scarce collateral the term premium and quantitative easing abstract a model of money credit and banking is constructed in which the differential pledgeability of collateral and the scarcity of collateralizable wealth lead to a term premium an upward sloping nominal yield curve purchases of long maturity government debt by the central bank are always a good idea but for unconventional reasons a floor system is preferred to a channel system as a floor system permits welfare improving asset purchases by the central bank

nonmonetary effects of financial crises abstract this paper empirically examines the nonmonetary effects of financial crises it exploits the special nature of the great depression in canada to test propositions linking financial structure and aggregate economic activity canada s large domestic debt and shrinking banking system had little impact on the course of the depression in comparison with results for the united states this implicates bank failures as a prime factor in the real effects of financial crises

bank runs and investment decisions revisited we examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the deposit contract offered and the investment decisions made by a competitive bank cooper and ross 1998 have shown that when the probability of a run is small the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank run equilibrium we show that in this case the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur in other words precautionary or excess liquidity will not be held this result allows us to determine how the possibility of a bank run affects the level of illiquid investment chosen by a bank we show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high the level of investment is decreasing in the probability of a run however when liquidation costs are moderate the level of investment is actually increasing in the probability of a run

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

clearinghouse banks and banknote over issue abstract the paper presents a model of banks as clearinghouses of private debt where money is used as the means of payment implications of the model include i the private provision of banknotes or a discount window may be needed to avoid the insufficient debt clearing that results from an inflexible currency stock and ii an uncontrolled total money stock may result in a multiplicity of equilibria including an inflationary banknote over issue

identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets lessons from the founding of the fed abstract we use the founding of the federal reserve to identify the effects of a lender of last resort we examine stock return and interest rate volatility during september and october when markets were vulnerable because of financial stringency from the harvest stock volatility fell by 40 and interest rate volatility by more than 70 following the monetary regime change the drop is insignificant if major panic years are omitted from the analysis however because business cycle downturns occurred in the same year as financial crises our results suggest that the existence of the federal reserve reduced liquidity risk

productivity and competitiveness although this article is about much more than uk manufacturing manufacturing is a bell wether for the whole economy because it is the key tradable sector accounting for over 80 per cent of uk non oil trade in 1988 it is also widely believed to be disproportionately important for wage determina tion despite now accounting for only around one quarter of all employment and under a third of full time employment further data availability and accuracy are better than for most of the rest of the economy so this is the sector with which we begin there are three key ways of measuring the inter national competitiveness of uk manufacturing relativ output prices relative export prices and relative unit labour costs where the relativities are taken against a weighted basket of our chief com petitors figures 1 a and 1 6 plot data on the three measures as published by the cso the 1980 or 1981 high points on the graphs indicate the post ar troughs reached by competitiveness in those ea s the combination of the exchange rate appre ciation resulting from the medium term financial stra egy mtfs and the oil revenue boom the eff cts of the recent wage inflation and the cyclical d cline in labour productivity produced

reprint of central bank collateral frameworks abstract this paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely overlooked yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems namely central bank collateral frameworks their importance can be understood by the observation that the money at the core of these systems central bank money is injected into the economy on terms not defined in a market but by the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks using the collateral framework of the eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study the paper brings to light the functioning reach and impact of collateral frameworks a theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy they can for example bias the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability evidence is presented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid collateral and more generally impairs market forces and discipline the paper also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the eurosystem s collateral framework

financial factors in the great depression eginning with irving fisher 1933 and john maynard keynes 1931 b 1963 macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the great depression turning points during the depression often coincided with or were preceded by dramatic events in financial markets stock market collapse waves of bankruptcy and bank failure and contractions in the money stock but the mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the depression has been a source of controversy as has been the relative importance of financial factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the depression this essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the depression and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the depression and for macroeconomics i argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial real links in the depression followed a paradigm shift in economics a central neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity also the increasing emphasis on learning and path dependence in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy makers failed to prevent the depression

international debt and world business fluctuations abstract the international transmission of real productivity disturbances is examined in an optimizing model with two countries each inhabited by an infinitely lived representative consumer producer we analyze the dynamics of output consumption investment interest rates and net external debt foreign productivity shocks can have positive or negative impacts on domestic output and international debt depending on the intertemporal distribution of the shocks transient foreign shocks are shown to be positively transmitted and lead to increased domestic indebtedness while permanent foreign shocks are negatively transmitted and lead to a decline in domestic indebtedness

the evolution of financial intermediation evidence from 19th century ontario microdata microdata for ontario decedents in 1892 and 1902 is analyzed to help explain the dramatic growth of the canadian banking system in the late 19th century combining data from probate inventories with census data at the township level we find that the expansion of deposit banking happened at the extensive rather than intensive margin and was correlated with the expansion of the branch network of the banking system although we cannot assign causation wealth and urbanization help to explain the growth of deposit banking but the significance of a dummy variable for 1902 points to other time correlated factors such as innovations in transportation and financial innovations that lowered costs and facilitated access to banking services resume l evolution de l intermediation financiere resultats a partir de micro donnees pour l ontario au 19e siecle les auteurs analysent les micro donnees pour les personnes decedees en ontario en 1892 et en 1902 pour tenter d expliquer la croissance dramatique du systeme bancaire canadien a la fin du 19 siecle en combinant des donnees provenant d inventaires apres deces avec celles de recensements au niveau des cantons on decouvre que l expansion du systeme bancaire va se produire a la marge extensive plutot qu a la marge intensive et etre co reliee a l expansion du reseau de succursales du systeme bancaire encore qu on ne puisse assigner un lien de causalite richesse et urbanisation aident a expliquer la croissance des banques de depots mais la signification de la variable fictive pour 1902 pointe vers des facteurs comme l innovation dans le transport et l innovation financiere qui ont reduit les couts et facilite l acces aux services bancaires

long run neutrality high inflation and bank insolvencies in argentina and brazil abstract using long low frequency data on money and output over 1884 1996 for argentina and over 1912 1995 for brazil it is found that money is long run neutral but not long run superneutral with regard to real output a rise in money growth is associated with a decline in output the opposite of the tobin effect the introduction of dummy variables for 1930s or to capture recent periods of financial disruption associated with bank insolvencies does not restore long run superneutrality for either country however results indicate that bank insolvency episodes have a distinct and negative influence on output

redemption costs and interest rates under the u s national banking system interest rates under the u s national banking system 1863 1914 appear to imply that banks failed to exploit an arbitrage opportunity for two reasons yields on government bonds exceeded the tax rate on note issue by approximately 150 basis points and short term interest rates varied seasonally this paper examines whether note redemption costs can explain observed interest rates we present a model in which redemption costs create a spread between the tax rate on note issue and bond yields and in which temporary seasonal fluctuations in currency demand generate seasonal movements in short term interest rates calibration of the model to actual data lends support to the model s implications further interest rates are shown not to vary seasonally when banks do not incur the costs of note redemption the banking system that existed in the united states between 1863 and 1914 the so called national banking system is unique in u s history under this system private commercial banks national banks were permitted to issue payable on demand liabilities banknotes that were required to be fully collateralized by government bonds and that carried an explicit government guarantee against noteholder loss should the issuing bank fail banks were taxed based on the quantity of their notes in circulation and each bani had to redeem its own notes at par in lawful money specie or greenbacks the national banking system gave rise to a national currency because each bank was required to accept the notes of other national banks at par a bank holding notes issued by another bank could redeem those notes at par in lawful money through redemption centers established by the u s treasury with the costs of redemption borne by the issuing bank during the period of the national banking system observed interest rates were characterized by two features first yields on intermediated government bonds ex

contributions to canadian economic history the last 30 years the cliometric revolution that transformed economic history in the us in the 1960s was soon embraced by canadian economic historians many of the important issues surrounding canadian development remained the same the role of resources the place of international trade immigration capital accumulation and interactions with native americans among others but beginning in the 1960s and certainly over the last 30 years economic historians of canada have addressed them with the tools of modern economics both theoretical and empirical we highlight the recent work emphasizing not just the methods but also the fundamental ways our understanding of canadian history has been changed

the use of risk and return models for multiattribute decisions with decomposable utilities normatively oriented approaches to decision making under uncertainty occupy a major portion of the literature of decision analysis among the proposed approaches the von neumann morgenstern expected utility eu theory has been the most prominent model of rational choice despite some controversies that surround this model with respect to its descriptive ability as well as the plausibility of utility assessment in actual decision situations 6 10 although most applications of the eu model have been concerned with decisions involving monetary outcomes its scope is not limited to any particular class of conse quences the basic appeal of the model is attributable partly to its generality in this regard and more importantly to the apparent reasonableness of its preferentialaxioms in the context of decisions with monetary outcomes several alternatives to the eu model have been proposed including the mean variance and mean semivariance models that have found popularity in the economies and finance litera ture see 4 8 and 9 in contrast to the eu theory where a decision maker s preferences among uncertain prospects are assumed given preferences in these models are formulated in terms of two attributes that are presumed to character ize all available choices in the mean semivariance model for example uncer tain prospects are viewed entirely in terms of their means and below target semivariances a generalization of this model was examined by fishburn 2 who showed that the general mean risk model exhibits a certain degree of compatibility with the eu model more recently holthausen 5 showed that this compatibility is significantly enhanced when mean is replaced by a return measure de fined as a probability weighted function of above target deviations specifically holthausen proved that this model yields the same preferences as the eu model whenever the expected utility function has the form

from great depression to great credit crisis similarities differences and lessons the great depression of the 1930s and the great credit crisis of the 2000s had similar causes but elicited strikingly different policy responses while it remains too early to assess the effectiveness of current policy it is possible to analyse monetary and fiscal responses in the 1930s as a natural experiment or counterfactual capable of shedding light on the impact of current policies we employ vector autoregressions instrumental variables and qualitative evidence for 27 countries in the period 1925 39 the results suggest that monetary and fiscal stimulus was effective that where it did not make a difference it was not tried they shed light on the debate over fiscal multipliers in episodes of financial crisis they are consistent with multipliers at the higher end of those estimated in the recent literature and with the argument that the impact of fiscal stimulus will be greater when banking systems are dysfunctional and monetary policy is constrained by the zero bound miguel almunia agustin benetrix barry eichengreen kevin h o rourke and gisela rua

new estimates of the canadian money stock 1871 1967 in this paper the authors construct historical data series beginning in 1871 for canadian m1 m2 and monetary base the new series are at a monthly frequency and use the bank of canada s definition of the monetary aggregates institutional and reporting changes however make perfect backwards extrapolation of the bank s series impossible there are only end of month data rather than average weekly since january 1994 daily data and the authors cannot precisely match savings accounts at chartered banks and trust companies that are included in the modern monetary aggregates their adjustments for these changes and their impact on the aggregates are documented

gross loan flows we present a series of stylized facts about gross loan flows and how they vary over time bank size and region we define loan creation as the sum of the change in bank loans at all banks that increased loans since last quarter loan destruction is similarly defined as the absolute value of the change in loans at all banks that decreased loans the gross flow akin to what the labor literature calls reallocation is the sum of creation and destruction

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

a real model of the world business cycle abstract in this paper a stochastic two country log linear infinite horizon model is used to analyze the generation and transmission of economic fluctuations across countries it is argued that following a country specific supply disturbance production interdependence and unitary elasticities in consumption and production are sufficient to generate comovements in aggregate economic activity investment and trade that are persistent over time and positively correlated across countries however the empirical analysis carried out for the usa japan germany and uk for the 1960 82 period suggests that common shocks rather than trade links are responsible for this pattern of comovements

the spectre of deflation a review of empirical evidence what explains the widespread fear of deflation this article reviews the history of thought economic history and empirical evidence on deflation with a view to answering this question it also outlines informally the main effects of deflation in applied monetary models the main finding is that for both historical and contemporary deflations there are many open empirical questions that could be answered using the tools economists use to study inflation and monetary policy more generally qu est ce qui explique la peur tres repandue de la deflation ce memoire fait un tour d horizon de l histoire de la pensee economique de l histoire economique et des resultats empiriques quant aux effets de la deflation en vue de repondre a cette question on fait aussi echo informellement aux effets principaux de la deflation dans les modeles monetaires appliques ce qui ressort principalement de ce travail est que tant pour les deflations dans l histoire que dans le monde contemporain il y a bien des questions empiriques encore irresolues auxquelles on pourrait donner une reponse en utilisant l outillage mental que les economistes utilisent pour etudier l inflation et la politique monetaire plus generalement sp c tre n thing that is thought to be seen but has no material existence haunting presentiment of ruin war madness etc

testing short run neutrality abstract this paper derives and implements a robust test of the short run neutrality of anticipated policy that is valid when the information set used to form expectations is incorrectly specified and the effect of unanticipated policy on deviations of output from the natural rate varies over time the test is based on the observation that if unanticipated policy affects output with a maximum lag of n quarters then any information prior to n should be uninformative about output movements the test is applied to quarterly data for the united states and the paper concludes that policy is not neutral

global influences on uk manufacturing prices 1970 2000 abstract we introduce the first consistent series of domestic product and related import price indices at the industry level for the uk using the data to analyse both domestic and international determinants of uk manufactured product prices foreign influences on uk prices in domestic markets are always present but domestic cost movements dominate we show that the pass through of world price tariff and exchange rate changes into product prices is partial in general and varies markedly between product categories standard tariff and exchange rate theories overstate price responses to global pricing determinants and fail to allow for variation between industrial sectors such theories can mislead when used for policy analysis and prediction

the real bills doctrine versus the quantity theory a reconsideration two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models the real bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such intermediation the quantity theory prescription in contrast is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate money from credit although our models are consistent with quantity theory predictions about money supply and price level behavior under these two policy prescriptions the models imply that the quantity theory prescription is not pareto optimal and the real bills prescription is

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

stability in the absence of deposit insurance the canadian banking system 1890 1966 the canadian banking system experienced a prolonged period of stability prior to the introduction of deposit insurance in 1967 documenting the reasons for this stability provides important evidence in the debate over the impact of mandatory flat rate deposit insurance in this paper we use new archival data to refute recent claims that this stability resulted from an implicit deposit insurance scheme managed by canada s largest banks and guaranteed by the federal government we argue that the canadian banking system was stable for two reasons first the absence of deposit insurance provided incentives for both prudence on the part of management and monitoring by depositors and regulators second the absence of unit banking and other regulatory barriers to competition facilitated efficient mergers which produced a relatively small number of well managed banks copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

economic organization with limited communication this paper presents formal stylized representations of communication accounting systems oral assignment portable object written message and telecommunication systems are considered the environments that allow this formalization are characterized by spatial separation private information and a need to keep track of past actions transfers and shocks in environments that have spatial separation and private information beneficial multilateral arrangements can depend critically on agents ability to communicate to one another values of contemporary shocks and to keep track of histories of past transfers or past announced shocks this paper formalizes this idea and focuses on com

the nonmonetary effects of financial factors during the interwar period i introduction in a monetary history of the united states friedman and schwartz 1963 attributed the enormous decline in real output and prices during the great depression of 1929 1933 to an unprecedented fall in the supply of money while there is much support today for the view that money played an important role in this episode many economists feel that this variable alone does not provide a sufficiently complete explanation of the link between the chaotic conditions in the u s financial sector and aggregate output and prices bernanke 1983 contended in an influential paper that financial shocks had important nonmonetary effects on aggregate economic activity in addition to their effects via the supply of money rather than consider the 1929 33 episode outside of its context bernanke widened his sample to include the entire interwar period which he defined as january 1919 december 1941 the major purpose of this paper is to present empirical evidence on the importance of the nonmonetary effects of financial factors in explaining fluctuations in real output and prices during the interwar period we define the interwar period as august 1922 june 1938 by omitting from our sample a few years immediately following world war i and immediately preceding world war ii we avoid the potential problems connected with war related government expenditures and autonomous gold flows discussed in joines 1985 our interwar period corresponds closely to the four peacetime cycles identified by firestone 1960 the theoretical literature on the nonmonetary effects of financial factors focuses on two related but distinct aspects 1 first studies by bernanke and blinder 1988 williamson 1987a 1987b bernanke and gertler 1987 and scheinkman and weiss 1986 demonstrate that the efficiency with which banks perform their intermediation function is an independently important determinant of the level of real economic activity second bernanke and gertler 1989 1990 gertler and hubbard 1988 and calomiris and hubbard 1990 focus on the effects of shocks to borrowers net worth positions on aggregate economic activity this approach suggests that exogenous shocks to borrowers net worth may be a source of economic fluctuations therefore for example to the extent that a deflation is unanticipated it is likely to erode borrowers net worth and thereby adversely affect aggregate economic activity beginning with fisher 1933 this deflation story has played an important role in studies such as bernanke 1983 hamilton 1987 and bernanke and james 1990 that attempt to explain the great depression in evaluating the effects of financial sector shocks during the great depression bernanke 1983 argued that in addition to the traditional monetary effects of adverse shocks to financial intermediation stressed by friedman and schwartz 1963 these shocks increased the cost of credit intermediation which in turn led to credit contraction rejection of otherwise profitable projects and subsequent falls in output to test this hypothesis bernanke included the deposits of failing banks and the liabilities of failing businesses as joint proxies for the cost of credit intermediation in a barro 1977 type output equation that also included unanticipated money both the deposits of failing banks and liabilities of failing businesses were found to be significant moreover dynamic simulations of the path of output for the period between mid 1930 and march 1933 accounted for substantially more of the actual decrease in output than was captured when only unanticipated money was included in the output equation in place of the joint proxies bernanke also used the yield differential between baa corporate and long term u s government bonds as a proxy for credit intermediation costs in all cases entry of the credit cost proxies significantly increased the percentage of the decline in output that was captured

monetary growth in a turnpike environment abstract a general equilibrium model of monetary growth in a turnpike economy is constructed it is shown that money lifts the economy up to a pareto superior growth path by eliminating the investment in projects with low returns the growth rate of the monetary economy is larger than that of the nonmonetary economy and mckinnon s complementarity hypothesis holds provided that the agents degree of relative risk aversion is not too large the main theorem states a sufficient condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium with a constant rate of return on money

an historical decomposition of the great depression to determine the role of money abstract the innovation accounting technique of historical decomposition seems ideally suited as a vehicle for a re examination of money s role during the depression its application using u s monthly data for 1919 to 1941 reveals that innovations in money exerted a considerable influence on prices and output after october 1929 although the depth of the depression and the extent of the subsequent recovery cannot be attributed solely to monetary factors an important albeit occasionally diminished monetary effect is also identified even when a passive contemporaneous response by money to price and output fluctuations is assumed not to contribute to the effect

monetary policy banking crises and the friedman rule banking crises are frequent events gerard caprio and daniela klingebiel 1997 catalog over 80 banking crises during the last 25 years interestingly some banking crises are associated with no output losses whatsoever while others involve massive recessions finally it is known that the probability of a banking crisis rises as the rate of inflation rises see asli demirguc kunt and enrica detragiache 1997 john boyd et al 2001a b while received wisdom exists about the conduct of monetary policy while a crisis is underway there is no formal treatment of how the conduct of monetary policy during normal times affects the potential for banking crises to occur to fill that gap i consider economies where spatial separation and limited communication create a transactions role for money and random shocks to agents liquidity preferences create a role for banks in addition banks confront randomness in withdrawal demand when withdrawal demand is sufficiently high banks exhaust their cash reserves there are good reasons to associate this with a banking panic the output lost during a banking panic depends on how great withdrawal demand is some banking crises generate no output losses while others generate large reductions in resource availability in addition the conduct of monetary policy during normal times affects the probability of a banking crisis the higher the nominal interest rate the inflation rate the higher is the probability of a panic driving the nominal interest rate to zero following the friedman rule eliminates bank panics this constitutes a new rationale for the friedman rule nonetheless conventional methods of implementing the friedman rule never produce an optimal resource allocation in particular low nominal interest rates induce banks to hold large cash reserves thereby forgoing socially more productive investments in effect the friedman rule induces banks to become narrow banks voluntarily the banking system is very safe but it undertakes a suboptimal level of investment less conventional methods for implementing the friedman rule such as allowing unrestricted access to the discount window at a zero nominal interest rate lead either to the nonexistence of equilibrium or to massive indeterminacies none of the equilibria will be consistent with full optimality

bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking abstract central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis the lender of last resort function this activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic the likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system banking systems with well diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry in addition big banks can self monitor through publicly observable branch closure systems of many small banks form incentive compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance a precursor of central banking

the timing of monetary and price changes and the international transmission of inflation this paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation into timing relationships between variables within and across industrialized countries the main empirical results of our analysis are 1 domestic monetary expansion appears to lead inflation in the sense that money granger causes prices without feedback contradicting an implication of the monetary approach to the balance of payments 2 hardly any significant timing relationship exists between domestic and foreign rates of inflation during the fixed exchange rate period providing no evidence for a generalized law of one price 3 some sterilization of official reserve inflows was successfully performed by the non reserve central banks except for canada 4 u s interest rates granger cause foreign rates providing evidence of some international transmission via asset markets

stochastic dominance and expected utility survey and analysis while stochastic dominance has been employed in various forms as early as 1932 it has only been since 1969 1970 that the notion has been developed and extensively employed in the area of economics finance agriculture statistics marketing and operations research in this survey the first second and third order stochastic dominance rules are discussed with an emphasis on the development in the area since the 1980s

rediscounting under aggregate risk abstract this paper compares three institutions that offer an elastic currency open market operations a discount window and a private banknote issuing clearinghouse in an economy with financial markets otherwise hampered by a lack of liquidity when this economy is subject to aggregate financial shocks these alternative forms of central banking are shown to differ in their implications for risk sharing interesting implications include i central bank losses and monetary innovations that are part of an efficient equilibrium and ii desirable quantity restrictions at the discount window

innovation accounting for the impact of fluctuations in u s variables on the canadian economy innovation accounting is conducted on a nine variable vector autoregression estimated using u s and canadian monthly data for january 1971 to december 1983 this reveals inter alia a positive impact of the u s interest rate on the canadian rate with the role the exchange rate plays in cushioning this impact being clearly apparent a positive effect of the u s money supply on both u s and canadian interest rates a positive albeit muted response of canadian production to a shock in u s production and a persistent influence of u s prices on production negatively and prices positively in canada are also detected l impact des fluctuations dans les variables americaines sur l eonomie canadienne une analyse utilisant la technique d innovation accounting les auteurs utilisent la technique d innovation accounting dans le cadre d un systeme a neuf variables estime comme autoregression vectorielle a l aide de donnees mensuelles canadiennes et americaines couvrant la periode de janvier 1971 a decembre 1983 cette analyse revl un effet positif de la masse monetaire americaine a la fois sur les taux d interet canadiens et americains une reaction positive mais en sourdine du niveau de production au canada a un choc dans le niveau de production americaine et une influence persistence des niveaux de prix americains sur le niveau de production au canada influence negative ainsi que sur les niveaux de prix canadiens influence positive we should like to thank gordon anderson douglas clarke john kennan john kuszczak angelo melino and stanely winer for a number of helpful discussions earlier versions of the paper were presented at the meetings of the canadian economics association in vancouver in june 1983 at the winter meetings of the econometric society in san francisco in december 1983 and in a session of invited papers at the meetings of the canadian economics association in guelph in june 1984 our discussants jacques raynauld in vancouver thomas doan and stephen king in san francisco and allan gregory in guelph offered many useful comments as too did the members of the money macro workshop at the university of western ontario alan harrison also thanks the economics department at the university of warwick for its hospitality and the social science and humanities research council of canada for financial support canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xviii no 4 november novembre 1985 printed in canada imprime au canada 0008 4085 85 784 98 1 50 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 40 77 167 14 on fri 16 sep 2016 06 02 12 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms impact of fluctuations in us variables 785

optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks abstract the tug o war for supremacy between inflation targeting and monetary targeting is a classic yet timely topic in monetary economics in this paper we revisit this issue within the context of a pure exchange overlapping generations model in which spatial separation and random relocation create an endogenous demand for money we study ar 1 shocks to both real output and the real interest rate irrespective of the nature of the shocks the optimal inflation target is always positive under monetary targeting shocks to output necessitate negative money growth rates for shocks to real interest rates money growth rates may be either positive or negative depending on the elasticity of consumption substitution also for output shocks monetary targeting welfare dominates inflation targeting but the gap between the two vanishes as the shock process approaches a random walk in sharp contrast for shocks to the real interest rate we prove that monetary targeting and inflation targeting are welfare equivalent only in the limit as the shocks become i i d the upshot is that persistence of the underlying fundamental uncertainty matters depending on the nature of the shock policy responses need to be either more or less aggressive as persistence increases

income velocity and institutional change some new time series evidence 1870 1986 this paper applies tests of cointegration to assess whether institutional factors in addition to income and an interest rate explain the long run behavior of velocity over a century of annual data from five industrialized countries are used institutional characteristics make a significant contribution to the determination of velocity in all the countries considered one generally rejects the hypothesis of cointegration between velocity and its traditional determinants but the same hypothesis cannot be rejected when velocity is also a function of institutional change proxies tests of coefficient stability also reinforce the validity of the institutional change hypothesis of velocity copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

financial structure and aggregate economic activity an overview this paper surveys literature that explores the possible links between the financial system and aggregate economic behavior the survey is in two parts the first reviews the traditional work and the second discusses new research copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

real time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy abstract using a neoclassical monetary model we investigate the welfare cost of a payment system that operates as a real time gross settlement rtgs system we illustrate how the cost of such systems ultimately derives from the credit constraints imposed by rtgs the effects of these constraints can be undone if the central bank makes intraday credit freely available if intraday credit is only available on a collateralized basis however rtgs will always impose a liquidity cost

revisiting the coyne affair a singular event that changed the course of canadian monetary history the coyne affair occurred during the 1959 61 period and led to the resignation of the governor eventually major reforms of the bank of canada act were enacted archival and empirical evidence is used to assess the performance of monetary policy throughout the 1950s in doing so a real time data set is constructed for both canada and the us that permits the estimation of a reaction function i find that while the case against james coyne is not proven there was a brief period when monetary policy was excessively tight and this may well have worsened an already weak economic environment l affaire coyne a eu lieu au cours de la periode 1959 61 et a conduit a la demission du gouverneur de la banque du canada eventuellement des reformes majeures a la loi sur la banque du canada ont ete mises en uvre on utilise des documents d archives et des resultats empiriques pour evaluer la performance de la politique monetaire dans les annees 1950 ce faisant on construit une base de donnees en temps reel pour le canada et les etats unis qui permet de faire l estimation d une fonction de reaction on decouvre que meme si l argumentation developpee contre coyne n est pas prouvee il y a eu une courte periode durant laquelle la politique monetaire a ete excessivement restrictive et que cela peut fort bien avoir entraine la deterioration d une economie deja affaiblie

intermediaries and payments instruments abstract we study an economy in which intermediaries have incentives to issue circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium we show that with arbitrarily small transactions costs only the liabilities of intermediaries will circulate and not those of other private sector agents therefore our model connects intermediation activity with the issuance of payments media a connection that has not been made in earlier literature we use our model to suggest a resolution of the banknote underissue puzzle of cagan in d carson ed banking and monetary studies richard d irwin publishing homewood il 1963

a small open economy in depression lessons from canada in the 1930s this paper tests the hypothesis that idiosyncratic u s disturbances and their inter national propagation can account for the global depression exploiting common stochastic trends in u s and canadian interwar data we estimate a small open economy model for canada that decomposes output fluctuations into sources identifiable with world and country specific disturbances we find that the onset depth and duration of output collapse in both canada and the united states are primarily attributable to a common permanent output shock leaving little significant role for idiosyncratic disturbances originating in either economy

monetary policy and banking structure in this paper i examine the differences in optimal monetary policy in various banking systems in particular i compare two monetary economies one with a competitive banking system and the other with a monopolistic one in addition the optimality of the discount window policy is considered it is shown that the friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy in a monopolistic banking economy and the zero inflation policy is optimal in a competitive banking economy under appropriate parameters in addition the combination of the friedman rule and the discount window policy can achieve efficient allocation in both banking systems

the evolution of cash transactions some implications for monetary policy this paper considers the implications for monetary policy of a decreasing demand for outside money it finds that even perpetual declines in the demand for base money pose no threat to the traditional methods employed for conducting monetary policy the effects of such reductions in the demand for central bank liabilities however do depend on how monetary policy is conducted four monetary policy regimes are analyzed with a policy of nominal interest rate targeting a secular decline in the volume of cash transactions unambiguously leads to accelerating inflation a policy of maintaining a fixed composition of government liabilities leads to accelerating decelerating inflation if agents have sufficiently high low levels of risk aversion inflation targeting produces falling nominal and real interest rates while a policy of fixing the rate of money growth can easily lead to indeterminacy and endogenous oscillation in interest rates it is argued that a policy of fixing the composition of government liabilities has several advantages if it is known that agents are not too risk averse and that the asymptotic demand for base money is small if this information is not known then interest rate or inflation targeting have an advantage because their consequences are not sensitive to such environmental features

a risk return model with risk and return measured as deviations from a target return two attribute risk and return models are very popular in the economics and finance literature for analyzing decisions under uncertainty their popularity stems primarily from the intuitive appeal of the dichotomy into risk and return and from the ease with which the concepts can be diagrammed in two dimensions the most commonly used risk return model is the mean variance model in which risk is measured as the variance and return by the mean of the probability distribution over outcomes the mean variance model has a number of shortcomings which are widely known but of particular concern here are the facts that 1 mean variance dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient for second degree stochastic dominance 2 unless the form of the probability distribution is restricted mean variance is consistent with von neumann morgenstern utility theory only if the utility function is quadratic and 3 as peter fishburn has noted

productivity and income per capita convergence in a peripheral european economy the irish experience birnie j e and hitchens d m w n 1998 productivity and income per capita convergence in a peripheral european economy the irish experience reg studies 32 223 234 gdp per capita in ireland increased from 60 to 90 of the uk average during 1986 95 this extremely rapid convergence begs the question whether increases in comparative productivity were of a similar magnitude industry of origin comparisons were used to benchmark ireland uk labour productivity in 1935 1968 and 1985 dramatic improvement in manufacturing comparative productivity was the immediate explanation of much of the convergence in gdp per capital levels unadjusted manufacturing productivity in the mid 1990s was as high as that in the us this was prima facie evidence of transfer pricing the likely scale of distortion created by transfer pricing is discussed and hence the extent of exaggeration of gdp an agenda for further research was suggested birnie j e et hitchens d m w n 1998 la convergence de la productivite e

canadian banking solvency 1922 1940 the use of market value accounting to restate the year end balance sheets for canadian banks strongly suggests that only one surviving bank was economically solvent during the depression like u s s ls the authors alternative hypothesis argues that canadian banks continued to operate because of the canadian government s forebearance policy of providing an implicit 100 percent guarantee of bank deposits standing ready to lend to banks and encouraging early mergers of troubled and healthier banks unlike the stylized fact the role of national branching was to facilitate this policy by reducing the number of banks and lessening competition copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

money growth and inflation a regime switching approach abstract we develop a markov switching model for inflation with time varying transition probabilities inflation is characterized by two regimes high and low inflation and the probability of regime changes depends on money growth using bayesian techniques we apply the model to the euro area germany the us the uk and canada for data from the 1960s up to the present our estimates suggest that a smoothed measure of broad money growth corrected for real time estimates of trend velocity and potential output growth has important leading indicator properties for switches between inflation regimes thus money growth provides an important early warning indicator for risks to price stability

monetary factors in the great depression this paper examines the role of monetary policy in the early stages of the great depression and considers the mechanism whereby this policy may have affected real activity i conclude that the depression was preceded by a dramatic shift towards a highly contractionary monetary policy the economic impact of this policy seems unlikely to have come through the conventional keynesian channels of a shortage of liquidity and high ex ante real interest rates but instead may have operated through unanticipated deflation and after 1930 through the disruption of financial intermediation as a consequence of the banking panics

further evidence on the credit view the case of finland the present paper provides further empirical evidence on the credit view i e bank credit availability has a positive impact on macroeconomic activity by investigating the case of finland the finnish economy suffered a severe recession in the early 1990s that was marked by widespread banking crisis and extensive government intervention using monthly data for the 1980 1996 period unrestricted and restricted vector autoregression var models with gdp money supply consumer prices bank credit and exports were estimated it is found that while money supply had the largest effect on economic output bank credit exhibited a fairly strong effect on output that exceeded price effects for the most part exports had little impact on fluctuations in gdp but did help to explain industrial output changes over time based on these results it is concluded that there is empirical support for the credit view in finland by implication government intervention in finland to restore safety and soundness during t