bidding behavior in descending and ascending auctions this research examines how individual differences and institutional practices influence consumer bidding in auctions bidders may be motivated by different goals e g thrill of winning the item with minimal attention to what they pay for it versus prudence winning the item at a price at or below its perceived value also innate or auctioneer induced differences may exist in the precision and salience of bidder cognitions about the item s value we report two studies on how these motivational and cognitive factors influence bids in descending and ascending auctions respectively each study also manipulated a situational variable wait time at each price step the two auctions realized different average prices for the same item set average bids were higher in the descending versus ascending auction in several study conditions in both auction formats bidders primed with thrill versus prudence bid higher but more precise and or salient values attenuated this goal effect among other results in the descending auction longer wait times elicited higher bids from bidders primed with thrill but not prudence in the ascending auction longer wait times produced lower bids for bidders primed with prudence but not thrill these findings on consumer bidding behavior have practical implications for auction design

anatomy of a contract change we study the productivity impact of a contract change the setting is a tea plantation in india the activity in question is tea plucking the output of which is measurable and contractible payments to pluckers consist of a baseline wage along with piece rates per kilogram kg of output that vary over different production intervals in 2008 a contract change was instituted as part of a customary practice of renegotiation once every three years this plantation represented only a fraction of the negotiating parties which involved representatives from some 20 unions and large plantations operating in the tea growing region with no dominant players on either side of the table negotiations commenced a few months prior to the expiration of the going contract and went through several rounds the new contract increased the baseline wage by approximately 30 percent almost all of this increase was mandated by state government legislation in june 2008 the government announced a preliminary notification under the minimum wages act 1948 setting the minimum daily wage payable to plantation workers in the state at rs 102 us 2 25 the baseline in force in our plantation was at

equal votes equal money court ordered redistricting and the distribution ofpublic expenditures in the american states a study of the effects of legislative re districting in the states during the 1960 s also contains data file

the effects of nonstationarities on performance in call markets abstract this experiment investigates the responsiveness of laboratory call markets to repetitive systematic shocks in underlying demand or supply conditions results of nine call markets conducted under three treatment conditions are compared with nine previously reported double auctions the informationally sparse call auctions perform no worse than the double auctions allocative efficiency is similar across institutions and call markets appear to track underlying equilibrium price movements more accurately than double auctions

information effects in uniform price multi unit dutch auctions we design a multi unit descending price dutch auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems we address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction or know that it is one of two possible sizes they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders we find that revealing group size decreases bids and therefore revenue if units remaining are not shown when group size is unknown the price also falls if the number of units remaining is revealed the most efficient and largest revenue outcome occurs when bidders are not provided information on either group size or units remaining these laboratory results conform to some directional predictions from our theory although overbidding is common

the price quantity sealed bid offer auction with pro rata rationing experimental evidence this study examines a price quantity sealed bid offer auction with pro rata rationing in risky and riskless settings an asset with a known distribution of possible values is traded in the risky setting results include prices and quantities less consistent with the competitive equilibrium than with other nash equilibria frequent overrevelation of quantities a 0 73 correlation between inferred and induced risk coefficients lower forgone profits for the nonrationed side of the market and relatively low efficiencies the riskless setting in which asset values are known exhibits many of the same characteristics but to a lesser degree coauthors are ann martin david senkow and galen sevcik copyright 1993 by royal economic society

how trading institutions affect financial market performance some laboratory evidence i introduction trading institutions vary considerably across contemporary financial markets 1 but most can be classified into one of two basic types the continuous double auction da allows traders to submit public offers to buy or to sell and to accept other traders offers at any moment in time the double auction institution offers immediacy but non uniform transaction prices the other basic trading institution the clearinghouse ch gathers offers and clears them at a unified price at a pre specified time it sacrifices immediacy for uniform transaction prices 2 the two types of institutions have co existed and evolved for centuries but now are emerging in new electronic versions market participants and policy makers would like to know which institution or variant or combination is most efficient but theoretical and empirical work to date provides little guidance this paper reports on a series of laboratory asset markets experiments designed to compare variants of the double auction and clearinghouse trading institutions the markets are small usually with eight or nine traders but the traders are profit motivated and experienced with the trading institutions the traded asset has uncertain market value and traders receive useful but inconclusive private information they can only learn the asset s true value during the course of trade laboratory markets offer several advantages for empirical study of financial market institutions first private information is observable even controllable in the laboratory and therefore the investigator can directly measure market efficiency 3 second the complexity of the environment can be varied systematically in the laboratory and its effects on market performance can be separated from the effects of the market institution and other forces finally the market institution itself is controllable in the laboratory so it is possible to make valid causal inferences on how the market institution shapes market performance i begin with a survey of relevant literature and other preliminaries in the rest of this section section ii outlines the laboratory procedures the creation of trading environments of varying complexity the electronic implementation of the clearinghouse and double auction trading institutions the computation of theoretical benchmark prices and allocations and the measurement of market performance section iii collects the results following an illustrative account of a double auction trading period and a clearinghouse trading period i use descriptive statistics to summarize market performance in each of the thirty nine experiments the main conclusions are based on statistical comparisons of market performance across alternative market institutions the clearinghouse institution does surprisingly well it delivers greater market depth than the double auction discovers prices at least as efficiently and produces final allocations almost as efficient as the double auction the main institutional variants examined in this paper concern the amount of information made public regarding order placement orderflow the data suggest that public display of the orderflow enhances double auction efficiency but may impair clearinghouse efficiency a study of trading volume shows higher volume in the double auction in both institutions volume increases when important private news arrives and when the trading period is about to end the paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the results a companion paper friedman 1991 considers the effects of awarding various privileges to some but not all traders copeland and friedman 1987 1991 provide useful background information on laboratory procedures and computerized double auction markets instructions for the current experiments are available on request the need for empirical work a skeptic might argue that empirical work is unnecessary the mere fact that the double auction and clearinghouse institutions both persist in major financial markets implies that both are highly efficient because a more efficient institution would displace less efficient institutions

the behavioralist visits the factory increasing productivity using simple framing manipulations recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can happen in markets such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments a missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally occurring field counterparts we provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to work with a chinese high tech manufacturing facility our study revolves around using insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research framing manipulations in an attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility using a natural field experiment we report several insights for example conditional incentives framed as both losses and gains increase productivity for both individuals and teams in addition teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains the magnitude of this framing effect is roughly 1 that is total team productivity is enhanced by 1 purely due to the framing manipulation importantly we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their significance over time rather the effects are observed over the entire sample period moreover we learn that repeated interaction with workers and conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long run this paper was accepted by gerard p cachon decision analysis

preference anomalies preference elicitation and the discovered preference hypothesis there is wide ranging evidence much of it deriving from economics experiments of anomalies in behaviour that challenge standard preference theories this paper explores the implications of these anomalies for preference elicitation methods because methods that are used to inform public policy such as contingent valuation are based on standard preference theories their validity may be called into question by the anomaly data however on a new interpretation these anomalies do not contradict standard theory but are errors in stated preference that can be expected to disappear as people become more experienced in relevant decision environments we explore the evidence for this interpretation and what implications follow for preference elicitation methodology

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

economics and emotion institutions matter abstract in two different types of institutions english and dutch auctions we collect heart rate data a proxy for emotion to test hypotheses based on findings in neural science about the effect of emotion on economic behavior we first demonstrate that recording heart rates does not distort prices in these auctions next we ask if knowledge of the intensity of a participant s emotional state improves our ability to predict price setting behavior beyond predictions of price based on usual economic variables our answer is that institutions matter in the dutch english auctions we find no evidence that knowledge of emotional intensity affects our ability to predict price setting behavior we then entertain the proposition that the cardiac system is an information system that processes economic events we are able to show that this hypothesis is consistent with our observations and furthermore that the processes differ across institutions

social image concerns and prosocial behavior field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme abstract using longitudinal data on the entire population of blood donors in an italian town we examine how donors respond to a nonlinear award scheme that rewards them with symbolic prizes medals when they reach certain donation quotas our results indicate that donors significantly increase the frequency of their donations immediately before reaching the thresholds for which the rewards are given but only if the prizes are publicly announced in the local newspaper and awarded in a public ceremony the results are robust to several specifications sample definitions and controls for observable and unobservable heterogeneity our findings indicate that social image concerns are a primary motivator of prosocial behavior and that symbolic prizes are most effective as motivators when they are awarded publicly we discuss the implications of our findings for policies aimed at incentivizing prosocial behavior

social responsibility messages and worker wage requirements field experimental evidence from online labor marketplaces this paper examines the effects of employer social responsibility on the wages workers demand through randomized field experiments in two online labor marketplaces workers were recruited for short term jobs and i manipulated whether or not they received information about the employer s social responsibility i then observed the payment workers were willing to accept for the job in the first experiment information about the employer s social responsibility marginally reduced prospective workers wage requirements on average and had a significant effect on the highest performers who were willing to give up the wage differential they would otherwise demand in the second prospective workers submitted 44 lower wage bids for the same job after learning about the employer s social responsibility this paper provides causal empirical evidence of a revealed preference for social responsibility in the workplace and of a greater preference among the highest performers more broadly it provides evidence that

the importance of ordering in sequential auctions to date the largest part of literature on multi unit auctions has assumed that there arek homogeneous objects being auctioned where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all ofk units these modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential the aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction we study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd price auctions two heterogeneous jobs and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

the magic of the personal touch field experimental evidence on money appreciation as gifts this paper makes use of two field experiments to explore individual effort responses to gifts we extend the literature by looking at nonfinancial gifts and gifts that combine financial and nonfinancial elements with or without adding a personal touch we find that non pecuniary gifts that signal worker appreciation induce reciprocity most importantly we find that there are interaction effects between money and appreciation while money and appreciation are individually effective they only work well together when they are combined with a personal touch this points to the importance of interpersonal elements in gift giving and has important implications for how to effectively elicit worker effort

party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures this paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997 we find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support this is borne out in two ways i counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments ii when control of the state government changes the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party we find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts finally we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections this suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results and the mechanism through which this works is mobilization rather than conversion of voters in a fixed electorate

seller beware supply and demand reduction and price manipulation in multiple unit uniform price auctions we experimentally compare under revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two sided price clock auctions we find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers behavior is consistent across clock directions as a result the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

competition control and spurious covariation a longitudinal analysis of state spending the most basic fact about the american states since world war ii has been their immense growth in activities employment and especially spending yet it is striking to see how many of the articles in the new state policy literature resolutely ignore that phenomenon instead of looking at the central trend which is the upward thrust of spending over time these articles have wrangled interminably over the impact of certain sacrosanct political variables on spending differences across states in one or two slices of time the treatment of interparty competition ipc and party control is an excellent case in point since the early findings by dawson and robinson 1963 and dye 1966 that socioeconomic variables were more powerful than competition and control as forces structuring state policy political scientists have gone back and forth over the hypothesis policy has been reconceptualized in a variety of ways for example as service levels sharkansky 1967 or benefit distribution fry and winters 1970 while competition and control have been measured and remeasured ranney 1971 pfeiffer 1967 hofferbert 1964 assorted variables have been introduced as interacting factors some of which enhance the power of ipc under limited conditions deleon 1973 carmines 1974 and finally researchers have moved to more complicated methodological treatments such as path analysis or nonlinear models tompkins 1975 lewis beck 1977 for several reasons the outcome still has not been very satisfactory first although some political scientists have continued faith in the idea that american politics is preeminently party politics winters 1976 p 629 that faith has not been very well explicated as pulsipher and weatherby observed a theory of political or even party competition is yet to appear 1968 p 1214 even the basic concepts and hypotheses have been charac

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

auction institutional design theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple unit generalizations of the dutch and english auctions historically english and dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce fish or cut flowers where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units such as the australian wool auction using english rules successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction in some but not all instances this is because the goods are not identical even though the various lots may be close substitutes see penny burns 1985 where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous as in the securities markets multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously in the securities industry orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple unit auctions in what are referred to as call markets that is the security is called for auction at a particular point in time this type of market is used on the stock exchanges of austria belgium france germany and israel some of these are verbal and some are sealed bid auctions although the u s organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation since 1984 of auction preferred stock goldman sachs and co october 1984 and money market preferred stock lehman brothers july 1984 we now have dutch auction rate transferable securities called darts stated rate auction preferred stock or straps and many more after the initial subscription offering of this type of security the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple unit auction the exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and or buy corresponding quantities the dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism vernon l smith et al 1980 the discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell by comparison with continuous trading call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages robert a schwartz 1988 pp 442 6 the cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency price stability individual trades which are thought to have a small impact on price reduced price uncertainty and finally nondiscriminatory pricing however there are offsetting disadvantages 1 the market is inaccessible except at the time of call 2 no bid offer contract or price information is available until the results of the call are announced and 3 there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid offer may be too low high to execute inside the supply demand cross these conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls these disadvantages may be significant in september 1988 the wall street journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock economic science laboratory university of arizona tucson arizona this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8320121

electoral competition in the american states electoral competition is a concept that has played a central role in much of the state politics literature one commonly used indicator of competition in the states is the ranney index we offer an alternative indicator of competition one based on district level outcomes of state legislative elections after evaluating both indicators in terms of validity and reliability the analysis suggests that the district level indicator is both empirically and intuitively superior as a measure of electoral competition the implications of this finding are discussed

opportunity cost inattention and the bidder s curse abstract auction winners sometimes suffer a bidder s curse paying more for an item at auction than the fixed price charged for an identical item by other sellers this seemingly irrational behavior is puzzling because the information necessary to avoid overpaying would appear to be readily available to bidders yet they seem to ignore it to understand this behavior we consider the bidders decisions whether to acquire information about the fixed price before bidding in the presence of opportunity costs our theory introduces costly information acquisition into an auction model with a fixed price aftermarket selling an identical good when information about the fixed price is costly bidders sometimes remain rationally ignorant and overbid in the auction generating the bidder s curse to assess the empirical validity of our proposed explanation we study the model s predictions in an experiment where subjects have an opportunity cost of looking up a fixed price and bid in an auction we find that information acquisition decreases and overbidding increases with opportunity cost as predicted most observed lookup behavior is rationalizable and rational ignorance reliably generates the bidder s curse

silent auctions in the field and in the laboratory we analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions we focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding we then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions as a controlled environment this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field the laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction jel d44 h41

crowding out in the labor market a prosocial setting is necessary recent studies mostly from prosocial settings suggest that monetary rewards may crowd out effort exertion by economic agents we design a field experiment with data entry workers to investigate the extent of such crowding out effects in a labor market using simple variations in the job description of a task we induce a natural work setting under the work frame and emphasize social preference under the social frame we find that crowding out of labor participation critically depends on framing whereas small monetary rewards reduce the participation rate under the social frame the participation rate is nondecreasing in the wage rate under the work frame moreover among the workers who participate in the task those who receive a positive wage perform a considerably higher amount of work than those who are paid zero wage under either frame thus there is weak evidence of crowding out only when the task is explicitly given a prosocial flavor and not under a regular work setting furthermore emphasizing social preference in the labor market in such a way reduces the overall labor supply and seems to have an adverse effect on the quality of work data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1807 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

using laboratory experimental auctions in marketing research a case study of new packaging for fresh beef this paper illustrates the use of laboratory experimental auctions in a pretest market research program for new products we review the experimental auctions literature discuss the range of auction mechanisms available and present the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular mechanism for a laboratory pretest market we then present a step by step example of how a theoretically incentive compatible auction mechanism fifth price sealed bid was used in a laboratory pretest market for vacuum packaged beef based on the illustration we discuss the potential for using laboratory experimental auctions in pretest market research we present the limitations that may be encountered in such applications and outline research aimed at improving the behavioral properties of the technique

framing manipulations in contests a natural field experiment abstract exploiting findings that losses loom larger than gains studies have shown that framing manipulations can increase productivity of workers using a natural field experiment that exogenously manipulates wage bonuses within contests in a chinese high tech manufacturing facility we show that how loss aversion affects worker behavior critically depends on the incentive scheme as well as the framing manipulation four sets of two identical teams competed against each other to win a bonus given to the team within a set with the higher average hourly productivity over the week in each set the bonus was framed as a reward or gain for one team and as a punishment or loss for the other average weekly productivity was slightly higher under the loss treatment but this increase was statistically insignificant however the team under the loss treatment was at least 35 more likely to win the contest as teams payoffs are based on relative productivity under a contest framing effect is much stronger in terms of relative productivity finally workers seemingly responded to the bonus by increasing the quality of production as well as quantity defect rate fell as productivity increased

do monetary incentives undermine performance on intrinsically enjoyable tasks a field test economists have long been intrigued by an influential literature in psychology positing that monetary pay lowers performance on enjoyable tasks by crowding out agents intrinsic interest in them b

the design testing and implementation of virginia s nox allowance auction we report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the commonwealth of virginia in 2004 the three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid csb auction a sequential english clock sec auction and a combinatorial english clock cec auction we find the sec and cec mechanisms to be superior the csb when demand is relatively elastic 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

on the relative efficiency of performance pay and noncontingent incentives we report evidence from a large field experiment that compares the effectiveness of contingent and noncontingent incentives in eliciting costly effort for a large range of payment levels the company with which we worked sent 7 250 letters asking customers to complete a survey some letters promised to pay amounts ranging from 1 to 30 upon compliance contingent incentives whereas others already contained the money in the request envelopes noncontingent incentives compared to no payment very small contingent payments lower the response rate while small noncontingent payments raise the response rate as expected response rates rise with the size of the incentive offered the response rate in the noncontingent incentives rises more rapidly for low amounts of incentive but then flattens out and reaches lower levels than under contingent payments we discuss how the optimal policy regarding the use of each size and type of incentives crucially depends on firms objectives jel d21 d93

do wage cuts damage work morale evidence from a natural field experiment employment contracts are often incomplete leaving many responsibilities subject to workers discretion high work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms we conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity reducing average output by more than 20 percent an equivalent wage increase however did not result in any productivity gains the results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output leaving enough room for positive reactions altogether these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity as opposed to inequality aversion

collusion facilitating and collusion breaking power of simultaneous ascending and descending price auctions this article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a collusion incubator environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction theories of collusion producing behavior along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions these theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion the experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator then once the tacit collusion developed changing to the descending auction the change moved prices from collusive levels to near competitive levels