duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference the legality of nonprice vertical practices in the u s is determined by their likely competitive effects an optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs which should be guided by empirical evidence empirically vertical restraints appear to reduce price and or increase output thus absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint s effect an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive

capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

the social costs of monopoly and regulation posner reconsidered focuses on social costs of monopoly and trade regulation in the united states benefit of marginal changes on antitrust activities equality of cost in obtaining monopoly and expected profit of monopolist elasticity of inputs in obtaining monopoly ebsco

why trading speed matters a tale of queue rationing under price controls we show that queue rationing under price controls is one driver of high frequency trading uniform tick sizes constrain price competition and create rents for liquidity provision particularly for securities with lower prices the time priority rule allocates rents to high frequency traders hfts because of their speed advantage an increase in relative tick size defined as uniform tick sizes divided by security prices increases the fraction of liquidity provided by hfts but harms liquidity we find that the message to trade ratio is a poor cross sectional proxy for hfts liquidity provision stocks with more liquidity provided by hfts have lower message to trade ratios received september 15 2015 editorial decision october 7 2017 by editor robin greenwood

contestability queues and governmental entry deterrence this paper demonstrates that a perverse kind of entry deterrence can result when government subsidized production is combined with non price rationing in the form of queuing even though queuing leads to a total cost to the consumer not including the tax cost that is higher than the cost of an unsubsidized private supplier and even though the government s money price is rigid the market is not contestable the key to the result is that the waiting cost portion of the consumer s acquisition cost declines immediately upon entry and losses would be forced upon the entrant privatization would negate the entry deterrence thus leading to entry increased output at lower full prices lower average production costs decreased waiting costs increased profits and increased consumer surplus

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

rent dissipation and efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations this paper introduces contest efficiency as an alternative to rent dissipation when measuring efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations contest efficiency is defined as the expected proportion of the maximum obtainable benefit captured by the contest and differs from rent dissipation because it values the expected winner of the contest therefore rent dissipation and contest efficiency may suggest contradictory conclusions when agents have asymmetric valuations this result is illustrated when comparing alternative equilibria in contests with asymmetric reimbursement and when analyzing the comparative static effect of a change in the relative benefit of two agents in a cournot nash contest

ski lift pricing with applications to labor and other markets the market for ski runs or amusement rides often features admission tickets with no explicit price per ride therefore the equilibrium i nvolves queues which are systematically longer during peak periods s uch as weekends moreover the prices of admission tickets are much l ess responsive than the length of queues to variations in demand eve n when these variations are predictable despite the queues and stick y prices the authors show that the outcomes are nearly efficient und er plausible conditions they then show that similar results obtain f or some familiar congestion problems and for profit sharing schemes i n the labor market copyright 1987 by american economic association

the effects of rent control expansion on tenants landlords and inequality evidence from san francisco using a 1994 law change we exploit quasi experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in san francisco to study its impacts on tenants and landlords leveraging new data tracking individuals migration we find rent control limits renters mobility by 20 percent and lowers displacement from san francisco landlords treated by rent control reduce rental housing supplies by 15 percent by selling to owner occupants and redeveloping buildings thus while rent control prevents displacement of incumbent renters in the short run the lost rental housing supply likely drove up market rents in the long run ultimately undermining the goals of the law

rationing and rent dissipation in the presence of heterogeneous individuals this paper discusses the implications of rationing by waiting when consumers have different time costs and personal valuations the joint distribution function of time costs and personal valuations is used to characterize market equilibrium it is argued that under certain conditions an increase in the variance of time costs will reduce the dissipation of rent furthermore it is shown that introducing a secondary market for a rationed good does not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuations the model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent seeking activities such as the patent system and import quotas

a bargaining theory of distribution channels abstract a critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties in this article the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer one retailer channel to establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract they show that the institution of bargaining has force and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present the authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination thus there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members the authors rec

waiting line auctions if prizes are to be awarded simultaneously at a specified time on a first come first served basis then individuals who queue for them will choose different waiting times through their arrivals at the queue this choice of arrival time at a queue is similar to the choice of a sealed tender in an auction an equilibrium for this waiting line auction is obtained here using methods for analyzing sealed tender auctions when individuals are risk neutral it is shown that several alternative waiting line allocation procedures result in the same transactions cost associated with waiting in line

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

the allocative cost of price ceilings in the u s residential market for natural gas a direct consequence of restricting the price of a good for which secondary markets do not exist is that in the presence of excess demand the good will not be allocated to the buyers who value it the most we demonstrate the empirical importance of this allocative cost for the u s residential market for natural gas which was subject to price ceilings during 1954 89 using a household level discrete continuous model of natural gas demand we estimate that the allocative cost in this market averaged 3 6 billion annually nearly tripling previous estimates of the net welfare loss to u s consumers

vertical integration raising rivals costs and upstream collusion abstract this paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear as a first step the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated it turns out this is the joint profit maximum of the colluding firms the discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry while the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising rivals costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here

vertical integration and downstream collusion we investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms ability to collude in a repeated game framework we show that a vertical merger has two main effects on the one hand it increases the total collusive profits increasing the stakes of collusion on the other hand it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors the integrated firm accessing the input at marginal cost faces higher profits in the deviation phase and in the non cooperative equilibrium which potentially harms collusion as we show the optimal collusive profit sharing agreement takes care of the increased incentive to deviate of the integrated firm while optimal punishment erases the difficulty related to the asymmetries in the non cooperative state as a result vertical integration generally favors collusion

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

queues rations and market comparisons of outcomes for the poor and the rich this paper presents a positive comparison of the outcomes of several alternative allocation systems the queue system convertible and nonconvertible rations and the unhindered market to distribute the limited quantity of a deficit good among heterogeneous individuals the authors show that for the poor the ranking of systems from better to worse is convertible rations nonconvertible rations the queue system and nonintervention the rich are found to be better off under nonintervention than under other systems these and other results are notably robust not only to many parameters of the economy but also to certain types of commodity taxes and administrative costs copyright 1987 by american economic association

the us generalised system of preferences in principle and practice in principle the us generalised system of preferences gsp offers uniform market access to exports from eligible developing countries for a broad set of gsp eligible products in practice realised gsp tariff exemptions demonstrate marked variation across countries industries and years in this paper we identify the sources of discretionary and non discretionary gsp exclusions and quantify the extent to which competitive needs limitations cnls waivers and additional annual product country and country product exclusions drive a wedge between the generalised principle of gsp and its implementation in practice

are rents fully dissipated students of rent seeking have erred in focusing their attention exclusively on the analysis of competitions for exogenously specified transfers when redistributive policies are treated as endogenous choices it is clear that there are both incentives and opportunities for policymakers to design them in ways that prevent the wasteful dissipation of a large proportion of the intended transfers an analytical framework that treats policy design in this way is capable of explaining a variety of common attributes of redistributive policies that are apparent anomalies under the traditional approach to rent seeking furthermore we predict and find supporting evidence that authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with higher ratios of government revenue to total income than do democracies we attribute this tendency to the substantially greater potential for dissipative competition for revenues under democracy than under dictatorship finally available estimates of lobbying expenditures and rents transferred under the recent federal crude oil controls contradict the hypothesis that rents are fully or almost fully disspated through political competition

housing market spillovers evidence from the end of rent control in cambridge massachusetts we measure the capitalization of housing market externalities into residential housing values by studying the unanticipated elimination of stringent rent controls in cambridge massachusetts in 1995 pooling data on the universe of assessed values and transacted prices of cambridge residential properties between 1988 and 2005 we find that rent decontrol generated substantial robust price appreciation at decontrolled units and nearby never controlled units accounting for a quarter of the 7 8 billion in cambridge residential property appreciation during this period the majority of this contribution stems from induced appreciation of never controlled properties residential investment explains only a small fraction of the total

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

the misallocation of housing under rent control the standard analysis of price controls assumes that goods are efficiently allocated even when there are shortages but if shortages mean that goods are randomly allocated across the consumers that want them the welfare costs from misallocation may be greater than the undersupply costs we develop a framework to empirically test for misallocation the methodology compares consumption patterns for demographic subgroups in rent controlled and free market places we find that in new york city which is rent controlled an economically and statistically significant fraction of apartments appears to be misallocated across demographic subgroups jel c25 d12 d61 r20

optimal allocation without transfer payments abstract often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return this may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs in this paper we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent while the designer cannot charge agents he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them we find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible is optimal in other cases those that send the highest signal should receive the goods however we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior also we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated

the economics of administering import quotas with licenses on demand in agriculture a nash equilibrium is determined for licenses on demand import quotas where licenses are allocated on a prorated basis inefficiency is incurred because licenses are allocated to high cost firms the ability to overbid exacerbates the inefficiency due to proportionate reductions in licenses quota expansion causes high cost firms to decrease their bids but reduces inefficiency the entry of a new firm causes all incumbent firms to increase bids or bid the quota not penalizing firms for the non use of licenses increases inefficiency the inefficiency impacts of tariff reductions license fees limits per firm and imperfect information are also addressed

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

the hot toy problem abstract every year around christmas there are shortages of the hot toy why don t sellers raise the price the hot toy problem is puzzling if we assume that a big shortage implies that a 500 bill is being left on the ground i show that a big shortage does not necessarily imply large losses in profits indeed the bigger the shortage as conventionally measured the smaller the loss in profit from underpricing the analysis of the hot toy problem demonstrates that the conventional definition of a shortage can be misleading and should be modified in favor of a definition based on the difference between the marginal willingness to pay and price

a theory of price control price or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place to delimit the scope of my analysis i shall use the term price control to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions first the control must fix the price or income terms of private contracts this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis 2 second the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government taxation and subsidization are thus excluded finally the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales purchases or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price 3 by this stipulation price support is also excluded even on such terms legal regulations to control price are still many and varied to evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts by this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications 4 an alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

anticompetitive vertical integration by a dominant firm backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise the dominant firm s advantage may or may not offset the negative effect of higher prices on social welfare whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration a vertical merger is similar to a hypothetical horizontal merger suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry should be similar to horizontal merger policy the dominant firm model yields an observable sufficient indicator of welfare improving vertical mergers copyright 1998 by american economic association

equilibrium vertical foreclosure reply in ordover saloner and salop 1990 hereafter oss we showed that a downstream duopolist may have an incentive to backward integrate in order to foreclose its downstream rival from a source of upstream supply as a result of the vertical integration the downstream rival s input price increases giving the integrating firm a competitive advantage in the downstream market moreover in equilibrium the foreclosed downstream rival does not find it profitable to negate these effects by integrating itself oss considers a four stage game involving two upstream firms ul and u2 and two downstream firms dl and d2 in the first stage the downstream firms can bid to acquire ul if there is an acquisition say dl acquires ul to form f1 upstream input prices are set in the second stage in the third stage knowing the input prices it faces d2 can attempt to acquire u2 finally in the fourth stage dl and d2 compete a la bertrand with differentiated products in his comment david reiffen 1992 makes three distinct points first he notes that once dl has acquired ul the equilibrium of the subsequent subgame depends critically on how upstream prices are set in the second stage he argues that our results depend on the ability of fl to commit to a high upstream price this criticism previously has been made by oliver hart and jean tirole 1990 we show below that the results in oss do not depend on the ability of fl to commit instead our main result stems from the fact that vertical integration changes the firm s incentives to engage in price cutting in the input market the notion that vertically integrated firms behave differently from unintegrated ones in supplying inputs to downstream rivals would strike a businessperson if not an economist as common sense 1 we show that there is theoretical merit to that common sense view second reiffen argues that the game considered by oss is similar to a game in which there is no vertical integration but rather where a nonintegrated dl has a first mover advantage in the downstream market in such a game dl benefits from the ability to commit to the price that its stackelberg leadership position gives it reiffen considers this to be additional evidence in support of the claim that oss depends critically on fl s ability to commit not on vertical integration we explain why the mechanism by which dl is able to raise its profits in the sequential one shot game considered by reiffen is conceptually quite different from the mechanism by which dl profits from vertical integration in oss third reiffen argues that our results depend on there being only two upstream firms this is correct in the symmetric bertrand model analyzed however as we discuss below our results do obtain as long as the upstream price is decreasing in the number of firms as occurs in many oligopoly models particularly when costs vary across firms the next section summarizes the conceptual problems pertaining to upstream pricing these problems are resolved in section ii by means of simple and natural price ordover department of economics new york university 269 mercer st 7th floor new york ny 10003 saloner graduate school of business stanford university stanford ca 94305 salop georgetown university law center 600 new jersey avenue nw washington dc 20001 we have benefited greatly from several discussions with faruk gul research support from the national science foundation grant 8813943 iri the sloan foundation and the c v starr center for applied economics at nyu is gratefully acknowledged for example the japan u s strategic impediments initiative is predicated on the proposition that the loosely linked japanese firms that form the various keiretsu do discriminate against nonaffiliated firms

lottery or waiting line auction abstract this paper studies the efficiencies of the two most widely used non price allocation mechanisms lotteries and waiting line auctions as our analysis suggests in addition to the fairness of the mechanism the use of lotteries in lieu of waiting line auctions can be also justified from an efficiency point of view in particular we show that the less dispersed consumers time valuations are the more efficient is a lottery relative to a waiting line auction in addition we identify four conditions under which a lottery dominates a waiting line auction in expected social surplus preserving furthermore the numerical simulations we conduct indicate that over a predominantly wide range of circumstances a lottery is more socially efficient than a waiting line auction as an allocative mechanism in the absence of a conventional price system