efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

uncertainty and incentives in crisis bargaining game free analysis of international conflict we study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict among our results we show that under some weak conditions there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war we also show that while uncertainty about the other side s cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations uncertainty about the other side s strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes along the way we are able to assess the degree to which particular modeling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well known relationship between uncertainty the incentive to misrepresent and costly war we find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important

the armed peace a punctuated equilibrium theory of war according to a leading rationalist explanation war can break out when a large rapid shift of power renders unbelievable a rising state s promise to compensate its declin ing opponent causing the latter to attack preventively this mechanism does not provide a complete and coherent explanation of war because it does not specify how inefficient fighting resolves this commitment problem we present a complete information model of war as a sequence of battles and show that although opportunities for a negotiated settle ment arise throughout the very desirability of peace creates a commitment problem that undermines its likelihood because players have incentives to settle as soon as possible they cannot credibly threaten to fight long enough if an opponent launches a surprise at tack this decreases the expected duration and costs of war and causes mutual deterrence to fail fighting s sheer destruction improves the credibility of these threats by decreasing the benefits from continuing the war equilibrium fighting may involve escalating costs that exceed the value of the stakes by the time peace is negotiated and that leave both players worse off than when the war began

bargaining and learning while fighting much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game ending costly lottery this article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse the model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power the analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly process literature i the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power ii it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty iii it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources and iv it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed

interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts the effects of monetary policy existing theory and evidence on the effects of monetary policy are reviewed substantial room for disagreement among economists remains new evidence based on multivariate time series studies of several countries is presented while certain patterns in the data consistent with effective monetary policy are strikingly similar across countries others particularly the tendency of interest rate increases to predict high inflation are harder to reconcile with effective monetary policy

information power and war ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed the probability of conflict goes to zero however conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender s reservation value i employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power centric theories of world politics balance of power and power transition theory the formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity information asymmetries are greatest thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power centric explanations of world politics

the principle of convergence in wartime negotiations if war results from disagreement about relative strength then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes i present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power in the markov perfect sequential equilibrium making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield however states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory the principle of convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat victory is not necessary to terminate initiate hostilities thus the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant

peace war and the balance of power every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics war is least likely if power is distributed equally war is least likely if power is distributed unequally and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war i try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation i argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation the most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are 1 whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and 2 how many states interests will be affected by the outcome

secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world abstract with the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community this paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries in a situation of asymmetric information in which the policy maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not we also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy maker additionally the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

on inflation as a regressive consumption tax abstract evidence on the portfolio holdings and transaction patterns of households suggests that the burden of inflation is not evenly distributed we build a monetary growth model consistent with key features of cross sectional household data and use this framework to study the distributional impact of inflation at the aggregate level our model economy behaves similar to standard monetary growth models within the representative agent abstraction inflation has however important distributional effects since it is effectively a regressive consumption tax thus neglecting the distributional consequences of inflation may prove misleading in assessing the effects of inflation in our economy

military coercion in interstate crises in an international crisis states make demands backed by threats to use force although these threats can be explicit in diplomatic communications they will not generally carry much weight unless substantiated by some show of force military measures designed to convey the commitment to resort to arms if one s demands are not satisfactorily met to have an impact this commitment must be credible it must be in one s interest to carry out the threat if the opponent refuses to comply in an environment where states possess private information about their valuations capabilities or costs credibility can be established by actions that a state unwilling to fight would not want or would not dare to take military moves such as arms buildups troop mobilizations and deployments to the potential zone of operations can alter incentives in a crisis by changing one s expected payoff from the use of force these are tacit bargaining moves that can restructure the strategic context thereby creating and possibly signaling one s commitments while undermining those of the opponent how can states use the military instrument to establish commitments and how does the nature of the instrument affect their ability to communicate them credibly to their adversaries there are two distinct mechanisms for credible signaling in economic models information can be transmitted reliably by sinking costs actors burn money to reveal that they value the disputed issue even more in contrast theories of interstate crisis bargaining usually rely on choices that increase the difference between backing down and fighting actors tie their hands by running higher risks of war to reveal their resolve the first mechanism involves costs that actors pay regardless of outcome and the second involves costs that actors pay only if they fail to carry out some threat or promise

guns butter and anarchy a state in the international system implicit in realism must allocate its limited resources between satisfying its intrinsically valued ends and the means of military power i formalize this guns versus butter problem in a simple infinite horizon model in which two states must continually decide how to allocate their resources and whether to attack the other state the analysis establishes sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which neither state attacks shows that there is a strictly pareto dominant pair of peaceful equilibrium payoffs characterizes the unique peaceful markov perfect equilibrium that yields them and describes the comparative statics of the equilibrium allocations more broadly the analysis also suggests that the notion of anarchy has little if any substantive significance distinctively related to international politics and that the problem of absolute and relative gains is superfluous

monetary policy through the credit cost channel italy and germany pre and post emu we present an empirical analysis of the credit cost channel ccc of monetary policy transmission this channel combines bank credit supply and interest rates on loans as a cost to firms the thrust of the ccc is that it makes both aggregate demand and aggregate supply dependent on monetary policy as a consequence 1 credit market conditions e g risk spreads are important sources and indicators of macroeconomic shocks 2 the real effects of monetary policy are larger and persistent we have applied the cointegrated vector autoregression cvar econometric methodology to italy and germany in the hard ems period and in the european monetary union emu period the short run and long run effects of the ccc are detectable for both countries in both periods simulation of the estimated model also confirms that inflation targeting by way of inter bank rate control stabilizes inflation through structural shifts of the stochastic equilibrium paths of both inflation and the output

stability and the distribution of power the relation between stability and the distribution of power is an important and long debated problem in international relations theory the balance of power school argues that an even distribution of power is more stable while the preponderance of power school argues that a preponderance of power is more stable empirical efforts to estimate this relation have yielded contradictory results this essay examines the relation between stability and the distribution of power in an infinite horizon game theoretic model in which two states are bargaining about revising the international status quo the states make offers and counteroffers until they reach a mutually acceptable settlement or until one of them becomes so pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement that it uses force to impose a new settlement the equilibrium of the game contradicts the expectations of both schools and offers an explanation for the conflicting empirical estimates in the model stability is greatest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the expected distribution of benefits that the use of force would impose

monopolizing violence and consolidating power governments in weak states often face an armed opposition and have to decide whether to try to accommodate and contain that adversary or to try to consolidate power and monopolize violence by disarming it when and why do governments choose to consolidate power and monopolize violence how fast do they try to consolidate power when does this lead to costly fighting rather than to efforts to eliminate the opposition by buying it off we study an infinite horizon model in which the government in each period decides how much to offer the opposition and the rate at which it tries to consolidate its power the opposition can accept the offer and thereby acquiesce to the government s efforts to consolidate or it can fight in an attempt to disrupt those efforts in equilibrium the government always tries to monopolize violence when it has coercive power against the opposition where roughly coercive power is the ability to weaken the opposition by lowering its payoff to fighting whether the government consolidates peacefully or through costly fighting depends on the size of any contingent spoils which are benefits that begin to accrue from an increase in economic activity resulting from the monopolization of violence and the higher level of security that comes with it when contingent spoils are small the government buys the opposition off and eliminates it as fast as is peacefully possible when contingent spoils are large the government tries to monopolize violence by defeating the opposition militarily jel codes d02 d74 h1 copyright 2013 oxford university press

bargaining in the shadow of war when is a peaceful resolution most likely this article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war should it take place i show that the aggressor s demand curve can be below the defender s offer curve that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war a simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

persistent fighting and shifting power three striking features about both interstate and civil war are 1 there are often periods of persistent fighting 2 fighting commonly ends in negotiated settlements as well as in militarily decisive outcomes and 3 fighting sometimes recurs this article links these features to shifts in the distribution of power and to the fact that one of the functions of fighting is to forestall adverse shifts the analysis centers on a simple model of state consolidation the equilibrium displays these features fighting occurs when the distribution of power is shifting rapidly the factions avoid fighting and cut deals when the distribution of power shifts slowly or is stable fighting resumes if the distribution of power again begins to shift rapidly the analysis also shows that state consolidation can occur without fighting if the process is sufficiently slow fighting now rather than later can also reduce the total cost of fighting

a model of spoils politics accounts of state failure in the developing world frequently highlight a logic of spoils politics in which a government and an opposing faction vie for control of the state and the accompanying spoils attempts to buy the opposition off play a key role in this logic and an informational problem often complicates these efforts because of limited transparancy the government generally has a better idea about the actual size of the spoils than the opposition does we formalize this aspect of spoils politics as a signaling game in which the government has private information about the size of the spoils and tries to co opt the opposition by offering a share of the spoils the opposition can accept the offer or reject it by fighting consistent with the strong empirical finding that the probability of civil war is higher when income is low the probability of breakdown increases as the size of the spoils decreases we also study the effects of uncertainty the opposition s military strength the cost of fighting and power sharing agreements on the probability of fighting

goliath s curse coercive threats and asymmetric power states typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries yet their threats often fail why expanding on a standard model of inter national crisis bargaining i argue that a theory of reputation building can help shed light on this puzzle the model casts reputation as a strategic problem showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors if challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands then even reputation conscious targets will acquiesce i argue however that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underesti mate their targets reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them in this way military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats the logic is illustrated by the 1939 russo finnish crisis and the argument s implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small