assessing the effects of wives earnings on family income inequality we argue that the effect of wives earnings can be assessed meaningfully only by comparing the observed distribution of income with a reference distribution the components of the standard decomposition of the gini coefficient have no implicit reference distribution and therefore should not be interpreted as a measure of the effect of an income source on inequality we suggest several intuitive counterfactual reference distributions and illustrate their use with 1979 and 1989 u s data we conclude that wives earnings reduced inequality in that the income distribution would have been less equal in their absence alternative measures of the impact have mixed results

university competition grading standards and grade inflation we develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities universities choose grading standards to maximize total wages of graduates job placement and wages hinge on a firm s productivity assessment given a student s university grade and productivity signal we identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between good and bad a s in contrast a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities we show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inflation and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools

anticipated discrimination choices and performance experimental evidence abstract this paper studies experimentally whether potential perceived discrimination affects decisions in a labor market setting with different stereotypes participants are assigned to a seven person group and randomly allocated a role as a firm or worker in each group there are five workers and two firms the only information firms have about each worker is a self selected avatar male female or neutral representing a worker s gender each firm then decides which worker to hire female workers react to potential discrimination when they know the task is math related but not otherwise men choose similar avatar patterns regardless of the task men do perform at much higher levels in the math related task but there is no difference in performance in the emotion recognition task where there is a strong female stereotype

an economic analysis of acting white this paper formalizes a widely discussed peer eect entitled acting white acting white is modeled as a two audience signaling quandary signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection without peer eects equilibria involve all ability types choosing dierent levels of education acting white alters the equilibrium dramatically the possibly empty set of lowest ability individuals and the set of highest ability individuals continue to reveal their type through investments in education ability types in the middle interval pool on a common education level only those in the lower intervals are accepted by the group the model s predictions t many stylized facts in the anthropology and sociology literatures regarding social interactions among minority group members

belief flipping in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination abstract the literature on statistical discrimination shows that ex ante identical groups may be differentially treated in discriminatory equilibria this paper constructs a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and explores what happens to the individuals who nonetheless overcome the initial discrimination if an employer discriminates against a group of workers in her initial hiring she may actually favor the successful members of that group when she promotes from within the firm the worker s welfare implications i e who benefits from an employer s discriminatory hiring practices are unclear even though agents face discrimination initially some may be better off because of it

racial discrimination in the labor market theory and empirics we review theories of race discrimination in the labor market taste based models can generate wage and unemployment duration differentials when combined with either random or directed search even when strong prejudice is not widespread but no existing model explains the unemployment rate differential models of statistical discrimination based on differential observability of productivity across races can explain the pattern and magnitudes of wage differentials but do not address employment and unemployment at their current state of development models of statistical discrimination based on rational stereotypes have little empirical content it is plausible that models combining elements of the search models with statistical discrimination could fit the data we suggest possible avenues to be pursued and comment briefly on the implication of existing theory for public policy jel j15 j31 j64 j71

racial disparities in job finding and offered wages abstractthe extent to which discrimination can explain racial wage gaps is one of the most divisive issues in the social sciences using a newly available data set this paper develops a simple empirical test that under plausible but not innocuous conditions provides a lower bound on the extent of discrimination in the labor market taken at face value our estimates imply that differential treatment accounts for at least one third of the black white wage gap we argue that the patterns in our data are most naturally rationalized through a search matching model in which employers statistically discriminate on the basis of race when hiring unemployed workers but learn about their marginal product over time

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

determinants of economic well being among u s farm operator households participation in government programs has a mild impact on the economic well being of u s farm households major factors that determine farm household prosperity are the primary operator s education level and ethnicity education level of the spouse and other characteristics such as forward purchasing of inputs use of contract shipping of products having a succession plan farm ownership and location in a metro area this article uses the 2001 agricultural resource management survey arms as well as relative and an absolute measure to assess u s farm households economic well being the relative measure compares the income and wealth position of farm households relative to median income and median wealth of the general population the absolute measure adds annualized wealth to a farm household s income

subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation we investigate the incentive and project screening effects of anonymity in a setting of subjective performance evaluation if the review process is blind then the applicant s payoff relevant type is hidden from the reviewer if the process is nonblind or informed then the reviewer observes the applicant s type directly in either case the evaluator receives a noisy signal on the quality of the agent s project and decides whether to accept or reject it we find that if the signal is not verifiable then informed evaluation results in an excessively steep equilibrium acceptance policy the standard applied to low ability applicants is too stringent and the standard applied to high ability applicants is too lenient blind review in which all applicants face the same standard often provides better incentives but it discards valuable information for screening projects we discover that blind review is more likely to be preferred by the evaluator when 1 the applicant pool is skewed toward high ability types 2 the stakes from acceptance are relatively high for applicants 3 both types of errors are relatively less costly or 4 there is little competition among reviewers we also discover that under blind review the evaluator may benefit from a more diverse applicant pool

mentoring and diversity we study how diversity evolves at a firm with entry level and upper level employees who vary in ability and type gender or ethnicity the ability of entry level employees is increased by mentoring an employ receives more mentoring when more upper level employees have the same type optimal promotions are biased by type and this bias may favor either the minority or the majority we characterize possible steady states including a glass ceiling where the upper level remains less diverse than the entry level a firm may have multiple steady states whereby temporary affirmative action policies have a long run impact

estimating gender differences in access to jobs this paper proposes a new measure of gender differences in access to jobs based on a job assignment model this measure is the probability ratio of getting a job for a female and a male at each rank of the wage ladder we derive a nonparametric estimator of this access measure and estimate it for french full time executives aged 40 45 in the private sector our results show that the gender difference in the probability of getting a job increases along the wage ladder from 9 to 50 females thus have a significantly lower access to high paid jobs than to low paid jobs

incorporating affirmative action into the welfare state abstract in this paper we discuss a novel aspect of affirmative action policy we examine its redistributive role asking whether in an egalitarian society supplementing the tax transfer system with an affirmative action policy would enhance social welfare we demonstrate that affirmative action could be a desirable policy tool even if racial discrimination does not exist in the labor market

the governance of non governmental organizations in uganda summary using original survey data we document the activities resources and governance structure of ngos operating in uganda the ngo sector is funded primarily by international non governmental organizations and bilateral donors we find large differences in size and funding across ngos with only a few ngos attracting most of the funding most ngos are small and underfunded and focus on raising awareness and advocacy few ngos are faith based most screening and monitoring is done by grant agencies some monitoring is also done internally by members and trustees little monitoring is done by government ngos do not file income tax returns and few respondents are able to provide coherent financial accounts

on gender gaps and self fulfilling expectations alternative implications of paid for training i introduction the recent literature on gender differences in the labor market has focused mainly on two issues the first one deals with the mechanisms e g adverse selection that can amplify initial differences in preferences or productivity across genders leading to sizeable gender gaps in wages labor force participation or working hours these models help us understand to what extent changes in gender gaps have been due to changes in fundamentals including differences in the pattern of endogenous accumulation of human capital by men and women 1 the second one is related to the channels explaining persistence in gender gaps even when exogenous differences across the sexes are of little importance or even absent 2 these studies tend to rely upon the existence of incentive problems in the labor market e g moral hazard leading to self fulfilling prophecies about differences in gender roles without assuming any initial comparative advantages our paper falls into this second strand of the literature by considering an alternative mechanism based on statistical discrimination by firms in the provision of paid for training to male and female workers this yields multiplicity of equilibria in gender gaps even in the absence of moral hazard 3 the basic idea in models of gender gaps relying upon self fulfilling prophecies is that employers beliefs about women s lower attachment to the labor market lead to wage differentials in favor of men hence since women expect to face a lower expected opportunity cost they end up devoting more time to housework validating in this way firms beliefs for example albanesi and olivetti 2009 propose a model where firms are subject to incentive compatible constraints due to their imperfect monitoring of workers effort a moral hazard problem and of hours of housework an adverse selection problem as a result different types of labor contracts are offered to men and women in a similar vein lommerud and vagstad 2007 deal with a model where firms allocate workers to fast and slow track jobs the former requiring a fixed investment cost if women have traditionally exerted primary major responsibility at home and wages are non contractible they will predominantly follow a mommy track in equilibrium while incentive problems often used to derive additional predictions on the structure of wages to be confronted with the data provide a useful modeling device they could be somewhat restrictive for instance concerning the difficulty of perfectly monitoring effort pay gaps should be negligible for routine tasks performed by less skilled employees for whom effort and output should be easily observable yet even after removing differences in observable characteristics and in the overall wage dispersion there is evidence about substantial gender gaps in hourly wages in these categories see e g blau and kahn 2000 bassanini and saint martin 2008 de la rica et al 2008 our paper contributes to this literature by proposing a novel mechanism which does not rely on incentive problems we consider a two period model in which firms initially offer paid for training to workers taking as given the division of housework between spouses in the second period spouses decide on how to split the certain and uncertain parts of housework where the latter is captured by the realization of a shock affecting household tasks during this period e g unexpected need of housework or events that require parental leave etc both decisions interact because the housework decision determines whether a spouse works or quits after receiving training and the firm chooses the amount of training without observing the household s housework allocation statistical discrimination arises in this setup as a result of firms prior beliefs about which spouse is more likely to quit the job under the key assumptions that wages are predetermined with respect to housework shocks and that the household does not re optimize after the shock is revealed asymmetric beliefs will induce differences in the provision of training across spouses

mommy tracks and public policy on self fulfilling prophecies and gender gaps in hiring and promotion abstract consider a model with two types of jobs the profitability of hiring a worker to a fast track job depends not only on his or her observable talent but also on incontractible effort we investigate whether self fulfilling expectations may lead to higher hiring or promotion standards for women if employers expect women to do more household work than men thereby exerting less effort in their paid job then women must be more talented to make it profitable to hire them specialization in the family will then result in women doing most of the household work such self fulfilling prophecies can be defeated by affirmative action or family policy however it is unlikely that temporary policy can move the economy to a symmetric equilibrium policy must be made permanent anti discrimination policy need not enhance efficiency and from a distribution viewpoint this is a policy with both winners and losers

social culture and economic performance the connection between obtaining higher paying jobs and undertaking some seemingly irrelevant activity is interpreted as social culture in the context of a society trying to adopt a new technology i show that by allowing the firms to give preferential treatment to workers based on some cultural activity the society can partially overcome an informational free riding problem therefore social culture may affect the economic performance by altering the effective production technology of the economy jel p17 z1 what is social culture what is the role of social culture in economic performance in a provocative article kenneth arrow 1971 argued that norms of social behavior including ethical and moral codes are reactions of society to compensate for market failure somewhat surprisingly this idea of the role of social culture has not been further pursued in the literature in this paper i take arrow s viewpoint seriously and construct a simple model to examine the possibility that social culture may alleviate market failure i consider a society that is deciding whether to adopt a new technology three important assumptions are made about the economy first adoption decisions are made by entrepreneurs or firms but the operators of the new technology are workers second the new technology can be successfully operated only when the worker has invested in some imperfectly observable requisite skills and third it is costly for the workers

the evolution of managerial expertise how corporate culture can run amok this paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital investments and hiring individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can evaluate dynamically when workers become managers managerial expertise can become increasingly skewed over time raising investment distortions and reducing output if firms select managerial expertise strategically efficient investments can be retrieved when a identifying whether workers skills matter more than distinguishing among skilled workers and b initial investment distortions are small otherwise such strategic design worsens long run outcomes finally we determine when short run affirmative action policies are effective

the dynamics of statistical discrimination this article demonstrates how learning dynamics select among equilibria in a statistical discrimination model of employment the static market model exhibits multiple equilibria the belief revision dynamics generate a markov market process which in the long run is mostly near one and only one of the static equilibria regardless of initial conditions usually policy effects appear in comparative statics where the equilibrium set moves with different policies but here policy is also seen to effect which equilibrium is selected even when it has no comparative statics effect at all social scientists have identified self fulfilling expectations as an important source of discrimination in labour markets and other social exchanges various theories highlight the role of negative racial attitudes in creating social outcomes that in turn help to perpetuate the initial beliefs in this account discriminatory outcomes appear as an equilibrium of beliefs and behaviour among sociologists merton 1948 is one source for this view 1 a similar view of discrimination was put forward by myrdal 1944 who referred to an equilibrium of beliefs and behaviour as the principle of cumulation and less abstractly as the vicious circle myrdal observes that social systems may have multiple equilibria and that different equilibria may be more or less robust to perturbations remedial policies he notes might work by destabilising one equilibrium in favour of another

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

pride and prejudice using ethnic sounding names and inter ethnic marriages to identify labour market discrimination labour markets discriminate against workers with particular ethnic sounding names we use non random sorting into interethnic marriage and salient differences between sephardic and ashkenazi surnames to evaluate the causal impact of sephardic affiliation on wages using the 1995 israeli census we estimate the effect of a sephardic sounding surname on wages we first compare the wages of israeli jewish males born to sephardic fathers and ashkenazi mothers sa who are more likely to carry a sephardic surname with the wages of israeli jewish males born to ashkenazi fathers and sephardic mothers as we find that israeli labor markets discriminate based on perceived ethnicity sa workers earn significantly less than their as counterparts we then exploit the custom of women to adopt their husbands surnames to disentangle actual ethnicity from the ethnicity perceived by the market consistent with ethnic discrimination based on surnames we find that it is father in law s ethnicity rather than father s ethnicity that shapes female wage rates finally we find that labor markets discriminate based on surname only when those names provide additional information about ethnicity when ethnicity can be discerned from skin tone surnames do not provide additional explanatory power with respect to wages

an equilibrium search matching model of discrimination abstract a model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical groups which are discriminated against e g blacks women earn lower wages and endure longer unemployment spells

cultural transmission and discrimination workers can have good or bad work habits these traits are transmitted from one generation to the next through a learning and imitation process which depends on parents investment in the trait and the social environment where children live if a sufficiently high proportion of employers have taste based prejudices against minority workers we show that their prejudices are always self fulfilled in steady state and minority workers end up having on average worse work habits than majority workers this leads to a ghetto culture affirmative action can improve the welfare of minorities whereas integration can be beneficial to minority workers but detrimental to workers from the majority group

strategic gains from discrimination abstract according to a classical argument an employer handicaps herself if basing hiring decisions on factors unrelated to productivity therefore discrimination is undermined by competition this paper in contrast argues that being discriminatory can be a commitment device that helps an employer and its rivals to partially segment the labor market which leads to lower wages and higher profits discrimination can thus be an endogenous response to competition indeed the relationship between discrimination and competition can be non monotone moreover the logic suggests that a ban on wage discrimination may instead lead to discrimination in hiring

matching with interviews abstract this paper explores how interviews affect the matching process when worker productivity is private information wages are determined by a single round of strategic bargaining after the worker is interviewed the implications of this hiring process for the efficiency of matching and the incidence and severity of statistical discrimination are considered the better are firms at identifying productive workers the worse the average quality of the unemployment pool so interviewing tends to slow down matching for every one multiple pareto rankable equilibria are possible such that any social group in a bad equilibrium faces stricter hiring standards longer spells of unemployment and lower welfare

asymmetric tournaments equal opportunity laws and affirmative action some experimental results this paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents more precisely we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator usually the firm the effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group s cost disadvantage when the cost disadvantage is severe these programs significantly increase effort levels and hence profits the opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight

to be or not to be stereotypes identity choice and group inequality abstract we extend a model of stereotyping by allowing agents to exert control over their perceived identities the logic of individuals identity choices induces a positive selection of the more talented individuals into a group with a superior reputation thus the inequality deriving from the stereotyping of endogenously constructed groups can be greater than the inequality that can emerge when perceived identity is not malleable moreover when identity manipulation is sufficiently easier to undertake an equality across social groups may not be achievable even with strong egalitarian interventions among the human behaviors illuminated by this theory are 1 the selective out migration from a stigmatized group and 2 the production of the indices of differentiation by better off members of the negatively stereotyped group we also examine the welfare implications of these identity manipulation activities

affirmative action and the utilization of minority and women owned businesses in highway procurement i introduction affirmative action programs in public procurement are among the more important government programs intended to advance self employment opportunities for minorities and women in 2002 6 75 of federal procurement dollars were awarded to disadvantaged business enterprises dbes through the small business administration and preferential treatment for minority firms is a common feature of many state and local government agencies recent court decisions and state measures have reduced the scope of and in some settings eliminated affirmative action programs based on race or gender which has given renewed importance to understanding the role of affirmative action in the success of self employed minorities and women the use of affirmative action is particularly widespread in the highway procurement industry since the late 1970s and early 1980s most states have employed affirmative action to award contracts to minority owned firms and since 1982 the federal highway administration fhwa has required states use affirmative action in awarding projects using federal funds in 1998 states awarded 14 6 billion of construction and repair contracts using federal funds of which 1 9 billion was awarded to firms owned by minorities and women as blanchflower and wainright 2005 note in the intervening years states have increasingly been able to use race neutral measures to meet goals which has had an adverse effect on utilization of minority owned firms understanding the effects of affirmative action in this industry is made important by the significance of the public sector according to the 2002 census of industries 72 6 of the revenue earned by firms in the highway street and bridge construction industry was from government owned projects as a result changes in public procurement policy will have a strong effect on firms in the highway construction industry despite the importance of affirmative action in this industry our understanding of the effects of these programs is limited states generally use percentage goals for the participation of minority owned subcontractors by prime contractors past research has established the response of dbe utilization to large episodic changes in affirmative action such as the elimination by certain states or cities of affirmative action programs blanchflower and wainright 2005 however little evidence exists regarding the intensive margin of affirmative action in public procurement that is as participation goals are raised or lowered what is the response of the utilization of dbes generally and minority and women owned firms specifically higher dbe goals do not necessarily raise the utilization of firms owned by minorities and women for two reasons first the dbe goal may not be binding in which case the marginal effect of small changes to the goal would be zero second goals for the utilization of dbes are often not perfectly enforced for instance a contractor facing a requirement to subcontract a fraction of a contract to dbes can skirt this requirement by documenting a good faith effort to employ firms owned by minorities and women the goal of this paper is to provide new evidence regarding the effectiveness of affirmative action programs in highway procurement at increasing purchases from firms owned by minorities and women two sources of variation are employed to answer this question the first is variation in dbe goals across states over time and the second is variation across projects within a state i begin by examining state level data regarding affirmative action goals and dbe utilization over the entire history of the fhwa s affirmative action program i utilize changes in affirmative action goals over time within states to identify the effect of affirmative action intensity on the level of dbe purchases i find that increasing goals for the utilization of dbe goals substantially raise the utilization of minority owned business enterprises mbes

racial realism a review essay on john skrentny s after civil rights in his valuable contribution after civil rights john skrentny shows that in many sectors of the labor market race is used in ways that were unanticipated when the 1964 civil rights act was enacted with separate chapters on the professions and business the public sector media and entertainment and the low skill market he demonstrates that the new racial realism is widespread generally has some justification from social scientific research and is usually inconsistent with judicial decisions i review the racially realistic practices racial matching increasing diversity racial signaling and racial characteristics and discuss their implications for labor economics and for policy

conspicuous consumption and race using nationally representative data on consumption we show that blacks and hispanics devote larger shares of their expenditure bundles to visible goods clothing jewelry and cars than do comparable whites these differences exist among virtually all subpopulations are relatively constant over time and are economically large although racial differences in utility preference parameters might account for a portion of these consumption differences we emphasize instead a model of status seeking in which conspicuous consumption is used as a costly indicator of a household s economic position using merged data on race and state level income we demonstrate that a key prediction of the status signaling model that visible consumption should be declining in reference group income is strongly borne out in the data for each racial group moreover we show that accounting for differences in reference group income characteristics explains most of the racial difference in visible consumption

affirmative action and labor markets affirmative action remains controversial the controversy extends from the original antidiscrimination legislation and its interpretation to estimates of affirmative action s effect on the labor market this paper provides a progress report on our recent efforts at detecting the effects of affirmative action on minority wages and employment although we find a substantial increase in wages for black men and black women over our sample period the timing of these wage changes is surprising most of the wage gains came prior to 1974 before the establishment of an effective monitoring structure for affirmative action indeed when the powers of the eeoc and ofcc are greatest the wage effects for young blacks are somewhat perverse using eeo 1 reports we find a major shift in black employment toward firms most vulnerable to the monitoring and potential sanctions of the affirmative action programs as with wages the shift in minority employment came prior to the expansion of the powers and budgets of the ee

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

statistical discrimination with peer effects can integration eliminate negative stereotypes we introduce peer effects in the costs of human capital acquisition into a model of statistical dis crimination in labour markets this creates a link between the level of segregation in social networks and racial disparities in job assignment and wages we show that this relationship is characterized by disconti nuities there is a threshold level of segregation below which negative stereotypes become unsustainable and steady state skill levels can change dramatically this change can work in either direction skill levels may either rise or fall in both groups vvtiich of these outcomes arises depends on the population share of the disadvantaged group and on the distribution of the costs of human capital investments we also examine the effects of affirmative action policies in the presence of peer effects and provide conditions under which such policies eliminate negative stereotypes

does affirmative action work caste gender college quality and academic success in india public policy in modern india features affirmative action programs intended to reduce inequality that stems from a centuries old caste structure and history of disparate treatment by gender we study the effects of one such affirmative action program an admissions policy that fixes percentage quotas common across more than 200 engineering colleges for disadvantaged castes and for women we show that the program increases college attendance of targeted students particularly at relatively higher quality institutions an important concern is that affirmative action might harm intended beneficiaries by placing them in academic programs for which they are ill prepared we find no evidence of such adverse impacts

collective reputation and the dynamics of statistical discrimination previous literature on statistical discrimination explained stereotypes based on the existence of multiple equilibria in which principals have difierent self conflrming beliefs about difierent social groups arrow 1973 coate and loury 1993 however the literature has not provided an account of where the principals prior beliefs come from moreover the static models dominating the literature do not ofier relevant information about the dynamic paths that lead to each equilibrium this paper develops a dynamic version of statistical discrimination in which economic players forwardlooking behaviors determine the dynamic paths to each equilibrium deflning group reputation as the objective information shared by principals regarding the average characteristics of agents belonging to each group this study identifles groups as advantaged or disadvantaged based on their initial reputation states and provides conditions by which a group can switch from one reputation state to another by understanding this dynamic structure of reputation evolution we examine the strategy that well coordinated principals may voluntarily utilize to maximize their proflts helping the group in the reputation trap to improve its skill investment rate

human capital true love and gender roles is sex destiny abstract we assume optimal specialization in the nuclear family involves one partner doing homework and the other wagework basic human capital for one or the other is imparted to individuals through early childhood training mates are chosen on the basis of noneconomic criteria true love because love strikes randomly after basic human capital is acquired a coordination problem arises in choosing complementary specializations even with no discrimination there exist equilibria characterized by gender roles perfect correlation between sex and family roles there may also exist other equilibria in which the correlation between sex and family roles is imperfect and individuals are trained by aptitude we rank the equilibria when they coexist and demonstrate that affirmative action policies can increase average welfare by eliminating some equilibria the analysis is conducted in a framework which characterizes individuals by training by aptitude and by family role in a 2 2 2 model in this framework we formalize the equality of the sexes as well as the relative importance of nature versus nurture and various types of training

estimating a dynamic adverse selection model labour force experience and the changing gender earnings gap 1968 1997 this paper addresses two questions what accounts for the gender gap in labour market outcomes what are the driving forces behind the changes in the gender labour market outcomes over the period 1968 1997 it formulates a dynamic general equilibrium model of labour supply occupational sorting and human capital accumulation in which gender discrimination and an earnings gap arise endogenously it uses this model to quantify the driving forces behind the decline in the gender earnings gap and the increase in female labour force participation the proportion of women working in professional occupations and hours worked it finds that labour market experience is the most important factor explaining the gender earnings gap in addition statistical discrimination accounts for a large fraction of the observed gender earnings gap and its decline it also finds that a large increase in aggregate productivity in professional occupations plays a major role in the increase in female labourforce participation number of hours worked and the proportion of females working in professional occupations although of less importance demographic changes account for a substantial part of the increase in female labour force participation and hours worked whereas home production technology shocks do not

human capital adaptive ability and the distributional implications of agricultural policy the ability to adapt efficiently to an economic environment that has been altered in a specific way may be a scarce resource in agriculture schultz 1 the setting that i wish to focus upon is one in which farmers face uncertainty about the future course of events production technologies prices and governmental policies and production is dynamic a large share of inputs is purchased from the nonfarm sector and a significant share of output is exported information is available on past realizations of events storing and analyzing information is costly consequently farmers are not assumed to have complete information farmers are assumed to differ in their adaptive ability which is viewed as a form of human capital and to employ efficiently the information that they acquire the thesis of this paper is that adaptive ability is unimportant when the processes generating the variables which farmers take as exogenous are stationary and unaltered however when these processes undergo structural change adaptive ability is expected to affect the quality of production marketing and investment decisions farmers who have superior adaptive skills are expected on average to make better decisions furthermore given the highly competitive nature of u s agriculture successfully adapting to structural change is selective farmers possessing poor adaptive skill can be expected to comprise a relatively large share of the persons forced by economic circumstances to seek alternative employment or retirement provided governmental intervention does not neutralize this selection process when farmers make production marketing and investment plans their decision rules can be expected to incorporate the anticipated values of uncertain variables that are exogeous to their choices the unanticipated components of these exogenous variables however may confuse them and reduce the efficiency of otherwise good plans 2 when shocks occur because of domestic or foreign macroeconomic policy u s agriculture is saddled with transmitting business cycle disturbances

the impact of the london bombings on the well being of adolescent muslims we exploit the timing of the london bombings coinciding with a large scale national survey of adolescents to identify the impact of extremist islamic terror attacks on the well being of adolescent muslims our analysis reveals interesting gender differences we find evidence of a decline in the happiness of muslim teenage girls after the bombings which is also accompanied by a rise in expectations of facing discrimination in the labour market these findings are robust to several falsification tests on the other hand we fail to uncover compelling evidence of any impact of the bombings on muslim teenage boys

minorities and endogenous segregation a theoretical analysis is proposed of segregation as an equilibrium phenomenon in a randommatching model of the marriage market otherwise identical partners possess a pay off irrelevant characteristic colour we derive the set of colour blind equilibria and show that they are generically constrained inefficient equilibrium segregation strategies are strategies that condition actions on the type of match it is shown that distributions of types exist such that segregation equilibrium pay offs pareto dominate colour blind pay offs for other distributions segregation also generates conflict where the majority unambiguously gains while the minority group may lose giving preferential treatment that is minority bias can increase overall welfare

the slowdown of the economics publishing process over the last three decades there has been a dramatic slowdown of the publication process at top economics journals a substantial part is due to journals requiring more extensive revisions various explanations are considered democratization of the review process increases in the complexity of papers growth of the profession and cost and benefit arguments changes in the profession are examined using time series data connections between these changes and the slowdown are examined using paper level data there is evidence for some explanations but most of the slowdown remains unexplained changes may reflect evolving social norms

the enforcement of equal opportunity laws under imperfect information affirmative action and alternatives more than twenty years have passed since the enactment of the civil rights act during that period the enforcement of title vii with its broad prohibition of discrimination in employment and compensation has proved to be both difficult and controversial as part of any attempt to regulate economic activity we must be able to observe violations but unequal treatment in employment relationships is difficult to identify employers must always differentiate between individuals when making hiring and promotion decisions since applicants possess diverse skills and abilities this diversity creates a fundamental problem in monitoring the compliance or noncompliance of employers with equal opportunity laws this paper examines the enforcement of equal opportunity laws in a labor market that exhibits statistical discrimination this type of discrimination may arise as a rational response by profitmaximizing firms to imperfect information about individual productivity in lundberg and startz 1983 an equal opportunity policy prohibiting raceor sex specific wage schedules was shown to be an efficiency enhancing response to statistical discrimination section ii extends this model to allow information a role in allocating heterogeneous workers among jobs in this environment restricting firms use of information through an equal opportunity policy improves workers incentives to acquire human capital at the expense of production losses and its net effect on efficiency becomes ambiguous firms will attempt to evade an equal opportunity law presenting the government and the courts with the task of monitoring and enforcing compliance the regulators are likely to possess imperfect information not only about the relationship between worker characteristics and productivity but also about the actual personnel policies followed by firms in section iii a simple costminimizing evasion policy for firms in which other worker attributes are used as imperfect proxies for race or sex is outlined in the next two sections alternative policies for enforcing compliance

job discrimination market forces and the invisibility hypothesis the invisibility hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem then at a competitive labor market equilibrium firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low level jobs consequently those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability as a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers

can gender quotas break down negative stereotypes evidence from changes in electoral rules abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of gender quotas on women s involvement in political activity by using a rich data set providing information on all italian local administrators who were elected from 1985 to 2007 gender quotas were introduced by law in italy in 1993 and were in force until 1995 because of the short period covered by the reform some municipalities never voted under the gender quota regime this allows us to identify a treatment and a control group and to estimate the effects of gender quotas by using a difference in differences estimation strategy our estimates show that women s representation in politics after the reform increased significantly more in municipalities that were affected by the reform than in municipalities that were not affected this result also holds true if we exclude from our analysis elections which took place during the period in which the reform was in force moreover the higher women s representation in gender quota municipalities is not related to the advantages that women who were elected during the reform have obtained from incumbency and does not seem to be driven by differences in temporal trends between southern and northern regions these findings suggest that affirmative actions can be of use in breaking down stereotypes against women

does job testing harm minority workers evidence from retail establishments because minorities typically fare poorly on standardized tests job testing is thought to pose an equality efficiency trade off testing improves selection but reduces minority hiring we develop a conceptual framework to assess when this trade off is likely to apply and evaluate the evidence for such a trade off using hiring and productivity data from a national retail firm whose 1 363 stores switched from informal to test based worker screening over the course of one year we document that testing yielded more productive hires at this firm raising mean and median tenure by 10 or more consistent with prior research minorities performed worse on the test yet testing had no measurable impact on minority hiring and productivity gains were uniformly large among minority and nonminority hires these results suggest that job testing raised the precision of screening without introducing additional negative information about minority applicants most plausibly because both the job test and the informal screen that preceded it were unbiased

promotion signaling discrimination and positive discrimination policies this article studies discrimination in a model in which promotions are used as signals of worker ability the model can account for statistical and taste based discrimination in the short run a positive discrimination policy is beneficial for workers in the middle of the ability distribution because these workers are promoted if and only if the policy is in place instead workers of either high or low ability suffer from the policy in the long run the policy benefits all targeted workers the model can explain empirical findings about the effects of a gender quota on the boards of norwegian companies

self selection and the earnings of immigrants this paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate the empirical study shows that differences in the u s earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills but from different home countries are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration excerpt

displacement asymmetric information and heterogeneous human capital gibbons and katz s asymmetric information model of the labor market predicts that wage losses following displacement should be larger for layoffs than for plant closings this was borne out in their empirical work in this article we examine how the difference in wage losses across plant closing and layoff varies with race and gender we find that the basic prediction by gibbons and katz holds only for white males we augment their asymmetric information model with heterogeneous human capital and show that this augmented model can match the data

discrimination and assimilation at school abstract i present a theory of assimilation among students of two different backgrounds with unequal status students with a disadvantaged background face an incentive to assimilate into the more advantaged group the advantaged group chooses the cost of assimilation strategically to screen those who seek to assimilate in equilibrium only the most skilled disadvantaged students assimilate this theory provides a novel explanation of the acting white problem acting white refers to a social phenomenon in which students from disadvantaged ethnicities suffer social sanctions if they obtain good grades these sanctions raise the cost of acquiring the skills that make it easier to assimilate disadvantaged students with low ability impose these sanctions in order to induce their more able co ethnics to stay in the disadvantaged group

discrimination and job uncertainty abstract in this paper i incorporate group behaviour into a model of the labour market and show that discrimination can be the result of competition between coalitions of workers and bosses for jobs if the probability of correctly assessing the productivity of individual workers decreases coalition formation on the basis of recognisable characteristics becomes relatively more rewarding than coalition forming on the basis of productivity the conditions are under which each individual in the endogeneously defined group actively discriminates persons with different recognisable characteristics independent of productivity

social identity and preferences social identities prescribe behaviors for people we identify the marginal behavioral effect of these norms on discount rates and risk aversion by measuring how laboratory subjects choices change when an aspect of social identity is made salient when we make ethnic identity salient to asian american subjects they make more patient choices when we make racial identity salient to black subjects non immigrant blacks but not immigrant blacks make more patient choices making gender identity salient has no effect on intertemporal or risk choices

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

public policy in a model of long term unemployment this paper considers a model in which the unemployed have to incur a cost to maintain their skills if whether they have done so is not observable the economy has multiple equilibria supported by self fulfilling beliefs on the part of the employers one of these equilibria which we argue is more likely to arise has equilibrium discrimination against the long term unemployed who in response decide to let their skills atrophy as a result in this equilibrium the exit probabilities from unemployment are duration dependent it is shown that equilibrium discrimination survives even if workers are allowed to accept negative wages at the beginning of the employment relation since this equilibrium is highly inefficient constructive government action in the form of positive discrimination subsidies and labour market policies are suggested to correct the market failures however subsidies and positive discrimination by private firms are shown not to have beneficial effects labour market policies in the form of retraining of the long term unemployed are beneficial but reduce the likelihood of a switch to the pareto preferred equilibrium the most useful policy appears to be a limited form of positive discrimination by a government sector

college assignment as a large contest abstract we develop a model of college assignment as a large contest wherein students with heterogeneous learning costs compete for seats at vertically differentiated colleges through the acquisition of productive human capital we use a continuum model to approximate the outcomes of a game with large but finite sets of colleges and students the continuum approximation lends tractability to a rich model for studying investment incentives in rank order competitions by incorporating two common families of affirmative action mechanisms into our model admissions preferences and quotas we can show that legal admissions preference schemes and illegal quotas have the same sets of equilibria including identical outcomes and investment strategies

does banning affirmative action lower college student quality banning affirmative action from college admissions cannot prevent an admissions office that cares about diversity from achieving it in ways other than explicitly considering race we model college admissions where candidates from two groups with different average quali cations compete for a xed number of seats under affirmative action an admissions office that cares both about quality and diversity admits the best quali ed candidates from each group under a ban it may promote diversity by partially ignoring candidates quali cations and therefore not admitting the best quali ed candidates from either group a ban always reduces diversity and may also lower quality jel j71 j 15 i28

incentives for discrimination this paper models employers incentives for discrimination against ex ante identical groups of workers when the workers must compete for a limited number of positions employers benefit from discrimination against minority workers because it can reduce the overall risk from workers noisy signals by increasing the expected quality of majority workers and their chance to win the competition for the limited number of positions we show that employers can influence the selection of a discriminatory equilibrium by choosing the set of finalists in competition primarily from a majority group and favoring them when the two groups are equally qualified we discuss the implications of equal opportunity laws in this context

the impact of agricultural policy on farm income concentration the case of regional implementation of the cap direct payments in italy one of the objectives of agricultural policy worldwide concerns the support of farm income common agricultural policy direct payments dps are the main instruments to support farm income in the european union this article addresses their role in the concentration of farm income this is done by calculating the gini coefficient and its disaggregation in a large sample of italian farms in the period between 2006 and 2007 although this approach has been used to develop ex post analysis in previous studies this article is innovative given that it is used here in an ex ante analysis aimed at evaluating the likely impact of a recent reform proposal this latter requests changing the current model to a regional model of dps application to make payment rates i e payment per hectare homogeneous among farms in the same region the analysis shows that dps and farm incomes are both very concentrated but that dps allow for an income concentration reduction in italian farms the shift to a regional implementation reduces dps concentration and to a limited extent farm income concentration of the considered regionalization scenarios those that redistribute dps among regions are the most effective in reducing concentration the extension of the gini considered approach to anexante setting seems effective because it provides insights that could feed the policy debate regarding the forthcoming reform jel classifications q12 q18 d31

customer discrimination and affirmative action i introduction beginning with the work of becker 1957 economists have been concerned with the relationship between competitive market forces and the persistence of labor market discrimination 1 a major insight of becker and the literature that followed is that competition could tend to eliminate discriminatory pay differentials if competitive forces do eliminate discrimination then empirical findings of persistent discrimination are either a result of faulty testing or market imperfections economic analysis of the link between competition and discrimination depends on the origins of prejudice becker identified at least three possible sources employers co workers and consumers 2 in each of these instances the group against which prejudice is directed e g women or minorities which will be termed minorities in this paper may be able to escape discrimination first minorities can work for nondiscriminatory employers if there are any moreover stiglitz 1973 shows that with constant returns to scale such employers will take over markets from the discriminators eliminating any pay gap based on prejudice 3 second if there is co worker prejudice then minorities can work in segregated firms which under constant returns to scale may have a cost advantage over integrated or all majority firms again discrimination will be driven away 4 third minorities can theoretically escape customer discrimination by specializing in the production of goods for which there is no contact between producers and consumers a case discussed by cain 1986 while competitive forces may in some cases erode discriminatory wage differentials the rate of decline of race and sex wage differentials has evidently not been rapid enough in the eyes of policymakers u s anti discrimination policy has been guided by two major vehicles title vii of the 1964 civil rights act and the office of federal contract compliance programs ofccp 5 the equal employment opportunity commission eeoc was created to enforce title vii and is empowered to aid plaintiffs or bring suit itself against employers the commission monitors the employment practices of federal contractors not only are contractors barred from discrimination against protected groups these firms are also required to take affirmative action not to discriminate the purpose of this paper is twofold first it demonstrates that in a general equilibrium framework the case of customer discrimination is theoretically distinct from employer or co worker prejudice in particular while constant returns to scale and the existence of nondiscriminatory firms can eliminate the latter two forms of discrimination customer discrimination may persist even under such conditions the persistence of discriminatory wage differentials is shown to depend on consumer demand technology and the relative size of the minority labor force 6 second the general equilibrium framework is then used to evaluate the impact of government anti discrimination policy where customers are the source of discrimination it is shown that if the government requires equal pay and proportional representation for minorities then the resulting allocation of resources will under particular assumptions be the same as if customers did not discriminate i then contrast these theoretical results with the predicted general equilibrium impact of affirmative action when there is employer or co worker prejudice among previous general equilibrium models of affirmative action welch 1976 assumed no discrimination while freeman 1978 did not specify the source of discrimination it is shown here that the source of prejudice markedly affects one s conclusions about affirmative action further even in some cases where segregation has eliminated discriminatory wage differentials the introduction of affirmative action has allocative effects finally evidence from studies evaluating the impact of affirmative action is used to distinguish among the various equilibrium models

measurement of inequality by components of farm household consumption expenditures inequality in consumption levels of families both nationally and internationally has been studied by theil however empirical studies that measure inequality in farm household consumption to our knowledge have not been performed this study measures inequality in farm household consumption in addition the study also measures inequality in consumption based on farm typology and farming region results from this analysis show consumption inequality among farm households is lower than consumption inequality among all other households results indicate that other expenditures component has the highest inequality and food and household supplies component has the lowest inequality further farm typology has information about difference in consumption expenditures the typology is informative when it comes to the components of consumption while the regional decomposition is not

a general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination we study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium the interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium the dominant group gains from discrimination rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination the model is also consistent with reverse discrimination as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity

the distribution of income and wealth of farm operator households because of the relatively low incomes of people associated with farming in the past income maintenance has been a major focus of farm policy the average money income of families earning farm self employment income in 1983 was 93 of the average money income of other u s families usdc however an average income of farm households has lost much of its meaning because it masks a great deal of variation compared to the past farm households represent a heterogenous population presenting a new challenge to policy makers concerned about framing income maintenance policies the current farm bill debate began in 1984 amidst piecemeal information on increased bankruptcies and general financial stress of farms analysis of the financial leverage and cash flow positions of farm businesses has since been forthcoming johnson baum and prescott however information on the financial well being of those households associated with farming has remained limited the purpose of this paper is to describe the financial well being of farm operator households by measuring their size distribution of personal income and farm equity in 1984 the contribution of each source of income to the total inequality of incomes is also analyzed

the impact of coupled and decoupled government subsidies on off farm labor participation of u s farm operators with the 1996 farm act the united states introduced payments that were designed to be decoupled labor allocation choices are likely to be affected by receipt of payments and income from off farm jobs has been the major source of income for most farm households for sometime this article examines whether the 1996 change has affected the off farm labor participation of farm households we conclude that the observed increase in off farm participation of farm operators who received payments was not the result of the 1996 policy change government payments whether coupled or decoupled have a negative effect on off farm labor participation

socially gainful gender quotas abstract we study the impact of gender quotas on the acquisition of human capital we assume that individuals formation of human capital is influenced by the prospect of landing high pay top positions and that these positions are regulated by gender specific quotas in the absence of quotas women consider their chances of getting top positions to be lower than men s the lure of top positions induces even men of relatively low ability to engage in human capital formation whereas women of relatively high ability do not expect to get top positions and do not therefore engage in human capital formation gender quotas discourage men who are less efficient in forming human capital and encourage women who are more efficient in forming human capital we provide a condition under which the net result of the institution of gender quotas is an increase in human capital in the economy as a whole

a sceptic s comment on the study of economics a survey was carried out among two groups of undergraduate economics students and four groups of students in mathematics law philosophy and business administration the main survey question involved a conflict between profit maximisation and the welfare of the workers who would be fired to achieve it significant differences were found between the choices of the groups the results were reinforced by a survey conducted among readers of an israeli business newspaper and phd students of harvard it is argued that the overly mathematical methods used to teach economics encourage students to lean towards profit maximisation

comments on economic models economics and economists remarks on economics rules by dani rodrik this essay reviews dani rodrik s superb book economics rules and argues that it can serve as an ideal platform for discussing what economists can and should accomplish the essay comments on some of the major issues in contemporary economics examined in the book whether economics is a science the meaning of economic models the nature of facts in economics and others it also touches on issues that the book overlooks such as the sociology of the profession the teaching curriculum in economics and the dismal situation of publishing in economics

statistical discrimination productivity and the height of immigrants building on the economic research that demonstrates a positive relationship between height and worker ability the author compares wage returns to height for immigrants and for natives to explore possible explanations for the positive wage height gradient using multiple data sets the article presents a robust empirical finding that the wage gains associated with height are almost twice as large for immigrants as for native born individuals this wage relationship occurs because the productivity gap between tall and short immigrants is greater than the productivity gap between tall and short native born workers the author next tests for the possibility that in the relative absence of other sources of information about immigrants employers place more importance on height for immigrants than for native born individuals the evidence does not support the hypothesis of statistical discrimination based on height

does equal pay legislation reduce labour market inequality this paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality when the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely however with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before profits of discriminating firms might increase and discrimination can persist in the long run although it would have disappeared without the policy

affirmative action in a competitive economy abstract we consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium in the presence of two distinguishable but ex ante identical groups of workers an affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may fail in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently however the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilibrium is the most discriminatory equilibrium in the model without the policy the welfare effects are ambiguous it is possible that the policy makes the intended beneficiaries worse off even if the starting point is the most discriminatory equilibrium the expected payoff may decrease for all agents in the target group

a cure for discrimination affirmative action and the case of california s proposition 209 proposition 209 enacted in california in 1996 and made effective the following year ended state affirmative action programs not only in education but also for public employment and government contracting this paper uses cps data and triple difference techniques to take advantage of the natural experiment presented by this change in state law to gauge the labor market impacts of ending affirmative action programs employment among women and minorities dropped sharply a change that was nearly completely explained by a decline in participation rather than by increases in unemployment this decline suggests that either affirmative action programs in california had been inefficient or that they failed to create lasting change in prejudicial attitudes

an empirical analysis of acting white abstract using a newly available data set which allows one to construct a novel measure of a student s social status we demonstrate that there are potentially important racial differences in the relationship between social status and academic achievement the effect is concentrated among students with a grade point average gpa of 3 5 or higher and more pronounced in schools with more interracial contact earlier studies showing a positive relationship between popularity and academic achievement for blacks are sensitive to the inclusion of more continuous achievement measures we argue that the data are most consistent with a model of acting white in which investments in education are taken as a signal of one s opportunity costs of peer group loyalty though imprecise estimates make definitive conclusions difficult

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided

biased screening and discrimination in the labor market the traditional economic analysis of discrimination is based on gary becker s study of taste discrimination by employers employees and consumers more recent work by kenneth arrow 1972 1973 has attempted to interpret intergroup wage differences in an alternative framework as a rational reaction to uncertainty in labor markets his model of statistical discrimination demonstrates that when the screening process used to determine a worker s qualifications is costly and prior expectations of productivity differ across race or sex groups then wage differentials may arise between workers of identical productivity by implicitly assuming a perfect screening process arrow ignores a potentially important source of wage differentials namely the fact that the screening process might be a more reliable predictor of productivity for one group than for another our paper generalizes the arrow model in two ways first in contrast to arrow we assume that all groups have identical distributions of productivity secondly the screening process used by the firm to determine an applicant s productivity is biased in the sense that a members of various groups may pass the test in different proportions despite their identical productivity distributions and b the predictive power of the test might vary across groups our objective is to analyze the effects of these types of biases in the screening process on the wage differentials between different population groups

gender and job performance evidence from wall street this study concerns the relationship between gender and job performance among brokerage firm equity analysts women s representation in analyst positions dropped from 16 percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 2005 the study found significant gender based differences in performance on various dimensions for example women cover roughly 9 stocks on average as compared with 10 for men and women s earnings estimates tend to be less accurate than men s estimates but the study also found that women are significantly more likely than men to be designated as all stars which indicates that they outperform men in other aspects of job performance

the incentive effects of affirmative action in a real effort tournament abstract affirmative action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for its implementation affects the underlying incentive structure which might induce lower performance by participants and additionally result in a selected pool of tournament winners that is less efficient in this paper we study the empirical validity of such concerns in a case where the disadvantage affects capacities to compete we conducted real effort tournaments between pairs of children from two similar schools who systematically differed in how much training they received ex ante on the task at hand contrary to the expressed concerns our results show that the implementation of affirmative action did not result in a significant performance loss for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects instead it rather enhanced the performance for a large group of participants moreover affirmative action resulted in a more equitable tournament winner pool where half of the selected tournament winners came from the originally disadvantaged group hence the negative selection effects due to the biased tournament rules were at least partially offset by performance enhancing incentive effects

trade credit in zimbabwean manufacturing abstract credit from suppliers is an important but often neglected source of finance for manufacturing firms zimbabwe is no exception unlike credit from financial institutions trade credit does not rely on formal collateral but on trust and reputation contract enforcement is flexible network effects and statistical discrimination affect the screening of trade credit applicants black entrepreneurs are disadvantaged by their lack of business contacts and by the difficulty of distinguishing themselves from the mass of financially insecure and short lived african owned businesses in zimbabwe a vicious circle is created between weak financial base unreliability as a debtor and inability to gain access to credit