analysts weighting of private and public information using both a linear regression method and a probability based method we find that on average analysts place larger than efficient weights on i e they overweight their private information when they forecast corporate earnings we also find that analysts overweight more when issuing forecasts more favorable than the consensus and overweight less and may even underweight private information when issuing forecasts less favorable than the consensus further the deviation from efficient weighting increases when the benefits from doing so are high or when the costs of doing so are low these results suggest that analysts incentives play a larger role in misweighting than their behavioral biases copyright 2006 oxford university press

security analyst superiority relative to univariate time series models in forecasting quarterly earnings abstract this paper provides evidence of security analyst sa superiority relative to univariate time series ts models in predicting firms quarterly earnings numbers and shows that sa forecast superiority in our sample is attributable to 1 better utilization of information existing on the date that ts model forecasts can be initiated a contemporaneous advantage and 2 use of information acquired between the date of initiation of ts model forecasts and the date when sa forecasts are published a timing advantage

following the leader a study of individual analysts earnings forecasts abstract this paper develops and tests procedures for ranking the performance of security analysts based on the timeliness of their earnings forecasts the abnormal trading volume associated with these forecasts and forecast accuracy our framework provides an objective assessment of analyst quality that differs from the standard approach which uses survey evidence to rate analysts we find that lead analysts identified by our measure of forecast timeliness have a greater impact on stock prices than follower analysts further we find that performance rankings based on forecast timeliness are more informative than rankings based on abnormal trading volume and forecast accuracy we also present evidence that analyst s forecast revisions are correlated with recent stock price performance suggesting that security analysts use publicly available information to revise their earnings forecasts

earnings skewness and analyst forecast bias abstract we argue that if analysts objective is to provide the most accurate forecast by minimizing the mean absolute forecast error then the optimal forecast is the median instead of the mean earnings forecast bias is observed when the median is different from the mean in a skewed earnings distribution thus part of the observed analyst forecast bias could be a result of analysts efforts to improve forecast accuracy when the earnings distribution is skewed we find that earnings skewness is significantly related to analyst forecast bias we also provide evidence that the market adjusts for part of the skewness induced bias

analyzing the analysts career concerns and biased earnings forecasts this paper examines the career concerns of security analysts we relate long histories of their earnings forecasts to job separations we find that relatively accurate past forecasts lead to favorable career outcomes such as remaining at or moving up to a high status large prestigious brokerage house controlling for accuracy optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus increase the chances of favorable job separations job separations depend much less on accuracy for analysts who cover stocks that are underwritten by their brokerage houses such analysts are also much more likely to be rewarded for optimistic forecasts than other analysts furthermore job separations were much less sensitive to accuracy and somewhat more sensitive to optimism during the stock market mania of the late 1990s these findings suggest that the well documented analyst forecast optimism bias is likely due to incentives to promote stocks

terrorist attacks analyst sentiment and earnings forecasts we examine whether exogenous and extremely negative events such as terrorist attacks and mass shootings influence the sentiment and forecasts of sell side equity analysts we find that analysts w

sell side analysts career concerns during banking stresses we propose a new approach to examine sell side analysts career concerns by relating their forecast boldness to their employers news flows specifically we use banking sector news to proxy for the severity of career concerns analysts follow more closely the consensus forecast when the prospects of the banking sector are negative and vice versa the effect is both economically and statistically significant after controlling for various firm analyst brokerage house and forecasting characteristics as well as sector and economy wide effects the more established analysts in terms of reputation and experience are generally unaffected by banking sector news in contrast their less established peers tend to cluster their forecasts near the consensus after a sequence of negative news flows for banks collectively our results support the notion that during banking stresses when job security is low analysts tendency to imitate others increases

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

loss function assumptions in rational expectations tests on financial analysts earnings forecasts abstract prior research concludes that financial analysts do not process public information efficiently in generating their earnings forecasts the ordinary least squares ols regression based tests used in prior studies assume implicitly that analysts face a quadratic loss function in contrast we argue that analysts likely face a linear loss function and hence try to minimize their absolute forecast errors we conduct and compare rational expectations tests using these two alternative loss functions we reproduce most prior findings of forecast inefficiency with ols regressions but find virtually no evidence of forecast inefficiency with least absolute deviation regressions where we explicitly assume a linear loss function

local autonomy tax morale and the shadow economy policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale however there is an alternative bottom up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems this paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy we use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in switzerland the findings suggest that there is a positive negative relationship between local autonomy and tax morale size of the shadow economy

desperate housewives communication difficulties and the dynamics of marital un happiness this paper develops a model of marital dissolution based on communication difficulties the quality of a marriage depends on the proximity of an action to a target the target is unknown and must be learned over time each individual receives private signals about the target and can communicate them only imperfectly to his or her spouse because of imperfect communication spouses may hold different beliefs about the optimal action the action actually chosen is a compromise of the spouses distinct beliefs if a couple s beliefs diverge too widely one or both of them may prefer to dissolve the marriage the paper explores how poor communication contributes to marital unhappiness as well as its implications for the dynamics of divorce risk the welfare properties of divorce decisions and the role of counseling when the distribution of decision making power in the household favors men wives but not husbands can find themselves trapped for prolonged periods in a marriage that leaves them as unhappy as it is possible to be without seeking relief through divorce

financial analyst characteristics and herding behavior in forecasting this study classifies analysts earnings forecasts as herding or bold and finds that 1 boldness likelihood increases with the analyst s prior accuracy brokerage size and experience and declines with the number of industries the analyst follows consistent with theory linking boldness with career concerns and ability 2 bold forecasts are more accurate than herding forecasts and 3 herding forecast revisions are more strongly associated with analysts earnings forecast errors actual earnings forecast than are bold forecast revisions thus bold forecasts incorporate analysts private information more completely and provide more relevant information to investors than herding forecasts

why are professional forecasters biased agency versus behavioral explanations professional forecasters may not simply aim to minimize expected squared forecast errors in models with repeated forecasts the pattern of forecasts reveals valuable information about the forecasters even before the outcome is realized rational forecasters will compromise between minimizing errors and mimicking prediction patterns typical of able forecasters simple models based on this argument imply that forecasts are biased in the direction of forecasts typical of able forecasters our models of strategic bias are rejected empirically as forecasts are biased in directions typical of forecasters with large mean squared forecast errors this observation is consistent with behavioral explanations of forecast bias

reading the tea leaves model uncertainty robust forecasts and the autocorrelation of analysts forecast errors abstract we put forward a model in which analysts are uncertain about a firm s earnings process faced with the possibility of using a misspecified model analysts issue forecasts that are robust to model misspecification we estimate that this mechanism explains approximately 60 of the autocorrelation in analysts forecast errors the remainder stems from the cross sectional variation in mean forecast errors and in analysts estimation errors of the persistence of earnings growth shocks consistent with our model we find that analysts learn about some features of the earnings process but not others and this learning reduces but does not eliminate the autocorrelation of forecast errors as firms age other potential explanations for the autocorrelation of analyst forecast errors are rejected our model of robust forecasting applies not only to analysts forecasts but also to all model based forecasts

what good does doing good do the effect of bond rating analysts corporate bias on investor reactions to changes in social responsibility in this study we explore how investors reconcile information on firms social responsibility with analysts assessments of future firm risk in the pricing of long term bonds we ask whether investors pay attention to small strides toward and or small slips away from socially responsible behavior arguing that analysts corporate bias toward gains and against losses influences investor reactions to corporate social responsibility we hypothesize that analysts notice and reward improvements in social responsibility yet excuse lapses we find support for this hypothesis using a unique dataset of long term bonds that combines lagged measures of firm level financial and social performance with bond specific data pertaining to risk of default and pricing the empirically robust asymmetry in investor responses to small but often cumulative increases versus decreases in corporate social responsibility reveals an under examined root cause of longer term larger scale distortions in financial market returns regarding corporate social performance our findings elaborate earlier behavioral research on how corporate bias influences analysts short term assessments of economic risk by theorizing why this corporate bias may influence long term assessments of social risk our work also motivates more critical scrutiny of the role analysts play in revising the future risk of today s social action versus inaction

herding in analysts recommendations the role of media abstract this study investigates the impact of media on analysts herding behavior when making stock recommendations we find three main results first we find that analysts herd less when stocks are covered more in the media second when the firm has negative media sentiment analysts tend to herd more third higher disagreement in the media is associated with a higher tendency to herd among analysts these findings are robust to the confounding effect of news flows on returns as well as to alternative explanations in addition we find that the effect of media on the herding behavior is conditional on analyst characteristics

self selection and analyst coverage this paper examines the relation between analysts information about a stock s future prospects and their decisions to issue investment recommendations and earnings forecasts for that stock and the implications of this relation for the observed distribution of recommendations and earnings forecast errors articles in the financial press have long argued that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavorable investment information perhaps because they fear jeopardizing potential investment banking

reputation and performance among security analysts members of the institutional investor all american research team supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts when forecasts are matched by the corporation followed and by the date of brokerage house issuance this contemporaneous advantage is complemented by a timing advantage all americans supply forecasts more often than other analysts stocks returns immediately following large upward forecast revisions suggest that all americans impact prices more than other analysts however there is virtually no difference in returns following large downward revisions nevertheless the collective results suggest a positive relation between reputation and performance and assuming that all americans are better paid pay and performance

biased forecasts or biased earnings the role of reported earnings in explaining apparent bias and over underreaction in analysts earnings forecasts the extensive literature that investigates whether analysts earnings forecasts are biased and or inefficient has produced conflicting evidence and no definitive answers to either question this paper shows how two relatively small but statistically influential asymmetries in the tail and the middle of distributions of analysts forecast errors can exaggerate or obscure evidence consistent with analyst bias and inefficiency leading to inconsistent inferences we identify an empirical link between firms recognition of unexpected accruals and the presence of the two asymmetries in distributions of forecast errors that suggests that firm reporting choices play an important role in determining analysts forecast errors r 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

do sell side stock analysts exhibit escalation of commitment this paper presents evidence that when an analyst makes an out of consensus forecast of a company s quarterly earnings that turns out to be incorrect she escalates her commitment to maintaining an out of consensus view on the company relative to an analyst who was close to the consensus the out of consensus analyst adjusts her forecasts for the current fiscal year s earnings less in the direction of the quarterly earnings surprise on average this type of updating behavior reduces forecasting accuracy so it does not seem to reflect superior private information further empirical results suggest that analysts do not have financial incentives to stand by extreme stock calls in the face of contradictory evidence managerial and financial market implications are discussed

consumer protection and the incentive to become informed we discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumer incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market in a market with costly consumer search we find that imposing a cap on suppliers prices reduces the incentive to engage in search with the result that prices paid by consumers both informed and uninformed may rise in a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off

conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommend companies that their firms have recently taken public we show that stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly than buy recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to at the time of and subsequent to the recommendation date we conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias we show also that the market does not recognize the full extent of this bias the results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers perform

rationality and analysts forecast bias this paper proposes and tests a quadratic loos utility function for modeling corporate earnings forecasting where financial analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy optimal forecasts with minimum expected error are optimistically biased and exhibit predictable cross sectional variation related to analyst and company characteristics empirical evidence from individual analyst forecasts is consistent with the model s predictions these results suggest that positive and predictable bias may be a rational property of optimal earnings forecasts prior studies using classical notions of unbiasedness may have prematurely dismissed analysts forecasts as being irrational or inaccurate

cluster sample methods in applied econometrics inference methods that recognize the clustering of individual observations have been available for more than 25 years brent moulton 1990 caught the attention of economists when he demonstrated the serious biases that can result in estimating the effects of aggregate explanatory variables on individual specific response variables the source of the downward bias in the usual ordinary least squares ols standard errors is the presence of an unobserved state level effect in the error term more recently john pepper 2002 showed how accounting for multi level clustering can have dramatic effects on t statistics while adjusting for clustering is much more common than it was 10 years ago inference methods robust to cluster correlation are not used routinely across all relevant settings in this paper i provide an overview of applications of cluster sample methods both to cluster samples and to panel data sets

herding among security analysts the paper shows that the buy or sell recommendations of security analysts have a signi cant positive in uence on the recommendations of the next two analysts this in uence can be traced to short lived information in the most recent revisions in contrast the in uence of the prevailing consensus is not stronger if the consensus accurately forecasts subsequent stock price movements this indicates consensus herding consistent with models in which analysts herd based on little information the consensus also has a stronger in uence when market conditions are favorable the resulting poorer information aggregation could cause bull markets to be intrinsically more fragilea e g bikhchandani et al j political economy 100 5 1992 992 1026 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved jel classixcation g11 g14 g24

security analysts career concerns and herding of earnings forecasts several theories of reputation and herding see e g scharfstein and stein 1990 suggest that herding among agents should vary with career concerns our goal in this paper is to document whether such a link exists in the labor market for security analysts specifically we look at the relationship between an analyst s job tenure a proxy for career concerns and various measures of stock earnings forecast performance we establish the following key results 1 older analysts are more likely to produce earnings forecasts of firms before younger ones 2 their forecasts also deviate more from the consensus forecast than their younger counterparts we argue that these results are consistent with some reputational models of herding we also establish a number of auxiliary findings regarding the relationship between forecast accuracy and frequency of forecast revisions with job tenure

inefficiency in analysts earnings forecasts systematic misreaction or systematic optimism a rational analysis of analyst behavior predicts that analysts immediately and without bias incorporate information into their forecasts several studies document analysts tendency to systematically underreact to information underreaction is inconsistent with rationality other studies indicate that analysts systematically overreact to new information or that they are systematically optimistic this study discriminates between these three hypotheses by examining the interaction between the nature of information and the type of reaction by analysts the evidence indicates that analysts underreact to negative information but overreact to positive information these results are consistent with systematic optimism in response to information the literature on financial analysts defines the phrase forecast inefficiency to mean forecasts that fail to accurately incorporate new information on a timely basis and or that are biased these forecasts have also been described as irrational or suboptimal prior studies report inefficiency in analysts forecasts finding that they are upwardly biased and inaccurately reflect available information some studies conclude from this that analysts underreact to information other studies conclude that analysts overreact if markets treat analysts forecasts as both rational and statistically optimal then inefficient forecasts could have important implications for the efficiency of pricing in securities markets in this paper we reexamine the apparent tendency of analysts to misinterpret earnings information the intent of this study is to discriminate between three hypotheses 1 that analysts systematically underreact to new earnings information 2 that analysts systematically overreact to new earnings information and 3 that analysts are systematically optimistic in their reactions for hypotheses 1 and 2 the direction of the misinterpretation i e underor overreaction is independent of the nature of the information received in contrast hypothesis 3 predicts that analysts are optimistic in interpreting