this asymmetry in residual risk affects the contingent contracts workers enter into for example if workers feel more comfortable facing a given risk when their incomes are higher the residual risk associated with layoff may lead them to accept lower contingent wages in the employed state in exchange for greater severance pay when laid off a problem with this kind of modification of the standard contract i e one with no residual risk is that if enough compensation is shifted into the unemployed state expected utility may actually be higher for laid off workers than for those who are retained this is a situation with voluntary layoffs and involuntary employment at prevailing wages retained workers would rather be laid off if workers can increase their chances of being fired by behaving unproductively involuntary employment contracts may be unenforceable

interest on bank reserves and optimal sweeping abstract a key rationale offered by the federal reserve for the payment of interest on reserves was to remove the incentive for banks to operate sweep accounts sweeping shifts funds from transactions deposits subject to reserve requirements to non reservable deposits this paper extends a conventional banking model to analyze sweeping behavior sweeping responds positively to increases in bank loan rates and reserve ratios and negatively to increases in the interest rate on reserves or exogenous increases in bank equity sweeping generates greater responsiveness in lending to changes in loan rates or the interest rate on reserves and lower responsiveness to changes in reserve ratios or equity than in its absence empirical analysis of an explicit condition that we derive suggests that with an unchanged reserve requirement the fed could eliminate sweeping by setting the interest rate on reserves to no less than approximately 4 points below the market loan rate

on barro s theorem of debt neutrality the irrelevance of net wealth the effects of national debt on real economic activity has been a recurring topic in the literature on macroeconomic policy analysis since the time of adam smith the problem is usually stated as follows for a given level of government spending is the economy sensitive to the financing mix between tax and debt historically attention has focused on the question of whether or not individuals perceive government bonds as net wealth the link between wealth and real activity being taken as given the main point of debate is well established the issue of bonds raises private assets by the full value of the bonds the corresponding tax liabilities for interest payments and retirement of the debt extend indefinitely into the future the perception of bonds as net wealth would then appear to depend on the length of the individual s optimization horizon the most recent contribution to this debate was made by robert barro 1974 in which he argued that despite the limitation of finite lives bonds will not be regarded as net wealth in a system characterized by operative intergenerational transfers the essence of his argument is that inclusion of a bequest motive effectively converts a finite horizon into an infinite one in that paper barro acknowledged a potential limitation on his proof of the neutrality result it was only valid for bonds that are redeemed at a known point in the future this limitation was raised again in a subsequent exchange with martin feldstein in which barro 1976 agreed that for a growing economy an increase in steady state per capita debt will generate net wealth if the rate of growth is greater than the interest rate however he argued that such a steadystate growth situation would not be consistent with rational utility maximizing behavior the main theme of this paper is that the literature has focused attention on the wrong question the real effects of national debt are independent of whether or not individuals perceive the debt as net wealth the correct question is whether or not changes in the level of debt force individuals into patterns of intertemporal consumption that they are unable to neutralize by adjustments in their portfolio behavior viewing neutrality in this light leads to some reinterpretation of the conditions under which neutrality is likely to hold my analysis starts where barro and feldstein leave off within the framework of the overlapping generations model with gift and bequest motives i show that steady state equilibrium growth is consistent with a growth rate in excess of the interest rate indeed without specific knowledge of the parameters of the economy there are no a priori grounds on which to expect any particular relationship between the growth and interest rates more importantly so long as it is valid to view the aggregate economy as behaving like a composite individual changes in the steady state level of government debt are neutral regardless of which relationship prevails provided one or the other of the intergenerational transfer motives is operative i will refer to this as the extended neutrality theorem section i presents an analysis of steadystate growth with gift and bequest behavior the steady state growth path is shown to lie above the golden rule solution if the gift

another look at long run money demand abstract this paper investigates the long run demand for m1 in the postwar united states previous studies based on data ending in the late 1980s are inconclusive about the parameters of postwar money demand this paper obtains precise estimates of these parameters by extending the data through 1996 the income elasticity of money demand is approximately 0 5 and the interest semi elasticity is approximately 0 05 these parameters are significantly smaller in absolute value than the corresponding parameters for the prewar period a caveat is that the analysis assumes there is no trend in money demand resulting from technological change

direct effects of base money on aggregate demand theory and evidence abstract meltzer the transmission process working paper carnegie mellon university 1999a shows that real monetary base growth is a significant determinant of consumption growth in the us controlling for the short term real interest rate in this paper i show that the same property of base money holds for total output relative to trend or potential in both the us and the uk the standard optimizing is lm model cannot account for this result but i show that it can once the long term nominal interest rate is included in the money demand function because the long term real rate matters for aggregate demand the presence of the long term nominal rate in the money demand function increases the effect of nominal money stock changes on real aggregate demand when prices are sticky

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

incomplete insurance and absolute risk aversion abstract suppose that a subset of states of nature are not verifiable individually given an optimal feasible insurance scheme the expected utility across a group of unverifiable states is greater less than that of a verifiable state if the degree of absolute risk aversion is decreasing increasing

financial innovations money demand and the welfare cost of inflation in the 1990s the empirical relation between money demand and interest rates began to fall apart we analyze to what extent improved access to money markets can explain this break down for this purpose we construct a microfounded monetary model with a money market which provides insurance against liquidity shocks by offering short term loans and by paying interest on money market deposits we calibrate the model to u s data and find that improved access to money markets can explain the behavior of money demand very well furthermore we show that by allocating money more efficiently better access to money markets decrease the welfare cost of inflation substantially

the wealth age relation among the aged aged people face the problem of allocating over the rest of their lifetimes the wealth that they have accumulated during their working years this problem is fairly complex because they are uncertain about the dates of their death and because they may wish to use their wealth to finance general consumption or hold it to meet emergencies leave estates or maintain power or status whether skilled at dynamic programming or not aged people effectively do make these decisions what are the results some studies of the entire lifetime pattern of saving and wealth tend to support the simple life cycle model in which the aged use up their wealth to help finance consumption harold lydall for example found saving rates to increase and then decrease with age in the whole population and to be negative for the group aged 65 and over guarded support for the theory was found by franco modigliani and albert ando in britain and by dorothy projector in the united states more recently a f shorrocks examined the lifetime pattern of wealth holding in estate tax data for a single cohort and found the hump pattern that is characteristic of life cycle saving other evidence on wealth holding runs contrary to this however in a study of estate tax returns in washington d c james d smith found that wealth increased with age among the aged after controlling for other demographic variables examining national estate tax data john brittain found wealth to increase with age in the united states and a b atkinson and a j harrison reported the same pattern in england and wales in a sample of tiaa annuity recipients analyzed by james mulanaphy over half reported that their total savings had increased during retirement and another quarter reported that their savings had remained about the same in this paper i examine wealth holding patterns among aged married couples using survey data representing the entire aged population of the united states in 1968 the statistical analysis serves as a test of the hypothesis that emerges from life cycle theory and provides some further exploration into the economic behavior of the aged i find that the aged tend to increase their wealth over time

public investment and its effects on the burden of the public debt few problems in economics have been so thoroughly debated without being resolved as the question about whether the burden of the public debt is passed on to the future the key issue in the debate is whether taxation and debt are equivalent in their real effects as methods of raising public revenues the question in this form is an old one and both sides of the debate were eloquently discussed by ricardo 2 the purpose of this paper is to present a framework within which the choices facing the many different individuals in the society can be analyzed as is explained below the nature of the economy s adjustment to debt issue cannot be fully understood without first understanding that different individuals will adjust differently to the issuance of additional debt it is unlikely that a single paper could end a debate that is well over two centuries old hence our goal is more modestly to extend the framework of the debate adding some more realistic features to a barro like model illustrates that there are areas of commonality that unite both sides of the debate this study extends the current debate in two ways first it examines the intergenerational transfer of public sector wealth by including the effects of intergenerational bequests of assets in addition to the intergenerational transfer of debt after all when individuals consider the well being of their heirs they must consider the value of the assets that are passed from one generation to the next in addition to the stock of public debt 3 second it

job matching with finite horizon and risk aversion the consequences of introducing risk averse workers with a known finite retirement age into a simple job matching framework are explored the job matching model includes two jobs in the primary job workers and firms learn about the worker s productivity by observing his output over time in the secondary job productivity of any worker is known with certainty at the outset workers start off in the primary job but based on their observed performance may choose to switch to the secondary job the model is developed in two stages first the finite retirement age is introduced while the usual assumption of risk neutral workers is retained in this model it is shown that all workers who achieve at least a certain cumulative output record denoted r by a certain age denoted t will thereafter remain in the primary job until retirement those who do not achieve r by age t switch to the secondary job at or before age t and remain there second risk aversion is introduced along with finite retireme

imperfectly enforceable labour contracts this paper presents a model where firms offer workers azariadian type labour contracts most workers abide by these contracts but some who have very small moving or retraining costs violate contractual agreements whenever higher wages are available on labour spot markets it is shown that the wilson equilibrium for this model can be pareto dominated by an outcome where mobility is restricted appropriately we give a simple classification for the set of economies where wilson equilibria are constrained pareto optima a propos de contrats de travail dont on ne peut faire appliquer les termes qu imparfaitement ce memoire presente un modele oui les entreprises offrent aux travailleurs des contrats de travail du type azariadis la plupart des travailleurs honorent ces contrats mais certains travailleurs pour qui les couts de deplacement et de recyclage sont faibles ne vont pas honorer leurs engagements quand le niveau de salaire est plus eleve sur le marche ferme que dans le contrat on montre que l equilibre de wilson dans un tel modele peut etre inf6rieur au sens de pareto a une solution impliquant certaines restrictions appropriees a la mobilite on propose une classification simple s appliquant a 1 ensemble des economies pour lesquelles les equilibres de wilson sont des optima paretiens sous contraintes

inflation and government deficits there is a pronounced positive correlation of inflation andgovernment deficits in the united states since world war ii the purpose of this paper is to test the three leading explanationsof this correlation these three explanations are a a deficitincreases prices through a wealth effect b a deficit results inthe federal reserve purchasing debt thus increasing the moneysupply and prices and c expected inflation increases the deficit which is the change in the nominal value of bonds no supportis found for either of the first two hypotheses the results indi cate that expected government deficits have no significance forfuture inflation since world war ii the united states has experienced large federal government deficits and a sustained peacetime inflation three differentconnections between the deficits and inflation are prominent in theliterature the most direct connection between government deficits and inflationis that by increasing the real value of outstanding bonds and perceived netwealth a deficit can raise total spending and the price level this connec tion is also the most long standing and is suggested by metzler 1951 andpatinkin 1965 for example monetarists generally and buchanan and wagner 1977 in particularhave emphasized a different link between deficits and inflation they sug gest that the federal reserve purchases government bonds when the trea sury sells bonds thus increasing high powered money the money supply and the price level the federal reserve might behave this way for exam ple because it is attempting to hold down interest rates on governmentsecurities when deficits occur recently barro 1978 1979 has put forward a hypothesis that deficitsare a result of inflation rather than inflation being a result of deficits thegovernment deficit is the change in the nominal value of outstanding gov ernment bonds if the anticipated inflation rate increases then the nomi nal value of bonds must increase i e the government will run a deficit tokeep the same anticipated real amount of bonds all three of these possible connections between government deficitsand inflation are consistent with the observed positive correlation of defi cits and inflation the implications however are strikingly different con

long run income and interest elasticities of money demand in the united states econometric techniques designed to accommodate nonstationary data are used to reexamine the stability of interest and income elasticities of money demand in the united states estimates based on postwar monthly data reveal a stable relationship between m1 velocity and various measures of interest rates that proxy the opportunity cost of holding money balances tests for the existence of cointegration and methods used to estimate the income and interest elasticities are based on procedures prescribed by soren johansen 1988 corresponding error correction estimates offer insight as to the dynamics of the process that maintains the equilibrium relation between velocity and interest rates copyright 1991 by mit press

on the welfare cost of inflation and the recent behavior of money demand post 1980 u s data trace out a stable long run money demand relationship of cagan s semi log form between the m1 income ratio and the nominal interest rate with an interest semi elasticity of 1 79 integrating under this money demand curve yields estimates of the welfare cost of modest departures from friedman s zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money that are quite small the results suggest that the federal reserve s current policy which generates low but still positive rates of inflation provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms to the alternative of moving all the way to the friedman rule jel e31 e41 e52

involuntary unemployment and worker moral hazard this paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance in repeated moral hazard situations workers typically bear risk associated with whether they are chosen to be laid off even though the latter is uninformative about previous effort choices and wages are performance contingent however the hypothesis is unsatisfactory as optimal contracts involve involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in a wide variety of circumstances the theory of implicit labour contracts as developed over the past decade has thrown considerable light on the nature of long term employment relationships by emphasizing that firm owners are usually less risk averse than workers and thus have an incentive to insure workers against fluctuations in the demand for the firm s product the theory manages to explain the emergence of long term contracts characterized by downward real wage rigidity see holmstrom 1983 however the theory also typically implies that workers will be indifferent about whether they are to be retained or laid off this runs contrary to the common observation that there is an element of involuntariness in layoff decisions i e within any job category with given skill and performance history if a proportion of randomly chosen workers are to be laid off in a recession the laid off workers would strictly prefer to be retained not only is this phenomenon of involuntary layoffs interesting to explain per se it also seems relevant to the keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment interpreted as unequal treatment of similar workers where some are employed while others are not and unemployed workers would strictly prefer to be employed it thus seems worthwhile to examine if the theory of implicit contracts can be extended to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily as a test of its plausibility and as a possible source of a consistent microfoundation for keynesian propositions to explain why the firm does not insure workers against the risk associated with selection of those to be laid off it is natural to think of possible informational asymmetries this has been attempted by geanakoplos and ito 1981 and moore 1985 geanakoplos and ito introduce the realistic feature that a firm does not observe spot market opportunities available ex post to a laid off worker this permits only incomplete insurance against the risk of layoff however their model produces the paradoxical conclusion that with decreasing absolute risk aversion workers strictly prefer ex ante being laid off moore allows workers to have better ex ante information about their spot market opportunities but finds a similar tendency toward involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that firms cannot perfectly observe effort decisions of employed workers and use the threat of involuntary layoff as a discipline device the analysis of stiglitz and weiss 1983 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 and singh 1982 of principal agent relations in the absence of demand fluctuations suggests that the threat of contract termination may be used as an incentive device in their models

employment with asymmetric information in an economy without informational and other distortions entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a pareto optimal allocation of resources this paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort in particular if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes employment will be less than fully pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature

government debt government spending and private sector behavior a current period tax reduction financed by issuing government debt shifts the timing of tax collection from the current period to the future if the future taxes implied by government debt are not fully perceived and discounted by the private sector there will be a net wealth effect that increases private sector consumption thus reducing capital accumulation and growth if on the other hand the implied future taxes are perceived and discounted by the private sector the current period tax reduction will be used to increase private saving to pay for the future taxes and government debt will be absorbed without any real effects on the economy the effects of government spending financed by current period taxation also depend upon private sector perceptions 2 if the benefits of government spending are ignored private sector consumption will decrease in accordance with the reduction in permanent disposable income to the extent that government spending is on consumption type goods that are perceived as substitutes for privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively greater reduction in private sector consumption to the extent that government spending is on investment type goods yielding future goods and services that are perceived as substitutes for future privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively smaller reduction in private sector consumption the standard approach to modeling private sector consumption saving behavior involves a rather asymmetric set of assumptions as to how the private sector perceives the various elements of government fiscal policy 3 current period taxes are assumed to be fully perceived but current period government spending is implicitly assumed to be completely ignored by the private sector in considering permanent personal disposable income the private sector is assumed to be forward looking in its assessment of income and taxation the stock of government debt is nevertheless included as part of the stock of private wealth the implicit assumption associate professor of economics graduate school of business university of chicago 1101 east 58th street chicago il 60637 i thank eugene fama levis kochin michael mussa paul evans and an anonymous referee for helpful comments i am particularly grateful to daniel benjamin for contributing many hours of discussion and laura lahaye who was a research assistant and valuable adviser on earlier drafts the theoretical debate on the burden of the debt has been long standing gerald o driscoll 1977 documents ricardo s nineteenth century position robert barro 1974 reopened the debate by introducing the fundamental issue of intergenerational transfers also discussed in merton miller and charles upton 1974 the empirical side of the debate was initiated by levis kochin s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of deficits on consumption and by martin feldstein s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of social security wealth on consumption other empirical contributions include jess yawitz and laurence meyer 1976 myself 1978 and j earnest tanner 1978 1979 with respect to the effects of government deficits and debt and barro 1978 michael darby 1979 and dean leimer and selig lesnoy 1982 with respect to social security wealth see also interesting recent papers by john seater 1982 who generates detailed tests of the effects of deficits and debt on consumption charles plosser 1982 who explores the effects of government spending and debt shocks on interest rates and feldstein 1982 who attempts tests similar to some in this paper see fn 29 2martin bailey s 1962 1971 development of the effects of government spending on private consumption and aggregate economic activity is the seminal contribution paul david and john scadding 1974 extend bailey s ideas and provide some supporting empirical evidence more recently willem buiter 1977 and myself 1978 developed models based on bailey s earlier work barro 1981 has an interesting paper on related issues see also david aschauer 1982 3the standard approach incorporates fiscal policy through the concept of personal disposable income and by including the stock of government debt as part of personal wealth see for example the empirical specification of albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 which has been the basis of most empirical consumption studies since and feldstein 1974 for one of the more influential papers based on the ando modigliani specification

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

sweep programs the fall of m1 and rebirth of the medium of exchange this paper investigates the effect of sweep programs on m1 using dynamic simulations of money demand over 1994 2000 the postsample period constitutes when sweep programs have been in effect all models generate predictions systematically above reported m1 using data on newly initiated programs test findings indicate that sweeps account for the overprediction within the conventional money demand model with a long term interest rate we construct a medium of exchange measure m1s equal to m1 plus estimated holdings of sweep balances m1s velocity compares favorably with that of broader aggregates evidence indicates cointegration within m1s money demand

labor contracts with voluntary quits this paper considers labor contracts between the risk neutral firm and risk averse workers with heterogeneous outside opportunities alternative wages which become known to the worker after a costly on the job search in the case of a deterministic alternative wage self selection over a menu of contract wages would achieve the first best contract if the alternative wages are stochastic the second best contract emerges as a trade off between productive efficiency and risk sharing workers who voluntarily search are fewer and workers who search are less likely to quit if the search effort is not monitored even fewer workers search

sectoral money demand and the great disinflation in the united states estimates of the welfare costs of inflation based on bailey 1956 are typically computed using aggregate money demand models yet the behavior of money demand may vary across sectors thus the impact on welfare of inflation regime shifts may differ between households and firms we specifically investigate the sectoral welfare implications of the shift from the great inflation to the present regime of low and stable inflation for this purpose we estimate different functional specifications of money demand for u s households and nonfinancial firms using flow of fund data covering four decades we find that the benefits were significant for both sectors

money debt and prices in the united kingdom this paper is concerned with testing the asset theory of the price level using quarterly uk data over the period 1968 1979 expressed in its most general form the asset theory states that the aggregate price level p is related to real variables such as the level of economic activity y financial wealth and the composition of wealth in terms of financial assets such as money m government bonds b etc this theory has a long tradition and has been revived and developed by blinder and solow 1973 among many others for the present we limit our attention to only two financial assets namely money and government bonds although in principle this set could be enlarged this preoccupation reflects the attention paid to money and bonds in the literature and the requirement that financial assets should be of the outside variety which precludes bank lending corporate liabilities etc hence our general specification of the price level is

results of a study of the stability of cointegrating relations comprised of broad monetary aggregates abstract we find strong evidence of a stable money demand relationship for mzm and m2m through the 1990s though the m2 relation breaks down somewhere around 1990 evidence has been accumulating that the disturbance is well characterized as a permanent upward shift in m2 velocity which began around 1990 and was largely over by 1994 taken together our results support the hypothesis that households permanently reallocated a portion of their wealth from time deposits to mutual funds although this reallocation may have been induced by depository restructuring we argue that the substitution could be explained by appropriately measured opportunity cost

the future of monetary aggregates in monetary policy analysis this paper considers the role of monetary aggregates in modern macroeconomic models of the new keynesian type the focus is on possible developments of these models that are suggested by the monetarist literature and that in addition seem justified empirically both the relation between money and inflation and between money and aggregate demand are considered regarding the first relation it is argued that both the mean and the dynamics of inflation in present day models are governed by money growth this relationship arises from a conventional aggregate demand channel claims that an emphasis on the link between monetary aggregates and inflation requires a direct channel connecting money and inflation are wide of the mark the relevance of money for aggregate demand in turn lies not via real balance effects or any other justification for money in the is equation but on money s ability to serve as a proxy for the various substitution effects of monetary policy that exist when many asset prices matter for aggregate demand this role for monetary aggregates which is supported by empirical evidence enhances the value of money to monetary policy

the stability of long run money demand in five industrial countries abstract this study provides strong evidence for the stability of long run demand functions for narrowly defined money m1 in five industrial countries u s japan canada u k and west germany using post war quarterly data evidence of stability is examined using two different estimation techniques and through a formal test of parameter constancy designed specifically for cointegrating vectors in the majority of these countries the key to stability is the imposition of a unitary long run income elasticity that is rarely rejected by the data

a note on long term contracts abstract the purpose of this paper is three fold i to interpret townsend s 1982 long term contract model as a labor contract model where a value of job matching for a worker is a private information ii to contrast townsend s long term contract model with holmstrom s 1983 long term contract model in a common framework and iii to explore the effect of workers mobility on the contract configuration of the two models both holmstrom and townsend construct models in which a single period contract is not viable but a long term contract is however reasons for this characteristic in the two models are quite different this paper proposes a simple framework of labor contracts with illustrates the essential difference of the two models and the role of mobility costs mobility costs in the two types of long term contracts are shown to be beneficial for both workers and the firm results of comparative statics show how contract configurations in two models are influenced by changes in mobility costs

u s narrow money for the twenty first century i introduction though money retains its fundamental role in a market economy money measures have been noticeably de emphasized within the conduct of u s monetary policy the federal open market committee fomc stopped reporting annual growth objectives for monetary aggregates although it states that money supply still has value for gauging economic conditions board of governors 2000 however a growing body of research calls for returning monetary aggregates to a more prominent role within monetary policy meltzer 1998 asserts that the view of persistent money growth as being the source of inflation is again widely accepted perhaps more firmly held by some central bank governors now than at any time in the twentieth century nelson 2002 provides evidence that base money has a significant effect on output relative to potential in the united states and united kingdom even after controlling for the short term real interest rate nelson 2003 argues that money growth governs the mean and dynamics of inflation in present day new keynesian models leeper and roush 2003 find evidence of an essential role for m2 within the transmission of monetary policy even after controlling for the nominal interest rate 1 this article focuses on the role of sweep programs in properly measuring narrow money in a sweep program banks move a portion of funds from customer demand deposits dds or other checkable deposits ocds into instruments with zero statutory reserve requirements we examine the effects of two types of sweep programs in the united states retail sweep programs and commercial demand deposit sweep programs narrow transactions based money historically has played a key role in the conduct of monetary policy as hafer and wheelock 2001 explain m1 served as the measure of money within the st louis model although monetarists had long been divided over whether a narrow or broad aggregate was the preferable target for monetary policy the fomc appeared to focus on m1 during the 1970s and early 1980s publishing their target ranges for money growth in terms of m1 hafer and wheelock 2001 though state that deviations in m1 velocity from its upward trend beginning in the early 1980s caused instability within the st louis model hoffman and rasche 1991 and hoffman et al 1995 place dummy variables in their vector error correction mechanisms to capture observed shifts in m1 velocity what attention remains on the money supply seems to be focused on broad rather than narrow aggregates but the broad aggregates have not escaped difficulties duca 2000 and hafer and wheelock 2001 document a deviation of m2 velocity from its long run trend in the early 1990s sometimes characterized as the missing m2 episode duca and vanhoose 2004 state that one response was to replace m2 with mzm consistent with the view that heightened substitution between small time deposits and mutual funds other than money market mutual funds mmmfs largely accounted for the instability in m2 velocity but as they go on to discuss m2 and mzm velocity encountered problems in the early 2000s plunging in ways not in line with opportunity cost variables duca and van hoose 2004 state that broader aggregates may have become more vulnerable to portfolio substitution involving stock and mutual funds other than mmmf narrow money has also been used extensively in examining money demand a sizable body of research has emerged that empirically investigates the demand for m1 especially using cointegration techniques hoffman and rasche 1991 hoffman et al 1995 dutkowsky and atesoglu 2001 and ball 2001 provide evidence of a stable long run money demand equation using m1 ball 2002 generates further support with m1 and establishes a correspondence between the partial adjustment formulation and the vector error correction model yet research and policy making using narrow money is currently being hampered by the lack of an accurate measure of transactions based money

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

an intergenerational transfer model of state debt financing as federal budget deficits and the overall national debt have risen in recent years scholarly attention to the causes and consequences of federal indebtedness has also increased much of that research has focused upon the intergenerational distributive effects of relying upon debt as opposed to tax financing considerably less attention has been directed toward debt financing by the american states despite the fact that such borrowing has increased steadily over the last thirty years though not with the dramatic suddenness that characterizes increases in federal borrowing regens and lauth 1988 this paper examines debt financing at the state level as a policy choice with important intergenerational consequences the analysis assumes that debt financing is the result of political decisions based upon a calculation of the economic interests of different demographic groups within each state elected officials are believed to weigh those interests in the light of their states electoral and legal environments borrowing from an argument by alex cukierman and allan meltzer this paper examines the proposition that a state s long term debt financing is likely to be sizeable in absolute per capita terms and relative to tax revenues when two conditions are met 1 the state has a large elderly population and 2 recent economic growth trends indicate that future generations of state taxpayers may have an easier time paying off currently incurred debt than current taxpayers would have paying off government obligations on a pay as you go basis under these conditions a large portion of a state s electorate is likely to be bequest constrained meaning that they are not willing to donate an inheritance of fully financed government facilities and services to successive generations instead they are willing to borrow from their heirs by forcing future taxpayers to pay the costs of current consumption of governmental benefits

a note on inflation and welfare abstract this note provides an analytical confirmation and a refinement of lucas jr r e 2000 inflation and welfare econometrica 68 62 247 274 march numerical findings regarding the characterization of optimality in the shopping time model presented in that paper the original numerical analysis concludes that a coefficient of risk aversion greater than 0 01 is sufficient for optimality here we use arrow s sufficiency theorem to confirm this result and more importantly to show without more calculations how changes in parameters can affect it

layoffs recruitment and interfirm mobility contract and search theories are integrated to provide a consistent explanation of contract formation the intertemporal structure of labor markets the absence of ex post market clearing and thus of unemployment in a contractual setting self fulfilling equilibria are described in which low productivity firms lay off some workers while high productivity firms recruitment search intensity and the resulting degree of interfirm mobility are endogenous the effects of severance pay on layoffs and mobility are identified finally the market economy is shown to generate too few layoffs whenever high productivity firms recruit new hires without recruitment laidoff workers are immobile and equilibrium is constrained efficient

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

the incentive implications of incomplete insurance the multiplicative case abstract when states of nature are not completely verifiable and payments in a pareto efficient insurance scheme contribute multiplicatively to wealth the insured may be better off in the insured against event depending upon the behavior of relative risk aversion

sweep programs and optimal monetary aggregation abstract this paper examines the admissibility of monetary aggregate groupings for the us over 1993 2001 based upon weak separability we investigate the impact of retail and commercial demand deposit sweep programs on the separability of monetary asset groupings weak separability is tested using the swofford whitney and fleissig whitney tests we use varian s measurement error adjustment procedure to eliminate violations of the generalized axiom of revealed preference garp when funds from both retail and commercial demand deposit sweep programs are placed within checkable deposits all groupings narrow and broad pass garp and weak separability for groupings based on conventional money measures tests tend to favor broad aggregates