the political economics of redistribution inequality and tax avoidance a central result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality however empirical evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed this paper shows how the different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement by focusing on structure induced equilibrium in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of tax enforcement we show that more inequality may well reduce the extent of redistribution depending on two opposing effects the standard political effect and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue

a distributional theory of government growth this article presents a closed form solution for time consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter extending meltzer and richard s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government at low stages of economic development the median voter identified as a relatively poor worker prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage at higher stages of development however when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises yet in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times hence government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state

tests of a rational theory of the size of government in many countries the political party holding power changes more frequently than the trend growth rates in government spending and taxes shifts of political power are often preceded by rhetoric about meeting needs or cutting taxes which post election performances rarely match yet changes in the size of government up and down occur on average the size of government measured by the share of taxes or spending to output has increased in many countries during the past century but changes in size occur at diffrent rates and at times the relative size of government declines

inequality redistribution and growth a challenge to the conventional political economy approach abstract this paper reconsiders the conventional political economy view that 1 1 more unequal societies tend to make more redistribution and 2 2 more redistribution is harmful to growth we present a number of theoretical arguments suggesting that the two previous implications are not necessarily true and that the empirically observed negative correlation between inequality and growth might just come from the fact that more unequal societies tend to redistribute less which in turn is actually detrimental to growth

spend it like beckham inequality and redistribution in the uk 1983 2004 a main activity of the state is to redistribute resources standard political economy models predict that a rise in inequality will lead to more redistribution this paper shows that for the uk in the period 1983 2004 a plausibly exogenous rise in income inequality has not been associated with increased redistribution we explore this example of the paradox of redistribution using attitudinal data we show that standard political economy models of the individual demand for redistribution do have explanatory power but that other attitudes and beliefs are also very important moreover these attitudes and beliefs change quite quickly so are very important in explaining variation in the demand for redistribution

solution of perfect foresight saddlepoint problems a simple method and applications abstract the paper proposes a method to compute adjustment dynamics that occur in infinite time horizon problems of deterministic optimal control without loss of accuracy this method is easier to implement than existing ones discussed applications are the standard neoclassical growth model and the general two sector growth model with cyclical adjustment on a two dimensional manifold

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

new ways of looking at old issues inequality and growth abstract the paper uses new cross country data on income and asset land distribution to show that i there is a strong negative relationship between initial inequality in the asset distribution and long term growth ii inequality reduces income growth for the poor but not for the rich and iii available longitudinal data provide little support for the kuznets hypothesis policies that increase aggregate investment and facilitate acquisition of assets by the poor might thus be doubly beneficial for growth and poverty reduction

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

time consistent redistribution if the government cares more about workers than about capitalists and taxes capital income to finance redistribution to workers how are inequality and capital accumulation affected in the long run assuming that the government cannot commit to future taxes a time consistent equilibrium a differentiable subgame perfect markov equilibrium is characterized in this equilibrium the current government in part uses the tax via capital accumulation to manipulate future governments into setting lower taxes the equilibrium has substantially lower taxes on capital income than 100 even though workers do not save and even though the weight on capitalists in government utility is negligible

the causes of government expenditure growth a survey of the u s evidence abstract the growth of government budgets can be broken down into a institutional and institutional components the former component the familiar substitution income and population public goods tax sharing effects is estimated to contribute about two fifths of the growth of u s government spending the latter component rent seeking political redistributions bureaucracy and perceptual informational impedimentia is important too but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory the cross effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures though interesting is not pursued

where on earth is everybody global matrices of bilateral migrant stocks spanning 1960 2000 are presented disaggregated by gender and based primarily on the foreign born definition of migrants more than one thousand census and population register records are combined to construct decennial matrices corresponding to the five census rounds between 1960 and 2000 for the first time a comprehensive picture of bilateral global migration over the second half of the 20th century emerges the data reveal that the global migrant stock increased from 92 million in 1960 to 165 million in 2000 quantitatively migration between developing countries dominates constituting half of all international migration in 2000 when the partition of india and the dissolution of the soviet union are accounted for migration between developing countries is remarkably stable over the period migration from developing to developed countries is the fastest growing component of international migration in both absolute and relative terms the united states has

the new economics of labor migration this paper reviews selected theoretical and empirical developments in the field of labor migration economics the migration behavior of individuals differs in accordance with their perceived relative deprivation those who are relatively more deprived tend to have stronger incentive to migrate than those who are relatively less deprived moreover a reference group characterized by more income inequality is likely to generate more relative deprivation highly skilled workers are also more likely to migrate migration decisions are often made jointly by the migrant and nonmigrant with a contractual arrangement regarding the sharing of costs and returns the exchange of commitments to share income provides coinsurance of particular interest are the determinants of the speed of adoption of migration as an innovation and the characteristics associated with the delay in the adoption of innovation new econometric techniques including techniques for the analysis of qualitative dependent variables techniques that correct for sample selection bias and those for the analysis of longitudinal data have substantially benefited empirical research in this area new methods that can correct for the biased estimate of the wages particular individuals would receive at 2 or more locations at the same point in time allow researchers to test locational decsion making models estimates of these structural models of labor migration support the hypothesis that individuals respond to income incentives in making the decsion to migrate further research is needed on the pazzling observation that migrant workers earn less than native born workers with similar characteristics during the 1st few years after migration but more thereafter other topics that need further research include the macroeconomic effects of migration the microeconomic and macroeconomic relationships between aging and labor migration and the migration behavior of dual earner families

thinking small poor economics a radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty review essay in poor economics abhijit banerjee and esther duflo eschew grand theorizing about poverty reduction in favor of an approach in which intelligently designed and tested small interventions based on a scientific understanding of the lives of the poor marginally improve their welfare in so doing they describe the findings from the recent large literature describing the behavior and institutions of the poor and the consequences of policy and experimental interventions targeted to poverty populations in this review i assess whether thinking small with its associated policy regime of transfers subsidies and nudges is both a practical and effective policy prescription for fighting poverty and whether the set of studies that have focused on populations that have not escaped poverty has improved our fundamental understanding of both the consequences and causes of poverty jel i32 i38 o15

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

imperfect information and the meltzer richard hypothesis standard majority voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean to median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed this paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean to median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple romer roberts meltzer richard framework with imperfect information in such a model it is important to consider the source of rising mean to median ratios income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich which tends to reduce the support for redistribution an empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first reagan tax cut

unilateral facilitation does not raise international labor migration from the philippines significant income gains from migrating from poorer to richer countries have motivated unilateral source country policies facilitating labor emigration however their effectiveness is unknown the authors conducted a large scale randomized experiment in the philippines testing the impact of unilaterally facilitating international labor migration the most intensive treatment doubled the rate of job offers but had no identifiable effect on international labor migration even the highest overseas job search rate that was induced 22 percent falls far short of the share initially expressing interest in migrating 34 percent the paper concludes that unilateral migration facilitation will at most induce a trickle not a flood of additional emigration

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

cyclical and noncyclical redistributive taxation consider the optimal time path of a tax on capital income the proceeds of which are transferred to labor in a lump sum it is known from earlier open loop formulations that if the optimal rate of tax converges to a point it converges to zero implying that in the long run a tax on capital income can do nothing for social welfare it is now shown that the optimal rate of tax need not converge to zero and in the case of feedback formulations that it may converge to a positive or negative number or to a limit cycle copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

explaining international and intertemporal variations in income inequality this paper explores the propositions that income inequality is relatively stable within countries and that it varies significantly among countries a new and expanded data set provides broad support for both propositions drawing on a political economy and capital market imperfection arguments to explain the intertemporal and international variation in inequality the empirical analysis shows that the predicted variables associated with the first argument a measure of civil liberties and the initial level of secondary schooling and the second argument a measure of financial depth and the initial distribution of land are indeed important determinants of inequality this paper explores two propositions regarding income inequality they are first income inequality is relatively stable within countries and second it varies significantly across countries to illustrate note that the gini coefficient in india remained almost constant for forty years 1951 92 with mean 32 6 and standard deviation 2 0 2 in contrast the variation in gini coefficients across countries is large 61 9 in honduras in 1968 compared with 17 8 in bulgaria in 1976 if substantiated these propositions have potentially significant implications for poverty the significance of the first is obvious barring any fundamental socio political change poverty reduction will depend crucially on the rate of economic growth given this the significance of the second is that in inegalitarian economies the poor will enjoy a smaller share of any national increment in income than in more egalitarian ones drawing on a new and expanded data set on inequality deininger and squire 1996a the first of the paper s three sections conducts standard statistical tests of the two propositions the sample comprises 573 observations on the most common measure of inequality the gini coefficient for 49 developed and developing countries covering the period 1947 94 the results broadly confirm our two propositions specifically analysis of variance anova shows that about 90 of the total variance in the gini coefficients

optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model abstract this paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by judd 1985 in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump sum payment to workers i show that the steady state optimal tax on capital income is generally non zero when the capitalists utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced budget constraint with log utility agents optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of return not any future rates of return or tax rates this feature of the economy effectively deprives the government of a useful policy instrument because promises about future tax rates can no longer influence current allocations when combined with a lack of other suitable policy instruments such as government bonds the result is an inability to decentralize the allocations that are consistent with a zero limiting capital tax i show that the standard approach to solving the dynamic optimal tax problem yields the wrong answer in this knife edge case because it fails to properly enforce the constraints associated with the competitive equilibrium specifically the standard approach lets in an additional policy instrument through the back door