renegotiation on incomplete procurement contracts abstractthis article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on procurement costs in road construction auctions ex ante contracts in these auctions often fail to specify all of the potential construction contingencies and consequently changes in scope are necessary after construction begins using vermont road construction contract data this study finds evidence that there is a statistically significant difference in costs of firms between auctions with and without extra work adjustments substantial adaptation costs are responsible for the higher procurement outlays in incomplete contract i also find that bidders inflate their bids to incorporate risk premiums in incomplete contracts however my estimates suggest that this bidding behaviour does not affect their profit margins

development effectiveness what have we learnt we suggest that the poverty efficiency aid allocation is merely a benchmark guide if a donor lacks other information about the country and also the power to change or prevail over government preferences we argue that in most circumstances donors have only limited scope for the latter and that while high aid dependence may reduce the fungibility problem and the use of ngos can by pass it altogether such circumstances are not very common hence the main reasons for departing from the benchmark are when the donor has additional information about likely poverty impact or if poverty reduction is not the objective

reconstituting the state city powers and exposures in chicago s infrastructure leases in the 2000s cities across north america began leasing existing infrastructure to global investment consortia previous evaluations of infrastructure leases focus on the lack of transparency of th

political instability corruption and policy formation the case of environmental policy abstract this paper develops a theory of environmental policy formation taking into consideration the degree of corruptibility and political turbulence the predictions that emerge are that the interaction between the two variables is important political instability has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations if the level of corruption is low but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high corruption reduces the stringency of environmental regulations but the effect disappears as political instability increases the empirical findings are fully consistent with the predictions of the model

risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public private partnerships we study the agency costs of delegated public service provision focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation we consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between efiort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may come along during operations our analysis points out at the e ciency gains that bundling planning and implementation as under public private partnerships can bring in terms of better project design and lower operational costs bundling also results in increasingly better performance as uncertainty is reduced by growing experience in the sector bundling should instead be viewed with caution when the private sector seeks to radically innovate on public service provision or to introduce new services but lacks the knowledge and expertise to anticipate the impact of the innovative design procedure technology on the cost of operations the compounding of asymmetric information ex post plus moral hazard and renegotiation may generate diseconomies of scope in agency costs which for high operational risk can make unbundling optimal in this context the use of private flnance can help re establishing the beneflt of bundling only if lenders have su cient expertise to help assessing project risks

dynamic procurement under uncertainty optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts we characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long term basic service when an uncertain add on is required later on introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service an income effect which reduces output distortions the firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add on this risk effect reduces the level of the add on but hardens information revelation for the basic service the interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions contract renegotiation and the value of incomplete contracts

infrastructure and development a critical appraisal of the macro level literature this survey reviews the existing macro level empirical literature on the link between infrastructure and development outcomes in a critical light after providing a general framework that casts the relevant terms of the controversy on the real effect of infrastructure on growth in the context of an aggregate production function it signals what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed this guides the systematic review of a number of empirical studies and the discussion of the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity finally building on related research in particular in contract theory and political economy the paper spells out several promising research avenues

german dominance in the ems evidence from interest rates abstract the paper presents an empirical analysis of german dominance and asymmetries in the ems based on a dynamic system of equations explaining national money market interest rates the hypothesis of strict german dominance of the ems is rejected however there are some noticeable asymmetries in the ems germany is a relatively strong player and has been the least dependent country in the early phase of the system since 1983 german independence has diminished in contrast france throughout and italy in the early phase of the ems have been relatively weak players in the system

the law of small numbers investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement abstracta commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts however restricted auctions are frequently used among eu member states to procure small contracts in this article we investigate this paradox using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009 we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result to our knowledge this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts

does foreign aid increase private investment evidence from panel cointegration this article uses panel cointegration and causality techniques to examine the long run relationship between foreign aid and private investment our main result is that aid has a statistically significant negative effect on private investment this result is robust to outliers different measures and forms of aid sample selection and the sample period in addition we find that long run causality runs in both directions suggesting that an increase in aid reduces private investment and that in turn higher private investment leads to lower aid inflows

renegotiation of concession contracts in latin america evidence from the water and transport sectors abstract high rates of contract renegotiation have raised serious questions about the viability of the concession model to attract private participation in infrastructure in developing countries after extending in reduced form a standard regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts we use a unique data set of 307 concessions awarded in latin america from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of transport and water to analyze the determinants of this high incidence of renegotiations of infrastructure contracts we look in details at the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession of regulatory institutions institutional features economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves we then derive some policy implications of our work

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

on the empirics of foreign aid and growth the present paper re examines the effectiveness of foreign aid theoretically and empirically using a standard olg model we show that aid inflows will in general affect long run productivity the size and direction of the impact may depend on policies deep structural characteristics and the size of the inflow the empirical analysis investigates these possibilities overall we find that aid has been effective in spurring growth but the magnitude of the effect depends on climate related circumstances finally we argue that the collier dollar allocation rule should be seriously reconsidered by donor agencies if aid effectiveness is related to climate the usefulness of foreign aid in promoting growth in developing countries has been an area of controversy ever since rosenstein rodan in 1943 advocated for aid to eastern and south eastern europe browsing through successive editions of a leading textbook in development economics provides a telling illustration of how the confidence in aid effectiveness dwindled over the years in the first edition of leading issues in economic development meier 1964 dedicated a full 18 page section to the issue of foreign aid he started out asking how much aid by the time of the sixth edition meier 1995 the treatment of foreign aid had been cut into half and the questions in focus were why official assistance and does aid work in the 2000 edition meier and rauch 2000 foreign aid is not even listed in the index

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

concessions of infrastructure in latin america government led renegotiation this paper analyzes government led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in latin america based on the same sample used in guasch laffont and straub 2003 to examine firm led renegotiations after extending the theoretical framework to a multiple period context in which both pareto improving and rent shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results while some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing as well as the corruption variables we provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

privatization in latin america what does the evidence say privatization is under attack criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses we evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from latin america the paper presents four main results first the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases second in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits third the manner in which privatization is carried out matters transparency and homogeneity in procedures speed and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion finally privatization s success is enhanced by two complementary policies deregulation or reregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms access to capital at lower cost overall the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity firm restructuring fiscal benefits output growth and even quality improvements most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design opaque processes with heavy state involvement lack of reregulation and a poor corporate governance framework

natural resources aid and democratization a best case scenario natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power attempts are being made therefore to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization i analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly the best case scenario the models show that even with institutional safeguards these resources diminish chances for democratization in addition to their practical importance the results have an important theoretical implication the political resource curse may not be due to dictators use of these resources but simply to their existence in nondemocracies

globalization and its challenges rudi was born and grew up in krefeld germany he was an undergraduate at the university of geneva and completed his ph d at the university of chicago in 1971 which is where we met he was a student of robert mundell and both the subject matter the development of the mundell fleming model and the elegance and insights of his early work reflected mundell s influence he taught at the university of rochester and at the university of chicago before accepting an offer from mit in 1975

following germany s lead using international monetary linkages to estimate the effect of monetary policy on the economy abstract forward looking behavior on the part of the monetary authority makes it difficult to estimate the effect of monetary policy interventions on output we present instrumental variables estimates of the impact of interest rates on quarterly real output for several european countries using german interest rates as the instrument these estimates confirm a strong forward looking bias in least squares estimates that persists even conditional on standard controls for the history of the system due to the potential for correlation of output shocks across countries we interpret our estimates as lower bounds for the effect of monetary policy on real output

contracting officer workload incomplete contracting and contractual terms this article estimates the causal effect of retirement induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms in a sample of 150 000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures decrease reliance on firm fixed price contracts increase risk of renegotiation and increase costs these estimates are consistent with a model of endogenously incomplete contracting the us federal government has experienced exceptional growth in acquisitions contracting over the past decade but limited growth in acquisitions manpower this article provides some of the facts necessary to evaluate the consequences of these shifts

interest rate targeting abstract the paper develops a model in which the monetary authority successfully targets the nominal interest rate while also holding down the forecast variance of the price level the latter objective pins down the extent of monetary accommodation to shifts in the demand for money and other shocks and thereby makes determinate the levels of money and prices at each date empirical evidence for the united states suggests that the model s predictions accord reasonably well with observed behavior for nominal interest rates growth rates of the monetary base and rates of inflation

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns the roots of public discontent abstract this paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers we show that there are cases in which privatization even though it fosters investments in infrastructure also opens the door to more corruption the public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in latin america where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency enhancing and have fostered investments and at the same time popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high especially among the middle class we show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region

human capital and growth abstract this paper describes a growth model with the property that human capital accumulation can account for all observed growth the model is shown to be consistent with evidence on individual productivities as measured by census earnings data the central hypothesis is that we learn more when we interact with more productive people

are there negative returns to aid the world bank report assessing aid assumes that an inflow of aid above a certain level starts to have negative effects in this analysis we empirically test this assumption we find evidence for negative returns to aid at high levels of aid inflows however the results are sensitive to both the countries included in the sample and model specification moreover the turning point above which aid starts to have a negative effect on growth seems to be much higher than assumed in the background calculations for assessing aid

on the dynamics of growth and fiscal policy with redistributive transfers abstract this paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy by studying the case in which the government simultaneously provides three main categories of expenditures public production services public consumption services and state contingent redistributive transfers we make two contributions to the literature firstly we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which rational voters choose the capital tax rate and the allocation of total tax revenues between productive government expenditures public production services and non productive ones public consumption services and redistributive transfers we study the properties of these policies and their impact on growth secondly we deliver analytic results for the long run and transitional dynamics of optimal fiscal policies and endogenous growth in particular we establish existence and investigate the possibility of uniqueness and dynamic determinacy and how this possibility is affected by the chosen allocative and redistributive policies

why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it abstract this paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies contrary to existing practices instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries the actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance this explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices first it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies second competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks which otherwise conceal the recipient s choice of action this enables the donor to give aid more efficiently

development paradigm failures over time the international development community has advocated various development paradigms but countries following these paradigms have often performed poorly we provide an explanation for this poor performance in our model the political leader of a developing country chooses a policy and whether to implement it in an honest or corrupt manner these choices affect domestic production and aid inflows production is high when productive capacity is high and when the policy is appropriate in the country specific circumstances and implemented honestly aid inflows are high when the policy is close to the paradigm in equilibrium countries with low productive capacity and high corruption resulting from weak political institutions follow the paradigm more closely hence our model suggests that development paradigms have a tendency to fail because they are primarily followed by countries that would fail anyway we provide empirical evidence in support of the main assumptions and results

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

a theory of bot concession contracts in this paper we discuss the choice for build operate and transfer bot concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility we show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose bot concessions this result stems from a trade off between the government s shadow costs of financing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period the incentives to choose bot concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential bot concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

aid poverty reduction and the new conditionality the paper examines the effect of aid on poverty rather than on economic growth we devise a pro poor public expenditure index and present evidence that together with inequality and corruption this is a key determinant of the aid s poverty leverage after presenting empirical evidence which suggests a positive leverage of aid donors on pro poor expenditure we argue for the development of conditionality in a new form which gives greater flexibility to donors in punishing slippage on previous commitments and keys aid disbursements to performance in respect of policy variables which governments can influence in a pro poor direction

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

interest rates and bank risk taking abstract a recent line of research views the low interest rate environment of the early to mid 2000s as an element that triggered increased risk taking appetite of banks in search for yield this paper uses approximately 18000 annual observations on euro area banks over the period 2001 2008 and presents strong empirical evidence that low interest rates indeed increase bank risk taking substantially this result is robust across a number of different specifications that account inter alia for the potential endogeneity of interest rates and or the dynamics of bank risk notably among the banks of the large euro area countries this effect is less pronounced for french institutions which held on average a relatively low level of risk assets finally the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk taking due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and is amplified for banks with higher off balance sheet items

aid the public sector and the market in less developed countries a reply the article in this journal by mosley et al i987 concludes its analysis of aid effectiveness as demonstrating inability of development aid over more than twenty years to provide a net increment to overall growth in the third world p 636 this note purports to show that this conclusion which is ostensibly distressing as the authors claim is not warranted the section of the study which is the basis of the conclusion cited and the subject of this note is a cross section regression analysis full details of which are shown in mosley et al table 3 the note is concerned with the relation between the dependent variable specified as the growth rate of real gdp per cent per annum hereafter gdp and aid specified as a percentage of gdp hereafter aid the aid results with only two significant positive coefficients in one subsample certainly give no basis for claiming aid effectiveness in terms of gdp growth the intention in this note is to interpret the results which are assumed to be valid this is made possible by the fact that the authors have helpfully provided the full input set of mean values derived from the raw data from this it is possible to calculate the gdp aid relationship for each country for the second and third period the procedure for deriving these relationships is as follows for each country the mean values of the time series of gdp and aid are extracted from the data for i 960 70 and for i 970 80 using i 960 70 as the base the signs of the change in the levels of the gdp and aid mean values between periods are recorded this is repeated for i980 4 with i970 80 mean values as the base the relationship between the two signs is an indication of the effect of aid on gdp in the period in which the change in levels is effected thus in the case of an increase in aid being combined with a decrease in gdp the latter must have fallen relatively to the former and aid effectiveness is negative mutatis mutandis for the other three sign combinations thus generating the appropriate gdp aid relationship for each country in each period a frequency distribution of the four sign combinations relating to the full sample is presented in table i since the signs of the changes in the levels of gdp and aid are derived by making explicit the arithmetic relationship implicit in the data they form a valid base from which to draw conclusions without requiring any test of

does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings we establish that season of birth is related to educational attainment because of school start age policy and compulsory school attendance laws individuals born in the beginning of the year start school at an older age and can therefore drop out after completing less schooling than individuals born near the end of the year roughly 25 percent of potential dropouts remain in school because of compulsory schooling laws we estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings by using quarter of birth as an instrument for education the instrumental variables estimate of the return to education is close to the ordinary least squares estimate suggesting that there is little bias in conventional estimates every developed country in the world has a compulsory schooling requirement yet little is known about the effect these laws have on educational attainment and earnings 1 this paper exploits an unusual natural experiment to estimate the impact of compulsory schooling laws in the united states the experiment stems from the fact that children born in different months of the year start school at different ages while compulsory schooling laws generally require students to remain in school until their sixteenth or seventeenth birthday in effect the interaction of school entry requirements and compulsory schooling laws compel students born

aid dependence and the quality of governance cross country empirical tests aid dependence can potentially undermine the quality of governance and public sector institutions by weakening accountability encouraging rent seeking and corruption fomenting conflict over control of aid funds siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions analyses of cross country data in this paper provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality corruption and the rule of law these findings support the need for donors to develop less costly and less intrusive ways of disseminating state of the art knowledge on public sector reform in developing countries

rent seeking incentives in share contests abstract this article investigates share contests in our framework we allow contestants to have more general preferences than have been used in the literature previous approaches have the unfortunate characteristic that contestants marginal rates of substitution between the rent share allocated by the contest and their effort is constant regardless of the size of the rent share this results in a conventional wisdom larger rents command more effort by providing a more general framework we show the reverse may also be true and we derive the conditions under which this is the case our approach then allows us to rationalize within a standard contest framework observations that rents might be more hotly contested when they become scarcer as has evidently been the case with the recent global contraction of public funds available for public policy

aid growth and devolution considering aid modality and different types of decentralization in this paper we provide further evidence on the relationship between decentralization and foreign aid effectiveness our previous work has shown that decentralization decreases aid effectiveness i e the impact of aid on economic growth is negative in decentralized countries however our previous work has not taken different types of aid and different types of decentralization into account which is at the heart of our current analysis we consider different measures of decentralization in particular measures of fiscal decentralization derived from government finance statistics and measures of political decentralization that are constructed based on countries constitutional rules in addition we take different types of aid into account grants loans technical assistance total net oda and we distinguish between multi lateral and bi lateral aid in order to consider differences in the donor structure our empirical analysis is based on panel data of up to 53 developing countries in our growth regressions we combine all types of decentralization with the different types of aid we find important differences between different types of decentralization i fiscal decentralization negatively affects aid effectiveness in line with our previous work ii employment decentralization may increase aid effectiveness and iii political decentralization does not hamper aid effectiveness or may even have positive effects

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

does foreign aid corrupt abstract we estimate the impact of foreign aid on corruption using geographical and cultural distance to the donor countries as instrumental variables to assess causality aid decreases corruption our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to different controls

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

identifying monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible exchange rates abstract previous empirical study on the effects of monetary policy shocks in small open economies has generated puzzling dynamic responses in various macroeconomic variables this paper argues that these puzzles derive from an identification of monetary policy that is inappropriate for such economies to remedy this it is proposed that a structural model be estimated to explicitly account for the features of the small open economy such a model is applied to canada with tightly estimated results overall the dynamic responses to the identified monetary policy shock are consistent with standard theory and highlight the exchange rate as a transmission mechanism

dynamic regulation design without payments the importance of timing abstract we consider a two period model of optimal regulation of a firm subject to marginal compliance cost shocks the regulator faces an asymmetric information problem the firm knows current compliance costs but the regulator does not both the regulator and the firm are uncertain about future costs in our basic framework the regulator may not offer payments to the firm we show that the regulator can vary the strength of regulation over time to induce the firm to reveal its costs and increase welfare in the optimal mechanism the regulator offers stronger weaker regulation in the first period and weaker stronger regulation in the second period if the firm reports low high compliance costs in the first period low cost firms expect compliance costs to rise in the future and thus prefer weaker regulation in the second period high cost firms expect costs to fall in the future and thus prefer regulation which becomes stricter over time thus the regulator offers the low high cost firms slightly weaker stronger regulation in the second period in exchange for much stronger weaker regulation in the first period thereby timing the regulation if the regulator can make payments then the optimal mechanism to some degree times the regulation as long as a positive marginal cost of funds exists if the marginal cost of funds is high enough then under the optimal mechanism the regulator will not use payments and use our timing mechanism exclusively

contract renegotiation and rent re distribution who gets raked over the coals policy shocks affect the rent distribution in long term contracts which can lead to such contracts being renegotiated we seek an understanding of what aspects of contract design in the face of a substantial policy shock affect the propensity to renegotiate we test our hypotheses using data on u s coal contracts after the policy shock of the 1990 clean air act amendments contracts are divided into two categories those that were renegotiated following the shock and those that were not characteristics of the contract are used to explain whether or not the contract was ultimately renegotiated results provide guidance on rent re distribution and contract renegotiation more generally and are applicable to contemporary policy issues such as climate change legislation

estimation of limited dependent variable models with dummy endogenous regressors applied economists have long struggled with the question of how to accommodate binary endogenous regressors in models with binary and nonnegative outcomes i argue here that much of the difculty with limited dependent variables comes from a focus on structural parameters such as index coefcients instead of causal effects once the object of estimation is taken to be the causal effect of treatment several simple strategies are available these include conventional two stage least squares multiplicative models for conditional means linear approximation of nonlinear causal models models for distribution effects and quantile regression with an endogenous binary regressor the estimation strategies discussed in the article are illustrated by using multiple births to estimate the effect of childbearing on employment status and hours of work

contractual flexibility rent seeking and renegotiation design an empirical analysis of information technology outsourcing contracts this paper examines renegotiation design in contracts for outsourced information technology it services whereas prior literature in information systems has highlighted the likelihood of ex post rent seeking engendered by renegotiation we build upon literature on incomplete contracts to posit that renegotiation can be pareto improving by incorporating contingencies revealed ex post research on contract renegotiation has been hampered by two sets of challenges the lack of appropriate data and empirical challenges in identification we circumvent this problem both by appropriate data collection and by employing an identification strategy to address alternate causal explanations we propose a measure pareto improving amendments to assess renegotiation outcomes that enhance the value from outsourcing by hazard equilibration and by incorporating learning using a unique sample of 141 it outsourcing contracts we examine the role of decision rights delineated ex ante in enabling pareto improving amendments and in resolving the trade off between adaptation and rent seeking we find that flexibility provisions termination for convenience rights and contractual rights whereby vendors are granted rights to reuse know how are associated with pareto improving amendments the results are robust to potential endogeneity of contractual provisions when parties have feasible foresight and to the possibility of adverse selection in the sample we also examine alternate explanations from the literature on contractual breach implications for practitioners and researchers are discussed this paper was accepted by sandra slaughter information systems

corruption and the composition of government expenditure abstract this paper asks whether predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government expenditure corruption is found to reduce government spending on education in a cross section of countries

one money for europe lessons from the us currency union currency union barry eichengreen the creation of a monetary union in europe is often justified by the desire to reap the full benefits of economic integration the complete removal of capital controls raises a large number of issues the case for free capital mobility is strong but not overwhelming it hinges on issues of technology transport costs market structure and labour mobility and in the end is an empirical matter for which us experience may provide useful information policy making institutions differ in important respects however the us tradition of fiscal federalism for example has no ec wide counterpart yet its functions seem a desirable feature of a monetary union in particular it is shown to play an important role in absorbing regional disturbances mostly via the tax system us experience also suggests that a currency union creates pressure for fiscal policy harmonization affecting both taxes and spending although a currency union fundamentally alters the balance of payments adjustment process the potential problem of depressed regions remains a serious one given the increased tightness of the external constraint the limited extent of labour mobility and other features of european labour markets solutions based on us experience include extensive swap facilities and a european version of fiscal federalism

aid infrastructure and fdi assessing the transmission channel with a new index of infrastructure official development assistance oda and foreign direct investment fdi are widely perceived to be alternative means of supplementing domestic savings and promoting economic development in low and middle income countries however possible complementarities of aid and fdi have received limited attention so far it remains open to debate whether aid could render recipient countries more attractive to fdi by removing specific bottlenecks that prevent higher fdi inflows in particular we raise the hypothesis that aid specifically targeted at economic infrastructure helps developing countries attract higher fdi inflows through improving their endowment with infrastructure in transportation communication energy and finance by performing 3sls estimations we explicitly account for dependencies between three structural equations on the allocation of sector specific aid the determinants of infrastructure and the determinants of fdi we find strong and robust evidence that aid in infrastructure is effective in improving the recipient countries endowment with infrastructure in sharp contrast other aid is not effective in improving infrastructure infrastructure consistently proves to be an important determinant of developing countries attractiveness to fdi consequently only targeted aid promotes fdi indirectly through the infrastructure channel in addition aid in infrastructure has direct effects on fdi it appears that foreign investors anticipate longer term effects of aid on the country s endowment with infrastructure and expect aid financed infrastructure to serve them particularly well

democracy rent seeking public spending and growth abstract does democratization imply faster growth less corruption and less inefficiency past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth we develop a simple two sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization producing a u effect this effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods rent seekers act as monopolistic competitors initially more democracy increases their number raising aggregate rents however rents per rent seeker fall with the number of rent seekers due to this crowding effect and the increased competition among rent seekers aggregate rents fall in mature democracies thus rents show an inverted u effect in relation to democracy we find fairly robust supportive evidence for the latter

on aid growth and good policies this study provides a critical analysis of the growth regressions in burnside and dollar 2000 first we analyse the relationship between aid and government expenditure in a modified neo classical growth model one of the main results of the analysis is that while good policies spur growths they may at the same time reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid second we show that the econometric results in burnside and dollar emphasising the crucial role of interaction between aid and good policies in the growth process are fragile as they are extremely data dependent finally we demonstrate that the burnside and dollar data lend support to the idea that the association between aid and growth can be approximated by decreasing returns to aid this finding conforms well to regression results in other recent studies

commitment in utility regulation a model of reputation and policy applications abstract this paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment by allowing the government s type to change over time i explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment restricting attention to equilibria that are strongly renegotiation proof i show that there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this contains episodes of investment and good behaviour followed by periods of expropriation and non investment i then apply the model to consider how the power of the incentive scheme and decentralization may influence the properties of this equilibrium in the case of the power of incentives the model suggests that price caps may worsen commitment in developing countries but not in developed ones similarly the model suggests that decentralisation is likely to have a significant effect on commitment but that this effect will depend on the general ability of the government to commit overall we conclude that the effect of such policies on commitment will be different across countries depending on the institutional environment

empirical evidence on satisfaction with privatization in latin america since the 1980s privatization of formerly state owned firms has been extensively implemented by governments across latin america despite the fact that most evaluations of the process fail to find significant adverse efficiency and welfare effects there has been a strong surge in public discontent with such policy in the region this paper performs a systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of such dissatisfaction using survey data from latinobarometro covering 17 countries over the period 1998 2008 complemented by country level data on macroeconomic political and institutional aspects as well as data on privatization dissatisfaction appears to respond to absolute and relative welfare effects and the authors find a robust u shaped effect in term of education and income levels with individuals in the middle of such distributions being more critical with the outcome of privatizations

humanitarian aid fertility and economic growth this paper examines the effect of humanitarian aid on fertility and economic growth in an overlapping generations model where health status in adulthood depends on health in childhood adult agents allocate their time to work leisure and childrearing activities humanitarian aid influences the probability of survival to adulthood health in childhood and the time that adults allocate to childrearing giving rise to an ambiguous effect on both fertility and growth an empirical investigation for the period 1973 2007 suggests that humanitarian aid has on average a zero effect on the rates of fertility and of per capita output growth

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

the long run effect of aid on health evidence from panel cointegration analysis abstractalthough a major objective of aid donors is to improve health outcomes in recipient countries there is relatively little research on whether aid to the health sector leads to improved heal

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

save the poor shoot some bankers bilateral or multilateral organizations control about 90 of official overseas development assistance oda much of which is wasted this note traces aid failure to the daisy chain of principal agent beneficiary relationships linking rich donors to aid bureaucrats to poor recipients waste results when aid middlemen un intentionally misdirect oda waste can be reduced by clarifying domestic goals for oda using fewer middlemen with greater intrinsic motivation empowering recipients and or replacing bureaucracy with markets

aid growth and devolution summary this paper examines whether the degree of fiscal decentralization in aid receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness the decentralization theorem predicts that the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness since local decision makers are better informed about local needs thereby decentralization may also have reverse effects e g through coordination problems excessive regulation administrative costs and local capture we use panel data for up to 60 countries and find that aid contributes to economic growth in centralized developing economies whereas it is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries the cases of indonesia the philippines and uganda support our findings our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how the two development instruments foreign aid and decentralization interact

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

optimal electoral timing exercise wisely and you may live longer using insights from option pricing in finance we explore the electoral timing problem in a flexible term democracy we assume that politic ally heterogeneous voters continuously learn over time about the evolving party merits this yields a mean reverting stochastic process for the support of the parties the incumbent sees its poll support and must call an election within five years o f the last election we assume that it wishes to maximize its expected total time in office so that this resembles the optimal exercise rule for an american financial o ption we characterize how the renewable election option behaves as waiting and stopping values interact we then calibrate our model to the labour tory rivalry in the u k with polling data from 1943 2005 and the 16 elections after 1945 excluding three elections essentially forced by weak governments our maximizing story explains when the elections were called quite well we also measure the value of election options finding that over the long run they should more than double the expected time in power of a fixed term electoral cycle