the impact of divided government on legislative production it seems obvious that divided governments should produce less legislation than unified governments yet studies have consistently failed to find such an effect because almost all existing studies focus on the experience of the u s national government the data have limited analysis to a consideration of executive legislative division and ignore the impact of division between bicameral chambers the state level data set employed in this study is not so limited the results show that divided legislatures decrease the production of laws by almost 30 nonetheless consistent with previous studies using national level data executive legislative divisions have no impact of legislative production the reason for this asymmetry is theoretically motivated additional hypotheses of interest are also tested including whether republican controlled legislative chambers are more conservative than democratic chambers in the sense of producing fewer laws than their democratic counterparts

institutional selection in international relations state anarchy as order by the end of the medieval era three new competing institutions attempted to capture gains from trade and reduce feudal particularism sovereign territorial states cityleagues and city states by the middle of the seventeenth century city leagues and city states had declined markedly territorial states survived as the dominant form because they were able to reduce free riding lower transaction costs and credibly commit their constituents the selection process took place along three dimensions first sovereign territorial states proved competitively superior in the economic realm second states increasingly recognized only other sovereign territorial states as legitimate actors in the international system third other actors defected to or copied the institutional makeup of sovereign territorial organization the emergence of discrete territorial units in which only sovereign authorities represented their citizens as the predominant type of organization in international affairs created a new solution to the problem of markets and hierarchies

technology international trade and pollution from us manufacturing pollution emitted by us manufacturers declined markedly over the past several decades even as real manufacturing output increased i first show that most of the decline in us manufacturing pollution has resulted from changing production processes technology rather than changes in the mix of goods produced i then show that increased net imports of polluting goods international trade accounts for only a small portion of the pollution reductions from the changing mix of goods together these two findings demonstrate that shifting polluting industries overseas explains only a minor part less than 10 percent of the cleanup of us manufacturing jel f18 l23 l60 o30 q52 q53

the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

the role of intermediate trade in the change of carbon flows within china in recent years evaluating the emissions embodied in trade eeit has become an important area of policy and research multiregional input output mrio analysis which links producers and final consumers is a widely used method for quantifying the eeit however the role of intermediate trade in driving changes in the eeit is still not fully incorporated in mrio analysis and as a result poorly understood here we present a framework that separately identifies the drivers of the emissions embodied in the trade of final and intermediate products we implement this framework in a case study in which we analyse the changes in co2 emissions embodied in interprovincial trade in china from 2007 to 2012 we find that the largest changes are a rising final demand which is associated with increased emissions that are to some extent offset by decreasing emissions intensity and changing interregional dependency regionally the rising imports and the growth in final demand in less developed regions in the north and central e g hebei and henan reduced the co2 emissions outsourced by central coastal regions and drove the traded embodied co2 flows between the central and western regions the framework enriches our understanding of the role played by intermediate trade in the relocation of emissions

bureaucratic capacity delegation and political reform thecentraltensionmotivatingcontemporarytheories of delegation from politicians to bureaucrats lies in the potential conflict between the value of bureaucratic expertise on one hand and the desire for political control on the other this tension is well known and has been debated at least since weber s classic work on bureaucracy modern bureaucracies are staffed with individuals who by virtue of rational bureaucratic organization are highly skilled policy experts who in principle should be able to help less knowledgeable politicians achieve their goals however the very skills and expertise that bureaucrats enjoy create the possibility that bureaucrats will usurp the rightful role of politicians in policymaking processes because the way this tension is resolved determines the ultimate compatibility of democracy and bureaucracy existing theories of delegation typically focus on understanding how and to what extent politicians can resolve it 1 in many contexts particularly developing democracies bureaucracy does not fit the weberian characteristics that are assumed in the existing delegation literature the bureaucracies may be staffed with individuals who lack the personal capacity to execute orders effectively the organizational structure may lead to breakdowns within bureaucratic hierarchies making it difficult for senior administrators to control their subordinates departments and ministries may lack basic budgets and resources to undertake implementation actions they may suffer from incentives for

a revelation scheme for allocating organizational resources abstract efficient resource allocation in a hierarchical organization frequently requires top management to obtain information from division managers but division managers may place personal interests above those of the organization and communicate distorted information designing simple and robust optimal game theoretic revelation schemes is difficult instead of making another attempt at this we analyze a project valuation scheme actually used by several us government agencies under certain environments the scheme encourages managers to truthfully reveal the relative benefits of alternative projects while some aspects of these environments do not have nice mathematical properties we argue that they may well represent better characterizations of the way managers actually view their situation

inter relationships between spot and sticky price markets for crude oil a diagrammatic analysis abstract transfers of crude oil have generally involved both spot market transactions and sticky price transactions under longer term contractual arrangements or at official opec prices under normal conditions when the opec cartel has been functioning effectively the sticky price market tends to drive the spot market under other conditions like an international supply crisis or weak cohesion in opec spot and sticky prices may deviate considerably and the spot market drives the sticky price market

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

dynamic policymaking with decay it is often said that the only constant is change itself as time passes the population grows new technologies are invented and the skills demographics and norms of the populace evolve these changes whether in isolation or in aggregate influence the effectiveness of policy in particular policies designed for today s world are unlikely to provide a perfect fit tomorrow we develop a notion of policy decay that captures this impact formally we introduce policy decay into a paradigmatic model of legislative policymaking and show that it leads to a starkly different perspective on legislative politics our results upend the classic notion of gridlock and bear implications more broadly for the practice of politics we show how a changing world impacts the power of agenda control how it drives the dynamic path of legislation how it reveals a novel conception of policy expertise and how it ultimately provides a foundational logic to the design of bureaucracy

first branch or root the congress the president and the federal reserve much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues from an empirical perspective that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy in this paper a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the congress the president and one agency we use the u s federal reserve as an extended example can dictate policy outcomes the results of the paper include the congressional dominance theorem if more than 2 3 of house members and more than 2 3 of senate members agree on something they get it the theorem is obvious the proof is in the u s constitution but often forgotten in the substantive literature more realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of congress are more diverse powers of the president to influence policy with and without appointments are also analyzed

evidence of work related and incentive payments in gubernatorial pay the usual caveat applicable to such exploratory study also applies to this one i e the results should be viewed as mere association and does not imply causality however the results are interesting and consistent with a causal argument presented here we find some support to the monitoring arguments presented in the paper and the ways such monitoring information may be produced our evidence is also consistent with the argument that in the high competition states the executive power may be viewed as a necessary productive input while in low competition states such powers could be viewed as alternative ways of allocating political dividends which could be traded with monitory compensation

mixing housing tenures is it good for social well being mixing tenures is now a widely accepted policy designed to tackle problems of social exclusion in disadvantaged neighbourhoods however the evidence base for mixing tenures is fragmented and ambiguous with few exceptions studies of mixed tenure effects have been small one off investigations of individual communities providing only a rudimentary basis for comparative evaluation in attempting to address these issues a national level ecological analysis of mixed tenure in great britain was conducted using aggregate data from two decennial censuses and geocoded vital registrations asking the question whether mixing housing tenures is good for social well being the objective of the research is to establish under what if any circumstances tenure mixing is positively related to indicators of the social well being of an area s population the findings provide little support for positive outcomes and lead the authors to question the efficacy of mixing tenures as a policy for improving social well being

adaptive signal processing hierarchy and budgetary control in federal regulation control over agency budgets is a critical tool of political influence in regulatory decision making yet the causal mechanism of budgetary control is unclear do budgetary manipulations influence agencies by imposing resource constraints or by transmitting powerful signals to the agency i advance and test a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency to address this question the principal findings of the paper are two first presidents and congressional committees achieve budgetary control over agencies not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts second bureaucratic hierarchy increases the agency s response time in processing budgetary signals limiting the efficacy of the budget as a device of political control i also show that the magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased for executive branch agencies after 1970 due to executive oversight reforms i conclude by discussing the limits of budgetary manipulations as a device of political control and the response of elected authorities to adaptive signal processing by agencies

impact of household consumption on co2 emissions danish household consumption increased by 58 over the period 1966 1992 while co2 emissions only increased by 7 using decomposition analysis we investigated the global co2 impact of danish household consumption from 1966 to 1992 our conclusion is that overall growth in private consumption but not changes in the composition of consumption is the key to understanding the increase in co2 emissions however the effect of growth in private consumption has been partly offset by substantial energy conservation in the energy supply and manufacturing sectors

neighbourhoods in urban economics incorporating cognitively perceived urban space in economic models this paper proposes that urban economic analysis would benefit from the use of cognitively perceived neighbourhoods which are discussed within urban studies georeferenced data should be aggregated by spatially bounded units that are identifiable by citizens in order to enrich one dimensional distance as the sole variable to bring urban complexity into economic models multivariate analysis is applied to data from belo horizonte brazil to formulate four indices ranked by neighbourhoods that together represent a spatially complex non linear influence on urban real estate markets the results of the indices by neighbourhood are then tested against a traditional specification in an econometrics exercise that does not include the concepts and indices put forward the definition of neighbourhood used and the empirical results provide a thorough description of urban fabric that can fully and more accurately represent urban influence in economics while avoiding abstract distance measurement

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

material implication of chile s economic growth combining material flow accounting mfa and structural decomposition analysis sda abstract over the last three decades the economic integration of the chilean economy into global markets has been taking place at a rapid pace for example in 1986 exports represented 29 of gdp while in 1996 they had increased to 38 of gdp this period of time was characterized by strong economic growth with an average annual growth rate of about 10 from a physical perspective material requirements more than doubled from 220 to 500 million tons of direct material inputs dmi during the same decade the rate of material growth requirements was around 13 per year the main objective of this study is to explain the changes in dmi by using a structural decomposition analysis sda the changes in material flow accounting mfa were broken down into the effects caused by changes in resource use per unit of output material intensity effect changes between and within sectors structural change effect changes in the composition of final demand mix effect changes due to shifting shares of domestic final demand and export categories category effect and finally changes in the overall level of economic activities level effects the results as a percentage of the total level of dmi used in 1986 indicate that economic growth was the major source of material changes 109 the material intensity and category effects explained 31 and 14 of the increase respectively the increase in the material intensity is mainly due to a declining quality of ores in copper production however these components were partly compensated by the structure 14 and mix 13 effects therefore for a southern american country such as chile the main causes of these changes in material consumption have been a combination of the nature of economic growth along with an increase in export production and material intensity of production

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

flexibility vs protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority abstract we derive the equilibrium institutional design of representative democracy by citizens who first vote on the supermajority required for a new policy to be adopted and then delegate decision making to a legislature that selects policy given that institutional constraint a legislature that can freely tailor policy to reflect society s current preferences is good however the views of the median legislator or agenda setter may differ from the median citizen s and an unchecked legislature can implement bad policy we characterize how the primitives describing the preferences of actors and the status quo policy affect the equilibrium degree of legislative flexibility

gridlock and delegation in a changing world fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time if left unattended such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation to better understand the mechanics of policy making in a changing world we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation of powers system we show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion institutional features that in isolation elicit widespread criticism can effectively ameliorate policies susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change the critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation which increases all decision makers well being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation of powers system we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium the presence of drift provides an opportunity for self interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency

income growth and atmospheric pollution in spain an input output approach abstract the relationships between economic growth and environmental pressures are complex since the early nineties the debate on these relationships has been strongly influenced by the environmental kuznets curve hypothesis which states that during the first stage of economic development environmental pressures increase as per capita income increases but once a critical turning point has been reached these pressures diminish as income levels continue to increase however to date such a delinking between economic growth and emission levels has not happened for most atmospheric pollutants in spain the aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between income growth and nine atmospheric pollutants in spain in order to obtain empirical outcomes for this analysis we adopt an input output approach and use namea data for the nine pollutants first we undertake a structural decomposition analysis for the period 1995 2000 to estimate the contribution of various factors to changes in the levels of atmospheric emissions and second we estimate the emissions associated with the consumption patterns of different groups of households classified according to their level of expenditure

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

money talks supplementary financiers and international monetary fund conditionality what explains the changes in international monetary fund imf conditionality i argue that imf conditionality agreements are influenced by supplementary financiers the imf regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payments imbalances as a result these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the imf and the design of its conditionality programs i consider the influence of one type of supplementary financier private financial institutions on imf conditionality conclusions are supported by a data set of 249 conditionality arrangements coded according to their terms and two case studies

the limits of tax and expenditure limits tel implementation as a principal agent problem previous scholarship has shown that tax and expenditure limits tels often fail to constrain government growth this paper views the implementation of tels as a principal agent problem agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents using panel data for the us states from 1970 through 2008 i conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal agent model for tels i find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government additionally state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action these findings contradict an alternative theory of tel implementation that looks towards the policy s origin my research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions tels effectively reduce government growth

the institutional dynamics of policy administration bureaucratic influence over securities regulation theory a dynamic systems model of administrative politics that 1 relaxes restrictive causal assumptions among the president congress and an administrative agency 2 emphasizes aggregate institutional behavior and 3 analyzes both anticipated and unanticipated policy behavior is set forth as a more general means to investigate agency political relationships hypotheses the main set of hypotheses focus on the aggregate institutional relationships among the president congress and administrative agency these four possible hypotheses include bureaucratic influence bureaucratic autonomy mutual influence and political influence the purpose here is to assess the relative merits of competing explanations for bureaucratic behavior securities regulation is a perfect area of inquiry to investigate these competing perspectives since the findings of existing research on this topic are disparate methods vector autoregressive time series statistical methods are used to empirically test the dynamic systems model of administrative politics by examining three empirical models of sec enforcement behavior in relation to presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals for the 1949 92 annual period results the sec sends potent signals of their own via their changes in regulatory outputs that will affect the budgetary preferences of its political principles however the sec s administrative outputs are shown to be somewhat less sensitive to political budgetary preference signals than what one would expect presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals with respect to the sec are interdependent to a sizeable extent thus raising doubts about the separate independent effect democratic institutions have over the bureaucracy the implications of this study suggest that conventional theories of agency political relations serve as an oversimplified way to study administrative behavior future research on this topic

dynamic pivotal politics we analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today s policy becomes tomorrow s status quo unlike in existing models of pivotal politics policy makers voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks relative to sincere voting the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution the volatility of the policy environment and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers the equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures

tests of institutional versus non institutional models of local public expenditure determination are institutional or non institutional factors more important determinants of local public expenditure decisions employing data that allows us to directly identify the entire distribution of voter expenditure demands we estimate models of deviations of actual expenditures from the expenditure demand of defensible benchmarks namely the median voter s expenditure demand and the mean of voters expenditure demands three competing paradigms are employed to specify these models namely a non institutional model the reform government movement s explanation of how institutions affect local government decisions and a transactions cost model of this same phenomenon predictions from these three competing models differ in many respects comparisons of results from estimating models of expenditure deviations are found to be generally more consistent with the non institutional model than with either of the two institutional models these results suggest that a competitive local public service market helps limit the ability of governments to tax and spend in excess of the demands of the median or mean voter

accounting for nitrogen in denmark a structural decomposition analysis abstract this paper examines the environmental economic cycle for nitrogen in denmark based on nitrogen input and output from different economic sectors an input output model is employed together with a nitrogen mass balance to apportion total nitrogen loading by final demand and estimate export and import of nitrogen from foreign trade the changes in agricultural and industrial nitrogen loading from the mid 1960s to the late 1980s are broken down into changes related to different technological and economic factors the analysis reveals that technological change intensified agricultural production and economic growth especially rising exports are the key factors structural shifts changes in commodity mix in the household and production sectors generally being of less importance

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding

an overview of the driving forces behind energy demand in china s construction industry evidence from 1990 to 2012 abstract the rapid urbanization in china has produced a large demand for energy in the past decades it is therefore urgent to have an understanding of the driving forces behind the energy increase in the construction industry this study applies structural decomposition analysis sda to quantify the effects of driving factors from insight into consumption and production the results show that the energy consumption trajectory of china s construction industry is the result of competition between the effect of increasing final demand and improvement in energy efficiency although the effect of consistent efforts in structure optimization by the central government was significant from 2007 to 2012 the potential to save much energy still lies in structure optimization in energy production and final demand according to the projection structural upgrades in economy would be the most important factor for energy reduction in 2020 scenario analysis further indicated that the percentage change of energy increments in 2020 can be reduced at 22 of 2010 level under the optimistic scenario sector aggregation analysis revealed that more aggregates would increase uncertainty to some extent and result in a misinterpretation of the importance of the underlying factors according to the quantitative analysis in this study the percentage change of total embodied energy consumption in the construction industry should be limited below 25 of 2010 level at the end of the 13th five year plan

introduction epistemic communities and international policy coordination the growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult if decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions what factors shape their behavior under conditions of uncertainty what are the origins of international institutions and how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge while a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights at its core the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system level factors unit level factors or some complex interplay between the two whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create defend or expand their own wealth and power to enhance collective material benefits or to promote nonmaterial values a related question of

ethics incentives and conflicts of interest a practical solution couched in positive agency theory it is shown that the straight commission compensation system sccs creates a conflict of interest between the agent s and the client s self interests based on this it is hypothesized that the sccs will encourage agents to intend to act unethically towards their clients two hundred and forty five insurance agents in the u s were surveyed with 59 responding the results suggest that the sccs does not significantly affect agents ethical intentions positively or negatively this lack of empirical evidence may be due to the unique nature of the sample indeed the company which enabled this sample appears to have found a practical solution to temper the potential negative effects of the sccs in its commitment to selective hiring and marketing products which benefit both the client and the agent

the power of parallel thinking a small computer model demonstrates that an appropriate organization of boundedly rational individuals can find optimal policies in an environment that is overwhelmingly complex for unorganized decision makers the model is also used to identify conditions under which optimal or even good policies are not found the demonstrated adaptive power of the model is interpreted in light of recent developments in the theory of computational complexity that place new stress on powerful methods of search and of new models from computer science which markedly advance search effectiveness by harnessing parallel structures of information processing

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

scraps of paper agreements and the durability of peace in the aftermath of war what determines whether peace lasts or fighting resumes and what can be done to foster durable peace drawing on theories of cooperation i argue that belligerents can overcome the obstacles to peace by implementing measures that alter incentives reduce uncertainty about intentions and manage accidents a counterargument suggests that agreements are epiphenomenal merely reflecting the underlying probability of war resumption i test hypotheses about the durability of peace using hazard analysis controlling for factors including the decisiveness of victory the cost of war relative capabilities and others that affect the baseline prospects for peace i find that stronger agreements enhance the durability of peace in particular measures such as the creation of demilitarized zones explicit third party guarantees peacekeeping and joint commissions for dispute resolution affect the duration of peace agreements are not merely scraps of paper rather their content matters in the construction of peace that lasts

the impact of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and fdi a new institutional analysis the effects of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and foreign direct investment fdi have gone understudied we employ panel data reported by oecd nations over the 1995 2002 period to estimate the impact of iso adoptions on country pair economic relations we find iso diffusion to have no effect in developed nations but to positively pull fdi i e enhancing inward fdi and positively push trade i e enhancing exports in developing nations

conditionalities and the performance of european structural funds a principal agent analysis of control mechanisms in eu cohesion policy bachtler j and ferry m conditionalities and the performance of european structural funds a principal agent analysis of control mechanisms in european union cohesion policy regional studies in the context of debates on the performance of european union cohesion policy this paper considers how the european union has used control mechanisms to influence the use of structural funds by member states using the principal agent model this paper examines empirically three case studies of conditionalities applied to the absorption of funding decommitment rule outcomes of interventions performance reserve and targeting of expenditure earmarking in european union programmes over the 2000 2013 period the findings reveal different levels of effectiveness of the three conditionalities attributable to the differential scope for trade offs during the regulatory negotiations external pressure and principal self interest the paper discusses an effectiveness threshold for introducing controls the tensions

structural change and energy use the case of the manufacturing sector in taiwan abstract this paper examines the role of sectoral shift and improvements in energy intensity of individual industries in aggregate manufacturing sector energy intensity changes in taiwan during 1971 1985 the divisia index approach is employed to decompose sectoral shift and energy intensity effects a major finding of this analysis is that changes in energy intensities of individual industries were the main influence in changes in aggregate manufacturing sector fuel and electricity intensities during the period sectoral shifts were found to contribute very little to the energy intensity changes

an affinity to commons model of public support for environmental energy policy abstract as atmospheric co 2 continues to rise above 450 ppm policymakers struggle with uncertainty concerning predictors of citizen support for environmental energy policies eeps and preferences for their design topics which have received limited attention in empirical literature we present an original model of policy support based on citizens affinity to commons pathways by which individuals enjoy natural public goods that in turn shape preferences between alternative policy mechanisms we evaluate this model using a survey of southern california electricity customers with results indicating the model s utility in predicting public support of eep stronger community ties are associated with preferences for pull type subsidies whereas stronger connections to natural commons are linked to support for both pull and push type sanctions findings have implications for coalition building as advocates may engender support for green energy policy by framing sanctions as protecting natural commons and framing subsidies either in this same way and or as producing benefits for communities

spatial models of delegation canonical assumptions this approach may be justified on grounds of tractability but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation consequently the justifications for delegation that have received recent scrutiny and testing differ from some of the more plausible justifications offered by informal studies of delegation we show that surprisingly few results in the literature hinge on risk aversion and surprisingly many turn on the ignored though equally canonical technological assumption that uncertainty is fixed relative to policies relaxing the key assumptions about dimensionality and functional forms provides a clearer intuition about delegation one that is closer to classical treatments the theory allows us to relate different institutional features commitment specialization costs monitoring multiple principals to delegation s observable properties lthough the practice of delegation dates back to antiquity the book of exodus refers to itonly in the last century has much scholarship examined its causes and effects and only recently has research focused on developing and testing formal theories that explore the logic of delegation 1 despite this recent surge in formal work on delegation scholars have failed to generalize several important properties of the early pathbreaking models instead of revisiting assumptions that were initially imposed for the sake of convenience recent papers tend to maintain and reinforce the cannonical assumptions applying these limited models to ever richer institutional settings although the breadth of understanding about delegation across various settings is impressive this approach has come at a price it has produced an understanding that only partly captures delegation s informational rationale in even the simplest contexts the literature is rich in predictions about delegation in complicated institutional settings when stylized foundational assumptions are satisfied but poor in explanations for and intuitions about why a poorly informed boss chooses to delegate to subordinates with different preferences moreover we lack an understanding of what basic features drive the boss s choice of which agent is given control of policy for example scholars have provided detailed explanations about how separation of power systems affect delegation by legislatures to agencies but the basic question does the informational rationale for delegation hinge on the boss s risk preferences has been ignored despite the analysis of complicated signaling and screening games between bosses with ex post controls and their subordinates we do not yet understand when or why the ally principle the boss picks the most ideologically similar agent as delegatee fails in simple settings we try to put models of delegation on more solid footing by examining a larger more general set of environments we eschew the canonical assumptions of quadratic utility or even risk aversion unidimensional outcome spaces and additive and homogeneous random shocks to policy our analysis focuses first on two basic questions when does delegation occur and to whom does the boss delegate we then consider richer institutionally driven extensions e g the role of commitment and monitoring devices the impact of multiple bosses and the institution in which their preferences are aggregated through a sequence of nested models with varying levels of abstraction the analysis isolates the relations between various assumptions and different findings

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

science policies as principal agent games institutionalization and path dependency in the relation between government and science national science policies seem to converge in policing the double edged problem of how to get policy and industry interested in the conduct of science and how to get science interested in the problems of policy and industry however similarity in the labels of institutes and instruments for science policy conceals traditional differences in the institutionalization of the relation between the state and science this article conceptualizes the relation between government and science as an ongoing principal agent game with different possibilities for stabilization each of these differ to the extent the principal or the agents can pursue their strategy institutionalization of the endless frontier ideology of consensus making and of competition between agents is elaborated path dependency emerges as costs for institutional changes are often higher than the accommodation of new instruments and policies to existing structures the argument is mainly and deliberately analytical but empirically illustrated by the development of foresight in the uk germany and the netherlands

can politicians police themselves natural experimental evidence from brazil s audit courts to enhance government accountability reformers have advocated strengthening institutions of horizontal accountability particularly auditing institutions that can punish lawbreaking elected offi

the dubious role of institutions in international business a road forward our commentary returns to the conundrum of how institutions matter in international business ib by revisiting the 2018 jibs decade award article by jackson and deeg 2008 on comparing capitalisms we first synthesize their main insights around institutional diversity and track its significant impact within ib and other management fields we then suggest three main takeaways that could move jackson and deeg s agenda further in terms of developing a more nuanced approach to institutions in ib we close with suggestions for future research and urge ib scholars to be more cautious when drawing on different strands of institutions theory

u s politics and greater regulation of inward foreign direct investment an analyst of u s foreign economic policy observes that each wave of antiforeign sentiment associated with the surge of foreign direct investment fdi coming into the united states washes ashore a flotsam of restrictive and exclusionary laws that recedes slightly or becomes buried and forgotten in the sand only to advance again with a new wave during the late 1980s the controversy generated by the sharp rise of japanese acquisitions in the united states washed ashore the latest flotsam of regulatory measures and further advanced the tangle of rules and regulations targeting inward foreign direct investment ifdi of the various types of fdi the present study is concerned mainly with the policy change toward foreign investment in an already established domestic business this type of investment often involves merger or acquisition and is distinct from a greenfield investment where the foreign investor establishes from scratch a new business in the host economy

healthy mixing investigating the associations between neighbourhood housing tenure mix and health outcomes for urban residents this paper examines the association between housing tenure mix and health outcomes for urban residents the analysis used cox s proportional hazard regression modelling with a range of health measures from two waves of the scottish health survey plus linked hospital morbidity records for the survey respondents there was no consistent pattern in health outcomes according to housing tenure mix for specific health issues particular types of neighbourhood had significantly different worse outcomes areas with a sizeable social renting sector for self reported health areas with a sizeable social or private renting sector for accidents and areas dominated by social renting for alcohol related illnesses there are indications that adjustments to the tenure mix of social housing areas might lead to improvements in some health outcomes improved mental health and reduced smoking via a reduction in area deprivation and reduced alcohol related illnesses due to possible effects of tenure mix on material context and culture

the political economy of state medicaid policy we develop and test a market based model to explain variations in states welfare medicine policy decisions the empirical results support the model of state policy outputs indicating that states spending efforts for welfare medicine are most sensitive to the supply of services within their borders we learn in addition that spending effort declines with demand for services indicating that the states spending the highest proportions of total personal income for the program are those who need it most and can afford it least measures of political system development affect spending effort positively and significantly suggesting that ideology diversity of interests and administrative professionalism increase states welfare efforts

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

structural decomposition analysis of physical flows in the economy many environmental problems can be attributedto the extraction and emissions of physicalsubstances increasing our understanding of theeconomic and technological driving forcesbehind these physical flows can contribute tosolving the environmental problems related tothem the input output framework is a usefulsetting in which to integrate detailedinformation about economic structure andphysical flows in this article a specificmethod in input output analysis is reviewed namely structural decomposition analysis sda it is based on comparative static analysis which decomposes historical changes of a policyvariable into determinant effects sda has beenapplied for example to analyze the demand andtechnological driving forces of energy use co2 emissions and various other pollutantsand resources this article examines thetheoretical aspects of structuraldecomposition in particular those concerningphysical flows and environmental issues furthermore the article includes an extensivesurvey of empirical studies

do cio it budgets explain bigger or smaller governments theory and evidence from u s state governments given the recent concern on big governments and rising budget deficits in the united states and european nations there has been a fundamental economic debate on the proper boundary and role of governments in a society inspired by this debate we study the relationship between information technology it and government size drawing on a broad range of the literature from multiple disciplines such as information systems industrial organization and political sciences we present several theoretical mechanisms that explain the impact of it on government expenditures using a variety of data on it spending and state government expenditures we find that greater it investments made by a state chief information officer cio are associated with lower state government spending it is estimated that on average a 1 increase in state cio budgets is associated with a reduction of as much as 3 49 in state overall expenditures this study contributes to the literature by identifying a key technological factor that affects government spending and showing that it investments can be a means to restrain government growth