interfering with secondary markets we present a model to address in a unified manner four ways in which a monopolist can interfere with secondary markets in the model consumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality so that used good markets play an allocative role our results are the following 1 in contrast to swan s famous independence result a monopolist does not provide socially optimal durability 2 allowing the monopolist to rent does not restore socially optimal durability and increases the monopolist s market power in the used market however forcing the monopolist to sell the goods may be a bad policy because it would lead to either lower output or lower durability 3 the manufacturer benefits from a well functioning used good market despite the fact that used goods provide competition for new goods 4 the monopolist prefers to restrict consumers abilities to maintain the good

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

political economy of public education non college bound students my previous research showed that two important changes in the political environment of public schools growing teacher unionization and a shift of funding responsibility to state governments adversely affected the performance of college bound students here i show similar impacts for public school students who do not go to college these effects are found in analyses of 1971 91 changes in a school performance measure derived from individual scores on the armed forces qualifying test comparative analysis of performance trends in different areas of the same state suggests that the adverse performance effects of teacher unionization and spending centralization stem from their impact on state educational policy rather than on the direct operation of schools these adverse effects are also found for students in the lower tail of achievement and for black students they are not plausibly related to broader political and social changes

product durability and market structure some evidence changes in product durability disturb existing supply and demand relationships whether they occur ultimately depends on expected profits and therefore on the degree of competition among sellers in competitive markets the firm is constrained by the actions of other producers being slow to introduce an innovation may force it to leave the industry as consumers turn to the improved products of competitors will the monopolist who faces no such immediate constraints produce a different quality of product from that which would emerge from competitive markets specifically will product durability be different under alternative industry structures if so will monopoly competition or some monopolistically competitive structure produce the better product the conventional view associated most closely with the work of martin 28 kleiman and ophir 22 levhari and srinivasan 24 and schmalensee 45 asserts that monopolistic firms are likely to shorten product life from that obtainable under competition the counter or revisionist position argued most convincingly by swan 48 49 states that monopolistic firms will not reduce product durability but instead will extract the monopoly toll by charging higher prices for fewer units of the optimum competitive durability although swan s revisionist formulation successfully overturned the conventional view given the latter s assumptions the assumptions themselves have become central to the continuing debate in short under various assumptions both competition and monopoly have been singled out as providing the most congenial environment for reductions in durability 1

school performance and the youth labor market we estimate how 1970 90 changes in an outcome based measure of school quality state average test scores affected changes in earnings for those leaving high school to enter a state s labor force we find that a one standard deviation deterioration in a state s relative test score performance is associated with a 3 or 5 sd reduction in average wages of young entrants to the labor force we also find a similar decline in college matriculation there is weak evidence that the school quality effect on earnings diminishes as labor force entrants acquire experience

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non marketable good this good is valued by a single principal and there is a verifiable measure of the agent s performance crucially the agent is intrinsically motivated due to warm glow altruism in addition the agent s budget which is controlled by the principal must not be less than the monetary performance cost faced by the agent this gives rise to a limited liability constraint it also restricts the agent s ability to under report costs in such environment we determine the link between the agent s budget and performance our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal agent problem and to most in the literature on mission motivated organisations and public services provision

on the incentive effects of job rotation abstract a new employee may work hard to build his reputation this effect is greatest when he starts the longer he is employed at his job the more the firm will already have learned about his ability the incentives for an employee to influence the firm s perceptions of his ability decrease over time if rotating the employee to a different job leads to new uncertainty about his ability this generates a fresh impulse for effort however job rotation also reduces the employee s time horizon thus reducing future rents from reputation this trade off leads to a unique optimum we derive a simple rule of thumb for an optimal rotation time our main results still hold for cases of complete but imperfect information transmission the incentive effects of job rotation also prevail in a setting in which skills are job specific we study several extensions rotations across multiple employees absence of commitment to a rotation time different bargaining positions discounting over time and learning by doing effects

the impact of local funding on the technical efficiency of oklahoma schools abstract the parameters of a stochastic production frontier and the determinants of x inefficiency are estimated simultaneously using a maximum likelihood estimator mle proposed by battese and coelli empirical eco 20 1995 325 the purpose is to test the effect of local control and funding on public school x inefficiency

monopoly distortions in durability and multi dimensional quality i show that swan s 1970 independence result requires a multiplicative interaction between durability and all other quality attributes because there is no compelling argument for a multiplicativity in quality monopolists tend to distort durability even with constant marginal costs distortions in durability and other quality aspects are aligned exactly when the marginal cost of quality do not increase too much with durability

planned obsolescence as an incentive device for unobservable quality stressing the multi dimensional character of quality i propose a new theory of planned obsolescence as an incentive device that benefits consumers i argue that planned obsolescence increases the frequency of repurchases and therefore enables consumers to punish producers faster for a lack of overall quality this strengthens the producers incentives to provide adequate levels of quality the theory implies a trade off between a good s durability and its other unobservable quality attributes this leads to an artificially high degree of obsolescence as compared to the first best where quality is observable

leviathan and competition among jurisdictions the case of benefit taxation abstract this paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and thus helps to tame leviathan governments however this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government in the case of benefit taxes e g user charges a leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum sum taxes

indexation and inflationary inertia brazil 1964 1985 some governments facing high rates of inflation have adopted wage and exchange rate indexation in an attempt to offset the costs to workers and exporters but indexation based on past values of inflation is considered to be a powerful source of current and future inflation that undermines fiscal and monetary stringency designed to reduce inflation brazil indexed wages and the exchange rate for more than twenty years the authors derive a transfer function and estimate time varying parameters to allow for the changes in indexing policy over the period the authors find that the increased frequency of wage and exchange rate adjustment amplified the effect of past inflation and made it less sensitive to monetary and fiscal policies and more vulnerable to domestic agricultural supply shocks indexing did not eliminate the effectiveness of monetary policy however which retained a significant effect throughout the indexation period

good principals or good peers parental valuation of school characteristics tiebout equilibrium and the incentive effects of competition among jurisdictions good principals or good peers parental valuation of school characteristics tiebout equilibrium and the incentive effects of competition among jurisdictions by j esse m r othstein school choice policies may by aligning admin istrators incentives with parental demand yield improved efficiency in educational production milton friedman 1962 john e chubb and terry m moe 1990 but eric a hanushek 1981 cautions if the efficiency of our school systems is due to poor incentives for teachers and admin istrators coupled with poor decision making by consumers it would be unwise to expect much from programs that seek to strengthen market forces in the selection of schools p 35 empha sis added poor decision making is not required parents may rationally choose schools with pleasant surroundings athletic facilities cultural advantages ibid p 34 over those that most efficiently pursue academic performance they may prefer poorly run schools with good peer groups over those that are more effective but en roll worse students j douglas willms and frank h echols 1992 1993 or they may simply be unable to identify effective schools thomas j kane and douglas o staiger 2002 any factor that leads parents to choose any but the most effective available schools will tend to dilute the incentives for efficient management that choice might otherwise create this study examines the distribution of stu dent outcomes across schools within metropol itan housing markets for evidence on parental demand economists have long noted that par ents choices among residential locations are potentially informative about how more com plete choice systems may operate charles m tiebout 1956 melvin v borland and roy m howsen 1992 caroline m hoxby 2000 rothstein 2005 1 i ask whether school effec tiveness plays a sufficiently important role in these decisions to create meaningful incentives for more productive school management i adopt a specific understanding of effective ness appropriate to the question at hand a substantial portion of between school differ ences in student performance can be attributed to differences in student body composition this portion includes the effects of individual stu dent characteristics on their own test scores any direct peer group effects and any indirect ef fects of a school s composition on the quality of its instruction if wealthy schools attract better teachers joseph r antos and sherwin rosen 1975 or more parental involvement this is for my purposes a peer effect it depends on the quality of the school s administration only via school composition a school administrator cannot attract demand by offering a school with wealthy students as these can be offered only if wealthy families demand the school in the first place only the remaining portion of a school s contribution to test scores is effectiveness 2 department of economics and woodrow wilson school princeton university wallace hall 3 rd floor princeton nj 08544 e mail jrothst princeton edu i thank alan auerbach tom davidoff caroline hoxby jus tin mccrary rob mcmillan john quigley cecilia rouse emmanuel saez till von wachter four anonymous refer ees editor robert moffitt seminar participants at several institutions and especially david card for helpful sugges tions i am grateful to the college board for essential data and to a national science foundation graduate research fellowship and the fisher center for real estate and urban economics at uc berkeley for funding see cecilia elena rouse 1998 julie b cullen et al 2005 william g howell et al 2002 and alan b krueger and pei zhu 2004 for analyses of several existing nonresidential choice programs though none focuses on the particular issue studied here this definition avoids the need to find observable de terminants of effectiveness which have proved elusive hanushek 1986 my definition however ignores a school s contribution to nontest outcomes e g sports or music if such outcomes motivate parental choices i will conclude that parents do not demand effective schools of

does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers tiebout choice among districts is the most powerful market force in american public education naive estimates of its effects are biased by endogenous district formation i derive instruments from the natural boundaries in a metropolitan area my results suggest that metropolitan areas with greater tiebout choice have more productive public schools and less private schooling little of the effect of tiebout choice works through its effect on household sorting this finding may be explained by another finding students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser degrees of tiebout choice among districts

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

the effect of government corruption on the efficiency of us commercial airports abstract in this paper we argue that the cost of providing public goods is affected by local government corruption because bureaucrats have no strong incentives to pursue mandated tasks under a corrupt environment commercial airports in the united states are chosen to demonstrate such impacts of corruption we first develop a theory which predicts the impacts of corruption on productivity and variable input allocation of airports we then test the predictions by estimating a stochastic variable cost frontier model which incorporates both technical and allocative efficiency of airports the empirical evidence confirms the theoretical predictions by revealing the following 1 airports are less productive in more corrupt environments and 2 airports tend to use more contracting out to replace in house labor in more corrupt environments the findings can be applied to the context of other public goods and have important policy implications for reforming governance structure of public good provision

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

the dynamics of chronic inflation in brazil 1968 1985 this article develops an error correction model with the aim of analyzing the behavior of prices during a period of chronic inflation in brazil the degree of inflationary inertia is estimated and tests for the importance of disequilibria in the domestic money foreign goods labor and domestic goods markets on inflation are carried out

a new perspective on planned obsolescence automobile manufacturers have long had a policy of introducing annual style changes into their new model cars textbook publishers have a policy of periodically bringing out revised editions of their popular books recently ibm changed the operating system used in its personal computers causing a reduction in the compatibility between its old and new machines if one were to ask the typical man in the street to explain what is happening in these markets he would not hesitate before giving the following answer in economists terminology he would say that for the above firms the incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete is too high i e the firms have an incentive to practice planned obsolescence of course just as is true for the man in the street economists have also long observed and commented on the speed with which new products are introduced for example galbraith 1958 suggests that the annual model changes of automobile manufacturers are socially wasteful while fisher griliches and kaysen 1962 provide empirical estimates of the costs of these changes there have also been numerous theoretical attempts to model the idea of planned obsolescence or the related idea of killing off the market for secondhand goods but most of these models have in fact considered the choice a monopolist faces concerning how much durability to build initially into his product rather than the monopolist s incentive to introduce new versions of his product over time 1 in this paper i consider planned obsolescence from the standpoint of a firm that can change the nature of what it sells and show that the man in the street is in fact correct in many settings the incentive for a durable goods monopolist to introduce new products that make old units obsolete will be above that which is socially optimal

planned obsolescence and the r d decision by investing in rd i e the r d choice that maximizes current profitability does not maximize overall profitability the result is that if output is sold rather than rented then in its r d decision the monopolist has an incentive to practice a type of planned obsolescence that lowers its own profitability

performance competition in local media markets abstract this paper investigates the impact of tax and public service performance on english local government popularity by using data on local property taxes service performance ratings and local election results after the introduction of a system of evaluation of local government performance comprehensive performance assessment the evidence emerging from estimation of a re election equation offers a somewhat more rounded portrait of the voter than the conventional fiscal conservative icon by highlighting the beneficial consequences of public service performance on government popularity and pointing to the role of local media networks the bbc regional television local radio and web network in shaping consensus by spreading tax related information

network externality compatibility choice and planned obsolescence this paper attempts to provide a formal theory of planned obsolescence based on incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities the author explores how a monopolist s ability to make the new product incompatible with the old version of a product constrains the optimal dynamic behavior of the monopolist the social optimum and the market equilibrium are compared finally the possibility of quality distortion is considered as a commitment mechanism to the future compatibility choice copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

evaluating efficient public good provision theory and evidence from a generalised conditional efficiency model for public libraries abstract provision of most public goods e g health care libraries education police fire protection utilities can be characterized by a two stage production process in the first stage basic inputs e g labor and capital are used to generate service potential e g opening hours materials which is then in the second stage transformed into observed outputs e g school outcomes library circulation crimes solved as final outputs are also affected by demand side factors conflating both production stages likely leads to biased inferences about public productive in efficiency and its determinants hence this paper uses a specially tailored fully non parametric efficiency model allowing for both outlying observations and heterogeneity to analyse efficient public good provision in stage one only we thereby employ a dataset comprising all 290 flemish public libraries our findings suggest that ideological stance of the local government wealth and density of the local population and source of library funding i e local funding versus intergovernmental transfers strongly affect library productive efficiency

evidence on the impact of state government on primary and secondary education and the equity efficiency trade off abstract state governments may affect the productivity of primary and secondary education in two ways first various regulations imposed on local school districts are expected to make schools less efficient second state efforts to reduce inequality in education spending make it more difficult for voters to increase school quality which should lead to less voter monitoring of schools and thus less efficient schools our empirical analysis of state scholastic aptitude test sat scores from 1987 to 1992 provides evidence on both effects the state s revenue share which captures state meddling in local decisions has the expected negative impact on school efficiency but our novel result is that state induced spending equalization also lowers average test scores but has had little if any effect on reducing the disparity in student achievement these results bring into question policy efforts designed to shift education responsibilities from local governments to state and federal governments

inflationary rigidities and orthodox stabilization policies lessons from latin america orthodox stabilization programs in latin american countries have been notoriously unsuccessful in combating inflation despite the imposition of stringent cuts in government deficits in most cases inflation came down only slowly and temporarily with concomitant declines in growth and employment the bolivian program one of the only latin american successes is contrasted with those of argentina brazil chile and mexico the problems of dealing with chronic inflation are compared with those of hyperinflationary countries and the influence of price and wage rigidities expectations and credibility is explored the study shows that fiscal restraint is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success and that sound management of nominal variables the exchange rate and money supply are also necessary the critical role of credibility is linked with price and wage rigidities in the chronic inflation countries whereas the unsuitability of hyperinflation is seen to increase the credibility of and thus the potential for successful stabilization programs

competition in the public school sector evidence on strategic interaction among us school districts abstract this paper provides evidence on strategic interaction among local school districts the analysis makes use of a significant change in the institutional environment for school districts in michigan in 1996 when the state established a voluntary inter district choice program the school districts participation decisions are modelled as discrete choice decisions using a spatial latent variable model strong effects are found saying that lagged adoptions of neighbors positively affect the current probability of participation a simple test exploiting limitations of student mobility in inter district transfers suggests that the driving force for interdependencies among adoption decisions was competition for students

competition in public service provision the role of not for profit providers abstract with public services such as health and education it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision many such services are provided by monopoly not for profit providers and there is concern that for profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality this paper explores the implications of entry by for profit providers when there is unobserved quality the model generates three key policy relevant insights first by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms it frames the relevant trade offs precisely second it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not for profit as an active provider third it characterizes the optimal payment or voucher value to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically

are efficiency and equity in school finance substitutes or complements this paper analyzes cases made for local and centralized school finance and policies such as vouchers categorical aid and equalization aid an ideal system of school finance would achieve efficiency and equity by ensuring every person invests in the amount of schooling that is socially optimal for him the author evaluates the empirical evidence for and the merit and importance of arguments for each policy she concludes that the theoretical arguments for centralized finance not only exaggerate the efficiency equity tradeoff but actually make better arguments for a system combining local school finance with categorical aid and means tested vouchers

parallel imports and repair services abstract this study explores the welfare effects of parallel imports when the producer may refuse to provide repair services for parallel imported units which reduces the degree of price convergence between countries if the probability of the product s breakdown is endogenously determined by the producer permitting parallel imports could increase the probability because a higher probability leads to a larger price gap as a result it is possible that prices increase and welfare deteriorates in both countries this negative welfare effect is more likely to emerge as the liberalization of trade in goods proceeds the prohibition of service discrimination recovers the positive welfare effect

the productivity of schools and other local public goods producers abstract i construct an agency model of local public goods producers in which households make tiebout choices among jurisdictions in a world of imperfect information and costly residential mobility i examine producers effort and rent under local property tax finance and centralized finance i show that if there are a sufficient number of jurisdictions conventional local property tax finance can attain about as much productivity as a social planner with centralized finance can even if the social planner is armed with more information than a real social planner could plausibly have the key insight is that decentralized tiebout choices make some information the social planner would need verifiable and other information unnecessary

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

assessing the importance of tiebout sorting local heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990 this paper argues that long run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods the tiebout hypothesis we develop an extension of the tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must weakly increase given the secular decline in mobility costs these predictions can be evaluated using historical data we find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across i a sample of u s municipalities 1870 1990 ii all boston area municipalities 1870 1990 and iii all u s counties 1850 1990

property taxation as incentive for cost control empirical evidence for utility services in norway recent theoretical research suggests that property taxation has incentive effects that can help control cost problems in the public sector the institutional setting in norway allows this first empirical investigation of the incentive effect of property taxation since we can separate between local governments with and without property tax the raw data of the variation in the unit cost level for utilities show that local governments with property tax have about 20 lower unit cost using both linear regression and propensity score matching we are not able to wash out the difference in unit costs our interpretation is that having a visible and controversial local tax related to property stimulates voter interest in local government activities and thereby may help cost control the incentive effect is of interest for the design of fiscal federalism

education distributive justice and adverse selection we consider a model of education planning in an economy in which agents differ in their costs of acquiring education the agents cost parameter called talent is not observed the principal is endowed with a fixed sum of money with which two types of transfer can be made in cash and in kind the principal can finance transfers in kind called help by means of schooling expenditures which reduce the agent s education cost the principal seeks to maximize a social welfare function which is a ces index of utility levels we study the optimal allocation of individual education effort schooling expenditures help and cash under self selection and budget constraints assuming first that the set of types is finite and that help and effort are sufficiently substitutable we find that individual education investment levels are an increasing function and help is a decreasing function of talent utility levels cannot be equalized because of self selection constraints more aversion for inequality unequivocally leads to more inequality of educational achievements and to more assistance through redistribution this remains true in the limit under strictly egalitarian preferences of the principal the same qualitative properties hold in the general case of a continuum of types bunching at the lower end of the talent scale is a feature of the solution for sufficiently high degrees of inequality aversion

adverse selection in durable goods markets we present a dynamic model of adverse selection to examine the interactions between new and used goods markets we find that the used market never shuts down the volume of trade can be large and distortions are lower than previously thought new cars prices can be higher under adverse selection than in its absence an extension to several brands that differ in reliability leads to testable predictions of the effects of adverse selection unreliable brands have steeper price declines and lower volumes of trade we contrast these predictions with those of a model where brands physically depreciate at different rates

second generation fiscal federalism the implications of fiscal incentives abstract first generation fiscal federalism fgff studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners second generation fiscal federalism sgff studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials the paper focuses on three aspects of sgff first it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers while fgff emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity sgff emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity sgff extends fgff approaches by showing how non linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth second the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies third the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism

regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum we analyze educational institutions incentives to set up demanding or lax curricula in duopolistic markets for education with endogenous enrolment of students we assume that there is a positive externality of student achievement on the local economy comparing the case of regulated tuition fees with an unregulated market we identify the following ine ciencies under regulated tuition fees schools will set up ine ciently lax curricula in an attempt to please low quality students even if schools internalize some of the externality on the other hand unregulated schools set up excessively di erentiated curricula in order to relax competition in tuition fees deregulation gets more attractive if a larger fraction of the externality is internalized

the neo luddite s lament excessive upgrades in the software industry we examine two reasons why a monopoly supplier of software may introduce more upgrades than is socially optimal when the upgrade is backward but not forward compatible so users who upgrade reduce others network benefits one explanation involves a commitment problem profits and social welfare may suffer because ex post the monopolist will want to sell the upgraded product to new consumers the second involves consumer heterogeneity here oversupply arises from the difference between the externality that upgrades impose on the marginal and average consumer and from the effect of upgrades on sales of the base good