bargaining enforcement and multilateral sanctions when is cooperation counterproductive scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use however previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation this puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation in this article i test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using james fearon s 1998 breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion the empirical results show that when multilateral economic sanctions fail their failure is due to enforcement not bargaining problems without the support of an international organization cooperating states backslide from promises of cooperation backsliding occurs because of domestic political pressures and uncertainty about the intentions of the other sanctioning countries backsliding causes an initial burst of cooperative behavior to decay over time without institutional support cooperation is worse than useless it is counterproductive this result suggests that international cooperation is a more fragile equilibrium than previously thought but undercuts realist arguments that international organizations are unimportant

moral hazard discipline and the management of terrorist organizations terrorist groups repeatedly include operatives of varying commitment and often rely on a common set of security reducing bureaucratic tools to manage these individuals this is puzzling in that covert organizations are commonly thought to screen their operatives very carefully and pay a particularly heavy price for record keeping the authors use terrorist memoirs and the internal correspondence of one particularly prominent group to highlight the organizational challenges terrorist groups face and use a game theoretic model of moral hazard in a finitely sized organization to explain why record keeping and bureaucracy emerge in these groups the model provides two novel results first in small heterogeneous organizations longer institutional memory can enhance organizational efficiency second such organizations will use worse agents in equilibrium under certain conditions the core logic is that in small organizations the punishment strategies that allow leaders to extract greater effort are credible only when operatives can identify and react to deviations from the leaders equilibrium strategy this dynamic creates incentives for record keeping and means that small organizations will periodically use problematic agents in equilibrium as part of a strategy that optimally motivates their best operatives

voter turnout in the industrial democracies during the 1980s there are two contending accounts of cross national variation in voter turnout rates one emphasizes the role of institutions and electoral attributes whereas the other stresses cultural and historical factors the authors evaluate the merits of these two arguments they first apply the model developed by r w jackman to turnout rates during the 1980s expanding the sample of industrial states to include three newer democracies with recent authoritarian histories greece portugal and spain they then examine the potential impact of cultural variables on voter turnout rates the authors conclude that the institutional argument outperforms the cultural account of conventional political participation

markets hierarchies and information on a paradox in the economics of organization abstract the literature on the economics of organization presents the following paradox on the one hand firms are said to be repositories of superior information about input characteristics on the other hand markets are said to be superior to hierarchies in coordinating resource allocation because hierarchies are forced to aggregate heterogeneous inputs into homogeneous categories this paper suggests reasons for the association of firms with refined input information and argues that it is not their hierarchical features but their provision of an appropriate framework for rent sharing that is responsible for this association

employer stock and 401 k plans the sharp decline in the stock prices of several firms at which employees held a large fraction of their 401 k plan assets in company stock including enron global crossing lucent and polaroid has sparked a public policy debate about investment options in 401 k plans at many large firms particularly those with retirement saving plans that combine elements of an employee stock ownership plan esop with a traditional 401 k a substantial fraction of defined contribution retirement plan assets are held in company stock such undiversified holdings are a source of concern because they raise the volatility of the retirement wealth for employees and expose some workers to the prospect of very small retirement values holding an undiversified position in employer stock may be particularly costly because of the potential correlation between company stock returns and the value of the worker s human capital which may depend on the company s prospects this paper reviews the extent of undiversified company stock investments in 401 k plans evaluates the cost of such investments from an employee s perspective and discusses a range of policy actions that could address the excessive concentration of retirement plan assets

value creation management competencies and global corporate citizenship an ordonomic approach to business ethics in the age of globalization this article develops an ordonomic approach to business ethics in the age of globalization through the use of a three tiered conceptual framework that distinguishes between the basic game of antagonistic social cooperation the meta game of rule setting and the meta meta game of rule finding discourse we address three questions the answers to which we believe are crucial to fostering effective business leadership and corporate social responsibility first the purpose of business in society is value creation companies have a social mandate to organize mutually advantageous cooperation second business ethics should teach the management competencies necessary to fulfill business s societal mandate these competencies are optimization competence in the basic game of value creation governance competence in the meta game of political rule setting and the three discourse related skills of orientation competence reception competence and communication competence necessary for engaging in the meta meta game third companies can help solve global problems through global corporate citizenship if they participate as political and moral actors in rule setting processes and rule finding discourse aimed at laying the foundation for value creation on a global scale

provoking preferences unionization trade policy and the ilwu puzzle if any group of american blue collar workers has benefited from the growth of trade it is the unionized dockworkers along the us west coast nevertheless the international longshore and warehouse union ilwu representing these workers is vocally opposed to trade liberalization we examine several competing explanations for this puzzle and evaluate them by tracing the union s stance on trade over several decades we also use an original survey to compare ilwu affiliates attitudes on trade with those of nonmembers with otherwise similar characteristics consistent with a model of organizational socialization the data support the hypothesis that ilwu membership affects the members revealed political opinions the data are difficult to reconcile with standard theories of international trade our findings indicate that the political support for trade depends not just on voters structural positions in the economy but also on the organizations and networks in which they are embedded

bad loans to good friends money politics and the developmental state in south korea why has the literature on asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in south korea how can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in south korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999 politics is central to the answer in this study i make two arguments first money politics was extensive in south korea both during and after the high growth era second political not economic considerations dominated policymaking this study explains both past and present and compares the patterns of money politics in the early post independence era with those that arose after the democratic transition in 1987 while during the park era a balance of power between businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control the transition to democracy altered the basic business state relationship allowing business to exert greater influence over policy decisions the political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state

the breakdown of hierarchies in the soviet union and china a neoinstitutional perspective why did modest attempts to decentralize the centrally administered soviet system lead to its collapse while more far reaching decentralization in china left central political and administrative hierarchies intact this article analyzes the disintegration of centrally planned organizations in the context of a neoinstitutional model of the breakdown of authority within hierarchies an agency model of hierarchy is presented that incorporates the ambiguous property rights authority relations and risk sharing conditions that prevailed under central planning and then persist during postcommunist transitions this model suggests that decentralizing reforms could trigger an organizational bank run prompting local agents to seize organizational assets under their control the article also considers reputation preserving strategies that central authorities might use to avert disintegration as an application of this model the collapse of soviet political industrial and state fiscal hierarchies are considered and compared with the experience of analogous sectors in china reforms in both states transferred significant autonomy from the center to local field agents in the soviet case these agents appropriated organizational assets with little interference from the center in china by contrast the center preserved both its capacity for monitoring and its reputation for disciplining transgressions and the rise of hybrid ownership forms made expropriation of state and party assets far less attractive

the fate of easter island the limits of resource management institutions abstract malthus malthus thomas 1798 1970 an essay on the principle of population penguin new york believed that population growth will eventually lead to natural resource depletion economic and social collapse and population decline brander and taylor brander james a taylor m scott 1998 the simple economics of easter island a ricardo malthus model of renewable resource use american economic review 88 119 138 use a predator prey model with an assumption of an open access resource they show that the collapse of easter island could be explained by a malthusian trap combined with technical characteristics of the resources they suggest that institutional change such as assignment of property rights could potentially have averted the collapse of easter island in this paper we show that even if the islanders had complete assignment of property rights and implemented optimal resource management with infinite horizon or equivalently had a social planner that implemented such an optimal plan as in neoclassical welfare economics a similar boom bust cycle would have occurred

team theory garbage cans and real organizations some history and prospects of economic research on decision making in organizations this essay attempts to articulate and advance a long term agenda for organizational economics the essay begins with a general discussion of four specific items on this agenda and then moves to a more specific discussion of decision making in organizations beginning with two polar opposite conceptions team theory and garbage cans and then describing several recent economic models part of the rationale for writing this essay is that this agenda has both substantive and methodological commonalities with the work of james march copyright 2003 oxford university press

betting your favorite to win costly reluctance to hedge desired outcomes we examined whether people reduce the impact of negative outcomes through emotional hedging betting against the occurrence of desired outcomes we found substantial reluctance to bet against the success of preferred u s presidential candidates and major league baseball national football league national collegiate athletic association ncaa basketball and ncaa hockey teams this reluctance was not attributable to optimism or a general aversion to hedging reluctance to hedge desired outcomes stemmed from identity signaling a desire to preserve an important aspect of the bettor s identity reluctance to hedge occurred when the diagnostic cost of the negative self signal that hedging would produce outweighed the pecuniary rewards associated with hedging participants readily accepted hedges and pure gambles with no diagnostic costs they also more readily accepted hedges with diagnostic costs when the pecuniary rewards associated with those hedges were greater reluctance to hedge identity relevant out

a politics of institutional choice post communist presidencies this work uses incomplete contracting theory to account for variation in the specific and residual powers of post communist presidencies it uses evidence from 24 post communist countries to test theories of institutional choice that link presidential powers to economic reform institutional legacies party systems and social cleavages it argues that two factors can account for variation in presidential powers the bargaining power of the electoral favorite and the degree of uncertainty over the electoral outcome it tests this model in greater detail against four cases russia 1991 estonia 1992 russia 1993 belarus 1994 three insights flow from these cases first political institutions can be analyzed as the by products of power seeking politicians making choices under varying degrees of uncertainty second despite the great uncertainty of the transition actors understand their interests and strategies third high uncertainty compels political actors to hedge their bets when designing politi

progress in behavioral game theory i s game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not it is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question the seminal book by von neumann and morgenstern the theory of games and economic behavior was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational in more recent work game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise at one extreme highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions at the other extreme adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple modelsmostly developed to describe nonhuman animals in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all when game theory does aim to describe behavior it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing this paper describes an approach called behavioral game theory which aims to describe actual behavior is driven by empirical observation mostly experiments and charts a middle course between over rational equilibrium analyses and under rational adaptive analyses the recipe for behavioral game theory i will describe has three steps start with a game or naturally occurring situation in which standard game theory makes a bold prediction based on one or two crucial principles if behavior differs from interested readers familiar with game theory should read crawford 1997 whose approach is more eclectic than mine he concludes p 236 that most strategic behavior can be understood via a synthesis that combines elements from each of the leading theoretical frameworks traditional game theory evolutionary game theory and adaptive learning with a modicum of empirical information about behavior behavioral game theory adds psychological interpretations to this synthesis

mixed signals central bank independence coordinated wage bargaining and european monetary union plans for the european monetary union emu are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects however the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank when signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective greater central bank independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated but it can bring higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is less coordinated thus currency unions like the emu may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage they will have costs as well as benefits and these will be unevenly distributed among and within the member nations depending on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination

irrational workers the moral economy of labor protest in egypt after comparing the predictions of marxist moral economy and rational choice theories concerning collective actions by workers in egypt in the period since the 1952 free officers coup this article concludes that a moral economy perspective is best able to explain the nature and frequency of these protests the supporting evidence is the correlation between labor protest and violations of workers feelings of entitlement as manifest in declining real wages or disruptions to established patterns of wage differentials the targeting of state institutions combined with the fact that workers have eschewed actual production stoppages in favor of symbolic protests indicates a view of reciprocal rights and obligations between themselves and the state the latter reinforces the moral economy by combining significant concessions with its repressive response to labor protests marxism proves unable to explain the largely defensive and reactive nature of labor protest while rational choice theory is reduced to efforts to quantify workers reactions to this repression

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

factors underlying rural household energy transition a case study of china abstract this paper identifies factors underlying the energy transition of rural households in china based on province level panel data for years of 1991 2014 it indicates that there exists the energy stacking process of rural household energy transition characterized by the significant consumption inertia effects of traditional biomass energy tbe traditional commercial energy tce and advanced commercial energy ace respectively the insignificant substitution effect of tce and ace for tbe and the significant partial substitution of ace for tce with regard to the factors underlying rural household energy transition 1 per capita disposal income is negatively correlated with tbe tce and ace consumption 2 the number of motorcycles is positively correlated with tce and ace consumption 3 the number of firewood saving stoves and the price for ace are positively correlated with tbe consumption 4 household size and the number of motorcycles and the number of appliances are positively correlated with ace consumption 5 education level is positively correlated with tbe but negatively with tce consumption 6 the number of rural energy management institutions is positively correlated with tbe but negatively correlated ace consumption therefore some policy implications are discussed

explicating political hazards and safeguards a transaction cost politics approach we apply the logical of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government we consider two strategies that investors may follow lobbying for the creation of a specialized political governance structure or the reliance on more general political mechanisms to influence policy in that sector on an ongoing basis we identify political hazards as crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards finally we highlight shift parameters in a nation s institutional environment that influence the choice between specialized and generalized political governance mechanisms

a social contract account for csr as an extended model of corporate governance ii compliance reputation and reciprocity this essay seeks to give a contractarian foundation to the concept of corporate social responsibility csr meant as an extended model of corporate governance of the firm whereas justificatory issues have been discussed in a related paper sacconi l 2006b this journal in this essay i focus on the implementation of and compliance with this normative model the theory of reputation games with reference to the basic game of trust is introduced in order to make sense of self regulation as a way to implement the social contract on the multi fiduciary model of corporate governance this affords understanding of why self regulation meant as mere recourse to a long run strategy in a repeated trust game fails two basic problems for the functioning of the reputation mechanism are examined the cognitive fragility problem and the motivational problem as regards the cognitive fragilities of reputation which result from the impact of unforeseen contingencies and from bounded rationality the paper develops the logic and the structure that self regulatory norms must satisfy if they are to serve as gap filling tools with which to remedy cognitive limitations in the reputation mechanism the motivation problem then arises from the possibility of sophisticated abuse by the firm developed in this case is an entirely new application of the theory of conformism and reciprocity based preferences the result of which is that the stakeholders refuse to acquiesce to sophisticated abuse on the part of the firm

non commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions abstract auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment the manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker s output taking into account all interim information he has obtained the worker will work just hard enough and show it to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult this usually raises the costs of setting work incentives so incentives are softened sometimes drastically moreover when a worker s on the job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information

resource curse an analysis of causes experiences and possible ways forward abstract higher prices for oil gas and mineral resources have again raised questions about how exporting countries can counter the challenges of resource curse international experience managing the risks of resource curse has varied summarising the continuing discussion on meeting the challenges of the resource curse this paper addresses four questions what are the positive and negative effects of high oil gas and mineral prices on exporters what have been the experiences with managing natural resource revenues can good institutions ensure that natural resource revenues have a positive impact on development and what is the direction for the way forward we argue that the current emphasis on institutions as a potential solution has largely ignored under what conditions institutions are formed and changed

the old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism abstract in economics recent emphasis on institutions suggests new policy dimensions for the traditional theory of economic policy which originated with tinbergen and others at the time of the keynesian revolution the paper presents elements of the traditional view instruments targets and policy models and then considers new aspects of policy especially policy for structural change the discussion emphasizes the implications for institutional design of incomplete knowledge and endogenous politics both public and private actors rely on incomplete policy models and the models themselves can become intermediate targets of policy

when less is more the benefits of limits on executive pay we derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders but not executives having its hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance contingent contracts this has implications for the ideal composition of the board the analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive compensation reform

own company stock in defined contribution pension plans a takeover defense abstract if managers induce employees to hold company stock in defined contribution pension plans as a form of takeover defense then changes in state laws that enhance managerial protection should lead to a reduction in employer stock in 401 k plans delaware s mid 1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board was followed by a significant decline in employee ownership within defined contribution plans for firms incorporated in delaware evidence using governance data suggests that this is due to responses of firms with staggered boards binary choice models confirm that employee ownership in defined contribution plans lowers takeover probabilities

mental health market power and governance this paper is concerned with the pricing behaviour of providers of residential care for people with mental health problems two aspects of pricing were considered first are there differences between providers market power and their actual mark up rates e g due to differences in motivation second do the different governance arrangements used in sectors of the industry such as unified public and non profit organisation and private bilateral contracting affect pricing behaviour a theoretical model was developed to underpin the empirical analysis of 496 residents in 112 mental health care facilities private bilateral organisation was found to be associated with comparatively lower potential price cost mark up but a greater propensity to use this power to make profits surpluses

south korean and taiwanese development and the new institutional economics the publication of books by both alice amsden and robert wade provide an opportune moment to reflect on the study of east asian development after an initial surge of interest beginning in the 1970s the field has reached a plateau and scholars recently have cast a wide net in searching for ways to extend the field in assessing the state of the art regarding the economic development of the east asian newly industrialized countries nics this review will treat three themes first i will argue that the focus on states versus markets is becoming stale and that much of the scholarly interest lies in the politics behind the economics second i argue that political scientists have underexplored the historical origins of korean and taiwanese capitalism and that such attention promises to strengthen both theories and explanations of development third i argue that the international system has been more important in promoting development in east asia than accounts in the first wave have recognized the purpose of this review is to assess the field reveal

transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth it is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output the incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer the model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey offarmers and landowners in nebraska and south dakota

dominant firms price leadership and the measurement of monopoly welfare losses abstract the possible welfare losses associated with monopoly power have been the subject of numerous studies over a number of decades recent estimates seem to confirm the earliest estimates which suggested that such losses were relatively trivial this paper suggests that the basis of such estimates is questionable in particular it is argued that the familiar dominant firm price leadership model is not well suited to the task of estimating monopoly welfare losses more appropriate assumptions are identified and their implications for assessing the magnitude of potential welfare losses are illustrated

firm competition and incentive pay rent seeking at work empirical evidence shows that competition among firms generates steep incentives inside firms incentive pay stimulates productive investments but may generate inefficient rent seeking investments

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

determinants of electronic integration in the insurance industry an empirical test electronic integration a form of vertical quasi integration achieved through the deployment of dedicated computers and communication systems between relevant actors in the adjacent stages of the value chain is an important concept to researchers in the information systems field since it focuses on the role of information technology in restructuring vertical relationships drawing on theoretical and empirical research on transaction costs we develop and test a model of the determinants of the degree of electronic integration in the commercial segment of the property and casualty p c industry based on a sample of 120 independent agencies operating under dedicated information technology mediated conditions we provide empirical support for three hypotheses on the determinants of electronic integration implications and research extensions are identified to guide further research in this important area

revisiting legal realism the law economics and organization perspective the contrast between american legal realism which ran itself into the sand schlegel 1979 p 459 and the law and economics movement which is perhaps the most important development in legal thought in the last quarter century posner 1986 p xix is dramatic that the one foundered while the other flourished is explained in large measure by the absence of an intellectual framework for legal realism and the use by law and economics of the powerful framework of neoclassical economics

corporate downsizing to rebuild team spirit how costly voting can foster cooperation we propose a new mechanism to achieve coordination through voting for which we discuss a number of real life applications among them the mechanism provides for a new theory for downsizing in organizations a crisis may lead to a decrease in the willingness to cooperate in an organization and therefore to a bad equilibrium a consensual downsizing episode may signal credibly that survivors are willing to cooperate and thus it may be optimal and efficiency enhancing for the individuals remaining in the organization as the empirical evidence suggests a variation of the same mechanism leads to efficient upsizing jel c70 d70 m50

getting to know you a theory of strategic group identity this paper develops a theory of strategic group identity that explains how strategic groups emerge in an industry and how they can affect firm behaviors and outcomes in so doing it provides a theoretical basis for the existence of strategic groups we argue that managers cognitively partition their industry environment to reduce uncertainty and to cope with bounded rationality social learning theory and social identification theory are used to describe how cognitive groups coalesce into meaningful substructures and how a group level identity emerges we describe the ways in which macro level factors condition the development of groups and their identities we introduce the notion of a strong identity which characterizes any group sufficiently recognized and attended to by members to affect individual action groups with weak identities are no more than transient agglomerations of firms and do not exist in any meaningful sense these ideas are developed into propositions that describe the conditions under which groups with strong identities are likely to emerge a second set of propositions describes their transformation over time identity strength is linked to both positive and negative outcomes in a final set of propositions we show how strategic groups with strong identities can affect firm performance resolving a longstanding problem which has plagued strategic groups research and conclude by suggesting some approaches for measurement and future research 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitment japan and the united states the domestic politics of great powers significantly influence the fate of such multilateral regimes at the general agreement on tariffs and trade and the north atlantic treaty organization unless great powers can make credible commitments to support those regimes few countries will offer more than token support domestic political constraints may bind national leaders to good faith adherence to multilateral regimes even if international circumstances do not compel adherence domestic politics also influence the ability of other countries to monitor national adherence to agreements case studies of u s and japanese responses to multilateral regimes show how the nature of the national electoral system the division of powers in the government and the transparency of the national political system influence credibility and lead to special features of multilateral economic and security regimes

in praise of rigidity the bright side of long term contracts in repeated trust games abstract we study a possibly repeated trust game between a principal and an agent whose skills are private information at the beginning of the relationship and later revealed to the principal the principal can commit to a long term relationship through a contract we show that such a commitment may be needed for trust furthermore the optimal length of the contract between the principal and the agent and the principal s payoff are not monotonic in both the probability that the agent is high skilled and the value of replacing a low skilled agent with a high skilled one

institutional and individual investors saving for old age this paper brings together the academic literature on individual and institutional investors in order to understand the nature of difficulties faced by them and set the background for the special issue this introductory article and the papers in the special issue contribute to the debate on how to support individuals in their savings commitments and investment decision making and whether and how institutional investors have fulfilled their role in supporting the development of the funded pension industry there are three main conclusions i individual investors are not ready for the role that has been assigned to them in the pension industry ii institutional investors are a long way short of establishing healthy relational contracts and trustworthy relationships with their clients and iii more effective regulation may be needed

mental accounting in portfolio choice evidence from a flypaper effect this paper documents a lack of coordination between the asset allocations of different financial accounts in a household portfolio our findings are predicted by the theory of mental accounting richard h thaler 1985 1990 1999 agents sometimes make decisions about individual accounts in their portfolio without considering their other accounts the setting for our analysis is a large u s firm when an employee at this firm makes a 401 k contribution the company makes a matching contribution proportional to the employee s contribution up to a match threshold in march 2003 the firm changed its 401 k matching rules creating a natural experiment both before and after the rule change the initial allocation of participants own contribution flows was determined by the participants 1 the change in march 2003 was to the policy determining the initial asset allocation of the employer match contributions in the first regime before march 2003 the firm directed matching contribution flows entirely into employer stock this was not a binding restriction as participants could freely reallocate their match balances after matching contributions were made although in practice participants rarely did so in march 2003 the company changed its match policy requiring new enrollees to actively choose the asset allocation for both their own and match contribution flows the change between these regimes was economically neutral any allocation of balances in one regime could be replicated in the other nevertheless allocations to employer stock differed vastly across the two regimes employees who enrolled in february 2003 just before the regime change allocated 23 of their own contribution flows to employer stock since all of their match contributions were directed into employer stock this resulted in a 56 total 401 k allocation to employer stock combining the own contribution and match contribution accounts few of these february enrollees made subsequent trades to reduce their employer stock balances in either account employees who enrolled in march 2003 right after the change allocated 23 of their total own plus match contribution flows to employer stock notice that own contribution allocations to employer stock in the first regime precisely match the combined allocation of own and match contributions in the second regime 23 in both cases even though combined allocations differ greatly across the regimes these results imply that each dollar of employer stock contributed to enrollees through the match in the first regime increased the employees total holdings of employer stock by a full dollar rather than being offset by reduced employer stock holdings elsewhere or being sold off directly in other words money sticks where it hits a phrase attributed to arthur okun generating an asset allocation flypaper effect that is akin to the flypaper effects of public finance corporate finance and intra household consumption 2 after considering several explanations for the asset allocation flypaper effect we conclude that it is due in part to mental accounting our results can be explained by the following simple model in the first regime new enrollees actively allocated only their own contribution flows effectively ignoring the fact that their matching contributions were entirely directed into employer stock in the second regime the match allocation became salient because new enrollees were required to choose both their match and own contribution allocations during the enrollment process this caused enrollees to consider their entire 401 k portfolio instead of just their own contribution accounts as a result the fraction of total contributions allocated to employer stock under the second regime equaled the fraction of own contribution flows allocated to employer stock under the first regime the average participant allocated roughly one quarter of assets to employer stock in whatever accounts were salient whether the set of salient accounts was narrow regime one or broad regime two the dependence of portfolio outcomes on account salience is inconsistent with investors having a clear target asset allocation for their entire portfolio which they efficiently implement through their investment choices in accordance with much prior research we also find that investors are quite passive rarely reallocating their portfolios 3 however our central finding concerns asset allocation decisions made at enrollment a point when people have overcome their passivity and are taking action investor passivity thus cannot account for the unresponsiveness of own contribution allocations to the match allocation at enrollment under the first regime although passivity helps explain why these initial decisions are rarely reversed subsequently

the role of installment payments in contracts for services this article studies the role of installment payments in relationships characterized by moral hazard and sunk costs we rule out vertical integration and payments contingent on the product of the contractor instead each payment is negotiated as and when made in such circumstances an initial down payment serves to redress the weakness of the contractor in ex post renegotiations if higher effort by the contractor in thefirst stage increases the marginal product of effort in the second stage a second installment payment induces the contractor to invest greater effort initially

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

the boundaries of the firm revisited why do firms exist what is their function and what determines their scope these remain the central questions in the economics of organization they are also central questions for business executives and corporate strategists the worldwide volume of corporate mergers and acquisitions exceeded 1 6 trillion in 1997 it is hard to imagine that so much time effort and investment bankers fees would be spent on adjusting firm boundaries unless there was some underlying economic gain indeed the exceptional levels of merger and acquisition activity over the past two decades are a strong indication that economically significant forces do determine organizational boundaries the study of firm boundaries originated with the famous essay by coase 1937 who raised the question of why we observe so much economic activity inside formal organizations if as economists commonly argue markets are such powerful and effective mechanisms for allocating scarce resources coase s answer was in terms of the costs of transacting in a world of imperfect information when the transaction costs of market exchange are high it may be less costly to coordinate production through a formal organization than through a market in large part thanks to the work of williamson 1975 1985 recent decades have seen a resurgence of interest in coase s fundamental insight that firm boundaries can be explained by efficiency considerations our understanding of firm boundaries has been sharpened by identifying more precisely the nature and sources of transaction costs in different circumstances in the process the focus of

optimal employee ownership contracts under ambiguity aversion the aim of this paper is to compute and describe the conditions of an optimal employee ownership contract between an employer and an ambiguity averse employee we then introduce ambiguity aversion in the baseline model of aubert et al 2014 using the multiple prior preferences of gilboa and schmeidler 1989 and its extension proposed by maccheroni et al 2006 this model offers solutions that reconcile labor and financial economics and behavioral economics research findings on employee ownership the paper focuses on the most common situation where employee ownership has a positive impact on corporate performance but can also be used as an entrenchment mechanism we determine the optimal company stock contribution which corresponds to a perfect subgame nash equilibrium in the ambiguity framework using the framework of gilboa and schmeidler s 1989 we show that the optimal ownership contract is respectively increasing with respect to the lower bound of the return expectation in the case of a high level of effort and decreasing with respect to the upper bound of the return expectation in the case of a low level of effort in the framework of maccheroni et al 2006 we prove that if aversion to ambiguity is sufficiently high then we find the same behavior as in the case of no ambiguity

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

information processing moderators of the effectiveness of trust based governance in interfirm r d collaboration it is generally assumed that improved outcomes accompany the use of trust as a governance mechanism in an interfirm relationship briefly trust is a social lubricant that reduces the friction costs of existing trade and or serves to increase the scope of trade in contrast to this universalistic view we posit that the performance of trust based governance is contingent on the ability of trading partners to read each other and learn about counterpart behavior these information processing abilities allow firms to assess partner trustworthiness better which reduces the risk of misplaced trust the increased efficacy of communication and learning from one another also enables them to better capitalize from the adaptation and revision possibilities uncovered through trust based governance during the task execution phase given the central role of these cognitive requirements we assess these contingent effects with data from a knowledge intensive task setting using a sample of 129 firms that have engaged outside contractors on client sponsored r d projects we find strong support for our thesis specifically we find that trust based governance has a larger positive impact on task performance when the client is more skilled at understanding the outsourced tasks at hand the task itself requires skills that are relatively more readily taught less tacit and the task itself is organized in parallel with work being done at the contractor as well as the client as a corollary we also find that firms adopt trust based governance to a greater extent as these information processing abilities increase as well as with the colocation of the contractor and client suggestions for engineering trust based governance are offered

preference modification vs incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment the role of culture terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics this weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free riding or defection from the weaker side there are two nonexclusive answers 1 atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation even if it results in the recruit s own death 2 create a set of incentives that reward loyalty by giving access to excludable near public club goods culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions culture is defined here as the set of inherited beliefs attitudes and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders to understand themselves and to communicate with each other the primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation the difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism if terrorists are selected for having unusual cooperative from the perspective of the terror group preferences then recruitment must be disrupted somehow if on the other hand terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods

retrieving and transferring embodied data implications for the management of interdependence within organizations this research helps to link theories of sticky information with organizational design and governance it suggests that information embodied in process material can allow downstream tasks to uncover information about upstream tasks it shows that downstream operators can use this information to negotiate interdependence problems with upstream operators data presented in this article begin to uncover when such information retrieval and exchange occurs and how managers can encourage it finally the article discusses implications for theories of operational design and governance

the fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world the transition from communism in europe and the former soviet union has only sometimes produced a transition to democracy since the crumbling of the berlin wall in 1989 and the collapse of the soviet union in 1991 most of the twenty eight new states have abandoned communism but only nine of these have entered the ranks of liberal democracies the remaining majority of new postcommunist states are various shades of dictatorships or unconsolidated transitional regimes this article seeks to explain why some states abandoned communism for democracy while others turned to authoritarian rule in endorsing actorcentric approaches that have dominated analyses of the third wave of democratization this argument nonetheless offers an alternative set of causal paths from ancien regime to new regime that can account for both democracy and dictatorship as outcomes situations of unequal distributions of power produced the quickest and most stable transitions from communist rule in countries with asymmetrical balances of power the regime to emerge depends almost entirely on the ideological orientation of the most powerful in countries where democrats enjoyed a decisive power advantage democracy emerged conversely in countries in which dictators maintained a decisive power advantage dictatorship emerged in between these two extremes were countries in which the distribution of power between the old regime and its challengers was relatively equal rather than producing stalemate compromise and parted transitions to democracy however such situations in the postcommunist world resulted in protracted confrontation between relatively balanced powers the regimes that emerged from these modes of transitions are not the most successful democracies but rather are unconsolidated unstable partial democracies

what makes rational peasants revolutionary dilemma paradox and irony in peasant collective action peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to olson s collective action problem this article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles everyday forms of peasant resistance unorganized rural movements and organized peasant rebellions that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined first what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals the level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations peasants demand selective incentives the suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations the authorities and the allies of both a political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market second what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry s collective cause selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective selective incentives alone are counterproductive these questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self interest it is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action the dilemma peasants face or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self interest of none the paradox peasants face or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma for example with selective incentives and participate in collective action and the irony peasants face or that self interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox

the self regulation of commodity exchanges the case of market manipulation influential economists argue that government regulation of manipulative practices in financial markets is unnecessary because exchanges have incentives to take nearly first best precautions against the exercise of market power this article shows that the theoretical arguments underlying this proposition are weak because exchange members are likely to ignore the effects of manipulation on inframarginal traders and price informativeness competition between exchanges may be limited and collective action problems preclude efficient exchange intervention for these reasons exchanges will likely take few precautions against market power an examination of the history of self regulation at 10 exchanges prior to the passage of laws proscribing manipulation shows that they took few if any measures to curb manipulation since the characteristics of manipulation imply that it can be deterred efficiently through the use of harm based sanctions this theory and evidence strongly suggest that self regulation is a

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

trust in triads effects of exit control and learning this paper provides theoretical background for some effects of social networks on trust we study the implications of a model with rational actors in two settings with three actors in the first setting there are two trustees who are involved in transactions with one truster implying that the truster has an exit option in the second setting two trusters play with one trustee which gives the trusters options for voice i e complaining and informing each other about the trustee s behavior we compare these models with a baseline model in which there is only one truster and one trustee it turns out that the opportunities for placing and honoring trust do not change for the exit model compared to the baseline model the opportunities for trust in the voice model differ from the baseline model only if both trusters inform each other at a rate that is high enough only if the possibilities for receiving information and transmitting information are large enough for both trusters trust will increase due to the information exchange possibilities in the voice model

the measurability of budget related rent seeking it has been suggested that the extent of rent seeking expenditures arising from attempts to influence budget allocations should be estimated by the absolute magnitude of the observed changes in allocation instead we argue that it is the extent of theex ante prospective changes that determine the level of rent seeking and that in the presence of countervailing activity these may be quite unrelated to the ex post observed values we further argue that the traditional rent seeking model of competition for a pre specified rent is inappropriate in this context

who should control a corporation toward a contingency stakeholder model for allocating ownership rights a number of companies allocate ownership rights to stakeholders different from shareholders despite the fact that the law attributes these rights to the equity holders this article contributes to an understanding of this evidence by developing a contingency model for the allocation of ownership rights the model sheds light on why companies despite pressures from the law vary in their allocation of ownership rights the model is based on the assumption that corporations increase their chance to survive and prosper if the stakeholders supplying critical contributions receive the ownership rights according to the model critical contributions involve 1 contractual problems due to specific investments long term relationships and low measurability 2 the assumption of the uncertainty resting on the company and 3 the supply of scarce and valuable resources the model is dynamic because it also provides a basis for understanding why the allocation of ownership rights changes with time finally the article presents the strategies companies can use to realize an efficient distribution of ownership rights among their stakeholders

logical deficiencies in spatial models a constructive critique a fundamental property of any good theoryis logical consistency however two commonassumptions in the rational choice approach topolitical analysis that induced preferences overpolicy are separable and that such preferences areindependent of changes in exogenous factors are notconsistent with the archetypal assumptions ofindividual utility maximization these particularpathologies of spatial models of politics have notbeen well recognized in the political scienceliterature

the effect of international environmental institutions how we might learn more analysts of international politics can measure and explain the effect of international environmental institutions on the behavior of states and other actors and on the natural environment in three steps first we measure the outcome to be explained in terms of goal attainment defined as the difference over time or across cases between actor behavior or the state of the natural environment on dimensions identified by institutional goals and certain end points determined by institutional goals second we assess the effect of an institution in terms of the extent to which the existence or operation of the institution contributes ceteris paribus to variation in goal attainment we transform these two variables into a score of institutional effectiveness to indicate the degree to which institutions contribute to the resolution of the environmental problems that motivate their establishment third we analyze the relationship between institutional effectiveness and specific dimensions of institutional design such as decision making rules membership and access conditions and the compliance system

on the strength of corporate cultures abstract we model corporate culture s as production technologies for which employees have to undertake culture specific investments that improve their effectiveness at a later date the organization can adopt cultural changes that make this investment partially redundant this leads to under investment however as agents invest more the organization s opportunity cost of a change increases which in turn increases each agents incentives to invest this externality among agents leads to multiple equilibria otherwise similar organizations can thus exhibit either high investment levels and low probability of changes strong culture or low investment levels and high probability of changes weak culture we also explore some implications for the nature and management of corporate culture

bundling governance mechanisms to efficiently organize small firm loans abstract bank loans are a common source of financing for small firms while scholars have examined specific conditions that affect small firm loan approval and interest rates practical questions remain about how these loans are structured to address characteristically acute challenges from asymmetric information this paper suggests collateral reputation and relationship banking each perform unique exchange organizing tasks and that small firms systematically use them in predictable combinations a multiple discriminant analysis of 796 small firm loans suggests four governance bundles are commonly employed in this setting the implications for managers focus on how loan governance mechanisms are most efficiently bundled together

formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms evidence from technology development projects formal contracting addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via explicit terms designed to achieve incentive alignment alternatively when firms expect to interact repeatedly relational mechanisms may achieve similar results without the associated costs however as we now know from a growing body of theoretical and empirical work the resulting intuition that relational mechanisms will be substituted for formal ones whenever possible does not generally hold the extent to which firms substitute relational mechanisms for formal ones in the presence of repeated interaction is an empirical question that forms the basis of this paper we study a sample of 52 joint technology development contracts in the telecommunications and microelectronics industries and devise a coding scheme to allow empirical comparison of contract terms counter to the above intuition but consistent with recent research we find that a firm s contracts are more detailed and more likely to include penalties when it engages in frequent deals whether with the same or different partners our results suggest complementarity between formal and relational contracts and have implications for optimal contracting particularly in high technology sectors

the law and economics of company stock in 401 k plans abstract some 11 million participants in 401 k plans invest more than 20 percent of their retirement savings in their employer s stock yet investing in the stock of one s employer is risky single securities are riskier than diversified portfolios and an employee s human capital typically is positively correlated with the company s performance in the worst case scenario workers can lose their jobs and much of their retirement wealth simultaneously for workers who expect to work for a company for many years a dollar of company stock can be valued at less than 50 cents after accounting for risk however employees still invest voluntarily in their employer s stock and many employers insist on making matching contributions in stock we provide evidence that employees underestimate the risk of owning company stock while employers overestimate the benefits associated with employee stock ownership we then analyze the likely effects of current and proposed regulations in this context