repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

tournaments with midterm reviews in many tournaments investments are made over time the question whether to conduct a review once at the end or additionally at points midway through the tournament is a strategic decision if the latter course is chosen then the designer must establish both a rule for aggregating the results of the different reviews and a rule for determining compensations we first study the case of a fixed exogenously given prize and then extend the analysis to the case where the prize is not fixed but may vary with the tournament s outcome it is shown that 1 it is always optimal to assign a higher weight to the final review 2 this weight increases with the dominance of the first stage effort in determining the final review s outcome when the prize is not fixed the optimal design generates an asymmetric tournament in the second stage that favors the winner of the midterm review

where does price discovery occur for stocks traded in multiple markets evidence from hong kong and london using a sample of hong kong listed stocks that are also traded on the london stock exchange we document the following results first london market makers use hong kong s closing prices as the benchmark for setting the opening prices in london second trading in the london market plays only a limited role in price discovery in the hong kong market third the stock returns from london trading are closely correlated with those of the hong kong market the above findings are consistent with the explanation that london trading is predominantly liquidity driven but not information driven

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment the employment relationship with employees ability and their actions both private information thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard is modeled as a repeated game with self enforcing contracts being perfect bayesian nash equilibria under termination contracts the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks finite in number even though ability is continuous reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment selection by bonding is not in general incentive compatible but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is many other features correspond to observed employment structures

learning from coarse information biased contests and career profiles an organization s promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly rational learning about ability the decision maker can bias noisy rank order contests sequentially thereby changing the information they convey the optimal final period bias favours the leader reinforcing his likely ability advantage when optimally biased rank order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information the leader is favoured in every period in other environments bias in early periods may i favour the early loser ii be optimal even when the workers are equally rated and iii reduce the favoured worker s promotion chances this paper presents a model of boundedly rational learning by an organization the aims are to represent in a simple form the costs of gathering processing or transmitting information and to analyse their implications for the procedures selected to handle information as well as for the decisions actually made like other recent work on the internal organization of firms this work explores to what extent organizational structure and behaviour as well as organizational performance can be explained by adaptation to the costs associated with information in the learning model we formulate the decision maker not only selects a rule specifying what action to take as a function of his observations but also chooses sequentially the information partitions generating those observations this general problem is interpreted in the context of an organization which needs to make an important promotion decision and which attempts to maximize the value of the information generated during the observation periods that precede the decision one of the motivations for this analysis was the finding by organizational sociologists that earnings and promotions in the later stages of a worker s career are strongly correlated with earnings and promotions in the early stages kanter 1977 rosenbaum 1984 later success is positively associated with early success even when one controls for the effect of observable characteristics likely to affect performance such as education one obvious source of this correlation is differences in ability that persist over time and that are not captured by the observable covariates in this paper we focus on differences in ability which are initially unobservable by organizations and their workers as well as by researchers we present a simple model of an organization trying to learn about differences in ability and show

the optimal prize structure of symmetric tullock contests we show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n player tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists if such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner take all structure we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts if no such optimal equilibrium exists no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts

how smooth is price discovery evidence from cross listed stock trading abstract the adjustment to parity can be nonlinear for a cross listed pair convergence may be quicker when the price deviation is sufficiently profitable we propose a threshold error correction model ecm to gauge the market respective information shares of canadian listings traded on the toronto stock exchange tsx and the new york stock exchange nyse since dynamics may alternatively be gradual we further generalize the threshold framework to a smooth transition ecm the empirical implications are as follows first the tsx and the nyse appear to have integrated over time second parity convergence accelerates upon discounts on the cross listings on the nyse third we find a larger feedback from the nyse if the price gap exceeds the threshold required arbitrage return fourth informed traders tend to cluster on the nyse upon discounts on the cross listings fifth information share and threshold are affected by the relative degree of private information market friction and liquidity measures firm level characteristics and aggregate risks

testing for the effects of concealed weapons laws specification errors and robustness abstract in 1997 john lott and david mustard published an important paper in which they found that right to carry concealed weapons laws reduce violent crime although lott and mustard appear to do all possible variations of the analysis a closer reading reveals that the study might suffer from several possibly important errors i reestimate the model and check for incorrect functional form omitted variables and possible second order bias in the t ratios lott and mustard s basic conclusions are generally robust with respect to these potential econometric problems overall right to carry concealed weapons laws tend to reduce violent crime the effect on property crime is more uncertain i find evidence that these laws also reduce burglary

more guns more crime this paper examines the relationship between gun ownership and crime previous research has suffered from a lack of reliable data on gun ownership i exploit a unique data set to reliably estimate annual rates of gun ownership at both the state and the county levels during the past two decades my findings demonstrate that changes in gun ownership are significantly positively related to changes in the homicide rate with this relationship driven almost entirely by an impact of gun ownership on murders in which a gun is used the effect of gun ownership on all other crime categories is much less marked recent reductions in the fraction of households owning a gun can explain one third of the differential decline in gun homicides relative to nongun homicides since 1993

common stochastic trends in international stock markets abstract this paper presents evidence concerning the number of common stochastic trends in the equity markets of the u s japan england germany and canada monthly and quarterly data from january 1974 through august 1990 on morgan stanley s capital international indices are used to compute johansen 1990 tests for common trends the results indicate the presence of a single common trend driving these countries stock markets estimates of the factor loadings suggest that this trend is most important in the japanese market and least important in the canadian market to interpret this evidence the paper demonstrates that under weak conditions the unit root and cointegration structure of stock prices should mirror the unit root and cointegration structure of their dividend payments the paper tests this prediction by constructing national dividend series from capital international s dividend yield data as well as by using gnp data as with stock prices the evidence points to a single common trend although the stochastic properties and relative importance of this trend differs somewhat from the trend in stock prices

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

rewarding improvements optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation we study a t period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private we find that the principal should punish the agent for performing poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past at the same time the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor evaluations in the past with better performance in the future optimal incentives are thus asymmetric conditional on the same number of good evaluations an agent whose performance improves over time should be better rewarded than one whose performance deteriorates

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

the impact of gun laws a model of crime and self defense abstract we develop a model of crime and self defense that provides a rationale both for the right to bear arms and for regulating this right it also suggests that a severe punishment for gun crime might best guarantee both the security and freedom of potential victims

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

interim performance feedback in multistage tournaments the optimality of partial disclosure workers competing in a tournament for a prize e g a promotion often perform sequentially in multiple stages when the firm is privately informed about the workers performance it can sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results but the policies that enhance final stage effort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage in our model the optimal disclosure policy has a simple form disclose only if all workers perform poorly this result offers a novel justification for partial disclosure in performance feedback also it contrasts with the existing literature that focuses on the extreme policies of full disclosure and no disclosure

contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations a repeated moral hazard setting in which the principal privately observes the agent s output is studied the optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized and shown to require burning of resources these are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor for the infinite horizon it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired furthermore optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short term contracts a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement comparative statics on the review length are carried out finally these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient jel d82 d86

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

quantitative implications of a debt deflation theory of sudden stops and asset prices abstract this paper shows that the quantitative predictions of an equilibrium asset pricing model with financial frictions are consistent with key features of the sudden stop phenomenon foreign traders incur costs in trading assets with domestic agents and a collateral constraint limits external debt to a fraction of the market value of domestic equity holdings when this constraint does not bind standard productivity shocks cause typical real business cycle effects when it binds the same shocks cause strikingly different effects depending on the leverage ratio and asset market liquidity with high leverage and a liquid market the shocks force fire sales of assets and fisher s debt deflation mechanism amplifies the responses of asset prices consumption and the current account precautionary saving makes these sudden stops infrequent in the long run

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

restricting the means of exchange within organizations abstract this paper considers why firms often ban monetary exchange between their employees while encouraging these trades through other means such as through the reciprocation of favours or barter despite classical inefficiencies associated with non monetary exchange we illustrate two themes as to why non monetary trade may be preferred to allowing money first the use of non monetary trade may affect the allocation of rents in surplus enhancing ways as agents respond strategically to the existence of these rents second non monetary trade improves the ability of agents to impose sanctions on those who act dishonestly

team contests with multiple pairwise battles abstract we consider a multi battle team contest in which players from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight in distinct component battles which are carried out sequentially or partially

productive low morale abstract this paper models employment relationship as a repeated principal agent problem with private evaluation the efficient contracts exhibit correlated movements between lagged wage and current effort that are consistent with the positive feedback between pay and morale in practice low morale therefore is an integral part of a well functioning relationship

price transmission foreign exchange rate risks and global diversification of adrs the purposes of this article are to reinvestigate how returns of major american depository receipts adrs from different countries are related to the underlying stock returns and to identify the determinants of adr risk premiums we use different types of error correcting terms in vector error correction models to examine information flows between adrs and the underlying foreign stocks general method of moments estimation of conditional international asset pricing model of dumas and solnik 1995 is applied to investigate adr return premiums we find that stock returns are more affected by disequilibrium between adr and stock prices in an inefficient way for us investors foreign exchange rate risk premiums and world market risk premium beyond us index are priced in adrs returns ex ante surprisingly it is shown that the exchange rate of new taiwan dollar and the interest rates of brazil and taiwan play important roles in determining adr risk premiums across countries

privately produced general deterrence in this study we use county data on private security establishments and employment for 1977 92 to test two hypotheses first we test whether private security deters crime second we test whether john lott and david mustard s estimates of the impact of shall issue laws on crime are biased because of a lack of controls for private security we find little evidence that private security reduces the crime rates for assault or larceny some estimates suggest murder robbery and or auto theft may be deterred by private security although these results are not robust of all the index crime categories only rape is estimated to have a consistent negative relationship with private security in addition we find little evidence that the lott and mustard results are biased because of a lack of controls for the private security measures employed in this study

the occupations of regulators influence occupational regulation evidence from the us private security industry licensing requirements for us private security firms and guards differ substantially from state to state state regulatory institutions for this industry also vary considerably some states have specialized regulatory boards with industry personnel guards firm owners and or public police as board members while others rely on non specialized regulators such as departments of commerce state professional regulation or consumer affairs these cross state variations in licensing requirements and regulatory institutions provide an opportunity to explore relationships between the two private security regulation is of particular interest in this context because previous empirical research implies that allocating more resources to private security reduces crime and that relatively stringent licensing requirements limit entry thereby increasing crime a panel of 1991 2010 state data is employed to see if particular regulatory institutions are associated with particular licensing requirements empirical results suggest that requirements for entry into this market tend to be relatively strict when active private security personnel are in control of licensing and that different patterns of regulation generally apply when police or non specialized agencies control licensing therefore both public interest and private interest explanations for the observed relationships between the structure of regulatory institutions and resulting licensing requirements are discussed

on equilibrium player ordering in dynamic team contests we study equilibrium player ordering in a dynamic all pay contest between two teams the contest lasts two periods and each team consists of two players who perform in different periods on behalf of their teams the team with the higher aggregate output wins the prize which is a public good to its players each team has one stronger player and one weaker player and the two teams can differ in their values of the prize the teams maximize their winning odds by strategically assigning their players to different periods we find that when the intrateam heterogeneity in player ability is not excessive the teams would allocate their stronger players to the late positions as the anchormen when both the intrateam ability gap and interteam heterogeneity in teams values become excessively large the team with high value always places its stronger player in the early position who will place a large bid to preempt late competition jel c7 d7 d8

public safety through private action an economic assessment of bids private actions to avoid and prevent criminal victimisation and assist public law enforcement are vital inputs into the crime control process one form of private action the business improvement district bid appears particularly promising a bid is a non profit organisation created by property owners to provide local public goods usually including public safety our analysis of 30 los angeles bids demonstrates that the social benefits of bid expenditures on security are a large multiple about 20 of the private expenditures crime displacement appears minimal crime reduction in the bid areas has been accompanied by a reduction in arrests suggesting further savings given the vital role of private individuals and firms in determining the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and the quality and availability of criminal opportunities private actions arguably deserve a more central role in the analysis of crime and crime prevention policy 1 but the leading scholarly commentaries on the crime drop during the 1990s have largely ignored the role of the private sector blumstein and wallman 2000 levitt 2004 zimring 2007 the potentially relevant trends include growing reporting rates the growing sophistication and use of alarms monitoring equipment and locks the considerable increase in the employment of private security guards and the decline in the use of cash cook and macdonald 2010 private actions can be encouraged or discouraged through regulation of the insurance industry reducing the costs of private co operation with police and courts gun control measures and other means the justification for such measures is the reasonable presumption that many sorts of private action to avoid mitigate and respond to crime generate substantial externalities business improvement districts bids are a particularly promising institution for harnessing private action to cost effective crime control a bid is a non profit organisation created by neighbourhood property owners to provide local public goods including public safety the organisation has the power to tax all the owners in the district including those who did not sign the original petition previous evaluations of bids in los angeles la indicate that they are successful in reducing crime rates brooks 2008 macdonald et al 2009 we provide a further analysis of the costs and benefits including the effect on arrests and spillovers and we estimate a dose response

information revelation in relational contracts we explore subjective performance reviews in long term employment relationships we show that firms benefit from separating the task of evaluating the worker from the task of paying him the separation allows the reviewer to better manage the review process and can therefore reward the worker for his good performance with not only a good review contemporaneously but also a promise of better review in the future such reviews spread the reward for the worker s good performance across time and lower the firm s maximal temptation to renege on the reward the manner in which information is managed exhibits patterns consistent with a number of well documented biases in performance reviews

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

international transmission of stock market movements this paper investigates the international transmission mechanism of stock market movements by estimating a nine market vector autoregression var system using simulated responses of the estimated var system we i locate all the main channels of interactions among national stock markets and ii trace out the dynamic responses of one market to innovations in another generally speaking a substantial amount of multi lateral interaction is detected among national stock markets innovations in the u s are rapidly transmitted to other markets in a clearly recognizable fashion whereas no single foreign market can significantly explain the u s market movements also the dynamic response pattern is found to be generally consistent with the notion of informationally efficient international stock markets

information policy in tournaments with sabotage sabotage is one of the main problems of tournament like reward schemes workers who are leading in a tournament are more dangerous rivals and are therefore sabotaged more heavily this implies that there is an extra cost to becoming a leader and hence to choosing high productive effort in the early stages of a tournament the incentives to exert productive effort are thereby reduced we show that this problem can be solved by concealing intermediate information on the performances of workers i e by clever information management moreover we offer experimental evidence indicating that such information management does increase productive efforts

regime switching analysis of adr home market pass through abstract we model and estimate adrs home market pass through and pricing to market using a regime switching approach which nests the two regimes in a conditional capital asset pricing model and treats any changes in these two regimes probabilistically our results from the 1998 to 2006 data show that the pricing to market regime dominates adrs from china and japan whereas the home market pass through regime dominates adrs from argentina and germany when their respective home markets are volatile

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

unemployment and the efficiency wage hypothesis there has been much recent discussion of the reasons why prices in certain markets and in particular in labour markets may not adjust to eliminate excess supply the absence of speedy adjustment of prices is an essential feature of the recent models of disequilibrium macroeconomics but for the most part no explanation for this absence is provided from within those models one explanation that has been around in the literature for some time and has been receiving increasing attention recently is the efficiency wage hypothesis initially applied to developing economies see leibenstein i957 it has more recently been adapted to developed economies by weiss i 980 and used in the context of a keynesian macroeconomic model by hart i 980 similar concepts have been applied to the credit market by stiglitz and weiss i98i the purpose of the present paper is to explore further the conditions under which the notion of an efficiency wage is applicable and can provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment the essential feature of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that the productivity of a firm s employees increases as their wage is increased at least over an economically relevant part of its range if the wage paid by the firm is denoted by w the number of employees by l and the productivity of each employee by p w where p w o then the effective labour force of the firm e can be represented by

price transmission dynamics between adrs and their underlying foreign securities abstract this paper extends previous research by considering three pricing factors for american depository receipts adrs the price of the underlying shares in the local currency the relevant exchange rate and the us market index using both a vector autoregressive var model with a cointegration constraint and a seemingly unrelated regression sur approach we examine the relative importance of and the speed of adjustment of adr prices to these underlying factors our results show that while the price of the underlying shares is most important the exchange rate and the us market also have an impact on adr prices while the bulk of the shocks to the pricing factors are reflected in the adrs within the same calendar day there are indications that the adjustments are not completed until the following day curiously the adrs appear to initially overreact to the us market index but underreact to changes in underlying share prices and exchange rates

evolution in dynamic linkages across daily national stock indexes abstract this article investigates how dynamic linkages among the daily rates of return of eight national stock indexes have evolved since 1972 a dynamic simultaneous equations model is estimated to describe the contemporaneous and lead lag relationships across national equity markets over three different years 1972 1980 and 1987 results reveal growing market interdependence within the same geographical region over time while there are many significant intermarket relationships within the same 24 hour period there are few significant lagged responses across markets beyond 24 hours this suggests a high degree of international market efficiency furthermore japan s market influence has been growing to rival that of the usa

does the right to carry concealed handguns deter countable crimes only a count analysis can say abstract an analysis of the effects of right to carry laws on crime requires particular distributional and structural considerations first because of the count nature of crime data and the low number of expected instances per observation in the most appropriate data least squares methods yield unreliable estimates second use of a single dummy variable as a measure of the nationwide effect of right to carry laws is likely to introduce geographical and intertemporal aggregation biases into the analysis in this paper we use a generalized poisson process to examine the geographical and dynamic effects of right to carry laws on reported homicides rapes and robberies we find that the effects of such laws vary across crime categories u s states and time and that such laws appear to have statistically significant deterrent effects on the numbers of reported murders rapes and robberies

do polls create momentum in political competition abstract we explore how public opinion polls affect candidates campaign spending in political competition generally polls lead to more asymmetric behavior under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby increases her lead in expectation polls create momentum when campaigning is very effective and the race is very close a second type of equilibrium may exist the trailing candidate outspends and overtakes his opponent regardless of the type of equilibrium polls have a tendency to decrease expected total campaigning expenditures by amplifying ex ante asymmetries between candidates and thus defusing competition when candidates care also for their vote share in addition to having the majority candidates incentives crucially depend on the distribution of voters candidate preferences

penalizing success in dynamic incentive contracts no good deed goes unpunished we examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present we find that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a lower powered incentive contract penalizing success in this manner serves to limit the agent s initial incentive to understate his ability

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

an empirical test of the efficiency of the adr market abstract this study examines the weak form efficiency of foreign equities american depository receipts traded in the u s the results of serial correlation and runs tests on a sample of listed and nasdaq adrs for the years 1974 1978 were consistent with weak form efficiency

the dynamic relationship between the prices of adrs and their underlying stocks evidence from the threshold vector error correction model this paper sets out to estimate the dynamic relationship that exists between the prices of adrs and their underlying stocks in both the short run and the long run using a number of recent developments of the threshold cointegration framework the empirical results support the notion of nonlinear mean reversion of the prices of adrs and their underlying stocks

intermediate information loss aversion and effort empirical evidence the present article empirically explores the impact of intermediate information on contestants effort data involving substituted soccer players of the german bundesliga indicate only weak evidence of a negative effect of ex ante heterogeneity on effort in contrast intermediate information measured by goal difference at the time of substitution significantly affects effort players exert the greatest effort when their team is leading by one goal and reduce their effort when it is trailing when intermediate information suggests the contest is already decided players from both teams reduce effort this behavior is in line with loss aversion such that players weight potential losses more than potential gains and adjust their effort accordingly jel z22 j41 m54

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

double edged transparency in teams abstract in a team project with significant complementarities between various players individual tasks news of early success by some encourages others to push ahead with their own tasks while lack of success has the opposite effect this ex post disparity in incentives created gives rise to two differing implications ex ante for an ideal team transparency sometimes it is better to commit to complete secrecy within the team of the various participants interim progress as it mitigates the negative effect of failures in some other situations commitment to full disclosure is better as players are then encouraged to be proactive by exerting efforts in the early rounds and motivate other team members into continued activities by way of interim progress transparency of outcomes has thus double edges it can boost incentives or dampen incentives

does private security affect crime a test using state regulations as instruments private security is employed to deter criminals from attacking specific targets presumably not to produce general deterrence indeed private security generates negative spillovers as criminals su

the importance of relative performance feedback information evidence from a natural experiment using high school students we study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information on performance under piece rate incentives a natural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusual opportunity to test this effect in a real effort setting for one year only students received information that allowed them to know whether they were above below the class average as well as the distance from this average we exploit a rich panel data set and find that the provision of this information led to an increase of 5 in students grades moreover the effect was significant for the whole distribution however once the information was removed the effect disappeared to rule out the concern that the effect may be driven by teachers within the school we verify our results using national level exams externally graded for the same students and the effect remains

exchange rate expectations and the pricing of chinese cross listed stocks abstract i show that the price discounts of chinese cross listed stocks american depositary receipts adrs and h shares to their underlying a shares indicate the expected yuan us dollar exchange rate the forecasting models reveal that adr and h share discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates particularly at long forecast horizons using panel estimations i find that adr and h share investors form their exchange rate expectations according to standard exchange rate theories such as the harrod balassa samuelson effect the risk of competitive devaluations relative purchasing power parity uncovered interest rate parity and the risk of currency crisis

incentives versus competitive balance abstract when players compete repeatedly prizes won in earlier contests may improve the players abilities in later contests this paper determines the allocation of prizes within and across contests that maximizes the weighted sum of aggregate efforts

the efficiency of bonus or terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations abstract we study a repeated principal agent model with subjective evaluations we construct simple bonus or terminate incentive schemes in these schemes the principal evaluates the agent every t periods the principal pays a bonus and asks the agent to work for t more periods if the evaluation is positive the relationship is terminated if the evaluation is negative the inefficiencies in these schemes vanish as the agent can be more frequently evaluated this result holds generally under objective or subjective evaluations

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

do wage cuts damage work morale evidence from a natural field experiment employment contracts are often incomplete leaving many responsibilities subject to workers discretion high work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms we conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity reducing average output by more than 20 percent an equivalent wage increase however did not result in any productivity gains the results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output leaving enough room for positive reactions altogether these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity as opposed to inequality aversion

some new filter rule tests methods and results mechanical trading rules seem to have more potential than previous tests found fama and blume 1966 looking at the dow 30 of the late 1950s found no profits for the best vipercent rule after adjusting for transactions costs fifteen of these stocks looked profitable in their sample however for the same rule the surviving fourteen show statistically significant profits for 1970 1982 for transactions costs obtainable by floor traders the test used here assumes constant risk premia or more generally that risk premia are on average approximately the same on days in as for the total period

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives