rules stability and growth abstract this paper examines two systems of fiscal redistribution in the context of a growing economy subject to unexpected shocks rules and discretion under the former system the tax system is in place and is known to households contemplating investment decisions under the second redistribution is decided upon only after the investment decisions have been made i find that rules always lead to faster capital accumulation and growth but political support for them is only likely to occur in a stable economy income inequality adversely affects the likelihood of adopting rules especially so in an unstable economy

war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

law enforcement and transition abstract we present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality we analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem a first mechanism which we call dualism follows the scenario of chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non state sector follows market rules the second mechanism we put forward is accession to the european union we show that accession to the european union even without external borrowing provides a mechanism to eliminate the bad equilibrium provided the accessing country is small enough relative to the european union interestingly we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

the tragedy of the commons and economic growth why does capital flow from poor to rich countries we analyze a differential game in which all interest groups have access to a common capital stock we show that the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity but enjoys private access may ameliorate the tragedy of the commons we use this model to analyze capital flight in many poor countries property rights are not well defined since safe bank accounts in rich countries the inferior technology are available to citizens of these countries they engage in capital flight we show that the occurrence of capital flight does not imply that opening the capital account reduces growth and welfare

the institutional and psychological foundations of natural resource policies abstractthe pressures of political interests which drive the resource curse are well understood but ordinary citizens are usually cast both as the innocent victims of this process and as the potential solution if only governments could be made more accountable to them this paper draws upon recent developments in social psychology to discuss the formation of mass opinions on two aspects of resource ownership one is the spatial assignment of ownership between local and national claims which has been a significant cause of conflict the other is the assignment of revenues between current consumption and future investment which has usually been excessively biased towards the former i suggest why in the absence of an active government communications policy to offset them known psychological biases may interact with resource discoveries to generate mass opinions which contribute to these problems

geography industrial organization and agglomeration this paper makes two contributions to the empirical literature on agglomeration economies first the paper uses a unique and rich database in conjunction with mapping software to measure the geographic extent of agglomerative externalities previous papers have been forced to assume that agglomeration economies are club goods that operate at a metropolitan scale second the paper tests for the existence of organizational agglomeration economies of the kind studied qualitatively by saxenian 1994 this is a potentially important source of increasing returns that previous empirical work has not considered results indicate that localization economies attenuate rapidly and that industrial organization affects the benefits of agglomeration

empirical research on discrete choice game theory models of entry an illustration abstract we discuss the empirical implementation of discrete game theoretic models of firm entry after presenting a simple model of entry that underlies much of existing empirical analysis we discuss the major problems that must be tackled when empirically implementing theoretical models and econometric methods used in the literature finally we present results from a reduced form estimation of a sequential move entry game using data from the uk hamburger market

bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator abstract we present a model of environmental regulation in which the stringency of a firm s emissions standard is determined by cooperative bargaining between the firm and a regulator we show that bargaining can be socially beneficial because it can achieve the first best outcome this outcome is never an equilibrium of the noncooperative stackelberg game we also show that the social cost function is not the preferred objective function for a regulator when regulations are determined by bargaining social costs are lower with a regulator that attaches more importance to damages and enforcement costs than to the firm s compliance costs

voracious transformation of a common natural resource into productive capital i analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights i obtain a feedback nash equilibrium to the dynamic common pool problem and obtain political variants of the hotelling depletion rule and the hartwick saving rule resource prices and depletion occur too fast so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high the power struggle boosts output but depresses sustainable consumption genuine saving is nevertheless zero in a fractionalized society world bank estimates may be too optimistic

commodity windfalls polarization and net foreign assets panel data evidence on the voracity effect this paper examines the effects that windfalls from international commodity price booms have on net foreign assets in a panel of 145 countries during the period 1970 2007 the main finding is that windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to a significant increase in net foreign assets but only in countries that are ethnically homogeneous in highly ethnically polarized countries net foreign assets significantly decreased to explain this asymmetry the paper shows that in ethnically polarized countries commodity windfalls lead to large increases in government consumption expenditures and political corruption the paper s findings are consistent with theoretical models of the current account that have a built in voracity effect

trade unions and regional development abstract we focus on the role that labour unions play in the context of a two region dual economy we show that unskilled unions will increase the wage of unskilled workers and depress growth in both the backward and the advanced regions the growth effects will be felt more strongly in the relatively poor region if skilled workers are allowed to migrate and unions recognize that a more aggressive wage setting policy may foster migration unions will moderate their wage requests however regional unions would then have a strong incentive to coordinate their wage demands across regions this would further raise the unskilled wage and more so in the backward region we conclude that labour market policies designed to foster regional convergence should seek both to discourage centralized wage setting and favour skilled labour mobility

voracity vs scale effect in a growing economy without secure property rights abstract this paper extends the standard model of growth with insecure property rights by introducing variable labor supply and increasing returns to scale it is assumed that capital stock is jointly owned by multiple interest groups and that each group participates in production activities by supplying its labor force in this setting there are two opposing factors that affect growth over consumption in the absence of secure property rights and the scale effect due to the presence of increasing returns the growth performance of the economy thus depends on which factor dominates

the economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement this study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient the analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers the socially optimal income redistribution and the social welfare from intervention

a dynamic model of conflict and appropriation abstract this paper presents an extension of a static model of economic conflict analyzed by hirshleifer 1991 1995 and skaperdas 1992 to an infinite horizon differential game our aim is to highlight the strategic role of appropriation among a smaller group of agents in an intertemporal context the model yields the conclusion that there exists a unique linear nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategy even when strategies are defined over the entire state space we demonstrate that partial cooperation can be seen as a long run response to conflict moreover a decrease in the effectiveness of appropriation the depreciation rate of a common pool stock the rate of time preferences or an increase in the degree of noise improves the degree of partial cooperation and thus welfare in an anarchic society

remediation and self reporting in optimal law enforcement abstract many environmental laws encourage firms to self report their violations to government regulators rather than subject themselves to probabilistic enforcement this paper studies self reporting enforcement regimes when there are ex post benefits of remediation or clean up remediation benefits are shown to impart two advantages to the use of self reporting beyond those identified elsewhere firstly whereas non reporting firms only engage in costly clean up when they are caught by an enforcement authority self reporting firms always engage in efficient remediation secondly with self reporting the government can costlessly impose stiffer non reporter penalties that reduce the government enforcement effort required to achieve a given level of violation deterrence

incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice abstract this paper extends the economic literature on the incomplete enforcement of social regulation by incorporating regulatory choice in an institutional environment of limited regulatory resources and powers we show how regulatory decisions determine the structure of incentives faced by regulated firms our results indicate that the expense of monitoring relative to the regulator s power to levy penalties helps to explain the differences between compliance and deterrence enforcement styles we find that in most circumstances firms with higher abatement costs will receive a larger share of regulatory resources and thus face higher penalties than firms with lower costs

resource curse or not a question of appropriability this thesis presents three self contained essays focusing on empirical questions in growth and development economics each article addresses specific questions on why countries perform differently in particular i analyse the effect of democracy on economic development the relationship between natural resources and growth and the efficiency of foreign development assistance in the first essay democracy consolidation and growth i analyse the effect of democracy on economic growth in this context i argue that an important aspect to consider is how consolidated political systems are put simply i find that it is not only a question of how democratic countries are but also how long they have been democratic in other words economic performance tends to improve with the duration of uninterrupted democracy the performance of autocracies on the other hand tends to deteriorate over time however for newly established political systems there seems to be a cost of being democratic this implies that democracies only bear their fruit after some time the analysis has important policy implications to overcome initial straits international assistance focused on democratic consolidation may be important and a very good investment in fostering long run development the second essay resource curse or not a question of appropriability together with anne boschini and jesper roine is concerned with the relation between natural resources and economic development for most laymen as well as for most economists it would seem reasonable that countries richly endowed in natural resources also benefit from this wealth however a large literature has found a systematic negative effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth we suggest that this so called resource curse is not determined by resource endowments alone but rather by the interaction between the type of resources a country possesses and the quality of institutions in the country this combination of factors determines what we call the appropriability of a resource the concept of appropriability captures the likelihood of natural resources leading to rentseeking corruption or conflicts which in turn will harm economic development our results suggest that if institutions are good enough the curse may be turned into a blessing this may explain why some countries such as norway and botswana tend to benefit from their resources while others such as angola and sierra leone do not the third and final essay of this thesis foreign sectoral aid fungibility growth and poverty reduction is a contribution to the aid efficiency literature which is concerned with the question of whether aid helps or hinders economic development foreign development assistance is often targeted on specific public expenditure sectors if this aid is not used in the sector for which it was granted e g health education it is said to be fungible and donors may end up financing something completely different from what they intended e g military expenditures the major concern about sectoral fungibility is that the alternative use of aid may be less productive or less socially useful however measuring fungibility is not sufficient to determine whether foreign sectoral aid fungibility is actually harmful what is important is how the funds treated as fungible are used the essay starts by obtaining estimates of fungibility for 57 countries the results suggest that sectoral aid is indeed largely treated as fungible by recipient countries next to assess the economic and health effects of fungibility these estimates are incorporated into an empirical model of aid and growth as well as into a model of aid and infant mortality altogether i find no evidence of more fungible sectoral aid leading to worse performance

cyclical expenditure policy output volatility and economic growth this article provides an empirical assessment of the relation between the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure policy output volatility and economic growth using a cross section of 88 countries over the period 1960 to 2004 identification of the effects of endogenous cyclical expenditure policy is achieved by exploiting the exogeneity of countries political and institutional characteristics which we find to be relevant determinants of the cyclicality of expenditures there are three main results first both pro and countercyclical expenditure policy amplify output volatility much in a way like pure fiscal shocks second output volatility due to variations in cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy is negatively associated with economic growth third there is no direct effect of cyclicality on economic growth other than through output volatility

optimal dutch disease growth models of the dutch disease such as those of krugman 1987 matsuyama 1992 sachs and warner 1995 and gylfason et al 1999 explain why resource abundance may reduce growth however the literature also raises a new question if the use of resource wealth hurts productivity growth how should such wealth be optimally managed this question forms the topic of the present paper in which we extend the growth literature on the dutch disease from a positive to a normative setting we show that the assumptions in the previous literature imply that the optimal share of national wealth consumed in each period needs to be adjusted down however some dutch disease is always optimal thus lower growth in resource abundant countries may not be a problem in itself but may be part of an optimal growth path the optimal spending path of the resource wealth may be increasing or decreasing over time and we discuss why this is the case

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

status concern and the exploitation of common pool renewable resources we examine the impact of social status concern in a common pool renewable resource oligopoly a small number of players share access to a common pool resource and sell their production in a common market where they are oligopolists we depart from the mainstream literature on common pool resource oligopolies by considering that each player cares about her social status we allow for two channels to impact a player s welfare harvest and profits under the first channel a player has a bump in her utility when her harvest is larger than the average harvest of the rest of the players in this case we show that the presence of this channel exacerbates the tragedy of the commons under the second channel a player enjoys a bump in her utility if she manages to earn more profits than the average profits of the other players in this case we show that social status concern may temporarily alleviate the tragedy of the commons it results in a decrease of extraction over an interval of stock sizes

industrial policy evaluation in the presence of spillovers the shortage of studies on spatial spillovers of capital subsidy policies is rather surprising considering that such policies are usually designed to generate spatial externalities we propose a new framework that allows positive agglomeration effects to be contrasted with the negative cross sectional substitution and the crowding out effect the global evaluation of the att and the spillover parameters shifts the spotlight from the policy effect on subsidised firms to the global effect of capital subsidy policies on the targeted territory the empirical evaluation of a policy in italy mainly directed towards small and medium sized firms shows that the impact on investments turnover and employment is positive and large but is negative on tfp however the employment growth is partially determined to the detriment of the untreated firms

comparative dynamics in a productive asset oligopoly abstract we build a subgame perfect nash equilibrium of a common property productive asset oligopoly and analyze separately the impact of a change in the implicit growth rate of the asset and a change in the number of firms exploiting the asset we show that the steady state level of asset can be a decreasing function of the asset s implicit growth rate this phenomenon arises when the initial stock of asset is below a certain threshold in the short run we show that firms exploitation rate can be a decreasing function of the implicit growth rate we study the impact of a change in the number of firms that share access to the asset reducing the number of firms can result in the long run in higher industry production in the short run it can result in an increase of the industry s exploitation and a decrease of the level of the asset s stock

local economic development agglomeration economies and the big push 100 years of evidence from the tennessee valley authority we study the long run eects of one of the most ambitious place based economic development policies in u s history the tennessee valley authority using a rich panel dataset of counties we conduct an evaluation of the dynamic eects of the tva on local economies in the seventy years following the program s inception we nd that the tva led to short run gains in agricultural employment that were eventually reversed while impacts on manufacturing employment continued to intensify well after the program s subsidies had lapsed a pattern consistent with the presence of strong agglomeration economies in the manufacturing sector economists have long cautioned that the local gains created by place based policies may be oset by losses elsewhere yielding ambiguous eects on the u s as a whole building on the framework in glaeser and gottlieb 2008 we develop a novel approach to assessing the aggregate consequences of shifting the spatial distribution of manufacturing employment our ndings suggest the aggregate productivity gains associated with relocating manufacturing activity to the tva region were probably minimal

social polarization fiscal instability and growth abstract we present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization of preferences plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse in a highly polarized society a deficit occurs endogenously fiscal spending path becomes more volatile output collapses and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output one novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit the magnitude of fiscal volatility and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization this is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers or socio economic groups to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting polarization effect thereby we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth moreover we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting

fiscal spending and economic growth some stylized facts using an event analysis this paper complements the cross country approach to the study of fiscal correlates of growth data on fiscal expenditures and growth for a database of 140 countries 118 developing countries over 1972 2005 are reorganized around turning points providing a summary but encompassing description of what is in the data for this sample the probability of occurrence of a fiscal event is about 10 and the probability of a growth event once a fiscal event had occurred is around 26 for developing countries fiscal events followed by growth events occur under situations of i significantly lesser deficit ii fewer resources devoted to non interest general public services and iii shift in primary expenditures toward transport communication after controlling for the growth inducing effects of positive terms of trade shocks and of trade liberalization reform probit estimates indicate that a growth event is more likely to occur in a developing country when surrounded by a fiscal event moreover the probability of occurrence of a growth event in the years following a fiscal event is greater the lower is the associated fiscal deficit confirming that success of a growth oriented fiscal expenditure reform is associate with a stabilized macroeconomic environment through limited primary fiscal deficit

the effectiveness of investment subsidies evidence from a regression discontinuity design this paper analyzes the effects of an investment subsidy program for small and medium sized enterprises in flanders from 2004 to 2009 the subsidies were awarded according to a ranking system that favored young growing and productive firms with a strong cash flow granting subsidies to the highest scoring firms until the depletion of funds the nature of this allocation system creates a sharp cutoff in granting the subsidy according to the score allowing us to estimate the causal impact of the subsidies using a regression discontinuity design we find a positive effect on firm level investment employment output and productivity for the firms that were granted the subsidy but only for the small firms however the effect is small relative to the cost of the subsidy

property rights and finance which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment weak property rights or limited access to external finance from a survey of new firms in post communist countries we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits even when bank loans are available where property rights are relatively strong firms reinvest their profits where they are relatively weak entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings

fiscal decentralization in rentier regions evidence from russia summary the paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure as a result such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest data on russian regions in the late 1990s early 2000s support this hypothesis advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development

investment tax incentives prices and the supply of capital goods using data on the prices of capital goods this paper shows that much of the benefit of investment tax incentives does not go to investing firms but rather to capital suppliers through higher prices the reduction in the cost of capital from a 10 percent investment tax credit increases equipment prices 3 5 7 0 percent this lasts several years and is largest for assets with large order backlogs low import competition or with a large fraction of buyers able to use investment subsidies capital goods workers wages rise too instrumental variables estimates of the short run supply elasticity are around 1 and can explain the traditionally small estimates of investment demand elasticities in absolute value the demand elasticity implied here exceeds 1

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

the determinants of asset stripping theory and evidence from the transition economies abstract during the transition from plan to market managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon there have been no efforts to model measure and investigate this process empirically this paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence we argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm s potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement our econometric results for about 950 firms in five transition economies provide support for this argument

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

walk in my shoes nudging for empathy conservation abstract the traditional policy approaches to encourage conservation including offering monetary incentives and direct regulation may lead to unintended consequences which may undermine their effectiveness in this paper we experimentally test the effectiveness of complementing financial nudging incentives with nudging for empathy our framed experiment models a situation in which an upstream farmer influences the water quality downstream by choosing the level of conservation financial nudging is represented by a crop insurance subsidy conditional on conservation compliance consistent with the 2014 farm bill policy empathy nudging is represented by a downstream water user sending a message to the upstream farmer encouraging the latter to walk in the shoes take the perspective of the former we found that empathy nudging can counteract the elimination of financial incentives however it is less effective than financial nudging empathy nudging coupled with financial incentives has a synergic effect and conservation increased significantly compared to using one of the nudges alone furthermore the combination of empathy and financial nudging was particularly effective in low initial conservation cases we argue that policy makers and the public should encourage empathy conservation and that the environmental policy narrative should appeal to empathy and call for farmers to join the cause for conservation and environmental protection

policy effectiveness in spatial resource wars a two region model abstract we develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two region setup to counteract the overexploitation of the resource the tragedy of commons that occurs when players are free to choose where to harvest the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies we compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve or assigns territorial user rights to the players we show that when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting effort the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and in addition they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players conversely in a context of higher harvesting effort the intervention can help to safeguard the resource preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players

why do more polarized countries run more procyclical fiscal policy abstract we study the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy to explain why some countries exhibit procyclical fiscal policy stances being expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times we develop a model that links the polarization of preferences over fiscal spending to the procyclicality bias we then present evidence that social polarization as measured by income inequality and educational inequality is consistently and positively associated with fiscal procyclicality even after controlling for other determinants from existing theories we also find a strong negative impact of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

local multipliers at work we measure the effects of a substantial place based policy shock on the local labor market systems exploiting as an instrumental variable the peculiar information necessary to apply for capital subsidies in italy during the period 1996 2006 the results show the presence of positive multipliers in the south of italy slightly lower than what was previously found for the us but much higher than those identified for european and asian countries the reasons for this finding lie in the greater accuracy of the data in the relevance of the instrument used and in the widespread underutilization of production factors

alternative approaches to evaluation in empirical microeconomics four alternative but related approaches to empirical evaluation of policy interventions are studied social experiments natural experiments matching methods and instrumental variables in each case the necessary assumptions and the data requirements are considered for estimation of a number of key parameters of interest these key parameters include the average treatment effect the treatment on the treated and the local average treatment effect some issues of implementation and interpretation are discussed drawing on the labour market programme evaluation literature

what should fiscal councils do fiscal watchdogs so called fiscal councils have been proposed as a method to counter deficit bias of fiscal policy the paper analyses theoretically what role fiscal councils could play and surve

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

transaction costs in payment for environmental service contracts citation jeffrey m peterson craig m smith john c leatherman nathan p hendricks john a fox transaction costs in payment for environmental service contracts american journal of agricultural economics volume 97 issue 1 1 january 2015 pages 219 238 https doi org 10 1093 ajae aau071

the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy evidence from the oecd this paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in scal policy in particular we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across oecd countries in line with leading theories of scal cyclicality we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical scal policies wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect scal cyclicality

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

do subsidies to private capital boost firms growth a multiple regression discontinuity design approach there is still little consensus among economists on the effectiveness of business support policies the evaluation of such policies requires a reliable identification procedure that is hardly achieved in empirical studies we analyse the impact of a policy instrument law 488 92 l488 the main italian regional policy that allocates subsidies to private firms by a multiple ranking system thanks to the peculiar l488 selection process that creates the conditions for a local random experiment we are able to assess the effectiveness of these types of incentives for a relevant subgroup of firms we propose a nonparametric multiple rankings regression discontinuity design that exploits the sharp discontinuities in the l488 rankings and extends the regression discontinuity design rdd approach to a context where the treatment is assigned by multiple rankings with different cut off points we find that the impact of the subsidies on employment investment and turnover is positive and statistically significant while the effect on productivity is mostly negligible the new subsidised capital is additional but non complementary with the owner financed investment the results are robust to different specifications and not due to intertemporal substitution

do government purchases affect unemployment we estimate the effect of government purchases on unemployment in 20 oecd countries for the period 1980 2007 an increase in government purchases equal to one percent of gdp is found to reduce unemployment by about 0 3 percentage points in the same year the effect is greater and more persistent under less employment friendly labour market institutions and greater and more persistent under a fixed exchange rate regime than under a floating regime the effect is also greater in downturns than in booms the effect on unemployment reflects a corresponding positive effect of increased government purchases on the employment to population rate this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

initial and continuing compliance and the trade off between monitoring and control cost abstract the trade off between firm abatement costs and regulatory monitoring costs modeled by amacher and malik 1 2 am is reinterpreted extended and critiqued in part the notion of technology is replaced with the quantity of abatement capital and a constant fine per unit is replaced with a lump sum maximum total fine analysis of first and second best regulatory situations indicate that the first best allocation involves a higher capital to labor ratio than that which would minimize the firm s costs of meeting the standard the relationship between initial and continuing compliance is analyzed the curvature of iso abatement curves is related to the extent of net cost saving possible from more capital intensive abatement and the effect of a delayed commitment to the pollution standard by the regulator is considered am s comparison of pollution taxes versus pollution standards fails to hold up under the modified assumption on fines

audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game abstract this paper uses a game theoretic model of the tax compliance game to estimate a model of audit selection and income tax underreporting in jamaica the empirical analysis make use of audited tax returns for individual taxpayers and a random sample of tax returns for the population from which the audited returns are selected the estimation results strongly indicate a nonrandom audit strategy and thus provide support for the game theoretic approach the results also indicate that the probability of underreporting and the level of underreporting are positively related to the marginal tax rate and to income and negatively related to marginal payroll tax benefits in general the underreporting elasticities are small

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

growth in transition what we know what we don t and what we should abstract this essay surveys macroeconomic issues that marked the transition from planned to market economy in central and eastern european and former soviet union countries we first establish stylized facts of the transition so far we then critically survey the theoretical literature on transition discussing explanations for the initial output fall and mediumterm issues such as optimal speed of transition disorganization institutions and sectoral reallocation as source of output dynamics we review the empirical literature to assess how well it translates the theoretical models and explains the stylized facts we conclude with suggestions for future research

to invest or insure how authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness in this article the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives over the use of aid in three ways first dictators have a greater incentive to invest in public goods when they have a long time horizon second dictators with short time horizons often face the threat of challengers to the regime this leads them to forgo investment and instead consume state resources in two forms that harm growth repression and private pay offs to political opponents third dictators with short time horizons have a strong incentive to secure personal wealth as a form of insurance in case the regime falls using panel data on dictatorships in 71 developing countries from 1961 to 2001 the author finds that time horizons have a positive impact on aid effectiveness foreign aid is associated with positive growth when dictators face long time horizons and negative growth when time horizons are short

controlling non additional credits from nutrient management in water quality trading programs through eligibility baseline stringency a concern for programs that offer payment for environmental services is that those services be additional non additional services are those that would have been provided without the payment one source of non additionality is farmer misrepresentation of their pre program management farm management practices are often difficult to observe particularly those that do not involve structural changes such as nutrient management if practices are difficult to observe management oversight lax and enforcement weak the farmer has an incentive to provide biased information that increases the likelihood that he will receive a more favorable baseline for calculating services created and a larger payment this is a moral hazard problem the presence of non additional credits in a water quality trading program can result in the degradation of water quality point source discharges above permitted levels are replaced by equivalent reductions from unregulated nonpoint sources if the abatement that point sources purchase from nonpoint sources is non additional discharges will be higher than if the abatement was truly additional preventing non additional credits from entering a water quality trading market is one of the goals of program design in this paper we assess how program eligibility baseline choice affects the incentive to misrepresent baseline nutrient management practices

the curse of the haven the impact of multinational enterprise on environmental regulation abstract we analyze the behavior of multinational enterprises in the context of resource rich and poor countries and regarding high and low income countries we depart from the pollution haven hypothesis and the resource curse the pollution haven hypothesis states that multinational enterprises move their dirty operations to countries with weak environmental regulation the resource curse holds that economic growth in countries abundant in natural resources is reduced we find that more polluting firms are relatively more often located in countries with weak environmental regulation however multinational enterprises do not have a significant impact on environmental regulation in the host country it appears that it is mainly the quality of institutions that drives both the pollution haven and the resource curse

spatial agglomeration and firm exit a spatial dynamic analysis for italian provinces the paper investigates the effect of spatial agglomeration on firm exit in a dynamic framework using a large dataset at the industry province level for italy 1998 2007 we estimate a spatial dynamic panel model via a gmm estimator and analyze the short run impact of specialization and variety on firm exit specialization negatively affects firm exit rates in the short run the effect is particularly significant for low tech firms the impact of variety on firm mortality rates at the industry level is instead less clear although still negative and significant for low tech firms

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

the competitive externalities and the optimal seignorage this study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decisionmakers who can effectively print more money via the central bank the author derives the sequential rational expectation equilibrium and shows that the presence of competing decisionmakers increases the inflation rate and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax laffer curve the analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces where the centralized government system is weak similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

government programs can improve local labor markets evidence from state enterprise zones federal empowerment zones and federal enterprise communities 1 abstract federal and state governments spend well over a billion dollars a year on programs that encourage employment development in disadvantaged labor markets through the use of subsidies and tax credits in this paper we use an estimation approach that is valid under relatively weak assumptions to measure the impact of state enterprise zones entzs federal empowerment zones empzs and federal enterprise community entc programs on local labor markets we find that all three programs have positive statistically significant impacts on local labor markets in terms of the unemployment rate the poverty rate the fraction with wage and salary income and employment further the effects of empz and entc designation are considerably larger than the impact of entz designation we find that our estimates are robust to allowing for a regression to the mean effect we also find that there are positive but statistically insignificant spillover effects to neighboring census tracts of each of these programs thus our positive estimates of these program impacts do not simply represent a transfer from the nearest non treated census tract to the treated census tract our results are noteworthy for several reasons first our study is the first to jointly look at these three programs thus allowing policy makers to compare the impacts of these programs second our paper along with a concurrent study by neumark and kolko 2008 is the first to carry out the estimation accounting for overlap between the programs third our estimation strategy is valid under weaker assumptions than those made in many previous studies we consider three comparison groups and let the data determine the appropriate group fourth in spite of our conservative estimation strategy by looking at national effects with disaggregated data we show that entz designation generally has a positive effect on the local labor market while most previous research on entzs much of which used more geographically aggregated data to look at state specific effects did not find any significant impacts fifth we note that there is little or no previous work on entcs overall our results strongly support the efficacy of these labor market interventions

policy design and conservation compliance on highly erodible lands we develop a game theoretic model of heterogeneous producers in order to identify the economic determinants of producer noncompliance with the conservation provisions of the united states department of agriculture usda policy on highly erodible lands we evaluate the policy effectiveness in inducing compliance and adoption of conservation practices the current policy design creates economic incentives for all noncompliant producers to masquerade as adopters and to claim government payments for which they are not entitled both theoretical and empirical results indicate that the increased income transfers to agriculture enacted under the latest farm bill will increase producer compliance and conservation activity on highly erodible lands

the political resource curse this paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians both with theory and data the theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates the data refer to brazil where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design the empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor these and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory jel d72 d73 h77 o17 o18

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

oil windfalls and export diversification in oil producing countries evidence from oil booms abstract this paper examines the factors behind export diversification in oil countries specifically we investigate the impact of oil booms on export diversification through an empirical framework the paper finds that economy s export structure before the oil boom determines whether oil windfalls might affect the diversification process thus an oil boom negatively affects export diversification only if countries initially exhibit low levels of diversification in countries with a high level of diversification before the boom an oil boom has no impact on diversification these results are based on a large sample of 134 countries and are robust to various sensitivity analyses they are corroborated with data from the manufacturing sector which show that oil booms only reduce diversification in countries with a small manufacturing sector prior to the boom

evaluation of spatial effects of capital subsidies in the south of italy de castris m and pellegrini g evaluation of spatial effects of capital subsidies in the south of italy regional studies the spatial effects of capital subsidies are neglected in the literature even if several industrial policies have a strong spatial dimension this study disentangles the spillovers generated by subsidized firms from the spatial attraction across neighbour s areas that cannot be attributed to incentive the presence of specific spatial effects is tested on the reduced form of a spatial autoregressive model evaluating the implicit common factor restriction the empirical analysis considers the main regional policies in the period 1996 2001 in the south of italy the results suggest the presence of a modest spatial crowding out where subsidized regions attract employment from neighbouring areas de castris m et pellegrini g une evaluation des effets geographiques des subventions d equipement dans le sud de l italie regional studies la documentation ne fait aucune attention aux effe

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

firm location decisions regional grants and agglomeration externalities we examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments we find that a region s existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas but importantly we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry this suggests that these subsidies are less effective in influencing firms location decisions in the face of countervailing co location benefits