how delegation improves commitment abstract mccallum 1995 american economic review papers and proceedings 85 2 207 211 conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it this holds if optimal ex ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available however with a flexibility credibility trade off delegation improves credibility

quantitative aggregate economics i am delighted to be able to present this lecture before so many people i m also very happy when i get to work with models inhabited by many people that is the key to the framework for which ed prescott and i were cited by the nobel committee individuals are introduced explicitly in the models their decision problems are fully dynamic they are forward looking that is one of the prerequisites for what we ultimately seek which is a framework we can use to evaluate economic policy the eminent researcher and 1995 nobel laureate in economics bob lucas from whom i have learned a great deal wrote one of the functions of theoretical economics is to provide fully articulated artificial economic systems that can serve as laboratories in which policies that would be prohibitively expensive to experiment with in actual economies can be tested out at much lower cost lucas 1980 p 696 our task as i see it is to write a fortran program that will accept specific economic policy rules as input and will generate as output statistics describing the operating characteristics of time series we care about which are predicted to result from these policies pp 709 10 the desired environments to which lucas refers would make use of information on individual responses that can be documented relatively cheaply by means of censuses panels and other surveys p 710 lucas seems to suggest that economic researchers place people in desired model environments and record how they behave under alternative policy rules in practice that is easier said than done the key tool macroeconomists use is the computational experiment with its help the researcher performs exactly what i just described places the model s people in the desired environment and records their behavior but the purpose of the computational experiment is broader than only to evaluate policy rules the computational experiment is useful for answering a host of quantitative questions that is those for which we seek numerical answers when evaluating government policy the policy is stated in the form of a rule that specifies how the government will behave what action to take under various contingencies today and in the indefinite future that is one reason it would be so difficult and prohibitively expensive to perform the alternative lucas mentions namely to test the policies in actual economies

rogoff s conservative central banker restored we show that delegation of monetary policy to a weight conservative central banker can be desirable although the government can also use an inflation contract an employment target an inflation target or any combination of these to control the central banker the key feature of our model is a stochastic inflation bias arising when wage setters receive some information about a supply shock prior to signing nominal wage contracts weight conservatism is found to be desirable if fully state contingent delegation is not possible and the stochastic inflation bias cannot be eliminated by optimal choice of the delegation parameters

inflation and welfare in a monetary economy it is in everyone s private interest to try to get someone else to hold non interest bearing cash and reserves but someone has to hold it all so these efforts must simply cancel out all of us spend several hours per year in this effort and employ thousands of talented and highly trained people to help us these person hours are simply thrown away wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all

should renewable energy policy be renewable political flexibility brings about trade offs for policy makers aiming to support the deployment of renewable energy sources res on the one hand it allows incorporating new information on ex ante uncertain benefits and costs of res policy on the other hand it may deter res investments this paper scrutinizes how these trade offs play out economically and politically when res policy makers choose the degree of flexibility as well as the instruments to implement flexibility the analysis builds on a theoretical framework distinguishing between flexibility by design and by adjustment it is complemented by a discussion of three case studies res support schemes in germany and the united kingdom and the eu emissions trading scheme theoretical as well as empirical results suggest that the politically chosen degree of flexibility by policy design may be sub optimally low in contrast flexibility by policy adjustment is often excessively high

monetary aggregates and output series title working paper frb title monetary aggregates and output date publication federal reserve bank of cleveland working paper no 9813 author s scott freeman finn kydland type working paper frb topics s us economy

the institutional foundations of monetary commitment a comparative analysis abstract this paper adopts an institutional perspective on the problem of designing governance structures for restraining monetary policy this perspective broadens the standard literature on central bank independence in several dimensions first although it recognizes that an independent central bank is one important institutional arrangement it also considers a much broader variety of institutional arrangements that have been used historically and today to restrain monetary policy second it considers not only the formal or legal institutional arrangements governing monetary policy but also the broader environment or institutional endowment in which those formal arrangements are embedded third this paper is concerned with the problem of enforcement given the institutional endowment in which formal monetary rules are implemented how likely are they to stick broadening the perspective in these ways frames the issue as a matching problem when it is recognized both that countries differ in the nature of their institutional endowments and that there is an array of possible formal arrangements that can be adopted to govern monetary policy the question then becomes how best to align the formal arrangements with the endowment in which they will be embedded case studies of diverse monetary policy making institutions in cote d ivoire argentina thailand and new zealand are used to motivate and illustrate the analysis

issues in new political economy an overview a brief overview of the historical background nature and rapid growth in volume and scope of new political economy since the early 1980s is provided the paper continues with some general reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the new political economy approach illustrated by the other contributions to this special issue of the journal of economic surveys the final section summarises these contributions

monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences this paper considers monetary policy when policy makers preferences are private information i show that in the first period of a two period term all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less but respond more to shocks than if there were no private information moderately inflation averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most a tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first with t period terms inflation depends solely on the policy maker s time left in office with unchanging preferences and no discounting inflation is lower the longer he has left

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

when and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information abstract this paper analyzes the role of noisy or imprecise announcements in mitigating the basic credibility problem in monetary policy based on a model where the monetary authority s private information gives rise to an unavoidable trade off between flexibility and credibility the analysis finds that noisy announcements can serve as a meaningful form of communication to make that trade off more favorable however such talk is not cheap the analysis predicts that those central banks who can speak more precisely are those who are less likely to speak at all

the global food crisis and guatemala what crisis and for whom summary international food prices rose sharply during 2006 08 precipitating the global food crisis we analyze the welfare effects of changes in prices over categories of households in guatemala and find three surprising results the first is that the transmission of international into domestic prices was quite modest the second is that most farm households are net buyers of food implying that they lost from rising prices the third is that farm households represent two thirds of all poor households losing from rising food prices stressing the importance of production for home consumption in sheltering the poor from the crisis

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained markets this paper compares two different models in a common environment the first model has liquidity constraints in that consumers save a single asset that they cannot sell short the second model has debt constraints in that consumers cannot borrow so much that they would want to default but is otherwise a standard complete markets model both models share the features that individuals are unable to completely insure against idiosyncratic shocks and that interest rates are lower than subjective discount rates in a stochastic environment the two models have quite different dynamic properties with the debt constrained model exhibiting simple stochastic steady states while the liquidity constrained model has greater persistence of shocks

destabilizing effects of exchange rate escape clauses abstract this paper studies policy rules with escape clauses analyzing as an example fixed exchange rate systems that allow member countries the freedom to realign in periods of stress while well designed escape clause rules can raise society s welfare in principle limited credibility makes it difficult to implement such rules in practice an ems type institution that imposes political costs on policymakers who realign may raise welfare but can also produce equilibria far inferior to an irrevocably fixed exchange rate switches between multiple equilibria may have the character of sudden speculative attacks

cash crop production food price volatility and rural market integration in the third world large farmers in the third world often devote to cash crops a larger share of their land than do small farmers this paper suggests a possible explanation even in the presence of food markets third world farmers food security is best assured by food self sufficiency a model of crop portfolio choice under multivariate risk is used to show that reasonable assumptions regarding risk and preferences reproduce the observed pattern simulations further indicate that food market integration reduces the need for food self sufficiency policy implications are drawn regarding domestic trade liberalization and agricultural technology

inflation in mozambique empirical facts based on persistence seasonality and breaks this article investigates inflation in mozambique using long range dependence lrd techniques in monthly data from december 1995 to october 2012 two important features of the data are analysed persistence and seasonality looking at aggregated and disaggregated data the stability of the parameters across the sample is also investigated the results indicate a high degree of persistence in the data along with a strong seasonal pattern policy implications are discussed

the law of one price intranational evidence for canada this study investigates the behaviour of intranational prices for 45 specific consumer goods across 25 canadian cities it finds positive roles for distance and provincial borders in intercity price disparities while sizable the provincial border effect is an order of magnitude smaller than the estimates for the canada u s border a majority of the intercity relative price series are stationary around small mean values indicating that long run price differences are close to zero the intercity prices converge at rates considerably faster than the consensus estimates for international prices in fact half lives for intercity price deviations average well under a year jel classification f15 f31 la loi d un seul prix resultats intra nationaux pour le canada ce memoire examine le comportement des prix intra nationaux de 45 biens de consommation specifiques dans 25 villes canadiennes il semble que la distance et les frontieres inter provinciales ont un impact sur les differentiels de prix entre villes meme si l impact des frontieres inter provinciales est important il est beaucoupplus petit que l impact de la frontiere canada u s une majorite des series de prix relatifs entre villes sont stationnaires autour de petites valeurs moyennes ce qui suggere que les differences de prix a long terme s approchent de zero il est clair que les prix entre villes convergent a des taux considerablement plus rapides que ce qu on observe au niveau international en fait les deviations de prix entre villes ont une esperance de vie qui en moyenne est de moins d un an

the effectiveness of monetary policy anchors firm level evidence analyses of monetary policy posit that exchange rate pegs inflation targets and central bank independence can help anchor private sector inflation expec tations yet there are few direct tests of this argument we offer cross national micro level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private sector inflation concerns using firm level data from eighty one countries approximately 10 000 firms we find evidence that international anchors exchange rate commit ments correlate significantly with a substantial reduction in private sector concerns about inflation while domestic anchors inflation targeting and central bank inde pendence do not our conjecture is that private sector inflation expectations are more responsive to exchange rate anchors because they are more transparent more con straining and more costly than domestic anchoring arrangements the literature on monetary policy highlights the role of monetary institutions in stabilizing private sector inflation expectations central bank independence cbi inflation targeting it and fixed exchange rates pegs are widely viewed as insti tutions that have the capacity to mitigate private sector concerns that policymak ers will exploit them after they have locked in their price wage and investment decisions while other empirical research explores the institutional correlates of inflation and its variability yielding mixed results we use firm level data in our study to directly assess the impact of monetary anchors on private sector inflation concerns we find evidence that pegs mitigate firm owners concerns with infla tion but that domestic anchors such as it and cbi are uncorrelated with our micro indicators of inflation expectations considerable research has investigated the use of it cbi and pegs as institu tions that establish monetary policy credibility whereas these anchors are expected

can aggregation explain the persistence of inflation abstract an aggregation exercise is proposed that aims at investigating whether the fast average adjustments of the disaggregate inflation series of the euro area cpi is coherent with the slow adjustment of euro area aggregate inflation estimating a dynamic factor model for 404 inflation sub indices of the euro area cpi allows to decompose the dynamics of inflation sub indices into a part due to a common macroeconomic shock and to sector specific idiosyncratic shocks although idiosyncratic shocks dominate the variance of sectoral prices one common factor appears to be the main driver of aggregate dynamics in addition the heterogenous propagation of this common shock across sectoral inflation rates and in particular its slow propagation to inflation rates of services generates the persistence of aggregate inflation we conclude that the aggregation mechanism explains a significant amount of aggregate inflation persistence

the information content of the reserve bank of australia s inflation forecasts in this article the inflation forecasts produced by the reserve bank of australia rba and that generated by private forecasters are used to assess whether the reserve bank possesses information about inflation that the private sector does not have the results show that the reserve bank inflation forecasts embody useful predictive information about inflation beyond that contained in private forecasts over the recent inflation targeting period

independent monetary policies and social equity monetary policy is formulated as a game between the government and the central bank we show that when fiscal policy has a redistributional component there is a conflict between optimally configured monetary policies and equality consequently inflation averse governments interested in social equity will need to limit their use of fiscal policy

congressional influence on u s monetary policy abstract congressional influence is generally discounted or ignored in political models of federal reserve behavior here i show that changes in the leadership of the senate banking committee are significantly correlated with monetary base growth more liberal committee leaders are associated with significantly higher base growth other factors held constant the result is shown to hold across several econometric specifications and different definitions of the congressional preference variable

the european central bank independence accountability and strategy a review this paper reviews research on central banking and monetary policy with special emphasis on the position of the future european central bank nowadays it is often thought that an independent central bank with an explicit mandate to aim for price stability constitutes an important institutional device to assure price stability indeed the ecb will be one of the most independent central banks as follows from the codings of various indicators measuring legal independence still it does not follow straightforwardly from the literature that the statute of the ecb is optimal it is also argued that the accountability of the ecb is poorly arranged for in comparison with that of several national central banks finally the discussion about the monetary strategy of the ecb is reviewed

international business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets backus kehoe and kydland 1992 baxter and crucini 1995 and stockman and tesar 1995 find two major discrepancies between standard international business cycle models with complete markets and the data in the models cross country correlations are much higher for consumption than for output while in the data the opposite is true and cross country correlations of employment and investment are negative while in the data they are positive this paper introduces a friction into a standard model that helps resolve these anomalies the friction is that international loans are imperfectly enforceable any country can renege on its debts and suffer the consequences for future borrowing to solve for equilibrium in this economy with endogenous incomplete markets the methods of marcet and marimon 1999 are extended incorporating the friction helps resolve the anomalies more than does exogenously restricting the assets that can be traded

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

on the welfare cost of inflation and the recent behavior of money demand post 1980 u s data trace out a stable long run money demand relationship of cagan s semi log form between the m1 income ratio and the nominal interest rate with an interest semi elasticity of 1 79 integrating under this money demand curve yields estimates of the welfare cost of modest departures from friedman s zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money that are quite small the results suggest that the federal reserve s current policy which generates low but still positive rates of inflation provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms to the alternative of moving all the way to the friedman rule jel e31 e41 e52

sustaining fiscal policy through immigration this paper explores the fiscal implications of immigration to the us and argues that immigration policy should be viewed as a vital part of fiscal policy in particular a case is made that skill

dynamics of the trade balance and the terms of trade the j curve the authors provide a theoretical interpretation of two features of international data the countercyclical movements in net exports and the tendency for the trade balance to be negatively correlated with current and future movements in terms of trade but positively correlated with past movements they document the same properties in a two country stochastic growth model in which trade fluctuations reflect in large part the dynamics of capital formation the authors find that their general equilibrium perspective is essential the relation between the trade balance and the terms of trade depends critically on the source of fluctuations copyright 1994 by american economic association

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

the flexible few oligarchs and wealth defense in developing democracies based on an original large n dataset of individual ukrainian oligarchs and qualitative evidence this article tests competing perspectives on the political power of big capital we find surprising

partially independent central banks politically responsive governments and inflation theories of central bank independence have more exact implications regarding inflation in different political economic environments than generally understood or empirically examined they imply that inflation in any given country time will be a weighted average of what it would be if the central bank completely controlled monetary policy and what it would be if the government completely controlled it with the degree of central bank independence weighting the former an equation embodying this theoretical expectation is estimated by constrained least squares from a time series cross section of inflation rates in developed democracies since the bretton woods era the results confirm that the antiinflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader politicaleconomic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently conversely the inflationary impacts of all such political economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence

optimal monetary policy rules in a rational expectations model of the phillips curve using a rational expectations model based on a phillips curve with persistence in inflation we derive optimal monetary policy rules under both commitment and discretion we assume that the central bank targets the natural rate of output so there is no incentive generating an average inflation bias with commitment inflation has less persistence but more conditional variability whereas output has more persistence and less conditional variability than with discretion as the commitment strategy stabilizes the systematic component of inflation it is less responsive to random shocks to inflation

where does the axe fall inflation dynamics and poverty rates regional and sectoral evidence for ghana summary the possibility of an inflation induced poverty trap due to the welfare decreasing effects of inflation and the advantages of geographic targeting in poverty programs are well documented using fractional integration methods and data from ghana we analyze regional and sectoral inflation dynamics vis a vis regional poverty rates to determine where the adverse impacts of inflation persistence would most likely hit hardest and policy should target in particular we conclude that the poor in three regions and patrons of five sectors require the most attention particularly since three of the five sectors are basic necessities

optimal reputation building in the new keynesian model abstract we study the optimal committed monetary policy when the private sector has imperfect information and has to infer the central banker s ability to commit the optimal policy is designed to influence learning and improve the central banker s reputation of being committed the reputation building implies that when a committed central banker first takes office he should resist the temptation to stimulate output with initially high but declining inflation he should reverse a missed inflation target rather than accommodate it and he should adopt a less accommodative inflation response to a cost push shock than a full commitment solution suggests

public inflation aversion and the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries if so what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions macroeconomic policy and international monetary cooperation this article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities the analysis establishes three key findings first the results suggest that economic context defined by inflation and unemployment performance has a substantial impact on the public s economic objectives in a way that is broadly consistent with the specification of utility loss functions in the theoretical political economy literature second the results suggest that there is significant cross country variation in inflation aversion controlling for economic context third some of this variation is accounted for by national level factors affecting the aggregate costs of inflation and unemployment these results have significant implications for optimal monetary policymaking the explanation of variation in economic outcomes and for accounts of the choice of institutional frameworks for policymaking i thank the bank of england the center for basic research in the social sciences and the institution for social and policy studies for research support and jim alt andrew bailey bill bernhard lawrence broz john freeman jeff frieden jim granato shigeo hirano david lake jeff lax simon price rose razaghian ron rogowski david stasavage gabriel sterne mike tomz jim vreeland the editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments all views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the bank of england

a bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank abstract in this paper a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political system the major results of the paper are 1 the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy 2 changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president s term in office to the first period of the president s term will lead to more partisan monetary policy 3 in equilibrium nominations to the board are not rejected thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a rubber stamp process 4 lengthening the terms on the board relative to the electoral cycle will lead to more moderate appointments to the central bank and a reduction in partisan policymaking

a political model of monetary policy with application to the real fed funds rate abstract we construct an empirical model of u s monetary policy assuming that the federal reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy we use the real federal funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive legislative and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996 we find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the senate banking committee leadership best represent legislative influence we argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

dynamic commitment and incomplete policy rules considering the dynamics of commitment highlights some neglected features of time inconsistency problems we modify the standard rules versus discretion question in three ways 1 a government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow 2 the government s commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules and 3 the government s ability to make irrevocable commitments is restricted three results stand out first the option to wait makes the incumbent regime rules or discretion relatively more attractive second the option to wait means that increased uncertainty makes the incumbent regime more attlwactive third because the commitment decision takes place in real time policy choice displays hysteresis when monetary policy is subject to dynamic inconsistencies optimal policy requires some precommitment by the central bank despite a proliferation of mechanisms designed to address this problem work in this area has continued to assume a once and for all choice between rules and discretion this paper asks two closely related questions first what happens if commitment decisions are made in real time so that failure to commit today does not rule out the possibility of commitment tomorrow second if governments can make only commitments that are difficult but not impossible to reverse what determines the dynamics of commitment and reversal the assumption of once and for all choice enforces simplistic dynamics on the policy process if the standard models are interpreted literally for example the commitment problem for u s monetary policy is moot having been resolved with the founding of the federal reserve system in 1914 if not at the constitutional convention of 1789 much of the interest in dynamic inconsistency however arises pre

local impacts of a global crisis food price transmission consumer welfare and poverty in ghana abstract this paper takes a local perspective on global food price shocks by analyzing food price transmission between regional markets in ghana it also assesses the impacts of food price increases on various household groups taking the 2007 2008 global food crisis as an example we show that prices for domestic grain products are highly correlated with world market prices this is true both for products for which ghana is highly import dependent e g rice and the products for which ghana is self sufficient e g maize the econometric results also show that price transmission is high between regional producer markets and markets located in the country s largest cities and the distance between producer and consumer markets and the size of consumer markets matter in explaining the price transmission the welfare analysis for households as consumers shows that the effect of world food prices appears relatively modest for the country as a whole due to relatively diverse consumption patterns within country however the national average hides important regional differences both between regions and within different income groups we find that the poorest of the poor particularly those living in the urban areas are hardest hit by high food prices the negative effect of the food crisis is particularly strong in northern ghana the main explanations for this regional variation in the price effect is the different consumption patterns and much lower per capita income levels in the north of ghana compared to other regions in the country

the economics of immigration this literature review concerns the impact of immigration on the economy of the host country focusing on the experience of the united states the emphasis is on the period from the 1970s to the 1990s the author shows that research earlier in this period generally concluded that the economic effects of immigration were positive but that more recent research on later migrations have generally concluded that immigration may be having an adverse effect on the earnings of native unskilled workers and be placing an increased burden on welfare programs the importance of such economic analysis for the formulation of appropriate migration policies is stressed

the inflationary bias in a model of the open economy a note abstract in this paper we highlight the importance of aggregate supply effects on the size of the inflationary bias under discretionary policy making using a simple model of an open economy that imports a foreign resource input we show that under discretion the inflationary bias bears an inverse relationship to the elasticity of output supplied with respect to the real exchange rate this theoretical finding is consistent with romer 1993 romer d 1993 openness and inflation theory and evidence quarterly journal of economics 108 869 903 empirical results that point to the existence of a negative association between openness and inflation

classifying monetary economics fields and methods from past to future we propose a simple yet sufficiently encompassing classification scheme of monetary economics it comprises three fundamental fields and six recent areas that expand within and across these fields the elements of our scheme are not found together and in their mutual relationships in earlier studies of the relevant literature neither is this an attempt to produce a relatively complete systematization our intention in taking stock is not finality or exhaustiveness we rather suggest a viewpoint and a possible ordering of the accumulating knowledge our hope is to stimulate an improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency of monetary economics at large

consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle a striking feature of u s data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age this paper asks if individual specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation we find that it can we construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the u s panel study on income dynamics consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the u s consumer expenditure survey the total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years in welfare terms the latter is found to be more important than the former

life cycle economies and aggregate fluctuations do the implications for business cycle issues change when we switch from studying infinitely lived representative agent models to more sophisticated demographic structures with finitely lived agents this article addresses that question by using a large overlapping generations model that is calibrated to u s demographic properties microeconomic evidence and national income and product accounts the finding is that the answers obtained are basically the same for the two kinds of models the article also explores the relative volatility of hours across age groups an issue that cannot be addressed by using the infinitely lived representative agent abstraction

food price surges and poverty in urban colombia new evidence from household survey data abstract the present study simulates the impacts of price surges in 2006 2008 on poverty in the main colombian cities drawing upon household survey data it is found that the price surges increased both extreme and moderate poverty in urban areas but the magnitude of poverty rise was not homogeneous across geographical locations or in terms of household characteristics such as education or gender of the household head as a policy option we suggest geographical targeting or demographic targeting that will select and support poor households by locations or socio demographic characteristics guided by the degree of household vulnerability to food price shocks

on the impossibility of central bank independence four decades of time and intellectual inconsistency the intellectual justification for modern central banking time inconsistency celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the cambridge journal of economics however the key progeny of the time inconsistency literature central bank independence has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research in the first instance the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country second central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence i conclude that independence fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context with central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy

policy preferences of fomc members as revealed by dissenting votes the composition of the federal open market committee the ability to predict the effect of policy decisions on economic and f1nancialvariables and political influence from the white house and the congress are all potentially significant determinants of monetary policy decisions this study uses the record of dissenting votes from federal open market committee meetings to consider the relevance of these influences tests for differences between voting patterns of bank presidents versus members of the board of governors and differences during various historical periods provide insight into four questions 1 are the policy preferences of bank presidents different from those of the members of the board 2 does uncertainty about the economic and financial results of policy actions influence the level of dissent 3 is there a difference in the pattern of dissent under different chairmen and 4 is there effective political influence on monetary policymakers the legitimacy of district bank presidents serving on the fomc has been challenged in the courts and the legislature challengers fear that district bank presidents who serve without executive or legislative approval prefer policy that produces lower inflation and higher unemployment relative to the policy preferred by members of the board who are appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate rogoff 1985 argues that in the presence of market distortions it is better for society to have central bankers who attach a larger weight than the society s

do we really want an independent central bank the issue of an independent central bank is assessed in the context of experience in the u k economy the historical role of the bank of england is examined revealing that the success of anti inflation policy depends on the exchange rate regime as well as on the institutional arrangements holding between the bank and government inflation targets are discussed but independence is also addressed by seeing how other targets such as nominal gdp might perform the theoretical arguments for and against an independent central bank are discussed in detail it is argued that partial independence where the central bank enjoys autonomy in relatively good states and is overridden in bad states is the preferred form of independence attention is drawn to the costs arising owing to a lack of coordination of policy when the finance ministry may compete against the central bank in the case where the latter is independent copyright 1994 by oxford university press

inflation taxes and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken in this study some of the consequences of an uncertain policy struggle game of chicken between independent taxing agencies a monetary and a fiscal authority are exam ined we show that policy uncertainty may improve upon regimes where there is no uncer tainty and one agency succeeds in implementing a low tax policy at the expense of the other agency an uncertain tax policy never dominates a fully coordinated tax policy but it can move average tax rates in the right direction in this sense the game of chicken between agencies can be beneficial and can compensate for the lack of a specific coordinating admin

regional inflation persistence evidence from italy vaona a and ascari g regional inflation persistence evidence from italy regional studies regional patterns of inflation persistence have received attention only at the level of european monetary union member states however economic disparities within european monetary union member states are an equally important policy issue this paper considers a country with a large regional divide italy at a fine level of territorial disaggregation nuts 3 it is shown that economically backward regions display greater inflation persistence moreover higher persistence is linked to a lower degree of competitiveness in the retail sector finally the inflation persistence at the national level does not present any geographical aggregation bias because it equals the mean of inflation persistence of provincial data vaona a et ascari g la continuite de l inflation regionale des preuves provenant de l italie regional studies c est seulement par rapport aux pays membres de la zone euro que la distributio

fiscal policy and regional inflation in a currency union abstract substantial attention has been devoted to inflation differentials within the european monetary union including suggestions that inflation differentials are a policy issue for national governments this paper investigates the ability of a region participating in a currency union to affect its inflation differential with respect to the union through fiscal policy in a two region general equilibrium model with traded and nontraded goods lowering the labor income tax rate in response to positive inflation differentials succeeds in compressing inflation differentials such policies can lead to higher volatility of domestic inflation while leaving the volatility of real output roughly unchanged regional fiscal policies also have spill over effects on the volatility of union wide and foreign inflation in our model

accountability transparency and inflation targeting inflation targeting regimes define a performance measure for the central bank a regime that places a large small weight on achieving the target is analogous to a high low powered incentive scheme high powered incentive structures promote accountability but may distort stabilization policy the optimal power under inflation targeting is derived under perfect and imperfect information the fundamental trade off between accountability and stabilization depends on the degree of transparency defined as the ability to monitor the central bank s performance multiplicative uncertainty increases the optimal weight to place on achieving an inflation target