capital flow controls international asset pricing and investors welfare a multi country framework this paper investigates the impact of capital flow restrictions on the pricing of securities on the optimal portfolio composition for investors of different nationalities and on their welfare under capital flow controls the equilibrium price of a security is determined jointly by its international and national risk premiums and investors acquire nationality specific portfolios along with a market wide proxy for the world market portfolio removal of investment barriers generally leads to an increase in the aggregate market value of the affected securities and all investors favor a move toward market integration introduction of different types of index funds in the world market generally increases world market integration and investor welfare in recent years the international capital markets have undergone numerous important changes that have increased the international linkage of national markets these changes include the creation of national index funds e g mexico korea taiwan india france and scandinavia and selective liberalization e g brazil india korea sweden and japan despite their potential impact on the national economies and global finance it is not clear what consequences these integrating changes entail for example is welfare increased by allowing cross border investment that is restricted to purchasing the entire national portfolio of which the national index fund is a class unfortunately with the exception of subrahmanyam 1975a who studies the pricing and welfare effects of fully integrating heretofore completely segmented markets other international asset pricing models that incorporate capital flow restrictions for instance black 1974 stulz 1981b lessard et al 1983 errunza and losq 1985 cooper and kaplanis 1986 and eun and janakiramanan 1986 analyze the pricing but not the welfare effects of investment barriers to analyze systematically the welfare implications of various structural changes in the current market environment this paper follows the lead of subrahmanyam and recasts the analysis in two important respects

downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly i analyse the effects of a downstream merger in a differentiated oligopoly when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents firms or unions bargaining outcomes can be observable or unobservable by rivals when competition is in quantities upstream agents are independent and bargaining is over a uniform input price a merger between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare however when competition is in prices or the upstream agents are not independent or bargaining is over a two part tariff or bargaining covers both the input price and the level of output the standard welfare results are restored a downstream merger always reduces consumer surplus and overall welfare

unions and profitability over the 1980s some evidence on union firm bargaining in the united kingdom in this paper an attempt is made to assess the behaviour of the rate of return on sales of unionised firms as compared to the non unionised ones in the late 1980s in the united kingdom the main aim is to examine what has happened to the relationship between unionisation and profitability after the changes in the union legislation competition environment and cyclical variations that took place over this period the impact of different forms of union firm bargaining on the union profitability effect is also examined the data reveal that the negative union effect on profitability exists even after controlling for firm specific fixed effects but that it has been sharply reduced over the 1980s

sequencing strategically wage negotiations under oligopoly abstract should an industry wide union in a unionized oligopoly e g the united auto workers in the us negotiate new contracts by bargaining with firms simultaneously or should it strategically sequence its bargaining partners the models presented isolate two key factors affecting this decision pre existing contracts and the post negotiation product market game the better the preexisting contracts for the union the more attractive is the option of sequencing moreover a high wage negotiated with the first firm reduces product market competition increasing other firms ability to pay higher wages as well this adds to the attractiveness of strategic sequencing for the union

competition under credit rationing theory and evidence from rural china abstract we present a duopoly model of financial competition to describe the conditions under which competition leads to greater bank effort when repressed financial systems ration credit the model features an entrant that freely sets its interest rate and an incumbent that must charge a rate below that which is market clearing both players may exert costly effort to inform themselves about borrower types using data on rural financial institutions in china we test empirically the effects of competition on deposit growth loan portfolio composition repayment rates and other effort measures finding positive effects of competition on effort and financial performance

the tax unit and household production under a progressive income tax conventional wisdom is that taxing individuals rather than households is preferred from an efficiency point of view the reason is that secondary workers whose labor supply elasticity is high will be taxed at a lower marginal rate than primary workers whose labor supply elasticity is low here we argue that once household production is taken into account things are more complicated since tax design should also not distort the input of family members time in household production factor input distortions as well as ramsey considerations thus need to enter the choice of the tax unit we provide a numerical example of an economy for which a move from an individual to a household basis in the income tax can be efficiency improving we then use a general equilibrium model parameterized using australian tax rates and data whose results clearly show that welfare gains can occur under changes from an individual to a household basis for an existing income tax our results th

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

countervailing power revisited abstract the paper uses the nash bargaining concept to study the predictions of the theory of countervailing power within two theoretical models a cournot model and a model of perfect competition within the cournot model a decrease in the number of retailers unambiguously leads to an increase in equilibrium consumer prices in the model of perfect competition the reverse is true one may thus conclude that countervailing power can have positive effects for the consumers only if competiton at the retail level is very fierce

bringing wind energy to market wind energy is a rapidly growing source of renewable energy generation however the current extra market approach to its assimilation into the electric grid will not scale at deep penetration levels in this paper we investigate how an independent wind power producer might optimally offer its variable power into a competitive electricity market for energy starting with a stochastic model for wind power production and a model for a perfectly competitive two settlement market we derive explicit formulae for optimal contract offerings and the corresponding optimal expected profit as wind is an inherently variable source of energy we explore the sensitivity of optimal expected profit to uncertainty in the underlying wind process we also examine the role of forecast information and recourse markets in this setting we quantify the role of reserves in increasing reliability of offered contracts and obtain analytical expressions for marginal profits resulting from investments in improved forecasting and local auxiliary generation the formulae make explicit the relationship between price signals and the value of such firming strategies

foreign equity investment restrictions capital flight and shareholder wealth maximization theory and evidence this article provides a theory of foreign equity investment restrictions we consider a model where the demand function for domestic shares differs between domestic and foreign investors because of deadweight costs in holding domestic and foreign securities that depend on the country of residence of investors we show that domestic entrepreneurs maximize firm value by discriminating between domestic and foreign investors the model implies that countries benefitting from capital flight have binding ownership restrictions such that foreign investors pay a higher price for shares than domestic investors the empirical implications of this theory are supported by evidence from switzerland article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the impact of wind generation on wholesale electricity prices in the hydro rich pacific northwest extant literature documents that wind generation can reduce wholesale electricity market prices by displacing conventional generation but how large is the wholesale price effect of wind generation in an electricity market dominated by hydroelectric generation we explore this question by analyzing the impact of wind generation on wholesale electricity prices in the pacific northwest region of the united states this hydro rich system tends to be energy limited rather than capacity constrained with its marginal generation during the hydro runoff season often a hydro unit instead of a natural gas fired unit we find that increased wind generation reduces wholesale market prices by a small but statistically significant amount while a hydro rich system can integrate wind generation at a lower cost than a thermal dominated region the direct economic benefits to end users from greater investment in wind power may be negligible

on the effects of barriers to international investment a simple model is presented in which it is costly for domestic investors to hold foreign assets the implications of the model for the composition of optimal portfolios at home and abroad are derived it is shown that all foreign assets with a beta larger than some beta plot on either one of two security market lines some foreign assets with a beta smaller than are not held by domestic investors even if their expected return is increased slightly while it is obviously not true that asset markets are completely segmented between countries there is evidence of barriers to international investment although reality seems to lie in that grey area between complete segmentation and no segmentation at all most international asset pricing models are concerned with the extreme case of no barriers to international investment no effort seems to have been made to study the effect on portfolio choice of such barriers which make it costly to hold foreign securities as opposed to domestic securities but which do not in general render international diversification so onerous that investors avoid foreign securities completely casual empiricism suggests that models without barriers to international investment should be suspect those models cannot explain why it appears that in every country investors on average hold more domestic securities than would be required if they held the world market portfolio 2 this paper constructs a model of international asset pricing in which there is a cost associated with holding either long or short risky foreign securities for the sake of simplicity in most of the paper we assume that while domestic investors face barriers to international investment foreign investors face no such barriers it turns out that nothing significant is lost with such an assumption the main conclusions of this paper for the case in which foreign investors face no barriers to international investment are 1 in the presence of barriers to international investment some risky foreign

brothers household financial markets and savings rate in china abstract this study analyzes the effect of the number of brothers an individual has on that individual s household savings rate under the current underdeveloped household financial market in urban china i show that having an additional brother reduces an individual s household savings rate by at least 5 percentage points brothers help households 1 by sharing risks providing a source of informal borrowing and 2 by sharing the cost of supporting parents sisters play a minor role in affecting a household s savings rate mainly because of cultural norms the decline in the average number of brothers in households induced by population policies explained at least one third of the increased aggregate household savings rate in urban china

to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the decision by firms under cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs considering classical models of union firm bargaining namely right to manage rtm and efficient bargaining eb we show that for a sufficiently low level of union power eb firms might adopt cost raising strategies this theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of eb and adds to the theoretical finding that eb might dominate rtm under unionized cournot nash oligopoly it also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel like services to oligopoly firms allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers

the demand for labor market structure an economic approach this paper formulates and estimates a model for the determination of employer and union demand for multiemployer vs single employer bargaining units utility maximizing risk averse firms and unions are both assumed to weigh the impact of each type of bargaining unit on the expected level and variability of profits and wages respectively the model is tested on a 1975 sample of 3 486 individual collective bargaining agreements because either party can generally leave a multiemployer unit without the other party s consent a partially observed bivariate probit model is used to estimate demand for structure it is found that the forgone profits due to a multiemployer unit relative to a single firm unit lower firm demands for this type of unit while forgone wages in a multiemployer unit relative to a single firm unit lower union demand for this type of unit

taxation of asset income in the presence of a world securities market abstract this paper examines a capm model of world security prices in which governments recognize their ability to influence international security prices via their tax treatment of foreign and domestic investors in this model governments have the incentive to set tax rates such that investors tend to specialize in domestic securities and to restrict net capital flows between countries each country does this to increase the utility of domestic residents taking as given the tax policies of other governments but the net outcome is a reduction in world efficiency and likely a reduction in the utility of all investors

upstream horizontal mergers vertical contracts and bargaining abstract we study horizontal mergers in the upstream sectors of vertically related industries when bargaining is present and contract types are endogenous we demonstrate that the contract types used can have significant implications for the equilibrium market structure and vice versa when trading takes place through two part tariff contracts merger incentives are absent however when the downstream firms are powerful merger incentives are restored since the merger leads then either to the exclusive or to the partial use of wholesale price contracts finally we show that whenever a merger occurs it is welfare detrimental

bilateral oligopoly the efficiency of intermediate goods markets abstract we show that intermediate goods markets may be efficient despite the presence of commonly accepted signs of market failure such as high concentration both among sellers and buyers sparse trading networks price dispersion and externalities the results are derived in an extensive form model of bilateral bargaining with multiple buyers and multiple sellers and with externalities between the negotiations we also characterize the structure of the endogenous trading network i e how firms choose trading partners prices are dispersed and depend on both the concentration of capital and the concentration of sales consistent with some stylized facts on buyer power

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

bargining bundling and clout the portfolio effects of horizontal mergers we examine the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between differentiated upstream firms in an intermediate goods market served by a downstream monopolist if the merged firm can bundle transfer pricing is efficient before and after the merger absent cost efficiencies consumer and total welfare do not change if the merged firm cannot bundle and its bargaining power is sufficiently high transfer pricing is inefficient after the merger absent cost efficiencies welfare typically falls we evaluate the profit effects of mergers for the case of two part tariff contracts rival firms gain lose from mergers that raise lower downstream prices contrary to conventional wisdom a merger that harms the retailer may increase welfare

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

the merit order effect a detailed analysis of the price effect of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in germany the german feed in support of electricity generation from renewable energy sources has led to high growth rates of the supported technologies critics state that the costs for consumers are too high an important aspect to be considered in the discussion is the price effect created by renewable electricity generation this paper seeks to analyse the impact of privileged renewable electricity generation on the electricity market in germany the central aspect to be analysed is the impact of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices the results generated by an agent based simulation platform indicate that the financial volume of the price reduction is considerable in the short run this gives rise to a distributional effect which creates savings for the demand side by reducing generator profits in the case of the year 2006 the volume of the merit order effect exceeds the volume of the net support payments for renewable electricity generation which have to be paid by consumers

countervailing power and consumer prices this paper considers the importance of countervailing power manifested as the effects of increased retail concentration on consumer prices and welfare within a market setting where imperfectly competitive retailers negotiate intermediate prices with a monopoly supplier only when retailer services are regarded as very close substitutes do final prices fall following a reduction in the number of retailers even in these circumstances the social benefits of countervailing power may not be realised as the supplier may seek to protect its profits by using a refusal to supply restraint to engage in exclusive trading

asset pricing in partially segmented markets evidence from the finnish market this paper analyzes asset pricing in a partially segmented market where citizens of a small country are allowed to hold only their domestic securities whereas the rest of the investors foreigners are essentially allowed to hold all securities in this market setting it may occur that the citizens of the small country are willing to pay less for their domestic securities than are the foreign investors the paper derives equilibrium required rates of return for different investors in this market setting which perfectly occurred in finland and tests this equilibrium model using data from the finnish stock market empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses derived from the model several studies see e g solnik 1974a and grauer and hakansson 1987 have shown that investors should diversify internationally as by so doing they can reduce the risk of their portfolio without lowering the expected return this implies that if the citizens of a certain country are by legal restrictions prohibited from holding foreign securities they may require a higher rate of return on the domestic securities than the foreign investors do this may happen because the domestic investors cannot diversify away the specific country risk in the same way that the foreign investors can thus if we could observe the prices which the foreign and domestic investors are willing to pay for these domestic securities we would expect them to differ because of this diversification effect the finnish law prohibited finnish investors from investing in foreign securities until 1986 while simultaneously allowing foreign investors to own up to 20 of the shares of any finnish company moreover since 1984 the helsinki stock exchange hse has separately quoted the prices for the unrestricted shares which can be owned both by foreign and domestic investors and for the restricted shares owned solely by domestic investors thus the market setting depicted in the previous paragraph occurred perfectly in finland during the years 1984 and 1985 in this paper our objective is to develop and test an asset pricing model which takes into account the legal restrictions in the finnish stock market in section i we specify the market structure in the finnish stock market in more detail by explaining the relevant legal restrictions affecting the market we also present some descriptive statistics on the prices of the restricted and the unrestricted on

multiunit bargaining in oligopolistic industries a model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions local bargaining and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry in both cases the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages in addition industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement

the competition effects of industry wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly this paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry wide resale price maintenance rpm arrangements such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against rpm a bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining we do not find rpm to be universally undesirable however where retailer power is strong the social effects of rpm are likely to be adverse since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising

nash in nash bargaining a microfoundation for applied work a nash equilibrium in nash bargains has become the workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly this paper proposes a non cooperative foundation for nash in nash bargaining that extends the rubinstein 1982 model to multiple upstream and downstream rms assuming there exists gains from trade for each rm pair we prove that there exists an equilibrium with immediate agreement and negotiated prices that correspond to rubinstein prices if and only if the marginal contribution of a set of agreements is weakly greater than the sum of the agreements marginal contributions we provide stronger conditions under which equilibrium prices are unique

a theory of the firm with non binding employment contracts this paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power vis a vis the firm although they are not unionized the main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers the paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm s workforce the analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions the main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria the profit maximizing and stationa ry equilibria the unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient it exhibits inefficient over employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers reservation wage it confirms earlier results derived by stole and zwiebel 1996a b in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities in contrast in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark up over the reservation wage

social desirability of free entry a bilateral oligopoly analysis abstract this paper explores the social desirability of free entry by analyzing a bilateral oligopoly model with bargaining that incorporates the entry process of firms we demonstrate that free entry in an industry producing a homogeneous final product leads to a socially insufficient number of firms when the suppliers of the intermediate products have sufficiently strong bargaining power this is in contrast to previous findings in the theoretical industrial organization literature which demonstrate that in homogeneous final product markets with cournot oligopoly and fixed set up costs level of entry in the free entry equilibrium is always socially excessive our analysis yields an important policy implication given that the standard excess entry result has often been used as a justification for apparently anti competitive entry regulations

market competition and strike activity we develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly we investigate how product differentiation and market competition bertrand vs cournot competition affect wages and strikes if bargaining takes place at the industry level then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of product differentiation whatever the type of market competition however if bargaining takes place at the firm level then wages and strikes are increasing with the degree of product differentiation and the strike activity is smaller under bertrand than under cournot competition

why unions reduce wage inequality a theory of domino effects numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences i demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages and still not sacrifice higher wages much if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency enhancing wage differences if these domino effects are strong enough then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage

posted pricing vs bargaining in sequential selling process we study the role of bargaining in a firm s sequential selling process the seller firm under consideration sequentially sells a fixed amount of stock to a random arrival stream of potential buyers who are heterogeneous in product valuation based on the stock level and the time to the end of the selling season the seller may dynamically choose either to post a take it or leave it price or to engage in bargaining with an arriving buyer we introduce a stochastic order called the scaled pricing order for the buyer s valuation distribution the scaled pricing order measures the average portion of trade surplus that the seller can obtain by posting a price for distributions with increasing length biased hazard rate checking the property of increasing decreasing scaled pricing order boils down to verifying the concavity convexity of the mills ratio we fully characterize the family of distributions that are invariant in the scaled pricing order which includes uniform and exponential distributions

government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market the case of china abstract we show that the many unusual features of china s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function under certain conditions these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income yet should be much easier to enforce the observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries the theory also forecasts however that china will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes

rate of return regulation and utility capital structure decisions a corporation s capital structure is a means for partitioning its return stream among different classes of securityholders and across different states of nature the primary thrust of capital structure theory has been to determine whether and how this partitioning affects the total value of the firm 1 for a firm subject to rate of return regulation however the capital structure decision may take on an additional dimension under such regulation the firm s output price is set by an outside agency so as to yield a fair return to providers of capital and if effective this process reduces monopoly profits but if the regulator s price setting rule depends on the firm s capital structure in some predictable way the firm may be able to influence price and hence reap additional profits by judiciously choosing its financing mix the purpose of this paper is to analyze possible price influence effects of a regulated firm s capital structure and to illustrate regulators attempts to combat them the determinants of a regulated firm s capital structure have been touched upon in previous papers gordon 8 elton and gruber 5 gordon and mccallum 9 jaffe and mandelker 11 meyer 14 and sherman 24 for example but that issue has not been their primary concern the present paper differs from those mentioned above by focusing its attention more directly on the capital structure decision this issue is of interest in its own right in view of the important position occupied by regulated firms securities in the capital market but the approach taken here also serves to highlight and extend some common threads in the previous papers in particular the results of these papers emerge as straightforward applications of the price influence principle and differences among them can be attributed to differing perceptions of the regulator s pricesetting behavior section i of the paper discusses the price influence principle in general terms and describes the circumstances under which it will alter a regulated firm s financing choice section ii presents three illustrations of how the general principle might work in practice depending on the price setting behavior of the regulatory agency section iii discusses regulators attempts to thwart the priceinfluence effect and conclusions are drawn in section iv

unionization structure licensing and innovation we show the effects of the unionization structure viz decentralized and centralized unions on a firm s incentive for technology licensing and innovation the incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions we identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions if the union s preference for employment is high the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions however if the union s preference for wage is high enough the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex post innovation if the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases we further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure which occurs in our analysis when e g licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation with no licensing occurs only under a centralized union