fiscal decentralisation the knowledge economy and school teachers wages in urban china abstractwe examine how fiscal decentralisation and progress towards the development of a knowledge intensive economy has affected teachers wages in china utilising panel data from 2001 to 2013 we find that fiscal decentralisation has a negative impact on teachers wages and that this effect is magnified through a deepening of the knowledge economy while the knowledge economy itself has no effect on teachers wages the findings suggest that incentives being offered to local administrators need to be revisited if china is convinced of the need to increase teacher quality in ways suited to the knowledge economy which it wishes to construct

consumer ethics in japan an economic reconstruction of moral agency of japanese firms qualitative insights from grocery retail markets the article reconstructs in economic terms managerial business ethics perceptions in the japanese consumer market for fast moving daily consumption products an economic three level model of moral agency was applied that distinguishes unintentional moral agency passive intentional moral agency and active intentional moral agency the study took a qualitative approach and utilized as empirical research design an interview procedure the study found that moral agency of japanese firms mostly extended up to unintentional and intentional passive moral agency certain myopic managerial views were found to affect active moral agency this leaves room for business ethics program that aim at the development of active moral agency

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

business cycle theory and econometrics we outline in turn criticisms made by econometricians of the methods used in empirical business cycle research and then criticisms made by business cycle researchers of some methods used by econometricians the aim is to clarify and in some cases correct thesecriticisms overall there is no conflict in using rigourous statistical procedures to study modern dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models we also provide a concise bibliographyof recent research on statistical methods for business cycle models

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

urban biased policies and rising income inequality in china since the start of economic reforms in 1978 china has experienced the largest increase in income inequality of all countries for which comparable data are available according to the world bank 1997 china s gini coefficient increased from 28 2 in 1981 to 38 8 in 1995 based on official survey data another study that used internationally standard definitions for incomes estimated china s gini ratio at 38 2 in 1988 and 45 2 in 1995 a level that already surpassed many developing economies in asia azizur khan and carl riskin 1998 are these income inequality changes the consequence of institutional reforms that replaced egalitarian rewards with work incentives employment contracts and labor mobility this paper uses household survey data collected by china s state statistical bureau ssb to investigate the sources and causes of this rising inequality by analyzing gini ratios and generalized entropy measures i decompose the overall inequality into three sectoral components i inequality within rural areas ii inequality within urban areas and iii sectoral disparity the data indicate that increases in rural urban income differentials have been the driving factor behind the rising overall inequality in china i argue that urbanbiased policies and institutions including labor mobility restrictions welfare systems and financial policies of inflation subsidies and investment credits to the urban sector are responsible for the long term rural urban divide and the recent increases in disparity

asset bubbles monetary policy and bank lending in japan an empirical investigation asset prices rose rapidly in japan during the latter half of the 1980s and then declined as quickly in the early 1990s their behaviour is consistent with the existence of speculative bubbles in these markets this paper investigates the dynamic relationships among stock and land prices in japan output and monetary and bank lending variables the results of causality tests and variance decompositions are reported for two time periods 1972 1501985 and 1986 1501991 the price bubbles affected each other in the first period although the size of this impact is dependent on the choice of variables in the vars in the bubble period there is strong evidence that the stock market bubble was determined by its own past and also influenced the land market bubble accounting for a significant proportion of the variance of the land market bubble however neither output the money supply nor the lending variables were significant in the causality tests or in explaining the variation of the two assset bubbles

vertical irmbalance in the fiscal systems of federal states a theory of vertical fiscal imbalance in federal states vfi is developed which distinguishes between long run and short run imbalances and between normative and positive interpretations of the concept the analysis is carried out in the context of a simple three sector model where the allocation of national output among sectors results from interaction of a public choice process with an overall resource constraint the paper proposes welfare theoretic definitions of long run and short run vfi in addition it uses the concept as part of a positive analysis in order to reassess broad trends in canadian fiscal history

interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts the effects of monetary policy existing theory and evidence on the effects of monetary policy are reviewed substantial room for disagreement among economists remains new evidence based on multivariate time series studies of several countries is presented while certain patterns in the data consistent with effective monetary policy are strikingly similar across countries others particularly the tendency of interest rate increases to predict high inflation are harder to reconcile with effective monetary policy

monetary policy in a heterogeneous monetary union the australian experience australia is a monetary union with strong regional specialization manufacturing and service industries are located in the population centres on the south eastern seaboard and mining and pastoral activities take place in the interior and north of the continent monetary policy affects the interior and north more strongly than the south eastern seaboard because australian primary goods are mostly exported and the exchange rate provides the main transmission channel for monetary policy the reserve bank of australia must consider the economic interests of the interior and north and the south eastern seaboard since monetary policy cannot differentiate between regions there is a need for interregional macroeconomic risk sharing

measuring world business cycles using kalman filtering and dynamic factor analysis the authors decompose aggregate output consumption and investment for the g7 countries into factors that are 1 common across all countries and aggregates 2 common across aggregates within a country and 3 specific to each individual aggregate in quarterly data for the period 1970 through 1993 fluctuations in all aggregates contain world and country specific common components that are both statistically significant and quantitatively important the authors find that the world and country specific common components play different roles in different business cycle episodes for each of the seven countries and that either may be dominant during a particular episode copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate if jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately they tax only land because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital to exploit absentee owners however jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level as absentee ownership increases throughout the economy land taxation results in greater inefficiency to alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land the higher level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate uniform taxation of land and capital or property taxation thus may be more efficient than separate taxation jel classification h21 h71 est ce que la terre et le capital devraient etre taxes d une maniere uniforme si on permettait aux diverses juridictions de taxer capital et terre separement elles taxeraient seulement la terre parce que la fiscalite imposee au capital cree des distorsions dans l allocation du capital mobile mais pour exploiter les proprietaires absents les diverses juridictions imposent un fardeau fiscal sur la terre qui va au dela de ce que l efficacite commande a proportion que la propriete absente se developpe dans l economie la fiscalite imposee a la terre devient source de plus en plus grande inefficacite pour reduire cette inefficacite attribuable a la sur taxation de la terre le niveau senior de gouvernement intervient pour forcer les juridictions juniors a taxer capital et terre au meme taux parce que le desir d attirer le capital reduit le taux de taxation il se peut donc que la taxation uniforme de la terre et du capital ou de la taxation sur la propriete soit plus efficace que des taux d imposition differents

the international effects of china s growth trade and education booms china s international trade flows have increased by 500 since 1992 far outstripping gdp growth likewise tertiary education enrollments have increased by 300 we simulate these changes using a multi sector growth model of the chinese and usa economies a decade of trade biased growth in china is found to have a large effect on the usa economy raising gdp approximately 3 4 5 percentage points we also show that the trade bias in china s growth accounts for more than half of the observed growth in tertiary enrolments in china in contrast neutral growth has practically no effect on usa incomes or china s stock of skilled labour finally the simulations reveal that china s education boom per se has practically no long run impact on the usa economy the results thus indicate that the pattern of productivity growth in exports sectors as might be caused by falling trade costs has been critical in transmitting benefits of chinese growth to the world economy they also point to an important link between falling trade costs and human capital formation

the flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods in this paper we explore how the ability of bureaucrats to extract resources from their community may be limited by competition in the local market for public goods specifically we examine intergovernmental aid as a resource bureaucrats seek to control intergovernmental aid has been found to be more stimulative of local government expenditures than predicted by neo classical economic theory in this research the flypaper effect is used as an indicator of the ability of bureaucrats to control local resources in excess of local demand and preferences we empirically relate variation in the flypaper effect to the extent of competition in the local market for public goods competition does not consistently limit the flypaper effect the implications of this finding for theories of competition in the local market for public goods are then discussed

international business cycles world region and country specific factors the paper investigates the common dynamic properties of business cycle fluctuations across countries regions and the world we employ a bayesian dynamic latent factor model to estimate common components in macroeconomic aggregates output consumption and investment in a 60 country sample covering seven regions of the world the results indicate that a common world factor is an important source of volatility for aggregates in most countries providing evidence for a world business cycle we find that region specific factors play only a minor role in explaining fluctuations in economic activity we also document similarities and differences across regions countries and aggregates jel f41 e32 c11 c32

the importance of global shocks for national policymakers rising challenges for sustainable monetary policies this paper analyses the importance of global shocks for the global economic developments and national policymakers from a novel perspective on the one hand we examine whether global factors convey additional information about monetary conditions not summarised by national aggregates more specifically we keep an eye on the question whether domestic monetary policies have become less effective in the wake of financial globalisation we adopt a favar framework to derive structural shocks on a worldwide level and their impact on other global and also national variables we estimate our macromodel using quarterly data from q1 1984 to q4 2012 for the g7 countries plus the euro area according to our results global liquidity shocks significantly influence the global economy at the commodity price level however some other common shocks originating from house prices and gdp play a role at the global level as well

policy theory and the cycle the paper sets out some simple statistical models and shows that they are capable of generating the ob served characteristics of classical cycles in three countries australia the united kingdom and the united states both analytical and simulation work is used for this purpose these models emphasize the fact that to generate a realistic business cycle requires some deterministic trend growth near unit root behaviour in the deterministically detrended data and innovations of a certain magnitude with this information we examine some popular models of the cycle asking how they produce these features and then explore the implications of the analysis for economic policy

state space estimates of international business cycles abstract this paper uses gnp data spanning 1973 i 1987 i for canada france germany japan the u k and the u s and presents evidence that business cycles in these countries can be accounted for by an unobservable components model with one serially correlated international component and serially uncorrelated domestic components

budget reform and the theory of fiscal federalism institute of university of ii business and california i economic research berkeley center for real estate and urban economics working paper series working paper 85 io8 budget reform and the theory of fiscal federalism by john m quigley and danlel l rubinfeld these papers are preliminary in nature their purpose 39 to stimulate discussion comm therefore they are n be cited or quoted in publication without th s permission of the aut graduate school of business administration

economic competition and political competition an empirical note this paper has examined the proposition that more concentrated or consolidated metropolitan areas will produce public goods less efficiently than if there were a greater degree of interjurisdictional competition the empirical evidence garnered in section 3 suggests that interjurisdictional competition does tend to reduce the cost of providing local public services and consequently local government expenditure levels

on distinguishing between leviathan and public interest governments in a federal state the purpose of this paper is to derive testable implications for the proposition that provincial governments in a specific federal system are leviathans that is revenue maximizers the leviathan model associated with brennan and buchanan 1980 hypothesizes that governments behave like monopolies who seek to maximize their revenue this model is contrasted with an alternative hypothesis the public interest theory a theoretical model of a federal state based on the canadian system is constructed and testable implications are derived the principal feature of the model is that it is set in the context of a particular game involving the federal government provincial governments and a consumer in attempting to model this situation care has been taken to try to incorporate as many institutional features of the canadian federal system as possible while still allowing the model to be somewhat parsimonious with some modification the model may be applicable to other countries with similar federal systems

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

impure public goods and transfers in a three agent model abstract this paper extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods the analysis is developed in the context of international public goods under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical if the preferences are divergent a country may gain by giving a transfer the receiver may lose and these two phenomena may appear at the same time

the role of international factors in the business cycle a multi country study abstract empirical research has been conducted on the various theories of the business cycle over many countries however very little research has attempted to undertake a multi country disaggregate investigation into the sources of output change this paper decomposes fluctuations in industry output in a particular country into 1 a nation specific shock 2 an industry specific shock 3 a common shock and 4 an idiosyncratic factor using a dynamic factor analysis state space approach the paper finds that the industry specific impulse explains a significant but small part of the variance of the forecast error this provides limited support for the disaggregated real business cycle paradigm

the productivity of schools and other local public goods producers abstract i construct an agency model of local public goods producers in which households make tiebout choices among jurisdictions in a world of imperfect information and costly residential mobility i examine producers effort and rent under local property tax finance and centralized finance i show that if there are a sufficient number of jurisdictions conventional local property tax finance can attain about as much productivity as a social planner with centralized finance can even if the social planner is armed with more information than a real social planner could plausibly have the key insight is that decentralized tiebout choices make some information the social planner would need verifiable and other information unnecessary

between anarchy and leviathan a note on the design of federal states abstract recent research suggests a rationale for the autonomy retained by federal states lower and intermediate level governments by encouraging interjurisdictional competition federal structures constrain the pursuit by public officials of private objectives inconsistent with the public weal but using federal structures to achieve this end has a cost the more decentralized a nation s public sector the more likely that some of the externalities generated by the provision of public goods and services will be ignored this note investigates the balance between the costs and benefits of decentralization that must be struck by a federal state s designers

municipal residency laws and local public budgets prior research has shown that residency laws increase the productivity of municipal employees which tends to reduce per unit operating cost however this gain in efficiency appears to have been lost when one considers that public employee groups tend to be high demanders who have a greater tendency to vote in local elections and to support expenditure increases bennett and orzechowski 1983 our results tend to provide additional evidence to support the findings of previous studies that public employee groups tend to exert a disproportionate impact on local budgetary decisions

stakeholder s preference and rational compliance a comment on sacconi s csr as a model for extended corporate governance ii compliance reputation and reciprocity lorenzo sacconi s recent re statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of csr as the expression of a fair multi party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant however at one crucial point in his theory sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders conformist preferences their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement refusing to abide by its own explicit csr policies and norms we take issue with him over this concept we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole as an alternative we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach we draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy skyrms danielson and we use a computer simulation of the trust game according to this approach the failure of the logic of reputation which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve is overcome through the dynamics of interaction

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

municipal annexation and local monopoly power we have found that the fiscal power of a city can be increased by extension of its borders within a land area that is homogeneous with respect to earning opportunities even when numerous rival jurisdictions exist in the area we hypothesized that extending municipal boundaries will have a positive effect on discretionary outlays and on expenditures per capita the evidence presented supports these hypotheses furthermore municipal wages appear to be significantly increased in cities experiencing annexation growth therefore we would expect to find that municipal employees are more inclined to favor annexation than the rest of the electorate from a policy standpoint this study suggests that significant perverse effects on fiscal efficiency may follow adoption of legal reforms that facilitate the ability of municipalities to extend their borders or that restrict the formation of new municipalities

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

local government structure and urban residential location the large research literature on the tiebout model has developed with little attention paid to the urban economic structure in which local government functions this paper attempts to examine the theoretical consequences of local jurisdictions functioning within a conventional monocentric urban model it also discusses a mathematical formulation of a two jurisdiction linear city in which the local service level and local property tax rate might be used as strategic variables in a game theory sense it is concluded that for this to happen the local service level has to have more than one element which is intuitively appealing some references are developed to current british local government and possible changes

the impact of congestion on local public good production abstract this paper models local public goods production where allocation of the publicly provided input occurs simultaneously with production of the final service output the framework models local public goods as developed in club theory where congestion is an increasing function of population central to identification of the model is that the quantities of the input police are differentiated from the produced output safety estimation is across neighborhoods within a single city the results show there is a very low elasticity of congestion on average but safety in some neighborhoods in more congested than private goods

the higher educational transformation of china and its global implications this chapter documents the major transformation of higher education that has been underway in china since 1999 and evaluates its potential global impacts this has involved major new resource commitments to tertiary education and significant changes in organizational form reflecting china s commitment to continued high growth through quality upgrading and the production of ideas and intellectual property as set out in both the tenth 2001 2005 and eleventh 2006 2010 five year plans the number of undergraduate and graduate students in china has been growing at approximately 20 per year since 1999 and the total number of graduates at all levels of higher education in china has increased by more than a factor of six in the last decade entering class sizes and total student enrolments have risen fast too approximately quintupling prior to 1999 increases in these areas were much smaller much of the increased spending is focussed on elite universities and new academic contracts differ sharply from earlier ones which lacked tenure and often used annual publication quotas

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

how to make the metropolitan area work neither big government nor laissez faire we study how political boundaries and tax competition among jurisdictions interact with the labor and land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas contrary to general belief institutional fragmentation and cross border commuting need not be welfare decreasing but the size of the central city matters for welfare under tax competition the central business district is too small tax competition also prevents public policy enhancing global productivity to produce their full impact although our results support the idea of decentralizing the supply of local public services by independent jurisdictions they also highlight the need of coordinating tax policies

labor migration and returns to rural education in china this paper provides an answer to the following question why do empirical studies find low returns to schooling in rural china and yet the schooling rates are high i find that schooling played a significant role in raising the accessibility of urban formal employment to rural people in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the face of the government s restrictive policy on labor migration from rural to urban areas the large urban rural income difference provided a strong incentive for senior high school education the theory also explains the drop in the senior high school attendance in the mid 1980s

international demand and liquidity shocks in a svar model of the australian economy a structural vector autoregressive model of the australian economy that allows for international shocks from the usa japan as well as world commodity prices is specified and estimated for the period 1979 1999 a block exogenous structure linking the three countries is imposed the international linkages are modelled using a factor structure to circumvent problems from estimating large scale dynamic models the factors are estimated recursively using a kalman filter and are found to represent aggregate demand and liquidity shocks for the usa and japan respectively the key empirical result is the usa shocks are the dominant source of international shocks on the australian economy with the japanese economy having a dampening effect on the usa shocks the empirical results also show that australian monetary policy responds to domestic conditions rather than international monetary policy

a long run structural macroeconometric model of the uk a new modelling strategy that provides a practical approach to incorporating long run structural relationships suggested by economic theory in an otherwise unrestricted var model is applied to construct a small quarterly macroeconometric model of the uk estimated over 1965q1 1999q4 in nine variables domestic and foreign outputs prices and interest rates oil prices the nominal effective exchange rate and real money balances the aim is to develop a model with a transparent and theoretically coherent foundation tests of restrictions on the long run relations of the model are presented the dynamic properties of the model are discussed and monetary policy shocks identified

sources and propagation of international output cycles common shocks or transmission abstract this paper studies the generation and transmission of international cycles in a multi country model with production and consumption interdependencies two sources of disturbance are considered and three channels of propagation are compared technology disturbances which are mildly correlated across countries are more successful than government expenditure disturbances in reproducing actual data the presence of a common component to the shocks and of production interdependencies appear to be crucial in quantitatively matching the properties of the data

do formula based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting evidence from ghana abstract various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation in this paper we investigate a formula based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation specifically we study the sharing of resources of the district assemblies common fund dacf in ghana amongst the country s district governments over the period 1994 to 2005 we find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants per capita dacf grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower suggesting that swing districts were targeted we find evidence that dacf formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

does detrending matter for the determination of the reference cycle and the selection of turning points we examine the sensitivity of turning points classification to detrending and compare the implied cycles to those derived by nber or doc researchers two dating rules are considered turning point dates are broadly insensitive to detrending with one dating rule but not the other and many procedures generate false alarms and miss several common turning points with the latter one amplitude and duration properties are also sensitive detrending and dating rules the hodrick and prescott and a frequency domain filters are best in mimicing nber and doc cycles regardless of the dating rule used

a numerical simulation analysis of hukou labour mobility restrictions in china abstract we use numerical simulation methods to analyze the hukou system of permanent registration in china which many believe has supported growing relative inequality over the last 20 years by restraining labour migration both between the countryside and urban areas and between regions and cities our aim is to inject economic modelling into the debate on sources of inequality in china which thus far has been largely statistical we first use a model with homogeneous labour in which wage inequality across various geographical divides in china is supported solely by quantity based migration restrictions urban rural areas rich poor regions eastern central and western non coastal zones eastern and central western development zones eastern central western zones more disaggregated 6 regional classifications and an all 31 provincial classification we calibrate this model to base case data and when we remove migration restrictions all wage and most income inequality disappears results from this model structure points to a significant role for hukou restrictions in supporting inequality in china we then present a further model extension in which urban house price rises retard rural urban migration the impacts of removing hukou restrictions on migration are smaller but are still significant finally we modify the model to capture labour productivity differences across regions calibrating the modified model to estimates of both national and regional gini coefficients removal of migration barriers is again inequality improving but less so