games for electricity traders understanding risk in a deregulated industry abstract we illustrate and discuss the use of a computer based learning environment known as a microworld for training agents in the colombian electricity market as the market operator was concerned with efficiency in the electricity spot market because of an insufficient number of participants they commissioned a tool that could help potential participants to learn about both market operation as well as the risk management it involved by making the industry more transparent it was intended that a larger number of traders and companies would participate in the market making it more efficient we describe the development and use of this tool which is based on system dynamics and gaming

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

optimal pricing in electrical networks over space and time an electrical system is modelled with a transmission network customers central generators and independent generators the system is subject to stochastic failures and stochastic demand parameters optimal spot prices are derived for the system they vary stochastically with space and time and depend on electrical load flow patterns the price difference between two locations or two voltage levels and the wheeling charge between them will change magnitude and sometimes sign over time as a function of events throughout the network current spatial pricing methods are significantly different from the spot price based methods derived here

the british model in britain failing slowly in 1990 britain reorganised its electricity industry to run on competitive lines the british reforms are widely regarded as successful and the model used provides the basis for reforms of electricity industries worldwide the main reason for this perception of success is major reductions in the real price of electricity with no reduction in service quality this paper examines whether the reputation of the british reforms is justified it concludes that the reputation is not justified and that serious fundamental problems are beginning to emerge the central question is have the british reforms resulted in the creation of efficient wholesale and retail markets on this criterion the reforms have failed the wholesale market is dominated by obscure long term contracts privileged access to the market and self dealing within integrated generator retailers leaving the spot markets with minimal liquidity and unreliable prices the failure to develop an efficient wholesale market places the onus on consumers to impose competitive forces on electricity companies by switching regularly small consumers will not do this and they are paying too much for their power for the future there is a serious risk that the electricity industry will become a weakly regulated oligopoly with a veneer of competition

informational efficiency of markets for stumpage this paper examines the weak form informational efficiency of markets for pine sawtimber stumpage in the u s south analyses of annual and quarterly rates of price change generally indicate that stumpage markets are efficient when viewed over monthly intervals stumpage markets do not pass the tests for weak form efficiency this failure is attributed to friction in the market due to the time and cost involved in consumating timber sales the results have implications for price responsive timber harvest scheduling for the application of asset pricing models to forestry investments and for policies governing sales of timber from public lands

de regulated electric power markets and operating nuclear power plants the case of british energy abstract one issue addressed in almost all electric power restructuring de regulation plans in both the united states us and the united kingdom uk was the recovery of operating nuclear power plant s spent fuel disposal costs and the expenditures to decommission the units when they are retired prior to restructuring in theory at least in both countries electricity consumers were paying for the back end costs from operating nuclear power plants moreover in virtually all cases in the us states included special provisions to insure that consumers would continue to do so after power markets were de regulated when power markets in the uk were initially restructured de regulated and nuclear power privatized the shareholders of british energy be were initially responsible for these costs however after electricity prices fell and be collapsed the british government shifted many of the costs to future taxpayers as much as a century forward if this was not done the book value of be s equity would have been about 3 5 billion pounds that is be s liabilities would have been about 3 5 billion pounds greater than their assets it is difficult to see how be could remain viable under such circumstances

vertical relationships an introduction this short essay introduces a special issue of the journal of industrial economics on vertical relationships including both vertical integration and vertical restraints in the last few years there has been a resurgence of theoretical and empirical work on vertical relationships and they are central to major current issues in industrial policy in this introduction the authors briefly describe the contribution by the papers that make up this special issue copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

reform of the electricity supply industry in britain an assessment of the development of public policy abstract several countries have been trying gradually to increase competition in electricity supply but britain has just taken a radical step with this aim a vertically integrated administered structure has been replaced by one that is more market based in particular electricity generation and transmission have been separated policy proceeded in four steps the commitment to privatise structural reform establishment of the regulatory framework and decisions on contractual arrangements this paper discusses difficulties that arose as policy developed and argues that the complexities of market failure problems in electricity supply were underestimated initially some lessons for policymakers elsewhere are suggested

north south lending and endogenous domestic capital market inefficiencies abstract we develop an open economy model of intertemporal trade under asymmetric information capital market imperfections are endogenous and depend on a country s stage of economic development relative to the perfect information benchmark north south capital flows are dampened and possibly reversed and world interest rates are lower whereas riskless rates are equalized across borders the domestic loan rate is higher in poorer countries the model can be applied to a number of policy issues including the debt overhang problem the indexation of foreign public debts and the effect of income distribution on growth

exclusionary vertical contracts and product market competition this article considers whether a monopolist is able to deter more efficient entrants through contracting with buyers in the antitrust literature the chicago school s stand is that such contracts cannot be anticompetitive hence vertical contracts should be accorded per se legal status in a four stage game with the following features 1 the incumbent enjoys a first mover advantage 2 the entrant must incur some sunk cost to enter the market and 3 entry is uncertain the author shows that vertical contracts can be anticompetitive if there exists product market competition thus the author advocates caution in treating all contracts as per se legal a three factor repeated measures experiment tested the effect of leadership style charismatic structuring and considerate on performance improvement on a manufacturing task over four trials findings from a repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance indicated that individual exposed to considerate leadership had superior initial performance but that this difference faded over time further analysis indicated that self efficacy fully mediated the relationship between leadership style and performance copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

privatization liberalization wages and employment theory and evidence for the uk most agency based privatization models are of the owner manager relation and ignore the labour market yet in the 1980s there were profound changes in public sector and privatized firms to wages and employment we develop a bargaining model of the manager workforce relation that explains employment and wages when firms are privatized government objectives become more commercial and markets are liberalised using data on 14 uk companies 1972 1988 that were publicly owned in 1972 we find a employment fell following the change to more commercial objectives b wages were only slightly affected by this but fell if the firm lost market power

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

an equilibrium selection theory of monopolization we develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market e g investing in process innovation or product development as well as in the market e g setting quantities or prices competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms investment levels relative size and profitability we show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market in particular it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm while not generating new equilibria this result complicates the task of determining whether a firm s dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization we discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation and illustrate these by means of two well known antitrust cases

how effective are capital controls a number of authors have recently argued that in order to avoid financial instability emerging countries should rely on capital controls two type of controls have been considered controls on capital outflows and controls on capital inflows in this paper i review the historical evidence on the effectiveness of these two type of controls i argue that controls on outflows have been ineffective they are circumvented and breed corruption i also analyze chile s recent experience with controls on inflows and i argue that their effectiveness has been exaggerated

portfolio risk and returns from timber asset investments this paper evaluates the investment performance of swedish timberland during the last three decades using the capital asset pricing model capm results suggests that swedish timberland investments show diversification potential and can serve as a hedge

optimal financial instruments debt and equity are developed as optimal financial instruments in a model where cash flows and control rights are allocated to investors endogenously when investment decisions must be made by a single party the debtholder s cash flows are fixed in order to provide the equityholder with efficient incentives for investment ownership of control may be transferred to the debtholder to attenuate the impact of asymmetric information concerning the investment opportunity on the efficiency of the decision making since the classic article by modigliani and miller 1958 a great deal of attention has been focused on the problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm spanning taxes and or transaction cost agency cost and signalling arguments have been offered as explanations for why a firm s cash flows might be split between debt and equity claimants in a particular way here we address the more basic question of the optimal design of the securities that firms issue the majority of the existing literature takes the form of the allowable financial instruments as given in defense of this approach it may be noted that to a first approximation firms have used two standard financial instruments debt and equity we argue here however that the characterization of the standard instruments used in much of the literature has been incomplete and that the incentives of decision makers within the firm cannot be completely understood until the problem is addressed from a more basic level than is typically done by concentrating on the cash flow characteristics of these instruments the equally important issue of the way the standard instruments distribute the control rights of the firm has been ignored as a consequence the objectives in corporate decision making have been assumed rather than developed endogenously we consider the allocation of cash flows and the distribution of control rights to optimal financial instruments in a security design problem by considering the design of securities in this way we are able to consider the

on the effects of barriers to international investment a simple model is presented in which it is costly for domestic investors to hold foreign assets the implications of the model for the composition of optimal portfolios at home and abroad are derived it is shown that all foreign assets with a beta larger than some beta plot on either one of two security market lines some foreign assets with a beta smaller than are not held by domestic investors even if their expected return is increased slightly while it is obviously not true that asset markets are completely segmented between countries there is evidence of barriers to international investment although reality seems to lie in that grey area between complete segmentation and no segmentation at all most international asset pricing models are concerned with the extreme case of no barriers to international investment no effort seems to have been made to study the effect on portfolio choice of such barriers which make it costly to hold foreign securities as opposed to domestic securities but which do not in general render international diversification so onerous that investors avoid foreign securities completely casual empiricism suggests that models without barriers to international investment should be suspect those models cannot explain why it appears that in every country investors on average hold more domestic securities than would be required if they held the world market portfolio 2 this paper constructs a model of international asset pricing in which there is a cost associated with holding either long or short risky foreign securities for the sake of simplicity in most of the paper we assume that while domestic investors face barriers to international investment foreign investors face no such barriers it turns out that nothing significant is lost with such an assumption the main conclusions of this paper for the case in which foreign investors face no barriers to international investment are 1 in the presence of barriers to international investment some risky foreign

compositional effects of capital controls theory and evidence this paper examines the effects of capital controls on the composition of inter national capital flows paying particular attention to debt inflows versus equity inflows a two period small open economy model with stochastic second period output and asymmetric information between domestic agents and international financiers is utilised to generate predictions regarding the effects of capital controls on the relative use of debt versus equity for financing first period investment these capital control implications are then investigated with quarterly frequency panel data for latin america capital controls are found to significantly affect the composition of the capital account

entry deterrence and the free rider problem the public good aspect of entry prevention is examined in an industry characterized by an established oligopoly facing a potential entrant although incumbent firms act noncooperatively underinvestment in entry deterrence does not occur and in fact incumbents may find themselves in a pareto dominated arrangement in terms of profits by preventing entry

pre emptive patenting joint ventures and the persistence of oligopoly abstract gilbert and newbery 1982 have examined pre emptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly the present paper considers pre emptive patenting when there are several incumbent firms rather than just one it is shown why the incumbent oligopolists behaving non cooperatively might fail to deter entry this suggests that a joint venture in r and d might be a useful entry deterring device insofar as it pools the incumbents incentives to prevent entry this is indeed the case for small innovations but for large innovations the formation of a joint venture weakens the incumbents incentive to innovate by removing the competitive stimulus between them

exclusive quality exclusive quality in the case of vertically differentiated products bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a high quality rival indeed because of differentiation the incumbent s inferior product is not eliminated upon entry due to the resulting competitive pressure a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity contract expects to earn much less than the incumbent s monopoly rents thus in equilibrium the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign the contract and achieve exclusion this is true under linear pricing for intermediate levels of entry costs and with two part tariffs even in the absence of entry costs copyright 2010 the author the journal of industrial economics 2010 blackwell publishing ltd and the editorial board of the journal of industrial economics

the british electricity experiment the privatization of the electricity supply industry esi in britain which began 1990 is in itself an unremarkable event much of the esi is privately owned in several european countries and in the united states and the u k privatization program has embraced utilities since 1984 when british telecom was privatized the thing that is remarkable about recent policy toward the industry is the radical nature of the regulatory reform accompanying privatization a vertically integrated administered generation and transmission structure was replaced overnight on march 31 1990 by one that is deintegrated and market based generation and transmission have been separated and there has been an attempt to establish competition in generation a number of countries have been moving gradually in the direction of encouraging competition but nowhere else have such dramatic changes been implemented so quickly

capital account liberalization what do cross country studies tell us capital account liberalization it is fair to say remains one of the most controversial and least understood policies of our day one reason is that different theoretical perspectives have very different implications for the desirability of liberalizing capital flows another is that empirical analysis has failed to yield conclusive results the answer another influential strand of thought contends is that this efficient markets paradigm is fundamentally misleading when applied to capital flows limits on capital movements are a distortion it is an implication of the theory of the second best that removing one distortion need not be welfare enhancing when other distortions are present

naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities this paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts we use the strategic environment described by rasmusen ramseyer and wiley 1991 and segal and whinston 2000 where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent when discrimination is impossible the game resembles a stag hunt coordination game in which the buyers payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium two way non binding pre play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller when discrimination and communication are possible the exclusion rate rises divide and conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given finally secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent s power to profitably exclude

reforms in the french power system from weak contestability to effective competition abstract one way to introduce competition in the power industries is to preserve the integration of the incumbent companies and to organise the access of potential competitors to the network on a fair basis but the combination of hierarchy and bilateral contracts between entrants ipp candidates foreign producers intermediaries suppliers and consumers appears to be unstable because of permanent tensions between the incumbent s dominant position and fair competition moreover in an institutional environment enlarged by the supranational powers of the european union heterogeneity of rules and structures between quasi integrated power industries and decentralised competitive ones are sources of permanent questioning the paper analyses the stability of the recent reform of the french power industry the extreme integration of which being deeply rooted in the french institutional peculiarities has been weakly affected by the directive 96 92 transcription two institutional scenarios are defined which give a different weight to two competition paradigms in conflicts one pertains to the industrial policy which inclines to preserve hierarchy in the national area to gain national champion s competitive advantages in the european as in the global field and the other to the neo classical paradigm of effective competition in the first scenario the integration of the industrial organisation is preserved but with transparent grid access rules supposed to create an actual market contestability and the playing field is the continental europe on which national champions compete in the second one the french industrial organisation has to conform to the competitive model with vertical and horizontal disintegration and creation of a power exchange market for promoting competition but this scenario is heavily strained by the institutional determinism of the nuclear legacy the future reality should be set between these two scenarios

financial crises in asia and latin america then and now in this paper we analyze the extent to which past financial crises share common characteristics in latin america asia europe and the middle east we examine the recent crises in asia and in latin america in particular their severity to assess whether the considerable historical differences that we have documented for the earlier sample have eroded we conclude that in a deregulated world the well behaved asian financia1 crises are a relic of the past

competitive energy markets and nuclear power can we have both do we want either in 1987 the uk conservative party was re elected promising to transform the electricity industry into a privatised competitive industry and to promote an expansion of nuclear power fulfilling both objectives was not possible the nuclear plants were withdrawn from the sale and plans to build new plants were abandoned but privatisation proceeded in 2007 the labour government began a new attempt to build nuclear plants to operate in the competitive electricity market promising that no subsidies would be offered to them by 2010 the utilities that were planning to build nuclear plants were beginning to suggest that support in some form would be needed if they were to build new plants more surprisingly the energy regulator ofgem cast doubt on whether a competitive wholesale electricity market would provide security of supply in 1990 the uk government opted for a competitive electricity market over expanding nuclear power now the option of opting for a competitive electricity market may not exist however this might not leave the way open for new nuclear plants the expected cost of power from new nuclear plants is now so high that no more than one or two heavily subsidised plants will be built

regulation and development of the argentinean gas market gas markets are becoming increasingly important around the world and the long term evolution of these markets is of strategic importance for many countries this makes it essential to understand how regulation and intervention in these markets affects the long term prospect for the secure supply of gas we use argentina as a case to illustrate some of the issues and consequences of gas regulation argentina is a country that has had a significant increase in the use of gas over the years and where a potential gas deficit looms large in the present and the future based on a simulation model developed to understand the supply of gas in argentina we discuss how regulation will influence the long term supply of gas in both argentina and surrounding countries using the model we develop a series of scenarios to highlight the consequences of different current and possible future interventions in the market by the regulator finally we discuss short term regulatory options to reduce the impact of a gas deficit and the possibility of securing the long term supply of gas in argentina

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

debt taxes and international equilibrium abstract this paper employs an extended miller model to analyze capital structure decisions of individual firms in a two country setting miller equilibria are generally not consistent with an international equilibrium if the tax subsidy of debt differs across countries the most obvious reason for differential tax subsidies is differences between national corporate tax rates we also identify differential tax subsidies of debt if inflation rates differ across countries for both cases we examine the adjustment process from national equilibria to an international equilibrium without and with barriers to international investment we derive the relationship between the equilibrium yields on debt and equity in the two countries and discuss the fisher hypothesis that real returns do not depend upon inflation in a two country miller world

temporary controls on capital inflows abstract during the past decade a number of countries imposed capital controls that had two distinguishing features they were asymmetric in that they were designed principally to discourage capital inflows and they were temporary this paper studies formally the consequences of these policies calibrates their potential effectiveness and assesses their welfare implications in an environment in which the level of capital inflows can be sub optimal in addition motivated by the fact that these types of controls have often been left in place after the dissipation of the shock that lead to the controls being implemented the paper evaluates the welfare cost of procrastination in removing these types of controls

exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry evidence from automobiles exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market we ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier and provide an empirical analysis of the european car market we first estimate a demand model with product and spatial differentiation and quantify consumers valuations for dealer proximity and dealer exclusivity we then perform policy counterfactuals to assess the profit incentives and possible entry deterring effects of exclusive dealing we find that there are no unilateral incentives to maintain exclusive dealing but there is a collective incentive for the industry as a whole furthermore a ban on exclusive dealing would raise the smaller entrants market share but more importantly consumers would gain not so much because of increased price competition but rather because of the increased spatial availability which compensates for the demand inefficiency from a loss of dealer exclusivity

economic perspectives on privatization despite being one of the most fundamental issues in political economy the question of the appropriate boundary between public and private enterprise received relatively little attention in mainstream economic analysis until quite recently in the 1980s however programs of ownership reform were started in many developed and developing countries dramatic though some of these policies have been they are likely to be overshadowed in the 1990s by even greater privatization in the reforming socialist economies the opening sections of this paper are organized around three broad and interrelated questions how does ownership matter for the efficiency of enterprise performance what is the role for privatization in financing public debts and deficits what are the distributional and political implications of privatization finally we examine privatization in practice in three countries britain chile and poland

objectives and incentives evidence from the privatisation of great britain s power plants abstract does privatization increase plant productivity because the private owner s objective is different or because they are better able to control management and is privatization sufficient to improve productivity or is it only effective in combination with competition we answer these questions using the quasi experiment of great britain s electricity industry privatization to separate the effect of a change in objectives from a change in incentives we assume that the former only affects labor but not fuel productivity and assuming that effective competition was only introduced after privatization we are able to separately identify the effects of privatization and competition we find that privatization increased labor but not fuel productivity evidence for the importance of objectives there is no evidence that the introduction of effective competition after privatization increased labor or fuel productivity evidence that privatization increases productivity by itself

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

tradable emission rights and strategic interaction the use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy this paper presents an analysis of how and under what conditions emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes

market power in tradable emission markets a laboratory testbed for emission trading in port phillip bay victoria abstract in theory competitive emission permit markets minimize total abatement costs permit markets are often imperfectly competitive however and may be thin and dominated by large firms the dominant firm s could exercise market power and increase other firms costs of pollution control while reducing their own emission control costs this paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organized using the double auction trading institution our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the port phillip watershed in victoria australia we vary across treatments the initial allocation of permits to sources so that in one treatment the seller of permits is a monopolist and in another treatment the market is duopolistic we also vary the information that subjects have about the number and abatement costs of their competitors we find that prices and seller profits are higher and efficiency is lower on average in the monopoly sessions compared with the duopoly sessions but the differences are not substantial and are not statistically significant due to pronounced variation across sessions moreover prices profits and transaction volumes are usually much closer to the competitive equilibrium ce than the monopoly equilibrium

capital controls re examined the case for smart controls the global financial crisis which began in east asia in 1997 is not over neither is the inquest into its implications for adjustment policy in the wake of this crisis we focus here on the role of capital controls which formed a much publicised part of the crisis coping strategy in one country malaysia and less openly were also deployed by other crisis afflicted countries evaluation so far has examined different target variables with different estimation methods generally concentrating on efficiency and stability indicators and ignoring equity measures it has also typically treated control as a one zero dummy variable ignoring the quality of intervention and in particular the extent to which efficiency gains are obtained in exchange for controls partly because of these limitations the literature has reached no consensus on the impact of controls nor therefore about where they fit within the set of post crisis defence mechanisms we propose an approach in which the government plays off short term political security against long term economic gain the more insecure its political footing the greater the weight it gives to political survival which is likely to increase the probability of controls being imposed the modelling of this approach generates a governmental policy reaction function and an impact function for controls which are estimated by simultaneous panel data methods across a sample of thirty developing and transitional countries between 1980 2003 using for the period since 1996 the new imf dataset which differentiates between controls by type we find that controls appear to cause increases in income equality and are significantly associated with political insecurity and relatively low levels of openness to trade they do not in our analysis materially influence the level of whole economy productivity or gdp across the sample of countries examined although they do influence productivity in particular sectors in particular manufacturing but the dispersion around this central finding is wide the tendency for controls to depress productivity by encouraging rent seeking sometimes is and sometimes is not counteracted by purposive government policy actions to maintain competitiveness whether or not this happens whether as we put it controls are smart and the manner in which they are smartened is vital on both efficiency and equity grounds we devise a formula for and make the case for capital controls which are time limited and contain an inbuilt incentive to increased productivity as a means of improving the sustainability and equity of the adjustment process whilst keeping to a minimum the cost in terms of productive efficiency

on the use of period average stumpage prices to estimate forest asset pricing models several recent papers thomson 1987 zinkhan 1988 zinkhan and mitchell 1988 cubbage harris and redmond 1988 binkley and washburn 1988a 1988b including one in this journal redmond and cubbage 1988 use either sharpe s 1963 single index market model with returns to the overall market portfolio serving as the index or the capital asset pricing model capm sharpe 1964 lintner 1965 to measure the risk and evaluate the performance of timberland investments the capm specifies an equilibrium relationship between asset i s expected rate of return eri the risk free rate of return rf and the expected risk premium on the market portfolio of all assets in the economy the expected market rate of return erm minus the risk free rate rf

timber harvesting as a part of the portfolio management a multiperiod stochastic optimisation approach a multiperiod stochastic optimization model is formulated for a land owner who can speculate between investing harvesting income in financial assets and postponing harvesting this paper demonstrates the benefits from using a multiperiod model the effects of cointegration on optimal portfolio and the differences between the timber harvesting model and the standard financial portfolio optimisation model the demonstrations are made partly by using a real finnish forest and price data and partly by using artificial data in the real data example the system is demonstrated using a case where it is assumed that the land owner has several mature forest stands which can be harvested at any time during the next 3 years investment alternatives are stocks government bonds and bank deposits the forestry returns were defined as a sum of exponential physical growth and stumpage price return the chosen definition of forestry returns makes the model very useful for example when speculating on what speed of physical growth is needed to make forestry a competitive investment alternative when both returns and risks are considered

upgrades switching costs and the leverage theory of tying this article investigates the role of product upgrades and consumer switching costs in the tying of complementary products previous analyses have found that a monopolist of one product will not increase its profits and reduce social welfare by tying and leveraging its monopoly position into a complementary market if the initial monopolised product is essential where essential means that all uses of the complementary good require the initial monopolised product we show that this is not true in settings characterised by product upgrades and consumer switching costs we also discuss various extensions including the role of the reversibility of tying

uk local authority engagement with the energy service company esco model key characteristics benefits limitations and considerations abstract this paper explores how some uk local authorities las have opted to engage with the energy service company esco model in a bid to enhance their influence over local energy system change and help them to deliver on their political public good objectives three common approaches to la esco model engagement are outlined including the 1 la owned arm s length model 2 private sector owned concession agreement model and 3 community owned and run model the la s decision to establish its own esco or alternatively enter into a partnership with another predominantly depends on its willingness to expose itself to risk the level of strategic control it desires and the resources it has at its disposal however the business case is contingent on the extent to which the national policy and regulatory framework facilitates and obligates las to play an active energy governance role stronger alignment of local and national energy agendas through communication and coordination between different governance actors could help to remove critical barriers to la esco engagement and their wider energy governance activities

the timing of mergers along the production chain capital structure and risk dynamics abstract i demonstrate that the timing of vertical mergers is generally dependent on industry characteristics my predictions are consistent with empirically observed patterns of vertical mergers i show that merger activity during economic upturns tends to be motivated by operating efficiencies while merger activity during economic downturns tends to occur as a means of keeping production chain operational mergers allow firms to capture synergies and improve efficiencies in order to survive economic contractions the pricing framework implies that a vertical merger decision usually reduces risk during two different economic states

buyer power and intrabrand coordination we analyze the competitive effects of vertical contracts in a contracting situation where rival retailers offer contracts to a manufacturer in contrast to bernheim and whinston 1998 who study the situation in which competing manufacturers offer contracts to a common retailer we find that two part tariffs even if contingent on exclusivity or not do not suffice to implement the monopolyoutcome richer arrangements including e g conditional fixed fees and upfront payments are thus required to internalize all contracting externalities the welfare implications are ambiguous on the one hand richer contracts ensure that no efficient retailer is excluded on the other hand they allow firms to maintain monopoly prices despite intrabrand competition simulations suggest that the latter effect may be more significant

strategic ex ante contracts rent extraction and opportunity costs this article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers the seller s optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant moreover this ex ante contract mitigates the seller s ex post rent seeking vis a vis the contracted buyer accordingly it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts depending upon the contracted buyer s financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed

controls on capital inflows do they work abstract this paper analyzes the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows in particular we analyze in great detail the chilean experience with the use of the unremunerated reserve requirement we examine the effects of the controls applied in chile in 1991 1998 on interest rates real exchange rate and the volume and composition of capital inflows the effects are elusive and it is difficult to pin down long run effects although after the unremunerated reserve requirement was introduced there was an increase in the interest rate differential the econometric evidence does not show it has a significant long run effect also we detect very small effects on the real exchange rate however the more persistent and significant effect is on the composition of capital inflows tilting composition toward longer maturity

power sector reform in orissa an ex post analysis of the causal factors abstract from the early 1990s dramatic changes have been taking place in the structure of electricity supply industry esi worldwide the primary reasons for electricity sector reform has however been different for industrialised and developing countries the objective of this paper is to study and identify various factors leading to power sector reform in developing countries the restructuring of orissa state electricity board in india was used as a case study in identifying the various factors the factors that result in implementation of restructuring are a contextual factors they are the primary drivers for initiating reform the performance of the utility and the conditionalities of the lending agencies are contextual factors b trigger factor it is the determining factor that creates a compelling necessity to undergo restructuring the inability of the government to continue to support the utility acts as the trigger factor c facilitating factors they act as facilitators for initiating reform support of the government absence of a powerful lobby and the support of the top management are facilitating factors

exclusive contracts and market dominance we propose a new theory of exclusive dealing the theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals and that the buyers willingness to pay for the product is private information in this setting the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive we discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases jel d21 d43 d82 d86 k21 l13 l40