price discrimination in broadway theater a common thread in the theory literature on price discrimination has been the ambiguous welfare effects for consumers and the rise in profit for firms relative to uniform pricing in this study i resolve the ambiguity for consumers and quantify the benefit for a firm i describe a model of price discrimination that includes both second degree and third degree price discrimination using data from a broadway play i estimate the structural model and conduct various experiments to investigate the implications of alternative pricing policies the observed price discrimination may improve the firm s profit by approximately 5 relative to uniform pricing while the difference for aggregate consumer welfare is negligible also i show that the gain from changing prices in the face of fluctuating demand is small under the observed price discrimination

dynamic price competition with fixed capacities in this paper we study price competition for an oligopoly in a dynamic setting where each of the sellers has a fixed number of units available for sale over a fixed number of periods demand is stochastic and depending on how it evolves sellers may change their prices at any time this reflects the fact that firms constantly and almost costlessly change their prices reacting to updates in their estimates of market demand competitor prices or inventory levels in a setting with demand uncertainty we show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for a duopoly in which all states sellers engage in bertrand competition and the seller with the lower equilibrium reservation value sells a unit at a price equal to the competitor s equilibrium reservation value this structure therefore extends the marginal value concept of bid price control used in many revenue management implementations to a competitive model we give a closed form solution to the equilibrium price paths for a duopoly and extend all the results to an n firm oligopoly we then study extensions to multiple customer types uncertain valuations and differentiated products this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

mergers and business model assimilation evidence from low cost airline takeovers this paper examines mergers that lead to an almost immediate replacement of the target firm s business model in favour of that of the acquiring firm we examine the post merger behaviour of the two leading european dedicated low cost airlines easyjet and ryanair each acquiring another low cost airline respectively go fly and buzz we find that both takeovers had an immediate and sustained impact on both the pricing structures and the extent of inter temporal price discrimination used on the acquired routes with early booking fares noticeably reduced and only very late booking fares increased overall the analysis points to a pro competitive effect of both takeovers as a consequence of the introduction of the acquiring firms business models and associated yield management pricing systems

unemployment profit sharing and japan s economic success abstract in this paper we examine the economic effects of profit sharing in a duopoly model where one firm engages in sharing profits with its union while the other firm does not the results show that profit sharing i reduces wages demanded by the unions ii tends to increase employment of the profit sharing firm and to increase employment in the entire industry and iii tends to increase the joint welfare of the profit sharing firm and the profit sharing union these results seem to suggest that the japanese success may be partly attributable to their informal profit sharing scheme

the impact of price discrimination on revenue evidence from the concert industry abstract concert tickets can be sold at the same price or at different prices that reflect different seating categories price discrimination generates about 5 greater revenues than single price ticketing the return to price discrimination is higher in markets with greater demand heterogeneity as predicted by price discrimination theory the return to an increase from three to four concert seat categories is roughly half that of an increase from one to two

the behavior of prices in the nikkei spot and futures market abstract we examine the relation between the prices of japanese stocks traded on the tokyo stock exchange tse as reflected in the nikkei stock average nsa stock index and the prices of the nsa futures contract traded on the singapore international monetary exchange simex since the inception of trading in september 1986 the nsa futures contract has generally sold at a discount relative to its theoretical value trading restrictions and transaction costs may explain some of this mispricing which has been declining over time as in the u s markets

airline market power and intertemporal price dispersion this paper analyzes the empirical relationship between market structure and price dispersion in the airline markets connecting the u k and the republic of ireland price dispersion is measured by the gini coefficient calculated using fares posted on the internet at specific days before takeoff we control for passengers heterogeneity in their purpose of travel as well as for such peak periods as christmas and easter our finding of a negative correlation between competition and price dispersion suggests that competition is likely to hinder the airlines ability to price discriminate although this effect appears to be lessened in peak periods

cournot oligopoly reconsidering cournot the cournot equilibrium is consistent this article uses an infinite regress model of firm level decisions to find a rational expectations equilibrium for a duopoly and to relate concepts of conjectural variations and consistency to the cournot equilibrium the model derives a conjectural variation instead of assuming it in particular the cournot equilibrium is shown to be consistent in the usual sense of the literature the conflict between notions of consistent conjectures and the cournot equilibrium results from a compounding problem inherent in the earlier models we extend these results to the n firm problem alternatively the article can be viewed as providing a purely static model that generates the cournot equilibrium without reference to conjectures or quasi dynamics

common volatility in major stock index futures markets abstract the main objective of this paper is to investigate whether the us uk and japanese stock index futures markets have a similar volatility process for this purpose the common feature analysis proposed by engle and susmel 1993 is applied to 1988 1991 data after first removing price innovations using vector autoregression the results suggest that the three markets have a single common factor generating volatilities among markets

does competition reduce price dispersion new evidence from the airline industry we analyze the effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 q1 through 2006 q3 competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination this effect is pronounced for routes with consumers characterized by relatively heterogeneous elasticities of demand on routes with a homogeneous customer base the effects of competition on price dispersion are smaller our results contrast with those of borenstein and rose who found that price dispersion increases with competition we reconcile the different results by showing that the cross sectional estimator suffers from omitted variable bias

an analysis of dynamic price discrimination in airlines prices for the same flight change substantially depending on the time of purchase this article uses a unique data set with round the clock posted fares to document significant within day price variation labeling time variation as discriminatory is difficult because the cost of an unsold airline seat changes with inventory days before departure and aggregate demand expectations after controlling for these factors and aggregating hourly fares to have a framework with two consumer types we are able to identify a component that is largely consistent with dynamic price discrimination we find higher prices during office hours when business travelers are likely to buy and lower prices in the evening when leisure travelers are more likely to purchase as the proportion of business travelers increases closer to departure both price dispersion and price discrimination become larger we provide an alternative explanation for the observed within day price differentials which is related to edgeworth price cycles

price discrimination in the airline market the effect of market concentration we test the hypothesis that price discrimination increases with competition in the airline market using a large cross section of tickets offered by several carriers on various routes we approximate price discrimination with marginal implicit prices of ticket restrictions that carriers typically use to price discriminate saturday night stayover re quirements and advanced purchase discounts we find that the restrictions are associated with lower airfares but that the discounts are smaller on routes with higher market concentration the results suggest that price dispersion attributed to ticket restrictions increases as markets becomemore competitive

industrial organization and public policy competition policy has been dominated by politics industrial organization can expect to exert an influence only insofar as it commands superior knowledge that is true with respect to the long run since economies of scale are limited to the short run competition is feasible in the long run therefore a trade off approach seeking to identify optimal market structures is misleading competition policy should instead be directed at prohibiting protective strategies of incumbents to deter entry competition being a process of creative destruction political viability of a competitive order requires competition policy to be supplemented by a social welfare policy

the international crash of october 1987 causality tests the paper analyzes lead lag relationships for six major stock market indexes new york s p 500 tokyo nikkei london ft 30 hong kong hang seng singapore straits times and australia all ordinaries for time periods before during and after the october 1987 market crash unidirectional and bidirectional causality tests are conducted by means of the granger methodology practically no lead lag relationships are found for the pre crash and post crash periods however important feedback relationships and unidirectional causality are detected for the month of the crash there is also an increase in contemporaneous causality during and after the month of the crash in general our findings suggest that the october 1987 market crash probably was an international crisis of the equity markets and that it might have begun simultaneously in all the national stock markets

international stock market linkages evidence from the pre and post october 1987 period abstract this paper uses recent developments in the theory of cointegration to provide new methods of testing the linkage and dynamic interactions among stock market movements our findings are in sharp contrast with previous research which discovered strong interdependence among national stock markets prior to october 1987 for the post october 1987 period however our results show that the degree of international co movements among stock price indices has increased substantially with the nikkei index the only exception furthermore the us stock market is found to have a considerable impact on the french german and uk markets in the post crash period we also find the response of the french german and uk markets to us stock market innovations to be consistent with the view of cross border informationally efficient stock markets finally we find the japanese equity market performance to have no links with both the us stock market and the stock markets in france germany and uk during the pre and post october crash period

dynamic capacity planning using strategic slack valuation in this paper we analyze a particular aspect of capacity planning that is concerned with the active trading of production facilities for a homogenous product market we provide a theoretical rationale for the valuation and trading of these assets based on a metric of strategic slack we show that trading production assets with non additive portfolio profitability involves complex coordination with multiple equilibria and that these equilibria depend on the foresight in the planning horizon using the concept of strategic slack we have analyzed the dynamics of market structure the impact of asset trading on the level of production of the industry and to derive boundaries on the value of the traded assets moreover through computational learning the formulation is applied to a large oligopolistic electricity market showing that plant trading tends to lead to increased market concentration high prices lower production and a decrease in consumer surplus

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

using yield management to shift demand when the peak time is unknown traditional peak load and stochastic peak load models assume firms have prior information about when peak demand occurs however price dispersion such as is typically used by firms practicing yield management can achieve some of the same efficient demand shifting even when the peak time is unknown equilibrium price dispersion arises because of stochastic demand and price rigidities but a previously unexplored benefit of price dispersion is its ability to reduce equilibrium capacity costs through demand shifting the model also suggests how yield management now more commonly called revenue management might actually benefit business travellers contrary to the popular prejudice

bounded rationality dynamic oligopoly and conjectural variations abstract we propose a dynamic model of n firm oligopoly that provides a logically consistent reinterpretation of conjectural variations each firm solves a dynamic optimization problem believing that the other firms will alter their future choices in proportion to its own current change these beliefs adapt in light of observed behavior we show that steady state equilibria can range from complete cooperation to predatory play and provide conditions under which the firms behavior and beliefs converge to a steady state the sufficient conditions for stability are more easily satisfied the smaller the cross effects among firms through demand or belief parameters they are also more easily satisfied in a price setting than in a quantity setting differentiated products model

inadequacies of the strategic rationale of export subsidies a major attraction of strategic trade theory is that it appears to explain governments desire to subsidise exports we argue that this appearance is illusory

correlations in price changes and volatility across international stock markets the short run interdependence of prices and price volatility across three major international stock markets is studied daily opening and closing prices of major stock indexes for the tokyo london and new york stock markets are examined the analysis utilizes the autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic arch family of statistical models to explore these pricing relationships evidence of price volatility spillovers from new york to tokyo london to tokyo and new york to london is observed but no price volatility spillover effects in other directions are found for the pre october 1987 period article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

a strategic production costing model for electricity market price analysis production costing models pcms have been extensively used to analyze traditional power systems for decades these tools are based on the costs of production but in oligopolistic electricity markets market prices can not be explained attending just to marginal costs but instead bid prices have to be considered since market participants seize their dominant position in the market looking for higher profits thus the merit order composition criteria applied in traditional pcms has to be somehow reconsidered in order to be able to represent the agents strategic bidding the objective of the strategic production costing model spcm presented in this paper is to evolve the pcm approach to adapt it to the actual wholesale electricity markets without losing its typical advantages the generalization proposed allows to represent an oligopolistic hydrothermal electricity market and provides the system price duration curve as well as the income and expected costs of every generating agent compared with other oligopolistic models the main advantage of the spcm is its potential computational speed which makes it very suitable for risk analysis studies that require considering a large number of scenarios

a further analysis of the lead lag relationship between the cash market and stock index futures market the intraday lead lag relation between returns of the major market cash index and returns of the major market index futures and s p 500 futures is investigated empirical results show strong evidence that the futures leads the cash index and weak evidence that the cash index leads the futures the asymmetric lead lag relation holds between the futures and all component stocks including those that trade in almost every five minute interval evidence indicates that when more stocks move together market wide information the futures leads the cash index to a greater degree this suggests that the futures market is the main source of market wide information article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

a brave new world kantian nashian interaction and the dynamics of global climate change mitigation abstract we model game theoretic situations in which agents motivated by kantian ethics interact with conventional nashian agents we define the concept of generalized kant nash equilibrium which encompasses the nash equilibrium the kantian equilibrium and the kant nash equilibrium as special cases we show the existence and uniqueness of a kant nash equilibrium in a static game of climate change mitigation and derive its properties in a dynamic setting we analyze a differential game of climate change mitigation in the presence of both types of agents and compare their markov emission strategies for both the static model and the dynamic model as the population share of kantians increases the quality of the environment improves and both types of agents are better off

is the effect of competition on price dispersion nonmonotonic evidence from the u s airline industry we investigate the effect of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 to 2008 we find a nonmonotonic effect of competition on price dispersion an increase in competition is associated with greater price dispersion in concentrated markets but with less price dispersion in competitive markets an inverse u relationship our empirical findings are consistent with an oligopolistic second degree price discrimination model and encompass contradictory findings in the literature

dynamic pricing advance sales and aggregate demand learning in airlines this paper uses a unique u s airlines panel data set to empirically study the dynamic pricing of inventories with uncertain demand over a finite horizon i estimate a dynamic pricing equation and a dynamic demand equation that jointly characterize the adjustment process between prices and sales as the flight date nears i find that the price increases as the inventory decreases and decreases as there is less time to sell consistent with aggregate demand learning and price adjustment demand shocks have a positive and much larger effect on prices than the positive effect of anticipated sales

the inconsistency of consistent conjectures abstract conjectural variation models have been criticized because firms are right for the wrong reasons and because possible equilibria are abundant lately several papers have attempted to meet these difficulties by some condition of consistency or rationality on the conjectural variation this paper shows that stronger versions of such conditions lead into paradoxes while the weaker forms are of little use in solving the conceived problems the original cournot assumption actually satisfies consistency enterions the problems with consistent conjectures illuminates fundmental problems with too demanding information assumptions like perfect foresight such assumptions may create non trivial structures of self reference

competition and price dispersion in the airline markets we use two ticket level data sets on one way domestic flights for the us airlines to examine the potentially nonlinear relationship between price dispersion and three forms of competition inter firm inter flight and frequency competitions the linear relationship is rejected at any conventional significance levels in particular there is an s shaped relationship between market concentration and price dispersion this can be a reason for the mixed results in the literature roughly speaking the inter flight and frequency competitions have opposite effects on price dispersion finally in general the size of aircraft has a positive effect on price however for very large aircraft the relationship becomes negative

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

efficient and competitive rationing abstract the contracts that interest us here are called priority service contracts the salient feature of such contracts is that they specify each customer s priority in obtaining service that is they specify the tank order in which a customer is served out of the available supply until all customers are served or supply is exhausted such contracts essentially establish queues for customers in section 1 the author provides some background about priority service section 2 formulates a basic model and offer several illustrations also describes two main examples that motivate the theoretical development section 3 derives some key results that show how the prices of priority service contracts are designed to induce customers to self select efficient service orders in section 4 the author discusses various ways that state enterprises can organize markets that implement priority service efficiently in section 5 we study the operation of competitive markets for priority service section 6 concludes with some summary remarks two themes are emphasized one is that a state enterprise can promote substantial efficiency gains by substituting priority service for absent spot markets the other is that oligopolistic firms may have insufficient incentives to offer efficient product diversity consequently allocative efficiency depends on entry of numerous firms even so dispersal of supplies among many firms can prevent productive efficiency when there are advantages from pooling supplies

mean variance asset liability management cointegrated assets and insurance liability abstract the cointegration of major financial markets around the globe is well evidenced with strong empirical support this paper considers the continuous time mean variance mv asset liability management alm problem for an insurer investing in an incomplete financial market with cointegrated assets the number of trading assets is allowed to be less than the number of brownian motions spanning the market the insurer also faces the risk of paying uncertain insurance claims during the investment period we assume that the cointegration market follows the diffusion limit of the error correction model for cointegrated time series using the markowitz 1952 mv portfolio criterion we consider the insurer s problem of minimizing variance in the terminal wealth given an expected terminal wealth subject to interim random liability payments following a compound poisson process we generalize the technique developed by lim 2005 to tackle this problem the particular structure of cointegration enables us to solve the alm problem completely in the sense that the solutions of the continuous time portfolio policy and efficient frontier are obtained as explicit and closed form formulas

market structure in the us electricity industry a long term perspective we estimate changes in market structure in the us electric power industry during the last three decades using two independent approaches first we estimate an industry wide conjectural variations parameter we find that industry concentration was generally rising during the 1970s but has been gradually and consistently falling since the early 1980s to check the robustness of these results we then use a translog production function to estimate the lerner index the results confirm that the industry was becoming less concentrated during the 1980s though the lerner index tended to fluctuate during the late 1980s and early 1990s our results suggest that the current state of the electricity industry may have more to do with long term changes in market structure than recent attempts to establish competitive wholesale electricity markets

the efficiency of advance purchase discounts in the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty abstract the pricing behavior of two airlines is examined one is operated by a welfare maximizing social planner the other by an unregulated monopolist total capacity is fixed and aggregate demand is uncertain it is shown that advance purchase discounts can assist in attaining an efficient allocation of capacity when it is not feasible to operate a spot market on the day of the flight it is further shown that the planner may offer larger or smaller discounts than the monopolist

common volatility in international equity markets in this article we take advantage of the time varying structure of stock returns variances to investigate whether two international stock markets share the same volatility process we use a test recently developed by engle and kozicki this test is also used to assess the validity of a one factor autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model we find that some international stock markets have the same time varying volatility

dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer we analyze a simple dynamic durable good model two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game we solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the necessarily mixed pricing strategies in equilibrium the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller a buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller

how do incumbents respond to the threat of entry evidence from the major airlines this paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors as distinguished from their response to competitors actual entry it uses a case study from the passenger airline industry specifically the evolution of southwest airlines route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly when southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future we examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events we find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by southwest s entry into their routes this is true even after controlling in several ways for airport specific operating costs the response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where southwest does not operate e g fares drop on routes from chicago midway but not chicago o hare the largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand incumbents do experience short run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts this is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor we examine evidence relating this demand building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion there is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes

systematic peak load pricing congestion premia and demand diverting empirical evidence abstract this paper finds empirical support to systematic peak load pricing in airlines higher fares in ex ante known congested periods it estimates a congestion premia and supports the main empirical prediction in gale and holmes gale i holmes t 1993 advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity american economic review 83 135 146 less discount seats on peak flights

asymmetric volatility transmission in international stock markets abstract the transmission mechanism of price and volatility spillovers across the new york tokyo and london stock markets is investigated the asymmetric impact of good news market advances and bad news market declines on volatility transmission is described by an extended multivariate exponential generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic egarch model using daily open to close returns we find strong evidence that volatility spillovers in a given market are much more pronounced when the news arriving from the last market to trade is bad a before and after october 1987 crash analysis reveals that the linkages and interactions among the three markets have increased substantially in the post crash era suggesting that national markets have grown more interdependent

overlapping jurisdictions substitutes or complements this paper presents a simple model of the demand relationship between the activities undertaken by overlapping governments and uses the framework to estimate the relationship between municipal and county expenditures the empirical results reveal a complementary relationship between county and city general expenditures any public sector expansion effects of monopoly power at the county level will therefore be reinforced by greater municipal spending further expanding the total size of the local public sector on the other hand changes in county police and roads expenditures appear to have no strong stable impact on municipal police and roads expenditures respectively providing no reinforcing or offsetting municipal spending responses to decisions at the county level

the relationship between daily u s and japanese equity prices evidence from spot versus futures markets abstract the daily and overnight transmission of equity prices between the u s and japan is examined in this paper this study documents that the use of the opening value of an equity index to represent equity prices at the open is unlikely to be reliable and the calculated opening values of the nikkei 225 and especially the s p500 indexes mostly reflect prior days closing prices unlike prior studies this paper accounts for this problem of non synchronous trading at the open and finds that u s equity prices do not lead japanese equity prices as both u s and japanese opening equity prices reflect overnight price changes in the other market

advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity optimal pricing by a monopoly airline that faces capacity constraints during the peak demand period is studied the existence of capacity constraints means that in order to expand output the airline must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak period a particular advance purchase discount policy is shown to be the profit maximizing method of selling tickets if the advance purchase requirement were infeasible output and total surplus would both be lower jel l12 substantial discounts for air travel are generally available to travelers who are willing to purchase tickets a week or more in advance of the departure date this paper demonstrates why the imposition of an advance purchase requirement may be a profit maximizing strategy for a monopoly airline facing capacity constraints during times of peak demand 1 the practice of imposing an advance purchase requirement on discount tickets is also placed in a favorable light in terms of its impact on social

shortages segmentation and self selection this paper considers the rationality and implications of using shortages as a self selection device shortages lead to uncertain access and enable sellers to offer ensured access either to the good or to a preferred variety of the good at a higher price or as part of a bundle it is shown that such activities allow firms to span nonconcavities in their revenue function firms respond to changes in demand and costs through changes in quantity and or the premium for ensured access but not through changes in the base price

equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty the roles of costly capacity and market structure when capacity is costly and prices are set in advance firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price i show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure strategy nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion moreover as the market becomes more competitive prices become more dispersed a pattern documented in the airline industry while generating similar predictions the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers

monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty when a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices this article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing when there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist s optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

dynamic oligopoly pricing evidence from the airline industry we explore how pricing dynamics in the european airline industry vary with the competitive environment our results highlight substantial variations in pricing dynamics that are consistent with a theory of intertemporal price discrimination first the rate at which prices increase towards the scheduled travel date is decreasing in competition supporting the idea that competition restrains the ability of airlines to price discriminate second the sensitivity to competition is substantially increasing in the heterogeneity of the customer base reecting further that restraints on price discrimination are only relevant if there is initial scope for price discrimination these patterns are quantitatively important explaining about 83 percent of the total within ight price dispersion and explaining 17 percent of the observed cross market variation of pricing dynamics

when choosing makes a good thing better temporal variations in the valuation of hedonic consumption abstract this research investigates how the valuation of delayed consumption of hedonic products such as concerts and chocolate varies with the passage of time between choice and consumption the authors find that when consumers make their own choices they exhibit increases in evaluations of delayed consumption but only if the interval between choice and consumption is relatively short the effect attenuates over longer periods resulting in an inverted u shaped relationship between evaluations and time in contrast when somebody else chooses the same option for the consumer evaluations decrease with the passage of time these effects depend on the extent of intrinsic motivation toward the object of consumption and occur only for consummatory consumption that is of inherent interest moreover anticipatory increases in evaluations before consumption have ironic negative effects on postconsumption evaluations the authors discuss implications and directions for further research

combined effects of capacity and time on fares insights from the yield management of a low cost airline abstract based on two strands of theoretical research this paper provides new evidence on how fares are jointly affected by in flight seat availability and purchasing date as capacity based theories predict it emerges that fares monotonically and substantially increase with flight occupancy after controlling for capacity utilization our analysis also supports time based theories indicating a u shaped temporal profile over a two month booking period as well as a sharp increase in fares in the two weeks prior to departure

the escape from conjectural variations the consistency condition in duopoly theory from bowley to fellner the paper covers the 1924 1949 debate on the conjectural variations approach to duopoly theory and focuses on the evolution of economists views about the imposition of a consistency condition on the firms conjectures the main point is that although the consistency condition entailed a notion of interactive equilibrium that resembled the modern correct conjectures equilibrium most neoclassical economists of the time refused to apply it because of the excessive requirements it imposed upon the firms forecasting abilities and because of its failure to encompass an explanation of the equilibrating process