peer group formation in an adverse selection model this paper develops an adverse selection model where peer group systems are shown to trigger lower interest rates and remove credit rationing in the case where borrowers are uninformed about their potential partners and ex post state verification or auditing by banks is costly peer group formation reduces interest rates due to a collateral effect namely cross subsidisation amongst borrowers acts as collateral behind a loan by uncovering such a collateral effect this paper shows that peer group systems can be viewed as an effective risk pooling mechanism and thus enhance efficiency notjust in the full information set up a well known family of adverse selection models in the stiglitz and weiss 1981 tradition demonstrates that when banks are imperfectly informed about the riskiness of borrowers projects and therefore cannot discriminate against risky borrowers interest rates become inefficiently high and worthy borrowers are driven out of the credit market the extent of this problem is substantially magnified when borrowers do not have adequate collateral to secure a loan typically adverse selection combined with lack of collateral leads to prohibitively high interest rates poorly endowed individuals e g students immigrants the unemployed and a vast majority of poor individuals in developing countries often face such high rates and therefore cannot take advantage of profitable investment opportunities a peer group formation system represents a possible solution to the above problem under this system a bank lends to borrowers without collateral on condition that the borrowers organise themselves into groups and that participant borrowers within each group accept to take joint responsibility for a loan thus in addition to repaying their own share of the loan each group member must accept to repay the obligations of their defaulting peers otherwise the entire group is denied access to future refinancing systems of this kind have been very successful in practice they have generated lower interest rates for the rural poor in for example bangladesh the philippines bolivia and the state of arkansas in the united states moreover group lending has also been successfully implemented in large urban areas such in the cities of dhaka and chicago 1

group lending repayment incentives and social collateral abstract in this paper we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment this type of scheme especially in the guise of the grameen bank in bangladesh has received increasing attention we set up and analyze the repayment game which group lending gives rise to our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates the positive effect is that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile the negative effect arises when the whole group defaults even when some members would have repaid under individual lending we also show how group lending may harness social collateral which serves to mitigate its negative effect

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

educational benefits and military service an analysis of enlistment reenlistment and veterans benefit usage 1991 2005 i introduction educational benefits for military veterans have become a prime recruiting tool in the all volunteer military force avf the primary education benefit for most of the avf era has been the montgomery gi bill mgib this version of the gi bill began in july 1985 and bears the name of its sponsor alabama representative sonny montgomery under this program eligible veterans who enroll in an education program approved by the veterans administration are eligible to receive up to 36 mo of benefits if they begin usage within 10 yr of separating from service veterans are only eligible for mgib benefits if they contribute 100 per month during their first year of service 1 from time to time three of the four military branches have supplemented the basic mgib benefit with college fund cf benefits research has indicated that educational benefits do in fact attract enlistments of high quality youth defined by the military services to be youth who possess a high school degree and who score above the youth population average of 50 on the armed forces qualification test afqt 2 although educational benefits attract more highly qualified youth into the military those benefits may be costly for at least two reasons first such youth may be more likely to separate from the military to use their benefits thus requiring higher rates of recruitment of new enlistees to maintain the size and quality of the force second higher benefits may increase the tendency of youth who separate from the military to use those benefits as well as increase the duration of usage of course this would not be surprising a growing body of research finds that college tuition subsidies raise college attendance interest in the potential behavioral effects of military educational benefits was recently heightened by a vigorous debate in congress over veterans benefits this debate culminated in the post 9 11 veterans education assistance act of 2008 which was passed in july 2008 becoming effective on august 1 2009 the act provides future veterans with substantially higher educational benefits than those available through the mgib this paper analyzes how gi bill benefits affect military retention and veterans benefit usage the analysis is useful for two reasons first as our review of the literature below indicates existing studies of the retention and usage effects of military education benefits are now quite dated second prior studies have all ignored issues relating to selection as a result the estimates of retention and usage effects found in them cannot be cleanly interpreted as pure incentive effects arising from benefit changes our analysis accounts for the possibility that higher veterans education benefits may attract youth who are more likely to separate and use those benefits conditional on their observables over the period of our analysis the nominal value of gi bill benefits were set legislatively and changed unpredictably we use the unpredictable evolution of the value of veterans education benefits over our data period to disentangle selection effects and incentive effects of benefit changes on retention and benefit usage our analysis makes use of administrative data that span the period 1988 2005 and contains annual information on every individual who entered active military service from the time of entry to the time of separation or if still in service until the end of fiscal year fy 2004 as shown below this was a period during which the real value of military educational benefits fluctuated considerably for those who separated details of educational benefit usage were available to us as of june 2005 if educational benefits do affect the retention behavior of military personnel or the educational decisions of military veterans their effects should be apparent in data over this period to highlight our key findings we estimate that a 10 000 increase in mgib benefits would increase the fraction of army veterans who use them within 2 yr of separation by 5 8 percentage points

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

estimating dynamic models of quit behavior the case of military reenlistment we estimate the effect of financial incentives for reenlistment on military retention rates using a stochastic dynamic programming model we show that the computational burden of the model is relatively low even when estimated on panel data with unobserved heterogeneity the estimates of the model show strong effects of military compensation especially of retirement pay on retention rates we also compare our model with simpler to compute models and find that all give approximately the same fit but that our dynamic programming model gives more plausible predictions of policy measures that affect military and civilian compensation at future dates

microfinance mission drift summary claims have been made that microfinance institutions mfis experience mission drift as they increasingly cater to customers who are better off than their original customers we investigate mission drift using average loan size as a main proxy and the mfis lending methodology main market and gender bias as further mission drift measures we employ a large data set of rated multi country mfis spanning 11 years and perform panel data estimations with instruments we find that the average loan size has not increased in the industry as a whole nor is there a tendency toward more individual loans or a higher proportion of lending to urban costumers regressions show that an increase in average profit and average cost tends to increase average loan and the other drift measures more focus should be given to cost efficiency in the mfi

moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment abstract this paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the presence of moral hazard and costly peer monitoring we compare peer monitoring treatments in which credit is provided to members of the group to individual lending treatments with lender monitoring we find that if the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the cost of lender monitoring peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring in the absence of monitoring cost differences however lending monitoring and repayment behavior is mostly similar across group and individual lending schemes within group lending contrary to theoretical predictions simultaneous and sequential lending rules provide equivalent empirical performance

health and death risk and income decisions evidence from microfinance abstract this paper examines the relationship between health and death risk and income decisions in rural pakistan using data from a microfinance institution we analyse how insurance against hospitalisation and accidental death influences the purpose of microcredit loans after correcting for the endogeneity of insurance uptake we find that individuals are more likely to maintain the same loan purpose as their previous loan if they are insured the result suggests that households that are insured against hospitalisation and accidental death pursue less diversified income portfolios this movement away from diversification may increase expected profits

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

financial performance and outreach a global analysis of leading microbanks microfinance contracts have proven able to secure high rates of loan repayment in the face of limited liability and information asymmetries but high repayment rates have not translated easily into profits for most microbanks profitability though is at the heart of the promise that microfinance can deliver poverty reduction while not relying on ongoing subsidy the authors examine why this promise remains unmet for most institutions using a data set with unusually high quality financial information on 124 institutions in 49 countries they explore the patterns of profitability loan repayment and cost reduction the authors find that institutional design and orientation matter substantially lenders that do not use group based methods to overcome incentive problems experience weaker portfolio quality and lower profit rates when interest rates are raised substantially for these individual based lenders one key to achieving profitability is investing more heavily in staff costs a finding consistent with the economics of information but contrary to the conventional wisdom that profitability is largely a function of minimizing cost

a more complete conceptual framework for sme finance abstract we propose a more complete conceptual framework for analysis of sme credit availability issues in this framework lending technologies are the key conduit through which government policies and national financial structures affect credit availability we emphasize a causal chain from policy to financial structures which affect the feasibility and profitability of different lending technologies these technologies in turn have important effects on sme credit availability financial structures include the presence of different financial institution types and the conditions under which they operate lending technologies include several transactions technologies plus relationship lending we argue that the framework implicit in most of the literature is oversimplified neglects key elements of the chain and often yields misleading conclusions a common oversimplification is the treatment of transactions technologies as a homogeneous group unsuitable for serving informationally opaque smes and a frequent misleading conclusion is that large institutions are disadvantaged in lending to opaque smes

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

a little at a time the use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs abstract informal lenders appear to be thriving even in regions where microfinance institutions mfis such as the grameen bank have established lending programs we suggest that an explanation for this well documented observation lies in the ubiquitous use of regularly scheduled repayments by mfis borrowers are typically required to repay their loans in tightly structured installments beginning soon after loan disbursement this little remarked aspect of the repayment schedule is usually explained as inculcating fiscal discipline among borrowers we argue that an alternative rationale for this loan repayment structure lies in the difficulty of monitoring borrowers actions the potential for moral hazard leads mfis to use innovative mechanisms such as regularly scheduled repayments which indirectly coopt the better informed informal lenders conversely this installment repayment structure allows informal lenders to survive further we show that this linkage can not only expand the volume of informal lending but may also raise the interest rate in the informal sector

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

marital status and productivity evidence from personnel data although a robust wage premium for married men has been documented extensively in the labor economics literature prior studies have been hampered in testing competing explanations of the premium by a lack of data on worker productivity this study exploits a unique data set that contains job performance measures for employees of a large hierarchical organization the quasi longitudinal data track the marital status and job productivity including performance reviews and promotions of male naval officers in technical and managerial jobs compared with single men married men receive significantly higher performance ratings and are more likely to be promoted in estimates that control for selection arising from quit decisions the size of the marriage productivity effect falls but in most cases remains robust also based on supplementary tests selectivity arising from the decision to marry appears to explain only a small portion of the unadjusted marriage premium for navy officers although the existence of a wage premium for married men has been documented extensively in the labor economics literature the source of the premium has remained controversial one hypothesis attributes the wage differential to economies of scale and specialization within the household which provides incentives for additional investment in specific human capital by married men becker 1981 alternative hypotheses are that the marriage premium stems from employer favoritism or that more productive or higher earning men are selected into marriage the extensive empirical literature that has attempted to test the competing explanations has produced conflicting conclusions however one research approach to assess the effect of marital status that seldom has been implemented in the prior literature is to use data on the realized productivity of employees of a single firm this study uses administrative data on male employees of a large hierarchical organization to explore the effect of marital status on selected job performance measures the personnel database covers male u s naval officers and contains relatively detailed information on career performance including promotion outcomes and annual performance reviews the article seeks to shed light on the existence and magnitude of job productivity differentials between married and single males and to assess competing explanations for marriage related performance differentials navy personnel data are especially fertile for analyzing the effect of marital status on employee job productivity several performance measures are available for each individual and the indicators capture performance throughout an employee s tenure rather than at a single career point the design

thy neighbor s keeper the design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by non firm economic institutions however our theories of non firm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy this paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from german credit cooperatives from the nineteenth and early twentieth century germany we build a model of credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test this using nineteenth century data authors

here today gone tomorrow can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible this paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives in the form of access to additional loans to discourage borrowers from strategic default or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized we propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions mfis by endogenizing the default penalty while constraining the mfi to maintain sustainable lending operations furthermore accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock we show that under certain circumstances the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans

a theory of compensation and personnel policy in hierarchical organizations with application to the united states military a large literature attempts to explain compensation and personnel policies in large organizations three features of the u s military system flat rank spreads in pay a relatively generous pension and heavy reliance on up or out promotions are at variance with common practices in large civilian organizations this article develops a model of individual decision making in a large hierarchical organization and uses the model to explain these apparent puzzles the lack of lateral entry and heterogeneity in entrants abilities and preferences for military service play key roles in the observed policies

joint liability lending and the peer selection effect we show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in ghatak 2000 violate an ex post incentive compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability we derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint

recent advances in lending to the poor with asymmetric information abstract microfinance institutions have successfully extended unsecured small loans to poor and opaque borrowers at the bottom of the economic pyramid this success is largely due to innovative financial contracts that impose joint liability and create dynamic incentives to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information given recent advances in microfinance contracts there is a need to map the theoretical developments this article aims to accomplish that by performing a critical literature survey of microlending contracts focussing on joint liability and dynamic incentives bringing out some of the deficiencies of contract theoretic propositions that cannot effectively account for the social mission of microfinance

labor economics and the psychology of organizations this essay is a discussion of how economists are attempting to understand institutions within the organizations of the labor market the institutions and issues discussed include mandatory retirement discontinuous jumps in wages pay compression rights of tenure up or out hierarchies timing of raises promotions and evaluations the existence of partnerships the use of bonuses vs penalties and pay as a motivator

is flexible labour good for innovation evidence from firm level data whether the use of flexible workers is damaging to innovation or not depends on the dominant innovation regime in a sector in sectors with a routinised innovation regime high shares of low paid temporary workers have a negative impact on the probability that firms invest in r d in sectors that tend towards a garage business regime however flexibility has no impact the two innovation regimes differ in the nature of their knowledge base reliance on generally available knowledge or dependence on a firm s historically accumulated knowledge base innovation in the latter regime benefits from longer job durations our results are consistent with findings in macro level studies that coordinated market economies with rigid labour markets have higher labour productivity gains than liberalised market economies

screening by the company you keep joint liability lending and the peer selection effect we look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other s projects that lenders do not we show that joint liability lending contracts similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group lending schemes will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information this can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable

group lending sequential financing lender monitoring and joint liability abstract we develop a simple model of group lending based on peer monitoring and moral hazard we find that in the absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring group lending schemes may involve under monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects moreover under certain parameter configurations group lending schemes involving either sequential financing or a combination of lender monitoring and joint liability are feasible in fact group lending schemes with sequential financing may succeed even in the absence of joint liability though the repayment rate will be lower in the absence of joint liability however group lending with lender monitoring is unlikely to be feasible

the personal discount rate evidence from military downsizing programs the military drawdown program of the early 1990s provides an opportunity to obtain estimates of personal discount rates based on large numbers of people making real choices involving large sums the program offered over 65 000 separatees the choice between an annuity and a lump sum payment despite break even discount rates exceeding 17 percent most of the separatees selected the lump sum saving taxpayers 1 7 billion in separation costs estimates of discount rates range from 0 to over 30 percent and vary with education age race sex number of dependents ability test score and the size of payment

worker heterogeneity job screening and firm size a model of job screening is developed in which firms make wage offers to workers based on an imperfect evaluation of their abilities if large firms have higher costs of acquiring information about workers they screen workers with less accuracy and choose a wage compensation scheme different from the one small firms choose this generates the often observed positive correlation between firm size and wages the model also predicts that wage structure and perhaps wage dispersion will differ by firm size and that individuals who acquire more schooling will also choose to work in a larger firm these hypotheses are tested and supported using data from the national longitudinal survey

encouraging long term tenure wage tilt or pensions the author analyzes data on 6 416 persons in 109 firms to determine whether the length of these workers tenure was positively related either to wage tilt the payment of below market wages in the early years of the worker s employment with a firm and above market wages in the later years or to the presence of defined benefit pension plans contrary to the popular but little tested hypothesis that wage tilt is important in inducing workers to make long term commitments to the firm the results show that wage tilt had no significant effect on tenure except indirectly through its effect on pension quit costs in contrast pensions increased tenure in the firm on average by more than 20