an experimental investigation of the hahn noll revenue neutral auction for emissions licenses abstract this paper reports on three series of laboratory experiments designed to test the performance of the hahn noll revenue neutral auction rna an alternative institution a no rebate uniform price auction upa is also examined as a benchmark in these experiments the rna markets were little different from upa markets in terms of either prices or market efficiencies the two institutions did differ in terms of the distribution of the gains from exchange and of the propensity of bidders to engage in a certain type of overbidding

market behavior in bid offer and double auctions abstract this study examines the robustness of the previously observed smith 1964 differences in market behavior between double auctions both buyers and sellers may enter price quotes bid auctions only buyers may enter price quotes and offer auctions only sellers may enter price quotes based on the results of twenty one market experiments we find little support for the a priori hypothesis that bid auction prices tend to be greater than double auction prices which tend to be greater than offer auction prices

the impact of endowment framing on market prices an experimental analysis framing effects are well known in individual decision making using experimental markets we investigated whether similar effects could be found in a market environment two series of experiments showed that negative framing can give different market prices than a positively framed endowment we also found that volume may be affected by the framing of the endowment 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution abstract intertemporal trading of emission permits banking is often identified as one of three promising market mechanisms for controlling pollution along with averaging and trading surprisingly the efficiency properties of permit banking systems have not been investigated using a simple optimal control model this paper investigates firms incentives for banking or borrowing emission permits and compares the emission and output streams firms would choose with the socially optimal solution we find that in many cases firms will suboptimally choose excessive damage and output levels in early periods and correspondingly too few in later periods if given the opportunity to freely move emissions between time periods we propose a simple alternative trading scheme we term modified banking that counters this problem and should be no more difficult for an environmental authority to implement than a straigth banking system

unintended consequences of price controls an application to allowance markets abstract price controls established in a cap and trade allowance market are intended to reduce cost uncertainty by constraining allowance prices between a ceiling and floor however they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would lower government revenue and increase emissions in particular when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price regardless of the prevailing market price in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances those purchases could either be transacted by firms intending to manipulate the market price or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement theory and simulations using allowance elasticity estimates for u s firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper although in practice many other conditions will determine its use

peer effects and risk sharing in experimental asset markets abstract we investigate the effect of introducing information about peer portfolios in an experimental arrow debreu economy confirming the prediction of a general equilibrium model with inequality averse preferences we find that peer information leads to reduced variation in payoffs within peer groups information also improves risk sharing as the data suggests that experiencing earnings deviations from peers induces a shift to more balanced portfolios in a treatment where we highlight the highest earner we observe a reduction in risk sharing while highlighting the lowest earner has no effects compared to providing neutral information our results indicate that the presence of social information and its framing is an important determinant of equilibrium in financial markets

the effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets abstract we report the results of twelve double auction market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric induced supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path toward a competitive equilibrium the proposition convergence bias that prices tend to approach the competitive equilibrium from above below when consumer surplus is greater less than producer surplus cannot be rejected we do however reject the proposition convergence symmetry that these convergence biases are of equal absolute magnitude excesses of producer over consumer surplus are found to have a more pronounced effect on the sequence of contract prices

a symmetric safety valve abstract how to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap and trade program for carbon dioxide with a safety valve that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level we find two significant problems both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase one is that most important examples of price volatility in cap and trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked but instead when allowance prices collapsed second a single sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment we illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one sided approach

incentive compatible pollution control policies under asymmetric information on both risk preferences and technology this article proposes a method to accommodate asymmetric information on farmers risk preferences in designing voluntary environmental policies by incorporating stochastic efficiency rules in a mechanism design problem the government can find incentive compatible policies by knowing only the general class of risk preferences among farmers the model also accounts for hidden information on technology types and input use the method is applied empirically to simulate a pollution control program in new york results suggest that participation incentives would be inadequate for many risk averse producers if the government does not account for the diversity in risk preferences

convergence to nonstationary competitive equilibria an experimental analysis abstract this paper reports the results of 26 posted offer and double auction markets examining the effect of systematic supply and or demand nonstationarities on market performance and dynamic adjustment paths to the competitive equilibria both the trading institution and the source of the nonstationarity are found to affect the ability of markets to track the competitive equilibrium although some posted offer markets track the competitive equilibrium price as well as comparable double auctions posted offer markets consistently exhibit lower efficiency the inability of the posted offer trading institution to track demand based market shocks is particularly striking

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

incentive based policy design for pollution control and biodiversity conservation a review this paper provides a succinct review of the main developments in the literature on incentive based policy mechanisms in the contexts of pollution control and biodiversity conservation dating from the early beginnings of the science in the 1960s a focal point in the review is on the design features of these policy mechanisms key developments in policy design were originally established in controlling externalities arising from pollution and have since been extended to policy design tailored towards biodiversity conservation special emphasis is given to the spatial characteristics of the environmental problems underlying both pollution control and biodiversity conservation the paper concludes by drawing some lessons and setting out elements of a future research agenda in both policy domains

some neglected social costs of government spending in farm programs economic welfare analyses of farm programs typically assume that the direct social opportunity cost of subsidy payments is one dollar per dollar of government spending recent literature suggests that the marginal opportunity cost of a dollar of u s federal government spending is more likely to be in the range of 1 20 to 1 50 this implies that the net social costs of farm programs that involve government spending are significantly greater than the typical estimates in addition the normative efficiency ranking of alternative policies is sensitive to the marginal opportunity cost of government spending

papers in experimental economics on nonbinding price controls in a competitive market interest in the effect of nonbinding price controls on double auction markets stems from two primary considerations the double auction institution converges to a competitive allocation more rapidly and with fewer participating agents than any other institution with which it has been compared see smith et al one way to improve our understanding of this important property is to determine what conditions if any can interfere with or retard this convergence process nonbinding price controls represent a condition that may affect this convergence process hence if such effects can be documented they will provide a body of data that any future proposed model of the double auction process should be able to explain a second reason for studying the effect of nonbinding controls on the double auction is practical the organized commodity exchanges often set limits on price fluctuations during any single day when prices at any point during a day rise above qr fall below the closing prices of the preceding day by more than the amount of the limit no further trading for that day is permitted walter labys p 162 consequently commodity trading frequently occurs at prices near the level of nonbinding price floors or ceilings mark issac and charles plott report the results of twelve exploratory experiments in which various price control constraints are imposed on double auction markets their two principal conclusions can be summarized as follows 1 the hypothesis is rejected that nonbinding price controls that is price ceilings above or price floors below the competitive equilibrium ce will serve as a focal point or signalling price on which sellers and buyers will key their contracts 2 inconclusive evidence is presented in support of the hypothesis that nonbinding controls near the ce will bias prices below ce when there is a price ceiling and above ce when there is a price floor support for this second hypothesis is not conclusive because some experimental markets show a tendency to converge from below and others from above depending upon the relative bargaining strength of buyers as against sellers thus sampling variation among subjects can yield a group in which buyers sellers are able to make contracts at an average price below above ce for several periods of trading consequently in an experiment in which there is a price ceiling floor five cents above below ce and in which contract prices are observed to occur below above ce one cannot determine conclusively whether the observed effect was due to the nonbinding price control or to the bargaining characteristics of the market participants we report below an experimental design developed for the purpose of separating these confounding factors and allowing the effect of nonbinding controls to be isolated the results of sixteen experiments strongly support the hypothesis that markets with a nonbinding price ceiling floor near ce will converge from below above relative to any otherwise identifiable tendency to converge from below above an analysis of the effect of a nonbinding price ceiling floor on the distributions of bids and offers reveals the cause of this bias ceilings limit the bargaining strategies of sellers especially but also that of buyers while floors have the opposite effect thus in the absence of price controls double auction trading is characterized by a process in which sellers typically make concessions from offer prices well above ce while buyers most often concede from bid prices well below ce a price ceiling truncates seller offer prices at the ceiling requir university of arizona and indiana university respectively research support by the national science foundation is gratefully acknowledged

simulating price patterns for tradable green certificates to promote electricity generation from wind abstract this article uses computer simulation to anticipate the price dynamics in a market for tradable green certificates tgcs these markets have been used in europe to promote generation of electricity from renewable resources like wind similar markets have been proposed in the united states of america usa where the certificates are called renewable energy credits recs the certificates are issued to the generating companies for each megawatt hour of renewable electricity generation the companies may sell the certificates in a market and the revenues from certificate sales provide an extra incentive to invest in new generating capacity proponents argue that this market based incentive can be designed to support government mandates for a growing fraction of electricity generation from renewable sources in the usa these mandates are set by the states and are known as renewable portfolio standards rps we simulate the price dynamics of a market designed to support an aggressive mandate for wind generation in the northwestern usa the simulations show that the certificate price climbs rapidly to the cap in the early years after the market opens investors then react to these high prices with construction of new wind capacity after a few years wind generation meets and then exceeds the requirement we show that this pattern appears again and again when the simulations are repeated with wide variations in the estimates of behavioral parameters we use the model to study the impact of different trading strategies by the wind companies and by the distribution companies we also study the simulated market response if the usa adopts the carbon allowance market envisioned in the climate stewardship act the article concludes with recommendations for policy makers involved in tgc market design

speciation through entrepreneurial spin off the acorn arm story abstract can the concept of speciation explain evidence on how technologies branch and advance can evidence on innovation through spin off usefully inform the concept of speciation these questions are addressed through a case study of detailed processes enabling the shift of technology to new domains of application an innovative it firm developed its own semiconductor technology to remedy supplier deficiencies but it required a joint venture with a completely new business model to adapt and move the technology into new market domains we propose the concept of techno organizational speciation to delineate this phenomenon competing perspectives on speciation compatibility niche and lineage approaches are found to illuminate the evidence while complementarities between these conceptual dimensions are revealed by the case causal processes uncovered include the following 1 techno organizational speciation through spin off may be needed to launch a dominant technical standard compatible with multiple applications 2 this can be achieved through niche creation from which develops a new business ecosystem 3 inherited knowledge together with organizationally based learning foster the branching and renewal of technological lineages

the conservation reserve program as a least cost land retirement mechanism mechanism design theory is used to characterize the properties of a least cost crp if marginal land rents decrease with acres farmed then a least cost crp is a set of nonlinear price schedules if marginal land rents are independent of acres farmed then an offer system constitutes a least cost crp the least cost offer system gives a useful estimate of the upper bound of a least cost crp empirical results suggest that a 34 million acre crp should have cost no more than 1 billion per year

the multiple unit double auction the note outlines institutional features of an open outcry market that permit multiple unit or block trades the purpose of the note is to introduce the process as a tool to be used in economics experiments the detailed rules governing the multiple unit double auction muda are stated for the case where offers are tendered by voice as opposed to through a computer the results of markets that use the rules are reported as a demonstration that convergence to equilibrium price traditionally observed in experimental markets remains with the use of the muda process

path dependence research in regional economic development cacophony or knowledge accumulation henning m stam e and wenting r path dependence research in regional economic development cacophony or knowledge accumulation regional studies the concept of path dependence has gained momentum in the social sciences particularly in economic geography this paper explores the empirical literature on path dependence and path creation in regional economic development it offers a critical reflection on these studies and outlines commonalities and problems in research designs and empirical testing the review suggests that the popularity of the path dependence concept in regional studies has led to a cacophony of studies rather than to a purposeful accumulation of knowledge around the concept gaps are identified and guidelines are suggested for future research on path creation and path dependence in regional development henning m stam e and wenting r

price controls and the behavior of auction markets an experimental examination price ceilings and price floors are common in all market systems the ancient greeks and hellenistic era egyptians are known to have utilized price controls see h michele p 272 and j p levy p 41 and numerous public policy questions today involve them apparently for as long as price controls have existed their effects have been debated for example diocletion s favorable view of his price ceilings was disputed by the religious philosopher lactantius who charged that the policy led to scarcity and low grade articles p 145

on the design of agricultural policy mechanisms the fact that different agricultural policy mechanisms have emerged for different commodities suggests that the choice of policy instrument may reflect the goals of agricultural policy makers this paper uses the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information to examine the motivations underlying the choice of agricultural policy mechanisms it is found that supply control mechanisms favor high cost producers and the budget while mechanisms resulting in overproduction favor low cost producers

firm specific output limits in a posted offer market distributive and efficiency effects abstract in this paper we look at the effect of the removal of firm specific binding and non binding quotas in experimental posted offer markets in the experiments we see that the effect of both binding and non binding quotas is carried over to the deregulated regime the effect of non binding quotas while being in effect on the number of contracts is statistically significant we also see that distribution of surplus may actually affect the convergence path of prices that is with binding quotas price convergence is observed from below the competitive equilibrium

stop and go agricultural policies with a land market this article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers productivity a government objective to insure farmers a minimum parity income an endogenous land rent and diminishing returns on alternative nonprogram crop land uses in this setting acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy although compensated acreage limits are when there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation or buyout program in which high cost producers participate and low cost producers do not copyright 2003 oxford university press

crop insurance in a political economy an alternative perspective on agricultural policy lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress this article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post disaster relief and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails absent ex ante government policy ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under production by operating farmers ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance price supports and a program participation fee copyright 2003 oxford university press

irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties tradable emission permits and emissions charges abstract a major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm s incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge however under efficient permit trading the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies we develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement investment to show how cost uncertainties affect investment under permits we compare the resulting investment incentive with that under charges after controlling for the assumption that random shocks affect the abatement cost linearly we find that firms investment incentive decreases in cost uncertainties but more so under emissions charges than under permits therefore tradable permits in fact may help maintain firms investment incentive under uncertainty

prices versus quantities versus hybrids in the presence of co pollutants we investigate the optimal regulation of a pollutant given its abatement interaction with another pollutant under asymmetric information about firms abatement costs we take a policy relevant second best approach by assuming that the co pollutant is regulated exogenously but perhaps not efficiently our focus is on optimal policy choice in this setting and we derive rules for determining whether a pollutant should be regulated with an emissions tax an emissions market or a market with price controls given the regulation of its co pollutant we find that the policy choice for a pollutant is unaffected by its interaction with a co pollutant that is controlled with a fixed number of tradable permits because changes in emissions of the primary pollutant do not affect aggregate emissions of the co pollutant however when a co pollutant is controlled with a tax the policy choice for the primary pollutant must account for its effect on expected co pollutant damage through changes in the variance of co pollutant emissions consequently standard conclusions about the environmental policy choice problem must be modified in this case our results have important implications for designing policies for greenhouse gases under uncertainty

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

price controls and banking in emissions trading an experimental evaluation we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate the effects of price controls and permit banking on limiting permit price risk while both instruments reduce between period price volatility and within period price dispersion combining price controls and permit banking yields important benefits banking alone produces high permit prices in earlier periods that fall over time but the combined policy produces lower initial prices and lower volatility however banking price controls and the combination all produce higher between period emissions volatility hence for emissions markets that seek to control flow pollutants with strictly convex damages efforts to limit permit price risk can result in higher expected damage

credit constraints in general equilibrium experimental results our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set up we report on somedouble auction two market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit the experiments display two regimes characterizedby high and low credit availability the critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the arrow debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit a have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high credit regime b have substantial effects bothon quantities and relative prices in the low credit regime

the economics of pollution permit banking in the context of title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments abstract this paper presents a model of the collective emission permit banking behavior of electricity generating units affected by title iv of the clean air act amendments of 1990 a rigorous treatment of the constraint that pollution permits cannot be borrowed from future allocations is introduced this approach enables an analysis of the impact of future changes in electricity demand regulations and technologies on the present permit price and emissions level the effect of uncertainty on the banking behavior is also explored

the role of the business model in capturing value from innovation evidence from xerox corporation s technology spin off companies this paper explores the role of the business model in capturing value from early stage technology a successful business model creates a heuristic logic that connects technical potential with the realization of economic value the business model unlocks latent value from a technology but its logic constrains the subsequent search for new alternative models for other technologies later on an implicit cognitive dimension overlooked in most discourse on the topic we explore the intellectual roots of the concept offer a working definition and show how the xerox corporation arose by employing an effective business model to commercialize a technology rejected by other leading companies of the day we then show the long shadow that this model cast upon xerox s later management of selected spin off companies from xerox parc xerox evaluated the technical potential of these spin offs through its own business model while those spin offs that became successful did so through evolving business models that came to differ substantially from that of xerox the search and learning for an effective business model in failed ventures by contrast were quite limited

emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking abstract in this laboratory experiment on emissions trading subjects face exogenous random emissions shocks after making production and emission control plans in some sessions subjects can bank their unused permits for future use after a reconciliation trading period following the shock realization subjects report their emissions to the regulatory authority and are placed in different inspection groups depending on their compliance history we identify important interactions between banking compliance and enforcement banking smoothes out the price variability arising from imperfect emissions control price stability comes at a cost however since noncompliance and emissions are significantly greater when banking is allowed

tests of market outcomes with asymmetric valuations of gains and losses smaller gains fewer trades and less value abstract the pervasive finding that individuals value losses more than gains suggests that actual gains from trade and numbers of market exchanges may well be much smaller than would be the case if people s buying and selling prices were equivalent as normally assumed the results of two sets of costless market simulations using actual gain and loss valuations show that the actual gains from exchange and trade volumes are less than half of those expected with conventional assumptions and that completion of all pareto efficient exchanges fail by wide margins to shift entitlements to those willing to pay the most for them these findings suggest the valuation disparity has significant welfare implications and may be a major cause of market stickiness

implementable ramsey boiteux pricing in agricultural and environmental policy agricultural producers frequently face price discrimination that is based either on characteristics of their products or on the physical manner in which the product is produced we consider how to set such discriminatory prices optimally and show that for a very broad range of production technologies the first best voluntary policy which involves a modified version of ramsey boiteux pricing is implementable even in the presence of hidden knowledge by farmers about their types

a model of intertemporal emission trading banking and borrowing abstract this paper provides a general treatment of emission trading banking and borrowing in an intertemporal continuous time model using optimal control theory the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least cost solution attainable under joint cost minimization explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits the policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed

double auction dynamics structural effects of non binding price controls in competitive equilibrium non binding price controls that is price floors below and ceilings above the equilibrium should not affect market outcomes but in laboratory experiments they do we build a simple dynamic model of double auction markets with zero intelligence zi computer traders that accounts for many though not all of the discrepancies between the data and the walrasian tatonnement predictions the success of the model in organizing the data and in isolating various consequences of price controls shows that the simple zi model is a powerful tool to gain insights into the dynamics of market institutions

combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change abstract uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave differently and leads to divergent welfare consequences although most of the debate on global climate change policy has focused on quantity controls due to their political appeal this paper argues that price controls are more efficient simulations based on a stochastic computable general equilibrium model indicate that the expected welfare gain from the optimal price policy is five times higher than the expected gain from the optimal quantity policy an alternative hybrid policy combines both the political appeal of quantity controls with the efficiency of prices using an initial distribution of tradeable permits to set a quantitative target but allowing additional permits to be purchased at a fixed trigger price even sub optimal hybrid policies offer dramatic efficiency improvements over otherwise standard quantity controls for example a 50 trigger price per ton of carbon converts the 3 trillion expected loss associated with a simple 1990 emission target to a 150 billion gain these results suggest that a hybrid policy is an attractive alternative to either a pure price or quantity system

emissions trading with shares and coupons when control over discharges is uncertain abstract two important decisions in designing markets for tradable emissions permits are whether to allow banking of permits coupons and whether to allow trading in entitlements to future permits shares banking is predicted to reduce price instability when firms trade in a reconciliation market after the quantity of emissions has been determined tradable shares are a common feature in proposals for emissions trading in canada we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how bankable coupons and tradable shares affect efficiency and prices under uncertainty cognitive demands on the subjects are reduced by computerized advice on the optimal allocation of coupons across periods and the implied marginal values of coupons and shares banking share trading and uncertainty conditions are introduced in a complete factorial design with three observations per cell high efficiencies are observed across all treatments uncertainty in the control of emissions leads to substantial price instability when banking is not allowed banking virtually eliminates the instability but reduces the efficiency of the market institution share trading reduces trading volumes increases price stability and improves efficiency

carbon markets and technological innovation this paper examines the effects of firm level innovation in carbon abatement technologies on optimal cap and trade schemes with and without price controls we characterize optimal cap and trade regulation with a price cap and a price floor and compare it to the special cases of pure taxation and a simple emissions cap innovation shifts the tradeoff between price and quantity based instruments towards quantitybased emissions trading schemes more specifically an increase in innovation effectiveness lowers the optimal emissions cap and leads to relaxed price controls unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage curve is small because of the decrease in the emissions cap innovation in abatement technologies can lead to a higher expected carbon price so as to provide sufficient incentives for private r d investments the expected carbon price decreases once innovative technologies are widely used

exchange economies and loss exposure experiments exchange economies were created in which individuals faced losses if people are risk seeking in the losses as predicted by prospect theory then due to the nonconvexity the competitive equilibria are all on the boundaries of the edgeworth box the experimental results are that risk seeking behavior is observed in many people and appears in markets as predicted in addition market behavior is consistent with answers to hypothetical questionnaires contrary to prospect theory risk seeking seems to diminish with experience preferences in the market setting are not labile and risk seeking preferences are not simply a result of framing effects copyright 1997 by american economic association

green payments and dual policy goals abstract we use a mechanism design framework to analyze the optimal design of green payment policies with the dual goals of conservation and income support for small farms each farm is characterized by two dimensions of attributes farms size and conservation efficiency the policymaker may not be able to use the attributes as an explicit criterion for payments we characterize optimal policy when conservation efficiency is unobservable to policymakers and when farm size is also unobservable an income support goal is shown to reduce the conservation distortion caused by asymmetric information the cost of optimal green payment mechanisms is shown to depend crucially on whether large or small farms have greater conservation efficiency

least cost cheap food policies some implications of international food aid abstract many low income countries pursue cheap food policies in which consumers pay subsidized prices for bread rice and other staples this paper addresses the issue of why different governments select different food subsidy policies using multiple instruments rather than a simple across the board subsidy to provide consumers with access to cheap food it examines the optimal structure of cheap food policies in the context of a partial equilibrium model in which the country may be large in trade and is able to combine import subsidies or tariffs and output taxes or subsidies to transfer income to consumers through the market the model allows for a marginal opportunity cost of government revenues greater than one dollar in addition in the model food aid from overseas may be either given away to the consumer or given to the government for subsequent sale in the domestic market the results indicate that only by happenstance will a country choose to use a pure consumption subsidy or a pure import subsidy to transfer income to consumers in addition an increase in international food aid does not necessarily lead the government to reduce producer and consumer prices for a commodity

an experimental investigation of hard and soft price ceilings in emissions permit markets tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution allowing the market for permits to determine the price price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits we test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms with special attention on the soft price ceiling we focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings hard ceilings effectively limit elevated prices in this setting by contrast reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied furthermore the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases

soft and hard price collars in a cap and trade system a comparative analysis we use a stochastic dynamic framework to compare price collars price ceilings and floors in a cap and trade system with uncertainty in the level of baseline emissions and costs we consider soft collars which provide limited volume of additional emission allowances a reserve at the price ceiling and hard collars which provide an unlimited supply of additional allowances thereby preventing allowance prices from exceeding the price ceiling conversely allowances are removed from the market if prices fall to the floor we find that increasing the size of the reserve strictly lowers expected net present values of compliance costs however there is a diminishing effect as the allowance reserve is expanded most of the expected cost savings are achieved with a modest reserve consequently a rather limited soft price collar could provide considerable assurance about cost while preventing the possibility that emissions could spiral out of control

enforcement and price controls in emissions trading this paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms abatement costs the analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits when this occurs accommodating the effect of abatement cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second best optimal values however it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices this enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs and the policy produces the second best optimal outcome

a new meta analysis on the wtp wta disparity abstract this study reports a new meta analysis of papers that elicit willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept compensation wta measures of value for the same good we investigate the effects of type of good and several survey design features on the wtp wta disparity measured as the logarithm of the ratio of mean wta to mean wtp confirming horowitz and mcconnell s 2002 pioneering meta analysis we find the disparity is smaller for ordinary private goods than for public and non market goods that it is not solely an artifact of using hypothetical transactions or other weak experimental or survey methods and that it is smaller for studies using student subjects in addition we find that the disparity is smaller when subjects have experience valuing the good in real markets or through repeated experimental trials in contrast to horowitz and mcconnell we find the disparity is significantly smaller in studies using incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms the disparity is smaller in more recent studies an effect that is attributable only in part to changes in study characteristics

economic effects of non binding price constraints for decades the conventional wisdom among economists has been that a non binding price floor or price ceiling has no effect whatsoever on the market equilibrium and quantity 1 this hypothesis rests on the shaky theoretical assumption that the competitive firm s perception of future market conditions is not altered when the government imposes a price control recent experiments by isaac and plott 6 and smith and williams 18 cast doubt on this conventional wisdom but they offer no theory to explain their findings similarly working 19 benedict 1 and johnson 8 alluded that price supports set below the market equilibrium price would distort the supply response offarmers without explaining why only lee 10 and eeckhoudt and hansen 4 have developed theories to explain why firms react this way lee used an intertemporal decision making model to show that a price ceiling implemented above the current price would affect both price and output in the current period however lee discussed only those cases where resources have a finite inventory non renewable resources which once depleted cannot be produced again following sandmo 15 ishii 7 and coes 3 eeckhoudt and hansen analyzed the restraining effects of minimum and maximum prices on a competitive firm using a static equilibrium model they explained the short run response of a utility maximizing firm to the imposition of price constraints however eeckhoudt and hansen were unable to sign the effect that a price ceiling has on the volume of industrial output furthermore they ignored all long run adjustments our model differs from the previous studies in that we assume firms maximize the market value of the firm in so doing we are able to determine both the short run and the long run effects that currently non binding price restrictions have on a competitive industry consider the conventional competitive market in which the long run equilibrium is achieved when all the firms in the industry have an expected net worth comparable to their next best alternative for simplicity assume a price floor pf is inacted that is lower than the current market price and will remain constant for the forseeable future furthermore assume the government agrees

labor market effects of employer provided health insurance i introduction increasing health insurance coverage is arguably an important policy goal the congressional budget office 2003 estimates that in 1998 20 30 million americans had no health insurance for the entire year approximately 40 million were uninsured at a specific point in time in the year and nearly 60 million were without coverage some time during the year most individuals who have health insurance in the united states obtain it through their employer in 1999 65 8 of nonelderly americans had employer provided insurance also called group insurance or employer sponsored insurance either through their own employer or through the employer of another household member see gruber 2001 employer provided insurance plans generally have lower premiums and offer more benefits than individual insurance plans health insurance providers can offer cheaper and better plans to company employees for at least two reasons first the average administrative cost of such plans is lower than individual plans second employment based plans are typically subject to less adverse selection than individual plans particularly so for large employers furthermore the tax subsidy afforded employment based health insurance renders the effective consumer price substantially lower than the cost see pauly 1986 and gruber 2001 together these various factors give a strong incentive for employers to offer and employees to accept coverage as part of their employment contract as employer provided insurance is by far the most prevalent form of coverage in the private sector policy makers look for further expansion of this base as a way to insure the uninsured while avoiding direct public financing as a way to increase employer based health insurance coverage some states either have or are considering government mandates that require employers to provide insurance to certain types of workers 1 the state of hawaii requires private sector employers to offer health insurance to all workers who work for more than 20 h a week and requires these workers to have insurance the state of california is currently considering a similar mandate there is a considerable interest from policy makers on the effects of such mandates on labor market outcomes in this study we report on an experiment that was designed to provide some insights about possible effects of alternative health insurance regulations on the competitive labor market with a particular focus on mandates since we only considered a competitive market setting with complete contracts and no wage rigidities our results may not be directly applicable to all labor market situations 2 however the study provides useful insights about the interaction of health insurance benefit provision wages and employment structure for labor markets where the competitive wage setting and the complete contracts assumptions are reasonable with these limitations in mind our results can be also generalized to other types of employer provided fringe benefits such as paid vacations or pension plans as any government intervention health insurance regulation may affect the labor market theory predicts that in perfectly competitive labor markets health insurance creates no distortionary effects on the labor market equilibrium as long as the coverage is not mandated and there are no wage rigidities 3 all workers who value insurance above its cost of provision are offered insurance and accept it the wages are adjusted downward see rosen 1986 and gruber 2000 summers 1989 used a simple supply and demand analysis to show that the effect of increases in premiums on equilibrium labor hours and wage depends both on the elasticity of labor demand and labor supply and on how fully workers value changes in the cost of health insurance if the demand or the supply of labor is completely inelastic or if workers fully value the insurance then an increase in the premium would result in an equal decrease shift in wages

predicting buyer seller pricing disparities numerous studies have shown that compensation demanded cd to give up a commodity often greatly exceeds willingness to pay wtp to obtain the same commodity even in incentive compatible experiments that penalize strategic misrepresentation observed cd wtp disparities are too large to be reconciled with traditional assumptions of economic rationality a prospect theory based behavioral framework for predicting cd and wtp is proposed which produces five distinct transaction encoding rules any one of which can in principle apply to a buyer or a seller according to this framework cd wtp gaps occur when buyers and sellers encode the prospective transaction differently and gaps can occur in multiple ways and vary in size depending on encoding the transaction encoding framework was tested in two experiments in experiment 1 model fits to subjects cd and wtp for lottery tickets were consistent with the hypothesis that buyers and sellers encode transaction problems differently moreover the quite large observed cd wtp gaps were explained fully by encoding when differences between buyers and sellers encoding processes were taken into account their estimated utility value and probability weighting functions did not differ the present framework and results show that the widely cited endowment effect is but one of several ways in which loss aversion can give rise to cd wtp gaps consistent with this broadened perspective experiment 2 demonstrated cd wtp gaps in the absence of an endowment effect and in the absence of rational economic causes the transaction encoding framework 1 provides a structured approach for predicting and testing the effects of a variety of task factors on pricing behavior and transaction outcomes and 2 reveals the useful property that in many cases the ratio cd wtp can be interpreted as a direct measure of the degree of loss aversion

judging agricultural policies a survey this survey provides a structured picture of 40 years of literature which uses welfare economic tools to judge agricultural policy challenges and developments of normative agricultural policy analysis are discussed in an easily accessible graphical framework it is shown how the literature has gone from examining a very small discrete set of simple policies to a much broader often continuous set of policies that combine policy instruments simultaneously the importance of the pareto criterion used to explore the limits of how government can affect welfare is revealed moreover given the importance of the objective of income redistribution in agricultural policy agricultural economists have often departed from the purely efficiency oriented tradition in economics it is shown that they have tried to incorporate equity considerations by either adding these criteria as constraints to the social welfare function or directly incorporating these criteria in the functional form of the social welfare function

experimental tests of the endowment effect abstract the endowment effect which predicts undertrading and a willingness to accept greater than willingness to pay is studied using responses that remove all reference to buying or selling and focuses only on choice tasks the results significantly lower the willingness to pay willingness to accept discrepancy but the latter is still significant a high efficiency open display uniform price auction is used to exchange mugs for money since mugs are randomly assigned to half of 2n subjects n 2 mugs are predicted to trade less than n 2 mugs trade on average but more than previously reported the phenomenon exists but is less prominent than reported previously

tick size price grids and market performance stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium abstract the tick size in a financial market is the minimum allowable difference between ask and bid prices by the rules of each exchange no transactions can occur within the tick interval the impact of tick size is an ongoing controversy which we study by experimental methods whose simplicity helps distinguish among competing models of complex real world securities markets we observe patterns predicted by a matching cooperative game model because a price grid interferes with a competitive equilibrium and restrictions on order flow interfere with information aggregation the matching model provides predictions when the competitive model cannot although their predictions are the same when a competitive equilibrium does exist our experiments examine stable allocations average prices timing of order flow information flow and price dynamics larger tick size invites more speculation which in turn increases liquidity however increased speculation leads to inefficient trades that otherwise would not have occurred

an intertemporal carbon emissions trading system with cap adjustment and path control abstract cap adjustment with shocks and cost effectiveness in cap and trade system has been an area of concern for regulators by a simple two period model of such system with banking and borrowing we examine how emission reduction technological changes affect the cap in three cases i e pure flow externality pure stock externality and mixed externality and identify the efficiency properties in such system with banking and borrowing we show that the effects of technological changes on cap are negative in both pure flow and pure stock externality cases in the mixed externality case the effects are uncertain which depend on the decayed rate of co2 stock the discounted rate and functions of marginal abatement costs and marginal damage in general cases the social optimum is not attainable via the cap and trade system since firms sub optimally distribute emissions across periods in a particular case if the ratio of marginal damage in period 1 to the discounted marginal damage in period 2 is exactly equal to the decayed rate the decentralized emissions of firms will lead to the social optimum finally a hybrid quantity price policy is proposed to rectify the paths of firms to be socially desirable with an effective quantity control

examining the effectiveness of price limits in an artificial stock market abstract this paper proposes an agent based framework to examine the effectiveness of price limits in an artificial stock market the market is composed of many boundedly rational and heterogeneous traders whose learning behavior is represented by a genetic programming algorithm we calibrate the model to replicate several stylized facts observed in real financial markets based on this environment the impacts of price limits are analyzed from the perspectives of volatility price distortion volume and welfare we find that the imposition of price limits possesses both positive and negative effects however compared with the market without price limits appropriate price limits help to reduce volatility and price distortion and increase the liquidity and welfare

carbon markets 15 years after kyoto lessons learned new challenges abstract carbon markets are substantial and they are expanding there are many lessons from market experiences over the past eight years there should be fewer free allowances better management of market sensitive information and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence moreover the emerging market architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions and a variety of other types of policies exist alongside the carbon markets this situation is in sharp contrast to the top down integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the kyoto protocol and raises a suite of new questions in this new architecture jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how whether and when to link with one another stakeholders and policymakers must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among markets as well as relative to a variety of other polic

conceptualising the heterogeneity of research based spin offs a multi dimensional taxonomy abstract research based spin offs rbsos have become an important aspect of the technology transfer process emanating from what is conventionally a non commercial environment rbsos pose major challenges if they are to realise their potential to meet the objectives of their founders and the parent research organisations pros from which they emerge an important issue is to understand the heterogeneity of rbsos this paper reviews the literature on rbso typologies to develop a taxonomy of rbsos we identify common themes in relation to these typologies in relation to 1 spin off creation and 2 spin off development the dimensions that differentiate between firms are the type of resources the business model and the institutional link we identify gaps in current typologies in order to propose avenues for future conceptual and empirical research

the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade an experimental study a study is a limited exploration into the relationship between the opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade and the resulting market performance laboratory experimental methods are applied to separate competing theories the competitive model predicts well relative to cartel models nevertheless when measurements are taken relative to the performance of markets where conspiracies are not possible the effects of attempted conspiracies can be determined

tell the truth or not the montero mechanism for emissions control at work abstract we experimentally test the truth telling mechanism proposed by montero 2008 for eliciting firms abatement costs we compare this mechanism with two well known alternative allocation mechanisms free and costly allocation of permits at the pigouvian price controlling for the number of firms and the firms maximal emissions we find that in line with the theoretical predictions firms over report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under report these under costly allocation of permits under montero s mechanism by contrast firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully however in terms of efficiency the difference between montero s mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm

demand uncertainty competition and non binding price controls abstract in our paper we will present a general model that demonstrate that a price floor or a price ceiling although not effective at the existing market price nevertheless alters the competitive equilibrium and leads to erroneous policy conclusions

technological pre adaptation speciation and emergence of new technologies how corning invented and developed fiber optics this article investigates how established firms innovate and even initiate new technological trajectories we build on and expand the notion of technological speciation to describe how a new technology emerges when a firm leverages its technological knowledge into a new application domain current research on technological speciation does not investigate how firms accumulate the technological knowledge which they eventually redeploy into different domains nor does it clarify the precise role of luck historical accidents and foresight strategy in shaping the overall process this requires a finer grained investigation of the microprocesses and evolutionary forces underlying the dynamics of technological speciation to this end we use a longitudinal case study of corning s invention and development of fiber optics technology we focus less on testing theory and more on describing a phenomenon to generate new theoretical insight

alternative approaches to cost containment in a cap and trade system we compare several emissions reduction instruments including quantity policies with banking and borrowing price policies and hybrid policies safety valve and price collar using a dynamic model with stochastic baseline emissions the instruments are compared under the design goal of obtaining the same expected cumulative emissions across all options based on simulation analysis with the model parameterized to values relevant to proposed us climate mitigation policies we find that restrictions on banking and borrowing including the provision of interest rates on the borrowings can severely limit the value of the policy depending on the regulator chosen allowance issuance path although emissions taxes generally provide the lowest expected abatement costs a cap and trade system combined with either a safety valve or a price collar can be designed to provide expected abatement costs near those of a tax but with lower emissions variance than a tax consistently a price collar is more cost effective than a safety valve for a given expected cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement when abatement costs decline

effects of ambiguity in market experiments prior studies have shown that individuals are averse to ambiguity in probability many decisions are however made in market settings where an individual s decision is influenced by decisions of others participating in the market in this paper we extend the previous research to evaluate the effect of ambiguity on individual decisions and the resulting market price in market settings we therefore examine an important issue whether ambiguity effects persist in the face of market incentives and feedback two different market organizations the sealed bid auction and the double oral auction were employed the subjects in the experiments were graduate business students and bank executives our results show that the individual bids and market prices for lotteries with ambiguous probabilities are consistently lower than the corresponding bids and market prices for equivalent lotteries with well defined probabilities the aversion to ambiguity therefore does not vanish in market settings our results provide insights into what a manager can expect in bidding situations where the object of the sale oil leases mineral rights involves ambiguity in probability due to for example lack of information or prior experience the results may also be useful in understanding some phenomena in insurance and equity markets

the role of alliances in the early development of high growth firms rapid growth is sought after but may overstretch a firm s resources can alliances supply compensating support for rapidly growing firms longitudinal data on firms in a technology cluster are used to investigate rapid growth in relation to alliances and other factors known to be associated with firm growth rapid firm growth appears beneficial in terms of higher survival rates and earlier attainment of mid size but is rarely sustained alliances are predictors of rapid growth as are international operations venture capital is not directly associated with firm growth in the findings but there is a high incidence of alliances among venture capital backed firms copyright 2014 the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

contract design for the purchase of environmental goods from agriculture an environmental stewardship program whereby farmers are paid directly for the environmental goods they provide is developed by combining the microparameter distribution model with mechanism design principles the program overcomes the information asymmetry between farmers and governments and accounts for the deadweight losses from distortionary taxes the characteristics of optimal input and payment schedules of the program are derived these optimal schedules are determined by the tradeoffs between farming profits environmental benefits and deadweight losses from taxes and are second best except under restrictive conditions on deadweight losses from taxes and on the marginal product of inputs and marginal pollution costs

information mirages in experimental asset markets one explanation for the apparent volatility of asset prices is that people overreact to trades that are uninformative creating self generated information mirages the authors test whether mirages occur in experimental asset markets there are insiders in only half the periods so traders cannot be sure if the trades of others reveal information the authors observed four clear mirages in forty seven periods without insiders mirages always occurred early in an experimental session in later periods traders learn whether there are insiders by observing nonprice information such as the speed of trading and mirages occurred only temporarily copyright 1991 by university of chicago press

the slow pace of rapid technological change gradualism and punctuation in technological change discussions of technological change have offered sharply contrasting perspectives of technological change as gradual or incremental and the image of technological change as being rapid even discontinuous these alternative perspectives are bridged using the punctuated equilibrium framework of evolutionary biology using this framework it is argued that the critical event is not a transformation of the technology but speciation the application of existing technology to a new domain of application as a result of the distinct selection criteria and the degree of resource abundance in the new domain a new technological form may emerge the new technological form may be able to penetrate other niches and in particular may precipitate a process of creative destruction and out compete prior technologies this framework is applied to an historical study of wireless communication from the early experimental efforts of hertz to the modern development of wireless telephony

second best instruments for near term climate policy intensity targets vs the safety valve abstract current proposals for greenhouse gas emissions regulations in the united states mainly take the form of emissions caps with tradable permits since weitzman s 1974 3 study of prices vs quantities economic theory predicts that a price instrument is superior under uncertainty in the case of stock pollutants given the general belief in the political infeasibility of a carbon tax in the us there has been recent interest in two other policy instrument designs hybrid policies and intensity targets we extend the weitzman model to derive an analytical expression for the expected net benefits of a hybrid instrument under uncertainty we compare this expression to one developed by newell and pizer 2006 6 for an intensity target and show the theoretical minimum correlation between gdp and emissions required for an intensity target to be preferred over a hybrid in general we show that unrealistically high correlations are required for the intensity target to be preferred to a hybrid making a hybrid a more practical instrument in practice we test the predictions by performing monte carlo simulation on a computable general equilibrium model of the us economy the results are similar and we show with the numerical model that when marginal abatement costs are non linear an even higher correlation is required for an intensity target to be preferred over a safety valve

growth and inventiveness in technology based spin off firms abstract this study focuses on technology based spin off firms that have had their initial product idea originated in the previous employment of the founder such entrepreneurial spin offs esos arise when an entrepreneur leaves an organisation to start a firm of his own using the data from 60 small swedish technology based firms 30 such entrepreneurial spin offs are identified it was found that as many as two thirds of the spin offs had originated in private firms and only one sixth from universities in this paper the background and the performance in terms of growth and inventiveness are compared for the spin off and the non spin off firms it was found that after an initial ten year period the spin offs were growing significantly faster than the non spin offs however no significant difference in the inventiveness was found between the two groups neither the growth nor the inventiveness could be explained by pre spin off variables but it is speculated that the earlier employment within the spin off parent has indirectly influenced the performance of the spin off firms

price controls non price quality competition and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium we investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities when price controls exist the existence of competitive equilibria is no longer guaranteed hence we investigate the nature of non price competition and how markets might evolve in its presence we develop a quality competition model based on matching theory equilibria of the quality competition model always exist in such price constrained markets moreover they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist additionally we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality competition model in the presence of price restrictions in a series of experiments we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model in particular price controls induce non price competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model

evaluation periods and asset prices in a market experiment we test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change it influence her risk attitude in markets in line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion benartzi and thaler 1995 we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced this result supports the findings from individual decision making and shows that markets do not eliminate such behavior

market stability backward bending supply in a laboratory experimental market 1999 presidential address western economic association the paper investigates the stability properties of markets with backward bending supply curves parameters are chosen so that the two classic models of price dynamics the walrasian model and the marshallian model give opposite predictions the results are 1 market instability can be observed 2 in the backward bending case stability is captured by the walrasian model and the marshallian model of dynamics is rejected previous experiments have demonstrated that the marshallian model works in the forward falling case thus which theory of dynamics is appropriate for a market depends upon the underlying reasons for demand and supply shapes

transaction costs in payment for environmental service contracts citation jeffrey m peterson craig m smith john c leatherman nathan p hendricks john a fox transaction costs in payment for environmental service contracts american journal of agricultural economics volume 97 issue 1 1 january 2015 pages 219 238 https doi org 10 1093 ajae aau071

additionality when redd contracts must be self enforcing this paper examines self enforcing contracts as a financial mechanism for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation when the opportunity cost of the land i e landholder type is private information and is imperfectly correlated over time i e partially persistent types because self enforcement limits the feasible incentives the conservation levels are constrained by the surplus created regardless of the degree of persistence of such opportunity costs across contracting periods a first best self enforcing contract can deliver additional carbon sequestration beyond the business as usual scenario only if the value of forest conservation is sufficiently high otherwise self enforcing contracts can induce some suboptimal level of carbon sequestration the degree of persistence of opportunity costs across periods does not affect the amount of total payments provided in the optimal menu of contracts but greater persistence of opportunity cost types leads to contracts that feature more of the total payment as a bonus in contracts for landholders with a high opportunity cost for their land and more of the total payment as an upfront fixed payment for landholders with a low opportunity cost

market power in oral double auctions this paper reports the results of a series of oral double auction experiments in which some traders possess market power a market is set up in which the configuration of the supply and demand curves leads to an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in their abilities to influence transactions prices this market structure does not always lead to convergence to the competitive equilibrium price despite the competitive nature of the oral double auction institution the nonconvergence occurs most frequently in the experiments involving experienced subjects

testing choquet expected utility many theories have been developed to model decision behavior under ambiguity in this paper we empirically investigate choquet expected utility which is based on nonadditive probabilities we first replicate ellsberg paradox behavior then we elicit nonadditive probabilities called capacities for individual decision makers those capacities did not have all properties theoretically required by ceu finally we found that ceu is not really superior to eu in predicting the participants decisions