effect of exporter s incentives on foreign distributor s role performance a foreign distributor s motivation to perform local marketing tasks for an exporter is often poor due to agency conflicts and transaction cost constraints characterizing the export channel while exporters may engage in actions such as offering incentives and overseeing partner activities to improve foreign marketing such intrusions into partner operations often fail to enhance the distributor s role performance drawing on motivation theory the authors develop a model explaining the efficiency of different incentive types in enhancing the distributor s motivational context to act on behalf of the exporter thereby improving relationship quality distributor relationship specific investments and consequently distributor role performance the authors use a sample of 278 european exporters to test hypotheses regarding relationship factors that mediate and moderate the incentive role performance relationship the results indicate that the impact of low powered incentives lpis substitutes for the effect of high powered incentives on relationship quality and specific investments the key mediators driving distributor role performance in addition exporter oversight of distributor activities weakens the effectiveness of lpis to increase distributor specific investment the authors derive implications for designing portfolios of incentives with inferences based on efficiently matching incentive induced motivational context with foreign distributor s actions required to accomplish exporter goals

international and domestic constraints on political business cycles in oecd economies a comment we attempt to assess the effect of monetary policy in a panel model for 16 member countries of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd to answer the question of whether central banks actively create political business cycles we focus on the short term interest rate as a proxy for the use of monetary instruments our results indicate that central banks do not create political business cycles this conclusion holds whether or not central banks are independent and whether or not they are constrained by the exchange rate system in force

economic growth strategies the effects of ideological partisanship on interest rates and business taxation in the united states we reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it the reformulated version ideological partisanship is based upon the theory that similar rates of economic growth may follow from the different use of policy instruments owing to their role as determinants of investment and growth interest rates business taxation rates and the redistribution of the tax burden between capital gains and earned income are examined we advance models that take into account other views of politics beside the partisan one and test for political influences the united states is characterized by very pronounced partisan differences in national economic policy with democratic administrations seeking to promote growth through a consumption driven while republican administrations promote an investment driven strategy democratic administrations also seek to shift the tax burden toward corporations and owners of capital these findings are examined in light of the comparative political economy literature we conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries

incidents of gray market activity among u s exporters occurrences characteristics and consequences each year the value of gray market products sold throughout the world runs into the billions of dollars past research has stated that exporters of manufactured goods can hardly afford to ignore the possibility of this phenomenon due to the often severe effects on their sales volume margins and relationships with distributors and end users through a survey of export managers of manufacturing firms coupled with a series of qualitative interviews this study investigates how organizational specific control specific and market specific factors drive gray market activity and in turn explores the effects of unauthorized distribution on export performance several factors are shown to evaluate the potential of unauthorized distribution in their export markets namely the centralization of decision making the degree to which the product is standardized channel integration and channel control international experience market volatility and the number of markets served were found to have no effect on gray market activity this contrary to traditional thinking furthermore the effects of gray market activity on strategic versus economic performance is shown to be significantly different each of these issues is discussed in detail along with the implications for export managers

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

federal reserve independence abstract the federal reserve is always called an independent agency the term independent is rarely defined the only attempt in the literature and internal records is based on chairman martin s statement that the federal reserve is independent with the government not independent of the government martin explained several times that independence within government meant that the federal reserve helped to finance government budget because they were approved by congress and signed by the president financing budget deficits is the very opposite of the principle adopted when congress approved the federal reserve act in 1913 in fact the federal reserve has supported treasury operations many times i conclude that it is far more important to have an enforceable policy rule such as the taylor rule but any rule must have a provision that permits the rule to be set aside

regulation competition and the structure of prices many competition policy issues in regulated industries concern the structure of prices charged by multiproduct firms for example price discrimination non linear pricing cross subsidies and network access pricing this article first sets out the ramsey principles of optimal pricing to recover fixed costs the sometimes conflicting aims of promoting competition and pursuing social objectives are brought into the analysis questions of whether to allow pricing structure discretion to the firm and how much are considered next with asymmetric information some discretion is often desirable but its optimal form is hard to characterize the article then turns to the controversial network access pricing problem on what terms should an integrated dominant firm be required to supply inputs required by its rivals finally there is discussion of pricing structure regulation in the transition from more to less regulation which it is to be hoped is in prospect in parts of the regulated industries as effective competition develops copyright 1997 by oxford university press

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

busting the boom bust pattern of development in the brazilian amazon global ecosystem services are clearly threatened by deforestation associated with human occupation and economic development of the brazilian amazon however the prognosis for the socioeconomic wellbeing of inhabitants remains unclear in an empirical regularity that has been termed the boom bust pattern or the resource curse the exploitation of natural resources is associated with short run gains in welfare that dissipate over time this coupling hypothesis asserts that deforestation and development are correlated such that deforestation leads to only short term advances in economic welfare that are not sustained once natural forests along with their mature timber and soil inputs are exhausted in contrast the decoupling hypothesis asserts that deforestation and development need not be correlated over time in this context growth that is initially based on deforestation may be sustained and translated into prolonged welfare gains even once the forest is exhausted using census and deforestation data from 1991 2000 and 2010 for municipalities i e counties in the amazon region we confirm that this boom bust pattern appears in cross sectional data however using panel data we show that socioeconomic welfare has become decoupled from environmental factors and is converging to rising national averages our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the exploitation of tropical forests is required to promote amazonian development

first branch or root the congress the president and the federal reserve much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues from an empirical perspective that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy in this paper a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the congress the president and one agency we use the u s federal reserve as an extended example can dictate policy outcomes the results of the paper include the congressional dominance theorem if more than 2 3 of house members and more than 2 3 of senate members agree on something they get it the theorem is obvious the proof is in the u s constitution but often forgotten in the substantive literature more realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of congress are more diverse powers of the president to influence policy with and without appointments are also analyzed

antecedents and performance implications of channel integration in foreign markets this study enhances our understanding of channel integration in foreign markets on two fronts first the eclectic approach to foreign entry mode proposed by hill hwang and kim 1990 and kim and hwang 1992 is used to examine transaction specific organizational capability and strategic factors that influence channel choices in foreign markets empirical results based on survey of u s firms support the combined relevance of these factors in predicting the degree of channel integration second the study empirically examines the performance consequences of channel integration the results suggest that although the degree of channel integration does not have a direct influence on channel performance a contingency model based on the fit between the contextual factors and the actual channel choice is significantly related to performance in foreign markets

converting forests to farms the economic benefits of clearing forests in agricultural settlements in the amazon agricultural expansion into tropical forests is believed to bring local economic benefits at the expense of global environmental costs the resulting tension is reflected in brazilian government policy the national agrarian reform program has settled farm families in the amazon region since the 1970s with the expectation that they will clear forests in order to farm the land on the other hand recent brazilian policy initiatives seek to reduce deforestation to mitigate climate change we contribute to the policy debate that surrounds these dual goals for the amazon by estimating the marginal effects of new agricultural land on the full income and assets of farm settlers over a 13 year period from 1996 to 2009 using micro panel data from agrarian settlements where forest was being rapidly cleared and controlling for factors that would otherwise confound the relationship we estimate the effect of converting forest to agriculture on total household income to estimate the opportunity cost of conserving forest our measure of income reflects any re allocation of resources by utility maximizing households and any productivity effects due to loss of forest ecosystem services the estimated effect of new agricultural land on income is positive but small relative to the income per hectare of previously cleared land however we show that income increases investment in physical assets which raises households income generating capacity and future accumulation of assets thus while there is only a small immediate income gain from clearing more forest the long term effects on wealth are still substantial this demonstrates that given the right conditions conversion of forest to agricultural land can be an impetus for asset accumulation by smallholders it also highlights the importance of considering the indirect and long term welfare benefits of new agricultural land when assessing the opportunity costs of forest conservation

territorial restrictions in franchise contracts i introduction efficient contracts establish the incentives for contractual parties through the assignment of rights or authority over decisions as well as shares of profit this insight has been widely used to explain the nature of the firm 1 the role of rights assignment in explaining specific business contracts however is relatively unexplored here we analyze contractual rights within franchise systems focusing on the right to add new franchisees to an existing franchise area the choice in a franchise contract is simple either grant the franchisor the right to add new franchisees in the future or allow existing franchisees the right to block the addition of new outlets the literature on vertical restraints assumes that the restraints specified in contracts are enforced and never renegotiated with respect to territorial exclusivity in particular the literature mainly takes two perspectives territorial protection either prevents franchisor hold up behavior the appropriation of franchisee returns from the investment in establishing the local market or it corrects distortions arising from competition among franchisees 2 our model extends the hold up story by recognizing the dynamic nature of contractual relations between parties contracts are always open for renegotiation and the initial contracts are designed with this in mind the key effect in assigning the right to add additional franchisees is on the status quo point in bargaining subsequent to the initial contract the central point is simple the party with the authority to add franchisees can extract a larger portion of the wealth created by investment in the system incentives depend on the appropriated portion of the return to investment therefore the optimal contract assigns the right to the party whose input is more valuable to the system 3 the next section offers a simple model that develops this theme in a subsequent section we examine some facts about franchise systems in place and illustrate alternative assignments of authority ii the model we consider the simplest franchise contract a franchisor f offers to a franchisee g a contract giving the right to collect profits from the use of the franchisor s brand name in a retail territory we assume that the level of economic profits cannot be verified by a third party such as a court this rules out explicit sharing rules for profits between the two parties 4 these profits depend upon the efforts of both the franchisor and franchisee in developing the market the efforts are undertaken immediately after the contract is signed the franchisee s input represents for example local advertising selling effort or quality and the franchisor s input represents for example national advertising or the maintenance of the brand name the profits from the venture are uncertain and depend on the realization of a draw should the system prove sufficiently successful it may be profitable to add another retail outlet the evolution of contracts will respond to any opportunity for profit enhancement and any restrictions in the initial contract preventing this realization will be open for renegotiation the role for territorial constraints in particular may be illustrated within a simple formal model the effort levels of the franchisor and franchisee are denoted by e sub f and e sub g and are measured in dollars the profits earned from the brand name depend upon a stochastic variable e g demand uncertainty denoted by theta which is realized after the efforts are undertaken after the realization of theta there is an opportunity for the franchisor to sell a position in the territory to a second franchisee a product idea that enjoys success warrants an expanded retail network as the market is mature at this point no further investment is required the key element of the contract for our interest is the allocation of authority over the admission of additional retailers to the territory in question does the contract guarantee to the original franchisee exclusive authority to the use of the brand name in the territory

price discrimination by u s and german exporters the insensitivity of the u s trade balance to the sharp depreciation of the dollar in the past three years has revived interest in the relationship between exchange rates and the trade balance a central issue in most analyses of the relation between the current account and the exchange rate concerns the price adjustment process the simple integrated competitive market model predicts that local currency prices should change in proportion to the nominal exchange rate for a country too small to influence world prices the relationship between local currency import prices and exchange rates has been referred to as the pass through relationship in the empirical literature in international economics if the proportional relationship between import prices and exchange rates holds pass through is said to be complete accounts of recent u s experience cite the failure of dollar prices of imported goods to rise in proportion to exchange rates i e incomplete pass through as an important factor in explaining the persistence of the trade deficit unfortunately observations on pass through alone provide limited insight into the behavior of markets since incomplete pass through is consistent with at least two fundamentally different paradigms one is the standard competitive model of trade in which the law of one price holds but exchange rate fluctuations are associated with large changes in import demand due to other factors for example if dollar appreciation is correlated with increases in world demand and industry marginal cost is increasing then pass through will be less than complete the other is an imperfectly competitive model in which exporters are capable of price discriminating across destination markets a phenomenon paul krugman 1987 has labeled pricing to market in this model incomplete pass through is typically associated with fluctuations in the markup of price over marginal cost on exports 2 these fluctuations in markups are believed to be countryspecific they do not reflect the behavior of prices to other export destinations both models are plausible explanations of recent u s experience unfortunately it is impossible to distinguish between these competing models using only information on import prices and exchange rates for a single country in order to distinguish between the competing models an empirical analysis of goods prices and exchange rates must be capable of measuring either marginal cost or the markup over marginal cost either of these tasks poses formidable empirical problems much of the empirical literature in industrial organization has been concerned with precisely these issues since markups are an important measure of the competitiveness of industries

product and promotion adaptation in export ventures an empirical investigation while the desirability of marketing adaptation vs standardization has long been debated within both academic and business circles empirical studies investigating the conditions under which each strategy becomes appropriate have been rare this article provides a formal investigation of the correlates of product and promotion adaptation in export ventures a conceptual framework of product and promotion adaptation in export ventures is proposed to integrate the diverse perspectives on the issue of standardization versus adaptation the conceptual framework is further specified in a testable form and tested via data collected by a series of in depth personal interviews with export marketing managers the results support the contingency perspective recently emerging in the standardization literature and suggest that the degree of the various aspects of product adaptation i e upon and after entry and promotion adaptation i e positioning packaging labeling and promotional approach are significantly influenced by company product industry and export market characteristics however the profile of the correlates varies across the various aspects of product and promotion adaptation

coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition this paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information free repair faster check out or after sales service differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high service retailers and lower price discount retailers therefore how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question yet the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard symmetric contracting assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination i bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation even if the retailers were ex ante identical in their cost and other characteristics the paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers next the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price service competition a manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice versa the paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers the framework that i develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity consumers are heterogeneous in their locations as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation and in their willingness to pay for retail services as in the models of vertical differentiation the model also uses a natural relationship in retail markets between the travel time cost incurred by a consumer and her willingness to pay the more affluent consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for retail services also have a higher cost for their personal time given these market features the paper analyzes the problem faced by a manufacturer who sells to competing retailers the paper shows that the standard notion in the literature of offering similar contracts to all the retailers is sufficient only in markets with substantial locational differentiation relative to the differences in the willingness to pay effective channel management in these markets simply requires mechanisms that ensure that retailer interests are aligned so that they compete by offering a mix of price and service that is desirable from the manufacturer s point of view however in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial diversity in consumer willingness to pay the manufacturer s problem is not just to align retailer interests but to also use the channel contract to induce the correct level of retail differentiation this helps the manufacturer to better cater to the diversity in consumer willingness to pay and to prevent the cut throat competition that the retailers would otherwise have indulged in the manufacturer can achieve this through the use of menu based contracts menu based contracts induce differentiated retailer behavior despite the fact that the retailers are not forced into accepting different terms of trade this aspect can be useful in shielding manufacturers from litigation under the robinson patman act the paper also shows that for relatively high ticket items retailers tend to be excessively biased towards competing in the provision of retail services the correlation between consumer willingness to pay for service and travel costs implies that for high ticket products the competing retailers will focus on the more service sensitive customers at the cost of ignoring the price sensitive consumers in the market the manufacturer is therefore likely to encourage greater price competition among the retailers in contrast for low ticket items the manufacturer prefers to reduce price competition and encourage greater provision of services this provides an endogenous rationale for the use of price ceilings versus floors the basic model is also extended to consider the effect of upstream competition between manufacturers under upstream competition coordinating retail price and service decisions is not always optimal for an individual manufacturer this extension to manufacturer competition provides a basis for understanding the role of retail price service differentiation in the context of a channel duopoly it also shows that a mixed distribution channel a channel in which one manufacturer chooses to be coordinated while the other chooses to be noncoordinated can be an equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty

testing the satisficing version of the political business cycle 1905 1984 this paper develops a test of the satisficing version of the political business cycle previous tests have focused on maximizing models of political behavior and are not sufficiently general to test for satisficing behavior using annual u s data for the period 1905 to 1984 we find evidence supporting the satisficing version of the political business cycle model but we reject the maximizing version in accordance with the satisficing hypothesis we find that increasing inflation or unemployment and decreasing monetary base growth in the third year of a presidential term are followed typically by reversals during the election year

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

what price accountability the lucas island model and the politics of monetary policy this paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables they observe precisely how monetary policy stimulates their local economies but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker s economic competence from cross sectoral spillover effects the incumbent has incentives to generate preelection monetary surprises that stimulate the local economies and generate cross sectoral spillover effects he thereby creates an impression of economic competence and furthers his reelection prospects his policy manipulations are the price of political accountability on a positive note the incumbent is more likely to survive voter scrutiny if he is more competent than the average political candidate

the impact of export strategy on export sales performance export sales are an important route to growth for the small to medium sized firm this article reports the results of an extensive empirical study of the export strategies of a large sample of high technology electronics firms and the performance results of adopting alternate export strategies six strategy scenarios were identified the results show that the types of foreign markets selected segmentation strategies and product strategies all have a pronounced impact on export sales and export growth the best performers a group of firms called the world marketers and representing 13 5 of the sample achieved a dramatic 188 annual growth in exports and exported 52 5 of their output the profiles of firms that elected each strategy scenario were determined also

public sector price controls and electoral cycles public enterprise prices are important policy instruments in developing economies this is why public sector price polices constitute a key element of stabilization programmes implemented in these economies however this significance is not specific to stabilization episodes first this study questions whether an opportunistic politician can manipulate public prices to win elections it analyses the impact of such price controls on budget deficits and the repercussions of alternative financing mechanisms of these deficits on the inflation rate and voters behaviour it is shown that electoral inflation cycles are obtained under domestic debt financing whereas money financing does not permit such a manipulative policy second by focusing on data of the turkish economy for the 1987 1 2003 12 period empirical evidence for such manipulative policies is given

political business cycles in the new keynesian model i know there s the myth of the autonomous fed nixon barked a quick laugh richard nixon talking to arthur burns on october 23 1969 just after burns s nomination to the fed had been announced 1 i d like to see another lowering of interest rates i think there s room to do that i can understand people worrying about inflation but i don t think that s the big problem now george h w bush interview with new york times june 24 1992 i introduction economic conditions before elections affect election outcomes 2 rational politicians who recognize this regularity may therefore be tempted to try to influence the economy in the quarters preceding an election date to maximize their chances of being reelected the literature on political business cycles pbc has developed models that rationalize economic fluctuations induced by political cycles nordhaus 1975 presented a model of opportunistic political cycles the party in power stimulates the economy before elections to improve its reelection probability others have observed that different parties may have different preferences over inflation and output or unemployment outcomes and therefore we should observe partisan political cycles hibbs 1977 was the first to introduce the partisan cycle model in which left wing parties were assumed to have at least one of the following a higher output target a higher inflation target or a higher relative weight on minimizing output rather than inflation deviations from the targets compared with right wing parties several papers test for the existence of opportunistic or partisan cycles in the united states alesina cohen and roubini 1992 and alesina roubini and cohen 1997 find only weak evidence of an opportunistic political cycle looking at m1 growth rates grier 1989 and beck 1987 instead find support for the effect of political variables on m1 growth rates for the 1960 1980 period but not on the mean level of the federal funds rate as discussed in drazen 2000a 2000b there is basically no evidence instead that political cycles matter for macroeconomic outcomes by looking at data on unemployment and output growth grier 2008 is a recent exception and only weak evidence for inflation empirical tests of the partisan cycle model alesina roubini and cohen 1997 faust and irons 1999 find partisan differences in output growth rates but no support for partisan cycles in inflation and monetary policy tests of pbc typically assume monetary policy as the main tool that is exploited by politicians to manipulate the economy these studies usually focus on comparing the level of inflation output money growth rates or interest rates across political cycles or they add a political dummy variable to the relevant regression and test its significance this paper offers a different approach the paper aims to empirically test various political business cycle theories adopting an optimizing new keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix as the main setting the inclusion of both fiscal and monetary policy is motivated by drazen 2000b 3 the new keynesian model is a baseline setting for the analysis of monetary policy but it has not been widely used to study pbc an advantage of this paper with respect to most of the previous pbc literature lies in the use of a general equilibrium framework this is in fact necessary when testing the importance of politically motivated policy choices to effectively control for differences in the macroeconomic conditions the set of shocks or the private sector expectations that prevail when the policy decision is taken the monetary and fiscal policy rule parameters as well as the parameters that reflect the frequency of price adjustment by firms and the steady state level of inflation are allowed to depend on the observed political regime

vertical control and price versus nonprice competition this paper considers a manufacturer distributing a product through retailers who compete in price and service which reduces the time it takes to purchase a good the mix of these instruments that maximizes collective profit is determined by the tastes of consumers on the product margin whereas decentralized retailers consider as well the tastes of consumers on the interretailer margins given search or travel costs consumers with low time costs are overrepresented on the interretailer margins in considering customers on the wrong margin retailers are therefore biased toward price competition this distortion that can be corrected with vertical restraints

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

congressional influence on u s monetary policy abstract congressional influence is generally discounted or ignored in political models of federal reserve behavior here i show that changes in the leadership of the senate banking committee are significantly correlated with monetary base growth more liberal committee leaders are associated with significantly higher base growth other factors held constant the result is shown to hold across several econometric specifications and different definitions of the congressional preference variable

welfare outcomes and the advance of the deforestation frontier in the brazilian amazon summary frontier expansion in the brazilian amazon is often described as boom bust development we critically assess this characterization by mapping and estimating statistical models of welfare as a function of deforestation at the municipal level after controlling for potential confounding variables and spatial autocorrelation estimation results are consistent with a frontier boom generated by exploitation of natural resources followed by a bust during which forests continue to fall but there is no compensating gain in welfare however average per capita welfare increases again with deforestation at very high levels this second turning point in average welfare along with the strong bivariate correlation between deforestation and municipal gdp km2 may encourage local leaders to equate deforestation with development this confirms the need for international incentive payments for global public goods such as biodiversity and carbon sequestration that are provided by the amazon forest

intertemporal price discrimination in frictionless durable goods monopolies i show that small differences in quality and production costs between durables and non durables in a product line allow a durable goods monopolist to intertemporally price discriminate even with continuous trading in particular a monopolist would want to both sell and rent out a durable to achieve price discrimination this incentive to price discriminate simultaneously creates inefficient delay in the sale of the durable good a finite trading period and long run efficiency of the market the coase conjecture fails because the non durable good acts as an outside option that guarantees a minimum profit in the market for durables

resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry wide adoption abstract we consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance rpm to dampen competition we find that even though the motive for using rpm is thus anti competitive market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers indeed we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market consumer welfare under a laissez faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which rpm is banned government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry wide adoption of rpm can have adverse welfare effects in the model we further show that proposed guidelines in the united states and europe may come close to minimizing welfare

on the existence of a political monetary cycle this paper examines electoral influence on monetary policy as measured by ml money growth i find a significant four year electoral cycle in money growth even when controlling for the influence of interest rates income and budget deficits further the residual electoral cycle produces the income and inflation movements associated with the political business cycle when it is used in simulations of simple reduced form macro models the paper concludes by discussing the difficulties in rationalizing cyclical monetary policy with rational expectations

organizational structure of a global supply chain in the presence of a gray market information asymmetry and valuation difference we consider a global supply chain of a multinational firm mnf with domestic and foreign markets in the presence of a gray marketer in particular we investigate the organizational structure of the mnf for pricing centralization vs decentralization when the foreign division of the mnf competes with the gray marketer the foreign division has a private information on the market potential and customers have a valuation difference between the products sold by the foreign division and the gray marketer in this situation while centralized pricing may control the gray marketer s activities decentralized pricing may take advantage of a local manager s private information especially when a significant valuation difference of customers exists due to product or service differentiation we analyze the trade offs in the choice of organizational structure for pricing and the impact of information asymmetry and valuation difference on this choice also we show that decentralization can be further improved by an incentive adjustment of profits between divisions which has a potential to increase all divisions and mnf s total profits over centralization

an assessment of the measurement of performance in international business research a sizeable body of international business ib research is devoted to building knowledge about the determinants of organizational performance a key precursor to accurately diagnosing why some organizations succeed in the international marketplace while others struggle is operationalizing performance appropriately yet to date no systematic investigation has considered how well ib research measures performance we examine the measurement of performance in 96 articles published in the academy of management journal administrative science quarterly journal of marketing journal of marketing research journal of international business studies management science organization science a nd thestrategic management journal between 1995 and 2005 the findings reveal that most studies do not measure performance in a manner that captures the multifaceted nature of the construct we describe the implications of these results and offer suggestions for improving future practice journal of international business studies 2008 39 1064 1080

us presidential elections and real gdp growth 1961 2004 in this paper i show that since 1960 an electoral cycle in us output growth can both be seen by the naked eye in the raw data and confirmed by a statistical analysis that allows for rational partisan effects as well as a wide range of control variables that is controlling for multiple lags of interest rate changes inflation money growth energy prices lagged output growth government spending or its growth and temporary partisan effects the timing of elections exerts a significant influence on quarterly real gdp growth

parallel imports challenges from unauthorized distribution channels we examine the problem of parallel imports unauthorized flows of products across countries which compete with authorized distribution channels the traditional economics model of a discriminating monopolist that has different prices for the same good in different markets requires the markets to be separated in some way usually geographically the profits from price discrimination can be threatened by parallel imports that allow consumers in the high priced region some access to the low priced marketplace however as this article shows there is a very real possibility that parallel imports may actually increase profits the basic intuition is that parallel importation becomes another channel for the authentic goods and creates a new product version that allows the manufacturer to price discriminate we propose a two country three stage model to quantitatively study the effects and strategies in the third stage and in the higher priced country where parallel imports have entered we characterize the resulting market segmentation one segment of consumers stays with the authorized version as they place more value on the warranty and services that come with the authorized version another segment switches to parallel imports because a lower price is offered due to lack of country specific features or warranties parallel imports also generate a third and new segment that would not have bought this product before unlike counterfeits that are fabricated by imitators all parallel imports are genuine and sourced from the manufacturer in the lower priced country through authorized dealers therefore the manufacturer s global sales quantity should increase but profit may rise or fall depending on the relative sizes and profitability of the segments a profit maximizing parallel importer should set price and quantity in the second stage after observing the manufacturer s prices in both countries there will be a threshold of across country price gap above which parallel imports would occur in the first stage the manufacturer can anticipate the possible occurrence of a parallel import its price and quantity and its effect on authorized sales in each country to make a coordinated pricing decision to maximize the global supply chain profit under some circumstances the manufacturer should allow parallel imports and under others should prevent them through a stackelberg game we solve for the optimal pricing strategy in each scenario we then find in one extension that when the number of parallel importers increases the optimal authorized price gap should narrow but the prices and quantities of parallel imports may rise or fall in another extension we nd that when the manufacturer has other means such as monitoring dealers differentiating designs and unbundling warranties to contain parallel imports the authorized price gap can widen as a function of the effectiveness of nonpricing controls in summary parallel imports may help the manufacturer to extend the global reach of its product and even boost its global profit if the manufacturer offers a discount version through its authorized dealers it is running a high risk of confusing customers and tarnishing brand images parallel imports may cause similar concerns for the manufacturer but unauthorized dealers are perceived as further removed from the manufacturer therefore there is less risk of confusing consumers when parallel imports are channeled through unauthorized dealers furthermore they are more nimble in diverting the product whenever their transshipment and marketing costs are small enough not to offset the authorized price gap and the valuation discount this may explain why some manufacturers fiercely fight parallel imports while others knowingly use this alternative channel

did the fed raise interest rates before elections the literature on political business cycles focuses on elected incumbents and neglects the incentives of appointed officials we present evidence of rate hikes before elections when the chair of the us federal reserve is from a different party than the incumbent president this finding contrasts with the traditional belief that an inappropriate policy rate bias implies a more expansive pre election policy stance we also find weak evidence that rates are lowered when the chair and president are from the same party the evidence that ideological preferences of the chair matter remains even when we control for career motives

direct marketing indirect profits a strategic analysis of dual channel supply chain design the advent of e commerce has prompted many manufacturers to redesign their traditional channel structures by engaging in direct sales the model conceptualizes the impact of customer acceptance of a direct channel the degree to which customers accept a direct channel as a substitute for shopping at a traditional store on supply chain design the customer acceptance of a direct channel can be strong enough that an indepent manufacturer would open a direct channel to compete with its own retailers here direct marketing is used for strategic channel control purposes even though it is inefficient on its own and surprisingly it can profit the manufacturer even when so direct sales occur specifically we construct a price setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer direct marketing which indirectly increases the flow of profits through the retail channel helps the manufacturer improve overall profitability by reducing the degree of inefficient price double marginalization while operated by the manufacturer to constrain the retailer s pricing behavior the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because it will be accompanied by a wholesale price reduction this combination of manufacturer pull and push can benefit the retailer in equilibrium finally we show that the mere threat of introducing the direct channel can increase the manufacturer s negotiated share of cooperative profits even if price efficiency is obtained by using other business practices

the world distribution of income falling poverty and convergence period we estimate the world distribution of income by integrating individual income distributions for 138 countries between 1970 and 2000 country distributions are constructed by combining national accounts gdp per capita to anchor the mean with survey data to pin down the dispersion poverty rates and head counts are reported for four specific poverty lines rates in 2000 were between one third and one half of what they were in 1970 for all four lines there were between 250 and 500 million fewer poor in 2000 than in 1970 we estimate eight indexes of income inequality implied by our world distribution of income all of them show reductions in global inequality during the 1980s and 1990s

manufacturer overseas distributor relations and export performance the export arrangement which makes use of overseas distributors is examined in this article although this method is important for many manufacturers operating in foreign markets there are reservations about the performance levels that are achieved under such arrangements it is suggested that there is an important link between the performance level achieved and the very nature of the relationship that exists between the manufacturer and overseas distributor the authors assert also that the nature of the manufacturer overseas distributor relationship is associated with certain characteristics of the participating companies namely their stake in the relationship their experience and their uncertainty surrounding the relationship these propositions are tested and largely corroborated through analysis of data collected from 41 companies in canada and the uk

the political manipulation of macroeconomic policy conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political as well as economic forces using vector autoregression analysis i test three models of monetary policy determination for the united states 1953 1984 the electoral cycle model that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle the party differences model that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations and the referendum model that changes in presidential approval create in effect a continuing referendum allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary analysis shows that monetary policies as measured by the monetary base and short term interest rates respond to the election cycle and presidential approval although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables

electoral and partisan cycles between us economic performance and presidential popularity empirical voting popularity research examines parameters that relate economic performance to voting and popularity not the interaction of these parameters with movements in economic performance which is what actually influences voting and popularity this paper examines that interaction for the usa from 1953 1 1990 4 by decomposing the response of popularity to economic performance by both political party and the quarter of the electoral term averaged over the electoral term economic performance increases the popularity of democrats but decreases it for republicans whereas near the election the opposite occurs overall the results appear consitent with a mix of partisan and electoral influences so that no single approach seems fully adequate

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

agent heterogeneity and consensual decision making on the federal open market committee the consensual aspects of decision making are essential for understanding policy made by administrative organizations that take the form of a commision or board consensual decision making reflects the degree of policy cohesion exhibited by high level officials within administrative organizations it is proposed here that this type of behavior may differ between heterogeneous agents the federal open market committee fomc of the federal reserve system serves as a salient setting for testing these propositions in a time series context the empirical results indicate that major intra institutional differences exist between board of governor bog and regional bank president rbp members of the federal open market committee fomc regarding consensual behavior in terms of policy decision making the econometric evidence clearly demonstrates that the consensual behavior of these agents are fundamentally different from one another this in turn has important implications for the study of other commission and board policy making bodies that consist of agents who are not all homogeneous

resale price maintenance and forward integration into a monopolistically competitive industry in this paper we adopt the ces model of product differentiation for the downstream stage of the industry with an upstream monopolist we first show that resale price maintenance is equivalent to forward integration and that both increase profits then we demonstrate that forward integration by an upstream monopolist will reduce welfare for the industry prices fall with forward integration but the integrating firm contracts the number of downstream subsidiaries so drastically that the reduced diversity more than offsets the gains from lower prices

slowing monetary growth since 1984 a public choice explanation until about 1984 the u s monetary base typically grew at an accelerating rate since then that acceleration has stopped modern evidence suggests that the federal reserve responds to political pressure we present empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that reduced monetary base growth reflects the fact that the political advantages of price inflation have been significantly reduced by the tax indexation provisions of the economic recovery tax act of 1981

vertical restraints in a model of vertical differentiation we consider the case of a manufacturer who sells a homogeneous good to retailers who compete in prices and cum sales or post sales services we show that the optimal linear price contract is inefficient from the point of view of the vertical structure and that simple forms of vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance and franchise fees dominate the optimal linear price contract but do not restore vertical efficiency our analysis is concluded with the description of an efficient contract

partisan monetary policies presidential influence through the power of appointment we investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a presidential administration could affect monetary policy making influence could be a result of direct presidential pressure exerted on members of the federal open market committee fomc or it could be a result of partisan considerations in presidential appointments to the board of governors to investigate these two channels of influence we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the fomc our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

modes of foreign entry a transaction cost analysis and propositions a frontier issue in international marketing is the appropriate choice of entry mode in foreign markets the objective of this paper is to offer a transaction cost framework for investigating the entry mode decision this framework provides 1 a theoretical basis for systematically interrelating the literature into propositions 2 propositions about interactions which resolve the apparently contradictory arguments advanced to date specifically the paper illustrates the feasibility of clustering 17 entry modes into the degree of control the mode provides the entrant proposes that the most appropriate i e most efficient entry mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the cost of resource commitment advances testable propositions delimiting the circumstances under which each mode maximizes long term efficiency

it s not me it s you the functioning of wall street during the 2008 economic downturn public officials have blamed wall street and its complex financial products for causing the 2008 economic downturn this article addresses three popular claims saying that complex financial markets are at fault and need more regulation it argues that even in the midst of a major economic downturn the much maligned mortgage backed securities collateralized debt obligations credit default swaps and unregistered hedge funds functioned almost exactly as designed when macroeconomic conditions worsened firms and investors that were paid to assume certain risks had to assume them those that opted for safer investment vehicles with more levels of private protection faced fewer problems although many investment vehicles lost money one must differentiate between problems that manifested themselves in markets and problems with the market itself even though government policies caused many of the problems public officials always have an incentive to point the finger at wall street and to argue for more regulations when their policies negatively affect markets

the economy of high wages an agency problem latitude with respect to the effort they supply and monitoring of effort and output is costly in this paper we examine the agency problem that arises in these circumstances the agent employee is assumed to maximize expected utility which depends on wages and effort a bad we assume that output is a deterministic function of effort that either effort or output can be accurately monitored and that monitoring is costly the firm s problem is to select a level of monitoring and a compensation package that will minimize the cost of obtaining a desired level of effort given the cost of monitoring the agent s preferences and the agent s opportunity cost of accepting employment with the firm his labour supply constraint the firm chooses a compensation scheme from the set in which compensation is contingent on effort if the agent is monitored and is equal to a standard

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

presidential elections and federal reserve policy an empirical test traditional macro economic models of federal reserve fed behavior typically assume that the fed enjoys a well defined objective function based on social welfare and generally predict counter cyclical monetary policy the increasing observation of procyclical monetary policy has led many researchers to investigate new models of fed behavior several recent papers imply that procyclical fed behavior is due to a lack of political accountability friedman 7 toma 23 and shughart and tollison 21 all attribute considerable bureaucratic discretion to the fed and seek to explain monetary policy by examining typical bureaucratic objectives other papers such as pierce 19 20 weintraub 26 and kane 10 11 argue that the fed operates in an arena filled with political constraints that cause sub optimal monetary policy but these constraints are not modeled explicitly one possible political constraint on fed behavior is the incumbent president s desire for re election in the political business cycle pbc literature presidential re election opportunities are enhanced by the production of a precise set of inflation and unemployment outcomes leading up to the election thus to the extent that presidents desire cyclical macro economic outcomes there will be executive pressure on the fed to create or accommodate such outcomes the effect this pressure will have on fed policy is ultimately an empirical question but most models deal with it by assumption traditional macro modeling assumes a zero effect while the pbc models implicitly assume that a favorable election cycle is a primary goal of all economic policymakers this paper examines presidential influence on the federal reserve by testing for an election cycle in money growth the major result is the identification of a regular 16 quarter cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections this cyclical effect is found to be stable over time and significant under a wide range of model specifications further when the cyclical component of money growth is used to simulate a simple macro model it produces a classic political business cycle in inflation and real output growth

the governance of exclusive territories when dealers can bootleg a transaction cost approach is used to investigate a manufacturer s policy towards exclusive territory dealers who bootleg sell across their assigned territories we show that optimal enforcement policies will generally tolerate some level of bootlegging this tolerance is a natural consequence of the transaction cost principle that institutional arrangements are not fully enforceable and that self enforcing implicit agreements will require some degree of tolerance the actual degree of tolerance is determined by a the importance of reseller services b the reduction in margin realized from surreptitious sales and c the resellers beliefs about the manufacturer s long run commitment to the channel we also show that deploying exclusive territories is beneficial to the manufacturer because it safeguards reseller services and permits resellers to capitalize on their superior local information however the latter effect is contingent on being able to convince resellers of the manufacturer s long r

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

strategic interactions between channel structure and demand enhancing services in this paper we investigate how opportunities to invest in demand enhancing services for a product line affect the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealer many demand enhancing services e g after sales support warranty repair etc can be provided either by the manufacturer or they can be delegated to the dealer we first show that when a manufacturer retains control of such services the dealer will have an incentive to choose a decentralized organizational structure as a means of committing to non product line pricing since this will encourage the manufacturer to invest more in demand enhancing services we then consider a game that is played between the manufacturer and the dealer in which the dealer chooses between centralized product line pricing or decentralized non product line pricing operations and the manufacturer chooses between insourcing the services i e providing them herself or outsourcing them to the dealer we find that the equilibrium depends on which if any channel partner has the ability to act as a stackelberg leader if the dealer can move first then the equilibrium will always be outsourced services and centralized dealer operations however if either the manufacturer moves first or if neither partner can move first then the equilibrium can be either insourced services and decentralized dealer operations or outsourced service and centralized dealer operations

elections and the fed is there a political monetary cycle to understand the political causes of macroeconomic policy it is necessary to examine the institutions that actually make such policy and the incentives those institutions face an explanation of the political causes of united states monetary policy must treat the various institutions that are influential in the monetary policy process which are at a minimum the federal reserve fed and the executive including the president the treasury department and other advisors in the executive office of the president the reelection motive has proven useful in modeling presidential incentives in this article i investigate whether electoral incentives associated with the theory of the political business cycle pbc can help to explain the behavior of the fed over the last quarter century the political business cycle has had a curious hold on modern political economy while the empirical evidence in favor of the cycle is far from overwhelming its theoretical importance leads to continuing empirical

political parties and the variable duration of business cycles a number of recent studies explore how political factors influence real economic activity with electoral models economic performance peaks near the election as in the retrospective model of nordhaus 30 electoral cycles also emerge at least in fiscal policy in the rational expectations model of rogoff and sibert 34 and rogoff 33 with partisan models economic activity differs systematically by party as in both the ideological model of hibbs 26 and the rationalexpectations model of alesina 1 economic activity surges after election of democratic presidents and recedes after election of republican presidents although recent tests of the electoral approach are supportive 21 22 24 25 the partisan approach enjoys the more compelling support 2 3 9 10 23 26 27 the electoral and partisan views are not mutually exclusive as the possibility of conflict between ideology and the desire to be reelected as the election approaches is well recognized indeed our evidence here is consistent with a combined electoralpartisan model the macroeconomic literature at large however has been slow to absorb accumulating evidence that the party affiliation of the incumbent president together with the timing of the electoral period are linked to real economic activity in this study we gauge the significance of these links for the united states and relate them to two important strands of the macroeconomic literature one strand the time series literature investigates the statistical properties of measures of real economic activity finding that these measures often exhibit nonconstant means and heteroscedastic variances in autoregressive integrated moving average arima models the conditional mean is a function of past innovations while the conditional variance is constant applications of arima and related models beginning with nelson and plosser 29 suggest that real economic activity for the united states exhibits near random walk behavior in autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic arch models the conditional variance is a function of past squared innovations while the conditional mean is constant applications of arch and related models beginning with engle 17 suggest that real activity exhibits heteroscedastic variances

the rationality of economic voting and the macroeconomic regime since voter rationality plays a major role in theories of political economics it is important for political analysts to investigate the extent of voter sophistication a conventional strategy for addressing this question is to determine what decision rule voters appear to use by estimating rival political support models that embody varying assumptions about voter rationality however under some circumstances such a strategy may be incapable of identifying the descriptively superior model due to an observational equivalence problem the paper estimates the competing political support models under alternative macroeconomic regimes and finds evidence favoring the nonrationalist or adaptive model

deficits politics and money growth the authors examine the linkage between federal deficits and money growth by allowing the fed s resp onse to any given deficit to vary systematically according to how the deficit is generated and the party affiliation of the current presid ent in equations for m1 and monetary base growth the structural def icit is consistently significant and invariant across political chang es while the cyclical component of the deficit or a direct measure of the business cycle is significant only during the tenure of democ ratic presidents copyright 1987 by oxford university press

opinion polls and political business cycles theory and evidence for the united states the paper shows that the frey schneider schultz hypothesis that there is a negative relation between the government s popularity and the government s incentives to engineer political business cycles is consistent with rational forward looking voting provided one makes appropriate assumptions about the incumbent s preferences the empirical part of the paper presents evidence favourable to the hypothesis using quarterly data on us money growth

beyond price mechanisms how much can service help manage the competition from gray markets abstract companies operating global supply chains in various industries struggle with parallel importers diverting goods from authorized channels to gray markets while the existing gray market literature mainly focuses on pricing in this paper we develop a model to examine the role of demand enhancing services as non price mechanisms for coping with gray markets we consider a manufacturer that sells a product in two markets and a parallel importer that transfers the product from the low price market to the high price market and competes with the manufacturer on price and service we show that parallel importation forces the manufacturer to provide more service in both markets we explore the value of service and the effects of competition intensity and market responsiveness to service on the manufacturer s policy we find that a little service can go a long way in boosting the profit of the manufacturer investing in service enables the manufacturer to differentiate herself from the parallel importer and to achieve the ideal price discrimination in addition service increases the value of strategic price discrimination when facing parallel importation we also analyze the case when the manufacturer sells through a retailer in the high price market and can delegate service provision to the retailer or provide service herself we find that delegating service to the retailer reduces double marginalization and can simultaneously benefit the manufacturer and the retailer even if the retailer is not as efficient as the manufacturer

a commentary on does the fed contribute to a political business cycle abrams and iossifov 2006 find that during 1957 2004 monetary policy turned significantly more expansionary prior to u s presidential elections when the federal reserve chairman and the incumbent president belonged to the same political party however their long sample period obscures changes in trends during the period stemming from advances in macroeconomic theory and in the implementation of monetary policy indeed when one considers only the volcker greenspan era 1979 2004 there is insufficient evidence to accept the notion of a political business cycle effect

the use of process and output controls in foreign markets this study builds upon previous control research to propose a model of formal controls used in managing activities performed in foreign markets theoretically derived contingency relationships are also proposed to assess the performance consequences of different formal control types the findings support the importance of internal and external sources of uncertainty in determining the type of control used partial support was also found for the premise that the fit between the type of control used and the type of uncertainty perceived will contribute to superior performance

identification and estimation of money demand in most natural sciences physics chemistry biology theories are validated by controlled experiment however in other natural sciences astronomy meteorology and in most social sciences including economics the data are characteristically generated not by experiment but by measurement of uncontrolled systems in economics theories take the form of restrictions on the models assumed to generate the data and statistical methods replace experimental controls in testing these restrictions and here is the difficulty in economics particularly macroeconomics the theory used to derive tests ordinarily does not generate a complete specification of which variables are to be held constant when statistical tests are performed on the relation between the dependent variable and the independent variables of primary interest accordingly in such cases there will be a set of often very different candidate regression based tests each of which has equal status with the others since each is based on a different projection of the same underlying multivariate model except in the unlikely event that the explanatory variables are mutually orthogonal the conditional regression coefficients which generally form the basis for the test statistic will depend on the conditioning set we conclude from this that if a theory which does not generate a complete specification of the regression test is nonetheless to have testable implications these implications must be robust over the permissible alternative specifications if the restrictions indicated by the theory are satisfied in some projections but not in others that have an equal claim to represent implications of the theory one cannot conclude that the theory has been confirmed the fact that the observable implications of valid theories must obtain over a broad but usually incompletely specified set of regressions rather than for a single regression introduces a large and unavoidable element of imprecision into hypothesis testing in macroeconomics generally it appears to be appropriate to weaken the statistical criterion for rejecting theories consider for example the theory of money demand which will engage our attention in this paper the tobin baumol square root formula implies that the elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate is exactly one half but which interest rate should wealth be held constant inflation in view of such uncertainties it would be inappropriate to insist in a literal minded fashion on rejecting the tobin baumol model if in some regression the measured interest elasticity differed from one half by more than two standard deviations and only then obviously a more flexible approach is called for the practice has been to conclude that the statistical evidence is consistent with the tobin baumol model as long as the interest rate coefficient is negative if it is negative and significant or negative and insignificantly different from minus one half that would provide somewhat stronger confirmation but a positive coefficient particularly a significantly positive coefficient would be viewed as raising questions about the validity of the theory in macroeconomics generally as in the money demand application the typical response to specification uncertainty has been to regard a theory as supported if the signs of the estimated coefficients agree with those expected from theory and as disconfirmed otherwise there is no theoretical justification for this procedure but it seems to be a reasonable course to follow the point that economic theory ordinarily generates incompletely specified statistical university of california santa barbara we have received helpful comments from andrew abel robert clower michael darby robert engle stephen goldfeld david laidler edward leamer robert lucas frederic mishkin and edward prescott thomas hall provided able research assistance

the federal reserve s response to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks evidence of a partisan political cycle the orthodox approach to modeling the fed s response to economic conditions is to employ a monetary policy reaction function most reaction functions are estimated by regressing a policy indicator possibly the federal funds rate or a monetary aggregate on variables that describe the state of the economy such as unemployment inflation and growth in output under certain conditions which we discuss below estimated coefficients from a reaction function provide information about the fed s monetary policy priorities moreover extending the model to include election and partisan dummy variables may provide information about the fed s response to political pressures there are two problems with interpreting the coefficients in a standard reaction function as the weights that the fed attaches to its policy objectives first the monetary policy decision may not be represented accurately by an aggregate reaction function one that models the fed as a whole because there are twelve voting members on the fomc chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 10 have recently addressed this issue by employing a disaggregated set of reaction functions the second problem with interpreting reaction function coefficients as the weights the fed places on its policy objectives is that this interpretation implicitly assumes structural stability of the underlying macroeconomy abrams froyen and waud 1 31 acknowledge this shortcoming when they state coefficients from estimated reaction functions do not provide direct information on policymaker utility functions rather than being the solution to an unconstrained optimization dependent only on policymaker preferences reaction functions are the output of a constrained maximization where the constraints are the reduced form equations that characterize

competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions in this article i refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions first i evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue of international organization out of this evaluation several ideas about how to produce a third generation of research on this topic emerge specific ideas include how to create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics such as information economics broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices in the second part of this article i explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved i show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are in a sense democratic as long as the public s perceived consensus about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real however if as new work suggests there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic in the conclusion i briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design