portfolio allocation as leadership strategy intraparty bargaining in japan how do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within parties while much of the existing literature focuses on portfolio allocation among parties in coalition governments bargaining over cabinet portfolios also takes place within parties because many parties have internal divisions or factions that influence these decisions by analyzing data on portfolio allocation in the liberal democratic party of japan from 1960 through 2007 this study demonstrates that contrary to the proportionality proposition gamson s law substantial variance exists in allocation outcomes over time because party leaders allocate cabinet portfolios among factions as a means of preventing defections and challenges from their party s members the resulting portfolio allocation reflects the bargaining dynamics within the party i find that party leaders surrender more portfolios as they become more vulnerable to challenges posed by internal rivals

how should control theory be used to calculate a time consistent government policy we study different solutions to a simple one dimensional linear quadratic game with a large number of private agents and a government a time consistent solution is defined as a solution to the hamilton jacobi bellman equation i e as a policy for which the government has noprecommitment capability this solution is compared to a policy where the government has an instantaneous pre commitment i e an equilibrium in which the government has a period by period leadership in both cases we show how control theory should be applied to calculate the equilibrium and how to relate these equilibria to the differential game literature

ten commandments for a fiscal rule in the e m u abstract fiscal rules in a monetary union should 1 be simple 2 ensure the solvency of the state 3 relate to the consolidated general government and central bank 4 be neutral as regards the size of the public sector 5 avoid pro cyclical behaviour of the fiscal policy instruments 6 make sense also in the long run 7 allow for important differences in economic structure and initial conditions 8 aggregate into behaviour that makes sense at the level of the union as a whole 9 be credible and 10 be enforced impartially and consistently the paper reviews the rules of the stability and growth pact the uk s golden rule and sustainable investment rule and buiter and grafe s permanent balance rule and enhanced permanent balance rule from the perspective of how well they meet these 10 criteria key words fiscal rules stability and growth pact golden rule financial sustainability journal of economic literature classification system e61 e62 e63 f33 f42 h62 h87 e32 e42 willem h buiter european bank for reconstruction and development one exchange square london ec2a 2jn united kingdom tel 44 0 20 7336 6805 fax 44 0 20 7338 6110 1 e mail buiterw ebrd com office e mail willembuiter whsmithnet co uk home www http www nber org wbuiter

current account imbalances and financial integration in the euro area abstract while the current account of the euro area as a whole has remained almost balanced in the past two decades several member countries have sizeable deficits or surpluses in this paper we interpret these imbalances as indicators of net capital flows among the euro area countries we distinguish between balances against the euro zone and the rest of the world and examine these for the eu 15 countries we find that for euro members the net flows follow differences in per capita incomes even before the introduction of the euro our results show further that with the introduction of the common currency the elasticity with respect to per capita incomes of net capital flows within the euro area has increased for the members of the euro zone this increase can neither be observed for the flows between the euro members and the rest of the world nor for the flows between the countries that stayed outside the monetary union and the euro zone we interpret this as evidence for increasing financial integration in the euro area there is also some evidence suggesting that the introduction of the euro has led to some financial diversion

european economic governance the berlin washington consensus this paper argues that the european union has gone farther than any other country or institution in internalizing the prescriptions of the washington consensus embedding neo liberal principles in the treaties defining its governance the eu has enshrined a peculiar doctrine within its constitution we further argue that this berlin washinghton consensus has serious empirical and theoretical flaws as its reliance on pareto optimality leads to neglect the crucial links between current and potential growth we show by means of a simple model that the call for structural reforms as an engine for growth may be controversial once current and potential output are related we claim that adherence to the consensus may go a long way in explaining the poor growth performance of the european economy in the past two decades because of the constraints that it imposed on fiscal and monetary policies the same constraints have deepened the eurozone crisis that started in 2007 putting unwarranted emphasis on austerity and reform challenging the consensus becomes a precondition for avoiding the implosion of the euro and recovering growth

determinants of levered portfolio performance the cumulative return to a levered strategy is determined by five elements that fit together in a simple and useful formula a previously undocumented element is the covariance between leverage and excess return to the fully invested source portfolio underlying the strategy in an empirical study of volatility targeting strategies over the 84 year period 1929 2013 this covariance accounted for a reduction in return that substantially diminished the sharpe ratio in all cases

reputation and time consistency recent work has shown that reputational arguments based on trigger strategies can sometimes be used to deal with the problem of time inconsistency in government policy this idea was exploited by robert barro and david gordon 1983 in a model of inflation and by v v chari and patrick kehoe 1988 in a model of capital taxation here it is shown that reputational arguments of this sort are widely applicable 2 a general policy model is developed based on an economy that is stationary over time contains identical households and has no endogenous state variables it is shown in general that the infinite horizon version of this model has equilibria in trigger strategies that yield outcomes strictly better than those attainable as equilibria in the one period model

price differentials in monetary unions the role of fiscal shocks we study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for 47 us states and 9 eu countries we identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamics of expenditures revenues deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics one for the average and one for each unit which optimally weight information contained in the data for all units on average expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses the negative price differentials responses in some units is partially explained by spillovers and labour supply effects

all that s gold does not glitter spurred by economic uncertainty interest in precious metals has increased dramatically investors target precious metal funds for two primary reasons 1 to capture an expected appreciation in pr

international risk sharing and european monetary unification abstract we explore income and consumption smoothing patterns among european community ec countries and among oecd countries during the period 1966 90 we find that for oecd as well as for ec countries about 40 percent of shocks to gdp are smoothed at the one year frequency with about half the smoothing achieved through national government budget deficits and half by corporate saving at the three year differencing frequency only 25 percent of shocks to gdp are smoothed mainly via government lending and borrowing in the absence of alternative income and consumption smoothing mechanisms the restrictions on budget deficits imposed by the maastricht treaty should be relaxed to allow governments to run large temporary deficits in response to output shocks

an early warning system for predicting systemic banking crises in the eurozone a logit regression approach abstract eurosystem macroprudential policies require shared action between national authorities and the european central bank ecb this has created the need for a common basis for macroprudential analysis and as result the macroprudential database mpdb was created by the ecb and the european systemic risk board esrb in 2015 in order to support the central bank s functions and esrb s needs this paper examines a multivariate binary logit early warning model ewm for systemic banking crises with the aim to evaluate the predictive validity of the risk indicators included in the mpdb as well as further variables not employed in previous relevant studies the main finding is that most of the risk indicators employed from mpdb are important for forecasting from 4 to 1 years before the onset of a systemic banking crisis specific banking variables that capture industry concentration assets funding and liquidity are more important on average than macroeconomic variables important financial stress indicators such as clifs and sovciss and economic expectations are also significant the model is robust to various specifications and has a better performance when post crisis observations are not included

interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal policies we consider monetary scal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the scal with both policies discretionary 1 nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities 2 of the two leadership possibilities scal leadership is generally better with scal discretion monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks but scal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion second best outcomes require either joint commitment or identical targets for both authorities output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative or complete separation of tasks jel e61 e63

the effects of public spending shocks on trade balances and budget deficits in the european union we investigate the consequences of an increase in public spending for trade balances and budget deficits in the european union using a panel var approach whereas the literature tends to treat the trade balance gdp ratio as a single variable we include exports and imports as separate variables this allows us to track in more detail the sources of trade balance movements further we use annual rather than quarterly data this facilitates the interpretation of the shocks and reduces potential anticipation effects of fiscal policy changes however the identification assumptions become stronger and we extensively check their validity according to our baseline estimate a 1 gdp increase in public spending produces a 1 2 on impact with a 1 6 peak rise in gdp rising imports and falling exports are responsible for a fall of the trade balance by 0 5 of gdp on impact and a peak fall of 0 8 in addition the spending increase produces a 0 7 impact and peak budget deficit thereby pointing to the potential relevance of the twin deficits hypothesis for the european union jel e62 h60

external imbalances in the eurozone the paper examines the extent to which current account imbalances of euro area countries are related to intra euro area factors and to external trade shocks we argue that the traditional explanations for the rising imbalances are correct but are incomplete we uncover a large impact of declines in export competitiveness and asymmetric trade developments vis a vis the rest of the world x96 in particular vis a vis china central and eastern europe and oil exporters x96 on the external balance of euro area debtor countries while current account imbalances of euro area deficit countries vis a vis the rest of the world increased they were financed mostly by intra euro area capital inflows in particular by the purchase of government and financial institutions securities and cross border interbank lending which permitted external imbalances to grow over time ruo chen gian maria milesi ferretti and thierry tressel

commodities for the long run using a novel dataset consisting of daily futures prices going back to 1877 we find that returns of commodity futures indices have on average been positive over the long run although return premiums are associated with both carry and spot returns commodity returns in different economic states inflation up down expansion recession vary mostly as a result of moves in the underlying spot price these economic states are important drivers of commodity returns even after conditioning on whether commodity markets are in backwardation or contango the evidence supports commodities as a potentially attractive asset class in portfolios of stocks and bonds

public information private information and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games abstract i study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher order beliefs as the players signals become more and more precise the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals the same condition also determines the convergence of common p belief to common knowledge which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

strategic interactions of fiscal policies in europe a global var perspective abstract the paper analyses the strategic interactions of fiscal policies in the european union context by modelling the interdependencies arising between public and private sectors saving investment balances in a global vector autoregressive framework we use two empirical specifications to reflect some important differences in the sequencing of the policy decision making process in this setting we draw policy implications with respect to fiscal policy coordination and fiscal policy discretion we highlight the importance of several factors such as global capital flows uncertainty with respect to policy actions and nature of the shocks as key elements defining the dimension of the prevailing policy tradeoffs

thousands of models one story current account imbalances in the global economy the global financial crisis has led to a revival of the empirical literature on current account imbalances this paper contributes to that literature by investigating the importance of evaluating model and parameter uncertainty prior to reaching any firm conclusion we explore three alternative econometric strategies examining all models selecting a few and combining them all out of thousands or indeed millions of models a story emerges the chance that current accounts were aligned with fundamentals prior to the financial crisis appears to be minimal

diversification return portfolio rebalancing and the commodity return puzzle diversification return is an incremental return earned by a rebalanced portfolio of assets the author argues that the underlying source of the diversification return is the rebalancing in contrast the incremental return of a buy and hold portfolio is driven by the fact that the best performing assets become a greater fraction of the portfolio on the basis of these findings the author resolves two aspects of a puzzle associated with gorton and rouwenhorst s index of commodity futures

coordination of fiscal policies in a world economy abstract this paper provides a simple counterexample to the standard belief that in a world economy in which all countries are small strategic interactions between policymarkers are trivial and thus cooperative and non cooperative government policies coincide it is well known that this holds for tariff policies however this paper demonstrates the result does not apply to fiscal policy in addition the paper analyzes how optimally coordinated fiscal policies differ from non cooperative policies it finds that relative to optimally coordinated levels non cooperative government spending can be too high or too low depending on the sign of a transmission effect which captures the overall effect countries actions have on each other

government spending shocks in quarterly and annual time series government spending shocks are frequently identified in quarterly time series data by ruling out a contemporaneous response of government spending to other macroeconomic aggregates we provide evidence that this assumption may not be too restrictive for annual time series data

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

debt crises and risk sharing the role of markets versus sovereigns debt crises and risk sharing role of markets versus sovereigns using a variance decomposition of shocks to gross domestic product gdp we quantify the role of international factor income international transfers and saving in achieving risk sharing during the recent european crisis we focus on the subperiods 1990 2007 2008 2009 and 2010 and consider separately the european countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 we decompose risk sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving and show that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk sharing during the sovereign debt crisis

fiscal policy coordination and emu a dynamic game approach abstract this paper examines the case for fiscal policy coordination in a european economic and monetary union emu a two bloc model with two market structures is examined emu producing a single homogeneous good in both blocs emu1 and a two good emu emu2 where each bloc produces a single home good the european central bank sets monetary policy so as to achieve credibly low inflation rates we find that for emu2 as relative prices can change countries have an incentive to improve their terms of trade leading to an inefficient noncooperative outcome which can be avoided by cooperation

monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers abstract with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership monetary unification reduces inflation taxes and public spending these disciplining effects of a monetary union which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases are likely to raise welfare two types of arrangements are considered for the union s common central bank ccb making the ccb more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the ccb in contrast to the results of svensson 1997 svensson l e o 1997 optimal inflation targets conservative central banks and linear inflation contracts american economic review 87 98 114 an optimally designed conservative ccb may outperform inflation targeting finally we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification hence subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare

estimating the effects of coordinated fiscal actions in the euro area abstract we estimate spillover effects of a fiscal shock in one member country in the euro area on outputs of the rest of the members using a global vector autoregression gvar model we compare the effects of a domestic fiscal shock with those of a similar size area wide shock expressed as a weighted average of the fiscal shocks across all member countries according to our estimates the impact of an area wide fiscal shock on output of a member country tends to be positive and larger than that of a domestic shock since the cost of participating in the area wide shock is lower than the cost of a similar size domestic shock our finding indicates the importance of coordinated fiscal actions in the euro area

the logic of gamson s law pre election coalitions and portfolio allocations gamson s law the proposition that coalition governments will distribute portfolios in proportion to each member party s contribution of seats to the coalition has been one of the most prominent landmarks in coalitional studies since the 1970s however standard bargaining models of government formation argue that gamson s law should not hold once one controls for relevant indicators of bargaining power in this article we extend these bargaining models by allowing parties to form pre election pacts we argue that campaign investments by pact signatories depend on how they anticipate portfolios will be distributed and thus signatories have an incentive to precommit to portfolio allocation rules we show that pacts will sometimes agree to allocate portfolios partly or wholly in proportion to members contributions of seats to the coalition this increases each signatory s investment in the campaign thereby conferring external benefits in the form of a larger probability of an alliance majority on other coalition members empirical tests support the model s predictions

on constraining fiscal policy discretion in emu we review the theoretical and empirical literature on the benefits and costs of imposing restrictions on fiscal policy we emphasize that the arguments in favour of restricting discretion of fiscal policy go beyond the notion of avoiding unsustainable budgetary plans that can lead to pressure on the central bank restrictions on fiscal policy can also be justified on the grounds that discretionary changes in spending or taxes can lead to unnecessary volatility in output and lower economic growth empirically there is evidence that implicit constraints on governments can be as effective as explicit constraints i e rules from the analysis in emu countries in the last 10 years we conclude that there has been a significant change in the conduct of fiscal policy in terms of increased discipline and less use of discretion however since 1999 there are clear signs of fatigue in this process as previous trends have either stopped or even reversed copyright 2003 oxford university press

a unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies the literature on cabinet duration is split between two apparently irreconcilable positions the attributes theorists seek to explain cabinet duration as a fixed function of measured explanatory variables while the events process theorists model cabinet durations as a product of purely stochastic processes in this paper we build a unified statistical model that combines the insights of these previously distinct approaches we also generalize this unified model and all previous models by including 1 a stochastic component that takes into account the censoring that occurs as a result of governments lasting to the vicinity of the maximum constitutional interelection period 2 a systematic component that precludes the possibility of negative duration predictions and 3 a much more objective and parsimonious list of explanatory variables the explanatory power of which would not be improved by including a list of indicator variables for individual countries

the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates a reappraisal fiscal stimuli to recover a cascade of academic and layman articles debate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy backed up by different economic models and empirical support this essay surveys the theoretical predictions and recent empirical vector autoregression var evidence on the short run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates

the costs of coalition coalition theories and italian governments governments in italy both change and remain the same from 1946 to 1992 the christian democratic party always held governing power but almost no cabinet stayed in office more than a few years and many governments collapsed after only a few months how can instability coexist with stability in this way how can governments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation these questions are rooted in but not resolved by the available game theoretic literature on coalitional behavior my answer is that politicians purposive actions can reduce the costs of coalition i argue that the costs of making breaking and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians opportunities and attempts to lower costs under some conditions as i show coalitions are cheap and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper the inference is that this framework comprehends both italy s extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies

diversification returns and asset contributions 1992 diversification returns and asset contributions financial analysts journal vol 48 no 3 pp 26 32