the impact of mandatory disclosure laws on product choices an analysis of the salad dressing market abstract the nutrition labeling and education act nlea requires most food products to include a nutrition label prior to the nlea labeling was voluntary this study uses nutrition label information and supermarket scanner data pre and post nlea to examine the impact of moving from a voluntary to a mandatory labeling regime on consumer product choice the voluntary unraveling of information is shown to be an important market mechanism prior to the nlea all low fat salad dressings had a nutrition label while the majority of the higher fat dressings did not however there remained large variation in fat content among dressings that did not voluntarily label those with the highest fat levels experienced a significant decline in sales after they were required to disclose the results indicate that even in markets with credible low cost mechanisms to disclose mandatory labeling can have an impact on consumer behavior and health

restabilizing matching markets at senior level abstract we study in many to one matching markets the restabilization process of a group stable matching disrupted by a change in the population if firms are not allowed to fire workers the market always reaches stability again only if the disruption is due to the opening of positions by firms or the retirement of workers this is shown by designing an algorithm which always leads to a group stable matching the algorithm mimics markets where firms make offers and workers accept the offer of their favorite firm if firms are allowed to fire workers we construct another algorithm which produces a group stable matching when the disruption is due to the entrance of workers or the closure of positions in this algorithm unemployed workers make offers to firms in both cases of disruption we require firms to have q substitutable preferences

buyer s equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility a recursive approach we study a decentralized trading model as in peters 1984a where heterogeneous market participants face a trade off between price and trade probability we present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in nash equilibrium based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions

information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

are legislative tv and campaign finance regulations complementary entry barriers evidence from the usa the present study examines the political use of legislative television and campaign finance restrictions as either complementary or substitutable forms of entry barriers using data from the 50 states for 1976 results from a simultaneous probit procedure indicate that where campaign finance regulations are relaxed demand for televised house sessions is increased results also suggest that the presence of televised proceedings increases the restrictiveness of a state s campaign finance rules thus supporting the hypothesis that legislative television and campaign finance restrictions serve incumbent legislators as complementary institutional entry barriers mixon 2002 supports this view by providing examples of outlets for voters to scrutinize elected legislators at the federal level in the united states for instance legislative positions for members of congress are often described in detail by nationally circulated periodicals such as time and newsweek and in widely circulated newspapers such as th

quality disclosure under consumer loss aversion consumers experience a sense of loss when a product s quality does not match their expectations to alleviate consumer loss aversion cla firms can disclose information to reduce consumers uncer

strategic information disclosure the case of multi attribute products with heterogeneous consumers we examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about quality attributes of differentiated products in particular we focus on the case of differentiated products with multiple attributes and consumers that are heterogeneous in their preferences over these attributes we show that there exist certain configurations of consumer preferences under which a firm producing a high quality product even with zero costs of disclosure may choose not to reveal the quality of its product this failure of firms to voluntarily disclose the quality of their products will arise when providing consumers with more information results in more elastic demands for these products which in turn triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits for all firms as a result the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from that in which disclosure is mandatory

the government procurement agreement implications of economic theory this paper analyzes the provisions of the new agreement on government procurement gpa drawing insights from trade theory and recent developments in the economics of information and law a central conclusion is that in a world where imperfectly informed procurers purchase from imperfectly competitive firms on behalf of imperfectly informed tax payers it is not easy to devise rules which would be optimal in all situations nevertheless the non discriminatory provisions of the gpa seem to approximate closely the rules which would maximize global welfare a significant benefit of the gpa is in helping to overcome national agency problems in procurement by creating mechanisms for reciprocal international monitoring supported by multilateral enforcement there is however scope for improvement first the gpa does not equip bidders for government contracts to vault over trade restrictions so the creation of genuine international competition for government procurement remains crucially dependent on the liberalization of trade secondly weaknesses remain in the enforcement mechanism these include the low level of compensation to a successful challenger the absence of restrictions on settlements and the lack of provision for challenge and review of bail outs the paper proposes certain improvements this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

comparative statics in matching markets abstract this paper studies the comparative statics of adding agents to matching markets that generalize the marriage and college admissions markets of d gale and l shapley amer math monthly 69 1962 9 15 it is shown for the wide class of matching markets studied by a roth econometrica 52 1984 47 57 that adding an agent to one side of the market weakens the competitive positions of the other agents on that side and strengthens the competitive positions of the agents on the other side

public expenditure international specialisation and agglomeration abstract it is widely recognised that public sector purchasers tend to favour domestic suppliers we study the consequences of such home biased public procurement on international specialisation using a general equilibrium model with a monopolistically competitive sector we find that a country will specialise in that sector if it has relatively large home biased procurement the pull effect furthermore home biased procurement can counter agglomeration forces in that sector and thereby attenuate the overall degree of international specialisation the spread effect our empirical analysis conducted on input output data for the european union yields supporting evidence for the pull effect and some support for the spread effect

favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts abstract this paper studies the rationale for giving preference to domestic firms in the award of government contracts when the regulator is interested in maximizing domestic welfare it is seen that in the absence of comparative advantages the regulator should discriminate in favor of the domestic firms because foreign firms profits do not enter in domestic welfare furthermore i show that the form of the discrimination function depends on the mechanism being used in order to simplify the implementation of an optimal policy the regulator should choose mechanisms based on second price auctions

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

rent seekers who demand government production bureaucratic output and the price of complements many goods and services produced by government bureaus are sold at prices which do not maximize net revenues maximize profits or minimize losses indeed bureaucratic institutions typically create incentives to expand production beyond that which would maximize net revenues furthermore many of the products sold by government bureaus are highly complementary to privately produced goods and services if a bureau s output is not priced to maximize net revenues then private sellers of various complements may be in a position to extract rents by adjusting their prices this paper explores the implications of bureaucratically generated rents for privately produced complements first rent seeking can materialize when private sector interests apply pressure for expanded bureau production and lower bureau prices second if the bureau does expand its production capacity beyond the net revenue maximizing level and if a private producer obtains exclusive rights to supply complements then the extraction of rents will result in an inefficient mix of resources in bureaucratic production the basis of the inefficiency is not the reason often given however rather inefficiencies arise because the actual level of use is less than that which the bureaucratic plant was constructed to produce due to the relatively high price of the complementary services

the effect of price advertising on prices evidence in the wake of 44 liquormart the 44 liquormart decision eliminating rhode island s ban on liquor price advertising made rhode island the subject of a natural experiment for measuring the effect of advertising on prices using massachusetts prices as controls we find that advertising stores substantially cut only prices of the products that they advertise prices of other products at both advertising and nonadvertising stores do not change advertising stores cut their prices on products advertised by rivals while nonadvertising stores do not we find no reductions in price dispersion across stores newspaper advertising stores appear to draw a higher share of customers after they advertise

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

advertising and coordination when market information such as price is difficult to communicate consumers and firms may be unable to take advantage of mutually beneficial scale economies so that coordination failures arise ostensibly uninformative advertising expenditures can be used to eliminate coordination failures by allowing an efficient firm to communicate implicitly that it offers a low price this provides a theoretical explanation for benham s 1972 empirical association of the ability to advertise with lower prices and larger scale advertising becomes necessary for optimal coordination when the identity of the efficient firm is uncertain an application to loss leader pricing is developed

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

appropriable rents from yellowstone park a case of incomplete contracting i introduction though the general populace accepts that national parks are and should be the domain of government the history of our first national park yellowstone reveals that from the beginning private entrepreneurs were actively involved in preserving the amenity values and capturing the amenity rents to appropriate the rents from yellowstone the early entrepreneurs had to carve the amenity values from the common domain or see them dissipated through open access without private ownership of the land this was accomplished through vertical integration of complementary inputs namely transportation services and tourist facilities necessary for the enjoyment of the natural amenities the extent of private sector success or failure in the history of yellowstone can be best understood in the context of the theory of the firm as developed by armen alchian his work with demsetz 1972 and with klein and crawford 1978 expands our understanding of how firms contract to appropriate rents and prevent postcontractual opportunism klein crawford and alchian 1978 300 distinguish between two reasons for vertical integration both of which apply to private firms operating in yellowstone at the time of its creation the first is the successive monopoly problem which occurs when two monopolists supply inputs into a final product or service and the second is postcontractual opportunism our purpose here is to apply these two important threads from the firm s contractual tapestry to the formation and operation of yellowstone national park the central theme is that amenity rents associated with the yellowstone region either could be dissipated through open access and the ensuing tragedy of the commons or appropriated through contractual arrangements that limited entry to the commons the former occurred until the northern pacific railroad with its monopoly on transportation services vertically integrated with monopoly suppliers of tourist facilities and operated the park as if it were privately owned 1 however the potential for rent dissipation still existed because the railroad did not own the park itself and could not effectively contract with the federal government to restrict entry therefore when the federal government opened the park to automobiles in 1915 the railroad s monopoly was eliminated and rent dissipation occurred through congestion ii brief history of yellowstone the natural features of the area that is now yellowstone national park were well known by 1860 following john colter s exploration of the area in 1807 numerous other trappers and later prospectors explored colter s hell in 1865 1870 and 1871 the first formal explorers financed in part by congress were sent to yellowstone these explorers provided scientific information photographs and paintings that increased the awareness in the east about the yellowstone area this awareness culminated in the creation of yellowstone national park by an act of congress on 1 march 1872 making it the first national park though yosemite had been established as a state preserve in 1864 early administration of the park was haphazard because the federal government provided no funds for operating expenses indeed many of yellowstone s natural features were being defaced until in 1886 the u s army assumed administrative responsibilities stationing a cavalry troop there the army stayed until 1918 at the time of yellowstone s creation the region was relatively inaccessible and sparsely settled but railroads changed this the northern pacific railroad completed its transcontinental line in 1883 and immediately added a sixty mile spur from livingston montana to yellowstone s northern entrance in 1903 the chicago burlington and quincy railroad gained access to yellowstone through cody wyoming and in 1908 the union pacific arrived at west yellowstone montana finally in 1915 the park was opened to automobile traffic

an empirical investigation of procurement contract structures this article presents a model of procurement contracting with asymmetric cost information and investigates whether two of the model s predictions are consistent with actual contracts between hospitals and california s medicaid program the article first tests for the presence of a fixed price payment region where medicaid s payments are independent of hospitals actual but unobservable production costs and then tests whether the size of the fixed price region depends upon expectations about hospitals costs to conduct these tests the article must first estimate hospitals unobservable costs attributable to medicaid patients the article finds evidence of a fixed price region but cannot confirm that the size of the fixed price region depends upon expectations about hospitals costs

the theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation in this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states we find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors 1 the extent of public sector union membership which represents the interest group hypothesis has a positive influence on pro union legislation 2 the extent of employer opposition to unions as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections has a negative effect on bargaining laws 3 two taste variables the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state have a positive influence on these laws a result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation

rent seeking from a property rights perspective james buchanan 15 15 has suggested that rent seeking analysis can readily be incorporated within the property rights approach and as with public choice the theory of rent seeking can be interpreted as an appropriate extension yet no one has really explored rent seeking or revenue premium tariff or directly unproductive profit seeking from a property rights perspective buchanan 14 15 16 17 clearly indicated that property rights assignments actually underlie the rent seeking process and others have also recognized this 4 20 23 28 but there are further insights into the workings of the political economy which can be derived for instance lobbying activities with nonpecuniary goals clearly fit into the rent seeking framework when viewed through the property rights paradigm this contrasts strikingly with the perception of rent seeking held by some writers 9 10 11 12 13 furthermore a property rights approach to rent seeking provides predictions of a spiraling process of government growth since successful rent seeking by one interest group generally requires expansion of bureaucratic powers while at the same time creating incentives for the formation of additional rent seeking interest groups legislative responses to these new groups requires further expansion of the bureaucracy and creates incentives for more rent seeking so the growth process continues in this paper a brief summary of the conclusions of the rent seeking literature will be presented followed by an explanation of how the same conclusions have been deduced using the property rights paradigm various extensions of the rent seeking concept such as those alluded to above are then obtained by emphasizing a property rights approach following this the terms used to describe rent seeking e g directly unproductive profit seeking etc will be discussed to determine which if any is the most appropriate characterization of the phenomenon

an empirical assessment of the factor supplier pressure group hypothesis the main purpose of this paper has been to empirically assess tullock s factor supplier pressure group hypothesis theory predicted that public employees would be most able to use their political power to expand public spending levels at the local level of government therefore in contrast to the two previous attempts to test this hypothesis the empirical tests focused on the growth oflocal public spending the test results lead to the conclusion that the political power of public employee groups is an important determinant of the growth of local public spending although the extent of their influence is as yet unknown general control personnel and sanitation workers were found to be exceptionally successful at influencing budgetary growth in terms of the former group these results lead me to suspect that the results of bennett and johnson s 1980 research on federal government growth apply to the local public sector as well that is while there may be debate over how much local public spending has increased as a percentage of net national product its composition has changed in that proportionally more resources are being used for the purposes of administrative rule making as is the case with federal governmental regulation increased regulation of the local public economy is sure to have substantial allocative and distributive effects which form an agenda for future research

the effect of information on product quality evidence from restaurant hygiene grade cards this study examines the effect of an increase in product quality information to consumers on e rms choices of product quality in 1998 los angeles county introduced hygiene quality grade cards to be displayed in restaurant windows we show that the grade cards cause i restaurant health inspection scores to increase ii consumer demand to become sensitive to changes in restaurants hygiene quality and iii the number of foodborne illness hospitalizations to decrease we also provide evidence that this improvement in health outcomes is not fully explained by consumers substituting from poor hygiene restaurants to good hygiene restaurants these results imply that the grade cards cause restaurants to make hygiene quality improvements

government procurement and international trade abstract we model the bidding for a government contract in which there is imperfect competition each bidder is better informed about his own costs than either his rival bidders or the government and the distribution of the domestic firms costs differs from the distribution of foreign firms costs because of comparative advantage effects we find that the government minimizes its expected procurement cost by operating a price preference policy not necessarily purchasing from the lowest bidder

the market for laws an economic analysis of legislation considerable insight into the workings of government has been gained in recent years by analyzing political behavior in the same way that economists analyze market behavior such analysis has led to at least two actually several distinguishable but often overlapping developments one might be labeled the interest group theory of government 1 4 10 11 12 16 while the second could be referred to as the economic theory of legislatures 4 5 10 15 18 the purpose of the following presentation is to combine these two theoretical developments and treat the legislative process as a market for laws then by simultaneously considering interest group characteristics and legislative production costs hypotheses concerning both the level of interest group pressure and the magnitude of legislative output are examined in particular the primary issues to be addressed are 1 what determines the number of interest groups formed in a state and 2 what impact does the number of interest groups have on the level of legislative output in the process the developing economic approach to government is extended in two directions first this study contains what appears to be the first direct empirical examination of the question of what factors lead to or limit aggregate interest group demands for legislation and second the level of interest group pressure and the constraints on or costs of legislative decision making are considered to simultaneously determine the aggregate output of the legislative process virtually all previous studies of interest group legislation examine the impact of specific interests on specific legislation 2 the following presentation is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction in order to explore the issues suggested above section ii characterizes the political process as a market in order to justify the theoretical hypotheses to be tested section iii details the theoretical

too good to fire non assortative matching to play a dynamic game abstract we model stable non assortative labor market matchings we endogenize how transferable utility is a matched firm and worker play an infinite horizon game with one sided moral hazard becker s 1973 result that complementarity yields positively assortative matching fails because increasing match quality harms dynamic incentives a firm cannot credibly threaten to fire a worker who is productive even with low effort thus firms may prefer lower type workers who will exert more effort we offer a new interpretation of efficiency wages committing to a high wage improves effort incentives indirectly by increasing the firm s willingness to walk away we also show that the set of stable outcomes has a lattice structure

quality disclosure and competition we analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare we show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost when the disclosure cost is low welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly but when the disclosure cost is high welfare is higher under duopoly in either market structure disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus

why are congressional committees dominated by high demand legislators a comment on niskanen s view of bureaucrats and politicans william niskanen argued that the characteristics of the legislative review process imply that bureaus are allowed to produce an output which is less efficient than the representative legislator would allow 4 5 the main points niskanen raised in this regard centered on the facts that i a committee not the whole legislature conducts the review process for each bureau and ii more important at least in the united states most committees are dominated by legislators who have higher demands for the services reviewed than the median demand in the whole legislature and the committee decisions are very seldom amended or reversed by the whole legislature 5 624 25 niskanen observed that the review committee prefers a greater output than that preferred by a representative legislator 5 625 26 since bureaucratic output is inefficiently large in the niskanen model of bureaucratic production the implication is that high demand committee review allows relatively more inefficiency than the representative legislator would condone niskanen assumed that all legislators wish to maximize their political support votes such legislators would not allow an increase in inefficiency without some offsetting benefit since some voters have a negative reaction to this inefficiency non consuming taxpayers yet in the niskanen model the bureau captures all the consumer surplus associated with the increase in output allowed by high demand committee review consumers of the bureau s output may appear to benefit since they consume more however they gain no additional surplus so there is no increase in consumer voter welfare there appears to be nothing positive to offset the loss in votes resulting from inefficient production under majority rule decision making it is often argued that the desires of the median voter will be met the representative legislator is the median voter in a legislative assembly therefore it seems that this median legislator s perception of marginal political returns and marginal political costs should dictate the allocation of resources in the public sector

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market abstract flexible firms compete by means of wages in the assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the marriage market workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the marriage market respectively assignment market are not robust to the entrance of flexible respectively rigid firms to this market a new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid respectively flexible firms from this market meaningful comparative static results are derived

quality disclosure and certification theory and practice this essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification after comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure we address two sets of theoretical issues first why don t sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of unraveling and given the lack of unraveling is it desirable to mandate seller disclosure second when we rely on certifiers to act as the intermediary of quality disclosure do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information we further review empirical evidence on these issues with a particular focus on healthcare education and finance the empirical review covers quality measurement the effect of third party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior as well as the economics of certifiers jel d18 k32 l15 m31

litigation settlement and collusion private enforcement of regulatory policy is a significant feature of many government sponsored contests such as procurements although private enforcement is supposed to promote social welfare we show that competitors can use it to achieve collusive outcomes in a noncooperative duopoly setting we show that the threat of litigation and the possibility of settlement can dramatically affect ex ante competition in the relevant market essentially the settlement process provides a legal mechanism for the exchange of side payments while the possibility of a court decision provides the plaintiff with a credible threat against the defendant so as to avert cheating the result does not require repeated play ex ante contracts or other commitment devices in the federal procurement context we show that our results are robust to alterations in the court remedy bargaining power of the litigants and many other factors

some further properties of the cumulative offer process we investigate extension resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of the cumulative offer process cop extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be better off whenever others start preferring more contracts to being unmatched resource monotonicity on the other hand requires that no doctor becomes worse off whenever hospitals start hiring more doctors the cop becomes extension and resource monotonic whenever contracts are unilateral substitutes us satisfying an irrelevance of rejected contracts condition irc this result implies that the cop is population monotonic under us and the irc we then turn to the respecting improvements property which states that no doctor should be harmed if some of his contracts become more popular with an additional law of aggregate demand condition we show that the cop respects improvements

school quality and information disclosure evidence from the housing market i introduction tiebout s 1956 theory tying residential sorting patterns to the provision of local public goods provided the foundation for a large and growing literature assessing the relationship between school quality and housing markets many of these studies have used housing prices to directly estimate the monetary value of improvements in student test scores to parents and homeowners few have focused on the role of information in mediating relationships between buyers sellers schools and housing values 1 fewer still have examined the behavior of home sellers and their role in the provision of information on school quality this article takes a step toward filling these gaps in the literature building on the unraveling theory of information disclosure in the industrial organization literature grossman 1981 milgrom 1981 we first investigate the behavior of home sellers in revealing information about local schools we ask whether and how school quality affects the likelihood that a seller will reveal the identity of a property s assigned school in an online real estate listing empirical tests of unraveling are rare as the true quality of a product is typically unobserved the housing market provides a novel context to test this theory if sellers selectively reveal information on schools then information on its own controlling for school quality may have an impact on sales prices if the cost to buyers of obtaining information on school quality is sufficiently high we explore these issues empirically both in a period where the costs of gathering information are relatively high years 2001 and 2002 and in a period where these costs are presumably much lower years 2006 and 2007 between these two periods the mandates of the 2001 no child left behind nclb act coupled with the growth of the internet undoubtedly reduced the cost of information gathering for potential buyers and perhaps also lowered the costs of disclosure for sellers drawing on multiple listing service mls data of residential sales in fairfax county virginia the largest suburb of washington dc our results confirm that sellers of units located in high quality school assignment zones are on average more likely to disclose the school s identity in an online listing an increase of just ten points in an elementary school s passage rate on statewide tests increases the likelihood of information disclosure by a sizeable 5 percentage points in the 2001 2002 period a finding that is robust to a variety of alternative specifications and controls including the addition of real estate agent fixed effects predictably selective disclosure appears to be present but weaker in the 2006 2007 period when the cost of gathering information on school quality was likely lower a ten point increase in test scores yields a 2 to 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of disclosure our findings of moderate selective disclosure in the latter period hold even when we apply a school boundary discontinuity design and are robust to alternate measures of school quality including measures of adequate yearly progress under nclb in both periods we observe more selective disclosure for single family homes and those with three or more bedrooms presumably families with children than for smaller units we also find more selective disclosure in neighborhoods with high concentrations of young children our results support the findings of several previous studies bayer ferreira and mcmillan 2007 figlio and lucas 2000 confirming that school quality is more important in housing transactions involving families with children than for those without we also investigate the extent to which information disclosure is capitalized in housing prices using school fixed effects to control for school quality we find that information disclosure does not have an independent effect on a home s price

strategic disclosure of meaningful information to rival i study a model of strategic disclosure of a private signal to a rival in the presence of a payoff externality in the model two agents forecast the unknown true state of a future period specifically the quality of the signal is also private information hence which quality of signal is revealed for which incentive is the main question of interest i show that even when disclosure is costly the revealing equilibrium where an agent voluntarily reveals his signal can exist and it should be a monotone equilibrium asymmetry between the penalty for an incorrect forecast and the reward for a correct forecast is a necessary condition for the existence of this revealing equilibrium if the penalty is larger than the reward the unique revealing equilibrium is a separating equilibrium where only the low quality signal is disclosed in order to induce the rival s imitation on the other hand if the reward is much larger than the penalty the unique revealing equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where the signal is always revealed in order to induce the rival s deviation if the reward is not much larger than the penalty no revealing equilibrium is robust to a costly disclosure jel d81 d82

the strategy structure of two sided matching markets we study two sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women the agents are to form partnerships which provide them with satisfaction and at the same time make monetary transfers e g salaries or dowries the core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability the idea of using walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively the scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions the competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly in general this procedure may run into two difficulties first nonuniqueness if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented and second manipulability if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data however as we will show here using the walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets these are the matching markets of our title and they include markets for single items like houses where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item they also include labor markets in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries it turns out that in these markets both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a

price competition and advertising in oligopoly abstract this paper studies price advertising in an oligopoly market where consumers have only local price information sellers may attract consumers from other locations by advertising their price with positive probability they advertise a low price to attract customers from distant locations with the remaining probability they post a high price and serve only local customers the random advertising equilibrium approaches the equilibrium under perfect price information when the cost of advertising becomes small

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

multi item auctions a collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders and each bidder is to receive at most one item assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal in a suitable sense for the bidders in this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy

informative advertising competition this paper investigates informative price advertising in an established product hotelling duopoly where firms compete for shares of a fixed market prices are uncertain because firms costs are private information for a sufficiently low cost of advertising advertising necessarily arises in equilibrium also the less balanced the initial distributions over costs the greater the potential for informative advertising moreover whenever firms use informative advertising it increases the firms expected profits and social welfare relative to the outcome without advertising

on discrimination in auctions with endogenous entry abstract when entry is exogenous strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues myerson 1981 when entry is endogenous so that entrants expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism optimal discrimination takes a completely different form the revenue maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics besides those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength these predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large the optimality of first price auctions is also discussed jel d44 h57

advertising restrictions and concentration the case of malt beverages the relationship between state imposed advertising restrictions and state level market concentration in the malt beverage industry is examined the authors find that the presence of proscriptions on price advertising significantly increases market concentration at the state level both absolutely and relative to a measure of national concentration the evidence also indicates that banning local nonprice advertising in addition to price advertising yields no marginal significant change in either measure of state level concentration analysis of individual brewers market shares suggests that large national brewers gain at the expense of smaller brewers when price advertising is restricted copyright 1995 by mit press

top trading with fixed tie breaking in markets with indivisible goods abstract we study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects when preferences are strict gale s top trading cycles algorithm finds the unique core allocation when preferences are not necessarily strict we use an exogenous profile of tie breakers to resolve any ties in individuals preferences and apply gale s top trading cycles algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences we provide a foundation of these simple extensions of gale s top trading cycles algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences we show that gale s top trading cycles algorithm with fixed tie breaking is characterized by individual rationality strategy proofness weak efficiency non bossiness and consistency our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a good and simple rule for the resulting strict preferences

producer and consumer responses to green housing labels we find green labels increase residential property values by an average of 5 this premium varies by label stringency and across market segments builders respond to the stringency of labels by strategically incorporating green features to achieve higher ratings this strategy seems reasonable as there is no market premium for green features that lead to scores between label rating cutoff values these results raise important questions as to how green label policies should be designed in order to foster the supply of green features gradations of green attributes are influential particularly for highly rated homes the most stringent labels have the greatest role at the high price end of the market jel q20 q40 r31

does duration of political control matter interstate differences in branch banking laws this study began by trying to explain differences in state branch banking regulations introducing a variable that captures the effect of political dominance over time improves upon the commonly used measures of political dominance at a specific point in time even the direct comparison with the previously used percentage point in time variables shows that duration of political influence matters significantly no matter which party is in control the length of time it has been in control in a state influences political outcomes we show that in terms of which kind of legislation will be enacted democratic and republican control exert equal but opposite effects on legislative results in other words length of control matters independently of party affiliation but party affiliation affects the nature of the outcome of the political process

a model of labeling with horizontal differentiation and cost variability we study optimal disclosure of variety by a multiproduct firm with random costs the prices for labeled varieties are increasing functions of the cost differential and do not reveal which variety is cheaper to produce nondisclosure is most common under moderate uncertainty about costs and not too much idiosyncrasy in valuations and quality asymmetry mandatory disclosure decreases expected welfare when cost variability is large and quality asymmetry is small the cheaper variety tends to be oversupplied undersupplied when disclosure is voluntary mandatory competition among multiproduct firms that source inputs in the same upstream market may not lead to more disclosure

is free trade passe abstract if there were an economist s creed it would surely contain the affirmations i understand the principle of comparative advantage and i advocate free trade yet the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 1817 publication of ricardo s principles of political economy and this is due to changes that have recently taken place in the theory of international trade while new developments in international trade theory may not yet be familiar to the profession at large they have been substantial and radical in the last ten years the traditional constant returns perfect competition models of international trade have been supplemented and to some extent supplanted by a new breed of models that emphasizes increasing returns and imperfect competition these new models call into doubt the extent to which actual trade can be explained by comparative advantage they also open the possibility that government intervention in trade via import restrictions export subsidies

on hotelling s competition with non uniform customer distributions abstract hotelling s competition in a two stage location price game is examined with increasing densities of consumers towards the centre it is shown that there is a range of rather even distributions for which firms locate at opposite ends of the market as the distribution becomes more concentrated duopolists will tend to move inside the market

curbing agency problems in the procurement process by protest oversight we study a model in which a potential bidder in a government procurement may challenge its exclusion from the procurement before a quasi judicial board in the case of a sole source procurement the excluded vendor does not know whether the decision was justified in terms of expected surplus or alternatively was due to an agency problem we explain the occurrence of i equilibrium protests ii deterrence of inefficient sole sourcing iii overdeterrence the choice of a competitive procurement when sole source would be appropriate iv buyoff settlements which preserve inappropriate sole source procurement and v fedmail settlements which accompany appropriate sole source procurements our normative analysis addresses recent legislative initiatives to reform the protest process

restrictions on price advertising in this paper the effects of advertising restrictions in an industry producing an undifferentiated product are analyzed when the product is undifferentiated advertising conveys information about price the standard intuition suggests that such prohibitions will raise buyer search costs making demand less elastic this raises price and profits in an industry advertising restrictions provide an indirect means of coordinating pricing strategies in this framework here we consider the cost side of the same argument the efficiency of firms in an industry is allowed to vary and information about costs is private in this environment efficient firms are hurt by advertising restrictions since lower advertised prices constitute their most effective competitive weapon we show that when the number of buyers and sellers is finite there is a nonzero probability that advertising restrictions will reduce every firm s price this occurs when all firms are more efficient than their competitors expect them to be f