testing for evidence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market a comment in 1994 puelz and snow presented empirical evidence of adverse selection in the market for automobile collision insurance using data from a private insurer they claimed to have found strong evidence of adverse selection in the insurer s portfolio their test was based on individuals choice of deductible in each risk class from the models of rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 it is well known that if residual adverse selection is present in some risk classes insurers will offer menus of contracts from which insureds will self select at equilibrium higher risk individuals will choose the smaller deductible and will be charged the higher price per unit of insurance dionne doherty and fombaron 2000 an empirical test of the theory is to verify in each risk class whether lower deductibles are chosen by insureds with higher accident proba

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

credit market imperfections and patterns of international trade and capital flows this paper offers two simple models to illustrate how corporate governance contractual enforcement and the balance sheet condition of the business sector etc can affect the patterns of international trade and capital flows in the presence of credit market imperfections jel d52 f15 f21 f40

the heterogeneous effect of finance on international trade is the impact of financial development on international trade heterogeneous being positive negative or null across manufacturing sectors and is it dependent on the level of sectoral requirement on external finance for capital need to examine these questions this article uses a panel trade database on 21 manufacturing sectors in 80 countries between 2000 and 2009 the analysis demonstrates that the effect of financial development on trade is indeed heterogeneous by estimating a coefficient for each sector and showing that the signs and significance levels vary across them the article also demonstrates that sectors with strong reliance on external finance export higher volume from countries with developed financial system and that financial development reduces trade in industries with low financial dependence level

risk adjustment and prevention widespread integration of market based incentives into healthcare systems calls for and has elicited increasing adoption of risk adjustment by deterring selection risk adjustment helps to assure fair and efficient payments among health insurers or capitated provider groups however since conventional risk adjustment allocates funds among regions or insurers according to current population health status it does not reward indeed it penalizes preventive efforts that improve population health this prevention penalty of risk adjustment represents a hidden cost of unclear magnitude undermining provider incentives for health promotion we develop a theoretical model of selection and prevention demonstrating this problem with conventional risk adjustment and suggesting a simple alternative risk adjustment should be linked to pay for performance for prevention l integration generalisee d incitatifs mercantiles dans les systemes de soins de sante appelle et a engendre l adoption croissante d ajustements au risque en decourageant la selection l ajustement au risque aide a assurer des paiements justes et equitables entre les assureurs ou les groupes de fournisseurs finances par capitation cependant comme les ajustements conventionnels au risque allouent des fonds entre les regions ou les assureurs selon le statut sanitaire present de la population ils ne recompensent pas et meme penalisent les efforts de prevention qui ameliorent la sante des populations cette penalisation de la prevention dans les ajustements au risque represente un cout cache d une magnitude mal etablie qui mine l incitation des fournisseurs a s occuper de promotion de la sante on developpe un modele theorique de selection et de prevention mettant en lumiere ce probleme dans l utilisation de l ajustement au risque conventionnel et on suggere une solution de rechange ou l ajustement au risque est reliea une remuneration a la performance pour la prevention

skill biased technological change and rising wage inequality some problems and puzzles the recent rise in wage inequality is usually attributed to skill biased technical change sbtc associated with new computer technologies we review the evidence for this hypothesis focusing on the implications of sbtc for overall wage inequality and for changes in wage differentials between groups a key problem for the sbtc hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing advances in computer technology sbtc also fails to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality including the gender and racial wage gaps and the age gradient in the return to education

marriage divorce and asymmetric information we use data on people s valuations of options outside marriage and beliefs about spouses options the data demonstrate that in some couples one spouse would be happier and the other spouse unhappier outside of some marriages suggesting that bargaining takes place and that spouses have private information we estimate a bargaining model with interdependent utility that quantifies the resulting inefficiencies our results show that people forgo some utility in order to make their spouses better off and in doing so offset much of the inefficiency generated by their imperfect knowledge thus we find evidence of asymmetric information and interdependent utility in marriage

the basic analytics of moral hazard the basic analytics of moral hazard are developed using the simplest possible model of the insurance market even when the underlying expected utility function and the function relating the accident probability to accident prevention effort are extremely well behaved the indifference curves and feasibility set the set of insurance contracts which at least break even are not indifference curves need not be convex and feasibility sets never are priceand income consumption lines may be discontinuous and effort is not in general a monotonic or continuous function of the parameters of the insurance policies provided

selection effects in the united kingdom individual annuities market this paper explores adverse selection in the voluntary and compulsory individual annuity markets in the united kingdom two empirical regularities support standard models of adverse selection first annuitants are longer lived than non annuitants these mortality differences are more pronounced in the voluntary than in the compulsory annuity market we estimate that the amount of adverse selection in the compulsory market is about one half of that in the voluntary market second the pricing of different types of annuity products within each annuity market is consistent with individuals selecting products based in part on private information about their mortality prospects the aging of populations in many developed nations has generated substantial interest in the way households finance consumption in their retirement years annuities insurance products that provide a payment stream for as long as the insured individual is alive offer one way to spread an accumulated stock of resources over a retirement period of uncertain length theoretical research beginning with yaari 1965 suggests substantial utility gains from annuitisation in the presence of stochastic length of life public policy discussions have also generated substantial current interest in the operation of annuity markets the decline in long term interest rates in the united kingdom since the early 1990s has coincided with a decline in annuity payouts relative to annuity premia this has sparked a debate

incentive effects in the demand for health care a bivariate panel count data estimation this paper contributes in three dimensions to the literature on health care demand first it features the first application of a bivariate random effects estimator in a count data setting to permit the efficient estimation of this type of model with panel data second it provides an innovative test of adverse selection and confirms that high risk individuals are more likely to acquire supplemental add on insurance third the estimations yield that in accordance with the theory of moral hazard we observe a much lower frequency of doctor visits among the self employed and among mothers of small children copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

evaluation of the subjective probabilities of survival in the health and retirement study in the health and retirement study respondents were asked about the chances they would live to 75 or to 85 we analyze these responses to determine if they behave like probabilities of survival if their averages are close to average probabilities in the population and if they have correlations with other variables that are similar to correlations with actual mortality outcomes we find that generally they do behave like probabilities and that they do aggregate to population probabilities most remarkable however is that they covary with other variables in the same way actual outcomes vary with the variables for example respondents with higher socioeconomic status give higher probabilities of survival whereas respondents who smoke give lower probabilities we conclude that these measures of subjective probabilities have great potential use in models of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty

preference heterogeneity and insurance markets explaining a puzzle of insurance the textbook approach to insurance markets emphasizes the role of private information about risk in determining who purchases insurance in the classic adverse selection model of michael rothschild and joseph stiglitz 1976 individu als with higher expected claims buy more insur ance than those with lower expected claims who may be out of the market entirely this basic prediction of asymmetric information models of a positive correlation between insurance cov erage and accident occurrence has been shown to be robust to a variety of extensions to the stan

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

health insurance without single crossing why healthy people have high coverage standard insurance models predict that people with high risks have high insurance coverage it is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured we show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in an insurance model where people choose treatment intensity we analyse different market structures and show the following if insurers have market power the violation of single crossing caused by income differences and endogenous treatment choice can explain the empirically observed outcome our results do not rely on differences in risk aversion between types

can the mortensen pissarides model with productivity changes explain u s wage inequality this article examines whether the mortensen pissarides matching model with productivity changes can explain the time pattern of wage inequality the main finding is that the model produces counterfactual results the main source of failure seems to be the exogenous matching function and or the exogenous surplus share neither of which allows firms to use wage policies to direct workers searches

minimum standards insurance regulation and adverse selection evidence from the medigap market abstract this paper examines the implications of minimum standards for insurance markets i study the imposition of binding minimum standards on the market for voluntary private health insurance for the elderly the central estimates suggest that the introduction of the standards was associated with an 8 percentage point 25 decrease in the proportion of the population with coverage in the affected market with no evidence of substitution toward other unregulated sources of insurance coverage to explore possible factors contributing to the impact of the minimum standards i develop comparative static predictions of the impact of imposing minimum standards in an insurance market with adverse selection the observed changes in market equilibrium associated with the minimum standards are broadly consistent with these predictions providing evidence of the existence of adverse selection in this insurance market more importantly they suggest that the presence of adverse selection which in principle may provide an economic rationale for minimum standards in practice may have exacerbated the declines in insurance coverage associated with the minimum standards

switching costs price sensitivity and health plan choice we investigate the extent to which sensitivity to health plan premiums differs across individuals according to characteristics related to the cost of switching plans our results indicate substantial variation in price sensitivity related to expected health care costs younger healthier employees are between two and four times more sensitive to price than employees who are older and who have been recently hospitalized or diagnosed with cancer we also find evidence of status quo bias estimated premium elasticities are significantly higher for new hires than for incumbent employees simulations combining our results with actuarial data illustrate the cost implications of risk related differences in price elasticity

finance firm size and growth the authors examine whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth they define an industry s technological firm size as the firm size implied by industrial specific production technologies including capital intensities and scale economies using cross industry cross country data the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms this suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications

expectations life expectancy and economic behavior this study analyzes responses to a questionnaire designed to elicit subjective expectations and probabilities of survival people do extrapolate past improvements in longevity when they determine their subjective horizons and they are fully aware of levels of and movements within todays life tables the subjective distribution has greater variance than its actuarial counterpart and the subjective variance decreases with age the implications of these findings for optimal social security for the construction of annuities for the analysis of savings behavior and for evaluating lifetime earnings are discussed the data were collected in the united states from a sample of 411 white male economists and a sample of 363 white males in a midwestern smsa excerpt

financial markets the pattern of industrial specialization and comparative advantage evidence from oecd countries due to underlying technological and organizational differences industries differ in their need for external finance since services provided by the financial sector are largely immobile across countries the pattern of industrial specialization should be influenced by the level of financial development among oecd countries we find a strong causal effect of the financial sector on industrial specialization further the financial sector is a source of comparative advantage in a way consistent with the hecksher ohlin vanek model results are also presented on which aspects of financial systems are important for specialization and comparative advantage

redistribution by insurance market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities we illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation we calibrate and solve a model of the united kingdom s compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender based pricing restrictions we find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous social security like annuity contracts our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis

health and mortality delta assessing the welfare cost of household insurance choice we develop a pair of risk measures health and mortality delta for the universe of life and health insurance products a life cycle model of insurance choice simplifies to replicating the optimal health and mortality delta through a portfolio of insurance products we estimate the model to explain the observed variation in health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of life insurance annuities including private pensions and long term care insurance in the health and retirement study for the median household aged 51 to 57 the lifetime welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal choice is 3 2 of total wealth

can higher prices stimulate product use evidence from a field experiment in zambia the controversy over how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests in part on whether higher prices can increase use either by targeting distribution to high use households a screening effect or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk cost effect we develop a methodology for separating these two effects we implement the methodology in a field experiment in zambia using door to door marketing of a home water purification solution we find evidence of economically important screening effects by contrast we find no consistent evidence of sunk cost effects jel c93 d12 i11 m31 o12

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

finance and trade a cross country empirical analysis on the impact of financial development and asset tangibility on international trade summary this paper investigates the interplay between financial development asset tangibility and international trade using industry level data on firms dependence on external finance and firms asset tangibility for 27 industries in 42 countries we find that economies with higher levels of financial development have higher export shares and trade balance in industries with more intangible assets using the same dataset we also show that the interplay between property rights protection and asset tangibility influences the pattern of trade higher levels of property rights protection lead to higher export shares and trade balance in industries with more intangible assets

separating moral hazard from adverse selection and learning in automobile insurance longitudinal evidence from france the identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature this paper performs tests of residual asymmetric information in the french automobile insurance market for the 1995 1997 period this market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experiencerating scheme bonus malus contract choices are strongly associated with the bonus malus of policyholders we have access to longitudinal survey data with dynamic information both on claims and accidents we propose a causality test to distinguish pathways through which a positive correlation arises between contract choice and accidents we find evidence of moral hazard among a sub group of policyholders with significant driving experience 5 15 years we distinguish this moral hazard estimate from adverse selection and learning policyholders with less experience have a combination of learning and moral hazard whereas no residual information problem is found for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience

advantageous selection in insurance markets this article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision risk tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk averse types taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients allowing a strict pareto gain this result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies as does the novel finding of a pure strategy partial pooling subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the insurance market copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

asymmetric information in insurance general testable implications several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard we show here that the positive correlationproperty can be extended to general setups competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public we test our results on a french dataset our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive they also suggest the presence of market power

do bad risks know it experimental evidence on optimism and adverse selection abstract subjects who overestimate their performance in experimental tasks unrelated to travel are less willing to insure against failing in the task and also less inclined to buy travel insurance this suggests intrinsic optimism influences insurance demand and diminishes adverse selection

employee choice of health insurance a new specification of health insurance plan choice is developed that uses a nonparametric functional form for the loss function used to evaluate insurance premiums and uncertain out of pocket expenditure the approach is implemented on data resulting from one firm s implementation of a new health plan with three distinct health insurance options health expenditure differences greater than 500 percent are observed indicating extremely strong biased selection plan choices are consistent with a convex loss function for small losses which suggests that consumers underweight high loss low probability outcomes relative to low loss high probability ones copyright 1989 by mit press

incentive compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums theoretical models of guaranteed renewable insurance display front loaded premium schedules such schedules both cover lifetime total claims of low risk and high risk individuals and provide an incentive for those who remain low risk to continue to purchase the policy questions have been raised of whether actual individual insurance markets in the us approximate the behavior predicted by these models both because young consumers may not be able to afford front loading and because insurers may behave strategically in ways that erode the value of protection against risk reclassification in this paper the optimal competitive age based premium schedule for a benchmark guaranteed renewable health insurance policy is estimated using medical expenditure data several factors are shown to reduce the amount of front loading necessary indeed the resulting optimal premium path increases with age actual premium paths exhibited by purchasers of individual insurance are close to the optimal renewable schedule we estimate finally consumer utility associated with the feature is examined

hospital utilization in mixed public private system evidence from australian hospital data this article investigates whether patients who used a mixture of private and public hospital care have higher total hospital utilization than those who exclusively used either public or private hospital care using australian hospital administrative data of heart disease patients we found that those who used a mixture of private and public care had the highest total hospital utilization our findings are robust to how utilization is measured and endogeneity between utilization and hospital type choice

declining job security this article defines and analyzes job security in the context of implicit contracts designed to overcome incentive problems in the employment relationship contracts of this nature generate predictions concerning the relationship between job security parameters such as worker seniority and sectoral economic conditions and the probability of separations to test these predictions i estimate binomial and multinomial models of job separations using panel study of income dynamics psid data for the years 1976 93 the results are consistent with a decline over time in the incentives to maintain existing employment relationships for male workers and for skilled white collar women

wealth as a determinant of comparative advantage abstract this paper shows that a country s wealth can be an important determinant of comparative advantage when access to credit differs across sectors of the economy wealthier nations exhibit a comparative advantage toward goods produced in sectors facing more severe financial imperfections these sectors are typically populated by small firms empirically this paper documents that these sectors are also labor intensive consequently this theory partially offsets traditional sources of comparative advantage and offers an explanation for trefler s missing trade mystery and the leontief paradox furthermore the theory makes the relation between trade and income distribution endogenous

financial dependence and growth revisited we revisit an earlier highly influential paper on financial dependence and growth by rajan and zingales 1998 we re examine their assumptions and the robustness of their results to alternative theories and interpretations we first show that they may be implicitly testing whether financial intermediaries allow firms to better respond to global shocks to growth opportunities rather than the extent that financial intermediaries allow firms to grow in industries with an inherent technological financial dependence we propose a more direct measure of growth opportunities if u s capital markets are perfect then actual growth in the u s is a good proxy for global growth opportunities we test this directly by including u s industry growth in rajan and zingales s original specification and find that our direct growth measure outperforms their financial dependence measure and is less vulnerable to controlling for outliers and level of development this still suggests an important role for finance in the allocation of resources but shifts the emphasis from financial dependence to global growth opportunities jel f3 g1 o4

unemployment vs mismatch of talents reconsidering unemployment benefits we develop an equilibrium search matching model with risk neutral agents and two sided ex ante heterogeneity unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment but also helps workers to get a suitable job we show through calibrations how the mere difference on unemployment insurance when countries experience a common skilled biased technological shock may result in differences in unemployment productivity growth and wage inequality these results are consistent with the contrasting performance of the labour market in europe and the united states in the last twenty five years the model is used to address some political economy issues

preference heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance the case of australia a basic prediction of theoretical models of insurance is that if consumers have private information about their risk of suffering a loss there will be a positive correlation between risk and the level of insurance coverage we test this prediction in the context of the market for private health insurance in australia despite a universal public system that provides comprehensive coverage for inpatient and outpatient care roughly half of the adult population also carries private health insurance the main benefit of which is more timely access to elective hospital treatment like several studies on different types of insurance in other countries we find no support for the positive correlation hypothesis because strict underwriting regulations create strong information asymmetries this result suggests the importance of multi dimensional private information additional analyses suggest that the advantageous selection observed in this market is driven by the effect of risk aversion the ability to make complex financial decisions and income

private information and insurance rejections across a wide set of nongroup insurance markets applicants are rejected based on observable often high risk characteristics this paper argues that private information held by the potential applicant pool explains rejections i formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk i first derive a new no trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections i then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no trade condition can explain rejections the methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents beliefs i apply this approach to three nongroup markets long term care disability and life insurance consistent with the predictions of the theory in all three settings i find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected i find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance and i show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected the results suggest that private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets publication abstract

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

family ties and the crowding out of long term care insurance insurance for long term care ltc has developed only moderately compared to other areas of welfare which has been explained variously as the result of market failures public misconceptions of the risk of ltc needs and intergenerational contracts this paper offers a cultural explanation for the limited ltc insurance development in europe it argues that family ties by enhancing informal care giving duties inhibit individuals expected public and private insurance coverage the empirical analysis of the paper exploits cross country and sub group variability of a representative database of european union member states containing records on ltc coverage and family structure drawing upon two measures of familistic culture or family ties we find a negative association between family ties and expected coverage of ltc for different sub samples these results are robust to a set of checks for different definitions of family ties and controls and for a sub sample of first and second generation migrants policy implications suggest that widespread expansion of ltc coverage might need to accommodate existing familistic cultural norms to avoid insurance crowding out

unemployment responses to skill biased technology shocks the role of labour market policy do skill biased shocks that increase the spread of labour productivities interacting with different policy regimes explain the rise in unemployment in europe relative to the united states in the 1980s and 1990s the hypothesis is an implication of a version of the mortensen and pissarides 1994 model of equilibrium unemployment which allows for worker heterogeneity a calibrated version of the model implies that a similar unemployment increase would have occurred in the united states over this period given changes in relative productivity by education implied by observed wage changes had unemployment compensation and employment protection policies been at european levels

moral hazard and selection among the poor evidence from a randomized experiment not only does economic theory predict high risk individuals to be more likely to purchase insurance but insurance coverage is also thought to crowd out precautionary activities in spite of stark theoretical predictions there is conflicting empirical evidence on adverse selection and evidence on ex ante moral hazard is very scarce using data from the seguro popular experiment in mexico this paper documents patterns of selection on observables into health insurance as well as the existence of non negligible ex ante moral hazard more specifically the findings indicate that i agents in poor self assessed health prior to the intervention have all else equal a higher propensity to take up insurance and ii insurance coverage reduces the demand for self protection in the form of preventive care curiously however individuals do not sort based on objective measures of their health

a matching model with endogenous skill requirements we consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements the distribution of worker abilities is exogenous but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms high skill jobs produce more output than low skill jobs but high skill jobs require high skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill we use a matching model together with a nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics wages and unemployment

institutional quality and international trade institutions quality of contract enforcement property rights shareholder protection and the like have received a great deal of attention in recent years yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes the purpose of this paper is twofold first we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modeled within the framework of incomplete contracts we show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply among other things that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade second we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade using data on us imports disaggregated by country and industry the empirical results provide evidence of institutional content of trade institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows

evidence on adverse selection equilibrium signaling and cross subsidization in the insurance market the configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system using contractual data from a representative insurer we estimate a reduced form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage the data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks

the impact of state tax subsidies for private long term care insurance on coverage and medicaid expenditures abstract in spite of the large expected costs of needing long term care only 10 12 of the elderly population has private insurance coverage medicaid which provides means tested public assistance and pays for almost half of long term care costs spends more than 100 billion annually on long term care in this paper i exploit variation in the adoption and generosity of state tax subsidies for private long term care insurance to determine whether tax subsidies increase private coverage and reduce medicaid s costs for long term care the results indicate that the average tax subsidy raises coverage rates by 2 7 percentage points or 28 however the response is concentrated among high income and asset rich individuals populations with low probabilities of relying on medicaid simulations suggest each dollar of state tax expenditure produces approximately 0 84 in medicaid savings over half of which funnels to the federal government

skill bias and employment frictions in the u s labor market 1970 1990 this article studies simultaneous changes in four labor market variables the unemployment rates for college and high school graduates the education wage premium and the level of college participation it develops an equilibrium search and matching model of the labor market where education is endogenously determined then the model is used to investigate quantitatively whether the change in the above labor market variables from 1970 to 1990 in the united states can be traced to changes in the environment a skill biased change in technology together with an increase in employment frictions can explain much of the observed variation in these variables

adverse selection in insurance markets policyholder evidence from the u k annuity market in this paper we investigate the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets we use a unique data set consisting of all annuity policies sold by a large u k insurance company since the early 1980s to analyze mortality differences among individuals who purchased different types of policies we find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity policy characteristics such as whether the annuity will make payments to the estate in the event of an untimely death and whether the payments from the annuity rise over time these mortality patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information in the annuity market we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences however across annuities of different size even though models of insurance market equilibrium with asymmetric information would predict such differences we also find that the pricing of various features of annuity contracts is consistent with the self selection patterns we find in mortality rates our results therefore suggest that selection may occur across many specific features of insurance contracts and that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others this highlights the importance of considering the detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information

an econometric analysis of the demand for private health insurance in england and wales this paper discusses the nature of demand for private health insurance in a health care market in which the consumer can neither opt out of tax payments for nor lose his entitlement to public health care a single equation econometric model of the demand for private health cover is estimated using the 1982 general household survey the results indicate that income and employment status are significant determinants of the probability of health insurance purchase

estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices we provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection we then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance such variation together with quantity data allows us to estimate the demand for insurance the same variation together with cost data allows us to estimate how insurers costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price the slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and the nature of selection and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare we illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employerprovided health insurance from one specific company we detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small in both absolute and relative terms

are the unemployed unemployable abstract this paper develops a matching model of the labor market under wage rigidity when hiring decisions are irreversible there are two types of workers the skilled and the unskilled the model is used to analyze whether technological advances may have increased unemployment it is shown that it is likely to be so if they are associated with an increase in the productivity and or the supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers these effects are stronger when hiring decisions are more irreversible

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

an empirical examination of information barriers to trade in insurance this paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world life insurance we report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information we conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market as in those for most other products

are risk preferences stable across contexts evidence from insurance data using a unique dataset we test whether households deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household coverage specific poisson processes we find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data our analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions jel d11 d83

optimal mandates and the welfare cost of asymmetric information evidence from the u k annuity market much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected once detected however there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs to do so we develop a model of annuity contract choice and estimate it using data from the u k annuity market the model allows for private information about mortality risk as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options we focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities the results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first best symmetric information benchmark by about 127 million per year or about 2 percent of annuitized wealth we also find that by requiring that individuals choose the longest guarantee period allowed mandates could achieve the first best allocation however we estimate that other mandated guarantee lengths would have detrimental effects on welfare since determining the optimal mandate is empirically difficult our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest

paying for health insurance the trade off between competition and adverse selection we use data on health plan choices by employees of harvard university to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection moving to a voucher type system induced significant adverse selection with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending but increased competition reduced harvard s premiums by 5 to 8 percent the premium reductions came from insurer profits so while harvard was better off the net effect for society was only the adverse selection loss adverse selection can be minimized by adjusting voucher amounts for individual risk we discuss how such a system would work governments are increasingly turning to market forces as a way to limit the cost of social insurance traditionally social insurance programs were operated as nonmarket goods governments mandated participation in a central program collected revenues to finance the program and ran the insurance system there was no role for competition among suppliers in providing the basic benefit as the costs of social insurance have increased however the centralized model of social insurance is coming under increasing strain in the united states for example recent proposals have called for replacing the medicare program with a health care voucher for the elderly aaron and reischauer 1995 cutler 1996 the voucher would guarantee people a basic insurance plan but the plans would be privately run competition among plans would generate plan premiums and enrollments similarly longstanding proposals for social security reform have called for replacing the current system with a system of individual accounts where people would make saving investment and annuitization decisions on their own advisory council on social security 1996 feldstein 1996 the trend is not just domestic in the united kingdom the national health service has moved to encourage more competition in recent years with the establishment of hospital trusts that bid for patients and partially fixed payments to physicians

the importance of adverse selection in the credit card market evidence from randomized trials of credit card solicitations analyzing unique data from multiple large scale randomized marketing trials of preapproved credit card solicitations by a large financial institution we find that consumers responding to the lender s inferior solicitation offers have poorer credit quality attributes this finding supports the argument that riskier type borrowers are liquidity or credit constrained and thus have higher reservation loan interest rates we also find a more severe deterioration ex post in the credit quality of the booked accounts of inferior offer types relative to superior offers after controlling for a cardholder s observable risk attributes demographic characteristics and adverse economic shocks we find that cardholders who responded to the inferior credit card offers are significantly more likely to default ex post our results provide evidence on the importance of adverse selection effects in the credit card market

enrollee mix treatment intensity and cost in competing indemnity and hmo plans abstract why do indemnity insurance plans cost substantially more per capita 77 more in our study than hmos we answer this question using data from a large organization s insurance pool covering 215 000 lives we decompose cost differences for eight major medical conditions into four sources demographics incidence within demographic groups treatment intensity and prices per service greater incidence of disease in the indemnity plan both from demographics themselves and within demographic groups and higher prices each explain nearly 50 of the difference contrary to conventional wisdom indemnity plans do not have greater treatment intensity

the interaction of public and private insurance medicaid and the long term care insurance market a long tradition in public finance examines how public programs can crowd out private activ ity in areas as diverse as education savings and insurance among others these studies typi cally focus on aggregate economic implications particularly for government expenditures and national savings in this paper we demonstrate that crowd out can also have an important effect on individual welfare specifically we show that the provision of even very incomplete public insurance can crowd out more comprehensive private policies by imposing a large implicit tax on private insurance benefits thus potentially increasing overall risk exposure for individuals we examine the interaction of public and private insurance for one of the largest uninsured financial risks facing the elderly in the united states long term care expenditures at 135 bil lion in 2004 long term care expenditures represented over 8 5 percent of total health expendi tures or all ages or roughly 1 2 percent of gdp moreover real long term care expenditures are projected to triple over the next 35 years due to rising medical costs and the aging of the baby boomers only 10 percent of the elderly however have any private long term care insurance and one third of expenditures are paid for out of pocket congressional budget office cbo 1999 cbo 2004 brown and finkelstein 2007 one potential explanation for the small size of the private market is that the public insurance provided by medicaid may crowd out demand for private insurance medicaid was designed to provide long term care insurance for the poor elderly mark v pauly 1989 1990 has established the qualitative result that as an incomplete but publicly funded source of long term care insur ance medicaid has the potential to reduce substantially demand for private long term care insur ance even among the nonpoor our work builds on this insight by quantifying the magnitude of medicaid s crowd out effect and the incomplete nature of medicaid coverage we also illustrate the mechanism behind medicaid s crowd out effect and are therefore able to assess the likely impact of alternative policies on private insurance demand we develop a utility based model of a 65 year old risk averse individual who chooses an opti mal intertemporal consumption path in the presence of uncertainty about long term care expen ditures we calibrate the model using data on the distribution of long term care expenditure risk common state medicaid rules and the prices and coverage of typical private long term care insurance policies

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

dynamic inefficiencies in insurance markets evidence from long term care insurance we examine whether unregulated private insurance markets efficiently provide insurance against reclassification risk the risk of becoming a bad risk and facing higher premiums to do so we examine the ex post risk type of individuals who drop their long term care insurance contracts relative to those who are continually insured consistent with dynamic inefficiencies we find that individuals who drop coverage are of lower risk ex post than individuals who were otherwise equivalent at the time of purchase but who do not drop out of their contracts these findings suggest that dynamic market failures in private insurance markets can preclude the efficient provision of insurance against reclassification risk this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

factor proportions and relative wages the supply side determinants of wage inequality supply side factors may contribute to rising wage inequality first certain changes in the supply of skills allegedly exacerbate wage inequality women s increased labor force participation and increased immigration are the leading candidates both allegedly reduce the wages of less skilled men however immigration s impact on wage inequality has been minor and the effects of women s participation is inconclusive second in evaluating the likelihood that human capital investment will mitigate future inequality evidence suggests that rising returns to education have increased the proportion of young people attending college limiting the growth of inequality among high wage workers

changing consequences of job separation in the united states using the panel study of income dynamics the author examines the consequences of job loss between the periods 1976 81 and 1986 91 he finds stability in the overall incidence of job separation but a statistically significant increase in the incidence of involuntary job loss relative to quits for older workers he also finds that the consequences of involuntary job loss worsened the reemployment rate of workers who experienced involuntary job loss dropped from 67 in 1976 81 to 62 in 1986 91 and among those who found new jobs the odds of receiving a large wage cut rose from 9 in 1976 81 to 17 in 1986 91

competitive insurance markets with two unobservables i study a screening game in a competitive insurance market in which insurance customers differ with respect to both accident probability and degree of risk aversion it is shown that indifference curves of customers may cross twice thus the single crossing property does not hold when differences in risk aversion are sufficiently large firms cannot use policy deductibles to screen high risk customers types may be pooled in equilibrium or are separated by raising premiums above actuarially fair levels this leads to excessive entry of firms in equilibrium