nonlinearities in economic dynamics two reasons that led to the dominance of the linear stochastic difference equations approach the first one was the fact that the nonlinear systems seemed incapable of reproducing the statistical aspects of actual economic time series at best such models were able to produce periodic motion1 and an examination of the spectra of economic time series showed the absence of the spikes that characterise periodic data the emphasis on the equilibrium approach to aggregate economic behaviour cf lucas i 986 would make things even more difficult the plethora of stability results for models of infinitely lived agents with perfect foresight turnpike theorems suggested that even the regular fluctuations that had been derived in the literature on endogenous business cycles were incompatible with a theory that had solid microeconomic foundations further this indicated that while nonlinearities could be present the explanations of the fluctuations had to rest solely on the presence of exogenous shocks that working through the equilibrating mechanism would create the observed randomness if such shocks were absent the system would tend to a stationary state the second reason was the empirical success of the models based on linear stochastic difference equations low order autoregressive processes captured some of the features of aggregate time series in turn these processes can in principle result from an economy with complete markets where production is subject to exogenous shocks though the task of confronting these equilibrium models with actual data has not yielded uncontroversial results see the discussion and references in section i there was no obvious gain in the

correlation neglect voting behavior and information aggregation in this paper we analyse elections when voters underestimate the correlation between their information sources correlation neglect we find that this cognitive bias can improve political outcomes we show that the extreme beliefs which result from correlation neglect induce some voters to base their vote on information rather than on political preferences we characterise conditions on the distribution of preferences under which this induces higher vote shares for the optimal policies and better information aggregation

a characterization of erratic dynamics in the overlapping generations model abstract in this paper we characterize and give examples o wide classes of utility functions which generate erratic dynamics in the standard deterministic overlapping generations model erratic dynamics refers to feasible trajectories which are bounded but which do not converge to stationary points or periodic orbits we show that such trajectories are pareto efficient we introduce credit into the model and show how a constant credit expansion rate can result in erratic trajectories in prices and the real value of credit finally we briefly discuss certain technical aspects of the mathematics used and the statistical nature of the dynamics that can arise from deterministic dynamical systems

further evidence on the asymmetric behavior of economic time series over the business cycle evidence has recently been presented by salih neftci to support the hypothesis that recessions in economic activity tend to be steeper and more short lived than recoveries in economic activity that evidence however was confined to the behavior of the unemployment rate in the united states in this paper it is shown that when neftci s methods are applied to analyze the behavior of real gross national product investment and productivity in the united states or when they are used to analyze industrial production abroad the asymmetry hypothesis seems to be less compelling

on the indeterminacy of capital accumulation paths abstract in neoclassical optimal growth models the stability of the accumulation paths depends on the discount parameter we prove that for discount factors small enough the policy function which describes an optimal path can be of any type the result is achieved using the notion of concavity we adopt a constructive approach given any twice differentiable map we show how to construct an optimal growth problem which produces that map as the optimal policy function a consequence is that chaos can appear in these models we also provide bounds on the values of the discount parameter for which indeterminacy is possible

a positive theory of social security based on reputation we construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay as you go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium we alalyze the welfare implictions of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measure to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness

a median voter model of social security this paper presents a theoretical median voter analysis of the determination of the level of social security the framework for the analysis is a continuous time overlapping generations model with nonaltruistic households facing borrowing constraints in the capital market a majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist in which the median voter is liquidity constrained the desired level of social security for each voter is a declining function of the preexisting level of social security as a consequence in a sequence of votes on social security beginning with a zero level the program initially overshoots its steady state value copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a diamond is forever and other fairy tales the relationship between wedding expenses and marriage duration in this study we evaluate the association between wedding spending and marriage duration using data from a survey of more than 3 000 ever married persons in the united states controlling for a number of demographic and relationship characteristics we find evidence that marriage duration is inversely associated with spending on the engagement ring and wedding ceremony jel j12 z1 d1

do pensions foster education an empirical perspective the paper examines the effect of population ageing on public education spending on the one hand ageing is expected to have a negative effect on education as an increasing number of retirees resu

equilibrium policy in an overlapping generations economy abstract this paper offers a mechanism for reducing the number of stationary equilibria that arise in a simple two period lived overlapping generations economy since each equilibrium is associated with a different combination of monetary and fiscal policies i assume that at each date the agent in his second period of life determines how that period s monetary and fiscal instruments will be set i show that the set of stationary equilibria where this occurs is a proper and nonempty subset of the set of stationary competitive equilibria and that at least one such equilibrium is a pareto optimum

is voter competence good for voters information rationality and democratic performance a long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence this literature got its start arguing that voters lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability a more recent literature deepens the debate with some authors claiming that voters eectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies and other authors claiming that voters are insuciently rational to do so we argue that regardless of its conclusions about voter competence this literature s singleminded focus on voter behavior is misguided we use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians when this strategic interaction is taken into account increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse one simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics aect the

on negative time preferences abstract survey data show that subjects positively discount both gains and losses but discount gains more heavily than losses this holds for monetary and non monetary outcomes these results do not confirm the findings of two earlier studies about negative time preferences for non monetary outcomes

the political intergenerational welfare state abstract using a three period overlapping generations economy framework we characterize an intergenerational welfare state with endogenous education and pension under voting we show that although politically establishing pay as you go payg social security in isolation in a dynamically efficient economy will always reduce the capital investment and therefore the social welfare as expected in contrast politically implementing education pension policy package instead can improve both human and physical capital accumulation and social welfare over laissez faire however for this the political influence of the old has to be small thus limiting the size of the payg social security program

markovian social security in unequal societies in this paper we develop a dynamic political economic theory of social security we analytically characterize a markov perfect equilibrium and find that the interaction between markovian tax policy and tax distortion on private investment in human capital shapes an intertemporal policy rule linking taxes positively over time by allowing current taxpayers to influence their own future social security benefits the positive intertemporal tax linkage provides political support for social security moreover this positive tax linkage leads to a negative correlation between wage inequality and the size of a nation s social security system consistent with the empirical pattern observed across oecd countries

the rationally uninformed electorate some experimental evidence this essay reports on a series of twenty four election experiments in which voters are allowed to decide between voting retrospectively and purchasing contemporaneous information about the candidate challenging the incumbent each experiment consists of a series of election periods in which dummy candidates choose spatial positions which represent either their policy while in office or a promise about policy if elected subjects voters are told the value to them of the incumbent s policy but they must decide prior to voting whether or not to purchase information about the value of the challenger s promise in general our data conform to reasonable expectations voters purchase less information and rely more on retrospective knowledge when the candidates strategies are stable and their likelihood of purchasing information during periods of instability is tempered by the likelihood that their votes matter by the reliability of the information available for purchase and by the degree of instability as measured by changes in each voter s welfare

substituting the end for the whole why voters respond primarily to the election year economy according to numerous studies the election year economy influences presidential election results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term here we describe a series of surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for this pattern that runs contrary to standard political science explanations but one that accords with a large psychological literature voters we find actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative growth however since that characteristic is not readily available to them voters inadvertently substitute election year performance because it is more easily accessible this end heuristic explanation for voters election year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole the end heuristic explanation also suggests a remedy a way to align voters actions with their intentions providing people with the attribute they are seeking cumulative growth eliminates the election year emphasis

benchmarking across borders electoral accountability and the necessity of comparison when the economy in a single country contracts voters often punish the government when many economies contract voters turn against their governments much less frequently this suggests that the international context matters for the domestic vote yet most research on electoral accountability assumes that voters treat their national economies as autarkic we decompose two key economic aggregates growth in real gross domestic product and unemployment into their international and domestic components and demonstrate that voters hold incumbents more electorally accountable for the domestic than for the international component of growth voters in a wide variety of democracies benchmark national economic growth against that abroad punishing rewarding incumbents for national outcomes that underperform outperform an international comparison tests suggest that this effect arises not from highly informed voters making direct comparisons but from pre benchmarking by the media when reporting on the economy the effect of benchmarked growth exceeds that of aggregate national growth by up to a factor of two and outstrips the international component of growth by an even larger margin implying that previous research may have underestimated the strength of the economy on the vote

increasing longevity and social security reforms a legislative procedure approach abstract increasing longevity causes an upward trend in the dependency ratio in many countries this raises concerns about the financial sustainability of social security schemes and reform proposals and initiatives abound it is shown that a fundamental policy choice inevitably arises since a given social security system cannot be maintained by simply indexing pension ages to longevity the political reform process is analysed using the so called legislative procedure when longevity increases the retirement age is raised more than proportionally to the increase in longevity but the young also make larger transfers to the old

voting on pensions a survey abstract the paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence size and political sustainability of pay as you go pension systems it proposes a simple framework of analysis a small open two overlapping generation economy model around which some variants are displayed dictatorship of the median voter is assumed the text is organized to answer the following questions i do political equilibria with payg pension schemes exist ii why do they emerge iii what are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified and finally iv what is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous e g demographic shock

nonlinear time series analysis of stock volatilities summary the absolute value of the mean corrected excess return is used in this paper to measure the volatility of stock returns we apply various nonlinearity tests available in the literature to show that such volatility series are strongly nonlinear we then explore the use of threshold autoregressive tar models in describing monthly volatility series the models built suggest that the volatility series exhibit significant lower order serial correlations when the volatility is large indicating certain volatility clustering in stock returns out of sample forecasts are used to compare the tar models with linear arma models and nonlinear garch and egarch models based on mean squared error and average absolute deviation the comparisons show that a the tar models consistently outperform the linear arma models in multi step ahead forecasts for large stocks b the tar models provide better forecasts than the garch and egarch models also for the volatilities of large stock returns and c the egarch model gives the best long horizon volatility forecasts for small stock returns

social contracts as assets a possible solution to the time consistency problem this paper presents a new solution to the time consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work the solution involves formulating a social contract institution or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy the social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract for the old generation breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it for the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract

performance federalism and local democracy theory and evidence from school tax referenda federal governments are increasingly employing empirical measures of lower level government performance to ensure that provincial and local jurisdictions pursue national policy goals we call this burgeoning phenomenon performance federalism and argue that it can distort democratic accountability in lower level elections we estimate the impact of a widely publicized federal indicator of local school district performance one that we show does not allow voters to draw valid inferences about the quality of local educational institutions on voter support for school tax levies in a u s state uniquely appropriate for this analysis the results indicate that a signal of poor district performance increases the probability of levy failure a substantively large and robust effect that disproportionately affects impoverished communities the analysis employs a number of identification strategies and tests for multiple behavioral mechanisms to support the causal interpretation of these findings

nonlinear dynamics and stock returns simple deterministic systems are capable of generating chaotic output that mimics the output of stochastic systems for this reason algorithms have been developed to distinguish between these two alternatives these algorithms and related statistical tests are also useful in detecting the presence of nonlinear dependence in time series in this article the authors apply these procedures to stock returns and find evidence that indicates the presence of nonlinear dependence on weekly returns from the center for research in security prices value weighted index copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

the political economy of social security we consider a two period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity in such a setting a redistributive pay as you go system is politically sustainable even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth the workers with medium wages not those with the lowest wages and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security this level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule

do voters demand responsive governments evidence from indian disaster relief abstract using rainfall public relief and election data from india we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses the data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control however fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters we also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election in accordance with these electoral incentives governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years these results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes

is the business cycle characterized by deterministic chaos abstract tests are conducted on u s macroeconomic data for the presence of low dimensional deterministic chaos where deterministic chaos is defined as in grandmont s 1985 walras bowley lecture or in brock 1986 the idea is to test for evidence of endogenous instability causing the business cycle low order autoregressions are hard to reject with our methods evidence of chaos is weak but our tests may be too weak to detect it evidence of nonlinearity is present in employment 1950 i to 1983 iv unemployment 1949 i to 1982 iv monthly post war industrial production and pig iron production 1877 1937

intergenerational risk sharing abstract in this paper we examine government debt and tax transfer policies that can be improve the allocation of risk between generations markets cannot allocate risk efficiently between two generations whenever the two generations are not both alive prior to the occurence of a stochastic event this implies that government policies transferring risk between generations have the potential to create first order welfare improvements our model provides a non keynesian justification for the debt finance of wars and recessions as well as an added rationale for social security type tax transfer schemes which aid unlucky generations e g the depression generation at the expense of luckier generations

reform support in times of crisis the role of family ties we argue that an important determinant of voters support for economic reform is the strength of family ties while the crisis hypothesis predicts that crises facilitate reform we show in a political economy model that this relation can break down and even reverse when agents take into account the effect of reform on their family members applied to southern european countries with strong family ties the model rationalizes why the extremely high youth unemployment following the great recession has not led to more substantial labor market reforms in such countries austerity might block rather than foster additional structural reforms

are business cycles asymmetric a correction neftci 1984 proposed a nonparametric test procedure for determining whether business cycles are asymmetric in the sense that contractions are steeper than expansions he found evidence of this type of asymmetry in postwar quarterly u s unemployment variables this comment identifies a probable error in neftci s empirical work that reverses the significance of his results for the unemployment rate and it suggests that this test may have low power and be sensitive to measurement error

presidential particularism and divide the dollar politics when inuencing the allocation of federal dollars across the country do presidents strictly pursue maximally ecient outcomes or do they systematically target dollars to politically inuential constituencies in a county level analysis of federal spending from 1984 to 2008 we nd that presidents are not universalistic but particularistic that is they reliably direct dollars to specic constituents to further their political goals as others have noted presidents target districts represented by their co partisans in congress in the pursuit of inuence visavis the legislature but we show that at much higher levels presidents target both counties within swing states and counties in core states that strongly supported the president in recent elections swing state particularism is especially salient during presidential reelection years and core partisan counties within swing states are most heavily rewarded rather than strictly pursuing visions of good public policy or pandering to the national median voter our results suggest that presidents systematically prioritize the needs of politically important constituents

the rise of the modern welfare state ideology institutions and income security analysis and evidence in the 25 year period between 1960 and 1985 there was a great expansion of welfare state programs throughout the west the fraction of gdp accounted for by social expenditures doubled in much of europe and grew by 40 50 in many other oecd nations after 1985 growth in social insurance programs slowed relative to other parts of the economy this paper explores the extent to which institutions and ideological shifts may have accounted for the period of rapid growth for differences in the extent of that growth and for the subsequent reduction in the growth rates of social insurance programs

policymakers horizon and trade reforms the protectionist effect of elections this paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization we focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the u s congress in which house and senate members serve respectively two and six year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years we show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than house representatives however this result does not hold for the last generation of senators who face elections at the same time as house members suggesting that inter cameral differences are driven by term length considering senators alone we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two this result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills the protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats

retrospective voting and party polarization we provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization we contrast sophisticated nash versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy instead they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance as determined in equilibrium we show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective compared to nash voting moreover this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals

the redistributive design of social security systems countries with low intragenerational redistribution in social security systems bismarckian are associated with larger public pension expenditures a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income inequality than countries with more redistributive social security beveridgean this article introduces a bidimensional voting model to account for these features agents different in age income and in their ability to invest in the capital market vote on the degree of redistribution of the social security system and on the size of the transfer in an economy with three income groups a small beveridgean system is supported by low income agents who gain from its redistributive feature and high income individuals who seek to minimise their tax contribution and to invest in a private scheme middle income individuals instead favour a large bismarckian system

the unemployment rate and the business cycle in britain an aggregate and regional analysis jones d manning n and stevenson m 1994 the unemployment rate and the business cycle in britain an aggregate and regional analysis reg studies 28 591 604 it has been suggested that if the business cycle is to be explained then its behaviour should be related to a non linear dynamic process not unlike a limit cycle the time irreversibility exhibited by post war unemployment data is not untypical of a pattern generated by such a non linear structure such a possibility could have important implications for economic policy in certain cases non linearities make forecasting extremely hazardous if not impossible as base line measurement errors cause prediction errors to accumulate at an exponential rate equally worrying is that fundamentally mistaken policy can arise when linear specifications are used to approximate non linear relationships the present paper tests for non linearities in the dynamics of regional unemployment in britain appealing to the idea of a regime switching process we u

social security universal versus earnings dependent benefits i compare the welfare implications of bismarckian earnings dependent benefits and beveridgean universal benefits social security systems agents are better off with a beveridgean system than with a comparable bismarckian system in an environment with intragenerational homogeneity the latter results in a larger decrease in net wages with intragenerational skill heterogeneity most agents benefit from the more redistributive beveridgean system when agents vote for the replacement rates with intragenerational homogeneity the resulting bismarckian system is larger than the beveridgean system with intragenerational skill heterogeneity the beveridgean system is larger overall agents are worse off with the larger system

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

on endogenous competitive business cycles the belief that the long run equilibrium of a competitive monetary economy that does not experience any exogeneous shocks whether originating from the external environment or from policy should be modelled as a state that is stationary or perhaps growing at a constant rate seems to be deeply rooted in the mind of some economists

one dollar one vote this paper revisits the relationship between inequality and redistribution in a panel of advanced oecd countries using panel data methods that hold constant a variety of determinants of redistributive spending i find a non monotonic relationship between pre tax and transfer distribution of income and redistribution relative to mean income a more affluent rich and middle class are associated with less redistribution and a richer poor class is associated with more redistribution these results are consistent with a one dollar one vote politico economic equilibrium when the income of a group of citizens increases aggregate redistributive policies tilt towards this group s most preferred policies

rational choice and erratic behaviour in this paper we show that rational choice in a stationary environment can lead to erratic behaviour when preferences depend on experience we mean by erratic behaviour choice sequences that do not converge to a long run stationary value or to any periodic pattern early investigations of the effects of experience on choice goes back to pareto see also benhabib 1979 some keynesian theories of the consumption function incorporate the effects of experience and habit formation on current levels of consumption duesenberry 1949 modigliani 1949 and brown 1952 a general model of experience dependent choice was described in day 1970 and investigated in day and kennedy 1971 while the specific issue of the existence of stable representable long run consumer demand when tastes vary endogenously has been treated by gorman 1967 pollak 1970 1976 weizsaicker 1971 mccarthy 1974 and hammond 1976 pollak gave conditions for the representability of long run choice when the equations of preference dependence are linear and utility additive hammond in a generalization of these findings provides conditions for stable representable long run choice when preferences are acyclic a condition which in essence assures convergence to a long run choice

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

are economic time series asymmetric over the business cycle it has long been argued that major cyclical variables such as the unemployment rate display an asymmetric behavior over various phases of the business cycle the paper provides a statistical test for this hypothesis using the framework of finite state markov processes i implement a test to see if the behavior of the unemployment rate is characterized by sudden jumps and slower drops it is argued that the framework provided in the paper can also be used to test other sample path properties of economic time series

intergenerational risk shifting through social security and bailout politics abstract this paper adopts a stochastic overlapping generations framework to analyze the allocation of aggregate financial risks under different social security systems and a majority voting rule we study whether there will be switches between pay as you go payg and fully funded ff systems in such an economy we show that in case of a negative aggregate shock low income young individuals will form a political coalition with the elderly to implement a payg system payg scheme is shown to persist even after a good aggregate shock if the system is redistributive enough

characterizing nonlinearities in business cycles using smooth transition autoregressive models during the past few years investigators have found evidence indicating that various time series representing business cycles such as production and unemployment may be nonlinear in this paper it is assumed that if the time series is nonlinear then it can be adequately described by a smooth transition autoregressive star model the paper describes the application of these models to quarterly logarithmic production indices for 13 countries and europe tests reject linearity for most of these series and estimated star models indicate that the nonlinearity is needed mainly to describe the responses of production to large negative shocks such as oil price shocks

peasants or bankers the american electorate and the u s economy t he usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the retrospective economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience voter as peasant a second model assumes a sophisticated economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations voter as banker using the components both retrospective and prospective of the index of consumer sentiment ics as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series with aggregate consumer expectations about long term business conditions in the approval equation neither the usual economic indicators not the other ics components matter moreover short term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy the qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen economics moves political behavior with hard times administrations lose support with good times they gain it we know this to be true but when we ask how by what processes the political translation of economic experience occurs the an

learning about voter rationality we model the accountability relationship between voters and politicians to clarify what can and can t be learned about voter rationality from existing evidence from the behavior literature we make two key points first we show that evidence on the electoral consequences of natural disasters and economic shocks typically interpreted as evidence for voter irrationality is consistent with a canonical model with rational voters second we show that the evidence on the electoral consequences of disaster response typically interpreted as evidence for voter rationality is consistent with the same model with irrational voters hence neither body of evidence can adjudicate between rational and irrational voting behavior we also derive new hypotheses that can better guide future empirical work attempting to assess voter rationality

political complements in the welfare state health care and social security abstract all oecd countries target a large majority of their welfare spending to the elderly through public pensions and health care programs spending in both programs has largely increased in the past decades often more than the share of elderly in the population we suggest that these phenomena may be due to political complementarities between these two transfer programs we show that these two programs may coexist because public health care may increase the political constituency in favor of social security and vice versa specifically public health decreases the absolute longevity differential between low and high income individuals therefore rising the retirement period and the total pension benefits of the former relatively to the latter this effect increases the political support for social security among the low income young we show that in a political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election a voting majority of low income young and retirees supports a large welfare state the composition between public health and social security is determined by intermediate median income types who favor the contemporaneous existence of these two programs since public health increases their longevity enough to make social security more attractive technological improvements in health care strengthens this complementarity and lead to more welfare spending

searching for good policies policymaking is hard policymakers typically have imperfect information about which policies produce which outcomes and they are left with little choice but to fumble their way through the policy space via a trial and error process this raises a question at the heart of democracy do democratic systems identify good policies to answer this question i introduce a novel model of policymaking in complex environments i show that good policies are often but not always found and i identify the possibility of policymaking getting stuck at outcomes that are arbitrarily bad notably policy stickiness occurs in the model even in the absence of institutional constraints this raises the question of how institutions and the political environment impact experimentation and learning i show how a simple political friction uncertainty over voter preferences interacts with political competition and policy uncertainty in a subtle way that surprisingly improves the quality of policymaking over time

positive arithmetic of the welfare state abstract this paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than other welfare programs because i retirees constitute the most homogeneous voting group and ii the intragenerational redistribution component of social security induces low income young to support this system in a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity we show that for sufficient income inequality and enough elderly in the population a welfare system composed of a within cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system represents the political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election social security is sustained by retirees and low income young while intragenerational redistribution by low income young unlike unidimensional voting model our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups

asymmetry in the business cycle evidence from the australian labour market abstract cyclical asymmetry has been recognised as a non linear phenomenon in recent studies examining unemployment rate time series the probalistic structure of such time series is different during upswings and downswings and models should reflect this change in structure by incorporating non linearities to allow for the switching in optimising behaviours between the different phases in this paper we use a number of established and new tests for identifying nonlinearities of different types as they occur in first differenced time series of the seasonally adjusted monthly australian aggregate and regional unemployment rates after identifying whether nonlinearity of a particular form is present in a given time series the appropriate non linear or linear model is fitted and the model analysed for cyclical behaviour

lessons for an aging society the political sustainability of social security systems what is the future of social systems in oecd countries in our view the answer belongs to the realm of politics we evaluate how political constraints shape the social security system in six countries france germany italy spain the uk and the us under population aging two main aspects of the aging process are relevant to the analysis first the increase in the dependency ratio the ratio of retirees of workers reduces the average profitability of the unfunded social security system thereby inducing the agents to reduce the size of the system by substituting their claims towards future pensions with more private savings second an aging electorate leads to larger systems since it increases the relevance of pension spending on the policy makers agenda the overall assessment from our simulations is that the political aspect dominates in all countries albeit with some differences spain the fastest aging country faces the largest increase in the social security contribution rate when labor market considerations are introduced the political effect still dominates but it is less sizeable country specific characteristics not accounted for in our simulations such as the degree of redistribution in the pension system and the existence of family ties in the society may also matter our simulations deliver a strong policy implication an increase in the effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen by the voters while often increasing its generosity finally delegation of pension policy to the ec may reduce political accountability and hence help to reform the systems

intergenerational altruism with future bias abstract we show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience this underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations we explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time we argue that future bias creates incentives to legislate and sustain a pay as you go pension system which every government views as a self enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old age transfers

media influence on vote choices unemployment news and incumbents electoral prospects how does news about the economy influence voting decisions we isolate the effect of the information environment from the effect of change in the underlying economic conditions themselves by taking

social security and family support this paper shows how the role of the market the state and the family in providing financial support at old age has evolved over time with changes in factors such as the reliability and the effectiveness of family support the rate of interest the cost of public funds and earning inequality we model a society in which agents with different productivity are asked to vote over the existence of a beveridgian pension system we show that when children assistance is certain and large agents may rely exclusively on family to finance old age consumption and prefer to vote for a zero tax rate only if income inequalities are very large a majority will be in favor of a pension system however when the size and the likelihood of family generosity decreases a pension system is more likely to emerge in that case agents supplement children assistance with pension benefits a pension system is also more likely to emerge when the cost of public fund is small and the return from private savings is high

the future of social security we analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security and equilibrium outcomes embedding a probabilistic voting setup of electoral competition in the standard olg model with capital accumulation we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism commitment or trigger strategies closed form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates a rising share of pensions in gdp but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree the response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old age consumption risk calibrated to match features of the u s economy the model suggests that in response to the projected demographic transition social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 other policies that distort labor supply will become less important labor supply therefore will rise in contrast with frequently voiced fears

social insurance with representative democracy in a representative democracy model we determine the preferred social insurance system we show that it corresponds to that which implies the lowest contribution rate when the risk aversion is high

what drives public acceptance of reforms longitudinal evidence from a dutch pension reform governments often find it hard to pursue economic reforms even if they eventually will benefit a majority of voters the literature remains inconclusive about the reasons for this some scholars on the one hand stress the role of distributional conflicts between different classes for instance dividing the young and the old in the case of pay as you go pensions others have highlighted that resistance to reform is rather broad based owing to the public s poor understanding of the need for reform this paper attempts to disentangle the drivers of public acceptance of reform by means of a case study the 2012 increase of the dutch statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 we exploit a unique longitudinal dataset on the attitudes of dutch households respecting pension reform in the 2003 2013 period our findings offer various new insights first we find that education occupational status and psychological traits were the most systematic drivers of reform preferences while age had a limited impact second and significantly we find that the year fixed effects were the main drivers of respondents acceptance of reform we interpret the pattern of the year coefficients as evidence of a collective learning process whereby households gradually updated their expectations and reform preferences in light of new information

the macroeconomics of early retirement early retirement was introduced after the appearance of redundant middle aged workers not entitled to pensions this distortionary policy reduces human capital accumulation and economic growth but shifts part of the tax burden on future generations why was it adopted alternative policies which do not introduce long term distortions but impose a larger cost on the current generation of workers were blocked by a coalition of high income workers who did not plan to retire early but sought to reduce the current tax burden and low income workers who expected to retire early and to benefit from the early retirement pension

suspiciously timed trade disputes abstract this paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes focusing on wto disputes filed by the united states during the 1995 2014 period we find that u s presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re election moreover u s trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states to explain these regularities we develop a theoretical model in which re election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity

voters commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs when will a vote seeking government pursue unpopular welfare reforms that are likely to cost it votes using a game theoretical model we show that a government enacts reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times but not during good ones the key reason is that voters cannot commit to re elect a government that does not reform during bad times this voters commitment problem stems from economic voting i e voters tendency to punish the government for a poorly performing economy the voter commitment problem provides an explanation for the empirical puzzle that governments sometimes enact reforms that voters oppose

overeducation in the labor market this article examines the reasons for the observed discrepancy between workers actual and required levels of schooling and the resulting differences in returns to schooling overeducated workers are found to be younger and to have lower amounts of on the job training than workers with the required level of schooling they also have higher rates of firm and occupational mobility characterized by movement of higher level occupations the findings suggest that overeducation can be explained by the trade off between schooling and other components of human capital and by the mobility patterns of overeducated workers

antisocial security the puzzle of beggar thy children policies the u s social security program has irrevocably transferred substantial wealth from workers to their ostensibly altruistic parents after some alternative explanations for this paradox are addressed a formal model is developed to show that a majority of rational voters who care about their descendants can support the preservation of current benefits for themselves but accept the prospect of social security s future retrenchment incorporating elements of tabellini s 2000 positive theory of social security and benabou and ok s 2001 analysis of income mobility the model identifies specific forces affecting this time varying individual support for social security these forces are embodied in three hypotheses related to income mobility relative income level and age an ordered logit analysis of cumulative anes data supports these hypotheses

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

retrospective voting an experimental study this essay reports on some experiments designed to study two candidate electoral competition when voters are retrospective voters the experiments consist of a sequence of elections in which subjects play the part of both voters and candidates in each election the incumbent adopts a policy position in a one dimensional policy space and voters are paid on the basis of single peaked utility function over that space for the position adopted by the incumbent neither voters nor candidates are informed of the voter utility functions and the only information received by the voter is the payoff he has received from the present and previous incumbent administrations despite the severely limited information of candidates and voters we find that generally candidates converge toward the median voter ideal point

exogenous shocks and democratic accountability evidence from the caribbean this study attempts to contribute to the growing debate over democratic accountability by focusing on the electoral impact of natural disasters and economic crises in the caribbean although largely ignored by political science the polities in the region share a long history of democratic governance as well as extreme vulnerability to adverse weather conditions and global economic fluctuations the caribbean thus offers unusually fertile opportunities for research on the capacity of voters to make rational electoral decisions two key questions are addressed first to what extent do citizens of the caribbean punish incumbents for exogenous economic and climatic shocks second what factors if any help to insulate democratic leaders from blame for conditions largely outside their control contrary to recent research on natural disasters and economic downturns in other contexts the analysis provides no evidence that voting in the caribbean has been characterized by systematic attribution errors or elec

some evidence concerning macroeconomic chaos abstract an empirical assessment of a linear stochastic perspective for canadian macroeconomic time series is presented the methods used are based on the mathematics of chaos present evidence suggests that low order deterministic chaos does not provide a satisfactory characterization of the data the absence of significant nonlinear structure for the investment and unemployment series is of particular note in light of past findings with american data the degree to which the use of a time trend can impose a pseudo structure on the data is illustrated

social security as trade among living generations we model u s social security that is legislated endogeneously by living generations specifically we consider the effects of social security on resource allocation and pareto optimality examining which generations gain from social security and whether some generations lose because saving and transfer decisions are made sequentially in the real world we use an infinite horizon overlapping generations framework in which life cycle saving and transfers to the old are determined by living agents we focus on the case in which agents are altruistic but place sufficiently greater weight on own comsumption than on the consumption of agents in other generations so that starting from a steady state without social security living agents would gain utility if consumption were shifted marginally to them from later generations excerpt

a positive theory of social security in many countries social security accounts for a large fraction of the government budget why is this so given that at any point in time the number of recipients of social security benefits is smaller than the number of contributors in the overlapping generations model studied in this paper all individuals currently alive vote on social security in every period in equilibrium the size of social security is larger the greater is the proportion of elderly people in the population and the greater is the inequality of pre tax income within each generation both predictions of the theory are supported by the empirical evidence in cross country data

sources of bias in retrospective decision making experimental evidence on voters limitations in controlling incumbents are citizens competent to assess the performance of incumbent politicians observational studies cast doubt on voter competence by documenting several biases in retrospective assessments of performance however these studies are open to alternative interpretations because of the complexity of the real world in this article we show that these biases in retrospective evaluations occur even in the simplified setting of experimental games in three experiments our participants 1 overweighted recent relative to overall incumbent performance when made aware of an election closer rather than more distant from that event 2 allowed an unrelated lottery that affected their welfare to influence their choices and 3 were influenced by rhetoric to give more weight to recent rather than overall incumbent performance these biases were apparent even though we informed and incentivized respondents to weight all performance equally our findings point to key limitations in voters ability to use a retrospective decision rule

voting inequality and redistribution this paper surveys models of voting on redistribution under reason able assumptions the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner if the median is poorer than average redistribution is from rich to poor and increasing inequality increases redistribution however under different assumptions about the economic environment redistribution may not be simply rich to poor and inequality need not increase redistribution several lines of argument are presented in particular political participation public provision of private goods public pensions and tax avoidance or evasion

primaries and candidate polarization behavioral theory and experimental evidence do primary elections cause candidates to take extreme polarized positions standard equilibrium analysis predicts full convergence to the median voter s position with complete information but behavioral game theory predicts divergence when players are policy motivated and have out of equilibrium beliefs theoretically i show that primary elections can cause greater extremism or moderation depending on the beliefs candidates and voters have about their opponents in a controlled incentivized experiment i find that candidates diverge substantially and that primaries have little effect on average positions voters employ a strategy that weeds out candidates who are either too moderate or too extreme which enhances ideological purity without increasing divergence the analysis highlights the importance of behavioral assumptions in understanding the effects of electoral institutions