patents or prizes monopolistic r d and asymmetric information abstract in this paper a model of r d regulation is analysed to compare the effect of two types of asymmetric information on the welfare properties of patents and prizes as r d incentive instruments when there is a technological leader using the case of full information as a benchmark it is found that the trade off between patents and prizes does not change if the innovator s r d costs are private information whereas the relative efficiency of patents decreases if the government is less informed about the market for the innovation

on sharks trolls and their patent prey unrealistic damage awards and firms strategies of being infringed abstract patent trolls or sharks are patent holding individuals or often small firms who trap r d intensive manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology while of great concern to management their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint in this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably why they are of growing concern how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them and which issues policy makers need to address to do so we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent holding firms and large manufacturers within a theoretical model our central finding is that the courts unrealistic consideration of the trade offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably

patent length and the rate of innovation this paper models the effect of patent length on the rate of innovation and consumer welfare the authors find that the patent length that maximizes the rate of innovation exceeds that which maximizes consumer welfare they show a countervailing effect of patent length upon the size and frequency of innovation longer patents increase the size but decrease the frequency of innovation the patent lengths that maximize the rate of innovation and welfare represent balance points between size and frequency the divergence of the welfare maximizing and rate of innovation maximizing patent lengths has important policy implications that the authors briefly explore copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases a patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified the patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement his reaction may be to go to court to settle or to accept entry we investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision in a simultaneous game even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial the likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty in sequential games regardless who plays first entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game

tilting the table the use of preliminary injunctions abstract this paper examines the economic role of preliminary injunctions in legal disputes we present a model in which differences in financing costs drive the use of preliminary injunction and explore the implications of this legal remedy for ex post efficiency and ex ante incentives controlling for the nature of the dispute we examine the relationships between the financial status of litigating parties and whether a preliminary injunction is requested the empirical analysis uses detailed data compiled for a sample of 252 patent suits and reveals patterns generally consistent with those suggested by the model

private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies reply further tests and thoughts on the oecd data lead me to conclude that if anything my 1986 paper underestimated the magnitude of the inverse relation between economic growth and government size if one takes the nominal based measure of government scale as advised by saunders the significance levels coefficient magnitudes and goodness of fits improve over what i found with my initial investigation i would suggest that saunders reconsider his reluctance to believe that the size of the public sector is unrelated to economic growth in oecd countries over this time period

field of use restrictions in licensing agreements a widely used clause in license contracts the field of use restriction four precludes licensees from operating outside of the technical field specified when a technology has several distinct applications four allow the licensor to divide up his rights and attribute them to the lowest cost producer in each field of use this can improve production efficiency with complex technologies however the boundaries of fields of use may be difficult to codify entailing a risk of licensees rights overlapping we explore how this affects the optimal license contract in a moral hazard framework where the licensor s effort determines the probability of overlap we show that depending on the contracting environment the license agreement may include output restrictions and non linear royalty schemes

patents and research investments assessing the empirical evidence a well developed theoretical literature dating back at least to nordhaus 1969 has analyzed optimal patent policy design we re present the core trade off of the nordhaus model and highlight an empirical question which emerges from the nordhaus framework as a key input into optimal patent policy design namely what is the elasticity of r d investment with respect to the patent term we then review the surprisingly small body of empirical evidence that has been developed on this question over the nearly half century since the publication of nordhaus s book

inter industry r d spillovers what difference do they make the analytical framework of d aspremont and jacquemin the american economic review 1988 78 1133 1137 is extended to a two industry two firm perindustry model allowing for r d spillovers to occur within industries as well as between industries in the first part of the paper we analyze the impact of intra and inter industry r d spillovers on the level of strategic r d investments output profits and total welfare when firms compete in both the r d and output stage in the second part we compare the equilibrium outcomes that result from r d cooperation which includes both intra and inter industry r d agreements inter industry r d spillovers have a very important effect on a firm s incentives to invest in r d both directly and indirectly because of their influence on the likely impact of intra industry r d spillovers also r d agreements that cut across industries may be more socially beneficial than cooperatives whose membership comes from a single industry

the case for permissive patents whatever its shortcomings in practice until very recently patent law has sought to embody the winner takes all principle this paper argues that it is both feasible and desirable to allow multiple prizes indeed it is possible that complete abolition of the patent system by raising the returns to late finishers would yield an improvement on the current situation

optimal patent breadth and length with costly imitation abstract patent breadth is defined using the number of potential entrants which enter an industry it is shown that optimal patent design may be broad and short lived or narrow and infinitely lived depending on the market structure assumed and the properties of the demand function in the presence of costly imitation and endogenous entry it is shown that optimal patent design may be either broad narrow or of intermediate breadth depending on the properties of the aggregate imitation cost function

the u s patent system in transition policy innovation and the innovation process abstract this paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the u s and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change it also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few possible reasons for these limited results are discussed and possible avenues for future research are suggested

private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies comment the main conclusion which emerges from the results in tables 1 3 is the extreme sensitivity of marlow s results to the countries included in the sample particularly japan to the time period and to the other variables included in the analysis this conforms with the oecd s own analysis of these data and subsequent research based on them it suggests that the underlying relationship being investigated is inherently unstable and that the estimated model leaves a considerable proportion of the variance of the dependent variable unexplained these aspects of the results are consistent with most of the other empirical work on the relationship between economic growth and the size and growth of government in industrialised economies it is to be emphasised however that the results presented here do not refute the claims that the size and growth of government have not had any detrimental impact on economic performance in general and economic growth in particular what they do point to is the absence of any simple aggregative relationships linking government size and growth to the rate of economic growth if such relationships are to be uncovered this will require a more detailed and complex investigation of the impact of government which is embedded in a more rigorously formulated structural model of the growth process

estimating the innovator s dilemma structural analysis of creative destruction in the hard disk drive industry 1981 1998 this paper studies strategic industry dynamics of creative destruction in which firms and technologies experience turnover theories predict that cannibalization between existing and new products delays incumbents innovation whereas preemptive motives accelerate it incumbents cost dis advantage relative to that of entrants would further reinforce these tendencies to empirically assess these three forces i estimate a dynamic oligopoly model using a unique panel data set of hard disk drive manufacturers the results suggest that despite strong preemptive motives and a substantial cost advantage over entrants cannibalization makes incumbents reluctant to innovate which can explain at least 57 percent of the incumbent entrant innovation gap

fiscal variables and growth a cross sectional analysis this paper examines the impact of the key fiscal variables taxes expenditures and deficits on economic growth performance using a reduced form model and cross sectional data for a sample of 76 developed and developing countries for the period 1972 81 its simultaneous consideration of fiscal variables overturns the results of some existing studies while taxes seem negatively associated with gdp growth they are concommitant with a higher rate of growth when their benefits in terms of reducing deficits are taken into account the positive association of government expenditures with gdp growth is rendered negative when their impact on deficits are factored in deficits are contractionary and deficit reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts are positively associated with growth a balanced budget expansion of taxes and expenditures is negatively associated with growth when separating the sample into low middle and high income countries these results hold only for the second group indicating that the level of development influences the linkages between fiscal variables and gdp growth

push or pull performance pay incentives and information we study a principal agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input we show 1 performance pay may not be optimal even if output is the only informative signal of an essential input 2 total surplus tends to be higher if one input is unobservable than if both inputs are observable and 3 bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types we explore the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage r d activity but our results have applications beyond this context

when do stronger patents increase continual innovation under continual innovation greater patent strength expands innovating firms profit against imitation but also shifts profit from current to past innovators we show how the impact of patents on innovation as determined by these two opposing effects varies with industry characteristics when the discount factor is sufficiently high the negative profit division effect is negligible and innovation monotonically increases in patent strength otherwise innovation has an inverted u relationship with patent strength and stronger patents are more likely to increase innovation when the discount factor or the fixed innovation cost is higher we also show how the impact of patents on innovation may change with firms innovation capability and with the intensity of competition from imitators

what determines patent value insights from the semiconductor industry abstract this paper contributes to an understanding which impacts certain patent characteristics have on the value of patent rights in an exploratory study 127 individual patents from a semiconductor company were evaluated comprehensively by technical and marketing representatives the analysis of this rare data shows that for patents used as bargaining chips novelty and inventive activity are most important difficulty of inventing around and disclosure turn out to be of limited importance due to a selection bias the influence of patent age on its value cannot be determined the results hint at a differentiated theoretical plausibility of value indicators

when do more patents reduce r d this paper develops a simple duopoly model in which investments in r d and patents are inputs in the production of firm rents patents are necessary to appropriate the returns to the firm s own r d but patents also create potential claims against the rents of rival firms analysis of the model reveals a general necessary condition for the existence of a positive correlation between the firm s r d intensity and the number of patents it obtains when that condition is violated changes in exogenous parameters that induce an increase in firms patenting can also induce a decline in r d intensity such a negative relationship is more likely when 1 there is sufficient overlap in firms technologies so that each firm s inventions are likely to infringe the patents of another firm 2 firms are sufficiently r d intensive and 3 patents are cheap relative to both the cost of r d and the value of final output this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

licence contracts future exchange clauses and technological competition abstract in an incumbent challenger innovation model this paper examines to what extent licence contracts can internalize the business stealing and common pool externalities occurring in technological competition due to these negative externalities private r d investments are higher than the socially optimal ones licensing of current technology creates a replacement effect for the challenger and thus induces lower research rates special exchange clauses concerning future improvements which are often used in licensing practice partially take care of the common pool externality although the externalities are not internalized completely a grant back clause requiring the licensee to license back improvements to the original licensor can achieve a welfare improvement by reducing the r d investments in some cases below optimal levels if there are no restrictions in setting the ex post licence fee for the improvement socially optimal r d investments can be induced a mutual exchange clause stating that the original licensor must license an improvement to the licensee and vice versa induces social underinvestment in r d

innovation through exaptation and its determinants the role of technological complexity analogy making patent scope the concept of exaptation has been recently introduced in innovation studies previous empirical studies have only focused on the organization level conditions of exaptation this paper fills the gaps by focusing on invention and inventor level conditions such as technological complexity inventors analogical ability and patent scope to test our hypotheses we analyse a large sample of u s patents obtained from the uspto and nber databases based on our findings we discuss a number of implications of exaptation for the management of innovation as well as for policy makers

patents imitation and licensing in an asymmetric dynamic r d race abstract rd some may have an advantage in early stages of the r d process while others may have advantages in other stages of the process this paper uses a two firm asymmetric ability multistage r d race model to analyze the effect of patents imitations and licensing arrangements on the speed of innovation firm value and consumers surplus by using numerical analyses to study the mpe of the r d race the paper demonstrates the circumstances under which a weak patent protection regime that facilitates free imitation of any intermediate technology may yield a higher consumers surplus and total surplus than a regime that awards a patent for the final innovation the advantage of imitation may hold even when we allow for voluntary licensing of intermediate technologies

patents and other intellectual property rights in this article the author reviews intellectual property rights iprs with some emphasis on the protection of agricultural and life sciences innovations the main institutional features of iprs are first discussed along with a brief historical background and an articulation of the main rationale for the existence of such rights this is followed by an overview of the principal economic issues related to iprs the author explains the main benefit cost trade offs of allowing patents and other iprs and then analyzes specific issues in some depth including the scope of patent protection the effects of patent races and the problems arising when iprs concern cumulative and or complementary innovations the author further illustrates the economics of iprs by considering instruments alternative to patents such as prizes and government procurement contracts finally the author briefly discusses some open policy issues in this area

endogenous r d and intellectual property laws in developed and emerging economies the incentive of providing protection of intellectual property has been analyzed both for an emerging economy as well as for a developed economy the optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth within a country are found to be positively related to each other for a fixed structure of laws abroad moreover a country can respond to stronger patent protection abroad by weakening its patent protection under certain circumstances and by strengthening its patent protection under other circumstances these results depend upon the curvature of the r d production function finally we investigate the impact of an increase in the willingness to pay in the emerging economy and find conditions under which there is an improvement in both patent length as well as patent breadth in the emerging economy

the effect of intellectual property rights on domestic innovation in the pharmaceutical sector summary there is little empirical evidence concerning the effect of intellectual property rights ipr protecting pharmaceutical products and processes on pharmaceutical domestic innovation indeed existing literature does not provide a punctual estimate of this effect for developing countries this paper fills this gap by exploiting a self constructed dataset which provides for a 22 year period information concerning ipr reforms involving pharmaceuticals for 74 developed and developing countries the identification strategy exploits the different timing across these countries of two sets of ipr reforms domestic innovation is measured as citation weighted domestic patent applications filed at the european patent office epo the highly skewed distribution of the dependent variable and the high number of zero observations are taken into account using count data models in particular a zero inflated negative binomial model is adopted to overcome previous literature assumption that all innovations are patented in the main markets of reference and to take into consideration the choice not to patent at the epo results show that innovation is sensitive to ipr protection but not to its degree moreover the effect is not long lasting my study also finds that developing countries profit significantly less than developed ones from the protection benefiting from an effect that is roughly half of that for developed countries consequent policy implications are examined and include the conclusions that a one size fits all approach can be inappropriate and that gradual reforms should be preferred to rare reforms that greatly alter the level of ipr protection

government expenditure and economic growth in the developed countries 1952 76 in the past decade or more the pace of economic growth has slowed considerably and the share of government expenditure in national product has increased considerably the average annual growth rate of per capita gdp for the 16 most important developed market economies was 6 3 from 1955 73 and 2 0 from 1973 79 the average share of government in gdp went from 27 in 1955 to 34 in 1970 to 43 in 1979 2 the simple correlation proves nothing but it suggests the growth of government might be one of the causes of the slowdown many economists have theorized that government production is staticly less efficient than private sector production with competitive markets see

do firms underinvest in long term research evidence from cancer clinical trials we investigate whether private research investments are distorted away from long term projects our theoretical model highlights two potential sources of this distortion short termism and the fixed patent term our empirical context is cancer research where clinical trials and hence project durations are shorter for late stage cancer treatments relative to early stage treatments or cancer prevention using newly constructed data we document several sources of evidence that together show private research investments are distorted away from long term projects the value of life years at stake appears large we analyze three potential policy responses surrogate non mortality clinical trial endpoints targeted r d subsidies and patent design jel d92 g31 i11 l65 o31 o34

patent pool formation and scope of patents basic innovations are often fundamental to the development of applications that may be developed by other innovators in this setting we investigate whether patent pools can rectify the lack of incentives for a developer to invest in an application following green and scotchmer 1995 we also wonder whether broad basic patents are necessary in order to provide enough incentives for basic innovators we show that patent pools are more likely

the impact of higher standards in patent protection for pharmaceutical industries under the trips agreement a comparative study of china and india a comparative study is undertaken that explores chinese and indian pharmaceutical industries under different patent regimes it is found that relative to india which had implemented process patent protection until 2005 china with a product patent regime since 1993 suffers from both lower drug accessibility and availability the latter is a missing parameter in the literature also china lags behind in both lower r d investment and patents filed by chinese nationals based on these findings and associated legal interpretation we conclude that higher patent protection in china generates negative impacts on the pharmaceutical industries thus governments should utilise trips flexibilities and other regimes such as price control to offset the anticompetitive effect in designing patent policies

innovation intellectual property rights and economic development a unified empirical investigation two important strands of literature investigate the way the effect of intellectual property rights ipr on innovation depends on either the initial ipr level or the level of economic development we expand on this by studying their joint effect in a single unified empirical framework we find that the effect of ipr on innovation is more complex than previously thought displaying important nonlinearities depending on the initial levels of both ipr and per capita gdp the policy implications of this are examined and include the conclusion that a single global level of ipr is in general sub optimal

on the effectiveness of patenting strategies in innovation races which if any of a firm s inventions should it patent should it patent at all many companies engaged in an innovation race seek a patenting strategy that balances protection of their intellectual property against the knowledge spillovers resulting from disclosure requirements not much is known about factors that determine the patenting strategy best able to resolve this trade off although scholars in various management economics and engineering disciplines have researched patents and patenting regimes little work has addressed the normative issues that pertain to forming an appropriate firm level patenting strategy we develop an inventory of real life patenting strategies and integrate them into a coherent framework our simulation model characterizes the optimal patenting choices for different environmental and firm level contingencies while capturing the dynamics between competing firms we identify the firm s research and development strategy as the most salient determinant of its optimal patenting strategy our research contributes to establishing a contingency theory of patenting strategies this paper was accepted by david hsu entrepreneurship and innovation

how do patent laws influence innovation evidence from nineteenth century world fairs studies of innovation have focused on the effects of patent laws on the number of innovations but have ignored effects on the direction of technological change this paper introduces a new dataset of close to fifteen thousand innovations at the crystal palace world s fair in 1851 and at the centennial exhibition in 1876 to examine the effects of patent laws on the direction of innovation the paper tests the following argument if innovative activity is motivated by expected profits and if the effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries then innovation in countries without patent laws should focus on industries where alternative mechanisms to protect intellectual property are effective analyses of exhibition data for 12 countries in 1851 and 10 countries in 1876 indicate that inventors in countries without patent laws focused on a small set of industries where patents were less important while innovation in countries with patent laws appears to be much more diversified these findings suggest that patents help to determine the direction of technical change and that the adoption of patent laws in countries without such laws may alter existing patterns of comparative advantage across countries jel d2 k11 l51 no 014

appropriability and commercialization evidence from mit inventions the effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied but there has been little analysis of the effect of appropriability on the commercialization of existing inventions exploiting a database of 805 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions licensed from the massachusetts institute of technology mit between 1980 and 1996 we explore the influence of several appropriability mechanisms on the commercialization and termination of projects to develop products based on university inventions our central hypothesis is that the relationship between a licensee s decision to either terminate or commercialize the invention is driven by the current market value of the invention as well as the option value of delaying its commercialization we use a competing risks framework that allows for nonparametric heterogeneity and correlated risks we find that better appropriability in the sense of more effective patent strength and secrecy has a strong negative effect on the hazard of license termination the effectiveness of learning has a strong positive effect on the hazard of technology commercialization while lead time has a negative effect

do patents slow down technological progress abstract this paper challenges the widely held view in the industrial organization literature that patents always speed up technological progress we introduce a model of an innovating firm with uncertain property right to its innovation the impact of a commitment to an r d project is to create future options for patenting and market introduction each decision undertaken will change the conditions in which the innovator operates it is shown that an increase in patent protection reduces the elasticity of the option value of the program with respect to the value of the project raising the threshold value of market introduction and enhancing the ability of the innovator to wait thus while the effect of patent is to raise the rents on and thereby the potential amount of innovations it also tends to slow down market introduction

the discursive dilemma in monetary policy the discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy conclusion based procedure or by voting on the premises for the decision premise based procedure we derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model when the board aggregates by majority voting a discursive dilemma can occur if either i the relationship between the premise and the decision is non

the quality factor in patent systems this article develops a methodology to compare the quality of examination services in three major patent systems quality is defined as the extent to which patent systems comply with the patentability conditions in a transparent way the methodology consists of a two layer analytical framework encompassing legal standards ls and their operational design od which includes several interdependent components that affect the stringency and transparency of the filtering process the comparison of patent systems in europe japan and the united states shows that their operational designs differ substantially the european system provides higher quality and more expensive examination services than the united states one while the japanese patent system is in an intermediate position the results illustrate that different system designs lead to different outcomes in terms of backlogs patent propensity and the number of dubious patent rights in force in this respect these findings i provide an empirical validation of the conjecture of a vicious cycle linking the quality of examination and demand for patents and ii highlight the need for a multifaceted convergence of patent systems before mutual recognition is put in place the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved

economic growth and alternative deficit reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts a cross sectional study this paper assesses empirically the relative desirability of alternative deficit reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts in terms of their individual impact on economic growth using cross sectional data for a sample of 21 developed countries for the period 1972 81

fiscal incentives and direct foreign investment in less developed countries this study found no support for the belief by the governments of most less developed countries ldcs that the provision of fiscal incentives is necessary to attract direct foreign investment and that the greater the generosity of these incentive programmes the greater would be the level of such investment what mattered were the presence of natural resources and a proven record of economic performance the provision of incentives could not compensate for the absence of either of these two factors the study is a cross sectional one of 27 ldcs for the period 1965 73

patents and patent policy a patent is the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular invention this right is sometimes termed an intellectual property right and is viewed as an incentive for innovation this article surveys the evidence on patent effectiveness in encouraging innovation and reviews the current controversies in patent policy

on limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress the effect of patent scope decisions abstract this essay is on the effects of the scope of a patent e g how broad its allowed claims on subsequent inventing in a field it is argued that this depends on the topography of technical advance in a field in particular on how inventions are linked to each other and in the extent to which rapid technical advance requires a diversity of actors and minds as contrasted with being facilitated by express coordination of inventive activity technical advance is examined in several different fields with a focus on how patents influenced the pace and quality of development the authors conclude that allowing and enforcing broad patent claims tends to hinder technical progress

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

how broad should the scope of patent protection be i explore the trade off between a patent s length that is its lifetime and its width that is its scope of coverage a wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented lower priced varieties sold by competitors but also permits higher prices which increase relative to profits the deadweight losses from consumers switching consumption out of the product class i show under what conditions infinitely lived but very narrowly focused patents are the socially efficient way to reward innovation and under what conditions very short lived but very broad patents are optimal

patent protection and r d with endogenous market structure in a model with endogenous number of innovating firms we show that whether patent protection increases r d investment is ambiguous and depends on the market demand function and the cost of r d if the market size increases with number of firms patent protection reduces r d investment if the cost of r d is sufficiently high and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower r d investment under patent protection if the market size does not increase with number of firms patent protection never reduces r d investment we find that welfare is lower under patent protection than under no patent protection

novelty and disclosure in patent law the stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms it also affects ex ante profitability of research we compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency we ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology the possible rules are first to invent which applies in the u s and first to file which applies everywhere else

international standards for intellectual property protection and r d incentives abstract we examine the effect of alternative standards for intellectual property protection uniform protection based on the gatt principle of non discrimination provides domestic and foreign firms with the same level of protection discriminatory protection based on section 337 of the u s trade laws provides different levels of protection depending upon where the firm is located we show that discriminatory protection may not increase and may decrease domestic r d the effect of asymmetric patent protection depends on whether the rivals have pre existing products on the costs of r d and on the value of the potential innovation

do patents work thickets trolls and antibiotic resistance this paper connects ideas from recent literature on the economics of intellectual property ip to address the question did the strengthening and broadening of ip rights from important patent policy changes in the us promote greater innovation the analysis rests on the theory of cumulative innovation which shows that if ip rights on a pioneer invention extend to follow on research and impediments to contracting exist then strengthening patents can actually reduce overall innovation recent empirical studies are consistent with the theory patents can significantly deter follow on research in complex technology areas where contracting is difficult computers electronics telecommunications but not in drugs chemicals and human genes i outline remedies from court decisions and antitrust policy for addressing inefficiencies from patent trolling patent thickets and the anti commons of fragmented ownership i then apply the analysis to the antibiotics market drawing on recent research to examine how patent and competition policies can be used to improve incentives for drug development in the battle against antibiotic resistance the literature provides persuasive evidence that the policy changes overreached in broadening and strengthening ip rights and reveals important patent reforms for improving the effectiveness of patent systems in the us and canada

patent breadth in an international setting we examine the nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically broader patents make r d more attractive but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic in a north south model where only the north can innovate harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the nash equilibrium when both countries can innovate harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare jel f02 f13 o3 o31 o32

innovation incentives through third degree price discrimination in a model of patent breadth abstract in a model of patent breadth generating linear demand functions it is shown that if a potential inventor has to be given an innovation incentive this is better done by permitting him to price discriminate than requiring uniform prices

digital copyright and the new controversy is the law moulding technology and innovation abstract this exploratory article sets out to examine if and how the new digital copyright laws in the u s and europe are affecting innovation on the internet it argues that these laws in balance at least to date are having a positive effect on internet innovation despite the strident argument that these laws will inhibit innovation the innovations the article discusses are peer to peer p2p file sharing technology and the new business models for music retailing that p2p has spawned it concludes that digital copyright laws could create perverse incentives for innovation and wonders if legislators may not require a better understanding of the innovation process when crafting ip laws