dynamic oligopoly with incomplete information we consider learning and signalling in a dynamic cournot oligopoly where firms have private information about their production costs and only observe the market price which is subject to unobservable demand shocks an equilibrium is markov if play depends on the history only through the firms beliefs about costs and calendar time we characterize symmetric linear markov equilibria as solutions to a boundary value problem in every such equilibrium given a long enough horizon play converges to the static complete information outcome for the realized costs but each firm only learns its competitors average cost the weights assigned to costs and beliefs under the equilibrium strategies are non monotone over time we explain this by decomposing incentives into signalling and learning and discuss implications for prices quantities and welfare

equilibrium analysis of dynamic models of imperfect competition motivated by recent developments in applied dynamic analysis this paper presents new sufficient conditions for the existence of a markov perfect equilibrium in dynamic stochastic games the main results imply the existence of a markov perfect equilibrium provided the sets of actions are compact the set of states is countable the period payoff functions are upper semi continuous in action profiles and lower semi continuous in actions taken by rival firms and the transition function depends continuously on actions moreover if for each firm a static best reply set is convex the equilibrium can be taken in pure strategies we present and discuss sufficient conditions for the convexity of the best replies in particular we introduce new sufficient conditions that ensure the dynamic programming problem each firm faces has a convex solution set and deduce the existence of a markov perfect equilibrium for this class of games our results expand and unify the available modeling alternatives and apply to several models of interest in industrial organization including models of industry dynamics

on the role of demand and strategic uncertainty in capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics abstract even mature industries seldom settle down into a long run steady state fluctuations in demand disrupt the status quo and call for firms to adjust their capacities on an ongoing basis we construct a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment disinvestment decisions in addition to uncertainty about the evolution of demand a firm faces strategic uncertainty concerning the decisions of its rivals we numerically solve the model for its markov perfect equilibria for one set of parameter values three equilibria exist and while all of them have simple intuitive structures they exhibit widely varying patterns of response to demand shocks at one extreme one firm dominates the industry almost as a monopolist and changes its capacity to accommodate demand at the other extreme the larger firm keeps its capacity nearly constant while the smaller firm acts as the swing producer

economic efficiency effects of alternative policies for reducing waste disposal abstract reducing the amount of municipal solid waste that is disposed of has become an important policy goal previous research argued that a virgin material tax offered an efficient method of meeting this goal and it continues to be considered as a policy option today this paper demonstrates however that a virgin material tax is not an efficient method of reducing waste but that an alternative policy a combined disposal tax and reuse subsidy is the combined disposal tax and reuse subsidy is theoretically consistent with unit based household charges for waste disposal but may have advantages in some situations

uncertain regulatory timing and market dynamics abstract using a dynamic model of capacity accumulation i examine the relationship between uncertainty about the timing of a new pigouvian tax and oligopolistic competition i find that for some market structures uncertainty about the timing of the regulatory change leads firms to increase investment these results stem from the nature of the uncertainty and its interaction with firms strategic incentive to engage in capacity races they dramatize the importance of accounting for initial conditions when forecasting firms reactions to anticipated regulatory changes in addition i find that more protracted uncertainty leads to greater welfare costs

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

piracy on the internet accommodate it or fight it a dynamic approach abstract this paper uses a dynamic stochastic model to solve for the optimal pricing policy of music recordings in the presence of p2p file sharing networks eroding their sales we employ a policy iteration algorithm on a discretized state space to numerically compute the optimal pricing policy the realistically calibrated model reflects the real world figures we observe and provides estimates of the optimal pricing policy as well as comparative statics figures the pricing policy is such that for a given p2p network size prices are increasing in the number of buyers of the product and for a given number of buyers of the product prices are non monotonic in the p2p network size surprisingly in the presence of p2p networks increases in production costs and decreases in the valuation of the product increase the consumer and total surplus a higher valuation of the product leads to a lower steady state price increased switching costs have a negative effect on prices and profits so the long term incentive to attract new consumers dominates the short term incentive to harvest loyal consumers the full enforcement of intellectual property rights has adverse effect on both consumer surplus and total welfare

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

the economics of predation what drives pricing when there is learning by doing predatory pricing a deliberate strategy of pricing aggressively in order to eliminate competitors is one of the more contentious areas of antitrust policy and its existence and efficacy are widely debated the purpose of this paper is to formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure our framework encompasses important phenomena such as learning by doing network effects switching costs dynamic demand and certain types of adjustment costs due to its prominent role in legal cases involving alleged predation we examine learning by doing in more detail we first show that predation like behavior arises routinely in our learning by doing model equilibria involving predation like behavior typically coexist with equilibria involving much less aggressive pricing to disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we next decompose the equilibrium pricing condition and develop alternative characterizations of a firm s predatory pricing incentives we finally measure the impact of these incentives on industry structure conduct and performance we show that forcing a firm to ignore the predatory incentives in setting its price can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation like behavior along with the predation like behavior however a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated

on markov equilibria in dynamic inventory competition we provide a review of the types of equilibria typically found in operations management inventory papers and a discussion on when the commonly used stationary infinite horizon open loop equilibrium may be sufficient for study we focus particularly on order up to and basestock equilibria in the context of inventory duopolies we give conditions under which the stationary infinite horizon equilibrium is also a markov perfect closed loop equilibrium these conditions are then applied to three specific duopolies the first application is one with stockout based substitution where the firms face independent direct demand but some fraction of a firm s lost sales will switch to the other firm the second application is one where shelf space display stimulates primary demand and reduces demand for the other firm s product the final application is one where the state variables represent goodwill rather than inventory these specific problems have been previously studied in both the single period and or stationary infinite horizon open loop settings but not in markov perfect closed loop settings under the markov perfect setting a variety of interesting dynamics may occur including that there may be a so called commitment value to inventory

dynamic legislative policy making abstract we prove existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in an infinite horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next we allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks we prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere we establish upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence and we provide weak conditions under which each equilibrium of our model determines an aperiodic transition probability over policies we establish a convergence theorem giving conditions under which the invariant distributions generated by stationary equilibria must be close to the core in a canonical spatial model finally we extend the analysis to sequential move stochastic games and to a version of the model in which the proposer and voting rule are determined by play of a finite perfect information game

materials product chains theory and an application to zinc and pvc gutters a framework is presented for the analysis of economic and environmental impacts of policies applied to materials product mp chains this is based on materials flows product flows costs prices and optimal management of an mp chain the main differences compared with other studies focusing on materials flows is that here the link between products or services and materials is explicitly dealt with the framework is developed on the basis of materials balance conditions production functions allowing for substitution and recycling of both materials and products after presenting theoretical mp chain models and analytical results an application to the problem of choosing between zinc and pvc gutters is discussed here optimal mp chain management decisions are presented for various policy and strategy scenarios

economic materials product chain models current status further development and an illustrative example abstract economic materials product m p chain models concentrate on modelling systems of competing final products rendering the same economic service an example of such a product would be window frames made out of different materials such as aluminium wood or plastic existing economic m p chain models make highly simplifying assumptions foreign trade for example is not taken into consideration and final products are seen as perfect substitutes for each other therefore existing approaches do not provide an adequate basis for an integrated economic ecological analysis of complex product systems it is the objective of this paper to discuss the current status of m p chain modelling and to show possibilities for further development it will be argued that the takayama judge price equilibrium activity model presents a good basis for m p chain modelling this quadratic programming qp approach permits the development of dynamic multi stages multi products models a transformation of the qp approach into linear complementarity programming lcp format leads to a flexible and high capacity tool for product system analysis the capability of the proposed approach is shown by an illustrative example the adapted real world m p chain of window frame production in germany

dynamic complexity in duopoly games abstract we discuss the occurrence of periodic and chaotic phenomena in infinite horizon duopoly games where firms maximize their discounted sum of profits and use markov perfect equilibrium strategies in the alternating case their corresponding actions are then constrained orbits of a map similar to a cournot t tonnement we show that any behavior is possible for small discount factors and that one obtains the cournot t tonnement as the discount factor goes to zero in the simultaneous case we show by mean of an example that many cournot t tonnements can be viewed as markov perfect equilibria of an infinite horizon game and that one obtains the nash equilibrium of the static game as the discount parameter goes to zero we are thus led to study in detail the dynamical properties of a cournot t tonnement

strategic investment and conjectural variations abstract this paper analyzes investment decisions under the alternative assumptions of competitive collusive open loop non cooperative and feedback non cooperative behavior steady state capital stocks prices and outputs are obtained and compared the paper shows that one of the linear feedback equilibrium decision rule coefficients is a dynamic version of a contemporaneous conjectural variation the same decision rule coefficients are shown to imply a particular value for the contemporaneous conjecture the implied conjecture embodies subgame perfection and approaches the competitive value as the number of firms in the industry increases

price controls and market structure evidence from gasoline retail markets in this paper we study the effect of price floor regulations on the organization and performance of markets the standard interpretation of the effects of these policies is concerned with short run market distortions associated with excess supply since price controls prevent markets from clearing they lead to higher prices while this analysis may be correct in the short run it does not consider the dynamic equilibrium consequences of price controls we demonstrate that price floor regulations can have important long run effects on the the structure of markets by crowding them and creating endogenous barriers to entry for low cost retailers moreover we show that these factors can indirectly lower productivity and possibly even prices we test this in the context of an actual regulation imposed in the retail gasoline market in the canadian province of quebec and show that the policy led to more competition between smaller less efficient stations this resulted in lowered sales and despite the reduction in efficiency did not increase prices

computable markov perfect industry dynamics we provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment entry andexit toensurethatthereexistsacomputationallytractablemarkov perfectequilibrium we introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model our game of incomplete information always has an equilibrium in cutoff entry exit strategies in contrast the existence of an equilibrium in the ericson and pakes model of industry dynamics requires admissibility of mixed entry exit strategies contrary to the assertion in their article that existing algorithms cannot cope with in addition we provide a condition on the model s primitives that ensures that the equilibrium is in pure investment strategies building on this basic existence result we first show that a symmetric equilibrium exists under appropriate assumptions on the model s primitives second we show that as the distribution of the random scrap values setup costs becomes degenerate equilibria in cutoff entry exit strategies converge to equilibria in mixed entry exit strategies of the game of complete information

investor heterogeneity market segmentation leverage and the equity premium puzzle abstract financial economists for the past two decades have attempted to explain why the equity premium is so high now known as the equity premium puzzle epp we model investor heterogeneity market segmentation and optimal leverage using the time separable standard power utility market completeness and ignoring transaction costs to explain the epp we explain both the epp and the related risk free rate puzzle without resorting to preference modification furthermore we show a unique interior equilibrium for the debt ratio contrary to the work by f modigliani m h miller the cost of capital corporation finance and the theory of investment american economic review 48 1958 261 297 corporate income taxes and the cost of capital american economic review 53 1963 433 443 and s c myers presidential address the capital structure puzzle journal of finance 39 1984 575 592 our simulations show the relevance of our models

endogeneity and simultaneity in competitive pricing and advertising a logit demand analysis in this article we use four data sets to provide a benchmark study of the effects of accounting for endogeneity and simultaneity in estimating marketing mix effects in a logit demand framework we compare the results obtained from accounting for endogeneity only to those from accounting for both endogeneity and simultaneity and in the latter case we allow for more general models of firm behavior to examine the consequences of imposing assumptions about the behavior of firms we find that accounting for both endogeneity and simultaneity not only affects the parameter estimates but also results in efficiency gains that affect the statistical significance of the estimates

garbage recycling and illicit burning or dumping abstract with garbage and recycling as the only two disposal options we confirm prior results that the optimal curbside fee for garbage collection equals the direct resource cost plus external environment cost when illicit burning or dumping is a third disposal option that cannot be taxed directly the optimal curbside tax on garbage changes sign the optimal fee structure is a deposit refund system a tax on all output plus a rebate on proper disposal through either recycling or garbage collection the output tax helps achieve the first best allocation even though it affects the choice between consumption and untaxed leisure

sequential moves and tacit collusion reaction function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly abstract this paper analyzes a finite horizon sequential move pricing duopoly restricting attention to markov strategies the solution yields stationary patterns independent of initial conditions where the reaction functions follow cycles of three periods the market price never settles down and is at all times strictly above marginal cost long run average industry profits are approximately 5 6 of the monopoly level these results demonstrate that neither a long horizon nor non markovian strategies are required for persistent profits in dynamic price competition games journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 l13

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

patents imitation and licensing in an asymmetric dynamic r d race abstract rd some may have an advantage in early stages of the r d process while others may have advantages in other stages of the process this paper uses a two firm asymmetric ability multistage r d race model to analyze the effect of patents imitations and licensing arrangements on the speed of innovation firm value and consumers surplus by using numerical analyses to study the mpe of the r d race the paper demonstrates the circumstances under which a weak patent protection regime that facilitates free imitation of any intermediate technology may yield a higher consumers surplus and total surplus than a regime that awards a patent for the final innovation the advantage of imitation may hold even when we allow for voluntary licensing of intermediate technologies

continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions abstract we consider a discounted stochastic game of common property capital accumulation with nonsymmetric players bounded one period extraction capacities and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition we show that the infinite horizon problem has a markov stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that every finite horizon truncation has a unique markovian equilibrium both in consumption functions which are continuous and nondecreasing and have all slopes bounded above by 1 unlike previous results in strategic dynamic models these properties are reminiscent of the corresponding optimal growth model journal of economic literature classification codes c73 o41 q20

a framework for dynamic oligopoly in concentrated industries in this article we introduce a new computationally tractable framework for ericson and pakes style dynamic oligopoly models that overcomes the computational complexity involved in computing markov perfect equilibrium mpe first we define a new equilibrium concept that we call moment based markov equilibrium mme in which firms keep track of their own state the detailed state of dominant firms and few moments of the distribution of fringe firms states second we provide guidelines to use mme in applied work and illustrate with an application how it can endogenize the market structure in a dynamic industry model even with hundreds of firms third we develop a series of results that provide support for using mme as an approximation we present numerical experiments showing that mme approximates mpe for important classes of models then we introduce novel unilateral deviation error bounds that can be used to test the accuracy of mme as an approximation in large scale settings overall our new framework opens the door to study new issues in industry dynamics

demand fluctuations in the ready mix concrete industry i investigate the role of demand shocks in the ready mix concrete industry using census data on more than 15 000 plants i estimate a model of investment and entry in oligopolistic markets these estimates are used to simulate the effect of eliminating short term local demand changes a policy of smoothing the volatility of demand has a market expansion effect the model predicts a 39 increase in the number of plants in the industry since bigger markets have both more plants and larger plants a demand smoothing fiscal policy would increase the share of large plants by 20 finally the policy of smoothing demand reduces entry and exit by 25 but has no effect on the rate at which firms change their size

habit persistence and the nominal term premium puzzle a partial resolution i introduction the consumption based capital asset pricing model ccapm has become the dominant paradigm in asset pricing theory because of its intuitive characterization of asset risk that is unlike expectations based asset pricing theories e g the present value model of stock prices which inherently assume risk neutrality the ccapm is predicated upon risk averse agents attempting to achieve a smooth consumption profile through the trading of assets from this perspective the risk of an asset is captured by the covariance of the asset s return with agents marginal utility of consumption or more broadly agents intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of wealth with this characterization the ccapm extends the results of the standard capm i e the risk of an asset is reflected in the covariance of the asset s return with the market portfolio to a general equilibrium setting however this intuitively appealing theory has not found much empirical support perhaps the most famous demonstration of inconsistency between the theory and data was rajnish mehra and edward prescott s 1985 analysis of the equity premium i e the difference between the average return on equity and that on government bonds using calibration methods rather than a formal statistical approach they showed that a standard ccapm severely underpredicts the size of the risk premium on equity the important implication of this finding is that the basic ccapm incorrectly models the covariance structure between the return on equity and asset holders intertemporal marginal rate of substitution economists response to this empirical rejection has been to either identify new sources of risk e g that implied by a particular monetary environment as in labadie 1989 or define alternative preferences toward risk e g the use of non expected utility theory as presented in weil 1989 and epstein and zin 1989 the potential for this research was illustrated recently by george constantinides s 1990 resolution of the equity premium puzzle in a model that included habit formation in consumption by relaxing the standard ccapm s assumption of time separable preferences constantinides demonstrated that a relatively smooth consumption profile and large risk premium on equity are consistent with equilibrium in a complete markets rational expectations framework 1 i use this insight to study another risk premium puzzle specifically the behavior of the nominal term premium the existence of a nominal term premium puzzle was demonstrated in papers by backus gregory and zin 1989 and salyer 1990 in which the term structure implications within a lucas 1982 type cash in advance cia economy were studied while some equilibrium characteristics of this model were consistent with the data both papers demonstrated that the model predicts the wrong sign of the term premium the theory implies the term premium should be negative while based on quarterly data for yields of three and six month u s treasury bills over the period 1959 1 1989 4 the observed term premium is positive similar to the equity premium puzzle as posed by mehra and prescott 1985 the prediction of a negative average term premium signals a critical discrepancy between the risk associated with nominal bonds as perceived by market participants and as captured by the models moreover this term premium puzzle is in some sense a stronger rejection of the underlying asset pricing model than that embodied by the equity premium puzzle to see this recall that within the consumption based asset pricing model the sign of the risk premium on any asset depends on the sign of the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and that asset s return applying this reasoning to the case of the equity premium suggests that while the discrepancy in size between the observed equity premium and that generated within the model is troubling the model s prediction of a positive equity premium implies that the basic payout structure of equity within the model is consistent with that in the data e

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

learning by doing organizational forgetting and industry dynamics learning by doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings this paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of flrms pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting we show that forgetting does not simply negate learning rather learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces in particular a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior market dominance and multiple equilibria whereas a model with learning alone cannot

a theory of dynamic oligopoly iii cournot competition abstract we study the markov perfect equilibrium mpe of an alternating move infinite horizon duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity we exhibit a pair of difference differential equations that when they exist differentiable mpe strategies satisfy for quadratic payoff functions we solve these equations in closed form and demonstrate that the mpe corresponding to the solution is the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium as the horizon tends to infinity we conclude with a discussion of adjustment costs and endogenization of the timing

the effects of banning advertising in junk food markets we develop a structural model to analyze the eects of banning advertising on market equilibria and welfare in junk food markets we consider the impact on demand and prices and show how to quantify welfare eects when advertising might lead consumers to take decisions that are inconsistent with their underlying preferences we use transaction level data on the potato chips market and nd that banning advertising leads to a direct reduction in demand but also toughens price competition leading to lower prices and increased demand welfare increases as consumers benet from no longer making distorted

persistency in sticky price models abstract nominal rigidities imply that nominal shocks have an impact effect which may be propagated by standard mechanisms however the nominal adjustment process may in itself be a propagation mechanism causing persistent effects of nominal shocks this may be caused by inertia in nominal wage and price adjustment arising due to input output networks or multiperiod nominal contracting as captured in models with staggered price wage decisions it has recently been contested whether staggering can account for persistency of any quantitative importance this paper reviews the theory and empirical evidence on this issue and it is concluded that staggering may be a quantitative important propagation mechanism

crash states and the equity premium solving one puzzle raises another abstract this paper examines the behavior of asset returns as predicted by the consumption based capital asset pricing model within an artificial economy that includes a low probability crash state in consumption and dividends it is demonstrated that the behavior of agents intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in such an economy is consistent with the hansen and jagannathan 1991 frontier even though the consumption process in the model is calibrated to actual data preferences are time separable and agents relative risk aversion is restricted to moderate levels moreover as demonstrated by rietz 1988 the crash state economy can replicate the mean of excess returns on equity i e the equity premium however the model severely underpredicts the volatility of excess returns

a dynamic analysis of the market for wide bodied commercial aircraft this paper uses an empirical dynamic oligopoly model of the commercial aircraft industry to analyse industry pricing industry performance and optimal industry policy a novel feature of the model with respect to the previous literature is that entry exit prices and quantities are endogenously determined in markov perfect equilibrium mpe we find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data such as high concentration and persistent pricing below static marginal cost are explained by this model we also find that the unconstrained mpe is quite efficient from a social perspective providing only 10 less welfare on average than a social planner would obtain finally we provide simulation evidence that an anti trust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing

r d induced industry polarization and shake outs abstract we consider the standard two stage game of r d and cournot competition with ex ante identical firms but depart from the literature in assuming that r d is characterized by mildly instead of strongly decreasing returns to scale we establish that only extreme r d levels are possible at equilibrium and that for a broad range of parameters equilibria are asymmetric in r d levels possibly leading one firm to endogenously exit this provides a simple link between returns to scale in r d and industry polarization including shake outs a novelty is that exit may be triggered by positive opportunities in a strategic setting given the original nature of our r d equilibrium a complete welfare analysis is conducted including a possible role for r d subsidies

estimating a war of attrition the case of the us movie theater industry this paper estimates the impact of competition and exogenous demand decline on the exit process of movie theaters in the us from 1950 1965 i modify fudenberg and tirole 1986 s model of exit in a duopoly with incomplete information to an oligopoly i estimate this model with panel data using variations in tv diusion across house holds and other market characteristics to identify the parameters in the theater s payo function and the distribution of unobservable exit values using the estimated model i show that theaters who are making negative pro ts may choose to remain in the market if they expect to outlast their competitors because at that point their pro ts would increase this creates a signi cant delay in the exit process in addition by decompos ing the across market variation in the exit process i nd that tv diusion explains a substantial proportion of the variation in the exit process

sacrifice tests for predation in a dynamic pricing model ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 meet ericson and pakes 1995 abstract to detect the presence of predatory pricing antitrust authorities and courts routinely ask whether a firm sacrifices current profit in exchange for the expectation of higher future profit following the exit of its rival because predatory pricing is an inherently dynamic phenomenon we show in this paper how to construct sacrifice tests for predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework along the lines of ericson and pakes 1995 in particular we adapt the definitions of predation due to ordover and willig 1981 and cabral and riordan 1997 to this setting and construct the corresponding sacrifice tests

subsidized buyer credits atypical results in strategic trade theory using subsidized buyer credit as a policy tool it is shown that the general result of strategic trade policy namely that by committing itself to an export subsidy any government can favorably change the outcome of the cournot oligopoly does not necessarily hold

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

lumpy capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries in this paper we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment disinvestment we use our model to suggest answers to two questions first what economic factors facilitate preemption races second what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination with a series of examples we show that low product differentiation low investment sunkness and high depreciation tend to promote preemption races the same examples also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness tend to promote capacity coordination although depreciation removes capacity it might impede capacity coordination finally our examples show that multiple equilibria arise over at least some range of parameter values the distinct structures of these equilibria suggest that firms expectations play a key role in determining whether or not industry dynamics are characterized by preemption races and capacity coordination taken together our results suggest that preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand in hand with capacity coordination in the long run

staggered vs synchronised wage setting in oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the dynamic equilibrium which emerges when wages are bargained upon at different times in the various firms operating in an oligopolistic industry unions set wages the management of the firms the output level and the outcome of this interaction is captured by the game theoretic concept of markov perfect equilibrium the steady state equilibrium is compared with that which would emerge if all wage negotiations occurred simultaneously it is shown that staggered wage setting leads to higher steady state levels of wage and unemployment than synchronised wage setting it is also shown that a longer duration for wage contracts leads other things equal to lower wages and higher employment the final part of the paper shows that allowing for nash bargaining between union and management and for risk averse unions does not alter the conclusions of the paper

on endogenously staggered prices taylor s model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks however in standard imperfect competition models if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions they will typically choose to synchronize this paper provides a simple model of imperfect competition which produces stable staggering our argument relies on strategic interaction at two levels between firms within an industries and across industries and produces a continuum of staggered price equilibria these equilibria are strict and hence stable under a simple adaptive learning process an enduring problem for business cycle theory is an explanation for the persistent effects of nominal shocks explaining persistence is particularly problematic for theories based on nominal shocks as opposed to real shocks this is because rational expectations implies that nominal shocks themselves cannot be serially correlated since nominal shocks are the deviation of realized nominal magnitudes from expected values in two important papers taylor 1979 1980 provided an argument as to why a nominal shock can have persistent effects taylor s argument required two important assumptions first he assumed that firms could adjust prices only in alternate periods an assumption which may be justified by menu or information costs taylor s second assumption was that price setting was staggered half the firms were constrained to adjust prices in odd periods while the other half were allowed to adjust prices in even periods these two assumptions combined to provide dramatic results on nominal inertia the adjustment of prices to a nominal shock is slow and hence output effects are long lasting taylor s results on persistence arise due to strategic complementarity between price setting decisions this implies that each firm s optimal price is an increasing function of the aggregate price level if a shock arrives in an even period firms in the even cohort will not adjust fully to the nominal shock since firms in the odd cohort have fixed prices in the current period furthermore with rational expectations the even cohort also takes into account the fact that its own failure to adjust fully will also make for partial adjustment in future periods this elegant story has made taylor s model possibly the most influential of new keynesian models by providing a dynamic setting within which small nominal rigidities may result in persistent nominal inertia

time to build and fluctuations in bulk shipping abstract this paper explores the nature of fluctuations in world bulk shipping by quantifying the impact of time to build and demand uncertainty on investment and prices we examine the impact of both construction lags and their lengthening in periods of high investment activity by constructing a dynamic model of ship entry and exit a rich dataset of secondhand ship sales allows for a new estimation strategy resale prices provide direct information on value functions and allow their nonparametric estimation we find that moving from time varying to constant to no time to build reduces prices while significantly increasing both the level and volatility of investment jel g31 l11 l62 l92

the economics of household solid waste generation and disposal abstract we develop a household production model of waste management that explicitly incorporates many of the technical and behavioral elements germane to current regulatory and non regulatory solid waste policy initiatives examination of first order conditions shows the interaction among household preferences these production options and external prices and fees a simplified simulation of our model illustrates these relationships showing that household response elasticities can vary widely over common price ranges and that relatively large household welfare gains may be obtained by adopting curbside recycling and unit pricing programs

dynamic product positioning in differentiated product markets the effect of fees for musical performance rights on the commercial radio industry this article predicts how radio station formats would change if as was recently proposed music stations were made to pay fees for musical performance rights it does so by estimating and solving using parametric approximations to firms value functions a dynamic model that captures important features of the industry such as vertical and horizontal product differentiation demographic variation in programming tastes and multi station ownership the estimated model predicts that high fees would cause the number of music stations to fall significantly and quite quickly for example a fee equal to 10 of revenues would cause a 4 6 drop in the number of music stations within 2 1 2 years and a 9 4 drop in the long run the size of the change is limited however by the fact that many listeners particularly in demographics that are valued by advertisers have strong preferences for music programming publication abstract

convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of r d the undiscounted case abstract will r d increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time we examine this issue in the context of a dynamic alternate move duopoly model of non cooperative r d the asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market utilizing a value loss process constructed from the optimality equation of dynamic programming we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time we obtain this convergence to symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to r d through the notion that r d investment cannot be changed instantaneously by allowing research externalities complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated r d and either increasing decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival r d

estimation of cost efficiencies from mergers application to us radio this article estimates fixed cost efficiencies from mergers using a dynamic oligopoly model in which mergers and repositioning of products are endogenous the inference is based on revealed preference approach selecting cost synergies that rationalize observed merger decisions the estimates can be used to assess the total welfare impact of retrospective and counterfactual mergers the framework is applied to estimate cost efficiencies after the 1996 deregulation of u s radio industry within the period of 1996 to 2006 the cost savings resulting from mergers amount to 1 2 billion per year equally split across economies of scale and within format cost synergies

a state dependent model of intermediate goods pricing recent analyses of transaction level datasets have generated new stylized facts on price setting and greatly influenced the empirical macroeconomics literature this work has uncovered marked heterogeneity in price stickiness demonstrated that even non zero price changes do not fully pass through cost shocks and offered evidence of synchronization in the timing of price changes further intrafirm prices have been shown to differ from arm s length prices in each of these characteristics this paper develops a state dependent model of intermediate goods pricing which allows for arm s length and intrafirm transactions and is capable of generating these empirical pricing patterns

detection and impact of industrial subsidies the case of world shipbuilding this paper provides a model based empirical strategy to i detect the presence and gauge the magnitude of government subsidies and ii quantify their impact on production reallocation across countries industry prices costs and consumer surplus i construct and estimate an industry model that allows for dynamic agents in both demand and supply and apply my strategy to world shipbuilding a classic target of industrial policy i nd strong evidence consistent with china having intervened and reducing shipyard costs by 15 20 corresponding to 5 billion us dollars between 2006 and 2012 the subsidies led to substantial reallocation of ship production across the world with japan in particular losing signi cant market share they also misaligned costs and production while leading to minor surplus gains for shippers

vertical integration as a source of hold up while vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold up problem this article highlights instead that it can generate hold up problems for rivals we consider a successive duopoly where downstream firms invest and then secure support from an upstream supplier we first show that vertical integration generates ex ante incentives to create hold up problems an integrated supplier is willing to pre commit itself to appropriating or dissipating part of its customer s profits to expose the independent rival to being held up by the other supplier and discourage in this way the rival s investment we then show that even in the absence of any pre commitment vertical integration also creates hold up problems ex post when degrading the quality of the support provided to one downstream firm benefits its rival we also provide illustrations in terms of standard industrial organization models and of antitrust cases and discuss the robustness of the insights

how do switching costs affect market concentration and prices in network industries i investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option i find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option without a viable outside option high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects but with a viable outside option switching costs increase market concentration furthermore switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option but generally raise prices otherwise

strategic entry before demand takes off in developing industries firms have to decide whether and when to enter the market depending on the state of demand existing firms in the industry and the firm s capabilities this paper investigates a model of increasing demand in which firms decide when to enter the market anticipating the strategic behavior of other potential entrants and the effects of entry on future potential entrants this paper shows that the ability of early entry to deter future competitors entry leads firms to enter the market at a rate faster than demand is expanding if there is the potential for many firms to enter the market firms may be less likely to enter because of future competitor entry to correct any market opportunities if firms enter the market depending on their fixed capabilities rather than depending on the firm s circumstances at each moment in time firms end up entering the market at a faster rate in the early periods

dynamic analysis of materials product chains an application to window frames abstract environmental pressure associated with a specific economic service can originate from several stages in the process of production use and disposal of products rendering that particular service when alternative products are available to fulfil such a service an interesting evaluation problem results because generally such alternatives will differ in terms of materials composition this means that different or even unique materials flows and environmental stress categories will be associated with each of them this type of evaluation problem is studied here using a materials product chain framework in which links between materials and product flows and between decision market and physical processes can be considered the term chain refers to a sequence of activities possibly including extraction production consumption materials recycling and re use of products and treatment incineration and dumping of waste chain management can then be considered as an overall policy strategy that takes explicit account of the sequential economic and physical linkages between these various activities a dynamic simulation model is developed for studying the materials product chain associated with the use of window frames in houses this provides an interesting example of a durable good the use of which has important long run consequences for material flows a number of environmental and economic indicators are considered in the modelling exercise so that a comparison and evaluation of policies and scenarios from a broad integrative perspective is possible among other things this allows for a ranking of instruments

choosing between order of entry assumptions in empirical entry models evidence from competition between burger king and mcdonald s restaurant outlets we demonstrate how a non nested statistical test developed by vuong 1989 can be used to assess the suitability of alternate order of entry assumptions used for identification purposes in empirical entry models as an example we estimate an entry model of mcdonald s and burger king restaurant outlets in united states the data set focuses on relatively small isolated markets for these markets the non nested tests suggest that order of entry assumptions that give burger king outlets a first mover advantage are statistically preferred last a monte carlo experiment provides encouraging results suggesting that the vuong type test yields reliable results within the entry model framework

regulation imperfect competition and the u s abortion market the u s abortion market has grown increasingly concentrated recently while many states tightened abortion laws using data on abortion providers i estimate an equilibrium model of demand price competition entry and exit to capture the effect of regulation on industry dynamics estimates show regulations played an important role in determining the abortion market structure and evolution counterfactual simulations reveal increases in demand aimed regulation were the most important observed factor in explaining recent abortion declines simulating utah s regulatory regime nationally shows tightening abortion restrictions can increase abortions in equilibrium mainly through tilting the competitive landscape toward low price providers

economically extended mfa a material flow approach for a better understanding of food production chain abstract in the following article we introduce a method called economically extended material flow analysis ee mfa which aims at studying causal relationships between economically motivated human behaviour and resource consumption for this purpose we expand mfa with economic information this method is evaluated by applying it in a case study on resource efficiency in the food production chain ee mfa reduces the shortcomings of a technically oriented mfa by including a description of the inputs and outputs in money units without changing the system structure this benefit is shown in the status quo analysis of to nourish where data from various sources could be compiled to set up a consistent model of material energy and money flows a further value addition of the method is that it creates a basis for a multi criteria evaluation of strategies to improve resource efficiency on a regional scale one result of this multi criteria evaluation is a classification of strategies according to their influence on the materials energy and money flows

competition and subsidies in the deregulated us local telephone industry the 1996 telecommunications act opened the monopolistic us local telephone industry to new entrants however substantial entry costs have prevented some markets from becoming competitive we study various subsidy policies designed to encourage entry we estimate a dynamic entry game using data on potential and actual entrants allowing for heterogeneous option values of waiting we find that subsidies to smaller markets are more cost effective in reducing monopoly markets but subsidies to only lower cost firms are less cost effective than a nondiscriminatory policy subsidies in only early periods reduce the option value of waiting and accelerate the arrival of competition

dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs abstract the literature on strategic investment emphasized the case of completely irreversible investment this paper considers an oligopoly model in which investment is reversible and capacity is subject to adjustment costs an n player linear quadratic differential game is analyzed existence and characterization results for perfect equilibrium feedback strategies are provided feedback strategies provide incentives for each player to invest strategically so as to preempt subsequent expansion by rivals a larger set of perfect equilibria is constructed by using memory dependent trigger strategies equilibria of this type are shown to support joint value maximization for some initial states and asymmetric steady states

preemption games under levy uncertainty abstract we study a stochastic version of fudenberg tirole s preemption game two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand firms differ in sunk costs of entry if the demand process has no upward jumps the low cost firm enters first and the high cost firm follows if leader s optimization problem has an interior solution the leader enters at the optimal threshold of a monopolist otherwise the leader enters earlier than the monopolist if the demand admits positive jumps then the optimal entry threshold of the leader can be lower than the monopolist s threshold even if the solution is interior simultaneous entry can happen either as an equilibrium or a coordination failure the high cost firm can become the leader we characterize subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in terms of stopping times and value functions analytical expressions for the value functions and thresholds that define stopping times are derived

export subsidies under dynamic duopoly abstract in this paper i analyze an export subsidy game under a dynamic cournot duopoly using a discrete time markov equilibrium model of dynamic cournot duoply according to maskin and tirole 1987 assuming a linear demand function i will show that under a dynamic duopoly 1 firms are more sensitive to changes in export subsidies 2 the equilibrium export subsidy in an export subsidy game is smaller 3 the output at the subsidy equilibrium is larger than a static duopoly with lower subsidy and higher output the welfare in countries under a dynamic duopoly is higher than a static duopoly

does amd spur intel to innovate more we estimate an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with durable goods and endogenous innovation to examine the effect of competition on innovation in the personal computer microprocessor industry firms make dynamic pricing and investment decisions while consumers make dynamic upgrade decisions anticipating product improvements and price declines consistent with schumpeter we find that the rate of innovation in product quality would be 4 2 percent higher without amd present though higher prices would reduce consumer surplus by 12 billion per year comparative statics illustrate the role of product durability and provide implications of the model for other industries

a dynamic model of entry and exit in a growing industry the potential demand in a new industry evolves over time demand is initially low but advertising by the industry s early entrants can speed up demand growth however there is intrinsic uncertainty of the demand level in each period and uncertainty of the demand evolution path which can be affected by the underlying economic environment we construct a dynamic model that features the stochastically and endogenously expanding demand of a new industry and we investigate the optimal entry and exit behavior of firms as the industry evolves we find that firms incentive to enter early depends critically on the cost that early entrants have to pay in developing the market when the cost is high and the benefit spills over to potential entrants firms have an incentive to wait and the probability of entry can increase with the number of incumbents under certain circumstances firms entry strategy is also influenced by the transition of economic states firms are more likely to enter under a state that shows the prospect of demand taking off soon we also find that in the early stage of an industry higher demand uncertainty can induce faster entry

keeping it fresh strategic product redesigns and welfare abstract product redesigns happen across virtually all types of products yet there is little evidence on the market and welfare effects of redesigns we develop a model of redesign decisions in a dynamic oligopoly model and use it to analyze redesign activity in the u s automobile market we find automobile model redesigns are frequent despite an estimated average cost around 1 billion our estimates also suggest that redesigns lead to large increases in profits and welfare due to the strong preferences consumers have for redesigns we show that welfare would be improved if redesign competition were reduced allowing redesign activity to be more responsive to the planned obsolescence channel the net effect of these changes would reduce total redesigns by roughly 10 increasing total welfare by roughly 3 the high valuation that consumers put on newly designed models drives frequent redesigns and gives automobile manufacturers fairly substantial market power with a 2 to 1 ratio of firm profits to consumer surplus

empirical analysis of closed loop duopoly advertising strategies closed loop perfect equilibria in a lanchester duopoly differential game of advertising competition are used as the basis for empirical investigation two systems of simultaneous nonlinear equations are formed one from a general lanchester model and one from a constrained model two empirical applications are conducted in one involving coca cola and pepsi cola a formal statistical testing procedure is used to detect whether closed loop equilibrium advertising strategies are used by the competitors rather than open loop strategies in the second application involving anheuser busch and miller the general model is estimated results indicate that closed loop equilibria better explain dynamic advertising competition than do open loop equilibria also closed loop equilibrium advertising strategies implied by model estimates show that competitive advertising levels may or may not be monotonic in market share

capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm size empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most industries we propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent with the observed facts the model highlights the mode of product market competition and the extent of investment reversibility as key determinants of the size distribution of firms in an industry in particular if firms compete in prices and the rate of depreciation is large then the industry moves toward an outcome with one dominant firm and one small firm industry dynamics in this case resemble a preemption race contrary to the usual intuition this preemption race becomes more brutal as investment becomes more reversible