long live the doge death as a term limit on venetian chief executives can an electorate use the projected life expectancy of a lifetime appointed chief executive to enforce binding informal term limits informal term limits based on the life expectancy of a chief executive candidate at election would enable an electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths to minimize expected turnover and tenure length costs while also providing a strictly binding term limit death we provide a detailed historical case study of venice from 1172 to 1797 when the ruling patricians utilized informal term limits on their chief executive the doge relying on the projected life expectancy of ducal candidates

voter preferences and state regulation of smoking i introduction tobacco taxation and smoking restrictions are two areas of regulation for which states have maintained a high level of control relative to the federal government 1 given this flexibility states have established a wide range of restrictions on smoking in areas such as government workplaces restaurants bars shopping malls indoor arenas and hospitals 2 although most states restrict smoking in hospitals there is considerable variation among states in restrictions in other areas in the 1998 99 period of this study about two thirds of states restricted smoking in restaurants whereas only four states restricted smoking in bars what has led to variation in smoking restrictions across states in a democratic society one would expect voter preferences to play an instrumental role in determining which policies are enacted and which are not this article provides the first empirical exploration of whether state level smoking restrictions are consistent with preferences of the citizenry taking into account both voting behavior and the role of smoking status in influencing whether an individual votes specifically we examine whether voters preferences for smoking restrictions in restaurants bars malls indoor sporting events and hospitals are consistent with state level restrictions on smoking in each of these public areas 3 our research draws on public choice models of policy making by state and local governments voters preferences typically play a central role because voting affects legislators incentives to support regulations 4 public choice research also finds that nonvoter factors may influence state and local policy making 5 in the case of smoking regulations public health advocates or tobacco industry lobbyists might influence regulatory policies the specific building block of our analysis of state restrictions on smoking is information on individuals voting behavior which we link to their smoking status and preferences over smoking restrictions our analysis uses measures of political pressure that account for individual preferences as well as their voting behavior to examine the possible role of interest group pressures we also control for nonvoter influences on smoking regulation including the proportion of the state population who smoke measures of state ideology and size of the tobacco industry with the exception of smoking in bars there is majority support for smoking restrictions unsurprisingly smokers are less supportive of restrictions than are nonsmokers nonetheless even smokers demonstrate a high level of support for many restrictions smokers are also less likely to vote than are nonsmokers even after controlling for other demographic factors the lower voting rate diminishes voter opposition to antismoking regulation but is usually not critical in view of the substantial support that most smoking restrictions have among smokers the political pressure indices for restrictions on smoking in each public area are generally significantly related to the probability that a state restricts smoking in that public area the nonvoter factors such as the smoking rate in the state and tobacco s role in the state economy are rarely influential policy debates over the desirability of smoking restrictions emphasize possible health risks due to exposure to environmental tobacco smoke ets and effects on business profitability the primary argument for expanding smoking restrictions is to protect workers and customers from exposure to ets 6 as our results show voters are generally supportive of smoking restrictions in public areas which would thereby protect workers as well as themselves and other customers however there is a substantial controversy over the extent of health risks associated with exposure to ets the basis for the push by the u s occupational and safety health administration osha for increased smoking restrictions to protect workers is the highly controversial u

the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation the fisher equation revisited stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0022 2879 28199602 2928 3a1 3c102 3atlrbni 3e2 0 co 3b2 2journal of money credit and banking is currently published by ohio state university press your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals ohio press html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgmon aug 27 13 58 08 2007

testing for the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation using cointegration techniques 1989 testing for the long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation using cointegration techniques applied economics vol 21 no 4 pp 439 447

a note on nonstationarity structural breaks and the fisher effect abstract we find empirical evidence that inflation nominal and real interest rates in the us are trend stationary with a structural break in both the unconditional mean and the drift rate of a deterministic trend which occurs shortly after the change in operating procedures of the fed in september 1979 this finding casts some doubts on cointegration tests of the long run fisher effect conducted in recent studies since the results of these tests can be affected by the existence of common structural breaks in the series we propose an alternative test of the fisher effect based on a var representation in appropriately detrended variables we find strong support for the fisher effect both in the medium term and in the long term

the long run fisher relation in canada in this paper the existing fisher equation research is extended to time series on the canadian nominal interest rate and inflation to test the validity of the fisher hypothesis and related hypotheses the evidence suggests a significant long run equilibrium between nominal rates and inflation in canada but that this relationship has not been completely stable over the last three decades

policy variability and economic growth this paper explores the effect of policy variability or frequency of regime switching on economic growth and welfare we study a one sector growth model where investment can be subsidized at either a positive rate or not subsidized at all we find that the lack of persistence in policies per se need not be welfare reducing and that it is likely to decrease growth higher variability implies more frequent changes in consumption and investment but by creating a stronger intertemporal link across regimes variability reduces the fluctuation in investment rates thus decreasing the magnitude of changes in consumption and increasing welfare

term limits and electoral accountability abstract periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable from this perspective term limits which restrict voters ability to reward politicians with re election appear counterproductive we show that despite the disciplining effect of elections term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters by reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences such truthful behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents we characterize under which circumstances two term or even longer term limits are the optimal institution for voters

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

micro estimates of public spending demand functions and tests of the tiebout and median voter hypotheses responses to questions given to a random sample of michigan households are used to estimate public spending demand functions while income and price elasticities are similar to those obtained from aggregate data positive income elasticities appear to arise because public services are distributed in a prorich manner a relatively small variance in spending demands among urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas with substantial public service variety suggests that the tiebout mechanism works this interpretation is supported by the fact that actual spending conforms substantially to desired levels in urban areas but less so in rural areas with little public sector choice

fiscal federalism and redistributive politics abstract we consider the interaction between redistributive politics at central and local levels in a federal system and characterize the factors influencing success in redistributive politics in both federal and unitary systems we examine how the political characteristics of different states and groups give them better or worse outcomes in a federal system as opposed to a unitary system we examine possibilities of multiple equilibria with divided government between the two layers we analyze the choice between block grants and matching grants we also examine the impact of federalism on the incentives for geographic mobility

policymakers horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation abstract this paper examines the impact of policymakers horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation we describe a prisoners dilemma game between two infinitely lived countries run by policymakers we show that re election incentives can act as a discipline device making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely lived policymakers we also show that when voting suffers from a recency bias policymakers may have incentives to collude to get re elected and term limits may help international cooperation

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

an analysis of welfare effects of legislative term limits this paper analyzes the welfare effects of term limits forstate legislators legislators tend to pursue their ownobjectives and deviate from the interests of voters as theystay longer in office however such long term incumbentsbecome more productive in transferring wealth to theirconstituents due to seniority they gain and voters re electthe incumbent term limits reduce the maximum seniority of adistrict s legislator and of other districts legislators aswell affecting the relative seniority of the legislator thus the legislator gains relative seniority sometimes andloses other times under term limits as a consequence votersof a district may or may not benefit from term limits thewelfare effects of term limits depend crucially on the shapeof the voters utility function

real effects of monetary policy in a world economy abstract we present a two country heterogeneous agent model in which changes in a country s monetary policy affect real interest rates relative prices of traded and nontraded goods and real exchange rates nontransitory real effects of monetary policy stem from legal restrictions in the form of country specific reserve requirements without violating the classical assumptions of individual rationality and flexible prices the model s implications seem qualitatively consistent with the u s experience of the 1980s a monetary policy tightening leading to a rise in the real interest rate and to an initial rise in the real value of the dollar which is subsequently reversed

on the fisher effect abstract we use post war quarterly data for belgium canada denmark france germany greece ireland japan the netherlands the united kingdom and the united states to examine the fisherian link between inflation and short term nominal interest rates in doing so we apply the king and watson 1997 methodology paying particular attention to the integration and cointegration properties of the variables since meaningful fisher effect tests critically depend on such properties we conclude that the data are generally rejecting the fisher effect

public debt stabilization the relevance of policymakers time horizons policymakers are stuck in time political short termism policy myopia policy short sightedness and similar words have been coined to emphasize the present centric policy thinking politics tends to produce short time horizons and as a result policymakers often fail to use present opportunities to mitigate future harms focusing on fiscal and monetary strategic interactions given different separate decision makers our paper aims to explore the effects of policymakers time horizons on debt stabilization to formalize our ideas we use the novel concept of nonlinear model predictive control feedback nash equilibrium nfne and find that present centric policy thinking and decision horizons matters under several dimensions

trend stationary of inflation rates evidence from lm unit root testing with a long span of historical data the article applies the lm univariate unit root test recently developed by lee and strazicich 2003 2004 to re examine the validity of trend stationary in the inflation rates of 11 oecd and asian countries using a longer span of historical data our empirical findings are favourable to the trend stationary of the inflation rates when we control the structural breaks in series and therefore they point to the absence of hyperinflation in the majority of the countries the results indicate that shocks to inflation rates are temporary and soon converge with the inflation rates being trend stationary hence most structural breaks in the inflation rate occur around the great depression world war i world war ii and energy shock periods for the convergence effect we repeat the unit root tests utilized above for smaller sub samples so as to provide a robust analysis the outcomes show that by selecting a longer data span we can catch more powerful convergent evidence overall some policy implications a

migration and income redistribution responsibilities this study examines whether afdc benefits determine or discourage state to state migration flows in the united states a pooled cross section time series model is developed to estimate afdc benefits in a state and recipients and whether benefits in one state affect benefits in other states a second model using data from the 1980 census and the panel study of income dynamics estimates migration of afdc recipients and the level of benefits in in migration and out migration states both models indicate that small but statistically significant amounts of migration occur which may be quite important but only in the long run movers although small in number are much more likely to move to a state with higher benefits states perceive this migration as important indicating that states should have less control and the federal government more control over income redistribution

why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency a rational choice explanation in recent elections voters supported initiatives to limit the number of terms that their representatives may serve yet at the same time overwhelmingly re elected their incumbents we provide a theoretical explanation for this and other puzzles associated with voting on term limitations the pattern of voting on term limits can be explained by the desire to redistribute power from one party to another from one branch of government to another and from districts with long term incumbents to districts whose representatives have served only for a short time span we test these hypotheses by looking at voting patters on california proposition 140 and the vote on the 22nd amendment with generally positive results

trend reverting fluctuations in the life cycle model abstract aggregate time series provide evidence of short term dynamic adjustment that appears to be governed by complex or negative real eigenvalues this finding is at odds with the predictions of reasonably parameterized convex one sector growth models with complete markets we study life cycle economies in which aggregate saving depends non trivially on the distribution of wealth among cohorts if consumption goods are weak gross substitutes near the steady state price vector we prove that the unique equilibrium of a life cycle exchange economy converges to the unique non monetary steady state via damped oscillations we also discuss examples and extensions

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

the politics of infrastructure a number of recent studies attempt to measure the productivity of public capital some estimates indicate that government investments are a potential well spring for economic progress while others indicate that public infrastructure has a negligible effect on private sector output this article investigates political institutions and processes underlying the decisions for public infrastructure spending we apply the framework of strategic models of fiscal policy and develop an empirical model to analyze the substantial differences in public capital across american states institutions such as term limits citizen initiative and budgeting procedures were significant determinants of state public capital stocks and the flow of new public investments during the 1980s the results further suggest that political conditions such as legislative stability and voter volatility are systematically related to infrastructure differences across states

budget referendums and government spending evidence from swiss cantons vortrag im forschungsseminar der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen fakultat der universitat basel schweiz am 20 november 2000

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

sources of regime switching in short term interest rates for canada the purpose of this study is to identify sources of regime switching in short term interest rates for canada the choice of information variables is based on three well known hypotheses about interest rates the expectations hypothesis the fisher relationship and the condition for uncovered interest parity the empirical framework consists of an autoregressive distributive lag adl model in error correction form with information spreads and a markov regime switching estimation methodology the models choose interest rate regimes that are similar in many respects to those found for the usa the different regimes in canada are driven by movements in the monetary policy rate the us short term rate and the long term yield the monetary policy rate is found to trigger very large changes in the short term rate responding one for one in the high variance regime and slightly less in the more normal interest rate regime both the us short rate and long term yield are also found to trigger relatively large

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

self imposed term limits in reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits dick and lott argue that since more senior representatives are better at rent seeking there is an inefficient tendency to re elect incumbents in their model term limits are preferred collectively by constituencies even though no constituency would independently oust its incumbent representative however many term limits are unilaterally self imposed in particular the 22nd amendment limiting presidents terms to two and their model cannot explain these limits in this comment i suggest that term limits may be self imposed by risk averse voters who prefer cycling between left and right wing candidates to a once and for all election that imposes a candidate of a single ideology on the entre electorate the market failure that makes term limits helpful is that out of power minorities cannot bribe the median voter

the politics of public provision of education public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind however does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well i analyze a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education agents differ in their income and in their age where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution i find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor they collude in order to reduce the size of government which benefits the rich and target some of its resources to education which benefits the young poor when the cohort size of the young is too large however income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium

interdependence in the technology adoption decision among municipalities this study examines the interdependence among municipalities in the discrete decision to adopt internet technology results from probit specifications with interaction effects suggest that cities are influenced by nearby neighbours with similar population size in developing a website evidence is also presented indicating interaction among municipalities in the decision to use internet technology to facilitate financial transactions

congressional voting on term limits between 1990 and 1995 twenty three states unilaterally imposedterm limits on their own delegations tocongress in 1995 the house ofrepresentatives defeated a constitutionalamendment that would have limited the termsfor all of congress only weeks later thesupreme court struck down the individualstate laws in 1997 the house againbrought the issue to a vote which alsofailed this paper models congressionalvoting on term limits with a simple gamewithin an interest group theory withlegislators as imperfect agents ofconstituents the game foremost predictsthat members from term limited states wouldbe more likely to support term limits inthe first vote but no more likely on thesecond vote the empirical section employsprobit multinomial logit and orderedprobit maximum likelihood estimations toconfirm the stated hypotheses among otherresults in particular both the joint andconditional probability of a yea on thefirst vote and a subsequent nay on thesecond vote is higher for members fromstates that had unilaterally self imposedterm limits the results are robust tomodel specification estimator andalternative sampling implications areproposed in the concluding comments

term limits causes and consequences this paper consults multiple literatures to specify andevaluate the economic rationales for term limitation particularly on congress i first consider theories that aroseto explain among related issues why individual states mightunilaterally self impose term limits on their own delegationsto congress next i consider two main lines of argument foruniversal limits both of which begin with the empiricalphenomenon of high and rising congressional tenure first supporters of term limits argue that higher tenure biaseslegislatures toward inefficiency big government highspending second higher tenure creates inefficient anti competitive conditions in the legislative election market term limitation would remedy these inefficiencies by virtue ofdecreasing average tenure these claims are then evaluated inlight of the evidence amassed in the literature based on theliterature reviewed this paper finds that while term limitswill reduce average tenure there is no evidence to suggestthat term limits will affect the underlying causes of theseinefficiencies further research on a more general reform which would strike deeper at these underlying causes isimplied

districts diversity and fiscal biases evidence from the american states abstract this paper argues that the configuration of legislative districts and not merely the number of districts matters for fiscal performance district configuration mediates the extent of constituent diversity both across and within districts both dimensions of diversity affect the political calculus associated with pork barrel politics empirical findings for the american states reveal statistically and quantitatively significant effects of constituent diversity on state government spending together the analysis and evidence emphasize the conditional nature of the law of l n in the united states this point acquires practical relevance from the constitutional mandate for decennial redistricting in all jurisdictions based on geographic representation

income redistribution in a federal system the question of the appropriate level of government to undertake income redistribution is receiving renewed attention from economists the standard argument about the issue might be summarized as follows 1 interstate migration of taxpayers and transfer recipients raises the cost to voters of income redistribution at the state level above the cost at the federal level 2 statewide redistribution confers spillover benefits to residents of other states 3 therefore as compared with a national system decentralized responsibility for income redistribution yields both less redistribution and less than the socially optimal amount of income redistribution the purpose of this paper is only to question step 1 of the above argument of course readers who accept the assumptions of the standard argument may conclude that the possible weakening of step 1 of that argument reduces the likelihood that its conclusion holds the paper argues that the cost of redistribution faced by state residents may in fact be lower at the state level than at the national level because their federal tax obligations fall as the state redistributes more income thus part of the cost of redistribution at the state level can be exported to residents of other states the state s federal tax bill falls when taxable incomes in the state are reduced by increased redistribution deductibility of state taxes enhances this result but is not necessary for it to demonstrate the proposition without adding unnecessary complication a simple model of income redistribution is described in which governments at all levels use linear tax transfer schedules to redistribute income the single government case is considered first then two levels of government are introduced and finally migration is allowed it is shown that without migration state costs are never greater than national costs of redistribution as long as redistribution reduces total money income when migration is allowed the result depends on the elasticity of migration responses compared with the elasticity of labor supply responses

on the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates in this paper we consider a particular international economic policy regime the laissez faire regime the distinguishing features of which are unrestricted portfolio choice and floating exchange rates and as we show this regime although favored by many economists is not economically feasible it does not have a determinate equilibrium that is an implication of an overlapping generations model more basically it is an implication of the notion that money is wanted only in order to accomplish trades

strategic institutional choice voters states and congressional term limits states choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed measures of relative political influence in congress explain much of this variation using 1992 data on the american states the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states at 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members terms but cannot under a supreme court ruling we discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states

strategic interaction among governments in the provision of a global public good abstract how do governments respond to other governments when providing a global public good using data from 2007 to 2014 on medical research funding for infectious and parasitic diseases we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries respond to funding changes by the us government which accounts for half of funding for these diseases because funding across governments might be positively correlated due to unobserved drivers they have in common we use variation in the representation of research intensive universities on us congressional appropriations committees as an instrument for us funding we find that a 10 increase in us government funding for a disease is associated with a 2 to 3 reduction in funding for that disease by another government in the following year

dollarization and the integration of international capital markets a contribution to the theory of optimal currency areas we consider the following questions 1 does the adoption of a common currency either reduce or enhance the scope for endogenously generated volatility to emerge 2 does the adoption of a common currency reduce or enhance the scope for indeterminacies to arise 3 is there a welfare justification for the adoption of a single currency 4 what are the fiscal consequences of a move to a single currency we address these issues in a two country model with both a transactions role and a store of value role for currency moreover banks arise endogenously in each country in this context we compare the determination and characteristics of an equilibrium in each of two situations one where each country issues its own currency and one where one of the countries adopts the currency of the other country the consequences of this dollarization depend very much on the degree of integration of the capital markets of the two countries when their credit markets are poorly integrated a regime with two currencies displays a unique stationary equilibrium dollarization under very weak conditions gives rise to a continuum of equilibrium paths these may exhibit oscillation hence when capital markets are segmented dollarization may be a source of indeterminacy and endogenously arising volatility in addition the welfare justifications for dollarization are weak and dollarization my have adverse fiscal consequences when credit markets are fully integrated internationally the results are substantially different in that case both regimes display a unique equilibrium path hence in the presence of unrestricted international capital flows the adoption of a common currency does

the political economy of policy centralization direct versus representative democracy abstract this paper analyzes policy centralization outcomes in a two jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and interjurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures direct referendum and representative democracy we show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policymakers rather than by referendum in these situations centralized policies converge to the preferred level of the jurisdiction that least favours centralization rather than to a compromise between the two jurisdictions preferred levels

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

effects of term limits on fiscal performance evidence from democratic nations political reputation models feature forward looking rational voters who re elect incumbents based on their estimate of an incumbent s ability level fiscal policy is one of the ways an incumbent establishes a reputation and thereby signals this ability level to voters the reputation building framework implies that term limits should affect fiscal performance a term limited incumbent places less value on reputation building than an incumbent eligible for re election does we examine differences in fiscal performance in democratic countries under alternative executive term limit regimes our results generally agree with the prior findings of besley and case 1995a who analyzed gubernatorial term limits in the american states we provide new evidence that the fiscal effects of term limits differ under a two term rule versus a single term rule

the relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits whether term limits would increase or decrease federal spending depends on the reason for the causal relationship between tenure and spending we investigate this subject by empirically studying congressional spending and tenure for all united states house and senate members who entered congress between the 94th and 102nd congresses 1975 1992 as our measure of congressional spending we use the national taxpayers union s congressional spending scores our study finds that a statistically significant relationship exists between congressional spending and tenure for some groups of congressmen we then test three hypotheses relating tenure and spending no single hypothesis is consistent with all of our empirical results nevertheless the small sizes of the empirical effects estimated in this study suggest that term limits would have an inconsequential impact on the level of federal spending at least via the moral hazard mechanisms described in this paper

the political economy of direct legislation direct democracy and local decision making local fiscal referenda the dampening effect on taxes and spending local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and given the decentralization trend in oecd nations this is likely to increase how should this spending be governed this article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision making at the state and local level to support this we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes the basic argument concerns voter control under representative democracy citizens only have direct control at election time with referenda and initiatives citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens preferences as a result fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences we empirically test this on swiss data since switzerland provides a natural laboratory for local governance the governance structures of swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels specifically we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 swiss cantons and 1990 data on 134 local communities it is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue and at the local level also on public debt combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens lars p feld and gebhard kirchgassner

optimal tenure of elected public officials constitutional limits on the tenure of elected chief executives are a prominent feature of many governments yet they have received little attention from economists working in the field of political behavior this paper develops an analysis of tenure limits and their incidence the analysis assumes that the limits substitute for more familiar electoral controls such as elections recalls and impeachment proceedings we assume that restrictions are imposed if they cause the constitutionally decisive voter to be better off on average this assumption although not a standard one applied to policy in general is fairly common in the literature on constitutional choice where the memberships of interest groups later to be formed are plausibly unknown at the time of the constitutional convention 1 the decision to restrict is undertaken in an environment of uncertainty and naturally it is not without its costs it is clear for instance that restriction substitutes inexperienced politicians for experienced ones moreover a tenure limit generates an incentive problem during the final term in office since no further electoral test remains 2 this lame duck

budget institutions and political insulation why states adopt the item veto abstract forty three of the fifty states of the united states have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions in this paper i test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power using data from 1865 to 1994 i show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future liberal legislatures the results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas first by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions second it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily insulate policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power e g moe 1989 de figueiredo 2002

fiscal effects of the voter initiative in the first half of the twentieth century abstract this paper compares the fiscal policy of initiative and noninitiative states in the first half of the twentieth century states with initiatives had higher combined state and local expenditure after controlling for income and other demographics but a lower ratio of state to local expenditure this together with existing evidence from later in the century suggests that the voter initiative does not have a consistent effect on the overall size of state and local government however it does systematically lead to more decentralized expenditure

between anarchy and leviathan a note on the design of federal states abstract recent research suggests a rationale for the autonomy retained by federal states lower and intermediate level governments by encouraging interjurisdictional competition federal structures constrain the pursuit by public officials of private objectives inconsistent with the public weal but using federal structures to achieve this end has a cost the more decentralized a nation s public sector the more likely that some of the externalities generated by the provision of public goods and services will be ignored this note investigates the balance between the costs and benefits of decentralization that must be struck by a federal state s designers

when is two better than one how federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition the current paper models power maximizing politicians behavior subject to imperfect political competition and perfect citizen mobility it then analyzes the welfare implications of federal and non federal structures the model abstracts from both heterogeneous preferences the most common argument in favor of federalism and externalities the most common argument against showing that even in this simplified setting federalism has important welfare implications there is one class of equilibria in which more federalism has the purely beneficial effect of offsetting imperfections in the political process however there is also a second class of equilibria in which citizen mobility makes political imperfections more severe by creating safe districts for both political parties 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

how a race to the bottom can make you fat abstractthis article measures the effect of fiscal competition on obesity rates in the united states through education and health spending we hypothesize that fiscal competition to attract firms r

beggar thy neighbor testing for free riding in state level endangered species expenditures an important public policy question that remains unresolved iswhether devolution will enhance sensible policy making byexploiting informational asymmetries or instead trigger a beggar thy neighbor response and stimulate free ridingamongst localities we analyze this question within theframework of u s environmental policymaking by scrutinizing aunique panel data set on state level endangered speciesexpenditure patterns our empirical estimates are consistentwith the notion that states free ride which may lead to anexpenditure equilibrium that is not pareto efficient

trend breaks and the fisher hypothesis in canada and the united states using the sequential estimation methodology developed by banerjee lumsdaine and stock journal of business and economic statistics 10 3 271 87 1992 zivot and andrews journal of business and economic statistics 10 3 251 70 1992 and extended by lumsdaine and papell review of economics and statistics 79 2 212 18 1997 empirical evidence is found consistent with the hypothesis that the 90 day treasury bill rate and the inflation rate in canada and the us are stationary around a deterministic trend with two breaks when the breaks are filtered out the data is consistent with partial long run adjustment of the nominal interest rate to an inflation shock but not of the size predicted by the fisher effect

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

real convergence in some central and eastern european countries this article examines the real convergence hypothesis in some central and east european countries both towards the german and the us economies by means of using time series techniques during the period 1950 to 2003 no evidence is found of real convergence for the whole period however when one allows for structural breaks evidence is found of a catch up process during the 1990s to 2003 period for poland the czech republic and hungary towards germany and only for poland towards the us economy

co integration error correction and the fisher effect 1989 co integration error correction and the fisher effect applied economics vol 21 no 12 pp 1611 1620

fisher hypothesis in japan analysis of long term interest rates under different monetary policy regimes this paper investigates the validity of the fisher hypothesis in japanese long term interest rates two three four five seven and ten years using non stationary time series models initially the entire sample period october 1987 june 2006 is investigated then the samples divided into three segments depending on each period s monetary policy regimes are investigated thus the asymmetric impacts of inflation expectation on japanese long term interest rates can be investigated the first period examined is from october 1987 june 1991 the second period is from july 1991 july 2000 the third period is from march 2001 june 2006 in the first period monetary policy is tightening but in the second and third periods it is easing thus it is concluded that the fisher hypothesis is valid only in all maturities of long term interest rates in the first period however it does not hold in any of the maturities in the entire sample period or in the second and third periods

interest groups and the size of government the results of the previous section estimates of a three equation model from 23 observations must obviously be regarded as tentative the consistent positive relationship between number of interest groups and size of government observed with changing sets of included independent variables changing samples of nations and treating the number of interest groups as either exogenous or codetermined does imply rather unequivocally that interest groups are able to influence public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government size beyond helping to reinforce this conclusion the results of the previous section should be regarded as first steps in the development of a model of the polity that can explain participation in the political process by interest groups and citizens as well as the size of government

what to stabilize in the open economy we consider the question how best to maintain price level stability in an open economy and evaluate three possible policy choices a a constant money growth rate rule b a fixed exchange rate and c a policy of explicit commitment to a price level target in each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the banking system in evaluating the three regimes we adopt the criterion that the best policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and excessive economic volatility in a steady state equilibrium the choice of regime is largely irrelevant any steady state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the control variable under any other regime however we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different when all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium under a regime of fixed exchange rates indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low reserve to deposit ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate finally when one country targets the time path of its price level under very weak conditions there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations