time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

wage and employment growth in america s drug epidemic is all growth created equal the rise in drug overdose deaths in the united states since the turn of the millennium has been extraordinary a popular narrative paints a picture whereby opioid overdoses among white male less educated rural workers have been caused by reduced economic opportunities borne by such people in this article we causally test the validity of this theory by using bartik type variables to explore the relationship between local economic conditions and county opioid overdose death rates we add to the literature by exploring how both employment and wage growth in different types of industries are related to opioid overdose deaths for the population as a whole as well as for rural vs urban male vs female and white vs black populations we find mixed evidence our results confirm that wage and employment growth in industries more likely to employ low skill workers are important protective factors for rural white males however we also find evidence that economic improvements in low skill industries are just as important in protecting blacks and women against opioid overdoses and for workers in metro counties we also find evidence that employment growth in high paying industries has led to increases in opioid overdoes rates

aggregation and aggregation we discuss economic aggregation and political aggregation in the context of a simple dynamic version of the canonical political economy model the meltzer richard model consumers differ both in labor productivity and initial asset wealth and there is no physical capital under commitment over future tax policy and for economic preferences that imply aggregation in assets and productivity the induced policy preferences for individuals do not depend on any distributional characteristics other than means they imply time inconsistency with taxes changing between the first and the second periods and staying constant thereafter political aggregation in the form of a median voter theorem applies only in special cases jel d72 d78 e61 h23

modeling the experimentally organized economy complex dynamics in an empirical micro macro model of endogenous economic growth abstract the swedish micro to macro model moses is used to show how complex economic behavior emerges from interacting boundedly rational agents the simulation model has been calibrated using business firm data non linearities arise in its specification of technology the distribution of firm characteristics and in the rules that govern entry and exit the model economy is characterized by a restless competitive growth process that is normally robust but that now and then generates phases of local disorderly behavior including for some parameter settings the collapse of entire sectors the model explains why government agents have difficulty predicting the reactions of the economy to policies suggesting that government treads cautiously in order not to do more harm than good

does drinking really decrease in bad times this paper investigates the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and drinking using individual level data from 1987 to 1999 interview years of the behavioral risk factor surveillance system brfss we confirm the procyclical variation in overall drinking identified in previous research using aggregate sales data and show that this largely results from changes in consumption by existing drinkers rather than movements into or out of drinking moreover the decrease occurring during bad economic times is concentrated among heavy consumers with light drinking actually rising we also find no evidence that the decline in overall alcohol use masks a rise for persons becoming unemployed during contractions these results suggest that any stress induced increases in drinking during bad economic times are more than offset by declines resulting from changes in economic factors such as lower incomes

time consistent redistribution if the government cares more about workers than about capitalists and taxes capital income to finance redistribution to workers how are inequality and capital accumulation affected in the long run assuming that the government cannot commit to future taxes a time consistent equilibrium a differentiable subgame perfect markov equilibrium is characterized in this equilibrium the current government in part uses the tax via capital accumulation to manipulate future governments into setting lower taxes the equilibrium has substantially lower taxes on capital income than 100 even though workers do not save and even though the weight on capitalists in government utility is negligible

bartik instruments what when why and how the bartik instrument is formed by interacting local industry shares and national industry growth rates we show that the typical use of a bartik instrument assumes a pooled exposure research design where the shares measure differential exposure to common shocks and identification is based on exogeneity of the shares next we show how the bartik instrument weights each of the exposure designs finally we discuss how to assess the plausibility of the research design we illustrate our results through two applications estimating the elasticity of labor supply and estimating the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives

a note on economic conditions and alcohol problems this paper reexamines the effect of the business cycle on alcohol consumption using u s state level analysis introduced by rhum ruhm c j 1995 economic conditions and alcohol problems journal of health economics 14 583 603 using an extended panel this analysis finds that ruhm s estimates are biased and inconsistent due to the problem of non stationarity in alcohol consumption and state economic condition time series corrected estimation using logarithmic first differences confirms ruhm s original finding of pro cyclical alcohol consumption but these results unlike ruhm s are robust to sample period

voting over redistribution in the meltzer richard model under interdependent labor inputs abstract this paper extends the median voter result of meltzer and richard 1981 to the case where a labor economy has any constant returns to scale production function under quasilinear preferences with constant wage elasticity average productivities of the different labor inputs depend on their relative abundance in the economy agents are heterogeneous due to their labor type and given type due to their relative efficiency they vote over income tax rates which in turn dictate the level of redistribution the paper shows that preferences over tax rates are single peaked and hence the median voter theorem applies this framework connects the scarcity of inputs to the most preferred tax rates

from plan to markets abstract while formerly planned economies lack critical institutions ailing welfare economies have too many reducing investment incentives in both while institutional redesign is urgent in the formerly planned economies there is no instant concern in the west where institutional change must be realized through reluctant democratic procedures some formerly planned economies therefore are likely to improve upon the west in institutional design and experience superior long run economic growth they explicitly link investment incentives one way to property rights and the other to investment and growth to demonstrate how such superior performance can be achieved

voting for income immiserizing redistribution in the meltzer richard model this paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers unlike labor income requires no direct sacrifice of leisure this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer this point is made within the classic meltzer and richard 1981 model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income redistribution program that finances a lump sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax the politicalequilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred utility wise by the median voter she and many poorer voters may support income redistribution that ironically leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility jel h2 e6 d

us manufacturing understanding its past and its potential future abstract the development of the us manufacturing sector over the last half century displays two striking and somewhat contradictory features 1 the growth of real output in the us manufacturing se

robots and jobs evidence from us labor markets we study the effects of industrial robots on us labor markets we show theoretically that robots may reduce employment and wages and that their local impacts can be estimated using variation in exp

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

equilibrium welfare and government policy with quasi geometric discounting abstract we consider a representative agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions we restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly we then characterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem the planner is a consumer representative who without commitment but in a time consistent way maximizes his or her present value utility subject to resource constraints the competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric journal of economic literature classification numbers e21 e61 e91

production subsidies and redistribution abstract who gains from stimulating output we explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension wealth there are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population first poorer agents gain from a rise in wages since to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply they work harder second because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future thus lowering real interest rates poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income we examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population we show that if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth then output stimulation and hence redistribution will only occur at time zero after that subsidies are zero a byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median voter theorem with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero the sequence preferred by the median wealth consumer is the unique outcome we also study lack of commitment since interest rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency we analyze this case formally by looking at the markov perfect time consistent equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers e g the median agent here subsidies persist they are constant over time and are more distortionary than under commitment moreover whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially in favor of the consumer who decides on policy it does not under lack of commitment

the composition of government expenditure economic conditions and preferences i introduction there are substantial variations among countries in their tax and expenditure policies even among developed democracies sharing similar economic and political regimes as discussed by tanzi 2000 and alesina and glaeser 2004 this study examines the question of why expenditure patterns differ among democratic countries using a sample of countries with a high democracy index section ii presents empirical evidence showing that the united states has a low ratio of expenditure on transfer payments to that on public goods despite its high income inequality scandinavian countries typically combine low inequality and much higher expenditure on transfer payments relative to public goods british commonwealth countries have higher income inequality than scandinavian countries and yet a lower ratio of transfer payments to public goods expenditure these findings seem inconsistent with the prediction of a large theoretical literature more basic income inequality leads to a larger extent of redistributive expenditure 1 however the observed partial relationship between the expenditure composition and income inequality is possibly obscured by many other factors reflecting differences in economic and demographic conditions or cultural differences across countries see lind 2005 and alesina and glaeser 2004 in order to attempt to understand the way in which cultural factors and economic conditions may combine to influence the composition of expenditure this paper examines the division of expenditure between public goods and a transfer payment under majority voting in the context of an overlapping generations model by taking a growth context and focusing on the expenditure composition for a given tax rate the model allows for a range of factors which may contribute to cross country variations in expenditure compositions such as income and population growth rates and the discount factor in particular cultural factors are captured by a parameter in the utility function reflecting individuals preference for public goods relative to private goods consumption direct independent evidence regarding preferences for public goods is extremely difficult to obtain in view of well known problems of preference revelation mechanisms a wide range of studies however take such differences as their starting point see for example haufler 1996 the transfer payment in the model is referred to as a pension as it is received in the second period of life 2 however it may be thought of more broadly as a standard type of income transfer as it involves in the present overlapping generations framework a decision regarding income shifting between periods within the life cycle as well as intra and intergenerational redistribution members of each cohort are considered to vote on their desired pension during the retirement period on the understanding that during the working period each cohort finances the expenditure previously agreed by the preceding cohort and voters are aware of the nature of the government budget constraint therefore there is a social contract in which each generation in the retirement period is able to benefit from the income and population growth of the following generation the condition under which the social contract is supported by a majority of the members of any cohort involves extending the condition obtained by aaron 1966 and samuelson 1958 the model yields a closed form solution for the majority choice of the expenditure ratio defined as the ratio of transfer payments to public goods expenditure consistent with previous theoretical literature the model predicts a positive relationship between income inequality and the expenditure ratio a numerical exercise is then implemented to examine the sensitivity of the expenditure ratio to variations in model primitives where baseline parameter values are calibrated to the dataset for a group of democratic countries

does job loss shorten life this paper examines the impact of job loss on overall and cause specific mortality using linked employer employee data we identified the workers displaced due to all establishment closures in sweden in 1987 and 1988 hence we have extended the case study approach which has dominated the plant closure literature the overall mortality risk among men increased by 44 percent during the first four years following job loss while there was no impact on either female overall mortality or in the longer run for both sexes however there was an about twofold short run increase in suicides and alcohol related mortality

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

why don t voters put the gini back in the bottle inequality and economic preferences for redistribution abstract the classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in market income inequality causes an increase in the size of government through majority voter support for an offsetting expansion of redistribution i argue that the predicted inequality redistribution relationship can break down when voters face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk with respect to future labor income and a timing differential between tax collections and government outlays this is formalized using an incomplete market heterogeneous agent dsge model with majority voting and time to build policy which suggests the collective demand for redistribution will not necessarily increase with growing income or wealth inequality this result implies that even with equal political power among voters democracies do not have a systematic mechanism to offset rising inequality as contrary to popular belief

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

median voter equilibria in the neoclassical growth model under aggregation we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model where agents differ in wealth taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare we characterize time consistent markov perfect equilibria twofold first restricting utility classes we show that the economy s aggregate state is mean and median wealth second we derive the median voter s first order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

economics of modern energy boomtowns do oil and gas shocks differ from shocks in the rest of the economy abstract the us shale boom has intensified interest in how the expanding oil and gas sector affects local economic performance research has produced mixed results and has not compared how energy shocks differ from equal sized shocks elsewhere in the economy what emerges is that the estimated impacts of energy development vary by region empirical methodology as well as the time horizon that is considered this paper captures these dimensions to present a more complete picture of energy boomtowns utilizing us county data we estimate the effects of changes in oil and gas extraction employment on total employment growth as well as growth by sector we compare this to the effects of equal sized shocks in the rest of the economy to assess whether energy booms are inherently different the analysis is performed separately for nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties using instrumental variables we difference over 1 3 6 and 10 year time periods to account for county fixed effects and to assess responses across different time horizons the results show that in nonmetro counties energy sector multiplier effects on total county employment first increase up to 6 year horizons and then decline for 10 year horizons we also observe positive spillovers to the non traded goods sector while spillovers are small or negative for traded goods in metro counties there are no significant effects on total employment although positive spillovers are present in some sectors yet equal sized shocks in the rest of the economy produce more jobs on average than oil and gas shocks suggesting that policymakers should seek more diversified development

rural bound determinants of metro to non metro migration in the united states a general global precept is that agglomeration forces lead to migration from rural to urban areas yet for much of the time since the early 1970s more people have moved from metro to nonmetro u s counties the underlying causes of this pattern have changed over time with economic shocks and changing household preferences for instance the post 2000 period has seen a significant decline in domestic migration rates a significant increase in commodity prices that favor rural areas and potential changes in the valuation of natural amenities that would affect migration this article investigates the determinants of u s gross migration from metro to nonmetro counties and nonmetro to metro counties for the 1995 2000 and 2005 2009 periods in order to compare the differences in rural to urban and urban to rural migration as well as compare the 1990s to the 2005 2009 periods more specifically the present study extends the literature by more broadly examining the underlying factors associated with deconcentration and economic restructuring arguments of metro to nonmetro migration the article uses 1 extensive county to county migration flows and 2 the utility maximization theory that extends the framework of a discrete choice model the results show that population density distance to urban areas industry mix employment growth natural amenities and percentage of older people are key factors underlying these migration patterns we also find a slight fading of effects of natural amenities and population density and a slight increase in the effects of wage and employment growth from 2005 2009

recessions healthy no more abstract over the 1976 2010 period total mortality shifted from strongly procyclical to being weakly or unrelated to macroeconomic conditions the association is likely to be poorly measured when using short less than 15 year analysis periods deaths from cardiovascular disease and transport accidents continue to be procyclical however countercyclical patterns have emerged for fatalities from cancer mortality and external causes among the latter non transport accidents particularly accidental poisonings play an important role

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

evolution economic competence and the market for corporate control abstract to assess the merits of the market for corporate control this paper examines two processes which standard analysis does not study the allocation of economic competence and the evolution of organizational structures economic competence is seen to be an unusual scarce resource embodied in the very ways in which individuals and organizations take economic decisions which guides the allocation of all scarce resources including itself its efficient allocation is shown to require an evolutionary trial and error process where the market for corporate control plays a crucial role

distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable abstract we characterize the optimal financing of productive public capital and compute the welfare loss from being unable to commit to the ramsey policy because this calculation ultimately relies on numerical approximations we contrast alternative approaches while perturbation and linear quadratic methods deliver accurate steady states the latter can yield misleading policy implications during transitions we find that moving from a regime with commitment to one with discretion implies only a small welfare loss although markov perfect consumption falls noticeably short of its ramsey counterpart in steady state consumption under discretion is higher in the short run which largely offsets this long run loss