the role of free entry in an oligopolistic heckscher ohlin model retaining the basic properties of the heckscher ohlin trade model namely free entry and exit fully integrated international commodity markets and the same number of sectors with that of factors the authors develop a two country model with cournot oligopoly in this economy factor price equalization and the standard heckscher ohlin theorem on comparative advantage hold between two countries which are identical except for size however autarkic prices are different even though the level of trade is zero under the free trade regime nevertheless free trade reduces the oligopoly price and increases welfare copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

restricted stock markets in simple general equilibrium models with production uncertainty it is shown that in a two sector production model with uncertainty analogous to work of batra and sakai there exists an implicit and arbitrarily restricted stock market interpretation of the model and that the appropriate duality lies between the relation of factor endowments and equity outputs and the relation of factor prices and equity prices these observations permit a generalization of the batra sakai assumption of maximization of expected utility of profits this is accompanied by an extensive characterization of the implicit market and several of its comparative statics properties a 2 2 2 2 joint production formulation is developed to examine stability properties

mission control the development of personnel systems in u s industry this paper examines historical differences in personnel practices among u s industries to explore the roots of modern bureaucratic work control we report multivariate analyses of data describing organizational personnel practices collected by the national industrial conference board between 1935 and 1946 we find evidence of three early strands of bureaucratic labor control in different industrial sectors worker allocation and job evaluation techniques which evolved from scientific management in modern assembly line industries internal labor market mechanisms in white collar nonmanufacturing practices related to seniority and the formalization of rules in unionized and skilled industries our analyses suggest that the institutional environment and the historical period of an industry s founding were among the central contingencies shaping labor control in a particular sector as were several factors that past research has emphasized more such as technology and skills labor market conditions and unionization our analyses thus corroborate some previous accounts of industrial differences in bureaucratic control while also suggesting some revisions concerning where when and why employment relations first became bureaucratized

threat positions and the resolution of environmental conflicts in the classic externality problem of one polluting firm and a passive victim we consider bargaining when the firm has the prior right to pollute assuming that a threat made prior to bargaining is perceived to be credible the firm will commit itself to an output level that is higher than both the efficient and profit maximizing levels in an extension we assume that the firm makes an irreversible investment in production capability to give its threat credibility we show that a credible investment must be greater than or equal to the profit maximizing investment

bargaining to preserve a unique ecosystem the role of anticipatory investments to establish stronger bargaining positions abstract a forester and a conservation organization bargain over the commercial exploitation or preservation of a forested tract of land with unique ecological characteristics the forester can improve its bargaining position by preparing a portion of the land for future timber production prior to negotiations between the two however doing so decreases the preservation value of the forest as well as the compensation the conservation group is willing to pay to preserve the forest the analysis suggests that the forester will begin preparing the land for timber production prior to negotiations only when the value of the land in timber production is significantly lower than the preservation values of the conservation group

explaining the absence of international factor price convergence abstract as capital markets have become integrated factor prices have not converged as expected this paper provides an explanation the key observation is that non specific output risks are borne by capital making international portfolio diversification a dominant strategy capital market integration can elicit many patterns of factor price response under this circumstance factor prices will move in parallel if countries are identical when countries differ factor prices may diverge or even have their relative sizes reversed the integration of capital markets affects welfare through changes in risk and in overall returns to savings welfare need not improve

international trade and incomplete markets trade theorists since the influential paper by helpman and razin 1978 have considered the impact of uncertainty and international trade in securities from the point of view of available risk markets helpman and razin elegantly showed that in a model with multiplicative production uncertainty the validity of the traditional theorems of international trade follows from the existence of domestic securities markets and international trade in securities under their assumptions output was written

payment systems and the structure of inequality conceptual issues and an analysis of salespersons in department stores output related payment systems such as commissions and piece rates are common in many jobs their central feature is that the wage of an employee is tied directly to her current performance focusing on salespersons in department stores the author considers wage differences under three payment systems a straight salary a straight commision and a salary plus commission four conceptions of wage inequalities under the three systems are contrasted a risk sharing a bargaining a sorting and a social status interpretation the empirical analyses compare the pay schemes and wages of approximately 63 000 salespersons in 178 department stores in 1981

uncertainty and the theory of international trade in long run equilibrium abstract we consider a country with two factors and two industries each of which faces technical and price uncertainty entrepreneurs choose outputs in order to maximize the expected utility of profits they also draw factor payments and purchase consumption goods after the uncertainty isresolved they enter and exit from an industry according to whether participation there increases their expected utility within this model the validity of the propositions of neoclassical trade theory depends on how the entrepreneurs entry decisions are affected by parameter changes via their roles as risk bearers consumers and factor owners

constant increasing and decreasing risk aversion with many commodities the arrow 1971 pratt 1964 theory of risk aversion has achieved important successes in the study of economic responses to risk this theory applies to a special class of cases in which the von neumann morgenstern expected utility hypothesis is used to explain these responses under this hypothesis individuals who maximize the expected utility of different utility functions will in general make different choices in the face of uncertainty for the purpose of predicting which of two different utility functions will lead to locally more risk averse economic behaviour the essential feature of these functions is their associated arrow pratt absolute risk aversion measures in fact the local comparisons can be extended to global comparisons if the arrow pratt absolute measures are uniformly comparable the arrow pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and a closely related measure of relative risk aversion also play crucial roles in the investigation of changes induced by wealth increases in the risk taking behaviour of a single expected utility maximizing individual this study has resulted in a satisfactory theory of increasing decreasing and constant absolute and relative risk aversion the special cases to which the arrow pratt theory is directly applicable are those in which the utility functions in question are functions of a single variable e g wealth unfortunately the models required to explain many economic decisions employ a version of the expected utility hypothesis in which the argument of the utility function is a multidimensional vector one example arises in the study of the consumption savings decision another occurs in the analysis of the combined consumption savings portfolio decision a final example is obtained in the investigation of demand for goods of uncertain quality the papers of kihlstrom mirman 1974 and diamond stiglitz 1974 have suggested a partial generalization of the arrow pratt theory of absolute risk aversion this

the biodiversity bargaining problem we employ cooperative bargaining theory and nash s rational threats idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem the problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier we discuss the importance of both efficiency bargaining frontier and fairness recognition of characteristics of bargainers in the choice of the appropriate contract we show that the incremental cost contract used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the south to the production of cooperative surplus a rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions

wage distortion and resource allocation under uncertainty the effects of uncertainty on resource allocation have been examined in a two sector general equilibrium model of production constructing a model in which firms are risk indifferent and face uncertainty regarding the use of capital rothenberg and smith 9 considered the implications of uncertainty for welfare resource allocation and income distribution their model was refined by batra 3 to permit uncertainty in production to influence the firms decisions to hire both capital and labor batra s approach appears to be more general in that producers are assumed to be risk averse in lieu of risk neutral the writing of this paper is inspired by batra s contributions 2 3 batra s well known intermediate run equilibrium model is reformulated to allow for wage distortion utilizing the model several issues regarding the effects of changes in factor supplies in commodity prices and in the degree of wage distortion will be examined factor market distortions in the absence of uncertainty have been studied extensively in literature 2 their impacts on resource allocation in stochastic environment have not been explored however we argue that the introduction of the wage differential has a major impact on batra s results first relative value factor intensities generally replace relative physical factor intensities in determining signs of

dynamic stability and international trade under uncertainty in the presence of output or price uncertainty the heckscher ohlin samuelson h o s model with incomplete risk markets has been shown to exhibit a wide range of perverse comparative statics responses which contradict the predictions d la stolper samuelson and rybczynski and opens up the possibility of perverse price output responses this paper revisits the question raised by neary 1978 and examines the dynamic stability properties of an h o s model under uncertainty in relation to the conditions under which these perverse responses emerge the findings suggest that once the risk attitudes of the representative entrepreneur is appropriately accounted for in the specification of value factor intensities dynamic stability with respect to a marshallian adjustment process is necessary and sufficient for the normality of all of the standard comparative statics responses except for the rybczynski result the basic analytics are then applied to various existing setups of the h o s model under uncertainty in each case the applicability of the stability condition in precluding comparative static responses that violate standard predictions is examined

input choices and uncertain demand the theory of the firm under demand uncertainty has to date assumed that the firm s input decisions are unaffected by the stochastic nature of demand this assumption is not usually made explicitly but it is implied by the assumption that the firm s cost function presumably derived by finding the minimum cost combination of inputs for any given level of output is unaffected by the uncertainty however if firms must choose some of their inputs before the uncertainty regarding demand is resolved then different input decisions may involve different levels of risk since firms decisions regarding price and output are affected by demand uncertainty and non linear risk preferences as previous authors have shown it seems reasonable to suspect that their input decisions will also be affected but if input decisions are affected then firms cost functions are not invariant to uncertainty and the results of previous studies must be reexamined three different types of firms are considered in this paper the competitive firm the quantity setting imperfect competitor and the price setting imperfect competitor input decisions of the competitive firm and the quantity setting imperfect competitor are shown to be unaffected by demand uncertainty and hence the assumption of an unchanging cost function is appropriate in these cases for the price setting imperfect competitor however input decisions are influenced by demand uncertainty and an unchanging cost function is therefore not appropriate this case is considered in some detail and conditions under which results can differ from those previously reported in the literature are examined

the origins of private social insurance public policy and fringe benefits in america 1920 1950 how did the american system of private employment related pension and health insurance arise data on corporate fringe benefit programs during the second quarter of the 20th century contradict the received wisdom that benefits rose in response to wartime federal policy changes and industrial factors instead it appears that public policies such as the wagner act and social security led to union and business support for private insurance which in turn spurred to growth of fringe benefits the historical record suggests that neoinstitutional and conflict approaches must be synthesized to explain the expansion of fringe benefits institutional factors influenced organizational outcomes by affecting interest group goals

internal labor markets in retailing the early years this study of two new york city department stores shows that contrary to the implications of previous studies internal labor markets existed before world war i outside heavy industry and in the absence of overt worker discontent among male office employees in one store the internal market was marked by job ladders relatively high wages and many senior employees in the other store female employees in both the office and sales divisions were in a mixed situation characterized by rudimentary job ladders and pay increasing with seniority but low average wages and no protection against arbitrary dismissal the authors hypothesize that classic internal markets exist only where workers possess the collective power to impose substantial turnover costs on the employer

a reexamination of the neoclassical trade model under uncertainty abstract this paper presents a model that pinpoints the exact places and reasons that the propositions of the heckscher ohlin samuelson model break down under uncertainty within the model if preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion i a capital poor country tends to obtain lower revenues from its resources than the same resources would yield in capital rich countries ii if there is one riskless and one risky sector a capital abundant country tends to have a comparative advantage in the risky sector and iii the pattern of trade depends on the intra national as well as the inter national distribution of endowments

regulating global biodiversity what is the problem we distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones where international cooperation is required global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands the basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted and those that have not we demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by nash rubinstein and others there are benefits from global land conversion and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual benefit sharing agreements prior informed consent clauses or very extreme incremental cost contracts the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved for this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date

sunk capital and negotiated resolutions of environmental conflicts two nations seek a cooperative agreement to control bilateral flows of an industrial pollutant from previous noncooperative production choices the nations hold a certain amount of sunk capital if production requires relatively large investments in sunk capital the nations may find that they cannot negotiate production quotas that improve on their noncooperative choices when the nations find cooperation worthwhile negotiated levels of production will be higher than in the absence of sunk capital furthermore both nations are motivated to attempt to manipulate the terms of the agreement by making strategic investments in sunk capital prior to its completion

constant returns to scale and competitive equilibrium under uncertainty abstract this paper considers the implications of the assumption of constant returns to scale in expected utility maximizing models of the competitive firm or industry in which markets for risk are absent under widely used assumptions about risk preferences it is shown that with constant returns to scale average profits are more than necessary to cover the implicit costs of risk bearing when the free entry of identical firms is possible this assumption about technology is shown to be incompatible with the assumption that entrepreneurs are risk averse