the labor market for new ph d economists presents results from a survey of 450 new 1996 97 ph d economists providing information about employment underemployment employers work activities salaries and job satisfaction comparisons are made across ranks of the graduates ph d programs sectors of employment and subfields of economics as well as over time labor market outcomes for economists also are compared with those of seven other disciplines results indicate that a growing proportion of new economics ph d s start their careers in business or industry that an international market for new economics ph d s is evolving and that job outcomes for economists compare favorably with new ph d s in many other disciplines

wages mobility and firm performance advantages and insights from using matched worker firm data to illustrate the wide applicability of longitudinal matched employer employee data we study the simultaneous determination of worker mobility and wage rates using an econometric model that allows for both individual and firm level heterogeneity the model is estimated using longitudinally linked employer employee data from france structural results for mobility show remarkable heterogeneity with both positive and negative duration dependence present in a significant proportion of firms the average structural returns to seniority are essentially zero but this result masks enormous heterogeneity with positive seniority returns found in low starting wage firms

asset redeployability liquidation value and endogenous capital structure heterogeneity firms with lower leverage are not only less likely to experience financial distress but are also better positioned to acquire assets from other distressed firms with endogenous asset sales and values each firm s debt choice then depends on the choices of its industry peers with indivisible assets otherwise identical firms may adopt different debt policies with some choosing highly levered operations to take advantage of ongoing debt benefits and others choosing more conservative policies to wait for acquisition opportunities our key empirical implication is that the acquisition channel can induce firms to reduce debt when assets become more redeployable

microcredit and the poorest of the poor theory and evidence from bolivia abstract we construct a theoretical framework that describes the social worth of a microfinance organization in terms of the depth worth to users cost to users breadth length and scope of its output we then analyze evidence of depth of outreach for five microfinance organizations in bolivia most of the poor households reached by the microfinance organizations were near the poverty line they were the richest of the poor group lenders had more depth of outreach than individual lenders the urban poorest were more likely to be borrowers but rural borrowers were more likely to be among the poorest

an empirical investigation of u s firms in reorganization the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization we find the recontracting framework of chapter 11 to be complex lengthy and costly violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered these deviations may result from the bargaining process of chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder oriented management to preserve firm value an example of such recontracting addresses myers underinvestment problem an investigation of the effects of chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter

negative returns to seniority new evidence in academic markets recent research has suggested that the long observed negative association between seniority and pay among college faculty largely reflects below average research productivity of senior faculty a possibility that most earlier studies did not examine overlooked in both waves of studies however is match quality because the higher quality of the faculty institutional match implied by higher seniority should all else equal result in higher salaries failure to account for match quality inflates the estimated returns to seniority indeed that positive bias the authors find is roughly equal in magnitude to the negative bias caused by failure to account for research quantity and quality when they account for both match quality and faculty research productivity in an analysis of data on economics faculty at five research universities over a 21 year period the authors estimate that holding experience and other factors constant the penalty for twenty years of seniority is 16 of salary

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

reputation and earnings the roles of quality and quantity in academe we examine the determinants of professional reputation does quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of quality does quality of the most important exposure have extra effects on reputation in a very large sample of academic economists there is little evidence that a scholar s most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation quality rankings matter more than absolute quality quantity has a zero or even negative effect on proxies for reputation data on salaries however show positive effects of quantity independent of quality we test explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary jel l14 j31

effects of regulation on utility financing theory and evidence standing of these cross sectional variations might be afforded by the detailed examination of specific industry characteristics and their relationship to firms financing patterns the present study offers a methodology for approaching this issue the first step is to assemble joint theories of industry and financial structure in order to identify the ways in which changing industry conditions might be associated with changes in financing evidence on such simultaneous changes can then be examined in an attempt to identify the most plausible joint theory the methodology is used to investigate the effects of state commission regulation on the financing of electric utilities this is a natural candidate for study since regulation is such a salient feature of the industry in addition the regulatory system imparts some interesting special features to the very nature of utility capital structures inherent in all capital structures for example are opportunities for shifting wealth between bondholders and shareholders but under regulation these wealth shifting opportunities are expanded to encompass consumers as well finally the study of regulation has resulted in several relatively well specified theories of why regulation is imposed and what its observable effects should be in section i the different theories of capital structure and regulation are discussed and their joint implications are derived the capital structure theories include the perfect capital market theory the debt capacity theory and the financing hierarchy theory the regulatory theories include the public interest or market failure theory the political economy theory and the imperfect monitoring theory in section ii financing data from the early days of state commission utility regulation are used to try to distinguish

quantifying consumer perception of a financially distressed company to measure how consumers respond to negative information about the financial health of a durable goods producer i use the prices at which vehicles sell in secondary markets to quantify consumer perception of the chrysler corporation during the period surrounding the chrysler loan guarantee act of 1979 i focus on chrysler s july 31 1979 announcement of financial distress and request for assistance from the u s government the trend in the prices of used chrysler vehicles relative to those of its american competitors provides strong support for the claim that consumers reduce their willingness to pay for the goods of a financially distressed company

corporate compliance with debt covenants in this paper i present and test a model of corporate compliance with the debt covenant requiring payment of a current obligation this study adds to the empirical literature on forecasting financial distress by showing conditions under which debt default may be a rational economic decision by the firm s shareholders this analysis departs from empirical financial distress studies which are often not linked to an underlying economic theory the focus on covenant default also extends the literature which has modeled bankruptcy bulow and shoven 1978 and liquidation decisions titman 1984 but which has not considered a common first symptom of financial distress covenant default briefly the model examines the costs that influence shareholders decision to comply with or violate a particular debt covenant payment of a current obligation these costs include those associated with bondholders reaction to possible default the model predicts that shareholders will default when holding other factors constant i interest rates have declined relative to coupon rates stated in the debt issue ii the probability of paying future obligations is high and iii the cost of obtaining funds to pay the obligation is high the model also predicts when stockholders and bondholders will renegotiate the debt contract and the amount of wealth transferred in the renegotiation finally the

the demand for microinsurance a literature review summary microinsurance has recently received much attention as a promising tool to protect poor individuals from important shocks yet voluntary demand from people has been low shedding doubt on the viability of microinsurance as a useful risk management tool to better understand this puzzle this paper reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature on the demand for insurance while people s lack of understanding of insurance does seem to limit the demand for it several more fundamental factors such as price quality limited trust in the insurer and liquidity constraints also seem to have an important role in explaining the puzzle

transition and enterprise restructuring the role of budget constraints and bankruptcy costs the focus of analysis is on the impact of financial leverage as a measure of bankruptcy costs on enterprise restructuring based on budget constraints in the economy data of bulgarian manufacturing firms allow comparison of firm behavior under soft and hard budget constraints as distinguished by the inception of a currency board in 1997 controlling for change in sales firm size and type of ownership statistically significant relationship between financial leverage and firm restructuring through labor adjustments is found to exist under hard budget constraints only

claimholder incentive conflicts in reorganization the role of bankruptcy law when a firm is financial distress in most cases a set of mutually advantageous reorganization plans exist this article shows that the bankruptcy code by providing rules governing the negotiation process yields a unique solution to the reorganization process in addition the structure imposed by the code mitigates the holdout problem created by the individual claimant s divergent incentives article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

as certain as debt and taxes estimating the tax sensitivity of leverage from state tax changes abstract using staggered corporate income tax changes across u s states we show that taxes have a first order effect on capital structure firms increase leverage by around 40 basis points for every percentage point tax increase consistent with dynamic tradeoff theory the effect is asymmetric leverage does not respond to tax cuts this is true even within firm tax increases that are later reversed nonetheless lead to permanent leverage increases the treatment effects are heterogeneous and confirm the tax channel tax sensitivity is greater among profitable and investment grade firms which respectively have a greater marginal tax benefit and lower marginal cost of issuing debt

taxation agency conflicts and the choice between callable and convertible debt abstract we analyze debt choice in light of taxes and moral hazard the model features an infinite sequence of nonzero sum stochastic differential games between equity and debt closed form expressions are derived for all contingent claims if equity can increase volatility without reducing asset drift callable bonds with call premia are optimal although callable bonds induce risk shifting call premia precommit equity to less frequent restructuring and are tax advantaged convertible bonds mitigate risk shifting but only induce hedging if assets are far from the default threshold convertibles are optimal only if risk shifting reduces asset drift sufficiently

capital structure investment and fire sales we study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capital structure trading off the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly default bankruptcy costs are endogenous as bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their assets resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid when the corporate income tax rate is positive firms have a unique optimal capital structure in equilibrium firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire sale prices the equilibrium features underinvestment and is constrained inefficient in particular there is too little debt and default

ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcy a basic question for the design of bankruptcy law concerns whether value should be divided in accordance with absolute priority research done in the past decade has suggested that deviations from absolute priority have beneficial ex ante effects in contrast this paper shows that ex post deviations from absolute priority also have negative effects on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders such deviations aggravate the moral hazard problem with respect to project choice increasing the equityholders incentive to favor risky projects as well as with respect to borrowing and dividend decisions

wages experience and seniority in this paper we study the sources of wage growth we identify the contribution to such growth of general sector specific and firm specific human capital our results are interpretable within the context of a model where the returns to human capital may be heterogeneous and where firms may offer different combinations of entry level wages and firm specific human capital development we allow for the possibility that wages are match specific and that workers move jobs as a result of identifying a better match to estimate the average returns to experience sector tenure and firm specific tenure within this context we develop an identification strategy which relies on the use of firm closures our data source is a new and unique administrative data set for germany that includes complete work histories as well as individual characteristics we find positive returns to experience and firm tenure for skilled workers the returns to experience for unskilled workers are small and insignificant after 2 years of experience their returns to sector tenure are also zero however their returns to firm tenure are substantial in this paper we study the growth of wages of young workers in germany knowing the extent and reasons for individual wage growth over the life cycle is important for a number of areas in economics just to mention two examples first it is a key element to understanding and designing active labour market programmes many such programmes offer temporary and often subsidized work opportunities examples are the new deal in the u k and the swedish programmes as well as a number of programmes in germany these programmes are based on the assumption that general skills are sufficiently enhanced while working so as to render the workers employable without a wage subsidy thus the success of these programmes depends on how skills improve on the job for the target population and whether this skill enhancement is transferable across jobs second it is a key to understanding the benefits and costs of job mobility this in turn matters for a number of policy issues including the design of pension policies relating for example to final salary schemes as a result of this widespread interest a large body of empirical research has focused on obtaining estimates for the returns of experience and seniority 1 our study uses a new and unique administrative data set with a number of features that are important for our analysis and allow us to avoid many problems encountered in earlier work in this field in our model wages grow due to learning by doing which may be heterogeneous across individuals moreover since firms offer different career profiles and because we allow for match specific effects on wages investments take the form of searching for the firm with the most desirable learning by doing characteristics career structure 2

the resolution of financial distress most models of financial structure embody an assumption about financial distress that causes debt to be costly to the issuing firm this approach has been criticized on the grounds that the assumed costs could be avoided by a costless financial reorganization in this article we show that despite the possibility of costless reorganization it may be rational for firms to incur significant costs in the resolution of financial distress the main assumptions that give rise to our results are the existence of asymmetric courts to impose a reorganization on the claimants of a firm article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

bankruptcy and agency costs their significance to the theory of optimal capital structure we support and generalize our original results 1978 in light of potential impediments to a pure market solution to agency problems and potential causal links between liquidation and bankruptcy in the case of bankruptcy costs market impediments are easily elimi nated through the inclusion of simple provisions in corporate charters and bond inden tures further we demonstrate that recent attempts to link liquidation costs to capital structure are without merit if the firm is to be liquidated on the basis of a rule other than one that maximizes the total value of all the claimants arbitrage profits arise and informal reorganization will discipline management to follow the liquidation rule that is optimal for existing securityholders also we find that the pure market solution is not readily generalizable to other classes of agency problems particularly the risk incentive problem how ever the alternative solution of the risk incentive problem through complex financing contracting may be useful in explaining complexities in contemporary financial contracts in a previous paper 1978 we employed arbitrage arguments to show that in a well functioning market bankruptcy costs are an insignificant determinant of a firm s capital structure we also pointed out that the decision to liquidate and its associated costs can be separated from the event of bankruptcy moreover any costs actually associated with the event of bankruptcy must be limited to the costs associated with an informal reorganization of the capital structure in the capital market prior to default these results were argued to hold under a com plex environment with multiple periods multiple securities and heterogeneous expectations we concluded that bankruptcy costs would be a significant deter minant of capital structure only in the face of irrationality on the part of market participants or unavoidable impediments to the arbitrage process since the publication of our paper there has been an accumulation of the

prudence as a competitive advantage on the effects of competition on banks risk taking incentives this paper builds on the notion that corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank s operations as their continued access to credit may depend on the bank s ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities a key implication of this observation is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on banks incentives to take on risk banks that are already riskier will take on yet more risk while their safer rivals will become even more prudent

the effect of collective bargaining on salaries in higher education using data from a 1977 survey of faculty from 158 u s colleges and universities the author estimates that the proportional salary advantage to unionized faculty members was typically less than two percent that differential varied considerably however with the length of time the institution had been organized in addition unionization increased the return to seniority and decreased the return to several measures of merit including number of publications and general post degree experience

job duration seniority and earnings an important stylized fact about labor markets is that workers with longer seniority with their current employer have higher earnings than other workers with the same total labor market experience this study shows that workers in longer jobs earn more throughout than workers in a series of shorter jobs and that the measured positive cross sectional return seniority is largely a statistical artifact due to the correlation of seniority with an omitted variable representing the quality of the worker the job or the worker employer match the implication is tha t earnings do not in fact rise very much with seniority copyright 1987 by american economic association

insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi this brief summarizes the insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi the farmers were offered loans for the november 2006 planting season does production risk suppress the demand for credit the author implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to adopt a new crop technology the study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in malawi where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall the author randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high yielding hybrid maize and groundnut seeds for planting in the november 2006 crop season the other half of farmers were offered a similar credit package but were also required to purchase at actuarially fair rates a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall surprisingly take up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan take up was 33 0 percent for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan there is suggestive evidence that reduced take up of the insured loan was due to farmers already having implicit insurance from the limited liability clause in the loan contract insured loan take up was positively correlated with farmer education income and wealth which may proxy for the individual s default costs by contrast take up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with these farmer characteristics

savings of the elderly and desired bequests cross section data often show that the wealth of the elderly increases with age even at advanced ages these and other results suggest that the life cycle hypothesis of consumption should be augmented to include a bequest motive for saving in this paper the author proposes a model of bequests and a test for a bequ est motive using panel data he finds that over a ten year period the elderly in the data set dissaved in contradiction to most cross section results the test offers no support for a bequest motive copyright 1987 by american economic association

human capital capital structure and employee pay an empirical analysis abstract we test the predictions of titman 1984 and berk stanton and zechner 2010 by examining the effect of leverage on labor costs leverage has a significantly positive impact on cash equity based and total compensation of chief executive officers ceos compensation of new ceos hired from outside the firm is positively related to prior year firm leverage in addition leverage has a positive and significant impact on average employee pay the incremental total labor expenses associated with an increase in leverage are large enough to offset the incremental tax benefits of debt the empirical evidence supports the theoretical prediction that labor costs limit the use of debt

fame and the fortune of academic economists how the market rewards influential research in economics we analyze the pay and position of 1 009 faculty members who teach in doctoral granting economics departments at fifty three large public universities in the united states using the web of science we have identified the journal articles published by these scholars and the number of times each of these articles has been subsequently cited in published research articles we find that research influence as measured by various measures of total citations is a surprisingly strong predictor of the salary and the prestige of the department in which professors are employed we also examine how coauthorship is rewarded by the market

taxes and capital structure evidence from firms response to the tax reform act of 1986 while the theoretical relation between taxes and capital structure has been extensively analyzed the empirical evidence on this issue has thus far been inconclusive one of the main difficulties confronting previous empirical studies of the cross sectional relationship between taxes and leverage was the control of intervening variables the tax reform act of 1986 tra which drastically changed the tax regime provides a unique opportunity to assess the interaction between taxes and leverage decisions in a controlled environment the authors test the relationship between leverage and certain tax related variables for a large sample of companies in the years surrounding the enactment of tra the results support the tax based theories of capital structure the findings indicate that there exists a substitution effect between debt and nondebt tax shields and that both corporate and personal tax rates affect leverage decisions coauthors are dan givoly aharon r ofer and oded sarig article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

an empirical examination of information barriers to trade in insurance this paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world life insurance we report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information we conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market as in those for most other products

firm specific human capital amd optimal capital structure the authors consider the moral hazard in managers undersupplying imperfectly marketable firm specific human capital firms may cope by granting long term wage contracts that protect managers against employment termination although ex ante efficient these contracts may be ex post inefficient when managerial ability is discovered to be low precommitted firms must honor these contracts unless there is ownership transfer that permits their legal invalidation bankruptcy is one such transfer mechanism since managers anticipate the contractual consequence of bankruptcy leverage worsens moral hazard this cost provides a counterbalance to the debt tax shield and leads to an optimal capital structure copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

citations or journal quality which is rewarded more in the academic labor market research quality can be evaluated from citations or from the prestige of journals publishing the research we relate salary of tenured university of california uc economists to their lifetime publications of 5 500 articles and to the 140 000 citations to these articles citations hardly affect salary especially in top ranked uc departments where impacts of citations are less than one tenth those of journals in lower ranked departments and when journal quality is less comprehensively measured effects of citations on salary increase if journal quality is just measured by counting articles in journal tiers apparent effects of citations are overstated jel a14 j44

which journal rankings best explain academic salaries evidence from the university of california the ranking of an academic journal is important to authors universities journal publishers and research funders rankings are gaining prominence as countries adopt regular research assessment exercises that especially reward publication in high impact journals yet even within a rankings oriented discipline like economics there is no agreement on how aggressively lower ranked journals are down weighted and in how wide is the universe of journals considered moreover since it is typically less costly for authors to cite superfluous references whether of their own volition or prompted by editors than it is to ignore relevant ones rankings based on citations may be easily manipulated in contrast when the merits of publication in one journal or another are debated during hiring promotion and salary decisions the evaluators are choosing over actions with costly consequences we therefore look to the academic labor market using data on economists in the university of california system to relate their lifetime publications in 700 different academic journals to salary we test amongst various sets of journal rankings and publication discount rates to see which are most congruent with the returns implied by the academic labor market jel a14 i23 j44

the family inheritance and the intergenerational transmission of inequality unequal inheritance of material wealth is commonly considered a major cause of inequality in consumption however theoretical models of the intergenerational transmission of inequality by becker blinder and ishikawa imply that unequal inheritance may either increase or reduce consumption inequality differences in inherited wealth resulting from unequal parental incomes increase inequality in recipients consumption however unequal bequests caused by differences among families in the endowed ability of children or the costs of producing human capital are equalizing empirical results confirm these predictions the inheritance received by children is inversely related to both children s income and parental education thus bequests are compensatory in that ceteris paribus low income children inherit more than their advantaged contemporaries

bankruptcy costs and the theory of oligopoly this paper examines the relationship between financial decisions and output decisions in oligopolistic markets assuming a duopoly market structure in which financial decisions and output decisions follow in sequence the authors analyze how bankrupt cy costs which are incurred when the firm is unable to meet current debt obligations affect the firm s behavior in output markets with fixed bankruptcy costs firms have an incentive to increase output le vels if they take on more debt proportional bankruptcy costs lead to a u shaped relationship between output and debt foresighted owners of firms are led to take into account the strategic output effects of financial structure when considering an optimal financial structure for the firm

citations in economics measurement uses and impacts i describe and compare sources of data on citations in economics and the statistics derived from them constructing data sets of the post publication citation histories of articles published in the top five journals in the 1970s and 2000s i examine distributions and life cycles of citations compare citation histories of articles in different subspecialties in economics and present evidence on the history and heterogeneity of those journals impacts and the marginal citation productivity of additional coauthors i use a new data set of the lifetime citation histories of over 1 000 economists from thirty universities to rank economics departments by various measures and demonstrate the importance of intra and interdepartmental heterogeneity in productivity throughout the discussion summarizes earlier work including the impacts of citations on salaries and nonmonetary rewards and how citations reflect judgments about research quality in economics and the importance of economic ideas

bequest motives and determinants of micro life insurance in sri lanka this paper emphasizes bequest motives by evaluating participation patterns in micro life insurance against insurance demand and supply side factors based on household survey data from sri lanka it presents evidence on the determinants of micro life insurance participation of low income households using probit and tobit models the results provide evidence that micro life insurance is positively correlated with measures of bequest motives such as the number of children or dependents besides better off households are less excluded from micro life insurance markets than their poorer counterparts the study finds a convincing need for the microinsurance sector to be more responsive to the needs of the poor with a key role in providing financial education to understand the need for microinsurance

trends in rankings of economics departments in the u s an update economics departments in the u s are ranked based on 1 the number of pages published in thirty six economics journals 2 publications in five of the top journals 3 output per faculty member and 4 an index of the concentration of research in a department evidence shows that the top twenty departments have generally retained their positions since the 1970s but rather large changes have occurred in departments ranked from 240 to 100 an economists hall of fame is developed listing the top fifty individual producers of research in the thirty six journal set and the top five journals

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

the mismatch between life insurance holdings and financial vulnerabilities evidence from the health and retirement study using data on older workers from the 1992 health and retirement survey along with an elaborate life cycle planning model the authors quantify the effect of each individual s death on the financial status of his or her survivors and the degree to which life insurance holdings moderate these consequences the average change in living standard that would result from a spouse s death is small both in absolute terms and relative to the decline that would occur without insurance however this average obscures a startling mismatch between insurance holdings and underlying vulnerabilities for many of the most vulnerable the amounts purchased are surprisingly small and for many of the least vulnerable the amounts are surprisingly large as a result uninsured vulnerabilities are quite widespread the magnitude of these vulnerabilities as well as the proclivity to address any given degree of vulnerability by purchasing life insurance vary systematically with individual and household characteristics

a quality adjustment model of the academic labor market the case of economists this paper uses some new data on the initial academic placements of new ph d economists to test a quality adjustment model which is consistent with the hypothesis that most academic appointments follow a downstream pattern by the use of weighted least squares the authors confirm the importance of the perceived quality of the faculty of the degree granting program the publishing performance of former graduates of these programs and the student faculty ratio of these programs in economics over the period 1960 to 1978 finally it is shown that contrary to popular opinion the extent of the downstream pattern has not been magnified in the so called buyers markets of the 1970 s

a general equilibrium theory of banks capital structure abstract we develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms the liquidity services of bank deposits make deposits a cheaper source of funding than equity in equilibrium banks pass on part of this funding advantage in the form of lower interest rates to firms that borrow from them firms and banks choose their capital structures to balance the benefits of debt financing against the risk of costly default an increase in the equity of a firm makes its debt less risky and that in turn reduces the risk of the banks who lend to the firm hence there is some substitutability between firm and bank equity we find that firms have a comparative advantage in providing a buffer against systemic shocks whereas banks have a comparative advantage in providing a buffer against idiosyncratic shocks

the market for new ph d economists in 2002 a period of malaise in the mid 1990 s led to a contraction in enrollment at many economics ph d programs the resulting reduction in the supply of new ph d economists combined with a smaller contraction in demand for new ph d economists generated as the wall street journal reported a hot pursuit for some economics ph d s with even low level candidates being treated like big shots jon e hilsenrath 2001 p b1 as might be expected the scarcity of new economics ph d s that materialized at the end of the decade appears to have induced more enrollments in economics ph d programs with annual matriculations rising by about 25 percent between fall 1998 and fall 2002 charles e scott and siegfried 1999 2003 predictions for the current job market are mixed on the one hand demand may expand as some academic departments whose hiring had been constrained by financial exigency return to active recruiting jennifer jacobson 2003 on the other hand the aftermath of the recession continues to limit some public university budgets at the same time that the supply of new economics ph d s may start to expand resulting in a job market for american ph d s that the economist 2003 p 60 describes as bleak five years ago we reported the results of a comprehensive survey of the labor market for economics ph d s graduating in 1996 1997 siegfried and stock 1999 in contrast to other social science and science disciplines most economists who graduated with a doctorate in 1996 1997 found full time careertracking jobs that paid well those in permanent full time jobs in the united states earned an average starting salary of 61 000 many of those employed in business and industry however were not satisfied with their jobs despite receiving a significant salary premium relative to academics here we report results from a new survey of the class of economics ph d s graduating in 2001 2002 this information should be of interest to current and prospective ph d students of use to advisors of undergraduates considering graduate study in economics and of assistance to faculty concerned with the employment prospects of applicants they admit to their doctoral programs for methodological details consult our earlier report siegfried and stock 1999

scholarships citations and salaries economic rewards in economics while substantial attention has been paid to the determinants of academics earnings 5 7 8 14 15 this literature has by implication suggested that the mere fact of having spent more time in the profession and the publication of more scholarly articles and books are the major determinants of salary differences our purpose here is to introduce a new determinant the quality of one s scholarly research measured by the frequency of references to that work as an additional objective measure of productivity we expect that this proxy for the extent of a scholar s influence on the work of other researchers is rewarded by the market in addition to giving a more complete picture of the determination of salaries in academic labor markets our approach should be useful in establishing a better framework for the evaluation of issues of discrimination in such markets than has been presented before 2 9

women in economics moving up or falling off the academic career ladder copyright 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 by the american economic association

income smoothing and consumption smoothing one way that risk averse households protect consumption levels is to borrow and use insurance mechanisms another way common in low income economies is to diversify economic activities and make conservative production and employment choices households thus tend toward limiting exposure only to shocks that can be handled with available credit and insurance typically both types of mechanisms are studied independently but much more can be learned by studying them together first we obtain a more complete picture of risks costs and insurance possibilities second it opens the way to considering biases in standard tests of credit and insurance

consumption insurance an evaluation of risk bearing systems in low income economies the hypothesis of full risk sharing can be taken to data from low income countries and evaluate formal and informal financial systems in many contexts idiosyncratic risks are high so credit insurance arrangements could be beneficial statistical tests reveal that households in southern india take advantage of these possibilities villages in cote d ivoire and countries in thailand do not do as well the paper includes an empirical description of the devices used to smooth consumption and a theoretical discussion of private information and incentives on ideal operating systems the full information and mechanism design frameworks provide benchmarks for policy analysis

does raiding explain the negative returns to faculty seniority i introduction economists have studied various aspects of faculty mobility research shows that turnover is greater among nonunion faculty rees 1994 female faculty average slightly more employers than male faculty barbezat and hughes 2001 ginther and kahn 2004 1 the responsiveness of turnover to relative pay diminishes with rank ehrenberg kasper and rees 1991 and research productivity enhances prospects for upward mobility ault rutman and stevenson 1979 1982 coupe smeets and warzynski 2005 still questions remain unanswered where do faculty go when they leave a university how does faculty turnover vary with time at a university what percentage of faculty move upward and what percentage move downward because of tenure denials or the prospect of being turned down for tenure the present article contributes to our understanding of these issues but its primary objective was to use data on faculty mobility to provide insights on another issue returns to academic seniority the negative returns to seniority that many studies find are commonly attributed to one of two factors 2 the first view is that negative returns reflect monopsony power on the part of universities faculty with high mobility costs acquire high seniority and because they are unlikely to move they are paid less than equally productive faculty that employers view as more likely to leave a competing explanation is that highly productive faculty are raided according to this story returns to seniority are biased negatively because faculty with high seniority tend to have low unmeasured productivity the best faculty are bid away moving on to better jobs those who remain are the faculty without outside offers and the negative returns estimated for senior faculty actually reflect a penalty for low unmeasured productivity rather than a true penalty for seniority the raiding story has several implications first estimated returns to seniority should become less negative the more fully the productivity is measured second estimated returns should be less negative once we control for faculty who are bid away finally and of particular importance estimated returns to seniority should not be negative for faculty who are bid away the faculty for whom unmeasured productivity is presumably high with the right data set these hypotheses can be tested rejection of the raiding hypothesis would provide tacit evidence of monoposony in academic markets 3 this article contributes to the literature in several ways it is the first research to directly test the raiding hypothesis it provides a detailed look at faculty mobility in one segment of the academic labor market it extends and improves bratsberg ragan and warren 2003 in the following ways it expands the sample to cover three decades of faculty pay records it includes additional controls for productivity number and types of books recent and prospective articles and so forth resulting in the most complete specification of research productivity to date and it allows for heterogeneity in the seniority penalty via phd pedigree and direction of move finally it tests for the possibility that the academic job market does a better job of matching faculty and universities in recent years as might be expected because of the information revolution the sample consists of five public phd granting universities in the midwest we track all tenure track economics faculty employed in these universities over a 30 yr period we measure their productivity their pay and their mobility as such the study provides a rich and detailed investigation of one subset of economics programs it is possible that mobility may be greater in urban areas where faculty can more readily obtain alternative employment without relocating and prior research indicates that pay structures depend on the university s stature and its relative emphasis on research and teaching

earnings profiles of department heads comparing cross section and panel models academics who become department heads suffer declining research skills because of time spent performing administrative tasks and this skill depreciation slows future wage growth this study examines kansas state university faculty who served as department heads during the period 1965 92 cross section estimates of the compensation for serving as department head are biased upward because of a correlation between unmeasured productivity characteristics and selection as department head to correct for this bias the authors reestimate earnings equations using a panel model that incorporates personal fixed effects although the average department head in the sample received a wage premium of 12 the premium for past administrative service had completely disappeared for the typical former head another finding is that skill depreciation was most severe and wage growth most adversely affected in the sciences as compensation department heads in the sciences received a larger initial administrative premium th

miller s equilibrium shareholder leverage clienteles and optimal capital structure the purpose of this paper is twofold first we examine the individual portfolio decisions when income from stocks and bonds is taxed at different rates second a rationale for the existence of risky debt in the presence of leverage related costs and differential personal income taxation is provided previous studies on capital structure with differential personal income taxation have ignored either the portfolio risk consideration and or the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields due to insufficient taxable earnings e g 8 2 3 14 13 6 7 1 9 19 20 21 23 in section i of this paper both the portfolio risk consideration and the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields are explicitly introduced this enables us to provide a rationale for the shareholder leverage clientele phenomenon within a mean variance framework we also demonstrate a non corner solution for the optimal corporate capital structure in a tax environment similar to that of miller s debt and taxes 14 in sections ii and iii of this paper miller s world is further modified to include risky debt and the attendant costs we re examine and synthesize recent studies on the theory of optimal capital structure which have appeared since the publication of debt and taxes e g 4 6 7 13 19 20

economic demographic and institutional determinants of life insurance consumption across countries life insurance has become an increasingly important part of the financial sector over the past 40 years providing a range of financial services for consumers and becoming a major source of investment in the capital market but what drives the large variation in life insurance consumption across countries remains unclear using a panel with data aggregated at different frequencies for 68 economies in 1961 2000 this article finds that economic indicators such as inflation income per capita and banking sector development and religious and institutional indicators are the most robust predictors of the use of life insurance education life expectancy the young dependency ratio and the size of the social security system appear to have no robust association with life insurance consumption the results highlight the importance of price stability and banking sector development in fully realizing the savings and investment functions of life insurance in an economy

monopsony in the labor market this paper surveys recent theoretical and empirical research on monopsony in labor markets broadly defined as upward sloping labor supply to an employer we compare older monopsony models based on small numbers of employers with newer models based on labor market frictions such as moving costs and search we also compare older econometric approaches that focus on static wage concentration relationships with newer approaches that focus on dynamics our review of empirical estimates suggests that monopsony power based on small numbers of employers is probably rare but occasionally large while monopsony power based on frictions is probably widespread but small on average

indirect costs of financial distress in durable goods industries the case of auto manufacturers financial distress can disrupt a durable goods producer s provision of complementary goods and services such as warranties spare parts and maintenance this reduces consumers demand for the core product causing indirect costs of financial distress we test this hypothesis in the market for used cars sold at wholesale auctions an increase in a manufacturer s credit default swaps significantly decreases the prices of its cars at auction especially cars with longer expected service lives our estimates imply substantial indirect costs of financial distress for car manufacturers these costs have occasionally even exceeded the tax savings benefits for general motors and ford the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

returns to articles versus pages in academic publishing do salary setters show article illusion the academic labor market rewards idea splitting where researchers publish several short articles rather than one long one there is a significant positive effect on salary from publishing more articles conditional on the total number of quality adjusted pages ever published

do academic salaries decline with seniority this article reexamines the negative seniority earnings relationship for academic economists the empirical results show that the anomalous negative seniority effect found in earlier academic market studies holds in the absence of direct measures of research productivity the negative effect however eventually disappears as more comprehensive measures of publishing citations and other productivity measures are included in the wage equation to control for the quantity and quality of faculty productivity faculty with greater seniority appear to be rewarded relatively less simply because many have been relatively less productive than their colleagues with less seniority at similar stages in their careers

an explanation for accounting income smoothing it is widely believed that corporate managers often engage in income smoothing taking actions to dampen fluctuations in their firms publicly reported net income one reason given for this is that managers think that investors pay more for a firm with a smoother income stream see ronen and sadan 1981 while there have been many empirical studies attempting to document whether or not income smoothing actually occurs there has been little exploration of why a manager might rationally want to smooth his firm s income explaining why smoothing might be observed and how it can result in an increased stock price is the focus of this paper in two recent studies lambert 1984 and dye 1988 demonstrate in agency settings that a risk averse manager who is precluded from borrowing and lending in the capital markets has an incentive to smooth his firm s reported income in this paper in contrast it is shown that within a market setting an incentive exists for a manager to smooth income that is independent of either risk aversion or restricted access to capital markets the market setting is also useful in that it allows for the analysis of the effect of income smoothing on stock prices it is shown here that if a manager can choose which of two periods to recognize certain income he may prefer the choice that is expected to

labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions this paper examines the impact of labor unemployment risk on corporate financing decisions theory suggests that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of mitigating worker exposure to unemployment risk using changes in state unemployment insurance benefit laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells we explore the connection between unemployment risk and the corporate financing decisions of public firms in the united states we find that increases in legally mandated unemployment benefits lead to increases in corporate leverage the impact of reduced unemployment risk on financial policy is especially strong for firms that have greater layoff separation rates labor intensity and financing constraints the estimated premium required to compensate workers for unemployment risk due to financial distress is about 57 basis points of firm value for a bbb rated firm these findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions

strategic financial signalling abstract in an entry game the entrant and financial markets are uninformed about the incumbent s costs the entrant wishes to enter the market if and only if the incumbent has high costs therefore a low cost incumbent would like to signal its cost to the entrant to deter its entry simultaneously it would like to reveal its private information to financiers to obtain actuarially fair financial prices we suggest that financial structure may act as a common signal in financial and output markets in equilibrium a low cost incumbent s highly leveraged financial stucture becomes an effective entry deterrent as it reveals private information to the entrant and financiers

how deep is the annuity market participation puzzle using microeconomic data for the united kingdom we analyze the empirical determinants of voluntary annuity market demand we find that annuity market participation increases with financial wealth life expectancy and education and decreases with other pension income and a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses we then show that these empirically motivated determinants of annuity market participation have the same quantitatively important effects in a life cycle model of annuity and life insurance demand saving and portfolio choice moreover reasonable preference parameters predict annuity demand levels comparable to the data for stockholders a strong bequest motive can simultaneously generate balanced portfolios and low annuity demand

debt bargaining and credibility in firm supplier relationships abstract we examine optimal leverage for a downstream firm relying on implicit self enforcing contracts with a supplier performing a leveraged recapitalization prior to bargaining increases the firm s share of total surplus however the resulting debt overhang limits the range of credible bonuses resulting in low input quality optimal financial structure trades off bargaining benefits of debt with inefficiency resulting from overhang consistent with empirical evidence the model predicts that leverage increases with supplier bargaining power e g unionization rates and decreases with utilization of non verifiable inputs e g human capital

can the trade off theory explain debt structure we examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of bank and market debt using a tradeoff model where banks have the unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy flexible bank debt offers a superior tradeoff between tax shields and bankruptcy costs ease of renegotiation limits bank debt capacity however optimal debt structure hinges upon which party has bargaining power in private workouts weak firms have high bank debt capacity and utilize bank debt exclusively strong firms lever up to their lower bank debt capacity augment with market debt and place the bank senior therefore the tradeoff theory offers an explanation for i why young small firms use bank debt exclusively ii why large mature firms employ mixed debt financing and iii why bank debt is senior the tradeoff theory also generates predictions consistent with international evidence in countries where the bankruptcy regime entails soft tough enforcement of contractual priority bank debt capacity is low high implying greater less reliance on market debt

human capital bankruptcy and capital structure we derive a firm s optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk while equity holders can diversify this risk away in the presence of corporate taxes our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice it also makes a number of predictions for the cross sectional distribution of firm leverage consistent with existing empirical evidence it implies persistent idiosyncratic dierences in leverage across firms an important new empirical prediction of the model is that ceteris paribus firms with more leverage should pay higher wages

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

employee well being firm leverage and bankruptcy risk employees of liquidating firms are likely to lose income and non pecuniary benefits of working for the firm which makes bankruptcy costly for employees this paper examines whether firms take these costs into account when deciding on the optimal amount of leverage we find that firms with leading track records in employee well being significantly reduce the probability of bankruptcy by operating with lower debt ratios moreover we observe that firms with better employee track records have better credit ratings even when we control for differences in firm leverage

dependents and the demand for life insurance a breadwinner s demand for life insurance depends on the demographic structure of his or her household the author captures the relationship by extending menahem e yaari s life insurance framework to include the preferences of all household members explicitly in many households the insured is the husband and the beneficiaries are his wife and offspring their demand for insurance of the husband s life is derived from a life cycle model in which income is uncertain the results are intuitively appealing in that they describe the explicit calculation made by purchasers of life insurance empirical estimates based on observed life insurance ownership also are encouraging copyright 1989 by american economic association

patterns of rainfall insurance participation in rural india take up of an innovative rainfall insurance policy offered to smallholder farmers in rural india decreases with basis risk between insurance payouts and income fluctuations increases with household wealth and decreases with binding credit constraints these results are consistent with the predictions of a simple neoclassical model with borrowing constraints other patterns are less consistent with the benchmark model for example participation in village networks and measures of familiarity with the insurance vendor are strongly correlated with insurance take up decisions and risk averse households are less not more likely to purchase insurance these results may reflect household uncertainty about the product given their limited experience with it

how strong are bequest motives evidence based on estimates of the demand for life insurance and annuities this paper presents new empirical evidence in support of the view that a significant fraction of total saving is motivated by the desire to leave bequests specifically i find that social security annuity benefits significantly raise life insurance holdings and depress private annuity holdings among elderly individuals these patterns indicate that the typical household would choose to maintain a positive fraction of its resources in bequeathable forms even if insurance markets were perfect evidence on the relationship between insurance purchases and total resources reinforces this conclusion

revealed performances worldwide rankings of economists and economics departments 1990 2000 in this paper i study the production of academic research by economics departments and economists worldwide rankings are provided based on both citations and publications these rankings reveal a dominant position of the united states in the production of economics literature over time however the extent of this dominance is decreasing jel a10 a14

the determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues we document the determinants of the term to maturity of 7 369 bonds and notes issued between 1982 and 1993 our main finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow at the short end and at the long end and of the maturity spectrum while firms with speculative grade credit ratings typically borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum this pattern is consistent with the theory that risky firms do not issue short term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation but are screened out of the long term debt market because of the prospect of risky asset substitution traditionally capital structure research has focused on how much of a firm s future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders instead of equityholders an equally important issue is when future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders a firm that finances its projects with short term debt risks serious financial difficulty if the debt cannot be extended similarly a firm that finances its activities with long term debt can sacrifice profits by needlessly risking mismanagement of resources after cash flows are returned from investments but before they are due to debtholders this study investigates the factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their liabilities we document the determinants of the maturity of 7 368 public debt issues made by u s corporations between 1982 and 1993 our empirical tests are based on existing theoretical models that relate the maturity of a firm s borrowings to the riskiness of its cash flows the time until investments pay off the quality of information held by outsiders the expected

do wages rise with job seniority many previous studies have found a strong positive effect of job seniority tenure on wages this paper re examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables scheme to deal with the fact that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics that affect the wage we use the variation of tenure over a given job match as the principal instrumental variable for tenure the variation in tenure over the job is uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual and job match specific components of the error term of the wage equation our main finding is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small and that general labour market experience and job shopping account for most wage growth over a career the strong cross section relationship between tenure and wages is due primarily to heterogeneity bias prior researchers see mincer and jovanovic 1981 bartel and borjas 1981 borjas 1981 cline 1979 and mellow 1981 and many others have established that job seniority has a strong positive relationship with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section time series of individuals in this paper we re evaluate the evidence concerning the partial effects on wages of job seniority tenure and total labour market experience the extent to which wages rise with tenure is important for several reasons first and foremost the wage tenure profile is a fundamental question about the structure of earnings over careers second the wage tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is tied to specific jobs and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by displaced workers hamermesh 1984 third evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline in quits with tenure since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that the worker will locate a superior alternative a growing theoretical literature surveyed in parsons 1984 has taken the evidence of a strong wage tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for the relationship the most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human capital oi 1962 becker 1962 mincer 1974 parsons 1972 kuratani 1973 and hashimoto 1980 in which the growth of wages with tenure holding experience constant is attributed to the worker s share of investments in firm specific skills more recently lazear 1981 has presented a supervision model of wage growth in which firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to shirk freeman 1977 and harris and holmstrom 1982 provide an explanation for wage growth based on an insurance motive salop and salop 1976 nickell 1976 and guasch and weiss 1982 present adverse selection models of wage growth in which firms use a wage tenure profile as a

efficient ex ante stabilization of firms abstract distressed firms are vulnerable to inefficient panic based runs of their workers suppliers and customers a policymaker may try to prevent such a run by pledging to protect the interests of these stakeholders should a firm cease to do business however this promise also enables the firm to demand better terms of trade from its stakeholders which blunts the policy s effectiveness we show how to avoid such an adverse response by the use of partial countercyclical insurance under certain conditions such a scheme costlessly implements the first best outcome in the limit as the stakeholders information becomes precise we also identify least cost efficient schemes in the cases of large noise learning and duopoly

academic pay in the united kingdom and the united states the differential returns to productivity and the lifetime earnings gap this paper estimates earnings functions for two samples of u k and u s academic economists despite significant differences in compensation schemes a comparably specified human capital earnings model does a good job explaining earnings variations for academic economists in both countries our estimates suggest that rewards for research are more immediate and direct in the united states because of the national salary scale the payoffs to experience and seniority are greater and the payoffs to research are lower in the united kingdom than in the united states after adjusting for productivity and demographic factors we find that u s economists are paid approximately 40 more than otherwise equivalent economists in the united kingdom simulating career age earnings profiles for both markets we find that the earnings gap widens with experience for relatively productive research economists and may even narrow with age for relatively less productive research economists nevertheless the cumulative lifetime earnings foregone are substantial for research and nonresearch economists in the united kingdom

seniority and monopsony in the academic labor market workers with high seniority usually have higher wages than workers with low seniority and the same total labor marke t experience in contrast the results of this paper indicate that higher seniority is associated with lower salaries for university professors the author documents this finding for national surveys a nd individual institutions and explains it as due to monopsonistic discrimination by employers copyright 1993 by american economic association

pricing exit and location decisions of firms evidence on the role of debt and operating efficiency abstract we compare pricing and exit decisions of discounters across the business cycle cities containing high debt and or low efficiency firms display higher prices during non recession years during recessions prices increase in cities with less efficient incumbents but decrease in cities with a mix of high and low debt firms high debt firms are more likely to exit cities with lower prices and high debt exiting firms are more likely to be efficient apparently low debt firms strategically lower prices during recessions to force exit of efficient financially constrained rivals weaker competitors face another cost new entrants locate closer

adam smith goes to college an economist becomes an academic administrator the author asks whether it is useful to view universities in a utility maximizing framework and shows that university organizing virtually guarantees that the utility maximizing model is the incorrect approach he then discusses resource allocation issues at cornell and reflects upon how concepts that are obvious to economists helped or hindered decision making at cornell the author hopes to convey not that economic concepts are irrelevant in operating a university but rather that it takes a long time to explain to all the actors in the system why these concepts should matter and even longer to actually make them matter

some factors affecting mobility in the labor market for academic economists this study examines the effects of publication geographic preferences and institutional preferences on the mobility of academic economists during the period 1955 69 using a sample of 3813 economists who published at least one article during this period the analysis indicates that publications do promote upward mobility but to a limited extent the number of publications rather than their quality promotes mobility but movement occurs primarily within well defined geographic regions the market for academic economists appears to be strongly segmented along geographic lines moves within geographic regions tend to be to departments of equal or lesser prestige than the department from which the individual has moved