credit lines and credit utilization while much is known about the characteristics of consumers or businesses that obtain credit lines relatively little is known empirically about credit line utilization after origination this study fills that gap by testing two interrelated hypotheses concerning borrower credit quality and credit line utilization the empirical analysis confirms that borrowers with higher expectations of future credit quality deterioration originate credit lines to preserve financial flexibility furthermore we estimate a competing risks model that confirms our predictions concerning changes in borrower credit line utilization in response to borrower credit quality shocks

product market imperfections and loan commitments i show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower s industry a bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank while it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments a loan commitment is a contract guaranteeing future availability of credit to a borrower at a prespecified fixed or stochastic interest rate although bank loan commitments are an important financial instrument and there exists an extensive literature analyzing them the rationale for their existence is still a matter of research this paper provides an explanation for the existence of bank loan commitments to borrowers from industries in which there is imperfect competition in the product market it is shown that in such industries the option to acquire financing at predetermined rates enhances the borrower s strategic power and thus creates value for the individual borrower consider an industry with imperfect competition where firms face the problem of noncooperatively exploiting a product market opportunity the optimal product market strategy of a firm depends on the output of its rivals a firm with access to resources at a lower marginal cost than its competitors has a strategic advantage that it can exploit to gain a larger market share and profits it is shown here that a firm that does not have such a strategic advantage can create it by purchasing for a fixed initial fee an option to acquire a factor of production such as financing at favorable terms specifically by initially negotiating a bank loan commitment the firm can finance an expansion of output to meet a strategic contingency at more favorable terms than would be possible if the expansion had to be financed in the spot market the ability to exercise the commitment enables the firm to threaten its rivals strategically and moves the industry to an equilibrium more favorable to that firm thus creating value for the borrower it is shown below that it is optimal for all firms to acquire bank loan commitments altering the industry equilibrium in the process

garp for kids on the development of rational choice behavior in this paper we examine the extent to which consumption choices by 7 and 11 year old children and college undergraduates satisfy the axioms of revealed preference we find that choices by even the 7 year olds are considerably more likely to obey revealed preference axioms than would be true if they were choosing randomly 11 year olds do better still while college students do no better than 11 year old children we also find that mathematical ability is not correlated with choosing rationally we argue that this evidence suggests that the ability to choose rationally is not innate but that it does develop quickly

semiparametric estimation and consumer demand this paper considers the implementation of semiparametric methods in the empirical analysis of consumer demand the application is to the estimation of the engel curve relationship and uses the british family expenditure survey household composition is modelled using an extended partially linear framework this is shown to provide a useful method for pooling non parametric engel curves across households of different demographic composition c 1998 john wiley sons ltd

bank forward lending in alternative funding environments this paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit funding and liability management environments assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain the bank must choose its supply of commitments given this choice the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending but merely accommodate the credit needs of their customers similarly the central banker s claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short run becomes understandable in a new context it is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system it is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments expected bank and banking system size

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

an economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments abstract an economic rationale is provided for the competitive equilibrium deployment of commitment and usage fees in loan commitment pricing it is shown that under perfect information assessing both fees rather than just one permits optimal risk sharing when the borrower is privately informed about its probability of future commitment utilization commitment and usage fees can be used to induce borrowers to identify themselves by self selection through contract choice the equilibrium characterized here is dissipative and thus raises the usual existence questions which are addressed in the paper

commercial paper bank reserve requirements and the informational role of loan commitments abstract an explanation is provided of the often observed purchase of back up bank loan commitments by corporations immediately preceding their sale of dealer placed commercial paper since loan commitments are typically viewed as hedging instruments our paper explains why a risk neutral corporation would purchase this type of instrument and how it is priced it is assumed that while firms know their own credit risks neither banks nor the paper market can distinguish between some credit applicants we show that the purchase of a commitment can identify these firms to the market the equilibrium is partially revealing of the firms with unobservable quality those with higher quality identify themselves by purchasing commitments while those with lower quality sell unbacked paper and are pooled together unbacked paper is sold also by firms whose quality is observable unidentified firms in the lowest quality range do not sell commercial paper

the economics of child labor if child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents concern for the household s survival the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force however this assumption about parental decision making coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work the paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications copyright 1998 by american economic association

the motivations for loan commitments backing commercial paper a comment on commercial paper bank reserve requirements and the informational role of loan commitments abstract bank loan commitments backing commercial paper issues other than credit guarantees insure against systematic liquidity risk by providing an alternative to rolling over maturing paper the form of these commitment contracts the fact that they are issued only by banks and the determinants of variation across issuers in the extent of commitment backing are consistent with their role as liquidity insurance and not with a recently espoused view that commitments signal firm quality

the impact of alcohol consumption on occupational attainment in england in this study we provide evidence on the effect of alcohol consumption on occupational attainment in england to do this we use samples of employees from the health survey for england between 1992 and 1996 we find that owing to the endogenous nature of alcohol consumption ols estimates may provide a biased picture of the impact of alcohol consumption on occupational attainment using various sets of instrumental variables we find positive and significant returns to moderate levels of drinking for male and female employees which drop off rapidly as consumption increases

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

bank credit commitments credit rationing and monetary policy when loan needs are uncertain and bankruptcy is costly contracts resembling bank credit commitments dominate ordinary debt contracts the fees charged on commitments reduce bankruptcy risk by smoothing out borrowers loan payments reduced bankruptcy risk entitles borrowers to larger loans thereby reducing the risk of quantity rationing even if commitments reduce rationing risk monetary policy is not necessarily weaker under commitment finance a rise in lenders cost of funds perhaps reflecting a monetary contraction can reduce the expected value of a project more under a commitment than under an ordinary debt contract copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

loan commitments and monetary policy abstract in this paper we examine the impact of loan commitment agreements on the way in which monetary policy affects the economy we estimate a vector autoregressive var model and find evidence of a smaller impact of monetary policy on loans made under commitment agreements than on loans not made under commitment our conclusion is that loan commitments effectively protect borrowers from quantity credit rationing and thus force monetary policy to work mainly through interest rate channels

credible commitments contract enforcement problems and banks intermediation as credibility assurance abstract we consider contract enforceability problems in credit transactions and justify a bank as an organizational solution to market breakdown due to unenforceable contracts specifically we explain i why loan commitments exist and ii why banks exist to sell such commitments a loan commitment resolves moral hazard more efficiently than any combination of inside equity and spot credit however the market breaks down if commitment sellers are individuals because their promises to honor contracts are not credible with a large bank a perfect sequential equilibrium is obtained in which credibility is restored

competitive equilibrium with type convergence in an asymmetrically informed market this article studies an asymmetric information game with type convergence in which under some realizations of a common uncertainity inducing informed agents to reveal their types through self selection by contract choice is either costly or impossible under other realizations self selection permits costless distinctions between informed agents i obtain sufficient conditions under which contracting with options prior to the realization of the common uncertainity leads to the existence of a perfectly separating costless nash equilibrium applications to variable rate loan commitments and life insurance contracting are discussed article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

loan commitment contracts terms of lending and credit allocation this paper analyzes the structure of loan commitment contracts and the interrelationships among their component parameters lenders offer borrowers a set of loan packages from which the latter may choose that package found to be most appealing borrowers may trade off changes in any loan parameter in exchange for other adjustments the borrower at this time may purchase a larger credit ration for a price supporting empirical evidence is presented recently researchers have begun to study the determinants of loan commitment or line of credit contracts such contracts play an extremely important role in bank credit allocation according to the federal reserve bulletin over 70 of u s commercial and industrial loans are made under loan commitment contracts given the central importance of the institution it is not surprising that it is the subject of a growing literature loan commitment contracts have importance both at the micro level in terms of the bank customer relationship and at the marco level in terms of the channels of operation of monetary policy in this paper we seek to present and test empirically an analytic model of loan commitment contracts our paper differs from most previous work in that we include empirical analysis of credit allocation moreover most previous theoretical work on the subject has concentrated on the specific issue of pricing of the contracts often using an approach based on option theory and not on the quantity allocation of credit and its determinants we are particularly interested in the determinants of the quantitative allocation of credit to bank customers and in the composition of and trade offs among the various parameters comprising such a loan commitment package our model helps explain how contract terms are established in the market and will illuminate the institutional framework of commercial lending a view of the credit contract as a package of loan terms has been implied recently in connection with the credit rationing problem studies by azzi and cox 21 arzac schwartz and whitcomb 11 and koskela 81 show that the

competition risk neutrality and loan commitments abstract we rationalize fixed rate loan commitments forward credit contracting with options in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutrality future interest rates are random but there are no transactions costs borrowers finance projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect project payoffs credit contract design by the bank is the outcome of a non cooperative nash game between the bank and the borrower the initial formal analysis is basically in two steps first we show that the only spot credit market nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result in welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank s informational handicap second we show that loan commitments because of their ability to weaken the link between the offering bank s expected profit and the loan interest rate enable the complete elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome that strictly pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium perhaps our most surprising result is that if the borrower has some initial liquidity it is better for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside equity in conjunction with spot borrowing

loan commitments investment decisions and the signalling equilibrium abstract this paper analyzes the use of loan commitments to finance future risky investment projects when the capital market is informed of a firm s project quality having a loan commitment would lead the firm to overinvest if banks are competitively rational the cost of this overinvestment would be borne by the firm making the loan commitment contract unattractive when the project quality is private information firms will signal their project qualities through purchasing loan commitments this signal is credible because purchasing a loan commitment poses overinvestment cost to the firm this paper establishes and characterizes this dissipative signalling equilibrium

bank loan commitments and interest rate volatility bank loan commitments are examined in the context of option pricing models and a valuation formula is obtained the partial takedown phenomenon which is both distinctive and vexatious is considered in detail finally estimates of the value of u s bank loan commitments and their sensitivity to interest rate changes are provided

liquidation under moral hazard optimal debt maturity and loan commitments abstract this paper examines the benefits and limitations of loan commitment financing commitments enable firms to adopt more efficient liquidation policies we demonstrate however that the limitations of commitment financing depend on a number of firm characteristics in some circumstances firms find long term debt to be a superior alternative to commitment financing this provides a possible explanation for why loan commitments are not universally utilized by considering both the benefits as well as the limitations of loan commitment financing we are also able to integrate loan commitment contracts into a model of optimal debt maturity

the commitment problem of secured lending the paper presents a new theory of trade credit in which firms buy inputs on credit from suppliers to restore the benefits of secured bank financing impaired by contract incompleteness in a setting where investment is endogenous and unobservable to financiers we show that a bank secured credit contract is time inconsistent upon being granted credit the entrepreneur has an incentive to alter the original input combination jeopardizing the bank s revenues anticipating the entrepreneur s opportunism the bank offers an unsecured credit contract reducing the surplus from the venture one way for the entrepreneur to commit to the contract terms is to purchase inputs on credit from the supplier the supplier observes the input investment and acts as a guarantor that inputs will be purchased as contracted thus facilitating access to secured bank financing the commitment role of trade credit still holds in a multi period extension that investigates the impact of bank relationship lending on secured debt and trade credit our model provides novel testable predictions on optimal financial contracts in both one period and repeated lending relationships

children and household economic behavior this paper looks at some of the methodological issues that arise in modeling the effects of children on household behavior and presents some estimates for selected areas for our purposes household behavior will be taken to refer to household decisions on labor supply the allocation of expenditure to different periods and the decision as to what to do with the difference between income and expenditure i shall be concerned mainly with the effects of dependent children and i restrict attention largely to western societies excerpt

output spillovers from changes in sovereign credit ratings this research examines how a sovereign rating revision of one country influences the economic growth rates of other countries rating revisions have significant output spillover effects a one notch upgrade downgrade prompts on average a significant downward revision of about 0 03 0 07 in the consensus forecast of annual economic growth rates of other countries in the two month period after the event the spillovers are transmitted through direct and indirect trade and financial linkages between event and non event countries the evidence indicates that a predominance of differential common spillovers leads upgrades downgrades to produce adverse output effects for other countries

funding growth in bank based and market based financial systems evidence from firm level data the authors investigate whether firms access to external financing to fund growth differs between market based and bank based financial systems using firm level data for forty countries they compute the proportion of firms in each country that relies on external finance and examine how that proportion differs across financial systems they find that the development of a country s legal system predicts access to external finance and that stock markets and the banking system have different effects on access to external markets the development of securities markets is related more to the availability of long term financing whereas the development of the banking sector is related more to the availability of short term financing they find no evidence however that firms access to external financing is predicted by an index of the development of stock markets relative to the development of the banking system

some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing this paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988 while commercial loan rates are sticky consistent with rationing this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory in addition the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing overall the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon

children as consumers investigating child diary expenditure data we investigate expenditure behaviour of school aged children using child diary information contained in the british family expenditure survey the estimates from an almost ideal demand system aids for child expenditure suggest that drinks sweets books and toys are normal goods for children but clothes travel leisure and vice prod ucts are luxury items with income elasticities greater than one being a lone parent child and having a working mother are important factors in determining child expenditure de cisions importantly a higher parental budget share on any given commodity is typically associated with an increased child budget share on the same commodity jel classification dll d12 j13