does the public sector over provide club goods a general result abstract with nondistortionary user charges the first best and second best of a single club exogenous income economy with identical individuals coincide they differ if incomes differ overprovision of a superior club good then occurs in the second best

the case for stabilizing exchange rates this paper presents the case for a return to an system the main point of the analysis in this paper exchange rate system resembling that which preis in fact to show why modem critiques of traditional vailed in the bretton woods period or which logic here are in fact unjustified prevails within europe at the present time that is it argues the case for a system of mostly fixed rates the paper is in five parts i begin with some broad that can sometimes be adjusted even philosophical questions about the reasons for even considering a return to fixed rates the second the argument is not an enthusiastic one i do not part documents what i believe to be the key thing claim that an adjustable peg system will solve all that we have learned in the past fifteen years that of the problems of the current system or that it will foreign exchange markets behave much more like be without problems of its own however the the unstable and irrational asset markets described experience of floating rates has made the adjustable by keynes than the efficient markets described by peg look much better in comparison and greatly modem finance theory the third part then asks reinforced the case against letting exchange rates be what harm this instability does and argues that determined just like any other asset price conventional efforts to test for serious costs which generally fail to show much harm from exchange fashions in exchange rate regimes go in obvious rate instability are likely to miss the main action cycles in spite of the vast additions both to our the fourth part examines the advantages of exchange store of knowledge and to our theoretical sophistrate flexibility and asks whether occasional parity ication since the 1940s practical arguments against changes are a good enough substitute finally the flexible rates are not very different from those fifth part tries to tie the whole argument together advanced by the architects of the bretton woods offering a case for an adjustable peg system

on measures of excess burden and their application abstract new measures of the additional excess burden of a tax reform are proposed and are shown to be useful in three key policy applications these new measures induce a unique measure of marginal excess burden meb among its interesting properties meb is uniformly zero for a proportional tax on inelastically supplied labor problems in applying the standard measures of total excess burden are demonstrated it is concluded that the induced measure of the marginal cost of funds mcf should be regarded as the most useful concept in applied tax analysis

the marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in africa abstract in this paper we propose estimates of the marginal cost of public funds mcf in 38 african countries we develop a simple general equilibrium model that can handle taxes on five major tax classes and can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data a key feature of our model is the explicit recognition of the informal economy our base case estimate of the average mcf from marginal increases in all five tax instruments is 1 2 focusing on the lowest cost tax instruments in each country commonly the vat but not always the average mcf is 1 1 finally extending the tax base to include sections of the informal economy by removing some tax exemptions offers the potential for a low mcf source of public funds and a lowering of mcfs on other tax instruments

pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second best pigouvian tax this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non linear taxes it is demonstrated that the optimal second best tax on an externality generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds since it equals one in the optimal tax system in the optimum distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains if the government does not have access to a non distortionary marginal source of finance the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution the optimal second best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the pigouvian level the findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative agent models shedding new light on the weak double dividend hypothesis and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes

randomization of commodity taxes an expenditure minimization approach using an expenditure minimization approach necessary and sufficient conditions for local random taxation are obtained in terms of the curvature of the compensated demand function so that intuition from excess burden analysis can be applied major findings include 1 random taxation is locally optimal if the compensated demand function is sufficiently convex 2 horizontally equitable taxation is locally optimal if the compensated demand function is concave and 3 local randomization is not optimal if the tax revenue requirement is sufficiently close to zero or to any local maximum we also derive an inverse elasticity characterization of the optimal random tax structure

progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds abstract this paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds smcf for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals labour supply decisions a formula for the smcf indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals average and marginal tax rates respectively other well known formulas for the smcf are shown to be special cases of this formula the difference between this formula and the mayshar 1991 formula is shown to be due to different but equally valid ways of computing the change in the average tax rate the condition under which a marginal tax rate increase may lead to a reduction in revenues is derived

the marginal welfare cost of public funds theory and estimates abstract we derive a general analytic formula for the marginal welfare cost mwc of public funds without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences or technologies the framework encompasses the various special cases previously considered and reconciles the disparities among the reported estimates of mwc unresolved differences in existing estimates are fully explained by appropriate interpretations of intended thought experiments and alternative assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply with respect to public spending further progress in measuring mwc requires empirical estimation of labor supply functions that include government spending as an explanatory variable

exchange rate behaviour under the ems regime was there any systematic change abstract most empirical studies fail to detect any systematic effects of the ems regime on the economic performance of member countries this reveals the difficulty of constructing controlled experiments which can distinguish what is due to the ems from that due to common external pressures we argue that the crucial step is to examine the exchange rates distribution since no performance improvements will appear if exchange rate behaviour does not change within the ems we find that there are changes in the third and fourth moments which imply that ems currencies have become more fragile and susceptible to shocks particularly negative shocks relative to non ems currencies

target zones and exchange rate dynamics this paper develops a simple model of exchange rate behavior under a target zone regime it shows that the expectation that monetary policy will be adjusted to limit exchange rate variation affects exchange rate behavior even when the exchange rate lies inside the zone and is thus not being defended actively somewhat surprisingly the analysis of target zones turns out to have a strong formal similarity to problems in option pricing and investment under uncertainty

nature of transfers income tax function and empirical estimation of elasticity of taxable income for brazil abstractthis article aims to estimate the elasticity of taxable income eti taking into account the nature of transfers and their use as a redistribution package involving cash and in kind transfers to households in brazil our contributions are twofold first we provide a simple model with balanced budget government that reveals the role played by cash and in kind transfers on the labour supply and income tax revenues thereof next in order to estimate eti in the presence of cash and in kind transfers brazilian population surveys pesquisa nacional por amostra de domicilios pnad are used to explore a limited tax reform that was implemented between 1997 and 1998 this reform only affected the higher income tax bracket our findings suggest that in kind cash transfers are positively negatively associated with reported taxable income and precise estimation of eti requires estimates of both types of transfers last we estimate the eti for brazil in the range from 0 4 to 1 3 not different fro

tax effects versus budget effects on labor supply this paper analyzes the effects on labor supply of parallel changes in taxes and public spending of various types a number of important recent developments in the labor supply behavior of households are highlighted by such a study of various types of budget effects rather than isolated tax effects this comes out in particular when considering cross substitution effects on labor supply of changes in public spending on goods and services or of the subsidization of goods and services provided by private markets moreover the income effects of tax changes are often mitigated or possibly even removed by the income effects of the accompanying expenditure changes

marginal welfare costs of taxation with human and physical capital i introduction marginal welfare cost of taxation is the amount by which the social cost of an additional tax dollar differs from 1 because of distortionary taxation browning and johnson 1984 stuart 1984 browning 1987 ballard 1988 and allgood and snow 1998 use static models of the u s economy in which labor supplies adjust but the stocks of human and physical capital are fixed to calculate estimates of this welfare cost relevant to cost benefit analysis the studies by lucas 1990 and perroni 1995 incorporate human and physical capital into calculations of excess burden for the purpose of comparing alternative tax systems but do not address the welfare costs of marginal tax and spending reforms ballard et al 1985 and judd 1987 provide estimates of welfare cost using models that allow the stock of physical capital to change in response to marginal reforms but the stock of human capital is exogenous in these studies however judd 2001 argues that there is ample evidence indicating that human capital investment decisions have a significant effect on the cost of altering the tax system which suggests that these decisions could also have an important influence on marginal welfare cost in this article we present estimates of welfare costs for marginal reforms to government tax and spending policies when labor supply saving and education decisions are all endogenous we focus our analysis on marginal reforms because as skinner and slemrod 1985 observe most policy reforms enacted do not involve replacing one tax or spending system with another but instead typically entail marginal adjustments in tax laws and government appropriations using a perfect foresight overlapping generations model with a three period life cycle we derive analytical expressions for the changes in labor supply saving and education and use them to calculate marginal welfare cost as shown by auerbach et al 1983 in overlapping generations models steady state welfare comparisons of alternative tax policies are biased unless households are compensated for intergenerational redistribution along the transition path to arrive at our steady state estimates of welfare costs we adapt the compensation method introduced by gravelle 1991 for analyzing fundamental tax reforms to the context of incremental tax and spending reforms in a static one consumer model triest 1990 has shown that marginal welfare cost mwc is positive solely because of tax leakage the decline in tax revenue caused by reductions in the tax base we extend this insight to an intertemporal context that incorporates tax leakage arising from changes in both human and physical capital investment we evaluate three sets of reforms first a revenue neutral reduction in the tax on capital income funded by a higher tax on labor income second spending on a public good financed by either a higher tax on labor or interest income third a per capita lump sum transfer or demogrant also funded by either a higher tax on labor or interest income we find that marginal welfare costs are uniformly lower in the dynamic model where investment decisions are endogenous than in the static model where investment decisions are fixed and that the majority of the difference between the dynamic and static estimates is attributable to human capital decisions the principal reason is that a reallocation of time between labor hours and human capital investment has opposing and potentially offsetting effects on effective labor supply as a result labor supply responds less elastically in the dynamic model and changes in labor supply are the main source of tax leakage because wage taxation is the main source of tax revenue we also find that shifting marginal financing from capital to labor results in a lower welfare cost the reason being that such a change encourages saving which increases wage rates and stimulates labor supply leading to a reduction in marginal welfare costs

public goods self selection and optimal income taxation using the self selection approach to tax analysis this paper derives a modified samuelson rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal nonlinear income tax this approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area generalises it and provides a simple characterisation of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances the analysis also emphasises and clarifies the significance of the choice of numeraire for the optimality of decentralising public spending decisions it is well known that the famous samuelson rule for the provision of public goods may not be applicable when the tax revenues used to finance the public goods come from distorting taxes the principle was recognized as long ago as pigou 1947 long before the samuelson rule was devised pigou saw that in addition to the resource cost involved in transferring funds from the private to the public sector there was a deadweight loss involved from this insight he suggested that the criterion for providing public goods should be more stringent than the samuelson rule would later suggest in particular one might expect that the inclusion of the deadweight loss of taxes as part of the cost of providing a public good would lead to a reduction in its optimal provision relative to a situation in which lump sum taxes were available the problem was investigated more systematically by atkinson and stern 1974 who considered the case in which a public good is financed by a set of optimal commodity taxes all individuals were assumed to be identical so efficiency alone dictated the objective they found that no prima facie case could be made for the pigou position that the use of distortionary taxes called for a reduction in the supply of the public good their analysis clearly showed that there were two influences at work when the financing of a public good was by distorting taxes on the one hand

pirates and traders some economics of pirate infested seas abstract even where all agents are risk neutral merchants can insure themselves against piracy such self insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard further there exist a patrolling intensity and or penalties for captured pirates which along with mercantile self insurance could eliminate piracy

redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds abstract discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one consumer economy while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution this paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high wage to low wage workers in an optimal tax system the mcf will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one without optimality the mcf will in general differ between different sources of finance

property taxation congestion and local public goods abstract the residential property tax has been viewed as a congestion fee even if it distorts housing decisions this paper shows that the rule for a competitive jurisdiction s optimal public good supply may be written in a form in which no such role appears congestion costs enter the cost side of this rule in the same way that they enter when only a land tax is available the new rule is reconciled with an alternative rule in the literature which contains no congestion costs

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

a marginal cost of funds approach to multi period public project evaluation implications for the social discount rate abstract although the use of marginal cost of funds mcf has been widely appreciated in public finance literature discussions of mcf have been confined to a static setting this paper develops a multi period project evaluation rule that is based on mcf unlike previous approaches the parameters required for implementing the mcf rule are independent of projects under consideration a lesson from this paper is that the government discount rate policies that are largely based on the concepts of social discount rate and shadow price of capital should be rewritten with the use of parameters representing mcf

the measurement of waste in a public goods economy abstract a small open economy model is developed to measure the waste of the whole economy when levels of public goods are determined by the government the allais debreu diewert measure of waste is defined and its second order approximation is calculated this measure utilizes the second order substitution matrices of the restricted profit function and the restricted expenditure function evaluated at an equilibrium finally simple examples and diagrams are utilized to clarify the economic implications of our approach

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

when do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public goods abstract it is often argued that the optimal level of public good provision is below the first best level as long as the government s expenditures have to be financed by distortionary taxes i examine this hypothesis and show that it is correct in a representative consumer economy if i the public good is normal and ii private commodities are normal and gross substitutes otherwise counterexamples can be constructed these results hold also with heterogeneous households provided that equity considerations are ignored in general however distributional objectives may lead to a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best

anarchy and autarky endogenous predation as a barrier to trade this article presents a general equilibrium two country ricardian trade model with endogenous transactions costs that arise from individual utility maximizing allocation of labor to production and piracy in the absence of institutions for risk sharing and coordination of defense autarky obtains over most of the parameter space when both trade and predation are supported in equilibrium terms of trade effects can make security immiserizing in that case paradoxically predation creates trade

is piracy sustainable we develop a model of international trade between three countries one of which hosts pirates when the number of pirate ships increases the probability for one of the pirate ships for one commercial ship encountering a commercial pirate ship decreases increases then the commercial ships have an incentive to spend more on defense and pirate ships to invest less on attack if pirates operate under free entry they do not internalize the entry externality then their number rises until it reaches a level such that their attack power has become negligible and the defense of the commercial ships has reached a high level the economy settles in a full deterrence equilibrium however if the number of pirate ships is controlled by an authority which maximizes their total profit the economy settles in an equilibrium where piracy is active and commercial ships spend less on defense piracy is a substitute for trade piracy depends on the terms of trade of the pirate country and on the relative efficiency of the attack versus the defense

an arrgh chy the law and economics of pirate organization this article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law economics and organization of pirates to effectively organize their banditry pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation minimize crew conflict and maximize piratical profit pirates devised two institutions for this purpose first i analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation second i examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history

tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium i introduction if the government changes the tax on wage income what happens to aggregate labor supply this question is at the core of debates between proponents of supply side and keynesian approaches to government fiscal policy it is unfortunate therefore that previous attempts to resolve the issue have obscured decisive assumptions regarding the preference relation between leisure and public spending one argument exposited recently by gwartney and stroup 1983 1986 and ehrenberg and smith 1988 179 80 descends from an older literature represented by the works of friedman 1949 1954 goode 1949 scitovsky 1951 and bailey 1954 and emphasizes the importance of a balanced budget framework for addressing the question this approach reveals the presence of an income effect caused by the change in government spending that must accompany the tax change at optimum according to this view this income effect exactly offsets the income effect of the tax change so that only the substitution effect of the tax remains as a consequence a balanced budget increase in the wage tax unambiguously decreases economy wide labor supply provided the increase in public spending is valued the same as the forgone private spending a different approach was initiated by winston 1965 and subsequently elaborated upon by lindbeck 1982 fullerton 1982 hanson and stuart 1983 bohanon and van cott 1986 and gahvari 1986 this approach stresses the importance of the preference relation between public spending and private spending rather than the role of the public spending income effect in determining the change in aggregate labor supply as a special example gahvari 1986 assumes a preference structure which implies that public spending does not have any influence on labor supply so there is only the partial equilibrium effect of the tax however the general conclusion of this line of reasoning is that the theoretical ambiguity of the labor supply response arises from both tax and spending effects in this paper a simple formal model is used to develop a careful accounting of the various income and substitution effects the model is sufficiently general to permit a rigorous comparison of earlier studies and to expose implicit assumptions responsible for their conclusions we show that the two approaches outlined above are associated respectively with the focal cases of compensated independence and ordinary independence between leisure and public spending the pan of the paper is as follows section ii contains a model of labor supply in the presence of wage taxation and public spending in section iii the effect on aggregate labor supply of a balanced budget change in wage taxation is analyzed section iv provides an interpretation of several previous analyses of these issues section v contains a summary of our results ii the model consider an economy with n identical consumers who derive utility from leisure l a pure private good x which serves as numeraire and a publicly provided good z the utility function u l x z is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi concave everyone is endowed with t units of time which are allocated either to labor market work or leisure nonmarket activities the marginal product of labor in producing the private good is the constant real gross of tax wage rate w because agents are identical we can confine attention to allocations of equal consumption as a consequence the production possibilities frontier assumed to be linear can be expressed in per capita terms as wl x p n z wt 1 where p is the constant marginal cost of z with identical agents and only two goods not publicly provided it may be assumed without loss of generality that public spending is financed by a wage tax with constant marginal and average ad valorem rate t

the persistence and inefficiency of property tax finance of local public expenditures abstract i both characterize and evaluate equilibrium outcomes in multiple jurisdiction economies with property and land taxation but where direct taxation of residents is not possible the model contains perfectly mobile capital and population and competitive entrepreneurial governments that choose local taxes and expenditures to maximize after tax land rent when the cost of public goods is proportional to population the property tax emerges as the sole source of local finance even though the land tax has no deadweight loss it is shown that equilibria are not constrained efficient in general hence decentralized decision making is not consistent with the best use of the available tax instruments

organized crime or individual crime endogenous size of a criminal organization and the optimal law enforcement i introduction organized criminal activities have been regarded as major economic and social issues since the early 1900s although there has been as pointed out by fiorentini and peltzman 1995 enormous research interest in the economics of criminal activities economists have done relatively little work on issues specifically related to the economics of organized crime we only see that much of the work has been done by following becker s 1968 framework where the target is the individual agent s allocative choice between legal and illegal activities in the face of different deterrence arrangements among the few exceptions a criminal organization is often thought of as a monopolistic firm and the theory of monopoly is predominantly used to analyze organized crimes schelling 1967 buchanan 1973 backhaus 1979 gambetta and reuter 1995 and more recently garoupa 2000 investigate the optimal public policy toward organized crimes through a welfare comparison between a monopoly organized criminals and competitive supplies individual criminals given that criminal activities are seen as social bads the monopolistic market is considered to be better than a perfectly competitive one because its output of crime is smaller 1 the monopolistic model implies that potential offenders have no other criminal choices but are forced to join the criminal organization if they decide to commit a crime clearly it is less than exhaustive in terms of describing agents choices in relation to criminal behavior in fact the criminal organization may not be monopolistic after all as argued by dick 1995 and others 2 criminologists johnson 1962 rubin 1973 and reiss 1986 observe that most criminal organizations are endemic in some particular areas and or restrictive in some particular illegal businesses these criminal activities such as bootlegging drug dealing pimping and prostitution are often less organized and would be difficult to successfully monopolize dick 1995 also points out that prostitution smuggling fencing and narcotics importation often involve substantial competition among downstream suppliers and can hardly be regarded as monopolistic businesses in other similar studies klein and crawford 1967 morash 1983 and sarnecki 1986 conclude that most youths who engage in delinquency are at most street gangsters and cannot be seen as members of a highly structured organization in reality the determination of the market structure for crime should be endogenous which has notable implications for the optimal crime enforcement policies and crime itself to recover the conventionally neglected facts and provide a more complete picture regarding organized crime this article develops a simple but more general model in this framework individual and organized crimes are coexisting alternatives to a potential offender and joining a criminal organization is seen as only one of the agent s rational choices in deciding whether to join a criminal organization the methods used to allocate the criminal organization s payoffs and the extra benefits provided by the criminal organization are given serious consideration they both play crucial roles in determining the sizes of the criminal organizations as well as in influencing the interactive relationship between the market structure for crime and the government s optimal law enforcement this study contributes to the existing literature and provides new insights in three respects first of all by allowing the agent to choose rationally between engaging in individual or organized crime we not only endogenize the size of the criminal organization but also explore the factors that determine the type high or low criminal ability of offenders that enter the criminal organization a new theoretical attempt is made in terms of providing an explanation to the observation of anderson 1995 there are considerable variations in personal qualities and values across different criminal organizations

a model of criminal sanctions that incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation abstract this paper adapts the standard economic model of crime to incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation the results show that adding incapacitation can result in either a longer or a shorter optimal prison term compared to the deterrence only model

the economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement this article extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime i model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion as long as extortion is a costless transfer from individuals to the criminal organization not only the existence of extortion is social welfare improving because it makes engaging in a criminal offense less attractive but it also allows the government to reduce expenditures on law enforcement when extortion is costly because the criminal organization resorts to threats and violence the existence of extortion is social welfare diminishing and may lead to higher expenditures on law enforcement

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

pirational choice the economics of infamous pirate practices abstract this paper investigates the economics of infamous pirate practices two closely related economic theories the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building explain these practices first i examine the pirate flag jolly roger which pirates used to signal their identity as unconstrained outlaws enabling them to take prizes without costly conflict second i consider how pirates combined heinous torture public displays of madness and published advertisement of their fiendishness to establish a reputation that prevented costly captive behaviors pirates infamous practices reduced their criminal enterprise s costs and increased its revenues enhancing the profitability of life on the account

labor supply taxes and government spending a microeconometric analysis the effect of government spending on labor supply behavior is critical to predicting the balanced budget effect of income taxes and to estimating the marginal social cost of public funds yet its very existence not to mention direction and magnitude has not been empirically investigated this research estimates a labor supply function that incorporates income taxation and government spending using microeconomic data for men and women the empirical results suggest that public sector spending may have a significant effect on labor supply thereby leading to estimates of the marginal social cost of public funds that differ from those typically calculated

the non tax wedge abstract this paper argues that there are a large number of non tax phenomena that have the effect of reducing input prices below marginal value products just as do taxes on income it is shown that the presence of the non tax wedge between the marginal value product of labor and the net wage is highly significant for the analysis of the total and marginal welfare costs of taxes similarly the presence of the tax wedge is significant for the analysis of the welfare effects of the non tax phenomena welfare costs are substantially higher when appropriate account is taken of tax and non tax wedges that both distort supply decisions

taxation base in developing countries abstract informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries this is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries we show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power and hence rents for the permitted entrants market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers the rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost the relevance of the theory is assessed with a sample of 64 countries empirical analysis supports the results of the paper

a generalized approach to multigeneration project evaluation 1 introductionit is well known that the choice of discount rate plays a significant role in the ranking of projects with varying time paths of costs and benefits for public projects the choice of the appropriate social discount rate sdr is not clear cut even in the context of short lived projects in which costs and benefits occur within a single generation in particular when capital taxes produce a wedge between gross and net rates of return should one discount at the economy s rate of return the before tax rate or the individual s rate of return the after tax rate in the single generation context the literature falls in two camps 1 one camp argues that the appropriate sdr is a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return with weights typically determined by the fractions of resources drawn from consumption and private investment respectively 2 a second camp argues that future benefits should be discounted at the net rate of return but that the initial investment should be multiplied by a scale factor so that the direct costs of the project can be expressed in terms of consumption units 3both approaches suffer from severe implementation problems for the first approach there is no general formula for the weights needed to calculate the sdr as a weighted average of two market rates of return dreze 1974 indeed the appropriate sdr to use is project specific stiglitz 1982 without a systematic methodology to derive project specific sdrs the weighted average approach is hard to implement for the second approach which equalizes the sdr to the net rate of return the scale factor the opportunity cost of public investment must be quantified the opportunity cost of public investment depends on whether resources come from private investment or consumption and on the calculation of the present value of the future consumption yielded by a unit of capital discounted at the net rate of return that is the shadow price of capital as lind 1997 points out however there is no general agreement on a specific procedure for calculating the shadow price of capital indeed the concept of the opportunity cost of public investment suffers the same project dependence problem as the first view of the sdr diamond 1968 multigeneration projects such as nuclear waste disposal natural resource conservation or even social security reform further complicate discount rate choice specifically intergenerational equity in addition to intertemporal efficiency plays a role in determining the appropriate social discount rate for multigeneration public project evaluation 4 as in the single generation context there are two competing views on the appropriate discount rate when evaluating multigeneration projects the descriptive and the prescriptive approaches 5the descriptive approach to discounting is a market based approach it does not rely on an explicit social welfare function swf or the pure time preference rate embedded in the swf however the descriptive approach works under the assumption that intergenerational compensation through changes in the tax debt policy is available 6 it is argued that under appropriate intergenerational compensation the market rates of return are still relevant for calculating the sdr for multigeneration project evaluation and in general the sdr should be a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return this descriptive view of setting the sdr equal to the market return appears to underlie the office of management and budget s omb adoption of 7 as the appropriate discount rate for federal programs 7the intent of the prescriptive approach is to use the social discount rate as an expression of ethical judgment on how consumption of future generations should be compared to consumption of current generations

the benefit rule for a pure public good in the presence of a social security program public good whereby the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and some numeraire private good for all agents who benefit frqm the public good must be equal to the corresponding marginal rate of transformation i e xmrs mrt this rule can be implemented in a decentralized fashion if the government has enough financing instruments available e g person specific lump sum taxes and government debt however whether or not the first best benefit rule can be implemented when the government only has control over relative prices is an open issue pigou 1947 diamond and mirrlees 1971 dasgupta and stiglitz 1971 atkinson and stern 1974 pestieau 1974 and more recently wildasin 1979 1984 1985 king 1986 and batina 1987 have considered the effect of decentralizing the government s policy on the optimal first best benefit rule for a public good it is generally true that if the government cannot completely control the economy because of a lack of policy instruments then the first best benefit rule governing the provision of the public good must be modified as a result

pirates and fishermen is less patrolling always bad abstract motivated by the somali fishermen pirates i explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non violent occupation fishing when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity for a range of parameters the static model yields multiple equilibria an efficient one with no patrolling and low piracy a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high patrolling high piracy equilibrium analyzing the dynamic analogue i obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy

decomposition of s concentration curves for any given order of inverse stochastic dominance standard concentration curves are decomposed into three components called contribution curves those compo nents correspond to within group inequalities between group inequalities and transvari ational inequalities we prove for all orders that contribution curve dominance implies systematically welfare improving tax reforms and conversely accordingly as welfare ex pansions may be costly in terms of particular inequalities we propose targeted fiscal reforms jel classification d63 h20

reconciling alternative views about the appropriate social discount rate abstract this paper shows that in an economy with an exogenous rate of return and a given capital income tax distortion and with lump sum taxes as the marginal tax instrument the soc and mcf criteria both correctly identify all worthwhile projects if the criteria are properly applied the equivalence between the soc and mcf criteria continues to hold i if distortionary taxes are used to balance the budget and ii if the rate of return to capital is endogenous apparent differences between the soc and mcf criteria arise from different definitions of a project s indirect revenue effect neither criterion has an implementation advantage because the information requirements for each are identical

the welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with distortionary local taxes a simple general equilibrium analysis this paper examines the welfare impact of intergovernmental transfers when recipient governments use distortionary taxes both lump sum and matching grants are investigated a distortionary factor depending on local demand and supply elasticities and the local tax rate on the taxed commodity determines the real income change to a jurisdiction per dollar transferred matching grants are dominated by lump sum grants when these can be set optimally for each recipient if grant policy must be uniform positive or negative matching rates are desired if equity adjusted distortionary factors are positively negatively correlated with local public service levels

marginal welfare cost calculations differential analysis vs balanced budget analysis abstract in a differential analysis tax revenue collections are held constant in a balanced budget analysis the spending level is changed and the level of distortionary taxation is changed correspondingly here income effects are important and efficiency calculations depend chiefly on uncompensated elasticities unless government exhaustive expenditure is assumed to substitute closely for cash a small scale computational general equilibrium model is constructed and differential and balanced budget experiments are performed results show that marginal welfare costs calculated from balanced budget experiments can be negative when labor supply functions are backward bending interactions among parameter values and efficiency costs are explored

on the mean reverting properties of target zone exchange rates one key prediction of the target zone model is that the exchange rate should be mean reverting within the band although this property is widely referred to in the target zone literature little work has been done to test it in this paper we seek to remedy this important lacuna in the literature by examining the time series properties of the seven currencies participating in the exchange rate mechanism erm of the european monetary system for the period 13 march 1979 to 9 april 1992 using standard univariate unit root tests we find little evidence of mean reversion however using variance ratio test statistics which control for heterogeneity in the distribution of exchange rate behaviour we find much more evidence of mean reversion another part of our work includes implementing a panel unit root test

intramarginal intervention in the ems and the target zone model of exchange rate behavior abstract exchange rate data produced by the european monetary system ems contradict important predictions made by the standard target zone model we show that the contradictions reflect a misinterpretation of policies pursued by the ems countries they intervened intramarginally to keep exchange rates will within their bands not at the edges of the bands to keep rates from crossing them in the basle nyborg agreement of 1987 however they agreed to make fuller use of the band and exchange rates behave differently thereafter the effect appears clearly in the behavior of the french franc and less decisively in the behavior of the italian lira we conclude by examining and rejecting other explanations for the observed difference in exchange rate behavior

consumption dominance curves testing for the impact of indirect tax reforms on poverty abstract a new tool is presented to test for the robustness of the impact on poverty of marginal tax reforms for pairs of commodities consumption dominance curves exist for every order of stochastic dominance an illustration is provided with bolivian data