global warming technological change and trade in carbon energy challenge or threat is it possible to combat global climate change through north to south technology transfer even without a global climate treaty or do carbon leakage and the rebound effect imply that it is possible to take advantage of technological improvements under the umbrella of a global arrangement only for answering these questions two possible states of the world are discussed one where more energy efficient technologies are transferred unconditionally from the north to the south and where regions do not cooperate in the solution of the global climate problem but unilaterally decide on climate policies and technology transfers one where the north to south technology transfer is tied to the requirement that the south in some way contributes to the solution of the global climate problem rebound and leakage effects hinder a sustainable and welfare improving solution of the climate problem

cores of inventory centralization games abstract consider a set of n stores with single item and single period demands assume an option of centralized ordering and inventory with holding and penalty costs only in this case a cooperative inventory centralization game defines allocations of the cost we examine the conditions under which such an inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we prove the existence of nonempty core for demands with symmetric distributions and the existence of nonempty core for joint multivariate normal demand distribution we establish the equivalency of four different nonempty core conditions for the newsboy problem and demonstrate their efficacy for discrete independent and identically distributed iid demands journal of economic literature classification numbers c44 c62 c71

advantageous reallocations a constructive example this note shows how to construct smooth examples of a phenomenon noted by gale in which a pair of agents make themselves better off at the expense of a third agent by reallocating their own endowments walrasian stability prevails

network models and financial stability abstract systemic risk is a key concern for central banks charged with safeguarding overall financial stability in this paper we investigate how systemic risk is affected by the structure of the financial system we construct banking systems that are composed of a number of banks that are connected by interbank linkages we then vary the key parameters that define the structure of the financial system including its level of capitalisation the degree to which banks are connected the size of interbank exposures and the degree of concentration of the system and analyse the influence of these parameters on the likelihood of knock on defaults first we find that the better capitalised banks are the more resilient is the banking system against contagious defaults and this effect is non linear second the effect of the degree of connectivity is non monotonic i e initially a small increase in connectivity increases the contagion effect but after a certain threshold value connectivity improves the ability of a banking system to absorb shocks third the size of interbank liabilities tends to increase the risk of knock on default even if banks hold capital against such exposures fourth more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic risk all else equal in an extension to the main analysis we study how liquidity effects interact with banking structure to produce a greater chance of systemic breakdown we finally consider how the risk of contagion might depend on the degree of asymmetry tiering inherent in the structure of the banking system a number of our results have important implications for public policy which this paper also draws out

financial markets and growth the last five years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth this issue had been extensively studied nearly two decades earlier by goldsmith 1969 mckinnon 1973 shaw 1973 and others who produced considerable evidence that financial development correlates with growth but their work though insightful lacked analytical foundations in traditional growth theory financial intermediation could be related to the level of the capital stock per worker or to the level of productivity but not to their respective growth rates the latter were ascribed to exogenous technical progress the recent revival of interest in the link between financial development and growth stems mainly from the insights and techniques of endogenous growth models which have shown that there can be self sustaining growth without exogenous technical progress and that the growth rate can be related to preferences technology income distribution and institutional arrangements this provides the theoretical underpinning that early contributors lacked tinancial intermediation can be shown to have not only level effects but also growth effects the resulting models have offered important insights into the effect of financial development on growth and vice versa they have also provided new impetus to empirical research on these issues this paper reviews the ground covered so far on the theoretical and empirical front and points to some still unresolved issues

collaborative replenishment in the presence of intermediaries in complex supply chains downstream buyers would often replenish individually from intermediaries instead of directly dealing with original manufacturers although collaborative replenishment from intermediaries might generate benefits significant cost reductions could be achieved when direct replenishments from manufacturers are considered this paper constructs a general model to study collaborative replenishment in multi product chains with alternative sources of supply i e manufacturers and intermediaries a collaborative organization determines the optimal choices of replenishment sources on behalf of its members to minimize collective costs we introduce a class of cooperative games associated with these situations and give sufficient conditions for their concavity we investigate the choice of allocation rule and its effect on supply chain efficiency when buyers strategically participate in the collaborative organization we prove that the shapley value coordinates the supply chain i e it makes complete participation the best strategy for buyers even under asymmetric information this setting is compared with an alternative structure where buyers can only collaborate in source specific replenishment organizations that purchase all requested products either from intermediaries or manufacturers although there are always participation strategies that result in minimum collective cost it is impossible to find allocation rules for source specific replenishment organizations that always motivate the buyers to choose such strategies

foreign ownership and the theory of trade and welfare some standard topics in the theory of international trade are reconsidered in this paper by distinguishing between national and aggregate income when fixed supplies of foreign inputs are present within the home country under conditions that would ensure a national welfare gain if foreign ownership were absent international transfer economic growth or tariff policy might cause a national welfare loss in the presence of foreign ownership the techniques developed could be applied to other domestic distinctions such as those based on race sex age or ethnicity and to the theory of customs unions in a three country world

borrowing constraints human capital accumulation and growth abstract borrowing constraints increase aggregate savings and therefore may increase growth this paper argues however that by reducing human capital accumulation borrowing constraints also have negative effects on growth these effects are discussed in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth empirical evidence for oecd and developing countries lend support to the main predictions of the model

the newsvendor game has a nonempty core we settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game we prove that its core is always non empty for all possible joint distributions of the random demands we give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non negative elements

who should abate carbon emission we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 4 the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these condition are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

financial contagion and attention allocation this paper explains financial contagion between two stock markets with uncorrelated fundamentals by fluctuations in international investors attention allocation we model the process of attention allocation that underlies portfolio investment in international markets using investors who face information processing constraints investors optimally allocate more attention to a region hit by a financial crisis to the detriment of other markets the resulting endogenous increase in uncertainty causes a reduction in the capacity to bear risks by international investors that induces them to liquidate their positions in all risky assets hence there is a collapse in stock prices around the world we show that the degree of non anticipation of a crisis is crucial for the existence of contagion using data from the east asian crisis and the number of news stories about thailand in the financial times relative to news stories about argentina brazil and chile as a proxy for the relative attention allocated to the asian stock market we find evidence consistent with two key predictions of our model first the higher the volatility of the originator market the more relative attention allocated to this market and second the more relative attention allocated to the originator market the higher the volatility of the other markets our findings support the attention reallocation channel as a transmission mechanism of financial crises between regions during the period from january 1997 to july 1998

magnitude and direction of technological transfers for mitigating ghg emissions this paper discusses the issues of technological transfers aimed at reducing ghg mitigation costs under various assumptions in a new version of rice model we introduce technological transfer mechanism that donors monetary transfers go to recipients ghg mitigation through such transfer mechanism we examine the relationships between magnitude direction of transfers and choice of social welfare weights in the model our simulations show that different social welfare weights may lead to significant shifts on magnitudes even directions of technological transfers the results suggest that proposing policies of technological transfers should be mindful of distributional aspects and modeling assumptions

uniqueness and indeterminacy on the dynamics of endogenous growth abstract in this paper we study the dynamics of endogenous growth both in the model of lucas and in a generalization that incorporates a labor leisure choice we characterize the regions of the parameter space that give rise to unique equilibria as well as the regions that yield a continuum of equilibria with positive growth rates we find that such multiple equilibria exist for empirically very plausible parameters in particular when the lucas model is modified to incorporate endogenous labor journal of economic literature numbers e00 e3 o40

pattern formation spatial externalities and regulation in coupled economic ecological systems abstract we study the management of ecosystems in which interacting state variables that are affected by management decisions diffuse in space we study pattern formation first in a setting where economic agents maximize myopic profits and ignore spillovers onto agents at other sites and second in the context of a social planner who internalizes these spillovers we compare patterns under these two institutions and study how the differences in the patterns generated by these two institutions impact the design of regulatory schemes to internalize the externalities at the same time we introduce new methods based on fourier series type decompositions that enable us to turn an intractable infinite dimensional optimal control problem into a countable number of finite dimensional optimal control problems as far as we know these methods are new to the economics literature our theory is applied to the management and regulation of a semi arid system

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

the cost allocation problem for the first order interaction joint replenishment model we consider an infinite horizon deterministic joint replenishment problem with first order interaction under this model the setup transportation reorder cost associated with a group of retailers placing an order at the same time equals some group independent major setup cost plus retailer dependent minor setup costs in addition each retailer is associated with a retailer dependent holding cost rate the structure of optimal replenishment policies is not known thus research has focused on optimal power of two pot policies following this convention we consider the cost allocation problem of an optimal pot policy among the various retailers for this sake we define a characteristic function that assigns to any subset of retailers the average time total cost of an optimal pot policy for replenishing the retailers in the subset under the assumption that these are the only existing retailers we show that the resulting transferable utility cooperative game with this characteristic function is concave in particular it is a totally balanced game namely this game and any of its subgames have nonempty core sets finally we give an example for a core allocation and prove that there are infinitely many core allocations

pooling of spare parts between multiple users how to share the benefits companies that maintain capital goods e g airplanes or power plants often face high costs both for holding spare parts and due to downtime of their technical systems these costs can be reduced by pooling common spare parts between multiple companies in the same region but managers may be unsure about how to share the resulting costs or benefits in a fair way that avoids free riders to tackle this problem we study several players each facing a poisson demand process for an expensive low usage item they share a stock point that is controlled by a continuous review base stock policy with full backordering under an optimal base stock level costs consist of penalty costs for backorders and holding costs for on hand stock we propose to allocate the total costs proportional to players demand rates our key result is that this cost allocation rule satisfies many appealing properties it makes all separate participants and subgroups of participants better off it stimulates growth of the pool it can be easily implemented in practice and it induces players to reveal their private information truthfully to obtain these game theoretical results we exploit novel structural properties of the cost function in our s 1 s inventory model

international cooperation on climate friendly technologies we examine international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on emission reductions we show that without any r d cooperation r d in each country should be increased beyond the non cooperative level if i the technology level in one country is positively affected by r d in other countries ii the domestic carbon tax is lower than the pigovian level or iii the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement we also show that a second best technology agreement has higher r d higher emissions or both compared with the first best outcome the second best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no international r d cooperation further when the price of carbon is the same in the second best technology agreement and in the case without r d cooperation welfare is highest r d is highest and emissions are lowest in the second best r d agreement

modeling financial contagion using mutually exciting jump processes we propose a model to capture the dynamics of asset returns with periods of crises that are characterized by contagion in the model a jump in one region of the world increases the intensity of jumps both in the same region self excitation as well as in other regions cross excitation generating episodes of highly clustered jumps across world markets that mimic the observed features of the data we develop and implement moment based estimation and testing procedures for this model the estimates provide evidence of self excitation both in the us and the other world markets and of asymmetric cross excitation with the us market typically having more influence on the jump intensity of other markets than the reverse we propose filtered values of the jump intensities as a measure of market stress and examine their out of sample forecasting abilities

information contagion and bank herding we show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks when bank loan returns have a common systematic factor the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor the increase in a bank s cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality in addition to the systematic risk factor hence banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives

stocking decisions for low usage items in a multilocation inventory system this research shows that organizations with a number of sister plants warehouses or other stocking points can profit from the concept of proactive use of transshipments as an element of their inventory control policy for certain types of parts employing transshipments can significantly reduce the total inventory needed throughout the entire collection of stocking points the study is motivated by a real life situation involving a large utility company having 29 power generating plants in five southeastern states where there are thousands of parts that are commonly used at multiple plants at present each plant operates independently and maintains enough stock to meet its own requirements transshipments take place between plants whenever there is an emergency requirement for a part but no explicit consideration is given to this effect while deciding on stocking levels at different plants in the case we examined by setting stocking levels to explicitly take account of transshipments total system cost could be reduced by about 70 over the company s decentralized policy in general this work considers a single echelon n location continuous review inventory system in which complete pooling of stock is permitted among the locations a model is developed for slow moving expensive and consumable parts that are common to two or more locations a one for one ordering policy and queueing theory allow development and solution of a system of equations for the probability distribution of net inventory at each location a heuristic procedure is also developed to determine cost effective stocking levels actual data from the utility company are used to demonstrate the applicability of the model savings achieved as a result of pooling are reported

indeterminacy and increasing returns abstract we investigate properties of the one sector growth model with increasing returns under two organizational structures capable of reconciling the existence of aggregate increasing returns with competitive behavior by firms the first involves input externalities the second involves monopolistic competition we show for parameters in close accord with recent literature on real business cycles that the model displays an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate a model of business fluctuations driven by self fulfilling beliefs in our first class of models growth is generated by exogenous increases in factor productivity in the second class the marginal product of capital is large enough for endogenous growth journal of economic literature classification numbers e00 e3 o40

who should abate carbon emissions an international viewpoint abstract we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 1993b the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these conditions are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

systemic risk financial contagion and financial fragility abstract although it is hard to arrive at a widely accepted definition for systemic risk it is generally acknowledged that it is the risk of the occurrence of an event that threatens the well functioning of the system of interest financial payments banking etc sometimes to the point of making its operation impossible we model systemic risk with two main components a random shock that weakens one or more financial institutions and a transmission mechanism which transmits and possibly exacerbates such negative effects to the rest of the system our model could be conceptually represented by a network already described in previous works in this work we show how is possible to estimate the distribution of losses for the banking system with our model additionally we show how it is possible to separate the distribution of losses into two components the losses incurred by the initial shock and the losses resulting from the contagion process finally once the distribution is estimated we can derive standard risk measures for the system as a whole another important contribution of this work is that we can follow the evolution of certain risk measures like the expected loss or the cvar in order to evaluate if the system is becoming more or less risky in fact more or less fragile additionally we can decompose the distribution of losses of the whole banking system into the systemic and the contagion elements and we can determine if the system is more prone to experience contagious difficulties during a certain period of time

population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility abstract an allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to allocate the worth of every coalition it is population monotonic if each player s payoff increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger we show that essentially a game has a population monotonic allocation scheme pmas if and only if it is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple games with veto control a dual characterization is also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a pmas include convexity and increasing average marginal contributions if the game is convex its extended shapley value is a pmas classification number 026

stability analysis of financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios abstract common asset holdings are widely believed to have been the primary vector of contagion in the recent financial crisis we develop a network approach to the amplification of financial contagion due to the combination of overlapping portfolios and leverage and we show how it can be understood in terms of a generalized branching process this can be used to compute the stability for any particular configuration of portfolios by studying a stylized model we estimate the circumstances under which systemic instabilities are likely to occur as a function of parameters such as leverage market crowding diversification and market impact although diversification may be good for individual institutions it can create dangerous systemic effects and as a result financial contagion gets worse with too much diversification there is a critical threshold for leverage below it financial networks are always stable and above it the unstable region grows as leverage increases note that our model assumes passive portfolio management during a crisis however we show that dynamic deleveraging during a crisis can amplify instabilities the financial system exhibits robust yet fragile behavior with regions of the parameter space where contagion is rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs our model and methods of analysis can be calibrated to real data and provide simple yet powerful tools for macroprudential stress testing

cooperative interconnection settlement among isps through nap abstract this paper studies the settlement problem among internet service providers isps who interconnect with each other through network access point nap a cooperative game framework is adopted for the analysis two commonly adopted allocations i e the non settlement profit allocation and the shapley value based profit allocation are analyzed and compared we check whether these two allocations can encourage isps to interconnect with each other i e in the core of the game and at the same time demonstrate fairness in settlement our results show that the non settlement allocation is not in the core and does not preserve fairness and the shapley value based profit allocation is in the core and demonstrates fairness however the complex structure of shapley value makes it difficult to understand for isps and hard to be implemented at nap especially when isps can only make their pricing decisions independently therefore we propose a characterized profit allocation cpa which is in the core preserves fairness and is easy to interpret we further propose a settlement rule based on cpa which enables the isps to act independently but achieve global optimality we also extend our basic model to incorporate interconnection quality decisions and market competition and show that the proposed settlement rule and its extended form work well in these scenarios numerical experiments confirm that cpa and its corresponding settlement rule can effectively encourage interconnection among isps and motivate isps to expand their networks

production growth and business cycles ii new directions abstract this paper outlines new directions for investigations of real business cycle models consideration of stochastic growth of exogenous and endogenous forms analysis of suboptimal outcomes arising due to externalities of distorting taxes and implications of labor market heterogeneity

equilibrium and optimality some imprints of david gale abstract the paper is a review of some of the themes to which david gale made lasting contributions it touches upon a number of the fundamental issues in the walrasian equilibrium theory existence uniqueness and stability the overlapping generations model non optimality and indeterminacy of competitive equilibria the von neumann equilibrium as a turnpike and in the theory of decentralized intertemporal allocation through competitive prices efficiency and golden rules duality and existence of optimal programs

adaptation for mitigation this paper develops a two region north and south dynamic model in which regional stocks of effective labor are negatively influenced by the global stock of pollution by characterizing the equilibrium strategy of each region we show that the regions best responses can be strategic complements through a dynamic complementarity effect the model is then used to analyze the impact of adaptation assistance from north to south it is shown that north s unilateral assistance to south thus enhancing south s adaptation capacity can facilitate pollution mitigation in both regions especially when the assistance is targeted at labor protection pollution might increase in the short run but in the long run the level of pollution will decline the adaptation assistance we propose is incentive compatible and pareto improving

the welfare effects of targeted export subsidies a general equilibrium approach a three country model of export subsidies is developed with an exporter an importer and a neutral country which can act on either side of the market when the neutral country is an exporter the country offering a targeted export subsidy always suffers a welfare loss however when the neutral country is an importer the possibility of a paradoxical result that the subsidizing country can gain and the subsidized country can lose is shown to exist and the conditions under which this result occurs are derived the model fails to provide justification on national welfare grounds for widespread use of targeted export subsidies such as the export enhancement program

foreign aid and public goods abstract most less developed countries ldcs use foreign economic aid to finance public consumption goods or public intermediate inputs this paper constructs a two country general equilibrium trade model where an income transfer that takes place between the two countries is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption good within this framework the paper identifies the conditions under which the income transfer improves or deteriorates the donor country s terms of trade and shows that the transfer can be welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient country the paper also demonstrates that the transfer can raise reduce world welfare in which case a welfare increase decrease in both the donor and the recipient country is possible

climate treaties and breakthrough technologies an effective climate change treaty must promote the joint supply of two global public goods climate change mitigation and knowledge of new technologies that can lower mitigation costs r d is especially needed to bring about substantial long term reductions in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases for this will require the development and diffusion of revolutionary breakthrough technologies martin i hoffert et al 2002 in principle such an outcome could be realized by the kyoto protocol approach if that agreement were strengthened over time however that response may be inadequate kyoto makes no provision for r d and as i shall demonstrate unlikely to succeed can a treaty system relying directly on targeted r d and the adoption of breakthrough technologies perform better in this same setting of anarchic international relations i will show that as a general rule the answer is no essentially the same forces that undermine kyoto also challenge the r d and technology approach there is one exception to this rule r d leading to breakthrough technologies exhibiting increasing returns can improve dramatically on the kyoto approach even when these technologies are otherwise inferior to the alternatives available this suggests that our approach to treaty design should be strategic

liquidity coinsurance moral hazard and financial contagion we study the propagation of financial crises between regions characterized by moral hazard problems the source of the problem is that banks are protected by limited liability and may engage in excessive risk taking the regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks so that liquidity coinsurance is pareto improving the moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized under autarky a limited investment is needed to achieve optimality so that a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk taking with interbank deposits the optimal investment increases and capital becomes insufficient to prevent excessive risk taking thus bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crises spread to other regions via the financial linkages opening the financial markets is nevertheless pareto improving consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance although they pay the cost of excessive risk taking finally we show that in this framework a completely connected deposit structure is more conducive to financial crises than an incompletely connected structure

credit markets with differences in abilities education distribution and growth this article presents an endogenous growth model in which credit markets affect time allocation of individuals with different educational abilities credit markets allow the more able to specialize in studying and the less able to specialize in working this specialization can increase growth and welfare this article also shows that in economies with high low levels of education abilities the opening of credit markets induces a more disperse equal income distribution the role of intergenerational transfers in overcoming the absence of credit markets is also discussed as well as other forms of credit markets imperfections

trade spatial separation and the environment we develop a simple two sector dynamic model to show how pollution can provide a motive for trade by spatially separating incompatible industries we assume that the production of smokestack manufactures generates pollution which lowers the prod uctivity of an environmentally sensitive sector farming two identical unregulated countries will gain from trade if the share of world income spent on smokestack goods is high in contrast when the share of world income spent on the dirty good is low trade can usher in a negatively reinforcing process of environmental degradation and real income loss for the exporter of smokestack goods 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

do multinationals deteriorate developing countries export prices the impact of fdi on net barter terms of trade this paper explores the economic relationship between foreign direct investment fdi to developing countries and the export prices of the latter measured by terms of trade it is rst shown that economic theory suggests such a relationship for various reasons but is inconclusive about the direction of the eect to address this open issue empirically i analyze data on more than 50 developing countries throughout the period 1980 2008 using robust dynamic panel data methods the results show that fdi had an economically relevant and statistically signicant positive impact on developing countries net barter terms of trade a higher level of education in the developing country fosters this eect

international redistribution of income summary how do international policies on aid trade and factor movements affect the international distribution of income we calculate the impact by world decile of the actual level of aid flows and the effect on income of merchandise trade restrictions by high income countries we find that aid s distributional impact is equality enhancing extremely small in terms of changes in inequality measures but of some importance for the lowest decile of the distribution we also find that some of this impact is counteracted by lost potential income in the lower deciles from merchandise trade barriers imposed by high income countries

the incentives for north south transfer of climate mitigation technologies with trade in polluting goods the need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations little progress has however been made as shown by article 10 of the paris agreement one reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets this paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions the north and the south and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market to analyze the north s incentives to accept technology transfer results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation when both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non cooperatively inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the north to accept the transfer in contrast when governments set quotas cooperatively the north has no incentive to share its technology either before or after the agreement technology transfer commitments may be included in the agreement but with no effect on global emissions and global surplus the only impacts are distributional technology transfers and side payments may be substitute instruments

effects of technology transfers on the provision of public goods in this paper we examine the viability ofcooperative policies oriented to the resolution oftransboundary pollution problems using the theory ofprivate provision of public goods in a two countrymodel we analyze the effects on economic welfare ofvoluntary technological transfers oriented to reducingthe emission of pollutants

financial contagion and economic development an epidemiological approach abstract we develop an epidemiological approach to analyze how financial contagion may affect and be affected by economic activity we show that according to specific parameter values the economy may converge either to a non speculative or to a speculative equilibrium in the former situation the level of per capita income is maximal while in the latter it is reduced by financial contagion the presence of economic and financial feedback effects may also give rise to macroeconomic fluctuations during the transitional path clearly showing that such economic and financial links are an important driver of the short run macroeconomic performance by extending the analysis to a spatial dimension we also show that financial contagion in some specific region may propagate quickly also in regions far away from those in which the contagion initially occurs highlighting the role of regional policy coordination to avoid interregional contagion

immiserizing transfers from abroad abstract this paper shows that an international transfer payment may paradoxically immiserize the recipient country or increase the donor country s welfare even when world markets are stable despite the traditional view that such a paradox theoretically requires market instability to demonstrate this paradoxical possibility the paper extends the conventional trade theoretic analysis to admit exogenous distortions created by tax cum subsidies in domestic production or endogenous distortions due to additionality requirements imposed by the donor on the recipient this analysis of immiserizing transfers from abroad immediately suggests significant implications for important policy issues including the evaluation of real benefits from foreign aid

negotiating free trade we develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once we show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome leading to worldwide free trade a model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection global free trade is not achieved when the political economy motive for protection is sufficiently large furthermore the model generates both building bloc and stumbling bloc effects of preferential trade agreements in particular we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form a building bloc effect and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden a stumbling bloc effect the analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges