strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining theory and data we develop a private information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm s willingness to pay previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike yet a prominent feature of u s collective bargaining is the holdout negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract we analyze the union s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment

measuring the quality of bank regulation and supervision with an application to transition economies i introduction financial sector development is closely associated with bank performance given that a major part of the financial sector is still accounted for by banks in a large part of the world banks play an essential role in resource allocation so long as depositors have confidence in the banking system s ability to pay the contracted return efficient transmission of resources by banks however can be threatened by adverse selection and moral hazard problems legal and institutional arrangements designed to achieve efficiency in resource allocation contribute to the soundness of the banking sector by reducing both the likelihood and the cost of such problems appropriately designed legal regulatory and supervisory frameworks and deposit insurance schemes constitute an essential part of such arrangements achieving a sound banking system via good regulation and supervision is not an end in itself however as it may also contribute to macroeconomic growth via improving efficiency in resource allocation 1 this article s contribution is twofold first it develops a general framework to evaluate the legal environment for regulation and supervision of the banking sector in doing that it proposes an extensive list of criteria a total of 98 criteria to measure the quality of bank regulation and supervision rs based on banking laws second using these criteria we construct indices of rs and empirically investigate the linkage between bank regulation and supervision quality and growth in transition economies banking laws lay out regulations with regard to bank ownership management asset structure operations reporting recording requirements and such we argue that the more rule based the legal regulatory framework the more transparent and thus easy to monitor are the bank operations this helps reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the banking sector 2 it is important to note however that the quality of regulation does not necessarily mean strictness of regulation rather by quality we mean the extent of coverage of the regulatory framework along with appropriate safeguards against the risks in the banking sector 3 good supervision reduces the likelihood and the extent of excessive risk taking by banks as a vehicle to ensure effective implementation of the regulatory practices supervision of the banking system is therefore as important for the health of the banking sector as regulation in addition a carefully designed deposit insurance scheme helps improve the quality of both regulation and supervision by mitigating the likelihood of the moral hazard problem in the banking sector these are all pertinent issues but measuring the quality of banking regulation and supervision is not a simple task like the measurement of the quality of any other institutional attribute the approach can be mainly of two kinds 1 evaluation of the letter of the law and 2 surveys the main advantage of measurement based on various legal attributes is to minimize subjective evaluations regarding an institution though it may have the disadvantage of not reflecting the practice especially in case the law is not fully adhered to on the other hand although surveys focus on practice they are also prone to possible subjective judgments of evaluators 4 both approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages but in this article we take the first approach 5 we nevertheless concede that additional information can be obtained by reconciling the approaches that can be complementary to each other to measure the legal bank regulation and supervision quality as objectively as possible we use various sources to develop a comprehensive set of criteria among these sources we primarily utilize the basle core principles bcps 6 other basle guidelines and documents see bcbs 1998a b 1999a b and the banking laws of individual countries

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output this paper characterizes monetary policy when policymakers are uncertain about the extent to which fluctuations in output and inflation are due to changes in potential output or to cyclical demand and cost shocks our results suggest an explanation for the inflation of the 1970s and the price stability of the 1990s it is shown that 1 policy is likely to be excessively loose for some time when there is a large decrease in potential output in comparison to a full information benchmark 2 retrospective policy errors and errors in forecasting potential output and the output gap are generally serially correlated 3 the increase in the fed s conservativeness between the 1970s and the 1990s implies that the information problem had greater consequences in the former period

patterns of transition from plan to market patterns of transition from plan to market martha de melo cevdet denizer and alan gelb hungary s bankruptcy experience 1992 1993 cheryl w gray sabine schlorke and miklos szanyi why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform jose edgardo campos and hadi salehi esfahani roads land use and deforestation a spatial model applied to belize kenneth m chomitz and david a gray industrial centralization in indonesia j vernon henderson and ari kuncoro guidlines on searching for a dalton improving tax reform an illustration with data from indonesia shlomo yitzhaki and jeffrey d lewis a new data set measuring income inequality klaus deininger and lyn squire

delays in renewal of labor contracts theory and evidence in many countries an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often protracted delay before the new contract is signed our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay it emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty the model is tested using israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent the empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model thus nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay and real uncertainty to decrease the delay but less in the public than in the private sector

who can adjust to the euro this study estimates potential exchange rate variation among 26 european countries during 1992 1998 as a proxy for the potential magnitude of adjustment they face to euro block membership using the instrumental variable iv method applying least squares cross section regression analysis based on optimal currency area theory a currency union among belgium denmark france germany ireland malta the netherlands and slovenia is found to entail a relatively light burden of adjustment for its members the current membership of other countries in the euro block is potentially very demanding on their societies in the long term this study also compares currency boards and independent central banks as alternative monetary frameworks for disinflation policies based on a pooled time series cross section dataset of the same countries and years currency boards are found to be more effective in reducing inflation in all countries except belgium balancing emu s credibility gains against its adjustment costs finland greece italy portugal and spain seem like unstable members of the euro block for all new eu member states except the czech republic malta slovenia and slovakia the advice is to stay out of the euro block until their economies are liberalised and flexible enough to withstand major adjustments and their societal interest groups supportive enough of these adjustments

political influence on the central bank international evidence political influence on the central bank is measured bere by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government the governor changes about half the time witbin six months of a nonconstitutional or other radical change of government a military coup or a restoration of democracy the governor is much less likely to change within six months following a routine change in the head of government about one fourth of the time in developing countries and one tenth in industrial countries these indicators vary across countries and correlate statistically with inflation and its variability and with real growth and real interest rates differences in the vulnerability of the central bank to political instability in political instability itself and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periods seem to be a major part of the explanation for why developing countries have on average higher and more variable inflation than industrial countries do

wage rigidity inflation and institutions we study the possible existence of downward nominal wage rigidity dnwr at wage growth rates different from zero in aggregate data even if dnwr prevails at zero for individual workers compositional effects might lead to falling aggregate wages while changes in relative wages combined with dnwr might lead to positive aggregate wage growth we explore industry data for 19 oecd countries over the 1971 2006 period we find evidence for a floor on nominal wage growth at 6 percent in the 1970s and 1980s at 1 percent in the 1990s and at 0 5 percent in the 2000s furthermore we find that dnwr is stronger in country years with strict employment protection legislation high union density centralized wage setting and high inflation

transitions at different moments in time a spatial probit approach this paper adopts a spatial probit approach to explain interaction effects among cross sectional units when the dependent variable takes the form of a binary response variable and transitions from state 0 to 1 occur at different moments in time the model has two spatially lagged variables one for units that are still in state 0 and one for units that had already transferred to state 1 the parameters are estimated on observations for those units that are still in state 0 at the start of the different time periods whereas observations on units after they transferred to state 1 are discarded just as in the literature on duration modeling furthermore neighboring units that had not yet transferred may have a different impact from units that had already transferred we illustrate our approach with an empirical study of the adoption of inflation targeting for a sample of 58 countries over the period 1985 2008 copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd

price stability and central bank independence discipline credibility and democratic institutions despite mixed empirical evidence in the past two decades central bank independence cbi has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure cbi seventy eight countries 1973 2008 we reexamine this relationship distinguishing the role of printing less money discipline from the public s beliefs about the central bank s likely actions credibility democracies differ from dictatorships in the likelihood of political interference and changes to the law because of the presence of political opposition and the freedom to expose government actions cbi in democracies should be directly reflected in lower money supply growth besides being more disciplinarian it also ensures a more robust money demand by reducing inflation expectations and therefore inflation empirical results are robust and support a discipline effect conditioned by political institutions as well as a credibility effect

variation in central bank independence across countries some provisional empirical evidence in this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested the predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias the higher political instability or the larger the government debt central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability we do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks

plant level concession bargaining the author investigates the reasons for the diversity in concession bargaining experience among plants in the meatpacking and tire industries in 1981 negotiations about one third of the plants in each industry engaged in concession bargaining and the others did not the author hypothesizes that this pattern resulted from interplant differences in the likelihood of layoffs or shutdowns measured by factors such as plant age and size relative wage level and nature of product regression analysis of the data from union and employer sources supports the author s hypothesis

bargaining and commitment in a permanent relationship abstract when bargaining over a flow of trades the players may decide themselves whether or not to continue trade during the bargaining previous work has shown that if one extends the rubinstein alternating offers bargaining model by adding the feature that one of the players the union in each period can choose whether to disrupt trade strike in that period then there is a multiplicity of equilibria this paper shows that if one of the players is able to commit to disrupt trade for two periods then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers j5 c78

central banks and seigniorage a study of three economies in transition abstract the paper examines the relations between central banks and other macro sectors in the czech republic hungary romania with respect to the creation and distribution of seigniorage taking austria and germany as a reference in economies in transition transfers of seigniorage from the central bank to the government and to the banking sector may appear as a natural way to soften the financial constraints of both sectors we propose a simple framework for the analysis of central bank seigniorage based on the opportunity cost approach and measure both the amount and allocation of seigniorage for the five countries in 1993 we find central bank seigniorage to be approximately four times our benchmark value in hungary and thirty times in romania the latter due to the high level of the inflation tax in hungary and romania most seigniorage is appropriated as an interest rate subsidy by the government in romania a large part also goes as a subsidy to the financial sector in none of the five countries we find that central banks retain an excessive amount of seigniorage for reserve accumulation or for current expenditures in the last part of the paper we discuss the implications of our findings on seigniorage for the evaluation of central bank independence vis a vis the government

the political economy of monetary institutions in recent decades countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions including alternative exchange rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions emphasizing their role in resolving both the time inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy this first generation work however suffers from a central limitation it studies exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other by contrast the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and central bank independence together and in so doing present a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions the articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions investigating how political institutions democratic processes political party competition and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives

a letter to the editor on wage bargaining abstract the rubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining model is problematic when applied to wage negotiations a strike or any other industrial action is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement because production can continue normally also when negotiations take place this paper extends the rubinstein model to incorporate the choice of calling a strike and it is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and that strikes with a length in real time can occur in equilibrium

central bank reform liberalization and inflation in transition economies an international perspective this paper develops extensive new data on the legal independence of new central banks in 26 former socialist economies fse this data is constructed using the codification system for measuring legal independence developed in cukierman webb and neyapti 1992 and in chapter 19 of cukierman 1992 this makes it comparable with earlier data on central bank independence cbi in the industrial democracies and in non fse developing countries and permits experimentation with alternative indices of cbi like those reviewed in eijffinger and van keulen 1995 the new indices of independence indicate that central bank cb reform in the fse during the nineties has been quite ambitious in spite of the large price shocks induced by the transformation from plan to market reformers in those countries chose to create central banks with levels of legal independence that are substantially higher on average than those of developed economies during the eighties based on data from 1989 through 1998 the evidence in the paper suggests that cbi is unrelated to inflation during the early stages of liberalization but for sufficiently high and sustained levels of liberalization and controlling for variables like price decontrols and wars legal cbi and inflation are significantly and negatively related these findings are consistent with the view that legal cbi no matter how high cannot contain the powerful inflationary impact of wide scale liberalization of formerly controlled prices but once the process of liberalization has gathered sufficient momentum legal independence becomes effective in slowing inflation down and the cumulative liberalization index developed by de melo et al 1996 becomes relatively less important the paper also presents evidence on factors that affect the level of cbi and examines the relation between inflation and cbi within a broader sample composed of the transition and of the developed economies

excessive deficits sense and nonsense in the treaty of maastricht maastricht s fiscal rules willem buiter giancarlo corsetti and nouriel roubini the maastricht treaty on economic and monetary union in the ec has specified limits on both government debt and fiscal deficits satisfying these criteria is necessary for getting into emu once inside violating these limits will also incur penalties the fiscal requirements especially the debt criterion are much tougher than is required to ensure public sector solvency trying to attain these targets will force the ec initially into substantial deflation and recession failure to correct for real growth inflation and the business cycle makes the nominal deficit a poor basis for any policy or target ambiguity about how fiscal targets will in fact be interpreted might provide a way out but cannot today be relied upon to do so supranational fiscal rules are sometimes claimed to be justified by externalities in national fiscal policies we find this justification wanting both in theory and empirically a better case might be built on the imposition of external commitments to offset domestic political distortions that systematically induce excessive deficits even so we conclude that the fiscal convergence criteria on balance are harmful and should be disregarded or applied very loosely to avoid the risk of serious fiscal overkill

macro prudential governance and central banks facts and drivers abstract the great crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing macro prudential architectures to address problems of financial stability central banks are always part of macro prudential settings but their role is far from being homogeneous across countries reflecting the fact that according to economic theory there are pros and cons in extending central bank influence to macro prudential supervision the issue is then genuinely empirical are there any meaningful drivers explaining the actual choices made by policymakers about the central bank s role in macro prudential governance we identify three potential drivers micro supervision involvement monetary policy discretion overall institutional independence and test for their relevance by analysing current institutional settings in 31 advanced and emerging market economies we find that central bankers already in charge of micro supervision and less politically independent are more likely to get extended macro prudential powers the same is true if they have low monetary policy discretion being constrained by a monetary stability objective we interpret these results by using a political economy perspective

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint una vez mas new latin american evidence evidence on the degree to which central bank independence can constrain government budget deficits remains surprisingly scarce this paper finds empirical support for the importance of the central institutional constraint for a 14 country sample of latin american countries over 1990 2012 these results suggest that greater central bank autonomy has indeed helped reign in fiscal excesses in a region that has been plagued by inflationary deficit expansion for much of the post war period the ability to potentially discipline government policy adds to an independent central bank s inherent role in adding to the checks and balances essential to a well functioning democracy

the expanding gender earnings gap evidence from the lehd 2000 census the gender earnings gap is an expanding statistic over the lifecycle we use the lehd census 2000 to understand the roles of industry occupation and establishment 14 years after leaving school the gap for college graduates 26 to 39 years old expands by 34 log points most occurring in the first 7 years about 44 percent is due to disproportionate shifts by men into higher earning positions industries and firms and about 56 percent to differential advances by gender within firms widening is greater for married individuals and for those in certain sectors non college graduates experience less widening but with similar patterns

union s threats and wage determination this paper considers local wage bargaining as a sequential game and focus es on how different rules of the game affect employment and equilibri um payment to workers and employers work to rule and other go slow t hreats lead to low employment while strike threats lead to high empl oyment an increase in the bargaining power of the union induces high er or unchanged equilibrium employment in the strike threat case whi le employment is reduced in the slow down case finally if all kinds of industrial actions are legal only one is credible which type de pends on the parameters of the model copyright 1988 by royal economic society

contract adjustment under uncertainty abstract consider trade in continuous time between two players the gains from trade are divided according to a contract and at each point in time either player may unilaterally induce a costly adjustment of the contract players payoffs from trade under the contract as well as from trade under an adjusted contract are exogenous and stochastic we consider players choice of whether and when to adjust the contract payment we show that there exists a nash equilibrium in thresholds where each player adjusts the contract whenever the contract payment relative to the outcome of an adjustment passes the threshold there is strategic substitutability in the choice of thresholds so that if one player becomes more active by choosing a threshold closer to unity the other player becomes more passive

checks and balances private information and the credibility of monetary commitments the authors develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power checks and balances the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs conversely the authors argue that central bank independence does not solve the problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation exchange rate pegs however mitigate these problems the authors present extensive evidence from cross country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions

wage bargaining and nominal rigidities abstract delays in wage negotiations do not necessarily mean work stoppage production can continue under the terms of the old contract while the parties are bargaining holdout this holdout option is included in a strategic bargaining game in addition to strike and lock out threats integrating the bargaining model in a standard macroeconomic framework it turns out that holdout threats will prevail under certain circumstances in this case wages will be rigid in nominal terms so that an increase in aggregate nominal demand increases aggregate output

striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents this paper models the wage contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide in each period whether or not to strike for the duration of that period we show that there exist subgame perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement although both parties are completely rational and fully informed this has implications for other inefficient phenomena such as tariff wars debt negotiations and wars in general we characterize the set of equilibria show that strikes can occur in real time and discuss extensions of the model such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities copyright 1991 by american economic association

why firms avoid cutting wages survey evidence from european firms firms very rarely cut nominal wages even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks this paper uses a unique survey of fourteen european countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages the paper examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts concerns about the retention of productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm types restrictions created by collective bargaining were found to be an important consideration for firms in western european eu 15 countries but were one of the lowest ranked obstacles in the new eu member states in central and eastern europe

downward wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a monetary union this paper analyses the implications of heterogeneity in the type of downward wage rigidity nominal or real for optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric wage adjustment costs indexation in one region of the union reduces optimal grease inflation in the presence of common productivity shocks large common shocks may have sizeable and persistent effects on the intra union terms of trade whereby the region characterized by downward real wage rigidity adjusts with a persistent loss of competitiveness in response to asymmetric productivity shocks there is no role for grease inflation because relative price changes facilitating the real wage changes dominate the adjustment mechanism

exchange rate regimes and independent central banks a correlated choice of imperfectly credible institutions theory and empirical evidence show that low inflation is a precondition for economic growth independent central banks and fixed exchange rates are institutional mechanisms that help keep inflation low by lending monetary policy credibility to governments however the two institutions are commonly analyzed as substitutes that tie the hands of inflation prone governments thus the literature has difficulties describing why governments would adopt both institutions and the interaction between them this paper presents a model that allows policymakers the simultaneous choice of monetary institutions and shows that imperfectly credible institutions will overlap when exchange rates are fixed but adjustable and central bank independence is not fully ascertainable governments choose both institutions more generally the paper generates hypotheses about the conditions that make fixed exchange rates and independent central banks complements or substitutes thus contributing to an explanation of the diversity of global monetary institutions in the post bretton woods period

globalization pressures and the state the worldwide spread of central bank independence the authors examine the impact of globalization on state structures in the specific instance of the central bank following the world system world society and neoinstitutional perspectives in sociology they assume that states are in cultural political and economic competition with each other thereby seeking to maintain their position and status frequently by adopting organizational forms or practices that make them isomorphic with their environment the authors predict that countries boost the independence of their central bank from the political power as their exposure to foreign trade investment and multilateral lending increases they also model the cross national dynamic process of diffusion of central bank independence by examining the impact of cohesive and role equivalent trade relationships between countries they find support for their hypotheses with information on 71 countries between 1990 and 2000

exchange rate proclamations and inflation fighting credibility if governments choose economic policies that often run counter to their public commitments are those commitments meaningless we argue that govern ment proclamations can be critical in signaling economic policy intentions we focus on the realm of exchange rate policy in which countries frequently implement an exchange rate regime that differs from the officially declared regime we argue that the official exchange rate regime is one of the most important signals of a government s economic policy preferences when a government makes a de jure public commit ment to a fixed exchange rate it sends a signal to domestic and international markets of its strict monetary policy priorities in contrast a government that proclaims a floating exchange rate signals a desire to retain discretion over monetary policy even if it has implemented a de facto fixed rate we use data on 110 developed and devel oping countries from 1974 to 2004 to test two hypotheses first that governments that adopt de facto fixed exchange rates will experience less inflation when they back up their actions with official declarations and second that governments that abide by their commitments as demonstrated by a history of following through on their public declarations of a fixed exchange rate regime will establish greater inflation fighting credibility within developing countries democratic institutions enhance this credibility results from fixed effects econometric models provide strong support for our hypotheses

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

replacing a disobedient central bank governor with a docile one a novel measure of central bank independence and its effect on inflation this paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor i the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and ii whether his her replacement is an ally of the government we identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government we find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

are bilateral remittances countercyclical by putting together a relatively large data set on bilateral remittances of emigrants this paper is able to shed light on the important hypothesis of smoothing the smoothing hypothesis is that remittances are countercyclical with respect to income in the worker s country of origin the recipient of the remittance while procyclical with respect to income in the migrant s host country the sender of the remittance the econometric results confirm the hypothesis this affirmation of smoothing is important for two reasons first it suggests that remittances should be placed on the list of criteria for an optimum currency area second it brings into doubt plans by governments in some developing countries to harness remittances for their own use in that government spending in these countries generally fails the test of countercyclicality which remittances pass

rough sets and the role of the monetary policy in financial stability macroeconomic problem and the prediction of insolvency in insurance sector microeconomic problem abstract this paper faces two questions related with financial stability the first one is a macroeconomic problem in which we try to further investigate the role of monetary policy in explaining banking sector fragility and ultimately systemic banking crisis it analyses a large sample of countries in the period 1981 1999 we find that the degree of central bank independence is one of the key variables to explain financial crisis however the effects of the degree of independence are not linear surprisingly either a high degree of independence or a high degree of dependence are compatible with a situation of financial stability while intermediate levels of independence are more likely associated with financial crisis it seems that it is the uncertainty related with a non clear allocation of monetary policy responsibilities that contributes to financial crisis episodes the second one is a microeconomic problem the prediction of insolvency in insurance companies this question has been a concern of several parties stemmed from the perceived need to protect general public and to minimize the costs associated such as the effects on state insurance guaranty funds or the responsibilities for management and auditors we have developed a bankruptcy prediction model for spanish non life insurance companies and the results obtained are very encouraging in comparison with previous analysis this model could be used as an early warning system for supervisors in charge of the soundness of these entities and or in charge of the financial system stability most methods applied in the past to tackle these two problems are techniques of statistical nature and variables employed in these models do not usually satisfy statistical assumptions what complicates the analysis we propose an approach to undertake these questions based on rough set theory

importing credible monetary policy a way for transition economies to fight inflation abstract in the 1990s transition economies were rearranging their monetary regimes this paper compares the chosen regimes based on the level of discretionary power and the ability to control inflation results show that non discretionary regimes produce lower and more stable inflation