using loopholes to reveal the marginal cost of regulation the case of fuel economy standards estimating the cost of regulation is difficult firms sometimes reveal costs indirectly however when they exploit loopholes to avoid regulation we apply this insight to fuel economy standards for automobiles these standards feature a loophole that gives automakers a bonus when they equip a vehicle with flexible fuel capacity profitmaximizing automakers will equate the marginal cost of compliance using the loophole which is observable with the unobservable costs of strategies that genuinely improve fuel economy based on this insight we estimate that tightening standards by one mile per gallon would have cost automakers just 9 27 per vehicle in recent years jel l51 l62 q48

tripartite income employment contracts and coalition incentive compatibility tripartite contracts between workers a firm and an insurance broker pareto dominate the usual bilateral arrangements if coalitions are not feasible they do this by allowing the broker to run surpluses over a reservation expected utility in some states and deficits in others we show that these contracts are manipulable by coalitions this motivates our main contribution the definition and characterization of coalition incentive compatible tripartite contracts we then ask whether broker intermediation can still be useful the answer is that not every coalition incentive compatibility requirement annuls the critical budget breaking property specifically if firm broker coalitions are feasible there is no three party contract that is coalition incentive compatible and pareto superior to bilateral firm worker contracts except in the extreme case where the workers demand for leisure is income inelastic but if only a firm worker coalition can form the addition of a broker to a bilateral arrangement does reduce the welfare losses caused by the existence of asymmetric information

state versus federal environmental regulation in a non cooperative monopoly screening model abstract a multiple principal monopoly screening model is presented in which two regulators act as rivals when setting a menu of contracts composed of a two part pricing scheme and design standard state and federal environmental regulation are modeled we show that the firm prefers federal environmental regulation because the design standards are more stringent this preference for stricter control occurs because higher standards generate higher information rents for the firm

policy spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants abstract we analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollutants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter the two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope they are regulated by distinct entities potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda we show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if the regulators anticipate that transboundary pollution will later be regulated through emission caps the regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope and not enough with economies of scope in contrast we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries in a lump sum way and that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is not linked to abatement costs

determinants and welfare of the environmental regulatory stringency before and after regulatory capture abstract the enforcement of environmental regulation relies on the willingness and capacity of the regulator the willingness could be disabled by regulatory capture which is widespread and that how many public resources should be invested in environmental regulation is always debatable we develop a 3 stage game to analyze the nonlinear effects and mechanism of regulatory capture and regulatory capacity on environmental regulatory welfare our model suggests that the importance of the regional economy to government the firm size and the customer s disutility on pollution emissions will influence the possibility of regulatory capture furthermore the dynamic research suggests that when the regulatory capture is controlled with the improvement of governmental regulatory capacity the regulator s and customer s welfare continues to grow until the capacity achieves a threshold beyond the threshold the regulatory capacity will be redundant

the welfare effects of fuel conservation policies in a dual fuel car market evidence from india we estimate a model of vehicle choice and kilometers driven to analyze the long run impacts of fuel conservation policies in the indian car market we simulate the effects of petrol and diesel fuel taxes and a diesel car tax taking into account their interactions with the pre existing petrol fuel tax and car sales taxes at levels sufficient to reduce total fuel consumption by 7 the increased diesel and petrol fuel taxes both yield deadweight losses net of externalities of about 4 2010 rs l however at levels sufficient to reduce total fuel consumption by 2 the increased petrol fuel tax results in a deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved that is greater than that caused by the diesel fuel tax this reflects both the high pre existing tax on petrol fuel and the high own price elasticities of fuel demand in india a tax on diesel cars that results in the same diesel market share as the large diesel fuel tax actually has a negative deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved the welfare effects of all three policy instruments are positive once the external benefits of reducing fuel consumption are added to the excess burden of taxation

delivering energy efficiency and carbon reduction schemes in england lessons from green deal pioneer places against a background of growing international and national carbon reduction legislation the uk government introduced the green deal to deliver a significant increase in housing energy efficiency and reduction in carbon emissions this paper reflects on one english local authority s experience delivering a programme intended to foster local interest in the green deal drawing on social surveys and pre and post green deal intervention interviews with five demonstrator homes households that applied to receive a green deal package fully funded by the scheme providing a test bed for the green deal recruitment and installation process this paper shows that awareness and understanding of the green deal scheme is low there is opposition to the cost of finance offered but a strong interest in improving household warmth and for funding improvements through payments added to the electricity bill demonstrator home residents perceived green deals had improved the warmth and quality of their home but saving money was the primary motivator for their involvement not increasing warmth whilst green deal has not delivered the level of success that was hoped much can be learned from the scheme to improve future energy efficiency schemes that will be necessary to deliver emission reduction commitments

does a procurement service provider generate value for the buyer through information about supply risks we consider a supply chain with one buyer and two suppliers who are subject to disruptions and whose likelihoods of disruption are their private information in such a setting does the buyer benefit from engaging the services of a better informed procurement service provider psp compared to procuring directly from the suppliers intuition might suggest that hiring a psp is always the right choice because the psp s knowledge of the supply base improves supplier selection and management on the other hand earlier studies prove that using a psp purely for its superior knowledge about supply costs is always worse for a buyer than contracting with the suppliers directly our answer to this research question is more nuanced contrary to the findings of earlier studies we find that the buyer may benefit from using a psp we identify quantify and explain all of the benefits and the costs of using a psp and describe conditions under which the benefits exceed the costs the benefits of using a psp are deriv

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

separation of powers and development abstract we model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion proofness then we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries unfortunately the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this institution

on governing multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts bilateral contracts while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information a set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties this mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract if agents preferences are risk neutral in money income and if their private information is independent then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions if in addition preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex then this equilibrium is essentially unique

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

distributional and efficiency impacts of increased us gasoline taxes we examine the impacts of increased us gasoline taxes in a model that links the markets for new used and scrapped vehicles and recognizes the consider able heterogeneity among households and cars household choice parameters derive from an estimation procedure that integrates individual choices for car ownership and miles traveled we find that each cent per gallon increase in the price of gasoline reduces the equilibrium gasoline consumption by about 0 2

incentives for environmental protection this book explores the extent to which pricing incentives such as charges on emissions in contrast to regulatory standards can be shaped into a practical policy that is technically effective politically enactable administratively enforceable and equitable it also compares he advantages and disadvantages of this approach to those that characterize the policy of compliance to regulatory standards and it identifies the criteria on which either pricing mechanisms or regulatory standards should be based three case studies comprise the heart of the book one investigates carcinogenic chemical emissions another audits the tradeoffs in controlling aircraft noise near major airports and the third treats the protection of air quality from pollution by primarily stationary sources the case studies are introduced by a chapter that gives numerous examples of possible pricing approaches and identifies common lessons that the three diverse studies reinforce the studies are followed by a chapter which is based on interviews with congressional staff environmentalists and industrial lobbyists and other interest groups in washington revealing their assessments of pricing mechanisms in environmental protection thomas c schelling and his co authors david harrison jr albert l nichols robert repetto and steven j kelman are all affiliated with the kennedy school of government harvard university the book is fifth in the series regulation of economic activity

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

an agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements abstract the combination of a general greening of international political debate and the events of 1992 at the rio earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection while it is recognized that international environmental agreements ieas are the means by which the earth s fragile environment is most likely to be protected this recognition has been recent hence there is very little formal research on the design and study of ieas as such in this paper i propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of ieas very generally i propose that we frame the iea design question as a problem in mechanism design we will then be able to use inter alia the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies to generate interesting new theoretical and practical insights into the workings of ieas

decentralization hierarchies and incentives a mechanism design perspective separation of ownership from management multidivisional firm organizations delegation of production decisions to worker teams delegation of pricing and advertising decisions to retail franchisers reliance on intermediaries in trade or finance and distribution of regulatory authority across different agencies represent examples of organizations that delegate and distribute decision making authority instead of centralizing it this paper reviews literature on costs and benefits of delegated decision making in hierarchical organizations or contracting networks with regard to problems of incentives and coordination it starts by describing incentive and coordination costs of delegation in simple canonical examples of hierarchies where both information and incentives of different decisionmakers differ one class of models pertain to contexts where the classical revelation principle applies i e where costs of contractual complexity information processing or communication are absent agents do not collude and the mechanism designer can commit to the mechanism delegation may conceivably entail a loss of control and coordination arising from the divergence of information and incentives sufficient and necessary conditions for this loss to be mitigated entirely include risk neutrality top down contracting and monitoring of transfers or production assignments between subordinates the next class of models introduces communication costs that restrict the performance of centralized arrangements relative to delegation owing to a resulting loss of flexibility which has to be traded off against possible control losses of delegation finally consequences of collusion among agents is discussed which typically enlarge the range of circumstances under which delegation can attain optimal second best outcomes the paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this theoretical literature to recently emerging empirical studies of industrial organizations where delegated decision making plays an important role adoption of innovative human resource management practices new information technologies and retail franchising

incentive compatible regulation of a foreign owned subsidiary abstract transfer prices are administered charges for intra firm transfers of factors of production for a multinational firm transfer prices for international transfers provide the means to redistribute costs and increase global profits given variations in national tax and profit repatriation policies local regulation of a subsidiary may thus be necessary to limit the welfare costs of strategic transfer pricing prusa journal of international economics 1990 28 155 172 characterizes the welfare maximizing regulations for a monopoly subsidiary that induce the firm to report transfer prices truthfully we show however that it can be more efficient to implement regulations that encourage the firm to misrepresent its true transfer costs

regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information abstract regulation of prices and pollution for a monopolist with private information is considered with a focus on the relative efficiency of standard setting and emissions taxation approaches to pollution control with incomplete information emissions taxation is a dominated regulatory instrument for abatement purposes because it generates information costs that can be avoided when an abatement standard and prices are set by the regulator an emissions tax has value however as a means of reducing those information costs but its use for this purpose may increase pollution

an incomplete contract perspective on public good provision abstract this paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided the paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods the rest of the paper presents results under asymmetric information it is constituted of two main parts in the first one the social planner has complete contracting ability we discuss the basic setting and assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study the trade offs it generates the second part of the paper is devoted to the study of contracting incompleteness such incompleteness can emerge from various sources which we present and discuss we then study the case of a politically chosen decision maker and the consequences of its inability to commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals to form groups finally we address the problem of the choice between public and private forms of public good provision the concluding section summarizes the main policy lessons

the effects of transport regulation on the oil market does market power matter instruments used to regulate the consumption of oil in the transport sector include fuel taxes biofuel requirements and fuel efficiency standards however the effects that these have on oil consumption and price vary if market power is present in the oil market the directions of change in consumption and price might contrast with those in a competitive market as a result the market structure affects not only the effectiveness of the policy instruments used to reduce oil consumption but also the terms of trade and carbon leakage in particular reduced oil consumption as a result of increased fuel efficiency standards will unambiguously increase the price of oil under a monopoly

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

the choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper consider a firm planning a project that poses a risk of environmental spillovers such a firm might be deterred by the threat of legal liability or restrained by gatekeeper regulation if regulators would be perfect gatekeepers then negligence based liability combined with regulation is more efficient that strict liability with or without regulation however if the regulator has incomplete information then any of a variety of regimes could be the most efficient harsher regimes regulation rather than laissez faire and strict liability rather than negligence are more appropriate for larger risks the choice of a liability regime is more complicated however if regulators are biased if they are biased against projects then negligence plus regulation is less likely to be the most efficient regime if regulators are biased toward projects then it is possible that apparently soft liability regimes are more desirable when risk is high

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

contractual contingencies and renegotiation in a dynamic model of asymmetric information between the owner of a firm and a manager we investigate the optimal set of contingencies on which an incentive contract should depend when renegotiation is possible in particular we characterize the circumstances in which the contracting parties find it desirable to deliberately restrict what the owner can monitor thereby limiting the contractible contingencies our findings thus provide an endogenous explanation for contract simplicity in contrast to those based on transactions costs or bounded rationality

estimates from a consumer demand system implications for the incidence of environmental taxes abstract most studies suggest that environmental taxes are regressive making them less attractive policy options we consider the distributional effects of a gasoline tax increase using four incidence measures and under three scenarios for gas tax revenue use to incorporate behavioral responses we use consumer expenditure survey data to estimate a consumer demand system that includes gasoline other goods and leisure our estimates confirm that when revenues are not recycled a gasoline tax is regressive use of incidence measures that ignore demand responses however will substantially overstate this regressivity in contrast the differences between the equivalent variation and easier to implement consumer surplus measures are relatively small in addition our results suggest that using the additional gas tax revenue to fund labor tax cuts makes the policy substantially less regressive while using the revenue to fund lump sum transfers actually makes it progressive

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

noncooperative regulation of a nonlocalized externality with a nonlocalized pollution externality different groups bear the costs and benefits of abatement in the case of acid rain these groups are respectively consumers in the midwest and pollutees in the northeast these groups have conflicting interests that are represented respectively by a public utilities commission and an environmental regulator we analyze a model in which the environmental protection agency acting as a von stackelberg leader regulates pollution and the public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives we characterize a noncooperative equilibrium and compare it with a cooperative equilibrium a nonlocalized pollution externality poses special regulatory problems when the benefits and the costs of abatement are borne by distinct groups whose interests are represented by different regulatory agencies a relevant example is acid rain which is believed to be caused in part by coal fired electricity generating plants these emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide which upon contact with moisture in the atmosphere form acid that falls with rain measures to reduce these emissions are of concern to the residents of the states in which the coal fired generating plants are located because abatement costs increase the prices they pay for electricity a number of plans have been proposed for distributing those costs more broadly but the costs of reducing the emissions of generating plants located in ohio will likely be borne in large part by ohio consumers and utilities while the benefits from abatement will largely be realized by the residents of the northeast and canada the control of a nonlocalized externality such as acid rain raises the issue of the relationship between the environmental regulator the environmental protection agency epa and the public utility commission the former is responsible for achieving an acceptable balance between the damage from pollution and the cost of abatement the latter is responsible for pricing electricity on the basis of the costs of production and pollution control one possibility is that cooperation between the two regulators leads to the joint regulation of emissions and prices cooperation would internalize the conflicting interests and mandates of the regulators but the distributive consequences of the regulatory alternatives inhibit cooperation the public utility commission for example has an interest in avoiding abate

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

verifiable and non verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist abstract optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum existing non bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function while bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution we introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information our p rice based s ubsidy ps mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period the regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand cost or damage functions of the firm all of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost either immediately or asymptotically

the demand for environmental quality in driving transitions to low polluting energy sources the purpose of this paper is to understand the long run demand for energy related environmental quality its influence on legislation and on transitions to low polluting energy sources it starts by presenting a simple framework of the relationship between the demand for and supply of environmental quality environmental legislation and energy this forms the structure for presenting a series of episodes in british history where a demand for improvements in energy related environmental quality existed this analysis proposes that markets can drive transitions to low polluting energy sources in specific economic conditions however most probably governments will need to push them and this cannot be expected without strong and sustained demand for environmental improvements yet while demand is a prerequisite it is not enough it must also be spearheaded by strong creative and sustained pressure groups i e powerful lobbying and the weakening of the counter lobby to introduce legislation to enforce it and to avoid it being over turned by future governments

coal fires fresh air and the hardy british a historical view of domestic energy efficiency and thermal comfort in britain fuel poverty has been most commonly researched in the uk although it is experienced in other parts of europe to varying degrees boardman 1991 showed that energy inefficient buildings and heating systems are the most significant components of fuel poverty and highlighted the legacy of older buildings in this country that remain the majority of those now recognised as hard to treat this paper considers the historical context for fuel poverty as a particularly british phenomenon it examines claims that this is due to the mild climate and low indoor temperature expectations it is concluded that there are significant differences from the european situation the climate particularly its characteristic changeability has influenced building and heating methods and the low priority given to energy efficiency by legislators significantly economic priorities produced poor quality mass housing during the industrial revolution the availability of coal encouraged the use of open fires which demanded high ventilation rates the british do value warmth but older buildings designed for heating with radiant open fires are difficult to adapt to convective central heating lessons can be drawn for newly industrialised economies similarly producing poor quality mass housing with low priorities for energy efficiency

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

the demand for gasoline evidence from household survey data summary in this paper we investigate the demand for gasoline in canada using recent annual expenditure data from the canadian survey of household spending over a 13 year period from 1997 to 2009 on three expenditure categories in the transportation sector gasoline local transportation and intercity transportation in doing so we use three of the most widely used locally flexible functional forms the almost ideal demand system aids of deaton and muellbauer 1980 the quadratic aids quaids of banks et al 1997 an extension of the simple aids model that can generate quadratic engel curves and the minflex laurent model of barnett 1983 which can also generate quadratic engel curves we pay explicit attention to economic regularity argue that unless regularity is attained by luck flexible functional forms should always be estimated subject to regularity as suggested by barnett 2002 and impose local curvature to produce inference consistent with neoclassical microeconomic theory our findings indicate that the curvature constrained minflex laurent model is the only model that is able to provide theoretically consistent estimates of the canadian demand for gasoline our estimates show that the own price elasticity for gasoline demand in canada is between 0 738 and 0 570 less elastic than previously reported in the literature copyright 2013 john wiley sons ltd

pollution taxes and revenue recycling abstract discussions of environmental policy and the tax system have emphasized the value of pollution tax revenues which can be used to reduce other tax distortions in the economy however by raising private marginal production costs environmental taxes also tend to reduce gdp and exacerbate the welfare costs of conventional taxes for environmental taxes in consumption goods industries the net welfare change from these two effects is negative unless this good is a relatively weak substitute for leisure an estimate for the optimal pollution tax with full revenue recycling is 63 to 78 of marginal environmental damages

the endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing abstract this paper analyzes the deadweight loss of delegated auditing in a three tier hierarchy in a costly state verification model this cost depends on the endogenous information structure the auditor s degree of risk aversion and the size of the punishment we identify the optimal contractual outcome of this delegation model with the solution obtained in a standard three tier hierarchical model of collusive auditor we then derive from this identification the set of parameters of the physical environment which may affect the efficiency of side contracting within the firm

the cost of reducing gasoline consumption high nominal gas prices new awareness of threats to national security and growing concern about global warming have reignited discussion of ways to reduce gasoline consumption in the united states debate centers on changing two policies already in place the federal gas tax and corporate average fuel economy cafe standards two influential recent reports find that increasing the gas tax would attain a given reduction in gas consumption at lower cost than would tightening cafe standards national research council 2002 congressional budget office 2003 the gas tax has this advantage because it encourages not just increases in fuel efficiency but also reductions in miles driven in contrast cafe standards actually encourage more driving because increases in fuel efficiency reduce the cost of gas per mile driven we also compare the costs of the gas tax and cafe standard but take into account interactions with preexisting tax distortions many papers examine the effects of these tax interactions in other contexts but to our knowledge none of them considers the cafe standard see e g lars bovenberg and ruud de mooij 1994 ian parry 1995 lawrence goulder 1995 bovenberg and goulder 1996 parry et al 1999 don fullerton and gilbert metcalf 2001 these interactions reduce the cost of the gas tax but increase the cost of cafe thus expanding the cost advantage enjoyed by the gas tax this difference does not arise because the gas tax raises revenue while the cafe standard does not rather this result is similar to that in west and williams 2004a which showed that since gasoline and leisure are relative complements raising the gas tax will increase labor supply generating additional efficiency gains in this paper we estimate a consumer demand system using data from the consumer expenditure survey and the california air resources board and find that miles driven and leisure are relative complements thus the gas tax encourages labor supply by raising the cost per mile driven producing an additional efficiency gain conversely because cafe reduces the cost per mile it discourages labor supply and yields an additional efficiency loss while the induced changes in labor supply are tiny relative to the labor market they are still substantial relative to the gas market and thus have a dramatic effect on the relative costs of the two policies our point estimates imply that they reduce the social marginal cost of the gas tax starting from the status quo gas tax rate and ignoring the benefits of reduced gas consumption by almost 30 percent while increasing the marginal cost of cafe by nearly 60 percent this result implies that the case for raising the gas tax rather than tightening the cafe standard is far stronger than previous studies suggest indeed it strongly suggests that any tightening at all of the cafe standard would lower welfare unless the benefits of reduced gas consumption have been seriously underestimated

biofuel subsidies versus the gas tax the carrot or the stick abstract this paper provides an analytical framework to examine the relative efficiencies of a revenue neutral biofuel subsidy and a gas tax in the presence of pre existing distortions and growing substitutability between fuels both policies are set to achieve a targeted reduction in gasoline use at the state level the model is then calibrated for a small open economy such as illinois which is one of the largest producers of biofuels such as ethanol in the u s the main result of the paper shows that raising the biofuel subsidy use reduces overall welfare by more than a higher gas tax both aimed to achieve a targeted reduction in pure gasoline the relative efficiency of the higher gas tax is primarily due to it exacerbating the pre existing distortion in the biofuel market by less than the subsidy moreover for current parameter estimates welfare improving policy combinations for achieving a targeted amount of energy security are higher gas taxes combined with lower biofuel subsidies and a lower tax on income however the preference for a gasoline labor tax swap shrinks as the elasticity of substitution between the two fuels rises

bicycle infrastructure and traffic congestion evidence from dc s capital bikeshare abstract this study explores the impact of bicycle sharing infrastructure on urban transportation we estimate a causal effect of the capital bikeshare on traffic congestion in the metropolitan washington d c area we exploit a unique traffic dataset that is finely defined on a spatial and temporal scale our approach examines within city commuting decisions as opposed to traffic patterns on major thruways empirical results suggest that the availability of a bikeshare reduces traffic congestion upwards of 4 within a neighborhood in addition we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects using panel quantile regression results indicate that the congestion reducing impact of bikeshares is concentrated in highly congested areas

the mediating role of social workers in the implementation of regional policies targeting energy poverty abstract this paper aims to provide a socio political reflection of the role played by social workers in regional policies and of the real needs of households affected by energy poverty the paper also examines the impact of technical specialised training on the ability of social workers to prevent and mitigate conditions of household energy poverty in europe the adoption of a research action participation methodological framework and a training research approach has permitted the opinions of social workers to be collected through surveys and their central role in implementing regional policies to be highlighted the conclusions obtained have made possible the construction of a self diagnosis and data collection tool which increases the ability of social workers to mediate and implement urgent mitigation measures for energy poverty finally regional policies which aim to mitigate household energy poverty are examined from the professional perspective of social workers

coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm abstract this paper considers the problem faced by two regulators in providing incentives to a common privately informed regulated firm under various degrees of coordination in the model the firm exerts effort toward cost reduction and self dealing and incentives can be input based monitoring and output based demanded cost targets full coordination between the regulators leads to the second best allocation a setting in which the regulators do not fully coordinate leads to i higher overall monitoring more aggressive input based incentives and ii higher demanded cost targets i e more lenience in terms of output based incentives as a consequence of i in all possible equilibria the effort toward cost reduction will be smaller when the agent reports to two regulators who do not coordinate i and ii imply that the impact on the effort toward self dealing activities is ambiguous in our leading example self dealing will be larger if the regulators coordinate on monitoring levels but smaller if they choose monitoring levels independently

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

are the costs of reducing greenhouse gases from passenger vehicles negative energy models suggest that the costs of reducing carbon emissions from transportation are high relative to those for other sectors this paper discusses why taxes or equivalent permit systems to reduce passenger vehicle emissions produce large net benefits rather than costs when account is taken of a their impact on reducing other highway externalities besides carbon and b interactions with the broader fiscal system both of these considerations also strengthen the case for a tax based approach over fuel economy regulation while fiscal considerations strengthen the case for taxes over grandfathered emissions permits the paper also comments on the practical relevance of automobile fuel taxes or their policy equivalents to broader legislation intended to mitigate climate change

analysis of energy poverty intensity from the perspective of the regional administration empirical evidence from households in southern europe abstract the current economic situation has increased the number of households in europe experiencing restrictions and or limitations of affordability of energy services demonstrating the urgent need to intervene in those extreme cases in which households suffer the daily consequences of what is internationally defined as energy poverty in such a context this paper presents the results obtained in a case study characterising a sample of 615 households with demonstrated energy poverty in the region of aragon spain in parallel the intensity of energy poverty in the studied cases is examined by measuring the percentage of energy expenditures with respect to income in the households that suffer it and a descriptive analysis of the main determinants of energy poverty in the homes studied is presented as well as the policy implication at regional level

motor fuel taxation energy conservation and economic development a regional approach abstract combustion of motor fuels has a variety of environmental impacts on local regional and global scales taxing motor fuels more heavily would mitigate those environmental impacts however many governments are reluctant to increase motor fuel taxes because they fear that the tax incidence will be regressive and that economic development will be impeded using data for the new england region of the united states this paper argues that an oil importing region can conserve energy avoid regressive impacts and encourage economic development by taxing motor fuels more heavily and rebating the incremental revenues to owners of motor vehicles

when can carbon abatement policies increase welfare the fundamental role of distorted factor markets abstract this paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue neutral carbon tax and nonauctioned carbon emissions permits taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets the presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies this cost increase is much greater under emissions permits since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about 18 per ton of carbon in contrast an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare improving so long as environmental damages are positive

oversight of long term investment by short lived regulators certain regulators of economic activity like utility regulators and government procurement officers typically serve for relatively short periods of time the authors consider how to best motivate long term investment in the presence of short lived regulators a firm s investment decision is overseen by one regulator whether the investment is ultimately adopted is determined by a second distinct regulator each regulator is concerned with the welfare of its own contemporary population transfer payments between populations are limited and relevant data cannot be verified by third parties underadoption and underinvestment on average result although overinvestment may also occur under the optimal regulatory charter copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

poor energy poor energy saving obligations distributional effects and the malfunction of the priority group abstract the european union s energy efficiency directive forces the member states to install energy efficiency obligation schemes in a first step this paper identifies the distributional effects caused by this policy instrument which occur when energy efficiency measures are implemented phase of delivery and when its costs are passed on to the society phase of financing in the phase of delivery suppliers prefer to implement measures at the property of those customers which enable them to minimise their costs i e enterprises with large energy savings potentials and high income households who can contribute a greater share of the costs in the phase of financing distributional effects occur when the costs of the scheme are passed on from the obliged suppliers to their customers primarily affecting less competitive customers i e households and small enterprises in the british scheme the so called priority group was installed in order to decrease distributional effects and to support energy poor households in a second step this paper evaluates approaches to reduce energy poverty and indicates ineffectiveness high transaction costs and incoherency with the aims of the obligation scheme alternative approaches to tackle energy poverty are briefly described

performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution abstract this paper presents a model of pollution regulation in an oligopolistic market two forms of regulation are considered performance standards which regulate pollution directly by an upper limit on emissions and design standards which regulate pollution indirectly by a minimum usage requirement of an enissions control input equilibria under each regulatory regime are characterized a welfare analysis reveals that performance standards are preferred to design standards if the objective is minimization of emissions plus pollution damage costs however the comparison is indeterminate if the regulator s objective is total surplus less pollution damage an equivalence between emissions taxes and performance standards is established so the above welfare comparisons also apply to emissions taxes versus design standards

inconsistent regulators evidence from banking we find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented we study supervisory decisions of u s banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors state regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently under federal regulators banks report worse asset quality higher regulatory capital ratios and lower return on assets leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds the discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and to some extent differences in regulatory resources we find no support for regulator self interest which includes revolving doors

the subsidiarity bias in regulation abstract we study the choice of the regulatory structure when a firm engages in different activities for different countries under decentralization regulatory contracts suffer from two opposite distortions the competition between regulatory authorities leads to too high powered contracts however with a dispersed ownership structure contracts tend to be too low powered for sufficiently substitutable activities decentralization always leads to an inefficient drift towards fixed price contracts nonetheless when regulators have private agendas and possess the discretion to distort their policy to gain the support of some interest groups decentralization may be preferred to centralization as competition between regulatory authorities mitigates their discretionary power

optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes general equilibrium analyses this paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other distortionary taxes are present we employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which in a second best economy optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the pigovian principle according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages both models indicate contrary to what several analysts have suggested that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the pigovian principle moreover the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre existing taxes this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

should we pay for ecosystem service outputs inputs or both payments for ecosystem service outputs have recently become a popular policy prescription for a range of agri environmental schemes the focus of this paper is on the choice of contract instruments to incentivise the provision of ecosystem service outputs from farms the farmer is better informed than the regulator in terms of hidden information about costs and hidden actions relating to effort the results show that with perfect information the regulator can contract equivalently on inputs or outputs with hidden information input based contracts are more cost effective at reducing the informational rent related to adverse selection than output based contracts mixed contracts are also cost effective especially where one input is not observable such contracts allow the regulator to target variables that are costly to fake as opposed to those prone to moral hazard such as effort further results are given for fixed price contracts and input based contracts with moral hazard the model is extended to include a discussion of repeated contracting and the scope that exists for the regulator to benefit from information revealed by the initial choice of contract the models are applied to a case study of contracting with farmers to protect high biodiversity native vegetation that also provides socially valuable ecosystem services

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

behind the revolving door a new view of public utility regulation regulatory officials frequently work for firms they regulate after they leave office this revolving door has been the subject of much scrutiny owing to the natural suspicion of corruption in a time dependent supergame i take a strategic look behind the revolving door and find it can lead to improved performance of regulated industries when firm managers and regulators have finite and concurrent terms investment incentives are minimal staggered terms and revolving doors can result in improved performance of regulated firms when each side s actions at each date are contingent on past outcomes

on some agency costs of intermediated contracting abstract this paper identifies a new agency cost of intermediated contracting a non productive intermediary can extract some rents when a the productive agent has some private information and b the intermediary s sub contract with the productive agent is not directly controlled by the top principal we show that the intermediary s informational rent is an increasing and concave function of the productive agent s own informational rent

biofuel economics in a setting of multiple objectives unintended consequences this paper examines biofuels from an economic perspective and evaluates the merits of promoting biofuel production in the context of the policies multiple objectives life cycle implications pecuniary externalities and other unintended consequences the policy goals most often cited are to reduce fossil fuel use and to lower greenhouse gas emissions but the presence of multiple objectives and various indirect effects complicates normative evaluation to address some of these complicating factors we look at a several combinations of policy alternatives that achieve the same set of incremental gains along the two primary targeted policy dimensions making it possible to compare the costs and cost effectiveness of each combination of policies for example when this approach is applied to u s produced biofuels they are found to be 14 31 times as costly as alternatives like raising the gas tax or promoting energy efficiency improvements the analysis also finds the scale of the potential contributions of biofuels to be extremely small in both the u s and eu mandated u s corn ethanol production for 2025 reduces u s petroleum input use by 1 75 and would have negligible net effects on co2 emissions and although eu imports of brazilian ethanol may look better given the high costs of other alternatives this option is equivalent at most to a 1 20 reduction in eu gasoline consumption

the organization of supplier networks effects of delegation and intermediation in a one principal two agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal s interest if the agents supply substitutes it can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed

the multiprincipal nature of government abstract one of the theoretical tools required to open the black box of the government organization is the theory of multiprincipals which describes how different incentive mechanisms compete with each others in viewing the set of relationships between several government bodies and the entities they regulate as a set of competing contracts in which the control of the regulatory process is shared amongst these different regulators we can address the question of the costs and the possible benefits of such structural separation first this paper surveys the previous literature on the topic then it traces out the possible benefits of such structures to the non benevolence of regulators we discuss also how regulatory rights of control and communication channels must be designed all together to deal with this problem

lose some save some obesity automobile demand and gasoline consumption abstract this paper examines the unexplored link between the prevalence of overweight and obesity and vehicle demand in the united states exploring annual sales data of new passenger vehicles at the model level in 48 u s counties from 1999 to 2005 we find that new vehicles demanded by consumers are less fuel efficient on average as a larger share of people become overweight or obese the ols results show that a 10 percentage point increase in obesity and overweight reduces the average mpg of new vehicles demanded by 1 4 percent an effect requiring a 12 cent increase in gasoline prices to counteract the 2sls results after controlling for possible endogeneity in overweight and obesity prevalence put those two numbers at 5 percent and 54 cent respectively these findings robust to a variety of specifications suggest that policies to reduce overweight and obesity can have additional benefits for energy security and the environment

government failure and market failure on the inefficiency of environmental and energy policy in this article we describe some important themes in energy and environmental policy there are two main reasons for our interest in these policies first such policies will likely be important in the coming decades as issues related to climate change and energy security come to the fore second there are important lessons to be learned from a careful review of the actual performance of energy and environmental policies we undertake a selective survey of the literature to highlight what is known about the efficiency of particular kinds of policies laws and regulations in these areas this paper makes three key contributions the first is to synthesize a large literature on energy and environmental policy in a way that can be easily digested by both non experts and experts the second contribution is to suggest that if history is a guide then we should not expect many interventions in these policy areas to come close to maximizing net economic benefits the third is to suggest what might be needed for the development of more efficient energy and environmental policies copyright 2010 oxford university press

intertemporal common agency and organizational design how much decentralization abstract in common agency where one agent contracts with several principals to what extent should the principals cooperate and centralize provision of incentives if the agency is over contract complements where an increase in activity for one principal increases the marginal value of contracting with other principals complete centralization seems optimal since this internalizes all externalities we show that this intuition is not generally valid for dynamic agency situations for although centralization provides more accurate incentives to the agent it also aggravates the ratchet effect and this negative effect may dominate the optimal degree of decentralization is discussed and partly characterized

environmentalism stimulus and inequality reduction through industrial policy did cash for clunkers achieve the trifecta the 2009 american cash for clunkers program which subsidized consumers who scrapped old vehicles and purchased new vehicles was promoted by appealing to multiple constituencies we evaluate the policy and alternatives according to its stated goals emissions reductions economic stimulus and reducing inequality we calibrate a dynamic partial equilibrium portfolio model to match consumer expenditure data from 1998 to 2011 focusing on heterogeneity across cars and trucks we find the program generated 0 17 in environmental benefits 0 28 in consumer surplus and 0 31 in net discounted additional spending per subsidy dollar since subsidies largely went to middle income infra marginal consumers the program exacerbated consumption inequality we evaluate alternative policy designs and find no policy which simultaneously improves all outcomes jel h23 l52 l92 d63

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

automobile externalities and policies this paper discusses the nature and magnitude of externalities associated with automobile use including local and global pollution oil dependence traffic congestion and traffic accidents it then discusses current federal policies affecting these externalities including fuel taxes fuel economy and emissions standards and alternative fuel policies summarizing insofar as possible the welfare effects of those policies finally we discuss emerging pricing policies including congestion tolls and insurance reform and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address automobile externalities

alternative environmental regulation schemes for the belgian power generation sector this paper discusses the effects of alternative waysof using external cost estimates to regulateinvestments and generation in the electricityproduction sector starting from the existing system four alternatives are considered emission taxes forthe utility and for independent producers emissiontaxes limited to the electric utility emissionpermits limited to the electric utility and finally asystem where only investments are regulated anddispatch is not taking external damage estimates fromthe literature these alternatives are compared usinga dynamic partial equilibrium model of the belgianelectricity market for the period 1995 2034 theefficiency and distribution effects of the alternativeenvironmental policy instruments are quantified

regulating an externality generating utility environmental taxes under limited information global warming is currently an important item on most nationalenvironmental agendas in many countries coal fired electricity generatingstations represent an important source of greenhouse gases we examinehow regulations to curb emissions affect public utility pricing regulationwhen regulators act non cooperatively we show that when there is limitedinformation on fixed abatement costs an environmental regulator prefersan emission tax over an output tax or a lump sum environmental tax thepublic utility regulator prefers the lump sum tax regime

the switching effect of environmental taxation within bertrand differentiated duopoly we investigate second best optimal taxation of the polluting variety of a product in a bertrand duopoly with differentiated varieties the analysis provides novel insight on a useful social function of environmental regulation besides internalizing the environmental externality the taxation of the polluting variety improves the matching of consumers and product varieties and so creates a socially desirable business switching between the differentiated varieties

agri environmental schemes adverse selection information structure and delegation this work analyzes alternative designs of agri environmental schemes and how different incentive mechanisms impact on their overall efficiency it focuses on spatial targeting and delegation in an asymmetric information context first the optimal contract under adverse selection is modeled this model underlines the trade off between information rents and allocative efficiency the impact of spatial targeting is then addressed disaggregated information structures increase the optimal efforts asked of the farmers it may also involve higher information rents and may reduce the net contributions of some farmers finally the consequences of delegating authority within the principal agent relationship are investigated the results illustrate that spatial targeting and delegation when combined have asymmetric impacts on farmers payoffs

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51