corruption and the shadow economy one way or two way street this paper attempts to bring some resolution to the relation between corruption and the shadow economy while previous research focuses on the static relationship between the two we account for dynamics using a panel vector autoregression model and consider influences from the official economy and institutional quality using cross national panel data for 108 countries over the period 1984 2006 results show a bidirectional relationship with initial complementarity and substitution over time thus the nature of the two way street is shown to change over time and our consideration of dynamics reveals the complementarity substitution switch

political competition and the politicization of the state in east central europe the expansion and politicization of the postcommunist state even among the reform leaders of czech republic hungary poland and slovakia has confounded early expectations that the state would s

the effect of taxes on labor supply in the underground economy this paper uses micro data from a randomized survey carried out in the metropolitan area of quebec city canada to analyze the decision to evade taxes and work in the underground economy the results indicate that taxes distort labor market activities away from the regular sector to the underground sector but the distortion is small for the average worker the distortion is large however for particular groups of the population such as welfare claimants copyright 1994 by american economic association

taxing the unobservable the impact of the shadow economy on inflation and taxation summary because the shadow economy cannot be taxed it erodes the tax base and reduces tax revenues forcing governments to resort to other ways to finance their expenditures accordingly a larger shadow economy should give governments an incentive to shift revenue sources from taxes to inflation in line with the public finance motive of inflation in this paper we recall that point in a simple canonical model then empirically test it in a sample of up to 153 developed and developing countries over the 1999 2007 period in line with the model s prediction we indeed observe a positive relation between inflation and the size of the shadow economy and a negative relation between the tax burden and the size of the shadow economy we find that both relations are conditional on central bank independence and on the exchange rate regime implying that it is the strongest in institutional set ups that constrain monetary policy the least both relations are present in the sub sample of developed countries as well as the sub sample of developing countries both relations survive several robustness checks using various sets of control variables including the stock of debt controlling for endogeneity using alternative estimates of the shadow economy and estimating the two relations as a system of equations

why is corruption less harmful to income inequality in latin america summary conventional wisdom says corruption is bad for income inequality but recent research on latin america finds a trade off between corruption and inequality and suggests this is due to the large informal sector in the region using data on a large sample of countries we find that the informal sector impacts the link between corruption and inequality in particular the marginal impact of corruption becomes negative once the informal sector becomes large this is true in latin america and more generally corruption reducing policies should be accompanied by measures that help displaced informal sector workers

law enforcement and transition abstract we present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality we analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem a first mechanism which we call dualism follows the scenario of chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non state sector follows market rules the second mechanism we put forward is accession to the european union we show that accession to the european union even without external borrowing provides a mechanism to eliminate the bad equilibrium provided the accessing country is small enough relative to the european union interestingly we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession

informality and poverty in ecuador this paper uses national representative data from the ecuadorian family expenditure survey to study the determinants of poverty and informality in the country taking into account the two way relationship between these two phenomena the main contribution of this paper is to present new empirical evidence on this relationship for a developing country where more than 60 of workers are in the informal sector the results support the view of a heterogeneous informal market in which informal work is both a demand led phenomenon and a voluntary and primarily supply led form of employment

measuring the hidden economy implications for econometric modelling in this paper i support using econometric techniques to measure the size of the hidden underground economy because such information is important for the construction of certain economic models and for empirical policy analysis generally detailed information on the output of the hidden economy is unavailable even where careful measures of the underground economy have been constructed usually these data are available only periodically important exceptions are the classic results of tanzi 1983 for the united states and bhattacharyya s 1990 series for the united kingdom in the case of the new zealand economy a time series of data on the hidden economy has been generated recently giles 1997a this provides the unusual opportunity to undertake econometric modelling in a way which takes account of such activity formally moreover we can examine the policy implications arising from the linkages between hidden output and various measured economic aggregates this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the impact of fiscal policy and deregulation on shadow economies in transition countries the case of ukraine a model of ukrainian shadow economy moneydemand is estimated that includes newregulatory burden tax complexity andsoft budget constraint variables thismodel is analyzed to determine the causesand dynamics of the ukrainian shadoweconomy and to assess the effectiveness ofstate measures undertaken to reduce itssize the direct tax burden thebroadly defined regulatory burden thecomplexity of the tax system andsoft budget constraints for enterprises are found tobe important causes of unofficial activity the main explanatory factors forthe estimated decline of the shadow economyin recent years are explained and it is argued that theevidence has implications beyond the caseof ukraine

the nexus of white collar crimes shadow economy corruption and uninsured motorists abstractthis article empirically examines the nexus of three white collar crimes shadow economy corruption and uninsured motorists whereas the shadow economy corruption linkage has been studied the linkages with uninsured motorists have not been formally studied results based on us data and accounting for possible bidirectional causalities show complementarity between shadow economy and corruption and between uninsured motorists and the shadow economy the magnitude of the impact of uninsured motorists on the shadow economy is greater than that of corruption in other findings shadow economy was lower in most prosperous states and in states that did not impose a sales tax

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

the hidden economy as an unobserved variable abstract the technique of unobserved variables is used to estimate the relative size and development time of the hidden economy of oecd countries the burdens of taxation and regulations and the tax morality turn out to be statistically significant determinants at the end of the scandinavian and benc lux countries are expected to have a relatively large and japan and switzerland a relatively small hidden economy canada and the united states are rank in the middle the size of all hidden sectors is estimated to have increased in the period 1960 1973 relative to officially measured gnp

inequality and informality abstract this paper presents theory and evidence on the determinants of the size of the informal sector we propose a simple theoretical model in which it is positively related to income inequality more so under weak institutions and is negatively related to the economy s wealth these predictions are then empirically validated using different proxies of the size of the informal sector income inequality and institutional quality the results are shown to be robust with respect to a variety of econometric specifications we also find that government interventions through regulations lose much of its robustness in the presence of the above factors

gravity models of trade based money laundering several attempts have been made in the economics literature to measure money laundering however the adequacy of these models is difficult to assess as money laundering takes place secretly and hence goes unobserved an exception is trade based money laundering tbml a special form of trade abuse that has been discovered only recently tbml refers to criminal proceeds that are transferred around the world using fake invoices that under or overvalue imports and exports this article is a first attempt to test well known prototype models proposed by walker and unger to predict illicit money laundering flows and to apply traditional gravity models borrowed from international trade theory to do so we use a dataset of zdanowicz of tbml flows from the us to 199 countries our test rejects the specifications of the walker and unger prototype models at least for tbml the traditional gravity model that we present here can indeed explain tbml flows worldwide in a plausible manner an important determinant is licit trade the mass in which tbml is hidden furthermore our results suggest that criminals use tbml in order to escape the stricter anti moneylaundering regulations of financial markets

real exchange rate overvaluation and wto dispute initiation in developing countries why and when do developing countries file trade disputes at the world trade organization wto although financial conditions have long been considered an important driver of trade policy they have been largely absent from the literature on trade disputes we argue that developing country governments bring more trade dispute to the wto when overvalued real exchange rates put exporters at a competitive disadvantage this dynamic is most prevalent in countries where large foreign currency debt burdens discourage nominal currency devaluations that would otherwise serve exporters interests our findings provide an explanation for differences in dispute participation rates among developing countries and also suggest a new link between exchange rate regimes and trade policy

does the quality of institutions limit the mena s integration in the world economy using a large sample of countries over the 1990s this paper examines the extent to which institutions functioning disables a greater participation of the middle east and north africa mena in the world economy it focuses on the impact on manufactured exports and fdi attractiveness and considers a broad index of political risk as well as indices targeted toward specific aspects of governance corruption government effectiveness and the rule of law the results are robust to different econometric approaches and lend strong support to the hypothesis that the functioning of institutions may disable the participation of mena countries in the world economy they suggest that the impact of an improvement in the quality of institutions may result in a sensitive increase of fdi inflows and manufactured exports that increase is comparable to the one resulting from liberalisation policies hence although institutional reforms can take time they deserve the necessary efforts given their outcomes as compared to other reforms

quantifying the black economy measurement without theory yet again i shall argue that measurement without theory is a fair description of the published empirical work aimed at guestimating the size of the hidden or black economy i shall also argue that a mere guestimate of the overall size of the black economy is of limited value for the policy maker it is also important to know who is doing what where how and why then we can see what should and or can be done about legislating for or against the black economy in assessing the various attempts to measure the size of the black economy one should also be aware of a political dimension to some of this work perhaps a large and growing black economy is an indication that the economy is overtaxed and over regulated and a neo liberal adjustment is needed to free it up if a large part of the black economy is social security fraud then maybe unemployment is not really as bad as it looks clearly such political conclusions depended on having good theoretical as well as sound quantitative foundations and both these components were generally missing

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

the informal sector in developed and less developed countries a literature survey the main goal of this study is two fold 1 to provide ageneral overview of the contributions to the literature on theinformal sector with a special focus on the public choiceapproach and 2 to compare these contributions across twoinstitutionally different types of countries developed andless developed developing and transition countries thepaper focuses on the criteria used to define the informalsector the relationship between the formal and informaleconomy tax evasion and public choice analysis it isstressed throughout this paper that the distinction betweenthe two types of countries is of key importance

blessing or curse foreign and underground demand for euro notes public finance solutions to the european unemployment problem developing countries may hold as much as 25 30 of the 1 3 trillion oecd currency supply although dollar holdings appear to exceed dm holdings by a factor of four the advent of the euro may change this balance indeed by issuing large denomination notes of 100 200 and 500 the european central bank appears to be well poised to challenge the dominance of the ubiquitous us 100 note however large denomination notes are also extremely popular in the oecd underground economy which appears to hold at least 50 of the currency supply as a result the seigniorage revenues obtained by issuing large denomination notes may be an accounting illusion substantially or fully offset by losses due to increased tax evasion hence the new european central bank may wish to consider policies that discourage underground use of currency even at the expense of losing out on foreign demand kenneth rogoff

why do firms hide bribes and unofficial activity after communism abstract our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden unofficial activity to be much larger in russia and ukraine than in poland slovakia and romania a comparison of cross country averages shows that managers in russia and ukraine face higher effective tax rates worse bureaucratic corruption greater incidence of mafia protection and have less faith in the court system our firm level regressions for the three eastern european countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output

political losers as a barrier to economic development per capita income in many sub saharan african countries such as chad and niger is less than 1 30th of that of the united states most economists and social scientists suspect that this is in part due to institutional failures that stop these societies from adopting the best technologies a particularly interesting historical example comes from the diffusion of railways in the 19th century while railways are regarded as a key technology driving the industrial revolution there were large lags in their diffusion for example in 1850 the united states had 14 518 km of track britain 9 797 km and germany 5 856 km in the russian and hapsburg empires there were just 501 km and 1 357 kim respectively all data from brian r mitchell 1993 why do societies as in this example fail to adopt the best available technologies one answer is that existing powerful interest groups block the introduction of new technologies in order to protect their economic rents and societies are able to make technological advances only if they can defeat such groups economic monopolies may be one example a monopolist might wish to block the introduction of a new technology by a rival that will capture the market this idea which we call the economic losers hypothesis was discussed by simon kuznets 1968 developed at length by joel mokyr 1990 in the context of technology adoption and formalized by per krusell and jose victor rios rull 1996 and stephen l parente and edward c prescott 1997 related ideas are widely discussed in the literature on international trade policy with many formal models e g gene m grossman and elhanan helpman 1994 there are problems with this story however first despite the intuitive appeal of the idea there are relatively few instances where major economic change was blocked by economic losers mokyr 1990 emphasizes the attempts of many skilled artisans to block the introduction of new machines the most famous example is the luddites skilled weavers who were thrown out of work by mechanization interestingly however many of these groups including the luddites were ultimately unable to block economic progress equally important the economic losers hypothesis relies on the presumption that certain groups have the political power to block innovation but if so why not use this power to simply tax the gains generated by the introduction of the new technology this might be because there are limits on the nature of fiscal instruments though it seems plausible that groups with sufficient political power to block innovation would be able subsequently to lobby effectively for redistribution a more important reason however may be that the introduction of new technology and economic change more generally may simultaneously affect the distribution of political power we argue that the effect of economic change on political power is a key factor in determining whether technological advances and beneficial economic changes will be blocked in other words we propose a political loser hypothesis we argue that it is groups whose political power not economic rents is eroded who will block technological advances if agents are economic losers but have no political power they cannot impede technological progress if they have and maintain political power i e are not political losers then they have no incentive to block progress it is therefore agents who have t discussant gene grossman princeton university

foreign direct investment and exports a time series approach the impact of the accelerated internationalization of the last decade on the austrian economy is a controversial issue granger s concept of casuality is used to investigate one aspect of the internationalization of production the realtionship between foreign outward direct investment and exports using aggregate flow data from the austrian economy the stationarity of the time series is examined and cointegration tests for the adequacy of the multivariate time series approach are performed the estimation results suggest significant causality of austrian foreign outward direct investment and exports in both directions impulse response analysis and varience decomposition show a very slow dynamic response of both variables to exogenous shocks of the other it furthermnore indicates the possiblity of a positive effect of exogeneously increased foreign direct investment on exports and a negative effect of export shocks on foreign direct investment however significant long run effects are not established

is globalization reducing poverty and inequality abstract over the past 20 years or so india china and the rest of east asia experienced fast economic growth and falls in the poverty rate latin america stagnated the former soviet union central and eastern europe and sub saharan africa regressed but what are the net trends the neoliberal argument says that world poverty and income inequality fell over the past two decades for the first time in more than a century and a half thanks to the rising density of economic integration across national borders the evidence therefore confirms that globalization in the context of the world economic regime in place since the end of bretton woods generates more mutual benefit than conflicting interests this paper questions the empirical basis of the neoliberal argument

occupational segregation and career advancement abstract this paper analyzes women s job choice in order to discriminate between different theories we model the joint determination of occupation and career advancement our results support the crowding hypothesis of occupational segregation and are against human capital and compensating wage differentials explanations

poverty and the shadow economy the role of governmental institutions this paper examines the impact of poverty on the size of the shadow economy using cross country panel data for over 100 countries for the period 1991 2015 the results show that poverty has a positive and significant effect on the size of the shadow economy furthermore we argue that the quality and size of governmental institutions matter in moderating the impact of poverty on the shadow economy considering the interactions between poverty and government quality and size we find that poverty has the largest effect on the size of the shadow economy when government quality is the lowest and the size of the government is the largest these results withstand a battery of robustness checks

sex discrimination and competition in product and labour markets theoritical explanations for wage discrimination collapse in the long run because competition should drive discriminations firms out of the market in product markets with imperfect competition em

endogenous oca analysis and the early euro experience some have argued that the endogenous responses to the formation of a currency area are so strong that one need not worry about optimum currency area conditions ex ante we argue that this is much too strong a conclusion we draw on a number of recent studies to evaluate the endogeneity experiences of the eurozone in three major areas trade flows business cycle synchronisation and structural reforms to improve labour and product market flexibility simple before and after comparisons are insufficient for analysis of endogeneity the experiences of non euro western european economies suggest that broader trends also had considerable influence on trade and business cycle patterns while trade rose substantially within the eurozone it also rose with and among other european economies we argue that political economy considerations tend to dampen the magnitude of endogeneity efforts on structural reforms and that meeting conditions for entry may be a more powerful mechanism in this than are subsequent endogenous responses we also discuss a number of areas for further research

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

approaches for estimating noncompliance examples from federal taxation in the united states crime and underground economic activity are a fact of life around the world most societies attempt to control these activities through the expenditure of resources on monitoring prosecution punishment and educational programmes gathering statistics about who is engaging in illegal or underground activity the frequencies with which various crimes or underground transactions are occurring and the severity or magnitude of these acts is crucial for making good decisions regarding our allocation of resources in this area unfortunately in general it is very difficult to obtain accurate information about these issues this is partly because the individuals engaged in such activities wish not to be identified and often take actions to avoid detection and partly because by their very nature the activities tend not to generate economic accounting legal demographic or other cultural records the fact that it is difficult to obtain accurate information about the activities however does not in any way imply that we should not make a concerted effort to try to obtain the best information we can i believe the cost associated with attempting to determine the extent and nature of these activities is in most circumstances well below the expected benefit which includes the likelihood of improved decisionmaking by relevant government personnel and the general public as a result i also believe the debate about developing estimates of illegal or underground economic activity should primarily focus on practical issues related to how best to go about developing estimates that are as reliable as possible in this short article i shall discuss the measurement of noncompliance with laws and regulations my particular area of expertise and shall not discuss the measurement of other kinds of hidden economic behaviours such as informal contracting unmeasured home production and grey market activities in particular i shall discuss three approaches for estimating the aggregate amount of noncompliance with respect to a specific law or regulation i intensive data collection for a focused subsample of the population ii detection controlled estimation and iii the comparision of estimates generated by distinct datasets and models for each i shall describe in general terms what the approach is and how it is implemented review limitations of the approach and present an example of the application of the approach to the measurement of tax noncompliance in the united states my discussion shall necessarily be short and i refer the interested reader to a variety of original research publications for more details especially about the specific examples

shadow economy and unemployment rate in u s a is there a structural relationship an empirical analysis this article aims to estimate the size of the us shadow economy se using a structural equation approach and to evaluate if a structural relationship exists between the se and the unemployment rate ur in the united states the size of the se is estimated to be decreasing over the last two decades we corroborate the existence of a structural relationship between the se and the ur by using a simple theoretical model furthermore we extend the okun s law to estimate the structural relationship between growth rate of official gdp se and ur our results indicate a significant positive relationship between the se and the ur

retirement of spouses and social security reform abstract the retirement decisions of spouses may be interdependent for various reasons similarity of tastes joint assets sharing rules for income and housework or complementarity of leisure because of data limitations only a few empirical studies exist on this topic from a policy point of view the understanding of interdependent retirement decisions should become important if legislators in different european countries are forced to synchronise minimum retirement ages for men and women which are lower now for females in a number of countries we study the possibility of interdependent retirement using austrian data the findings show an asymmetry husbands react to changes in wives legal minimum retirement age wives don t react vice versa the cross effect on men s participation rates resulting from a rise in women s minimum retirement age is almost half as large as the direct effect upon the women themselves

the informal sector wage gap new evidence using quantile estimations on panel data abstractwe estimate the informal formal sector pay gap throughout the conditional wage distribution using panel data from brazil mexico and south africa we control for time invariant unobservables and identification stems from intersector movers we control for observables in a nonlinear way using propensity score reweighting and carefully check for potential measurement errors using similar definitions of informality we obtain consistent results for all three countries informally employed workers earn much less than formal workers primarily because of lower observable and unobservable skills estimates of the conditional wage gap show that they are also underpaid compared to their formal sector counterparts in all three countries the informal wage penalty is larger in the lower part of the conditional distribution and tends to disappear at the top i e the informal sector increases wage dispersion the magnitudes of these effects vary across countries with the largest penalties in lower cond

policies for a heterogeneous informal sector in latin america abstract the concept of the informal sector has gained increasing acceptance in latin america some 30 million persons now work outside the modern economy in low productivity jobs with marginal incomes many of them are living in poverty international and national policy makers have become aware of the political and economic consequences of this phenomenon and are seeking ways to improve returns and incomes the sector however is composed of different kinds of activities each with its own problems which need to be addressed in different ways policy planners should bear this in mind as they seek solutions the paper recommends three types of measures providing productive assistance to informal enterprises supporting informal sector workers and revising regulations that govern informal sector activities

corruption and the shadow economy an empirical analysis this paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa we hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries the hypotheses are tested for a cross section of 98 countries our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions based indices of corruption are used employing an index of corruption based on a structural model however corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income but not in high income countries

how big is the shadow economy a re analysis of the unobserved variable approach of b s frey and h weck hannemann abstract in a widely quoted study b s frey and h weck hannemann estimated the size and the development of the shadow economy in 17 countries by means of the latent variable approach a re analysis of the data shows that the results of frey and weck hannemann s model are extremely unstable and cannot be regarded as reliable statements about the shadow economy of these 17 countries even minor variations in the number of countries included in the analyses in the period under investigation or in the index which is defined lead to a pronounced instability a critical look at the observational variables used in the model lead to the conclusion that the authors cannot even be sure that what they have investigated is indeed the shadow economy the latent variable could equally well be interpreted in other ways it could be for instance that they have measured the development of the welfare state

decentralization and the shadow economy oates meets allingham sandmo this article studies the impact of decentralization on the shadow economy we argue that decentralization may decrease the size of the shadow economy mainly through two transmission channels 1 decentralization enhancing public sector efficiency efficiency effect and 2 decentralization reducing the distance between bureaucrats and economic agents which increases the probability of detection of shadow economic activities deterrence effect using various measures of fiscal political and government employment decentralization in a cross section of countries we find the deterrence effect to be of more importance the deterrence effect is stronger the lower the degree of institutional quality we find no robust evidence of the efficiency effect

estimating the size of the danish shadow economy using the currency demand approach an attempt the currency demand approach provides some insight into the size and development of the shadow economy in denmark currency demand is statistically affected by tax rates the difference in currency demand is calculated by comparing the actual tax burden over time to the lowest tax burden in the period 1952 82 the shadow economy grew steadily to 10 per cent of gnp in 1977 and then fluctuated between 7 10 per cent of gnp for the period 1978 82 the calculated size fits nicely with the results obtained using the same

exiting a lawless state an earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset stripping and the prevalence of asset stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law highlighting a coordination failure this paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non rule of law state the paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition the inability under a rule of law to forgive theft this can lead to the perpetuation of the non rule of law state even when it might seem that the alternative is pareto improving

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

review of de soto s the mystery of capital in the mystery of capital hernando de soto promotes his explanation of why formal capital markets function poorly in developing countries de soto argues that much of the population of developing countries lacks access to credit not because they lack assets but because ownership of their property is secured informally which prevents the use of property as collateral the inability to convert assets into capital keeps the developing world from benefiting from capitalism

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

estimating the second economy in tanzania abstract the official national accounts of tanzania suffer from two serious weaknesses incomplete coverage as well as inaccurate estimates of the activities covered this arises because many of the activities especially those in the informal sector are either misreported or underrecorded often however the required information is deliberately concealed from public authorities either because the agents are involved in illegal black market activities or where such parallel market activities are legal there is a deliberate intention to evade government controls the misstatement and omission of these second economy activities from official statistics imply that macroeconomic measures are not robust enough for meaningful analysis development planning policy and program formulation this paper attempts to estimate the magnitude of and changes in the second economy in tanzania to establish the extent to which official statistics misstate actual production of goods and services

uses and abuses of estimates of the underground economy ered valuable by at least a part of society narcotics production and distribution prostitution gambling these activities can be large in some countries and should be counted in the national accounts of all countries although they rarely are their omission affects the comparability of data across countries the incomes generated by illegal activities are rarely taxed many other activities such as those associated with the subsistence or informal sectors are estimated rather than measured and are generally not taxed because of the low value they generate to those who engage in them in conclusion there are many reasons beside the ones discussed in this paper why the measurements of national output may not be complete about two decades ago a few economists became convinced that many normal economic activities that should be measured and taxed were taking place underground or in the shadow thus presumably escaping the attention of the statistical offices of the tax authorities and more generally of the government regulators some of these economists also claimed that like alice in wonderland these hidden activities were growing in a ridiculous fashion see gutmann 1977 and feige 1979 by the late 1970s the role of government had grown enormously so that the level of taxation and the tax rates had risen sharply and regulations had proliferated in many countries see tanzi and schuknecht 1997 these developments had created strong incentives for individuals and enterprises to go underground to avoid taxes and regulatory restrictions thus a good case could be made that what came to be called the underground economy was a phenomenon to worry about newspaper articles were ready to accept the

corruption and entrepreneurship evidence from brazilian municipalities we estimate the effect of corruption on business activity in brazilian municipalities we employ a new measure of corruption based on data from random audits of municipal governments our results suggest that higher levels of corruption are generally associated with reductions in the number of business establishments furthermore we find that these effects become larger over time suggesting that corruption is particularly detrimental over the long run however we also find that the effect of corruption on business activity can be insignificant or even positive conditional on institutional quality being very poor this is consistent with the grease the wheels hypothesis which argues that corruption provides entrepreneurs with means to avoid burdensome regulations and taxes

the hard shadow of the greek economy new estimates of the size of the underground economy and its fiscal impact this article presents new estimates of the greek underground economy and explores the link between the underground economy and aggregate debt we show that the greek underground economy has been underestimated heavily and has been on a rising trend again since greece adopted the euro we also present evidence that the size of the underground economy is positively related to the debt to gdp ratio implying that fighting the underground economy is also conducive to financial and macroeconomic stability our results suggest that for our sample of 11 emu member countries the loss of the inflation tax as an economic policy instrument had drastic consequences while the underground economy did not have a statistically significant impact on aggregate debt before the introduction of the euro it has pushed up the debt to gdp ratio in our sample since

informal sector the credit market channel abstract we build a model of firms choice between formality and informality complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods enforcement of property rights and contracts that make the participation in the formal credit market possible in a moral hazard framework with credit rationing their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements the model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

does capital punishment deter white collar crimes this paper examines whether capital punishment either directly or via a spillover effect has a deterrent effect on white collar crimes using data on nearly 150 nations and various dimensions of capital punishment including capital punishment for non violent crimes we consider two widely prevalent white collar crimes corruption and the shadow economy nesting the empirical analysis in the broader literature on determinants of corruption and the shadow economy we find that capital punishment in general reduced both corruption and the shadow economy and the deterrent effect on the shadow economy was relatively more prevalent adding some empirical insights to the theoretical arguments surrounding the desirability of maximal punishments results show some trade off between the quantity and quality of punishment

the design of reform packages under uncertainty the authors present a model of large scale economic reforms modeled on the transition process in eastern europe with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms the government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms the authors compare big bang strategies with gradualist reform packages they show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big bang approach copyright 1995 by american economic association

when does privatization work the impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies this paper compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of central europe while controlling for various forms of selection bias it argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to whom it gives control in particular privatization to outsider but not insider owners has significant performance effects where privatization is effective the effect on revenue performance is very pronounced but there is no comparable effect on cost reduction overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners leads to a substantial overstatement of potential employment losses from postprivatization restructuring

production uncertainty and the market equilibrium of the competitive firm abstract assumptions outputs are planned ex ante by risk neutral firms actual outputs are stochastic with variance function of planned output production costs are function of planned outputs while the market linear demand function is stable if individual outputs as positively correlated expected profit is decreased by the negative covariance between output and price the firms and market equilibria are analyzed in the short run and the long run with varying number of firms they are compared with oi s and tisdell s uncertain demand models

firm size wage differentials in switzerland evidence from job changers using information on job changes and search behavior of workers and controlling for endogenous mobility we study firm size wage differentials in switzerland we find that the observed cross sectional firm size premium cannot be explained exclusively by worker heterogeneity almost 50 of the cross section differential is a firm size effect this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the devil is in the shadow do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity this paper assesses the relationship between institutions output and productivity when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy our results confirm the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy however once output is corrected for the shadow economy the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker the impact of institutions on total corrected factor productivity becomes insignificant differences in corrected output must then be attributed to differences in factor endowments these results survive several tests for robustness

how does corruption affect public debt an empirical analysis summary this paper investigates the relationship between corruption the shadow economy and public debt it additionally examines whether the shadow economy increases the adverse effects of corruption on public debt the model is empirically tested for 126 countries over 1996 2012 using ordinary least squares ols fixed effects system generalized method of moments gmm and instrumental variable estimation and two measures of corruption the transparency international corruption perceptions index and the kaufmann et al corruption index results confirm that increased corruption and a larger shadow economy lead to an increase in public debt results additionally indicate that the shadow economy magnifies the effect of corruption on public debt suggesting that they act as complements results also suggest that a larger shadow economy reduces tax revenues and thus increases public debt similarly higher government expenditure enhances the effects of corruption on government debt hence reducing corruption should be a primary policy goal of governments given the complementarity detected between corruption and the shadow economy reducing corruption would also lead to a fall in the size of the shadow economy and public debt reducing corruption will also minimize the adverse effects of corruption on government debt through government expenditure

double penalty in returns to education informality and educational mismatch in the colombian labour market abstractthis article examines the returns to education taking into consideration the existence of educational mismatches in the formal and informal employment of a developing country results show that the returns of surplus required and deficit years of schooling are different in the two sectors moreover they suggest that these returns vary along the wage distribution and that the pattern of variation differs for formal and informal workers in particular informal workers face not only lower returns to their education but suffer a second penalty associated with educational mismatches that puts them at a greater disadvantage compare to their formal counterparts

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

towards connecting green economy with informal economy in south africa a review and way forward the informal economy is a vibrant and growing phenomenon offering both opportunities and lessons on resilience and innovation when considering global social economic and environmental challenges resilience and innovation are valuable response strategies the notion of a green economy has similarly inspired a number of ideological geopolitical and institutional responses yet a review of the dominant approach indicates the propensity to undervalue or ignore the informal economy within the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication connecting the informal economy with the green economy is imperative this paper explores possible connections between the green economy and the informal economy in south africa and argues that by engaging the informal economy in discussions on the green economy a more informed policy and planning environment may ensue resulting in more socially equitable and environmentally sustainable development

business culture and tax evasion why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist abstract this paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria in bad equilibria high cheating and corruption increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating the source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures as tax evasion and corruption become more common they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered a third externality that between firms and inspectors is the source of the perverse effect more cheating by firms is good for bribe taking inspectors and more bribe taking inspectors are good for cheating firms

tragic choices and collective decision making an empirical study of voter preferences for alternative collective decision making mechanisms central to this paper has been the idea that there might be a demand on the part of the citizens for having specific decision mechanisms in specific types of situations this demand cannot be deduced on purely theoretical grounds but rather should be registered case by case theory might help in categorising classes of situations where decisions can be tackled with the same approach in any case the choice of a decision mechanism should not be left completely at the discretion of the policy maker if the citizens s welfare is to be promoted in a suitable way

a test of dual labor market theory despite substantial differences in their views of the appropriate policy response to the existence of poverty neither the proponents of dual market theory nor its critics have proposed potentially conclusive tests of the dual market hypothesis this paper presents a test of the two central propositions of dual market theory 1 the existence of two distinct labor markets with different wage setting mechanisms and 2 the existence of barriers to mobility between the labor markets we find considerable support for both hypothesis estimation of a switching model of wage determination with unknown regimes yields two distinct wage equations the one which most workers are associated with closely resembles the standard human capital regression with significant returns to education and experience the other equation is flat with no returns to human capital these two equations resemble the predictions of dual market theory for the primary and secondary markets respectively further we present evidence that at least some non white workers are involuntarily confined to the secondary market this crowding of minority workers into the low wage labor market accounts for a substantial portion of white non white wage differences we interpret these results as providing empirical support for the dual market hypothesis and for recent theoretical work on efficiency wagemodels in addition combining the efficiency wage argument with the observation that much of the white non white wage difference is explained by the exclusion of non whites from the primary sector suggests an explanation for the persistance of wage differences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

the influence of direct democracy on the shadow economy we analyze both theoretically and empirically the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development of shadow economies our model suggests that as the extent of direct democracy increases implemented fiscal policies more nearly reflect the preferences of citizens and so reduce their incentives to operate in the informal sector this theory implies a negative relationship between the extent of direct democracy and the size of the country s shadow economy we also theorize that direct democracy has a greater effect in reducing the informal sector when the former is at low or intermediate values and when the electoral system is characterized by a larger district magnitude an empirical investigation of a sample of 57 democracies confirms our model s predictions

original sin good works and property rights in russia are property rights obtained through dubious means forever tainted with original sin or can right holders make their ill gotten gains legitimate by doing good works this is a critical question for developing and transition countries where privatization is often opaque and businesspeople may receive property but remain unwilling to use it productively due to concerns about the vulnerability of their rights to political challenge using a survey of 660 businesspeople conducted in russia in 2005 the author finds that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult to expunge contrary to a coasian view of privatization property rights transferred through a legally questionable privatization are seen as illegitimate long after privatization businesspeople however can improve the legitimacy of property rights by doing good works such as providing public goods and using their assets well finally managers who provide public goods for their region are more likely to invest in their firms than those who do not this suggests a possible political rationale for the provision of public goods by private firms these findings have implications for studies of privatization property rights and business state relations in transitions and developing countries

why do governments delay devaluation in the sequence of currency crises in emerging economies in the 1990s there was an observed reluctance to devalue the exchange rate although ultimately adopted the decision to devalue was usually delayed often until it could no longer be avoided while economic explanations of delay are available they need to be combined with an evaluation of the political implications in order to secure a better understanding of exchange rate inertia this article presents a political economy interpretation of delayed devaluation it introduces and discusses the determining factors drawing on available empirical evidence and briefly applies these ideas to a range of specific examples it also examines why there may be even more impediments in the way of timely revaluation since delayed exchange rate adjustment carries economic costs the article also considers ways in which delay may be minimised

global corruption and the shadow economy spatial aspects using a large sample of nations this paper examines the relation between corruption and the shadow economy focusing especially on geographic spillovers the results point to complementarity between corruption and the shadow economy we find evidence of own contagion across nations in both corruption and shadow economy activity while cross contagion mostly points to substitution between own shadow economy corruption and neighboring corruption shadow economy these findings are fairly robust across different estimation techniques and measures of the shadow economy

exploring the dynamics of the shadow economy across us states this article examines the dynamics of the shadow economy using data for 50 us states over the period 1998 2008 using a panel var model we analyse the impulse response of the shadow economy to an orthogonal shock in capital tax rates educational attainment union participation and gross state product we find evidence of significant dynamics underlying the relationship between the shadow economy and its determinants the results remain robust to alternate measures of the determinants of the shadow economy alternate causal ordering of the variables in the system and conditioning on the level of income in each state

corruption extortion and evasion corruption evasion and the abuse of power and the possibility thereof are pervasive features of economic activity a prominent instance is tax collection this paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of potentially non linear tax collection schemes amongst the findings are that the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual in practice and collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption may require that inspectors be paid commission on high income reports but not on low with the cost of this potentially creating what seems to be a previously unnoticed trade off between equity and efficiency

the not so dark side of trust does trust increase the size of the shadow economy this paper reports a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust in a sample of countries both developed and developing that relationship is robust to controlling for a large set of economic policy and institutional variables to changing the estimate of the shadow economy and the estimation period and to controlling for endogeneity it is independent from trust in institutions and from income inequality and is mainly present in the sample of developing countries those findings suggest that the tax compliance effect of trust dominates its role as a substitute for the formal legal system

does globalisation affect the shadow economy we investigate the impact of globalisation on the shadow economy using panel data for 119 countries our evidence suggests that globalisation matters in mitigating shadow development more specifically we find that political globalisation reduces the shadow economy whereas economic and social globalisations have limited statistical support after controlling for important factors that affect the size of the shadow economy overall these results are robust after accounting for an alternative measure of the shadow economy outliers endogeneity and alternative model specifications

the impact of environmental regulation shadow economy and corruption on environmental quality theory and empirical evidence from china abstract mounting environmental pressures led china to focus on the effectiveness of the environmental regulation to control pollution since the shadow economy or underground economic activities that are not included in official statistics accounts for an increasing fraction of china s economy its impacts on environmental quality should be carefully evaluated in this study the main research questions are as follows 1 what is the extent of the effect of environmental regulation on environmental quality and 2 what are the factors that influence the impact of environmental regulation on environmental pollution a theoretical model is developed to explain the relationship among the environmental regulation shadow economy and environmental quality in china an empirical analysis is conducted to test the three propositions of the model thereby examining the explanatory power of the theoretical model concretely using panel data from 30 provinces for the period of 1998 2012 the generalized method of moments gmm method is employed to control for potential endogeneity and introduce dynamic effects the estimation results indicate that stringent environmental regulation and the level of the shadow economy are both positively related to china s environmental pollution however the results also indicate that tighter environmental control would help reduce pollution at a given level of the shadow economy moreover an increase in the proportion of corrupt officials may weaken the environmental regulation which would consequently lead to the increase in illegal production and total pollutant emissions besides many economic and social factors may also affect the environmental quality for instance the development of secondary industry contributes toward an increase in pollutant emissions however increased research and development r d spending on eco friendly industrial operations can help to reduce pollution

who wants to revise privatization the complementarity of market skills and institutions using survey data from 28 transition countries we test for the complementarity and substitutability of market relevant skills and institutions we show that democracy and good governance complement market skills in transition economies under autocracy and weak governance institutions there is no significant difference in support for revising privatization between high and low skilled respondents as the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases the difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically this finding contributes to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform

does variability in crimes affect other crimes the case of international corruption and shadow economy abstractusing data on more than 125 countries this article attempts to add to the research linking corruption and the shadow economy by examining the effect of variability uncertainty in one whi

tax evasion and the demand for currency in norway and sweden is there a hidden relationship variables associated with the level of hidden economic activity are examined in terms of their effects on the demand for currency in norway and sweden aggregate time series of marginal tax rates are compiled for this purpose no such effects are evident for norway while in the case of sweden the demand for currency was found to be significantly related to marginal tax rates these estimates are then used as a basis for deriving an estimate of the size of the hidden economy in sweden an analysis of the assumptions underlying this procedure shows that the uncertainty involved in applying the currency approach to measuring the size of the hidden economy is so great as to make it hazardous to rely on such estimates

the effects of irregular markets on macroeconomic policy some estimates for belgium abstract the paper aims at evaluating the efficiency of traditional keynesian demand or neo classical income policies in the presence of an irregular sector the analysis is applied to the belgian economy for which it is shown that the objectives of increasing output and employment and reducing the importance of the irregular economy will often lead to conflicting policy prescriptions in addition keynesian multipliers may be lowered by as much as 40 though the irregular market only represents some 10 to 15 of total activity