the impact of divided government on legislative production it seems obvious that divided governments should produce less legislation than unified governments yet studies have consistently failed to find such an effect because almost all existing studies focus on the experience of the u s national government the data have limited analysis to a consideration of executive legislative division and ignore the impact of division between bicameral chambers the state level data set employed in this study is not so limited the results show that divided legislatures decrease the production of laws by almost 30 nonetheless consistent with previous studies using national level data executive legislative divisions have no impact of legislative production the reason for this asymmetry is theoretically motivated additional hypotheses of interest are also tested including whether republican controlled legislative chambers are more conservative than democratic chambers in the sense of producing fewer laws than their democratic counterparts

the economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators party leaders and groups doing business with congressional committees the costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements the problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible as in congressional committees while legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees once an issue leaves a committee the costs of monitoring decline and leadership influence increases the absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain thus party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior however obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains

legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in american states in accordance with the median voter theorem the median legislator is decisive in representative democracy if the preferences of the median legislator differ from the preferences of the median voter in the polity fiscal policy choices will predictably diverge from those favored by the median voter this paper seeks to identify the median district and therein the preferences driving the median legislator in american state legislatures using economic characteristics of constituents we find substantial differences between the median district and the statewide median as the income of the median district rises above the median income of the polity government expenditures increase in addition the degree to which income is skewed across legislative districts affects spending for redistribution programs finally we find that direct democracy procedures which allow the statewide median voter to check legislative decisions limit the impact of differences between the district and polity medians

budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

local government structure and public expenditures the law of 1 n postulates a positive relationship betweenthe number of democratically electedrepresentative districts and governmentspending strong support for thisrelationship exists in legislatures in theunited states at both the state andnational level and across countries fewstudies have examined this relationship atthe local level despite the fact that localgovernments operate under constraintssimilar to those faced by representativelegislatures using a sample of georgiacounties we find the number of countycommissioners to be positively correlatedwith county government expenditures indicating support for the law of 1 nat the local level

reputational capital opportunism and self policing in legislatures this paper examines the question of whether reputational capital can deter opportunistic behavior among legislators preparing to exit the house of representatives i create a measure of reputational trustworthiness based upon pooled samples of constituency opinion derived from the national election studies surveys i then examine the extent to which such reputational good will among constituents deters lame duck foreign travel by exiting house incumbents within the context of a quasi experimental research design the analysis suggests that legislators may be self policed by their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness to the point of discouraging unethical activity urveys i then examine the extent to which such s derived from the national election studies

surveys in public sector economics part i public sector production 2 shadow pricing in the public sector peter hammond professor of economics stanford university 3 regulation of public utilities and nationalized industries ingo vogelsang professor of economics boston university 4 economics of publicly provided goods and services paul hare professor of economics heriot watt university part ii distribution and welfare 5 the political economy of fiscal policy daniel ingberman and robert inman respectively assistant professor of public policy and management wharton school university of pennsylvania and professor of finance economics and public management university of pennsylvania 6 policy targetting in a new welfare framework with poverty john beath geoff lewis and david ulph both john beath and geoff lewis are lecturers in economics bristol university david ulph is professor of economics bristol university 7 the structure of income and commodity taxation christopher heady lecturer in economics university college london part iii estimation and computation 8 econometric issues in public sector economics richard blundell director of the institute for fiscal studies 9 general equilibrium computation applied to public sector issues john piggot professor of economics university of sydney with appendix by jon fuller

the effect of legislature size on public spending evidence from a regression discontinuity design what is the effect of legislature size on public spending an answer to this question is provided by weingast et al j polit econ 89 4 642 664 1981 whose law of 1 n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives always leads to an increase in public spending because elected politicians regard the tax base as a common pool from which they can finance specific projects for their constituencies and these specific constituencies internalize the full benefits of the projects but only bear a fraction of the costs projects are financed from the common tax base fiscal inefficiency will increase with the number of representatives in this paper i test the validity of the law of 1 n using a dataset of 9325 german municipalities between 2008 and 2010 through the application of a regression discontinuity design many of the methodological pitfalls of previous studies can be avoided and a valid estimation of the causal effect of legislature size on public spending for german municipalities can be determined the results do not corroborate the positive findings of previous studies which generally supported the implications of the law of 1 n for the years 2008 2010 i find a negative effect of legislature size on public spending in german municipal councils

legislative organization of fiscal policy in the voluminous literature on fiscal policy there is little evidence about the impact of legislative organization on shaping fiscal decisions by comparing different organizations of committee structure to control tax and spending policies this article presents such evidence regarding spending we test whether the dispersion of spending authority among multiple committees creates a problem similar to that of the common pool using american state data we find that when only one committee has the authority to spend spending is restrained relative to when spending authority is balkanized regarding taxation we hypothesize that if a single committee controls not only all spending authority but also all taxation authority that committee will have more incentive to tax than a committee that does not control spending it can obtain the benefits of increased taxation more directly again this proposition is supported by evidence at the state level

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

legislative organization and pollution taxation the role of political institutions in shaping public policy has been analyzed in isolation from corruption and legislative organization specifically bicameralism has received minimal attention we analyze pollution taxation when decisions are influenced by several veto players such as legislative chambers our theory predicts that an increase in the number of veto players e g moving from uni to bi cameralism pushes the pollution tax towards the social optimum with the effect being conditional on corruption as such dispersion around the optimal tax is lower under bicameralism empirical tests using data from 86 countries support the theory

central local relations in china during the reform era the economic and institutional dimensions abstract central local relations are a core but problematic issue in china s reform process the conventional wisdom is that the economic reforms have considerably weakened control by the central government over economic activities in the localities political implications are derived directly from these economic observations the prevalent view is that the economic reforms have reduced the political control of the center and indeed have called into question the viability of china as a single political entity this article disputes these views it shows that economic decentralization has been accompanied by a strengthening of china s unitary political system this has direct bearings on local economic conduct because of the political and institutional constraints local officials surrender tax revenues to the central government and curb their inflationary investment demand

bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the u s congress explaining why committee systems emerge there but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries to analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures we adopt a vote buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers we show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader

searching for symptoms of political shirking congressional foreign travel despite the hypothesized propensity for shirking to marklegislative institutions the evidence is rather equivocal moreover most of the research has focused exclusively onlegislator voting thereby constraining whatevergeneralizations might emerge the purpose of this paper is tocontribute to the debate over the question of politicalshirking by extending the range of phenomena examined toinclude congressional foreign travel our analysis providesevidence that opportunism is a problem in congress we findthat last period problems have arisen in the area of foreigntravel and that increased scrutiny to the problem on the partof congress only shifted consumption patterns i e legislators began taking foreign junkets near but not at theend of their legislative careers not all foreign travelshould be construed as worthless junketing since there isstrong evidence that some foreign travel is related tomembers responsibilities on congressional committees

regulation and the theory of legislative choice the interstate commerce act of 1887 this article concerns the economic incidence of the interstate commerce act of 1887 ica our focus is the short haul pricing constraint a provision of the ica that prohibited railroads from charging higher rates to isolated primarily agrarian shippers than it charged to intercity shippers of similar commodities utilizing the event study methodology we find that the impending passage of the ica generated a distribution of abnormal returns to railroads and shipping firms that is consistent with the theoretical implications of our analysis of the short haul pricing constraint shpc however early interpretations of the shpc by the interstate commerce commission reduced some of the abnormal returns to railroads in a manner that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the short haul pricing constraint was an important mechanism of early railroad regulation the analysis does support a multiple interest interpretation of the interstate commerce act and has implications for the positive theory of regulation

divided we reform evidence from us welfare policies abstract divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock i investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in us states between 1978 and 2010 panel data regressions show that under divided government a us state is around 25 more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government several robustness checks confirm this counter intuitive finding case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor senate and house

campaign finance reform and electoral competition using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002 this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races this is reflected in several dimensions conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins the regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office and they increase the probability that incumbents win re election campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

final voting in legislatures in representative democracies such as the united states legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process for example much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs ideological influences on congressional voting behavior in this approach the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups including the legislator s own preferences for wealth and ideology james kau and paul rubin 1979 joseph kalt and mark zupan 1984 sam peltzman 1985 missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence gary becker 1983 as such rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature in this paper we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control we seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing sequence and outcomes of such votes specifically we look at final floor voting in the u s congress the patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required the findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints in section i the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail the purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization rather it is to focus the reader s attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature empirical results including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills are reported in section ii the data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the u s house of representatives during the 96th and 98th congresses some concluding remarks are offered in section iii

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

supermajority rule the law of 1 n and government spending a synthesis i develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending where the coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition an increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending a higher requirement increases the tax price internalized by the minimum winning coalition but also increases the number of districts included in this coalition i develop separate models in which the spending in question consists of i a nonexcludable good ii a distributive consumption good iii infrastructure spending and iv a transfer payment a supermajority rule has no effect on spending for nonexcludable goods and ambiguous effects on spending for distributive projects and infrastructure spending an increased supermajority requirement does unambiguously reduce transfer spending i also relate the supermajority rule to the law of 1 n if the coase theorem holds and a minimum winning coalition forms an increase in the number of districts n has precisely the same effect on overall expenditure as a decrease in the supermajority requirement thus the ambiguous spending effects stemming from supermajority rule carry over into this version of the law of 1 n

local intergovernmental competition and the law of 1 n this article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal law of 1 n and leviathan theories which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases and the costs of distributive politics which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases using a panel of u s state and local government spending data empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the leviathan model is partially offset by the law of 1 n this result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

state government expenditure determinants and tax revenue determinants revisited the primary aim of the research was to test the general hypothesis that many institutional and political variables affect fiscal outcomes that the preferences of public officials and the decision processes used to act on those preferences matter state government data state only not state and local from 1980 1985 and 1990 were used to specify state tax revenue and expenditure models a previous merrifield 1991 state tax revenue model identified many significant institutional and political variables but it was based only on 1985 data 49 observations the larger data set 147 observations including better data for some of the variables indicated that most of merrifield s 1991 findings are robust the state expenditure models facilitated a second test of the general institutional and political variable hypothesis as well as the hypotheses about specific variables the expenditure model also facilitated comparisons of expenditure and tax determinants and comparisons with results published in the literature though there are some noteworthy differences between the expenditure and tax models the expenditure models also supported many of the institutional and political variable hypotheses

budget institutions and fiscal policy in the u s states this paper summarizes state balanced budget requirements and the available empirical evidence on the effect of these rules on state fiscal policies existing state rules differ from many current proposals at the federal level they are typically restricted to part of the state budget they frequently permit short term borrowing and they lack formal enforcement mechanisms the paper also surveys previous research on how anti deficit provisions affect state fiscal policy the available evidence indicates that stringent anti deficit provisions lead to more rapid adjustment of state taxes and expenditures when fiscal deficits emerge this suggests that changing the federal budget process has the potential to affect federal fiscal policy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny evidence from the us states 1960 1997 buchanan and tullock 1962 demonstrates that supermajority rules can reduce tyranny of majority problems in a democracy however recent theoretical work by dixit grossman and gul 2000 postulates that this static analysis of supermajority rules may be inadequate to explain political decisions in a dynamic setting in fact supermajority rules may increase the incidence of majority tyranny because of rotating political representation using data from us state legislatures we examine the effect of supermajority rules on different categories of government expenditures and tax revenues during the latter half of the 20th century we find supermajority rules have little effect on general government expenditures and tax revenues however supermajority rules are associated with lower public welfare transfers which supports the traditional analysis of the fiscal effects of supermajority rules

divided we vote divided government is known to correlate with limited government but less is understood about the empirical conditions that lead to divided government this paper estimates the determinants of continuous and categorical measures of divided government in an empirical macro political economy model using 30 years of data from the american states voters support more divided government after increased government spending per dollar of tax revenues but more unified government after worsening incomes and unemployment rates only conditional support is found for the strategic moderating theory alesina and rosenthal in econometrica 64 6 1311 1341 1996 that focuses purely on midterm cycles and split ticket voting absent economic conditions

communication in federal politics universalism policy uniformity and the optimal allocation of fiscal authority the paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy relevant information depending on the type of policy under consideration communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible this generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending universalism and uniformity building on these findings i develop a theory of fiscal de centralization which revisits the work of oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication empirical results from a cross section of us municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

the new institutional economics and its applicability to development abstract the several remarkable developments in the social sciences which have come to be known as the new institutional economics nie have not yet been fully exploited for analyzing the determinants and effects of institutional change in the context of development this paper identifies two important components of the nie and illustrates both a potential complementarities between them and b their applicability to various problems and policies in the long term development of developing countries

political deadlocks and distributional information the value of the veil contractarian normative theory relies on the veil of ignorance construct to generate the political consensus required for its theories of justice by eliminating distributional information the veil is presumed to facilite consensus building by reducing conflict over the distributional effects of proposed constitutional rules or institutions this paper explores the extent to which excessive distributional information might also impede the ordinary day to day decision making of democratic institutions our analysis suggests that distributive information makes political deadlocks under majority rule more likely statistical evidence suggests that the efficacy of the u s congress has been reduced by the dramatic increase in distributional information made available to it over the past twenty five years

instability of collective decisions testing for cyclical majorities the issues of cyclical majorities and instability of collective choices have been in the fore front in the discussion of social choice mechanisms cycling lack of equilibria and so called chaos theorems have been prevalent in the public choice literature whether cycling actually occurs in processes that are decided by majority rule has been a long standing question however cycling has not been made quantifiable nor has it been clear how one would determine empirically whether majorities are cyclical in this paper cycling has been given an empirical meaning this paper provides a method to test for cyclical majorities and applies it to decisions made in the us congress the test results indicate stability and the presence of persistent winners and losers in congress

wagner s hypothesis in time series and cross section perspectives evidence from real data for 115 countries internationally comparable data on income and government expenditure for 115 countries covering the period 1950 80 are used to assess the validity of wagner s hypothesis individual country time series data and several intercountry cross sections are studied besides a tremendous diversity in the position for various countries the results indicate that while there is support for the hypothesis in some time series data sets such support is lacking in most cross section estimates much of the support for the hypothesis reported in many earlier studies therefore was probably due to either use of limited samples or inadequate data comparability across the observations studied copyright 1987 by mit press

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement comment the purpose of this comment has not been to question the main point of holcombe s paper unanimous legislative agreement if it occurs could be inefficient for the reasons put forth by holcombe the motivation for this comment is that holcombe s explanation for the existence of legislative unanimity is not a compelling one since it begs an important question that question is if the cooperation exists to maintain a unanimous coalition why does not the cooperation exist to maintain a less than unanimous coalition unless holcombe can answer this question satisfactorily his explanation for legislative unanimity is fundamentally flawed

obstacles in energy security an analysis of congressional and presidential framing in the united states despite decades of policymaking the u s has only recently made significant strides in becoming a more energy secure nation with a focus on the executive and legislative branches this paper investigates two possible political obstacles to achieve this policy goal the first question it asks is whether or not the two branches have been defining energy security in the same way as the concept itself has no universal definition it is possible that the branches have been focusing on different aspects of the term results from a content analysis of presidential speeches and congressional hearings suggest that no such division has occurred the subsequent question asks whether or not the two branches in tandem are providing the foundation for sound policy results suggest that congress and presidents have defined and discussed energy security in a generally balanced comprehensive and internally non conflictual way what policy emerges from these discussions should be the subject of future research

changing the price of pork the impact of local cost sharing on legislators demands for distributive public goods abstract the provision of public services through national legislatures gives legislators the chance to fund locally beneficial public projects using a shared national tax base nationally financed and provided local congestible public goods will be purchased at a subsidized price below marginal cost and may be inefficiently too large as a consequence an important assumption behind this inefficiency is that national legislators in fact demand more of the locally beneficial project as the local price for projects declines this paper provides the first direct test of this important assumption using legislators project choices following the passage of the water resources development act of 1986 wrda 86 we find legislators chosen water project sizes do fall as the local cost share rises with a price elasticity of demand ranging from 0 81 for flood control and shoreline protection projects to 2 55 for large navigation projects the requirement of wrda 86 that local taxpayers contribute a greater share to the funding of local water projects reduced overall proposed project spending in our sample by 35 and the federal outlay for proposed project spending by 48

gridlock and delegation in a changing world fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time if left unattended such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation to better understand the mechanics of policy making in a changing world we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation of powers system we show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion institutional features that in isolation elicit widespread criticism can effectively ameliorate policies susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change the critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation which increases all decision makers well being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation of powers system we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium the presence of drift provides an opportunity for self interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency

aid effectiveness and the politics of personalism this article examines how political institutions that provide an incentive to cultivate a personal vote condition the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in developing country democracies politicians in aid recipient countries with high levels of personalism are more likely to pursue corruption and target government spending to narrow constituencies because personalism affects these outcomes it provides incentives to use foreign aid for politically motivated spending at the expense of investing foreign aid in growth promoting public goods using panel data from 61 aid recipient democracies from 1961 to 2001 the author finds that aid increases growth in democracies with less personalist institutions but decreases growth in countries with high personalism the author also shows that personalism conditions the relationship between aid and the composition of government spending aid increases spending on public goods relative to narrow particularistic goods in countries with low person

fiscal forecasts and political systems a legislative budgeting perspective which are the institutional and constitutional settings that best reduce the tendency to manipulate fiscal forecasts this paper addresses the question by examining the quality of fiscal forecasts at different stages of the budget process in 13 european union countries by using annual forecast vintages 1999 2013 from stability and convergence programmes both the role of political structures and the balance of power between the executive and the legislature are assessed as determinants of systematic forecasting errors the findings suggest that the forecasting bias is more effectively countered in presidential and semi presidential systems in parliamentary systems with strong bicameralism and when executive legislature relations are constrained by checks and balances confirmation of these results is also provided by linking our approach to the fiscal institutionalist approach based on the form of fiscal governance and the stringency of fiscal rules in terms of institutional capacity if fiscal rules and legislative organizational and research capacity counter the executive s monopoly of fiscal forecasting strengthening the legislature s formal powers negatively influences the fiscal forecast accuracy indeed strategic considerations may induce the executive to anticipate the legislature s amendment or rejection of the tabled budget by means of more favourable economic and fiscal assumptions the crisis and its urgencies crisis seem to have weakened the effect of institutional executive legislature relations on fiscal forecast accuracy

comparative forecasting performance of symmetric and asymmetric conditional volatility models of an exchange rate abstract the relative out of sample forecasting quality of symmetric and asymmetric conditional volatility models of an exchange rate differs according to the symmetric and asymmetric evaluation criteria both symmetric and asymmetric forecast competitors of currency volatility are biased and systematically over predict volatility

do large cabinets favor large governments evidence on the fiscal commons problem for swiss cantons abstract the fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics for a panel of the 26 swiss cantons over the 1980 1998 periods this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes we distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments cabinet size and coalition size in addition we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation the results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government while fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent

public choice principles of redistricting this paper uses fundamental principles of public choice mainly the median voter theorem to develop a simple theory of redistricting the focus is on how closely policy outcomes correspond to majority rule the main results are 1 potential policy bias in favor of nonmajority groups is structurally linked to the number of legislative seats and the population and the structure of most states puts them very close to the theoretically maximum bias 2 random districting which might seem like the essence of neutrality does not eliminate policy bias on average 3 traditional principles of compact contiguous districts that respect existing political boundaries stressed in the supreme court s shaw v reno decision minimize the chance of nonmajoritarian outcomes our analysis also offers a gerrymandering explanation for the positive relation between seats and spending that is usually taken as support for the law of 1 n

territorial competition in china and the west chien s s and gordon i territorial competition in china and the west regional studies in modern western societies and most other economies to which it has spread territorial economic competition is associated with a combination of competitive electoral politics and private land ownership in mainland china however a very strong form of this competition has emerged without either of these supports in general the development of such local collective action and its particular effects reflect an interaction between materially interested local agents and structural pressures the difference in china is that these agents are principally local government leaders whose career prospects within a still centralized system depend upon performance in terms of economic criteria set from above chien s s et gordon i la competition territoriale en chine et dans l ouest regional studies dans les societes occidentales d aujourd hui et dans la plupart des autres economies auxquelles elle s est etendue la

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

constitutional political economy in the european union this article surveys recent research in constitutional political economy in europe although not all of theworks discussed necessarily focus only on european constitutional issues or are written by europeans european constitutional issues figure importantly in each area surveyed the article examines the literatures linking constitutional institutions to economic growth government size government deficits and corruption bicameralism direct democracy and federalism three exclusively european topics also are covered constitutional issues in the transition countries the structure of the european union and the draft constitution for the european union

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

does the size of the legislature affect the size of government evidence from two natural experiments this paper makes use of regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of the number of legislators on the size of government the results indicate a negative effect i e the larger the size of the legislature the smaller is the size of government this runs counter to conventional wisdom one potential explanation is that more legislators can better control a budget maximizing bureaucracy i present evidence that is consistent with the proposed mechanism

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

are the garch models best in out of sample performance abstract out of sample performance of exchange rate volatility model depends on criteria used to measure it the linear garch models cannot generally outperform the nonlinear models in the rmse criterion furthermore the nonparametric kernel model is best in the mae criterion

deviations from constituent interests the role of legislative structure and political parties in the states this paper investigates the determinants of state spending over 1960 1990 recent empirical studies suggest that state government expenditure is greater than the electorate desires our main finding is that expenditure was positively related to the number of seats in a state s legislature this is consistent with the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would like we also find that political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure but do influence the composition of spending in particular democratic control of state government is associated with higher levels of welfare spending

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

the m form hierarchy and china s economic reform for 13 years from 1979 to 1991 economic reforms in china have generated a significant growth its gnp grew at an average annual rate of 8 7 or at 7 37 for per capita gnp 1 the chinese economic performance is in contrast to that of eastern europe and the former ussr the average growth rate of gdp in hungary was 1 8 between 1981 and 1985 and almost zero in 1988 and 1989 in poland the average gdp growth rate was less than 2 between 1981 and 1989 from both theoretical and policy perspectives china s outstanding reform performances and associated differ ent reform strategies from those of eastern europe and the ussr are particularly interesting and puzzling there are two popular views in explaining the differences between china and eastern europe the first view states that china was at a much lower development stage than eastern europe and the ussr 3 the second view argues that china has followed a gradual and piecemeal approach as

bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium recent papers have established that bicameralism can support a non empty core in majority voting games in two dimensional policy spaces we generalise this result to the n dimensional case and provide a discussion of multi cameralism bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria by institutionalising opposition between mutually oriented median voters this provides a clear link with the standard median voter model and with more traditional analyses of bicameralism

modeling heteroscedasticity in daily foreign exchange rates this article estimates autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic arch and generalized arch garch models for five foreign currencies using 10 years of daily data a variety of arch and garch specifications a number of nonnormal error densities and a comprehensive set of diagnostic checks it finds that arch and garch models can usually remove all heteroscedasticity in price changes in all five currencies goodness of fit diagnostics indicate that exponential garch with certain nonnormal distributions fits the canadian dollar extremely well and the swiss franc and the deutsche mark reasonably well only one nonnormal distribution fits the japanese yen reasonably well none fit the british pound

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

bicameral sequence theory and state legislative evidence theory voting sequence is a strategic variable between bicameral chambers decisions by chambers to acquire costly information affect the payoffs chambers receive from sequencing choices thus it is also a strategic variable between bicameral chambers hypotheses 1 because of incentives to take advantage of one chamber s informational expertise when chambers share relatively homogeneous policy preferences house chambers in legislatures dominated by a single party will initiate adopted legislation in greater proportion relative to legislatures that are not dominated by a single party 2 a cost advantage in acquiring information grows with an increasing disparity in the number of legislators between bicameral chambers lower information acquisition costs in the larger bicameral chamber account for a persistent first mover advantage for that chamber methods hypotheses are derived from a game theoretic model in which informational endowments are endogenously chosen by bicameral chambers and in which voting sequence is endogenously determined implications of the model are tested with an original data set developed from the session laws of thirty three state legislatures results under specified conditions bicameral chambers sequence themselves to take advantage of one chamber s informational expertise under other conditions bicameral chambers will not take advantage of a chamber s informational expertise the main theoretical results conclude 1 that one party legislatures take greater advantage of informational expertise relative to divided party legislatures 2 that senators have an incentive to specialize in more risky policy environments relative to house members and 3 that there is an informational basis for house chambers to initiate more adopted legislation than senate chambers the empirical results are consistent with hypothesis 1 the results are consistent with hypothesis 2 although an alternative noncontradictory theory might also account for the result

legislative term limits and state spending supporters of legislative term limits often claim that they will lower state spending levels using fiscal data from 48 states from 1977 to 2001 this paper finds little support for this assertion instead this analysis finds that states with term limits have higher spending levels than states without term limits these results suggest that term limits give legislators greater incentives to deviate from socially optimal fiscal policy by altering the legislative environment in which such policy is formulated

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

fiscal discipline and the budget process the critical economic policy issue for many oecd countries developing countries and transition economies currently is fiscal consolidation and the maintenance of long run fiscal balance two related components underlie this general goal first several countries face the issue of deficit reduction particularly those countries with high debt gdp ratios second it is becoming increasingly apparent that major reforms of the welfare system and specifically of social security systems are critical ingredients of a long lasting fiscal consolidation see alesina and perotti 1995a in the case of monetary policy a constructive discussion has generated a widespread consensus about the benefits of different monetary institutions relatively few economists dispute the benefits of a certain amount of central bank independence even though different commentators and policymakers may disagree on the optimal degree of independence also a contracting approach has highlighted the benefit of inflation targeting and of certain institutional relationships contracts between the executive and the central bank a similar theoretical and empirical discussion on the role of budget procedures and budget institutions is just beginning in this paper we ask the following two questions i do budget procedures matter for the determination of the budget balance and its composition ii are there certain institutional reforms that one should feel comfortable in recommending based on the relatively scarce empirical evidence available we tentatively answer yes to the first question budget procedures matter on the second question we suggest that the two critical areas of reform are first more transparency second a strengthening of the roles of the executive branch vis a vis the legislature and of the treasury minister vis a vis the rest of the executive branch in order to achieve a centralized and top bottom approach to the budget process

committee characteristics and re election margins an empirical investigation of the us house models of legislative organization frequently begin with the premise that the committee system serves the re election interests of incumbent legislators attempts to substantiate this notion empirically have been unsuccessful nevertheless the notion lives on nourished by a stylized characterization of the committee system in the standard model committees have jurisdictional monopolies over specialized policy areas and legislators gravitate toward those committees that deal most closely with the policy concerns of their constituents contrary to this simplifying characterization the degree of monopoly control and policy specialization varies across standing committees in the us congress some committees have wide jurisdictions and attract members with diverse policy preferences jurisdictional overlap and resulting turf battles are common aspects of congressional sessions we suggest here that these realities warrant a re opening of the empirical investigation into the link between electoral success and committee characteristics our findings indicate that assignment to a committee with a relatively high degree of monopoly control increases a member s vote share and that assignment to a narrowly focused specialized committee does not

legislative organization and government spending cross country evidence abstract the law of 1 n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact the law of 1 n has received only limited empirical scrutiny and the existing evidence for the american states provides mixed support for the thesis this paper examines the law of 1 n in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross section of democratic countries the results indicate that legislative size matters under both legislature structures but bicameralism dampens the 1 n effect relative to unicameralism

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

institutional interest ownership type and environmental capital expenditures evidence from the most polluting chinese listed firms this study empirically examines whether firms environmental capital expenditures impact institutional investors investment decisions in the chinese market we particularly examine the impact of ownership type on the relationship of environmental capital expenditures and the behavior of different types of institutional investors by classifying institutional investors into two categories short term and long term investors in addition this study further investigates whether environmental capital expenditures related to ownership type increase firm value we find that long term institutional investors tend to invest in state owned firms soes making environmental capital expenditures results also indicate that with governmental backing and encouragement the market value of soes making more environmental capital expenditures is likely to increase however no similar results are found for non soes

fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments evidence from china abstract this paper examines how fiscal incentives affect the policy choices of local governments in the context of china based on exogenous changes in the intergovernmental revenue sharing scheme we construct a simulated instrumental variable to resolve the endogeneity problem we find evidence that local governments shifted their efforts from fostering industrial growth to urbanizing china i e to developing the real estate and construction sectors when their retention rate of enterprise tax revenue was reduced the increase from the new revenue source compensated for half of the losses in revenue that resulted from the reassignment of fiscal rights the reassignment had also the effect of retarding the industrial growth of domestically owned firms in particular

supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining this paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule that requires logrolling across additional members increases with the ratio of seats in the house relative to seats in the senate using a panel of us states 1970 2008 we find that the ratio of house to senate seats has a robust positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget our finding implies that a supermajority rule can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes in bicameral legislatures owing to two factors the geographic overlap between chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods

does duration of political control matter interstate differences in branch banking laws this study began by trying to explain differences in state branch banking regulations introducing a variable that captures the effect of political dominance over time improves upon the commonly used measures of political dominance at a specific point in time even the direct comparison with the previously used percentage point in time variables shows that duration of political influence matters significantly no matter which party is in control the length of time it has been in control in a state influences political outcomes we show that in terms of which kind of legislation will be enacted democratic and republican control exert equal but opposite effects on legislative results in other words length of control matters independently of party affiliation but party affiliation affects the nature of the outcome of the political process

m form hierarchy with poorly diversified divisions a case of khrushchev s reform in soviet russia we test the premise of the theoretical literature that m form political hierarchies are effective in creating yardstick competition between regional divisions only when those divisions have sufficiently diversified or similar industrial composition the reason for this is that the competition among poorly diversified inter related divisions creates incentives for regional leaders to pursue policies that inhibit industrial growth in neighboring regions in order to make their own region look better from the point of view of the center we use a unique episode in soviet history when a traditional soviet unitary form u form hierarchy was replaced by a multidivisional form m form organization namely khrushchev s sovnarkhoz reform first we demonstrate that during this reform regional leaders were subjected to relative performance evaluation which created incentives to generate industrial growth second we show that these career concerns resulted in higher growth in regions with sufficiently diversified and therefore self contained economies and lower growth in highly specialized regions

executive veto power and credit claiming the line item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending a model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods the item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades

how to reform a planned economy lessons from china the countries of eastern europe and the former soviet union have been flooded with advice from the west on how to liberalize their planned econo mies this advice is unfortunately offered in an empirical vacuum no one knows how these econo mies will react to the proposed liberalization meas ures there exists however a neglected source of information china offers a long time series of data over a decade s worth on the effects of reforms on a planned economy china s reforms were gradual but their cumulative effect has been large and they have been remarkably successful china s experiments provide some practical les sons on what kinds of reforms can work elsewhere the dominant school of thought among economists favours the big bang policy of reforming quickly and according to a comprehensive plan partial reforms in this view are useless they will be negated by the remnants of the planning system the proponents of big bang reform have been influential with poland czechoslovakia and rus sia announcing plans for a rapid transition to capi talism

bicameral legislatures and fiscal policy john stuart mill s observation in the mid 19th century is clearly outdated the two chamber question receives scant attention in modern political economy the absence of continued debate might simply reflect a general satisfaction with the dual chambered structure as a desirable democratic institution most developed democracies and all but one of the american states have adopted a bicameral legislative structure in this paper we stress the many variations in bicameralism even among the american states and the effects these variations have on policy making and fiscal outcomes put simply bicameralism is not an all or none institution instead bicameralism is a variable institution that alters the identity of the median legislator within each chamber and determines the similarity of the dominant coalitions between the two chambers in this perspective the impact of bicameralism on policy comes principally from the different bases of representation across the two chambers moreover the analysis stresses that the degree of bicameralism changes regularly as a consequence of the redistricting process the remainder of the paper is organized as follows section 2 reviews the main conceptual arguments underlying the function of a bicameral organization section 3 examines implications for fiscal policy using data from the american states we develop several measures of bicameralism using detailed constituency data on economic and demographic characteristics at the level of state legislative districts we then use these measures to examine the effect of interdistrict constituent homogeneity on total state government spending as well as on the major com