price distortions in agriculture and their effects an international comparison the central thesis of this paper is that agricultural pricing policies pursued by developing countries produce effects which are diametrically opposite to those produced by the pricing policies of many developed countries and that the policies of both are costly in terms of global welfare in general the agricultural sector in developing countries is heavily taxed while that in the developed countries receives substantial price protection the effects of agricultural price distortions on output consumption trade and rural employment are estimated for nine countries in addition the effects of price distortions on the distribution of income between producers and consumers on government revenue and foreign exchange and the net social losses of the policies are calculated the results indicate that there are large income transfers and impacts on migration from the rural to the urban sector in developing countries and from the urban to the rural sector in developed economies

political economic markets perts and pests in food and agriculture j i lyniversity of california berkeley jjept of agricultural and resource economic l working paper al cljdare i lorking paper 0 231 politic eco lic l rxets a d pests i j food l ti achiculture by per ts cordon c rausser ja nlnl tt junot tlon a riii ent st ticn giannini fou 1cl itiol1of ar ricultllrnj econo ll i cs july 11 w

myopic loss aversion revisited in this paper we reexamine several experimental papers on myopic loss aversion by analyzing individual rather than aggregate choice patterns we find that the behavior of the majority of subjects is inconsistent with the hypothesis of myopic loss aversion

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in austria in most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted two different viewsare presented to explain why the chicagoan view efficient redistribution hypothesis and the virginian view inefficient outcome of political bargaining a vertically structuredempirical model of the austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented

anomalies the equity premium puzzle stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199724 2911 3a1 3c191 3aatepp 3e2 0 co 3b2 0the journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgfri aug 17 15 58 04 2007

the development of agricultural policies in central and eastern europe abstract agricultural and food subsidies and fixed prices imposed by the old central command system have been abolished recently throughout central and eastern europe cee however protectionist government regulations have been reintroduced this viewpoint argues that these policy changes are consistent with the results from the literature on new political economy or endogenous policy theory moreover as privatization of farms continues and the non agricultural sectors of the economy start growing this theory predicts that protectionist policies will increase in the agricultural sector in central and eastern europe in addition agricultural protectionism in western countries stimulates the increase in cee agricultural protectionism

tariff endogeneity evidence from 19th century europe abstract this paper tests an endogenous tariff model for six european countries from around the mid 19th century until the eve of world war 1 ww1 the tariff rate was generally cointegrated with real gnp real wages the price level and the external trade balance results from granger causality tests suggest that real gnp and the price level may be important endogenous determinants of tariff levels

omnichannel management with consumer disappointment aversion abstract with the popularity of omnichannel retailing consumers are sophisticated enough to make strategic channel decisions considering the possible disappointment for an unexpected outcome induced by various uncertainties from online and offline channels value uncertainty online can trigger low value disappointment and availability uncertainty offline may cause stock out disappointment this study characterizes the effect of consumers anticipated disappointment aversion behavior on the optimal pricing decisions of retailers with or without inventory constraint in the omnichannel environment when a retailer operates in dual channel and faces offline inventory constraint the concern for consumers homogeneous disappointment aversion changes the threshold above which the retailer implement different channel pricing strategies then we show how the negative impact of disappointment on profit and market can be mitigated by physical showroom mechanism which is increasingly adopted by omnichannel management introduction of a cost effective physical showroom expands the market by relaxing the restriction of stock out disappointment and improves profit as long as consumers low value disappointment is high enough interestingly the low value disappointment benefits the omnichannel in expanding the market coverage by alleviating the constraint exerted by stock out disappointment further discussions regarding the disappointment behavior are derived from the extension of consumers heterogeneity in disappointment aversion

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy the answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries our results suggest that they do previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows in contrast we find that when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported jel classification fl f14 f18 est ce que la politique environnementale est une barriere commerciale secondaire une analyse empirique est ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent etre etendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale la reponse depend du degre de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour proteger leurs industries nationales nos resultats suggerent que cet impact est important des etudes anterieures de cette relation ont traite la politique environnementale comme exogene et ont montre qu il existe une co relation negligeable entre politique envir onnementale et flux commerciaux au contraire nous revelons que quand la politique environnementale est consideree comme variable endoge ne son effet sur les flux com merciaux est plus eleve de maniere significative que ce qu on a note anterieurement

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

on the incidence of us tariffs this paper provides evidence on the incidence of tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries by investigating the relationship between per capita incomes of us trading partners and tariff rates it constitutes the first attempt to assess the incidence of tariffs imposed by the us on countries that span the entire range of per capita incomes average tariff rates are lower for the poorest and richest countries and higher for countries in the middle of the income distribution this finding is not consistent with the widely held view that tariffs used by industrial nations bear more heavily on products of export interest to poorer developing countries than on imports from industrial nations it is consistent with the tariff escalation pattern reported in earlier studies if advanced countries account for most products at the high end of the fabrication scale results show that poorest countries will find it difficult to escape tariffs by attaining higher levels of economic development

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

revisiting asset pricing under habit formation in an overlapping generations economy abstract by incorporating habit formation into an overlapping generations economy we show that the middle aged consumers savings decision has a substantial impact on the equity premium the higher incentive for savings for the middle aged resulting from the habit formation preference causes an even higher demand for bonds and a lower demand for equity which eventually generates a lower risk free rate and a higher required return for holding equity than does the framework of non habit forming models calibration results verify that the habit formation setting together with an olg framework is capable of yielding lower bond returns and higher equity returns than the standard crra utility models and the borrowing constraint imposed on the young aged consumers amplifies the positive effect of habit formation on the equity premium the findings imply that habit formation preferences within the overlapping generations framework under the borrowing constrained economy can provide a more improved explanation of the equity premium puzzle

partner contributions as predictors of equity share in international joint ventures the type of expertise that a company contributes to a joint venture may affect the amount of equity that it owns this research observes the ownership patterns associated with four common combinations of partner expertise in international joint ventures the results rank company assets with respect to the contributor s ability to negotiate majority ownership in the original joint venture contract and that company s tendency to buy up equity from the partner later on

lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the united states the authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the united states in the manner suggested by the political economy model of grossman and helpman 1994 this is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data the authors test the model using a detailed cross sectional data set of agricultural protection subsidies and political action committee pac contributions in the late 1990s the model is qualitatively affirmed by the data they make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model s quantitative implications also found in recent studies this solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government the results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge

the growth of agricultural protection in europe in the 19th and 20th centuries 1247 johan f m swinnen dramatic changes took place in agricultural policies in europe in the 19th and 20th centuries in the 1860s european nations agreed on a series of trade agreements which spread free trade across the continent in the 1960s european nations concluded an international agreement which spread heavy government intervention and protection against imports across the continent this paper quantifies these changes in protection over the course of a century relates them to changes in policies and offers a political economy explanation for the growth in agricultural protection in europe

politically realistic objective functions and trade policy profs and tariffs abstract this paper demonstrates a mathematical correspondence between the deus ex machina tariff formation approach and political economy approach the correspondence implies that the tariff chosen by lobbying influenced policy makers will be equivalent to a tariff chosen by a deus ex machina government that gives too much weight to profits this result allows many political economy issues to be addressed in the simple framework of a deus ex machina government which faces a politically realistic objective function prof

a generalized theorem for joint ventures and licensing negotiations traditional theory has viewed direct investment licensing and trade mainly as foreign market entry alternatives however a growing number of overseas ventures are being formed as a mix of the 3 methods where a joint venture partner may be compensated by a package involving some return on equity investment plus royalties plus margins on components or finished product traded with the joint venture corporation this paper presents an algebraic model for the negotiations position of each partner in a prospective venture the trade offs between the 3 compensation types are complex as they involve non zero sum games the methodology is extended to enable a host government to calculate for each alternative arrangement the foreign exchange cost tax revenues or other national costs and benefits the model makes some unconventional recommendations for corporate strategy and government policy

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

the bias in favor of pro tariff lobbies abstract we show that the probability of success of the pro tariff lobby defined as a decreasing function of the ratio of consumer loss to producer gain rent generated by the tariff rises with the tariff under very general conditions this appears as an exception to becker s view that less distortionary measures tend to be adopted over their more distortionary counterparts we then provide a micro foundation for our probability definition using the imperfectly discriminating lobbying framework

protectionist responses and declining industries abstract this paper employs a three factor ricardo viner model of a small economy to analyse the effect of a falling world import price on the domestic price of the economy s importable good in the presence of an endogenously determined tariff the outcome is seen to depend on a the way in which the recycled tariff revenue is allocated to the three factor groups and b differences in relative risk aversion across those groups however under reasonable assumptions hillman s 1982 result that a declining industry will continue to decline is seen to hold in our general equilibrium framework

why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders nevertheless the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision this article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism problems that usually plague contract negotiations the article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs uses them to construct a simple probit decision making model and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty year period

knowledge transfer capacity and its implications for the theory of the multinational corporation this study updates and extends research on foreign entry modes by examining the impacts of knowledge transfer capacity and knowledge tacitness research on international corporate expansion has long emphasized that deploying intangible knowledge based assets is required for successful international expansion more recently research from a knowledge based perspective has addressed the role of tacitness in constraining a firm s ability to transfer knowledge internationally we combine these perspectives to describe how knowledge tacitness affects the relative suitability of four archetypal entry modes exporting licensing establishing an alliance and wholly owned entry we then examine and develop conceptually a seldom studied firm characteristic knowledge transfer capacity we offer predictions that describe the combined effects of knowledge tacitness and transfer capacity on entry mode choice we distinguish between the transfer capacity of the organization that develops knowledge source transfer capacity and that of the organization that seeks to access that knowledge recipient transfer capacity the discussion addresses how our model generalizes to knowledge seeking strategies and to the study of ongoing multinational networks the study enriches and reconciles multiple theoretical perspectives on entry strategy it brings together the study of knowledge characteristics and firm heterogeneity in the theory of the multinational corporation and in international and strategic management more generally journal of international business studies 2003 34 356 373 doi 10 1057 palgrave jibs 8400037

endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

targeting agricultural research and extension for food security and poverty alleviation a case study of fish farming in central cameroon over 5 years of participatory on farm research market access profitability farming systems productivity and economic sustainability were compared on 100 small scale farms in central cameroon integration technology based on the use of agricultural by products as fishpond inputs was the driver for intensification over all farms fishpond productivity increased from 498 kg to 1609 kg fish ha 2145 kg ha yr during the project period the number of active fish farmers increased from 15 to 192 including 55 farms which participated only through information exchange over all farms net returns from aquaculture increased by 5 times over pre project levels productivity intensity and profitability increased more significantly in periurban areas with good market access compared to rural areas among farmers with good market access average net income from the aquaculture enterprise rose from 118 up to 1485 research extension team ret support cost an average of 61 300 per year over 5 years rural farmers recaptured 23 of the relevant ret investment compared to 442 by periurban farmers likewise increase in production attributable to ret intervention was higher for periurban 253 compared to rural 11 3 fish farmers within 3 years of the end of extension support rural farmers had returned to pre project production levels whereas periurban farms had better maintained their productivity and profitability findings indicate that in areas with little or no access to markets the number of fishponds and fish farmers can be increased and yields improved increasing local food supplies but sustainability in the absence of extension subsidies is questionable to achieve either of the two principal goals for the sector food security and or poverty alleviation investments need to be made in improving the availability of quality technical assistance to targeted farmers and finding means of reducing social conflict arising from perceived inequalities in the accrual of the benefits of development

the political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture an empirical study the paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture we use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures pari the empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses the analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers but also to invest in public agricultural research furthermore the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision making on pari is non linear and conditional on other factors regarding the impact of political institutions the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers agricultural protection nor to lower investment in public goods pari

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

performance verifiability and output sharing in collaborative ventures this paper studies the problem of contracting between two firms when they try to exploit their complementary resources in a collaborative venture cv but their performance in the cv cannot be precisely verified by the other party or by a third party arbiter using a mathematical model that treats performance verifiability as a continuous variable the paper first establishes that a party whose performance cannot be perfectly verified has an incentive to shirk if it is paid only a flat fee and that this shirking problem is more severe as its performance is less verifiable then the paper shows in a general setting that a contract under which each party shares a fraction of the output is superior to a contract under which one of them is paid only a flat fee when performance verifiability is sufficiently low in addition with some specific assumptions about the forms of the revenue and cost functions the paper also shows that a party s share of the venture s residual output in the equilibrium is an increasing function of its productivity and a decreasing function of its opportunity cost finally the numerical examples constructed in the paper suggest that a contract which combines the self enforcing mechanism of output sharing with the third party enforcement mechanism of arbitration generally performs better than a contract that utilizes only one of these mechanisms

investor s choice of shariah compliant replicas and original islamic instruments abstract this paper offers a behavioral perspective on why islamic capital markets are dominated by those financial instruments that almost replicate conventional financial products i e islamic debt bonds and islamic equities in contrast the original islamic instruments involving risk and return sharing musharakah have failed to emerge this paper argues that before the replicas an investor s choice was simply between islamic and non islamic instruments along with risk and return compliance with islamic principles or shariah was an integral part of investor utility as shariah standards came to give legitimacy to other financial structures the investors could then choose between various islamic replicas and the original islamic instruments we argue that once the investor s intrinsic need for shariah compliance is fulfilled an instrument s risk return features would become more important so for loss averse investors with shorter evaluation periods the loss sharing feature of the islamic risk and return instruments musharkah makes them less attractive than islamic debt bonds for longer evaluation periods islamic equities are also shown to outperform the risk and return musharakah instruments using the s p islamic bond index for bond data and the dow jones islamic market world index for islamic equities we confirm these views about investor utility by way of both loss aversion and habit based consumption models the findings suggest that islamic debt bonds and islamic equities have been allowed to jointly crowd out the original islamic risk and return musharakah instruments

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

the value of partnership under competition when competitors may be r d joint venture and supply chain partners for a critical component conventional wisdom suggests that firms are worse off when the intensity of competition increases however when competitors have the option of cooperating as supply chain and r d joint venture rjv partners the findings may be counterintuitive in this paper we consider two competing firms that must develop a critical component for their products they must decide whether to develop a distinct component or to form an rjv with their competitor in order to develop a common component and how much research effort should be exerted to improve the quality of this component forming an rjv partnership reduces r d investment because both firms are jointly responsible for the research cost but customers perceive the products to be less differentiated thus leading to a more intense degree of competition between products moreover one of the manufacturers does not produce this component and must therefore decide whether to outsource the production of this component to its competitor or to a third party supplier we examine the following two drivers of competition 1 competition because the two base products are substitutable and 2 when the two firms form an rjv to develop a common component the competition between these two products intensifies our main results show that both firms are better off when the competitiveness of the industry increases or when forming an rjv intensifies the competition between two products moreover we investigate the robustness of our results to the firms bargaining powers by considering a generalized nash bargaining game where firms negotiate on the rjv partnership decision and we find that unless the supplier has a very large bargaining power our results hold

equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise this paper extends the internalization approach to the theory of the multinational enterprise mne to include an expanded role for equity joint ventures using the transaction cost paradigm of williamson this paper explains why joint ventures may sometimes be preferred over wholly owned subsidiaries also presented is empirical work on joint venture performance in developing countries which demonstrates that under certain conditions joint ventures can be the optimal mode of foreign direct investment

living wages protection for or protection from low wage workers living wage laws are touted as anti poverty measures yet they apply to only a small fraction of workers most commonly covering only employers with city contracts the apparent contradiction between broad anti poverty goals and narrow coverage suggests that goals other than poverty reduction may partly underlie living wage campaigns this paper considers the hypothesis that living wage laws act to maintain or increase rents among unionized municipal workers by raising the wages that city contractors would have to pay living wage laws may reduce the incentives for cities to contract out work that would otherwise be done by unionized municipal employees hence increasing the bargaining power of municipal unions and leading to higher wages for their members the evidence presented here from an analysis of cps data for 1996 2000 indicates that the wages of unionized municipal workers are indeed increased as a result of living wage laws covering contractors

the newly industrializing countries in the international system explanations of the growth of the newly industrializing countries nics by neoclassical economists and dependency theorists neglect the role of politics in shaping development strategies different social configurations state structures and ideas about development help explain the divergent policy choices made by the export oriented east asian nics korea and taiwan and the more inward looking countries of latin america particularly mexico and brazil these different strategic choices in turn account for variations in the patterns of external dependency that characterize countries in the two regions

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

policy dependency and reform economic gains versus political pains economic analysis condemns market intervention in favour of farmers as inefficient and ineffective and therefore worthy of radical reform practical experience however indicates that such lessons are hard to learn and implement economic analysis tends to ignore the path dependencies generated by the policy evolution process without reform strategies that take full account of these dependencies policy reform will continue to be reluctant slow and frequently counterproductive this paper reconsiders the evolution of farm policies and the economic assessment of their costs and benefits in so doing it re phrases conventional economic arguments in terms which seem to accord better with sensible intuition which may prove more accessible and credible to policymakers and advisors the difficulties of reconciling economic efficiency with political acceptability are identified the paper concludes with a substantial challenge to the agricultural economics profession

structure of agricultural protection in industrial countries abstract the nominal rates of agricultural protection in ten industrial countries from 1955 to 1980 are estimated with the same commodity coverage and data definitions a regression analysis is conducted to explain variations in the measured level of agricultural protection in terms of political as well as economic factors nearly 80 percent of the variations is accounted for by differences in agriculture s comparative advantage agriculture s share in total economy the international terms of trade between agricultural and manufactured commodities regionalism eec and food security consideration associated with non military alliance

explaining price policy bias in agriculture the calculus of support maximizing politicians a model is developed to explain observed patterns of policy intervention in agriculture we analyze the interaction between political support seeking politicians and supportsupplying citizens society consists of a rural and urban group we determine the effects on transfers of relative group size disparities in income endowments between groups and the deadweight loss of redistribution the framework advanced is an alternative to that of the interest group model and is used to explain for example why the export sectors in developing countries are taxed more and why the united kingdom is less adamant for higher price supports than germany

the effect of short term information on long term investment an experimental study abstract we present a multi trial experiment that extends the classic experiment of thaler et al 1997 by adding short term information to long term investment the allocation to the risky asset is reduced in the long term when we add short term information

influences on foreign equity ownership level in joint ventures in china this study examines the determinants of foreign equity ownership in joint ventures in china drawing upon duning s ownership locational and internalization paradigm and the literature on bargaining power eleven variables that impact foreign ownership preferences and concessions are examined these variables are advertising intensity foreign capital input country risk of china ejv investment amount ejv contractual duration cultural distance competitive intensity local partner state ownership local partner alignment foreign partner alignment and ejv location the empirical findings are largely consistent with the hypotheses the empirical findings are largely consistent with the hypotheses further interesting differences were found among u s european and japanese firms with respect to the impact of these determinants

agricultural incentives in developing countries measuring the effect of sectoral and economywide policies the impact of sector specific direct and economywide indirect policies on agricultural incentives for 18 developing countries for the period 1975 84 are estimated the direct effect is measured by the proportional difference between the producer price and the border price adjusting for distribution storage transport and other marketing costs the indirect effect has two components 1 the impact of the unsustainable portion of the current account deficit and of industrial protection policies on the real exchange rate and thus on the price of agricultural commodities relative to nonagricultural nontradables and 2 the impact of industrial protection policies on the relative price of agricultural commodities to that of nonagricultural tradable goods the authors found that a in almost all cases the direct effect is equivalent to a tax on exportable goods and to a subsidy for importables b the indirect effect also taxes agriculture and dominates the direct effect and c the direct policies for both importables and exportables stabilize domestic producer prices

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

political systems and distortions an empirical study this paper studies empirically why price distortions are more prevalent in some countries than in others we find no significant difference between democracies and dictatorships but frequent regime changes reduce distortions political systems factional subordinate that encourage redistributive activities rda tend to have more distortions allowing for different effects of rda in democracies and dictatorships there is a positive and significant effect of rda on distortions in dictatorships in democracies distortions destroying lobbying seems more important since no significant relation between rda and distortions can be found

donors and domestic policy makers two worlds in agricultural policy making in recent decades many developing countries have moved from taxing their agricultural sector to subsidizing it a phenomenon referred to as overshooting using ghana and uganda as case study countries this study aims to contribute to explaining this phenomenon by examining the role of policy beliefs the study is based on the advocacy coalition framework and relies on discourse analysis as analytical method in depth interviews with policy actors in both countries served as empirical basis a quantitative analysis of the transcripts was used to identify different discourse coalitions and a qualitative analysis was conducted to examine the discourses and identify their underlying policy beliefs the paper identified far reaching differences in the agricultural policy beliefs between domestic policy makers and donors regarding the question what does it actually take to develop small holder agriculture the evidence from this analysis highlights the role that divergent policy beliefs can play in influencing agricultural policy choices

a positive theory of agricultural protection the present paper analyses the political economy of agricultural protection in a general equilibrium framework rational politicians offer protectionist policies in return for political support from their constituency individuals in the economy have different factor endowments politicians exploit these differences in establishing redistributive policies when maximizing political support changes in economic variables such as the urban rural income gap capital intensity the share of agriculture in total output and total employment and the share of food in consumer expenditures affect the political equilibrium policy the analysis concludes that the observed correlation between economic development and agricultural protection is caused by a multiplicity of factors

myopic loss aversion disappointment aversion and the equity premium puzzle abstract this paper takes a close look at the behavioural finance explanations of the equity premium puzzle namely myopic loss aversion benartzi s thaler r h 1995 myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle quarterly journal of economics 110 73 92 and disappointment aversion ang a bekaert g liu j 2005 why stocks may disappoint journal of financial economics 76 471 508 the paper proposes a simple specification of loss and disappointment aversion and brings these theories to the data the main conclusion is that a highly short sighted investment horizon is required for the historical equity premium to be explained by loss aversion while reasonable values for disappointment aversion are found also for long investment horizons stocks may not only lose in the short term but also disappoint in the long term

germany and the cap a bargaining model of ec agricultural policy formation a bargaining model of ec agricultural policy formation is formulated the model allows for more explicit consideration of political factors than is possible in standard political economy models it shows how the political system in germany has increased the power of german farm interests relative to farm interests elsewhere in the ec the paper recognizes cap negotiations are an on going process results of the previous bargaining round form the basis for the current round and give momentum to price changes understanding this momentum provides insight into the fluctuating price supports that have characterized the cap

first order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle abstract this paper integrates yaari s dual theory of choice under uncertainty into a multiperiod context and examines its implications for the equity premium puzzle an important property of these preferences is that of first order risk aversion which implies in our model that the risk premium for a small gamble is proportional to the standard deviation rather than the variance since the standard deviation of the growth rate in aggregate consumption is considerably larger than its variance the model can generate both a small risk free rate and a moderate equity premium