is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping abstract given conditions of oligopolistic competition the coordinated ban of direct export promoting policies e g in the eu or by gatt increases the income of exporting countries however in the presence of environmental distortions free trade can lead to ecological dumping in exporting countries the question arises if free trade is still in the interest of exporting countries we show that welfare maximizing governments of exporting countries prefer free trade even if countries subsidize their local industries indirectly via ecological dumping the existence of further national policy instruments does not make free trade agreements obsolete

multiregional oligopoly with capacity constraints we develop a model of cournot competition between capacity constrained firms that sell a single good to multiple regions we provide a novel characterization for the unique equilibrium allocation o

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

strategic labour contracts labor contracts affect a firm s cost function and for this reason they can be used as a recommitment device to gain a strategic advantage against other firms in a model that is otherwise neutral it is found that if firms compete in prices then strategic considerations alone yield results similar to those obtained by c azariadis 1983 workers are underemployed and worse off in more adverse states of nature on the other hand if firms compete in quantities then the equilibrium contracts resemble those of j green and c kahn 1983 workers are overemployed and better off in more adverse states

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

exchange rate economics 1986 in the past fifteen years key exchange rates have moved in larger and more persistent ways than advocates of flexible rates in the late 1960s would have left anyone free to imagine certainly there was no expectation of constancy for nominal exchange rates but real exchange rate movements of 30 or forty percent were definitely not suggested as a realistic possibility moreover where these large movements did occur they did not obviously appear to be connected with fundamentals and hence seemed difficult to explain in terms of the exchange rate theories at hand the persistence of rate movements was as surprising as the rapid unwinding of apparent misalignments when they did ultimately occur the past fifteen years provide a natural dividing line between the keynesian and monetary approaches of the 1960s and the more recent analysis that takes into account exchange rate expectations and portfolio issues which took off in the early 1970s as well as the brand new approaches that concentrate on partial equilibrium microeconomics to review these ideas the paper starts with a brief look at the u s experience with flexible exchange rates from there it proceeds to the mundell fleming model as a comprehensive framework of analysis the following sections deal with persistent effects of policy disturbances links between exchange rates and prices the political economy of exchange rate movements and the question of policies toward excess capital mobility this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

coordinating monetary and macroprudential policies this paper studies noncooperative games between a monetary authority and a macroprudential regulator whose objectives are a subset of those in the social loss function the analysis is based on a new keynesian model with a financial sector and a financial friction a la gertler and karadi 2011 when the friction affects the financing of all factors of production equally macroprudential policy is shown to be a powerful additional tool fully eliminating inefficiencies regardless of the source of the shock and no matter whether the central bank and the regulator cooperate but when trade offs are present and policy is discretionary the institutional arrangements become crucial while coordination leads to higher welfare than a setting in which each authority takes the decision rule of the other as given namely the nash equilibrium our analysis shows that a noncooperative setting in which the macroprudential authority acts as a leader within the period can be superior to cooperation finally our conclusions are unaffected by whether the macroprudential instrument affects funding costs or acts as a liquidity requirement

dichotomy between macroprudential policy and monetary policy on credit and inflation this paper compares macroprudential policy and monetary policy using a simple new keynesian model with credit macroprudential policy is effective in stabilizing credit with limited impact on inflation monetary policy stabilizes inflation but is too blunt for credit stabilization

valuing petroleum reserves using current net price i introduction the hotelling valuation principle hvp states that when valuing any depleting mineral reserve one can simply multiply the current net price price less unit extraction cost associated with those reserves by the quantity of reserves 1 v sub s lambda sub s r sub s where lambda sub s p sub s c sub s is the current time s net price and r sub s is current recoverable reserves in place miller and upton 1985a the derivation combines discounted cash flow dcf analysis with hotelling s 1931 result that in equilibrium the net price of a non renewable resource must rise at the rate of interest with net cash flows being inflated and discounted at the same rate the result is intuitive and its simplicity has drawn the attention of mineral appraisers and national income accounting agencies 1 the u s department of commerce for instance uses equation 1 as one method of valuing the stock and depletion of the nation s mineral assets carson 1994 miller and upton 1985a 24 empirically test the principle against oil and gas reserve values imputed from firm balance sheets and conclude that it provides not only reasonably good descriptions of the structure of actual market values of a sample of u s petroleum producing companies but substantially better descriptions than the publicly available alternative appraisals based on much the same underlying raw data they claim that the abstractions of the hvp constant marginal cost perfect information and perfect competition do not appear to invalidate the empirical performance and so miller and upton propose that equation 1 remains theoretically intact even when these abstractions are relaxed further investigation however has found the hvp to severely overvalue oil and gas reserves for example watkins 1992 finds that the formula overvalues oil and gas reserve transactions by an average of 85 2 indeed in miller and upton s original work the imputed reserve values are less than the hvp values in 81 of 94 valuations in the first data set and in 95 of 98 in a second data set in many cases by 50 or more 3 several empirical studies have found that the coefficient on lambda sub s r sub s in equation 1 is in the order of one half this tendency of the hvp to overstate the value of petroleum reserves is recognized by users of the principle such as bartelmus et al 1994 who nevertheless continue to rely on it for reserve valuation several economists have attempted to explain the overvaluation magliolo 1986 investigates data sources and tax effects cairns and davis 1998 and davis and moore 1998 show that for the case of hard rock mining capacity constraints on production produce a coefficient on lambda sub s r sub s that is less than one others have instead rejected not only the hvp as a valuation tool but also the entire hotelling theory underlying the principle for example adelman 1993 and watkins 1992 argue that i for practical purposes there is no binding resource stock constraint for oil and gas as explicitly assumed by hotelling 1931 and ii oil and gas net price data do not reveal hotelling s r rule mcdonald 1994 adds that regulation of well spacing and extraction rates is another important facet of oil production that is not modeled by hotelling and that this could be a cause of the empirical failure of the principle still others propose that oil reserves cannot be valued accurately using a discounted cash flow framework rather the analyst must also incorporate an option value which arises whenever producers can adjust production through time in response to realizations of stochastic events such as price fluctuations brennan and schwartz 1985 paddock siegel and smith 1988 and smit 1997 this position is valid but it does not explain the empirical failures of equation 1

valuing mineral reserves when capacity constrains production abstract we add a capacity constraint and heterogeneous reserves to the hotelling valuation principle this produces a more general version of the principle that is more consistent with empirical valuations while retaining the underlying relationship between net price and reserve value

environmental standards and cournot duopoly a stability analysis in this paper the dynamic effects of public environmental policies are investigated in a cournot duopoly with both heterogeneous and homogeneous expectations in a context of limited rationality it is shown that the increase in upper limits to emissions always tends to destabilise markets and generate a chaotic market dynamics in both cases the policy implication of this result is that the use of environmental policies may favour market stability it is also shown that higher costs of abatement technology entail a higher likelihood of stability loss although in the heterogeneous expectations case also a decrease in costs may destabilise

an evaluation of alternative scenarios for the gazprom monopoly of russian gas exports in june 2006 russian federal law legalized the exclusive right of gazprom to export natural gas to europe and thus thwarted efforts by the european union to bring competition to the russian gas industry an understanding of the motivation of the russian government to support this export monopoly is important if europe wishes to reduce its dependence on gazprom the principal aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of this important question our analysis employs a theoretical model and several numerical simulations of an alternative organization used for gas exports where independent gas producers in russia are permitted to export gas to europe we evaluate the effects of this alternative organization on consumer surplus industry profits and russian welfare the results demonstrate that while export by independent producers reduces gazprom s export profits it may also increase the total domestic and export profits earned by the russian gas industry however the results also suggest that russian gas consumers will not benefit if independent gas producers are able to supply both the domestic and international markets

the tax they pay may be your own promotion taxes and labour supply a model of labour supply is formulated in which increased effort results in an increase in the probability of promotion a simple benchmark model is extended in two directions the first emphasizes the link between labour supply and saving decisions the other takes account of the interaction between workers via contests for promotion a general insight that emerges from the analysis is that when studying the effects of wages and taxes on incentives to work it is sometimes the after tax incomes of other workers in particular senior workers who have already been promoted which are of crucial importance

equilibrium pollution taxes in a two industry open economy abstract this paper involves strategic implications of environmental policy in case of two international oligopolies when countries take part in an international environmental agreement and have agreed on national target levels for a global pollutant this set up permits an analysis of the design of optimal emission taxes across domestic producers by differentiating taxes between industries with different abatement cost demand and number of domestic firms governments are in a position to raise national net foreign rents it is argued that a single national emission trading programme encompassing all domestic producers cannot provide the equivalent strategic policy design

customer markets credit market imperfections and real price rigidity according to standard theory an increase in demand should raise prices of goods given factor prices empirically however prices appear to be unaffected by short run variations in demand this paper suggests an explanation of this observation if customers react slowly to price changes and credit markets are imperfect prices may be unchanged or even fall when demand increases the reason is that when demand is high profits are high and firms can compete more intensely for customers without increasing their borrowing copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

the green paradox of the economics of exhaustible resources abstract the green paradox states that an increasing tax on emissions of carbon dioxide consonant with the expected increase in their marginal damages may induce oil producers to shift their production toward the present and thereby to exacerbate the problem of climatic change the model is based on hotelling models of resource use that do not take the natural and technical features of oil production into account natural features include the decline of production through time according to a decline curve technical features include the requirement to sink investment in productive capacity a model of a profit maximizing firm indicates that if these features are taken into account the prediction of the green paradox is unlikely

market structure and organizational form this paper studies the determinants of a firm s organizational form in the context of an imperfectly competitive industry there are two kinds of organizational forms the multi divisional form m form and the unitary form u form an m form firm suffers from ignorance of demand externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated in contrast in a u form firm demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists a firm s optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure

trade imbalance and domestic market competition policy this study investigates the effect of a country s suppression of competition in its market for nontradables it assumes that the initial equilibrium is stationary and demonstrates that if competition is suppressed in a small country the country s trade surplus increases in the short run in the large country case the same change creates an excess demand for future tradables and affects the relative price between present and future tradables using a two country model the study shows that this price change redistributes real wealth from the country with a trade deficit to the country with a trade surplus

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

tax incidence under imperfect competition comment abstract delipalla and o donnell 2001 contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem taxes in a conjectural variation oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms the formula is incorrect we derive the correct formula and provide a discussion of the error and its implications for empirical studies of pass through

the pricing of oil and gas some further results the hotelling valuation principle hvp implies that the unit value of an exhaustible natural resource can be written as a function of its current price net of extraction costs other variables such as interest rates have no additional explanatory power the results of earlier tests using data from 1979 1981 strongly support the hvp this paper presents a series of follow up tests using time series cross section data covering the period august 1981 to december 1983 because the variance of petroleum prices in this period was substantially less than in the earlier period the follow up sample proved generally noninformative the sample also contains some observations on oil and gas royalty trusts tests of the hvp using these trust data yielded generally satisfactory results although given the limited sample size the results must be viewed with caution the purpose of this paper is to present follow up tests of the hotelling valuation principle hvp for exhaustible resources the hvp and the earlier tests are described in detail in an earlier paper miller and upton 5 and we will limit ourselves here to a brief summary the principle that the unit price of an exhaustible natural resource less the marginal cost of extraction will tend to rise at the rate of interest was first stated by harold hotelling 2 it follows from intertemporal profit maximization on the part of a price taking owner of an exhaustible natural resource if the unit price of resources net of extraction costs is expected to rise by less than the rate of interest why not extract it now and if it will rise by more why extract any today the hotelling principle has become the standard paradigm for natural resource economics although perhaps more from the absence of any viable alternative than from strong empirical validation earlier tests of the hotelling principle generally based on time series of resource prices have yet to provide convincing support

good timing the economics of optimal stopping abstract this paper presents an economic interpretation of the optimal stopping of perpetual project opportunities under both certainty and uncertainty prior to stopping the expected rate of return from delay exceeds the rate of interest the expected rate of return from delay is the sum of the expected rate of change in project value and the expected rate of change in the option premium associated with waiting at stopping the expected rate of return from delay has fallen to the rate of interest viewing stopping in this way unifies the theoretical and practical insights of the theory of stopping under certainty and uncertainty

export orientation and domestic merger policy theory and some empirical evidence abstract recent open economy industrial organization literature finds export orientation enhances the weight of post merger international competitive gains favouring lenient domestic merger policy however mergers seldom generate the significant synergies supportive of international competitive gains since a joint economies of production effect suggests domestic mergers tend to generate international competitive losses not gains export orientation favours strict not lenient domestic merger policy we show how non synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger reviews a panel data set of u s merger policy by manufacturing sector 1990 2001 empirically supports export orientation leading to strict merger policy jel classification l40 f10

airline network rivalry in this paper the effects of the strategic interaction between deregulated airlines on their network choice are analyzed the authors examine whether switching from a linear to a hub spoke network confers a strategic advantage because it saves costs and improves service quality they find that if hubbing lowers total cost which includes both airline and passenger inconvenience costs the pursuit of strategic advantages usually intensifies the extent of hubbing even if hubbing raises total cost it might be pursued by the airline either because hubbing is a dominant strategy in an oligopolistic setting or because hubbing will be useful in deterring entry

domestic merger policy in an international oligopoly the nordic market for electricity many domestic markets are becoming integrated in international markets is this an argument for permitting mergers between domestic producers it is shown that a merger with no cost saving effects will always be detrimental to domestic welfare if the country is an importer of the good in question and may increase welfare if the country is an exporter and the price cost margin is sufficiently low initially we specify a general condition for a merger to improve welfare and apply the condition on the nordic market for electricity numerical calculations suggest that in this particular market the norwegian competition authority should ban domestic mergers with no cost savings

monetary and macroprudential policy coordination among multiple equilibria abstract the notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetary macroprudential models with unique equilibria using a game theory setup this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other s objectives one of the tools macroprudential is coarse while the other monetary policy is unconstrained we find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria giving the unconstrained authority a weight on helping the constrained authority leaning against the wind now has unexpected effects the relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump shaped and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities objectives

option valuation of claims on real assets the case of offshore petroleum leases this paper extends financial option theory by developing a methodology for the valuation of claims on a real asset an offshore petroleum lease several theoretical and practical problems not present in applying option pricing theory to financial assets are addressed most importantly we show the necessity of combining option pricing techniques with a model of equilibrium in the market for the underlying asset petroleum reserves the advantages of this approach over conventional discounted cash flow techniques are emphasized the methodological development provides important insights for both company behavior and government policy promising empirical results are reported

on using current information to value hard rock mineral properties we reformulate the hotelling valuation principle to take into account the special production characteristics of hard rock minerals the data requirements of the revised model are still parsimonious but the resultant valuations are some 40 below those produced by the hotelling valuation principle our valuation equations are also user friendly allowing the valuer to specify price and cost expectations that need not comply with the hotelling rule empirically our model provides estimates of market value for producing mineral properties that are more accurate than those produced by the hotelling valuation principle

financial constraints competition and hedging in industry equilibrium we analyze the hedging decisions of firms within an equilibrium setting that allows us to examine how a firm s hedging choice depends on the hedging choices of its competitors within this equilibrium some firms hedge while others do not even though all firms are ex ante identical the fraction of firms that hedge depends on industry characteristics such as the number of firms in the industry the elasticity of demand and the convexity of production costs consistent with prior empirical findings the model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the decision to hedge in the most competitive industries

potential foreign competition in us manufacturing abstract trade barriers are falling and firms are competing in increasingly open international markets the data reveal considerable heterogeneity across industries in the intertemporal path of import shares against this backdrop we focus on an issue that is increasingly important for competition policy analysis potential foreign competition inadequate attention to this aspect could result in a biased picture of total competition leading to misguided antitrust decisions drawing on the conceptual framework outlined by landes and posner harvard law review 94 1981 937 we measure potential foreign competition by the intertemporal response of industry import share to industry specific and aggregate economic factors and our estimates indicate wide variation across industries in this dimension a particularly striking finding is that highly concentrated industries which are more likely to be subject to antitrust scrutiny have a greater degree of potential foreign competition than industries with low concentration even though the extent of actual foreign competition is similar across these groups of industries

strike when the force is with you optimal stopping with application to resource equilibria optimal investment in a nonrenewable resource project occurs when the rate of increase of the project s forward value falls to the force of interest this stopping rule yields a financial interpretation of resource quality as being a property of the project rather than of individual units of reserves it also leads to re interpretations of a rent as the present value of the project rather than of units of reserves and b hotelling s insight as not a rule for the path of rents but an equilibrium algorithm for price the analysis is extended to sequential development of pesticides antibiotics and forests

a structural model of the analysis of retail market power the case of fluid milk we derive a structural model of firm behavior that is composed of the generalized quadratic almost ideal demand system to represent both consumers milk preferences and firm profit maximization conditions that allow for a range of competitive scenarios the importance of this specification is found in its fuller representation of consumer preferences as opposed to the linear approximate almost ideal demand system used in previous analyses we apply this structural framework to investigate retailer conduct in the sale of beverage milk in a u s market using product level data our lerner index estimates show that retailers are not perfectly competitive however this deviation is small copyright 2012 oxford university press

globalization and the autonomy of domestic competition policy an empirical test on the world airline industry the globalization literature questions national autonomy in a world where mnes spur increased international flows of capital and trade this paper empirically tests whether globalization undermines the autonomy of domestic airline competition policy a comprehensive panel data set covering twenty one nations over the 1983 92 period yields two major findings 1 globalization undermines domestic airline competition policy autonomy 2 government institutions mediate globalization s impact

merger policy in open economies abstract we extend farrell and shapiro s 1990 analysis of horizontal mergers to the case of an open economy we show how the rules for approving a merger ought to be adapted to account for the fact that the regulator is only concerned with domestic welfare that is ignores the effect of the merger on foreign firms and consumers we also explore the consequences of this externality in a model of a single market which includes consumers and producers of different countries in particular we provide conditions under which a decentralized process of evaluating merger proposals a la farrell shapiro can survive the externality mentioned above

comparative economic performance of conventional and profit sharing firms abstract this paper compares the various economic properties of conventional firms and profit sharing firms the properties contrasted include wage level employment output price total economic rents and industry efficiency the firms operate in an oligopolistic industry with a labor union in general profit sharing firms outperform non sharing firms however there exist counterexamples in which non sharing firms can outperform sharing firms to test the robustness of the results the analysis is conducted for a variety of oligopolistic industries quantity setting pricesetting and joint collusion

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

cost reducing r d in oligopoly abstract this paper provides a conjectural variations model to explore competition in cost reducing r d and the nature of the inter firm externalities it is shown that 1 r d investment in a market with price competition becomes optimal if firms expect that changes in their own r d investment are followed by the rival firms 2 the optimal r d subsidies are positive in collusive oligopolies but negative in competitive oligopolies 3 joint r d ventures in oligopoly could reduce total surplus by causing underinvestment and 4 promoting price competition reduces welfare if firms are not collusive in their r d decisions

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

did tough antitrust policy lead to lower mark ups in the us manufacturing industry abstract this paper tests whether antitrust policy in the us has an impact on the price cost margin using a unique database the methodology developed by domowitz et al review of economics and statistics 70 1988 55 66 is applied to find estimates of the price cost margin the estimates indicate presence of market power in many industries but also substantial heterogeneity of behaviour both across time and industries finally it confirms the hypothesis that mark ups were lower when the antitrust policy was very tough

the credibility of a threat to nationalize abstract this paper empirically estimates the credibility of the african national congress s recent threat to nationalize south african mineral assets while south africa s financial press argued that the threat was negatively affecting mineral investment and asset values mining industry executives were confident that the threat was not credible using financial market data i estimate the annual probability of nationalization to have been relatively low at 1 4 although specific to the south african political environment this result can serve as a benchmark when including political risk in applied models of land and natural resource valuation investment timing and resource extraction

a test of the hotelling rule using old growth timber data the paper tests hotelling s prediction that scarcity rent for a non renewable resource will rise at the rate of discount in a market equilibrium we perform the test using data for old growth timber a resource that is effectively non renewable in contrast to previous studies for this resource a measure of scarcity rent is directly observable in the form of stumpage price bids in timber auctions we construct a model that allows for replanting and captures the institutional framework of the western u s timber market the modified hotelling rule that we derive is not rejected in several of our specifications

a free lunch in the commons we derive conditions under which raising costs through a regulatory constraint or a fully expropriated tax can increase the profits arising from a common pool resource the basic model assumes a fixed number of identical agents with linear costs selling in a single period at an exogenous price a necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to be profitable is that aggregate output from the resource be locally convex in aggregate effort we also show that cost increases can be profitable even if price is endogenous agents are heterogeneous entry is costless or agents are playing a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game we also discuss more general welfare implications of the result along with its relation to existing results for a cournot oligopoly

lechatelier samuelson principle in games and pass through of shocks abstract the lechatelier samuelson principle states that as a reaction to a shock an agent s short run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long run adjustment when the agent can also adjust other related actions we extend the principle to strategic environments where the long run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies we show that the principle holds for supermodular games strategic complements satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes heterogeneity we discuss the principle s implications for cost pass through of multiproduct firms

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure abstract emission taxes and abatement subsidies are considered to be efficient measures for environment protection the purpose of this paper is to quantify their effects on industry output firm output and on the number of firms in the industry three types of market structure are under discussion perfect competition oligopoly and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe it turns out that emission taxes and abatement subsidies affect the structure of the polluting industry in opposite ways while the effects on industry s emissions are similar in direction but different

a test of the hotelling valuation principle time series tests of the hotelling r percent rule for natural resource prices have not been strongly supportive but the tests and the data are subject to serious difficulties we propose here an alternative testing strategy based on another but less widely known implication of the hotelling model we test this implication which we call the hotelling valuation principle by regressing the market values of the reserves of a sample of u s domestic oiland gas producing companies on their estimated hotelling values we find that the estimated hotelling values account for a significant portion of the observed variations in market values and that the hotelling measures are better indicators of the market values of petroleum properties than two widely cited publicly available alternative appraisals

monetary and macroprudential policies under rules and discretion abstract we study the policy design problem faced by central banks with both monetary and macroprudential objectives we find that a time consistent policy is preferred to a widely studied class of simple monetary and macroprudential rules when interest rates adjust to macroprudential policy in an augmented monetary policy rule improved outcomes result when policy authority is split between institutions strategic interactions between discretionary policymakers can result in notably poor outcomes

strategic foreign exchange management this paper argues that it is possible to advise firms on how to hedge against foreign exchange risks only if one has detailed knowledge of the competitive environment they work in to illustrate this we compare firms hedging requirements in a number of different standard industrial organizations models in particular the cournot model a model with conjectural variations price taking firms and monopolistic competition consider the situation of a firm producing in germany and selling an important part of its total output in the us obviously its profitability may be seriously compromised by an unexpected appreciation of the dm relatively to the the company can react to this uncertainty in two ways either it can assume that the conditions of the modigliani miller theorem are approximately fulfilled and that it best serves the interests of its shareholders by behaving in a risk neutral fashion alternatively the firm may for a variety of reasons behave as a risk averter itself and try to obtain some coverage against exchange rate risk when looking at the amount of insurance taken up by companies on conventional insurance markets one gets the impression that the latter alternative risk averse firms is for many practical cases a realistic assumption the activities of many companies are more easily understood if one admits that they exhibit a certain degree of risk aversion if one accepts this one may go on to ask just how companies should go about insuring themselves against unexpected exchange rate fluctuations more specifically one has to study how much exchange risk the firms should insure against and which exchange rates are of relevance in the example above of a german company selling in the us the answer might at first sight seem obvious the company should obtain coverage against dm fluctuations for an amount approximately equal to its anticipated revenues on brief reflection it immediately appears that this is surely an excessively simplistic answer first the amount of coverage required must be affected by the question of how the price of the product varies when the dm exchange rate shifts second it may be the case that the german company s main competitors are located in say france in this case fluctuations of the

option premiums in mineral asset pricing are they important mineral assets consistently trade at market values greater than their discounted cash flow dcf values one explanation is that dcf analysis does not and cannot incorporate the asset value generated by asset management under uncertainty this paper surveys the attempts to empirically quantify the option premium associated with optimal mineral asset management the option premium appears to explain at most half of the observed gap between dcf value and market value and adds at most 3 percent to a mineral asset s gross worth asset management option premiums therefore have only a second order impact on mineral asset pricing

the efficiencies defence in merger cases implications of alternative standards we compare alternative interpretations of the efficiencies defence provided under canadian competition law for mergers found likely to lessen competition substantially we find the respective percentage reductions in long run marginal cost required for a profitable merger to satisfy the total surplus price and two weighted surplus standards given pre merger market structure we find that when efficiency spillovers are low and markets are concentrated the cost reduction required to satisfy the price standard is over four times higher than is required for a profitable total surplus increasing merger and the cost reductions required to satisfy the weighted surplus standards are nearly twice as high les auteurs comparent diverses interpretations des strategies de defense en terme d e cacite pour les fusions dont on pense qu elles vont reduire substantiellement le concurrence dans le cadre de la loi sur la concurrence au canada ils identifient que les reductions en pourcentage dans le cout marginal de longue periode qui sont requises pour qu une fusion profitable satisfasse aux normes du surplus total du prix et des deux surplus ponderes compte tenu de la structure de marche avant la fusion il semble que quand les e ets de debordement d efficacite sont faibles et que les marches sont concentres les reductions de couts requises pour satisfaire la norme de prix soient quatre fois plus elevees que ce qui est requis dans le cas d une fusion profitable qui accroit le niveau de mieux etre et presque deux fois deux fois plus elevees pour satisfaire la norme des surplus ponderes