demise of the standard model for power sector reform and the emergence of hybrid power markets following earlier reforms in the power sectors of industrialized countries and emerging markets e g chile developing countries were encouraged to unbundle their electricity industries and to introduce competition and private sector participation this paper highlights the developments that led to how power sector reform came to be defined as a standard model and theoretical framework in its own right and how the model was used prescriptively in many developing countries however we also show that after more than 15 years of reform efforts this new industry model has not fully taken root in most developing countries finally we identify and characterize the emergence of new hybrid power markets which pose fresh performance and investment challenges

tipping and concentration in markets with indirect network effects this paper develops a framework for measuring tipping the increase in a firm s market share dominance caused by indirect network effects our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects in practice this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects we build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware software paradigm to demonstrate its applicability we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32 64 bit generation of video game consoles a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects in our example we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong economically significant increase in market concentration we also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war and on the supply side as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks

energy policy aid and the development of renewable energy resources in small island developing states abstract small island developing states sids have established ambitious renewable energy targets the promotion of renewable energy has been motivated by several factors a desire to lessen dependence on fossil fuels to attract development assistance in the energy sector and to strengthen the position of sids in climate change negotiations here we explore the interplay between the role of aid and energy policy in the development of renewable energy resources in sids we find that the importance of development assistance has implications for the sustainability of renewable energy development given that funding is not always accompanied by necessary energy policy reforms we also identify energy efficiency and access to modern energy services as having received insufficient attention in the establishment and structure of renewable energy targets in sids and argue that this is problematic due to the strong economic case for such investments

promoting network competition by regulating termination charges abstract this paper contributes to the policy debate about the optimal termination charge when penetration rates are explicitly taken into account although lowering termination charges towards cost leads to more efficient usage its impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous since it induces an increase in fixed subscription fee through the so called waterbed effect we show that a reduction in termination charge below cost has two opposing effects on consumer surplus it softens competition but also helps to internalize network externalities hence it can decrease or increase penetration depending on whether or not the first effect dominates the second we show that the first effect dominates the second when networks are weak substitutes or the penetration rate is high

skill biased technological change and rising wage inequality some problems and puzzles the recent rise in wage inequality is usually attributed to skill biased technical change sbtc associated with new computer technologies we review the evidence for this hypothesis focusing on the implications of sbtc for overall wage inequality and for changes in wage differentials between groups a key problem for the sbtc hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing advances in computer technology sbtc also fails to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality including the gender and racial wage gaps and the age gradient in the return to education

optimal contracts with lock in the authors analyze incomplete long term contracts when buyers incur relationship specific set up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties if set up costs are observable the first best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot enforceably specify quality this does not even require long term contracts if set up costs are unobservable however then long term price contracts can strictly outperform short term contracts equilibrium may involve either inefficiently low quality with no buyer switching or efficient quality with inefficient switching a policy of taxing switching or the availability of budget breaking third parties can improve welfare copyright 1989 by american economic association

do switching costs make markets less competitive abstract the conventional wisdom in economic theory holds that switching costs make markets less competitive this article challenges this claim the authors formulate an empirically realistic model of dynamic price competition that allows for differentiated products and imperfect lock in they calibrate this model with data from frequently purchased packaged goods markets these data are ideal in the sense that they have the necessary variation to identify switching costs separately from consumer heterogeneity equally important consumers exhibit inertia in their brand choices a form of psychological switching cost this makes the results applicable to the broad range of products that are distinctly identified i e branded rather than just to products for which there is a product adoption cost or explicit switching fee in the simulations prices are as much as 18 lower with than without switching costs more important equilibrium prices do not increase even in the presence of switching costs that

capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

mobile termination network externalities and consumer expectations we re examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities externalities arise when firms discriminate between on and o net calls or when subscription demand is elastic this literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases when termination charges increase this is puzzling since in reality regulators are pushing termination rates down while being opposed to do so by network operators this puzzle is resolved when consumers expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium as defined by katz and shapiro aer 1985 instead of being responsive to non equilibrium prices as assumed until now

labor managed cooperatives and private firms in north central italy an empirical comparison the authors analyze the differences between the behavior of private firms and that of producer cooperatives in a matched sample of the two organizational types from the regions of emilia romagna and toscana in north central italy where producer cooperatives are numerous individual firm level surveys provide new detailed comparative data on key issues such as investment productivity wages employment and industrial relations differences between the two types of firm are found in labor relations employment pay production methods the relationship to the external market environment and the level of economic performance the authors find no significant differences in investment horizons or criteria for finance despite theoretical assertions to the contrary the cooperatives apparently have higher productivity more labor intensive production methods lower income differentials and a more tranquil industrial relations environment than the private firms

on the optimality of the full cost pricing abstract this article is aimed at defining the full cost pricing as a leader follower game in two tier organizations i the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost ii the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost in the cournot oligopoly case the full cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules there exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost for which the full cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules in terms of gross profit

the rise of the super rich power resources taxes financial markets and the dynamics of the top 1 percent 1949 to 2008 the income share of the super rich in the united states has grown rapidly since the early 1980s after a period of postwar stability what factors drove this change in this study we investigate the institutional policy and economic shifts that may explain rising income concentration we use single equation error correction models to estimate the long and short run effects of politics policy and economic factors on pretax top income shares between 1949 and 2008 we find that the rise of the super rich is the result of rightward shifts in congress the decline of labor unions lower tax rates on high incomes increased trade openness and asset bubbles in stock and real estate markets

the economics of predation what drives pricing when there is learning by doing predatory pricing a deliberate strategy of pricing aggressively in order to eliminate competitors is one of the more contentious areas of antitrust policy and its existence and efficacy are widely debated the purpose of this paper is to formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure our framework encompasses important phenomena such as learning by doing network effects switching costs dynamic demand and certain types of adjustment costs due to its prominent role in legal cases involving alleged predation we examine learning by doing in more detail we first show that predation like behavior arises routinely in our learning by doing model equilibria involving predation like behavior typically coexist with equilibria involving much less aggressive pricing to disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we next decompose the equilibrium pricing condition and develop alternative characterizations of a firm s predatory pricing incentives we finally measure the impact of these incentives on industry structure conduct and performance we show that forcing a firm to ignore the predatory incentives in setting its price can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation like behavior along with the predation like behavior however a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated

the economic impact of wireless number portability this paper examines the price response of wireless carriers to the introduction of number portability in the u s i find that wireless prices decreased in response to number portability but not uniformly across plans average prices for the plans with the fewest minutes decreased by only 0 19 month 0 97 but average prices for medium and high volume plans decreased by 3 64 month 4 84 and 10 29 month 6 81 respectively the results suggest that higher volume users in the wireless market benefited more from the policy induced reduction in switching costs

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks when costs are sunk and revenues are uncertain this paper studies optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks with large sunk costs and uncertain revenues using techniques from the option pricing literature we show that the optimal access price corresponds to a risk free form of the efficiency component pricing rule ecpr that is where the opportunity cost is based on the risk free rate of return we also show that at levels of revenue above the optimal level that triggers entry the entrant should pay a premium above risk free ecpr that rewards the incumbent for relinquishing his rights to the risky cash flows at the higher revenue level

the role of incentives for opening monopoly markets comparing gte and boc cooperation with local entrants while the 1996 telecommunications act requires all incumbent local telephone companies to cooperate with local entrants section 271 of the act provides the bell companies but not gte additional incentives to cooperate using an original data set i compare the negotiations of at t as a local entrant with gte and with the bell companies in states where both operate my results suggest that the differential incentives matter the bells accommodate entry more than does gte as evidenced in quicker agreements less litigation and more favorable prices offered for network access consistent with this there is more entry into bell territories

multi period competition with switching costs an overlapping generations formulation i examine an infinite period duoply market with positive consumer switching costs and overlapping generations of consumers when consumers have a finite time horizon then unlike beggs and klemperer 1992 the two firms may alternate dominance from one period to the next alternately charging high and low prices this agrees with the intuition that firms with a high locked in market share may set price so as to exploit that market share which causes a subsequent low market share among the new cohort of buyers leading to lower prices etc jel codes l13 d21 d43 d92

financialization and u s income inequality 1970 2008 focusing on u s nonfinance industries we examine the connection between financialization and rising income inequality we argue that the increasing reliance on earnings realized through financial channels decoupled the generation of surplus from production strengthening owners and elite workers negotiating power relative to other workers the result was an incremental exclusion of the general workforce from revenue generating and compensation setting processes using time series cross section data at the industry level we find that increasing dependence on financial income in the long run is associated with reducing labor s share of income increasing top executives share of compensation and increasing earnings dispersion among workers net of conventional explanations such as deunionization globalization technological change and capital investment the effects of financialization on all three dimensions of income inequality are substantial our counterfactual analysis suggests that financial

the effect of price advertising on prices evidence in the wake of 44 liquormart the 44 liquormart decision eliminating rhode island s ban on liquor price advertising made rhode island the subject of a natural experiment for measuring the effect of advertising on prices using massachusetts prices as controls we find that advertising stores substantially cut only prices of the products that they advertise prices of other products at both advertising and nonadvertising stores do not change advertising stores cut their prices on products advertised by rivals while nonadvertising stores do not we find no reductions in price dispersion across stores newspaper advertising stores appear to draw a higher share of customers after they advertise

social class and income inequality in the united states ownership authority and personal income distribution from 1980 to 2010 this study outlines a theory of social class based on workplace ownership and authority relations and it investigates the link between social class and growth in personal income inequality since the 1980s inequality trends are governed by changes in between class income differences changes in the relative size of different classes and changes in within class income dispersion data from the general social survey are used to investigate each of these changes in turn and to evaluate their impact on growth in inequality at the population level results indicate that between class income differences grew by about 60 since the 1980s and that the relative size of different classes remained fairly stable a formal decomposition analysis indicates that changes in the relative size of different social classes had a small dampening effect and that growth in between class income differences had a large inflationary effect on trends in personal income inequality

computable markov perfect industry dynamics we provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment entry andexit toensurethatthereexistsacomputationallytractablemarkov perfectequilibrium we introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model our game of incomplete information always has an equilibrium in cutoff entry exit strategies in contrast the existence of an equilibrium in the ericson and pakes model of industry dynamics requires admissibility of mixed entry exit strategies contrary to the assertion in their article that existing algorithms cannot cope with in addition we provide a condition on the model s primitives that ensures that the equilibrium is in pure investment strategies building on this basic existence result we first show that a symmetric equilibrium exists under appropriate assumptions on the model s primitives second we show that as the distribution of the random scrap values setup costs becomes degenerate equilibria in cutoff entry exit strategies converge to equilibria in mixed entry exit strategies of the game of complete information

measuring the effects of search costs on equilibrium prices and profits abstract this paper assesses the effects of search costs on equilibrium prices and profits using an estimated model of demand and costs in a laundry detergent market i find that some firms profits initially rise and then fall with search costs overall the magnitude and direction of the search costs effects on prices and profits are heterogeneous this is because search costs create conflicting incentives for a firm to reduce prices to attract the attention of searching consumers yet also raise prices to harvest profit from consumers who are unaware of competing products these effects can vary with the relationship between the firms actual prices and the consumers pre search beliefs about prices

intraconnectivity and interconnectivity when value creation may reduce profits this paper analyses firms decisions to provide connectivity to their customers we distinguish between intraconnectivity the ability of one firm s customers to connect to each other and interconnectivity the ability of one firm s customers to connect with another firm s customers the profitability implications of allowing connectivity are not a straightforward consequence of the consumer value of connectivity because connectivity affects not only the customer value but also the intensity of competition by creating or changing network externality we find that if sales are driven by brand switching rather than by category expansion a firm may find it optimal not to provide intraconnectivity even if providing it is not costly and may find it optimal to provide interconnectivity even at a cost exceeding the consumer value of connectivity on the other hand if category expansion is possible providing intraconnectivity may be profitable in this case either the equilibrium intraconnectivity provision may be asymmetric or both firms may find it individually optimal to provide intraconnectivity under certain conditions in the latter case the firms choice of intraconnectivity is a prisoner s dilemma game

avoiding market dominance product compatibility in markets with network effects as is well recognized market dominance is a typical outcome in markets with network effects a firm with a larger installed base offers a more attractive product which induces more consumers to buy its product which produces a yet bigger installed base advantage such a setting is investigated here but with the main difference that firms have the option of making their products compatible when firms have similar installed bases they make their products compatible in order to expand the market nevertheless random forces could result in one firm having a bigger installed base in which case the larger firm may make its product incompatible we find that strategic pricing tends to prevent the installed base differential from expanding to the point that incompatibility occurs this pricing dynamic is able to neutralize increasing returns and avoid the emergence of market dominance

price regulation of access to telecommunications networks abstract without access of networks to each other competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable endusers to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system wide monopolist one way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants while two way access concerns the interconnection between networks whereas one way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power two way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities among the numerous pricing rules discussed none clearly dominates this article provides a roadmap vis a vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation

intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty this paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power under uncertainty the unconstrained firm waits longer before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry in the certainty case the imposition of an inter temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution by contrast under uncertainty it cannot even if the price cap is optimally chosen under uncertainty the monopoly firm will generally a under invest and b impose quantity rationing on its customers

selling costs and switching costs explaining retail gasoline margins recent theoretical work has shown that price discrimination can take place in imperfectly competitive as well as monopoly markets the persistence of higher retail margins on unleaded than on leaded gasoline during the 1980s suggests that discrimination may occur even in very competitive markets this article studies a number of cost based explanations for such gasoline pricing as well as the possibility of price discrimination the analysis indicates that gas stations discriminate against groups of customers who are less likely to switch to another station the conclusions highlight the influence of shopping or search costs on pricing decisions even in markets thought to be quite competitive

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

network competition ii price discrimination our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing this article relaxes this assumption and allows networks to charge different prices for calls terminating on the subscriber s network and those terminating on a rivals network this creates a price differential between services that are identical for the consumer and generates network externalities despite network interconnection we show that in both the mature and entry phases of the industry the nature of competition is substantially affected by such price discrimination

power sector reform in small island developing states what role for renewable energy technologies abstract due to various pressures and desires more and more developing countries embark on power sector reform programmes yet there are a wide range of reform options and at present insufficient evidence is available as to which path will deliver best the desired objectives presently most small island developing states sids are dependent on high cost fossil fuel imports for power generation in spite of evidence that harnessing abundant domestic renewable sources of energy can deliver environmental social and economic benefits however depending on the type of power sector reform the transition towards renewable energy technologies rets can be either undermined or facilitated the specific focus on sids is justified because they have inherent characteristics that limit the degree to which the power sector can be transformed in comparison to larger continental developing countries with specific reference to sids this manuscript reviews the drivers and desires for power sector reform as well as presenting the available reform options and their implications on the up take of rets in addition to elaborating aspects of market governance other barriers to the consideration of rets such as financial bias in investment human capacity and environmental policy are discussed in view of this discussion which is based on evidence from recent reform programmes and theoretical academic literature recommendations are formulated that discourage full privatisation of the power sector as well as proposing less dogmatic lending conditions by international assistance bodies

revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs abstract the degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is analyzed in an infinite horizon model of duopolistic competition in contrast with previous analyses we assume that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by setting prices simultaneously in each period this problem is formulated as a simple stochastic game and a symmetric stationary markovian perfect equilibrium with distinctive economic features is studied we show that switching costs unambiguously relax price competition in equilibrium but that on the contrary they may make tacit collusion more difficult to sustain journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 l13

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

strategic loyalty reward in dynamic price discrimination in a dynamic model with overlapping generations of consumers we study duopolistic competition when firms can price discriminate at each period between their previous customers and the consumers that they have never served long term contracts are not enforceable in markov perfect equilibrium one firm charges higher prices to its past customers than to its new customers as past customers have revealed their strong preferences for the firm the other firm however rewards its previous customers by charging lower prices to them than to its new customers this loyalty reward strategy comes from the interplay between the firms usual incentive to extract surplus from consumers with revealed strong preferences and their incentives to acquire information and to recognize their young loyal customers the result also relies on the firms inability a priori to tell different generations apart it is the outcome of the unique equilibrium of a simplified two period or t period version of the game and holds with forward looking consumers who are impatient enough

bertrand supertraps we study oligopoly price competition between multiproduct firms firms whose products interact in the profit function specifically we focus on the impact of intrafirm product interactions on the level of equilibrium profits this impact may be decomposed in two different ways a a direct effect keeping the competitors actions fixed plus a strategic effect i e through the competitors actions or alternatively b a competitive advantage effect change in firmi only plus an imitation effect change in all other firms we derive conditions such that a the strategic effect more than outweighs the direct effect and conditions such that b the imitation effect more than outweighs the competitive advantage effect bertrand supertraps for example an increase in the degree of economies of scope would increase profits if prices were fixed or if the change were limited to firmi s cost function however if all firms increase the degree of economies of scope then all firms receive lower profits a variety of other applications is considered including learning curves core competencies demand synergies systems competition compatibility bundling network effects switching costs durable goods long term contracts

the behavior of worker cooperatives the plywood companies of the pacific northwest using data collected by the authors on the largest and most durable of worker owned firms in u s manufacturing this paper is addressed to two questions first are the responses of cooperatives to changes in their economic environment different from those of conventional firms it appears that cooperatives are more inclined to adjust pay than employment second how profitable has membership in the cooperatives been using information on share prices the authors find membership to have been extremely profitable and in this sense the prices of co ops shares have been underpriced the riskiness of cooperative memberships is discussed copyright 1992 by american economic association

learning by doing organizational forgetting and industry dynamics learning by doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings this paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of flrms pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting we show that forgetting does not simply negate learning rather learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces in particular a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior market dominance and multiple equilibria whereas a model with learning alone cannot

nonlinear pricing with random participation the canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent s participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents outside options we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification we develop a multidimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing first with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar nodistortion at the top result persists but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching second in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that generally the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome however when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form efficient quality allocations with cost plus fee pricing

bertrand competition under network externalities abstract two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network the value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good when the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions we identify the set of pricing strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market the set includes marginal cost mc pricing as well as bipartition pricing which offers discounts to some buyers and charges markups to others we show that mc pricing fails to be an equilibrium under non linear externalities in a general network but identify conditions for an equilibrium with bipartition pricing to be robust against perturbations in the externalities from linearity the analysis is applied to platform competition in a two sided market under local and approximately linear externalities

revenge of the managers labor cost cutting and the paradoxical resurgence of managerialism in the shareholder value era 1984 to 2001 institutional changes associated with the rise of shareholder value capitalism have had seemingly contradictory effects on managers and managerialism in the united states economy financial critiqu

a guide to the pitfalls of identifying price discrimination this paper demonstrates that plausible cost based explanations exist for what are commonly perceived to be cases of price discrimination we explain such commonly discussed problems as the price spreads of retail gasoline products the high price of dinners at restaurants the high price of popcorn at movie theaters and the fact that airline ticket prices vary with how long the ticket is purchased before the flight s departure our explanations benefit from not relying on consumer ignorance or implicit collusion among numerous sellers

asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets abstract in liberalized telecommunications markets the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant s profits are high so that entry is encouraged i show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant this is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with european legislation

price competition with reduced consumer switching costs the case of wireless number portability in the cellular phone industry wireless number portability wnp is a telecommunication regulatory policy that requires cellular phone service providers to allow customers who switch service subscriptions to retain their original phone numbers the right to retain the number lowers the switching cost for a consumer thus the purpose of the policy is to induce more competition and facilitate the growth of new or small service providers in this paper we show that wnp drives market price downward as expected but with a surprising twistrather than helping the smaller firms grow the policy may accelerate the process of market concentration we find that the main contributing factor to this peculiarity is the discriminatory pricing scheme prevalent in the industrythat is a service provider charges a lower per minute fee for the calls initiated and received within the same network than for the calls connected across two networks under this pricing scheme a consumer who subscribes to a larger network would benefit more than if subscribing to a smaller network despite the relatively higher fixed access fee that the former may charge by lowering the barrier of switching wnp creates a market condition conducive for a larger network to gain market share we support our analysis with the empirical evidence gathered from hong kong where wnp was adopted in march 1999

did installed base give an incumbent any measurable advantages in federal computer procurement this research examines the relative strength and significance of the status of incumbent contractor in federal computer procurement one finding as expected is that an agency is likely to acquire a system from an incumbent vendor another finding perhaps more interesting is that the in compatibility between a buyer s installed base and a potential system also influences the vendor choice a result that may be the first econometric measurement of the competitive effects of incompatibility an illustration of this thesis comes from ibm s experience new evidence shows however that ibm s apparent disadvantage with government agencies is largely due to incompatibilities in ibm s product line

firm size inequality and market power abstract in this paper we reexamine the relationship between firm size inequality fsi and market power in light of modern oligopoly theory using a model with capacity constraints and endogenous conduct we show that the market power fsi relationship is more complex than the positive link traditionally predicted we show that two separate effects are at work leading to a u shaped relationship between market power and fsi we also show that prices should be more unstable in markets where fsi is high we test these predictions on data for the u s airline industry and find results that support them

the need for improved financial reporting of a developing country energy utility abstract some consideration has been given to regulatory and institutional reforms to facilitate sustainable development in electricity usage in papua new guinea but little attention has been paid to bringing about full compliance of financial reporting expectations of the country s main energy utility examining documentary evidence of the audit reports of the auditor general s office of papua new guinea this study considers the financial reporting compliance of png power for the period 2007 2013 and the means by which compliant reporting may be improved the results of the study reveal that the financial statements of png power are late and receive disclaimers of opinion from the auditor general s office which suggest that png power s stakeholders are not receiving accurate and reliable financial information to make informed decisions about sustainable development of electricity usage and planning in papua new guinea the study reveals that it would take little resources to improve png power s reporting which in turn could enhance national energy policy decision making and energy utility accountability

equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription drugs this study seeks to establish the empirical importance of price dispersion due to costly consumer search by examining retail prices for prescription drugs posted prices in two geographically distinct markets are shown to vary considerably across pharmacies within the same market even after one controls for variation due to pharmacy differences pharmacy heterogeneity accounts for at most one third of the observed price dispersion the empirical analysis hinges on the observation that consumers incentives to price shop depend on characteristics of the drug therapy cross sectional patterns in price distributions across drugs are consistent with the predictions of a search model prices for repeatedly purchased prescriptions for which the expected benefits of search are highest exhibit significant reductions in both dispersion and price cost margins

inequality among american families with children 1975 to 2005 from 1975 to 2005 the variance in incomes of american families with children increased by two thirds in attempting to explain this trend labor market studies emphasize the rising pay of college graduates while demographers typically highlight the implications of family structural changes across time in this article we join these lines of research by conceiving of income inequality as the joint product of the distribution of earnings in the labor market and the pooling of incomes in families we develop this framework with a decomposition of family income inequality using annual data from the march current population survey our analysis shows that disparities in education and single parenthood contributed to income inequality but rising educational attainment and women s employment offset these effects most of the increase in family income inequality was due to increasing within group inequality which was widely shared across family types and levels of schooling

welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the u k we develop a calibrated simulation model of the u k mobile telephony market and use it to analyze the effects of reducing mobile termination rates mtr s as recommended by the european commission we find that reducing mtr s is likely to increase both consumer surplus and networks profits depending on the strength of call externalities i e benefits to the recipient of a call social welfare may increase by as much as 1 billion to 4 6 billion per year we also use the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between orange and t mobile and find that the merger led to a substantial reduction in consumer surplus

cellular service demand biased beliefs learning and bill shock by april 2013 the fcc s recent bill shock agreement with cellular carriers requires consumers be notied when exceeding usage allowances will the agreement help or hurt consumers to answer this question we estimate a model of consumer plan choice usage and learning using a panel of cellular bills our model predicts that the agreement will lower average consumer welfare by 2 per year because rms will respond by raising monthly fees our approach is based on novel evidence that consumers are inattentive to past usage meaning that bill shock alerts are informative and advances structural modeling of demand in situations where multipart taris induce marginal price uncertainty additionally our model estimates show that an

dynamic price competition with network effects i consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate and firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices i derive a series of results pertaining to a existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria b monotonicity of the pricing function e g larger networks set higher prices c network size dynamics increasing dominance vs reversion to the mean and d firm value how it varies with network effects finally i apply my general framework to the study of termination charges in wireless telecommunications i consider various forms of regulation and examine their impact on firm profits and market share dynamics

occupations and the structure of wage inequality in the united states 1980s to 2000s occupations are central to the stratification systems of industrial countries but they have played little role in empirical attempts to explain the well documented increase in wage inequality that occurred in the united states in the 1980s and 1990s we address this deficiency by assessing occupation level effects on wage inequality using data from the current population survey for 1983 through 2008 we model the mean and variance of wages for each occupation controlling for education and demographic factors at the individual level to test three competing explanations for the increase in wage inequality 1 the growth of between occupation polarization 2 changes in education and labor force composition and 3 residual inequality unaccounted for by occupations and demographic characteristics after correcting for a problem with imputed data that biased kim and sakamoto s 2008 results we find that between occupation changes explain 66 percent of the increase in wage inequality from 1992 to 2008

horizontal and vertical integration in securities trading and settlement this paper addresses a very european issue the consolidation of securities trading and settlement infrastructures in a two country model we analyze welfare implications of different types of consolidation we find that in our model full technical horizontal integration of settlement systems is better than vertical integration of exchanges and settlement systems but vertical integration is still better than no consolidation these findings have clear policy implications with regards to the highly fragmented european securities infrastructure

access to electricity in small island developing states of the pacific issues and challenges abstract energy poverty is widespread in small island developing states sids of the pacific it is estimated that 70 percent of pacific islander households do not have access to electricity which is equivalent to access rates in sub saharan africa and slightly below the average for low income countries pacific sids face unique challenges in expanding access to electricity given that their populations are spread across tens of thousands of islands governments and development partners in pacific sids continue to prioritise development of electricity grids as is evident in ongoing subsidisation of grid based power consumption and the establishment of ambitious grid based renewable energy targets this paper argues that traditional approaches to rural electrification which prioritise grid extension are not suited to the pacific islands region increased funding should be directed by both governments and development partners towards rural electrification especially in off grid areas where isolated systems are more appropriate institutional reform is also important regulatory reform is needed for power utilities to extend electricity grids into rural areas institutional arrangements that facilitate the sustainable operation and maintenance of off grid systems also need to be established past donor and government funded off grid rural electrification projects have rarely been sustainable alternative approaches involving payment of output based subsidies to energy service companies are worth exploring although will only succeed where sound regulatory arrangements are in place

the economics of immigration this literature review concerns the impact of immigration on the economy of the host country focusing on the experience of the united states the emphasis is on the period from the 1970s to the 1990s the author shows that research earlier in this period generally concluded that the economic effects of immigration were positive but that more recent research on later migrations have generally concluded that immigration may be having an adverse effect on the earnings of native unskilled workers and be placing an increased burden on welfare programs the importance of such economic analysis for the formulation of appropriate migration policies is stressed

hubs and high fares dominance and market power in the u s airline industry this article estimates the importance of route and airport dominance in determining the degree of market power exercised by an airline the results indicate that an airline s share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint airports significantly influences its ability to mark up price above cost the high markups of a dominant airline however do not create much of an umbrella effect from which carriers with smaller operations in the same markets can benefit the article suggests a number of possible explanations for this asymmetry

a review of fiji s energy situation challenges and strategies as a small island developing state abstract fiji is an island country with just over 300 small islands and approximately 853 000 people it is a small island developing state sids that is heavily dependent on imported fossil fuel for its energy needs the paper attempts to determine the past and current energy situation in fiji challenges faced and strategizes to overcome these challenges in 2014 fiji generated 859 gw h of grid electricity from 259 8 mw of power plants here 45 4 of grid electricity was produced by hydro 50 9 by diesel generators and the remaining by biomass however fiji s transport sector is completely dependent on fossil fuels with fuel import bill equivalent to an average 58 of export earnings and taking up 21 of total import bill the smallness of fiji and dispersed islands within fiji group leads to many challenges to have accessible affordable and sustainable energy supply these challenges are comprehensively discussed in this paper strategies such as increasing private public partnership in renewable energy projects changing customer behavior setting up a credible feed in tariff structure developing locally owned business in renewable energy and energy efficiency setting up of risk mitigation facilities and strengthening institutions supporting energy sector are discussed to overcome or minimize challenges

reform despite politics the political economy of power sector reform in fiji 1996 2013 abstract attempts to reform the electricity sector in developing countries have achieved mixed results despite the implementation of similar reforms in many developed countries and concerted effort by donors to transfer reform models in many cases political obstacles have prevented full and effective implementation of donor promoted reforms this paper examines the political economy of power sector reform in fiji from 1996 to 2013 reform has been pursued with political motives in a context of clientelism policy inconsistency and reversal is explained by the political instability of ethnic based politics in fiji modest success has been achieved in recent years despite these challenges with fiji now considered a model of power sector reform for other small islands developing states sids in the pacific the experience demonstrates that reform is possible within difficult political environments but it is challenging takes time and is not guaranteed the way in which political motives have driven and shaped reform efforts also highlights the need for studies of power sector reform to direct greater attention toward political drivers behind reform

demand and innovation in services the case of mobile communications abstract this paper aims to analyse the pricing strategies of mobile communications operators and examine the role of demand characteristics in the development of new tariff plans in so doing we depart from a traditional industrial organization approach to price discrimination and interpret new tariff plans as innovations in the spirit of schumpeter we look at competition in this sector as depending upon this form of innovation and we argue that given the specific features of the industry the development of new tariff plans is strongly related to the users characteristics and behaviour our main point is that in a context of uncertainty demand affects firms innovative strategies in two ways first by providing information on user behaviour and by increasing the capability of market segmentation and second by providing the incentives to innovate this argument is supported by an empirical analysis carried out on the basis of an original dataset which includes all the tariff plans on offer in the history of the italian market between 1992 and 2005 we find that both a firm s installed customer base and the level of market saturation play a role in shaping firms innovative pricing strategies in terms of the number and characteristics of the new tariff plans

international telecom settlements gaming incentives carrier alliances and pareto superior reform liberalized countries that allow competition in international telecommunications favor traffic re routing practices as arbitrage against foreign monopolists this view is seriously incomplete monopolists allied with carriers in liberalized countries can use these practices to reduce termination payments to nonalliance carriers thereby harming also consumers in liberalized countries by gaming regulations that require equal termination rates at both ends and proportional return the monopolist s traffic is allocated among carriers in proportion to their shares of traffic to its country we also present a simple bilateral settlements reform that eliminates gaming incentives and other proportional return distortions yet benefits both countries

how do switching costs affect market concentration and prices in network industries i investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option i find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option without a viable outside option high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects but with a viable outside option switching costs increase market concentration furthermore switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option but generally raise prices otherwise

allocating the economic benefits of renewable energy between stakeholders on small island developing states sids arguments for a balanced approach abstract for many small island developing states sids the cost of producing electricity from imported fossil fuels is so high and the cost of renewable energy technology has fallen so significantly that transitioning towards renewable energy is likely to produce cost savings a recent workshop at nyu school of law which brought together sids utility representatives with a leading renewable energy developer and other stakeholders provided strong support for this prediction utilities are likely to own the majority of renewable energy assets in sids and will therefore be the initial custodians of any cost savings renewable energy provides this raises a key policy question to what extent should sids utilities pass on these savings to consumers by lowering electricity rates we analyze this overlooked element of energy policy and highlight undesirable consequences that complete disbursement of the savings to consumers could cause

good times bad times postwar labor s share of national income in capitalist democracies this article returns to a classic question of political economy the zero sum conflict between capital and labor over the division of the national income pie a detailed description of labor s shar

network competition with income effects i generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination rates unregulated network operators competing in nondiscriminatory retail contracts negotiate termination rates above cost for any positive income effect this also holds when operators discriminate between on net and off net calls if networks are differentiated operators profit from increasing termination rates above cost under second degree price discrimination if a sufficient share of consumers prefer on net off net contracts and their subscription demand is relatively inelastic