returns to regionalism the past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional trade agreements with many policymakers and academics seeming to believe that these provide more than the traditional gains from trade this article examines several possible benefits that regional trade agreements may confer on their partners including credibility signaling bargaining power insurance and coordination it assesses the necessary conditions for each possible channel to work gives stylized examples of specific types of policy where the benefit might be applicable examines cases where the explanation might be relevant and discusses their overall plausibility it concludes by examining the north american free trade agreement and the europe agreements

europe vs america institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model we show how the differences in us and european institutions can arise in a normative model the paper focuses on the labor market and the government s decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock the government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse incentive effects whereby benefits increase unemployment it is found that when an adverse shock occurs benefits should be increased most when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest adjustment costs of changing benefits introduce hysteresis and can help explain why post oil shock benefits remained high in europe but not in the us desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non negative and self correcting empirical evidence concerning the role of corporatism is discussed

profits and politics coordinating technology adoption in agriculture abstract this paper examines the political economy of government led coordination of economic activity in a simple two sector model in which individuals choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization we demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria the economy is either characterized by the use of a traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized technology and a high level of industrialization relative to the traditional technology use of the mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off we show that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility of pareto improving coordination by an elected policy maker even when we allow for income redistribution

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

the need for enemies we develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage creating an incentive to underperform in the task we test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents using colombian data the main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them especially in electorally salient places we find that after the largest victories against farc rebels the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts especially in politically important municipalities politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage

credible commitment and success with public enterprise reform abstract this paper studies why some efforts at public enterprise reform fail and why others succeed economic reforms are intended to increase efficiency and thus help sustain long term growth yet many governments have had difficulty sustaining the reforms they initiated and have reintroduced rigid controls over markets and enterprises this is because either in the process of implementation the government discovers that the costs of carrying the reform further are greater than the expected efficiency gains or the public is skeptical that the new policies can be sustained and does not take the actions necessary for the gains to be realized this paper develops a new institutionalist framework and employs various measures of policy commitment and net gain from continued reform to analyze these issues the paper suggests ways in which the potential success or failure of a reform can be assessed with implications for the steps that reformers might take to increase the chances of success

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting this paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country when trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria one in which the countries are both protectionist and another in which they trade freely with each other starting with trade protection in both countries a unilateral reform in one country is shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium that obtains majority support in both countries

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

lottery versus all pay auction contests a revenue dominance theorem abstract we allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way i e she can favor specific contestants by designing the contest rule in order to maximize total equilibrium effort resp revenue the two predominant contest regimes are considered all pay auctions and lottery contests for all pay auctions the optimal bias is derived in closed form it implies extreme competitive pressure among active contestants and low endogenous participation rates moreover the exclusion principle advanced by baye et al 1993 becomes obsolete in this case in contrast the optimally biased lottery induces a higher number of actively participating contestants due to softer competition our main result regarding total revenue comparison under the optimal biases reveals that the all pay auction revenue dominates the lottery contest for all levels of heterogeneity among contestants the incentive effect due to a strongly discriminating contest rule all pay auction dominates the participation effect due to a weakly discriminating contest rule lottery

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

endogenous trade policy through majority voting an empirical investigation abstract the median voter approach to trade policy determination within a heckscher ohlin framework as in mayer am econ rev 74 5 1984 970 predicts that an increase in inequality holding constant the economy s overall relative endowments raises trade barriers in capital abundant economies and lowers them in capital scarce economies we find support for this prediction using cross country data on inequality capital abundance and diverse measures of protection we perform certain robustness checks that include controlling for the effects of political rights and schooling as well as using alternative datasets on factor endowments

incumbent employees resistance to implementing privatization policy abstract the recent anti privatization trend in latin america france and south africa is a reminder that employees resist privatization because pre privatization firms tend to be over manned and to pay excessive wages we study the effect of employees resistance on the successful implementation of privatization in a stylized model in which the government interacts with employees of an unknown type the analysis clarifies some of the difficulties associated with the implementation process furthermore although common sense dictates that the government negotiates with the employees before finding an outside buyer we show that sometimes it is better off contacting an investor first

creating balance in dynamic competitions abstract we consider incentives for organizing competitions in multiple rounds focusing on situations where there is heterogeneity among the contestants ex ante which discourages effort in a single contest heterogeneity evolves across rounds depending upon the outcomes of previous rounds we present conditions under which balance in such a competition can be created by determining the number of rounds and dividing the prize fund carefully across them so that full rent dissipation entails in the model each round is an all pay auction where contestants differ in their abilities to gain a momentum from winning we also discuss the case when negative prizes are feasible demonstrating that this strengthens the full dissipation result and we consider a case where the size of the winner s momentum is related to the size of the prize attained showing that the stronger this linkage the less of the prize is awarded early on

some results on rent seeking contests with shortlisting we show that rent seeking contests with shortlistinghave comparative static properties which depend on thestage of the contest by generalising the argument inamegashie 1997 we show that well known comparativestatic results in single stage rent seeking contestsdo not necessarily carry over to contests withshortlisting the analysis suggeststhat policy prescriptions for reducing rent seekingexpenditures in contests with shortlisting cannot begiven without taking into account the stage of thecontest we also extend the model in amegashie 1997 to the case of unequal class sizes finally theshortlisting method in amegashie 1997 is comparedwith that in clark and riis 1996

income distribution human capital and economic growth in colombia abstract colombian income distribution has followed a clear path during the last two decades in the second half of the 1970s human capital accumulation reduced the dispersion of income distribution and lead to a period of stagnation between 1983 and 1990 when mobility declined after the structural reforms a skill bias technological change the wage differential for skilled workers increased inequality by a polarization in the bi modal distribution of income these topics are discussed in the paper along some dynamic aspects of income and educational mobility in colombia

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

leviathan resists the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in turkey this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance it is found that favorable short run performance weak market potential higher employment lower socio economic development concentrated voter preferences and weaker representation of right wing parties in the firms locality delay the timing of privatization the paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale

a positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits in a wage bargaining model a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages therefore the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process we consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential using panel data for 19 oecd countries we find support for these theoretical predictions moreover we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness

environmental economics and ecological economics where they can converge abstract environmental economics and ecological economics share the common objective of understanding the human economy environment interaction in order to redirect the economies towards sustainability in pursuing this objective these two perspectives utilise different types of analytical framework and are opposed to each other on many of the fundamental theoretical and methodological issues while the environmental economics has progressed within a narrowly but sharply focused neoclassical analytical approach the ecological economics has expanded by adopting a diversified approach which led to widen the gap between the two this article makes an attempt to highlight the divergence between these two perspectives on different issues and identifies certain research avenues that would potentially bring convergence between these two perspectives

strategic groups and rent dissipation we consider a rent seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays we examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation we show the following when just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking however when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking jel

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

optimal favoritism in all pay auctions and lottery contests abstract we analyze the revenue enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants two instruments of favoritism are considered head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids in the all pay auction head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first best revenue in the lottery contest head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue as all pay auctions revenue dominate lottery contests under optimal biases we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

capital flight and political risk abstract this paper provides the first serious attempt to examine the relationship between political risk and capital flight for a large set of developing countries the outcomes of the analysis show that in most cases political risk variables do have a statistically robust relationship to capital flight once domestic and international macroeconomic circumstances are added at least when the robustness test as proposed by sala i martin is applied we conclude that on the basis of the analysis in this paper we have found support for the hypothesis that political risk leads to increased capital flight

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

reform support in times of crisis the role of family ties we argue that an important determinant of voters support for economic reform is the strength of family ties while the crisis hypothesis predicts that crises facilitate reform we show in a political economy model that this relation can break down and even reverse when agents take into account the effect of reform on their family members applied to southern european countries with strong family ties the model rationalizes why the extremely high youth unemployment following the great recession has not led to more substantial labor market reforms in such countries austerity might block rather than foster additional structural reforms

towards an equilibrium level of market reform how politics affects the dynamics of policy change in this article we examine the dynamics of economic reforms that are implemented by incumbent policy makers interested in maintaining their political power we use a sample of 86 countries over a time period going from 1980 to 2001 and find that the achievement of an equilibrium level of market liberalization is highly costly our results are robust to endogenity and model specification

trade liberalization through asset markets abstract political economy expositions of trade policy have traditionally described asset or factor ownership as not subject to change asset markets however allow individuals to change the composition of income sources we consider an economy with stochastic productivity to show how the equilibrium composition of asset portfolios influences individual attitudes toward free trade the model links financial market completeness and trade liberalization in the second half of the 20th century and provides a contributing answer to why governments in poorer countries without well developed financial markets have failed to liberalize trade

explaining welfare spending welfare expenditures are difficult to explain within a pure public choice framework in this article i shall argue that the difficulties may be resolved by assuming that the main purpose of welfare schemes is to provide the electorate in their capacity of different risk categories with insurance against various social risks rather than to redistribute economic resources towards weak and destitute groups in society this solution not only explains the scope of existing welfare arrangements but may also hold the key to an explanation as to how public welfare policies change and evolve across time

the determination of unemployment benefits while much empirical research exists on labor market consequences of unemployment benefits there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits we present a simple model where workers desire insurance against unemployment risk and benefits increase the unemployment rate we then conduct one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the benefit system using data for developed countries for 1971 89 controlling for year and country fixed effects and the government s political color we find evidence that the level of benefits falls when the unemployment rate is high this is consistent with wright s tax effect

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

insider ownership human resource strategies and performance in a transition economy researchers and potential investors in transition economies need to understand the human resource management hrm strategies of target firms since human resources are arguably their most valuable assets understanding is difficult however because hrm strategies help to determine firms performance but are in turn influenced by corporate governance particularly insider ownership this paper employs a structural equation modeling methodology to examine the relations between governance hrm strategies and performance in the context of a novel dataset of ukrainian industrial firms it is found that insider ownership is positively associated with high commitment hrm strategies and negatively with low commitment cost cutting hrm strategies cost cutting hrm strategies are in turn associated with weaker firm performance these outcomes correspond broadly with theoretical expectations

why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders nevertheless the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision this article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism problems that usually plague contract negotiations the article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs uses them to construct a simple probit decision making model and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty year period

intergenerational support and the life cycle incomes of young men and their parents human capital investments coresidence and intergenerational financial transfers this article examines the resource allocations of parents in the form of both shared residence with and financial transfers to their young adult sons based on an overlapping generations model incorporating a game between parents and adult children estimates of the determinants of such transfers are obtained from the kinship linked cohorts of the national longitudinal surveys the estimates suggest that both types of parental assistance are as important as governmental transfers in supporting young men and are responsive to the current and anticipated earnings of their offspring suggesting that young men cannot adequately smooth their consumption without parental help

biased contests for symmetric players in a biased contest one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process we characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions we however challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post we show that contests with arbitrary favorites i e biased contests of symmetric players can be optimal in terms of various objectives such as expected aggregate effort the probability to reveal the stronger player as the winner or expected effort of the winner

a comparison between economic systems with an application to transition abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium theory of endogenous firm and class formation under non contractibility with heterogeneous individuals a collectivist economy a private ownership economy and a mixed economy are compared on the basis of identical economic fundamentals methodological symmetry each economic system generates specific inefficiencies so that none dominates the others in general the main trade off is between the welfare loss associated with risk taking in the private ownership economy and the informational problems in the collectivist economy we then use this framework to study the political economy of transition between economic systems and provide detailed welfare results

exploring the political economy of labour market institutions labour markets how reforms took place many economists argue that the european unemployment problem relates to large labour market rigidities this paper argues that many of those inflexibilities and the underlying institutional regulations can be understood as the outcome of political influence by incumbent employees this is because many policies that increase unemployment actually benefit these insiders an empirical investigation of the determinants of labour market institutions demonstrates that the observations are consistent with this view the findings imply 1 higher exposure of the employed to unemployment facilitates a reduction in the level of employment protection 2 unemployment benefits are lower the more employment reacts to wages 3 a higher level of unemployment and the existence of a right wing government slow down the growth rate of the minimum wage giles saint paul

does unemployment insurance displace familial assistance the objective of this study is to examine the extent to whichbenefits received from the unemployment insurance programdisplace assistance that the unemployed receive from theirextended family using data from a supplement to the panelstudy of income dynamics it is found that the unemployedreceive private support and that these private networks arefairly pervasive twenty nine percent of those receivingunemployment insurance benefits also receive cash transfersfrom their family or friends moreover it is found thatunemployment benefits displace familial support by as much as24 40 cents per dollar

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

rain emotions and voting for the status quo abstract do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo we exploit exogenous variation in emotions caused by rain and analyze data on more than 870 000 municipal vote outcomes in switzerland to address this question the empirical tests are based on administrative ballot outcomes and individual postvote survey data we find that rain decreases the share of votes for political change our robustness checks suggest that this finding is not driven by changes in the composition of the electorate and changes in information acquisition in addition we provide evidence that rain might have altered the outcome of several high stake votes we discuss the psychological mechanism and document that rain reduces the willingness to take risks a pattern that is consistent with the observed reduction in the support for change

the choice of insurance in the labor market employment protection and unemployment benefits are considered the most prominent insurance devices for workers to protect themselves against the risk of unemployment it occurs that societies either choose a high level of employment protection relative to unemployment benefits or vice versa this paper explains where countries locate on this trade off it is argued that higher coverage of voters out of the labor force with intra household transfers yields a politico economic equilibrium with relatively high employment protection and relatively low unemployment benefits cross country data and survey data on voters preferences are presented that corroborate the outcomes of the model

tax reform and the political economy of the tax base abstract this paper studies the political prospects for reform in a model where the tax base and statutory rate are separate instruments of tax policy the model suggests that large changes in the tax code may be easier to enact than marginal reforms the tax base faces a tipping point where even the beneficiaries from tax exemptions support reform at this tipping point tax reform is pareto improving politically feasible tax reform occurs when fiscal needs are large but may nonetheless involve reductions in marginal tax rates there is strategic complementarity in lobbying for tax exemptions resulting in multiple equilibria the model s main predictions are consistent with recent tax reforms in oecd countries

the political economy of food subsidy reform the case of egypt abstract this paper examines the political economy of food subsidy reform efforts in egypt egypt provides a case of a country with a large food subsidy program that has been relatively effective as a social safety net but a program that is also expensive and poorly targeted to the needy policy discussions about strategies to improve the system s performance run into the extreme political sensitivity of the issue of food subsidies in egypt food subsidies are perceived to be important in promoting political stability and providing some legitimacy to a political system where civil liberties are limited egypt therefore illustrates the dilemmas facing policymakers and others contemplating food subsidy reform in developing countries where there are concerns that reform may spark political unrest this paper argues that even in cases where food subsidy reform is a highly politicized issue there are still a number of pragmatic policy steps that can be taken that meet the twin goals of reforming the system in ways that better target the poor while functioning more efficiently

openness country size and government abstract this paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in gdp and are also more open to trade these empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models explaining country formation and break up and may account for the observed positive empirical relationship between trade openness and government size

economic reform and political transition in africa the quest for a politics of development the 1980s were bracketed by crises in africa as protracted economic malaise was succeeded by a wave of political reform analysts have sought to understand the sources of economic decline as well as the political requisites for recovery in the region neoclassical and structuralist analyses have been challenged by state centric views of economic change the latter perspective emphasizes the need for capable developmental states as a basis for long term adjustment but a political theory of economic change is still lacking such a theory must address the institutional foundations of growth as well as the shifting basis of social coalitions in african regimes political liberalization suggests the possibility of a new setting for economic reform though the effects of political reform on institutions and coalitions remain ambiguous and democratization cannot be regarded as a panacea for the region s developmental failure future research must look more closely at the interests and structures in transitional regimes and scholars should adopt a more comparative vantage on africa s challenges of reform

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

generalised taylor and generalised calvo price and wage setting micro evidence with macro implications the generalised calvo and the generalised taylor models of price and wage setting are unlike the standard calvo and taylor counterparts exactly consistent with the distribution of durations observed in the data using price and wage micro data from a major euro area economy france we develop calibrated versions of these models we assess the consequences for monetary policy transmission by embedding these calibrated models in a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model the generalised taylor model is found to help rationalise the hump shaped and persistent response of inflation without resorting to the counterfactual assumption of systematic wage and price indexation

dynamic commitment and incomplete policy rules considering the dynamics of commitment highlights some neglected features of time inconsistency problems we modify the standard rules versus discretion question in three ways 1 a government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow 2 the government s commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules and 3 the government s ability to make irrevocable commitments is restricted three results stand out first the option to wait makes the incumbent regime rules or discretion relatively more attractive second the option to wait means that increased uncertainty makes the incumbent regime more attlwactive third because the commitment decision takes place in real time policy choice displays hysteresis when monetary policy is subject to dynamic inconsistencies optimal policy requires some precommitment by the central bank despite a proliferation of mechanisms designed to address this problem work in this area has continued to assume a once and for all choice between rules and discretion this paper asks two closely related questions first what happens if commitment decisions are made in real time so that failure to commit today does not rule out the possibility of commitment tomorrow second if governments can make only commitments that are difficult but not impossible to reverse what determines the dynamics of commitment and reversal the assumption of once and for all choice enforces simplistic dynamics on the policy process if the standard models are interpreted literally for example the commitment problem for u s monetary policy is moot having been resolved with the founding of the federal reserve system in 1914 if not at the constitutional convention of 1789 much of the interest in dynamic inconsistency however arises pre

rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained in the original tullock 1975 1980 game an individual bidder s probability of winning with a bid b is proportional to br where the exponent reflects economies of scale in rent seeking different interpretations can be given to these probabilities first one may view r as a reflection of the political culture alternatively one may view r as a choice variable for a politician intuition suggests that a society with a high tolerance for the selling of political favors and politicians who are receptive to rent seeking would both induce greater rent seeking expenditures than other societies all else equal this paper shows that a lower value of r can actually lead to more rent dissipation than a higher value this paper also reinforces two points concerning rent seeking first the analysis confirms the robustness of under dissipation of rents even in the face of entry second it points out the importance of distinguishing between rent seeking expenditures and rent dissipation when bidders must borrow for example total expenditure may understate rent dissipation

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

the joint determination of household membership and market work the case of young men except in special cases market work and household membership are jointly chosen a nash bargaining model of family behavior is used to specify stochastic structural relationships two indirect utility functions and a market and a reservation wage function that jointly determine work consumption and household membership the maximum likelihood estimates of the implied trinomial probit model differ sharply from those obtained when either market work or household membership is taken as exogenous this application to white male youths from the national longitudinal surveys shows the insurance function of families parents insure their sons against poor market opportunities

collective contests for commons and club goods abstract this paper focuses on collective contests for commons and club goods our main objective is to examine in this context the effect of group size on its performance the main results specify conditions for the existence non existence of the group size paradox namely the situation where a larger group is less more effective in pursuing its interest because of despite the combined effect of the incentives that result in the free riding problem and the tragedy of the commons the paper also explains under what circumstances there exists a bias towards excessive or inadequate winning group size finally it examines the effect of restricted excludability of the commons good within the winning group on the relationship between group size and its winning probability

the option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules abstract we consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision voters can either implement the project in the first period or they can postpone the decision to the second period we analyze the effects of different majority rules individual first period voting behavior may become less conservative under supermajority rules and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a supermajority rule that would not be implemented under simple majority rule we characterize the optimal majority rule which is a supermajority rule in contrast to individual investment problems society may be better off if the option to postpone the decision did not exist these results are qualitatively robust to natural generalizations of our model

a reform dilemma in polarized democracies abstract we study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies we develop a simple election model where i reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change and ii politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently we identify a so called reform dilemma which manifests itself in two variants from a static perspective low reform ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step this property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment from a dynamic perspective incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re elected regardless of their reform ability

learning about the prospects for mobility economic and political dynamics following fundamental policy reform abstract the political left turn in latin america which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior this paper generalizes the forward looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic possibly non concave income processes under full information the model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present in contrast modeling voters evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information perspective accounts for latin america s right to left political shift and offers additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

gradualism versus big bang speed and sustainability of reforms a beneficial reform may be blocked by a majority if it is implemented by a big bang but the same reform may succeed with an optimally designed gradualist approach a gradualist approach can sometimes split opposition force and is in this sense more politically sustainable on the other hand if both approaches are politically preferred to no reform a big bang is often preferred to gradualism in terms of both political support as well as economic efficiency

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

contests with endogenous discrimination abstract this paper builds a complete information contest model with endogenous discrimination we show that a revenue maximizing contest designer will optimally set a bias towards a weaker contestant against a stronger contestant and completely eliminate the asymmetry between the two moreover in contrast to fair contest models where the revenue maximizing contest designer is better off if the weaker contestant becomes stronger or the stronger contestant becomes weaker our model shows that the opposite result may arise

contests with draws axiomatization and equilibrium we introduce and axiomatize a class of single winner contest success functions that embody the possibility of a draw we then analyze the game of contest that our success functions induce having different prizes delivered in the occurrence of a win and a draw we identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric interior nash equilibrium and show that equilibrium efforts and equilibrium rent dissipation can be larger than in a tullock contest with no possibility of a draw due to increased competition even if the draw prize is null these results suggest that a contest designer may profit from introducing the possibility of a draw finally we show that this approach naturally extends to multiprize contests with multiple draws across different subsets of the set of players jel c72 d72 d74

moral hazard in repeated procurement of services this paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a two period model with a potential repeated agency relationship in the first period there is an incumbent who provides a service in the second period there is a contest stage in which the principal selects the next service provider the agents effort is non contractible and the contest stage is the mechanism to mitigate potential moral hazard problems the principal takes account of the past service effort in the contest stage by choosing the weight of past effort and the degree of substitutability between past and current efforts the results show that when the principal does not value contest effort considering past effort as the relevant effort in the contest is optimal when the principal values contest effort and effort cost increases decreasing substitutability between efforts is optimal

is free trade passe abstract if there were an economist s creed it would surely contain the affirmations i understand the principle of comparative advantage and i advocate free trade yet the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 1817 publication of ricardo s principles of political economy and this is due to changes that have recently taken place in the theory of international trade while new developments in international trade theory may not yet be familiar to the profession at large they have been substantial and radical in the last ten years the traditional constant returns perfect competition models of international trade have been supplemented and to some extent supplanted by a new breed of models that emphasizes increasing returns and imperfect competition these new models call into doubt the extent to which actual trade can be explained by comparative advantage they also open the possibility that government intervention in trade via import restrictions export subsidies

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association