a mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms in this paper a mixed oligopoly model is considered in which a state owned public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms previous articles on mixed oligopoly did not include foreign private firms the effect on the equilibrium involves a lower price and a different allocation of production relative to the case when all private firms are domestically owned in addition issues such as the effects of an open door policy allowing foreign firms to enter and the effects of foreign acquisition of domestic firms are discussed

effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly abstract in a mixed oligopoly an increase in tax ad valorem or specific does not change total output but increases the output of the public firm and the tax revenue also privatization may increase both tax revenue and welfare

efficiency and privatisation in imperfectly competitive industries if a public firm is managed less efficiently than private producers facing similar conditions then privatisation will increase the overall efficiency of the industry and benefit society this paper challenges this apparently innocuous conclusion as long as the private firms efficiency improves as a result of competition then it will also be higher when they are subjected to unfair competition from a public oligopolist with no budget constraint we show that it may happen that the loss in efficiency due to the relatively inefficient public firm is more than compensated by gains in the efficiency of the private firms

some empirical evidence on the effects of shocks to monetary policy on exchange rates this paper investigates the effects of shocks to u s monetary policy on exchange rates we consider three measures of these shocks orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the romer and romer index of monetary policy in sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates specifically according to our results a contractionary shock to u s monetary policy leads to i persistent significant appreciations in u s nominal and real exchange rates and ii significant persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of u s interest rates

trade policy and mixed enterprises this paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments in the case of rivalry in the home market the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive for the case of cournot rivalry in a third market the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership while in the case of bertrand rivalry with differentiated products the optimal export tax increases

how do fiscal and technology shocks affect real exchange rates new evidence for the united states abstract using vector autoregressions on u s time series relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries this paper provides new evidence on the dynamic effects of government spending and technology shocks on the real exchange rate and the terms of trade to achieve identification we derive robust restrictions on the sign of several impulse responses from a two country general equilibrium model we find that both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade whose responses are left unrestricted depreciate in response to expansionary government spending shocks and appreciate in response to positive technology shocks

openness central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio traditional explanations of the negative correlation between openness and inflation presume that an inverse relationship between the degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio reduces the inflation bias of descretionary monetary policy temple 2002 concludes however that such a relationship fails to emerge in cross country data our analysis of the same cross country data considered by temple indicates that once the degree of central bank independence and its interaction with greater openness and the sacrifice ratio in addition increased openness lessens the positive effect of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio

capital flows in the euro area and target2 balances abstract this paper explores how the uneven recourse by national banking systems in the euro area to the ecb s unconventional refinancing operations that led to the accumulation of large target2 balances at the ncbs has contributed to the evolution of aggregate economic activity in important member states of the euro area for the period between 2008 and 2014 we estimate a panel var model and identify the structural shocks by means of sign restrictions our results suggest that the build up of target2 balances was driven mainly by capital flow shocks while being barely responsive to other aggregate shocks furthermore on the basis of counterfactual experiments we find that the ability to build up sizeable target2 liabilities has contributed substantially to avoiding deeper recessions in the distressed euro area member countries like spain italy ireland and portugal while to a smaller extent depressing aggregate economic activity in core member states such as germany the netherlands and finland

reform of the coal sector in an open economy the case of china cheap abundant and easy to transport and store coal has been produced and consumed to meet people s energy needs the last decade s growth in global coal use has been driven mainly by developing economies like china whose phenomenal economic growth has been powered by coal fired electricity and promoted by the export of manufactured goods a recent reform focus in china s coal sector is on coal taxation the paper develops a game theoretic model tailored to the context of china where coal taxation reform takes place against the background of privatisation of coal firms and an open economy it finds that the adoption of special coal taxes is optimal for social welfare under most circumstances but may induce coal firms to commit opportunistic behaviour in the process of privatisation the paper also cautions about potential resistance to the reform from consumers coal firms and government officials

global imbalances and financial fragility the united states is currently engulfed in the most severe financial crisis since the great depression the crisis was triggered by the crash in the real estate bubble and amplified by the extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged financial sector conventional wisdom is that both the bubble and the risk concentration were the result of mistakes in regulatory policy an expansionary monetary policy during the boom period of the bubble and failure to reign in the practices of unscrupulous lenders in this paper we argue that while correct in some dimensions this story misses two key structural factors behind the securitization process that supported the real estate boom and the corresponding lever age first over the last decade the us has experienced large and sustained capital inflows from foreigners seeking us assets to store value caballero emmanuel farhi and pierre olivier gourinchas 2008 second especially after the nasdaq tech bubble and bust excess world savings have looked predominantly for safe debt investments this should not be surprising because a large amount of the capital flow into the us has been from foreign central banks and governments that are not expert investors and are merely looking for a store of value krishnamurthy and annette vissing jorgenson 2008 in this paper we develop a stylized model that captures the essence of this environment the model accounts for three facts observed during the boom and bust phases of the current crisis first during a period of good shocks which we interpret as the period up to the end

explaining peak inflation rates prior to disinflationary policy adjustments or what got us into this mess this study investigates using annual data from 1974 2004 whether unionization rates trade openness and central bank independence can help explain cross national and inter temporal variations in level of peak inflation prior to a disinflationary policy adjustment i find that unionization is positively associated with both peak inflation rates whereas more independent central banks and trade openness are correlated with lower inflation levels these results are robust to controlling for the high inflation decade of the 1970s and to using average rather than peak inflation as the explanatory variable

the impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate evidence from three small open economies this paper studies the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in australia canada and new zealand during the 1990s shocks are identified by the reaction of three month market interest rates to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day the main result is that a 100 basis point contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2 3 percent on impact the association of interest rate hikes with depreciations that is sometimes observed during periods of exchange market pressure is mainly attributable to reverse causality

do state trading exporters distort trade abstract in this paper we analyse the trade distorting effects of state trading enterprises stes which exist in some exporting countries because of these potential effects several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the doha round negotiations in the wto the belief is that stes in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy stes also exist in developing countries though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax we present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting stes in developed and developing economies the model is calibrated with data on two examples of stes one typical of an ste in a developed country the other typical of an ste in a developing economy in each case we allow for differences in the nature of the ste s pay off function the overall conclusion is that stes do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant

house price booms current account deficits and low interest rates one of the most striking features of the period before the great recession is the strong positive correlation between house price appreciation and current account defi cits not only in the united states but also in other countries that have subsequently experienced the highest degree of fi nancial turmoil a progressive relaxation of credit standards can rationalize this empirical observation lower collateral requirements facilitate access to external funding and drive up house prices the current account turns negative because households borrow from the rest of the world at the same time however the world real interest rate counterfactually increases the two key ingredients that reconcile a demand based explanation of house price booms and current account defi cits with the evidence on real interest rates are nominal interest rates lower than the predictions of a standard monetary policy rule in leveraged economies and foreign exchange rate pegs in saving countries

portuguese banking sector a mixed oligopoly abstract in this paper we investigate whether we can find evidence of a regulatory intervention in the portuguese banking sector we develop and estimate using panel data a simple oligopoly model where one public bank competes in prices with several private banks we assume that private banks maximize profits and that the public bank is instructed to maximize an objective function that depends on the profits of the public bank and on the public bank s revenues from deposits and loans evaluated at their respective opportunity costs empirically we find evidence supporting the existence of a regulatory intervention in the loans market which aimed at reducing the equilibrium interest rates paid on loans however in the deposits markets our empirical results do not support the hypothesis of the existence of internal regulatory devices

mixed oligopoly privatization subsidization and the order of firms moves several types of objectives abstract we show the robustness of results in earlier works for a subsidy in mixed oligopoly these results do not depend upon the fact that each private firm maximizes its own profits

mixed markets and crime abstract this paper specifies and solves a two stage game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control in the first stage of the model private targets and the government choose levels of policing in the second stage criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit the paper s key results are as follows first private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less protected targets suffer second an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing this is an instance of a political incentive externality where private policing affects the objective function of the government specifically it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good third the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing in effect private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening this in turn may lead to an increase in the severity of crime fourth the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient and in some situations mixing may reduce the utility of all targets

openness exchange rate regimes and the phillips curve abstract recent research suggests that the phillips curve slope measured using sacrifice ratios from the period 1961 88 is positively related to trade openness contradicting the romer 1993 openness and inflation theory and evidence quarterly journal of economics 108 869 903 hypothesis that disinflations are less costly in open economies in this paper i consider sacrifice ratios and output inflation trade offs from 1981 98 and allow their dependence on openness to vary with the exchange rate regime sacrifice ratios are weakly negatively related to openness but the strength of the relationship does not increase with exchange rate flexibility output inflation trade offs are negatively related to openness and the strength of the relationship increases with exchange rate flexibility

r d subsidies spillovers and privatization in mixed markets we examine the use of subsidies to research and development rd however it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs we also find that privatization of the public firm reduces r d activity and welfare in the duopoly market this result stands even when optimal r d subsidies are provided

mixed oligopoly subsidization and the order of firm s moves the relevance of privatization abstract a series of previous papers demonstrate that there are no consequences from privatization in a mixed oligopoly when the government uses a subsidy to ensure first best this conclusion depends upon the assumption that privatization results in a simultaneous move oligopoly if instead privatization results in a public leader becoming a private leader the optimal subsidy output and welfare are all reduced

privatization neutrality theorem revisited fjell and heywood 2004 show that privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a production subsidy if firms move sequentially we find that the neutrality holds for any time structure if instead an output floor is introduced

business cycle measurement with some theory a method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the dgp and the exact specification of the aggregate decision rules is proposed we derive robust restrictions in a class of models use some to identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub models the approach has good properties even in small samples and when the class of models is misspecified the method is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction the presence of rule of thumb consumers in a standard class of models

political manipulation of a public firm s objective function abstract in the context of a government owned public firm that competes with a private firm this paper demonstrates how the government can maximize its true objective by assigning the public firm a different objective function interestingly this assigned objective function need bear no resemblance to the actual objective being sought enabling the government to disguise a politically unpopular agenda and or outside influence

r d versus output subsidies in mixed markets we analyse the relative welfare effects of an r d and an output subsidy in a mixed duopoly we show that an r d subsidy is beneficial for society as a whole and socially superior to an output subsidy when spillovers are sufficiently high otherwise an output subsidy is socially superior

mixed duopoly privatization and subsidization with excess burden of taxation we investigate optimal tax subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation we compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes mixed and private cournot duopolies and stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships we show that in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem privatization affects resulting welfare duopole mixte privatisation et subsidisation en presence de fardeau fiscal excedentaire on examine les politiques optimales de taxes et de subventions dans le cas d oligopoles mixtes et prives en presence de fardeau fiscal excedentaire on compare les subsides optimaux et les effets sur le niveau de bien etre dans quatre regimes les duopoles de cournot mixte et prive et la concurrence a la stackelberg avec leadership public et prive on montre que contrairement a ce que suggeraient les travaux anterieurs sur le theoreme de la neutralite de la privatisation la privatisation affecte les niveaux de bien etre

capital flows consumption booms and asset bubbles a behavioural alternative to the savings glut hypothesis bernanke 2005 hypothesized that a global savings glut was causing large trade imbalances however we show that the global savings rates did not show a robust upward trend during the relevant period moreover if there had been a global savings glut there should have been a large investment boom in the countries that imported capital instead those countries experienced consumption booms national asset bubbles explain the international imbalances the bubbles raised consumption resulting in large trade deficits in a sample of 18 oecd countries plus china movements in home prices alone explain half of the variation in trade deficits

capital inflows and the u s housing boom we estimate an open economy vector autoregressive var model to study the effect of capital inflow shocks on the u s housing market we look at different external shocks that generate capital inflows to the u s in particular saving glut shocks and foreign monetary policy expansions the shocks are identified with theoretically robust sign restrictions derived from an open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model our findings suggest that capital inflows that result from saving glut shocks have a positive and persistent effect on real house prices and real residential investment

conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly we study a mixed duopoly model in which a state owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private foreign firm compete under general enough assumptions we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium cve applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly a particular case of a cve with constant influence conjecture coefficients is also examined

price equilibrium and willingness to pay in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly in the framework of a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with uncovered market and zero costs we study the existence of a price equilibrium when a welfare maximizing public firm producing low quality goods competes against a profit maximizing private firm producing high quality goods we show that a price equilibrium exists if the quality spectrum is wide enough vis a vis a measure of the convexity of the distribution of the consumers willingness to pay and that such equilibrium is unique if this sufficient condition is tightened logconcavity of the income distribution is inconsistent with the existence of equilibrium

public private mixed delivery and information effects this paper analyses public private mixed delivery of essential public services under price regulation a private firm may have lower production costs and can potentially provide a performance benchmark for a public firm a public firm may offer higher quality service and can reveal the production cost of the private firm to the regulator however this paper shows that public private mixed delivery does not always dominate public delivery or private delivery mixed delivery is optimal only when i the cost uncertainty of the private firm is large ii the managerial incentive problem of the public firm is large and iii the performances of the public and private firms are highly correlated

house prices borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle i develop a general equilibrium model with sticky prices credit constraints nominal loans and asset prices changes in asset prices modify agents borrowing capacity through collateral value changes in nominal prices affect real repayments through debt deflation monetary policy shocks move asset and nominal prices in the same direction and are amplified and propagated over time the financial accelerator is not constant across shocks nominal debt stabilises supply shocks making the economy less volatile when the central bank controls the interest rate i discuss the role of equity debt indexation and household and firm leverage in the propagation mechanism finally i find that monetary policy should not target asset prices as a means of reducing output and inflation volatility

openness inflation and the phillips curve a puzzle models of open economies with nominal rigidities are often thought to predict a correlation between openness to trade and the slope of the output inflation trade off or phillips curve using a variety of measures of the trade off and a standard measure of openness this paper argues that the direct evidence for a correlation is not strong in turn this calls into question the usual explanation for the negative correlation between openness and inflation that was documented by romer 1993 the paper considers some alternative explanations for the romer evidence

is the exchange rate a shock absorber or a source of shocks new empirical evidence this paper analyses the role of the real exchange rate in a structural vector autoregression framework for the united kingdom euro area japan and canada vis a vis the united states a new identification strategy is proposed building on sign restrictions the results are compared to the benchmark conventional approach of clarida and gali 1994 based on longrun zero restrictions although the restrictions are derived from the same theoretical model the results are strikingly different in contrast to the benchmark model an important role for nominal shocks in explaining real exchange rate fluctuations is found hence the exchange rate can rather be considered as a source of shocks instead of a shock absorber

industries with private and public enterprises in this paper attention will be focussed on an industry consisting of public enterprises and institutions rather than on a public enterprise itself public enterprises can be used by the government as an instrument to implement an industrial policy since there exist a variety of instruments and objectives we firstly categorize industries as well as market structures section 2 next we mention some recent results section 3 in the last section a general equilibrium model is introduced that offers a framework to policy makers when designing an efficient organization of an industry with external effects

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

comparing bertrand and cournot in mixed markets abstract we revisit the classic comparison between bertrand and cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms the results are often strikingly different and opposite to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in the standard setting with all profit maximizing firms

mixed oligopoly cost reducing research and development and privatisation abstract we develop a mixed oligopoly model to examine the role of r d subsidies and evaluate the welfare effects of privatisation in solving the oligopoly model we propose a novel use of aggregative games techniques our analysis reveals that privatisation reduces the optimal r d subsidy furthermore privatisation improves social welfare but only when the number of firms is sufficiently large implementing solely a subsidy to r d does not lead to a privatisation neutrality theorem or irrelevance result

the effects of fiscal shocks on employment and the real wage we study the transmission of fiscal shocks in the labor market we employ a structural var and base identification on the restrictions that shocks to government consumption investment and employment must raise output and deficits these restrictions hold in both prototype real business cycle rbc and new keynesian models shocks to government consumption and investment increase real wages and employment contemporaneously both at state level and in the aggregate the dynamics in response to employment shocks are mixed increases in government employment raise the real wage and total employment in the aggregate however in one third of the states they reduce total employment

privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry we consider a market in which a public firm competes against private ones and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized in the short run privatization is harmful because prices rise the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost in the long run privatization leads to further entry the net effect is beneficial if consumer preference for variety is not too weak a sufficient statistic for the social surplus to be higher in the long run is that the public firm makes a loss this suggests that profitable firms should not necessarily be privatized

drawing conclusions from structural vector autoregressions identified on the basis of sign restrictions abstract this paper discusses the problems associated with using information about the signs of certain magnitudes as a basis for drawing structural conclusions in vector autoregressions we also review available tools to solve these problems for illustration we use dahlhaus and vasishtha s 2019 study of the effects of a u s monetary contraction on capital flows to emerging markets we explain why sign restrictions alone are not enough to allow us to answer the question and suggest alternative approaches that could be used

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

the shortage of safe assets in the us investment portfolio some international evidence this paper develops a bayesian global var gvar model to track the international transmission dynamics of two stylized shocks namely a supply and demand shock to us based safe assets our main findings can be summarized as follows first we find that positive supply sided shocks lead to pronounced increases in economic activity which spills over to foreign countries the impact of supply sided shocks can also be seen for other quantities of interest most notably equity prices and exchange rates in europe second a demand sided shock leads to an appreciation of the us dollar and generally lower yields on us securities forcing investors to shift their portfolios towards foreign fixed income securities this yields sizable positive effects on us output equity prices and a general decrease in financial market volatility

endogenous role in mixed markets a two production period model in this paper i investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly where private and state owned public firms compete by allowing two production periods i find that many equilibria exist including the cournot type equilibrium and one stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower however another stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist if small inventory costs are introduced the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower

conference on housing stability and the macroeconomy international perspectives this article provides an introduction to the jmcb special issue on housing bubbles the global financial crisis and the ensuing recessions in countries that experienced housing busts we focus on five themes that are important for policymakers and researchers alike the domestic and international factors driving housing booms and busts the relevance of the housing sector for the real economy how monetary policy should react to housing booms and busts how housing and mortgage finance reform could affect financial stability and the broad lessons learned for macroeconomics and macroprudential policy

oligopoly games and the cournot bertrand model a survey traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable output cournot or price bertrand alternatively a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price also known as the cournot bertrand model when the choice of strategic variable is endogenous the established dominant strategy is output competition a growing body of work demonstrates however that the cournot bertrand outcome can be a subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries observations of real world markets consistent with cournot bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications we lay out the roots of the cournot bertrand model and explore a number of model developments we categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions in particular some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous altogether this research identifies when cournot bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions we also review the cournot bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics industrial organization labor and public economics we expect the literature to continue to expand in the future

inflation targeting matters evidence from oecd economies sacrifice ratios using data from oecd economies we show that inflation targeters suffered smaller output losses during disinflations when compared to nontargeters we also study why some countries choose to inflation target while others do not and find that higher average inflation and smaller debt levels render the adoption of the regime more likely applying heckman s procedure to control for selection bias does not alter the link between inflation targeting and less costly disinflations

csr in an asymmetric duopoly with environmental externality we investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation a la ramsey and a negative environmental externality pollution in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility csr in its statute and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function if the market is sufficiently large the csr firm sells more accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit seeking rival

welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed bertrand duopoly abstract i investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces while a private enterprise has no such obligation i show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first best outcome walrasian equilibrium

the impact of public ownership in the lending sector we examine the effects of increased government ownership of suppliers in the lending sector which induces increased concern with total welfare and reduced concern with profit such increased ownership of a lender can have unanticipated effects for instance it can increase lender profit furthermore borrower welfare often declines as government ownership increases in a lender with a relatively limited ability to discern the true quality of borrowers projects in addition there are settings in which increased government ownership of a lender has no impact on either lender profit or borrower welfare resume l impact de la propriete publique sur le secteur des prets les auteurs examinent les effets de la propriete gouvernementale croissante des offreurs dans le secteur des prets un phenomene qui se traduit en un plus grand interet pour le bien etre global et un interet moindre pour le profit un tel accroissement de la propriete publique peut avoir des effets non anticipes par exemple cela peut accroitre les profits des preteurs de plus le bien etre des emprunteurs decline souvent a proportion que la croissance de la propriete gouvernementale d un preteur connote une competence relativement limitee pour discerner la veritable qualite des projets des emprunteurs enfin il existe des circonstances dans lesquelles l accroissement de la propriete gouvernementale d une institution preteuse n a aucun impact soit sur le profit du preteur soit sur le bien etre de l emprunteur

partial privatization in mixed duopoly abstract we investigate a quantity setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors the private firm maximizes profits while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration we consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm we find that neither full privatization the government does not hold any shares nor full nationalization the government holds all of the shares is optimal under moderate conditions

price or quantity the strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly this paper investigates the endogenous choice of the strategic variable price or quantity taken in a mixed duopoly by a public and a private firm prior to market competition while matsumura and ogawa 2012 in a standard mixed duopoly find that price is the unique equilibrium we show that by introducing firm subsidization in the same setting quantity can constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium

game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly abstract in this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments

technology shocks and robust sign restrictions in a euro area svar we use a model based identification strategy to estimate the impact of technology shocks on hours worked and employment in the euro area the sign restrictions applied in the vector autoregression var analysis are consistent with a large class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models and are robust to parameter uncertainty the results are in line with the conventional real business cycle rbc interpretation that hours worked rise as a result of a positive technology shock by comparing the sign restrictions method to the long run restriction approach of gali quaterly journal of economics 1992 709 38 we show that the results do not depend on the stochastic specification of the hours worked series or the data sample but only on the identification scheme

exchange rate pass through abstract the resilience of trade balances of the major industrialized economies to changes in their exchange rates has evoked interest in the exchange rate pass through relationship so far there has not been a comprehensive survey of this literature the paper aims to fill this gap in two ways first it pieces together the theoretical literature on exchange rate pass through second it provides a critical survey of the empirical literature on exchange rate pass through emphasis is placed on the data and methodology employed in previous work this is done in order to guide future work in this growing area of research

mixed oligopoly privatization and strategic trade policy this paper investigates the effects of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies within an international mixed oligopoly serving a single market if the government uses a domestic production subsidy then welfare is always increased with privatization while the optimal subsidy falls if the government uses an import tariff privatization increases welfare over much of the parameter space the optimal tariff however may rise or fall in recent years many countries around the world are privatizing their state owned industries at the same time many of these countries are also showing remarkable changes in their economic policies toward international trade on many occasions tariffs are significantly altered and domestic production subsidies are substantially reduced for example russia has privatized its aircraft industry and doubled its tariff on imported aircraft colombia has privatized its stateowned automobile maker colombia automotriz and reduced the import tariffs on foreign made cars in argentina the government is pursuing a policy of selective privatization and subsequent reduction of subsidies in western europe countries such as germany and spain have privatized their major airlines lufthansa and iberia respectively and significantly reduced subsidies what is the connection between privatization and strategic trade policies does privatization require a welfare maximizing government to alter trade barriers the objective of this paper is to answer these questions by investigating the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies the effects of privatization are typically analyzed in the context of mixed oligopoly models where state owned welfare maximizing public firms interact with profit maximizing private firms 1 we investigate the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies by incorporating strategic trade instruments in an international mixed oligopoly model specifically we consider two strategic trade instruments an import tariff and a domestic production subsidy the government chooses the optimal level of tariff or subsidy to maximize domestic welfare for each trade instrument we primarily focus on two questions first does privatization increase

flexible vs dedicated technology adoption in the presence of a public firm author affiliation maria jose gil molto department of economics university of leicester university road leicester le1 7rh england united kingdom m j gil molto le ac uk corresponding authorjoanna poyago theotoky dagger department of economics loughborough university sir richard morris building loughborough le11 3tu england united kingdom j poyago theotoky lboro ac uk acknowledgment we thank john beath nikolaos georgantzis rafael moner colonques vicente octs and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments all remaining errors are our own we also thank for financial support the spanish ministry sej2005 08764 econ and the british academy joint activities scheme 1 introductionin the recent past many firms all over the world have substituted their traditional production processes with more flexible systems some of these flexible technologies allow for greater capacity process flexibility which can increase the ability of firms to adapt to fluctuations in demand boyer and moreaux 1997 boyer jacques and moreaux 2002 in other cases the advantage of a flexible manufacturing system fms over dedicated equipment de is that the former allows a firm to supply several products and consequently to participate in different markets in other words to become a multiproduct or multimarket firm1 without having to invest in separated manufacturing processes this is called product flexibility and is the main focus of our paper apart from benefits flexible technologies also report higher set up costs mainly in the form of development or adjustment costs jaikumar 1986 the study of the adoption of fms by private firms was first introduced by roller and tombak 1990 and kim roller and tombak 1992 in the context of oligopolistic competition their findings indicate that the adoption of flexible technologies requires a sufficiently low adoption cost sufficiently high product differentiation and large enough markets while consumers benefit from the use of fms due to the increase in competition 2 in addition roller and tombak 1993 validate these results with an empirical study dixon 1994 evaluates the welfare effects of using fms when the marginal cost of production is increasing in the number of goods produced and when the markets are unrelated as a result adopting fms might lead to welfare losses due to the inefficiency in production on the other hand eaton and schmitt 1994 point out that the adoption of fms may correspond to preemptive strategies leading to higher levels of concentration in the context of horizontal product differentiation to the best of our knowledge the issue of technology choice as exemplified by the adoption of fms versus de technologies has not been studied in the context of a mixed market where private profit maximizing firms coexist with public not for profit ones such mixed markets are quite prevalent in transition economies but not exclusively so telecommunications health services and the postal sector in many countries are organized as mixed markets although many public firms have been privatized in recent years it is worth pointing out that the behavior of these recently privatized firms remains subject to public regulation our analysis is motivated by a large number of industries in which multiproduct and single product firms coexist and the presence of public or newly privatized but still regulated firms is common this is the case for industries such as energy supply transport telecommunications or health care first consider the case of telecommunications traditionally the provision of internet access telephone and tv services required the use of different technologies and separate production processes for each one of them at present however cable technology can be used by firms to provide these three different services using the same production process thereby enabling firms to be present in all three markets and to exploit economies of scope

capacity investment timing by start ups and established firms in new markets we analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start ups entering new markets which have a high degree of demand uncertainty firms may invest in capacity early when uncertainty is high or late when uncertainty has been resolved possibly at different costs established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits whereas start ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival when a start up competes against an established firm we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time the start up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity whereas the established firm follows by contrast when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game both firms invest late we conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start ups this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures abstract in this paper we consider a model of mixed oligopoly with conjectural variations equilibrium cve the agents conjectures concern the price variations depending upon their production output s increase or decrease we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium called an exterior equilibrium for any set of feasible conjectures to introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium we develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures referred to as influence coefficients and prove the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium understood as a cve with consistent conjectures to prepare the base for the extension of our results to the case of non differentiable demand functions we also investigate the behavior of the consistent conjectures in dependence upon a parameter representing the demand function s derivative with respect to the market price

imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership this paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country the impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects the first is an output distortion effect which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption the second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input when the level of privatization increases a decrease in final good production lowers input demand causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase the third is a rent leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm the rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect with foreign ownership however complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent leaking effect we further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes e g selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm

incentive schemes as strategic variables an application to a mixed duopoly abstract in the context of asymmetry of information between firms owners and their managers we investigate the use of incentive contracts as strategic variables in a duopoly with a public and a private firm by giving the public manager an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue we show that welfare can be improved furthermore we show that the government should not privatize the public company

should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining a mixed duopoly approach abstract should civil servants employees in the public sector be allowed to bargain collectively to answer this question we construct a model of unionized mixed duopoly and examine the regulatory framework of public institutions especially focusing on a wage regulation imposed on the public firm the wage regulation turns out to yield critical welfare implications as it gives rise to two opposing strategic effects the wage regulation intensifies downstream market competition while it loosens upstream market competition the overall welfare effect is ambiguous depending crucially on the degree of product differentiation between the firms we also show that in contrast to the popular belief granting the right to bargain collectively to civil servants would not necessarily help them because they tend to demand excessively high wages when they are allowed to bargain collectively finally we briefly discuss a new perspective on the role of profit motives in public institutions when the wages are determined endogenously

mixed oligopoly privatization and subsidization abstract this paper demonstrates three effects of domestic production subsidies in a mixed oligopoly industry regarding privatization and efficiency first if subsidies are used before and after privatization welfare is unchanged by privatization second if subsidies are used only before privatization then privatization always lowers welfare regardless of the number of private firms in the industry third the subsidy contributes to overall efficiency in a mixed oligopoly due to cost distribution effects

asset prices exchange rates and the current account this paper analyses the role of asset prices in comparison to other factors in particular exchange rates as a driver of the us trade balance it employs a bayesian structural var model that requires imposing only a minimum of economically meaningful sign restrictions we find that equity market shocks and housing price shocks have been major determinants of the us current account in the past accounting for up to 30 of the movements of the us trade balance at a horizon of 20 quarters by contrast shocks to the real exchange rate have been less relevant explaining about 9 and exerting a more temporary effect on the us trade balance our findings suggest that large exchange rate movements may not necessarily be the key element of an adjustment of today s large current account imbalances and that in particular relative global asset price changes could be a potent source of adjustment

endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly abstract endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly where the firms first choose the timing for choosing their quantities the results are strikingly different from those obtained in a corresponding oligopoly with all profit maximizing firms

distribution channel strategies in a mixed market abstract this paper studies equilibrium channel strategies in a mixed market with a public firm and a private firm the public firm is concerned with social welfare while the private firm aims to maximize its own profit each firm decides whether to adopt an integrated or a decentralized channel we examine two standard market competition modes bertrand and cournot within each competition mode we consider two typical vertical contracts wholesale price and two part tariff contracts our results suggest that equilibrium channel structures depend on the market competition mode the vertical contract form and the level of product substitutability specifically the channel strategy of the private firm depends mainly on the vertical contract form under a two part tariff contract the private firm always chooses decentralization under a wholesale price contract the private firm chooses integration for most scenarios except for highly substitutable products under bertrand competition i e under very intense competition the channel strategy of the public firm depends mainly on the competition mode under bertrand competition the public firm always chooses decentralization under cournot competition the public firm always chooses the opposite of the private firm s strategy

policy objectives and performance in a mixed market with bargaining abstract we analyse a mixed duopoly in which wages and salaries are determined by nash bargaining and where the public firm s unit costs depend on its objectives because of constant returns to scale welfare maximisation without restriction would eliminate or significantly weaken the private firm therefore we focus on constrained welfare maximisation in which case unit costs are normally higher in the public firm on the other hand the private firm may even earn more than in a monopoly if the public firm maximises profits or if the constraint offers too much protection

mixed oligopoly public firm behavior and free private entry we analyze a mixed oligopoly with free entry by private firms assuming that a public firm maximizes an increasing function of output subject to a break even constraint we establish an irrelevance result whenever a mixed oligopoly is viable then aggregate output aggregate costs and welfare are the same with and without the public firm however replacing a viable mixed oligopoly with a public monopoly yields higher net welfare implications for privatization policy are suggested