carbon tax and opec s rents under a ceiling constraint we study the markov perfect nash equilibrium mpne of a game between oil importing countries who seek to maintain the atmospheric carbon concentration under a given ceiling and oil exporting countries the oil importing countries set a carbon tax and the oil exporting countries control the producer price we obtain implicit feedback rules and explicit non linear time paths of extraction carbon tax and producer price consumers are always able to reap some share of the scarcity and monopoly rents whereas producers partially pre empt the carbon tax only if the marginal damage under the ceiling is small we compare the mpne to the efficient open loop and cartel without tax equilibria

inequality aversion and voting on redistribution some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair minded voters are pivotal pivotality in turn depends on the structure of income classes we experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the rich are in majority with a poor majority we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self interest

anomalies risk aversion economists ubiquitously employ a simple and elegant explanation for risk aversion it derives from the concavity of the utility of wealth function within the expected utility framework we show that this explanation is not plausible in most applications since anything more than economically negligible risk aversion over moderate stakes requires a utility of wealth function that is so concave that it predicts absurdly severe risk aversion over very large stakes we present examples of how the expected utility framework has misled economists and why we believe a better explanation for risk aversion must incorporate loss aversion and mental accounting

against naive materialism culture consumption and the causes of inequality economie orthodoxy is narrowly materialistic in that it largely neglects the cultural significance of commodities taking as its starting point sen s work on capabilities the paper examines modern consumer theory and argues that consumption is an inherently complex activity that requires considerable knowledge and expertise and which cannot be adequately understood from an individualist point of view it is argued that interpersonal comparisons are consequently more complicated than is suggested in sen s work on capabilities and that an inquiry into the cultural aspects of consumption encourages a reappraisal of the role of preferences and sheds light on the deeper causes of inequality

pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic noncompetitive energy pricing abstract the literature on energy and carbon taxes is by and large concerned about the derivation of globally efficient strategies in contrast this paper considers the dynamic interactions between cartelized energy suppliers and a consumers government that collectively taxes energy carriers for pigouvian motives two different kinds of external costs are associated with energy consumption flow e g acid rain and stock externalities e g global warming the dynamic interactions between a consumers government and a producers cartel are modeled as a differential game with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium in linear and nonlinear markov strategies the major implications are that the nonlinear solutions are pareto inferior to the linear strategies and energy suppliers may preempt energy taxation and thereby may raise the price at front however this effect diminishes over time because the producers price declines while taxes increase

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices abstract we discuss nonlinear strategies in an infinite horizon duopoly game with sticky prices where firms maximize their discounted sum of profit we construct a stationary feedback equilibrium without guessing value functions and feedback strategies that solve the hamilton jacobi equation for this purpose we study the auxiliary equation that is derived from the hamilton jacobi equation we show that the domain of the state space plays an crucial role in characterizing feedback equilibria and discuss several implications of this observation in particular we find that when the upper bound of the state space is not very high previously unknown feedback equilibria emerge

energy prices and carbon taxes under uncertainty about global warming this paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers welfare for uncertainty global warming follows an ito process stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version the unconstrained reversible case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case nevertheless interesting analytical properties e g about when to stop emissions implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply are derived and complemented by a numerical example

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

can carbon tax eat opec s rents abstract we consider the optimal emission tax for a stock pollutant when the pollutant flow is also regulated by a resource exporting cartel we consolidate clarify and generalize a set of previous results to obtain clear isolation of the pigouvian and trade policy components of the tax because of the trade policy component the tax can shift more rents from the cartel than the pollution causes damage related costs this leads to the possibility that the pollution problem accompanied by the coordination of taxation can bring about net benefits at the expense of the cartel

revealed p reference theory abstract this paper develops axiomatically a revealed preference theory of reference dependent choice behavior instead of taking the reference for an agent as exogenously given in the description of a choice problem we suitably relax the weak axiom of revealed preference to obtain endogenously the existence of reference alternatives as well as the structure of choice behavior conditional on those alternatives we show how this model captures some well known choice patterns such as the attraction effect jel d11 d81

reference dependent subjective expected utility abstract a reference dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented in this theory preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points which may be uncertain acts it is characterised by a set of axioms in a savage style framework a restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states encoded in a satisfaction function from attitudes to gains and losses of satisfaction given weak additional assumptions the restricted theory excludes cycles of choice explains observed disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept valuations of lotteries and predicts preference reversal

leviathan governments and carbon taxes costs and potential benefits abstract this paper addresses positive aspects of the global warming debate that so far has been concerned by and large with normative issues the paper considers a consumers government that appreciates tax revenues as such leviathan in addition to conventional measures of welfare i e carbon taxes serve the dual purpose of correcting for externalities here global warming or more generally a stock externality from energy use and of raising revenues this government faces either a competitive or a perfectly cartelized supply the major findings are 1 i consumers may benefit from a leviathan government that appropriates some of the monopoly rent by deterring preemption to some extent 2 ii the leviathan motive raises initial taxes and thereby lowers initial emissions but increases the long run stock externality in a play with linear strategies 3 iii there exists a continuum of equilibria in nonlinear markov strategies which are however pareto inefficient compared with the linear strategies 4 iv but in case of a binding resource constraint nonlinear strategies are the only feasible ones

syndication institutionalization and lottery play1 why do people play the lottery since lottery tickets are assets with negative expected return lottery play challenges the basic assumptions of economic theory this article approaches lottery play from a networks perspective and focuses on syndicate play a comparison of the development of lottery markets in germany austria spain and portugal from the 17th century onward shows that lottery play declined with rising incomes except in countries in which syndicate play diffused widely namely spain and to a lesser extent portugal although syndicating originated among the relatively poor as a response to an increase in lottery prices it persisted even when individual play became affordable this article contends that syndicating endured because of an institutionalization process by which lottery tickets have transformed from purely economic assets into symbolic carriers of interpersonal ties that convey membership and status position in relevant social networks

negative voters electoral competition with loss aversion this paper studies how voter loss aversion affects electoral competition in a downsian setting assuming that the voters reference point is the status quo we show that loss aversion has a number of effects first for some values of the status quo there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo regardless of other parameters second there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters ideal point than in the absence of loss aversion in a dynamic extension of the model we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage and we find that this increases policy rigidity finally we show that with loss aversion incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences the underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent this prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new and we test it using elections to us state legislatures the results are as predicted incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter

democracy war and wealth lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation in this article we use an original data set to provide the first empirical analysis of the political economy of inherited wealth taxation that covers a significant number of countries and a long time frame 1816 2000 our goal is to understand why if inheritance taxes are often very old taxes the implementation of inheritance tax rates significant enough to affect wealth inequality is a much more recent phenomenon we hypothesize alternatively that significant taxation of inherited wealth depended on 1 the extension of the suffrage and 2 political conditions created by mass mobilization for war using a difference in differences framework for identification we find little evidence for the suffrage hypothesis but very strong evidence for the mass mobilization hypothesis our study has implications for understanding the evolution of wealth inequality and the political conditions under which countries are likely to implement policies that significantly redistribute wealth and income

non linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game abstract we study non linear markov perfect equilibria in a two agent linear quadratic differential game in contrast to the literature owing to tsutsui and mino 1990 nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices journal of economic theory 52 136 161 we do not associate endogenous subsets of the state space with candidate solutions instead we use the catching up optimality criterion to address the possibility of infinitely valued value functions applying sufficiency conditions for existence based on those in dockner et al 2000 differential games in economics and management science cambridge university press cambridge yields the familiar linear mpe and a condition under which a continuum of non linear mpes exists these include as their limit a previously unreported piecewise linear mpe the condition relaxes with increasing patience allowing more efficient steady states thus suggesting a folk theorem for differential games as the lower state and control bounds go to the non linear strategies are eliminated

the market for preferences learning processes are widely held to be the mechanism by which boundedly rational agents adapt to environmental changes we argue that this same outcome might also be achieved by a different mechanism namely specialisation and the division of knowledge which we here extend to the consumer side of the economy we distinguish between high level preferences and low level preferences as nested systems of rules used to solve particular choice problems we argue that agents while sovereign in high level preferences may often find it expedient to acquire in a pseudo market the low level preferences in order to make good choices when purchasing complex commodities about which they have little or no experience a market for preferences arises when environmental complexity overwhelms learning possibilities and leads agents to make use of other people s specialised knowledge and decision rules

strategic pigouvian taxation stock externalities and polluting non renewable resources este trabajo propone una extension del modelo de wirl y dockner 1995 disenado para analizar la interdependencia bilateral a largo plazo entre un cartel exportador de un recurso y una coalicion de paises importadores en primer lugar se incorporan los efectos agotamiento al analisis de las propiedades intertemporales de un impuesto pigouviano en segundo lugar se calculan los equilibrios feedback de stackelberg los resultados muestran que la dinamica del impuesto depende criticamente del nivel del dano medioambiental marginal ademas tambien demuestran que el impuesto definido por el equilibrio de nash perfecto de markov es un impuesto pigouviano neutral en el sentido que solo corrige la ineficiencia causada por la externalidad del stock sin embargo para el equilibrio feedback de stackelberg el impuesto es ventajoso para los paises importadores ya que la imposicion pigouviana estrategica reduce el poder de mercado del cartel

contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice we contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues the results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory in particular our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains risk seeking in the domain of losses and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains this is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times the results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options contrary to the assumption of invariance finally we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting

do multiple nash equilibria in markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons abstract in a seminal paper dockner and van long 1993 international pollution control cooperative versus non cooperative strategies journal of environmental economics and management 25 13 29 argue that nonlinear strategies allow to protect the commons compared with the linear and singular strategy this paper shows that the existence of multiple equilibria depends on preference characteristics and that multiple equilibria need not foster conservation in particular if the absolute elasticity of marginal utility is decreasing then multiple equilibria aggravate the tragedy of the commons compared with the singular or saddlepoint strategy

income distribution and tax structure empirical test of the meltzer richard hypothesis abstract the meltzer richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research but little empirical support the empirical literature has concentrated on cross country studies and the size of the public sector and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality this analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution here tax structure new data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in norway are exploited we show how the multi dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences in the econometric analysis instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution the estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution

a hotelling model with a ceiling on the stock of pollution abstract environmental agreements such as the kyoto protocol aim to stabilize the amount of carbon in the atmosphere which is mainly caused by the burning of nonrenewable resources such as coal we characterize the solution to the textbook hotelling model when there is a ceiling on the stock of emissions we consider both increasing and decreasing demand for energy we show that when the ceiling is binding both the low cost nonrenewable resource and the high cost renewable resource may be used jointly a key implication is that if energy demand were to decline in the long run we may supplement energy supply through clean renewables to meet the environmental standard but then revert back to using only dirty fossil fuels in the future when the ceiling has become non binding that is the much heralded societal transition to clean energy resources may be short lived

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

trade with polluting nonrenewable resources abstract the paper considers nonrenewable resource extraction in a situation where the resource buyers have formed a government which applies emission taxation for slowing pollution accumulation and the sellers are competitive or a resource cartel the noncompetitive situation is studied as a stackelberg differential game which the cartel leads it is first assumed that extraction costs do not depend on the resource stock level and that the pollution stock does not decay in the time consistent and markov perfect equilibrium the sellers monopoly power vanishes asymptotically the sellers market power reduces the buyers emission tax at each point in time in the stackelberg equilibrium the emission tax is below the marginal present value of pollution damage if pollution decays and extraction costs depend on the resource stock level buyers have monopsony power and the ability of sellers to receive emission tax revenues is weakened when the rate of pollution decay is high the producer price falls below the pareto optimal level

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

reference dependent consumption plans we develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption because changes in wealth are news about future consumption preferences over money are reference dependent if news resonates more when about imminent consump tion than when about future consumption a decision maker might to generate pleasant surprises overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news people exhibit an unambiguous first order precautionary savings motive

the exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes a dynamic game approach this paper considers efficient and monopolistic extraction of non renewable energy resources when the resource consumption leads simultaneously to a stock externality global warming the case of monopolistic supply leads to a dynamic game between cartelised producers and a consumers government for this game we compute linear markov perfect strategies that are characterized by preemption of the tax at the wellhead when compared with the open loop solution unfortunately the general asymmetric two state variable model does not allow for an explicit analytical solution therefore a simplified version with one state variable neglecting depreciation of the stock of the pollutant is studied and a numerical example is presented it turns out that the simplified and analytically solved framework provides a good approximation of the initial phase of the transient behaviour but not of the long run