bookbuilding and strategic allocation in the bookbuilding procedure an investment banker solicits bids for shares from institutional investors prior to pricing an equity issue the banker then prices the issue and allocates shares at his discretion to the investors we examine the books for 39 international equity issues we find that the investment banker awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids regular investors receive favorable allocations especially when the issue is heavily oversubscribed the investment banker also favors revised bids and domestic investors investment banks commonly build a book before pricing an equity issue in the united states it has been standard practice for a number of years in many other countries where fixed price offerings were traditionally used the bookbuilding procedure is becoming increasingly common especially for international equity issues 1 under the formal bookbuilding procedure the investment banker solicits indications of interest from institutional investors such indications consist of a bid for a quantity of shares and might include a maximum price i e a limit price or other details the investment banker uses the information to construct a demand curve the issue price is not set according to any explicit rule but rather based on the banker s interpretation of investors indications of interest he generally sets the price at a level at which demand exceeds supply and then allocates shares to the bidders at his discretion thus the

ipo underpricing and flotation methods in taiwan a stochastic frontier approach adopting stochastic frontier analysis this article studies the pricing model and underpricing phenomenon of the initial public offerings ipos in taiwan and further elucidates the potential impact of offering mechanisms on underpricing the sampling period is from 1996 to 2003 in which 647 ipos are selected empirical results suggest that issuing firms with greater earning potentials less risk or less asymmetric information have lower underpricing furthermore the variables included to explain underpricing are mostly significant especially the proxy variable for flotation method observed mean ipo underpricing is 20 59 in the sample period compared to 17 12 for the subgroup using the auction method this statistically significant difference implies that the introduction of the auction method can help reduce ipo underpricing

testing informational assumptions in common value bidding models this paper provides an example of a means of linking mathematical theory laboratory experiments and standard empirical work theory by necessity abstracts from the naturally occurring world and experiments designed to test theory must incorporate the same abstractions on the other hand empirical tests are generally performed on naturallyoccurring data which may not reflect those same abstractions given this possible divergence naturally occurring data should be tested for consistency with theoretical assumptions whenever possible on the basis of standard symmetric bidding theory this paper reports on a preliminary version of such a test for off shore oil bidding data

contestability in real time experimental flow markets this article reports the results from laboratory markets using a new trading institution in which sellers post offers to sell flows of output in real time we use the new institution to examine the outcomes in natural monopoly experimental markets no stable price outcomes were observed in markets contestable by two firms a finding that is consistent with the contestable markets hypothesis but in conflict with assertions commonly made by those advancing the theory s role in policy formation the average efficiency of markets contestable by two firms while greater than that of monopoly markets protected from entry was significantly less than that associated with the sustainable equilibrium

robust trading mechanisms we consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information it is shown that posted price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy a posted price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

mechanisms for incentive regulation theory and experiment this article develops the theoretical properties of a new incentive mechanism for regulating a monopoly seller and reports the results of laboratory experimental tests of its behavioral properties the design of the new mechanism draws upon the results of our earlier experimental research on the behavioral properties of two other mechanisms one by loeb and magat 1979 and a second by finsinger and vogelsang 1981 as with finsinger and vogelsang the new mechanism weakens loeb and magat s requirement that regulators have complete knowledge of market demand the new mechanism however is not subject to the destabilizing profit destroying cycles of nonoptimal behavior observed with finsinger and vogelsang s

high tech firms and credit rationing abstract informational frictions between borrowers and lenders differ across classes of borrowers innovative firms undertake high risk high return projects which are likely to be little understood by financial intermediaries as a consequence they may end up allocating too large a share of funds to traditional low risk low return projects this proposition finds some support in a cross section of italian manufacturing firms using several proxies to classify firms into high tech and low tech groups and direct information on each firm s access to bank credit high tech firms are found to be more likely to be credit constrained than low tech firms the results suggest that the responsiveness of r d expenditure to cash flow found in the literature is likely due to pervasive credit constraints on innovative firms rather than to cash flow proxying for future expectations the paper also sheds light on the main factors affecting the probability of a firm being rationed in the credit market

efficient collective decision making marginal cost pricing and quadratic voting we discuss the mechanisms related to quadratic voting from vickrey s counter speculation mechanism and his second price auction through the family of groves mechanisms and its most notable member the clarke mechanism to the expected externality mechanism goeree and zhang s mechanism the groves ledyard mechanism and the hylland zeckhauser mechanism we show that each mechanism that involves collective decisions has a quadratic aspect and that all of the mechanisms that we discuss are applications of the fundamental insight that for a process to be efficient all parties involved must bear the marginal social costs of their actions

market structure and discrimination the case of small businesses this paper examines bank market structure to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small businesses the authors analyze credit application and denial rates loans outstanding and interest rates across demographic groups this set of variables in combination with information on local bank market structure helps them distinguish among borrower preferences lender tastes and inadequate lender information as likely causes of differences in credit market experiences of small business operators from distinct demographic groups the authors find that white men and women can expect similar treatment in credit markets with some benefits to female owned firms located in concentrated banking markets minorities by contrast fare worse than whites moreover by appealing to becker s 1957 classic theories we find some clear evidence to support the view that prejudicial discrimination is at least partly to blame

ethnic networks and access to credit evidence from the manufacturing sector in kenya it is often anecdotally observed that networks can facilitate exchange but there are few empirical studies that explore the significance of such networks in this paper the authors analyze the impact of ethnic networks on access to finance of kenyan firms using an exceptionally rich data set the authors find that ethnicity does not affect access to formal sources of finance but being a member of an ethnic group is significant in explaining access to informal sources of finance like supplier credit the authors interpret these results in terms of information and contract enforcement mechanisms that work within ethnic groups but not across them

surplus extraction and competition a competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have correlated private information about their valuations in contrast to the monopoly case where sellers charge entry fees and extract all buyers surplus it is shown that in the unique symmetric equilibrium with competition sellers hold second price auctions with reserve prices set equal to their cost most important it is a best reply for sellers not to charge entry fees of the kind normally used to extract surplus even though it is feasible for them to do so

the effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade abstract mindful of the market structure conduct performance paradigm fundamental to industrial organization research this paper uses laboratory experimental techniques to study the impact of conspiratorial opportunities on market performance we compare posted offer markets where sellers but not buyers are all conspiratorial opportunities with observations from three control groups 1 posted offer markets without conspiratorial opportunities 2 double auction markets with conspiratorial opportunities and 3 posted offer markets with true single seller monopolists the basic conclusions generated by our experimental design are 1 seller conspiracies in posted offer markets tend to raise prices but not profits relative to similarly organized markets without conspiracies 2 posted offer conspiracies tend to generate higher prices but not profits than double auction conspiracies and 3 posted offer monopolies tend to generate higher profits but not prices then posted offer conspiracies

market contestability in the presence of sunk entry costs this article extends previous laboratory experimental research to examine the competitive discipline of contested markets with a natural monopoly type cost structure where sunk costs are neither zero nor infinite several alternative conjectures as to how or whether sunk costs can weaken the discipline of contested markets are presented and interpreted in the context of the experimental design sunk costs are found to weaken the support for strong interpretations of the contestable markets hypothesis and thus yield a wide diversity of dynamic patterns of market performance yet the disciplining power of contestability remains impressive with no indications of sustained monopoly pricing

do firms get the financing they want measuring credit rationing experienced by small businesses in the u s this paper measures the extent to which small businesses in the united states in the late 1980s were able to access the external credit finance they desired we argue that a comprehensive definition of credit rationing must account for both a creditworthy firms that apply for and are denied financing and b creditworthy firms that decide not to apply for desired external financing given expectations about how long it may take to obtain financing and the evolution of investment opportunities

no deep pockets some stylized empirical results on firms financial constraints this paper is a survey of recent empirical work on financial constraints faced by firms it is organized as a series of stylized results which mirror what is generally understood about the severity of financial constraints and the effects that they have upon firms the review of the literature shows that a financial constraints are a widespread key concern for firms hindering their ability to carry out their optimal investment and growth trajectories and b the severity of such constraints depends on institutional and firm specific characteristics as well as on the nature of investment projects

regulation by price adjustment the regulatory price adjustment process originally proposed by vogelsang and finsinger has been shown to be vulnerable to strategic manipulation by the regulated firm this article proposes several modifications to that scheme which improve its performance and broaden its applicability inclusion of a monopoly franchise market and the firm s past prices and earnings in the price adjustment constraints are shown to ensure efficient production by the firm and convergence to ramsey prices regardless of the firm s cost structure

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

mortgage lending in boston interpreting hmda data the home mortgage disclosure act was enacted to monitor minority and low income access to the mortgage market the data collected for this purpose show that minorities are more than twice as likely to be denied a mortgage as whites yet variables correlated with both race and creditworthiness were omitted from these data making any conclusion about race s role in mortgage lending impossible the federal reserve bank of boston collected additional variables important to the mortgage lending decision and found that race continued to play an important though significantly diminished role in the decision to grant a mortgage copyright 1996 by american economic association

the role of personal wealth in small business finance abstract this paper provides new empirical evidence on the relationship between personal commitments and the allocation of small business credit the data suggest that personal commitments are important for firms seeking certain types of loans guarantees are more prevalent than collateral and organization type corporate versus noncorporate status appears to be particularly important in determining commitment use no systematic relationship is observed between commitment use and owner wealth personal commitments appear to be substitutes for business collateral at least for lines of credit while personal collateral and personal guarantees do not seem to substitute for each other personal commitments have generally become more important to small business lending since the late 1980s

who is credit constrained in the u s economy an important assumption of the life cycle model of consumption is the postulate of perfect capital markets this hypothesis has recently been challenged by substantial empirical evidence hall and mishkin 1982 using the panel study of income dynamics estimate that 20 percent of united states families are liquidity constrained mariger 1986 derives a life cycle model with endogenous liquidity constraints and using a cross section estimates this fraction to be 19 4 percent hubbard and judd 1986 simulate a model with a constraint on net worth which shows that with reasonable assumptions about preferences 19 0 percent of united states consumers are liquidity constrained the emerging consensus points therefore to a fraction of approximately 20 percent of the population behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with the pure life cycle model in addition hayashi 1985 and zeldes 1989 investigate the correlation among consumption wealth and income for various population groups and infer that liquidity constraints are more important for younger families with low levels of wealth and saving the main limitation of these studies is that in their data sets constrained consumers are not observable and have to be identified via indirect evidence thus there is as yet little firm evidence about the characteristics of the consumers who are likely to be credit constrained this paper adopts an approach that differs from previous tests for liquidity constraints because it makes use of data where constrained consumers are observable and explicitly links their existence to credit market imperfections and personal characteristics the data drawn from the 1983 survey of consumer finances scf and described in section ii provide information on individuals whose request for credit has been rejected by financial intermediaries in section iii a model is developed in which consumers and lenders behavior jointly determines the probability that a consumer is rationed in the credit market this probability is then

laboratory subjects as multiproduct monopoly firms an experimental investigation abstract previous experimental research demonstrates that market responses of laboratory subjects as monopoly firms converge to theoretic predictions this research increases the complexity of market decisions facing such subjects each subject is established as a multiproduct monopoly firm capable of producing two distinct goods in this environment the seller must select a selling strategy from limited alternatives and offer prices results show that market responses of subjects are more likely to converge to multiproduct monopoly model predictions when strategy options are relatively simple or when greater rewards are present results are consistent with profit maximizing behavior

start up capital does gender matter female and male entrepreneurs differ in the way they finance their businesses this difference can be attributed to the type of business and the type of management and experience of the entrepreneur indirect effect female start ups may also experience specific barriers when trying to acquire start up capital these may be based upon discriminatory effects direct effect whether gender has an impact on size and composition of start up capital and in what way is the subject of the present paper the indirect effect is represented by the way women differ from men in terms of type of business and management and experience the direct effect cannot be attributed to these differences and is called the gender effect we use of a panel of 2000 dutch starting entrepreneurs of whom approximately 500 are female to test for these direct and indirect effects the panel refers to the year 1994 we find that female entrepreneurs have a smaller amount of start up capital but that they do not differ significantly with respect to the type of capital on average the proportion of equity and debt capital bank loans in the businesses of female entrepreneurs is the same as in those of their male counterparts

business starters and credit rationing this paper investigates which business starters experience credit rationing by simultaneously analyzing which business founders apply for credit and which are refused we argue that credit denial depends largely on the entrepreneurs commitment and signals regarding the repayment of the loan and the success chances of the proposed business our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 1140 potential business starters in the dutch county south limburg our findings show that commitments drive the credit application and approval while the effects of signals are mixed the findings also suggest that business founders have a pretty good idea regarding whether their applications will be honored or not

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

monopoly behaviour decentralized regulation and contestable markets an experimental evaluation this study provides a comparative experimental evaluation of several alternative approaches to the single product monopoly problem we contrast incentive compatible decentralized regulatory mechanisms with notions of market contestability in a decreasing cost environment the decentralized regulatory mechanisms are found to be significantly more effective at restraining monopoly power than is allowing direct contestability but the regulatory mechanisms examined require that the regulatory agency know the market demand curve though not the industry cost curve since this is significantly more information than is required to implement direct contestability an interesting tradeoff is suggested does the greater efficiency in monopoly restraint provided by the regulatory mechanism relative to direct contestability outweigh the former s greater informational requirements

bookbuilding how informative is the order book we examine the institutional bids submitted under the bookbuilding procedure for a sample of international equity issues we find that information in bids which include a limit price especially those of large and frequent bidders affects the issue price oversubscription has a smaller but significant effect for ipos public information affects the issue price to the extent that it is reflected in the bids oversubscription and demand elasticity are positively correlated with the first day aftermarket return and demand elasticity is negatively correlated with aftermarket volatility our results support the view that bookbuilding is designed to extract information from investors

bookbuilding vs fixed price an analysis of competing strategies for marketing ipos we compare two mechanisms for selling ipos the fixed price method and american book building when investors have correlated information and can observe each other s subscription decisions in this environment the fixed price method is a strategy that can create cascading demand alternatively an underwriter building a book aggregates investor information into the offer price we find that bookbuilding generates higher expected proceeds but exposes the issuer to greater uncertainty and that it provides the option to sell additional shares that are not underpriced on the margin

contestable markets an uprising in the theory of industry structure presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th meeting of the american economic association on december 29 1981 discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry ebsco

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

an experimental test for risk aversion abstract this paper evaluates an experimental method to measure attitudes to risk in individual subjects the method is applied to study the degree of risk aversion of 46 subjects the results lead us to reject a working hypothesis of risk neutrality for such experimental subjects

preplay communication participation restrictions and efficiency in initial public offerings the extent to which the observed procedures for selling new issues are efficient is studied we show that a posted price mechanism in conjunction with nonbinding preplay communication and participation restrictions leads to an allocation of the security and payment that maximizes the seller s expected revenue given the informational constraints imposed by the optimizing incentives of the potential buyers article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

new firm growth and bank financing this paper examines the extent to which lucas ideas on human capital and jovanovic theorising on learning can provide further insights into the development of small firms it focuses exclusively upon newly established independent firms our evidence from two surveys is that bank lending to new firms is unrelated to many of the personal characteristics of founders which have been argued by other researchers to relate to small firm performance instead lending appears to be more related to whether or not the founder can or chooses to use personal savings and the legal status of the business

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

on public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget abstract consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible dsic ex post individually rational epir and ex post budget balanced epbb it is well known that if there are only two agents then any such mechanism must have a threshold or fixed cost sharing form providing the public good if and only if both agents have values that are at least their respective thresholds when there are more than two agents there are mechanisms that are dsic epir and epbb that are not of the threshold form any dsic epir and epbb mechanism that additionally satisfies that the lowest types expect zero net utility from participating are again of the threshold form this additional condition arises endogenously when maximizing expected welfare subject to dsic epir and epbb

signalling by underpricing in the ipo market abstract empirical evidence suggests the existence of hot issue markets for initial public offerings in certain periods and in certain industries new issues are underpriced and rationing occurs this paper develops a model consistent with this observation which assumes the firm itself best knows its prospects in certain circumstances firms with the most favorable prospects find it optimal to signal their type by underpricing their initial issue of shares and investors know that only the best can recoup the cost of this signal from subsequent issues

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

predatory pricing in a multiple market experiment a note abstract isaac and smith 1985a b present a strong behavioral case that predatory pricing is not an observable laboratory phenomenon we propose several modifications of their design resulting in a multiple market experiment in which predatory pricing is present the primary modification involves conducting several markets concurrently providing an active escape opportunity for any prey and a potential reward to a reputation for predation these results provide a behavioral existence proof for the predatory pricing phenomenon they do not address the issue of the phenomenon s behavioral robustness

an empirical approach to the financial behaviour of small and medium sized companies this paper shows how the financial behaviour of small and medium sized companies is influenced by size and business sector this idea underlies two research approaches to capital structure i credit rationing and ii the pecking order theory both approaches are based on asymmetric information and have been widely developed over the past two decades an analysis has been carried out on 1000 valencian companies that were randomly selected from the state company registry these companies were divided by size before analysis as an innovation the investigation implements a multivariate manova model that takes into account two key variables in the financing of small and medium firms our results show that size influences company self financing strategies and that business sector influences short term financial policy

the latent demand for bank debt characterizing discouraged borrowers concerns that small firms encounter credit constraints are well entrenched in the literature despite widespread empirical evidence that a relatively small proportion of small firms have their loan applications rejected however many firms may be discouraged from applying for fear of rejection these businesses are the focus of this paper based on responses to a large scale postal survey of uk small and medium sized enterprises smes we find that twice as many businesses were discouraged from applying for a bank loan than had their loan request denied more particularly we observe a number of distinguishing characteristics of discouraged borrowers relative to applicants these include strategy sector prior entrepreneurial experience and banking relationships the implications of our findings for policy and future research are briefly discussed

intra experimental income effects and risk aversion abstract harrison s 1986 modification of the bekker degroot and marshak 1964 mechanism for eliciting risk preferences is employed to test the hypotheses of expected utility theory with respect to changes in income increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion subjects in the laboratory are shown to exhibit such behavior

initial public offering discount and competition abstract lacking examples of initial public offering ipo mechanisms that are open to the public and priced competitively previous studies could not determine what size discount if any is economically efficient we compare two pricing regimes on the tel aviv stock exchange an investor driven dutch auction limited by a binding maximum price replaced by one that is free of that constraint our evidence shows that rationing and herding disappear improving the access of uninformed investors to strong issues and alleviating their exposure to losses attached to weak issues pricing quality increases by the elimination of the underpricing bias decreased price dispersion and increased price sensitivity to ipo unique factors underwriter services do not deteriorate but garner moderately higher fees apparently to compensate for a higher risk consistently there is no deterioration in ipo efficiency as a screen from weak issues our evidence does not support the view that underpricing is competitive or eff

contestability in the presence of an alternate market an experimental examination most earlier experimental tests ofthe contestable market hypothesis assume a zero opportunity cost of entry this design feature makes interpretation of results in terms of entry behavior problematic the experimental study that i report tests contestability with the addition of an alternate market that yields a positive profit with certainty this safe haven operationalizes a positive opportunity cost of entry hit and run entry is observed in the experiments adjusted mean prices are not significantly different from the zero opportunity cost case two methodological questions are also examined in one treatment sellers price offers are allowed only in 0 25 increments the simplification of the sellers decision space makes collusive arrangements more probable secondly market outcomes using human subject buyers are compared with outcomes from experiments with computer simulated demand the disciplining effect of human subject buyers results in market prices that converge to competitive levels more quickly the theory of contestable markets as presented by william baumol in his 1981 address as outgoing president of the american economic association has received considerable attention since its introduction the thesis of contestability is that we can model a market that attains a competitive outcome without the large numbers price taking assumption in the perfectly contestable market envisioned by baumol and others we would observe the efficient competitive price in equilibrium even with few or only one active seller the threat of entry is the disciplining force that sustains the efficient price as an equilibrium previous experimental tests of the contestable market hypothesis for the natural monopoly case all include at least two active firms pricing in every period the laboratory outcomes of these markets are indistinguishable from the destructive competition that has historically concerned scholars sharkey 1982 one can assert that the competitive prices that result from these natural monopoly markets are due to cutthroat competition because that market is the only game in town the study of the contestable natural monopoly that i report allows subjects the option of earning a normal rate of return in an alternate market thus there is at least the possibility that we can observe a single active seller choosing the efficient price

coordination and externalities abstract we analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly we consider a general multi agent situation with externalities among agents incomplete information and type dependent reservation utilities when the regulator optimally leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents centralized coordination reduces global activity coordination induces more activity when the principal optimally leaves rents to the most inefficient agents last if we impose budget balance our mechanism can also be interpreted as the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d62 d82 l51

are business startups debt rationed using a large random sample of u k start ups and a rich data set the paper demonstrates that human capital is the true determinant of survival and that the correlation between financial capital and survival is spurious provision of finance is demand driven with banks supplying funds elastically and business requests governing take up firms self select for funds on the basis of the human capital endowments of the proprietors with better businesses more likely to borrow a reason why others have seemingly identified start up debt gaps may be the failure to test a sufficiently rich empirical model copyright 1996 by royal economic society

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

natural monopoly and contested markets some experimental results a firm may become a monopolist because the average cost of producing the product reaches a minimum at an output rate that is big enough to satisfy the entire market at a price that is profitable in a situation of this sort if there is more than one firm producing the product each must be producing at a higher thanminimum level of average cost each may be inclined to cut the price to increase its output rate and reduce its average costs the result is likely to be economic warfare and the survival of a single victor the monopolist

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

risk attitudes in first price auction experiments a bayesian analysis non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to risk or are all risk neutral this paper constructs an explicit bayesian prior distribution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsiders the experimental results it finds that observed bidding behavior is still inconsistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk attitudes thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents archetypical of this result is the nash equilibrium prediction for first price auctions for an object that is valued by agents in an independent and private manner received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to riskor are all risk neutral in this paper we construct an explicit prior distrlbution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsider the experimental results we find that observed bidding behavior is indeed consistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk aversion however when one allows for risk loving subjects as well observed behavior is inconsistent with nash predictions thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes in section i we consider a specific nash equilibrium ne bidding model due to cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1988 that clearly illustrates the risk sensitivity of the theoretical predictions in section ii we provide independent evidence of the risk attitudes of experimental subjects in a test for risk attitudes developed by harrison 1986a this evidence allows us to construct an explicit prior probability density function over the coefficient of constant relative risk attitudes employed in the specific bidding model of section i in section iii we reconsider the evidence from the first price fp experiments reported in cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1983a 1983b i a specific bidding model cox roberson and smith 1982 hereafter crs present a model based on a power function utility specification for agent i ui y y 1 received for publication august 31 1987 revision accepted for publication december 18 1989 university of south carolina i am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments although they are not responsible for my conclusions

litigation risk intermediation and the underpricing of initial public offerings we formally examine the role of litigation risk in initial public offering ipo pricing the underwriter s pricing decision trades off current revenue against expected future litigation costs both of which are increasing in the ipo price given a time consistency constraint and rational expectations on the part of investors however the standard litigation risk argument does not lead to equilibrium underpricing we develop a richer model that provides sufficient conditions under which there is equilibrium underpricing the issuer s choice of employing an underwriter versus floating the ipo on its own is examined and various testable implications of the model are developed article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

racial and gender discrimination in the micro firms credit market evidence from trinidad and tobago this paper examines the market for loans from banks to micro and small enterprises in trinidad and tobago it tests for the presence of racial and gender discrimination it takes the reported refusal to grant loans to groups when all other indicators of credit worthiness are taken into account as evidence of discrimination the paper distinguishes between application and denial rates it finds that once all other indicators of credit worthiness are taken into account neither application nor denial rates differ significantly by gender reported denial rates are however higher for africans compared with other ethnic groups implying the possible presence of discrimination

collateral relationship lending and family firms prior research suggested that relationship lending could play a role in solving asymmetric information problems between borrower and lender other studies suggest a relationship between family ownership and the shareholder bondholder agency conflict the present paper investigates the impact of relationship characteristics family ownership and their interaction effects upon the use of collateral in sme lending we examine the determinants of collateral as well as the determinants of the choice between business and personal collateral using decision tree analysis the results reveal that relationship characteristics have a significant influence but not always in the direction as expected moreover they do not seem to be the primary determinants in our classification models the most important determinants in both classification models seem to be the loan amount total assets and the family versus non family firm distinction in addition we differentiate between line of credit and non line of credit loans and find significant differences between these decision trees

a theory of discouraged borrowers this paper examines the implications for the sme financing market of application costs that vary between firms and of imperfect screening of applicants by banks under these conditions discouraged borrowers can exist these are good borrowers who do not apply for a bank loan because they feel they will be rejected the paper shows that under a range of assumptions the scale of discouragement in an economy depends upon the screening error of the banks the scale of application costs and the extent to which the bank interest rate differs from that charged by the moneylender discouragement is shown to be at a maximum where there is some but not perfect information