the price of pollution a dual approach to valuing so2 allowances under the 1990 clean air act amendments a market based scheme to reduce u s sulfur dioxide emissions takes effect in 1995 indications are that participation in the market will be light and allowance prices will be lower than was once expected using an output distance function approach for wisconsin coal burning utility plants we estimate the shadow price of so2abatement which should approximate the allowance price the estimated average shadow price is above the prices at which the few observed allowance trades have occurred wisconsin s stringent state so2legislation may explain a portion of this divergence

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

attitudes toward risk and compliance in emission permit markets we investigate the effects of uncertainty and concomitant risk aversion as they impact the incentive structure and subsequent operation of an emissions permit market modeled after the u s s02 market our theoretical results suggest that uncertainty dulls incentives to achieve cost savings through permit trading and inhibits efficient allocation of abatement efforts by firms we test hypotheses in an experimental laboratory setting and find that the irreversibility of investment in abatement technology may present countervailing incentives for potential sellers of permits resulting in a wait and see attitude toward adoption of efficient levels of abatement technology

market efficiency and the u s market for sulfur dioxide allowances focusing on the u s sulfur dioxide so2 allowance market from its inception in 1994 to 2009 we model allowance prices to determine the influence of market fundamentals on allowance price level and volatility we find evidence that the so2 market operates in ways that are not inconsistent with an efficient market prices that reflect marginal abatement costs after the first few years of the program but before a court decision that introduced significant uncertainty into the market in mid 2008 our empirical analysis finds that the so2 market similar to other emission markets studied in the literature can remain relatively inefficient for several years after launch we also find that market volatility increases in response to all types of communications from the administrator suggesting that the development of a formal communication strategy possibly similar to that used by central banks would reduce price volatility and increase the efficiency of the market

ethical influences on the evolution of the us tradable permit approach to air pollution control abstract in 1975 a novel approach to air pollution control was implemented in the usa from this rather humble beginning this approach has now been expanded rather dramatically in several different directions this paper describes this evolution shows how the design of the system has been adapted to accommodate ethical concerns and describes how the latest versions of this approach have transformed the regulatory process which spawned the approach in the first place

an interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading ide iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments established the first large scale long term environmental program to rely on tradable emissions permitscalled allowances in this program to control pollution this program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulfur dioxide so2 emissions from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level beginning in 1995 it is of interest both as a response to an important environmental issue and as a landmark experiment in environmental policy this experiment comes at a particularly important time since emission trading is under serious consideration with strong u s backing for use to deal with global climate change by curbing emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of magnitude intergovernmental panel on climate change 1996 this article summarizes the results to date of our ongoing empirical analysis of compliance costs and allowance market performance under the u s acid rain program

sellers hedging incentives at epa s emission trading auction cason 1993 argued thattheauction theepaused in order to start the market for sulfur allowances is not efficient the set up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance in this paper we show that the sellers incentives are even more perverse than cason suggested in particular we show that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid it is not possible to derive the nash equilibrium for this set up if such an equilibrium exists sellers either set only a positive ask price or an ask price equal to zero and a positive bid as well

the us so2 auction analysis and generalization abstract the new acid rain program allows electric utilities all over the us to trade so 2 emission permits an annual discriminative and revenue neutral auction is linked to this program this innovative so 2 auction distributes 3 of the permits in circulation and takes place at the chicago board of trade early results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price still in the important starting phase a non discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since potentially severe downward biases in both seller price offers and buyer bids are due to the discriminative feature of the epa auction

transaction costs in pollution markets an empirical study this paper studies a market in pol lution permits launched in los angeles in 1994 this tradable permit market has been projected to lead to substantial cost savings due to the flex ibility it provides firms in terms of compliance with environmental regulation this paper shows that transaction costs can play an important role in the initial years of the program the transac tion cost variables have been defined to include search costs and information costs these costs are significant in explaining non participation of some firms in the market the study also draws policy implications for the development of future emissions trading programs jel q28 q25

an analysis of chinese provincial carbon dioxide emission efficiencies based on energy consumption structure abstract china plans to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from 2005 levels by 40 45 by 2020 and by 60 65 by 2030 this research project addresses this challenge by analyzing chinese provincial carbon dioxide emission efficiencies and the energy consumption structure the study applies the slacks based measure sbm model to analyze the data from 30 regions in china from 2000 to 2011 the situation of provincial carbon dioxide emission efficiency the characteristics of the energy consumption structure in each province and the differences among these provinces are quantitatively analyzed based on the k means cluster analysis this research suggests that china be divided into five groups in the energy consumption structure the inefficient and less reasonable group the inefficient and more reasonable group the efficient and less reasonable group the efficient and more reasonable group and the efficient and most reasonable group the study offers recommendations for the government to develop policies to effectively and efficiently reduce carbon dioxide emission levels for each group it also has profound implications for government administration in developing countries to guide the energy consumption and to control environmental pollution for the healthy development of the economy

creating markets for air pollution control in europe and the usa this paper surveys recent efforts to relax the rigid regulatory frameworks for air pollution control in europe and the usa european policies have mainly taken the form of bubbles and compensation or offset schemes emission trading has been limited to intra firm solutions for various reasons industry structure absence of real scarcity and too restrictive trading rules bubbles have been granted to homogenous sectors only and can be characterized as direct regulation for a group rather than tradable permit systems by contrast the sulphur allowance program in the usa has laid down the foundation for a pollution permit market with few formal restrictions problems that arise are mainly related to local environmental and public utility controls europe can learn from the usa that regular national permit markets could be installed preferably for homogenous sectors in designing the permit system the differences between the usa and europe in terms of ecosystem sensitivity stringency of regulation and differentiation of regional environmental policy have to be taken into account

economic assessment of the regional clean air incentives market a new emissions trading program for los angeles this article documents the methodology used to compare policy alternatives considered for reclaim an emissions trading program for los angeles which commenced january 1994 reclaim reduces no x and so x emissions from stationary sources with declining emissions credit allocations the emissions trading model etm includes credit supply and demand spatial restrictions and opportunity costs of owning credits the etm solves interactively with a regional model that estimates economic impacts predicted emissions distributions are input into airshed and exposure models the models predict similar improvements in air quality and public health as command and control regulations but with lower costs and employment impacts

sulfur allowance trading and the regional clean air incentives market a comparative design analysis of two major cap and trade permit programs this paper investigates in detail the design parameters of the two mostprominent us cap and trade permit program the us epa sulfur allowancetrading program and the south californian regional clean air incentivesmarket reclaim in contrast to expectations the two programs turn out to be rather different in several important design parameter choices common elements emerge primarily in the existence of an ambitious quantifiedenvironmental target mandatory use of stringent emission monitoring methodsand stiff penalties for non compliance coexisting command and controlregulations the creation of a competitive permit market structure andsome distributional concessions in the initial permit allocation generalizing from these common features we find that provisions to assurepolitical acceptance functional interdependencies and overlapping regulation are the most important influences on the design of applied cap and trade permit programs

seller incentive properties of epa s emission trading auction abstract the new clean air act amendments instruct the environmental protection agency epa to conduct annual sealed bid offer auctions of emission allowances the auction pricing rules are discriminative and sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper assesses the seller incentives of this auction and demonstrates that the auction rules cause sellers to choose asking prices that under reveal their cost of emission control furthermore increasing the number of sellers intensifies this misrepresentation if the number of buyers remains fixed the epa s rules can therefore generate significantly biased price signals and reduce the efficiency of the allowance trading market

consignment auctions of free emissions allowances abstract while the initial distribution of emissions allowances is usually thought to be independent of the emissions outcome free allocation can affect the efficiency and fairness of allowance trading inefficiency may result from thin allowance markets poor price discovery and regulatory or organizational complexities that hinder the recognition of opportunity costs concerns about fairness may result from intransparency in the process of transferring substantial allowance value we explore the role of consignment auctions in mitigating these concerns these revenue neutral auctions return the financial value of allowances to their original holders while revealing prices and directing allowances to their highest valued use they also can be used to support a minimum price when allowances are freely distributed which may facilitate program linkage consignment auctions have minimal administrative costs and do not necessarily involve government experience indicates that they can play an important role especially in new markets

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

voluntary compliance with market based environmental policy evidence from the u s acid rain program the u s acid rain program implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities sulfur dioxide so2 emissions and included voluntary compliance possibilities for nonaffected sources i observe significant voluntary participation albeit with small impact on the so2 market mostly from sources with counterfactual emissions below their allowance allocations an ex post analysis suggests that costs from the resulting higher emissions outweigh savings from shifts in emissions reductions from high cost affected sources to low cost nonaffected sources further utilities voluntary participation is well explained by economic variables which provides new evidence of cost effective compliance strategies and low transaction costs

trade of permits for greenhouse gas emissions bilateral trade need not be the answer the kyoto protocol sets national quotas on ghg emissions and allows international trade of these quotas taking terms of trade effects into account we argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric identity dependent externalities and show that bilateral trade of permits may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions we derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits the conditions are strong in this sense we argue that for emissions permits market design matters

taxes versus tradable discharge permits a review in the light of the u s and european experience the u s and west european environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution the u s has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes the countries of the european community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits a review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control a bargaining solution abstract one of the primary justifications for using transferable permits for pollution control is that they achieve a given level of emission reduction at the lowest cost although the initial allocation of pollution permits may have no impact in terms of efficiency it does have a significant impact on equity in this paper we examine a variety of permit allocation rules for a small catchment in south west england an asymmetric nash bargaining framework is employed to characterise agents co operative behaviour and to explain their likely preferences over permit allocation rules the results indicate that the preferred allocation scheme depends upon the relative bargaining power of the agents furthermore some potential links between ex ante and ex post equity criteria were also discussed

pricing the permission of pollution optimal control based simulation of payments for the initial emission allowance in china china has modified its pollution control policy system with such price tools as the pollution charge pc policy and the payment for initial emission allowance piea policy the aim of pc policy is to compensate for the environment damage caused by pollutants while piea is in charge of the initial emission allowance iea within the emission trading system ets however since the implementation of piea it has been criticized as redundant because of the similar pricing scheme with the pc in addition the existing piea pricing approaches have ignored interactions with other policies such as pc and total emission control tec policies in this research we established an optimal control based model with chemical oxygen demand cod and ammoniacal nitrogen nh3 n two independent pollutants variables to simulate the water pollutants piea price simulation results indicated that emission quantity and optimal social benefit in the pc piea combination scenario was equal to the situation in the piea scenario under this design pc compensated for the emission damage and piea paid for the scarcity rent while piea does not duplicate the pc policy in addition the piea policy has a complex effect on pollutant emission because piea policy increases the enterprises discharging cost most regions cod emissions are less than the baseline excepting beijing shanghai jiangsu zhejiang fujian shandong and guangdong in which emission quantities are greater than the baseline the nh3 n emission shows an opposite trend the simulation result is that excluding inner mongolia hubei hunan tibet gansu qinghai ningxia and xinjiang the nh3 n emissions in the rest of regions are increased tec policy has a significant effect on pollutant emissions and the piea price the cod emission quantity with tec is lower than that without the tec policy therefore the tec policy will be effective for pollutant emission control the pollutant beyond the restricted target will be charged a payment for iea at a higher price than without the tec policy

a case for maximum wage in this paper we demonstrate that supplementing the optimal non linear income tax system with a binding maximum wage rule attains a pareto improvement by serving to mitigate the mimicking incentives of the high skill individuals without entailing distortions

a simple analysis of the us emission permits auctions we examine a stylized version of epa auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers there are inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where all exchange occurs at a uniform price we also provide examples under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold c 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved jel classification d44 q29

anti discrimination rules versus income taxation in the pursuit of horizontal equity abstract we consider a model of prejudice driven discrimination where the advantaged tall discriminate against the disadvantaged short we employ an egalitarian social welfare function to compare anti discrimination legal rules with a non discriminatory height blind income tax

horizontal equity income taxation and self selection with an application to income tax credits abstract this paper investigates the relationship between utilitarianism and horizontal equity in models of income taxation in particular and self selection in general an example involving well behaved individual preferences is constructed in which a maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function leads via income taxation to horizontal inequities sufficient conditions for utilitarianism to bring horizontal equity are derived the results are applied to the question of whether income tax credits are an appropriate way to treat differences in family size

efficiency evaluation with strong ordinal input and output measures abstract data envelopment analysis dea evaluates the relative efficiency of decision making units dmus with multiple inputs and outputs when inputs and outputs are only known as bounded data or in ordinal relations the standard dea model becomes a non linear and non convex program such a non linear dea model can still be solved by standard dea models via converting bounded and ordinal inputs outputs into exact data the current paper shows that caution should be paid when strong ordinal inputs and outputs are present models are developed to identify the benchmark in selecting a positive scalar used in converting weak ordinal relations into strong ones it is shown that extreme efficient dmus remain efficient when weak ordinal input output relations are replaced by strong ones the paper is illustrated with an application to a korea telecommunication company

an experimental investigation of the seller incentives in the epas emission trading auction the clean air act requires the epa to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances under the discriminative auction rules sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the epa auction consistent with theoretical predictions buyers bid above their valuation auction outcomes are inefficient and increasing the number of buyers increases bids buyers facing human opponents compete more aggressively than the risk neutral prediction but bids do not differ systematically from this prediction when buyers face computerized nash robots copyright 1995 by american economic association

heterogeneity irreversible production choices and efficiency in emission permit markets abstract this paper investigates a class of market mechanisms for environmental regulation based on the clean air act tradable discharge permit program laboratory market experiments capture some of the more salient institutional features and focus on issues of firm technological heterogeneity and irreversible investment regarding the operation of the permit market experimental results suggest that higher degrees of abatement cost heterogeneity may lead to reduced trade volume while the implications of increased cost heterogeneity regarding price volatility are mixed finally increased cost heterogeneity appears to result in decreased laboratory efficiency

economic instruments for environmental regulation our knowledge about economic incentive approaches to pollution control has grown rapidly in the two decades in which they have received serious analytical attention not only have the theoretical models become more focused and the empirical work more detailed but we have now had over a decade of experience with emissions trading in the u s and emission charges in europe as the world community becomes increasingly conscious of both the need to tighten environmental controls and the local economic perils associated with tighter controls in a highly competitive global marketplace it seems a propitious time to stand back and to organize what we have learned about this practical and promising approach to pollution control that may be especially relevant to current circumstances this paper draws upon economic theory empirical studies and actual experience with implementation to provide a brief overview of some of the major lessons we have learned about two economic incentive approaches emissions tradi copyright 1990 by oxford university press

the impact of economics on environmental policy abstract environmental economists have seen their ideas translated into the rough and tumble policy world for over two decades they have witnessed the application of economic instruments to several environmental issues including preserving wetlands lowering lead levels and curbing acid rain this essay examines the impact of the rise of economics in the policy world on the making of environmental policy i focus on two related but distinct phenomena the increasing interest in the use of incentive based mechanisms such as tradable permits to achieve environmental goals and the increasing interest in the use of analytical tools such as benefit cost analysis in regulatory decision making i argue that economists and economic instruments have had a modest impact on shaping environmental health and safety regulation but that economists will play an increasingly important role in the future although the role of economics is becoming more prominent it does not follow that environmental policy will become more efficient this apparent inconsistency can be explained by the political economy of environmental policy

designing more efficient markets lessons from los angeles smog control market based approaches for environmental protection are beginning to take root around the world this article attempts to improve our understanding of the performance of environmental markets by constructing and evaluating an information base on trades in los angeles which includes the first detailed data on trading prices the analysis suggests that trading activity has been shaped by the detailed regulations governing the market in addition transaction costs have played a crucial role we argue that the move toward adopting market based approaches for environmental protection needs to be accompanied by a vigorous effort to assess the properties of these systems as they are actually implemented

combinatorial auction design combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors dealing with these forces trade offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency revenue maximization low transaction costs fairness failure freeness and scalability computational complexity can be dealt with algorithmically by relegating the computational burden to bidders by maintaining fairness in the face of computational limitations by limiting biddable combinations and by limiting the use of combinatorial bids combinatorial auction designs include single round first price sealed bidding vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanisms uniform and market clearing price auctions and iterative combinatorial auctions combinatorial auction designs must deal with exposure problems threshold problems ways to keep the bidding moving at a reasonable pace avoiding and resolving ties and controlling complexity

tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact in the european monetary union tradable deficit permits efficient implementation of the stability pact borrowing from the experience of environmental markets this paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the european monetary union having chosen an aggregate target for the union and an initial distribution of permits emu countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit creation the scheme exploits countries incentives to minimize their costs is transparent and flexible in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks and allows for adjustments in case of europe wide recessions in addition it need not treat all countries identically and can be designed to penalize countries with higher debt to gdp ratios finally the scheme rewards countries for reducing their deficit below the initial allowance lending credibility to the stability pact s goal of a balanced budget in the medium run alessandra casella

an application of idea to wheat farming efficiency data envelopment analysis dea is a nonparametric approach to evaluating the relative efficiency of decision making units dmus that use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs an assumption underlying dea is that all the data assume the form of specific numerical values in some applications however the data may be imprecise that is all the input and output data cannot be exactly obtained due to the existence of uncertainty they are only known to lie within specified intervals a dea model with imprecise data or more compactly an imprecise dea idea model proposed in this article to evaluate efficiency for each dmu the article is illustrated with an application to iranian wheat producer provinces

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic