cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

asset pricing with loss aversion using standard preferences for asset pricing has not been very successful to match asset price characteristics such as the risk free interest rate equity premium and the sharpe ratio to time series data behavioral nance has recently proposed more realistic preferences such as preferences with loss aversion to model asset pricing research has now started to explore the implications of behaviorally founded preferences for asset price characteristics encouraged by some studies of benartzki and thaler 1995 and barberis et al 2001 we study asset pricing with loss aversion in a production economy we here employ a stochastic growth model and use a stochastic version of a dynamic programming method with adaptive grid scheme to compute the above mentioned asset price characteristics of a model with loss aversion in preferences as our results show a model with loss aversion performs considerably better than pure consumption based asset pricing models

flexibility and uncertainty the preserving of flexibility when faced with uncertainty is a neglected aspect of behaviour under risk yet it is an important factor in decisions to hold liquid assets or delay irreversible investment this paper formalizes the notion of flexibility in a sequential decision context and relates its value to the amount of information an agent expects to receive a rudimentary money demand model is developed embodying these ideas and the history of flexibility as an economic concept is traced choices are frequently made between alternatives that imply different degrees of future commitment between a short term investment that leaves future options open for example and a long term one that by its very nature forecloses those options the relative attractiveness of the two depends on their probability distributions of payoffs over time a basic consideration in this choice is the recognition that beliefs about the risks governing these payoffs may change current doubts may be partially resolved in the near future this prospect decreases the attractiveness of the longer term commitment in that one is able to respond less fully to new information and even if it does not directly affect the risks associated with shorter term choices enhances their appeal this paper formalizes the above remarks by establishing connections between the following two partial orderings the first is an ordering based on variability of beliefs one set of beliefs is more variable than another if more final risk is resolved at an intermediate stage the more one expects to learn by an intermediate period relative to what one knows today the more variation one is anticipating in beliefs about the final outcome the second is an ordering of current actions or positions based on flexibility one position is more flexible than another if it leaves available a larger set of future positions at any given level of cost these two orderings are incorporated in a simple sequential decision model to suggest the following behavioural principle the more variable are a decision maker s beliefs the more flexible is the position he will choose this principle potentially applies whenever i there will be opportunities to act after further information is received and ii current actions influence either the attractiveness or availability of different future actions

strategic interactions and airline network morphology under demand uncertainty abstract in this paper we examine how strategic interactions affect airline network under demand uncertainty we develop a three stage duopoly game at stage 1 airlines determine their network structure linear versus hub and spoke at stage 2 they decide on their capacities at stage 3 firms compete in quantities the main feature of the model is that firms have to decide on network structure and capacities while facing demand uncertainty we show that while hubbing is efficient airlines may choose a linear network for strategic reasons furthermore we show that this structure softens competition by preventing contagion of competition across markets

bargaining search and outside options abstract this paper studies a two sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer the buyer has an outside option which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time two cases are considered in regime i both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters we find that in contrast to bargaining with complete information the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium however the no delay result still holds in regime ii where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option delay is possible the solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

optimal vs traditional securities under moral hazard this paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of traditional securities by wellestablished firms standard moral hazard models predict that equity debt and warrants are almost never optimal financing instruments i show that issuing these securities is nevertheless nearly optimal the issuer would gain very little by using non traditional securities instead combined with equity one debt issue without multiple layers of seniority and one warrant issue without multiple exercise prices suffice to achieve near optimality the near optimality of traditional financing depends crucially on the issuer s ability to use war rants in addition to debt and equity

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

fairness price stickiness and history dependence in decentralized trade this chapter investigates the implications that social preferences have for the stationary strategic equilibrium of such a decentralized market agents are supposed to be averse to unfairly unfavorable as well as unfairly favorable deals in the spirit of fehr and schmidt 1999 but we stay rather close to standard individualistic preferences the negative weights on advantageous and disadvantageous deviations from what is considered as the fair benchmark are such that utility remains strictly increasing in own surplus share and in contrast to the original fehr schmidt model the fair split need not automatically be a 50 50 division any price between sellers cost and buyers willingness to pay may be the one which for whatever reasons is agents reference point in a given market this makes it possible to consider a more flexible notion of fairness than is usually done it is in line with cognitive dissonance theory from psychology and the noteworthy experiments of binmore et al 1991 1993 where subjects who were triggered to play different bargaining equilibria ended up considering very different surplus distributions as fair

liquid capital and market liquidity this article considers how the supply of liquid capital affects the liquidity of asset markets the article views the former notion as a technological property of real investments and the latter as an endogenous property of financial market equilibrium and describes a channel by which the two are linked when agents hold more wealth in technologically liquid investments a marginal adjustment to portfolio holdings alters discount rates less causing a smaller price impact thus even without intermediaries or frictions the stock of transformable capital may be a crucial determinant of the resilience of financial markets

complexity and the character of stock returns empirical evidence and a model of asset prices based on complex investor learning empirical evidence on the distributional characteristics of common stock returns indicates 1 a power law tail index close to three describes the behavior of the positive tail of the survivor function of returns pr r x x a reflection of fat tails 2 general linear and nonlinear dependencies exist in the time series of returns 3 the time series return process is characterized by short run dependence short memory in both returns as well as their volatility the latter usually characterized in the form of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and 4 the time series return process probably does not exhibit long memory but the squared returns process does exhibit long memory we propose a model of complex self referential learning and reasoning amongst economic agents that jointly produces security returns consistent with these general observed facts and which are supported here by empirical results presented for a benchmark sample of 50 stocks traded on the new york stock exchange the market we postulate is populated by traders who reason inductively while compressing information into a few fuzzy notions that they can in turn process and analyze with fuzzy logic we analyze the implications of such behavior for the returns on risky securities within the context of an artificial stock market model dynamic simulation experiments of the market are conducted from which market clearing prices emerge allowing us to then compute realized returns we test the effects of varying values of the parameters of the model on the character of the simulated returns the results indicate that the model proposed in this paper can jointly account for the presence of a power law characterization of the positive tail of the survivor function of returns with exponent on the order of three for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity for long memory in volatility and for general nonlinear dependencies in returns

on the consistency of the black scholes model with a general equilibrium framework we construct a simple economy with consumption only at the final date in which we endogenize the stochastic behavior of prices assumed in the black scholes model certain preferences constant proportional risk aversion and beliefs are shown to be sufficient and necessary in certain respects for the existence of such an equilibrium the analysis is then generalized to a continuous consumption framework in which we embed the merton proportional dividend model

trade and search generated unemployment we argue that trade economists should begin to seriously consider environments in which unemployment is carefully modeled we introduce such a model derive several results and compare them to results derived in full employment models we argue that some traditional results are probably too narrow the determinants of comparative advantage and that some results do not generalize to models with unemployment the link between trade and income distribution for employed factors we also show that in some important cases results do generalize there is an extended stolper samuelson theorem that links trade to the distribution of income for searching factors and that our model allows us to address issues that traditional models cannot handle the impact of trade on unemployment and the welfare of the unemployed 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies we characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets if governments can commit to future policies optimal first period intervention should diverge from the profit shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by fudenberg and tirole s animal spirits taxonomy of business strategies without government commitment there is an additional basis for intervention whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions we consider a variety of applications to rd spillovers consumer switching costs etc and also extensions to constrained second best policies

market resolution and valuation in incomplete markets the arrow debreu approach to general equilibrium in an economy has been recognized as one of the most general and conceptually elegant frameworks for the study of financial problems under uncertainty 2 9 equally well known is its elusiveness when it comes to ready application to practical problems like capital budgeting or empirical testing see 6 15 18 however some recent research see 1 3 6 12 16 18 and 19 has made a serious attempt to put the state preference theoretic model in an operational setting breeden and litzenberger 6 have developed an interesting approach to derive constructively the prices of elementary arrow debreu securities from the prices of call options on aggregate consumption banz and miller 3 use a similar technique to value capital budgeting projects based on values for state contingent claims computed from prices of call options written on the market portfolio the supershare securities proposed by hakansson 14 16 and related work by garman 13 ross 24 etc have also served to give the so called state contingent approach a practical flavor

it pays to be different endogenous heterogeneity of firms in an oligopoly abstract heterogeneous firms can be supported by familiar conditions of technology and demand in a two stage duopoly game firms choose technologies simultaneously in stage i from a continuous technology set in stage ii once technological commitments have been made firms choose quantities and the equilibrium price is determined if the technology set is insufficiently convex firms choose only the extreme production technologies in some cases they choose the same technology in others they choose different technologies when compared to socially optimal industry structures equilibria tend to have too little heterogeneity uncertainty about demand or costs favors the emergence of heterogeneous firms

contestable markets under uncertainty in this article we present a model of a market which is ex post contestable we show that in a market characterized by uncertainty a firm will face a tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility and generally will make some precommitments to take advantage of ex ante technologies we show that in the face of potential entry the incumbent will increase his precommitments and in so doing will affect the probability of entry the degree of market contestability is therefore endogenously determined by the choice of precommitments the extent to which precommitments will be used to affect entry probabilities is shown to depend on the efficiency of ex ante production adjustment costs and the degree of uncertainty in particular we show that the market becomes more contestable as the relative efficiency of ex post production increases and as market conditions become more uncertain

unemployment and the business cycle in a small open economy g m m estimation and testing with french data abstract what is a relevant model for the european business cycle in this paper the empirical performances of three models are compared a canonical walrasian r b c framework its extension to the case of a small open economy and a version of this model with search and wage bargaining on the labor market structural parameters of the models are estimated using g m m and their abilities to reproduce the french business cycle taken as representative of the european business cycle are tested only the small open economy with unemployment is able to generate theoretical moments that match their empirical counterparts

managerial incentives risk aversion and debt we investigate the risk choices of risk averse ceos following recent theoretical work we expect ceo risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability we find that the ceos of these firms reduce firm risk even in the presence of strong risk taking incentives our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of ceo wealth to stock price changes firm risk determinants the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on ceo incentives unobserved firm and market effects and debt governance the impact of ceo risk aversion is economically significant

equilibrium portfolios in the neoclassical growth model abstract this paper studies equilibrium portfolios in the standard neoclassical growth model under uncertainty with heterogeneous agents and dynamically complete markets preferences are purposely restricted to be quasi homothetic the main source of heterogeneity across agents is due to different endowments of shares of the representative firm at date 0 fixing portfolios is the optimal equilibrium strategy in stationary endowment economies with dynamically complete markets however when the environment displays changing degrees of heterogeneity across agents the trading strategy of fixed portfolios cannot be optimal in equilibrium very importantly our framework can generate changing heterogeneity if and only if either minimum consumption requirements are not zero or labor income is not zero and the value of human and non human wealth are linearly independent

matching search and bargaining abstract first the paper incorporates search for alternative opportunities into a model of strategic bargaining second this search and bargaining model is embedded in a market matching model the solutions are presented in a manner that clarifies the role of the search abilities and the details of the bargaining procedure in the determination of the outcomes the predictions of the model are contrasted with the related literature the main accomplishment is the attainment of a manageable model which is still rich enough to grasp important differences between environments which are not captured by the standard matching models

counting and multidimensional poverty measurement this paper proposes a new methodology for multidimensional poverty measurement consisting of an identification method k that extends the traditional intersection and union approaches and a class of poverty measures m our identification step employs two forms of cutoff one within each dimension to determine whether a person is deprived in that dimension and a second across dimensions that identifies the poor by counting the dimensions in which a person is deprived the aggregation step employs the fgt measures appropriately adjusted to account for multidimensionality the axioms are presented as joint restrictions on identification and the measures and the methodology satisfies a range of desirable properties including decomposability the identification method is particularly well suited for use with ordinal data as is the first of our measures the adjusted headcount ratio we present some dominance results and an interpretation of the adjusted headcount ratio as a measure of unfreedom examples from the us and indonesia illustrate our methodology

political competition and human development evidence from the indian states abstractrecently it has been argued that political competition may have similar effects on economic performance as it does on market competition this study empirically examines this proposition by linking political competition with the human development index hdi of the indian states the findings suggest that politically competitive governments perform well along the hdi a more detailed analysis also shows that rural india benefits most from the intense political competition compared to urban india we also found that if the same government rules a state for a relatively long period it helps the state to achieve a higher hdi score increasing voter participation is found to be positively associated with hdi score but this finding is confined to the sample of major indian states increasing public spending on developmental activities is also found to have a positive and significant effect on hdi performance

flexibility and the theory of the firm abstract the object of this paper is 1 to bring together and integrate the various concepts of flexibility found in the economic literature 2 to flesh out the meaning of various aspects of flexibility and their implications thereby bridging the gap between the existing highly abstract theories and the empirical facts and 3 in the process to give a rich and comprehensive enough description of an industry to stimulate further theoretical as well as empirical work the study tries to combine inductive and deductive reasoning using empirical observations based on indepth interviews with manufacturers in the metalworking industry in the united states and sweden

the influence of seller learning and time constraints on sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market in this paper we test some hypotheses about the formation of prices through sequential bilateral bargaining on a perishable goods market under the assumption of behavioural learning by buyers and sellers we constructed a multi agent simulation model based on a survey concerning the fruit and vegetables market in marseille france in our model the agents bargain the price of a perishable good the representation of agents rationality is inspired by a literature relative to markets of perishable goods kirman 6 7 and rouchier 18 19 20 as well as on artificial bargaining brenner 2 weisbuch 22 we study the influence of three parameters the sellers initial beliefs concerning the buyers willingness to pay the time spent by buyers on the market and the heterogeneity in the sellers limit value on the evolution of prices and of agents representations of others agents we compare our results with empirical observations and some existing literature on bargaining we find that our assumptions concerning the learning process give consistent results and lead the transactions prices to converge toward the sellers limit value

organizational inertia and dynamic incentives abstract we model the level of inertia as an endogenous rational choice made by the organization principal we show that the efficient organizational response to the presence of private information on the value of change will in general be to bias the decision rule towards the status quo the compensation of the agent differs significantly according to whether the information is private to the principal or the agent and the efficient distribution of real authority in an organization need not always be profitably retained by the principal

mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information abstract we present a model of cost reducing r d investments where the marginal cost realization is private information of the innovating firm the main contribution is the conclusion according to which with merger anticipations the innovating firm does not have ex ante incentives to reveal its cost realization prior to the takeover interestingly we also find the expected consumer surplus to be higher for the regime characterized by incomplete information as compared to a regime based on information sharing

on the fluctuations in consumption and market returns in the presence of labor and human capital an equilibrium analysis abstract we examine the effects of human capital on consumption stock market and other fluctuations in a general equilibrium continuous time model a representative consumer worker investor derives utility from consumption and leisure a representative firm demands labor as the sole input to a stochastic production technology driven by general possibly nonmultiplicative shocks for cobb douglas utility and multiplicative shocks labor is nonstochastic and consumption and stock market volatility are equated as under no human capital deviations from this are analyzed for logarithmic utility and constant elasticity of substitution production technology cases are identified where the presence of labor causes consumption to be smoother than the stock market

contract costs and financing decisions like bondholders most agents contract for fixed payoffs thus corporate capital structures which are less than 50 percent debt are less levered than overall contract structures in which about 90 percent of total flows are fixed payoffs the hypothesis analyzed here is that loans and bonds lower contract costs by delegating the monitoring and bonding of the default risks of fixed payoffs to credible specialists financial intermediaries bond holder trustees rating agencies and auditors other agents can then focus on their specialties that is efficient supply of labor materials and other services and the contract problems of these specialties copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

bargaining and efficiency in networks abstract we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement the global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium for many networks all markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient even as players become patient we investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect but non markovian equilibria the analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain

search for a monetary propagation mechanism abstract this paper examines a monetary propagation mechanism in an economy where exchanges in goods and labor markets involve costly search it is shown that an increase in the money growth rate increases steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is low but reduces steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is already high the model produces persistent hump shaped responses in employment and output to money growth shocks even when the shocks have no persistence the model also generates desirable features in job vacancy sales inventory and the velocity of money all these features emerge here in an economy with perfectly flexible prices and wages journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e40 e30

political competition policy and growth theory and evidence from the us this paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth we test the predictions of the model on panel data for the us states in these data we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti growth policies higher taxes lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right to work laws we also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth

a drawback of electoral competition in most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters we provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties in our model the larger the number of parties the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition the reason is that when the number of parties increases electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits the analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition thresholds of exclusion runoff electoral systems and majoritarian two party political systems jel d82 l15

animal spirits financial crises and persistent unemployment this article uses a rational expectations model with multiple equilibrium unemployment rates to explain financial crises the model has equilibria where asset prices are unbounded above i argue that this is an important feature of any rational agent explanation of a financial crisis since for the expansion phase of the crisis to be rational investors must credibly believe that asset prices could keep increasing forever with positive probability i explain the sudden crash in asset prices that precipitates a financial crisis as a large shock to expectations that leads to a permanent increase in the unemployment rate

how to reduce unemployment a new policy proposal this paper uses a model with a continuum of equilibrium steady state unemployment rates to explore the effectiveness of fiscal policy the existence of multiple steady state equilibria is explained by the presence of search and recruiting costs i use the model to explain the current financial crisis as a shift to a high unemployment equilibrium induced by the self fulfilling beliefs of market participants about asset prices i ask two questions 1 can fiscal policy help us out of the crisis 2 is there an alternative to fiscal policy that is less costly and more effective the answer to both questions is yes

opportunities welfare and social justice a review of fishkin s bottlenecks in his bottlenecks a new theory of equal opportunity joseph fishkin claims he presents an entirely new way of thinking about equality of opportunity the core of the new theory is the call for opportunity pluralism which consists in enlarging the range of opportunities available to people at every stage in life in this essay we discuss how successful fishkin is at shaking the way economists think about equality of opportunity we identify two aspects of fishkin s theory that deeply conflict with economic theories of equality of opportunity those aspects have to do with the way economists interpret the ethical values of respect for preferences and responsibility we also argue that the way fishkin suggests to look at opportunities can help economists fill gaps in the way they define well being and social justice

the political economy of government responsiveness theory and evidence from india the determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive this suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy the ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from india we show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater controlling for shocks where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

the equity premium in brock s asset pricing model abstract in this paper we combine dynamic programming methods with projection methods for solving stochastic growth models as an application of these methods we solve brock s asset pricing model with a variety of parameterizations we focused on finding parameterizations that result in an equity premium that is high relative to the variation in consumption we show both analytically and numerically that the equity premium can be higher in a production based asset pricing model than it is in the consumption based asset pricing model even when the real output level is the same in both models

capital market equilibrium with externalities production and heterogeneous agents abstract the paper studies general equilibrium in an economy with externalities production and heterogeneous agents the model developed builds on brock brock w a 1982 asset prices in a production economy in mccall j j ed the economics of information and uncertainty university of chicago press chicago pp 1 43 and merton merton r c 1987 a simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information journal of finance 42 483 510 it involves both a stock market and a market for loans together with negative externalities produced by a subset of firms importantly the technological production structure of the firms is reflected in the properties of the shares traded in the stock market agents are heterogeneous in their financial choices potentially discriminating against the firms producing a negative externality the model sheds light on the utility costs of the discriminating behavior and on the impact on the price of the stock issued by the firm which is responsible for the externality the model is used to study the factors which may magnify or reduce the impact of discrimination a set of discriminated firms may be seriously affected only if the discriminating investors command a large portion of overall wealth and or they do not represent important diversification instruments the model can be applied to understanding the effects of socially responsible investment whereby investors discriminate against companies belonging to some sectors which are perceived as socially dangerous or unethical

pre commitment and flexibility abstract this paper considers several related strategic duopoly settings in which uncertainty creates an option value from retaining flexibility by delaying investment or output decisions until after uncertainty is resolved this value of flexibility must be weighed against the strategic value of pre commitment yielding a trade off between flexibility and pre commitment we obtain a simple characterization of the timing of output decisions as a consequence of the degree of uncertainty particular attention is paid to the implications for entry deterrence by an incumbent firm and to the possible flexibility enhancing effects of investment in capital

strategic choice of flexible production technologies and welfare implications this paper examines the market conditions under which firms would choose a more flexible production technology with respect to product design the authors use a two stage game in which firms choose between flexible and less flexible production technologies in the first stage and subsequently choose output they find that consumers would benefit from the introductions of flexible production technologies in their model the authors also find that the production technology game is a prisoner s dilemma when firms invest in flexible manufacturing systems they derive the conditions under which the resulting equilibria are efficient copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

children s resources in collective households identification estimation and an application to child poverty in malawi children s resources matter but they are hard to identify because consumption is typically mea sured at the household level modern collective household models permit some identication of indi vidual household member resources but these models typically either ignore children or treat them as attributes of adults we propose a collective household model in which children are people with their own utility functions possibly assigned to them by parents extending the frameworks of browning chiappori and lewbel 2007 and lewbel and pendakur 2008 we show identication of children s resource shares within households we invoke semiparametric restrictions on individual preferences and use data on the household level consumption of assignable private goods to achieve identication of each individual s resource share within the household we show this without being able to observe consumption by individual household members of goods that are partly or wholly shared goods within the household further we obtain identication using only engel curves and so do not require ob served price variation in the data we estimate our model using data from malawi andnd that as the number of children in a household grows women s resource shares fall and children s resource shares rise and men s resource shares are basically unchanged we alsond evidence of gender bias against girls and observe that the resource shares of mothers and children are increasing in the education level of the mother finally we use our estimates to construct poverty indices at the person level andnd that per capita poverty indices understate the incidence of child poverty in malawi

the choice of technology and capital structure under rate regulation this paper examines a regulated firm s choice of technology it presents a model in which regulatory opportunism induces the firm to adopt a technology that gives rise to cost functions with higher variable costs and lower fixed costs than is socially optimal this distortion arises because the regulated price is positively correlated with marginal costs consequently a technology with low marginal costs implies a low regulated price and hence is unattractive to the firm debt financing is shown to alleviate this distortion because it induces regulators to increase the regulated price to prevent the firm from financial distress thereby reducing the cost to the firm of adopting technologies with low marginal costs when regulators restrict the firm s ability to issue debt the firm may have an incentive to goldplate i e waste resources this incentive disappears when the firm can use its most preferred mode of financing

returns to scale in a matching model of the labor market abstract this paper presents evidence on the degree of returns to scale in the labor market using a transcendental logarithmic model of the labor market matching technology the empirical results imply locally increasing returns to scale and are consistent with multiple equilibria thereby suggesting a potentially welfare enhancing role for macroeconomic policy intervention

capacity investment under uncertainty the effect of volume flexibility abstract real option theory is a central tool in today s investment theory as it integrates uncertainty and managerial flexibility in the analysis and valuation of investment projects this paper studies the optimal time and size of investment for a monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty and volume flexibility in our modeling framework demand is random and the firm first decides the optimal time and size of the production process after entry the firm adjusts continuously production volume to match the observed demand volume flexibility comes at a cost which depends on both the current output and the established capacity we study two different models of volume flexibility downside volume flexibility allows the firms to produce any quantity below the installed capacity upside volume flexibility allows to expand production above the firm s capacity size in both cases the option to temporary suspend production is not given a priori but it is part of the firm s optimal choice with this feature the model provides conclusions that contrast some of the most recent theoretical findings on the same subject we find that an increase of the degree of downside volume flexibility makes the firm willing to invest earlier in a larger plant we also show that downside volume flexibility reduces the utilization rates especially in highly uncertain markets upside volume flexibility has the joint effect of reducing the size of the investment and the investment threshold at which the firm installs capacity the utilization rates are significantly higher compared to the case of downside volume flexibility only and there is an increasing relationship between increased upside flexibility and utilization rates

environmental taxation and strategic commitment in duopoly models in this paper we address the issue of optimalenvironmental taxation under imperfect competition the problem is analysed for three different types ofduopoly models the cournot open and closed loopmodels and the stackelberg model we explicitlyanalyse the role of strategic behaviour each firm hasto make a choice of output level and of the level ofa strategic variable the choice of this strategicvariable affects both marginal cost and emissions wecompare the properties of these three duopoly models and derive and compare optimal environmental taxes weshow that whether the optimal tax is lower or higherthan marginal environmental costs depends on theinformation transmission and the effect of thestrategic variable on marginal costs in addition thedifferences in market shares and the influence of thetax on the cost structure play important roles indetermining optimal emission taxes

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

a new characterization of the efficiency of equilibrium with incomplete markets abstract this paper defines a new concept of efficiency for economies with incomplete markets called d efficiency which characterizes radner equilibrium allocations we show that these allocations are d efficient for some partition d of the set d of date event pairs and that under certain conditions any d efficient allocation may be decentralized as an equilibrium with lump sum transfers since any d efficient allocation is a social nash optimum our results generalize s j grossman s j econ theory 15 1977 1 15 characterization of efficiency also since for d d d efficiency coincides with full pareto efficiency we obtain sufficient conditions for radner equilibrium allocations to be pareto efficient

principals principles when agents actions are hidden abstract we examine the behavior of subjects in a simple principal agent game with hidden action while subjects in the role of agents tend to choose the actions which maximize their expected profits subjects in the role of principals offer contracts which differ from the theoretical predictions we identify three principles of contract design 1 the agent s remuneration for the better outcome is at least as high as the remuneration for the worse outcome 2 the agent must not risk making a loss 3 the net profit of the agent should not be higher than the net profit of the principal

flexibility choices and oligopolistic competition in an evolutionary environment we study the problem of the endogenous choice of technology when the level of demand is uncertain firms can choose either a flexible technology which allows them to vary the cost structure or a rigid technology which in periods of high demand is more efficient firms tend to adopt the ex ante more rewarding technology we develop a full dynamic model with given number of firms as well as with entry and exit and with perfect foresight as well as with myopic firms we show that firms with different technologies can coexist in the market in a permanent way and characterise the parameter configurations leading to such results

the evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure several empirical regularities concerning firm growth rates and industry firm size distributions have been developed by studying primarily mature industries the primary purpose of this article is to bring together and extend empirical regularities on the evolution of new industries and to use these regularities to gain further insight into the forces governing industry evolution to explain these regularities a model is constructed which emphasizes how factors governing the early evolution of industries may shape their market structure at maturity it stresses how chance events and exogenous factors that influence the number of potential entrants to the industry the growth rate of incumbents and the ease of imitation of industry leaders will influence the ultimate number and size distribution of firms in the industry

the comparison of multi dimensioned distributions of economic status the literature on inequality measurement has been largely concerned with single dimensioned indicators this paper explores some of the issues which arise when there are several dimensions to inequality and these are not readily reduced to a single index concentrating particularly on the two dimensioned case we make use of results on multi variate stochastic dominance in portfolio theory extending these and applying them to the measurement of inequality the use of the dominance conditions is illustrated by an application to the international distribution of income and life expectancy

the effect of time to build on strategic investment under uncertainty we show that time to build which creates a lag between the decision to invest and production is an important element of industry structure we study a multiperiod investment game where there is demand uncertainty adding time to build to the model alters the classic tradeoff between making strategic commitments and exploiting the option to wait furthermore time to build gives rise to novel equilibria in which firms invest incrementally which contrasts with most prior work on multiperiod investment games in which firms invest only once we show how time to build affects firm heterogeneity investment timing the option value of waiting the evolution of prices and social welfare copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

stochastic turnpike property and stationary equilibrium abstract i study the stability properties of a stochastic equilibrium growth model with a finite number of infinitely lived consumers the exogenous stochastic environment is represented by a stationary stochastic process that influences preferences technology and primary resources consumers maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities production is intertemporal and primary resources are assumed to be necessary for the production of capital goods by adapting standard assumptions in general equilibrium theory and turnpike theory i show that if consumers have homogeneous discount factors close enough to one the allocation of an interior equilibrium converges to the allocation of a stationary equilibrium with transfer payments this result is used to prove the existence of a stationary equilibrium

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

preemptive investment with resalable capacity we study an entry game under perfect information with the salient feature that capacity is resalable we show that an inability to precommit to final output can help rather than hurt in contrast to other analyses of limited commitment e g maskin tirole 1988 which do not specify the sources of or reasons for limits to commitment we assume that such limits arise from the resalable nature of capacity and are led naturally to a consideration of additional strategic variables that can improve the incumbent s position in our model resalability increases the complexity of the incumbent s precommitment problem but it also furnishes her with an additional source of power in our model the price at which to resell capacity while a capacity resale market enables capacity to be shared and can help anticompetitive behavior the very existence of a resale market can generate an incentive for a much larger initial level of investment to the point where the overall equilibrium outcome can be more competitive

on the adjustment speed of smes to their optimal capital structure the aim of this paper is to analyse the speed of adjustment of small and medium sized enterprises smes to the target leverage by applying a system gmm technique to spanish panel data collected during the period 1995 2005 we estimate a partial adjustment model in which both target leverage and speed of adjustment are simultaneously endogenized we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of target leverage and the speed of adjustment more specifically the rate of financial flexibility growth opportunities and size are positively related to the speed of adjustment whereas the distance to the optimal ratio of debt shows a negative impact our findings demonstrate that in terms of sample mean a high percentage of spanish smes adjust rationally to their target additionally the smes analysed appeared to be over levered and fairly motivated to adjust annual adjustment speed 26

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

strategic bargaining with firm inventories this paper characterizes how a firm s opportunity to sell from its stock of inventories affects the outcome of strategic wage negotiations with a union of workers in equilibrium the union and firm share the benefits from an immediate return to work less the costs of a strike of infinite duration this outcome is equivalent to a nash bargaining solution in which the threat points are the agents expected payoffs should a strike last forever we also demonstrate that for a given level of inventories the wage increases when demand is high conversely given demand the wage falls as inventories rise

equilibrium entry patterns under uncertainty abstract in this paper we develop a model in which incumbency patterns are determined endogenously we consider a two period duopoly game under uncertainty and show that the equilibrium entry patterns are determined by the costs and benefits of early entry and the strategic interactions between the firms we also show that under quite plausible cost conditions incumbency may not arise as an equilibrium pattern of the duopoly game

the determinants of equilibrium unemployment the paper takes the search and matching model of the aggregate labor market to the data it tests the model s empirical validity and employs structural estimation to generate a characterization of the optimal behavior of firms and workers the model is applied to israeli data that are uniquely suited for this kind of empirical investigation the structural estimates are used to quantify the frictions embodied in the model including the costs of search the congestion and trading externality effects and the matching process a calibration simulation analysis then studies the effect of several key variables on equilibrium unemployment

how to design infrastructure contracts in a warming world a critical appraisal of public private partnerships we analyze how long term uncertainty for example regarding future climate conditions affects the design of concession contracts and organizational forms in a principal agent context with dynamic moral hazard limited liability and irreversibility constraints the prospect of future uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm s effort creates an option value of delaying efforts a course that exacerbates agency costs contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control this cost of delegated flexibility the possibility for the agent to delay investment in response to uncertainty and irreversibility also elicits preference for unbundling different stages of the project through short term contracts our analysis is relevant to infrastructure sectors that are sensitive to changing weather conditions and sheds a pessimistic light on the relevance of public private partnerships in this context

the effect of incomplete information about future technological opportunities on pre emption abstract in this paper we model the strategic choice of investment by an incumbent firm facing competition from a potential entrant and the uncertain prospect of technological development the model presented extends the basic dixit model into two directions it allows for production over two periods and introduces uncertainty about the technology available in the second we show that the incumbent does not necessarily prefer to pre commit irreversibility of investment creates in fact an option value of retaining flexibility and the strategic gains from pre commitment must be compared with the option value for strategic investment to be chosen the strategic use of investment can also explain the observed inertia of incumbent firms in the adoption of new technologies compared to new entrant firms

capacity and entry under demand uncertainty this paper examines the decision to enter into a sector dominated by a monopoly if demand is random at entry time given a two period world the monopolist enters initially and enjoys an uncontested monopoly for one period while the entrant may enter and compete during the second period demand is random one period earlier and independently distributed in both periods and enitry corresponds to an irreversible capacity choice made under certain deimand all other production decisions take place after demand has been revealed risk neutrality is assumed on both sides if entry occurs then there is a cournot duopoly in the second period it is shown that concurrently with this cournot production game there is a separate stackelbergtype game with capacities as decision variables entry deterrence conditions are derived under general demand and cost assumptions it is shown that demand uncertainty changes several of the results of similar certain demand models

do capm results hold in a dynamic economy a numerical analysis in this research we use the projection method reported by judd to find numerical solutions to the euler equations of a stochastic dynamic growth model the mode1 that we solve is brock s asset pricing model for a variety of parameterizations of the production functions using simulated data from the model conjectures which are not analytically tractable can be verified we show that the market portfolio is mean variance efficient in this dynamic context we also show a result that is not available from the static capm theory the efficient frontier shifts up and down over the business cycle

oligopoly exploitation of a private property productive asset abstract in this paper we build a closed loop nash equilibrium of a private property productive asset oligopoly we compare and contrast private with common property in terms of exploitation rates and social welfare and provide a comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the number of firms in the industry contrary to previous studies on oligopolistic exploitation of productive assets before exploitation begins the resource is parcelled out each firm privately owns and manages the assigned parcel over the entire planning horizon compared with the common property regime we find a new set of results both in the short and in the long run as for social welfare we provide conditions on the implicit growth rate and the initial asset stock under which the socially optimal allocation of the resource implies a natural monopoly