submarkets and the evolution of market structure we construct a model of industry evolution in which the central force for change is the creation and destruction of submarkets firms expand when they are able to exploit new opportunities that arrive in the form of submarkets they contract and ultimately exit when the submarkets in which they operate are destroyed this simple framework can transparently explain a wide range of well known regularities about industry dynamics most notably the subtle relationships between size age growth and survival data on the laser industry where submarkets are prominent further illustrate the ability of the model to explain distinctive patterns in the evolution of industries and firms

should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors abstract if some but not all countries are cooperating to reduce co2 emissions one could make the following argument a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors and therefore co2 emissions in the cooperating countries however this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy and since it is only total co2 emissions from all countries that are relevant for the climate there is no point in a policy that simply relocates co2 emissions from the cooperating countries to the countries that have no climate policy according to this line of reasoning carbon intensive tradeable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy this paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy provided one can use import and export tariffs on all traded goods it is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods however informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are likely also to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors

lessons from the polder energy tax design in the netherlands from a climate change perspective this paper evaluates energy tax reform in the netherlands between 1988 and 2002 from a climate change perspective in particular the introduction of two indirect taxes on energy products is now responsible for a considerable amount of tax revenue from a green tax base the paper discusses the energy tax base and rate structure from a modern pigovian tax perspective and illustrates the practical difficulties involved in the indirect and non uniform taxation of emissions also further improvements of the energy tax structure are discussed such as a better targeting of the energy tax base and tax rate to fuel characteristics

time to build and capacity choice abstract this paper studies how demand uncertainty and time to build interact in affecting irreversible investment activity using impulse control methods we find the optimal timing and size of investment for a firm such as an electric utility that considers expanding its capacity in order to meet an uncertain demand when the construction lag is short uncertainty delays investment while increasing its size once it takes place however for comparatively long and realistic times to build the sensitivity to uncertainty is drastically reduced and the results can even be reversed more uncertainty can speed up investment and reduce its size

climate policy and fiscal constraints do tax interactions outweigh carbon leakage climate policymaking faces twin challenges of carbon leakage and public sector revenue requirements a large literature advocates the use of carbon dioxide co2 pricing and recycling the revenues to lower distorting taxes as a way to minimize costs in this paper we explore the implications of labor tax interactions for the cost effectiveness of border adjustments and other measures to cope with leakage we find that for plausible values of labor supply elasticities the cost savings from revenue recycling are significant from 15 to 25 percent the cost savings from anti leakage measures are generally smaller but also significant particularly for small coalitions or more binding reduction targets tax interactions further enhance the cost savings from border adjustments but make other measures like rebates or exemptions less attractive

firm dynamics and financial development abstract using comprehensive firm level datasets this paper studies the impact of cross country variation in financial market development on firms financing choices and growth in less financially developed economies small firms grow faster and have lower leverage than large firms as financial development improves the growth difference between small and large firms shrinks while the leverage difference rises the paper then develops a quantitative model where financial frictions drive firm growth and debt financing through the availability of credit and default risk the model explains the observed cross country variations in firm size leverage and growth in response to changes in financial frictions

closing coal economic and moral incentives climate policy requires that much of the world s reserves of fossil fuels remain unburned this paper makes the case for implementing this directly through policy to close the global coal industry coal is singled out because of its high emissions intensity low rents per unit value local environmental costs and sheer scale direct supply policy the sequenced closure of coal mines may lead to less policy leakage across countries and time than other policies based on demand or price management it also has the advantage of involving relatively few players and leading to clear cut and observable outcomes appropriately sequenced closure of the world coal industry could we suggest create the moral force needed to mobilize collective international action

age effects leverage and firm growth abstract recent theories of firm dynamics emphasize the role of financial variables as determinants of firm growth empirically examining these relationships has been difficult since there is a lack of financial data on the small young and private firms using a unique administrative data set this paper considers the growth of new firms in canadian manufacturing from a financial perspective we find that financial factors such as leverage and initial financial size impact growth rates for new firms further the inclusion of leverage has little impact on the economic significance of the conditional age and size relationships with firm growth

when starting with the most expensive option makes sense optimal timing cost and sectoral allocation of abatement investment this paper finds that it is optimal to start a long term emission reduction strategy with significant short term abatement investment even if the optimal carbon price starts low and grows progressively over time moreover optimal marginal abatement investment costs differ across sectors of the economy it may be preferable to spend 25 dollars to avoid the marginal ton of carbon in a sector where abatement capital is expensive such as public transportation or in a sector with large abatement potential such as the power sector than 15 dollars for the marginal ton in a sector with lower cost or lower abatement potential the reason distinct from learning spillovers is that reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires investment in long lived abatement capital such as clean power plants or public transport infrastructure the value of abatement investment comes from avoided emissions but also from the value of abatement capital in the future the optimal levelized cost of conserved carbon can thus be higher than the optimal carbon price it is higher in sectors with higher investment needs those where abatement capital is more expensive or sectors with larger abatement potential we compare our approach to the traditional abatement cost curve model and discuss implications for policy design

alternative designs for tariffs on embodied carbon a global cost effectiveness analysis in the absence of effective world wide cooperation to curb global warming import tariffs on embodied carbon have been proposed as a potential supplement to unilateral emissions pricing we consider alternative designs for such tariffs and analyze their effects on global welfare within a multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium cge model of global trade and energy our analysis suggests that the most cost efficient policy could be region specific tariffs on all products based on direct plus electricity emissions in the end however the potential cost savings through carbon tariffs must be weighed against the administrative costs as well as legal issues and political considerations

warrant valuation and exercise strategy abstract this paper demonstrates that warrant valuation and exercise strategy differ fundamentally from call option valuation simultaneous exercise of warrants is shown to be suboptimal and a monopolist owning all warrants can achieve a higher value unless warrants are perfectly divisible no satisfactory equilibrium exists for the valuation and exercise of widely held warrants the problems encountered appear to be quite general and stem from necessary assumptions about future corporate dividend policy and capital structure such assumptions are necessary for any model of corporate security valuation

measures to enhance the effectiveness of international climate agreements the case of border carbon adjustments abstract actions on climate change which are not supported by all countries are not very effective however full participation in a global climate treaty with meaningful emission reductions is difficult to achieve the non excludability of the public good mitigation provides an incentive to abstain from global action moreover carbon leakage renders it unattractive to join a treaty without full participation we study whether and under which conditions border carbon adjustments bcas can mitigate free riding and reduce carbon leakage in a simple strategic trade model we show that bcas can lead to large stable climate agreements including full participation associated with large global welfare gains if treaties do not restrict membership open membership as this is typical for environmental agreements we caution against restricting accession to treaties exclusive membership as this is typical for trade agreements which may serve individual but not global interests

warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets abstract we develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block we prove that the warrant bond price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant bond price equals the warrant bond price in the block constrained economy we illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long

the efficiency cost of protective measures in climate policy despite recent achievements towards a global climate agreement climate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions remains quite heterogeneous across countries energy intensive and trade exposed eite industries in industrialized countries are concerned on stringent domestic emission pricing that puts them at a competitive disadvantage against producers of similar goods in other countries with more lenient emission regulation this paper focuses on climate policy design in the united states of america us and compares the economic implications of four alternative protective measures for us eite industries i output based rebates ii exemptions from emission pricing iii energy intensity standards and iv carbon intensity standards using a large scale computable general equilibrium model we quantify how these protective measures affect competitiveness of us eite industries we find that protective measures can improve common trade related competitiveness indicators such as revealed comparative advantage or relative world trade shares but at the same time may lead to a decline in the output value for eite industries because of negative income effects the economy wide cost of emission abatement under protective measures increase as compared to uniform emission pricing stand alone such that the gains of protective measures for eite exports may be more than compensated through losses in domestic eite demand

optimally differentiated carbon prices for unilateral climate policy abstract economic thought on climate policy as an instance of environmental regulation is strongly influenced by the principle of a uniform carbon price economists acknowledge that this principle breaks down in a second best world with other distortions such as taxes and market power in domestic and international markets however systematic analysis of this point in the economic climate policy literature is scarce in the present paper a computable general equilibrium cge set up is chosen in order to examine what pattern of differentiated carbon prices emerges as optimal in a second best world the cge model worldscan which is considered to be representative of the class of models routinely used for numerical climate policy analysis produces three main results first the optimal pattern of carbon prices is highly differentiated ranging from almost prohibitive taxes to high subsidies with a range of more than 1700 euros per ton of co 2 second the welfare gain from switching from a uniform price to optimally differentiated prices is enormous equivalent to a 27 emission reduction for free third the most important drivers of carbon price differentiation are market power in export markets as well as taxes on consumption intermediate inputs and domestic output this shows that carbon price differentiation cannot be dismissed as a policy option lightly however before translating these findings into concrete policy advice the relevant features of modelling pre existing distortions in cge models need close revision

unilateral climate policy design efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage abstract global cost effectiveness of unilateral emission abatement can be seriously hampered by carbon leakage we assess three widely discussed proposals for leakage reduction carbon motivated border tax adjustments industry exemptions from carbon regulation and output based allocation of emission allowances we find that none of these measures amounts to a magic bullet when both efficiency and equity criteria matter compared to unilateral emission pricing alone border carbon adjustments are most effective in leakage reduction and promotion of global cost effectiveness but can markedly exacerbate regional inequality exemptions and output based allocation tend to avoid distributional pitfalls but are less effective in leakage reduction and global cost savings exemptions may even decrease global cost effectiveness of unilateral emission abatement

how robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns abstract this paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework we characterize the drivers for non uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences quantitatively assessing the case of price based co2 emissions control in the u s economy we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax the deviation from uniform emissions pricing however becomes non negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target downstream vs upstream taxation pre existing distortionary taxes and parametric uncertainty in firms and households equilibrium tax responses

time to build option value and investment decisions a comment abstract we correct the analysis of the model of time to build in majd and pindyck 1987 journal of financial economics 18 7 27 for the omission of an essential optimality condition our analysis reveals an additional insight long times to build reduce the effects of increased project value volatility i e higher investment thresholds in comparison to standard real option models of investment under uncertainty where investment is instantaneous thus a naive npv rule can sometimes be an appropriate initial guide to investment

efficient climate policy with internationally mobile firms a major concern in the design of an incomplete climate agreement is thatfirms that use fossil fuels intensively may respond to emission regulationsby relocating their plants from cooperating to non cooperating countries this paper analyses how the cooperating countries might deal with the issueof firm delocation through emission taxes trade provisions and alocalisation subsidy to mobile firms it is shown that firms should not beinduced to stay in the cooperating countries by lowering emission taxesbelow the pigouvian tax rate incentives to stay should be given partlythrough trade provisions and partly through a localisation subsidy a secondbest solution without localisation subsidies is also discussed in thatcase the efficient emission tax is lower than the pigouvian tax rate finally the paper discusses the implications of the first best and thesecond best policy regimes for the pattern of firm localisation

dynamic climate policy under firm relocation the implications of phasing out free allowances the allocation of free allowances for firms within the european union emissions trading scheme was found to lead to substantial overcompensation which is why some stakeholders recently called for phasing out of free allowances in the near term this paper analyzes the consequences of phasing out free allowances in a two period model when one country unilaterally implements climate policies a carbon price induces firms to invest in abatement capital but may lead to the relocation of some firms the regulator addresses the relocation problem by offering firms transfers i e free allowances conditional on maintaining the production in the regulating country if transfers are unrestricted in both periods then the regulator implements the first best by equalizing the carbon price with the marginal environmental damage and using transfers to prevent any relocation however if transfers in the future period are restricted the planner optimally implements a declining carbon price path with the first period price exceeding the marginal environmental damage a high carbon price triggers investments in abatement capital and thus creates a lock in effect with a larger abatement capital stock firms are less affected by carbon prices in the future and therefore less prone to relocate in the second period

what does an oligopoly maximize a monopolist maximizes a well defined objective function monetary profit in a competitive industry although each individual pursues selfish objectives the market behaves as if an agent was maximizing an objective function social welfare can we say the same for an oligopoly do firms pursuing selfish objectives and behaving strategically act as if an agent was maximizing a fictitious objective function necessary and sufficient conditions for nash equilibria of static and state space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems are derived nash equilibria of the game that are not maxima of the function are shown to be generically unstable copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

coordinating climate and trade policies pareto efficiency and the role of border tax adjustments abstract this paper explores the role of trade instruments in globally efficient climate policies focusing on whether or not some form of border tax adjustment bta is warranted when carbon prices differ internationally the analysis shows that while there is no case for bta when all instruments can be freely deployed pareto efficiency does require a form of bta when carbon taxes in some countries are constrained its purpose then is to partly counteract the impact on emissions of inappropriate carbon pricing there or equivalently to undo the trade distortions such pricing creates the required form of bta is generally complex but a special case is identified in which it optimally has the simple structure envisaged in practical policy discussions it is also shown that the efficiency case for bta depends critically on whether climate policies are pursued by carbon taxation or by cap and trade

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the triple inefficiency of uncoordinated environmental policies when pollution is transboundary and there is international trade a domestic inefficiency may arise in addition to the well known inefficiencies at the international level more precisely there will be a nash equilibrium in which each country chooses a policy that gives it lower welfare than would otherwise be possible given the emission levels of all countries however there will also be a nash equilibrium in which each country chooses tradable emission quotas as its policy instrument to achieve its desired level of emissions in this nash equilibrium welfare in each country is maximised given the emission levels of all countries

the role of public policy in optimizing renewable energy development in the greater southern appalachian mountains abstract this research presents a third component of a comprehensive decision support system for energy planning that allows for combining existing electricity generating capabilities with increased use of renewable energy sources it focuses on energy planning at the regional level and concentrates specifically on the greater southern appalachian mountains of the eastern united states a region that was chosen for analysis not only due to its heavy dependence on coal for electricity but also because of its potential for increased use of wind and solar power previous research used a geographic information system gis model for identifying renewable energy potential to provide input data for a multi objective linear programming molp model to determine the optimal constrained mix of renewable energy sources and existing fossil fuel facilities by balancing annual generation costs against the corresponding greenhouse gas emissions this new component of the system analyzes three potential public policies renewable portfolio standard carbon tax and renewable energy production tax credit that have been used to foster increased renewable energy usage these policies require minor modifications to the molp model for implementation the results of these policy cases were then analyzed to determine the impact that these policies have on generation cost and pollution emissions within the region

the dynamic impact of unilateral environmental policies this paper builds a two country two sector polluting nonpolluting trade model with directed technical change examining whether unilateral environmental policies can ensure sustainable growth the emission rate of the polluting sector depends on its relative use of a clean and a dirty input a unilateral policy combining clean research subsidies and a trade tax can ensure sustainable growth while unilateral carbon taxes alone increase innovation in the polluting sector abroad and generally cannot ensure sustainable growth relative to autarky and exogenous technical change respectively trade and directed technical change accelerate environmental degradation either under laissez faire or with unilateral carbon taxes yet both help reduce environmental degradation under the appropriate unilateral policy i characterize the optimal unilateral policy analytically and numerically using calibrated simulations knowledge spillovers have the potential to reduce the otherwise large welfare costs of restricting policy to onecountry

climate policy instruments and industry effects and potential responses in the swedish context efficient policy instruments for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases are essential for the realization of a successful climate policy general economic policy instruments have the potential for providing efficient emission reduction as they equalise marginal costs for emission reduction between different actors they also provide incentives for a great variety of responses such as energy efficiency improvements fuel substitution and reduced consumption of carbon intensive products however as a result of the fact that it has so far been impossible to implement policy instruments on a global scale these instruments are often adapted in such a way that some of their potential advantages are eliminated in this paper the possibility of different policy instruments to contribute to reductions in industrial co2 emissions while preserving the competitiveness of industry is evaluated theoretically the consequences of increasing the cost of co2 emission in various industrial sectors are also discussed attention is directed towards carbon taxes emission trading and regulation co2 taxes without tax reductions and emission trading with allocation through auctioning have theoretical advantages in a global climate regime but may lead to significant disadvantages if implemented in a single or a small groups of countries emission trading with free intensity based allocation would in this case have a major advantage in combining incentives for emission reductions through efficiency improvements and fuel substitution with little impact on production levels less

optimal containment and policy differentiation under unilateral climate policy without a broad international agreement climate policy is less effective due to carbon leakage we investigate whether this negative effect can be addressed by partially containing the policy s effects to intermediate goods sectors such as electricity or transportation services we use a three sector model to study a policy that taxes emissions caused by intermediate goods production while subsidizing the intermediate good we characterize the optimal containment policy for combating carbon leakage and show that it complements the concept of policy differentiation

the effect of carbon tax on per capita co2 emissions new huadu business school 09zd050 national social science foundation of china 09zd050 08ajy022 research foundation of ministry of education of china 10jzd0018 fundamental research funds for the central universities 2010221051

the relationship between firm growth size and age estimates for 100 manufacturing industries this study uses a sample of all firms operating in 100 manufacturing industries to examine some aspects of firm dynamics it finds that firm growth the variability of firm growth and the probability that a firm will fail decrease with firm age it also finds that firm growth decreases at a diminishing rate with firm size even after controlling for the exit of slow growing firms from the sample gibrat s law therefore fails although the severity of the failure decreases with firm size copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

unilateral climate policy and competitiveness economic implications of differential emission pricing unilateral emission reduction commitments raise concerns on international competitiveness and emission leakage that result in preferential regulatory treatment of domestic energy intensive and trade exposed industries our analysis illustrates the potential pitfalls of climate policy design which narrowly focuses on competitiveness concerns about energy intensive and trade exposed eite branches the sector specific gains of preferential regulation in favour of these branches must be traded off against the additional burden imposed on other industries beyond burden shifting between industries differential emission pricing bears the risk for substantial excess cost in emission reduction as policy concedes too low carbon prices to eite industries and thereby foregoes relatively cheap abatement options in these sectors from the perspective of global cost effectiveness we find that differential emission pricing of eite industries hardly reduces emission leakage since the latter is driven through robust international energy market responses to emission constraints as a consequence the scope for efficiency compared to uniform pricing is very limited only towards stringent emission reduction targets will a moderate price differentiation achieve sufficient gains from leakage reduction to offset the losses of diverging marginal abatement cost

interest rates and credit risk this paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default we develop a dynamic model in which the relationship between firms and their outside financiers is affected by a moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs initial wealth is scarce the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival the need to finance new investment with outside funding pushes firms leverage ratio above some state contingent target towards which they gradually adjust through earnings retention the dynamic response of leverage and default to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms both rises and cuts increase the aggregate default rate in the short run however a higher interest rate reduces firms target leverage and hence produces lower default rates in the longer run this helps rationalize some evidence regarding the risk taking channel of monetary policy

capacity expansion games with application to competition in power generation investments abstract we consider competitive capacity investment for a duopoly of two distinct producers the producers are exposed to stochastically fluctuating costs and interact through aggregate supply capacity expansion is irreversible and modeled in terms of timing strategies characterized through threshold rules because the impact of changing costs on the producers is asymmetric we are led to a nonzero sum timing game describing the transitions among the discrete investment stages working in a continuous time diffusion framework we characterize and analyze the resulting nash equilibrium and game values our analysis quantifies the dynamic competition effects and yields insight into dynamic preemption and over investment in a general asymmetric setting a case study considering the impact of fluctuating emission costs on power producers investing in nuclear and coal fired plants is also presented

fair optimal or detrimental environmental vs strategic use of border carbon adjustment abstract we carry out a detailed sensitivity analysis of border carbon adjustment rates by applying a global computable general equilibrium cge gtap7 based model we find different incentives for the regions in the climate coalition to raise carbon based border tax rates btax above the standard rate that mimics an equalisation of carbon prices across regions herein the strategic use of btax the manipulation of the terms of trade is stronger for all coalition regions than the environmental use the reduction of carbon emissions abroad higher btax can reduce carbon leakage but with a declining marginal effect furthermore we find different incentives for regions outside the coalition to oppose high btax rates russia and the other energy exporters would oppose it while the low income countries would not because of benefits from the trade diversion effect thus btax encourages the former to join the coalition while compensating transfers are necessary to encourage the other developing countries including china and india

emissions leakage environmental policy and trade frictions abstract we develop a two good general equilibrium model of a small open economy to decompose the effect of a country s unilateral strengthening of environmental policy on pollution emissions in the rest of the world known as emissions leakage we show analytically and numerically that the level of emissions leakage depends on the level of trade friction in the service sector in the model production in the manufacturing sector is associated with pollution emissions and production in the service sector is clean in a special case with free trade in manufacturing and no trade in services no leakage occurs allowing for trade in services we solve for the relationship between trade frictions in the service sector and leakage at lower levels of service sector s trade friction leakage from a small strengthening of environmental regulation decreases increases if services are imported exported finally we simulate the model calibrating the to the canadian economy to compare these effects relative sizes over a range of plausible parameter values leakage is about 18 lower when using trade friction levels estimated from the literature rather than assuming no trade friction in services

buy coal a case for supply side environmental policy free riding is at the core of environmental problems if a climate coalition reduces its emissions world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more they may also extract the dirtiest type of fossil fuel and invest too little in green technology the coalition s second best policy distorts trade and is not time consistent however suppose that the countries can trade the rights to exploit fossil fuel deposits as soon as the market clears the above mentioned problems vanish and the first best is implemented in short the coalition s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them

does increased extraction of natural gas reduce carbon emissions without an international climate agreement extraction of more natural gas could reduce emissions of co2 as more clean natural gas may drive out dirty coal and oil using a computable equilibrium model for the western european electricity and natural gas markets we examine whether increased extraction of natural gas in norway reduces global emissions of co2 we find that both in the short run and in the long run total emissions are reduced if the additional quantity of natural gas is used in gas power production in norway if instead the additional quantity is exported directly total emissions increase both in the short run and in the long run however if modest co2 taxes are imposed increased extraction of natural gas will reduce co2 emissions also when the additional natural gas is exported directed

opec s response to international climate agreements this paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement the signatories and opec the purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income given a goal on global carbon emissions as a response to the climate agreement opec imposes an oil tax on its member states that maximizes opec s profits within a numerical model we find the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game in which each player chooses when to fix his decision variables it is shown that in equilibrium the group of signatories chooses to be the leader and opec chooses to be the follower it is demonstrated however that for both agents the order of move is of minor numerical importance hence the players have limited incentives for strategic behaviour

the impact of lead time on capital investments abstract we study equilibrium investment strategies of firms competing in stochastic dynamic market settings and facing two types of investment structures investment with significant lead time or time to build and investment without or minor lead time we investigate how investment behavior changes when investment is subject to time to build versus when it is not we characterize equilibrium investment strategies under several information structures and compare results to the social optimum we offer some new results the model predicts that controlling for demand and production and investment costs investments and outputs can be higher in progressive industries which often exhibit time to build than in fast paced industries where time to build is insignificant furthermore for both investment types investment with or without time to build we offer a novel equilibrium in which firms incrementally invest this behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints also expected outputs are lower than cournot outputs as firms face uncertainty moreover the amount of uncertainty has different effects over investment types

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

robust technology policy against emission leakage the case of upstream subsidies asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of industries and lead to emissions leakage which hampers countries welfare in order to limit leakage governments consider supporting domestic trade exposed firms by subsidizing their investments in abatement technology the suppliers of such technologies tend to be less than perfectly competitive particularly when both emissions regulations and advanced technologies are new in this context of twin market failures we consider the relative effects and desirability of subsidies for abatement technology we find a more robust recommendation for upstream subsidies than for downstream subsidies downstream subsidies tend to increase global abatement technology prices reduce pollution abatement abroad and increase emission leakage on the contrary upstream subsidies reduce abatement technology prices and hence also emissions leakage

border tax adjustments in the climate policy context co2 versus broad based ghg emission targeting abstract using a multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium cge model this paper compares the efficiency distributional and emission leakage effects of border tax adjustments btas as part of unilateral climate policies that are based on carbon dioxide co2 only versus those based on all greenhouse gases ghgs simulation results suggest that the broad based ghg policies in general have lower efficiency costs and result in less re distributive effects btas bring modest efficiency gains with adverse distributional consequences the distributional impacts are smaller under broad based ghg policies compared to that based on co2 only however these are due to a wider variety of abatement options under multi gas policies rather than the btas per se the main difference between the two policies is distributional effects first co2 only based policies have worse impacts on fossil fuel exporters such as russia and relatively better outcomes for oil importers such as india and china compared to that of multi gas policies particularly when it involves large global emission reduction second sectoral coverage under btas also influences the differential outcomes for example brazil is worse impacted under ghg based policies if agriculture is brought under btas as two third of its emissions are non co2 based and agriculture is the primary source of these emissions

embodied carbon tariffs in a world where the prospects of a global agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions are bleak the idea of using trade policy as an implicit regulation of foreign emission sources has gained many supporters in countries contemplating unilateral climate policies embodied carbon tariffs tax the direct and indirect carbon emissions embodied in imported goods the appeal seems obvious as oecd countries are on average large net importers of embodied emissions from non oecd countries carbon tariffs could substantially extend the reach of oecd climate policies we investigate this claim by simulating the effects of embodied carbon tariffs with a computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use we find that embodied carbon tariffs do effectively reduce carbon leakage however the scope for improvements in the global cost effectiveness of unilateral climate policy is limited the main welfare effect of the tariffs is to shift the burden of oecd climate policy to the developing world

energy taxation reasons for discriminating in favor of the production sector abstract if a small open economy wishes to restrict it s greenhouse gas emissions it has to decide whether to impose uniform taxes on all polluters or to resort to a discriminatory policy in practice countries tend to impose higher taxes on households and to tax the industrial sector more leniently this paper identifies conditions under which this is efficient it is shown that an efficiency maximizing tax planner discriminates in favor of the production sector if i there are restrictions on the taxation of lump sum income or if ii labor supply exerts market power

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

equilibrium and options on real assets in aggregate options on real and financial assets can have very different properties typically the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand and developers have finite capacities also the supply of options can be limited and developers can be less than perfectly competitive in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium with these properties the optimal exercise policy and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly the novel comparative statics are discussed in detail article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

between a rock and a hard place a trade theory analysis of leakage under production and consumption based policies without a comprehensive global climate agreement carbon leakage remains a contentious issue consumption based pricing of emissions which could in practice be implemented with a full border tax adjustment bta has been forwarded as an option to increase the effectiveness of unilateral climate policy this paper questions the economic rationale behind this approach using a theoretical 2 times 2 trade model in which leakage occurs through terms of trade effects we show analytically first that consumption based pricing of emissions does not necessarily result in less leakage than production based policies second the sign of the optimal unilateral carbon tariff depends on the carbon intensity differential between the foreign country s exporting and non exporting sectors and not on the differential between home s and foreign s exporting sectors as implied by the full bta approach third based on empirical data for the year 2004 our model implies that full bta applied by the european union on e g imports from and exports to china would by shifting china s production from the export sector with a relatively low carbon intensity towards the more carbon intensive non export sector actually increase leakage

optimal emission pricing in the presence of international spillovers decomposing leakage and terms of trade motives abstract carbon leakage provides an efficiency argument for differentiated emission prices in favor of emission intensive and trade exposed sectors under unilateral climate policy however differential emission pricing can be used as a beggar thy neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade adopting an optimal tax framework we propose a method to decompose the leakage and terms of trade motives for emission price differentiation we employ our method for the quantitative impact assessment of unilateral climate policy based on empirical data we find that the leakage motive yields only small efficiency gains compared to uniform emission pricing likewise the terms of trade motive has rather limited potential for strategic burden shifting we conclude that in many cases the simple first best rule of uniform emission pricing remains a practical guideline for unilateral climate policy design

taxing consumption to mitigate carbon leakage this is a post print version of an article published in environmental and resource economics made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the journal publisher no commercial re distribution or re use is allowed this version may contain minor differences from the journal s pdf version

emissions trading with offset markets and free quota allocations we study optimal climate policy for a policy bloc of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non policy fringe of countries such as with the cdm policy bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations which are updated according to either firms past emissions or outputs we show that the resulting abatement and its allocation between policy bloc and fringe are both inefficient when all quotas are traded freely at a single price the policy bloc chooses to either not constrain the offset market leading to suboptimal policy bloc mitigation or ban offsets completely the former latter case occurs when free allocation of quotas is not very generous and the offset market is large small it is preferable for policy bloc countries governments to instead buy offsets directly from the fringe at a quota price below marginal damage cost of emissions while the policy bloc quota price will be above this cost with maximization of global welfare and a unified quota price this price is higher and offsets constrained in fewer cases but the solution still inefficient full efficiency then requires a higher quota price in the policy bloc than in the fringe

assessing alternative solutions to carbon leakage abstract a modified version of the computable general equilibrium gtap e model is developed in order to assess the economic and carbon emission effects of alternative trade policy measures aimed at reducing carbon leakage we compare several unilateral policy measures implemented by countries subject to an emissions level cap results provide evidence of the scarce effectiveness of these policies in reducing the carbon leakage rate and conversely some of the trade measures that are discussed seem to be more consistent with the goal of protecting market shares of national firms in the domestic markets of abating countries assessing environmental and competitiveness outcomes jointly confirms that a global cooperative solution would be the most effective as well as an efficient policy option for reducing carbon leakage

energy taxes in the netherlands what are the dividends in this paper the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral energy tax in the netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium age model the effects of a small user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared while taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms the model contains a great level of detail with respect to emissions and environmental indicators greenhouse effect acidification eutrophication and waste which is helpful for assessing environmental quality the results show that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform not only improves the environment but also raises non environmental welfare which is due to an improvement of the efficiency of the tax structure

carbon leakage the green paradox and perfect future markets policies of lowering carbon demand may aggravate instead of alleviate climate change green paradox in a two period three country general equilibrium model with finite endowment of fossil fuel one country enforces an emissions cap in the first or second periods when that cap is tightened the extent of carbon leakage depends on the interaction of various parameters and elasticities conditions for the green paradox are specified all determinants of carbon leakage resulting from tightening the first period cap work in the opposite direction when the second period cap is tightened tightening the second period cap does not necessarily lead to the green paradox

explicit investment rules with time to build and uncertainty abstract we establish explicit socially optimal rules for an irreversible investment decision with time to build and uncertainty assuming a price sensitive demand function with a random intercept we provide comparative statics and economic interpretations for three models of demand arithmetic brownian geometric brownian and the cox ingersoll ross committed capacity that is the installed capacity plus the investment in the pipeline must never drop below the best predictor of future demand minus two biases the discounting bias takes into account the fact that investment is paid upfront for future use the precautionary bias multiplies a type of risk aversion index by the local volatility relying on the analytical forms we discuss in detail the economic effects for example the impact of volatility on the optimal investment is negligible in some cases it vanishes in the cir model for long delays and in the gbm model for high discount rates

border adjustment for european emissions trading competitiveness and carbon leakage unilateral or sub global policies to combat climate change are potentially sensitive to free riding and carbon leakage one way of dealing with carbon leakage and competitiveness is the imposition of border adjustment measures for competing imports for example in the form of the obligation to importers of goods to purchase and surrender emissions allowances to the authorities when importing in this paper we explore some implications of border adjustment measures in the eu ets for sectors that might be subject to carbon leakage we examine the implications of two variants of these measures on the competitiveness of these sectors and on the global environment with the help of a multi sector multi region computable general equilibrium cge model of the global economy our calculations suggest that border adjustment might reduce the sectoral rate of leakage of the iron and steel industry rather forcefully but that the reduction would be less for the mineral products sector including cement the reduction of the overall or macro rate of leakage would be modest so from an environmental point of view border tax adjustments would not be a very effective policy measure but might mainly be justified by considerations of sectoral competitiveness

comparing policies to combat emissions leakage border carbon adjustments versus rebates we explore conditions determining which anti leakage policies might be more effective complements to domestic greenhouse gas emissions regulation we consider four policies that could be combined with unilateral emissions pricing to counter effects on international competitiveness a border charge on imports a border rebate for exports full border adjustment and domestic output based rebating each option faces different potential legal hurdles in international trade law each also has different economic impacts while all can support competitiveness none is necessarily effective at reducing global emissions nor is it possible to rank order the options effectiveness depends on the relative emissions rates elasticities of substitution and consumption volumes we illustrate these results with simulations for the energy intensive sectors of three different economies the united states canada and europe although most controversial full border adjustment is usually most effective but output based rebating for key manufacturing sectors can achieve many of the gains

cheaper oil a turning point in paris climate talk abstract the 2015 paris climate conference is designed to achieve a legally binding agreement on climate change for the first time in over 20 years however the participants face a much tougher task in striking a new deal after the disappointing preparatory climate change talks in lima however falling oil prices have created more room to maneuver for the forthcoming global climate talks than previously thought average global oil prices have plunged from usd 110 per barrel in june 2014 to approximately usd 60 per barrel in may 2015 with the sharply falling oil prices and the downward pressure on gas and coal prices both the removal of fossil fuel subsidies ffs and the implementation of a carbon tax could be conducted without raising energy costs a growing body of research suggests that removing ffs and implementing a carbon tax could significantly reduce carbon emissions thus the approximately 50 drop in oil prices has provided a window of opportunity to reduce carbon emissions by removing ffs and internalizing climatic externalities worldwide as this window will not last forever both these measures should be implemented quickly and be considered central to the paris climate change conference compared with the lack of success in the previous two decades of climate diplomacy these two measures constitute technical and economic factors that will make a difference in the 2015 un climate change conference

optimal environmental border adjustments under the general agreement on tariffs and trade a country choosing to adopt border carbon adjustments based on embodied emissions is motivated by both environmental and strategic incentives we argue that the strategic component is inconsistent with commitments under the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt we extend the theory of border adjustments to neutralize the strategic incentive and consider the remaining environmental incentive in a simplified structure the theory supports border adjustments on carbon content that are below the domestic carbon price because price signals sent through border adjustments inadvertently encourage consumption of emissions intensive goods in unregulated regions the theoretic intuition is supported in our applied numeric simulations countries imposing border adjustments at the domestic carbon price will be extracting rents from unregulated regions at the expense of efficient environmental policy and consistency with international trade law

the effect of time to build on strategic investment under uncertainty we show that time to build which creates a lag between the decision to invest and production is an important element of industry structure we study a multiperiod investment game where there is demand uncertainty adding time to build to the model alters the classic tradeoff between making strategic commitments and exploiting the option to wait furthermore time to build gives rise to novel equilibria in which firms invest incrementally which contrasts with most prior work on multiperiod investment games in which firms invest only once we show how time to build affects firm heterogeneity investment timing the option value of waiting the evolution of prices and social welfare copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

regional carbon policies in an interconnected power system how expanded coverage could exacerbate emission leakage abstract interconnected regional electricity markets are often subject to asymmetric carbon policies with partial coverage for co2 emissions while the resulting problem of carbon leakage has been well studied its mitigation has received relatively less attention we devise a proactive carbon policy via a bi level modelling approach by considering the impact of an emission cap that limits the cost of damage from a regional power market in particular a welfare maximising policymaker sets the cap when facing profit maximising producers and the damage costs from their emissions at two nodes a partial coverage policy could degrade maximised social welfare and increase total regional co2 emissions with potential for carbon leakage due to a higher nodal price difference a modified carbon policy that considers co2 emissions from both nodes tightens the cap which increases maximised social welfare and decreases total co2 emissions vis a vis the partial coverage policy albeit at the cost of greater scope for carbon leakage as it causes nodal prices to diverge as a compromise an import coverage policy implemented by california that counts only domestic and imported co2 emissions could alleviate carbon leakage at the cost of lower maximised social welfare with higher total emissions vis a vis the modified coverage policy

impacts of climate policy on the competitiveness of canadian industry how big and how to mitigate competitiveness concerns have been at the forefront of climate policy debates in canada particularly as a result of its high energy intensity and significant exposure to international markets this paper uses a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to assess the likely impacts on sectoral competitiveness that would accompany efforts to meet greenhouse gas mitigation targets that have been set by the canadian government additionally it evaluates several design mechanisms that could be used to reduce the negative competiveness impacts associated with adoption of domestic climate policies the analysis suggests that several sectors would likely face significant competiveness challenges under a reference scenario in which permits are given to emitters in lump sum however it finds that competiveness impacts can be minimized by using output based recycling of permits or by using border tax adjustments

output based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour s backyard competitiveness leakage and welfare we investigate how in an open economy carbon taxes combined with output based rebating obr perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner analytical results suggest that whether the purpose of the obr policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare accounting for global emission reductions the obr rate should be positive in policy relevant cases numerical simulations for canada with the us as the neighbouring trading partner indicate that the impact of us policies on the obr rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the canadian obr policies if for a given us carbon policy canada s aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission intensive and trade exposed eite firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation we find that the necessary domestic obr rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies however if not only the canadian carbon tax but also an equally high us tax is introduced compensatory canadian obr rates will be up to 50 lower depending on the sector and on us obr policy if the policy objective is to increase economy wide allocative efficiency welfare of canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage the us policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable obr rates in canada practical choices of obr rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance thus output based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating eite industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy wide allocative efficiency

financial determinants of firm dynamics evidence from a european panel i use a panel of large european firms for the period 1999 2007 to study scale dependence in firm dynamics i find that scale dependence is much more pronounced when focusing on within firm rather than between firm variation and that scale dependence is a decreasing function of financial development

a look inwards carbon tariffs versus internal improvements in emissions trading systems abstract subglobal climate policies will be the norm for some years to come however several options exist for improving the efficiency of domestic emissions regulation a prominent but contentious policy option for improving the external efficiency is the implementation of carbon tariffs on non regulating regions this is thought to reduce carbon leakage and increase domestic production albeit at the cost of non regulating countries in contrast internal efficiency improvements can be more collaborative in type among others they include extending and linking of domestic emissions trading systems this study compares the relative economic impacts of those policy options if annex i countries would follow one or the other the study uses a computable general equilibrium model of the global world economy and develops a set of emissions trading and carbon tariff scenarios with various degrees of sectoral and regional coverage for a globally effective annex i emissions reduction target of 20 the results indicate that linking annex i countries domestic emissions trading systems and expanding their sectoral coverage could yield greater global welfare improvements than implementing carbon tariffs on energy intensive goods imported from non annex i countries while non annex i countries would be significantly better off without facing carbon tariffs on their exports annex i countries could gain from either policy the relative gains from linking and extending the sectoral coverage of domestic emissions trading systems are greater for early policy implementation within a large annex i coalition of climate regulating countries while late implementation within a small coalition would yield greater relative welfare gains from imposing carbon tariffs the results suggest that in addition to the political benefits there exists an economic rationale for substituting the external efficiency improvements associated with implementing carbon tariffs with internal ones associated with extending annex i countries emissions trading systems

irreversible investment with price ceilings a model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed in the absence of restrictions investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long run average cost by an option value factor when a lower ceiling is imposed investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher shadow price as the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long run average cost this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely because investment is depressed a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long run average price

subglobal climate agreements and energy intensive activities an evaluation of carbon leakage in the copper industry subglobal climate policies induce changes in international competitiveness and favour a relocation of carbon emitting activities to nonabating regions in this paper we evaluate the potential for co abatement and the emissions leakage effect in the copper industry a prominent energy intensive trade exposed sector we formulate a plant level spatial equilibrium model for copper commodities in which parameters describing the behavioural response of agents are calibrated to a set of estimated price elasticities we find producers and consumers to be price inelastic even in the long run making the copper industry unresponsive to climate policies monte carlo simulations with our model based on statistical uncertainty on elasticity estimates suggest that around 30 per cent of emissions reductions in industrialised countries would be compensated by an increase of emissions in nonabating countries

robust policies to mitigate carbon leakage abstract unilateral climate policy induces carbon leakage through the relocation of emission intensive and trade exposed industries to regions without emission regulation previous studies suggest that emission pricing combined with border carbon adjustment is a second best instrument and more cost effective than output based rebating we show that the combination of output based rebating and a consumption tax for emission intensive and trade exposed goods can be equivalent with border carbon adjustment moreover it is welfare improving for a region that implements emission pricing along with output based rebating to introduce such a consumption tax the welfare gain is particularly large if output based rebating is already implemented for a sector that is not much exposed to leakage e g due to uncertainty about exposure or due to lobbying activities thus supplementing output based rebating with a consumption tax constitutes robust policies to mitigate carbon leakage

collaborative optimal carbon tax rate under economic and energy price shocks a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model approach abstract existing literature on climate policy analysis in an international environmental agreement does not condition the optimal policy on the economic conditions of the countries this paper constructs a two country environmental dynamic stochastic general equilibrium e dsge model to compare the optimal carbon tax rates between countries in noncooperative and cooperative scenarios in the presence of different economic shocks compared to those in the cooperative scenario countries without cooperation would have an optimal carbon tax rate that increases less in response to a positive home country total factor productivity tfp shock and decreases more in response to a positive energy price shock further in the noncooperative scenario the carbon tax rate decreases in response to the foreign country tfp shock but to a lesser extent than that in the cooperative scenario countries cooperation does not necessarily lead to a lower emissions stock it decreases only in response to positive home and foreign country tfp shocks and it increases in response to a positive energy price shock

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

does gibrat s law hold evidence from canadian retail and manufacturing firms this paper investigates the validity of gibrat s law holding for firms in manufacturing and retail trade sectors the object is to expand our knowledge of gibrat s law to include non manufacturing firms a unique longitudinal firm level database which contains information on canadian incorporated establishments enables the inter industry comparison the findings of the analysis are that gibrat s law is violated in both manufacturing and retail sectors violations of gibrat s law for both sectors include i growth rates that depend on firm size ii growth variability that depends on firm size and iii a negative persistence of firm growth finally age effects or selection effects are not the causes of these violations

differentiated carbon prices and the economic cost of decarbonization employing a numerical general equilibrium model with multiple fuels end use sectors heterogeneous households and transport externalities this paper examines three motives for differentiated carbon pricing in the context of swiss climate policy fiscal interactions with the existing tax code non hbox co 2 related transport externalities and social equity concerns interaction effects with mineral oil taxes reduce carbon taxes on motor fuels and transport externalities increase them we show that the cost effective overall carbon tax on motor fuels should be lower than the one on thermal fuels this is found in spite of the fact that pre existing taxes on motor fuels are well below our estimate of the transport externality per unit of transport fuel consumption differentiating taxes in favor of motor fuels yields only slightly more equitable incidence effects among households suggesting that equity considerations play a minor role when designing differentiated carbon pricing policies

efficient co2 emissions control with emissions taxes and international emissions trading abstract we consider a stylized model of the hybrid co 2 emissions control in the eu a group of countries operates a joint emissions trading system ets covering only part of each country s economy the countries levy an emissions tax in the rest of their economy and possibly an additional tax in their ets sectors welfare maximizing governments are shown to lack incentives for group efficient policies preexisting taxes overlapping with the ets lead policy makers to allocate more permits to their ets sectors than cost effectiveness would suggest the cases of small and large countries exhibit significantly different efficiency implications