rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations a development perspective abstract financial self help groups in low income countries consist of two basic types rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations or roscas and ascras in the ascra funds are not immediately withdrawn but are left to grow for loan making comparing the two groups the author finds similarities and differences efforts to rectify the rosca s shortcomings have prompted many innovations and given birth to a hybrid preserving the best of both types in constant adaptation to changing environments

rotating savings and credit associations credit markets and efficiency this paper examines the allocative performance of rotating savings and credit associations roscas a financial institution which is observed world wide we develop a model in which individuals save for an indivisible good and study roscas which distribute funds using random allocation and bidding the allocations achieved by the two types of rosca are compared with that achieved by a credit market and with efficient allocations more generally we find that neither type of rosca is efficient and that individuals are better off with a credit market than a bidding rosca nonetheless a random rosca may sometimes yield a higher level of ex ante expected utility to prospective participants than would a credit market i introduction rotating savings and credit associations roscas are a widely observed institution for financial intermediation they are found all over the world particularly in developing countries and have heretofore received scant attention from economists this paper and its companion piece besley coate and loury 1993 constitute a first attempt to analyse their economic role and performance roscas come in two main forms the first type allocates funds randomly in a random rosca members commit to putting a fixed sum of money into a pot for each period of the rosca s life lots are drawn and the pot is randomly allocated to one of the members in the next period the process repeats itself with each previous winner excluded from the draw the process continues until each rosca member has received the pot once at this point the rosca is either disbanded or begins over again individuals may also form a bidding rosca in which the pot is allocated via a bidding procedure the individual who

the economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation this paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations roscas detailed evidence from roscas in a kenyan slum nairobi suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income to explain this phenomenon we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption the empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in kenya

ingratiation experimental evidence we investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion conformity both individuals performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover in some treatments first movers can change their opinion after learning that held by the second mover we find evidence of high ingratiation indices as opinion conformity is rewarded however second movers reward conformity less when it is common knowledge that opinions can be manipulated strategically introducing a monetary cost for changing opinion reduces ingratiation introducing performance related pay for the second mover makes ingratiation less rewarding but does not eliminate it completely reducing the noise in the measurement of ability has little effect

roscas as financial agreements to cope with self control problems abstract we consider a model in which people with limited self control can sign binding financial agreements among themselves thereby forming coalitions we show that these financial agreements may help them to alleviate their self control problems we then demonstrate that there exists a stable structure of coalitions in which people form rotating savings and credit associations roscas we therefore provide a behavioral rationale for one of the most prevalent and puzzling financial institutions in developing countries finally we derive and discuss some empirical predictions

saving more in groups field experimental evidence from chile abstract we test the impact of a peer group program on savings in a sample of microcredit clients we conduct two randomized trials among these 2687 microcredit clients the first finds that a savings group treatment which combines public goal setting monitoring in the group and non financial rewards increases savings in a new savings account significantly the number of deposits grows 3 7 fold and the average balance almost doubles in contrast a more classical measure a substantially increased interest rate has no effect for most participants and raises the savings balance only for the very top of the distribution a second experiment conducted a year later tests an alternative delivery mechanism and shows that effects of similar size can be achieved through feedback text messages without meetings rewards or peer pressure given that participants are borrowing at 90 apr we discuss how and when saving more could be harmful or beneficial

roscas in urban ethiopia are the characteristics of the institutions more important than those of members abstract using household data from urban ethiopia we provide an empirical test of the economic theory of rotating savings and credit associations roscas and identify the impact of roscas and member characteristics on participation and volume of saving unlike other studies we account for the endogeneity of all rosca variables muslims individuals who live in richer households the self employed private sector employees and households with large numbers of women are more likely to join roscas a robust finding is that the savings are significantly affected by the characteristics of the members but not that of the informal saving institution some policy implications are discussed

nonmarket institutions for credit and risk sharing in low income countries the design credit and risk institutions in low income countries provides one of the most exciting testing grounds for theories of contracting with imperfect information and limited enforcement this paper reviews some of the recent literature with a special focus on nonmarket institutions that cope with risk and provide credit this literature attempts to bring together insights from economic theory especially information economics contract theory and mechanism design theory however it is also applied being motivated by the circumstance of the poor countries that their authors have visited and studied

procrastination and obedience in this lecture i shall focus on situations involving repeated decisions with time inconsistent behavior although each choice may be close to maximizing and therefore result in only small losses the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors may be quite large thus in my examples decision makers are quite close to the intelligent well informed individuals usually assumed in economic analysis but cumulatively they make seriously wrong decisions that do not occur in standard textbook economics this lecture discusses and illustrates several pathological modes of individual and group behavior procrastination in decision making undue obedience to authority membership of seemingly normal individuals in deviant cult groups and escalation of commitment to courses of action that are clearly unwise in each case individuals choose a series of current actions without fully appreciating how those actions will affect future perceptions and behavior the standard assumption of rational forwardlooking utility maximizing is violated the nonindependence of errors in decision making in the series of decisions can be explained with the concept from cognitive psychology of undue salience or vividness for example present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs

the role of roscas lumpy durables or event insurance abstract the stylised representation of roscas in recent theoretical work as a device driven by impatience for lumpy consumer durables misses the important insurance role of this pervasive informal financial institution in the developing world that insurance role explains why roscas with concurrent bidding are the dominant means of determining the sequence and pricing of allocations in roscas so structured the recipient and the implied interest rate for each period s allotment are determined by competitive bids at the time of distribution we use an example of an actual bidding rosca to demonstrate the extent of unpredictable needs for funds as reflected in the volatility of interest rates implicit in winning bids

poverty and self control we argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self control in line with a distinguished psychological literature we consider modes of self control that involve the self imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards we study settings in which consumers with quasi hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self control trapping people in poverty while individuals with high initial assets can accumulate indefinitely thus even temporary policies that initiate accumulation among the poor may be effective we examine implications concerning the effect of access to credit on saving the demand for commitment devices the design of financial accounts to promote accumulation and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across income from different sources we also explore the nature of optimal self control demonstrating that it has a simple and behaviorally plausible structure that is immune to self renegotiation

the economics of rotating savings and credit associations supported by the center for energy policy studies m i t and the japanese corporate associates program at the kennedy school of government

the economics of rotating savings and credit associations evidence from the jamaican partner abstract using a unique sample of rotating savings and credit association rosca members from jamaica we provide the first econometric tests of the recent theoretical advances in the literature on roscas and find considerable support for an economic theory of roscas we find for example that payments to the rosca leader significantly enhance the sustainability of the rosca and that the contractual relationship between the leader and other rosca members is transaction cost minimizing when the degree of asset specificity is higher the contract is more flexible other theoretical predictions we validate are the inverse relationship between size of rosca and size of contribution and the use of rosca funds for durable goods purchase

commitment savings in informal banking markets abstract i study the provision of commitment savings by informal banks to sophisticated hyperbolic discounters since a consumer is subject to temptation in the period that he signs a contract banks might exploit his desire for instant gratification even as they help him to commit for the future without banking savings decisions and welfare are not monotonic in the degree of time inconsistency consequently commitment savings will lower welfare for moderately time inconsistent agents if loan contracts are enforceable pure commitment savings will disappear this will further lower welfare if the lender is a profit maximizing bank but raise welfare if the lender is a welfare maximizing ngo finally i consider the coexistence of a bank and ngo there will be zero takeup of ngo provided commitment savings if there is competition from a moneylender but the ngo s offer will raise the agent s reservation utility thus reducing the surplus that can be extracted by the moneylender

group formation in risk sharing arrangements we study informal insurance within communities explicitly recognizing the possibility that subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group we therefore consider self enforcing risk sharing agreements that are robust not only to single person deviations but also to potential deviations by subgroups however such deviations must be credible in the sense that the subgroup must pass exactly the same test that we apply to the entire group it must itself employ some self enforcing risk sharing agreement we observe that the stability of subgroups is inimical to the stability of the group as a whole two surprising consequences of this analysis are that stable groups have uniformly bounded size a result in sharp contrast to the individual deviation problem and that the degree of risk sharing in a community is generally non monotonic in the level of uncertainty or need for insurance in the community

efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time inconsistent abstract we consider an exchange economy with time inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable if consumers have identical discount factors then allocations that are pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation proof in an economy with a sequence of markets competitive equilibria are pareto efficient in this sense and for generic endowments only if preferences are locally homothetic

rotating savings and credit associations when participants are risk averse we model rotating savings and credit associations roscas among risk averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks a random rosca is not advantageous whereas a bidding rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion the payoff scheme of a bidding rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries the risk sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk sharing contract and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution

a credit score system for socially responsible lending ethical banking microfinance institutions or certain credit cooperatives among others grant socially responsible loans this paper presents a credit score system for them the model evaluates social and financial aspects of the borrower the financial aspects are evaluated under the conventional banking framework by analysing accounting statements and financial projections the social aspects try to quantify the loan impact on the achievement of millennium development goals such as employment education environment health or community impact the social credit score model should incorporate the lender s know how and should also be coherent with its mission this is done using multi criteria decision making mcdm the paper illustrates a real case a loan application by a social entrepreneur presented to a socially responsible lender the decision support system not only produces a score but also reveals strengths and weaknesses of the application

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

liability structure in small scale finance evidence from a natural experiment microfinance the provision of small individual and business loans has witnessed dramatic growth reaching over 150 million borrowers worldwide much of its success has been attributed to overcoming the challenges of information asymmetries in uncollateralized lending yet very little is known about the optimal contract structure of such loans there is substantial variation across lenders even within a particular setting this paper exploits a plausibly exogenous change in the liability structure offered by a microfinance program in india which shifted from individual to group liability lending the analysis finds compelling evidence that contract structure matters for the same borrower required monthly loan installments are 6 percent less likely to be missed under the group liability setting relative to individual liability in addition compulsory savings deposits are 19 percent less likely to be missed under group liability contracts

the anatomy of an informal financial market rosca participation in taiwan abstract little is known about informal financial markets in developing countries this paper analyzes participation in rotating savings and credit associations using a national household survey from taiwan we find that participation is highest among high income households there is some evidence that income stability may play a role as well life cycle differences suggest a role in funding durables purchases our evidence indicates that roscas may be an alternative savings device to the formal financial sector

born with a silver spoon danish evidence on wealth inequality in childhood we study wealth inequality in childhood using danish wealth records from three decades while teenagers have some earnings we estimate that transfers account for at least 50 percent of wealth at age 18 and much more so for the rich children inheritance from grandparents does not appear quantitatively important but we do find evidence that children receive inter vivos transfers while wealth holdings are small in childhood they have strong predictive power for future wealth in adulthood asset holdings at age 18 are more informative than parental wealth in predicting wealth of children many years later when they are in their 40s hence childhood wealth reveals significant heterogeneity in the intergenerational transmission of wealth which is not simply captured by parental wealth alone we investigate why this is the case and rule out that childhood wealth in itself can accumulate enough to explain later wealth inequality our evidence indicates that childhood wealth is a proxy for a broad set of circumstances related to intergenerational transmission and future wealth accumulation including savings investment behavior and additional transfers