sequential bargaining as a noncooperative foundation for walrasian equilibrium allocation are weakly preferred to those obtainable from the initial endowments by means of the given set of net trades these conditions are similar to ones studied by schmeidler and vind 1972 and vind 1978 but here they are thought of as characterizing the set of net trades available in steady state equilibria of market games like those studied by douglas gale 1984 1985 1986a 1986b and 1986c the characterization result is used as a key step in the proof of results like gale s the allocations induced by steady state equilibria are walrasian for the economy given by the constant flow of new agents into the market our approach generalizes the one followed in gale 1986c and allows us to dispense with assumptions made in previous treatments for example gale s 1986a assumption of dispersed characteristics is dropped we also demonstrate that such a result depends on the assumption that agents cannot observe the past behavior of agents with whom they trade

job mobility and earnings instability there is still no consensus on the causes of the increase in the variance of transitory earnings earnings instability in the united states it is difficult to attribute the rise in instability to job mobility because there is no evidence of a concurrent increase in job turnover or separations using an error component model of the covariance structure of earnings on panel survey of income dynamics and survey of income and program participation data this study shows that job mobility and the increase in the variance of wage changes upon job change accounts for a substantial part of the increase in earnings instability the empirical evidence is consistent with the simulations of a search and matching model where an increase in the variance of productivity shocks increases on the job search and earnings instability among job changers while leaving job turnover approximately constant jel j21 j31

high tech firms and credit rationing abstract informational frictions between borrowers and lenders differ across classes of borrowers innovative firms undertake high risk high return projects which are likely to be little understood by financial intermediaries as a consequence they may end up allocating too large a share of funds to traditional low risk low return projects this proposition finds some support in a cross section of italian manufacturing firms using several proxies to classify firms into high tech and low tech groups and direct information on each firm s access to bank credit high tech firms are found to be more likely to be credit constrained than low tech firms the results suggest that the responsiveness of r d expenditure to cash flow found in the literature is likely due to pervasive credit constraints on innovative firms rather than to cash flow proxying for future expectations the paper also sheds light on the main factors affecting the probability of a firm being rationed in the credit market

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

measurement error and misclassification a comparison of survey and administrative data we provide both a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relation between administrative and survey data by distinguishing between different sources of deviations between survey and administrative data we are able to reproduce several stylized facts we illustrate the implications of different error sources for estimation in simple econometric models and find potentially very substantial biases this article shows the sensitivity of some findings in the literature for the assumption that administrative data represent the truth in particular the common finding of substantial mean reversion in survey data largely goes away once we allow for a richer error structure

innovation and communication signalling with partial disclosure this paper introduces a model of feedback effect equilibrium i e equilibria in which an asymmetrically informed agent is motivated to communicate its privately known attribute but can do so only through channels or signals which convey directly useful information to competing agents this revelation to the competition serves to reduce the value of the private information held by the first agent models of this kind are of obvious relevance to realistic theories of product or financial market disclosure policies of firms patenting and a host of related behavioural and regulatory issues this model is developed in the context of a set of firms engaged in research and development rivalry in which the value of privately held and disclosed information arises from its implications for the likelihood and timing of productive innovation

an expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty abstract in economies where agents bear some risk the analysis would often be facilitated by the assumption that the risks are i i d and disappear in the aggregate a formal appeal to the law of large numbers requires the consideration of a sequence of finite economies in an economy with a continuum of agents there are countable families of sets for which it is impossible for a law of large numbers to be valid with countably many agents and a finitely additive measure independence is compatible with the law of large numbers

the rising instability of u s earnings the inequality of earnings and of family incomes in the united states has increased since the late 1970s autor katz and kearney 2008 this increase in cross sectional inequality has largely been interpreted as a growing disparity in permanent incomes between those with high incomes and those with low incomes however growing inequality could equally well be a result of growing income instability if workers experience increasingly large fluctuations in earnings from year to year this would also increase the measured inequality of earnings from year to year for example if everyone maintained the same level of permanent income but some experienced a 500 increase in their income in the first year and then a reversal to 500 below their permanent incomes in the following year while an equal number experienced the opposite a drop in income followed by an offsetting rise measured inequality would rise though nothing would have happened to the dispersion of permanent incomes while this example is an extreme one it points to the fact that the large rise in earnings inequality between the 1970s and the 1990s could reflect either a rise in disparity of permanent incomes a rise in earnings instability or some portion of both without longitudinal data it is impossible to distinguish between these two very different explanations for increased cross sectional measures of inequality in this paper we provide longitudinal measures that separate changes in income inequality into changes that permanently change income to new levels and those that only reflect transitory change we refer to the latter as changes in income instability and discuss how the instability of individual earnings and family income in the united states has evolved over the last quarter century

bank liquidity and stability in an overlapping generations model in an infinitely repeated version of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model intergenerational transfers enable a bank to achieve interest rate smoothing and to provide depositors with liquidity insurance without diamond and dybvig s assumption of no side trades the bank is subject to runs that may result from either excessive withdrawals or the lack of new deposits the latter cause which cannot occur in diamond and dybvig s one generation model implies that suspension of convertibility may not prevent bank runs government intervention may be necessary to maintain bank stability article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

contagion of self fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios abstract we look at two countries that have independent fundamentals but share the same group of investors each country might face a self fulfilling crisis agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will a crisis in one country reduces agents wealth this makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments consequently the probability of a crisis there increases this generates a positive correlation between the returns in the two countries since diversification affects returns in our model its welfare implications are non trivial

trends in the transitory variance of male earnings methods and evidence we estimate the trend in the transitory variance of male earnings in the united states using the michigan panel study of income dynamics from 1970 to 2004 using an error components model and simpler but only approximate methods we find that the transitory variance started to increase in the early 1970s continued to increase through the mid 1980s and then remained at this new higher level through the 1990s and beyond thus the increase mostly occurred about 30 years ago its increase accounts for between 31 and 49 percent of the total rise in cross sectional variance depending on the time period

exact arbitrage well diversified portfolios and asset pricing in large markets abstract for a market with an atomless continuum of assets we formulate the intuitive idea of a well diversified portfolio and present a notion of exact arbitrage strictly weaker than the more conventional notion of asymptotic arbitrage and necessary and sufficient for the validity of an apt pricing formula our formula involves essential risk one based on a specific index portfolio constructed from factors and factor loadings that are endogenously extracted to satisfy an optimality property involving a finite number of factors we illustrate how our results can be translated to markets with a large but finite number of assets

higher order expectations in asset pricing we examine formally keynes idea that higher order beliefs can drive a wedge between an asset price and its fundamental value based on expected future payoffs we call this the higher order wedge which depends on the difference between higher and first order expectations of future payoffs we analyze the determinants of this wedge and its impact on the equilibrium price in the context of a dynamic noisy rational expectations model we show that the wedge reduces asset price volatility and disconnects the price from the present value of future payoffs the impact of the higher order wedge on the equilibrium price can be quantitatively large

membership in citizen groups we analyze the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits the public good and the benefits are jointly produced so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good with asymmetric information about the cost of provision the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee we show that heterogeneity in valuations for the excludable benefits is always detrimental to the group however in a dynamic contest in which heterogeneity arises endogenously returning members receive additional seniority benefits at the expense of junior members we show that in the ex ante optimal contract offering seniority benefits is beneficial for the group despite the heterogeneity in valuations created

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining we examine a simple bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other we begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting we then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form we take an implementation approach characterizing the possible allocation rules which result as the extensive game form is varied we are particularly concerned with the impact of making trade voluntary imposing individual rationality on and off the equilibrium path no buyer or seller consummates an agreement which leaves them worse off than the discounted expected value of their future rematching in the market finally we compare and contrast the efficient allocations with those that could ever arise as the equilibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure

slow information diffusion and the inertial behavior of durable consumption this paper studies the aggregate dynamics of durable and nondurable consumption under slow information diffusion sid due to noisy observations and learning within the permanent income framework we show that sid can significantly improve the model s predictions on the joint behavior of income durable consumption and nondurable consumption at the aggregate level specifically we find that sid can significantly improve the model s predictions for i smoothness in durable and nondurable consumption ii autocorrelation of durable consumption and iii contemporaneous correlation between durable and nondurable consumption furthermore we discuss that incorporating a fixed cost into our sid model does a better job of reproducing the infrequent adjustments of durable consumption at the individual level and the slow adjustments at the aggregate level

signal jamming in new credit markets this paper develops a simple two period model in which a lender s credit operations in a new market end up externalizing information on borrowers repayment capabilities this information improves the competitive position of outside lenders by allowing them to enter the credit market with a more accurate description of potential clients equilibrium strategies are then identified where an inside lender chooses to offer a costly first period contract with the explicit objective of distorting the quality of the external information flow in the second period

errors in self reported earnings the role of previous earnings volatility and individual characteristics abstract i report the measurement error in self reported earnings for a developing country using a novel data set the data set consists of two cross sections of the federated states of micronesia fsm wage and salary sectors additionally a subset of the two cross sections may be linked to create a panel administrative data from fsm social security office are matched to the fsm census data for the wage and salary sectors i find that the error in annual self reported earnings is centered on zero additionally i find strong evidence for mean reversion in the data suggesting non classical measurement error i identify the impact of prior years earnings variability on the current reporting of earnings using administrative data on earnings histories prior earnings volatility strongly affects measurement error in current period however the effect of prior shocks diminish significantly over time suggesting that first differencing and fixed effects techniques will not improve accuracy

evidence on the validity of cross sectional and longitudinal labor market data this article investigates error properties of survey reports of labor market variables we use the panel study of income dynamics psid validation study a two wave panel survey of workers employed by a large firm that shared its detailed payroll records individuals reports of annual earnings are fairly accurate errors are negatively related to true earnings reducing bias due to measurement error when earnings are used as an independent variable biases are moderately larger for changes in earnings earnings per hour are less reliably reported than annual earnings biases in estimating earnings functions are relatively small but those in labor supply functions may be important

are small innovators credit rationed drawing upon a sample of 256 small firms who applied for bank loans the current paper is concerned with the extent to which innovativeness is associated with a lower level of loan application success the paper records the proportion of loan successfully applied for and estimates a series of tobit models utilising a number of proxy measures for innovation in terms of inputs outputs and commercial significance to the firm and incorporating standard controls in general the models suggest as anticipated that the most innovative firms are less successful in loan markets than their less innovative peers though there is some variation by proxy moreover there is tentative evidence that a little innovation may be a good thing

r d and internal finance a panel study of small firms in high tech industries since joseph schumpeter economists have argued that internal finance should be an important determinant of r d expenditures yet almost without exception previous empirical studies have not found evidence of such a relation using newly available data the authors investigate this puzzle with a panel of 179 small firms in high tech industries under each estimation strategy they employ the authors find an economically large and statistically significant relationship between r d investment and internal finance their results are consistent with the view that because of capital market imperfections the flow of internal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small high tech firms acquire technology through r d copyright 1994 by mit press

taxes and marriage a two sided search analysis this article analyzes the effects of differential tax treatment of married and single individuals in the united states on marriage formation and composition divorce and labor supply we develop a marriage market model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents that is sufficiently rich to capture key elements of the problem under consideration we then calibrate the model and use it to evaluate the quantitative effects of several tax reforms aimed at making the tax law neutral with respect to marital status we find that these reforms i systematically increase the labor supply of married females with changes ranging from 0 3 to 10 1 percent ii have substantial effects on the correlation of spouses incomes which changes from 0 2 to values between 0 185 and 0 334 iii can lead to either an increase or decrease in the fraction of people married with changes that range from 0 6 to 2 4 percent

robust comparative statics in large dynamic economies we consider infinite horizon economies populated by a continuum of agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks this framework contains models of saving and capital accumulation with incomplete markets in the spirit of works by bewley aiyagari and huggett models of entry exit and industry dynamics in the spirit of hopenhayn s work and dynamic models of occupational choice and search models as special cases robust and easy to apply comparative statics results are established with respect to exogenous parameters as well as various kinds of changes in the markov processes governing the law of motion of the idiosyncratic shocks

how much of observed economic mobility is measurement error iv methods to reduce measurement error bias with an application to vietnam research on economic growth and inequality inevitably raise issues concerning economic mobility because the relationship between long run inequality and short run inequality is mediated by income mobility for a given level of short run inequality greater mobility implies lower long run inequality yet empirical measures of both inequality and mobility are biased upward due to measurement error in income and expenditure data collected from household surveys this paper presents a straightforward method to remove this bias using instrumental variable estimates the method is applied to panel data from vietnam the results imply that at least 15 and perhaps as much as 42 of measured mobility is upward bias due to measurement error the results also suggest that measurement error accounts for at least 12 of measured inequality

futures markets a consequence of risk aversion or transactions costs a two period model of an industry of risk neutral processors who have nonlinear production costs and who face transact ions costs in the spot and futures markets is put forth as a countere xample to the models of commodity markets in which processors risk a version plays the major role the model s equilibrium exhibits the sa lient endogenous features of actual commodity markets namely that t he futures price is below the current spot price that processors hol d inventories despite this opportunity cost that those holding inven tories are short in futures and that processors as a group hold an u nbalanced usually net short position in the futures market copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

earnings dynamics and measurement error in matched survey and administrative data this article analyzes earnings dynamics and measurement error using a matched longitudinal sample of individuals survey and administrative earnings in line with previous literature the reported

the optimum quantity of money in a stochastic economy individuals in a monetary economy face both economy wide and individualspecific risks friedman s 1969 assertion that the price level should fall at the rate of time preference must be modified when such risks are present bewley s 1983 conjecture that the modified deflation should proceed at a rate greater than the rate of time preference is demonstrated to be true in special cases but false in general moreover the indeterminacy of equilibrium bewley found is eliminated by the inclusion of a transactions demand for money

learning from others a welfare analysis abstract this paper considers a smooth and noisy version of the statistical prediction model studied in the herding informational cascades literature and compares market and optimal learning the latter is characterized by defining a decentralized welfare benchmark as the solution to an infinite horizon team problem market behavior involves herding in the sense that agents put too little weight on their private information for any given precision of public information and yields underinvestment in the production of public information however both market and optimal learning involve slow learning examples of the model include learning by doing reaching consensus and consumer learning about quality journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d83

efficiency in a pure currency economy with inflation individuals who are buffeted by stochastic shocks will wish to substitute consumption intertemporally to effect this substitution they can enter into insurance contracts or they can use money this paper investigates the connection between optimum insurance and friedman s 1969 concept of the optimum quantity of money using a simplified version of lucas s 1980 pure currency economy monetary efficiency and efficient insurance are equivalent here an example is presented in which an efficient monetary equilibrium exists contrary to bewley s 1983 conjecture in the example the efficient rate of return on real balances is less than the internal rate of discount

a dual characterization of incentive efficiency we show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information because these welfare effects may generate non convexities incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived

stock flow matching this paper develops and quantifies the implications of the stock flow matching model for unemployment job vacancies and worker flows workers and jobs are heterogeneous so most worker job pairs cannot profitably match leading to the coexistence of unemployed workers and job vacancies productivity shocks cause fluctuations in the number of active jobs which in turn cause fluctuations in labor market outcomes we derive exact expressions for employment and worker transition rates in a finite economy and analyze their limiting behavior in a large economy a calibrated version of the model is consistent with the co movement of labor market variables observed in u s data and can explain about one third of their volatility

on aggregation of information in competitive markets the dynamic case abstract this article examines in the spirit of hellwig 1980 how a dynamic competitive security market aggregates and communicates information between various market participants at every instant it employs a continuous time economy consisting of a large number of heterogeneous agents who are endowed with noisy private signals about the risky asset payoff of differing precision it yields a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in which at every instant the agents use information contained in the market prices without rendering their private information redundant it shows that the market price reflects only that part of private information which is common to many signals and thus extends hellwig s single period results to a multi period model

are earnings inequality and mobility overstated the impact of non classical measurement error abstract measures of inequality and mobility based on self reported earnings reflect attributes of both the joint distribution of earnings across time and the joint distribution of measurement error and earnings while classical measurement error would increase measures of inequality and mobility there is substantial evidence that measurement error in earnings is not classical in this paper we present the analytical links between nonclassical measurement error and some summary measures of inequality and mobility the empirical importance of nonclassical measurement error is explored using the survey of income and program participation sipp matched to tax records we find that the effects of nonclassical measurement error are large however these nonclassical effects are largely offsetting when estimating mobility as measured by the intertemporal correlation in earnings as a result sipp estimates of the correlation are similar to estimates based on tax records though sipp estimates of inequality

price and quality cycles for experience goods we explore a dynamic competitive model for experience goods and study an equilibrium for it in which firms plan initially to produce high quality at low price then high quality at high price then low quality at high price each consumer is aware that all firms eventually intend to run down their reputations at customers expense yet he rationally chooses to wait for direct evidence that the firm to which he is attached has already entered into the exploitative phase

f o b pricing versus uniform delivered pricing a welfare analysis in a stochastic environment abstract under imperfect information but otherwise competitive assumptions spatial market equilibria are examined for two pricing structures under f o b pricing buyers face a price that reflects exactly the transportation cost between sellers and themselves under uniform delivered pricing u d p the seller charges the same price to all buyers inclusive of delivery under both buyers know only of sellers from whom they received ads sent randomly by sellers it is found that u d p equilibria may exist when f o b equilibria do not but not conversely also f o b equilibria are not always welfare superior to u d p ones these equilibria are not robust a new firm often succeeds in penetrating a market using a different pricing structure

private investment in higher education comparing alternative funding schemes this paper uses an overlapping generations framework to analyse the implications of different financing regimes in the education sector for human capital formation and economic welfare agents privately invest in education after they have received a noisy information signal about their abilities the incentives of individuals to invest in education are determined by the financing regime under which the economy operates we analyse and compare three financing regimes under each regime the payback obligation of an educational loan is contingent to some extent on an individual s future income

consumption and labor supply with partial insurance an analytical framework we develop a model with partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage shocks to quantify risk sharing closed form solutions are obtained for equilibrium allocations and for moments of the joint distribution of consumption hours and wages we prove identification and demonstrate how labor supply data are informative about risk sharing the model estimated with us data over the period 1967 2006 implies that i 39 percent of permanent wage shocks pass through to consumption ii the share of wage risk insured increased until the early 1980s and iii preference heterogeneity is important in accounting for observed dispersion in consumption and hours jel e21 e23 e31 e52

investment internal funds and public banking in germany abstract previous studies supposed that low investment cash flow sensitivities of german firms may be caused by a dominance of public banking the paper addresses this assumption and applies a unique accounting dataset of german firms results from a dynamic version of the sales accelerator model show that the dependence of investment spending on internal funds does not significantly differ among firms attached to savings banks cooperative banks or commercial banks thus the importance of the public banking sector in germany may not explain the rather low dependence of german firms on internal funds and public ownership of banks does not seem to be important for reducing financing constraints

investment opportunities and corporate demand for lines of credit abstract the behavior of a risk neutral corporation in selection of a line of credit is modeled in a new framework where demand for credit lines by a firm arises from the stochastic arrival in continuous time of short lived opportunities to capture investment projects the firm needs speed and secrecy to capture projects before competitors the firm chooses a credit line that balances its up front commitment cost against the expected extra cost of borrowing in the spot market upon exhaustion of its credit line the firm s demanded credit line depends upon both relative pricing within the contract and the nature of the firm s growth opportunities interestingly while credit line demand is positively related to business growth prospects it is potentially negatively related to uncertainty in those prospects

demographic structure and capital accumulation this paper develops an overlapping generations olg model to analyze the consequences of demographic structure changes induced by an exogenous shift in the birth rate we first show that a finite growth rate of the population that maximizes long run capital per capita exists then we examine the theoretical properties of this growth rate by showing that i it corresponds to the demographic structure such that the average ages of capital holders and workers are equal ii it is associated to an efficient steady state iii it increases with compulsory transfers from younger to older generations finally we explain why standard olg models do not exhibit such a growth rate

a general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination we study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium the interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium the dominant group gains from discrimination rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination the model is also consistent with reverse discrimination as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity

money with idiosyncratic uninsurable returns to capital abstract this paper extends the income fluctuations problem to an economy with endogenous growth individuals instead of owning a stream of endowments accumulate capital with an investment irreversibility constraint and face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks to the return to capital money provides both a risk diversification and a liquidity role balanced growth paths exist despite the increasing dispersion of the wealth distribution the return to money cannot be equated to the social return to capital unless the government owns the entire capital stock with idiosyncratic risk and it is capable of operating this stock as efficiently as private agents can journal of economic literature classification numbers e31 e42 e58

causes and effects of financing constraints at the firm level this paper focuses on the empirical assessment of determinants and effects of financing constraints at the firm level using a standard model of credit rationing based on asymmetric information firm age and size are found to be factors which should influence the probability of financing constraints improving business conditions strengthen the degree of informational asymmetry a unique panel of firm data for germany including direct information on financing constraints is used for the econometric analysis firms size and improving business conditions are found to have a significant effect furthermore a significant impact on investment and r d expenditures cannot be rejected

differential information and dynamic behavior of stock trading volume this article develops a multiperiod rational expectations model of stock trading in which investors have differential information concerning the underlying value of the stock investors trade competitively in the stock market based on their private information and the information revealed by the market clearing prices as well as other public news we examine how trading volume is related to the information flow in the market and how investors trading reveals their private information article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

welfare measurement and measurement error the approximate effects of measurement error on a variety of measures of inequality and poverty are derived they are shown to depend on the measurement error variance and functionals of the error contaminated income distribution but not on the form of the measurement error distribution and to be accurate within a rich class of error free income distributions and measurement error distributions the functionals of the error contaminated income distribution that approximate the measurement error induced distortions can be estimated so it is possible to investigate the sensitivity of welfare measures to alternative amounts of measurement error and when an estimate of the measurement error variance is available to calculate corrected welfare measures the methods are illustrated in an application using indonesian household expenditure data

direct versus intermediated finance an old question and a new answer we consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with a competitive bond market firms can finance a risky project either by a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse investors who also hold safe deposits at the bank we show that the bank tends to allocate more capital to lower quality projects but there are some interesting qualifications if the asymmetric information concerns only the success probability then we observe adverse selection while if it concerns only the expected return bad types are driven out of the market

an international comparison of lifetime inequality how continental europe resembles north america we compare earnings inequality and mobility across the united states canada france germany and the united kingdom during the late 1990s a flexible model of earnings dynamics that isolates positional mobility within a stable earnings distribution is estimated earnings trajectories are then simulated and lifetime annuity value distributions are constructed earnings mobility and employment risk are found to be positively correlated with base year inequality taken together they produce more equalization in countries with high cross section inequality such that the countries in our sample have more similar lifetime inequality levels than cross section measures suggest

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

loan availability and investment can innovative companies better cope with loan denials this study examines the consequences of loan denials for the investment performance of small and medium sized german enterprises as a consequence of a loan denial innovative companies experience a smaller drop in the share of actual to planned investment than noninnovative companies the nonrandomness of loan denials is controlled for with a selection equation employing the intensity of banking competition at the district level as an exclusion restriction we can explain the better performance of innovative companies by their ability to increase the use of external equity financing such as venture capital or mezzanine capital when facing a loan denial

the free rider problem and a social custom model of trade union membership the literature on public good provision by groups has traditionally emphasized the free rider problem if it is assumed that a group forms to provide or to lobby for the provision of a good that is collective to potential members then the major conceptual problem to the formation of such a group is that individuals can enjoy the benefits of group action without incurring the costs by doing this they free ride in small groups the free rider problem is not generally considered insurmountable however the larger the number of potential beneficiaries the more difficult it is to overcome the free rider problem due to exclusion and surveillance difficulties and the less likely is optimal collective good provision or any collective good provision in the extreme the free rider hypothesis has a long history in economic thought as early as 1848 the free rider potential of any group of workers was perceived by j s mill however it appears that it was not until 1965 that an attempt was made to explain why large groups providing collective goods manage to exist despite the free rider problem olson 1965 proposed the following explanation if a large group exists it must have formed either because membership is compulsory or because the group provides private goods and services accessible only to its members with ancillary provision of the collective good as a byproduct the literature that developed from olson s work has focused primarily on the suboptimal provision of the collective good the difficulties of getting members to contribute in proportion to the benefits received and preference revelation incentives see for example groves and ledyard 1977 however there are problems with both of the solutions proposed by olson to overcome the free rider problem facing large groups first if coercion is looked at as a solution to the free rider problem the question arises as to how the coercion itself is financed guttman 1978 this is unlikely to be costless the second problem concerns the byproduct solution private good pro

does firm size matter evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in germany abstract this paper examines the link between liquidity constraints and investment behavior for german firms of different sizes from 1970 to 1986 results indicate that medium sized firms appear to be more liquidity constrained in their investment behavior than either the smallest or largest firms in the study suggesting that the unique german infrastructure designed to assist the small firm has indeed succeeded in alleviating to some degree such liquidity constraints findings also support the hypothesis that the emerging competition and internationalism which characterized the german financial markets in the 1980s have been improving access to capital for some groups of firms

affirmative action in a competitive economy abstract we consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium in the presence of two distinguishable but ex ante identical groups of workers an affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may fail in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently however the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilibrium is the most discriminatory equilibrium in the model without the policy the welfare effects are ambiguous it is possible that the policy makes the intended beneficiaries worse off even if the starting point is the most discriminatory equilibrium the expected payoff may decrease for all agents in the target group

income distribution in the dynamic two factor trade model the issue of the effects of trade on personal income distribution has remained largely unexamined this paper describes an overlapping generations 2 x 2 model with a bequest motive and heterogeneous agents in order to examine the problem in this dynamic setting trade leads to both short run and long run reductions increases in inequality in labor capital abundant countries if the investment good is capital intensive if the consumption good is capital intensive the short run effects continue to hold but the long run effects are ambiguous copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

efficiency welfare and political competition we study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences our framework covers models of income taxation public goods provision or publicly provided private goods politicians are vote share maximizers they can propose any policy that is resource feasible and incentive compatible they can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate we prove two main results first the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus maximizing and hence first best pareto efficient second there is a surplus maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare maximizing policy thus in our model policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible jel codes c72 d72 d82 h21 h41 h42

foundation of competitive equilibrium with non transferable utility abstract this paper investigates the dynamic foundation of a competitive equilibrium studying a sequence of random matching models between ex ante heterogeneous buyers and sellers under two sided incomplete information with no entry where each agent is endowed with non transferable utility the economy is populated with two sets of infinitesimal agents buyers and sellers who have private information about their own valuations of the object in each period buyers and sellers in the pool are matched to draw randomly a pair of expected payoffs which will realize if the long term relationship is formed each player decides whether or not to agree to form a long term relationship conditioned on his private information if both parties agree then they leave the pool receiving the expected payoff in each period while the long term relationship continues the existing long term relationship is terminated either by will or by a random shock upon which both parties return to the respective pools of agents we quantify the amount of friction by the time span of each period we demonstrate that as the friction vanishes any sequence of stationary equilibrium outcomes in which trade occurs with a positive probability converges to the competitive equilibrium under a general two sided incomplete information about the private valuation of each agent

multi period information markets abstract this article examines the single shot decision problem of a monopolistic information seller selling a flow of information in a dynamic framework in a generalized version of wang s 1993 economy it shows that the profit maximizing strategy of the seller is to sell his information as is but only to a fraction of traders it argues that this strategy of selling information is different from that in a static model mainly due to the very different nature of constraints faced by the information seller in a dynamic framework

measurement error and earnings dynamics some estimates from the psid validation study previous empirical work on measurement error in survey earnings data has shown that the variance of the measurement error is roughly constant over time it is negatively correlated with true earnings and it is autocorrelated with previous measurement errors this article proposes a simple model in which the measurement error stems from underreporting of transitory earnings fluctuations and a white noise component the model fits well to data from the panel study of income dynamics validation study the results imply that autocorrelations in the changes of earnings can be estimated relatively accurately despite the presence of measurement error

the importance of equity finance for r d activity this article analyzes the importance of equity finance for the r d activity of small and medium sized enterprises we use information on almost 6 000 german smes from a company survey using the intensity of banking competition at the district level as an instrument to control for endogeneity we find that a higher equity ratio is conducive to a higher r d intensity owners may only start r d activities if they have the financial resources to sustain them until successful completion we find a larger influence of the equity ratio for young companies equity may be more important for young companies which have to rely on the original equity investment of their owners since they have not yet accumulated retained earnings and can rely less on bank financing

rationalizable foresight dynamics abstract this paper proposes and studies the rationalizable foresight dynamics a normal form game is repeatedly played in a random matching fashion by a continuum of agents who make decisions at stochastic points in time a rationalizable foresight path is a feasible path of action distribution along which each agent takes an action that maximizes his expected discounted payoff against another path which is in turn a rationalizable foresight path we consider a set valued stability concept under this dynamics and compare it with the corresponding concept under the perfect foresight dynamics

estimating measurement error in annual job earnings a comparison of survey and administrative data we propose a new methodology that does not assume a prior specification of the statistical properties of the measurement errors and treats all sources as noisy measures of some underlying true value the unobservable true value can be represented as a weighted average of all available measures using weights that must be specified a priori unless there has been a truth audit the census bureau s survey of income and program participation sipp survey jobs are linked to social security administration earnings data creating two potential annual earnings observations the reliability statistics for both sources are quite similar except for cases where the sipp used imputations for some missing monthly earnings reports