wall street occupations many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses and hard to monitor effort we analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting we show that finance jobs feature high compensation up or out promotion and long work hours and are more attractive than other jobs moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms even though pay increases employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are too hard to manage

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

private v public antitrust enforcement a strategic analysis we compare private and public enforcement of the antitrust laws in a simple strategic model of antitrust violation and lawsuit the model highlights the tradeoff that private firms are initially more likely than the government to be informed about antitrust violations but are also more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically to the disadvantage of consumers assuming coupled private damages if the court is sufficiently accurate adding private enforcement to public enforcement always increases social welfare while if the court is less accurate it increases welfare only if the government is sufficiently inefficient in litigation pure private enforcement is never strictly optimal public enforcement can achieve the social optimum with a fee for public lawsuit that induces efficient information revelation private enforcement can also achieve the social optimum with private damages that are efficiently multiplied and decoupled

a signaling theory of consumer boycotts abstract we present a theory that explains the prevalence of consumer boycotts in our model a firm does not know how concerned consumers are about the firm s misconduct because it is only optimal for the firm to alter its behavior if consumers are very concerned consumers have an incentive to overstate their concern by boycotting the firm we show that free riding problems do not preclude such boycotting in fact in each equilibrium boycotting occurs with positive probability and the firm always caters to the demands of those who boycott should boycotting ensue

strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining theory and data we develop a private information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm s willingness to pay previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike yet a prominent feature of u s collective bargaining is the holdout negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract we analyze the union s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment

strategic price complexity in retail financial markets abstract there is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous also despite the large number of firms in the market prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise as more firms enter in a non cooperative oligopoly pricing model i show that these anomalies arise when firms add complexity to their price structures complexity increases the market power of the firms because it prevents some consumers from becoming knowledgeable about prices in the market in the model as competition increases firms tend to add more complexity to their prices as a best response rather than make their disclosures more transparent because this may substantially decrease consumer surplus in these markets such practices have important welfare implications

multidimensional bargaining under asymmetric information a buyer with private information regarding marginal valuation bargains with a seller to determine price and quantity of trade depending on parameter values a high valuation buyer wants either to reveal information to create value or to conceal it to capture value in the first case equilibrium trades are efficient in the second case the low valuation buyer purchases less than her efficient quantity and there can be a one period delay in trade the quantity distortion is the only inefficiency that persists when time between offers approaches zero there exist equilibria that are independent of the seller s prior beliefs

concentration diversification and earnings instability some evidence on developing countries exports of manufactures and primary products policies aimed at diversification of the commodity composition of exports continue to be advocated as a means of reducing instability in ldcs export earnings the usual assumptions are that earnings from manufactures are more stable than earnings from primary products and that diversification will reduce the covariances between earnings from different pairs of products it is suggested here that for several reasons these assumptions may not be valid evidence is then presented which indicates that across a sample of countries diversification has taken place but has not been accompanied by relatively greater stability in manufactures and favourable changes in covariances

treble damage awards in private lawsuits for price fixing the traditional model for assessing the effects of treble damage pena lties on price fixing is reexamined and shown to yield surprising res ults unless the probability of detection is extremely sensitive to the price charged increasing the damage multiple will affect neither market efficiency nor expected distribution and will raise the mark et price copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

bargaining orders in a multi person bargaining game abstract this paper studies a complete information bargaining game with one buyer and multiple sellers of different sizes or bargaining strengths the bargaining order is determined endogenously with a finite horizon there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the buyer purchases in order of increasing size from the smallest to the largest with an infinite horizon if the sellers have sufficiently different sizes there is a unique equilibrium outcome which has the same bargaining order if the sellers have similar sizes with an infinite horizon there may be multiple equilibrium outcomes with different bargaining orders

wages and human capital in the u s financial industry 1909 2006 we study the allocation and compensation of human capital in the u s finance industry over the past century across time space and subsectors we find that financial deregulation is associated with skill intensity job complexity and high wages for finance employees all three measures are high before 1935 and after 1980 but not in the interim period workers in the finance industry earn the same education adjusted wages as other workers until 1990 and significantly more afterward by 2006 the premium is 40 on average and 200 for top earners and ceos earnings risk and firm size effects account for some of the premium but the majority does not appear to be sustainable

signalling in a dynamic labour market this paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the spence job market signalling model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time the dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yield a multiplicity of sequential equilibria including ones that sustain implicit collusion even though the length of the game is finite emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the independence of never weak best response criterion of kohlberg and mertens 1986 it is shown that in the limit as the time between offers tends to zero any such equilibrium results in expectation in the unique stable outcome of the static spence model

big data in finance and the growth of large firms abstract two modern economic trends are the increase in firm size and advances in information technology we explore the hypothesis that big data disproportionately benefits big firms because they have more economic activity and a longer firm history large firms have produced more data as processor speed rises abundant data attracts more financial analysis data analysis improves investors forecasts and reduces equity uncertainty reducing the firm s cost of capital when investors can process more data large firm investment costs fall by more enabling large firms to grow larger

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

empirical test of a separating equilibrium in national football league contract negotiations i empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining contract of national football league nfl contract negotiations the separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations these predictions are tested using data on 1 873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 nfl drafts the empirical results support the implications of the separating equilibrium

models of export instability and empirical tests for less developed countries abstract alternative models are developed in which export earnings instability is generated by domestic supply domestic demand or foreign demand fluctuations their relative merits over the 1957 1972 period are examined through multiple regression analysis for a sample of 50 ldcs with breakdown into sub samples based on the type of commodity exported and the nature of foreign markets the results suggest that export instability originates mainly from foreign sources especially variations of market shares in foreign markets and commodity groups however domestic supply and demand fluctuations are the dominant factors for countries highly dependent on food exports geographic concentration is an important factor for countries dependent on food exports and developed country markets

the use of replacement workers in union contract negotiations the u s experience 1980 1989 it is argued in many circles that a structural change occurred in u s collective bargaining in the 1980s strike incidence declined dispute incidence increased and the composition of disputes shifted away from strikes and toward holdouts we investigate the extent to which the hiring of replacement workers can account for these changes for a sample of over 300 major strikes since 1980 we estimate the likelihood of replacements being hired we find that the risk of replacement is lower for bargaining units with more experienced workers and declines during tight labor markets the composition of disputes shifts away from strikes as the predicted risk of replacement increases in addition the overall level of disputes increases as a result of the shift in the composition of disputes based on our estimates reducing the predicted replacement risk faced by bargaining units to the pre 1982 levels would have lead to a reduction in the dispute incidence by around 5 percentage points an increase in the fraction of disputes involving a strike by around 4 percentage points and an increase in the strike incidence by around 0 8 percentage points

dynamic signaling and market breakdown we consider the effects a public revelation of information e g rating grade has on trading in a dynamic signaling model competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration the external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium more interestingly we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices if signals are noisy no trade takes place just before the revelation of external information if signals are fully revealing then trade occurs even close to revelation however transaction prices are discontinuous

bargaining and waiting until recently the final word on bargaining with full information had been rubinstein s 1982 seminal work which concluded that an agreement will be reached immediately and the first mover will have the advantageous share rubinstein s model was one of alternating offers made at fixed time intervals many variations of the model have emerged and until recently they mainly focus on asymmetric information with some having the uninformed agent making all the offers the conclusion from examining these variations is that the equilibrium is highly sensitive to the exact specification of the institutional structure in more recent work perry and reny 1990 perry and reny 1993 sakavics 1993 and nickerson sadanand and sadanand 1994 endogenize the structure of the bargaining by allowing the order and timing of play to be determined endogenously the first three papers endogenous structure models deal with the full information setting and the last is an asymmetric information model 2 in addition to the exogenously given minimum reaction time for responding to offers made by the other player the endogenous structure models introduce the important innovation of an exogenous waiting time a time between a player s offer and his next offer they also allow players to make simultaneous offers which sakovics later disallows the findings in this recent literature are rather startling i the waiting time has a profound impact the longer the time the greater the share the player can command 3 ii the consequence of simultaneous offers is multiple equilibria when the reaction time is zero a continuum of shares lying between the two unique rubinstein shares can result and additional continua of shares arise with delayed agreement when the reaction times are positive iii equilibrium paths are almost exclusively characterized by simultaneous offers in this paper we examine the question of simultaneous offers and reconcile the conflict between the infrequency of simultaneous offers in real life bargaining and their prevalence in the endogenous structure models we

wage bargaining with time varying threats we study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm s willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired as strikers find temporary jobs and as inventories or strike funds run out we find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary if dispute costs increase in the long run then dispute durations are longer settlement rates are lower and wages decline more slowly during the short run and may even increase the settlement wage is largely determined from the long run threat rather than the short run threat

qualitative uncertainty in a market with bilateral trading bargaining between a single seller and a succession of potential buyers of an indivisible object is studied in this paper the seller bargains with one buyer at a time and switching buyers is costly the seller does not know the buyers reservation prices and buyers cannot observe the quality of the object if the costs of switching buyers are high there exists a signalling equilibrium in which the seller s price offer reveals the quality of the object if the costs of switching are low adverse selection occurs and the high quality seller drops out of the market

signaling through obstruction obstruction is a time honored tradition in legislative politics in many cases obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful and in some of these cases purely costly even to the obstructor in this article i construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient the theory based on the legislators reelection motivations offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting including the legislator s value for reelection the appeal of the legislator s challenger the legislator s individual specific seniority competence and or valence and the visibility of the legislator s obstruction efforts to the voter finally the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing even in the absence of pandering

the paradox of financial fire sales the role of arbitrage capital in determining liquidity how can fire sales for financial assets happen when the economy contains well capitalized but non specialist investors our explanation combines rational expectations equilibrium and lemons models when specialist informed market participants are liquidity constrained prices become less informative this creates an adverse selection problem decreasing the supply of high quality assets and lowering valuations by non specialist uninformed investors who become unwilling to supply capital to support the price in normal times arbitrage capital can multiply itself by making uninformed capital function as informed capital but in a crisis this stabilizing mechanism fails

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

trading complex assets we perform an experimental study of complexity to assess its eect on trading behavior price volatility liquidity and trade eciency subjects were asked to deduce the value of a particular asset from information they were given about the composition and price of several portfolios following that subjects traded with each other anonymously in a well dened simple bargaining process portfolio composition ranged from requiring simple analysis to more complicated computation in order to deduce the value of the asset complexity altered subjects bidding strategies decreased liquidity increased price volatility and decreased trade eciency however in follow up experiments we show that uncertainty over private values does not lead to the same changes in trading behavior therefore while complexity induces estimation errors and higher uncertainty this is not what drives our results

the principle of convergence in wartime negotiations if war results from disagreement about relative strength then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes i present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power in the markov perfect sequential equilibrium making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield however states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory the principle of convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat victory is not necessary to terminate initiate hostilities thus the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant

education signalling with preemptive offers offers before workers complete their education workers cannot commit to turning down such offers offers are private so that workers are unable to use one firm s offer in an attempt to elicit better offers from other firms in the unique sequential equilibrium outcome of the model with unproductive education there is no wasteful education when education is productive the standard model predicts that more able individuals become overeducated to separate themselves from less able workers in our model less able workers become overeducated to partially pool with more able workers the pooling mutes the incentives of high ability workers who in consequence actually choose to become undereducated we examine the robustness of our result to modifications to the basic model

geographic concentration and china s agricultural export instability this paper investigates the impacts of geographic concentration on china s agricultural export instability with a multiple region variance decomposition approach the decomposition results suggest that china s agricultural export concentration into the japanese market greatly lowers agricultural export instability while concentration into the hong kong south korea asean the us and russian federation markets increases export instability china s exports to the eu also lower its agricultural export instability further decomposition results indicate that the impacts of geographic concentration on different agricultural product export instabilities are different

commodity concentration and export earnings instability a shift from cross section to time series analysis conventionally commodity concentration has been regarded as a major factor contributing to the short term instability in earnings experienced by developing countries the repeated and unexpected lack of correspondence between the conventional view and results of empirical studies has generated attempts to identify the limitations of the customary analytical framework this paper attempts to derive a more satisfactory alternative framework application of this alternative approach to export data for a sample of developing countries produces results which in contrast to the evidence of previous studies indicate the widespread existence of a statistically significant positive relationship between concentration and export instability

on the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default this paper reviews the lessons learned from the application of the tools of game theory to the theoretical study of sovereign debt and default we focus on two main questions first we review answers to the most fundamental question in the theory of sovereign debt given that there is no supranational institution for enforcing the repayment of debts why do countries ever repay their debts second we review theories of the process by which sovereign debts are restructured with a view to answering the following question why does the process of sovereign debt restructuring appear so inefficient the first question raises issues in the design of self enforcing contracts and on the credibility of threats to punish a country in default the second question involves applications of the theory of bargaining in environments where the parties to a bargain cannot commit to honour the terms of the bargain or even commit to enter into negotiations in the first place copyright 2013 oxford university press

uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining we study a one sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer s valuation we show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes in particular second order beliefs can lead to a delay in reaching agreement even when the seller makes frequent offers we show that not all types of second order beliefs lead to a delay when the buyer assigns positive probability to the seller knowing the buyer s value then delay not only can occur but it must occur for a class of equilibria however in all other cases delay will never occur

financial expertise as an arms race we show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise in our model expertise improves firms ability to estimate value when trading a security expertise creates asymmetric information which under normal circumstances works to the advantage of the expert as it deters opportunistic bargaining by counterparties this advantage is neutralized in equilibrium however by offsetting investments by competitors moreover when volatility rises the adverse selection created by expertise triggers breakdowns in liquidity destroying gains to trade and thus the benefits that firms hope to gain through high levels of expertise

dynamic bargaining in a supply chain with asymmetric demand information we analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product both firms are impatient and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached the buyer is privately informed about his type which can be high or low the high type s demand is stochastically larger than the low type s in the dynamic negotiation process the seller can screen whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers and the buyer has an endogenous and type dependent reservation profit with rational assumptions on the seller s belief structure we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game interestingly we find that both quantity distortion and information rent may be avoided depending on the firms relative patience and the seller may reach an agreement with either the high type or the low type first or with both simultaneously furthermore we explore our model to characterize the effect of demand forecasting accuracy on firm profitability we find that improved demand forecast benefits the buyer but hurts the seller when the buyer s forecasting accuracy is low however once the buyer s forecasting accuracy exceeds a threshold both firms will benefit from further improvement of the forecast this observation makes an interesting contrast to previous findings based on the one shot principal agent model in which improvement of forecasting accuracy mostly leads to a win lose outcome for the two firms and the buyer has an incentive to improve his forecasting accuracy only when it is extremely low this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities this paper studies infinite horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present we extend the analysis in jehiel and moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria jehiel p moldovanu b 1995a cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities rev econ stud 62 619 637 a characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

export instability and economic growth in sub saharan africa empirical research on the relationship between export instability and economic growth in less developed countries ldcs has yielded mixed results while some researchers find a negative relationship between export instability and economic growth others find a positive relationship a third group of researchers finds no significant relationship between export instability and economic growth in ldcs 1 those who find a negative relationship between export instability and economic growth in ldcs stress the negative effect export instability has on the supply of output through the generation of uncertainty in long term planning as well as due to shortages of inputs at critical times during the production process those who find a positive relationship between export instability and economic growth argue that ldcs respond to export instability by reducing consumption this process if repeated over a period of time increases savings and hence the rate of investment those who find no significant relationship between export instability and economic growth argue that ldcs are able to anticipate the fluctuations in export earnings and plan for such fluctuations hence instability in export earnings has no appreciable effect on economic growth c moran investigates the relationships between domestic savings rate and economic growth rate on the one hand and export instability on the other in a sample of ldcs 2 he finds that export instability has no significant long run impact on either domestic savings rate or economic growth rate however over relatively short periods of time export instability has a negative and significant effect on both savings and economic growth rate the negative effect occurs when the negative effects of price and of quantity fluctuations reinforce each other on the other hand when the negative effect of price fluctuations is counterbalanced by the effects of quantity fluctuations export instabil

dealer price discrimination in new car purchases evidence from the consumer expenditure survey this paper documents the variation in dealer discounts for new cars using transactions price data from the consumer expenditure survey consumer specific characteristics fail to explain dealer discounts whereas model market specific and purchase transaction variables e g first time purchase trade in and financing through dealer do explain them the results contradict earlier findings of race and gender discrimination based on a controlled experiment this contradiction is reconciled by examining the higher moments of the empirical discount distribution while mean and median markups do not vary by race and gender minority purchases are characterized by higher dispersion this may rationalize the disparate treatment of minorities by dealers documented in the controlled experiment

why are similar workers paid differently the role of social networks abstract we provide a matching model where identical workers are embedded in ex ante identical social networks job arrival rate is endogenous and wages are bargained we study the evolution of networks over time and characterize the equilibrium distribution of unemployment rates across networks within our framework wage dispersion arises endogenously as the consequence of the dynamics of networks firms strategies and wage bargaining we show that networks induce new search externalities which shape the dynamics of the labor market our endogenous framework allows us to quantify these effects

optimal antitrust enforcement competitor suits entry and post entry competition abstract we consider the effect of competitor suits in a model in which an incumbent can take an action that deters the entry of a rival the option to sue the incumbent can provide a subsidy for entry which can maintain competition even when the incumbent takes this action liability for the entrant s lost profits however can soften post entry competition if the incumbent s action is potentially efficient taking market structure as given e g it reduces her costs then competitor suits can generate some post entry competition without deterring this efficient cost reduction if the incumbent s action is inefficient e g it increases the rival s costs but does not reduce the incumbent s costs then competitor suits even with maximal antitrust liability cannot deter the incumbent from increasing the rival s costs by at least a small amount thus the paper suggests that while competitor suits have advantages for efficient actions that deter efficient entry they do not work well for inefficient actions that deter entry

valuation adverse selection and market collapses we study a market for funding real investment where valuation meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs creates an adverse selection problem unlike previous models more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation this strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria with multiple equilibria the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofitable investments switches to valuation equilibria valuation runs look like credit crunches a large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and potentially only if subsidized

alternating offer bargaining with two sided incomplete information i study alternating offer bargaining games with two sided incomplete information about the players discount rates for both perfect bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability style notion i characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game i also construct bounds on agreements that may be made the set of expected payoffs is easy to compute and incorporate into applied models my main result is a full characterization of the set of perfect bayesian equilibrium payoffs for games in which the distribution over the players discount rates is of wide support yet is in a weak sense close to a point mass distribution i prove a lopsided convergence result each player cannot gain from a slight chance that she is a strong type but the player can suffer greatly if there is a slight chance that she is a weak type

tolerance of arrearages how imf loan policy can effect debt reduction a model of bargaining with asymmetric information is applied to the case of sovereign debt and imf intervention debtors and creditors are assumed to bargain over the price to be paid by the debtors for their outstanding debt and the ability of the debtors to delay an agreement is private information it is shown that an imf policy of no lending in arrears increases the price of the debt increases any delay to agreement and increases the likelihood that the creditor will demand the highest price an imf policy of lending in arrears in contrast decreases the price of the debt decreases the delay time to agreement and my increase the likelihood that the creditor accepts the lowest price as it shifts the locus of bargaining power predictions of the model are consistent with results from recent debt agreements and implications for current debate on debt reduction strategies are discussed

delay in trade networks we study decentralized markets involving producers and consumers that are facilitated by middlemen we do this by analyzing a noncooperative networked bargaining game we assume a complete information setup wherein all the agents know the structure of the network the values of the consumers and the transaction costs involved but allow for some search friction when either producers or consumers trade with middlemen in such a setting we show that sunk cost problems and a heterogeneous network can give rise to delay or failure in negotiation and therefore reduce the total trade capacity of the network in the limiting regime of extremely patient agents we provide a sharp characterization of the trade pattern and the segmentation of these markets

cancellable insider trading plans an analysis of sec rule 10b5 1 rule 10b5 1 enables insiders to preplan future trades before becoming informed within a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework i characterize an insider s unique optimal trading plan which balances portfolio diversification against exploitation of the rule s selective termination option because the rule reduces adverse selection and provides insurance against bad outcomes the rule generally improves welfare for both the insider who later becomes informed and uninformed outsiders provided there exists a sufficient degree of information asymmetry eliminating the rule s selective termination option results in an even greater welfare improvement under a large subset of parametric conditions received march 9 2018 editorial decision january 11 2019 by editor wei jiang

selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two issue complete information bargaining game abstract this paper explores the effects of a selective acceptance rule on the outcome of two issue negotiations the alternating offer game introduced here allows for the possibility that settlement may be reached on one issue while negotiation continues about the other this model captures features of laws that are generally believed to increase efficiency the analysis shows that if one issue is indivisible there are inefficient subgame perfect equilibria with no pareto improving alternative equilibria with opposing valuations rapid communication guarantees inefficiency these are unique examples of this strong form of inefficiency in an alternating offer bargaining game with complete and perfect information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 j30

waiting to persuade i analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power measured as the probability of making offers but learn as they play the game i show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date but never reach one before it given any discount rate if the learning is sufficiently slow the players agree immediately i show that for any speed of learning the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long provided that the players are sufficiently patient therefore although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn

the game of negotiations ordering issues and implementing agreements abstract we use a two issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining we uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium how the order in which issues are bargained over matters and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have if agreements are implemented as they are reached easy issues are negotiated first and hard issues later if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled then it is size that matters with large issues settled first all parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter

are treble damages neutral sequential equilibrium and private antitrust enforcement a sequential equilibrium model of private antitrust enforcement is presented consumers have incomplete information about cartel costs and cannot accurately estimate a priori the damage recovery from an antitrust action consumers are able to infer cartel costs from the equilibrium pricing strategy of firms the universal divinity criterion is used to characterize the sequential equilibrium it is shown that for a sufficiently large damage multiple antitrust enforcement effectively increases social welfare copyright 1990 by american economic association

bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing abstract the timing structure of a bargaining game is crucial in the static bargaining model of j nash 1953 econometrica 21 128 140 any division of the surplus is a possible equilibrium in the alternating offer model of a rubinstein 1982 econometrica 50 97 109 there is a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne this paper takes a step toward endogenizing the timing of offers by expanding the strategy space to include the duration of the offer and permitting but not imposing simultaneous moves we find that virtually any division is a possible spne whenever simultaneous accept reject decisions are permitted

bargaining structure and strike activity in this paper the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and strike activity in particular they focus on the implications of the fact that the amount of information revealed by a union s actions depends on the bargaining environment in which it operates the authors demonstrate that a union representing workers of more than one firm will face a greater incentive to reject offers than an independent union this implies that a merger of two unions or the formation of bargaining coalitions will lead to a greater level of strike activity

traders vs relationship managers reputational conflicts in full service investment banks we present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients interest on the other hand banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so a behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities the model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral and type reputation concerns

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

bargaining with surplus destruction in a two player alternating offer bargaining model if one player can destroy the surplus to be allocated then the value to bargain for is endogenous except at the beginning even with complete information the model has perfect equilibria with delayed agreement and or surplus destruction the model therefore explains inefficiency and destruction that may appear irrational we characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and its limiting be haviour as the time between offers vanishes real time delay remains possible even in the limit we also consider the case of surplus destruction that is exogenously limited by the

determinants of export instability in the primary commodity trade of ldc s abstract based on a sample of 61 ldc primary commodity markets an attempt is made to explain inter market variations in price quantity and earnings instability a model similar to that used to explain aggregate export earning instability is tested empirical results point to internal fluctuations as a major determinant of export market instability

delay in contests abstract why is there delay in contests in this paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of carl von clausewitz to explain delay for a given contest technology delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate and if the additional cost of investment in future strength is low

the determinants of u s labor disputes we present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations in which the union decides between two threats the union can strike or it can continue to work under the expired contract the model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form disputes take strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive because of low unemployment or a real wage drop we test these predictions by estimating logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for negotiations from 1970 to 1989 we find support for the model s key predictions but these associations are weaker after 1981

bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions abstract in this paper we study renegotiation in procurement auctions a procurer with private valuation announces a project which can be completed by many firms these firms submit bids which may be renegotiated upon later in the equilibrium we characterize the probability of renegotiation is decreasing in both the cost of renegotiation and the number of firms we conclude that the initial bids are more than cheap talk these prices serve simultaneously as bids to win the contract and signals of the firms costs finally we compare our model to other renegotiation models in the literature

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

resistance redistribution and investor friendliness abstract poor communities sometimes resist private investment and destroy economic surplus even if the government has the willingness and ability to redistribute we interpret such acts of resistance as demands for redistribution destruction contains credible information about how the affected group values surplus and such information is used by the government in implementing the optimal redistribution policy the extent of destruction is increasing in the extent of political marginalization of the affected group resistance not only destroys economic surplus it also mutes the investor s incentives to create surplus the government uses a tax subsidy on the investor to maximize weighted social surplus and we show that the possibility of destruction may force the government to be too soft in its negotiations with the investor we discuss several policy instruments that have the potential to improve welfare these include compensation floor for the affected group legal or financial protection for the investor and licensing fees for the investor

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

learning in crowded markets abstract we present a novel entry game with endogenous information acquisition to study the welfare effects of opacity and competition potential entrants to an opaque market are uncertain about their competitive advantage relative to other investors i e their type they construct optimal costly signals to learn about their types where the marginal cost of learning captures the opacity of the market in general the individually optimal entry and learning decisions are socially suboptimal players over invest in learning and more opaque markets are associated with more crowding nevertheless more opaque markets might still lead to higher welfare by implying a better trade off between the degree of crowding and the total cost of learning similarly decreasing the share of smart investors in the market might also improve welfare however fierce competition is always detrimental to welfare as it leads to more wasteful learning without changing the level of crowding

a bargaining model with incomplete information multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player this paper re examines the bargaining model in rubinstein 1985a b monotonicity restrictions are placed on off the equilibrium path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

from low quality reporting to financial crises politics of disclosure regulation along the economic cycle abstract this paper examines how financial reporting regulations affect and respond to macroeconomic cycles by exploring a positive framework in which regulators subject to political pressures respond to cyclical demands by borrowers and lenders we establish that as economic conditions initially decline political power shifts toward interest groups favoring less financial transparency what follows is a counter cyclical increase in economic activity as more non reporting loans are financed possibly coincidental with more aggregate uncertainty during a recession reporting quality is increased potentially causing a crisis like adjustment of economic activity to the cycle we also discuss implications for event studies bank lobbying mark to market and cost of capital

bargaining with endogenous information two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values this paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable three types of inefficiencies can arise if the information cost is in an intermediate range no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists although the agents maintain symmetric information if the information cost is low any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition if the agents face asymmetric information cost the akerlof s lemons problem arises as a self fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs

bargaining and the right to remain silent this paper analyzes a class of alternating offer bargaining games with one sided incomplete information for the case of no gap if sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional restrictions of stationarity monotonicity pure strategies and no free screening we establish the silence theorem when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the informed party never makes any serious offers in the play of alternating offer bargaining games a class of parametric examples suggests that the time interval required to assure silence is not especially brief as a byproduct of the analysis we also prove under the same set of assumptions a uniform version of the coase conjecture when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the initial serious offer by either party in an alternating offer bargaining game must be less than e times the highest possible buyer valuation for an entire family of distribution functions