an empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures abstract models of government formation processes in multi party democracies are usually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs i e the parties selected to propose a potential government the theoretical literature has focused on two selection rules selection proportional to seat share and selection in order of seat share in this paper we use a new data set on government formations in 11 parliamentary democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data we find that while there is little empirical support for selection in order of seat share proportional selection fits the data well however we also find that a simple alternative that combines the insights of the two selection rules outperforms both of them in their ability to explain the data

where do markets come from production markets have two sides producers are a fully connected clique transacting with buyers as a separate but aggregated clique each producer is a distinctive firm with a distinctive product each side continually monitors reactions of the other through the medium of a joint social construction the schedule of terms of trade each producer is guided in choice of volume by the tangible outcomes of other producers not by speculation on hypothetical reactions of buyers to its actions each producer acts purely on self interest based on observed actions of all others summarized through a feedback process the summary is the terms of trade schedule which reduces to constant price only in limiting cases the market emerges as a structure of roles with a differentiated niche for each firm explicit formulae both for firms and for market aggregates are obtained by comparative statics methods for one family of assumptions about cost structures and about buyers evaluations of differentiated products not just any set of firms can sustain terms of trade with any set of buyers there prove to be three main kinds of markets and three sorts of market failure within a parameter space that is specified in detail one sort of market paradox has a madison avenue flavor another is more conventional grind and a third crowded is a new form not included in any existing theory of markets current american industrial markets are drawn on for 20 illustrations of which three are presented in some detail inequality in firms market shares measured by gini coefficients is discussed

electric power sector reform liberalization models and electric power prices in developing countries an empirical analysis using international panel data this study aims to clarify whether the effects of electric power sector reforms should be different either across regions or between developing and developed countries an empirical model was analyzed to observe the impact of electric power prices on the selection of a liberalization model in the power sector this was achieved by the use of an ordered response fixed effect and a random effect model an instrument variable technique was also used to estimate the impact of the liberalization model on the electric power price this technique addressed the problems of simultaneity bias between the electric power price and the liberalization models selected these econometric models were designed using panel data from 78 countries in four regions developed countries asian developing countries the former soviet union and eastern europe and latin america for the period from 1985 to 2003 the research findings suggest that higher electricity prices are one of the driving forces for governments to adopt liberalization models however the development of liberalization models in the power sector does not necessarily reduce electricity prices in fact contrary to expectations there was a tendency for the price to rise in every market modeled

party system institutionalization and government formation in new democracies party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment stability in party systems ensures the presence of regularities that can be observed in government formation but most empirical research focuses on established democracies in new democracies party systems are less institutionalized which means that interactions between parties can be unpredictable and has significant implications for coalition formation this article presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design comparable to that of the leading research on western europe the author uses a new data set of potential coalitions in central and eastern europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized the results show first that incumbency is a disadvantage for governments in new democracies when formation occurs postelection this disadvantage is due to high levels of electoral volatility caused by policy failure and clientelistic practices incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place midterm as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative second the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition instead programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities and third established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation a possible indicator that a party system is becoming more institutionalized the article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions

firms fdi ownership the influence of government ownership and legislative connections the level of ownership in an overseas subsidiary has been an important issue in international business existing literature based on transaction cost theory predicts that firms prefer higher ownership for subsidiaries located in favorable foreign institutional environments we propose two moderating factors to this prediction governments as owners of firms and firms legislative connections we hypothesized that the level of subsidiary ownership was less affected by the heterogeneity of foreign institutional environments for firms with a higher level of government ownership and for firms with legislative connections these two interaction effects were tested using a sample of overseas subsidiaries documented in the 2010 annual reports of listed chinese firms the empirical findings provide robust support for the hypothesized effects this study offers fresh insight on the role of government and political factors in firms internationalization activities

the effect of power distribution privatization on electricity prices in turkey has liberalization served the purpose various electricity reforms have been adopted by a number of countries within the last 2 decades turkey as one of those countries has restructured its electricity market and intensively privatized the distribution companies as one of the main targets of the liberalization efforts in the sector was announced to be reduced consumer prices it is a matter of interest to look at the related developments after privatizations hence this study attempts to explore the impact of power distribution privatization in turkey on the national end user electricity prices results of the analysis suggest that privatization of electricity distribution companies has not yielded the expected retail price declines within the first 4 years of the program whereas wholesale tariffs exhibit a reduction in the rate of 10 retail tariffs show an increase of 5 9 within the period in question besides the unstable patterns of the two tariffs imply that the market is not yet ready for the automatic pricing mechanism planned to be implemented based on a cost reflective methodology therefore results indicate that the factors behind the unsatisfactory outcomes of the program should be explored in order for the privatization efforts in the turkish electricity distribution market to serve the purpose

the social structure of a national securities market in this article a national securities market the stock options market is characterized as a social structure represented by the networks of actors who traded options on the floor of a major securities exchange trading among actors exhibited distinct social structural patterns that dramatically affected the direction and magnitude of option price volatility the argument that this market is socially structured is constructed in four parts behavioral assumptions about the nature of economic actors models of micronetworks models of macronetworks and price consequences in the ideal typical model of the market actors are assumed to be hyperrational and never to act opportunistically with these behavioral assumptions the micronetworks of actors should be expansive a condition which would result in undifferentiated and homogeneous macronetworks such macronetworks would tend to reduce the volatility of option prices but in the empirical market studied here actors are subject to bounded rationality a

investment security of supply and sustainability in the aftermath of three decades of power sector reform the last three decades have witnessed many electricity industry reform processes in more than half of the countries in the world the reforms have aimed inter alia at encouraging private investments in electricity infrastructure enhancing security of electricity supply and making power industry operate in line with the requirements of the sustainable development using an original panel dataset from 55 developed and developing countries covering the period from 1975 to 2010 this study aims at finding out to what extent these objectives have been materialized so far econometric models are used to identify the effects of electricity market liberalization on these variables the research findings suggest that the progress toward the electricity market reform is associated with a decline in private investments in the electricity industries of developing countries higher levels of self sufficiency in electricity supply and lower co2 emissions from electricity generation

betting on hitler the value of political connections in nazi germany this paper examines the value of connections between german industry and the nazi movement in early 1933 drawing on previously unused contemporary sources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns we find that one out of seven firms and a large proportion of the biggest companies had substantive links with the national socialist german workers party firms supporting the nazi movement experienced unusually high returns outperforming unconnected ones by 5 to 8 between january and march 1933 these results are not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimators and definitions of affiliation

three lenses on the multinational enterprise politics corruption and corporate social responsibility scholars who analyze multinational enterprises mnes recognize the complex relationship between international business ib and society however compared with other ib topics research on politics corruption and corporate social responsibility three lenses on the mne remains somewhat embryonic with unresolved issues regarding frameworks measurement methods and theory this presents unique opportunities for integration and extension of disciplinary perspectives which we explore in this article we provide an introduction to potential linkages across these three lenses an agenda for additional theoretical and empirical research and a review of the papers in the jibs focused issue

comparing capitalisms and taking institutional context seriously a major limitation of existing international business ib research remains the rather thin view of institutional context in this retrospective we reflect upon and highlight different strategies for overcoming de contextualized perspectives and developing thicker conceptions of institutions drawing on comparative research institutions shape firm behavior not only through their direct or additive effects but have more complex influences by moderating relationships between firm level variables or having interactive or configurational effects related to wider sets of institutions these views can each be extended by adopting a dynamic perspective examining how multinational enterprise mne agency contributes to processes of institutional change ultimately a large gap remains in taking institutions seriously that ib scholars could fill by developing middle range theories that link and compare how particular kinds of institutions or institutional configurations influence particular kinds of mne activities

assessing the determinants of household electricity prices in the eu a system gmm panel data approach abstract a meaningful portion of the consumer basket of european households and companies is embodied by electricity as well as gas or refined petroleum products as energy products are essential inputs of nearly all final goods and services whichever change of energy prices has a direct impact of the general price level in this context the main purpose of this study is to assess the main drivers of household electricity prices in the european union eu throughout a period of deep sector transformation relying on eurostat data not only we analyze the long term progress of household electricity prices across the eu but also we provide empirical evidence on their determinants while confronting the results with the eu energy policy path for this purpose a firsthand approach is herein developed based on a dynamic model with panel data through gmm proposal method by blundell and bond 1998 4 with the windermeijer 2005 41 correction the data analysis provides grounds for a relation between the variable of household electricity prices with variables related to sector liberalization renewable energy sources which support the eu policy to boost liberalization this study offers evidence that the sector liberalization is accompanied by a decreasing trend in prices which is consistent with the european commission s objectives to liberalize

corruption and the role of information several studies have explored how certain economic and cultural variables affect a country s corruption level this study extends previous research by not only considering these variables but also taking into account the impact that information and communication technology can have on corruption the results indicate that the greater the access to information the lower the corruption levels therefore bridging the digital disparity across countries can also serve to lessen national corruption levels

tools of the trade the socio technology of arbitrage in a wall street trading room to analyze the organization of trading in the era of quantitative finance we conduct an ethnography of arbitrage the trading strategy that best exemplifies finance in the wake of the quantitative revolution in contrast to value and momentum investing we argue arbitrage involves an art of association the construction of comparability across different assets in place of essential or relational characteristics the peculiar valuation that takes place in arbitrage is based on an operation that makes something the measure of something else associating securities to each other the process of recognizing opportunities and the practices of making novel associations are shaped by the specific socio spatial and socio technical configurations of the trading room calculation is distributed across persons and instruments as the trading room organizes interaction among diverse principles of valuation

corporate governance under proportional electoral systems this paper provides a political explanation for the form of corporate governance captured by the degree of minority shareholder protection msp using a multi stage game model of three party competition under proportional electoral systems i demonstrate that the electoral threshold the minimum percentage of votes a party must receive to get at least one seat in parliamentary pr systems is inversely related to the degree of msp this finding represents an important modification to formal models in the political economic literature that tends to omit the political process

a model of endogenous government formation political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the formateur enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions however empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalition in support of gamson s law of portfolio allocation this article examines government formation as a process in which both the government coalition and the formateur are determined endogenously in equilibrium if parties have similar preferences over cabinet portfolios the share of seats they are allocated is proportional to the parties sizes

executive shareholding compensation and analyst forecast of chinese firms abstractwe examine the impact of executive and leadership shareholding and cash compensation on analyst forecast error and dispersion as proxies for information asymmetry we find that firms pay higher compensation or excess compensation to executives and directors are associated with higher information asymmetry the positive association is stronger where executives and directors shareholdings are higher shareholding appears to facilitate managerial entrenchment and gives highly paid executives leadership stronger structural power which adversely affects information disclosure leading to larger forecast error and dispersion these results are robust to different measures of compensation and alternative models controlling for the predictability of firm level earnings our findings indicate that executive director shareholding and compensation do not provide sufficient incentives for information disclosure by chinese firms

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

analyzing the analysts career concerns and biased earnings forecasts this paper examines the career concerns of security analysts we relate long histories of their earnings forecasts to job separations we find that relatively accurate past forecasts lead to favorable career outcomes such as remaining at or moving up to a high status large prestigious brokerage house controlling for accuracy optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus increase the chances of favorable job separations job separations depend much less on accuracy for analysts who cover stocks that are underwritten by their brokerage houses such analysts are also much more likely to be rewarded for optimistic forecasts than other analysts furthermore job separations were much less sensitive to accuracy and somewhat more sensitive to optimism during the stock market mania of the late 1990s these findings suggest that the well documented analyst forecast optimism bias is likely due to incentives to promote stocks

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

the effects of electricity reforms on productivity and efficiency of china s fossil fired power plants an empirical analysis abstract this paper investigates the effects of electricity reforms on productivity and efficiency of china s generation plants based on the third industrial census data and the first economic census data partial factor productivity pfp analysis indicates that the productivity improvements in labor and capital inputs associated with the reforms are approximately 26 and 45 respectively the effect of the reforms on fuel expense is weakly significant but there is evidence of significant productivity improvement in fuel usage further total factor productivity tfp analysis shows that the efficiency gain from the reforms is still significant when the substitution effect of labor and capital inputs are considered though the magnitude is much lower than that of the pfp analysis the effect of the reforms on technical efficiency becomes weakly significant when fuel expense is further included in tfp analysis but a significant positive effect is expected if fuel input is measured in physical quantity

broken dreams unmet expectations of investors in the philippine electricity restructuring and privatization abstract over the last three decades privatization and restructuring of electricity sectors has been a hot topic the expectation was that prices would fall due to increased competition and that generators would become more innovative and efficient however the enthusiasm for deregulation wavered after events such as the debacle in california the fall of enron and the setbacks of ontario in the philippines comprehensive legislation was passed in 2001 but the implementation has been rather slow and controversial this paper looked at the allegation of politicizing power rates and found a logical alternative to the perceived conspiracy angle based on market data it is highly probable that depressed market rates was a result of coping mechanisms of new players trying to adjust to the restructured industry

strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict although strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the strategic interdependence implied by those theories i demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized strategic interaction i show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use monte carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values finally i reanalyze a well known game theoretic model of war bueno de mesquita and lalman s 1992 international interaction game my results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model

the conditional impact of incumbency on government formation previous research on coalition politics has found an incumbency advantage in government formation but it has provided no clear explanation as to why this advantage exists we classify existing theories as either preference based or institutions based explanations for why incumbent coalitions might be likely to form again and we integrate these explanations into a coherent theoretical argument we also claim that it is possible to some extent to distinguish these explanations empirically by taking into account the historical context of coalition bargaining using a comprehensive new data set on coalition bargaining in europe we show that coalitions in general are more likely to form if the parties comprising them have worked together in the recent past and that incumbent coalitions are more likely to re form if partners have not experienced a severe public conflict while in office together or suffered a recent setback at the polls the incumbency advantage disappears completely if partners have become mired in conflict or have lost legislative seats even after accounting for the impact of seat share on coalition size moreover in certain circumstances institutional rules that grant incumbents an advantage in coalition bargaining greatly enhance their ability to remain in office

too close for comfort geographic propinquity to political power and stock returns abstract we show that firm headquarters geographic proximity to political power centers state capitals is associated with higher abnormal returns consistent with the notion that this effect is rooted in social network links we find it is more pronounced in communities with high levels of sociability and political values homophily and that it dissipates when firms move their headquarters to another state finally in line with the view that investors perceive such networks to be associated with political risk we find that this effect is particularly strong when there are substantial levels of corruption dependency on government spending and politicians turnover

impact of reform and privatization on consumers a case study of power sector reform in orissa india abstract orissa is the first state in india to have undergone reform in the power sector with the government withdrawing its control the model of this reform is known as the wb orissa model the goal of this paper is to examine the impact of this reform on consumers of electricity which has been measured using multiple regression models the variables represent the parameters that consumers are most interested in and the regression coefficients represent the weights of the corresponding variables the data were collected using a survey methodology the impact of reform was found to be mixed some groups of consumers saw benefits while others felt a negative impact a focus group study was conducted to identify the variables of interest to consumers of electricity the model was used to estimate consumer benefit and was validated using primary data and structural equation modeling the study revealed beneficial aspects of reform and areas with no benefits

uncovering the complex relationships between political risk and mne firm legitimacy insights from libya using the before after natural experiment occasioned by the arab spring in libya we explore how market and non market activity affect foreign firm legitimacy in times of political turmoil although all mnes in libya had to cultivate strong ties to qadhafi to succeed during his 40 years of rule we found that those that also invested in social benefit projects and in social ties with families with few ties to the qadhafi family earned a broad based legitimacy that helped them survive qadhafi s overthrow our findings contribute to the political risk and political behavior literature the notion that the pursuit of firm legitimacy in general and especially in the eyes of social sector actors is an effective hedge against political risk more theoretically our findings support the addition of a social sector based path to firm legitimacy in the host country that complements and may at times substitute for the government based path to foreign firm legitimacy practically our findings suggest that mnes facing severe political risk can improve their prospects for survival by investing in relationships with influential social groups and by offering goods or services that are perceived as socially valuable

the stability of american markets much of the evidence of coordination between corporations and their markets comes from cross sectional conducted within portions of the american economy during the past two decades we know especially for manufacturing during the late 1960s that certain structural qualities of markets predict profits and the organization of large firms but this evidence is open to an uncomfortable empirical question to what extent did the social structural qualities determining resource dependence in american markets change during the 1960s and 1970s so as to limit the generalizability of cross sectional evidence the analysis here shows that markets were dramatically stable in he social structure of production relations known to predict the structure of large firms relying principally on department of commerce data the article traces the american economy through the 1960s and 1970s in terms of 77 broadly defined markets describing the stability of market boundaries and patterns of transactions with suppliers and c

information asymmetry valuation and the corporate spin off decision we empirically analyze the information hypothesis that the separation of a rm s divisions into independently traded units through a spin o enhances value because it mitigates information asymmetry about the rm consistent with this hypothesis we nd that rms that engage in spin o s have higher levels of information asymmetry compared to their industry and size matched counterparts and the information problems decrease signi cantly after the spin o the gains around spin o s are positively related to the degree of information asymmetry and this relation is more pronounced for rms with fewer negative synergies between divisions finally rms with higher growth opportunities and rms in need of external capital show a higher propensity to engage in spin o s they also raise more capital following a spin o which is consistent with the view that

social capital structural holes and the formation of an industry network the formation of a network is determined by the opposition of two forces the first is the reproduction of network structure as a general social resource for network members the second is the alteration of network structure by entrepreneurs for their own benefit the idea of reproduction is a conventional one in organizational sociology but has taken on increased importance due to the work of bourdieu and coleman in contrast burt stresses the entrepreneurship of individual agents in exploiting structural holes that lie between constrained positions though complementary the theories of social capital and structural holes have fundamentally different implications for network formation this paper investigates these theories by examining empirically the formation of the interorganizational network among biotechnology firms we propose that network structure determines the frequency with which a new biotechnology firm or startup establishes new relationships network structure indicates both where soci

financial analyst characteristics and herding behavior in forecasting this study classifies analysts earnings forecasts as herding or bold and finds that 1 boldness likelihood increases with the analyst s prior accuracy brokerage size and experience and declines with the number of industries the analyst follows consistent with theory linking boldness with career concerns and ability 2 bold forecasts are more accurate than herding forecasts and 3 herding forecast revisions are more strongly associated with analysts earnings forecast errors actual earnings forecast than are bold forecast revisions thus bold forecasts incorporate analysts private information more completely and provide more relevant information to investors than herding forecasts

the impact of power market reforms on electricity price cost margins and cross subsidy levels a cross country panel data analysis abstract one of the main expectations from power market reform has been a reduction in both price cost margins and cross subsidy levels between industrial and residential consumers this paper focuses on this issue by looking at the impact of the electricity industry reforms on residential and industrial electricity price cost margins and their effect on cross subsidy levels between consumer groups using panel data for 63 developed and developing countries covering the period 1982 2009 empirical models are developed and analyzed the research findings suggest that there is no uniform pattern for the impact of reform process as a whole on price cost margins and cross subsidy levels each individual reform step has different impact on price cost margins and cross subsidy levels for each consumer and country group our findings imply that reform steps have different impacts in different countries which supports the idea reform prescription for a specific country cannot easily and successfully be transferred to another one so transferring the formal and economic structure of a successful power market in a developed country to developing countries is not a sufficient condition for good economic performance of the electricity industries in developing countries furthermore the study suggests that power consumption income level and country specific features constitute other important determinants of electricity price cost margins and cross subsidy levels

did residential electricity rates fall after retail competition a dynamic panel analysis abstract a key selling point for the restructuring of electricity markets was the promise of lower prices there is not much consensus in earlier studies on the effects of electricity deregulation in the u s particularly for residential customers part of the reason for not finding a consistent link with deregulation and lower prices was that the removal of transitional price caps led to higher prices in addition the timing of the removal of price caps coincided with rising fuel prices which were passed on to consumers in a competitive market using a dynamic panel model we analyze the effect of participation rates fuel costs market size a rate cap and switch to competition for 16 states and the district of columbia we find that an increase in participation rates price controls a larger market and high shares of hydro in electricity generation lower retail prices while increases in natural gas and coal prices increase rates we also find that retail competition makes the market more efficient by lowering the markup of retail prices over wholesale costs the effects of a competitive retail electricity market are mixed across states but generally appear to lower prices in states with high participation rates

determinants of flows into retail international equity funds diversification benefits appear to be a major reason why investors choose international equity funds funds less correlated with the us market tend to receive higher flows from investors in addition investors prefer funds that invest in a diversified portfolio of securities from different regions in the world to funds that focus only on a specific region risk adjusted return is shown to exert greater effect on flows into international equity funds than raw return international equity funds from fund families offering a greater number of investment objectives also receive higher flows on the other hand international equity fund investors do not appear to be sensitive to expenses or exchange rates

mode of international entry an isomorphism perspective the determination of entry modes is examined using an institutional theory framework two sources of isomorphic pressures affect a strategic business unit s sbu entry mode choice 1 host country institutional environment and 2 internal institutional environment the parent organization sbus were hypothesized to adopt similar organizational forms structures policies and practices thus becoming isomorphic based on felt pressures to conform to behavioral norms within the environments the results indicated that sbus using wholly owned entry modes demonstrated high levels of internal parent isomorphism those using exporting joint ventures or licensing agreements demonstrated external isomorphism and those using multiple or mixed entry mode demonstrated low levels of isomorphic pressures

comparing capitalisms understanding institutional diversity and its implications for international business this paper examines the role of institutional analysis within the field of international business ib studies within ib institutions matter but the view of institutions tends to be thin utilizing summary indicators rather than detailed description and thus approaches institutions as unidimensional variables that impact on particular facets of business activity this paper argues that ib research would be usefully advanced by greater attention to comparing the topography of institutional landscapes and understanding their diversity a number of alternative case based approaches are outlined that draw on a growing comparative capitalisms literature in sociology and political science the paper develops a number of empirical examples to show the utility and limits of these approaches for ib scholars

the impact of regulatory quality and corruption on residential electricity prices in the context of electricity market reforms abstract the european electricity markets have been undergoing significant regulatory reforms since the introduction of the first liberalisation directive in 1996 theory predicts that liberalisation promotes cost efficient production and competition and hence leads to lower prices the goal of this paper is to assess the impact of regulatory quality and non compliance with the law on electricity prices in the context of electricity market reforms we address problems of endogeneity by using the blundell blond system gmm estimator and find that vertical integration and market concentration lower end user prices all else equal moreover improving regulatory quality and reducing corruption both have a negative impact on prices when holding other factors constant the intensity of the reforms has limited impact on electricity prices when these reforms are introduced in an institutional environment characterised by high levels of corruption and low quality regulation

high level politically connected firms corruption and analyst forecast accuracy around the world the international business ib literature has widely recognized political forces as major factors that complicate the strategic decisions of multinational enterprises mnes analyses by financial intermediaries can help to reduce the risk of information asymmetry caused by such factors using firm level data from 17 jurisdictions between 1997 and 2001 this study investigates the association between a firm s high level political connections and earnings forecasts made by financial analysts an important group of financial intermediaries we find that after controlling for other determinants of forecast accuracy analysts experience greater difficulty in predicting the earnings of firms with political connections than those of firms with no such connections however in jurisdictions in which corruption level is relatively high earnings forecast accuracy is influenced more by a firm s political connections our findings contribute to the ib literature by demonstrating that political connections exacerbate the information asymmetry between investors and managers and also that anti corruption measures can curb the adverse effect of political connections on the corporate information environment these findings bear the practical implication that mnes must consider political issues when making resource allocation decisions

the economics of organization the transaction cost approach the transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way the approach applies both to the determination of efficient boundaries as between firms and markets and to the organization of internal transactions including the design of employment relations the approach is compared and contrasted with selected parts of the organization theory literature

deregulation vertical unbundling and the performance of china s large coal fired power plants article i nfo in 2003 china s integrated electricity utility the state power corporation spc was unbundled and dism antled into five generation groups and two grid companies in an effort to increase competition and improve ef ficiency in this paper we study the impact of this deregulation reform on the operational efficiency for a balanced panel of 34 large power plants for the period 1997 2010 we find that on average these power plants have converged to the technological frontier over the sample period controlling for substantial heterogeneity in the technical profile we also find that the unbundling reform has boosted productivity of china s large thermal power plants however the presumably differential impacts of the reform on the previously spc managed power plants and the independent power producers in our sample are insignificant

dynamic forecasting behavior by analysts theory and evidence abstract we develop a multi period learning model to examine the relation between analysts forecasting behavior and their performance in a competitive market for banking services the surplus and the analyst s payoff which is determined through bargaining are convex in her reputation the convexity of her payoff structure and the presence of employment risk lead to a u shaped relation between the analyst s forecast boldness and prior performance and a positive relation between forecast boldness and experience we find support for these predictions in our empirical analysis significant underperformers outperformers face higher lower employment risk and are more likely to issue bolder forecasts

the only game in town stock price consequences of local bias abstract theory suggests that in the presence of local bias the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region using data on u s states and census regions we find clear cut support for this proposition most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita regions with low population density e g the deep south are home to relatively few firms per capita which leads to higher stock prices via an only game in town effect

corporate reputation s invisible hand bribery rational choice and market penalties drawing upon rational choice and investor attention theories we examine how accusations of corporate bribery and subsequent investigations shape market reactions using event study methodology to measure loss in firm value for public firms facing bribery investigations from 1978 to 2010 we found that total market penalties amounted to 60 61 billion we ran moderated multiple regression analysis to examine further the degree to which the unique characteristics of bribery explain variations in market penalties companies committing bribery in less corrupt host countries and with the involvement of compromised executives experienced greater market penalties than did other companies after partitioning share value losses into components for regulatory penalties class action settlements and loss to reputation we found that reputational penalties account for 81 8 of every dollar of share value loss omission of reputational penalties in rational choice calculus underestimates bribery costs by 4 5 times the results suggest that firms should not underestimate the importance of market imposed reputational penalties by merely considering regulator imposed fines and sanctions

national capital city location and subsidiary portfolio expansion the negative effect of geographic distance to the capital city at inception on the speed of subsequent investments a multinational enterprise develops its subsidiary portfolio by investing in new foreign markets and subsequently pursuing further investments within these host countries we find that firms which locate their first equity investment closer to the national capital city can subsequently expand their subsidiary portfolio within the host country at a higher speed this effect is particularly strong in emerging economies further analyses of various contingencies support the robustness of our findings we discuss different theoretical mechanisms which could cause these effects in particular face to face interactions with governmental actors and opportunities to develop political connections our research contributes to the literature on internationalization processes by analyzing how the initial location choice affects the development of the subsidiary portfolio

gamson s law versus non cooperative bargaining theory we compare gamson s law a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining with two noncooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does gamson s law we also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non cooperative bargaining models namely proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under the baron ferejohn model and a significant number of bargaining rounds tend to take more than two steps under demand bargaining and more than one stage under baron ferejohn counter to the models predictions regressions using the experimental data provide results similar to the field data but fail to do so once one accounts for predictions regarding coalition composition under gamson s law

the environmental paradox in generation how south america is gradually becoming more dependent on thermal generation there has been an increasing focus on global warming emission of green house gases ghg and the problems this might create in this article we review the trend in sustainable and renewable electricity generation in south america where the generation portfolio increasingly depends on thermal generation in particular gas south america is a region that has relatively low emissions but the current development is not desirable in environmental terms we analyze the underlying reasons for this development which is related to security of supply deregulation and the cost of renewable energy we review and discuss the policies to promote renewables in the region we analyze the potential advantages and drawbacks of different types of market interventions such as direct subsidies that create potentially strong market distortions more sophisticated market interventions that might be less intrusive but not necessarily as effective as e g firm energy markets we also review market based solutions such as the clean market mechanism and its potential and the use of renewable electricity in non interconnected zones which might be one of the most economically attractive applications of renewables however without a stronger and more aggressive intervention from the governments in the region it is unlikely that the increase in thermal generation can be stopped

political aspects of mne theory political behavior by mnes has usually been ignored downplayed or passively treated in dominant economic models of the multinational enterprise in order to remedy this lacuna dunning s eclectic paradigm is expanded to integrate political dimensions in the analysis of ownership internalization and location advantages

demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining i propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play the equilibrium majorities and the policy outcome the ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is however invariant to fundamental institutional differences and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power the bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office the order of play is endogenous and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker the role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied

political pricing of electricity can it go with universal service provision abstract political parties in india are known to use electricity prices as a tool to secure a win in the democratic election process this article examines the setting of electricity prices from a political economy perspective citizens differ in their willingness to pay for electricity and the consumer surplus and electoral uncertainty seem to influence their choices while exercising their franchise to win political parties must receive a majority of votes and a party in power may try to achieve this by choosing to ignore a consumer group either by charging a price higher than their willingness to pay or by choosing to satisfy them by charging a lower price two theoretical models are proposed the first model computes the possible prices when common perfectly correlated electoral shocks are anticipated while the second model computes the possible prices for independent and identically distributed electoral shocks we test these models with available data on willingness to pay and electricity price for agricultural domestic and industrial consumers in an indian state by generating prices that would be charged to each of these types of consumers to maximize the chances of re election actual prices seem to confirm the second model more than the first

corporate political strategy an examination of the relation between political expenditures environmental performance and environmental disclosure two fundamental business ethics issues that repeatedly surface in the academic literature relate to business s role in the development of public policy suarez s l 2000 does business learn the university of michigan press ann arbor mi roberts r w and d d bobek 2004 accounting organizations and society 29 5 6 565 590 and its role in responsibly managing the natural environment newton l 2005 business ethics and the natural environment blackwell publishing oxford when studied together researchers often examine if and how corporations influence environmental policy decisions drawing from literatures on corporate political activity corporate social and environmental performance and corporate environmental disclosure we develop and empirically examine two research questions concerning the relations between corporate political expenditures environmental performance and environmental disclosure the questions are 1 do corporations that are poorer environmental performers spend more on political activities than their better performing counterparts 2 is there an association between corporations spending on political activities and the extent of their financial report environmental disclosures we investigated these questions through analyses of data we gathered on a sample consisting of 119 u s environmentally sensitive firms for the 2001 2002 election cycle after controlling for firm size and specific industry effects our tests reveal a significant inverse relationship between firm environmental performance and political spending this is consistent with the notion that u s firms with relatively poorer environmental performance records engage more intensely in corporate political activities as part of their overall strategic management of their relationship with the state in addition a significant and positive association between the amount of political spending and the extent of environmental disclosure suggests that environmental disclosure and political spending are both proactive complementary tactics to strategically manage public policy pressure if corporations strategies are intentionally designed to unreasonably limit their environmental responsibilities or to misrepresent firm environmental performance then we argue that these activities reflect a significant lapse in ethical conduct

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

extending the internationalization process model increases and decreases of mne commitment in emerging economies the internationalization process model suggests that firms internationalize by building positions in foreign markets and networks following iterative cycles of learning and changes in commitment however as subsidiaries evolve commitments may be decreased as well as increased a phenomenon that has rarely been studied moreover it remains an open question why strategic intentions at the outset of an investment project differ from the actual operations established we address these questions by extending the model and combining it with mintzberg and waters framework of strategy formation specifically we suggest that commitment decisions correspond to statements of intended strategy while network positions correspond to realized strategies the processes of learning opportunity creation and trust building triggered by commitment decisions are however moderated by institutional influences that lead to divergences between realized and intended strategies we test propositions derived from this framework on a survey data set of subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in hungary lithuania and poland and find that institutional voids and institutional uncertainty affect subsidiary strategy implementation but in opposing directions under high institutional uncertainty investors prefer low commitment but flexible modes that enable later commitment increases whereas institutional voids increase up front information search and adaptation costs that reduce the likelihood of early post entry adjustments our analysis reinforces the need for more differentiated theoretical analyses of how institutions affect business strategies over time

political connections and the process of going public evidence from china abstract we examine how political connections impact the process of going public specifically we test how political connections impact the pricing of the newly offered shares the magnitude of underpricing and the fixed cost of going public based on the experience of the newly public firms from chinese security markets and using multiple measures of political connections we find robust evidence that the issuing firms with political connections reap significant preferential benefits in the process of going public to be specific we find that firms irrespective of their ownership status with greater political connections have relatively higher offering price lower underpricing and lower fixed costs during the going public process

the determinants of mne subsidiaries political strategies evidence of institutional duality in this study we develop and test a model of the determinants of political strategies used by foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises mnes using recent theoretical advances in institutional theory that recognize that mne subsidiaries are confronted with pressures for isomorphism within the corporation internal legitimacy and within the host country external legitimacy we integrate international business and political strategy literatures to create a multilevel model of subsidiary host country and parent determinants of political strategy our hypotheses are tested using survey and archival data from western european subsidiaries of us mnes

airline traffic and urban economic development this paper provides new evidence on the link between airline traffic and employment in us metropolitan areas the evidence confirms the common view that good airline service is an important factor in urban economic development frequent service to a variety of destinations reflected in a high level of passenger enplanements facilitates easy face to face contact with businesses in other cities attracting new firms to the metro area and stimulating employment at established enterprises the empirical results show that a 10 per cent increase in passenger enplanements in a metro area leads approximately to a 1 per cent increase in employment in service related industries however airline traffic has no effect on manufacturing and other goods related employment suggesting that air travel is less important for such firms than for service related businesses these estimates are generated controlling for reverse causality between employment and traffic the results imply that expansion of chicago s o hare ai

making the first move a two stage analysis of the role of formateurs in parliamentary government formation a standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move the formateur party will determine the bargaining outcome most empirical studies of parliamentary coalition formation have paid surprisingly little attention to the formation process in this paper we model government formation as a two stage unordered discrete choice problem that better reflects this process the first step involves the selection of a formateur party and the second involves the choice of partners by the predicted formateur we evaluate several hypotheses for the two stages using a data set of all cabinets formed in the western european countries from 1970 to 2006 in our analyses of formateur selection we find that party size is clearly the dominant feature in the second stage we show that when predicting government composition it is fruitful to add information drawn from a first stage analysis

effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry on electricity prices in developing countries electric power sector reforms in the electricity supply industry have had an impact on industrial and household prices in developing countries in latin america the former soviet union and eastern europe using original panel data for 83 countries during the period from 1985 to 2002 we examine how each policy instrument of the reform measures influenced electricity prices for countries in the above regions we found that variables such as entry of independent power producers ipp unbundling of generation and transmission establishment of a regulatory agency and the introduction of a wholesale spot market have had a variety of impacts on electricity prices some of which were not always consistent with expected results the research findings suggest that neither unbundling nor introduction of a wholesale pool market on their own necessarily reduces the electric power price in fact contrary to expectations there was a tendency for the price to rise however coexistent with an independent regulator unbundling may work to reduce electricity prices privatization and the introduction of foreign ipp and retail competition lower electricity prices in some regions but not all

who wins determining the party of the prime minister the prime ministership is the preeminent political post in parliamentary democracies yet few studies examine pm party choice perhaps under the assumption that the choice is a simple function of party size in this article we argue that key strategic actors and the context in which government negotiations take place can play a critical role in pm party choice we test our hypotheses using a mixed logit with random coefficients on an original data set comprising pm selection opportunities in 28 european countries our methodological approach allows us to incorporate qualitative concerns about heterogeneity and causal complexity into our analysis contrary to conventional wisdom we find that the largest party is often disadvantaged when it comes to pm party choice that some presidents play an influential role in choosing the pm and that the value of being the incumbent depends on one s performance in office and how the previous government ended

a 100 year review of electricity policy in ireland 1916 2015 abstract over the past century ireland s electricity sector has undergone a significant transformation this paper documents the nation s struggle to build an electricity system to improve security of electricity supply through portfolio diversification and to promote indigenous energy sources this was a challenge for an electrically isolated island with little natural resources the paper also identifies the ineffective policy decisions that left ireland exposed to the 1970s energy crises the crises did however provide a clear impetus for focusing irish energy policy going forward the successful deployment and integration of large scale wind power was due to strong national and supranational policy decisions in 2015 ireland had the third highest wind energy share of national electricity demand 22 8 of all iea wind member countries the paper also traces ireland s transition through market reform regional fragmentation and looks onwards to the eu internal market for electricity in essence this paper provides a holistic view of the implications of various policy decisions on the electricity sector along with the stresses of external factors on the electricity market and should be useful for policy makers elsewhere faced with similar decisions

governance infrastructure and us foreign direct investment this paper examines the statistical importance of governance infrastructure as a determinant of us foreign direct investment fdi in broad terms governance infrastructure represents attributes of legislation regulation and legal systems that condition freedom of transacting security of property rights and transparency of government and legal processes our econometric analysis uses a two stage estimation procedure in the first stage the probability that a country is an fdi recipient is estimated the results indicate that countries that fail to achieve a minimum threshold of effective governance are unlikely to receive any us fdi countries that receive no us fdi are typically countries that do not promote free and transparent markets that have ineffective governments and that often have legal systems that are not rooted in english common law in the second stage the analysis is restricted to those countries that did receive fdi flows the estimated equations focus on the determinants of the amount of fdi received given that a country is a recipient of us fdi governance infrastructure including the nature of the legal system is an important determinant of the amount received

distributional impacts of climate change mitigation in indian electricity the influence of governance abstract studies that examine the distributional impacts of climate change mitigation policies often neglect the influence of institutions that implement these policies this study examines the short term consumption side distributional impacts of expanding low carbon electric supply in the state of maharashtra india with a focus on the influence of regulatory discretion in pricing households welfare impacts from economy wide electricity price shocks are simulated against a baseline that is calibrated to actual household economic and electricity service conditions including actual electricity budgets block tier prices and supply rationing industrial price impacts are propagated to households using a leontief input output analysis regulatory pricing decisions are evaluated based on social welfare metrics for economic efficiency and income inequality the analysis reveals new linkages between climate change mitigation electricity policy and income distribution low income households can be shielded from mitigation impacts without losses in aggregate welfare to the extent that regulators can recover mitigation costs through industrial price increases regulators flexibility to distribute costs across households is constrained by industrial customers migration off the grid reduced supply interruptions to the rural poor from the resulting demand contraction are a potential co benefit of mitigation distributional impacts therefore depend on other electricity policies that are driven by the political economy of the sector

constraints on cabinet formation in parliamentary democracies coalition theory typically treats political parties involved in government formation in parliamentary democracies as if they were unconstrained players in an institution free world yet actual coalition options are often severely constrained by institutional arrangements and prior commitments we develop a systematic account of different constraints on government formation and examine their frequency across 10 parliamentary democracies hypothetical and empirical examples demonstrate how a small number of constraints can dramatically reduce the range of coalition options and redistribute bargaining power among political parties more adequate coalition theories need to recognize the effects of such constraints and to build on the theoretical lessons of the neoinstitutionalist approach to legislative behavior