chinese villages and townships as industrial corporations ownership governance and market discipline1 public firms in a reforming socialist economy face two problems the old soft budget constraint syndrome and new principal agent problems china s township village government owned enterprises tves outperform state owned enterprises soes in growth rate and productivity three explanations are proposed in the literature 1 tves represent informal or ambiguous private property rights which are most efficient in partial reform 2 the small size and scale of township village governments as industrial corporations allows officials to monitor tves directly and to limit their wherewithal for cross subsidizing 3 strict market disciplines facing tves render indirect market monitoring to mitigate agency problems effectively analyses of jiangyin data show that a while both superior to local soes village and township enterprises share similar productivity and b the scale of township village corporations slightly increases productivity i conclude that local state corporatism should be revised to inc

why haven t developing countries privatized deeper and faster abstract despite a decade of privatization in the developing world the vast majority of state owned enterprise soe assets continue to be in government hands bureaucrats in business world bank 1995 correctly identifies politics as one reason for the slow pace of privatization but it underestimates the role of institutional and economic constraints success stories of privitization are rare in low income countries and the long term promise of privatization in sectors posing regulatory complications remains to be established countries in crisis may reform soes quickly and deeply despite these uncertainties but others may opt for gradual reform which need not be altogether bad if speedy privatization results in poorly conceived schemes the cure can be worse than the illness finally bureaucrats are likely to stay in business for years to come and therefore it is important to improve their effectiveness in the roles they are unlikely to shed in the future a market friendly approach to soe reform need not be government un friendly

mass privatization state capacity and economic growth in post communist countries why did the transition from socialism to capitalism result in improved growth in some countries and significant economic decline in others scholars have advanced three main arguments 1 successful countries rapidly implemented neoliberal policies 2 failures were not due to poli cies but to poor institutional environments and 3 policies were counterproductive because they damaged the state we present a state centered theory and empirically demonstrate for the first time one of several possible mechanisms linking neoliberal policies to poor economic performance mass privatization programs where implemented created a massive fiscal shock for post communist governments thereby undermining the development of private sector gover nance institutions and severely exacerbating the transformational recession we performed cross national panel regressions for a sample of 25 post communist countries between 1990 and 2000 and found that mass privatization programs negatively affected economic growth state capacity and property rights protection we further tested these findings with firm level data from a rep resentative survey of managers in 3 550 companies operating in 24 post communist countries within countries that implemented mass privatized programs newly privatized firms were sub stantially less likely to engage in industrial restructuring but considerably more likely to use bar ter and accumulate tax arrears than their state owned counterparts

barriers to efficiency and the privatization of township village enterprises abstract qian 2000 and others suggest that post 1994 tax and banking reforms in china combined with the development of markets for allocating resources influenced the economic performance of township village enterprises tves and private enterprises pes this paper uses chinese provincial level data to search for evidence of advantages and or disadvantages offered to tves and pes before and after the 1994 reforms we define a sectoral net income based measure of overall efficiency and decompose the measure into components that highlight the existence of credit constraints output target constraints and labour hiring constraints the results offer empirical support for qian and others explanation of why private enterprises eventually emerged as the dominant institution for allocating resources in post 1994 rural china

enterprise ownership enterprise organisation and worker attitudes in chinese rural industry some new evidence china s township and village enterprises tves have performed remarkably well during the post 1979 period however agreement on their organisational and behavioural characteristics and the reasons for their success remains elusive for some tves are simply private enterprises in disguise and behaviourally equivalent for others tves represent a unique form of enterprise organisation based on collective ownership the success of which poses a serious challenge to the conventional prescriptions favouring privatisation this paper reports findings from a small survey of private and collective rural enterprises in heilongjiang north east china we find strong evidence that differences in ownership are reflected in different forms of organisational behaviour residual payment stuctures and in different worker attitudes and degrees of commitment to the enterprise casual observation shows however that the majority of rural collectively owned firms are de facto privately owned firms kornai 1992 p 442 china s experience shows that community ownership can be an effective way of overcoming market failure for an important segment of the rural non farm sector privatisation proved to be an unimportant part of the explanation for the accelerated growth of this sector nolan 1995 p 222

the timing and magnitude of retail store markdowns evidence from weekends and holidays we examine daily prices of eight goods at seventeen retail stores collected in ann arbor michigan over a four month period from november 1 to february 28 we focus on weekly and seasonal price patterns and on the frequency of price markdowns or sales there were frequent markdowns in the intensive shopping period prior to christmas and a tendency for such sales to occur on weekends we interpret these findings as evidence that a significant number of markdowns are timed to occur when shopping intensity is exogenously high we complement the imperfect information based motives for sales in the literature by contributing an additional element based on the role of bulk shopping and increasing returns in the shopping technology

cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist in the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination a new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay within each cohort consumers vary in their tastes for the good under broad conditions the seller will vary the price over time in most periods he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay periodically however he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay

new institutional economics in the post socialist transformation debate the paper suggests that there is a tension between the basic tenant of new institutional economics nie and the manner in which it has been applied in the debate on post socialist transformation this tension is explored in the context of four main perspectives on nie i property rights ii transaction costs economics iii new economic history and iv evolutionary economics there are two main arguments the first is that the transformation phase should be seen as open ended rather than a closed process where the pure market is the inevitable end result the second is that although the nie literature touches on most of the issues which are relevant to post socialist transformation the insights that it offers are still too general for policy guidance

chinese institutional innovation and privatization from below one of the most distinctive features of china s transition to a market economy has been the role played by rural township and village enterprises tve s in the face of sustained rapid growth of tve s the share of total industrial output produced by state owned enterprises soe s has fallen below half despite steady state sector growth and the absence of significant privatization yet most tve s are collectives a form of publicly owned enterprise this feature seems to make them unique in no other transitional economy has public ownership played such a dynamic role china presents the unusual picture of an economy that has made a transition to a primarily market economy but in which publicly owned enterprises still produce the bulk of manufacturing output surprisingly also the collective ownership form does not have a precise legal definition in china leading to some uncertainty about ultimate property rights martin weitzman and chenggang xu 1993 point out that public ownership with vaguely defined ownership ought to represent a recipe for economic disaster to them tve success suggests instead advantages to the internal institutional form of tve s which are seen to facilitate cooperation through implicit contracts among community members locked into an ongoing relationship victor nee 1992 advances a similar interpretation arguing that long time community residents create forms of income sharing that may be optimal in the absence of an independent legal system an alternative perhaps complementary view is presented here the success of tve s i argue is due largely to a set of external conditions to which tve s are an effective adaptation tve s are responses to one of the most distinctive characteristics of the chinese transition as a whole the early creation of product markets which exist for a prolonged period without well developed markets for factors of production or assets tve s are a flexible and effective but basically ordinary adaptation to this environment

multiproduct pricing made simple we study pricing by multiproduct firms in the context of unregulated monopoly regulated monopoly and cournot oligopoly using the concept of consumer surplus as a function of quantities rather than prices we present simple formulas for optimal prices and show that cournot equilibrium exists and corresponds to a ramsey optimum we then present a tractable class of demand systems that involve a generalized form of homothetic preferences as well as standard homothetic preferences this class includes linear and logit demand within the class profit maximizing quantities are proportional to efficient quantities we discuss cost passthrough including cases where optimal prices do not depend on other products costs finally we discuss optimal monopoly regulation when the firm has private information about its vector of marginal costs and show that if the probability distribution over costs satisfies an independence property then optimal regulation leaves relative price decisions to the firm

overcoming distrust how state owned enterprises adapt their foreign entries to institutional pressures abroad state owned so enterprises are subject to more complex institutional pressures in host countries than private firms these institutional pressures arise from a weak legitimacy of state ownership in some countries which arises from a combination of ideological conflicts perceived threats to national security and claimed unfair competitive advantage due to support by the home country government these institutional pressures directed specifically at so firms induce them to adapt their foreign entry strategies to reduce potential conflicts and to enhance their legitimacy testing hypotheses derived from this theoretical argument for subsidiaries of listed chinese firms we find that so firms adapt mode and control decisions differently from private firms to the conditions in host countries and these differences are larger where pressures for legitimacy on so firms are stronger these findings not only extend institutional theory to better explain differential effects on different entrants to an organizational field but demonstrate how foreign investors of idiosyncratic origins may proactively build legitimacy in host societies

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition this paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information free repair faster check out or after sales service differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high service retailers and lower price discount retailers therefore how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question yet the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard symmetric contracting assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination i bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation even if the retailers were ex ante identical in their cost and other characteristics the paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers next the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price service competition a manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice versa the paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers the framework that i develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity consumers are heterogeneous in their locations as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation and in their willingness to pay for retail services as in the models of vertical differentiation the model also uses a natural relationship in retail markets between the travel time cost incurred by a consumer and her willingness to pay the more affluent consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for retail services also have a higher cost for their personal time given these market features the paper analyzes the problem faced by a manufacturer who sells to competing retailers the paper shows that the standard notion in the literature of offering similar contracts to all the retailers is sufficient only in markets with substantial locational differentiation relative to the differences in the willingness to pay effective channel management in these markets simply requires mechanisms that ensure that retailer interests are aligned so that they compete by offering a mix of price and service that is desirable from the manufacturer s point of view however in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial diversity in consumer willingness to pay the manufacturer s problem is not just to align retailer interests but to also use the channel contract to induce the correct level of retail differentiation this helps the manufacturer to better cater to the diversity in consumer willingness to pay and to prevent the cut throat competition that the retailers would otherwise have indulged in the manufacturer can achieve this through the use of menu based contracts menu based contracts induce differentiated retailer behavior despite the fact that the retailers are not forced into accepting different terms of trade this aspect can be useful in shielding manufacturers from litigation under the robinson patman act the paper also shows that for relatively high ticket items retailers tend to be excessively biased towards competing in the provision of retail services the correlation between consumer willingness to pay for service and travel costs implies that for high ticket products the competing retailers will focus on the more service sensitive customers at the cost of ignoring the price sensitive consumers in the market the manufacturer is therefore likely to encourage greater price competition among the retailers in contrast for low ticket items the manufacturer prefers to reduce price competition and encourage greater provision of services this provides an endogenous rationale for the use of price ceilings versus floors the basic model is also extended to consider the effect of upstream competition between manufacturers under upstream competition coordinating retail price and service decisions is not always optimal for an individual manufacturer this extension to manufacturer competition provides a basis for understanding the role of retail price service differentiation in the context of a channel duopoly it also shows that a mixed distribution channel a channel in which one manufacturer chooses to be coordinated while the other chooses to be noncoordinated can be an equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty

multi product price and assortment competition we address a generic price competition model in an industry with an arbitrary number of competitors each offering all or a subset of a given line of n products the products are substitutes in the sense that the demand volume of each product weakly increases whenever the price of another product increases the cost structure is linear with arbitrary cost rates our demand model is the unique regular extension of a set of demand functions that are affine in a limited polyhedral subset of the price space a set of demand functions is regular if it satisfies the following conditions under any given price vector when some product is priced out of the market i e has zero demand any increase of its price has no impact on the demand volumes depending on the set of prices selected by the competing firms a different product assortment is offered in the market we characterize the equilibrium prices product assortment and sales volumes in the price competition model under this demand model under minimal conditions we show that a pure nash equilibrium always exists while multiple price equilibria may arise they are equivalent in the sense of generating an identical product assortment and sales volumes subject classifications games group decisions noncooperative marketing competitive strategy pricing area of review operations and supply chains

retail price drivers and retailer profits what are the drivers of retailer pricing tactics over time based on multivariate time series analysis of two rich data sets we quantify the relative importance of competitive retailer prices pricing history brand demand wholesale prices and retailer category management considerations as drivers of retail prices interestingly competitive retailer prices account for less than 10 of the over time variation in retail prices instead pricing history wholesale price and brand demand are the main drivers of retail price variation over time moreover the influence of these price drivers on retailer pricing tactics is linked to retailer category margin we find that demand based pricing and category management considerations are associated with higher retailer margins in contrast dependence on pricing history and pricing based on store traffic considerations imply lower retailer margins

own brand and cross brand retail pass through in this paper we describe the pass through behavior of a major u s supermarket chain for 78 products across 11 categories our data set includes retail prices and wholesale prices for stores in 15 retail price zones for a one year period for the empirical model we use a reduced form approach that focuses directly on equilibrium prices as a function of exogenous supply and demand shifting variables the reduced form approach enables us to identify the theoretical pass through rate without specific assumptions about the form of consumer demand or the conduct of a category pricing manager thus our measurements of pass through are not constrained by specific structure on the underlying economic model the empirical pricing model includes costs of all competing products in the category on the right hand side not only the cost of the focal brand and yields estimates of both own brand and cross brand pass through rates our results provide a rich picture of the retailer s pass through behavior we find that pass through varies substantially across products and across categories own brand pass through rates are on average more than 60 for 9 of 11 categories a finding that is at odds with the claims of manufacturers about retailers in general importantly we find substantial evidence of cross brand pass through effects indicating that retail prices of competing products are adjusted in response to a change in the wholesale price of any given product in the category we find that cross brand pass through rates are both positive and negative we explore determinants of own brand and cross brand pass through rates and find strong evidence in multiple categories of asymmetric retailer response to trade promotions on large versus small brands for example brands with larger market shares and brands that contribute more to retailer profits in the category receive higher pass through we also find that trade promotions on large brands are less likely than small brands to generate positive cross brand pass through i e induce the retailer to reduce the retail price of competing smaller products on the other hand small share brands are disadvantaged along three dimensions trade promotions on small brands receive low own brand pass through and generate positive cross brand pass through for larger competing brands moreover small share brands do not receive positive cross pass through from trade promotions on these larger competitors we also find that store brands are similarly disadvantaged with respect to national brands

a model of price promotions with consumer search this paper presents a price discrimination model of price promotions the distinguishing feature of our model is the explicit distinction between regular and promotional prices regular prices are chosen first then promotional prices further while regular prices are always available to everyone promotional prices are only available when offered and only to those who search for them we show that even a monopolist will offer random promotions under these circumstances furthermore as search costs increase the frequency and depth of promotions increase with competition for the promotion oriented consumers the seller becomes more aggressive in his promotional policies even more so as search costs increase the high reservation price consumers however end up worse off with competition

from privatization to deindustrialization implications of chinese rural industry and the ownership debate revisited summary this paper examines the evolution of chinese rural industry since the rural reform in the late 1970s and revisits the debate on the role of ownership based on a case study of w county in southern jiangsu province as well as drawing on national data the author shows that the community based market dynamic had been a key factor in the expansion of rural enterprises and that its weakening in recent years has led to the closing of village enterprises and deindustrialization of the countryside large scale land expropriation sponsored by local government is the principal factor responsible for the change

technology shocks in the new keynesian model in the new keynesian model preference cost push and monetary shocks all compete with the real business cycle model s technology shock in driving aggregate fluctuations a version of this model estimated via maximum likelihood points to these other shocks as being more important for explaining the behavior of output inflation and interest rates in the postwar u s data these results weaken the links between the current generation of new keynesian models and the real business cycle models from which they were originally derived they also suggest that federal reserve officials have often faced difficult trade offs in conducting monetary policy

united we stand or divided we stand strategic supplier alliances under order default risk we study the alliance formation strategy among suppliers in a framework with one downstream firm and n upstream suppliers each supplier faces an exogenous random shock that may result in an order default each of them also has access to a recourse fund that can mitigate this risk the suppliers can share the fund resources within an alliance but they need to equitably allocate the profits of the alliance among the partners in this context suppliers need to decide whether to join larger alliances that have better chances of order fulfillment or smaller ones that may grant them higher profit allocations we first analytically characterize the exact coalition proof nash stable coalition structures that would arise for symmetric complementary or substitutable suppliers our analysis reveals that it is the appeal of default risk mitigation rather than competition reduction that motivates cooperation in general a riskier and or less fragmented supply base favors larger alliances whereas substitutable s

the decline of township and village enterprises in china s economic transition summary a paradoxical phenomenon in china s transitional economy is that markets developed under predominant public ownership which nevertheless has declined with the development of markets previous studies reveal that initial political and economic conditions of reform and fiscal decentralization gave rise to local public enterprises leading role in early marketization this paper explains the subsequent fall of such a role building and expanding on recent studies of privatization we argue that market development and competition have constrained the abilities of local public enterprises to address revenue and employment imperatives whereas local governments sales oriented growth strategies have exacerbated governance problems panel data are analyzed to provide provisional test of pertinent hypotheses

friends with benefits how political connections help to sustain private enterprise growth in china by analysing data from a survey of 511 chinese private enterprises we find that their owners respond to government discrimination by developing political connections with government officials a one standard deviation increase in the insecurity of property rights has the effect of increasing the number of friends in the government by a substantial 22 these friends significantly help to mitigate by half the negative effect arising from the difficulties of obtaining land and excessive regulations on enterprise growth this explains why an institutional environment of weak property rights has not stopped private enterprises in china from developing rapidly

cost pass through and inverse demand curvature in vertical relationships with upstream and downstream competition this paper provides two characterizations of the retailer s markup relative to the manufacturer s markup in vertical relationships with homogeneous manufacturers and homogeneous retailers we first show that retailer s relative markup is equal to the ratio of the retail pass through to the wholesale pass through multiplied by the number of manufacturers relative to the number of retailers we then provide its expression in terms of the inverse demand curvature

double marginalization and cost pass through weyl fabinger and cowan meet spengler and bresnahan reiss consider the classical double marginalization problem of single product successive monopolies we show that the ratio of the cost pass through at the final sale relative to that at the wholesale level is characterized by the curvature of inverse demand in the final market we also apply cowan s 2012 method which utilizes the idea of pass through in an analysis of third degree price discrimination to compare consumer surplus under vertical integration and separation

structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer retailer interaction vertical strategic interaction research in empirical industrial organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers horizontal strategic interaction decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer pricing rules e g constant markup category profit maximization the appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market however is an empirical question this paper therefore empirically infers 1 the vertical strategic interaction vsi between manufacturers and retailer 2 the horizontal strategic interaction hsi between manufacturers simultaneously with the vsi and 3 the pricing rule used by a retailer the approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data where there is no information on wholesale prices researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices even manufacturers who have access to their own wholesale prices usually have limited information on competitors wholesale prices in the absence of wholesale prices we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer pricing rules we then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations while our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available early research on the inference of hsi among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data e g kadiyali et al 1996 1999 made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin this assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers in this paper we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail price coordination across brands hence the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing category management done by the retailer we find empirical support for this argument this highlights the need to properly model and infer vsi simultaneously to accurately estimate the hsi when using data at the retail level functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data but recent theoretical research on channels lee and staelin 1997 tyagi 1999 has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough while the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100 lee and staelin call this vertical strategic substitute vss the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100 vertical strategic complement vsc because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100 chevalier and curhan 1976 armstrong 1991 we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit vss and the multiplicative vsc functional form for the data we perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market we found that the vss implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model we also find that for both categories the best fitting model is one in which 1 the retailer maximizes category profits 2 the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg and 3 manufacturer pricing hsi is tacitly collusive the fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations the inference that the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82 in the yogurt market and 65 in the peanut butter market the result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature the finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about vsi hsi and the functional form the results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems

technical note sequential multiproduct price competition in supply chain networks we analyze a general model in which at each echelon of the supply process an arbitrary number of firms compete offering one or multiple products to some or all of the firms at the next echelon with firms at the most downstream echelon selling to the end consumer at each echelon the offered products are differentiated and the firms belonging to this echelon engage in price competition the model assumes a general set of piecewise linear consumer demand functions for all products potentially brought to the consumer market where each product s demand volume may depend on the retail prices charged for all products consumers preferences over the various product retailer combinations are general and asymmetric similarly the cost rates incurred by the firms at the most upstream echelon are general as well we fully characterize the equilibrium behavior under linear price only contracts and we show how all equilibrium performance measures can be computed via a simple recursive scheme moreover we establish how changes in the model parameters in particular exogenous cost rates or intercept values in the demand functions impact the system wide equilibrium these comparative statics results allow for the quantification of cost pass through effects and the measurement and characterization of the firms brand value lastly we illustrate what qualitative impacts various changes in the structure of the supply chain network may bring forth

market liberalization and firm performance during china s economic transition this paper examines the impact of market liberalization on firm performance through institutional changes during the economic reform in china the conceptualization focuses on the decentralization of control ownership restructuring and industrial policy as the primary institutional changes to implement market liberalization in china these institutional changes affect firm performance by shaping managerial incentives affecting transaction and agency costs and making selective resource allocations across and within industries using a large scale data set including 23 577 firms between 1992 and 1996 the study examines how market liberalization affects the profitability and productivity of chinese firms and the relationship between ownership change and the performance of state owned enterprises

a general theory of pass through in channels with category management and retail competition i provide a general formulation of the channel pass through problem as a comparative static of the retail price equilibrium and i analyze the impact of category management and retail competition on pass through focusing on brand and retailer differences and the nature of the cost change being passed through whether it is brand specific retailer specific both or neither with category management a retailer s response to a brand specific cost change is not limited to that brand in general a retailer will also change the prices of other brands the cross brand effect can be positive or negative and depending on its sign it either enhances or attenuates pass through i explain the cross brand effect as an interaction between two forces a demand substitution force that pushes for a negative cross brand effect and a strategic complementarity force that pushes for a positive cross brand effect retail competition adds another layer of strategic complementarity causing other retailers to respond even for retailer specific cost changes and increasing pass through of categorywide cost changes but its effect for brand specific cost changes is ambiguous i apply the theory to two commonly used demand functions linear demand and nested logit and show that they have significantly different pass through properties the paper concludes with a discussion of how the theory relates to the empirical literature including the companion piece by besanko et al besanko d j p duba s gupta 2005 own brand and cross brand retail pass through marketing sci 24 1 123 137

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

pass through of commodity price shocks in distribution channels with risk averse agents abstract we apply variance analysis for studying the risk sharing mechanism in distribution channels in which the risk averse buyer and supplier are suffered from commodity price shocks we obtain the closed form optimal pass through rate that minimizes the total channel price cost risk and maximizes the channel throughput for a stackelberg leadership game and a nash bargaining solution using the commodity price data in the steel industry we demonstrate that the pass through rate should be set between 40 and 80 for major metal alloys

post the washington consensus economic governance and industrial strategies for the twenty first century recent events in the global economy have led to a growing dissatisfaction with the neo liberal economic paradigm that has dominated economic policy over the last 30 years and the increasing concentration of and abuse of economic power within the corporate sector that has ensued however amidst calls for a new approach to economic management there is a danger that a new policy framework may overlook underlying economic governance structures that exist and may evolve within the economy such oversight has implications for development this paper seeks to demonstrate that the long run efficacy of industrial strategy depends upon designing appropriate economic governance structures that serve the wider public interest it does so by exploring past experiences of industrial strategy drawing lessons from the usa the uk japan the third italy and the emerging and transition economies we also offer some suggestions for ways forward

predicting competitive response to a major policy change combining game theoretic and empirical analyses this research uses procter gamble s value pricing initiative as a context for testing whether actual competitor and retailer response to a major policy change can be predicted using a game theoretic model we first estimate demand functions for p g and competitor brands from the period before value pricing was initiated we then formulate a dynamic manufacturer retailer stackelberg model that includes p g a national brand competitor and a retailer the model takes p g s move as given and prescribes the price and promotion response of the competitors and the retailer we substitute the estimated demand parameters into the model to obtain prescriptions for each competitor and the retailer and see whether these prescriptions are related to the actual response we find that the dynamic game theoretic model calibrated with empirical estimates of demand parameters has significant predictive power we also test the predictive power of two benchmark models the first is based on the reaction function approach of leeflang and wittink leeflang peter s h wittink dick r 1992 diagnosing competitive reactions using aggregated scanner data internat j res marketing9 39 57 and the second is a simplification of our dynamic model where the retailer is not strategic the dynamic game theoretic model performs better than either benchmark

commentaries and rejoinder to measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks by paulo albuquerque and bart j bronnenberg this series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on strategic and managerial issues arising from albuquerque and bronnenberg albuquerque p b j bronnenberg 2012 measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks marketing sci 31 1 4 23

the timing of sales this paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination a fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase the sellers typically vary their prices over time charging a high price in most periods but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price in some equilibria all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level

decomposing the sales promotion bump with store data sales promotions generate substantial short term sales increases to determine whether the sales promotion bump is truly beneficial from a managerial perspective we propose a system of store level regression models that decomposes the sales promotion bump into three parts cross brand effects secondary demand cross period effects primary demand borrowed from other time periods and category expansion effects remaining primary demand across four store level scanner datasets we find that each of these three parts contribute about one third on average one extension we propose is the separation of the category expansion effect into cross store and market expansion effects another one is to split the cross item effect total across all other items into cannibalization and between brand effects we also allow for a flexible decomposition by allowing all effects to depend on the feature display support condition and on the magnitude of the price discount the latter dependence is achieved by local polynomial regression we find that feature supported price discounts are strongly associated with cross period effects while display only supported price discounts have especially strong category expansion effects while the role of the category expansion effect tends to increase with higher price discounts the roles of cross brand and cross period effects both tend to decrease

decision stages and asymmetries in regular retail price pass through we study the pass through of wholesale price changes onto regular retail prices using an unusually detailed data set obtained from a major retailer we model pass through as a two stage decision process that reflects both whether as well as how much to change the regular retail price we show that pass through is strongly asymmetric with respect to wholesale price increases versus decreases wholesale price increases are passed through to regular retail prices 70 of the time while wholesale price decreases are passed through only 9 of the time pass through is also asymmetric with respect to the magnitude of the wholesale price change with the magnitude affecting the response to wholesale price increases but not decreases finally we show that covariates such as private label versus national brand 99 cent price endings and the time since the last wholesale price change have a much stronger impact on the first stage of the decision process i e whether to change the regular retail price than on th

distribution channels an extension of exclusive retailership the underlying channel structure in most studies to date has consisted either of exclusive dealers that sell only one manufacturer s brand or of a single retailer selling multiple brands little attention has been given to the larger segment of most consumer goods markets in which retailers compete to sell multiple brands at the same location this research seeks to add to the growing literature of channel competition by analyzing three channel structures the least constrained of which deals with two competing manufacturers and two retailers each of whom distributes both products in a noncooperative game with two nash s and one stackleberg equilibrium using differentiated products and a linear demand function we introduce the concept of store substitutability a measure corresponding to product substitutability representing competitiveness at the retail level between the two retailers we are able to obtain closed form solutions for all cases we show that the presence of competitive effects at both retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on profits and prices we also study the effects of various power relationships in the channel furthermore we compare these results to those obtained by previous research finally we propose some testable implications and suggest avenues for future research

reconsolidation of state power into urbanising villages shareholding reforms as a strategy for governance in the pearl river delta region shareholding cooperatives scs are the officially recognised organisations responsible for managing villagers collectively owned assets in recent years massive land requisitions in the pearl ri

lechatelier samuelson principle in games and pass through of shocks abstract the lechatelier samuelson principle states that as a reaction to a shock an agent s short run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long run adjustment when the agent can also adjust other related actions we extend the principle to strategic environments where the long run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies we show that the principle holds for supermodular games strategic complements satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes heterogeneity we discuss the principle s implications for cost pass through of multiproduct firms

assessing the competitive interaction between private labels and national brands in this article we employ the linear approximate almost ideal demand system la aids and specify price reaction equations derived under the la aids specification we perform intracategory analyses using data on six individual categories as well as a pooled analysis on a sample of 125 categories and 59 geographic markets we find that consumer response to price and promotion decisions demand and firm pricing behavior supply jointly determine observed market prices and market shares further estimates of residual demand elasticities suggest that examination of partial demand elasticities alone may provide an incomplete picture of the ability of brands to raise price copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

regional institutions ownership transformation and migration of industrial leadership in china the case of the chinese synthetic dye industry 1978 2008 scholars have emphasized the gradual ownership transformation of enterprises as a key driver of the chinese economy s unprecedented growth however little work has been done on the issue of whether this transformation process takes place evenly across the various regions in china this article describes the important role of regional institutions in shaping the ownership based competitiveness of local enterprises and the migration of industries across regions in the case of the chinese synthetic dye industry the passing of leadership from state owned enterprises soes to collectively owned enterprises coes and then to private enterprises pes was accompanied by a concurrent leadership migration from one region to another the article contends that this simultaneous occurrence was not accidental four institutional constraints the degree of central supervision the local labor arrangements the local social welfare provision and the degree of ambiguity in property rights retarded the rise of new ownership forms in the previously dominant regions this gave other regions the opening to take over leadership positions by providing a more favorable institutional context for new ownership forms these findings are likely to apply to all of the chinese manufacturing industries that existed prior to 1978 and that subsequently did not experience significant technological changes and were not highly protected by the government

channel pass through of trade promotions packaged goods manufacturers spend in excess of 75 billion annually on trade promotions even though their effectiveness has been hotly debated by academics and practitioners for decades one reason for this ongoing debate is that empirical research has been limited mostly to case studies managerial surveys and data from one or two supermarket chains in a single market in this paper we assemble a unique data set containing information on prices quantities and promotions throughout the entire channel in a category our study extends the empirical literature on pass through in three important ways first we investigate how pass through varies across more than 1 000 retailers in over 30 states second we study pass through at multiple levels of the distribution channel third we show how the use of accounting metrics such as average acquisition cost rather than transaction cost yields biased estimates of pass through and therefore overstates the effectiveness of trade promotions we find that mean pass through elasticities are 0 71 0 59 and 0 41 for the wholesaler retailer and total channel respectively more importantly at each level of the channel we observe large variances in pass through estimates that we explain using various measures of cost and competition surprisingly we find that market structure and competition have a relatively small impact on pass through we conclude by showing how the profitability of manufacturer and wholesaler deals can be improved by utilizing detailed effectiveness estimates for example a manufacturer using an inclusive trade promotion strategy might offer a 10 off invoice deal to all retailers on every product this strategy would decrease manufacturer and wholesaler profits for 56 of product store combinations whereas retailers experience a profit boost in 96 of cases manufacturers and wholesalers can avoid unprofitable trade deals for specific products and retailers by utilizing estimates of pass through consumer price elasticity and margins compared to the inclusive strategy such a selective trade promotion strategy would improve deal profitability by 80 and reduce costs by 40

creating win win trade promotions theory and empirical analysis of scan back trade deals manufacturer trade promotion spending is second only to cost of goods sold as a profit and loss item yet manufacturers often lose money on these deals as a result of forward buying by retailers the search for more effective forms of trade promotion and the availability of scanners at cash registers has led to the emergence of a new type of trade deal the scan back that gives retailers a discount on unitssoldduring the promotion rather than on unitsbought we develop a theory to compare retailer pricing decisions and profitability under scan back and traditional off invoice trade deals we show that when the terms of the trade deal are identical retailers prefer off invoice trade deals and manufacturers prefer scan backs manufacturers can however redesign the scan back to leave the retailer weakly better off and leave themselves strictly better off using proprietary data from the beverage category we conduct an empirical analysis and find that during the promotion period scan back trade deals relative to off invoice deals 1 do not cause excess ordering and 2 generate higher retail sales through lower retail prices implications for researchers and managers are discussed

game theory and empirical generalizations concerning competitive promotions this paper offers the generalization that competitive promotions are mixed strategies first an empirical regularity is established that promotions are independent across competitors this regularity is then elaborated on in the context of a promotion game the promotion game is linked to observable outcomes and a classification of possible situations is developed in particular the classification includes the prisoners dilemma battle of the sexes and marketing models of promotion competition the evidence for the generalization comes from a variety of product markets spanning trade promotions retail price reductions and retail promotions such as advertised specials the product markets include coffee baby diapers toilet tissue saltines dishwashing fluid ketchup and detergents among others the data in some cases were from cooperating grocery chains and in others from iri scanner panels the evidence from extant research and from new analyses is presented each situation is identified as be

how complex do movie channel contracts need to be the motion picture industry is characterized by a dynamic market environment limited shelf space and product category management and consequently complex channel contracts specifying the split of box office revenue between distributors and exhibitors although such a contracting practice creates a considerable administrative effort and channel conflict it is not clear whether such complexity is necessary for superior channel performance this study investigates this question by analyzing the impact of movie contract structure on movie scheduling and channel member profitability we develop and analyze a game theoretic model using the genetic algorithm approach and a decision support system silverscreener to capture strategic behaviors of channel members in a complex market environment we find that simpler two part tariff or 50 50 split contracts perform as well as the current contracts thus the complexity of the market environment need not be reflected in the complexity of the channel contracts channel contract structure has significant impact on channel member profitability and the exhibitor s movie scheduling behavior in particular our results indicate that the flat rate contract structure represents an attractive alternative to the current practice for distributors

why do entrepreneurs enter politics evidence from china this article examines the determinants of the entrepreneur s political participation by employing a unique matched firm institution data set from china we find that the likelihood of an entrepreneur s participation can be explained by the underdevelopment of markets and market supporting institutions according to our estimates the probability of entering politics decreases by 8 20 from the mean when the institutional indices improve by one standard deviation our findings support the view that the institutional environment shapes the private entrepreneur s motivation to participate in politics they also provide an example of how private entrepreneurs respond to state market failure in developing and transition countries jel g1 h00 o10 p2 p3

public versus private ownership of firms evidence from rural china why are many of china s successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities using a set of provincial data we find that the share of community public firms township village enterprises or tves relative to private enterprises is higher where the central government s influence is greater the community government s power is stronger and the level of market development is lower we also find that tves help achieve the community government s goals of increasing government revenue rural nonfarm employment and rural income however tves do not increase rural income given the levels of nonfarm employment and local public goods provision indicating possible inefficiency as compared with private enterprises