the local response to tax limitation measures do local governments manipulate voters to increase revenues abstract this paper provides evidence that some cities subject to a statewide tax limit manipulate their mix of productive and administrative services in an attempt to get voters to override the statewide limit when a statewide limit reduces a city s budget one manipulative response is to cut service inputs for example teachers or uniformed police officers by a relatively large amount while cutting administrative inputs by a relatively small amount this approach reveals a relatively large trade off between public and private goods and the severe consequences from a tax limit may encourage local voters to override the statewide limit we provide evidence that cities with local override options tend to adopt this approach manipulation is most prevalent among cities run by city managers as opposed to strong mayors

relative versus absolute income joy of winning and gender brain imaging evidence in this paper we study the role of absolute versus relative income using functional magnetic resonance imaging fmri while being scanned in two adjacent mri scanners pairs of subjects had to simultaneously perform a simple estimation task that entailed monetary rewards for correct answers we show that a variation in the comparison subject s payment affects blood oxygenation level dependent bold responses in the ventral striatum this brain region is engaged in the prediction and registration of primary rewards such as food delivery as well as more abstract forms of rewards like money in particular we show that activation in the ventral striatum increases in absolute income and for a given level of absolute income decreases in lower relative income using a male and a female sample allows us to study whether the perception of relative and absolute incomes is gender specific we find that the effects of absolute and relative incomes are strong and relatively similar for both genders finally we analyze the importance of joy of winning i e the impact of outperforming another subject our results suggest that the mere fact of outperforming the other subject positively affects reward related brain areas

e ztax tax salience and tax rates this paper examines whether the salience of a tax system affects equilibrium tax rates i analyze how tolls change after toll facilities adopt electronic toll collection etc drivers are substantially less aware of tolls paid electronically i estimate that in steady state tolls are 20 to 40 percent higher than they would have been without etc consistent with a salience based explanation for this toll increase i find that under etc driving becomes less elastic with respect to the toll and toll setting becomes less sensitive to the electoral calendar alternative explanations appear unlikely to be able to explain the findings

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

more on tax perception and labour supply the spanish case abstract we estimate the marginal tax rate perceived by married spanish males the results suggest the existence of prominent divergences between subjective perception and formal income tax rules the efficiency and welfare implications of this tax rate gap are also assessed

active and passive behaviour in land ownership in recent years empirical studies of the motives and behaviour of landowners have helped enlighten theoretical understandings of the process of land supply for urban development structuralist and behaviourist approaches have both been used in empirical work this paper presents the results of recent research on the involvement of landowners in the local planning process the research points to a much greater variety of landowner behaviour than either acknowledged by structuralist typologies or contained within behaviourist characteristics involvement in the local planning process would however appear to be an early indicator of later activity by the landowner in the development process such early warnings may be useful in enabling landowner behaviour to be predicted

understanding overbidding in second price auctions an experimental study we present results from second price private value auction spa experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponentsvalue such signals change biddersperception about the strengthof their opponent and the relationship between biddersperception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in spa we found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values supporting a modifiedjoy of winninghypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values consistent with thespite hypothesis second price private value auctions spas are the most easily understood auction format from a theoretical point of view 1 in standard private value auction models of fully rational bidders with standard preferences bidding one s own value is a weakly dominant strategy this theoretical prediction holds irrespective of biddersrisk atti tudes the number of rival bidders symmetry in the value distributions and so on in laboratory experiments however subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding kagel et al 1987 found that the actual bids are on average 11 above the dominant strategy bids kagel and levin 1993 found that about 62 of all bids in their five bidder spa sessions exceed the bidder s value while only 8 of all bids were below it both kagel and levin 1993 and harstad 2000 further reported that experience has only a small effect in reducing overbidding in spa an important related finding is that overbidding in english auctions a mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the spa in the case of private values is known to be a short term phenomenon that subjects quickly learn not to undertake kagel and levin 1993 thus any explanation for the prevalence and persistence of overbidding in the spa must also explain its rarity in the english auction given the robustness of the findings of overbidding in spa it is surprising that economists have little understanding of why it happens kagel et al 1987 conjectured that bidding above one s own value in a spa is based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second highest bid 2 moreover they argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive profits and because the negative feedback from overbidding is a weak mechanism in the spa for example if a bidder overbids in a spa by 10 above her value it is quite possible that she does not win at all and thus does not experience

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

tax aversion in labor supply abstract in a real effort laboratory experiment labor supply decreases more with the introduction of a tax than with a financially equivalent drop in wages this tax aversion is large in magnitude when we decompose the productivity decrease that arises from taxation we estimate that 40 is due to the lower net wage and the remaining 60 to tax aversion this tax aversion affects labor supply more on the extensive margin working less than on the intensive margin being less productive while working the aversion is equally strong whether tax revenue goes to the u s government or back to the experimenter a laboratory tax we discuss the implications of our results for the relationship between labor supply and taxation

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply recent surveys on the labor supply responses of men document a divergence in the estimates of substitution and income effects obtained using various estimation approaches generally studies accounting for nonlinear tax schedules in a static setting via a piecewise linear approach produce estimates that typically imply higher substitution and lower income responses than are suggested by empirical work applying other approaches this paper demonstrates that maximum likelihood estimation of a consumer choice problem with nonlinear budget sets implicitly relies on the satisfaction of inequality constraints that translate into behaviorally meaningful restrictions these constraints arise not as a consequence of economic theory but instead as a requirement to create a properly defined statistical model in the analysis of piecewise linear budget sets the implicit constraints required by maximum likelihood in estimation amount to imposition of slutsky conditions at all wage income combinations associated with kink points in the analysis of differentiable budget sets the tacit constraints invoked by maximum likelihood also involve inequality restrictions on slutsky terms the empirical work presented in this study supports the contention that these implicit constraints play a major role in explaining the discrepancies in estimates found in the literature on men s labor supply

bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply how can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs or inattention i derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed effect of a price change on demand the size of the price change and the degree of frictions the degree of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum the bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin elasticities i apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1 of earnings as a result small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities extensive and intensive margin elasticities and other disparate findings pooling estimates from existing studies i estimate a hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0 33 on the intensive margin and 0 25 on the extensive margin after accounting for frictions

vertical irmbalance in the fiscal systems of federal states a theory of vertical fiscal imbalance in federal states vfi is developed which distinguishes between long run and short run imbalances and between normative and positive interpretations of the concept the analysis is carried out in the context of a simple three sector model where the allocation of national output among sectors results from interaction of a public choice process with an overall resource constraint the paper proposes welfare theoretic definitions of long run and short run vfi in addition it uses the concept as part of a positive analysis in order to reassess broad trends in canadian fiscal history

competition and monopoly power in local government an extension of caplan 2001 caplan 2001 shows that because land is asource of immobile wealth localgovernments can use the property tax toavoid competitive pressures of the tieboutmodel allowing them to deviate fromcitizens preferences in this comment ishow that the property tax is not the onlytax local governments can use to avoidcompetitive pressure most taxes placed onproperty owners allow local governments toextract some rents despite perfect citizenmobility

the effect of income taxation on the labor supply of married men in sweden abstract this paper presents labor supply functions estimated on a sample of prime age swedish males the model used takes account of the nonlinear character of individuals budget sets caused by the progressive income tax it also allows preferences to vary between individuals calculations with the estimated functions using a partial equilibrium framework indicate a sizeable effect of the income tax on hours of work the average expected deadweight loss of the income tax is found to be approximately 20 percent of tax revenue

charity donations and the euro introduction some quasi experimental evidence on money illusion we compare the revenues of a house to house collection for a charity before and after the introduction of the euro in a ceteris paribus setting we find strong evidence of money illusion supplementing earlier econometric experimental and survey evidence on its existence

leviathan and competition among jurisdictions the case of benefit taxation abstract this paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and thus helps to tame leviathan governments however this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government in the case of benefit taxes e g user charges a leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum sum taxes

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

property taxation congestion and local public goods abstract the residential property tax has been viewed as a congestion fee even if it distorts housing decisions this paper shows that the rule for a competitive jurisdiction s optimal public good supply may be written in a form in which no such role appears congestion costs enter the cost side of this rule in the same way that they enter when only a land tax is available the new rule is reconciled with an alternative rule in the literature which contains no congestion costs

pedagogic comment and the supply of land for a particular use this article continues the recent debate in urban studies on the supply of land it specifies the analytical framework corrects misinterpretations of wiltshaw 1985 emphasises the possibility of the individual possessing a powerful welfare effect and a backward bending land supply curve and stresses the need to consider the distributions of non land income and landownership as well as the form of the utility function when aggregating supply for a particular use

the non equivalence of labour market taxes a real effort experiment under full rationality a labour market tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent with boundedly rational agents this equivalence is no longer obvious in a real effort experiment we study the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector subjective well being labour supply and on the job performance our findings suggest that employer side taxes induce preferences for a larger public sector subjective well being is higher under employer side taxes while labour supply is lower at least at the extensive margin we discuss three mechanisms that may underlie these results

wage subsidies and fair wages abstract wage subsidies can be provided directly to the worker or indirectly by subsidizing the employer with reduced cost of labor employers offer higher wages the standard literature stipulates that this statutory incidence bears no implications for the economic incidence we propose and test a mechanism by which indirect subsidies lead to higher social welfare studies show that workers reciprocate higher wages with higher effort indirect subsidies are shifted to the workers as higher wages leading workers to reciprocate with higher effort and productivity a controlled laboratory experiment supports our behavioral hypotheses and confirms the behavioral and welfare implications

should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate if jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately they tax only land because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital to exploit absentee owners however jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level as absentee ownership increases throughout the economy land taxation results in greater inefficiency to alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land the higher level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate uniform taxation of land and capital or property taxation thus may be more efficient than separate taxation jel classification h21 h71 est ce que la terre et le capital devraient etre taxes d une maniere uniforme si on permettait aux diverses juridictions de taxer capital et terre separement elles taxeraient seulement la terre parce que la fiscalite imposee au capital cree des distorsions dans l allocation du capital mobile mais pour exploiter les proprietaires absents les diverses juridictions imposent un fardeau fiscal sur la terre qui va au dela de ce que l efficacite commande a proportion que la propriete absente se developpe dans l economie la fiscalite imposee a la terre devient source de plus en plus grande inefficacite pour reduire cette inefficacite attribuable a la sur taxation de la terre le niveau senior de gouvernement intervient pour forcer les juridictions juniors a taxer capital et terre au meme taux parce que le desir d attirer le capital reduit le taux de taxation il se peut donc que la taxation uniforme de la terre et du capital ou de la taxation sur la propriete soit plus efficace que des taux d imposition differents

labor supply and taxes a survey i survey the male and female labor supply literatures focusing on implications for effects of wages and taxes for males i describe and contrast results from three basic types of model static models especially those that account for nonlinear taxes life cycle models with savings and life cycle models with both savings and human capital for women more important distinctions are whether models include fixed costs of work and whether they treat demographics like fertility and marriage and human capital as exogenous or endogenous the literature is characterized by considerable controversy over the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in wages and taxes at least for males it is fair to say that most economists believe labor supply elasticities are small but a sizeable minority of studies that i examine obtain large values hence there is no clear consensus on this point in fact a simple average of hicks elasticities across all the studies i examine is 0 30 several simulation studies have shown that such a value is large enough to generate large welfare costs of income taxation for males i conclude that two factors drive many of the differences in results across studies one factor is use of direct vs ratio wage measures with studies that use the former tending to find larger elasticties another factor is the failure of most studies to account for human capital returns to work experience i argue that this may lead to downward bias in elasticity estimates in a model that includes human capital i show how even modest elasticities as conventionally measured can be consistent with large welfare costs of taxation

the flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods in this paper we explore how the ability of bureaucrats to extract resources from their community may be limited by competition in the local market for public goods specifically we examine intergovernmental aid as a resource bureaucrats seek to control intergovernmental aid has been found to be more stimulative of local government expenditures than predicted by neo classical economic theory in this research the flypaper effect is used as an indicator of the ability of bureaucrats to control local resources in excess of local demand and preferences we empirically relate variation in the flypaper effect to the extent of competition in the local market for public goods competition does not consistently limit the flypaper effect the implications of this finding for theories of competition in the local market for public goods are then discussed

an empirical assessment of the factor supplier pressure group hypothesis the main purpose of this paper has been to empirically assess tullock s factor supplier pressure group hypothesis theory predicted that public employees would be most able to use their political power to expand public spending levels at the local level of government therefore in contrast to the two previous attempts to test this hypothesis the empirical tests focused on the growth oflocal public spending the test results lead to the conclusion that the political power of public employee groups is an important determinant of the growth of local public spending although the extent of their influence is as yet unknown general control personnel and sanitation workers were found to be exceptionally successful at influencing budgetary growth in terms of the former group these results lead me to suspect that the results of bennett and johnson s 1980 research on federal government growth apply to the local public sector as well that is while there may be debate over how much local public spending has increased as a percentage of net national product its composition has changed in that proportionally more resources are being used for the purposes of administrative rule making as is the case with federal governmental regulation increased regulation of the local public economy is sure to have substantial allocative and distributive effects which form an agenda for future research

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

budget reform and the theory of fiscal federalism institute of university of ii business and california i economic research berkeley center for real estate and urban economics working paper series working paper 85 io8 budget reform and the theory of fiscal federalism by john m quigley and danlel l rubinfeld these papers are preliminary in nature their purpose 39 to stimulate discussion comm therefore they are n be cited or quoted in publication without th s permission of the aut graduate school of business administration

estimating the perceived tax scale within a labor supply model the swedish marginal tax scale is too complex to be known in detail by individuals this paper indicates that perceived tax scales can be estimated jointly with a labor supply equation the differe

the market for laws an economic analysis of legislation considerable insight into the workings of government has been gained in recent years by analyzing political behavior in the same way that economists analyze market behavior such analysis has led to at least two actually several distinguishable but often overlapping developments one might be labeled the interest group theory of government 1 4 10 11 12 16 while the second could be referred to as the economic theory of legislatures 4 5 10 15 18 the purpose of the following presentation is to combine these two theoretical developments and treat the legislative process as a market for laws then by simultaneously considering interest group characteristics and legislative production costs hypotheses concerning both the level of interest group pressure and the magnitude of legislative output are examined in particular the primary issues to be addressed are 1 what determines the number of interest groups formed in a state and 2 what impact does the number of interest groups have on the level of legislative output in the process the developing economic approach to government is extended in two directions first this study contains what appears to be the first direct empirical examination of the question of what factors lead to or limit aggregate interest group demands for legislation and second the level of interest group pressure and the constraints on or costs of legislative decision making are considered to simultaneously determine the aggregate output of the legislative process virtually all previous studies of interest group legislation examine the impact of specific interests on specific legislation 2 the following presentation is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction in order to explore the issues suggested above section ii characterizes the political process as a market in order to justify the theoretical hypotheses to be tested section iii details the theoretical

fragmentation and the growth of local government an assumption of the post world war ii metropolitan reform movement was that fragmentation of metropolitan regions into multiple local governments was wasteful and inefficient increasing the cost and size of government more recently polycentrists have argued that the competition between multiple governments in metropolitan regions can in factreduce the growth in government by providing a competitive check on the excessive demands of local bureaucrats for more resources in this article i explore the effects of fragmentation on growth in the size of suburban municipal government budgets and in the number of services offered competition inherent in more fragmented metropolitan regions is shown to slow the expansion in local government expenditures and service levels

economic competition and political competition an empirical note this paper has examined the proposition that more concentrated or consolidated metropolitan areas will produce public goods less efficiently than if there were a greater degree of interjurisdictional competition the empirical evidence garnered in section 3 suggests that interjurisdictional competition does tend to reduce the cost of providing local public services and consequently local government expenditure levels

biased effects of taxes and subsidies on portfolio choices we study how taxes and subsidies affect portfolio choices in a laboratory experiment we find highly significant differences after intervention even though the net income is identical in all our treatments and thus the decision pattern of investors should be constant in particular we observe that the willingness to invest in the risky asset decreases markedly when an income tax has to be paid or when a subsidy is paid we investigate this result further in a range of variations of the baseline experiment and find our main result to be largely robust however as we reduce the number of states of nature the bias weakens considerably

behavioral effects of withholding taxes on labor supply in most advanced economies income tax collection uses third party withholding for wage income because withholding taxes do not necessarily reflect true effective taxes these may give false signals of net of tax pay we test labor supply responses to such misconceptions using laboratory experiments withholding taxes and the resulting tax refunds should be behaviorally neutral but our results show that tax adjustments lead to effort adjustments which suggests that withholding blurs tax incentives while there is no statistically significant response in the overall sample the participants in the subgroup who self assess to be motivated by monetary incentives about half of the total sample reduce their effort in response to withholding taxes and increase their effort after receiving tax refunds

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

experimental comparison of multi stage and one stage contests this article experimentally studies a two stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one stage contest contrary to the theory the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest there is significant over dissipation in both stages of the two stage contest and experience diminishes over dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject s utility a simple behavioral model that accounts for a non monetary utility of winning can explain significant over dissipation in both contests it can also explain why the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest

taxpayer confusion evidence from the child tax credit we develop an empirical test for whether households understand or misperceive their marginal tax rate our identifying variation comes from the loss of the child tax credit when a child turns 17 using this age discontinuity we find that despite this tax liability increase being lump sum and predictable households reduce their reported wage income upon discovering they have lost the credit this finding suggests that households misinterpret at least part of this tax liability change as an increase in their marginal tax rate this evidence supports the hypothesis that tax complexity can cause confusion and leads to unintended behavioral responses jel d12 d14 h24 h31

bureaucracy publicness and local government expenditures revisited comment the empirical literature on the publicness of local government services has observed no significant degree of publicness it is difficult to reconcile these findings with wyckoff s conclusion that bureaucrats prefer pure public goods wyckoff s solution is to suggest that bureaucracy has little effect on operating non capital expenditure decisions this solution however conflicts with the empirical findings of numerous local expenditure and wage studies based on bureau supply models but there is no need to consider this evidence because we have shown that wyckoff s cost assumptions imply that a median voter regime will also operate at a maximum attainable degree of publicness hence we must either reject wyckoff s assumptions or conclude that the nature of the services demanded from local government is such that the maximum attainable degree of publicness is close to no publicness at all in any case wyckoff s conclusions are not supported within the context of his own assumptions

the econometrics of nonlinear budget sets traditional empirical analysis of consumer demand has usually made the assumption of linear budget sets that is the consumer is assumed to purchase any desired quantity at a constant price subject to a budget constraint the major exception to this framework is the analysis of demand when some goods are rationed 2 in the rationed case the price is constant up to a quantity limit in contrast to the rationed case here i consider the situation where the price varies with the amount of the good purchased empirical situations with nonconstant prices come readily to mind and of course they have received much recent attention from theorists since mirrlees 44 paper on optimal nonlinear taxation the following examples are meant to give a partial listing of cases when nonlinear budget sets occur i electricity prices many electric utilities engage in declining block pricing that is the marginal price of successive kwh s of electricity decrease at a given number of points determined by total demand thus the budget set is piecewise linear houthakker 36 was the first to propose an approach to this problem taylor 51 analyzes the problem at length and hausman kinnucin and mcfadden 31 use an instrumental variables estimator to provide consistent estimates of the demand function

designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants an experimental study is the right amount of effort exerted in multiperson tournaments where contestants have two different levels of initial endowments termed favorites and underdogs we develop theoretical predictions for the level of effort and the effect of varying the prize structure we test these predictions for three person tournaments using an economic experiment in a social environment where contest outcomes are publicly announced we find that both favorites and underdogs overexert effort relative to the theoretical point predictions moreover in the treatment with two favorites and one underdog favorites increase their effort when the number of prizes is increased from one to two contrary to the theory prediction we show that a generalized model that allows for psychological losses from losing for favorites and psychological gains from winning for underdogs because of social comparisons tracks the experimental results better than the standard theoretical model this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

progressive taxation in a tournament economy abstract not enough is known about the responsiveness of individuals in particular those who work under different incentives to changes in marginal tax rates we ask whether changes in tax rates are less distortionary for workers engaged in a contest to examine this potential rationale for a more progressive tax code we first model the effort decisions of workers faced with progressive taxation under tournaments and piece rates because of the difficulty identifying any distortion that may be induced by the tax code in naturally occurring data we then report on the results of a real effort experiment based on this model consistent with a behavioral approach to public finance we find that competitive tournament workers are less sensitive and hint in our discussion at the possible welfare benefits of progressive taxation in tournament economies

municipal residency laws and local public budgets prior research has shown that residency laws increase the productivity of municipal employees which tends to reduce per unit operating cost however this gain in efficiency appears to have been lost when one considers that public employee groups tend to be high demanders who have a greater tendency to vote in local elections and to support expenditure increases bennett and orzechowski 1983 our results tend to provide additional evidence to support the findings of previous studies that public employee groups tend to exert a disproportionate impact on local budgetary decisions

the productivity of schools and other local public goods producers abstract i construct an agency model of local public goods producers in which households make tiebout choices among jurisdictions in a world of imperfect information and costly residential mobility i examine producers effort and rent under local property tax finance and centralized finance i show that if there are a sufficient number of jurisdictions conventional local property tax finance can attain about as much productivity as a social planner with centralized finance can even if the social planner is armed with more information than a real social planner could plausibly have the key insight is that decentralized tiebout choices make some information the social planner would need verifiable and other information unnecessary

experimental evidence on the relationship between tax evasion opportunities and labor supply abstract motivated by the observation that access to evasion opportunities is distributed heterogeneously across the labor market this paper examines the extent to which labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates depend on such evasion opportunities we first discuss the channels through which access to evasion affects labor supply responses and then set up a laboratory experiment n 205 in which all participants undertake a real effort task over several rounds subjects face a tax rate that varies across rounds and are required to pay taxes on earned income the treatment group is given the opportunity to underreport income while the control group is not we find evidence that participants in the treatment group respond differently to changes in the net of tax rate than participants in the control group the effect is more prevalent when tax rates fall additionally the direction of the treatment effect is dependent on the evolution of tax rates across rounds

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

how powerful are public bureaucrats as voters empirical evidence is collected and discussed regarding the influence of public bureaucrats on government sector outcome in their capacity as consumer voters it is necessary to isolate the specific effect of working in the public sector compared to other occupations on voting participation and on the probability to support an increase in the public budget for a balanced evaluation of public bureaucrats power other forms of their influencing the government sector outcome need to be taken into account

between anarchy and leviathan a note on the design of federal states abstract recent research suggests a rationale for the autonomy retained by federal states lower and intermediate level governments by encouraging interjurisdictional competition federal structures constrain the pursuit by public officials of private objectives inconsistent with the public weal but using federal structures to achieve this end has a cost the more decentralized a nation s public sector the more likely that some of the externalities generated by the provision of public goods and services will be ignored this note investigates the balance between the costs and benefits of decentralization that must be struck by a federal state s designers

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

what happens when you tax the rich evidence from executive compensation this paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995 the data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income indeed this small group of executives may account for as much as 20 percent of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for approximately the one million richest taxpayers over this time period one person alone can account for more than 2 percent the decline however is almost entirely a short run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income the short run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share exceeds one in this sample but the elasticity after one year is at most 0 4 and probably closer to zero breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows that the large short run responses come almost entirely from a large inc

adjustment costs firm responses and micro vs macro labor supply elasticities evidence from danish tax records we show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms we develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs we present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using danish tax records first larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities second kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities third the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods

municipal annexation and local monopoly power we have found that the fiscal power of a city can be increased by extension of its borders within a land area that is homogeneous with respect to earning opportunities even when numerous rival jurisdictions exist in the area we hypothesized that extending municipal boundaries will have a positive effect on discretionary outlays and on expenditures per capita the evidence presented supports these hypotheses furthermore municipal wages appear to be significantly increased in cities experiencing annexation growth therefore we would expect to find that municipal employees are more inclined to favor annexation than the rest of the electorate from a policy standpoint this study suggests that significant perverse effects on fiscal efficiency may follow adoption of legal reforms that facilitate the ability of municipalities to extend their borders or that restrict the formation of new municipalities

performance pay and wage inequality an increasing fraction of jobs in the u s labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonus pay commissions or piece rate contracts using data from the panel study of income dynamics we show that compensation in performance pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed and unobserved productive characteristics of workers than compensation in non performance pay jobs we also find that the return to these productive characteristics increased faster over time in performance pay than in non performance pay jobs we show that this finding is consistent with the view that underlying changes in returns to skill due for instance to technological change induce more firms to offer performance pay contracts and result in more wage inequality among workers who are paid for performance thus performance pay provides a channel through which underlying changes in returns to skill get translated into higher wage inequality we conclude that this channel accounts for 21 of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and for most of the increase in wage inequality above the eightieth percentile over the same period

local government structure and urban residential location the large research literature on the tiebout model has developed with little attention paid to the urban economic structure in which local government functions this paper attempts to examine the theoretical consequences of local jurisdictions functioning within a conventional monocentric urban model it also discusses a mathematical formulation of a two jurisdiction linear city in which the local service level and local property tax rate might be used as strategic variables in a game theory sense it is concluded that for this to happen the local service level has to have more than one element which is intuitively appealing some references are developed to current british local government and possible changes

are we taxing ourselves how deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes abstract we let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets we test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers i e on voters themselves even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax shifting in the market we show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax shifting bias that experience is an effective de biasing mechanism but that pre vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy to interpret facts are needed to de bias voters

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

the impact of congestion on local public good production abstract this paper models local public goods production where allocation of the publicly provided input occurs simultaneously with production of the final service output the framework models local public goods as developed in club theory where congestion is an increasing function of population central to identification of the model is that the quantities of the input police are differentiated from the produced output safety estimation is across neighborhoods within a single city the results show there is a very low elasticity of congestion on average but safety in some neighborhoods in more congested than private goods

tax misperceptions and the effect of informational tax nudges on retirement savings despite subjects being informed about tax rules before making saving decisions we find using laboratory experiments that deferred taxation results in after tax pensions that are approximately 25

on the political economy of land value capitalization and local public sector rent seeking in a tiebout model abstract the political economy of capitalization in a tiebout model when there is a rent seeking local public sector is examined a new approach to test for the effects of successful local public worker rent seeking on property values is suggested and initial results are presented we find evidence that potential residents are compensated through lower property prices in cities where local public employees earn substantially higher wages than similar local public employees earn on average in other cities finally we expand upon how landowners public workers and renters can use the regulatory process to capture a share of the short run rents associated with a tiebout disequilibrium

the case for a progressive tax from basic research to policy recommendations the fair distribution of the tax burden has long been a central issue in policyhe fair distribution of the tax burden has long been a central issue in policymaking a large academic literature has developed models of optimal tax making a large academic literature has developed models of optimal tax theory to cast light on the problem of optimal tax progressivity in this theory to cast light on the problem of optimal tax progressivity in this paper we explore the path from basic research results in optimal tax theory to paper we explore the path from basic research results in optimal tax theory to formulating policy recommendations formulating policy recommendations models in optimal tax theory typically posit that the tax system should maximize a models in optimal tax theory typically posit that the tax system should maximize a social welfare function subject to a government budget constraint taking into account social welfare function subject to a government budget constraint taking into account that individuals respond to taxes and transfers social welfare is larger when resources that individuals respond to taxes and transfers social welfare is larger when resources are more equally distributed but redistributive taxes and transfers can negatively are more equally distributed but redistributive taxes and transfers can negatively affect incentives to work save and earn income in the fi rst place this creates the clasaffect incentives to work save and earn income in the fi rst place this creates the classical trade off between equity and effi ciency which is at the core of the optimal income sical trade off between equity and effi ciency which is at the core of the optimal income tax problem in general optimal tax analyses maximize social welfare as a function of tax problem in general optimal tax analyses maximize social welfare as a function of individual utilities the sum of utilities in the utilitarian case the marginal weight for individual utilities the sum of utilities in the utilitarian case the marginal weight for a given person in the social welfare function measures the value of an additional dollar a given person in the social welfare function measures the value of an additional dollar of consumption expressed in terms of public funds such welfare weights depend on of consumption expressed in terms of public funds such welfare weights depend on the level of redistribution and are decreasing with income whenever society values the level of redistribution and are decreasing with income whenever society values more equality of income therefore optimal income tax theory is fi rst a normative more equality of income therefore optimal income tax theory is fi rst a normative theory that shows how a social welfare objective combines with constraints arising from theory that shows how a social welfare objective combines with constraints arising from limits on resources and behavioral responses to taxation in order to derive specifi c limits on resources and behavioral responses to taxation in order to derive specifi c

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

how work effort responds to wage taxation an experimental test of a zero top marginal tax rate abstract phelps 1973 sadka 1976 seade 1977 presented theorems that showed work effort could increase if the marginal tax rate was zero at the top income this was tested in a laboratory experiment the prediction was supported

how to make the metropolitan area work neither big government nor laissez faire we study how political boundaries and tax competition among jurisdictions interact with the labor and land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas contrary to general belief institutional fragmentation and cross border commuting need not be welfare decreasing but the size of the central city matters for welfare under tax competition the central business district is too small tax competition also prevents public policy enhancing global productivity to produce their full impact although our results support the idea of decentralizing the supply of local public services by independent jurisdictions they also highlight the need of coordinating tax policies

promotions and incentives the case of multistage elimination tournaments promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms we analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments in our two main treatments we compare a two stage tournament to a one stage tournament subjects in the two stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage both with respect to nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one stage tournament additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing

net wage illusion in a real effort experiment in a controlled laboratory experiment subjects had to fold letters in order to earn money while the net income per letter was the same in the three treatments the gross income varied and the tax rate was 0 25 and 50 percent although work incentives should be the same in all treatments subjects worked harder and longer when they were taxed we conclude that this is because of a net wage illusion effect the existence of this effect demonstrates that not only are the tax rate and the tax base of importance for work incentives but the perception of a tax is also important

do formula based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting evidence from ghana abstract various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation in this paper we investigate a formula based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation specifically we study the sharing of resources of the district assemblies common fund dacf in ghana amongst the country s district governments over the period 1994 to 2005 we find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants per capita dacf grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower suggesting that swing districts were targeted we find evidence that dacf formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers

incentive systems in a real effort experiment in the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects payments based on individual team and relative performance are compared subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort the results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels in team production free riding occurred but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay effort was higher but more variable in tournaments while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others finally attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

local government inefficiency and the tiebout hypothesis does competition among municipalities limit local government inefficiency the tiebout hypothesis has in the past thirty years come to refer to a number of different propositions about local public service provision first there is the point initially stressed by tiebout 15 that the mobility of consumer voters results in a market type of solution to public service provision in which people s demands for public services are revealed as they sort themselves among localities according to their tastes for public services second also discussed by tiebout is the proposition that local public services will tend toward efficient provision finally there is the claim that the mobility of consumers and the competition among the localities for these consumers make politics relatively unimportant in determining local public service provision the bulk of the empirical work on the tiebout hypothesis has attempted to determine if as tiebout suggested local public services are efficiently provided the most common approach has been to estimate the effects of public service provision and tax policy on property values and determine if a balanced budget change in the tax rate changes property values if not then property values are being maximized with respect to public services and public services therefore are efficiently provided studies using this technique include those by oates brueckner and sonstelie and portney 11 1 2 13 these empirical studies while providing evidence about whether or not public services are provided efficiently do not suggest the reasons why local public services are or are not efficiently provided are the limits on inefficiency in the local public sector attributable to local politics or are they the result of the constraints imposed on local governments because of the mobility of residents and capital evidence that local public services are efficiently provided cannot be considered support for the contention that the mobility of people and capital are the factors responsible for this efficiency romer and rosenthal 12 for example provides evidence from

tax competition rent seeking and fiscal decentralization abstract the present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self defeating we find that rent seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost

emotions in tournaments abstract we introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when agents compare their own performance with the performances of other agents assuming heterogeneity among the agents the interplay of emotions and incentives is analyzed within the framework of rank order tournaments which are frequently used in practice tournaments seem to be an appropriate starting point for this concept because a tournament induces incentives by making agents compare themselves with their opponents we identify certain conditions under which the principal benefits from emotional agents furthermore the concept of emotions is used to explain the puzzling findings on the oversupply of effort in experimental tournaments

how work effort responds to wage taxation a non linear versus a linear tax experiment abstract this is one of a series of experiments by the author testing predictions of the labor supply model that comes from the theory of single period single person utility maximization where utility is a quasi concave function of consumption and leisure and where consumption is assumed a normal good this paper studies how people adjust their work effort in response to a gross wage rate change under a non linear tax system in comparison to a linear tax system the linear tax system is chosen as the hausman equivalent of the non linear system at the starting wage rate the prediction is that work effort will be higher under the linear tax system after the gross wage rate change this experiment supports the theorem the implication is that tax flattening will yield more labor and possibly more tax revenues as wage rates rise