a dynamic analysis of licensing the boomerang effect and grant back clauses this article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on r d competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant back clauses of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant back clause can mitigate this distortion i also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee s incentive to engage in r d and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets

section 337 and the protection of intellectual property in the united states the complainants and the impact under section 337 of the tariff act of 1930 a firm can challenge imports that infringe its u s intellectual property rights such as patents copyrights and trademarks based on publicly available information this paper examines the characteristics of firms that file complaints under section 337 and also evaluates how firms are affected by the outcomes we find a complaining firm compared with peer firms in the same industry is typically larger produces a more diverse range of products has invested more in intangibles and is no less profitable a finding of no violation significantly depresses the filing firm s profits compared to peers section 337 appears to protect innovators but its effectiveness in promoting more innovation cannot be demonstrated so clearly copyright 1996 by mit press

the determinants of success of r d projects evidence from american israeli research alliances abstract until 1997 a basic premise of israeli r d support programs had been the principle of neutrality all eligible projects were funded with a binding budget constraint the government had to select the projects it funded and thus to depart from neutrality an optimal departure would favor those projects that have less of a chance to succeed without support in this paper i examine the performance of government supported collaborative research projects i find that size and organizational form affect the probability of technical success and duration to commercialization in a way that suggests departing from neutrality by preferring less established firms

the growth performance of agriculture in subsaharan africa the historical view of overall global economic growth provided by maddison presents striking evidence of africa s poor performance maddison s cross regional study suggests that african real gdp grew at 0 6 per annum between 1820 and 1992 which was half the rate of world growth since much of gross domestic product gdp is still in agriculture the sector has done poorly african agriculture lags other regions both in production and in productivity for the two decades prior to 1990 agricultural production per capita declined significantly cereal yields on average are less than half those in other developing regions even for tubers and plantain for which african agroecological conditions are suitable average yields are lower than in asia and latin america the sector is also severely undercapitalized leading to low agricultural labor productivity historically the marginal product of agricultural labor in africa is about the same as the average product whereas in asia and latin america the average product of labor is much greater than the marginal product delgado and ranade total factor productivity growth also was slow block thirtle hadley and townsend lusigi and thirtle there are of course large variations within and among african countries with some countries achieving yields input use and technology adoption at levels similar to other developing regions however the bottom line is clear over the past century african agriculture has not accumulated capital and has not grown fast enough to realize its potential as an important engine of economic growth and poverty reduction this paper explores the relative roles played by agricultural endowments low population density remoteness and adverse policies in explaining the undercapitalization and the poor growth of african agriculture over the last century we attribute the adverse performance largely to poor policies and to institutional failures which plagued the continent for several centuries however we also explain how the adverse endowments could have contributed to the locking in of poor policies and to the difficulties of breaking out of the adverse policy trap the paper then describes the acceleration of agricultural growth during the 1990s and explores the policy institutional and public investment agenda for the future

quality improvements and the incentive to leapfrog abstract in a model of an uncovered market of vertically differentiated products incentives of non identical duopolists to improve the technological maximum quality are analyzed it is assumed that initially firms offer products with different qualities and that the r d cost function changes exogenously this induces a reconsideration of firms quality decisions both firms have the same r d costs for improving the maximum quality quality changes within the existing quality range are assumed to incur only fixed adjustment costs it is shown that the firm which initially is in the low quality position always has a higher incentive to improve industry s quality than its rival if adjustments costs are sufficiently high persistence of dominance may occur for a low degree of initial differentiation low adjustment costs and r d cost functions with a high slope

on the equilibrium proportion of innovation and imitation abstract a game theoretic model is developed that analyses firms decisions concerning innovation and imitation it is shown that in a game of identical players an equilibrium between innovation and imitation exists this non cooperative equilibrium is globally stable if a sequential time structure is supposed however the equilibrium is not pareto efficient

an empirical test of the asymmetric models on innovative activity who invests more into r d the incumbent or the challenger the theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the potential entrant invests more into r d has attracted considerable interest this paper reports the results of an empirical study on this question using data of about 3500 german firms over the years 1992 to 1995 the survey explicitly asks the firms for their motives to undertake innovative activity it is thus possible to take account of intended not just completed market entry it turns out that the challenger invests more into r d in order to enter a new market than the incumbent thus the patent racing model by reinganum and others seems to characterize innovative activity more accurately than the competing auction model of gilbert and newbery we use a heteroscedastic tobit as well as a tobit model with selectivity in order to deal with the econometric problems of double censoring

attracting skeptical buyers negotiating for intellectual property rights expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property ip in principle confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use in practice sellers often waive confidentiality rights we provide an incomplete information explanation for the waiver of confidentiality rights that are valuable in complete information settings waiving sacrifices the protective value of confidentiality to gain greater buyer participation buyer skepticism which reduces participation arises endogenously from three elements asymmetric information regarding seller ip rent dissipation from competition for ip and ex post costs from expropriation lawsuits

agriculture for development new paradigm and options for success the role of agriculture as an instrument for industrialization had been rigorously conceptualized in the 1960s and 1970s under theclassicalparadigmofdevelopmenteconomics aftermanyimplementationfailuresunderimportsubstitutionindustrialization policies and protracted neglect of agriculture under the policies of the washington consensus that followed the debt crisis agriculture has gradually returned in the development agenda especially with the food crisis we argue in this article that a new paradigm has started to emerge as to how to use agriculture for development pursuing a broadened development agenda we explore the specifications of this paradigm and discuss conditions for successful implementation jel classifications b20 o13 q18

foreign ownership and technology adoption evidence from indian firms abstract firms in developing countries rely on foreign technology purchases to improve their technology we use a theoretical framework developed by katz and shapiro to examine the ongoing technology adoption behavior of foreign owned and domestic firms using firm level data on indian firms from 1989 to 1993 we test this theoretical model we find that foreign ownership firm size and market structure are among the variables that impact a firm s probability of adopting new technology we also find that the 1991 liberalization of technology transfer policies in india appears to have had a larger impact on foreign owned firms than domestic firms

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

innovation and the persistence of monopoly abstract the auction framework enables us to highlight a crucial feature of many r d races the losing firm can recoup part but not the entirety of its r d investments this feature is shown to account for the marked differences in results obtained by gilbert and newbery and by reinganum when the firm investing the largest amount wins with certainty we establish the existence of a unique equilibrium neither firm employs a pure strategy and the incumbent wins more often than the challenger

dynamic r d competition with learning to account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation we formulate a differential game of r d competition with an unknown hazard rate we show as time passes with success firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation reducing their r d investment and possibly exiting the race an increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms r d intensities for given beliefs but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race time paths of r d investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

innovation timing games a general framework with applications abstract we offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable we use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems we find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second mover advantage either for any level of r d costs process innovation or for high r d costs product innovation moreover both models predict that the second mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of r d

innovation and imitation in an asymmetrically regulated industry abstract we model a game of innovation and imitation between a regulated firm and an unregulated firm although regulation may slow the industry wide pace of innovation it does not necessarily do so in fact by weakening the regulated firm s incentive to imitate a rival s successful new technology regulation may make the rival s innovation profitable thereby accelerating innovation by extension giving the regulated firm stronger incentives may backfire by producing either excessive or insufficient innovation these negative outcomes are more likely the greater is the cost reducing potential offered by the new technology

the impact of formal finance on the rural economy of india india has systematically pursued a supply led approach to increasing agricultural credit its objectives have been to replace moneylenders to relieve farmers of indebtedness and to achieve higher levels of agricultural credit investment and output india s success in replacing moneylenders has been outstanding between 1951 and 1971 their share of rural credit appears to have dropped from more than 80 percent to 36 percent it may have dropped to as low as 16 percent by 1981 but that estimate is disputed still institutional credit is far from reaching all farmers only about a quarter of cultivators borrow and no more than 2 percent take out long term loans most small farmers have little access to credit and long term credit goes mostly to large farmers overall farm debt has probably not increased sharply in real terms as formal credit has primarily substituted for credit from other sources moreover with the rapid growth of commercial banks in the 1970s the system mobilized more deposits than it lent in rural areas in 1981 of course enhanced deposit services are a useful service of the rural population but one must ask what has been the impact of heavy rural credit and better financial services on agricultural investment production and rural incomes the authors econometric results suggest that the rapid expansion of commercial banks in rural areas has had a substantially positive effect on rural nonfarm employment and output the availability of better banking facilities appears to have overcome one of the obstacles to locating nonfarm activities in rural areas expanded rural finance has had less of an effect on output and employment in agriculture than in the nonfarm sector the effect on crop output has not been great despite the fact that credit to agricluture has greatly increased the use of fertilizer and private investment in machines and livestock there has been more impact on inputs than on output so the additional capital investment has been more important in substituting for agriclutural labor than in increasing crop output but overall rural credit and expansion of the rural financial system have had a positive effect on rural wages creating nonfarm jobs has apparently added more to total employment than the substitution of capital for labor has subtracted it in agriculture so wages have risen even for agricultural workers albeit modestly the supply led approach to agricultural credit that has been pursued for three decades has clearly benefited current borrowers and farm households formerly indebted to moneylenders it has also spurred fertilizer use and investment in agriculture it has been less successful in generating viable institutions and has failed to generate agricultural employment the policy s costs to india s government have been high as portfolio losses associated with poor repayment ultimately have to be borne by the government or one of its institutions under optimistic assumptions the benefits of the agricultural income are at best no more than 13 percent higher than the cost to the government of the extra agricultural credit if assumptions about the cost of supplying the credit and about repayment rates are less optimistic the social costs and the costs to the government of providing the credit would have exceeded the benefits in agricultural income the expansion of commercial banks to rural areas paid off in nonfarm growth employment and rural wages the question is could these benefits have been achieved without imposing agricultural credit targets on the commercial banks and credit cooperatives or did the commercial banks expand only because they were forced to lend to agriculture the authors could not answer these questions with the data at hand

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

on vertical relations and the timing of technology adoption we study the timing of new technology adoption in markets with input outsourcing and thus with vertical relations we find that technology adoption can take place earlier when firms engage in input outsourcing than when they produce the input in house hence the presence of vertical relations can accelerate the adoption of a new technology we also find that particular features of a vertically related market such as the distribution of bargaining power and the contract type through which trading is conducted can crucially affect the speed of technology adoption

appropriability and commercialization evidence from mit inventions the effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied but there has been little analysis of the effect of appropriability on the commercialization of existing inventions exploiting a database of 805 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions licensed from the massachusetts institute of technology mit between 1980 and 1996 we explore the influence of several appropriability mechanisms on the commercialization and termination of projects to develop products based on university inventions our central hypothesis is that the relationship between a licensee s decision to either terminate or commercialize the invention is driven by the current market value of the invention as well as the option value of delaying its commercialization we use a competing risks framework that allows for nonparametric heterogeneity and correlated risks we find that better appropriability in the sense of more effective patent strength and secrecy has a strong negative effect on the hazard of license termination the effectiveness of learning has a strong positive effect on the hazard of technology commercialization while lead time has a negative effect

is firm size conducive to r d choice a strategic analysis of product and process innovations abstract using a duopoly model of multiproduct firms we show that different innovation incentives cause the larger firm to invest more in process cost reducing innovations and the small one to allocate more resources to search for new products because of this heterogeneity of r d behavior the large firm remains dominant for the original product in the post innovation market but the small firm is more likely to be a leader in the new product market these theoretical results are consistent with recent empirical findings

budget allocation for permanent and contingent capacity under stochastic demand we develop a model of budget allocation for permanent and contingent workforce under stochastic demand the level of permanent capacity is determined at the beginning of the horizon and is kept constant throughout whereas the number of temporary workers to be hired must be decided in each period compared to existing budgeting models this paper explicitly considers a budget constraint under the assumption of a restricted budget the objective is to minimize capacity shortages when over expenditures are allowed both budget deviations and shortage costs are to be minimized the capacity shortage cost function is assumed to be either linear or quadratic with the amount of shortage which corresponds to different market structures or different types of services we thus examine four variants of the problem that we model and solve either approximately or to optimality when possible a comprehensive experimental design is designed to analyze the behavior of our models when several levels of demand variability and parameter values are considered the parameters consist of the initial budget level the unit cost of temporary workers and the budget deviation penalty reward rates varying these parameters produce several trade offs between permanent and temporary workforce levels and between capacity shortages and budget deviations numerical results also show that the quadratic cost function leads to smooth and moderate capacity shortages over the time periods whereas all shortages are either avoided or accepted when the cost function is linear

optimizing the use of contingent labor when demand is uncertain abstract we develop a new model for flexible workforce management in environments with uncertainty in the demand for labor in particular we model a workforce comprised of regular workers who have fixed schedules and may work overtime and contingent workers whose working hours are flexible as specified by a contract over a finite planning horizon our model can represent a variety of contracts including temporary workers on call workers with guaranteed minimum pay and comp time arrangements we formulate the model as an optimization problem that determines the regular and contingent worker pool sizes that minimize expected labor and backlog costs embedded within this problem is a dynamic programming problem of making optimal operational staffing decisions with respect to the utilization of contingent and overtime resources numerical examples demonstrate the effect that the timing of information has on the benefits of flexibility we also derive structural results that may be exploited to reduce the computational effort required to use the model

investment uncertainty and pre emption this paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so we show that the possibility of pre emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a single agent real options model the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows in contrast the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases in fact we show that under certain parameter values greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier these findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players applications to industry situations are also discussed

analyzing the evidence of an ipr take off in china and india abstract both china and india have been experiencing a historical take off in the use of intellectual property rights ipr in terms of trademark applications filed with domestic ip offices in 2009 the evidence demonstrates that china now ranks 1st worldwide and india 5th while for patent filings china ranks 3rd worldwide and india ranks 9th this performance is remarkable as both china and india experienced negligible demand for ipr protection as recently as two decades ago the ipr take up trends in these two countries are analyzed in detail highlighting the structure of patent and trademark demand since 1990 specifically the available series are broken down and analyzed according to i national versus foreign origin of patents and trademarks ii technological ipc and trademark nice classes and iii the major individual patent users in each country the data used refers to applications in the chinese and indian ip offices although the demand from residents of these two countries in both the international and other national systems is also assessed beyond the existing momentum in ipr registrations by china and india and their capacity to maintain it into the near future the paper addresses practical questions about the strategies motives and benefits behind the current trends in particular we seek to evaluate the capacity of both china s and india s national innovation systems to internalize the potential returns of this increasing demand for ipr the insight reached finds that should both china and india sustain their current ipr growth rates they will be able to catch up with the most advanced economies within the time span of a few decades

unbundling the local loop abstract we study competition for high bandwidth services in the telecommunications industry by introducing the possibility of unbundling the local loop where leased lines permit the entrant to provide services without building up its own infrastructure we use a dynamic model of technology adoption and study the incentives of the entrant to lease loops and compete service based and or to build up a new and more efficient infrastructure and compete facility based given the rental price we show that the incumbent sets too low a rental price for its loops hence the entrant adopts the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective the distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption but also on the type quality of the new technology to be adopted we also show that while regulating the rental price may suffice to achieve socially desirable outcomes a sunset clause does not improve social welfare

r d rivalry with licensing or imitation the authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post development dissemination of the innovation such as licensing or imitation this dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery when this occurs conventional results in the economics of r d no longer need apply they find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult copyright 1987 by american economic association

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

product market competition and r d rivalry abstract this paper analyzes the impact of a future r d race on current firm behavior in the product market it is shown that in order to soften rivals in the future r d race firms behave less aggressively in the pre innovation product market than in the standard duopoly models as a result the r d rates are lower than what firms would choose if standard duopoly outcomes are assumed r d cooperation is shown to be capable of restoring the duopoly outcome

empowering rural people for their own development abstract this elmhirst lecture first discusses the features of the institutional environment which allow rural people in low income countries to design plan and implement their own rural development these are divided into two broad groups the institutional environment for rural development environment for the private sector communities and civil society local government and sector institutions and the many factors governing profitability of investment in agriculture while in many poor countries the institutional environment has improved over the last 20 years the most poorly performing countries still have by far the poorest environment for local government in the world within an empowering institutional environment the rate of agricultural and rural development is determined by investments of many different types that in turn depend primarily on the profitability of agriculture the paper discusses the large number of factors which determine profitability few of these are under the direct control of farmers or agricultural sector institutions but depend on governance and investments in other sectors such as trade and transport in many of the poorest countries there has been considerable improvement in macro economic management and sector policies over the past 20 years but progress in international and intra regional trade policies in agricultural trade policies in transport infrastructure and in agricultural research and extension have been limited

budgeting costs of nursing in a hospital this paper examines issues in building decision support models for budgeting nursing workforce requirements in a hospital we determine regular time overtime and agency workforce levels for various skill classes in a budget cycle we introduce a family of eight models ranging from a single period aggregate and deterministic model to a multiperiod disaggregate and probabilistic model in a single period model we ignore the time varying nature of demand for nursing hours aggregation is done over the nurse skill class mix for probabilistic models we consider demand uncertainty using empirical data we evaluate the effects of level of sophistication in model building and in information requirements on their relative performances the results suggest that ignoring the time varying nature of demand does not induce gross errors in budget estimates however ignoring demand uncertainty produces underestimates about five to six percent of budget needs a consequence of a madansky madansky a 1960 inequalities for stochastic linear programming problem management sci 6 197 204 inequality it also induces added costs to the system due to implementing nonoptimal regular time workforce levels finally we find that a simple formula using a single period demand estimate gives excellent approximations to the budget estimates obtainable from the more precise models

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

second mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty abstract this paper introduces technological uncertainty into a timing game of new technology adoption it is shown that the timing neither necessarily involves first mover advantages in precommitment equilibria reinganum review of economic studies xlviii 1981 395 405 nor rent equalization due to the threat of preemption fudenberg and tirole review of economic studies lii 1985 383 401 rather there may be second mover advantages because of informational spillovers furthermore the model predicts that the equilibrium payoffs will typically be discontinuous and non monotonic in the probability that the new technology is profitable a welfare analysis reveals several market failures and suggests that policy intervention should adequately depend on the nature of uncertainty and the rate of technological progress

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

general licensing schemes for a cost reducing innovation optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost reducing innovation in a cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators it is shown that for any nondrastic innovation a the license is practically sold to all firms ensuring full diffusion of the innovation b consumers are better off firms are worse off and the social welfare is improved c the optimal licensing policy involves positive royalty for relatively significant innovations d compared to an incumbent firm an outsider invests more in r d and has higher incentive to innovate and e as a function of the magnitude of the innovation the industry size that provides the highest incentive to innovate is u shaped

incomplete adoption of a superior innovation we consider a model in which an innovating monopolist of a technologically superior intermediate input must sell this product to final output producers prior research shows that with complete information the monopolist s optimal strategy will lead to complete adoption of this technologically superior innovation in this article we show that when the price of some competitively supplied input used in the final product market is endogenous and is altered by adoption of the innovation then the optimal pricing strategy of the monopolist may lead to incomplete innovation thus the standard result of complete adoption of the superior technology is partly attributable to the partial equilibrium nature of prior models

behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture in this essay we develop a framework for analysing the major institutions governing the production and exchange of output and the primary factors of production in rural areas the analysis incorporates general considerations of risk and information constraints jointly with the principal material attributes of agriculture and of agricultural production factors the framework is used to analyse barriers to the existence of the major intertemporal and factor markets it is applied specifically to land scarce environments for which it provides an internally consistent explanation for many of the well documented institutional features of such settings in addition the analysis provides new implications for among other phenomena the inter relationships among ownership holdings operational scale family size and factor productivity for the scarcity of animal rental markets and use of animals as collateral for the renting out of land by small landowners and for the existence of plantations for certain crops

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

market research and innovation strategy in a duopoly we model a duopoly in which ex ante identical firms must decide where to direct their innovation efforts the firms face market uncertainty about consumers preferences for innovation on two product attributes and technology uncertainty about the success of their research and development r d investments firms can conduct costly market research before setting r d strategy we find that the value of market information to a firm depends on whether its rival is expected to obtain this information in equilibrium consequently one firm may forgo market research even though its rival conducts such research and learns the true state of demand we examine both vertical and horizontal demand structures with vertical preferences firms are a priori uncertain about which attribute all consumers will value more in this case a firm that conducts market research always attempts innovation on the attribute it discovers that consumers prefer and expends more on r d than a rival that has not conducted market research with horizontal preferences distinct segments exist each caring about innovation on only one attribute and firms are a priori uncertain how many consumers each segment contains in this case a firm that conducts market research may follow a niche strategy and attempt innovation to serve the smaller segment to avoid intense price competition for the larger segment a firm that conducts market research may therefore invest less in r d and earn lower postlaunch profits than a rival that has forgone such research

timing of technology adoption and product market competition abstract this paper examines how product market competition affects firms timing of adopting a new technology as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives it demonstrates that adoption dates differ not only among symmetric firms but also among markets with different market features more specifically technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with cournot competition than in a market with bertrand competition it can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes therefore this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives when goods are sufficiently differentiated adoption occurs later than is socially optimal

to innovate or imitate entry strategy and the role of market research abstract a firm planning market entry can attempt to develop a product that is either similar to the incumbent s existing offering imitation or entirely novel innovation the authors establish that when the incumbent is more aggressive in research and development r d this negatively affects the entrant s marginal return on r d thus if greater profits produce a strong weak desire for the incumbent to increase its r d level the entrant will respond by sharply decreasing increasing its r d level as a result the incumbent s likelihood of retaining the lead position will exhibit an inverse u shaped pattern as a function of monopoly and duopoly profits the authors then examine the impact of uncertainty about the rewards from new products and allow firms to conduct market research to resolve the uncertainty they characterize the conditions for the entrant s innovation versus imitation decision to reveal information about future rewards to the incumbent when duopoly profits are uncertain and ca

obtaining strategic advantage from being imitated when can encouraging clones pay an important business strategy research theme concerns finding ways to minimize competition faced by the firm this paper however focuses on a different set of situations the model developed suggests that an innovator s best strategy may be to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present key factors to consider in assessing whether encouraging cloning is the innovator s best strategy are 1 the benefit to be derived in terms of added user base contributed by the clone sales traded off against 2 the unit sales that will be lost to the clones these factors in turn depend upon the strength of the network effect and the degree to which the innovator s product quality is perceived by consumers to be superior to the clone s the model further suggests that both the innovator and clone earn their highest payoffs when the clone takes the lead in price setting i e when the clone establishes its own price by considering for each price it might set how the innovator will react to that price and the innovator as price follower responds to the price the clone chooses the paper demonstrates that the clone leader innovator follower situation represents the unique nash equilibrium in price setting strategies a central implication is that when operating in a network externality environment instead of a problem to be avoided clones may be valuable assets to an innovating firm building up the user base for the innovator s technology by bringing lower valuing consumers into the market which in turn makes the innovator s product more attractive to high and medium valuing purchasers thus when the above described conditions hold being cloned can be more profitable for an innovating firm than dominating the market alone

explaining agricultural and agrarian policies in developing countries the paper describes and as far as possible explains variations in policies programs and institutions that influence agricultural growth agrarian relations and rural welfare across developing countries and over time it evaluates the impact of distorted policy patterns on agricultural production and rural poverty and identifies conditions under which policy reforms meant to bring about greater efficiency and equity are likely to be initiated and sustained it draws upon a broad range of literature to show how material conditions missing markets and government policies affect static welfare outcomes patterns of accumulation state formation and the establishment of political institutions it suggests ways to improve policy advice and proposes directions for future research

the sale of unprotected inventions under alternative models of contracting behavior abstract when property rights are unavailable or unenforceable for a specific invention it has been shown am econ rev 84 1994 190 that it may still be possible for an independent inventor to enjoy some of the surplus generated by his invention in this paper i consider the case of an independent inventor with bargaining power who is free to choose the form of contracting when attempting to sell a valuable invention to firms in a duopoly industry i show that an inventor with small wealth can do no better than to disclose his invention to a randomly chosen firm and make a contract offer for moderate wealth i show that even though industry profit is maximized under a monopoly structure the inventor may be indifferent between selling the invention to both firms by signaling the value of his invention which is accomplished by offering contracts to both firms and selling the invention to one firm by offering a contract when wealth becomes sufficiently large i show that it is always more profitable for the inventor to signal the value of his invention by offering a contract to only one firm

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed