learning and wage dynamics we develop a dynamic model of learning about worker ability in a competitive labor market the model produces three testable implications regarding wage dynamics 1 although the role of schooling in the labor market s inference process declines as performance observations accumulate the estimated effect of schooling on the level of wages is independent of labor market experience 2 timeinvariant variables correlated with ability but unobserved by employers such as certain test scores are increasingly correlated with wages as experience increases and 3 wage residuals are a martingale we present evidence from the nlsy that is broadly consistent with the model s predictions

ambiguity aversion in buyer seller relationships a contingent claims and social network explanation negotiations between buyers and sellers or suppliers of goods and services have become increasingly important due to the growing trend towards international purchasing outsourcing and global supply networks together with the high uncertainty associated with them this paper examines the effect of ambiguity aversion on price negotiations using multiple priors based real options with non extreme outcomes we study price negotiation between a buyer and seller in a dual contingent claims setting call option holding buyer vs put option holding seller to derive optimal agreement conditions under ambiguity with and without social network effects we find that while higher ambiguity aversion raises the threshold for commitment for the seller it has equivocal effects on the buyer s negotiation prospects in the absence of network control conversely when network position and relative bargaining power are accounted for we find the buyer s implicit price or negotiation threshold decreases or increases unequivocally with increasing aversion to ambiguity extending extant real options research on price negotiation to the case of ambiguity this set of results provides new insights into the role of ambiguity aversion and network structures in buyer seller relationships including how they influence the range of negotiation agreement between buyers and sellers the results also help assist managers in formulating robust buying selling strategies for bargaining under uncertainty by knowing their network positions and gathering background information or inferring the other party s ambiguity tolerance beforehand buyers and sellers can anticipate where the negotiation is heading in terms of price negotiation range and mutual agreement possibilities

reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment the employment relationship with employees ability and their actions both private information thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard is modeled as a repeated game with self enforcing contracts being perfect bayesian nash equilibria under termination contracts the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks finite in number even though ability is continuous reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment selection by bonding is not in general incentive compatible but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is many other features correspond to observed employment structures

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

counteroffers and efficiency in labor markets with asymmetric information this article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker s productivity than potential employers previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker s qualifications as a result assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient i find that when current employers can match outside offers the equilibrium outcome may be efficient i analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers and find these investment levels to be first best

managerial control of international firms and patterns of direct investment abstract formal analyses of international firms have concentrated on advantages from large operations due to for example economies of scope however the standard framework implicitly assumes the existence of managerial costs for running international operations the paper develops a model that explicitly incoporates both economies of scope and costs of managerial control of large and international operations it highlights the potential importance of international firms organizational structure suggesting a qualitative difference between situations where international firms have different stages of production located in different countries and situations where firms in addition have the same stage located in different countries

taxes tariffs and transfer pricing in multinational corporate decision making three interrelated aspects of u s multinational corporation activity are analyzed here the ability to shift profits from high tax countries to low tax countries the impact of host country taxes and tariffs on the distribution of real capital and the influence of these policies on international trade patterns of the united states and host countries the cross sectional empirical analysis indicates that the observed pattern of reported profits in high and low tax countries is consistent with income shifting behavior and that real investment responds to host country effective tax rates and tariffs the united states appears both to import more from and export more to low tax countries where mnc investment is greater but this bilateral focus must be amplified to consider multilateral effects if trade benefits are to be projected copyright 1991 by mit press

the multinational firm direct investment is incorporated into a simple general equilibrium model of international trade the analysis focuses on an attempt to endogenize the internalization decision it is argued that a reasonable approach assumes that arm s length contracts must be simple so that complex arrangements require internalization the model relates direct investment to the degree of underlying uncertainty and to fundamental trade determinants such as relative factor endowments the behavior of the model contrasts sharply with that of the markusen helpman model which takes internalization for granted

promotion turnover and preemptive wage offers this paper examines the strategic promotion and wage decisions of employers when employees may be more valuable to competing firms competing employers must incur a cost to learn the quality of their match with a manager promotion signals that workers are potentially valuable managers in other firms and so can lead to turnover to preempt competition for a manager an employer may offer a wage high enough to discourage competitors from acquiring information and bidding up the wage further or hiring the worker away this transfers wages from good workers to bad more costly information acquisition yields greater expected lifetime wages copyright 1993 by american economic association

accounting for endogeneity when assessing strategy performance does entry mode choice affect fdi survival firms choose strategies based on their attributes and industry conditions therefore strategy choice is endogenous and self selected empirical models that do not account for this and regress performance measures on strategy choice variables are potentially misspecified and their conclusions incorrect i highlight how self selection on hard to measure or unobservable characteristics can bias strategy performance estimates and recommend an econometric technique that has been developed to account for this effect although this concern applies to a wide range of strategy questions to demonstrate its effect i empirically examine if entry mode choice acquisition versus greenfield influences foreign direct investment survival in specifications that do not account for self selection i find that greenfield entries have survival advantages compared to acquisitions this confirms previous findings however the significance of this effect disappears once i account for self selection of entry mode in the empirical estimates the results confirm that estimates from models that do not account for self selection of strategy choice can lead to incorrect or misleading conclusions

a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms we show that a framework that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms including the following first real wage decreases are not rare but demotions are second wage increases are serially correlated third promotions are associated with large wage increases fourth wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder fifth workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next

managerial task assignment and promotions a two period model of managerial task assignment is developed where the current employer has the advantage of observing the actual performanc e of the manager while outside employers can observe only the assign ments optimal contracts are rigid but the market value of managers is below actual productivity and they are promoted less than is effic ient the author introduces the idea of managers explo iting their information to separate themselves out in the market plac e as a consequence the model has the appealing property of small ab ility based wage differentials within a task as well as large ones b etween tasks copyright 1988 by the econometric society

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

multinationals multi plant economies and the gains from trade a general equilibrium model of a multinational enterprise based on economies of multi plant operation is developed these economies are modelled as arising from the existence of a joint input whose productivity in each production facility is independent of the number of facilities maintained by a firm the multinational thus offers the world increased technical efficiency by eliminating the duplication of the joint input that would occur with independent national firms since this technical efficiency may come at the expense of increased market power the full determinants of home country host country and world welfare are considered

knowledge transfer capacity and its implications for the theory of the multinational corporation this study updates and extends research on foreign entry modes by examining the impacts of knowledge transfer capacity and knowledge tacitness research on international corporate expansion has long emphasized that deploying intangible knowledge based assets is required for successful international expansion more recently research from a knowledge based perspective has addressed the role of tacitness in constraining a firm s ability to transfer knowledge internationally we combine these perspectives to describe how knowledge tacitness affects the relative suitability of four archetypal entry modes exporting licensing establishing an alliance and wholly owned entry we then examine and develop conceptually a seldom studied firm characteristic knowledge transfer capacity we offer predictions that describe the combined effects of knowledge tacitness and transfer capacity on entry mode choice we distinguish between the transfer capacity of the organization that develops knowledge source transfer capacity and that of the organization that seeks to access that knowledge recipient transfer capacity the discussion addresses how our model generalizes to knowledge seeking strategies and to the study of ongoing multinational networks the study enriches and reconciles multiple theoretical perspectives on entry strategy it brings together the study of knowledge characteristics and firm heterogeneity in the theory of the multinational corporation and in international and strategic management more generally journal of international business studies 2003 34 356 373 doi 10 1057 palgrave jibs 8400037

international corporate diversification market valuation and size adjusted evidence errunza and senbet es 7 analyze the effects of international operations on the market value of the firm both at theoretical and empirical levels the theoretical model which is largely heuristic exploits the costly supply adjustment of multinational firms mncs in providing international portfolio diversification services to investors who face differential cost barriers to direct holdings of assets across national boundaries mncs compete as financial intermediaries to undo the barriers so that in equilibrium profits are driven out mncs and pure domestic firms sell at an equivalent risk adjusted return however costly financial intermediation and the associated relative efficiency leads to a positive valuation effect for mncs relative to purely domestic firms further the equilibrium analysis implies that demand side investor barriers to international capital flows alone are inconsequential to the valuation of mncs in their pure financial role but that the interaction with the supply side costs are necessary to produce a valuation effect at the corporate level es subject the theory to an empirical analysis in a value based approach by employing a variant of tobin s 17 qratio the analysis controlling for industrial market power suggests that the relationship between the excess valuation and the degree of international involvement doi has magnified over periods characterized by severe u s government controls vis a vis the more recent periods in this paper we formalize the theoretical argument by viewing indirect portfolio diversification by mncs as a means of completing the international capital market we employ a paradigm in the unanimity literature and formally characterize the equilibrium in which there is a rationale for mnc financial intermediation we then perform an expanded empirical study by employing generalized least squares and maximum likelihood procedures since the positive relationship between excess valuation and doi as suggested in es 7 might be attributed to the so called small firm or size and the p e effects the test methodology controls for such effects also the traditional literature has relied upon foreign sales percentage as a proxy for doi in view of the well recognized limitations of this proxy we employ four different measures of international

the effects of international operations on the market value of the firm theory and evidence this paper investigates the existence of monopoly rents associated with international operations in a market value theoretic framework the benefits of international operations evolve from such factors as 1 imperfections in the product and factor markets 2 differential international taxation and 3 imperfections in the financial markets in this paper these factors are subject to an equilibrium analysis in the context of recent advances in financial theory in particular imperfections in the financial sector arising from corporate international diversification are examined in a framework which allows a supply adjustments by multinational firms and b the interaction of barriers to international capital flows faced by both firms and investors taking the u s capital market and investors as a base we then specify the conditions under which the foregoing imperfections get priced out in an equilibrium these pricing effects cannot be detected empirically through the methodologies employed by the existing studies which examine the effects of corporate international diversification indeed it was an attempt to rescue the limitations of these studies which initially motivated our paper the existing empirical inquiries into this area rely on traditional risk adjusted performance measures e g 7 or international analogs of return generating processes e g 1 8 instead at the empirical level we employ a value based method which is in the same vein of the thomadakis 17 approach developed to identify the monopoly benefits of industrial market structure we conduct the tests over subperiods characterized by differential government controls in an attempt a to separate the pure financial motives for multinationality from other motives and b to detect if the benefits of international operations carry through recent periods

human capital investment under asymmetric information the pigovian conjecture revisited this article investigates how human capital investment labor turnover and wages are jointly determined when the current employer knows more about a worker s productivity than potential employers results derived are quite different from or unexplored by the standard human capital theory we show that the information asymmetry can cause an externality distortion in human capital investment because higher productivity due to the investment may not be recognized by the market the investment level increases in the degree of firm specificity of human capital the underinvestment problem is more severe when human capital is general than when it is firm specific

internalization an event study test abstract the internalization theory of multinational firms proposes that direct international investment occurs when a firm has information related intangible assets with public good properties we find that firms with characteristics suggesting the presence of information based assets experience a significantly positive stock price reaction upon announcing a foreign acquisition on the other hand firms apparently lacking such assets experience at best zero abnormal returns upon announcing overseas acquisitions

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

repeated bargaining with persistent private information the paper analyses repeated contract negotiations involving the same buyer and seller where the contracts are linked because the buyer has persistent but not fully permanent private information the size of the surplus being divided is specified as a two state markov chain with transitions that are synchronized with contract negotiation dates equilibrium involves information cycles triggered by the success or failure of aggressive demands made by the seller because there is persistence in the markov chain generating the surplus a successful demand induces the seller to make another aggressive demand in the next negotiation since the buyer s acceptance reveals that the current surplus is large rejection of an aggressive demand on the other hand leads the seller to be pessimistic about the size of the surplus in the next contract so the seller makes a soft offer that is sure to be accepted then after several such offers have been accepted the seller is optimistic enough to again make an aggressive demand creating an information cycle an interesting feature of this cycle is that the soft price is not constant but declines as the cycle continues so as to offset the buyer s option value of re starting the cycle when the current state is bad an explicit mapping is given for the relationship between the basic parameters and the equilibrium prices and quantities in particular there is a closed form solution for the threshold belief that makes the seller indifferent between hard and soft offers

corporate takeover bids methods of payment and bidding firms stock returns this study explores the role of the method of payment in explaining common stock returns of bidding firms at the announcement of takeover bids the results reveal significant differences in the abnormal returns between common stock exchanges and cash offers the results are independent of the type of takeover bid i e merger or tender offer and of bid outcomes these findings supported by analysis of nonconvertible bonds are attributed mainly to signalling effects and imply that the inconclusive evidence of earlier studies on takeovers may be due to their failure to control for the method of payment recent studies on corporate takeovers provide inconclusive results on the valuation effects of acquisitions on the common stock of bidding firms 1 substantial differences are reported between the studies that analyze acquisitions initiated as tender offers and those that confine their samples to merger proposals the existence of mixed empirical findings for the bidding firms makes it difficult to interpret existing evidence and to draw conclusions about the managers acquisition motivations nevertheless the reason for the substantial difference between empirical findings on mergers and tender offers still remains an unresolved issue it is observed however that mergers are usually common stock exchange offers whereas tender offers are usually cash offers given that different methods of financing a project have different signalling implications myers and majluf 39 the differential stock returns of bidders in mergers and tender offers may be due to the method of acquisition financing

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

wage signaling a dynamic model of intrafirm bargaining and asymmetric learning the article analyzes the effect of employer worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers a failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss because the disagreement points depend upon the worker s productivity productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages in existing models of asymmetric learning wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics this model in contrast generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics

a theory of the firm with non binding employment contracts this paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power vis a vis the firm although they are not unionized the main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers the paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm s workforce the analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions the main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria the profit maximizing and stationa ry equilibria the unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient it exhibits inefficient over employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers reservation wage it confirms earlier results derived by stole and zwiebel 1996a b in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities in contrast in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark up over the reservation wage

balance of payments and related issues in the uruguay round of trade negotiations little attention has been paid to the balance of payments provisions of the general agreement on tariffs trade gatt despite the fact that they directly influence the trade policies of the developing countries this article suggests that there is a need to reconsider these provisions in the context of the ongoing uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations the article traces the historical evolution of gatt practices on trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes with the general introduction of more flexible exchange rate arrangements the original rationale for temporary barriers to safeguard a country s external financial position appears to have lost its force recent theoretical and empirical work has demonstrated that neutral or export promoting trade strategies are more effective for development than the import substitution frequently advocated by economists in the 1950s and 1960s the current debt problems of developing countries strengthen the argument for a relatively open trade and payments regime to attain balance of payments viability the article suggests that stronger international discipline over trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes would contribute to and presuppose other necessary improvements in the multilateral trading system which are already on the agenda of the uruguay round

the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may and often do diverge and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear in creating these new relationships the quasi public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution it has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit seeking enterprise 1

strategic investments and the development of multinationals a model of multinational behavior is presented in which either the existence or absence of multinationals can be a nash equilibrium outcome the key determinant is the relationship between plant scale economies a force for geographic centralization and multiplant economies plus transport costs leading to multinationality the model predicts that multinational enterprise production arises when firm specific and transportation costs are large relative to plant scale economies the latter are both a technological and a strategic variable in the entry decision copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided

us companies in transition economies wealth effects from expansion between 1987 and 1999 this study uses a unique sample to evaluate changes in shareholder wealth from announcements of expansion by us firms into 18 transition economies through four entry modes from 1987 to 1999 on average expansion in transition economies is associated with significant positive wealth effects results show that value creation is most significantly associated with expansion through less risky entry modes into host countries that are in the more advanced stages of market liberalization and structural reform sample firms with lower profitability also experience significantly higher abnormal returns while significant value creation documented for firms entering transition economies in 1989 1990 and 1992 suggests first mover advantages