pareto improving campaign finance policy this paper argues that campaign finance policy in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing can be pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters the optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen the argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions

bid caps in large contests abstract we study the effect of rigid and flexible bid caps on contestants aggregate costs and aggregate bids in all pay contests with a large number of heterogeneous contestants and prizes we show that rigid caps always decrease aggregate costs whereas flexible caps have essentially no effect on aggregate costs rigid caps decrease aggregate bids when costs are linear or concave but increase aggregate bids under some conditions when costs are convex flexible caps always decrease aggregate bids

multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders in the last few years governments in many parts of the world have aggressively sought to privatize socially held assets this wave of privatization has included the sale of industrial enterprises in the former soviet union and eastern europe the sale of public transportation systems in britain and scandinavia and the sale of radio spectra in the u s both the enormity and the importance of these sales have naturally led to an examination of how best to accomplish this task auctions have been proposed and have frequently been used as time honoured convenient and attractive mechanisms for such sales this in turn has led to a revival of interest in the theory of auctions particularly those involving multiple objects the magnitude of these privatization sales has meant that in many instances it is realistic to consider that buyers may run up against liquidity or borrowing constraints the presence of these financial constraints introduces important differences into traditional auction theory for instance pitchik and schotter 1986 and che and gale 1996 1998 have shown that when bidders are subject to such constraints the conclusion of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds when multiple objects are auctioned in the presence of budget constraints it may be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively on one object with a view to raising the price paid by his rival and depleting his budget so that the second object may then be obtained at a lower price in effect a bidder may wish to raise a rival s costs in one market in order to gain advantage in another thus unlike in traditional auction theory a particular bidder s payoff is affected by the price paid by a rival bidder it is important to note that this effect comes into play only when several objects are sold

lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies abstract this paper uses the common agency approach to analyze the joint determination of product and labor market distortions in a small open economy capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages while other factors of production are not organized the paper shows that product and labor market distortions always move in the same direction and that their level is not modified by social pacts between capital and labor it also shows that labor market distortions are second best hence conditionality by foreign organizations should target distortions in product markets but not in labor markets

nonlinear dynamics in deviations from the law of one price a broad based empirical study abstract in this paper we test empirically the validity of the law of one price using data for five major bilateral us dollar exchange rates and nine goods sectors during the recent floating exchange rate regime since the early 1970s using threshold autoregressive models we find strong evidence of nonlinear mean reversion in deviations from the law of one price with plausible convergence speeds consistent with theoretical arguments on international goods markets arbitrage under transactions costs and with an emerging strand of empirical literature these results contribute towards forming a consensus view in favor of discrete regime switching in deviations from the law of one price and the presence of differing nonzero transactions costs across a broad range of goods and countries

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

caps on political lobbying comment following the 1999 israeli elections the winning candidate s ehud barak s party was fined 3 2 million dollars for violating israel s campaign financing laws by exceeding the spending cap imposed and raising 1 2 million dollars illegally see time europe 2000 while adhering to the strict ncaa recruiting regulations the university of oregon spent 3 million dollars to make their football locker room the best anywhere including the nfl lexington herald leader 2003 when asked about the previous salary cap in the uk football league players said that it the cap was so artificial that clubs paid money in brown paper envelopes bbc2 newsnight 2002 in all these cases there officially existed a rigid spending cap however they show that even though a cap exists the cap might not be easily enforced when enforced the penalty may just be financial rather than a change in outcome the cap may be enforced and adhered to but there may also be alternate perhaps less effective hence more costly means of spending we also see that the flexible nature of the cap is often built into the rules by examining the salary caps of the four major us sports leagues where the caps are routinely exceeded in baseball and basketball surpassing the cap invokes a pure financial penalty called a luxury tax which is proportional to the excess in football while the cap is stated in terms of salaries many teams use signing bonuses as a way to circumvent it in ice hockey there is a dual cap system where the luxury tax is invoked on salaries falling between the two caps and signing bonuses are an allowed method to exceed the

heterogeneous risk loss aversion in complete information all pay auctions we extend previous theoretical work on n player complete information all pay auctions to incorporate heterogeneous risk and loss averse utility functions we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria with a given set of active players with any strictly increasing utility functions and characterize the players equilibrium mixed strategies assuming that players can be ordered by their risk aversion player a is more risk averse than player b if whenever player b prefers a certain payment over a given lottery so does player a we find that in equilibrium the more risk averse players either bid higher than the less risk averse players and win with higher ex ante probability or they drop out furthermore while each player s expected bid decreases with the other players risk aversion her expected bid increases with her own risk aversion thus increasing a player s risk aversion creates two opposing effects on total expected bid a sufficient condition for the total expected bid to decrease with a player s risk aversion is that this player is relatively more risk averse compared to the rest of the players our findings have important implications for the literature on gender differences in competitiveness and for gender diversity in firms that use personnel contests for promotions

a restriction on lobbyist donations abstract this paper studies the consequences of a fine for violating a ceiling on permissible donations in a competition for a political prize increasing the fine can increase or decrease the amount of expected donations in equilibrium

welfare effects of liberalization reforms with distortions in financial and labor markets abstract liberalization can have ambiguous effects on welfare and produce unexpected macroeconomic changes because of conflicting effects stemming from distortions in other markets both within the same period and across time this approach presents a two period intertemporal model of a small open economy to examine the welfare effects of removing one distortion financial repression tariffs while others wage and price rigidity remain in place the equilibrium conditions from this model are used to derive welfare effects of various liberalization policies and to determine optimal levels of the policy variables

trade liberalization and rising wage inequality in latin america reconciliation with hos theory abstract the paper puts forward the hypothesis that the transitory effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality can differ from the long run outcome in cases where the hos theory predicts a decline in wage inequality in the long run a temporary rise can nevertheless occur due to i the asymmetries in the speed of contraction in the import sector and expansion in other sectors and ii the capital skill complementarity in production the asymmetric contraction and expansion causes a transitory capital accumulation that boosts the relative and the real wage of skilled labor due to capital skill complementarity although the long run hos fundamentals are therefore dominated in the short run by the transient effects arising due to capital skill complementarity the observed rise in wage inequality is nonetheless consistent with the hos theory appropriately extended to a dynamic setting

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

bid costs and endogenous bid caps we study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a price all bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids and moreover bids may be capped we show that regardless of the number of bidders if agents have linear or concave cost functions then setting a bid cap is not profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the average bid on the other hand if agents have convex cost functions i e an increasing marginal cost then affectively capping the bids is profitable for a designer facing a sufficiently large number of bidders

competition policy for elections do campaign contribution limits matter this paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes states are a natural laboratory to examine this issue we analyze elections to assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions we find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation we also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race

credit auctions and bid caps abstract in this paper we offer two contributions to the field of credit auctions first we compare first and second price credit auctions and provide solvency dependent conditions such that one mechanism dominates the other in terms of expected payoffs of all the parties involved in addition we present a new possibility of using bid caps in credit auctions we study the equilibria in the capped mechanisms and show that bid caps can increase the seller s expected payoff and in some cases the expected payoffs of all sides a win win situation

tests for symmetric and asymmetric nonlinear mean reversion in real exchange rates new tests based on smooth transition autoregressive models for mean reversion in time series of real exchange rates are proposed one test forces mean reversion to be symmetric about the integrated process central case while the other permits asymmetry the tests are applied to monthly series of seventeen real exchange rates against the u s dollar and fourteen against the deutsche mark they reveal stronger evidence against the unit root null hypothesis than does the usual dickey fuller test

are real exchange rates nonstationary evidence from a panel data test it is well documented that real exchange rates between the united states and many industrialized countries in the post bretton woods period are integrated this result implies that purchasing power parity ppp does not hold even as a long run relationship this paper demonstrates that the failure to reject the unit root hypothesis may result from the low power of existing univariate test procedures i test for unit roots in real exchange rates by employing a more powerful panel based procedure using both cpi and wpi real dollar exchange rate data i strongly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root my results provide overwhelming support for the long run ppp under the current float copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

distributional conflict in organizations abstract hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations contrary to what has frequently been argued we show that multi divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single tier organizations even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be influenced these benefits derive from two effects first part of the conflict in multi divisional organizations takes place on the division level where a small number of agents fight over only a fraction of the overall prize second by grouping agents into common divisions multi divisional organizations create free rider problems in rent seeking our model sheds new light on the desirability of divestitures and the transition from the u to the m form by us corporations in the 1920s

real and nominal exchange rates in the long run an empirical investigation abstract this paper reports on econometric tests of the hypothesis that purchasing power parity holds as a long run relationship using data on eight industrialized countries during the flexible exchange rate period the empirical work proceeds by i testing whether nominal exchange rates and relative price levels are co integrated and ii conducting impulse response analysis of long run exchange rate and relative price level changes to explain the data keynesian models suggest that shocks during the estimation period were due principally to exogenous shifts in aggregate demand while equilibrium models suggest that monetary factors have been relatively more important

influencing rent seeking contests this paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants effort costs can lead to an increase in total effort in asymmetric settings this levels the playing field and therefore encourages weaker players who otherwise would have stayed out to enter paradoxically a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total effort may thus wish to make rent seeking more difficult these results suggest that the often lamented bureaucratic red tape might in fact be a rational response to the problem of attracting lobbyists to participate in a contest

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

policy watch congressional campaign finance reform while campaign finance reform attracts a lot of attention it seems unlikely that such reform at least in it current guise will have a large impact on the functioning of the american political system recent studies have called into question the conventional wisdom that challenger campaign spending is especially effective suggesting that attempts to close the gap between incumbent and challenger spending will have a smaller than expected impact on election outcomes while it is safe to conclude that pacs wield some influence it is not clear that limiting cash contributions will have a substantial effect

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

gradualism in free trade agreements a theoretical justification a notable feature of many recent trade agreements is the gradual rather than immediate reduction of trade barriers in this paper we model trade liberalization as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non cooperative environment we show that specialization capacity irreversibility and the development of trade partner specific capital increase the benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease over time the lowest obtainable self enforcing tariff by increasing the penalty of future defection sunk costs ensure that the self enforcing trading relationship starts slowly but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to improve

was it real the exchange rate interest differential relation over the modern floating rate period in this paper we explore the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials in the united states germany japan and the united kingdom contrary to theories based on the joint hypothesis that domestic prices are sticky and monetary disturbances are predominant we find little evidence of a stable relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates we consider both in sample and out of sample tests one hypothesis that is consistent with our findings is that real disturbances such as productivity shocks may be a major source of exchange rate volatility this paper investigates the empirical relationship between major currency real exchange rates and real interest rates over the modern post march 1973 flexible rate experience the exchange rates examined here include the dollar mark dollar yen and dollar pound rates our two major findings are as follows first the data do not indicate a strong correspondence between real interest rate differentials short term or long term and real exchange rates this finding appears to conflict with the predictions of most monetary and portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination though the conflict can be substantially reconciled if aggregate disturbances are primarily real in nature i e changes in productivity tastes etc it is true that in many cases the sign of the estimated exchange rate interest rate differential relationship is consistent with the possible predominance of financial market disturbances but the relationship is not stable enough to be statistically significant second although one does find some evidence of a unit root in both real exchange rates and long term but not shortterm real interest differentials these two series do not appear to be linearly cointegrated hence the nonstationarity or near nonstationarity in the two series cannot be attributed to the same factor in section i we briefly describe a class of small scale monetary models of exchange rate determination the importance of this class of models for empirical work derives from its strong predictions about how the exchange rate will move

terms of trade tariffs and labor market adjustment in developing countries a three goods model importables exportables and nontradables is used to analyze labor market adjustment to changes in the terms of trade and import tariffs for a small open economy first a three goods four factor model labor and capital specific to each sector is developed and used to investigate how an exogenously generated change in a country s terms of trade affects labor allocation and wages in the short run next a more traditional three goods two factor model is used to examine the effects in the long run the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regarding wage flexibility full flexibility economy wide real wage rigidity and sector specific real wage rigidity

incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits abstract this paper presents a model which captures the three main arguments for and against campaign spending limits campaign spending limits are purported to restrict the incumbent s ability to exploit his fundraising advantage in contrast to conventional wisdom a ceiling increases the incumbent s probability of victory regardless of the candidates relative fundraising abilities as long as the challenger is not more effective in campaign spending if the challenger is more effective in campaign spending ceilings have a non monotonic effect when the incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage a moderate ceiling decreases the incumbent s probability of victory but further restricting the limit favors the incumbent irrespective of incumbency status the marginal benefit to quality decreases with a more restrictive cap in an open seat contest a more restrictive limit improves the electoral prospects of the superior quality candidate stricter ceilings may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected spending

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

political contribution caps and lobby formation theory and evidence abstract the perceived importance of special interest group money in election campaigns motivates widespread use of caps on allowable contributions we present a bargaining model in which the effect of a cap that is not too stringent on the amount a lobby can contribute improves its bargaining position relative to the politician it thus increases the payoff from lobbying which will therefore increase the equilibrium number of lobbies when lobby formation is endogenous caps may then also increase aggregate contributions from lobbies and increase politically motivated government spending we present empirical evidence from u s states that support various predictions of the model we find a positive effect on the number of pacs formed from enacting laws constraining pac contributions moreover the estimated effect is non linear as predicted by the theoretical model very stringent caps reduce the number of pacs but as the cap increases above a threshold level the effect becomes positive contribution caps in the majority of u s states are above this threshold

optimal sequencing of credible reforms with uncertain outcomes abstract we study a two period representative agent economy in which economic liberalization is modeled as adding a positive random variable to the marginal product of capital we show liberalization always raises the expected utility of agents agents may respond to this by increasing consumption in the first period consequently consumption in the second period is sometimes smaller than the in the first depending on the realization of the random variable this tail may cause the government to reject liberalization of declining gdp enters negatively in the government s objectives we apply these results to the chilean experience of the 1980s

the power of money wealth effects in contests abstract the relationship between wealth and power has long been debated nevertheless this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game in this paper we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game two opposing effects arise wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest we consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth our theoretical analysis shows that the effects of wealth are strongly contest dependent it thus does not support general claims that the rich lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur conflicts

symmetric two stage contests with budget constraints the impact of a budget constraint on individual expenditures is examined in two models of two stage contests with homogenous and risk neutral players competing to win a single indivisible commonly valued rent the set of players is partitioned into equally sized groups in the first model one contestant from each group survives to compete on the second stage against the other survivors in the second model one group survives the first stage and its members compete against each other on the second stage we derive and discuss the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium solution for each model

information alliances in contests with budget limits we study the role of information exchange that may occur in alliances in a contest without noise contestants learn their own limits of what they can spend in a contest they may also form alliances and learn the limits of all players who are within the same alliance then they decide independently about their own contest efforts alliance formation for the purpose of information exchange is beneficial for members of the same alliance and neutral for all other players also a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members further we identify and discuss the set of stable alliance combinations

participation in deterministic contests abstract this paper considers participation in deterministic contests for m 1 identical prizes which employ an auction like rule to determine the winners in most papers that investigate such models participation by precisely m 1 players is associated with players having complete information about their opponents characteristics and participation by more than m 1 players is associated with players having incomplete information about their opponents characteristics i show that incomplete information is in fact neither sufficient nor necessary for participation by more than m 1 players

the all pay auction when a committee awards the prize there is very little work on the equilibrium of the all payauction when the prize is awarded by two or more people iconsider an all pay auction under committee administrationwith caps on the bids of the contestants i show that for anynumber of committee members and contestants there exists apure strategy equilibrium in which the contestants bid anamount equal to a suitably chosen cap i argue that the cap isnot an artificial restriction on the game given that thereare caps on political lobbying in the real world i find thatcommittee administration could result in higher aggregateexpenditures even if there is some probability that thecommittee will not award the prize the intuition for thisresult is that the inclusion of additional administratorsrelaxes the effect of caps on lobbying that is caps onlobbying tend to be more effective the smaller is the size ofthe committee caps may also be a solution to the problem ofmajoritarian cycles in all pay auctions under committeeadministration

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

tests for unit root versus threshold specification with an application to the purchasing power parity relationship we consider modeling the real exchange rate by a stationary three regime self exciting threshold autoregressive setar model with possibly a unit root in the middle regime this representation is consistent with purchasing power parity in the presence of trading costs our main contribution is to provide statistical tools for testing unit root versus a setar first we show that a setar with a unit root in the middle regime is stationary and mixing under reasonable assumptions second we derive analytically the asymptotic distribution of our unit root test under the null using monthly real exchange rate data our test rejects the null of unit root against a threshold process for five european series

campaign contributions and access an important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given in this story access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy relevant information under complete information regarding donors policy preferences i argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups and the recipient legislators preferences are similar however one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive relaxing the informational assumption on donors preferences i reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the informational value of access to any agent is endogenous

mass media and special interest groups abstract media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior it is generally accepted that news coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups however existing models reach the opposite conclusions about the relationship between the profitability of advertising and media bias we present a theoretical model that reconciles these results the model shows that the sign of the effect of marginal costs of production or marginal advertising revenues on the level of distortion in news coverage depends on complementarity or substitutability between media bias and audience size for an interest group the existence of a budget constraint for an interest group and media outlets reliance on subscription in addition to advertising revenues

altruistic voting and campaign contributions abstract an altruistic citizen votes yes in a referendum if the perceived benifit of the project exceeds its perceived cost the altruist gets information about benifits and costs from contributions to the pro and con campaigns in the nash equilibrium of a campaign contribution game with two beneficiaries altruists vote on the side with the largest contribution and altruistic voting guarantees efficient choices if there are many agents however altruistic voters do not always make efficient choices a disclosure law that provides information about the number of beneficiaries increases the efficiency of the referendum process

competitive burnout theory and experimental evidence abstract we examine equilibrium selection in a two stage sequential elimination contest in which contestants compete for a single prize this game has a continuum of equilibria only one of which satisfies the coalition proof nash equilibrium cpne refinement that equilibrium involves burning out by using all of one s resources in the first stage it is pareto dominated by many other equilibria we find that cpne predicts well when four people compete but not when eight people compete for two second stage spots using a cognitive hierarchy ch framework we show that when the number of players and the mean number of thinking steps are large the ch prediction involves burning out this provides a partial explanation of our results we also develop a formal argument as to why cpne logic is more compelling with more players we conclude that more competition leads to higher bids and that burning out is indeed a competitive phenomenon

campaign finance and voter welfare with entrenched incumbents two candidates compete for elective office each candidate has information she would like to reveal to the voters but this requires costly advertising the candidates can solicit contributions from interest groups to finance such advertising these contributions are secured by promises to perform favors for the contributors should the candidate win the election voters understand this and elect the candidate they like best taking into account their expectations about promises to special interests there is an incumbency advantage in fundraising which is sometimes so great that the incumbent faces no serious opposition at all introducing partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system while it can reduce welfare in other districts the optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

exchange rate based stabilization in latin america abstract this paper examines the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for achieving price stability in latin america it will explore the impact of exchange rate anchoring on the real sector by analyzing five stabilization programs the paper will identify conditions that make exchange rate based stabilization successful and those that lead to its failure it will also demonstrate that while the income effect can be instrumental in describing consumption booms associated with exchange rate based stabilizations the popular view based on the credibility hypothesis fails to explain key events associated with such programs

equilibrium contingent compensation in contests with delegation we consider two player contests in which each player hires a delegate who expends his effort to win a prize on the player s behalf endogenizing delegation contracts we focus on the equilibrium contracts between the players and their delegates we first show that each player s equilibrium contract is a no win no pay contract then we examine the delegates equilibrium compensation spreads effort levels probabilities of winning expected payoffs and the players equilibrium expected payoffs we show that economic rents for the delegates may exist

multi stage sequential all pay auctions abstract we study multi stage sequential all pay contests auctions where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter ability that affects their cost of effort we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants expected highest effort

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

three regime asymmetric star modeling and exchange rate reversion the breakdown of the bretton woods system and the adoption of generalized floating exchange rates ushered in a new era of exchange rate volatility and uncertainty this increased volatility leads economists to search for economic models able to describe observed exchange rate behavior in the present paper we propose more general star transition functions that encompass both threshold nonlinearity and asymmetric effects our framework allows for a gradual adjustment from one regime to another and considers threshold effects by encompassing other existing models such as tar models we apply our methodology to three different exchange rate data sets one for developing countries and official nominal exchange rates the second for emerging market economies using black market exchange rates and the third for oecd economies

neoliberalism and income distribution in latin america abstract this paper reviews the principal neoliberal policy measures instituted in latin america in the last decade and their impact on equity it first emphasizes the difficulty of separating the impact of liberalization measure from the necessary fiscal adjustments of the 1980s and their transitional vs longrun effects and then places the observed movements in distribution in global and historical context the second part places several innovations of neoliberal regimes in historical perspective and argues that their overall impact is unlikely to be regressive and that previous regimes were probably not especially progressive over the long run developments in factor markets the demand side driven by reoriented industrial growth and the increasing importance of the service sector interacting with the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled labor are likely to be of overriding importance in determining the evolution of the distribution of income

speed of adjustment and self fulfilling failure of economic reform abstract an economic reform programme where inefficient public labour is laid off is considered the immediate effect is a lowering of wages and increased profitability in the private modern sector over time as capital accumulates in the modern sector wages and production increases big bang reform generates a sharp transitory drop in wages while gradual reform gives a more modest decline in the presence of a subsistence wage constraint popular resistance can cause the cancellation of big bang reform two arguments for gradualism can in that case be made first a more gradual reform requires a less abrupt drop in the wage and will therefore be feasible second the initial wage drop will be stronger if a cancellation of reform is expected and since cancellation is dependent on the severity of the initial wage drop multiple equilibria occurs the existence of multiple equilibria is dependent on the speed of reform sufficiently gradual programmes have a unique successful equilibrium

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

caps in sequential contests i introduction in many competitions we can often observe situations where severe constraints are imposed on contestants for example in the u s electoral campaign there is a specific maximum campaign contribution that a single agent can make to a candidate 1 in sports where equipment plays a major role e g sailing motor races etc explicit or implicit technological constraints are imposed on the allowed equipment also several sports leagues e g the national basketball association nba implement a salary cap which places a limit on the total amount of money a team can spend on players salaries salary caps are clearly binding and teams are sometimes forced to trade expensive players in order to make place for other needed team members the usual reason for applying salary caps is that they facilitate even competition between small and large city teams otherwise large city teams could pay more buy the best talent and ultimately destroy any semblance of competition in the league the goal of caps imposed by designers of competitions is to create what we call a competitive balance so that many players have a chance to win and not necessarily the strongest ones in addition if the contest is more competitively balanced the uncertainty of the outcome is higher and therefore the contest is more attractive furthermore competitive balance may lead to an improvement of the expected total performance of all the players rather than just the performance of the top player several other ways have been suggested to enhance the competitive balance in contests for example baye kovenock and de vries 1993 showed that in all pay auctions contests by excluding the strongest player the player with the highest value of winning the contest becomes more competitively balanced and then the players expected total bid may increase moldovanu and sela 2001 found that in all pay auctions under incomplete information when cost functions are convex several positive prizes may be optimal for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total bid in other words by increasing the number of the prizes the chances of the players with relatively low values of winning to win one of the prizes increase and therefore these players will increase their efforts accordingly cohen kaplan and sela 2008 studied all pay auctions with effort dependent rewards under incomplete information and demonstrated that when the designer maximizes the total bid effort and when there is a sufficiently large number of contestants the optimal reward decreases in the contestants bid this means that a designer will offer higher prizes to the players with relatively low values of winning those who exert lower efforts than to the players with relatively high values of winning those who exert higher efforts such a distribution of prizes balances the bids submitted by the players with high and low values of winning we focus here on the role of bid caps to enhance the competitive balance in contests relatively weak players players with low abilities or low values of winning usually exert low efforts which are lower than the level of the bid cap imposed by a designer in a contest with a bid cap if these players exert an effort that is equal to the bid cap they will have a higher chance to win since no one can exert a higher effort than the bid cap thus the weak players exert more effort than they would in a contest without a bid cap however relatively strong players players with high abilities or high values of winning usually exert higher efforts than the level of the bid cap thus the strong players exert less effort than they would in a contest without a bid cap hence the effect of the bid cap on the players total effort depends on the trade off between the increase of the weaker players efforts and the decrease of the stronger players efforts to be fully effective the bid cap system must guarantee that as many players as possible raise their efforts to the level of the bid cap and as less as possible reduce their efforts to this level

evidence on purchasing power parity from univariate models the case of smooth transition trend stationarity recent research has found that trend break unit root tests derived from univariate linear models do not support the hypothesis of long run purchasing power parity ppp for us dollar real exchange rates in this paper univariate smooth transition models are utilized to develop unit root tests that allow under the alternative hypothesis for stationarity around a gradually changing deterministic trend function these tests reveal statistically significant evidence against the null hypothesis of a unit root for the real exchange rates of a number of countries against the us dollar however restrictions consistent with long run ppp are rejected for some of the countries for which a rejection of the unit root hypothesis is obtained

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

investment in the absence of property rights the role of incumbency advantages in many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output this paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest depending on the advantages an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment the results are applied to autocrats investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations

determinants of taiwan s trade liberalization the case of a newly industrialized country abstract this paper attempts to account for the success of policy reform in taiwan s trade liberalization through an investigation of the periods 1986 92 and 1992 95 the objective is to undertake an empirical examination of haggard et al s the political feasibility of adjustment in developing countries development centre of the oecd oecd paris 1995 strategies for minimizing the political costs involved in implementing policy reforms empirical evidence supports the haggard et al arguments that is indirect compensation is used to facilitate the implementation of trade liberalization for downstream industries while the speed of trade liberalization within certain specific industries is comparatively slow furthermore in a democratic regime the pressure brought to bear by well organized domestic interest groups along with the pressure from international interest groups can strongly influence the pattern of trade liberalization policies

campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups abstract regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones are these regulations desirable this paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry in the absence of entry contribution caps improve welfare by leveling the political playing field with entry however a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions in particular a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo and even if better policies are chosen the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups creating costly rent seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

transactions costs and nonlinear adjustment in real exchange rates an empirical investigation eolquilibrium models of real exchange rate determination in the presence of transactions costs imply a nonlinear adjustment process toward purchasing power parity ppp conventional cointegration tests which ignore the effect of transactions costs may be biased against the long run ppp hypothesis our results using both monthly data for the interwar period and annual data spanning two centuries clearly reject the linear framework in favor of an exponential smooth transition autoregressive process the systematic pattern in the estimates of the nonlinear models provides strong evidence of mean reverting behavior for ppp deviations and helps explain the mixed results of previous studies

campaign advertising and voter welfare this paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it an electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players many voters two candidates and one interest group the group has non verifiable insider information on the candidates quality and on the basis of this information offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position candidates spend the contributions they receive on non directly informative advertising this paper shows that 1 a separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive 2 although voters are fully rational a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare improving and 3 split contributions may arise in equilibrium and if they arise too often they are detrimental to voters

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40

bidding in hierarchies this paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single stage contests a condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single stage contest and when the single stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly the outcome depends on inter and intra group heterogeneity and is not driven by free rider incentives

inefficient equilibria in lobbying lobbying is often represented as a common agency game common agency games typically have multiple equilibria one class of equilibria called truthful has been identified by bernheim and whinston quarterly journal of economics 1986 101 1 1 31 in this paper we identify another class of equilibria which we call natural in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative we run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative the alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65 of the matches while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5 of the matches 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

should we tax or cap political contributions a lobbying model with policy favors and access abstract this paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell policy favors or sell access access allows interest groups to share hard information with the politician in support of their preferred policy here selling access maximizes policy utility while selling policy favors maximizes total contributions imposing a binding contribution limit makes it more likely that the politician sells access which can improve expected constituent welfare however a contribution limit distorts the signals associated with the contributions which tends to result in worse policy alternatively a tax on political contributions can ensure that the politician sells access without distorting his information therefore from the viewpoint of a representative constituent a tax on contributions is strictly preferred to a contribution limit or no reform the politician however may prefer regulation in the form of a contribution limit even when a tax is better for the constituent

the incentive effects of affirmative action in a real effort tournament abstract affirmative action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for its implementation affects the underlying incentive structure which might induce lower performance by participants and additionally result in a selected pool of tournament winners that is less efficient in this paper we study the empirical validity of such concerns in a case where the disadvantage affects capacities to compete we conducted real effort tournaments between pairs of children from two similar schools who systematically differed in how much training they received ex ante on the task at hand contrary to the expressed concerns our results show that the implementation of affirmative action did not result in a significant performance loss for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects instead it rather enhanced the performance for a large group of participants moreover affirmative action resulted in a more equitable tournament winner pool where half of the selected tournament winners came from the originally disadvantaged group hence the negative selection effects due to the biased tournament rules were at least partially offset by performance enhancing incentive effects

soft money and campaign finance reform we analyze special interest influence on policy when political contributions are capped but the regulation contains soft money loopholes the politician chooses between two policy options we define special interest influence as the probability the politician chooses the policy he would not have chosen in the absence of contributions any binding cap reduces special interest influence but the effect may be nonmonotonic a ban on contributions can result in greater special interest influence than a binding but nonzero cap the results may also have implications for the policy response to the 2010 supreme court ruling on citizens united v fec

the overvaluation of purchasing power parity abstract recent panel studies of purchasing power parity have reported strong evidence of mean reversion in real exchange rates however these studies fail to control for cross sectional dependence in the data this failure has dramatic consequences raising the significance level of tests with a nominal size of 5 percent to as much as 50 percent it is shown in this paper that controlling for cross sectional dependence no evidence against the random walk null can be found in panels of up to 64 real exchange rates this finding cannot be attributed to low power as there is ample power in panels of this size to reject the unit root null