growth and unemployment this paper analyses the effects of growth on long run unemployment using a search model of equilibrium unemployment where growth arises explicitly from the introduction of new technologies that require labour reallocation for their implementation the analysis uncovers and compares between two competing effects of growth on unemployment the first is a capitalisation effect whereby an increase in growth raises the capitalised returns from creating jobs and consequently reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment the second is a creative destruction effect whereby an increase in growth reduces the duration of a job match thereby raising the equilibrium level of unemployment both directly by raising the job separation rate and indirectly by discouraging the creation of job vacancies this paper asks the question of how the rate of economic growth affects unemployment in the long run the main consideration that leads us to think that this is an interesting question has to do with the re allocative aspect of growth in the long run faster economic growth must come from a faster increase in knowledge to the extent that the advancement of knowledge is embodied in industrial innovations it is likely to raise the job destruction rate through automation skill obsolescence and the bankruptcy associated with the process of creative destruction in short increased growth is likely to produce an increased rate of job turnover and the search theories of lucas and prescott 1974 and pissarides 1990 imply that an increased rate of job turnover will result in a higher natural rate of unemployment this conclusion is also consistent with the empirical results of davis and haltiwanger 1990 which show that periods of high unemployment tend to be periods of high job turnover at the establishment level it suggests the possibility of a positive longrun tradeoff between growth and unemployment at least over some range there has been relatively little attention paid to our question in the literature on longrun determinants of unemployment for example the recent empirical examination by layard nickell and jackman 1991 of unemployment rates among oecd countries did not even consider the rate of economic growth as a possible explanatory variable this is consistent with the seminal theoretical work of phelps 1968 which implies that the natural rate of unemployment is independent of the rate of productivity growth the only

the empirical content of the roy model this paper clarifies and extends the classical roy model of self selection and earnings inequality the original roy model based on the assumption that log skills are normally distributed is shown to imply that pursuit of comparative advantage in a free market reduces earnings inequality compared to the earnings distribution that would result if workers were randomly assigned to sectors aggregate log earnings are right skewed even if one sectoral distribution is left skewed most major implications of the log normal roy model survive if differences in skills are log concave however few implications of the model survive if skills are generated from more general distributions we consider the identifiability of the roy model from data on earnings distributions the normal theory version is identifiable without regressors or exclusion restrictions sectoral distributions can be identified knowing only the aggregate earnings distribution for general skill distributions the model is not identified and has no empirical content with sufficient price variation the model can be identified from multimarket data cross sectional variation in regressors can substitute for price variation in restoring empirical content to the roy model

the performance of pivotal voter models in small scale elections evidence from texas liquor referenda abstract this paper explores the ability of pivotal voter models to explain voter behavior in small scale elections using data from texas liquor referenda the findings provide little support for the view that pivotal voter models are a reasonable theory for understanding small scale elections interestingly this is not because they cannot explain the levels of turnout in the data but rather because they cannot explain the size of the winning margins the logic of pivotal voter models implies that elections must be expected to be close even if there is a significant difference between the sizes of the groups or the intensity of their preferences with even a relatively small number of eligible voters elections that are expected to be close ex ante must end up being close ex post however in the data winning margins are often significant

compulsory versus voluntary voting an experimental study abstract we report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions if voting is compulsory then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely i e against their private information if voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed then sincere voting in accordance with a voter s private information is always rational while participation may become strategic we find strong support for these theoretical predictions in our experimental data moreover voters adapt their decisions to the voting institution in place in such a way as to make the group decision accuracy differences between the two voting institutions negligible the latter finding may serve to rationalize the co existence of compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in nature

redistribution income and voting a model that reconciles the positive association between income and voting found in cross sectional studies with the negative correlation between income and turnout over time is developed voting is modeled as a group rational activity voter turnout rates in the united states for the 1948 1960 1968 and 1980 elections are used to test the model voter turnout is found first to fall and then to rise as families move up the income distribution voter turnout also rises as real wages fall as educational attainment increases as elections become closer and as poll taxes and literacy tests are removed

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

proportionality and turnout evidence from french municipalities many studies find that voter turnout is higher in proportional representation pr elections than in plurality elections but because the two systems differ in multiple ways and are used in differe

son preference children s gender and parents time allocation evidence from china this article investigates the effect of children s gender on parents time allocation in developing countries due to the long existing tradition of son preference a collective model generates pred

do direct democratic procedures lead to higher acceptance than political representation are direct democratic decisions more acceptable to voters than decisions arrived at through representative procedures we conduct an experimental online vignette study with a german sample to investigate how voters acceptance of a political decision depends on the process through which it is reached for a set of different issues we investigate how acceptance varies depending on whether the decision is the result of a direct democratic institution a party in a representative democracy or an expert committee our results show that for important issues direct democracy generates greater acceptance this finding holds particularly for those voters who do not agree with a collectively chosen outcome however if the topic is of limited importance to the voters acceptance does not differ between the mechanisms our results imply that a combination of representative democracy and direct democracy conditional on the distribution of issue importance among the electorate may be optimal with regard to acceptance of political decisions

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

home ownership as status competition some theory and evidence abstract in this paper we explore the implications of home ownership as a status good for housing prices more concretely if a family s housing wealth relative to others is an important sorting variable for relative attractiveness in the marriage market then competition for marriage partners might motivate people to pursue a bigger and more expensive house apartment to test the hypothesis we explore regional variations in the sex ratio for the pre marital age cohort across china as a proxy for differential strength for concerns for status we find that the evidence is consistent with the status competition hypothesis

the downsian voter meets the ecological fallacy this paper presents evidence that voter participation does not depend on the probability that one vote is decisive an extensive summary of the empirical participation literature is provided which shows that most but not all studies have found that turnout in an electoral district is higher when the race is closer individual level vote regressions for the 1979 and 1980 canadian national elections are estimated using objective measures of closeness as opposed to self reported measures the main finding is that a citizen is no more likely to vote in a close election than in a lands lide election district level turnout regressions for the same elections are also estimated and a significant relation between closeness and turnout is observed this suggests that aggregation bias may generate a spurious closeness turnout relation in district level regressions

the effect of randomized school admissions on voter participation there is little causal evidence on the effect of economic and policy outcomes on voting behavior this paper uses randomized outcomes from a school choice lottery to examine if lottery outcomes affect voting behavior in a school board election we show that losing the lottery has no significant impact on overall voting behavior however among white families those with above median income and prior voting history lottery losers were significantly more likely to vote than lottery winners using propensity score methods we compare the voting of lottery participants to similar families who did not participate in the lottery we find that losing the school choice lottery caused an increase in voter turnout among whites while winning the lottery had no effect relative to non participants overall our empirical results lend support to models of expressive and retrospective voting where likely voters are motivated to vote by past negative policy outcomes

to vote or not to vote the paradox of nonvoting one paradox of voting states that in a general election in which many citizens vote the probability that a single voter can affect the outcome is so small that in general citizens have no rational reason for voting however if all citizens accept this reasoning then none will vote and so each vote has a large probability of affecting the outcome hence all should vote after all the adoption of mixed strategies resolves this paradox if each citizen adopts a certain small probability of voting then the actual number of citizens voting will be just enough to make it worth those citizens while to vote a nash equilibrium point thus occurs here we compute nash equilibria for the simple case of majority voting for the more complicated case of composite voting for example as in a presidential election we draw certain qualitative inferences

closeness expenditures and turnout in the 1982 u s house elections students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout this may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization we explore the latter possibility by using fec and state data on campaign expenditures in house senate and gubernatorial races our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels we also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of senate and gubernatorial expenditure on house turnout

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

getting out the vote participation in gubernatorial elections scholarship on electoral turnout has long emphasized two main themes explanations of nonvoting in terms of individual characteristics and in terms of contextual variables these investigations have deeply enriched our understanding of electoral participation but their limitations have also sensitized us to the remaining problems of explanation perusal of the work on american politics exposes a rather striking tendency in studies of participation to ignore or soft pedal the effects of active political mobilization in this article we formulate two models of electoral turnout socioeconomic and political mobilization and apply them to aggregate data on voting in gubernatorial elections of 1978 and 1980 the socioeconomic model of turnout includes such influences as income age and educational attainment to assess the effects of political mobilization we have considered campaign spending partisan competition electoral margin and the presence or absence of a simultaneous race for the united states senate both of the models perform quite well individually producing significant and meaningful coefficients and adequate fits yet in the final analysis we demonstrate that quite apart from major sources of variation in gubernatorial turnout such as region and presidential versus nonpresidential years the mobilizing influences of campaign activism and competitiveness have a strong impact on electoral participation electoral law i e closing date of registration retains a small but significant effect on voting for governor and socioeconomic characteristics included in a fully specified model have little to contribute independently to an explanation of electoral turnout these findings are very much in the same vein as related cross national investigations which emphasize the crucial role of electoral law and political parties and downplay individual characteristics as determinants of electoral participation on the basis of the research reported here we argue that scholars need to pay more attention to political mobilization as an explanation of electoral turnout in the presidential election between cox and harding in 1920 only half of the eligible voters participated this relatively low turnout together with the historically minimal rates of participation in state and local elections created deep concern among those who believed that reasonably high levels of political involvement are crucial in maintaining a healthy democratic politics it was in this atmosphere of worry about low electoral turnout that charles e merriam and harold f gosnell 1924 conducted in the city of chicago the first systematic study of nonvoting subsequently gosnell 1927 went even further and executed the first experimental study in modern political science demonstrating conditions that could stimulate electoral turnout we too worry about low participation in elections today at every level of government and we believe these classic studies

the case for nil votes voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems in an informational voting environment we study the impact of an explicit nil vote option on the ballot when some voters are uninformed and face the swing voters curse we postulate a simple model of strategic voting in which voters entertain heterogeneous thresholds on legitimacy of different voting actions we predict that introducing a nil vote option reduces the number of uninformed and invalid votes increasing expected welfare in both voluntary and compulsory voting we test our model in a pen and paper laboratory experiment and find that the predictions of the model hold in the data for both voting systems

what price accountability the lucas island model and the politics of monetary policy this paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables they observe precisely how monetary policy stimulates their local economies but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker s economic competence from cross sectoral spillover effects the incumbent has incentives to generate preelection monetary surprises that stimulate the local economies and generate cross sectoral spillover effects he thereby creates an impression of economic competence and furthers his reelection prospects his policy manipulations are the price of political accountability on a positive note the incumbent is more likely to survive voter scrutiny if he is more competent than the average political candidate

analyzing the turnout competition link with aggregate cross sectional data numerous papers by public choice oriented scholars and others have sought to test the hypothesis inspired by downs 1957 that ceteris paribus turnout should be higher when elections are close most look in cross sectional terms at variations in turnout at the constituency level for elections of a given type by and large the results have been disappointing see e g foster 1984 we are skeptical of these weak findings and argue that a complete portrait of the turnout competition link requires us to examine that link for at least three different types of turnout turnout among potential eligibles turnout among registrants and turnout for a given office relative to other offices such as top of the ticket and to take into account longitudinal changes in turnout for recent off year elections to the u s senate and also for off year elections to the u s house of representatives in states where there was no gubernatorial or senatorial contest on the ballot we find strong evidence for higher turnout among eligibles in close contests for these elections to the u s senate we also find evidence for an ecological effect that leads to turnout being maximized at values of competition other than 50 50 moreover when we look at turnout for office relative to top of the ticket voting in the california assembly and the u s senate in presidential years we again find some evidence for an ecological effect in which turnout is maximized at a value of republican vote share above 50 percent and find further strong evidence for a clear link between competition and turnout for office among those at the polls

conspicuous consumption and race using nationally representative data on consumption we show that blacks and hispanics devote larger shares of their expenditure bundles to visible goods clothing jewelry and cars than do comparable whites these differences exist among virtually all subpopulations are relatively constant over time and are economically large although racial differences in utility preference parameters might account for a portion of these consumption differences we emphasize instead a model of status seeking in which conspicuous consumption is used as a costly indicator of a household s economic position using merged data on race and state level income we demonstrate that a key prediction of the status signaling model that visible consumption should be declining in reference group income is strongly borne out in the data for each racial group moreover we show that accounting for differences in reference group income characteristics explains most of the racial difference in visible consumption

homo ludens social rationality and political behavior the most straightforward defense of political democracy is grounded in rational choice political democracy gives people power in public life parallel to that afforded by markets in private life the power to turn their preferences into social outcomes however rational choice models of voter behavior dramatically underpredict voter turnout in all but the smallest elections fiorina 1990 has called this the paradox that ate rational choice theory this anomaly is the centerpiece of green and shapiro s 1994 critique of rational choice methodology in political theory this paper proposes a form of social rationality that strengthens the classical rational actor model this concept explains many central statistical regularities concerning voter turnout and the historical regularities concerning collective action

participatory accountability and collective action experimental evidence from albania it has been argued that accountability is a public good that only citizens can provide governments can put institutions in place that allow citizens to hold public servants to account but citizens must participate in those institutions if accountability is to be achieved thus citizens face a social dilemma participate in holding public servants to account at a cost in terms of time and effort or free ride i e do not participate while benefiting from the efforts of those who do if this characterization of accountability is valid we would expect more cooperatively inclined citizens to participate in accountability institutions while the less cooperatively inclined do not we test the validity of this characterization by investigating the correlation between individual behavior in a simple public goods game and their participation in local and national accountability institutions in albania we involve a nationally representative sample of 1800 adults with children in primary school we find significant correlations between cooperativeness and participation in school accountability institutions and national elections both at the individual level and the district level these correlations are robust to the introduction of many controls in the analysis and in the case of national elections to the use of official election turn out statistics in place of self reported turn out

number of siblings credit constraints and entrepreneurship in china with an under developed financial market borrowing from relatives becomes an important funding source in starting one s own business in china this paper examines the positive effect of number of

mating competition and entrepreneurship abstract we used a natural experiment in taiwan to test whether mating competition is a major motive for entrepreneurship after being defeated in mainland china more than half million solders retreated to taiwan in 1949 the soldiers were not allowed to get married until the military marriage ban was lifted in 1959 the policy change created a severe marriage squeeze for local men triggering their animal spirits to engage in entrepreneurial activities empirical results show that local men exposed to high sex ratios as a result of the removal of the marriage ban were more likely to become entrepreneurs later on

public information and electoral bias abstract we present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate these findings suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences e g through pre election polls or expert forecasts may undermine the democratic process our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences is common knowledge then the unique type symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in which each alternative is equally likely to win the election by contrast when citizens are ignorant about the preference distribution the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower welfare is therefore unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the preference distribution

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs a state of the art model abstract we consider a committee of experts that decides to approve or reject an innovation on behalf of society in addition to a payoff linked to the correctness of the committee s decision each expert receives disesteem payoffs if he she votes in favor of an ill fated innovation or votes against an innovation that proves to be beneficial we find that the predictions of the model are sensitive to the signal technology in the standard condorcet framework experts signals are i i d conditional on the state of the world implying that the state of the world is approximated with arbitrary precision by a sufficiently large number of signals under this assumption any combination of disesteem payoffs leads to acceptance with too high a probability however if this assumption is relaxed depending on the relative size of the disesteem payoffs the committee may accept or reject the innovation with too high a probability

a theory of the competitive saving motive abstract motivated by recent empirical work this paper formalizes a theory of competitive savings an arms race in household savings for mating competition that is made more fierce by an increase in the male to female ratio in the pre marital cohort relative to the empirical work the theory can clarify a number of important questions what determines the strength of the savings response by males or households with a son can women or households with a daughter dis save what are the conditions under which aggregate savings would go up in response to a higher sex ratio this theory can potentially help to understand the savings patterns in china india vietnam singapore hong kong and other economies that have experienced a dramatic increase in the pre marital sex ratio

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting we investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models in a generalized costly voting model we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient increasing turnout in small elections is only inefficient if the electorate is evenly divided or if there is already almost complete voter participation finally we argue that the effects underlying our results are robust in a large class of endogenous participation models

turnout in gubernatorial and senatorial primary and general elections in the south 1922 90 a rational choice model of the effects of short run and long run electoral competition on relative turnout using data on non presidential year elections for governor and u s senators in eight southern states over the period 1922 1990 we provide a rational choice inspired model of the factors that should be expected to affect the relative levels of turnout in primaries as compared to general elections both v o key and anthony downs have argued that voters will be more likely to participate in the elections in which they can most expect to be decisive v o key 1949 proposed that when general elections are usually lop sided because of one party dominance of a state s politics the primary of the dominant party of the state should have a higher turnout than the general election downs argued that turnout should be higher in competitive elections our modelling combines these ideas we use as our dependent variable the ratio of primary to general election turnout in each year we posit that this ratio will increase 1 the greater the degree of within party competition in the primary especially that within the dominant party of a state if there is one and 2 the weaker the degree of between party competition in the general election in addition to election specific effects we also posit long run effects such that the ratio for the offices of governor and u s senator will be affected not merely by the degrees of competition within and between parties specific to any given election but also by the long run trends in party competition this hypothesis leads us to expect that 3 in the south with the rise of the republican party the ratio of primary to general election turnout should decline over time all of our expectations about the links between turnout and competition are strongly supported we argue that rational choice models of turnout perform quite well when we view them in a comparative statics perspective rather than using them to make predictions about who will and who will not vote in any given election

the institutional and political factors that influence voter turnout state data were used to develop an econometric model of voter turnout for an off year 1982 general election the premise of the research was that existing voter turnout models lacked some of the true explanatory variables in particular the political efficacy component of the decision to vote was believed to be under represented in those models

abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences we analyze a model of a two candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences we demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that nevertheless elections effectively aggregate voters private information using examples we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed however may lead to higher levels of abstention we conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes

a unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group specific costs we provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting focusing on type symmetric equilibrium we show that for small electorates members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election as the electorate size grows without bound equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of voting in each political group we relate our equilibrium characterization to myerson s poisson games and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium

saving and bequest in china an analysis of intergenerational exchange particularly high saving rates among the elderly in both rural and urban china call for an investigation of the involved bequest motive utilizing unique survey data from a diverse group of chinese households we document that the magnitude of the bequest from parent to child is associated with the level of personal assistance from child to parent moreover we find indicative evidence that both bequest and assistance are increasing in the parent s income and decreasing in the child s income comparing with the predictions from a stylized intergenerational model these findings are consistent with an exchange based bequest motive our findings have potential implications for how public policies and transfer schemes should be designed in order to contribute to the chinese government objective of increased private consumption our results are conditional on the inclusion of housing wealth as part of the bequest which indicates that transfer of housing is key to understanding the intergenerational assistance and bequest motives and subsequently the high saving levels among the elderly in china

who marries whom in a surging housing market abstract this paper investigates the impact of a surging housing market on marital sorting our empirical analysis shows that there is increasing assortativeness on original family background in response to housing price appreciation that is for husbands when the down payment doubles one more year of paternal schooling predicts a marriage in which the father in law s schooling is 0 057 year greater than in a scenario in which the down payment does not increase the rising assortativeness could exacerbate the already expanding inequality caused by the booming housing market in addition to the benchmark analysis we find that a divorce reform which awards assets proportionate to the shares the spouses paid for the initial down payment rather than awarding equal shares upon divorce alleviates assortativeness the evidence suggests that joint investment in housing is likely to be a significant consideration in marital sorting

money and votes a simultaneous equation model this paper has specified and estimated a model of the interaction between money and voting in american politics convincingly establishing the identification of a system of equations can be difficult even when theory provides a guide in the study of money in politics however no theoretical perspective has been established in the literature to make the case for identification as unambiguous as possible this paper has done two things first the specification was based in part on theory which has formally been developed elsewhere and which satisfactorily describes data at the economic interest group level welch 1980 second part of the question of identification revolves around the relationship between party strength and socioeconomic variables because there are questions as to the best measurement of party strength results based on two measures were presented for a number of reasons the presidential vote was the preferred measure this study draws four conclusions first money influenced voting in u s house elections in 1972 although its effect was small second patterns of total contributions to a u s house candidate are consistent with the hypothesis that a majority of dollars come from contributors who prefer to support likely winners third the total contributions made to a candidate are a positive function of the district s median years of schooling completed and the gini coefficient total contributions made to a democratic candidate are also a positive function of the median income finally had house campaigns been financed in the early 1970s even to the point of giving each major party candidate 150 000 in 1978 dollars few elections would have been changed it is also worth mentioning some of the things about the financing of political campaigns that we still do not know the above conclusions involve only elections to the u s house there are good reasons for suspecting that money is more influential in u s senate elections ols statistics support this belief and the greater visibility of those races help justify it although money has little effect on house elections we do not know whether contributions affect legislative voting in the house representatives apparently believe that expenditure influences their reelection chances given the complexity of the process it should be no surprise that this belief conflicts with our findings acting on this belief a representative s vote may very well be influenced by the sources of his contributions either directly or indirectly through the giving of access to contributors finally we should be reminded that the above model is static while the electoral process is dynamic the amount contributed to a candidate is affected by his probability of winning in the previous time period e g week month and in turn affects that probability in the following time period as usual what we know is overshadowed by what we do not know the above questions are both interesting in their own right and of interest to policy making

turbulence and unemployment in a job matching model according to ljungqvist and sargent 1998 high european unemployment since the 1980s can be explained by a rise in economic turbulence leading to greater numbers of unemployed workers with obsolete skills these workers refuse new jobs due to high unemployment benefits in this paper we reassess the turbulence unemployment relationship using a matching model with endogenous job destruction in our model higher turbulence reduces the incentives of employed workers to leave their jobs if turbulence has only a tiny effect on the skills of workers experiencing endogenous separation then the results of ljungqvist and sargent 1998 2004 are reversed and higher turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment thus changes in turbulence cannot provide an explanation for european unemployment that reconciles the incentives of both unemployed and employed workers jel e24 j64

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

an explanation of anomalous behavior in models of political participation this paper characterizes behavior with noisy decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions applications include voting participation games candidate entry the volunteer s dilemma and collective action problems with a contribution threshold a simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a quantal response equilibrium and the resulting predictions are compared with nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner

large electorates and decisive minorities there are many instances in which even in a democracy the political preferences held by a minority of the electorate are reflected in political outcomes it is shown that for a simple two alternative election environment characterized by costly voting and private information when the expected population is very large the alternative preferred by more expected zealous voters who have either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating wins with high probability in any equilibrium even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that preference is arbitrarily small this is an undersirable outcome under either of two natural but very different normative criteria

bipolar multicandidate elections with corruption the goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority s preference on policy questions but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders we consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria among a wide class of single winner scoring rules only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model

is civic duty the solution to the paradox of voting although sense of civic duty is seen by many scholars as the most obvious solution to the paradox of voting very few empirical studies provide clear evidence on that motive we use blood donation to build proxies focusing only on intrinsic motivations and then introduce such measures into electoral turnout regressions our results show that civic duty has a strong influence on voter turnout rates confirming that the satisfaction voters receive from voting matters regardless of election outcomes the results are even stronger when we incorporate the number of plasma and platelet donations which take more time and require stronger commitments from donors

distributional dynamics following a technological revolution in this paper we explore the link between technological change and the dynamics of employment production and the distribution of earnings technological change not only advances society s collective capability but also changes the relative productivities of its members the latter effect establishes the likely winners and losers from advances in productive capabilities provides a mechanism that can generate cyclical fluctuations in output as well as employment and determines the evolution of the earnings distribution dynamique de la repartition a la suite d une revolution technologique ce memoire examine le lien entre le changement technologique et la dynamique de l emploi de la production et de la repartition des revenus le changement technologique n augmente pas seulement la capacite collective d une societe mais modifie aussi les productivites relatives de ses membres ce dernier effet cree des gagnants et des perdants declenche un mecanisme qui peut generer des fluctuations cycliques tant dans le niveau de production que dans celui de l emploi et determine l evolution de la repartition des revenus

incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout an empirical test this study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective it reviews the paradox of voting and finds one model which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders to be a promising solution it tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout using an ecological analysis of turnout in five montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections the 1993 canadian federal the 1994 quebec provincial and the 1994 montreal municipal elections data on mobilization are taken from semi directed interviews with association leaders in each community the results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election the overall results are weak indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout

the performance of rational voter models in recent presidential elections in an economic theory of democracy downs hypothesized that rational utility maximizing citizens would calculate the benefits from voting as opposed to abstaining altogether and then vote if this expected benefit exceeded voting cost this hypothesis is logically derived from economic principles of rational behavior but is counterintuitive even if the utility increment is plausibly large the probability of casting a pivotal tie breaking vote in any sizable polity is minute hence the expected benefit will be less than the time cost of voting and no rational person will vote nevertheless a number of statistical studies have found that voter turnout does respond to differences in the probability of casting a decisive vote even though that probability may be small this article uses data gathered at the state level from the 1968 1972 1976 and 1980 general elections to reestimate the relationship between voter turnout and the probable closeness of the election pooled data least squares dummy variable lsdv regressions are used whenever preliminary tests indicate that such pooling is permissible the empirical results suggest that the relationship between closeness and turnout is weak unstable or nonexistent in all of the models tested

turnout and closeness evidence from 60 years of bavarian mayoral elections one prediction of the calculus of voting is that electoral closeness positively aects turnout via a higher probability of one vote being decisive i test this theory with data on all mayoral elections in the german state of bavaria between 1946 and 2009 importantly i use constitutionally prescribed two round elections to measure electoral closeness and thereby improve on existing work that mostly uses expost measures that are prone to endogeneity the results suggest that electoral closeness matters a one standard deviation increase in closeness increases turnout by 1 68 percentage points which corresponds to 1 of a standard deviation in this variable i also evaluate how other factors like electorate size or rain on election day aect turnout dierentially depending on the closeness of the race

your vote counts on account of the way it is counted an institutional solution to the paradox of not voting when we explicitly lay out all its steps we find that the paradox of not voting since the chance of one vote s making a difference is about zero why trouble to vote rests on a false but hitherto unremarked assumption about the institutional context of elections my solution to the paradox is more conservative than others that have been proposed and it yields a rational choice model of voting whose consequence accord well with empirical findings on turnout

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

follow the leader theory and evidence on political participation using state by state voting data for u s presidential elections the authors observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness to explain the strategic component of political participation they develop a follow the leader model political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal which depends on the expected closeness of the race at both state and national levels and how voters respond to their effort structural estimation supports this model for example a 1 percent increase in the predicted closeness at the state level stimulates leaders efforts which increases turnout by 0 34 percent

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

when does one bad apple spoil the barrel an evolutionary analysis of collective action this paper studies collective action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork a leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players quantal response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails a full characterization of long run play reveals the determinants of success these include the correlation between players costs of provision and their valuations for the good the addition of an extra bad apple player can spoil the barrel by destabilizing successful teams and so offers a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

social organization in an endogenous growth model we develop an endogenous growth model in which individuals form matches in order to consume goods that are not explicitly traded the matching process endogenously generates a concern for relative wealth and is thereby beneficial for capital accumulation and economic growth we then study how social segmentation in the matching process affects economic growth under strong segmentation social competition over mates occurs inside homogeneous groups this homogeneity increases the severity of the rat race of wealth accumulation and fosters economic growth

asymmetric information and the electoral momentum of public opinion polls this paper demonstrates that the existence of public opinion polls amplifies the effects of shifts in the distribution of the public s preferences over the issue space on the election s results voters evaluate candidates by their positions on the issue space and by a valence or general ability dimension some individual s the informed have more precise information about the relative abilities of candidates than others the uninformed since public opinion polls reflect the information of the informed high approval for a candidate at the polls signals to the uninformed that he is more likely to be abler however high approval may also reflect changes in the distribution of the public on the issue space as a result the uninformed partly confuse the two effects and public opinion polls tend to reinforce the effects of shifts in the public s ideological preferences on election results a shift to the right that shows up as more support for the right wing candidate at the polls is partly interpreted as a higher efficiency of this candidate as a result he wins with a higher margin than the margin he would have won with in the absence of polls or under perfect information

political rents and voter information in search equilibrium abstract political parties committed to grab rents may run for election and even win if citizens are uninformed but how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search we propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout we show that i the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies i i the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely u shaped in the information search cost i i i turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system

how a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy this paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators the firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy in equilibrium no one vote may be decisive so each legislator who seeks the firm s investment votes for the policy though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy and when votes reveal information about the district the firm s implicit promise or threat can be credible unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests

the political participation puzzle and marketing abstract this study shows that one of the most intriguing findings on political participation that the participation rate is higher in close elections is due to the omission of variables namely the marketing activities this relationship between closeness and participation is intriguing because 1 it implies that people participate in elections because their vote might be decisive but 2 such an incentive to vote is unreasonable this study presents a theoretical model that suggests that closeness does not affect the turnout rate directly but rather through the marketing activities of the parties in other words in equilibrium close elections attract higher marketing spending which in turn increases turnout the author uses data on the 1996 2004 presidential elections in the united states to examine the model and its implications using structural and nonstructural estimation the author finds that the data support the model and its implications furthermore the effect of marketing on turnout i

missing women and the price of tea in china the effect of sex specific earnings on sex imbalance economists have long argued that the sex imbalance in developing countries is caused by underlying economic conditions this paper uses exogenous increases in sex specific agricultural income caused by post mao reforms in china to estimate the effects of total income and sex specific income on sex differential survival of children increasing female income holding male income constant improves survival rates for girls whereas increasing male income holding female income constant worsens survival rates for girls increasing female income increases educational attainment of all children whereas increasing male income decreases educational attainment for girls and has no effect on boys educational attainment