optimal self employment income tax enforcement abstract most models of optimal income tax enforcement assume that income is either random or solely remunerates labor neglecting that auditing strategies may depend on observable inputs this paper outlines a model to optimally monitor self employed entrepreneurs when in addition to reported profits the tax collection agency also observes the number of workers employed or any other input variable at each firm we show that by conditioning the monitoring strategy only on labor input it is optimal for the irs to audit firms in a way that generates some empirical regularities like the missing middle we also show that the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by an indirect monitoring strategy that is consistent with actual irs practices in particular the irs calculates inputted income as function of labor whenever an entrepreneur reports profits that are lower than inputted income she is randomly monitored finally we formalize a model of optimal presumption taxation in which inputted income is the tax base to compare revenue collection across tax systems

cooperation against theft a test of incentives for water management in tunisia water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi arid regions cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring using a theoretical model we show that theft is more likely when prices are high punishments are weak and cooperatives are large we also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring we test the model on data from tunisia for the years 2001 2003 relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs the results confirm that well designed incentives can reduce theft and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

a minimum wage can be welfare improving and employment enhancing abstract we examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal tax transfer scheme the government cannot observe household abilities only their incomes and is constrained to ensure that those working are at least as well off as those not working a minimum wage combined with the institutional features of typical welfare systems allows the incentive constraint to be severed at the ability level associated with the minimum wage if such a scheme can be enforced the government can increase the amount of redistribution from those working to those not working and possibly lower the number of unemployed

a normative model of behavior based upon an activity hierarchy this paper integrates the psychological framework of a preference hierarchy with the economic framework used to analyze the allocation of time and commodities residual income available to an activity is found to be the primary determinant of the level of an activity s time and commodity demands and the most important variable affecting marginal consumption of new commodities

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

income tax evasion and the fear of ruin this paper characterizes the optimal income tax function when the agent is risk averse and the objective of the principal is to maximize a social welfare function we show that the optimal tax function is generally non decreasing and concave if the principal s objective is maximin and the agent s utility function satisfies a reasonable condition which we call repetitive risk aversion it is shown further that in many cases the optimal tax function is similarly concave when the social welfare function is utilitarian into income and that while ability and effort cannot be observed at any cost income which is the product of the two can be observed perfectly and costlessly mirrlees makes this latter unrealistic assumption only in order to emphasize the supply side effects of income taxation or the problem of moral hazard if individual effort and therefore income is exogenous the optimal income tax problem becomes trivial since by assumption income can be observed perfectly and costlessly on the basis of numerical simulations mirrlees 1971 shows that in the presence of moral hazard the optimal income tax function is approximately linear in at least some cases 2 the more recent literature on optimal income tax enforcement goes to the other extreme 3 on the one hand it rules out the moral hazard problem as individual income is treated exogenous and on the other it assumes that individual income can be observed only by performing an audit which is costly such an assumption introduces certain realistic features into the model besides tax rates a policy must now include an audit strategy and a scheme of penalties or fines for misreporting in this setting the equity versus efficiency issue arises in a form that is different from the one in mirrlees s optimal income tax problem a progressive tax function generates stronger incentives for taxpayers to underreport income and thus its enforcement requires more auditing since audit expenditure is a direct resource cost an optimal policy must weigh the redistributive gains from more progressive taxes against the concomitant rise in audit expenditure indeed chander and wilde 1998 show that the optimal tax function is generally non decreasing and concave if the principal s objective is to maximize net revenue 4 but under the rather strong assumption that the agent is risk neutral the same result need not hold when the agent is risk averse since the incentive to underreport income which is equivalent to taking a risk is weaker if the agent is risk averse and even weaker if the agent s income is higher and aversion to risk is increasing with income 5 both of these effects can weaken the incentive to underreport income so much that a progressive tax function may

catching the agent on the wrong foot ex post choice of monitoring abstract in a principal agent model with multiple performance measures we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored if it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type for cases of small asymmetry of information the principal can implement the first best contract for more serious asymmetries of information the first best is not implementable then the low type may be required to overproduce which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting we also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use

a theory of optimal random crackdowns police often engage in crackdowns on crime which are intermittent periods of high inten sity policing this paper develops a theoretical framework for modeling police monitoring behavior and individuals decisions to engage in crime within this framework we show that there are situations where it will be optimal for a crime minimizing police agency to engage in random crackdowns when they occur crackdowns also provide a way of estimating the deterrence effect of policing we illustrate the application of the model in analyzing a speed

optimal taxation in the presence of tax evasion expected utility versus prospect theory abstract it is now well known that the predictions of expected utility theory eut applied to tax evasion are quantitatively and qualitatively at variance with the evidence while prospect theory pt makes the correct predictions in this literature the tax rate is exogenous we endogenize the tax rate and require that a successful theory should explain jointly the facts on the tax rate tax gap and the level of government expenditure we find that the data is best described by taxpayers using pt and the government using standard utility theory eut the results are robust to several possible alternative specifications we discuss how our results have a bearing on the debate between liberalism versus paternalism in behavioral economics we also propose an alternative explanation based on the notion of context dependent preferences

viewpoint innovations in the theory and practice of redistribution policy we present a survey of key results from second best optimal redistribution theory and their implications for tax transfer policy the core results include the corlett hague theorem the deaton conditions the production efficiency theorem the atkinson stiglitz theorem and the mirrlees saez characterization of the optimal non linear income tax system these have been augmented in recent years by optimal participation tax rates the implications of involuntary unemployment the use of unconventional instruments such as minimum wages in kind transfer and workfare and the optimal taxation of capital income and bequests l auteur presente un survol des principaux resultats theoriques de la redistribution optimale de second ordre et de leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts les resultats fondamentaux incluent le theoreme de corlett hague les conditions de deaton les theoremes d efficacite en production le theoreme d atkinson stiglitz ainsi que la caracterisation du systeme optimal d imposition non lineaire du revenu a la mirrlees saez ces derniers resultats ont ete enrichis au cours des dernieres annees par certains autres portant sur les taux d imposition decoulant des allocations conditionnelles les implications du chomage involontaire l usage d instruments non conventionnels tels que le salaire minimum les transferts en nature le workfare ainsi que l imposition optimale des revenus du capital et des legs ces resultats sont exposes et leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts sont discutees

an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection this article presents an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection based on individual level data drawn from the internal revenue service 1982 and 1985 taxpayer compliance measurement programs i specify a model consisting of two equations the first measures the extent of evasion the second the fraction of evasion detected the empirical analysis explores the effects of income the marginal tax rate and various socioeconomic characteristics on filer evasion behavior and it assesses the variability in detection rates among irs examiners finally i use the empirical estimates to construct new estimates of the income tax gap the new estimates are very close to the previous irs estimates

cost padding in regulated monopolies abstract this paper considers the regulated monopoly that pads or falsifies its costs to increase the cost reimbursement it receives from the regulator contrary to the standard literature on cost regulation the firm engages in cost reducing investment before it enters into a regulatory contract this pre contractual investment in cost reduction determines the firm type at the contracting stage the paper derives both the optimum incentive compatible falsification contract and the equilibrium type distribution with the distribution of cost types determined endogenously by the pre contractual investment choice an increase in the cost of falsification has two effects first there is a direct effect that reduces cost padding because it becomes more expensive to do so second there is an indirect effect that increases cost padding because the firm responds by choosing lower investments and lower investments are associated with more cost padding it is demonstrated that the direct effect will dominate and both expected levels of cost padding and expected costs for falsification will be reduced however the indirect effect increases real costs and despite the reduction in cost padding the net effect can reduce welfare it is determined that these conclusions are significantly different from those obtained when the distribution of cost types is exogenously fixed

tax evasion and the optimum general income tax abstract this paper incorporates tax evasion into an optimum general income tax problem with endogenous labor supply it posits a two group model with high and low wage individuals to investigate the properties of optimal audit and tax structures the following main results are obtained first high wage persons are never audited while low wage persons are audited with a probability strictly less than one secondly high wage persons should face a zero marginal tax rate thirdly low wage individuals who have been audited and found innocent should pay a lower tax than those who are not audited fourthly there are two possible tax regimes low wage persons face a positive marginal tax rate under one regime and a zero rate under the other fifthly even if honesty cannot be rewarded the other results of the paper continue to hold

delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions abstract a difference in the objectives of members of a customs union may be a unifying rather than a divisive force if countries outside the union behave strategically one union member may want to delegate to its partner the ability to set the common external tariff we demonstrate these results in the context of a pure exchange general equilibrium trade model we show that if tariffs are strategic substitutes the union country which is relatively less well endowed in the exported good may be willing to delegate to its partner which behaves more aggressively in setting the union s policy the delegation decision is reversed if tariffs are strategic complements the model extends the standard results on the appropriate level of the union policy by adding another dimension that of the optimal decision making agent

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

global capital flows and financing constraints firms often cite financing constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment global capital flows by bringing in scarce capital may ease the financing constraints of host country firms but if incoming foreign investors borrow heavily from domestic banks foreign direct investment may exacerbate financing constraints by crowding host country firms out of domestic capital markets combining a unique cross country firm level panel with time series data on restrictions on international transactions and capital flows harrison love and mcmillan find that different measures of global flows are associated with a reduction in firm level financing constraints first the authors show that one type of capital inflow foreign direct investment is associated with a reduction in financing constraints second they test whether restrictions on international transactions affects the financing constraints of firms the results suggest that only one type of restriction those on capital account transactions negatively affects firms financing constraints the authors also show that multinational firms are not financially constrained and do not appear to be sensitive to the level of foreign direct investment this implies that foreign direct investment eases financing constraints for non multinational firms finally the authors show that 1 foreign direct investment only eases financing constraints in the non g7 countries and 2 other kinds of flows such as portfolio investment have no impact on financing constraints

evading auditing and taxing the equity compliance tradeoff tax evasion and auditing are analyzed in a model of linear income taxation taxpayers minimize expected tax payments including penalty for underreporting while the tax administration sets its audit policy to maximize expected net revenue under the restriction of only two audit rates per class of taxpayers given the reaction of taxpayers and tax administration we derive the optimal income tax that the government should adopt to maximize social welfare there are several classes of taxpayers each characterized by a given distribution of pretax income and specific audit policy parameters

optimal marginal and average income taxation under maxi min using the mirrlees optimal income tax model with a maxi min social welfare function we derive conditions for a decreasing marginal tax rate throughout the skill distribution a strictly concave tax function in income and a single peaked average tax schedule with additive preferences and a constant labor supply elasticity marginal tax rates are decreasing below the modal skill level and will also decrease above the mode if aggregate skills are non decreasing with the skill level in this case and with a bounded skill distribution or with a constant hazard rate the tax function is strictly concave in income and the average tax rate single peaked when quasilinear utility functions apply in either consumption or leisure under fairly mild restrictions on the truncated or untruncated distribution function marginal tax rates are decreasing in skill and the average tax profile is single peaked the distribution of skills has the same quantitative influence for either case of quasilinearity these results continue to hold when there is bunching at the bottom due to a binding non negativity constraint we also illustrate how relaxing the assumption of constant elasticity of labor supply generally used in the literature modifies the results

preference trees preference hierarchies and consumer behavior n a recent article coursey 1985 i considered consumer behavior in a model in which preferences are described by an activity hierarchy using this activity hierarchy description consumers were found to sequentially satisfy higher ranked activities in their preference ordering up to the point that their monetary and time resources were exhausted among the more interesting implications of this behavior were that 1 if a consumer s economic resources are subsequently increased then additional consumption will commence at the point where the consumer s resources were initially exhausted 2 a change in the price of a commodity used in an activity will have a pure substitution effect in the production of that activity and a spillover income effect at the point of resource exhaustion and 3 comparative statics effects of any change are unidirectional and will affect behavior only from the point where the effects enter the consumer s sphere forward to the point of exhaustion of economic resources the results were derived under the assumption that each commodity can be used in the production of only one activity in their follow up article brooks and earl 1987 relaxed this assumption and considered the implications of jointness in consumption in the context of the activity hierarchy model in their extension a commodity may be used as a perfect substitute at different places in the activity hierarchy they concluded that my general results become less clear when commodities can be used in this fashion i fully concur with their motive for this extension and welcome their remarks as a further contribution to the field of choice regarding priorities 2 in this brief article i wish to outline fully how their results should be interpreted one interpretation involves the theoretical relationship between the activity hierarchy model and the more traditional to economists utility maximization model the second interpretation involves the use of the activity hierarchy model and its extensions for empirical analysis

regulatory errors optimal fines and the level of compliance abstract this paper shows that with a hierarchical structure of enforcement regulatory errors cause the optimal penalty to be non maximal even if offenders are risk neutral and fines are pure transfers and the private benefit from violation is strictly less than the social cost for all individuals in contrast with error free monitoring no finite fine is optimal within the same hierarchical structure also full compliance is an equilibrium outcome in the presence of errors whereas in the absence of errors the regulator can achieve only partial compliance

hierarchical choice in economics abstract the paper examines the relevance for economic issues of choice which is not characterized by unlimited substitutability after showing that hierarchical choice is common in other social sciences like psychology the paper proceeds with an examination of such choice and of its different categories subsequently the implications for hierarchical choice for specific economic issues are analysed in particular there is discussion and literature review of demand theory engel curves the theory of the firm and social choice theory finally some suggestions for the application to other economic problems are considered

the optimal size of a tax collection agency the condition that characterizes the optimal size of a tax collection agency is derived and then given a simple interpretation in terms of excess burden the paper clarifies an earlier finding of sandmo which suggests that the optimal degree of enforcement is higher than a simple cost benefit calculation would indicate the appropriate condition is that at the margin the resource cost of increasing enforcement should equal the saving of excess burden due to the decline in exposure to risk the increased revenue gained from stricter enforcement does not enter the expression because it merely represents a transfer among the economy s identical agents

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

optimal monitoring policies in agencies this article considers a principal agent problem in which the principal has access to a costly monitoring technology that can be used to acquire additional information about the agent s actions subsequent to observing the agent s output although randomized monitoring policies are feasible we show that in a variety of contexts optimal monitoring policies are deterministic and lower tailed that is there exists some critical level of output such that further investigation of the agent s actions occurs if and only if output falls below this critical level

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

optimal auditing with heterogeneous income sources the optimal enforcement policy when households are heterogeneous with respect to both income level and to income source leads to more intense income auditing for easy to monitor sources we obtain the common result that within each income source any taxpayer reporting less than a predetermined cut off level will be audited while taxpayers reporting at least this level will never be audited however this audit policy leads to very different reporting behavior depending on the income source the internal revenue service does not audit only honest taxpayers and an increase in the audit budget may lead to a larger segment of full evaders

corruption in tax administration abstract we extend the game theoretic model of graetz reinganum and wilde 1986 to allow for corruption in tax administration in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence in fact in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited moreover when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue

financial and legal constraints to growth does firm size matter using a unique firm level survey database covering 54 countries we investigate the effect of financial legal and corruption problems on firms growth rates whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size it is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial legal and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most there is only a weak relation between firms perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth we also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth

a general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement this paper develops a general approach to characterizing optimal income tax and enforcement schemes our analysis clarifies the nature of the interplay between tax rates audit probabilities and penalties for misreporting in particular it is shown that for a variety of objective functions for the principal the optimal tax schedule is in general concave at least weakly and monotonic the marginal tax rates determine the audit probabilities and less harsh penalties lead to higher enforcement costs our results imply that there exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations in the enforcement context which is similar to that in the moral hazard context for tax policy it is well accepted by now that informational asymmetries generate important constraints on the formulation of economic policy an early and classic example is given by mirrlees 1971 who considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals differ in their ability to transform effort into income it is assumed that ability and effort of an individual cannot be observed at any cost whereas income which is the product of these two unobservables is perfectly and costlessly observable taxes can thus depend only on final income under these informational conditions the equity efficiency tradeoffs that constrain the choice of tax policy arise only because of the presence of moral hazard associated with taxation of income if there were no moral hazard i e individual efforts and therefore incomes were exogenous the problem of optimal income taxation would be a trivial one since by assumption individual incomes are perfectly and costlessly observable in much of the recent literature on optimal income taxation in the presence of costly enforcement reinganum and wilde 1985 border and sobel 1987 and others on the other hand individual incomes are treated as exogenous i e there is no moral hazard however informational constraints arise from another important consideration namely an individual s income cannot be directly observed it can only be verified through a costly

the occurrence of tax amnesties theory and evidence this paper presents a theoretical model and empirical evidence to explain the occurrence of tax amnesties we treat amnesties as endogenous resulting from a strategic game between many taxpayers discounting future payments from punishment and a government that balances costs and benefits of amnesty programs from the model we derive hypotheses about the factors that should influence the occurrence of tax amnesties to test these predictions empirically we rely on amnesty information from us states between 1981 and 2011 in line with the theoretical model our empirical findings suggest that the likelihood of amnesties is mainly driven by a government s fiscal requirements and the taxpayers expectations on future amnesties

an institutional economic analysis of the decision to do it yourself in housing renovation this paper examines home renovators decision in choosing do it yourself diy or hiring contractors diy may reduce financial pressure but may lead to potential domestic discord and perils of incompetence hiring contractors may alleviate time pressures but may require more financial resource this choice is modelled as analogous to williamson s corporate strategic decision between outsourcing and internalisation in the context of vertical integration and extended via richardson s capabilities based theory with social reputation effect taken into account based on a survey of brisbane home renovators it is found that the richardson s thesis seems stronger than the williamson s when applied to housing renovation and that trust issues in respect of contractors are paramount

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

honesty is sometimes the best policy this paper examines two central points in the economics of tax evasion if the taxation authorities have reason to believe that tax is being illegally evaded how far should they go in pursuit of the missing income and what roles should thoroughness of investigation and severity of penalties play in the pursuit of that income previous contributions have examined the positive economics of various control instruments on tax payers behaviouri the degree of threat or the level of policing required to enforce truthful reporting and the desirability of different types of policy in terms of tax payers expected utility some writers have investigated the design of sophisticated investigation schemes to maximise expected government receipts or to enforce truthful reporting at low resource cost the approach adopted here is to examine the desirability of various combinations of policy instruments in the context of an explicit model of social welfare it is not self evident that honesty is desirable from the point of view of the government if honesty is desirable it is not obvious that people should be forced to be completely honest and it is not obvious how they ought to be forced the desirability of an economic policy depends on two major issues which are sometimes left submerged the objectives of the government or its agents and the constraints under which such objectives must be pursued the objective is often assumed to be a simple form of ex ante expected utility this is surprising since value systems other than utilitarianism are frequently invoked in the design of tax systems and so it seems reasonable to

tax progressivity income distribution and tax non compliance this article examines the determinants of tax non compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive tax advice industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability we apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry this tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence the level of noncompliance is the convexity of the demand schedule we show that in this context this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre tax income the progressivity of the tax schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income it is shown that lower pre tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities therefore the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline one way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions

on the implications of jointness in a normative model of behavior based on an activity hierarchy t he widespread belief that it is often useful to kill two birds with one stone makes it clear that most consumers recognize that there exists considerable scope for using an input gainfully in the production of more than one consumption activity however economic theorists often forget this lay belief as they set up their formal models and consequently they come to inappropriate conclusions this recently occurred in coursey s 1985 normative analysis of consumer behavior in this journal where he models priority based choice over activities this article indicates how the implications of his model may be modified if activities use a common input 2 in contrast to coursey we show that priority based choice does not necessarily imply that 1 an increase in an individual s income will lead to a reduction in the percentage of a consumer s budget spent on inframarginal activities or 2 a change in the price of a commodity producing a marginal activity will only lead to changes in an individual s consumption of marginal and extramarginal commodities put simply it appears that coursey s general results are valid only when one adopts his implicit assumption that there is no jointness in production

formula apportionment vs separate accounting a private information perspective abstract in 2002 the european commission recommended that member countries use formula apportionment procedures to tax multinational companies this departure from the standard separate accounting transfer pricing approach is an attempt to reduce the costs and distortions associated with auditing transfer prices unfortunately apportionment formulas create their own economic distortions and contrary to popular belief they do not eliminate distortions due to asymmetric information between the multinational and the national tax authorities in this paper i explicitly model the role of private information in two tax competition games one in which tax liabilities are calculated under formula apportionment and one in which tax liabilities are calculated under separate accounting and transfer prices are audited switching to a formula apportionment system affects the after tax profit of multinationals and the tax revenues paid by both domestic and foreign firms the direction and magnitude of the changes depend on the accuracy of the auditing technology and non monotonically on multinational costs the switch will have different effects on the tax receipts from domestic and foreign firms

costly state verification with varying risk preferences and liability abstract in the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification we examine how the properties of the set of states different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments in particular we show that with risk averse debtors a general set of states a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states if the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral this non monotonicity of consumption disappears moreover given the loan size there is more monitoring under debtor risk aversion than risk neutrality we present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability finally we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework

optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top income earners we examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes changes the optimal nonlinear income tax scheme in a mirrleesian economy an individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs utilities and costs both depending on productivity a simple formula that complements saez s formula obtained in closed economy is derived for the marginal tax rates faced by top income earners it depends on the labour elasticity the tax rate abroad and the migration costs expressed as a fraction of the utility obtained abroad the rawlsian marginal tax rates obtained for the whole population illustrate a curse of the middle skilled simulations are provided for the french economy

efficient redistribution using quotas and subsidies in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating this paper introduces misrepresentation and cheating into the policy analysis of output quotas and subsidies analytical results show that when cheating occurs output quotas are a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed as well cheating increases the transfer efficiency of output subsidies the result is that an all or nothing choice between quotas and subsidies will generally favor the use of subsidies a combination of quotas and subsidies however usually remains the most efficient means of income redistribution through market intervention a key assumption in agricultural policy analysis is that farmers follow the provisions of the policy instruments in the manner desired by the policy maker or alternatively that it is costless to ensure that farmers do so in reality however farmers may be expected to act opportunistically when faced with an agricultural policy when a production quota is in effect farmers may cheat by overproducing and selling the above quota amount through alternative channels under an output subsidy scheme farmers may report and collect on a greater quantity of production than they actually produced the possibility of misrepresentation and cheating arises because it is costly to determine farmers actions because of this cost farmers are in a position to misrepresent their quantity of production and or to cheat very few studies have incorporated misrepresentation or cheating in theoretical agricultural policy analysis one exception is alston and smith who raise the question of cheating and black market activity in an examination of rationing in an industry with an effective minimum price policy in place studies that deal with farmer opportunism can also konstantinos giannakas is an assistant professor in the department of agricultural economics university of nebraska lincoln murray fulton is director centre for the study of co

self regulation and government oversight self regulation is a feature of a number of professions for example in the u s the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self regulatory organizations sros like the new york stock exchange and the national association of securities dealers we analyse one regulatory task of an sro enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers specifically we model contracting enforcement as a two tier problem an sro chooses its enforcement policy the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule given an enforcement policy agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers expected utility we assume that the sro s objective is to maximize the welfare of its members the agents we show that the sro chooses a more lax enforcement policy meaning less frequent investigations than what customers would choose a general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents we also investigate government oversight of the self regulatory process the threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the sro just enough to pre empt any government enforcement copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

a contest with the taxman the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources abstract we develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified this setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place however we use the framework to investigate tax evasion we model tax evasion as a concealment detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority we show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest additionally we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

tax evasion inflation and stabilization abstract this paper focuses on the public resort to tax evasion in developing countries as an adjustment tactic during economic downturn we show using a theoretical model of intertemporal consumption that tax compliance declines when current income declines expectations about future income improve or inflation rises we then apply the model empirically to the cases of argentina brazil and chile three countries which have long experience with tax evasion and inflation over the last 40 years and find confirmation

racial profiling fairness and effectiveness of policing citizens of two groups may engage in crime depending on their legal earning opportunities and on the probability of being audited police audit citizens police behavior is fair if both groups are policed with the same intensity we provide exact conditions under which forcing the police to behave more fairly reduces the total amount of crime these conditions are expressed as constraints on the quantile quantile plot of the distributions of legal earning opportunities in the two groups we also investigate the definition of fairness when the cost of being searched reflects the stigma of being singled out by police

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

tax evasion concealment and the optimal linear income tax this paper incorporates tax evasion into the analysis of optimal linear income taxation taxevaders can influence the probability of being caught if audited through expenditures on concealment it is proved that tax evasion can make a given tax system more as well as less progressive depending on the concealment technology the paper derives and interprets simple formulas for characterizing the optimal tax rate and audit probability it also gives sufficient conditions under which tax evasion lowers the optimal tax rate while showing that an increase in the optimal tax rate is also possible

keeping it off the books an empirical investigation of firms that engage in tax evasion this article uses a unique dataset that contains detailed information on firms from around the world to investigate factors that affect under reporting behaviour the empirical strategy employed exploits the nature of the dependent variable which is interval coded and uses interval regression which provides an asymptotically efficient estimator provided that the classical linear model assumptions hold these assumptions are investigated using standard diagnostic tests that have been modified for the interval regression model evidence is presented that shows that the firms in all regions engage in under reporting regression results indicate that government corruption has the single largest causal effect on under reporting resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 51 3 higher taxes have the second single largest causal effect on under reporting resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 18 0 higher followed by access to financing

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

partially verifiable information and mechanism design in a principal agent model with adverse selection we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent s message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic we characterize such correspondence for which the revelation principle is valid returns must not contradict easily observable elements of the taxpayer s lifestyle in this paper we present a model of two person organizations in which these considerations are important we ask whether the restrictions on fallacious statements inherent in the system are sufficient to achieve the goals of the organization we show that the optimal way of eliciting the agent s response may not be to establish incentives for truthtelling in all instances in our model there is one player the agent who observes the state of the economic system another player the principal takes an action based on the information presented to him by the agent this class of models is often referred to as the principal agent problem in the extensive and growing literature on this problem it has always been assumed that the agent could lie to the principal and therefore that he had to be properly motivated to act at least partially in the principal s interest our formal way of modelling the partial verifiability of information is to introduce the restriction that the agent s responses must lie in a set m o that varies with the true state 0 it is assumed that this set always admits the possibility of responding with the true state the way in which the allowable response set varies with the true state is known to the principal in other respects we retain the usual principal agent formalization in particular the principal is the stackelberg leader in this game he can commit himself to choose a collective action as a function of the message transmitted by the agent whether the variation of the message space with the true observation is purely technological or whether it is induced by the severity of potential actions of the principal

predictive analytics and the targeting of audits the literature on audit strategies has focused on random audits or on audits conditioned only on income declaration in contrast tax authorities employ the tools of predictive analytics to identify taxpayers for audit with a range of variables used for conditioning the paper explores the compliance and revenue consequences of the use of predictive analytics in an agent based model that draws upon a behavioral approach to tax compliance the taxpayers in the model form subjective beliefs about the probability of audit from social interaction and are guided by a social custom that is developed from meeting other taxpayers the belief and social custom feed into the occupational choice between employment and two forms of self employment it is shown that the use of predictive analytics yields a significant increase in revenue over a random audit strategy

corruption extortion and evasion corruption evasion and the abuse of power and the possibility thereof are pervasive features of economic activity a prominent instance is tax collection this paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of potentially non linear tax collection schemes amongst the findings are that the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual in practice and collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption may require that inspectors be paid commission on high income reports but not on low with the cost of this potentially creating what seems to be a previously unnoticed trade off between equity and efficiency

performance based wages in tax collection the brazilian tax collection reform and its effects we use panel data from the brazilian tax collection authority to examine the effects of a major incentive reform instituted in 1989 to improve tax enforcement beforehand fine collections per inspection were relatively stable however a striking trend break occurred afterwards which we attribute to the incentive reform not to changes in the macroeconomy or personal and corporate income tax rates our estimates suggest the growth in fines per inspection after the reform is about 75 above what it would have been without it and that there is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across tax regions

self reporting investigation and evidentiary standards abstractself reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement this paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort i show that this leads to a negative relationship between self reporting incentives and investigation effort three main conclusions arise first violators self report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered second self reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high finally authorities can increase the incentives to self report when they convict without hard evidence however a hard evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior

auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud the credibility issue abstract this paper characterizes the equilibrium of an insurance market where opportunist policyholders may file fraudulent claims we assume that insurance policies are traded in a competitive market where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists the insurer policyholder relationship is modelled as an incomplete information game in which the insurer decides to audit or not the market equilibrium depends on whether insurers can credibly commit or not to their audit strategies we show that a no commitment equilibrium results in a welfare loss for honest individuals which may even be so large that the insurance market completely shuts down we also show that transferring monitoring costs to a budget balanced common agency would mitigate the commitment problem

foreign portfolio investment and financial constraints of small firms the article examines the impact of foreign portfolio investment fpi and constrains on small firms fpi has significant influence on a country s economic development and improvement in spite of the fact that the degree of constraints differ across counties and firms it is mostly small firms that suffer constrains from foreign investment constraints that are significantly lower in richer larger and faster growing countries this paper seeks to shed light on the factors that bring foreign investors to georgia on the motives of these investors on some of the constraints and barriers evidenced in the georgian investment environment and on the amount fdi and fpi flow in georgia in last years finally we summarize and provide some recommendations on how to increase the competitiveness of the country s investment climate in retaining existing and attracting new foreign and domestic investors

tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation abstract this paper incorporates tax evasion into ramsey s optimal taxation problem it provides i a precise and intuitive characterization of the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit probabilities and ii a modified version of the ramsey equation it also proves that in the presence of tax evasion a the well known requirement of proportional reduction in compensated demands b the traditional result on the optimality of uniform taxation when income is exogenous and c the equivalence of wage and uniform commodity taxes are no longer valid

avoiding tax avoidance a repeated game theoretic approach abstract we propose an optimal auditing scheme for the tax authorities who face a given tax and penalty functions and a given budget constraint under our proposed strategy individuals can be classified into one of three groups each group is characterized by two parameters i the probability of being audited in that group and ii into which group will an individual move if ii a he reported truthfully ii b he cheated it is then shown that there is a choice of these parameters so that in equilibrium i e when every individual maximizes his payoff given the auditing strategy the percentage of individuals that cheat is arbitrarily small

compliance with endogenous audit probabilities in this paper we study the effect of endogenous audit probabilities on reporting behavior in a face to face compliance situation such as at customs in an experimental setting in which underreporting has a higher expected payoff than truthful reporting we find an increase in compliance of about 80 percent if subjects have reason to believe that their behavior towards an officer influences their endogenous audit probability higher compliance is driven by considerations about how their own appearance and performance affect their audit probability rather than by the social and psychological effects of face to face contact

constrained efficient fine cum tax rate structures the case of constant relative risk aversion this paper explores the possibility that fines and tax rates impose different welfare costs on different types of taxpayer so that the government may want to apply different fine tax rate treatments to different types of taxpayer under the assumption that taxpayers exhibit constant relative risk aversion we characterize the constrained pareto efficient fine tax rate structure showing that i the co existence of compliers the above ground economy and evaders the underground economy is typical at the pareto optimum and ii pareto efficiency requires compliers to face tax rates no higher and fines no lower than those faced by evaders

utilitarianism and horizontal equity the case for random taxation this paper establishes that far from being able to derive the principle of horizontal equity from utilitarianism the principle is actually in consistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances we derive conditions under which a it is optimal to impose random tax schedules ex post randomization and b it is optimal to randomize the tax schedules imposed on a set of otherwise identical individuals ex ante randomization the implications for optimal tax theory are discussed more generally it is shown that there are a number of potentially important economic situations with which the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent not only with utilitarianism but even with pareto optimality this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tax enforcement problems we study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions these are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem the penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms we prove that for a large family of penalty functions this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness this result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection

optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy abstract we study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when i the regulator does not know the firms abatement costs ii penalties for tax evasion are limited and iii monitoring of pollution is costly we show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms incentives to over estimate their abatement costs in particular depending on the firms abatement costs the optimal policy may involve over or under deterrence compared to the full information outcome we then investigate the properties of a pollution standard we show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered