fighting with one hand tied behind the back political budget cycles in the west german states theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre election period only if fiscal transparency is low i argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal electioneering governments may increase spending on highly visible policies the composition of the budget serves as a second best strategy it increases political support without straining the budget balance an empirical analysis of the west german states reveals alternative electoral budget strategies and ultimately point to the importance of analyzing how governments choose between alternative fiscal instruments

political cycles and economic performance in oecd countries empirical evidence from 1951 2006 this paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short term economic performance i employ data on annual gdp growth in 21 oecd countries over the 1951 2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests in countries with two party systems gdp growth is boosted before elections and under leftwing governments in the first two years of a legislative period these findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance my findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short term economic performance

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

the welfare implications of moral hazard and adverse selection in competitive insurance markets i model a competitive insurance market with both moral hazard and adverse selection and analyze the effect on welfare when both problems are present simultaneously an examination of the interaction between these two problems leads to two hypotheses first the nature of the equilibrium contracts is such that each problem partially offsets the welfare loss associated with the other and second the degree to which this occurs increases as agents become more heterogeneous simulation results overwhelmingly support both hypotheses

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

adverse selection repeated insurance contracts and announcement strategy in this note we present a strategy which relies on multi period contracts and on a self selection mechanism which induces the insured to announce his true risk in the first period thus eliminating inefficiency due to adverse selection

market equilibrium with private knowledge the effect of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers on product quality was first explored by akerlof 1970 in his pathbreaking paper on the market for lemons he showed that if all purchasers have imperfect information on quality then a market for the product may not exist or if it does function it may not be efficient these results have led to a number of papers concerning insurance and labor markets under different assumptions regarding how agents discriminate between products of varying quality see pauly 1974 rothschild and stiglitz 1976 wilson 1977 miyasaki 1977 and spence 1978

money and product quality under asymmetric information this article examines the effects of money on product quality as well as the price pattern of heterogeneous quality goods in a search theoretical monetary model with divisible money and divisible commodities we establish the existence and uniqueness multiplicity of monetary equilibrium in several different cases the steady state equilibrium of our model displays several properties that are absent or distinct from those of previous studies in particular we find that under egalitarian bargaining the friedman rule cannot achieve socially efficient allocation due to asymmetric information we find that the price of informed high quality goods is higher than the price of uninformed quality goods we also find that an increase in inflation can improve product quality jel e40

multi period insurance contracts this paper examines the form of insurance contracts in the presence of asymmetric information about consumers accident probabilities our goal is to understand the adjustment in contract terms as a function of accident histories in a finite horizon model we also compare these adjustments between alternative market structures our principal findings indicate that history dependent insurance contracts serve a useful sorting role individuals who declare themselves low risks to insurance companies face adverse contracturai terms if they subsequently have many accidents these adjustments are strongest in the case of a single insurance seller but are present in the competitive model as well

financial intermediation delegated monitoring and long term relationships abstract this paper considers the consequences of enduring relationships for bank structure and policy in an information based banking model adding a richer time dimension allows repeated lending between the intermediary and borrower this contract lets a bank produce information and enforce compliance more easily than direct monitoring of the borrower s organization this implies an asymmetric banking structure banks enter long term relationships with borrowers but not with depositors next it shows how enduring relationships solve problems with loan participations and security underwriting by commercial banks

can group incentives alleviate moral hazard the role of pro social preferences abstract incentivizing unobservable effort in risky environments such as in insurance credit and labor markets is vital as moral hazard may otherwise cause significant welfare losses including the outright failure of markets ensuring incentive compatibility through state contingent contracts between principal and agent however is undesirable for risk averse agents we provide a theoretical intuition on how pro social preferences between agents in a joint liability group contract can ensure incentive compatibility two independent large scale behavioral experiments framed in an insurance context support the hypotheses derived from our theory in particular effort decreases when making agents payoff less state dependent but this effect is mitigated with joint liability in a group scheme where agents are additionally motivated by pro social concerns activating strategic motives slightly increases effort further particularly in non anonymous groups with high network strength the results support existing evidence on joint liability groups and further suggest that even if peer pressure to ensure effort provision is absent such group policies can improve efficiency when agents are pro social

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

educational business cycles the political economy of teacher hiring across german states 1992 2004 strong institutional constraints and better informed voters may lead re election seeking incumbents to shift the use of political business cycle mechanisms away from monetary and fiscal policy towards other policy domains that are more easily manipulable targetable and timeable we investigate teacher employment patterns at the state level in germany and find strong evidence of cycling mechanisms in the form of electioneering and honeymooning against a backdrop of a continuously shrinking total teachers pool german state level incumbents accelerate the hiring of new teachers during election periods and partly reverse this during politically safer points in the electoral cycle cycles are mediated by issue salience heightened attention to german public schooling after the notorious pisa 2000 tests further strengthens the manipulation of new teacher hiring for electoral purposes

electoral cycles in government employment evidence from us gubernatorial elections abstract incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards i investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment around us gubernatorial elections exploiting staggered gubernatorial election cycles across states i use both county fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference in gubernatorial election cycles consistent with manipulation state and local government employment per capita are higher leading up to elections afterwards employment abruptly returns to normal political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated including by election competitiveness term limits incumbent party affiliation and ideological alignment between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens differences across types of government employment and private sector employment are also explored

price discrimination by a many product firm determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unknown tastes is a difficult task this paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products becomes large

search money and inflation under private information abstract i study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods introducing imperfect information in the lagos wright a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis j polit economy 113 3 2005 463 484 economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment in general my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market the proportion of agents holding money is endogenous and depends negatively on the level of expected inflation as in lagos and wright s model in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation but the origins of this cost are very different

money barter and costly information acquisition abstract endogenous information structure is analyzed in a search model of production and exchange under qualitative uncertainty by allowing agents to invest in an inspection technology at a fixed cost where incurring a higher cost permits quality to be recognized with higher probability in any equilibria where agents acquire information some bad commodities are always produced the information acquisition promotes production and exchange of good commodities as the information problem becomes severe money can improve welfare by economizing on information costs in the optimal monetary equilibrium agents adopt trading strategies which contribute to the saving of information costs

self selection and monitoring in dynamic incentive problems with incomplete contracts a dynamic trading problem is examined in which a monopsonistic employer tries to hire workers whose productivities and reservation wages are private information the employer can only observe an employee s quality indirectly by monitoring a non verifiable measure of on the job performance the employer makes contract offers which employees can accept or reject once a contract has been accepted it is impossible for the employer to exchange messages with individual employees on the unique stationary equilibrium path for the contracting game the employer chooses between two mutually exclusive outcomes in the market outcome the employer offers long term contracts and information is conveyed entirely through self selection and delayed production in the monitoring outcome the employer offers short term contracts and contract renegotiation is conditioned by an employee s past performance a simple characterization theorem is provided which illustrates the often surprising effects of improvements in information in this setting for example an employer who is initially offering short term contracts to exploit performance information may stop monitoring and shift to market screening when the monitoring technology becomes more informative

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

electoral cycles in active labor market policies we examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote short term job creation such policies reduce measures of unemployment using german state data for the period 1985 to 2004 we show that election motivated politicians pushed job promotion schemes before elections

money in search equilibrium in competitive equilibrium and in competitive search equilibrium we compare three market structures for monetary economies bargaining search equilibrium price taking competitive equilibrium and price posting competitive search equilibrium we also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry we study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure under bargaining trade and entry are both inefficient and inflation implies first order welfare losses under price taking the friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second and inflation may actually improve welfare under posting the friedman rule yields the first best and inflation implies second order welfare losses

automobile insurance ratemaking in the presence of asymmetrical information automobile insurance is an example of a market where multi period contracts are observed this form of contract can be justified by asymmetrical information between the insurer and the insured insurers use risk classification together with bonus malus systems in this paper we show that the actual methodology for the integration of these two approaches can lead to inconsistencies we develop a statistical model that adequately integrates risk classification and experience rating for this purpose we present poisson and negative binomial models with regression component in order to use all available information in the estimation of accident distribution a bonus malus system which integrates a priori and a posteriori information on an individual basis is proposed and insurance premium tables are derived as a function of time past accidents and the significant variables in the regression statistical results were obtained from a sample of 19 013 drivers

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

political budget cycles the case of the western german lander this paper focuses on the issue of the electoral andideological cycles in state government budget for the elevenwestern german lander we verify this hypothesis over theperiod 1974 1994 for the following budgetary variables totalexpenditures surplus deficit administration health care education roads and social security benefits while overallour results seem to show that generally the party variabledoes not play a systematic role in spending decisions theyprovide some support to the opportunistic cycle theory showingthat the only relevant phenomenon is the effect of theupcoming election on the government spending inclinations

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

electoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities abstractelectoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities regional studies this paper provides evidence that there is an electoral cycle in public administration decisions using data from german local governments in the period 2001 10 specifically it finds that the number of building licences issued by the public administration significantly increases in election years this result is robust to various specification tests and to dealing with the potential endogeneity of the election timing

the dual role of demand deposits under asymmetric information when there is initial asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers accepting checkable deposits can give banks information about the quality of future borrowers hence the two main types of bank activities are complementarities nevertheless it is shown that intermediaries who fund themselves by other means and thus do not get the same borrower information as banks can coexist with banks in equilibrium with the possibility of legally binding contingent contracts banks earn zero expected profits in equilibrium in spite of their information advantage relative to other intermediaries if legally binding contingent contracts are infeasible there may exist an implicit contract equilibrium

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

do constitutions matter evidence from a natural experiment at the municipality level this paper asks if it does matter for taxes and government spending whether the mayor is elected and recalled by direct election or by the municipal council it thus contributes to the economic literature on the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes the effects are identified based on reforms of the municipal constitutions that were exogenous from the point of view of the municipalities in content and timing each year quasi randomly selected groups of municipalities introduced the new constitution this setup helps overcome endogeneity and identification issues that are common to many studies in the field using country level data using a new panel dataset of the 686 municipalities in three german states this paper shows that direct mayoral election and recall through referendum only as opposed to election and recall through the municipal council reduce tax rates and increases spending on government employees

evidence on the incentive properties of share contracts abstract ever since adam smith share contracts have been condemned for their lack of incentives sharecropping tenants face incentives to undersupply productive inputs since they receive only a fraction of the marginal revenue the empirical literature reports that lands under sharecropping are indeed less productive and employ inputs less intensively than those operated by owners this paper shows that 1 sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy are both associated with low quality lands 2 plots under sharecropping and fixed rent present on average the same unconditional productivity 3 controlling for observed land quality and input use their average productivities are also identical to those of owner operated plots and 4 the input choices satisfy the same profit maximization conditions for all land contracts these results challenge the conventional wisdom connecting sharecropping to incentive distortions they support an alternative view that farmers optimally employ more input resources into

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

bank market power and lending during the global financial crisis abstract this research examines how the global financial crisis gfc affected banks supply of credit not only in a direct way but also indirectly through changes in bank market power we use a sample of 735 banks from 17 countries during the 2003 2012 period we find that the direct negative impact of the gfc on banks supply of loans is counteracted by an indirect effect through the increased level of bank market power in the years after the onset of the crisis this result is particularly relevant in countries with less stringent restrictions on bank activities and less supervisory power

moral hazard insurance claims and repeated insurance contracts the paper develops a simple model of repeated automobile insurance contracts providing a framework for analyzing changes in aggregate insurance data in periods of changes that affect driver incentives experience rating of premiums gives drivers an incentive to exert effort to avoid accidents ex ante moral hazard and an incentive to hide accidents ex post moral hazard the empirical analysis using data from the competitive insurance markets in ontario and alberta over a period of major legislative changes in ontario suggests that much of the recent decline in accidents in ontario was due to an increased incentive to hide accidents jel classification d 12 d82 hasard moral reclamations d assurance et contrats d assurance renouveles le texte developpe un modele simple de contrats d assurance automobile renouveles fournissant un cadre d analyse des donnees d assurance agregees dans des periodes de changement qui affectent les incitations des chauffeurs un regime de primes cotees selon l experience donne aux chauffeurs une incitation a faire des efforts pour eviter les accidents hasard moral ex ante et une incitation a cacher qu il y a eu accident hasard moral ex post l analyse empirique utilisant les donnees recueillies dans les marches d assurance con currentiels de l ontario et de l alberta pour une periode au cours de laquelle il y a eu des changements legislatifs majeurs en ontario suggere qu une bonne partie du declin des accidents enregistre en ontario a ete attribuable a une incitation accrue a cacher les accidents

dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection we study a novel dynamic principal agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection persistent as well as repeated in the model an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks one after the other upon arrival of each task the agent learns its level of difficulty and then chooses whether to accept or refuse each task in turn and how much effort to exert although his decision to accept or refuse a task is publicly known the agent s effort level is his private information we characterize optimal contracts and show that the per period utility of the agent approaches his per period utility when his skills are publicly known as the discount factor and the time horizon increase

adverse selection and finite horizon insurance contracts abstract we use a particular contract to analyze three issues regarding adverse selection monopoly and the use of time within a finite horizon the description and existence of an epsilon equilibrium equilibrium the achievement of a nash equilibrium and the optimality of risk revelation among the results obtained we show that at equilibrium low risk individuals buy full insurance most of the time and high risk individuals always buy full insurance we also show that the equilibrium with risk revelation is a nash equilibrium these results are compared with those of the self selection mechanism stiglitz 1977 and of the equilibrium under moral hazard radner 1981

the equivalence of lending equilibria and signalling based insurance under asymmetric information i present a model in which a continuum of individuals have stochastic idiosyncratic income shocks complete insurance is physically feasible but unattainable due to an information asymmetry income shocks are observable only by the individuals receiving them any insurance institution must therefore rely on self reporting of income innovations two ways of achieving incentive compatible self reporting are presented the first is a debt market with an explicit lending restriction the second is an insurance contract that linearly filters a signal transmitted by individuals the two are then demonstrated to be identical equilibrium consumption fluctuates in a random walk which is inefficient given the physical potential for complete insurance but is efficient given the information constraints the results are complementary to those of green 1987 but permit more general stochastic processes of income to be analyzed serial correlation of income reduces the efficiency of the insurance

bargaining and the value of money abstract search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on nash 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica 18 155 162 bargaining or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade by considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first degree importance in monetary economics such as i the efficiency of monetary equilibrium ii the optimality of the friedman rule and iii the welfare cost of inflation

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

currency and credit are equivalent mechanisms i study a pure exchange economy with many agents whose marginal utility of consumption is stochastically heterogeneous and independent of wealth with realized marginal utility of wealth private information i show that currency and credit are equivalent to a contract that is efficient when the privacy of information is viewed as a constraint and that the cash in advance constraint is an expression of an incentive constraint

collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring abstract this paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs prices nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm s continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms the mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by harrington and skrzypacz 24

a model of the threat of counterfeiting abstract a simple matching model of money with the potential for counterfeiting is constructed in contrast to the existing literature lotteries are included these provide scope for the operation of the intuitive criterion of cho and kreps the application of that refinement is shown to imply that there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting if the cost of producing counterfeits is low enough then there is no monetary equilibrium otherwise there is a monetary equilibrium without counterfeiting in other words the threat of counterfeiting can eliminate the monetary equilibrium

political budget cycles and divided government abstractpolitical budget cycles and divided government regional studies this study empirically examines the effect of divided governments on the existence of political budget cycles it uses a setting at the german municipality level where divided governments occur frequently and can be clearly disentangled from the underlying political system in this setting the executive does not have full discretion over expenditures and tax rates and needs support from the legislative to manipulate policy before executive elections the study shows that political budget cycles in expenditures and tax rates are more likely when the same party controls executive and legislative under divided government policy manipulation is significantly smaller

unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring we show that any correlated equilibrium payoff of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring and without discounting can be reached as the nash equilibrium payoff of the game extended by a universal mechanism of unmediated communication this result holds regardless the particular concept of equlibrium involved upper lower banach or uniform equlibrium the communication mechanism is built up by using commutative one way functions these functions are designed with the help of cryptographic tools

short term contracting and strategic oil reserves the effect of short term contracting on resource extraction is studied in a two country model of international trade in oil countries planners are assumed to be fully rational with perfect information and perfect foresight contracts are assumed perfectly enforceable and complete except that short term contracts do not allow commitments to actions taken beyond the contract period we show that short term contracting limits countries opportunities for intertemporal consumption smoothing reducing their collective tolerance for temporal variation in consumption this tends to make them extract more slowly than in the efficient plan that results from long term contracting contractual relationships often outlive the contracts that govern them it is therefore common for a long term relationship to be governed by a sequence of short term contracts when these contracts allow complete control of the organization of the relationship within each contract period any outcome that can be achieved in a long term contract covering the entire life of the relationship is also feasible with a sequence of short term contracts short term contracting can nevertheless have significant effects on resource allocation because each contract must be voluntarily negotiated in the environment created by its predecessors an allocation that is acceptable to both parties as a long term contract might not be voluntarily negotiable as a sequence of short term contracts because short term contracting is so prevalent it is worth asking what sorts of relationship can be organized efficiently only by long term contract and what kinds of distortion are caused by short term contracting two kinds of answers to these questions have been given in the literature one important line of investigation considers the use of memory in contracts designed to control parties incentives under asymmetric information baron and besanko 1985 rubinstein and yaari 1983 sanchez and zapater 1985 stiglitz and weiss 1983 tirole 1986 and townsend 1982 among others have shown how parties can use

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

search bargaining money and prices under private information this paper presents a model of money and search where bargaining determines prices and the quality of goods is private information it studies how a lemons problem affects the purchasing power of money there are multiple pareto ranked equilibria the superior equilibrium where no lemons are produced exists even if information about quality is relatively scarce in other equilibria there is price dispersion and uninformed buyers pay higher prices than informed buyers for all goods taxing money balances a proxy for inflation makes buyers less selective thus reducing the average quality of supply and the premium paid for known quality

money and information this paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply when the fraction of high quality producers in the economy is given money promotes the production of high quality goods which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously when this fraction is endogenous however we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium the origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low quality producers which can result in a higher fraction of low quality producers in the monetary equilibrium finally we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium consequently money is welfare enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange but not because it saves information costs

the effect of information sharing between lenders on access to credit cost of credit and loan performance evidence from a credit registry introduction abstract using a rich dataset from a commercial bank in albania we utilize the introduction of a public credit registry by the albanian central bank in january 2008 as a natural experiment to analyze the effect of information sharing between lenders on 1 access to credit 2 cost of credit and 3 loan performance our results suggest that information sharing by means of a credit registry does not affect access to or cost of credit but improves loan performance specifically loans granted after the introduction of the credit registry are 3 points less likely of turning problematic representing a 35 reduction of the overall sample average arrear probability we further find that the effect is more pronounced for repeat borrowers and in areas where competition is weak this indicates that information sharing among lenders improves loan performance mainly by disciplining borrowers to repay in their concern about future access to credit

the political economy of the german lander deficits weak governments meet strong finance ministers we analyse the deficits of the german lander regional states for the period 1960 to 2005 and test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on the political economy of public deficits we find evidence for the weak government hypothesis that is coalition governments issue significantly more debt than single party governments a result that is typically explained by the common pool problem as our data suggest this result crucially hinges on the position or strength of the finance minister within coalition governments we find that coalition governments with a strong finance minister are in terms of borrowing not significantly different from single party governments in addition we find weak evidence for an opportunistic political business cycle as borrowing is significantly lower in pre election years it appears that german voters favour fiscal discipline there is no evidence for partisan behaviour so party ideology seems to play a negligible role

partisan alignment effects on total factor productivity aray h partisan alignment effects on total factor productivity regional studies unlike the literature on political effects on real economy that suggests that partisan effects accrue through aggregate demand it is hypothesized that such effects could also accrue through aggregate supply using panel data for the spanish regions over the 1986 2010 period the main results are 1 partisan alignment effects only arise when central government enjoys a majority 2 there exist a positive contemporaneous effect and negative lagged effects and 3 in absolute value such effects vanish over time results are robust to different specifications and measures of total factor productivity tfp and methods of estimation

search based models of money and finance an integrated approach many applications in monetary economics of search and bargaining theory use shi trejos wright hereafter stw many applications in finance use duffie g rleanu pedersen hereafter dgp these models share several features and both concern liquidity yet they also differ in stw agents use assets as payment instruments when trading goods in dgp they pay with goods or transferable utility when trading assets we integrate the two this clarifies connections between the literatures and generates novel insights several new results are provided for the baseline stw and dgp models while the integrated structure generates even more interesting outcomes including endogenous transactions patterns and belief based dynamics

banking and insurance abstract this paper studies the economic role of financial institutions in economies where agents incomes are subject to privately observable idiosyncratic random events the information structure precludes conventional insurance arrangements however a financial institution perhaps best viewed as a savings bank can provide partial insurance by generating a time pattern of deposit returns that redistributes wealth from agents with high incomes to those with low incomes resulting in a level of expected utility higher than that achievable in simple security markets insurance is incomplete because the bank faces a tradeoff between provision of insurance and maintenance of private incentives

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

repeated insurance contracts with differential learning using principal agent and insurance models several authors recently have shown that inefficiencies arising from asymmetric information between economic agents can be eliminated if the relationship between the agents is enduring and the future is not heavily discounted dionne 1983 radner 1985 radner 1986 rubinstein 1979 rubinstein and yaari 1983 in those models the efficient actions of the parties are common knowledge or it is common knowledge that the party with the private information knows the efficient actions the efficient outcomes are implemented by a statistical scheme comparing realized outcomes with what should have arisen if the efficient actions had been taken this paper studies an insurance model in which the full information efficient actions are not known neither the insurer nor the customer knows the customer s risk characteristics however over time the customer learns about his characteristics and may pass this information on to the insurer though the insurer cannot verify the truthfulness of these reports a customer has good days and bad days on good days it is easier for the customer to prevent accidents the customer s type is the probability with which he has a good day efficient risk sharing between such a risk averse customer and a risk neutral insurer would protect the customer against the randomness in his ability and against loss due to an accident however the insurer appears to be disadvantaged since it cannot observe the customer s actions a moral hazard problem and the customer may become better informed about his own type an adverse selection problem one wonders whether the customer might hide behind a cloak of ignorance about this type in order to exploit his informational advantage in fact i show that in the infinitely repeated model the insurer writing a good faith policy for the customer does implement the full information competitive outcome the insurer takes as true the customer s ability reports and updates its beliefs about the agent s type if the customer s record with the insurer is satisfactory then the insurer offers to this customer the best full information zero profit contract for a customer whose type is given by the mean of these updated beliefs otherwise a high premium is charged until a satisfactory record is regained the martingale version of the law of the iterated

repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard abstract an attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims we argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

pricing weather insurance with a random strike price the ontario ice wine harvest weather insurance within the agricultural sector has been limited by the difficulty in defining the appropriate weather event and in pricing the product we develop a new pricing method for weather insurance under situations where returns depend not only on the occurrence of the weather event but also its timing the method is used to price weather insurance for ice wine because the harvest quantity of grapes for ice wine degrades over time the strike value on the weather event measured as harvestable hours is random we develop a monte carlo method to estimate the premium

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

aggregate fluctuations interest rates and repeated insurance under private information using a linear quadratic framework i show i the formal equivalence of lending and optimal insurance when information about states is private ii that lending equilibria induce the serial correlation patterns of aggregate and individual stochastic processes of consumption to be identical even if the corresponding income processes differ iii the influence of the interest rate and the underlying serial correlation of the aggregate income process on potential insurance available in lending markets iv the breakdown of individual rationality of the repeated private information contract and corresponding equilibria via defection to autarky as an initial exploration of the force needed by an external mechanism that might prevent this defection i analyze the average gain from defection finding that the average gain from defection increases with the serial correlation of idiosyncratic income associating defection with low interest rates