on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance abstract this paper investigates the implications of channel power on supply chain stability in a setting where multiple suppliers sell substitutable products through a common retailer such supply chains have been traditionally analyzed as one or two stage stackelberg non cooperative games with all suppliers sharing balanced equal decision making power in this paper we relax this assumption and formulate game theoretic models to examine scenarios where one supplier can act as the stackelberg leader consequently we analyze new supply chain structures and introduce the notion of structure dominance a novel approach to analyze the performance of supply chains that has practical implications thus a decision maker can employ the concepts of structure dominance to determine whether there exist supply chain scenarios that are more stable than others i e less prone to power reconfigurations at both agent and group level we find that power imbalance causes significant declines in supply chain profits and the more balanced the agents are the higher their profits when demand is linear regardless of product competition it develops that neither the manufacturer stackelberg nor the retailer stackelberg supply chains are stable structures in our generalized setting but that structures where power is equally split between agents provide for best stability and performance

leadership and competition in network supply chains this paper considers network supply chains with price dependent demand by modelling them as large acyclic networks such large networks are common in the automobile and apparel industries we develop a model to analyze the effect of these large scale problems involving long sequences of contracts and show that contract leadership as well as leader position in the network affect the performance of the entire supply chain we generalize spengler spengler j 1950 vertical integration and anti trust policy j political econom 58 347 352 to a game on a contract tree for a particular supply chain and extend the concept of double marginalization so that it can be applied in the form of a transformation to each contract that is offered by one member to another in the contract tree we construct an algorithm to find the equilibrium solution and derive the optimal location of the leader optimal being the leader location that maximizes total supply chain profits our work formalizes many intuitive insights for example member profits are determined by systemwide rather than individual costs finally we model cournot competition between competing supply chains both two heterogeneous trees and multiple identical trees and show the effect of changes in leader position as well as cost structure on the equilibrium

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

the impact of deregulation on the production structure of the motor carrier industry empirical analysis of the motor carrier industry pre and post regulatory reform reveals that deregulation resulted in significant changes in firm production structure and lower real average costs translog cost functions for firms operating in 1977 and 1983 were estimated and compared for other specialized commodity carriers fitted average costs were computed from these functions the results indicate significant differences in the cost functions and real costs that cannot be attributed to technological changes but rather suggest efficiency gains the results also suggest that it is inappropriate to predict outcomes of deregulation using empirical analyses of firms in the regulated environment

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

a three stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers we present and study a three stage model of a decentralized distribution system consisting ofn retailers each of whom faces a stochastic demand for an identical product in the first stage before the demand is realized each retailer independently orders her initial inventory in the second stage after the demand is realized each retailer decides how much of her residual supply demand she wants to share with the other retailers in the third stage residual inventories are transshipped to meet residual demands and an additional profit is allocated our model is an extension of the two stage model of anupindi et al abz 2001 which implicitly assumes that all residuals enter the transshipment stage we show however that allocation rules in the third stage based on dual solutions which were used in the abz model may induce the retailers to hold back some of their residual supply demand in general we study the effect of implementing various allocations rules in the third stage on the values of the residual supply demand the retailers are willing to share with others in the second stage and the trade off involved in achieving an optimal solution for the corresponding centralized system

the flip side of financial synergies coinsurance versus risk contamination this paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs contrary to conventional wisdom separate financing dominates joint financing when risk contamination losses that are associated with the contagious default of a well performing project that is dragged down by the other project s poor performance outweigh standard coinsurance gains separate financing becomes more attractive than joint financing when the fraction of returns lost under default increases and when projects have lower mean returns higher variability more positive correlation and more negative skewness these predictions are broadly consistent with evidence on conglomerate mergers spinoffs project finance and securitization

the effects and incentive of vertical mergers an analysis from the view of om abstract we investigate the effects and incentive of vertical mergers in a supply chain with three types of firms i e suppliers manufacturers and integrated firms integrated firms can sell both intermediate and final goods while suppliers and manufacturers can sell only intermediate or final goods respectively whether selling intermediate goods to other manufacturers is introduced as the integrated firms endogenous decisions we find that a vertical merger always decreases the price of final products both the production quantity and the profits of each unintegrated manufacturer and integrated firm and most of the time leads to a drop in the total profit of the supply chain while it always results in a rise in the quantity of final products and social welfare second we find that market foreclosure only happens when competition among integrated firms is weak and vertical mergers occur only when competition among unintegrated manufacturers is weak finally we provide a theoretical explanation for the phenomenon of merger waves with the aid of our model

the impact of merger bids on the participating firms security holders this paper investigates whether merger bids have an impact on the wealth of the participating firms bondholders and stockholders monthly and daily bond and stock returns are calculated relative to the announcement date of a merger bid for a sample of conglomerate mergers the results show that while the stockholders of target firms gain from a merger bid no other securityholders either gain or lose to provide direct evidence on the existence of diversification effects and incentive effects we test whether the bondholders returns are dependent upon the correlation between the returns of the merging firms and whether the size of the bondholders and stockholders returns in individual mergers are correlated the results are consistent with a capital market that efficiently resolves conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders recent empirical studies by mandelker 22 langetieg 18 dodd 6 and asquith 1 provide evidence that mergers have a favorable effect on the market value of the common stocks of merging firms the acquired firms stockholders earn large positive abnormal returns from the merger and the acquiring firms stockholders are affected little if at all although these empirical studies provide extensive evidence concerning the effects of mergers on the stockholders of the merging firms they still leave several important questions unanswered first these studies examine the returns of only one group of the firm s claimants the stockholders it is possible that the positive abnormal returns reported come at the expense of other claimants that is mergers may impose a loss on some claimants of the merging firms and the stockholders positive abnormal returns may simply reflect negative abnormal returns to these other claimants jensen and meckling 15 argue that there is an incentive for the stockholders of leveraged firms to expropriate the bondholders wealth by undertaking investment projects which increase the firm s riskiness since a merger is also a corporate investment it follows that there is an incentive for the stockholders to acquire firms which increase the variability of the firm s cashflow that is the stockholders may earn positive abnormal returns even if there is no real synergy at the expense of bondholders by increasing the firm s risk through merger the bondholders lose because of the increase in the default risk of the

the wealth effect of merger activity and the objective functions of merging firms abstract this paper studies the net effects of the long run sequence of events leading to merger and of merger per se on shareholder wealth the appropriate measure of the wealth effect is shown to be the abnormal dollar return cumulated over time using this measure the long run wealth effect of the event sequence culminating in merger is significantly negative for acquiring firms for acquired firms the effect is negative but not significant the immediate impact of merger per se is positive and highly significant for acquired firms but larger in absolute value and negative for acquiring firms the evidence also reveals that measured abnormal rates of return to acquiring firms are sensitive to a slight variation in model specification and dependent on firm size with smaller firms earning significantly negative post merger returns

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

on mergers divestments and options a note in this note a loss shared by the security holders of merging firms is pointed out separate corporate entities provide double protection against future negative cash flows that are part of any production process e g when customer or employee liabilities exceed future in come independent of whether or not debt is used in the corporate capital structure a merger involves a relinquishment of this double protection in return for a less valuable single protection limited liability in the merged corporation against combined negative cashflows

a generalized model of pricing for homogeneous goods under imperfect information this paper generalizes the model developed in wilde and schwartz 1979 to allow downward sloping demand curves and u shaped average cost curves it shows that the basic qualitative conclusions of wilde and schwartz still hold moreover it shows that the critical proportion of comparison shoppers needed to generate a competitive equilibrium falls as demand becomes more elastic or average costs become more inelastic finally it shows that when imperfect information generates non competitive outcomes they are bounded below in welfare terms by the monopolistically competitive equilibrium

cooperation between multiple news vendors with transshipments we study a situation with n retailers each of them facing a news vendor problem i e selling to customers over a finite period of time product with a short life cycle such as fashion groups of retailers might improve their expected joint profit by coordinating their orders followed by transshipments after demand realization is known we analyze these situations by defining a cooperative game called a general news vendor game for such a situation with n retailers we concentrate on whether it makes sense to cooperate by studying properties of general news vendor games our main result states that general news vendor games have non empty cores

stable farsighted coalitions in competitive markets in this paper we study dynamic alliance formation among agents in competitive markets we look at n agents selling substitutable products competing in a market in this setting we examine models with deterministic and stochastic demand and we use a two stage approach in stage 1 agents form alliances coalitions and in stage 2 coalitions make decisions price and inventory and compete against one another to analyze the stability of coalition structures in stage 1 we use two notions from cooperative games the largest consistent set lcs and the equilibrium process of coalition formation epcf which allow players to be farsighted thus in forming alliances players consider two key phenomena first players trade off the size of the total profit of the system versus their allocation of this total pie and second they weigh the possibility that an immediate beneficial defection can trigger further counter defections that in the end may prove to be worse than the status quo in particular one such example is that of the grand coalition which we show to be stable in the farsighted sense even though players benefit myopically by defecting from it we also provide conditions under which a situation of a few lone players competing against a large coalition is stable we examine the impact of the size of the market n the degree of competition the effect of cost parameters and the variability of the demand process on the prices inventory levels and structure of the market we discuss the possible strategic implications of our results to firms in a competitive market and for new entrants

formation of alliances in internet based supply exchanges in different industries such as automobiles chemicals or retailing competitors are joining forces in establishing electronic marketplaces to reduce inefficiencies in the purchasing process and cut costs by combining their buying power joining such an alliance leads to reduced costs including those of possible rivals because members share the development and operating costs a company that joins an alliance agrees to share its suppliers with others which may lead to more intense competition among the increased number of suppliers and it may further benefit an alliance member at the expense of companies left outside the alliance natural questions that could arise then are when would a firm prefer to take part in an electronic marketplace joint venture when would it prefer that other firms possibly rivals join the venture and what are the financial consequences of either joining an alliance or remaining independent in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the issues we have developed a model of three retailers whose products may have a certain degree of substitutability we provide some conditions in terms of product substitutability and compatibility of retailers that would lead to the formation of a three member alliance or a two member alliance or no alliance at all we also study the effect of alliance structure and compatibility of retailers on the profit of a company

vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership stability and fair profit allocation abstract this paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract we consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration a cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition we find that in this case the grand coalition s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs nevertheless we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains

is regulation necessary for value of service pricing this article presents evidence for the existence of value of service pricing in the neverregulated market for trucking services to haul florida produce rates per truckload are found to increase by eleven to twelve cents for every one dollar increase in the average daily loss in the value of the cargo due to product deterioration ceteris paribus this result is at variance with the commonly held belief that value of service pricing in transportation is a form of price discrimination made possible by the policies of rate bureaus and regulatory agencies

guarantees leverage and taxes this paper considers the optimal joint decision on firm organization and capital structure under a tax bankruptcy trade off stressing the role of guarantees against default conditional guarantees which are embedded in parent subsidiary structures increase joint value and joint debt relative to unguaranteed stand alone firms such guarantees that are unilateral rather than mutual for moderate default costs may dominate the unconditional mutual guarantees built in mergers we study the optimal characteristics of both guarantors and beneficiaries as well as their impact on the self enforcement potential of conditional guarantees

endogenous coalation formation in cooperative oligopolies coalition formation among firms in a cooperative oligopolistic market is endogenously derived in terms of the relevant market characteristics market demand firm costs and the behavioral assumptions that every possible coalition of firms makes about firms that are not in the coalition this is done by defining different games in characteristic function form each game corresponding to a different assumption about how a coalition s opponents will respond by establishing cooperative equilibria that cannot be upset by any firm acting alone or any group of firms acting in concert the authors are able to derive coalition formation in the market endogenously copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

competition in multiechelon assembly supply chains in this paper we study competition in multiechelon supply chains with an assembly structure firms in the supply chain are grouped into homogenous sectors nodes that contain identical firms with identical production capabilities that all produce exactly one undifferentiated product that may itself be a kit of components each sector may use several inputs to produce its product and these inputs are supplied by different sectors the production process within any sector is taken to be pure assembly in fixed proportions the number of firms in each sector is known the demand curve for the final product is assumed to be linear as are production costs in all sectors competition is modeled via a coordinated successive cournot model in which firms choose production quantities for their downstream market so as to maximize profits given prices for all inputs and all complementary products production quantities for sectors supplying the same successor are coordinated through pricing mechanisms so that complementary products are produced in the right proportions under these assumptions equilibrium prices for any multiechelon assembly network are characterized by a system of linear equations we derive closed form expressions for equilibrium quantities and prices in any two stage system i e a system with multiple input sectors and a single assembly sector we show that any assembly structure can be converted to an equivalent larger structure in which no more than two components are assembled at any node finally large structures can be solved either by direct solution of the characteristic linear equations or through an iterative reduction compression to smaller structures

competition and structure in serial supply chains with deterministic demand supply chains often consist of several tiers with different numbers of firms competing at each tier a major determinant of the structure of supply chains is the cost structure associated with the underlying manufacturing process in this paper we examine the impact of fixed and variable costs on the structure and competitiveness of supply chains with a serial structure and price sensitive linear deterministic demand the entry stage is modeled as a simultaneous game where the players take the outcomes of the subsequent post entry cournot competition into account in making their entry decisions we derive expressions for prices and production quantities as functions of the number of entrants at each tier of a multitier chain we characterize viability and stability of supply chain structures and show using lattice arguments that there is always an equilibrium structure in pure strategies in the entry game finally we examine the effects of vertical integration in the two tier case altogether the paper provides a framework for comparing a variety of supply chain structures and for studying how they are affected by cost structures and by the number of entrants throughout the chain

transshipment of inventories among retailers myopic vs farsighted stability the author considers a model of a decentralized distribution system consisting of n retailers selling an identical product retailers face a stochastic demand and must order their initial inventory before this demand is realized after demand realization retailers decide how much of their unsold inventory or unsatisfied demand they want to share with other retailers this is followed by a transshipment of leftover inventories and distribution of the additional profit generated through inventory sharing the author addresses the following issue suppose that the retailers distribute the profit from inventory sharing according to an allocation rule that induces retailers to share their residuals in a way that maximizes the additional profit such as the shapley value but may not belong to the core is it likely that in this framework all retailers will jointly share their residuals and not form subcoalitions previous research has looked at this problem from a myopic viewpoint and concluded that the grand coalition is not stable unlike the prior work the author looks at stability in a farsighted sense that is retailers do not consider only their immediate payoffs but are also concerned with reactions of other retailers to their actions in a symmetric setting with identical additional unit revenues from transshipments generated by all retailers farsighted retailers always maximize their allocations by not defecting from the grand coalition the author also provides conditions when the same is true for nonidentical additional unit revenues