covered interest rate arbitrage in the interwar period and the keynes einzig conjecture keynes 1923 conjectured that deviations from covered interest rate parity would not be arbitraged unless a profit of at least a half of one percent on an annualized basis was available and that larger deviations would still be moderately persistent because of less than perfect elasticity of supply of arbitrage funds this two part conjecture was given further emphasis by other writers on this period notably einzig 1937 we apply nonlinear econometric techniques to a previously unexploited weekly data base for the 1920s london and new york markets and find strong support for the conjecture

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

linking permit markets multilaterally we formally study the determinants magnitude and distribution of efficiency gains generated in multilateral linkages between permit markets we provide two novel decomposition results for these gains characterize individual preferences over linking groups and show that our results are largely unaltered with strategic domestic emissions cap selection or when banking and borrowing are allowed using the paris agreement pledges and power sector emissions data of five countries which all use or considered using both emissions trading and linking we quantify the efficiency gains we find that the computed gains can be sizable and are split roughly equally between effort and risk sharing

theory of the firm and structure of residual rights abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model with consumer producers economies of specialization and transaction costs to investigate the emergence of firms from the division of labor and the function of a structure of residual rights it is shown that the institution of the firm can be used to get intangible intellectual property involved in the division of labor while avoiding its direct pricing and marketing so that the division of labor can be promoted by saving on transaction costs

origins and development of the eu ets the successful creation of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets was not inevitable countries such as canada and japan which might be thought to have a less complex and more cohesive cultural and institutional context failed to do so europe succeeded for a number of reasons with a single market for the economy the logic of a single market for environment is inexorable the european commission which had failed in its earlier efforts to introduce a carbon energy tax made the case for trading with great skill and persistence on the basis of qualified majority voting which meant no country had a veto the uk and denmark initiated their own national schemes and there was a serious risk of balkanising the market with up to 27 different schemes with the losses of scale and scope this would entail meeting the union s kyoto commitments required a substantive pan european response and eu ets was the most credible and effective way of doing so the european parliament and environmental non governmental organisations played a constructive role pushing for more auctioning of allowances and less of them allocated centrally free allocation managed by member states ms was a necessary condition to achieve the support needed so they failed to achieve these objectives in the initial phase but they characterize the commission s proposals post 2012

emission trading with fiscal externalities the case for a common carbon tax for the non ets emissions in the eu a government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first best level of public spending when involved in emission trading a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales this fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries our theory explains how and when fiscal externalities may be expected to arise moreover we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect 1 the price of emission permits 2 the global distribution of abatement effort and 3 total greenhouse gas mitigation costs this is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets our findings are especially relevant for the eu which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between eu member countries for all emissions outside the european emissions trading system

climate policy with technology transfers and permit trading in this paper we analyze technology transfers tt and tradable emission rights which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations subsidizing tt leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the south thereby reducing the international permit price this is beneficial for the north as long as it is a permit buyer hence it chooses to subsidize tt by contrast the permit selling south suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates despite receiving subsidies we also consider how tt affects countries non cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions finally a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics

global trading versus linking architectures for international emissions trading abstract international emissions trading is widely seen as an indispensable policy pillar of climate change mitigation stern n 2007 the economics of climate change the stern review cambridge university press new york this article analyzes five different types of trading architectures classified into two top down unfccc driven and three bottom up driven by individual countries or regions approaches the two types of approaches are characterized by a trade off between environmental effectiveness and political feasibility respectively whereas their relative cost effectiveness depends on implementation details bottom up architectures constitute imperfect substitutes for top down architectures in terms of environmental effectiveness and thus remain mere fallback options however especially the formal linking architecture can act as complement in terms of cost effectiveness

bottom up world climate policies preserving fossil fuel deposits vs capping fuel consumption the policy of purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation is an alternative to the demand side climate policies that predominate in practice and in professional studies this paper analyzes the deposit purchase approach and compares it to the standard demand side policy in a model with international trade and non cooperative governments that account for the effects of their policies on equilibrium prices we investigate how the two regimes differ with respect to their equilibrium allocations and in particular with respect to the countries mitigation effort and welfare if countries are symmetric mitigation is stronger in the demand side than in the supply side regime and the transition from the latter to the former is welfare enhancing for all countries if countries have different endowments of deposits in a two country economy the country with higher extraction costs does not purchase deposits for preservation and the country with lower extraction costs is better off with the supply side than with the demand side policy finally we consider the case of combined policies and find surprisingly that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists when heterogeneous countries apply both policy instruments politiques climatiques mondiales ascendantes preservation des gisements de combustibles fossiles par opposition a la limitation de la consommation de carburant la politique d achat de gisements de combustibles fossiles aux fins de preservation represente une alternative aux politiques climatiques axees sur la demande predominant a la fois dans la pratique mais aussi dans les etudes professionnelles cet article analyse l approche fondee sur l achat de gisements et la compare a la politique standard axee sur la demande dans un modele de commerce international et de gouvernements non cooperatifs prenant en compte les effets de leurs politiques sur les prix d equilibre nous avons recherche en quoi les deux regimes differaient relativement a leur repartition de l equilibre et notamment relativement a l effort d attenuation et a la protection sociale si les pays sont symetriques l attenuation est plus prononcee dans un systeme axe sur la demande comparativement a un systeme axe sur l offre et la transition du second au premier systeme permet d ameliorer la protection sociale pour tous les pays dans une economie a deux pays differemment dotes en matiere de gisements le pays ayant les couts d extraction les plus eleves n achete pas de gisements a des fins de preservation tandis que le pays ayant les couts d extraction les moins eleves se retrouve en meilleure posture dans une politique axee sur l offre plutot que sur la demande pour terminer nous examinons le cas des politiques combinees et etonnamment nous constatons qu il n existe aucun equilibre en matiere de strategies pures lorsque des pays heterogenes appliquent les deux moyens d action

non linearity between finance and growth abstract we present a simple model which establishes a non linear and possibly non monotonic relationship between financial development and economic growth applying a threshold regression model to king and levine s q j econ 109 1993 83 data set we find evidence consistent with the theoretical model

transferable licenses versus nontransferable licenses what is the difference this paper questions the presumption that transferable licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare we show that the price of a transferable license may be lower than that of its nontransferable counterpart if the underlying quota is not very severe however transferability is preferable to nontransferability if consumer surplus and license revenue have equal weight in the welfare function we also examine whether licenses will be monopolized by domestic producers with market power the models have implications for several issues including the design of pollution permits and how to maximize revenue from ticket sales

testing the scale effect predicted by the fujita krugman urbanization model abstract this paper tests the scale effect predicted by the fujita krugman fujita m krugman p 1995 when is the economy monocentric von th nen and chamberlin unified regional science urban economics 25 505 528 urbanization model which implies a monotonically positive relationship between the average firm size and the degree of urbanization given that population and fixed cost do not decrease empirical data from seven oecd countries are examined and the fujita krugman model is tested the results suggest that the prediction in the fujita krugman model is incompatible with empirical observation the evidence in the paper seems to support the alternative classical urbanization theory proposed by xenophon gordon b 1975 economic analysis before adam smith macmillan london and william petty petty w 1683 another essay on political arithmetics in hull c h ed economic writings of sir william petty augustus m kelly new york p 947 reissued in 1963 and formalized by yang yang x 1991 development structure change and urbanization journal of development economics 34 199 222 yang and rice yang x rice r 1994 an equilibrium model endogenizing the emergence of a dual structure between the urban and rural sectors journal of urban economics 25 346 368 and sun and yang sun g yang x 2002 agglomeration economies division of labor and the urban land rent escalation a general equilibrium analysis of urbanization australian economic papers 41 164 183

allocating tradable permits on the basis of market price to achieve cost effectiveness it is a well known result that distributional constraints can lead to an imperfectly competitive permit market where the emission target is no longer met at least cost in this paper we suggest an allocation rule for tradable permits which can handle this problem if the permit allocation is dependent on the market price for permits this allocation rule can achieve both cost effectiveness and meet specific requirements for cost distribution across agents

how smooth is price discovery evidence from cross listed stock trading abstract the adjustment to parity can be nonlinear for a cross listed pair convergence may be quicker when the price deviation is sufficiently profitable we propose a threshold error correction model ecm to gauge the market respective information shares of canadian listings traded on the toronto stock exchange tsx and the new york stock exchange nyse since dynamics may alternatively be gradual we further generalize the threshold framework to a smooth transition ecm the empirical implications are as follows first the tsx and the nyse appear to have integrated over time second parity convergence accelerates upon discounts on the cross listings on the nyse third we find a larger feedback from the nyse if the price gap exceeds the threshold required arbitrage return fourth informed traders tend to cluster on the nyse upon discounts on the cross listings fifth information share and threshold are affected by the relative degree of private information market friction and liquidity measures firm level characteristics and aggregate risks

a note on market power in itq fisheries abstract individual transferable quotas itqs in fisheries are analogous to transferable pollution permits in environmental policy however they are different in that the right to produce is for the final product the fish whereas pollution permits are for a non market joint product i e sulfur dioxide of the good produced for sale in both cases the actual economic efficiency effects of creating the property rights depend upon the workings of the market for both the final product and the rights there has been considerable work on market failures for pollution permits and this paper extends the analysis to itqs it is shown that the difference between pollution permits and itqs can change the type and occurrence of failure in the market for the final product but it does not affect the potential for failure in the market for permits

the voluntary provision of a pure public good the case of reduced cfc emissions and the montreal protocol abstract this paper applies the theory of the voluntary provision of a pure public good to the behavior of nations to curb chlorofluorocarbon cfc emissions during the late 1980s by devising an empirical test we determine that these cutbacks in emissions are consistent with nash behavior when taste parameters are controlled the relationship between emission cutbacks and national income is nearly linear as implied by the theory if the sample is purged of potential outliers then the linear relationship results a significant taste parameter is the extent of political and civil freedoms while a marginally significant parameter is geophysical position in terms of latitude

higher price lower costs minimum prices in the eu emissions trading scheme this paper examines the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system ets when some emissions are regulated outside of the ets we theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare using a numerical simulation model of the european union we find that moderate minimum prices in the eu ets can reduce the costs of eu climate policy by up to thirty percent we also find that due to tax interaction effects the optimal minimum price in the eu ets should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non ets sectors this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

itqs firm dynamics and wealth distribution does full tradability increase inequality concerns over the re distributive effects of individual transferable quotas itq s have led to restrictions on their tradability we consider a general equilibrium model with firm dynamics to evaluate the redistributive impact of changing the tradability of itqs a change in tradability would happen for example if permits are allowed to be traded as a separate asset from ownership of an active firm if the property right is associated with ownership of an active firm the permit can be leased in each period but it is not possible to exit the industry and keep the right however allowing the permits to be traded as a separate asset has two effects first it leads to a greater concentration of production in the industry second it directly converts a non tradable asset into a tradable one and this is equivalent to giving a lump sum transfer to all firms the first effect implies a concentration in revenues while the second implies a redistribution of wealth we calibrate our model to match the observed increase in revenue inequality in the northeast multispecies groundfish u s fishery we show that although observed revenue inequality measured by the gini coefficient increases by 12 wealth inequality is reduced by 40

general equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor abstract we study a general equilibrium model with specialization and division of labor the market coordinates all individuals decisions in choosing their patterns of specialization in order to utilize positive network effects of division of labor net of transaction costs we establish the equilibrium existence theorem the first and second welfare theorems and the core equivalence for a family of general equilibrium models with both possible increasing returns and transaction costs using an analytical framework with consumer producers economies of specialization and transaction costs we resurrect the spirit of the classical economics of the division of labor in a modern body of mathematical formalism

an emission saved is an emission earned an empirical study of emission banking for light duty vehicle manufacturers abstract this paper presents results of an empirical study of emission banking for light duty vehicle manufacturers an intertemporal model of manufacturers choices is combined with econometrically estimated abatement cost functions to simulate the cost savings and emission effects of an averaging trading and banking marketable permit system relative to command and control regulations while the cost savings of such a system are estimated to be modest the intertemporal emission effects may be sizable the sensitivity of the results to discount rates abatement cost functions and model specifications is also explored

the clean development mechanism in a world carbon market this paper discusses the role of the clean development mechanism cdm on the market for carbon quotas and countries commitments to reduce their carbon emission levels we show that the cdm contributes to an efficient funding of clean technology investments in least developed countries however the cdm is not neutral on the global level of carbon emissions as it entices countries to raise their emission caps the cdm may also make inappropriate the inclusion of any country that takes no emission abatement commitment it can even make inefficient a country s decision to commit to an emission target

emissions trading with updated allocation effects on entry exit and distribution allocation of emissions allowances may have significant distributional and efficiency effects it is well known that cost efficiency may be achieved if allowances are auctioned or distributed in a lump sum manner e g based on emissions levels before the start of the system grandfathering bohringer and lange eur econ rev 49 2041 2055 2005 show that a cost effective outcome can also be achieved if the base year for allocation is continually updated updating given that banking and borrowing are prohibited in this paper we examine whether updating alters the entry and exit conditions for firms compared to grandfathering and how it affects profits for new and existing firms we find that the two schemes function surprisingly similar first the incentives to entry and exit are identical second the total value of free quotas to existing firms based on emissions before the system starts is also identical without any auctioning with updating initial claims for free allowances have a shorter lifetime compared to grandfathering but quota prices are higher as firms anticipate the effect of current emissions on future claims to free allowances the two effects exactly cancel each other out if there is some combination of auction and free allocation the total value of free quotas will always be highest under grandfathering if the auction rate is the same entry and exit incentives are still equal

free trade and global warming a trade theory view of the kyoto protocol this paper demonstrates how three important results in environmental economics true under mild conditions in closed economies are false or need serious amendment in a world with international trade in goods since the three results we highlight have framed much of the ongoing discussion and research on the kyoto protocol our viewpoint from trade theory suggests a re examination may be in order specifically we demonstrate that in an open trading world but not in a closed economy setting 1 unilateral emission reductions by the rich north can create self interested emission reductions by the unconstrained poor south 2 simple rules for allocating emission reductions across countries such as uniform reductions may well be efficient even if international trade in emission permits is not allowed and 3 when international emission permit trade does occur it may make both participants in the trade worse off and increase global emissions

strategic investment in climate friendly technologies the impact of global emissions trading our point of departure is that a group of industrialized countries invest in research and development r d of greenhouse gas ghg abatement technologies r d investments influence the future ghg abatement choices of both industrialized and developing countries we distinguish between investments that reduce industrialized countries abatement costs and investments that reduce developing countries abatement costs unlike earlier contributions we include global trading in emission permits this changes the nature of the game with global permit trading industrialized countries should in many cases invest strategically in technologies that only reduce abatement costs at home this comes in addition to investments abroad second we show that r d investments always decrease total emissions finally we find that the developing region receiving investments always benefits

abuse of eu emissions trading for tacit collusion in this paper we show that loopholes in eu emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets the abuses originate from the covert misuse of eu emissions trading institutions such as pooling or project based mechanisms we analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions even if those firms are price takers on the permit market which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the eu the identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms profits decreases the consumers surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges consequently public authorities should not allow emissions trading s overall good reputation based upon its efficient abatement of pollution to blind them to options in european emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition

extending the sectoral coverage of an international emission trading scheme in a model inspired by the eu emissions trading scheme non cooperative countries allocate their emissions to internationally trading and non trading sectors each country is better off with trading than without and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading scheme we analyze the effects of extending the sectoral coverage of the trading scheme in a two country model with quadratic abatement costs if only the original trading sector is asymmetric between countries the welfare change is always positive and the same in both countries if the original and additional trading sectors are asymmetric one country might lose but there is an aggregate welfare gain if the original trading sector and the non trading sector are asymmetric both countries always gain

optimal allocation of tac and the implications of implementing an itq management system for the north east arctic cod first we study the allocation rule applied to split the norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels second we explore the bioeconomic implications of an itq management system for this fishery a model combining a cannibalistic biomodel with cooperative game theory is developed key results from the study are 1 the current allocation rule acts in opposite fashion to what may be considered bioeconomically optimal and 2 an itq system for this fishery is likely to result in economic losses as the biological advantages of harvesting with the two vessels types may be lost

political influence on non cooperative international climate policy we analyze non cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups in the first stage countries decide whether to link their domestic emission permit markets to an international market which only forms if it is supported by all countries in the second stage countries non cooperatively decide on the number of tradable emission allowances in both stages special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor we find that i both the choice of regime and the levels of domestic and global emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups and ii an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the lobby group s less preferred regime

welfare ranking of environmental policies in the presence of capital mobility and cross border pollution we construct a model of two regions with cross border pollution and with inter regional regional capital mobility rcm or international international capital mobility icm capital mobility each region uses emission taxes or intra regionally or inter regionally tradable emission permits to reduce pollution we show that the non cooperative settings of all three instruments are always inefficient relative to their cooperative settings when regions are symmetric then i with rcm the non cooperative setting of intra regionally tradable emissions permits is welfare superior to that of the other two instruments ii with icm the non cooperative settings of intra regionally tradable emission permits and of emission taxes are equivalent and superior to that of inter regionally tradable emission permits and iii with icm the three instruments are equivalent only when cross border pollution is perfect

from common fish to rights based fishing fisheries management and the evolution of exclusive rights to fish abstract since the second world war the international law of the sea has been altered fundamentally an exclusive economic zone eez extending 200 nautical miles from baselines has been established in which the coastal states have practically full sovereignty over natural resources including fish this development appears explicable in the light of the economic theory of property rights due to increased scarcity of fish and lower costs of supporting claims to fish resources the eez has major implications for the efficient utilization of fish resources through its limitation of free access in some cases it amounts to the establishment of national property rights to fish resources while in others the number of parties with a legitimate claim to access has been restricted in the wake of this fisheries management by total allowable catches tacs has become widespread this method of management has a potential for increasing the efficiency of fisheries given that a single state or a group of states are able to control the fishery how should this be done to ensure efficiency four methods are discussed i privatization of the resources ii taxes on landings or fishing activity iii fishing licences and iv individual transferable quotas itqs some questions related to itqs are discussed i fixed itqs versus shares in the tac ii stable versus variable itqs and iii how the tac should be set for each particular year the economic theory of property rights predicts the emergence of private property rights to fish stocks or fishing rights in the present situation recent cases of such rights emerging are discussed

combining price and quantity controls under partitioned environmental regulation abstract this paper analyzes hybrid emissions trading systems etss under partitioned environmental regulation when firms abatement costs and future emissions are uncertain we show that hybrid policies that introduce bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement provide a way to hedge against differences in marginal abatement costs across partitions price bounds are more efficient than abatement bounds as they also use information on firms abatement technologies while abatement bounds can only address emission uncertainty using a numerical stochastic optimization model with equilibrium constraints for the european carbon market we find that introducing hybrid policies in eu ets reduces expected excess abatement costs of achieving targeted emission reductions under eu climate policy by up to 89 we also find that under partitioned regulation there is a high likelihood for hybrid policies to yield sizeable ex post cost reductions

optimal pollution taxation in a cournot duopoly it is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution it has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage in this paper i derive the optimal pollution tax for a cournot duopoly if firms have different production costs the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage this is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm it is also shown that if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level

a model of intertemporal emission trading banking and borrowing abstract this paper provides a general treatment of emission trading banking and borrowing in an intertemporal continuous time model using optimal control theory the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least cost solution attainable under joint cost minimization explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits the policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed

who should abate carbon emissions an international viewpoint abstract we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 1993b the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these conditions are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

scale and transfers in international emissions offset programs abstract voluntary emissions offset programs between developing and industrialized countries suffer from adverse selection because participants will self select into the program in contrast pure subsidies for mitigation lead to full participation and hence efficiency but require large financial transfers which make them unattractive to industrialized countries we present a simple model to demonstrate the impact of three policy options on the performance of offset programs 1 baseline scale increases 2 offset discounting and 3 setting stringent baselines with baseline scale increases entire political jurisdictions such as regions or nations are assigned a single aggregate baseline and must choose whether to participate as one entity we find that increasing scale both improves efficiency and reduces transfers from offset buyers to sellers offset discounting means paying less than the value of abatement and can be paired with trading ratios between offsets and allowances in a cap and trade system we show that discounting is inefficient but can make offsets more attractive to industrialized countries setting stringent baselines also involves a tradeoff between efficiency and transfers we finally show that pareto efficient policies that are individually rational for buyers and sellers entail some combination of discounting and or stringent baselines offset policies are never first best but can be efficiency improving especially with increased scale

stochastic pollution permits and merger incentives pollution permit regulations introduce nonlinearities into the objective function of a polluting firm we develop a microeconomic model to show the effects these nonlinearities might have upon firm decisions when emissions are stochastic under perfect competition the fraction of planned pollution covered by permits is shown to be separable from planned production we also demonstrate that permit management incentives may motivate a merger of otherwise independent firms incentives to petition for bubble coverage are also considered the model is studied under risk neutrality and risk aversion imperfectly competitive situations in the output and permit markets are also analyzed

nonlinear mean reversion in the term structure of interest rates abstract the expectations hypothesis implies that the yield curve provides information on the future change in the short term interest rate however transaction costs exist in the financial market which prevent investors from realizing the arbitrage opportunity when the arbitrage does not fully cover the transaction costs the purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of transaction costs on the predictability of the term structure by using the threshold vector error correction model which allows for the nonlinear adjustment to the long run equilibrium relationship a significant amount of threshold effect is found and the adjustment coefficients are regime dependent the empirical result supports the nonlinear mean reversion in the term structure of interest rates

international emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices abstract this paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non tradable emission allowances by non cooperative countries i find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to less pollution in particular environmentally more concerned countries usually choose less allowances if these are tradable but this may be offset by the choice of more allowances on the side of environmentally less concerned countries moreover if the establishment of a trading system requires the unanimous approval of all countries there may be no agreement on trading even if it were to lead to less pollution overall conversely a trading system may find unanimous approval even if it induces more pollution

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

price transmission dynamics between adrs and their underlying foreign securities abstract this paper extends previous research by considering three pricing factors for american depository receipts adrs the price of the underlying shares in the local currency the relevant exchange rate and the us market index using both a vector autoregressive var model with a cointegration constraint and a seemingly unrelated regression sur approach we examine the relative importance of and the speed of adjustment of adr prices to these underlying factors our results show that while the price of the underlying shares is most important the exchange rate and the us market also have an impact on adr prices while the bulk of the shocks to the pricing factors are reflected in the adrs within the same calendar day there are indications that the adjustments are not completed until the following day curiously the adrs appear to initially overreact to the us market index but underreact to changes in underlying share prices and exchange rates

on international equity weights and national decision making on climate change abstract estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions require the aggregation of monetised impacts of climate change over people with different incomes and in different jurisdictions implicitly or explicitly such estimates assume a social welfare function and hence a particular attitude towards equity and justice we show that previous approaches to equity weighting are inappropriate from a national decision maker s point of view because domestic impacts are not valued at domestic values we propose four alternatives sovereignty altruism good neighbour and compensation with different views on concern for and liability towards foreigners the four alternatives imply radically different estimates of the social cost of carbon and hence the optimal intensity of climate policy

the design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections abstract market power within a dynamic system of tradeable quotas with banking and borrowing of quotas leads to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across agents in this paper we introduce a quota system that may reduce the efficiency loss from market power and thereby result in a distribution of abatement across agents that is closer to a cost effective outcome however this system will in general lead to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across periods hence we may face a trade off between a cost effective distribution of abatement across periods and reduced adverse effects of market power

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

modelling the demand for loans to the private sector in the euro area this article studies the determinants of loans to the private sector in the euro area using the johansen methodology the study identifies one cointegrating relationship linking real loans gdp and interest rates this relationship implies that in the long run real loans are positively related to real gdp and negatively to real short term and long term interest rates both the signs and the magnitude of the coefficients suggest that the cointegrating vector describes a long run demand equation the short run dynamics of the demand for euro area real loans is subsequently modelled by means of a vector error correction model vecm a number of specification tests performed on the vecm produce satisfactory results with tests of stability of the model parameters showing no signs of structural breaks during the sample period 1980 1 1999 2 all of this suggests that developments in real loans to the private sector in the euro area can be reasonably explained by the model

does environmental regulation create merger incentives this paper studies merger incentives for polluting cournot firms under a competitive tradable emission permits market we find that when firms are symmetric and marginal costs are constant an horizontal merger is welfare enhancing if efficiency gains are high enough for the merger to take place the presence of a competitive or monopolistic outside market that also trades in the permits market makes profitable a merger that would not happen otherwise when firms are vertically related in an input output chain an horizontal merger in one of the markets increases profits in the other market due to the permits price decrease finally we consider an oligopoly fringe model in which firms differ in their marginal production costs a merger between the dominant oligopolistic firms decreases the permits price and is always profitable such setting is relevant to assess the observed mergers between power generators in several market for permits like the regional greenhouse gas initiative rggi allowing us to derive some policy recommendations

development structural changes and urbanization abstract this paper constructs an equilibrium model by formalizing a trade off between the gains from trade based on increasing returns to specialization and transaction costs the relationship between development structural changes and urbanization is investigated in addition the function of a free market in searching for the efficient market structure is explored

marketable permits market power and cheating abstract in this paper we present a model of a noncompliant firm operating in a marketable pollution permit market in the main result of the paper we show how compliance is related to the initial distribution of permits a firm with market power will cheat less the larger its endowment of permits is from a fixed stock of permits the competitive fringe however will cheat more as its endowment of permits is reduced generating an ambiguous global impact on cheating

the relation between savings and growth cointegration and causality evidence from asia the direction of causality between savings and growth remains unclear even though it is of critical importance for development policy in this paper granger causality analysis is undertaken for seven asian countries using the vecm engle and granger and var procedures we find that in most cases the direction of causality runs primarily from growth or income to savings although in some countries there is also evidence of a feedback effect from savings to income and growth thus development policy should focus less on promoting high savings rates and more on promoting high growth rates estimation of the savings functions are presented using engle and granger s static ols and stock and watson s dynamic ols dols procedures where appropriate the high savings rates in asia are found to be due to the high rate of growth of income per capita declining shares of dependent population and some special institutional features such as the high central provident fund rates in singapore interest rates ar

searching for threshold effects in the evolution of budget deficits an application to the spanish case abstract in this paper we use recent developments on threshold autoregressive tar models that allow us to derive endogenously threshold effects in the evolution of the spanish budget deficit specifically a mean reverting dynamic behaviour of the budget deficit should be expected once such threshold is reached

the dynamic relationship between the prices of adrs and their underlying stocks evidence from the threshold vector error correction model this paper sets out to estimate the dynamic relationship that exists between the prices of adrs and their underlying stocks in both the short run and the long run using a number of recent developments of the threshold cointegration framework the empirical results support the notion of nonlinear mean reversion of the prices of adrs and their underlying stocks

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

tradable emission rights and strategic interaction the use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy this paper presents an analysis of how and under what conditions emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes

threshold cointegration and purchasing power parity in the pacific nations the paper uses a threshold cointegration methodology to explore the properties of long run purchasing power parity ppp in the pacific nations using japan and the usa as base countries it is shown that long run ppp holds for most asian countries but that the adjustment mechanism is asymmetric in contrast to symmetric error correction models it is found that asymmetric adjustments of nominal exchange rates play an important role in eliminating deviations from long run ppp

the principal agent model with multilateral externalities an application to climate agreements we consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present the motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness to pay wtp for emissions abatement due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and thus can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading moreover optimal contracts can include a boundary part i e the endogenous type dependent participation constraint is binding which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract compared to this outside option a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low wtp and reduce her payoff for high types subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal

optimum tariffs and retaliation revisited how country size matters in his seminal work on tariff retaliation johnson review of economic studies 21 1953 1954 showed that a country will win a bilateral tariff war if its relative monopoly monopsony power in world trade is sufficiently large however it is unclear from johnson s analysis and from subsequent research on the subject how this power is determined in general economic environments an important goal of this paper is to address this issue with the help of a neoclassical trade model in which country size is at centre stage it is shown that a sufficient condition for a country to prefer a non cooperative nash tariff equilibrium retaliation over free trade is that its relative size be sufficiently large the paper also refines the structure of the general trade model and generates additional characterization results on the importance of country size for best response tariff functions retaliatory tariffs and welfare

monitoring of workers and product market competition the role of works councils i introduction technological advancement allows firms to closely monitor their workers actions more than ever before for instance firms can acquire worker monitoring software to monitor activities on computers or cell phones such software enables firms to assess whether workers play games on their computers or surf the internet instead of working productively and even to track workers exact locations similarly firms scan emails or use video surveillance to monitor their workers behavior unsurprisingly the growing use of monitoring technologies has led to a debate on how closely firms should be allowed to monitor their workers actions and on whether government intervention is needed to protect workers privacy at first sight it appears that this debate centers around two different kinds of arguments economic arguments e g higher worker productivity in favor of extensive worker monitoring against ethical issues according to which workers privacy must be protected schmitz 2005 however demonstrates that this is not necessarily true in a contract theoretical model he finds that firms employ monitoring technologies not to increase efficiency but rather to reduce rents that must be paid to the workers in the case of imperfect monitoring he concludes that monitoring technologies may lead to inefficiencies and thus calls for laws protecting workers privacy whereas worker protection in the united states is rather weak in this respect it is typically stronger within the european union in germany for instance works councils are important institutions that provide workers with power on the firm level particularly with respect to working conditions within the system of co determination works councils have legally guaranteed influence on management decisions concerning working conditions within a firm for instance the law prescribes that worker representatives must consent to any introduction of technologies that monitor the workers effort and output 1 given these rights of works councils it may be puzzling that firm owners do not more strongly oppose this limitation of their control rights in this paper we offer an explanation to resolve this puzzle by analyzing the interaction between internal organization and market conduct we argue that works councils and their right to block monitoring of workers can act as a commitment device of firms to mitigate product market competition as relaxed competition increases profits and because workers receive an information rent from their co determination rights workers and firms have aligned interests in establishing works councils at the expense of consumers we derive these results in a simple model of two competing firms where each firm faces a moral hazard problem with its workforce that could be solved by installing a monitoring technology without monitoring inducing high effort by workers is more costly as a result effort levels will be lower and so will be output this may serve a similar purpose as quantity reduction in a cartel and it may thereby increase firm profits 2 however similar to quantity reduction in a cartel also with respect to monitoring there is a danger that a single firm deviates and installs the monitoring technology consequently the deviator can produce higher output more cheaply and free rides on the lower output of its competitor thus firms would like to ex ante commit not to use a monitoring technology usually no such commitment is possible however works councils may serve this unintended purpose because they must give their consent to monitoring technologies this provides them with a property right on the information rent arising in case of nonmonitoring to receive their consent the firm must offer the workers compensation for the foregone rent this additional cost of monitoring makes deviation from a nonmonitoring situation less attractive implying that works councils may serve as the desired commitment device

transitional restricted linkage between emissions trading schemes linkages between emissions trading systems are deemed an important element of the future climate policy landscape they are however difficult to agree and remain few and far between temporary restrictions on permit trading have potential to facilitate and gradually approach unrestricted full linkage we compare the relative merits of several link restrictions in this respect namely quantitative transfer limits border taxes on transfers exchange and discount rates and unilateral linkage to this end we develop a simple model to have a unifying framework which in conjunction with lessons we draw from real world experiences serves as a basis for a broader policy oriented discussion while quantitative restrictions seem to be the natural route to full linkage they can lead to uncertain distributional effects and weaken price signals these aspects are mitigated under a border permit tax but this policy seems harder to implement exchange rates have potential to adjust for programmes stringencies and raise ambition over time but can be challenging to select as experience corroborates unilateral linkage can be a convenient approach

international emissions trading good or bad abstract using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency

dynamic hedge ratio for stock index futures application of threshold vecm this study represents one of the first papers in stock index futures arbitrage literature to investigate the effects of arbitrage threshold on stock index futures hedging effectiveness by using threshold vector error correction model hereafter threshold vecm moreover in contrast to prior studies focusing on examining case studies involving mature stock markets this study not only adopts us s p 500 stock market as the sample but also adds an analysis of one emerging stock market hungarian bsi and examines the differences between them finally this investigation employs a rolling estimation process to examine the impact of arbitrage threshold behaviours on the setting of futures hedging ratio the empirical findings of this study are consistent with the following notions first arbitrage behaviour reduces co movement between futures and spot markets and increases the volatility of both futures and spot markets second this article denotes the outer regime of futures spot market for the case of hung

price transmission and asymmetric adjustment in the spanish dairy sector asymmetric threshold vector error correction models are applied to monthly price data to analyse price relationships and patterns of transmission among farm and retail markets for a variety of dairy products in spain the results suggest that asymmetries affect a conspicuous part of the raw milk processed in spain implications for the organizational structure of spanish dairy markets are offered

push or pull the relationship between development trade and primary resource endowment abstract we develop a model to capture the interaction between transaction efficiency and primary resource endowment for specialization and development this interaction leads to four broad patterns of development countries with low primary resource endowment can be pushed into development so long as their institutions exhibit sufficient transaction efficiency otherwise development may fail to occur similarly a country may fail to develop because it is cursed by abundant natural resources if however that country has sufficiently high transaction efficiency it can overcome the curse and develop but the threshold level of transaction efficiency for development rises as natural resources become more abundant in this sense the institutional hurdle for development increases as natural resources become more abundant we consider the welfare effects of different development paths and also consider how technological development may aid or hinder development

international emission permit markets with refunding we propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the eu trading scheme each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer a fraction of these permits is grandfathered the remainder is auctioned revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions we show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets if the share of grandfathered permits is sufficiently small we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions

strategic behavior private information and decentralization in the european union emissions trading system in the european union emissions trading system the supply of carbon permits is determined in a decentralized manner by member states alternatively the supply could be determined by an eu central authority we analyze whether decentralization leads to lower total abatement costs under various assumptions about the behavior of member states and the privacy of information about their abatement costs if member states do not behave strategically then decentralization is preferred regardless of whether abatement costs are private information if the member states behave strategically then decentralization may or may not be preferred depending on the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters the variation in emission endowments and the number of member states

auctioning vs grandfathering in cap and trade systems with market power and incomplete information we compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies based on real life cases such as the eu ets we consider a multi unit multi bid uniform auction at the auction each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market either as a leader or a follower this role affects each firms valuation of the permits which are not common across firms as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost effective allocation of permits as it occurs in simpler auction models auctioning tends to be more cost effective than grandfathering when the firms abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough

vegetable oil market and biofuel policy an asymmetric cointegration approach abstract the present paper analyses the long run relationship between vegetable oil prices and conventional diesel prices in the eu for the period 2005 2007 we applied recent developments in the threshold cointegration approach to investigate the presence of asymmetric dynamic adjusting processes between the prices of rapeseed oil sunflower oil and soybean oil and the price of a mineral oil diesel the results presented suggest a two regime threshold cointegration model only for the rapeseed oil diesel price pair thus the rapeseed oil price adjusts rapidly to its long run equilibrium determined by fossil diesel prices but this adjustment is asymmetric it differs if the divergence between the two prices is above or below a critical threshold consequently rapeseed oil appears particularly exposed to external shocks deriving from global political scenarios suggesting the reassessment of the high quota 80 of eu biodiesel represented by this vegetable oil

using history dependence to design a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections a transferable quota system is analysed in a two period model with market power so far the management mechanisms presented in the literature to remedy market power have either not succeeded in securing efficiency in the distribution of quota within and across time periods or have resulted in only one of the two inefficiencies being eliminated in this paper a new mechanism is introduced where allocation of quota is made dependent upon historic quota acquisitions this opens for a trade off between distributional and time efficiency or under specific circumstances securing overall efficiency

enforcing transferable permit systems in the presence of market power we derive an enforcement strategy for a transferable permit system in the presence of market power that achieves complete compliance in a cost effective manner we show that the presence of a firm with market influence makes designing an enforcement strategy more difficult than enforcing a perfectly competitive system we also re consider hahn s 1984 suggestion that a firm with market influence should be allocated permits so that it chooses to not participate in the permit market when enforcement and its costs are taken into account hahn s suggestion does not hold except in a very special case the presence of market power will limit the extent to which transferable emissions permit systems can fulfill their theoretical promises hahn 1984 was the first to show that permit trading in the presence of market power cannot be expected to result in a distribution of emissions that minimizes aggregate abatement costs furthermore the distribution of emissions will never be completely independent of the initial allocation of permits modeling a transferable permit system in which one firm has market power while the rest are perfect competitors a dominant firm competitive fringe model hahn demonstrated that aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when the dominant firm is allocated exactly the number of permits it will choose to hold in equilibrium simply aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when a firm that can manipulate the permit price does not because it chooses to not trade permits like most of the theoretical literature on transferable permit systems hahn ignored the fact that compliance in a permit system must be enforced recognizing this important omission van egteren and weber 1996 extended hahn s work to

is trade in permits good for the environment we analyze the impact of trade in emission permits on environmental policy when countries trade a differentiated good pollution is always higher with tradable permits as compared to the case where permits are not internationally tradable if pollution is a pure global public bad i e the marginal damage from transboundary pollution is the same as that from local pollution the permit price under trade equals the domestic marginal damage from own emissions if pollution is not a pure global public bad i e the marginal damage from transboundary pollution is less than that from local pollution trade results in a permit price lower than the domestic marginal damage from own emissions pollution is higher under trade relative to autarky regardless of the nature of transboundary pollution the permit price equivalent pollution tax is lower and pollution is higher with internationally tradable permits than with nontradable permits

a regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies outcomes and noncooperative equilibria this study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries and that high income countries may be the major losers from cooperation jel h41 q4 q2 q20

using threshold cointegration to estimate asymmetric price transmission in the swiss pork market this paper employs threshold cointegration tests that allow for asymmetric adjustment towards a long run equilibrium relationship to examine the relationship between producer and retail pork prices in switzerland the short run adjustments are also examined with asymmetric error correction models that are compared to the conventional symmetric error correction models the results indicate that price transmission between the producer and retail levels is asymmetric in the sense that increases in producer prices that lead to declines in marketing margins are passed on more quickly to retail prices than decreases in producer prices that result in increases in the marketing margins

spatial market integration in the presence of threshold effects a large body of research has evaluated price linkages in spatially separate markets much recent research has applied models appropriate for nonstationary data such analyses have been criticized for their ignorance of transactions costs which may inhibit price adjustments and thus affect tests of integration this analysis utilizes threshold autoregression and cointegration models to account for a neutral band representing transactions costs we evaluate daily price linkages among four corn and four soybean markets in north carolina nonlinear impulse response functions are used to investigate dynamic patterns of adjustments to shocks our results confirm the presence of thresholds and indicate strong support for market integration though adjustments following shocks may take many days to be complete in every case the threshold models suggest much faster adjustments in response to deviations from equilibrium than is the case when threshold behavior is ignored a large amount of empirical research has evaluated the extent to which spatially separate markets are integrated though the term is used loosely in the literature tests of market integration usually consider the extent to which shocks are transmitted among spatially separate markets the integration of markets can have important implications for price discovery and the operation of the market since persistent deviations from integration may imply riskless profit opportunities for spatial traders

efficient co2 emissions control with emissions taxes and international emissions trading abstract we consider a stylized model of the hybrid co 2 emissions control in the eu a group of countries operates a joint emissions trading system ets covering only part of each country s economy the countries levy an emissions tax in the rest of their economy and possibly an additional tax in their ets sectors welfare maximizing governments are shown to lack incentives for group efficient policies preexisting taxes overlapping with the ets lead policy makers to allocate more permits to their ets sectors than cost effectiveness would suggest the cases of small and large countries exhibit significantly different efficiency implications

spatial market arbitrage and threshold cointegration goodwin and piggott reported that corn and soybean prices in spatially separated markets in north carolina exhibited threshold cointegration and that commodity prices in different markets may persistently diverge here a multivariate approach is used to test for threshold cointegration and nonlinear cointegration the results suggest that departures from the law of one price do not persist indefinitely goodwin and piggott gp examined daily corn and soybean prices across spatially separated markets in north carolina and reported that bivariate pairings of prices were threshold cointegrated gp used a twothreshold model in which price differences across markets could persist indefinitely they concluded that empirical models should consider threshold effects in order to adequately characterize spatially integrated markets the purpose of this article is to extend the gp analysis in several directions gp employed the techniques of martens kofman and vorst which involve a multistepped search for thresholds in the residuals of a cointegrating regression this single equation search process is subject to potential misspecification so it is interesting to determine whether the direct multivariate test of threshold cointegration of hansen and seo provides confirmatory evidence in addition gp allowed two thresholds to affect each commodity pair without directly testing for the number of thresholds the second extension uses hansen tests to determine the number of thresholds two thresholds imply no arbitrage bounds that allow persistent departures from the law of one price one threshold is consistent with the traditional view that price differentials are fleeting as arbitrageurs drive excess returns to zero the final extension recognizes that spatially integrated markets might follow a nonlinear relationship that depends on transactions costs peter s sephton is professor school of business queen s university kingston ontario canada the author would like to thank nick piggott for providing his dataset and the dean s research fund in the school of business for financial assistance two anonymous referees provided helpful comments sufficiently large deviations from the law of one price should lead to a reduced price dispersion a direct test of nonlinear cointegration demonstrates that price differences tend to be resolved over time background