contagion as a wealth effect financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous time model with two risky assets and three types of traders noise traders trade randomly in one market long term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets asset price dynamics are endogenously determined numerically as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise when convergence traders lose money they liquidate positions in both markets this creates contagion in that returns become more volatile and more correlated contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management during the f inancial panic associated with the default of the russian government in august 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund long term capital management numerous hedge funds banks and securities firms tried simultaneously to reduce exposures to a variety of financial instruments such as russian bonds brazilian stocks u s mortgages spreads between on therun and off the run government securities and spreads between swaps and u s treasuries although the fundamental values of these positions would appear to have little correlation during this financial crisis the asset prices in these markets exhibited the following common empirical pattern 1 financial intermediaries suffered losses as prices moved against their positions 2 market depth and liquidity decreased simultaneously in several markets 3 the volatility of prices increased simultaneously in several markets and

credit supply and the housing boom an increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market is the key force behind four empirical features of the housing boom before the great recession the unpreced

social absorption capability systems of innovation and manufactured export response to preferential trade incentives abstract in many extant analyses of the impact of non reciprocal system of trade preferences it is typical to focus on the details of market access value of tariff concessions as explanation for why export of beneficiaries may or may not respond to incentives very often the role that supply related factors can and do play in the process is relegated to the background this paper argues that the social absorption capability of a beneficiary s economy as expressed in her incumbent systems of innovation is a crucial determinant of export performance response the experience of sub sahara african countries under the us african growth and opportunity act apparel trade incentive is used as a classical illustration of this proposition it is shown that the comparative efficiency of lesotho despite emerging from a relatively weak trade performance potential background in recording the highest level of export success among beneficiaries of the scheme is a function of the relative efficiency of her systems of innovation

nonlinear effects of mortgage spreads over the business cycle this paper provides robust evidence for the nonlinear effects of mortgage spread shocks during recessions and expansions in the united states estimating a smooth transition vector autoregression stvar model we show that mortgage spread shocks hitting in a recessionary phase create significantly deeper and more protracted declines in consumption and housing market variables in addition we provide evidence that these mortgage spread shocks could be largely interpreted as credit supply shocks in the mortgage market our empirical results imply that unconventional monetary policy such as the federal reserve s mortgage backed security purchase program would be a more effective tool for stabilizing the economy during recessions than in expansions

asset prices and institutional investors empirical evidence indicates that trades by institutional investors have sizable effects on asset prices generating phenomena such as index effects asset class effects and others it is difficult to explain such phenomena within standard representative agent asset pricing models in this paper we consider an economy populated by institutional investors alongside standard retail investors institutions care about their performance relative to a certain index our framework is tractable admitting exact closed form expressions and produces the following analytical results we find that institutions optimally tilt their portfolios towards stocks that comprise their benchmark index the resulting price pressure boosts index stocks while leaving nonindex stocks unaffected by demanding a higher fraction of risky stocks than retail investors institutions amplify the index stock volatilities and aggregate stock market volatility and give rise to countercyclical sharpe ratios trades by institutions induce excess correlations among stocks that belong to their benchmark index generating an asset class effect institutions finance their additional purchases of index stocks by taking on leverage a policy prescription that calls for a reduction in leverage while reducing the riskiness of institutional portfolios would also reduce the ability of institutions to tilt their portfolios towards index stocks depressing the index level

self fulfilling fire sales fragility of collateralised short term debt markets this paper shows that collateralised short term debt although privately optimal for reducing borrowers moral hazard can cause fragility multiple equilibria when the collateral market is illiquid a new form of coordination failure between borrowers ex ante margin and risk taking decisions engenders a systemic run in the collateralised debt market large changes in credit rationing margins repo spreads etc the model also captures the large small crosssectional differences between safe and risky collateral in bad good times finally i show that asset price guarantees could improve welfare and promote stability but repealing repo contracts automatic stay exemption might do the opposite

money interest rates and exchange rates with endogenously segmented markets we analyze the effects of money injections on interest rates and exchange rates when agents must pay a baumol tobin style fixed cost to exchange bonds and money asset markets are endogenously segmented because this fixed cost leads agents to trade bonds and money infrequently when the government injects money through an open market operation only those agents that are currently trading absorb these injections through their impact on these agents consumption these money injections affect real interest rates and real exchange rates the model generates the observed negative relation between expected inflation and real interest rates as well as persistent liquidity effects in interest rates and volatile and persistent exchange rates

aggregate implications of micro asset market segmentation an extensive empirical literature finds that micro asset markets are segmented from one another we develop a consumption based asset pricing model to quantify the aggregate implications of a financial system comprised of many such segmented micro asset markets we specify exogenously the level of segmentation that determines how much idiosyncratic risk traders bear in their micro market and calibrate the segmentation to match facts about systematic and idiosyncratic return volatility in our benchmark model traders bear 30 of their idiosyncratic risk the unconditional aggregate equity premium is 2 4 annual and the welfare costs of segmentation are substantial 1 8 of lifetime consumption

from cash in the market pricing to financial fragility we review some recent research that explores the relationship between asset price volatility and financial fragility when markets and contracts are incomplete jel e5 g2

structural adjustment and african industry over the years many analysts have despaired of the effects of structural adjustment on the economies of sub saharan africa the ability of these economies to respond positively to exposure to market liberalisation has been weak and faltering the weakness of the african supply response has been particularly marked in manufacturing industry and manufactured export performance even the world bank the main architect of adjustment programmes has at times shown disappointment with the failure of its recipes though it has remained doggedly optimistic however its latest report on adjustment in africa world bank 1994 comes to rather optimistic conclusions on the impact of adjustment especially on industry thus adjustment in africa starts as follows in the african countries that have undertaken and sustained major policy reform adjustment is working 2 it finds that the countries that had the most improvements in policies had the strongest increases in gdp growth and that the increase in their industrial and export growth rates was even more striking in view of the past debate on the effects of structural adjustment in africa3 following the established convention the discussion of africa covers sub saharan africa excluding south africa these findings are important and deserve scrutiny

when do export subsidies have a redistributional role if an export subsidy is efficient that is has a surplus transfer role then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector if an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists we show that dependence exists in large export equilibrium not in small export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions the failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring s cons umersand taxpayersto farmers

some neglected social costs of government spending in farm programs economic welfare analyses of farm programs typically assume that the direct social opportunity cost of subsidy payments is one dollar per dollar of government spending recent literature suggests that the marginal opportunity cost of a dollar of u s federal government spending is more likely to be in the range of 1 20 to 1 50 this implies that the net social costs of farm programs that involve government spending are significantly greater than the typical estimates in addition the normative efficiency ranking of alternative policies is sensitive to the marginal opportunity cost of government spending

efficiency of decoupled farm programs under distortionary taxation when lump sum taxation is not feasible decoupled transfers to farmers which require raising government revenue will entail welfare loss somewhere in the economy assuming the government s objective is to assure a given welfare level for farmers we show that when decoupling is possible free trade is always superior to some tariff protection for a small country even under distortionary taxation as expected for a large country there is scope for an optimal tariff policy that improves the terms of trade however we show a separation between the exercise of market power through an optimal tariff and the interaction of distortionary taxation with transfers to farmers we conclude that decoupling is usually desirable even in a distorted economy in which lump sum taxation is not feasible

the paradox of financial fire sales the role of arbitrage capital in determining liquidity how can fire sales for financial assets happen when the economy contains well capitalized but non specialist investors our explanation combines rational expectations equilibrium and lemons models when specialist informed market participants are liquidity constrained prices become less informative this creates an adverse selection problem decreasing the supply of high quality assets and lowering valuations by non specialist uninformed investors who become unwilling to supply capital to support the price in normal times arbitrage capital can multiply itself by making uninformed capital function as informed capital but in a crisis this stabilizing mechanism fails

on the size of the active management industry we argue that active management s popularity is not puzzling despite the industry s poor track record our explanation features decreasing returns to scale as the industry s size increases every manager s ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines the poor track record occurred before the growth of indexing modestly reduced the share of active management to its current size at this size better performance is expected by investors who believe in decreasing returns to scale such beliefs persist because persistence in industry size causes learning about returns to scale to be slow the industry should shrink only moderately if its underperformance continues

leverage cycles and the anxious economy ing opportunities for emerging economies their access to international markets has turned out to be very volatile with frequent periods of market closures even worse as we will show emerging economies with sound fundamentals are the ones that issue less debt during these closures the goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed light on the problems of emerging assets like emerging markets that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public their marginal buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the whole economy who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets we will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses

the politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries increasing fdi through international trade agreements the flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time the political factors that affect these flows are not well understood focusing on the relationship between trade and investment we argue that international trade agreements gatt wto and preferential trade agreements ptas provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets thus reassuring investors and increasing investment these international commitments are more credible than domestic policy choices because reneging on them is more costly statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 support this argument developing countries that belong to the wto and participate in more ptas experience greater fdi inflows than otherwise controlling for many factors including domestic policy preferences and taking into account possible endogeneity joining international trade agreements allows developing countries to attract more fdi and thus increase economic growth

convergence trading with wealth effects an amplification mechanism in financial markets abstract i study convergence traders with logarithmic utility in a continuous time equilibrium model in general convergence traders reduce asset price volatility and provide liquidity by taking risky positions against noise trading however when an unfavorable shock causes them to suffer capital losses thus eroding their risk bearing capacity they liquidate their positions thereby amplifying the original shock in extreme circumstances this wealth effect causes convergence traders to be destabilizing in that they trade in exactly the same direction as noise traders this situation is consistent with the near collapse of long term capital management in 1998

slow moving capital we study three cases in which specialized arbitrageurs lost significant amounts of capital and as a result became liquidity demanders rather than providers the effects on security markets were large and persistent prices dropped relative to fundamentals and the rebound took months while multi strategy hedge funds who were not capital constrained increased their positions a large fraction of these funds actually acted as net sellers consistent with the view that information barriers within a firm not just relative to outside investors can lead to capital constraints for trading desks with mark to market losses our findings suggest that real world frictions impede arbitrage capital this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a macroeconomic model with a financial sector this paper studies a macroeconomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents we pursue four sets of results i the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes as volatility spikes agents precautionary motive increases depressing prices even further log linear approximations fail to capture these non linear effects that can cause economies to be significantly depressed for long periods of time ii endogenous risk during volatile episodes increases asset price correlations iii financial experts impose a negative externality on each other and on the labor sector by not maintaining adequate capital cushion and funding structure iv while risk sharing within the financial sector through securitization and derivatives contracts reduces many inefficiencies it can also amlify systemic risks

pricing mortgage backed securities in a multifactor interest rate environment a multivariate density estimation approach multivariate density estimation mde suggests that mortgage backed security mbs prices can be well described as a function of the level and slope of the term structure we analyze bow this function varies across mbss with different coupons an important finding is that the interest rate level proxies for the moneyness of the option the expected level of prepayments and the average life of the cash flows while the term structure slope controls for the average rate at which these cash flows should be discounted though the origination and prepayment behavior of mortgages differ substantially across coupons there remains an unexplained common factor in mbs prices this factor does not seem to be related to the usual suspects and therefore presents a puzzle to financial economists coauthors are robert f whitelaw matthew richardson and richard stanton article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

managing credit booms and busts a pigouvian taxation approach we study a dynamic model in which the interaction between debt ac cumulation and asset prices magni es credit booms and busts we nd that borrowers do not internalize these feedback eects and therefore suf fer from excessively large booms and busts in both credit ows and asset prices we show that a pigouvian tax on borrowing may induce borrowers to internalize these externalities and increase welfare we calibrate the model by reference to i the us small and medium sized enterprise sector and ii the household sector and nd the optimal tax to be countercycli cal in both cases dropping to zero in busts and rising to approximately half a percentage point of the amount of debt outstanding during booms

limited investment capital and credit spreads using proprietary credit default swap cds data i investigate how capital shocks at protection sellers impact pricing in the cds market seller capital shocks measured as cds portfolio margin payments account for 12 of the time series variation in weekly spread changes a significant amount given that standard credit factors account for 18 during my sample in addition seller shocks possess information for spreads that is independent of institution wide measures of constraints these findings imply a high degree of market segmentation and suggest that frictions within specialized financial institutions prevent capital from flowing into the market at shorter horizons

rationalizing agricultural export subsidies comment alston carter and smith acs claim an export subsidy can be an efficient mechanism for redistributing income to producers and is always so in a small country unable to influence the world price when raising government revenue causes deadweight losses this claim is surprising in view of the general result in trade theory that domestic distortions are more efficient transfer mechanisms than border distor

financial frictions investment and tobin s q we develop a model of investment with financial constraints and use it to investigate the relation between investment and tobin s a firm is financed partly by insiders who control its assets and partly by outside investors when their wealth is scarce insiders earn a rate of return higher than the market rate of return i e they receive a quasi rent on invested capital this rent is priced into the value of the firm so tobin s is driven by two forces changes in the value of invested capital and changes in the value of the insiders future rents per unit of capital this weakens the correlation between and investment relative to the frictionless benchmark we present a calibrated version of the model which due to this effect generates realistic correlations between investment a nd cashflow

a model of capital and crises we develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in determining asset prices the model is cast within a dynamic general equilibrium economy and the role for intermediation is derived endogenously based on optimal contracting considerations low intermediary capital reduces the risk bearing capacity of the marginal investor we show how this force helps to explain patterns during financial crises the model replicates the observed rise during crises in sharpe ratios conditional volatility correlation in price movements of assets held by the intermediary sector and fall in riskless interest rates

fdi agoa and manufactured exports by a landlocked least developed african economy lesotho lesotho a resource poor country located inside south africa is now africa s largest exporter of apparel to the us its performance very unusual for africa relies heavily on asian investors and trade privileges this article traces the origins of fdi in lesotho and the determinants of its export competitiveness showing that apparel production suffers from low productivity poor skills and weak local links its prospects after agoa the african growth and opportunities act remain uncertain unless the government addresses these structural problems lesotho holds important lessons for industrial development in africa going beyond creating a good investment environment

when do export subsidies have a redistributional role reply our differences are three the first arises from the belief that a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution alston smith and vercammen p 543 paragraph 3 consider the two equations 1 o f p3 and 2 f 3 r h a p3 representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted marshallian surplus using simultaneously a per unit border intervention 9 and a per unit domestic intervention wr in the solution parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments see the appendix details of the forms of the functions f p and h ot p are easily derived but what matters in the context of alston smith and vercammen s comment is redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values alpha and whereas the optimal domestic intervention 7r has both alpha and beta effects the optimal border intervention r has only a beta effect it does not have a redistributional role garth holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics department of agricultural and food economics school of agriculture policy and development university of reading the author is very grateful to xavier irz bhavani shankar chittur srinivasan colin thirtle and richard tiffin for their comments and their wisdom and to mario mazzochi marinos tsigas and cal turvey for their scholarship including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite alston and hurd they are not responsible for any errors or omissions note in equation 1 that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 0 implies 3 1 8 1 and thus f p 0 see appendix using alston smith and vercammen s definition the instrument is now efficient and therefore has a redistributive role but now suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 1 8 1 8 0 and consequently the border intervention is zero according to alston smith and vercammen the instrument is now inefficient and has no redistributive role the reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution of course the definition is false it follows that a domestic distortion arising from the excess burden argument 3 1 8 8 0 does not make an export subsidy efficient the export subsidy having only a beta effect does not have a redistributional role the second disagreement emerges from the comment that holloway uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government alston smith and vercammen p 543 paragraph 2 the objective function that generates equations 1 and 2 see the appendix is the same as the objective function used by gardner 1995 when he first questioned alston carter and smith s claim that a domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers the objective function used by gardner 1995 is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus domestic intervention streeten yeh paarlberg 1984 1985 orden gardner 1985 the objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from wallace and includes most notably gardner 1983 but also alston and hurd amer j agr econ 86 2 may 2004 549 552 copyright 2004 american agricultural economics association this content downloaded on tue 15 jan 2013 07 58 41 am all use subject to jstor terms and conditions 550 may 2004 amer j agr econ the objective function in holloway is this same objective function it is of course marshallian surplus 1 the third disagreement concerns scholarship the comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers especially bhagwati and ramaswami and bhagwati both of which precede corden 1974 1997 but also lipsey and lancaster and moschini and sckokai one important aspect of alston and hurd and one extremely important result in holloway this oversight has some unfortunate repercussions first it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property second it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations third it prevents alston smith and vercammen from linking a finding in holloway pp 242 43 with an old theorem lipsey and lancaster that settles the controversy alston carter and smith 1993 1995 gardner 1995 and presently alston smith and vercammen about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions

the deposits channel of monetary policy we propose and test a new channel for the transmission of monetary policy we show that when the fed funds rate increases banks widen the interest spreads they charge on deposits and deposits ow out of the banking system we present a model in which imperfect competition among banks gives rise to these relationships an increase in the nominal interest rate increases banks market power inducing them to increase deposit spreads and hence restrict deposit supply households respond to the increase in deposit prices by substituting from deposits into less liquid but higheryielding assets consequently changes in the nominal interest rate aect banks cost of capital and lending using branch level data on the universe of u s banks we show that following an increase in the fed funds rate deposit spreads increase by more and supply falls more in areas with less deposit competition we control for changes in banks lending opportunities by comparing branches of the same bank we control for changes in macroeconomic conditions by showing that deposit spreads widen immediately after a rate change and even if this change is fully anticipated our results imply that monetary policy has a signicant impact on how the nancial system is funded on the quantity of safe and liquid assets it produces and on its provision of loans to the real economy

jointly optimal regulation of bank capital and liquidity in an economy with financial frictions banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints which require less information than pigouvian taxes the liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of basel iii can implement efficiency additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly micro and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes optimally macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk

phasing out the gses we develop a new model of the mortgage market where both borrowers and lenders can default risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers the government plays a crucial role by providing both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations as well as to high financial sector leverage mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries balance sheets increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee crowds in the private sector reduces financial fragility leads to fewer but safer mortgages lowers house prices and raises mortgage and risk free interest rates due to a more robust financial sector consumption smoothing improves and aggregate welfare increases while borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees savers are substantially better off while aggregate welfare increases so does wealth inequality jel g12 g15 f31

venture capital and the macroeconomy i develop a model of venture capital vc intermediation that quantitatively explains central empirical facts about vc activity and can evaluate its macroeconomic relevance the impact of vc backed innovations is significantly larger than suggested by observed aggregate venture exit valuations even after accounting for large exposures to systematic and uninsurable idiosyncratic risks the risk properties of venture capital play a quantitatively important role in both explaining empirical regularities and shaping the value of ventures contributions to economic growth the model is analytically tractable and yields exact solutions despite the presence of matching frictions imperfect risk sharing and endogenous growth received january 16 2018 editorial decision november 7 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh

dynamic moral hazard and risk shifting incentives in a leveraged firm i develop an analytically tractable model that integrates the risk shifting problem between bondholders and shareholders with the moral hazard problem between shareholders and the manager an optimal contract binds shareholders and the manager and this contract s flexibility allows shareholders to relax the manager s incentive constraint following a good profitability shock thus the optimal contract amplifies the upside and thereby increases shareholder appetite for risk shifting whereas some empirical studies find a positive relation between risk shifting and leverage others find a negative relation this model predicts a non monotonic relation between risk shifting and leverage and can reconcile these contradictory empirical findings

capital mobility and asset pricing we present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between asset markets that are distinguished only by the levels of capital invested in each investment in that market with the greatest amount of capital earns the lowest risk premium intermediaries optimally trade off the costs of intermediation against fees that depend on the gain they can offer to investors for moving their capital to the market with the higher mean return the bargaining power of an investor depends on potential access to alternative intermediaries in equilibrium the speeds of adjustment of mean returns and of capital between the two markets are increasing in the degree to which capital is imbalanced between the two markets and can be reduced by competition among intermediaries

leverage and beliefs personal experience and risk taking in margin lending what determines risk bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets using unique archival data on collateralized lending we show that personal experience can affect individual risk taking and aggregate leverage when an investor syndicate speculating in amsterdam in 1772 went bankrupt many lenders were exposed in the end none of them actually lost money nonetheless only those at risk of losing money changed their behavior markedly they lent with much higher haircuts the rest continued as before the differential change is remarkable since the distress was public knowledge overall leverage in the amsterdam stock market declined as a result

intermediary asset pricing abstract we model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary intermediaries face an equity capital constraint risk premia r

efficient redistribution through commodity markets efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention the implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs the results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient given the political power of interest groups

equilibrium analysis of portfolio insurance a martingale approach is used to characterize general equilibrium in the presence of portfolio insurance insurers sell to noninsurers in bad states and general equilibrium requires that the risk premium rises to induce noninsurers to increase their holdings we show that portfolio insurance increases price volatility causes mean reversion in asset returns raises the sharpe ratio and volatility in bad states and causes volatility to be correlated with volume we also explain why out of the money sp that is the demand for an absolute level of price protection is equivalent to a demand for put options 1 we show that a similar argument can be used in a

broken chain agoa and foreign direct investment in the kenyan clothing industry drawing upon survey and interview research covering 23 of an estimated total of 35 clothing manufacturing establishments operating in kenya as well as interviews with the policy community this paper examines the local economic development impacts associated with the recent agoa prompted re birth of the clothing industry in kenya just after its recent high watermark in 2003 it provides evidence of the characteristics of these manufacturing establishments as well as evidence of the multiple and interconnected failures on the part of government parent companies agents and customers to promote the longer term sustainability of the industry as such it provides further case study evidence of africa s uniquely problematic incorporation into global commodity chains

sovereign debt portfolios bond risks and the credibility of monetary policy we document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency we introduce two features into a government s debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding risk averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment a government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post which leads risk averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante this makes local currency debt too expensive from the government s perspective and thereby discourages the government from borrowing in its own currency

financial intermediaries instability and euro area macroeconomic dynamics abstract fitting a markov switching structural vector autoregression to euro area data we show that after taking into account heteroskedasticity the differences in the behavior of the economy between tranquil and financial distress periods e g great recession and sovereign debt crisis reflect variations in the transmission mechanism when and only when a period of financial distress occurs disruptions in financial intermediation trigger adverse effects for the real economy and turn out to be the primary source of business cycle fluctuations finally we provide strong evidence that ecb interventions in the financial sector had beneficial effects on the real economy during the sovereign debt crisis

limits of arbitrage theory and evidence from the mortgage backed securities market limits of arbitrage theories hypothesize that the marginal investor in a particular asset market is a specialized arbitrageur rather than a diversified representative investor we examine the mortgage backed securities mbs market in this light we show that the risk of homeowner prepayment which is a wash in the aggregate is priced in the mbs market the covariance of prepayment risk with aggregate wealth implies the wrong sign to match the observed prices of prepayment risk the price of risk is better explained by a kernel based on mbs market wide specific risk consistent with the specialized arbitrageur hypothesis a number of recent limits of arbitrage theories predict that the distressed liquidation of assets by hedge funds results in a large drop in asset prices see for example shleifer and vishny 1997 kyle and xiong 2001 gromb and vayanos 2002 geanakoplos 2003 or he and krishnamurthy 2006 these theories are often referenced in explaining episodes of market illiquidity and falling asset prices such as the events during the fall of 1998 in traditional asset pricing theory the marginal investor in every asset market is the same broadly diversified representative investor thus a hedge fund liquidating 200 billion of mortgage backed securities finds a large pool of ready buyers comparable to the entire capital market and the liquidation does not affect expected returns because the representative investor acts quickly to eliminate excess returns according to the limits of arbitrage theory on the other hand the marginal investor in a particular asset market is an investor who specializes in that market in this case liquidations can have large effects on prices given that the relevant set of buyers is a smaller specialized pool of investors

rationalizing agricultural export subsidies export subsidies are an important form of agricultural policy especially for large traders such as the united states and the european community a number of small countries also use export subsidies in effect e g saudi arabian wheat or canadian dairy products in that the domestic price is set well above world levels and surplus production is dumped onto the world market a number of recent contributions to trade theory have argued that export subsidies can be welfare enhancing for the subsidizing country and by implication that the policy choice is consistent with the hypothesis that a benevolent government is pursuing pareto efficiency in the present paper we examine these arguments and present an alternative explanation of export subsidies utilizing the concept of efficient redistribution becker gardner 1983 in standard trade models arguments in favor of global export subsidies arise from failure to exploit market power in another good itoh and kiyono feenstra itoh and kiyono use a threegood model to show that subsidies on marginal goods defined as goods not exported at all or exported in small quantities can increase welfare in the subsidizing country a subsidy on marginal goods causes their production to increase and the supply of nonmarginal goods to decrease thereby raising the price of the nonmarginal goods and increasing the exporter s terms of trade feenstra also employs a threegood model and demonstrates that it is possible for the pattern of substitutability and complementarity across goods to allow subsidies to increase welfare the necessary condition is that the subsidized export be a stronger substitute for another exported good or a stronger complement for an imported good in the subsidizing country than abroad the export subsidy increases welfare by improving the terms of trade in the other imported or exported good the distortion in feenstra s model is the failure to exploit market power in the second or third market as an alternative to global export subsidies abbott paarlberg and sharples aps have examined targeted export subsidies and found that in some circumstances they can be welfare improving dutton later showed the aps result arises because they first constrain the export tax to the rest of the world to be zero so that it becomes theoretically possible for the best export tax to the targeted country to be negative the aps result hinges on differences in import demand elasticities and the exporting country s use of market power in order to price discrim

the africa growth and opportunity act and its rules of origin generosity undermined the african growth and opportunity act agoa signed into american law on may 18 2000 is a major plank of u s initiatives toward the african continent the act aims broadly at improving economic policymaking in africa enabling countries to embrace globalization and securing durable political and economic stability as an incentive for africa to adopt the necessary policy reform agoa offers increased preferential access for african exports to the united states this paper describes the provisions of agoa and assesses its quantitative impact on african exports particularly in the apparel sector its main conclusions are 1 agoa will provide real opportunities to africa even on conservative estimates about africa s supply response africa s non oil exports could be increased by about 8 11 percent 2 however the medium term gains could have been much greater if agoa had not imposed certain conditions and not excluded certain items from its coverage the most important condition is the stringent rule of origin that is the requirement that exporters source certain inputs from within africa or the united states estimates suggest that the absence of these conditions would have magnified the impact nearly five fold resulting in an overall increase in non oil exports of us 0 54 billion compared with the us 100 us 140 million increase that is expected in the presence of these restrictions these restrictions particularly on apparel will come at a particularly inopportune time as africa will be exposed to competition from other developing countries when the quotas maintained on the latters exports under the multi fiber arrangement mfa are eliminated africa s apparel exports will be lower by over 30 percent with the dismantling of the mfa if on the other hand agoa had provided unrestricted access the negative impact of the dismantling could be nearly fully offset

shadow banks and macroeconomic instability we develop a macroeconomic model in which in which commercial banks can o oad risky loans to a highly levered shadow banking sector and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets we highlight the liquidity creation role played by securitization we show how an endogenous tightening of credit constraints can exacerbate the e ect of shocks by limiting the ability of shadow banks to supply collateral and of banks to securitize the model is able to reproduce the cyclical behavior of bank and non bank credit and leverage macroeconomic shocks that directly impact the worth of financial sector are particularly harmful to economic activity but purely redistributive intra financial shocks can also generate recessions we discuss how government policy can stabilize the securitization market when the shadow banking system becomes impaired

endogenous risk in a dsge model with capital constrained financial intermediaries abstract this paper proposes a perturbation based approach to implement the idea of endogenous financial risk in a standard dsge macro model recent papers such as mendoza 2010 brunnermeier and sannikov 2012 and he and krishnamurthy 2012 that have stimulated the research field on endogenous risk in a macroeconomic context are based on sophisticated solution methods that are not easily applicable in larger models we propose an approximation method that allows us to capture some of the basic insights of this literature in a standard macro model we are able to identify an important risk channel that derives from the risk aversion of constrained intermediaries and that contributes significantly to the overall financial and macroeconomic volatility

on the theory of international currency portfolios abstract the paper develops a general equilibrium theory of the optimal currency composition of international bond portfolios like the partial equilibrium portfolio balance literature of the 1980s the theory emphasizes the critical roles of government debt and government balance sheet operations in the determination of portfolios prices and allocations consistent with empirical findings optimal foreign currency positions are found to be small with their size decreasing with exchange rate volatility while optimal domestic currency positions are large and increasing with domestic interest rates a large open market purchase of domestic currency bonds from private households lowers domestic interest rates

presidential address asset price dynamics with slow moving capital i describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries i discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions which subsided afterward after presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings i offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors i address the implications for asset price dynamics of the apparent slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the arrival of new capital to an investment opportunity can be delayed by fractions of a second in some markets for example an electronic limit order book market for equities or by months in other markets such as that for catastrophe risk insurance accordingly prices respond to supply or demand shocks with a sharp reaction because of the relatively small subset of capital and thus risk bearing capacity that is immediately available to absorb a shock on short notice such a price impact is substantially reversed over time as additional capital becomes available the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect many sorts of attention costs to trade as well as institutional impediments to capital movement such as search costs for trading

liquidity shortages and banking crises we show in this article that bank failures can be contagious unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages this could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system given the costs of a meltdown there is a possible role for government intervention unfortunately liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis we propose a robust sequence of intervention banks are often found at the center of systemic financial crises the causes of these crises have long been debated do they stem from depositor panics or do they arise because bank balance sheets are exposed to common factors if it is the latter then is there any sense in which bank failures can be contagious can anything be done to prevent these crises or stop them from propagating once they begin our purpose in this paper is to reexamine whether bank failures can start and propagate systemic crises even if we assume that depositors do not panic that is even if depositors actions are coordinated and they do not run simply because they fear others will run our focus is not because we think that panics are empirically unimportant the jury is still out on that instead we show that contagion can stem from an underlying real general equilibrium problem rather than just from lack of coordination among depositors from a policy perspective attempts to reassure investors through confidence building measures will not work if panic and lack of coordination are not the reasons for a crisis we begin in this paper with a model of a bank that we developed in diamond and rajan 2001 assets in this model are illiquid they cannot be borrowed against or sold for the full value of resources they will generate in their best use because the human capital necessary to generate that full value cannot

liquidity shocks business cycles and asset prices abstract in the aftermath of the great recession macro models that feature financing constraints have attracted increasing attention among these kiyotaki et al 2012 is a prominent example in this paper we investigate whether the liquidity shocks and financial frictions proposed by kiyotaki et al 2012 can improve the asset pricing predictions of the frictionless rbc model we study the quantitative business cycle and asset pricing properties in an economy in which agents feature recursive preferences are subject to a liquidity constraint and suffer liquidity shocks we find that the model predicts highly nonlinear time variation and levels of risk premia which are driven by endogenous fluctuations in equity prices however the model fails to account for a basic fact periods of scarce liquidity are associated with high asset prices and low expected returns

trading volume and serial correlation in stock returns this paper investigates the relationship between aggregate stock market trading volume and the serial correlation of daily stock returns for both stock indexes and individual large stocks the first order daily return autocorrelation tends to decline with volume the paper explains this phenomenon using a model in which risk averse market makers accommodate buying or selling pressure from liquidity or noninformational traders changing expected stock returns reward market makers for playing this role the model implies that a stock price decline on a high volume day is more likely than a stock price decline on a low volume day to be associated with an increase in the expected stock return