exchange rate pass through in u s manufacturing industries this paper studies exchange rate pass through in u s manufacturing industries and its cross sectional variation through an adapted dixit stiglitz model of product differentiation the paper predicts that pass through is positively related to the degree of product differentiation and inversely related to the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output empirical estimates of the pass through elasticities show that pass through is incomplete and varies across industries the degree of pass through is found to be positively correlated to different proxies for product differentiation and negatively to a proxy for the elasticity of marginal cost

the interaction of foreign exchange and market power effects on german domestic prices this paper illustrates the importance of international influences on domestic markets a model is presented in which changes in a country s terms of trade pass through to industrial prices in varying degrees depending on import penetration and seller concentration empirical results suggest that the 8 4 percent decline in the real external value of the deutsche mark from 1977 to 1983 allowed upward movement of about 2 percent in domestic producer prices of traded goods relative to the gnp price deflator increased market concentration led to a reduced effect while increased import penetration led to some increase in the exchange rate passthrough standard industrial organization models stress the impact of market power and entry conditions on economic performance with particular interest in price effects at the industry level greater concentration is expected to lead to higher prices ceteris paribus while greater ease in entry or a larger competitive fringe implies lower prices the international economics literature indicates that in the absence of trade barriers transactions and transportation costs and market power foreign exchange rate changes will be fully passed through to import and export prices implying that domestic prices of traded goods for an appreciating currency will be adjusted downward by the full amount of the exchange rate change the dramatic changes in exchange rates since the early 1970s provided exporters with new opportunities to enter markets of nations that had a strong currency west germany has been regarded as one such country this paper investigates the effect of exchange rate movements on particular german industrial prices i test to see whether the prominence of imports

efficient black markets abstract this paper investigates analytically the welfare effects of black market activities that firms undertake to evade taxes the desirability of a black market is linked to the attributes of the goods supplied by black market firms the analysis identifies cases where a black market reduces increases the distortionary impact of taxation on the allocation of resources across the goods that the government is attempting to tax leading to a welfare gain loss

exchange rate economics 1986 in the past fifteen years key exchange rates have moved in larger and more persistent ways than advocates of flexible rates in the late 1960s would have left anyone free to imagine certainly there was no expectation of constancy for nominal exchange rates but real exchange rate movements of 30 or forty percent were definitely not suggested as a realistic possibility moreover where these large movements did occur they did not obviously appear to be connected with fundamentals and hence seemed difficult to explain in terms of the exchange rate theories at hand the persistence of rate movements was as surprising as the rapid unwinding of apparent misalignments when they did ultimately occur the past fifteen years provide a natural dividing line between the keynesian and monetary approaches of the 1960s and the more recent analysis that takes into account exchange rate expectations and portfolio issues which took off in the early 1970s as well as the brand new approaches that concentrate on partial equilibrium microeconomics to review these ideas the paper starts with a brief look at the u s experience with flexible exchange rates from there it proceeds to the mundell fleming model as a comprehensive framework of analysis the following sections deal with persistent effects of policy disturbances links between exchange rates and prices the political economy of exchange rate movements and the question of policies toward excess capital mobility this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

diversification multi market contact and profitability this paper analyses the relationships between diversification multi market contact and industry profitability it focuses on the link between diversification and multi market contact to show that when diversification establishes or increases the extent to which firms meet in more than one market the effect of such multi market contact is to increase the possibility that collusion emerges as an evolutionary stable strategy as a result multi market contact may increase the potential for tacit collusion and so lead to higher profitability the effects of diversification and multi market contact on the price cost margin and the rate of return to capital are estimated using a specially constructed new database for uk manufacturing industry in 1979 this database provides information on the diversification and multi market contact of 418 firms across 134 manufacturing industries thus linking firm and industry level data the results show a clear positive effect of multi market contact on industry profitability

market structure and the empirical specification of profit margins we present evidence from a panel of u k manufacturing industries to test the sensitivity of the margins concentration relationship to specification changes in the dependent variable instrumental variable estimates demonstrate that a positive association between profit margins and concentration is contingent on how the margin is formulated

unions and monopoly profits using cross sectional data for u s manufacturing the author identifies a negative effect of unions on the profits of highly concentrated industries and virtually no effect on the profits of unconcentrated industries the results for concentrated industries are explained in terms of the monopoly model which predicts a negative effect of unions on profits equivalent to the change in employer s surplus the monopoly model also suggests that previous profit studies which omitted the union variable were likely to significantly underestimate the relationship between concentration and profits this prediction is also supported by empirical evidence m sany studies have demonstrated the ability of unions to raise wages above the level of nonunion workers higher union wages in turn may affect the level of prices employment capital intensity productivity and profits recent studies by clark 1982 and freeman 1983 have found significant negative effects of unions on profit rates in the united states using line of business data from 1970 to 1980 for 900 firms clark found a negative effect of unions on the rate of return to capital more specifically the union effects were found to be significantly negative when market shares were low and insignificant when market shares were high according to clark the absence of a union effect in the latter case can be explained by the ability of firms with market power to pass on higher union wages into higher prices 1982 p 47 on the other hand freeman 1983 using data from the survey of manufactures from 1958 to 1976 and the internal revenue service from 1965 to 1976 also found a negative effect of unions on profits contrary to clark s results however the union profit effect was negative only in concentrated industries the point of contention appears to be the role of concentration in determining the union profit effect rather than the overall negative impact of unions the results of clark and freeman are important because previous industrial organization research on profit rates generally ignored unions for instance of the forty six profit studies surveyed by weiss 1974 none included a union variable more recently a profit study in this review by ravenscraft 1983 using high quality line of business data from the federal trade commission also ignored unionization as will be demonstrated the omission of the union variable leads to an understatement of the effect of industrial concentration on profits this means that concentrated industries generate much greater profits than indicated by previous research in order to measure the size of the understatement a new concept employer s surplus is developed which illustrates the theoretical impact of a union wage increase on monopoly profits the empirical estimates of employer s surplus in this paper indicate how monopoly profits are divided between firms and unions most of the data used in this study were obtained from james medoff and charles brown 2 unlike the previous two studies each observation corresponds to a state by two digit sic industry for manufacturing in 1972 because of the large variations in unionization across states this data set offers a useful test of the union profit effect i employer s surplus according to accepted theory the profit maximizing monopolist will employ labor up to the point where the market wage equals the marginal revenue product mrp 3 if for simplicity we assume that all other factors are variable then the mrp curve represents the monopolist s long run demand for labor in the absence of unions employment is determined by the intersection of the mrp curve and nonunion wage wn as pictured in figure 1 if unions raise wages to wa employment will decrease from ln to l with the reducreceived for publication november 28 1983 revision accepted for publication july 6 1984 eastern washington university i am very grateful to dave bunting lisa brown bill dickens claire brown and george strauss for their valuable suggestions on this research this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 from the author s ph d thesis the union impact on profits productivity and prices university of california berkeley 1 see parseley 1980 for a recent review of this literature 2 i would like to thank brown and medoff for making these data available to me 3 marginal revenue product is equal to marginal revenue multiplied by marginal physical product see rees 1979

nash s theory of cooperative games as a predictor of the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations an experiment in media purchasing the authors report an experimental investigation of the ability of nash s theory of cooperative games to predict the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations using the purchase of media time as an ex

the effects of foreign exchange movements on u s domestic prices this paper draws on the fields of international economics and industrial organization to model and empirically examine the relationship between currency value fluctuations and domestic producer prices the major focus is the issue of whether and why domestic industries differ systematically in their response to exchange rate changes the major findings are that changes in the external value of the u s dollar between 1974 and 1987 passed most fully into domestic prices of industries heavily reliant on imported inports and producing goods highly substitutable for imports highly capital intensive and concentrated industries and those protected by extensive barriers to entry both from domestic and foreign sources have exhibited less domestic price change from the exchange rate movements copyright 1989 by mit press

the optimal elasticity of taxable income abstract the strength of the behavioral response to a tax rate change depends on the environment individuals operate in and may be manipulated by instruments controlled by the government we first derive a measure of the social benefit to affecting this elasticity the paper then examines this effect in the solution to the optimal income taxation problem when such an instrument is available first in a general model and then in an example when the government chooses the income tax base

let me talk to my manager haggling in a competitive environment although negotiating over prices with sellers is common in many markets such as automobiles furniture services consumer electronics etc it is not clear how a haggling price policy can help a firm gain a strategic advantage or whether it is even sustainable in a competitive market in this paper we explore the implications of haggling and fixed prices as pricing policies in a competitive market we develop a model in which two competing retailers choose between offering either a fixed price or haggling over prices with customers there are two consumer segments in our analysis one segment thehagglers has a lower opportunity cost of time and a lower haggling cost than the other segment thenonhagglers when both retailers follow the same pricing policy then a haggling policy is more profitable than a fixed price policy only when the proportion of nonhagglers is sufficiently high we find two kinds of prisoners dilemma under some conditions a more profitable haggling policy can be broken by a fixed price policy and under other conditions a fixed price policy can be broken by a haggling policy surprisingly we show that under some conditions an asymmetric outcome with one retailer haggling and the other offering a fixed price is also an equilibrium

a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in this paper we develop a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in the highly relevant marketing context of automobile transactions consumer brand choice is modeled as a multinomial probabilistic outcome and the individual consumer level transaction price is modeled to be consistent with the nash bargaining solution our simultaneous model introduces a natural way to account for price endogeneity in a microlevel choice setting when the price paid is individual specific and correlated with the idiosyncratic preference of a buyer it also accounts for the potential selectivity bias in studying the negotiated price by integrating consumer brand choice modeling we apply the proposed model to a data set of 4 795 consumer automobile purchases the empirical results show that the proposed approach not only better fits the data of consumer choice and negotiated price but it also provides additional insights into buyers and sellers behaviors in comparison with models that study only consumer choice or the negotiated price but not both simultaneously

on the timeliness of tax reform abstract this paper analyzes efficient government reactions to unanticipated tax avoidance quickly reforming tax laws to reduce the effectiveness of new tax avoidance techniques prevents widespread adoption but indirectly encourages the rapid development of new avoidance methods if prior users are permitted to retain their tax benefits tax reforms that immediately prevent new avoidance mean that innovators need not fear imitation by competitors and cannot rely on copying the innovations of others such an activist reform agenda diverts greater resources into tax avoidance activity and might thereby lead to a faster rate of tax base erosion than would a less reactive government strategy efficient government policy therefore entails either the retroactive elimination of tax savings with possible associated costs or else a deliberate pace of tax reform in response to taxpayer innovation

public sector price controls and electoral cycles public enterprise prices are important policy instruments in developing economies this is why public sector price polices constitute a key element of stabilization programmes implemented in these economies however this significance is not specific to stabilization episodes first this study questions whether an opportunistic politician can manipulate public prices to win elections it analyses the impact of such price controls on budget deficits and the repercussions of alternative financing mechanisms of these deficits on the inflation rate and voters behaviour it is shown that electoral inflation cycles are obtained under domestic debt financing whereas money financing does not permit such a manipulative policy second by focusing on data of the turkish economy for the 1987 1 2003 12 period empirical evidence for such manipulative policies is given

optimal policies with an informal sector abstract this paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion and undocumented workers in equilibrium domestic workers may work exclusively in the formal sector or also in the informal sector surprisingly in equilibrium wages are always equalized between domestic and undocumented workers even if they do not work in the same sectors of the economy this is driven by the interaction of firm level decisions with optimal government policy we also find that enforcement may not always be decreasing in its cost and that governments will optimally enforce labour market segmentation if enforcement costs are not too high

wage pressure bargaining and price cost margins in uk manufacturing to the extent that union employer bargaining is efficient price cost margins in oligopolistic industries are predicted to depend on wage rents and on the elasticity of substitution between wages and employment in union preferences unanticipated wage inflation will also affect margins cross section and time series analysis of price cost margins in u k manufacturing industries finds that margins tend to be eroded by the level of wage rents and are invariant to the rate of wage inflation copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

labour supply tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds an empirical investigation abstract in this paper we extend the concept of marginal cost of public funds itmcf to incorporate tax evasion in the labour market mcf values are also computed from various tax reforms applied to the province of quebec canada 1985 for this purpose a utility based labour supply model that allows for both regular and irregular work activities is used at the benchmark situation the mcf associated with an increase in marginal income tax rates ranges between 1 39 and 1 53 depending upon whether we consider rationing or not moreover the presence of the irregular sector accounts for between 0 02 and 0 05 of this mcf although small in magnitude the impact of the irregular sector increases rapidly with the level of marginal tax rates

black markets and optimal evadable taxation in a simple model of evadable indirect taxation some surprises emerge because of a market thinning effect of high prices high taxes induce multiple equilibria low price black markets and high price legal markets further evadability introduces a bifurcation to optimal taxation for less effective tax administrations the optimal tax system follows a cash cow pattern with one sector bearing all of the tax but for relatively effective administrations the optimum follows a slightly modified ramsey rule this discontinuity results from the mathematics of evasion incentives and may help explain tax reforms commonly seen over the course of economic development

the profitability concentration relation market power or efficiency industrial economists have been studying the relationship between profitability and concentration using cross industry samples for many years now however as sometimes happens once it appeared that some consensus had been achieved with few exceptions market concentration and industry profitability are positively correlated peltzman i977 p 229 people began to question the interpretation of those results in particular demsetz e g i973 i974 and others suggested that rather than concentration market power leading to higher prices and profits the causal direction in fact ran from greater efficiency to both higher profits and incidentally to higher concentration our purpose here is to subject these conflicting hypotheses to cross industry empirical test using u k data in order to do this we first develop a model which is sufficiently general to allow for both alternative explanations of a positive concentration profitability correlation in the light of this model we then examine the implications for the within industry relation between market share and firm level profitability more specifically we explore demsetz s claim that the empirical form of this relationship should signal which of the alternative hypotheses is consistent with the between industry profitability concentration correlation our model suggests that in certain special circumstances this claim is partly justified in that it should be possible to assess the relative strengths of the market power and efficiency effects from the within industry relation more generally however factors such as product differentiation and scale economies may seriously impair the information content of the relation with at least a strong suspicion that the estimates will tend to exaggerate the evidence in favour of the efficiency hypothesis in the event our results tend to confirm that for most industries the within industry data offer little conclusive support for either hypothesis but for a not insignificant minority of industries the evidence suggests some support for the view that both efficiency and market power are at work simultaneously our model is detailed in section ii and estimated on u k data in section iii after which we offer a few comments in section iv first however we drovide a backcloth to the later analysis

input contracts market structure and the empirical specification of price cost margins abstract we examine the implications for the empirical specification of the margins concentration relationship of different forms of contracting for intermediate inputs we offer an alternative explanation why the results of profit margin regressions depend on whether the margin is deflated by gross output or net output 1997 elsevier science s a

tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds tax evasion and deadweight loss have similar implications for the rules of public finance the optimal mix of taxes can be derived from the minimization of the sum of aggregate deadweight loss and aggregate cost of tax evasion similarly the marginal cost of public funds includes allowances for marginal deadweight loss and marginal cost of tax evasion per dollar of public revenue acquired

exchange rate pass through and international pricing strategy a conceptual framework and research propositions the extent to which exchange rate fluctuations affect international prices is called exchange rate pass through this paper develops a conceptual model in explaining how exchange rate fluctuations are channeled into international pricing strategy and offers research propositions our model posits that the extent of exchange rate pass through in international pricing is affected by the firm s pricing orientation performance orientation distribution policy and brand equity as well as by exchange rate uncertainty and competitive symmetry

the optimal size of a tax collection agency the condition that characterizes the optimal size of a tax collection agency is derived and then given a simple interpretation in terms of excess burden the paper clarifies an earlier finding of sandmo which suggests that the optimal degree of enforcement is higher than a simple cost benefit calculation would indicate the appropriate condition is that at the margin the resource cost of increasing enforcement should equal the saving of excess burden due to the decline in exposure to risk the increased revenue gained from stricter enforcement does not enter the expression because it merely represents a transfer among the economy s identical agents

a larger slice or a larger pie an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel this research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model we use the nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics the parties bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side the more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option the weaker the bargaining position we use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years firm size increases store brand introductions and service level differentiation in our empirical analysis of the german market for coffee we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer retailer pairs this result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner we are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits

a behavioral perspective on negotiating international alliance this study examines the influence tactics of senior u s executives in negotiating international business alliances the strategy literature on alliances and the behavioral literature on negotiations were incorporated into a behavioral model of alliance negotiations constructs identified from transaction cost power dependence and game theories were integrated and linked to hypotheses describing negotiators influence tactics in alliance negotiations in examining eighty three alliance negotiations negotiator trust perception of a partner firm s alternatives conflict frame time horizon and cultural distance were found to affect negotiators tactics

concentration profitability and trade in a simultaneous equation analysis the case of taiwan this paper is the first attempt to use a simultaneous four equation system to study the role of foreign trade in the analysis of market structure and performance and the determinants of trade intensity in a newly industrializing country taiwan a cross sectional analysis is carried out with the manufacturing censuses of 1976 the results indicate that public enterprises significantly influence market structures and performance also import control measures influence import intensity significantly and offset potential impacts of imports on concentration and on profitability however trade intensity is mainly explained by comparative advantage rather than market forces concentration and profitability

the determination of profit margins in uk manufacturing this paper examines the determinants of profit margins in 91 u k manufacturing industries over the period 1983 86 it considers how the inclusion of labor market characteristics in empirical industrial organization specifications affects the estimated concentration margins relationship the empirical work pays detailed attention to the endogenous nature of variables derived from structural industrial organization models the authors report instrumental variables estimates of margins equations in which there emerges a significant role for labor market characteristics indeed both unionization and industrywide unemployment are found to depress profit margins the impact of concentration is seen to be biased downward when these variables are omitted

tax evasion with labour income allingham and sandmo s 1972 classic paper on tax evasion set out a simple framework for looking at the effects of regular tax parameters and of the structure of penalties on the amount of tax dodging carried out by a tax evader subsequent papers have enriched the basic model of individual behaviour and have attempted to adduce some empirical evidence 2 but with few exceptions the essential nature of the assumed underlying problem has remained the same how much income shall i reveal to the authorities in the face of the known penalties and the known possibility of getting caught whilst this approach is useful for some types of tax evasion by individuals it is clearly inappropriate for others such as the phenomenon of working off the books rather than concealing a portion of a uniform lump of income that is undistinguished as to its source the person cheats the government by taking one or more different jobs either in addition to or as a replacement for his regular employment the income from which is administratively difficult to tax this paper examines the implications of the possible diversity of form of the tax evasion problem for the analysis of the fundamental questions which allingham and sandmo addressed the effect of government instruments on the incentives to participate in legal and illegal work activities to do this we must concentrate on one major development of the original model namely that where income is endogenous in effect we construct a particular version of the analysis of labour supply under uncertainty within which to

the response of exchange rate pass through to market concentration in a small economy the evidence from korea this paper finds that domestic market concentration in korea a small country systematically affects pass through of individual industries the estimates suggest that exchange rates are only partially passed on to import prices in korea the evidence implies that imperfect competition is relevant for the exchange rate pass through even in a small economy this finding has important implications for issues such as inflationary effects of depreciation and the effect of trade liberalization

pigouvian taxation with administrative costs abstract this paper examines how the optimal pigouvian tax should be adjusted to reflect adminisrative costs several cases are examined depending on whether the administrative costs are fixed per firm taxed or are a function of the amount of tax collected and on whether such costs are borne by the government or by the taxed firm in some cases the presence of administrative costs leads to an optimal tax greater than the external cost while in other cases it leads to a tax less than the external cost

the ability of nash s theory of cooperative games to predict the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations a dyad level test this research develops and implements a dyad level procedure for testing whether the outcomes of buyer seller negotiations correspond to settlements prescribed by nash s theory of cooperative games the procedure entails a multivariate statistical test in which some parameters are estimated by simulation while others are provided directly from the assessment of negotiator utility functions by means of conjoint analysis the procedure is applied to an experiment in which subjects participated in a realistic role playing exercise that replicated the purchase of television advertising time results indicate that at the 0 01 significance level 57 8 of the dyads can be rejected as not having achieved nash solutions these results and their implications for marketing practitioners as well as future research are discussed

optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between optimal taxation and optimal tax enforcement a central question concerns the extent to which revenue should be raised through higher tax rates which distort behavior or greater enforcement which distorts behavior and also entails direct resource costs in the models examined some expenditure on enforcement may be optimal despite its resource cost its distortionary effect and the availability of other revenue sources having no enforcement costs rules for optimal tax rates and enforcement expenditures are derived which also indicate the marginal cost of government funds and optimal enforcement priorities for a tax collection agency

the importance of others welfare in evaluating bargaining outcomes this research proposes that negotiators consider each other s payoffs in their evaluation of potential settlements beyond the level necessary to maintain the bargaining relationship we further hypothesize that the way in which negotiators weight their opponents payoffs relative to their own is a function of characteristics of the relationship and of the bargainers personalities specifically we consider liking of the other party payoff expectations satisfaction with past settlements the likelihood of future negotiations egocentricity and power orientation we demonstrate the impact of these factors on the satisfaction negotiators derive from profiting more and less than their opponents using data from an experiment in which subjects negotiate with computer simulated opponents

optimal taxation capital mobility and tax evasion the problem of capital flight and tax evasion is of paramount concern to many countries the fear is that capital mobility may lead to capital flight from high to low tax countries in such large amounts that it deprives a nation of its tax base and as a consequence its welfare system today s international climate where bank secrecy laws protect foreign investors anonymity in addition to substantial differences in national tax rates makes this fear a reality capital flight and tax evasion are also of concern from an equity as well as an efficiency point of view to the extent that labor cannot evade taxation as easily as capital labor is subject to higher effective tax rates than capital the presence of capital flight therefore imposes a higher tax burden on immobile factors and creates inequality giovannini 1989 and razin and sadka 1991 have recently studied the welfare effects of capital flight both studies are undertaken from the extreme assumption that foreign savings cannot be taxed and hence that tax evasion is undetectable and costless although evidence suggests that governments have difficulties taxing foreign source income governments derive positive tax revenue from foreign source income this paper thus adopts a different perspective capital flight and tax evasion are viewed as problems of tax enforcement the purpose of the paper is to analyze the intertemporal savings decision of an individual who can allocate consumption between two periods by borrowing and lending abroad and domestically it is assumed that foreign savings can evade taxation with a certain probability depending on the amount of money the government allocates to tax enforcement within this setting we investigate how taxes on foreign and domestic savings should be set optimally and how much money if any the government should allocate to tax enforcement

a bargaining model for a first time interaction under asymmetric beliefs of supply reliability we consider the case of a first time interaction between a buyer and a supplier who is unreliable in delivery the supplier declares her estimate of the ability to meet the order obligations but the buyer may have a different estimate which may be higher or lower than the suppliers estimate we derive the nash bargaining solution and discuss the role of using a down payment or nondelivery penalty in the contract for the case of buyer overtrust the down payment contract maximizes channel profits when the suppliers estimate is public information if the suppliers estimate is private information a nonsymmetric contract is shown to be efficient and incentive compatible for the case of buyer undertrust the contract structure is quite different as both players choose not to include down payments in the contract when delivery estimates are public information a nondelivery penalty contract is able to maximize channel profits if the buyer uses the suppliers estimate in making the ordering decision if estimates are private information channel profits are maximized only if the true estimates of both players are not far part we also discuss the effect of different risk profiles on the nature of the bargaining solution in three extensions of the model we consider the following variants of the basic problem first we analyze the effect of early versus late negotiation on the bargaining solution then we study the case of endogenous supply reliability and finally for the case of repeated interactions we discuss the impact of updating delivery estimates on the order quantity and negotiated prices of future orders

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

guarantees in auctions the auction house as negotiator and managerial decision maker the multimillion dollar price guarantees that an auction house can offer for paintings have already had a large impact on auction house profits and place new demands on the auctioneer s decision making and negotiating skills yet auctioneers have not been studied as independent entities and decision makers to create a price guarantee the auction house and the seller must negotiate both the guarantee amount and the extra commission the seller pays if the auction price exceeds the guarantee we present a normative model of negotiations and find the frontier of guarantee and commission that is the nash bargaining solution we also determine the optimal reserve that the auctioneer should place on guaranteed property we find that guarantees decrease the auction house s expected revenue compared to a conventional auction but do allow it to attract business which might otherwise be lost guarantees benefit sellers increasing the expected value and lowering the variance of their auction revenue the auctioneer s optimal strategy depends not only on the distribution of the artwork s auction price but also the price it will bring if it fails to sell at auction in the latter case the auction house must pay the seller the guarantee and then sell the artwork which it now owns in a private secondary market where buyers regard the property as damaged goods and lower their offers although all points on the frontier produce equal expected revenue several frequently used decision making rules suggest that both parties may prefer a guarantee arrangement where the seller pays no additional commission and the guarantee has the lowest value on the frontier

serial correlation and the fixed effects model this paper generalizes the durbin watson type statistics to test the ols residuals from the fixed effects model for serial independence also generalized are the tests proposed by sargan and bhargava for the hypothesis that the residuals form a random walk a method for efficient estimation of the parameters is also developed finally an earnings function is estimated using the michigan survey of income dynamics in order to illustrate the uses of the tests and the estimation procedures developed in this paper

tax evasion inflation and stabilization abstract this paper focuses on the public resort to tax evasion in developing countries as an adjustment tactic during economic downturn we show using a theoretical model of intertemporal consumption that tax compliance declines when current income declines expectations about future income improve or inflation rises we then apply the model empirically to the cases of argentina brazil and chile three countries which have long experience with tax evasion and inflation over the last 40 years and find confirmation

vertical integration input contracts and the margins concentration relationship in recent years it has become common when specifying empirical price cost margins to use net output as opposed to the more usual gross output in the denominator it has been noted that with gross output as the denominator the point estimate on concentration from a regression of margins on concentration is lower than with net output as the denominator and the estimate is frequently insignificant the possible explanations that have been put forward to explain this empirical phenomenon are discussed and evidence is presented using data from the uk census of production and the uk input output tables neither theoretical nor empirical justification is found for the use of the adjusted margin but instead it is suggested that the empirical phenomenon is caused by the omission of appropriate variables to control for contracting relations in purchasing intermediate inputs

the competitive structure of u s agricultural exports the competitive structure of u s agricultural exports is examined using a model of exporter behavior based on pricing decisions across destination markets market power is revealed in the adjustment patterns of export prices in response to exchange rate movements the results reject the hypothesis that the export pricing decisions by u s firms are consistent with price discrimination across destination markets for cotton corn and soybeans the strongest evidence against the competitive market structure is obtained for international trade in wheat where results indicate that the two largest importers soviet union and prc may exert market power to obtain lower prices

labour s share market structure and trade unionism abstract using british manufacturing data this paper tests kalecki s degree of monopoly theory of the determination of factor incomes the paper demonstrates how both product market structure captured by the live firm concentration ratio and trade unionism measured by collective bargaining agreements shape production worker wage share we report estimates in which it emerges that there is an important role for seller concentration in influencing wage share but the estimated trade union coverage results are less robust our tests reveal that once idiosyncratic industry effects and accounted for the union effect on wage share disappears

international capital tax evasion and the foreign tax credit puzzle in this paper we examine how the presence of international tax evasion affects the choice of a foreign tax credit by a capital exporting region since the credit raises the opportunity cost of concealing foreign source income it can be employed to discourage evasion activity international tax evasion can thus help to rationalize the adoption of a tax credit in excess of a deduction equivalent rate jel classification h21 h26 evasion fiscale pour le capital international et le probleme du credit d impot pour le fardeau fiscal a l etranger ce memoire examine comment la presence d evasion fiscale pour le capital international affecte le choix du credit d impot pour le fardeau fiscal a l etranger par une region qui exporte du capital puisque le credit d impot accroit le cout d opportunite du camouflage de la source etrangere de revenus c est une technique qui peut etre employee pour decourager l evasion fiscale voila qui peut expliquer qu on adopte un credit d impot qui est plus genereux que ce qui constituerait la deduction dans un systeme ou le fardeau fiscal a l etranger est simplement deduit du revenu imposable

the effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement evidence from a natural experiment in china abstract this paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the agricultural taxes in 2005 across china on county governments incentives for tax enforcement i show that the revenue loss of county governments was largely offset by tougher tax enforcement the incentive for vat enforcement can be weakened however if the county 1 receives a lower share of total vat revenues 2 has a broader vat tax base or 3 has more abundant sources of revenue from land sales these findings suggest that incentives of local governments can be vital to tax enforcement and to the tax capacity of a country

if agricultural land taxation is so efficient why is it so rarely used the land tax enjoys a distinguished pedigree in the theoretical literature on tax efficiency yet it is rarely used as a serious revenue source in rural areas of developing countries this article considers three drawbacks of the land tax relative to taxes on exports or marketed output 1 capitalization effects of the land tax impose a large burden on the current generation 2 land taxation increases the riskiness of net farmer income and 3 administration of the land tax entails costly informational requirements this article demonstrates that only the second and third drawbacks are valid economic arguments against the land tax simulations based on an economic model of farm behavior suggest that farmers may still prefer a land tax to an export tax despite the increased uncertainty of their after tax income administrative costs are therefore the best explanation of the weak link between the theoretical and practical aspects of land taxation

predicting joint choice using individual data choice decisions in the marketplace are often made by a collection of individuals or a group examples include purchase decisions involving families and organizations a particularly unique aspect of a joint choice is that the group s preference is very likely to diverge from preferences of the individuals that constitute the group for a marketing researcher the biggest hurdle in measuring group preference is that it is often infeasible or cost prohibitive to collect data at the group level our objective in this research is to propose a novel methodology to estimate joint preference without the need to collect joint data from the group members our methodology makes use of both stated and inferred preference measures and merges experimental design statistical modeling and utility aggregation theories to capture the psychological processes of preference revision and concession that lead to the joint preference results based on a study involving a cell phone purchase for 214 parent teen dyads demonstrate predictive validity of our proposed method

exchange rate pass through abstract the resilience of trade balances of the major industrialized economies to changes in their exchange rates has evoked interest in the exchange rate pass through relationship so far there has not been a comprehensive survey of this literature the paper aims to fill this gap in two ways first it pieces together the theoretical literature on exchange rate pass through second it provides a critical survey of the empirical literature on exchange rate pass through emphasis is placed on the data and methodology employed in previous work this is done in order to guide future work in this growing area of research

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

founding family leadership and industry profitability in this article we argue that firms in high margin industries can benefit from founding family influence specifically in more profitable markets the influence of the founding family provides an additional corporate governance monitoring function the sample consists of 294 firm year observations from 98 publicly traded companies headquartered in sweden representing approximately half of all non financial traded firms our support that the effect of family leadership in publicly held firms should be assessed in relation to the intensity of industry competition

exchange rates market structure and price cost margins evidence from a developing country this paper analyses the sensitivity of firm performance to exchange rate fluctuations in a two country world consisting of a developing domestic country and a developed foreign country we show that this sensitivity is closely related with market structure and the share of imported inputs in total cost when the share of imported inputs is low depreciation leads to an increase in price cost margin this increase intensifies in more competitive industries when the imported input share is high the price cost margin may decrease as a result of depreciation and this effect becomes pronounced in more competitive industries the empirical test where we used 3 digit turkish manufacturing industry data support most of the findings of our model

the empirical specification of price cost margins abstract this paper examines why results for profit margin regressions may depend on whether the margin is deflated by industry sales or value added it attributes disparate results to stage of production effects which occur because the price elasticity of demand is an omitted variable

margins concentration unions and the business cycle theory and evidence for britain abstract a number of recent studies have examined the cyclical relationship between price cost margins concentration and unions u s data has concluded that unions reduce margins margins vary over the cycle and concentration unionisation and the cycle interact in their effect on margins however there is almost no theory to account for these results we propose a simple theory that assumes only that there is overhead labour present at the firm this produces theoretical predictions that can explain these results and discriminate between existing theories we present results of our own using u k panel data and show similar findings to the u s

tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation abstract this paper incorporates tax evasion into ramsey s optimal taxation problem it provides i a precise and intuitive characterization of the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit probabilities and ii a modified version of the ramsey equation it also proves that in the presence of tax evasion a the well known requirement of proportional reduction in compensated demands b the traditional result on the optimality of uniform taxation when income is exogenous and c the equivalence of wage and uniform commodity taxes are no longer valid

the excess burden of tax evasion an experimental detection concealment contest abstract tax evasion may cause social welfare losses due to the incentives of taxpayers to invest in the concealment and of tax authorities to invest in the detection of tax evasion reducing the investment of both parties at the same time would then lead to a pareto improvement given that concealment and detection costs are hardly measurable in reality we show in a controlled laboratory experiment that the welfare losses from a concealment detection contest depend positively on the prevailing tax rate but not on the penalty which is imposed in case of detected tax evasion hence policy makers who are concerned about socially inefficient concealment and enforcement costs should focus on tax rates rather than penalty rates

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

exchange rate shocks and the speed of trade price adjustment 1 introduction theoretical and empirical work in the international trade literature dealing with the relationship between exchange rate and trade prices has been dominated and guided by the static pass through and profit markup model see e g feinberg 1986 mann 1986 fisher 1989 hooper and mann 1989 knetter 1989 gagnon and knetter 1995 feenstra gagnon and knetter 1996 and lee 1997 the shortcoming of such models is well captured by william branson 1989 p 333 difference in adjustment response signals to me the need for a reconsideration of the theoretical framework for the analysis of the pass through question by now we should be thinking about optimizing price policy for investors and exporters who know that they face an exchange rate that follows some sort of stochastic process over time these differences call for a revision of pass through theory along the lines of time series analysis our explicit incorporation of profit maximizing firms facing adjustment costs develops the model introduced by krugman 1987 it transforms the traditional markup and pass through model to explain from first principles a dynamic markup and a price adjustment speed both depending on fundamental characteristics of the firms involved krugman 1989 concludes his paper on pricing to market by calling for further research on the adjustment cost model regarding the adjustment cost approach he states krugman 1989 p 44 it is still a speculative idea not grounded in solid empirical tests but it is a good story and if it is correct it has extremely important implications for economic policy the present paper provides the quantity adjustment cost approach that krugman calls for as such it complements the work of gagnon 1989 and kasa 1992 while gagnon and kasa employ quantity adjustment cost models with many of the same features as the model developed here they provide only approximate solutions and focus on a quite different set of issues gagnon examines the effect of exchange rate variability on trade volume kasa investigates the importance of mean reversion in exchange rates as an explanation for the pricing to market hypothesis in contrast our focus is on the relation between adjustment speeds and pass through thus our contribution relative to gagnon 1989 and kasa 1992 is that we provide the passthrough issue in a dynamic context with exact analytical solutions that relate the degree of passthrough to adjustment speeds and identify the determinants of commodity specific adjustment speeds in response to exchange rate shocks the remainder of the paper is organized as follows in section 2 we develop a partial equilibrium model taking exchange rates as given of the pricing policies of a profit maximizing firm competing in foreign markets and subject to a convex quantity adjustment cost section 3 develops testable implications directly from the model section 4 discusses the data and empirical methodology for preliminary two stage time series and cross sectional tests section 5 provides the tentative estimation and section 6 concludes 2 a simple partial equilibrium model consider a representative firm producing fox export that maximizes the expected discounted value of infinite horizon real profits the firm generates its revenue abroad in foreign currency it has no influence on the exchange rate may adjust its price at any point in time but is subject to a convex cost of quantity adjustment the firm maximizes where x is the exogenously given real exchange rate at time t we define x as the units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency multiplied by the export destination country s price index and divided by the home country s price index instantaneous profits are discounted at a rate r which is specific to the firm this rate accounts for a standard risk premium inherent in the riskiness of the firm s activities

exchange rates and prices the adjustment of relative prices to exchange rate movements is explained in an industrial organization approach given labor costs in the respective currencies exchange rate movements change costs for firms selling in the home market and thus disturb the industry equilibrium the extent of absolute and relative price adjustment is shown to depend on market integration product substitutability the relative number of domestic and foreign firms and the market structure the impact of exchange rates on prices is illustrated in a variety of approaches including the cournot a dixit and j stiglitz 1977 and s salop 1979 models some empirical evidence is offered in support of the theory copyright 1987 by american economic association