network externalities technological progress and the competition of market contracts abstract network externalities are used to describe the fact that many modern products become more valuable the more users adopt products of the same technology where network externalities and technological progress exist the various kinds of inefficiencies discussed in the recent literature can be explained by different types of contracts the main categories analysed are simple market contracts update contracts and service contracts it is shown that these types of contract emerge endogenously from the incentive structure of profit maximizing firms competition between these contracts may substantially reduce inefficient allocations caused by network externalities

tipping and concentration in markets with indirect network effects this paper develops a framework for measuring tipping the increase in a firm s market share dominance caused by indirect network effects our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects in practice this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects we build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware software paradigm to demonstrate its applicability we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32 64 bit generation of video game consoles a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects in our example we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong economically significant increase in market concentration we also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war and on the supply side as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks

joint pricing and ordering policy for two echelon imperfect production inventory model with two cycles abstract this study deals with an imperfect epq economic production quantity price dependent inventory model over two types of cycles in the first cycle the retailer sells only good product with actual price and in the second he sells the products with a discount price in the production run time the non conforming items are produced at a random rate and they are reworked after the regular production run time and the reworked items are almost perfect as good as original quality items the retailer starts the second cycle when a certain percent of good items are left to him after the completion of regular production the retailer continues simultaneously two cycles up to which both types of the products are available to him now our objective is to find out optimal ordering lot size and optimal price for which the profit of the integrated model is maximum also we check the best strategy of retailer for the time of starting second cycle a numerical example is provided to illustrate the behavior and application of the model

self reinforcing mechanisms and market information abstract we consider the possibility of switching between two technological standards when there are network externalities and imprecise market information by modeling the decisions of each firm by a stochastic process necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be multiple equilibria in market share and for permanent lock in to one of these equilibria not to occur are presented in such a case the market lingers at prevalence of one standard with intermittent transitions to prevalence of the other the frequency of which is derived by the theory of large deviations

tying and innovation a dynamic analysis of tying arrangements this paper analyses the effects of tying arrangements on r d incentives it shows that tying is a means through which a firm can commit to more aggressive r d investment in the tied goods market tying also has the strategic effect of reducing rivals incentives to invest in r d the strategy of tying is a profitable one if the gains via an increased share of dynamic rents in the tied goods market exceed the losses that result from intensified price competition in the market the welfare implications of tying and consequently the appropriate antitrust policy are discussed

climbing the hierarchical ladders of rules a life cycle theory of institutional evolution this paper proposes an analysis of the emergence and evolution of institutional frameworks it explains the causes process and outcome of institutional evolution we first describe the institutional framework as a multilevel system at the bottom of which several local and flexible institutions apply to subsets of the society while at the top a single generic and rigid institution applies to all dissatisfied with generic order promoters of local orders try to design collective governance solutions that are better suited to their needs if agents are heterogeneous as we assume then coordination needs differ and a competitive process begins among sponsors of alternative orders to benefit from efficiency gains promoters of local orders encourage adherence to their preferred system of rules the resulting competition for adherents explains why local and voluntary institutions might progressively turn into generic and mandatory ones we thus establish a logical continuum between contractual governance mechanisms and institutions we then analyze the strategic interplay among sponsors of alternative institutional orders by considering not only the horizontal competition among institutions emerging in the same time but also the vertical competition between promoters of new rules and sponsors of the established more generic rules

a generalized utility model of disappointment and regret effects on post choice valuation in this paper we show that performance information about forgone alternatives i e alternative that were considered but not chosen can have a significant impact on post choice valuation our approach introduces a new and parsimonious way of looking at satisfaction that combines the literature on post choice valuation with research regarding generalized expected utility theory while the post valuation literature focuses on the selected brand as the valuation s basis e g anderson and sullivan anderson e w m w sullivan 1993 the antecedents and consequences of customer satisfaction for firms marketing sci 12spring 125 143 bolton and drew bolton r j drew 1991 a multistage model of customers assessments of service quality and value j consumer res 17 375 384 we draw on a stream of research in generalized expected utility theory that considers both chosen and forgone alternatives as the basis for valuation e g bell bell d 1983 risk premiums for decision regret management sci 29 1156 1166 and bell d 1985 disappointment in decision making under uncertainty oper res 33 1 27 loomes and sugden loomes g r sugden 1982 regret theory an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty the econom j 92 805 824 and loomes g r sugden 1986 disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty rev econom stud 53 271 282 the result is a combined model of post choice valuation that explicitly incorporates both concepts specifically we extend the existing paradigm of post choice valuation to include buyers regret concerning forgone alternatives proposing a generalized utility theory based treatment of post choice product assessment that uses the intuitively appealing concepts of disappointment and regret as the basis we propose a model for conceptualizing post choice valuation that is consistent with the existing literature discuss how this model extends the construct to consider the influence of forgone alternatives and report results of an empirical test that contrasts our model to important recent work in the area e g boulding et al boulding w a kalra r staelin v a zeithaml 1993 a dynamic process model of service quality from expectations to behavioral intentions j marketing res 30february 7 27 our generalized model of post choice valuation is based on the sum of three components that represent factors that may contribute to consumers assessment of a chosen product or service the first component is expected performance the second component is disappointment which captures the discrepancy between actual and expected performance much as the disconfirmation construct in traditional satisfaction research the third component is regret which captures the difference between the performance of the chosen product service and the performance of a forgone product service this perspective is useful in that risk is captured by the disappointment and regret terms providing an intuitively appealing decomposition of post choice valuation and offering several advances over previous representations of disappointment and regret we test our model via a choice experiment participants in the empirical study were asked to make choices between successive lottery pairs they were then given outcome feedback on the forgone alternative as well as on the chosen alternative in each lottery pair immediately following outcome feedback for each choice subjects were asked to evaluate their decision our results clearly suggest an effect of regret on post choice valuation information about the forgone alternative influenced subjects valuation of the chosen alternative we also find evidence that as predicted the effects of disappointment and regret on post choice valuation are asymmetric specifically the negative effect of disappointment on post choice valuation was greater than the positive effect of elation similarly the negative effect of regret was greater than the positive impact of rejoicing our research offers five contributions to the literature on post choice valuation first our results illustrate the advantage of using generalized utility theory as the basis for conceptualizing and modeling post choice valuation we derive a model of post choice valuation that formally captures the components of disappointment and regret and show that the outcome of both the chosen alternative through disappointment and a forgone alternative through regret can influence the chosen alternative s valuation second we formally integrate the concepts of disappointment and regret which have been examined separately for many years into a single model based on a multiattribute preference structure third we argue that the effects of disappointment and regret on post choice valuation are asymmetric and present empirical evidence in this regard fourth our results suggest that word of mouth regarding forgone alternatives may affect post choice valuation extending research that has not heretofore considered forgone outcomes role in this process finally our development provides a preconsumption measure of potential disappointment and regret in modeling choice at the time of choice consumers may visualize the feelings of disappointment and or regret that will be derived at consumption taking into account both the chosen brand and forgone brands our generalized utility theory based approach to the post choice valuation construct can be useful in examining the role of disappointment and regret as preconsumption constructs

state and standards in this paper a new economic approach to standardization has been presented standardization has been regarded as a problem ofgradual choice an individual chooses to apply more or less standards within a hierarchy of standards with this decomposition of standards the problem of strategic market power becomes less important than in the traditional models of standardization it becomes possible to analyze the problems of network externalities within a framework of non strategic behavior and to apply the tools of the traditional theory of externalities and public goods while decentralized action may lead to too little standardization committees may overcome this deficiency to some extent but bureaucracies are likely to lead to overstandardization in the empirical section of the paper it has been shown that our approach can be applied to the standard setting process in languages railroads and telecommunications in all three cases the tendency of bureaucracies to generate more standardization than committees has been corroborated

compatibility and bundling of complementary goods in a duopoly this paper presents a simple model of compatibility and bundling in industries where consumers assemble several necessary components into a system that is close to their ideal the authors show that for a wide range of parameters firms will choose to produce compatible components but will offer discounts to consumers who purchase all components from the same firm however firms would be better off if they could commit not to provide such discounts furthermore the equilibrium tends to involve socially excessive bundling finally mixed bundling strategies tend to increase the range of parameters over which socially excessive standardization occurs copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

product introduction with network externalities the authors study the introduction of a new product in a market with network externalities there is a common presumption that such markets exhibit excess inertia i e that they are biased toward existing products in contrast the authors provide conditions under which equilibrium involves insufficient friction i e a tendency to rush into new incompatible technologies they also analyze the firms incentives to make their products compatible and they show that the firm introducing the new technology is biased against compatibility copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

bolivia hyperinflation stabilisation and beyond this article argues that the bolivian hyperinflation of 1984 85 was fundamentally rooted in problems of external finance and distributional conflict and shows how the new economic policy nep addressed these issues with an orthodox approach that attracted the support of international lending institutions and shifted the balance of power away from labour along the way i conduct an econometric investigation of the proximate determinants of inflation in both the hyperinflationary and post inflation periods i close by considering current and future problems in the bolivian macroeconomy

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

optimal dynamic pricing for expanding networks this paper analyzes the dynamic pricing decision of a monopolist marketing a new product or service whose consumption value increases with the expansion of the network of adopters we characterize an optimal pricing strategy which maximizes the present value of the monopolist s profits subject to the dynamics of the demand for network access these dynamics depend among other factors on the current price and consumer anticipations about future network growth we examine the effects of changes in the growth anticipations and the discount rate on the optimal equilibrium access price and network size it is shown that higher growth anticipations and a lower discount rate result in a lower equilibrium price and a larger network

consumer preference for a no choice option the traditional focus in the decision making literature has been on understanding how consumers choose among a given set of alternatives the notion that preference uncertainty may lead to choice deferral when no single alternative has a decisive advantage is tested in seven studies building on recent research the article shows that the decision to defer choice is influenced by the absolute difference in attractiveness among the alternatives provided and is not consistent with trade off difficulty or the theory of search these findings are then extended to show that choice deferral can also be modified for the same alternatives by manipulations that make them appear more similar in attractiveness or that decrease the need to differentiate among them the results are consistent with the notion that preference uncertainty results in a hesitation to commit to any single action since small differences in attractiveness among the alternatives are potentially reversible consistent with this premise the effect of attractiveness difference on choice deferral decreased significantly when subjects were first allowed to practice making monetary trade offs among the available alternatives

optimal bundling of technological products with network externality for many high tech and internet related products utility to consumers depends in part on the size of the user base a phenomenon called network externality a firm with a portfolio of these and other products that are often asymmetric in their degree of network externality or marginal cost may have to look beyond the traditional strategies of pure components pure bundling and mixed bundling one such strategic alternative in a two product case would be a so called mixed bundling 1 under which the bundle and product 1 are offered but the other product can only be purchased in a bundled form the purpose of this study is to compare and contrast the impact of such asymmetry or symmetry in direct network externality and cost on the choice of bundling strategies we model a monopolist firm that has a product in each of two categories and faces heterogeneous consumers results suggest that pure bundling is more profitable when both products have low marginal costs or high network externality whereas pure components or mixed bundling 1 is more profitable when the products diverge in their costs and network externality e g only one product has network externality traditional mixed bundling is optimal in other instances

complementarity coordination and compatibility the role of fixed costs in the economics of systems abstract we analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system we assume the presence of two systems each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products the combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect we focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and by this means the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed monopolistic or duopolistic symmetric or asymmetric we also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible

attack defence and contagion in networks sanjeev goyal acknowledges support from a keynes fellowship cambridge inet institute and european research area complexity net resilience and interaction of networks in ecology and economics adrien vigier acknowledges support from a gates cambridge fellowship as well as a core fellowship from universite catholique de louvain

ford whitman harris and the economic order quantity model ford whitman harris first presented the familiar economic order quantity eoq model in a paper published in 1913 even though harris s original paper was disseminated widely it apparently was unnoticed for many years before its rediscovery in 1988 during this period much confusion developed over the origin of the eoq model this paper explores the early literature on this model and traces the evolution of the confusion it also sketches the remarkable life of harris who made contributions as an engineer inventor author and patent attorney even though he received no formal education beyond high school harris s original 1913 essay is reprinted following this paper

innovation regimes r d and radical innovations in telecommunications abstract by introducing the concept of innovation regimes the aim of this article is to show how the rapid pace of technological development in the telecom sector may be explained by the close links between the sector s own r d and the creation of numerous innovations many of which are radical in contemporary innovation theory a theoretical antinomy exists whereas the creation of incremental innovations is variously explained in terms of rational responses to markets dynamics of technological regimes dominant design etc radical innovations in contrast are explained in terms of serendipity chance or haphazard scientific discoveries evidence from analysis of innovations in the telecom sector suggests that innovation regimes have provided a capability of coordination direction and leadership in the creation of many of the radical technological innovations that have emerged in the sector thus one may claim that the strong innovation regimes and high r d intensity of the telecom sector at least until recently have provided a capability of creating innovations on purpose for a purpose the policy implications of this contradict some of the assumptions on which the prevailing market oriented r d governance models and policies are based and which are supported by contemporary innovation theories

information imitation and growth abstract this paper presents an analysis of the role of information in determining the growth and development prospects of economies in an overlapping generations model producers of capital choose between two types of technology safe and risky depending on the information available decision making may or may not be characterised by herd behaviour whereby each producer imitates the decisions of others in an information cascade multiple development regimes arise when the quality of information is determined endogenously through purposeful but costly activities it is shown that both the prospect of transition between these regimes and the characteristics of the transition path can be very different in imitation free and imitation prone economies

price competition and compatibility in the presence of positive demand externalities in many cases the benefit to a consumer of a product increases with the number of other users of the same product these demand interdependencies are referred to in the literature as positive demand externalities or network externalities this paper examines the dynamic pricing behaviors of an incumbent and a later entrant with special attention to the impacts of demand externalities compatibility and competition on prices and profits defining market power as the ability to price above a competitor without losing market share we show how demand externalities and installed base combine to confer market power we model optimal pricing as a differential game with the optimal price trajectory established as nash open loop controls for a duopoly durable goods market with strong demand externalities the results show an increasing price trajectory can be optimal as expected a new entrant is better off if its products are compatible with those of the incumbent especially when demand externalities are strong and the installed base of the incumbent is large less intuitively the incumbent as well may be better off agreeing on common standards the comparison of monopoly and duopoly shows that under strong demand externalities and a small installed base the incumbent profits from compatible entry

new product diffusion acceleration measurement and analysis it is a popular contention that products launched today diffuse faster than products launched in the past however the evidence of diffusion acceleration is rather scant and the methodology used in previous studies has several weaknesses also little is known about why such acceleration would have occurred this study investigates changes in diffusion speed in the united states over a period of 74 years 1923 1996 using data on 31 electrical household durables this study defines diffusion speed as the time it takes to go from one penetration level to a higher level and it measures speed using the slope coefficient of the logistic diffusion model this metric relates unambiguously both to speed as just defined and to the empirical growth rate a measure of instantaneous penetration growth the data are analyzed using a single stage hierarchical modeling approach for all products simultaneously in which parameters capturing the adoption ceilings are estimated jointly with diffusion speed parameters the variance in diffusion speed across and within products is represented separately but analyzed simultaneously the focus of this study is on description and explanation rather than forecasting or normative prescription there are three main findings 1 on average there has been an increase in diffusion speed that is statistically significant and rather sizable for the set of 31 consumer durables the average value of the slope parameter in the logistic model s hazard function was roughly 0 48 increasing with 0 09 about every 10 years it took an innovation reaching 5 household penetration in 1946 an estimated 13 8 years to go from 10 to 90 of its estimated maximum adoption ceiling for an innovation reaching 5 penetration in 1980 that time would have been halved to 6 9 years this corresponds to a compound growth rate in diffusion speed of roughly 2 between 1946 and 1980 2 economic conditions and demographic change are related to diffusion speed whether the innovation is an expensive item also has a sizable effect finally products that required large investments in complementary infrastructure radio black and white television color television cellular telephone and products for which multiple competing standards were available early on pcs and vcrs diffused faster than other products once 5 household penetration had been achieved 3 almost all the variance in diffusion speed among the products in this study can be explained by 1 the systematic increase in purchasing power and variations in the business cycle unemployment 2 demographic changes and 3 the changing nature of the products studied e g products with competing standards appear only late in the data set after controlling for these factors no systematic trend in diffusion speed remains unaccounted for these findings are of interest to researchers attempting to identify patterns of difference and similarity among the diffusion paths of many innovations either by jointly modeling the diffusion of multiple products as in this study or by retrospective meta analysis the finding that purchasing power demographics and the nature of the products capture nearly all the variance is of particular interest specifically one does not need to invoke unobserved changes in tastes and values as some researchers have done to account for long term changes in the speed at which households adopt new products the findings also suggest that new product diffusion modelers should attempt to control not only for marketing mix variables but also for broader environmental factors the hierarchical model structure and the findings on the systematic variance in diffusion speed across products are also of interest to forecasting applications when very little or no data are available

shared atm networks and banking competition abstract in this paper we study the incentives of banks to share their automatic teller machines atms when they are competitors in the market for deposits we construct a stylized model of banking competition which emphasises the distinctive features of atm compatibility we find that in equilibrium either a strict subset of banks share their atms or total incompatibility prevails we also derive the implications for atm compatibility of withdrawal fees interchange bank fees entry and depositor switching costs finally we investigate the normative implications of our model and draw some policy conclusions

distributional implications of macroeconomic policy theory and applications to el salvador abstract this article offers a theoretical framework for designing macroeconomic strategy for el salvador that will both respect stabilization and structural adjustment needs and enhance social equity after outlining the largely negative distributional implications of the orthodox policies followed by el salvador in recent years we argue that stabilization and efficiency could actually be improved by increased equity and sketch out the elements of an alternative approach that would be distributionally sensitive and thereby help consolidate the peace

network effects software provision and standardization in this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms the provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies we show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium we show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market

the impact of standards competition on consumers effectiveness of product information and advertising formats abstract compared with other markets those with competing technological standards exhibit certain fundamental characteristics that make a consumer s decision to adopt a new product more risky and more complex this article examines how standards competition affects consumer behavior an issue that has been relatively neglected by previous research in this area the results show that consumers depend on different types of information in their adoption decisions and respond differently to advertising specifically the authors find that standards competition motivates consumers to pay more attention to information that is comparative in nature thus information about the relative absolute performance of a product has a stronger weaker impact on a product s share in markets with standards competition study 1 standards competition also moderates the effectiveness of different advertising formats it strengthens the effect of comparative advertisements but weakens the effect of noncomparative advertis

do converters facilitate the transition to a new incompatible technology a dynamic analysis of converters abstract this paper analyzes the process of transition in standards between incompatible technologies when converters are available contrary to a common presumption that converters facilitate the transition from an old technology to an otherwise incompatible new technology i find circumstances in which the possibility of transition is blockaded by the existence of converters in the welfare analysis of converters a distinction is made between ex ante and ex post efficiency effects finally i also analyze the equilibrium behavior in the provision of converters and compare it to the socially optimal outcome

competing technologies the learning curve and rational expectations abstract the problem of choice between several variants of a technology subject to dynamic learning economies is examined in a rational expectations model with overlapping adopters it is shown that even with rational expectations the long term market outcome depends sensitively on the pattern of early chance events and that only one variant of the technology will come to dominate the market in the long run this variant need not be the one which is socially optimal or most promising technically

currency substitution the recent experience of bolivia abstract one of the more puzzling aspects of bolivia s economic performance since 1986 has been the rapid increase in the share of foreign currency deposits in the domestic banking system that has occurred notwithstanding low inflation rates and a high degree of external stability an analysis of the determinants of currency substitution in bolivia shows that economic variables are statistically significant but have a fairly low explanatory power compared to variables that measure the degree of inertia in the currency substitution process hence conventional fiscal and monetary measures may not be sufficient to reverse the process of currency substitution this points toward an interesting asymmetry where currency substitution increases rapidly with macroeconomic instability but is difficult to reverse even after years of macroeconomic stability

network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly abstract network externalities characterize the consumption of many products in a setting where a monopolist does not price discriminate without externalities we show that presence of network externalities induces the monopolist to price discriminate and segment its market

globalizing carbon lock in this paper extends the arguments surrounding carbon lock in elaborated in unruh energy policy 28 2000 817 30 2002 317 to countries currently undergoing industrialization it argues that for numerous reasons industrializing countries are unlikely to leapfrog carbon intensive energy development on the contrary carbon lock in may be globalizing and could further constrain climate change mitigation options it is then argued that many policy recommendations ignore carbon lock in possibly limiting their potential for successful implementation the paper then discusses four policy approaches that appear to have advantages given lock in conditions it is recognized however that relative ease of implementation does not necessarily equate with superiority instead it is merely a path dependent outcome of past development decisions pursuing policies on the basis of relative implementation ease may help address the issue of climate change but could also result in sub optimal outcomes along other dimensions of sustainable development

celebrating a century of the economic order quantity model in honor of ford whitman harris abstract this writing presents a brief introduction to the papers included in the special issue celebrating a century of the economic order quantity model in honor of ford whitman harris published by the international journal of production economics forty one papers covering an extensive scope of inventory management have been incorporated in this volume from contributing authors from 20 countries located in america asia europe and africa this special issue also provides a basis for new directions in inventory management research

boom and bust patterns in the adoption of financial innovations we develop a dynamic model of the adoption of financial innovations each period firms decide whether or not to adopt an innovation of uncertain value and the profitability of each period s adoptions reveals information about the innovation s value we show that characteristics of financial innovation waves cited by critics as evidence of irrational excess are in fact consistent with fully rational behavior we also show that social welfare is enhanced when more firms adopt innovations of questionable value and that financial intermediaries base an incentive to encourage such adoption article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

global sensitivity analysis in inventory management abstract this paper deals with the sensitivity analysis sa of inventory management models when uncertainty in the input parameters is given full consideration we make use of sobol function and variance decomposition method for determining the most influential parameters on the model output we first illustrate the method by means of an analytical example we provide the expression of the global importance of demand holding costs order costs of the harris economic order quantity eoq formula we then present the global sa of the inventory management model developed by luciano and peccati 1999 capital structure and inventory management the temporary sale problem international journal of production economics 59 169 178 for the economic order quantity estimation in the context of the temporary sale problem we show that by performing global sa in parallel to the modeling process an analyst derives insights not only on the eoq structure when its expression is not analytically known but also on the relevance of modeling choices as the inclusion of financing policies and special orders

timing decisions of new product preannouncement and launch with competition abstract we develop a game theoretic model to study the timing of new product preannouncement and launch under competition we derive firms optimal timing choices and conducted a numerical analysis to evaluate the role of various factors our analytical and numerical results showed that anticipated competitor s timing choices are the most significant factors a firm should not preannounce early unless the preannouncement is effective in creating pent up demands however the preannouncement and launch should be rushed if the quality or profit margin of the new product is high and postponed if the market share of the existing product is high the market leader should preannounce earlier in a simultaneous game than in a sequential game but the opposite for the market follower data collected from the microprocessor industry validated our model

the provision of two way converters in the transition process to a new incompatible technology this paper analyzes the dynamic provision of converters in the transition process between two incompatible technologies i derive the equilibrium behavior in the provision of converters and compare it to the socially optimal outcome i find that there can be two types of market inefficiency in the provision of converters first converters can be supplied by the wrong group second the timing of provision may be too late since the providers of converters ignore the positive externality that their provision would confer on the users of the rival technology

social learning and dynamic pricing of durable goods we analyze the impacts of social learning sl on the dynamic pricing and consumer adoption of durable goods in a two period monopoly consumers can make either early uninformed purchases or late but potentially informed purchases as a result of social learning several results are derived first we identify the market conditions under which ex ante homogeneous consumers may choose to purchase at different times second equilibrium adoption may demonstrate inertia where all adopt late or frenzy where all adopt early in particular adoption inertia appears when sl intensity is reasonably high but may vanish when sl intensity exceeds a certain threshold third firm profits and social welfare first weakly decrease in sl intensity and may then jump up by a lump sum amount at the threshold sl intensity level mentioned above last we show that the firm potentially benefits from informative advertising or investing to cultivate more social learning

announcement entry and preemption when consumers have switching costs i study the incentives of innovating firms to announce their entry in markets in which consumers incur a cost of switching from one product to another announcing entry can prevent the lock in of potential demand before the launch of the new product at the same time however the incumbent firm learns about the impending entry and has the opportunity to cut prices and preempt the market in equilibrium entrants do not always announce and i show that this behavior maximizes ex ante total welfare by contrast consumers might be better off with a ban on announcements when the entrant s claims are not verifiable vaporware announcements arise in equilibrium and i demonstrate that they can be beneficial for consumers

how many parts to make at once reprinted from factory the magazine of management volume 10 number 2 february 1913 pp 135 136 152 interest on capital tied up in wages material and overhead sets a maximum limit to the quantity of parts which can be profitably manufactured at one time set up costs on the job fix the minimum experience has shown one manager a way to determine the economical size of lots

the diffusion of clean technologies a review with suggestions for future diffusion analysis abstract this article gives an overview of the literature on clean technology diffusion followed by suggestions for future analysis findings from diffusion analysis are presented in the form of 10 stylised facts helping the reader to see the forest for the trees the overall conclusion is that the diffusion of clean technology same as the diffusion of normal innovations is governed by endogenous mechanism epidemic learning and learning economies and by exogenous mechanisms policy is important for clean technology diffusion but other factors are important too the characteristics of the clean technology absorptive capacities of potential adopters and the age structure of capital it is often overlooked that companies have a choice they can choose between an end of pipe solution a process change adaptation and a change of process substitution this means that the diffusion and evolution of one clean technology will be at the expense of the diffusion of another clean technology something overlooked in studies on clean technology diffusion further research is needed on the influence of public policy on clean technology choice expectations about learning economies and prices adjustment costs network externalities and complementary innovations on clean technology adoption choices

currency competition network externalities and switching costs towards an alternative view of optimum currency areas existing models of currency competition and monetary union ignore network effects and switching costs this paper develops a simple model that incorporates these features and shows how it can be used to shed light on observed monetary experience and current issues in international monetary relations it explains why agents will often be reluctant to switch currencies highlights the role of expectations and sheds light on the nature of currency competition and the effect of legal restrictions copyright 1993 by royal economic society

cross market network effect with asymmetric customer loyalty implications for competitive advantage a cross market network effect exists in many industries e g newspaper publishing media software in which a seller sells both a primary and a secondary product e g a newspaper publisher sells newspapers to readers and advertising space to advertisers and the value of the secondary product depends on the size of the user base of the primary product this paper examines the competitive implications of asymmetric customer loyalty in such markets in traditional markets an advantage in customer loyalty generates a profit advantage we show here however that in the presence of a cross market network effect a midlevel of loyalty advantage in the primary product market can lead to an overall profit disadvantage this surprising result is derived from the interdependence of the two markets whereby a profit in one market may be gained at the cost of the other and by the positive relationship between a larger loyalty segment and a higher opportunity cost of price competition in the product of the primary market extending our model to a two period entry game also shows that under certain conditions the entrant with disadvantage in customer loyalty can outperform the incumbent in profit and market share this result suggests that asymmetry in customer loyalty can be a source of first mover advantage or disadvantage

a century of evolution from harris s basic lot size model survey and research agenda abstract determining the economic lot size has always represented one of the most important issues in production planning this problem has long attracted the attention of researchers and several models have been developed to meet requirements at minimum cost in this paper we explore and discuss the evolution of these models during one hundred years of history starting from the basic model developed by harris in 1913 up to today following harris s work a number of researchers have devised extensions that incorporate additional considerations the evolution of eoq theory strongly reflects the development of industrial systems over the past century here we outline all the research areas faced in the past by conducting a holistic analysis of 219 selected journal papers and trying to give a comprehensive view of past work on the eoq problem finally a new research agenda is proposed and discussed

technology revolutions in the presence of network externalities abstract the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of varying consumer preferences over technology advance and network size on the timing and frequency of new technology adoption in the presence of installed bases resulting from network externalities the paper shows that the duration of each adopted technology and the frequency of technology adoptions depend on a whether in consumers perspectives the network size effect is a substitute for or a complement to the quality of the technologies b the degree of compatibility of new technologies with the old technology and c the technology growth rate and consumer population size

differential importance and comparative statics an application to inventory management abstract in this work we deal with the problem of establishing which parameters impact an inventory policy the most a new sensitivity measure is introduced by relating the differential importance d and the comparative statics cs techniques we discuss the properties of the new indicator and show that it shares the additivity property we provide the expression of for optimization models numerical results are offered for the sensitivity analysis of a recently introduced inventory management model

social contagion and income heterogeneity in new product diffusion a meta analytic test standard diffusion models capture social contagion only coarsely and do not allow one to operationalize different contagion mechanisms moreover there is increasing skepticism about the importance of contagion and as has long been known s shaped diffusion curves can also result from heterogeneity in the propensity to adopt we present hypotheses about conditions under which specific contagion mechanisms and income heterogeneity are more pronounced and test these hypotheses using a meta analysis of the q p ratio in applications of the bass diffusion model the ratio is positively associated with the gini index of income inequality in a country supporting the heterogeneity in thresholds interpretation the ratio also varies as predicted by the gamma shifted gompertz diffusion model but the evidence vanishes after controlling for national culture as to contagion the q p ratio varies with the four hofstede dimensions of national culture for three of them in a direction consistent with the social contagion interpretation furthermore products with competing standards have a higher q p ratio which is again consistent with the social contagion interpretation finally we find effects of national culture only for products without competing standards suggesting that technological effects and culturally moderated social contagion effects might not operate independently from each other

local network externalities and market segmentation this paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction it departs from the standard katz shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents it shows that even if rival firms engage in bertrand competition this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits the analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation while for others there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the welfare implications of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities this paper finds that unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities can not only induce greater firm profits relative to the case where there is no copying it can lead to a pareto improvement in social welfare ceteris paribus when network externalities are present firms have a greater incentive to expand output because marginal revenue is higher and or they may wish to create preemptive installed bases this paper suggests that unauthorized copying can be a relatively efficient means of achieving this by allowing the firm in effect to price discriminate among different classes of consumers copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

the economics of networks a survey of the empirical literature network effects the increase in value of consuming a product if many other consumers use the same product are a feature of many markets and in particular of many high technology products this paper surveys the burgeoning empirical literature that has developed especially during the last years after theoretical work dominated the earlier years of research in this area newer research has combined theoretical models with empirical studies and applied work with direct implications for public policy marketing and company strategies furthermore insights from the study of social networks have been applied to analyse how consumers interact with each other the paper argues that a closer analysis of the network structure of consumer interaction promises fruitful future research avenues and advances in our understanding of how network effects operate copyright 2009 blackwell publishing ltd

coalition formation in standard setting alliances we present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance especially close rivals the predicted alliance configurations are simply the nash equilibria i e those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance we illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing unix operating system standards in 1988

on the interplay of informational spillovers and payoff externalities this thesis consists of four independent essays which consider different topics in information economics and political economy the first two papers are variants of the same idea an uninformed principal e g a government will make a decision in order to gain more information it may consult two experts however these experts have a private interest in certain policies being implemented the question is to gain as much information as possible should the principal consult experts who are biased in the same direction or experts who prefer different decisions the main result is that as long as collusion between experts can be prevented homogeneous panels are superior to heterogeneous ones and this advantage increases with the experts informational precision in the third paper two firms consider entry in a new product market and must decide when to enter the market and how to design their product firms do not know for certain what the best design is so both firms want to outwait the other s decision in order to gain more information the focus of the paper is on which firm will make the first decision the main result is that if products are strong strategic substitutes the worst informed firm makes the first decision in equilibrium the analysis should apply to a range of other contexts such as investors trading decisions or the policy choices of political candidates the final paper asks the following question could it be that parties in a two party system may benefit from using several candidates in the same election to promote the use of multiple candidates i assume that a party never runs the risk of having its votes split up among its candidates despite this it turns out that parties have a strong incentive to restrict their number of nominees paradoxically it seems that the more uncertain parties are about voter opinion the fewer candidates they want to use in particular with a uniform voter distribution the optimal number of candidates is one

economic order quantities in production from harris to economic lot scheduling problems abstract this article provides a short historical overview from harris and his economic order quantity eoq formula to the economic lot scheduling problem elsp the aim is to describe the development of the elsp field from the eoq formula to the advanced methods of today in a manner that suits master and graduate students the article shows the complexities difficulties and possibilities of scheduling and producing several different items in a single production facility with constrained capacity the items have different demand cost operation time and set up time set up time consumes capacity and makes the scheduling more complicated idle time makes the scheduling easier but is bad from a practical point of view since it creates unnecessary costs due to low utilisation of the facility a heuristic solution method is used on a small numerical example to illustrate different solution approaches the solution method creates a detailed schedule and estimates the correct set up and inventory holding cost even if the facility works close to its capacity

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

venture capital and the birth of the local area networking industry abstract venture capital has played an important role in funding the development of a number of us high technology industries economists and business scholars utilizing models based in traditional economics have studied venture capital from the perspective of investment decision making these models provide significant insights and yet they do not explain the actual operation of venture capital this case study of the creation of lan industry utilizes a synthesis of the dominant design and social constructionist perspectives to create a more nuanced explanation of how the practice of venture capitalists operates to create firms and industries

modeling the evolution of markets with indirect network externalities an application to digital television the usefulness of a technology product for an end user often depends on the availability of complementary software products and services computers require software cameras require film and dvd players require movie programming in order for customers to value the whole product this phenomenon where the demand for hardware products is mediated by the supply of complementary software products is called an indirect network externality indirect network externalities create a two way contingency between the demand for the hardware product and the supply of software products and result in a strategic interdependence between the actions of hardware manufacturers and the actions of software providers indirect network externalities are gaining economic significance in technology markets because hardware and software are typically provided by independent firms and both sets of firms have an incentive to free ride on each others demand creation efforts despite the ubiquity of this phenomenon it has largely been ignored in the marketing science literature we present a conceptual and operational model for the evolution of markets with indirect network externalities the key feature of our framework is to model the market mediated dependence between the actions of hardware manufacturers and software complementors created by the direct dependence of consumer demand for the whole product on the actions of manufacturers as well as complementors in addition we incorporate marketing mix effects on consumer response aswell as heterogeneity in consumer preferences for hardware and software attributes we model consumer response usinga latent class choice model to estimate the complementor response functions we use a modified delphi technique that allows us to convert qualitative response data into quantitative response functions we integrate the consumer and complementor response models to create a simulation modelthat generates forecasts of market shares and sales volumes for competing technologies as a function of marketing mix effects and exogenously specified regulatory scenarios the modeling framework is of interest to new product modelers interested in creating empirical models and decision support systems for forecasting demand in technology markets characterized by indirect network externalities the decision support aspects of the modeling framework should appeal to managers interested in understanding and quantifying the complex interplay between hardware manufacturers and software complementors in the evolution of markets with indirect network externalities we present an application of the modeling framework to the u s digital television industry and use the framework to characterize the competition among analog and digital tv technologies our results suggest that complementor actions play an important role in the acceptance of digital tv technologies in general and high definition television hdtv in particular we find that forecasts that ignore the influence of indirect network externalities would be seriously biased in favor of hdtv we illustrate how the modeling framework can be used to identify and profile customer segments in the digital tv market based on their utility for hardware related features as well as programming related features we also illustrate the decision support capabilities of the modeling framework by evaluating the sensitivity of the forecasts to varying marketing regulatory and complementor response scenarios we derive implications for marketing and public affairs policies of the hardware manufacturers the developments in the digital tv industry generally support our finding that hdtv will be a niche product and will diffuse slower than originally expected due in part to the lack of programming the delays in the introduction of digital tv to the marketplace also suggest that most forecasts for infrastructure intensive technologies like digital tv may be too optimistic simply because they underestimate the delays in agreeing upon technology standards and resolving regulatory debates

theorizing path dependence a review of positive feedback mechanisms in technology markets regional clusters and organizations the concept of path dependence has often been criticized as vague and only narrowly applicable although we can find some very refined definitions of the concept we also find a wide range of empirical phenomena being described as path dependent we argue that more detailed accounts of the positive feedback mechanisms that form paths can take path dependence beyond this state of being overdetermined but under specified reviewing three well described cases of path dependent dynamics in technology markets regional clustering and organizations we define a core set of positive feedback mechanisms that constitute path dependence at different analysis levels and clarify the relationship between positive feedback and increasing returns we show that path dependent processes that is processes driven by positive feedback that veer toward rigidity or lock in can be but do not have to be found under many labels including structural inertia coevolution or institutional persistence we conclude that a precise definition of path dependence does not need to be at odds with the concept s widespread use in understanding organizational and industrial development processes copyright 2013 the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

the city network paradigm measuring urban network externalities in recent years network behaviour has been analysed extensively as the emerging model for economic growth by network behaviour a metaphor for co operative behaviour among individuals corporate

inefficient standard adoption inertia and momentum revisited i introduction since the establishment of the theory of network effects economists have been concerned with the question of whether a market with network effects will tend to settle on the socially optimal standard it has been postulated that markets may exhibit excess inertia once a technological standard is in place a new superior standard may not displace it because of installed base effects alternatively markets may exhibit excess momentum consumers may adopt a new standard too quickly ignoring the stranding effect they are having on previous users similar issues arise in the adoption of language and social norms the literature has investigated various conditions under which one of these inefficiencies arises such inefficiencies are of particular concern for open technologies such as the qwerty and dvorak keyboards 1 the situation is somewhat different when individual firms own standards in that case a simple argument seems to indicate that there is no possibility that an inefficient standard will persist if a new standard is superior in any objective sense there are gains to be made from switching to it once the standard has been adopted the firm can appropriate these gains therefore the firm has incentive to lower the initial price enough to induce adoption of the standard the preceding argument is made in liebowitz and margolis 1999 and repeated in spulber 2002 spulber expresses a general skepticism about the likelihood of inefficiencies when property rights are defined and markets exist critics might claim that previous models that imply inefficient standard adoption are unrealistic in some way and that if such models were modified slightly the inefficiency would disappear i reconsider the issue of inefficient standard adoption using a parsimonious yet compelling model assuming only that there are successive generations of finitely lived consumers that preferences are heterogeneous and that there are network effects among users adoption decisions can be inefficient this is true even if consumers can coordinate efficiently within a generation and a firm can act as a coordinating device across generations the model presented here generates some of the same results found in other papers collectively but in a more general setting and with more robust results if there is an established standard and a superior alternative emerges no single generation of consumers will be willing to switch to the new standard if the switching cost the loss of network benefit from breaking with past users is too high it may be that the benefits to future generations of consumers are large enough that from a social standpoint it would be efficient for one generation to adopt the new standard even if it is privately optimal for that generation to retain the old standard on the other hand the current generation considers only its own switching cost and not the cost it imposes on the previous generation leading to potential overadoption of new technology even for proprietary standards it is not clear that the incentive of the firm to induce adoption matches the social incentive in particular if consumer preferences are heterogeneous the firm will not be able to price in such a way to extract all of the additional surplus gained from the new standard on the other hand the firm will be able to appropriate some of the surplus generated by the network effect itself which is present for any standard and thus does not affect the social incentive to change standards it is not possible to address this issue with a two period model as in some of the previous literature see for example choi 1994 choi and thum 1998 katz and shapiro 1986 if a new technology is introduced in the second period but then the game ends the welfare of future generations of consumers is neglected 2 this article also differs from previous infinite horizon models of technology adoption

network effects and environmental externalities do clean technologies suffer from excess inertia abstract we study the diffusion of a clean substitute to a dirty durable in a dynamic model consumer utility of both durables increases in their respective market shares due to network effects first we characterize the optimal dirty good tax the tax should achieve a long run optimal division of the market between the two goods along the transition path to this steady state the optimal tax depends on the current and future market shares of the clean durable thus even if the marginal environmental damage from an additional dirty durable is constant the optimal tax should not be constant second we study whether excess inertia can occur if the emission tax is not optimally set we then find that a constant tax that only accounts for the environmental damage caused by the dirty good may lead to excess inertia excess inertia could happen even if the clean technology is proprietary and the technology owner has incentives to sponsor the initial market diffusion of the technology

technology choice and timing with positive network effects abstract when two competing and incompatible products coexist in a market potential users face a choice between the two products and the alternative of deferring the decision this paper examines the choice between the two substitutes where each one is subject to a positive network effect that is a user of one of the products experiences an increase in the value for each additional person using the same product we examine this buy or wait problem either for an individual or a manager making the investment on behalf of a firm by formulating and analyzing a decision theoretic model to model the stochastic evolution of market share we build on the generalized polya urn of arthur et al arthur w b ermoliev y m kaniovski y m 1987 path dependent processes and the emergence of macro structure european journal of operational research 30 3 294 303 allowing for composition of the market to affect not just the relative market shares but also the absolute growth rate of the market we show that the optimal strategy is defined by a pair of market penetration thresholds that depend on the market composition looking at the effect of the network effects on the optimal strategy we find that more pronounced network effects can either raise or lower the penetration thresholds

effects of discounting and demand rate variability on the eoq the economic order quantity eoq formula is probably the most well known formula in inventory theory it determines the optimal value of the ordering quantity by minimizing the average cost in an ordering cycle it is based on the assumptions that there is a fixed lead time and a constant demand rate these assumptions are usually not fulfilled in practice especially when dealing with slow moving items demand seems to fluctuate furthermore since the time between two successive orderings is often large for slow moving items discounted costs instead of average costs should be minimized in this paper we determine the optimal ordering quantity if demand is modelled by a poisson process and the expected discounted costs are minimized we also analyze the case where demand is uniform and or the average cost criterion is used we give graphical presentations of the optimal ordering quantities besides easily determining the optimal values these allow us to show what the effects of changing the objective function and of changing the demand distribution are we derive a simple discounted cost ordering quantity formula denoted by eoq d for slow moving items we show that for items with a small demand rate and high fixed ordering costs the eoq d is much closer to the optimal discounted cost ordering quantity than the traditional eoq formula c 1998 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

equilibrium entry patterns under uncertainty abstract in this paper we develop a model in which incumbency patterns are determined endogenously we consider a two period duopoly game under uncertainty and show that the equilibrium entry patterns are determined by the costs and benefits of early entry and the strategic interactions between the firms we also show that under quite plausible cost conditions incumbency may not arise as an equilibrium pattern of the duopoly game

hardware quality vs network size in the home video game industry abstract this paper analyzes competition between multiple proprietary and incompatible hardware systems when indirect network effects are present and software is provided competitively by third party developers a discrete choice demand structure is employed within a game theoretic setting to allow for a continuum of market share possibilities empirical evidence supports the claim that excess inertia is not a pervasive problem two data sets covering the life of the home video game industry yearly from 1976 to 2003 and monthly january 1995 to october 2007 yield three main results 1 market share is 11 4 times more sensitive to hardware quality than network size 2 the number of available games is 3 69 times more sensitive to hardware quality than network size and 3 hardware quality has a larger impact than network size on the probability of hardware success

preying for monopoly the case of southern bell telephone company 1894 1912 focusing on the southern bell telephone company we propose a modified version of the predation hypothesis to explain bell s natural monopoly over local telephone service southern bell effectively eliminated competition through a strategy of pricing below cost in response to entry which deprived competitors of the cash flow required for expansion even if it failed to induce exit investing in toll lines ahead of demand isolating independent companies in smaller towns and rural areas and forcing them to consolidate on favorable terms and influencing local regulatory policy in large cities to weaken rivals and ultimately to institutionalize the bell monopoly

short waves in hungary 1923 and 1946 persistence chaos and lack of control abstract monetary policies follow a complex and chaotic process one that is enhanced when monetary growth is taken to the extreme as in hyperinflation while we have a basic understanding of the complex dynamics of hyperinflation a less explored phenomenon accompanying hyperinflationary episodes is the effect that they have on institutional development building on recent advances in economic history examining monetary policy and institutions this analysis uses more explicit recourse to complexity theory and in particular complex adaptive systems to examine two separate hyperinflationary episodes in hungary 1923 and 1946 delving into the institutional and cultural roots of the inflationary policies of the hungarian government and detailing the institutional effects which succeeded hyperinflation this paper shows that the twin experiences of hungary were both chaotic and created a chaotic and complex aftermath the results of which are still being felt indeed hungary s 1923 and especially its 1946 hyperinflation shows that some economic chaos cannot be restrained by political institutions and in fact the institutions themselves were changed when staring into the abyss hungary also found that the abyss stared back

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

the optimal cash balance proposition maurice allais priority maurice allais well deserved nobel prize fortuitously brought to our attention an injustice inadvertently done him to which we were unknowing accessories for years the literature has ascribed to us the parentage of the transactions cost model of optimal cash balances with its notorious square rootformula derivedfrom inventory theory recently we found that its essence is contained in allais 1947 economie et interet pp 238 41 as jacob viner used to say no matter to what source the origin of an economic proposition is ascribed someone is sure to come up with an earlier one in any event here is a translation of the pertinent passages allais describes the model in footnotes 11 and 12 to the following text pp 238 41

obtaining strategic advantage from being imitated when can encouraging clones pay an important business strategy research theme concerns finding ways to minimize competition faced by the firm this paper however focuses on a different set of situations the model developed suggests that an innovator s best strategy may be to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present key factors to consider in assessing whether encouraging cloning is the innovator s best strategy are 1 the benefit to be derived in terms of added user base contributed by the clone sales traded off against 2 the unit sales that will be lost to the clones these factors in turn depend upon the strength of the network effect and the degree to which the innovator s product quality is perceived by consumers to be superior to the clone s the model further suggests that both the innovator and clone earn their highest payoffs when the clone takes the lead in price setting i e when the clone establishes its own price by considering for each price it might set how the innovator will react to that price and the innovator as price follower responds to the price the clone chooses the paper demonstrates that the clone leader innovator follower situation represents the unique nash equilibrium in price setting strategies a central implication is that when operating in a network externality environment instead of a problem to be avoided clones may be valuable assets to an innovating firm building up the user base for the innovator s technology by bringing lower valuing consumers into the market which in turn makes the innovator s product more attractive to high and medium valuing purchasers thus when the above described conditions hold being cloned can be more profitable for an innovating firm than dominating the market alone

hyperinflation the exchange rate and endogenous money post world war i germany revisited abstract we re examine the interaction of domestic and external factors in the german hyperinflation by extending frenkel s monetary model of the exchange rate to incorporate 1 endogeneity of the money supply with respect to government debt expected inflation and money wages 2 the direct impact of exchange rate depreciation on the domestic price level and 3 endogenous wage determination four equation estimates support each extension of the monetary model it appears that government deficit finance the collapse of the exchange rate and the monetary transmission of the wage price spiral were all crucial contributors to the price explosion

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

an early classic misplaced ford w harris s economic order quantity model of 1915 the familiar square root formula for the optimal economic order quantity was derived originally by harris in 1915 harris f w 1915 what quantity to make at once the library of factory management vol v operation and costs a w shaw company chicago 47 52 since all citations found to harris s paper over the past 35 years are incorrect it seems that no one has been able to locate the paper during this period the paper s apparent misplacement probably stems from an inaccurate citation given by raymond in 1931 raymond f e 1931 quantity and economy in manufacture mcgraw hill new york harris s paper exemplifies skillful presentation of the concepts of management science and still merits reading today s researcher can learn much from harris s modeling approach and would do well to emulate his expositional clarity and motivational effectiveness

optimal patenting and licensing of financial innovations recent court decisions starting with the state street decision in 1998 allow business methods to be patentable and now give financial institutions the option to seek patent protection for financial innovations this new patentability paradigm and the heterogeneity of characteristics associated with financial innovations pose an immediate decision problem for senior management what to patent we present a parsimonious decision framework that answers this question we show that for innovations with certain characteristics it is optimal not to patent even if the option of patenting and licensing is available our model emphasizes the role of embedded real options that arise from certain types of financial innovations the model provides an explanation of observed patenting behavior of financial institutions and the success of a wide class of innovations including swaps credit derivatives and pricing algorithms