the impact of private and public feedback on worker performance evidence from the lab previous empirical studies have demonstrated the positive incentive effects of private performance feedback as well as public recognition on work performance in our laboratory experiments we directly compare these two feedback schemes moreover we compare their incentive effects across two real effort tasks that differ in regard to how interesting the subjects perceive working on them we find that both feedback schemes lead to performance increases compared to the tasks respective control treatments in particular subjects ability and a positive interim feedback enhance performance competitive preferences significantly affect performance only in the less enjoyable and challenging task jel c9 j3 m1

status in markets this project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market we consider a special box design market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices we manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures in the first a subject s score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status in another subjects are assigned randomly to a higher status or lower status group in both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher status sellers face lowerstatus buyers and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers across all sessions the higher status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus earning significantly more than their lower status counterparts

do central bank forecasts influence private agents forecasting performance versus signals focusing on a set of central banks that publish their internal macroeconomic forecasts in real time enables one to shed light on the expectations channel of monetary policy the main contribution of this paper is to assess whether central bank forecasts influence private forecasts the response is positive for inflation forecasts in sweden the uk and japan to disentangle the sources of influence of central banks two concepts are proposed endogenous influence which is due to more accurate central bank forecasts and exogenous influence which is due to central bank signals on either future policy decisions or private information original empirical evidence on the central bank forecasting performance relative to private agents is provided and estimates show that in sweden more accurate inflation forecasts generate specific central bank influence that is different from the influence from signals the publication of forecasts may therefore refer to two central banking strategies that aim to shape private expectations forecasting or policymaking

information content of wages and monetary policy we examine whether it is sufficient for central banks to observe and forecast nominal variables only analyzing the interplay of wage setting unions and a central bank we show that although central banks may not gain more information by directly acquiring data about indicators of real shocks in the economy such activities are nevertheless beneficial for central banks and yield lower social losses moreover the extent of research activities by central banks should depend on the process of union formation

ex ante and ex post welfare optimality under uncertainty it is widely believed by economic theorists that if there were no transactions costs and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all then arrow debreu contingent commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation the basis for this belief seems clear we have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that in the absence of external effects any competitive allocation is pareto efficient and that any pareto efficient allocation is competitive provided that appropriate lump sum transfers are made of course there are some reservations that need to be made local satiation and non convexities are well known to cause problems but these are not the problems i wish to discuss here to return to the usual argument the next step involves noticing how with contingent commodity markets the efficiency theorems of welfare economics carry over to an economy with uncertainty as explained for instance in chapter 7 of debreu s theorpj of value the fundamental value judgment that gives these efficiency theorems their normative interest is what may be called consumer sovereignty it is an assumption that the social welfare ordering should respect the preferences that govern consumers market behaviour it is a serious value judgment more serious than most economists have been prepared to concede but its seriousness increases when there is uncertainty we know full well that individuals misperceive the probabilities of certain events assuming that they even perceive any probabilities at all see for example kahneman and tversky 1979 nor are we always willing to accept as appropriate the attitudes to risk of individuals who seem either extremely reckless or extremely cautious societies are often willing to make some gestures towards property owners who have not insured themselves adequately against damage from fire flood or tempest and not just because of imperfect insurance markets or even misperceptions of probabilities in addition the inequalities of income that arise when some individuals take more risks than others are not necessarily seen to be desirable particularly if an individual has undertaken a useful but risky activity and has a very low income as a result of failure such gestures are examples of contingent lump sum transfers it seems clear that if such transfers occur to a sufficient extent they could supplant completely the securities markets which are usually sufficient to bring about pareto efficiency they may even be able to go further and correct the imperfections of an arrow debreu market allocation when individuals do misperceive probabilities or else have wrong attitudes to risk this is the main question i wish to consider here the idea that consumer sovereignty should not always extend to economies with uncertainty is not new it can be found in work by diamond 1967 dr6ze

locally interdependent preferences in a general equilibrium environment abstract this paper explores the consequences of interdependent preferences for consumer goods that is preferences that evolve in response to the consumption decisions of neighboring agents the key feature is that the interdependence of preferences coexists and interacts with the price mechanism in a general equilibrium environment the interaction between the negative feedback operating through the price system and the positive feedback expressed in the bandwagon effect creates distinct geographic patterns of consumption on the micro level and a characteristic evolution of average preferences and production on the macro level in equilibrium agents preferences and consumption are completely polarized into stable regions in which every agent consumes the same good exclusively

stock returns over the fomc cycle we document that since 1994 the equity premium is earned entirely in weeks 0 2 4 and 6 in federal open market committee fomc cycle time that is even weeks starting from the last fomc meeting we causally tie this fact to the fed by studying intermeeting target changes fed funds futures and internal board of governors meetings the fed has affected the stock market via unexpectedly accommodating policy leading to large reductions in the equity premium evidence suggests systematic informal communication of fed officials with the media and financial sector as a channel through which news about monetary policy has reached the market

the social basis of interdependent preferences abstract most economists are sympathetic to the idea that concerns for relative position are an important aspect of many economic problems there has traditionally been a reluctance to include such concerns primarily because models that included them often allow such a broad range of behavior that there are few if any restrictions on equilibrium behavior and hence such models would have little or no predictive power in this paper we discuss how reduced form models may naturally give rise to utility functions that depend in part on relative standing there are several advantages of modelling concern for relative standing in reduced form utility functions even when there is no similar concern in the deep preferences it provides structure and constraints on the way that relative standing affects utility and further it can yield testable implications about the way that changes in the underlying environment affect the concern for relative standing we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of modelling social concerns in this way and provide examples that illustrate how concerns for relative standing can affect savings investment and labor choice decisions

information and securities a note on pareto dominance and the second best a unified analysis is provided of two related problems the first concerns the welfare impact of changing the set of tradeable securities in an incomplete market economy the second concerns the welfare implications of changing the common information structure faced by all agents both problems arise from a common second best framework in which expanding the set of trading opportunities can lead to a pareto worsening journal of economic literature classification number 026 rl 1987 academic press inc in this note we provide a unified analysis of two related problems the first concerns the welfare impact of changing the set of tradeable securities in an incomplete market economy the second concerns the welfare implifications of changing the common information structure faced by all agents we will discuss apparent paradoxial results that arise in both problems using a single geometric example the example provides a clear illustration of the source of the apparent paradoxes both problems arise from a common second best framework by second best we mean the lipsey lancaster 20 idea of additional constraints on allocations over and above resource availability constraints our discussion brings together two related but distinct literatures the we are greatly indebted to james ohlson for many constructive comments and to david kreps and n v long for comments on a previous draft

on the valuation of uncertainty in welfare analysis thisarticle developsa general model of private and public choice under temporal uncertainty the model incorporatesthe effectsof ris k preferencesand the pros pect of future learning into both the individual and aggregate valuationsof public projects the analys isprovidesnew ins ightson individual valuation itsimplicationsfor benefit cos t analys isand the characterization of paretoefficiency under uncertainty it also resolves some of the confusion in the option value and quasioption value literature private and public decisions typically involve many sources of uncertainty including uncertainty about prices income technology environmental quality health etc temporal uncertainty is also common where some of the risk 1 getsresolved over time due to learning additionally private and public decisions often exhibit some form of irreversibility implying that current choicescan affect the ability of decision makers to be flexible and to adjust their future choices in response to forthcoming information when uncertainty and irreversibility are both present welfare analys isgainscomplexity and importance although considerable progress has been made since weisbrod s seminal article a better understanding of the roles of uncertainty and irreversibility in welfare analys improve our ability aseconomis ts to communicate the importance of risk in project evaluation to public decision makers

social comparisons and contributions to online communities a field experiment on movielens we design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community we find that after receiving behavioral information about the median user s total number of movie ratings users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent when given outcome information about the average user s net benefit score above average users mainly engage in activities that help others our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision

ex post efficiency and ex post welfare some fundamental considerations ross starr 1973 demonstrates that a competitive equilibrium while ex ante pareto efficient may not be ex post efficient the authors contend that an implicit second best issue requires that this assertion be substantively qualified specifically the ex ante efficiency concept is second best while its ex post counterpart is first best they est ablish the equivalency of first best ex post and ex ante concepts whe never the second best ex ante efficiency conditions hold the second best elements derive from the timing of information flows starr s theorem is shown to concern the social gains from improved information additional results deal with varying concepts of ex post welfare copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target on market interest rates in the 1970s abstract this paper examines the influence of monetary policy on interest rates by estimating the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target the federal reserve s policy instrument on market interest rates in the 1970s we find that changes in the target caused large movements in short term rates and smaller but significant movements in intermediate and long term rates we hypothesize that the similarity of the reactions of three six and twelve month rates to changes in the target offers a possible explanation for the lack of support for the expectations theory from studies that have tested the theory using these rates

the impact of banking sector stability on the real economy this article studies the relationship between the degree of banking sector stability and the subsequent evolution of real output growth and in ation adopting a panel var methodology for a sample of 18 oecd countries we flnd a positive link between banking sector stability and real output growth this flnding is predominantly driven by periods of instability rather than by very stable periods in addition we show that an unstable banking sector increases uncertainty about future output growth no clear link between banking sector stability and in ation seems to exist we then argue that the link between banking stability and real output growth can be used to improve output growth forecasts using fed forecast errors we show that banking sector stability instability results in a signiflcant underestimation overestimation of gdp growth in the subsequent quarters

efficient status seeking externalities and the evolution of status games abstract status seeking games are games in which an individual s utility is determined by his relative expenditure on status seeking activities rather than his absolute consumption there are a number of parallels between status seeking and rent seeking activities for example a tendency for pareto excessive private investment however many status seeking activities differ from rent seeking activities insofar as they generate significant benefits to individuals not actively involved in the game given an array of more or less productive status seeking games it is likely that relatively efficient status conferring mechanisms will tend to displace less efficient ones

occupational mobility and the distribution of occupational success among young men interpretation of the distribution of occupational success depends crucially on an understanding of the process of mobility if the holders of low paying jobs this year are just as likely as anyone else to hold good jobs next year then the lower tail of the earnings distribution is not a matter of great social concern further if the distribution of success is primarily determined by a random process the prospects for a significant reduction in the inequality of earnings are unfavorable on the other hand high mobility in the short run may conceal systematic stratification of the labor force it may be that the same individuals spend most of their time in the worst jobs if so luck and random events may play a small role in the distribution of well being inequality may be a major issue and the elimination of stratification may hold out the promise of an important reduction in inequality simple tabulation of distributions of success and of mobility among categories of success cannot answer the basic question of the role of stratification in this paper we develop a model and statistical method for studying mobility and relating it to characteristics upon which stratification may be based our study rests on annual interviews conducted from 1966 through 1969 with about 3 000 white males born between 1942 and 1952 1 we find that mobility is closely related to personal characteristics especially intelligence and education men with high iqs and extensive education are more likely to move to high paying jobs and are more likely to remain in them nevertheless random events dominate the distribution of occupational success in the short run our results strongly support the finding of christopher jencks and his collaborators that redistribution of the determinants of earnings would do almost nothing to reduce the observed inequality of annual earnings

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

contests for ranks experimental evidence we use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance in our experiment i rank is defined as subjects relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and ii subjects earnings are independent of their performance we find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive and this result is independent of the group size in the large group the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives finally the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher prestige effect in additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the statusprize winners we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes the last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status the results are important for managerial practices

social network structure and status competition in status competition studies the utility of heterogeneous individuals typically depends on an economy wide average indicator of status in our model emulative and jealous agents are embedded in an exogenous network where agent specific reference group is determined by the direct link emanating from the agent similarly to ghiglino and goyal 2010 but in a somewhat different framework we show that individual consumption is proportional to the agent s outbound katz bonacich network centrality measure and equilibrium is generally inefficient more important the negative externality associated with each agent depends on her inbound centrality measure the conspicuousness index a tax based on this index combined with a uniform lump sum transfer attains efficiency

testing the rationality of price forecasts new evidence from panel data this paper tests the rationality of individual price forecasts in a panel of professional forecasters here unlike in most previous studies rationality is not rejected the results here differ because 1 using individual forecasts avoids aggregation bias 2 comparison of forecasts to initial data avoids bias due to data revision 3 the professional forecasters have economic incentives to state their expectations accurately and 4 a new covariance matrix estimator consistent when forecast errors are correlated across individuals is used copyright 1990 by american economic association

does the federal reserve possess an exploitable informational advantage abstract this paper provides evidence that the federal reserve has an informational advantage over the public that can be exploited to improve activist monetary policy the informational superiority does not result from the fed having earlier access to publicly released financial data instead this advantage is generated by confidential supervisory knowledge about troubled non publicly traded institutions as a result this information can remain confidential for an extended period since these banks have neither the desire to fully disclose the extent of their financial troubles nor the requirement to do so the informational advantage is both statistically significant and economically important providing a potential justification for activist monetary policy

does the fed act gradually a var analysis abstract the tendency for changes in the federal funds rate to be implemented gradually has been considered evidence of an interest rate smoothing objective for the federal reserve this paper investigates whether gradual funds rate movements can be explained by the dynamic structure of the economy and the uncertainty surrounding that structure without recourse to including an ad hoc interest rate smoothing argument in the fed s objective function in the absence of parameter uncertainty the optimal policy involves more aggressive movements in the funds rate than observed parameter uncertainty however limits the responsiveness of the interest rate as a result the optimal policy under parameter uncertainty can account for a considerable portion of the gradualism observed

valuing amenity resources under uncertainty a skeptical view of recent resolutions abstract this paper questions colby and cory s recent characterization 1987 1988 1989 of the appropriate benefit measures to be used to value improvements in the quantity quality or conditions of access to environmental resources under uncertainty the paper uses graham s 1981 analysis of individual and aggregate welfare measurement under uncertainty to demonstrate the problems with colby and cory s recommendations it evaluates their classification of important research issues and summarizes in general terms the difficulties that arise in the practical implementation of the conceptual measures for benefits under uncertainty

information and the dynamics of environmental protection the concept of the critical period earlier work on environmental decisions under uncertainty is extended from two periods to many permitting treatment of a richer variety of problems implications for pollution control policy of several different kinds of ecosystem recovery dynamics are considered in the context of improving information about ecosystem behavior and preferences for environmental goods multiperiod analogs of the two period concept of quasi option value are developed

is the fed too timid monetary policy in an uncertain world estimates of the taylor rule using historical data from the past decade or two suggest that monetary policy in the u s can be characterized as having reacted in a moderate fashion to output and in

managing beliefs about monetary policy under discretion in models of monetary policy discretionary policymaking is typically constrained in its ability to manage public beliefs however when a policymaker possesses private information policy actions serve as signals to the public about unobserved economic conditions and belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies this article derives the optimal time consistent policy for a general linear quadratic setting the optimal policy is illustrated in a simple new keynesian model where analytical solutions can be derived as well in this model imperfect information about the policymaker s output target leads to lower policy losses

is bank supervision central to central banking whether central banks should play an active role in bank supervision and regulation is being debated both in the united states and abroad while the bank of england has recently been stripped of its supervisory responsibilities and several proposals in the united states have advocated removing bank supervision from the federal reserve system other countries are considering enhancing central bank involvement in this area many of the arguments for and against these proposals hinge on the effect this change would have on the ability of the central bank to conduct monetary policy we find that confidential supervisory information on bank ratings significantly improves

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

ex post welfare economics and the theory of merit goods in recent years a number of papers have questioned the extension of the main theorems of welfare economics to a world of uncertainty stemming from the work of arrow 1953 and debreu 1959 the arrow debreu extension is based on the idea that consumer preferences may be defined on state contingent commodities as a special but important case these preferences may be represented by von neumann morgenstern utilities with this interpretation of the commodity space the main theorems of weltare economics remain valid in a world of uncertainty a competitive equilibrium is a pareto optimum a pareto optimum can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium and the diagnosis of the causes of market failure remains as before there are several reasons why one may feel uneasy about this construction a good deal of attention has been paid to the assumption of universality of markets necessary to establish the connection between equilibrium and optimum on a deeper level perhaps are the doubts that one may have about the criterion of welfare or efficiency first should social welfare be a function of individuals expected utilities or should the appropriate concept be that of expected welfare second if probability beliefs are not identical across individuals whose probabilities if any should be used for welfare evaluation in the next section we review some concepts and results in the recent literature on ex post welfare economics and in section ii it is argued that this literature can provide the foundations for a more satisfactory theory of merit goods a concept originally introduced by musgrave 1959 this idea is applied in section iii to a model with a complete set of markets in the arrow debreu sense and in sections iv and v to an incomplete markets model which provides the most natural framework for the study of merit goods various remarks on further aspects of the problem are collected in the concluding section of the paper

status concern and the exploitation of common pool renewable resources we examine the impact of social status concern in a common pool renewable resource oligopoly a small number of players share access to a common pool resource and sell their production in a common market where they are oligopolists we depart from the mainstream literature on common pool resource oligopolies by considering that each player cares about her social status we allow for two channels to impact a player s welfare harvest and profits under the first channel a player has a bump in her utility when her harvest is larger than the average harvest of the rest of the players in this case we show that the presence of this channel exacerbates the tragedy of the commons under the second channel a player enjoys a bump in her utility if she manages to earn more profits than the average profits of the other players in this case we show that social status concern may temporarily alleviate the tragedy of the commons it results in a decrease of extraction over an interval of stock sizes

on welfare analysis under temporal uncertainty the implications of uncertainty for costbenefit analysis remain controversial one issue raised in the evaluation of welfare compensation tests has been the appropriate use of observable economic behavior in the measurement of agents willingnessto pay or willingness to receive in the context of surplus measure this question has received considerable attention in the analysis of the welfare impact of price changes under certainty e g willig 1976 chipman and moore 1980 hausman 1981 mckenzie and pearce 1982 moreover the introduction of uncertainty has raised a number of questions about the appropriateness of alternative welfare measures e g schmalensee 1972 1975 graham 1981 for example graham 1981 has argued that there is little basis to recommend either option price or expected surplus for a role of prominence in welfare analysis the issue rather is whether or not there exists a distribution of individual payments or receipts that maximizes aggregate willingness to pay and passes the pareto improvement test i e that leaves no individual worse off and makes at least one individual better off graham 1981 but in the implementation of the pareto improvement test how is the aggregate willingness topay supposed to be measured empirically more specifically what is the influence of uncertainty and its temporal resolution on the validity of agent surplus the welfare triangle given by the area between a compensated choice function and its corresponding price as a welfare measure some progress has been made in this direction by chavas bishop and segerson 1986 in the context of option price however as shown by graham 1981 while option price is the appropriate measure of benefits in situations involving similar individuals and collective risk it may not be the appropriate welfare measure in more general situations therefore there is a need to refine our understanding of how agent surplus can be used as a welfare measure in the general context of a potential pareto improvement test under temporal uncertainty the objective of this paper is to investigate how temporal uncertainty can affect the measurement of willingness to pay in general welfare compensation tests temporal uncertainty corresponds to the situation where new information becomes available over time which resolves at least part of current uncertainty facing economic agents this new information can influence future individual decisions as well as individual willingness to pay particular attention will be given here to the case where income compensation is conditional on the new information that will become available in the future and results in a more efficient allocation of risk among individuals this paper focuses on competitive agents e g households or firms for which welfare changes can be expressed in terms of price changes this includes the analysis of the welfare effects of various government pricing policies this also includes the evaluation of public projects based on the travel cost method which under a weak complementarity condition consists in using price changes of related private goods as an indirect means of measuring the value of a public project maler 1974 the analysis is presented in the context of a general two period model where the agents are uncertain about the state of the world as suggested by graham 1981 it is shown that the option price provides a lower bound on