heterogeneous wage effects of apprenticeship training the relatively small average wage effects of employer and occupation changes after apprenticeship training mask large differences between occupation groups and apprentices with different schooling backgrounds people who change employer and occupation within industrial occupations enjoy large wage advantages whereas apprentices in commerce and trading occupations as well as in construction and crafts occupations face wage losses from an occupation change the differences between the firms that provide the apprenticeship training are found to be small or insignificant in this paper we reconcile the differences between previous findings by comparing and replicating the empirical estimation strategies used this demonstrates that selectivity in occupations and changes unobserved heterogeneity between occupations and sample selection do matter

the transition to the knowledge economy labor market institutions and income inequality in advanced democracies the transition from fordism to the knowledge economy in the world s advanced democracies was underpinned by the revolution in information and communications technology ict the introduction and rapid diffusion of ict pushed up wages for college educated workers with complementary skills and allowed top managers and ceos to reap greater rewards for their own talents despite these common pressures income inequality did not rise to the same extent everywhere income in the anglo saxon countries remains particularly unequally distributed to shed new light on this puzzle the authors carry out a panel data analysis of eighteen oecd countries between 1970 and 2007 their analysis stands apart from the existing empirical literature by taking a comparative perspective the article examines the extent to which the relationship between the knowledge economy and income inequality is influenced by national labor market institutions the authors find that the expansion of knowledge employment is positively associated with both the 90 10 wage ratio and the income share of the top 1 percent but that these effects are mitigated by the presence of strong labor market institutions such as coordinated wage bargaining strict employment protection legislation high union density and high collective bargaining coverage the authors provide robust evidence against the argument that industrial relations systems are no longer important safeguards of wage solidarity in the knowledge economy

optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market this article studies optimal linear and non linear redistributive income taxation when there is adverse selection in the labour market unlike in standard taxation models firms do not know workers abilities and competitively screen them through non linear compensation contracts unobservable to the government in a miyazaki wilson spence equilibrium adverse selection leads to different optimal tax formulas than in the standard mirrlees 1971 model because of the use of work hours as a screening tool by firms which for higher talent workers results in a rat race and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross subsidies the most surprising result is that if the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not policies that endogenously affect adverse selection are discussed the model has practical implications for the interpretation estimation and use of taxable income elasticities which are central to optimal tax design

the school to work transition a cross national perspective school to work patterns and issues are discussed for seven economies france germany japan the netherlands sweden the united kingdom and the united states the emphasis is placed on differences across countries in the current labor market position of young people and recent trends therein along with the institutions that regulate youth education training and employment the power of public policies including labor market deregulation labor market programs vocationalization of education and apprenticeship to improve youth outcomes is discussed drawing on national evaluation literatures evidence of extensive policy failure points up the need to develop nationally appropriate institutions to improve school to work transitions

on the job specific training and efficient screening employment relationships are governed by short term incomplete contracts and typically involve on the job screening and firm specific training this article studies a dynamic employment relationship with these features and identifies a potential conflict between the employer s twin objectives to screen and train the worker when the training technology is quite productive the employer may have to sacrifice from worker performance during the screening process the article thus offers an explanation for why firms may invest suboptimally on training which complements the standard inappropriable rents explanation based on ex post mobility of young employees

counteroffers and efficiency in labor markets with asymmetric information this article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker s productivity than potential employers previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker s qualifications as a result assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient i find that when current employers can match outside offers the equilibrium outcome may be efficient i analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers and find these investment levels to be first best

on gender gaps and self fulfilling expectations alternative implications of paid for training i introduction the recent literature on gender differences in the labor market has focused mainly on two issues the first one deals with the mechanisms e g adverse selection that can amplify initial differences in preferences or productivity across genders leading to sizeable gender gaps in wages labor force participation or working hours these models help us understand to what extent changes in gender gaps have been due to changes in fundamentals including differences in the pattern of endogenous accumulation of human capital by men and women 1 the second one is related to the channels explaining persistence in gender gaps even when exogenous differences across the sexes are of little importance or even absent 2 these studies tend to rely upon the existence of incentive problems in the labor market e g moral hazard leading to self fulfilling prophecies about differences in gender roles without assuming any initial comparative advantages our paper falls into this second strand of the literature by considering an alternative mechanism based on statistical discrimination by firms in the provision of paid for training to male and female workers this yields multiplicity of equilibria in gender gaps even in the absence of moral hazard 3 the basic idea in models of gender gaps relying upon self fulfilling prophecies is that employers beliefs about women s lower attachment to the labor market lead to wage differentials in favor of men hence since women expect to face a lower expected opportunity cost they end up devoting more time to housework validating in this way firms beliefs for example albanesi and olivetti 2009 propose a model where firms are subject to incentive compatible constraints due to their imperfect monitoring of workers effort a moral hazard problem and of hours of housework an adverse selection problem as a result different types of labor contracts are offered to men and women in a similar vein lommerud and vagstad 2007 deal with a model where firms allocate workers to fast and slow track jobs the former requiring a fixed investment cost if women have traditionally exerted primary major responsibility at home and wages are non contractible they will predominantly follow a mommy track in equilibrium while incentive problems often used to derive additional predictions on the structure of wages to be confronted with the data provide a useful modeling device they could be somewhat restrictive for instance concerning the difficulty of perfectly monitoring effort pay gaps should be negligible for routine tasks performed by less skilled employees for whom effort and output should be easily observable yet even after removing differences in observable characteristics and in the overall wage dispersion there is evidence about substantial gender gaps in hourly wages in these categories see e g blau and kahn 2000 bassanini and saint martin 2008 de la rica et al 2008 our paper contributes to this literature by proposing a novel mechanism which does not rely on incentive problems we consider a two period model in which firms initially offer paid for training to workers taking as given the division of housework between spouses in the second period spouses decide on how to split the certain and uncertain parts of housework where the latter is captured by the realization of a shock affecting household tasks during this period e g unexpected need of housework or events that require parental leave etc both decisions interact because the housework decision determines whether a spouse works or quits after receiving training and the firm chooses the amount of training without observing the household s housework allocation statistical discrimination arises in this setup as a result of firms prior beliefs about which spouse is more likely to quit the job under the key assumptions that wages are predetermined with respect to housework shocks and that the household does not re optimize after the shock is revealed asymmetric beliefs will induce differences in the provision of training across spouses

firm specific human capital a skill weights approach the theory of human capital is agnostic on what constitutes firm specific skills the theory specifies that specific skills contribute to productivity only at the current firm a broader approach lets all skills be general but firms use them with different weights attached for example computer programming economics and accounting are general skills but there may be only one firm that wants workers trained in all three one implication is that wage profiles and the split of human capital costs depend on thickness of the market another is that firms pay for what appears to be general training

the role of interfirm networks in technological innovation and education this article examines the sociopolitical conditions for preventing market failure in public goods investment based on international social survey program data for 17 advanced industrialized countr

on the job search and moral hazard we analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on the job search in our model agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation at the same time workers do on the job search deferred compensation improves workers incentives to exert effort but distorts their on the job search decisions we show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker firm pair of on the job search is high moreover the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects if firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation fewer firms with vacancies enter the on the job search market and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation these feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria a low turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation and a high turnover equilibrium where they do not furthermore the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on the job search are small

intra firm wage compression and coverage of training costs evidence from linked employer employee data the author uses german linked employer employee data to estimate the impact of intra firm wage dispersion on the probability that establishments pay for further training about half of all establishments in the estimation sample cover all direct and indirect training costs which contradicts the standard human capital approach with perfect labor markets the main finding of cross section panel and instrumental variable probit estimations is that establishments with larger intra firm wage compression are more likely to cover all direct and indirect training costs which is consistent with theoretical considerations of the new training literature about imperfect labor markets

does demand for product quality increase worker training abstract we uniquely examine the relationship between firm organized training and the sensitivity of consumer demand to product quality cross section panel fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates confirm that british workplaces provide more intensive training when their product demand is more sensitive to product quality robustness checks including using alternative key variable definitions and a counterfactual analysis examining the importance of competing on price support this confirmation

up or out contracts a signaling perspective a firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer i argue that this process can be important in environments characterized by up or out contracts in that the retention decision can serve as a signal of productivity the article investigates this argument in an environment where up or out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion

a framework for understanding differences in labor turnover and human capital investment abstract we analyze the causes and the welfare consequences of international differences in labor turnover and human capital investment the framework incorporates different views as special cases conditions are identified under which multiple equilibria or differences in deep economic parameters explain the observed differences in labor practices we show that when there is an informational problem regarding job changing workers quality general human capital like firm specific human capital can also affect labor turnover and that better job matching is obtained at the expense of lower human capital investment given multiple equilibria a high turnover equilibrium is found superior in the pareto sense to a low turnover equilibrium if matching uncertainty is large the reverse is true when matching uncertainty is small

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

does delegation increase worker training we model a principal firm offering training to its agent worker under two alternative organizational structures integration where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker and delegation where the principal cannot overrule the worker s preferred investment project we assume that training reduces the worker s effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit maximizing intensity of training empirical estimates from matched employer employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training this result persists in two cross sections in panel fixed effect estimates and critically in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects jel d21 d22 d23 m53 m54

worker reciprocity and employer investment in training standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training empirical evidence however indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts we propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if the worker is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity a reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm a full return on its investment we present empirical evidence that supports the proposed mechanism workers with a high sensitivity to reciprocity have 15 higher training rates than workers with a low sensitivity to reciprocity

dynamic inefficiencies in an employment based health insurance system theory and evidence we investigate the effects of the institutional settings of the us health care system on individuals life cycle medical expenditures health is a form of general human capital labor turnover and labor market frictions prevent an employer employee pair from capturing the entire surplus from investment in an employee s health thus the pair underinvests in health during working years thereby increasing medical expenditures during retirement we provide empirical evidence consistent with the comparative statics predictions of our model using the medical expenditure panel survey meps and the health and retirement study hrs our estimates suggest significant inefficiencies in health investment in the united states

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

firm sponsored training in regulated labour markets evidence from spain using data from the 1994 european community household panel survey the author examines who receives formal firm sponsored training in spain the author finds that the distribution of firm sponsored training in the work force is uneven and concentrated among more skilled workers in the upper deciles of the wage distribution the data show that the likelihood of receiving firm sponsored training for a low education employee is much lower also the better educated employees in high wage occupations of the largest establishments have higher probabilities of receiving specific training spain has a highly regulated labour market and the labour market frictions and institutions compress and distort the structure of wages however the results suggest that the highly compressed wage structure do not provide firms with the incentive to invest in general training

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

human capital investment under asymmetric information the pigovian conjecture revisited this article investigates how human capital investment labor turnover and wages are jointly determined when the current employer knows more about a worker s productivity than potential employers results derived are quite different from or unexplored by the standard human capital theory we show that the information asymmetry can cause an externality distortion in human capital investment because higher productivity due to the investment may not be recognized by the market the investment level increases in the degree of firm specificity of human capital the underinvestment problem is more severe when human capital is general than when it is firm specific

investment in general training the role of information and labour mobility following the seminal work of becker i964 it is widely accepted in the literature that firms will be unwilling to finance training which workers may use in other firms this paper takes issue with this prediction and suggests that firms will frequently share in the cost of such general training 1 becker argues that a firm which pays for the training of workers in skills of potential use to other firms will lose these workers since other firms bear none of the costs of general training they can attract a worker with such training by outbidding the firm which trained him recognising this absence of property rights over an investment in general training firms will refuse to provide it hence if general training is to take place the trainee will have to pay for it if potential trainees are unwilling or unable to pay general training will not take place a shortage in general training is likely to emerge this may be especially pronounced in developing countries 2 in contrast the outlook for

the layoff rat race we investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs after investments are made firms may have to lay off workers and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates greater skill investments especially in specific human capital contribute more to a firm s bottom line so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last we show that as long as workers bargaining positions are not too weak workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities indeed workers over invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough even though they only receive a share of any investment more generally we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms the probability that a firm will downsize and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy

general training by firms apprentice contracts and public policy workers will not pay for general on the job training if contracts are not enforceable firms may if there are mobility frictions private information about worker productivities however prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere their new employers then receive external benefits from their training in this paper training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion at these high wages only good workers are retained this signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit regulation of apprenticeship length a historically important feature enhances efficiency appropriate subsidies enhance it further

the impact of product market competition on training provision evidence from canada while standard models of training focus on how input market affects firms training decisions this paper investigates the impact of product market competition on training provision using the longitudinal data from statistics canada s workplace and employee survey we find that increased competition is strongly associated with more training provision this association is unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity specific measures used and other relevant factors to the extent that training is a significant source of human capital and industry competitiveness our results suggest that increasing training is an important channel through which competition raises productivity

employer learning productivity and the earnings distribution evidence from performance measures two ubiquitous empirical regularities in pay distributions are that the variance of wages increases with experience and innovations in wage residuals have a large unpredictable component the leading explanations for these patterns are that over time either firms learn about worker productivity but productivity remains fixed or workers productivities themselves evolve heterogeneously in this paper we seek to disentangle these two models and place magnitudes on their relative importance we derive a dynamic model of learning and productivity that nests both models and allows them to coexist we estimate our model on a 20 year panel of pay and performance measures from a single large firm the baker gibbsholmstrom data incorporating performance measures yields two key innovations first the panel structure implies that we have repeat measures of correlates of productivity as opposed to the empirical evidence on employer learning which uses one fixed measure second we can separate productivity from pay whereas the previous literature on productivity evolution could not we find that both models are important in explaining the data however the predominant effect is that worker productivity evolves idiosyncratically over time implying firms must continuously learn about a moving target therefore while the majority of pay dispersion is driven by variation in individual productivity wages differ significantly from individual productivity at all experience levels due to imperfect information we believe this represents a significant reinterpretation of the empirical literature on employer learning

training and union wages abstract this paper investigates whether unions through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression increase on the job training our analysis focuses on germany based on a model of unions and firm financed training we derive empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training intensity layoffs wage cuts and wage compression in unionized and nonunionized firms we test these implications using firm panel data matched with administrative employee data we find support for the hypothesis that union recognition via imposing minimum wages and wage compression increases training in apprenticeship programs

testing some predictions of human capital theory new training evidence from britain we confront the predictions of various theories with new training data from the british household panel survey we find that employer financed training is associated with significantly higher wages at current and future firms with a larger impact in future firms this is consistent with human capital theory with credit constraints and with the new training literature assuming imperfectly competitive labor markets

bounded rationality and strategic complementarity in a macroeconomic model policy effects persistence and multipliers motivated by recent developments in the bounded rationality and strategic complementarity literatures we examine an intentionally simple and stylized aggregative economic model when the assumptions of fully rational expectations and no strategic interactions are relaxed we show that small deviations from rational expectations taken alone lead only to small deviations from classical policy ineffectiveness but that the situation can change dramatically when strategic complementarity is introduced strategic complementarity magnifies the effects of even small departures from rational expectations producing equilibria with policy effectiveness output persistence and multiplier effects

improving the speed of adoption of agricultural technologies and farm performance through farmer groups evidence from the great lakes region of africa the article examines the effect of membership in farmer groups mfg on adoption lag of agricultural technologies and farm performance in burundi the democratic republic of congo and rwanda we use duration and stochastic production frontier models on farm household data we find that the longer the duration of mfg the shorter the adoption lag and much more so if combined with extension service delivery farmer groups function as an important mechanism for improving farm productivity through reduced technical inefficiency in input use we discuss policy implications under which farmer groups are a useful channel to reduce adoption lag and the means through which improved farm performance can be achieved

do government subsidies stimulate training expenditure microeconometric evidence from plant level data this paper examines whether financial assistance provided by government induces firms to spend more of their own funds on training expenditures using plant level data for the republic of ireland we pay particular attention to the potential problems in such an evaluation study namely selectivity and endogeneity by first identifying a valid counterfactual for grant receiving plants via a matching estimator and then employing a difference in differences technique on this matched sample our results show that there are differences in causal effects between domestic and foreign owned plants for the former we find clear evidence that grant receipt stimulates private expenditure whereas there are no statistically significant effects for foreign owned plants based in ireland

quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory abstract overeducation is an empirical phenomenon in two dimensions qualitative and quantitative quantitative overeducation addresses a firm s decision to train more employees than needed one explanation for this decision is modeled in this article that of classical bargaining power the main idea is that after investing in human capital the employer uses employees outside the firm to raise the bargaining power when he negotiates with the employees within the firm on how to share the profit of the firm to model this we use cooperative game theory for the first time the labor market is modeled by a coalition structure and the payoffs are determined by the value casajus 2009

large firms and within firm occupational reallocation abstract this paper considers the equilibrium interaction between within firm and across firm reallocation in the presence of labor market frictions while a sizable literature has investigated frictional labor markets it has ignored within firm mobility nonetheless every year a sizable fraction of workers switch occupations without changing firms employees in large firms can sample from a larger selection and across firm mobility is replaced by within firm mobility bringing together within and across firm reallocation along with labor market frictions naturally accounts for the observed differences in worker flows and wages across firms of different sizes