r d investments under endogenous cluster formation abstract we provide an innovative theory based explanation for the positive relationship between firms r d intensity and their degree of r d cooperation we show that when oligopolistic firms decide on long term r d investment before forming research clusters among competitors investment incentives are increased by the desire to become a member of an attractive cluster this can result in over investment compared to the welfare optimum and compared to a scenario where research clusters are ex ante fixed thereby as a theoretical contribution we fully characterize the equilibria of the unanimity game on cluster formation with heterogeneous firms

evaluating greening farm policies a structural model for assessing agri environmental subsidies this study uses a structural econometric model to evaluate the impacts of support from a european union agri environmental program designed to reduce nutrient pollution from agricultural land drawing on a representative sample of individual grain farms we first quantify the effects of agri environmental payments on farms decisions on land allocation and on fertilizer use we then combine the predicted land allocation and fertilizer use with environmental production functions to quantify the impact on nutrient loading finally we assess the monetary value of reduced nutrient pollution drawing on a recent valuation study

hybrid r d we develop a model of r d collaboration in which individual firms carry out in house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non core activities with other firms we develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which r d investments in different projects of a firm are complementary we show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models we then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits in this context we identify a second aspect of complementarity equilibrium investments in in house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects however we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

the effect of entry on r d networks we investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of r d networks considering farsighted firms we show that the presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbent firms to establish an r d link in particular incumbent firms may choose to form an otherwise undesirable r d collaboration in order to deter the entry of a new firm moreover an incumbent firm may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable r d collaboration expecting to form a more profitable r d link with the entrant finally potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market we also perform a welfare analysisand show that market and societal incentives are often misaligned

estimating a brand level demand system for american cheese products to evaluate unilateral and coordinated market power strategies the advantage of this method compared to baker and bresnahan p 432 is that it does not constrain the conduct of the manager in their analysis they assume that the manager proportionally varies the quantity of each brand market shares remain constant once one has the unilateral total and fully collusive elasticities one can analyze the this paper was presented at the assa winter meetings atlanta ga january 2002 papers in these sessions are not subjected to the journal s standard refereeing process ronald w cotterill is professor of agricultural economics at the university of connecticut department of agricultural and resource economics he is currently director of the food marketing policy center and editor of agribusiness an international journal pierre o samson completed a master of science degree in agricultural economics at the university of connecticut in 2000

costing an international public good the case of the baltic sea abstract the paper discusses an economically efficient and internationally equitable provision of a specific public good the good in question the baltic sea satisfies a number of needs but economic values implied may be different in various countries polluting and using the sea the level of eutrophication has been identified as a key characteristic of the baltic sea relevant for its value the chander tulkens model of cost sharing is used to determine a hypothetical allocation of abatement costs across the countries around the sea the application of the model is based on estimates of national abatement costs as well as national willingness to pay for reduced eutrophication estimating willingness to pay in a collection of countries some of which undergo a transition from centrally planned systems has been the main challenge of this study the results were derived from a coordinated series of contingent valuation surveys in lithuania poland and sweden combined with benefit transfer studies to cover the rest of the region predictions of cost sharing schemes obtained from the chander tulkens model are confronted with actual data on abatement expenditures and international assistance several recommendations on how to optimize the baltic wide programmes conclude the paper

estimating the environmental impact of land and production decisions with multivariate selection rules and panel data we propose an estimation procedure dealing with multivariate selection and dynamics in land choice and unobserved heterogeneity in structural and crop selection equations the method is applied to a multi output profit function with multiple corner solutions and farm level panel data estimation results reveal that the single selection rule associated with the tobit procedure is rejected in favor of our multivariate selection treatment inconsistent estimates are expected with the tobit procedure or if farmer fixed effects are omitted which can have important consequences for policy recommendations as illustrated in an evaluation of nitrogen runoff elasticities with respect to economic variables copyright 2011 oxford university press

structural agricultural land use modeling for spatial agro environmental policy analysis this paper develops a spatially disaggregated structural econometric model of agricultural land use and production based on the joint multi output technology representation introduced by chambers and just 1989 starting from a flexible specification of the farm profit function we derive land use allocation input application crop yield and livestock intensity equations in a joint and theoretically consistent framework to account for the presence of censored observations in micro level data the model is estimated as a system of two limit tobit equations via quasi maximum likelihood we present an empirical application using fine scale spatial data covering the entirety of england and wales and including the main economic policy and environmental drivers of land use change in the past forty years a simulation of the effects of diffuse pollution reduction measures illustrates how our approach can be applied for agro environmental policy appraisal

cooperative and noncooperative r d in an oligopoly with spillovers this paper examines the positive and normative effects of cooperative r d whereby member firms commit themselves to the joint profit maximizing level of r d in a precompetitive stage but remain fierce competitors in the product market vis a vis noncooperative r d socially first best r d and socially second best r d in the presence of sufficiently large r d spillovers neither noncooperative nor cooperative equilibria achieve even second best r d levels in the absence of spillover effects however while the cooperative r d level remains socially insufficient the noncooperative level may overshoot first and second best levels of r d copyright 1992 by american economic association

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers abstract we examine the endogenous formation of research coalitions with high spillovers among symmetric firms members of a research coalition set their r and d investments in order to maximize the aggregate profits of members of their coalition the exclusive membership rule supports a more concentrated coalition structure and thus leads to higher industry r and d investments for high spillovers than the open membership rule does however due to free riding problems the grand research coalition which is the socially efficient outcome is rarely an equilibrium outcome under either rule our results suggest that government subsidies to research consortia for basic research with high spillovers can improve social welfare by encouraging wider participation to a research consortium that is by alleviating free rider problems in coalition formation from a more theoretical viewpoint our results on stable coalition structures are applicable to a wide variety of economic coalitions with positive externalities

r d networks we develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition firms incentives to invest in r d and the architecture of collaboration networks in the absence of firm rivalry the complete network where each firm collaborates with all others is uniquely stable industry profit maximizing and efficient by contrast under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint this suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links

choosing organizational modes of strategic technology partnering international and sectoral differences this paper focuses on international strategic technology partnerships and the choice that companies have in terms of the organizational mode either through complex inter organizational modes involving equity sharing or contractual non equity alliances the empirical results show that the choice of particular mode of cooperation varies with the technological characteristics of sectors of industry joint ventures are disproportionately represented in relatively mature industries contractual alliances dominate strategic technology partnering in so called high tech industries

from exogenous to endogenous economic networks internet applications economic agents behaviour is affected by their position in a network either exogenous or endogenous in which they interact with a sub set of neighbours only the network s links which may be generated by vertical and or horizontal relations or by more complex morphologies may explain the transition between dynamic equilibria and the instability of economic aggregates moreover networks shape strategic interaction among agents by determining their strategies the problem of access and interconnection particularly relevant in the internet is perhaps the best example a two way feedback between strategies and network structures arises instead when links are endogenous those features are clearly shown in the mechanism underlying the formation of peering links an dr d networks

strong and weak links many of the interesting issues in the economics of networks information transmission individual incentives with local externalities investments in connections and the structure of complex networks have to do with the quality of links between individuals entities however most of the research to date has assumed a one zero formulation of connections i argue that it is possible to write down tractable models of quality of links and that analyzing such models yields fresh insights into these issues jel c72 d85 z13

farm level production effects from participation in government commodity programs did the 1996 federal agricultural improvement and reform act make a difference in theory lump sum transfers are a way to redistribute wealth without distorting production decisions recent agricultural policy reforms are an unusual large scale application of this concept the 1996 federal agricultural improvement and reform fair act removed most price contingent agricultural subsidies and replaced them with production flexibility contracts lump sum payments with few ties to farmers production decisions the payments were envisioned as way to maintain income transfers to agricultural interests while minimizing production distortions the united states has argued that these decoupled agricultural payments are minimally trade distorting usda ers there is a great deal of uncertainty about how the system of agricultural payments established under the 1996 reforms affects production some including representatives from developing nations with domestic agricultural sectors that compete with the united states contend that decoupled payments significantly affect agricultural production and trade two general arguments underpin this assertion first decoupled payments are not really lump sum that is despite the reforms important links to production remain for example there are restrictions in the fair act that preclude new vegetable plantings or the conversion of land to nonagricultural uses second the perfect market assumptions underpinning the

from microlevel decisions to landscape changes an assessment of agricultural conservation policies the growth in conservation programs has created a need for modeling frameworks capable of measuring microlevel behavioral responses and macrolevel landscape changes this paper presents an empirical model that predicts farmers production practices and the resulting levels of agricultural runoffs at more than 42 000 agricultural sites in the upper mississippi river basin under alternative conservation policies results suggest that payments for conservation tillage and crop rotations increase the use of these conservation practices however the acreage response is inelastic and the programs are not likely to be cost effective on their own for addressing hypoxia problem in the gulf of mexico

taking the dogma out of econometrics structural modeling and credible inference without a doubt there has been a credibility revolution in applied econometrics one contributing development has been in the improvement and increased use in data analysis of structural methods that is the use of models based in economic theory structural modeling attempts to use data to identify the parameters of an underlying economic model based on models of individual choice or aggregate relations derived from them structural estimation has a long tradition in economics but better and larger data sets more powerful computers improved modeling methods faster computational techniques and new econometric methods such as those mentioned above have allowed researchers to make significant improvements while angrist and pischke extol the successes of empirical work that estimates treatment effects based on actual or quasi experiments they are much less sanguine about structural analysis and hold industrial organization up as an example where progress is less dramatic indeed reading their article one comes away with the impression that there is only a single way to conduct credible empirical analysis this seems to us a very narrow and dogmatic approach to empirical work credible analysis can come in many guises both structural and nonstructural and for some questions structural analysis offers important advantages in this comment we address the criticism of structural analysis and its use in industrial organization and consider why empirical analysis in industrial organization differs in such striking ways from that in fields such as labor which have recently emphasized the methods favored by angrist and pischke

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

estimation of area elasticities from a standard profit function this article demonstrates that both crop area and output elasticities can be calculated from a profit function a chambers just profit function which includes land allocations as quasi fixed factors is used to derive shadow price equations for each crop area allocation jointly solving these shadow price equations for crop area makes it possible to calculate individual crop area elasticities a profit function is specified to represent agricultural producers in the state of iowa shadow price equations are jointly estimated with output supply and input demand equations from these estimated equations we derive the individual crop area response and output response to a change in prices

networks of knowledge among unionized firms we develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of r d networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry whenever firms settle wages the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough however when unions settle wages the complete network is the unique stable network in other words the stronger the union bargaining power is the more symmetric stable r d networks will be in terms of network efficiency the partially connected network when firms settle wages does not pareto dominate the complete network when unions settle wages and vice versa

public policy towards r d in oligopolistic industries the importance of determining optimal policy towards r d cannot be exaggerated given the worldwide interest in fostering r d and given the significant differences between european and u s policies towards interfirm cooperation on r d moreover the problem is an inherently difficult one because of the complex nature of the r d process since r d is a component of fixed costs industries where it is important tend to be concentrated hence r d policy must go hand in hand with competition policy at the same time r d is like any form of investment in that it precedes the production stage hence issues of time consistency and strategic commitment inevitably arise in considering the choice of r d policy finally r d by one firm typically leads to spillovers wbich benefit other firms so that r d exhibits many of the character department of economics university college dublin belfield dublin 4 ireiatid for helpful discussions and comments we are grateful to two anonymous referees to pedro bartos steve martin massimo motta and damien neven and to participants at seminars in birmingham st andrew s and warwick at a cepr workshop on r d spillovers in lausanne at erwit 94 in caslel gandolfo eea 95 in prague the 1996 conference on industrial economics at universidad carlos iii de madrid and a meeting of the dublin economics workshop this paper was produced as part of the international economic performance programme of the centre for economic performance london school of economics supported by the u k esrc an earlier version was circulated as cepr discussion paper no 1243 see alexis jacquemin 1988 and stephen martin 1996 istics of a public good albeit one that is mostly privately produced tbe degree to which such spillovers occur and can be internalized is another crucial influence on the desirable pattem of intervention