bonus culture competitive pay screening and multitasking to analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation we embed multitasking and screening within a hotelling framework competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay shifting effort away from long term investments risk management and cooperation efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal who dulls incentives to extract rents as competition intensifies monopsonistic underincentivization of low skill agents first decreases and then gives way to growing overincentivization of high skill ones aggregate welfare is thus hill shaped while inequality tends to rise monotonically bonus caps can help restore balance in incentives but may generate other distortions

decision maker preferences for international legal cooperation why do some decision makers prefer big multilateral agreements while others prefer cooperation in small clubs does enforcement encourage or deter institutional cooperation we use experiments drawn from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology along with a substantive survey focused on international trade to illustrate how two behavioral traits patience and strategic reasoning of individuals who play key roles in negotiating and ratifying an international treaty shape their preferences for how treaties are designed and whether they are ratified patient subjects were more likely to prefer treaties with larger numbers of countries and larger long term benefits as were subjects with the skill to anticipate how others will respond over multiple iterations of strategic games the presence of an enforcement mechanism increased subjects willingness to ratify treaties however strategic reasoning had double the effect of adding enforcement to a trade agreement more strategic subjects were particularly likely to favor ratifying the agreement we report these results for a sample of 509 university students and also show how similar patterns are revealed in a unique sample of ninety two actual us policy elites under some conditions certain types of university student convenience samples can be useful for revealing elite dominated policy preferences different types of people in the same situation may prefer to approach decision making tasks and reason through trade offs in materially different ways

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity this paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity within a n country prisoner s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect in addition to the standard non cooperative equilibrium cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a nash equilibrium in an emission game however where countries can choose their abatement level continuously equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient nash equilibrium finally in a two stage game on coalition formation the presence of equity interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains here even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached

counteroffers and efficiency in labor markets with asymmetric information this article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker s productivity than potential employers previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker s qualifications as a result assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient i find that when current employers can match outside offers the equilibrium outcome may be efficient i analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers and find these investment levels to be first best

foreign know how firm control and the income of developing countries nber working paper seriesforeign know how firm control and the income of developingcountriesariel bursteinalexander monge naranjoworking paper 13073http www nber org papers w13073national bureau of economic research1050 massachusetts avenuecambridge ma 02138may 2007we thank manuel amador pol antras andy atkeson wilbur john coleman pete klenow eva nagypal giorgio primiceri andres rodriguez clare esteban rossi hansberg martin schneider aleh tsyvinski and seminar participants in various places for useful comments and suggestions gilberto arce providedsuperb research assistance the views expressed herein are those of the author s and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the national bureau of economic research 2007 by ariel burstein and alexander monge naranjo all rights reserved short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including notice is given to the source

bonuses and promotion tournaments theory and evidence standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses we combine classic and market based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles we use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the finnish economy our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature

task specific experience and task specific talent decomposing the productivity of high school teachers abstract we use administrative panel data to decompose worker performance into components relating to general talent task specific talent general experience and task specific experience we consider the context of high school teachers in which tasks consist of teaching particular subjects in particular tracks using the timing of changes in the subjects and difficulty levels to which teachers are assigned to provide identifying variation we show that a substantial part of the productivity gains to teacher experience are actually subject specific similarly while three quarters of the variance in the permanent component of productivity among teachers is portable across subjects and levels there exist non trivial subject specific and level specific components counterfactual simulations suggest that maximizing the test score contribution of task specific experience and task specific talent can increase student performance by as much as 04 test score standard deviations relative to random assignment of teachers to classrooms

managerial skills acquisition and the theory of economic development micro level studies suggest managerial skills play a key role in the adoption of modern technologies in this paper we model the interactive process between on the job managerial skill acquisition and the adoption of modern technology we use the model to illustrate why some countries develop managerial skills quickly and adopt best practice technologies while others stay backwards the model also explains why managers will not migrate from rich countries to poor countries as would be needed to generate convergence finally we show why standard growth accounting exercises will incorrectly attribute a large proportion of managerial skills contribution to tfp and we quantify the importance of this bias aq2

comparative advantage learning and sectoral wage determination we develop a model in which a worker s skills determine the worker s current wage and sector the market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker s skills endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor market participants learn about these unobserved skills we show how the model can be estimated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques we apply our methodology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations and industries using individual level panel data from the national longitudinal survey of youth we find that high wage sectors employ high skill workers and offer high returns to workers skills

task specific human capital since gary becker s 1964 seminal work the theoretical and empirical literature on human capital has focused almost exclusively on general purpose and firm specific human capital in this paper we discuss the implications of a third type of human capital which we call task specific and which we believe is potentially as commonplace and as important as the two classic types by task specific human capital we mean that some of the human capital an individual acquires on the job is specific to the tasks being performed as opposed to being specific to the firm in other words task specific human capital is the simple but plausible idea that much of the human capital accumulated on the job is due to task specific learning by doing the idea of task specific human capital is closely related to occupationand industryspecific human capital in each case human capital is specific to the nature of the work not specific to the firm hence when capital is accumulated multiple firms value the capital so most or even all of the value of the capital will be reflected in the worker s wage the main difference between the idea of task specific human capital and occupationand industryspecific human capital is in how the idea is applied we argue that task specific human capital has much wider applicability than suggested so far by the occupationand industry specific human capital literatures the specific issues we address are cohort effects job design and promotions another argument in the literature closely related to ours is the classic argument of adam smith 1776 in the wealth of nations concerning returns to specialization smith s argument was that due to learning by doing at the level of the task productivity can be enhanced by having each job entail fewer tasks we believe that smith was correct in focusing on learningby doing at the level of the task as an important idea for thinking about organizations the goal of our paper is to describe some of the other implications of this idea for the design and operation of organizations

issue linkage and issue tie in in multilateral negotiations we describe a model of international multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions the model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie in the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution we show that while in some cases negotiation tie in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable in others a formal tie in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable

reciprocity matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences we find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism vcm we also examine a game with different equilibria the weakest link mechanism wlm here in contrast participants match the minimum contribution of others

an international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases abstract greenhouse gas emissions build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time we identify weakly renegotiation proof equilibria with full participation in a game of international emission reduction treaties are easier to reach for long lived than for short lived gases

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

on the self interested use of equity in international climate negotiations abstract we discuss self interested uses of equity arguments in international climate negotiations using unique data from a world wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy we show that the perceived support of different equity rules by regions may be explained by the ranking of their economic costs despite being self interested equity arguments may be perceived as being used for different reasons for example out of fairness considerations or in order to facilitate negotiations consistent with experimental and behavioral studies on fairness perceptions we find that individuals are more likely to state reasons with positive attributes if they evaluate their own region or regions that support the individual s personally preferred equity rule negotiators perceive the use of equity by regions as less influenced by pressure from interest groups

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy abstract a theoretical and empirical analysis of within job and promotion based incentives for middle managers is presented using personnel data from a firm within job incentives are stronger than implied by previous studies evidence is provided that promotions sort employees by ability and also generate incentives promotions are associated with large increases in lifetime earnings as long as performance is sustained in the future there is little evidence that the firm trades off within job and promotion based incentives as predicted instead it appears to use a simple incentive scheme resulting in declining incentives for those passed over for promotion

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the joint determination of union status and union wage effects some tests of alternative models the problems of estimation and interpretation of union wage differentials are examined the properties of cross section and longitudinal estimators are compared estimates are presented and those in the literature summarized conflicting results are obtained longitudinal estimators typically produce results smaller than those of ols while cross section methods instrumental variables or inverse mills ratio raise the estimate the paper offers a reconciliation of these results it supports a more optimistic conclusion than that reached in reviews by freeman and lewis who argued that little has been learned from attempts to deal with the endogeneity issue comparisons between estimators are used to throw light on the process governing union status and to suggest interpretations of union differentials consistent with the current evidence

testing for asymmetric employer learning recent evidence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker s productivity the more time he or she spends in the labor market the following question arises is learning symmetric that is do all employers have the same information about workers productivity or is learning asymmetric that is does the current employer have superior information about workers productivity this article develops a learning model with endogenous mobility that nests both learning hypotheses it then proposes new tests for asymmetric employer learning overall learning appears to be mostly symmetric except possibly when the employees involved are college graduates

international environmental agreements on climate protection a binary choice model with heterogeneous agents abstract climate change poses a major challenge to present and future generations our analysis focuses on international environmental agreements ieas entered into by countries that decide rationally and autonomously on whether to adopt a climate friendly policy this raises the question how many and which countries will sign such an iea in addition to material incentives to combat climate change issues pertaining to justice and fairness motivate reciprocal behavior even during international negotiations integrating reciprocity preferences may stimulate cooperation and thus increase participation in an iea however there is some evidence that fairness also stabilizes small sized iea coalitions hence this gives rise to the following open question under which conditions does reciprocity have an enhanced and harmful impact on an iea furthermore we introduce heterogeneity with respect to a country s emphasis on reciprocity the costs it incurs when implementing a climate friendly policy its benefits from preventing negative consequences of climate change and country size in addition the present paper examines which countries might or might not sign an iea and identifies the characteristics that determine a country s participation or non participation in a coalition

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

worker allocation hierarchies and the wage distribution economists have traditionally viewed the allocation of workers among jobs through the concept of comparative advantage this paper investigates hierarchical production models which display an absence of comparative advantage in order to demonstrate that for hierarchical production there is a second allocating factor which plays an important role two results are found first the allocation of workers among jobs tends to match high ability workers with positions which value ability highly second despite the fact that the models display an absence of comparative advantage i e the standard theoretical explanation for why wage distributions might be skewed the models wage distributions are skewed to the right relative to the underlying ability distributions

tipping versus cooperating to supply a public good in some important multiplayer situations such as efforts to supply a global public good players can choose the game they want to play in this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision by a group with fixed membership playing over a finite number of periods to choose between a tipping game in which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute and a prisoners dilemma the classic cooperation game in the prisoners dilemma the first best outcome is attainable but cannot be sustained as a nash equilibrium in the tipping game only a second best outcome may be attainable but there exists a nash equilibrium that is strictly preferred to the one in the prisoners dilemma we show that many groups persistently choose the prisoners dilemma despite its strategic disadvantage and that the groups that eventually choose the tipping game do better than the ones that stick with the prisoners dilemma

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

learning the ropes general experience task specific experience and the output of police officers abstract we estimate the role that law enforcement officer experience has on the probability of punishment using a unique data set of tickets issued by the idaho state police linked to human resource records all else equal officers issue fewer tickets earlier in their career than later in their career quasi exogenous shocks to an officer s task specific experience generated by law changes cause a temporary reduction in the frequency with which a subset of troopers use those laws creating disparities in the likelihood that individual citizens are cited for law violations the reduction in ticketing in response to a law change is largest for newer troopers and law changes later in a trooper s career have a smaller effect on his use of that law

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

r d implementation and stagnation a schumpeterian theory of convergence clubs we use schumpeterian growth theory to account for the divergence in per capita income that has taken place between countries since the mid 19th century as well as for the convergence that took place amongst the richest countries during the second half of the 20th century the argument is based on the premise that technological change underwent a fundamental transformation in the 19th century associated with new scientific ideas and the increasingly scientific content of new technologies countries then sorted themselves into three convergence groups r d implementation and stagnation a country s group membership depends on initial conditions as well as on fundamentals

markets externalities and the dynamic gains of openness inflows of foreign knowledge can be the key for developing countries to catch up with the world technology frontier in this paper i construct a simple tractable model to analyze a the incentives of foreign firms to bring their know how to a developing country and b the incentives of domestic firms to invest in their own know how the model embeds the two mechanisms typically considered separately in the literature for the diffusion of knowledge externalities and markets the relative preponderance of these mechanisms significantly changes the dynamic implications of openness notably openness allows developing countries to fully catch up only when market transactions fully dominate the diffusion of ideas while externalities can also push domestic firms to upgrade their productivity the equilibrium exposure to ideas in the country is always below the frontier and asymptotically the country would remain importing foreign know how however in general the dynamic gains of openness are substantial

multinational firms and technology transfer the authors construct an oligopoly model in which a multinational firm has a technology superior to those of local firms in the host country workers employed by the multinational acquire knowledge of the superior technology and can spread their knowledge to local firms by switching employers the multinational chooses to pay a wage premium to prevent local firms from hiring away its workers if the local firms are sufficiently disadvantaged or if there are enough local firms diffusion of the superior technology benefits local firms at the expense of workers whose wages suffer the host government might have an incentive to attract foreign direct investment even when technology transfer will not result because of the wage premium local employees of the multinational firm earn also foreign direct investment with technology transfer may reduce the total economic rent the host country earns

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

revealed distributional preferences individuals vs teams we compare experimentally the revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams in allocation tasks we find that teams are significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality while the benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across decision makers a consequence for the frequency of preference types is that while a substantial fraction of individuals is classified as inequality averse this type disappears completely in teams spiteful types are markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams on the other hand by far more teams than individuals are classified as efficiency lovers

recent progress of cooperation on climate mitigation a bibliometric analysis abstract effective international cooperation is an important measure to mitigate climate change the purpose of this study is to clarify the research progress in the field of cooperation on emission reduction identify the influential authors and articles and reveal the main research topics based on the bibliometric method and the web of science database this study analyzes the literature in the field of cooperation on emission reduction the results show that the publications in this field have increased significantly over the past decade with the usa and china are the most influential countries keyword co occurrence and frequency analysis show that the most important research topics are as follows burden sharing and equity the stability of the climate coalition and international environmental agreements technology transfer and climate finance the linkage of carbon markets and the response to noncooperation behavior the main methods involved are game theory model integrated assessment models and computable general equilibrium model equitable distribution of mitigation responsibilities is the basis for cooperation on carbon reduction specific rulebooks for carbon market linkage is the key to its successful implementation this study helps researchers to clarify the current research status in the field of cooperation on emission reduction and provide valuable information for future research

an opposing responses test of classic versus market based promotion tournaments we use a systems based econometric method to show that classic and market based tournament models are empirically distinguishable since the role of risk differs across these models implementing the method using a large finnish worker firm matched panel we find support for classic tournaments given that promotions depend on relative performance the firm s wage structure is convex promotion probabilities are decreasing in the number of competitors performance is increasing in the wage spread and workers and firms adjust their choice variables in opposite directions when the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance changes

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes abstract governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment fdi focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes this paper examines the impact of indirect non income taxes on fdi by american multinational firms using affiliate level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of american companies estimates imply that 10 higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7 1 lower affiliate assets which is similar to the effect of 10 higher income tax rates affiliate output falls by 2 9 as indirect taxes rise by 10 while higher income taxes have more modest output effects high corporate income tax rates depress capital labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates whereas high indirect tax rates do not these patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect fdi

empirical age earnings profiles the human capital earnings function in which earnings are expressed as a quadratic in potential experience is probably the most widely accepted empirical specification in economics in spite of its widespread acceptance the human capital earnings function provides a very poor approximation of the true empirical relationship between earnings and experience the standard formulation understates early career earnings growth by about 30 50 and overstates midcareer growth by 20 50 however simple alternative specifications that fit the data are available

economic development as self discovery in the presence of uncertainty about what a country can be good at producing there can be great social value to discovering costs of domestic activities because such discoveries can be easily imitated we develop a general equilibrium framework for a small open economy to clarify the analytical and normative issues we highlight two failures of the laissez faire outcome there is too little investment and entrepreneurship ex ante and too much production diversification ex post optimal policy consists of counteracting these distortions to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante but to rationalize production ex post we provide some informal evidence on the building blocks of our model

the impact of equity preferences on the stability of international environmental agreements this paper uses a coalition formation model to explore how equity considerations affect countries cooperation on global environmental issues e g on climate change when developing countries are exempted from obligations to reduce their emissions i find that opening them for abatement projects financed by industrialized countries changes the incentives to cooperate in a way which can increase emissions and decrease welfare equity concerns in industrialized countries regarding the difference between their per capita emission levels and those of developing countries lead to increased abatement but do not qualitatively change the incentives to cooperate inequality aversion with respect to differences to abatement targets across industrialized countries generally induces larger coalition sizes and stricter abatement here the inclusion of developing countries improves upon the prospects of cooperation

incentives and earnings growth the career prospects of newly recruited employees differ substantially within an organization the stars experience considerable growth in earnings others can hardly maintain their entry salaries this article sheds light on the mechanisms generating the observed heterogeneity in earnings growth by investigating the effects that explicit short run incentives and implicit incentives have on earnings growth the model s predictions are tested using personnel records from a large bank and are found to be consistent with the observed earnings growth during the first half of the employees careers

a climate agreement with full participation abstract using a repeated game model we demonstrate that by limiting the punishment for non compliance a climate agreement with full participation can be sustained as a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium even without watering down abatement levels

the role of comparative advantage and learning in wage dynamics and intrafirm mobility evidence from germany this article measures the importance of job level assignment based on comparative advantage and learning about workers ability in explaining intrafirm wage and mobility dynamics using survey data from the german socio economic panel the results reveal the importance of nonrandom selection of workers into the rungs of the firm s job ladder measured and unmeasured ability play important roles in workers rank assignment with unmeasured ability being more important at higher levels of the hierarchical job structure there is some evidence of learning effects for workers below age 35 generating mobility between upper and executive levels

promotion signaling gender and turnover new theory and evidence we extend promotion signaling theory to incorporate gender and across firm mobility within and across job levels evidence from worker firm linked finnish panel data supports our theory for some groups controlling for worker performance inferred from performance related pay within firm promotion probabilities are increasing and wage increases from promotion are decreasing in educational attainment for some educational groups with results stronger for first than for subsequent promotions women have lower promotion probabilities than men and a greater sensitivity of promotion probability to educational attainment across firm promotions are rare but bring wage increases exceeding those for internal promotions and across firm lateral moves

asymmetric employer information promotions and the wage policy of firms abstract this paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information building on the seminal work by waldman 1984a and milgrom and oster 1987 we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions using experimental labor markets we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a causal factor for both inefficient promotions and large wage increases upon promotion furthermore we analyze the effect of asymmetric employer information on profits and turnover

performance pay and wage inequality an increasing fraction of jobs in the u s labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonus pay commissions or piece rate contracts using data from the panel study of income dynamics we show that compensation in performance pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed and unobserved productive characteristics of workers than compensation in non performance pay jobs we also find that the return to these productive characteristics increased faster over time in performance pay than in non performance pay jobs we show that this finding is consistent with the view that underlying changes in returns to skill due for instance to technological change induce more firms to offer performance pay contracts and result in more wage inequality among workers who are paid for performance thus performance pay provides a channel through which underlying changes in returns to skill get translated into higher wage inequality we conclude that this channel accounts for 21 of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and for most of the increase in wage inequality above the eightieth percentile over the same period

employer learning productivity and the earnings distribution evidence from performance measures two ubiquitous empirical regularities in pay distributions are that the variance of wages increases with experience and innovations in wage residuals have a large unpredictable component the leading explanations for these patterns are that over time either firms learn about worker productivity but productivity remains fixed or workers productivities themselves evolve heterogeneously in this paper we seek to disentangle these two models and place magnitudes on their relative importance we derive a dynamic model of learning and productivity that nests both models and allows them to coexist we estimate our model on a 20 year panel of pay and performance measures from a single large firm the baker gibbsholmstrom data incorporating performance measures yields two key innovations first the panel structure implies that we have repeat measures of correlates of productivity as opposed to the empirical evidence on employer learning which uses one fixed measure second we can separate productivity from pay whereas the previous literature on productivity evolution could not we find that both models are important in explaining the data however the predominant effect is that worker productivity evolves idiosyncratically over time implying firms must continuously learn about a moving target therefore while the majority of pay dispersion is driven by variation in individual productivity wages differ significantly from individual productivity at all experience levels due to imperfect information we believe this represents a significant reinterpretation of the empirical literature on employer learning

why do wages increase with tenure on the job training and life cycle wage growth observed within firms empirical results in this paper indicate that firm specific wage growth occurs almost exclusively during periods of on the job training this finding suggests that within firm wage growth is mainly determined by contemporaneous productivity growth the results provide no evidence that contractual considerations are an important source of firm specific wage growth copyright 1989 by american economic association

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

reciprocal climate negotiators abstract do reciprocal preferences matter for participation in international environmental agreements combining the two canonical models of barrett 2003 and rabin 1993 i find that 1 the empty coalition is always stable 2 the grand coalition is stable if reciprocity preferences are sufficiently strong 3 if a minority of countries are not reciprocal a majority coalition can still be stable if reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread and 4 there is also a stable minority coalition if costs are moderate and the number of countries is not too small the latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences but barely improves on welfare and is characterized by negative sentiments the analysis illustrates that although models of reciprocity tend to be complex the context of a specific applied game may reduce this complexity

corporate tournaments human capital acquisition and the firm size wage relation this paper provides a possible explanation for the empirically observed size wage effect and inter industry wage differences it develops a model in which incentives for workers to accumulate general human capital are provided by corporate tournaments where workers with the highest level of general human capital win promotions given that the prizes in such tournaments are determined by outside market conditions the investment and the equilibrium wages depend on firm and industry characteristics the model implies that workers in bigger firms and in more technology intensive and profitable firms and industries acquire more human capital and receive higher wages and benefits

are international trade and factor mobility substitutes abstract this paper analyzes whether factor flows and commodity trade are substitutes or complements i e whether increasing the level of one impacts adversely or favorably on the volume of the other it derives with the aid of a new general equilibrium framework of the world which allows possible differences in factor endowments tastes and technologies across the two trading countries the necessary and sufficient condition for substitutability and complementarity the results are then further examined in two special cases a survey of different concepts of substitutability and complementarity which have appeared in the literature is also given

enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in this article we extend that model in two ways first we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence second and more important we show that introducing task specific human capital allows us to produce cohort effects we further argue that task specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications we also discuss limitations of our extended approach

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided

heterogeneous firms and the organization of production firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm this input must be allocated to two activities coordinating production and monitoring workers able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring a dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities the design of products and the organization of production the monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior

career concerns matching and optimal disclosure policy raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better informed about his workers quality when workers have career concerns and matching influences productivity the initial employer can strategically disclose information to influence incentives and matching efficiency long term complete contracts induce full disclosure when raiders are perfectly competitive the optimal short term contract induces full disclosure if raiders are perfectly competitive and the workers are risk neutral and are not liquidity constrained these conditions are not only sufficient but also almost necessary for full disclosure partial disclosure may be optimal if any of these conditions is relaxed

brain drain or brain gain technology diffusion and learning on the job this paper studies technology transfer when technology is embodied in human capital and learning requires on the job communication between managers and workers patterns of technology diffusion depend on where high knowledge managers work and how much time they allocate to training workers managers appropriate the surplus training creates and in the open economy managers face a cross country trade off between labor costs and the value of knowledge transfer complementarity between country level efficiency and managerial knowledge makes learning more valuable in the north meaning that high knowledge managers choose to work in the north and globalization precipitates a brain drain of high knowledge southern agents to the north the brain drain reduces learning opportunities in the south and exacerbates cross country technology differences

the effect of financial development on convergence theory and evidence we introduce imperfect creditor protection in a multicountry schumpeterian growth model the theory predicts that any country with more than some critical level of financial development will converge to the growth rate of the world technology frontier and that all other countries will have a strictly lower long run growth rate we present evidence supporting these and other implications in the form of a cross country growth regression with a significant and sizable negative coefficient on initial per capita gdp relative to the united states interacted with financial intermediation in addition we find that other variables representing schooling geography health policy politics and institutions do not affect the significance of the interaction between financial intermediation and initial per capita gdp and do not show any independent effect on convergence in the regressions our findings are robust to removal of outliers and to alternative conditioning sets estimation procedures and measures of financial development

positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons we investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties a linear public goods pg game a non linear pg game and a common pool resource cpr game results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear pg are higher if the externality is framed positively rather than negatively corroborating earlier findings by andreoni 1995 by contrast we find no such framing effects in the non linear pg game or the cpr game in these games the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more counteracting effects of pro social preferences positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons

the design of stable international environmental agreements economic theory and political economy international environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement international environmental agreements must be self enforcing game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation therefore environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics moreover interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement