the pricing of durable exhaustible resources partial or total durability characterizes a large class of exhaustible resources hotelling s r percent rule will apply to a durable resource produced in a competitive market but will not apply if the resource is produced in a monopolistic market however the r percent rule does not mean that price is steadily rising it is shown that in general the competitive market price will fall initially as the stock in circulation increases and later will rise as the stock decreases and eventually depreciates toward zero after production ceases accounting for durability may thus help explain the u shaped long term price profiles observed for many resources 11 references 3 figures

income inequality capitalism and ethno linguistic fractionalization we examine the relationship between capitalism and income inequality for a large sample of countries using an adjusted economic freedom index as proxy for capitalism our results suggest that there is no robust relationship between economic freedom and gini coefficients based on gross income subsequently we analyze the relationship between income redistribution and ethno linguistic fractionalization we find that the impact of ethno linguistic fractionalization on income redistribution is conditional on the level of economic freedom countries that have a high degree of fractionalization redistribute income less while capitalist countries that have a low degree of fractionalization redistribute income more

nonrenewable resource scarcity nonrenewable resource theory often is summarized by hotelling s rule this paper reviews theoretical extensions and empirical investigations of resource extraction models observed data are often inconsistent with the hotelling rule suggesting that other characteristics of nonrenewable resource supply including exploration heterogeneous ore quality technological progress and capital investment are important determinants of the dynamic behavior of resource prices given the persistent recurrence of concern about nonrenewable resource scarcity measures of nonrenewable resource scarcity and the empirical evidence for the time trends of those measures are reviewed finally the implications of nonrenewable resource scarcity for economic growth are examined

information inequality and mass polarization ideology in advanced democracies growing polarization in the american congress is closely related to rising income inequality yet there has been no corresponding polarization of the u s electorate and across advanced democracies mass polarization is negatively related to income inequality to explain this puzzle we propose a comparative political economy model of mass polarization in which the same institutional factors that generate income inequality also undermine political information we explain why more voters then place themselves in the ideological center hence generating a negative correlation between mass polarization and inequality we confirm these conjectures on individual level data for 20 democracies and we then show that democracies cluster into two types one with high inequality low mass polarization and polarized and right shifted elites e g the united states and the other with low inequality and high mass polarization with left shifted elites e g sweden this division reflects long standing difference

empirical investigation of the long term movement of resource prices a preliminary report abstract this note reports the results of an investigation into the long run movements of natural resource prices and their relationship to interest rates and extraction costs the results do not support the equilibrium type hotelling rule but rather a more general asset market approach

the political economy of linguistic cleavages article i nfo this paper uses a linguistic tree describing the genealogical relationship between all 6912 world languages to compute measures of diversity at different levels of linguistic aggregation by doing so we let the data inform us on which linguistic cleavages are most relevant for a range of political economy outcomes rather than making ad hoc choices we find that deep cleavages originating thousands of years ago lead to better predictors of civil conflict and redistribution the opposite pattern emerges when it comes to the impact of linguistic diversity on growth and public goods provision where finer distinctions between languages matter 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

polarized business cycles abstract four stylized facts motivate this paper i business cycle movements are wider in emerging countries ec than in developed ones ii ec experience greater economic policy uncertainty iii ec are more polarized and less politically stable and iv epu is positively related to political polarization a standard real business cycle model augmented to incorporate political polarization a polarized business cycle pbc model is shown to be consistent with these facts we first derive our results analytically and then quantify the effects of a permanent increase in polarization to the us economy

the elephant in hotelling s room this paper questions the assumption commonly used in theoretical and policy research that scarcity rents make up a large proportion of market prices for oil and coal we show that the empirical literature simple calculations of historical and future scarcity rent shares and possible theoretical explanations all imply the same overall conclusions that scarcity rents seem to have been marginal or non existent historically that they almost certainly do not dominate fossil resource prices today and that there will be other factors shaping the prices in the upcoming decades we therefore argue that using the scarcity rent as the main or only basis for policy or for explaining empirical outcomes is ill advised

innovation and communication signalling with partial disclosure this paper introduces a model of feedback effect equilibrium i e equilibria in which an asymmetrically informed agent is motivated to communicate its privately known attribute but can do so only through channels or signals which convey directly useful information to competing agents this revelation to the competition serves to reduce the value of the private information held by the first agent models of this kind are of obvious relevance to realistic theories of product or financial market disclosure policies of firms patenting and a host of related behavioural and regulatory issues this model is developed in the context of a set of firms engaged in research and development rivalry in which the value of privately held and disclosed information arises from its implications for the likelihood and timing of productive innovation

antitrust for high technology industries assessing research joint ventures and mergers the purpose of this paper is to analyze if and how the standard methodology of antitrust analysis should be modified to reflect the importance of r and d and innovation as competitive forces and engines of economic progress focus is on such r and d intensive business combinations as research joint ventures rjvs and horizontal mergers in high technology industries the authors do not propose a complete set of guidelines for the assessment of such combinations they present an economic model of rjvs and high technology mergers that might serve as an analytical underpinning for such guidelines one conclusion of the analysis is that rjvs ought to be accorded special treatment under the antitrust laws this special treatment should entail an explicit recognition that rjvs will be scrutinized under the rule of reason according to guidelines specific to this purpose

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

interest rates and metal price movements further evidence abstract we offer a theory about the relationship between interest rates and metal price movements the theory is a version of the hotelling rule eq 8 the results obtained from prices of four different metals based on seasonally and unadjusted quarterly data over the period 1968 2 1982 2 suggest that a reformulated hotelling rule which has a dynamic structure can explain the relationship between metal prices and interest rates in view of this result it appears that the return on exhaustible resources is related to changes in rather than the levels of interest rates this result also confirms the results of g m heal and m m barrow rev econom stud 48 161 181 1979 econom lett 7 95 103 1981

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

resource prices and planning horizons abstract this paper shows that a seemingly simple assumption that agents use a rolling planning horizon can reconcile the puzzling long run price dynamics of exhaustible resources such as oil gas and metals a rolling horizon has the effect of removing the scarcity consideration of resource owners when stocks are large hence extraction will be non decreasing and resource prices non increasing for a long period of time and there will be no connection between the price growth and the interest rate in line with the trends of a majority of exhaustible resources in the last century a calibration of the model to the oil market yields a price which closely fits the gradually falling real oil price after wwii and the sharply increasing price after 1998 this suggests that while long run scarcity was not an important parameter on the oil market in the 20th century it has been important in shaping the oil price from around 1998 and onwards

the invariance of market innovation to the number of firms this article provides a set of conditions under which the r d undertaken in a market economy is invariant to the number or size distribution of firms and the market s allocation is efficient i e given the aggregate expenditure the market chooses socially optimal projects as in several patent race studies we assume that a winner takes all competition determines firms gains but our model differs from earlier studies in that firms are not restricted to undertake only one research project our analysis shows that how one characterizes a firm s choices and innovation technologies has a strong influence on the conclusions one draws from economic analyses of r d

contests for experimentation we study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation s feasibility and opponents outcomes we characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize sharing scheme and a disclosure policy a public winner takes all contest dominates public contests where any success is immediately disclosed with any other prize sharing scheme as well as winner takes all contests with any other disclosure policy yet jointly modifying prize sharing and disclosure can increase innovation in a broad class of mechanisms it is optimal to share the prize with disclosure following a certain number of successes under simple conditions a hidden equal sharing contest is optimal

sharing productive knowledge in internally financed r d contests we examine the optimal design of two stage research and development r d joint ventures at the second stage researchers choose r d effort levels independently in an attempt to achieve an innovation in the first stage researchers have an opportunity to share endowments of productive knowledge initial pecuniary resources are limited so rewards for disclosing knowledge and succeeding at the second stage must be financed from successful innovation we derive conditions under which full sharing of knowledge and the socially desired levels of r d effort can be motivated and examine the optimal incentive structure when this ideal outcome cannot be implemented full sharing will always be motivated at the first stage but inefficient r d effort will be induced to foster information sharing

persistent ideology and the determination of public policy over time this article investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in dynamic politico economic equilibria to this end i develop a tractable model to analyze the dynamic interactions among public policy individuals intertemporal choice and the evolution of political constituency my main finding is that a right wing ideology may increase the size of government data from a panel of 18 oecd countries confirm that after controlling for the partisan effect there is a positive relationship between the right wing political constituency and government size this is consistent with my theoretical prediction but hard to explain by existing theories

economic indicators of resource scarcity a critical essay abstract the theoretical arguments of the conceptual and empirical literature on economic indicators of long run resource scarcity are logically flawed if resource allocators were informed of the nature of resource scarcity their behavior and the economic indicators it generates would reflect the scarcity but if they were so informed we could simply ask them if resources were scarce if they are not informed their behavior and economic indicators are as likely to indicate their ignorance as the reality unfortunately there is no way of knowing whether they are informed or not unless we already know whether resources are scarce

futures markets price stabilization and efficient exploitation of exhaustible resources markets for natural resource futures contracts and cash forward contracts experience a rapid growth according to theory this should result in more efficient resource depletion implying that price formation is more consistent with hotelling s rule the rationale of this stabilization effect is briefly discussed next we analyze the impact of expanding futures markets on the behaviour of individual resource owners trading on the cash market using a simple pulse extraction model we demonstrate that the expected time of depletion can shift to the present or the future and that utility of exploitation can go up or down as market prices are stabilized

testing the efficiency of extraction from a stock resource the theoretical conditions for efficient extraction from a known stock resource by a competitive mining firm are reviewed these conditions are tested using proprietary data from a mining firm output price data and coefficient estimates from a translog cost system are used to compute the in situ value of the resource and the stock effect changes in the in situ value over time are then statistically compared with the expected price path the results reject the hypothesis that the data are consistent with the theoretical model and the maintained hypotheses variations of the basic model that incorporate a time varying discount rate an alternative expected price series and a constraint on the rate of output are also tested and rejected 46 references 10 tables

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

linking conflict to inequality and polarization in this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict we show that a suitable monotone transform of the equilibrium level of conflict can be proxied by a linear function of the gini coefficient the herfindahl hirschman fractionalization index and a specific measure of polarization due to esteban and ray jel classification d74 d31

models of resource markets and the explanation of resource price behaviour abstract much of the recent theoretical work in resource economics has been aimed at relaxing the stringent simplifying assumptions of the basic hotelling model in an attempt to better explain observed resource price behaviour this paper surveys the characteristics of exhaustible resource markets that are likely to be important for the development of successful positive models in particular we discuss exploration and its relationship to production and market price the effects of various forms of uncertainty on price behaviour and for some resources the treatment of durability finally we address the question of whether producer behaviour can properly be viewed as that of dynamic optimization this paper should be seen as an attempt to stimulate discussion over research directions and priorities in resource economics

political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias abstract we develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings and maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information that the partisan audience does not like hearing while voters are rational understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately important information is lost through bias and can lead to electoral mistakes we characterize those conditions that give rise to electoral mistakes showing that heightened political polarization and asymmetric distributions of voter ideologies make electoral mistakes more likely even if the median ideology is a centrist and centrist voters gain access to unbiased news media bias can generate excessive cross over voting which in turn can lead to the election of the wrong candidate

does high income promote democracy the authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors such as the historical context various features of the institutional setting and simultaneity with the process of leadership change even after correcting for these many other influences the democratizing effect of income remains as a statistically significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions the authors go on to find that leaders risks of losing power rise during their time in office and that these risks are higher in more democratic countries the authors confirm the finding by burkhart and lewis beck that the democracy promoting effect of income is stronger among the european countries they suggest that high income has a more powerful democratizing effect among the southern european countries because it interacts with pressure from major trading partners to democratize this suggests a revaluation of policies designed to foster the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones through free trade

examining trends of criteria air pollutants are the effects of governmental intervention transitory despite its growth in other areas of economics time series econometric methods have not beenwidespread in the area of environmental andresource economics we illustrate one use oftime series methods by examining the time pathof us nitrogen oxide nox emission dataover the period 1900 1994 the analysishighlights that proper time series methods canaid in optimal regulatory policy as well asdeveloping empirical verification of theoriesput forth to explain economic phenomena inaddition several interesting results emerge first we find that the emissions seriescontains both a permanent and random component second if one attributed all of the emissionsreductions to regulatory policy interventionanalysis suggests that the 1970 clean air act caa did not merely have transitory effects but permanently influenced the noxemission path in terms of total regulatoryimpact an upper bound on the emissions saveddue to the 1970 caa is in the range of27 48

on the determinants of political polarization in this article we aim to identify the main determinants of political polarization using bayesian model averaging to overcome the problem of model uncertainty we find that the level of trust within a country and the degree of income inequality are the most robust determinants of political polarization

transparency political polarization and political budget cycles in oecd countries we investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance while some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies in contrast we show conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies using a sample of 19 oecd countries in the 1990s we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low er transparency countries while no such cycles can be observed in high er transparency countries furthermore we find in accordance with recent theory that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries

barriers to investment in polarized societies i present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short sighted policies the relative price of investment to consumption is excessively large in equilibrium due to over taxation investment rates are too low which slows down growth along the transition in the long run this results in output consumption and welfare being inefficiently low the larger is the degree of polarization the greater is the inefficiency political stability mitigates the effects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the choice of growth retarding policies

strategic disclosure of meaningful information to rival i study a model of strategic disclosure of a private signal to a rival in the presence of a payoff externality in the model two agents forecast the unknown true state of a future period specifically the quality of the signal is also private information hence which quality of signal is revealed for which incentive is the main question of interest i show that even when disclosure is costly the revealing equilibrium where an agent voluntarily reveals his signal can exist and it should be a monotone equilibrium asymmetry between the penalty for an incorrect forecast and the reward for a correct forecast is a necessary condition for the existence of this revealing equilibrium if the penalty is larger than the reward the unique revealing equilibrium is a separating equilibrium where only the low quality signal is disclosed in order to induce the rival s imitation on the other hand if the reward is much larger than the penalty the unique revealing equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where the signal is always revealed in order to induce the rival s deviation if the reward is not much larger than the penalty no revealing equilibrium is robust to a costly disclosure jel d81 d82

the time path of scarcity rent in the theory of exhaustible resources there is now a consensus in the literature on resource economics that a depletable resource should command a price in excess of its marginal extraction cost simply to reflect the opportunity cost of using a unit of it today rather that conserving it for the future but how this excess is to change along an optimal or competitive equilibrium path of resource use is still an unresolved question this might at first seem puzzling since according to the fundamental theorem of economics of exhaustible resources or hotelling i 93 i rule on an optimal path price minus marginal extraction cost also termed interchangeably as scarcity rent user cost or royalty should steadily grow over time at the social rate of discount however the literature contains sharply contrasting views on the subject for example kay and mirrlees 1975 have argued that since along an optimal path the scarcity rent grows exponentially as a finite stock of a resourcexnears exhaustion then situations in which the resource stock is still very large and yet the price greatly exceeds the marginal extraction cost should indicate that the price is significantly above its optimal level and that the resource is overconserved in stark contrast to this view heal i976 has argued that as the resource stock nears exhaustion the difference between price and marginal cost or what he termed social cost of extraction falls monotonically to zero hanson i980 analyses the same model as heal s but unlike heal who assumes the unit extraction cost to be convex he postulates it to be concave and yet like heal concludes that the scarcity rent will be monotonically declining over time solow and wan i976 analyse a still different situation where resource deposits differ in quality and the unit extraction cost increases as higher grade deposits are exhausted and extraction proceeds to lower grades they show that along an optimal path the shadow price of a resource must rise at the real rate of interest despite differential extraction costs but that the difference between price and the marginal extraction cost or what they call degradation charge declines monotonically over time to zero these sharply differing conclusions suggest that far from being resolved the question of how scarcity rent changes over time is much in want of a close scrutiny the need for such a scrutiny becomes even stronger once it is noted

income and co2 emissions evidence from panel unit root and cointegration tests abstract this paper re investigates the stationarity properties of per capita carbon dioxide co 2 emissions and real gross domestic product gdp per capita for 109 countries within seven regional panel sets covering 1971 2003 we apply the recent unit root test of the panel seemingly unrelated regressions augmented dickey fuller suradf test developed by breuer et al 2001 misleading inferences from panel unit root tests with an illustration from purchasing power parity review of international economics 9 482 493 2002 series specific unit root tests with panel data oxford bulletin of economics and statistics 64 527 546 the panel suradf test accounts for the presence of cross country correlations in the data and the parameters in the panel specification vary across countries more importantly this test allows us to identify how many and which members of the panel contain a unit root overall our empirical results illustrate that real gdp and co 2 emissions in these countries are a mixture of i 0 and i 1 processes and that the traditional panel unit root tests could lead to misleading inferences as well as the conduct of cointegration analysis being perhaps inappropriate the results of our analysis carry critical implications for the modeling of co 2 emissions and gdp because of the different orders of integration for the two variables

dynamic r d competition the authors study a simple two stage stochastic patent race involving two firms they examine the behavior of the participants as they gain the lead or fall behind in the race the authors find that the leader engages in rd 2 a policy of issuing patents for intermediate research results and 3 the effects of research joint ventures whereby the firms coordinate their initial research efforts and share their results copyright 1987 by royal economic society

untested hypotheses in non renewable resource economics the present paper reviews the literature on the empirical implications of the hotelling rule and suggests directions for further research in this area

the perils of polarization economic performance in the postcommunist world perhaps the most striking feature of the postcommunist transformation is the tremendous variation in rates of economic growth across countries to account for these differences this article develops an alternative to the j curve and partial reform views that currently dominate discussions of the politics of economic reform this approach treats economic performance as a political struggle between ex communist and anticommunist factions engaged in a war of attrition over economic and political resources using a pooled time series analysis of economic growth across twenty five postcommunist countries for the period 1990 98 it finds that political polarization between ex communist and anticommunist factions has had a devastating effect on economic growth where these competing factions have had roughly equal power and have struggled over the economic rules of the game as in bulgaria or ukraine economic growth has been slow in contrast where either ex communist or anticommunist factions have dominated the political scene as in estonia or uzbekistan economic performance has been much better in addition economic growth has followed the electoral calendar in polarized countries as elections approach and the odds of a change in economic policy increase growth rates have plummeted in polarized countries these findings have implications for studies of the postcommunist transformation the political business cycle and the politics of economic reform more generally