cyclical ratcheting in government spending evidence from the oecd this paper studies the role of business cycles in the phenomenon of increasing government spending gdp ratios in the oecd countries an empirical framework that includes both long run and cyclical considerations in the determination of government spending is applied to panel data covering 1975 1998 the main finding is that the prolonged rise in the spending gdp ratio is partially explained by cyclical upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behavior the ratio increases during recessions and is only partially reduced in expansions the long run ratcheting effect is estimated as approximately 2 of gdp also analyzed are the cyclical changes in the composition of government spending government consumption transfers and subsidies and capital expenditure as well as a possible link between cyclical ratcheting and government weakness

does direct democracy reduce public debt evidence from swiss municipalities although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times public debts ofmany oecd countries remain at high levels since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society s ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process such as a strongrole of the minister of finance aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision makingprocedures in addition to such top downbudgetary procedures this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest swissmunicipalities in 1990

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

state ownership and transparency in foreign direct investment we contribute to ib literature on state owned multinationals by examining an understudied element of mne strategy transparency drawing insight from accounting finance and political science we develop theory and hypotheses regarding ownership effects on fdi disclosure we argue that transparency of outward fdi depends on both state ownership and home and host country institutions we also posit that host governments harness their soes to exploit information disclosed by foreign mnes discouraging inward fdi transparency we test our hypotheses using a unique transaction level database from the global petroleum industry analyzing a sample of 965 investment disclosures across 81 developing and developed countries we find state ownership reduces mne transparency soes are less sensitive to host country political risk than private firms soes from better governed countries are more transparent and regardless of ownership foreign mnes are more opaque when investing in the presence of a host country soe

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

stock returns and volatility a firm level analysis abstract it has been previously documented that individual firms stock return volatility rises after stock prices fall this paper finds that this statistical relation is largely due to a positive contemporaneous relation between firm stock returns and firm stock return volatility this positive relation is strongest for both small firms and firms with little financial leverage at the aggregate level the sign of this contemporaneous relation is reversed the reasons for the difference between the aggregate and firm level relations are explored

partisan influence on the local tax burden in the netherlands this paper analyses the role of partisan politics in determiningthe local tax burden property taxes are the most important revenuesource which municipalities in the netherlands can decide uponthemselves using a new data set on dutch local property taxes in1996 it is concluded that municipalities with a council dominatedby left wing parties have a higher tax burden we also find thatlarger coalitions have lower levels of taxation finally taxexporting increases tax rates

how to succeed at increasing spending without really trying the balanced budget amendment and the item veto congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending in particular the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents interests through pork barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest however assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results the supermajorities requires by the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log rolling that promote and may indeed increase pork barrel spending

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

political uncertainty and public financing costs evidence from u s gubernatorial elections and municipal bond markets this research investigates how political uncertainty around u s gubernatorial elections in uences the borrowing costs of public debt measured by yields of municipal bonds our evidence from both the new issuance market and the secondary market shows that yields of municipal bonds increase sharply by 6 to 8 basis points before elections and then reverse afterward elections have more pronounced impact during economic downturns when outcomes are less predictable and when states have more outstanding debt several state institutions such as gaap budgeting spending limits and tax increase limits help to mitigate the adverse impact of political uncertainty

explaining top management turnover in private corporations the role of cross country legal institutions and capital market forces we investigate private firms ability to identify and replace poorly performing managers across countries we document three main findings first private firms are more likely to retain poorly performing managers in countries where legal institutions that protect minority investors are weak second private firms are more likely to retain poorly performing managers than public firms only in countries where governance mechanisms inherent in public equity markets limit managerial entrenchment in public firms third private firm managers are less likely to be replaced even when poor performance continues for relatively long horizons overall our findings provide new evidence on the potential vulnerability of minority shareholders in private firms

political fractionalization and delay in fiscal stabilizations a duration analysis this article employs a duration analysis approach to empirically investigate whether political fractionalization leads to delayed fiscal stabilizations using a broad sample of both developed and developing countries for the period 1975 2011 we consistently find strong evidence that political fractionalization is significantly associated with longer delays in stabilizing high deficits in particular political fractionalization has a greater impact on delays in periods of macroeconomic distress we also show that while the fractionalization of government parties delays fiscal stabilization the fractionalization of opposition parties tends to facilitate fiscal stabilization

government strength power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in oecd countries a voting power approach we test for the influenceof government strength and dispersion ofpower among the parties of coalitiongovernments on the size of annual debtaccumulation through budget deficits inoecd countries from 1970 to 1999 government strength and power dispersion incoalition governments are measured by thebanzhaf index of voting power respectivelythe standard deviation of banzhaf indicesof coalition parties we believe that theseare better suited proxies than most of whathas been applied so far governmentstrength turns out to be insignificant however coalitions with equally strongpartners run significantly higher deficitsthan coalitions with one dominating party

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

the impact of within party and between party ideological dispersion on fiscal outcomes evidence from swiss cantonal parliaments the impact of the fragmentation of executive and legislative bodies on the level and composition of government expenditure is a feature of politics that has attracted considerable attention from economists however previous authors have abstracted from two important concepts ideology and intra party politics in this paper we account for these two phenomena explicitly and make two main contributions first we show that both intra and inter party ideological dispersion matter in explaining the level of sub national public spending therefore it is improper to consider parties as monolithic entities we also show that ideological dispersion matters especially for current expenditures and not so much for investment expenditures to do so we construct a panel database 2003 2010 comprising data from a survey that quantifies the policy preferences of party members who were candidates in swiss elections

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

do international investors enhance private firm value evidence from venture capital we examine the impact of international venture capital investors on private firm success spanning 81 countries over the years 1995 2010 the data examined indicate that relative to deals in which the investor base is purely domestic private firms that have an international investor base have a higher probability of exiting via an initial public offering ipo and higher ipo proceeds the evidence is consistent with the view that while the benefits of internationalization may be difficult and costly to manage for those firms that succeed in managing cross border coordination costs there is potential value for an ipo firm the benefits relative to the costs of internationalizing the investor base for private firms sold in acquisitions by contrast are much less pronounced the most important source of this benefit appears to be access to capital

modeling microstructure price dynamics with symmetric hawkes and diffusion model using ultra high frequency stock data this study examines the theoretical and empirical perspectives of the symmetric hawkes model of the price tick structure combined with the maximum likelihood estimation the model provides a proper method of volatility estimation specialized in ultra high frequency analysis empirical studies based on the model using the ultra high frequency data of stocks in the s p 500 are performed the performance of the volatility measure intraday estimation and the dynamics of the parameters are discussed a new approach of diffusion analogy to the symmetric hawkes model is proposed with the distributional properties very close to the hawkes model as a diffusion process the model provides more analytical simplicity when computing the variance formula incorporating skewness and examining the probabilistic property an estimation of the diffusion model is performed using the simulated maximum likelihood method and shows similar patterns to the hawkes model

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

creditor protection laws debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle we examine how legal creditor rights are related to debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle using firm level data from 40 countries we find that creditor rights are associated with greater debt financing and investment during economic downturns but creditor rights have a significantly smaller effect during expansions the beneficial effects of creditor rights during recessions are stronger for firms that are more likely to have severe shareholder bondholder agency problems we also find that during recessions relative to expansions strong creditor rights are associated with a smaller decline in net capital flows our findings are consistent with credit market frictions increasing during recessions and with stronger creditor rights decreasing the negative effects of these frictions overall the results suggest that better creditor protection laws help moderate the decline in debt financing and investment during recessions

inference on self exciting jumps in prices and volatility using high frequency measures summary dynamic jumps in the price and volatility of an asset are modelled using a joint hawkes process in conjunction with a bivariate jump diffusion a state space representation is used to link observed returns plus nonparametric measures of integrated volatility and price jumps to the specified model components with bayesian inference conducted using a markov chain monte carlo algorithm an evaluation of marginal likelihoods for the proposed model relative to a large number of alternative models including some that have featured in the literature is provided an extensive empirical investigation is undertaken using data on the s p 500 market index over the 1996 2014 period with substantial support for dynamic jump intensities including in terms of predictive accuracy documented copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd

financial credibility ownership and financing constraints in private firms as shown in the international business literature the ability of controlling owners to extract private benefits is greater in countries with weaker legal institutions in these countries providing credible financial information could play an especially important role in reducing information asymmetry between private firms and external providers of finance for our sample of firms across 68 countries we find that firms with greater financial reporting credibility i e annual financial statements reviewed by an external auditor experience significantly lower perceived problems in gaining access to external finance further the impact of financial credibility in reducing financing constraints in the presence of a controlling owner is more pronounced in countries with weaker creditor rights given the predominance of private firms around the world their economic significance and the fact that an increasing number of private firms now operate in multinational environments with different institutional features we contribute to the literature on the role of financial information firm characteristics and country level institutions for an important and interesting group of firms

creditor rights claims enforcement and bond performance in mergers and acquisitions this article shows that country level differences in creditor protection affect bond performance around cross border m a announcements using eurobonds and a global sample of 1 100 cross border m as we find that the bondholders of bidding firms respond more positively to deals that expose their firm to a jurisdiction with stronger creditor rights and more efficient claims enforcement through courts positive creditor protection spillovers are enhanced by now global jurisdictional cooperation in multinational insolvencies and creditors ability to do insolvency arbitrage the spillover effects we observe are stronger for firms with higher asset risk longer maturity bonds and a higher likelihood of financial distress

fiscal policy public debt stabilisation and politics theory and uk evidence this paper presents a two party model of fiscal and debt policy in which the parties do not care about policy outcomes when out of office unlike other models of this type our model has predictions that are largely consistent with existing empirical findings about partisan and electoral effects on government expenditure tax revenue and debt it also yields new predictions about how the feedback of fiscal policy on lagged debt may depend on partisan and electoral effects these new predictions are not rejected by a test of the model on uk data in multi party democracies the motives of the party in power undoubtedly affect fiscal and monetary policy many economists and political scientists believe that economic policy makers are driven by two not mutually exclusive motives first they wish to remain in office as long as possible the survival or opportunistic motive second they wish to benefit their constituencies partisan motive the effects of these motives may show up in two ways in the data first there may be effects of ideological differences of the parties in power on fiscal and monetary policy so called partisan effects for example we might expect left wing governments to tax and spend more and possibly accumulate more debt second there may be attempts by the incumbent party to use fiscal and monetary policy to bribe the electorate prior to elections e g by cutting taxes and interest rates so called electoral effects recent econometric work has established some interesting stylised facts which are broadly consistent with these predictions several studies report evidence of electoral effects on various fiscal policy instruments for the united states tufte i978 for transfers bizer and durlauf i990 for taxes and macdonald i99i for state level public expenditure more recently alesina et al i 992 i 993 have found evidence of electoral effects on government debt in a panel study of oecd countries evidence of partisan effects on fiscal policy is scarcer alesina et al i 993 report partisan effects on debt and roubini and sachs i989 report in a study of oecd democracies that countries with a higher percentage of left wing governments have significantly higher longrun government spending to gnp ratios concurrently with the accumulation of this evidence a theoretical literature notably alesina and tabellini 1990 rogoff 1990 and rogoff and sibert i 988 has provided new explanations of observed electoral effects on

assessment and optimization of clean energy equity risks and commodity price volatility indexes implications for sustainability abstract although clean energy equities have emerged as a new asset class for market participants especially environmentally concerned investors existing and previous studies pay very little attention to how equity investors in clean energy markets can reduce their downside risk the authors of this paper address this void by considering the roles of the commodity market volatility indexes of crude oil gold and silver the results of the dynamic conditional correlation model show that commodity volatilities and clean energy equity prices move in opposite directions based on the hedging effectiveness each of the three volatility indexes acts as an effective tool for reducing the risk of clean energy equity indexes the implied volatility index of crude oil is the most effective tool followed by that of gold and silver further analysis indicates the robustness of the results to the application of an asymmetric conditional correlation model the findings extend the limited understanding of how to hedge the downside risk of clean energy stock indexes and provide useful implications to market participants on the ability of implied volatility indexes of major commodities to hedge that risk

theory and evidence of municipal borrowing in chile although chilean municipalities are not permitted to borrow they do so through arrears and leasing contracts a formal model of municipal indebtedness is estimated based on a sample of 345 municipalities with yearly data from 2004 to 2007 variables that are positively and significantly related to borrowing through arrears are mayors closely tied to the ruling central government coalition politically diverse municipal councils years close to elections and deeper municipal involvement in education while leasing contracts appear to be insensitive to political factors they are positively and significantly related to municipal staff managerial skills and municipal revenues per capita

exploring return dynamics via corridor implied volatility some fundamental questions regarding equity index return dynamics are difficult to address due to the latent character of spot volatility we exploit tick by tick option quotes to compute a novel corridor volatility index which may serve as an observable proxy for short term volatility exploiting this index we find that equity index volatility jumps are common symmetrically distributed and cojump with the underlying returns moreover the return volatility asymmetry is more pronounced than is generally recognized and is in force for both diffusive and jump innovations in volatility finally the index performs admirably during turbulent market conditions constituting a useful real time gauge of market stress

how legal environments affect the use of bond covenants we examine how country level legal and institutional investor protection shapes contractual creditor protection we examine debt covenant information from foreign corporate bonds issued in the us from more than 50 countries between 1991 and 2007 we find that bonds of firms incorporated in countries with stronger creditor rights use fewer covenants this finding suggests that creditor protection substitutes for covenants in reducing the agency cost of debt in contrast bonds of firms with stronger shareholder rights or firms with stronger firm level corporate governance use more covenants these findings support the notion that firms with stronger shareholder control may face an increase in the shareholder bondholder conflict and therefore prefer to use more covenants however greater shareholder rights are not associated with the use of more covenant restrictions on equity issuance as firms with greater minority shareholder protection are unlikely to suffer such equity dilution

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

the real effects of financial markets the impact of prices on takeovers using mutual fund redemptions as an instrument for price changes we identify a strong effect of market prices on takeover activity the trigger effect an interquartile decrease in valuation leads to a seven percentage point increase in acquisition likelihood relative to a 6 unconditional takeover probability instrumentation addresses the fact that prices are endogenous and increase in anticipation of a takeover the anticipation effect our results overturn prior literature that finds a weak relation between prices and takeovers without instrumentation these findings imply that financial markets have real effects they impose discipline on managers by triggering takeover threats does a low market valuation make a firm a takeover target in theory if acquisition prices are related to market prices acquirers can profit from taking over a firm whose market value is low relative to its peers due either to mispricing or mismanagement and restore it to its potential indeed in practice acquirers and other investors appear to track a firm s valuation multiples for indications on the potential for acquisition and managers strive to maintain high market valuations to prevent a hostile takeover understanding whether such a link exists is important because if so this would suggest that the market is not a sideshow but rather exerts a powerful disciplinary effect on firm management as suggested by marris 1964 manne 1965 a ndjensen 1993 despite the above logic existing empirical studies on takeovers fail to systematically uncover a meaningful relationship between market valuations

budget deficits and redistributive politics this paper proposes a new view of the forces in the political process that cause governments to accumulate debt the analysis builds on a model of redistributive politics that contrary to median voter models does not restrict the set of policies that politicians can propose i show that deficits occur even in an environment where voters and periods are homogeneous this is an environment where previous political theories of debt would predict budget balance in the model deficits are a way for candidates to better target promises to voters and are therefore used as tools of redistributive politics the main contribution of the analysis is to show that the same forces that push candidates to redistribute resources across voters to pursue political advantage are forces that generate budget deficits most countries have sizeable national debts indeed thinking of governments as debtors seems so customary that it feels awkward to talk about a national credit this suggests that there are systematic forces pushing governments to regularly borrow to cover the excess of spending over receipts at the same time a significant amount of government spending consists of transfers to special interest groups that are hard to justify on efficiency or equity grounds this paper presents a political economic model that suggests that these two phenomena are connected debt is at least in part caused by the fact that in order to get elected candidates need to appeal to groups of voters with promises of transfers debt allows candidates a finer control over the promises they make to these groups

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits abstract this paper shows that a simple two stage voting mechanism may implement a constrained optimal state dependent decision about the size of the fiscal deficit i consider a setup with strategic fiscal deficits similar to alesina and tabellini 1990 three groups of voters are informed about the relative desirability of current public spending voters differ in their preferences for public goods and swing voters preferences may change over time the current government decides on the current spending mix and it has an incentive to strategically overspend a simple two stage mechanism under which a deficit requires the approval by a supermajority in parliament approximates a constrained optimal decision and under certain conditions increases social welfare relative to both a strict rule and a laissez faire constitution when the current majority is small political bargaining may further increase social welfare however when the current majority is large a supermajority mechanism with bargaining leads to a biased spending mix and it may reduce welfare whereas the laissez faire mechanism may yield the first best an appropriately adjusted majority threshold can avoid inefficient bargaining whenever necessary

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

the balanced budget amendment clarifying the arguments from the perspective of a supporter this paper responds to the several criticisms that have been raised to the proposed constitutional amendment to require budget balance economists have concentrated on the loss of fiscal flexibility this objection is countered by reference to the political inefficacy of attempted budgetary manipulation lawyers have concentrated on problems of enforcement this objection is countered by reference to observed respect to other constitutional rules

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

the leverage effect and the basket index put spread abstract benchmark models that exogenously specify equity dynamics cannot explain the large spread in prices between put options written on individual banks and options written on the bank index during the financial crisis however theory requires that asset dynamics be specified exogenously and that endogenously determined equity dynamics exhibit a leverage effect that increases put prices by fattening the left tail of the distribution the leverage effect is larger for puts on individual stocks than for puts on the index thus increasing the basket index spread time series and cross sectional variation in the leverage effect explains option prices well

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

portable country governance and cross border acquisitions the agency theory and law and finance literatures show good country governance encourages financial development mitigates agency problems and increases firm value drawing on these literatures we develop a theory that benefits from good country governance are portable by firms across countries through cross border acquisitions using acquisitions from 56 countries from 1990 to 2007 we find that acquirers can transport the benefits from good country governance so that they gain more from acquiring targets with worse country governance than their own as predicted the acquirer s stock price reaction to acquisitions increases with the country governance distance between the acquirer and the target

the going public decision and the development of financial markets this paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency the choice between private and public financing and the development of capital markets in emerging economies generally the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire and if investors receive valuable information without cost the value of public firms generally depends on public market size which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public the model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

national culture the missing country level determinant of corporate governance it is well known that firm level corporate governance practices vary mainly between rather than within countries but country level factors such as legal and financial institutions explain less than 50 of this cross country variation in this article we show that two dimensions of national culture individualism and uncertainty avoidance capture about 90 of the country fixed effects and outperform the country level explanatory variables used in prior literature we argue that culture works through a tradeoff between managerial expertise and certainty of control a tradeoff largely overlooked by prior literature that captures a country s preference for the anglo saxon approach versus the direct control approach for governance consistent with this argument we find that the effect of culture on corporate governance varies across firms with different needs for managerial expertise and certainty of control we also find that culture interacts with other factors to determine firm level governance

foreign independent directors and the quality of legal institutions foreign directors can affect firm value through their advising and monitoring functions however the demand for these directors as well as their effect on firm performance is likely to be influenced by firm and country level characteristics in a large sample of non us firms we find that foreign directors are more likely to be associated with firms that have more foreign operations and an international shareholder base and firms that are located in countries with a limited supply of potentially qualified domestic directors countries with a smaller less well educated populace and lower levels of capital market development we also find that the association between foreign directors and firm performance is more positive in countries with lower quality legal institutions and when the director comes from a country with higher quality legal institutions than the firm s host country our study highlights the importance of considering national demographic factors and levels of capital market development when modeling the supply and demand for foreign directors and also underscores the importance of institutional quality in the foreign director s home and host country when assessing the effect of that director on firm performance

the effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions empirical evidence from spanish municipalities the need for restrictions on borrowing by subnational governments is a generally accepted notion that is justified both by public choice theory and by the fact that such restrictions are in force in the majority of decentralized countries furthermore recent breaches of the stability and growth pact of the european union have led to the introduction of legislative tools aimed at balancing the budget at all levels of government have come to the forefront of interest in european public finance research this paper is concerned with the financial situation and debt level of spanish municipalities from 1988 to 2000 we have two main objectives the first is to assess the value of mandatory limitations on municipal borrowing and past trends in the borrowing policies adopted by spanish local authorities the second is to develop an econometric model using panel data stratified by population size to measure indebtedness in spanish municipalities these measures enable us to formulate a series of hypotheses to explain municipal borrowing practices which are then tested empirically the evidence thus obtained appears to support the effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions to introduce some financial discipline in the borrowing policies adopted by local governments in spain

governance structures and the durability of economic reforms evidence from inflation stabilizations abstract this paper investigates the relationship between a country s political economic and institutional environment and its ability to implement sustainable economic reform programs the policy issue on which the study focuses is inflation stabilization it consists principally of econometric estimations of the relationship between the success of stabilizations in a large sample of countries and several political and economic explanatory variables the hypotheses tested are drawn both from the recent macroeconomic literature on policy credibility and from political science the major findings include the following 1 a despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary political repression does not appear to be an effective means for implementing sustainable stabilization policies durable economic reforms and political freedoms appear to be complementary 2 b as has been previously argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically political instability is detrimental to policy reform 3 c the political will and popular consensus for stabilization policies are enhanced during a severe economic crisis 4 d there is weak evidence that intervention by the international monetary fund rather than supporting reform programs can undermine their credibility

the political economy of deficit spending in nine industrialized parliamentary democracies the role of fiscal institutions this article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958 1990 this article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country s fiscal deficit the strength of fiscal bureaucracy it is argued that the stronger a country s fiscal bureaucracy the lower its deficit ceteris paribus empirically the authors find that the state of a nation s economy heavily affects its deficit little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation s deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits in contrast to the findings of roubini and sachs finally it is found that the strength of a country s fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies

the political economy of inaction abstract this paper develops a simple model of political inaction in a two party democracy i e it shows the conditions under which both parties will prefer to live with an unsatisfactory and inefficient status quo rather than to raise an issue the risk of raising the issue to either party is the fear of ending up with the other party s policy for example by losing the electron regarded as even worse than the status quo the model shows that the problem is likely to be particularly serious the more evenly matched is political competition the more risk averse the parties the less voters trust the parties the more divided is public opinion and the more important the issue the model is illustrated with a number of examples of real world inaction e g on fiscal deficits abortion the transition to socialism and the fall of the weimar republic in general the analysis also suggests that over a range more representation of political viewpoints implies a smaller likelihood of political action so that democracy implies a tradeoff between representation and the capacity for political action

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

the leverage effect puzzle disentangling sources of bias at high frequency the leverage effect refers to the generally negative correlation between an asset return and its changes of volatility a natural estimate consists in using the empirical correlation between the daily returns and the changes of daily volatility estimated from high frequency data the puzzle lies in the fact that such an intuitively natural estimate yields nearly zero correlation for most assets tested despite the many economic reasons for expecting the estimated correlation to be negative to better understand the sources of the puzzle we analyze the different asymptotic biases that are involved in high frequency estimation of the leverage effect including biases due to discretization errors to smoothing errors in estimating spot volatilities to estimation error and to market microstructure noise this decomposition enables us to propose novel bias correction methods for estimating the leverage effect

top management compensation and capital structure the interrelationship between top management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied the optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus we analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are 1 equity and risky debt and 2 equity and convertible debt in addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt the optimal management compensation derived has low pay performance sensitivity with convertible debt instead of straight debt the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay to performance sensitivity a negative relationship between pay performance sensitivity and leverage is derived our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of jensen and murphy 1990 with agency theory other testable implications include 1 a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top management compensation structures and 2 the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices the model yields implications for management compensation in banks and federal deposit insurance reform our results explain the dynamics of top management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization

a new class of discrete time stochastic volatility model with correlated errors abstractreturns of risky assets and their time dependent volatility are often jointly modelled by stochastic volatility models svms over the last few decades several svms have been proposed to adequately capture the features of the relationship between the return and its volatility the earliest svm considers a hierarchical model with current return as a function of the current latent volatility which is further modelled as an auto regressive process in an attempt to make svm more appropriate for complex realistic market behaviour leverage parameter was introduced which however led to violation of martingale difference property of the risky part of return a necessary mean zero condition that prevents arbitrage opportunities under mild regularity conditions subsequently alternative svms had been developed and are currently in use in this article we propose mean corrections for several generalizations of svm with leverage that capture the complex market behaviour as well as satisfy martingale

resolving the agency problems of external capital through options this paper investigates the role of stock options in resolving the agency problems of external capital as originally identified by jensen and meckling 1976 these problems are precipitated by managerial incentives a to consume excessive non pecuniary benefits or perquisites beyond the optimal level for sole ownership and b to engage in risk shifting in productive decisions so as to transfer wealth from external capital contributors these incentive problems can be resolved through a strategy that judiciously combines call and put options retained by the owner manager and external financiers respectively the resolution of the agency problems through this mechanism provides an economic rationale for the existence of managerial stock options and convertible debt the work by jensen and meckling 7 has brought more realism to the theory of the firm in their paper jm address agency problems in the context of a firm which is viewed as a nexus of contracts among various factors of production the contractual relationships involve incentive conflicts arising from the pursuit of self interest by limiting themselves to an entrepreneur or owner manager who retains complete control of the firm jm have demonstrated that financing through the issuance of common stock or debt to outsiders engenders costs these costs are precipitated in part by the manager s propensity to consume nonpecuniary benefits or perquisites perks by employing certain resources in excess of their optimal usage 1 and by his propensity to engage in high risk investment projects so as to transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders 2

an empirical investigation of the strategic use of debt the paper examines the accumulation of debt by swedish local governments i find that right wing governments accumulate more debt when facing a higher probability of defeat whereas the opposite occurs for left wing governments these effects are sizable a right wing government increases its level of debt by 15 percent whereas a left wing government decreases its debt by 11 percent if they are both certain of being replaced as compared to when they are certain of remaining in office the results are consistent with the predictions from a strategic debt model developed by persson and svensson

price and volatility co jumps abstract the nature of the dependence between discontinuities in prices and contemporaneous discontinuities in volatility co jumps has been reported by many as being elusive in terms of sign magnitude and statistical significance using a novel identification strategy in continuous time relying on trade level information for spot variance estimation as well as infinitesimal cross moments we document that a sizeable proportion of discontinuous changes in prices are associated with strongly anti correlated contemporaneous discontinuous changes in volatility assuming a possibly nonmonotonic pricing kernel we illustrate the equilibrium implications of price and volatility co jumps for return and variance risk premia

political fragmentation party ideology and public expenditures in this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions the model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power we estimate the model in the case of the french departements our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the french departements depend on the effective political power of the majority

coalition governments versus minority governments bargaining power cohesion and budgeting outcomes recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult it combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament a general indifferenceresult applies an exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures at the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled if the formateur is strong a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

local government borrowing and repayment in indonesia does fiscal capacity matter abstract most regional government borrowing in indonesia has been conducted via central government mechanisms while the terms and conditions of central lending have been highly favorable to regional borrowers repayment of debt has been very poor the empirical evidence suggests that local governments have borrowed well within their fiscal capacities to repay and that repayment problems are largely a function of unwillingness to repay debts and of central government acquiescence regional borrowing must significantly increase in the years ahead in order to meet growing demand for infrastructure services and lending to regions will have to become more market based reducing systemic credit risk and improving the creditworthiness of regional borrowers are prerequisites to increased and sustained market based lending

charles k rowley william f shughart ii and robert d tollison eds the economics of budget deficits the international library of critical writings in economics 153 ed by mark blaug cheltenham u k and northampton ma u s a edward elgar 2002 2 vols 1 112 pages usd 370 00 gbp 245 00 cloth

do large cabinets favor large governments evidence on the fiscal commons problem for swiss cantons abstract the fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics for a panel of the 26 swiss cantons over the 1980 1998 periods this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes we distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments cabinet size and coalition size in addition we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation the results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government while fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent

sovereign default interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets abstract a large body of the empirical literature shows that high turnover rates length of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affects sovereign spreads debt and default rates we help to rationalize such claims by including these political features in a dynamic stochastic small open economy model of sovereign debt and default in this way we offer a complementary approach to the econometric analyses in the literature consistent with the data the quantitative analysis shows that politically unstable and more polarized economies experience higher default rates and larger level and volatility of sovereign interest rate spreads

stock returns and volatility most asset pricing models postulate a positive relationship between a stock portfolio s expected returns and risk which is often modeled by the variance of the asset price this paper uses garch in mean models to examine the relationship between mean returns on a stock portfolio and its conditional variance or standard deviation after estimating a variety of models from daily and monthly portfolio return data we conclude that any relationship between mean returns and own variance or standard deviation is weak the results suggest that investors consider some other risk measure to be more important than the variance of portfolio returns