strategic behavior and partial cost sharing abstract the main objects here are games in which players mainly compete but nonetheless collaborate on some subsidiary activities play assumes a two stage nature in that first stage moves presume coordination of some subsequent tasks specifically we consider instances where second stage coordination amounts to partial cost sharing anticipated and sustained as a core solution examples include regional cournot oligopolies with joint transportation we define and characterize equilibria and inquire about their existence

using ols to estimate and test for structural changes in models with endogenous regressors summary we consider the problem of estimating and testing for multiple breaks in a single equation framework with regressors that are endogenous i e correlated with the errors we show that even in the presence of endogenous regressors it is still preferable in most cases to simply estimate the break dates and test for structural change using the usual ordinary least squares ols framework except for some knife edge cases it delivers estimates of the break dates with higher precision and tests with higher power compared to those obtained using an instrumental variable iv method also the ols method avoids potential weak identification problems caused by weak instruments to illustrate the relevance of our theoretical results we consider the stability of the new keynesian hybrid phillips curve iv based methods only provide weak evidence of instability on the other hand ols based ones strongly indicate a change in 1991 q1 and that after this date the model loses all explanatory power copyright 2013 john wiley sons ltd

why has u s inflation become harder to forecast we examine whether the u s rate of price inflation has become harder to forecast and to the extent that it has what changes in the inflation process have made it so the main finding is that the univariate inflation process is well described by an unobserved component trend cycle model with stochastic volatility or equivalently an integrated moving average process with time varying parameters this model explains a variety of recent univariate inflation forecasting puzzles and begins to explain some multivariate inflation forecasting puzzles as well

models of military expenditure a brief review of the extensive empirical literature devoted to explaining levels of military expenditure indicates a wide variety of unreconciled results however comparing the alternative models is not straightforward this paper uses british post war military expenditures to illustrate some of the methodological issues involved in model comparison evaluation and selection starting from two published models for the uk a systematic specification search leads to a new model which dominates alternative specifications passes a wide range of misspecification tests and also fits well to french data

economics of alliances the lessons for collective action this essay provides an up to date summary of the findings of the literature on the economics of alliances we show that the study of the economics of alliances has played a pivotal role in understanding and applying public good analysis to real world applications we establish that the manner in which alliances address burden sharing and allocative issues is related to strategic doctrines weapon technology perceived threats and membership composition past contributions are evaluated and areas needing further development are identified the theoretical and empirical knowledge gained from the study of alliances is shown to be directly applicable to a wide range of international collectives

the triple entente and the triple alliance 1880 1914 a collective goods approach the distribution of burdens in alliances may be explained in terms of public and private outputs a joint product model is applied to the triple alliance and triple entente using generalized least squares auto regressive moving average gls arma techniques and time series data results indicate that countries regarded allies military effort more as complements than as substitutes though several examples of free riding behavior are noted the method used here may provide more accurate estimation of publicness problems than is found in the usual static tests

economic models of nato abstract the seminal work of olson and zeckhauser 1966 on the economic theory of alliances in particular nato provides the theoretical background for this paper after restating their results on alliance allocation behavior in a formal framework we show that these results may fail in a context with decentralized production of the public defense commodity finally we introduce a simple mechanism which allows the implementation of an efficient allocation characterized by proportional burden sharing and cost monotonicity these results can also be applied to other public goods problems

complementarity free riding and the military expenditures of nato allies abstract this paper examines the major influences of an ally s demand for military expenditures demand equations are estimated for a sample of nato nations using the iterative seemingly unrelated regressions technique evidence is presented indicating that structural changes occured in these equations in the early 1970s this instability is the predicted effect of the doctrine of flexible response adopted by nato during this time period the statistical tests show that the medium sized nuclear powers military expenditures responded identically to income and defense spillins the same held true for the lowland allies

cost sharing under increasing returns a comparison of simple mechanisms a technology with decreasing marginal costs is used by agents with equal rights each agent demands a quantity of output and costs are divided by means of a fixed formula several such mechanisms are compared for the existence of nash equilibrium demand profiles and for the equity properties of these equilibria among three mechanisms average cost pricing the shapley shubik cost sharing and serial cost sharing only the latter two possess at least one nash equilibrium on a reasonable domain of individual preferences only the serial cost sharing equilibria pass the equity tests of no envy and stand alone cost journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d63

robust monetary policy structural breaks and nonlinearities in the reaction function of the central bank of brazil abstract in this work we seek to investigate the existence of nonlinearities in the reaction function of the central bank of brazil arising from this policymaker s uncertainties about the effects of the output gap on inflation theoretically we follow tillmann 2011 to obtain a nonlinear optimal monetary policy rule that is robust to uncertainty about the output inflation trade off of the phillips curve in addition we perform structural break tests to assess possible changes in the conduct of the brazilian monetary policy during the inflation targeting regime the results indicate that i the uncertainties about the slope in the phillips curve implied nonlinearities in the central bank of brazil s reaction function ii we cannot reject the hypothesis of a structural break in the monetary rule parameters occurring in the third quarter of 2003 iii there was an increase in the response of the selic rate to output gap and a weaker response to the current inflation gap in meirelles tombini s administration and iv the central bank of brazil has also reacted to the exchange rate in meirelles tombini s administration

exploration information and aec regulation of the domestic uranium industry abstract for roughly twenty years following the second world war the atomic energy commission was the only purchaser of domestically produced uranium such monopsony power implicitly allowed the atomic energy commission s to regulate the u s uranium industry this paper investigates the atomic energy commission s implicit regulation asking if an efficient allocation of resources was induced the main finding is that undesirably high levels of exploration were induced

alternative collective goods models of military alliances theory and empirics i introduction in a seminal article mancur olson and richard zeckhauser 1966 characterized the north atlantic treaty organization nato in the mid 1960s as a group of allies who shared a pure public good in the form of deterrence to qualify as a pure public good a good s benefits must be nonexcludable i e available to all group members once provided and nonrival in consumption i e consumption opportunities associated with a unit of the good do not decline with the number of users pure public goods are characterized by free riding behavior owing to non excludability which permits individuals to partake in the benefits of the good without expending their own scarce resources olson and zeckhauser also demonstrated that a pure public good such as deterrence is associated with an exploitation hypothesis whereby the large agents allies shoulder the payment burdens of the small agents allies using data from 1964 olson and zeckhauser 1966 274 77 established that defense burdens are positively correlated with the economic size of the allies as measured by gross national product gnp over the next twenty five years a large literature has generalized and extended the olson and zeckhauser collective goods theory of alliances van ypersele de strihou 1967 recognized that defense expenditures could generate country specific private benefits e g disaster relief protection of colonies management of domestic unrest along with purely public deterrence with the presence of ally specific benefits the strength of the exploitation hypothesis is attenuated since a small ally might willingly shoulder a relatively large burden provided that this ally views its defense expenditures as possessing a large share of nation specific benefits in a series of articles murdoch sandler and others 1 formulated a joint product model in which the military activity of an ally yields pure public impure public and or private jointly produced outputs or benefits if the benefits derived from the allies military expenditures were from a single purely public good then the joint product model would obviously degenerate to the model of olson and zeckhauser 1966 murdoch and sandler 1984 sandler and forbes 1980 and sandler and murdoch 1990 have shown that the joint product model outperforms the pure public good deterrence model for nato during various time periods in recent years a number of important contributions to the collective good analysis of alliances have appeared these include the inclusion of foreign trade considerations wong 1991 marginal cost differentials among allies mcguire 1990 weber and wiesmeth 1991 leader follower behavior bruce 1990 and median voter considerations dudley and montmarquette 1981 murdoch sandler and hansen 1991 and okamura 1991 mcguire and groth 1985 engineered an econometric procedure for distinguishing between allocative processes e g non cooperative and cooperative within an alliance while subsequent work by sandler and murdoch 1990 operationalized this econometric procedure until now collective good models of alliances have computed alliancewide defense levels by simply summing the allies expenditures however the appropriate manner for aggregating defense efforts among allies may depend on geographical strategic and technological determinants for example the defense efforts of the weakest ally or link along a front may determine the strength of the allies defenses since the enemy s ability to penetrate behind the front hinges on the weakest fortification hirshleifer 1983 in consequence the minimal defense level of the allies and not the sum determines alliance capabilities the purpose of this paper is fivefold first we intend to look at different methods of aggregating allies military expenditures to determine alliancewide defense levels three procedures summation weakest link and best shot are examined

strategic interaction among governments in the provision of a global public good abstract how do governments respond to other governments when providing a global public good using data from 2007 to 2014 on medical research funding for infectious and parasitic diseases we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries respond to funding changes by the us government which accounts for half of funding for these diseases because funding across governments might be positively correlated due to unobserved drivers they have in common we use variation in the representation of research intensive universities on us congressional appropriations committees as an instrument for us funding we find that a 10 increase in us government funding for a disease is associated with a 2 to 3 reduction in funding for that disease by another government in the following year

the political economy of scandinavian neutrality the article examines whether three of the neutral nations of eu rope sweden switzerland and finland have adhered to their choice of armed neu trality by being self reliant on their own defenses using a joint product model the authors specify a reduced form equation for a nation s demand for military expenditures empirical estimates of these demands suggest that sweden free rod e on nato after institution of the doctrine of flexible response however the o thertwo netural nations have been self reliant throughout the period 1957 82 w ith pooled data cross equation restrictions highlight theessential differences between nato and nonaligned scandinavian countries copyright 1986 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

large versus small foreign exchange interventions abstract we use non temporal threshold analysis to investigate the exchange rate effects of large versus small interventions more than two decades of official daily data on intervention in the jpy usd market facilitate our analysis we find no evidence that small interventions exert a discernible influence on the exchange rate while large interventions significantly influence the exchange rate in the theoretically consistent manner we conclude that small interventions may not be considered a determinant of the exchange rate while large interventions constitute an important element in our understanding and modeling of the exchange rate

the demand for military expenditures an international comparison earlier studies have explained inter country variations in the share of gnp devoted to military expenditures by international spillovers and by differences in the threat of attack related to relative incomes in this paper we use the theory of public choice to explain these differences we attempt to measure the importance of both international spillovers and relative incomes along with two other factors the tax price elasticity of demand and economies of scale in the consumption of security we find that international spillovers are significant and positive that the income elasticity of demand is greater than unity that the tax price elasticity of demand explains part of observed inter country differences and that there are considerable economies of scale in the consumption of military spending finally between 1960 and 1975 there was apparently a substantial increase in the value which each country derived from a dollar of military spending by its allies this phenomenon which seems related to the increased importance of deterrent weapons has tended to induce individual alliance members to reduce the share of their national income devoted to defense

origins of the federal reserve system international incentives and the domestic free rider problem from the civil war to 1914 the united states had one of the worst e nancial systems in the world the dominant institutional feature of the system was the absence of a central bank and its most salient performance characteristics were the recurrence of banking panics and severe seasonal interest rate e uctuations these e nancial problems were economically costly panics were accompanied by sharp declines in the money supply reduced economic activity and increased unemployment and business failures in 1913 congress created the federal reserve system to safeguard the nation from panics and smooth out interest rate seasonals in more general terms the federal reserve was established to provide the national public good of e nancial system stability in this study i explain how american society overcame the collective action problems that normally constrain the production of public goods to inadequate levels in other words the article is about the political effort that produced an infrastructural cornerstone of the modern u s economy in the face of incentives that should have left few people with sufficient motivation to pay for the improvement i bring to bear a joint products selective incentives argument to explain the voluntary collective action behind the federal reserveact 1 the lobbying effort was aboutsolving thepanic problem tobe sure but becausethisexpected benee t approximated a societywide public good it did not on its own motivate collective action instead the united states faced a second problem of e nancial organization before 1914 and it was this problem that created a private inducement to lobby for the federal reserve the structure of the domestic e nancial machinery contributed not only to instability at home but also to the near complete absence of the u s dollar in global e nancial affairs indeed the united states was the only major trading country whose currency did not function as an international currency before 1914 the new this article is a revision of a paper delivered at the 1996annual convention of the southern economic association washington d c 23 25 november i thank michael bordo marc busch william r clark benjamin j cohen barry eichengreen jeffry frieden william keech stephen krasner charles lipson jameslivingston louispauly georgeselgin bethsimmons richardtimberlake danielverdier eugene n white and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments 1 see olson 1965 and sandler 1992

on the status of the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium in economic theory in economic theory the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium is a widely used equilibrium concept nevertheless the concept is frequently misunderstood and misleading explanations and interpretations are often given this paper presents a sample of such frequently appearing misleading explanations and goes on to explain why they are misleading the case for using the nash noncooperative equilibrium concept is stronger than what is implied by the many misleading statements found in the literature a basic issue is whether it can be argued that decisions in accordance with the noncooperative equilibrium theory are individually rational decisions this issue is not covered by the classical rationality postulate in economic theory this problem is tackled by stating certain postulates which may be taken as defining individual rationality in situations of noncooperative interaction it is shown that nash behavior satisfies these postulates

the theory of collective action and burden sharing in nato mancur olson s theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the north atlantic treaty organization nato in the early years of the cold war but the association between economic size gross domestic product or gdp and defense burden the ratio of military expenditures to gdp has declined to insignificant levels two influences are shown to be important in producing this change the increased pursuit of private goods by greece turkey and portugal and the growing cooperation among the other european allies since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the europeans with credible means of self defense it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in europe during the postwar period nato is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good accordingly the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance

burden sharing in the nato alliance an empirical test of alternative views this paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances the first view associated with olson and zeckhauser argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members a second view argues that nato defense activities produce a mix of outputs some of which are not purely public and some of which may be complementary across nations furthermore the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies the test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of nato members and their population and relative wealth shares a simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data the empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the olson zeckhauser non cooperative model

the origins of central banking solutions to the free rider problem certain domestic institutions are sources of international power by way of their abilities to encourage investment and to mobilize social resources in wartime for example states with democratic institutions almost always win the wars they e ght a regularity known as the democratic advantage 1 this result is intriguing since it rests on intuition about the effects of military competition on domestic institutions rivalry among states may put pressure on sovereigns to provide the political foundations for secure markets in order to enlarge future military capabilities in this article i address the role of war in inducing domestic institutions that allowed governments to credibly commit to promises to pay their debts a probable source of democracies edge in war rather than investigate the entire range of protections affected by democratic institutions a life s endeavor as the work of douglass north attests i focus on a single e nancial element of the reforms the innovation of central banking britain s superior e nancial economic and military performance after 1689 rested in large part on the establishment of the bank of england 2 the central bank provided a commitment technology that improved the government s ability to borrow a need impelled by intense military competition 3 my motivation derives from puzzles concerning the origins and the diffusion of credibility enhancing institutions like central banks institutions resolve collective action problems but institutions themselves are public goods meaning that their origins are subject to the same dilemmas they are meant to resolve 4 what then explains the incentives of self interested and free riding individuals to contribute to

consistency of the least squares estimator in threshold regression with endogeneity this paper shows that when the threshold variable is independent of other covariates such as in the structural change model the least squares estimator of the threshold point is consistent even if endogeneity is present

decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale we consider the problem of cost sharing in the presence of increasing returns to scale and potential strategic behavior on the part of consumers we show that any smooth and strictly monotonic mechanism for which a nash equilibrium exists for all profiles of convex and monotonic preferences must be dictatorial however we propose a cost sharing mechanism the decreasing serial mechanism for which an interesting domain restriction ensures existence of a noncooperative equilibrium for its cost sharing game a characterization theorem of the mechanism based on the strategic properties of existence uniqueness and efficiency of its noncooperative equilibrium is provided journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d70 cost allocation is a practical problem that organizations of all kinds face universities allocate computing costs among departments aviation authorities set landing fees for aircraft based on their size regulatory com missions set rates for electricity water and other utilities based on the costs of providing these services the common feature in all of these exam ples is that prices are not determined externally by market forces but are set internally by mutual agreement or administrative decision a simple situation where a cost sharing problem can emerge is when a set of users share a technology that transforms a single input into a single output we study this cost sharing problem when the cost function is increasing and concave examples include the division of costs incurred in setting telephone lines or a water supply system the assessment of fees to pay for a secretary or a gardener s services and so on the situations we have in mind are those of cooperative production or natural nonregulated monopolies for either of these situations there is no obvious answer to the question of how to divide the cost of producing the total output among the users

an econometric technique for comparing median voter and oligarchy choice models of collective action the case of the nato alliance this paper devises an empirical methodology for discriminating between the median voter model and the oligarchy choice model when applied to the collective provision of a public good in particular an empirical methodology is engineered so that a nested test procedure can evaluate competing models the authors apply this methodology to examine the demand for military activities of ten members of the nato alliance a two stage least squares procedure corrected for autocorrelation is used to estimate the demand equations test results vary some allies abide by the median voter model others by the oligarchy model and still others by neither copyright 1991 by mit press

var based estimation of euler equations with an application to new keynesian pricing abstract var based estimation of euler equations exploits cross equation restrictions that the theory imposes on a vector autoregressive var process for market expectations this paper shows that sargent s 1979 a note on maximum likelihood estimation of the rational expectations model of the term structure journal of monetary economics 5 133 143 original approach of imposing these restrictions on the endogenous variable of the euler equation i e computing the rational expectations solution implies multiple solutions and is therefore impracticable the paper shows that this identification problem can be circumvented by reverse engineering the cross equation restrictions on the forcing variable of the euler equation the proposed reverse engineering approach contrasts with the conventional approach in the literature that avoids the identification problem by constraining the system formed by the euler equation and the var process to yield a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium this uniqueness condition makes little economic sense because the var process is just a reduced form approximation of true market expectations and a simulation experiment shows that imposing uniqueness can lead to severe misspecification bias the severity of this misspecification bias is illustrated in practice with an application to gali and gertler s 1999 inflation dynamics a structural econometric analysis journal of monetary economics 44 195 222 hybrid new keynesian phillips curve

the political economy of the peace dividend we develop a model of the peace dividend and use it to predict the fiscal consequences of a reduction in the demand for military spending the model is based on the assumption that the political process responds to political demands and costs in a way that maximizes net political benefits the predictions of our model on how a peace dividend will be allocated over nonmilitary spending tax relief and deficit reduction is tested against the experience of eight major wars in united states history

inconsistency of 2sls estimators in threshold regression with endogeneity abstract this paper shows the inconsistency of three forms of 2sls estimators to illustrate the specialty of the endogeneity problem in threshold regression