bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction auctions have become a pervasive method of exchange in the online world as each day thousands of auctions take place online and this trade volume totals to billions of dollars worth of goods per year 1 this large volume of auction transactions implies the existence of a large number of sellers competing for buyers the obvious implication is that the competition among the sellers for the pool of potential buyers can be fierce and any competitive edge a seller can find could be important one such competitive edge a seller might exploit is using an auction design that attracts bidders away from their competitors when designing a real auction or modeling a theoretical one the entry decision of prospective bidders is rarely considered most auction analysis is performed assuming that a certain number of bidders will participate for certain or perhaps that the number of bidders is unknown and randomly determined it should be clear however that the most crucial part of a successful auction is encouraging as many bidders as possible to participate in general this should be expected to have a positive effect on revenue at least in noncommon value environments and in certain types of auctions it may help combat the possibility of bidder collusion because there are typically competing auctions available for similar goods or even outside options that bidders can pursue when auctions are for unique goods it is important to understand how the aspects of an auction format can effect the entry decision of a bidder consider a bidder who is faced with the choice of entering one of two auctions for similar or even identical objects how does this bidder make the decision of which auction to enter the obvious answer is that the bidder will enter into the auction that maximizes his or her expected utility so long as that expected utility is greater than some reservation value the real question then is how are these expected utilities constructed profit from participating in the auction is an obvious argument there are also a number of environmental considerations that might effect this decision that would be difficult to account for precisely such as the reputation and trustworthiness of the auctioneer quality of the advertisement for the auction and things of this nature it is also possible that the format of the auction itself can have an impact on the preferences of the bidder this latter point will be the issue of this study the particular focus will be looking at bidder preferences between the two most common standard auction formats used in the field the sealed bid first price will be abbreviated as just the sealed bid auction and the ascending or english auction the other reason we are interested in comparing these two auction formats rather than the ascending and second price or first price and descending is that it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between the two due to the strategic differences between them such differences lead to substantial differences in terms of the difficulty of deciding how to bid and also in the possibility that an outcome leads to a bidder experiencing some form of regret regret may occur in a first price auction when a bidder loses to a bid that is below his value as he may think that if only he had bid higher he could have won although such feelings of regret may be considered irrational that does not preclude their existence such a scenario should not reasonably occur in an ascending auction if one considers the situation of a bidder choosing between two auctions that differ only in regard to whether the auction is being conducted according to an ascending or sealed bid format it is not immediately obvious which would be the most preferred even assuming a standard symmetric independent private values environment were all bidders risk neutral then of course revenue equivalence would hold and the bidders would be indifferent

auctions with endogenous entry abstract predictions from auction models with endogenous bidder participation depend on whether entry takes place under asymmetric information or not auctions that are not revenue equivalent in the former set up may be so in the latter moreover under asymmetric information the social planner does not discourage entry even when the bid preparation cost is large

aspects of labor market adjustments in japan this article discusses some aspects of labor market adjustments in japan that may be relevant to the low unemployment rate there japanese statistics treat kyugyosha persons not at work as being employed but some of these workers would be counted as unemployed in the united states the kyugyosha group appears to increase in size during downturns and decreases during upturns suggesting that temporarily laid off persons are an important part of this group japanese employers evidently rely less on employment adjustments and more on adjustments in hours of work and inventory while employers in the united states rely more on employment adjustments to deal with cyclical changes in product demand japanese manufacturing employment became less sensitive and hours of work more sensitive to demand shocks after the introduction of the employment insurance law in 1975

on favoritism in auctions with entry abstract we examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single unit auction when the seller s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders we show that unless the seller values those bidders welfare more than her own private utility a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal

reserve prices without commitment abstract when potential bidders in an auction have to incur a cost to prepare their bids and thus to learn their valuations imposing a reserve price and announcing that in case no bid is submitted there will be another auction without a reserve price is both revenue and welfare improving reserve prices that induce less than maximum entry in the first auction may be optimal also entry fees are not necessarily better instruments than reserve prices journal of economic literatureclassification number d44

stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers the regular case abstract we analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication e g vincent p crawford joel sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 and optimal delegation e g bengt holmstrom on the theory of delegation in m boyer r e kihlstrom eds bayesian models in economic theory north holland 1984 pp 115 141 a principal agent model with hidden information no monetary transfers and single peaked preferences we demonstrate that under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent s bias the optimal mechanism is deterministic we also provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

spending time versus spending money we find systematic differences in the way that people spend time versus money ex post people are able to more easily accommodate negative outcomes by adjusting the value of their temporal inputs ex ante people are willing to spend more time for higher risk higher return options whereas when spending money the pattern is reversed and the more standard pattern of increasing risk aversion is observed although accurate assessment of the opportunity costs of time is key to making good decisions ambiguity in the value of time promotes accommodation and rationalization

a comparison of buyer determined and price based multiattribute mechanisms reverse auctions are fast becoming the standard for many procurement activities in the past the majority of such auctions have been solely price based but increasingly attributes other than price affect the auction outcome specifically the buyer uses a scoring function to compare bids and the bid with the highest score wins we investigate two mechanisms commonly used for procurement in business to business markets in a setting in which buyers welfare is affected by exogenous nonprice attributes such as the quality service and past relationships under both mechanisms bidders bid based on price but in the buyer determined mechanism the buyer is free to select the bid that maximizes her surplus while in the price based mechanism the buyer commits to awarding the contract to the low price bidder we find both in theory and in the laboratory that the buyer determined mechanism increases the buyer s welfare only as long as enough suppliers compete if the number of suppliers is small and the correlation between cost and quality is low the buyer is better off with the price based mechanism these findings are intended to help procurement managers make better decisions in designing procurement mechanisms for a variety of settings

markups aggregation and inventory adjustment in this paper i suggest a unified explanation for two puzzles in the inventory literature first estimates of inventory speeds of adjustment in aggregate data are very small relative to the apparent rapid reaction of stocks to unanticipated variations in sales second estimates of inventory speeds of adjustment in firm level data are significantly higher than in aggregate data the paper develops a multisector model where inventories are held to avoid stockouts and price markups vary along the business cycle the omission of countercyclical markup variations from inventory targets introduces a downward bias in estimates of adjustment speeds obtained from partial adjustment models when the cyclicality of markups differs across sectors this downward bias is shown to be more severe with aggregate rather than firm level data similar results apply not only to inventories but also to labor and prices montercarlo simulations of a calibrated version of the model suggest that these biases are quantitatively significant

ranking auctions with risk averse bidders this paper ranks first and second price independent value auctions with risk averse bidders when entry is endogenous unless bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion dara the fixed n ranking of first price over second price is sustained however when bidders exhibit dara we show that the effect of entry sometimes reverses the ranking we discuss how elements of the auction environment such as the relative magnitude of entry costs the number of potential bidders and the degree of risk aversion affect the ranking journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d44 d82 c72

optimal auctions revisited in symmetric privately known values oral auctions with costly entry for bidders the seller can do no better than by committing ex ante to a reservation price and entry fees or subsidies which result in no fewer and at most one more bidders than a reservation price equal to the seller s value would in the absence of entry fees or subsidies journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c72

a model of inventory and layoff behaviour under uncertainty this paper develops a model of firm behavior under uncertainty designed to study the interac tion of inventories and layoffs the model is a blend of a buffer sto ck model of inventory behavior and an implicit contract model of layo ffs the model creates a distinction between inventory biased and lay off biased firms each of which exhibits inherently different pattern s of response of inventories and temporary layoffs to demand shocks in addition the model implies that the inventory layoff interaction tends to strengthen weaken the response of price and the work force to changes in anticipated demand real interest rates copyright 1988 by royal economic society

the shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle abstract the analysis of second price auctions with externalities is utterly modified if the seller is unable to commit not to participate in the mechanism for the general symmetric model introduced by milgrom and weber p milgrom r weber a theory of auctions and competitive bidding econometrica 50 1982 1089 1122 we characterize the full set of separating equilibria that are symmetric among buyers and with a strategic seller being able to bid in the same way as any buyer through a so called shill bidding activity the revenue ranking between first and second price auctions is different from the one arising in milgrom and weber the benefits from the highlighted linkage principle are counterbalanced by the shill bidding effect

robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction the answer to the question of how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous entry decisions into auctions the issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers attempting to attract bidders to their auctions there is a growing literature addressing issues in endogenous entry in auctions there are several papers such as engelbrecht wiggans 1993 pevnitskaya 2004 and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 that consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior there is a much larger group for example harstad 1990 engelbrecht wiggans 1993 levin and smith 1994 mcafee 1993 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 that considers competition between auctioneers in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price we consider the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction mechanism our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the entry decisions of potential bidders of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior in ivanova stenzel and salmon iss 2004a we introduced an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending a dynamic mechanism and sealed bid first price a static mechanism auctions it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them in a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid these differences might result in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret 1 the design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed bid first price auction versus a two bidder ascending auction each with different entry prices by varying the entry prices we could measure the subjects willingness to pay for either auction our main finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction at equal entry prices they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the two auctions to participate in an ascending auction thus they ended up entering the supposedly less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make a higher net surplus including the cost of the entry fee by entering into the ascending auction instead that paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle that involved assuming that bidders were risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice behavior this explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid first price auction just as we observed in the experiment for the most risk averse bidders this is because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in the event that they win they consequently end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders this is a trade off risk a verse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative though risky ascending auction

money talks an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money we experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side in which senders either use costless messages money or a combination of the two we find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases cheap talk tends to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages a behavioral model due to kartik 2009 assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best

the high low divide self selection by values in auction choice abstract most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders find out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter we examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and or the outcome of the auctions the results show a strong impact on auction choice subjects with low values choose the first price sealed bid auction more often while subjects with high values choose the ascending auction more often the number of bidders in each auction revenue efficiency and average bidder surplus all end up equalized

buffer stocks and labor demand further evidence this paper presents estimates of a multivariate flexible accelerator model of labor demand hours and the number of production workers which shows that stocks of finished goods unfilled orders and materials inventories have significant impacts upon labor demand univariate time series models are used to capture expectations of the determinants of desired stocks new orders real wages and real raw materials prices and these magnitudes are found to follow a random walk without drift expected new orders and errors in forecasting new orders are found to have an important impact upon labor inputs real wage forecasting errors are found to be important for hours demand

determination of employment with wage and price speculation the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether aggregate fluctuations in employment may be explained within a market clearing framework as intertemporal substitution in labor supply and demand an intertemporal substitution model for the firm is derived this model is estimated with a lucas rapping type supply equation empirical results with finnish data lend support to the intertemporal substitution model particularly concerning the demand function specification on the other hand the results for the supply equation are somewhat mixed being rather sensitive to the dynamic specification

we will be right with you managing customer expectations with vague promises and cheap talk delay announcements informing customers about anticipated service delays are prevalent in service oriented systems how delay announcements can influence customers in service systems is a complex problem that depends on both the dynamics of the underlying queueing system and on the customers strategic behavior we examine this problem of information communication by considering a model in which both the firm and the customers act strategically the firm in choosing its delay announcement while anticipating customer response and the customers in interpreting these announcements and in making the decision about when to join the system and when to balk we characterize the equilibrium language that emerges between the service provider and her customers the analysis of the emerging equilibria provides new and interesting insights into customer firm information sharing we show that even though the information provided to customers is nonverifiable it improves the profits of the firm and the expected utility of the customers the robustness of the results is illustrated via various extensions of the model in particular studying models with incomplete information on the system parameters allows us also to highlight the role of information provision in managing customer expectations regarding the congestion in the system further the information could be as simple as high congestion low congestion announcements or it could be as detailed as the true state of the system we also show that firms may choose to shade some of the truth by using intentional vagueness to lure customers

risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first and second price auctions abstract we analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second price auctions in the classic setting of symmetric and independent private values we show that the seller s optimal reserve price decreases in his own risk aversion and more so in the first price auction the reserve price also decreases in the buyers risk aversion in the first price auction thus greater risk aversion increases ex post efficiency in both auctions especially that of the first price auction at the interim stage the first price auction is preferred by all buyer types in a lower interval as well as by the seller

indicative bidding an experimental analysis indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale furthermore there exist alternative bid procedures that in theory at least guarantee 100 efficiency and higher revenue for the seller we employ experiments to compare actual performance between indicative bidding and one of these alternative procedures the data shows that indicative bidding performs as well as the alternative procedure in terms of entry efficiency while having other characteristics that favor it over the alternative procedure our results provide an explanation for the widespread use of indicative bidding despite the potential problem identified in the equilibrium analysis

imperfect competition in auction designs we study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers the sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions upon observing the set reserve prices the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid we show that this game has at least one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient reserve prices are not driven to zero cost we also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly

contracting with endogenous entry we analyze entry in markets where a principal contracts with a privately informed agent before learning his production cost the agent knows his probability of having a low cost his ex ante type and decides whether to pay an entry fee to contract with the principal there are two cut off equilibria that determine the possible types of an agent who actually enters the market and neither equilibrium can be discarded by standard selection criteria contrasting with standard intuition in the equilibrium with the highest cut off an increase in the entry fee reduces the marginal type of the agent who enters thus increasing entry and the expected cost of an entrant this equilibrium is selected by a criterion based on robustness to equilibrium risk even though the equilibrium with the lowest cut off is pareto dominant for the agent public policies that increase entry barriers may be welfare improving

unionism mio the cyclical behavior of the labor tv rket in u s manufacturing t he traditional view of market dynamics implies that when demand varies intertemporal variation in quantities exchanged increases as prices become less flexible this reasoning leads to the proposition that wage and price rigidities are important contributors to cyclical fluctuations in output fischer 1977a and gray 1978 based formal macro models on this principle although this view is common it has little empirical support the coexistence of union and nonunion establishments engaged in similar activities contains potential for testing its merits economists have long maintained that in the short run union wages are less flexible than nonunion wages dunlop 1950 rees 1951 this difference should produce larger fluctuations in union employment and hours empirical studies have generally supported the union wage rigidity hypothesis lewis 1963 ashenfelter johnson and pencavel 1972 and hendricks 1981 2 but until recently lack of data precluded analysis of hours and employment definitive answers to the important questions concerning unions influence on cyclical behavior require yet unavailable information matching the behavior of firms and characteristics of workers but data from modem surveys have allowed considerable progress nevertheless it remains a challenge to determine how much of differences observed in the stability of labor utilization are attributable to differences in the stability of demand medoff 1979 and raisian 1979 report that cyclical variation of employment and hours is indeed greater for union labor but despite attempts to allay suspicion that their finding arises primarily from concentration of union members in cyclically sensitive industries both studies leave room for doubt raisian estimated functions relating an individual s wage and weeks worked in a year to a proxy for excess demand that year s unemployment rate in the worker s industry the technique is attractive but raisian s data included workers from the entire economy and the industries were broad aggregates thus differences in the union and nonunion groups compositions may play a large role medoff who confined his study to production workers in manufacturing and used data allowing finer partitions investigated the importance of composition more thoroughly but he did not estimate relationships between adjustments in employment or hours and a measure of demand furthermore his focus was principally on the composition of manhours adjustments rather than their size in this paper i combine the strongest features of the medoff and raisian studies in further examination of the influence of unionism on cyclical fluctuations using current population surveys u s department of commerce 1978 from may of 1973 75 my analysis covers production workers in manufacturing during a period of rising inflation and unemployment the heart of the analysis is a measure of residual employment that quantifies by three digit industry and year shortrun excess demand for labor i construct this variable from employment time series and use it to estimate union nonunion differences in the cyclical responses of unemployment hourly wage rates and hours worked the results are consistent with the view that increasing rigidity in wages amplifies cyclical fluctuations in the utilization of labor the wage regressions add further to the literature s already strong support for the union wage rigidity hypothesis the employment status and hours regressions imply that the sensitivities of employment received for publication august 12 1981 revision accepted for publication february 11 1983 federal reserve bank of dallas this paper is based on my ph d dissertation which was completed at ucla with financial assistance from the rand corporation and the department of labor comments by referees and by participants of labor workshops at ucla and the university of chicago as well as the computation assistance of brian mckee are gratefully acknowledged i am responsible for any remaining errors the views expressed should not be attributed to the federal reserve bank of dallas or the federal reserve system one study is gordon 1982 who concludes page 41 that macroeconomic instability in the united states has been aggravated by the unusually sluggish behavior of nominal wages in the postwar era 2see also johnson 1975 parsley 1980 and moore and raisian 1980

dynamic pricing for network service equilibrium and stability consider a data communication network owned and operated by a single organization the network has an infinite number of small users and is managed by a system manager sm whose objective is to maximize the net value of the system as a whole the objective of this paper is to study pricing mechanisms that induce the optimal arrival rates when the sm has no full knowledge of the demand in advance we investigate the system behavior under three alternative dynamic pricing rules and users expectations models and characterize the equilibrium and its stability conditions

why do sellers usually prefer auctions we compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly a simple simultaneous auction and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding the sequential process is always more efficient but preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers because the auction is more conducive to entry precisely because of its inefficiency it usually generates higher expected revenue we also discuss the effects of lock ups matching rights break up fees as in takeover battles entry subsidies etc

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

ex ante efficient mechanism with private entry costs this paper studies ex ante efficient resource allocation mechanism in an environment where agents endowed with their private values must incur private entry costs to participate due to the nature of this bidimensional screening problem and the difficulty in fully characterizing all implementable endogenous entries the domain of the related social planner s problem that is essential for establishing the existence of efficient mechanism needs to be carefully designed we find that a second price auction among the entrants with a reserve price equal to the seller s valuation is ex ante efficient and any ex ante efficient mechanism must be ex post efficient jel d44 d61 d82

a note on cheap talk and burned money abstract austen smith and banks cheap talk and burned money j econ theory 91 1 2000 1 16 study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of crawford and sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 i identify an error in the main theorem of austen smith and banks and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications i also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning this strengthens a result of austen smith and banks but uncovers other errors in their analysis finally an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct

efficient secrecy public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy this paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy conventional audience cost models suggest that state leaders must go public to reveal information in interstate crises because leaders cannot enhance their credibility by tying their hands if domestic audiences cannot observe their private signals i present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience the equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat albeit of limited credibility can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational ine cacy because secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war the logic of e cient secrecy may shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises the alaska boundary dispute illustrates this logic

setting customer expectation in service delivery an integrated marketing operations perspective service firms have increasingly been competing for market share on the basis of delivery time many firms now choose to set customer expectation by announcing their maximal delivery time customers will be satisfied if their perceived delivery times are shorter than their expectations this gap model of service quality is used in this paper to study how a firm might choose a delivery time commitment to influence its customer expectation and delivery quality in order to maximize its market share a market share model is developed to capture 1 the impact of delivery time commitment and delivery quality on the firm s market share and 2 the impact of the firm s market share and process variability on delivery quality when there is a congestion effect we show that the choice of the delivery time commitment requires a proper balance between the level of service capacity and customer sensitivities to delivery time expectation and delivery quality we prove the existence of nash equilibria in a duopolistic competition and show that this delivery time commitment game is analogous to a prisoners dilemma

do antitrust laws facilitate collusion experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies bertrand supergames with non binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets the experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication zero cost low cost and high cost prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly moreover costly communication decreases the number of messages but more importantly it enhances the stability of collusive agreements mccutcheon 1997 presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of mccutcheon s 1997 argument the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms

upping the ante how to design efficient auctions with entry of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage we first formalize hold up regarding entry costs that preys on second price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill bidding activity we derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions second we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post which offers some valuable flexibility the english auction with jump bids implements then the first best in general environments

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions more magic on the internet i present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first price sealed bid auctions the auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the internet for collectible trading cards from the game magic the gathering i examine a number of outcomes including the number of participating bidders the probability of sale the levels of individual bids and the auctioneer s revenues the benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric risk neutral bidders with independent private values the results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding many bidders behave strategically anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others bids

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

military coercion in interstate crises in an international crisis states make demands backed by threats to use force although these threats can be explicit in diplomatic communications they will not generally carry much weight unless substantiated by some show of force military measures designed to convey the commitment to resort to arms if one s demands are not satisfactorily met to have an impact this commitment must be credible it must be in one s interest to carry out the threat if the opponent refuses to comply in an environment where states possess private information about their valuations capabilities or costs credibility can be established by actions that a state unwilling to fight would not want or would not dare to take military moves such as arms buildups troop mobilizations and deployments to the potential zone of operations can alter incentives in a crisis by changing one s expected payoff from the use of force these are tacit bargaining moves that can restructure the strategic context thereby creating and possibly signaling one s commitments while undermining those of the opponent how can states use the military instrument to establish commitments and how does the nature of the instrument affect their ability to communicate them credibly to their adversaries there are two distinct mechanisms for credible signaling in economic models information can be transmitted reliably by sinking costs actors burn money to reveal that they value the disputed issue even more in contrast theories of interstate crisis bargaining usually rely on choices that increase the difference between backing down and fighting actors tie their hands by running higher risks of war to reveal their resolve the first mechanism involves costs that actors pay regardless of outcome and the second involves costs that actors pay only if they fail to carry out some threat or promise

the resurgence of inventory research what have we learned abstract recent empirical and theoretical research on business inventories is surveyed and critically evaluated while most inventory research has had macroeconomic motivations we focus on its microtheoretic basis and on potential conflicts between theory and evidence the paper asks two principal questions first how can inventories which are allegedly used by firms to stabilize production nonetheless be a destabilizing factor at the macroeconomic level second why if firms are following the production smoothing model is production more variable than sales in many industries we suggest that the so called s s model may help answer both questions

scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions we analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects either economies or diseconomies of scale we show that economies of scale give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices whereas the converse is not generally true moreover first and second price auctions are not always revenue equivalent economies of scale make second price auctions more profitable for the seller whereas revenue equivalence may be preserved in the case of diseconomies

cheap talk games may have unique informative equilibrium outcomes abstract we demonstrate that cheap talk games can have unique informative equilibrium outcomes by providing an example of an infinite action bayesian game which absent cheap talk does not possess an equilibrium

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

the impact of delaying the delay announcements many service providers use delay announcements to inform customers of anticipated delays however this information is usually not provided immediately but after a short period of time spent either waiting or occupied by the system the focus of this paper is on the impact of this postponement on the ability of the firm to influence customer behavior by communicating nonverifiable congestion information to its customers as well as on the profits and utilities for the firm and the customers respectively we show that this postponement can actually help the firm create credibility and augment the resulting equilibrium however in other settings this delay can also detract from the resulting equilibrium furthermore we show that whenever credibility is created it improves not only the profit for the firm but also the customers overall utility under certain settings

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements abstract this paper formulates a continuous time information transmission model in which an altruistic sender privately observes a stochastic state variable and incurs a communication cost when she broadcasts a message we characterize the sender s optimal announcement strategy using an ordinary differential equation we prove the optimality of the sender s strategies using a martingale verification argument and show that the sender s optimal strategy involves sending discrete messages furthermore we apply the model to the timing decision of credit rating announcements and provide a framework to study various aspects of rating announcements such as the probability of rating reversals and the expected time before a rating change

entry coordination and auction design with private costs of information acquisition i introduction in most auction literature bidders are passively endowed with private information about their valuations the analysis then focuses on optimal elicitation of private information on many occasions bidders may instead have to incur costs to collect this information 1 auction design in these cases has to balance between information acquisition and information elicitation which are interdependent the performance of an auction depends not only on the bidding equilibrium but also crucially on the information acquisition equilibrium 2 as a salient feature auction design with information acquisition costs has been complicated by entry coordination among bidders due to multiple entry equilibria issue in a symmetric independent private value ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 with fixed information acquisition cost levin and smith 1994 note that the ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auction a second price auction with no entry fee and no reserve induces many asymmetric entry equilibria other than the targeted symmetric one the existence of asymmetric entry equilibria in this setup fundamentally lies in bidders constant marginal cost of entry 3 information acquisition costs could be private information of bidders just as with their private information about values for example in the cases of construction procurements or u s timber auctions many aspects of prebid information acquisition and analyzation are private knowledge of bidders 4 clearly when information acquisition costs are private information of bidders auction design has to additionally take into account information elicitation at the information acquisition stage this aspect of analysis has yet to be reflected in the literature while the case with fixed information acquisition costs has been thoroughly studied by milgrom 1981 mcafee and mcmillan 1987 engelbrecht wiggans 1987 1993 harstad 1990 levin and smith 1994 mcafee quan and vincent 2002 ye 2004 2007 and cremer spiegel and zheng 2009 among others a widely recognized insight of these studies is that ex ante efficiency can be achieved through a second price auction while setting the reserve at the seller s valuation if ex ante entry fees can be used to extract all the expected surplus of bidders then there is a congruence between the revenue and total surplus 5 this article advances this line of research by studying the implications of private acquisition costs on auction design with an emphasis on bidders coordination at the information acquisition stage specifically we consider the ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 and levin and smith 1994 while allowing the information acquisition costs to be bidders private information which follow a continuous distribution in light of our previous discussion this article attempts to answer the following questions 1 how are ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auctions affected by this additional dimension of private information in other words how does information rent extraction at the entry stage affect the auction designs 2 can this private information alleviate rather than aggravate the problem of entry coordination with the dispersion in private information acquisition costs the multiplicity of entry equilibria arising from the constant marginal cost in levin and smith 1994 might be avoidable the types with higher information acquisition costs must have less incentive to enter which could reduce the number of entry equilibria the questions are will sufficient dispersion coordinate bidders and induce a unique entry if yes how much dispersion is enough due to the potential multiplicity of entry equilibria for any given mechanism it is rather difficult to compare performances across varieties of mechanisms to overcome this difficulty we come up with an alternative approach our analysis begins with characterizing efficient and revenue maximizing auctions for any given feasible entry pattern which can be described through a vector of bidders entry thresholds of acquisition costs

when should sellers use auctions the simultaneous bid auction is a standard method for sellers to solicit offers from buyers a simple alternative is for a seller to ask buyers to make offers sequentially if it is costly for buyers to participate the sequential mechanism will tend to be more efficient than the simultaneous auction because later potential buyers can condition their participation decisions on earlier bids however the sequential mechanism s greater efficiency may not produce higher revenues because while the possibility of deterring later potential entrants can lead early bidders to bid aggressively the fact that later firms might be deterred will tend to reduce revenues the relative revenue performance of the mechanisms will therefore depend on whether the threat of potential future competition which can raise bids in the sequential mechanism is more valuable to the seller than actual competition which will tend to be greater in the simultaneous auction the relative revenue performance of these alternative mechanisms has direct implications for how assets should be sold in the case of how to structure the sale of corporations this question has attracted attention from practitioners and commentators since the delaware supreme court s 1986 revlon decision charged a board overseeing the sale of a company with the duty of getting the best price for the stockholders revlon v mcandrews and forbes holdings 1986 in practice

revenue equivalence revisited the conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient we re examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats consequently we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue they also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher

complements and substitutes in sequential auctions the case of water auctions we use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are com plements or substitutes a sequential english auction model determines the estimating structural equations when units are complements one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units when units are substitutes different bidders win the units with positive probability paying prices similar in magnitude even when the same bidder wins all units we re cover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with non cooperative behavior demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features

persuasion with communication costs this paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report contrary to previous literature it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by milgrom 1981 is relatively robust to costly reporting a separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs intuitively the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation with reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria for example a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high finally a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report as long as this cost is not too high

dynamic labour demand using error correction model using a new econometric model this study provides evidence that contradicts previous assertions about the japanese labour market the interrelationship between employment and hours of labour is stressed in this analysis by explicitly dividing labour input into both employment and labour hours this model enables results to be obtained through both simulation and estimation which allow measurement of adjustment speeds and elasticity in both employment and labour hours to wages the results of the simulations are as follows no apparent difference in adjustment speeds between employment and hours of labour was found the adjustment of hours of labour is more cyclical and overshoots whereas that of employment is smoother the adjustment speed of each simulation is slower than that found in most previous studies in the present long run simulation it is not as slow in the short run and policy simulations therefore adjustment speeds strongly depend on the method of simulation

a dynamic model of bertrand competition with entry abstract this paper analyzes a simple repeated game of simultaneous entry and pricing we report a surprising property of the symmetric equilibrium solution if the number of potential competitors is increased above two the market breaks down with higher probability and the competitive outcome becomes less likely more potential competition lowers welfare another bertrand paradox the model can also be applied to auctions to explore whether a revenue maximizing auctioneer should restrict the number of bidders if bidder participation is costly

excess labour and the business cycle a comparative study of japan germany the united kingdom and the united states against the background of firm specific human capital theory this paper investigates empirically the relative propensity of manufacturing industries in japan germany the united kingdom and the united states to hold excess labour over the business cycle both stock and utilization dimensions of the labour input are integrated into the study throughout discussion is linked to earlier research that has analysed the relative international performance of the japanese labour market

cheap talk can matter in bargaining this paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a twostage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation the intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model instead if good faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade off bargaining position against the probability of continued negotiation our cheap talk equilibrium features bargaining behavior that could not be equilibrium behavior in the absence of talk

auctions with heterogeneous entry costs it is well known that if bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs a rst or second price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller s value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue and leaves bidders with no surplus further in mixed strategy entry equilibria social surplus and seller revenue decrease with the number of bidders we show that when entry costs are heterogeneous and private information the revenue maximizing reserve price is above the seller s value a positive inspection fee and a reserve price equal to the seller s value generates even more revenue and in either case bidders capture informational rents further seller revenue and social surplus may either increase or decrease with the number of bidders nevertheless seller revenue is asymptotically the same whether entry costs are homogeneous or heterogeneous our results are framed in terms of screening values rather than reserve prices and apply to any standard auction

increasing returns labour utilization and externalities procyclical productivity in the united states and japan this paper investigates procyclical productivity and attempts to discriminate among several competing explanations the study focuses on the united states and japan since the different industrial relations in these two economies serve to cast a sharper light on the procyclical productivity debate labour hoarding evaluated through the introduction of a labour utilization proxy proves to be an important influence the interpretation of the role of external economies remains an open issue

on absolute auctions and secret reserve prices from a theory viewpoint the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices also called absolute auctions or of auctions with secret reserve prices is somewhat puzzling despite being common by allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge we also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats thereby offering a range of testable predictions alternative approaches are reviewed

premium auctions and risk preferences abstract in a premium auction the seller offers some payback called premium to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction this paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders risk preferences we analyze a two stage english premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders risk tolerance a net premium effect is key to this result

sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects abstract we show that in sequential auctions of a large enough number of stochastically equivalent objects with bounded values prices will on average have a downwards trend

on discrimination in auctions with endogenous entry abstract when entry is exogenous strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues myerson 1981 when entry is endogenous so that entrants expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism optimal discrimination takes a completely different form the revenue maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics besides those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength these predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large the optimality of first price auctions is also discussed jel d44 h57

inventories layoffs and the short run demand for labor this paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the short run employment layoff and inventory strategies of firms on average more than two thirds of all layoffs in american manufacturing end in a rehire by the employer of origin martin feldstein 1975 david lilien 1980 these temporary layoffs have recently accounted for about half of all ongoing employer initiated spells of unemployment in that sector see table 1 and have led to a revised interpretation both of the involuntary nature of these separations costas azariadis 1975 feldstein 1976 martin baily 1977 and of the durability of employment relationships evidently a significant proportion of unemployed workers know that the conditions that generated their separations are temporary and so they expect to be recalled within some reasonable time the point of departure for this paper is in interpreting these findings as evidence of a privately and socially efficient stock of excess capacity held against contingent future demands that is as an inventory of a productive input this view leads to empirically refutable hypotheses regarding both the role of temporary layoffs and the circumstances under which they will be important in particular both excess capacity idle resources and inventories are devices by which firms may economize on the costs of rapid adjustments when faced with unstable market conditions george stigler 1939 in such an environment the demands for layoffs and for other buffer stocks are jointly determined elements of long run technology the choice among alternative stocks will depend on relative profitabilities and firms may choose to hold stocks of inputs as a substitute for inventory accumulation especially if the costs of varying capacity or of storage are important this reasoning implies that i the structure of short run employment and layoff decisions will vary across firms and industries and ii differences in these structures will be systematically related to the role of inventories in firms dynamic strategies some perspective is warranted at least since charles holt et al 1960 economists have recognized the production smoothing role of inventories and the necessity of predicting future demand in making current decisions david belsley 1969 gerald childs 1967 michael ward 1978 similarly one of the contributions of recent work on implicit labor contracts is in viewing the exchange of labor services as a bilateral and durable commitment both these lines of analysis are concerned with the methods firms use to respond to fluctuating demand yet the underlying interrelated nature of employment and inventory decisions has rarely been recognized roger miller 1968 m ishaq nadiri and sherwin rosen 1973 r g crawford 1979 robert hall 1972 this paper aims to provide a framework for evaluating these decisions and in so doing to explain some interesting features of observed labor markets the notion of substitution between inventories of human and physical capital suggests a more disaggregated look at the data table 2 shows the importance of temporary layoffs in the distribution of unemployment among manufacturing industries it reports layoff and total unemployment rates for twelve representative industries over the period 197376 and average layoff rates and recall frequencies for 1958 76 among all 21 twodigit manufacturing industries the correlation between layoff and rehire rates is 6 and the table illustrates this evidently industries with larger than normal layoff rates also tend to have larger rehire frequencies from firm initiated spells of unemployment this university of chicago i am indebted to gary becker robert cotterman sherwin rosen jose scheinkman michael ward finis welch the managing editor and an anonymous referee for discussions and comments at various stages the usual disclaimer applies

introduction to the symposium phe stimulus for this symposium was the appearance in 1996 of richard caves multinational enterprise and economic analysis caves book is one of several books that could be used as the starting point in an inquiry into the future of economics research on international business john dunning s multinational enterprises and the global economy and peter buckley and mark casson s the future of the multinational enterprise are other books that come to mind and there are surely more however caves book has one notable feature lacking in the others the 1996 book is the second edition appearing fourteen years after its predecessor in 1982 the two caves editions thus permit the reader not only to gauge the stock of economics research available on the multinational firm in the early 1980s but also to know how one eminent scholar in the field has appraised the flow over the decade or so that followed the topical and methodological distribution of this flow segment we believe can provide market signals of where economics oriented researchers or perhaps more to the point journal editors have placed their bets on scholarly work what better time than now to ask other notable scholars in the field to add their judgments to caves in a jibs symposium a secondary but important stimulus was the recent administrative change in jibs the journal has moved through another orderly transition in its history with the transfer to a new editor a new home institution and a reconstituted board of editorial advisors we thought that analyses of trends in international business scholarship would be useful to jibs new team we conceived of this symposium as a way for recognized scholars in the field of international business to use caves work as a benchmark so to speak to bring light on two issues first have any important strands of research slipped through caves net second where do these scholars place their bets on the topics and research methods that will yield the highest returns to scholars over the next two decades we invited professor caves as well to add his own insights on scholarly roads less traveled but routes which could lead to new perspectives on international business each participant in the symposium has used one or more chapters from

some international evidence on inventory fluctuations abstract this paper shows some international evidence that production is more variable than sales in most developed countries but the reverse is true in most developing countries from international perspectives cost shocks do not appear to be the predominant source of fluctuations in inventories contrary to the widely accepted evidence in the postwar united states demand shocks and serial correlations in demand on the other hand appear to be of roughly equal importance for inventory fluctuations

waiting time and decision making is time like money time is a resource as such consumers have to make decisions regarding their use of time in the purchase and consumption of goods and services using prospect theory and mental accounting as theoretical frameworks this article investigates whether consumers treat time like money when they make decisions in a series of studies we found that the value of consumers time is not constant but depends on contextual characteristics of the decision situation our results also suggest that in deterministic situations people make decisions involving time losses in a manner consistent with the convex loss function proposed by prospect theory however in decision making under conditions of risk people seem to make risk averse choices with respect to decisions in the domain of time in contrast to the risk seeking behavior often found with respect to decisions involving losses of money we discuss the nonfungibility of time as an explanation for the discrepancy between decisions involving time and those involving money

exclusive dealing through resellers in auctions with stochastic bidder participation this paper demonstrates that a seller prefers to exclude final consumers from an auction and sell only to resellers when these resellers can gain access at a cost to a sufficiently bigger market than the seller himself the intuition is that resellers recoup their expenses for marketing the item by reselling it to final consumers if some consumers participate in the first auction and are outbid by the resellers then their values for the item are relatively low outbidding part of their customer base is bad news for the resellers and this depresses their bids when consumers compete with them the socially optimal and revenue maximizing choices of auction format may not coincide restricting participation of consumers may be socially optimal but privately suboptimal and vice versa the results suggest that i the exclusion of final consumers in some auctions may not be driven by transaction cost considerations and ii sellers should not necessarily sell directly to consumers even though new technologies allow them to do so at essentially zero cost unless they can access a sufficiently large portion of the market

equilibrium adjustment with endogenous information and inventories the paper analyzes the interaction of information acquisition and inventory flexibility with industry adjustment to imperfectly perceived cost and demand disturbances improved information about disturbances reduces the extent to which disturbances are unperceived and dampens the use of inventories reduced inventory flexibility induces firms to devote more resources to acquiring information about disturbances the analysis demonstrates how equilibrium price and output adjustment depend endogenously on the degree of inventory flexibility and other structural parameters influencing the acquisition of information in this paper we analyze how endogenous information acquisition and inventory flexibility influence price and output adjustment in a competitive industry we focus on the potential substitutability of information acquisition for inventory flexibility when disturbances are imperfectly perceived by individual firms the analysis highlights the general issue of how market adjustment depends on structural parameters that influence agents incentives to acquire information there are several reasons why information acquisition may play a role in market adjustment first the rapid development of information technology has enabled firms to gather and process data relevant to production and sales decisions from a greater number of external and internal sources this trend has reduced the costs of forecasting and monitoring factors influencing production and demand conditions for the individual firm relative to those of its competitors as well as for the industry as a whole in particular it has permitted quicker awareness of changing customer demand as well as greater control of the flow of inputs and intermediate goods during the production process this implies that the resources devoted to information acquisition and processing have come to play an important role in firm decisions 2 second improved information about demand and cost conditions may affect the function of inventories inventory adjustment allows a firm s production costs to be smoothed in response to anticipated movements in demand and costs and to be buffered against unanticipated disturbances see ashley and orr 1985 thus

on recalls layoffs variable hours and labor adjustment costs abstract the paper analyzes the employment policy of a firm that can vary both hours and the level of employment the analysis differs from previous work in the adjustment cost literature in that the firm is able to change its employment not only through hires layoffs and quits but also by recalls of employees who were previously laid off thus we introduce the possibility of the firm inventorying the labor input it is shown that this labor inventory potential is necessary if the firm is to ever lay off workers further it is demonstrated that linear rather than strictly convex adjustment costs are then required if the firm is to always recall employees who were previously laid off prior to hiring new workers

optimal limited authority for principal abstract this article studies a principal agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent we show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal biased toward the agent s preference generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain compared to no commitment limited authority improves the quality of communication from the agent as a result it can give the principal a higher expected payoff than delegating the decision to the agent

secrecy two sided bias and the value of evidence abstract we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on players preferences for a verifiable message game to possess a separating equilibrium and or a pooling equilibrium as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be pooling we also characterize all nonseparating equilibria and use this property to show that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters

the response of prices sales and output to temporary changes in demand we determine empirically how the big three automakers accommodate shocks to demand they have the capability to change prices alter labor inputs through temporary layoffs and overtime or adjust inventories these adjustments are interrelated non convex and dynamic in nature combining weekly plant level data on production schedules and output with monthly data on sales and transaction prices we estimate a dynamic profit maximization model of the firm using impulse response functions we demonstrate that when an automaker is hit with a demand shock sales respond immediately prices respond gradually and production responds only after a delay the size of the immediate sales response is linear in the size of the shock but the delayed production response is non convex in the size of the shock for sufficiently large shocks the cumulative production response over the product cycle is an order of magnitude larger than the cumulative price response we examine two recent demand shocks the ford explorer firestone tire recall of 2000 and the september 11 2001 terrorist attacks

inventories rational expectations and economic activities abstract this paper examines the role of inventories when adjustments in output involve fixed employment costs such as hiring and training costs these costs force the firm to use inventories to stabilize output fluctuations contrary to the blinder fisher model unanticipated aggregate disturbances in the present model may have no subsequent impacts on the economy the exchange between mccallum and blinder frydman are also discussed in this context