fdi and taxation a meta study despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses it still remains open whether or when tax competition is harmful moreover the influence of tax differentials on multinationals decisions is still insufficiently analyzed thus economists have increasingly resorted to empirical analysis in order to gain insights on the elasticity of fdi with respect to company taxation as a result the empirical literature on taxation and international capital flows has grown to a similar abundance during the last 25 years as the respective theoretical literature its heterogeneity leads to a rising need for concise reviews on the existing empirical evidence in this paper we extend former meta analyses on fdi and taxation in three ways first we add the most recent publications unconsidered in meta analyses up to date second we apply a different methodology by using a broad set of meta regression estimators and explicitly discuss which one is most suitable for application to our meta data third we address some important issues in research on fdi and taxation to the clarification of which meta analysis can make valuable contributions these issues are mainly the influence of variables which might moderate effects of tax differentials e g public spending the implications of using aggregate fdi data as opposed to firm level information on measured tax effects the implications of bilateral effective tax rates and the possible presence of publication bias in primary research

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

districting and government overspending theories of government spending driven by a common pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government this paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the united states the main finding is that when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity the results also show that at large electoral systems do not and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do break this relationship

local government structure and the quality of minority neighborhoods one of the most long standing and controversial issues surrounding local government structure in the united states is how reformed political institutions have impacted minority neighborhoods a common belief is that reformism has harmed these neighborhoods but there is no empirical evidence on this issue drawing upon capital asset pricing theory this paper empirically investigates the effects of two reforms the council manager form of government and at large councilor elections on the quality of nonwhite neighborhoods quality is found to be higher in majority white places with at large as opposed to district based elections quality is not found to be affected by the form of government

a test of executive behavior in the local public sector this paper provides an empirical framework to test three competing theories regarding the behavior of public executives in the local public sector these alternative theo ries are the public interest median voter and expense preference or surplus maximizing leviathan models this study tests these various theories by determining whether aggregate property values the median value of housing or administra tive expenditures is a more significant determinant of the salary of a representative school executive in connecticut the empirical results lend some support for the expense preference model leviathan model of public executive be havior

firm size wage gaps job responsibility and hierarchical matching i present the fact that wage gaps due to firm size increase with job responsibility i use swedish data to determine whether wage gaps increase with a direct measure of job responsibility to compare the age patterns of the wage gaps for blue and white collar workers and to compare wages by job responsibility and spans of control with u s data i compare supervisory to nonsupervisory occupations and find that wage gaps increase with job responsibility for most occupational ladders this fact is consistent with hierarchical matching models in which the larger number of subordinates amplifies managerial talent

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

hierarchical organization and performance inequality evidence from professional cycling this article proposes an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy with an implicit market for productive time in this market agents buy or sell productive time this implicit market gives rise to the formation of teams organized in hierarchies with one leader buyer at the top and helpers sellers below relative to autarky hierarchical organization leads to higher within and between team payoffs productivity inequality this prediction is tested empirically in the context of professional road cycling we show that 46 of performance inequality in the tour de france is due to hierarchical organization within team whereas team composition only accounts for 6

why do households without children support local public schools linking house price capitalization to school spending while residents receive similar benefits from many local government programs only about one third of all households have children in public schools we argue that capitalization of school spending into house prices can encourage even childless residents to support spending on schools we identify a proxy for the extent of capitalization the supply of land available for new development and show that towns in massachusetts with little undeveloped land have larger changes in house prices in response to a plausibly exogenous spending shock towns with little available land also spend more on schools we extend these results using data from school districts in 46 states showing that per pupil spending is positively related to the percentage of developed land this positive correlation persists only in districts where the median resident is a homeowner and is stronger in districts with more elderly residents who do not use school services and have a shorter expected duration in their home our findings support models in which capitalization encourages the provision of durable local public goods and provides an additional reason why some elderly support local school spending

jurisdictional homogeneity and the tiebout hypothesis abstract in this paper an alternative to the capitalization approach to testing the tiebout model is presented the tiebout foot voting mechanism suggests that households will sort and stratify into approximately homogeneous local public goods jurisdictions at a point in time the efficiency of the sort will be positively related to the number of existing jurisdictions using a measure of homogeneity introduced by theil the relationship between stratification homogeneity within jurisdiction and number of jurisdictions is tested for a sample of school districts within 33 smsas the tiebout stratification hypothesis is confirmed

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

leviathan in the crosshairs following in the spirit of the leviathan hypothesis this paper empirically examines how the degree of local government market power influences efficiency in the local public sector market power is measured by the number and relative size distribution of similar government units in the same market area to avoid confusing market power with the comparative efficiency or superiority of larger sized organizations the relative size distribution of the individual government unit is held constant in the empirical analysis in the empirical test aggregate property values serve as the measure of efficiency the empirical results suggest that aggregate property values are lower and thus efficiency suffers in more concentrated municipal market areas ceteris paribus thus providing some evidence for leviathan type governments in connecticut

evaluating the social optimality of durable public good provision using the housing price response to public investment recent empirical work in public finance uses the housing price response to public investment to assess the efficiency of local durable public good provision this paper explores the theoretical justification for this technique it points out that the logic justifying the technique for evaluating non durable public good provision does not translate to the durable case a model in which investment is determined by the interaction between a budget maximizing bureaucrat and a community s residents is used to demonstrate that the technique can falsely predict under provision falsely predict over provision or perform without error

worker allocation hierarchies and the wage distribution economists have traditionally viewed the allocation of workers among jobs through the concept of comparative advantage this paper investigates hierarchical production models which display an absence of comparative advantage in order to demonstrate that for hierarchical production there is a second allocating factor which plays an important role two results are found first the allocation of workers among jobs tends to match high ability workers with positions which value ability highly second despite the fact that the models display an absence of comparative advantage i e the standard theoretical explanation for why wage distributions might be skewed the models wage distributions are skewed to the right relative to the underlying ability distributions

a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector abstract this paper develops a test for pareto efficiency in the local public sectorusing the analytical result that aggregate property value is maximized at the public output level which satisfies the samuelson condition for efficiency by using cross section data it is possible to deduce whether a representative community provides its public goods in a property value maximizing and hence efficient fashion the empirical results show no systematic tendency to either under or over provide public goods in a sample of massachusetts communities

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

inequality and the organization of knowledge since the seminal work of lawrence f katz and kevin m murphy 1992 the study of wage inequality has taken as its starting point a neoclassical constant elasticity of substitution production function using as inputs capital and lowand high skill labor this approach assumes that the organization of production is fixed and determined by a particular specification of technology and it ignores both the source of the interaction between workers and the organizational aspects of this interaction these shortcomings are particularly important in light of growing empirical evidence that points first to the importance of decreases in the cost of processing and communicating information and second to the complementarity between organizational change and adjustments in the distribution of wages e g timothy f bresnahan et al 2002 this paper argues that theories that seek to guide empirical research on these areas must put knowledge and information at the center of the analysis of organizations and link the organizational structure with aggregate variables via equilibrium frameworks in garicano and rossi hansberg 2003 we present a model of this kind it determines the patterns of organization as manifested by the communication and specialization patterns and the implied wage structure that result from different costs of acquiring and communicating information here we present a simple variant of this theory that allows us to focus on one of the main aspects of that framework the sorting of agents into teams and the wage and organizational structure that accompanies that sorting we use this simple model to analyze the changes in organization and wages that result from a very specific type of technological change a reduction in the cost of communicating knowledge or information this model allows us to consider the effect on within class wage inequality and the impact of information technology on the creation and form of organizations e g size distribution of hierarchies however because knowledge is exogenously given and agents cannot invest in learning an important margin of the model in garicano and rossi hansberg 2003 is fixed namely the degree of decentralization or the extent to which problems are solved at lower levels that model allows the simultaneous study of the acquisition of knowledge spans of control and matching in equilibrium moreover it goes beyond the current analysis in that it allows for organizations with an unconstrained number of layers and in that it studies two aspects of the impact of information technology communication technology like here and the technology to acquire knowledge or information e g processing power through cheaper database access

property taxes and property values evidence from proposition 212 abstract we examine the effect of proposition 2 1 2 on revenues and housing prices in massachusetts communities that were initially constrained by the law saw large increases in state aid and the use of fees we use these initial constraints as instruments for changes in other components of revenue while treating the change in the property tax as exogenously determined by proposition 2 1 2 our results strongly suggest that communities that were able to increase their property taxes more rapidly saw greater increases in their housing values in the period following passage of the law

evaluating efficient public good provision theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries abstract provision of most public goods e g health care libraries education police fire protection utilities can be characterized by a two stage production process in the first stage basic inputs e g labor and capital are used to generate service potential e g opening hours materials which is then in the second stage transformed into observed outputs e g school outcomes library circulation crimes solved as final outputs are also affected by demand side factors conflating both production stages likely leads to biased inferences about public productive in efficiency and its determinants hence this paper uses a specially tailored fully non parametric efficiency model allowing for both outlying observations and heterogeneity to analyse efficient public good provision in stage one only we thereby employ a dataset comprising all 290 flemish public libraries our findings suggest that ideological stance of the local government wealth and density of the local population and source of library funding i e local funding versus intergovernmental transfers strongly affect library productive efficiency

fiscal consequences of electoral institutions abstract there are more than 500 000 elected local government officials in the united states the most electorally dense county has more than 20 times the average number of elected officials per capita this paper offers the first systematic investigation of the link between electoral density and fiscal outcomes electoral density presents a tradeoff between accountability and monitoring costs increasing the number of specialized elected offices promotes issue unbundling reducing slack between citizen preferences and government policy but the costs of monitoring a larger number of officials may offset these benefits producing greater latitude for politicians to pursue their own goals at the expense of citizen interests we predict diminishing returns to electoral density and a documentclass aastex usepackage amsbsy usepackage amsfonts usepackage amssymb usepackage bm usepackage mathrsfs usepackage pifont usepackage stmaryrd usepackage textcomp usepackage portland xspace usepackage

city government structure are some institutions undersupplied city councilors have a vested interest in maintaining the local government structure that got them elected this resistance to change may result in non optimal supplies of particular local political institutions as cities and metropolitan areas experience changes in population and diversity using unique data from the state of florida we show that there is an undersupply of cities offering larger council sizes our evidence also suggests that there is no undersupply of cities with the mayor council versus the council manager form of government or cities with at large versus district election methods

urban governance competition and welfare the market mechanism of spatial resource allocation is examined in a system of cities where social welfare depends on city size the competitive dynamics of the system is a product of the interplay between people s individual exit type choices migration and their collective voice type choices urban governance it is shown that the use of efficiency enhancing measures of urban governance depends on the pressure of exit a necessary condition for dynamic efficiency is that the market equilibrium of migration is non stable which sounds somewhat paradoxical dynamic efficiency is more likely to emerge between initially small cities in which agglomeration economies dominate than between initially large cities in which agglomeration diseconomies dominate the incentives for proper urban governance are somewhat ambiguous in the most relevant case where cities are of asymmetrical size it is therefore important to strengthen the incentives by means of national urban policy

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

demographic factors affecting constitutional decisions the case of municipal charters after decades of studying municipal charters largely by looking for patterns in the data we have a good basis for proceeding more formally with testable theories the political significance of demographic change becomes apparent by looking at its impact on political conflict in combination with the biases in social choice rules the theory of civil rights provides a framework for doing this it suggests identifying 1 the distribution of civil rights conveyed to citizens by alternative charters and 2 the bases for political conflict such as different demands for services and the unequal command of economic resources to satisfy them charters then become political tools simple statistical tests fail to refute this

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

assessing the efficiency of local open space provision abstract this paper tests the efficiency of local provision of land conservation i examine how housing prices which capitalize open space amenities and future tax obligations change after municipalities vote on referendums for conservation spending using a dynamic regression discontinuity based on voting outcomes results suggest that average housing prices increase about 0 68 1 12 for every 1000 per household of open space spending authorized which indicates inefficiency and underprovision of conservation i also examine tax capitalization and supply side explanations for estimated capitalization

measuring the property value effects of local land use and preservation referenda this paper examines a massachusetts policy that encourages communities to raise money through referenda for preservation and affordable housing i use difference indifferences fixed effects and quantile regression to compare home prices before and after such referenda in two towns i include covariates representing existing land uses zoning and historic resources to estimate the value of these amenities standard regression techniques indicate weak effects of the referenda while the estimated coefficients on land use and historic preservation confirm that preservation has a positive effect on property values the quantile regression sheds light on some heterogeneity that goes unnoticed in standard regression results

household location and tiebout do families sort according to preferences for locational amenities abstract if households sort efficiently across locations then at a given location families receive the same marginal benefit from the locational amenities we test for such sorting by imposing cross equation restrictions on hedonic regressions that difference away location versus house specific effects estimates are obtained using a unique subset of the american housing survey in which adjacent housing units are grouped together and observed in both 1985 and 1989 rejection of the cross equation restrictions unambiguously implies an inefficient sorting of households in contrast the data support the cross equation restrictions which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficient sorting

mortal managers and long term goals an impossibility result this article examines decision myopia under effort and risk neutrality an infinite non overlapping sequence of mortal managers is selected and their performance evaluated contracts admit premature termination plant condition depends on maintenance which induces an interstage linkage in production when ability and action are imprecisely known by employers no contract achieves the first best outcome furthermore if the manager discounts less than the owners inefficiency is partially due to moral hazard which resembles myopia optimal contracts infer ability and motivate behavior via manipulation of wage schedules and tenure guidelines

hierarchical sorting and learning costs theory and evidence from the law abstract garicano and rossi hansberg garicano l rossi hansberg e 2005 organization and inequality in a knowledge economy nber working paper 11458 show that knowledge based hierarchies are characterized by positive sorting between workers and managers when knowledge acquisition takes place before production we extend the analysis and find that complementarities between manager and worker skill are even stronger when knowledge is acquired on the job we then examine empirically the existence of sorting in law firms along the dimensions of cognitive ability and experience we find strong evidence of positive sorting by cognitive ability as proxied by the quality of the law school attended but little evidence of sorting by experience suggesting little substitutability between cognitive ability and experience

using market valuation to assess public school spending abstract we examine whether school expenditures are valued by potential residents and whether the current level of public school provision is inefficient by estimating the effect of state education aid on residential property values we find evidence that overall state aid is valued by potential residents and that school districts do not overspend on education however we find that districts may overspend in areas where residents have fewer schooling options but find no difference in efficiency by the degree of district unionization one interpretation of these results is that increased competition may reduce overspending on public schools in some areas

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

paving streets for the poor experimental analysis of infrastructure effects abstract we provide the first experimental estimation of the effects of the supply of publicly financed urban infrastructure on property values using random allocation of first time street asphalting of residential streets located in peripheral neighborhoods in mexico we show that within two years of the intervention households are able to transform their increased property wealth into significantly larger rates of vehicle ownership household appliances and home improvements increased consumption is made possible by both credit use and less saving a cost benefit analysis indicates that the valuation of street asphalting as capitalized into property values is about as large as construction costs

electoral rules and minority representation in u s cities of minority representation majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules with the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by u s cities particularly in the south we show why majorities tend to adopt winner take all city wide rules at large elections in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small in this case for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking conceding representation to voters from minority elected districts however as the minority becomes larger closer to a fifty fifty split the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority packed districts single member district rules serve this purpose we show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model in a novel data set covering u s cities and towns from 1930 to 2000

local government inefficiency and the tiebout hypothesis does competition among municipalities limit local government inefficiency the tiebout hypothesis has in the past thirty years come to refer to a number of different propositions about local public service provision first there is the point initially stressed by tiebout 15 that the mobility of consumer voters results in a market type of solution to public service provision in which people s demands for public services are revealed as they sort themselves among localities according to their tastes for public services second also discussed by tiebout is the proposition that local public services will tend toward efficient provision finally there is the claim that the mobility of consumers and the competition among the localities for these consumers make politics relatively unimportant in determining local public service provision the bulk of the empirical work on the tiebout hypothesis has attempted to determine if as tiebout suggested local public services are efficiently provided the most common approach has been to estimate the effects of public service provision and tax policy on property values and determine if a balanced budget change in the tax rate changes property values if not then property values are being maximized with respect to public services and public services therefore are efficiently provided studies using this technique include those by oates brueckner and sonstelie and portney 11 1 2 13 these empirical studies while providing evidence about whether or not public services are provided efficiently do not suggest the reasons why local public services are or are not efficiently provided are the limits on inefficiency in the local public sector attributable to local politics or are they the result of the constraints imposed on local governments because of the mobility of residents and capital evidence that local public services are efficiently provided cannot be considered support for the contention that the mobility of people and capital are the factors responsible for this efficiency romer and rosenthal 12 for example provides evidence from

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment