trade and protection in vertically related markets abstract we consider home country tariff and subsidy policies in a setting where a home firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated firm for supplies of a key input the firms are cournot competitors in the home market for the final product we show that a tariff on final product imports may cause the foreign vertically integrated firm to reduce the price charged for the input under circumstances where a simple monopoly supplier of the input would increase its price supply conditions for the input significantly affect whether imports of the input should be taxed or subsidized

natural gas futures bias predictive performance and the theory of storage this study reports several empirical findings concerning natural gas futures prices first spot and futures prices are non stationary and the observed trends are due to positive drifts in the random walk components of the prices rather than possible deterministic time trends second market forecast errors are stationary third futures are less than expected future spot prices so that futures are backwardated fourth the bias in the futures prices is time varying fifth futures have statistically significant market timing ability despite the bias in the magnitude forecasts finally the data lends partial support to the cost of carry theory of the basis determination

the effects of human resource management practices on productivity a study of steel finishing lines the authors investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of thirty six homogeneous steel production lines owned by seventeen companies the productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices which include incentive pay teams flexible job assignments employment security and training achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach which includes narrow job definitions strict work rules and hourly pay with close supervision their results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices

market power in emission permit markets theory and evidence from the eu ets a well known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm i show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone i then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase i of the eu ets i find that some firms excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions my results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets

some examples of dynamic cournot duopoly with inventory this article analyzes a two period game where firms can produce inventory in the first period for sale in the second period we assume that revenues and costs are time invariant and that the firms are symmetric we focus on the nature and the existence of the subgame perfect equilibrium of this model we use examples to show that the nash value functions defined on the joint inventory vector are likely to be ill behaved in particular they need not be concave nor even continuous in the firm s own inventory as a result asymmetric equilibrium is possible when average production costs are falling single firm operation can occur in equilibrium nonexistence is also a distinct possibility

cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials abstract saloner 1987 analyzes a cournot model with two production periods before the market clears if costs do not vary across periods any point on the outer envelope of the reaction functions between the firms stackelberg outputs is attainable with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne saloner s analysis is generalized by allowing for cost differences across periods the continuum of equilibria vanishes for any cost differential if costs fall slightly over time there are multiple leader follower equilibria otherwise the model generates a unique spne where both firms produce their single period cournot outputs in the period when production is cheaper

empirical implications of alternative models of firm dynamics abstract this paper considers two models of firm behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms idiosyncratic or firm specific sources of uncertainty and discrete outcomes exit and or entry both the characteristics of firm level panel data sets and the nature of the questions we characteristically ask of them imply that models with these features are likely to underlie most detailed empirical work on microdata sets the models we consider are a bayesian learning model due to jovanovic 20 and a model of research and exploration due to ericson and pakes 11 the paper provides a simple set of empirical procedures to help determine which if either of these two models might be appropriate for alternative data sets we conclude by checking for the implications of the two models on an eight year panel of wisconsin firms the results indicate that one model is consistent with the data on manufacturing firms while the other is consistent with the data on retail trade journal of economic literature classification numbers c52 l60 l80

time varying risk and long term reversals a re examination of the international evidence long term reversals ltrs have been extensively documented as existing in international markets the predictability of returns opens the question whether investors should continue to diversify across international markets such predictability also has implications for the corporate decision of where and when to raise capital this paper re examines the international evidence for long term contrarian profits using a longer time horizon than all previous studies 81 years of data from 1925 to 2005 and finds that the long term contrarian anomaly disappears when time varying conditional alphas are considered this is true even without transaction costs for the marginal trader conservative transaction costs subsume ltr profits whether returns are risk adjusted or not this suggests that benefits from actual trades on ltrs do not negate a strategy based on diversification although time varying beta has been extensively documented as ineffective in describing ltrs this paper demonstrates that it is important to control for time variation in alpha a full conditional capital asset pricing model captures the ltr premium this suggests that macroeconomic factors are important for understanding ltrs and their associated risk

efficient mechanisms for access to storage when competition in gas markets is imperfect abstract scarce storage capacity and distortions in access to storage can lead to market foreclosure in liberalized gas markets we consider rules currently adopted in europe for storage allocation and discuss efficient rationing mechanisms as based on the value of storage when other flexibility inputs are partially available we initially analyze productive efficiency issues without explicitly considering vertical restraints we then assume imperfect competition in the downstream market for gas supplies given the availability of storage capacity upstream and analyze strategic behavior in a two stage model in this framework we compare regulated storage tariffs coupled with a centralized rationing mechanism with storage auctions finally we consider the allocation of storage that arises from welfare maximization by a benevolent social planner we find that it is usually optimal to maximize the amount of storage capacity allocated to new entrants in liberalized gas markets storage auctions deviate from the optimal mechanism but still afford greater efficiency than do rules that allocate storage capacity independently of its value furthermore storage allocation appears to be a powerful mechanism with which to improve competition and efficiency in gas markets

evaluating the economic cost of natural gas strategic storage restrictions the european commission wants to implement a single market for gas one of the components of this market is a regulated provision for security of supply which consists of rules for the implementation and use of a given reserve stock of gas we investigate the impact of this policy on the profitability of a storage operator using data from denmark and italy keeping storage capacity constant the costs of the strategic stock are around 20 of the value of the storage market for denmark and 16 for italy this cost is due to the inability to extract arbitrage profits from the captive stock furthermore the strategic storage restriction induces behavior that would virtually never be replicated by a private storage operator in an unconstrained market in particular in the first 6 months of the year when unconstrained firms empty their reservoirs much faster suggesting the strategic restriction is unnecessarily distorting the market c 2010 published by elsevier b v less

entry and exit decisions in flexible teams the present study identifies a major limitation of current research on multinational enterprises mnes joint decision making in a distributed setting is of critical importance in practice but has received little attention in our theories to address this gap in knowledge we examine the effects of flexible decision teams when mnes assess turbulent markets remarkably flexible teams composed of fallible evaluators can outperform what is usually thought of as an optimal decision our main result supports the claims advanced in recent empirical studies structural flexibility can help mnes achieve high levels of performance even in conditions of turbulence

stochastic programming for decentralized newsvendor with transshipment abstract this paper discusses a family of two stage decentralized inventory problems using a unifying framework taxonomy depicted as a multilevel graph this framework allows us to model and link different problems of competing retailers who independently procure inventory in response to uncertain demand and anticipated inventory decisions of other retailers in this family of problems in the ex post stage the retailers exercise recourse actions in response to the realized demand and competitors chosen procurement levels for example retailers could coordinate inventory transshipment to satisfy shortage with overage based on profit sharing agreements our framework provides a unifying parsimonious view using a single methodological prism for a variety of problems equally importantly as recourse options are laid out our framework clarifies and contributes a modeling connection between problems in a clear taxonomy of models this unifying perspective explicitly links work that appeared in isolation and offers future research directions

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

a decision support framework for evaluating revenue performance in sequential purchase contexts abstract this paper studies the product ordering problem in sequential purchase contexts where sellers aim to maximize their revenue faced with budget constrained buyers we propose a multi layered decision support framework that combines empirical data with simulation optimization and econometric methods to address this problem our framework allows sellers to i compare revenue performances of limited information sequencing strategies ii quantify benchmark revenue levels that can be achieved via the optimal sequence based on detailed buyer information iii determine the costs of limited information and strategic buyers to the seller and iv identify the moderators of sequencing strategy performance we illustrate our framework through two applications in a business to business used car auction setting contrary to previous studies reporting practitioners tendency to sequence items from the lowest value to the highest our results suggest that the best performing limited information sequencing strategy depends on buyers bidding behavior we also find that the revenue difference between the optimal sequence and a limited information sequencing strategy can be substantial our results show that a significant portion of this revenue difference is associated with the seller s limited information on buyers budgets and product valuations our applications also provide various sensitivity analyses and develop new propositions on the moderators of the relationship between the seller s revenue and sequencing strategies

trips trade and technology transfer a north south model of unintentional technology transfer is developed where the stringency of southern patent protection provides the institutional backdrop for a strategic game in a high tech goods market the appropriability regime is set endogenously and combines elements of imperfect southern patent protection with the protection afforded by market made northern technology masking less stringent protection of northern intellectual property can work much like other strategic trade policies therefore developed countries appear to be right in demanding discussion of intellectual property rights in gatt

interdependency competition and the distribution of firm and industry profits coordination of interdependencies among firms productive activities has been advanced as a promising explanation for sustained heterogeneity in capabilities among firms in this paper we extend this line of research to determine the industry structures and patterns of expected firm profits for the case when difficulty optimizing interdependent activities does in fact generate and sustain capability heterogeneity among firms we combine a widely used agent based model where firms search to discover sets of activities that complement one another reducing overall costs or raising product quality with traditional economic models of competition among profit maximizing firms the agent based model produces a distribution of performance interpreted as variable cost or product quality among firms and the competition models determine resulting industry outcomes including patterns of entry exit and profits the integration of economic models of competition among firms with an agent based model of search for improvement by firms reveals a rich relationship between interdependencies in production functions and industry structure firm profits and industry average profitability

firm survival and industry evolution in vertically related populations this paper examines how the density and governance of vertically related populations affect the life chances of organizations we integrate the literatures on organizational ecology and vertical integration to develop a theory of how 1 specialized upstream industries affect downstream survival rates 2 the prevalence of different governance forms among upstream and downstream organizations moderates this relationship and 3 different forms of governance exert differential competitive pressures on focal organizations we find evidence supporting our hypotheses in an empirical examination of the downstream laser printer industry and upstream laser engine industry this paper was accepted by jesper sorensen organizations

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

organizational constraints to adaptation intrafirm asymmetry in the locus of coordination we assemble a panel data set of firms in the u s defense industry between 1996 and 2006 to examine the drivers of heterogeneous incumbent firm adaptation following the industry wide demand shock of september 11 2001 this shock entailed not only an increase in aggregate demand but more importantly a shift in the relative attractiveness of individual product areas resulting in the need for firms to reshuffle their product portfolios in response to changing demand conditions the exogenous nature of the shock allows us to empirically identify the effect of preshock interdependence structures on postshock adaptation outcomes we find that the locus of coordination inside a firm can explain differential postshock adaptation performance because interdependencies spanning organizational boundaries are more difficult to manage than those contained within such boundaries coordination across product areas creates greater adaptation challenges compared with coordination within product areas we further inves

endogenous stackelberg equilibria with identical firms abstract a symmetric duopoly with two production periods is considered in the first period firms simultaneously choose initial production levels these outputs become common knowledge and then additional second period outputs are chosen simultaneously the market clears after the second period if production costs fall slightly over time a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist there are two stackelberg leader follower outcomes in each outcome one firm produces only in the first period and the other produces its best response in the second period this paper allows the firms to use mixed strategies and analyzes a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d43 l13

strategic outsourcing revisited this paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market we apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by fudenberg and tirole 1984 to characterize the different equilibria and find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market if firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals costs we illustrate our analysis using a linear cournot model

the effects of a content requirement on a foreign duopsonist abstract this paper considers the operation of a local content requirement in a duopsony between domestic and foreign firms and demonstrates its consequences for the domestic producer of a final good it is shown that content protection may have perverse effects on a foreign firm s profits and may be welfare improving overall shifting profits from the domestic firm to both the foreign firm and domestic input producers

the grouping of stars an application to professional sports abstract this paper uses a two period model to analyze competition for high quality labor in a professional sports market leagues vertically differentiate their products by competing for the services of a small number of stars thereby endogenizing the cost of product quality if utility is linear or convex in the number of stars one league successfully employs all of them this grouping of stars results in an equilibrium market structure of either a monopoly or a duopoly depending on the opportunity costs of players and the number of consumers market efficiency of the resulting equilibrium is then discussed

examining market power in the european natural gas market in this paper we develop a mixed complementarity equilibrium model for the european natural gas market this model has producers as cournot players with conjectured supply functions relative to their rivals as such these producers can withhold production to increase downstream prices for greater profits the other players are taken to be perfectly competitive and are combined with extensive pipeline seasonal and other data reflecting the current state of the market four market scenarios are run to analyze the extent of market power by these producers as well as the importance of pipeline and storage capacity

internationalization and firm risk an upstream downstream hypothesis corporate international diversification theory posits that multinational corporations mncs should have lower risk and higher financial leverage than purely domestic corporations dcs we suggest an alternative upstream downstream hypothesis according to which the overall effect of internationalization on the risk and leverage of mncs is expected to vary with home and target market conditions the empirical results are consistent with the suggested hypothesis

interdependency competition and industry dynamics asystematic understanding of industry dynamics is critical to strategy research because individual firm performance dynamics both reflect and affect change at the industry level descriptive research on industry dynamics has identified a dominant pattern where prices fall output rises and the number of firms rises and then falls over time several models have been advanced to explain these patterns with a particular focus on explaining why a shakeout in the number of firms occurs in the most prominent models shakeout is generated by rising realized heterogeneity among firms that either is assumed to be unrecognized but determined ex ante or is generated by stochastic innovation outcomes coupled with convex adjustment costs and scale advantages in innovation and learning in this paper we develop an alternative model where heterogeneity develops among firms over time leading to a shakeout because firms must make choices about highly interdependent productive activities where the ideal combinations cannot be easily deduced or imitated by combining two established models a cournot model of competition with an nk model of interdependency in production activities we are able to advance an alternative explanation for the observed patterns of industry behavior including shakeout we show that variation in the potential for interdependency in activities among industries is able to explain varying levels of shakeout as well as differing patterns of entry and exit among industries notably the model generates several empirical predictions not apparent in past research and several that directly conflict with the results of prominent alternative models of industry dynamics specifically we show that when the potential for interdependency within an industry is low entry slows down and incumbent survival is all but assured whereas in industries where the potential for interdependencies is high shakeouts are severe and the rates of entry and exit remain high over longer time periods with decreasing survival rates for incumbents

political consumerism and public policy good complements against market failures political consumerism has become over the past years an ever growing phenomenon by which citizens express through their consumption their political environmental and ethical opinions this paper discusses political consumerism from an economic science perspective focusing on the link between political consumerism and public policies it wonders to what extent political consumerism may represent an effective and fair instrument against market failures overall it seems that it would be better to consider it as a complement to conventional public policies

some economics of seasonal gas storage we propose a model of seasonal gas markets which is flexible enough to include supply and demand shocks while also considering exhaustibility the relative performances of alternative policies based on price caps and associated measures or tariffs are discussed we illustrate with structural estimates on us data how this theory can be used to give insights into the intertemporal incidence of policy instruments

strategy complexity and economic rent this paper discusses important friction forces that future theories of strategy must incorporate some of these are technological and environmental but the most important ones it is argued are psychological the view is developed that strategy at its core concerns the development and testing of heuristics for high stake decisions in environments too unstable and complex to be optimized the paper especially highlights the behavioral dimension in the belief that strategies should incorporate both the rational and suboptimal aspects of human behavior the rational approach is in many ways the easier as there may be only one way to be right yet the great variety in which people and companies can err gives strategy its creative and real world challenge the tension between the rational and behavioral components is what the field of strategy should seek to exploit

good times bad times and vertical upstream integration abstract we consider a set of downstream firms each of which has a stochastic requirement for a particular input downstream firms can produce the input themselves yet do not trade it upstream firms produce the input to sell it through a walrasian market to downstream firms efficient pooling of capacities requires the input to be produced by upstream firms and traded in the market yet downstream firms will always vertically integrate by producing some of its own input needs a downstream firm cuts down on aggregate input demand thus depressing prices in the market

the failing firm defense this paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm defense ffd in the eu and u s merger laws to this end i combine an oligopoly model with an endogenous valuations auction model the ffd is shown to work reasonably well for consumers unless small firms are too small the ffd may however lead to total surplus losses due to a least danger to competition ldc condition which favors small and thus possibly inefficient firms it is also shown that in a multi firm setting the ffd increases the incentive for predation only when the assets are industry specific

optimal cross licensing arrangements collusion versus entry deterrence this paper analyzes optimal cross licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants the optimal cross licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis a vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation we show that a positive cross licensing royalty rate which would otherwise relax competition and sustain a collusive outcome dulls incentives to litigate against entrants our analysis can shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry as such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as entry deterrence mechanism

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

frontrunners and laggards the strategy of environmental regulation under uncertainty the extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts first companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation second ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates finally regulators use limited information provided by the industry i construct a game theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator in equilibrium companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry this profit driven behavior is not always socially detrimental however as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost additionally the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates if companies condition compliance on the installation cost only low cost companies install in equilibrium the analysis combines regulatory capture with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator

multi sector model of tradable emission permits this paper presents a multi sector model of tradable emission permits which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive industries the firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well as in the product market specifically we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets it is shown that raising the number of initial permits allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm under certain conditions raising a clean less polluting firm s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices we discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits considering the trade off between production inefficiency and consumer benefit

a characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions in a cournot model with linear costs under linear demand a small reduction in a firm s marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its market share is less than 1 2n 2 or equivalently its marginal cost exceeds a critical level determined by the market a large cost reduction by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value the paper also extends the results to non linear demand but the characterizations become less tractable

endogenous protection foreign direct investment and protection building trade abstract we introduce the possibility of foreign direct investment fdi in a strategic oligopolistic setting with endogenous protection and find that a number of unique subgame perfect equilibria may arise including a new result we call protection building trade this phenomenon occurs in our model when foreign firms locating production in the home country try to increase protectionist pressures in the home country through increased exports to provide larger barriers against other foreign competitors in future periods we discuss how the foreign firm behavior surrounding significant u s protectionist actions including the vers on japanese automobiles may be consistent with protection building trade behavior

voluntary pollution reductions and the enforcement of environmental law an empirical study of the 33 50 program abstract this paper studies determinants and effects of firms participation in the 33 50 program which is a voluntary pollution reduction vpr program initiated by government regulators we examine a wide range of explanations for voluntary corporate environmentalism and find evidence in support of an enforcement theory that predicts that 1 vpr participation is rewarded by relaxed regulatory scrutiny 2 the anticipation of this reward spurs firms to participate in the program and 3 the program rewards regulators with reduced pollution we also find that 33 50 participation was more likely for firms operating in states with larger environmentalist constituencies

when are private standards more stringent than public standards retailers private standards are increasingly important for addressing consumer concerns about safety quality and social and environmental issues empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts this article develops a political economy model that helps explain this stylized fact we show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one depending on several factors

national treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities we analyze the role of national treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy a social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good we show that whether national treatment of standards interferes with welfare maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker consumption or emissions tax and differences in the cost of complying with the standard we also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal this asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare maximizing policy to violate national treatment on analyse le role du principe de traitement identique des entites domestiques ou importees dans la reglementation des normes environnementales dans une economie ouverte un gouvernement utilise des normes pour controler les emissions decoulant de la consommation d un produit transige internationalement on montre que le fait que le traitement identique des normes va ou non interferer avec l objectif poursuivi qui est de maximiser le niveau de bien etre va dependre de l ensemble des instruments disponibles pour l architecte des politiques une taxe sur la consommation ou sur les emissions et des differences dans les couts a encourir pour se conformer aux normes on souligne aussi l incidence asymetrique des normes sur les produits domestiques et importes quand les taxes sont sous optimales cette incidence asymetrique peut faire que la politique qui vise la maximisation du bien etre soit en violation du principe de traitement identique

globalization of corporate risk taking we explore how the interconnected nature of global finance affects corporate risk taking we show that a common global factor known to be associated with fluctuations in cross border banking is also strongly associated with common co movements in corporate risk taking across a diverse universe of international firms our study contributes to the international business literature as the first comprehensive investigation of how global financial conditions induce greater synchronization of risk taking across regions and sectors

selective contracts foreclosure and the chicago school view abstract i examine a mechanism by which exclusive supply contracts may inefficiently deter entry into the market in the model the incumbent supplier selectively offers contracts only to some buyers and convinces them to consent by guaranteeing them low prices the contracts strengthen the monopoly position of the incumbent supplier and allow it to extract rents from the remaining buyers that were not offered contracts aside from the favorable contract terms buyers have another reason to consent to the exclusivity scheme the latter raises the input costs of rival buyers that were not offered contracts the model has potential applications to the recent microsoft antitrust case 1994 i define exclusive supply contract as an agreement under which an upstream firm becomes the exclusive supplier of a downstream firm the downstream firm is prohibited from buying from other suppliers

from the editors explaining theoretical relationships in international business research focusing on the arrows not the boxes distinctive features of articles accepted by the journal of international business studies are that they are multidisciplinary in scope and interdisciplinary in content and methodology and they make a substantial theoretical contribution to international business studies failure to meet this last requirement is an often cited reason given by reviewers for article rejection sometimes reviewers mean that a manuscript does not conform to the dominant paradigm in that it is not the next logical step in the study of a phenomenon or they mean that there is little if any integration of several theories used to explain a phenomenon however perhaps the most common underlying meaning when reviewers cite lack of a theoretical contribution for rejection is that the nature of the relationships proposed is not well explained while the first two meanings may be influenced by the specific discipline or methodology involved this final one is not in this editorial we provide a set of guidelines that authors can use to ensure that their paper meets the standard of explaining the logic of the relationships they propose

competition policy in the united states an overview this paper provides a summary of the basic policies in the united states that affect the state of competition in u s markets much of the paper focuses on antitrust policy but a substantial fraction of the paper is devoted to regulatory policies for both types of policies the paper explains the basic structures of the policies and also provides discussions of recent developments copyright 1993 by oxford university press

an experimental evaluation of strategic preemption abstract this paper reports the results of a series of two stage two person noncooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other in one of our designs the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption in the other it entails partial preemption the data show that players tend to completely preempt when it is privately optimal however when partial preemption is privately optimal a non trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non preemptive structure this may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively

a cultural explanation of the foreign bias in international asset allocation abstract this paper examines the foreign bias in international asset allocation following extant literature in behavioral finance we argue that a society s culture and the cultural distance between two markets play an important role in explaining the foreign bias in particular we hypothesize that the degree of a nation s uncertainty avoidance affects the foreign bias more uncertainty avoiding countries allocate less to foreign markets as does the degree of a country s individualism in individualistic countries performance is more directly attributed to a person and less to teams causing these individuals to be more aggressive in their foreign asset allocations we further expect that the degree of cultural distance between two countries affects the amount of money allocated to that market based on extensive robustness analyses we find support for our hypotheses on the role of culture in international asset allocation

failure to complete cross border m as to vs from emerging markets while cross border mergers and acquisitions m as involving emerging markets have been increasing in recent years a high percentage collapse before completion this study investigates how the predictors of cross border m a completion involving emerging markets depend upon the direction of global expansion i e investment inbound to a developing market or outbound from a developing market analysis based on 15 years of data from four emerging economies brazil russia india and china from 1995 to 2010 reveals fundamental differences in the predictors of inbound vs outbound m a completion country level factors reflecting differences in political trade and legal environments strongly affect the completion for inbound m as but have a much weaker influence on outbound m as by contrast firm level factors such as past m a experience have a significantly stronger effect on completion for outbound than for inbound m as most interestingly two deal level factors the percentage of stake sought by the acquirer and whether or not the deal is a cash transaction increase the likelihood of completion for inbound but decrease it for outbound m as these findings have important managerial implications for enhancing the success of global expansions

an empirical test of the resource based theory strategic regulation in the dutch audit industry the resource based view of the firm is a recent strategic management theory that seeks to identify the resources that may provide firms with a sustainable competitive advantage this paper has two purposes first the paper relates strategic management arguments to parallel lines of reasoning in industrial organization theory and argues that strategic regulation is a major source of sustainable competitive advantage the second purpose of the paper is to report the results of an empirical test of the resource based theory on the basis of a longitudinal data set on the postwar history of the dutch audit industry a key determinant of this history proves to be strategic regulation which stimulates demand for audit services and protects rent producing resources

exclusive dealing before bork and beyond abstractantitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that bork articulated in the antitrust paradox indeed they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain when exclusive dealing might possibly cause harm and have modeled a variety of special cases where it does some albeit not all of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges

impact of growth opportunities and competition on firm level capability development trade offs how should managers prioritize among production product development branding internationalization and other capabilities and resources this question is central to the resource based view and the answer depends not only on the direct returns on investment in each capability but also on the trade offs in using those returns for future growth or survival in a competitive market through simulation experiments this study examines firm level capability development trade offs in the context of a firm s market level competition and growth it is found that investing in operational capabilities which enhance short term performance gains priority over investing in long term dynamic capabilities when the operational capability investment strengthens the reinforcing loop between performance investment flow and capability development such operational capability investment provides growth opportunities and competitive advantage moreover in strategic competition firms anticipating rivals focus on short term growth need to further ignore dynamic long term capability building in order to survive testable propositions are offered as to how trade offs between short term and long term investments depend on different firm and industry characteristics the results may explain why short term focused firm behavior persists in firms even in the absence of discounting short term managerial incentives decision biases or learning failures

upgrades switching costs and the leverage theory of tying this article investigates the role of product upgrades and consumer switching costs in the tying of complementary products previous analyses have found that a monopolist of one product will not increase its profits and reduce social welfare by tying and leveraging its monopoly position into a complementary market if the initial monopolised product is essential where essential means that all uses of the complementary good require the initial monopolised product we show that this is not true in settings characterised by product upgrades and consumer switching costs we also discuss various extensions including the role of the reversibility of tying

caveat innovator strategic and structural characteristics of new product introductions abstract the assumptions underlying models of strategic behavior by incumbents are evaluated using a case study of a ground coffee product introduction the assumption underlying earlier strategic models that the entrant does not know the incumbent s payoffs after strategic have been tested does not appear to apply instead strategic behavior is observed to hinge on ex ante uncertainty about the structure of the payoff matrix and the incremental decision making which this uncertainty spawns in this environment strategies which create noise can slow learning and delay entry

do markets differ much this essay reports the results of a crosssection study of differences in accounting profitability that sheds light on some basic controversies in industrial economics most previous cross section studies in this field have been concerned with testing hypotheses about structural coefficients in models meant to apply to essentially all markets as we have learned more about the difficulties of constructing such general models and of performing tests on their structural parameters properly structural cross section analysis has fallen out of fashion in contrast to most of the cross section literature the analysis reported here is fundamentally descriptive it does not attempt directly to estimate or to test hypotheses about structural parameters i hope to show by example that one can perform illuminating analysis of cross section data without a host of controversial maintained hypotheses cross section data can yield interesting stylized facts to guide both general theorizing and empirical analysis of specific industries even if they cannot easily support full blown structural estimation one can view the sort of search for stylized facts conducted here as either a replacement for or an input to interindustry structural estimation depending on one s feeling about the long run potential of that research approach this study also departs from much of the cross section literature by being fundamentally concerned with the importance of various effects not just with coefficient signs and t statistics in particular this essay provides estimates of the relative importance of firm market and market share differences in the determination of business unit divisional profitability in u s manufacturing using 1975 data from the line of business program of the u s federal trade commission ftc i find support neither for the existence of firm effects nor for the importance of market share effects moreover while industry effects apparently exist and are important they appear to be negatively correlated with seller concentration in these data section i relates firm market and share effects to current issues and controversies in industrial economics and thus supplies the motivation for our empirical analysis the remainder of the essay treats the data and

regional free trade and social integration this paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective in contrast to most other literature which fails to take into account geographical factors it is argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners a political support maximizing government will consider these factors when balancing political support from free traders and protectionists

government manipulation of constitutional level transaction costs a general theory of transaction cost augmentation and the growth of government transaction costs are pivotal to the ongoing political choice of where to draw the line between the private sector and the public sector contrary to the dominant paradigm politically important transaction costs are actively manipulated in the public sector by those who perceive potential personal gain from such action over time transaction cost changes so created by government decision makers may fundamentally redefine the role and scope of government to analyze the role of transaction costs in the growth or decline of government it is essential to distinguish transaction costs that are unavoidable realworld constraints from those that are contrived in the sense that they are created by government officials use or extension of their existing authority once discretionary power is vested in the government its officials have both the capacity and the incentive to restructure the transaction costs constraining the revision ofgovernrnental authority this restructuring of transaction costs may take two forms 1 altering people s perceptions of the costs and benefits of governmental authority in a given sphere an information cost problem 1 2 altering the cost of acting upon one s perceptions of the costs and benefits of collectivization in order to procure revision of the scope of governmental authority 2

access to natural gas storage facilities strategic and regulation issues abstract in this paper we analyze the strategic function of gas storage focusing on how gas storage decisions impact competition between gas companies on both spot and downstream markets using a two tier oligopolistic structure we first show that gas storage is actually used strategically even in a symmetric oligopolistic setting along the gas value chain storage is then a way to intensify competition on the spot market second we analyze the setting where a company has favored access to storage for example due to a historical monopolistic position and we analyze this as a leadership situation in the context of tpa regulation we then show that this setting compels the leader to adopt a strategic storage decision this strategy consists of levels of gas stored being greater than supplies available in the downstream market such a leader decision is part of a strategy to raise a rival s costs furthermore one can think that optimal regulation of the access to storage facilities would prevent such a behavior however especially when storage is not too costly we show that preventing a storage strategy for the leader is not optimal since the strategy helps to reduce the spot market price

the strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards this paper investigates the welfare consequences of strategic behavior by firms to affect the amount of environmental regulation they face environmental regulation often attempts to force an industry to develop cleaner technology but the regulator may have no means to commit to a specific standard this lack of regulatory commitment induces firms to choose innovation strategically it is well known that firms have incentives to suppress innovation to induce the regulator to ratchet down the standard and this strategic behavior lowers welfare this paper explores a countervailing incentive in oligopoly settings firms have heightened incentives to innovate so as to increase regulation and raise rivals costs in equilibrium the incentive to raise rivals cost can mitigate the welfare loss arising from no regulatory commitment also a regulator who is unable to commit ex ante to the stringency of a regulatory standard can induce more clean technology than a regulator with a commitment mechanism

a signaling model of environmental overcompliance abstract we present a theory of unilateral regulatory overcompliance as a signaling device firms that have a competitive advantage in the use of a cleaner but more costly technology overcomply in order to signal to an imperfectly informed benevolent government that compliance costs are low thereby triggering tougher regulation we identify the conditions under which such an overcompliance signaling equilibrium arises showing that there may be over overcompliance in that firms may overcomply even when tougher regulation is not socially desirable we also discuss the differential implications of the signaling theory as compared to other theories of unilateral regulatory overcompliance

does an endogenous relationship exist between environmental and economic performance a resource based view on the horticultural sector the aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between environmental and economic performance from the resource based theory within firms of the fresh fruit and vegetables sector this study considers that the adoption of environment friendly practices has a greater influence on firms opportunities and abilities in the agricultural sector than in manufacturing sectors and leads to closer links between performance variables the reference for this empirical analysis is a panel data of horticultural farming marketing firms in spain the voluntary environmental programmes and the heterogeneity of their application lead us to regard acquiring a competitive advantage as a relevant driver to improve environmental performance in this sector a simultaneous equations model is suggested reflecting the differential environmental effect and the assumption of endogeneity among variables the results show a positive impact of environmental differentiation on profitability and market share also suggesting that the perception of this positive experience implies greater environmental performance

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references

access pricing and exclusionary behavior abstract when a regulated upstream monopolist vertically integrates downstream a price squeeze or non price discrimination becomes a concern the access pricing rule that protects against this type of exclusionary behavior is unique and is a form of the efficient component pricing rule

an integrated location production distribution and investment model for a multinational corporation abstract we present a mixed integer linear formulation that extends published models on multinational corporation facility location decisions by including exogenous variables such as exchange rates and tariff rates and incorporating production distribution and investment decisions the model provides insights on production levels facility configurations distribution strategies and levels of investment needed at these facilities and explores factors that influence the facility s configuration decisions several scenarios are considered based on various facility configurations and levels of exchange and tariff rates the results obtained from these show that the model s performance and results are in complete agreement with accepted economic theories