deciding between competition and collusion we develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions first we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders second we study the problem of identie cation in our model we state a set of conditions that are both necessary and sufe cient for a distribution of bids to be generated by a model with competitive bidding third we discuss how to elicit a prior distribution over a e rm s structural cost parameters from industry experts given this prior distri bution we use bayes s theorem to compare competitive and collusive models of industry equilibrium finally we apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction e rms in the midwest the techniques we propose are not computationally demanding use e exible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

updating the reserve price in common value auctions we consider a common value auction model with bidder participation determined jointly by nature and by bidder optimization in this framework an increase in the reserve price as two effects it deters marginal bidders and it deters bidders from becoming informed we then derive a test statistic for establishing when it is optimal to raise the reserve price this statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations we then apply the analysis to u s offshore oil sales and find evidence that the reserve price is dramatically too low this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

efficiency gains from organizational innovation comparing ordinal and cardinal tournament games in broiler contracts abstract we analyze the contract settlement data of a poultry company who contracts the production of broiler chickens with a group of independent growers the company originally used rank order ordinal tournaments to compensate their contract growers and later switched to cardinal tournaments based on the observed payment mechanism we construct an empirical model of a rank order tournament game and estimate structural parameters of the symmetric nash equilibrium and then simulate growers performance under the observed cardinal tournament contract we found that the model with risk averse agents fits the data better than the model with risk neutral agents and that switching from a rank order tournament to a cardinal tournament while keeping the growers ex ante expected utility constant improved efficiency the principal company gains from the switch whereas some of the agents growers gain and others lose depending on their realized productivity shocks

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

informational rents in oil and gas concession auctions in brazil abstract this article aims to estimate the informational rents earned by winning bidders in oil and gas exploration and production auctions in brazil we estimate the distributions of bids and bidders private valuations using a nonparametric structural model and assuming independence and asymmetry between participants petrobras the brazilian state owned petroleum giant and former oil sector monopolist was considered a competitor that was distinct from other competitors thus we investigate a database based on information from all auctions held between 1999 and 2008 the results suggest that petrobras earned significantly higher information rents than other competitors such rents ranged from 15 to 63 depending on the number and type of competitors

does the sun shine on art prices this paper examines how variation in mood influences subjective risk and hence auction prices for art in london during the period 1990 2007 the private value of an object is closely related to taste and mood which is proxied for by the variation in weather using a unique data set that includes presale estimates for paintings sold through sotheby s and christie s auction houses as well as weather data for london from the british atmospheric data centre we find that the lower part of the price distribution is populated with paintings with a relative high private value whereas in the upper part prices are driven primarily by the common value characteristics our findings have important implications for collectors and investors in the art market

an empirical analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing abstract we estimate a model of competitive nonlinear pricing with multidimensional preference heterogeneity using individual level data on advertisements bought by local businesses e g doctors electricians from two yellow page directories in one u s city market variation in individual choices and payments allows us to identify the joint density of preferences marginal costs of publishing and common utility parameters our estimates suggest substantial welfare loss due to asymmetric information comparing duopoly outcomes with counterfactual monopoly outcomes we find that with less competition i producer surplus increases substantially ii more low type consumers are excluded iii product variety increases but benefits accrue only to the high type consumers iv total consumer surplus decreases v but its distribution across consumers does not change

nonparametric estimation of utility function in first price sealed bid auctions i propose a simple method to nonparametrically estimate the utility function in first price sealed bid auctions when bidders participation is exogenous using a pair of bid densities each for a different number of bidders i establish a contraction mapping that converges to the true utility function the method employs nonparametric estimates in place of the true bid densities to construct the contraction mapping and computes the utility function by iterating the contraction operator a monte carlo study shows that the method approximates the true utility function and valuation density

nonlinear pricing in village economies this paper examines the prices of basic staples in rural mexico we document that nonlinear pricing in the form of quantity discounts is common that quantity discounts are sizable for basic staples and that the well known conditional cash transfer program progresa has significantly increased quantity discounts although the program as documented in previous studies has not affected unit prices on average to account for these patterns we propose a model of price discrimination that nests those of maskin and riley 1984 and jullien 2000 in which consumers differ in their tastes and because of subsistence constraints in their ability to pay for a good we show that under mild conditions a model in which consumers face heterogeneous subsistence or budget constraints is equivalent to one in which consumers have access to heterogeneous outside options we rely on known results to characterize the equilibrium price schedule which is nonlinear in quantity we analyze the effect of nonlinear pricing on market participation as well as the impact of a market wide transfer analogous to the progresa one when consumers are differentially constrained we show that the model is structurally identified from data on prices and quantities from a single market under common assumptions we estimate the model using data on three commonly consumed commodities from municipalities and localities in mexico interestingly we find that relative to linear pricing nonlinear pricing is beneficial to a large number of households including those consuming small quantities mostly because of the higher degree of market participation that nonlinear pricing induces we also show that the progresa transfer has affected the slopes of the price schedules of the three commodities we study which have become steeper as consistent with our model leading to an increase in the intensity of price discrimination finally we find that a reduced form of our model in which the size of quantity discounts depends on the hazard rate of the distribution of quantities purchased in a village accounts for the shift in price schedules induced by the program

identification in first price and dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable within the ipv paradigm we show nonparametric identication of model primitives forrst price and dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction specic unobservable sets of potential bidders

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

detecting collusion on highway procurement this paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first price procurement the main objective is twofold first to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction in california i identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within each type bidders are symmetric i find evidence supporting the collusive scheme for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of competition and a model of collusion

identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand this note shows how to identify and estimate the distribution of valuations of bidders participating in discriminatory auctions when valuations are private and bidders have singleton demand

predicting bid prices by using machine learning methods abstractit is well known that empirical analysis suffers from multicollinearity and high dimensionality in particular this is much more severe in an empirical study of itemized bids in highway pr

unobserved correlation in private value ascending auctions abstract in private value ascending auctions the winner s willingness to pay is not observed leading to underidentification of many econometric models i calculate tight bounds on expected revenue and optimal reserve price for the case of symmetric and affiliated private values

an empirical study of auction revenue rankings the case of municipal bonds using a novel dataset of 386 rst price municipal bond auctions held in california i perform counterfactual revenue comparisons based on the theoretical result of milgrom and weber 1982 i show that the revenue in the second price auction is non parametrically identi ed and the counterfactual revenue in the english auction can be bounded in an informative way these results form a

nonparametric identification of risk aversion in first price auctions under exclusion restrictions this paper studies the nonparametric identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders within the private value paradigm first we show that the benchmark model is nonindentified from observed bids we also derive the restrictions imposed by the model on observables and show that these restrictions are weak second we establish the nonparametric identification of the bidders utility function under exclusion restrictions our primary exclusion restriction takes the form of an exogenous bidders participation leading to a latent distribution of private values that is independent of the number of bidders the key idea is to exploit the property that the bid distribution varies with the number of bidders while the private value distribution does not we then extend these results to endogenous bidders participation when the exclusion restriction takes the form of instruments that do not affect the bidders private value distribution though derived for a benchmark model our results extend to more general cases such as a binding reserve price affiliated private values and asymmetric bidders last possible estimation methods are proposed

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

disadvantaged business enterprise goals in government procurement contracting an analysis of bidding behavior and costs programs that encourage the participation of disadvantaged business enterprises dbe as subcontractors have been a part of government procurement auctions for over three decades in this paper we examine the impact of a program that requires prime contractors to subcontract out a portion of a highway procurement project to dbe firms we study how dbe subcontracting requirements affect bidding behavior in federally funded projects within a symmetric independent private value framework we use the equilibrium bidding function to obtain the cost distribution of firms undertaking projects either with or without subcontracting goals we then use nonparametric estimation methods to uncover and compare the cost of firm bidding on a class of asphalt projects related to surface treatment in texas the analysis shows little differences in the cost structure between projects that have subcontracting goals and those that do not

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

private information and altruism in bidding roscas this article studies how altruism improves allocations in a private information environment where strategic behaviour reduces economic welfare a theoretical analysis establishes that in an environment characterised by uncertainty and private information outcomes of auctions in rotating savings and credit associations roscas are more efficient when bidders preferences are altruistic rather than selfish a semi parametric structural estimation technique for rosca auctions is presented a parametric structural estimation identifies interactions between group characteristics and bidder altruism it is found that effective leadership and intra group diversity are associated with a greater extent of bidder altruism and thus more efficient intra rosca allocations

identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values we introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions we exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard independent private values ipv model we also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest applying our methods to much studied u s forest service timber auctions we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates this correlation causes expected profit the profit maximizing reserve price and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional ipv analysis of the data would suggest

using all bids in parametric estimation of first price auctions abstract recently laffont et al 1995 have proposed an snlls estimator using winning bids only here we derive a relationship between the means of observed bids and private values to propose an snlls estimator using all bids in first price auctions

do farmers value the environment evidence from a conservation reserve program auction the paper uses data from one conservation reserve program crp auction to elicit farmers attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids the crp pays farmers to remove chosen plots of land from agricultural production and put them to a conservation use an interesting aspect of this auction is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots using decision theoretic approach to model this auction we show that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they value environmental benefits especially those that increase future soil productivity of their land

not knowing the competition evidence and implications for auction design in a government auction program where first price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than english auctions i document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants motivated by additional data evidence i estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals participation is stochastic allowing for bidders risk aversion and asymmetry counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders uncertainty about the number of entrants combined with risk aversion substantially softens the revenue impact of low competition in first price auctions this explains the observed revenue patterns and uncovers an empirically important reason for sellers to favor first price auctions over english auctions

identification and estimation of stochastic bargaining models stochastic sequential bargaining models merlo and wilson 1995 1998 have found wide applications in different fields including political economy and macroeconomics due to their flexibility in explaining delays in reaching an agreement this paper presents new results in nonparametric identification and estimation of such models under different data scenarios

auctioning and bargaining an econometric study of timber auctions with secret reservation prices this article considers a first price sealed bid auction at which the seller s reservation price is not announced in advance we allow for a second round of bargaining and consider the nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round we characterize the bidders and seller s bayesian nash equilibrium strategies the distributions of the buyers and seller s private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from auction data on standing timber while solving numerically the differential equations characterizing the seller s and buyers equilibrium strategies the performance of the estimated model is then compared to a model in which the players behave myopically

nonparametric estimation of asymmetric first price auctions a simplified approach abstract we present an approach to nonparametric estimation of pseudo values in asymmetric affiliated private values apv models for first price auctions that eliminates the curse of dimensionality we show that pseudo values can be estimated by using two dimensional functions of bids for apv models regardless of the form of asymmetry

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

predictive testing of consumer choice models not subject to independence of irrelevant alternatives the probabilistic modeling of the relationship between objective or perceived characteristics of multiattribute alternatives and consumer choice is receiving increased attention in marketing and ot

identification of search models using record statistics this paper shows how record value theory a branch of statistics that deals with the timing and magnitude of extreme values in sequences of random variables can be used to recover features of the wage offer distribution in conventional search models using national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy wage data i show that the data are not compatible with specifications for the offer distribution characterized by extreme negative skewness in addition i show that my approach can be used to construct a bound on the returns to job seniority my results suggest that job seniority plays only a minor role in the wage growth of the workers surveyed in the nlsy copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

estimation of beauty contest auctions beauty contests are auction mechanisms used to buy or sell differentiated products where the auctioneer does not specify a decision rule to pick the winning bidder beauty contests are widely used in procuring welfare to work projects freelance services selling online ads real estate transactions and hiring dating marriage decisions unlike price only auctions beauty contests have no closed form bidding strategies and suffer from nonmultiplicatively separable unobserved auction heterogeneity which makes their estimation challenging to address these challenges we formulate beauty contests as incomplete information games and present a two step estimator a key contribution of our method is its ability to account for common knowledge auction specific unobservables using finite unobserved types we show that unobserved auction types and distributions of bids are nonparametrically identified and recoverable in the first step using a nonparametric expectation maximization em like algorithm and that

bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders values and private signals this poses a challenge when bids are observed from rst price common value auctions i bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure using data from u s municipal bond auctions i nd rst price and second price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing rst price formats the number of bidders has a more signi cant impact on revenues in optimal auctions i also nd invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal sp auctions

structural econometric analysis of descending auctions since vickrey s 1961 paper the theory of auctions has considerably expanded particularly over the last decade see e g milgrom 1985 1986 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 for recent surveys in contrast except for some experimental work only a few empirical studies have attempted to validate the new theoretical auction models using field auction data two approaches have emerged the first has concentrated upon testing some implications of the theory of auctions using reduced form econometric models with observed bids as the explained variables explanatory variables might then be the reservation price the number of potential bidders when observed and some characteristics of the auctioned object examples are hansen 1985 1986 hendricks et al 1987 and hendricks and porter 1988 the second approach which is structural has a long tradition in econometrics starting from the work of the cowles commission this approach is followed in this paper the basic idea is simple and relies upon

economic valuation of environmental quality using property auction data a structural estimation approach this study proposes a method to economically evaluate environmental quality using property auction data our approach is consistent with microeconomic auction theory and can directly estimate the value function from the data a task that is often difficult when using conventional revealed preference methods such as the hedonic approach we use a method of simulated moments to estimate the value function which in turn is used to calculate the economic value of environmental quality changes we apply this method to data on foreclosure property auctions in tokyo in order to economically evaluate hypothetical improvements in neighborhood fire risks