children as collective goods and divorce settlements the failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female headed households this paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children s welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce the point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother within marriage proximity and altruism serve to overcome the free rider problem associated with the provision of public goods however on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a pareto optimal allocation of their joint resources a model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event

multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences abstractthis article examines multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences across countries under a planner who uses linear approximation for utility maximization we show that 1 a country is an income receiver if it has a higher productivity than the average in producing public goods enabling it to provide more public goods 2 the amount of transfers can be pinned down for all countries with an adjustment cost 3 each country obtains an identical utility increment and 4 the country with the lowest adjustment cost is the best candidate for the planner country all results are derived based on well known information regarding the cost of producing the public goods and income levels

altruism in the family and selfishness in the market place adam smith argued in a famous passage that people are selfish in their market transactions it is not from the benevolence of the butcher the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner but from their regard to their own interest we address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self love and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages 1937 p 14 in an earlier study he said with irony we are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in selfishness 1853 p 446 selfishness in market transactions has been assumed in practically all subsequent discussions of the economic system objections were dismissed with vague allusions to human nature or with an assertion that altruism loses out to selfishness in the struggle to survive in the market sector yet altruism is generally recognized to be important within a family again adam smith said

the impact of subsidies on x efficiency in ldc industry theory and an empirical test the x inefficiency costs of protection and industrial concentration have been topics of considerable interest in the literature on economic development balassa 1975 and bergsman 1974 for example have argued that protection by increasing x inefficiency generates a major welfare cost which is not captured by traditional costs of protection calculations and white 1976 has examined the relationship between inappropriate factor intensities which he associates with xinefficiency and industrial concentration the common theme which emerges from each of these studies is that public policy can have a major impact on economic performance not only by influencing factor proportions but also by influencing the intensity with which a non measurable input x efficiency is employed despite the intuitive appeal of the x efficiency concept there have been very few empirical tests of this hypothesis this partly reflects the imprecise nature of the basic concept but also the lack of adequate micro economic data x efficiency clearly relates to efficiency within firms so that the most appropriate tests would rely on data on firm level efficiency in this paper we propose a direct test of the x efficiency hypothesis using firm level data we build on previous work by corden 1970 1974 and martin 1978 who showed how to model x efficiency effects using the concept of managerial leisure we extend these simple models of managerial behavior emphasizing the role of the external managerial labor market the model is then used to explore the relationship between changes in public policy managerial effort and x inefficiency certain predictions of the model are tested using cross section data from a survey of firms in two subsidized industries in ghana efficiency indices are computed on the basis of a translog frontier production function variations in relative efficiency are then correlated with several explanatory variables including the presence or absence of subsidy payments to the firm subsidized firms in both industries are found to exhibit higher relative levels of x inefficiency

statistical measures of unsustainability abstract statistical measures are needed to reveal at a glance how far or near various countries are to meeting the conditions of long run sustainability and how conditions are changing on a year to year basis i e whether sustainability is being approached or not the scheme proposed in this paper presents numerical comparisons of energy and materials use in the real world vis a vis an ideal case where all of the identifiable criteria for sustainability are satisfied apart from population stabilization five general but quantifiable criteria for sustainability are suggested including 1 stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 2 stabilization of acidity ph in rainfall 3 reduction of dissipative uses and wastes of heavy metals to natural mobilization rates or lower 4 elimination of agriculture based on pumping fossil water from non renewable aquifers and 5 elimination of loss of arable land because of salination or erosion other criteria such as preservation of biodiversity and socio economic equity between countries and generations might be added to the list they introduce more difficult measurement problems however which are not considered further in the paper having fixed the list of criteria the next step is to identify measures that either go to zero or unity as the system approaches more and more closely to sustainability at least in the limited sense defined above various types of measures of sustainability unsustainability can be developed viz i measures of relative dependence of the economy on non renewable sources of energy and materials ii measures of the productivity of energy and materials consumed by the economic system and iii measures of dissipative loss especially of toxic and hazardous substances specific examples of each type are discussed

the corona pandemic a game theoretic perspective on regional and global governance we argue that the incentive structure of all individual and coordinated measures across countries to contain the corona pandemic is that of a weakest link public good game we discuss a selection of theoretical and experimental key results of weakest link games and interpret them in the light of the corona pandemic first we highlight that experimental evidence does not support the assumption that coordination can be trivially solved even among symmetric players second we argue that for asymmetric countries the weakest link game does not only pose a problem of coordination but also a problem of cooperation third we show how and under which conditions self enforcing treaties can foster coordination and cooperation we account for the possibility that countries make mistakes when choosing their actions our discussion shows that north south cooperation is relevant and likely to be self enforcing and that regional cooperation e g within the eu will also be important

spatially distributed production data for supply chain models forecasting with hazardous waste abstract this paper introduces a novel approach to forecasting future commodity production in hundreds of nodes which represents a key input for many applications of supply chain models a mathematical model was proposed to handle the problem of forecasting with spatially distributed and uncertain data it is derived from the principle of regression analysis and extended by a data reconciliation technique additional areal constraints guarantee mass conservation in a tree like structure which reflects the organisational arrangement of an investigated region the proposed model was tested through a case study where future production of hazardous waste suitable for thermal treatment was forecasted in 206 base nodes 14 superior nodes and one apex based on an extensive investigation of historical data it was revealed that extrapolations carried out at different levels of the hierarchical organisational structure lead to inconsistent forecasts the differences between forecasts reached up to 50 in addition to this mass conservation was violated significant corrections were performed by computations utilizing the formulated model the corrections ranged from between 0 and 12 for 90 of nodes there were 17 nodes where massive adjustments of up to 30 were inevitable

nash bargained household decisions reply pierre andre chiappori s 1988 claim that the nash bargaining model is of weak empirical relevance and neither convenient nor really restrictive is incorrect nash bargained household behavior implies a rich set of empirical implications extending well beyond the pareto efficiency of intrafamily distributions by systematically accounting for the impact of opportunities outside the family on resource distribution within the family nash bargained demand theory considerably expands the scope of neoclassical demand theory such expansion can elucidate issues ranging from the impact of alimony and child support laws in developed societies to the intrafamily distribution of nutrition in less developed countries copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

determinants of productivity differences in international manufacturing to access the influence of various factors on labor productivity a production function model of a plant in a labor intensive consumer goods industry is developed and estimated econometrically the model is derived from a production function specified in three functional forms which is expanded to include management and quality adjustment factors for the capital and labor inputs the management variable is a performance ranking of the plants in terms of meeting output quality and cost goals data on approximately 30 plants from a dozen countries over the period 1975 through 1982 was used for the analysis all of the plants are of a single multinational firm and produce similar products

strategic transfers and private provision of public goods abstract this paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good if the agents differ in their contribution productivity then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game the less productive agent becomes a stackelberg leader furthermore the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization

the mix of social and private provision of goods and services abstract in some countries health insurance and education are supplied as social goods at near zero prices and funded from taxation this paper analyses a case where such provision competes with income supplements as a redistribution device and where taxes or transferable vouchers influence the take up of the social goods compared to alternatives available in a private market each consumer chooses to consume either social or private goods and a vertical market segmentation results from differential demand for quality

transfers and the weakest link an extension of hirshleifer s analysis abstract with the weakest link social composition function analysed by hirshleifer it is shown that an incentive exists for some agents to transfer resources to others so as to achieve higher quantities of the public good the characteristics of such an equilibrium with transfers are examined together with the implications of differing income distributions for the quantity of the public good some observations are offered as to how well the model can capture co operative behaviour

the max min group contest weakest link group all pay auction we investigate a group all pay auction in which each group s effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group specific public good we fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups there are four types of equilibria the pure strategy equilibria in which all active players exert the same effort the semi pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support we then analyze a general contest with n groups

tax transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first it extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods second it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump sum and distortionary policies the analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism

nash bargained household decisions a rejoinder this note is a rejoinder to marjorie b mcelroy and mary jean horney s 1990 reply it discusses the scope of mcelroy and horney s previous results and the possibility of estimating a nash bargained model from independent observation of threat points copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

pure public goods versus commons benefit cost duality sandler and arce 1 pure public goods versus commons benefit cost duality by todd sandler school of international relations university of southern california von kleinsmid center 330 los angeles ca 90089 0043 tsandler usc edu 213 740 9695 213 742 0281 fax and daniel g arce m department of economics rhodes college 2000 n parkway memphis tn 38112 1690 arce rhodes edu 901 843 3121 901 843 3736 fax final revision november 2002 sandler is the robert r and katheryn a dockson professor of international relations economics university of southern california and arce is the robert d mccallum distinguished professor of economics business rhodes college sandler s and arce s research was funded through the dockson and mccallum endowments respectively we have profited from the helpful comments of two anonymous referees

foreign aid and weakest link international public goods an experimental study in this paper we investigate efficiency differences between income and in kind transfers as distribution mechanisms of foreign aid to weakest link international public goods in a laboratory environment we find that if there is relatively small difference in country size then income transfers seem to provide a higher provision of the international public good and thus higher overall welfare level than that of in kind transfers however if there is a large disparity in country size then in kind transfers appear to provide a higher level of ipg provision and higher accompanying global welfare

weakest link public goods giving in kind or transferring money abstract this paper extends the analysis of weakest link public goods whose level equals the smallest of the agents provision levels by permitting an agent either to increase one s own provision or else augment both one s own provision and that of the other agent s nash equilibria may be either symmetric with agents matching one another s provision or else asymmetric with an in kind transfer by one agent to another an equilibrium with cash transfers but no in kind transfers may be pareto superior to one with only in kind transfers if agents differ in their efficiency then in kind transfers by the low cost agent may dominate a cash transfer the possibility of pareto improving transfers is enhanced as the number of agents increases

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

marital division of labor with risk of divorce the role of voice enforcement of contracts it is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce implicit marital contracts by voice therefore in the present model divorce has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for such voice enforcement is weakened moreover perhaps surprisingly i find that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic

the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior in households whose allocation decisions can be represented as nash bargained household decisions extrahousehold environmental parameters eeps serve as pure shifters of the threat points the comparative statics of changes in demands due to changes in these eeps are given these are incorporated into a comprehensive statement of the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior including a nash generalization of barten s 1966 fundamental matrix equation of the theory of consumer demand estimation and data requirements are discussed along with nested testing of the following structure the neoclassical model is nested in the nash bargained model which in turn is nested in an unrestricted model of household demands emphasized throughout is the enriched menu of explanatory variables for demand analysis provided by the nash model as well as the model s ability to jointly analyze i household formation and ii intrahousehold allocation decisions

task divisions in teams with complementary tasks abstract a team leader and a team follower non cooperatively produce a team specific public good out of two complementary tasks both team members are identically productive and can contribute to both tasks by moving first the team leader effectively determines the division of the tasks in the team we show that the existence of multiple but finitely many types of task divisions is associated with a non convex leader s budget constraint non convexity generates discontinuities and non monotonicities in the equilibrium provision of the good and also in the follower s utility if incomes are redistributed within the team non monotonicity of the follower s utility motivates the follower to give a cash transfer to the leader having received the cash transfer the leader adopts a task division that compensates the contributions of the follower hence we observe a non cooperative gift exchange with a monetary gift to the leader and a subsequent non monetary reward to the follower through a lighter task allocation these gift exchanges disappear in the presence of infinitely many types of task divisions generated by a continuum of complementary tasks

designing sustainable energy supply chains by the p graph method for minimal cost environmental burden energy resources input we present a computer aided methodology for designing sustainable supply chains using the p graph framework to develop supply chain structures which are then analyzed using cost the cost of producing electricity and two sustainability metrics the ecological footprint and the emergy input these metrics respectively represent environmental burden in terms of land use and energy resources the results are the continuation of a research effort between members of the office of research and development ord of the u s epa and the university of pannonia in earlier work the basis of the research the integration of supply chain design and sustainability were presented there the p graph framework provided a mathematically rigorous procedure for synthesizing optimal and alternative suboptimal networks subject to profitability and ecological footprint criteria in this work the effort is extended with another sustainability metric emergy emergy a measure of the energy used up in transformations directly and indirectly to make a product or maintain a service was assessed for each energy production supply chain the proposed methodology demonstrates the optimal design of a supply chain which provides electric power and heat to an agricultural region with agricultural wastes that can potentially be recovered as renewable resources the results of the study indicate that compared to using electricity from the grid and or natural gas renewable energy resources can yield substantial cost reductions of up to 17 as well as significant ecological footprint and emergy reductions these results indicate that it is possible to design more sustainable supply chains that are also cost effective

family policy with non cooperative families we consider a non cooperative model of a family s time allocation between market work and providing a home produced family public good such as child care or care for the elderly the model predicts underprovision of the public good because of crowding out this does not necessarily warrant public provision in contrast to other approaches in family economics we find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage and that such a policy may be pareto improving we also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving

weakest link public goods giving in kind or transferring money in a sequential game abstract this paper extends the leader follower analysis of a weakest link public good by permitting an agent to provide the good on one s own territory or on another s territory through an in kind transfer an equilibrium with cash transfers followed by in kind transfers from the income recipient may be pareto superior any cash transfers must be from the follower to the leader for welfare to improve

unconditional aid and green growth abstract environmentally motivated aid can help developing countries to achieve economic growth while mitigating the impact on emission levels we argue that the usual practice of giving aid conditionally is not effective and we therefore study aid that is given unconditionally our framework is a differential open loop stackelberg game between a fully developed leader country and a developing follower country the leader chooses the amount of mitigation aid given to the follower which the follower either consumes or invests in either costly non polluting capital or cheap high emission capital we show that giving aid conditionally is only rarely effective and if so is based on a forced intertemporal savings effect in all other cases it is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst moreover we find that the leader gives unconditional mitigation aid only when sufficiently rich or when caring sufficiently about environmental quality if unconditional aid is given in steady state it decreases the steady state level of high emission capital and capital investments in the recipient country as well as the global pollution stock but it has no effect on the levels of non polluting capital and non polluting investments transitional aid accelerates the economic growth of the follower moreover we find that the increase in growth takes place in the non polluting sector

pareto optimal redistribution and private charity abstract when private charity exists and is motivated by utility interdependence a non pareto optimal outcome the free rider problem typically arises nevertheless incremental fiscal redistribution cannot achieve a paretian welfare improvement so long as private charity continues at positive levels donors respond to incremental fiscal redistribution by reducing their voluntary contributions by exactly a dollar for every dollar transferred in this way no net transfer is achieved unless incremental fiscal redistribution is pursued to the point where private contributions have been driven to zero alternatively a net transfer may be achieved by fiscal measures which affect donors marginal incentives to donate