uk innovation systems for new and renewable energy technologies drivers barriers and systems failures abstract a better understanding of the systemic processes by which innovation occurs is useful both conceptually and to inform policy making in support of innovation in more sustainable technologies this paper analyses current innovation systems in the uk for a range of new and renewable energy technologies and generates policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of these innovation systems although incentives are in place in the uk to encourage innovation in these technologies system failures or gaps are identified in moving technologies along the innovation chain preventing their successful commercialisation sustained investment will be needed for these technologies to achieve their potential it is argued that a stable and consistent policy framework is required to help create the conditions for this in particular such a framework should be aimed at improving risk reward ratios for demonstration and pre commercial stage technologies this would enhance positive expectations stimulate learning effects leading to cost reductions and increase the likelihood of successful commercialisation

contest design and optimal endogenous entry this paper derives the effort maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs the organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments he sets the value of the prize purse and arranges a monetary transfer entry subsidy or fee for each participating contestant in other words the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse the results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a positive fixed entry cost and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants the study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low

innovations improvements and the optimal adoption of new technologies abstract this paper extends the literature on technology adoption by introducing a distinction between technological breakthroughs innovations and the engineering refinements improvements that follow such a breakthrough firms do not necessarily wait for a future technological breakthrough but instead have an incentive to delay the adoption of a new technology until it is sufficiently advanced we characterize a firm s adoption decision as the solution to a continuous time infinite horizon dynamic programming problem which gives rise to an ordinary differential equation that is highly non linear and does not have a closed form solution we thus employ projection techniques and show how these techniques can be applied to the analysis of optimal stopping problems

uncertainty avoidance and the preference for innovation championing roles this paper examines the preferences of 4405 individuals in forty three organizations from sixty eight different countries for four innovation championing roles the organizational maverick the network facilitator the transformational leader and the organizational buffer the study shows that the cultural value of uncertainty acceptance is significantly associated with preferences for these four championing roles it suggests that uncertainty accepting societies may be more innovative than uncertainty avoiding societies because of the greater legitimacy of those roles

transforming the energy sector the evolution of technological systems in renewable energy technology this paper analyses the development and diffusion of technologies that utilize renewable energy sources in germany sweden and the netherlands the analysis enlarges the life cycle model of industry evolution to one where the focus is on the formation and evolution of new technological systems particular focus is on explaining success and failures in shifting from a formative phase into one characterized by positive feedbacks a set of challenges is identified for policy makers attempting to influence the process of transforming the energy sector

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

monotone comparative statics in games with non monotonic best replies contests and cournot oligopoly abstract in this paper we employ lattice theoretic techniques to derive a number of comparative statics in a logit contest a class of games for which best replies are generically non monotonic using the same approach we obtain several comparative statics in a cournot oligopoly model without imposing the usual assumptions that ensure the game is one of strategic substitutes our analysis illustrates how lattice theoretic techniques can deliver powerful insights in games with non monotonic best replies

the structure of equilibria in market share attraction models a market share attraction model of competitive effort allocation by two firms is formulated as a constant sum two person game the dependence of optimal competitive effort allocations on factors such as gross profit margins relative effectiveness of effort and attraction elasticity of effort is studied two versions of the model are developed in the first version effort budgets of both competitors are exogenously fixed in the second the competitors each choose both budget levels and allocations in each version of the model an important function of the parameters called the competitive advantage ratio indicates when it is optimal to either increase or decrease effort allocated in a market in response to changes in various measures of effectiveness implications of differences in the cost associated with each competitor s budget on equilibrium allocations are derived

bad loans to good friends money politics and the developmental state in south korea why has the literature on asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in south korea how can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in south korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999 politics is central to the answer in this study i make two arguments first money politics was extensive in south korea both during and after the high growth era second political not economic considerations dominated policymaking this study explains both past and present and compares the patterns of money politics in the early post independence era with those that arose after the democratic transition in 1987 while during the park era a balance of power between businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control the transition to democracy altered the basic business state relationship allowing business to exert greater influence over policy decisions the political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i examine players equilibrium effort levels in two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i first characterize the nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game i show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same i also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players probabilities of winning at the nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half then i examine how the equilibrium effort ratio the prize dissipation ratios and the players equilibrium effort levels respond when the players valuations for the prize or their abilities change jel d72 c72 i introduction a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending irreversible effort to win a prize typical examples are various types of rent seeking contests competition among firms to win a monopoly rent secured under government protection or by a government procurement contract competition between domestic and foreign firms to obtain governmental trade policies favorable to them competition among firms to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota and competition among firms to capture rents created by governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers other examples of contests include auctions patent races research and development r d competition among firms litigation competition for jobs among job candidates competition among candidates to win promotion to higher ranks election campaigns between political candidates and competition between local governments to invite business firms government institutions or government owned corporations into their districts naturally due to their prevalence and importance in economies such contests have been studied by many economists loury 1979 lee and wilde 1980 tullock 1980 rogerson 1982 rosen 1986 appelbaum and katz 1987 dixit 1987 hillman and riley 1989 hirshleifer 1989 ellingsen 1991 nitzan 1991 1994 krishna and morgan 1997 che and gale 1998 hurley and shogren 1998 and konrad 2000 to name a few in this vast literature on the theory of contests one of the main issues is how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize indeed it is of great interest because the players effort levels determine the profitability of the players engaging in the contest and in some cases they are revenues collected by the contest organizer or bribes given to government officials furthermore they account for other important outcomes of the contest for example in a rent seeking contest efforts expended by the players are viewed as social costs due to rent seeking activities so that total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency in an r d contest effort levels expended by the players these are r d expenditures of the firms determine the expected date of invention this article also addresses the issue how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize but it differs from previous research by dealing with contests with ratio form contest success functions 1 specifically the novelty of this article is to consider two player asymmetric contests in which each player s probability of winning is a function of the ratio of the two players effort levels two player contests with ratio form contest success functions or two player contests that can be best modeled with ratio form contest success functions are easily observed in the real world examples include various types of two player rent seeking contests litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant election campaigns between two parties or candidates and r d competition between two firms consider for example a rent seeking contest in which two firms potential monopolists compete with each other to win a government monopoly franchise contract

biomass power exploring the diffusion challenges in spain the use of biomass resources for power generation offers numerous benefits of interest for political decision makers fuel security rural and industrial development ecological benefits in spain policy instruments have been used since 1980 to stimulate biomass power generation however the diffusion outcome by 2007 was very disappointing only 525 mw this paper argues that two factors lie at the core of this the conceptualization of biomass resources by political decision makers in the instruments used and the desire that policy instruments be in line with market liberalization principles these generated a persistent economic obstacle for biomass power generation and impeded the development of markets for the supply of biomass resources the policy learning regarding the heterogeneity of biomass resources and the investors expectations on risks profitability and resource markets was very slow among political decision makers the paper contributes to the understanding of diffusion outcomes by proposing to analyse diffusion by means of five indicators types of resources technologies developers motivations to invest and project sizes besides the paper shows the usefulness of investigating policy instruments in terms of their risk and profitability characteristics this enables a better understanding of the diffusion patterns and outcomes

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

incorporating policymaker costs and political competition into rent seeking games 1 introductionrent seeking in politics involves agents who lobby policymakers for potential benefits in a seminal contribution tullock 1980 modeled rent seeking as a lottery game a major weakness of tullock s game was that it lacked verisimilitude to actual rent seeking because it omitted politics the absence of politics meant that the game essentially assumed that there are no costs to the policymakers of supplying rents but as tollison 1997 and others have pointed out these costs are not zero and the politics surrounding the policy decision influence the pattern of lobbying and the rent seeking outcome in this paper we address two aspects of those politics the costs to policymakers of supplying rents and the variable intensity of political competition among a given number of rent seekers including these aspects increases the similarity of the game to actual rent seeking situations and makes clearer the incentives to rent seekers costs to supplying rents arise due to various constraints legislators must build coalitions acquire parliamentary rights maintain a positive image and service constituent interests policymakers in agencies must follow procedural rules submit to congressional oversight and budgeting pass omb reviews and so forth lower policymaker costs should increase the effectiveness of lobbying and this should attract greater lobbying efforts among rent seekers 1 increasing policymaker costs makes lobbying less effective indeed because of these costs policymakers often turn away lobbies empty handed in short policymakers have constraints that affect the policies they design and this affects lobbying expenditures dougan and snyder 1993 this paper introduces policymaker costs in monetary units such that they are comparable to the value of the rent and rent seeking expenditures political competition among rent seekers also influences the rent seeking outcome competition traditionally has been modeled by varying the number of rent seeking agents actual or potential or their relative lobbying expenditures e g posner 1975 rogerson 1982 sun and ng 1999 competition can vary however even among a given number of rent seekers and for a given profile of expenditures for example two agents may lobby a policymaker for the same unique and exclusive political good then one agent directly opposes the other and only one agent can win the good alternatively the same two agents may lobby a policymaker for two separate political goods in that case the agents oppose each other only indirectly this situation is frequent in politics as rent seeking agents compete for space on the political agenda for policymakers time and for portions of a particular government budget in this situation success by one agent does not necessarily result in failure by the other but it does lower the probability that the other agent will succeed competition is more intense in the first example even though the examples involve the same number of firms industrial organization economists have shown that a single parameter can determine incumbent firms competition in price and quantity regardless of the number of firms present 2 this paper introduces rent seeking competition analogously allowing a parameter to alter the competitiveness of the rent seeking game among a fixed number of firms we incorporate monetized policymaker costs and the political competition parameter into the success probabilities of the standard rent seeking game the resulting model is a game in which the agents simultaneous maximization of expected net returns or profits determines a nash equilibrium in their expenditures incorporating politics into the standard game makes the game more accurate because equilibrium and comparative statics depend in part on the politics of the rent seeking contest more specifically increasing political competition decreases rent seeking expenditures unless the value of the rent is sufficiently large relative to policymaker costs and dissipation rates are lower than in previous research because of policymaker costs

uncertainty competition and the adoption of new technology faced with the decision of whether or not to adopt a new technology whose economic value cannot be gauged with certainty the manager of the firm may elect to decrease the uncertainty by sequentially gathering information at a unit cost of c 0 updating his prior beliefs in a bayesian manner uncertainty regarding the actions of a competitor however cannot be reduced our model allows a manager to account for potential competition either substitute or complementary by inclusion of strategic considerations modelled in a game theoretic setting we show that the firm s best response mapping satisfies a dynamic programming recursion even when the one period reward function is unbounded providing management with a familiar tool to solve its problem best response behavior is characterized by a monotone sequence of pairs of threshold numbers which give rise to a cone shaped continuation region the continuation region is shown to shift up down with increases in the expected level of substitute complementary competition making the firm less more likely to adopt the innovation finally the existence of a nash equilibrium in cone shaped strategies is established

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

the development of an infrastructure for entrepreneurship abstract this paper takes a macroperspective of entrepreneurship and focuses on the issues and events involved in constructing an industrial infrastructure that facilitates and constrains entrepreneurship this infrastructure includes 1 institutional arrangements to legitimate regulate and standardize a new technology 2 public resource endowments of basic scientific knowledge financing mechanisms and a pool of competent labor as well as 3 proprietary rd numerous entrepreneurial actors in the public and not for profit sectors play crucial roles it motivates one to examine the different roles played by these actors and how their joint contributions interact to develop and commercialize a new technology this in turn makes it possible to understand how the risk time and cost to an individual entrepreneur are significantly influenced by developments in the overall infrastructure for entrepreneurship it also explains why the entrepreneurs who run in packs will be more successful than those that go it alone to develop their innovations

the assessment the economics of sport the study of sports economics has expanded rapidly in recent years in response to significantly increased demand for sport itself for economic analysis relevant to commercial litigation in sport for lively teaching material in schools and universities and for research into the incentive properties of sporting contests while much of the literature has focused on the issue of competitive balance and how to achieve it there have still been relatively few studies that apply the lessons of the economic theory of contests to the analysis of sports there remain huge opportunities both to develop our theoretical understanding of incentive mechanisms in sport and to conduct empirical research in the operation of incentives in sporting contests copyright 2003 oxford university press

responding to structural industry changes a technological evolution perspective we argue that the search for a dynamic theory of strategy and for a link between the product market and resource based views may be incomplete without an exploration of the evolution of the technology that underlies products and heterogeneous firm capability as technology evolves so do industry characteristics products and critical success factors firms without the right capabilities are forced to exit thus an industry s structure attractiveness and the kinds of capabilities that it needs to succeed may vary over time suggesting different strategies for each phase

the power of money wealth effects in contests abstract the relationship between wealth and power has long been debated nevertheless this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game in this paper we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game two opposing effects arise wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest we consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth our theoretical analysis shows that the effects of wealth are strongly contest dependent it thus does not support general claims that the rich lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur conflicts

what is challenging renewable energy entrepreneurs in developing countries this paper cumulates the findings from a review of the challenges faced by renewable energy entrepreneurs in developing countries to date research that could facilitate the success of renewable energy entrepreneurs in the world s developing regions has been fragmented across two main bodies of literature management specifically entrepreneurship and renewable energy by conducting a qualitative review of the extant literature i propose that the findings from both bodies of research may be distilled to six 6 key challenges inadequate access to institutional finance the price of renewable energy technologies rets the lack of skilled labour underdeveloped physical infrastructure and logistics power dominance of incumbents inadequate government or policy support through this research i not only advance a unified conceptualisation of the challenges faced by renewable energy entrepreneurs in developing countries but also highlight a number of the revealed opportunities for future research

towards alternative trajectories reconfigurations in the dutch electricity regime abstract in the early 2000s dutch electricity companies are increasingly investing in technologies that enable them to replace coal with biomass replacing large amounts of coal up to 40 requires the companies to invest in technological trajectories alternative to the ones they have supported over the past decades this paper aims to understand why these incumbent firms in the dutch electricity regime are developing alternatives the second aim of the paper is to provide a way for assessing the potential of innovations the paper does so by bringing together insights from literature on socio technical regimes and insights from literature on technological and market niches strategic niche management the main conclusion is that both niche processes at the level of experimenting with alternatives and changes in the incumbent regime are necessary for understanding the innovation journey of a new technology a two by two matrix is developed that can be used for both analysis and governance purposes

a generalized model of rent seeking behavior in this paper i present a formal analysis of rent seeking games in which the players valuations for the prize are represented as vectors the players in this game are risk neutral and may not be indifferent to who wins the contestable rent if it is someone else both tullock s original rent seeking model and the public goods rent seeking model by katz et al turn out to be special cases of this more general model

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

farm level constraints on the domestic supply of perennial energy crops in the uk abstract there are a number of estimates of the land area that could potentially be dedicated to perennial energy crops such as short rotation coppice src willow and miscanthus in the uk but little is known about how farmers will respond to the opportunities presented by these relatively novel crops perennial energy crops face competition from other arguably more flexible uses of farmland and if not seen as attractive propositions to individual farmers they will not be grown farmers decisions are therefore a key constraint on potential supply this paper reviews the policy background and considers whether policy is based on any consideration of likely supply response before presenting outcomes of focus groups composed of farmers who already grow or are considering growing perennial energy crops there appear to be a number of barriers to adoption in addition to concerns over the security of contracts the current high wheat price increases the opportunity cost of committing land to perennial energy crops there are also worries about the impact of willow roots on field drains and the cost of returning the land to other uses this paper outlines a number of issues of importance to policy makers and suggests future research needs

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

a tug of war team contest this paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams in each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug of war there exists a unique markov perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player s valuation and the current state of the tug of war we derive rich comparative statics for this equilibrium by using the fact that the state of the tug of war evolves according to a time homogeneous absorbing markov chain

modelling farmer uptake of perennial energy crops in the uk abstract the uk biomass strategy suggests that to reach the technical potential of perennial energy crops such as short rotation coppice src willow and miscanthus by 2020 requires 350 000 hectares of land this represents a more than 20 fold increase on the current 15 546 hectares previous research has identified several barriers to adoption including concerns over security of income from contracts in addition farmers perceive returns from these crops to be lower than for conventional crops this paper uses a farm level linear programming model to investigate theoretical uptake of energy crops at different gross margins under the assumption of a profit maximising decision maker and in the absence of known barriers to adoption the findings suggest that while src willow at current prices remains less competitive returns to miscanthus should have encouraged adoption on a wider scale than at present this highlights the importance of the barriers to adoption recently announced contracts for miscanthus appear to offer a significant premium to farmers in order to encourage them to grow the crops this raises the question of whether a more cost effective approach would be for government to provide guarantees addressing farmers concerns including security of income from the contracts such an approach should encourage adoption at lower gross margins

equilibrium contingent compensation in contests with delegation we consider two player contests in which each player hires a delegate who expends his effort to win a prize on the player s behalf endogenizing delegation contracts we focus on the equilibrium contracts between the players and their delegates we first show that each player s equilibrium contract is a no win no pay contract then we examine the delegates equilibrium compensation spreads effort levels probabilities of winning expected payoffs and the players equilibrium expected payoffs we show that economic rents for the delegates may exist

organizational environments and industry exit the effects of uncertainty munificence and complexity economists and organization theorists have asked which factors are linked to the rate at which firms exit an industry yet little research has linked exit rates to changes over time in the key dimensions which characterize an industry s environment this study examines linkages between exit rates and changing levels of uncertainty munificence and complexity in an industry a longitudinal study of the american cement 1888 1980 and minicomputer 1958 82 industries reveals that uncertainty is the key environmental dimension associated with organizational mortality controlling for ecological and macroeconomic conditions exit rates are associated with uncertainty but not complexity or munificence the greater the uncertainty the higher the exit rates two kinds of uncertainty create hazardous environmental conditions unpredictable changes in demand and eras of ferment bounded by technological discontinuities and dominant designs our results indicate that while organizations can deal with different levels of economic munificence and complexity uncertainty is a significantly more lethal characteristic of organizational environments the results support schumpeterian perspectives linking industry turnover to waves of creative destruction but suggest more broadly that an organization s ability to cope with uncertainty is a key determinant of its life chances copyright 2001 by oxford university press

robust incentives and the design of a climate change governance regime in building a governance regime to address climate change should we prioritize the development of global institutions or national ones this paper focuses on two neglected characteristics to inform the governance problem the incentives for investment in low carbon energy technology and the influence of historical policy volatility examining a case study of an important low carbon energy technology wind power this study finds 1 policy volatility has been substantial 2 policy changes were uncorrelated across jurisdictions suggesting that 3 investors could have substantially reduced their exposure to the risk of policy volatility by operating globally while it also has downsides a poorly coordinated international policy regime has the advantage of reducing the risk associated with a global policy failure beyond this case study the importance of this positive effect depends on the probability of policy failures in each country the correlations among them and the probability of a global policy failure

on being asset constrained in litigation contests this paper establishes that being asset constrained may be advantageous for defendants in litigation contests an active asset constraint of defendants i may increase decrease defendant plaintiff contest effort ii may lower the sum of plaintiff and defendant contest effort iii lowers expected defendant payment and iv makes a symmetric contest asymmetric

optimal timing of technology adoption abstract in a dynamic programming framework this paper investigates the optimal timing of technology adoption by a competitive firm when technology choice is irreversible and the firm faces a stochastic innovation process with uncertainties about both the speed of the arrival and the degree of improvement of new technologies a numerical example illustrates how the optimal timing decision is affected by changes in parameter values reflecting market conditions the firm s initial technological attributes and the characteristics of the stochastic innovation process some of these effects turn out to be in sharp contrast to common intuition contrasting the optimal decision rule derived here with the rule obtained under the net present value shows that the former implies a slower pace of adoption than implied by the latter the optimal decision rule is generalized for the case of multiple technology switches and it is shown that for all the switching decisions except the last one the optimal rule satisfies the net present value criterion

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

the influence of perceived uncertainty on entrepreneurial action in emerging renewable energy technology biomass gasification projects in the netherlands emerging renewable energy technologies cannot break through without the involvement of entrepreneurs who dare to take action amidst uncertainty the uncertainties that the entrepreneurs involved perceive will greatly affect their innovation decisions and can prevent them from engaging in innovation projects aimed at developing and implementing emerging renewable energy technologies this article analyzes how perceived uncertainties and motivation influence an entrepreneur s decision to act using empirical data on biomass gasification projects in the netherlands our empirical results show that technological political and resource uncertainty are the most dominant sources of perceived uncertainty influencing entrepreneurial decision making by performing a dynamic analysis we furthermore demonstrate that perceived uncertainties and motivation are not stable but evolve over time we identify critical factors in the project s internal and external environment which influence these changes in perceived uncertainties and motivation and describe how various interactions between the different variables in the conceptual model internal and external factors perceived uncertainty motivation and previous actions of the entrepreneurs positively or negatively influence the decision of entrepreneurs to continue entrepreneurial action we discuss how policymakers can use these insights for stimulating the development and diffusion of emerging renewable energy technologies

the paradox effects of uncertainty and flexibility on investment in renewables under governmental support abstract given that companies have the flexibility to decide about size and timing of a renewable electricity investment the existence of four paradox effects is proven only the type but not the amount of governmental support has an influence on the optimal capacity of a renewable electricity generating system a decrease of governmental support over time may result in higher capacities of renewables installed on an industry level at least on the short term likewise higher uncertainty may encourage an expansion of these capacities in contrast technological progress may hamper the expansion of capacities finally these four paradox effects are exemplified in a germany based case study regarding a photovoltaic project

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40

firms r d decisions under incomplete information abstract the paper considers a patent race in which firms do not know their relative positions in this setting firms that start in the same position proceed at the highest possible speed and if one firm has an initial advantage it preempts the rival but at the cost of dissipating a significant part of its monopoly rent so the paper shows that incomplete information in a patent race leads to rent dissipation the latter is higher the higher the value of the prize and the lower the cost of r d thus for innovations that provide relatively high profits the time to discovery is shortened but the social losses are likely to be high due to duplication of effort

bidding for contests the procurement of product development and production services brings special strategic considerations to the buyer seller relationship in industrial and institutional markets multiple sourcing in particular dual sourcing is a likely way of dealing with the increased risks faced by buyers however there is lack of dual sourcing models that analyze the selection and control process in an integrated fashion this omission had led to apparently contradictory findings in agency and auction theory the paper models the strategic issues for a cost containment contest between two suppliers the suppliers are drawn from several vendors who participate in a bidding competition the supplier with the lower final cost in the contest wins a larger share of the pooled profit fee propositions are derived for the optimal cost plus contest and comparisons are made with the common incentive contract for the integrated selection and control model the larger the winner s share the greater the effort the buyer can make a credible commitment to the optimal winner s share as the winner s share rises however the bid prices increase due to increased contract risk this incentive risk tradeoff determines a the optimal winner s share that minimizes expected procurement price b the corresponding profit fee bid by suppliers c the ensuing cost control effort and d the final price for the procurement comparisons with the common incentive contract tell us when the cost plus contest induces more effort and when bidding for a contest results in a lower final procurement price

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

incentives in lottery contests with draws abstract we investigate the incentive consequences of introducing the possibility of draws into lottery contests equilibrium total effort unambiguously decreases when draws are introduced whereas the equilibrium expected winner s effort increases when the contestants valuations of the prize become sufficiently dispersed