a one period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games we study strategies with one period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games a strategy has one period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period we show that if players are sufficiently patient given any proposal in the space of possible agreements there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the given proposal is made and unanimously accepted in period zero as a corollary we derive that also perpetual delay can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium our strategies are pure and have one period recall and we do not make use of a public randomization device the players discount factors are allowed to be heterogeneous we also construct a finite automata representation of our strategy profile

positioning jibs as an interdisciplinary journal journal of international business studies 2011 42 1 9 doi 10 1057 jibs 2010 50 it is with great honor and pleasure as well as in keen anticipation of what we are confident can be achieved by the journal that we begin this three year term as the new editors of the journal of international business studies we are both long term members of the academy of international business aib and readers of jibs for almost as long as we can remember over the years we have watched the ever more promising development of jibs of which we now enjoy more issues per year and in which the gradual progression in the depth and breadth of its content has laid the foundations for what we hope and believe will be a new phase in the flourishing of the journal in the period that now lies ahead in this respect we must begin by paying tribute to all the editorsin chief of the journal that have preceded us whose conscientious efforts have not gone unrewarded naturally enough we owe a debt of gratitude especially to our two most recent predecessors arie lewin and lorraine eden before arie jibs was the long established leading specialist journal within the field of international business ib studies a partially hidden gem for those of us in the know after arie it was recognized much more widely as a top a journal among scholars of business and management even outside the ib field arie raised the stature of jibs in business schools as a whole an achievement that was crucial not just for the journal but for the continued vitality of our field before lorraine if we are brutally honest jibs had remained a rather shambolic affair in terms of its administrative structure and procedures in fact it is a credit to the earlier editors that they managed to achieve so much with such limited resources and systems of support most of which were concentrated in a single office that used to hold responsibility for everything after lorraine jibs has become an exemplar of efficient organizational systems and well managed and clearly understood procedures for conduct including a pioneering code of ethics we should also acknowledge here with warm appreciation the critical contributions that have been made by the aib executive secretariat and especially by managing editor anne hoekman as well as by david bull and his wonderful staff at palgrave whose degree of commitment to the journal and support for it has been second to none when we look at how radically jibs has been transformed under arie s and lorraine s leadership suffice to say that but for the sea changes which they have brought about we would have had to think very hard before offering our services as editors but with the firm foundation that they have given us and with the resulting opportunities that the journal now has in front of it stepping forward as editors is a decision we have made with ease as well as pride journal of international business studies 2011 42 1 9 2011 academy of international business all rights reserved 0047 2506

informational constraints and the overlapping generations model folk and anti folk theorems this paper analyses the sustainability of inter generational transfers in samuelson s consumption loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events we find that with mild informational constraints transfers cannot be supported by pure strategy equilibria mixed strategies allow transfers to be sustained even if agents have little information so that a version of the folk theorem holds however these equilibria are not robust if each agent s utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation as in harsanyi 1973 these mixed strategy equilibria unravel and only the zero transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable outcome this result is an example of mixed strategy equilibrium of an extensive form game which cannot be purified

the changing nature of the international business field and the progress of jibs the journal of international business studies jibs is a journal with a high academic standing and the leading journal in the field of international business ib research it has become more open to new authors and to a wider range of ib scholarship ib scholars study cross border aspects of business activity some recent jibs special issues have facilitated certain innovative new streams of ib research both the authors and the reviewers of the journal have become substantially more geographically diverse recently

seigniorage operating rules and the high inflation trap there may be both a high and a low inflation equilibrium when the government finances the deficit through seigniorage under rational expectations the high inflation equilibrium is stable and the low inflation equilibrium unstable under adaptive expectations or lagged adjustment of money balances with rational expectations the low inflation equilibrium may be stable adding bond financing dual equilibria remain if the government fixes the real interest rate but a unique equilibrium is attained when the government sets a nominal anchor for the economy the existence of dual equilibria is thus a result of the government s operating rules

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

information institutions and constitutional arrangements this paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered term overlapping generations organizations such as legislative bodies our model is a simple stochastic game of multi principal multi agent dynamic relationships our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the constitutional moment first they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows imperfectly informed legislators with information about the history of play second we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word of mouth communication abstract we analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly where consumers exchange information via word of mouth communication a fraction of consumers who do not learn any new information remain locked in at their previous supplier in each period we analyze markov perfect equilibria in which firms use mixed pricing strategies market share dynamics are driven by the endogenous price dispersion depending on the parameters we obtain different classes of dynamics when firms are impatient there is a tendency towards equal market shares when firms are patient there are extended intervals of market dominance interrupted by sudden changes in the leadership position

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

fifty years of methodological trends in jibs why future ib research needs more triangulation we analyze methodological trends in empirical research in jibs from 1970 2019 our results point to the prevalence of the following patterns there has been an increase in the use of 1 large scale longitudinal cross national datasets 2 complex analytical techniques including the incorporation of multiple analytical techniques within the same study but 3 a decline in the diversity of methods in use we relate these trends to the underlying social technical and communicative conventions in the journal during the 50 year period the observed patterns are consistent with theory that posits scientific fields entrench a dominant paradigm over time resulting in a restricted set of methodological options being selected such restrictions jeopardize the quality of research because the study of any phenomenon requires the use of multiple methodological procedures to avoid the systematic biases errors omissions and limitations introduced by any single option therefore we propose the use of triangulation as a strategy for building methodological alternatives into research designs institutionalization of this principle in the field of international business has the potential to enhance both the rigor and scope of inquiry of future research

limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games abstract in two player infinite horizon alternating move games a limited forecast n 1 n 2 equilibrium is such that 1 player i chooses actions according to his n i length forecasts so as to maximise the average payoff over the forthcoming n i periods and 2 players equilibrium forecasts are correct with finite action spaces n 1 n 2 solutions always exist and are cyclical and the memory capacity of the players has no influence on the set of solutions a solution is hyperstable if it is an n 1 n 2 solution for all n 1 n 2 sufficiently large hyperstable solutions are shown to exist and are characterized for generic repeated alternate move 2 2 games journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

a theory of dynamic oligopoly iii cournot competition abstract we study the markov perfect equilibrium mpe of an alternating move infinite horizon duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity we exhibit a pair of difference differential equations that when they exist differentiable mpe strategies satisfy for quadratic payoff functions we solve these equations in closed form and demonstrate that the mpe corresponding to the solution is the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium as the horizon tends to infinity we conclude with a discussion of adjustment costs and endogenization of the timing

assessing the impact of jibs as an interdisciplinary journal a network approach in this editorial we assess the cross disciplinary connections of jibs by examining its citation network which spreads across no less than 36 disciplines or fields using a citation network of 166 citing and 645 cited journals we investigate jibs interdisciplinarity using the intermediation and integration approaches of network analysis our analyses of citation patterns for a 12 year time period 2001 2012 suggests that jibs is helping bridge disciplines that do not often otherwise talk to each other a task of critical importance for new knowledge creation we also find that jibs is enabling integration of knowledge from a diverse set of disciplines in comparison to other prominent leading management journals

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a robust folk theorem for the prisoner s dilemma we prove the folk theorem for the prisoner s dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring from this follows a limit folk theorem when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate but private and possibly independent any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium the strategies used can be implemented by finite randomizing automata journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82

methodological practices in international business research an after action review of challenges and solutions we combine after action review and needs assessment frameworks to describe the four most pervasive contemporary methodological challenges faced by international business ib researchers as identified by authors of journal of international business studies articles psychometrically deficient measures mentioned in 73 of articles idiosyncratic samples or contexts mentioned in 62 2 of articles less than ideal research designs mentioned in 62 2 of articles and insufficient evidence about causal relations mentioned in 8 1 of articles then we offer solutions to address these challenges demonstrating why and how the conceptualization of a construct is accurate given a particular context specifying whether constructs are reflective or formative taking advantage of the existence of multiple indicators to measure multi dimensional constructs using particular samples and contexts as vehicles for theorizing and further theory development seeking out particular samples or contexts where hypotheses are more or less likely to be supported empirically using big data techniques to take advantage of untapped sources of information and to re analyze currently available data implementing quasi experiments and conducting necessary condition analysis our article aims to advance ib theory by tackling the most typical methodological challenges and is intended for researchers reviewers and editors research consumers and instructors who are training the next generation of scholars

inflationary rigidities and orthodox stabilization policies lessons from latin america orthodox stabilization programs in latin american countries have been notoriously unsuccessful in combating inflation despite the imposition of stringent cuts in government deficits in most cases inflation came down only slowly and temporarily with concomitant declines in growth and employment the bolivian program one of the only latin american successes is contrasted with those of argentina brazil chile and mexico the problems of dealing with chronic inflation are compared with those of hyperinflationary countries and the influence of price and wage rigidities expectations and credibility is explored the study shows that fiscal restraint is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success and that sound management of nominal variables the exchange rate and money supply are also necessary the critical role of credibility is linked with price and wage rigidities in the chronic inflation countries whereas the unsuitability of hyperinflation is seen to increase the credibility of and thus the potential for successful stabilization programs

how individual preferences are aggregated in groups an experimental study abstract this paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences through unrestricted deliberation are aggregated into a group decision in two contexts reciprocating gifts and choosing between lotteries in both contexts we find that median group members have a significant impact on the group decision but the median is not the only influential group member non median members closer to the median tend to have more influence than other members by investigating the same individual s influence in different groups we find evidence for relative position in the group having a direct effect on influence these results are consistent with predictions from spatial models of dynamic bargaining for members with intermediate levels of patience we also find that group deliberation involves bargaining and compromise as well as persuasion preferences tend to shift towards the choice of the individual s previous group especially for those with extreme individual preferences

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

a policy game approach to the high inflation equilibrium abstract the high inflation equilibrium hie refers to a steady state solution where inflation is higher than the one which maximizes seigniorage i e inflation is on the falling segment of the laffer curve it has been claimed that the hie can be stable when the adjustment of expectation is fast however adjustment is fast because inflation is high so the argument is circular in this paper we rationalize the hie using the policy game approach which distinguishes between discretionary and precommitment regimes we expand and demonstrate rigorously using a technique developed by obstfeld barro s suggestion that a hie may result from a discretionary regime we show that this is not possible under precommitment in addition we demonstrate that a hie may result from non fiscal factors such as the motivation to reduce unemployment in a discretionary regime we conclude with a simple diagrammatic exposition of the difference between our approach and the previous one

intertemporal price competition alternating price competition between firms selling differentiated products to nonhomogeneous consumers can yield two different types of equilibria one which we call disciplined arises when products are close substitutes another which we call spontaneous emerges when products are more differentiated in disciplined equilibria an implicit threat to cut price further in response to an initial price cut supports quite collusive outcomes which become less collusive as product differentiation increases in spontaneous equilibria no such threat is needed consumers in the smaller market tend to pay a higher price as do consumers served by the more efficient firm copyright 1990 by the econometric society

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

repeated games played by overlapping generations of players the present paper tries to explain cooperative behaviour in an organization run by a sequence of long but finitely lived agents we show that the folk theorem holds for infinitely repeated games with overlapping generations of finitely lived players any mutually beneficial outcome can approximately be sustained if the player s life span and the overlapping periods are long enough the result is stronger than the usual folk theorems in that it employs no assumption on the stage game such as the full dimensionality of payoff set or multiplicity of equilibria

asynchronous choice and markov equilibria we provide a theoretical foundation for the use of markov strategies in repeated games with asynchronous moves if admissible strategies must display finite arbitrarily long memory and each player incurs a complexity cost which depends on the memory length required by her strategy then every nash equilibrium must be in markovian strategies if in addition admissible strategies have uniformly bounded memory every rationalizable strategy must be markovian these results are robust to considerations of perfection and also yield interesting implications for equilibrium selection in simple contexts

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

the repeated prisoner s dilemma with imperfect private monitoring abstract in this paper i study a repeated prisoner s dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect a partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring

the changing landscape of jibs authorship in this study we examine the landscape of jibs authorship over time to assess 1 the accessibility of jibs to new contributors and 2 the diversity of authors contributing to jibs our analysis of author data from 1972 to 2014 shows that jibs is becoming more accessible as indicated by the high and sustained proportion of first time contributors to the journal this is also evident from the recent decline in the share of authors with multiple past jibs publications with regard to diversity our findings show that jibs has a much wider geographic scope of authors on its landscape in comparison to previous decades this may be attributed partly to increasing travel and communication in scholarly communities and partly to the increased migration of scholars in the recent decades our analysis of migration patterns of jibs authors suggests that about 51 of prominent international business scholars are employed outside their country of birth of the 49 employed in their country of birth 12 are return migrants in our sample china south korea and canada have the highest number of returnees the usa the uk germany the netherlands and china have the highest number of natives whose country of birth country of phd granting institution and country of university affiliation are identical

dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo we analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players conflict of interest players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo this leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia under certain conditions the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock players never reach an agreement gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar preferences provided they are sufficiently patient in legislative settings our model predicts polarization and explains why legislators may fail to react promptly to economic shocks

what happened to the transnational the emergence of the neo global corporation bartlett and ghoshal s transnational solution for managing the mnc remains popular among scholars and practitioners alike however our in depth qualitative study of unilever an exemplary case of a transnational found that in the period 2000 2012 the company evolved into a very different organizational form with a distinct set of characteristics we call this the neo global corporation in explaining how and why this transformation occurred we turn to organizational evolutionary theory and use our case to generate a multi cycle process model of mnc evolution given the dynamism of the mnc and its environments we anticipate that the neo global will also eventually transform and call for more organization level case studies of mncs in future international business research