spectrum auction designs and revenue variations this study examines a sample of 93 national 3g spectrum auctions for the period 2000 2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations an implied reduced form econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid per mhz per million populations values to regulator determined auction design characteristics auction competitiveness mobile wireless market conditions and spectrum package attributes identified from tender documents the analysis reveals that among other factors all auction design characteristics independently impact on realized 3g spectrum auction revenues

theory and behavior of multiple unit discriminative auctions this paper reports the results of controlled experiments designed to test the harrisraviv generalization of the vickrey theory of bidding in multiple unit discriminative auctions the paper also discusses further development of the theory in a way suggested by the experimental results to include bidders with distinct risk preferences in a well known paper vickrey 20 formulated a nash equilibrium model of bidding by risk neutral economic agents in single unit auctions this analysis was subsequently extended in numerous papers vickrey 21 generalized his original model to include multiple unit auctions in which each of n risk neutral bidders can bid on one out of a total of q homogeneous items up for auction where 1 c q n in both of the vickrey papers individual values for the auctioned object s were assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution holt 12 and riley and samuelson 19 for single unit auctions and harris and raviv 11 for multiple unit auctions have extended the vickrey model to the case in which valuations are from a general distribution function and all agents have identical concave utility functions this paper reports the empirical properties of individual bidding behavior and seller revenue for a group of 28 laboratory experiments designed to test the harris raviv generalization of the vickrey hereafter vhr model of nash equilibrium behavior in multiple unit discriminative auctions in section i we summarize briefly the theoretical results of the vhr model which form the basis for the hypotheses that we test section ii describes the experimental design that we use section iii describes the experimental results and various tests based on the bidding behavior of individual subjects and on aggregate market seller revenue data the results from six of the ten n q parameter designs reported

empirical evidence on competitive bidding some surprising results abstract this paper compares the assumptions and predictions of common values auction theory with ocs leasing data we find that the general assumption of continuous bid density functions is not supported by the empirical evidence this leads us to suggest several lines for future theoretical experimental and empirical research

evaluating decision strategies for equity of public risks many important decisions include the loss of life among their possible consequences alternative actions have different implications for the number of possible fatalities the equity of those eventual fatalities and the equity of the process resulting in those fatalities this paper defines a concept of ex ante risk equity to address the equity of the process and distinguishes this concept from the ex post risk equity of the fatalities the paper indicates that an analysis of decision strategies addresses ex ante equity in this context both types of equity as well as loss of life are included in a von neumann morgenstern utility model developed to evaluate public risks this approach provides a method to investigate the implications of different value judgments in examining alternatives and illustrates an appropriate use of von neumann morgenstern utility for problems involving social consequences such as public risks

the transition to the knowledge economy labor market institutions and income inequality in advanced democracies the transition from fordism to the knowledge economy in the world s advanced democracies was underpinned by the revolution in information and communications technology ict the introduction and rapid diffusion of ict pushed up wages for college educated workers with complementary skills and allowed top managers and ceos to reap greater rewards for their own talents despite these common pressures income inequality did not rise to the same extent everywhere income in the anglo saxon countries remains particularly unequally distributed to shed new light on this puzzle the authors carry out a panel data analysis of eighteen oecd countries between 1970 and 2007 their analysis stands apart from the existing empirical literature by taking a comparative perspective the article examines the extent to which the relationship between the knowledge economy and income inequality is influenced by national labor market institutions the authors find that the expansion of knowledge employment is positively associated with both the 90 10 wage ratio and the income share of the top 1 percent but that these effects are mitigated by the presence of strong labor market institutions such as coordinated wage bargaining strict employment protection legislation high union density and high collective bargaining coverage the authors provide robust evidence against the argument that industrial relations systems are no longer important safeguards of wage solidarity in the knowledge economy

information inequality and mass polarization ideology in advanced democracies growing polarization in the american congress is closely related to rising income inequality yet there has been no corresponding polarization of the u s electorate and across advanced democracies mass polarization is negatively related to income inequality to explain this puzzle we propose a comparative political economy model of mass polarization in which the same institutional factors that generate income inequality also undermine political information we explain why more voters then place themselves in the ideological center hence generating a negative correlation between mass polarization and inequality we confirm these conjectures on individual level data for 20 democracies and we then show that democracies cluster into two types one with high inequality low mass polarization and polarized and right shifted elites e g the united states and the other with low inequality and high mass polarization with left shifted elites e g sweden this division reflects long standing difference

skill biased technological change and rising wage inequality some problems and puzzles the recent rise in wage inequality is usually attributed to skill biased technical change sbtc associated with new computer technologies we review the evidence for this hypothesis focusing on the implications of sbtc for overall wage inequality and for changes in wage differentials between groups a key problem for the sbtc hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing advances in computer technology sbtc also fails to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality including the gender and racial wage gaps and the age gradient in the return to education

winner s curse without overbidding abstract we report the results of a series of second price auction experiments where each bidder s signal is given by a normally distributed value plus a normally distributed error while bidders values differ in one treatment they are the same in another which allows for a direct test of the winner s curse irrespective of confounding factors bidders may also fall prey to a news curse when they do not sufficiently take into account that signals and errors are correlated we find that the effects of the winner s curse are mitigated by a news curse and loss or risk aversion

the effect of unions on the structure of wages a longitudinal analysis this paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity the econometric model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a large panel data set formed from the u s current population survey the results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills in addition the patterns of selection bias differ by skill group among workers with lower levels of observed skill unionized workers are positively selected whereas union workers are negatively selected from among those with higher levels of observed skill despite a large and sophisticated literature there is still substantial disagreement over the extent to which differences in the structure of wages between union and nonunion workers represent an effect of trade unions rather than a consequence of the nonrandom selection of unionized workers over the past decade several alternative approaches have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers 2 one method that has been successfully applied in other areas of applied microeconometrics is the use of longitudinal data to measure the wage gains or losses of workers who change union status unfortunately longitudinal estimators are highly sensitive to measurement error even a small fraction of misclassified union status changes can lead to significant biases if the true rate of mobility between union and nonunion jobs is low this sensitivity led lewis 1986 to essentially dismiss the longitudinal evidence in his landmark survey of union wage effects in this paper i present some new evidence on the union wage effect based on a longitudinal estimator that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status the estimator uses external information on union status misclassification rates along with the reduced form coefficients from a multi variate regression of wages on the observed sequence of union status indicators to isolate the causal effect of unions from any selection biases introduced by a correlation between union status and the permanent component of unobserved wage heterogeneity recognizing that unions may raise wages more or less for

distribution and redistribution in postindustrial democracies this paper analyzes the processes of distribution and redistribution in post industrial democracies we combine a pooled time series data base on welfare state effort and its determinants assembled by huber ragin and stephens 1997 with data on income distribution assembled in the luxembourg income survey lis archive in the case of the lis data we re calculate the micro data in order to remove the distorting influence of pensioners on pre tax pre transfer income distribution we examine the determinants of three dependent variables pre tax pre transfer income inequality post tax post transfer income inequality and the proportional reduction in inequality from pre to post tax and transfer inequality we hypothesized that pre tax pre transfer income inequality would be determined by labor market institutions union density bargaining centralization labor market conditions unemployment and economic structures post industrialism third world imports we hypothesized that the reduction in inequality would be determined by political configurations directly by left government and indirectly via their effect on welfare state generosity by left government and christian democratic government post tax and transfer income inequality was hypothesized to be a product of the combination of labor market variables and political variables the results broadly confirms our hypotheses and the overall fit is very good

equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections abstract we evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union we find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high and low skilled workers when the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy it will dampen this tendency further higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high skilled workers whereas it will reduce it among the low skilled workers overall outsourcing will reduce economy wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high skilled workers is sufficiently low

a test that discriminates between two models of the dutch first auction non isomorphism abstract previous experiments reject the hypothesis that the dutch and first auctions are isomorphic two alternatives to the standard normal form analysis of the dutch auction are formalized 1 bidders violate bayes rule 2 bidders experience a utility of suspense that is additive with the utility of monetary reward paired comparisons of bidding behavior between groups in which the treatment is to triple the payoff of the baseline group yields no significant effect of this treatment we therefore reject the utility of suspense model

the fragmentation of the bargaining society wage setting in the nordic countries 1950 to 1992 it is commonly believed that corporatist bargaining institutions have been in general decline in the 1980s and 1990s the leading explanations of the purported universal trend toward greater decentralization of collective bargaining are the impact of technological change changes in the occupational structure and growing international economic integration decentralization should be particularly visible in the nordic countries because collective bargaining was more centralized in these countries in the 1960s and 1970s than in any others in western europe in this article the authors present data on the changes in the centralization of wage bargaining in the four nordic countries since 1950 they document that a significant decentralization of collective bargaining has occurred in sweden as is well known but not in the other three the article concludes with a review of possible explanations of swedish exceptionalism

the dynamics of trade unionism and national economic performance i test two theories of the political processes of trade unions the first argues that wage moderation depends on a centralized labor movement the second contends that institutional conditions permitting unions coordination of bargaining strategies is sufficient coordination is most likely to he achieved when there are small number of unions that do not compete for members that is when union monopoly is high important empirical anomalies may be resolved by analyzing the effects of union centralization and monopoly separately rather than combining them into a composite index of corporatism reanalyzing comparative data from organization of economic cooperation and development countries between 1963 and 1985 largely corroborates the hypothesis that monopoly is more important than either centralization or composite indices of corporatism for national economic performance the conceptual rationale underlying indices of corporatism should be reexamined

wage dispersion and productive efficiency evidence for sweden the swedish record of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized solidarity bargaining followed by substantial decompression of wages after central bargaining broke down supplies observations well suited to empirical evaluation of arguments about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution we obtain no results supporting fairness morale and cohesiveness theories implying that wage leveling within workplaces and industries may enhance productivity reduction of interindustry wage differentials evidently did however contribute positively to aggregate output and productivity growth most likely for the structural reasons first emphasized by swedish trade union economists almost a half century ago

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

risk aversion and overbidding in first price sealed bid auctions new experimental evidence bidding above the risk neutral nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion later studies however offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role in a novel experimental design we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets we find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding jel d44 c91

equity axioms for public risks from the perspective of a two person society we explain and analyze six axioms for equity among individuals who are exposed to the possibility of death from a public hazard the axioms are concerned with how a given total risk expected fatalities is distributed over the four possible life death consequences for the two people maximal subsets of mutually compatible equity axioms are identified first for a monotonic ordinal utility function and then for a more restrictive von neumann morgenstern utility function

does economic globalisation affect income inequality a meta analysis a large volume of econometric literature has studied the impact of economic globalisation on income inequality around the world however reported econometric estimates vary substantially which makes it difficult to draw valid conclusions this paper presents a quantitative summary and analysis of existing estimates regarding the globalisation inequality relationship we use a new data set consisting of 1 254 observations from 123 primary studies by applying meta analysis and meta regression methods we obtain several main findings first globalisation has a small to moderate inequality increasing effect second while the effect of trade globalisation is small financial globalisation shows a more sizeable and significantly stronger inequality increasing impact third we find an average inequality increasing impact of globalisation in both advanced and developing countries fourth education and technology moderate the impact of globalisation on income inequality

wage inequality and varieties of capitalism this article draws on a new data set that enables the authors to compare the distribution of income from employment across oecd countries specifically the article conducts a pooled cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of wage inequality in sixteen countries from 1973 to 1995 the analysis shows that varieties of capitalism matter the authors find that the qualities that distinguish social market economies from liberal market economies shape the way political and institutional variables influence wage inequality of particular interest to political scientists is the finding that the wage distributive effects of government partisanship are contingent on institutional context union density emerges in the analysis as the single most important factor influencing wage inequality in both institutional contexts

labour market institutions and economic performance labour markets richard freeman do particular types of labour market institution hold the key to economic success should other countries try to emulate the flexibility of the american labour market or the centralization of swedish style corporatism since 1970 within the oecd there has been a sharp divergence both of economic performance and of indicators of labour market structure the paper uses union density and the degree of wage dispersion across industries to proxy a country s underlying labour market institutions in assessing economic performance it is argued that cross country differences in output growth were much smaller than differences in employment growth for given output growth there is a clear negative relationship between employment growth and real wage growth across countries why do different countries find themselves at different points on this trade off the final part of the paper examines the correlation between indicators of labour market structure and the position on the wage employment trade off it concludes that the degree of wage dispersion across industries is the most important indicator of market structure and that countries with very high or very low dispersion typically the countries with highly centralized or highly decentralized bargaining in the labour market have better employment performance than countries with intermediate degrees of centralization and wage dispersion

asset price bubbles from poorly aggregated information a parametric example abstract we sketch a parametric example of bubbles i e discrepancies between an asset s fundamental value under full information aggregation and market clearing price we demonstrate for our exponential gamma example that bubbles exist and can exhibit momentum and overshooting for some values of the information parameters

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

modeling the societal impact of fatal accidents a number of proposals have been put forth regarding the proper way to model the societal impact of fatal accidents most of these proposals are based on some form of utility function asserting that the social cost or disutility of n lives lost in a single accident is a function of n a common view is that a single large accident is more serious than many small accidents producing the same number of fatalities hence 1 drawing upon a number of empirical studies we argue that there is insufficient justification for using any function of n fatalities to model societal impacts the inadequacy of such models is attributed in part to the fact that accidents are signals of future trouble the societal impact of an accident is determined to an important degree by what it signifies or portends an accident that causes little direct harm may have immense consequences if it increases the judged probability and seriousness of future accidents we propose that models based solely on functions of n be abandoned in favor of models that elaborate in detail the significant events and consequences likely to result from an accident

tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions abstract this paper reports the results of eight first price sealed bid auction market experiments using cash motivated subjects to test a constant relative risk averse model crram of equilibrium bidding behavior of heterogeneous bidders

fairness and social risk i unaggregated analyses this paper is the second of a two paper study of fairness issues for decisions that affect the benefits received and the risks encountered by a population the study examines fairness for individuals and for homogeneous groups within the population it considers fairness both for population benefit risk profiles and for probability distributions over profiles our study bases fairness on notions of envy among individuals and groups the first paper focused on fairness in profiles and profile distributions when benefits and risks are not aggregated the present paper uses individual preferences to assess fairness when benefits and risks are aggregated within groups or over the population it concentrates on intergroup envy measures and fairness indices that account for ways that aggregated benefits and risks might be allocated to members of groups or to groups within the population

inequality and redistribution evidence from u s counties and states 1890 1930 abstract does economic inequality affect redistributive policy this paper turns to u s county data on land inequality over the period 1890 to 1930 to help address this fundamental question in political economy redistributive policy was primarily decided at the local level during this period making county level data particularly informative examining within state variation also reduces the potential impact of latent institutional and political variables the paper also uses a variety of identification strategies including historic variables as well as county weather and crop characteristics as instruments for land inequality the evidence consistently suggests that greater inequality is significantly associated with less redistribution this negative relationship is especially large in heavily rural counties where concentrated landownership implied that landed elites also controlled the majority of economic production

the equality multiplier how wage compression and welfare empowerment interact we explore how more wage equality fuels the generosity of the welfare state via political competition in elections and how a more generous welfare state fuels wage equality via empowerment of weak groups in the labor market together the two mechanisms may generate a cumulative process that explains how equality multiplies and why countries with more equal distributions of market outcomes also have stronger welfare states the complementarity between wage setting and welfare spending can explain why almost equally rich countries differ so much in economic and social equality among their citizens jel h53 i31 j31

technical note measuring equity in public risk an equitable distribution of risk is often an important criterion in the evaluation of technological and environmental risks in this paper we define the concept of equity precisely and develop measures for ex post and ex ante equity we then show how these measures combined with information on the number of possible fatalities can be used to rank alternatives that involve risks to human life

dispersive equity and social risk dispersive equity is concerned with the impact of life threatening risks from alternative policy decisions on homogeneous groups in a population it is not addressed to the disutility of various numbers of fatalities that might occur but rather to how fatalities are distributed over the groups although dispersive equity has long been recognized as an important component of some policy decisions it has received little formal treatment within the matrix of salient factors for such decisions our purpose is to advance its formal development this is done within a formulation based on probability distributions over potential fatality sets the formulation gives rise to four distinct but not independent equity concepts individual risk equity group risk equity dispersive equity and social outcome equity each of these is analyzed but special attention is given to dispersive equity the paper also comments on relationships between total equity and its four components and between total equity and the dis

fixed revenue auctions theory and behavior i introduction there are numerous varieties of auction institutions used in practice and studied in the economics literature the four standard mechanisms for selling a fixed quantity as in a single unit or lot are the english dutch first price sealed bid and second price sealed bid auctions the widely known theoretical results are that the english and second price auctions are equivalent as are the dutch and first price auctions one of the most insightful theoretical results of private value auctions is that under certain assumptions the expected revenue is constant across the four mechanisms see mcafee and mcmillan 1987 milgrom 1987 myerson 1981 but behavioral examinations of private value auctions have consistently found that the relationships among the formats are not so straightforward english clock auctions generate truthful revelation as predicted however second price auctions which should also generate truthful revelation do not reliably do so in a laboratory setting harstad 2000 kagel harstad and levine 1987 further revenue equivalence does not hold between first price and second price auctions coppinger smith and titus 1980 1 in part this is due to the fact that many bidders in first price auctions act as if they are risk averse furthermore dutch auctions and first price sealed bid auctions are not behaviorally isomorphic observed prices are significantly lower in the dutch clock auctions than in first price auctions cox roberson and smith 1982 almost exclusively the focus of previous work has been on auctions determining the selling price for a prespecified lot 2 however in some situations a seller may be more concerned about raising a fixed amount of revenue for example a business may sell off just enough inventory to gain the needed liquidity to undertake a particular project a person may pawn just enough items to secure money with which to pay the monthly bills alternatively in a procurement setting a buyer may desire to acquire as much as possible for some nonfungible fixed budget for example a researcher whose grant is expiring may buy as many supplies as possible with the remaining money or a firm may have a fixed advertising budget with which to buy the most effective campaign though not typically thought of in this way auctions can be used to solve these types of problems as well 3 we define a fixed revenue auction to be a bidding mechanism in which a prespecified total payment is exchanged for a variable quantity of a good 4 wessen and porter 1997 developed a fixed revenue auction to cover the 326 000 cost of moving antennae for the cassini mission to saturn the auction allowed competing research teams to place bids in terms of the mass they desired on the craft and the price per unit for the mass the goal of this paper is to understand the behavioral properties of fixed revenue auctions utilizing the four standard mechanisms to enable comparisons with the extensive literature on auctions the environment is designed to allow the maximum similarity between auctions in the two dimensions this includes placing nontrivial restrictions on buyer values to yield a theoretical equivalence between auction dimensions given this one might be inclined to suppose that the behavioral properties are a forgone conclusion this need not be the case as evidenced by the aforementioned lack of isomorphism between first price and dutch auctions and between english and second price auctions in the standard setting experiments have shown that even simple changes in framing can impact behavior 5 for example framing a lottery as a gain or a loss can change the value one places on the lottery and framing the ultimatum game as a buyer seller interaction can lead to behavior more consistent with material self interest a change in auction dimension however is more than a simple framing effect it is a change in the underlying decision problem

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

aggregate risk and the pareto principle abstract in the evaluation of public policies a crucial distinction is between plans that involve purely idiosyncratic risk and those that generate correlated or aggregate risk while natural this distinction is not captured by standard utilitarian aggregators in this paper we revisit harsanyi s 1955 celebrated theory of preferences aggregation and develop a parsimonious generalization of utilitarianism the theory we propose captures sensitivity to aggregate risk in large populations and can be characterized by two simple axioms of preferences aggregation

equity considerations in public risks evaluation recent contributions by r k sarin and r l keeney and r l winkler approach the problem of public risks evaluation from a multiattribute perspective in which fatalities ex ante equity and ex post equity play leading roles the present paper considers the same problem from the perspective of holistic comparisons between potential fatality distributions we consider a number of axioms for such comparisons identify maximally compatible sets of axioms and relate our approach to the multiattribute approach we also identify a form of dispersive equity that is not discussed in recent work but deserves further consideration

individual behavior of first price auctions the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets abstract this article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the nash equilibrium predictions of the first price sealed bid auction a subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer simulated bids the design used between subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral nash equilibrium our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments which after each auction reveals the winning bid only by means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

verifiable offers and the relationship between auctions and multilateral negotiations we use the experimental method to compare second price auctions with verifiable multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds despite the two institutions seeming equivalence we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second price auctions the difference occurs because low cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers below the second lowest cost we also compare the two institutions to previously studied first price auctions and multilateral negotiations with non verifiable offers second price auctions yield the highest prices followed in order by verifiable negotiations non verifiable negotiations and first price auctions one of the more interesting facets of voluntary exchange is how changes in the strategic environment lead to differences in transaction outcomes for example the pioneering experimental work in chamberlin 1948 and smith 1962 illustrates that changing the nature of the information available to participants can dramatically influence the price and efficiency of an exchange process with this insight in mind in this article we use the experimental method to examine and compare four exchange mechanisms in a procurement setting in which a buyer faces several sellers that have privately known production costs the first two institutions are the first price auction and the second price auction these well known auction formats and their outcome equivalent variants the dutch auction and the english auction are used extensively to allocate products as varied as flowers art produce fish government securities and mineral rights 1 several governments have recently used auctions to allocate such valuable resources as radio spectra electric power and pollution rights 2 the second two institutions are variants of the multilateral negotiations introduced in thomas and wilson 2002 in this common exchange mechanism a buyer solicits price offers from multiple sellers and then he elicits more favourable offers by playing the sellers off one another until he accepts one of the offers or breaks off the negotiations among other settings multilateral negotiations are

a new database on human capital stock in developing and industrial countries sources methodology and results abstract the paper describes the techniques and data adopted for the construction of a new series of estimates of the stock of education in 85 countries over 28 years 1960 1987 the series are built from enrollment data using the perpetual inventory method adjusted for mortality estimates are corrected for grade repetition among school goers and country specific drop out rates for primary and secondary students enrollment data series used start as far back as 1930 for most countries and even earlier for others this reduces the need for backward extrapolation of enrollments to provide the initial estimates of the investment inventory

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

the social value of mortality risk reduction vsl vs the social welfare function approach we examine how different welfarist frameworks evaluate the social value of mortality risk reduction these frameworks include classical distributively unweighted cost benefit analysis i e the value per statistical life vsl approach and various social welfare functions swfs the swfs are either utilitarian or prioritarian applied to policy choice under risk in either an ex post or ex ante manner we examine the conditions on individual utility and on the swf under which these frameworks display sensitivity to wealth and to baseline risk moreover we discuss whether these frameworks satisfy related properties that have received some attention in the literature namely equal value of risk reduction preference for risk equity and catastrophe aversion we show that the particular manner in which vsl ranks risk reduction measures is not necessarily shared by other welfarist frameworks jel d81 d61 d63 q51

the decline of welfare benefits in the u s the role of wage inequality welfare benefits in the u s have experienced a much studied secular decline since the mid 1970s we explore a new hypothesis for this decline related to the increase in wage inequality in the labor market and the decline of real wages at the bottom of the distribution we posit that voters prefer benefits which are tied to low skilled wages we test the hypothesis using a 1969 1992 panel of state level data an additional contribution of our analysis is the use of general social survey data on voter preferences for welfare which we combine with current population survey data to determine the voter in each state who has the median preferred welfare benefit level our analysis reveals considerable evidence in support of a role for declining real wages in the decline of welfare benefits

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

foreign direct investment and income inequality in mexico 1990 2000 in this article we explore the relationship between the investments of multinational corporations foreign direct investment and income inequality in mexico we argue that mexico s liberalization of foreign direct investment fdi inflows in the 1990s provides a natural experiment to test how fdi affects income inequality in a middle income country we use an instrumental variables approach as our identification strategy to mitigate problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias in an empirical test of the determinants of changes in income inequality from 1990 to 2000 we find that increased fdi inflows are associated with a decrease in income inequality within mexico s thirty two states the authors would like to thank lawrence broz john freeman matt gabel geoff garrett quan li eddy malesky layna mosley katie ridgeway pablo pinto john stringer and andy sobel for comments and suggestions jacob gerber and mariana medina provided excellent research assistance thanks also to patricio aroca gonzalez for generously providing us with his data we acknowledge the financial support of the weidenbaum center on the economy government and public policy nate jensen s contribution to this article was written as a global fellow at ucla s international institute

economic globalization domestic politics and income inequality in the developed countries a cross national study this article assesses the impact of economic globalization and domestic political factors on income inequality and state redistribution in the developed countries over the past two decades using household level data from the luxembourg income study that are more detailed accurate and cross nationally comparable than those used in previous empirical work it examines three major modes of international integration trade direct foreign investment and international financial flows as well as four domestic political variables the partisan balance of national cabinets electoral turnout union density and the centralization of wage setting institutions the study finds only scattered relationships between global integration and income distribution or redistribution but reasonably strong positive relationships between several domestic political variables and an egalitarian distribution of income and or extensive state redistribution these findings are consistent with a growing number of studies that emphasize the resilience of domestic political factors in the face of economic globalization

assessing risky social situations this paper reexamines the welfare economics of risk it singles out a class of criteria the expected equally distributed equivalent as the unique class that avoids serious drawbacks of existing approaches such criteria behave like ex post criteria when the final statistical distribution of well being is known ex ante and like ex ante criteria when risk generates no inequality the paper also provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante preferences in the vein of harsanyi s aggregation theorem

catastrophe aversion and risk equity in an interdependent world catastrophe aversion and risk equity are important concepts both in risk management theory and practice keeney keeney rl 1980 equity and public risk oper res 28 3 527 534 was the first to formally define these concepts he demonstrated that the two concepts are always in conflict yet his result is based on the assumption that individual risks are independent it has therefore limited relevance for real world catastrophic events we extend keeney s result to dependent risks and derive the conditions under which more equity and more correlation between two risks imply a more catastrophic situation we then generalize some of the results for multiple correlated risks this paper was accepted by manell baucells decision analysis

risk attitudes in first price auction experiments a bayesian analysis non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to risk or are all risk neutral this paper constructs an explicit bayesian prior distribution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsiders the experimental results it finds that observed bidding behavior is still inconsistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk attitudes thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents archetypical of this result is the nash equilibrium prediction for first price auctions for an object that is valued by agents in an independent and private manner received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to riskor are all risk neutral in this paper we construct an explicit prior distrlbution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsider the experimental results we find that observed bidding behavior is indeed consistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk aversion however when one allows for risk loving subjects as well observed behavior is inconsistent with nash predictions thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes in section i we consider a specific nash equilibrium ne bidding model due to cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1988 that clearly illustrates the risk sensitivity of the theoretical predictions in section ii we provide independent evidence of the risk attitudes of experimental subjects in a test for risk attitudes developed by harrison 1986a this evidence allows us to construct an explicit prior probability density function over the coefficient of constant relative risk attitudes employed in the specific bidding model of section i in section iii we reconsider the evidence from the first price fp experiments reported in cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1983a 1983b i a specific bidding model cox roberson and smith 1982 hereafter crs present a model based on a power function utility specification for agent i ui y y 1 received for publication august 31 1987 revision accepted for publication december 18 1989 university of south carolina i am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments although they are not responsible for my conclusions

earnings inequality and welfare spending a disaggregated analysis the welfare state is generally viewed as either providing redistribution from rich to poor or as providing publicly financed insurance both views are incomplete welfare policies provide both insurance and redistribution in varying amounts depending on the design of the policy the authors explore the political consequences of the mix of redistribution and insurance in the context of studying the impact of income inequality on expenditures in different categories of welfare spending in advanced industrial societies from 1980 to 1995 they find that spending on pensions health care family benefits poverty alleviation and housing subsidies is largely uncorrelated with income inequality but that spending on income replacement programs such as unemployment insurance sickness pay occupational illness and disability are significantly higher in countries with more egalitarian income distributions they show that this pattern is exactly what a theory of political support for redistributive social insurance programs would predict

political reinforcement how rising inequality curbs manifested welfare generosity we propose a political reinforcement hypothesis suggesting that rising inequality moves party politics on welfare state issues to the right strengthening rather than modifying the impact of inequality we model policy platforms by incorporating ideology and opportunism of party members and interests and sympathies of voters if welfare spending is a normal good within income classes a majority of voters moves rightward when inequality increases as a response the left in particular shift their welfare policy platform toward less generosity we find support for our arguments using data on the welfare policy platforms of political parties in 22 oecd countries

attitudes toward catastrophe in light of climate change and other global threats policy commentators sometimes urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes this paper reflects on what society s attitude toward low probability high impact events is or should be we first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses based on this conception we review studies from decision sciences psychology and behavioral economics that explore people s attitudes toward various social risks contray to popular belief we find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion the preference for a mean preserving contraction of the loss distribution and discuss a number of possible behavioral explanations next we turn to social choice theory and examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk we explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other regarding preferences finally we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk

unions employers associations and wage setting institutions in northern and central europe 1950 1992 the eight countries examined in this study austria belgium denmark finland germany the netherlands norway and sweden have long been viewed as exemplifying corporatist industrial relations

determinants of relative poverty in advanced capitalist democracies using relative poverty measures based on micro level data from the luxembourg income study in conjunction with pooled time series data for 14 advanced capitalist democracies between 1970 and 1997 the authors analyze separately the rate of pretax transfer poverty and the reduction in poverty achieved by systems of taxes and transfers socioeconomic factors including de industrialization and unemployment largely explain pre tax transfer poverty rates of the working age population in these advanced capitalist democracies the extent of redistribution measured as poverty reduction via taxes and transfers is explained directly by welfare state generosity and constitutional structure number of veto points and the strength of the political left both in unions and in government

explaining international differences in male skill wage differentials by differences in demand and supply of skill this paper explores the hypothesis that wage differentials between skill groups across countries are consistent with a demand and supply framework using micro data from 15 countries we find that about one third of the variation in relative wages between skill groups across countries is explained by differences in net supply of skill groups the demand and supply framework does an even better job at explaining relative wages of low skilled workers

local unemployment and the relative wages of immigrants evidence from the current population surveys abstract we provide evidence on wage profiles of immigrants using current population survey data from 1979 to 2003 taking into account that changes in labor market conditions impact natives and immigrants differently high rates of immigrant wage assimilation in general and relatively high wages of immigrant cohorts that arrived during the 1990s in particular can to a large extent be explained by a negative trend in unemployment in the data relating immigrant and native period effects to local labor market unemployment we find that wage assimilation among lesser educated immigrants is negligible for high school and college educated male immigrants rates of wage assimilation during early years in the united states are procyclical suggesting that rising unemployment slows accumulation of u s specific human capital

labor markets production strategies and wage bargaining institutions the swedish employer offensive in comparative perspective transformed patterns of labor market governance occupy a central place in the study of contemporary west european political economies here detailed analysis of the dramatic decentralization of wa

collusion facilitating and collusion breaking power of simultaneous ascending and descending price auctions this article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a collusion incubator environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction theories of collusion producing behavior along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions these theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion the experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator then once the tacit collusion developed changing to the descending auction the change moved prices from collusive levels to near competitive levels