aid and sectoral growth evidence from panel data this article examines empirically the proposition that aid to poor countries is detrimental for external competitiveness giving rise to dutch disease type effects at the aggregate level aid is f

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

ex post redistribution in a federation implications for corrective policy abstract this paper analyzes whether changes in the timing of equalizing transfers to state governments necessitate an adjustment in federal corrective policy according to the existing literature assuming an ex ante choice of transfers the corrective grant is equal to the marginal damage benefit inflicted by externality generation when the federal government accommodates state finances ex post the grant differs in formula from existing prescription allocative federal policy corrects state policy incentives twofold it entails a correction for the distortion in the marginal benefit of state spending as in earlier literature and for the distortion in the marginal cost of public funds induced by the ex post provision of transfers the required grant rule is generically disproportionate to the equilibrium externality even with lump sum taxation furthermore the ex post provision of transfers is critical for the nature of the equilibrium inefficiency equalizing transfers at least partly internalize consumption spill overs but simultaneously establishes a new source of inefficiency as a final result the existing prescription for allocative federal policy continues to apply if the public good is pure

evaluating the bank of england density forecasts of inflation we consider evaluating the uk monetary policy committee s inflation density forecasts using probability integral transform goodness of fit tests these tests evaluate the whole forecast density we also consider whether the probabilities assigned to inflation being in certain ranges are well calibrated where the ranges are chosen to be those of particular relevance to the mpc given its remit of maintaining inflation rates in a band around per annum finally we discuss the decision based approach to forecast evaluation in relation to the mpc forecasts

a panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid the donor community has been increasingly concerned that development assistance intended for crucial social and economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive military and other expenditures the link between foreign aid and public spending is not straightforward because some aid may be fungible this article empirically examines the impact of foreign aid on the recipient s public expenditures using cross country samples of annual observations for 1971 90 for the base sample of 14 developing countries it finds that aid is not fungible at the aggregate level and there is no associated tax relief increasing the number of countries however makes aid fungible moreover results based on the main sample indicate that aid is fungible in three out of five sectors examined developing country governments receiving earmarked concessionary loans for agriculture education and energy reduce their own resources going to these sectors and use them elsewhere only loans to the transport and communication sector are fully spent on the purposes intended by donors because most aid appears to be fungible the rate of return on a specific donor funded project tells little about the impact of that assistance a better approach may be to tie foreign aid to an overall public expenditure program that provides adequate resources to crucial sectors

values cultural practices and economic performance theory and some evidence from kenya summary policies saving rates human capital etc are possible explanations for poor economic performance but while these factors are changeable underdevelopment persists looking for an unchangeable factor we construct a theory for the effect of cultural values such as moral values risk taking and responsibility to others on economic performance and demonstrate it using a model in which responsibility for parents prevents development we construct data of economic performance and values of seven tribes in kenya and use it to support the model thus we suggest a methodology for the quantitative analysis of the effect of values over the economy

public goods self selection and optimal income taxation using the self selection approach to tax analysis this paper derives a modified samuelson rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal nonlinear income tax this approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area generalises it and provides a simple characterisation of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances the analysis also emphasises and clarifies the significance of the choice of numeraire for the optimality of decentralising public spending decisions it is well known that the famous samuelson rule for the provision of public goods may not be applicable when the tax revenues used to finance the public goods come from distorting taxes the principle was recognized as long ago as pigou 1947 long before the samuelson rule was devised pigou saw that in addition to the resource cost involved in transferring funds from the private to the public sector there was a deadweight loss involved from this insight he suggested that the criterion for providing public goods should be more stringent than the samuelson rule would later suggest in particular one might expect that the inclusion of the deadweight loss of taxes as part of the cost of providing a public good would lead to a reduction in its optimal provision relative to a situation in which lump sum taxes were available the problem was investigated more systematically by atkinson and stern 1974 who considered the case in which a public good is financed by a set of optimal commodity taxes all individuals were assumed to be identical so efficiency alone dictated the objective they found that no prima facie case could be made for the pigou position that the use of distortionary taxes called for a reduction in the supply of the public good their analysis clearly showed that there were two influences at work when the financing of a public good was by distorting taxes on the one hand

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic

mechanisms of the aid curse lessons from south korea and pakistan abstractrecently scholars have argued that far from contributing to development foreign aid hinders development but in the 1960s the east asian countries developed rapidly despite receiving large amounts of aid to examine why aid seems to undermine development in some cases but not in others we conduct a detailed comparison of the mechanisms of the aid curse in south korea and pakistan we show that south korea saw astonishing levels of corruption but this did not hinder its development and pakistan had a strong bureaucracy which did not help it to grow the key difference between the two countries was in the strength of their tax systems foreign aid in the context of underdeveloped tax administration leads to increasing cycles of debt that undermine development when foreign aid arrives in the context of commitment to strong taxation a country can avoid the aid curse

pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility abstract we examine the non cooperative provision of a pure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the european union where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and the central government is a stackelberg follower a federation with decentralized leadership the center makes interregional income transfers after it observes the contributions to the pure public good imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region despite the degree of labor mobility we show that the pure public good and interregional transfers are generally allocated efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

the effects of international migration on migrant source households evidence from ethiopian diversity visa lottery migrants about a million people have migrated to the us via the diversity visa dv lottery the dv was instituted by an act of the united states congress to diversify the u s population through a lottery made available to people from countries with historically low rates of immigration to the country in any given year the probability of winning the lottery is less than 1 with millions of people from around the world competing for a maximum of 55 000 immigrant visas that can be obtained through this migration channel using ethiopian dv participants which have consistently made up between 6 and 8 of all dv immigrants i study the causal effects of emigration on the well being of the migrant sending families i infer that migration contributes positively to the welfare of the source families overall migration increases consumer expenditure but has no effect on savings and business ownership of the senders the positive treatment effects do not diminish with duration of emigration migrant men contribute more to the increase in their families standard of living than their female counterparts do while expenditure on food and energy are invariant to the migrants gender the gains in terms of durable ownership access to clean water and sanitation facilities occur almost entirely in families where the emigrants are men i find that dv participants are favorably selected relative to the overall population

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

aid dependence and the quality of governance cross country empirical tests aid dependence can potentially undermine the quality of governance and public sector institutions by weakening accountability encouraging rent seeking and corruption fomenting conflict over control of aid funds siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions analyses of cross country data in this paper provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality corruption and the rule of law these findings support the need for donors to develop less costly and less intrusive ways of disseminating state of the art knowledge on public sector reform in developing countries

rent seeking incentives in share contests abstract this article investigates share contests in our framework we allow contestants to have more general preferences than have been used in the literature previous approaches have the unfortunate characteristic that contestants marginal rates of substitution between the rent share allocated by the contest and their effort is constant regardless of the size of the rent share this results in a conventional wisdom larger rents command more effort by providing a more general framework we show the reverse may also be true and we derive the conditions under which this is the case our approach then allows us to rationalize within a standard contest framework observations that rents might be more hotly contested when they become scarcer as has evidently been the case with the recent global contraction of public funds available for public policy

a two factor model to combine us inflation forecasts the combination of individual forecasts is often a useful tool to improve forecast accuracy the most commonly used technique for forecast combination is the mean and it has frequently proved hard to surpass this study considers factor analysis to combine us inflation forecasts showing that just one factor is not enough to beat the mean and that the second one is necessary the first factor is usually a weighted mean of the variables and it can be interpreted as a consensus forecast while the second factor generally provides the differences among the variables and since the observations are forecasts it may be related with the dispersion in forecasting expectations and in a sense with its uncertainty within this approach the study also revisits friedman s hypothesis relating the level of inflation with expectations uncertainty at the beginning of the twenty first century

dodging adverse selection how donor type and governance condition aid s effects on school enrollment summary we employ aiddata to test the effects of primary education aid on school enrollment we argue that the problem of adverse selection complicates both the allocation and the effectiveness of aid we hypothesize that bilateral donors ought to have greater freedom to condition aid on recipient governance quality than multilateral donors which are often bound by institutional rules to provide aid more impartially compared to their multilateral counterparts bilateral donors may have advantages in overcoming adverse selection resulting in bilateral aid s boosting enrollments to a greater degree aiddata s extensive coverage of multilateral aid enables this analysis for up to 100 low and low middle income countries from 1995 to 2008 latent growth regression analysis suggests that compared to multilateral donors bilateral donors indeed condition their primary education aid on recipient control of corruption and that bilateral aid is significantly related to improved enrollments

are windfalls a curse abstract a puzzling feature of temporary terms of trade booms is that some countries have responded to such windfalls by running current account deficits furthermore those countries that ran current account deficits failed to attain greater post boom growth rates indicating the deficits were consumed or invested in low quality projects the point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in determining outcomes if fiscal control is unitary then the consumption smoothing effect is operative and representative agent models of the current account have predictive power however if control is divided among several fiscal claimants a voracity effect appears which counteracts the consumption smoothing effect leading to a deterioration of the current account in response to a positive temporary shock we model the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic game and show that in equilibrium aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall itself this results in a deterioration of the current account we also show that all the windfall is dissipated with the country experiencing no increase in welfare 1998 elsevier science b v

forecasting food inflation in developing countries with inflation targeting regimes developing countries that employ inflation targeting monetary policy regimes require accurate short run food inflation forecasts we develop a systematic approach to improve food inflation forecasts apply it to colombian monthly data from december 1989 to april 2006 and show its relevance for inflation targeting regimes forecast accuracy can be improved by disaggregating food products into away from home processed and fresh foods employing econometric methods to combine forecasts from individual models and using flexible least squares methods in the presence of structural changes we also show the importance of accurate food inflation forecasts in models simulating monetary policy transmission ams subject classification copyright 2012 oxford university press

aid infrastructure and fdi assessing the transmission channel with a new index of infrastructure official development assistance oda and foreign direct investment fdi are widely perceived to be alternative means of supplementing domestic savings and promoting economic development in low and middle income countries however possible complementarities of aid and fdi have received limited attention so far it remains open to debate whether aid could render recipient countries more attractive to fdi by removing specific bottlenecks that prevent higher fdi inflows in particular we raise the hypothesis that aid specifically targeted at economic infrastructure helps developing countries attract higher fdi inflows through improving their endowment with infrastructure in transportation communication energy and finance by performing 3sls estimations we explicitly account for dependencies between three structural equations on the allocation of sector specific aid the determinants of infrastructure and the determinants of fdi we find strong and robust evidence that aid in infrastructure is effective in improving the recipient countries endowment with infrastructure in sharp contrast other aid is not effective in improving infrastructure infrastructure consistently proves to be an important determinant of developing countries attractiveness to fdi consequently only targeted aid promotes fdi indirectly through the infrastructure channel in addition aid in infrastructure has direct effects on fdi it appears that foreign investors anticipate longer term effects of aid on the country s endowment with infrastructure and expect aid financed infrastructure to serve them particularly well

bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation do wages in the civil service affect corruption and by how much abstract this paper presents what is to our knowledge the first empirical estimate of the effect of pay in the civil service on corruption first we show that theory is ambiguous on the relationship between civil service pay and corruption then we examine the issue using a new data set on wages for low income countries we find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative civil service pay and corruption in regressions based on cross country averages where we control for a wide array of variables the relationship implies that a rather large increase in wages is required to eradicate corruption solely by raising wages

federal acid rain games abstract federal environmental policy designed to control acid rain is shaped after the hierarchy of the system and is controlled simultaneously by regional and central governments each governmental level controls one of two policy instruments pollution abatement production and pollution tax in a two stage game where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and control pollution taxes the subgame perfect equilibrium is socially efficient but the subgame perfect equilibrium for a two stage game where the central government is the stackelberg leader and controls pollution taxes is inefficient it corresponds to the nash equilibrium for a game where regional governments control both policy instruments

hold your nose and vote corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy this paper analyzes how corruption alters policy decisions in democracy and examines whether this distortion can result in a long term persistence of corruption even when the voters are well informed and rational by applying a citizen candidate model of representative democracy the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private consumption altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions the outcome is a reduction in real public expenditure and if the median voter s demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic a reduction in taxes in this case some citizens benefit indirectly from corruption the paper also presents some empirical evidence that in democratic countries corruption results in lower tax revenue and proceeds to show that when this occurs citizens anticipating a shift in preferences in favor of public expenditure may support institutions that favor corruption this result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in democracy to some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system it also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community

tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership this paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment lack of commitment implies that local tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers the paper s main result is that ex post federal policy neutralizes horizontal fiscal externalities insulating tax policy from capital mobility federal policy however introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition specifically ex post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare deteriorating relative to tax competition

the impact of food inflation on urban poverty and its monetary cost some back of the envelope calculations this paper uses a sample of 73 developing countries to estimate the change in the cost of alleviating urban poverty brought about by the recent increase in food prices this cost is approximated by the change in the poverty deficit that is the variation in financial resources required to eliminate poverty under perfect targeting the results show that for most countries the cost represents less than 0 1 percent of gross domestic product however in the most severely affected it may exceed 3 percent in all countries the change in the poverty deficit is mostly due to the negative real income effect of those households that were poor before the price shock while the cost attributable to new households falling into poverty is negligible thus in countries where transfer mechanisms with effective targeting already exist the most cost effective strategy would be to scale up such programs rather than designing tools to identify the new poor

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

decentralized fiscal federalism revisited optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership this paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension under plausible assumptions horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership

inflation targeting in brazil constructing credibility under exchange rate volatility abstract this paper assesses the challenges faced by the inflation targeting regime in brazil the inflation targeting framework has played a critical role in macroeconomic stabilization we stress two important challenges construction of credibility and exchange rate volatility the estimations indicate the following results i the inflation targets have worked as an important coordinator of expectations ii the central bank has reacted strongly to inflation expectations iii there has been a reduction in the degree of inflation persistence and iv the exchange rate pass through for administered or monitored prices is two times higher than for market prices

optimum taxation with errors in administration abstract the paper compares the welfare levels which can be achieved by two distinct tax regimes lump sum taxation where one attempts to identify individuals and allocate transfers or subsidies on the basis of characteristics and income taxation where characteristics are not observed but personal incomes are measured and taxed where there are no errors in classifying individuals lump sum taxation is superior but where mistakes are made in the allocation of lump sum grants or subsidies income taxation may be more attractive the level of errors where the regimes are equally desirable in terms of social welfare is computed in simple models following that of feldstein 1973 where there is strong aversion to inequality then income taxation becomes preferable at quite small errors in analysing income taxation it is shown that in the feldstein model with endogenous wages the marginal tax rate in optimum income taxation on the more skilled is negative and that on the less skilled is positive in contrast to the standard results see seade 1977 with exogenous wages