crowding in of complementary contributions to public goods firm investment into open source software abstract we present a fairly general model in which firms are competitors in a commercial market segment and can invest into a complementary public good like open source software we show that contrary to standard predictions additional contribution to the public good by the government or a new market entrant can lead to higher investments of all incumbent firms that is a crowding in effect this result occurs if the investment cost function is superadditive we find that government contribution leads to larger crowding in effects than subsidizing market entry if the price elasticity of demand with respect to the private good is large relative to the one with respect to the public good our results are robust to extensions in the timing and the mode of competition

the rise and fall of the washington consensus as a paradigm for developing countries abstract the introduction of the washington consensus involved not simply a swing from state led to market oriented policies but also a shift in the ways in which development problems were framed and in the types of explanation through which policies were justified key changes were the partial globalization of development policy analysis and a shift from historicism to ahistorical performance assessment the main challenge to this approach is a latent southern consensus which is apparent in the convergence between east asian developmentalism and latin american neostructuralism the demise of the washington consensus is inevitable because its methodology and ideology are in contradiction

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

strategic trade policy intellectual property rights protection and north south trade abstract in this paper we analyze the issue of optimal tariffs when the northern and southern firms compete in quantities in an imperfectly competitive northern market and there are potentially varying degrees of intellectual property rights ipr violation by the south ipr violation is reflected through the leakage of technological knowledge spillovers from the northern to the southern firm creating unit cost reduction it is shown that optimal tariffs in this framework are always higher than in the simple duopoly model since they serve here not only as profit shifting devices but also as instruments that influence domestic innovative activity generate scale economies and countervail the ipr violation of the south the other notable difference from the standard duopoly model is that positive tariffs may be desirable from the world welfare point of view

time to complete and research joint ventures a differential game approach abstract in this paper we analyze cooperation in r d in the form of research joint ventures rjvs we show that the optimal size of an rjv does not only depend on the degree of spillovers as literature suggests but also on the cost function of r d activities moreover the explicit consideration of the fact that r d projects take time to complete shows that benefits from cooperation in r d not only allow rjvs to carry out larger r d projects but also to reduce the time to completion for projects with a given size and consequently to accelerate the acquisition of the benefits associated with the innovation

an econometric analysis of the european commission s merger decisions abstract using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the european commission and logit regression techniques we analyse the commission s decision process we find that the probability of a phase 2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties market shares the probabilities increase also when the commission finds high entry barriers or that the post merger market structure is conducive to collusion we do not find significant effects of political variables such as the nationality of the merging firms

upgrading primary production a global commodity chain approach abstract global commodity chain gcc analysis has been concerned mainly with examining power relations in global manufacturing industries although it has been preoccupied increasingly by the question of how developing country dc producers can upgrade this paper extends gcc analysis to traditional primary commodities where international traders exercise the driving role and suggests a new agenda for their upgrading in dcs based upon public action

cost reducing and demand creating r d with spillovers this article analyzes r d policies when the returns to cost reducing and demand creating r d are imperfectly appropriable and market structure is endogenous we generalize previous characterizations of appropriability to permit the possibility that own and rival r d are imperfect substitutes we also describe how equilibrium expenditures on process and product r d as well as equilibrium market structure depend on technological opportunities and spillovers in contrast to previous work diminished appropriability does not necessarily reduce r d expenditures for example under some conditions an increase in the extent of process product spillovers will lead to an increase in product process r d we estimate several variants of the model by using manufacturing line of business data and data from a survey of r d executives

inter industry r d spillovers what difference do they make the analytical framework of d aspremont and jacquemin the american economic review 1988 78 1133 1137 is extended to a two industry two firm perindustry model allowing for r d spillovers to occur within industries as well as between industries in the first part of the paper we analyze the impact of intra and inter industry r d spillovers on the level of strategic r d investments output profits and total welfare when firms compete in both the r d and output stage in the second part we compare the equilibrium outcomes that result from r d cooperation which includes both intra and inter industry r d agreements inter industry r d spillovers have a very important effect on a firm s incentives to invest in r d both directly and indirectly because of their influence on the likely impact of intra industry r d spillovers also r d agreements that cut across industries may be more socially beneficial than cooperatives whose membership comes from a single industry

union structure and firms incentives for cooperative r d investments we examine how different unionisation structures and the spillovers of r d activities affect r d investments and fi rms incentives to form ar esearch joint venture we find that whenever firms invest non cooperatively an industry union increases r d investments if industry specific spillovers are low in case of a research joint venture investments are always higher under firm level unions we also find that firms incentives to form a research joint venture are stronger when they face an industry union if spillovers are low rigidities in the labour market such as high unemployment benefits or and a central union have negative effects on employment output and profits and hinder the diffusion of the efficiency created by a rjv to consumers and employees integrated labour market and r d policies are also discussed

on the organization of cooperative research and development theory and evidence abstract it has become increasingly prevalent that business firms often rival firms join forces in cooperative r and d to develop new technologies that they can use in their downstream business equity research joint ventures and non equity co development are the two major modes of organization and they differ in how ownership rights over newly developed technologies are assigned this paper addresses the question of when cooperative r and d should be carried out in a research joint venture as opposed to a co development program in a setting of contractual incompleteness the nature of the downstream business of participating firms is shown to determine the organization of cooperative r and d empirical evidence that is consistent with the theoretical analysis is also presented

learning curve spillovers and market performance this paper examines the effect of learning curve spillovers on market structure and performance we derive a simple characterization of the true marginal cost for a broad class of learning curves and use calculated examples to show that spillovers substantially undercut the barriers to entry erected by proprietary learning unlike the case of cost reducing research and development spillovers also tend to improve market performance the increased efficiency of the industrywide reduction process typically outweighs the decrease in firms incentives to reduce costs by expanding output

has mercantilism reduced urban poverty in ssa perception of boom bust and the china africa trade in lome and bamako this paper addresses the immediate impacts of the china africa trade on africa s informal traders and its longer term impact on urban poverty based on a comparison of the major cities of two west african countries and drawing on semi structured interviews with traders and on schedule based interviews with key informants in government business and the informal trade sector the findings are that the increase in imports from china initially broadened access to trading for the poor creating short term improvements in livelihoods but competition is driving down profit margins and restricting the trade to a survival mechanism for many today thus it has provided limited long term potential as an economic platform for national development and poverty reduction the findings are discussed in terms of structuration theory and in terms of alternative conceptualizations of informal trade in africa

intellectual property rights violations and spillovers in north south trade abstract the article examines the role of technological spillovers when northern and southern firms compete in quantities on the common world market and when only the northern firm is supposed to conduct innovative activity the intensity of spillovers is interpreted as an indicator of the strength of intellectual property rights ipr protection in this light the paper reconsiders the questions raised in the recent economic analysis of ipr protection in north south relations when and whether the southern countries benefit in welfare terms from protecting ipr how the north fares in this story how large is the conflict between the north and south and what is the optimal level of ipr protection at the world level the paper shows that the common belief that the south generally benefits from relaxing ipr protection while the north is worse off does not carry over in the applied duopoly model with spillovers in this respect the congruence of interests between north and south with respect to southern ipr protection regime should not be an exceptional or even impossible state of affairs

spillovers rivalry and r d investment spillovers of research knowledge are unavoidable most technologies have some public good aspects moreover rival firms are able to through industrial espionage and reverse engineering access and copy new innovations and are thus able to eat into monopoly profits of innovators the threat of spillovers affects r d investments and consequently reduces innovative activity imitators spend resources on acquiring or copying existing innovations resources that would have otherwise gone into the pursuit and development of new products and processes industries with excessive spillovers are likely to have little private r d investment and might have to rely on public r d funding while patents are designed to provide protection to inventors they provide only imperfect protection against imitation mansfield schwartz and wagner 13 have shown that a large number of patented innovations are copied in a relatively short time when patents do not provide adequate protection against spillovers fewer innovations might be forthcoming and firms might choose to not patent research spillovers however are not without their benefits whereas perfect appropriability generates static efficiency by conferring a monopoly on an innovator spillovers might be more efficient in a dynamic sense because of reduced duplication of research effort and perhaps more innovations in the long run the presence of r d spillovers thus creates a wedge between private and social returns to r d

on the design of stable joint ventures abstract an analytical model is developed to study the problem of designing stable joint ventures aimed at jointly developing and supplying a new technology the analysis focuses on the extent to which traditional motives for joint ventures like cost sharing synergy effects or technological spillovers may shape the incentives for firms to cheat on the arrangement and hence despite larger cooperative benefits endanger the formation of a stable agreement the cheating firm although supplying the contractually specified inputs to the venture manages to keep its knowhow proprietary while benefiting from the loyal partner s know how through spillovers from the venture only if know how can be kept sufficiently proprietary within the venture will synergy effects stimulate the formation of a stable joint venture increasing the profitability of cooperation while at the same time stifling the incentives to cheat but if know how becomes difficult to appropriate synergy effects may increase the incentives to cheat resulting in no agreement at least when both parties have perfect foresight

the spillover effects of md a disclosures for real investment the role of industry competition abstract we explore whether disclosures in the management discussion analysis mda it is stronger when firms operate in industries that have lower entry costs are larger and have less substitutable products we obtain similar results for investment efficiency overall our evidence suggests that md a disclosures have spillover effects for investment that can improve investment efficiency and that spillover effects are moderated by industry competition

noncooperative oligopoly and preemptive innovation without winner take all earlier models of innovation under oligopolistic rivalry are modified to include a share parameter a describing the manner in which profits are divided among rivals when one firm is successful in its search for a valuable resource stock there is a unique value of a that maximizes expected industry profits by guiding noncooperative oligopolists to choose the profit maximizing exploration rate moreover setting a at this maximizing value which always allocates some share of industry profits to the losers in the exploration race leads to an exploration rate identical to what would be chosen by a jointly managed cartel

private sector development policies practices and problems private sector development psd has become a central concern of most donors development cooperation efforts during the last decade this paper is a critical review of policies in the area donors work with concepts of psd which are highly abstract treat developing countries private sectors as tabula rasa and focus mainly on macro level preconditions in practice however concrete psd policies are mostly micro level ones the paper argues that they are shaped mostly by the nature and interests of private sectors in donor country themselves incorporate a high proportion of tied aid and fail basic tests of coherence

the world bank and the street how do doing business reforms affect tanzania s micro traders the well documented weaknesses of structural adjustment policies have led to a reconceptualisation of the world bank s approach to neo liberal reforms the doing business reforms aim to foster a better climate for business in a number of ways the main policy documents reject interventions targeted at specific groups but although they identify informal small and medium enterprises smes as likely to benefit disproportionately they specifically exclude micro enterprises as a target group the general argument of this paper is that reforms may well impact non target groups through interactions with several areas of policy and law with public attitudes and with multiple economic sectors in particular it is argued that the exclusion of micro traders from the reforms contributes to their marginalisation in political and policy arenas increasing their vulnerability to state intervention the paper draws on a four month study conducted by the authors in tanzania in 2007

power sector reform in developing countries mismatched agendas power sector reform is rapidly spreading across all corners of the developing world at an alarmingly rapid pace while the rationales for reform seem to have gained acceptance among the stakeholders the reform model and process are contested this paper examines the impacts of reform using the promised outcomes as a basis for analysis the ability of reform to meet the developmental challenges facing the reformers is explored it concludes that reform has had some achievements if conventional performance indicators are used but also questions the validity of some of these indicators reform has however not fulfilled many of its goals and the prevailing recipes are likely to leave developing countries socially and economically worse off than in the pre reform period progressive government intervention is needed to shift reform process towards a more responsible development path

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

research joint ventures and optimal r d policy with asymmetric information abstract when to allow research joint ventures rjvs or not is an important instrument in the development of an optimal r d policy the regulator however is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate r d optimally the extent to which there exist appropriability problems between the firms is one such variable that is private information to the firms in the industry in a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a second best r d policy where the government can either allow rjvs or not and give lump sum subsidies to the parties involved the second best r d policy without subsidies will either block some welfare improving rjvs or allow some welfare reducing ones with lump sum subsidies the second best policy trades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasing rjvs or blocking welfare increasing ones

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers comment claude d aspremont and alexis jacquemin 1988 employ a simple yet elegant symmetric duopoly model of r d and spillovers to compare several equilibrium concepts these concepts include 1 the two stage noncooperative solution 2 the two stage mixed game 3 the two stage fully cooperative solution 2 and 4 the social planner s optimum 3 for each of the cases stated above they computed the equilibrium levels of output q q1 q2 and r d xl x2 x and the required second order conditions they report i for large spillovers i e b 0 5 x x x and q q q q and ii for small spillovers i e 3 x 2x x and q q q q where x denotes a firm s r d level q denotes total industry output denotes the social optimum denotes the fully cooperative model the noncooperative two stage case and the mixed game 3 is the spillover parameter here we show that comparing the pure cooperative and the pure noncooperative solutions as defined by d aspremont and jacquemin is only meaningful when the noncooperative solution is stable that is when spillovers are not too small we find that for very small spillovers in our example this occurs when 3 0 17 the d aspremont jacquemin observation holds because the noncooperative model is unstable the importance of this result rests on the fact that even though the output reaction functions cross correctly when 3 0 17 the r d reaction functions do not when 0 17 0 41 stability obtains but r d levels are higher in the noncooperative case than the fully cooperative one for large spillovers the d aspremont jacquemin result is confirmed moreover we find that the introduction of spillovers in the case of the noncooperative model tends to promote stability in the case of the cooperative model however as the level of spillovers is increased an equilibrium ceases to exist

inter firm cooperation with imperfectly appropriable research abstract inter firm collaboration in pre competitive research is not always beneficial rather its effectiveness in raising social benefits relative to a non cooperative setup depends on both the nature of the agreement and the technological and market conditions of the industry in question joint ventures that simply allow members to coordinate their actions in pre competitive research can restore firm incentives for both pre competitive research and development in the presence of high knowledge spillovers and poor opportunities for innovation joint ventures which additionally improve the dissemination of information among member firms raise social benefits whenever the opportunities for innovation are not exceptionally good even in the presence of relatively insignificant spillovers

equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers this paper analyzes a simple oligopoly model with information spillovers firms spend on r d to affect their costs of production the main finding is that depending on the magnitude of the spillover the market may not provide enough incentives for the optimum degree of cooperation to take place it is shown that the equilibrium size of a research joint venture is usually less than the optimum size which requires all firms to participate in the research joint venture the policy implications of this result are that there should be encouragement for firms competing in high technology industries to form industry wide cooperative agreements copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

the degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective r d abstract the amount of cost reduction or effective r d that results in a symmetric sequential nash equilibrium with quadratic payoffs and differentiated goods is shown to increase with spillovers in oligopolies with a few rivals and to achieve a maximum for spillovers that are not perfect in industries with many firms similar tendencies apply for consumer surplus profits and static welfare more rivals typically lead to reduced investments output and profitability while consumer surplus and welfare increase or at least do not decrease limited entry in markets with a few rivals may enhance innovative investments profitability and consumer surplus if only product differentiation and spillovers are sufficiently high and r d costs sufficiently low too many rivals will then again lead to reductions and a decrease in static welfare

research joint ventures vs cross licensing agreements an agency approach abstract in this paper two broad categories of organizing a cooperative r d project are compared a research joint venture rjv and a cross licensing agreement cla in a non deterministic r d setting including asymmetric information we show that an rjv is more efficient in providing incentives it allows to capture existing synergies and facilitates the dissemination of the partners know how which is socially desirable however contrary to a cla an rjv faces the risk of opportunistic behavior by the partners regarding the provision of their know how to the venture which could lead a cla to perform more efficiently and in some cases this organization turns out to be superior

investigating transatlantic merger policy convergence abstract we propose a framework to examine convergence in the jurisdictional patterns of the american ftc and the european commission based on a sample of 595 merger cases scrutinized by either of these agencies in the 1995 2007 period we estimate logit models of the probability of intervening in a merger for both jurisdictions and use them to predict the decisions of the respectively other agency the results point to an increasing harmonization of merger regimes and corroborate the theoretical appraisal that the 2004 reform of eu merger law constituted a step towards the us system

firm heterogeneity imitation and the incentives for cost reducing r d effort i develop and test a model of strategic r d investments where innovating and non innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals i find that a larger proportion of non innovating rivals stimulates cost reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level r d key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of r d using the 1994 carnegie mellon survey of u s industrial r d results also suggest that r d and size are simultaneously determined with r d being proportional to size as predicted by the theoretical model

governance and trade in fresh vegetables the impact of uk supermarkets on the african horticulture industry production of fresh vegetables for export has grown rapidly in a number of countries in sub saharan africa over the last decade this trade brings producers and exporters based in africa together with importers and retailers in europe large retailers in europe play a decisive role in structuring the production and processing of fresh vegetables exported from africa the requirements they specify for cost quality delivery product variety innovation food safety and quality systems help top determine what types of producers and processors are able to gain access to the fresh vegetables chain and the activities they must carry out the control over the fresh vegetables trade exercised by uk supermarkets has clear consequences for inclusion and exclusion of producers and exporters of differing types and for the long term prospects for the fresh vegetables industry in the two major exporting countries studied kenya and zimbabwe

cournot equilibrium with imperfectly appropriable r d the authors investigate the effects of knowledge spillovers numbers of incumbents and demand characteristics on market equilibria involving either noncooperative firms or a research joint venture firms engage in cost reducing r d before competing in outputs noncooperative r d expenditure is socially suboptimal with convex demand and likely to be so under general demand functions a research joint venture involving all firms in the industry always invests too little relative to the social optimum it may however lead to better market performance than is achieved under the noncooperative regime copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

introduction epistemic communities and international policy coordination the growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult if decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions what factors shape their behavior under conditions of uncertainty what are the origins of international institutions and how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge while a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights at its core the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system level factors unit level factors or some complex interplay between the two whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create defend or expand their own wealth and power to enhance collective material benefits or to promote nonmaterial values a related question of

do micro enterprises benefit from the doing business reforms the case of street vending in tanzania the world bank s doing business reforms were originally expected to help the growth and formalisation of smes and micro enterprises the expectations that reforms would support the growth and development of smes were challenged by scholars but the reforms impact on the micro enterprises of the poor has received little scholarly attention drawing on a desk study and on field studies of street vendors carried out in tanzania in 2007 and 2011 this paper argues that the growth and formalisation of micro businesses are badly served by the doing business reforms

microequity and microfinance abstract this paper examines the work of the village enterprise fund an us nongovernmental organization in east africa as a case study in equity based microfinance in low income countries many small businesses established in high income countries rely on some form of equity capital to fund the startup phase and much of the growth of the business the success of startup grants and equity financing in high income countries suggests that this method might also be applicable in low income countries using the work of the village enterprise fund as an example the paper argues that startup grants and equity finance are useful and appropriate in addition to the more common loan based approaches

r d cooperation or competition abstract the economic literature provides empirical evidence of the existence of technological cartels such as research joint ventures or deliberate sharing of technological knowledge our aim is to answer to the questions i is the creation of technological cartels beneficial from a social welfare point of view and ii do the firms have private incentives to form such cartels we depart from the approach adopted in the literature by considering a dynamic model and allowing for the possibility that the firms are asymmetric the results show the importance of the degree of existing technological spillovers and stress the differences between the symmetric and asymmetric cases

sustaining economic reform under political liberalization in africa issues and implications abstract structural adjustment programs in sub saharan africa have resulted in only partial economic successes but have played a significant role in facilitating political liberalization economic reforms can be deepened however if policies which sustain economic and political reform efforts are more explicitly linked the gains to be reaped from economic reforms will only be fully realized in conjunction with improvements in governance and expansion of democratic representation in particular there are four key dimensions for facilitating the sustainability of economic reform in the context of political liberalization in sub saharan africa changing government behavior and strengthening government capacity enhancing the political capacity for effective policy implementation nurturing civil society and increasing nongovernment organization ngo participation and fostering the necessary institutional foundations for markets

convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of r d the undiscounted case abstract will r d increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time we examine this issue in the context of a dynamic alternate move duopoly model of non cooperative r d the asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market utilizing a value loss process constructed from the optimality equation of dynamic programming we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time we obtain this convergence to symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to r d through the notion that r d investment cannot be changed instantaneously by allowing research externalities complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated r d and either increasing decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival r d

strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers this paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay offs a unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other at most is able to receive only small spillovers the leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome

explaining african economic performance africa has had slow growth and a massive exodus of capital in many respects it has been the most capital hostile region we review and interpret the aggregate level and microeconomic literatures to identify the key explanations for this performance there is a reasonable correspondence of the two sets of evidence pointing to four factors as being important these are a lack of openness to international trade a high risk environment a low level of social capital and poor infrastructure these problems are to a substantial extent attributable to government behaviour and the paper includes a review of the political economy literature which addresses that behaviour

the globalization of product markets and immiserizing growth lessons from the south african furniture industry the central issue addressed in this paper is whether some developing countries will find it difficult to compete effectively in global product markets and will therefore be locked into processes of immiserizing growth it focuses on the role of south african producers in the global furniture value chain analyzing the factors affecting firm upgrading particularly the role of global buyers the paper observes a global industry characterized by increased competition and falling unit prices with local firms dependent on a falling exchange rate it concludes with implications for policy and future research including generalizing the findings to other sectors and countries

interindustry r d spillovers rates of return and production in high tech industries this paper presents estimates of the productivity and factor bias effects of interindustry r d spillovers for five high tech industries each industry is distinguished as a separate spillover source the industries are each affected by r d spillovers and are themselves spillover sources thus a spillover network between the industries is estimated private and social rates of return to r d capital are calculated the private rates of return are generally greater than the returns to physical capital in addition the social rates of return are greater than the private rates the results show that there are significant differences between industries as to their importance as sources of r d spillovers this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

downstream research joint venture with upstream market power in a vertically related industry we examine the downstream firms incentives to invest in cost reducing research and development r d and to form a research joint venture rjv under two alternative structures of input supply exclusive vertical relations and a single supplier in contrast to the hold up argument in which downstream firms invest non cooperatively and spillovers are low r d investments are higher under a single supplier than under competing vertical chains downstream firms incentives to form a rjv are also stronger in the former case than they are in the latter we identify conditions under which an rjv is beneficial for society integrated innovation and competition policies are also discussed

cooperative r d and vertical product differentiation abstract a partial equilibrium model with vertical product differentiation coumot competition and quality determined by r d expenses is analysed cooperative agreements on r d entail higher levels of r d quality output and welfare than at the non cooperative equilibrium under well denned conditions on spillover rates this confirms in a new setting a well known outcome of models with cost reducing r d further cooperation in r d allows a larger number of firms to operate in the industry than in the non cooperative case via a reduction in prices a new source of social gains from cooperative research is identified

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers erratum in our article published in this review volume 78 no 5 december 1988 pp 1133 37 we have shown that in the presence of sufficient spillovers of the r d benefits duopolists cooperating in r d but not in the output spend more on r d than noncooperating firms at both stages and also produce more output closest to the socially optimal level a second symmetric result is that for small spillovers duopolists cooperating neither in r d nor in output spend more on r d and produce more output than cooperative firms however this result has been obscured by an obvious inequality inversion and other typos implying a modification in the conclusions indeed in fn 13 on p 1135 one should have that x x iff

vertical integration and r d information flow is there a need for firewalls abstract we examine the impact of r d information flow on innovation incentives and welfare in particular we consider the case in which the information flows from a downstream nonintegrated firm to the downstream division of a vertically integrated firm via its upstream subsidiary in a setting where both the integrated and nonintegrated firm engage in cost reducing r d and compete in the product market we show that the impact of the r d information flow on innovation output and profits is positive for the integrated firm and negative for the nonintegrated firm unless information spillovers are high goods are close substitutes and r d is very costly firewalls decrease welfare