speculative attacks unique equilibrium and transparency abstract models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks morris and shin 1998 have shown that in the context of those models unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced in this paper we apply the method of morris and shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies that their results continue to hold even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents we provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack for the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks

quantitative analysis of network externalities in competing technologies the vcr case we develop a dynamic structural model of consumers choices and producers pricing in an oligopolistic market for newly introduced durable products with network externalities the model is then applied to empirically analyze the de facto standardization of the vhs format in the u s home vcr market during 1981 1988 we find i the network advantage of vhs explains at least 70 3 to 86 8 of the logarithm of relative sales of vhs to betamax in each year ii an increase in the network advantage of vhs was an engine of tipping toward the vhs format and iii in the early 1980s the network advantage of vhs was mainly due to its expected growth advantage

tipping and concentration in markets with indirect network effects this paper develops a framework for measuring tipping the increase in a firm s market share dominance caused by indirect network effects our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects in practice this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects we build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware software paradigm to demonstrate its applicability we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32 64 bit generation of video game consoles a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects in our example we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong economically significant increase in market concentration we also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war and on the supply side as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks

some empirical evidence on the effects of shocks to monetary policy on exchange rates this paper investigates the effects of shocks to u s monetary policy on exchange rates we consider three measures of these shocks orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the romer and romer index of monetary policy in sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates specifically according to our results a contractionary shock to u s monetary policy leads to i persistent significant appreciations in u s nominal and real exchange rates and ii significant persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of u s interest rates

optimal government policy in a small open economy with rational expectations and uncertain election outcomes many of the major western economies have recently been engaged in monetary disinflation at the expense of considerable short term losses in output and jobs in some of these economies there are opposition parties which promise a greater emphasis on job creation and expansion of public expenditure programs when elected into office the possibility of a more keynesian political party gaining office in the near future might have dra matic consequences for the pre election outcomes of the economy for example if there is a chance that demand will be stimulated in the future the economy will anticipate the possibility of future budget deficits and rising future short term interest rates this implies a rise in current long real rates of interest which combined with the appreciation of the currency can aggravate the recession caused by the monetary disinflation package implemented by the incumbent political party 2 because the election outcome will not be known until all votes have been counted on the morning after the election the economy will jump onto a new trajectory in order to take account of the election news it is clear therefore that future political uncertainty can cause major fluctuations in the current state of the economy however most of the literature on political business cycles e g nordhaus 1975 macrae 1977 van der ploeg 1984b assumes that the private sector is backward looking so that the effects described above do not occur instead this literature assumes that the incumbent political party attempts to secure re election by maximizing the expected number of votes cast in its favour at the forthcoming election and to exploit lags due to adaptive expectations the government can then fool the electorate by judiciously depressing output in the early part of its term in office in order to force down the expected rate of inflation and by engineering a boom without too many adverse inflationary consequences

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

coordinating regime switches the canonical model of strategic complementarities between individual actions which exhibits multiple equilibria under perfect information is extended with heterogeneous agents and imperfect information agents observe their own cost of action and the history of the levels of aggregate activity the distribution of individual characteristics evolves through a random process and individuals are rational bayesians under plausible conditions there is a unique equilibrium with phases of high and low activity and random switches applications may be found in macroeconomics and revolutions

financial contagion through capital connections a model of the origin and spread of bank panics financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks the equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined we explore how the cross holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious eects conditional on the failure of a financial institution we show that contagion is possible in the unique equilibrium of the economy and characterize exactly when it may exist at the same time we identify a direction of flow for contagious eects which provides a rationale for localized financial panics simulations identify the optimal level of interbank deposit holdings in the presence of contagion risk our results suggest that when the probability of bank failure is low maximal levels of interbank holdings are optimal when cross holding of deposits is complete we demonstrate that the intensity of contagion is increasing in the size of regionally aggregate liquidity shocks

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

models of currency crises with self fulfilling features the discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency market equilibria after describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self fulfilling features the paper reviews some other self reinforcing mechanisms recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms

contagion of self fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios abstract we look at two countries that have independent fundamentals but share the same group of investors each country might face a self fulfilling crisis agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will a crisis in one country reduces agents wealth this makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments consequently the probability of a crisis there increases this generates a positive correlation between the returns in the two countries since diversification affects returns in our model its welfare implications are non trivial

hedonic price indexes for spreadsheets and an empirical test for network externalities in this article i first estimate hedonic price equations for computer spreadsheet programs and then use the analysis to empirically test whether network externalities exist in this industry the study shows that consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for spreadsheets that are compatible with the lotus platform and for spreadsheets that offer links to external databases and a similar premium for spreadsheets that offer local area network externalities finally the quality adjusted real price of computer spreadsheets declined by approximately 15 per year from 1986 to 1991

risk and wealth in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks market participants risk attitudes wealth and portfolio composition in uence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and therefore may have important efiects on the sustainability of currency pegs we analyze such efiects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices generating a rich set of theoretical comparative static predictions related to often discussed but rarely modelled accounts of the onset and timing of currency crises the model can be solved in closed form and the methods could be used to study other economic issues in which coordination and risk aversion play important roles

testing economic theories of voter behaviour using micro data three hypotheses often encountered in economic analyses of voter behaviour are tested using an extensive data set derived from six consecutive national election studies in the netherlands in the period 1971 1986 these hypotheses are i the party choice and turnout decisions are taken sequentially and independently by voters ii social gorups play a central role in the decisionmaking processes in the political sphere iii the effect of individual level variables on party choice is stable over time the results provide support for the first hypothesis and partial support for the second where the specific categorization of individuals to be chosen is a matter that needs further investigation the third hypothesis is rejected by the data the relationship between the variables chosen and party choice proved to be unstable

a dynamic model of voter behavior and the demand for public goods among social groups in great britain abstract a dynamic model of voter behavior is discussed explaining transitions in party choice by imputed party responsibilities with respect to public and private consumption possibilities the model uses a group framework to explicitly describe voter interests it allows for an estimation of the relative preference for public goods as determined by the revealed preference mechanism of voting the model is compared to popularity functions in their general form an empirical application to great britain is presented it appears that retired individuals have the highest relative preferences for public goods followed by housewives men manual workers self employed and non manual workers

disposable income unemployment inflation and state spending in a dynamic political economic model this paper formulates a medium term macroeconomic model of disposable income unemployment inflation and state spending proposes a theory of qualitative choice to explain electoral popularity in terms of these variables and develops three approaches to the formulation of political economic policy the first approach is static sets the tax rate to reconcile the interests of various pressure groups and yields a political trade off between the private and public sector the second approach relies on maximizing the probability of winning the next election and gives rise to a political business cycle unless the electorate votes strategically the implications of crowding out of private investment under alternative monetary rules autonomous behaviour of the state bureaucracy and tax indexation for the political business cycle are also examined the third approach analyzes the objective of maximizing the uninterrupted length in office it yields a short run political cycle superimposed on a longer cycle

diffusion of a new product under network effects the us dvd market we formulate a model that captures the inter dependence between hardware demand and software supply indirect network effect in the dvd industry the identification of the network effect comes from the difference in software availability across two different formats vhs and dvd we find that a 1 increase in the number of dvd titles raises the demand for dvd players by 0 87 simultaneously a 1 increase in video player ownership leads to a 0 14 increase in the variety of video titles our simulations show that hardware manufacturers might be able to internalize the network externality to increase total industry revenues

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

on crises contagion and confusion abstract since the tequila crisis of 1994 1995 the asian flu of 1997 and the russian virus of 1998 economists have been busy producing research on the subject of contagion yet few studies have examined empirically through which channels the disturbances are transmitted if there are indeed fundamental reasons for the spillovers we observe we attempt to fill this gap by analyzing how both trade links and the largely ignored financial sector links influence the pattern of fundamentals based contagion we examine the role of international bank lending the potential for cross market hedging and bilateral and third party trade in the propagation of crises

political accountability and the room to maneuver a search for a causal chain many studies of the room to maneuver make no provision for popular evaluation of policy they assert rather than demonstrate popular satisfaction with policy choices and macroeconomic outcomes the authors present a framework that explicitly models channels for popular preferences to influence policies and outcomes results for economic policy making in britain do not support the room to maneuver thesis in the authors sample 1981 to 1997 the british government was responsive to changes in political evaluations and its policy choices effectively fed back into popular evaluations of government policy however this accountability mechanism worked outside the real economy shifts in popular evaluations induced changes in policy but had no impact on inflation and economic growth government capacity to shape macroeconomic outcomes was limited and popular influence over economic policy was ineffectual this form of accountability probably existed because british citizens had difficulty gauging the real impacts of their government s policies

competition between networks a study of the market for yellow pages this paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for yellow pages i estimate three simultaneous equations consumer demand for usage of a directory advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher s first order condition derived from profit maximizing behaviour estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising implying a network effect i find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus as an application i consider whether the market benefits from monopoly which takes advantage of network effects or oligopoly which reduces market power i find that a more competitive market is preferable copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

revealed preferences for public goods applying a model of voter behavior most analyses of preferences for government supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society these preferences are revealed by an individual choice the vote in this paper this is taken account of in a model explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi party system the model assumes that voters may be categorized into k groups of individuals pursuing the same interests who remember how parties do in representing these interests given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy the model allows one to estimate party identification sensitiveness to economic performances time preference and relative preferences for public versus private goods all for each of the groups furthermore the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies

the effect of content on global internet adoption and the global digital divide a country s human capital and economic productivity increasingly depend on the internet as a result of its expanding role in providing information and communications this has prompted a search for ways to increase internet adoption and narrow its disparity across countries the global digital divide previous work has focused on demographic economic and infrastructure determinants of internet access that are difficult to change in the short run internet content increases adoption and can be changed more quickly however the magnitude of its impact and therefore its effectiveness as a policy and strategy tool has until now been unknown quantifying the role of content is challenging because of feedback network effects between content and adoption more content stimulates adoption which in turn increases the incentive to create content we develop a methodology to overcome this endogeneity problem we find a statistically and economically significant effect implying that policies promoting content creation can substantially increase adoption because it is ubiquitous internet content is also useful to effect social change across countries content has a greater effect on adoption in countries with more disparate languages making it a useful tool to overcome linguistic isolation our results offer guidance for policymakers on country characteristics that influence adoption s responsiveness to content and for internet firms on where to expand internationally and how to quantify content investments this paper was accepted by lorin hitt information systems

banking panics the role of the first come first served rule and information externalities this paper proposes that both the first come first served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs the first come first served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors this payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks therefore failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks contagious runs may occur even if i depositors choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and ii the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare the feasibility of reforming the fdic to impose market discipline is also investigated

dynamics of pricing in the video game console market skimming or penetration abstract nintendo lost its dominant position in the video game industry during the console war between its nintendo 64 and sony s playstation however nintendo could have made several different strategic decisions to change the outcome this article develops a structural model and investigates these alternative strategies through policy simulations in particular the author provides a framework to study firms optimal pricing strategies under network effects consumer heterogeneity and oligopolistic competition consumer heterogeneity provides an incentive for a durable goods manufacturer to price skim while network effects lead to an opposite motive for penetration pricing the proposed framework incorporates these two competing motives under oligopolistic competition the author estimates a demand system that allows for indirect network effects and consumer heterogeneity and then numerically solves for the markov perfect equilibrium in firms dynamic pricing game policy simulations indicate that ni

informational channels of financial contagion two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion one is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets using global games i present a two country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and i test its predictions experimentally the experimental results show that subjects do not extract information optimally which leads to two systematic biases that affect these channels directly base rate neglect leads subjects to underweight their prior and thus weakens the fundamental channel an overreaction bias strengthens the social learning channel since subjects rely on information about the behavior of others even when this information is irrelevant these results have significant welfare effects rooted in the specific way in which these biases alter behavior

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

peasants or bankers the american electorate and the u s economy t he usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the retrospective economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience voter as peasant a second model assumes a sophisticated economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations voter as banker using the components both retrospective and prospective of the index of consumer sentiment ics as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series with aggregate consumer expectations about long term business conditions in the approval equation neither the usual economic indicators not the other ics components matter moreover short term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy the qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen economics moves political behavior with hard times administrations lose support with good times they gain it we know this to be true but when we ask how by what processes the political translation of economic experience occurs the an

identifying monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible exchange rates abstract previous empirical study on the effects of monetary policy shocks in small open economies has generated puzzling dynamic responses in various macroeconomic variables this paper argues that these puzzles derive from an identification of monetary policy that is inappropriate for such economies to remedy this it is proposed that a structural model be estimated to explicitly account for the features of the small open economy such a model is applied to canada with tightly estimated results overall the dynamic responses to the identified monetary policy shock are consistent with standard theory and highlight the exchange rate as a transmission mechanism

the economics of networks a survey of the empirical literature network effects the increase in value of consuming a product if many other consumers use the same product are a feature of many markets and in particular of many high technology products this paper surveys the burgeoning empirical literature that has developed especially during the last years after theoretical work dominated the earlier years of research in this area newer research has combined theoretical models with empirical studies and applied work with direct implications for public policy marketing and company strategies furthermore insights from the study of social networks have been applied to analyse how consumers interact with each other the paper argues that a closer analysis of the network structure of consumer interaction promises fruitful future research avenues and advances in our understanding of how network effects operate copyright 2009 blackwell publishing ltd

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

asset commonality debt maturity and systemic risk we develop a model in which asset commonality and short term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk two asset structures arise in a clustered structure groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together in an unclustered structure defaults are more dispersed portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency when bank debt is short term creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are ine ciently liquidated this information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures in contrast when bank debt is long term welfare is the same under both asset structures

new models for new labour the political economy of labour party support january 1992 april 1997 this article uses newly available british time series data to analyze dynamic interrelationships among labour vote intentions perceptions that the labour leader would make the best prime minister and labour party identification error correction models reveal that best prime minister perceptions and party identification have important short and long run influences on vote intentions tests of rival models indicate that personal economic expectations outperform other economic evaluations in the vote intention and party identification analyses national retrospective judgments perform well in analyses of best prime minister perceptions and emotional reactions to economic conditions significantly influence these perceptions as well as party identification

when in peril retrench testing the portfolio channel of contagion abstract the impact of past gains and losses on international investors risk aversion is an important factor in the propagation of financial shocks across countries we first present a stylized model illustrating how changes in investors risk aversion affect portfolio decisions and stock prices we then examine empirically the behavior of international mutual funds when funds returns are below average they reduce their exposure to countries in which they were overweight and vice versa an index of financial interdependence that reflects the extent to which countries share overexposed funds helps explain the pattern of stock market comovement across countries and the pattern of contagion during crises

bayesian methods for dynamic multivariate models if dynamic multivariate models are to be used to guide decisionmaking it is important that probability assessments of forecasts or policy projections be provided when identified bayesian vector autoregression var models are presented with error bands in the existing literature both conceptual and numerical problems have not been dealt with in an internally consistent way in this paper the authors develop methods to introduce prior information in both reduced form and structural var models without introducing substantial new computational burdens their approach makes it feasible to use a single large dynamic framework for example twenty variable models for tasks of policy projections copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

macroeconomic performance and government popularity in new zealand this article empirically investigates the effects of macroeconomic variables on the popularity of the new zealand government by testing various popularity functions for the period 1970 1981 the results unambiguously show that the existence of this important politico economic relationship cannot be doubted in particular the empirical results suggest that new zealand voters are 1 forward looking rather than backward looking 2 capable of comparing the actual macroeconomic condition with some notion of a variable normal performance and 3 well aware of the openness of their economy

a computable equilibrium model for the study of political economy theory the need for the development and use of a concept of joint political economic equilibrium is increasingly recognized by students of democracy and markets yet to date no adequate theoretical and methodological synthesis of this kind has been produced the few works which have attempted it suffer from a lack of theoretical balance between economic and political theory unrealistic temporally aggregated conceptions of political economic equilibrium failure to incorporate theoretically meaningful stochastic elements of economic and political processes and the absence of a coherent methodology for gauging the empirical power of political economic models methods in the spirit of the ajps workshop it is shown how these problems can be solved an improved model is built one which fuses a branch of real business cycle theory and the theory of presidential approval this model produces a notion of computable political economic equilibrium that provides for market clearing and simultaneous stochastic optimization by economic and political agents then using data analysis techniques developed in parallel by real business cycle theorists hansen and heckman 1996 kydland and prescott 1990 1996 lucas 1987 prescott 1986a 1986b 1991 sims 1996 and political methodologists brady 1996 jackson 1995 the model is parameterized for the united states more specifically on the basis of estimates from economics and political science and some numerical experimentation certain of its parameters are set so that when simulated the model mimics the united states political economy in the 1980s results the parameterized model is used to study some important counterfactuals the first is the impact of increased approval volatility on political economic equilibration such volatility is expected in view of america s likely involvement in the post cold war era s increasing number of low intensity international conflicts the second is the impact of presidents pursuing relatively high nonminimum winning levels of approval this kind of behavior is attributed to certain presidents along with the claim that it has harmful effects on markets and hence on various facets of social welfare the former

dynamics of consumer demand for new durable goods most new consumer durable goods experience rapid prices declines and quality improvements suggesting the importance of modeling dynamics this paper specifies a dynamic model of consumer preferences for new durable goods with persistently heterogeneous consumer tastes rational expectations and repeat purchases over time we estimate the model on the digital camcorder industry using panel data on prices sales and characteristics we find that the 1 year elasticity in response to a transitory industrywide price shock is about 25 percent less than the 1 month elasticity standard cost of living indices overstate welfare gain in later periods due to a changing composition of buyers

a political explanation of variations in central bank independence although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies their institutional structures their levels of independence differ greatly my explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and in a multiparty government coalition partners an independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts politicians will choose an independent bank 1 if government ministers party legislators and coalition partners have different monetary policy incentives and 2 if government ministers fear that party legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy dispute i statistically test the argument against the cross national variation of central bank institutions i also use the theoretical framework to examine episodes of institutional choice and reform in germany britain and italy

hardware quality vs network size in the home video game industry abstract this paper analyzes competition between multiple proprietary and incompatible hardware systems when indirect network effects are present and software is provided competitively by third party developers a discrete choice demand structure is employed within a game theoretic setting to allow for a continuum of market share possibilities empirical evidence supports the claim that excess inertia is not a pervasive problem two data sets covering the life of the home video game industry yearly from 1976 to 2003 and monthly january 1995 to october 2007 yield three main results 1 market share is 11 4 times more sensitive to hardware quality than network size 2 the number of available games is 3 69 times more sensitive to hardware quality than network size and 3 hardware quality has a larger impact than network size on the probability of hardware success

tenure issues in higher education the system of tenure that dominates american higher education has long been a source of controversy the institution of tenure has been attacked for entrenching a lazy professoriate more interested in attending faraway conferences and producing unreadable research than in teaching or developing practical insights while on the other hand it has long been defended as an absolute necessity for the defense of open intellectual inquiry the tenure controversy has been sharpened in recent years by several events the end of mandatory retirement which was abolished by federal law effective january 1 1994 has heightened concerns about the productivity and commitment of professors who received tenure long ago and who no longer have the same incentives to invest in long term reputation there is also ongoing concern over the steadily rising cost of higher education which raises the question of what students as well as the taxpayers who support public institutions of higher education are getting for their money 1 the idea that tenure is a wasteful institution for universities runs up against the puzzling fact that the commitment to tenure is one that academic institutions impose on themselves although the american association of university professors aaup provides a powerful lobby in favor of tenure generally colleges and universities most notably private ones are under no legal requirement to observe tenure constraints although as administrators we certainly feel the weight of those constraints our view is that a tenure system in fact provides important benefits to society and to colleges and universities we argue here that the role of tenure is

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

democracy and markets the case of exchange rates the relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied severa competing propositions about how political re equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested the results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency market equilibria additionally opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and or the contents of public policies electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency market equilibria political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority plurality systems there is less evidence that central bank independence consensual corporatist systems or political coherency reduces the effect of politics on currency markets he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field the size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases substantively with globalization currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments reducing their room to maneuver analytically in comparison to most goods markets currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria today s exchange rate is determined by currency traders fully informed expectations about tomorrow s exchange rate the sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration 1 this article demonstrates there are informationally relevant political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency market equilibria moreover these factors vary in important ways across democracies some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency

contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms abstract this paper presents a model in which the contagion of a liquidity crisis between two nonfinancial institutions occurs because of learning activity within a common creditor pool after creditors observe what occurs in a rollover game for a firm they conjecture one another s type or attitude toward the risk associated with the firm s investment project creditors inference about one another s type then influences their decision to lend to the next firm by providing an analysis of the incidence of failure the threshold for a liquidity crisis for each firm this paper demonstrates that the risk of contagion increases sharply if it originates ex ante from a firm facing a low probability of failure in addition the paper proposes some policy measures for mitigating the severity of contagion during a liquidity crisis

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

economic outcomes and political support for british governments among occupational classes a dynamic analysis the first section of the article establishes the political salience of macroeconomic issues to the british electorate reviews the distributional consequences of macroeconomic outcomes and suggests that unemployment outcomes in particular have strong class related distributional effects the second part presents a dynamic model of how rational voters evaluate the governing party based on the idea that voters evaluate the cumulative performance of the governing party relative to the prior performance of the current opposition since the present relevance of prior outcomes decays over time voters weight current performance more heavily than past performance informing contemporaneous political judgments the empirical analyses in the third section include measures of nominal economic performance inflation and exchange rate movements and real economic performance unemployment and real income fluctuations the regression results indicate that the responses of political support among the occupational classes to macroeconomic changes are sizeable and that the cross class variations are consistent with the distributional consequences reviewed at the beginning of the article the concluding section develops the electoral implications of the empirical results and presents a novel interpretation of trends in class related political support for the parties the evidence shows that the argument that there has been a persistent decline of class based political alignments in britain is erroneous

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation

competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions in this article i refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions first i evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue of international organization out of this evaluation several ideas about how to produce a third generation of research on this topic emerge specific ideas include how to create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics such as information economics broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices in the second part of this article i explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved i show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are in a sense democratic as long as the public s perceived consensus about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real however if as new work suggests there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic in the conclusion i briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design