barriers to entry and competitive behavior evidence from reforms of cable franchising regulations between 2005 and 2008 19 of the 50 states of the u s reformed the franchising process for cable television significantly easing entry into local markets using a differencein differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms we find that prices for basic service declined systematically by about 5 5 to 6 8 percent following the reforms but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular expanded basic service we also find that the reforms led to increased actual entry in reformed states by about 11 6 relative to non reformed states our analysis shows that the decline in price for basic service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry consistent with limit pricing by incumbents to control for potential state level shocks correlated with the reforms we undertake a sample split test examining changes in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry because they were close to a prominent second entrant we find larger declines in prices for both basic and expanded basic services in these markets our results are consistent with limit pricing models that predict incumbents respond to increased threat of entry and suggest that the reforms facilitated entry and modestly benefitted consumers in reformed states

collective labor supply and household production this paper emphasises the importance of incorporating household production into the collective model of the household and considers how and to what extent the results of chiappori 1992 can be extended to this case this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

price discrimination copyright law and technological innovation evidence from the introduction of dvds u s copyright law effectively prevents direct price discrimination for copyright holders that sell to different markets in response these firms can engage in indirect price discrimination i derive theoretical predictions about the use of indirect price discrimination and i analyze how optimal pricing strategies differ for different products using data on vhs and dvd movie distribution i find that firms pricing choices are consistent with the predictions of theory and that firms use of indirect price discrimination benefits consumers but harms ancillary retailers finally i examine what optimal pricing strategies might look like in a legal environment that permits direct price discrimination

introducing household production in collective models of labor supply in a recent paper chiappori 1992 i proposed a model of labor supply based on a collective representation of household behavior in this framework each household member is characterized by his or her own utility function and decisions are only assumed to result in pareto efficient outcomes i showed that these simple assumptions were sufficient to i generate testable restrictions on labor supply functions and ii recover individual preferences and the outcome of the decision process from observed behavior for the sake of simplicity the results were derived in the simplest possible case namely a static labor supply model with private consumptions such a framework was appropriate only for the purpose of the paper that is a preliminary exploration of the properties of collective models of labor supply the next step is to evaluate the robustness of the results to various extensions of the basic model this opens a general research program and generates a wide range of particular problems that it is hoped will be considered in the future among the most serious shortcomings of the 1992 model is the absence of household production as in most labor supply models agents were assumed to divide their time between market activities and leisure as apps and rees 1997 in this issue very rightly point out in their comment the absence of domestic production is far from innocuous as soon as welfare issues are considered for instance a low level of market labor supply will automatically be interpreted as a large consumption of leisure whereas it may in fact reflect the specialization of one of the members in domestic

individual versus joint taxation in models with household production in a recent paper piggott and whalley 1996 challenge the conventional wisdom that says that the individual rather than the household should be the unit of taxation and argue instead for joint taxation their point of departure is a point well taken the literature on which this wisdom is based in particular boskin and sheshinski 1983 ignores the existence of household production the general argument is a nice one in the theory of the second best in the absence of taxation of market wage income the marginal rates of technical substitution between primary and secondary labor in market and in household production would be equal to each other and the marginal rate of substitution between the market and household good would be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between them thus achieving pareto efficiency introduction of income taxation leads to a distortion of the relation between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation which is the focus of concern in the literature 2 and given the differing econo

vertical integration market foreclosure and consumer welfare in the cable television industry i examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry i assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings prices and subscriptions and i compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets the results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions first integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators second vertical integration does not harm and may actually benefit consumers because of the associated efficiency gains

ownership consolidation and product characteristics a study of the us daily newspaper market this paper develops a structural model of newspaper markets to analyze the effects of ownership consolidation taking into account not only firms price adjustments but also the adjustments in newspaper characteristics a new dataset on newspaper prices and characteristics is used to estimate the model the paper then simulates the effect of a merger in the minneapolis newspaper market and studies how welfare effects of mergers vary with market characteristics it finds that ignoring adjustments of product characteristics causes substantial differences in estimated effects of mergers jel g32 l13 l82 m37 do mergers affect product characteristics standard merger analyses typically study price effects only and ignore changes in product characteristics this paper endogenizes both it is likely that firms would adjust the features of their products after a merger ignoring this aspect of firm decisions in a merger analysis can lead to a bias in estimated welfare effects specifically i study how ownership consolidation affects product characteristics and welfare in the us daily newspaper market the newspaper market provides an ideal environment for analyzing the effect of mergers on product features for both econometric and economic reasons first of all individual newspapers often circulate in local markets there is substantial variation in demographics and ownership structure across these markets this variation is crucial for this study secondly the characteristics of newspapers are obviously important for welfare for example after an ownership consolidation do newspaper publishers improve or diminish the content quality do they enlarge or shrink the local news ratio do they increase or decrease content variety to address these questions i set up a structural model of the us daily newspaper

pigou meets ramsey gender based taxation with non cooperative couples abstract this paper explores the implications of gender based income taxation in a non cooperative model of household behavior in a first step we show how gender based taxes can act as pigou taxes and correct the externality induced by a non cooperative household equilibrium we find that the first best pigou tax rules are solely determined by spouses relative marginal rates of substitution between the public household good and private consumption breaking down this general rule into the primitives of the model the spouse with a comparative advantage in home production should be taxed at a higher rate in a second step we embed our non cooperative framework in a standard second best planning problem in which taxes serve a revenue raising purpose in this case the optimal structure of differential taxation by gender is partly determined by a ramsey type inverse elasticity rule and partly by a pigouvian tax element we show that these two forces work in opposite directions in determining whether men or women should be taxed at a higher rate and that either one could be dominant depending on the revenue raising position of the government this result is robust to the introduction of two groups of households that differ in their mode of decision making which can be either cooperative or non cooperative

the effects of piracy on competition evidence from subscription tv abstract competition studies that focus on antitrust issues e g market definition market power are typically conducted in markets where all firms are assumed to operate legally competitors are tax abiding entities pay for all inputs used in their production process have paid the proper government licenses to do so etc we investigate competition issues in a market characterized by widespread piracy subscription tv in peru estimates suggest that 50 of subscription tv users in peru 30 in latin america use an illegal provider we make use of a unique dataset in which households provided crucial information regarding the il legality of their paid tv supplier using quantitative antitrust tools based on demand estimation techniques we study the impact that the presence of the informal sector has on competition our estimates suggest that the illegal operators constitute a close substitute for and henceforth significantly constrain the pricing power of legal operators this finding can have important antitrust implications the failure to account for piracy could lead to erroneous conclusions regarding market power measurement and the delineation of the relevant antitrust market this may be particularly important in several industries especially in the developing world where the leading operator may be cataloged as dominant only in the absence of illegal providers

the tax unit and household production under a progressive income tax conventional wisdom is that taxing individuals rather than households is preferred from an efficiency point of view the reason is that secondary workers whose labor supply elasticity is high will be taxed at a lower marginal rate than primary workers whose labor supply elasticity is low here we argue that once household production is taken into account things are more complicated since tax design should also not distort the input of family members time in household production factor input distortions as well as ramsey considerations thus need to enter the choice of the tax unit we provide a numerical example of an economy for which a move from an individual to a household basis in the income tax can be efficiency improving we then use a general equilibrium model parameterized using australian tax rates and data whose results clearly show that welfare gains can occur under changes from an individual to a household basis for an existing income tax our results th

love and taxes and matching institutions we study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family everyone prefers a partner that has high income and is a perfect emotional match but compromises must often be struck a high income earner may abstain from marrying a low income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally because the highincome earner may dislike the implicit income redistribution implied by the marriage redistributive income taxation may ease this problem income matching institutions that secure that people largely from the same income groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution so that optimal redistribution is reduced we also introduce a divorce option redistributive taxation is shown both to further and stabilize marriage

optimal tax treatment of the family married couples abstract this paper examines the appropriate tax treatment of the family in a series of analytical models and numerical examples for a population of taxpaying couples which differ in earning capacity we drive the optimal tax rates for each potential earner these rates depend crucially upon own and cross labor supply elasticities and the joint distribution of wage rates our results suggest that the current system of income splitting in the united states under which husbands and wives face equal marginal tax rates is nonoptimal using results from recent econometric studies and allowing for a sensitivity analysis the optimal tax rates on secondary workers in the family are much lower than those on primary earners indeed our best estimate is that the secondary earner would face tax rates only one half as high as primary earners

household bargaining and the design of couples income taxation this paper studies the design of couples income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses utilities bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple information structure and labor supply decisions follow the mirrleesian tradition however while the household s total consumption is publicly observable the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable with a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses marginal income tax rate includes a pigouvian paternalistic and an incentive term the pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy tax for the high weight low weight spouse whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low high the sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples in some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low weight spouse who may be female and a negative one for the high weight spouse possibly the male this is at odds with the traditional boskin and sheshinski results our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions finally we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model the calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower and possibly even negative marginal tax rate

on the taxation of trade within and between households abstract tax reform proposals affect individual welfares in ways which strongly depend on the nature of specialisation in household production and the pattern of trade within households variation in the degree of specialisation in domestic production across households strongly influences the impacts on individual tax burdens of a given tax reform the standard models of the economics literature cannot be used to analyse these issues because they ignore the two person nature of households and the existence of household production and trade this paper proposes a simple and tractable model to remedy this and uses it to analyse the impacts of the types of tax reform that have been the subject of recent policy debate

the welfare performance of sequential pricing mechanisms consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits furthermore evidence suggests that a menu of optional two part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective

until taxes do us part tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision the tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the us france and germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus we study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage proposal game at the end of the game they may get married live together without formal marriage or split up in this signaling game proposing or getting married is costly but can indicate strong love the striking property we obtain is that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married if the bonus is sufficiently large the signaling mechanism breaks down and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains similarly a marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability specifically the penalty may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission which was otherwise not possible our results also imply that marriage decisions in the laissez faire are not necessarily privately optimal in some cases a bonus or a penalty may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient it may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded

income splitting among the self employed under individual taxation with progressive marginal tax rates households in which the distribution of income is unequal benefit from attributing income to the lower income household member self employment provides greater potential to split income in this way because of the absence of a third party reporting income using the canadian experience as a case study this paper develops a unique estimator of the incidence of illegal income splitting among self employed couples the results suggest that the incidence of income splitting among self employed men in canada is non trivial but no evidence is found that self employed women attribute income to their spouses jel classification h26 h21 h31 j22 le fractionnement du revenu chez les travailleurs autonomes dans un regime fiscal qui a des taux marginaux d imposition progressive des revenus les membres d un menage dans lequel la repartition des revenus n est pas g rien n indique que les femmes qui sont travailleurs autonomes attribuent une portion de leurs revenus a leur epoux

taxation and the household abstract previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function to analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities as determined by the household resource allocation process

estimation of random coefficient demand models two empiricists perspective we document the numerical challenges we experienced estimating random coefficient demand models as in berry levinsohn and pakes 1995 using two well known data sets and a thorough optimization design the optimization algorithms often converge at points where the first and second order optimality conditions fail there are also cases of convergence at local optima on convergence the variation in the values of the parameter estimates translates into variation in the models economic predictions price elasticities and changes in consumer and producer welfare following hypothetical merger exercises vary at least by a factor of 2 and up to a factor of 5

the welfare effects of bundling in multichannel television markets we measure how the bundling of television channels affects short run welfare we estimate an industry model of viewership demand pricing bundling and input market bargaining using data on ratings purchases prices bundles and input costs we conduct simulations of a la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers we estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103 0 percent under a la carte these higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated 5 4 to 0 2 percent and 1 7 to 6 0 percent respectively jel d12 l11 l51 l82 m31

gender agricultural production and the theory of the household virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources is pareto efficient within many african households agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by different members of the household pareto efficiency implies that factors should be allocated efficiently across these plots i find in contrast that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men the estimates imply that about 6 percent of output is lost because of inefficient factor allocation within the household the paper suggests a new approach to modeling intrahousehold allocation consistent with the empirical results

competitive screening under heterogeneous information we study the interplay between informational frictions and second degree price discrimination our theory recognizes that consumers differ in their tastes for quality as well as in the information they possess about available offers which leads to dispersion over price quality menus in equilibrium while firms are ex ante identical we show that their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus to consumers of all valuations we explore the cross section of equilibrium menus and variations in market conditions to generate empirical predictions on prices qualities and markups across firms and within a firm s product line for instance more competition may raise prices for low quality goods yet consumers are better off as the qualities they receive also increase the predictions of our model illuminate empirical findings in many markets such as those for cell phone plans yellow pages advertising cable tv and air travel

the effect of satellite entry on cable television prices and product quality how has the entry of satellite television affected the pricing and product quality of incumbent cable firms programming packages i estimate a model in which firms compete over both price and product quality as determined by what channels are offered satellite entry typically causes cable firms to raise quality and lower price however in some markets cable optimally responds by raising both price and quality or by lowering both price and quality a counterfactual scenario that eliminates quality competition results in on average softer price competition and lower aggregate consumer surplus but greater surplus for consumers with weaker preferences for quality

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

the effects of joint taxation of married couples on labor supply and non wage income abstract the united states changed its tax treatment of married couples in 1948 from a system in which each spouse paid taxes on his or her own income to a system in which a married couple is taxed as a unit the switch from separate to joint taxation changed incentives for labor supply and asset ownership this paper investigates the effects of the conversion to joint taxation taking advantage of a natural experiment created by cross state variation in property laws married individuals in states with community property laws had always been taxed as if each spouse had earned half of the couple s income and thus were unaffected by the 1948 legal change comparing the behavior of highly educated taxpayers in affected and unaffected states indicates that the tax change is associated with a decline of approximately 2 percentage points in the employment rate of married women consistent with the higher first dollar tax rates they faced after 1948 women married to self employed men were also less likely to have non wage income after 1948 reflecting pre 1948 allocation of family assets to wives for tax purposes the effects of joint taxation on married men s labor force participation and non wage income holding are generally not statistically significant

nonmarket household time and the cost of children raising children demands a considerable amount of parental time obliging working parents either to reduce their leisure time further or to buy childcare services in the market parents may face additional opportunity costs upon deciding to participate in the labor market but these are difficult to measure using a survey instrument in belgium and germany we estimate the income compensation needed to maintain family well being when adults work versus when they do not enter the labor market in both countries we find that full time working parents face extra child costs and require higher labor market participation compensation compared with childless adults

endogenous product choice a progress report empirical models of differentiated product demand are widely used by both academics and practitioners while these methods treat carefully the potential endogeneity of price until recently they have assumed the number and characteristics of the products offered by firms are exogenous this paper presents a progress report on an ongoing research agenda to address this issue first it summarizes how the appropriate choice of orthogonal instruments can yield consistent estimates of own and cross price elasticities in the presence of endogenous product characteristics second it summarizes how to measure quality markups and the welfare consequences of endogenous product quality in u s cable television markets related papers and extensions to consider multiple product characteristics and dynamics are also discussed

reply to apps rees and gottried richter in our earlier paper in this journal 1996 we argued that in a model with both market and household production each of which has two factor inputs primary and secondary worker labor individualbased taxation will distort the factor input ratio whereas household or joint taxation which has similar tax rates for the two workers will not there is an added distortion of household production under individual taxation that does not appear in a model with only consumption of goods and leisure and in which ramsey labor supply elasticity considerations point toward individual taxation we used 1974 australian data to analyze a possible move from an existing individual based income tax to an alternative household based tax a move from a status quo separate tax regime to joint taxation we suggested that the added distortion of household production under individual taxation made such a move more likely to be welfareimproving we considered pairwise comparisons of model solutions under prevailing nonoptimal individual tax rates and common household member rates calculated in various ways our results showed that if the dispersion in individual tax rates is large enough the tax induced distortion of household production can be the dominant consideration in the comparison we neither computed nor characterized optimal tax rate configurations in this application the lessons from optimal tax design seemed uninteresting and rather trivial a de novo design of an optimal tax structure across household members would almost certainly