credit constraints and international financial crises abstract a version of the kiyotaki and moore j political econom 105 1997 211 model of credit cycles is used to examine the extent to which a crisis in a country can spread to another seemingly unrelated country the model features two small open economies that face credit constraints and produce a differentiated commodity which they export to a large country a productivity shock to one of the small open economies triggers an adverse terms of trade shock to the other which is then amplified by credit constraints the paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between terms of trade shocks and the balance of payments that differs from existing models which focus on risk sharing and consumption smoothing in particular it is shown that if financial frictions are present a temporary terms of trade shock can trigger capital outflows and a rapid deterioration in the current account

deception the role of uncertain consequences abstract we study how decisions to lie extend to risky environments we provide experimental evidence from a sender receiver game where there is uncertainty over the amount by which a sender s lie reduces its receiver s payoff which is known only to potential liar even though all reduction amounts are equiprobable ex post beliefs elicited from senders suggest that unlike truth tellers most liars underestimate the extent of the actual reduction in the receiver s payoff and appear to exploit this self serving bias resulting in substantially more lying relative to a baseline treatment without the uncertainty subsequent treatments confirm the bias by either providing additional evidence or by removing possible confounds an intervention treatment nudging senders toward correcting the bias reduces lying

communication structure and coalition proofness experimental evidence abstract the paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication i e who is talking with whom in a coordination game we run an experiment in a three player game with pareto ranked equilibria where a pair of players has a profitable joint deviation from the pareto superior equilibrium we show that specific communication structures lead to different coalition proof equilibria in this game results match the theoretical predictions subjects communicate and play the pareto superior equilibrium when communication is public when pairs of players exchange messages privately subjects play the pareto inferior equilibrium even in these latter cases however players beliefs and choices tend to react to messages despite the fact that these are not credible

shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money burning options in a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumer s payoff expectations i an opportunity for the expert to make a non binding promise and ii an opportunity for the consumer to burn money in belief based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expert s behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer by contrast the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path experimental results confirm the behavioral relevance of i but fail to confirm ii

norms and contracting we argue that contracts establish the norms of a relationship and that individuals incur disutility when deviating from these norms in a laboratory experiment we allow agents to make simple contracts before they play one of four games and the most effective contract always includes an unenforceable handshake agreement to take the first best action in three games a contract with only this handshake agreement is at least weakly optimal the handshake is particularly effective in games with strategic complements our results highlight an explanation for contractual incompleteness establishing a norm can effectively substitute for weak enforceable restrictions this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

issues in irrigation pricing in developing countries abstract this paper surveys the current literature on irrigation pricing in developing countries and discusses the important issues involved in particular this paper discusses the role of government in irrigation development and allocation economics of irrigation pricing current status of irrigation water pricing and cost recovery in developing countries and the reasons for the marginal cost pricing principal being not followed in developing countries the paper also provides some suggestions for improving methods of water pricing and cost recovery

ready for capital account convertibility abstract this paper investigates whether the impact of capital account convertibility on the long term volatility of economic growth depends on financial development it estimates a system of three simultaneous equations mean growth volatility of growth and financial development this allows for the study of both the impact of capital account liberalization on volatility as well as its direct impact on financial development results indicate that economies with low financial development fall prey to excess volatility arising from capital account openness while capital account openness itself has a significant positive impact on financial development the results are robust to alternative measures of financial development and volatility and to the removal of outliers

promises and expectations abstract we investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects in a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second order expectations promisors expectations about promisees expectations leads to a significant change in promisor behavior we provide evidence that a promisor s aversion to disappointing a promisee s expectation leads her to behave more generously we propose and estimate a simple model of conditional guilt aversion that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases

biotechnology boosts to crop productivity in china trade and welfare implications genetically modified gm cotton is widely adopted and the list of gm technologies in trials is impressive in china at the same time there is an active debate on when china should commercialize its gm food crops this paper provides an economy wide assessment of some of the issues surrounding the adoption and commercialization of biotechnology based on unique data from empirical micro level study and field trials in china and a modified gtap model our results indicate that the development of biotechnology has an important impact on china s production trade and welfare welfare gains far outweigh the public biotechnology research expenditures most gains occur inside china and can be achieved independently from biotech unfriendly polices adopted in some industrialized countries

broken promises and hidden partnerships an experiment abstract previous research indicates that cheap talk promises promote cooperation we extend the empirical study of promises to a three person environment doing this enabled us to study two features of promises in the naturally occurring world that have not been studied in the previous literature for one we are able to determine the impact of contingent promises which refers to promises that need to be kept or broken only in the event that another event first occurs second we were able to study promise chains by which we mean a set of sequentially made promises in both cases we are able to apply existing theories to these novel environments to predict promise keeping behavior consistent with theory predictions we find that promises are not necessary and do not change behavior when incentives are aligned when there is conflict of interest and when a promise is definite that is not contingent we find that people are indeed willing to forgo monetary payoff to keep their promises however when the promise is contingent promises no longer promote cooperation people are equally like to choose a selfish action regardless whether they made a promise finally we find that promise chains do not promote trustworthiness with people at the end of the chain no more likely to honor their promises than people at earlier positions despite the additional indirect harm that people later in the chain cause by defecting our findings offer insights relevant for the behavioral economic theory of guilt aversion

promises and endogenous reneging costs we present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency we explore a two player partnership game where before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort we allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises we demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging and show that these intermediate costs induce second best optimal outcomes

testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs we conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether subjects tend to meet the expectations of others the guilt aversion hypothesis the specificity of our approach is that second order beliefs are manipulated exogenously just by changing the parameters of the experimental game in particular we consider a simple communication game where the sender is perfectly informed about his material benefit from lying to the receiver at the same time the receiver knows only the ex ante distribution of the sender s material incentives by changing this distribution between the experimental treatments we achieve an exogenous variation in the receiver s payoff expectations and hence in the corresponding sender s second order beliefs while keeping the sender s actual material incentives fixed the results show that the rate of lying is significantly lower when the receiver is supposed to have higher payoff expectations however only in the case when the monetary incentives for lying are fixed at a moderate level

impact of water scarcity in australia on global food security in an era of climate change abstract australia is a major food exporting country recent droughts reduced dryland farming production and the volume of water allocated to irrigated agriculture with a resulting decline in aggregate agricultural production and exports this paper analyses the possible impact of increased water scarcity on australian agricultural production and the magnitude of subsequent impacts on global food security using the australian bureau of statistics abs data on land and water use coupled with a hydro economic stochastic modelling approach the impacts of reduced agricultural production in the southern murray darling basin and more generally for australia are analysed changes in agricultural activity reduction in agricultural exports and altered composition of products exported attributed to the severe 2000 2009 drought are also analysed to highlight the implications for global food security the impact of climate change on food production is examined the analysis shows that climate change when modelled as the extreme case along with other factors such as land use will impact australian food exports despite its relatively small contribution to total global food supply australia s contribution to international trade in wheat meat and dairy products is substantial and could affect global food prices furthermore australia s agricultural exports are of disproportionate importance within the south and south east asian and oceania region both in terms of volume and for strategic reasons adaptation along with investment in agriculture production is needed to maintain australian agricultural production and enhance global food security

aggregate spending and the terms of trade is there a laursen metzler effect this paper investigates the spending and current account effects of terms of trade shifts in a model where households maximize utility over an infinite planning period in the framework developed here an economy specialized in production must experience a fall in aggregate spending and a current surplus as a result of an unanticipated permanent worsening in its terms of trade the paper s model thus provides a setting in which the current account deficit predicted by laursen and metzier harberger and others fails to materialize

the labor market return to academic fraud abstract academic fraud by undergraduate students is pervasive but should it be taken seriously as an economic problem our research suggests so using a unique data set from the caucasus we estimate a large positive effect of academic fraud on the probability of employment econometrically we deal with endogenous selection into academic fraud and possible measurement error in the reporting of academic fraud using partial identification techniques the findings demonstrate that incentives to commit academic fraud are strong and point towards the potentially damaging consequences of academic fraud in broader settings

the economics of climate change impacts a la stern novel and nuanced or rhetorically restricted abstract the stern report conducts an estimation of greenhouse gas control costs weighed against the benefits of avoiding damages at the global scale as i show stern and colleagues are aware of the limits to cba although they chose to ignore the considerable literature on the subject the many contributions by ecological economists and especially work specific to the enhanced greenhouse effect various problems are raised or mentioned in the report including strong uncertainty incommensurability plural values non utilitarian ethics rights distributional inequity poverty and treatment of future generations how then can this report acknowledging so many of those aspects of climate change that render cba an unsuitable tool for generating policy recommendations go ahead to conduct a global cba and make policy recommendations i explain how issues are suppressed and sidelined in a careful and methodical manner with the pretence they have been addressed by state of the art solutions meanwhile the authors maintain allegiance to an economic orthodoxy which perpetuates the dominant political myth that traditional economic growth can be both sustained and answer all our problems besides perpetuating myths this diverts attention away from alternative approaches away from ethical debates over harming the innocent the poor and future generations and away from the fundamental changes needed to tackle the very real and serious problems current economic systems pose for environmental systems

promises in contract design in this paper we propose a new channel of contract design to boost efficiency if deviating from one s own words induces a self imposed moral burden the optimal contracting procedure with regard to cheap talk shall assign the responsibility for installing the nonbinding promise in the contract to whoever has the residual right to break such promise in the spirit of grossman and hart 1986 and hart and moore 1990 to study whether a worker s own promise of effort level governs his real choice of effort in a gift exchange game we implement four treatments in our experiments by varying two factors 1 who the firm or the worker takes the position of the proposer to propose the contract and 2 whether the proposed contract includes a nonbinding specification of the worker s effort level our key finding is that when it is the worker who proposes the contract and the contract includes the worker s promised effort level both the worker s actual effort choice and the aggregate profits are significantly higher than in each of the

bare promises an experiment abstract is truth value of a statement what lying aversion is all about we propose an experimental test and find only limited support in this context with bare promises we also test for guilt aversion and again find only limited support

the terms of trade and the current account the harberger laursen metzler effect the paper examines the effect of terms of trade changes on a small country s spending and current account assuming optimizing behavior in an intertemporal framework with perfect international capital mobility a temporary future terms of trade deterioration implies a deterioration improvement of the trade balance whereas a permanent terms of trade deterioration has an ambiguous effect depending on the rate of time preference nominal and real variables are considered via exact price indexes two periods and an infinite horizon are examined

a meeting of the minds informal agreements and social norms using coordination games we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists we combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior we demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion we estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10 of total earnings and more than 120 in the bertrand game we show that informal agreements affect behavior through their direct effect on social norms as well as through an indirect effect on beliefs this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

guilty conscience and incentives with performance assessment errors this study examines the effects of guilty conscience on incentive in the situation where an agent performance assessment has errors there are two types of assessment error undervaluation and overvaluation in overvaluation agents will not correct the assessment because their wages would then decrease although agents will want their undervaluation corrected principals will not correct the error due to increased wage cost hence correcting errors is complicated however this type of selfish behavior by agents and principals produces feelings of guilt particularly when others trust them in this situation a high incentive is desirable for conscientious people with a strong sense of guilt or for nonconscientious people who do not feel guilt but it is undesirable for intermediate type people who are conscientious only to a certain extent jel d03 d82 j41

on crises contagion and confusion abstract since the tequila crisis of 1994 1995 the asian flu of 1997 and the russian virus of 1998 economists have been busy producing research on the subject of contagion yet few studies have examined empirically through which channels the disturbances are transmitted if there are indeed fundamental reasons for the spillovers we observe we attempt to fill this gap by analyzing how both trade links and the largely ignored financial sector links influence the pattern of fundamentals based contagion we examine the role of international bank lending the potential for cross market hedging and bilateral and third party trade in the propagation of crises

temptation in vote selling evidence from a field experiment in the philippines abstract we report the results of a randomized field experiment in the philippines on the effects of two common anti vote selling strategies involving eliciting promises from voters an invitation to promise not to vote sell is taken up by most respondents reduces vote selling and has a larger effect in races with smaller vote buying payments the treatment reduces vote selling in the smallest stakes election by 10 9 percentage points inviting voters to promise to vote your conscience despite accepting money is significantly less effective the results are consistent with a behavioral model in which voters are only partially sophisticated about their vote selling temptation

relationship organization and price delegation an experimental study price delegation to the salesforce is a practice widely adopted by firms this paper examines the relationship between price delegation and managerial profits using a laboratory economics experiment a novel feature of our experiment is that we study how varying the relationship organization of the sales manager and salesperson to allow for 1 requests by the salesperson for the manager to choose price delegation and for 2 the manager to award a small bonus after observing the salesperson s decisions can affect behavior the results show that contrary to the theoretical prediction managers choose price delegation frequently and salespeople respond reciprocally leading to higher manager profits under price delegation moreover this behavior increases when requests and bonuses are allowed we show that a behavioral economics model that incorporates positive reciprocity can explain these results well data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1778 this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

returns to investment in less favored areas in developing countries a synthesis of evidence and implications for africa abstract a large proportion of world s population lives in marginal or less favored areas these areas are of home to the poorest segment of the population particularly in rural areas in the past government has targeted their resources mostly to the high potential or irrigated areas these investments have generated rapid growth in agricultural production for example the so called green revolution in south and southeast asia in the 1970s and 1980s which in turn has helped to alleviate rural and urban poverty however as investments continue to increase in these favored areas their marginal returns have begun to decline and environmental problems are emerging evidence shows that it is in the marginal areas or less favored areas where many investments may have higher returns today these investments may have even larger impacts on poverty reduction and environmental protection as poor people are increasingly concentrated in the marginal areas where natural resources have already been severely degraded this study synthesizes some recent studies from india and china on the relative returns to investments in favored and less favored areas and presents some preliminary evidence from uganda and offers some policy implications for africa on how governments and international donors can reprioritize their investment portfolio in order to achieve multiple goals of growth poverty reduction and environmental protection

contractual incompleteness unemployment and labor market segmentation this article provides evidence that involuntary unemployment and the segmentation of labour markets into firms offering good and bad jobs may both arise as a consequence of contractual incompleteness we provide a simple model that illustrates how unemployment and market segmentation may jointly emerge as part of a market equilibrium in environments where work effort is not third party verifiable using experimental labour markets that differ only in the verifiability of effort we demonstrate empirically that contractual incompleteness can cause unemployment and segmentation our data are also consistent with the key channels through which the model explains the emergence of both phenomena copyright 2014 oxford university press

designing incentive systems for truthful forecast information sharing within a firm we consider a firm where the sales division sales is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division operations is responsible for ordering sales has better information about the demand than operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to operations to incentivize truthful information sharing we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of sales besides monetary payoffs we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of sales we model the setting as a signaling game and derive the pareto dominant separating equilibria of the game in laboratory experiments we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected payoff maximizing behavior we use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out of sample treatments and out of sample subjects we conduct additional experiments to provide further robus

the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth a multiple country test of an oath script hypothetical bias is one of the main issues bedeviling the field of nonmarket valuation the general criticism is that survey responses reflect how people would like to behave rather than how they actually behave in our study of climate change and carbon emissions reductions based on the increasing bulk of evidence from psychology and economics regarding the effects of making promises we investigate the effect of an oath script in a contingent valuation survey the survey was conducted in sweden and china and its results indicate that an oath script has significant effects on respondent behavior in answering willingness to pay wtp questions in both countries the shares of zero wtp responses and extremely high wtp responses decrease when an oath script is used resulting in lower variance furthermore the conditional wtp decreases in the chinese but not in the swedish sample we also find that the effect of the oath script is not generally dependent on respondent characteristics and the few differences we observe vary with the countries

promises and conventions an approach to pre play agreements abstract i analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two player games specifically i assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other a central insight is that it is easier to sustain efficient informal agreements if actions are strategic complements than if they are strategic substitutes i complement this general insight by studying two specific cases where negotiators face uncertainty about the breach of the agreement i show that while the optimal agreement in a game with strategic substitutes must compromise on surplus maximization and efficiency the optimal agreement in a game with sufficiently strong strategic complements tends to maximize both the surplus and the probability of compliance especially if the game is symmetric

honesty beliefs about honesty and economic growth in 15 countries the honesty of people in an online panel from 15 countries was measured in two experiments reporting a coin flip with a reward for heads and an online quiz with the possibility of cheating there are large differences in honesty across countries average honesty is positively correlated with per capita gdp this is driven mostly by gdp differences arising before 1950 rather than by gdp growth since 1950 a country s average honesty correlates with the proportion of its population that is protestant these facts suggest a long run relationship between honesty and economic development the experiment also elicited participants expectations about different countries levels of honesty expectations were not correlated with reality instead they appear to be driven by cognitive biases including self projection

honesty on the streets a field study on newspaper purchasing many publishers use an honor system for selling newspapers in the street we conducted a field experiment to study honesty in this market finding that a moral reminder increases the level of honesty in payments whereas the same message has no effect on whether one is honest reminding customers of the legal norm has no effect we argue that these results are consistent with a preference for honesty based on an internalized social norm auxiliary evidence suggests that the moral message remains effective when it is posted for longer periods and even when it is removed again authors abstract

food and freedom the links between food and freedom at first appear rather remote to policymaking and far from central and practical concerns the lecture discusses important connections between the two that need to be recognized more fully as background to practical food policy although ethics specifically freedom seems far less compelling a concept than concrete demands of food the contrast is artificial the provision of food is a central issue in general social ethics since so much in human life does depend on the ability to find enough to eat in particular the freedom that people enjoy to lead a decent life including freedom from hunger from avoidable morbidity from premature mortality etc is centrally connected with the provision of food and related necessities also the compulsion to acquire enough food may force vulnerable people to do things they resent doing and may make them accept lives with little freedom thus the role of food in fostering freedom can be extremely important on the other side freedom may also causally influence the success of the pursuit of food one consideration that has received a great deal of attention relates to the role of freedom to make profits by providing incentives for the expansion of food production this consideration has often cropped up in the critical evaluation of agricultural policies pursued in many countries in africa and asia the lecturer supplements the conceptual and theoretical discussions with practical illustrations

every drop counts a water conservation experiment with hotel guests we implement a field experiment with hotel guests to measure the effects of nonprice interventions on water conservation and customer satisfaction in hotels guests have no direct pecuniary incentive to conserve water as consumers do at home where they pay their own water bills because hotels earn greater profits when they manage to convince guests to conserve guests may be suspicious of a hotel s stated social goal of water conservation by implementing behavioral interventions that address these challenges we find that our nudges can induce guests to reduce their water consumption even when no direct monetary incentive is provided using post stay customer surveys we detected no adverse effects on customer satisfaction due to these nudges jel d12 i31 q41 q50

cheating to win dishonesty and the intensity of competition we argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat to make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace for low and high levels of competition we show that in equilibrium few are predicted to misreport it is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest we test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it this finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations

commitment to pay taxes results from field and laboratory experiments abstract a tax authority s ability to successfully collect taxes depends on its relationship with the taxpayers as well as their commitment to contribute to the common good in this paper we examine the effect of promises on tax compliance aimed at fostering taxpayer commitment first in a field experiment we investigate whether tax compliance changes when taxpayers make a formal promise to pay their taxes on time with compliance rewarded by entry into a lottery for either a financial or nonfinancial in kind reward we then complement this analysis with a laboratory experiment in which we measure the effect of promises in the different compliance domain of tax honesty and contrast the effect of a pure promise to pay with schemes that pair the promise with a reward offer we find that taxpayers with a history of compliance or high scores on tax morale are more likely to make the promise but solely offering the possibility to make a promise does not lead to a change in compliance behavior whether or not compliance improves depends on the type of reward to which the promise is linked in our experimental analyses for example compliance only increases if the reward for promise fulfillment is nonfinancial

why do people keep their promises an experimental test of two explanations numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games this paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect the first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word the second assumes that people dislike letting down others payoff expectations according to the latter account promises affect behavior only indirectly because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others i conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations the results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations this suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se

rational contagion and the globalization of securities markets this paper argues that globalization may promote contagion by weakening incentives for gathering costly information and by strengthening incentives for imitating arbitrary market portfolios in the presence of short selling constraints the gain of gathering information at a fixed cost may diminish as markets grow moreover if a portfolio manager s marginal cost for yielding below market returns exceeds the marginal gain for above market returns there is a range of optimal portfolios in which all investors imitate arbitrary market portfolios and this range widens as the market grows numerical simulations suggest that these frictions can have significant implications for capital flows in emerging markets

technology transport globalization and the nutrition transition food policy abstract diet and activity have been affected by the rapid worldwide shifts in technological innovations reducing energy expenditures during leisure transportation and work globalized modern food processing marketing and distribution techniques global mass media the increases occur increasingly in rural areas on all continents the resultant global increase in obesity increasingly is shifting the burden of obesity to the poor while few direct linkages between globalization of trade in goods services and technology can be directly linked to diet and activity a strong case exists for globalization s role as a key underlying force behind this stage of the nutrition transition

cheap promises evidence from loan repayment pledges in an online experiment abstract across domains people struggle to follow through on their commitments this can happen for many reasons including dishonesty forgetfulness or insufficient intrinsic motivation social scientists have explored the reasons for persistent failures to follow through suggesting that eliciting explicit promises can be an effective way to motivate action this paper presents a field experiment that tests the effect of explicit promises in the form of honor pledges on loan repayment rates the experiment was conducted with lendup an online lender and targeted 4 883 first time borrowers with the firm individuals were randomized into four groups with the following experimental treatments 1 having no honor pledge to complete control 2 signing a given honor pledge 3 re typing the same honor pledge as in 2 before signing and 4 coming up with a personal honor pledge to type and sign i also randomized whether or not borrowers were reminded of the honor pledge they signed prior to the repayment deadline the results suggest that the honor pledge treatments had minimal impacts on repayment and that reminders of the pledges were similarly ineffective this suggests that borrowers who fail to repay loans do so not because of dishonesty or behavioral biases but because they suffer from true financial hardship and are simply unable to repay

competitive devaluations toward a welfare based approach abstract this paper revisits the international transmission of exchange rate shocks in a multicountry economy providing a choice theoretic framework for the policy analysis of competitive devaluations as opposed to the traditional view a devaluation by one country does not necessarily have an adverse beggar thy neighbor effect on its trading partners because they can benefit from an improvement in their terms of trade furthermore a retaliatory devaluation need not be the optimal strategy for the neighbor countries as the induced terms of trade deterioration can be large enough to offset the gains from defending their export market share the concern over competitive devaluations reflected in the fund s charter and the system wide implications of changes in exchange rates still motivate fund policy recommendations a major fund concern in the asian crisis has been the fear that asian currencies would become so undervalued and current account surpluses so large as to damage the economies of other countries developing countries included this is one reason the fund has stressed the need first to stabilize and then to strengthen exchange rates in the asian countries now in crisis and for this purpose not to cut interest rates until the currency stabilizes and begins to appreciate

read my lips but only if i was elected experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises shirking and trust abstract we experimentally test whether electoral competition reduces shirking behavior by office holders and increases citizens trust using a novel multi person investment game with voting we indeed find that elected office holders shirk less i e they back transfer more to citizens relative to investments than randomly appointed office holders surprisingly this effect is not driven by electoral competition inflating office holders promises instead elected office holders feel more committed to their promises than their randomly appointed counterparts elections initially also increase citizens trust because voters select candidates with the right kind of promises neither low nor non credibly high however over the course of the entire experiment we find no evidence that electoral competition increases citizens trust

human rights requirements to social and economic development abstract this paper presents the normative framework of international human rights and the duty of states to cooperate for development starting with the charter of the united nations and proceeding to examine the international bill of human rights and the various international instruments treaties and declarations built upon it by ratifying some of these instruments a large majority of states have undertaken legally binding obligations to ensure freedom from hunger and to promote adequate standards of living including food nutrition and care the paper notes that promotion of human rights and development two purposes that are closely interrelated in the charter of the united nations have since followed two separate trajectories but efforts are now under way to bring them closer together as manifested in particular by the declaration on the right to development adopted by the general assembly of the united nations in 1986 the paper further points out that under international human rights law a comprehensive system of international reporting and monitoring by expert bodies has been developed full transparency has been achieved by ensuring that the state reports are made public and their examination by the international expert bodies are open to anyone interested it is indicated that for reporting in the development field comparable transparency and examination could be developed including for international agencies and other bodies dealing with food and nutrition issues

trust but verify monitoring inspection costs and opportunism under limited observability abstract is feedback on trustworthiness necessary for the functioning of economic relationships in many real world economic environments such feedback can at best be acquired through costly monitoring raising questions of how trust and efficiency can be maintained in the lab we conduct a modified finite horizon binary trust game in which we vary the observability of the trustee s actions in the baseline condition trustors can perfectly observe their trustee s actions we compare this to a condition in which that actions are unobservable and three conditions in which they must be actively monitored at zero low or high cost respectively counter intuitively differences in observability do not lead to significant differences in trust and efficiency but the levels are supported by very different information structures while trustors monitored every action under zero observation costs most of trusting actions were blind trustors did not learn whether their trust was honored or not under costly monitoring even under complete unobservability almost half of the available surplus was realized there are distributive impacts however the gains from trust favor trustees under the more adverse informational conditions the behavioral patterns are consistent with the fact that trustors beliefs about their trustee s conduct are almost invariant across conditions

bt cotton in india field trial results and economic projections abstract the performance of bt cotton in india is analyzed on the basis of field trial data from 2001 the amounts of pesticides applied during the trials were reduced to one third of what was used in conventional cotton while under severe pest pressure yield gains were 80 productivity effects are modeled econometrically with a damage control specification the first approval for the commercial cultivation of bt hybrids was given in 2002 by 2005 the technology is expected to cover one quarter of total indian cotton area medium term projections show sizeable welfare gains for the overall economy with farmers being the main beneficiaries

the lack of strategic sustainability orientation in german water companies abstract water supply and distribution companies wsc are dealing with one of the most crucial natural resources that is why the german national sustainability strategy highlights water as one of the priority fields of action in germany wsc show characteristics of natural monopoly the distinct separation between public institutions and the private sector as well as municipal operators being responsible for practicing special functions is characteristic for the german water economy from an evolutionary perspective it is of interest how german wsc implement sustainability strategically therefore strategic concepts and tools facing sustainability e g iso 14001 reporting and balanced scorecard etc were analysed and evaluated in the context of the water industry using literature studies and web analysis the relevant data of 110 german wsc was put together a cross sectional design was used in order to find patterns possible gaps are highlighted and ongoing steps to foster sustainability are stressed this study points out a sustainable management is just marginally implemented the results obviously show that there are differences between large companies and smes facing sustainability requirements wsc having own regenerative power generation and an integrative thinking of farming and water supply are part of good practice

financial structure and aggregate economic activity an overview this paper surveys literature that explores the possible links between the financial system and aggregate economic behavior the survey is in two parts the first reviews the traditional work and the second discusses new research copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

credit cycles redux theoretical studies have shown that under unorthodox assumptions on preferences and production technologies collateral constraints can act as a powerful amplification and propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks we investigate whether or not this result holds under more standard assumptions we find that collateral constraints typically generate small output amplification large amplification is obtained as a knife edge type of result

westernization of asian diets and the transformation of food systems implications for research and policy abstract rapid economic and income growth urbanization and globalization are leading to a dramatic shift of asian diets away from staples and increasingly towards livestock and dairy products vegetables and fruit and fats and oils while the diversification of diets away from the traditional dominance of rice with rising incomes is expected and observed current food consumption patterns are showing signs of convergence towards a western diet the diet transition is characterized by increased consumption of wheat temperate fruit and vegetables and high protein and energy dense food globalization and the consequent global interconnectedness of the urban middle class is the driving force behind the convergence of diets the rapid spread of global supermarket chains and fast food restaurants is reinforcing the above trends the growing demand for diet diversity cannot be met solely by the traditional food supply chain it requires the modernisation of the food retail sector and the vertical integration of the food supply chain in effect linking the consumers plate to the farmers plow as a consequence asian agriculture is on an irreversible path leading away from its traditional pre occupation with cereal crop production especially rice towards a production system that is becoming increasingly commercialized and diversified this paper describes the determinants and trends in the diversification and westernization of asian diets implications of the evolving demand trends for food supply and retail systems are presented the paper discusses the prospects for small farmer participation in the emerging food supply system with a particular emphasis on asian rice production systems finally the paper considers emerging challenges for food policy small holder welfare and agricultural research and development priorities

getting consumers to eat more whole grains the role of policy information and food manufacturers the 2005 dietary guidelines were unique because they offered quantitative recommendations for consumption of whole grains this case study examines the hypothesis that the changed recommendations were responsible for the recent increase in retail sales and consumption of whole grain food products we find that release of the dietary guidelines and related media attention did increase availability and sales of whole grain foods a large impact on consumption occurred through reformulation of existing products induced by competition among food suppliers this study reveals the key role product reformulation plays in inter firm competition and in realization of dietary changes recommended by public

can gm technologies help the poor the impact of bt cotton in makhathini flats kwazulu natal abstract the results of a two year survey of smallholders in makhathini flats kwazulu natal show that farmers who adopted bt cotton in 1999 2000 benefited according to all the measures used higher yields and lower chemical costs outweighed higher seed costs giving higher gross margins these measures showed negative benefits in 1998 99 which conflicts with continued adoption but stochastic efficiency frontier estimation which takes account of the labor saved showed that adopters averaged 88 efficiency as compared with 66 for the nonadopters in 1999 2000 when late rains lowered yields the gap widened to 74 for adopters and 48 for nonadopters

the social contract in the laboratory an experimental analysis of self enforcing impartial agreements social contract theories are based on the idea of the consent of the governed according to which norms rules and institutions constitutions in particular must be based on the general consensus or unanimous consent of the individuals who are subject to the regulation the article reports the results of an experiment aimed at identifying the conditions for the emergence of a self enforcing social contract in the laboratory our main result is that spontaneous compliance with a non self interested norm of distribution is likely to occur if individuals have been part of the same process of ex ante agreement on the distributive norm under a veil of ignorance to which the emergence of reciprocal expectations of conformity is also related this is in line with rawls s idea of an endogenous sense of justice stabilizing ex post institutions that would have been ex ante chosen in the original position

the terms of trade the real exchange rate and economic fluctuations this paper examines the relationship between terms of trade and business cycles using a three sector intertemporal equilibrium model and a large multicountry database results show that terms of trade shocks account for nearly one half of actual gdp variability the model explains weak correlations between net exports and terms of trade the harberger laursen and metzler effect and produces large and weakly correlated deviations from purchasing power parity and real interest rate parity terms of trade shocks cause real appreciations and positive interest differentials although productivity shocks have opposite effects the puzzle that welfare gains of international asset trading are negligible is left unresolved copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

three bubbles and a panic an explanatory review of recent food commodity price events abstract this paper is a summary of the behaviour of food commodity prices in 2007 2008 and a review of the causes of the price increases extracted from a report to the chief scientific advisor to her majesty s government thirtle c piesse j 2008 an explanatory review of the world food commodity price events of 2007 2008 a report to the chief scientific advisor department for innovation universities and skills london the historical background shows that the price spike was much less severe than in the 1970s the conventional wisdom that prices of the main food commodities were falling prior to 2006 is questioned most ceased falling and were quite stable from the 1980s the paper separates the causes of the spike from the underlying changes driving the long run trends the literature on the causes of the spike is critically reviewed and summarised there is a reasonably broad consensus on most of the causes but much less on the impact of the depreciation of the us dollar there are also concluding speculations on the future

the sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems political analysis of the interplay between security resource scarcity political systems and global trade this article looks at the interrelationship between water and food security more specifically it examines the resilience and sustainability of water and food systems to shocks and stresses linked to different levels and intensity of conflict global trade and climate change the article makes four points 1 that resource scarcity as a driver of conflict is inconclusive especially at regional and national levels 2 most insecurities surrounding water and food are explained by political power social and gender relations 3 global trade has enabled national food and water security but that is now threatened by increasing food prices food sovereignty movements and land grabbing 4 and that water and food security will face major challenges under conditions of climate change

preferences for power abstract power the ability to determine the outcomes of others usually comes with various benefits higher compensation public recognition etc we develop a new game the power game to demonstrate that a substantial fraction of individuals enjoy the intrinsic value of power they accept lower payoffs in exchange for power over others without any benefits to themselves these preferences exist independently of other components of decision rights cannot be explained by social preferences and are not driven by mistakes confusion or signaling intentions we further show that valuation of power i is higher when individuals directly determine outcomes of others ii depends on how much discretion one has over those outcomes and iii is tied to relationships between individuals we establish that ignoring preferences for power may have large welfare implications and consequently should be included in the study of political systems and labor contracts

many borrow more save and all insure implications for food and micro finance policy abstract among policy makers researchers and micro finance practitioners alike there is much discussion on the role of micro finance for alleviation of poverty this paper focuses on the linkages between access to credit savings and insurance services and household food security what is the role of micro finance in the overall mix of policy instruments what types of financial services are demanded by the poor and which are offered by micro finance institutions mfis hence which are the gaps in financial products we present a conceptual framework that addresses these questions and provide a synthesis of the empirical results of a multi country research program in ten african and asian countries we conclude that insurance can be considered as the missing third of micro finance during the 1990s and that the mfi s outreach to the poor can be improved by offering savings credit and insurance products that enhance the poor s ability to bear risks applied research on the poor s preferences as well as bold experimentation with new financial products appear to be particularly promising in making progress towards that goal since insurance services are difficult to be offered except for easily observable idiosyncratic risks precautionary savings services can be a valuable insurance substitute in particular for the poorest

global water crisis and future food security in an era of climate change food policy should serve humanity by advancing the humane goals of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger however these goals have recently been challenged by emerging forces including climate change water scarcity the energy crisis as well as the credit crisis this paper analyses the overall role of these forces and population growth in redefining global food security specifically global water supply and demand as well as the linkages between water supply and food security are examined the analysis reveals that the water for food security situation is intricate and might get daunting if no action is taken investments are needed today for enhancing future food security this requires action on several fronts including tackling climate change preserving land and conserving water reducing the energy footprint in food systems developing and adopting climate resilient varieties modernising irrigation infrastructure shoring up domestic food supplies reforming international food trade and responding to other global challenges

incomplete information models of guilt aversion in the trust game in the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge however this is often unrealistic in particular it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population therefore an incomplete information methodology is needed we take a first step in this direction focusing on guilt aversion in the trust game in our models agents have heterogeneous belief hierarchies we characterize equilibria where trust occurs with positive probability our analysis illustrates the incomplete information approach to psychological games and can help to organize experimental results in the trust game this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

preference elicitation under oath eliciting sincere preferences for non market goods remain a challenge due to the discrepency between hypothetical and real behavior and false zeros the gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate real commitments or a combination of both herein we examine whether the traditional real world institution of the solemn oath can improve preference elicitation applying the social psychology theory on the oath as a truth telling commitment device we ask our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive compatible second price auction the oath is an ancillary mechanism to commit bidders to bid sincerely in a second price auction results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest that the oath only auctions outperform all our other auctions real and hypothetical in our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection the oath only design induced people to treat as binding both their experimental budget constraint i e lower values on the high end of the value distribution and participation constraint i e positive values in place of the zero bids used to opt out of auction based on companion treatments we show the oath works through an increase in the willingness to tell the truth due to a strengthening of the intrinsic motivation to do so

compliance with endogenous audit probabilities in this paper we study the effect of endogenous audit probabilities on reporting behavior in a face to face compliance situation such as at customs in an experimental setting in which underreporting has a higher expected payoff than truthful reporting we find an increase in compliance of about 80 percent if subjects have reason to believe that their behavior towards an officer influences their endogenous audit probability higher compliance is driven by considerations about how their own appearance and performance affect their audit probability rather than by the social and psychological effects of face to face contact

guilt in games a clear conscience is a good pillow why does this old proverb contain an insight the emotion of guilt holds a key psychologists report that the prototypical cause of guilt would be the infliction of harm loss or distress on a relationship partner roy baumeister arlene m stillwell and todd f heatherton 1994 245 june price tangney 1995 moreover guilt is unpleasant and may affect behavior to render the associated pangs counterfactual baumeister stillwell and heatherton state if people feel guilt for hurting their partners and for failing to live up to their expectations they will alter their behavior to avoid guilt in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship avoided guilt is the down of the sound sleeper s bolster how can guilt be modeled how are human interaction and economic outcomes influenced we offer a formal approach for providing answers start with an extensive game form which associates a monetary outcome with each end node say that player i lets player j down if as a result of i s choice of strategy j gets a lower monetary payoff than j expected to get before play started player i s guilt may depend on how much he lets j down player i s guilt may also depend on how much j believes i believes he lets j down we develop techniques to analyze equilibria when players are motivated in part by a desire to avoid guilt the intellectual home for our exercise is what has been called psychological game theory this framework originally developed by john geanakoplos david pearce and ennio stacchetti 1989 and recently extended by battigalli and dufwenberg 2005 henceforth b d allows players utilities to depend on beliefs about choices states of nature

public goods games and psychological utility theory and evidence abstract we consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity guilt aversion surprise seeking and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions in order to test our predictions we implement the induced beliefs method and a within subjects design using the strategy method we find that all our psychological variables contribute towards the explanation of contributions guilt aversion is pervasive at the individual level and the aggregate level and it is relatively more important than surprise seeking our between subjects analysis confirms the results of the within subjects design

changing locus of agricultural research will the poor benefit from biotechnology and privatization trends over the past decade the locus of agricultural research and development has shifted dramatically from the public to the private multinational sector three interrelated forces are transforming the system for supplying improved agricultural technologies to the world s farmers the first is the strengthened and evolving environment for protecting intellectual property in plant innovations the second is the rapid pace of discovery and growth in importance of molecular biology and genetic engineering finally agricultural input and output trade is becoming more open in nearly all countries these developments have created a powerful new set of incentives for private research investment altering the structure of the public private agricultural research endeavor particularly with respect to crop improvement

is an integrated farm more resilient against climate change a micro econometric analysis of portfolio diversification in african agriculture abstract this paper examines whether an integrated farm that owns both crops and livestock is more resilient under global warming than a specialized farm in crops using around 9000 farm surveys across africa we explore how farmers choose one of the farm types and how the net revenue of each type varies across the range of climate in africa the results indicate that an integrated farm increases in number while a specialized farm decreases across africa under climate predictions for 2060 the relative profitability of each system against each other also changes an integrated farm becomes relatively more profitable over specialized farms half a century from now the impacts of climate change on integrated farms range from 9 loss to 27 gain depending on climate scenarios behavioral models can capture portfolio diversification benefits that agro economic models cannot measure

third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest an experiment on the effects of promises is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor having a conflict of interest e g a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal phd student we propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not incentivized assessment a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as an incentivized assessment i e when the assessor gains higher payoff if the assessment is correct

are asset price guarantees useful for preventing sudden stops a quantitative investigation of the globalization hazard moral hazard tradeoff abstract an implication of the globalization hazard hypothesis is that sudden stops caused by global financial frictions could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets these guarantees create a tradeoff however because they weaken globalization hazard while creating international moral hazard we study this tradeoff using a quantitative equilibrium asset pricing model without guarantees margin calls and trading costs cause sudden stops driven by a fisherian deflation price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign demand for assets the effectiveness of price guarantees their distortions on asset markets and their welfare implications depend critically on whether the guarantees are contingent on debt levels and on the price elasticity of foreign demand for domestic assets

loopholes undermine donation an experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in israel article i nfo giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting lists as has been implemented in israel and singapore pro vides an incentive for registration and has the potential to increase the pool of deceased donor organs however the implementation of a priority rule might allow for loopholes as is the case in israel in which an individual can reg ister to receive priority but avoid ever being in a position to donate organs we experimentally investigate how such a loophole affects donation and find that the majority of subjects use the loophole when available the existence of a loophole completely eliminates the increase in donation generated by the priority rule when information about loophole use is made public subjects respond to others use of the loophole by withholding donation such that the priority system with a loophole generates fewer do nations than an allocation system without priority 2013 published by elsevier b v